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[2]‘104-10302-10000 | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
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[12]| Exocutive Ragistry
[14]“Ber esES
[16]25 July 1962
[18]MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
[19]SUBJECT: Meeting on CA Matters with the Panel of the President's
[20]Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board ~
[22]1. On 20 July 1962, the Director and the Deputy Director (Plans)
[23]wet with Messrs. Robert Murphy, Gordon Gray, William Langer, and
[24]J. Patrick Coyne to discuss certain aspects of the Agency's Political
[25]Action Programs. The Director sat with the Panel from 10:30 'til noon,
[26]the Deputy Director (Plans) was present from 10:30 to 12:30 and from
[27]2:00 to 3:30.
[29]2. The Director opened the discussion with a historical description
[30]of the Agency's covert financial support to political parties in the
[31]fight against Commmism. He described in detail the procedures now in
[32]effect whereby Political Action Projects ara originated, staffed out,
[34]and cleared with appropriate elements of Government. He pointed out
[36]that each project mst have bis epproval prior to its circulation to
[38]the members of the Special Group. At this point, he digressed to inform
[39]the Pane] that reconnaissance overflights are now approved by the
[40]Special Group and subsequently by the President. He said that this
[42]same procedure applies to peripheral flights although to a lesser de-
[43]gree. He terminated this part of the discussion by stating that in
[45]his opinion “all covert action programs are now handled in an orderly,
[47]CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
[48]~ RELEASE AS SANITIZED
[49]1998
[51]correct mamer".
[53]ar
[59]Be The Director then Genaribed in some ) detadl heency covert — .
[60]financial support in the recent ffersJotections, the last [ircel elections,
[61]"and the[Fimtolj election. He also described our activities in con-
[62]nection with the Ttelian political parties. Following this, he covered
[63]our plans for the upcoming/Brasilian/elections. He touched on our
[64]thoughts with regard to the political situation in fritish Gulang
[66]h. At this jumetere, the Director discussed Agency labor opera-
[67]"tions. He read to ‘the group a short paper which outlined our support
[68]to: enti Commis labor unions in[rrénes] end[Itely} our work through
[69]the foray and our relationships with /imerican]labor and the sssistance |
[70][Tnttea stated unions /have given ug.
[72]5. Agency support to cultural organizations was raised by 7
[73]Dr. Langer, and the Director covered in some detail the current status
[74]of our support plus that of the Ford Foundation to the Congress for
[75]Cultursl Freedom and the International Commission of Juriste. He
[76]touched on the Asia Foundation, and our desire to try to obtain the
[77]‘services of Mr. Livingston Merchant to head it.
[79]6. In the time remaining to kin, the Director, went over with the
[80]Panel. country by country an extended list of political parties and
[81]leaders supported by the Agency throughout the world. What he did not
[83]have an opportunity to cover in this list the Deputy Director (Fans)
[84]finished during the remainder of the morning and during the afternoon
[85]session.
[90]Original
[92]7. Also in the afternoon, the Deputy Director (Plans) read to .
[93]the Panel a paper on Operation Mongoose which the Director had used —
[95]earlier in the day for briefing the President. This paper was used
[97]on the instruction of the Director. The ‘Panel asked questions about
[98]Agency activity Anvelving Cuba, all of which were answered with the
[100]exception of one having to do with the role of the Attorney General.
[102]This query was raised by Mr. Gray who recognized and gracefully ace
[103]cepted the fact that he was not answered directly.
[105]8. Before the afternoon session adjourned, the Panel raised the —
[106]question of the total. doller amount. of funds expended. annually for
[107]covert action. The Deputy Director (Plans) showed then a chart con
[108]piled ty DDP-2G, dated h April 1962. This chart gives the precise
[110]. dollar enounts expended annually. These figures vary from the Congres-
[112]gional ones since the support slice is not ineluded.
[116]Deputy Director (Plans)
[118]- The Director
[119]1 ce = Exec. Director
[120]1 co - 0/CA-I0
[122]1 ce = DD/P
[124]MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
[126]SUBJEGT: Meeting on CA Matters with the Panel of the President's
[127]Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
[129]. 1. On 1 November, the Deputy Director (Plans) met with
[131]Messrs. Robert Murphy, Gordon Gray, and J. Patrick Coyne to present
[133]a follow-up briefing on the Agency's political action programs since
[135]the one held on 20 July 1962. The mesting lasted from 2:30 to k:h5.
[137]2. There was little discussion on Guba. In response to
[138]Mr. Murphy's inquiry, I told him that a good intelligence job had
[139]been done but that I thought it desirable to have this studied by
[141]_ the Board on the basis of a paper which the Director was having pre- _
[142]pared and which Mr. Kirkpatrick had assured Mr. Coyne would be sub-
[144]“mitted to the Board after the Director had had an opportunity to re-
[145]view it.
[147]3. The Gras{atan]otention program was covered in considerable
[148]detail. Points covered were: (a) the reason for the program, (b) the
[149]manner in which candidates were chosen, (c) the amount of money in-
[150]volved, (d) the metinds of funding, and (e) the coordination of State
[151]and the Agency ‘on the entire scenario. Following the presentation of
[152]the factual olenentd there was considerable discussion of the politi-
[153]cal situation in (frasti] ana the direction in which that Governnent
[154]seemed to be tending. .
[156]13-00000
[158]4 no e
[162]bh. GIA-sponsored activities at the Helsinki Youth Festival vas
[163]the next iten presented. A full report was given which followed care-
[164]fully the > post nortan written by the CA Staff.
[166]5. As for Ca activities in the remainder of Latin America, the
[167]following countries were covers’ Dominican Republic, Chile, ek
[168]and [Yenesuela]. fais) and rition Guians/were then ,tonstoa on, with —
[169]particular reference to the sensitivity of tne[os ta) cooperation on
[170]the latter.
[172]6 Jn Southeast Asia, an up-to-date report was presented on
[173]operations in Laos, South Vietnam, and North Vietnam. Problems in
[174]connection with North Vietnamese operations were specifically identi-~
[175]fled.
[177]7. On the [Sino~Indtan conflict, the Panel was made aware of
[178]pending and current requests from the([Indian aa oxy] for assistence in
[179]the training of guerrilla forces. The role of the Tibetans was also
[181]_ identified. In response to a query from Mr. Murphy, I said that I
[182]‘| did not gee any requirenent at this tine for an inerease of our perma-
[183]| nent establishment in ina) expressing the opinion that any trainers
[184]and paramilitary experts which we might send could be covered for us
[186]by the indians]
[188]| 8. Tn Barope, Ch prograns in the following areas were wp
[189]dated: Berlin, France and nase et Foieni) ana Grprus)
[191]oh
[193]13-00000
[197]_. Mir. Murphy seemed particularly interested in ths level of activity
[198]. in Italy and our efforts to cut it back.
[200]i "9. At one point in the briefing, I spoke of the change in
[201]status of the African-American Institute and told of our negotiations
[202]| with the Ford Foundation on the Congress for Cultural Freedom. I
[204]| mentioned the Department of State veto on passing finds to fiocnten
[205]Roberto There was some discussion of the Yemen and associated
[206]problems. Here, I sinply gave an intelligence briefing on the Yemen
[207]and the effects of the revolution there on Saudi Arabia and the
[208]British position in the Aden Protectorate. —
[210]lone
[212]13-Q0000 _...... ;
[213]- Ee) .UNcASSIFIED =]. Pa, [CONFIDENTIAL (1 SECRET
[214]~- ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET | |
[216]" Office of the DD/P
[217]Rm. 3-C-34—Hdars.
[219]| 2 - NOV 1962
[220]TO: (Officer designation, room number, and ~
[222]building) COMMENTS {Number each comment’ to. show from. whem J
[223]. : , . : to > whom: : "Draw C) Nine across ) columa, after each comment. ).. -
[225]Yeats 610 “einere O secret CONFIDENTIAL §=[] jse-onty  L-) UNCLASSIFIED”
[227]Geo 1961: O—3593646
[228]We
[230]13-00000
[232]a
[234]sae 7 oe
[236]. eo
[238]that he had been informed ia New Yor
[240]| Executive Regisity
[242]MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
[244]SUBJECT: Meeting on CA Matters. with the Panel of the President's
[245]Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board —
[247]1. On iS April, at DDP's request, I met with Messrs. Robert
[248]Murphy, Gordon Gray, and J. Patrick Coyne to brief them on major
[250]' covert action developments since their previous briefing on
[252]2 November 1962. The meeting lasted from 10:00 to 12:15.
[254]2 At Mr. Murphy's request, I began with a description of our
[255]electoral operations as ppeproved by the Special Group in Chile, the
[256]Dominican Republic, (B ail] and Guatemala, Mr. Murphy was
[257]particularly concerned with the situation in(Brazil] and both he aad
[258]Mr. Gray found it difficalt to anderstand why the State Department 6
[259]continued to provide large-scale economic assistance whea Kouliart/
[260]had to date refused to clean house of the Communists and fellow
[261]travelera both within the government and the labor movement. They
[262]were interested in knowing that we werg in toach with some of the
[263]military leaders who are opposed to(Goulart] and they seemed to feel
[264]that a military coup af, some point might be preferable to allowing a
[265]coantry/as large and péwerfal as Brasil/te drift into the hands of the
[266]opposition. Both gentlemen wished to know the amounts that we had
[267]expended in these electoral operations and our own estimate of the
[268]results, They did not question either the need for intervention or
[269]the size of our effort; although in the[Chilead case Mr. Murphy wanted
[270]to be sure that we had evidence that the funds passed through/Italian ] 7
[271]hands actually reached the[Chilead, Christian Democrats.
[273], &
[275]3,. Mr. Murphy then raised the /Argeating/problem and said
[276]‘that the State Department was
[278]putting considerable pressure on the AArgen ne /regime to persaade it
[280]_ to hald the electiona scheduled for [Tune i963. He questioned the
[282]wisdom of this pressure, pointing out that there waa a real danger.
[283]of the| Peronistas) returning to power if the elections were held. He
[284]asked our opinion and | said that, despite the pressure, there was still
[285]considerable doubt whether the elections would actually take place.
[287]Yur
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[295]g
[297]I added that the more responsible military were trying to work out with
[298]the(Guido government and the non eronist/political parties a formula .
[299]which would prevent the(Peronistas/from making large gains on the
[300]national leval. g
[302]. 4 Qn the subject of fdlei] Mr. Murphy felt that in so armall a
[303]country action should be possible to réemove[Duvalier/ fad wondered
[304]why it had not been done. I pointed cut that we had as yet no policy
[305]approval for such action but that we were active in identifying and
[306]making contact with opposition elements both within (Haiti And in exile.
[307]I described some of the difficulties, such a$/Duvalier'g control of
[308]the arms in the palace and his widespread penetration of opposition
[309]plotting that had just resulted in the rolling up of a coup attempt by
[311]army officers.
[313]5. Mr. Gray noted that he had seen in the newspapers a report
[315]of our recent decision to allow Radie Liberty to broadcast in Russian
[316]to the Soviet troops in Cuba. He was heartily in favor of such action |
[318]‘but wondered how we were able to obtain approval of it when the
[320]Administration seems so anxious to avoid actions that might appear
[321]to be provocative to the Soviets. Ll informed him that there had, in fact,
[322]been some delay in obtaining the approval.
[324]& Both the gentlemen asked for detailed information on the
[325]structure and workings of the Latin American Policy Committee (LAPC)
[326]and asked whether we felt this committee in any way hampered or
[327]interfered with the approval process in the Special Group. I said that
[328]both Chief, WH and myself were well pleased with the way the LAPC —
[329]operates and believed it to be highly aseful.
[331]7. I then briefed them on actions which were taken in Southeast
[332]Asia, particalarly the measure to strengthen the border police ia the
[334]10 (eorts of India.) I told them that/Nehrujwas aware of these actions and
[336]ey wanted to be certain Mr. [Bowles fwas clearly instructed prior to
[337]his departare/[as ambasuador}
[339]8. Both men objected to press reports that certain Administration.
[340]officials believed the Sovies to be exerting a helpful and restraining
[341]influence in Laos. I had to agree with them that it was hard to maintain
[342]gach a view in the face of the increasing aggressiveness of the Pathet Lao,
[343]and | described the existing policy limita on our relations with(Phoumi/ v4
[344]and{Kong Le/ I then described the present state of the Soviet-Chinese
[346]rs
[348]YX
[352]af
[354]i
[356]< -
[358]split and some of our efforta to exploit and exacerbate these tenalons.
[359]Mr. Murphy asked for specific information on the extent of trade, if
[360]any, between China and the Soviet Union and the amount of the out-
[361]standing Chinese debt to the Soviets. I agreed to provide this via
[362]Mr. Coyne. Mr. Gray asked about the depth and extent of our
[363]intelligence from Peking and the China mainland, and was critical of
[364]the information supplied to us by the Chinese Nationalists. I said
[365]that intelligence operations in China were not my field but that I would
[366]make sure that a report on this did get to them. .
[367]9. I went on to describe the cultural ferment within Rassia and
[368]recent action Khrushchev had taken to discipline the dissident writers
[369]and artists. They were very much interested in the actions we! had
[370]taken to exploit this situation and particularily interested ia the current
[371]isaue of Encounter and in the account therein of the Khrushchev tirade
[372]at the recent art exhibition.
[374]10. On Cuba lI explained that I was not in a position to brief
[375]them in depth and any questions in this field would be handled by the —
[376]Director or DDP. I did, however, brief them on the Kralak Committee
[377]and the recent meetings in Managua regarding measures that could be
[378]taken to limit the export of subversion from Cuba. (I have gent to
[379]them via Pat Coyne the CIA Memorandum on the present scope of the
[380]Cuban subversive training effort. )
[382]11, I described the covert support to the [italian] political parties
[383]for the forthcoming parliamentary election as approved by the Special
[384]Group. Mr. Marphy had not previously known of the decision to lend
[385]some selective support to the [Neani autonomistsjand described this
[386]decision with some surprise as quite a awitch. "
[388]i2. Finally, gwhen informed of the policy limitations on our
[389]relations with the [Ragotan Nationalists/and{Holden Roberta,” Mr. Murphy
[390]expressed himself as being in agreement with those Limitations and =
[391]seemed to feel that the best course to follow was to assist the (Portuguese)
[392]Government in its attempts to control the situation. He said that he had
[393]met recently for the first time with (Roberto Holdenjia New York last
[395]week and waa not impressed by the man.
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[401]13. The meeting was throughout a cordial one and I detected
[402]no evidence of a critical attitude towards the Agency's covert
[403]i action prograin.
[405]CORD MEYER, JR.
[406]Chief
[407]Covert Action Staff
[410]- Orig. - Director, CLA
[411]| 1 = Exec. Director
[412]1 - DDP
[413]2 - C/CA.
[415]18 10 OF Wy e3
[418]13-0000 - oe va a
[419]“DA ‘UNCLASSIFIED ms ] CONFIDENTIAL © ([] SECRET
[420]_ _ + * ROUTING AND RECORD ‘SHEE,
[422]'[ SUBJECT: (Optional)
[425]a toting) ar desig number, end +5 | COMMENTS [Number eoch comment to show from whom |
[426]a to whom. | Draw a Hine ecross “column ofter each comment.)
[428]7” -Exec.: Director .
[430]Mets. 610 “irene 1] secret =] CONFIDENTIAL ran INTERNAL = (._s UNCLASSIFIED
[432]“GPa 1960: o—se36ee
[434]23 April 1963
[436]MG M17 7/7 WLLL MMe
[440](CLASSIFICATION?
[442]Handle Via Indicated Controls
[444]74
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[449]WARNING
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[455]t of the United Stover. at een onnel especially indoce
[456]ized to receive informatio ‘the “des ted Its security must be
[459]This document contains rooney to Projects:
[461]nna COBOMA. ee fae k LORE ccc
[463](CLASSIFICATION)
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[494]24 April 1963
[496]MEMORANDUM FOR THE / RECORD
[498]SUBJECT: Meeting of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board,
[499]1015, Tuesday, 23 April 1963
[501]Present: Dr. Killian, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Clifford, Mr. Pace,
[502]Gen. Doolittle, Mr. Gray, Dr. Langer, Dr. Land;
[504]Staff members Messrs. Coyne and Ash;
[506]From CIA: Mr. McCone, Mr. FitzGerald,
[508]Mr. Bruce Clarke, Mr. Lyman Kirkpatrick
[510]1. When Mr. McCone entered the room the group had been discussing
[511]the release of the American prisoners in Cuba, and it had been explained to
[512]the Board that the three CIA men who had been imprisoned had been released.
[513]Mr. Murphy had asked what their cover story had been and had been told
[514]that they represented themselves as conducting audio surveillance for com-
[515]mercial interests, and that their fictitious names ta d apparently held up
[516]during interrogation.
[518]Mr. Murphy asked Mr. McCone the conditions of the release of the
[519]22 and the DCI explained that at Castro's request we were trying to obscure
[520]the fact that there had been a quid pro quo in releasing the four Cubans in
[521]exchange for the 22 Americans. The Attorney General had arranged the
[522]release of the three Cubans who had been accused of, but not convicted of
[523]sabotage, and Mr. McCone had personally arranged the release of Molina
[524]with Governor Rockefeller, who had granted him executive clemency with
[525]deportation. Mr. McCone noted that the release of the three CIA persons
[526]was very important to the Agency, and that nothing in the agreement for the
[527]release involved any other commitments.
[529]Mr. Murphy asked what the DCI thought was behind Castro's making
[530]these releases. Mr. McCone replied that it was probably domestic foibles,
[531]and that Donovan was the only thread open to the United States. Mr. Clifford
[532]asked if we had everyone out that we wanted. The DCI replied that he knew
[533]of no one else there that we wanted. He reported that Donovan had to make
[534]a statement that he would not return to Cuba, advised that he had no intention
[535]of returning at this time, and he would have to use another cover if he did
[536]return. Dr. Land asked why Castro did all this, and the DCI said we didn't
[537]really know, but one possibility offered by Donovan was that Castro
[538]apparently is interested in trying to reach some rapprochement with
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[543]the United States, that Donovan says he is not a Communist, and that Fidel
[544]didn't know how to go about making any accommodation with the U.S,
[545]because he was so closely surrounded by advisers who were watching every-
[547]. thing he did. ‘Mr. McCone said that Castro had specifically requested that
[549]the President, the-Astermes-General and the DCI be advised of his attitude.
[551]Mr. Clifford asked why Castro wanted the DCI to know, and Mr. McCone
[553]said he had no idea, because at no time during the Donovan negotiations was
[554]any indication given that CIA was being consulted or advised. Dr. Killian
[555]then suggested that the Board turn to the briefing on Cuba. Mr. McCone
[556]said there were several things he wished to discuss before going on to that
[557]briefing.
[559]2, Mr. McCone reported that on coordination the NRO agreement was
[560]in effect and working pretty well. An agreement had been reached on the
[561]complete and comprehensive use of the NPIC facilities by DIA, and NPIC .
[562]was developing well. The Special.Group has expanded its review of counter-
[563]insurgency activities to include those of the DOD, and they are now cognizant
[565]- of DOD activities in this field. In the field of current intelligence reporting,
[567]we aré now attempting to correct the DIA and CIA bulletins and to establish
[568]one bulletin with increased DIA input and with DIA issuing addendum.
[570]Mr: McCone said this was. supported at the DOD stage by the Secretaries.
[571]He noted that he was attempting to get all issues with the DOD settled by the
[573]15th of May so that they can be fully implemented before Mr. Gilpatric leaves
[575]in June. He said that in the clandestine collection field the work of Defense
[576]was being fully and caréfully coordinated on a regular basis. Mr. McCone
[577]said that reasonable progress was being made on the five areas of coordina-
[578]tion. He said that he and Mr.. McNamara had postponed the reorganization
[579]of USIB. It was going along all right.as it was and they didn't see any point
[580]of creating problems on the Hill by a reorganization at this my ib
[581]“3, Mr. McCone reported that recent CORONA fna TACKLE flights over
[582]China Jproduced the best photography we have ever had, and that he had not
[583]set up a formal briefing for the Board because of their busy schedule. He
[584]advised that there was one point concerning ICBM complexes in the Soviet
[586]Union which he wished to call to the attention of the Board.. The last CORONA
[588]flight had revealed one new ICBM complex and this now located these
[589]installations in 18 separate places, He noted that these complexes ranged
[590]from four pads to possibly as many as 18. This might well indicate that
[592]18 launching pads were standard, and if the support facilities are proportioned
[593]similar to the one with 18 pads, there might well be as many as 18 times 18
[594]launching pads, or a total of about 450, Mr. McCone advised that at this time
[595]we were analyzing each one to determine the level of support facilities.
[601]Yon
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[607]‘The photograph was. being reviewed for clearer guide lines as to construction
[608]time. He said. he saw no reason to change the mid-'63 estimate of 125 to.150
[609]launching sites, but there might be reason to change the future estimate.
[610]Dr. Langer asked how many sites there were with 18 pads and Mr. McCone.
[611]replied, "Only one."
[614]4. Dr. Land stated that CORONA was getting better and better, and —
[615]he hoped that all of those in the pursuit of a better vehicle would not forget
[616]that CORONA is doing the job. Mr. McCone replied that this was true, and
[617]said that he had the schedule for satellite launchings which he would leave
[618]with the Board, This called for CORONA-M once a month to July, with an
[619]extra one in May, and CORONA-J once a month from May 1963 to July 1964,
[620]with two in September. If trouble develops with the "J" configuration, 'M"
[621]can be continued once a month until March, The next [LANYARD] ot is
[622]scheduled for early next month and will be followed by three more. The first
[623]GAMBIT Jshot is scheduled in June, and will then be launched once a month
[624]through all of 1964. Mr.:McCone noted that if there were future failures,
[625]there should be no hiatus and a maximum of only seven days' delay between
[626]shots, .
[628]5, Mr. McCone reported that the OXCART vehicle would have one more
[629]_ flight at Mach 2. 5" and then would be pughed up to. its full speed and altitude.
[630]General Doolittle noted that the next[- 6}increase presented very serious
[631]engineering problems. Mr. McCone said that this was thoroughly understood
[633]but he wanted the Board to be apprised of the status.
[635]6. Mr. McCone reported that he was establishing a panel to make a
[636]judgment as to what additional steps should be taken to bring satisfactory
[637]photography in the area of resolution. He noted that he felt we were dealing
[639][ tee much in optimistic hope at the present time, and that he wanted the best
[640]possible judgment as to the resolution that could be achieved from satellite
[641]photography in order to be weighed with the political decision of overflying
[643]’ the Soviet Union.{(“He stated that he had gone to Cambridge to see ~
[644]Dr. Edward Purcell in an effort-to persuade him’to chair a panel which
[645]would be composed of the best brains from both inside and outside the Govern-
[646]ment. He reported that he felt he must be able to tell the President when
[647]satellite photography would reach the desired resolution. Mr. McCone
[648]advised that he had a memorandum establishing the terms of reference of
[649]this committee which he would submit to the President's Board. He noted
[650]that there were many studies oriented toward the most exotic types of
[651]reconnaissance, including the best read-out, but that he wanted this com-
[652]mittee to be completely impartial and objective and therefore was establishing
[653]it under his personal direction. He noted that he had the enthusiastic support
[657]13-00000
[658]Ce TB SER RET
[660]of DOD in doing this. He said he would like the support of the President's
[661]Board and their thoughts on the terms of reference and the membership,
[662]including whether they thought some members of the Board might sit on the
[663]committee or whether this would present a conflict of interest, as the Board
[664]had apparently felt in a previous ; matter’).
[666]Dr. Killian asked if this panel was supposed to look at the future poten-
[667]tiality of satellite photography, and Mr. McCone then read to the Board the
[668]terms of reference in his memorandum. He noted that he thought this panel
[669]should be constituted at this time because there were serious doubts in the
[670]U.S. Government about flying an aircraft over the USSR. Mr. Clifford
[671]asked if the panel would deal with politics, and Mr. McCone replied, "No."'
[672]Dr. Land asked what the relations of the panel would be with NRO and
[673]Mr. McCone replied that NRO would support the panel. Gen. Doolittle noted
[674]that the Air Force had a committee on satellite survivability, and
[675]Mr. McCone said that he knew this, hut felt that that committee was not full
[677]- out and not devoting the effort that the seriousness of the problem warranted.
[678]Gen. Doolittle replied that he was a member of that committee and he
[679]thought they were giving the problem very serious consideration. Mr. McCone
[680]said he thought the problem involved a vast amount of work and he was
[681]concerned because all of the views were not being pulled together. He noted
[682]that what was necessary was to get an authoritative expression as to what
[683]resolution was required down to the nearest inch in order to determine the
[685]engineering of missile wa
[687]Mr, Land asked what Dr. Purcell had said, and commented that he
[688]thought such a panel would be all right if it was composed of four or five
[689]_ who knew what they were talking about. Mr. McCone replied that he was
[690]not sure he had been able to get Purcell, and that he might have to ask
[691]Dr. Land to persuade Purcell; Dr. land | replied that he might be able to do it.
[693]cc Fp ngs ae en Gn - ve een ne tena ~~
[695]; _e _ (Mr. Pace asked whether there had been ‘one or two ‘U-2 flights over a)
[696]fre China. Mr. McCone replied that there had been two, and that they had uf
[697]‘ produced some interesting results, These included progress on a possible 4. [;
[698]1 gaseous diffusion plant. He noted that the preparations are just half those 7
[700]| of the Soviet plant, of which it may be a duplicate. He said that this was: re
[701]|| not understood, and noted that, as presently constituted, the plant could not
[702]|| produce cascades to develop the quality of the top product. He noted that it .
[703]a could possibly be another process, metallurgical or textile, but on another A
[704]i area there were a large number of cooling towers. Mr. McCone advised t|
[705]i that he had set up a special group under Dr. Roddis to study the Chinese ij
[706]|| nuclear energy program. This group has made a report in which they pointed i
[707]pe the paucity of the information available. However, they had put wt together) i
[711]a eet ‘ we ‘ a i nee
[713]Von
[716]13-00000
[718]ap ne
[720]S whole lot of intelligence information and Ut come to the conclusion that
[722]e Chinese Communists were making a tremendous effort in this field
[723]and were possibly nearer the stage of exploding some device. He reported
[724]that the Board of Estimates was making a new estimate on the subject at
[725]this moment and that the program was being supplemented by intensive over-
[726]flights. Dr. Land asked whether the DCI saw any problems in using the A-12
[727]over China, and Mr. McCone ‘said. that he didn't and, furthermore, that he
[728]Personally didn't. See any. problem. ix in n using | it over | the he USSR]
[730]cree . meee
[732]pull together the Agency's scientific and technical assets. | He had established
[733]a Research and Development Review Board. He said that it didn't seem wise
[734]at this time to relocate OSI and TSD. The Office of Scientific Intelligence
[735]analyzes and makes estimates on the basis of incoming intelligence, and its
[736]removal from DD/I would take away an essential link in the process of that
[737]area. He said further that TSD was directly linked to the operational aspects
[738]of DD/P, and he didn't feel it should be removed from that area. He noted
[739]that the Research and Development Review Board would meet under General
[741]’ Carter biweekly and would provide cross fertilization and coordination. He
[743]said that he would provide a copy of the memorandum establishing this Board
[744]and read to the Board the membership.
[750]Mr. “MecCone advised that t he had taken some “additional - steps. 40: as
[752]}i.
[754]13-00000
[756]0
[758]TOP SECRET
[760]9. Mr. McCone then turned to a discussion of Cuba and stated that
[761]he was giving the Special Group this afternoon a study showing the results
[762]of 51 days' reconnaissance over Cuba and that this was disturbing when the
[763]four principal targets.were analyzed. There were 59 occasions when
[764]weather precluded any readout of what was going on in these four Soviet
[765]military camps. Some of the camps were not seen for five or six days in
[767]‘a row and in one instance for as long as 12 succéssive days. Mr. McCone
[769]then read from the memorandum on reconnaissance over Cuba dated 23 April
[770]1963 and said he would provide the Board with a copy.
[772]The DCI then reported that James Donovan during a nighttime drive
[773]to Veradero had passed a convoy of 25 very large trucks, the type generally
[774]carried on railroad flatcars. Mr.’ McCone stated that an examination of the
[775]photography for that day and the following day provided absolutely no trace —
[776]of the convoy. Dr. Land stated that the DCI's previous statement may have
[777]provided the answer as to where this convoy might be. The DCI said he
[778]planned to recommend low-level flights in order to provide more information.
[780]10. At this point Mr. FitzGerald was asked to give his presentation on
[781]operations in Cuba. He commenced by displaying the chart which indicated
[782]the number of resident agents, illegal teams, legal teams, shipboard agents
[783]and penetrations of Cuban installations. He noted that the number of illegal -
[784]teams had risen to three as a result of a successful operation on Sunday,
[785]and one of these teams had as many as 100 subagents with extensive coverage
[787]in the province of Pinar del Rio. Dr. Langer asked what the subagents were
[789]looking for, and Mr. FitzGerald replied that their coverage was mostly
[790]military. Mr. Murphy asked if these agents were all strictly collecting
[791]intelligence, and Mr. FitzGerald replied that this was their primary purpose
[792]at the moment, but the illegals could create a resistance net if this was
[793]desired. He pointed out that the policy at the present time precluded attempt-
[794]ing to develop a large scale dangerous activity. ,
[796]Mr. Tae pointed out that the penetration of Cuban installations
[797]were mainly[diplomat .cJinstallations and that some fi4 Cuban diplofnats]were
[798]our agents. Mr. Clifford asked how the information was gotten out of Cuba,
[799]and Mr. FitzGerald replied that it was mostly by secret writing transmitted
[800]to[Mexico City) by mail and then forwarded to Washington. He said there
[802]were four radios in Cuba and that we now had a greatly improved medium ay
[803]speed transmitter that was quite small, {the size of about two cigarette cartons
[804]and it could get a message off in just 60 seconds.. He said that there was a
[805]smaller and better transmitter currently in the process of development.
[807]Z
[810]13-00000
[812]TOP Sc
[816]Dr. Land asked if the loss of this transmitter would compromise others.
[817]Mr. FitzGerald replied that it would not compromise any other agents
[818]except the one apprehended, and the DCI noted that it would simply com-
[819]promise the instrument. —
[821]Mr. Murphy asked concerning the quality of substantive reporting,
[822]and Mr. FitzGerald noted that the 1,040 reports looked impressive, but it
[823]was quite true that this was not a true indication. zgie said that some of the
[824]reporting was very good, and there were two (Cuban ambas sadors/on the
[825]payroll who provided some first-rate reports and were closest to the bone
[826]in what Castro was thinking... Mr. Murphy asked if we had Castro's
[827]immediate entourage penetrated and Mr. FitzGerald said his sister worked
[828]for us but that she didn't always have inside information. He pointed out
[829]that the 665 reports from resident agents. were primarily on military targets,
[830]and the intelligence community felt they were really worthwhile as a supple-
[831]ment to reat reconnaissance. General Doolittle asked if an illegal
[833]‘team was/t opin nand Mr. FitzGerald replied "yes''". Mr. Murphy asked
[835]whether these agents provided information on Soviet troop strength and
[836]equipment, and Mr. FitzGerald replied in the affirmative. Mr. Clifford
[837]noted that with just two illegal agent teams in Cuba at this time we were
[838]back to where we started from in 1962. Mr. FitzGerald commented that the
[839]casualty rates were very high and referred to the charts 'Legal Resident
[840]Agents in Cuba! and "legal Agent Development". .
[842](At this point Mr. McCone left the meeting and Mr. Cottrell came
[843]in.)
[845]Mr. Gray asked if the modest number of agents was a result of
[846]policy or operations. Mr. FitzGerald replied that this was primarily a
[847]result of operations and noted that it was not the result of lack of effort, but
[848]because of the high attrition rate and the dangers involved. He went-over
[849]the lists of what had happened to the agents that were put in. He noted that
[851]it was presently planned to carry out approximately five operations a month.
[853]Mr. Murphy asked if there was evidence of organized resistance in Cuba.
[855]Mr. FitzGerald replied "yes", but they were now small bands scattered »
[856]throughout the island. He noted that Castro had broken up the large country-
[857]wide resistance networks last summer, He then produced the chart entitled
[858]"Tllegal Infiltration -- Exfiltration Operations" and commented on this.
[860]Mr. Murphy asked if the groups on the island committed sabotage, and
[862]Mr. FitzGerald said the policy presently precluded major sabotage operations
[863]and limited it to "subtle sabotage". Mr. Murphy asked what constituted
[864]“subtle sabotage", and Mr. FitzGerald described it as tying a rock to a wire
[865]and throwing it across high tension lines.
[868]13-00000
[870]11. The Board then turned to Mr. Cottrell and asked him to describe
[871]the work of his group. Mr. Cottrell said the President had become con-
[872]cerned there were so many government agencies dealing with so many
[873]Cuban groups, and he had set up the group under Mr. Cottrell to coordinate
[874]all of this activity. He said that his immediate group consisted of a repre-
[875]sentative of Defense and CIA, and there were additional committees or
[876]groups reporting to them. He outlined the general policy guidance under
[877]which they were operating and under questioning from Mr. Murphy stoutly
[878]denied that the policy was basically defensive in nature, and it was
[879]directed toward getting rid of communism and Castro in Cuba. It was
[880]further explained that CIA's activities were coordinated through this group.
[882]12, Dr, Killian then asked Bruce Clarke to give a brief report on the
[883]situation in Cuba, and with the aid of photographs Clarke analyzed the
[884]present Soviet troop strength on the island and explained how these figures
[885]were arrived at. At 12:00 this session was recessed to permit the presenta-
[886]tion by DIA. : ,
[888]Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
[889]Executive Director
[891]LBK* dma: AG
[892]ty ts De
[895]#3 - ExPR
[896]#4 FR
[899]13-00000
[901]Subjects covered in briefing 23 April 1963:
[903]10.
[905]Discussion of the release of the three American prisoners in Cuba,
[907]Coordination on NRO agreement - "in effect and working well".
[909]77 [DP
[910]Report on photographic results of Corona find Tackle flight over
[911]Chinaj mentioned there would be one more Ox flight | at ee. 5/9H
[912]and then be pushed 1 to full speed and altitude.
[914]Reported on establishment of Purcell Panel.
[915]/d2_ .
[916]Discussion of U-2 flights over China jand results.
[918]Establishment of R&D board to pull together the Agency's scientific
[919]and technical assets.
[921]. Discussion of Cuba; DCI said plans to recommend low-level flights
[923]to provide more information.
[924]FitzGerald gave presentation on operations in Cuba.
[925]Cottrell described the work of his group.
[927]Bruce Blark gave report on the situation in Cuba’.
[930]1300000
[932]20 April 1963
[934]MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Kirkpatrick"
[936]‘DCI does no ith Cottrell
[937]and requests that you advise the Board that Cottrell is not privy
[938]to many operational matters. Your suggestions seemed agree-
[939]able to Mr. McCone. ,
[941]Wb
[943]W. Elder
[946]ry
[947]a |
[949]13-00000
[951]22 April 1963
[953]. SUGGESTED TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION WITH THE PRESIDENT'S
[954]FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD, 1015 A.M., 23 APRIL
[955]: te
[957]ry Asa.
[959]I Coordination.
[961]a. NRO Agreement--currently in effect.
[963]b. NPIC--agreement with DIA is fairly well solidified
[964]with not too many differences in opinion.
[966]c. Counterinsurgency--new system whereby DOD goes
[967]to the Special Group now in effect.
[969]d. Current Intelligence Reporting--now in negotiation
[970]stage with DIA. co
[972]e. Clandestine Intelligence Collection--close coordination
[973]between CIA and DIA now in effect.
[975]94
[978]i Recent CORONA Covera e plus Recent|TACKLE /Flights
[979]bel celecks, oof flag Ee ft IGG S -£%% a
[981]le. en
[983]I Prétvest on CAR S
[985]a. Establishment of the Purcell Panel.
[987]IV Scientific and Technical Intelligence in CIA.
[989]“Ne
[991]a. Report of the Roddis Panel on Chines se nuclear energy
[992]capabilities.
[994]b. The CIA Research and Development ‘Review Board.
[995]en
[997]bypoathe., gs cal to
[1000]13-00000
[1002]. Handle w EMAN
[1004]Contr tem
[1006]17 April 1963
[1008]’ MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
[1010]SUBJECT: -Meeting of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory
[1011]Board, Tuesday, 23 April 1963
[1013]1. The President's Board has asked that you ‘meet with them on
[1014]the 23rd from 10:15 to 11:15. They have suggested that the later half
[1015]of this period be devoted to a review of both operations and intelligence
[1017]on Cuba and have suggested that Mr. Cottrell attend for that period.
[1019]- 2. Assuming that the question of the Board's charter and proce-
[1020]dures will have been settled prior to the 23rd, I would suggest that you
[1021]may wish to give them a quick review of outstanding matters including
[1022]their recommendations and perhaps a briefing on the latest Cr
[1024]and (T.]o4 flights.
[1026]an B. Kirkpatrick
[1027]Executive Director
[1029]cc:. DDCI
[1030]Handle viy [BYEMAN
[1031]Contr stem
[1034]13-00000
[1036]Da
[1038]Ae Ree ee nue.
[1040]28 March 1963
[1041]MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director LIK
[1043]‘Reference the attached memorandum from the ‘Director,
[1044]I will of course be pleased to meet with the President's Board
[1045]on Tuesday, 23 April, and would appreciate very much your
[1046]informing Pat Coyne accordingly. I hope that you will be able
[1047]to be present also in accordance with your normal procedures.
[1048]If not, I would appreciate your appointing an appropriate repre-
[1049]sentative. If you can find out in advance from Mr. Coyne just
[1050]what the Board may want, it would be most helpful. In the
[1051]meantime, please ask the staff to prepare appropriate briefing
[1052]memoranda on whatever will be appropriate at that time!!s
[1054]Marshall S. Carter
[1056]Lieutenant General, USA
[1057]Deputy Director
[1060]Memo to IDCI from DCI dated 28 March 1963 (ER 63-2540)
[1063]Distribution:
[1064]Original - Addressee w/att
[1065]1 - DDCI w/cy att
[1066]1 - ER w/cy att
[1068]13-00000
[1070]. :
[1072]. oe . ' . Ixecutive Registry ;
[1075]wt |
[1077]28 March 1963
[1078]MEMORANDUM FOR: General Carter
[1080]In discussions with Dr. Killian, he mentioned
[1081]that his Board were meeting for one day. He had
[1082]been advised that I would be in Europe at that time.
[1083]The meeting date is April 23rd. Dr. Killian specifi-
[1084]cally requested that you be available for an hour or
[1085]so on that date, andI saidI would convey this request
[1086]to you. -
[1089]13-00000
[1091]ES om OSG 3
[1092]So SY,
[1094](CLASSIFICATION)
[1096]Handle Via Indicated Controls
[1098]2
[1101]BYEMAN
[1104]WARNING
[1105]s document contoins information offee rotion e Uni States within the mean
[1106]ing of the espionage laws U. S, Cod ie 1% 1798 na 7 The i rohibits its transmis:
[1107]r the lation of its con tea unauthorized pei well as i?
[1108]anner prejudicia I he sofet 4 ‘the ited Stet te r the t f f
[1109]the detrime: the U | be s ly by U. i
[1110]ond io recel f. he desi d tol ch Is. | ty
[1111]d dance with regul o th c
[1113]This document contains information referring to Projects:
[1115]Pe mew re wee wees ce ew eee eee ee eh chee cerns eee ens asec ereaneenreses seoeserneeeneane
[1119]7
[1123](CLASSIFICATION)
[1127]13-00000
[1129]: - . . _
[1130]SENDER WILL. CHECK CLASSI} ATION TOP AND BOTTOM
[1132]TT _uncassiriep |__|
[1133]CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
[1134]OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP .
[1136]NAME AND ADDRESS | paATE | INITIALS
[1138]Fe ie “Tt
[1140]| [action sss] =~ DIRECT. REPLY | | PREPARE-REPLY _—S|
[1141]|_| APPROVAL —s—“s| =~ DISPATCH =| | RECOMMENDATION
[1142]|_|commenT ss || S| FILE, S—C—Cti‘“‘CSC#*YLSC#;dSRETURNC
[1144]Remarks:
[1146]Distribution to other than DDCI and
[1147]yourself awaits your approval.
[1149]FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER
[1151]FROM: NAME. ADDRESS AND PHONE NO. . | pate |
[1153]Executive Director pI Dec 67
[1154][| UNGLASSIFIED_[ | CONFIDENTIAL | | SECRET |
[1156]ie xa. 937 Use previous editions (40)
[1158]* U.S, GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1961 O—887282
[1160][| CONCURRENCE | _—s| INFORMATION |  ‘|SIGNATURE
[1161]SS
[1163]13-00000
[1165]28 December 1962
[1167]MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
[1169]SUBJECT: Meeting of the DCI with the President's Foreign Intelligence
[1170]Advisory Board, Friday, December 28, 0930 a.m.
[1172]Specific
[1174]Subject +: Discussion of Cuba .
[1176]1. -At 0930 Dr. Killian opened the meeting with a statement to the
[1177]Director that the Board had read the report and appreciated the great
[1178]amount of work that had been put into it. He commented particularly
[1180]on the lucidity of the report and said the Board had also looked at the
[1182]‘changes. which had been sent to them this morning. The Director
[1184]commented on page 90, the final conclusions, and said that he ‘still did
[1185]not feel sufficient. attention had been paid to important indicators.
[1187]Mr. McCone then said that there were one or two other subjects that
[1188]he wanted to mention to the Board before getting into the Cuban report.
[1189]These are covered in separate memoranda.
[1191]2. After coverage of the other subjects, Dr. Killian then asked
[1193].Mr. McCone whether he had any further comments to make on the report.
[1194]‘The Director, referring to conversation the previous evening, said he had
[1196]“no further comments and that he thought it was understandable why his
[1198]personal position had not been included in the report. He noted that these
[1199]were covered in his October 31 memorandum for the record which the
[1201]Board had. Dr. Killian asked if the Board did have this and Mr. Goyne _
[1202]cs
[1203][Ste 3757 £2]
[1205]op we Io
[1207]Fle
[1209]13-00000
[1212]7
[1214]noted that Dr. Killian had seen it at the previous meeting. Mr. McCone
[1216]_ went on to say that the Board should realize that the people in receipt
[1218]of his cables had been receiving intelligence on an hour to hour basis.
[1220]Mr. Clifford noted that the Director's messages would be of tremendous
[1221]interest in any Congressional investigation and thought that the Board should
[1222]have copies of them. Mr. McCone replied that he realized this and would
[1223]supply copies.
[1225]3. Mr. Gray asked if they could then turn to question 16. Dr. Killian
[1227]-asked the question, which was whether the existence of the Special Group
[1229]had complicated the intelligence program and he noted particularly the
[1230]detailed decisions made by the Special Group in relation to Mongoose.
[1232]Mr. McCone replied no, in fact. the Special Group had assisted. He noted
[1233]the way it operated and said that the Augmented Special Group, with the
[1234]Attorney General, served as authority to stimulate intelligence gathering
[1235]through increased use of agents, refugee interrogations and third country
[1236]activities. He noted that prior to Mongoose there had been a hiatus and
[1237]that everything apparently had stopped after the Bay of Pigs. In December
[1239]of last year there had been no interrogation of refugees, no agents and no
[1241]_ Miami setup. At the instigation of the President, the Attorney General
[1243]and himself, all of this had been built up. Mr. Murphy asked why opera-
[1244]tions against. Cuba had stopped and whether this was for psychological
[1245]reasons. The Director said it was psychological. There had been
[1246]investigations and there was general discouragement. Dr. Killian said
[1248]TAY STAD
[1254]so ao ote ee al
[1256]., 3.
[1257]wasn't there a similar danger now and that there seemed to be a general
[1259]euphoria and a feeling of success. Mr. McCone said there was a great
[1260]danger inherent in Cuba. The SAM sites were still there as well as many
[1261]other things. He said a week ago Monday he had brought this up forcefully
[1262]_ in the Executive Committee and the President had issued instructions that
[1263]word be gotten to the Soviets that any interference with our reconnaissance
[1264]over Cuba would bring an instant reply with action from the United States.
[1265]This word was communicated by Stevenson to Kuznetov and by Thompson
[1266]to Dobrynin. He said that the present understanding is that we will fly
[1267]two or more high level flights a day, or if weather or other reasons fore-
[1268]stall these flights, there will be a request made to the President for low
[1269]level flights. He noted that. low level flights could escalate a critical
[1270]situation. . |
[1271]4. Mr. Pace asked if there were any prohibitions on intelligence
[1272]collection on Cuba today. Mr. McCone replied yes. We would like a
[1273]more aggressive pattern of agent infiltration. He said he thought it was
[1274]important that in the next three or four months there be extensive intelli-
[1275]gence operations to find out the trend of developments in Cuba. He said ;
[1276]he thought the Soviets might move completely out of Cuba, and certainly
[1277]this was one impression they were trying to convey; or second, that they
[1278]would recognize they had a good piece of real estate which they would
[1279]‘want to maintain for subversion through Latin America, and a base of
[1280]operations. This would involve a control of Castro and while they
[1282]might not re-install offensive missiles, they will always have the
[1284]mA ATA
[1285]Poe Er ea |
[1286]a rns |
[1288]13-00000
[1290]capability to do so. Mr. McCGone said he was inclined to believe that the
[1291]second alternative would be followed, and obviously the intelligence effort
[1292]should be at a maximum to discover Russian intentions.
[1293]| 5. Mr. Murphy said obviously there should be an all out effort
[1294]to penetrate the Cuban government, The DCI said yes, that every effort
[1295]should be made to exploit cracks in the top in their monolithic structure
[1296]and that more and more agents should be put it. He noted that only this
[1297]week a'team had been infiltrated and another team exfiltrated. Mr. Murphy
[1298]asked how many there were in. a team and the Director replied ieee to five]
[1299]6. Mr. McCone went on to say that we are making extensive efforts
[1300]to wee third aia in o- Cuban vp eiligence effort and mentioned
[1301]mre [Britiet Ganadiang frenct] Germansfand one or two Latin countries.
[1302]He said that he expected some invaluable information would be produced
[1303]by discussions with Donovan and Nolang. We already know that Castro
[1304]had a fight with Che Guevarya. Castro also-spent three hours with the
[1305]captain of the erican Pio! and the captain had indicated that he wanted
[1307]. . ; \
[1308]to talk to intelligence immediately on landing in Florida. Mr. McCone |
[1310]said that he intended to get the Special Group, immediately after the
[1312]first of the year, to approve a program for extensive intelligence activities.
[1313]He said that he did not believe that any efforts should be made at this time
[1314]to stimulate an uprising and that all of our resources should be concen-
[1316]trated on intelligence collection.
[1319]13-00000
[1323]5.
[1324]7. Mr.. Pace asked whether this plan would include using Guantanamo.
[1325]The Director replied that he did not recommend the use of Guantanamo.
[1326]He noted that if it was used as a base for intelligence operations, and we’
[1328]got caught, Castro could mobilize world opinion against us. Dr. Killian
[1330]said that Castro assumed that we used it in this way whether we do or
[1332]not,
[1334]8. General Doolittle asked how frequently we are overflying Cuba
[1335]now. The Director replied that there were two flights a day at present,
[1336]but if the weather is bad and our program slips, there is authority to
[1337]fly additional daily flights. General Doolittle asked how frequently this
[1338]gave complete coverage of the island and Mr. McCone said that it worked
[1339]out to about once a week, He nced that some areas such as harbors were
[1340]covered more frequently, and that COMOR had worked out a system of
[1341]priorities for aerial reconnaissance.
[1343]9. Mr. Pace then asked if we had studied the possibilities for the
[1344]use of Guantanamo and what could be achieved in using it as a base for
[1345]operations. The Director replied that we had made no such study.
[1347]10. Mr. Pace then inquired about restrictions on u-2 flights during
[1349]September and said that apparently effort was made to penetrate critical
[1351]. A
[1352]areas by agents and therefore he thought we should have. explored using
[1353]Guantanamo. Mr. McCone pointed out that the operators had proposed a
[1354]Grom Goatand ry
[1356]series of agent infilitr ations An August, but that this was not approved.
[1358]Nobody at the policy level, including the JCS, would approve these
[1360]operations.
[1363]13-00000
[1365]6.
[1367]ll. Mr. Gray then asked if the situation in January looks different
[1368]than it did in August, would there be accelerated operations. The
[1369]Director said he would re-open the whole question if that was the case.
[1370]Mr. Pace returned to the subject of Guantanamo and said that in his
[1371]opinion if effective use could be made of it this should be done regardless
[1372]of policy inhibitions. Dr. Killian asked if Guantanamo was as fon
[1373]SIGINT] purposes. Mr. McCone said that he was sure it was and
[1374]referred to Mr. Kirkpatrick who read from fae NSA . mesoranduni on
[1375]their expanding activities in June, noting the additional positions
[1377]were 2y
[1378]activated in June and the fact that/there some floating positions jestablished
[1379]near Santiago de Cuba.
[1381]12. Mr. Murphy then asked what was the difference between
[1382]Mongoose and Myngoose B-plus. Mr. McCone replied that the first
[1383]phase of the Mongoose oper ation was to determine the intelligence
[1384]potential in Cuba. This was fairly successful despite extreme difficulties.
[1385]He mentioned that there were 100, 000 informers organized on a block and
[1386]community basis throughout the island and that these people controlled
[1388]ration cards and travel, thereby making all movement difficult. He said
[1390]the second 1 phase of the Mongoose operation considered three or four
[1392]' different levels of activity. "'A'' was the most violent, directed toward
[1394]precipitating a revolution. '"B'" involyed extensive sabotage. " B plus"
[1396]was somewhere between the two and therefore involved even more
[1398]activity, such as mining harbors. Mr. McCone said that his big problem
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[1421]7.
[1422]is the question of United States policy. He did not wish to put CIA in the
[1424]position of stimulating an uprising unless he was certain that U. S. policy
[1425]would commit troops to back the uprising. He noted that on August 10,
[1427]when he forecast MRBMs in Cuba to the Secretary of Defense, he had
[1429]- discussed the ramifications of an uprising in Cuba extensively. Dr. Killian ©
[1431]asked who chaired the Special Group on Mongoose. Mr. McCone said he
[1432]wasn't sure whether it was Bundy or the Attorney General and turned to
[1433]Mr. Kirkpatrick, who didn't know. |
[1435]13. Mr. Pace asked whether an assessment had been made of the
[1437]accuracy of NPIC interpretations on Soviet missiles. He said he wondered
[1439]’ whether there were flaws which might change some of our estimates.
[1441]-Mr. McCone replied that, quite to the contrary, there was no instance
[1443]where NPIC failed. He said that, for example, the. September photography
[1444]of San Cristobol showed some construction equipment. In retrospect we
[1446]know. it was for developing missilesites, but the photography could be
[1448]interpreted as being only a few trucks for agricultural purposes.
[1450]14, Dr. Killian said that he was very concerned about the. clear
[1451]implication that the Soviet Union would soon be developing better
[1452]camouflage techniques. This, plus the lack of resolution in the photography,
[1453]might pose considerable difficulties. Mr. McCone said that this was a
[1455]different story. He noted that he was concerned about the adequacy of
[1457]' coverage of the Soviet Union. He noted that the targets for coverage were
[1459]reviewed repeatedly, but at the present time of year the light was poor
[1461]and the coverage was bad. He noted that there was a certain margin
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[1472]allowed in the estimates to take into account missile sites that might
[1474]not have been seen. The DCI said that NIE 11-8 had just been reviewed
[1476]and that an amending memorandum would be issued shortly. He said
[1477]obviously it was impossible to say precisely what was going on in the
[1478]Soviet Union.
[1480]15. Dr. Killian said that he was terribly concerned about the fact
[1481]that the public now seems to feel that we have swung all the way from
[1482]a missile gap to a great superiority over the Soviet Union, and that
[1483]this was obviously the wrong way. Mr. McCone said he agreed that this
[1485]was definitely wrong. Mr. Murphy asked whether the government was
[1487]putting out this information. Mr. McCone said he didn't know and that
[1489]he felt it was wrong and dangerous and would develop complacency and
[1490]might even result in an economy minded Congress cutting the Defense
[1491]budget drastically. Mr. Murphy noted that it was implicit that we should
[1492]have precise knowledge on what was going on inside Russia. Mr. McCone
[1493]said that in his presentations to Congress he specifically made the
[1494]reservation each time that there were obviously things we didn't know.
[1496]Dr. Killian noted that even photography can be wrong and can give an
[1498]_ erroneous impression; e.g., that nothing is there. Mr. McCone
[1500]acknowledged that this was a danger. Dr. Killian asked whether
[1502]Congress, the President ‘and the Secretary of Defense understood this
[1503]danger. Mr. McCone replied that he always stressed it, and he also
[1504]stressed that intelligence was commencing to have almost absolute
[1506]dependence on photography. ee
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[1512]. 16. _Mr. Pace commented that since November there had been
[1513]72 overflights of Cuba, and yet for a much greater length of tire there
[1514]had been no U-2 flights over the Soviet Union, which was a much more
[1515]important target. He said that obviously there must be great gaps in
[1516]our knowledge on the. USSR. General Doolittle said it was even worse
[1518]than that. He noted that CORONA had given no valuable intelligence
[1520]on Cuba and that apparently the U-2 gave questionable intelligence so
[1522]that low level reconnaissance was needed. The Director said this
[1523]wasn't accurate, that the U-2 gave all of the intelligence that was needed
[1524]to convince the OAS and our other allies. The low level flights were
[1525]needed for backstopping possible military operations. Mr. Pace asked
[1526]if it was correct that CORONA had produced no valuable intelligence on
[1527]Cuba and Mr. McCone said that this was true. General Doolittle noted
[1528]the closeness of the dangers and commented that if the Cubans had
[1529]moved faster and gotten the camouflage up, we might never have dis-
[1530]covered the missiles.
[1532]17. Dr. Killian noted that the time was drawing to an end and said
[1533]that the Board would make a strong recommendation on an intensive
[1534]research program/on sensors to break through camouflage]
[1536]18. Mr. Murphy asked if the Director had noted any difference in
[1537]the philosophy of the State Department in regard to intelligence. He
[1539]noted that the Department had played quite a role during the Cuban
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[1557]crisis. Mr. McCone said yes, he thought there had been a change in the
[1558]State attitude and noted that it and others had been quite timid on the U-2 ©
[1560]and other intelligence activities. He said that he was having arecapitu- ~= ~~
[1562]x
[1564]lation made of the inhibitions on intelligence operations which might
[1566]interest the Board. He cited the fact that we had been prevented from Tht
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[1568]covering [China] North Vietnam and North Korea. He said that | a second sage.
[1570]10 an
[1572]U-2 had been sent to [Formosa] and that the wraps had been taken off
[1573]Far Hastern]reconnaissance. On the other hand, every time there was
[1574]an overflight State got very nervous and had made several telephone
[1575]calls. | |
[1577]19. Dr. Killian again expressed the Board's appreciation for the
[1579]report and for Mr. McCone's taking the time to ‘be with them.. Mr. McCone
[1581]replied that he would be happy to consider any suggestions the Board had
[1583]’ eoncerning the report, except that he felt the conclusions should stand as
[1585]presented. If, however, there were any additional substantive matters,
[1586]there might well be additional conclusions that could be drawn.
[1588]20. This session was completed at 10:40.
[1590]rn B. felpes
[1592]LBK:rm Executive Director
[1594]Orig - DCI CC Eina
[1595]cy 2 - DDCI Reeves
[1597]cy 3 - DD/P
[1600]_ cy 5- DD/I
[1602]cy 6-1G