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[2]\104-10332-10009 | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
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[14]a a peense 1893 =~
[15]ama GAL REVIEW Rock 30 May 1978 4M 5 004 m8.
[17]eres LC oe
[19]COLLECTIONS:
[20]KELEASE my é ULL
[22]MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence 2000 j
[25]Executive’ Registry
[27]Fa
[29]VIA | : Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
[31]FROM . : S. D. Breckinridge
[32]. Principal Coordinator, HSCA
[33]; Office of Legislative Counsel
[35]SUBJECT : House Select Committee on Assassinations
[36]Request for Access to the "Hart Report"
[38]1. Action Requested: That you approve the recommendation at —
[39]paragraph 14 for limited access of selected House Select Committee
[40]on Assassinations (HSCA) staff members to a classified, sanitized |
[41]version of the Hart Report.
[43]2. Background: As you know, the HSCA Staff Director, Mr. Blakey,
[44]has requested you in a letter dated 9 May 1978 (Tab A), to provide access -
[45]to a report prepared by John Hart in 1977 on the subject of the Agency's
[46]handling of the Nosenko case. This request is part of an inquiry into
[47]hypotheses arising from Epstein's book Legend, in which the. view is
[48]presented that Nosenko was a dispatched agent with the mission of
[49]concealing KGB ties with Lee Harvey Oswald. Central to HSCA interest.
[50]is the question of Nosenko's bona fides. Additional to that issue, interest
[51]has developed in the manner in which Nosenko was treated during the period
[53]that his bona fides were suspect. These two issues are treated separately
[54]below.
[56]: oo, ; I
[58]i 3. The Hart report is directed at the handling of the Nosenko case,
[59]addressing the actions and conduct of various officers in the Agency. These
[60]matters cannot be treated without also considering the question of Nosenko's
[61]bona fides, so there also is considerable review of the methodology employed
[63]-and the analyses of those handling the matter. Mr. Blakey states in his
[65]. letter that he has been. informed that the report contains no information on
[67]; the issues of bona fides, being concerned instead only with personnel and
[69]internal procedures. This understanding on his part is incorrect, and
[70]his letter suggests that he himself has reservations about it.
[72]4
[75]SECRET
[78]13-00000
[80]4. The Agency has made available to the HSCA two studies conducted
[81]in 1967 and 1963 by SE Division, both of which questioned Nosenko's
[82]bona fides. A subsequent study by the Office of Security in 1968 has also
[83]been made available; it reached a conclusion contrary to the preceding
[84]studies and supports Nosenko's bona fides. Other Soviet defectors have been
[85]interviewed by the HSCA staff, as well as knowledgeable CIA officers and
[86]retirees. As a result, much of the information on the ease has been
[87]revealed to the Committee.
[89]5. The two SE Division studies, concluding that Nosenko was a KGB
[90]agent, were superceded by the Office of Security study, which prevailed.
[91]The HSCA investigators reportedly have problems with how the earlier two
[92]studies could be rejected so shortly after their completion. As a result,
[93]the HSCA seems focused on the issues as viewed at that time. The Hart
[94]report has the advantage of having been prepared after a ten year period,
[95]during which experience with the validity of Nosenko's information provides
[96]the basis for an objective re-examination. Itis relevant to HSCA interests
[97]that the Hart Report constitutes a convincing statement of the bona fides
[98]of Nosenko. Access to this portion of the Hart Report would help broaden
[100]_and complete the understanding of the HSCA of the matter. .
[102]6. Because of the above, the Agency has everything to gain and nothing
[103]to lose in providing the Hart Report for its review of the issue of Nosenko's
[104]bona fides.
[106]I
[108]7. In addition to the central issue of Nosenko's bona fides, Chairman
[109]Stokes has expressed interest in the treatment accorded Nosenko during the
[110]period that his bona fides were in question. Nosenko reportedly has provided
[111]the HSCA with some detail on this. . We have made the point that how
[112]Nosenko was treated was a result of the issue, not a part of it. When we
[113]questioned the relevance of this line of inquiry to the HSCA charter,
[115]HSCA staff representatives assert that their charter extends to the conduct ©
[116]of the intelligence agencies in the Warren Commission inquiry which
[117]includes this- The rationale appears a bit contrived and stretched in terms
[118]of the real issues. How Nosenko was treated may indicate how concerned
[120]‘CIA was with the man's bona fides, but so far as relating further to the
[122]inquiry concerning President Kennedy's assassination, it seems marginal at
[123]best. The rationale is so far-fetched that we have been led to Consider that its
[124]dramatic qualities are attractive for the projected TV spectacular this
[126]coming September. It also doubtless provides an opportunity for public
[127]criticism for those staff members who have been. acknowledged by Mr.
[129]Blakey as hostile to the Agency.
[131]CEROCT |
[133]13-00000
[135]8. If the rationale of the HSCA for pursuing the question of
[136]Nosenko's treatment is contrived, and largely peripheral to the real
[137]purpose of the Committee, as we believe it to be, it should be faced
[138]in those terms. No one would disagree with there being relevant
[139]inquiries, but it is hardly proper to take an internal critique and turn.
[140]it against the Agency on a point irrelevant, to the central purpose of the
[141]inquiry. The HSCA staff position is tendentious, and reflects on its
[142]face a hostile attitude that the Committee may not otherwise want to be
[143]so obvious. The Committee has the right to determine what is relevant
[144]to its charter, but the Agency should also assert.a similar right to: defend
[145]itself from truly peripheral and hostile fishing expeditions.
[147]9. Therefore, while we believe that the Hart Report should be made
[148]available to the HSCA staff, we do not believe that such action should be
[149]taken prior to attempting to limit the use made of information contained
[150]in the Report not related to the issue of Nosenko's bona fides.
[152]it
[153]10. There are aspects of the Hart Report that contain information on
[155]foreign liaison services that should not be exposed to the HSCA. There is,
[156]therefore, a question of some sanitization to be conducted prior to the
[158]; Report's being made available.
[160]ll. A version of the Report has been prepared for the FBI in which the
[161]names of employees below the DCI have been removed, as well as certain
[162]modifications in more dramatic rhetorical phrases. That version is in
[163]other respects faithful to the original Report. It provides. a-working basis
[164]for further sanitization. Sanitization prior to review is not foreign to the
[165]HSCA, as the Directorate of Operations has had a continuing policy of
[166]selected sanitization. Extending this practice to the Hart Report would .
[167]be consistent with the extant working relationship with HSCA. The Report
[168]will remain classified. ; :
[170]12. If the paper is made available, classified and sanitized, it should be
[172]on a highly restricted basis; the HSCA wants six named persons to have
[173]access toit, whichis at least three times the number needed for bona fide
[174]researcn purposes.
[176]13. Staff Position: This paper favors making a sanitized version of the
[177]paper, in classified form, available to a limited number of the HSCA staff
[178]representatives at the CIA Headquarters Building at Langley. Any such
[179]release should be preceded by appropriate discussions limiting use of the
[180]material by the Committee. The General Counsel is of the opinion (Tab B)
[182]oo
[184]Ve aeiors
[185]wake:
[189]13-00000
[191]“SEO
[193]riat if the paper is withheld, anda court test results, the Agency
[195]sjust expect to fail in withholding the paper. The Office of the General
[196]‘counsel, the Office of Security, SE Division and CI Staff favor making the
[197]paper available under the conditions set forth above.
[199]14. Recommendation: That you approve granting access to a limited
[200]number of staff members of the HSCA to a classified, sanitized version of
[201]the Hart Report. Such access shall bé conditioned on agreement to limit
[202]ase of materials contained in the Report to those matters relating to the
[203]sjuestion of Nosenko's bona fides.
[205]S.D. Breckinridge
[207]Attachments
[208]CONCURRENCE: . .
[209]Slcuep . . 31 MAY 1978
[210]~ General. Counsel : : ; ) Date
[211]- Chief, SE Division . Date
[212]~ Chief, CI Staff Date
[213]1 JUN 1978
[214]- Director’ ot Sef oe Date
[215]78/ Prank tO, Gary ant ¢
[216]APPROVAL: .
[217](ke , Director of Central Intelligence . Date
[218]mi ; ; .
[219]pISAPPROVA
[220]Director of Central Intelligence et Date
[222]pe
[225]7
[226]sh}
[228]13-00000
[230]SUBJECT: House. Select Committee. on Assassinatiozs
[231]Request for Access to the "Hart Repert™.
[233]Distribution:
[235]Orig - Adse
[236]1 - DDCI
[237]1 - ER
[238]1 - OGC
[239]1 - C/SE Div .
[240]1 - C/CI Staff
[241]1- - SA/DO/O
[242]1 - D/OS
[243]1 - OLC/Subj
[244]1 - OLC/Chrono
[246]OLC/SDB/ksn (30 May 78)
[248]13-00000
[250], Ol, aa
[251]a yg ey payee
[252]OLA WLECTIONS
[253]11 March 1993
[254],
[255]NOTE FOR: irector for Operations
[256]FROM: eter Earnest
[258]“ Chief, Media Relations
[259]SUBJECT: WASHINGTON POST Request to Talk to an Agency
[260]; Specialist on the Kennedy Assassination
[262]The WASHINGTON POST is preparing a series of articles on L
[263]the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the Kennedy .
[264]assassination.
[266]With the help of CIC, we recently arranged for George
[267]Lardner and Walter Pincus of the WASHINGTON POST to interview a
[268]former KGB officer Yuri Nosenko about his knowledge of Lee i
[269]Harvey Oswald during the time Oswald lived in the Soviet
[270]Union. To ensure that Nosenko's resettlement identity and
[271]location would remain protected, I made the arrangements for .
[272]Nosenko to come to Washington for the interview.
[274]The POST reimbursed Nosenko for expenses and paid him a
[275]$250 consulting fee. The interview was done on Wednesday,
[276]3 March, at the POST offices downtown. I did not remain for
[277]it. Lardner and Pincus also hosted a lunch for Nosenko which
[278]was attended by Ben Bradlee. Lardner and Pincus were very
[279]pleased with their session with Nosenko and appreciative of
[280]our making it possible. I also spoke afterwards with Nosenko
[281]who said he was satisfied with how the interview was ;
[282]conducted and with the financial arrangements.
[284]Shortly after the interview, Lardner faxéd me a list of
[285]the questions that he and Pincus had prepared for themselves .
[286]to use in checking out: Nosenko's information. They asked if
[287]there was anyone at the Agency they could talk to about the
[288]individuals named. I told them that developing information
[289]in response to:-their questions would probably take a good
[290]deal of research arid that I doubted the Agency would be able
[291]to take on such a task at this time for the POST. However, I
[292]said I-would take it up with the appropriate offices.
[294]Although I told the POST that I do not believe anyone
[295]would be willing to undertake research on their questions,
[296]I'm wondering if there is anyone around who might be
[297]knowledgeable of Nosenko's information who would be willing
[298]to talk with Lardner and Pincus on background based on
[299]his/her existing knowledge. I think Lardner and Pincus would
[300]be grateful for making such a person available even if
[303]13-00000_
[305]SUBJECT: WASHINGTON POST Request
[307]all their questions aren't answered. Considering that they
[308]are trying to do serious research on the Kennedy
[309]assassination, I think any effort on our part to help them
[310]would be seen as a gesture of good will.
[312]A
[314]: a > |
[316]Peted Earnest
[318]Attachment:
[319]As stated
[321]Agree to having a specialist talk to them on background
[322]about the Nosenko information if an appropriate person is
[323]available.
[325]No, do not want anyone from the DO talking about the
[326]Nosenko information.
[328]13-00000
[330]SUBJECT: WASHINGTON POST Request to Talk to an Agency
[331]specialist in the Kennedy Assassination
[333]DCI/PAI/Earnest :ncbx37758 (11 March 1993)
[334]Distribution:
[336]Original Addressee ~
[337]ADDO
[339]SA/DDO
[341]'DO Registry
[342]D/PAI
[344]D/DO/CIC
[345]C/DO/NROC
[346]C/DO/CE
[350]C/History Staff
[352]PRERPPBPP PPP
[354]13-00000
[356]Names of Russians we should try to track down about Lee Harvey Oswald, Yuri Nosenko and the
[357]JFK assassination:
[359]1. oO M. Gribanoy, head of the Second Chief Directorate of the KGB in the early 1960s
[360]where Nosenko says he worked, primarily against American tourists, as deputy chief of the Seventh
[361]eee a eae ee nent he tala Gabeave ia,
[362]structed bim, after the JFK assassination, to retrieve the Oswald file from the Minsk KGB right
[364]away.
[365]2. iy Koralenko, deputy chief of the Second Chief Directorate or one of its departments, at
[366]pecs Nosenko said when the file arrived from Minski, he and Koralenko were
[367]the allimportant first volume’and finding KGB had nothing to do with Orwald-when a
[368]RGB oficar from tha Fiat Denarbment came in and picked it up on Grianov's orders, to review i
[369]and write a summary of
[370]3 The cticer wht cicked it up was Col: Ma tveey, deputy chief{I think) of First(or American) De-
[371]partment, Second Chief Directorate. Unhave first name.
[372]4. Chief of this First Department was Col. Sergei M. Fedoseyev or Fedoseey and presumably he
[373]would have had a hand in or supervised preparation of the preva or summary.
[374]5. Gribanov and more than 40 other KGB officers were k ed ott because of Nosenko's defection,
[375]scconiing to Nosenko. That right? Whar hay,
[376]| Rastrusin, Fe 1950 0 ecnied one oficer ia KGB responsible for Intourist mat-
[377]says that it was Rastrusin who told him about Oswald and how he wanted to stay in
[378]Soviet Union. 'Nosenko said Rastrusin said Oswald “doesn't present interest” to KGB and Nosenko
[379]checked out with his superiors. Word came back not to bother with Oswald. Nosenko was told to tell
[380]Rastrusin to tell Intourist to deal with him.
[382]neat day and said we got a roblem. Oswald tried to kill self, ete. KGB
[384]returned
[385]washed bands of he decided to let Intourist deal him. Intourist then part of Ministry of For-
[386]eign Trade. Nosenko said be believes question of what to do with Oswald was run to top of that min-
[388]istry and beyond, to Khruschev or one of his deputies. In any case, decision was made to let Oswald
[390]stay in Minsk. But Newenyo$ arate
[391]8. In the fall of 1963, a Service No. 2(counterintelligence in foreign
[393]countries), First Chief Directorate, told Nosenko orally that Menon City station had just sent a cable.
[395]about a request by Oswald for a visa to re-enter Soviet Union. What should be done?
[397]Nosenko said be said, ‘wait a second. How come he’s back in America?’ At that point, Nosenko said |
[399]he hadn’t know Oswald had gone back.
[400]. 9. Novenko said he sald lets go to chef of department who he identified 28 a Col. Chelnekow or
[401]Chetnenko(but later seemed to say his timing might be off and somebody else may of
[402]Noeenko’a department at the time). Tn any cate, Nosenko quoted chief assaying, in effect, T remem
[403]ber this crary nut. No. No. No. Tell them we don’t have any interest.’
[405]Cable back to Mexico City advising KGB there get rid of Oswald by telling him to go back to his
[406]own country and apply for 3 visa at Soviet Embassy in Washington, etc. etc.
[408]Col. Grusdey, was chief of the KGB department in Minsk that was responsible for foreigners
[410]then
[411]11, - Olea Nechioorenko, one of three KGB officers stationed in Mexico City who reportedly inter-
[412]rogated or dealt on his visit to Embassy there. Now living in Moscow area.
[414]Other two Mexico City officers, both still alive in Russia: V: tikov and Pavel Yatzkov.
[417]13-00000
[419]3 March 1994
[421]Memo’ to: C/HRG
[422]Subject: Mangold Litigation a
[424]Today I alerted OGC (Theresa Wilcox/E eye)
[425]the JFK collections contains a significant number of
[426]documents on Nosenko (5-6000 pages) which may impact on the~
[427]Mangold litigation. As I understand it, the Mangold
[428]Litigation is over the Angelton files and is several years
[429]old. According to JFK reviewers at the FBI, documents on
[430]Nosenko's defection and treatment are part of case. I
[431]talked with Theresa Wilcox who is the para-legal handling
[432]the litigation, however, she was not familiar. with the” :
[433]documents involved. She will consult with «By the. lawyer
[434]on the case, and get back to me. =
[436]I consider the ball in OGC's court. I propose that we
[437]continue to review the Nosenko files. If there are Mangold
[438]or other consideration to address, we can do so after the
[439]HRG review is complete.
[441]Barry
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[445]13-00000
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[484]13-00000
[486]a
[488]INTERNAL USE ONLY
[489]23 March 1994
[491]Memorandum For: C/HRG
[492]Subject: Nosenko and the Mangold Litigation
[494]I received a call from (Kathy Kelly, oGC, this morning
[495]concerning the Nosenko files in the JFK files. I described
[496]the files again (about 4000+ pages that include transcripts
[497]of all his interrogations and numerous studies on his bona
[498]fides and treatment by the Agency including the Solie and
[499]Hart reports and an 835 page comprehensive study). Since
[500]Nosenko is an important figure in the JFK assassination
[501]story and the files are part of the sequestered collection,
[502]HRG is reviewing the files under the JFK Assassination
[503]Records Collections Act. However, we were aware that some
[504]of the documents were part of the Mangold litigation and
[505]wanted to make sure that they were properly coordinated.
[507]®athy Kelly)said that the Mangold litigation should not be a
[509]factor in HRG's review. If the files were subject to the
[510]JFK Records Act, they should be processed under that Act.
[511]When the review is: complete, a list of the documents
[512]released should be provide so that OGC can treat them the
[513]same in the Mangold case.
[515]I also talked with Kathy Stricker (yesterday) to get some
[516]background on the handling of Nosenko files and what were
[517]the "secrets" given what we know is publicly available. She
[518]said for years the agency "glomared" Nosenko except for the
[519]Oswald information: however, once Golitsyn became public
[520]that ended. Today, the battle over his bona fides and how
[521]he was treated are public knowledge. The Agency up until a
[522]couple years ago had not released some of the studies (she
[523]mention Solie) but she was not sure that this was still the
[524]case or if it was possible to continue to deny them. DO has
[525]protected the information provided by Nosenko on other
[526]Soviet sources and leads. for possible recruitment. This
[527]type of information should continue to be protected.
[529]Kathy Stricker's comments are consistent with HRG's handling
[530]of the Nosenko files. We are considering all of the files
[531]as related; his bona fides is a key element of the story and
[532]there was a large amount of information including parts of
[533]the studies on him in both the Oswald 201 and the JFK hard
[534]copy collection. We have deleted information provided on
[535]other sources and operations not related to the JFK story.
[536]‘We are also recommending release of the rest of the studies.
[537]Although they contain potentially embarrassing information
[538]for the Agency (as did the IG report on the Castro plots),
[539]there doesn't appear to be grounds for denying under the JFK
[540]Act. . .
[542]13-00000
[546]-
[548]SECRET
[549]CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
[551]Restrictions on Declassifying Material on Yuriy Ivanovich
[552]NOSENKO
[554]The following should be used as guidelines in
[555]declassifying material files pertaining to the career and
[556]"bona fides" of Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO
[558]1. CIA Knowledge of Russian intelligence tradecraft.
[559]Specific information in the files about KGB targetting of
[560]American citizens could reveal to the Russian Intelligence
[561]service our knowledge of their tradecraft. Since the
[562]Russian services continue to target Americans, this
[563]information should continue to be protected.
[565]2. To protect a CIA asset. Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO
[566]remains an asset of this agency, and is under contract.
[567]Moreover, the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVRR)
[568]remains interested in NOSENKO's whereabouts and activities.
[569]Russian intelligence services since the Second World War
[570]have tried to track their defectors. There are indications
[571]that the Russian services remain interested in the NOSENKO
[572]case.
[574]o At the time of his arrest,(Rick Ames had some }
[575](HOSENKO files (AESAWDUST) jin his possession. The US
[576]“@ounterintel igencé Cémmunity is unsure if this
[578]material was passed €o the Russian service,)
[580]--Following NOSENKO's brother and mother's visit to the
[581]United States, both were questionned by the Russian
[582]service about NOSENKO's activity and place and
[583]residence.
[585]Leca\ pos beam
[587]ea.
[589]SECRET
[590]CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
[592]13-00000
[593]. . P.374
[595]eraion, Vineuia Cernion, Virginia 22071
[597]Dear Bob,
[598]It was very good to meet with you again in Washington on June 12.
[599]I am writing to confirm our recent convereation about the CIA's release
[600]of documents about me to the National Archives. is i explained to you at .
[601]cur meeting, I am very. displeased that this was done without my knowled-
[602]@e and especially eince ny photograph was officially releaeed by the
[603]Agency fcr the first time in thirty years.
[605]Y
[606]As you know, it hes come to my attention that the CIA released these
[607]meny hundreds of pages to the public without consulting me or telling
[608]ne that this was going to be done. I have already seen copies of two of
[609]these reports totalling more than 7CO pages. One is the October 1968
[610]‘report sunporting me by Bruce Solie; the other was a February 1968 re-
[611]port by the CI Steff which attacked my credibility. (This latter report
[612]contains a cory of my photo from the late 19608. I consider thie a breach
[613]of my personal security.)
[614]I also consider many of the details in both of these reports to be of a
[615]very personal nature. Other pages deal with with some very sensitive
[616]cages’ which I gave the Agency about other people. The information in
[617]these reports was given freely and accurately by me to the CIA officers
[618]in the 1960s under terms of strict confidentiality. Although it is very
[619]difficult for me to say this, I feel that my trust in the Agency has now
[620]been seriously dameged.
[621]This releese particularly troubles me because for: the past thirty years
[622]I have renaineé very loyal to the Agency and considerate ef its wishes. .
[623]For instance, despite many requests, I have only, apoken to a few jouré
[624]nalists, and only when the Agency advised me +o, I have never sought
[629]P.4/4
[631]1
[633]age 2
[635]. CB my own to publish my story in an article or took. But now, the OIA
[636]has not returned this courtesy. Insteed, 4t has released sensitive
[637]information to the public without speaking to me first.
[639]Under the circumstances, I would like to respectfully request the
[642]1. That you show this letter to DDO Ted Price, Directer James Woolsey,
[644]and the current heads of the CIA's Freedom of Information Office and
[645]Historical Review steff ~- so thet they ere aware cf what has happened. |
[647]2. I would like te receive, in writing, an explanation frem these res—
[648]ponsible.ef whr this release was done,
[650]3. I weuld like te receive a list ef the majer reperta absut me which
[651]have already been released. Aside from the twe reperte thet I already
[652]have seen, I would like te receive copies cf any ether major studies
[654]that have been released. (For instance, if there are reperts released
[655]by Peter Bagley, Newton Miler, James Angleton, the CI Staff end John
[657]Hart, then I would like to see them as well.)
[659]4. I would like te be given the Agency's written assurance that further
[660]releases will not ocour witheut consulting me first.
[662]Bab, you should know that before I wrete this letter I have speken
[663]‘abeut this matter with my geed friend George Kalaris. He tes was troub-
[664]led by what I teld him, and he advised me that I sheuld ask the &gency
[665]for an explanation. :
[667]Beb, I apolegize fer troubling you with this matter, but I have neo one
[668]else to turn te fer assistance.
[670]Please let me knew if there is any respense as seen as possible.
[672]Respectfully yeurs,
[675]13-00000
[677]avert”
[679]SEP 16 794 @9:5@AM -
[681]Draft letter to Nosenko from FRE PDO: ae
[683]Dear .-
[685]eG
[687]The Director has asked me to respond to your letter
[688]expressing concern that US Government declassification of
[689]material could compromise your privacy and security.
[691]In regard to your question about the documents that have
[692]already been released, rest assured that I have directed
[693]officers responsible for FOIA requests to take special care
[694]in reviewing information concerning you in light of your
[695]-special circumstances. We will make full use of all
[697]*" possible vaxceptions to FOIA-mandated declassification in
[699]order to protect your privacy.
[703]As you know, in 1992 Congress passed the JFK Assassination.
[704]Records Collection Act, which required all US Government
[705]agencies to release any records related to théVassassinatio
[706]of President Kennedy. As Deputy Director for Operations, I
[707]am of course committed to fully supporting the DCI in
[708]meeting this requirement, but I also appreciate your concern
[709]about the files. on you that are related to the >
[710]assassination. I have therefore directed a senior officer
[711]n the DO to meet with the officials in the Agency's |
[712]1-stets who are involved in the declassification
[713]This officer has had extensive discussions with
[716]7a of fe e.
[718]program.
[720]_tgnbers' of the *Gtany and has worked closely with them to
[722]dentify those portions of the files that include personal
[724]2°" | and operational information.
[726]AOE Ste: ra) See te preter? ae
[727]As a result of this effort, we have ostponed~release~of ~any]
[729]Seat rte information touching on your private life or on operational
[731]information pertaining to your debriefings. Under the JFK
[732]law, a Presidential Review Board will make the‘ final
[734]- decision on the disposition of the material. This Agency
[736]values the sacrifices you have made for our country, and we
[737]will present the Board with the strongest possible case for
[738]protecting information that could affect your privacy and
[739]security.
[741]Best wishes,
[743]7 Meena
[744]Soe aes
[747]13-00000
[750]. ‘ UNCLASSIFIED
[751]17 April 1997
[752]ne ~ .
[753]_ Sue Amianoy SA/CIC, gave to Gary Brenneman to give to Barry
[754]Harrelson, Historical Review Group, X31825,
[755]entitled:
[757]2 soft files
[758]1. "WARREN COMMISSION/OSWALD"
[759]2. "DOCUMENTS YURI Ivanovich NOSENKO/OSWALD"
[761]found by (Al Bonner) in the vault.
[763](7 - APE) - 7 ?-
[765]UNCLASSIFIED
[767]13-00000
[769]30 April 1997
[771]Note To: ARRB Staff
[773]Subject: CIC Soft files:
[774]1. Warren Commission/Oswald .
[775]2. Documents Yuri Ivanovich NOSENKO/Oswald
[777]The attached files were located in CIC. They are soft
[778](or working) files containing information on Nosenko, Warren
[779]Commission and Oswald. It is not clear if the files date,
[780]from the Warren Commission period, or were created in
[781]1975/76 (latest. date of documents) in response to a request
[782]or investigation.
[784]Most of the documents are in the sequestered collection
[785](OGC folders). The other documents may be in the Norsenko
[786]material put aside for discussion with the ARRB or in the
[787]Microfilm part of the sequestered material (the Microfilm is
[788]not indexed document by document) .
[791]13-09000 ,
[794]Administrative - HRG Internal Use Only
[796]30 April 1997
[798]Note for the Record
[799]Subject: CIC Oswald/Nosenko' related soft files:
[801]1. Warren Commission/Oswald
[802]2. Documents Yuri Ivanovich NOSENKO/Oswald
[804]1. I advised Sue Amiand, SA/CIC, that most of the
[805]documents in the two folders: are duplicates of documents in
[806]the CIA JFK Collection sequestered by the HSCA. The other
[807]documents are related to Nosenko, but do not mention Oswald.
[809]‘These decuments are probably); duplicated in the Nosenko
[811]material set aside for discussion with the ARRB. I
[812]recommended that we make the folders available to the ARRB
[813]staff. She concurred.
[815]2. Documents will be made available to. Michelle Combs,
[816]ARRB staff, on her next visit.
[818]1
[820]Barry
[822]Administrative - HRG Internal Use Only
[824]13-00000
[826]o 7 SECRET Qe
[828]TO: (Eileen M. Wukitch
[829]FROM: { James W. Zirkle
[830]DATE: 08/01/97 09:54:03
[831]SUBJECT: #%j)Re: The Nosenko Papers
[833]CL BY:(2034442
[835]CL REASON: 1.5(c)
[836]DECL ON: X1
[838]DRV FROM: HUM 4-82
[840]Eileen: Let me introduce myself. | am CiC/Legal. C/CIC asked me to touch base with you
[841]concerning any possible ARRB release of privacy information concerning Nosenko. While we are
[842]aware that such a decision to release is within the Board's discretion, we do believe that the
[843]Agency, when giving this information over to them, should request that the Board protect such
[844]information to the maximum extent possible. {f | can be of help in that regard just let me know.
[845]Jim
[847]From the Desk of Dennis_D. Lamb \
[849]NOTE FOR: Ron L. Seckinger
[850]FROM: Dennis D. Lamb
[851]DATE: 07/31/97 10:44:28
[852]SUBJECT: The Nosenko Papers
[854]cx By: (6790423
[855]CL REASON: 17.5{c)
[856]DECL ON: X71
[858]DRV FROM: HUM 4-82
[860]At about 1020 hrs on Tuesday, 31 July, | received a call from@ileen Wukitch\of the Agency's
[861]External Support Group/Historical Collection Staff regarding Michelle Combs's interest in reviewing
[862]the Nosenko papers for the upcoming meeting of the Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB/
[863]on 5 August. CWukitch sai Combs, an ARRB staffer, is planning on taking 20 pages of the Nosenko
[864]material with her. Wukitch wants to know whether we would like copies of the material Combs is
[865]taking. | said yes. ‘ukitch said Combs appears understanding of our concerns in this case and to
[866]this end wanted the following questions answered so she could put a human touch on our concerns
[867]in explaining our position to the ARRB.
[869]7. ts Nosenko married? (No ane in CIC/AG knows.)
[871]2. What part of the country is he living in? {This is known, but I can't see why she or the
[872]ARRB needs to know.) yt
[874]3. Did the Soviets actually sentence Nosenko to death? Or was this just his claim. (No one
[875]in CIC/AG know, but it appears reasonable to assume that the Soviets did sentence him to death.)
[877]4, Nosenko's current age? (No one in CIC/AG knows off hand. Henry's observation was
[878]that Combs can find this out from open literature.)
[880]SECRET
[882]13-00000
[886]According to\Wukitch} Combs also wants to take to the ARRB two letters pertaining to the affair:
[887]the letter Nosenko wrote in 1994 objecting to the release of his material without his being consulted
[888]or advised, and the letter Ted Price wrote to him in response assuring him that everything possible
[889]would be done to prevent further release of his papers. | don't see any problem with this since the
[890]papers would support our position--unless the ARRB starts thinking about releasing the fetters also.
[892]( Wukitchsaid she told Combs CIC would have(Bob Pringle; former Chief of AG/FIOB currently
[893]serving as Officer in Residence at the University of Kentucky, flown in to address the ARRB if this
[894]appears necessary. Combs will pass this on to the ARRB. (Wukitch\noted that Combs alluded to
[895]the possibility that that ARRB might want to talk with Nosenko himself.
[897]y
[899]Cc:
[901]ce: lane B. ENGBERTWancy T. BRUNQNE, Edgar C. BAUML{Bennis D. Lamb) Curtis L. )
[904]MACKIAI cqueline Frankfor DCI<Ron L. Seckingen
[906]SECRET
[908]13-00000
[910]MEMORANDUM
[912]_ August 5, 1997 | _ CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
[913]. DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR,
[914]To: T. Jeremy Gunn RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
[915]From: Michelle Combs
[916]Subject: Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko
[918]Ihave prepared this memorandum at your request for the upcoming meeting where the
[919]Board will be briefed on issues related to the Soviet defector, Yuriy Nosenko.
[921]Summary and Recommendation
[923]The information on Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko contained in the CIA Sequestered
[924]Collection microfilm consists of approximately 3500 pages of interviews, transcripts,
[925]memos, and reports. Of the total, approximately 1200 have been released to the public
[926]as open in full or with only minor redactions. Of the 1200 released pages, roughly 800
[927]contain information directly relevant to Lee Harvey Oswald and the Kennedy
[928]assassination.
[930]After my review of the Nosenko records and our discussion of the issues, it is our
[931]judgment that the remaining 2300 pages are unrelated to the assassination of President
[932]Kennedy and we recommend that they be processed as “NBR.” These NBR records
[933]consist of such items as general family and professional contact information, Soviet
[934].intelligence methodology and operations, and Soviet navy information dating to
[935]Nosenko’s early career in Soviet Naval Intelligence. I suggest that we review carefully
[936]these 2300 records to ensure that there is no assassination-related material, and, to the
[937]extent this is correct, we should process them as “NBRs.”
[939]Background on Nosenko
[941]KGB Lieutenant Colonel Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko first secretly contacted the CIA in _
[942]Geneva in June 1962. One and a half years later on February 4, 1964, he defected to the
[943]_ United States for what he said were ideological reasons. His.case became the single
[944]most difficult counterintelligence case in the Agency’s history to date. Nosenko’s
[945]information on the assassination of President Kennedy made his bona fides of more
[946]importance than simply a means to determine his true identity or whether he was the
[947]prototype of a KGB disinformation plot against Western intelligence agencies.
[949]The conflict over Nosenko began two and a half years prior to his actual defection, in
[951]13-00000
[953]2
[955]December 1961, when Anatoliy Golitsyn, a KGB defector, predicted that the KGB would
[956]dispatch false defectors after him to discredit him and confuse Western intelligence
[957]agencies as part of a massive disinformation campaign. Golitsyn, who had described a
[958]darkly intentioned monolithic Russian master deception plan and Soviet intelligence
[959]agencies of brutal efficiency, claimed that Nosenko was the most important of these
[960]fake defectors and that any Soviet sources who came later and supported Nosenko’s
[961]bona fides would also be false. Golitsyn was wholly believed by Counterintelligence
[962]Chief James Angleton, who shared Golitsyn’s world view. Golitsyn argued that any
[963]CIA officers who believed Nosenko should be considered as moles themselves.
[965]Nosenko’s first four meetings with the CIA in Geneva in June 1962 produced an
[967]- intelligence bonanza and the two CIA officers (George Kisevalter and Peter Bagley)
[969]who.met with him believed he had conclusively proved his bona fides. During his
[970]debriefings in 1964, Nosenko provided detailed information about Lee Harvey
[971]Oswald’s stay in the USSR which, he said, had come across his desk routinely as the
[972]deputy chief of the Second Chief Directorate (SCD) department responsible for
[973]watching American visitors in the USSR.
[975]With Golitsyn arguing against Nosenko’s bona fides, plans were made in March 1964,
[976]to imprison Nosenko and begin hostile interrogations to find any shifts in his
[977]information. On April 2, Deputy Director for Plans Richard Helms and Soviet Division
[978]Chief David Murphy met with the Deputy U.S. Attorney General and obtained legal
[979]approval from the Justice Department to imprison Nosenko so that he could not
[980]communicate with his supposed KGB controllers. On April 4, he was imprisoned in an
[981]attic room in a CIA safe house near Washington. Nosenko was kept in solitary.
[982]confinement, subjected to physical and mental torture, and submitted to hostile
[983]interrogations from April 4, 1964 to October 27, 1967 first at the safe house and then ina
[984]specially built cement house in Virginia. Despite over three-years of severe treatment,
[985]Nosenko’s original story remained unchanged, no “confession” was forthcoming, and
[986]no evidence was produced indicating he was, as Golitsyn still claimed, a fake defector.
[988]On August 8, 1968, Nosenko was polygraphed for the third time by an Office of
[990]Security specialist. During the examination, Nosenko was asked whether he had told
[991]the truth about Oswald and the Kennedy assassination; the polygraph operator found
[992]only positive responses to the questions. Security Officer Bruce Solie submitted a
[993]comprehensive report in October 1968 which evaluated all of Nosenko’s information, to
[994]date, and concluded that he was what and who he ‘had claimed to be all along. After a
[995]review of his case by the Soviet Division, Nosenko was finally released from CIA
[996]custody on March 1, 1969 and employed as an independent consultant by the CIA.
[998]File 4.0.2 Nosenko
[999]Combs e:\nosenko.wpd
[1001]13-00000
[1003]a
[1005]In the 35 years since Nosenko first approached the CIA in Geneva, no prima facie
[1006]evidence has ever emerged to prove that he was a KGB provocation and subsequent
[1008]_ defectors have affirmed him as a bona fide defector. He has identified many hundreds. :
[1009]of Soviet intelligence officers, provided a considerable quantity of useful information on
[1010]the organization, doctrine and methods of the KGB, and conducted numerous special
[1012]~ studies on Soviet subjects. Today, Nosenko is seventy years old, recently retired as a
[1013]contractor from the CIA, an American citizen, married, and living quietly in the
[1014]Sunbelt.
[1016]File 4.0.2 Nosenko
[1017]Combs e:\nosenko.wpd
[1019]13-00000
[1021]6 October 1997
[1023]Note To: DO
[1025]From: Barry Harrelson
[1026]JFK Project Officer
[1027]Historical Review Group
[1029]Subject: Nosenko records in JFK Collection
[1031]The ARRB (JFK Board) staff has agreed to accept CIA's
[1032]designation of 25 folders of the Nosenko material in the JFK
[1033]sequestered collection as “not believed to be relevant”
[1034](NBR). The staff plans to present their proposal to the JFK
[1035]Board at the 14 October meeting. The Board requires a
[1036]description of all NBRs to be made available to the public.
[1037]Please review the attached draft prepared by ARRB staff
[1038]member, Michelle Combs, for classification and public
[1039]release. The ARRB staff needs a response by COB Thursday if
[1040]possible. HRG/DO JFK reviewers here have no problem with
[1041]the draft and recommend release. If you have any questions,
[1042]call me on 31825. Thanks.
[1044]Barry
[1046]Per ple cal\ Ges Denes Lal 5 Ock q ry
[1047]\- 0 + ew (Gaver Wes nwo pre blu wt
[1048]aNheclrod dascr-p ho ot Nesunko
[1050]Qles, Ba—
[1053]13-00000
[1055]Folder Summaries of the Nosenko Material Not Believed to be Relevant to the JFK
[1056]Assassination
[1058]Reel 45, Folder 3
[1060]During July and August 1965, Peter Deryabin, a Soviet defector, conducted a series of
[1061]interrogations of Nosenko in conjunction with CIA efforts to establish Nosenko’s bona
[1062]fides. This folder contains one 66 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions
[1063]which cover Nosenko’s family, background, early career and Komsomol experiences. —
[1065]Reel 45, Folder 4
[1067]This folder contains a 76 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by Peter
[1068]Deryabin which cover Nosenko’s career, Party membership, Komsomol personalities and
[1069]procedures, military personalities and experiences, and his incarceration by CIA.
[1071]Reel 45, Folder 5
[1073]This folder contains a 59 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by Peter
[1074]Deryabin which cover Nosenko’s military career, KGB buildings, personalities and
[1075]procedures, and other Soviet intelligence people, roles, and titles.
[1077]Reel 45, Folder 6
[1079]All the documents in this folder, but one, have been released to the public. The NBR
[1080]document is a five page February 1964 memo from the Director of the Soviet Division
[1082]'(C/SR) David Murphy to the Deputy Director of Plans (DD/P) Richard Helms on plans
[1084]to debrief Nosenko based on C/SR’s belief that Nosenko is a Soviet plant.
[1086]Folder 8A contains the 263 page “Conclusions and Comments in the Case of Yuriy
[1087]Ivanovich Nosenko” 1 October 1968 report by Bruce Solie, Deputy Chief of the Security
[1088]Research Staff which concludes that Nosenko is a bona fide defector and should be
[1089]believed. A sanitized version of the Solie report has been released to the public. The
[1090]NBR document in folder 8B is a 135 page report on Nosenko prepared in April 1969 by
[1091]N. Scott Miler of the Counterintelligence Staff (DC/CI/SIG) based on the comments and
[1092]questions of Anatoliy Golitsyn. The report contains Golitsyn’s comments on
[1093]inconstancies he believes exist in Nosenko’s testimony and his recormmendations for
[1094]further questioning. Golitsyn believed Nosenko was a dispatched agent.
[1096]13-00000
[1098]Reel 45, Folder 13
[1100]This folder contains one document. The document is a ten page extract from the 835
[1101]page study “The Case of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko” by Peter Bagley. It records Peter
[1102]Deryabin’s conclusions on Nosenko’s bona fides. Deryabin does not believe Nosenko.
[1104]1 45, Folder
[1106]This folder contains an 89 page verbatim transcript-of an interrogation session by Peter
[1107]Deryabin which covers Nosenko’s career as a KGB officer, his marriage, and KGB
[1108]buildings, personalities, and procedures. A two page key to abbreviations in the
[1109]transcript is also included.
[1111]Reel 45, Folder 19
[1112]This folder contains pages 349-602, part IV of the 835 page study “The Case of Yuriy
[1113]Ivanovich Nosenko” prepared by Peter Bagley of the Soviet Division (DC/SB) in 1967.
[1115]intelligence officer. The conclusion of the report is that Nosenko i is adispatched agent
[1116]under the control of the KGB. ;
[1118]Reel 45, Folder 20
[1119]This folder contains an 89 page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by Peter
[1121]Deryabin which covers Nosenko’s career as a KGB officer, and KGB buildings,
[1122]personalities, and procedures. ,
[1124]Reel 45, Folder 21
[1125]This folder contains an 85 page verbatim transcript of ani interrogation session by Peter
[1127]Deryabin which covers Nosenko’s experiences in and knowledge of Komosol and
[1128]Communist Party: personalities, buildings, and procedures.. I
[1130]Reel 45, Folder 24
[1132]This folder contains pages 1-84, parts I, II, III, and IV, of the 835 page study “The Case
[1133]of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko” prepared by Peter Bagley of the Soviet Division (DC/SB)
[1134]in 1967.
[1136]Reel 45, Folder 25
[1138]This folder contains pages 85-348, part V of the 835 page study “The Case of Yuriy
[1139]Ivanovich Nosenko” prepared by Peter Bagley of the Soviet Division (DC/SB) in 1967.
[1141]13-00000
[1143]This folder contains pages 603-835, parts VII, VIII, and IX of the 835 page study “The
[1144]Case of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko” prepared by Peter Bagley of the Soviet Division
[1146]~ (DC/SB) in 1967.
[1148]Reel 46, Folder 2B
[1150]This folder contains a variety of documents, some of which have been released to the
[1151]public. The NBR documents include: 14 reports of interrogations sessions with Peter
[1152]Deryabin in July and August 1965, an unsigned May 1965. memo for Chief, SR/CI on the
[1153]3-13 May interrogation sessions with a psychologist, an unsigned May 1965 paper
[1154]analyzing, Noseniko’s sessions with the psychologist which refutes the reported
[1155]conclusions of the psychologist, and a November 1968 Memorandum of Transmittal to
[1156]Chief, SB/CI/K on the 15 Deryabin-Nosenko July-August 1965 transcripts.
[1158]Reel 46, Folder 3
[1160]This folder contains most of the 186 page report by John Hart commissioned by the CIA
[1161]in June 1976. Chapter X, pages 159-176 inclusive are missing. The report is a
[1162]reinvestigation of the Nosenko case in the context of reviewing the techniques of
[1163]handling Soviet agents and defectors. It is highly critical of the Clandestine Services’
[1164]handling of the Nosenko case. The Hart report endorses the conclusions reached in
[1165]October 1968 by the Office of Security (the Solie Report) that Nosenko is a bona fide
[1166]defector.
[1168]Reel 46, Folder 5
[1170]This folders contains documents pertaining principally to personalities in the Minsk area
[1171]during Lee Harvey Oswald’s residence there. Some documents have been released to the
[1172]public. The two NBR documents include: a nine page 1964 “homework assignment”
[1173]prepared by Nosenko on KGB leadership in the provinces, and a four page memorandum
[1174]on KGB personalities in the Minsk area in the mid 1970’s.
[1176]Reel 62, Folder 2
[1178]This folder contains an 82 page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by Peter
[1179]Deryabin which covers Nosenko’s background, marriage, and divorce.
[1181]Reel 62, Folder 3
[1182]This folder contains a 75 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by Peter
[1184]Deryabin which detail Nosenko’s career progress, and a disciplinary problem and its
[1185]impact on his promotion schedule in the KGB.
[1187]13-00000
[1189]. This folder contains two verbatim transcripts (33 and 46 pages) of interrogation sessions
[1191]by Peter Deryabin which cover specific KGB operations and.a particular KGB operation
[1192]targeted against an American tourist.
[1194]Reel 62, Folder 6
[1196]This folder contains one 22 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by
[1197]Peter Deryabin which cover a particular KGB operation targeted a against an American
[1198]tourist.
[1200]~ Reel 62, Folder 7
[1202]This folder contains one 84 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by
[1203]Peter Deryabin which cover Nosenko’s education, Navy career, and a particular KGB
[1204]operation targeted against an American tourist.
[1206]Reel 62, Folder 8
[1208]This folder contains an eight page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by Peter
[1209]Deryabin in which Deryabin encourages Nosenko to confess that he was sent under KGB
[1210]control and to think about becoming a double agent. Nosenko says that he has been
[1211]telling Deryabin the truth all along.
[1213]1 older
[1215]This folder contains 51 pages of 12 Deryabin reports on his interrogation sessions with
[1216]Nosenko in July and August 1965. The information in these reports summarizes
[1217]information detailed in the actual interrogation transcripts.
[1219]Reel 62, Folder 10
[1221]This folder contains a mix of intra and inter-Agency memoranda pertaining to the
[1222]handling of Nosenko and is. labeled “TS Material from Deryabin Safe.” This folder was
[1223]not examined by the HSCA staff. Thirty-seven pages of documents have been released
[1224]to the public. The 97 pages of NBR documents include: correspondence with various US
[1225]Government agencies and the Attorney General, memoranda on Nosenko’s day to day
[1226]handling, emergency procedures for Office of Security guards assigned to Nosenko, a
[1227]report to the CIA Inspector General on the Nosenko case, Nosenko’s request for political
[1228]asylum, copies of his subsequent contracts with the CIA as an independent contractor,
[1229]and additional reports, memos, and briefings concerning the Nosenko case and his
[1230]handling.
[1232]13-00000
[1234]10/09/87 1HU Lo:UU FAA zuz 1z4 U457 AKKD “giuua
[1236]MEMORANDUM
[1237]HAS NO OBJECTION TO
[1238]DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
[1239]October 9, 1997 0 RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
[1240]To: Jeremy Gunn
[1241]Executive Director
[1243]Deputy Director
[1244]. From: Michelle Combs We
[1245]Subject: Files on Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko in the CIA Sequestered Collection
[1247]Microfilm Containing Information of No Believed Relevance to the
[1248]Assassination of President John F. Kennedy
[1250]The information on Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko contained in the CIA Sequestered
[1251]Collection microfilm consists of approximately 3600 pages of interviews, transcripts,
[1252]memos, and reports. Of the total, approximately 1200 pages have been released to the
[1253]public as open in full or with redactions. Of the 1200 released pages, roughly 800
[1254]contain information directly relevant to Lee Harvey Oswald and the assassination of
[1255]President John F. Kennedy. Although all of these 800 pages have been released in
[1256]redacted form, we have asked the Agency to re-review them under the standards of the
[1257]JFK Act before we submit them to the Board.
[1259]After my review of the Nosenko records and our discussion of the issues, it is my
[1260]judgment that the remaining approximately 2400 pages are unrelated to the
[1261]assassination of President Kennedy and should be processed as “NBR.” These NBR
[1262]records, which are described on the attached list, consist of such items as general family.
[1263]and professional contact information, Soviet intelligence methodology, personalities,
[1264]and specific operations, and Soviet Navy information.dating to Nosenko’s early career
[1265]in Soviet Naval Intelligence. Much of the information consists of various attempts by
[1266]the Agency in the 1960's to establish Nosenko’s bona fides. The October 1968 Solie
[1267]Report, which has been released in redacted form and will be re-reviewed under the
[1268]JFK Act, establishes Nosenko’s bona fides. The conclusions of the Solie report were
[1269]reaffirmed in a 1976 report by John Hart. A brief summary of the conclusions of the _
[1270]Hart Report will also be processed for release.
[1272]The approximately 2400 pages of proposed Nosenko NBR records have been reviewed
[1273]carefully to confirm that they contain no material helpful to a deeper understanding of
[1274]the assassination. During the review some additional material, not previously released,
[1275]which may add to an understanding of the Nosenko story, was marked relevant and.
[1276]identified for processing and review.
[1278]13-00000
[1280]ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY
[1282]a .
[1284]16 October 1997
[1286]MEMORANDUM FOR: Fredrick C. Wickham @ DO
[1288]DO JFK Board Focal Point
[1289]FROM: J. Barry Harrelson
[1291]JFK Project Officer
[1292]OFFICE: CSI/HRG
[1293]SUBJECT: Agenda for ARRB meeting 17 November 1997
[1294]REFERENCE:
[1296]The following issues are tentatively scheduled for action at the next JFK Board meeting:
[1297]1. Date of release of Nosenko material; see memo on results of Oct. meeting.
[1299]If you or CIC have any comments on the proposal to change the release date (subject of Agency review and appeal) from 2017 to 2010,
[1300]please provide them to me by 23 October.
[1302]2. State cover,
[1304]This issue originally surfaced in April and was scheduled but not addressed at the September meeting.. | recommend that you review the
[1305]material we sent the ARRB staff for the September meeting to determine if you want to provide additional "evidence". Are there other
[1307]components that should be consulted on this issue? (Sue Burggraty as involved in discussions in April.
[1309]3. DRE Monthly Reports. This is along standing request from the Board staff. Please provide a status of the request by October 21.
[1311]cc: John Pereira @ DCI
[1312]Eileen Wukitch/@ DO
[1314]Sent on 16 October 1997 at 04:57:17 PM
[1316]ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY
[1318]13-00000
[1320]FAY Ree! “Tet Ay ae he Nosenxo
[1322]28 October 19937
[1324]SUBJECT: Disclosure of Information on Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko
[1328]1. The Board intends to decfassity and release for public
[1329]consumption, approximately 2400’pages of counterintelligence
[1330]staff studies, interrogation reports, file reviews, and bona
[1331]fides studies on Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko. These studies contain
[1332]sensitive personal and operational material completely unrelated
[1333]and irrelevant to Lee Harvey Oswald and the assassination of
[1334]President Kennedy. It has been officially stated and documented
[1335]that the remaining Nosenko records have been carefully reviewed
[1336]to confirm that they contain no material helpful to a deeper
[1337]understanding of the assassination. Mr. Nosenko has adhered time
[1338]and time again to the stipulations of his Memorandum of
[1339]Understanding not to divulge his relationship with this Agency,
[1340]even in view of the less than satisfactory conditions this Agency
[1341]forced upon him during his early resettlement. Public disclosure
[1342]of the remaining documents would constitute an unwarranted.
[1343]invasion of his personal and professional privacy not to mention
[1344]the breech of trust on the part of this Agency to protect his
[1345]right of privacy and above all, his security. This trust was
[1346]reconfirmed in a personal letter from the former DDO, Ted Price, ©
[1347]in September 1994, stating that we would take special steps to
[1348]protect any sensitive information touching on Mr. Nosenko’s
[1349]private life or on operational information pertaining to his
[1350]debriefings. The letter further states that this Agency valued
[1351]the sacrifices he made for our country, and every effort would he
[1352]made to protect information that could affect. his privacy and
[1353]security. The question has been asked before. Should we not’
[1354]show the same integrity that we expect from those who put their
[1356]' lives on the line in defense of our national interests?
[1358]2. Furthermore, the recruitment of sources of high
[1359]intelligence value has always been this Agency’s top priority.
[1360]Public disclosure of this information could do irreparable damage
[1361]to our ability to attract individuals who admire the US and might
[1362]be disposed to collaboration. Disclosure of cooperation with the
[1363]USG would cause any potential source to think twice before
[1364]placing his life in the hands of an organization who cannot
[1365]protect his information. For those individuals such as Mr.
[1366]Nosenko, who placed their trust in this country in the past,
[1367]entered our resettlement program, and are now US citizens, the
[1368]indiscriminate release of information, some of it very personal
[1371]REASON 1,5(c)
[1372]DECL Xl
[1374]DRV DEF 2-82
[1376]13-00000
[1378].
[1380]om. sty EM
[1382]enrol
[1383]SECRET
[1385]SUBJECT: |
[1387]and with no real relevance to any national issue, seriously
[1389]erodes this Agency’s credibility. and undermines our Resettlement
[1390]Program.
[1392]2
[1394]SEGRER
[1396]13-00000
[1398]oo SECRET
[1399]CL BY: 611637
[1400]CL BEASOE: Section 1.5 C
[1401]‘Dect om: XT
[1402]pav Fem: LOC 5-82
[1403]5 November 1997
[1404]MEMORANDUM FOR: John Pereira @ DCI
[1405]; Fred Wickham @ DO
[1406]Lee Strickland @ DA
[1407]‘Kathryn Dyer @ DCI
[1409]FROM: ; J. Barry Harrelson
[1410]JFK Project Officer
[1411]OFFICE: , CSHHRG
[1412]SUBJECT: | 17 November JFK Board Meeting- CIA issues (update)
[1414]REFERENCE:
[1415]1. The following CIA items are on the agenda for the 17 November ARRB meeting:
[1416]e 6s) Reconsideration of the release of¥arrenton, Wa. as the location of the CIA Record Center.
[1418]In addition to written evidence being prepared by DA, the:Agency has been. offered the opportunity to brief the Board.
[1420]© = Chairman Tunheim's proposal to advance the opening date of the Nosenko NBR {f jot Believed Relevant) material fram the 2017 per
[1422]the JFK.Act to the year 2010.
[1424]The ARRB staff disagrees with.the Board on this issua and will recommend that the release date remain 2017. However, they are not
[1425]confident that the Board will accept their recommendation and has requested the Agency's position on the 2010 date. If the Agency
[1426]opposes the 2010 change in the date, | will need a memo from the DO explaining why. We could offer a compromise--accept the 2010
[1427]date provided the Agency has the same right in 2010 as: 2017 to review and appeal the'release of the records. | have ask OGC for a legal
[1428]‘opinion. Please note that this decision affects only those documents designated "NBR" by ARRB. The documents declared to be
[1429]Assassination Records (AR) will be're-reviewed and released, either sanitized or in full, during the‘coming year.
[1431]e ‘s) Proposed release of reference to CIA employee being under ¢i .
[1433]We have provided written evidence (DO note coordinated évith Stattand copyof MOA between CIA and Staté]
[1434]staff, some Board members consider CIA use of state cover ps an “open secret" arid are inclined to release.
[1435]opportunity to brief the Board. . ;
[1437]. According to the ARRB
[1438]Ve have been offered the
[1440]. SECRET
[1442]oe ; SECRET
[1444]e = Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) financial records.
[1446]ARRB staff plans to recommend to the Board that monthly summaries be considered ARs and the remaining material be designated NBR.
[1448]Samples of these documents have been provided to DA, DO, and DCI/IRO. if you have ariy comments or objections, please forward them
[1449]to me by COB Wednesday. .
[1451]e@ Documents containing long lists of names, crypts, companies, etc. These include both Agency documents and notes of HSCA
[1452]staffers. (FYI - no action required at this time)
[1454]The ARRB staff will ask the Board to delay processing of such documents and, in some cases, declare them NBR. The staff considers
[1455]them marginal to the story and believes that they are not worth the time involved.
[1457]TS) 2. We need to advise the ARRB staff no later than COB 12 November (Wednesday), if we plan to brief the Board on Waprentomn,
[1458]and/or State Cave Written evidence is due to ARRB staff by COB 13 November (Thursday). They need at least one day to review the
[1459]material and prepare their presentations fer the Beard.
[1461]ce: CFileen Wukitchy@ DO
[1463]Becky Rant @ DA
[1465]SECRET
[1467]SECRET
[1469]CL BY: 611637
[1471]€1 BEASON: Section 1.5 6
[1472]Dect om X1
[1474]onv Fem: COV 2-87
[1476]21 November 1997
[1478]MEMORANDUM FOR: John Pereira @ DCI
[1479]Fredrick C. Wickham @ DO
[1480]Lee Strickland @ DA
[1482]CGinda Cipriank@ DCI
[1484]FROM: J. Barry Harrelson
[1485]JFK Project Officer
[1486]OFFICE: CSI/HRG
[1487]SUBJECT: ARRB meeting 17 November - Results
[1488]REFERENCE:
[1490]1. Reconsideration of the release of CIA Records Center:
[1491]The Board accepted the Agency's request for reconsideration; postponed until 2017.
[1492]2. ClA use of State Cover:
[1493]The Board did not find the Agency's evidence persuasive; released.
[1494]This determination affects 16 documents ( 3 duplicates) that were pending Board action. Future documents will be impacted by this
[1495]decision. Copies of the documents have been sent to DO and OGC for reconsiderationfappeal review.
[1496]3. Release date of Nosenko NBR.cecords:’
[1497]The Board moved the release date from 2017 to 2010 giving the Agency the right to review and appeal! at that time.
[1498]4. Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) Financial Records:
[1499]The Board accepted the ARRB staff's recommendation (concurred in by CIA) that only "General Statement for Month" records
[1500]for January 1960 and to January 1995 be processed as Assassination Records, and that the approximately 6,000 remaining pages of
[1501]financial records be declared to have "no believed relevance (NBR)" to the JFK assassination.
[1503]5. Ramparts Damage Assessment Document:
[1505]The Board accepted the ARRB staff's recommendation (concurred in by CIA) that the paragraphs on the one relevant
[1507]SECRET
[1509]13-00000
[1511]SECRET
[1513]organization be ard¥essed as a assassination record, and that the remainder of the CIA Ramparts Memorandum be declared NBR. The
[1514]memorandum discusses the truth or fallacy of the allegations in Ramparts the Agency used non-governmental organizations for support
[1515]and funding of worldwide anti-Communist operations. Over one hundred organizations are mentioned in the Ramparts article. The
[1516]relevant organization is thei{fitérnational| Rescue Commuttes; the {RC aided Oswald on his return to the US.
[1518]6. Book Cables Dissemination Lists: a
[1519]The Board accepted the Agency's request that book cable dissemination list be protected in full even if they contain Stations
[1520]that are releasable. a
[1522]7. Document # 104-10072-10232 :
[1524]The Board rejected the Agency's request to protect the full crypt (SREUCK), The document has been sent to the DO for
[1525]reconsideration{appeal review. ~ .
[1527]8. Other Documents:
[1528]The Board accepted the Agency's and ARRB staff's recommendations on 204 additional documents. , 5
[1529]Reconsideration and Appeals:
[1531]If the Agency wishes to ask the Board to reconsider a decision or plans to appeal to the President, the ARRB staff has
[1532]requested that it be notified prior to the letter to the Agency informing the DCI of the Board's decision. We expect the letter on or around
[1533]Dec. 1st; the Board's determinations will also be published in the Federal Register an that date. As mandated by the White House, the
[1534]Agency has seven days after notification to appeal a JFK Board decision to the President.
[1536]ce: “ leet Wiikitely @ DO
[1537]Kathryn-Dyer @ OCI
[1538]- Becky Dyer @ DA
[1540]Sent on 21 November 1997 at 05:04:45 PM
[1542]SECRET
[1544]13-00000
[1546]roe
[1548]7
[1550]FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
[1552]NOTE FOR: J. Barry Harrelson
[1554]FROM: Fredrick C. Wickham @ DO
[1555]OFFICE:
[1557]DATE: 10/10/97 12:10:24 PM
[1558]SUBJECT: Nosenko Records
[1560]| have reviewed the descriptions of the folders proposed by the ARRB Staff. While | see this as a success to have them support our
[1561]position and have some concern about the detail included within the descriptions. We had an occasion in the past to ask for a legal
[1562]opinion about a former employee's access rights to Nosenko's file and were told he is entitled protection under the Privacy Act. Nosenko
[1563]has already personally expressed (in a letter to the Agency) his concern and objection about potential release of information about him. |
[1564]think we should carefully consider the amount of detail included in the public release and whether it violates his rights under the Privacy
[1565]Act.
[1567]| trust the judgment of those that have reviewed these descriptions as to content in relationship to other released material and
[1568]classification but | just want to raise a mild concern about the detail contained in the descriptions of folder content. | will not object to
[1569]the these if everyone feels compelled to accept them to protect the success we have achieved as long as they are determined to not be in
[1570]violation of his privacy rights.
[1572]In future efforts to protect NBR information, | would like to see fess detail in the description if at all possible.
[1574]ce: Gilgen M. Wukitg>@ DO,‘Lee E. Carle'¥- @ DO
[1575]Sent on 10 October 1997 at 12:10:24 PM ~ “~~
[1577]FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
[1579]13-00000
[1581]Classification of Material Transmitted
[1583]HISTORICAL REVIEW GROUP
[1584]CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF INTELLIGENCE
[1585]Phone # 703-613-1806
[1587]PLEASE DELIVER IMMEDIATELY
[1589]3 EE 3 2 EE EE 3 2 2 EE EE AE IE EE EE EE EE 2 9 EE SE SE 9 a IE EE 6 I I HE EEK HE EE I .
[1591]CLASSIFIED FAX
[1593]SUBJECT: Voto, he
[1595]FROM: |). ba Ng path
[1597]SENDING FAX NO. 703-613-201,0
[1599]DELIVER TO: 5 KALE ht
[1601]RECEIVING FAXNO. SY3- £3 YE
[1603]DATE TRANSMITTED: whe PAGES TRANSMITTED: We
[1604](including cover sheet)
[1605]a0 .
[1606]TRANSMITTED BY: ) / wy
[1607]1
[1609]3 EME A HH HE EEE EE EEE EE EE EE IE IE IE IE HEE HE EE EE MEE HE HE EE HE EEE EE EEE OE
[1611]MESSAGE:
[1613]Classification of Material Transmitted
[1616]13-00000,/o9/97 THU 15:00 FAX 202 724 0457 AtUCs : ; _ wove
[1618]~MEMORANDUM
[1620]October 9, 1997
[1622]To: Jeremy Gunn
[1623]Executive Director
[1625]ce: Tom Samoluk
[1626]Deputy Director
[1628]From: _ Michelle Combs PO
[1630]Subject: Files on Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko in the CIA Sequestered Collection
[1631]Microfilm Containing Information of No Believed Relevance to the
[1632]Assassination of President John F. Kennedy
[1634]The information on Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko contained in the CIA Sequestered
[1635]Collection microfilm consists of approximately 3600 pages of interviews, transcripts,
[1637]memos, and reports. Of the total, approximately 1200 pages have been released to the
[1638]public as open in full or with redactions. Of the 1200 released pages, roughly 800
[1639]contain information directly relevant to Lee Harvey Oswald and the assassination of
[1640]President John F. Kennedy. Although all of these 800 pages have been released. in
[1641]redacted form, we have asked the Agency to re-review them under the standards of the —
[1642]JFK Act before we submit them to the Board. :
[1644]After my review of the Nosenko records and our discussion of the issues, it is my’
[1645]judgment that the remaining approximately 2400 pages are unrelated to the
[1646]assassination of President Kennedy and should be processed as "NBR." These NBR.
[1647]records, which are described on the attached list, consist of such items as general family
[1648]and professional contact information, Soviet intelligence methodology, personalities,
[1649]and specific operations, and Soviet Navy information dating to Nosenko’s early career
[1650]in Soviet Naval Intelligence. Much of the information consists of various attempts by
[1651]the Agency in the 1960's to establish Nosenko’s bona fides. The October 1968 Solie
[1652]Report, which has been released in redacted form and will be re-reviewed under the -
[1653]JFK Act, establishes Nosenko’s bona fides. The conclusions of the Solie report were
[1654]reaffirmed in a 1976 report by John Hart. A brief summary of the conclusions of the.
[1655]Hart Report will also be processed for release.
[1657]The approximately 2400 pages of proposed Nosenko NBR records have been reviewed |
[1658]carefully to confirm that they contain no material helpful to a deeper understanding of
[1659]the assassination. During the review some additional material, not previously released,
[1660]which may add to an understanding of the Nosenko story, was marked relevant and
[1661]identified for processing and review.
[1663]13-0000, 08/97 1HU 15:0U FAA zuz 124 U4aar AKU wy uve
[1665]NER Folder Summaries
[1667]Each folder also contains an HSCA signature sheet. At least one member of the HSCA.
[1668]reviewed all but the last of the folders listed below.
[1670]Reel 45, Folder 3
[1672]‘During July and August 1965, Peter Deryabin, a Soviet defector, conducted a series of
[1673]interrogations of Nosenko in conjunction with CIA efforts to establish Nosenko’s bona
[1674]fides. This folder contains one 66 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation
[1675]sessions which cover Nosenko’s family, background, early career, and Komsomol
[1676]experiences.
[1678]Reel 45, Folder 4
[1680]This folder contains a 76 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by
[1681]Peter Deryabin which cover Nosenko’s career, Party membership, Komsomol
[1682]personalities and procedures, military personalities and procedures, and his (then
[1684]- current) incarceration by the CIA. :
[1686]Reel 45, Folder 5
[1688]This folder contains one 59 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by
[1689]Peter Deryabin which cover Nosenko’s military career, KGB buildings, personalities
[1690]and procedures, and other Soviet intelligence people, roles, and titles.
[1692]Reel 45, Folder 6
[1694]‘ All the documents in this folder, but one, have been released to the public. The NBR
[1695]document is a five page February 1964 memo from the Director of the Soviet Division
[1696](C/SR) David Murphy to the Deputy Director for Plans (DD/P) Richard Helms on
[1697]plans to debrief Nosenko based on C/SR’s belief that Nosenko is a Soviet plant.
[1699]Reel 45, Folder 8B
[1701]. This folder contains a 135 page report on Nosenko prepared in April 1969 by N. Scott
[1702]Miler of the Counterintelligence Staff (DC /CI/SIG) based on the comments and
[1703]questions of Anatoliy Golitsyn. The report contains Golitsyn’s comments on
[1704]inconsistencies he believes exist in Nosenko’s testimony and his recommendations for
[1705]further questioning. Golitsyn believed Nosenko was a dispatched agent.
[1707]13-00000
[1709]10/08/97 THU 15:01 FAX 202 724 0457 ARRB
[1711]BS
[1713]Reel 45, Folder 13
[1715]This folder contains one document. The document is a ten page extract from the 835
[1716]page study "The Case of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko” written by Peter Bagley of the
[1717]Soviet Branch (DC/SB) in 1967. The document records Peter Deryabin’s conclusions on
[1718]Nosenko’s bona fides. Deryabin does not believe Nosenko.
[1720]Reel 45, Folder 17
[1722]This folder contains an 89 page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by Peter
[1723]Deryabin which covers Nosenko’s career as a KGB officer, his marriage, and KGB
[1725]buildings, personalities, and procedures. A two page key to the abbreviations in the
[1727]transcript is also included in this folder.
[1729]Reel 45, Folder 19
[1731]This folder contains pages 349-602, part IV, of the 835 page study "The Case of Yuriy
[1732]Ivanovich Nosenko” prepared by Peter Bagley in 1967. The study analyzes Nosenko’s
[1733]biography, case work, and responsibilities as a Soviet intelligence officer. The
[1734]conclusion of the report is that Nosenko is a dispatched agent under the control of the
[1736]_ KGB.
[1738]Reel 45, Folder 20
[1740]This folder contains an 89 page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by Peter
[1741]Deryabin which covers Nosenko’s career as a KGB officer and KGB buildings,
[1742]personalities, and procedures.
[1744]Reel 45, Folder 21
[1746]This folder contains an 85 page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by Peter
[1747]Deryabin which covers Nosenko’s experiences in and knowledge of Komsomol and
[1749]Communist Party personalities, buildings, and procedures.
[1751]Reel 45, Folder 24
[1753]- This folder contains pages 1-84, parts I, I, II, and TV, of the 835 page study "The Case
[1755]of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko” prepared by Peter Bagley.
[1757]i) VUG
[1759]13-0000f, 709/97 THU 15:01 FAX 202 724 0457 ARRB wvur
[1761]Reel 45, Folder 25 .
[1763]This folder contains pages 85-348, part V, of the 835 page study "The Case of Yury
[1764]Ivanovich Nosenko" prepared by Peter Bagley.
[1766]Reel 46, Folder 2A
[1768]This folder contains pages 603-835, parts VII, VIII, and IX of the 835 page study "The
[1769]Case of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko" prepared by Peter Bagley.
[1771]Re ‘0. 2B
[1773]This folder contains a variety of documents, some of which have already been released
[1774]to the public. The NBR documents include: 14 reports of interrogation sessions with
[1775]Peter Deryabin in July and August 1965; an unsigned May 1965 memo for Chief SR/CI
[1776]on the 3-13 May interrogation sessions with a psychologist, an unsigned May 1965 ;
[1777]paper analyzing Nosenko’s sessions with the psychologist which refutes the reported
[1778]conclusions of the psychologist, and a November 1968 Memorandum of Transmittal to
[1779]SB/CI/K on the 15 Deryabin-Nosenko July-August 1965 transcripts.
[1781]Reel 46, Folder 3
[1783]This folder contains most of the 186 page report by John Hart commissioned by the
[1784]CIA in June.1976. Chapter X, pages 159-176 inclusive are missing. The report is a
[1785]reinvestigation of the Nosenko case in the context of reviewing the techniques of
[1786]handling Soviet agents and defectors. It is highly critical of the handling of the
[1787]Nosenko case by the Clandestine Service. The Hart Report endorses the conclusions
[1788]reached in October 1968 byth the Office of Security (the Solie Report) ¢ that Nosenko is a
[1789]bona fide defector.
[1791]Reel 46, Folder
[1793]This folder contains documents pertaining principally to personalities in the Minsk area
[1794]during Lee Harvey Oswald’s residence there. Some documents in this folder have been
[1795]released to the public. The two NBR documents include: a nine page 1964 “homework —
[1796]assignment” prepared by Nosenko on KGB leadership in the provinces and a four page
[1797]memorandum on KGB personalities in the Minsk area in the mid 1970's.
[1799]Reel 62, Folder 2
[1801]This folder contains an 82 page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by Peter
[1802]Deryabin which covers Nosenko’s background, marriage, and divorce.
[1804]13-0000), 09/07 THU 15:01 FAX 202 724 0457 | AKKB
[1806]Reel 62, Folder 3
[1808]This folder contains a 74 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by Peter
[1809]Deryabin which detail Nosenko’s career progress and a disciplinary problem and its
[1810]resulting impact on his promotion schedule. _-
[1812]Reel 62, Folder 5
[1814]This folder contains two verbatim transcripts (33 and 46 pages) of interrogation sessions
[1815]by Peter Deryabin which cover specific KGB operations and a particular KGB operation
[1816]targeted against an American tourist. |
[1818]Reel 62, Folder 6
[1820]This folder contains one 22 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by
[1821]Perter Deryabin which cover a particular KGB operation targeted against an American
[1822]tourist.
[1826]Ree Fo
[1828]This folder contains one 84 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by
[1829]Peter Deryabin which cover Nosenko’s education, Navy career, and a particular KGB
[1830]operation targeted against an American tourist.
[1832]Reel 62, Folder 8
[1834]_ This folder contains an eight page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by
[1835]Peter Deryabin in which Deryabin encourages Nosenko to confess that he was sent
[1836]under KGB control and to think about becoming a double agent. Nosenko responds
[1837]that he has been telling Deryabin the truth all along.
[1839]Reel 62, Folder 9
[1841]The folder contains 51 pages of 12 Deryabin reports on his interrogation sessions with
[1842]Nosenko in July and August 1965. The information in these reports summarizes
[1843]information detailed in the actual interrogation transcripts.
[1845]Reel 62, Folder 10
[1847]This folder contains a mix of intra and inter-Agency memoranda pertaining to the
[1848]handling of Nosenko and is labeled “TS Material from Deryabin Safe.” This folder was
[1849]not examined by the HSCA staff. Thirty-seven pages of documents have been released
[1851]wWuUuue
[1853]13-00000
[1855]* 46/68/97 THU 15:02 FAX 202 724 0457 ARRB ig}008
[1857]to the public. The 97 pages of NBR documents include: correspondence with various
[1858]US Government agencies and the Attorney General, memoranda on Nosenko’s day to
[1859]day handling, emergency procedures for Office of Security guards assigned to Nosenko,
[1860]a report to the CIA Inspector General on the Nosenko case, Nosenko’s request for
[1861]political asylum, copies of his subsequent contracts with the CIA as an independent
[1862]contractor, and additional reports, memos, and briefings concerning the Nosenko case
[1863]and his handling.
[1865]Combs e:\nosenko4.wpd
[1866]File 4.20.5, 4.0.2, and 2.4
[1868]13-00000
[1870]: CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
[1871]DECLASSIF!C
[1872]September 22, 1998 ‘ RELEASE CG
[1874]IN THIS DOCU
[1876]' CRMATION
[1878]Tor _ ‘Laura Denk
[1879]_ “Executive Director
[1881]Bob Skwirot.
[1882]CIA Team Leader
[1884]we “Associate Director for Research and Review
[1885]Subjéct: 7 Working Files on Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko Containing Information Not
[1886]retell Believed Relevant to the Asiassination of President John F. Kennedy .
[1888]Previously, the Review Board voted to declare NBR approximately 2400 pages. of
[1889]_ material'on Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko contained in the CLA sequestered collection
[1890]microfilm urirelated to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.
[1892]‘The Review Board staff has since examined an additional two boxes of working files on
[1893]Noseriko pr duced as a result of the search for records related to'the Kennedy...
[1894]a ; material. either vay dedi or is the gah copy of tee sequestered
[1896]m, to be NBR. The files See ames sich
[1898]2 Board decare the contents ofthe to boxes of working les on
[1901]13-00000
[1903]SECRET
[1905]CI-277-94
[1906]31 August 1994
[1908]MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
[1910]SUBJECT: Discussions with Center for the Study of
[1911]Intelligence on the Release of Material Relating
[1913]to Yuriy Nosenko
[1915]ca
[1917]1. On 3 August I had a series of discussions with the
[1918]staff of, the Center for the Study of Intelligence (CST) at.
[1919]the Center's office in the Ames Building. Our discussion °
[1920]centered on the disposition of more than 3,200 pages
[1921]relating to the career of former KGB officer--and current
[1922]CIA independent contractor-~Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko. The
[1923]documents are being reviewed for declassification and
[1925]release as required by the JFK law.
[1927]2. The Declassification Problem: CSI's de-
[1928]classification staff has carefully reviewed the Nosenko
[1929]material. Ellie Neiman--a career Directorate of Operations
[1930]officer--is representing the DO in the review process.
[1932]Ms. Neiman noted that the material can be divided into two
[1934]parts:
[1935]Approximately 800 pages that deal with Nosenko's infor-
[1936]mation about Lee Harvey Oswald's life in the Soviet Union
[1937]and his relationship with the KGB. ;
[1939]A body of counterintelligence staff studies, inter-
[1940]rogation reports, file reviews, and bona fides studies on
[1941]Nosenko totaling some 2,400 pages. These studies contain
[1942]sensitive personal and operational material. For
[1944]example:
[1945]-~ Information on how CIA conducted operations in
[1947]Moscow ("sticks and bricks"), material on how
[1948]bona fides analysis is conducted, and details on
[1949]how we evaluated the KGB's operations.
[1951]CL BY SIGNER
[1952]DECL OADR \
[1953]‘DRV HUM 4-82:-
[1955]WARNING NOTICE
[1956],INTELLIGENCE SOURCES -
[1957]"OR METHODS INVOLVED
[1960]13-00000
[1962]w é SECRET
[1964]SUBJECT: Discussions with the Center for the Study of
[1965]Intelligence on the Release of Material Relating
[1966]to Yuriy Nosenko
[1968],
[1970]-- Extensive personal details on US citizens the KGB.
[1971]assessed and pitched (approximately 100 cases)
[1972]and on. Americans Moscow Station used as assets.
[1973]One US citizen the KGB developed is now a
[1974]senior professor of history in California.
[1975]3. Nosenko's Sensitivities: I discussed with
[1976]Ms. Neiman Nosenko's concern about the impact of the release
[1977]of information on his personal life. I informed hef.-of
[1978]Nosenko's recent letter to the DCI complaining about the |
[1979]release of material related to his association with CIA, and
[1980]of his concern that future releases would endanger his
[1981]privacy and security. The bona fides studies dwell in great
[1982]detail on Nosenko's personal life, - including his problems
[1983]-with venereal disease and his relationships with women.
[1984]Since the bona fides were based on detailed analyses of
[1985]Nosenko's life, their release would reveal modus operandi of
[1986]sensitive clandestine operations and further embarrass a man
[1987]who has served as a CIA employee for more than three
[1988]decades.
[1991]a
[1993]4. Following my discussions with Ms. Neiman, I met
[1994]with John Pereira, Acting Director of CSI, and Barry
[1995]Harrelson, a member of his staff. I recommended: that CIA
[1996]move to release the material dealing with Oswald, but--
[1997]citing the operational costs, embarrassment to prominent
[1998]American citizens, and threat to Nosenko's privacy~-strongly
[2000]suggested that the other material be held back. Mr. Pereira
[2002]agreed to take these points into consideration, noting that
[2003]the law did allow CIA to withhold certain information to
[2004]protect national security or for reasons of privacy. He
[2005]told me in closing that later this year .the Agency would
[2006]have to justify to the Congressionally-mandated review board
[2007]the reasons for withholding. I promised that I would raise
[2008]the issue with the Chief of the Counterintelligence Center
[2009]and said. I believed we could provide the justification.
[2011]Robert Pringle
[2013]13-00000
[2015]SUBJECT: Discussions with Center for the Study of
[2016]Intelligence on the Release of Material Relating
[2017]to Yuriy Nosenko 7
[2019]. ff : 2 Sept 744.
[2020]John Pereira (AD/CSI) Date
[2022]fs/ 25
[2023]Barry Harrelson’ (CSI) . Date
[2025]a.
[2027]Ellie Neimah 7 . Date
[2029]: . SECRET ee i
[2030]} f] 4
[2032]13-00000 |.
[2034]SECRET
[2036]SUBJECT: Discussions with Center for the Study of
[2037]Intelligence on the Release of Material Relating
[2038]to Yuriy Nosenko
[2040]DO/CIC/AG/FIOB/RPringle:ek/76246 (31 Aug 94).
[2042]Distribution:
[2043]Orig - John Pereira, Barry Harrelson, Ellie Neiman
[2045]for Concurrence and Return to CIC/AG .
[2046]AD/CSI-
[2047]CSI (Harrelson)
[2048]- Neiman
[2050]- CIC/AG Chrono
[2051]-CIC/AG Defector File
[2053]Hehe
[2054]it
[2056]po SECRET
[2058]13-00000
[2060]580 531
[2062]: of the factors I . _
[2063]‘ed if, and I will continas sider in conn, EXCERPTS OF DEPOSITION OF DAVID MURPHY BE
[2064]reuence, not opinion... Be pe It
[2066]; ‘ORE THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON. ASSAS-
[2067]INATIONS ON: AUGUST 9, 1978 so
[2068]deent him.to Miner, 0°74: When they oo
[2070]INTRODUCTION
[2071]Your knowledge of Nosenko, based on v,. ; : oe intelli fi h
[2072]‘d on your knowledge 5 on your kn, i ing heard from Nosenko and from an intelligence officer who
[2073]> credible when he save they nena and me aved him to be bona fide, the committee spoke to the CIA official
[2075]iad overall responsibility for the interrogation of Nosenko dur-
[2076]ho pe years 1964-67 > when. Nosenko was kept in solitary confine-
[2077]hin,
[2079]Among othe: che was.asked about the reason Nosenko
[2081]What is meant by interview, 5 AE
[2082]Ting to is a KGB officer speaking taupe
[2084]§ “a8: 8° KGB officer, b “placed ‘in solitary: confitiement, about why he questioned No-
[2085]i credibnwenko saya that never wake’s credibility, and ‘about: Nosenko’s charge that his statements
[2087]to the. Agency were inaccurate because he had been drugged by the
[2089]- best ledge, :
[2090]of his knowledge, T will have to—z s of that transcript follow.,
[2091]Ppen ” aaroRRPTS.OF DEPOSITION of DAVID Munpity Berors House SeLEor CoMMITTEE ON
[2092]the KGB didn't have a large bo co, ASSABSINATIONS ON AvGUST 99,1978 ~ :
[2093]er done to check out the ge book on ASS. /
[2095]feasibility of ita ; -Kuzin. When Nosenko defected in' 1964, when he came to the United States,
[2096]devo by Rane cxperlences of other defectors whe in the custody of the Central Intelligence Agency at that time?
[2097]7 KG : Cers? Was that ever done: "vr. Mozruy. I don’t. want té be cute’by saying I believe so. I am not exactly
[2098]L ntaryi ‘ So gure of the legal—_t mean what his legal status was. Insofar as physical facts,
[2099]vas in the custody of theIO::.
[2100]nr Kiem, What division or. unit of the Central Intelligence Agency had pri-
[2101]” mary responsibility for Nosenko? : /
[2103]. Some who were in Russia ‘in ap
[2105]2d, possitie. roximate pe : My, Munpsry. The Soviet Russian Division.
[2106]reriod ot Ge pecans pot would almost have ty ; Mr, Kz. Of which you were the Chief?
[2107]1e comparison. should be Witereational situation 3 Mr. Murray. Yes, sir. -
[2109]the approximate | . Mr. Kumn, And what yéar did you leave the Soviet Russia Division?
[2111]many He detector tac : . Mugriy. Beginning in'1968.
[2113]now He detector tests, to.yo : Mr Krzrn, And up until what year did the Soviet Russia Division have
[2114]snare nsibility for Nosenko?
[2118]test tone - comple’ valle test valid? ” Mr. Mounpny. I don’t recall the exact time but it was certainly up until the
[2120]: 3 th; f 1967.
[2121]se front war offles seusston concerning the | poly. Pie Kazim. ihe investigation by Bruce Solie began at the end of 1967. At that
[2122]ind I will only confine myeee not an operator, — time did the control or responsibility over Nosenko change from the Soviet
[2123]; nesti : Russia Division to another division? .
[2124]Oneonta sngormation into a ore iat Mr. ‘Munpar, My recollection is that it changed in the spring or early summer
[2125]aly to not be valid, to b a, is of 1967 and the responsibility was turned over to the Office of Security of which
[2127]ur knowledge?
[2129]€ completely iny: olie was a member. : .
[2131]Done taee Harvey Oswald wag a minor acpect Mr. Kiem. As Chief of the Soviet Russia Division, did you have the primary
[2133]8s responsibility for what happened to Nosenko? And when I say happened, where
[2134]ate: . he was kept, what he was asked?
[2135]art tobeemgrald aspect? ur. Moneiy, Twas responsible for the case.
[2136]‘it recei >. . KLEIN. aoe . :
[2137]Lee Ha ved the full consideration and the Mr. Mugpxy. Although the case was handled by one of the groups within the
[2138]us amount of frend ne eee Division.
[2142]tio.
[2143]en that Nogenko was not | pestred 7a 1864.
[2145]) Mr. Kuz. But they would réport to you?
[2146]arvey Oswald, would. that beet in his rela- . ce. dees
[2148]Mr. Murrry. Yes.
[2150]\8 bona fide? nt as to 8 * Tg * . * *
[2151]I would have to consider, Mr. Kixin. There came a time in 1964, Apri) 4, I believe, when the treatment
[2152]sible that he could be lying about Oswald and coments by Nosenko greatly changed in that hostile interrogations began, is that
[2153]€ was lying about Oswald. Mr. Muzpuy. I am not sure I agree with the formulation of the question.
[2154]Mr. Kien. Well, elaborate. . ,
[2155]. Ty ‘Mr. Munpxy. No; the previous pattern of voluntary discussion of issues under
[2156]he was lying about Oswala consideration changed and Nosenko was not permitted to evade questions or to
[2158]‘whether he was bona fide? do you think that decide when he would or would not wauit to respond.
[2160]Mr. Krzr. Could you describe for us what the pattern was before, as far as
[2161]conditions and how it was changed?
[2164]13-00000
[2166]532
[2168]Mr, MurrHy. Well, the pattern before was one of pretty much permitting.
[2169]Nosenko to call.the shots. In other words, we wanted his cooperation and we
[2170]wanted to discuss these things in a reasonable manner, but his preference was
[2171]not to sit still for a full day’s briefing, to want to go out socially all the time,
[2172]which made it difficult the next day to continue to work. And the most important
[2173]aspect, I think, of the change was the decision to confront him with inconsisten-
[2174]cies as opposed to taking what he said and passing it on.
[2176]Mr, Kie1n. What about the day-to-day living conditions, were they changed?
[2178]Mr. Murpuy. Well, he was not permitted to leave. He was not permitted to
[2179]depart.
[2181]Mr. Krern. Other than that, his day-to-day treatment, not the actual interroga-
[2183]_ tion sessions, but his food intake, his recreation, was that changed at that time?
[2185]Mr. Murpiy. I don’t think so, not.that early. I don’t’ emember that:
[2186]* * * 5 s s
[2188]Mr. Krew. Subsequent to April 4, is it correct that Nosenko + was interrogated —
[2189]by people from the Soviet Russia Division?
[2191](Mr, Mureny. That is right.
[2192]' Mr, Kizrn. And how were the particular subareas on which he was interrogated. :
[2193]chosen?
[2195]Mr. Murprry. I am not sure. I don’t know. Subject areas? This is a guess, this is |
[2196]a recollection, but I think the decision was made based on what the CIA people
[2197]thought offered the best opportunity to get an admission and to break on that.
[2198]In other words, I think it was based on points that they had collateral on. By |.
[2199]that I mean other information which said what this man is saying is not the truth -
[2201]or this man does not know about this and, therefore, let us hit him hard on this: -
[2203]And so it was a fully tactical, these were tactical considerations relating to pos-.
[2204]session of information in the "hands of the interrogators which then offered the
[2205]best opportunity to get through and get the truth.
[2207]\One breakthrough it was felt, as is normally the case, gives you other break-
[2208]throughs. The decision on what subjects to be interrogated was essentially a fac-
[2209]tor of the tactics of the debriefing.
[2211]Mr. Krern. Would it.be fair to say that after April 4 the subject areas were
[2212]determined by a desire to try to catch him, to break him, as opposed to a desire
[2213]to gain knowledge that would be of use to you in your role as an intelligence
[2214]agency? In other words, knowledge of the operation.
[2216]Mr. Murpuy. That is an accurate impression. The answer is yes because by
[2217]the end of April there was a view that the man was not telling the truth, that
[2218]parts of what he was saying were known to be untrue and that, therefore, ‘made
[2219]no sense, and although the reasons for his behavior and his "statements were
[2220]not clear, it made no sense then, it did not appear to make sense to accept as
[2221]valid any data he might provide ‘unless you could be sure that that data was in
[2222]fact correct, and there were so many doubts about this, leaving aside the moti-
[2223]vation for it, the contradictions or the way in which he presented it, that the
[2224]information was not considered acceptable.
[2228]0 Mr. Krein. Were you aware of the substance of what Nosenko had to say about
[2229]swe.
[2231]Mr. Murpuy. From the very first. I mean, when he first said it back in February
[2232]or March.
[2234]. Mr. Kuiern. Do you recall now the substance of it?
[2236]‘Mr: Murpny. No; not exactly, anything I said would be polluted by so much
[2237]back and forth. I know that the thrust of the message was that Oswald was
[2238]never of interest to the Soviet Intelligence Services, that he was never debriefed
[2239]by them, and I can guarantee that because I was personally involved in the
[2240]affair. There is more detail, but I can’t really pin it down.
[2242]Mr. Kiet. Did you accept this statement by Nosenko?
[2244]Mr. Murray. I did not. I did not believe that it would be possible for the
[2245]Soviet Intelligence Services to have remained indifferent to the arrival in 1959
[2246]in Moscow of a former Marine radar operator who had served at what was an
[2247]active U-2 operational base. I found that to be strange. It was only later, I think,
[2248]that as the Nosenko case and its other ramifications began to emerge that it
[2249]sbenied to me that the Oswald story became even more unusual.
[2251]I think I mentioned the other day it seems to me almost to have been tacked on
[2252]or to have been added as though it didn’t seem to be part of the real body of
[2255]13-00000
[2257]532
[2259]xefore was one of pretty much
[2261]words, we wanted ‘his cooperation and’ we
[2262]reasonable manner, but his preference wag
[2263]ng, to.want to go out socially all the tim
[2265]$ Sontinue to work. And the most important
[2267]2 decision to conf: is]
[2269]a ad Da oon ront him with inconsisten-
[2270]ay conditions, were they
[2272]Tmitted to leave. He was not permiten to
[2274]’-to-day treatment, not the actual
[2276]recreation, was that changed at ta noes
[2278]that early. I don’t remember that.”...<.. *
[2279]e . * 6: eo
[2281]is it correct z
[2283]is At cox that Nosenko was interroga
[2285]ular subareas on which he was interrogated .
[2287]kuow. Subject areas? This is
[2288]? a guess,
[2289]ne was made based on what the CIA pests
[2290]get an. admission. and to break on.that.
[2291]on points that-they had collateral on. By
[2292]aid what this man is saying is not the truth.
[2294]and, therefore, ‘let us hit him hard on this. . ; ,
[2296]vere tactical considerations relating to.
[2298]£ the interrogators which then’ offered ‘the oe
[2300]et the truth,
[2302]normally the case, gives you oth
[2303]ts to be interrogated was essentially « Co.
[2305]that after April 4 the sub areas
[2308]ae e reak him, as opbeeed toa desire
[2309]the opeeticn your role as an intelligence
[2310]impression. The answer is yes beca
[2311]it the man was not telling.the truth, thes
[2312]tr his behavior and hiss eres me
[2313]K . 8
[2314]id not appear to make sense to anne
[2315]‘s you could be sure that that data was in
[2317]ubts about this, leaving aside the moti-
[2319]2 ;
[2320]oey in which he presented it, that the
[2323]ubstance of what Nosenko had to say about ©
[2325]‘ean, when he first said it back in February
[2327]anes of it?
[2328]& I said would be polluted b
[2329]ist of the message was that Oswald waa
[2330]rnee te Te that he was never debriefed
[2331]personally
[2333]cally pint qn involved in the
[2334]rent by Nosenko?
[2336]eve that it would be possib}
[2337]er erarent to the arrival in 1900
[2339]‘ served at what w:
[2342]me even more unusual. ‘9 emerge that it
[2343]eems to me almost to have been tack
[2344]dn’t seem to be part of the real bode ot
[2346]wert te em
[2350]533
[2352]the other things that he had to say, many of which were true. You understand
[2353]that Nosenko was—much of what hé said was true. :
[2355]Mr. Krern. You are talking about other areas? . to :
[2356]Mr. Mourpery. Yes, sir. This one seemed to be tacked on and didn't have much
[2358]relationship, and it seemed to be so totally dependent on not just one coincidence
[2360]but a whole series of coincidences, for him to have been there.and all that sort
[2361]of thing. That is what I mean. . : :
[2362]€ -) 2 * * . * *
[2364]Mr. Kizrn, Do you recall any other specifics about what you could not accept
[2365]in Nosenko’s statements about Oswald?
[2367]Mr. Morrxy. Yes, that they just—this is part.of the first one—no contact was
[2368]ever made, that he went up to. Minsk and lived happily and well with no contact.
[2369]The Soviet Union with foreigners don’t do that.-I mean, ‘he is the only person.
[2370]Read the accounts of what happened to this poor. gentleman, what happened to
[2371]Jay Crawford in Moscow and their intensive debriefing of him on the layout of
[2372]the American Embassy. It didn’t seem to be possible. f .
[2374]“Now, again, that does not constitute proof, d n't constitute any breakthrough.
[2375]It seemed to me to be strange. : : rr
[2377]Mr. Kiem. Would you distinguish between first the fact: that nobody debriefed
[2378]Oswald when he first came to the Soviet Union, nobody tried to find out what he
[2379]knew as @ marine, as a radar operator, and, second, the fact that once they
[2381]. dedided to allow him to stay, nobody-debriefed him to find out if he was some
[2383]kind of a Western security agent or working. for OIA? = .
[2385]Mr. Museny. Yes, they would be two different points. 'The first. point clearly
[2386]involves the KGB and GRU. This is simply a chap arriving with this background
[2387]and no one taking the time just from a military intelligence technical point of
[2388]view, telling us how it worked when this thing came in at 90,000 feet. what did the
[2389]blips look like. I don’t think they had many American radar operators handling
[2390]operational traffic involving U-2’s. * 7
[2392]Mr. Kizmv. How would you react to a statement by Nosenko that although
[2393]the KGB knew Oswald was a marine, they did not bother to question him,
[2394]and because of that, never knew that he was a radar operator or that he
[2395]worked at the base from which the U-2’s took off and landed?
[2397]Mr. Munpxy. I think it would be strange. .
[2399]My other point, going back to your first question, that is, the first aspect of
[2400]your question, which is the initial arrival and lack of debriefing. There is no
[2401]indication here that the GRU was advised, which in the case of a defector,
[2402]there is no operational interest in a defector. GRU would be properly the out-
[2403]fit that would want to be talking to any marine. They will talk to a marine
[2404]about close order drill. You follow me? It doesn’t require that he be known to
[2405]have been a radar operator or that he be known to have been a——they would
[2406]talk to him about bis military affiliation just as we would. : .
[2408]1 realize that there is a body of thought which says that some people think
[2409]the Soviets are 10-foot tall. I don’t believe they are. I think they are very,
[2410]very, very much the other way. What I find difficult on the part of many Ameri-
[2411]cans is that they will not ascribe to the Soviets the same elemental competence
[2412]that we have. That is all I ask. And, therefore, we in Germany will talk to a
[2413]private in the Hast German Border Gi The GRU would be interested
[2414]in. talking to a private. He was a corporal in the Marine Corps, who had stated
[2415]to a consul in a consular office, which is manned by the Soviets, Soviet locals
[2416]and what have you, fully accessible to the Soviets, unlike the higher floors of the
[2417]Embassy, that he wanted to talk about his experiences, that he wanted to tell all.
[2418]I guess I found it difficult to believe this is one of the things that made, or many
[2419]other aspects of the case, but this is one of the things that created an atmosphere
[2421]- of disbelief that there must be something to this case that is important, vitally
[2422]important to the Soviet Union and we can't understand it. .
[2423]bet may be right, he may be right, but at the time it was very hard to
[2424]ve. - :
[2428]Mr. Kuern. And on the basis of your experience and knowledge gained over
[2429]almost 30 years, is that what is giving you trouble with Nosenko’s statements
[2430]about Oswald? -
[2432]Mr, Munpry, And other things.
[2434]Mr. Kxemy. Do you know of comparable situations where somebody wasn't
[2435]questioned like this, was just left alone, as Nosenko says Oswald wis?
[2438]13-00000
[2440]534
[2442]Mr, Murpry. I honestly couldn’t find anyone, or I am not aware of anyone
[2443]that the division or the CI Staff, that is, those officers concerned with this
[2444]case, were handling {it directly. I don’t know of any former Soviet intelligence
[2446]officer or other knowledgeable source to whom they spoke about this matter _—
[2447]who felt this would have been possible. If someone did, I never heard of it.
[2449]Mr. Kiein. During this interrogation period, beginning in April 1964, would
[2450]it be fair to say that the questions relating to Oswald and the problems which
[2451]you have just been discussing relating to Oswald constituted a major area
[2452]for questioning and in interrogating Nosenko?
[2454]Mr. Morpuy. Probaby not.
[2456]Mr. Kix. Why would that have been?
[2458]Mr. Murpxy. Because there were many other areas which posed.equally inter- .
[2460]‘esting aspects yet about which we knew much more and which had occurred
[2462]abroad and involved collateral knowledge, which obviously" is not easy for us
[2463]to obtain in the Soviet Union.
[2465]Mr. Kiem. Who in the Soviet ‘Russia division made the decision ¢ as to who.
[2466]would question Nosenko, subsequent to April 4?
[2468]Mr. Morpxy. (OIA employee], chief of the group.
[2470]Mr.:-Kietn. And do you know of any criteria that he used to ‘piek’ his inter-
[2473]Mr..Mureny. Some knowledge of Russian, as Nosenko’s English was not good,
[2475]_the fact that he had been exposed. Well, that is one of the aspects of the CIA
[2477]interrogation. You try not to use too many people because you then lose. In the
[2479]_ first. place, you are dealing with a potentially hostile guy who is Hable to go
[2481]back to the Soviet Union, or return to the other side, and so you don’t want to
[2482]expose too many officers, plus the fact it is not a good idea to simply bring a lot ;
[2483]of people in. You have to have people who studied the case and became in depth, ~
[2484]know it in depth and therefore, so they use the officers that they had available
[2485]and there. were a variety of criteria. ©
[2487]Mr. Kuern. As I mentioned to you in our conversations about a week ago, it is
[2488]‘our information that the person who interrogated Nosenko about the Oswald
[2489]matter had no background whatsoever in Oswald, he didn’t know anything
[2490]about Oswald’s background or really about Oswald at all. Is. there any reason
[2491]that such a person would be used. that you can tell us?
[2493]Mr. Muppsy. I am not sure I understand. I thought the point was that he had,
[2494]he was not a man of a lot of background in the CI debriefings or interrogations.
[2495]I wasn’t sure of the point he didn't know. about Oswald. I am not sure very
[2496]many of us knew very much about Oswald than was available at the time.
[2498]Mr. Kier. Two points——
[2500]Mr. Murpxry. The reason that the chap was chosen was because he was level-
[2501]headed, extremely toughminded, and was going to be with the case for the
[2502]long pull. He was not going to be changed. That is why he was used. And his
[2503]career since then has borne out the judgment of many, he is a very good officer.
[2505]Mr. Kiem. But wouldn’t——
[2507]Mr. Mourpxry. I don’t know that he didn’t, that he wasn’t what you are saying,
[2508]he knew nothing at all about Oswald’s case. I find that difficult to believe. But I
[2509]don’t know.
[2511]-Mr. KizIn. Well, if I asked you to consider a hypothetical situation, where I
[2512]told you the officer who interrogated Oswald knew nothing about Oswald other
[2513]than what he learned from Nosenko, would you think that was unusual that
[2514]they would not, if they didn’t have somebody already who knew about Oswald, at
[2515]least given somebody a thorough briefing from A to Z, everything that the CIA
[2516]knew about Oswald, would you think it was unusual, that they didn’t do that?
[2518]Mr. Murpnry. I would certainly think so.
[2520]Mr. Kre1n. The second part of my question was the other point I made to you
[2521]a week ago when we spoke, to our knowledge, let me be frank, we spoke to the
[2522]Particular officer in a deposition, so that our knowledge is gained from that,
[2523]it is possible that since I have not seen the typed up deposition that what I say
[2524]might not be exactly what the deposition says, but my recollection of it is that
[2525]he also had little or no prior interrogation experience, and my question is would
[2527]Mr. Murrxy. That wouldn’t surprise me because there were very few people,
[2528]relatively few people, in the Division or indeed elsewhere who had a lot of
[2529]interrogation experience. We hadn't done a lot of very many hostile CIA debrief-
[2530]ings. People who might have been used were probably otherwise, either abroad, -
[2533]13-00000
[2535]one, or I am not aware of anyone
[2537]those ‘officers concerned wi ;
[2538]of any former Soviet intelligen
[2540]om they spoke about this matter .
[2542]omeone did, I never heard of it
[2544]rd, ‘beginning: in April 1904, weeta
[2545]‘0 Oswald and the problems which
[2546]Oswald constituted’ a major area
[2548]er areas which posed equally
[2549]ich more and which had ovctirred
[2550]hich obviously is not easy for ug
[2552]si cls y :
[2553]rh on made the decision as to who. |
[2555]oup.
[2556]cia that he used to pick his inter-
[2558]is Nosenko’s English was no!
[2559]ft is one of the aspects of the Ore
[2561]sople because you then lose. In :
[2562]ly hostile guy: who, is liable to go:
[2563]her side, and 20 you don’t want to_
[2565]'t a good idea to simply bring a
[2566]died the case and beeen in septs
[2567]‘he officers that they had available
[2569]nversations about a. week :
[2571]ogated Nosenko about the Dewnla
[2573]pewald, jhe didn’t know anything
[2574]wv a Tj
[2576]‘a tel t s there any reason:
[2577]ought the point was tha
[2579]1e CI debriefings or interrogations
[2581]bout Oswald. I am not sure very
[2583]lan was available at the time.
[2585]i chosen was because he was level-
[2586]ping to be with the case for the
[2587]Chat is why he was used. And his
[2588]of many, he is a very good officer.
[2590]zat he wasn't what you are
[2591]find that difficult to helieve Butt
[2593]‘a hypothetical situation, wher
[2594]er
[2595]knew nothing about Oswald other
[2596]you think that was unusual that
[2597]: dready who Imew about Oswald, at
[2598]a A to Z, everything that the CIA
[2599]unusual, that they didn't do that?
[2601]was the other point I mad
[2603], let me be frank, we spoke to the
[2604]r knowledge is gained from that,
[2605]ped up deposition that: what I say
[2606]8, but my recollection of it is that
[2607]yerience, and my question is would
[2609]cause there were very few
[2610]leed elsewhere who had Ape:
[2611]of very many hostile CIA debrief-
[2612]probably otherwise, elther abroad,
[2614]oo ee
[2615]oo _
[2616]-
[2617]. ~~
[2619]‘“gquads and
[2621]-¢ould be used to interrogate him?. .
[2623]| We thought Wwe Were go
[2624]area at that time. =~
[2626]. those years, it is your statem:
[2628]535
[2630]’ might have had experience, but I know it might sound strange, There just wasn’t
[2632]id squads. of highly trained fluent Russian speaking CI expefienced:
[2634]interrogators. * wm Bot
[2635]. Krern. One thing I would point out to you is that I have listened to a
[2637]there was no Russian. -
[2639]Mr. MurrHy. Yes,. . . cs ! .
[2640]Mr. Kien. My question is, was the questioning of Nosenko considered a major.
[2642]operation in the Bureau in 1964? :
[2644]Mr. Mugrxy: It was an important operation, an important case. : .
[2645]tion experience who
[2647]° Mr.
[2648]nuinber of tapes,-and all of the ones I have listened to were totally in English,
[2650]‘Mr. Kiztn. And yet’ there was nobody with interroga!
[2652]“Me: MogpHy. I am sure some of. the people had interro $
[2653]mean. [CLA:employee) himself had a lot of background in this field. I can’t explain ©
[2654]Oswald did not have prior briefing on Oswald
[2656]’ “why. the officer who debriefed him on
[2658]‘except what I mentioned to you the ‘other day; because it was not a thing’ that
[2659]ing to get through on, because we ‘were weak. in that
[2660]+o on 3 ; .« — , ; eo
[2662]Mr. Kiein, Was Nosenko ever given any drugs?
[2664]-. Mr: Murpuy. Not to my knowledge... : . .
[2665]versations in which you took: part: about
[2667]. Mr. Kiern: Were there ever any conv:
[2669]- . whether to give him drugs in order to get him to tell the truth?’ an .
[2670]> Mr. Murry. There were ‘time about various
[2672]‘ many, many conversations all the ‘
[2673]things that could be done, all the techniques that are known, ‘to get him to talk, |
[2674]but-as far.as.I. know and in discussions with the medical officer. who handled — -
[2676]decision made:or any attempt ‘made to use these,
[2678]_the case, there was never any } ; m: '
[2679]‘ed to be likely to produce results ‘and they all would
[2681]because none of them a i
[2682]be very harmful and, therefore, not produce results. ae
[2683]lost control over the’ case, ‘in
[2685]“Mr. Kiern: Between 1964 and 1967 when you )
[2686]ent that if any drugs were given to him, to get him
[2688]to tell the truth, you would have known about it, and no such thing happened?
[2690]Mr, Murpxy. That is correct.
[2694]Mr. Krier. Are you aware that Nosenko was given & lie detector test in 1964,
[2695]in April? : .
[2696]Mr. Morrxy. Yes, sir.
[2698]Mr. Kuzin. Do you know the result of that test?
[2699]Mr. Mugrzy. It indicated he was lying on several key points.
[2700]Mr. Kiem. Do you have any reason to believe that test was invalid?
[2702]Mr, Mugrxy. No. :
[2703]Mr. Kier. Are you aware that he was given a second He detector test in
[2704]1966? . ot
[2705]Mr. Murrry. Yes.
[2706]Mr. Kern. Do you know the result of that test?
[2707]Mr. Murpxy. Same .
[2708]eagon to believe that test. was invalid?
[2710]: thing.
[2711]Mr. Kizr. And do you have any ©
[2712]Mr. Mougruy. No; I believe the operator who gave him the test in 1966 was the
[2714]game operator who gave him the test in 1964.
[2716]Mr. Kiem. That is correct. 7 . ;
[2717]-Y. EXCERPTS OF DEPOSITION OF JAMES C. MICHAELS
[2718]‘AND ALEKSO POPTANICH, AUGUST 11, 1978, BEFORE
[2720]THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINA-
[2721]TIONS ;
[2722]INTRODUCTION
[2724]to clear'up the facts surrounding Nosenko’s claims |
[2726]the CLA should not be used to impeach his pres’
[2727]BI and CIA
[2729]Ina further effort
[2731]that his statements to the ¢ be
[2732]ent testimony, the committee took depositions from
[2734]agents who were present
[2736]during the 1964 interviews. These agents were
[2738]gation experience. I” mo
[2740]13-00000
[2742]. _ INVESTIGATION OF THE "ASSASSINATION é.
[2743]a OF PRESIDENT JOHN F FEENEY,
[2745]HOUSE. OF REPRESENTATIVE
[2746]: NINETY- FIFTH CONGRESS.
[2748]Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Assassinations ,
[2750]U.8. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
[2751]41-872 0 WASHINGTON : 1978
[2753]"For sale by the Superintendent of Documen heaves U.5. Gov: ernment Printing Office
[2754]Washington, D.C. oo
[2757]13-00000
[2759]" September 25, 1978,
[2761]of meetings which were
[2762]Helms' recollection... I‘am attaching a copy of the relevant page of the
[2763]. wk _ calendar. ‘Although it is clear from this page that there was such a
[2764]- , meeting, I continue to have absolutely no recollection of it, and there-
[2765]_ ' 4 fore cannot tell you what/was discussed beyond what is stated in the
[2766]calendar itself. :
[2768]; It was 8 not my custom to make notes on suck meetings, and I”
[2769]doubt that there are in the files of the Department any notes made by
[2770]me: However it is pogsible. that Mr. Yeagley or Mr. Foley made such
[2771]notes. I believe. Mr .. Foley i is now-deceased, but Mr. Yeagley is now
[2772]a judge in the District of Columbia and: perhaps he would have some —
[2773]reeollection of the meeting. ee ne sh.
[2775]“had; prior to'm ‘testimony: checked my. calendar diary for the
[2776]petted dealing with the assassination and the creation of the Warren
[2777]Commission, but had not thought it relevant to the Committee's investi-
[2778]gation to go as far as ‘April. Hence I was unaware of this entry. While.
[2781]13-00000
[2783].. change. my testimony, it did seem to m t in fairness to both the
[2784]- +. Committee and'Mr, Helms I ahould meke it available to you.
[2786]Respectfully: yours,. ‘% a
[2790]Sabb bs Taek
[2792]r,.Gary
[2793]Hon « Richard C. Helms ‘::
[2794]Edward Bennett Williams, E
[2796]13-00000
[2798]750° - 151
[2800]cougsis A ow ‘aad eis a
[2801]b my rBdotiseticn ai ps Aovil 2,196. 0698 cs
[2802]a CTOLG ers :
[2804]: Party Thursday y-
[2805]would fake yon ‘fiew Lindenbaum". -), Givil . 9:35
[2806]a J
[2810]avid Tilvaroff.. ) briefing 9:35.
[2811]Respectfully yours, 7 joan Douglas - dos, 9:35
[2812]' f Jack Rosenthal ° yeP - 9:35
[2814]_ Burke Marshall ) 9:35 .a.m.'
[2820]3:10 '
[2822]3:30 (y
[2823]3:32.
[2824]4307.
[2826]} David Filvaroff
[2828]All bs na |
[2830]4:08 Dim,
[2831]4:08.
[2832]“4308 p.
[2833]* 4208 ps
[2837](J. ‘dalter recgiey
[2838]Jillian Foley,
[2840]- Uefector Case)
[2842]B24O
[2843]6:45 pan. - SAN:
[2844]v~ John Douglas : 6:56 pam. . SAW
[2845]\S dilliam Orrick / i - 7:06 p.m. . SAL
[2847]/Joseph Dolan \ 7:15 pem. SAW
[2848]f ya
[2849] f oe
[2850]p 9:15 a.m. SAd
[2851]os 7 f)- 9:30 a.m. sid
[2852]| | Harold Reis ef) Civil 9:30 a.m. ' SAW
[2853]s. 4 ° David Filveroff “ ) Rights 9:30 a.m. SAq
[2854]Burke Marshall. Iwriefing 9:30-a.m . SAT
[2855]ne £ ack Rosenthal , 9:30 a.m. SAW .
[2856]vee Joseph Dolan >. 9:30 am. SAW
[2861]13-00000
[2863]INVESTIGATION OF THE 7 .
[2864]OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY‘),
[2866]“SELBOT 0 | COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATION
[2868]a OFTHE :
[2870]US. ‘HOUSE OF REPRESENPATIVES
[2871]_ | NINETY- FIFTH CONGR ss. a
[2873] SHPTEMIBER 22; 25, AND 28,1078 Sage 2
[2874]VOLUME IV
[2876]Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Assassinations
[2878]a
[2880]ot U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
[2881]41-3730 ; WASHINGTON : 1979
[2883]For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
[2884]Washington, D.C. 20402
[2886]Stock Number 052-0T0-04906-5 |
[2889]13-00000
[2891]have a say in what happens with respect 3
[2892]artainly was involved with decisions on’ #&
[2894]: to end, but Iwas not. the controlling
[2896]re were three major agency reports that
[2897]» the Nosenko case; specifically there was
[2898]by the Soviet Russia Division, another
[2899]_ | the Office of Security report, and then.a
[2900]red to as the Hart report. :
[2902]tther you are familiar with all three of 4
[2904]ll any longer whether Lread the first two }
[2906]wiefed.on their.contents. The Hart report
[2907]the agency. in early February 1973 and I
[2908]onnections with it since. =’ :
[2910]ing his defection in 1964 and upo
[2912](missed the question.
[2914]3; asking precisely. during his defection in
[2916]in the United States, was Yuri Nosenko_
[2918]. That was an accepted procedure under ;
[2920]sragency Defector Committee ‘that defec-
[2921]mtry were handled by the CIA, through
[2923]2settling period,'whatever had to be done -
[2925]iat the legal authority under which he
[2927]k that perhaps, Mr. Chairman, if you
[2928]like to answer that question a little bit
[2929]dulge me. :
[2930]nly.
[2932]‘ before this committee in executive ses-
[2934]reviewing that transcript I noted that, °
[2935]‘er, I characterized Mr. Yuri Nosenko’s -
[2936]between 1964 and 1969 in a number of :
[2938]is an area of obvious interest to the 4
[2939]) take this opportunity to describe my 4
[2940]greater detail as to what Mr. Nosen- 4
[2942]entral Intelligence Agency was.
[2944]a lawyer nor a.judge, so I was not.
[2945]conclusions about Mr. Nosenko’s tenure }
[2947]xe Agency..I’m sorry, I am not prepared.
[2949]Geneva, Switzerland, Mr. Nosenko ree °°
[2950]ad to defect to the West. Mr. Nosenko’s ss.
[2952]npanied by a claim that he could give a
[2954]ee Harvey Oswald’s.contacts in connec- -
[2956]Oswald’s stay in the Soviet Union be-
[2958]2 the significance that Yuri Nosenko’s |
[2960]iwestigation of President Kennedy's as-
[2962]turned out to be a bona fide defector, if !
[2964]n his |
[2965]tes was Yuri Nosénko.in the custody of:
[2967]go, un September 20, 1978, I received a *
[2969]21
[2971]information were to be believed, then we could conclude that
[2972]GB and the Soviet Union had nothing to do with Lee Harvey -
[2973]ald in 1963 and therefore had ‘nothing to do with President
[2975]‘<nnedy’s murder. . a ae : .
[2976]‘Kennedy the other hand, Mr.:Nosenko had been programed in
[2977]wance by the KGB to minimize KGB connections with Oswald, if
[2978]Mr. Nosenko was giving us false information. about Oswald’s con-
[2979]tacts with the KGB in 1959 to 1962, it was fair for us to surmise
[2980]that there may have been an Oswald-KGB connection in November
[2981]1963, more specifically that Oswald was acting as a Soviet agent
[2982]hen he shot President Kennedy. _ ee ee
[2983]:-If it were shown: that. Oswald was in fact acting as a Soviet agent
[2984]~ when he shot President Kennedy, the consequences to' the United:
[2985]' States. .of America and, indeed, to the world, would have been.
[2986]staggering. Thus, it became a matter of the utmost importance to.
[2987]this.
[2989]“Mr. Nosenko arrived in the country in February 1964. By the end’
[2990]. -of March it was clear. to us that the task of evaluating Mr. Nosen-: .
[2991]: :ko’s credibility would not, be easy. oe
[2992]’ On April 2, 1964, as Deputy Director of Plans, I, along. with:..
[2993]David Murphy, Chief of the Soviet Bloc Division, and Mr. Lawrence’. |
[2994]Houston, the General Counsel to the CIA, met with Mr. Nicho-. -
[2995]atzenbach, then Deputy Attorney General: of the United:
[2996]“Mr.-J. Walter Yeagley, Chief of the Internal Security Divi-..
[2997]n. ofthe Justice Department; Mr. William E.. Foley, who. was: .
[2998]“then. Mr. Yeagley’s First Assistant in the Internal Security Divi-:
[2999]“sion; and Mr. Harold F. Riese from the Office of Legal Counsel in:
[3001]the Justice Department.
[3002]The meeting took place in Mr. Katzenbach’s office in the Justice
[3003]- Department. The purpose of the meeting was to define Mr. Nosen-
[3004]_ko’s legal status in the United States and to anticipate what kind
[3005]of legal problems might arise in connection with the Agency’s
[3006]ongoing custody of Mr. Nosenko.
[3007]'.% The Agency provided me a copy of the memorandum for the
[3008]_ record written by Mr. Lawrence Houston describing this meeting
[3009].on: April 2, 1964, and’ a second memorandum which reflects the
[3010]‘substance of a telephone call from Mr. Foley on the following day,
[3011]April 3, 1964. These documents were in ‘part declassified by the
[3012]~Agency on September 18, 1978, and I would like to make them part
[3013]-the record of these proceedings.
[3014]‘During the meeting of April 2, 1964, the Department of Justice
[3015]‘as fully informed of Mr. Nosenko’s status with the Agency and
[3016]he Department's opinion was requested as to the scope of the
[3017]Agency's ongoing authority with respect to Mr. Nosenko.
[3018]As Mr. Houston’s memorandums relate, Mr. Nosenko’s technical
[3020]ty
[3022]1 means that the Immigration and Naturalization Service had
[3024]technically excluded Mr. Nosenko from the United States but had
[3026]_ also temporarily “paroled him” to the custody of the Central Intel-
[3027]ligence Agency. ; -
[3029]«18 my understanding that the terms of the parole provided that
[3031]Mr. Nosenko would remain in the custody of the Agency unless it
[3033]Nosenko should be deported or
[3035]‘Was determined whether Mr.
[3036]whether he should be permitted to settle in the United States.
[3038]vernment to determine the bona fides of Mr..Yuri Nosenko.;
[3041]13-00000
[3043]24
[3045]statement of some employee or something. He was designated by. the s Present Direc- i
[3046]tor to ‘come‘here and present the story because’ he was “supposed to be. the uost i
[3047]_ familiar with it since he had reviewed if for the CLA. eine “f. I
[3049]‘else in the country; namely, a device described by him as @ bank’ vault, and. then i
[3051]built a house around the bank vault to put this man in and then kept him there ,
[3052]_ under the valent of some “3 years with that kind of thing, 1,277 days to be
[3053]- specific, at be Point they finally gave up and gave him some emolument and put
[3055]him on their payroll and let him go.
[3056]..And.then. they gave as their—I questioned on the authority to do a thing like
[3058]that..Did they have any kind of process, and they said other than the fact that.Mr.
[3060]Helms had‘ conferred with you and gotten’ your OK, ‘that: this would: be ‘legal. .
[3062]And Ijust-found it awfully difficult. to believe that. And that is w: —and I don’t
[3064]: -imagine.it would be the kind of thing that you would be asked to OK enough that
[3065]_ on would ‘not rather clearly. remember the incident if it had occurred. ° Mee
[3067]: Karzeneacn. If the facts that you have just set forth to me, Co! an, :
[3068]_ had ever. been made known to me, I would recollect it; I am certain;.and I would - |
[3069]hope to goodness I would not have given the legal advice that is claimed. .
[3070]. Mr. Saywenr. It makes me feel better about it. Thank you, .
[3071]- That ‘i is all have, Mr. Chairman. ©
[3072]oo, Having -heard Mr. Katzenbach’s testimony of. yesterday, can you
[3073]~“réconcile-his testimony to this committee with your statement just
[3074]; read to:this committee?
[3075]_ °° Mr, ‘Hetos. I can only say, Mr: Stokes, that it is: very hard to
[3076]reconcile: I think the basic point at issue here is really whether the
[3077]“meeting with him took place at all. What happened after the
[3078]meeting is something he was. not responsible;for as. far as I am
[3079].. aware.
[3080]- Let me read to you the memorandum for the record which Mr.
[3081]Lawrence R. Houston, the. General Counsel. of CIA, wrote on April
[3082]3, 1964. I have a copy in front of me. It is headed Memorandum for
[3083]the Record and the subject is the Nosenko case.:
[3085]It reads:
[3087]Mr. Helms, Mr. Murphy, and I met with Mr. Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, J. Walter
[3088]Yeagley, William E. Foley, and Harold F. Ries, on April 2, 1964. Mr. Helms outlined
[3089]the problems foreseeable in our future relations with Nosenko and asked the opin-
[3090]ion of the Justice representatives on what we. could do to control the situation. I
[3091]pointed out. that his technical status is one of exclusion and parole—or more
[3092]technically, deferment arid parole.
[3094]Paragraph 2:
[3096]After some discussion, Mr. Foley stated it was his opinion that Agency representa-
[3097]tives could take any action necessary to carry out the terms of the parole. Mr.
[3098]‘Katzenbach asked Mr. Foley to check this and let me know and Mr. Foley. later
[3099]confirmed this position by telepfione. .
[3101]. Tin turn, the meeting, reviewed the parole agreement and provided an
[3102]intenrennbe thereof for Director of Security, a copy of which is attached hereto.
[3103], Also, I informed Mr. Foley of this interpretation. Signed, Lawrence R. Houston,
[3104]General Counsel.
[3105]. The. attachment is a memorandum also dated April 3, 1964. It i is
[3106]; signed by Lawrence R. Houston, General Counsel. It is a memoran-
[3107]dum for the director of security. That would be the officer. who was
[3108]the director of the security office of the Central Intelligence
[3109]oe _ Agency. The subject is Parole status of defectors:
[3110]: On 2 April 1964, we had a discussion with the Department of Justice on the status
[3111]of aliens whose inspection by INS—
[3113]ne rere na
[3115]oe 0 TY TRE EI
[3118]13-00000
[3120]Services
[3123]LEVEL 1 - 20 OF 80 STORIES
[3125]Copyright 1993 American Broadcasting Companies, Inc.
[3126]All rights reserved
[3127]' ABC NEWS-
[3128]SHOW: 20/20 (ABC 9:00 pm ET)
[3129]August 27, 1993
[3130]Transcript # 1337
[3131]TYPE: Show; Show
[3132]SECTION: News; Domestic
[3133]LENGTH: 8240 words
[3134]HEADLINE: Case Closed
[3135]GUESTS: MARK LANE, Author/Attarney; GERALD POSNER, Author, "Case Closed"; Dr.
[3136]PEPPER JENKINS; Sheriff JIM BOWLES, Dallas; URI NOSENKO, Former KGB agents;
[3137]ROBERT OSWALD, Brother
[3138]HIGHLIGHT:
[3139]Lynn Sherr reports an a new book about the JFK assassination, and interviews
[3140]author Gerald Posner, who says computer enhancements prove LeeHarvey Oswald
[3141]acted alone, and was not a Mafia or KGB agent.
[3142]BODY:
[3143]BARBARA WALTERS, ABC News: Good Evening. I' m Barbara Walters. Hugh Downs is
[3144]on vacation. This is 20/20.
[3146]ANNOUNCER: From ABC News, around the world and into your home, the stories that
[3147]touch your life, with Hugh Downs and Barbara Walters - this is 20/20.
[3149]Tonight, 30 years after the Kennedy assassination, will a powerful new book end
[3150]the contraversy once and for all? Investigative journalist Gerald Posner says he
[3151]has the answers about Oswald, the magic bullet, and every conspiracy theory to
[3152]come along. Lynn Sherr's explosive report - ‘Case Closed.'
[3154]And-
[3156]SELMA SCHIMMEL, Breast Cancer Survivor: (Csp?] Wha is equipped to think of dying
[3157]in your 20's or 30's?
[3159]ANNOUNCER: -if you think it only happens to older women, you're wrong.
[3161]KERI DEARBORN, Breast Cancer Survivor: And everyone told me I was too young to
[3162]have breast cancer, and I thought they were cight.
[3164]ANNOUNCER: It's happening more and more, and doctors admit the younger you are,
[3165]the harder it is ta detect.
[3167]Dr. TIMOTHY JOHNSON, ABC News Medical Editor: Mammography.can have an error rate
[3168]ore to 40 percent in young women versus.a rate af less than 15 percent in |
[3169]older women.
[3171]LEX S#NEXIS(@E: LEXIS:NEXIS‘@ie _EXIS‘NEXIS@E:
[3173]of Mead Data Central, Inc.
[3175]13-00000
[3177]° PAGE 7
[3178]20/20 (ABC), August 27, 1993 ©
[3180]. ANNOUNCER: For women in their 20's and 30's, Dr. Timothy Johnson has some
[3182]shocking news - 'It Could Happen to You.'
[3184]Plus, can gay men be made straight? This therapist says he transforms
[3185]homosexuals. This man once preferred men. Taday, he's happy with his wife.
[3187]JOHN STOSSEL, ABC News: And now is sexuality an important part of your marriage.
[3189]RICHARD COHEN , Nicolosi Patient: Oh, yes. We have good sex, if that's what
[3190]you're asking.
[3192]ANNOUNCER: Others claim treatment is helping them-
[3194]ALEX,’ Nicolosi Patient: For the first time in my life, you know, 30. years of
[3195]my life, I feel alive. ;
[3197]ANNOUNCER: ~-but in the gay community, backlash.
[3198]GAY MAN: This is not a disease. There's no such thing as a cure.
[3200]ANNOUNCER: John Stossel brings you the hot debate over gay men. Are they ‘Born
[3201]or Bred?' Those stories tonight, August 27, 1993, after this brief message.
[3203]{Commercial break]
[3204]Case Closed
[3206]BARBARA WALTERS: The Kennedy assassination was back in the headlines all this
[3207]week when mare than 900,000 pages of previously classified government files were
[3209]finally opened after nearly 30 years. And while close to half the current
[3211]population wasn't even alive at the time, the controversy surrounding that event
[3212]continues ta haunt us all.
[3214]The fact is a majority af Americans don't believe the Warren Commission, and do
[3215]believe some form of conspiracy was involved. But now, a powerful new book
[3216]claims to have the last word. Its conclusion? Lee Harvey Oswald did indeed act
[3217]alone. The book is titled Case Closed, but is it?
[3219](voice-over] Whatever side you're on in this still-raging controversy, you li
[3220]want to see Lynn Sherr's repart now.
[3222]LYNN SHERR, ABC News: Cvoice-aver] No period in an American presidency has been
[3223]as controversial, as thoroughly analyzed or as frequently written and speculated
[3224]about as the final six seconds in John F. Kennedy's Life.
[3226]ist NEWSCASTER: [7] Three shots were fired at the President's motorcade as it
[3227]passed out of the downtown area of Dallas.
[3229]SHERR: [voice-over] No detail about the final moments of the President's life
[3230]has been spared scrutiny. Every eyewitness account, ballistics test, photograph,
[3231]medical conclusion and investigative finding has been challenged, reinterpreted
[3232]or dismissed, then woven into countless theories. For three decades, an already
[3233]skeptical American public has been left wondering if we would ever learn the
[3234]truth about what happened in Dealey [sp?] Plaza on November 22, 1963.
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[3249]MAN: (€?] The President of the United States, John Fitzgerald Kennedy, is dead.
[3250]Let us pray.
[3252]SHERR: The official version of what happened is that from that sixth-floor
[3253]corner window, acting alone, Lee Harvey Oswald fired three shots, the third of
[3254]which ended the life of America's 35th president. But that's too simple an
[3255]explanation for a great many Americans, and for conspiracy theorists, far ton
[3256]convenient that one man alone did it. Doubters insist that the shot or shots
[3257]that killed the President came from behind that fence on the grassy knoll, or
[3258]from a railroad overpass just beyond.
[3260]MARK LANE, Author/Attarney: Shots came from at least two directions. A bullet
[3261]‘hit the President in the back. A bullet hit him in the throat. It came from the
[3262]front. A bullet hit him in the head. It came from the front. That was three
[3263]shots. At least one bullet hit Governor Connolly (sp?], One bullet missed,
[3264]struck the curb.
[3266]SHERR: Evoice-over] Attorney/author Mark Lane, one of the most persistent and
[3267]Prolific of conspiracy theorists, has long insisted that the Warren Commission
[3268]Was wrang, and covered up critical evidence that might make it possible to
[3269]identify the President's assassins.
[3271]Mr. LANE: Today, with hundreds of thousands af documents in the vaults of the
[3272]CIA, the DI (?], and the FBI and the National Archives - which we can't see --
[3273]the cover-up is continuing.
[3275]~SHERR: Cvoice-over] But another lawyer-turned-author, Gerald Posner, says
[3276]evidence available to researchers and conspiracy buffs for years led him
[3277]directly ta the only person who could possibly have shot the President.
[3279]SERALD POSNER, Author, ‘Case Closed': Lee Harvey Oswald killed Jack Kennedy,
[3280]acting alone.
[3282]SHERR: Cvoice-over] Posner, author of Case Closed, the culmination of a
[3283]three-year, exhaustive reexamination of the Kennedy assassination, concedes that
[3284]in identifying a familiar culprit, he's not likely to win aver many conspiracy
[3285]buffs. But he says the evidence didn't allow for any other suspects.
[3287]Mr. POSNER: Mast people who have written conspiracy hooks started with their
[3288]conclusion already done. They knew it was a conspiracy in their heart, and they
[3289]went around to prove that case.
[3291]SHERR: Cvaice-over] One of the major assassination controversies Posner seeks to -
[3292]resolve is the number of shots fired, where they came from, and which ones
[3294]Struck the President. Using recently-developed computer enhancements of the home
[3295]movie taken by Abraham Zapruder, Posner explained for 20/20 how he says he was
[3296]able to count the shots, for which he says Oswald had more time than the Warren
[3297]Commission believed.
[3299]Mr. POSNER: Oswald's first shot, which missed, was fired much earlier than
[3300]anyone realized - just after the car turned the corner. Evidence of this is
[3301]overlooked by mast experts. It's in the film. In the upper righthand corner of
[3303]your screen, you'll see a little girl. She's heard that shot and turned. In the
[3304]car, the President and Mrs. Kennedy and the Governor also heard the. shat and
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[3315]turned. After this shot, Oswald, still had aver eight seconds, not five, for the
[3316]next two. .
[3318]The second shot is fired. This bullet hits both Kennedy and Connolly. After
[3319]passing through Kennedy, you see it go through the Governor, as his suit lapel
[3320]flaps forward. A computer technician discovered that crucial detail just last
[3321]year.
[3323]SHERR: Cvoice-over] This is the so-called ‘magic bullet! that seemed to zigzag
[3324]through the two men.
[3326]Mr. POSNER: This computer animation illustrates that the second bullet needed no
[3327]magic. Because of the way the two men were: lined up, this bullet passed directly
[3328]through them. [t turned only after it slowed down and shattered Connolly's wrist |
[3329]- no zigs, no zags.
[3331]SHERR: How could that bullet have emerged so clean, with na flaws on it, really,
[3332]whatsoever?
[3334]Mr. POSNER: [I was skeptical about that bullet, and I think that was the thing
[3335]that stops many people from believing Oswald did it alone. It emerged sa clean
[3336]because that it went through Kennedy, it Slawed up. When it went through
[3337]Connolly's chest, it slowed up. By the time it hit the big bone in his wrist,
[3338]which everybody thinks would damage it, it was traveling at half or a third of
[3339]its speed - fast engugh to crush the bone, but not fast enaugh to deform the
[3340]bullet.
[3342]SHERR: Cvoice-over] The sudden backward motion of the President's head as the
[3343]third and final bullet struck, blowing away part of his skull, has led many ta
[3344]believe that the shot came from the front, but Posner says normal neurological
[3345]reflexes make the body stiffen when struck, causing it ta move back.
[3347]And Dr. Pepper Jenkins, one of the physicians attending the President at
[3348]Parkland Hospital, points to yet another possible factor, the brace President
[3349]Kennedy wore for his chronic back pain.
[3351]Dr. PEPPER JENKINS: He was so tightly wound into a brace that- the metal coming
[3352]up his back, and he was tied to the metal or strapped to the metal with an Ace
[3353]bandage.
[3355]SHERR: In the Zapruder film and in all the pictures we've seen- well, how do you
[3356]describe what the body is doing, having seen the brace?
[3358]Dr. JENKINS: Well, I would think you couldn' t fall forward. I think you'd have»
[3359]to fall backwards aor aside.
[3361]SHERR: Because?
[3362]Dr. JENKINS: Because the brace held him in such a position.
[3364]2nd NEWSCASTER: C7] At approximately. one o'clock, the President is dead. The
[3365]doctors were working too frantically to revive him ta notice the exact moment.
[3367]SHERR: Lvoice-over] Dr. Jenkins also has a very poignant memory of Mrs. Kennedy
[3368]sometime standing next to hia.
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[3381]Dr. JENKINS: She had such a drawn look. I really feel like she was in shock, and
[3382]she was just halding her hands, one above the other. And one of the times, she
[3383]nudged me with her elbow and handed me something in her hand, which is part of
[3384]his brain that obviously was in her lap- with his head in her lap as the car
[3385]came to Parkland. Bad moment.
[3387]SHERR: [voice-over] After examining computer animation of the presidential
[3388]limousine and its passengers, Posner sought ta show where in Dealey Plaza, the
[3389]shots came from,
[3391]Hr. POSNER: Kennedy and Connolly are placed into computer animation, and working
[3392]back from their wounds, the computer determines the only possible location for
[3393]the assassin, as indicated by the yellow shading. Notice that Oswald's
[3394]sixth-floar window is right in the center of it.
[3396]Mr. LANE: Posner believes the magic-bullet theory. Next, I guess, we're going tao
[3397]hear about the Tooth Fairy. It's just mathematically impossible. No one has ever
[3398]been able to recreate what it is said that Lee Harvey Oswald did.
[3400]SHERR: Well, they've done it- he's done it now with a computer enhancement-
[3401]Mr. LANE: I know that.
[3403]SHERR: -and he claims the computer shows that it's absolutely the way it
[3404]happened.
[3406]Mr. LANE: Well, he's entitled to his computer. The American people were there,
[3407]and they testified, and two-thirds af them said they know shots came from the
[3408]wooden fence.
[3410]SHERR: [voice-over] What. about that reported fourth shot fired. from the grassy
[3411]knoll? When the House Select Committee on Assassinations concluded in 1978 that
[3412]there was a 95-percent certainty of such a shot, conspiracy theorists were -
[3413]heartened, but the committee's finding, according to Dallas Sheriff Jim Bowles
[3414]{(sp?], was based on a static-filled Dictabelt recording of a Dallas police
[3415]motorcycle radio stuck in the on position. The sheriff says the motorcycle
[3416]wasn't even in Dealey Plaza, but the committee heard four shots. We couldn't
[3417]hear any. ;
[3419]‘Cinterviewing] You have a copy of that tape, right?
[3421]Sheriff JIM BOWLES, Dallas: I certainly do.
[3423]SHERR: Why don't you play it, and let's take a listen. Is that a shot?
[3425]‘Sheriff BOWLES: No, that's the motorcycle Slowing down, see?
[3427]jervices
[3429]SHERR: I didn't hear any shots.
[3431]Sheriff BOWLES: Neither has anyone else. They listened to the same belts we
[3432]listened to, and they claimed to hear four shots.
[3434]SHERR: So where do you think the four shots came from on the House Select .
[3435]Committee's tape?
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[3446]Sheriff BOWLES: You have to ask them.
[3448]Mr. POSNER: They clearly went down the wrong path. The National Academy of
[3449]Sciences reviewed their work later, and pointed out all the flaws in it. They
[3450]just made an error on that Dictabelt. There is no fourth shot. There's no shot
[3451]at all, even, to hear. -
[3453]SHERR: Even if people accepted the physical evidence gathered here in Dealey
[3454]Plaza, and agreed that it tended to support the Warren Commission's findings,
[3455]that would not end the speculation. Surveys show that most Americans doubt that
[3457]Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone, believing instead that he was either part of or
[3458]himself became a victim of a conspiracy.
[3460]LEE HARVEY OSWALD: I didn't shot anybody, no, sir.
[3461]3rd NEWSCASTER: (71 Oswald has been shot!
[3463]SHERR: What about the Ruby- the Jack Ruby-arganized crime connection? Clearly,
[3464]there was a connection there.
[3466]Mr. POSNER: No question. AS a matter of fact, I think the Warren commision
[3467]underplayed Jack Ruby's organized.crime connections.
[3469]SHERR: Isn't there some evidence, then, that he might have been acting on their
[3470]behalf ta wipe out Oswald?
[3471]Mr. POSNER: Right. No. If he had a contract from organized crime, why didn't he
[3472]shoot Oswald when he saw him for the first time two days earlier? On the day.
[3473]Ruby finally killed Oswald, it was only by chance that their paths crossed. He ©
[3474]was not acting on behalf of organized crime. He was acting for his own
[3475]motivation, this desire, as he thought, to be a hero in Dallas, that he would
[3476]erase the stain and the stigna attached to the city that had‘been done by the
[3477]President's murder.
[3479]SHERR: You're saying Jack Ruby acted all by himself,.a lone-gunman theory once.
[3480]again?
[3482]Hr. POSNER: Without any doubt.
[3484]SHERR: Cvoice-over] Posner also explained his views on the many conspiracy
[3485]theories about the assassination.
[3487]"ROBERT F. KENNEDY: ‘Did you say, ‘That 5.0. .B., I'11 break his back'?
[3488]JIMMY HOFFA: Who?
[3490]Mr. KENNEDY: You.
[3492]Mr. HOFFA: Who's the ‘who'?
[3494]SHERR: The Mafia wanted the President killed, because that would get rid of -
[3495]Bobby Kennedy, who was going after organized crime.
[3497]Mr. POSNER: I would not be surprised if the Mafia, in 1962 or ‘63, sat ata
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[3508]table with some of its key henchman, and discussed Killing President Kennedy.
[3509]They did hate him. They might have even had a conspiracy afoot. There is no tie
[3510]between Lee Harvey Oswald and organized crime. There's not opportunity for hia
[3511]to have been their assassin. In essence, he beat the Mafia to Kennedy.
[3513]SHERR: How about, as in the Oliver Stone movie, JFK, the military industrial
[3514]complex?
[3516]Mr. POSNER: The movie, JFK, served what I call the kitchen sink. If you can't
[3517]just have one of them, let's have everybody in the plot, because they all have
[3518]some reason to knock off Kennedy.
[3520]JIM GARRISON: We have the mystery of the assassination of the President solved,
[3521]and there.is no question about it.
[3523]SHERR: What about the Garrison investigation?
[3525]Mr. POSNER: He had great delusions on the assassination. I think it’s a
[3526]disgrace. It was a travesty of justice, a miscarriage of justice. Garrison knew
[3527]it. I discovered files of his investigation - documents, affidavits, memos from
[3528]his investigators - which showed the extent of this scam that was pulled an the
[3529]American public. Here was a’ man who knew better. I think his behavior actually
[3530]crossed the line to being criminal.
[3532]SHERR: Is there any evidence- do you believe at all that Lee Harvey Oswald was
[3533]working on behalf of the CIA to kill the President?
[3535]Mr. POSNER: No. I don't believe the CIA had any connection, not only to kill the
[3536]President, but they had no connection to Oswald at all. And the reason that [
[3537]can say that so confidently to you is actually an unusual source. It's the KGB
[3538]files. The KGB files, which had surveillance on Qswald for day in and day out
[3539]for nearly two years in Russia, came to the conclusion that he was not a sleeper
[3540]agent, that he had no American intelligence contact.
[3542]SHERR: [voice-over] So if Oswald wasn't working for the CIA, how about the KGB?
[3543]After all, he spoke Russian, defected to the Soviet Union in 1959, married, a
[3544]Russian, and lived in Minsk for two years.
[3546]‘He. POSNER:.A popular early theory, popular that we now see in the documents
[3547]just released this past week in Washington. The KGB was high on the CIA'S
[3548]possible List af targets. The KGB did not want Oswald from day one. They
[3549]realized Oswald had problems, psychological problems.
[3551]URI NOSENKO, Former KGB Agent: (sp?1 I do not think that Oswald will be trusted
[3552]by any intelligence. :
[3554]SHERR: Cvoice-over] Uri Nosenka is someone who might know. Before defecting to
[3555]the United States in 1943, Nasenko was Oswald's KGB handler, and had access to
[3556]his file. He insists Oswald never worked for the KGB. Still concerned about his.
[3557]own safety, Nosenko asked 20/20 not to show his face. ,
[3559]Mr. NOSENKO: Lee Harvey Oswald was mentally unstable.
[3561]SHERR: Cvoice-over] But unlike Posner, Naosenko says he doesn't believe Oswald
[3562]could have shat the President for a very simple reason.
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[3572]Mr. NOSENKO: In Minsk, he was shooting rabbits with shotgun. Would. you believe
[3574]it? He never shoot a single rabbit. And here we see person shooting rifle on a
[3575]long diStance, and shooting three, four shots in several seconds. ‘
[3577]Mr. POSNER: He didn't get a rabbit, and therefore that's used as evidence that
[3578]he couldn't kill the President? But talk to those who actually knew what Oswald
[3579]was like with a gun, his brother wha used to go out with him.
[3581]ROBERT OSWALD, Brother: We have shot cottontail rabbits with .22's on the run,
[3582]Okay? We've shot squirrels in the trees with .22's.
[3584]SHERR: [voice-over] Robert Oswald Says his younger brather was always interested
[3586]‘in guns. He still has the pistol Lee Oswald bought when he was 164.
[3588]Mr. OSWALD: My experience with him in the field with a shotgun or a .22 was he
[3589]usually got his game.
[3591]SHERR: Cvoice-over] And Lee Harvey Oswald used the same rifle that killed the
[3592]President only weeks earlier in a failed attempt to murder to retired Army
[3593]general Edwin Walker. In other words, according to author Gerald Posner, Oswald,
[3594]a loser in life, wanted to accomplish something. .
[3596]MAN: £7] Lee Harvey Oswald, 0, S, W, A, L, D.
[3597]REPORTER: Did you fire that rifle?
[3599]LEE HARVEY OSWALD: That's the facts that you people have been getting, but I
[3600]emphatically deny these charges.
[3602]SHERR: Cvoice~over] If, as you say, Lee Harvey Oswald was not working with the
[3603]mob or with the CIA or with the KGB or with the military industrial complex, why
[3604]did he kill the President?
[3606]Mr. POSNER: I think that Oswald killed the President, because this was ta he
[3607]almost his fulfillment, his moment in the sun. Three-days. before Kennedy arrives
[3608]in Dallas, he's given a gift on a silver platter. Jack Kennedy's going to pass
[3609]in front of the Depositary. It's nat ideology, it's not because he's Communist,
[3610]but it's because he has that opportunity to place himself in history. Here we
[3611]are, 30 years later, talking about him. He was successful. He got his wish.
[3613]WALTERS: Well, there's a lot of proof. Is the case closed?
[3615]SHERR: Well, certainly, Gerald Posner believes 50, but out experience is that
[3616]people on the other side are so dug in, it's unlikely anything is going to
[3617]change their mind. You know, even at Dealey Plaza, there are people just walking
[3619]around, telling you what their theories are. And incidentally, Barbara, Dealey
[3620]Plaza-
[3622]WALTERS: Which is where assassination took place.
[3623]SHERR: -which is where it took place-
[3624]WALTERS: Yeah.
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[3637]SHERR: It's so much smaller in real life-
[3639]WALTERS: Really?
[3641]SHERR: ~than it appears-
[3643]WALTERS: I think of it as a huge-
[3645]SHERR: Right.
[3647]WALTERS: -kind of highway.
[3649]SHERR: It's quite small, and Posner points out that if all the eyewitnesses wha
[3650]have come forward were in fact there that day, it would have been elbow to
[3651]elbow. In fact, it was not very crowded. that day. ;
[3653]WALTERS: Nine hundred thousand documents released this week- what, 10,000 more
[3654]to come. Is that going ta settle anything?
[3656]SHERR: Unlikely. That, however, is the one area where both sides agree -
[3657]unclassify all those documents. Otherwise- and even sa, this is going to be
[3658]argued for generations to come.
[3660]WALTERS: Probably. Probably. Thank you, Lynn.
[3662]Next, most people feel that breast cancer anly attacks women over the age of 50.
[3664]Cvoice-over] But Dr. Tim Johnson reports that more and more young women are
[3665]discovering they have a special battle to Fight. What should yau knaw? After
[3666]this.
[3668]{Commercial break]
[3670]It Could Happen to You
[3672]BARBARA WALTERS: The American Cancer Society's meetings on breast cancer are
[3673]taking place in Boston this week, and from that conference come reports of a
[3674]disturbing new trend - younger women diagnosed with the disease at a growing
[3675]rate. Though diagnostic tests have improved over the years, breast cancer. in
[3676]younger women presents a special and quite serious set of problems.
[3678]{voice-over] And as Dr. Tim Johnsan reports, if you are under 40, much of what
[3679]you previous learned about the disease may not apply ta you.
[3681]TERESA ROBERSON, Breast cancer Survivor: I had lumps before, they were all- they
[3682]turned out ta be cysts. But 1 knew this was different.
[3684]GAYLE RUSSELL, Breast Cancer Survivor: I had no history of any type of cancer in
[3685]my family, so I was very surprised.
[3687]KERIL DEARBORN, Breast Cancer Survivor: And everyone told me I was too young to
[3688]have breast cancer, and 1 thought they were right.
[3690]Or. TIMOTHY JOHNSON, ABC News Medical Editor: Cvoice-over] A disease they
[3691]thought they were toa young to get, but more and more, the woman on the
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[3700]LEVEL 1 - 15 OF 80 STORIES
[3702]Copyright 1993 Chicago Tribune Company
[3703]Chicago Tribune
[3705]Octaber 3, 1993 Sunday, FINAL EDITION
[3706]SECTION: TEMPO; Pg. 1; ZONE: C
[3707]LENGTH: 1949 words
[3709]HEADLINE: THE CASE AGAINST CONSPIRACY ;
[3710]GERALD POSNER, ACTING ALONE, HAS WOUNDED THE JFK COVER-UP INDUSTRY
[3712]BYLINE: By Paul Galloway, Tribune Staff Writer.
[3714]BODY:
[3715]The rendezvous was arranged for a weeknight last fall at a ‘Turkish restaurant
[3717]near CIA headquarters in Langley, Va. The proprietor would be expecting hia.
[3719]When author Gerald Posner said he was there ta meet George and his wife, as
[3720]he had been instructed to do, the proprietor led Posner and his wife, Trisha, to
[3721]a private table in the back room.
[3723]George was the code name for Yuri Nosenko, a KGB officer who defected ta the
[3724]U.S. in 1964 and now Lives under another name in an undisclosed part of the’
[3725]country. Posner was researching a book about the assassination of John F.
[3726]Kennedy, and Nasenka had agreed to speak for the first time exclusively about
[3727]the Soviet intelligence agency's surveillance of Lee Harvey Oswald during his
[3728]stay in the Soviet Union from late 1959 until June 1962. Nasenko had suggested
[3729]that he and Posner bring their wives, Posner said, because the sight of twa
[3730]couples dining together would serve as cover for their interview.
[3732]"Yuri supervised the Oswald file in Moscow and was familiar with the K&B
[3734]_ files on Oswald's time in Minsk, which I had seen," Posner said. "I knew he
[3736]could be extremely helpful in reconstructing that period 2f Oswald's life."
[3738]A chapter in Pasner's new book, "Case Closed: Lee Harvey Oswald and the
[3739]Assassination of JFK," is devoted to Nasenko and his assessments of Oswald.
[3741]As the title suggests, Posner finds Oswald ta be Kennedy's assassin, acting
[3742]alone, just as the Warren Commission said. Further, he was not a CIA agent, not
[3743]a KGB agent, not an innocent patsy but a saciopath and Loser who had grandiose
[3744]notions of making a mark in history.
[3746]Posner is as surprised at the book's: conclusion as the conspiracy buffs are
[3747]riled.
[3749]"I'm getting some very personal, vindictive calls from the conspiracy people.
[3750]If it's any consolation, I never set out to do a book that would say here is the
[3751]final answer, here is who did it," Posner said during a visit to Chicago.
[3753]Posner's intention was to write a primer of sorts about the assassination
[3754]after examining the welter of conspiracy theories to see what was credible and
[3755]what wasn't.
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[3768]Paking in the garbage
[3770]"When you read all the conspiracy books, it's apparent they can't all be
[3771]right because they flatly contradict each other," he said. "I knew there was
[3772]garbage on the record. I didn’t know how much."
[3774]After he debunked as many inaccuracies and false leads as he could, he
[3775]assumed there would be some issues that would require further investigation,
[3776]perhaps questions about acoustics or ballistics or possible Mafia involvement.
[3778]Yet toward the end of his research, Posner notified Bab Loomis, his editar at
[3779]Random House, that he had taken an unexpected turn.
[3781]“I was convinced the Warren Commission had gotten it right. The evidence was
[3782]overwhelming,” he said.
[3784]Posner also was aware, of course, that a large majority of the populace
[3785]thinks the Warren Commission had gotten it wrong, maybe on purpose.
[3787]He got a feel for such skepticism when Loomis, vice president and executive
[3788]editor of Random House, took his own poll at the next meeting of the publishing
[3789]house's top editors, who periodically gather to report on works in progress.
[3791]“Bab told them about what I'd found and asked how many believed the Warren-
[3792]Commission was right,* Posner said. "Remember, these are some of the brightest,
[3793]best-informed, best-educated. people in New York City, and no one raised a hand
[3794]except Bob Loomis."
[3796]Posner was not dismayed. “When peaple cite polls showing 70 or 80 or even 90
[3797]percent of the public as believing the assassination was the result of a
[3798]conspiracy, I say I’m surprised it's not 100 percent when you consider that
[3799]people have essentially heard only one side for three decades."
[3801]‘JFK' an ‘abominatian'
[3803]A 1978 congressional investigation estimated that ‘2,000 books, including
[3804]thase that are self-published, had been written on the subject. All but a
[3805]handful present a variety of sometimes~elaborate scenarios about plotters,
[3806]matives, killers and cover-ups, and as a rule, the conspiracy books make
[3807]bestseller lists, while the others dan't.
[3809]“Then there are the TV documentaries, which are invariably pro-conspiracy,"
[3810]Posner said. “A recent one was a five-hour British film for Arts & Entertainment
[3811]called ‘The Men Who Killed Kennedy.' “
[3813]And most influential of all, he said, is Oliver Stone's $50 million movie,
[3814]"JFK," released in late 1991.
[3816]“Half of our country's present population weren't born (as of) November 1943.
[3817]Stone's mavie is a historical abomination that's filled with demonstrable
[3818]falsehoods, but to young people, it's a documentary.
[3820]"Even if they read articles criticizing it, they say, ‘Well, Stone may have
[3822]exaggerated, but there's gat to be something there.' Believe it or not, there's
[3823]not."
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[3834]What's especially galling, Posner said, is that Stone based his movie on the
[3835]investigation of former New Orleans District Atty. Jim Garrison, including his
[3836]prosecution of businessman Clay Shaw as an alleged conspirator.
[3838]"Garrison's prosecution of Clay Shaw was disgraceful, criminal and has been
[3839]thoroughly discredited. There was coercion of witnesses and changing of ©
[3840]testimony," Posner said. "The jury took only 45 minutes to find Shaw not guilty,
[3841]and one of the jurors said it would have been 20 minutes but that several jurors
[3842]had to go to the bathroom."
[3844]Stone has said "JFK" was.a "“counter-myth" to the "myth" of the Warren
[3845]Commission.
[3847]The no-Longer magic bullet
[3849]Among the doctrines of conspiracy literature bolstered by "JFK, " Posner
[3850]noted, is that the so-called magic bullet found on Texas: Gov. John Cannally's
[3851]stretcher at Parkland Hospital was almost pristine, couldn't have struck Kennedy .
[3852]and Connally, as the Warren Commission said it did, without zigzagging in
[3853]sidair, and was probably planted.
[3855]"If ballistics tests didn't prove conclusively the bullet struck Kennedy. and
[3856]Connally, which they do, use your common sense," Posner said. "At the time the -
[3857]bullet was found, the conspirators wouldn't know if the bullets fired at "
[3858]Connally and Kennedy were still lodged in their bodies or had been recovered.
[3862]"If they wanted to shield the conspiracy, there can only be three shots.
[3864]More than that, and the single assassin doesn't have time to shoot. So why risk
[3866]exposing the conspiracy by planting a fourth bullet that wouldn't match
[3867]ballistically with remnants of the ather rounds?"
[3869]And what about Jack Ruby, the Chicago native who moved to Dallas to run strip
[3870]clubs? Did he just happen by the Dallas jail on Nov. 24 and shoot Oswald on the
[3871]spur of the moment?
[3873]"Ruby's murder of Oswald does more to undermine this case in terms of getting
[3874]the truth out than anything else," Posner said. "First, it prevents the trial of
[3875]Oswald, where the evidence would have convicted him. It also gives us a second
[3876]assassin, with ties to organized crime. It's hard for people to believe this was
[3877]a coincidence, so you're aff and running with a conspiracy.”
[3879]Posner's account of Ruby’ § life and his actions during the assassination week
[3881]demolishes any notion he was a conspirator.
[3883]According to the trade journal Publishers Weekly, six books by major
[3884]publishers will appear this fall to coincide with the 30th anniversary of the
[3885]assassination, with "Case Closed" standing alone in itS anti-conspiracy stance.
[3887]Posner has been heartened by promising sales and positive reviews. "Many
[3888]readers are put off by conspiracy books that select only material that's
[3889]favorable to their position, whether it checks out or not. I think these people
[3890]are buying the book."
[3892]Thumbs up from the critics
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[3905]Three weeks after its release, it is eighth on The New York Times national
[3906]best-seller list and seventh on the Tribune's List af Chicago's best sellers.
[3908]U.S. News & World Report, which ran excerpts from "Case Closed," writes:
[3909]“Posner achieves the unprecedented. He sweeps away decades of polemical smoke,
[3910]layer by layer, and builds an unshakable case against JFK's killer . . . Lee
[3911]Harvey Oswald." It quotes. Stephen Ambrose, biographer of Dwight Eisenhower and
[3912]Richard Nixon: “The chapter on the (magic) bullet is a tour de force, absolutely
[3913]brilliant, absolutely convincing."
[3915]New York Times book critic Christopher Lehmann-Haupt writes that "Posner
[3916]effectively refutes hundreds of claims that have added up ta conspiracy
[3917]heories."
[3919]In a Tribune review, author Jeffrey Toobin writes that "Case Closed" is
[3920]“utterly convincing in its thesis, which seems, in light of ail that has
[3921]transpired over the past 30 years, almost revolutionary."
[3923]Posner, 39, didn't set out to be a writer, instead complying with the wishes
[3924]af his father, a union official in San Francisco. "My father dealt with a lot of
[3925]lawyers. He said, ‘Son, these fellows charge fees you can't believe.’ "
[3927]So Posner attended law school at the University of California at Berkeley,
[3928]where he was an honor student, then joined a prestigious Wall Street law firm,
[3929]leaving two years later to form his own firm.
[3931]In 1981 he represented Jewish victims of Dr. Josef Mengele, the notorious
[3932]Nazi war criminal who escaped from Germany after World War II and died in hiding
[3934]in South Auerica.
[3936]"It waS a pro bono case, and I sued the Mengele family and the German
[3937]government," Posner said. “Nothing came of the suit, but I accumulated 25,000
[3938]documents about Mengele, so I thought I'd write a book."
[3940]"Mengele: The Complete Story," which he co-wrote with John Ware, was
[3941]published in 1984, prompting Posner to leave the law-and write full time.
[3943]"Case Closed" is his fifth book. “A weakness of mine is that I tend to
[3944]underestimate the difficulty of each project I undertake. This was true with
[3945]this book, but as I kept going I kept finding answers to things I didn't think I
[3946]could get answers to."
[3948]The real cover-ups
[3950]Posner agrees with critics of the Warren Commission who say its investigation
[3951]was flawed.
[3953]"There was a cover-up by the FBI and the CIA, but they weren't attempting to
[3954]conceal their involvement in the murder of the president but rather their own
[3955]inefficiency and bungling," Posner said. "I go inta detail in exposing these
[3957]cover-ups, but they can't be interpreted as evidence of conspiracy."
[3959]The Warren Commission's work also was tarnished by a dubious finding of the
[3960]1978 investigation by the Hause Select Committee on Assassinations, Posner said.
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[3973]"The committee's acoustics experts tested a Dictabelt recording of radia
[3974]traffic on Dallas police channels. and said they were 95 percent certain there
[3975]had been a fourth shot, therefore a second shooter and a conspiracy."
[3977]A retest by the National Academy of Sciences discredited the committee's
[3978]experts, concluding that the recording was made a minute after the shooting,
[3979]Posner said.
[3981]Half of "Case Closed" is a meticulaus examination of Oswald's entire life,
[3982]culminating in an almost day-by-day chronicle of his movements in the last two
[3983]aonths before the assassination. “Many conspiracy books almost ignore Oswald.
[3984]But he's the key, and it's amazing how much is known about him," Posner said.
[3985]"It's certainly enough to disprove all the theories that he was a spy or a
[3987]patsy.
[3989]"My technigue was to go to Original sources. Tao many books quote secondary
[3990]sources, some of which are passing on misinformation, which means the garbage is
[3991]disseminated again and again, becoming fact.
[3993]“Here's an example. 'JFK' opens with Rose Cheramie, a prostitute, warning her
[3994]doctors that the Kennedy assassination is going to take place in Dallas and
[3995]naming Ruby as involved. I found her doctor, who said she was psychotic and
[3996]didn't mention the assassination until the day after it happened or Ruby until
[3998]the day after he killed Oswald."
[4000]Posner paused. "I can go on."
[4002]GRAPHIC: PHOTO GRAPHIC
[4004]PHOTO (color): Gerald Posner, debunker of conspiracy theorists, at Smyth
[4005]School on West 13th Street, which Jack Ruby attended. Tribune photo by Charles
[4006]Cherney. —
[4008]GRAPHIC: The three shots. From: "Case Closed: Lee Harvey Oswald and the
[4009]Assassination of JFK," by Gerald Posner (Random House, Sept. 1, 1993.)
[4010]See microfilm for complete graphic.
[4012]LANGUAGE: ENGLISH
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