[1]177-10002-10097, | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
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[33]JFK Assassination System
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[36]Agency Information
[38]LBJ
[39]177-10002-10097
[41]NSF, INTELLIGENCE BRIEFINGS, 11/23/63-12/5/63, BOX 1
[43]Document Information
[45]CIA
[47]THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST
[49]11/26/1963
[50]11
[52]INTELLIGENCE REPORT
[54]PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[55]Unclassified
[57]1B; Mandatory Review Material
[58]Redact
[60]12/12/1997
[62]DOC. #4
[64]- Date:
[66]3/6/2018
[68]TOP SECRET
[70](Security Classification)
[72]are
[74]CONTROL no. [Sci5-094/43 Bl
[76]copy Asoo
[78]LNennder Cuddeback [2S Tilovan, ifs"
[80]COMINT
[82]Channels
[84]Access to this document will be restricted to
[85]those approved for the following specific activities:
[87]NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
[88]Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
[90]TOP SECRET
[92](Security Classification)
[95]THE PRESIDENT’S
[96]INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST
[98]ISSUED BY THE
[99]CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
[101]26 NOVEMBER 1963
[102]TOP SECRET
[104]1. Ivraq-Syria
[106]a. The shaky new accommodation
[107]between the two countries following
[108]the recent coup in Iraq has been
[109]threatened by Syria's action in’ grant-
[110]ing asylum to Ali Saleh Saadi, the
[111]exiled leader of the extremist wing
[112]of the Iraqi Baath.
[114]b. Saadi had arrived in Syria
[115]unannounced following a brief stay
[116]in Madrid. On Friday, Iraq sent a
[117]message asking Syria to expel him on
[118]grounds that sheltering him was a
[119]breach of agreement.
[121]c. Both regimes continue to be
[122]troubled with internal dissension
[123]with affairs in one deeply tangled
[124]with those in the other,
[126]d. In Syria, as we mentioned
[127]yesterday, the Baathist regime is
[128]split. between moderates who desire
[129]a broadening of the government's
[130]power base,and a doctrinaire faction
[131]which wants to keep all control of
[132]the government in Baathist hands.
[134]e. In Iraq, the pull is more
[135]away from the Baathists. Two minis-
[136]ters have threatened to resign unless
[137]the government adopts an openly pro-
[138]Egyptian policy. Nevertheless the
[139]government feels secure enough to
[140]ease up on curfew and transport re-
[141]strictions imposed since the coup.
[143](Cont 'd)
[145]For The President Only - Top Secret
[147]a
[149]2.
[151]Laos
[153]f. Iraq has announced that the
[154]military union with Syria remains in
[155]force, and that a new commander of
[156]the joint armies will be announced
[157]soon,
[159](Includes INTERCEPTS)
[161]a. Intercepted neutralist mes-
[162]sages on Sunday reported that govern-
[163]ment forces had finally secured Vang
[164]Vieng and its airfield, long held
[165]by the Pathet Lao. They also told
[166]of the capture of Ban Namone farther
[167]south on Route 13,
[169]b. The neutralist, rightist Lao
[170]Army, and Meo tribal guerrilla forces
[171]hope to sustain their coordinated
[172]clearing action until remaining Pathet
[173]Lao pockets in this area north of
[174]Vientiane are cleared.
[176]c. Such operations in Laos
[177]have often been followed by a Con-
[178]munist riposte. We have a few in-
[179]dicators that something could be up
[180]on the Communist side, but these are
[181]so far very tenuous indeed.
[183]d. One such indicator is a
[184]stand down in the last two weeks on
[185]the Hanoi-controlled military con-
[186]munications net in Laos which could
[188](Cont'd)
[190]For The President Only - Top Secret
[192]3.
[194]South Vietnam
[196]point to a change in the. disposition
[197]or strength of Communist forces.
[198]Other enemy nets are normal.
[200]e. There are also unconfirmed
[201]reports of North Vietnamese troop
[203]-reinforcements in the Plaine des
[205]Jarres,
[206](INTERCEPTS)
[208]a. According to press reports,
[209]Viet Cong attacks on Sunday wiped
[210]out two of the government's strategic
[211]hamlets in the central highlands about
[212]250 miles north of Saigon.
[214]b. More than 1,000 inhabitants
[215]in the hamlets--who are minority
[216]tribesmen--are missing and possibly
[217]have fled into the mountains. They
[218]abandoned a significant quantity of
[219]weapons to the Viet Cong,
[221]ec. These attacks not only sug-—
[222]gest continued erosion of the govern-
[223]ment's programs to win over tribal
[224]support, but also signal that stepped-
[225]up Viet Cong pressure against the new
[226]regime is spreading to the north.
[228](Cont'd)
[230]For The President Only - Top Secret
[232]22 OCTOBER 1963 ICBM FIRING FROM PLESETSK
[234]ares 2 = PEG: a SE eRe ae re
[236]Aha
[238]Z\ NY _
[241]oN
[243]us
[246]sahesnoyerse
[247]raranety 2 fae
[250]pat seh tnBeBe Yor
[254](nardemougy ad favnint
[256]Frome
[258]parsand
[259]sl fees
[262]d.° This Communist effort is
[263]aimed at discrediting the post-Diem
[264]regime before the new leadership is
[265]able to get its feet on the ground
[266]and capture the loyalty and respect
[267]of people in the provinces.
[269]e. Although the Viet Cong still
[270]continues to draw its main strength
[271]from local recruiting, a steady stream
[272]of cadre and training personnel con-
[273]tinues to make its way to the south
[274]from North Vietnam along the Laotian
[275]border.
[277]£. We are now reasonably sure
[278]that at least 784 persons infiltrated
[279]from the north during 1963 and the ,
[280]actual total may be much higher.
[282]4. USSR a. There have been no further
[283]: developments in Soviet preparations
[284]‘for a series of extended range ICBM
[286]shots to the Pacific,
[288]b. We probably should have had
[289]by now an announcement closing an area
[290]roughly 500 miles south of Johnston
[291]Island to shipping. We suspect the
[292]Soviets may have delayed it in order
[293]not to appear to be rattling rockets
[294]immediately after President Kennedy's
[295]death. ;
[297](Cont 'd)
[299]For The President Only - Top Secret
[301]5.
[303]USSR-Berlin
[305]c. The USSR may repeat last
[306]year's performance of multiple fir-
[307]ings from a prototype operational
[308]complex at Tyuratam., Three such
[309]launchings were attempted at five-
[310]Minute intervals in May 1963; two
[311]succeeded.
[313]d. We also do not rule out the
[315]possibility of firings from opera-
[316]tional sites as opposed to the test
[317]center at Tyuratam., We observed _
[318]the first such firing on 22 October
[319]from the Plesetsk site, roughly 400
[320]miles northeast of Moscow.
[321](Includes INTERCEPTS)
[323]a. Embassy Bonn feels that
[324]the Soviet Union may be seeking at
[325]least a temporary modus vivendi on
[326]the autobahn without prejudicing
[327]its juridical position, which can
[328]be used to cause difficulties there
[329]in the future. :
[331]b. The embassy bases this on
[332]the Soviet replies to the Western
[333]notification to the USSR on 29
[334]October regarding harmonized convoy
[336]' procedures--two oral statements on
[338]16 November and a note of 21 Novem-
[339]ber.
[341]For The President Only - Top Secret
[343](Cont ' a)
[345]c. The Soviet note was designed
[346]to make a record, showing that the.
[347]USSR exercises "control" of the auto-
[348]bahn and that the recent incidents
[349]resulted from US refusal to comply
[350]with “existing procedures."
[352]d. On the other hand, the Soviet
[353]procedures described in the oral re-
[354]plies seem to reflect actual Allied
[355]practices, though there is enough
[356]ambiguity to afford the USSR flexi-
[357]bility in any future actions,
[359]6. Brazil a. The danger of an immediate
[360], coup against the Goulart regime has
[361]receded with the reported decision
[362]of Second Army Commander General
[363]Bevilaqua not to join the coup plot-
[364]ters.
[366]b. Bevilaqua, who has been some-
[367]thing of a storm center, may have
[368]been asked to hand over his command
[369]today as part of a series of reassign-
[370]ments made by President Goulart to
[371]keep the military off balance.
[373]c. On the other side of the
[374]coin, there is widespread belief
[375]that Goulart himself will at some
[376]time resort to a coup to establish
[377]an authoritarian regime.
[379](Cont 'd)
[381]For The President Only - Top Secret
[383]d. As oné éxample Raneiri
[384]Mazzilli, President of the Chamber
[385]of Deputies and next in line for the
[386]presidency, told Ambassador Gordon
[387]on Saturday that he profoundly mis-
[388]trusts Goulart's intentions and in-
[389]tends to maintain the strictest con-
[390]gressional vigilance.
[392]e. Our station in Brazil be~
[393]lieves that Goulart is living in a
[394]dream world. He seems either out
[395]of touch with reality or very poorly
[396]‘informed. Public opinion is not
[397]with him and the tradition that po-
[398]litical power should only be trans-
[400]‘ferred constitutionally is very
[401]strong in the army, coup reports
[402]notwithstanding.
[404]f£. The biggest danger from
[405]this quarter is that the opposition
[406]may resort to some illegal act, giv-
[407]ing Goulart the excuse to take’ over,
[409]For The President Only - Top Secret
[411]Cc.
[413]E,
[415]NOTES
[417]Ethiopia-Congo Haile Selassie has acceded to our
[418]ambassador's request and is rescinding his earlier
[419]decision to withdraw the 1,743-man Ethiopian con-
[420]tingent from the UN force in the Congo, ;
[422]Communist China - Africa The Guinean ambassador
[424]in Peiping has it unofficially that Premier Chou En-
[425]lai will leave in mid-December for a tour of some
[426]Afro=Asian countries, He is to stop first in Egypt
[427]and then visit several other African countries includ—
[428]ing Guinea, Ghana, and Mali, Chou would be the high-
[429]est ranking Chinese leader ever to visit Africa, (IN-
[430]TERCEPTS) .
[432]Indonesia-Philippines Two good sources have reported
[434]that President Sukarno plans to go to Manila this
[435]Thursday to confer with Philippine President Macapagal,
[436]No reasons have been advanced for the visit, Our.
[437]chargé guesses that it is an Indonesian move to head
[439]off Philippine recognition of Malaysia, .
[441]Venezuela The terrorists have struck again, this
[442]time firing six US-owned oil and gas pipelines near
[443]the northeastern city of Puerto la Cruz, The elec-~
[445]‘tions are still on for Sunday,and we look for a maxi-
[447]mum effort from the pro-Castro terrorist organization,
[449]Congo We now have word that 49 members of the Soviet
[450]Embassy, including dependents, left Leopoldville on
[451]Saturday aboard a Sabena flight for Brussels, They
[452]are expected to book onward passage for Moscow, It is
[453]reported that the Congolese will allow one Russian
[454]without diplomatic status to stay to look after Soviet
[455]property.
[457]For The President Only - Top Secret