[1]198-10007-10029
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[39]JFK Assassination System Date: 6/24/201
[41]Identification Form
[43]Agency Information
[45]ARMY
[46]198-10007-10029
[48]CALIFANO PAPERS
[50]Document Information’
[52]CIA
[53]C. TRACY BARNES
[55]REPORT ON THE COLD WAR USE OF RADIO BROADCASTING BY CIA
[57]06/25/1953
[58]15
[60]RADIO BROADCASTING - CIA
[62]PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[63]Secret
[65]1A; 1B
[67]Redact
[69]04/03/1998
[71]Califano Papers, Box I, Folder 2. Memo from Barnes re: Report on the Cold War Use of Radio
[72]Broadcasting by CIA. ;
[74]AEK Ravise
[76]Department of the Army EO 13526
[77]CADeclassifty [ Exclude Exempt
[78]Authority.
[80][= Refar To
[82]Review Date 2/2615 By AST Wrg
[84]38
[85]Page 1
[87]a ; Bo SECRET
[88]; Security Information
[90]se . | 25 June 1993
[92]MEMORANDUM FOR: (See distribution below) |
[93]SUBJECT : Report On The Cold War Use of Radio Broadcasting by CIA
[95]‘Lo We have made a complete survey of the use of radio broadeast] ;
[96]inp in the cold war mission of CIA. ‘The essential parts of the report .
[97]and recommendations are contained in the attached memorandum dated
[98]15 May 1953 and entitled "Report On the Cold War Use of Radio Broadcast~
[99]ing by CIA". .(Operational information and other sensitive matter con»
[100]tained in the original, but deleted from the attached, will be sep~ |
[101]arately supplied where appropriate to the interested area divisions.)
[102]_20 The policy outlined in the attached memorandum has been approved
[103]by the} Deputy Director for Plans, who has directed the following actions:
[105]ao Undertake, in collaboration with each area division, 3
[106]country by country analysis of all indigenous broadcasting and
[107]television systems for the purpose of devising plans for their
[108]penetration, where feasible, or.an explanation where it appears
[109]not to be feasible. ,
[111]bo Develoo and submit, in collaboration with the appropriate
[112]personnel and training offices, a plan for the reernitment and
[113]training of officers qualified fer covert broadcasting operations.
[115]co Explore with the State Department the possibilities of a
[116]joint undertaking to exploit fully, in the interest of efficiency
[117]and economy, material derived from escapee interropations and other
[118]intelligence sources, covert as well as overt, to suppert all UoSe
[120]_propapanda efforts. ; ;
[122]do. Develop. and recommends in collaboration with area divisicns,
[123]an improved method for the issuance and dissemination of policy
[125]-guidance to. the field.
[126]oe. Prepare and submit, in collaboration with General McClelland,
[127]'@ project to producé broadcasting devices capable of electronic
[128]intrusion into Communist broadcasts; to develop special techniques
[130]for their useg and to contime research and development of other
[131]unconventional methods of breadeasting suitable to our migsion.
[133]3e Chief of Op: rationa,
[135]; SECRET
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[139]Security Information
[141]ia
[143]. 3. Chief of Operations, DD/P, has authorized the circulation of
[144]tre attached material with the request that -you cooperate in the carrying
[146]out of the Dn/Pts directive. Particular attention is called to. item 2. ao
[147]ah OVE 6
[149]: he Mr. Co Lloyd Egmr, assisted by Mre. Stanley 1 P. Riciardscny huve
[150]‘ been assigned the résvonsibility for staff coordination of these matters
[151]on behalf of CPP and will be available to you for assistance in planning
[152]and sunnerting broadcasting onerations.
[154]/s/ C. Srag Barnes.
[155]C, TRACY LARK S
[157]. Chicf . -
[158]Political and Psycholorical
[159]Werfare
[161]Attachment
[163]As stated above -
[164]Tistribution. |
[168]AQ @ 1]
[170]Cliefs, All Areas = 7 Gao
[171]Cries, Senior Staffs - 1] ea
[172]r/Tr at
[173]PY /¢/OPS. el] ;
[174]PE/CFY = 1 ,
[175]rr /C/PAD ~ 1 7
[176]r/Mr. Femr = 2
[177]Ri «#1
[179]a
[181]oo . SECRET
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[185]Security Information
[187]15 May 1953
[189]MEMORANDUM FCR: CITLF, POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE
[191]SUBJECT : Report Gn The Cold War Use of Radio Broadcasting by CIA
[193]Attached hereto is our report on CIA radio broadcasting ss @ cold
[194]war weapon. It is grouped inte the following sections: - ;
[196]; 1. Section 1, Page 1, deals with RADIO AS A MLDIUM IN TH COLD LAR.
[197]ft shows in the main that the countrics having the most to fear from
[198]Conminism are doing the Icast to counter its radio propaganda o
[200]2. Seetion 2, Page 2, deals with CAPABTLITIFS, It embraces a
[201]discussion of the techniques available to CTA,
[203]3. Section 3, Pare 3, discusses broad TARGETS and appraises our -
[204]current and vlanned activities arainst them.
[206]4. Section lh, Page l, deals with the principal PROFLEMS peculiar
[207]to covertly direeted broadcasting, and their solution.
[209]So. Section 5S, Page 10, contains RECOMMENDATIONS for a body of
[210]princivles to govern over-all CTA volicy in its present and future
[211]activities in this field. : ;
[213](For a detailed statement, of present CIA radio broadcasting
[215]assets, reference is made to CPY to CPP memorandum of 25 February 1953,
[216]entitled "Preliminary Survey of Radio Broadcasting Media", TS C6669.)
[218](The original "Report On The Cold War Use of Rudio Broadeasting.
[219]" from which this document is excerpted, was dated 15 May 1953,
[220]Se) . a
[221]\ , (The data on broadcasting hours by caintries was ebtained fron
[222]FBID and VOA, that on available reeeivers from OSI/ORR and VOA, and that -
[223]on Soviet jamming transmitters from ONE.)
[225]‘By Cl,
[226]TS Ohly
[228]t
[230]/s/ Go Lloyd kgner
[231]«LLOYD BCNER
[232]Attachment, as stated. _ — . . an |
[233]PP/CLEsha -
[235]r
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[239]ow
[240]ti
[241]Ob
[242]be
[244]ie)
[246]SECRET
[247]Security Information
[249]15. May 1953
[251]REPORT ON THE COLD WAR USE OF RADIO BROADCASTING BY CIA
[253]le Radio As «a Medium in the Cold War
[255]a. The USSR and its satellites, including China, prosdesat
[256]te countries outside the Orbit 15395 hours per week of aggressive psych= _
[257]olexical warfare o
[259]bo. The free world ‘responds with 11,018 hours per weeks
[261]&o ‘This gives the. enemy & numerical. advantage of approxinetely
[262]seven to five, In reality, the Communist advantage is.much greater .
[263]because of their successful interference with free world broadcasts to the
[264]Orbit through jamming and the penalties they impose on their own vsoples
[265]for listening to foreign broadcasts. It is estimated that these measures
[266]reduee the effectivensss of free world broadcasts to the Orbit by as mich,
[267]if not more than, 50 percent. fn illustration. is that the Commmists
[268]devote an estimated 900 transmitters to the jamming of free world broad-
[269]casts, There is no jamming of Orbit broadeasts. to the Western worlds nor
[270]any restrictions on listening to them.
[272]. de Only the English speaking world holds its own numerically in
[273]the over-all radio war with the Orbit. VOA, BRC and Canada together
[274]brosdeast 238 hours per week arainst the Orbit; whereas the Orbit countries
[275]combined direct 222 hours per week to English language audiences in North
[276]America, the: United Kingdom, and ‘the Pacific area
[278]6e In the vest of the world, the balance is drastically in
[279]favor of the Commmiste. They broadcast 1, 173 jam-free hours to ali
[280]other countries around the world in multiple languages, compared with a
[281]mere 26); hours broadcast to all Orbit countrd ies by. non-English speaking
[282]nations of the free world,
[284]£. Of the total of 1,015 vroadeast hours beamed by all the free
[285]world to the Orbit, CIA, throug rh TPTONIC and other quasi-clandestine
[286]stations, breadeasts 513 hours, or more than half, in the name of exiles
[287]from. Commnis’ dominated APERSo
[289]ge The, greatest disparity in effort is most notiteable- in
[290]Western Furope. France, which receives @9 hours ef broadcasts per week
[291]from the Orbit as-a whole, responds with only 35 to the Orbit. Italy
[292]receives 97 hours from the Orbit but breadcasts only Lh to it, Spain 9h
[293]to 12, Greoce 89 to 9, Turkey 3, to 7. Even relatively aggressive
[294]Yugoslavia receives 19h brcadcast hours from the Orbit against its outout
[296]to the Orbit.of o &9 hours. -
[297]my h. The one-sided
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[304]he The one-sided contest is even more marked in a comparison
[305]of the breadeast output of the USER alone, without the satellites,
[306]arainst Europes It subjects Spain, Greece and Italy together, for
[307]instance, to 10 hours of broadeasts per week. ‘The combined broadcasts
[308]of these three countries to the USSR, however, number only 19 hours per
[309]weeks France and Turkey who, together, reecive 6, hours per week from
[310]the USSR, make no broadcasts at all to the USSR. -
[312]i. Appendix I gives a compilation by country or area of the
[313]international broadcasts to and from USSR and the satellites. It shows
[314]that the Communists are outslugging the free world, and that Western
[315]Europe, in particular, is doing far less than it. should in .the radio
[316]propaganda battle with the Orbit. ,
[318]26 Capabilities
[320]Several techniques are available to CIA for the use of radio
[321]broadcasting in its covert psychological warfare mission.
[323]ae Overt international broadcasting on fixed frequencies under
[324]cover of covertly controlled emigre groups. This technique rormally
[325]would be calculated to reach wide audiences by means of high power and
[326]the use of miltiple frequencies; but it invites heavy jamming, is costly
[327]and presents security, control and political problems in the acquisition
[328]and maintenance of suitable bases and frequency allocations.
[330]i a i a ae
[332]bo. Quasi-clandestine broadcasts in the name of notional or
[333]*eaptive" resistance movements using relatively low power and employing
[334]a frequency switching technique to evade jamming. This technique presents
[335]more manageable security and control problems, delivors a Signal in spite
[336]of jamming and costs less than high power, but it places a burden on
[337]listeners and presents special problems.in avoiding interference with
[338]‘broadcasts of friendly countries. — :
[340]eH RE RH H
[342]; ¢.o Subsidigation of overt nonpolitical, but anti-Comminist,
[343]religious broadcasts» 2M dk at .
[345]; da. Through covert nenetration and/or support, the manipulation
[346]of free world domestic broadcasting systems for the purpose (1) streng=
[347]thening their antieCommunist broadcasts to the Orbit and/or (23 influence
[348]ing them to more aggressive anti-Communist, pro-Western attitudes in their
[349]domestic services. -
[351]. This technique lends itself naturally to clandestine
[352]operations. It requires a minimum of U.S. personnel, presents no
[354]problems concerning
[355]2
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[367]problens concerning besos ‘and management, ‘end requires relatively
[368]em2ll investrents and @XPense Tt would be advantageous beyond the
[369]_ dumediate PP field. In such a post an agent could observe communist
[370]infiltration, spot forthcoming politcal. changes by observing changes
[371]- dn povernnent prepaganda direetivas, recruit agents with reliable
[372]cover for other covert undertakings and cooperate in planning for
[373]dental of the facilities to an enény in the event of hostilities.
[375]We believe at should be the agency's established policy
[376]to carry out such penetrations wherever opportunities offer or can
[377]be createds A glance at the world map is sufficient to indicate the |
[378]immensity of this field ‘of potentialities, ‘poth as coneerns the ~~~
[379]countries on the peripheries. of the USSR and Communist China ia -
[380]Europe, the Near East and Far Eastg and in Latin America as welle .
[381]We propose that an immediate start be made, in cooperation with Area ©
[382]_Divigions, on a country~by-country survey of possibilities in this .
[383]area and that action he taken to achieve penetration wherever this
[384]study indicates it my be foasibles
[386]ne RR RR ane
[388]-  -@e5. Use ‘of purchased or free time through covert channels
[389]on existing radio systems in: friendly COUNTIES ot eS
[391]f. Electronic penetration of enony - proadeasts. y, maples
[392]the "Ghost? . Voice operations of World War Ir. This techn sue is .
[393]discussed in. para. 5ateo(S) below.
[395]ge To exploit the amateur [rast proadcasters, Large
[396]numbers of whom dstist in Russia, * * + A Droject is being Grafted
[397]te explore the possibilities ef this technique.
[399]; hho Broadcasting from . airplanes. Thia has been carried out
[400]‘experimental ly in two areas with digappointing results due primarily
[401]to operational and equipment-limitations which make. for Limited aude ~
[402]‘fence coverage at best. It is, morenver, very ‘costly and-alse pre=
[403]sents ‘special gecurity problems. It is not recommended, except for -
[404]possible hit-and-run operations. Airborne transmitters might be used
[405]‘on occasion to similate messages from agents inside: ‘the USSR or sate |
[406]ellites. This ie a desention technique rather ‘han broadcasting: but
[407]shoulds we believe, be explored. . -
[409]3. Targets in n onder of, importance o, with optim of Ade quecy
[411]* YSSReosRadio is the only consistent: medium for. picre~ .
[412]ing the Soviet ‘von curtain. It.is estimated that there are approxi=
[413]‘mately 4,000,000 receiving sete in the USSR, of which 75 to 60 per
[414]cent are believed to be equipped with frequency bands capable of
[415]receiving foreign shortwave broadcasts. Virtually all of then. readily
[416], veeeive hong | and medium wave signals. Wot ell of these receivers are
[418]in the hands of
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[424]in the hands of private individual! however} and the’ number of those
[425]having access to shortwave receivers is estimated to be constantly ©
[426]deereasing due to Soviet efforts t6,increase group listening by means.
[427]of wired networks. Nevertheless, at would appear that there will be a .
[428]sizeable potential audience for foreign broadcasts in all three
[429]-Wee bands for som» time to: come. One indication of this is the
[430]fact, that at present the USSR is bréadessting approximately 900 hours
[431]per day over 160 transmitters in 26 or more languages to its own peoples
[433]‘Many of these transmissions are to areas and over Frequencies which lie =
[435]within our transmitting capabilitics.
[437]Our assets: for exploiting this potential audience,
[438]; reladtng projects still ‘in the Planning Stages | are far from adequate
[440]be ‘Communist China e=<Like tlie USSR, the Communist government
[441]of China relicS heavily on radio broadcasting for communication with
[442]"  @he peovies It utilizes more than. con fational ‘and. regional stations
[443]_. for this purpose, operating chiefly on medium and Long wave bat to
[444]' some extent, also, on shortwave o % # He
[446]mh em A ae oe
[448]Be cari Satellites «<The preponderance of CIA broade
[449]casting efforts are cent ered ia area, % % ;
[451]7 de The Free Worl.d.--Hany countries afford opportunities
[453]for relatively inexpensive exploitation by covert penetration. of
[454]indigenous broadcasting systems: and use of free or purchased. times * ROE
[455](See, Parae 20 d.)
[457]bbe Problems ¢ x of * Covert. Broadcasting
[458]as cover oO
[459]: --°- (1) 8 radio transmitter that ean 1 be heard cannot be
[460]fidden. Put another way, there are no known methods. for concealing —
[461]fom téemical monitors the’ geographical : “gource of broadcasts, eithough
[462]the non-technicdl listening public can +e and often is deceivede .
[463]Cover for broadcasting operations, therefore, presents a formidable
[464]protieme Autonomoue emigre organizations, which offer the most _
[465]eredible. cover, generate. factionalism ag well as ‘control, security —
[466]and manager: “nt problems. © ese difficulties ‘gould, however, be ~
[467]minimized by positive agency y control through a compartnentel ization
[468]whieh separates the cover organization from program and transmitting
[470]operations and lays dam strict requirements on security, budget
[471]control, and high professional atandarde.7 See Charts Annex IT.
[473]( 2) Religious broadeasting presents few cover heade
[474]aches, but is of doubtful. propagenda Values - — ;
[475]G) The best cover
[477]ep h : tae :
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[484]Oh The: best cover is afforded by covert. penetration
[485]of friendly systems, (a-Western European nation. ‘talking back to > USSEp
[486]€t., a8 discussed in’ 2ode above)s .’
[488]a “(4)” Commercial proadeasting cover presents some. » possi
[489] palitdes ‘in. the free ‘world but none ‘for hroadeasting to. the Soviet
[490]Orbite-  -”
[492]“Be Bases,
[494]. aay Becauge governnenta object to providing bases for
[495]ageressive psychological. warfare which they do not influence or control,
[496]it is difficult to: find bases in areas suitable for broadcasting to the —
[497]Orbit. Furthermore, adequate broadcasting facilities take time to
[498]plan, build, . and staff ‘and long temre is therefore | important c How-»
[499]. ver, the political Climate of a ‘country can change: abruptly, with |
[500]_ wegulting. uncertainty as to length of tenure. . Munich, for. instance,
[501]which once furnished.an excellent base for a variety of broadéasta —
[502], targeted t to the Orbits. appears: to be becoming | less and less satisfactory.
[504]a Cover and control problens are ‘elesely’ related to
[505]this. A base for a secure and competently managed operation should be
[506]less difficult. to obtain than for a deosely organized ONG «
[508]“ay Seaborne transmitters offer mech in nobility but
[509]‘antenna ‘Limitations restrict their effective powere As in the case:
[510]6f the VOA COURIER, stationary antennas on land are: vequired for
[511]maximum effectiveness. Thus, the political problen. becomes: the sane
[512]as for land transmitter bases, and.costs in investaent and méintennance
[513]are. considerably higher. than land. based operations, Moreover, the. =.
[514]difficulties of providing ‘eredible cover for a covert seaborne operation
[515]are manifest. While this office wil] contime to study VOA experience
[516]in this field, it. SeeS no Prospect ‘of any: agency use for ite ¢
[518] £ 3) The OA. presently controls numerous broadcasting
[519]bases and are developing additional bases,. in areas of the world”
[520]sulteble for our purposes. The netessary agreements with host:
[521]countries have already been negotiated; power, housing, transporta=
[522]‘ion and. other..logistics. have been provided.. The present: manage=
[523]mont of YOA are symoathetic to sharing these bases’ with . CIAs °.
[525]_ In addition to the’ saving in cost, thie vould furnish us secure.
[526]: Sreas for transmitters with the minimum of housekeeping problems,
[527]If the difficult but not ingurmountable problem of cover canbe 7
[528]resclved, ‘gueh, ‘Locations: would be. Adee’ ‘for our: PUPpOBes . « a
[530]“Informatien Support .
[532]-  €)y To supplemerit: available normal news | sources, a:
[533]wosdeasting t to Orbit countries is dependent for program material,
[535]upon: intelligence _
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[543]upon intelligence reports, interrogation of defectors, escapees
[545]and exiles, indigenous newspapers and a regular flew of intercepts
[546]from enemy broadcasts. These are indispensable to credible, intere
[547]eating, and timely broadcasts. Despite our vast rotential resources
[548]‘and large U.S. expenditures in these fields, the effective "take" is
[549]far from adequate, rarely timely, and unnecessarily costly. FBID, Vor,
[550]and several others monitor the same foreign broadcasts to extract the
[551]Sane or Similar information. Several U.S. agencies interrogate the
[552]same exiles for PW information, whereas a single interrogator, trained
[553]in PW needs, could supply most, if not all, the requirements not only
[554]for all radio but all other Pi activities better and faster. A cleared
[555]consultant, on behalf of one of our more successful operations, pro-
[556]dueed on abundance of exesllent support information and evaluation
[557]data. The same data, properly sterilized and speedily disseminated,
[558]could equally serve the VOA and any other covert or overt Fil effort
[559]targeted to the same area,
[561]This complex problem needs a high level decision
[562]by State and CIA and the appointment of a small team of officers —
[563]experienced in both FW and interrogation work with power to devise
[564]an effective and efficient program to exploit our rich resovrces.
[566]de fo Deliver a Signal That Can Be Heard
[568](1) Soviet jamming of propaganda broadcasts Yaises
[569]serious questions concerning our ability to deliver a signal that
[570]can be heard above the jamming. ‘Te be sure, some of our breadeasts
[571]get through becauge they are unable simultaneously to jam broadcasts
[572]in all areas nor do they in practice jam a given broadcast transe
[573]mission at ell hours.
[575]For future planing purposes, however, these factors
[576]seen clear:
[578]{a} Soviet capabilities for jamming are large and
[579]on the increase.
[581](b) The degree of their jamming seems to be re=
[582]lated to their estimate of the harmful effect of the broadcasts on
[583]their interests, Hence, the more effective parts of our propaganda
[584]are likely to be jammed even though other parts get through.
[586]{c) We have no present capsbilities to monitor
[587]their jamming if they use--as they probably do in congested areag-=
[588]low-powered local jammers.
[590](2) Prudent planing would, therefore, require that
[591]any substantial future investments by CIA in radio broadcasting
[592]transmitters include provision for all possible techniques to ensure
[593]our broadcasts being heard to the maximum in spite of jamming.
[595](3) What techniques
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[605](3) What techniques are available to meet this requiree
[608](a) To deliver a signal of such power as to be
[610]heard above the jamming. Here we are at a disadvantage in that a
[611]Jomepoueeed and inexpensive local jammer is capable of rendering _
[612]unintelligible « signal of substantially higher power from a distant
[613]pointe The greater the power of ovr transmitter the more complicated
[614]the installation and the more exoensive the investment. And the more
[615]diffieult becowes the cover and securlty problems as well as the
[616]political considerations involved in base negotiations. Since the
[617]enery is not required to equal our power with his jammers, we would
[618]therefore be fighting e losing battle if we attempted to "slug it out!
[619]on & power basis only.
[621]{(b) Jamming evasion turough the device of vary=
[622]ing the frequency has so far proven to be an effective means of lay--
[623]ing down a signal that can be heard clearly despite jamaing. This —
[624]method requires constant dial changing by the listener and must
[625]assume therefore a desire on his part to hear the program sufficient
[626]to overcome tue annoyance of dial twisting. When used in combination
[627]with appropriate programming techniques and the use of tuo or more
[628]frequencies similtaneously Liis has so far proven to be the most
[629]effective means of jamming avoidance ¢
[631]Such frequency shiftines cannot be accomplished
[633]within the legal. rules laid down for international broadcasting.
[635]These mst, therefore, be "black" broadeasts in the sense that they
[636]can be credibly denied by our Government as well as the fovernnent
[638]of the host country. The movement at will through various frequencies
[639]proccrces an annoying interference for the listeners to broadcasters to
[640]whom those frequencies are legally assigned. This interference, while
[641]fully justified in the ease of USSR and satellite assigned frequencies,
[642]must be avoided in the case of frequencies assigned to our friendss
[644]Our proadeasts using this technique have so
[645]far avoided annoyance to friendly countries by the use of very lew
[646]pover, This Limits us to a small part of the total Soviet Orbit
[647]target and that only on the periphery. The same vechniques can be
[648]used with higher power and at greater distances from the target. —
[649]fe-aveid interference with friendly nations! broadeasts the base
[650]mast be located in an area which, ‘with the proper antenna adjust-
[651]rents, permits our signal to "skip" over the territory of friendly
[652]countries in its path. An example would be that, given a transmitting
[653]‘pass in Saudi Arabia for broadcasts te the USSR, the facility would
[654]have to be engineered sc that its signal wonld not interfere with:
[655]lecal. broadcast reception in Turkey and other friendly countries in
[657]between.
[658](ec) The development ot 4 unconventional broadeasting
[659]techniques for
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[666]techniques for the penetration of enemy domestic radio broadcasting
[667]services might well enable us to evercome the handicaps imposed by -
[668]the jamming of our conventional breadcasts to the Soviet orbit and
[669]seize the cold war initiative in the radio ophere It is a field
[670]which has been neglected thus far.
[672]' Sone possibilities in this area are described
[673]in 1 the te Troy” report of the Massachusetts Institute of
[674]Technology Vol. 1, Annex 26) of 1 February, 1951.
[676]no Among then is the "intrusion," or "gide=bana
[677]injeetdon,” ‘technique which wes used successfully by the Russians
[678]‘against Germany during World War II. It would enable us to intrude ..
[679]our own propaganda messages into radio programs being broadcast on |
[680]“enemy Home channels. It would enable us in effect to talk to the |
[682]- Soviet, satellite and neutral radio audiences. over enemy facilities
[684]or compel the enemy to disrupt his own broadcast service in an effort —
[685]to prevent it. It could also be used in turning Soviet propaganda
[686]broadcasts to Western Burope to the advantage of our friends. ‘The ‘Troy
[687]report observes as to’ the technique itself: od
[689]“This would be an effective and annoying
[690]technique which would be extremely difficult, te counter."
[692]Utilization of this technique appears to. be
[693]within our. _gapabtlities at the moment.. It has been field tested
[694]and is yeady for use as soon as the necessary technical adaptations
[695]tan be made to conventional transmitters. The time and cost involved
[696]in mounting a facility for utilizing this technique is now being
[697]explored by ADCO at the suggestion of this office.
[699]. _ Another unconventional technique being devel-~
[700]oped by an agency consultant and now almost ready for field testing
[701]‘4s the so-called "cuddling" device. This operates on the theory that
[702]we can transmit an interfering sigaal into an orbit domestic radio. -
[703]sorvice which will cause the listening audience to shift to our
[704]nearby program in endeavoring to tune out the interference. on his:
[706]our: home program. | .
[708]Other unconventional 1 means of - carrying the .
[709]cold war to the Orbit by means. of clandestine radic might. be cap-
[710]able of invention and development, and the scientific and practical
[712]. potentialities in this field should be explored to the utmost.
[714]This office is convinced that emphiagis must
[715]be placed more and more on unconventional radio broadcasting tech-
[717]. Wiques if the cold war of the air waves is not to-become more one-
[718]sided than it already is in favor of the Communists. Properly devel-
[719]oped and utilized, those techniques already perfected or in the pro-~
[720]cess of perfection and those which might be invented mignt even be
[722]: . the means of
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[730]the means of shitting the whole radio propagandd war balance dn our
[731]favor. They would be indispensablé in the: event . of hot war. We,
[732]therefore, are impressed with the necessity of developing our capaci«:
[733]ties in this direction to the utmost. and proceeding inmediately with
[734]the covert procurenent of bases amet equipment needed fer the task.
[736]. | Bo recapitulate, 4b would. diem desirable for. .
[737]_ CIA to Limit ite present and future conventional, radio broadcasting
[738]acitvities to the absolute minimum and that any new: undertakings.
[739]. should provider -
[741], i “A mascinmam transnitter power of
[742]200,000 watts capable of ‘eccommodating: ©
[744], - 2 Bult an - jenming evadiion capabili-
[745]' t1esg ani
[747]ee 3 baste in unconvontiond broodeasting
[748]apepiitieee .
[750]& Bases in secure and 1 protected areas:
[751]which permit tiie - use of the jamming evasion teshnique without inter-
[752]ference with friendly countries. A study of base possibilities is
[753]now being nasle by this office, — , _
[755]Bo Lad Lead Time
[757]. @) (a) Radio| ‘proadeasting gacilitiée cannot be created
[758]_ over night. From the time that plans are finally. approved, it takes
[759]' 12 to 18 months to design, construct. and install & transmitter.”
[760]Prior to such approval time.is required for the planning cycle, negobia~
[761]tion for bases, the staffing problem, eteo
[763](b) Deep. cover penetration of” existing radio sta~
[764]tdons or ‘eyatens likewise require tine for development. °
[766](2) All in all; it would be prident, to. estimate that
[767]upwards of two years arc. required from the conception of a project
[768]for broadeasting and its impLehentation. Hence, the planning must
[769]bs long-range. It is not possible to improvise broadcasting capabil—
[770]ities for targets of opportunity, gach as Stalin's death.
[772]fo and Management, ~
[774](1) Control by CZA of the substance of broadeast, and
[775]the management of broadcasting cperations should be absolute and through
[776]| efficers directly responsible to agency control. —
[778](2) The doctrine of. compartnentalization : should be
[779]strictly enforced. No. ones excepting the handful of technicians required
[781]to eperste ;
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[790]to operate a transmitter, should‘ be allowed near the transmitter
[791]site. The delivery of tapes, ete., should be through a cutout. . Likes
[793]wise, the studio and programming activity should be separated from the
[794]operation of the transmitter as well as from ‘any other activities of
[795]the cover organization... If two or more language groups use the seme -
[797]facilities they should be compartmented fron ach other. ® # #
[798](Soe Para, 4u8.(1)) | |
[800]g Evaluation - me oo
[801]; - GQ) In the Preliminary Survey of Radio Broadcasting —
[802]| (25 February 1953-85 86889) -attention was called to the need for a
[803]continuing evaluation of all radio broadeasting- operations with partic-
[804]ular referencé to coverage am impact, and sources for the essential
[805]information were outlined, = ,
[807]___ , (2) PP/OPS, in ecllaboration with this office, has -
[808]initiated this much-needed underteking, _ ;
[810]he ° Personnel,
[812](2) There is a shortage of proféssional and. technical
[813]personnel qualified for covert radio broadeasting. A program of
[815]selective recruitment should be undertaken in coordination with any
[816]plans for new radio projects. — cS
[818]+ " (2): A training program in covert. broadcasting techniques
[819]should also be initiated. This training should be undertaken in safe
[820]houses by detail- of qualified instructors from covert training for basic
[821]indoctrination; te be supplemented by area‘instruction by the area desks
[822]and specialized radio training by Commo. and this office. , .
[824]5. Recommendations =
[826]' Pending clarification of CIA's future responsibility in the
[827]. old war we have made certain assumptions ag to. the criteria which
[828]should govern agency activities in radio broadcasting. -
[830]Our théalis is that CIA should use radio Broadcasting in
[831]covert Psychological Warfare only under the following conditions:
[833]Be! That the task cannot be performed by VOA or other ©
[834]overt media.°- , : : : ,
[836]_ bo ‘That any contemplated operation follew strict cone
[837]septs for clandestizie operations, including ©. me
[839]ae (1) Positive and direct agency control of both
[840]management and policy. + oO, : se
[842]. ‘.. (2) Strict security requirements ineluding ecome=
[843]partmentation of all elements of broadcasting operations.
[845]=10= (3) Maintenance of
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[854]- (3) Maintenance of sufficient sover to permit oo
[855]eredible dental of official connection by U.S. or: host t country govern-
[858]&, ‘That no direct brbadcast opereiton be undertaken by
[859]GIA untdl ever; possibility has been exhausted to have the task under-
[860]taken by another country (or countries) through ; ‘penctration, manipula
[862]ton and/or cuntrel aid or covert: -parchase of time on, Andigenous radio
[863]ot faedlities.
[865]Our foremost objective 5 should be to eqlott the :
[866]brosdeastin, syatens of friendly a and neutral countries. This generally
[867]is possible in “te wy
[869](2). fo stimlate. sur friends. ‘te greater aggressive
[870]effort ia their international broadcasts to the. Soviet orbit; and
[872](2) To influence the output ef the domestic ser
[873]vices o! friendly and neutral. states in the interests of the: ‘Western
[874]- eanse.
[876]os within this frame. of referencé we made the following
[879]a (1) Proceed 448! eiiott the tiga possibilities to.
[880]Be indigenous ratio systeng in- -fedondly and néutral. nations with the
[881]objectives of (a) increasing the smount and effectiveness of their ..
[882]propaganda éfforts against USSR aad the satellites, (b) exposing and
[883]_dihibiting Commun‘st fifth colum activities end & ‘the maintenance.
[884]ef. pro-US. anid pro-Western attitudes. a
[886]mS These missions should be undertelcen in closest
[887]7 collaboratdon with the USIS missions to the en that all that. can be .
[888]decompl ished overtiye a
[890](2) ndertekce. a recruitment: and training progran to
[891]make availab:. © highly qualified and thoroughly indoctrinated officers
[892]preferably with natural. cover to undertake and ‘to support such ndasions.
[894](33 tn ecoperadon with Staté, develop a positive
[895]pro. eam for information. ‘euppert of all propaganda sotivities Chrough
[896]neximim use of intelligence and defector sources» .
[898](4). Strengthen and streamline. the machinery for
[899]; policy , guidance, with Washington headquarters responsible for. broad
[900]policy only and the field missions to be given the widest. poasible .
[901]latitude in the application of: those policies to local sequirements |.
[902]arid the exploitation of targets a opportunity. A mature staff officer.
[903]‘experienced in'P We should be-dvailable in the miasion to (a) feed
[904]propaganda Mines, (o) expedite Pls ‘Support (ce) coordinate with USIS |
[906]and (a) generally
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[913]and (d). generally backstop the operation. .
[915]. (5) Botablish machinéry for evaluating the ewhetence,
[916]eoverage, impact and management. of radio operations. oo.
[918]5. (6) - Proceed, with thio @evelopnent of capabilities to
[919]electronically imsrude upon: and otherrise exploit the Cosmuniat radio
[920]broadeasting to their own and foreign audiences. It is important. BO -
[922]. . hewe these facilities reacy at the earliest possible date for possible
[923]. use. in the ecld war—lot to have them available at the outbreak of .
[924]“hot: war would be a tragic mistake.
[926]seea re eas u&
[928]ote: Reecumendatdons with respect to speeific
[929]‘tardsts haye been transmitted. to the © SEPROPFAStS ,
[930]divisions
[931]: (10) a ‘anal staf? element should be, ereated to
[932]supervise CIA planning and operations in covert radio broadcasting.
[933]‘This’ staff. should be lnstructed to expedite the implementation of
[934]the above recommendations and provide a continuing review of CTA
[935]Policy and Progam for the use of this Hedia..
[937]le. “ioyd Ener
[938]“6, Low BGRER
[940]"5 May 1953
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