[1]176-10036-10102
[3]| 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 | :
[5]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[6]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[8]AGENCY :
[10]RECORD NUMBER :
[11]RECORD SERIES :
[12]AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
[14]NARA
[15]176-10036-10102
[16]National Security Files
[18]ORIGINATOR :
[19]FROM :
[21]TO:
[23]TITLE :
[25]DATE :
[27]PAGES :
[29]SUBJECTS :
[30]DOCUMENT TYPE :
[31]CLASSIFICATION :
[32]RESTRICTIONS :
[33]CURRENT STATUS :
[34]DATE OF LAST REVIEW :
[35]OPENING CRITERIA :
[36]COMMENTS :
[38]CIA Information Telegram
[39]3/19/1963
[40]3
[42]9/10/2000
[44]National Security Files, Box 197: Vietnam, 2/63-3/63. Box 2
[46]4
[48]a a ; . — ( co, Ponty WV £ vis hott aS fy a ,
[49]. Loe eae nee -- : ' -
[50]. : . 4 .
[53]w
[55]CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY = - \} pew
[57]This material contains inlormation affecting the Netional Defonse of ths United States within the meening of tho Espionage Lows, Title 18, U.S.C Secs
[58]793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to ac unauthorized person is prohibited by faw.
[60]CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
[61]NO FOREIGN DISSEM
[63]C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
[65]COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM/CHINA (TAIWAN) REPORT NO. ToCs-3/540, 863
[67]te 2 spe
[68]. Bes p
[69]SUBJECT DISCUSSIONS. BETWEEN PRESIDENT DIEM AND DATE DISTR. 19 MARCH 1963 5 he d
[70]VICE PRESIDENT CHEN CHENG OF NATIONALIST 7 . ‘
[71]CHINA PRECEDENCE ROUTINE
[72]pateor 4-9 MARCH 1963 REFERENCES IN 89258
[73]- INFO, : . , . a
[74]Place g VIETNAM, SAIGON (5-12 MARCH 1963)
[75]‘DATE ACQ.
[76]APPRAISALSE B FIELD REPORT NO. FVS-8661
[78]THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRAOINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE,
[80]SOURCE A HIGH-LEVEL MEMBER (B) OF THE CHINESE NATIONALIST DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENT IN
[81]SAIGON WHO IS BELIEVED TO REPORT WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OF HIS GOVERNMENT, A
[82]CHINESE BUSINESSMAN (F) WITH EXTENSIVE CONTACTS IN THE CHINESE COMMUNITY, AND A
[83]MEMBER (F) OF THE CHINESE NATIONALIST DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENT IN SAIGON.
[85]APPR. IT IS PROBABLY TRUE THAT LENGTHY DISCUSSIONS OCCURRED BETWEEN THE “TWO LEADERS AND
[86]POSSIBLY TRUE THAT THE SUBJECTS INDICATED WERE COVERED.
[88]1. DURING THE VISIT OF NATIONALIST CHINA'S (CHINAT) VICE ofestout -CHEN CHENG
[89]TO SOUTH VIETNAM FROM 4 ‘TO'9 MARCH 1963,.HE AND PRESIDENT NGO DINH DIEM CONVERSED
[90]IN EXCESS OF TWENTY HOURS, CHIEFLY IN PRIVATE WITH ONLY AN INTERPRETER: PRESENT.
[91]THE SERIOUS NATURE OF THE CONVERSATIONS WAS EVIDENCED BY THE EXPRESSIONS ON THE
[92]FACES OF THE TWO MEN FOLLOWING THEIR VARIOUS CONVERSATIONS. THE CONTENTS OF THE
[93]CONVERSATIONS DID NOT APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED WITH (His “ADVISORS OF ELTHER
[94]PARTICIPANT. = —_ ,
[96]2. CHEN DELAYED ‘HIS SCHEDULED DEPARTURE FROM SAIGON FOR 2h HOURS TO PERMIT
[98]HIM TO TRAVEL WITH DIEM TO DALAT, ‘WHERE, EXCEPT FOR A BRIEF
[100]CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS dachede ee enone
[101]C-O-N-F-I-D-B-N-T-I-A-L No FOREIGN DISSEM | 4
[103]downgrading and
[104]dectosuficotion
[106]| Ec i se Eo ROE
[108]_TELEGRAM _ | TELEGR
[110]en NK Oe 197 S856
[112]rooM 1Kb oBS0LETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. ; . (15-29)
[116]“coKHENTIR _ NO FORBIGN DISSEM
[118]CONFIDENTIAL
[120]" CLASSIFICATION = = DISSEMINATION CONTROLS’
[122]tocs -37/ 540 863
[124]VISIT TO THE MILITARY SCHOOL, THE ENTIRE’ TIME WAS. DEVOTED TO PRIVATE
[125]TALKS, MEMBERS OF THE CHEN ENTOURAGE WERE NOT NOTIFIED: UNTIL THE
[127]LAST MOMENT OF THE REVISED SCHEDULE NOR WERE THEY GIVEN ANY IND LGAT ION
[128]AS TO THE CONTENT OF THE DISCUSSIONS.
[130]3, MEMBERS OF THE CHINAT DELEGATION AND’ OF THE CHINAT DIPLOMATIC
[131]COMMUNITY SPECULATED THAT THE TWO MAIN TOPICS OF CONVERSATION WERE. ™
[132]GREATLY INCREASED CHINAT MILITARY SUPPORT FOR SOUTH VIETNAM, AND ‘THE
[133]USE OF SOUTH VIETNAM AS A BASE FOR CHINAT MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST
[134]THE CHINA MAINLAND, CHEN 1S BELIEVED TO HAVE OFFERED: DIEM UNRESTRICTED
[135]MILITARY TRAINING AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT, PLUS UP TO: ONE DIVISION OF
[136]COMBAT TROOPS TO FIGHT IN VIETNAMESE ARMY UNIFORMS.’ - CHEN IS ALSO
[137]THOUGHT TO HAVE ASKED DIEM TO CEASE DRAFTING OVERSEAS CHINESE -
[139]VIETNAM, WHICH |S CAUSING THE CHINATS EMBARASSMENT , I.E. , DEMONSTRATIONS
[140]BY THESE LOCAL CHINESE AGAINST THE “CHINAT EMBASSY IN’ SAIGON AND
[142]APPEALS TO THE CHINAT AMBASSADOR.. CHEN PROBABLY ASKED DIEM TO: PUB-
[143]LICLY SUPPORT THE CHINAT MAINLAND COUNTERATTACK THEME AND TO GRANT AIR-
[144]FIELD AND COASTAL: BASES FOR CHINAT MILITARY AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE
[145]OPERATIONS AGAINST THE SOUTHERN AND WESTERN PORTIONS OF CHINA.
[147]OTHER LIKELY TOPICS OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE Two MEN WERE THE
[148]CONDUCTING OF JOINT OPERATIONS INTO NORTH VIETNAM AND LAOS, THE
[150]MATTER OF THAILAND'S MOVEMENT TOWARDS NEUTRALITY, AND JOINT EFFORTS
[152]TO UNSEAT CAMBODIA'S SIHANOUK, WHOM THE CHINATS FEEL 1S:A-LACKEY OF
[154]NO FOREIGN DISSEM
[157]CLASSIF: CATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
[159]“PONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM . TDCS -3/540,863
[161]PEIPING, CONCENSUS AMONG THE CHINAT COMMUNITY AND CHEN'S DELEGATION
[163]WAS THAT SOME ACCORD WAS REACHED BY THE TWO LEADERS, AS CHEN WAS IN
[164]EXCELLENT SPIRITS AT THE CONCLUSION OF HIS VISIT.
[165]4, -ALTHOUGH SOMEWHAT SLOW IN GETTING STARTED, THE VISIT DID
[167]RESULT IN BRINGING THE TWO GOVERNMENTS CLOSER TOGETHER, PARTICULARLY
[168]THE COUNTERPARTS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES. THE VISIT ALSO SERVED A
[169]USEFUL PURPOSE IN EFFECTIVELY IMPRESSING THE LOCAL CHINESE POPULATION,
[170]WHICH TURNED OUT MORE OR LESS SPONTANEOUSLY IN AN ESTIMATED ONEi.HUNDRED’
[171]THOUSAND ALONG THE ROUTE 10/1 RPORT TO CHEER CHEN WHEN HE.
[172]DEPARTED, THE APPARENTLY GENUINE ENTHUSIASM OF THE USUALLY APATHETIC
[173]VIETNAMESE CHINESE CAME AS A SURPRISE EVEN TO THE LOCAL CHINAT
[174]"DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITY.
[175]5. FIELD DISSEM, STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV MAAG AID. USIA
[176]‘CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF 9TH FIELD STATION 2ND AIR DIVISION.
[178]‘END OF MESSAGE
[180]. CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
[182]GONFIENTIL warn re