[2]\i104-10331-10338 | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
[4]Tere
[5]. t Too
[7]i - , Secret
[9]26 February 1997
[11]Memorandum For: John Pereira
[12]Chief, Historical Review Group
[14]From: Barry Harrelson
[15]JFK Project Officer
[17]Subject: (U) CIA Employees Names in JFK Records
[19]Background
[21]{(AIOU) In March 1996, the ARRB agreed to protect the
[22]names of all Agency staff employees that appear in JFK
[23]documents until. May 1997. The agreement reflected the
[24]Board's recognition of the need to facilitate the document
[25]review, and that it would take time for the Agency to
[26]collect evidence to defend individual names. Attached are
[27]Jeremy Gunn's memo summarizing ‘*the Board's approach to the
[28]release of CIA employee names and the DO's response. Both
[29]memos assume a name-by-name approach and set categories and
[30]specific requirements for the release or protection of an
[31]individual. Also attached is an analysis of the ARRB and DO
[32]approaches.
[34](AIOU) I do not know how prepared the DO is, but I
[35]suspect that there is still a significant amount of work to
[36]be done prior to the Board's May meeting. I understand that
[37]many former employees have not responded to the DO's letter
[38]and that most of the responses have been negative. Even if
[39]‘the DO is able to complete the research on all employees
[40]protected to date, it is unlikely that they will be able to
[41]develop the type of evidence required by the Board to
[42]protect most individuals. Under the name-by-name approach,
[43]we can expect a majority of the names to be released.
[45]Issue
[47](AIOU) There is considerable concern among HRG
[48]reviewers that the continued release of hundreds of Agency
[49]employees' true names has the potential to do unacceptable
[50]harm to US national security. The harm from release of a
[51]large number of names lies in the fact that it cannot be
[52]Measured. This is due to the ripple effect that would occur
[53]among assets in many places and with many liaison services.
[54]It undermines the basic concept of cover for a claudestine
[55]service.
[57]CL By: 411637)
[59]CL Reason: 1.5 (c)
[61]DECL On: X1
[63]DRV From: PER 9-87;COV 1.1-86
[65]Secret
[67]13-00000
[69]|
[70]. Secret
[72](U) To date over (500/ CIA employee names, mostly DO,
[73]have been protected and are subject to review by the Board
[74]in May 1997. Most of these individuals have little or no
[75]connection to the JFK assassination story. This is far
[76]more names than had been anticipated when we agreed in March
[77]1996 to the case-by-case approach. [FYI Note: I estimate
[78]that approximately /[800// names have been released to date in
[79]the JFK review].
[81](S) In addition, the decisions made by the Board at the
[82]May meeting will set a precedent for the potentially
[83]hundreds of names to come. We have reviewed only the Oswald
[84]201 file and 12 boxes of the JFK sequestered collection. At
[85]this point it is impossible to determine the total number of
[87]-employees mentioned in the JFK collection. (For _examplé inj
[88]‘Box 48, theré is a Position Control Régister (155 25 _pages /
[90]listing all employees in Far East Division including the’
[92]q Tokyo station.)
[95]Recommendation
[97](AIOU) That the Agency re-visit the name issué with the
[98]ARRB based on the following considerations:
[100]* It should be recognized that there are two separate
[101]aspects of the public interest involved in this matter,
[102]and that it is necessary to achieve a reasonable
[103]balance between them. On the one hand, it is clear
[104]that it is now in the public interest to release as
[105]much of our JFK collection as is possible. On the
[106]other hand, it is equally clear that it is-.in the
[107]public interest for this Agency to maintain its
[108]essential security practices in order to be able to
[109]serve the Nation effectively in accordance with its
[110]enabling legislation.
[112]* It is not in the public's interest for one of the
[113]fundamental principles of an intelligence agency--
[114]protecting the identity of covert employees--to
[115]continue to be eroded. While it is not always
[116]possible to show harm by the release of any one
[117]individual's name, the magnitude of the JFK release
[118]clearly has the potential to do harm to the Agency as
[119]an institution and to national security. There is no
[120]way to measure the possible effect of these releases on
[121]future employees and operations.
[123]* Since most of the individuals involved have little or
[124]no connection with the JFK assassination, the release
[125]of their true names does not add to the story. The
[126]substitution of pseudonyms would meet the historian's
[127]need to track who is saying what, etc.
[129]Secret
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[133]7 Secret
[135]* The Agency recognizes that there are employees who are
[136]part of the JFK story (many of their names have already
[137]been released). We propose that the ARRB staff and HRG
[138]work together to establish a list of individuals who
[139]are important to the story. These names would be
[140]released unless the Agency is able to provide the
[141]required evidence of current harm.
[143]This approach would serve both the public's and the Agency's
[144]interests. It would also allow the Agency to focus its
[145]resources on completing the review and responding to the
[146]special requests of the Board, instead of spending an
[147]inordinate amount of time and money on individuals of
[148]marginal or no interest to the JFK story.
[150](Cc) [Note: ere is also thé issue of State Department!
[151]@quitieés and the impact of officially acknowledging as CIA /
[153]{hundreds of officers who were under official State cover.] 3
[154]. me a — . a . a ~. - = 7
[156]Proposed Action
[158](AIOU) We have a little over two months to resolve this
[159]issue and be ready for the ARRB meeting, May 12-13: I ,
[160]propose that I set up a meeting with Fred and Linda this
[161]week. If they agree, then I suggest a memo to the DO and
[162]the General Counsel presenting the issues. Support from top
[163]management including a willingness to raise the issue with
[164]the acting/new DCI and possibly the White House is critical
[165]to success. I see OGC (Linda) being tasked with preparing a
[166]memo for the Board similar to the one prepared on sources.
[168](AIOU) The Board has meetings scheduled for 13-14
[169]March, 2-3 April and 23-24 April. I recommend that we begin
[170]discussions with ARRB staff as soon as possible with the
[171]goal of having the memo ready no later than the 2-3 April
[172]meeting. We should also be prepared to discuss the issue
[173]directly with the Board since we are asking them to
[174]reconsider a decision in which we initially concurred.
[176](ATOU) It is important that the DO continue to develop
[177]evidence on the individuals who are scheduled for review in
[178]May. The worst possible scenario is not succeeding with the
[179]new proposal, and not being ready to defend those
[180]individuals who need protection.
[182]Attachments: As stated
[184]Secret
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[188]BAS \ wen
[190]ask We TJEK
[191]TU rear ear Cer comueds
[192]oy Gunn's a sda
[193]__ Meenos {attached ) ;
[194]mm Gon did bes as
[196]OW Wen dD
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[201]ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY
[203]SUBJECT: Analysis of ARRB and DO Memoranda re Treatment
[204]of CIA Officer Names in JFK Collection
[205](Prepared by Gary Breneman, 11 Feb 97)
[207]1. ARRB Memorandum. The Gunn memorandum sets out the
[208]criteria required to meet the burden under several
[209]situations.
[211]A. For officers who are still alive, Mr. Gunn
[212]states that the proofs required to postpone release of a
[213]name are three in number and all three must be met:
[214]| i. The officer must be living outside of the U.S.
[215]OR,
[216](R) easonably be expected to travel outside of
[217]the U.S. in the foreseeable future;
[218]AND,
[219]id. The officer is either working ... (presumably
[220]a current staff officer, contract employee,
[221]or independent contractor) ... or is retired
[222]under cover; |
[223]AND,
[225]iii. The officer objects to the release of his or
[226]her true name.
[227]COMMENTS: Mr. Gunn's criteria are a little confusing
[229]and may reach beyond the Board's authority.
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[237]a. First, note again that the three elements are
[238]joined by an “AND” meaning all elements must be met to
[239]satisfy a postponement.
[241]b. Second, the first requirement of living or
[242]traveling outside of the U.S. is not tied to “cover.” Many
[243]officers who do not work under cover all of the time are, in
[244]fact, provided cover for overseas TDY's. Thus, any officer
[245]who might “reasonably” be expected to travel outside of the
[246]U.S. would warrant postponement of his/her true name. This
[247]would seem to include every CIA employee, contract employee
[248]and independent contractor, past and present.
[250]| c. With respect to the third element, Mr. Gunn and the
[251]Board appear to be in error. To my knowledge, they have no
[252]authority to require that an individual be consulted
[253]concerning his or her wishes to maintain cover, thus having
[254]his or her true name postponed, or to give up cover, thus
[255]having the name released. This decision does not lie in the
[256]first instance with the individual but is an institutional
[257]decision which lies solely within the purview of the Agency
[258]and the executive branch of the government. CIA as an
[259]executive agency charged with the creation, maintenance, and
[260]dissolution of cover mechanisms is the only entity competent
[261]to make such a decision. It alone knows if release of an
[262]officer's true name will compromise an existing cover
[263]mechanism which will, in turn, expose others who share or
[264]have shared the same cover. It alone knows if release of an
[266]officer's name will expose CIA sponsorship (a cover entity)
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[274]of a sensitive activity. It alone knows if release of an
[275]officer's name will violate a promise of confidentiality to
[276]a commercial cover sponsor which could cause both
[277]embarrassment and, possibly, financial hardship to the
[279]sponsor and, in turn, substantially hinder the Agency's
[281]-ability to secure subsequent commercial cover sponsors.
[283]d. Turning next to the wishes of a particular officer
[285](either current or retired) vis
[289]vis staying with his or
[290]her cover, these thoughts come to mind. For current |
[291]employees, the decision is again not entirely theirs. If,
[292]after careful review, the Agency does not have a strong
[293]position on the employee maintaining the cover, the officer
[294]should be permitted to decide. He or she should be
[295]counseled however, that an action to remove cover could have
[296]an adverse impact on future assignments or TDYs. With
[297]respect to retirees, if, after careful review, the Agency
[298]does not object to the removal from cover, the individual
[299]should be permitted to decide. Note, that the responses to
[300]this inquiry will be mixed. As a historical note, the
[301]Agency over the years has been on an ever-swinging pendulum
[302]with respect to “cover into retirement,” “cover for life,”
[303]etc. There will be officers who petitioned hard
[304]unsuccessfully to have their cover removed when they retired
[305]and will gladly consent to lifting the cover. “There will be
[306]those officers who do not want their cover lifted under any
[308]circumstance.
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[314]. ’ .
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[318]B. Former officers, status unknown. While the
[319]heading to this section would seem to suggest the CIA does
[320]not know the cover/non-cover status of some of its former
[321]officers, the section does not really deal with this issue.
[322]Rather, within the section, Mr. Gunn simply recognizes the
[323]fact that CIA may not be able to find all of its former
[324]officers to ask if they want to be opened up or remain under
[325]cover. The test required by Mr. Gunn to satisfy the Board
[326]and thus continue postponement until 1 June. of this year is
[327]a “good faith showing that reasonable attempts” were made to
[328]locate the officer and failed. .
[330]The section contains the additional provision which
[331]advises the Board may continue a postponement beyond 1 June
[332]of this year (i.e., until 2010) if the CIA provides the
[333]board with evidence which satisfies the criteria of either
[335]category 1 or category 3. Such “additional evidence” must
[337]. be provided by 1 May 1997.
[339]The requirements or tests of this section for the
[340]Agency are not onerous but should be set-out as a series of
[341]uniform actions or check-off 's taken in the attempt to
[342]locate each “current status unknown” officer. The record of
[343]these actions could then be presented to the ARRB in support
[344]of a request for continued postponement. The DO Memorandum
[346]mentions the possibility of asking the (ERS?or the (opm /for
[348]assistance in this regard and this should probably be done.
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[354]* a
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[358]C. Names having effect on current intelligence
[359]interests. The Gunn letter appears to subscribe a higher
[360]level of concern to this section and its criteria than the
[361]previous two, not recognizing the plain fact that the
[362]criteria of all three sections are inextricable. It sets
[363]out four separate criteria which, if CIA satisfies its
[364]burden; i.e, provides sufficient evidence to prove any one
[365]of them, will operate to postpone a true name until the year
[366]2010. Note again, the criteria required are four separate
[367]ones, each separated by a comma and between numbers 3 and 4
[368]and “OR.” They are: .
[370]i. The officer must be currently engaged in
[371]clandestine activities; OR,
[373]ii. The release of the officer's name would
[374]compromise ongoing intelligence operations or
[375]operations with current intelligence value
[376](presumably, the latter permits a review into
[377]the officer's past activities, agent
[378]relationships, and cover positions); OR,
[380]iii. The release of the officer's true name would
[381]reasonably be expected to cause significant harm
[382]to a living person (including family members) ;
[383](read broadly, this provision would include, the
[385]individual, former agents, anyone who shared the
[387]same cover or cover position, i.e.
[388]Department of State slot within an embassy); OR,
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[399]iv. The release of the officer's name would cause
[400]significant harm to the national security or the
[401]foreign relations of the U.S. (a criteria which
[402]is broad enough to drive the proverbial Mack
[403]truck through).
[405]2. In Part II, the Gunn memorandum takes back part of
[406]what it gave in the previous section. It sets up a test of
[407]“importance to the assassination story vs. evidence of
[411]harm. Essentially, it advises that the Board will weigh
[413]the CIA's evidence but, if within its view, the true name
[414]being considered for postponement is important to the
[415]assassination story, the Board will release it. This means
[416]for those few individuals who may be viewed as “important to
[417]the story,” truly substantial evidence must be brought to
[418]bear. Absent such evidence, the Board will release, and the
[419]only recourse left to the Agency would be an appeal to the
[420]President.
[422]3. The Directorate of Operations Memorandum. The
[423]memorandum basically describes. the steps for handling
[424]employee names as contained in JFK records. over (500) names
[425]will be subject to ARRB action in May 1997.
[427]Comments: |
[429]a. For officers who retired under cover, the first
[430]step will be to contact them and ask if they want their true
[431]name released. This should be the last step of the review,
[433]not the first.
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[441]b. The resources and data bases which will be
[442]researched for each name should be clearly established and
[443]followed in a uniform manner. Deviation from a set, orderly
[444]process will open CIA determinations to criticism,
[445]objections and dismissal; i.e. release of a name that should
[446]be postponed.
[448]c. In addition to the data bases described --
[449]retirement records, annuity pay records, the office of
[451]security, insurance lists -- consideration might be given
[452]'
[454]to the Northwest Federal Credit Union) and overt data bases
[455]such as Phonedec.} Like the TRS and OPM; the éredit union /
[456]might not be able from a legal standpoint to provide an
[457]address. However, it would probably be prepared to contact
[458]an individual and ask that he/she be in touch.
[460]dad. The universal release of the true names of overt
[461]employees raises concern about current employees. To the
[462]extent that any current employee, even an overt employee,
[463]may be sent overseas on TDY under light cover, the release
[464]of his or her true name via these JFK documents which will
[466]receive widespread review could jeopardize his/her overseas
[468]mission and possibly place his/her life in danger.
[470]ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY
[472]1 3-00000
[474]qe : “INTERNAL
[475]du UNCLASSIFIED ‘a. INTERNAL Dicom
[476]ae "ROUTING AND: RECORD SHEET.
[477]; eed (Optional) -
[479]Proposal for Dealing with Employees". Names :
[481]FROM: Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.
[482]- DO, Focal Point. for "ARB - ——
[483]1D4107 OXB. mo re July eee
[485]TO: foteer designation, room number, and
[487]rom 610 “Eis C] SECRET [1] CONFIDENTIAL INTERNAL = ]_«UNCLASSIFIED
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[491], , ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY
[493]29 July 1996
[495]MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief Historical Review Group
[497]FROM:
[499]SUBJECT:
[501]1.
[503]Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.
[504]DO, Focal Point for ARRB
[506]Proposal for Dealing with Employees' Names
[508]Cover mechanisms are an integral part of conducting
[510]clandestine operations. We are concerned about individuals that
[511]continue to be dependent on particular cover legends and on the
[512]organizations that cooperatively work with us to provide those
[513]cover legends. The following proposal is offered to streamline
[514]the process of handling names and minimize the potential damage
[515]an inappropriate release could cause.
[517]A. Incomplete and Unidentifiable names:
[519]a. We will release the occurrence of a name when a
[520]common last name appears by itself or in conjunction
[521]with a common first name such that it does not tend
[522]to specifically identity the individual.
[524]b. We will release the occurrence of a name if it
[525]remains unidentified after a reasonable search is
[526]conducted.
[528]B. Identifiable names for employees that retired
[530]overtly:
[532]In most cases, overt employees’ names will be released,
[533]but in some cases overt employees may have a
[535]portion of their employment remain under cover. Such
[536]cases will require the same review as that of an
[537]employee who remained under cover into retirement.
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[545]_ ADMINISTRATIVE +* INTERNAL USE ONLY
[547]SUBJECT: Proposal for Dealing with Employees' Names
[549]C. Identifiable names for employees that retired
[550]covertly:
[552]a. We will make a reasonable attempt to locate a
[553]current address and contact the person. If the person
[554]objects to the release of his or her name for reasons
[555]associated with current life style issues, we will
[556]object to the release of the name. If the person does
[557]not have objections based upon personal circumstances we
[558]will review the name for organizational issues. (See
[559]para C. c.) ,
[561]b. If reasonable efforts fail to locate the
[562]current address, but it can be determined that the
[563]individual is still receiving a pension, insurance or
[564]other benefit based upon cover legend, we will need to
[565]continue to protect the name since source of income or
[566]benefits can not be altered without prior notification
[567]to the individual. If we fail to identify a pension or
[568]other active benefit, we will review the name for
[569]organizational issues. (See para C. c.)
[571]c. We will make a reasonable attempt to review the
[572]name to look for identifiable harm to the person’s
[573]safety, family, ongoing operational activities, national
[574]security or foreign relations. Assuming that none of
[575]the previous concerns are identified, we will review the
[576]potential damage to the cover mechanism or cover
[577]provider by the specific occurrence of the name if
[578]released.
[580]2. Because families of deceased ‘employees: could be the
[581]beneficiary of pensions or insurance provided under the employees
[582]cover legend, we must review them the same as we would the
[583]employee. We also have second and third generation officers
[584]following in the footsteps of their parents that could be
[585]negatively impacted by the revelation.
[587]3. Our efforts to locate current addresses will include all
[588]- internal record systems maintained by Office of Personnel
[590]Security, (Retirement Brancly and(Insurance Brancly. We will
[592]include a checklist reflecting completion of these searches
[594]2
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[604]SUBJECT: Proposal for Dealing with Employees' Names
[606]within the documentation when requesting continued protection of
[607]the name.
[609]4. We considered options of contacting IRS or OPM during
[610]our attempts to locate current addressing information, but based
[611]upon the fact that these offices would be unwitting of the cover
[612]arrangement for the individual, it was determined to be an
[613]unreasonable risk to the cover of these officers.
[615]redarick C. Wickham, gr.
[617]3
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