[1]157-10014-10100
[3]| 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
[5]JFK Assassination System Date: WH201S
[6]Identification Form
[8]rT CRE th Un
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[11]RECORD NUMBER :
[13]RECORD SERIES :
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[17]Agency Information
[19]SSCIA
[20]157-10014-10100
[22]MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTTEE
[24]07-M-06
[26]A
[30]ORIGINATOR :
[31]FROM:
[32]TO:
[34]TITLE :
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[39]SUBJECTS :
[41]DOCUMENT TYPE:
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[43]RESTRICTIONS :
[44]CURRENT STATUS :
[45]DATE OF LAST REVIEW :
[47]OPENING CRITERIA :
[49]COMMENTS :
[51]HY 40955 Dacld: 327423486
[53]Document Information
[55]SSCIA
[56]SCHWARZ, FREDERICK A.O. JR.
[58]NOTES ON GORDON GRAY
[60]07/04/1975
[61]72
[63]ASSASSINATIONS
[64]CIA
[66]TRUJILLO
[67]LUMUMBA, PATRICE
[68]GRAY, GORDON
[70]REPORT
[71]Declassified
[73]Redact
[74]05/05/2000
[76]CCBOX 450
[78]Page 1
[80]Date : 08/06/95
[81]Page : 1
[83]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[84]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[86]AGENCY INFORMATION
[88]AGENCY : SSCIA
[89]RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10100 .
[90]RECORDS SERIES : MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTTEE
[91]AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
[93]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[95]ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
[96]FROM : SCHWARZ, FREDERICK A.O. JR.
[98]TITLE : NOTES ON GORDON GRAY
[99]DATE : 07/04/75
[100]PAGES : 72
[101]SUBJECTS : GRAY, GORDON
[102]ASSASSINATIONS
[103]TRUJILLO
[105]LUMUMBA, PATRICE
[107]CIA
[109]DOCUMENT TYPE : REPORT
[110]CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET
[112]RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
[113]CURRENT STATUS : POSTPONED IN FULL
[114]DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 01/05/99
[115]OPENING CRITERIA :
[116]COMMENTS : CCBOX 450
[118][R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED
[120]HY 50955 Docld: 324235486 Page 2
[124]os
[126]es
[128]oO
[130]=)
[131]i=)
[132]<4
[133]i)
[134]oo
[141]Tokmm Buk Files
[143]From: Frederick a ee
[144]Re:. Notes on. GORDON GRAY
[145]Date: 7/4/75 - .
[146]ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION TESTIMONY _
[147]Page Subject
[148]wena ge 2262 aLographical background - — .
[149]RE EBX
[151]2268 ' Opinions on PFIAB generally
[152]_ ~ 2072- Never heard of Egecutive Action 7
[153]- 2273 - - "T know of no plan,plot, operational organization that”
[154]ae _ _ _ ever came to President Eisenhower with respect #0 any
[155]assassinations," HHH (2272- 3)
[156]2273 ta 1960, Eisenhower "approved a four point progran,. ‘Saka:
[157]ee sabotage, stepped up economic sanctions, propaganda,
[158]and the the training of Cuban refugees"
[159]2274 There was oné wm “well known individual” on PFYAB
[160]who would ask at each CIA briefing on Vietnam "have you
[161]considered trying to bump off some of the leaders in Nor:
[162]Vietnam". fham@iixmemithemxma Gray says that "Agency police:
[163]° was agatist assassination on the ground that it didn't
[164]. accomplish anything"
[165]2275 "I know of no (assassination) plan or operational
[166]——S capabitity Phe oes over Seen suchorized at any righ
[167]level. of government’
[168]2276 Bumgetdem At a meeting with Gray and a representative
[170]of the Cit in—-1958,"the-President—teld me—that—he—wante:
[172]the 54/12 gropp to pass upon all. activities of this
[174]—--__ governmnent—_which—_impinged upon the sovereignty or—the——
[175]' people of some other nation....President Eisenhower was
[176]—very-sensitive_—tothenecessity_of having the top people
[178]in government from the appropriate agencies pass upon
[180]the widdom,—and—in-some cases, feasibility of those ————
[181]kinds of operations.”
[183]Gray is unenthusiastic about proposal for Joint ‘Congress:
[184]al goversight committee because of danger of leake
[186]Gray recommends creation of a "chief intelligence office:
[188](either the DCI or a Special Assist. to the Pres. for In
[190]RB ERUSEBLO: Gray did not recall Ambassador Farland's
[191]report in May, 1960 that dissidents in the Rom. Rep. .wan'
[193]ares
[195]high powered rifles with telescopic scopesx and subseque
[197]received authorization to provide them by_ the Assist. Se
[199]hower Admin. (11/29/60;
[200]“furnish arms to dissidents in the Dom.Rep. ~~
[201]-~"T would think our concern was, if we had that kind of
[203]1/12/61) at. which it was agreed.
[205]eoncérn, was with béine of Asststance to the dissidents,
[206]and not assasssination, or that kind of activity."
[208]HW 50955 Docld: 32423488 Page 4
[211]Tokux Euk Files
[212]Frederick Bar ,
[214]From:
[216]Re: Notes on
[217]Date: 7/4/75
[219]Page
[220]2262
[221]REKX
[222]Sixax
[223]2268
[225]2272.
[226]2273.
[228]2273
[230]2274
[232]2275
[234]2276
[237]2281
[239]2292
[241]2293
[245]4
[247]HW 50955. Doctd:
[249]GORDON GRAY
[251]ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION TESTIMONY
[253]Subject
[255]- Slographical--background oe , : . ve ne woe
[257]‘Opinions on PFIAB generally
[259]Never heard of Emecutive Action:
[260]"I know of no plan,plot, operational organization that |
[261]ever came to President Eisenhower with respect 0 any
[262]assassinations," XKH (2272-3)
[264]“In 1960, Eisenhower "approved a four point program, sakmk
[266]sabotage, stepped up economic Sanctions, Propaganda, _
[267]and the tke training of Cuban refugeas"
[269]' There was one wa "well known individual” on PFIARB
[271]9
[273]32493488
[275]who would ask at each CIA briefing on Vietnam "have you a
[276]considered trying to bump off some of the leaders in North |
[277]Vietnam", Lhem@hiamaninhemxma Gray says that "Agency policy
[278]was against assassination on the ground that it didn't °° > 7
[279]accomplish anything",
[281]"I know of no (assassination) plan or operational
[282]capability that has ever been authorized at any high
[283]level of government" .
[284]ee a . oo, - 2
[285]Rugeinenm At a meeting with Gray and a representative
[286]of the CIA-in 1958, “the: President told me that he-wanted |
[287]the 54/12 gropp to’ pass upon all activities of this :
[288]government which impinged upon the sovereignty or the...
[289]people of some other nation....President Eisenhower was"
[290]very sensitive to the necessity of having the top people
[291]in government from the appropriate agencies pass upon
[292]the widdom, and in some cases, feasibility of those
[293]kinds of operations."
[295]Gray is unenthusiastic about Proposal for Joint Congression
[296]al goversight committee because of danger of leake
[298]Gray recommends creation of a "chief intelligence officer" -
[299](either the DCI or a Special Assist. to the Pres. for Int.)
[301]E FRUSEHLO: Gray did not recall Ambassador Farland's 7
[302]report in May, 1960 that dissidents in the Bom. Rep. wanted*¢
[303]high powered rifles with telescopic Scopesx and subsequentl™::
[305]Gray did not recall Special Group meetings at end of Eisen-
[306]hower Admin. (11/29/60; 1/12/61) at which it Was agreed to
[307]furnish arms to dissidents in the Dom.Rep,. °
[308]--"I would think our concern was, if we had that kind of
[309]concern, was with being of assistance to the dissidents,
[310]and not assasssination, or that kind of activity." ,
[312]Page a.
[314]Token Kuk Files
[316]“From: Frederick Bar t .
[318]Re: Notes on GORDON GRAY
[320]Date: 7/4/75
[322]ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION TESTIMONY
[324]Page Subject.
[326]2262. Slographical background
[328]REERX
[330]@iedx _ .
[332]2268 Opinions on PFIAB generally
[334]2272 Never heard of Executive Action :
[336]2273 "I know of no plan,plot, operational organization that
[337]ever came to President Eisenhower with respect &o0 any _ 7
[338]assassinations, "4KH(2272~3)
[340]2273 In 1960, Eisenhower "approved a four point program, sma
[341]Sabotage, Stepped up economic Sanctions, Propaganda, _
[342]and the tke training of Cuban refugeas"
[344]2274 There was one we "well known individual” on PFIARB me
[345]who would ask at each CIA briefing on Vietnam "have you *
[346]considered trying to bump off some of the leaders in North |
[347]Vietnam", themikmenihemxms Gray says that "Agency policy
[348]was against assassination on the ground that it didn’t"
[349]accomplish anything".
[351]2275 "I know of-no (assassination) plan or operational
[352]capability that has ever been authorized at any high
[353]level of government! .
[355]aa ate we . . . . . - - oe , ~ oS
[357]2276 Emzeinhem At a meeting with Gray and a representative
[359]- of the CIA in 1958, "“the- President told me that he wanted-7
[360]the 54/12 Sropp to pass upon all activities of this 7
[362]| government which impinged upon the sovereignty or the.
[364]people of some other nation....President Eisenhower was
[365]very sensitive to the necessity of having the top people
[366]in government from the appropriate agencies Pass upon
[367]the widdom, and in some cases, feasibility of those
[368]kinds of operations."
[370]2278-9 Gray is unenthusiastic about proposal for Joint Congression
[371]al Roversight committee because of danger of leake
[373]2281 Gray recommends creation of a "chief intelligence officer"
[374](either the DCI or a 8pecial Assist. to the Pres. for Int.)
[376]2292 KR ERUSILLO: “Gray did not recall Ambassador Farland's ;
[377]report. in May, 1960 that dissidents in the Ron. Rep. wanted:
[378]high powered rifles with telescopic Scopesx and subsequentl™-
[379]received authorization to provide them by the Assist. Secy ™™"
[380]of State through the DCI. .
[382]2293 Gray did not recall Special Group meetings at end of Eisen-
[384]HW 50955 Docld:32423466 Page 6
[386]‘concern, was with being of assistance to the dissidents,
[388]hower Admin, (11/29/60; 1/12/61) at which it was agreed to
[389]furnish arms to dissidents in the Dom.Rep. ——
[390]--"I would think our concern was, if we had that kind of
[392]and not assasssination, or that kind of activity."
[396]These documents were pulled from a i
[397]Spécial Group file by John Bayly. .
[398]They should be replaced after we
[399]xerox those minutes we intend to |
[400]use as exhibits for the Gray testimony.
[403]a 01h Mtewe fr
[404]a4 Bn exh br F, : | :
[406]Page 7?
[408]HW 50955  Dooldaf32493408
[410]. GORDON GRAY
[412]Chronolo and Issues
[414]Biographical Background
[418]1949-1950
[419]1950-1951
[420]1951
[422]29512-1955
[424]1955
[426]1958
[427]1958-1961
[429]1961-1975
[431]U.S. Army (Private to Captain) ;
[433]Department of Army (ultimately Secretary
[434]of the Army)
[436]Special Assistant to President TRUMAN
[438]Organized for TRUMAN the Psychological
[439]Strategy Board, which involved close
[441]contact with intelligence community
[443], President, University of North Carolina
[445]Assistant Secretary of Defense for
[446]International Security Affairs (ISA)
[448]Director, Office of Defense Mobilization
[450]SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT (EISE ENHOWER)
[451]FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS (Head of NSC)
[453]Member, PFIAB (President's Foreign Intelli-
[455]gence Advisory Board) appointed by JFK
[457]7]
[459]Chronology of Events
[461]1959
[463]November 4
[465]Special Group discusses Allen DULLES' "Cuba
[466]Propaganda Project" for use of radio trans-
[467]mitters. GRAY said "he was sure (the project
[468]would meet with high level approval" provided
[469]it was acceptable to the President of Mexico.
[471]famover ok
[473]“Issues and Questions
[475]GRAY represents President EISENHOWER
[476]at Special Group meetings.
[478]Page a
[480]HW 50955 Docld? 32423488
[482]1960 (Cont'd)
[484]February 12
[486]February 17
[488]March 9
[490]March 14
[492]April 7.
[494]A "special" NSC meeting was held on this day:
[495]The only record of this meeting in the NSC
[496]minutes states: "On instructions from the
[497]Executive Secretary no memorandum was written."
[498](NSC Minutes)
[500]Special Group approves evaluation of agents
[501]for Cuban sugar mill sabotage. GRAY "discussed
[503]this matter with his associate” (Eisenhower)
[505]and reported two tactical objections.
[506](SG Minutes)
[508]GRAY tells Special Group that any covert-action
[509]like sugar. mill sabotage should be undertaken
[510]only after overall consideration of "whether
[512]_and how the U.S. wishes to move against CASTRO.
[514](SG Minutes)
[516]At an NSC meeting, Allen DULLES "reported that:
[517]a plan to affect the situation in Cuba was being
[518]worked on. Admiral BURKE suggested that any
[520]ian for the removdl of Cuban leaders should be
[522]a package deal, since many of the leaders around
[523]CASTRO were even worse than CASTRO," (NSC Minutes)
[525]At a Special Group meeting, after a paper
[526]titled "General Covert Action Plan for Cuba"
[527]was read, there was "a general discussion as
[528]to what would be the effect on the Cuban_
[530]scene if FIDEL and RAUL CASTRO. and CHE GUEVARA
[531]should disappear simultaneously. (SG Minutes)
[533]"GRAY asked the [Special] Group's views on what
[534]happens after TRUJILLO, specifically how CASTRO
[536]ean be kept out of the Dominican Republic.”
[538]Acting DCI CABELL recommends U.S. military, inter-
[539]vention after TRUJILLO departs. (SG Minutes)
[541]Issues and Questions
[543]Why were no minutes written?
[545]Does context show that phrase "his _
[546]associate" refers to President
[547]EISENHOWER?
[549]Did such consideration involve
[550]assassination plotting? |
[552]Was this "package deal" the simultaneous
[553]triple assassination plot that was
[554]mentioned on November 3, 19607
[556]Does this simultaneous disappearance
[557]plan refer to assassination planning?
[559]Is there a connection between this
[560]Special Group discussion and the NSC
[561]discussion on March 14, 1960, re a plan
[562]to remove Cuban leaders?
[564]Did U.S. support TRUJILLO'S opponents out
[565]of a desire to keep CASTRO out of the
[566]Dominican Republic? |
[568]Page 9
[572]BW 50955 Doctld
[574]1960 (cont'd)
[576]April 14
[578]April 14
[580]June 30
[582]July 1
[584]July 5.
[586]At an NSC meeting. presided over by Vice President
[588]NIXON, Allen DULLES reported "TRUJILLO'S position
[590]continued to weaken and was now quite precarious.
[592]{he] thought further attempts will be made to kill
[594]or oust TRUJILLO." Under Secretary of State
[595]DILLON said “if TRUJILLO could be removed from
[597]power in the Dominican Republic while pro-CASTRO
[599]elements were prevented from seizing power
[600]in that country, our anti-CASTRO campaign
[601]throughout Latin America would receive a
[602]great boost. The Vice President agreed that
[603]retting rid of TRUJILLO would be a favorable
[604]development for us." (NSC Minutes)
[606]Allen DULLES predicted at an NSC meeting, that
[607]one possible outcome with respect to CASTRO
[608]was an assassination that would make CASTRO
[610]a martyr. (NSC Minutes)
[612]GRAY says "the U.S. has taken publicly about
[613]all that it can afford to take from the
[614]CASTRO government." (SG Minutes)
[616]Memo from the Chief of CIA's Western Hemis-
[617]phere Division to the Acting DCI recommending
[618]delivery of high-powered rifles with telescopic
[619]scopes to the opponents of TRUJILLO. The ;
[620]memo said: “approval for delivery of these
[621]arms has been given by ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
[622]STATE ROY RUBOTTOM."
[624]President EISENHOWER met with Secretary of
[625]State HERTER and others to discuss the ;
[626]Dominican Republic. "The President thought
[627]we should knock out of any documents on file
[628]any reference to starting a revolution."
[629](Conference Memorandum)
[631]Issues and Questions
[633]Were these U.S.
[635]DILLON'S comment indicates that the U.S.
[636]had an active interest in removing TRUJILL(
[638]attempts to kill TRUJILLO?
[640]What did NIXON mean by "getting TRUJILLO"? .*
[642]Does this show that assassination was not
[643]a favored alternative because it would
[645]produce martyrdom?
[647]General atmosphere of vehement opposition
[649]to CASTRO.
[651]Was the Special Group aware of this action
[652]Was the President aware of. the plan?
[654]Purpose
[656]of weapons?
[658]HW 50955 Docld! 32423488
[660]Page 10
[662]1960 (cont'd)
[664]July 7
[666]July 21
[668]Allen DULLES reported to the NSC that the
[669]Venezuelan government wants, the United States
[670]to lead the way in breaking relations with
[671]TRUJILLO. DULLES stated: The Venezuelan
[672]government was engaged in an all-out effort,
[673]through the OAS and otherwise, to isolate, .
[674]condemn and cause the downfall of TRUJILLO. . .
[675][Because] they have convincing evidence that
[676]TRUJILLO was responsible for the assassination
[677]attempt on BETANCOURT [President of Venezuela
[678], . . BETANCOURT believes another attempt will
[679]be made momentarily and therefore it [his
[680]government } wants a showdown without dela ."
[681](NSC Minutes)
[683]"Mr. DULLES stated that he believes, and. the
[684]intelligence community agrees, that the
[685]roblem of TRUJILLO must be settled before the
[687]‘problem of CASTRO can be dealt with, even
[689]though CASTRO is the greater threat."
[690](NSC Minutes)
[692]The NSC Minutes further state that BETANCOURT
[693]was told that the U.S. cannot act without
[694]ascertaining TRUJILLO'S successor. The U.S.
[695]will work with BETANCOURT and FIGUERES of .
[696]Costa Rica on suggestions for a successor to
[698]TRUJILLO. President EISENHOWER suggested that
[700]a government in exile should be ready to go
[701]into the Dominican Republic in the event of
[702]TRUJILLO'S downfall. (NSC Minutes)
[704]GRAY said “his associates" would favor the
[706]’ development of sabotage operations in CUBA.
[708](SG Minutes)
[710]Issues and Questions
[712]'The U.S. .was under pressure to move
[714]against TRUJILLO.
[716]Did TRUJILLO'S attempt against BETANCOURT
[717]make him "fair game" for assassination in
[718]the eyes of OAS nations including the U.S.
[720]Did the U.S. determine a successor?
[721]Did the U.S. “act?
[723]pad
[725]Ll
[727]au
[731]a
[733]is=]
[735]i=]
[737]=H
[739]ia)
[743]=H
[745]"Associate" is the euphemism for Eisen- we
[746]hower.— a
[747]Does sabotage imply the further. steps 4
[749]of assassination?
[751]HW 50955
[753]LE aH ey
[755]1960 (cont'a)
[757]‘July 28
[759]August 12
[761]August 16
[763]August 25
[765]August
[766](approx)
[768]TOP SEGRE) ;
[770]j
[771]| Issues and Questions
[773]President EISENHOWER stated at an NSC meeting:
[775]“Until TRUJILLO is eliminated, we cannot get ; Does "elimination" mean "assassination"?
[776]our Latin American friends to reach a proper ; ,
[778]level of indignation in dealing with CASTRO."
[780]In this regard, "the President said if we
[782]attempted to take any action with respect to
[784]Cuba before settling the TRUJILLO situation,
[786]we would be the loser." (NSC Minutes)
[788]BISSELL outlines 13.3 million dollar budget
[789]for Cuban operations which was to be laid
[790]before “higher authorities" for decision.
[791](SG Minutes)
[793]Services) receives box of Cuban cigars to , ' aware of this? Co
[794]be treated with lethal poison for use against :
[795]CASTRO. (IG REPORT p. 21).
[797]After the Special Group approved anti-LUMUMBA
[798]operations in the Congo, "GRAY commented,
[799]however, that his associates had expressed
[801]Is this circumlocutious order for
[802]assassination from the President? An
[803]‘indication that at the least, assassina-
[804]tion was within the range of acceptable
[805]means for "getting rid of LUMUMBA"?
[807]and he wondered whether the plans as outlined
[808]would be sufficient to accomplish this .-.. . It
[809]was finally agreed that planning for the Congo
[811]would not necessarily rule out 'consideration'
[812]of an articular kind of activity which
[813]might contribute to getting rid of LUMUMBA."
[814]SG Minutes; emphasis added)
[816]At the NSC meeting, Mr. STANS ‘suggested that
[817]the U. S. might "throw out LUMUMBA by peaceful
[818]means." (NSC Minutes)
[820]BISSELL asks EDWARDS to find underworld contacts . Were EISENHOWER, GRAY, or Allen DULLES
[821]with Cuba to aid in an assassination operation aware of this? Was it authorized by
[823]Page 12.
[825]e32493488
[827]thee
[829]HY 409545 Docld:
[831]1960 (cont'd
[833]September 8
[835]September 21
[837]‘October 2)
[839]a
[841]November 3
[843]During brief discussion of CONGO developments,
[844]“GRAY said that he hoped that Agency people in
[845]the field are fully aware of the top-level
[847]feeling in Washington that vigorous action would
[849]not be amiss." (SG Minutes; emphasis added)
[851]Allen DULLES stated at an NSC meeting that
[853]"LUMUMBA was not disposed of and remained a
[854]reat danger as long as he was not disposed
[855]of." (NSC Minutes
[857]At an NSC meeting, Allen DULLES reported
[858]that "five Congolese soldiers had attempted
[859]to assassinate MOBUTO on the 15th of
[860]October. The U.S. had prior information
[862]of this attempt and had warned MOBUTO ...
[863](NSC Minutes)
[865]At a Special Group meeting, Mr. MERCHANT.
[866]“asked whether any real planning has been done
[868]‘in taking direct positive action against FIDEL,
[870]RAUL and CHE GUEVARA. He said that without
[871]these three the Cuban government would be
[872]leaderless and probably brainless. He conceded
[873]that it would be necessary to act against all
[874]three simultaneously."
[876]The minutes further state: "General CABELL
[877]pointed out that action of this kind is
[878]uncertain of results and highly dangerous
[879]in conception and execution, because the
[880]instruments must be Cuban. He felt that,
[881]particularly because of the necessity of
[882]simultaneous action, it would have to be
[883]concluded that Mr. MERCHANT'S suggestion is
[884]beyond our capabilities." (SG Minutes)
[886]Issues and Questions
[888]Against LUMUMBA personally? —
[890]Did the NSC contemplate "disposing of"
[891]LUMUMBA by assassination?
[893]. Did. this information prompt the U.S.
[895]to plot the assassination of LUMUMBA
[896]in retaliation or to protect MOBUTO?
[898]Was MERCHANT referring to an assassina-
[899]tion of Cuban leaders?
[901]Shortly before this, CIA had made the
[902]assassination contract with the Mafia.
[903]Was General CABELL unaware of this CIA
[904]contract? . Was General CABELL expressing
[906]a traditional CIA objection to assassina-
[908]tion proposals? If so, on what other
[909]occasion did Mr. GRAY hear the CIA
[910]objection?
[912]Bage 13
[916]HW 50955 Docld!32423498
[918]1960 (cont'd)
[920]December 29
[922]1961,
[924]January 12
[926]Late Jan.—
[927]Early Feb.
[929]Ata Special Group meeting, Mr. BISSELL gave
[930]the broad outlines of a two-pronged plan
[931]for proceeding with certain limited covent
[933]activities directed against the TRUJILLO
[935]regime, but "he also emphasized that the
[936]roposed actions would not of themselves -
[937]bring about the desired result in the near
[938]future, lacki some decisive stroke against.
[939]TRUJILLO himself." (SG Minutes Source:
[940]Minutes, December 29, 1960, by T. Parrott,
[942]of Special Group Meeting, December 29, 1960,
[943]02752)
[945]. 5
[946]Special Group approves the State Department
[948]proposal explained by MERCHANT "that limited
[949]Supplies of small arms and other material
[950]Should be made available for dissidents inside
[951]the DOMINICAN REPUBLIC." SG Minutes;
[952]emphasis added) a
[954]DDP BISSELL asks William HARVEY to establish
[955]an EXECUTIVE ACTION capability under project
[957]. SRRIFLE. HARVEY'S notes are quoted as saying
[959]that BISSELL said he had been "twice urged by
[961]the White House” to establish such a
[963]capability, including the capability to assassina-
[964]ate political leaders.
[966]Issues and Questions
[968]TRUJILLO was assassinated on May 3
[969]1961.
[971]Did Mr. BISSELL or the Special Group
[972]propose to approve aiding Dominicans
[973]who might assassinate TRUJILLO to
[974]effect such a "decisive stroke"?
[976]Were these assassination-type weapons?
[978]If not, was this Special Group action -
[979]used as implicit authority for sub-
[981]‘sequent provision of weapons for the.
[983]assassination of TRUJILLO?
[985]Was the EXECUTIVE ACTION project initiated
[986]or authorized during the EISENHOWER Adminis
[989].Fage i4
[991]HY 50955 Docld?32423488
[993]GORDON GRAY: Short Summary
[995]Gordon Gray was Special Assistant to the President for National Security
[996]Affairs from 1958-1961. During this period Gray represented President
[997]EISENHOWER at Special Group meetings at which the following subjects
[998]-were discussed: “any particular kind of activity which might contribute
[999]-. to getting rid of LUMUMBA"; provision of small arms to opponents to
[1000]TRUJILLO in the Dominican Republic; and detailed planning for "how the
[1001]U. S. wishes to move against CAS'
[1003]Gray' s testimony should involve the following questions (see attached
[1004]list of exhibits):
[1006]_ CASTRO
[1008]1. What was Admiral Burke referring to at the March 14, 1960, NSC meet-
[1009]ing when he spoke of "a plan for the removal of Cuban. leaders should
[1010]be a package deal"? (Exhibit at Tab EB)
[1012]2. Is there a connection between the plan referred to by Admiral Burke:
[1013]at the March 14 NSC meeting and the discussion at the March 14
[1014]Special Group meeting on the "effect on the Cuban scene if Fidel and
[1015]Raoul Castro and Che Guevara should disappear simultaneously"?.
[1016](Exhibit at Tab F) ;
[1018]3. Were President Eisenhower or Mr. Gray aware that on August 16, 1960,
[1019]the CIA Office of Medical Services received a box of Cuban cigars to
[1020]be treated with poison for use against Castro? (Exhibit at Tab 0)
[1022]4, Were President Eisenhower or Mr. Gray aware that in August 1960
[1023]Bissell asked Edwards to find underworld contacts with Cuba for an
[1024]assassination mission? (Exhibit at Tab R)
[1026]5. At the November 3, 1960, Special Group meeting, was Mr. Merchant
[1027]referring to planning for assassination when he asked whether plan~
[1028]ning had been done "in taking direct positive action against Fidel,
[1029]Raoul, and Che Guevara"? How does General Cabell's response (that
[1030]Merchant's suggestion "is beyond our capabilities") square with the
[1031]fact that shortly before November 1960 the CIA had made contact with
[1032]the Mafia for a Castro assassination effort? (Exhibit at Tab V)
[1034]TRUJILLO
[1035]1. Was Vice President Nixon referring to assassination.at the April 14,
[1037]1960, NSC meeting when he said "getting rid of Trujillo would be a
[1038]favorable development"? (Exhibit at Tab H) ;
[1040]RW 50955 Docld:32423488  Page.15
[1042]_
[1046]2. Was the Special Group, Mr. Gray, or President Eisenhower aware that
[1047]Assistant Secretary of State Rubottom was reported, on July 1, 1960,
[1048]by the CIA Western Hemisphere Division Chief to have approved delivery
[1049]of high-powered rifles with telescopic sights to Trujillo Opponents?
[1050](Exhibit at Tab YZ) ;
[1052]3. when President Eisenhower was reported at the July ‘28, 1960, NSC meet-
[1053]' ing to have said that “until Trujillo is eliminated . . .", was he
[1054]referring to an assassination? (Exhibit at Tab M)
[1056]4. On January 12, 1961, the Special Group approved making available
[1057].“small arms" to dissidents in the Dominican Republic. Were these
[1058]assasSination-type weapons such as the rifles with telescopic sights
[1059]‘referred to in Exhibit at Tab YZ? (Exhibit at Tab X re January 12 ©
[1060]meeting) ;
[1062]5. Did the attempts by Trujillo to assassinate President Betancourt of -
[1063]Venezuela prompt the Special Group to favor supplying arms to Dominican
[1064]dissidents who might try to assassinate Trujillo? (Exhibit at Tab K)_
[1066]LUMUMBA
[1068]1. When Mr. Gray commented at the August 25, 1960, Special Group meeting
[1069]that "his associates had expressed extremely strong feelings on the
[1070]necessity for very straight-forward action", was he referring to
[1072]‘assassination? Do Mr. Dulles' reservations indicate that he was
[1073]objecting to a suggested assassination? (Exhibit at Tab P)
[1075]' 2. When Mr. Gray said at the Special Group meeting on September 8, 1960,
[1076]that "he hoped that agency people in the field are fully aware of the
[1077]top level feeling in Washington that vigorous action would not be
[1078]amiss", was he referring to assassination of Lumumba? (Exhibit at
[1079]Tab S) - ,
[1081]COMMAND and CONTROL
[1083]What was the command and control system for covert action operations
[1084]in the Eisenhower Administration?
[1086]Pertinent Relationships
[1088]President. Eisenhower Gray was the President's liaison to the
[1089]: intelligence community and the National
[1090]Security Council (including | the Special
[1092]Group).
[1093]DCI Allen Dulles Gray met with Dulles in the Special Group.
[1094]DDP Richard Bissell - _.. Gray new Bissell well. Bissell initiated
[1096]the CIA~Gambling Syndicate plot to assassinate
[1097]Castro and the Executive Action capability.
[1099]FB/RKK
[1100](1/8/75
[1102]HW 50955 -Docld: 32423449. Page 16 _
[1104]TO: Frita Schwarz and Curt Smothers SECRET
[1105]FROM: Frederick Baron
[1106]’ DATE: July 6, 1975
[1108]GORDON GRAY: SHORT SUMMARY
[1110]Gordon Gray was Special Assistant to the President for Natonal Security
[1112]Affairs from 1958-61. During this period Gray represented President EISENHOWER
[1113]at Special Group meetings at which the following subjects were discussed:
[1115]‘any particular kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid of
[1116]LUMUMBA;'' provision of small arms to opponents of TRUJILLO in the Dominican
[1117]Republic; and detailed planning for "how the U.S. wishes to move against CASTRO"
[1119]Gray's testimony should involve the following questions:
[1121]- Did any of the Special Group meetings implicitly or
[1122]explicitly contemplate or plan assassination attempts
[1123]against LUMUMBA, TRUJILLO, or CASTRO?
[1125]- To what extent were CIA plans against these leaders .
[1126]authorized by or made known to President EISENHOWER,
[1127]Gordon GRAY, DCI Allen DULLES, or the Special Group as a whole?
[1129]- What were the general command § control practices?
[1131]Questioning of Gray should focus upon the following documents:
[1133]- Special Group Minutes, November 3, 1960.
[1135]- Special Group Minutes, August 25, 1960.
[1137]-. Memorandum of July 1, 1960 from J. C. King, Chief, Western Hemisphere
[1138]Division: to the Acting DCI. _
[1140]- Minutes of the Special Group of January 12, 1961.
[1142]PERTINENT RELATIONSHIPS
[1144]President Eisenhower , Gray was the President's liaison to the
[1145]intelligence community and the National
[1146]_ Security Council (including the Special Group).
[1148]DCI Allen Dulles Gray met with Dulles in the Special Group.
[1149]DDP Richard Bissell =~ +~—«<Gray ‘mew Bissell well. Bissell initiated the
[1150]; CIA-Gambling Syndicate plot to assassinate CASTRO
[1151]and the EXECUTIVE ACTION capability. |
[1153]President Truman Gray was Secretary of the Anny and
[1154]Special Assistant to the President
[1156]Livingston Merchant _ Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs
[1158]representing the State Department at Special
[1159]Group meetings.
[1161]HW 50955 Docld:32423488 Page i7
[1163]EXHIBITS FOR THE EXAMINATION OF GORDON GRAY
[1165]Castro*
[1166]Special Group Minutes, November 3, 1960.
[1168]‘Special Group Minutes, August 12, 1960.
[1170]Lumumba —
[1171]Special Group Minutes, August 25, 1960.
[1173]Special Group Minutes, September 8, 1960.
[1175]Trujillo —
[1177]Memorandum of July 1, 1960 from J. C. King, Chief,
[1178]Western Hemisphere Division to the Acting DCI.
[1180]Minutes of the Special Group of December 29, 1960.
[1182]Minutes of the Special Group of January 12, 1961.
[1184]HW 50955 DocId:32423488 Page 18
[1186]: err) be ee weet
[1187]a \ “ ™ Nw,
[1189]3 November 1960 _ cS
[1190]MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
[1191]SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 3 November 1960
[1193]PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Douglas, Gray, Gen. Cabell,
[1194]Gen, Lansdale : ;
[1196]* J
[1198]1. . Cuba
[1200]Mr. Gray inquired once more as to the status of planning for
[1201]problems which would arise post-Castro. Mr. Merchant said’he
[1202]would check into the progress of the State Department group which
[1203]has been charged with developing recommendations on this matter.
[1205]From this the Group leunched into a far-ranging discussion of
[1206]the entire concept of U.S. efforts against Castro. Mr. Douglas,
[1207]supported by Mr. Gray and Mr. Merchant, expounded the idea that -
[1208]pernaps things have now progressed toa point where covert activities
[1209]of the type originally envisaged for CIA to undertake will not be effective.
[1210]Mr. Douglas referred to the extensive program of the militia, Mr. Gray
[1211]cited the matter of arms from the Soviet bloc, and Mr. Merchant dwelt
[1212]on the increasing effectiveness of Castro's measures to control the
[1213]population in ways which the Communists have developed so weil, The
[1214]latter said that he and others in the State Department had originally
[1215]thought that a popular rebellion would develop within Cuba and that
[1216]this could be augmented by the comparatively small-scale efforts of
[1217]exiles under CIA control. Now the sare people are beginning to feel
[1218]more and more that despite the numerous defections and the economic
[1219]deprivations being experienced by tne middle and upper classes, time
[1220]ts actually working on Castro's side. Mr. Merchant said that he
[1221]foresaw that there would occur 4 point in time beyond which covert
[1223]intervention would not do the job. - cre
[1225]Mr. Gray expressed the opinion that we will never be able to
[1226]Nelean up" the situation without the use of overt U.S. military force.
[1227]He suggested the possibility of using the CIA-backed exiles to-mount a
[1228]simulated attack on Guantanamo in order to offer an excuse for overt)
[1230]sy TL
[1231]peeve)
[1233]PROPERTY 1 erentt
[1234]ve - ape poo he ght vat Sad : '
[1235]“HE WHITE HOUSE fe eit! Cid mw ake
[1237]HW 50955 Docld: 32423483 Page 19
[1241]We uted “ a ae Woden
[1243]: intervention. This led to an involved discussion, the Beneral conclusion
[1244]‘of which was that such action on our Part would not be desirable, but
[1245]that should Castro be foolish enough actually to attack Guantanamo
[1246]this would almost certainly mean war, Mr. Gray said that he had had
[1248]order to be able to arrive at a top-level decision on this very point,
[1250]‘7 He thought it essential that the Policy of the U.S. should be completely
[1251]understood by rTesponsible officials, so that any Overt Cuban act would»
[1252]be met with a previously-agreed-on response.
[1254]Mr. Merchant Stated that, apart from any attack on Guantanamo,
[1256]he thought that some of the previous argumentation in today's meeting
[1258]_ Was faulty, in that we could not have it both ways. By this he meant
[1259]that it is not logical to conclude that an indigenous uprising is impossible
[1260]and yet that it is feasible for the U.S. to go in overtly and "clean up
[1261]the mess." He Pointed out that if Castro's Support were such that an
[1262]uprising was out of the question then an open invasion by the U.S. would
[1263]be met by a hostile Population and we would be plunged into a situation
[1265]like Algeria,
[1267]_ Turning to the immediate problem before the Group, Gen. Cabell
[1268]outlined the general proposal to establish bases in the U.S., with the
[1269]‘reasons for coming to this conclusion. He cited Specifically the
[1270]Possibility of U.N, investigation in Guatemala and the increased Scope
[1271]of the Program, which has been brought about by the increased strength
[1272]of the Castro regime. All members of the Group expressed serious
[1273]doubts as to whether such activity could be kept at all secure. Mr,
[1274]Merchant said at one Point, that although this does not represent a
[1275]final conclusion on his part, he is inclined to think that the Proposal
[1276]embodies the worst aspect of both worlds; that is, the choice Should
[1277]rest between continuing our operations entirely on foreign soil ot
[1279]Mr, Gray suggested that the decision could be put up to his
[1280]associates at the same time Tibet is discussed. Mr, Merchant agreed
[1281]that this is where it Should end up, but asserted that he is not prepared
[1282]to move in that direction until a Survey has been made of the Possibilities
[1283]of keeping operations in the U.S, unrevealed,
[1285]CPE PIT — peers oubt y PROPERT.
[1286]Bevan TELE lt
[1288]TRE WHITE Hous.
[1290]HW 50955 Docld: 32423488 Page. 20...
[1292]Mr. Douglas said that in any cage he would be prepared to have
[1293]the Department of Defense investigate the availability of specific
[1294]locations that would be suitable. ; ;
[1296]Finally, Mr. Merchant asked whether any real planning has been
[1297]done for taking direct positive action against Fidel, Raul and Che Guevara.
[1298]“He said that without these three the Cuban Government would be
[1300]leaderless and probably brainless. He conceded that it would be Q
[1302]necessary to act against all three simultaneously. Gen. Cabell pointed _-
[1304]out that action of this kind is uncertain of results and highly dangerous
[1305]in conception and execution, because the instruments must be Cubans.
[1306]He felt that, particularly because of the necessity of simultaneous
[1307]action, it would have to be concluded that Mr. Merchant's suggestion
[1309]igs hevand anr canahilities. b
[1311]«ree ARETE PROPERTY 0
[1312]Poel) Uae THE WHITE HOuSo UiFevt
[1315]ares
[1316]ON Teg ts
[1318]Cees
[1320]HW 50955 Docld:32493488 Page 21
[1322],
[1324]f
[1326]a
[1328]a
[1330]4
[1332]EOP, Nase erent cred ed
[1334]Sree btu d ‘baw wi oa Jind . :
[1336]a! Biot
[1338]eo +4, Supply Drops - Cuba
[1340]Gen. Cabell explained that the Pinar de Rio supply mission had
[1341]not taken place because of the absence of specified communication
[1342]from the DZ, and the Escarnbray operation had been canceled because
[1343]of weather. He said that these missions are still planned, and assumed. ° ——
[1345]"that the Group had no objections. The members 50 signified.
[1347]“5, U-2, Cuba
[1349]Gen. Cabell said that the photographic coverage on the first
[1350]flight had been only about 50%, because of cloud cover. He continued
[1351]that we are analyzing the exact results ona priority basis and that
[1352]some time after the middle of next week we should be in a position to
[1353]make recommendations for the missions required to extend the coverage.
[1355]Mr. Gray commented somewhat wryly that this was all right with
[1356]him since he "would certainly not-be available to discuss anything of
[1357]this kind before the middle of next week, '' The other members appeared
[1358]to have the same reaction. a . ~
[1360]6, Policy Consideration Re Cuban Exiles —
[1362]Mr. Gray said that Assistant Attorney General Yeagley had spoken
[1363]to him after his meeting with Col. King and Messrs. Esterline and
[1364]Holman. He had said that the information given to him by the CIA
[1365]representatives, and the arrangements for future coordination if
[1366]necessary, were entirely satisfactory to him. He had stated, however,
[1367]that a problem remains with respect to action the FBI should take; -
[1368]that is, the FBl needs guidance in its handling of Cuban exile groups
[1369]other than those under the direction of CIA..
[1371]The Group agreed that the best way to attack this problem would
[1372]be to have Mr. Yeagley attend next week's Special Group meeting and
[1373]discuss the matter at firsthand. Mr. Parrott was asked to make
[1374]arrangements for this.
[1376]J 7. Value of Cuba to the USSR as a Base Vis-a-vis
[1377]Cape Canaveral .
[1379]Mr. Parrott gave Mr. Merchant the gist of the OSI memorandum
[1381]4 | CE
[1383]pad fie
[1385]me
[1387]z ed
[1389]Cena ; pera penea ue
[1390]eda sh, i
[1393]acd Lee. la
[1395]BW 50955 Docld:32493488 Page 22 —-
[1397]eRe ee Ge fe eb leu nw ins  teid dae dl
[1398]wate ea
[1400]cn this subject, which bad been discussed with the rest of the Group
[1401]- on 20 October 1960. . a ZL
[1403]: | . THOMAS A. PARROTT
[1405]| os
[1406]| ete
[1407]-
[1410]LCV Eee ay
[1411]oie She We.
[1412]: ' | ateteetetentl
[1413]5
[1414]. ;
[1415]Sora ee t % a exrys co,
[1416]“hay 4 aan 5 baide Ub Wirt --
[1417]wlask bead ig be
[1419]HW 50955 Docld: 32423488 Page 23
[1421]: SUNT ES
[1423]RYO ab
[1424]BYcs Gal
[1425]12 August 1960
[1427]MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
[1428]SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting - 11 August 1960
[1430]PRESENT: Messre. Merchant, Gray, Dulles, and Bissell
[1432]. . . . ~eNeet rer Ors ae )
[1433]i . ; C wT eg a , i % a
[1434]" Coy ta) ah .
[1435]: “2, Budget for Cuban Operations: Mr, Bissell summarized the.
[1437]budget which had been prepared as a basis for seeking a release trom the
[1438]Reserve to finance Cuban operations for the balance of the fiscal year,
[1439]The budget for the year totals approximately thirteen and a quarter rnillion
[1440]dollars, not including provision for the replacerment of material with an
[1441]estimated value of 1,6 million dollars to be withdrawn from Agency -
[1442]inventory. Since 2,5 million dollars of budgeted and Reserve funds have
[1443]been made available for this program by an earlier action, the balance
[1444]reauired is about ten and three-quarters million dollars. Mr, Dulles»
[1445]stated that a release of ten million would be requested at this time since
[1446]there is inevitably a wide margin of uncertainty as to what the actual costs
[1447]will turn out to be. Mr, Bissell stated the amounts required by major
[1448]sub-headings as follows:.
[1450]Political Action Po $s 960, 000,00
[1452]Propaganda 2,152,120,00
[1453]Paramilitary ; 8,055, 753,00
[1454]Intelligence Collection ; 833, 200,00
[1455]Counter Intelligence 325, 400,00
[1456]Communications Support ; 229, 420,00
[1457]Support 731,718.00
[1459]$ 13,287,611,00 Total
[1461]: THIS Noninv.
[1463]PRUPLET S| eee pene “pore
[1464]oe peste TA ON . A Stump 6.0027?
[1465]rae were wouscorme: | BYES GY aes
[1466]ne . ns PAPre cs pg tt
[1468]SEGRE | | BE RRO
[1470]a, Wms
[1472]HW 50955 Docld:32423488 Page 24 mt
[1474]ye
[1475]i
[1476]f
[1478]It was agreed that the operations in question must go forward and that
[1480]the amount did not seem unreasonable for activities of this scope and
[1482]scale but it was understood that Messrs. Merchant and Gray could not
[1484]\ state that they had reviewed in any detail the manner in which the
[1485]estimates had been arrived at. Following further discussion, it was_ ,
[1487]agreed that this matter should be laid before the appropriate higher .
[1489]authorities and a presentation would be arranged hopefully within the
[1490]next ten days. This was believed to be wise, not because any actions.
[1491]involving major political risks were to be taken in the near future, but
[1492]because the Agency would soon become committed to various substantial
[1493]expenditures which should not be undertaken without reasonable assurance
[1494]that the operation was to go forward,
[1496]pees
[1500]. .¢
[1501]Wee De
[1502]RICHARD M, BISSELL, JIRe ;
[1504]Deputy Director.
[1505](Plans)
[1507]PUTO ON _ PROPER
[1508]7 ate OnLy . TRE WHITE WOUL. Uri
[1512]BW 50955 Docld: 32423483 ‘Page 25
[1515], .
[1516]e , .
[1517]“ey .
[1519]TOHOREDU POs Acting Director of Central Intelligence —
[1520]Viss Deputy Direstor (lans)
[1522]SUDJECTs - . Glondesting Delivery of roa to Oppoattion Losdertntp
[1523]4a tho Dominican Republic.
[1527]4. ‘Dis mezorandws: racomonda action by the acting Dircetar of
[1528]Central Intelligence. such recommendation io contained in pora §,
[1530]2. Yolo setansadar Varlend vas in tho. Doainicen Republic, a prime
[1531]cipal leazer of the onscaition requestod that o Lisdted meter of ares ba)
[1532]nado available waich could be used to preaipatete tee overthrow of tho
[1533]rezine of Cornernl imfeal Loonidsy Trujillo, These arms presizably would
[1534]cba used aguinat kay nenbera of the trujillo regines.,
[1536]Within rocent tonths, the Tyo recine hee becone inerensingly
[1537]wistabla dua to prowing opposition within tho professional and middle
[1538]clasnoa to the excesses of tha dictatorghio. «alitical oprression of
[1539]thove groups haa brow:ht about suvarely strained relations betweon the
[1540]Cathalic Church amd tho Trujillo reqize. iiost kLuowlocgoable sources have
[1541]been prodiating that the fol of the recine du dminent. —
[1543]Sines the fall of tho Trujillo reriza unscara inevitablo, ia to the
[1544]_ intercat of tua Uec. thet our relations with tho opposition ba aa closa
[1545]on poraihic, rroviding the arna-as requestad would cantricute slgnifi-
[1546]contly toward this end.
[1548]3. It is proposed to proce ond doliver to undorzroursl opposition
[1550]forces in the boninican Republic twelve (12) sterilo Uese rifles, iedel
[1552]| 1903 (Springfield), with telesconie sichts, together with five hundred
[1553](500) rounds of czvunition for ‘ease. fms ond asumition are immediately
[1554]available at HOsn0i decoty anpraxinate cost 46 22706. It is planned to
[1555]deliver those weapons by cir throurh bv) fecilities provided orrancocents
[1556]can be varxed out uith the opposition for thoir rocestion, LU! they cannat
[1558]_ bs delivered by air, plisnsa ore currently boing stinicd dn the Ca star’ for
[1559]delivery by cea, : 7
[1561]4. Approval for dolivery of thess orret han boon sven ty Ansistent i/
[1562]Socratary of Stale Joy Aubottom, vio reguerta thet the arms be placed in a
[1563]‘the hands of the opposition at the cerliest pasaible noreate [:
[1564]Q EMT TY ; ° PROT of ne y oF
[1566]rare ty aac
[1567]“ qe WHITE oust O16
[1569]-
[1572]of CRET
[1574]HW 50955 Docld: 32423403 Page726 a
[1577]S. It 4s recomondoed that the opposition in the Dosinican Bepablia
[1578]be provided the orn as requested.
[1580]' Brox
[1582]— Chior Te
[1583]Western Lontechers Diviston
[1585]eat DDCr
[1587]CQictwas
[1588]Deputy Pirostor 7 Date the recomandation contained. in
[1589](lana) _ paragraph § 4s epproveds
[1590]| Sanita
[1591]ernie terete net
[1592]Director of Central intelligence
[1593]O JUL joe
[1594]| Pate 2) JUL josh
[1595]DDP/WH == kb (1 July 60)
[1596]Distributions .
[1597]Qeig & 1 - Addressee
[1598]1 DDCI
[1599]1 — DDP
[1600]1 ~ C@S
[1604]PROPERTY os
[1605]THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE
[1609]HW 50955 Docld:32423493 Page“ 27 =<
[1611]_ 29 December 1960
[1613]MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
[1614]SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 29 December 1960
[1616]PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Douglas, Gray, Dulles, Bissell
[1618]y ;
[1619]3, Air Drops - Cuba
[1621]‘Mr. Bissell notified the Group of plans for five supply drops in
[1622]the next three days, | _
[1626]t co . —_——
[1628]5. Dominican Republic Se ae
[1630]Mr. Bissell gave the broad outlines of a two-pronged plan for
[1631]‘proceeding with certain limited covert activities directed against the
[1632]Trujillo regime. He emphasized that although support would be given
[1633]to the Figueres group, there is no intention of establishing a para-
[1634]military force as such, since this would be impractical in view of
[1636]_ requirements for Cuba. He also emphasized that the proposed actions
[1637]would not of themselves bring about the desired result in the near future,
[1638]lacking some decisive stroke against Trujillo himself.
[1640]The Group agreed with the proposal as outlined and felt that it Oo a
[1641]should be mentioned at the Tuesday meeting. It was noted that OO
[1642]“Mr. Pawley feels that overt intervention in the Dominican Republic.
[1643]should be mounted simultaneously with the Cuban operation. The
[1644]consensus of the Group was that this would not be entirely consistent.
[1645]However, it was agreed that the plan is worth beginning at this time
[1646]no matter what the eventual decision on overt intervention may be.
[1648]“6, Cuba
[1649]Mr. Merchant reported a brief conversation he had had with 7
[1650]Mr. Gray's associates this morning. The latter had made two points:
[1652]' (a) it would be desirable to obtain the cooperation and support of
[1653]individual Latin American governments, (b) it would be desirable, if
[1654]possible, for the U.S. to break relations with Cuba, in concert with
[1656], other countries, some time before January 20th.
[1658]2 ~~ . PROPERTY 1:
[1659]| THE WHITE Hous.
[1661](rhe,
[1663]a | _ greeer ree gy So
[1665]NW 50955 Docld: 32423488 Page: 26
[1667]ae wo
[1669]© be i bee tan i
[1671]a - oo 12 January 1961
[1673]- -¥EMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
[1674]SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meet
[1676]PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant,
[1678]V f i . ;
[1679]\ . 3. Delegation from the Cuban Democratic Revolutionary Front
[1681]Mr. Dulles reported the information received from General .
[1683]ing, 12 January 1961 4 |
[1684]/ _
[1686]Gray, irwin, Dulles. a
[1688]a
[1690]Goodpaster to the effect that ala i
[1691]rge delegation from the bove- i
[1692]group reportedly, will visit Washington on Saturday , overmentons
[1694]W V5, Contingenc
[1696]. Mr. Willauer outlined 4 proposal to es .
[1697]of State, CIA, Defense and the Joint Staff
[1699]consisting of representatives
[1701]to draw up contingency plans covering the p
[1703]overt U.5. forces.
[1705]All members agreed
[1706]Mr. Gray asked that a preliminary report
[1707]for the meeting of January 19th.
[1711]‘ / 7, Capture of Supplics in Cuba_ .
[1712]Yn answer to a question, Mr. Barn
[1714]tablish a task force
[1716]ossible eventual use of
[1718]that such planning is an essential step.
[1720]of the task force be availabic
[1722]4
[1724]ORE
[1726]es gave details of the Cuban
[1727]e cache.
[1729]wo airdrops plus on
[1731]government's capture of materiel from t
[1732]PROPERTY Sy! d THIS DoT
[1733]te WHITE nit) Ce A SOUR. -
[1734]_ . yn cs hu
[1735]soos oe net PED { a I : PLTEN bes
[1737]50955 Docld:32423488 Page 29
[1739]d
[1741]- f9, Dominican Republie
[1743]Mr. Merchant explained the feeling of the Department of State
[1744]that limited supplies of small arms and other materiel should be made
[1745]available for dissidents inside the Dominican Republic. Mr. Parrott oe
[1746]. Said that we believe this can be managed securely by CIA, and that
[1747]the plan would call for final transportation into the country being .
[1748]provided by the dissidents themselves. The Group approved the project.
[1750]Vil, U-2 Flights - Vietmam
[1751]ee ne .
[1753]Mr. Dulles and Mr. Parrott outlined generally the results of the
[1755]three successful U-2 flights over Vietnam, noting that Hanoi had not
[1757]been.covered because of clouds, and that it is planned to fly a mission
[1759]to cover that area as soon as the weather permits, :
[1760]The Group agreed that no such flight should take place after |
[1762]January 20th. They also requested a brief memo summarizing results,
[1764]for the meeting of the 19th, . ;
[1766]| _ eranry ¢VvTe eM
[1767]oe i ate - Pe Lh
[1768]oO PRUPERRY 0
[1770]| THE WHITE HOUSE uric ;
[1772]HW 40955 Dorld:32493488 Page 30 —
[1774]. 4 Cad lee ee C)
[1776]3 November 1960 a 4
[1777]MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
[1778]SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 3 November 1960
[1780]PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Douglas, Gray, Gen, Cabell,
[1781]Gen. Lansdale
[1785]1. . Cuba
[1787]“
[1789]Mr. Gray inquired once more as to the status of planning for
[1790]problems which would arise post-Castro. Mr. Merchant saidhe ~-
[1791]would check into the progress of the Strate Department group which.
[1792]has been charged with developing recommendations on this matter.
[1794]From this the Group launched into a far-ranging discussion of
[1795]the entire concept of U.S. efforts against Castro. Mr. Douglas, ' '
[1796]supported by Mr. Gray and Mr. Merchant, expounded the idea that ,
[1797]perhaps things have now progressed toa point where covert activities
[1798]of the type originally envisaged for CLA to undertake will not be effective.
[1799]Mr. Douglas referred to the extensive program of the militia, Mr. Gray i
[1800]cited the matter of arms from the Soviet bloc, and Mr. Merchant dwelt :
[1801]on the increasing effectiveness of Castro's measures to control the
[1802]population in ways which the Communists have developed so weil. The mm
[1803]latter said that he and others in the State Department had originally
[1804]thought that a popular rebellion would develop within Cuba and that
[1805]this could be augmented by the comparatively small-scale efforts of
[1806]exiles under CIA control. Now the same people are beginning to feel
[1807]more and more that despite the numerous defections and the economic
[1808]deprivations being experienced by tne middle and upper classes, time
[1809]is actually working on Castro's side. Mr. Merchant said that he
[1810]foresaw that there would occur & point in time beyond which covert
[1812]oe
[1815]intervention would not do the job. ; ; fot Tas
[1817]Mr. Gray expressed the opinion that we will never be able to
[1818]“clean up'! the situation without the use of overt U.S. military force.
[1819]He suggested the possibility of using the CIA-pbacked exiles to mount a
[1820]- gimulated attack on Guantanamo in order to offer an excuse for overt
[1822]PROPERTY [* GENT
[1824]: re A)
[1825]CHE WHITE HOUSE S.0b ehh :
[1827]aa es rn a
[1828]rer, hae d wae
[1832]ow
[1833]1
[1834]af
[1835]Cy
[1836]'
[1839]a
[1841]wt de
[1843]cee te cee a ’
[1844]HW 50955 Docld:32493488 Page 31.. a ; a ~ : _
[1846]LS ew ee dO bee De LA ed ee
[1848]. intervention. This led to an involved discussion, the general conclusion
[1849]of which was that such action on our part would not be desirable, but
[1850]that should Castro be foolish enough actually to attack Guantanamo
[1851]_ this would almost certainly mean war. Mr. Gray’ said that he had had
[1852]‘the subject of Cuba inscribed on the NSC agenda for next Monday in
[1853]_ erder to be able to arrive ata top-level decision on this very point. a
[1854]- He thought it essential that the policy of the U.S. should be completely. —.
[1855]understood by responsible officials, so that any overt Cuban act would ,
[1856]be met with a previously-agreed-on response.
[1858]Mr. Merchant stated thar, apart from any attack on Guantanamo,
[1860]he thought that some of the previous argumentation in today's meeting
[1862]_was faulty, in that we could not have it both ways. By this he meant ~ ae
[1863]‘that it is not logical to conclude that an indigenous uprising is impossible
[1864]and yet that it is feasible for the U.S. to go in overtly and "clean up
[1866]' the mess.'' He pointed out that if Castro's support were such that an
[1867]uprising was out of the question then an open invasion by the U.S. would
[1868]be met by a hostile population and we would be plunged into a situation
[1869]like Algeria.’
[1871]‘Turning to the immediate problem before the Group, Gen. Cabell
[1872]outlined the general proposal to establish bases in the U.S., with the
[1873]reasons for coming to this conclusion. He cited specifically the
[1874]possibility of U.N. investigation in Guatemala and the increased scope
[1875]of the program, which has been brought about by the increased strength
[1876]of the Castro regime. All members of the Group expressed serious
[1877]doubts as to whether such activity could be kept atall secure. Mr.
[1879]- Merchant said at one point, that although this does not represent a
[1880]final conclusion on his part, he ‘is inclined to think that the proposal
[1881]embodies the worst aspect of both worlds; thatis, the choice should : oan
[1882]rest between continuing our operations entirely on foreign soil or
[1883]preparing to make the best possible case for overt intervention.
[1885]Mr. Gray suggested that the decision could be put up to his ©
[1886]associates at the same time Tibet is discussed. Mr. Merchant agreed
[1887]that this.is where it should end up, but asserted that he is not prepared
[1888]to move in that direction until a survey has been made of the possibilities
[1889]of keeping operations.in the U.S. unrevealed.
[1891]In this: connection Gen. Cabell mentioned the possibility of using
[1892]a refugee organization - either an existing one or a’contrived one - to
[1893]backstop the operations. ,
[1895]pal cl ote. —
[1897]ecenty To My PROPERT’ w"
[1898]ree, Ee Se Rt
[1899]wot at ae ee anor er
[1901]THE WHITE HOJS. o.)..
[1903]HW 50955 Docld:32423488 Page 32_ ns
[1905]me wet a me et fa os
[1907]Mr. Douglas said that in any case he would be prepared to have. i
[1908]the Department of Defense investigate the availability of specific &
[1909]locations that would be suitable. {
[1911], :
[1912]i
[1913]f
[1915]Finally, Mr. Merchant asked whether any real planning has been LS
[1916]done for taking direct positive action against Fidel, Raul and Che Guevara. | Og
[1917]“Be said that without these three the Cuban Government would be . ; Jy
[1918]leaderless and probably brainless. He conceded thatit would be — 7 fo
[1919]" necessary to act against all three simultaneously. Gen. Cabell pointed 4
[1920]out that action of this kind is uncertain of results and highly dangerous” ;
[1921]in conception and execution, because the instruments must be Cubans. .
[1922]He felt that, particularly because of the necessity of simultaneous i
[1923]action, it would have to be concluded that Mr. Merchant's suggestion _
[1925]fe
[1927]ig hevand aur canahilitier.
[1929]sy PUTS Ey pRorerry te
[1930]Spr c) Give tHe white xoust Go: ot
[1932]HW 50955 DoeId:32423488 Page 33°
[1934]HW 50955 Docld: 32423483 ._Page 34°:
[1936]. 4, Supply Drops - Cuba
[1938]Gen. Cabell explained that the Pinar'de Rio supply mission had
[1939]not taken place because of the absence of specified communication
[1940]from the DZ, and the Escambray operation had been canceled because
[1941]of weather. He said that these missions are still planned, and assumed See
[1942]_that the Group had no objections. The members so signified.
[1944]“5, U-2, Cuba
[1946]Gen. Cabell said that the photographic coverage on the first
[1947]flight had been only about 50%, because of cloud cover. He continued
[1948]that we are analyzing the exact results ona priority basis and that
[1949]some time after the middle of next week we should be in a position to
[1950]make recommendations for the missions required to extend the coverage.
[1952]Mr. Gray commented somewhat wryly that this was all right with .
[1953]him since he "would certainly not be available to discuss anything of
[1954]. this kind before the middle of next week." The other members appeared
[1955]to have the same reaction.
[1957]6, Policy Consideration Re Cuban Exiles:
[1959]Mr. Gray said that Assistant Attorney General Yeagley had spoken
[1960]to him after his meeting with Col. King and Messrs. Esterline and
[1961]Holman. He had said that the information given to him by the CIA ©
[1962]representatives, and the arrangements for future coordination if —
[1963]necessary, were entirely satisfactory to him. He had stated, however,
[1964]‘that a problem remains with respect to action the FBI should take;
[1965]that is, the FBl needs guidance in its handling of Cuban exile groups
[1966]other than those under the direction of CLA, © ,
[1968]The Group agreed that the best-way to attack this problem would
[1969]be to have Mr. Yeagley attend next week's Special Group meeting and
[1970]discuss the matter at first hand. Mr. Parrott was asked to make
[1971]arrangements for this. t
[1973]J 7. Value of Cuba to the USSR as a Base Vis-a-vis|
[1974]Cape Canaveral
[1976]Mr. Parrott gave Mr. Merchant the gist of the OSI memorandum
[1978]Teen
[1980]an rene rn ;
[1982]ae [ oes mR PSY
[1983]ie = Y : . f oe "
[1984]P, cs eee th a L. eee 4
[1986]) bad TH be iva
[1988]on this subject, which had been discussed with the rest of the Group
[1990]on 20 October 1960. “on
[1992]. THOMAS A. PARROTT
[1994]wn .
[1996]Coed LEE es | -
[1997]Silas’ 7 Ei Uiiad -
[1998]— .
[2002]HW 50955 Docld:32423488 Page 35.
[2004]SECRET
[2005]EVES Gl
[2007]MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
[2009]SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeti
[2011]12 August 1960-
[2013]ng - 11 August 1960
[2015]PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Gray, Dulles, and Bissell
[2017]a aes eT OUTS _)
[2018], (te: et, tot i ‘ wy
[2019]. a Sr a .
[2020]™ ; Ci lated ins a) Vode
[2021]: “2, Budget for Cuban Operations: Mr, Bissell summarized the
[2023]budget which had been prepared as a basis
[2025]for seeking a release from the
[2027]Reserve to finance Cuban operations for the balance of the fiscal year,
[2028]The budget for the year totals approximately thirteen and a quarter million
[2030]dollars, not including provision for the rep
[2032]lacement of material with an-
[2034]estimated value of 1,6 million dollars to be withdrawn from Agency
[2035]inventory. Since 2.5 million dollars of budgeted and Reserve funds have
[2036]been made available for this program by an earlier action, the balance
[2037]required is about ten and three-quarters million dollars. Mr, Dulles
[2038]stated that a release of ten million would be requested at this time since
[2039]there is inevitably a wide margin of uncertainty as to what the actual costs
[2041]-will turn out to be, Mr. Bissell stated the
[2042]sub-headings ag follows: ;
[2044]amounts required by major
[2046]Political Action POE § 960, 000,00
[2048]Paramilitary 8,055, 753.00
[2049]Intelligence Collection 833,200.00
[2050]Counter Intelligence 325, 400,00
[2051]Communications Support 229, 420,00
[2052]Support = 731,718.00
[2053]$ 13,287,611.00 Total
[2054]pyuper ie S ma o
[2055]THE WHITE ROUSE OFFICE EVES GY Y
[2057]SS CSERRET
[2059]HY 50955 Docld:32423488 Page 36
[2062]_ It was agreed that the operations in question must go forward and that .
[2063]the amount did not seem unreasonable for activities of this scope and , ,
[2064]° scale but it was understood that Messrs. Merchant and Gray could not
[2065]state that they had reviewed in any detail the mammer m which the
[2066]estimates had been arrived at. Following further discussion, it was
[2067]agreed that this matter should be laid before the appropriate higher
[2068]authorities and a presentation would be arranged hopefully within the
[2069]next ten days, This was believed to be wise, not because any actions
[2070]involving major political risks were to be taken in the near future, but
[2071]because the Agency would goon become committed to various substantial
[2072]expenditures which should not be undertaken without reasonable assurance
[2074]that the operation was to go forward. wv.
[2076]“Wits 4, Vane
[2078]RICHARD M, BISSELL, JR. [
[2079]' Deputy Director
[2080]— : , (Plans)
[2084]vES . PROP: : ,
[2085]q sah THE WHITE HOUSE Urres.
[2087]HW 50955 Docld: 32423488 Page 37
[2090]25 August 1960
[2092]. - tet
[2094]MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
[2095]SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 25 August 1960
[2097]PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Gray, Irwin, Dulles
[2099]“1, Congo
[2101]Mr. Parrott outlined broadly. three (or as Mr. Dulles later
[2102]described them ''2 1/2") operational lines that we are following in ©
[2103]mounting an anti- Lumumba campaign in the Congo. These included:
[2104]operations through the chief advisor of the Christian Trade Unions;
[2105]the planned attempt of a Socialist labor Senator to arrange a vote of —
[2106]no confidence in Lumumba; and a brand new contact with an alieged
[2107]leader of certain independent labor groups. He emphasized that the
[2108]latter had just Come up and that we are now in the process of assessing
[2109].the bona fides and capabilities: of the individual. . vos
[2111]The Group agreed that the action contemplated is very much
[2112]in order. Mr. Gray commented, however, that his associates had
[2113]expressed extremely strong feelings on the necessity for very
[2114]straightforward action in this situation, and he wondered whether
[2115]the plans as outlined were sufficient to accomplish this. Mr. Dulles
[2116]replied that he had taken the comments referred to seriously and had
[2117]every intention of proceeding as vigorously as the situation permits
[2118]or requires, but added that he must necessarily put himself ina
[2119]position of interpreting instructions of this kind within the bounds of
[2120]necessity and capability. It was finally agreed that, planning for the
[2121]Congo would not necessarily rule out ''consideration" of any particular
[2123]kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid of Lumumba.
[2125]Mr. Irwin commented that certain individuals in Defense have
[2126]given thought to the possibility of using high officials of the Catholic
[2127]Church in Africa to promote the general objectives of the West. In
[2128]this connection, he cited a preliminary assessment which had been
[2130]made of the Negro Cardinal recently appointed by the Pope - the , cma
[2131]assessment being that the individual in question is a man of not aeajr te
[2132]PROPERTY SF SEG Aon fas
[2133]THE WHITE HUUSE OF esGe In C8 Nope Lt VAS
[2134]SiR CYPHER PAY PAPER 19. ee
[2137]. cn wanes af eee OEOT, BOER. &
[2138]HW 50955- Doctld: 32425486 | “Page. Se : : ,
[2140]Rel tee Sar cas hi SN zelei ure dla
[2142]outstanding intelligence, ability or drive, put that he is obviously
[2143]-well motivated. Mr. Irwin asked whether there might be other
[2144]jndividuals of similar, although naturally lesser, stature in the church
[2146]hierarchy who could be useful.
[2148]Mr. Merchant commented that the Catholic Church in Black
[2149]Africa is not a very substantial force. Mr. Dulles concurred in this,
[2150]- put added that this would be something to keep in mind as appropriate.
[2154]PRUP La pov
[2156]THE WHITE #01
[2158]wer cE
[2159]. me AS
[2160]_ :
[2162]HW 50955 Docld:32423488 Page 39°
[2164]NN V4, Cuba
[2166]_ ‘The DCI summarized the progress we have made in establishing
[2167]contact with certain dissident groups within Cuba. In this connection ;
[2168]he also noted the apparent fulfillment of a sabotage requirement which mil
[2169]had been levied on one of these groups as a test of its capabilities ;
[2170](after this action had been cleared with the Special Group).
[2172]2. He also said that we hope to have a paramilitary force of
[2173]approximately 500 people ready to operate by November. In answer
[2174]to Mr. Irwin's question, he outlined two possible ways of initiating —
[2175]the tactical combat phase.
[2177]* Mr. Gray then told the Group of a talk he had had with the
[2178]Director of the Bureau of the Budget. The latter had told Mr. Gray
[2179]that he had discussed the Cuban project with Mr. Macy and that as
[2180]a result of this discussion he, Mr. Stans, had two reservations that -
[2181]he would like Gray to look into. ~ oy
[2183]:! One of these had to.do with the statement by Macy that in his
[2184]discussion with CLA representatives in connection with the latest
[2185]withdrawal from the Reserve, he had received "no evidence!" that any
[2187]effective resistance had been identified within Cuba. (Mr. Gray had
[2188]answered that in the formal presentation last week, Mr. Dulles and
[2189]Mr. Bissell had mentioned a number of such groups. ) ,
[2191]. The second point had to do with a feeling that we might not
[2193]PROPERTY OF
[2194]ane) THE WHITE HOUSE OF Fick
[2196]HY 50955 -Docld:32423498 Page 40
[2198]wud “Lib wish
[2200]know enough about the political attitudes of the members of the Frente,
[2202]particularly as to basic freedoms, their attitude toward restoration
[2204]of seized American property, etc. (In answer to this, Mr. Gray had
[2206]pointed out that the Frente is composed of people who have broken
[2207]_with Castro, at least on the basic philosophies. )
[2209]_ In an attempt to clarify the situation with respect to the first
[2210]‘ point, Mr. Parrott told the Group about last Monday's meeting with
[2211]Mr. Macy, at which Mr. Barnes had covered in considerable detail
[2212]all aspects of the Cuban project. He said that he was ata loss to
[2213]understand how Macy could have received the impression that CIA
[2214]is not aware of dissident groups. He went on to say that in answer
[2215]to Mr. Macy's question as to the outlook, Mr. Barnes had stated -
[2216]and had developed at considerable.length - the thesis that our view
[2217]was one of limited optimism, and that he had explained in detail just
[2218]why this is so; this explanation had included specific comments on the
[2219]steps that have been, and are being, taken to identify such groups and
[2220]to assess their apparent leaders. Mr. Parrott said further that the
[2221]point had been made forcibly to Macy that it would be out of the question V
[2222]‘for CIA to attempt to mount an invasion of Cuba by itself, . without the
[2223]participation of large numbers of disaffected individuals within the
[2224]country. ©
[2226]On the second point, Mr. Dulles said that we do know a good
[2227]deal about the basic political sympathies of Frente members, and
[2228]cited as an example the position that had been taken as to the inclusion
[2229]of certain ultra-conservative groups. He said that the Frente had
[2230]issued a statement of its aims, which he summarized very broadly .
[2231]as being to preserve the principles of the revolution. He said that as —_—-
[2232]to specific stands on restoration of U.S. property rights, etc., this
[2233]was thought to be unwise because it would give the Frente the appearance
[2234]of being a tool of the Americans. He agreed, however, that Mr. Stans!
[2235]point was a valid one to bear in mind and said we would certainly do
[2236]so. He added that he expects to lunch with Mr. Stans in the near future
[2238]‘ and would take that opportunity to discuss these matters further, as
[2239]appropriate. : ,
[2241]Mr. Parrott said that there was no disagreement that the. political
[2242]ideas of-these individuals must be constantly assessed and must be
[2243]clearly established before the operation actually comes off. He
[2244]added, however, that it should be borne in mind that once these
[2245]politically-screened individuals had issued their general statement
[2246]of objectives, our primary operational task has been to hold the FRD
[2247]together, and that at this particular stage it would not be practical
[2249]Oe as PROPERTY OF
[2251]HW 50955 DocTd:32423488° Page 41.0 0°
[2253]Re ae eer Plays ;
[2254]ee ame a em be Ete nog ae |
[2256]oe Ee eel dian
[2258]to insist on a more precise spelling out of individual or group
[2259]views. :
[2261]Mr. Parrott also said that Mr. Macy had raised a related
[2262]point which Mr. Barnes and he had agreed had validity, and that
[2263]Mr. Barnes had undertaken to assure Macy that it would be given oe
[2264]adequate attention by the interagency planning group. This was a
[2265]concern expressed as to planning for the support - fiscal and otherwise -
[2266]of a new Cuban government immediately after a successful overturn
[2268]of the present one. Mr. Merchant said that he agreed fully with the
[2269]necessity for making contingency plans of this sort, and had in fact
[2270]directed three weeks ago that State officials begin to draw them up. Ze.
[2272]c ‘ Porth
[2274]THOMAS A. PARROTT |
[2278]te hy
[2279]Rarteueren
[2280]Pi
[2282]THE aa PE Gla.
[2284]ro are ve fomtt if
[2285]Sl bet sal te exe
[2287]WW 50955 .DecId: 32423488 Page 42
[2289]While agreeing that the Government could not take an official ;
[2291]stand, Mr. Merchant. expressed his personal opinion that if the f
[2292]companies should suspend operations, this would give the Soviets a
[2293]great opportunity, given the fact that the Cuban economy is so dependent
[2294]on oil. He pointed out that no alternative leader to Castro has yet
[2295]emerged, and that the United States would be held liable for any
[2297]- economic crisis that might be precipitated in this WAYe.
[2299]Mr. Gray related the consideration of this sort of action to the |
[2300]sugar project discussed three weeks ago by the Group. He emphasized ;
[2301]that in his opinion these are isolated actions and that any moves of _—
[2302]this kind should be made only after an over-all consideration of .
[2303]whether and how the United States wishes to move against Castro, |
[2304]Mr. Irwin took some exception to this, indicating that he thought it
[2305]wa's possible and perhaps desirable to take such actions as those
[2306]contemplated in the sugar proposal, apart from any. concerted acrass-~
[2307]the-board program. Mr. Dulles emphasized that in any case we will
[2308]have to decide before long whether covert action should be taken in
[2309]Cuba. Sea
[2311]- It was then agreed that a special meeting of the Group should be
[2312]held on Monday, March 14th,’ to consider what might and should be
[2313]done in Cuba. It was agreed that in addition to the regular members, .
[2314]Mr. Rubottom, Admiral Burke, Mr. Bissell, Mr. King and perhaps
[2315]Colonel Lansdale should attend. , oo
[2319]There was then a brief discussion of Admiral Burke's letter to
[2320]Mr. Merchant, It developed that the attachment to’this letter has now
[2321]been given the status of a JCS document but that it hassnot been forwarded ..
[2322]to the NSC as the JCS had desired. (Mr. Irwin said that he had held
[2323]up this action because of the informal nature of the letter.) Mr. Merchant
[2324]said the Department is preparing comments and that he hoped the JCS
[2325]paper would not be considered apart from State's comments.
[2327]Mr. Dulles said that we would require a policy decision on
[2328]whether a black radio could be established on U.S. territory, probably
[2329]in the Florida Keys. It was agreed that this proposal should be staffed
[2330]through the Scott office.
[2332]proper’ y
[2334]FAPTT “era Ney THE WHITE HOLS.
[2335]SEErE -Eine USLT
[2337]. . Vole
[2339]HY 50955 Docld:32423485 Page 435
[2341]7 April 1960
[2343]MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
[2344]SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting,_ 7 April 1960
[2346]PRESENT: Mr. Merchant, Mr. Douglas, Mr. Gray, Gen. Cabell
[2348]x%
[2350]4, Dominican Republic
[2351]’ Mr. Gray asked the Acting DCI whether he had anything to add
[2352]on the situation in the Dominican Republic to what had been covered
[2353]by himself and the Secretary of State that morning at the NSC meeting.
[2354]General Cabell replied that he would only like to add the comment
[2355]that it appears evident that Trujillo will not consider making any
[2356]arrangements for an orderly succession to bimself, but that he will
[2357]either hang on to the bitter end or flee the country on short notice,
[2359]& la Batista.
[2361]. Mr. Gray asked the Group's views on what happens after Trujillo,
[2362]specifically how Castro can be kept out of the Dominican Republic.
[2363]General Cabell commented that so far no worthwhile opposition to the
[2364]Benefactor has been identified, and that in his opinion it might well
[2365]become necessary to dispatch U.S. forces, openly identified as such,
[2366]to the country in the immediate aftermath ‘of the demise or flight of
[2367]Trujillo. Mr. Merchant said that his preliminary thoughts were that
[2368]there would probably be a good chance to get OAS support for a move
[2369]of this kind to forestall Castro; on the other hand, we might expect
[2370]some internal revulsion at the arrival of U.S. forces because of the
[2371]“memory of the Marine occupation.
[2373]Mr. Merchant added that Mr. Rubottom was thinking seriously.
[2374]of a plan to seal off the land approaches to the Dominican Republic
[2375]‘via Haiti, thereby requiring any sizeable Castro. effort to be an
[2376]amphibious one. He said that this plan has not yet been formally _
[2378]poe
[2380]at 7 4. Guba
[2381]Mr. Gray expressed satisfaction with the organizational
[2383]arrangements for interagency groups considering the continuing
[2385]- development of the Cuban situation. In this connection he expressed
[2386]some concern that USIA and CIA might be working on parallel or
[2387]conflicting lines with respect to radio. General Cabell assured him
[2388]that the top people in USLA are aware of CIA plans and there should.
[2389]be no crossing of wires. 7
[2391]wp ca peg pew ; , wire HOUSE UE
[2392] REPRET EYES OMY oe
[2394]HW50955 Docld:32493488 Page 44
[2396]a
[2399]weep tee ete
[2403]28 April 1960 . ;
[2405]MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD a —
[2406]SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 2& Aprik 1960 : —
[2408]"PRESENT: Messrs. Hare, Gray, Dulles
[2410]Mr. Joseph Scott of the Department of State sat in as an
[2411]obseryer. - :
[2413]\ . / 8. Cuba
[2415]Mr. Gray said that he had discussed with his associates the
[2416]organizational entities within the U.S. Government which have been
[2417]7 established to ‘deal with the Cuban ‘situation. He noted thata number
[2419]of different groups and committees, with varying interests and
[2420]objectives, are concerning themseives with this situation and that
[2421]there seemed to him to be no "chief of staff'' to whorn all could look
[2422]as a central point,
[2424]He said that the opinion had been expressed to him that Mr.
[2425]Dillon should assume this function, but that in Dillon's absence, ae
[2426]Mr. Hare should take on the responsibility and should inform himself —_——.
[2427]of the general outlines. of what has been going on in the Government. .
[2428]Mr. Gray said that it had been felt essential to have such an official
[2429]available over the coming weekend, because of the expected May Day
[2430]troubles, and that since this official should be of such a stature as
[2431]to permit access to the highest levels, Mr. Hare had been ‘decided
[2432]upon, pending Mr. Dillon's availability. . -
[2434]In this connection it was agreed that Mr. Dillon should be brought
[2435]up to date at an appropriate time on the status of covert operations
[2436]with respect to Cuba. ; ~ .
[2438]Inter alia, Mr. Gray expressed concern and some surprise at
[2439]staternents and actions by UAR officials with regard to Cuba.. Mr.
[2440]Hare explained at some length his conviction that Deputy Foreign
[2441]Minister Sabri (older brother of Ali Sabri) is largely responsible for semen
[2442]this kind of thing, and that it does not represent the feelings of
[2443]- Nasser or Ali Sabri. He traced the brother's background and describe
[2445]him as a "twisted personality. " PROPESTY :
[2446]i . THE WHITE
[2448]Ca
[2450]queen Cee a AA
[2452]BW 50955 Docld: 32423488 Page “45
[2456]ae poe
[2457]pee ad eh ott ib
[2459]19 November 1960
[2461]MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
[2463]SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 19 November 1960
[2465]PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant and Mann; Douglas and Gen. Lansdale;
[2466]Gray; Dulles and Bissell
[2468]/ 2. Cuba
[2470]; Mr. Merchant began by stating that in his opinion we are putting
[2471]more. burden on the Guatemalan government with our training base than
[2473]‘that government can support for very long. He noted that Mr. Mann
[2475]believes the solution is to move our training activities to the U.S.,;
[2476]but Mr. Merchant does not think we can get away with this, particularly
[2478]if an increase in numbers is contemplated: Therefore, the only solution,
[2480]would seem to be to move to another base or bases in other countries;
[2481]this would involve the same burden on the other countries as now exists
[2483]_ with respect to Guatemala. Although he has not discussed this point
[2485]with Secretary Herter, Mr. Merchant believes that it is time to take
[2487]another look at Cuba andif the U.S. attitude toward Castro remains’
[2489]PROPERTY
[2490]He WHITE HOU
[2492]unchanged then we should consider shifting our entire posture. This
[2493]would involve a break in diplomatic relations, the support of a govern--
[2494]ment in exile, and other activities mostly overt, including some
[2495]training in the U.S.
[2497]y at
[2499]ree Posy esp eye
[2500]Cr oa a EY
[2502]HW 50955 -Docld: 32423486 Page 46
[2505]. pow 4
[2506]cites! i a, rc
[2507]Cabde el ule cr a ee ree :
[2509]Mr. Mann commented that he thinks we cannot maintain training
[2510]anywhere in Latin America indefinitely, although he does think we
[2511]could maintain small airstrips without too much danger. He said that
[2512]he believes everyone in Guatemala knows by now the true nature of
[2513]our activities there, and that if they are going to be publicized before
[2514]the world he would rather have them exposed in the U.S. rather than
[2515]in Latin America. He recognized that this would be highly embar-
[2516]rassing for this country, but that for most Latin American governments
[2517]it could be fatal. He spoke of the impending OAS investigation of
[2518]Guatemala, and conceded that OAS support would be required to carry
[2519]out training successfully in the U.S. To this, Mr. Merchant replied
[2520]that he did not think exposure of such activities on American soil would .
[2521]be acceptable, particularly in the U.N,
[2523]Mr. Bissell then said that he has agreed for some time with
[2524]Mr. Mann's point as to the strain on Guatemala. He said that we have
[2525]developed an evacuation plan to be used in the event of outside investi-
[2526]gation, but that this is not a satisfactory answer to the problem. He ~
[2527]said that within about four weeks an alternate site could be established
[2528]in Nicaragua but that this would be very expensive, would tie us into
[2529]the Somoza brothers, and would call attention to Nicaragua in the same
[2530]way as Guatemala.
[2532]Mr. Bissell said that he foresaw several possibilities for
[2533]constructive change in the training operation, some for the immediate
[2534]future and some over a period of longer range. They include:
[2536]a. A sort of refugee camp in the U.S. ostensibly
[2537]designed for temporary care of Cuban exiles. This story
[2538]could be defended but it is difficult to say for how long
[2539]or how. effectively. -
[2541]b, A guarded military facility in the U.S. This !
[2542]could be handled more securely, but the existence of
[2543]an area where peculiar things are going on could not
[2544]be kept secret indefinitely. An alternative would be
[2545]private property such as the King Ranch, but this would
[2546]take longer to arrange than a.military base,
[2548]‘c. Vieques Island, off Puerto Rico. This is fairly
[2549]remote, but the government of Puerto Rico is already
[2551]trying to get the U.S. Marines out.
[2554]PROPERTY OF
[2555]CRARET i ny Ay THE WHITE HOUSE OFFIC:
[2556]4 * ‘4 er i a ° aM ; !
[2559]Where fo Ea
[2560]his "lle Gala
[2562]HW 50955 Docld:324293488 Page 47
[2564]d. The CIA site on Saipan. This would be very secure
[2565]but would require a large amount of airlift. ,
[2567]e. Fort Randolph, in the Panama Canal Zone. At this
[2568]location the trainees could be kept secure but would almost
[2569]certainly know where they were. .
[2571]Mr. Douglas said that a military base could be made available,
[2572]such as Laughlin Air Force Base near Del Rio, Texas. He said that
[2573]the use of such real estate might be tied into some sort of cooperation
[2574]with Tracy Voorhees' Committee on Cuban Refugees. He felt also
[2575]that the U.S. capability for intervention in Cuba will probably not be
[2576]effective enough unless there is more overt participation than has _
[2577]been contemplated to date. Gen, Lansdale said that he and Gen. Bonesteel
[2578]were of the same opinion.
[2580]Mr. Gray supported this general position, stating that when the
[2581]current Cuban plan was approved, the situation in that country was
[2582]different than itis now. Since then, the Cubans have received sizeable
[2583]amounts of bloc arms and have organized a militia, and Mr. Gray
[2584]wondered how effective a few hundred exiles could be.. Mr. Dulles posemoee
[2585]acknowledged that it would be necessary to have internal support if le
[2586]the Castro government were to be successfully overthrown; he felt -_
[2587]that there is reason to believe such support might develop, perhaps
[2588]within the militia itself.
[2590]Mr. Mann expressed the opinion that the way to proceed is to
[2591]seal Cuba off from the rest of Latin America and to settle down for a
[2592]one or two year wait, presumably to see whether the tide might not turn
[2593]in our favor. He said that in the meantime we could infiltrate small
[2594]_ groups of trained Cubans as a token, but that we should postpone a
[2595]decision on a striking force for four or five months. In this general
[2596]connection, Mr. Bissell said that even if itis finally decided that overt
[2597]U.S. forces should be used, there still should be a nucleus of trained
[2598]Cubans available. Therefore, our present activities should be continued
[2599]in any case. :
[2601]Summing up, the Group decided that the possibility of splitting
[2602]the present body of trainees into three or four groups should be examined
[2603]urgently (particularly in view of Mr. Mann's estimate that the OAS
[2604]investigation might take place in two or three weeks). Alternate sites
[2605]to be examined would include Vieques, Laughlin AFB and Fort Randolph,
[2607]PROPERTY Af
[2608]THE WHITE HOUsE
[2610]HW 50955 Docld:32423488 Page 46
[2612]HW 450955.
[2616]eT
[2617]ane a
[2618]4 . No ys
[2620]foe yo
[2621]Qe cata vee Ft
[2623]The latter location should absorb no more than 200. Mr. Douglas
[2625]cautioned that the use of DOD facilities should at the present time
[2627]be considered as a holding operation rather than a continuation or
[2629]stepping up of present training. The possibilities of establishing a
[2630]kind of CCC under the Voorhees auspices should be examined,
[2632]v3, Advice to Assistant Attorney General
[2634]Mr. Parrott tabled the draft of suggested zavice ta Mr. Yeagley
[2635]in connection with Cuban exiles. Mr. Douglas felt that it was not
[2636]desirable to give Mr. Yeagley any piece of paper. He suggested that |
[2637]Yeagley should simply be advised that the Group feels the best method
[2638]of procedure might be to prosecute one test case, e.g. Masferrer,
[2639]but not to institute wholesale prosecutions. In answer toa question,
[2640]Mr. Parrott stated that he did not know whether this procedure would
[2641]satisfy Mr. Yeagley, but that-he would discuss it with Mr. Gray, who.
[2643]. had by that time left the meeting. (Later, Mr. Gray talked to Yeagley,
[2645]urba anneared ratisfied with the aral ouidance. \
[2647]Y 5, U-2 for Cuba
[2649]Mr. Bissell summarized the results of the first U-2 flight over
[2650]Cuba and asked for the Group's permission for two additional sorties
[2651]to fill in the remaining 50% coverage. The Group agreed, subject to
[2652]Mr. Gray's concurrence. (This was obtained later.) -
[2654]arp. TT ayy ) PROPERTY o¢
[2655]: . ~~ THE WHITE HOUSE oFeics
[2657]Docld:327423488° Page 49
[2659]23 November 1960
[2661], PRUPERT) OF
[2662]MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE
[2663]SUBJECT: Minutes of Special.Group Meeting, 23, Now - 1960
[2665]PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Gray, Gen. Lansdale, Dulles and
[2666]Bissell
[2667]“2, Cuba
[2669]Mr. Bissell reported that further consideration following the
[2671]’ meeting of last Saturday had led to a tentative conclusion that Saipan
[2673]would be the best place to which to move the bulk of the Cuban trainees.
[2674]He emphasized the security advantages of the location, and said that
[2676]itis believed the move can be accomplished with our own transportation
[2678]plus two roundtrips by C-124s, These we would request the Department
[2679]of Defense to provide. We would probably move some small
[2681]- commando-type units - about 50 men - to Fort Randolph. Mr. Bissell
[2683]also stressed the fact that additional construction costs would be
[2684]significantly less at Saipan than anywhere else,
[2685]aa ye
[2687]The DCI agreed in general with thig preliminay ‘thinkin He
[2688]urged, however, that the matter of morale of the trainees be borne
[2689]constantly in mind, and that the move not be accomplished all at once.
[2690]Gen. Lansdale agreed. Mr. Dulles also asked that President Ydigoras
[2691]be informed.
[2693]‘Mr. Bissell concluded that plans would not be firmed up until
[2695]receipt of Defense's report on facilities, available in the U.S.
[2697]_ Mr. Bissell then spoke of the report of a possible attempt by
[2698]Cuban dissidents to take over the Isle of Pines, He explained that we
[2699]have nothing to do with the plan and would in fact be unable to give much
[2701]‘support to it. He said that it is highly questionable whether this attempt
[2703]will take -piece.sm the reporied time schedule, or indeed at all, but
[2704]emphasized that this illustrates how initiative might be taken by others,
[2705]so that we could be presented with drastic requests for assistance on
[2706]very short notice. Mr. Bissell also mentioned the report of possible
[2707]major sabotage to be carried out in the very near future. In addition,
[2708]he said that we now have six B-26s, plus eleven crews, available for
[2709]combat,’ with other aircraft for supply. He noted that Nicaragua might
[2710]be used for refueling in the event of actual operations, but that the ;
[2711]immediate objective would be to obtain strips on the Isle of Pines.
[2713]Myr. Dulles remarked that this would of course require an active revolt.
[2715]Mr. Dulles also mentioned the proposal by Peter Grace to encourage
[2717]- Father Peyton (described as a sort of Catholic ‘Billy Graham) to carry
[2719]HY 409545
[2721]out activities in Cuba.
[2725]Doold:32423488 Page 50
[2727]fewer
[2729]30 November 1960
[2730]MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
[2731]SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 30 November 1960 ,
[2733]PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant and Mann; Douglas; Gray; i
[2734]Dulles and Bissell oo
[2736]/ | OG
[2737]2. Cuba . ey es
[2739]Mr. Gray solicited the Group's assistance in arriving ata
[2740]consensus of views as to what exactly had been decided as a result -
[2741]of the high-level meeting of the day before. The following points were
[2742]agreed: ,
[2744]7 “4 . ~
[2746]ut
[2748]he?
[2750]a, Mr. Gray's associates ‘stand ready to deny U.S.
[2751]activity based in Guatemala, even though it may become
[2752]blown (Mr. Douglas urged that every effort be made to”
[2753]make it possible to deny plausibly). ,
[2755]b. Ifthe program is enlarged, additional facilities
[2756]may be obtained, but at this stage not in the U.S. No
[2757]training of Cubans:will be conducted in the U.S. under
[2758]present circumstances. (Mr. Bissell told the Group of
[2759]the possibility of an additional finca in Guatemala. )
[2761]c. Evacuation plans should be kept in readiness,
[2762](Mr. Mann said that he thought he could arrange a week's
[2764]PROPERTY OF | . _ a ma
[2765]THE WHITE HULL nf vee Cr : os £ rane tal. L -_ : eae
[2766]. ° Se eo gg a 8 5] %, i a.
[2767]Pai wD lal / Pleo bY Be exer —
[2769]cee ce ee ve _ a
[2771]AW O50955 Boeld:32493498 Page 51
[2773]notice before any OAS committee actually visited
[2774]Guatemala and that it might be possible even then to
[2775]avoid actual investigation on the spot. Mr. Bissell
[2776] gaid that if we do have a week, evacuation could be
[2777]carried out by Agency aircraft; if more speed is
[2778]required DOD assistance might be necessary.
[2779]Mr. Douglas, with Mr. Dulles and Mr. Bissell
[2780]concurring, felt that the possibility of emergency
[2781]evacuation to Florida under the guise of ordinary
[2782]refugees should be kept in mind. } ,
[2784]Mr. Dulles suggested that questions on Cuba might be asked at
[2785]the next Presidential press conference and that we should be prepared
[2786]‘with a statement along the lines that we do not entirely discourage
[2787]revolutionary activity. Mr. Merchant said he would arrange to have
[2788]a draft prepared along these lines. In this connection, Mr. Parrott
[2789]reported the request from Assistant Attorney General Yeagley for
[2790]guidance as to possible action against an alleged collaborator of
[2791]General Pedraza. (Note: Mr. Yeagley was later told that we have no
[2792]operational interest and no objection to the Department of Justice's
[2793]pursuing the case. Mr. Yeagley said that they would proceed with
[2794]investigation, but that it is by no means certain the case will ever
[2796]come to trial. ). . ; pe ee,
[2797]Ces ae
[2799]a i!
[2801]Mr. Gray then outlined his understanding of his friends’ desires
[2802]with respect to organization of the anti-Castro effort. He said that the
[2803]principal need foreseen was for an individual to serve as a focal point
[2804]for diverse interests in this situation, and to be available to meet with
[2805]Mr. Gray's friends at any time. In addition, someone should be
[2806]available to deal with the FRD and to.talk to other Latin American
[2807]governments, ,
[2809]After a considerable amount of discussion, the consensus of the
[2810]Group was as follows: Probably two men will be required, one to handle
[2811]the overt and the other the covert aspects. They would work together
[2812]on a daily basis and both would have the entire picture in.mind, but
[2813]responsibility for the execution of covert operations would have to rest
[2814]with CIA. The overt man should ideally be a government official,
[2816]_ preferably someone senior in the Foreign Service or the Department
[2817]of State. There should be a sort of ''board of directors" to oversee
[2819]all aspects of the operation, This should be the Special Group plus
[2820]Secretary Anderson when matters of major policy are considered.
[2822](Mr. Gray was not entirely sure that his friends would accept the two-’
[2823]man concept but Mr. Dulles and Mr. Merchant emphasized that whether
[2825]2 .
[2827]| . PROPERTY f
[2828]RPA TP Omens ey THE WHITE. Hobo! Urie.
[2829]gu! jo a 7 UE :
[2830]SL ae wa et Nee ows
[2832]WW 50955 Docld:32423488 Page “52 ~
[2835]there were one man or two, CIA would have to maintain its own
[2836]organizational: integrity.)
[2838]There then ensued a lengthy examination of qualifications and
[2839]availability of a number of individuals. It was finally decided that, ___.
[2840]taking all things into consideration, including the aspect of quick ;
[2841]availability, Ambassador Willauer would probably be the best choice.
[2842]On the CIA side, Mr. Dulles nominated Mr. Barnes. It was recog-
[2843]nized that these nominees would have to be checked with Mr. Gray's
[2844]associates. ;
[2846]Mr. Mann suggested that Mr. Willauer might also do the FRD
[2847]job, but the DCI pointed out that this requires a covert approach and
[2848]must be done Py the Agency.
[2850]As to Mr. Pawley, it was decided that it would be unwise to have
[2851]him embark on a grand tour or to endow him with official government
[2852]status. Mr, Merchant said he would not object, however, to Mr. Pawley's
[2853]talking to President Frondizi.. n
[2855]Mr. Gray then mentioned the report which had reached his
[2856]friends about a representative of the FRD who had apparently just
[2857]-returned from’a trip around Latin America. It was noted that the
[2858]individual referred to was probably Sardinius, and Mr. Dulles said
[2859]he would obtain a written report of the trip, for passage to Mr. Gray's
[2860]associates.
[2862]Mr. Bissell reminded Mr. Douglas of the outstanding request
[2863]‘to the DOD for thirty- eight NCOs and officers for service outside the
[2864]U.S.
[2866]Yadbuatt
[2868]THOMAS A, PARROTT
[2874]Conetp oT ae Yoo PROPERTY 1)
[2875]t wo Bae THE WHITE HOUS2 Ui ou:
[2877]a
[2879]HW 50955 Docld:324293488 Page 53
[2881]ted tae Wy Adee ere oom
[2883]17 February 1960
[2885]MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
[2886]SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, LZ. February 1960
[2888]PRESENT: Messrs. Gray, Irwin, Dulles
[2890]. Mr. Joseph Scott of the State Department sat in as an observer.
[2891]\ /y, Cuba
[2893]The project providing for covert spotting and assessment of
[2894]potential agents for eventual sabotage of sugar mills was discussed
[2895]at some leagth. Within the limits outlined - that is, that no action
[2896]would be initiated under the terms of any approval reached at this
[2897]meeting, but rather that approval would cover only the identification
[2898]and evaluation of assets - the Group expressed general approval.
[2899]Mr. Dulles reiterated that he was not asking for approval actually
[2900]to proceed with operations. Mr. Irwin stated that he and Secretary
[2902]. Douglas were enthusiastic about the project. It was agreed that it
[2903]should be presented to the Secretary of State and that Mr. Gray would
[2904]discuss it further.
[2906]_ (Later Mr. Gray reported that he had discussed this matter
[2907]with his associate. The latter had made two points;
[2909]a. He doubted the efficacy of the proposed action, ~~ Lad
[2910]feeling that if it were successful in denying money to
[2911]the Castro regime which could otherwise be used for
[2912]subversive activities, the Cuban government could
[2913]obtain offsetting funds from other sources. .
[2915]b. He would not agree to identifying assets for this
[2916]particular sabotage operation, He would agree that the
[2917]Agency could proceed to spot and assess potential agents
[2918]for a variety of possible tasks. He said that.once this
[2920]PROPERTY OF
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[2925]itetied 7 bet bed wiided
[2927]t i 5
[2928]4 . %,
[2930]was done anda comprehensive program of suggested
[2931]action was drawn up, it should be submitted to the
[2932]Special. Group, and if the Group recommended approval
[2933]it should probably then be discussed with him. It was
[2934]stipulated that in any case no action should take place
[2935]until his return from the trip on which he is about to
[2936]embark.
[2938]bs Cit.
[2940]Mr. Scott’‘also reported later that Mr. Herter had made exactly
[2941]the same point as-outlined in b. above.)
[2943]v2,
[2947]a
[2949]Dominican Republic
[2951]There was a brief ‘discussion of the situation in the Dominican
[2952]Republic. Mr. Irwin commented that the Defense Department is most
[2953]interested in determining whether or nota sort of Third Force can be
[2954]identified.
[2956]Sata ons
[2958]PROPERTY o:
[2959]THE WHITE HOUSE Op fs
[2961]oo, cAney _ CUTe PMY
[2962]—- SRERLE coe Bid. .
[2964]HW 50955 Docld:32423488
[2966]meray GET
[2968]ee 7-ES EL 9
[2970]28 December 1960
[2972]‘MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD — _ —_.
[2974]SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 28 December 1960 - |
[2976]- PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Douglas, Gray and Dulles
[2978]2. Special Meeting on Cuba
[2980]Mr. Gray said that itis desired to setup a special meeting on
[2981]Cuba for 9:00 AM Monday, 2 January. His associates wanted particularly
[2982]to make certain that everyone concerned "clearly sees the sequence of
[2983]events." He also said that Mr. Pawley had hada recent conference in
[2985]the White House.
[2987]Mr. Gray asked that Mr. Merchant and Mr. Dougias determine
[2989]whether their respective Secretaries wish to attend. He said that .
[2991]Mr, Willauer-~wowia also be on hand. Finally, he asked that the Army
[2993]colonel (Lt. Col. Egan) who had given such an enlightening description’ '
[2995]of the qualities of the Cuban volunteers be on hand for the meeting.
[2997]It was noted that Col. Egan is currently out of the country, but the ;
[2998]- DCI agreed to have him brought to Washington for the meeting. _ _.
[3000]_ . . ” ,
[3002]PROPERTY OF ;
[3003]THE WHITE HOUSE OF Fut a. IN CS etn Tons
[3004]_ ; _ PAPER 0. “AAO
[3005](ORO y Po "DO HOP DESTINY
[3007]HW 50955 DocId:32423488 Page 56°
[3009]cit x a a ( ay Y
[3011](SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
[3012]CONCLUDING REMARKS ,
[3014]You will, I hope, permit me some personal, but I think
[3015]not unimportant observations. I hope that you will complete your
[3016]work as expeditiously as possible as I feel very strongly the need ;
[3017]fora viable Central Intelligence Agency operating, of course, within
[3018]its charter, I believe that the present furor about C.I.A. is
[3019]impeding it in the performance of its mission and the sooner it is
[3020]able to go about its business, not in a fish bowl, the better our
[3021]country will be served, I believe that we will continue to need
[3022]effective, intelligent collection and analysis for our policy makers
[3023]and I think there will be occasions when covert activities should be
[3024]undertaken in the interests of our National security.
[3026]Finally, one thing that bothers me, Mr. Chairman, is that
[3027]there is tremendous concern now -- and I don't suggest that it is
[3028]improper -- with the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency,
[3029]while at the same time péople seem not to be equally concerned
[3030]about what the Soviet Union is up to in this country, especially
[3031]through its very many KGB agents here. T would hope that a
[3033]Congressional Committee would be interested enough to investigate
[3035]this most serious matter.
[3037]a
[3039]HW 50955 Docld?32423488 Bage 57
[3043]PRESIDENT EISENHOWER, DOUGLAS - 4
[3044]DILLON, GENERAL GOODPASTER July 5, 1960 | TRUJILLO
[3046]Dillon. Also present were Gen. Goodpaster and
[3047]General Persons. The memorandum of the conference stated: "With regard to the |
[3048]Dominican Republic, Mr. Herter said there are various things being done which .
[3049]could result in a provisional government being set up. The President said if such
[3050]a government were set up we should recognize it quickly. We could then move in with
[3051]troops on their request if need should arise. In so far as the question is one of
[3052]internal: intervention, we must use the CIA in order to avoid attribution. The
[3054]-Prestdent--thoughtwe--shoutd-knock“out of-any“documents~on.file.any. 1° reference.to_.
[3055]Starting,.a..revolution."
[3057]SOURCE: Presidential Papers of Dwight Eisenhower STARE:
[3059](Whitman File) (DDE DIARY SERIES) — A b lewe. DATE: _ Kelley
[3060]——=July 6, 1975
[3062]FILE:
[3066]VICE PRESIDENT NIXON, MR. GRAY, March 14, 1960 7 CASTRO
[3068]DOUGLAS DILLON , MONGOOSE _
[3070]OCCURRENCE? At a National Security Council meeting on March 14, 1960 Mr. Dillon
[3071]' said: "Our objective is to bring another government to power in Cuba...there is
[3073]no. apparent alternative to the present government in the event Castro disappears.
[3075]Irideed the result of Castro's disappearance might be a Commmist takeover."
[3077]"Mr. Dulles reported that a plan-to affect the situation in Cuba was being
[3078]worked on. Admtrat--Burke~suggested- that any-plan-for-the-removal- of Cuban’ leadersy
[3079]should-be=package~deat, since many of the leaders around Castro were even worse:
[3080]than Castro." ;
[3082]SOURCE: Presidential Papers of Dwight Eisenhower
[3083](Whitman File) (NSC meeting series) 436th NSC meeting,
[3084]March 10, 1960 - AlosLene
[3086]FILE:
[3088]STAFF:
[3089]Kelley
[3091]DATE July 6, 1975
[3093]St GE SE ES EE EN ES NE EN OE EE SE SY SNE SN AE SN I SD ED GI AOE Ge GEE ny SD GAD SED em AED GEE GED nh AED GE GY EE AE GP ay EDO GED ES GED GE Gd GES ED GN GEE a ES ONG ED a aS SD
[3097]- CATEGORTES:
[3099]I
[3101]VICE PRESIDENT NIXON, DOUGLAS April 14, 1960 |
[3103]DILLON, H. SHELDON (CIA), MR. LAY
[3105]TRUJILLO
[3107]ecurity Council meeting on April 14, 1960, Vice
[3109]President N: Nixon presiding, ' ': ‘Mr. Dulles reported..Trujillo's position continued
[3110]to weaken and was now quite precarious... (he}- thought~ further. attempts: will be made
[3111]to-kilL.or. oust-Trujible."
[3113]“Mr. Dillon said there was one favorable aspect. . .4£—Traj+be-could-be- removed
[3114]Lron-power-in—the~ Dominicanr-Republic while pro= -Castro-etements-were-prevented from
[3115]seizing-power—in-that-country,—our anti-Castro~campaten~ throughout Latin-America
[3116]would receive-a-great—boost, Fhe Vice President agreed Shae gereing ridof Trujillo
[3117]Woutd-be-a-favorabte development for- ts."
[3119]SOURCE: . “Presidential Papers of Dwight Eisenhower
[3120](Whitman File) (NSC meeting series, 441st meeting, April 4, 7).
[3121]1960) — A "€. i Kelley
[3122]PILE: HLewe ; DATE July 6, 1975
[3124]STAFF:
[3126]HW. 50955 . Docld:32423488 Page 56
[3130]VICE PRESIDENT NIXON, DOUGLAS
[3131]‘ DILLON, H. SHELDON (CIA), MR. LAY
[3133]DATES: CATEGORIES:
[3135]April 14, 196% TRUJILLO
[3137]OCCURRENCE: On April 14, 1960 at a National Security Council meeting Mr. Beskkes
[3139]reported that a SR. Betancourt /no relation to Venezuelan leader/ had defected
[3140]from Cuba and predicted three outcomes with respect to Castro:  ( ie
[3141]thet-—wertd-make-Castre-e-martyny (2) Castro's suicide as a result of the failure ~
[3142]of the Cuban experiment and (3) a trend to.a socialist dictatorship and a Batista
[3143]terror regime.
[3145]. - f f> a
[3146]. . , ~ i : } J fay vee’ fob Pa)
[3147]. ors AN. fo NM 484.) ara of BP OE AIR a a TD fae,
[3148]~ Ij } : A a ~ 4 a
[3149]Nate De Q, Case [ds ;
[3151]san
[3153]ANC lene 4
[3155]. SOURCE:
[3157]STAFF:
[3159]Kelley
[3160]DATE July 6, 1975
[3162]Presidential Papers of Dwight Eisenhower
[3164](Whiteman File) (NSC meeting series, 441 st meeting, April 14
[3165]6 .
[3166]Free} “Ab, leve
[3168]. PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: | CATEGORIES:
[3169]PRESIDENT EISENHOWER, VICE PRESI- | July 7, 1960 | TRUJILLO
[3170]DENT NIXON, DOUGLAS DILLON, ALLEN | CASTRO
[3171]DULLES | - MONGOOSE
[3173]At a National Security Council meeting on July 7, 1960 Mr. Dulles
[3174]stated: ''The Venezuelan government was engaged in an all-out effort, through
[3175]the OAS and otherwise, to isolate, condemn and cause the downfall of Trujillo.
[3176]An important reason for the vigor of the Venezuelan efforts was the fact the
[3178]have convincing evidence that Trujillo was lapeee pee for the assassinat(On
[3180]attempt on Betancourt /President of Venezuela/*** "Betancourt believes
[3182]attempt will be made momentarily and therefore it wants a showdown without .
[3183]delay.'" Mr. Dulles further explained that the Venezuelan Foreign Minister wants
[3184]the United States to lead the way in breaking relations with Trujillo and that
[3186]Betancourt wants a meeting of the OAS nations to deal with the Trujillo problem.
[3188]SOURCE: DTAVR:
[3190]— Presidential Papers af Dwight Hisenhower
[3192](Whitin Vito) (NSC moat tag REN TOR, THOT NSC moat bjt, - Kart bee
[3194]ieylys 7, Wnt) . PDA EY 8, Nes
[3195]coe Vad Oe a
[3197]Ne 8 2g ee Re GI wee ee wey Nar uel oe Ont Ie mat ome DE AE BO MOE OD po oem vu me pe BS og amemem sty were ak ta we 2
[3199]PERSONS/ENTIVIES : DATES: CATEGORIES:
[3200]PRESIDENT EISENHOWER, VICE
[3201]PRESIDENT NIXON, DOUGLAS DILLON,
[3202]ALLEN DULLES .
[3204]July 7, 1960 | TRUJILLO
[3205]CASTRO
[3206]MONGOOSE
[3208]On July 7, 1960 at a National Security Council meeting +Mre-Dudbes
[3209]eves; ‘the~intel Li genee-eommun: ty-eprees;—that-the~prebter
[3211]. jtiLo-mustbe—settied-before-the-problem-ok-Castre~can_bo-doalt-withs even-
[3213]theugh-Castre-ts—the-grerter-threat ."' . ;
[3215]The NSC minutes further state that the United States told Betancourt of
[3216]Venezuela that the United States can't act without knowing who the successor to
[3217]Trujillo would be. The U.S. will work with Betancourt and Figueres of Costa
[3218]Rica on suggestions for a successor for Trujillo. President Eisenhower suggested
[3219]a government in exile be ready to go into the Dominican Republic in the event
[3220]of Trujillo's downfall.
[3222]a SOURCE:
[3224]STAFF:
[3225]_ _ Kelley
[3227]Presidential Papers of Dwight Eisenhower
[3228]| DATESuly 6, 1975
[3230](Whitman File) (NSC meeting series, 450th NSC meeting,
[3231]Pply -7, 1960) :
[3234]HY 50955 Docld:32423466 Page 59
[3237]DATES: CATEGORIES:
[3240]MR. GRAY, PRESIDENT EISENHOWER July 28, 1960 | CASTRO
[3241]| TRUJILLO
[3243]MONGOOSE
[3245]OCCURRENCE:
[3247]| frtends—te-rese-a.. pore of tri t pret It was
[3248]noted that Venezuela was trying to s
[3250]Meets tevineenen
[3253]eparate the Cuban and Domincan Republic prob-
[3254]lems in OAS forms. On this matter, ''The President said if we attempted to take
[3255]any action with respect to Cuba before settling the Trujillo situation, we would
[3256]be the loser.'' ‘
[3258]Dios We per ve m tp oN pctd attain ‘|
[3260]SOURCE: Presidential Papers of Dwight Eisenhower STAPF:
[3261](Whitman File) (NSC meeting series, meeting of July 28, 1960 pater kelley
[3263]. July 6, 1975
[3264]PILE: Abslewe ,
[3266]SS LS SS SY Se Ae SD AT SE a a A SU ES ST Ey MLN WY ce DG SEY aN wD SY ME em em HE I en sD GET GE wom een comm SP GAD GE SRE OD ky em tao GUE ED Ga Se ANS MN KN HN A MA ED GED SER SP re? AD ems
[3268]PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: i CATEGORIES:
[3270]|
[3271]PRESIDENT EISENHOWER, MAURICE Aug. 25, 1960 {| LUMUMBA
[3272]STANS, MR. GRAY —
[3274]OCCURRENCE: On August 25, 1960 the minutes of the National Security Council
[3275]meeting that day state: "The President suggested the United Nations might re-
[3276]cognize Katanga. Mr. Stans suggested that we might base ourselves on Tshombe
[3277]and Kasavubu and throw out Lumumba by peaceful means." (page 15)
[3281]Ari:
[3283]SOURCE:
[3284]Presidential Papers of Dwight Eisenhower
[3285](Whit-man File) (NSC meeting series, meeting of August _ Kelley
[3287]FASE 1960 ~ Ab,lewe DATE July 6, 1975
[3289]ee a hh a ee ne we eee eu wey wu ru uu nse sin ste see wan exe en
[3293]PRESIDENT EISENHOWER, GORDON GRAY, | Sept. 21, 1960 | LUMUMBA
[3295]On September 21, 1960, at a National Security meeting, Mr. Dulles
[3296], : ecent-attennt=te-assassinate ~hedfebbed. ***Mobutu appeared
[3297]to be the effective power umumba.was-net
[3299]= 259 te rd
[3301]in the Congo
[3303]we
[3304].
[3306]SOURCE: Presidential Papers of Dwight Eisenhower STAFF:
[3307](Whitman File) (NSC meeting series, meeting of Sept. 21, 1960); Kelley
[3309]FILE: ; . | DATE July 6, 1975
[3310]“WW 50955 vocrarsedatieh< Ye 60 oo _ .
[3312]"PERSONS/ENTITIFS: . DATES: _ | CATEGORIES: .
[3313]PRESIDENT EISENHOWER, GORDON GRAY Oct. 24, 1960 LUMUMBA
[3315]OCCURRENCE: On October 24, 1960 ata National Security Council meeting Mr.
[3316]Dulles reported:
[3318]"An intercepted UAR /Egypt/ message indicated that five Congolese soldiers
[3319]had attempted to assassinate Mobutu on | the 15th of October. the~UsSawhad.prier x
[3320]> = FFG Cheats atts RE Fy ea PEF Rees
[3322]itywas probable thatche wuld have-beenveawghes!. - (page 16)
[3324]SOURCE: Presidential Papers of Dwight Eisenhower STAPF:
[3326](Whitman File) (NSC meeting series, minutes of meeting, DATE: Kelley
[3328]er 24, 1960 mm JUL 6, 1975
[3329]retee yo Abilewe Y
[3331]PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES:
[3332]GORDON GRAY, MARION W. BOGGS Feb. 12, 1960 | LUMUMBA
[3333]| CASTRO ©
[3334]TRUJILLO
[3335]OCCURRENCE:
[3337]On Febraumedop=b06@>a special" National Security Council meeting
[3339]was held, and Marion W. Boggs, Deputy Executive Secretary, attended as Acting
[3341]Executive Secretary. The only record of this meeting appearing in the NSC meeting
[3342]series of | minutes is a one- e-page notation which states: UOambpstractrorns=frur
[3344]|
[3346]|
[3348]SOURCE:
[3349](Whitman File)
[3350]Feb. 12, 1960.
[3352]FILE: Ab, Lewe.
[3354]TARE:
[3356](NSC meeting series, special NSC meeting,
[3357]Kelley
[3358]DATE sha Buy 6, 1975
[3360]PERSONS/ENTITIES: : , CATEGORIES:
[3362]SOURCE:
[3364]PILE: oo l pare:
[3366]. - . \
[3367]HY 50955 Docld:32423466 Page 61 .. : “oe
[3369]MOTE ON GRAY TESTIMONY FOR FAOS:
[3371], _ short summary
[3372]If we don't re-write the Gray shemamimgyx, you
[3373]should note to the senators that since we w
[3374]drafted it we have received a new batch of
[3375]key documents from the Eisenhower library
[3377]which are reflected (quoted) in the
[3379]Gray Chronology.
[3381][dd Nyon 6
[3383]BW 50955 Docld:32423488 Page 62 . , _
[3385]To: Files
[3386]From: Frederick Baron
[3387]Re: DELETION IN SPECIAL CROUP MINUTES OF NOVEMBER 3, 1960
[3389]Date: July 7, 1975
[3391]In a phone conversation with Jim Wilderotter of the White House,
[3392]Wilderotter assured me af that after the line "beyond our gp capabil-
[3393]ities" on page 3, there was a double space followed by
[3394]Item 2, which deals with the African continent (not Congo),
[3395]followed by a double space, then Item 3, which deals .
[3396]with Southeast Asta.
[3397]‘Wilderotter assured me that neither item related to
[3398]our inquiry. He said that there was nothing deleted on
[3400]page 3 that related to KCuba.
[3402]va
[3404]HW 50955 Docld:324293498 Page 63
[3406]| EXHIBITS FOR THE EXAMINATION OF GORDON GRAY
[3409]Special Group Minutes, November 3, 1960.
[3410]Special Group Minutes, August 12, 1960.
[3411]- Tumunba . .
[3412]Special Group Minutes, August 25, 1960.
[3413]Special Group Minutes, September 8, 1960.
[3415]frujillo
[3417]Memorandum of July 1, 1960 from J, C. King, Chief, Western Hemisphere
[3418]Division to the Acting DCI.
[3420]Minutes of the Special Group of December 29, 1960.
[3422]‘Minutes of the Special Group of January 12, 1961.
[3424]* The Special Group Minutes of February 17, 1960 could be used for |
[3425]two purposes: (1) To establish the general atmosphere in the
[3426]Special Group of planning, sabotage, operations in Cuba; and. (2)
[3427]The fact that, at least in this case, Gray's "associate" was
[3428]President Eisenhower.
[3430]HW 50855 Docld:32423488 Page 64
[3432]MiEMORANDUM
[3434]FO: . Files
[3435]FROM: Frederick Baron
[3436]DATE: July 5, 1975
[3438]SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW WITH GORDON GRAY
[3440]GENERAL BACKGROUND
[3442]1. Staff Responsibilities Under Eisenhower:
[3444]Gray said that the structural chain of command ran directly from the -
[3445]DCI to the President during the Eisenhower administration. Allen Dulles
[3446]was able to approach Eisenhower directly, rather than through Gray.
[3448]Andrew Goodpaster staffed President Eisenhower on many of the samme
[3449]subjects that Gray worked on. Gray was responsible for long-range planning;
[3450]CGoodpaster was responsible for spot. work. Gray said that Goodpaster and he
[3451]kept cach other "intimately informed". However, Gray said that any covert
[3452]action program would go through him and not Goodpaster. "Although I would
[3453]tell Goodpaster about anything I discussed with the President." Some covert
[3454]action programs were extremely tightly held, for example, on the U-2 incident
[3455]only the following people were knowledgeable: Eisenhower, Goodpaster, and John
[3457]Eisenhower. .
[3459]“J didn't live with Eisenhower 24 hours a day. I don't know everything
[3460]that he did. But I do think I knew every major decision, approval, or action
[3462]of Eisenhower's."
[3464]2. Special Group Function
[3466]At the 54/12 committee, Gray said, "I represented the President's interest,
[3468]that was my role."
[3470]HY 50955 Docld:32423486 Page 65
[3472]Gray said that shortly after the BERLIN TUNNEL, Eisenhower said,
[3474]Ss bat 7 a
[3477]copies Ul
[3479]"T want the 54/12 comnittee to consider any action that impinges Upon, .
[3481]“a
[3483]the sovereignty of another country."
[3485]Gray said that in almost every case, a proposed covert action would
[3486]have been discussed with the State Department and would have been staffed
[3487]out before Special Group meeting. ‘Most of the rest of us did not have a chance
[3489]to reflect before the meeting."
[3491]Gray said that during his tenure, there was no chairman of the 54/12
[3493](Special Group). But perhaps Merchant conducted the meetings.
[3495]Gray said that during the transition to the Kennedy administration, he
[3496]asked McGeorge Bundy to promise him that the Special Group would not be
[3497]washed out. Gray explained that the Special Group was necessary for the
[3498]protection of the President. The Special Group discussions allow the President
[3499]the chance to know in advance about actions which are potentially embarrassing
[3500]to him. The President's representative to the Group (Gray, then Bundy) has the
[3501]right to object to an action and take it up with the President. The President .
[3502]has a chance to know about everything that goes on in the Special Group, and
[3503]through his Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, the President would
[3504]have a chance to say "no" to a proposed action. Gray said that the presence
[3505]of the Special Group would protect a President from operations such as assass-
[3507]jnations.
[3509]3. "His Associate"
[3511]Initially, Gray did not recognize the phrase used by Parrott in the
[3512]Special Group minutes 'Mr. Gray's associate" or "His associates" to Gray's
[3513]first reaction was that “his associates" would probably refer to members
[3515]of his NSC staff.
[3517]“HW 50955 DocId: 32423488 Page 66
[3519]-3- ; . i
[3521]But after seeing the minutes of the Special Group mecting of
[3522]February 17, 1960, Gray said that it was clear that in those minutes
[3524]u
[3526]“his associate" referred to President Eisenhower.
[3528]Gray said that he never used the phrase "associate", that was
[3529]Parrott! s phrase. ‘Gray was not aware the phrase was used at the time
[3530]in those minutes and couldn't, without reconstructing each minute, be
[3531]sure it referred to the President in cach case. He said that when he
[3533]attended the meetings,he would refer to "the President" directly.
[3535](Note: Since the phrase "the President'' is never used in Parrott's
[3536]minutes, it is fair to assume that at least some of the references to
[3538]'Mr. Gray's associate” are euphemisms for President Eisenhower.)
[3540]Gray recalls that. the President called him, and perhaps Allen Dulles,
[3541]‘into. his office shortly after Gray's appointment and said that "no
[3542]minutes, notes, or memos of Special Group meetings are to be kept, except
[3543]by the DCI and they are to be kept in the DCI's files." Gray said that
[3544]: Dulles was not present at this ineeting. He knows that he would have told
[3546]Dulles shortly afterwards.
[3548]Gray did not keep personal notes of the Special Group meetings.
[3549]Although he did defy the Presidential directive in one specific instance,
[3551]by- deciding to make a memorandum of every meeting with the President relating
[3553]to the subject of Cuba. These memoranda are on file at the. Presidential
[3554]Library in Abilene, Kansas. -
[3555]Gray said that he never reviewed Thomas Parrott's minutes of the
[3557]“Special Group. But the NSC minutes were passed to the principals at the
[3559]HW 50955 DoclId: 32423488 Page of
[3563]meeting for their review. Gray prepared the "records of action" for
[3565]the NSC, along with Jinmy Lay, Gray's assistant.
[3567]LUMUNBA
[3569]Gray said that he did not remember the August 25, 1960 meeting at
[3570]which it was reported that Gray commented that “his associates had expressed
[3571]extremely strong feelings on the necessity for very straight-forward action"
[3572]in relation to LUMUMBA. Gray said at first that he did not remember
[3573]LUMUMBA's position in the Congo. Gray said that he did not remember talking -
[3575]with Eisenhower about LUMUMBA.
[3577]However, Gray docs remember that "we were anti-LUMUMBA and wanted to
[3579]see him removed from his position of responsibility."-
[3581]In reference to the August 25 meeting, after he had seen the minutes
[3582]of the meeting, Gray said that "when I said ‘straightforward action’, certainly
[3583]assassination would be one possibility." Gray continued to say that Allen
[3584]DULLES. was consistently in opposition to assassination and “he was probably
[3585]saying to ne that assassination was one of the things we shouldn't do."
[3587]; | | :
[3589]With reference to testimony received by the Select Committee from Robert
[3590]JOHNSON, a State Department official who was a member of the Policy Planning ©
[3591]Council, he said that he had no recollection of a meeting in the sumer of
[3592]1960, at which President EISENHOWER ordered the assassination of LUMUMBA or
[3594]said words to that effect.
[3596]Gray said that he knows Bronson TWEEDY, but he never discussed LUMUMBA
[3598]with TWEEDY.
[3600]Lat csah -
[3604]HW 50955 Docld: 32423488 Page 66
[3606]TRUJTLLO
[3607]"Tt am sure there was no discussion with EISENHOWER about the
[3609]_ assassination of TRUJILLO."
[3611]"I don't see how the DCI and the Department of State could have
[3612]approved arms shipments without going up to the Special Group... The
[3614]DCI should have taken a suggested course
[3616]of action to the Special Group
[3618]_after checking with State."
[3620]Gray said: "A high-powered weapon with a telescopic site would ©
[3622]connote to me that it would be used for the purpose of assassinating an
[3624]individual.”
[3626]CUBA
[3627]Gray said that President E[SENHOWER would frequently remark at
[3628]meetings on Cuba that an operation should be planned so that it would be
[3630]carried through successfully, otherwise it should not be planned at all.
[3632]Referring to the minutes of the Special Group meeting of February 17,
[3633]1960, Gray’ said that at some point during that period. of time, Allen
[3634]DULLES brought his sugar mill sabotage plan to President EISENHOWER, who
[3635]listened attentively. Afterward, the President said, "I don't think
[3636]sabotage of sugar mills will do something significant. Bring me a complete
[3637]plan."' Subsequently, DULLES brought the President a four-point program:
[3638]propaganda; economic sanction, sabotage; and the training of Cuban exiles.
[3640]GRAY said the President approved this Remo. (Note that Gray also said that he
[3642]made a memo of this meeting and subsequent meetings on Cuba.)
[3644]iy iéie.g™ Nabe .
[3645]a Wy RL US Uf
[3647]AW 50955) BDaocld:324273468 Page 69
[3649]~G-
[3651]After the BAY OF PIGS, Gray called President EISENHOWER and
[3653]offered to show him all of the memos that Gray had prepared on Presidential
[3654]meetings on Cuba. ‘Gray said that JOHN EISENHOWER obtained the memos and -
[3655]‘brought them to Gettysburg, Gray and President EISENHOWER reviewed the.
[3656]“memos, Gray said that the President objected to the word "planning" in
[3657]reference. to a Cuban invasion, on the basis that there was no actual military
[3658]planning. EISENHOWER Suggested that the page should be retyped to change
[3660]the word “plaming". Gray said they did retype the page. .
[3662]Gray said that although in his mind and EISENHOWER's, there was no
[3663]military "plaming'', definitely EISENHOWER knew that Cuban exiles were being
[3665]trained for an amphibious landing in Cuba.
[3667]President EISENHOWER went so far in contingency planning, said Gray, as to
[3668]advocate to Allen DULLES the formation of a government in exile among the
[3669]Cuban community, But, Gray said, the Cubans could never settle among them-
[3671]selves who would constitute the leadership of such a government.
[3673]Referring to the minutes of Special Group meeting of August 12, 1960,
[3674]Gray remembers the presentation by Richard BISSELL of a budget for Cuban
[3675]operations over. 13 million dollars, with a heavy emphasis on paramilitary
[3676]operations. Gray said that the reference at the end of the memo to laying.
[3677]this budget before “higher authorities" for approval clearly referred to
[3679]President EISENHOWER.
[3681]Referring to the minutes of the Special Group meeting of November 3, 1960,
[3682]- at which MERCHANT asked a question about whether there had been planning "for
[3684]taking direct positive action against FIDEL, RAUL, and CHE GUEVARA," Gray said
[3686]HY 50955 Docld: 327423488 Page 70
[3690]_that he did not remember the meeting. Gray acknowledged, however, that.
[3691]the phrase "direct positive action" in this context "could have included
[3692]assassination.’ Gray said that the reaction by General CABELL that such
[3694]action would be beyond CIA capabilities, was the “usual DCI reaction".
[3696]Referring to the Special Group minutes of December 28, 1960, Gray said
[3697]that "the special mceting'’ mentioned therein is clearly a meeting with the President,
[3698]Gray though that this must have been the last meeting on Cuba with the == ~ |
[3699]President, the purpose of which would have been to clean up the Cuba project
[3700]for the new administration. Gray said that there must have been dozens of
[3702]meetings on Cuba (all of which will be reflected in the Gray memos in Abilene).
[3704]CASTRO/GANBLING SYNDICATE, OPERATION, PHASE I
[3705], Gray said that he was completely unaware of any conversation between
[3706]Richard BISSELL and Sheffield EDWARDS about establishing underworld contacts
[3707]for the purpose of an assassination attenpt on CASTRO. Gray also said that
[3708]he was unaware of any development, within the Technical Services Division of
[3709]the CIA, of assassination devices to be used against CASTRO such as lethal cigars.
[3710]Likewise, he was unaware of the development of any devices designed for the
[3712]disorientation or embarrassment of CASTRO.
[3713]Gray said that he knew BISSELL well, but not EDWARDS.
[3715]Gray said that, if such operations were in progress, the DCI should have
[3716]known about them. Gray said that if the DCI knew about such operations, "he
[3717]would have raised it at the Special Group or with me. He didn't. I think I
[3718]would have known if Allen DULLES had discussed such subjects with the President."
[3720]Gray said that it was possible that BISSELL was acting unilaterally on this
[3722]“HH 50955 Docld:32473488 Page 71
[3726]matter, Gray said that he'd talked to Andrew GOODPASTER about the recent
[3727]news stories which indicate that there was assassination planning against
[3728]CASTRO during this period of time, and GOODPASTER said that he'd never
[3730]heard about such things.
[3731]EXECUTIVE ACTION
[3733]“"T never heard of EXECUTIVE ACTION until David BELIN mentioned it to
[3735]me."
[3736]ASSASSINATIONS GENERALLY
[3738]. Gray said that he remembered two ment ions of assassination: (1) When
[3739]NASSAR was riding high, someone at the planning board said "we ought to bump
[3740]him off''. But Gray said this was not a serious discussion. . Assassination was
[3741]not an option that went to the President. (2) At the PFIAB meetings, one
[3742]member consistently would ask the CIA “about bumping off the leadership in
[3743]Hanoi", Gray did not think this was a serious suggestion. Gray said the
[3744]member who suggested this is "well-known" and he was reluctant to provide the
[3746]name to uS.
[3748]"— followed closely any covert operations I was interested in," Gray said
[3749]that "if I had known of any assassination attempt, I probably would have called"
[3750]the responsible official to stay abreast. He said he didn't know of any such
[3752]attempts.
[3754]HW 50955 Docld: 32423488 Page 7f2
[3756]interview Questdons For Gordon Gray
[3757]TRUJILLO
[3759]1. MEMO of July 1, 1960 from J.C. King, (Chief, WHD) to Acting
[3760]DCI @akexi recommending the delivery of arms (high-powered rifles
[3761]with telescopic scopes) to the opposition of TRUJILLO. The Memo
[3762]says that "APPROVAL FOR DELIVERY OF THESE ARMS HAS BEEN GIVEN
[3763]BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE ROY RUBOTTOM",
[3764]- ~Kmemkhem Were there any proceedings of the Special Group at
[3765]this time which authorized delivery of arms? (We don't have
[3766]record of any authorézation until January 12, 1961 S.G. Minutes)
[3768]~If not, did the DCI and Assistant Secretary of State exceed
[3769]their authority? :
[3771]o~Generally, what was the procedure in the Eisenhower administratior
[3772]for handling the approval of such a project?
[3773]-Could the DCI approve it under his own authority?
[3774].~Did the Assistant Secretary of State exceed his authority
[3775]by not requesting?@% receiving approval foom the Secy of Stat
[3777]~Shouldn't the Special Group have been consulted?
[3778]L
[3779]2. SPECIAL GROUP MINUTES of 12 JANUARY 196%. GRAY was present.
[3781]The Group approves shipment of arms to "dissidents inside
[3782]the Dominican Republic"
[3784]-Do you Emgm remember this event? Are the minutes accuragte?
[3786]-What was the policy behind the approval?
[3788]-Weren't the weapons intended for use in assassination?
[3790]HW 50955 DocId: 32423488 Page 73
[3792]HY 50955
[3794]To; Files
[3795]From: FDB
[3797]Re: NOTES ON TESTIMONY OF ROBERT H. JOHNSON (6/18/75)
[3799]Date: 7/5/75
[3801]Biographical Background
[3803]1951-62
[3805]1962-67
[3807]National Security Council staff member
[3809]State Department, member of Policy Planning Council
[3811]Chronology of Events
[3813]Summer, 1960
[3815]Johnson attended a meeting of the NSC to discuss
[3817]'developments in the CONGO. "At some time during that
[3819]discussion, President EISENHOWER said something --
[3820]I can no longer remember his-words ~~ that came
[3821]across to me as an order for the assassination
[3822]of LUMUMBA...There was no discussion; the meeting
[3823]simply moved on,”
[3824]-~-Johnson said he might have omitted the statement
[3825]from his de-briefing memo due to its sensitivity.
[3826]~~ J. said probably Allen DULLES and Gordon GRAY
[3827]were present at the meeting (in the Cabinet Roo).
[3828]-~-The formal record of decision by the NSC is.
[3829]unlikely to contain infommation on this subject,
[3830]he said.
[3831]~-The memos which Johnson did on the meetings would
[3832]be with President Eisenhower ' Ss papers. (10)
[3834]"I was surprised £...that I would ever hear a President
[3835]say anything like this in my presence or the presence
[3837]of a group of people, I was startled."
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