[1]DARAAN .
[2]Ii104-10332-10076 | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 . lL .
[3]ta . — ee ee - | :
[5]nn . Central Intelligence Agency , —_—_—
[7]or
[8]wee
[10]' 13 December 1996
[12]MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director
[13]Assassination Records Review Board
[15]SUBJECT: (U) Identity of Human Sources
[17](We request that this memorandum be returned to CIA
[18]once the Review Board has completed its deliberations. on the
[19]issues discussed below.)
[21]1. (U) Issue. The purpose of this memorandum is to
[22]"relate CIA's concerns to the Review Board regarding the
[23]release of the true names of human sources of intelligence
[24]which appear in the JFK Collection and to present a proposal
[25]on how this problem could be addressed. )
[27]I. Factual Background
[29]2. (U) In general, CIA “sources” are foreign
[30]nationals, recruited and living in a foreign country, who
[31]provide information to the U.S. Government under a promise
[32]of confidentiality. Their act of passing information to the
[33]U.S. is generally against the national interest of their own
[34]country and would be considered espionage, which is a.
[35]capital offense in most countries. Just as in this country
[36]when a spy is caught, should a CIA source be discovered, it
[37]would be “headline news," even 30 years after the fact. The
[38]Review Board will recall that when former National Security
[39]Agency employee Robert Lipka was arrested approximately a
[40]year ago for espionage he allegedly committed 30 years
[41]earlier, this received a lot of attention in the United
[42]States. Lipka is currently awaiting trial. in the U.S. for
[43]his alleged espionage activities.
[45]3. (U) This month, the Review Board will be
[46]considering approximately 50-60 true names of human sources
[47], for release. These particular sources range from encrypted
[49]CL BY: (0185904 }
[50]CL REASON: 1.5(c) —
[51]DECL ON: X1
[53]DRV FM: HUM 4- 82
[55]SECRET
[57]13-00000
[59]SECRET
[61]SUBJECT: (U) Identity of Human Sources
[63]assets to one-time contacts. It is our understanding that
[64]additional source names appear throughout the JFK Collection
[65]and will be reviewed in the future. It is important,
[66]therefore, that the Review Board and CIA agree ona
[68]‘consistent method of dealing with source names appearing in
[70]the JFK Collection at this time so as not to. impede the
[71]future review of documents. .
[73]4. (C) The Review Board has recently developed a
[74]policy for releasing the true names of covert CIA employees.
[75]Although there are. many similarities between covert
[76]employees and sources, there is an important difference that
[77]should be reflected in the way the Review Board looks at
[78]this issue. With CIA covert employees who are mentioned in
[79]this collection, it has been possible in some instances to
[81]go to them and seek their permission to reveal their names.
[83]Some of these former employees have even been made available
[84]for interviews and depositions. With most sources, it is
[85]not possible to do this. First, CIA has dropped contact
[86]with some of these sources and may not be able to locate
[87]them. Attempting to find these individuals would create
[88]some risk of creating suspicions that they were or are
[89]associated with this Agency or the U.S. Government. If CIA
[90]were unable to locate a particular source, there would still
[91]be some risk in releasing his name. Just because CIA cannot
[93]‘locate him, does not mean that he. is not alive and:-well-
[95]known in his own community. Even if we were able to locate
[96]a source without risk to his safety, it is probable that he
[97]would not want to be visited by the CIA again after so many
[98]years. More than likely, sources do not now want their past
[99]association revealed when they have undoubtedly moved on in
[101]' their lives to-do other things. Some may be in political or
[103]private enterprise positions where CIA affiliation would
[104]damage them professionally and/or harm them and their
[105]families personally.
[107]5. (U) Another important distinction that needs to be
[108]taken into account is the difference between CIA and Federal
[110]Bureau of Investigation (FBI) “sources.” Perhaps the most
[112]significant difference is that many FBI sources provide |
[113]information with the understanding that the information and
[114]the source will be publicly revealed. FBI sources are often
[115]used in criminal prosecutions as witnesses. CIA, on the
[116]other hand, promises secrecy and confidentiality to its
[117]sources. CIA sources rarely appear at public trials. [In-
[118]fact, not only is the identity of CIA sources protected from
[119]public acknowledgment, but also it is closely held within
[120]the Agency itself. Another difference is the fact that a
[122]2
[123]SECRET
[125]13-00000
[127]SECRET
[129]SUBJECT: (U) Identity of Human Sources
[131]foreign’ national cooperating with CIA is usually committing
[132]a unique violation of his own country’s laws-~espionage. ‘IE
[134]- one gets caught committing espionage, the punishment in many
[136]countries is for a capital offense. On the other hand, a
[137]foreigner who cooperates with the FBI is not usually
[138]committing espionage. Cooperation may be with the full
[140]‘knowledge of his government--such as cooperation in a
[142]criminal investigation. Therefore, the risks for
[143]cooperation with the FBI are not usually as great as
[144]cooperation with CIA.’ In addition, the FBI has greater
[145]means for protecting individuals who provide information to
[146]it, for example, the. witness protection program, which CIA
[147]does not have. .
[149]II. Legal Considerations
[151]6. (U) Although Section ll{a) of the JFK Act provides
[152]that when the Act requires release of information, it takes
[153]precedence over all other laws that would otherwise prohibit
[154]the true names of sources. CIA believes that it is
[155]important for the Review Board to consider the laws, which
[156]have been growing and developing over the years, to protect
[157]classified information because they clearly reflect a larger
[158]U.S. Government policy to protect intelligence sources.
[160]7. (U) By Executive Order (E.O.)and statute, the
[161]President and Congress have made the Director of Central
[162]Intelligence (DCI) responsible for protecting intelligence
[163]sources. In his Directive of 22 January 1946 which
[164]established the Central Intelligence Group, President Truman
[165]made the DCI responsible. for protecting sources. With the
[166]establishment of the CIA, Congress also gave the DCI this
[167]responsibility. The National Security Act of 1947, Section
[168]103 (d) (3), codified at 50 U.S.C. §403(3)(c) (5), requires the _
[169]DCI to protect intelligence sources from unauthorized
[171]‘disclosure. In addition, §403(3) (d) (2) requires the DCI to
[172]ensure that risks to the United States and those involved in
[174]the collection of intelligence through human sources are
[175]minimized.
[177]8. (U) Protecting the identity of individuals working
[178]with or for CIA has been of particular concern to U.S.
[179]lawmakers since the establishment of the Agency. For
[180]example, with Section 6 of the Central Intelligence Act. of
[181]1949, 50 U.S.C. 1949 §403g, Congress specifically exempted
[182]the CIA from the provisions of any law requiring the
[183]publication or disclosure of the organization, functions,
[184]names, titles, salaries or numbers of personnel employed by
[185]the Agency. Although the purpose of this law is to protect
[187]3.
[188]SECRET
[190]13-00000
[192]SECRET
[194]SUBJECT: °©(U) Identity of Human Sources
[196]employees of the CIA, and not assets or contacts, it .
[197]indicates Congress‘ intent from early on to protect those
[199]working covertly for the U.S. Government... -
[201]9. {U) In 1980, Congress passed the Classified
[202]Information Procedures Act (CIPA) which sets out pretrial,
[204]trial, and appellate procedures for criminal cases involving
[206]or potentially involving classified information. Working
[207]with the Department of Justice and the courts, CIA has
[208]successfully protected intelligence sources from public
[209]release even in criminal trials where there are heightened
[210](i.e., constitutional) considerations favoring disclosure to
[211]the defendant of all.government information relevant to the
[212]défense. CIPA allows for in camera ex parte hearings in
[213]which the judge can rule on questions of admissibility and
[214]relevancy of classified information, including the identity
[215]of human sources who may have information pertaining to the
[216]defense, before it is introduced either to the defendant or
[217]Gefense counsel, or in open court. In some cases involving
[218]CIA, the judge has ordered that CIA information be turned
[219]over to the defense, but only in some unclassified form such
[220]as in a summary. In other cases, judges have reviewed the
[221]Classified information and ruled that the harm to national
[222]security outweighs the defendant‘s legal rights to the
[223]information. In still other cases, the defense was never
[224]notified that CIA even had information bearing on the case
[225]as the judge ruled that the mere fact that CIA possessed
[226]this information was classified and outweighed any rights
[227]the defendant had. .Moreover, under CIPA, the Attorney
[228]General has the authority to drop a prosecution in those
[229]cases where the risk to national security is too great.
[231]10 (U) In 1982, Congress acted to protect human
[232]intelligence sources by passing the Intelligence Identities
[233]Protection Act of 1982, 50 U.S.C. §421 which criminalizes
[234]the revelation of a source’s identity. This Act subjects
[235]anyone who reveals information that identifies a covert
[236]agent to prosecution with up to 10 years in prison and
[237]$50,000 in fines. A covert agent includes: (a) a U.S.
[238]citizen whose intelligence relationship | with the U.S.
[239]Government is classified and is acting abroad as an agent,
[240]informant or source of operational assistance to an
[241]intelligence agency; and (b) an individual, other than a
[242]U.S. citizen whose past or present intelligence relationship
[243]to the U.S. is classified information and who .is a present —
[244]or former agent or: informant of, or is of operational
[246]_ assistance to, an intelligence agency.
[248]4
[249]_ SECRET
[251]13-00000
[253]SECRET
[255]ry
[257]SUBJECT: (U) Identity of Human Sources
[259]11. (U) These statutes are just a few examples ofa
[260]larger government policy to protect human sources from
[261]public disclosure. There has also developed over the years
[263]-a significant amount of case law which further implements
[264]this policy. For example, in Sims y. CIA, 10 S.Ct. 1981
[266](1985), the Supreme Court. held that pursuant to the National
[267]Security Act, the DCI had the authority to protect from
[268]release to Freedom of Information Act requesters the
[269]identities of individuals conducting research on projects
[270]financed by CIA. The Supreme Court further stated that the
[271]DCI’s authority to protect sources was broad, and was not
[272]limited to only those individuals who were guaranteed
[273]confidentiality.
[275]12. (U) Most recently, President Clinton signed an
[277]Executive Order on classified national security information
[279]which came into effect in October 1995. Although it
[280]requires that agencies make greater declassification efforts
[281]than the prior Executive Order, Executive Order 12958
[282]affords human sources extra protection from its
[283]declassification provisions. .Under E.0. 12958, information
[285]that is over 25 years old and has historical value must be
[287]declassified within five years. owever, information
[288]revealing the identity of a-human source may continue to be
[289]protected.
[291]13. (U):' The above federal statutes and case law show
[292]a long-standing practice of protecting human sources who
[294]provide intelligence’ information to the U.S. Government. In
[296]carrying out its statutory obligations, the Review Board
[297]should give serious weight to this policy and afford the
[298]protection of human sources the highest priority.
[300]III. Operational Considerations
[302]14. (U) As the Review Board is well aware, in order
[303]for CIA officers to effectively collect intelligence around
[304]the world, they cannot acknowledge publicly that they work
[305]for CIA and, conversely, CIA cannot acknowledge a particular
[307]“individual's affiliation with it. This is true even more so
[309]with sources. In addition to the risk to a source’s
[310]personal safety, discovery of a CIA source would also reveal
[312]‘any operations he was conducting and CIA case officers with
[314]whom he was meeting or might even cast suspicion on the
[316]* (U) The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. §552 is another
[317]example of a federal statute that allows for the protection of human
[318]sources. Although the FOIA generally mandates release of government
[319]documents, exemption b(3) allows for withholding: from release
[320]information that is exempted from disclosure by statute. The National
[321]Security Act has been held’ by the Supreme Court to be such a withholding
[322]statute. Sims v. CIA, 105 S.ct. 1981 (1985). ;
[324]SECRET
[326]13-00000
[328]SECRET
[330]SUBJECT: (U) Identity of Human Sources:
[332]affiliation of innocent family and friends. This is no less
[334]_true with a source who -no longer works for. the Agency. A
[336]source's. prior affiliation.with CIA is normally still
[337]classified in order to protect him, his former contacts at
[338]CIA, the CIA facilities at which he may have been meeting
[339]with case officers, the cover mechanisms employed to protect
[340]his affiliation with CIA, and the operations which he
[341]conducted.
[343]15. (U) The public disclosure of an individual’s
[344]affiliation with CIA could and, in fact, has threatened the
[345]safety and lives of not only the source, but also their
[346]families, colleagues, officials of foreign governments and
[347]other foreign nationals with whom they have had contact.
[349]The Review Board will certainly recall the Proenza case
[351]{since this was released by the Board in August 1995) in
[352]which a number of Cuban officials were falsely believed to
[353]be CIA agents. They were arrested, convicted and spent
[354]years in prison for their alleged treasonous activities and
[355]their professional and personal lives were ruined. The
[356]threat of violence to those who are in fact associated with
[358]CIA is even more real. These individuals live and work in
[360]foreign countries, many of which have a local population
[361]hostile to the United States and especially CIA. If one
[362]should doubt the risks that those affiliated with CIA face,
[363]one only has to recall that, in 1992, two CIA employees were
[364]murdered while waiting to turn into CIA Headquarters in.
[365]Virginia. If this type of attack is possible right at the
[366]CIA’s front gate, it is not hard to imagine the personal
[367]risks that those working with the CIA abroad face. Clearly,
[368]the-risk is that much greater for those who are sources:
[369]for example, as a result of Aldrich Ames’ disclosures to
[370]the KGB, 10 Soviets who were covert assets of the CIA were
[371]executed.
[373]16. (U) Incidents: such as these clearly demonstrate
[374]that the policy of protecting association with the CIA is an
[376]‘important one. Individuals associated with CIA have been —
[377]and will continue to be subjected to threats, reprisals and
[379]physical injuries from foréign intelligence services,
[380]terrorist groups, and other persons or organizations hostile
[381]to CIA or the U.S. Government. Individuals choose to .._
[382]undertake these risks for many different reasons, but it is.
[383]with the condition that the CIA will protect their ,
[384]cooperation with the U.S. Government.
[386]Iv. ‘Proposal
[387]‘17. (U) In light of the foregoing, CIA believes it is
[389]important to work toward a general policy of protecting CIA
[390]sources in the JFK Collection.. The Agency proposes that in
[392]6
[393]SECRET
[395]13-00000
[397]SECRET
[399]SUBJECT: _ (U) Identity of Human Sources |
[401]most .cases a substitution for the true name be used. In
[402]prior releases of these same documents, the Review Board >
[403]agreed to redact the true name and substitute “source.” If
[404]the Review Board is: concerned about tracking particular
[405]sources throughout the records, a particular identifying
[407]_ substitution can be used for an individual source throughout
[409]{for example, “Mexican source 1”).
[411]18. (S) Among the names that are currently being
[412]considered for release by the Review Board, the following
[413]are some that the CIA proposes be treated in this manner:
[415]e True name of LIRING/3, an encrypted asset of the
[416]CIA{and unilateral penetration of. the Cuban |
[417]‘Embassy. His wife also worked at the Embassy ,and
[418]he was “apparently suspected as being CIA though it
[419]was never proven. LIRING/3 at some point
[420]disappeared and we have no way of knowing what his
[421]_current situation is.
[423]° True name of SETHRGTD (3 the ai lateral
[424](penetration of ‘the Nicaraguan Service./ The Review
[425]Board will recall that it has already been fully
[427]briefed on ERTHYROID/3 and had agreed to the
[429]protection of the fact {that he was a unilateral)
[431]) {Enthony Cc: M. Devere (4041901210022) was [is] a
[432](member of the. British Service jAs Such, he was
[434]Tis] “a \diaison Jsource. Th This raises concerns about
[436]protection of our, liaison) relationships.
[438]Moreover, Mr. Devere’ s\|identity constitutes
[440]-* forei “government:-inftorn don*’\which, as the
[442]Board has already been informed, the CIA does not.
[444]“have the authority to release.
[446]19. (S) Another type of name that similarly should be’
[447]protected from release is the new identity provided toa |
[448]defector. Although defectors do not face some of the
[449]dangers that “assets” overseas face, they are still given
[450]new identities for their protection because there is some
[451]risk to their personal safety even in the U.S. For example,
[452]in this collection the identity of Golitsyn appears in
[453]documents being reviewed this month.’ Since the time of his
[454]defection,..Golitsyn has utilized successive identities;
[455]because they /have been unofficially disclosed, that have not
[457]7 (S) Golitsyn‘ s identity had to be changed again. However, there is a
[459]risk that revealing this former identity could lead to the
[460]identification of Golitsyn’s current identity.
[462]7
[463]SECRET
[465]13-00000.
[467]ay
[475]SECRET
[477]SUBJECT: (U) Identity of Human Sources
[479]been officially released and that are closely held within
[480]the Agency. This is done for his own protection and that of.
[481]his family even though they live in the United States. CIA
[482]cannot, at this time, agree to the official release of
[483]Golitsyn’s assumed new identities or for that matter of any
[484]defectors that appear to date:in the collection.
[486]20. (S) CIA has noted that-in some cases a source is
[487]identified by only a first name or a code name. Where CIA
[488]has been unable to identify any information about that
[489]individual or there is no other source revealing information
[490]that has been revealed in the JFK Collection, it would he ,
[491]possible to release that name. For example, in a few
[492]documents, the name “Tota” appears. To date, CIA has been
[493]unable to determine who this person is and there does not
[494]appear to be any further source revealing information in the
[495]collection. It is probably that “Tota” is just a code name
[496]or a street name known to his colleagues. As “Tota” is a
[497]common name, such a release would not threaten the
[498]particular individual or his family, and as the person can
[499]not be identified it would not seriously undermine the U.S.
[501]Government policy to protect intelligence sources.
[503]21. (U) The Agency recognizes that some names may be
[504]particularly important to the JFK story. In such cases, the
[505]CIA is willing to work with the Review Board to come to the
[506]appropriate resolution. CIA proposes that it conduct a
[507]record search for information on that individual. It may be
[508]that in these cases, if the person is deceased and has no
[509]living family, that the Review Board and the CIA can agree
[510]that the value of revealing the true name outweighs the need
[511]to protect that source from disclosure.
[513]22. (U) %&It is our hope that the CIA and the Review
[514]Board can work out a mutually agreeable policy regarding the
[515]identity of human sources that will not undermine the
[516]important policy of protecting those who work covertly for
[517]the U.S. Government. As usual, my staff and I are available
[518]to discuss this matter with you.
[520]MS Leo .
[521]\John F. Pereira
[522]Chief, Historical Review Group
[524]8
[525]SECRET
[527]13-00000
[529]SUBJECT: (U) Identity of Human Sources
[531]a
[533]DCI/CSI/J.Pereira: apd/x31805 (13 Dec 96)
[534]G:/CSIFO/SHARED/Pereira.doc
[536]Distribution:
[538]Original - Addressee
[539]- CSI/HRP Chrono
[540]- D/CSI
[541]C/CSI/HRG
[542]- Barry Harrrelson, CSI/HRP
[543]- (linda: ‘Cipiriani,
[545]PRPRPRPP
[548]9
[549]SECRET
[552]13-00000
[554]"Fe
[555]cog
[558]oe CIA HAS KO OBJECTION TO
[559]MEMORANDUM DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
[560]RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
[561]. IN THIS DOCUMENT
[562]September 25, 1998
[563]To: Laura Denk
[564]Executive Director
[565]co: Bob Skwirot
[566], CIA Team Leader .
[567]From: Michelle Combs
[569]Associate Director for Research and Review
[571]Subject: No Evidence of Contact Between Lee Harvey Oswald and the CIA’s Office of
[572]Operations
[574]One of the e enigmas that has surrounded Lee Harvey Oswald’s defection and re-defection is the
[575]question of-whether the CIA’s Office of Operations (later the Domestic Contacts Division)
[576]interviewed or took note of Oswald either before his trip or upon-his return from the Soviet
[577]Union. The available evidence is somewhat contradictory. The CIA has long claimed that
[578]Oswald was never a source, asset, or employee of the CIA. Yet, a November 25, 1963
[579]memorandum discusses the recollections of a CIA staff officer that the Agency considered
[581]_interviewing Oswald. Further, another former CIA officer, Donald E. Deneselya, has stated that
[583]he recalls reading an OQ debriefing report in the summer of 1962 from a former Marine re-
[584]defector who had worked at the Minsk Radio Factory. The Review Board could not corroborate
[585]the recollections of the two former CIA officers with additional records or information.
[587]In an effort to clarify the mystery, the Review Board searched for records that might confirm or
[588]deny any contact between Oswald and the CIA before or after his time in the Soviet Union. In
[589]the early 1960's, the Office of Operations (OO) was.a part of the Directorate of Intelligence.
[591]This office, which interviews American citizens who might have come into contact with
[592]information or individuals of intelligence interest overseas, later became the Domestic Contacts
[593]Division (DCD) of the Directorate of Operations. - This office nommally only contacts individuals -
[594]after receiving questions or requirements from intelligence community customers looking for
[595]particular types of information.
[597]’ The Review Board staff examined OO records and operational histories to gain an understanding
[599]of OO practices in the late 1950's and early 1960's. The Review Board staff could find no
[600]evidence of contact between Oswald and OO either before or after his time in the Soviet Union.
[601]Had Oswald departed for his trip to.the Soviet Union through New York City, as did most
[602]travelers, he possibly might have come to the attention of OO. The Review Board. staff did not
[603]locate any reference or record to Oswald’s departure from New Orleans via freighter that
[604]predates the assassination. The Review Board staff also could not locate any.information to
[606]13-00000
[608]document an OO interest in Oswald upon his return from the Soviet Union. While OO was
[609]interested in interviewing tourists to the Soviet Union for general information in the 1950's, by
[610]1962 only travelers with special access, knowledge, or skills were of intelligence interest. OO
[611]had no specific policy covering contacts with returning defectors although a local field office
[612]could initiate a contact if justified by a particular situation. According to the records located,
[613]OO only made contact with three of twenty-three defectors in the 1954-1962 time period. No
[614]records or reporting showing any OO contact with Oswald could be located. The Office of .
[615]Operations did interview re-defector Robert Edward Webster in June 1962 on his work at the —
[617]Plastics Institute of Leningrad.
[619]While a DCD “A” file on Oswald does exist in the CIA’s sequestered collection, most of the .
[621]documents in the file are from the mid-1970's, none predate the assassination, and the file
[622]appears to have been created as DCD personnel attempted to locate any evidence of contacts —
[623]with Oswald in response to various congressional investigative bodies. This file has been
[624]processed for inclusion in the JFK Collection at the National Archives. ;
[626]File 4 4. 50 0 (Wrap Up Memos)
[628]13-00000
[629]a SECRET
[631]9 October 1997
[633]Memorandum to: Jeremy Gunn
[634]Executive Director
[635]Assassination Records Review Board
[637]From: J. Barry Harrelson
[639]JFK Project Officer
[641]CIA/CSI/HRG
[642]Subject: October 14 Meeting - Source Names
[643]Reference: “A” Name List of Sources
[645](CIA requests that this memorandum and its attachments
[646]be returned once the Review Board has completed its
[647]deliberation on the names discussed below.)
[649]1. Manuel Calvillo, an unwitting source of (Alfonso /
[650]‘Wichtrich _ (see below)/, Calvillo became a figure in the JFK
[651]story, whén Elena Garro de Paz identified him as the person
[652]who sequestered her in a hotel after she protested at the
[653]Cuban Embassy. Because of this link to stories related to
[654]Oswald's visit to Mexico City, Calvillo is considered a JFK
[655]assassination figure. His name and all assassination-x: related.
[656]information have been released in collection. } However, his ?
[657]\erypt when Iinked to his true name has been deleted. “The
[658]* CIA requests that his crypt not be released when associated
[659]¢with the true name in order to protect Wichtrich and other ~_
[660]_ involved with the LIHUFF project. The linkage of Calvillo's <
[661]“true name with his crypt could lead to his association with | :
[662]~ and identification of Wichtrich and his assistant. LO
[664]~,
[666]Pa
[669]2. CIA concurs with the release of the following name
[670]in the specific documents cited:
[672]Miguel Nazar-Haro in documents 104-10052-10058
[673]and 104-10014-10016.
[675]‘Because of the relationship of this individual with the CIA,
[676]futuré documéfts containing his name must be reviewed on a
[677]case-by-case basis; there may be situations in which the
[678]Agency will request that the name be protected.
[680]i
[682]CL BY: £611637 :
[683]CL REASON: “1.5 (c) ~
[685]DECL ON: X1
[687]DRV FRM: COV 2-87
[689]SECRET
[691]13-00000
[693]a“
[695]a
[697]f
[698]Pew “po
[700]XQ £8 honor its commitments of confidentiality.
[702]ae a a —— Sy
[704]SECRET
[706]3. Phillipe “Thyyraud- “De Vosjoli: eee a
[708]Former head of the French Service in Washington
[709](1951-63), De Vosjoli retired and became a CIA/FBI asset. As
[710]a USG asset, he had contact with German and Canadian 7
[711]Intelligence Services in the mid-1960s and early 1970s. He :
[712]became a naturalized US citizen c.1971. Apparently his case if
[713]was not handled in normal defector channels as the fs
[714]responsible component has no records of De Vosjoli. His 201 a
[715]file shows that his last substantive contact with the Agency yy
[716]was in 1972 and was initiated by him from Florida. Although ff
[717]De Vosjoli has publicly acknowledged his unilateral 7
[719]relationship with the Agency during his tour in Washington, js
[720]it is not clear if the extent of his activities following |
[721]his defection is widely known. Official confirmation of his ‘ij
[723]“defection” could potentially affect the Agency's foreign Le
[726]Maison relationships |. __. er
[728]4. The CIA requests that the three names discussed _
[729]below from the A List be protected. ) All are, or were,
[731]covert “assets of the Agency: The Agency has a Moral; and ~
[732]possibly a legal, obligation to protect their identities. \ \
[733]As a basic tenet of the covert relationship, the Agency
[735]agreed to protect the fact of their relationships with the \
[736]USG; and they, in turn, promised to keep those relationships \
[737]secret. To our knowledge, the individuals have honored this \\
[738]basic contractual commitment. The Agency believes that the
[739]possible harm to the individuals, their families and/or V4
[740]associates, and the potential for damage to sensitive
[741]intelligence operations, outweigh the contribution the a
[742]release of these three names would make to public
[743]understanding of the assassination. The Agency is
[744]particularly concerned about the erosion of the principle of
[745]protecting the identity of sources and the potential L,
[746]chilling effect on future agent operations and recruitment. ii
[747]The Agency is further concerned about the possibility of //
[748]liability to the individuals and their families for failure J/
[750]eiaded ra oe _ — we ae
[751]A. Franklin sthony GavGia Welore a
[752]WU SELL Se ae
[753]i The Agency acknowledges” that Wheelock is a key figure
[755]/ tn the Alavarado story, and it has released all information
[756](including his crypt) except for his name. It is not known:
[757]if Wheelock is still alive. However, he had five children
[758]who may still be living in Nicaragua and are probably
[759]unaware of their father's Agency relationship. The release
[760]of his name could have negative repercussions for Wheelock
[761]and his family. Nicaragua is a small, provincial place, and
[762]Wheelock's patronymic name is a prominent one in the
[763]country. Revelation of his name and his relationship with
[764]CIA would be quickly disseminated within Nicaragua, and his
[765]family members would be easily identified. Such
[767]ee _ 7 ~ ee pee ——— : . — a
[769]“SECRET
[771]13-00000
[773]Fe _—— SECRET
[774]ff identification could result in anything from public oS
[775]f humiliation to dangerous retaliation by the thriving leftist a
[776]i Sandinistas. In either case, disclosure would undercut the ff
[777]\ Agency's ability to recruit sources in small countries such //
[778]SH Nicaragua. ro Spee a Eng ena ~ an
[780]——-~B;> Jose Marie Mankel. 7 ee
[782]PO Coto
[784]Mr. Mankel is a central figure in the Agency project SY
[785]named ZRRIFLE. The Agency has released his crypt and al-
[786]most all the information related to the project. Mankel's
[788]| relationship with the Agency commenced in November 1960 and i
[789]i ended in February 1964. Our files do not reflect any contact |
[790][i since that time. It is presumed that, if Mankel is still 4
[791]| alive, he is living in Luxembourg. VA
[793]Mankel had numerous acquaintances in European criminal vA
[794]circles, and, on behalf of Agency/ZRRIFLE interests, he
[795]sought out individuals from this element. Acknowledgment 1
[796]| that Mankel worked for the USG/CIA could result in personal i
[797]\ harm to him, his family, and associates. In addition, his |
[798]\ 201 file, which is in the JFK collection, contains a number iF
[799]| of references to his support of the Bureau of Narcotics and if
[800]Dangerous Drugs. Given the potential compromise of ;
[802]|
[803]individuals and operations totally unrelated to the JFK fi
[804]| story, the Agency requests that Mankel's true name continue I
[805]\ to be protected. Coordination with DEA may also be required /;
[806]in this case. Mankel's 201 File is available for review in LE
[807]AN the CIA secure area. : OY
[808]aa “(Alfonso RudoTpa’ WIChEriCh. TO re
[809]_— ann 7 ene —
[810](or ——~ A WWII intelligence officer, Wichtrich worked with the \
[812]if Agency in Panama during 1947-49 and in Mexico City from \
[813]4 1954-70 in various capacities (Station contact, field agent,
[814]i and contract agent). A prominent businessman, he was general
[815]manager of the Royal Crown Cola Company in Mexico and later
[816]I was executive vice president of the American Chamber of
[818]| Commerce in Mexico. During the JFK time frame, he was
[820]| primary agent on a CA project (LIHUFF), initially set up to /
[821]i] support a conservative front organization. He later became I
[822]|; the sole focus of the project. In that role he also served |
[823]as the cut-out for an unwitting individual, Manuel Calvillo if
[824]{see above). Wichtrich's only link to the JFK story appears fi
[825]| to be his relationship with Calvillo. A review of his files i
[826]| (OP, 201, C, Production) by the ARRB staff did not identify i
[828]TR.
[829]oe
[831]\\ any other connection to the JFK story. A selection of if
[832]\\. Gocument s from his file are attached. y
[834]SECRET
[836]13-00000
[838]-. SECRET
[840]Given Wichtrich's high profile, the release of his name
[841]could impact both past and future intelligence operations
[842]and directly affect Mr. Wichtrich and his family. His son
[843]had contact with the Panama City Station'in 1979; we are
[844]trying to determine the extent of that relationship. In this
[845]case, the Agency believes that the potential for harm
[846]clearly outweighs the contribution the release of
[847]Wichtrich's name would make to the JFK assassination story.
[849]J. Barry Harrelson
[851]Attachments: As stated
[853]SECRET