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[13](2 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
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[21]JOHN A. McCONE
[23]THE SIXTH DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
[25]t
[27]By
[28]Bee, Walter Elder
[29]- Edited by Mary .S. McAuliffe, DCI Staff Historian
[30]1987 ‘.
[31]The attached is a draft history CL BY BYE-1
[32]which has not been forwarded for DECL OADR
[34]review outside the DCI History Staff. DERIVED FROM BYE-1
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[45]CHAPTER IV
[47]In the meanwhile, Cuba remained a sore point for both the CIA and
[48]the Kennedys. _ |
[50]Shortly after the Bay of Pigs, President Kennedy asked General
[51]Maxwell Taylor to chair a small commission, consisting of Robert
[52]Kennedy, Allen Dulles and Admiral Arleign Burke, to investigate,
[53]Highly critical of the piecemeal and acquiescent administrative
[54]decisions which. had accompaned the operation's progress, the Taylor.
[55]report was mild in comparison with the severely critical internal
[56]report prepared by CIA Inspector General Lyman Kirkpatrick.
[58]Robert Kennedy also produced a personal Bay of Pigs .report. to the
[59]President, which he discussed with McCone in late November 1961. The
[60]Attorney General was especially critical of Richard Bissell, Deputy
[61]Director for Plans, because Bissell had told the President the
[62]operation was likely to succeed, Robert Kennedy was also highly
[63]critical of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for spending only twenty
[65]Minutes studying the planned operation before making its first report
[67]“to the President endorsing the operation.
[69]It is worth noting that McCone was the only official in the
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[76]government privy to all the studies of the Bay of Pigs operation,
[77]including the Taylor report, Robert Kennedy's personal report, the
[78]Kirkpatrick report, and the views of the President's Foreign
[79]Intelligence Advisory Board.
[81]“McCone did not dwell on the Bay of Pigs after he took office, but
[82]he did draw several conclusions. Firmly believing the decision to go
[83]ahead was a mistake, he nevertheless thought it an even worse mistake
[84]to dismember the operation once underway, contending that the CIA
[85]should have appealed directly to the President to reverse the
[86]decision to stand down the air strikes. Concluding as well that the
[87]members of the Taylor commission had been too’ closely involved with
[88]the events to have sufficient perspective, he believed the CIA and
[89]JCS had to bear special responsibility for advising the new President
[90]to go ahead, since at that time these were the only two Washington
[91]organizations dealing with international affairs which possessed
[92]complete continuity.
[94]Taking a detached view of the operation, McCone was able to
[95]concentrate on what the Agency could do to avoid similar mistakes in
[96]the future. Leery of large-scale operations involving the Agency's
[97]paramilitary capability, McCone strove, with mixed results, to remove
[98]the CIA from such enterprises. He also stressed the importance of
[99]planning ‘an operation from beginning to end (an attitude which
[100]dominated his approach during the Cuban missile crisis). Finally, he
[101]insisted that the Agency's estimative function be privy to planned
[103]operations, providing early and frequent judgments.
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[114]Cuba, however, remained a subject of considerable concern, In
[115]April 1961, shortly after President Kennedy established the Taylor
[116]Commission, Presidential adviser Walt Rostow speculated that Cuba
[117]might join with the Soviet Union in setting up an offensive air or
[118]missile base. He additionally posed that Cuba might build its
[119]conventional military strength and develop its subversive network to
[120]threaten other Latin American nations from without and within. "Its
[121]ideological contours. are a moral and political offense to us," he
[122]concluded, "and we are committed, by one means or another, to remove
[123]that offense...." .
[125]The Kennedy administration proceeded to address the situation
[127]directly. At a White House meeting which McCone attended in late
[129]‘November 1961, the President announced that General Edward Lansdale,
[131]acting under the direction of the Attorney General, had already begun
[132]to study possible actions to overthrow the Castro regime. These
[133]covert activities, explained Robert Kennedy, included anything
[134]possible to create internal dissension and discredit Castro. . He. then
[135]proposed that, to accomplish this goal, Lansdale head up a committee
[136]made up of representatives of Defense, State, USIA, and CIA, which
[137]would cut across organizational lines. .
[139]McCone decided that the administration and the Agency both seemed
[140]in a state of shock so far as Cuba was concerned. Although skeptical
[141]from the beginning about the Lansdale program's prospects for
[142]success, he nevertheless recognized that the CIA had a special role
[144]and responsibility so far as Cuba was concerned. He himself
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[158]supported the notion of dynamic action, but urged that such action
[160]not be reckless. -Conséquently, he recommended that the Lansdale
[162]group report to the 5412 oversight committee, which was properly
[164]‘qualified to give political guidance and evaluate proposals for
[166]action. In addition, alithough McCone agreed the facilities of all
[167]agencies should be made available for such high-priority operations,
[168]he emphasized that these should remain in place and not be removed to
[169]form a new unit under Lansdale.
[171]‘In this way, MONGOOSE, as it came to be known, was launched.
[172]With the White House's decision to go ahead (keeping the 5412
[173]Committee fully informed), McCone proceeded. to discuss the Lansdale
[174]operation with top Agency officials. Acknowledging that the project
[175]had to be closely held--Lansdale had asked that the CIA's
[176]representative, Richard Helms, report only to the DCI--McCone
[177]nevertheless stated he intended to skip no appropriate echelon of the
[178]Agency, as such a course would deprive him of the advice of other
[179]senior officers. Action would be at the Helms level, and the Agency
[180]would offer Lansdale all necessary support and assistance, but .
[181]without excluding the participation of other Agency members within
[182]the strict security guidelines laia down by the President. Further,
[183]McCone directed the Board of National Estimates and the DD/I to
[184]undertake a continuing evaluation of MONGOOSE, viewing such
[185]precautions as a major step toward overcoming the compartmentation
[186]which had excluded the DD/I from any advance knowledge of the Bay of
[187]Pigs landing. |
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[197]Significantly, McCone insisted on bringing analytical and
[198]estimative functions to bear on Cuban operations from the beginning.
[199]Further, he insisted that truly clandestine actions be small. Most
[201]importantly, he required that careful records be kept of actions and
[203]' conversations, himself setting an example by keeping meticulous
[205]memoranda for the record.
[207]MONGOOSE represented McCone's first working encounter with Robert
[208]Kennedy. The Attorney General, McCone immediately realized, was a
[209]dynamic force with a keen interest in the intelligence community, as
[210]well as a strong influence on the President. McCone became quite
[211]close to him. MONGOOSE also reinforced McCone's awareness of the
[212]extent of the administration's obsession with Cuba. He consequent ly
[213]accepted as a personal charge the administration's desire to
[214]overthrow Castro. He was not, however, about to allow Lansdale or
[215]anyone else dictate the use of CIA sources. Had he detached Agency
[216]resources for Lansdale's use, McCone would have lost control. He
[217]further insisted on the checks and balances of 5412 committee
[218]overview. .
[220]The Special Group (5412 Committee), made up of the Special
[221]Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Deputy
[222]Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of State for Political
[223]Affairs, the Director of Central Intelligence, and other appropriate
[225]representatives, had been established in 1955 by National Security
[227]Council Directive 5412/2 to provide interdepartmental coordination of
[229]covert actions. In general, the Group's cognizance extended to any
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[240]covert activity which, because of its impact, could, if exposed,
[242]-reflect on the official position of the United States. Thus, a
[244]sizeable activity aimed solely at intelligence collection through
[245]clandestine methods could come under the Group's scrutiny.
[246]Conversely, small political actions, with little flap potential,
[247]could be undertaken without referring the activity to the Group.
[249]The Kennedys, however, were sufficiently alarmed over the threat
[250]of Communist subversion and covert aggression that, in January 1962,
[251]another special committee, Special Group (Counterinsurgency),
[252]appeared. Largely the brainchild of General Maxwell Taylor, Special
[253]Group (CI) aimed at identifying those areas where an insurgent threat
[254]existed or threatened to emerge, directing the use of appropriate
[255]resources to counter that threat.
[257]In practice, the CIA had always been reluctant to expose its
[259]activities to an interdepartmental body. The Defense Department had
[261]been similarly reluctant to submit its extensive program of
[262]peripheral reconnaissance flights to Special Group review, although,
[263]beginning in June 1961, the group began to consider these flights.
[264]The special Group's influence depended, in the final analysis, on the
[265]attitude of the President and the Special Group chairman, as well as
[266]on the temper of the DCI. Allen Dulles served as an advocate for the
[267]CIA's proposed activities. John McCone took the position that, as
[268]DCI, he was a personal adviser to the President and thus free to
[269]approve or disapprove the CIA's proposals as he saw fit.
[271]The entire Cuban situation was difficult from the outset, and
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[280]McCone was careful to warn the President and Attorney General that he
[281]‘anticipated no quick or easy road to success. [itn le approval Co) i en
[282]Ambassador Alphand,.a close personal friend of McCone, the French —
[283]embassy in Havana had agreed to serve as. the Agency's Cuban eyes and ==
[284]ears, with Philippe de Vosjoli, SDECE's Washington representative, —..=
[285]reporting directly to McCone. De Vosjoli’ reported that at least | ===
[286]ninety percent of all Cubans supported Castro, while McCone added
[287]that of twenty-seven or twenty-eight CIA agents in Cuba, only twelve
[288]presently were in communication. Contact even with these was
[289]infrequent, and an additional team of seven, infiltrated in December,
[290]had been captured (with two featured on a television "confession"
[291]show). |
[293]Nevertheless, at-a Spécial Group meeting in Aprii 1962, McCone
[294]urged a review of our national policy toward Cuba and asked that we
[295]consider more aggressive action, including direct military
[297]intervention. Noting that various intelligence reports suggested
[299]-that Castro was in deep trouble, he questioned whether the military
[301]strength of the Castro government was as large and as effective as
[302]had been understood. In response to objections that such a course
[303]might lose us friends in Latin America, McCone countered that a show
[304]of strength was more likely to win than lose us friends.
[306]Shortly thereafter, McCone learned from the Attorney General that
[307]there was some movement afoot to exchange our prisoners from the Bay
[308]of Pigs for food. (Castro had offered to release the prisoners in
[309]exchange for a large quantity of drugs and medicines). Later, in
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[319]‘early June, McCone suggested forming a committee to negotiate such a
[320]release. Robert Kennedy was generally sympathetic, but did not at
[321]that time request covert support for the project. The subject was
[322]left for.further discussion, with an agreement that it would not be
[323]discussed with anyone in CIA, Defense, or State who was active in
[324]Cuba operations. |
[326]In mid-July, McCone and Robert Kennedy reviewed. the Cuban
[327]situation in considerable. detail. Kennedy thought that, although
[328]considerable intelligence had been acquired, the program's action
[329]phases had been disappointing. Shortly after, McCone had the
[330]opportunity to review MONGOOSE with the President. Since the
[331]beginning of February, McCone reported, nine intelligence collection:
[332]teams (about half the originally-planned number) had been infiltrated
[333]into Cuba and maintained in place, thousands of Cuban refugees had
[334]been systematically interrogated in Florida, and a number of
[335]third-country agents recruited inside Cuba. U-2 overflights were
[336]being.conducted on a regular two-a-month schedule. The operation was
[337]costing the CIA about $1 million per month in direct costs and even
[338]more in indirect support costs. .
[340]Although McCone was skeptical about the aims and operations of
[341]MONGOOSE, he believed the CIA bore a special responsibility to
[342]collect intelligence on Cuba. He therefore told the President that
[343]this collection effort had produced a substantial amount of hard
[344]intelligence on conditions inside Cuba, and a continuation would
[346]provide additional intelligence, possibly revealing opportunities for
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[360]political, guerrilla or insurgent activities designed to overthrow
[361]Castro. McCone added, however, that many individuals felt that more
[362]dynamic actions were called for, including mass landings and military
[363]activity. McCone did not agree. “our intelligence, he said, did not
[364]support this point of view, and any such attempts would face disaster
[365]unless the United States was prepared to commit large military forces
[366]to support them. |
[368]In the meantime, Castro had officially cast his lot with the
[369]Soviet Union, and indications were increasing that the USSR was
[370]Willing to invest substantial amounts of money, not only to keep the
[371]Cuban leader afloat, but to enhance his capability to create mischief
[372]for the United States. After 1 February 1962, our U-2 flights over |
[373]Cuba increased from one to two per month, and intelligence reports
[374]revealed steady Soviet shipments of military as well as economic aid.
[376]On August 4, McCone learned that eleven Soviet ships believed to
[377]be carrying arms were bound for Cuba. McCone asked for further
[378]details. On August 5, he received a breakdown on the ships, and he
[379]directed immediate U-2 coverage (which began: the following day).
[381]According to reports, up to 5,000 Soviet technicians had arrived, in
[383]‘addition to military communications equipment. The preliminary U-2
[385]readout, however, was not very helpful, and another flight was
[387]planned for August 11.
[389]On August 10, McCone met with Secretary of State Dean Rusk,
[390]presidential military adviser General Maxwell Taylor, McGeorge Bundy,
[391]Deputy Secrety of Defense Roswell Gilpatric and the Attorney .
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[399]General. It was during this meeting,. which approved intensifying
[400]MONGOOSE operations, that McCone first shared outside the CIA his
[401]fear that the Soviets might introduce offensive missiles into Cuba.
[402]His statement had little immediate impact. The experts unanimously
[403]and adamant ly agreed that this was beyond the realm of possibility.
[404]McCone's conclusion that the USSR might put offensive missiles
[405]into Cuba was set in motion by the continuing influx of Soviet
[406]military equipment. It was intensified by the arrival of Soviet
[408]personnel, then brought to a head by reports which suggested that the
[410]Soviet Union was preparing to install surface-to-air missiles (SAMs)
[412]there.
[414]Why, asked McCone, would the Soviet Union place SAMs in Cuba? If
[415]the United States were to launch a military attack, the SAMs could be
[416]easily and quickly destroyed. The SAMs were not being put there to
[417]protect Cuban canecutters; therefore, McCone argued, their real
[418]purpose was to blind the United States by deterring further U-2
[419]overflights. This action would then permit the Soviet Union to take
[420]further steps which they could reveal at a time of their own choosing.
[421]McCone then asked himself what he would do if he were in
[423]Khrushchev's shoes. The United States and Soviet Union were balanced
[425]in nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems, but the USSR had a
[427]‘decided edge in intermediate.and medium-range missiles. These
[429]missiles could not, however, reach the United States from Soviet
[431]launch pads. The USSR had not deployed these missiles outside its
[433]borders, presumably because they could be redirected against the
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[445]Soviet Union if they fell into the wrong hands. However, Cuba was
[446]one place where the Soviets could safely put their missiles. As
[447]McCone put it, "IE I were Khrushchev, I'd put offensive missiles in
[448]Cuba. Then I'd bang my shoe on the desk and say to the United
[449]States, 'How do you like looking down the end of a gun barrel for a
[450]change? Now, let's talk about Berlin and any other subject that I
[451]choose, including all your overseas bases.*"
[453]McCone had confidence in the logic of his conviction and was
[454]prepared to alert the top policy levels. He recognized that he
[455]lacked hard evidence, but was convinced that the implications of
[456]putting Soviet offensive missiles in Cuba would be so serious for
[457]American national security interests: that the contingency should be
[458]considered as soon as possible. |
[460]He stood absolutely alone.
[462]At. noon on August 21, he met with Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense
[463]Robert McNamara, Deputy Under Secretary of State Alexis Johnson,’ the
[464]Attorney General, Maxwell Taylor, General Lyman Lemnitzer (Chairman,
[466]Joint Chiefs of Staff), and McGeorge Bundy to review the Cuban
[468]situation. He noted that since their last meeting on Cuba, the CIA
[470]had received intelligence indicating an enormous increase in Soviet
[471]military support to Cuba. Further, there now were indications of
[472]construction work by Soviet personnel, as well as technicians to
[473]handle the newly-delivered Soviet equipment. While the nature of the
[474]construction remained unknown, McCone warned that it could be missile
[476]sites, For, he emphasized, we had to consider the possibility that
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[489]the Soviets would install offensive weapons in Cuba.
[491]The group proceeded to consider various courses of action open to
[492]the United States should the Soviets place MRBMs in Cuba. McCone had
[493]a three-part Proposal already in hand, calling for 1) an immediate
[494]aggressive political action program to awaken Latin America and the
[495]Free World; 2) a provocative action against Guantanamo or some other
[496]vital American interest, leading to instant United States
[497]retaliation; and, 3) immediate commitment of sufficient U.S.
[498]military forces. to occupy Cuba, destroy the regime, free the people,
[499]and establish Cuba as a member of the community of American States.
[500]McCone noted that the group was reluctant to consider committing U.S.
[501]military forces, however, both because of the magnitude of the task
[503]the world. : : oe
[505]Reaching no conclusions on any course of action, the group at
[506]length asked McCone to brief the President on the situation. The
[507]‘following day, McCone reported in detail to the President, adding the
[508]personal report of-De.Vosjoli, who had recently visited Cuba. The
[509]President, who appeared quite familiar with the situation, expressed
[510]concern, but agreed with General Taylor and McCone that policy
[511]decisions should wait until the next day, when he would meet with his
[512]principal advisers.
[514]On August 23, therefore, President Kennedy met with Rusk,
[515]McNamara, Gilpatric, Taylor, Bundy and McCone to discuss Cuba. The
[517]President requested an analysis of the threat which offensive
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[536]missiles located in Cuba posed to the United States and Latin’
[538]America. He requested as well a- continuing analysis of the numbers
[540]and types of Soviet and Oriental_(.as reported by De Vosjoli) — é
[541]personnel being introduced, the quantities and types of equipment,
[543]their probable uses, and all construction activity in Cuba. In
[545]response to the President's question about our ability to
[547]discriminate between SAM and surface-to-surface missile sites, McCone
[549]said we probably could not differentiate between SAM sites and
[551]350-mile surface-to-surface missiles, but that MRBMs and IRBMS could. ee
[552]be distinguished. "McNamara noted that portable missiles could ‘not -be -
[553]located under. any circumstances. “
[555]The President wondered whether we should make a statement of our
[556]position in advance, outlining the courses of action open to us insu os
[557]the event that the Soviets should install missiles in Cuba. He also oe
[558]asked what we could do against such missile sites. could we take
[559]them out by air action, or would ground action be required? Could
[560]they be destroyed by a substantial guerrilla action? He also asked
[561]what we should do in Cuba if the Soviets decided to precipitate a
[563]crisis in Berlin.
[565]Secretary Rusk received approval for his proposal that the United
[567]‘States inform its NATO allies, particularly Canada, of the growing
[569]seriousness of the situation. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, however,
[570]strongly opposed his recommendation to remove restrictions on
[571]MONGOOSE operations operating out of Guantanamo. McCone again
[572]proposed his three-part program to combat the current Cuban
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[584]situation. After consideration, the President directed the Defense
[586]Department to prepare céntingency plans for possible military action
[588]against Cuba. He and his advisors agreed, however, that no steps
[590]should be taken until full agreement was reached on a policy aimed at
[591]completely solving the Cuban problem.
[593]| Cuba was our most serious problem, McCone shortly afterward told
[594]Robert Kennedy, adding that, in comparison, he would readily give up
[595]our missile bases in Italy and Turkey. Cuba, he told the Attorney
[596]General, was more important than Berlin. It was the key to Latin
[597]America; and if Castro succeeded, then most of Latin America would.
[599]fall to Soviet influence and domination.
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[609]forty-eight hours should the President's terms not be met,
[611]Sunday morning, October 28, with U-2 overflights continuing and
[612]no evidence of slow-down on the Cuban missile sites, Moscow
[613]broadcast yet another Khrushchev communique--this one announcing
[614]that, in the interest of world peace, the Soviet Union had agreed to
[615]dismantle and return the Cuban missiles under United Nations |
[616]verification. Not waiting for the official text, the President
[618]drafted a quick acceptance. The immediate crisis was over.
[620]Serious problems, however, remained. It hada become clear to
[621]McCone that removing Castro no longer was an objective of American
[622]policy, and he was concerned that, as a result of Soviet military
[623]and economic aid, Castro would be left in a position to create much
[624]mischief. Since no agreement had been reached for on-site
[625]inspection, and the SAM system remained in place to limit aerial
[626]inspection, the DCI and intelligence community would not be able to
[627]verify the removal or check on possible future reintroduction of
[628]Cuban missiles. . Further, the MONGOOSE operation, tasked with
[629]toppling Castro, was in disarray. Lansdale complained he was not
[630]being kept informed of JCS planning and that the CIA's Cuban Task
[631]. Force was acting outside MONGOOSE-channels. At the height of the
[632]missile crisis (on October 26), a high-level meeting on MONGOOSE
[634]agreed to recall intelligence collection teams and discontinue
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[644]the Soviet Union were so delicate.
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[648]sabotage operations while relations between the United States and
[650]“on | November 3, McCone in ormed the , Executive Committee ‘that,
[651]despite indications that the missiles were being dismantled, there
[652]also were signs that the Soviets were taking steps which might
[653]represent a continuing threat to the United States. More IL-28s had
[654]been uncrated; some fourteen Soviet ships were en route to Cuba,
[655]and there were indications that the Soviets were proceeding with
[657]plans to develop a submarine support base at Banes. Stressing the
[659]unprecedented nature of the SAM system deployment and the fact at 7
[660]the system remained in place to provide a shield from aerial J
[661]inspection, McCone emphasized that we did not and could not know the |
[662]exact number of offensive missiles originally placed in Cuba or |
[663]whether all in fact had been removed. Indeed, McCone pointed out,
[664]there remained a distinct possibility that missile complexes could
[665]be hidden from view in Cuba's caves.
[666]The President listened to McCone's warning but appeared more
[668]concerned about the question of past intelligence failures. For by
[669]this time postmortems had begun to surface alleging either a near
[671]intelligence failure or the withholding of vital intelligence
[673]information on the Cuban missile build-up. Deeply concerned, McCone
[675]had already ordered an intensive internal investigation. Now the
[677]_ President himself requested a review of the entire intelligence
[679]community, seeking a judgment as to whether better intelligence and
[681]intelligence evaluation could have forecast Cuban developments ‘more.
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[692]“however, that the United States continue its surveillance and be
[694]prepared to act if a plane were shot down. 9K :
[695]. With the release of the Bay of Pigs prisoners and the completion : |
[696]of Donovan's mission, McCone again pressed for low-level flights
[697]over Cuba--a recommendation supported by the USIB but. opposed by
[699]both McNamara and Rusk because of its possible political
[701]consequences. Noting that the administration could not very well
[702]ignore the views of the DCI and USIB, President Kennedy proposed
[704]three sorties on a trial. basis. But, after considering the pros and |||
[706]cons,. the: President on May 21 decided to postpone a subsequent
[708]low-level mission on the grounds of insufficient urgency. a ~ 4
[710]. Following the missile crisis, Cuban exile groups escalated their
[712]activities, but the Executive Committee. was. ‘unable to come to a firm.
[713]agreement: on how to respond. Similarly, the special Group to
[714]consider Cuban’ sabotage operations met with disagreement and
[715]indecision. ‘It was clear McCone stood virtually alone in his view
[716]that the United States should sustain an aggressive approach towards
[717]Cuba, with the dual aim of getting rid of both the Soviet presence
[718]and. Castro. No senior officials went so far as to propose that the
[719]covert action program be stopped; but the original impetus which
[720]had given birth to the Program had all but disappeared.
[721]American policy towards Cuba, and especially the Agency's role
[722]in supporting this policy, remained ambigious for the rest of
[724]McCone's tenure. Officially, the United States held the Soviet.
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[741]military presence in and Castro's control over Cuba to be
[742]unacceptable. Practically, however, the disposition to take strong -
[743]actions had weakened. Instead, the administration was willing to
[744]accept the removal of the missiles as an adequate foreign policy.
[745]achievement. . |
[747]'McCone never accepted this judgment; he never was comfortable
[748]with the policy resttictions placed on Cuban operations, and he. -
[749]never wavered in his conviction that in order to carry out the tasks
[750]levied on him as DCI, he needed the freedom to carry out intensive. 7
[751]reconnaissance and covert operations. |
[753]Under President Johnson, there were flurries of concern about
[754]Cuba; but, after the missile crisis, the momentum had largely
[755]C.. disappeared. The United States government turned its attention to.-
[757]other issues, and McCone found himself once again fully engaged.
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[769]. and improve relations.
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[773]CHAPTER XVIII
[775]Shortly before the coup began, on 1 November 1963, Diem suddenly
[776]became cooperative.
[778]Lodge and Admiral Harry Felt (CINCPAC) had been at the.
[780]Presidential palace until almost noon. Rather than see_Felt off at
[782]the airport, Diem asked if Lodge would remain. Lodge stayed, and
[783]Diem proceded to tell him that. he could understand President
[784]Kennedy's concerns about: South Vietnam. Lodge should assure the
[785]President that he, Diem, was prepared to take almost any steps the
[786]United States considered appropriate to correct existing problems
[788]Diem's concessions--if that was what they were--came too late.
[789]At about the same time, General Don's aide-de-camp directed Lou
[790]Conein to go at once to the Joint General Staff headquarters. .
[791]Assigned a private telephone, Conein proceeded to provide a
[792]comprehensive, current and coherent account of the coup to the CIA
[793]station in Saigon. The station, in turn, informed Washington.
[795]The first reports reached Washington shortly after midnight. By
[796]mid-morning it was clear the coup was likely to succeed. By this
[797]time, however, both Diem and Nhu were dead, and the President was
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[811]concerned about the circumstances. When the facts became known, he
[812]said, he hoped the new government would be able to state that the
[813]Ngo brothers had either committed suicide or violated their
[814]surrender agreement, rather than been murdered in cold blood.
[816]The President was also concerned that the new government might
[817]be tempted to offer anmesty to the Viet Cong. He consequently was
[818]emphatic that we watch with care the type of political leadership
[819]the military group might install. Warning against the installation
[820]of ultra-liberals or quasi-Communists with a free hand in political
[821]affairs, he remarked that he was more interested in an effective
[822]than a "pretty" government.
[824]As a result, President Kennedy sent William Colby, in the .
[825]capacity of Presidential representative, to Saigon--an assignment
[826]which McCone noted with pleasure as a mark of great confidence in
[827]both Colby and the CIA. |
[829]On November 18, McCone, Rusk, McNamara and Bundy flew to
[830]Honolulu to confer with Lodge and Harkins. McCone later reported
[831]that the formal briefing sessions had gone fairly predictably until
[832]an economist named Silver from AID had discussed the South
[833]vietnamese economy, with its huge deficits and unfavorable balance
[834]of trade. This briefing triggered a lively discussion and the
[835]general conclusion that the Vietnamese economic situation was bleak,
[836]with no apparent solution in sight.
[838]There was other bad news as well. In some areas, the Viet Cong
[839]reportedly had a better strategic hamlet and school system than the
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[849]government. And it was clear to everyone present that the military
[850]situation was far from rosy, although Harkins tried to put it ina
[851]good light. The meeting decided that a major effort should be made
[852]to construct strategic hamlets and to wage anti-guerrilla warfare in
[853]the delta region, but McCone returned more discouraged than ever
[854]about Vietnam and believed McNamara and Bundy shared this |
[855]impression. Lodge, McCone remarked, would emerge from Vietnam
[856]either as a fourteen-foot-tall political giant or as a thoroughly
[858]washed-up government official.
[860]The end of the Diem era marked one kind of transition in
[861]Vietnam; President Kennedy's assassination, on November 22, marked
[862]another. .
[864]The day after the assassination, as official Washington and the
[865]world were trying to come to grips with the shocking news, McCone
[867]told his morning meeting that he knew very little about the new
[869]‘President's personal relationships around Washington or his position
[871]on current issues. In late August, Lyndon Johnson as Vice President
[872]had been opposed to ousting the Diem regime, but McCone had not even
[873]spoken with him since the time of the Cuban prisoner exchange.
[875]McCone then reviewed the CIA memorandum on world reactions to
[876]the President's assassination and ordered that it be disseminated.
[877]He also reviewed the President's Intelligence Checklist and directed
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[887]that it be delivered to the White House as usual. Johnson was
[888]unaware of the checklist, having previously received the Current
[889]Intelligence Bulletin. McCone reported that Johnson had told
[890]McGeorge Bundy to carry on as before, and that the Agency should
[891]therefore continue to move its publications through the usual
[892]channels until directed otherwise.
[894]In other ways, McCone attempted to carry on as before. Before
[895]the morning meeting, he had instructed Walt Elder to telephone
[896]Johnson's secretary to tell her that he would be at the White House
[897]at 9:00 a.m. as usual, to give the President his regular morning
[898]intelligence briefing. This message was relayed as a statement of
[899]fact. The only question was. whether Johnson would be going to his
[900]old office in the Executive Office Building or to the Oval Office.
[901]The word came back that Johnson was: on his way to the White House.
[903]McCone accordingly was at the White House by 9:00 a.m. At 9:15,
[904]President Johnson arrived. |
[906]Johnson opened the conversation by recalling a long background
[907]of association and friendship with McCone. On a number of issues
[908]which had arisen since McCone had become DCI, Johnson said he and
[909]McCone had seen eye to eye. Expressing great respect for the CIA
[910]and complete confidence in McCone as DCI, Johnson said he wanted
[911]McCone to continue in the future doing exactly as he had done in the
[912]past. |
[914]After McCone in -turn expréssed his confidence in the President
[916]and stated his desire to support him in every way, he reviewed some
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[930]‘of the items from the President's checklist, explaining the nature
[932]of the publication. Johnson asked that, for the next few days,
[934]McCone continue to brief him personally every morning and that
[936]senior CIA officials brief the President's staff. Johnson also
[938]directed that any urgent matter of importance be brought to his
[940]personal attention at any hour of the day or night. In this, he
[941]designated no intermediary.
[943]That noon, McCone met with both Johnson and Bundy to relay the
[944]information that Lee Harvey Oswald had been in touch with the Soviet
[945]and Cuban embassies in Mexico City. That evening, McCone reviewed
[946]this information with Secretary Rusk, in addition volunteering the
[947]Agency's assistance in coping with the flood of official visitors
[948]coming to attend the funeral. Rusk agreed to call on him for help.
[950]After informing his November 24 morning meeting that he would
[951]make an effort to dispel the widely-held view that it was somehow
[952]"immoral". for the DCI to be seen openly in his role as a direct
[953]adviser to the President, McCone briefed Johnson for about twenty
[954]minutes in his private residence. The President, McCone suggested,
[955]should receive an early briefing on the Soviet long-range striking
[956]capability, air defense posture, and the condition of the Soviet
[957]economy. McCone also suggested that the President learn about the
[958]CIA's operational programs, adding that the Agency was watching .
[959]Venezuela and Ecuador very closely because of Cuban subversive
[960]activities. |
[962]That afternoon, McCone met with the President, Rusk, Ball,
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[972]3D McNamara, Bundy and Lodge to discuss the situation in Vietnam...
[973]Lodge reported that the United States was in no way responsible for
[974]the deaths of Diem and Nhu (had they followed his advice, he said, .
[975]they would be alive today) and said he was hopeful about the
[976]future. The change in South Vietnam's government had been an
[977]improvement, and by February or March we would see marked progress.
[978]McCone, concerned lest Lodge's statements leave the President
[979]with the impression that we were on the road to victory, disagreed.
[980]The Agency, he cautioned, had observed a continuing increase in Viet
[981]Cong activities since November 1, including military attacks. It
[982]had also observed a high volume of messages on the Viet Cong
[983]military and political communications networks, which could indicate
[984]preparations for sustained guerrilla attacks. Moreover, the new
[985]“) government's military leaders were having considerable difficulty in
[986]organizing the government's political structure and were receiving
[987]little if any help from civilians, who were staying on the sidelines
[988]in their traidtional role as critics. In consequence, McCone could
[989]not at this time offer an optimistic appraisal of Vietnam's future
[990]prospects.
[992]Here, President Johnson observed that he approached the
[993]situation in Vietnam with some misgivings. A great number of
[994]Americans had questioned the United States' role in supporting the
[995]coup, and there were those in Congress who strongly believed we
[996]should get out.of Vietnam. Both of these factors caused him
[997]considerable anxiety. He was not at all sure the United States had
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[1009]followed the right. course in upsetting the Diem regime; but now
[1010]that it was done, we had to see that we accomplished our objectives.
[1012]In addition, Johnson now told them, he had never been happy with
[1013]American operations in Vietnam. The dissensions within the American
[1014]community there displeased him, and he told Lodge that he wanted the
[1015]situation cleaned up. Any official who did not go along with agreed
[1016]U.S. policy there should be removed. ; a.
[1018]At this point, Bundy remarked that we were searching for a
[1019]successor to William Trueheart as Saigon Deputy Chief of Mission.
[1020]What was needed was a capable administrator to run the country
[1021]team. In response, Johnson repeated that the Ambassador was in
[1022]charge and that he, the President, was holding him personally
[1023]responsible for the situation.
[1025]Vietnam's economy was the subject of particular concern, and-
[1026]McNamara now commented that the United States would have to be
[1027]generous with its aid, not expecting the South Vietnamese government
[1028]to produce miracles. Johnson replied that he supported the concept
[1029]of generous aid but wanted it made abundantly clear that he did not
[1030]think we had to re-make every Asian after our own image. Too often,
[1031]he observed, when the United States became involved in the affairs
[1032]of another country, it felt an obligation to reform the country .
[1033]along American lines. This, he said, was a mistake. He himself was
[1034]anxious to get on with winning the war; he did not want so much
[1035]effort devoted to so-called social reforms.
[1037]Following this meeting, Bundy issued a statement saying that the
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[1050]United States would continue the late President Kennedy's Vietnam
[1051]policies as they had been confirmed at a mid-November meeting in
[1052]Honolulu. McCone also observed that, for the first time, he had
[1053]received an indication of what the Johnson tone would be.
[1055]McCone did not brief Johnson on November 25, the day of
[1056]President Kennedy's funeral, and at a State Department reception
[1057]that evening, the President apologized to McCone for it. Were there
[1058]were any developments which required his personal attention?, he
[1059]asked. McCone replied that there were not and that: he would call
[1060]him if any developed. .
[1062]The following day, McCone met with the President for about
[1063]twenty minutes. Johnson asked whether all appropriate Agency
[1064]> resources were being made available to support the FBI's
[1066]investigation of the assassination. He then told McCone with
[1067]considerable contempt that certain Justice Department officials had
[1068]proposed an independent panel, headed by someone like Thomas E,
[1070]- Dewey, to investigate the assassination. Johnson had rejected this
[1071]proposal, only to learn that an identical plan would appear as lead
[1072]editorial in the Washington Post. Furious at what he believed was a
[1073]deliberate leak, he had finally succeeded in killing the editorial
[1075]by intervening personally with Katherine Graham... 46.
[1077]McCone met again with the President on November : 28 ‘for. about
[1079]thirty minutes. After reviewing the checklist, Johnson. questioned | .
[1081]him about South Vietnam, Venezuela, Greece, Turkey, Rumania and
[1083]Yugoslavia. He asked } McCone to recommend someone as Ambassador to!
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[1091]McCone History
[1093]CHRONOLOGY
[1095]SEGRE eT
[1100]13-00000
[1102]10 November 1960
[1104]17 April 1961
[1106]22 April 1961
[1108]4 May 1961
[1110]28 June 1961
[1112]30 August 1961
[1114]7 September 1961
[1116]19 September 1961
[1118]- 27 September 1961
[1120]13 October 1961
[1122]_SECKE
[1124]‘CHRONOLOGY L
[1126]President-elect Kennedy announces that
[1127]Allen W. Dulles and J. Edgar Hoover will
[1129]continue in their positions.
[1130]Landing at the Bay of Pigs
[1132]Study group formed (Maxwell Taylor,
[1133]Arleigh Burke, Robert Kennedy, Allen Dulles)
[1135]“to examine Bay of Pigs operation.
[1137]President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory.
[1138]Board (PFIAB) reconstituted with James
[1140]Killian as chairman.
[1141]Taylor named. Military Representative to the _
[1143]President and Chairman of the Special Group ©
[1145]' (5412).
[1147]USSR resumes nuclear’ testing in the atmos-
[1151]President Kennedy confers with John McCone
[1153]on nucléar issues.
[1155]Kennedy asks McCone to become the Director
[1157]of Central Intelligence.
[1158]_Kennedy announces the appointment of McCone.
[1160]McCone becomes consultant; travels to
[1162]the Far East until 23 October.
[1165]13-00000
[1168]-
[1170]1 28 October 1961
[1172]i
[1174]| 21 November 1961
[1176]ence 29 November 1961
[1178]30 November 1961
[1180]| 4 December 1961 ©
[1182]"5 December 1961
[1184]6 December 1961 |
[1186]Ll December 1961
[1188]12 December 1961
[1190]_30 November 1961
[1192]- 1 December 1961
[1194]13 December 1961.
[1196]15 December 1961 —
[1198]SECRET
[1200]Dulles and McCone visit Western Europe
[1202]until 13 November.
[1204]McCone meets with President ana Robert
[1206]“Kennedy to Giscuss new program for Cuba.
[1208]McCone sworn in by Chief Justice Warren
[1210]McCone attends meeting of NSC committee _ ,
[1212]on nuclear testing.
[1213]. :
[1215]“McCone attends first meeting of United -
[1217]States Intelligence Board (USIB) as chairman.
[1219]‘McCone attends first meeting of Special
[1221]Group (5412) as DCI.
[1223]McCone meets with McNamara and Gilpatric
[1225]to discuss NSA and national estimates
[1227]McCone establishes study group under |
[1229]Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jz..
[1231]“Mrs. McCone dies.
[1235].McCone: meets with President Kennedy alone, |
[1237]McCone calls on J, Edgar Hoover.
[1238]DDCI becomes CIA representative on USIB.
[1240]McCone meets with Phillipe de Vosjoli.
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[1243]T : SECKE |
[1245]' 27 December 1961 — " General.Cabell announces retirement
[1247]effective 31 January 1962.
[1248]| 5 January 1962 Schuyler, Coyne added to:-Kirkpatrick
[1250]‘study group.
[1252]6 January 1962 - McCone attends NSC meeting on Laos. “
[1253]8 January 1962 _McCone meets with Joint Chiefs of Staff.
[1254]‘12 January 1962 — , Mccone briefs General Eisenhower in Palm.
[1255]. ‘Desert.
[1256]-15. January 1962 McCone's name submitted to Senate Armed
[1257]Services Committee.
[1258]16 January 1962 -” ‘President Kennedy issues letter of in-
[1259]structions to DCI. .
[1260]16 January 1962° ; McCone meets with Ambassador (Atphana]ana_
[1261]Secretary of Labor Arthur Goldberg.
[1262]18 January 1962 Confirmation hearings ‘begin
[1263]; 18 January 1962 _ DCI attends first meeting of Special Group
[1264](Counter-Insurgency) .
[1265]19 January 1962 McCone meets with The Joint Committee on
[1266]_ Atomic Energy and the PFIAB.
[1267]j | 20 January 1962 McCone briefs President: Truman at Mayflower
[1269]Hotel.
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[1274]22 January
[1276]28 January
[1278]‘31 January
[1280]6 February
[1282]8 February.
[1284]17 February
[1286]19 February
[1288]19 February:
[1290]22 February
[1292]28 February’
[1294]1962
[1296]1962
[1298]1962
[1299]1962
[1300]1962
[1302]1962
[1304]1962
[1306]1962
[1308]1962,
[1310]1962
[1312]CTA.
[1314]SECRET
[1316]McCone meets with House Sub-Committee
[1318]on CIA.
[1320]McCone meets with Chiefs of Station from
[1321]Western Hemisphere Division in Panama
[1323]until 2 February.
[1325]Senate confirms McCone by floor vote of
[1327]71-12; total vote is 84-15.
[1330]McCone speaks to senior seminar at Foreign
[1332]Service Institute.
[1334]McCone meets with Senate Sub-Committee on |
[1336]-
[1338]Richard Bissell resigns as Deputy Director fir
[1339]Plans; succeeded by Richard Helms,
[1341]ph: Ser
[1343]‘Deputy Director (Research established as
[1345]new directorate with Herbert A. ‘Scoville,
[1347]Jr. as head,
[1349]McCone meets with Board of Inquiry chaired.
[1352]by Judge Prettyman to study implication of |
[1354]Powers' case,
[1356]McCone meets with Major General Marshall
[1358]S. Carter.
[1360]Kennedy receives first briefing by
[1362]Arthur C.: Lundahl
[1364]q!
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[1371]7 March 1962 : McCone presents Carter to President
[1372]| Kennedy; Carter named DDCI on 9 March.
[1373]~ . , : : tar
[1374]30 March 1962 Robert Amory, Sr. resigns as Deputy Director/
[1375]| Intelligence. . .
[1376]| ; : ; . .
[1377]“— 1 April 1962 Office of General Counsel, Office of
[1379]| : ‘Legislative Counsel, and Office of Comp-
[1380]troller moved to Office of the DCI; John
[1382]‘Bros named Comptroller.
[1384]- 10 April 1962 _ Kirkpatrick named to new position as
[1386]Executive Director.
[1387]|| (23 April 1962 Ray S. Cline named DD/I
[1389]| a) May 1962 8 ; Jack Earman becomes Inspector ‘General;
[1391]Walter Elder named as Executive Assistant
[1393]-to the DCI.
[1395]|| 15 May 1962. DCI attends meeting of National Security “
[1396]Council with Congressional leaders on
[1397]fo _— - ' American role in Laos.
[1399]-3 June 1962 McCone travels to Far East until 17 June; “
[1400]+ . . . .c . . \ . . . . .
[1401]develops basis position paper-on situation
[1403]| , , ; in, Southeast Asia.
[1405]| 4 gune 1962 | Albert D. Wheelon, Jr, named Assistant
[1407]Director/Scientific Intelligence.
[1410]1;
[1412]CRO S
[1413]WUE
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[1418]; 29 June 1962 . McCone meets with the Bureau of the Budget
[1419][ to review the projected intelligence community
[1420]| : . ; budget.
[1421]10 July 1962 ' McCone meets with Frank G. Wisner on
[1423]Oo latter's. future.
[1425]| ‘12 July 1962 McCone discusses consultant status with
[1427]Allen W. Dulles.
[1428]; ok
[1429]20 July 1962 _ President Kennedy briefed in detail on
[1430]; information derived from Anatole Golitsen.
[1431]mi 27 July 1962 i - McCone becomes immersed in nuclear testing
[1432]| oo ; Sc a - issue “and the role of intelligence in the
[1434]event of a treaty banning nuclear testing _
[1436]| - in the atmosphere.
[1438]28. July 1962 co McCone meets with [Prince Souvanna Phouma  -
[1439]| eS (o£ Laos,] |
[1441]10 August 1962 ‘At Cuban meeting, McCone makes first
[1443]Lo. oo SO explicit statement outside Agency on the —
[1445]possibility of offensive missiles-in Cuba.
[1447]a be ; .
[1448]10 August 1962 — : Najeeb Halaky proposes covert development. -
[1450]| oe of super-sonic transport.
[1452]“21 August 1962. McCone warns senior government officials
[1454]about offensive missiles in Cuba.
[1456]13-00000
[1458]i:
[1459]|
[1461]21 August 1962
[1463]22 August 1962
[1465]23 August 1962
[1467]29 August 1962
[1469]7,10,13,16 and |
[1470]19 September 1962
[1472]24 September 1962 .
[1473]27 September 1962
[1475]4 October 1962
[1477]9 October 1962
[1479]10.October 1962
[1481]SEUREL
[1483]McCone attends meeting to discuss inten- ~
[1485]sified operations against North Vietnam.
[1487]McCone advises President Kennedy about
[1488]possibility of offensive missiles in Cuba;
[1489]also on 23 August with senior advisers
[1491]present.
[1493]McCone leaves Washington until 24 Sept.
[1495]“MeCone marries Mrs. Paul Piggott in
[1497]Seattle; SAMs in Cuba photographed,
[1499]McCone sends cables reiterating his concern.
[1501]about missiles in Cuba.
[1503]| McCone meets with Robert Kennedy on
[1505]‘ransoming brigade prisoners in Cuba..
[1507]McCone meets with President /Ayub of. . Do
[1509]‘Pakistanj/in New. York. ~
[1511]McCone urges Special Group to direct U-2.
[1513]coverage of Cuba.
[1516].
[1518]Special Group approves U-2 coverage.
[1520]President Kennedy briefed on IL-28 crates;
[1522]Kennedy orders limitations on dissemination
[1524]of information about offensive weapons,
[1526]13-00000
[1528]. OCUNELI
[1530][ . "12 October 1962 . SAC takes over U-2 overflights of Cuba.
[1532]| 14 October 1962 u-2 overflies San Cristobal MRBM site.
[1534]| . 15 October 1962 NPIC identifies MRBMs
[1536]16 October 1962 McCone notified; returns from Seattle.
[1537]“se 17 October 1962 ‘ McCone develops position paper on Cuba.
[1539]_ 18 October 1962 - IRBM sites identified.
[1540]: 18 October 1962 , ‘NSC Executive Committee divides into two.
[1542]“study groups to consider "fast" and "slow"
[1544]courses of action.
[1546]19 October 1962 . Special National Intelligence Estimate: a
[1547]| a, ok - concludes that USSR would not risk general .
[1549][ _ oe, ' . war over Cuba.
[1551]19 October 1962 : McCone develops position on measures beyond -
[1553]a blockade.
[1555]| 20 October 1962 Chinese Communists attack India -
[1556]21 October 1962 -  MeCone briefs Vice-President Johnson on
[1557]ij _ Cuba, a - :
[1558]| 21 October 1962 Briefers go to London, Paris, Bonn, Ottawa.
[1559]| 22 October 1962 — _ Meeting with Congressional leadership just ”
[1561]prior to President Kennedy's speech.
[1563]23 October 1962 President Kennedy signs blockade proclama~_
[1565]tion.
[1567]wo
[1568]a
[1569]Si
[1574]13-00000
[1576]af 7
[1578]24 October
[1580]27 October
[1581]28 October
[1583]29 October
[1585]2 November
[1587]5 November
[1589]“9 November
[1591]17 December 1962
[1593]1962
[1595]1962
[1597]1962
[1599]1962
[1601]1962
[1603]1962.
[1605]14 Novenber 1962,
[1606]a Novenber 1982
[1608](20 November 1962_
[1610]4 December 1962
[1612]SECRET |
[1614]Soviet ships near Cuba stop or turn.
[1616]Messages from USSR show willingness to
[1618]avoid confrontation.
[1620]McCone orders post-mortem on handling of
[1622]intelligence.
[1624]f
[1626]SB,
[1628]Cuban refugee reports on missiles in cave
[1631]President Kennedy requests review of
[1633]intelligence handling.
[1635]McCone meets-with Rusk to protest nibbling
[1637]away at approvéd operational. programs.
[1638]PPIAB requests post-mortem on intelligence
[1640]handling.
[1642]Kennedy and Eisenhower meet at McCone's
[1644]residence.
[1646]Kennedy announces lifting of the blockade.
[1648]McCone meets with Gilpatric to discuss
[1650]Air Force view of NRO.
[1652]Kennedy approves concept of covert support
[1654]to Congo government.
[1656]cecheT
[1658]13-00000
[1660]FY
[1662]27 December 1962
[1664]z
[1668]2 January 1963
[1670]3 January 1963
[1672]10
[1674]10.
[1676]“17
[1678]21
[1680]27
[1682]30.
[1684]January
[1686]January
[1688]January
[1689]January
[1690]January
[1692]January
[1694]1963
[1696]1963.
[1698]1963
[1700]1963.
[1702]1963
[1704]1963
[1706]10
[1708]SLUKEL
[1709]Report on intelligence community's handling
[1711]of intelligence relating to Cuban missile
[1713],crisis completed for PFIAB.
[1714]NPIC moves into Building 213.
[1716]McCone meets with McNamara and Gilpatric
[1718]to discuss A-11,SWITCHBACK, policy towards
[1720]Cuba.
[1722]. : Nos .
[1723]Special Group reviews reconniassance over
[1725]' Cuba, .
[1727]‘McGeorge Bundy discusses DOD-CIA friction;
[1728]raises Kennedy's concern over Chinese
[1730]Communist nuclear potential.
[1734]McCone meets with/Italian Prime Minister
[1735]Fanfanil. :
[1737]"Meeting with President Kennedy on surfacing
[1739]A-l1l.
[1741]McCone meets with Chiefs of Station in
[1743]Panama until 29 January.
[1745]Col. Delsany, SDECE, admits charges of KGB
[1747]penetrations and French espionage against
[1749]US Oe RERBET program.
[1750]WAAL
[1754]ye
[1756]re SECRET
[1758]31 January 1963 - McCone attends meeting with Kennedy to
[1760]| , discuss European problems.
[1762]1 February 1963 - McCone develops basic position paper on
[1763]oO ' Europe.
[1764]6 February 1963 ' Public statement by DCI on Cuba before
[1766]‘Stennis sub-committee; DOD public briefing.
[1769]‘10 February 1963 McCone travels to Paris and London until,
[1771]i7 February.
[1773]28 February 1963 MeCone talks with Bundy on lack of ‘policy|
[1775]| . towards (Cuba and ‘Problems in the. Middle. Bast.
[1777]4 March 1963 — - Meeting with President Kennedy on Cuban.
[1779]reconnaissance gap.
[1781]11 March 1963 - ‘Meeting with President Kennedy on the
[1782]bo Middle East with special reference to
[1784]Yemen. }
[1785]| 13 March 1963 McCone meets with the President and then
[1786]the NSC to discuss Latin America and
[1788]| . policy towards Cuba.
[1790]i 13 March 1963 McCone and :Gilpatric sign new NRO agreement.
[1792]po | seckEr
[1794]13-00000
[1796]i
[1797]|
[1799]' 4
[1801]21 March 1963
[1804]ui.
[1806]March 1963
[1808]26 March 1963
[1810]29 March 1963
[1812]9 April 1963
[1814]11 April 1963
[1816]1l April 1963
[1818]15 - 17
[1820]April 1963—
[1822]OEUNEL
[1824]McCone meets with Brockway McMillan, new
[1826]Director/NRO.
[1828]Meeting with President Kennedy to discuss
[1829]special Agency operation aimed at exposing
[1831]the KGB.
[1833]‘Meeting with Dean Rusk to discuss the
[1835]Middle East with special reference to
[1837]a :
[1839]Israel's nuclear potential.
[1841]Executive Committee meeting on raids. by
[1843]Cuban exiles,
[1845]McCone meets with Stewart Alsop for general.
[1847]background ‘briefing,
[1849]McCone. develops basic position paper on
[1851]responsibility for reconnaissance over
[1853]denied areas,
[1855]Special Group discusses sabotage operations —
[1857]against Cuba,
[1859]oe
[1861]. . a . aan
[1862]President.Kennedy, the Attorney~General, and
[1864]the Secretary of State briefed on:svezial 7%}
[1866]at
[1868]| - 2
[1869]operation against {French intelligence/
[1871]“SERRET
[1873]service..
[1876]13-00000
[1878]t
[1880]|
[1882]SEUKEI
[1884]20 April 1963 . At NSC meeting on Laos, President Kennedy
[1886]' .
[1888]requests study of increased pressures
[1890]against North Vietnam.
[1892]ya
[1894]23 April 1963 — Clark Clifford’ succeeds Killian as Chairman,
[1895]PFIAB. |
[1896]25 April 1963 President approves low-level reconnaissance
[1898],flights over Cuba.
[1900]25 April 1963. . Scoville submits resignation as DD/R
[1902]effective 14 June 1963
[1904]26 April 1963 - -McCone travels to Paris, Rome, and
[1906]Frankfurt until 8 May.
[1908]7 May 1963 - Penkovsky put'on trial in Moscow,
[1909]9 May 1963 NSC meeting on US support for India,
[1910]13-14 May 1963 McCone meee with Rusk to discuss support hoe
[1912]ferfionalng
[1914]14 May 1963 . McCone meets with Clark Clifford.
[1916]15 May 1963 " McCone meets with President Kennedy to
[1918]discuss Penkovsky
[1920]SECRET
[1922]13-00000 -
[1924]|
[1925]|
[1929]1
[1931]18 May 1963
[1933]21 May 1963
[1935]3 June 1963
[1937]14 June
[1939]19 June
[1941]21. June
[1943]2i June
[1945]25 June
[1947]7 June 1963
[1949]1963
[1951]1963
[1953]1963
[1955]1963
[1957]1963
[1959]SELKEL oe '
[1961]McCone develops position paper on Haiti.
[1963].
[1965]McCone attends three meetings with President
[1967]Kennedy; low-level reconnaissance over Cuba;
[1969]_ high-yield, large megatonnage nuclear weapons;
[1971]Haiti.
[1973]McCone develops position paper for dis-
[1975]cussion with Gilpatric on ‘Air Force push
[1977]to take over: all reconnaissance,
[1978]McCone presents his view of the world in
[1980]speech to National War College.
[1982]McCone ‘meets with Rusk to discuss relations “
[1984]with France.
[1986]McCone attends three meetings with President
[1988]Kennedy; the Profumo case; Laos; Cuba.
[1990]McCone ategnds meeting with President Kennedy
[1992]on Betctsn! Guiana}
[1994]McCone meets with Rusk to discuss covert
[1996]program on Cuba.
[1998]McCone develops position paper on the: role.
[2000]of intelligence in a nuclear test ban treaty.
[2002]Voge
[2004]13-00000
[2006]-
[2008]2% June 1963
[2010]1 July 1963
[2012]9 July 1963
[2014]10 July 1963 —
[2016]21 July 1963.
[2018]23 July 1963 |
[2020]30. July 1963
[2022]23 duly 1963
[2024]5 August 1963
[2026]SEUNLI
[2028]McCone notes Roy Tod's’ paper on an inventory
[2030]of intelligence community assets.
[2032]DCI's Scientific Advisory Board established
[2033]under Dr. Kinzel.
[2035]‘y
[2037]President Kennedy briefed on mosaic of {Israel}
[2039]“gas bomb in Yemen, and findings of the
[2041]Purcell Panel on reconnaissance satellites.
[2043]McCone writes McNamara on need to review
[2045]intelligence community programs.
[2047] McCone meets with Rusk to discuss DeGaulle.
[2049]McCone attends meeting with President Kennedy
[2051]‘to hear John J. McCloy report on the
[2053]“Middle East.
[2055]Sgt. Dunlap‘commits suicide. ,
[2057]McCone attends meeting with President
[2059]Kennedy on Laos,
[2061]DD/R re-constituted as DD/Science and
[2063]Technology with Wheelon as head.
[2065]15
[2068]13-00000
[2069]|
[2071]5, August 1963
[2073]16 August 1953
[2075]21 August 1963
[2077]24 August 1963
[2079]26 August 1963 -
[2081]‘31 August 1963 —
[2083]2 September 1963
[2085]4 September 1963
[2087]9 September 1963
[2089]VLUIALI
[2091]Nuclear test ban treaty signed in Moscow.
[2093]McCone presents position on test ban
[2094]treaty to Stennis sub-committee,
[2095]McCone attends meeting with President _a
[2096]Kennedy to discuss actions by Diem govern-
[2097]ment against the puddhests.
[2101]Department of State Telegram 243 sent to vy
[2103]Saigon.
[2105]Saigon station officers in contact with
[2107]Generals Khiem and ‘Minh.,
[2109]A
[2113]Pr pew 1 a
[2115]7 A-Sae. a peg nals
[2116]a Peeve ge At Ae
[2118]ur
[2119]i
[2123]ortttyet
[2125]John Richardson cables his view that there will
[2127]be | no coup.
[2129]McCone reviews two papers on Diem government;
[2131]one by William Colby; one by George Carver.
[2136]McConé meets with McNamara and Rusk to discuss
[2137]terms of reference for review of intelligence
[2139]community programs.
[2141]John Bross appointed Deputy to the DCI for
[2143]National Intelligence Programs Evaluation,
[2145]setber
[2147]13-00000 , sLUNECI
[2148]T. -10 September 1963 : McCone develops position paper for meetings /
[2149]| with President Kennedy and McGeorge Bundy on
[2151]Vietnam.
[2153]ll September 1963 Huntington D. Sheldon cables his views from Vv
[2155]_ Saigon; ‘McCone asks Agency experts to answer
[2157]: six basic questions on Vietnam.
[2159]16 September 1963 Ambassador Lodge requests Lansdale as re-
[2161]placement for Richardson,
[2163]19 September 1963 McCone writes Lodge about COs Saigon.
[2165]| ' 19 September 1963 Colby briefs Special Group on re-vamping
[2167]Agency operations in the Far East.
[2169]20 September 1963 -McCone briefs McGeorge Bundy on. plans to re-
[2171]organize Saigon station and a covert program: —
[2173]| - _ aimed at the KGB. |
[2175]20 September 1963 _ McCone develops basic position. paper on
[2177]National Reconnaissance Program.
[2179]‘24 September 1963 McCone deyelops basic position paper on v
[2181]Agency role in Vietnam,
[2183]a BRET
[2185]13-00000
[2187][ _3 October 1963
[2189]|
[2191].5 October 1963
[2193]4 October 1963
[2195]9 October 1963
[2197]| a6 October 1963
[2199]| _ 17 October 1963
[2201]| 1 November 1963
[2203]. 25 October 1963
[2205]OLUNEI
[2207]McCone asks John Richardson to return to
[2209]Washington on temporary duty; Dave Smith
[2212]acting COS Saigon.
[2214]After hearing trip report by McNamara and Vv
[2216]Taylor, President Kennedy states publicly
[2218]that war in Vietnam can be won by the end
[2220]of 1965; McCone takes pessimistic view.
[2222]McCone meets with John. Richardson,
[2224]President Kennedy answers two questions at
[2226]- press conference about Richardsm and. the —
[2228]Agency.
[2230]Far East Division develops basic paper on
[2232]re-organization of Saigon station.
[2234]McCone discusses role of.Air Force and national
[2236]intelligence assets with Gilpatric.
[2238]McCone develops position paper for meeting W~
[2239]with President Kennedy on coup plotting in .
[2241]Vietnam.
[2243]Diem government overthrown by Vietnamese /
[2245]generals,
[2247]18 |
[2251]13-00000 OEUNCLI
[2252][ , 3 November 1963 - President Kennedy orders Colby to go to Saigon
[2254]| as Presidential emissary.
[2256]| 12 November 1963 icCone, Helms meet with President Kennedy
[2258]for basic discussion of Cuba; President is
[2260]shown Cuban rifle captured in Venezuela, -
[2262]18 November 1963 McCone attends conference in Honolulu on “a
[2264]Vietnam until 21 November,
[2265]4 , , .
[2267]| 18 November 1963 Executive Director -and Comptroller functions
[2269]merged under Kirkpatrick.
[2271]| 22 November 1963. '. President Kennedy assassinated in Dallas,
[2272]| - 23 November 1963 McCone meets with President Johnson alone.
[2273]; 24 November 1963 McCone meets with President Johnson and Lodge W—
[2275]| : on .Vietnam,
[2277]| ~~ 28° November 1963 McCone’ meets with President Johnson who asks
[2279]So that McCone play an active role aS a policy.
[2281]advisor. |
[2282]29 November 1963: McCone attends meeting with President Johnson
[2284]| ; _ ; on A-ll.
[2286]| | OO 19
[2287]SEURET
[2289]13-00000
[2291]To ce — SECRET |
[2293].
[2295]_ 5” December 1963 : President Johnson holds first NSC meeting;
[2297]McCone presents intelligence briefing.
[2299]6 December 1963. - McCone meets with President Johnson to discuss
[2300]COS, Saigon; Peer de Silva named; Johnson
[2302]sends message to Lodge.
[2304]7 December 1963 McCone meets with President Johnson to discuss.
[2306]~changing the image of the DCI and CIA.
[2308]12 December 1963 _ McCone meets with the Bureau of the Budget
[2310]-to review the Agency's covert action program.
[2312]13 December 1963 -McCone meets with McNamara and Gilpatric to
[2313]discuss the need for economy in intelligence
[2315]“operations.
[2316]13 December 1963 McCone meets with Rusk and Harriman who approve
[2317]concept of releasing information on. Soviet
[2319]economy.
[2321]16 December 1963 McCone visits Saigon to install de Silva - v.
[2323]until 20 December.
[2325]21-December 1963. ‘McCone presents his views on Vietnam to V
[2327]President Johnson.
[2329]Pry
[2333]13-00000°— “ QLUINLI
[2334]i December 1963 . McCone meets with President Johnson at LBJ
[2335]Ranch; Johnson reiterates hig views on
[2337]McCone'’s policy role.
[2339]31 Dacember 1963 McCone meets with Genéral Eisenhower in
[2340]Pasadena and again on 2 January 1964 to discuss
[2342]President Johnson's budget plans.
[2344]i 4 January 1964 McCone meets with President Johnson at LBJ
[2345]a . .
[2346]Ranch to review meetings with General
[2348]Eisenhower.
[2349]7 January 1964 McCone attends meeting to hear General |
[2350]| . So Krulak discuss proposals for: intensified
[2352]operations against North Vietnam.
[2354]9 January 1964. =~ +=‘ Thomas Dale of The New York Times publishes
[2356]article on Soviet economy with attribution
[2358]| : _— to CIA; other newsmen briefed.
[2360]9 January 1964 . McCone attends meetings. with President
[2364]Johnson on Panama.
[2365]| - 13 January 1964 oO McCone develops position paper on how plan to
[2367]release information on Soviet economy was
[2369]| . mis-handled, .°
[2371]po | other
[2373]130000000 . - SEUKEI
[2375]* e a
[2379]“14 January 1964 McCone attends meetings on Robert Kennedy's.
[2380]| . . trip to meet Sukarno.
[2381]14 January 1964 Cyrus Vance succeeds Roswell Gilpatric
[2383]effective 28 January.
[2385]18 January 1964 McCone travels to Paris, London, Rome, Madrid,
[2386]- Bonn - until 1 February. |
[2387]‘ . | :
[2388]7 February 1964. McCone attends meetings on Cuban fishing ~
[2390]boats and Guantanamo water supply. —
[2392]| il February 1964 ; -McCone develops position paper on reconnais—
[2393]Te a sance after Air Force deployment to fly
[2395]| So - -Us2s out of Clark Field.
[2397]28 February 1964 McCone develops position paper. in preparation
[2399]| _ mo _ for trip to Vietnam.
[2401]| . 28 February 1964 McCone attends meeting with President
[2403]Johnson jon surfacing A-ll.
[2405]t Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern
[2406]| Affairs.
[2408]|
[2410]i. 4 March 1964 USIB re-organized,
[2412]i
[2413]~ 4 March 1964 _ William Bundy succeeds Roger Hilsman as
[2415]gether Oo
[2417]13-00000
[2419]LJ ‘
[2421],
[2422]4-5 March 1964
[2424]6 March 1964
[2426]L7 March 1964
[2428]1 April 1964 _
[2430]2 April 1964
[2432](7 April 1964
[2434]22 April 1964
[2435]29 April 1964.
[2437]2 May 1964
[2439]SEUKE|
[2440]McCone meets with General Eisenhower who
[2442]discusses relations with de Gaulle.
[2444]McCone travels to Vietnam until 13 March;
[2445]McCone dissents on McNamara's trip report;
[2446]reports policy disagreement separately wv
[2448]to President Johnson.
[2449]NSC meeting on Vietnam. v
[2451]McCone develops basic position paper. on NRE
[2453]for use with Baker panel of PFIAB,
[2455]At evening seminar, McCone develops position —
[2457]paper on operations against North Vietnam.
[2459]McGeorge Bundy develops position paper on.
[2460]Covert Program Against Cuba for use in .
[2462]meeting with President Johnson.
[2464]McCone talks to McGeorge Bundy about lack of
[2466]direct briefings of the President by the DCI.
[2468]McCone talks to President Johnson about ‘lack
[2470]of direct access.
[2472]NSC meeting on Cuban overflights.
[2474]SECRE
[2476]13-00000
[2478]ore «
[2479][os
[2482].
[2484]|
[2486]x
[2488]5
[2491]May 1964
[2495]May 1964
[2497]6 May 1964
[2499]14
[2501]16
[2503]18
[2505]- 24
[2507]25
[2509]May 1964
[2510]‘May. 1964
[2512]“May 1964
[2514]‘May 1964
[2516]May 1964
[2520]- bombing North Vietnam, ff:
[2522]SEUKEL
[2524]“MeCone sets forth position on "The
[2526]Invisible Government,”
[2528]McCone attends meeting with President Johnson
[2529]on Cuba and Laos; remains for Tuesday lunch .
[2530]meeting with the President, McNamara, Taylor |
[2532]and Bundy.
[2534]McCone attends meeting with President Johnson
[2536]4
[2538]' to consider General Khanh's statements about
[2540]war footing and march north. /
[2542]‘McNamara's report on trip to Vietnam discusses |
[2544]y
[2546]McCone. gives President Johnson Agency estimate .
[2548]on action against North Vietnam, /
[2550]“At meeting on Laos and Vietnam, Rusk raises
[2552]question of when does the United States |
[2554]commit troops, A
[2556]Meetings all day with President Johnson on
[2558]Southeast Asia. v
[2560]‘William Bundy paper on Courses of Action on
[2562]Southeast Asia.
[2564]i Denn
[2565]SECRET
[2567]13-00000
[2571]4
[2573]|
[2575]Pa
[2577]oe
[2579]7" 38 May 1964
[2581]4,5,6,7 June
[2583]6 June 1964
[2585]11 June 1964.
[2587]11 dune 1964
[2589]‘15 June 1964
[2591]17 June 1964.
[2593]30 June 1964
[2595]oCUNEI
[2596]McCone goes to Honolulu for meeting on
[2598]Vietnam until 3 June.
[2600]McCone attends meetings with President Johnson
[2602]on Laos with the President asking, "What comes
[2606]McGeorge Bundy and Michael Forrestal raise
[2607]with McCone the possibility of an Agency
[2609]program along pre-SWITCHBACK lines.
[2611]McCone develops position paper on Southeast.
[2613]Asia. v
[2615]McCone writes McGeorge Bundy about PFIAB
[2617]report on NRP,
[2619]McCone meets with President Johnson to suggest
[2620]that McCone leave his post; President asks
[2622]‘that he remain until after the election.
[2624]a
[2626]McCone develops position paper on NRP.
[2628]McCone issues guidance for developing re-
[2630]quirements for reconnaissance satellites.
[2632]25
[2633]Seunel