[1]'[198-10008-10119
[3]| 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
[5]JFK Assassination System Date: 6/24/201
[6]Identification Form
[7]Agency Information
[8]AGENCY: ARMY
[9]RECORD NUMBER: — 198-10008-10119 ~
[10]RECORD SERIES: CALIFANO PAPERS
[11]AGENCY FILE NUMBER : :
[12]Document Information
[13]ORIGINATOR: ARMY
[14]FROM: JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR.
[15]TO: CAPT. ZUMWALT ET AL
[16]TITLE: = ICCCA: ACTIONS TAKEN DURING JULY-AUGUST 1963 IN CURBING CUBAN SUBVERSION
[17]DATE: 10/14/1963
[18]PAGES: 20
[19]SUBJECTS :
[20]COUNTERSUBVERSION PROGRAM
[21]TRAVEL OF LATIN AMERICANS TO CUBA
[22]CUBAN SUBVERSION
[23]DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[24]CLASSIFICATION: — Secret
[25]RESTRICTIONS : 1A; 4
[26]CURRENT STATUS : Redact
[27]DATE OF LAST REVIEW: — 06/01/1998
[29]COMMENTS :
[32]HY 50955 Doactd: 324274608
[34]OPENING CRITERIA :
[36]Califano Papers, Box 2, Folder 25. Memo No. 71 from Joseph Califano with attached report of
[37]Subcommittee on Subversion. :
[39]VEK faview
[41]Se Declassity
[43]Authority,
[45]Review Date AUIS. Py Lkden fo 9
[46]NO STATE OBJECTION
[48]apartment ot ha EO tee
[49]ude EA Exempt
[51]TO DEGLASSIFICATION
[52]BY_gf bare WEG
[54]Page 1
[56]82 OCT ies |
[58]MEMORANDUM NO. 71 FOR CAPTAIN =. a. RUMWALT, 3IR., USN (SD)
[59]“ Ait. D ALGER, USA
[60]W. WENDT, USN
[61]GENERAL 3. W. GARPENTER, Wl, UGAP
[62]BRIGADIER GENERAL Ww. ow JONES, USMG
[64]SUBIEGT: interdapartenantal Coordiusting Committers of Gahan Atfainet
[65]Actions Taken During July-August 1963 ta Curbing Cuban
[66]Sabvercion in Latin America
[68]Attached is the finel report of the Subcommittee on Subversion on
[69]Actions Taken During July-August 1963 in Curbing Guban Gubversion in.
[71]ieatin America.
[72]Signed
[73]Joseph A. Califano,Jr.
[74]doeeph A. Califans, Je.
[75]General Counsel
[76]Attachment
[77]Ae Stated
[79]oo.
[80]wee Boe eating (OSD)
[82]Mr. Califano
[84]Mt Col Haigs i
[85]ASG
[86]Wa
[88]seer wR PROG |
[89]RECRADED | UNCLASSTFIED WHEN SEPARATED
[90]SECRET FROM CLASSIFIED INCLOSURES
[91]a
[93]HY 50955 Docld: 327424608 Page 2
[96]Le
[97]— @ This a) He
[99], nt consist
[100]SECRET No43. or Le S of LG Pages
[101]— “*F Copies, Series
[103]REPORT OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE ON CUBAN SUBVERSION:
[104]ACTIONS TAKEN DURING JULY-AUGUST 1963
[106]IN CURBING CUBAN SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA
[108]SECRET
[110]364, ASG Control! Nor. 3 24.
[111]Win by GRoUP 1
[112]Excluded fr
[113]downgrading
[114]declassifica
[116]OM automatie
[117]and
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[122]SECRET
[124]1. Control of Travel to and from Cuba
[126]Central Intelligence enc
[128]a. Developed highly useful information on frequency
[129]of Cuban "chartered" flights to Brazil, names and nationali-
[130]ties of passengers and crew, and lax measures of control
[131]followed by Brazilian authorities. Transmitted this informa-
[132]tion to station chiefs in the Latin American countries of the
[133]non-Brazilians travelling on those flights.
[135]b. Maintained close watch over travel to and from
[136]Cuba. See Annex B for table of known travel of Latin
[137]Americans during July and August.
[139]c. As a result of information furnished to him by
[140]the CIA Station in Buenos Aires and with the Station's urging,
[141]the Argentine Minister of Interior indicated that he would
[142]make every effort to prevent Argentine delegates from attend-
[143]ing the International Union of Architects Congress in Havana.
[145]d. At the urging of the CIA Station and the Embassy,
[146]the Bolivian Minister of Interior issued in mid-July an
[147]order prohibiting the granting of travel permits to Cuba or
[148]other bloc countries to Bolivian nationals.
[150]e. Partly as a result of the efforts of the CIA
[151]station in Santiago, the Government of Chile prohibited the
[152]entry into Chile of organizers of the Cuban-sponsored Second
[153]Latin American Youth Congress, which had been scheduled to
[154]take place in Santiago in August. This was one of the
[155]factors which led to postponement of the Congress.
[157] £. After considerable prodding by the CIA Station
[158]and the Embassy the Minister of Public Security of Costa
[159]Rica presented legislative proposals to the Costa Rican
[160]Assembly which will require all persons intending to travel
[161]to Communist countries to have their travel approved by a
[162]newly created Costa Rican security agency.
[164]g. CIA Station in Mexico City developed information
[165]concerning the clandestine arrival of passengers in Vera Cruz
[167]GROUP 1 SECRET
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[171]SECRET
[172]“De
[174]on Cuban merchant ships. Efforts are being made to obtain
[175]more information and to encourage stricter controls by the
[176]Mexican authorities.
[178]Department of State
[180]a. Instructed Embassy Conakry to try to persuade
[181]Guinean authorities to deny use of airport facilities by
[182]flights on Habana-Moscow route. These efforts achieved a
[183]temporary withholding of permission for future regular flights,
[184]at least until such time as the Soviets develop their own
[185]refueling facilities at Conakry.
[187]b. Instructed Embassy Rio to approach Brazilian
[188]authorities to express our deep concern at the growing
[189]frequency of Cuban non-scheduled flights to Brazil and request
[190]their cooperation in curbing them. Also instructed our
[191]Embassies in several Latin American countries to work with CIA
[192]station chiefs in furnishing the names of nationals of those
[193]countries travelling on these flights to local authorities _
[194]and urging them: (1) to institute tighter controls on their
[195]own citizens travelling to Cuba, and (2) to express their
[196]concern to the Brazilian Government over Cuban use of Brazil
[197]as a way station for transporting subversives.
[199]c. As a result of representations made to the
[200]British Government about Cuban flights to the Cayman Islands
[201]carrying Latin American subversives, the British developed
[202]an administrative scheme which will effectively prohibit the
[203]use of British Caribbean dependencies by Cubana as transit
[204]points for passengers. The British intend to require transit
[205]visas of passengers passing through their areas, and to
[206]reject applications. for such visas except in certain special
[207]cases. Persons not possessing visas would be prevented from
[208]leaving their aircraft, or would be returned to their point
[209]of origin.
[211]d. Instructed Embassy Mexico City on August 29 to
[212]inform the Mexican airline CMA that the United States is
[213]opposed to a proposal that CMA operate charter flights to
[215]. SECRET
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[219]SECRET
[222]carry refugees from Habana to Central America. CMA, as a
[223]result, stated that they had no intention of proceeding
[224]further with this project.
[226]e. Instructed our missions in Curacao. and the Hague
[227]to investigate a report that KLM was planning to renew
[228]scheduled Curacao-Habana flights and to reiterate US
[229]opposition to resumption of air service to Cuba. KLM assured
[230]our Embassy that there is no plan to initiate service,
[231]scheduled or non-scheduled, to Habana.
[233]£. Instructed Embassy Ottawa to express our strong
[234]objections to a proposal that a Cubana charter flight pick
[235]up a second group of U.S. students in Montreal to fly them
[236]to Cuba. The flight was not authorized.
[238]g- Instructed Consulate Georgetown to investigate
[239]Cubana approaches to secure flight facilities. Mission
[240]reported on August 1 that the Governor bad no knowledge of
[241]any talks between the B.G. Ministry of Communications and
[242]the Cuban Government regarding landing rights for Cubana
[243]planes. The Governor indicated his intention to inquire
[244]further and to keep us advised. London reported that neither
[245]the Cuban nor the British Guiana Governments had raised the.
[246]issue of landing rights with H.M.G.
[248]h. Urged the governments of Mexico, Canada, Jamaica
[249]and the Netherlands to refuse to assist the Cuban Government
[250]in its efforts to find a short route for return of the 58
[251]American students who illegally travelled to Cuba. Also
[252]informed Pan American Airways that we were opposed to a Cuban
[253]request for a PAA charter flight to fly the students from
[254]Habana to New York.
[256]i. Instructed our missions at Port of Spain and
[257]Barbados on several occasions to approach these governments
[258]to express the concern of the U.S. at indications of Cuban
[259]interest in the use of their aviation facilities.
[261]Embassy Port of Spain discussed with the Foreign Secretary
[262]of Trinidad various legal moves available that would enable
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[268]SECRET
[269]Ge
[271]GOTT to control movements of aircraft within their territory,
[272]citing examples of such controls instituted by Mexico, Canada
[273]and Ireland. He indicated receptiveness to the proposal that
[274]the list of suggestions be made available to the aviation
[275]officials concerned.
[277]j. During a previous reporting period Embassy
[278]Santiago urged the government of Chile to refuse visas to
[279]Cuban delegated to a preparatory meeting for the II Latin
[280]American Youth Congress scheduled for August in the Chilean
[281]capital. Inability of Cuban delegates to chtain Chilean
[282]visas for this meeting is one of the contributing factors to
[283]the Cuban sponsors announcing during August that the meeting
[284]had been postponed.
[286]k. Sent general instructions to our missions in
[287]countries which participate in the International Union of
[288]Architects asking them to urge the coop:ration of governmental
[289]authorities in preventing or discouraging the attendance of
[290]their nationals to the VII UIA Congress in Habana, September
[291]29 - October 4, 1963. Followed this up with instructions to
[292]individual posts to try where feasible to dissuade
[293]architects from free world countries from serving on the jury
[294]for the selection of a Bay of Pigs monument.
[296]1. Urged Canadian Government to block a plan to
[297]commence food parcel shipments to Cuba on a commercial basis
[298]that would have required the establishment of scheduled
[299]weekly charter flights by Canadian planes.
[301]2. Control of Movement of Cuban Propaganda
[302]Central Intelligence Agency
[304]Responding to the urging of the CIA Station, police
[305]of the State of Guanabara seized large quantities of
[306]propaganda brought into Brazil by passengers on the special
[307]Cubana flights. For example, some 50 pounds of printed
[308]propaganda was taken from the various passengers who arrived
[309]on the 16 August Cubana flight.
[311]SECRET
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[315]SECRET
[317]3. Control of Clandestine Movement of Guerrillas and Arms
[319]Department of Defense
[321]a. Continued surveillance of the area surrounding
[322]Cuba during the months of July and August at the same rate
[323]and with the same emphasis as prior to 1 July 1963.
[325]b. Continued to maintain U.S. Forces, primarily from
[326]within the Atlantic Command, available to assist other
[327]Caribbean governments in the interception of suspicious craft.
[328]in territorial waters, as might be requested. No such
[329]requests were received from any other government during the
[330]period covered by this report. However, U.S. Forces did keep
[331]track of the location of the Soviet merchant freighter
[332]MITCHURINSK, which was suspected of carrying subversives and
[333]arms from Cuba to British Guiana in mid-July. MITCHURINSK
[334]was under U.S. surveillance from its departure from Habana.
[335]until United Kingdom forces assumed the task of keeping this
[336]ship under surveillance upon its approach to Georgetown,
[337]British Guiana. Subsequeatly, British police search of
[338]MITCHURINSK in British Guiana waters revealed nothing of a
[339]suspicious nature.
[341]Central Intelligence Agency
[343]At the repeated urging of the CIA Station in Lima,
[344]the Peruvian Government late in August published a new anti-
[345]terrorists law providing a penalty of no less than five
[346]years imprisonment for persons who participate in guerrilla
[347]activities or in the illegal manufacture of weapons or
[348]explosives.
[350]The Peruvian National Intelligence Service is working
[352]on a lead furnished by the CIA Station in Lima concerning a
[353]290 ton vessel reportedly involved in arms traffic.
[355]Department of State
[357]Instructed our Consulate General in Georgetown to
[358]investigate reports that commercial cargoes (which could
[360]SECRET
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[364]SECRET
[366]conceal illicit arms traffic out of Cuba) had developed
[367]between British Guiana and Cuba. Investigations to date
[368]have been negative.
[370]4. Control of Transfer of Funds
[372]Department of State
[374]Cooperated with the Foreign Assets Control Office
[375]of the Treasury Department in developing blocking controls
[376]with respect to Cuba which went into effect on July 9, 1963.
[378]5. Strengthening of Counter-Insurgency Capabilities
[380]Department of Defense
[382]a. Continued the installation of military communica-
[383]tions facilities in Latin America. Operational dates for
[384]the multi-channel radio stations to be installed in Managua,
[385]Nicaragua and Tegucigalpa, Honduras have been delaved to 15
[386]October 1963 and 15 December 1963, respectively because of
[387]new engineering and contractual requirements. Negotiations
[388]are continuing with Colombia and Ecuador for installation
[389]of U.S. military radio facilities. Completion of a new
[390]commercial trans-isthmian cable in the Panama Canal Zone
[391]within the coming month is expected to improve military
[392]communications within the United States and the Commander-
[393]in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command.
[395]b. Continued the surveillance of Cuba by U.S.
[396]Forces, reporting as before to U.S. commanders, organiza~
[397]tions and agencies. Reports of surveillance have been
[398]disseminated to all who have a requirement to know.
[400]ec. Established a 24 hour per day, 7 day per week
[401]duty watch at the U.S. Military Groups in the Caribbean
[402]countries in conjunction with implementation of the military
[403]alerting system. Continued efforts to staff the U.S.
[404]Southern Command Intelligence Center with properly cleared,
[405]trained personnel (this center is the military focal point
[406]for relaying information concerning the movement of
[407]subversives). Filled, partially, the authorized billets in
[409]SECRET
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[413]SECRET
[414]-J-
[416]the U.S. Southern Command Intelligence Center and took
[417]under consideration the problem of an increase in the billet
[418]structure in the Center. The Commander-in-Chief, U.S.
[419]Southern Command together with his intelligence officer
[420]visited Honduras and Nicaragua and determined that no
[421]significant problems existed which would interfere with
[422]effective operations in those countries.
[424]d. Action previously initiated by the Commander,
[425]U.S. Naval Forces, Southern Command (COMUSNAVSO0) to establish
[426]a Small Craft Inspection and Training Team (SCIATT) as a
[427]contribution to the Caribbean Surveillance System is progress-
[428]ing satisfactorily. Permanent assignment of U.S. Coast Guard
[429]personnel to SCIATT in the Canal Zone has been approved and
[430]the U.S. Coast Guard has taken appropriate implementing
[431]actions. ,
[433]e. During the period of this report, the SCIATT con-
[434]ducted an on-the-job training course at Puntarenas, Costa
[435]Rica. Training was given to 13 members of the Guardia Civil
[436]of Costa Rica who were either newly assigned to the 40 foot
[437]Coast Guard utility boats (CGUBs) or were to be assigned as
[438]replacement crew members.
[440]£. A quarterly inspection and evaluation of the CGUBs
[441]provided other Central American countries was conducted
[442]during the period 17 to 31 August by a mobile training team
[443](MTT) made up of SCIATT personnel.
[445]g- Continued efforts to improve the internal security
[446]of Latin American armies through the provision of Intelligence
[447]Advisors. Presently there are such advisors assigned to 14
[448]Latin countries, emphasizing counterintelligence and counter-
[449]subversion.
[451]h. During the reporting period MITs conducted train-
[452]ing in counterinsurgency for the armed forces of Colombia,
[453]Bolivia, Venezuela, Peru and El Salvador.
[455]i. Civic Action MITs were sent to Guatemala, Bolivia,
[456]Colombia, El Salvador, Jamaica and Ecuador.
[458]SECRET
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[462]SECRET
[466]6. Exchange of Intelligence on Cuban Subversion
[467]Central Intelligence Agency
[469]CIA Stations throughout Latin America continued in
[470]a great majority of countries to furnish to the local internal
[471]security organizations with whom they are in liaison informa-
[472]tion concerning travelers to and from Cuba, as well as such
[473]information as came to CIA's attention concerning the movement
[474]of funds, arms and propaganda material. In many instances,
[475]the furnishing of information to the internal security
[476]service by the CIA Station was paralleled by the furnishing of
[477]similar information to the Foreign Office by the Ambassador
[478]or his representative. The response to this information has
[479]varied greatly. The Central American countries, in general,
[480]began to pay greater attention to the information and act on
[481]it. At the other extreme, the Brazilian Government during
[482]the reporting period showed little inclination to follow up
[483]on the information. ,
[485]Department of State
[487]a. Reiterated to the Foreign Minister of Peru our
[488]. interest in having the facts of the Puerto Maldonado incident
[489]brought to the attention of the OAS, and urged that this
[490]action be taken as soon as possible.
[492]b. Urged the Government of Guatemala to submit
[493]evidence of communist activity to the OAS.
[495]7. Surveillance of Cuban Diplomatic, Commercial and Cultural
[497]Missions
[499]Department of State
[501]Instructed Embassy La Paz to foilow up closely on
[502]charges of involvement by the Cuban mission in internal
[503]policies of Bolivia, and, at the Embassy's discretion, to
[504]point out to Bolivian officials the opportunity for a possible
[505]break in relations with Cuba. Embassy La Paz was not able to
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[511]SECRET
[514]press for a break when the evidence of Cuban intervention
[515]did not prove to be as conclusive as originally reported.
[517]8. Other Special Actions
[519]Department of State
[521]a. Obtained action by the COAS on July 3 on the
[522]Lavalle Committee Report transmitting the document to the
[523]governments and urging them to implement the specific and
[524]general recommendations contained therein as soon as
[525]possible.
[527]b. Through Embassy Managua informed the Nicaraguan
[528]Government of the matters which we wanted to have considered
[529]“during the informal meeting of the Ministers of Security and
[530]Intericr of the Isthmian countries held in Managua, August
[531]26-28 in preparation for the second formal meeting of the
[532]Managua Security Conference countries later this year.
[534]c. Explained in detail the nature of the Cuban
[535]threat and the related policy objectives of the U.S., during
[536]conversation in London and in Washington with Mr. Adam Watson,
[537]newly appointed British Ambassador to Cuba.
[539]United States Information Agency
[541]a. The Agency's press service during the reporting
[542]period transmitted 12 articles, commentaries, and back-
[543]grounders on its wireless file service to USIA posts through-
[544]out Latin America for placement in the local newspapers and
[545]the Voice of America Spanish broadcasts to Latin America
[546]carried a total of 28 commentaries and features on the subject
[547]of Cuban-based subversion. These stories were designed to
[548]alert people in Latin America to the dangers of this
[549]subversion.
[551]b. In response to standing Agency instructions to
[552]give special attention to developments related to Cuba-based
[554]subversion, USIA posts in Latin America were prompt in
[555]reporting incidents and in providing editorial comments from
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[561]SECRET
[564]the Latin American press, all of which was used in the
[565]Agency's radio and press output.
[567]The main developments treated in the Agency's radio
[568]and press coverage included Castro's July 26 speech urging
[569]revolutions in Latin America, the discovery of terrorist
[570]weapons factories in Guayaquil, the Ecuadorean Vice
[571]President's accusation of Cuban responsibility for terrorism,
[572]the Cuban use of Grand Cayman as a way station for subversive
[573]elements from Cuba, the expulsion from the University of a
[574]Bolivian youth leader for receiving funds from Cuba,
[575]Castro-trained guerrillas in Honduras, and Bolivian protests
[576]against meddling by the Cuban Embassy in the miner's strike.
[577]A Voice of American roving reporter in Latin America
[578]provided several reports on the subversion picture in coun-
[579]tries he visited.
[581]c. In support of the Agency's effort on Cuban-based
[582]subversion, the publications center in Mexico began work on
[583]three pamphlets during the period based on Castro's report
[584]of his visit to the Soviet Union (showing that he contradicted
[585]himself in some of his extravagant claims of Soviet progress),
[586]the losses suffered by Cuban labor under Castro, and the
[587]fate of political prisoners in Cuba. When completed, these
[588]pamphlets will be reproduced and distributed in quantity
[589]throughout the area.
[591]SECRET
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[595]SECRET
[596]ANNEX A
[597]CIA Intelligence Annex
[599]1. Travel to and from Cuba
[601]“Brazil
[602]Chartered Cubana airlines flights between Cuba and
[603]Brazil have become a major means of transporting non-Cuban
[604]Latin Americans to and from Cuba. The five such flights
[605]since late July have carried nearly 400 non-Cubans.
[607]The first of the recent series -- on 25 July --
[608]brought 7i Latin American passengers to Havana for the
[609]26 July celebrations. The other four flights -- on 15,
[610]22, 28 and 29 August -- transported over 200 Latin
[611]Americans to Brazil from Havana. Some of the aixcraft
[612]involved returned to Cuba with smaller numbers cf passen-
[613]gers. Many of the 200 Latin American passengers had
[614]been delegates to the 26 July ceremonies, but others had
[615]apparently been in Cuba for longer periods and some had
[616]probably received training there. Of the passengers on
[617]these four flights to Brazil, 75 were natives of
[618]Caribbean area countries. Their circuitous travel through
[619]Brazil was evidently designed to help conceal the fact
[620]that they had been in Cuba,
[622]Costa Rica
[624]Two Costa Ricans were among the passengers on a
[625]chartered Cubana plane which was turned back to Havana
[626]at Grand Cayman on 11 July 1963. One was Luz Marina
[627]Hernandez Salazar, the only Costa Rican woman known to
[628]have been sent to Cuba for training as a guerrilla
[629]warfare instructor. She had been in Cuba since September
[630]1962. The other Costa Rican passenger was Carlos Guillen,
[631]former head of the Costa Rican Society of Friends of
[632]the Cuban Revolution, who had been in Cuba since November
[633]1962.
[635]SECRET
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[639]SECRET
[640]- 2
[642]Eecvador
[644]The CIA Station in Quito reports that the military
[645]junta, which assumed power in Ecuador on 11 July, can
[646]be expected to follow the guidance of the Embassy and
[647]the Station in controlling travel to and from Cuba and
[648]the Soviet bloc. The activities of Cuban subversives
[649]in Fevador, at least for the present, have been greatly
[650]inhibited by the mass arrests of Commmists and pro-
[651]Cubans and by the outlawing of the Comaunist Party by
[652]the junta.
[654]Honduras
[656]It is reported that the Fonduran Communist Party
[657]has issued orders to its members not to attempt to
[658]travel to Cuba at the present time. This action is
[659]apparently the result of the increasing vigilance of
[660]the Honduran government and the greater implemertation
[661]of stricter travel controls.
[663]2. Movement of Cuban Propaganda
[664]Guatemala
[666]According to an unconfirmed report received in July,
[667]a Bureau of Information of the Communist Party of
[668]Guatemala is being formed in collaboration with Prensa
[669]Latina and is to be managed clandestinely. It expects
[670]to receive news by shortwave radio from Cuba and print
[671]bulletins for distribution by radio stations. This may
[672]indicate a pattern by which Prensa Latina will attempt
[673]to distribute on a more clandestine basis in other areas
[674]in Latin America.
[676]Honduras
[678]It was reliably reported that in mid-July 1963, a
[679]small coastal freighter landed 14 large boxes of Communist
[680]propaganda on the northern coast of Honduras, the boxes
[682]having been transferred at sea from a larger vessel. The
[683]report has not been confirmed.
[685]SECRET
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[689]SECRET
[692]3. Movement of Guerrillas and Arms
[694]Argentina
[696]Extremist members of the Peronist Party, apparently
[697]under the leadership of such figures as Hector Villalon
[698]and John William Cooke, were reported to be receiving
[699]encouragément and promises of large sums of money from
[700]Cuba in support of their efforts to train and crganize
[701]subversive groups in Argentina. Villalon has stated
[702]that his plan calls for expanding and accellerating
[703]subversive activities in Argentina culminating in a
[704]complete take over within two years. There is no indica-
[705]tion that Peron himself has agreed to this plan. It has
[706]been reported that leaders of the Communist Party of
[707]Argentina have been greatly annoyed by the tendency of
[708]the Castro regime to support the revolutionary Peronists
[709]without having consulted the Communist Party of Argentina.
[711]It is reported that the so-called Army of Pational
[712]Liberation (ANL) of Argentina, which is a relatively
[713]small Castroist organization directed from Cuba by
[714]John William Cooke, has in recent weeks been negotiating
[715]for the purchase of arms and has been offered submachine
[716]guns, bazookas and other weapons by two or three private
[717]suppliers. It was reported, however, that the ANL was —
[718]having difficulty getting enough dollars from Cuba to
[719]make significant purchases possible.
[721]Bolivia
[723]The Bolivian Ministry of Foreign Relations on 23
[724]August protested formally to the Cuban Chargé d'Affaires
[725]in La Paz against the Cuban Embassy support to the miners
[726]during the recent crisis. Subsequently, however, Foreign
[727]Minister Fellman informed the Cuban Chargé that he need
[728]not fear that the Government of Bolivia would break
[729]diplomatic relations with Cuba, There has, in fact, been
[730]no hard information linking the Cuban Embassy with the
[731]present mining crisis in spite of some unconfirmed
[732]reports of Cuban support.
[734]SECRET
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[738]SECRET
[741]Brazil
[743]Cuban Ambassador to Brazil, Raul Roa Kouri, is
[744]reported to have attempted to encourage peasant league
[745]leader Francisco Julio to revitalize the leagues in
[746]northern Brazil. According to some reports efforts are
[747]being made to unify the leadership and bring dissident
[748]elements under the general direction of Juliao. Other
[749]reports indicate that, although the Cuban Embassy is
[750]providing guidance and possibly financial support to the
[751]movement, it had not yet resolved the internal dissension
[752]in the leagues.
[754]Colombia
[756]From Coletkia reports have been received of incre-
[757]asing Cubai assistance, primarily in the form of training
[758]courses by instructors who have been trained in Cuba,
[759]to the Worker-Student~-Feasant Movement (MOEC). A small
[760]guerrilla band encountered by the Colombian army in
[761]Juiy 1963 was broken up when five members of ithe band
[762]were killed and two others captured. A smali quantity
[763]of arms and a considerable amount of books and pamphlets
[764]on revolutionary warfare, photographs of Fidel Castro,
[765]Camilo Cienfuegos and Mao Tse-tung, and bulletins of
[766]the MOEC were found at the camp site. Recent reports
[767]have indicated an increase in the terrorist efforts of
[768]the MOEC and increased promises of assistance from Che
[769]Guevara with regard te the training of additional MOEC
[770]members.
[772]Costa Rica
[774]There have been a number of unconfirmed reports
[775]alleging small-scale training of revolutionaries on
[776]Costa Rican territory for guerrilla activity in
[777]Nicaragua. For example, in mid-July an increased number
[778]of guerrillas were reportedly being trained in Costa Rica
[779]by Adolfo Garcia Barberena, well-known Nicaraguan
[780]revolutionary leader and member. of the FLN (National
[781]Libération Front -~- a Communist-dominated, Cuban-supported,
[783]SECRET.
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[787]SECRET
[788]- 5 -
[790]anti-Nicaragua revolutionary group). In early August,
[791]Alberto Serrato, leader of the FLN in Cdsta Rica, ©
[792](reportedly left with a group of Nicaraguaéng’ for the
[793]Costa Ricdan-Nitaraguan border. Another téport indicatéd
[794]that Hector Bogantes Zamora, Costa Rican agitator was
[795]supposed to have left San Jose in mid-August for the
[796]Nicaraguan border to supervise the passage of Nicaraguan
[797]guerrillas from Costa Rica into Nicaragua. Bogantes,
[799]who recently returned from attending the May Dey celebra-
[800]tions in Cuba, is said to have been assigned this
[801]responeibility by the Costa Rican Communist Party.
[803]So far as we know, the GON, which is normally well-
[804]informed and highly sensitive to such activities on its
[805]borders, has not made any complaints or otherwise signified
[806]concern or awareness of these reported activities.
[808]Honduras
[810]The Honduran armed forces began to move agsinst a
[811]group of pro-Castro guerrillas operating egainst the
[812]Nicaraguan Government and active in the vicinity of the
[813]Nicaraguan-Honduran border. The Nicaraguan National Guard
[814]has been conducting operations on its side of the border
[815]against the insurgents since July. The dense jungle and
[816]difficult terrain, however, will impede the efforts of
[817]both forces to eliminate the guerrillas.
[819]Information on the guerrilla force is scanty and
[820]conflicting. It is apparently composed of members of the
[821]National Liberation Front (FLN), a Communist~-dominated
[822]and Cuban-supported revolutionary organization active
[823]primarily in Honduras and Nicaragua since the fall of
[824]1962. The strength of the force is not known.
[826]Nicaragua
[828]A captured guerrilla of the FLN (National Liberation
[829]Front - a Communist-dominated, Cuban-supported, anti-
[830]Nicaraguan group) confessed that he was a member of a
[831]group of 46 who entered Nicaragua from Honduras on 22 July.
[833]SECRET .
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[837]e  &
[838]SECRET .
[841]He said that their mission was to establish a base camp
[843]in the Isabella mountains, Department of Jinotega, in
[844]order to indoctrinate the peasants. and to train them in
[845]guerrilla tactics. He admitted that he had received six
[846]months’ puerrilla warfare training in Cuba and that other
[847]FLN leaders had received similar training. He also said
[848]that the FLN training camp in Honduras was near Fl Lagarto,
[849]on the Patuca River.
[851]4. Transfer of Funds
[852]British Guiana
[854]In British Guiana, Guiana Import-Export Corporation
[855](Gimpex) received a one million dollar advance payment
[856]deposited by the Cuban Alimpex Corporation fcr goods to
[857]be delivered to Cuba in the future. Gimpex has, in turn,
[858]loaned this money to the Government of British Guiana.
[859]Cheddi Jagan's People's Progressive Party is the major
[860]stockholder in Gimpex. Mohammed Kassim, Manager of Gimpex,
[861]has indicated that Gimpex will be able to secure additional
[862]loans from Cuba in amounts sufficient to tide the Jagan
[863]government over any foreseeable crisis. It was also
[864]reported that Gimpex plans to buy aircraft, spare parts
[865]and other machinery in the United States for reshipment
[866]to Cuba.
[868]General
[870]Reports continue to be received from many places
[871]indicating that the suitcase full of currency is still one
[872]of the most common methods used by the Cubans for trans-
[873]mitting funds for use in supporting subversive activities
[874]throughout the hemisphere. Instances where such funds
[875]have been confiscated by the police have occurred recently
[876]in El Salvador, Panama and Ecuador.
[878]SECRET
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[884]os
[885]QO
[886]by
[889]KNOWN TRAVEL OF LATIN AMERICANS TO AND FROM CUBA - JULY.1963
[891]JULY. ~ PIBPOSE_OF_TRIP TO CUBA___________. ..|
[892]i. TO FROM | _. |
[893]ARGENTINA to. ___0 26th of July Celebrations. -|
[894]BOLIVIA | aa | 0 | 26th of July Celebrations. _. — |
[895], BRAZIL | 25 | o | 26th of July Celebrations. t
[896]; RR, GUIANA | oo | oo ee
[897]| CHILE | 1 26th of July Celebrations. A returning Chilean Diplomat
[899]COLOMBTA |_29 | ,.26th of July Celebrations. eeeneneneeneentene nen nen
[901]4
[902]ICOSTA RICA
[904]2.
[906]_ jp oth of July Celebrations. — ec recemire ereepeeenges
[908]DOM, REP. 0 | 26th of July Celebrations. | _
[909]| ecuADOR | 2 0 | 26th of July Celebrations. |
[910]PL SALVADOR | 4 L__{ 26th of July Celebrations.
[911](GUATEMALA 6 0 i _
[912]| HAITI | 0 0. r
[914]| HONDURAS io 0 i “ _
[915]| JAMAICA } 33 1 30-Football team. 3-to 26th of July Celebrations, |
[916]MEXICO 65__| 28 | 26th of July Celebrations,
[917]NICARAGUA 5B | 0 H 26th of July Celebrations. __ |
[918]; PANAMA | 15 | 0 _} 26th of July Celebrations. - |
[919]| PARAGUAY 3 | o | 26th of July Celebrations. _
[920]| PERU . ~ | 4 a 1 _
[921]| TRINIDAD an) : _ oo oe
[922]{ URUGUAY, | az 15 26th of July Celebrations. °*' @tteeguyg pitt remain
[923]1 VENEZUELA 22 0 _26th of July Celebrations. a
[924]SPOTALS 319 «| 47 -_ ee
[926]seo oN EThehth
[928]SECRET
[930]Page 20
[932]HW 50955 Docld: 32424608
[934](>
[935]we
[937]t
[939]Aen
[941]SECRET
[943]KNOWN TRAVEL OF LATIN AMERICANS TO AND FROM CUBA ~ AUGUST 1963
[945]NATIONALITY | Avot, | PURPOSE OF TRIP TO CUBA
[946]| Avot, |
[947]ARGENTINA ce 26th July Celebrations.
[948]BOLIVIA .
[949]BRAZIL oo 22-Returning from 26th.. Faly Celebrations.
[950]BR, GUIANA Herder Institute in Leipzig. .
[951]CHILE’ 22 8-Physical Ed, Seminar = 1-Seelking: ‘funds - 10-Returning
[952]from’ 26 July Celebrations -
[953]COLOMBIA 14 ; : ‘
[954]COSTA RICA . [26th July Celebrations.
[955]bow. REP,
[956]ECUADOR
[957]EL SALVADOR OO 7 fa
[958]_—— earners ea)
[959]GUATEMALA 1-Study at University of Sofia. ms
[960]OO A ren OD
[962]HAITI
[963]HONDURAS Hee
[964]MEXICO tS
[966]| 0 |
[967]PANAMA | 6 |
[969](Seen July Celebrations:
[971]au Tel
[972]L
[975]| 26th July Celebrations. wR, coe : /
[976]IPARAGUAY fo | 7 re: |
[977]Pew |? 9-Returning were members of (MIR) who received vA
[978]: guerrilla training. vo ; va
[979](TRINIDAD .€] . . . | ene nnn
[980]URUGUAY 10 | 16 | 26th July Celebrat ions. —
[981]VENEZUELA 3 0 | 26th July Celebrations. a
[983]roTALS floa | 214
[985]Docld: 32474608 Page 21
[987]HW 50955