[1]157-10014-10151 | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
[2]JFK Assassination System Date: 015
[4]Identification Form
[6]Agency Information
[8]AGENCY:  SSCIA
[9]RECORD NUMBER: = 157-10014-10151
[11]RECORD SERIES: MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE
[13]AGENCY FILENUMBER:  07-M-56 .
[15]Document Information
[17]ORIGINATOR:  SSCIA
[18]FROM:
[21]TITLE: SELECT COMMITTEE ASSASSINATION REPORT
[23]DATE: 09/01/1975
[24]PAGES: 560
[26]SUBJECTS :
[27]SSCSGO, REPORT
[29]DOCUMENT TYPE: REPORT
[30]CLASSIFICATION: Declassified
[31]RESTRICTIONS: 1B; 1C .
[33]DATE OF LASTREVIEW: 03/21/2000
[35]OPENING CRITERIA :
[37]COMMENTS :
[39]v9.1 1
[41]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 1
[43]Date
[45]08/07/95
[46]Page. 1
[48]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[49]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[51]AGENCY INFORMATION
[53]AGENCY : SSCIA
[54]RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10151
[55]RECORDS SERIES : MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMIITTEE
[56]AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-M-56
[58]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[60]OPENING CRITERIA
[61]COMMENTS
[63]ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
[64]FROM :
[65]TO :
[66]TITLE : SELECT COMMITTEE ASSASSINATION REPORT
[67]DATE : 09/01/75
[68]PAGES : 560’
[69]SUBJECTS : SSCSGO, REPORT
[70]DOCUMENT TYPE : REPORT :
[71]CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET ~
[72]RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
[73]CURRENT STATUS : POSTPONED IN FULL
[74]DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 01/08/99
[76]{R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED
[78]HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 2
[80]/ | ; _ ; Se September 1, 1975
[82]i
[83])
[85]SELECT COMMITTEE ~ ASSASSINATION REPORT
[87]Tab A: PROLOGUE
[88]Tab B: Part I: Introduction and Summary
[89]Tab C: Part Il: Covert Action as Vehicle for Foreign Policy Implementation
[90]Tab D: Part ITI/Cuba .
[91]Tab E: Part III/Dominican Republic
[92]Tab F: | Part ITI /Chile
[93]Tab G: Part III /Congo
[94]Tab H: Part III/South Vietnam.
[95]Tab I: Part IV: Findings and Conclusions Te
[97]Tab J: Part V: Recommendations
[100]a
[102]HW 50955 | Doold: 324249539 .Page 3
[104]Agreed to by Subcommittee
[106]Oo re October 8, 1975
[107]PROLOGUE
[109]“The events discussed in this Interim Report must. be viewed in
[110]the context of United States policy and actions designed to counter
[111]the threat of spreading Communism. Following the end of World
[112]War Il, many nations in eastern Europe and elsewhere fell under
[113]‘Communist influence or control. The defeat. of the Axis powers was
[114]“accompanied ‘by: the ‘rapid disintegration, of the Western colonial
[115]empires. The Second World War no sooner ended than a new struggle
[116]‘began. ‘The Communist threat, emanating from what was: then called 4
[118]‘the "gino- Soviet bloc, "produced a policy of .containment intended ~
[119]: @ ‘to prevent further encroachment by Communism into the "free world."
[120]| ‘United States strategy for conducting the Cold War called for
[121]‘the establishment’ of’ interlocking treaty arrangements and military.
[122]bases throughout the world. Our concern over the expansion of an
[123]aggressive Communist monolith led the United States to fight two
[124]“na jor wars in Asia. In addition, it was considered necessary to
[125]wage a relentless cold war against Communist expansion wherever
[126]| it appeared in the "back alleys of the world." This called for a - pay
[127]“full range of clandestine activities in response to the operations ¢
[128]» of Communist clandestine services. oo : fe
[129]The. fear of expanding Communism. was particularly acute when
[130]Fidel Castro emerged as the leader of Cuba in the late 1950's.
[132]His takeover was, seen as the first significant penetration by the
[134]. ‘Communists into the Western Hemisphere. U.S. leaders, including
[136]oft 50955 “DocTd:32423539 Page-4
[138]@ ‘most Members of Congress, called for vigorous action to stem: the
[139]Communist infection in this hemisphere. These policies rested on
[141]_ wideSpread popular support and encouragement.
[143]Throughout this period, the’ U.S. felt impelled to respond to
[144]‘threats which were, or seemed ‘to be,..skirmishés ina global Cold”
[146]War against Communism. Castro's Cuba raised ‘the spectre of a. Soviet
[147]“outpost at ‘America’ s doorstep. Events in the Dominican. Republic
[148]‘appeared to offer more such opportunities. for ‘the Russians and their -
[150]‘allies. The Congo, freed from Belgian rule, occupied the strategic
[151]vcenter. of the African continent, and the prospect of Communist pene-
[152]“tration there was viewed as.a threat to American interests in emerging
[154]| Africa. Americans are well aware of. the ‘powerful reactions set off
[155]lan the’ United States in. the 1960' Ss by the domino theory in Indochina.
[157]- Disa, even the election in 1970. of a Marxist president in Chile was .
[158]“seen by some as a threat similar. to that of Castro’ s takeover in Cuba. -
[159]: The. Committee regards the unfortunate events dealt with in this
[161]Interim Report as an aberration, explainable at least in part, but.
[163]a Ee ee
[164]“hot. justified, by” the pressure of events at the time. . The Committee
[166]believes that ait is still in ‘the national interest of the United
[168]“States to do what it canto he
[170]nations resist Communist dominatio
[171]put. it is clear that this cannot justify in the future the kind of.
[172]“abuses covered in this report. Indeed, the Committee has resolved
[174]that steps must be taken to prevent them from happening again.
[176]© tee
[178]DEE M4 ATI
[180]e
[182]j
[184]es ere
[185]BAR 50955 \ Docla:32423539 Page 5
[187]4
[189]3
[191]my . Agreed to b Drafting Subcommittee
[192]— on August 27, 1975' ;
[194]L. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY.
[196]This interim report covers allegations of United States involve-
[197]ment in assassination plots against foreign political leaders. Of equal
[198]sienificance in this report are certain other cases where foreign political
[199]leaders in fact were killed, where the United States was in some manner
[201]involved in activity leading up to the killing, but where it would be
[203]incorrect to say that the purpose of United States involvement had been
[205]to encourage assassination.
[207]the evidence establishes that the United States was implicated in
[209]es
[211]several assassination plots. The Committee believes that the use of assassi-
[212]nation as a tool of foreign policy is incompatible with American principles,
[213]international order, and morality. It should be rejected.
[215]Our inquiry also revealed serious problems with respect to United
[216]States involvement in coups directed against foreign. governments. Some of
[218]these problems are addressed here on, the basis of our investigation to date;
[220]others we raise as questions to be answered after our investigation into
[222]‘covert. action has been completed.
[224]We stress the interim nature of this report. In the course of
[225]the Committee's ‘continuing work, other. alleged assassination plots tay
[226]surface, and new evidence concerning the cases covered herein may come to
[227]light. Uowever, it is the Committee's view that the cases covered herein
[228]have been developed in sufficient detail to clarify the issues which are
[229]at the heart of the Committee's mandate toe recommend legislative and other
[231]reforms relating to the vital matters discussed below.
[232]a , :
[234]* The Vice Chairman reserved as to the first sentence in the discussion
[235]of the similarities and differences among the plots. (See p.
[237]HW 50955 Docld:32493539 Page 6
[239]ae)
[241]In depth treatment of the assassination question has lengthened
[243]the Committee's schedule but has greatly increased the Committee's awareness
[244]of the hard issues it must face in the months ahead. The Committee intends,
[245]nevertheless, to complete, by February, 1976, its main job of undertaking the
[247]first comprehensive review of the intelligence community.
[249]A. The Committee's Mandate
[251]Under Senate Resolution 21, the Committee was instructed to in-
[252]vestigate the Full range of governmental intelligence activities and the
[253]extent, if any, to which such activities were “illegal, improper or un-
[257]ethical". In addition to that very broad general mandate, the Conmittee
[258]was required by the Senate ta investigate, study and make recommendations
[259]concerning various specific matters, several of which relate to the assassi-
[260]nation issue .*
[262]Al though the Rockefeller Commission conducted an inquiry into
[263]reported assassination plots, the Commission declared it was unable, for
[264]a variety of reasons, to complete its inquiry. ‘At the direction of the Presi-
[265]dent, the Executive Branch turned over: to the Select Committee the work
[267]the Comission had done, along with other documents relating to assassina-
[269]tions.
[271]* For exawple, &. Res. 21 requires the Committee to study and investi-
[272]gate the following: ©
[274]the extent and necessity of . ... covert intelligence activities
[275]oe » abroad";
[276]' ‘ .
[278]“[the] nature and extent of executive branch. oversight of all
[280]United States intelligence activities": : ~
[282]"the need for improved, strengthened, or consolidated oversisht
[283]: of United States intelligence activities by the Congress": and
[285]the need for new lezislation.
[287]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 7
[289]B. Committee Decision To Make Vhis Report Public
[291]7 This report raises important questions of .national policy. We
[292]Py
[294]stieve that the public is entitled to know what certain instrumentalities
[296]Further, our, recommendations can only be
[298]_
[300]Sudged in light of the factual record. Therefore, this interim report
[301]“should be made public.
[302]Because of. our faith in the democratic system, and the paranount
[304]. |
[305]importance of strengthening the institutions of this country, the Committee
[307]believes ‘the truth about the assassination allegations should be told.
[309]Democracy depends upon a well-informed electorate. Truth underlies both rhe
[311]i - shes
[312]Toate
[314]that IT
[316]kept secret because they are embarrassing to the United States. Despite ck. + w/l;
[318]be donb
[320]justice and freedom,
[322]‘We reject any contention that the facts disclosed herein should be
[324]the possible injury to our national reputation, the Committee believes that
[325]foreign peoples will, upon sober reflection, respect the United States nore
[327]for keeping faith with its democratic. ideal than they will condemn us for
[329]the misconduct itself.
[331]The fact that portions of the story have already been publicly dis~-
[333]closed only accentuates the need for full disclosure. Innuendo and mis-
[335]b .
[336]leading partial disclosures are neither fair to the individuals involved,
[338]nor a responsible way to lay the groundwork for informed public policy
[340]judgments.
[342]t
[343]4
[345]C. The Scope of the Committee's Investigation
[347]The investigation of the assassination issue has been an unpleasant
[348]duty, but one that the Select Committee had to meet. The Committee has
[350]compiled a massive record in the months that the inquiry has been underway.
[351].
[352]i > - i
[354]HY 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 6
[356]ane
[358]va , . ~-4— aaay
[360]The hearing record includes some _ pages of sworn testimony from
[361]witnesses*during shearing days as well as numerous staff interviews.
[363]The documents which the Committee obtained included raw files From the
[365]agencies and departments, from the White House, and from the Presidential
[367]libraries of the’ Administrations of former Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy
[369]Kennedy and Johnson.**
[371]We obtained evidence of two general types: first, evidence
[373]which related to the overall setting of events, the national policy of ~
[376]the time, and descriptions of normal operating procedures including
[378]channels of command and control; and second, evidence relating to specific
[380]i -
[382]events.
[384]A Senate Comittee is not a'lcourt. It looks to the past, not to
[386]: i .
[388]determine guilt or innocence, but in order to wake recommendations for the
[389]. at
[391]future. Therefore, where we found the evidence to be ambiguous--as we did
[393]on sone issues--we have set out both sides, in order that the evidence may
[395]speak for itself.
[396]Despite the number of witnesses and documents examined by the
[398]Committee, there were the Following shortcomings in the evidence available
[400]to us: |
[402]i
[404]“* The names of the witnesses are set forth in Appendix A.
[405]** The Committee served both general and specific document requests upon
[406]the Executive Branch and the Administration represented to the Committee that
[407]it did not know of any additional relevant documents, except, of course, for
[408]the possibility that the "'Nixon papers" (which the Committee is attempting
[410]to obtain) may contain material relevant to the allegations relating to Chile.
[411]. . _
[413]Me
[415]HWY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 9
[418]. ae . .
[419]Hany of the events'under consideration occurred as
[420]. 1 7
[422]long as fifteen years ano. With one exception, they
[425]occurred during the administrations of Presidents now dead.
[428]Other high officials, whose testimony might have
[430]additional light upen the thorny issues of authorization
[432]af
[434]and control, are also dead. Woreover, with. the passage
[436]of time, the memories o£ those still alive have ditmed.
[437]af ,
[439]te
[441]fhe Committee often faced the difficult task of dis-
[443]tinguishing refreshed recollection from speculation. In
[444]. f
[446]“ha
[447]many instances, witnesses were unable to testify from in-
[449]Cs
[451]dependent recollection and had to rely on documents con-
[453]temporaneous with the évents to refresh their recollections.
[455]While informed speculation is of some assistance, it can
[456]only. be assigned limited weight in judging specific events.
[458]Assassination is not a subject on which one would
[460]expect many records orjidocuments to be made or retained.
[461]al
[463]In fact, there were more relevant contemporaneous documents
[465]then we had expected, and the CIA in 1967 made internal
[467]'
[468]study of the Castro, Trujillo and Diem assassination allega-
[470]tions. That study was quite useful, particularly in
[471]: .
[472]suggesting leads for uncovering the story of the actual
[474]assassination activity. Unfortunately, some material
[477]4
[480]* Those studies were made at the direction of CIA Director Richard Helms
[481]to provide him with information .to respond to questions put to him by
[482]President Johnson. The. President's questions, as to Castro, were provoked
[483]by a Drew Pearson newspaper column of ‘March [6], 1967, which had alleged
[484]CIA attempts on the life of Castro using the Mafia. *
[486]HY 50955 Docld: 32423539
[488]about Trujillo and Diem.
[490]The President asked Helms at the |/same time to provide information
[491]tf ,
[493]Page 10
[497]relating to. that investigation was destroyed upon its
[499]completion.*
[501]A final deficiency in the evidence stems from the . *)
[502]doctrine that CIA covert operations should be concealed
[503]from the world and performed in such a way that if they
[505]were discovered, the role of the United States could be
[507]° plausibly denied. As an extension of this doctrine of T?
[508]“plausible deniability"” communications between the Agency My 2
[509]and high Administration officials were often convoluted yr
[511]beh.
[513]and imprecise.* * -
[515]The evidence contains sharp conflicts, Some of which relate to
[516]basic facts. But the most important conflicts telate not so much to basic
[517]facts as to differing perceptions and opinions based upon relatively undis-
[518]puted facts.
[520]With» respect to both kinds of conflicts, the Committee has
[521]attempted to set forth the evidence extensively so that it may speak for
[522]itself. In the findings and. conclusions section, we suzzest resolutions
[523]of some of the conflicts. Remembering that the Committee's main job is
[524]to find lessons for the future, there are also occasions where we point
[525]out that resolving conflicts in the evidence may be less important than
[527]making certain that the system which produced the aibiguities is corrected.
[529]* This was done pursuant to the instructions of CIA Director Richard
[530]Helms (Helms Ex. ; 6/13/75 Tr.__). In fairness to Director Helms it
[531]should be added, however, that he was responsible for requesting the
[532]preparation of the I.G. Reports and for preserving them.
[534]** For a full discussion of this doctrine see pages ; . a
[536]HY 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page qi
[538]i
[540]fd en
[543]D. Summary of Findings and .Conclusions
[545]1. The Questions Presented
[547]The Committee sought to answer four broad questions:
[549]ASSASSINATION PLOTS. Did U.S. officials instigate,
[550]attempt, aid and abet, or acquiesce in plots designed to
[551]assassinate. foreign leaders?
[553]INVOLVEMENT IN OTHER KILLINGS. Did U.S. officials
[554]assist foreign dissidents in a way which significantly con-
[555]tributed to the killing of foreign leaders?
[557]AUTHORIZATION. Where there was involvement by U.S.
[558]officials in assassination plots or other killings, were such
[560]activities ordered and if so, at what levels of our Government?
[561]COMMUNICATION AND. CONTROL... Even if not authorized,
[563]were the’ assassination activities perceived to.be within the
[565]scope of agency authority, and was adequate control exercised
[567]over its activities.
[569]2. Summary of Findings and Conclusions on the Plots
[571]The Seven Allegations. The Committee investigated alleged
[573]U.S. involvement in assassination plots in five foreign countries.* They
[575]were:
[577]Country Individual Involved**
[578]Cuba Fidel Castro
[579]Congo (Zaire) Patrice Luaunba
[581]* Insert Footnote on Sukarno and Duvalier.
[583]‘Le . ¥® Insert re Raul and Che and Ngo Dinh Nhu.
[585]HW 50955 DoclId:32423539 Page 12
[589]Countr ; ‘Individual Involved
[590]Dominican Republic Rafael Trujillo
[591]Chile General Rene Schneider
[593]South Vietnam » Ngo Dinh Diem _
[594]In summary, the evidence with respect to each allegation disclosed
[596]the following.*
[598]Fidel Castro (Cuba). United States Government personnel plotted
[600]to kill Castro beginning in 1960. American underworld figures were used in
[601]these plots as well as Cubans hostile to the Castro regime. One of the later
[602]plots, which lasted until 1965, involved a Cuban dissident who was provided
[604]encouragement and material support by the United States..
[606]Patrice Lumumba (Congo/Zaire). In the Fall of 1960, two CIA
[607]officials were asked by superiors to assassinate Lumumba. Poisons were
[608]sent to the Congo and some exploratory steps were taken toward gaining ey /
[611]CW
[612]access to Lumumba. Subsequently, in early 1961, Lumumba was killed by ~~ orF
[614]Congolese rivals. It does not appear from the evidence tha i
[616]States was involved in the actual killing.
[618]. Rafael Trujillo (Dominican Republic). Trujillo was shot by
[619]Dominican dissidents on May 31, 1961. Commencing in 1960 and continuing
[620]to the time of the assassination, the U.S. Government generally supported
[621]these dissidents and some Government personnel were aware that they intended
[622]to kill Trujillo. Three pistols and three carbines were furnished by
[623]American officials, although a request for machine guns was later refused. |
[624]There was conflicting evidence whether the weapons were knowingly supplied
[626]for use in the assassination and whether any were present at the scene.
[628]f 1
[631]* See Section III for a detailed treatment of the evidence.
[633]HW 50955 DociId:32423539 Page 13
[635]mo wens: set omnes
[636]General Rene Schneider (Chile). On Se tober 25, “1979, Ceneral
[638]Schneider died of gunshot wounds inflicted while resisting a kidnap attempt
[639]three days earlier. Schneider,'as Commander in Chief of the Arny and a
[640]constitutionalist opposed to military coups, was considered an obstacle to
[641]efforts to prevent Salvador Allende from assuming the office of [resident | ye
[642]HA ie
[643]of Chile. The United States Government supported and sought to instigate, [en yer
[644]a military coup to block Allende. U.S. officials supplied financial aid,
[645]machine suns and other equipment to various military figures who opposed
[646]Allende. ‘There was conflicting evidence on whether the United States had
[647]previously severed relations with the sroup,that kidnapped and killed
[648]1
[649]Schneider and on whether any of the equipment supplied was actually used
[650]in the kidnapping. ‘ .
[652]Neo Dinh Diem (South Vietnam) . Diem and his brother, Nhu, were
[653]killed on November 2, 1963, in the coutse of a South Vietnamese Cenerals'
[654]coup. Although the United States Government supported the coup, there was
[655]no evidence: that Anerican officials Favored the assassination. Indeed, it
[656]appeared that the assassination of Diem was not part of the Generals’ pre-
[657]coup planning but was instead a spontaneous act which occurred during the
[658]coup and with which there was no American connection.
[660]In addition to these Five cases the Cownittee received evidence
[662]that ranking yovernment officials discussed, and may have authorized, the
[664]establishment within the CIA of a generalized capability to assassinate.
[666]ce- Chairman Similarities and 1 Differences Among the Plots. The plots all
[668]‘vex reserved
[670]“ht to involved Third World countries, most of which were relatively mall and
[672]ranze to
[674]‘clude con- none of which possessed great political or military strength. Apart from.
[676]‘nt of Com- ‘ , .
[678]mist sphere that similarity, there were significant differences anong the plots. The
[681]“tha following distinctions are pertinent:
[683]‘stern HBemi-
[687]4
[690]HW 50955 DociId:32423539 Page 14
[692]- = 1LO- |
[694](1) Whether United States officials initiated the plot or
[695]were yesponding to requests of local dissidents for aid.
[697], (2) Whether the plot was specifically intended to kill a
[698]foreipn leader.or whether the Leader's death was a reasonably
[700]foreseeable consequence of an attempt to overthrow the fovern-
[701]rs
[704]ment.
[706]The Castro case is an example of a plot conceived by United States
[708]officials to kill a foreign leader.
[710]The Lumumba plot falls into the same
[711]category.
[712]In the case of Trujillo, althoughethe U. S. Covernment certainly
[713]opposed his repine, it did not initiate the plot. Rather, United States
[714]officials responded to requests for aid from local dissidents whose ain
[716]a | : +s
[717]clearly was to assassinate Trujillo.
[721]By aiding them this country was in- Cav
[723]. 4 \
[725]plicated, whether the specific weaponry actually supplied was meant to kill di sven
[726]DG . oe yor
[727]Trujillo or was only intended as a symbol of U.S. support for the dissidents. pot me
[729]. ay thas
[731]The Schneider case is different from that of both Castro and Tru- plinwwy
[733]tad : 6 e
[734]jillo. The United States Government sought a coup and provided support to ‘A “
[736]sees . . tr
[737]local dissidents, knowing they believed that General Schneider was an obstacle AALS
[738]to their plans. However, even though the support included. deadly weapons,
[740]it appears that the intention of both the dissidents and the United States
[741]officials was to abduct, not to kill, General Schneider. Similarly, in
[742]the Diem case, United States officials did want a change in Government, but
[744]there is no evidence that the United States sought the death of Diem himself.
[746]Sumrary of Findings and Conclusions on the Issues of Authority
[747]and Control.
[749]|
[752]L
[754]4
[755]4
[758]To put the inquiry into assassination allegations in context, two
[760]HW 50955 Doold:32423539 Page 15
[762]fe Sat
[766]points must be made clear. First, there is no doubt that the United States
[768]Government opposed the various leaders in question. U.S. officials’
[769]at the highest levels objected to the Castro and Trujillo regimes, believed
[770]the accession of Allende to power in Chile would be harmful to American in-
[771]terests, and thousht of Lumumba as a dangerous force in the heart of Africa.
[772]Second, the evidence on assassinations has to be viewed in the context of other,
[773]more massive activities directed against the regimes in question. For
[774]example, the plots directed against Fidel Castro personally, cannot be under-
[775]stood without considering the fully authorized, comprehensive, assaults upon
[776]his regine, such as the Bay of Pigs invasioa in 1°41 and Operation tMonzeose in
[777]1962,
[779]“Movever, the issue of Governmental authorization of assassination
[780]is of independent importance. There .is a significant difference between a
[781]coldblooded, targeted, intentional killing of an individual foreign leader and ly
[782]other forms of intervention in the affairs of foreign nations. Therefore, IT
[783]the Committee endeavored to explore as fully as possible the question of .
[785]and
[787]how and why the plots happened, whether they were authorized, and if so, from
[789]what level the authorization came.
[791]We discovered a murky picture. Tt is not clear whether this is
[792]due to the system of deniability and the consequent state of the evidence
[793]which even after our long investigation remains conflicting and inconclusive,
[794]or whether there were in fact serious shortcomings in the syste of authori-~
[795]zation so that activities such as assassinations could have been undertaken by
[797]an agency of the United States Government without express authority:
[800]a
[802]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 16
[804]Based upon the record of our investigation, the Committee's
[805]single most important finding is that the system was such that assassina-—
[806]tion activity could have been undertaken by an agency of the United States
[807]Government without it having been uncontrovertibly clear that there was
[809]explicit authorization from the highest level.
[811]Along with that paramount conclusion, the Committee makes four other
[812]najor findings.* The first relates to the lack_of direct evidence of authori~
[814]zation of the assassination plots by Presidents or other persons above the
[815]Covernmental arency or agencies involved. the second explains why certain
[816]officials may have, nonetheless, perceived Mat, according to their judgment
[818]—_——e "HD Pew
[819]and experience, assassination was an acceptable course of action. The third
[823]criticizes agency officials for failing on several occasions to revea L
[825]plans and activities to superior authorities, or. for failing.to do so with
[826]sufficient detail and clarity. The fourth criticizes Administration officials
[828]for, on.occasion, giving vague and indirect instructions to subordinates, and
[830]— — , TPO AN
[831]consideration. . ps Lyme THA? TRAP AAL rin tonw
[834]There is admittedly a tension within the four findings. The first
[836]4
[837]and third points tend to suggest a lack of authority while the second and
[838]_ fourth points explain why agency officials could nonetheless have perccived
[839]that their actions were proper. This tension reflects a basic conflict in the
[840]evidence. While there are some confliéts over facts, it is more important
[841]that there may often have been two differing perceptions of the same facts.
[842]This distinction may be the result of the differing backgrounds and ex-
[844]perience of those persons experienced in covert operations as distinguished
[846]* The Committee's findings are elaborated in Se¢tion >» infra.
[848]HY 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page if
[852]from those who were not. Words of urgency which to the former nay have meant
[853]killing, to the latter may have meant nothing of the sort.
[855]While we are critical of certain individual actions, the Committee
[856]is mindful of the inherent problems in a system which relies upon secrecy,
[857]compar tmentation, circumlocution, and the avoidance of clear responsibility.
[858]This sytem creates the risk of confusion and rashness in the very areas where
[859]clarity and sober judgment are most necessary. lence, before turning to an
[860]extensive reviewof the evidence relating to the cases, we briefly deal with
[863]the general subject of covert action during the relevant period.
[865]cd
[867]HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 16
[869]Subcommittee
[871]Il. COVERT ACTION AS VEHICLE FOR FOREIGN POLICY IMPLEMENTATION
[873]Simply stated, covert action may be defined as activity which sup-
[874]ports the sponsoring nation's foreign policy objectives but is concealed
[875]under circumstances permitting that nation to plausibly deny its actions.
[877]The National Security Act of 1947 did not specifically include
[878]authority for covert operations. However, it granted to the National
[879]Security Council, then created as an. instrument of the President, the
[880]authority to direct the CIA to "perform such other functions and duties | ——
[881]related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National
[882]Security Council may from time to time direct." Thereafter, at its
[884]first meeting in December 1947, the National Security Council issued
[886]a top secret directive granting the CIA the authority to conduct covert
[888]panne
[889]operations. From 1955 to 1970, the basic authority for these operations .
[890]was National Security Council 5412/2.*
[891]This directive framed the purposes of covert operations entirely
[892]in terms of opposition to "International Communism ,"'** directing the CIA _ a
[894]to counter, reduce and discredit "International Communism" throughout the
[895]world in a manner consistent with U. S. foreign and military policies.
[896]It alse directed the CIA to undertake covert operations to achieve this
[898]end, and defined covert operations ‘as any covert activities related to
[900]* Today the basic authority for CIA covert action operations is National . a
[901]Security Decision Memorandum 40, “which _ Superceded NSC 5412/2 on Feb- -
[902]ruary 17, 1970. . ' . . 7
[904]** By contrast, NSAM 40 of 1970. described ‘covert actions as those secret
[905]activities designed to further official U. S. programs and policies,
[906]abroad. It made no reference 'to. communism,
[908]HY 50955 Docld:324293539 Page 19°
[910]propaganda, economic warfare, political action (Gneluding sabotage,
[912]demolition and assistance to resistance movements) and all activities
[914]‘compatible with the directive (emphasis supplied). In 1962, the CIA's
[915].
[916]General Counsel rendered the opinion that the Agency's activities are
[918]“not inhibited by any limitations other than those broadly set forth
[920]in NSC 5412/2." (CIA General Counsel Memorandum 4/6/62)
[922]POLICY. DEVELOPMENT AND APPROVAL MECHANISM
[924]The evidence dealt with tn Part LIE is concerned with what actually
[925]happened as far as obtaining, or not obtaining, authorization for the ac~
[926]tivities under review by the Committee. With respect to what was meant
[927]to happen in regard to covert action generally, the CIA's General Counsel
[929]stated in 1962:
[930]CIA must necessarily be responsible for planning. Oc-
[931]casionally suggestions for action will come from out-
[932]side sources but, to depend entirely on such require-
[933]ments would be an evasion of the Agency's responsibili-
[934]ties. Also, the average person, both in government and
[935]outside, is thinking along normal lines and to develop
[936]clandestine cold war activities properly, persons know-~
[937]ing both the capabilities and limitations of clandestine
[938]action must be studying and devising how such © actions -
[939]can be undertaken effectively.
[941]With respect to policy. approval, the General Counsel went on to say:
[943]Both in developing. ideas ‘or plans. for action it is in-
[944]cumbent upon the. Agency” to obtain necessary policy ap-
[945]proval, and for this purtpose these matters should be
[946]explored with proper officials in other departments
[947]-and agencies, particularly in the Departments of State
[948]and Defense, so: the” determination can be made as to
[949]whether any.one- proposal. ‘should go to the ‘Special Group
[950]or higher for policy determination.
[952]The General Counsel's 1962 memorandum made it clear that the CIA
[954]considered itself responsible: for. developing Proposals and plans to
[956]HY 50955 DocId:39423539 Page 20
[959]- 3
[961]implement the specific objectives of NSC 541k
[963]we
[965]ever, the memorandum stated that even in the development of ideas or plans
[967]for action, it was incumbent upon the Agency not only to coordinate with
[969]other executive departments and agencies, but also to “obtain necessary —
[970]policy approval" (emphasis added): The issue which faced the Committee,
[971]of course, was whether such approval was, in fact, sought and obtained
[972]for assassination plans, and whether CIA officials thought it was "neces~
[973]a ; : .
[974]sary" to obtaig expres abproval for thes ivities.
[977]Beginning in 1955, the responsibility for authorizing CIA covert
[979]action operations rested inthe Special Group, : a Sub- Cabinet level sub-
[980]“committee of the ‘National Security Council corfposed of the President's
[981]Assistant for National Security Affairs, the Director of Central In-
[982]telligence, the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of ——
[983]State for Political Affairs. Today: this group is known as the 40 Com-
[984]mittee, and its membership now includes the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
[985]of Staffs. In addition, during 1962. another subcommittee of the NSC was
[986]established to oversee covert operations relating to Cuba. It was known
[987]as the Special Group (Augmented) ‘and was: composed of the members of the -
[988]Special Group, the Attorney General and certain other high officials.
[989]The overriding purpose ‘of the Special Group and its successors
[990]has been to exercise control over covert operations abroad. The Special
[991]Group was charged with the responsibility of considering the objectives
[992]of any proposed activity, whether: or not it would accomplish these aims.
[993]how likely it would be to succeed, and in géneral whether or net it would
[997]be "proper" and in the American interest. The Special Group Chairman
[999]usually was responsible for determining which projects required Presi-
[1001]a oo aaa
[1002]dential consideration, as well as keéping him abreast of progress or changes.:
[1004]> . a , ola NN
[1007]The Foregoing should not be taken to imply that the procedurés
[1009]always have been clear and tidy, nor that they have always been fol-
[1011]lowed. Prior to 1955, formal procedures barely existed at all. In
[1013]a aa
[1015]1955 the Special Group procedures were. made more formal. Neverthe~
[1016]less, the procedures that were|followed during the period of 1959-63
[1017]were characterized by an internal CIA memorandum as "somewhat cloudy
[1019]and thus can probably be described as having been based on value judg- ; .
[1021]ments by the DCI." (Memorandum for the Record, C/CA/PEG, "Policy Co-
[1022]ordination of CIA's Covert Action’ Operations," 21 February 1967)
[1024]| In addition to the "somewhat,-cloudy" nature of the formal pro-
[1025]cedures themselves, there are other options afailable to any Chief Ex-
[1026]ecutive. The Committee recognizes that, an agency charter to plan cov-
[1027]ert action could not preempt Presidential authority to develop and nad
[1028]mandate foreign policy. Similarly, it is equally clear that what may
[1029]be represented as the "desire" of a. President is often communicated by
[1030]-intermediary officials whose perceptions may Or may not accurately
[1031]reflect the true Presidential purpose. Obviously, formal procedures
[1033]i
[1035]can be disregarded from above or below. In at least one case, for
[1036]| . . .
[1037]example, a President instructed CIA’ officials not. to consult with the
[1039]‘Special Group or other departments. In at least one other case, Agency
[1041]officials decided not to bring! matters to ‘the attention of the Special
[1043]Group. It should also be noted that all of the above procedures apply
[1045]to activities labeled "covert action" whereas. some of the activities
[1046]considered in this report were) treated as. "counter-intelligence" actions.
[1048]oe . ne ; a nn
[1049]Such actions are not normally subject to 40 Committee-type interdepart=
[1051]mental authorization and review.
[1054]The Concept of "Plausible|Deniabilitry"
[1055]Non-attribution for U. S.|Government covert operations was the
[1057]original and principal purpose} of the so-called doctrine of plausible fh i
[1058]: f
[1060]| | ain
[1061]denial. 3 . by sree As
[1062]Evidence before the Committee clearly demonstrates that this con- [Pere
[1063]cept, designed to protect the U. &. and its operatives from the conse-
[1064]quences of disclosures, has been significantly expanded to: (1) mask ; -
[1066]not only Presidential decisions but those of his senior staffers; (2)
[1067]support less than complete advice to such persons regarding these op-
[1068]’ erations.
[1070]The quest for "plausible denial" has shaffed the processes of the
[1071]i :
[1073]U. S. Government for approving|
[1075]and evaluating covert actions. The 40
[1076]{ . .
[1078]Committee and its predecessors|can serve as "circuit breakers" for a co —
[1079]President, placing the locus of consideration of covert action at sev-
[1080]eral removes from the Oval office. One consequence of the doctrine of
[1082]plausible denial is an incomplete documentary record.
[1084]wads Tinons
[1086]These tech- a a
[1087](Pe
[1089]niques have had as their purpose the objective of allowing the Presi-
[1091]The quest for "plausible denial" has also led to the use of cer-
[1093]tain techniques, including euphemism and circumlocution.
[1095]dent and other senior officials to. deny knowledge of an operation should
[1096]it be disclosed. In addition,} the use. of indirect reference to inform
[1098]a President could be reversed--a President could communicate his desire
[1099]. ;
[1101]to see a highly sensitive operation undertaken in a similar indirect,
[1103]ee a OWE Way an e ovher
[1104]circumlocutious manner. Whether,,.at- times: circumlocution had thd affect :
[1106]of failing to let Presidents or other officials accurately understand
[1108]what was being said, was'a question faced by the Committee.
[1111]spr)
[1113]a eo Sey
[1115]"Plausible deniability" raises a number of other issues which the
[1116]Committee has had to confront.} Differing interpretations of the practice
[1118]of plausible denial has affected the extent to which sensitive matters |
[1120]x
[1122]were raised or considered. The evidence discussed below revealed that ; —
[1124]very serious problems of assessing and insuring accountability and con-
[1126]trol can arise out of plausible deniability.
[1128]ee,
[1132]HW 40955 Borld: 32493539 Page 24°
[1134]on August 29, 1975
[1136]7
[1138]B. Cuba
[1140]We have divided the facts with respect to Cuba into three
[1141]broad sections. |
[1143]The first discusses the plots against Fidel Castro's life
[1144]without attempting to confront the question of authorization.
[1146]The second deals with the ‘evidence concerning whether or not
[1147]the successive Directors of Central Intelligence, Allen Dulles and John
[1148]McCone, authorized or knew about the various plots. (Although we have
[1149]organizationally divided the evidence relating to the DCI's from the
[1150]proof relating to other high administration officials, it is important
[1151]to remember that the Director of Central Intelligence is the principal
[1152]advisor to the President on intelligence matters, a member of major
[1153]administrative policy-making councils as well as head of the Central
[1154]Intelligence Agency.)
[1156]The third section covers the evidence concerning whether or
[1157]not other high officials-~including the various. Presidents--authorized
[1158]or knew about the plots. This section also considers the evidence relating
[1159]to whether or not the CIA officials who were involved with the plots believed
[1160]them to be consistent with the general policy objectives - of the various
[1161]administrations even if they had no personal knowledge as to whether the
[1163]plots were or were not specifically authorized by higher authority.
[1165]HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 25
[1168]Peal
[1169]Met
[1171]Sad
[1172]Ser,
[1174]1
[1175]L
[1177].. The Assassination Plots Themselves
[1179]We have found concrete evidence of at least eight
[1180]plots involving the CIA to assassinate Fidel Castro from 1960
[1182]‘to 1965. Although some of the assassination plots did not
[1184]advance beyond the stageof planning and preparation, one plot
[1185]involving the use of underworld figures reportedly twice pro-
[1186]gressed to the point of sending poison pills to Cuba and
[1187]dispatching teams to commit the deed. Another plot involved
[1188]furnishing weapons and other assassination devices to a Cuban
[1189]dissident. The assassination proposals ran-the gamut from
[1191]high-powered rifles to poison pills, poison pens, deadly
[1193]“bacterial powders, and other devices which would _strai
[1195]‘The most ironic of these plots took place on
[1196]November 22, 1963--the very day that President Kennedy was
[1197]shot in Dallas--when a CIA official in Paris offered a poison
[1198]pen to a Cuban for use against Castro while at the same. time
[1199]an enissary from President Kennedy was meeting with Castro to.
[1200]explore the possibility of improved relations.
[1202]The following narrative sets forth the facts of
[1203]assassination plots against Castro as established before the
[1204]Committee by witnesses and documentary evidence. The question
[1205]of the level and degree of authorization of the plots is
[1207]considered in the sections that follow.
[1209]HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 26
[1211](a) Plots: Early 1960
[1212](1) Plots to Destroy Castro's Public Image
[1214]Efforts against Castro did not begin with .
[1215]assassination attempts.
[1217]From March through August 1960, during the
[1218]last year of the Eisenhower Administration, the CIA considered
[1219]plans to undermine Castro's charismatic appeal by sabotaging his
[1220]speeches. According to the Inspector General's Report, an
[1221]official in the Technical Services Division (TSD) recalled dis-
[1222]cussing a scheme to spray Castro's brSadcasting studio with a
[1223]chemical which produced effects similar to LSD, but rejected the
[1224]scheme because the chemical’ was not reliable. During this period,
[1225]TSD impregnated a box of cigars with a chemical which produced
[1226]temporary disorientation, hoping to induce. Castro to smoke one
[1227]of the cigars before. delivering a speech. The Inspector General
[1228]also reported a plan to destroy Castro's image as "The Beard” by
[1229]dusting his shoes with thallium salts, a strong depilatory that.
[1230]would cause his beard to fall out. The chemical was to be adminis-
[1231]-tered during a trip outside of Cuba, in which it was anticipated .
[1232]Castro would leave his shoes outside the door of his hotel room
[1233]to be shined. TSD procured the chemical and tested it on animals,
[1234]but apparently abandoned the scheme because Castro cancelled his
[1235]trip. (1.G., pp. 10-13.)
[1237](2) Proposal to Sabotage Flight
[1239]The first proposed action against the life of, rn
[1241]a Cuban leader sponsored by the CIA of which the Committee is J Of
[1243]aware took place in July 1960. : On July 18, 1960, a Cuban airline DP
[1245]Hy 50955 DoclId: 324235393 Page 27
[1247]pilot who had volunteered to assist the CIA in gathering intelli-
[1248]gence informed his case officer in Havana that he would probably
[1250]be chosen to fly to Prague on July 21 to return Raul Castro to
[1252]Cuba (Memo to 1.G., 1/17/75). ‘On July 20 the pilot confirmed that
[1253]he would definitely fly the plane. CIA Headquarters and field
[1254]stations along the route were requested to inform the Havana Station
[1255]of any intelligence needs that the pilot might fulfill. The case |
[1256]officer testified that he and the pilot contemplated only acquiring
[1257]information about Czechoslovakia and Raul Castro, and that assas-
[1258]sination was not considered.* ~ -
[1260]The cable from the Havana Station was received at Head-
[1261]quarters on the night of July 20. The duty officer, who was summoned ~
[1262]to Headquarters from his home, contacted Tracy Barnes, Deputy to
[1263]DDP Richard Bissell, and J.C. King, Chief of the Western Hemisphere
[1264]Division.** Following their instructions, he sent a cable to the
[1265]Havana Station early in the morning of July 21, statine: "Possible
[1266]removal top three leaders is receiving serious consideration at
[1267]HQs." The cable inquired whether the pilot was sufficiently
[1269]motivated to risk "arranging an accident during return trip" and
[1271]* A cable to Headquarters requesting any intelligence needs
[1272]supports this account. ;
[1274]** The duty officer testified that he must have spoken with King
[1275]because he would not otherwise have signed the cable "by direction,
[1276]J.S. King". (Duty Officer, p. 16) He also would "very definitely"
[1277]have read the cable to Barnes before sending it, because "Barnes
[1278]was the man to whom we went. . . for our authority and for work
[1279]connected with the Cuban Project." (Duty Officer, pp. 4, 25) Since
[1280]King at that time was giving only "nominal attention" to Cuban
[1281]. affairs, the officer concluded that a proposal of the gravity of an
[1282]at assassination could only have "come from Mr. Barnes". (Duty Officer,
[1283]p. eh)
[1285]HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 26
[1287]~ : advised that the station could "at discretion.contact subject to
[1288]determine willingness to cooperate and his suggestions on details".
[1289]Ten thousand dollars was authorized as payment "after successful
[1290]completion", but no advance payment was permitted because of the
[1291]possibility that the pilot was a double agent. According to the
[1292]ease officer, this cable represented "quite a departure from the
[1293]conventional activities we'd been asked to handle". (Case Officer
[1294]interview, 8/4/75, p. 2)*
[1296]The case officer contacted the pilot and told him of the
[1297]proposal while accompanying him. to thé airport for the flight. The
[1298]case officer avoided the word "assassinate", put made it clear that
[1299]the CIA contemplated an “accident to neutralize this leader's
[1300](Raul's) influence". “(Case Officer interview, p. 2) After being
[1301]assured that his sons would be given a college education in the
[1302]event of his death, the pilot agreed to take a "calculated risk",
[1303]limited to possibilities that might pass as accidental.** (Cable,
[1304]Havana to Director, 7/22/70) |
[1306]Immediately after returning to the station the case
[1308]officer was told that a cable had just arrived stating: "Do not
[1312]* The duty officer remembered the cable and some of the surround-
[1313]ing facts for precisely that reason: "[I]t was an unusual type of
[1314][cable], and I say this because I can remember it 15 years later."
[1315](Duty Officer, p. 14) The case officer recalled that when he saw
[1316]the cable, he "swallowed hard". (Case Officer interview, p. 3)
[1318]**® The cable from Havana to Headquarters stated that the pilot
[1319]was willing to risk: "A. Engine burnout on takeoff to delay or
[1320]harrass trip: B. Vague possibility water ditching approximately
[1321]three hours out from Cuba." .
[1325]it
[1327]HW 50955 Doocld:32423539 Page 29
[1329]pursue ref. Would Like to’ drop matter." (Cable, Director to
[1330]Havana, 7/22/60; Memo to I.G., 1/17/75)* It was, of course, too
[1331]late to “drop the matter" since the plane had already departed.
[1332]When the Cuban pilot returned, he told the case officer that he
[1333]had not had an opportunity to arrange an accident. |
[1334](3) Poison Cigars
[1335]A notation in the records of the Chief,
[1337]Operations Div., Office of Medical Services indicates that on
[1339]- August 16, 1960, he was given a box of Castro's favorite cigars
[1340]with instructions to treat them with a lethal poison (1.G., Pp.
[1341]21). The cigars were contaminated with a botulinum toxin so
[1342]potent that a@ person would die after putting one in his mouth
[1343](I.G., p. 22). The Chief reported that the cigars were ready on
[1344]October 1, 1960; TSD notes indicate that they were delivered to
[1345]an unidentified person on February 13, 1961 (I.G., p. 22). The
[1346]record does not disclose whether an attempt was made to pass the
[1348]cigars to Castro.
[1350](b) Use of Underworld Figures--Phase I
[1352](1) The Initial Plan
[1353]In August 1960, the CIA took steps to enlist
[1355]the aid of members of the criminal underworld with gambling
[1357]® This cable was signed by Tracy Barnes (Duty Officer, p. 28)
[1358]The duty officer recalled seeing this cable, and testified that he
[1359]had heard that Allen Dulles had countermanded the cable authorizing
[1360]the possible assassination attempt against Raul Castro. (Duty
[1361]Officer, pp. 29-30) The reasons for Dulles' action are discussed
[1362]infra at ; : *
[1364]HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 30
[1366]syndicate contacts .to assassinate Castro. The earliest evidence
[1367]of the operation is a conversation. between Deputy Director of
[1368]Plans (DDP) Richard Bissell and Colonel Sheffield Edwards, Chief
[1369]of the Office of Security. Edwards recalled that Bissell asked
[1370]him to locate someone who could assassinate Castro (Edwards,
[1371]pp. 2-3). Bissell confirmed that he requested Edwards to find
[1372]someone to assassinate Castro, and believed that Edwards raised
[1373]the idea of contacting members of a gambling syndicate operating
[1374]in Cuba (Bissell, 6/9, pp. 71-73). Edwards assigned the mission
[1375]to James P. O'Connell, Chief of. the Operational Support Division
[1376]of the CIA's Office of Security, explaining that he and Bissell
[1377]were looking for someone to "eliminate" or "assassinate" Castro
[1378](O'Connell, pp. 6-8, 95-96).
[1379] Rawards and O'Connell decided to rely on Robert A.
[1380]Maheu to recruit someone "rough enough” to handle the job
[1381](O'Connell, p. 8). Maheu was an ex-FBI agent who had entered into
[1382]a career as a private investigator in 195h. Robert Cunningham,
[1383]a former FBI associate of Maheu's who was employed in the CIA's
[1385]Office of Security, had arranged for the CIA to use Maheu in
[1387]* Although Castro closed the gambling casinos in Cuba when
[1388]he first came to power, they were reopened for use by foreign
[1389]tourists in late February 1959, and remained open until late
[1390]September 1961.
[1392]HY 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 31
[1394]several sensitive covert operations in which "he didn't want to
[1396]have an Agency person or a government person get caught"* (O'Connell,
[1398]p. 158). Maheu was initially paid a monthly retainer by the CIA |
[1400]of $500, which was terminated after his practice became more
[1402]lucrative (O'Connell, pp. 13-14; I.G., p. 15). O'Connell had
[1404]served as Maheu's case officer since the Agency first began using
[1405]_Maheu's services, and by 1960 they had become close personal
[1407]friends (Maheu, p. 6).
[1409]Sometime in late August or early September 1960,
[1411]O'Connell approached -Maheu about the proposed operation (O'Connell,
[1413]p. 9; Maheu, 7/29, p. 6). As Maheu recalls the conversation,
[1415]O'Connell asked him to contact John Roselli, an underworld figure
[1417]with possible gambling contacts in Las Vegas, to determine if he
[1419]* During 1954-1955, Maheu cooperated with the CIA in‘ attempting
[1420]. to undermine Aristotle Onassis' contract with the Saudi Arabian
[1421]government that would have given Onassis virtually complete control .
[1422]over shipping of oil from Saudi Arabia. Although he was employed
[1423]by Onassis' competitor, Niarchos, Maheu worked closely with the
[1424]CIA. He testified that he contracted for a listening device to be
[1425]placed on Onassis' room in New York after first consulting with the
[1426]Agency, and that he provided the impetus for the termination of the
[1427]contract by publicizing its terms in a newspaper in Rome that he
[1428]said he purchased with CIA funds. (Maheu, 7/30/75, pp. 14-25.)
[1430]O'Connell testified that Maheu, at the CIA's request had also
[1431]previously arranged for the production of a film in Hollywood
[1432]depicting a foreign leader with a woman in the Soviet Union. The
[1433]CIA planned to circulate the filn, representing it to have been pro-~-
[1434]duced, but not released (O'Connell, pp. 159, 162-153). Maheu testi-
[1435]fied that he had located an actor resembling the leader and -had
[1437]_ arranged for the production of the film (Maheu, 7/30/75, pp. 39-h2).
[1441]HY 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 32
[1443]oe would participate in a.plan to "dispose" of Castro® (Maheu, 7/29,
[1444]p. 8). Maheu had known Roselli since the late 1950's (Maheu, 7/29,
[1445]pp. 58-60). Although Maheu claims not to have been aware of the
[1446]extent of Roselli's underworld connections and activities, he
[1447]recalled that .
[1448]"it was certainly evident to me that he was-able to
[1449]accomplish things in Las Vegas when nobody else seemed
[1450]to get the same kind of attention" (Maheu, 7/29, p. 60).
[1451]O'Connell had previously met Roselli at Maheu's home (Maheu, 7/29,
[1452]p. 8). O'Connell and Maheu each claimed that the other had raised
[1453]the idea of using Roselli, and Maheu Said O'Connell was aware that
[1454]Roselli had contacts with the gambling syndicate Tate! OGOnn err 7elrs
[1455]p. 8; O'Connell, pp. 15-16).
[1456]Maheu was at first reluctant to become involved
[1457]in the operation because it might interfere with his relationship
[1458]with his new client, Howard Hughes. He finally agreed because he
[1459]felt that he owed the Agency a commitment (O'Connell, PP. 12-13,
[1460]103). O'Connell recalled that Maheu was to approach Roselli
[1461]using a cover story that he represented business firms suffering
[1462]heavy financial losses caused by Castro's actions** (O'Connell,
[1463]p. 16). O'Connell testified that Maheu was told to offer money ,
[1464]t
[1465]7 * Maheu testified that he was told that the plan to assassinate
[1466]eae was one phase of a larger project to invade Cuba (Maheu,
[1467]- 7, 13, 47).
[1468]** Roselli testified that the story was developed later and
[1470]used as a mutual "cover" by O'Connell, Maheu, and Roselli in
[1471]dealing with Cubans recruited for the project (Roselli, pp. 16-17).
[1473]HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 33
[1475]probably $150,000, for Castro's assassination* (O'Connell, pp. 16,
[1476]111; Memorandum, Osborn to. DCI, 6/24/66).
[1477](2) ‘Contact With The Syndicate
[1478]In early September 1960, Maheu met Roselli
[1479]at the Brown Derby in Beverly Hills, told him that “high govern-
[1483]ment officials” needed. his cooperation in getting rid of Castro,
[1485]and asked him to help recurit Cubans to do the job (Roselli, p. 8).
[1487]Maheu recalled. that Roselli was at first reluctant to participate
[1488]in the project and insisted: on meeting with a representative of
[1489]the government (Maheu, 1/29, pp. 10-11; Roselli, p. 9). A meeting
[1490]with O'Connell was arranged in New York City at the Plaza Hotel
[1491]during the week of September 1h, 1960 (Roselli, pp. 10-11; I.c.,
[1492]p- 16). O'Connell testified that he was introduced to Roselli .
[1494]as a pusiness associate of Maheu, and that Maheu told Roselli
[1496]that he represented international business interests which were
[1497]pooling money to pay for the assassination of Castro (O'Connell,
[1499]p. 26). Roselli claimed that Maheu told him at that time that
[1501]O'Connell was with the CIA** (Roselli, pp. 11, 85).
[1503]* The I.G. Report places the amount at $150,000; O'Connell
[1504]thought it might have been $100,000 (O'Connell, p. 16), Roselli
[1505]recalled $250,000 (Roselli, p- 25) and Edwards confirmed the
[1506]$150,000 figure (Edwards, p. 9). Maheu could recall no "price
[1507]tag" for Castro's assassination (Maheu, p. 34).
[1509]** The weight of the testimony indicates that Roselli realized
[1510]the CIA was behind the assassination attempt at an early stage.
[1512]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 34
[1514]10
[1516]11
[1518]It was arranged that Roselli would go to
[1519]Florida and recruit Cubans for the operation (Roselli, pp. 11-12).
[1520]Edwards informed Bissell that contact had been made with the
[1521]gambling syndicate (Bissell, 6/9, pp. 20-21; I.G., p. 17).
[1522]During the week of September 24, 1960,
[1523]O'Connell, Maheu, and Roselli met in Miami to work out the
[1524]details of the operation (O'Connell, pp. 25-26; Roselli, p. 12;
[1525]I.G., p. 18). Roselli used the cover name of "John Rawlston"
[1526]and represented himself to the Cuban contacts as an agent of belin ot
[1528]“some business interests of Wall Street. that had... w,
[1529]nickel interests and properties around in Cuba, and I we kC
[1530]was getting financial assistance from them" (Roselli,
[1532]pp. 9, 17).
[1534]Maheu handled the details of setting up
[1535]the operation and keeping O'Connell informed of developments.
[1536]After they had been in Miami for a short time, and certainly
[1538]prior to October 18,* Roselli introduced Maheu to two indivi-
[1540]Maheu substantially confirmed his account (Maheu, ._p. 111).
[1541]O'Connell recalled that about three weeks after the New York
[1542]meeting, Roselli told him, "I am not kidding, I know who you
[1543]work for." (O'Connell, p. 26.)
[1545]* Maheu recalls that he first met "Sam Gola" (Giancana)
[1546]after November ,; 1960, when he was staying at the Fountainbleu
[1547]Hotel (Maheu, p. 17), Other evidence indicates that the meet-.
[1548]ing took place earlier. When they first went to Miami, Maheu
[1549]and Roselli stayed at the Kennilworth Hotel (Maheu, pp. 15-16);
[1550]FBI records reveal that Maheu and Roselli (alias J. A. Rollins)
[1551]were registered at the Kennilworth from October 11-30 (File
[1552]R-505, FBI summary, p. 10). Giancana must have been involved
[1553]in the operation during the October period at the Kennilworth
[1554]pecause (1) the wiretap of Rowan's apartment, discussed infra,
[1555]was made on October 30°; (2) on October 18, the FBI sent, a memorandum to
[1556]Bissell stating. that Giancana had been telling several people that he was
[1557]involved in an assassination attempt against Castro (see infra, p. ).
[1559]HW 50955 DociId:32423539 Page 35
[1561]12
[1563]duals on whom he intended to rely: "Sam Gold", who would
[1564]serve as a "back-up man" (Roselli, p. 15), or dan fl’ (38
[1565](Maheu, p. 17), and "Joe", whom "Gold" said would serve as
[1567]a courier to Cuba and make arrangements there (I.G., p. 19).
[1568]O'Connell, who was using the name "Jim Olds", met "Sam" and
[1569]"Joe" only briefly (O'Connell, pp. 26-29).
[1570]O'Connell. testified that he learned the true
[1571]identities of his associates one morning when Maheu called and
[1572]asked him to examine the "Parade" suppiement to the Miami
[1573]Times.* An article on the Attorney General's ten-most-wanted
[1574]criminals list revealed that "Sam Gold" was Mom Salvatore Giancana,
[1575]a Chicago-based gangster ,** and "Joe" was Santos Trafficante,
[1576]. the Cosa Nostra chieftain in Cubad (O'Connell, pp. 28-30);
[1577]I.G., p. 19). O'Connell reported his discovery to Edwards
[1578](O'Connell, pp. 31, 33) but did not know whether Edwards
[1579]reported this fact to his superiors (O'Connell, pp. 32, hi).
[1580]O'Connell testified that this incident occurred after "re
[1581]were in this thing up to our ears", a month or so after
[1583]* A search of supplements to all Miami papers during this
[1584]period did not reveal the article described by O'Connell.
[1586]** Sam Giancana was murdered in his home on June 20, 1975.
[1588]# Trafficante made regular trips between Miami and Cuba on
[1589]gambling syndicate business (1.G., pp. 19-20).
[1591]HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 36
[1593]“ ole > coe” uP. a
[1594]ae wee si clpiae fon ® 13
[1596]Giancana had been brought into the operation, but prior to
[1598]giving the poison pills to Roselli (O'Connell, pp. 30, Wb). a4 ia aan
[1600]peo 7 ven l/s
[1602]Maheu recalled that it was Giancana's job
[1604]to locate someone in Castro's entourage who could accomplish
[1606]the assassination (Maheu, p. 19), and that he met almost
[1608]daily with Giancana over a substantial period of time (Maheu,
[1610]p. 18). Although Maheu described Giancana as playing a "key
[1612]role" (Maheu, p. 34), Roselli claimed that none of the Cubans
[1614]eventually used in the operation were acquired through
[1616]Cs
[1618]Giancana's contacts (Roselli, p. 15).
[1620](3) Rowan Wiretap Incident
[1622]In late October 1960, Maheu arranged for
[1623]a Florida investigator, Edward DuBois, to place an electronic
[1624]"bug" in comedian Dan Rowan's room in Las Vegas (Maheu, p. 36).
[1625]DuBois' employee, Arthur J. Balletti, flew to Las Vegas and
[1626]installed a tap on Rowan's phone (Maheu, p. 38). O'Connell
[1627]characterized the ensuing events. as a "Keystone comedy act"
[1628](O'Connell, Pp. 68). On October 31, 1960, Balletti, believing
[1629]that Rowan would be out for the afternoon, left the wiretap
[1630]equipment unattended. A maid discovered the equipment and
[1632]notified the local sheriff, who arrested Balletti and brought
[1634]* According to O'Connell and Roselli, DuBois had been
[1635]requested to place a legal electronic bug against the wall
[1636]from an adjacent apartment. Balletti instead installed an
[1637]electronic tap on the phone (O'Connell, pp. 67- 685 Maheu,
[1638]pp. 36-37). ‘ 7
[1640]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 37
[1642]| ESE pron ate ype
[1647]him to the jail. Balletti called Maheu in Miami, tying "Maheu into this
[1649]14
[1651]thing up to his ear" (0'Comnel1, pp. 71-72; File R-505, FBI memorandum).
[1652]Balletti's bail was paid by| Roselli (Roselli, p. 52).
[1653]i
[1655](i) Evidence Concerning CIA involvement in the Tap. The
[1657]Committee received conflicting evidence on whether the agency was consulted
[1659]prior to. the installation of the tap.” O'Connell testified that he
[1661]had called Edwards and cleared ‘the placement of an electronic "bug" in
[1663]i
[1664]4
[1666]Rowan's apartment prior to ‘the installation of the tap (O'Connell,
[1668]pp. 67-71). Maheu recalled that he hadeinitially asked O'Connell if
[1669]the CIA would handle the job, and that O'Connell had told him that
[1670]: .
[1671]"he would: call Mr. Edwards and see if they would have the
[1672]capability of accomplishing this, . . . and that subsequently
[1673]he informed me that Mr. Edwards had said that they would not
[1674]“do it, but approved paying for it if we hired an independent
[1675]private detective to put it on." (Maheu, 7/29, p. 37).
[1676]On the other hand, Bawards ina May 14, 1962 memorandum for the
[1677]Attorney General (aiscussed at length, infra, p. —),,_ stated that
[1679]"At the time of [the incident neither the Agency nor
[1681]the Umerstened jes of ‘the proposed technical installation."**
[1683]Ms Regardless of whether thé CIA initially authorized the tap, it is apparent
[1684]at the CIA paid for the tap. DuBois told FBI agents that Maheu had
[1685]a paid him a retainer of $1, 000 (File R-505, p. 14). O'Connell confirmed
[1686]that CIA "indirectly" paid for the tap because "we paid Maheu a certain
[1687]amount of money, and. he just paid it out of what we were giving him."
[1689]~ "Q: But it was understood, or you understood, that out of the money
[1690]. the CIA made available to Maheu, Dubois would be paid for the tap?
[1692]A: Yes.
[1693]re a “
[1694]Q: And Colonel Edwards . .» . knew somebody was being employed
[1695]oo - _ dn order to accomplish a tap?
[1696]cad gg ‘A: That is right.") (O'Connell, p. 69.)
[1698]“A memorandum : by J. Edgar Hoover states that the Attorney General said he had
[1699]been told by Edwards that the "CIA admitted that they had assisted Maheu
[1700]-in making the installation" (Memo, Hoover, 4/10/62) .
[1702]|
[1704]t
[1705]t
[1706]_ {
[1707]HW 50955 Docld: 32742734539 Page 36
[1709]15
[1711]- The Inspector General's Report accepted Edwards' assertion that "the
[1712]Ageney was first unwitting and then a reluctant accessory after the fact",
[1713]but offered no further evidence to support that contention (1.G., p. 67).
[1715]The Committee also received conflicting evidence concerning
[1717]whether the tap had been placed to keep Giancana in Miami or to check
[1718]on security leaks. O'Connell testified that during the early stages of
[1719]negotiations with the gambling syndicate, Maheu informed O'Comell that a
[1720]girl friend of Gianeana was having an affair with Rowan. Giancana wanted
[1721]Maheu to bug Rowan's room; otherwise, Glancana threatened to fly to Las
[1722]Vegas himself. Maheu was concerned that Giancana's departure would
[1723]disrupt the negotiations, and secured O'Connell's permission to arrange
[1724]for a bug to ensure Giancana's continued presence and cooperation.
[1725](O'Connell, pp. 68-67.) Maheu substantially confirmed this account
[1726](Maheu, pp. 25-30).
[1728]There is some evidence suggesting that the CIA itself may have vel,
[1729]instituted the tap to-determine whether Giancana was leaking information ae
[1730]about his involvement in an assassination attempt against castro.
[1731]Bissell was informed that Giancana had been talking about Giancana's
[1733]involvement in an assassination plot* ( without indicating the CIA was
[1735]* when Roselli talked with Giancana after the wiretap had been discovered,
[1736]Giancana "laughed. . . I remember his expression, smoking a cigar, he .
[1737]almost swallowed it laughing about it" (Roselli, p. 52). Roselli
[1738]claims that he was "perturbed" because "It was blowing everything,
[1739]blowing every kind of cover that I had tried to arrange to keep quiet"
[1740](Roselli, p. 52).
[1742]Roselli said that he told Giancana that the CIA was involved in the
[1743]operation "in order to have. him keep his mouth shut" (Roselli, p. 27).
[1745]HY 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 39
[1747]PR iy
[1749]Be
[1751]Boy as U6
[1752]involved) by an October 18, 1960 memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover, which
[1753]a stated that "a source whose reliability has not been tested" reported:
[1755]"(During recent conversations with several friends,
[1757]Giancana stated that Fidel Castro was to be done
[1759]away with very shortly. When doubt was expressed
[1761]regarding this statement, Giancana reportedly assured
[1763]those present that Castro's assassination would
[1765]occur in November. Moreover, he allegedly indicated
[1767]that he had already met with the assassin-to-be on
[1769]three occasions. . . Giancana claimed that everything has
[1771]been perfected for the killing of Castro, and
[1773]that the ‘assassin’ had arranged with a girl, not further
[1775]described, to drop a 'pill' in some drink or
[1777]food of Castro's." (File R-505, memo from Hoover
[1779]to DCI (Att: DDP), 10/19/60.)
[1780]Roselli testified that Maheu had given him two explanations for the tap
[1781]on different occasions: first, that Gjancana was .concerned about a
[1782]possible affair between Rowan and his girl friend; and, second, that he
[1783]had arranged the tap to determine whether Giancana had told his girl
[1784]friend about the assassination plot, and whether she was. spreading the
[1785]story (Roselli, pp. 47-48). Maheu gave the second explanation to the
[1786]FBI when he was questioned about his involvement in the tap (File
[1787]R-505, FBI Summary), and Edwards wrote in the memorandum to the
[1788]Attorney General: .
[1790]“"NMaheu stated that Sam Giancana thought that (Giancana's:
[1792]girl friend) might know of the proposed operation and
[1794]might pass on the information to one Dan Rowan, a friend
[1796]of (Giancana's girl friend)". (Memorandum, Edwards to
[1798]. Kennedy, 5/14/62.) .
[1800](ii) Consequences of the tap. Edwards told Maheu that if he
[1801]was "approached by the FBI, he could refer them to me to be briefed
[1803]that he was engaged in. an intelligence operation directed at Cuba"
[1805](Memo, Edwards to Kennedy, 5/14/62). FBI records indicate that on April 18,
[1807]HW 50955 DoclId: 32423539 Page 40
[1809]17
[1811]1961, Maheu informed the FBI that the tap involved the CIA,
[1812]and suggested that Sheffield Edwards be contacted (File R-505,
[1813]Memo, 4/20/61). Edwards subsequently informed the Bureau
[1815]that the CIA would object to Maheu's prosecution because it
[1817]4
[1819]might reveal sensitive information relating to the abortive
[1820]Bay of Pigs invasion* (R-505, Summary of FBI file). Ina
[1821]memo dated April 24, 1962, Herbett J. Miller, Assistant
[1822]Attorney General, Criminal Division, advised the Attorney
[1823]General that the "national interest" would preclude any
[1824]prosecutions based upon the. tap. Following a briefing of
[1825]the Attorney General by the CIA, a decision was made not to
[1827]prosecute .**
[1829]'*® Details of the discussions between the CIA and FBI are
[1830]described fully infra at pp.
[1832]#% Maheu subsequently drew on his involvement with the CIA
[1833]to avoid testifying before Senator Edward Long's Committee
[1834]investigating invasions of privacy in 1966. According to the
[1835]Inspector General's Report, when Maheu learned that the
[1836]Committee intended to call him, "he applied pressure on the
[1837]Agency in a variety of ways--suggesting that publicity might
[1838]expose his past sensitive work for the CIA" (I.G., p. 74).
[1839]Lawrence Houston, General Counsel for the CIA, met with Maheu
[1840]and his attorney, Edward P. Morgan, and informed Senator Long
[1841]that Maheu had been involved in CIA operations (Houston, pp.
[1842]58-60). As a result, the Long Committee did not call Maheu
[1843]to testify. —_
[1845]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 41
[1847]18
[1849](1) Poison Pills Are Prepared and Delivered
[1850]to Cuba
[1851]The Inspector General's Report described
[1853]‘conversations among Bissell, Edwards, and Comet ius Roosevelt, reCETS Ar, a
[1854]Chief of the Technical Services Division (TSD), concerning
[1855]the most effective method of poisoning Castro (1.G., pp. 23-
[1856]Dh), There is some evidence that Giancana or Roselli originated
[1857]the idea of depositing a poison pill in Castro's drink to give
[1858]the "asset" a chance to escape (I.G., p. 25). O'Connell |
[1859]recalled Roselli's request for something "nice and clean, with-
[1860]out getting into any kind of out and out ambushing", preferably
[1861]a poison that would disappear without a trace (O'Connell, p. 116).
[1862]The Inspector General's Report cited O'Connell as stating that
[1863]the Agency had first considered a "gangland-style killing" in
[1864]which Castro would be gunned down. Giancana reportedly opposed
[1865]the idea pecause it would be difficult to recruit someone for
[1866]such .a dangerous operation, and suggested instead the use of
[1867]poison. (1.G., p. 25)
[1868]Edwards rejected the first batch of pills
[1869]prepared by TSD because they would not dissolve in water. A
[1870]second batch, containing botulinum toxin, "did the job expected
[1871]of them" when tested on monkeys. (I.G., pp. 25-26; O'Connell,
[1872]p. 43) O'Connell received the pills from TSD, probably in
[1874]February 1961, with reassurances that they were lethal ,* and
[1876]* Records of the TSD still extant in 1967 indicate that the
[1877]‘ pills were tested on February 10 and delivered to O'Connell
[1878]sometime thereafter.
[1880]HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 42
[1882]19
[1884]then gave them to Roselli (O'Connell, p» 43).
[1886]In late February or March 1961, Roselli
[1887]reported to O'Connell that the pills had been delivered in
[1888]Cuba to an official close to Castro who may have received
[1889]kickbacks from the gambling interests (1.G., p. 23). The
[1890]‘official kept the pills for a few weeks, then returned them.
[1891]‘Roselli and O'Connell ascribed his failure to a case of
[1892]"cold feet" (Roselli, p. 24; O'Connell, p. uk). The Inspector
[1893]General noted that he had lost his position in the Prime
[1894]Minister's office, and thus access to*Uastro, before he
[1895]received the pills (1.G., p. 28).
[1897](5) A Second Delivery ts Attempted
[1899]Following this first failure, Roselli told.
[1900]O'Connell that Trafficante believed Tony Varona, a leading
[1901]figure in the Cuban exile movement, might be able to accom-_
[1902]plish the assassination (I.G., p. 29).* “Dr. Manuel Antonio
[1903]de Varona y Lorado headed the Democratic Revolutionary Front,
[1904]a Cuban exile group supported by the CIA. The Inspector
[1905]General" S Report suggests that Varona may have been receiving
[1906]funds from Trafficante and other racketeers interested in
[1908]securing "gambling, prostitution, and dope monopolies" in
[1910]® O'Connell testified that he met Varona only once. and
[1911]that after the meeting Varona told Roselli: .
[1913]"Took, L don't know [sic] like the CIA and you can't
[1915]tell me that this guy isn't a CIA man". O'Connell
[1916]recalled, "I don't know whether I showed it or what, “
[1917]. but. he suspected that I wasn't what I was represented
[1919]to be." (O'Connell, p. 22.)
[1921]HW 50955 DociId:32423539 Page 43
[1923]20
[1925]- Cuba after the overthrow of Castro (1.G., p. 29). The Report
[1926]speculated that Varona was interested in the assassination
[1927]scheme as a means of financing the. purchase of arms and
[1928]communications equipment (1.c., p. 31).
[1930]' Varona claimed to have a contact inside
[1931]a restaurant frequented by Castro (Roselli, Pp. 21). AS a
[1932]prerequisite to the deal, he demanded cash and $1,000 worth
[1933]of communications equipment (1.G., pp. 31-32; O'Connell, p. 23).
[1934]O'Connell recalls that Colonel J. C. King, head of the Western
[1935]Hemisphere Division, gave him $50,0007in Bissell's office to
[1936]pay Varona if he successfully assassinated Castro (O'Connell,
[1937]pp. 17-21). O'Connell stated that Bissell also authorized him
[1938]to give Varona the electronics equipment that he requested
[1939](O'Connell, pp. -20-2h).
[1940]Bissell testified that he did not doubt that
[1941]some cash was given to O'Connell, and that he was aware that
[1942]“the poison pills had been prepared. He did not recall the
[1943]meeting, and considered it unlikely that O'Connell would have
[1944]been given the money in his office (Bissell, 6/11, p. 40). The
[1945]Inspector General's Report, relying on an Office of Security
[1946]memorandum to the DDCI dated June 24, 1966, as well as on an
[1947]interview with the person who signed the voucher for the funds,
[1948]placed the amount at $10,000 (I.G., pp. 31-32). If the
[1949]Inspéctor General's conclusions Were correct, the funds which
[1951]Bissell allegedly authorized were probably the advance payment =
[1953]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 44
[1955]- to Varona, and not the $150,000 that was to be paid to Varona
[1956]after Castro's death.
[1957]The record does clearly reflect, however,
[1958]that communications equipment was delivered to Varona* and
[1959]that he was paid advance money to cover his expenses, probably
[1960]in the amount of $10,000 {(1.G., p. 32). The money and pills
[1961]were delivered at a meeting between Maheu, Roselli, Trafficante,
[1963]and Varona at the Fontainebleau Hotel in Miami. As Roselli
[1965]recalled, Maheu
[1967]"opened his briefcase and dumped a whole lot of money
[1968]on his lap .. . and also came up with the capsules
[1970]and he explained how they were going to be used. As
[1972]far as I remember, they couldn't be used in boiling
[1973]soups and things like that, but they could be used in
[1974]water or otherwise, but they couldn't last forever...
[1975]It had to be done as quickly as possible. (Roselli,
[1977]p. 21). ¥**
[1979]Varona had no better success tha
[1981]According to the Inspector General's Report, Edwards béttéved
[1982]the scheme failed because Castro stopped visiting the restau-
[1984]rant where the "asset" was, employed. Maheu suggested an
[1986]* O'Connell testified that a man from the communications
[1987]office delivered the communications equipment that Varona had
[1988]requested to Miami (O'Connell, p. 20). Maheu recalled deliver-
[1989]ing an automobile which he had been told contained communica-
[1990]tions equipment,to an empty lot (Maheu, p. 52).
[1992]** Maheu denied that this dramatic event ever occurred, and
[1993]' did not recall being present at a meeting at which the pills
[1994]were passed (Maheu, pp. 40-41). Maheu did recall that O'Connell
[1995]showed him the pills in an envelope and told him that the pills
[1996]would be given to a Cuban (Maheu, p. lio).
[1998]HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 45
[2002]al
[2004]els.
[2006]alternative reason. He recalled being informed that after
[2007]- the pills had been delivered to Cuba, "the go signal still had
[2008]to be received before in fact they were administered” (Maheu,
[2009]p. he). He testified that he was informed by O'Connell some-
[2010]time after the operation that the Cubans had an opportunity
[2011]to administer the pills to Fidel Castro and either Che Guevarra,
[2012]or Raul Castro, but that the "go sighal" never came (Maheu,
[2013]pp. 43-hh, 60-61). He did not know who was responsible for
[2014]giving the signal (Maheu, p. 44-45). Varona subsequently
[2015]returned the cash and the pills (O'Connell, pp. 19-20; CIA
[2016]Justice file R-153, Memorandum,: Osborn to DCI, 6/24/66).
[2018]The date of the Varona operation is
[2019]unclear. The Inspector General's Report places it in March-
[2020]April 1961, prior to the Bay of Pigs (1.G., p. 29). Bissell
[2021]testified that the effort against Castro was called off after
[2022]the Bay of Pigs (Bissell, 6/11, p. 52) and Maheu testified
[2023]that he had no involvement in the operation after the Bay of
[2024]Pigs (Maheu, p. 50). O'Connell, however, was certain that it
[2026]oceurred during early 1962 (O'Connell, pp. 17-8)..
[2028](c) Use of Underworld Figures: Phase II
[2030](1) Change in Leadership
[2032]The Inspector General's Report
[2034]divides the gambling syndicate operation into Phase I, termina~ ~
[2036]HW 50955 DoclId: 32423539 Page 46
[2038]22
[2040]ting with the Bay of Pigs, and Phase IT, beginning with
[2041]William Harvey's involvement in late 1961. The distinction
[2042]between 4 clearly demarcated Phase I and Phase II may be an
[2043]artificial one, as there is considerable evidence that the
[2044]operation was continuous, perhaps lying dormant for the period
[2045]immedidtely following the Bay of Pigs.*
[2047]In early 1961, Harvey** was assigned the
[2048]responsibility for establishing a general capability within
[2049]the CIA for disabling foreign leaders, including assassination
[2051]as a "last resort" (Bissell, 6/9, p. 73; Harvey, 6/25, pp. 34-35).
[2053]* Harvey. said that he took over a "going operation" from
[2055]‘Edwards (1.G., p. 42; Harvey, 6/25, p. 67) and emphasized
[2057]that:
[2059]"I would. like to make as clear as I can that there was
[2060]no phase 1, phase 2 in this. This is an ongoing matter
[2061]which I injected into... . (Harvey, 6/25, p. 90).
[2063]Continuity was provided by retaining O'Connell as the case
[2064]officer for the project well into May 1962.. During interviews
[2065]for the Inspector General's Report, O'Connell recelled. that
[2066]there was "something going on" between the Bay of Pigs and
[2067]Harvey's assumption of control, (1.G.; p. 43). When testifying
[2068]before the Committee, O'Connell firmly recalled several trips
[2069]to Miami in the Fall of 1961, and "right up to the time I
[2070]turned it over to Harvey I was in and out of Miami" (O'Connell,
[2072]pp. 89-90).
[2074]** Harvey had a long background in clandestine activities.
[2075]He had conceived and carried out the Berlin tunnel operation
[2076](Harvey, 6/25, pp. 8-9), and served as Chief of the givision,
[2077]which was responsible for the..surreptitious acquisition of code
[2078]information (Harvey, 6/25, pp. 8-9).
[2080]HY 50955 DoocTd:32423539 Page 47
[2082]23
[2084]The capability was called Executive Action and -was later
[2085]included under the eryptonym ZR/RIFLE. It and the ‘evidence ”
[2086]relating to (i) its connection to the "White House" and (ii)
[2087]whether or not it involved action as well as “capability” is
[2088]discussed extensively infra at
[2089]Harvey's notes reflect that Bissell asked
[2091]him to take over the gambling syndicate operation from Edwards
[2092]and discussed the "application of ZR/RIFLE to Cuba" on
[2093]November 16, 1961 (I.G., p. 39). Bissell confirmed that the
[2094]conversation took place and accepted the November date as
[2095]accurate (Bissell, 7/17; pp. 12-13). He also testified that the
[2096]operation
[2098]"vas not reactivated, in other words, no instructions
[2100]went out to Roselli or to others .. . to renew the
[2102]attempt, until after I had left the Agency” (Bissell,
[2104]6/11, p. 53).
[2105]Harvey agreed that his conversation with Bissell was limited
[2106]to exploring the feasibility of using the gambling syndicate
[2107]against Castro (Harvey, 7/11, p. 60).
[2109]Richard Helms replaced Bissell as
[2111]DDP in February 1962. As such, he was Harvey's superior.
[2114]Harvey testified that he kept Helms informed of the gambling
[2116]HY 50955 Doocld:32423539 Page 46
[2118]syndicate operation at all stages* (Harvey, 6/25, pp. we 66.
[2119]T/ll, p. 42; I.6., p. 42).
[2120](2) The Operation is Reactivated
[2121]In early April 1962, Harvey, who testi-
[2122]fied that he was acting on "explicit orders" from Helms (Harvey,
[2123]7/11, p. 18), requested Edwards to put him in touch with Roselli
[2124](CIA Justice File R-153; Edwards memorandum, 5/14/62). O'Connell
[2125]first introduced Harvey to Roselli in Miami, where Harvey told
[2126]Roselli to maintain his Cuban contacts, but not to deal with Maheu
[2127]or Giancana (O'Connell, p: 50; Roselli, pp. 27-30), whom he had
[2128]decided were "untrustworthy" and "surplus" (Harvey, 6/25, p. 65).
[2130]O'Connell recalled that Roselli did not initially trust Harvey,
[2132]*When interviewed for the Inspector General's Report, Harvey
[2133]stated that he briefed Helms on his first meeting with Roselli,
[2134]and "thereafter he regularly briefed Helms on the status of the
[2135]Castro operation" (I. G., p. bi).
[2137]Helms' recollection was less certain. Helms did reeall that
[2138]he was briefed by Harvey when Harvey first contacted Roselli in
[2140]April 1962. He remembered that he "reluctantly" had approved the operation,
[2141]‘but that. he had no confidence that it would succeed (Helms, 7/17,
[2142]p. 23). ,
[2144]When asked if he authorized sending the poison pills to Florida,
[2145]Helms testified: .
[2146]"I believe they were poison pills, and I don't recall
[2147]necessarily approving them, but since Harvey alleges to
[2148]have them and says that he took them to Miami, I must
[2149]have, I must have authorized them in some fashion."
[2150](Helms, 6/13, p. hh).
[2152]; Helms confirmed that Harvey was "reporting quite regularly what
[2153]-was going on. Whether he reported everything or not, I do not know."
[2154]It was Helms' expectation that Harvey would have reported to him a
[2155]matter such as the pills. (Helms, 6/13, p. 105). However, Helms also
[2156]. testified: .
[2160]"You saw the I.G. Report says that I was kept currently
[2161]informed. Maybe I was and maybe I wasn't, and today
[2163]I don't remember it; as I have said. But I do not
[2164]recall ever having been convinced that any attempt was
[2165]really made on Castro's life'"(Helms, 7/18, p. 32).
[2167]HW 50955 DoclId: 32423539 Page 49
[2169]although they subsequently developed a close friendship.
[2170]“(o'connell, p. 52).
[2172]Harvey, O'Connell and Roselli met for
[2173]a second time in New York on April 8~9, 1962 (I.G., p. #3). A
[2174]notation made dur ing this time in the files of the Technical Ser-
[2175]vices Division indicates that four poison pills were given to O'Connell
[2176]on April 18, 1962 (I.G., pp. 46-47). The pills were passed to Harvey,
[2177]who arrived in Miami on April 21, and found Roselli already in touch
[2178]with Varona (1.c., p. 47). He gave the pills to Roselli, explaining
[2179]that "these would work anywhere and at any time with anything" (Roselli,
[2180]p. 31). Roselli testified that he told Harvey that the Cubans intended
[2181]to use the pills to assassinate Che Guevara as well as Fidel and Raul
[2182]Castro. According to Roselli's testimony , Harvey approved of the
[2183]targets, stating "everything is all right, what they want to do"
[2184](Roselli, p. 34). .
[2186]Varona requested arms and equipment as
[2187]a quid pro quo for carrying out the assassination operation (O'Connell,
[2188]pp. 53-54). Harvey, with the help of the CIA's Miami station
[2190]CIMMAVE)
[2192]: t . ‘
[2193]procured explosives, detonators, rifles, handguns,
[2195], Fadtos, and boat radar costing about $5,000 (I.G., p. 49). Harvey
[2196]and the chief of the JMWAVE station rented a U-Haul truck under
[2197]an assumed name and delivered the equipment to a parking lot
[2199](Harvey, 6/25, p. 63). The keys were given to Roselli, who watched ©
[2201]the delivery from across the street with O'Connell (O'Connell, pp. 92-93).
[2203]HW O50955 Docld:32423533 Page 50
[2205]The truckload of equipment was finally picked up by either Varona
[2207]or Roselli's agent Maced\(I.G., pp. 49-50; Roselli, p. 40).
[2208]Harvey testified thatthe arms "could" have been for use in the
[2209]assassination attempt, but that they were not given to Varona
[2210]solely for that purpose (Harvey, 1/2, p. 9).
[2212]Roselli kept Harvey informed of the
[2213]- operation's progress. Sometime in May 1962, he reported that the
[2214]pills and guns had arrived in Cuba (Harvey, 6/25, p. 64; Roselli,
[2216]pp. 34, 42-43). On June 21, he told Harvey that Varona had dis-—
[2218]patched a three-man team to Cuba. The Inspector General's Report
[2220]t
[2222]described the team's mission as “vague'. and conjectured that the
[2223]team would kill Castro or recruit others to do the job, using the
[2225]poison pills if the opportunity arose (I.G., p. 51).
[2227]26
[2229]Harvey met Roselli in Miami on September 7
[2231]and 11, 1962. Varona was reported’ to be preparing to send in
[2232]another three-man team to penetrate Castro's bodyguard. Harvey
[2233]‘was told that the pills, referred to as "the medicine,” were
[2234]still "safe" in Cuba (Harvey, 6/25, p. 103; I.G., p. 51).
[2235]Harvey testified that by this time he
[2236]had grave doubts about whether the operation would ‘ever take
[2237]place, and told Roselli that "there's not much likelihood that
[2239]this is going anyplace, or that it should be continued" (Harvey,
[2241]6/25, p. 104). Varona's second team never left for Cuba, claiming
[2243]that "conditions" in Cuba were not right (I.G., p. 51-52). During
[2244]early January 1963, Harvey. paid Roselli $2,700 to defray Varona's
[2246]expenses (1.G., p. 52).
[2248]HY 40955 Docld:32423539 Page 51
[2250]RE
[2252]OF
[2256]4
[2257]is
[2259]Harvey terminated the operation in mid-February 1963. At a
[2260]meeting with Roselli in Los Angeles, it was agreed that Roselli
[2261]would taper off his communications with Varona (1.G., pp. 52-53).
[2262]Roselli testified that he simply broke off contact with the Cubans.
[2263]However, he never informed them that the offer of $150,000 for
[2264]Castro's assassination had been withdrawn* (Roselli, p. 45).
[2266]The agency personnel who dealt with
[2267]Roselli attributed his motivation to patriotism** and testified
[2268]that he was not paid for his services. According to O'Connell,
[2269]Roselli
[2271]“paid his way, he paid his own hotel fees, he paid
[2273]his own travel.... And he never took a nickel, he
[2275]said, no, as long as it is for the government of the
[2277]United States, this is the least I can do, because
[2279]I owe it a lot.” (O'Connell, p. 27).
[2280]Edwards agreed that Roselli was “never paid a cent" (Edwards,
[2281]p. 16), and Maheu testified that "Giancana was paid nothing at
[2282]all, not even for expenses, and that Mr. Roselli was given a
[2284]pittance that did not even begin to cover his expenses (Maheu,
[2286]7/29, p. 68). It is clear, however, that the CIA did pay Roselli's
[2288]“* "Q: As far as those Cubans knew, then the offer which they
[2289]understood from you to come from Wall Street was still
[2290]outstanding?
[2292]"A: I don't know if they still think so ... I didn't see
[2293]them after that to tell them that” (Roselli, p. 45)."
[2295]**® Roselli claims that he was motivated by “honor and dedi-
[2296]cation" (Roselli, p. 59).
[2298]In 1943, Roselli had been convicted of extorting money from
[2299]motion picture producers to insure studios against labor strikes,~
[2300]and during the period of his contacts with the CIA, Roselli was
[2301]deeply involved in hotel and gambling operations in Las Vegas
[2303]a (File R-505, Summary of FBI Documents). It is possible that he
[2304]- believed cooperating with the government in the assassination
[2305]operation might serve him well in the future.
[2307]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 52
[2309]eT
[2311]28
[2313]on hotel bill during his stay in Miami in October 1960.* ‘the CIA's involvement
[2315]with Roselli caused the Agency some difficulty during Roselli's subsequent
[2316]prosecutions for fraudulent gambling activities and living in the country
[2317]under an assumed name. **
[2319]- (a) ‘Plans in Early 1963
[2321]Two plans to assassinate Castro were ex-
[2323]plored by Task Force W, the section concerned with covert Cuban
[2324]operations, in early 1963. Desmond Fitzgerald (now deceased), Chief
[2325]of the Task. Force, asked Samuel Halpern to determine whether an exotic
[2326]seashell, rigged to explode, could be deposited in an area where Castro
[2327]commonly went skin diving (Halpern, p. 28). The idea was explored by the
[2328]Technical Division and discarded as impractical (Helms, 6/13, p. 135; 1.G., p-77)
[2330]A second plan involved having James Donovan -
[2332](who was negotiating with Castro for the release of prisoners
[2334]* FBI reports reveal that Roselli'’s expenses at the Kennilworth Ilctel,
[2335]where he was registered from October 11 - 30, 1960 under the name. of J.A.
[2336]Rollins, were paid by Maheu (File R-505, FBI file summary, p.10). Maheu's
[2337]expenses were reimbursed by the CIA. ,
[2339]** In May 1966, the FBI threatened to deport Roselli for living in. the United
[2340]States under an assumed name unless he cooperated in an investigation of the
[2341]Mafia. (Roselli, whose true name is Filippo Saco, was born in Italy and
[2342]allegedly brought illegally into the United States while still a child.)
[2343]Roselli contacted Edwards, who informed the FBI that Roselli wanted to
[2344]“keep square with the Bureau," but was afraid that gangsters might kill him
[2345]for "talking" (CIA Justice File. R-153, Memorandum, Osborn to FBI, 5/27/66).
[2346]After Roselli was arrested for fraudulent gambling activities at the Friars
[2347]Club in Beverly Hills in 1967, he requested Harvey, who had left the Agency,
[2348]‘to represent him (CIA Justice File R-153, Memorandum for Record by Osborn,
[2349]12/11/67). Harvey contacted the Agency and suggested that it prevent the
[2350]prosecution (Osborn Memorandum, supra). Roselli was subsequently convicted
[2351]of violating United States interstate gambling laws. In 1971, the CIA
[2352]approached the Immigration and Naturaliaation Service, Department of Justice,
[2353]to "forestall public disclosure of, Roselli's past operational activity
[2354]with CIA "that might occur if deportation proceedings were brought. (CIA to
[2355]fot Select Committee, 7/21/75). It was agreed that CIA would be kept informed
[2356]: of developments in that case. The deportation order is presently Peing\
[2357]litigated in the courts. id 7
[2359]a pay
[2360]Le prep 7?
[2362]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 53
[2364]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 54 : |
[2366]29
[2368]taken during the Bay of Pigs operation) present Castro with a
[2369]contaminated diving suit* (Colby, 5/21, pp. 38-39).
[2371]The Inspector General's Report dates this
[2372]operation in January 1963, when Fitzgerald replaced Harvey as
[2373]Chief of Task Force W, although it is unclear whether Harvey or
[2374]Fitzgerald conceived of the plan (I.G., p. 75}. It is likely
[2375]that the activity took place earlier, since Donovan had completed
[2376]his negotiations by the niladie of January 1963. Helms characterized
[2377]the plan as "cockeyed" (Helms, 6/13, p. 135).
[2379]TSD dought a diving suit, dusted the inside
[2381]with a fungus that would produce a chronic skin disease (Madura
[2382]foot), and contaminated tle breathing apparatus with a tubercule
[2383]bacillus (I.G., p. 75). -° The Inspector General's Report states
[2384]that, the plan was abandoned because Donovan gave Castro a different
[2385]diving suit on his own “initiative (I.G., p. 75). Helms testified
[2386]that the diving suit never left the laboratory (Helms, 6/13, p. 135).
[2387](1) ‘origin of the Project
[2389].
[2391]jIn March 1961, an officer of the Mexico
[2392]City CIA station met witha highly~placed Cuban official.to determine
[2393]if he would cooperate in derorts against the Castro regime (I.G.,
[2394]p. 78). The Cuban, referred to by the eryptonym AMLASH-1, had been
[2396]|
[2398]i]
[2399]*Donovan was not aware of the plan.
[2401]a
[2406]AOR, PRPS bay 30
[2408]picker
[2411]4 of
[2413]involved with an anti-Batista faction that only grudgingly accepted
[2414]Castro's rule. (Case Officer 2, p. 9, 39).* The meeting was incon-
[2415]clusive, but lead to subsequent meetings at which AM/LASH-1 agreed
[2416]to cooperate with the CIA.
[2418]AM/LASH-1 was viewed as an important "asset"
[2419]inside Cuba. As a high-ranking military leader who enjoyed the
[2420]confidence of Fidel Castro, he could keep the CIA informed of the
[2421]internal workings of the regime (Case Officer 2, pp. 23, 40). It
[2422]was also believed that he might play:a part in fomenting a coup
[2423]within Cuba (Case Officer 2, p. 43) .*%
[2425]Prom the first. contact with AM/LASH-1, until
[2426]the latter part of 1963, it was uncertain whether he would defect
[2428]or remain in Cuba. His initial requests to the CIA and FBI for
[2430]. wat
[2432]aid in defecting were rebuffed (I.G., pp. 80, 82-83). When Case
[2434]Officer 1 joined the AM/LASH-1 operation in sane (967, ts assign-
[2435]‘ os et
[2437]* The Committee has taken the testimoy of the two case officers
[2438]involved in the AM/LASH project. Case officer 1 dealt with AM/LASH-1
[2439]through September 1963; Case Officer 2 continued until mid-1965
[2440](Case Officer 2, p. ). The Committee has agreed not to divulge hy
[2441]their names as they are still in active service with the Agency.
[2443]prem J
[2445]*% AM/LASH-1 was the major “asset” in the AM/LASH operation.
[2447]_ During this period the CIA also sponsored a separate operation to
[2449]“penetrate the Cuban military to encourage either defections
[2450]or an attempt to produce information from dissidents, or
[2451]perhaps even to forming a group which would be capable of
[2452]replacing the then present government in Cuba" (Case Officer 1,..
[2453]. pp. 18, 22). ;
[2454]The case officers for AM/LASH were also involved in this second
[2455]related program.
[2457]HW 50955 DoclId: 32423539 Page 55
[2459]HW 50955
[2461]31
[2463]ment was to "stay in place and report to us” (Case officer 1, p. 38).
[2464]At a meeting in August 1962 in a foreign capital, AM/LASH-1 stated
[2465]that he would remain in Cuba if he "could do.something really signifi-
[2466]cant for the creation of a new Cuba", and expressed a desire to plan
[2467]the execution of Fidel Castro (Case Officer 1 Contact Report, August 1
[2468]meeting). The subject of assassinating castro was again discussed
[2469]at\a meeting on August 10, 1962, between AM/LASH-1 and his case
[2470]officer. The case officer's contact report states that assassination
[2471]was raised in discussing AM/LASH-1's role in Cuba, and that AM/LASH-1
[2472]was visibly upset. "It was not the act that he objected to, but
[2473]merely the choice of the word used to describe it. ‘'Eliminate' was
[2475]acceptable." (Case Officer’ 1, Contact Report, August 7-10, meetings).
[2477]The case officers who testified before the Com-
[2478]mittee said that AM/LASH-1 was not directly requested to assassinate
[2479]Castro. The record clearly reveals, however, that the agency per-
[2480]sonnel dealin. gwith AM/LASH-1 were aware of his desire to take such
[2481]action. A cable to headquarter's reporting : an August 16, 1963 neet-
[2482]ing with AM/LASH-1 stated: |
[2483]"Have no intention give AMLASH-1 physical elin-
[2484]ination mission as requirement but recognize
[2486]this something he could or might try to carry
[2487]out on his own initiative."*
[2489]® Case Officer 1 testified that AM/LASH~1 discussed "eliminating Castro,
[2491]although he attributed such remarks to AMLASH-1's “nercurial" nature,
[2492]and stated that no specific plans for assassinations were ever discussed
[2493](Case Officer 1, pp. 39-41, 62). The case officer who took over the
[2494]AMLASH project in September 1963 recalled. being briefed by Case Officer
[2495]1 on AMLASH's belief that Castro's assassination was a necessary first
[2496]step in a coup. (Case Officer 2, p. 28).
[2498]The second AMLASH case officer described the ontext in which AMLASH-1
[2499]generally raised the topic of assassination:
[2501]"You also must recognize that AMLASH was a rather tempera-
[2502]mental man whose temperament was of a mercurial nature and
[2503]whereas he may have said something like this in one fit of
[2505]pique, he would settle down and talk about organiztng a regular
[2506]military coup in the next breath.” (Case Officer 2, p.29)
[2508]Docld: 32423539 Page 56
[2510]2 is
[2512]At a meeting on October 3, 1963, AMLASH-1
[2513]again raised the possibility of defecting, but indicated that he
[2514]would’ be willing to continue working against the Castro regime if
[2515]he received firm assurances of American support (Case officer 2,
[2516]pp. 48-49). According to Case Officer.2, AMLASH~1 asked for
[2517]military supplies, a device with which to protect himself if his
[2518]plots against Castro were discovered, and a meeting with Attorney
[2519]General Robert Kennedy (Case Officer 2, pp. 48-9).
[2521]Desmond Fitzgerald (now deceased), who was
[2523]then Chief, SAS * agreed to meet AMLASH-1 and give him the assur-
[2524]ances he sought. The Inspector General's Report states that Fitz-
[2525]gerald consulted with the DDP, Helms, who agreed that Fitzgerald
[2528]should hold himself out as a personal representative of Attorney Ay )
[2530]— . neblen
[2531]/ |
[2533]General Kennedy (1.G., p.89).**
[2534]Helms testified that he did not recall the con-
[2535]versation, and speculated that the Attorney General might not have
[2537]been consulted because
[2539]"this was so central to the whole theme of what we had
[2540]been trying to do . . .(find someone inside Cuba who might
[2541]head a government and have a group to replace Castro).
[2542]This is obviously what we had been pushing, what every-
[2543]body had been pushing for us to try to do, and it is that
[2544]context that I would have made some remark like this."
[2545](Helms, 6/13, p. 117)
[2547]® SAS (Special Affairs Staff) was the name given to Task Force W in
[2548]early 1963 when Fitzgerald replaced Harvey as head of the covert Cuban
[2549]‘operations. The AMLASH Case Officers reported directly to Fitzgerald.
[2550]**® The contact plan for the proposed meeting stated:
[2551]"Fitzgerald will represent self as personal representative of
[2552]Robert F. Kennedy who travelled to (foreign capital) for spe-
[2553]cific purpose meeting AMLASH-1 and giving him assurances of
[2554]full support with a change of the present government in Cuba."
[2556]HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 57
[2558]“33
[2560]Helms recalled that he told Fitzgerald to
[2561]"go ahead and say that from the standpoint of political
[2562]support, the United States government will be behind you if
[2563]you are successful. This had nothing to do with killings.
[2564]This had only to do with the political action part of it”.
[2565](Helms, 6/13, p. 131.) ; _
[2566]Fitzgerald met AM/LASH-1 on October 29, 1963,
[2567]in a foreign capital, and promised that the United States would
[2568]support a coup against Castro® (Case Officer 2, p. 60). When
[2569]later interviewed for the Inspector General's Report, Fitzgerald
[2570]recalled that AM/LASH-1 repeatedly requested an assassination
[2571]weapon, particularly a "high powered rifle with telescopic sights
[2572]that could be used to kill Castro froma distance" (I.G., p. 90).
[2573]Fitzgerald stated that he told AM/LASH-~1 that the United States ptt
[2574]would have "no part of an attempt on Castro's life" (I.G., p. 90). J OC MFT
[2575]Case Officer 2 recalled that AM/LASH-1 raised the prospect of
[2576]assassinating Castro, but aid not propose an explicit plan (case
[2578]Officer 2, pp. 62, 85). AM/LASH-1, was, however, "convinced that
[2580]Castro had to be removed from power before a coup could be under-
[2582]¥ Case Officer 2 did not recall whether Robert Kennedy's name
[2583]was used (Case Officer 2, p. 60).
[2585]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 58
[2589]taken in Cuba" (Case Officer 2, p. 61).
[2591]AMLASH+1 also requested high-powered rifles
[2592]and grenades (Case Officer 2, Pp. 77). A memorandum by Case
[2593]Officer 2, dated November 18, 1963, states:
[2595]"C/SAS (Fitzgerald) approved telling AMLASH-1 he would a yon
[2597]be given a cache inside Cuba. Cache could, if he ote
[2598]requested it, include... high powered rifles with AAD 23
[2601]P (Prev p
[2602]AMLASH-1 was told on November 22, 1963, that the cache would be
[2604]dropped in Cuba (Case Officer 2, p. 92).
[2605](2) The Poison Pen Device
[2606]On November 22, 1963, Case Officer 2 met with
[2607]AMLASH-1 in a foreign capital, offered him a ball-—point pen rigged
[2608]with a hypodermic needle, and suggested that Blackleaf 40 would be
[2609]an effective poison to use in the device. (Case Officer 2, p. 110)
[2610]The needle was designed to be so fine that the victim would not
[2611]notice its insertion (Case Officer 2, p. 103).
[2612]The Inspector General's Report states that
[2613]Case Officer 2, when he was interviewed in 1967, stated that AMLASH-1
[2614]nad requested the Agency to
[2615]"@€evise some technical means: of doing the job that would
[2616]not automatically cause him to lose his own life in the
[2617]try." (2.G., p. 92)
[2618]The Report concluded that:
[2619]"although none of the participants so stated, it may be
[2620]inferred that they were seeking a means of assassination
[2622]of a sort that AMLASH-1 might reasonably have been ex-
[2623]pected to have devised himself." (I.G., p. 92)
[2625]Co
[2627]HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 59
[2629]35
[2631]Halpern, Fitzgerald's assistant, told the
[2632]Committee that the pen was intended to show "bona fides" and
[2633]"The orders were to do something to get rid of Castro .
[2634]and we thought this other method might work whereas a rifle
[2635]wouldn't." (Halpern, p. 26)
[2637]Helms confirmed that the pen was manufactured
[2639]"to take care of a request from him that he have some device
[2640]for getting rid of Castro, for killing him, murdering him,
[2641]whatever the case may be." (Helms, 6/13, p. 113)
[2643]"|. (t)his was a temporizing gesture." (Helms, 6/11, p. 133)*
[2644]On November 22, #963, Fitzgerald and the case
[2646]officer met with AMLACH-1 in a European capital and offered him
[2648]the poison pen, recommending that he use Blackleaf~-0, a deadly poison
[2650]which is commercially available. (Case Officer 2, p. 112) The Inspect-
[2652]or General's Report noted that -
[2654]"it is likely that at the very moment President Kennedy was
[2655]shot a CIA officer was meeting with a Cuban agent in Paris
[2656]and giving him an assassination device for use against
[2657]Castro." (1.G., p. 94)
[2659]® In his testimony before the Committee, Case Officer 2 offered a con-
[2660]flicting story. He said that the purpose of the pen was
[2662]"to provide AMLASH with a’ device which would serve him to
[2663]protect himself in case he was confronted with and charged
[2664]with being involved in a military coup against Castro.”
[2665](Case Officer 2, p. 107)
[2667]According to the case officer, AMLASH-1 had requested an "esoteric device
[2668]which could easily be concealed and which he. could use in self-defense
[2669](Case Officer 2, po. 98- 99). The device was not intended for offensive
[2670]use against any person, but was rather ;
[2672]"a kind of psychological crutch . . .to help him think that
[2674]we were interested in his own protection, his own security”
[2675](Case Officer 2, pp. 104-105).
[2677]This version is wholly inconsistent with documents in the CIA files, some
[2678]of which were written by the AMLASH case officer, which establish, that
[2679]AMLASH-1 intended to kill Castro, and that the CIA knew his desire and
[2680]endeavored to supply the means that he needed.
[2682]HW O50955 Docld:32423533 Page 60
[2684]36
[2686]The case, officer later recalled that AMLASH-1 did not "think much
[2688]of the device,"jand complained that CIA could surely "come up with
[2690]t
[2691]i
[2693]something more sophisticated than that" (I.G., p. 93a).
[2695]The case officer recalled offering the pen
[2697]to AMLASH-1, but could not remember whether AMLASH-1 threw it away
[2699]then or took it with him (Case Officer 2, pp. 105, 110). He did
[2701]recall that AMLASH-1 said he would not take the pen back to Cuba, —
[2703]but did not know what AMLASH-1 in fact did with the pen (Case Offi-
[2705]‘cer 2, pp. 110-111). ~
[2707]An entry in the CIA files on AMLASH dated
[2709]March 29, 1965, states:
[2711]HY 450955 Dacld: 32423539
[2713]"Although Pitzgerald and the case officer assured AMLASH-1
[2714]on November 22, 1963, that CIA would give him everything
[2715]he needed (telescopic sight, silencer, all the money he
[2716]wanted) the situation changed when the case officer and
[2717]Fitzgerald left the meeting to discover that President
[2718]Kennedy had been assassinated. Because of this fact,
[2719]plans with AMLASH-1 changed and it was decided that we
[2720]could have no part in the assassination of a government
[2721]leader (including Castro) and would not aid AMLASH-1 in
[2722]this attempt. . . AMLASH-1 was not informed of (this de-
[2723]cision) until. he was seen by the case officer in Novem-
[2724]ber, 1964."
[2726]Page 61
[2728](3) Providing AMLASH-1 with Arms
[2730]CIA cables indicate that one cache of arms
[2731]for AMLASH-1 was delivered in Cuba in March 1964 and another in
[2732]June. An entry in the AMLASH file for May 5, 1964, states that
[2733]the case officer requested the Technical Services Division to pro-
[2735]‘’a silencer which would fit an FAL rifle.
[2737]duce, on a "crash basis,’
[2739]The contact report of a meeting between the case officer and a
[2740]confidant of AHMLASH states that AMLASH was subsequently informed
[2741]that it was not feasible to make a silencer -for an FAL.
[2743]Toward the latter part of 1964, AMLASH-1
[2744]became more insistent on the fact that the assassination’ of the
[2745]Cuban leadership was a necessary initial step in a successful coup.
[2746](Case Officer 2, pp. 129-133). In a memorandum dated December 10,
[2747]1964, the case officer wrote:
[2749]"AMLASH-L was told and fully understands that the United
[2751]States Government cannot become involved to any degree
[2753]in the 'first step' of his plan. If he needs support, he
[2755]realizes he will have to get it elsewhere. FYI: This is
[2757]where B-1 could fit in nicely in giving any support he
[2759]would request."
[2761]Documents in the AMLASH file establish that in
[2763]early 1965, the CIA put AMLASH in contact with B-1, the leader of an
[2765]anti-Castro group. As the case officer explained to the Inspector
[2767]General:
[2769]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 62
[2771]"  .). what had happened was that SAS had oe Mea
[2772]to put B-1 and AMLASH together in such a way that
[2773]neither of them knew that the contact had been engin-
[2774]eered by CIA. The thought was that B-1 needed a man
[2775]inside and AMLASH wanted a silenced weapon, which CIA
[2776]was unwilling to furnish to him directly. By putting
[2777]the two together, B-1 might get its man inside Cuba
[2778]and AMLASH might get his silenced weapon -- from B-1.
[2779](I.G., p. 101)
[2781]A report of a meeting between a case officer and
[2783]B-1 states that B-1, in his initial contacts with AMLASH-1, discussed
[2785]plans for assassinating Castro. AMLASH-1 suggested that guerrilla
[2787]raids against Cuba should be stepped up one month before the
[2789]-
[2791]“attempt on Fidel Castro" to "prepare the public and raise the morale
[2793]and resistance spirit of the people." B-l reported that AMLASH-1
[2795]‘pelieved that the only solution to the problems in Cuba would be
[2797]"to get rid of Fidel Castro. He is able either to shoot
[2799]him with a silencer or place a bomb in some place where
[2801]Fidel will be. He might use, for example, a small bomb
[2803]that he can carry and place, or with his group attack,
[2805]the residence where Fidel lives ... . B-l is going to
[2806]provide AMLASH-1 with escape routes and places where B-1
[2808]is able to pick him up. He will memorize these points .
[2810]and escape routes. . . Next, B-l is to provide AMLASH-1 either
[2811]a silencer for a FAL or a rifle with a silencer.*
[2813]* A CIA document dated January 3, 1965, states that B-l told a
[2815]case
[2817]officer that he and AM/LASH~-1 had reached an agreement on the
[2819]following points:
[2821]HY 50955 Docld: 32423539
[2823]"l1, Bel is to provide AM/LASH-1 with a silencer for the FAL;
[2824]if this is impossible, B-1 is to cache in a designated
[2825]location a rifle with a scope and silencer plus several
[2826]bombs concealed either in a suitcase, a lamp or some
[2827]other concealment device which he would be able to carry
[2828]and place next to Fidel Castro.
[2830]"2. B-1 is to provide AM/LASH~1 with escape routes controlled
[2831]by B-1 and not by the Americans. The lack of confidence
[2832]built up by the Bay of Pigs looms large:
[2834]"3, B-l is to prepare one of the western provinces, either
[2835]Pinar del Rio or Havana, with arms caches and a clandes-—
[2836]tine underground mechanism. This would be a fall back
[2837]position and a safe area where men and weapons are avail-
[2838]able to the group.
[2840]Page 63
[2842]39
[2844]A Raat
[2845]Seruany J 1965 tated
[2846]ve OF VERY state
[2847]PRPURES 070?
[2848]that B-l had given AMLASH-1 a silencer and that AMLASH-1 had
[2849]"small, highly concentrated explosives." On February 11, 1965
[2850]the Madrid Station cabled that AMLASH-1 would soon receive "one
[2851]pistol with silencer and one FAL rifle with a silencer from B-l1's
[2852]secretary" (I.G., p. 103). A subsequent cable reported that
[2853]"B-1 had three packages of special items made up by his technical
[2854]people and delivered to AMLASH~1 in Madrid" (1.G., p.,103
[2856]In June 1965, CI#® terminated all contact with
[2857]AMLASH-1 and his associates because of reports that his activities
[2859]were widely known (I.G., pp. 104-105).
[2861]"h. Bel is.to.be in Cuba.one week before the elimination
[2862]of Fidel, but no one, including AM/LASH-1 will know
[2863]B-1's location. ;
[2865]"S. B-l is to arrange for recongition by at least five Latin
[2866]American countries as soon as Fidel is neutralized and
[2867]a junta is formed. This junta will be established even
[2868]though Raul Castro arid Che. Guevara may still be alive
[2869]and may still be in control of the part of the country.
[2870]This is the reason AM/LASH-1 requested that B-l be able
[2871]to establish some control over one of the provinces so
[2872]that the junta can be formed in that location.
[2874]"6S, One month to the day before the neutralization of Fidel,
[2875]B-1 will increase the number of commando attacks to a
[2876]maximum in order to raise the spirit and morale of the
[2877]people inside Cuba. In all communiques, in all radio
[2878]messages, in all propaganda put out by B-1 he must relate
[2879]that the raid was possible thanks to the information
[2880]received from clandestine sources inside Cuba and from
[2881]the clandestine underground apparatus directed by "P".
[2882]This will be AM/LASH-1's war name.”
[2884]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 64
[2886]Approved by Drafting
[2887]Subcommiteee 9/5/75
[2889]2. At What Level Were the Castro Plots Authorized or.
[2891]Known About Within the Central Intelligence Agency?
[2892](a) | The Question Presented. As we have seen, first
[2893]Richard Bissell and then Richard Helms, each as Deputy Director of
[2894]Plans (DDP), were aware of plots to assassinate Fidel Castro. The
[2895]evidence set forth herein relates to whether their superiors in
[2896]the Agency, in particular Allen Dulles and John McCone, authorized
[2897]or were aware of the assassination plots. .
[2898]Dulles served as Director of Central Intelligence (DCI)
[2899]from 1953 to November 1961. McCone served as DCI from November 1961
[2900]to 1965.* The Committee took considerable testimony on whether Dul-
[2901]les and MeCone ‘(or their Deputy DCI s, General Cabell and General
[2902]| Carter, respectively) knew about or authorized the plots against
[2903]Fidel Castro's life. | |
[2905]In summary, the evidence is as follows:
[2907]. (i) Dulles: Bissell and Edwards both
[2908]expressed the belief that Dulles ‘(and his Deputy, General Cabell)
[2909]authorized the initial phase of the assassinatign plot involving
[2910]underworld figures. They acknowledged, however, that Dulles (and ,
[2911]his Deputy) were not told about the plot until after the under- .
[2913]; world figures had been contacted. The words said to have been
[2915]used to brief them-~-"an intelligence operation''--do not convey on
[2919]* Bissell served as DDP from January 1, 1959,. to February#17,
[2920]; 1962. (President Kennedy decided to replace Dulles and Bissell
[2921]A } because of the failure of the Bay of Pigs (Bissell, 6/9, pp. 6-8). )
[2922]Helms, who had been Bissell's Deputy, succeeded Bissell in
[2923]February 1962 as DDP. He was appointed DDCI in April 1965, and
[2924]DCI in June 1966.
[2926]HY 430955. Docld:32423539 Page 65
[2928]their face that the plot involved assassination, although- Bissell
[2929]and Edwards insist the real meaning must have been understood.
[2930]There is some other evidence which can be said both to suggest .
[2931]that Dulles and Cabell did know and to suggest that they did not
[2932]know. . (See Section (b) below.) 7 |
[2934](ii) MeCone: McCone testified that he did not
[2935]know about or authorize the plots. Helms and Bissell both stated
[2936]that McCone was not told by them of the earlier assassination ef-
[2937]forts when McCone assumed the position of DCL in November 1961.
[2938]The I.G. Report states that Harvey received Helms' approval not
[2939]to brief.McCone when the actual efforts were resumed in 1962.
[2940]Harvey testified this accorded with his recollection. Thereafter,
[2942]Helms and Harvey did not tell McCone about assassination activity
[2944]ed
[2946]on several occasions.. Helms did not recall any agreement not to>
[2948]brief McCone, but did not call into: question the position taken by
[2950]Harvey or the.I.G. Report on this matter. Helms did say that Mc-
[2952]Cone never told him not to assassinate Castro, but added that he
[2954]was not claiming that he told McCone about the plots. (These mat-
[2956]ters, as well as the various reasons put forward by Harvey and
[2957]Helms for not briefing McCone, are set forth. in Section (ec) below. )
[2959]| (b) Did Allen Dulles Know of or “Authorize the Initial
[2961]Plots. Against Castro?* Both Allen Dulles and his Deputy (DDCI),
[2963]* This testimony relates to the "airplane" incident in July 1960
[2964]and what the I.G. Report referred to as the initial phase of the
[2965]assassination effort involving the underworld. > With respect to
[2967]Lo the "schemes" prior to that operation, the I. G. Report concluded
[2968]Pod , they could "find no evidence that any of the schemes were approved
[2969]at any level higher than division, if that". (1.G.,.p. 10.)
[2971]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 66
[2973]General Cabell, are deceased. Since we were unable to take any
[2974]testimony from either, the Committee's investigation centered
[2975]around the documents available and the testimony of those still
[2977]alive. who served under Dulles and Cabell. *
[2979]ai
[2981]\ *The Inspector General questioned neither Dulles nor Cabell in
[2982]2 preparing his Report in 1967.
[2984]50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 67
[2986]‘ ' (i) Dulles’ January 1960 Statement to the Special
[2988]Group Suggesting Contingency Plans for the Overthrow of the
[2990]- Casto Government , but Ruling Out "Elimination" of Castro.
[2991]‘January 13, 1960, Allen Dulles, in what was apparently
[2992]‘the first Special Group discussion of a covert program to over-
[2993]throw Castro, emphasized that "a quick elimination of Castro"
[2994]was not contemplated by the CIA (minutes of Special Group meet-
[2995]ing, 1/13/60). According to the minutes of the meeting, Dulles
[2996]first "noted the possibility that over the long run the U.S.
[2997]will not be able to tolerate the Castro regime in Cuba, and. sug-
[2998]gested that covert contingency planning to accomplish the fall
[2999]of the Castro government might be in order." Then, in response
[3000]to the State Department representative's comment that "timing
[3001]was very important so as to permit a solidly based opposition
[3002]to take over,'’ Dulles |
[3003]“emphasized that we do not’ have in mind a quick
[3004]elimination of Castro, but rather actions designed
[3006]‘to enable responsible opposition leaders to get. a
[3007]foothold.”
[3009](ii) Dulles' Alleged Recission of the July 1960
[3010]Airplane Assassination Plan -Upon Learning of It. |
[3012]As discussed in greater detail above (see Pe),
[3013]in July, 1960, Tracy Barnes, Bissell's assistant, approved the
[3014]sending of, in July, 1960, a cable to the Havana station stating
[3015]that “possible removal of top three leaders (was). receiving
[3017]serious consideration,"
[3019]and instructions were given to carry out
[3020]a plan to kill Raul Castro. That plan was, however, abandoned
[3022]shortly after it had been approved.
[3024]HY 50955 Docld:327423539 Page 66
[3026]The Executive Officer to the Chief of the Cuba
[3028]Y action project, wno had sent the cables testified that
[3029]he had "heard" that Dulles had countermanded Barnes' plan and
[3030]had indicated that "assassination was not to be considered."
[3031](Duty Officer, p. 29)..* The officer added, however, that he
[3032]had no-personal knowledge of the reason for calling off the plan,
[3033]or even if Dulles had been the one who called it off, he further
[3035]‘testified that
[3037]“assassination had not been part of the Cuba
[3038]covert action project in 19690 and that Dulles’
[3039]action in this incident conformed with CIA
[3040]policy. against the use of assassination." (Duty
[3041]Officer, p. ).**
[3043]4
[3045]* The countermanding cable to the Havana station, which was
[3046]“Operational Immediate," was sent the morning after the cable
[3047]oF of the previous night. The officer who sent that cable testified:
[3049].l saw the cable and was told that, to the
[3050]‘best of my knowledge, my memory is that the
[3051]Director [Dulles], not the Deputy Director
[3052][Bissell] ... had countermanded the cable and
[3053]nad directed that ~---had indicated that
[3054]assassination was not to be considered. me
[3055](Duty Officer, p. 29).
[3057]The officer stated that he did not talk: to either Dulles or
[3058]- Bissell about the countermanding cable, but that he did see the
[3059]cable and in all likelinood heard of. the reason for Dulles' re-
[3060]action in discussions the same morning with his superior, the
[3061]Chief of the Cuba project. (Duty Officer, pp. 30-32).
[3062]** The officer testified: .
[3063]"'..we were schooled that although other countries
[3065]{used assassination] we do not, and I had always
[3066]understood this as a basic rule.” (Duty Officer, p 14).
[3068]"Question: So was it your understanding after this .
[3070]cable, and in view of your knowledge of the Agency © «
[3072]general practice with respect to assassination in which
[3074]you had been schooled that it was not done, that assass-
[3075]ination was not part of the Cuba Project, as far as you
[3081]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 69
[3083]Nagel!
[3085]HW 50955
[3087]"Officer: That's correct."
[3090]"Question: And would it be accuaate to say that
[3091]your recollections concerning what you now view
[3092]as what Mr. Dulles' attitudes were ... are based
[3093]on your general training about what had-always been
[3094]said ... [and] that after this incident, what you
[3095]were told ... fortified that previous belief [in]
[3096]that Dulles had nullified at least this particular
[3097]cable?" ,
[3099]"Officer: Correct.”
[3101]"Question: Do. you have anything in your recollection
[3102]or as a result of your informed opinion or experience
[3103]that would indicate to the contrary; that is, that
[3104]Mr. Dulles did have assassination in his arsenal, so
[3106]"Officer: I have no basis for any such speculation."
[3107](Duty Officer, pp. 31, |).
[3109]Bocld:32423539 Page 70
[3111](iii) Dulles Briefing on Use of Underworld Figures
[3113]in September 1960.
[3114]1. Bissell and Edwards Said Dulles Was Told
[3116]About An "Intelligence Operation” With No "'Bad Words" Used,
[3118]But That Dulles (and his Deputy) Understood That to Mean
[3120]Assassination.
[3121]Bissell recalled that "in the latter. part of
[3123]September" there was’ "a meeting in which Col. Edwards and I
[3124]briefed Mr. Dulles and General Cabell" (Bissell, 6/9, p. 20).
[3125]Bissell testified that "Colonel Edwards outlined in somewhat
[3126]circumlocutious terms the plan that he had discussed with
[3127]syndicate representatives" (Bissell, 6/9, p. 22). He stated
[3128]that Edwards had said:
[3130]“that contact had been made with [the underworld], that
[3132]a plan had been prepared for their use, and I think he
[3134]either said in as many words or strongly inferred that
[3136]the plan would be put into effect unless at that time
[3138]or subsequently he was told by Mr. Dulles that it should
[3140]not be". (Bissell, 6/9, p. 22.)%*
[3142]The CIA's 1967 L.G. Report, based upon interviews
[3143]with Edwards and Bissell, said Dulles and Cabell were briefed
[3144]as follows:
[3146]"The discussion was circumspect. Edwards deliberately
[3147]avoided the use of any ‘bad words'. The descriptive
[3148]term used was ‘an intelligence operation’. Edwards is
[3150]quite sure that the DCI and the DDCI clearly understood
[3151]the nature of the operation he was discussing. He
[3153]* Bissell testified that he was relying on the dating,
[3154]provided in the Inspector General's Report, but that his state-
[3155]ments concerning what was said at the meeting were of his ©
[3156]poy, personal Knowledge (Bissell, 6/9, pp. 20- 22).
[3160]HY 50955 Docld: 327423539 Page 71
[3162]i recalls describing the channel as being ‘from A to B to
[3164]C'. As he then envisioned it, A was Maheu, B was —
[3165]Roselli, and C was the principal in Cuba. Edwards
[3166]recalls that’ Mr: Dulles merely nodded, presumably in
[3167]understanding and approval. Certainly there was no
[3168]opposition. Edwards states that, while there was no
[3169]formal approval as such, he felt that he clearly had
[3170]tacit approval to use his own judgement." (1.G.,
[3171]pp. 17-18.) ,
[3173]Bissell testified that the description sounded "highly plausible".
[3174](Bissell Tr. 6/9/75 at 24.) Edwards said it was "accurate"
[3175](Edwards Tr. at 11).
[3177]In light of the manner in which Bissell and Edwards
[3178]described briefing Dulles, the question arises as to whéther
[3179]‘Dulles in fact would have understood that the operation involved
[3180]assassination. The Inspector General, in attempting to “con-
[3181]jecture as to just what the Director did approve", decided
[3183]"It-is safe to conclude, given the men participating and
[3184]the general subject of the méeting, that there was little
[3185]likelihood of misunderstanding--even though the details
[3186]were deliberately blurred and the specific intended
[3187]‘result was never stated to unmistakable language. It is
[3188]also reasonable to conclude that the pointed avoidance of
[3189]‘bad words' emphasized to the participants the extreme
[3190]sensitivity of the operation." (1.G., p.18_).
[3192]Bissell testified that
[3194]"I can only say that I am quite sure I came away from
[3195]that meeting--and there was, I think, subsequent
[3196]occasions when this came up between Mr. Dulles and
[3197]myself, and I am quite convinced that he knew the nature
[3198]of the operation."
[3203]"Q.: What were the subsequent conversations you had
[3204]with Mr. Dulles in which you concluded that he knew
[3205]that this was an assassination effort?
[3207]"Bissell.: . . . it's really a guess on my’ part*that
[3209]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 72
[3211]2. such conversations occurred . ._. I do believe they did
[3212]occur is that during the entire-autumn I suppose I must
[3213]have spoken to Mr. Dulles practically daily about some
[3214]aspect of the whole Cuban operation and I am virtually
[3215]certain that he would ih one or another of those con-
[3216]versations and probably more than once have asked if
[3217]there was anything to report about the Sheffield Edwards'
[3218]operation. He also may have been in direct contact with
[3219]Edwards at that time." (Bissell Tr. 6/9/75, pp. 24-26)
[3221]‘When asked by the Chairman why, in this context,
[3222]persons within the Agency talked "in riddles to one another",
[3224]Bissell replied: that:
[3226]", I think there: was a reluctance to spread even
[3227]on an oral record some aspects of this operation.
[3228]"Chairman: Did the reluctance spring from the fact
[3229]that it simply grated against your conscience to have
[3230]to speak more explicitly?
[3232]“Bissell: I don't think it grated against my conscience.
[3233]I think it may have been a feeling that. the Director
[3234]} [Dulles] preferred the use of the sort of language that.
[3235]aa is described in the I.G. Report. " ,
[3237]Bissell, in a subsequent appearance before the
[3238]Committee, again addressed the issue of whether he and Edwards
[3239]had made it clear to Dulles that what was involved was an
[3240]assassination operation:
[3242]"I thought I made clear that it was my impression--and
[3244]I believe the impression incidentally. that -I thought
[3246]was confirmed.in the [I.G. Report]--that in discussing
[3247]this with Dulles and Cabell . . . the objective of the |
[3248]operation was made unmistakably clear to them. The
[3250]terms 'an intelligence operation’, I think someone
[3252]said, was. that :-not a cover designation? But we would not
[3253]under any circumstances have told Allen Dulles that this
[3254]was.an intelligence collection operation. If said that
[3255]on Monday, I must have given a wrong impression.
[3257](Bissell Tr. 6/11, p. 24.)
[3259]On the other hand, Scott Breckenridge, the only
[3260]3 author of the Inspector General's. Report still with the CIA,
[3261]testified that in his opinion a "pointed avoidance of ‘bad.
[3263]HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 73
[3265]-~ 10 -
[3267]words would have made it less likely that an “intelligence
[3269]operation" would have been understood as an assassination
[3270]_ attempt, and that "it was open to question how clearly this -
[3271]was stated to Mr. Dulles and whether or not Mr. Dulles under-
[3273]stood" (Colby/Breckenridge, 5/. , p. |.)
[3275]Sheffield Edwards was quite infirm when examined by
[3276]the Committee and has since died.* Edwards testified before
[3278]the Committee as follows:
[3279]" . . {T]his possible project was approved by Allen B.
[3281]Dulles, Director of CIA, and by General Cabell, the
[3283]Deputy Director. They are both tlead.
[3285]"The Chairman: How do you know, Colonel, that the
[3286]project had been approved by these two gentlemen?
[3288]“Edwards: I personally briefed Allen Dulles ... . and
[3289]Cabell." (Edwards, 5/30/75, pp. 5-6)
[3291]In his interview with the Rockefeller Commission,
[3292]Edwards testified (Edwards interview, p. 5):
[3294]"Q.: Now, who inside the Agency besides Bissell did
[3295]you have any contact with on the top echelon?
[3297]"Al: Very important. The plan was approved by Allen W.
[3298]Dulles and General Cabell." _ :
[3300]* As the investigation proceeded, members of the Committee
[3301]requested that Edwards be recalled. Edwards passed away
[3302]before this could be accomplished. As a result of Edwards’
[3303]infirmity and subsequent death, the Committee was unable to
[3304]examine him effectively concerning his conflicting prior
[3305]statements concerning Dulles' knowledge of the plots.
[3307]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 74
[3309]- li =-
[3311]James O'Connell, who was the case officer for the
[3312]operation involving underworld figures, testified that when
[3313]he and Edwards discussed the matter in 1975, prior to giving
[3314]evidence to the Rockefeller Commission, he was sure that
[3316], Edwards had told him Dulles had approved the plot (O'Connell
[3317]Tr. 5/30, pp. 58-59). He added that he was "reasonably sure"
[3318]or "knew" in the "back of my mind" that. either Edwards or .
[3319]Bissell had also told him of Dulles': knowledge when the plot
[3320]was underway in 1960-62 (O'Connell Tr. 5/30, pp. 33-34; 36;
[3321]60). | . oo.
[3323]A review of Dulles' calendar for August through
[3324]December 1960 showed no meeting involving Dulles, Cabell,
[3326]Bissell and,Edwards.** Of course, such a meeting could have
[3328]i
[3329]i
[3330]Nee
[3332]occurred without having been recorded.
[3334](2.. Whatever Was Said to Dulles, He Was .Not Briefed
[3336]Until After Contact With the Underworld Figures Had Been Made.”
[3338]Bissell and the Inspector General's.Report (which
[3340]* In June 1966, Howard J. Osborn, Edwards' successor as
[3341]Director of Security, wrote a memorandum for Helms on Maheu |
[3342]stating that "the DCI was briefed and gave his approval".
[3344]' When questioned about this memorandum, Osborn stated that he
[3345]had no firsthand knowledge of the briefing, and that he had
[3346]most likely obtained this statement from Edwards or O'Connell.
[3348]*&k The calendar also reflects no meetings during that period
[3349]between Dulles, Edwards and Bissell, or between Dulles. and
[3350]Edwards. :
[3352]Ne
[3354]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 75
[3356]- 12 -
[3358]relied on Edwards) placed the briefing of Dulles in "the latter
[3359]part of September 1960".
[3361]Bissell did not have a clear independent recollection
[3362]of the dates involved, but recalled that discussions concerning
[3363]the possible use of syndicate members against Castro began "in
[3364]the Autumn of 1960".* He recalled initial discussions among
[3365]himself, Edwards, and Colonel J. C. King, Chief of the Western
[3366]Hemisphere Division, which he said occurred before Dulles and
[3367]Cabell were approached about assassinating Castro. According
[3371]to Bissell,
[3373]“those conversations, the subject matter was a capability
[3374]to eliminate Castro if such. action should be decided
[3375]upon.
[3377]on “It is, therefore, accurate to say that my best
[3378]recollection of those conversations (with Edwards and
[3379]King) is that they addressed themselves to the existence
[3380]or non-existence of the capability and to the possibility
[3381]of developing a capability. They were not conclusive or.
[3382]decisive conversations . . , nor would they have revealed
[3383]a prior decision to implement such a plan by anybody.'
[3384](Bissell, 6/9, p. 19. ) 1
[3386]t
[3387]Neer!
[3389]* "Q.: When did you first become aware of any plan Or
[3390]effort to assassinate Mr. Castro?
[3392]"Bissell: Well, I became aware of. planning. a contingency
[3393]basis for such an operation. My recollection is
[3395]‘August .
[3397]"Q.: August of 1960?
[3399]"Bissell: "60; correct. .:. but without reading [the
[3401]I.G. Report], ‘I would have remembered initial conversations
[3402]early in the autumn of 1960." (Bissell Tr. 6/9, pp. 17-18.)
[3404]wee
[3406]Me
[3408]HW 50955 Docld:32493539 Page T6
[3410]- 13 -
[3412]O'Connell contacted Roselli in early September 1960.
[3413]During the week of September 25,|.0'Connell, Maheu, and Roselli
[3414]_
[3416]tet with Giancana and Trafficante in Miami. Bissell testified
[3417]as follows concerning the sequence of those events:
[3419]"Q.; Well, before we come to the meeting [with Dullesi,
[3421]you had been informed, prior to that, had you not, that
[3423]contact had been made with the Mafia?
[3425]"Mer . Bissell.: I had.
[3427]"Q.: Now were you informed; that the Mafia had been given
[3429]the go ahead to proceed with actual efforts to assassinate
[3432]. . | .
[3433]"Bissell: Not that early, to my “best recollection.
[3434]I cannot date that at all well. I would suppose that it.
[3436]was within the next two or three weeks. (Bissell, 6/9,
[3437]“pp. 20-21. )
[3439]; |
[3440]On the other hand, Roselli's testimony suggests that Maheu had
[3441]indicated prior to the “latter part of September’ 1960 that a
[3443]large sum of “money ‘would be paid! for Castro’ s death (Roselli,
[3445]P.- 17), and Edwards' May 14, 1962 memorandum indicated the
[3446]briefing of "senior officials" took. place after the money had |
[3447]been offered. Be, |
[3448]| It is clear, then, that even if Dulles was informed ©
[3449]about the use of underworld figures to assassinate Castro, sub-
[3450]- ordinate agency officials had previously decided to take steps |
[3452]toward: arranging for the killing of Castro, including discussing
[3454]it with organized crime leaders.
[3456]HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page Tf?
[3458](iv) Questions Raised iby Edwards’ Commuihicatiotis
[3459]to the Justice Department’ in 1961 and 1962.
[3461]As fully described supra, pp.___, the FBL discovered
[3462]in the late 1960's that Maheu had been involved in an illegal
[3464]‘ wiretap in Las Vegas. In April 1961, Maheu told the FBI that
[3465]the tap had been placed in connection with a CIA operation, and
[3466]suggested that the FBI contact Edwards to verify this fact.
[3467]An FBI report of a May: 3, 1961 interview with Edwards
[3469](in which Edwards vaguely described the use of Giancana as
[3472]t
[3474]relating to "clandestine efforts! against the Castro Government"
[3475]with no mention of assassination, and a copy of which was given
[3476]to the Attorney General) stated: |
[3478]"Col. Edwards. advised that only Mr. Bissell (Director of
[3479]Plans, CIA) and two others in CIA were aware of the
[3480]Giancana-Maheu activity in behalf of CIA’s program and ~
[3481]Allen Dulles was completely unaware of Edwards’ contact
[3482]with Maheu in this connection. He added that Mr. Bissell,
[3483]in his recent briefings of Gen. Taylor and the Attorney
[3484]“General in connection with their inquiries into CIA
[3485]relating to the Cuban situation, told the Attorney General
[3486]that some of the associated planning included the use of
[3487]Giancana and the underworld against Castro." (FBI memo-
[3488]randum entitled "Arthur James Balletti et al.",May 22,
[3489]1961, p. 2.) (Emphasis added)
[3491]|
[3495]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 78
[3497]Bissell said he was certain, however, that the- .
[3498]statement regarding Dulles' knowledge about the operation was
[3499]wrong, and testified that "it is just flatly contrary to my
[3500]recollection that Allen Dulles was unaware of these contacts,
[3502]‘as I have testified several times" (Bissell, 6/11, p. 27).”
[3504]When asked to speculate on why Edwards would have
[3505]told the FBI that Dulles was unaware of Edwards’ contact with
[3506]Maheu, Bissell replied: .
[3508]"I can only surmise that he believed he could. secure
[3509]the cooperation of the Justice Department that he
[3510]required without in any way involving his superior,
[3511]Mr. Dulles, and simply did| this in a. protective
[3512]fashion." (Bissell, 7/7, p. 20).
[3513]A year later, on May 7), 1962, Edwards and.CIA's
[3514]oy General Counsel met with Attorney] General Robert Kennedy.. (That
[3516]meeting, is discussed extensively! below at p. ). Edwards'
[3518]memorandum of the meeting indicated that he had said that
[3519]after Roselli and Giancana had been offered $150,000, Edwards
[3522]had "then briefed the proper senior officials of [the]
[3524]i
[3526]Now, it (the FBI memorandum) is just flatly
[3527]contrary to my recollection that Allen Dulles
[3528].Was unaware of these contacts, as I have testified
[3529]several times. Also, I submit it is quite im-
[3530]plausible that I would have briefed Gen. Taylor
[3531]_and the Attorney General--and incidentally, I
[3532]have no recollection of briefing those two gentle
[3533]men except as members of the Board of Inquiry
[3534]that I have described, of which Allen Dulles him-
[3535]self was a member--it is quite implausible that
[3537]I would have briefed them on a matter which had
[3538]been going on for some months, and some which
[3540]the Director, Mr. Dulles himself, had never been
[3542]7 } informed."
[3544]i
[3546]HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 79
[3548]~ 16 -
[3550]i
[3551]Nee
[3554]Agency" (without specifying whom) and they had "duly orally
[3555]approved."* It further states that "knowledge" of the project
[3556]had been “kept to a total of six persons." **
[3558]Dulles had left the Agency between the time of
[3560]Edwards' two statements.
[3562](v). Remarks Made to the Special Group by General
[3563]Cabell in November 1960. a
[3565]“Bissell and Edwards testified that Cabell was aware
[3566]of the Castro plots (Bissell Te «| O29) oP 22; Edwards Tr. 5/30/75,
[3570]. * On the same day as writing ‘that memorandum for the
[3572]i) Attorney General, Edwards wrote another memorandum for his
[3573]own files indicating that after putting Harvey in contact
[3574]with Roselli in early April, he had’:
[3576]“cautioned him [Harvey] that I felt that any future -
[3577]projects of this nature should have the tacit approval
[3578]of the Director of Central Intelligence." (5/14/62, —
[3579]Memorandum for the Record:) ;
[3581]‘This memorandum, which contained other information which
[3582]Harvey and Edwards had agreed to include to "falsify" the record,
[3583]is discussed infra, P. _:
[3584]**. The 1967 Inspector General's‘ Report surmised that thirteen
[3585]people knew of the plot, including Dulles, based upon Bissell's
[3587]and Edwards' account of the Dulles briefing. (See discussion,
[3588]supra. at mo,
[3590]**k*k The Inspector General's Report stated:
[3592]"With Bissell present, Edwards briefed the Director
[3593](Dulles) and the DDCI. (Cabell) on the existence of a plan
[3595]involving members of the syndicate. . . Edwards is quite
[3596]sure that the DCI and the DDCI clearly understood the
[3597]— ; nature of the operation he was discussing.’ ¢IG Repoft,
[3598]iy . ‘P. 17.)
[3599]od O'Connell testified ‘that prior to O'Connell's testifying
[3601]before the Rockefeller Commission, Edwards told O'Connell that
[3602]Cabell had. been aware of and authorized the project.
[3604]HW O50955 DoclId:32423533 Page 30
[3606]- 17 -.
[3608]The testimony indicates that the meeting between Dulles,
[3610]Bissell, Edwards, and Cabell occurred sometime “in the autumn"
[3612]of 1960, probably around September. The minutes of a meeting of
[3614]the Special Group, the high-level governmental body for consider-
[3615]-ing covert action, on November 3, 1960, reflect the following
[3617]remarks:
[3619]"Finally, Mr. Merchant asked whether any real planning
[3621]had been done for taking direct positive action against
[3622]Fidel, Raul and Che Guevara. He said that without these
[3623]three the Cuban Government would be leaderless and
[3625]probably brainless. He conceded that it’ would be necessary
[3626]to act against all three simultaneously. General Cabell
[3627]pointed out that action of this kind is uncertain of
[3628]results and highly dangerous in conception and execu-
[3630]tion, because the instruments must. be Cubans. He
[3632]felt that, particularly because of the necessity of
[3633]simultaneous action, it would have to be concluded iS hy
[3634]that Mr. Merchant's suggestion is beyond our capabilities.’ trbowlis
[3635](11/3/60 Special Group Minutes , P, 3.
[3637]Exactly what the term "direct positive action" meant: to the - bef AT feat
[3639]speaker or those listening is uncertain. Neither was able to . heljeve pes,
[3640]offer any interpretive help to the Committee. However, other
[3641]participants at this meeting have testified that the reference
[3643]could mean: or include assassination.*
[3645]he
[3648]"Q: Do you read. . . direct, positive action.
[3649]as meaning killing (Fidel Castro, Raul Castro and Che
[3650]Guevara)?"
[3652]"A: IT would read it that way, yes." (Lansdale
[3653]Tr. 7/8/75, p. 103.) _
[3655]OQ: . . .would you agree that the words ‘direct
[3656]positive action’ appear to question whether there's been any
[3657]planning in connection with assassinating (the Castros and
[3659]Guevara)?" ee _
[3660]we "A: I think. the phrase "positive action’ could include
[3661]assassinations, but. . . I'm not sure what was in Mr. Merchant's
[3663]“mind.” (Gray Tr. 7/9/75, p. 9. )
[3665]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 61
[3667]HY 50955
[3669]- 18 -
[3671]Bissell was also asked about the minutes of the
[3672]November 3 meeting. After reading the reference to "direct
[3673]positive action," Bissell said "I find it difficult to
[3675]understand" (Bissell Tr. 7/17, p. 18). He’was then asked
[3677]"Q: Do you, in light of the November 3
[3678]minutes) remain firm that Cabell was knowledgeable
[3679](of the assassination plots)?"
[3681]"A: It casts some doubt on that in my mind."
[3683]When asked if it cast "some significant doubt in light of
[3685](Cabell's) character", Bissell answered "yes" (Bissell, 7/17,
[3687]“pp. 22-23).
[3689]DoclId: 324235393 Page 82
[3691]-~ 19 -.
[3693](ec) ‘Did John MeCone Know of or Authorize Assassina-
[3695]tion Plots During His Tenure as DCI
[3696]The CIA considered several assassination plots
[3698]against Castro during McCone's tenure as Director. Harvey
[3699]initiated his contact with Roselli in April 1962, and the
[3700]operation involving underworld figures continued into early.
[3701]1963. In early 1963 the CIA looked into the possibility of
[3702]assassinating Castro with an exploding seashell and contaminated
[3703]diving suit. AM/LASH was offered a poison pen device in
[3704]November 1963, and caches of arms were delivered to Cuba for
[3705]nis use in the following year.
[3707](i). McCone Testified That He Did Not Authorize
[3709]Lf , or Know About the Castro Plots and That He Would Have Dis-
[3710]| approved the Plots Had He Been Asked
[3711]McCone testified that he was not aware of
[3712]the plots to assassinate Castro which took place during the
[3713]years in which he was DCI, and that he did not authorize those
[3714]plots. * (MeCone, 6/6/75, pp. 33, 44-45) He testified that he
[3715]was not briefed about the assassination plots by Dulles,
[3716]Bissell, Helms, or anyone else when he succeeded Dulles as
[3717]_ Director in November 1961 (McCone, 6/6/75, pp. 6-7, 17), and
[3718]that if he had ever been asked about the plots, he would have
[3720]disapproved. (McCone, 6/6/75, p. 47) .McCone testified:
[3722]-_ * MeCone testified that he. first learned of. the Roselli operation
[3723]w in August, 1963, long after it had been terminated. See discussion,
[3724]Pp. : . : : , . :
[3726]HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 63
[3728]-~ 20 -
[3730]I had no knowledge of any authorized plan or
[3731]planning that might lead to, a request for
[3732]authorization. Of course, during those days
[3733]it was almost common for one person or another.
[3734]to say, we ought to. dispose of Castro
[3736][bJut at no time did anyone come to me, or
[3737]come to other authorities to my knowledge,
[3738]with a plan for the actual undertaking of an
[3739]assassination.
[3741]* * woke ode
[3743]Senator Hart of Colorado: . . . Did you
[3745]ever discuss the subject of assassinations PLA
[3746]with your predecessor, Mr. Dulles?
[3748]McCone: No, I did not. - , CAR IY 4"
[3749]rs Lamang?
[3751]. (ii) Helms, Bissell, and Other Subordinate Agency
[3753]Employees Testified That They Did Not Ask McCone to Approve
[3755]ed
[3757]the Plots or Know If He Had Knowledge Of Them.
[3759]Richard Bissell was DDP under MeCone for three months,
[3761]‘from November 1961 until. February 1962. — Richard Helms assumed
[3763]the duties of DDP from Bissell.
[3765]Bissell testified about MeCone"s knowledge as follows:
[3767]HW 50955 Docld: 32423539
[3769]Q,: Your testimony is that you never discussed
[3773]assassinations with Mr. McCone?
[3775]A.: That is correct.
[3777]Q.: . . .[D]id you tell McCone anything about
[3779]that conversation with Mr. Harvey in which
[3780]you at least told him (Harvey) to take
[3781]over the relationship with the criminal
[3782]syndicate?
[3784]A.: I don't remember so doing.
[3786]Page 64
[3788]Helms testified that he did not recall ever having dis-
[3790]cussed the assassination plots with McCone while the plots
[3792]‘were continuing.* When asked whether MeCone was aware of the
[3794]assassination plots against Castro, Helms testified:
[3796]No, it isn't my impression that I told him,
[3798]at least I don't have any impression, unfor-
[3799]tunately. . . .. Mr. McCone is an honorable |
[3800]man. He has done his own testifying, and all
[3801]I can say is that I do not know specifically
[3802]whether he was aware or not. (Helms, 6/13/75,
[3803]pp. 90, 101-102)
[3805]Helms further testified: ~
[3807]Q.:° I believe Mr. McCone testified that he
[3809]never heard of any of these attempts when he
[3810]was Director. Would you have any reason to
[3812]disagree with his testimony?
[3814]Helms: Sir, I have always ‘liked McCone and
[3816]t don't want to get-into an altercation with
[3817]him. He had aecess to Harvey and everybody
[3819]else just the way I had and he had regular
[3821]‘access to the Attorney General.
[3823]Helms t
[3825]we oO*
[3827]Q.: If you were a member of this Committee
[3828]wouldn't you assume that Mr. McCone was un-
[3829]aware of the assassination attempts while
[3830]they were underway?
[3832]Helms: I don't know how to answer that,
[3834]Senator. Mondale. He was involved in this up
[3835]to his scuppers just the way everybody else
[3837]estified that he first told McCone about the plot
[3839]using underworld figures in August 1963, See discussion supra
[3841]at p,
[3843]HY 50955 Docld: 32423539
[3845]Page 65
[3847]-??-
[3849]was that was in it, and I just don't know.
[3850]I have no reason to impugn his integrity.
[3851]On the other hand, I don't understand how
[3852]it was he didn't hear about some of these
[3854]_ things that ne claims that he didn't.
[3855](Helms, 7/13/75, pp. 32-33)
[3858]I honestly didn't recall that Mr. McCone
[3859]‘was: not informed and when Iwas told that
[3860]there was evidence that he wasn't informed,
[3861]I was trying to scratch my head as to why I
[3862]didn't tell him at the time and my surmises
[3863]are the best I can come up with. I am really
[3864]surprised I did not discuss it with him at
[3865]the time. My relations with him were good,
[3866]and so my surmises are just the best I am
[3867]able to do in 1975 over an episode that took
[3868]place that many years ago. (Helms, 6/13/75,
[3869]p. 90)
[3871]Several other Agency officials who were aware of the
[3872]assassination plots testified that they had not told McCone
[3873]of the plots. William Harvey testified that he never spoke
[3874]with McCone about the operation involving underworld figures
[3875]or assassination and that, to the best of his knowledge,
[3876]McCone had not been told about the project. (Harvey, 6/25/75,
[3877]p. 66), .
[3879]Sheffield Edwards, when asked whether he had informed
[3880]McCone about the plot, replied:
[3882]Edwards: No, I did not inform Mr. McCone. .
[3884]Q.: Was there a reason for why you did not
[3885]._ inform Mr. McCone?
[3887]HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 66
[3889]-~ 23 -
[3891]Edwards: Well, I did not want to drag
[3892]“Mr. McCone into this thing that. in my
[3894]opinion had petered out, and I did not
[3895]want to involve him. (Edwards, p. 18).
[3897]James O'Connell, who was the case officer for the opera-
[3898]tion under Edwards, testified that he recalled that Edwards had
[3899]told him during a discussion about the plots in 1965 that
[3900]Edwards had not briefed McCone on the operation.
[3902]As a matter of fact, I don't think he ever
[3903]knew. about it. From later conversations with
[3904]Colonel Edwards, not recently, we talked about
[3905]it, and he said that he wae convinced that
[3907]Mr. McCone never knew about it, it wasn't on
[3908]his watch, so to speak, and he didn't want to
[3909]get him involved. (O'Connell, pp. 37, 39)
[3911]George McManus, Helms' Special Assistant for Cuba during
[3912] } _ the relevant period, testified that he was not told about the
[3913]‘assassination activities, and gave his opinion that if McCone
[3915]had been asked to approve an assassination, he "would have
[3917]Wow
[3919]reacted violently immediately .
[3921]*McManus advanced two reasons for this opinion:
[3923](1) MeéeCone had a great love for the President of
[3924]the United States and he sort of looked at him
[3925]as an older son or a brother, a very protective
[3926]sense he had about the President, President
[3927]Kennedy, and McCone would have immediately said
[3928]Jesus, this is a no win ball game. .
[3930](2) Secondly, as an individual, he would have found
[3931].it morally reprehensible. (McManus, p. 33)
[3933](Continued) ~
[3937]a
[3941]HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 67
[3943]> 24 -
[3945]Walter Elder, McCone's Executive Assistant, testified
[3946]that he had not known of the underworld operation until August 7
[3947]1963, and that in his opinion McCone did not learn of the
[3948]‘operation prior to that time.* (Elder, p. 15)
[3950](iii) Helms and Harvey Did Not Brief McCone About
[3952]the Assassination Plots
[3954]McCone assumed the position of DCI in Novem-
[3955]ber 1961. It was also in November 1961 that Bissell asked
[3956]Harvey to: assume operational control-over the Castro plot in-
[3957]volving underworld figures.** Richard Helms replaced Bissell
[3959]in February of 1962 and was subsequently briefed by Harvey on
[3961](Continued)
[3962]McManus also testified:
[3964]I always assumed that Mr. Helms would keep the
[3965]Director fully informed of any activity that he
[3966]thought was sensitive. . . . Under most cir-
[3967]cumstances, and indeed under all circumstances
[3968]you can imagine, Helms would have told McCone,
[3969]with the exception of a situation in which
[3970]Helms had been told by higher suthority not to
[3971]tell him. (McManus, Pp. 32-34)
[3973]*In ‘August 1963 Helms gave McCone a copy of Edwards' May 14,
[3974]1962, memorandum to the Attorney General. See discussion infra
[3975]“at p. ;
[3976]With respect. to the Cuban assassination matters, where
[3977]Colby's knowledge was only second-hand, Colby said: "Mr. McCone
[3978]did not know of it." (Colby, 5/21/75, p. 101) ,
[3980]**See earlier discussion supra.
[3982]HY 50955. Docld:32423539 Page 66
[3984]the existence of the assassination plots. Helms was Harvey's
[3985]immediate superior and the person to whom he reported about
[3986]the Castro plot activities,
[3987]Harvey testified that in the spring of -
[3988]1962, when he was preparing.to contact Roselli, he briefed
[3989]. Helms on the assassination plot. - (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 65)
[3990]Harvey said:
[3991]. . . L briefed Helms generally on the take-
[3992]over of Roselli, on the doybts about the
[3993]- operation, on the possible . .... future of
[3994]it, and to the extent it had then been possible,
[3995]the assessment. of Roselli and the cutting out
[3996]of various individuals. *
[3997]Harvey testified that when he briefed Helms on. the assassina-
[3998]sa tion plot operation, they decided that it would not be .appro-~
[3999]priate at that point to brief John McCone.
[4000]There was a fairly detailed discussion be-”
[4001]tween myself and Helms as to whether or not
[4003]the Director should at that time be briefed |
[4004]concerning this. For a variety of- reasons
[4006]*Harvey testified that when he took over the Roselli opera~
[4007]tion, he had "cut out" both Maheu and Giancana because wregard-
[4008]less of what I may. have thought of their trustworthiness,
[4009]they were surplus" to the operation. (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 65).
[4013]HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 69
[4015]he
[4016]SN
[4017]t
[4019]which were tossed back and forth, we agreed
[4020]that it was not necessary or advisable to brief
[4021]him at that time.
[4023]I then said, as I recall, to Mr. Helms, if you
[4024]decide in the future that he should be briefed,
[4025]I would like to know about it in advance to
[4026]which, to my best recollection, he agreed.
[4027](Harvey , 6/25/75, p. 66)
[4029]Harvey then offered the following explanation for why he and
[4030]Helms had decided not to discuss the matter with McCone at
[4031]that time:
[4033]There were several reasons*for this. One,
[4035]this operation at that stage had not been
[4036]assessed. . It was obviously questionable on
[4037]several grounds. .It obviously involved know-
[4038]ledge by too many people. We were not even
[4039]‘sure at that point it had any remote possibility
[4040]or rather any real possibility for success. It —
[4041]had arisen with full authority insofar as either
[4042]of us knew long before I knew anything about it,
[4043]and before the then- Director became Director of
[4044]the Agency.
[4046]I saw no reason. at that time to charge him
[4047]with knowledge of this, at least until we reach--
[4048]ed the point where it appeared it might come to
[4049]fruitation or had had a chance to assess the
[4050]“individuals involved. and determine exactly the
[4051]problem we faced, including the possible problem
[4052]-- and it was a very, or it appeared to be, and
[4053]in my opinion was, at that time, a very real
[4054]possibility of this government being blackmailed
[4055]either by Cubans for political purposes or by
[4056]figures in organized crime for their own self-
[4057]protection or aggrandizement, which, as it turned
[4058]‘out, did not happen, but at that time was a very
[4059]pregnant possibility. (Harvey, 6/25/75, pp. 67-68)
[4061]ole ake ale wh ate
[4062]w ay Ww * w
[4064]HW 50955 Docld:324273539 Page 90
[4066]- 27 -
[4068]- I am definitely not saying that there was any
[4069]effort to hide or conceal any information from
[4070]the Director. There was not.. This was a dis-
[4071]cussion as to whether or not it was even neces-
[4072]sary or appropriate at this point to take details
[4073]-of this particular operation in an unassessed
[4074]form to the then-Director at that time. (Harvey,
[4075]6/25/75, p. 69)
[4077]Harvey stated that he did not have any reason to believe
[4078]that the assassination activities would have been "disapproved
[4080]we
[4082]by the Director" had he been advised of the project (Harvey,
[4083]6/25/75, p.. 69) and stated that he hdd thought the plots "were
[4084]completely authorized at every appropriate level within and —
[4085]beyond the Agency". (Harvey, 7/11/75, P. 66) When asked why
[4087]‘McCone had not’ been given an opportunity to consider the plot,
[4089]Harvey replied:
[4091]One of the things that I don't know from
[4092]my own. . . knowledge . ... is who was briefed
[4093]in exactly what terms at the time of the so-
[4094]called Las Vegas flop that involved attempts to
[4095]place a technical surveillance ... . in Dan |
[4096]Rowan's hotel room. (Harvey, 7/11/75, p. 46)
[4098]HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 91
[4100]~ 28 -
[4102]Harvey was queried on wnether the reasons he had given for not -
[4103]briefing McCone were actually "reasons why he should [have been]
[4104]briefed forthwith". Harvey replied:
[4106]Well, Senator Huddleston, it will be quite
[4107]easy in looking at it now to say, well, I can
[4108]see your argument.
[4110]All I ean say to you in answer is at that
[4111]time I didn't feel that it was necessary or
[4112]advisable. I-did not make this decision except
[4113]in consultation, and had I been disagreed with,
[4114]that would have been it. And I am not off-
[4115]loading this on Richard Helms or attempting to
[4116]at all. It isn't all that easy for me to go
[4117]back this many years and sort of recast all of
[4118]the reasoning and be. sure I am accurate. And
[4120]-I don't also want to evade it by saying, well,
[4121]it seemed like a good idea at the time. But ~
[4122]_actually it did.
[4124]\ , In other words, this was not something
[4125], that either Helms or myself felt that at that .
[4126]stage there was any point in attempting to
[4127]brief the Director.on it until, at least,.we
[4128]had a somewhat better handle on it.
[4132]And I might also add, if I may, .. . but as
[4134]far as either one of us knew at that point he
[4136]might have been or should have been briefed,
[4138]if you want it that way, by either Allen Dulles
[4140]or Richard Bissell. (Harvey, 7/11/75, pp. 67-71)
[4142]The 1967 Report prepared by the Inspector General for
[4144]Helms states that Harvey said: "When he briefed Helms on
[4145]Roselli, he obtained Helms' approval not to brief the
[4147]Director." (I.G., p. 41)
[4149]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 92
[4151]Helms
[4153]- 29. -
[4155]testified that he did not recall this conversation,
[4157]but that he had no reason to doubt the accuracy of Harvey's
[4159]testimony and the Inspector General's Report. (Helms, 6/13/75,
[4160]pp. 32, 106) .
[4161]Helms, when asked about Harvey's testimony that he and
[4163]Harvey had agreed not to brief McCone, stated "I frankly don't. |
[4165]recall having agreed to this."
[4167]My recollection is that I had very erave
[4168]doubts about the wisdom of this. . . . And as
[4170]_I recall it, we had so few*assets inside Cuba
[4172]at that time that I was willing to try almost
[4173]anything. But the thing did not loom large in
[4174]my mind at that time. I was enormously busy
[4175]with a lot of other things, taking over a new
[4176]job [as DDP]. Mr. McCone was realtively new in
[4177]the Agency and I guess I must have thought to
[4178]myself, well this is going to look peculiar to
[4179]him and I doubt very much this is going to go
[4180]anyplace, but if it does, then that is time
[4182]_enough to bring him into the picture. (Helms,
[4184]Helms also
[4186]6/13/75, p. 33)
[4187]stated:
[4189]It was a Mafia connection and Mr. McCone was |
[4190]relatively new to the organization and this was,
[4191]you know, not a very savory effort. (Helms,.
[4192]6/13/75, p. 92)
[4194]“Helms later testified that he did not "recall ever having been
[4196]convinced
[4198]that any attempt was really made on Castro's life."
[4199]y .
[4201]I am having a very difficult time justifying
[4202]before this Committee, because there is some-
[4203]thing in here that doesn't come together, even
[4204]for me, I am sorry to say. Because if this was
[4206]all that clear, as everybody seems to think it
[4208]HY 40955 Dacld: 327423539
[4210]Page 93
[4212]- 30.-
[4214]was, that there were those pills in that restau-
[4215]rant in Cuba and Castro was about to die, I cer-
[4216]tainly would have talked to McCone about: it.
[4218]And this never was that clear, I am sorry to say,
[4219]but it never was, not at that time. (Helms,
[4220]7/17/75, p. 34)
[4222]On May 7, 1962, Edwards and the CIA's General Counsel,
[4223]Lawrence Houston, briefed Attorney General Robert Kennedy on:
[4224]the operation involving underworld figures, describing it as
[4225]terminated. * . . .
[4227]“Harvey told the Inspector General that:
[4229]on 14 May he briefed Helms on the meet-
[4230]ing with the Attorney General, as told to him
[4231]by Edwards. Harvey, too, advised against
[4232]briefing Mr. McCone and General Carter and
[4233]states that Helms concurred in this. (1.G.,
[4234]. . pp, 65)
[4237]Harvey testified that what he had probably told Helms was that:
[4239]Any briefing of the Director on the discussion
[4240]with the Attorney General concerning this
[4241]should come from Colonel Edwards and Larry
[4242]Houston, the General Counsel, and not from the
[4243]DDP unless we are asked. (Harvey, 6/25/75,
[4245]p. 99) ,
[4247]Helms testified that he did not recall this conversation and _~
[4249]remarked:
[4251]It seems odd to me only because, if the Attorney
[4253]General had been briefed on something it would
[4255]seem very logical that it would be very important
[4257]to brief the Director at that time on the same
[4258]thing. (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 107)
[4260]“The briefing is exhaustively described supra af p.
[4262]According to the Inspector. General"s-Réport, Hatvey and
[4263]Roselli had a farewell dinner before Harvey went on an assign-
[4264]ment to Rome in June 1963. The meeting was observed by the FBI,
[4265]and Sam Papich, the FBI liaison with the CIA, notified Harvey
[4267]HY 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 94
[4271]_— Harvey supplied poison pills and weapons to Roselli
[4272]| and his Cuban associates during a trip to Miami in’April,-1962.*
[4273]At a Special Group meeting on April 26, General Taylor requested
[4274]that Harvey "attend the next meeting and report on agent
[4275]activities". (Memo, McCone, 4/26/62). On April 26, Harvey
[4276]was sent a memorandum informing him of General Taylor's request
[4277]and MeCone's wish to meet with Harvey and Lansdale “immediately |
[4278]on your return to discuss, the Task Force Activities." (Memoran-
[4279]dum, Elder to Harvey, 4/27/62). | .
[4280]"Harvey testified that upon his return, he reported
[4281]to the Special Group on the "status of the active and potential
[4283]te ¥
[4285]sources inside Cuba. .
[4287]Q.: "Did you report on. the passage of the pills to Roselli?
[4288]‘y Harvey: No, I did not. . .
[4289]- :
[4291]Qa: “Which you had just accomplished in Miami. . .for
[4293]- the purpose of assassinating Fidel Castro.
[4295]Harvey: : No. | |
[4297]Q.: And did you report that to Mr. McCone when he asked
[4298]you to. tell him what you had done in Miami? |
[4300]‘Harvey: ‘No, I did not." (Harvey, 7/11, pp. 16~-17.)°
[4302]that Hoover. would be informed. Harvey asked Papich to call him .
[4303]if he felt that Hoover would inform the Director about the incident.
[4305]"Harvey said that he then told Mr. Helms of the incident
[4306]and. that Helms agreed that there was no need to.brief
[4308]McCone unless a call from Hoover was expected. (1.G.,
[4309]p. 54.) , Lo
[4311]‘* Harvey described the trip to Miami as = .. ao ae
[4313]Re . "one .of a number of periodic trips for the purpose of
[4314]reviewing in toto. . . the actual and potential operations at the
[4315]Miami. base. . . and this covered the whole gamut from personnel
[4316]‘administration, operational support in the way of small craft (and)
[4317]so on. . ." (Harvey, 7/11, pp. 15-16).
[4319]BW 50955 Docld: 32423539 . Page 35.-
[4321]HY 409545
[4325]A
[4327]Harvey stated that he did not tell McCone or the Special Grouo
[4329]about the operation at that time because:
[4331]"I did not consider either, A, that this should be in any
[4332]sense in this amorphous stage, surfaced to the Special Group,
[4333]nor, as I have attempted to explain before that it should be
[4334]briefed to John McCone at that point in the state that it was
[4335]in with as little -as we knew about it, and with all of the at-
[4336]tendant. background which at that point, and I was not personal-
[4337]ly cognizant of all of this, had been going on for approximate-
[4338]385)" recall, two to two-and-a-half years."" (Harvey, 7/11,
[4339]Pp. . se
[4341]Harvey attended an August 10, 1962 meeting of the
[4343]Special Group Augmented.* He testified that a person [Robert
[4345]McNamara] at that meeting suggested that the Special Group “consider
[4347]the elimination or assassination of Fidel" (Harvey, 7/11; p. 30).
[4349]Harvey then testified that on the day.following this Special Group
[4351]meeting (Harvey, 6/25, p. 71):
[4353](9
[4355]\ my Pv id
[4357]how’
[4363]"in connection with a morning briefing of John McCone, the
[4364]question again came up and I expressed some opinion as to
[4366]the inappropriateness of this having been raised in this
[4368]form and at that forum [Special Group meeting], at which ©
[4369]point Mr. McCone stated in substance that he agreed and
[4371]also that he had felt so strongly that he had, I- believe,
[4373]the preceding afternoon or evening,. personally called the
[4374]gentleman who made the proposal or suggestion and had stated
[4375]similar views as to the inappropriateness and that he [Me-
[4376]Cone] said in addition .. . if I got myself involved in some-
[4377]Cping like this, I might end up getting myself ex-communicated."
[4379]Harvey stated that he did not tell McCone on that occasion. about
[4381]the actual assassination operation involving Roselli. He said
[4383](Harvey, 6/25, p. 73):. -
[4385]we
[4387]*This meeting and the raising of the suggestion of assassina-
[4388]. tion is discussed in depth in part __, infra.
[4390]Docld:32423539 Page 96
[4394]"YT would like to recast the time that this took place. This
[4395]was August of '62. This was at the start of the so-called
[4396]Missile Crisis.
[4398]"A tentative decision had been made at that point that
[4399]the only sensible thing to do with [the Roselli operation]
[4400]was to terminate it as rapidly and cleanly as it could be
[4401]done . . . I am sure that I had discussed with Roselli, at
[4402]least on a tentative basis, by August, the probable neces-
[4403]sity of terminating this_
[4405]According to the Inspector General's Report, the "medicine" was ~
[4406]reported to be still in Cuba at this time. (1:6G., pp. 51-52)
[4407]Harvey testified that the Report was referring to the pills -
[4409](Harvey, 6/25, p. 105).*
[4413]In relation to the August 10 meeting,.Helms was asked whether
[4414]he believed McCone would have stopped an assassination attempt if
[4415]he had known that one was underway. Helms stated:
[4417]LP Mr. Helms: "The reason I say I don't know... is that
[4419]: elsewhere Mr. McCone states that He went to see Mr. Mc-
[4420]Namara in connection with this August 1962 affair and told
[4421]Mr. McNamara that he wouldn't have anything to do with
[4422]this, that I have no recollection that I don't believe he
[4423]ever. said anything to me about his not wanting to have any-
[4424]thing to do with it.
[4426]—Q.: "And you were close to Mr. McCone in that period? You
[4427]are his Deputy for Plans?
[4429]Mr. Helms: "I saw him almost daily.
[4431]Q.: “And is it your belief that if he had made any such
[4432]statement to Mr. MeNamara that he would have come to you
[4433]and told you about it at some point?
[4435]Mr. Helms: "I just don't know why he didn't but I don't re-
[4436]call- any such statement. As I said, and -I would like to ©
[4437]repeat it, Mr. McCone had given me my job, he had promoted
[4438]me, IT felt close to him, I felt loyal to him, and I would
[4439]not have violated an instruction he gave me if I could have
[4440]possibly helped it.
[4441]as *Harvey said:
[4442]. "T may have deferred for a period of a few weeks giving
[4443]an actual order to terminate this as soon as possible,
[4445](Harvey, 6/25, p. 74).
[4447]HW 50955 DocId:32423539 Page 97
[4451]O.: "But in any event, it is your judgment that he did not
[4452]indicate that he was opposed to assassinations
[4454]Mr. Helms: "Not to me.'
[4455]Walter Elder, who served as McCone's Fxecutive Assistant, testified,
[4456]however, that he had personally told Helms of McCone's opposition
[4458]to assassination after. the August 10 meeting.*
[4460](iv) The. August 1963 Briefing of. McCone
[4462]An August 16, 1963, Chicago Sun Times article claimed
[4463]that the CIA had had a connection with Giancana.** MeCone asked
[4464]Helms for a report about the article. McCone testified that when
[4465]Helms. came to see him, he brought the. following ‘memorandum:
[4467]"L. “Attached is the only copy in the Agency of a memorandum
[4468]on subject, the ribbon copy of which was sent to the Attorney
[4469]_ General in May of 1962. Iwas vaguely aware of the existence’
[4470]of such a memorandum since I was informed that it had been
[4471]a . written as a result of a briefing given by Colonel Edwards and -
[4472]a Lawrence Houston to the Attorney General in May of last year.
[4474]"9, 7 spoke with Colonel Edwards on the telephone last evening,
[4475]and, in the absenee of Mr. Bannerman on leave, I was with.Colo-
[4476]nel Edwards’ assistance able to locate this copy. As far as I
[4478]*Elder told the Committee:
[4480]a told Mr. “Helms that Mr: MeCone had expressed his feeling
[4482]that assassination could not be condoned and would not
[4483]-be approved. Furthermore, I conveyed Mr. McCone's statement
[4484]that it would be unthinkable to record in writing. any consid- .
[4485]eration of assassination because it left the impression that
[4486]the subject had received serious consideration by governmental
[4487]policy makers, which it had-not. Mr. Helms responded, ‘I un-
[4488]derstand’. -The point is that I made Mr. Helms aware ‘of the
[4489]strength of Mr. MeCone's opposition to assassination. : I know
[4490]that Mr. Helms could not have been under any misapprehension
[4491]about Mr. McCone's feelings after this conversation. (Elder
[4492]Affidavit. )
[4494]; **kThe 8/16/63 Chicago Sun Temes. article states that “Justice
[4495]Department sources’ cago Sun ines “that Giancana never did’ any spying
[4496]for the CIA, but pretended to 20 “along with the Agency "in the
[4498]a . hopes that’ the Justice Department's drive to put him behind bars
[4500]might be slowed - or at least affected | - by his ruse of coopera-
[4501]tion with another government agency.
[4503]BW 50955 Doecld: 32423539 Page 36
[4507]am aware, this is the only written information available on
[4509]Agency relationships with subject. I hope that this will
[4511]serve your purpose.
[4513]"3. assume you are aware of the nature of the operation ©
[4515]. discussed in the-attachment."' (Memorandum to Director of
[4517]Central Intelligence, re: Sam Giancana, from Helms, 8/16/63.)*
[4518]That memorandum attached the May 14, 1962, memorandum to Attorney
[4519]General Kennedy from Sheffield Edwards which described the opera-
[4520]tion as having been terminated before McCone became DCI. (See
[4521]discussion, infra, p. _)
[4523]Neither McCone nor Helms were able to remember what was said
[4524]at the meeting. Walter Elder, who was then McCone's Executive As-
[4525]sistant, recalled:
[4527]"Mr. Helms came in with [the memorandum]. He handed it to
[4529][McCone] who read it and . . . handed it back without any
[4531]particular comment other than to say, ‘Well, this did not
[4532]happen during my tenure.'"
[4536]Q.: "Was anything else said?
[4538]A.: "No, he had very little to say about it.
[4540]Q.: "Did Mr. Helms then leave?
[4542]A.: "Mr. Helms left." (Elder, pp. 16-17, 57-59.)
[4544]Elder testified that he had concluded that the operation in-
[4545]volved assassination from reading the two memoranda that were given
[4546]to McCone (Elder, 8/13, p. 60). Elder "further concluded that [Mc-
[4547]Cone] was perfectly aware of what Mr. Helms was trying to say to
[4549]*hen asked whether this entry in the memorandum suggested that
[4550]he had previously been aware of the operation, -McCone testified that
[4552]fos Helms had orally informed him "on that day in August" that it in-
[4553]Bat volved assassination (McCone, p. 9).
[4555]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 99
[4559]him" (Elder, p. 60). Elder further testified:
[4561]'
[4562]Q.: "Other than that conversation that you just described
[4563]between yourself and Mr. McCone, did he have anything else
[4565]to say about that memorandum?
[4567]e-Elder: "No."
[4568]Q.: "I take it then he did not tell either you or Mr. Helms
[4569]that we absolutely could not have this activity going on in
[4571]‘the future?
[4573]Mr. Elder: "No."
[4575]The Inspector General's Report concluded that:
[4577]"This is the earliest date on which we have evidence
[4578]of Mr. McCone's being aware of any aspect of the
[4579]scheme to assassinate Castro using members of the
[4581]gambling syndicate." (1.G., p. 70)..
[4583]HW 50955 DocId: 32423539 Page 100
[4586]fel Based on
[4587]Subcommittee
[4588]Meeting, 8/29/75
[4590](bo) The Question of Authorization Outside The Central Intelli-
[4592]ence Agency In The Eisenhower Administration.
[4594]1. Summary
[4595]As discussed in the preceding section, the evidence as to whether.
[4596]Allen Dulles, CIA Director during the Eisenhower Administration, was
[4598]informed of the Castro assassination operation is not clear.
[4599]Even assuming that Dulles was so informed, ‘authorization outside
[4600]-the CIA for a Castro assassination could, according to the testimony,
[4602]only have come from President _Elsenhover , from someone speaking for hin,,.
[4604]or from the Special Group.* At issue, therefore, is whether President
[4606]Eisenhower, his close aides, or the Special Group authorized or had knowledge
[4608]of the Castro assassination plots.
[4612]In addition to Bissell, we took considerable testimony from
[4613]President Bisenhower's principal staff assistants, Gordon Gray (Special
[4614]Assistant for National Security Affairs and President Eisenhower's
[4615]representative on the Special Group) ; General Andrew Goodpaster (starr
[4617]Secretary to President Eisenhower with particular responsibility for
[4621]*¥ With respect to then. Vice President Nixon, Bissell testified~-and he
[4622]was supported by the principal White House assistants and the documents—-
[4623]that Nixon was not significantly involved in Cuban matters generally at
[4624]the critical times. There is no evidence suggesting his knowledge of the
[4625]Castro assassination effort during ‘the period under review, significant
[4627]parts of which occurred during the Presidential campaign. (Bissell >
[4629]p. 3; Gray, 7/9, p- 39) Therefore, we concluded that, despite the
[4630]indications in Nixon's book My Six Crises (p. ) that he was’ involved
[4632]in Cuban matters generally--and Howard Hunt's characterization of him as
[4634]the [action officer] for the Bay of Pigs, there was insufficient reason
[4636]to examine Mr. Nixon on Cuba looked at alone. We came-to a contrary
[4637]my conclusion on Chile and... .
[4639]HY 50955 Dacld: 32423539 Page i101
[4641]HW 50955
[4643]ere a
[4645]Qwrmwe
[4647]national security operational matters); John Eisenhower (Assistant Staff
[4648]Secretary and the President's son) and from Thomas Parrott (Secretary
[4649]to the Special Group and special assistant to Allen Dulles). In summary,
[4650]the evidence was: . :
[4652](i) Bissell testified that he did not inform the Special Group
[4653]or President Eisenhower of the Castro assassination operation, and he
[4654]had no personal knowledge that Allen Dulles informed either President
[4655]Eisenhower or the Special Group. However , Bissell expressed the belief
[4656]that Allen Dulles would have advised President Eisenhower (but not the
[4657]Special croup) ina "circumlocutious" or "oblique" way. Bissell based
[4658]this "pure personal opinion" on | his understanding of Dulles' practice
[4659]with respect to other particularly sensitive covert operations.” But
[4660]Bissell testified that Dulles never told him that he had so advised
[4661]President Risenhower regarding the Castro assassination operation, even
[4663]though Dulles had told Bissell when he had employed this "circumlocutious"
[4665]approach to the President on certain other occasions.
[4667](ii) Gordon Gray testified that the Special Group never approved
[4669]a Castro assassination, and that President Eisenhower had charged the‘
[4671]‘Special. Group with the responsibility of authorizing all-important covert
[4673]operations. A review of the records of Special Group meetings shows that
[4675]a query concerning a plan to take "direct positive action" against Castro
[4677]at a Special Group meeting caused Allen Dulles! Deputy, General Cabell,
[4679]to advise that such action was beyond the CIA's capability. Gray,
[4680]Goodpaster and John Hisenhower all affirmed (i) that they did not believe
[4682]President Eisenhower would have considered such a matter in a private
[4684]Bocld: 32423539 Page 102
[4686]meeting with Dulles, or indeed that President Eisenhower. would have approved
[4687]a Castro assassination in any event, and (ii) that he would not have dis-
[4688]cussed such a matter without telling them. They conclude, therefore, as a
[4689]matter of. opinion, that President Eisenhower was never told, and testify,
[4691]as a matter of fact, that they never heard anything about any assassination
[4692]at any time.
[4694](iii) In addition to the I.G. Report (which found that the CIA could :
[4698]; . : sos : . : . erie nibh
[4700]not say that any assassination activity carried on during this period was Lu memes
[4701]i
[4703]responsive to Administration pressure), the documentary evidence showed that
[4706]the subject of Castro's removal was discussed at two meetings of the tational Ac
[4707]Security Council and the Special Group in March 1960. The minutes of these fm
[4708]meetings indicated that the discussions were in the context of a general con- Sey
[4709]sideration of the proposal to train a Cuban exile force for an invasion of: |
[4710]Cuba and an assessment that Castro's overthrow night result in a Communist Me (i
[4711]takeover. Gray and Admiral Burke testified that the discussion of Castro's [
[4712]removal at these meetings did not refer to assassination, but rather to the y [2
[4713]problem of creating an anti-Castro exile force strong enough to insure a non-
[4714]Communist successor to the Castro regime. In any event, no action was shown
[4716]to have stemmed from those meetings. An additional Special Group document
[4718]showed that when a question regarding planning for “direct positive action"
[4720]- against Cuban leaders was raised at a meeting in the Fall of 1960 (shortly
[4722]after Phase L-of the CIA/underworld assassination operation was initiated),
[4724]the Deputy Director of the CIA told the Special Group that such action was
[4726]beyond the CIA's capability.
[4728]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 103
[4730]2. Richard Bissell's Testimony
[4732]LU SROEEE
[4734](a) Lack of Personal Knowledge. Bissell testified that he knew
[4736]nothing of clearances outside the CIA for the Castro assassination effort. -
[4737](Bissell, 6/9, p. 30). Indeed, Bissell met frequently with the Special
[4739]Group in the Fall of 1960 for the purpose of discussing Cuban operations,
[4741]but never informed the Special Group that there was a plot underway involving
[4742]use of underworld figures to assassinate Castro, (Bissell, 6/9, pp. 25~26);
[4743]nor did Bissell inform President Eisenhower or Vice President Nixon or any
[4744]other person outside the CIA (Bissell, 6/9, pp. 26-29). Bissell testified
[4745]that his reason for not doing so was that as Deputy Director of Plans, he
[4746]reported to the Director and under Agency procedures relied upon the Director
[4747]to inform the appropriate persons outside the.Agency. Thus, the question of
[4748]President Eisenhower's knowledge rests on whether Allen Dulles personally
[4749]informed him of the Castro plot.
[4751](b) Assumptions Concerning Dulles. Based upon his belief that
[4753]7 A Dulles had been briefed about.the operation involving. underworld figures
[4755]r
[4757]and understood that it involved assassination, Bissell assumed that Allen
[4758]' Dulles would have sought authorization above the CIA level. As Bissell
[4760]testified:
[4762]"T went'on the assumption that, in a matter of this sensitivity,
[4763]the Director would handle higher level clearances. By clearance
[4764]I mean authorization."* (Bissell, 6/9, p. 26.) */
[4766]re
[4768]*Bissell reiterated this view on his second day of testimony: ". . . I
[4769]felt that. the responsibility for obtaining necessary authorization should
[4770]remain with the Director." (Bissell, 6/11, p. 4)
[4772]ae.
[4774]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 104
[4776]Bissell further stated that although he believed that Dulles
[4777]"probably" talked with President Eisenhower: |
[4778]Vohe Mafia operation was not regarded as of enormous importance
[4779]and there were much more important matters to talk about with
[4780]the President." (Bissell, 7/17, p. 25.)
[4781]Bissell said he was "guessing" that Dulles informed Eisenhower.
[4782](Bissell T/1T, pp- 38-39.) He said, however, that he based his assumption
[4783]on his knowledge of "command relationship, of Allen Dulles as an individual,
[4784]and of his [Dulles'] mode of operations”. (Bissell, 6/11, p. 6.) As
[4787]Bissell explained, his guess that Dulles informed President Eisenhower “is
[4789]not based on hard evidence” but is "pure personal opinion”. (Bissell,
[4791]ear”
[4793]a 6/9, p. 61.) Nevertheless, he believed it to be so, and that the Presi-
[4794]dent thereupon gave his authorization "perhaps only tacitly". (Bissell,
[4796]6/11, p. 6.) As Bissell explained,
[4798]"My guess is that indeed whoever informed him, that is Dulles
[4799]directly or Dulles through a staff member, would have had the
[4800]same desire. . . to shield the President and to shield him in
[4801]the sense of intimating or making clear that something of the
[4802]sort was going forward, but giving the President as little in-
[4803]formation about it as possible, and the purpose of it: would have
[4804]been to give the President an opportunity, if he so elected, to
[4805]cancel it, to order it cancelled, or to allow it to continue but
[4806]without, in effect, extracting from him an explicit endorsement
[4807]of the detailed specific plan." (Bissell, 6/9, p. 61)
[4809]p) penn
[4811]BW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 105
[4813]HY 409545
[4815]Bissell said circumlocution would have been used "to protect
[4816]the President" in accord with.the concept of "plausible deniability".*
[4818]As noted above, Bissell testified he had no personal knowledge
[4820]that Dulles informed President Eisenhower of the Castro plot. On other
[4821]specific occasions involving sensitive covert operations, Dulles had told
[4823]Bissell he had used the "circumlocutious" approach with President
[4825]Bisenhower. (Bissell, 6/11, p. 10.) But with respect to the Castro d /
[4826]. . : eas h@
[4827]assassination attempt, Dulles did not so inform Bissell. (Bissell, 6/11, «a7
[4828]FO PAL
[4829]p. 11.) As Bissell testified: ; ov 42
[4832]"I still want to be quite clear, I do not have.a recollection of the Ie Sa
[4833]Director telling me that on this specific operation he had made é
[4835]such at approach and received assent, approval, tacit or otherwise.’ pee a
[4836](Bissell, 6/11, p. ll.)
[4838]As to whether Dulles knew of the plots and informed Eisenhower, we
[4839]have discussed above the fact that in January 1960 Dulles had told the Special
[4840]Group that the CIA "did not have in mind a quick elimination of Castro."
[4841](Memorandum of Special Group meeting, January 13, 1960, pe). And in July
[4842]1960 an instruction by Bissell's deputy to attempt to kill Raul castro, which
[4843]also stated that “possible removal of top three leaders is receiving serious
[4844]consideration at headquarters" had been | countermanded. The CIA officer
[4845]who drafted this instruction testified that he hed heard at ‘the time that
[4847]it was Dulles who countermanded this instructio doing so had "indicated
[4849]that assassination was not to be considered." (Hinkle, p.
[4851]® Bissell explained the "plausible deniability" practice as follows:
[4853]“Any covert operations, but especially covert operations . . . that
[4854]if successful, would have very visible consequences, it was of course
[4855]an objective to carry out in such a way that they could be plausibly
[4856]‘disclaimed by the U.S. Government. " (Bissell, 6/11, p. 5:)
[4858]Bissell apparently assumed that a corollary to that doctrine required the
[4859]use of “oblique”, "circumlocutious" language.
[4861]Docld: 3242793539 Page 106
[4863](iii) White House Officials Denied Knowledge of Assassination
[4865]Efforts and Gave the Opinion that President Eisenhower Was Not Informed.
[4866]“1. Gordon Gray. Gordon Gray served as President Eisenhower's
[4867]Special Assistant for National Security Affairs from July 1958 to the
[4868]end of the Eisenhower Aaministration on January 20, 1961. (Gray, p. 4.)
[4869]In this capacity, Gray served as the President's representative on the
[4870]Special Group. (Gray, p..4.) President Eisenhower specifically instructed
[4871]Gray that all covert actions impinging on the sovereignty of another
[4872]country must be deliberated by the Special Group. (Gray, p. 6.) Gray
[4873]testified that during the period July 1958 to January 20,.1961, the
[4874]Special Group never approved an action to assassinate Castro (Gray, p. 6) -
[4875]and no such suggestion was made by Bissell. (Gray, D. 37.)
[4876]— | Gray testified he did not believe Allen Dulles would have
[4877]approached President Eisenhower without informing Gray. Gray stated:
[4878]"I find it very difficult to believe, and I do not believe, that
[4879]Mr. Dulles would have gone independently to him with such a
[4881]proposal without, for that matter, my knowing about it from Mr.
[4882]Dulles." (Gray, p. 35.)*
[4884]® Gray pointed out "that I was not with President Eisenhower twenty-
[4885]four hours a day. It was a few.minutes every day, practically every day."
[4886](Gray, p. 35.)
[4888]According to the records of the Eisenhower Library, Dulles was alone
[4889]with President Eisenhower on one occasion in the Fall of 1960. That
[4890]meeting lasted ten minutes on November 25, 1960. .The record of the
[4891]previous portion of the meeting attended by Gray indicates only that, in
[4893]’ addition to discussion of operations in another country, "there was also
[4894]some discussion of Cuba". (Memorandum, November 28, 1960, by Gordon Gray,
[4895]of Meeting with the President, November 25, 1960 at 10:40 A.M.). We feel
[4896]compelled to state that the fact of this brief meeting, on the evidence
[4897]available, is of little, if any, significance or relevance.
[4899]HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page i107
[4901]ne
[4903]Gray further testified that his relationship with President
[4905]Eisenhower was such that President Eisenhower "would discuss with me any
[4906]- thing that came to his attention independently of me.", (Gray, p. 7.)
[4908]And Gray testified that President Eisenhower never discussed with him the
[4909]subject of a Castro assassination or of the use of the underworld figures
[4910]and Cubans in such an effort. (Gray, p. 7.)
[4912]é. Andrew Goodpaster. Goodpaster served as President Eisenhower's
[4913]Staff Secretary and Defense Liaison Officer during the last two years of
[4914]the Eisenhower Administration. (Goodpaster, p. 3.) In addition to responsi-
[4915]bility for the President's schedule and the supervision of the White House
[4916]staff, Goodpaster was responsible for handling with the President "all
[4917]matters of day to day operations" in the foreign affairs and national
[4919]security field, including the activities of the CIA and the Departments
[4921]ta
[4923]of State and Defense. (Goodpaster, p. 3.) Goodpaster testified that he
[4924]had a "very close personal relationship" with President Eisenhower ‘and
[4925]saw the President “Yessentially every day when [President Eisenhower] was
[4926]in Washington (Goodpaster , p. 4). Along with Gordon Gray, Goodpaster
[4927]served as the channel between the CIA and the President. Goodpaster was
[4928]the particular channel for "operations in which [President Eisenhower |]
[4929]might take a personal part". (Goodpaster , P. a)
[4930]_Goodpaster testified that he never heard any mention of assas-—
[4931]ination efforts. (Goodpaster, p. 5.) He said that President Eisenhower
[4932]‘never told him about any assassination effort and that it was his belief,
[4933]under White House procedures and by virtue of his close relationship with
[4934]President Eisenhower, that if an assassination plan or operation had ever.
[4935]fos : been raised with the President, he would have learned of it. (Goodpaster,
[4937]Nes. a
[4938]p. 5.)
[4940]4
[4942]way
[4943]SE if
[4945]HW 50955 Doold:327493539 Fage 106
[4947]Beyond this General Goodpaster testified that he found Bissell's
[4948]assumption of a "circumlocutious" personal conversation between Dulles and
[4950]the President "completely unlikely".
[4952]"That was simply not the President's way of doing business. He
[4953]had made it very clear to us how he wanted to handle matters of
[4954]this kind, and we had set up procedures to see that they were then
[4955]handled that way." (Goodpaster, pp. 6-7)
[4957]According to Goodpaster, after the collapse of the Paris Summit
[4958]Conference between President Eisenhower and Premier Khruschev as a result
[4959]of the U-2 incident in the Spring of 1960, the Eisenhower Administration
[4960]reviewed its procedures for approval of CIA Sperations:and tightened then.:
[4961]General Goodpaster testified that this review was carried out
[4963]"with the aim in mind of being sure we had full and explicit under-
[4964]standing of any proposals that came to us and we knew from
[4966][President Eisenhower] that in doing that we were responsive .to
[4967]a desire on his part." (Goodpaster, p. 7.) :
[4971]Secondly, according to Goodpaster, the relationship between
[4972]President Eisenhower and Allen Dulles was quite different from that
[4973]between the President and John Foster Dulles. He said John Foster Dulles
[4974]was a confidant of the President while Allen Dulles was not. (Goodpaster,
[4975]p. 8.) |
[4976]3. Thomas Parrott. Thomas Parrott, a GIA officer, served as
[4977]Secretary of the Special Group from 1957 through the end of the Eisenhower
[4978]. Administration (and thereafter until October 1963). . (Parrott, p- ke)
[4979]“Parrott stated that, by virtue of this assignment, he functioned. as Allen
[4980]Dulles’ assistant in connection with the Special Group, knew Dulles well,
[4982]and gained an understanding of Dulles' method of expression and his
[4984]HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 109
[4986]See
[4988]Se re ee
[4989]Re ton doh AEG “
[4991]practice for dealing with the President. (Parrott, pp. 13-1).)*
[4993]Parrott testified that early in 1959, President Eisenhower
[4994]directed the Special Group to meet at least once a week to consider, approve,
[4995]or reject all significant covert action operations (Parrott, p. 4.).
[4997]Parrott testified it would have been "nighly unlikely" for President
[4998]Eisenhower to have instructed the CIA to carry out a covert operation
[5000]without informing the Special Group. Parrott testified:
[5002]“as evidenced in his . . . revitalization . ... of this Committee
[5003][the Special Group], {President Eisenhower was] highly conscious of
[5004]the necessity to be protective . . . in this field, and I just
[5005]cannot conceive that [President Eisenhower] would have gone off and
[5006]mounted some kind of covert operation on his own. This certainly
[5007]would not have been consistent with President Eisenhower's staff
[5008]method of doing business .. . "**(Parrott, p. 7.)
[5009]4. John Eisenhower. John Eisenhower, President Eisenhower's
[5010]son, served in Goodpaster's office as Assistant Staff Secretary from mid-
[5011]1958 to the end of the Eisenhower Administration. (Eisenhower, pp. 5, 9)
[5012]He testified that his father had confided secret matters in him "to a very
[5013]large extent". (Eisenhower, p. 3.) For example, he said that after the
[5015]Potsdam Conference in July 1945, then Gen. Eisenhower told him that the
[5017]United States had developed the atomic bomb at a time when this was highly
[5021]"T saw him [Allen Dulles] several times a week for hours at a time.
[5022]I had known him somewhat before . . . but I got to know him very
[5023]well indeed during these four r years." (Parrott, p. 13. )
[5025]**® Parrott further testified that Allen Dulles ‘followed a practice of
[5026]insisting upon specific orders rather than "tacit approval” and he also-
[5027]found Bissell's assumptions regarding a. circumlocutious conversation
[5028]petween President Eisenhower and Allen Dulles "hard to believe”
[5030](Parrott, p. 14.)
[5032]HW 50955 DoclId: 32423539 Page 110
[5034]ahead
[5036]secret information. (Eisenhower, p. 3.) And he said that as early as
[5037]1956, President Eisenhower tola him of the secret U-2 flights. (Eisenhower,
[5038]p. 4.) |
[5040]John Hisenhower testified, as a matter of fact, that President
[5041]Eisenhower never told him of any CIA activity involving an assassination
[5042]plan or attempt with respect to Castro. (Eisenhower, p. 5.) Based on
[5043]his father's practice in other matters, it was his opinion that President
[5044]Eisenhower would have told him if the President had known of any such
[5045]activity. (Eisenhower, p. 5.) He further testified that President Eisenhower
[5047]did not deal with important subjects in a circumlocutious manner. (Eisenhower, p. 8.)
[5049]John Bisenhower further testifiea that it was his father's belief that
[5050]no leader was indispensable, and thus assassination was not an alternative
[5051]in the conduct of foreign policy. (Eisenhower, p. 14.)
[5052](iv) The Documents |
[5054]1. The Inspector General's Report
[5056]The document latest in date which bears upon the issue of
[5057]authorization: for Phase I of the Castro assassination efforts is the 1967
[5058]Inspector General's Report. ‘In the concluding section of the Report to
[5059]Director Helms, the authors advanced several possible Ageney responses to
[5061]"Drew Pearson's public. charges regarding CIAAinderworld links.* One of the
[5063]* On March 3, 1967, Drew Pearson stated in his newspaper column that
[5064]there was a U.S. "plot" to assassinate Castro, and that "one version
[5065]claims that.underworld figures actually were recruited to carry out the
[5067]plot." (Pearson, Washington Merry Go-Round, March 3, 1967)
[5069]HY 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 111
[5071]4 Rey a Woh AR f ,
[5073]questions they asked was whether the Agency could say it was acting pur-
[5075]i suant to Government policy --; or as they put the question: "Can CIA state
[5076]or imply that it was merely an instrument of policy?" The answer given
[5078]Was:
[5080]"Not in this case. While it is true that Phase Two (the i
[5081]attempt commencing in April 1962) was carried out in an
[5083]atmosphere of intense Kennedy Administration pressure to |
[5084]do something about Castro, such is not true of the earlier H .
[5085]phase." (I.G., p. 132). ; —l 7 °
[5087]In addition to the I.G. Report, we examined the records of the National
[5088]Security Council and the Special Group, as well as other relevant White House
[5089]files bearing on the question of authorization for the period from .
[5090]Castro's rise to power to the end of the Eisenhower Administration. As we
[5091]discuss below, three documents were found which contained references arguably
[5093]e
[5095]related to the subject of assassination.
[5096]2. The Contemporaneous Documents
[5097]In March 1960, the National Security Council and the Special
[5099]Group focused.on Cuban policy. President Eisenhower had just returned from
[5100]a foreign trip in which
[5102]“Latin American Presidents had counseled further forbearance
[5104]by the U.S. in the hope that the members of the Organization
[5106]of American States would finally see the potential danger in
[5108]Cuba and take concerted action." (Gray, Ex..2, Memorandum of
[5110]March 10, 1960 NSC Meeting, p. 8).
[5111]Castro was chatacterized as hostile, but his Communist ties were apparently
[5112]then unclear. Indeéd, it may have been the prevailing opinion, at that time,
[5113]that Castro was not actually a Communist.* For it was stated in the minutes
[5114]of the March 10, 1960 NSC meeting:
[5116]"there is no apparent alternative to the present government in
[5118]the event Castro disappears. Indeed the result of Castro's dis-
[5119]appearance might be a Communist takeover." (Gray, Ex. 2, p. 7). |*
[5121]Look San ERE
[5122]Sad * Castro apparently first announced publicly that he was a "Marxist-Lenist”
[5124]on December 2, 1961. (David Larson, Cuba Crisis of 1962, p. 304).
[5126]HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 112
[5128]13
[5130]Me Add
[5132]vitae WE Me 6G wa bald 4
[5134]Out of these March 1960 meetings of the NSC and Special Group came
[5138]the general covert action plan against Cuba.*
[5140]Against this background of general discussions of Cuba, we con-.
[5141]sidered certain remarks appearing in the records of a March 10, 1960 National
[5142]Seeurity Council meeting and a March 14, 1960 Special Group meeting.
[5144]The record. of the NSC meeting of March 10, 1960 (at which President
[5146]Eisenhower was present) states that Admiral Arleigh Burke, in- commenting on
[5147]Allen Dulles! statement that the Cuba ebvert action plan was in preparation,
[5148]“suggested that any plan for the removal of Cuban leaders should be a package
[5149]deal, since many of the Cuban leaders around Gastro were even worse than Castro."
[5150](Gray Ex. 2, p. 9). And, according to the minutes of a Special Group meeting
[5151]on March 14, 1960 (which President Eisenhower did not attend) "there was a
[5152]general discussion as to what would be the effect on the Cuban scene if Fidel
[5153]i) and Raul Castro and Che Guevara should disappear simultaneously.” (Gray Ex. 3,
[5154]p. 2).
[5155]Admiral Burke, who served as Chief of Naval Operations from 1955 to
[5156], 1961, stated in an affidavit** that although he did not have a specific vecollec-
[5157]; tion of the March 10, 1960 meeting of the National Security Council, he had a
[5158]clear recollection of the discussions of Cuba policy that took place in the
[5159]spring of 1960. (Burke affidavit, p. 1). Burke stated that the reference to
[5161]the suggestion by him at the March 10, 1960 meeting "clearly. refers to the
[5163]* As Gray testified, this plan covered four areas: sabotage, economic sanc-
[5164]tions, propaganda, and training of a Cuban exile force for a possible invasion.
[5165]Gray stated that this plan had nothing to do with assassination. (Gray, 7/9/75,
[5167]Pt AT) ; . ) .
[5168]** Admiral Burke was unable to te a , —V—e
[5169]: ; stify in person before | .
[5170]oa because he was in the hospital. Pp efore the Committee
[5172]1 CLOMET
[5174]on si ae
[5176]HY 50955 Docld: 324235539 Page 113
[5178]TREO Bry 2 USE AMY Boy Seu 14
[5180]general covert action plan reported by Allen Dulles at that meeting and to
[5182]the general consideration given at that time in the U. S. Government: to
[5183]identify Cuban groups with which the U.S. might work to overthrow the Castro
[5185]‘regime." (Burke affidavit, p. 1). Burke stated:
[5187]"In this connection, it was my view that the U.S. must support
[5188]those Cuban groups who would: have a sufficient power base among
[5189]the Cuban people, not merely to overthrow Castro, but to be
[5191]able to cope with and dismantle his organization as well. It
[5193]was my firm belief at the time that many people in Castro's
[5194]organization were Communist and that Castro was probably a
[5195]Communist. .I therefore advocated that any effort to support
[5196]groups so as to achieve Castro's overthrow must focus, not
[5198]merely on the leaders at the top of the Castro regime, but on
[5200]the very strong organization that had been the key to Castro's
[5201]rise to power, and was the basis for hig power." (Burke affidavit,
[5202]p. 1-2).* : : os
[5204]Burke stated further:
[5206]. "The question of a Castro assassination never arose at the March 10,
[5208]: * 1960 NSC meeting or at any other meeting or-discussion that I
[5210]. attended or in which I participated. It is my firm conviction
[5211]based on five years of close association with President Eisenhower
[5212]during my service as Chief of Naval Operations, that - President
[5213]Eisenhower would never have tolerated such a discussion,
[5214]or have permitted anyone to propose assassination, nor would he
[5215]have ever authorized, condoned, or permitted an assassination
[5216]attempt." (Burke affidavit, p. 2).!
[5218]‘Gray testified that the discussion at the March 10 and March 1h,
[5219]1960 meetings dealt with plans to overthrow the Castro governnent,, rather than
[5220]to assassinate Castro himself. He said that Admiral Burke's recorded comment
[5221]at the March 10, 1960 NSC meeting was part of a lengthy and general discussion
[5222]of the problem of Cuba. At the outset of that discussion, it was Under Secretary
[5223]of State Douglas Dillon who pointed out that "the result of Castro's disappearance
[5225]might be a Communist takeover." (Gray Ex. 2, p- 7; Gray, p. 11): Ana
[5227]om
[5229]“HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 114
[5231]El ie eb a 4 15
[5233]Admiral Burke's reference to a "package deal" for the removal of Cuban
[5234]leaders was in direct response to a comment by Allen Dulles recorded in
[5236]the minutes that "a plan to affect the situation in Cuba was being worked
[5238]Ww
[5240]on. (Gray Ex. 2, p. 9; Gray pp. 13-14). Gray said he believed that
[5242]np
[5244]Mr. Dulles "was certainly referring to" the Eisenhower Administration's COAL
[5245]‘plan to train Cuban exiles for an invasion, rather than a targeted attemp a
[5246]din |$
[5250]on Castro's life.*/ (Gray pp. 14, 45). Gray testified that viewing Admiral od,
[5251]SRA
[5253]Burke's remarks in context, he believed it was clear that "Admiral
[5255]fin Alves
[5257]*f A CIA memorandum of an internal CIA meeting (Memorandum of First
[5258]Meeting of Branch 4 Task Force, March 9, 1960), shows that the first
[5259]meeting of the CIA task force established to plan -the training of a
[5260]Cuban exile force was held on March 9, 1960, the day before the March
[5262]' 10, 1960 NSC meeting. (Memorandum of First Meeting of Branch 4 Task
[5263]Force, March 9, 1960). At that March 9, 1960, CIA meeting, the CIA
[5264]task force discussed "an operation directed at the overthrow of the
[5265]Castro regime" and described that. operation as one: in which-a Cuban
[5266]exile force would be trained for “6-7 months." In the discussion of
[5267]this operation, it was noted that a principal problem was the weakness
[5268]of the Cuban exile groups which "had no real leader and are divided
[5269]into many parts," put it was hoped that during the long training
[5270]period the "opposition groups will have been merged and will have formed
[5271]a government-in-exile to which all trained elements could be attached."
[5272](Id., p. 2).
[5274]According to the memorandum of the meeting,
[5275]chief of the CIA's Western Hemisphere division
[5276]J. C. King, had stated, “unless Fidel and Raul Castro and Che Guevara could
[5277]be eliminated in onepackage - which is highly unlikely - this operation
[5278]can be a long, drawn-out affair jand the present government will only be
[5279]overthrown by the use of force." (Id., p. 1).
[5281]nerd cree Or ne ine cen
[5283]HY 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 115
[5285]LV
[5287]Burke ... was expressing his opinion that if you have any plan /for the
[5288]overthrow of Castro/ it ought to take these factors into consideration, that
[5289]you might end up with a Communist government." (Gray, p. 45).
[5290]With respect to the March 14, 1960 Special Group meeting, Admiral
[5292]Burke stated that the "general discussion" referred to in the record of that
[5293]meeting ‘clearly did not involve a discussion of assassination of Cuban leaders,
[5294]but to the possible effects should only those leaders be overthrown by a group
[5295]not powerful enough to also master the organization those leaders had established
[5296]in Cuba." (Burke affidavit, p. 2) Burke stated further:
[5298]"Thus, it was consistent with my views then that I should have
[5300]been recorded in the. record of the March 14 meeting as warning
[5302]in this discussion that the Communists might move into control
[5304]even if these three top leaders should be overthrown. As stated
[5306]above, I strongly believed that a strong, organized group must
[5308]be in the forefront of any effort to overthrow the Castro
[5310]government." (Burke affidavit, p. 2).
[5312]~ In any event, when a question “whether any real planning had been
[5314]done for taking direct positive: action against Fidel, Raul and Che Guevara"
[5315]was subsequently asked at a Special Group meeting on November 3, 1960, the
[5316]Deputy Director of the CIA, General Cabell, according to the record of that
[5317]meeting, pointed out
[5319]"that action of this kind is uncertain of results and highly
[5321]dangerous in conception and execution, because the instruments
[5323]must be Cubans. He felt that, particularly because of the
[5325]necessity for simultaneous action, it would have to be concluded
[5326]that (such action) is beyond our capabilities." (Gray Ex. 1, p. 3).
[5328]* The record of the March 14 meeting states: "Admiral Burke said that the
[5329]only organized group within Cuba today were the Communists and there was therefore
[5330]the danger they might move into control." (Gray Ex. 3, p. 2)
[5332]HY 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 116
[5334]17
[5336]The reference to "direct positive action" is ambiguous and can
[5337]be subject to a number of different interpretations, including a. u
[5338]question suggesting exploration of assassination. * However, it is.clear
[5339]that at most a question was being asked. Moreover, assuming that "direct
[5340]positive action" meant killing, it is significant that shortly after assassi-
[5341]nation plots were begun, the CIA Deputy Director told the Special Group that
[5343]such action was "beyond our capabilities,"
[5345]Se
[5346]* Testimony varied as to the meaning of the phrase "direct positive action"
[5347]and General Cabell's response in the November 3, 1960 memorandum.
[5349]Gray testified that the phrase "@irect pasitive action" could be taken
[5350]to include assassination, but he did not know whether Mr. Merchant intended
[5351]to refer to assassination or not. (Gray, 7/9, p. 9). ,
[5353]Parrott, the author of the memorandum, testified that, although he had
[5354]no recollection of the November 3, 1960 meeting, it was his opinion, based
[5355]on the context of weekly Special Group meetings and discussion in the Fall of
[5356]1960, that this discussion centered on the possibility of a palace coup, as
[5357]opposed to a paramilitary operation mounted from outside Cuba; General Cabell
[5358]was indicating that "we simply do not have agents inside of Cuba to carry out
[5359]this kind" of a coup. (Parrott, pp. 19-21) Parrott also testified that the
[5360]phrase "direct. positive action" was not a euphemism, and that he did not
[5361]employ euphemisms in Special Group records, except for references to the
[5362]President. (Parrott, pp. 19-21). We discuss in greater detail at pp. 9
[5363]: > and other ambiguous phrases in minutes and memoranda drafted by aryacs
[5364]Parrott. Cp he bu?
[5366]niet h
[5368]Bissell testified that he found it Vdifficult to understand" that =| (-
[5372]Cabell would have told the Special Group that it was beyond the CIA's capa-—
[5373]bilities to take "direct positive action" (if that referred to assassination)
[5375]in light of Bissell's assumption that General Cabell was informed of the CIA/ :
[5376]underworld assassination effort. (Bissell, 7/17, pp. 15-18). ,
[5378]Mr. Merchant was unable to testify because of ill health and orders of
[5379]his physician.
[5381]HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 ‘Page 117
[5383]TABLE OF CONTENTS
[5385]c. THE QUESTION OF AUTHORIZATION DURING THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION
[5389]a..
[5390]b.
[5391]c.
[5392]d.
[5394]e,
[5395]“\)
[5397]HW 50955 Docld: 32423539
[5399]BISSELL WAS OF THE. OPINION THAT DULLES HAD INFORMED
[5400]RESIDENT KENNED
[5402]T THE AS TION O} T'LON HAD
[5404]BISSELL TESTIFIED HE DID NOT INFORM THE PRESIDENT OR
[5405]ITE, Hi
[5407]0
[5409]C
[5411]THE Ob NG S ON
[5413]NLO PRE
[5415]KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS DENIED KNOWLEDGE OF -
[5416]REED ES Oe ae CAE OPINION THAT. PRESIDENT
[5418](i) BRIEFING OF THE PRESIDENT-ELECT ----------------- --
[5420](ii) DISCUSSION WITH BUNDY ON "EXECUTIVE ACTION
[5422](iii) ‘TAYLOR/KENNEDY BAY OF PIGS INQUIRY --2-----2-------
[5424](iv) MEMORANDUM TO ‘THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ------eeeee nen
[5425]CONVERSATION BETWEEN PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND
[5427]Page 118
[5430]WURAPLLNG SUDLUMMLL LL bD)
[5431]TOP SECRET -- FOR INTERNAL COMMITTEE USE ONLY 8/29/75
[5433]c. THE QUESTION OF AUTHORIZATION DURING THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION
[5435]The evidence on the issue of whether or not assassination plots were
[5436]authorized during the Kennedy Administration is divided herein into two
[5437]broad sections. The first primarily relates to the assassination operation
[5438]involving underworld figures and occurring prior to the Bay of Pigs invasion
[5439]of April, 1961. . The second section deals with the Post-Bay of Pigs period,
[5440]including the Roselli operation in the spring of 1962, Operation Mongoose, the
[5441]laboratory schemes in early 1963, and the AM/LASH plot in the fall of 1963.
[5442](i) PRE-BAY OF PIGS ASSASSINATION PLOTS |
[5443]The pattern of testimony for this period was essentially the same
[5444]as for the Eisenhower Administration. . Bissell, once again, said he assumed
[5445]and believed that Dulles had met with President Kennedy and informed him, in
[5446]‘a circumlocutious fashion, that the operation had been planned and was being
[5447]my attempted. Bissell also testified that he (Bissell) did not inform the
[5448]President about the assassination efforts or any of the other non-CIA persons with
[5449]whom he was working on covert Cuban operations. The Kennedy Administration
[5450]officials all testified that they did not know about or authorize the plots.
[5451]“Furthermore, they said they did not believe the President did or would authorize.
[5452]an assassination plot.
[5453]There were for this period no significant contemporaneous documents.
[5455]a. BISSELL. WAS OF DE POON THAT, EES HAD INFOREED ee aT KENNEDY. °
[5457]When John F. Kennedy became President in January , 1961, Richard Bissell .-
[5458]was still Deputy Director for Plans and the principal agency official -Tespon-
[5459]sible for the ongoing efforts against the Castro regime, including both the
[5461]Bay of Pigs operation and the assassination plots. Bissell is the only sur-
[5463]Bes
[5465]y
[5467]tw,
[5469]HW 50955 Docld:32493539 Page 119 toe Ser ere neennanme ese tiee ets aaa sn oe
[5471]Page Z
[5473]viving CIA policy maker with first hand knowledge of high-level decision-
[5474]making in the early phases of the Castro assassination efforts. Bissell
[5475]testified that he believed Allen Dulles had informed the President (although
[5476]Dulles did net so inform him) and that accordingly the plots had been approved
[5477]by the highest authority. Bissell was questioned about how he felt the Pres-
[5478]ident would have been made aware of the plots:
[5479]"Senator Baker: ...You have no reason to think
[5480]that he [Dulles] didn't, or he did [brief President
[5481]Kennedy]. .But the question I put was whether or
[5482]not in the ordinary course of the operations of
[5483]the CIA as you know it under their traditions,
[5484]their rules and regulations, their policies as
[5485]you knew them what in your opinion -- [wJas the
[5486]President, President-elect briefed or was he in
[5487]the light of all these circumstances?
[5488]Bissell: I believe at some stage the President |
[5489]and the President-elect both were advised that such
[5490]an operation ‘had been. planned and was being attempted.
[5491]Senator Baker: ’ By whom?
[5493]Bissell: I would guess through some channel by
[5494]Alien Dulles. ,
[5496]The Chairman: But you're guessing, aren't you?
[5498]Mr. Bissell: I am, Mr. Chairman, and I have said that
[5500]I cannot recollect the giving of such briefing at
[5502]the meeting with the President-elect in November or
[5504]in any meeting with President Eisenhower." (6/9/75,
[5506]pp. 38-39).
[5508]Bissell's testimony varied with respect to the force with which he stated
[5510]his belief that the President had been informed. Once he referred to it as
[5511]"a pure personal opinion". (Bissell, 6/9/75, pp. 60-1); on another occasion he
[5513]testified as follows:
[5515]sol
[5517]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 120
[5519]Page 3
[5521]a . "Senator Morgan: Mr. Bissell, it's a serious
[5522]j matter to attribute knowledge of this sort to
[5523], the President of the U.S., especially one who
[5524]cannot speak for-himself. Is it fair to assume
[5525]that out of an abundance of caution you are simply
[5526]telling us that you have no knowledge unless you
[5527]are absolutely certain?...I gather that you think
[5528]-it [assassination plot information] came out
[5529]but because of the seriousness of the accusation
[5530]you are just being extremely cautious...is that
[5531]a fair assumption to make?
[5533]Bissell: ° That is “very close to a fair assumption,
[5534]sir. It's just that I have no direct knowledge,
[5535]' first-hand knowledge of his [President Kennedy's]
[5536]being advised, but my belief is that he Imew of it.
[5537][assassination plans]."" (Bissell, 6/9, p. 56).
[5539]When asked why he hac not himself informed White House officials or the
[5540]President of the assassination plots, Bissell said since Dulles was the DCI,
[5541]he "left the question of advising senior officials of the government and .
[5542]obtaining clearances in Allen Dulles’ hands" (Bissell, 6/9/75, pp. 29, 33).
[5543]As with President Eisenhower, Bissell said that, based upon his testimony
[5544]that Dulles knew about the assassination plot, he "assumed" that Dulles
[5546]"had at least intimated [to President Kennedy |
[5548]that some such thing was underway. " (Bissell,
[5549]6/9/75, p. 33).*
[5551]_ * The Presidential logs from the Kennedy Administration indicate only one
[5552]meeting before the Bay of Pigs invasion.at which the President and Allen Dulles
[5553]may have met privately. This meeting took place on March 25, 1961. (There is
[5554]no record of the meeting. We feel compelled to state that the fact of this .
[5556]-meeting, on the evidence available, is of little, if any significance or
[5557]relevance.
[5559]io
[5561]HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 121
[5563]Page 4
[5565]Again as part of his "pure personal opinion" (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 60)
[5566]that this was done, Bissell speculated that Dulles would have engaged in a
[5567]“cireumlocutious" sort of conversation. (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 6), using
[5568]“rather general terms." . .
[5570]Bissell repeatedly coupled Eisenhower and Kennedy together when he
[5571]speculated about’ the mammer in which he felt the Presidents would have been
[5572]advised to maintain "plausible deniability." (Bissell, 6/9/75, pp. 38, 57; ,
[5573]6/11/75, pp. 5-6): .
[5575]"In the case of an operation of high sensitivity
[5576]of the sort that we are discussing, there was a
[5577]further objective that would have been pursued at
[5578]various levels, and that was specifically with
[5579]‘respect to the President, to protect the President.
[5580]And, therefore, the way in which I believe that
[5581]Allen Dulles would have attempted to do that was to
[5582]have indicated to the two successive Presidents the .
[5583]general objective of the operation that was contem-
[5584]plated, to make that sufficiently clear so that the
[5585]President -- either President Eisenhower or President
[5586]Kennedy -- could have ordered the termination of the
[5587]operation, but to’ give the President just as little
[5588]information about it as possible beyond an under-
[5589]standing of its general purpose. Such an approach
[5591]’ to the President: would have had as its purpose to
[5592]leave him in the position'to deny knowledge of the
[5594]ed
[5596]operation if it should surface.
[5598]"My belief -- a belief based, as I have said, only to
[5599]me knowledge of command relationship of Allen Dulles
[5600]as an individual, and of his mode of operations -- is
[5601]that authorization was obtained by him in the manner
[5602]that I have indicated. I used the word on Monday
[5603]“circumlocutious ,"" and it was to this approach that I
[5605]referred.
[5607]‘Assuming for the moment that I am correct, since the
[5609]effort would have been to minimize the possibility of
[5610]embarrassment to the President, it is, I think, under-
[5611]standable that neither I nor anyone else in the Agency —
[5612]would have discussed this operation on our own initiative ~
[5613]with, for instance, members of the White House staff.
[5615]Ne
[5617]HW 50955  DocgTa:32423439" Page “122
[5621]The effort would have been to hold to the
[5622]absolute minimum the number of people who knew
[5623]that the President had been consulted, had been
[5624]' notified and had given, perhaps only tacitly,
[5625]his authorization."' (Bissell, 6/11/75, pp. 5-6).
[5626]However, Bissell testified that Dulles never told him he had briefed
[5627]President Kennedy and he did not recall asking Dulles. (Bissell, 6/9/75,
[5628]| p. 34; 6/11/75, p. xx; 7/17/75, p. 27). In contrast, Bissell testified that
[5629]on certain other occasions, Dulles had mentioned that a "circumlocutious"~A*
[5630]approach had been used to brief President Eisenhower on sensitive subjects oe
[5631](Bissell, 6/11/75, pp. 10-14). Bissell also said that he never asked to
[5632]what degree Dulles had advised McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the
[5633]President’ for National Security Affairs, of the assassination plot. (Bissell,
[5634]6/9/75, p. 34). — _
[5635]b. BISSELL TESTIFIED HE DID NOT INFORM THE PRESIDENT OR WHITE HOUSE
[5636]OFFICIALS OF THE ONGOING ASSASSINATION PLOTS. ,
[5638]When asked if he had informed anyone outside the CIA that an effort to.
[5639]assassinate Fidel Castro was undemay , Bissell stated, "not to my recollection."
[5640]He added that he was not told that any Adninistration official had been made
[5641]aware of such efforts. (Bissell, 6/9/75, pp. 28-30).
[5643]- After the change of Administration, McGeorge Bundy was the White House
[5644]official who was the liaison with Bissell concerning Cuba and in general was
[5645]the principal White House official responsible for CIA matters (Bissell, 6/9/75,
[5646]: . p. 16). Bundy was a former student of Bissell's at Yale and they were personal
[5647]friends (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 28). — Bissell testified that he did not tell Bundy
[5648]about the ongoing Castro assassination plots (Bissell, 6/9/75, pp. 28-29; 7/22,
[5650]p. 3), and Bundy confirmed this (Bundy, p. 41).
[5652]HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 123
[5654]Page 6
[5656]Cuban affairs during this period leading up to the Bay of Pigs received
[5657]active high-level attention. Bissell said that, in a continuation of the kind
[5659]of intense weekly scrutiny the Eisenhower Administration had given the invasion
[5661]plans (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 13).
[5662]_almost from the beginning of the Kennedy _
[5663]Adninistration the President himslef and a
[5665]number of Cabinet members and other senior
[5667]officials took a very active interest in the
[5668]operation (s) concerning Cuba."". (Bissell, 6/9/75,
[5670]p. 16).
[5671]Bissell "almost invariably" was present at meetings in which the President
[5672]and other senior officials took an "active interest" in Cuba (Bissell, 6/9/75,
[5673]p. 17). Bissell testified that he did not éimform any of them of the assassin-
[5674]ation plot.- (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 39).
[5676]~¢. KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS DENIED KNOWLEDGE OF ASSASSINATION EFFORTS
[5677]WD OPINION ‘Ti ENT KENNED i HEORME
[5679]Testimony was taken by the Committee from all living officials high in
[5680]the Kennedy Administration who: dealt with Cuban affairs.* The theme of their
[5681]testimony -- which is set forth in detail below -- was that they had no know-
[5682]ledge of any assassination plan or attempt by the U.S. government before or
[5683]after the Bay of Pigs invasion.
[5685]As with the Eisenhower Administration officials, members of the Kennedy
[5686]Administration also said they did not believe the President's character or
[5687]style of operating would be ‘consistent with approval of such.a matter.
[5689](McNamara, p. 4; Bundy, p. 98; Taylor, pp. 45,51).
[5691]* Most of the testimony from officials high in. the Kennedy Administration
[5692]dealt with the period after the Bay of Pigs invasion, involving Operation Mon-
[5693]goose and related activities. (See Section vinfra. ) It was during this period
[5694]that most of the high officials in the White House, ise, State Department , Defense
[5695]Department, and the CIA were drawn into the detailed planning .of Cuban-operations.
[5696]During this period, an extraordinary amount of decision making memoranda and
[5698]a other documents were genstated in response to the Cuban situation.
[5700]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page i24
[5702]rage /
[5704]Secretary of State Dean Rusk testified:
[5706]? . "T never had any reason to believe that anyone
[5707]that I ever talked to knew about had any active
[5708]planning of assassination underway . " (Rusk,
[5709]pp- 65,49).
[5711]Likewise, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara stated that he had "no
[5712]knowledge or information about.. -plans or preparations for a possible assass-
[5713]ination attempt against Premier Castro.'' (McNamara, pp. 7,4). [The question
[5714]of whether McNamara once raised the issue of assassinating Castro is discusséd
[5715]at Section ,infra. |
[5717]Roswell Gilpatric, Deputy Secretary of Defense under McNamara, said that
[5719]killing Castro was not within the mandate of the Special Group which he con-
[5721]strued to be the weakening and undermining of "'the Cuban system." (Gilpatric,
[5723]“p. 28).
[5725]This was supported by General Maxwell Taylor, who chaired Special Group
[5726]meetings on Operation Mongoose. . Taylor stated that he had "never heard" of
[5728]. the assassination effort against Castro (Taylor, pp. 72, 7-8). Taylor stated
[5730]_ that he never raised the question of assassination with anyone. (Taylor, p.
[5732]19). . Moreover, Taylor testified that he was not aware of a directive for an.
[5733]assassination effort from:the President or the Attorney General, nor was he
[5734]aware of a proposal for the assassination of a foreign leader in any form by
[5735]anyone to the Special Group (Taylor, pp. 41,45,62).
[5736]McGeorge Bundy stated that it was his "conviction" that
[5737]| "no one in the Kennedy Administration, in the
[5738]White House, or in the Capitol, ever gave any
[5739]authorization, approval, or instruction of any
[5741]kind for any effort to assassinate anyone by the
[5742]CIA." (Bundy, p. 54)
[5744]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 125
[5746]rave o
[5748]Furthermore, Bundy testified that he was never told by anyone at any time that
[5749]assassination efforts were being conducted against Castro (Bundy, p. 63).
[5750]Bundy said that Richard Bissell never informed him about CIA involvement in
[5752]assassination attempts against any foreign leader (Bundy, p. 41). Bundy
[5754]acknowledged, however, that he had once been briefed by Richard Bissell on
[5756]the development of an "executive action capability’' at the CIA (see Section
[5758], infra) .* . ;
[5759]Walt Rostow, who shared national security duties with Bundy before moving
[5760]to the Department of State, testified that during his entire tenure in govern-
[5762]ment he "never heard a. reference" to an intention to undertake an assassination
[5766]effort (Rostow, pp. 10, 12-13, 38).
[5768]Asked if he’ had ever been told anything about CIA efforts to assassinate
[5769]Castro, Richard Goodwin, Assistant Special Counsel to the President, replied,
[5770]"No, I never heard of such a thing." (Goodwin, p. 13) .** |
[5772]. an .
[5773]on
[5774]\ |
[5776]* As indicated further below, Bundy also said (i) that the matter of a
[5778]Castro assassination was "mentioned from time to time ... as something to
[5779]talk about rather than to consider." (Bundy, p. 73); and (ii) he had a "very
[5781]" vague, essentially refreshed recollection" that at some time he had heard
[5782]about "poison" in connection with a "possibility of action in Cuba" -- what
[5783]stuck in his mind was that it seemed "totally impractical because it was
[5784]going to kill a large number of people in a headquarters mess or something
[5786]- like that." (Bundy, pp. 42-43). Bundy stated flatly, however, that no
[5788]assassination plot was approved and that he was never informed about the
[5789]various plots. (Bundy, pp. 54, 63-64).
[5791]Saeed
[5793]*® As indicated below, Goodwin did on two occasions hear questions raised
[5794]about assassination. One involved the President, who said he was opposed
[5795](see p. ); the other involved the meeting of August 10, 1962 (see pp.
[5796]to). |
[5798]a
[5800]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 126
[5802]“Pape y
[5804]Presidential Assistant Theodore Sorensen said that his “first-hand
[5805]knowledge" of Cuban affairs was limited to the post-Bay of Pigs period
[5806](Sorensen, p. 4). Sorensen stated, however, that his general opinion based
[5807]upon his close contact with President Kennedy, was that
[5809]"such an act [as assassination] was totally
[5810]foreign to his. character and conscience,
[5811]foreign to-his fundamental reverence for
[5813]human life and his respect for his adversaries,
[5814]foreign to his insistence upon a moral dimen-
[5815]sion in U.S. foreign policy to his pragmatic
[5817]' recognition that so horrendous but inevitably
[5818]counterproductive a precedent committed by a
[5819]country whose own chief of state was inevitably
[5820]vulnerable could only provoke reprisals and‘ in-
[5821]flame hostility."' (Sorensen, p. 5).
[5823]lso said that- President Kennedy "would not make major foreign
[5825]policy decisions alone without the knowledge or participation of one or. more
[5826]of those senior foreign policy officials in whose judgment and discretion he ~
[5828]‘had confidence."' (Sorensen, pp. 5-6).
[5830]Samat!
[5832]Sorensen concluded his testimony by providing the Committee his judgment
[5833]on the following question:
[5835]- "Q: Would you think it would be possible that ... the
[5836]Agency, the CIA could somehow have been under
[5837]the impression that they had a tacit authorization
[5838]for assassination due to a circumspect discussion
[5839]that might have taken place in any of these
[5840]meetings?
[5842]Sorensen: It is possible, indeed, I think the
[5843]President on more than one occasion felt that Mr.
[5844]Dulles, by making rather vague and sweeping re-
[5846]- ferences to particular countries was seeking tacit ”
[5847]approval without ever asking for it, and the Presi-
[5848]dent was rather concerned that he was not being
[5849]asked for explicit direction and was not being given
[5850]explicit information, so it is possible. But on
[5851]something of this kind, assassination, I would
[5852]doubt it very much. Either you are for it or you
[5853]are not for it, and he was not for it. ' (Sorensen,
[5854]7/21/75, pp. 32-33.) So ”
[5856]HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page i27
[5858]Page 10
[5860]d. THE QUESTION OF WHETHER ASSASSINATION EFFORTS WERE DISCLOSED
[5861]IN VARIOUS BRIEFINGS OF ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS.
[5863](1) BRIEFING OF THE PRESIDENT-ELECT.
[5864]After the election, in the latter part of November, 1960, Dulles
[5865]and Bissell jointly briefed President-elect Kennedy on "the most important
[5866]details with respect to the operation which became the Bay of Pigs." (Bissell,
[5867]6/9/75, p. 34). Bissell testified that he did not believe the ongoing assass-
[5868]ination efforts were mentioned to the President-elect, and that to the best of
[5869]his recollection they were not. (Bissell, 6/9/75, pp. 27, 35-36). Bissell
[5870]surmised that the reasons he and Dulles did not tell Kennedy at that initial
[5871]meeting were: (a) “apparently” they had not thought it was an important
[5872]matter*; and (b) they "would have thought that that was a matter of which he
[5873]should be advised upon assuming office rather than in advance." (Bissell,
[5874]6/9/75, p. 35). The latter comment led to the following exchange:
[5875]wel "The Chairman: Isn't it a strange distinction
[5876]that you draw that on the one hand (as) a Presi-
[5877]dential designate, as President-elect, he should
[5878]have all of the details concerning a planned in-
[5879]vasion of Cuba, but that he should not be told
[5880]about an ongoing attempt to assassinate Fidel
[5882]Castro?
[5884]Mr. Bissell: I think that in hindsight it could
[5885]be regarded as peculiar, yes.
[5887]"The Chairman: -(I)t just seems too strange
[5888]that if you were charged with briefing the man who
[5890]- ' * This was subsequent ly repeated by Bissell in response to examination of
[5891]his assumption that Dulles probably told President Eisenhower about the assass-
[5892]ination operation:
[5894]",,.the Mafia operation was not regarded as of
[5895]enormous importance and there were much more. ~
[5896]important matters to talk about with the
[5897]President.'' (Bissell, 7/17/75, p. 25).
[5899]HW 50955 Docld:324293539 Page 126
[5901]Page 11
[5903]was to become President of the U.S. on matters
[5905]- so important as a planned invasion of a neigh-
[5906]boring country, and that if you mew at the
[5907]time in addition to the planned invasion there
[5908]was an. ongoing attempt to assassinate the leader
[5909]of that country, that you would tell Mr. Kennedy
[5910]about one matter and not the other.'"'
[5911]Mr. Bissell: Well, Mr. Chairman, it is quite
[5912]possible that Mr. Dulles did say something about
[5913]an attempt to or the possibility of making use
[5914]of syndicate characters for this purpose. I do
[5915]not remember his doing so at that briefing. My
[5916]belief is that had he done so, he probably would
[5917]have done so-in rather general terms and that
[5918]neither of us was in a position to go into detail
[5919]on the matter. '' (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 35).
[5920]- However, Bissell also testified generally that pursuant to the doctrine of
[5921]plausible. denial, efforts were made to keep matters that might be "embarrassing"
[5922]away from Presidents (Bissell, 6/11/75, pp. 5-6).
[5923](ii) DISCUSSION WITH BUNDY ON "EXECUTIVE ACTION CAPABILITY"
[5924]oN As explained in the next section, sometime during the early period
[5925]of the Kennedy Administration, Bissell discussed with Bundy the subject of a
[5926]"capability" for "executive action" -- a term said by Bissell to include various
[5927]means of "eliminating the effectiveness" of foreign leaders up to and including
[5928]assassinations (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 72).
[5929]There is some dispute concerning when this occurred and who initiated it,
[5930]and this subject’ is discussed at length at Section » infra.
[5931]Bissell and Bundy both testified, however, that Bissell did not tell Bundy --
[5932]in the course of discussing the executive ‘action capability or at any other
[5933]time -- of the actual assassination plots against Castro (Bissell, 7/22,
[5934]p. 31; Bundy, p. 41). (However, there was some testimony that the
[5935]. names of Castro, Trujillo, and Lumumba might have been mentioned in connection
[5936]f
[5939]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page i129
[5941]eater?
[5945]HY 50955
[5947]Page 12
[5949]with the discussion of "research" into the capability. (Bissell, 6/11/75,
[5950]pp. 50-51)). -
[5951](iii) TAYLOR/KENNEDY BAY OF PIGS INQUIRY
[5953]Following the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion, President Kennedy
[5955]‘convened a “board of inquiry" which reviewed "the causes of...[the] failure"
[5957]. i : .
[5959]of the operation (Bissell, 6/9/75, pp.; 42,45). The members of the board were
[5960]Robert Kennedy, General Maxwell Taylor), Allen Dulles and Admiral Arleigh Burke.
[5961]The panel examined the Bay of Pigs failure for several weeks and issued its
[5963]fl
[5965]report on June 13, 1961. The "Taylor Report" does not mention the assassination
[5969]pilots. ; . 4
[5971]on
[5973]Bissell was questioned extensively and appeared to General Taylor to have
[5974]been the principal person involved in the operation and much more knowledgeable
[5975]than Dulles who had deliberately kept himself out of the planning and delegated
[5976]responsibility to Bissell. (Taylor, p. 73). |
[5978]Bissell testified that he did not disclose to the Tay lor/Kennedy Committee
[5980]that there had been an assassination effort against Castro (Bissell, 6/9/75,
[5981]p. 42). He put forward several reasons for not having done so. First, "the
[5982]question was never asked." Second, he claimed Dulles already mew about the
[5983]operation. Third, Bissell said "by that time the assassination attempt had been
[5984]called off." Fourth, he contended that the assassination effort was "not germane'!
[5985]because it did not contribute to the failure of the Bay of Pigs. (Bissell,
[5986]6/9/75, pp. 44-46; 6/11/75, p. 39).
[5988]Bissell hastened to add that he had no reason to believe'' that Allen Dulles,
[5990]. . n DOMETHEHESETILT Wot discus : .
[5991]himself a board mémber, did not discuss -the plots with one or more members
[5993](Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 46).
[5995]Docld: 32423539 Page 130
[5997]Page 13
[5999]However, both General Taylor and Admiral Burke stated that neither
[6000]Bissell nor Dulles informed them of the assassination plots (Taylor, pp. 12-73:
[6001]Burke affidavit, 8/25/75, p. 3). .
[6003]When asked if Richard Bissell ever informed him that underworld figures
[6004]had been offered a large sum to assassinate Castro, General Taylor responded,
[6005]"No, I never heard that, and it amazes me" (Taylor, p. 72). Taylor said that
[6006]during his review of the Bay of Pigs operation no mention was made of an
[6007]assassination effort against Castro (Taylor, p. 72). Despite the fact that
[6008]Dulles met with Taylor on the Board of Inquiry thirty or. forty times, Taylor
[6009]testified that Dulles never told him about the plot (Taylor, p. 73).
[6011](iv) MEMORANDUM TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
[6013]Bissell's testimony that he had not disclosed assassination plots to
[6014]the Kennedy/Taylor "court of inquiry" was consistent with his statement that
[6016]"T have no knowledge that Robert Kennedy was
[6018]7) advised of this (the plot to kill Mr. Castro)."
[6019](Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 41)..
[6020]The Committee tested this statement against other parts of Bissell's
[6021]testimony. An attachment to the May 22, 1961 FBI memorandum (regarding the
[6022]Las Vegas tap) which Director Hoover had sent to the Attorney General* had
[6023]quoted Edwards as saying that Bissell in "recent briefings" of Taylor and
[6024]Kennedy ,
[6025]"told the Attorney General: that some of the
[6026]associated planning included the use of ©
[6027]- . ° Giancana and the underworld against Castro.".
[6028](Bissell, 7/17/75, Ex. 3).
[6029]When first shown this document, Bissell said,
[6030]* A handwritten note from the Attorney General to his assistant on the
[6031]face of the memorandum indicates that he had actually seen the: document’ This
[6032]. memorandum is discussed in detail at Section » infra. ;
[6033]AD
[6035]HY 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 131
[6037]Page 14
[6039]"I have no recollection of briefing those
[6040]- two gentlemen except as. members of the Board
[6041]. of Inquiry that I have described, of which
[6042]Allen Dulles himself was a member." (Bissell,
[6043]’ 6/11/75, p. 27).
[6044]As mentioned above. (Section (e), supra), Bissell testified that his briefings
[6045]to the Board of Inquiry did not deal with assassination efforts. (Bissell,
[6046]6/11/75, pp. 45-46).
[6047]Discussing the document in a subsequent appearance before the Committee,
[6048]Bissell again said that he had no recollection of any such conversation (Bissell,
[6049]7/22/75, p. 56) but he was sure that it did not take place in front of the
[6050]Kennedy/Taylor board of inquiry (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 64).
[6051]However, Bissell speculated, the report quoted language which "I might —
[6052]very well have used, that is, the use of the underworld against Castro."
[6053]- (Bissell, 6/11/75, p.. 21). -
[6054]The examination of Bissell on whether he had had any such discussion and,
[6055]i if so, why he used such obscure and indirect ‘Language, elicited the following
[6056]testimony: i ,
[6057]"Q: Did you, sometime in May of 1961 communicate
[6058]the state of your awareness to the Attorney General
[6059]in your briefing to him?
[6060]Bissell: Well, there is a report which I was shown,
[6061]it was last week, I believe it also came
[6062]from the FBI, but I could be wrong about that, or
[6063]. indicating that I did, at that time in May, brief
[6064]the Attorney General, and I think General Taylor to
[6065]the effect that the Agency had been using -- I
[6066]don't know whether Giancana was mentioned by name,
[6067]- but in effect, the Underworld against the Castro
[6068]regime,
[6069]Q: -Did you tell them -- then being the Attorney
[6071]General and General Taylor -- that this use included
[6072]actual attempts to assassinate Mr. Castro?"
[6074]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page i132
[6076]Page 15
[6078]"Bissell: I have no idea whether I did [.]
[6079]I have no idea of the wording. I think it
[6080]might quite possibly have been left in the
[6082]- More general terms of using the underworld
[6084]against the Castro regime, or the leadership
[6085]of the Castro regime.
[6087]Q. Mr. Bissell, given the state of your
[6088]knowledge at that time, wouldn't that have be
[6089]deliberately misleading information?
[6091]Bissell: I don't think it would have been.
[6092]We were indeed doing precisely that. We were
[6093]trying to use elenents of the underworld
[6094]against Castro and the Cuban leadership.
[6096]Q. But you had information, didn't you, that
[6097]you were, in fact, trying to kill him?
[6099]Bissell: I think that is a Way of using these
[6100]people against him. oo
[6102]Q. That's incredible. You're saying that in
[6103]briefing the Attorney General you are telling
[6104]him you are using the underworld against Castro,
[6105]and you intended that to mean, Mr. Attorney
[6106]General, we are trying to kill him?
[6108]Bissell: I thought it signalled just exactly
[6109]that to the Attorney General, I'm sure.
[6111]Q. Then it's your belief that you commmicated
[6112]to the Attorney General that you were, in fact,
[6113]trying to kill Castro?
[6115]Bissell: I think it is best to rest on that
[6116]report we do have, which is from a source over
[6117]which I had no influence and it does use the
[6118]phrase I have quoted here. Now you can surmise
[6119]and I can suxmise as to just whattthe Attorney
[6120]General would have read into that phrase."
[6121](Bissell, 7/22/75, pp. 53-54).
[6123]Bissell then testified:
[6125]HW 50955 Docld: 32423539
[6127]Page 133
[6129]"Q. Was it your intent to circumlocutiously
[6130]or otherwise, to advise the Attorney General
[6132]. that you were in the process of trying to kill
[6133]Castro?
[6135]Mr. Bissell: [U]nless I remembered the con-
[6136]versation at the time, which I don't, I don't
[6137]have any recollection as to whether that was
[6138]my intent or not." (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 56).
[6139]Bissell proceeded to speculate that a "proper'' briefing might not
[6140]have included any reference to the assassination plot. (Bissell, 7/22/75,
[6141]p. 59). He gave two reasons for this speculation: (i) even if he had —
[6142]“thoroughly briefed"' the Attorney General he would have chosen "circumlocutious"
[6143]language to tell him about the activity involving Giancana. (Bissell, 7/22/75,
[6144]pp. 53-56); and (ii) the. assassination effort had been "stood down by then."
[6145](Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 59). Bissell concluded by reiterating that he had "no
[6146]knowledge" that the Attorney General was "specifically advised" of the.
[6147]assassination plot against Castro (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 62).*
[6148]“ e. CONVERSATION BETWEEN PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND GEORGE SMATHERS
[6149]George Smathers, former U.S. Senator fron Florida, testified that the
[6150]subject of the possible assassination of Castro arose in a conversation between
[6151]‘Smathers and President Kennedy on the White House lawn in 1961.** Smathers
[6152]* Tf the FBI quotation of Edwards is to be accorded significant weight, then
[6153]it is important to note that another section of it contradicts Bissell's assump-
[6155]_ tion that Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy had been circumlocutiously advised .
[6157]’ by Dulles of the assassination plot. Edwards told the FBI that "Allen Dulles was
[6158]completely unaware of Edwards’ contact with Maheu'" in comection with Cuban opera-
[6159]tions.
[6161]Bissell's explanation for Edwards' statement was that Edwards was being "pro-
[6162]tective" of the DCL. (Bissell, 7/17/75, p. 20). But this testimony must be
[6163]reconciled with Bissell's previous testimony that Dulles knew of the operation and
[6164]probably would have told the President about. it. ——
[6166]** Smathers ' testimony about this conversation referred to the transcript of
[6167]an Oral HIstory interview, conducted on March 31, 1964, in which his testimony was
[6168]based gives an indication that the conversation transpired in 1961, before the
[6169]Bay of Pigs invasion in mid-April... a
[6171]Sal 7 ‘It appears from the White House logs of Presidential meetings, that there were
[6173]only two occasions in 1961 when Senator Smathers met with the President alone for
[6174]as much as twenty minutes. Both of those meetings: took place in March. (Supra,
[6176]Pp. >.
[6178]HY 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page i534
[6180]rage L/
[6182]said he discussed the general Cuban situation with the President many times
[6183](Smathers, p. 6). Smathers had many Cuban constituents, was familiar with
[6184]Latin American affairs, and was a long-time friend of the President (Smathers ,
[6185]> 8. -
[6186]Smathers had the "impression" that the President raised the subject of
[6187]assassination with him because someone "had apparently discussed this and
[6188]other possibilities with respect to Cuba'' with the President (Smathers, pp.
[6189]16, 25). Smathers had no direct knowledge of any such discussion, nor did he:
[6190]know who might have been involved (Smathers, pp. 18-19, 25). The President
[6191]| did not indicate directly that assassination had been proposed to him (Smathers,
[6192]pp. 18). ° . |
[6194]According to Smathers:
[6196]liked Fidel Castro that I did not think it would
[6198]we ",.. {President Kennedy] asked me what reaction
[6199]; ( Al ; I thought there would be throughout South
[6200]fh { wv America were Fidel. Castro to be assassinated...
[6201]‘s we. \ I told the President that even as much as I dis-
[6203]¢ t be a good idea for there to be even considered
[6204]Neri Gee 4 fan assassination of Fidel Castro, and the Pres-
[6205]qe \ yr. ident of the United States completely agreed with
[6206]gc Wl ‘|. me, that it would be a very unwise thing to do,
[6207]ni the reason obviously being that no matter who did
[6208](er it and no matter how it was done and no matter
[6209]what, that the United States would receive full.
[6210]credit for it, and the President receive full
[6211]credit for it,.and it would work to his great
[6212]disadvantage with all of the other countries in
[6213]Central and South America...I disapproved of it,
[6214]and he completely disapproved of the idea."
[6215](Smathers, p. 22). ,
[6217]Smathers further testified that he had said the reason it would work to "great
[6218]disadvantage" with the nations of Central and South America was because they would
[6220]blame the United States for any assassination of Castro (Smathers, p. 6).
[6222]HY 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 135
[6224]Page 18 |
[6226]|
[6228]i
[6230]Smathers said that on a later oceasion he tried to raise the subject
[6231]of "Cuba and what could be lone" with President Kennedy (Smathers, p. 22).
[6232]The President made it clear to Smathers that he should not raise the subject
[6233]with him again.* ! |
[6235]Senator Smathers concluded his ‘testimony by indicating that on Cuban |
[6237]affairs in general, he felt he was "taking a tougher stance than was the
[6239]President" (Smathers, p. 24). But Smathers said that he disapproved of even
[6241]\ As thinking about assassinating Castro and said he was "positive'’ that Kennedy
[6242]1; . .
[6244]. wet also opposed it (Smathers, Ps 16).
[6246]; * One night at dinner with Senator Smathers, the President emphasized |
[6247]his point by cracking his plate at the mention of Cuba. _@mathers, p. 22).
[6249]HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 136
[6251]ALL a
[6253]Meeting: 8/30/75
[6254]-1- . ; (pp. 75-80 reserved by
[6255]Senator Tower)
[6257](iii) Kennedy Administration -- The Question of Authorization Outside the
[6258]Agency During the Post Bay of Pigs, Mongoose, and 1963 Periods
[6260]This section discusses the question of. authorization outside the Agency
[6261]for the assassinatiom plots during 1962 and 1963 -- the period of Operation
[6262]Mongoose (the 1962 Kennedy Administration program aimed at overthrowing Castro
[6263]by an internal revolt), the Missile Crisis in the fall of 1962, and the subse-
[6264]quent program in 1963 which saw a more limited covert action program directed ~_
[6266]Tr ww
[6268]against Cuba.
[6269]A. Recap of the Assassination Activity After the Bay of Pigs
[6270]| During: 1962 and 1963 there were three principal assassination plots.
[6271]1. In the spring of 1962, William Harvey reactivated the contact
[6272]with John Roselli and in April.providea lethal pills and guns to Roselli and
[6273]Cuban associates in Miami. In May it was reported that the pills reached Cuba.
[6275]'2. %In early 1963 the science fiction schemes }— exploding sea shell
[6277]and poisoned diving suit -- were contrived and then abandoned,
[6279]3. In: November 1963 the dissident Cuban who was code-named AMLASH
[6280]was given a poison pen device.’
[6282]B. The Issue of Authority
[6284]‘The fundamental issue dealt with in this section is whether the above
[6286]assassination plots were authorized outside the Agency. The issue arises from
[6288]the differing perceptions of Helms and his subordinates, on the one hand,
[6289]and menhera of the Kennedy Administration. including the Director of the .
[6290]CIA, on the other hand.
[6291]‘While Helms stated that he never received a direct order to assassinate
[6292]‘Castro, Helms testified that. he fully believed that the CIA was at all times acting
[6293]within the scope of its authority and that he believed a Castro assassination came
[6295]within the bounds of the Kennedy Administration's effort to overthrow Castro and his
[6297]a2 the Kennedy
[6299]ail ;
[6303]regime. Helms stated that he never informed REEOge oF vany offiedial
[6304]Se
[6306]i
[6308]7
[6310]ya
[6313]Ba
[6314]OM
[6316]BW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 137
[6320]Administration of the assassination plots. .On the other hand, McCone and the sur-
[6321]viving members of the Kennedy Administration testified that they did not believe
[6322]a Castro assassination was permissible without a direct order, that assassination
[6323]was not within the parameters of the Administration's anti~Castro program, and
[6325]testified that to their knowledge no such direct order was given to Helms.
[6327]Before setting out the testimony in detail, we discuss below the Kennedy
[6328]: oN
[6330]e
[6332]Administration's 1962 covert action program, Operation Mongoose (as well as the *.
[6334]events in 1961 leading to that program) which was designed to overthrow the Castro
[6335]regime. An understanding of that program is essential to an evaluation of the testi-
[6337]mony on the issue of authorization.
[6339]Cc. Events From the Bay of Pigs to the Establishment of Mongoose .
[6340]i. The Taylor Review .
[6341]On April 22, 1961, following the Bay of Pigs failure, the President requested
[6342]a, ‘ - General Maxwell Taylor to conduct a re-evaluation of "our practices and pro-
[6343]grams in the areas of military and paramilitary, guerilla and anti-guerilla
[6344]‘activity which fall short of outright war." The President hoped that Taylor
[6346]would give special attention to Cuba. (Letter to Maxwell Taylor, April 22,
[6347]: 4
[6348]1961) Robert Kennedy was to be Taylor's principal colleague in this effort.
[6350]The resulting review of the U.S. policy in this area concluded:
[6352]“We have been struck with the general feeling that there can be no
[6353]long-term living with Castro as a neighbor. His continued presence
[6354]within the hemispheric community as a dangerously effective exponent
[6355]of Communism and Anti-Americanism constitutes a real menace capable
[6356]of eventually overthrowing the elected governments in any one or more
[6357]of weak Latin American republics. ,
[6359]HAR
[6360]"Tt is recommended that the Cuban situation be reappraised in the light’
[6361]of, all presently known factors and new guidance be provided for political,
[6363]military, economic and propaganda action against Castro." (Report to
[6364]the President, June 13, 1961, memorandum No. 4, p. 8)
[6366]aa.
[6368]HW 50955 Docld:324273539 Page 138 ~ SS . “_—
[6370]It is clear from the record moreover, that the defeat at the Bay of Pigs
[6371]* had been regarded as a humiliation for the President personally and for the CIA
[6373]institutionally.
[6375]By July the Special Group had ag sreed that the basic objective “is. to provide
[6376]support to aU. S. program to develop opposition to Castro and to help bring about
[6377]a regime acceptable to the U. Se (Memo for the Record, July 21, 1961.) Occasional
[6378]harrassment operations were mounted during the summer but there was neither over-
[6379]all strategy nor much activipy. .
[6381]2. Wational Security Action Memorandum 100 of October 5, 1961 19 61, and the
[6383]teen
[6385]CIA Intelligence Estimate
[6386]The documentary evidence and testimony indicate that in the fall of 1961
[6387]the question of the effect of Castro's removal from power and the prospects in
[6388]that event, for U. S. military intervention were considered by the kennedy Admini-
[6389]stration. .
[6391]‘ ‘ ' Two studies were prepared in this connection. Pursuant to Hational Security
[6392]Action Memorandum 100 ("NSAM 100"), the State Department was asked to assess the
[6393]potential courses of action open to the U. S.' should Castro be removed from the
[6394]Cuban scene, and to prepare a contingency plan with the Department of Defense
[6395]for military intervention in that event. The CIA, prepared an "Intelligence
[6397]Estimate” on the "situation and prospects” in Cuba. As discussed below, the
[6399]evidence indicates that the focus of these studies was on the ‘possible
[6401]r
[6402]iB a Syne
[6404]of action open to the U. S. in a post-Castro. Cuba, rather than on
[6406]- : . cal, 5
[6407]might bring about Castro's removal. However, it ae
[6409]was not excluded from the potential means by which Cd
[6410]NSAM 100
[6411]_ On October 5, 1961, Bundy issued National Security Action Memorandum No.
[6413]100 ("NSAM 100") (Bundy, Ex 3)-entitled "Contingency Planning for Cuba", NSAN
[6415]100 was addressed to the Secretary of State stated in full: "In confirmation of
[6417]HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 139
[6419]oral instructions conveyed to Assistant Secretary of Crate Voodward*, a plan is
[6420]desired for tne indicated contingency."
[6422]Related documents indicate thet the subject matter of the contingency
[6423]referred to in HSAN 100 was the "possible removal of Castro from the Cuban scene".
[6424](Gundy Ex 3A, Minutes of Special Group Meeting, October 6, 1°61, p. 1.)
[6426]The IHinutes of the Special Group meeting on October 4, 1°51, (the day after
[6427]the issuance of NSAH 100) state that the Group was told that in addition to an overall
[6428]plan for Cuban covert operations,” a contingency plan in connection with the pos-
[6429]sible removal of Castro from the Cuban scene” was in preparation.— (Bundy, Ex: 3A,
[6430]Memorandum for the Record of Special Group meeting, October 6, 1961, p. 1.)
[6434]In addition, a Memorandum for the Record by Parrott on October 5, 1961,
[6435]states that Parrott informed Assistant Secretary Woodward's Deputy that "what was
[6436]wanted was a plan against the contingency that Castro would in some way or other
[6438]be removed from the Cuban scene”. (Bundy, Ex 3B, p. 1.) Parrott's memorandum
[6440]further stated that in preparing the plan, “the presence and positions of Raul
[6441](Castro) and Che Guevara must be taken into account", and that General Taylor had
[6443]told Parrott he preferred "the President's interest in the matter not be mentioned"
[6445]covert side, I talked to Tracy Barnes in CIA and asked that
[6447]ES)
[6451]be furnished as soon as possible on what is going on and w
[6453](Bundy, Ex.3B, p. 1.)
[6455]*Woodward at that time was Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs.
[6457]HW 50955 DoclId:32423539 Page 140°"
[6459]Testimony of Bundy
[6461]- Bundy testified that the contingency referred to in HSAM 100 and the related
[6462]documents was "what would we do if Castro were no longer there”, but that
[6463]"clearly one of the possibilities would be assassination". (Bundy, p. 77.)
[6464]However, Bundy emphasized that NSAM 100 represented an effort to assess the
[6465]effect should Castro be removed from power by any means (including assassina~
[6467]tion) but "without going further with the notion (of assassination) itself".*
[6469](Bundy, p. 77.)
[6471]x"T£ people were suggesting this to you and you were curious about whether it
[6472]was worth exploring, one way of getting more light on it without going any fur-.
[6473]ther with that notion itself would be to ask political people, not intelligence
[6474]people, what they thought would happen if Castro were not there any longer."
[6475](Bundy, p. -)
[6477]HW 50955 “Daca: 32423539 “Page 141°
[6479]ea?
[6483]ae +s Bo . 7
[6484]| a
[6486]Bundy further contended that the President was not considering an assassina-
[6488]tion, but rather "what are things going to be like after Castro." (Bundy, p.- 81.)*
[6490]/ Taylor's Testimony
[6492]Taylor testified that he had no recollection of NSAM 100 of the events de—
[6493]scribed in the related documents set out above. (Taylor, p. 18.) On the. basis of
[6494]his review of the documents, Taylor testified that “it sounds like purely a political
[6495]consideration of the sequence of. power in Cuba.""** Taylor emphasized, moreover,
[6496]that"never at any time" did he raise the question of of assassination with Parrott,
[6498]or with anybody else. (Taylor,;p. 19)
[6499]i
[6500]i
[6501]i
[6505]Parrott, the Special Group Secretary who transmitted the request for the
[6507]NSAM 100 study to the State Department testified that the request for a plan re-
[6509]flected in his memorandum of October 5, 1961, and the reference in that memorandum
[6511]to the "contingency that Castro would in some way or another be removed from the
[6513]H
[6514]i
[6515]t
[6517]Cuban scene” (described above, 'p. 18), reflected interest in a contingency study
[6519]; jo.
[6520]for Castro's removal, but by méans "short of being killed." (Parrott, p. 83)
[6521]{ . .
[6523]: 5 hat hacer
[6525]4
[6527]*Thus, with respect to the desire not to indicate the President's interest in
[6528]the plan requested from the State Department, Bundy testified:
[6529]" ..it was precisely to:insulate the President from any false in-
[6530]ference that what he was asking about was assassination. It is easy
[6531]to confuse the question, what are things going to be like after. ,
[6532]Castro, with the other question, and we were trying to focus atten-
[6533]tion on the information!he obviously wanted, which is, what would
[6534]happen if we did do this sort of thing, and not get one ‘into the
[6535]frame of mind of thinking that he was considering doing it.
[6536](Bundy, p. 81)
[6538]**Taylor said he was puzzled by the wording of NSAM 100 and the related documents
[6539]and stated, "I just cannot tie in the language here with a plausible explanation."
[6540](Taylor, p. 18)
[6542]eRe
[6544]BW 50955 Docld:324235379 Page 142 : wore seems
[6546]The CIA's Intelligence Estimate
[6548]The CIA study in connection with the consideration of Castro's removal.
[6549]was an intelligence estimate prepared by the CIA's Board of ational Estimates
[6550](which was not part of the CIA's covert action directorate), entitled "The Situation
[6552]and Prospects in Cuba"*, The CIA Estimate was pessimistic regarding the chances
[6554]For success of a Cuban internal revolt, and further found that a Castro assassina~
[6556]we AS being
[6557]tion would likely strengthen the Communist position in Cuba. dd
[6558]ne (Savslem ~~
[6559]After a general review of the economic, military, and political situation ttow fo °C
[6561]in Cuba, the CIA estimate concluded that the Castro regime had sufficient popular {f*4°7
[6562], wf me he
[6564]and repressive capabilities to cope with an internal threat. The concluding
[6565]2) CTA
[6567]paragraph of the estimate was entitled "If Castrq were to Die”. It noted that:
[6568]"Nis (Castro's) loss now, by assassination or by natural
[6569]causes, would have an unsettling effect, but would almost-
[6570]certainly not prove fatal to the regime...(I)ts principal
[6572]surviving leaders would probably rally together in the -
[6573]face of a common danger." (Estimate, p. 9.)
[6575]i_/ The CIA study further predicted that should Castro die, “some sort of power struggle
[6577]would almost certainly develop eventually," but that wha
[6579]a struggle, the Communist Party's influence would be "
[6581](Estimate, p. 9%.)
[6583]¥The IG Report apparently refers to an earlier draft of this intelligence estimate.
[6584](IG, np. 4.) The IG Report, in reporting that many CIA officers interviewed in the
[6585]IG investigation stressed the point that "elimination of the dominant figures in a
[6586]governumént...will not necessarily cause the downfall of the governnent ," stated:
[6588]"This point was stressed with respect to Castro and Cuba in an internal CIA
[6590]- draft paper of October 1961, which was initiated in response to General ilax-
[6591]well Taylor's desire for a contingency plan. The paper took the position
[6592]that the demise of Videl Castro, from whatever cause, would offer little op-
[6593]portunity for the liberation of Cuba from Communist and Soviet loc control.”
[6594](IG, p. 4.) The CIA was unable to locate. the dvaft ‘paper.referred to in the
[6595]IG Report. ,
[6597]*kA cover memorandum by. Lansdale transmitting the CIA estimate to Robert Kennedy.
[6598]stated that the estimate "seems to be the major evidence to be used-to oppose
[6600]( your program" (referring to the proposed overall Mongoose operation). Lansdale's
[6602]\' memorandum criticized the estimate's assessment that “it is highly improbable that
[6603]an extensive popular uprising. could be fomented" against Castro as a "conclusion
[6604]of fact quite outside the area of intelligence." (Lansdale Memorandum to Robert
[6605]Kennedy, 11/62, p.1) As discussed in detail at pp. - below, Lansdale's basic
[6606]concept for the Mongoose program Was to overthrow Castro through an internal revolt
[6607]of the Cuban people. ,
[6609]HY 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 143
[6611]At the close of the meeting, Robert Kennedy asked Szule to meet
[6613]with President Kennedy the following day (Szule, p. 25). On November 9,
[6614]1961; Szule, accompanied only by Goodwin, met with President Kennedy
[6616]for over an hour in the Oval Office.* (Szule, 6/10, p. 25.) Szule
[6617]recalled that the President. discussed "a number of his views on Cuba
[6619]in the wake of the Bay of Pigs, asked me a number of questions concerning
[6620]my conversations with Premier Castro, and...what the United States could
[6621]_for7 might do in...either a‘ hostile way or in establishing some kind of,
[6622]a dialogue..." (Szulc, 6/10, pp. 25-26).
[6626]Szule testified that after this general discussion, the President
[6630]then asked "what would you think if I ordered Castro to be assassinated. */*/
[6632](Szulc, 6/10, p. 26; Szule Notes of conversation with President Kennedy, ; Ygar
[6633]. . a _ eo Te ha
[6634]) November 9, 1961). Szule testified that he repl¥ed’that an assassination <_Al
[6636]- | -_ +he
[6637]would not necessarily cause a change in the Cuban system, and that it was oan
[6638]Szulc's personal view that the United States should not be party to murders /
[6639]. ya ess
[6640]and political assassinations. (Szulc, 6/10, p. 26). Szulc testified that Ne
[6644]*/Goodwin testified that President Kennedy met frequently with members of
[6645]| the press and others who were experts in their fields, but that it was "possible"
[6646]S- ° that the meeting with Szulc may have been an occasion for the President to con-
[6648]* sider Szule for a position in the Administration (Goodwin, p. 29-30).
[6650]On November 2, 1961 Goodwin had: addressed an "eyes only" memorandum to the
[6651]President and the Attorney General outlining a suggested organization for what
[6652]became the Mongoose operation. Goodwin proposed five "staff components,"
[6654]“pene including "intelligence collection," "guerrilla and underground," and "propa-
[6655]ee - ganda." The memorandum stated: "As for propaganda, I thought we might ask
[6656]aed Tad Szule to’ take a leave of absence from the Times and work on this one--
[6658]: although we should check with /USIA Director/ Ed Murrow and Dick Bissell."
[6659](Goodwin Ex. 2, p. 1, 2). ~ , ~
[6661]'*/*/ Szule made notes of the conversation with President Kennedy as soon
[6663]». as he returned to his office, based on his memory of the meeting. President
[6664]Rem Kemedy's question regarding a Castro assassination appears in quotation marks
[6666]{ is in Szule’s notes, which were made the same day from “reasonably fresh" memory.
[6668]“rem. (Szulc, 6/10, p.30).
[6670]HW 50955 Docld:324273539 Page 144
[6672]8 BA asinine Bi
[6674]3. Testimony of Szulc on President Kennedy's November 9, 1961 Question ;
[6675]Regarding a Possible ‘Castro. Assassination
[6677]Tad Szulc* testified that in a private meeting he had with President Kennedy
[6678]on Novebmer 9, 1961, the President asked"Szulc what would you think if I ordered
[6679]Castro to be assassinated," and said "I agree with you completely" when
[6680]Szulc answered that a Castro assassination should be ruled out on both practical
[6681]and moral grounds. Szule further testified that President Kennedy went on "to
[6682]make the point how strongly he and his brother felt that the United States for moral
[6683]reasons” must not be involved in assassinations. (Szule, p.27).
[6685]In early Nevember }961 szulc was asked by Richard soodwin, the Special Assistant
[6686]to President Kennedy, to meet with Attorney General Robert Kennedy on November 8,
[6687]1961, to discuss the situation in Cuba. . he meeting was an "off-the-record" one
[6688]which Szule attended as a friend of Coodwin's and not as a reporter. (Szulc,
[6689]p. 24.) During the meeting with Robert Kennedy, the discussion centered on "the
[6691]situation in Cuba. following the (Bay of Pigs) invasion (and) the pros and cons
[6695]i of some different possible actions by the U. S. in that context' (Szulc, p. 25).
[6696]The subject of assassination was not mentioned during this meeting. (Szulc, p.
[6698]31.)
[6700]*In November 1961 Tad Szule was employed as a reporter in the Washington Bureau
[6701]of the New York Times (Szulc, p. 24). Szule had visited Cuba in May-June 1961,
[6703]following the Bay of Pigs invasion. (Szulc, p. 24) During the course of that
[6704]trip, Szule had a "series of very long conversations with Castro”. «(Szule, Bf. -
[6706]Bs
[6708]24.)
[6710]HW 50955 Docld:32493539 Page i145
[6712]19
[6714]thereupon the President said, "I agree with you completely." Szule stated
[6716]further:
[6718]"He /President Kennedy/ then went on for a few minutes
[6720]to make the point how strongly he and his brother felt
[6722]that the United States for moral reasons should never be
[6724]in a situation of having recourse to assassination." (Szulc, p.27).
[6726]Szulc's notes of the meeting with the President state:
[6728]"JFK then said he was testing me, that he felt the same
[6729]way -- he added ‘I'm glad you feel the same way'
[6731]because indeed U.S. morally must not be part [sich § to
[6732]assassinations."
[6734]Szule's notes of the conversation further state:
[6735]"JFK said he raised question because he was under
[6737]terrific pressure from advisers (think he said intel-
[6738]ligence people, but not positive) to okay a Castro
[6740]murder. sed /sic/ he was resisting pressures." (Szule
[6741]note of conversation with President Kennedy, November
[6742]9, 1961). : ra S62
[6744]Szule stated , relying on his memory, that it is "possible" / ofp
[6745]and he "believed" that President Kennedy used such words as "someone in the f
[6746]‘intelligence business," as the source of the pressure for a Castro assassina- Ag wT
[6749]tion. (Szule, 6/10, p. 29). The President did not identify the person or [CB Il ba
[6751]i -_ CUkam.-
[6752]persons. (Szulc, 6/19, pe 27). 3. . ; 7
[6753]7 If anyone was in fact putting pressure « on the President, there was no at at
[6755]other evidence on this point adduced before the Committee. This was particularly ow ners
[6757]troublesome since everyone questioned by the Committee, both within and without
[6759]the CIA,denied ever having discussed assassination with the President, let
[6761]alone having pressured him.
[6763]Testimony of Goodwin .
[6765]. “Goodwin attended the November 9, 1961 meeting between President: -
[6767]Kennedy and Szulc. (Goodwin, p- 3). Goodwin testified that, after asking
[6769]we
[6771]Szule for his reaction to a suggestion that Castro be assassinated,
[6773]President Kennedy said "well, that's the kind of thing I'm never going to do.
[6775](Goodwin, p. 3).
[6777]BW 50955 DoclId:324273539 Page 146
[6781]Goodwin testified further that several days after the meeting wiih
[6782]Szulc, Goodwin referred to the mention of. assassination ta Ssule, and President
[6783]Kennedy Said only "we can't get into that kind of thing, or we would all be
[6785]5
[6786]targets". (Goodwin, p. 4, 11.)
[6788]4. The The Rejection of Assassination in President Kennedy's November 16 “46,
[6789]1961 3] Speech
[6791]A few days after the meeting with Szule and Goodwin, and some six
[6792]weeks after the issuance of NSAM 100, President Kennedy delivered a speech at.
[6794]the University of Washington. In that public address, President Kennedy stated:
[6796]"We cannot, as a free nation, compete with our adver- Low y oes
[6797]saries in tactics of terror, assass#ination, false Hat
[6798]promises, counterfeit mobs and crises." (Public Papers
[6800]of the Presidents, John F. Kennedy, 1961, p. 72!) If
[6802]We discuss in the next section the nature of the program which was initiated
[6804]against the Castro regime at the end of November- 1961 pursuant to President
[6806]Kennedy's instruction, and which continued to the Missile Crisis in the fall of
[6808]"1962.
[6810]er
[6812]HW 50955 “Docld:32423539 Page 147
[6814]she
[6816]D. Operation Mongoose
[6818]i 1. The Creation of Operation Mongoose. In November 1962 the
[6820]proposal for a major covert program to overthrow Castro was developed.
[6821]Richard Goodwin, a special assistant to President Kennedy, and Edward
[6822]Lansdale, a military officer with.experience in counter-insurgency
[6823]operations, played major staff roles in the creation of:Mongoose. Both
[6824]Goodwin and Lansdale worked closely with Robert Kennedy, who took an
[6825]active interest in this preparatory stage and in the later conduct of
[6826]Mongoose. On November 1, 1961, Goodwin advised the President that
[6827]Robert Kennedy "vould be the most effective commander" of the proposed
[6828]operation. (Memorandum to .the President, November 1,.1961, p. ).
[6829]Lansdale, in a memorandum to Robert Kennedy on November 15, 1961, out-
[6830]lining the Mongoose proposal, stated that a "picture of the situation
[6831]has emerged clearly enough to indicate ‘what needs to be done and to
[6832]support your sense of urgency concerning Cuba". (Memorandum, November 15,
[6833]1961, p. )
[6835]At the end of the month, on November 30, 1962, President Kennedy
[6836]issued a memorandum recording his decision to begin the Mongoose project--
[6837]to “use our available assets -_ - to help Cuba overthrow the Communist
[6839]regime". (Lansdale Ex. 17, Memorandum to the Secretary of State,
[6841]Defense, et al., November 30,.1961). ‘Y {i ee
[6842]- ° . £94 a
[6843]- , Important organizational changes were made in establi
[6845]ie Operation
[6847]MONGOOSE.
[6848]a. The Special Group Augmented. A new control group, the Special
[6850]Group Augmented, was put in charge of Operation MONGOOSE. The SGA con-
[6852]sisted of the regular Special Group (i.e., Bundy, Johnson of State, a
[6854]HY 50955 Daocld: 32423539 Page 146
[6858]Gilpatric of Defense, McCone of CIA, and Gen. Lemnitzer of the Joint
[6859]’ Chiefs) plus Robert Kennedy and General Taylor. Also, Secretaries
[6861]Rusk and McNamara. more frequently attended its meetings than they aia
[6863]those of the Special Group itself. . .
[6865]b. General Lansdale as the Chief of Operations of MONGOOSE.
[6866]General Edward Lansdale was named the Chief of Operations of the MONGOOSE
[6867]activities by President Kennedy. Lansdale had developed a reputation in
[6868]the Philippines and Vietnam for having an ability to deal with revolu-_
[6869]tionary insurgencies in less developed countries. In addition, as a
[6870]result of the Bay of Pigs failure, President Kennedy distrusted the CIA
[6871]and believed he required someone from outside the Agency to oversee.
[6872]major covert action programs. Rather than appoint Robert Kennedy to
[6873]head Mongoose as proposed by Goodwin, President Kennedy gave Lansdale
[6875]the task of coordinating the CIA's Mongoose operations with ‘those of the
[6877]Departments of State and Defense, and made General ‘Taylor the Chairman
[6879]of the special Group Augmented. However, Robert iennedy did play an active
[6880]role in the Mongoose structure, unrelated to his position as Attorney General.
[6881]-c. CIA Organization for Mongoose. In late 1961 or early 1962, William
[6882]Harvey was put in charge of the CIA's Task Force WW, the CIA arm: for Hongoose
[6883]Operations. Task Force W operated under the special Group Augmented and em-
[6884]ployed some 400 people at cIA headquarters and at the Miami Station. McCone
[6885]and Harvey were thereafter. the principal CIA participants in, Operati
[6887]5
[6888]Pose ttse
[6890]“MotiBodse.
[6891]Mow:
[6893]Helms attended only some 7 of 40 Mongoose neet igs
[6895]a
[6897]was “fair to state that McCone and Harvey, rathe Naas Nelms, were principally |
[6898]concerned with Hongoose.. tlelms was, however, substantially involved in Mongoose
[6899]and testified that he "was as interested" in Mongoose as Marvey and IicCene were.
[6901]fo} (ilelms, 7/15, p. 10)
[6903]HW 50955 Dacldi 324939599 “Page 149°
[6905]yo eT
[6907]2. Lansdale's Theory and Objective for Mongoose
[6909]in the fall of 1961, Lansdale had been asked by President
[6910]t
[6911]Kennedy to examine the Administration's Cuba policy and to make recommen-—
[6913]dations. Lansdale testified that, in reporting his recommendations to
[6914]President Kennedy, he emphasized that "Castro -». had aroused con-
[6915]siderable affection for himself personally with the Cuban population...."
[6916](Lansdale, p. 4), and that the U.S. "should take a very different course"
[6917]from the "harassment" operations that had been directed against Castro
[6918]up to that time. (Lansdale, p..3}). These prior U.S. operations were
[6919]conceived and led by Americans, Lansdale informed the President. (Lans-
[6920]dale, p. 5). In contrast, Lansdale proposed that the U.S. work with
[6921]all exiles, particularly professionals who had opposed Batista and then -
[6922]became disillusioned by Castro. (Lansdale, pp. 4, 10-11): Lansdale's
[6923]ultimate objective was to have "the people themselves overthrow the
[6924]. Castro regime rather than U.S. engineered efforts from outside Cuba."
[6926]i, . (Lansdale, p. 41).
[6927]| Hence, after his appointment as Chicf of Operations, hansdale's
[6928]concept for the MONGOOSE project emphasized as a first step the develop-
[6929]ment of leadership elements, and "a very necessary political basis"
[6930]among the Cubans opposed to Castro, before any large actions began.
[6932](Lansdale, p. 11). At the same time, Lansdale. sought to develop "means
[6935]to infiltrate Cuba successfully" and to organize “eels, anda ere a5 495 =
[6938]: : i Ea
[6939]inside Cuba .«.. who could work secretly and safely. "8 L,
[6941]Lansdale's plan was designed so as not to "arouse premature actions, not
[6942]to bring great reprisals on the people, and abort any eventual success."
[6944](Lansdale, p. 11).
[6946]wee
[6948]_*/ .As Lansdale described his "concept of operation™ for Méngoose ‘in a
[6950]memorandum to the President on January 18, 1962, it was to "help the
[6952]\ ‘i Cubans from within Cuba" to overthrow the Castro regime through a
[6953]"revolt of the Cuban people." (Lansdale Ex. 3, p. 2).
[6955]a
[6957]HW 50955 DoclId: 32423539 Page 150
[6959]“a
[6961]_ 3. Bissell's Testimony Concerning Presidential Instruc- he 7
[6962]: . oo . firm
[6963]tions to Act More Vigorously, But That Assassination Was Not Included.
[6965]Sometime in the early fall of 1961, Bissell was apparently called to
[6966]the White House and was said to have been
[6967]"chewed out in the Cabinet Room in the White House
[6969]by both the President and the Attorney General for,
[6970]as he put it, sitting on his ass and not doing any-.
[6972]thing about getting rid of Castro and the Castro : , .
[6973]. it -
[6974]regime. . rl aaa E
[6975]This description comes from the testimony of Samuel Halpern, a middle-
[6976]. . ,
[6978]level CIA covert action officer, who said Bissell told him about the
[6980]meeting, and directed him to come up with some plans. (Halpern, pp. 8,
[6982]36-37). Bissell said he did not remember that precise meeting but that
[6984]he had been, in essence, told to "get off your ass about cuba."
[6986](Bissell, 7/25/15, pp. 37-38).
[6987]gly : ; Bissell was asked whether he considered such. an instruction
[6988]to constitute authority for proceeding to assassinate Castro. He said it
[6989]would not, and that “formal and explicit approval” would be required for
[6990]assassination action (Id., 38-39).
[6992]Bissell also testified that there was in fact no assassination
[6993]activity between the pre-Bay of Pigs/Roselli operation and his departure
[6994]from the Agency in February 1962. . |
[6996]In late 1961 Halpern became Harvey's Executive Assistant
[6998]on Task Force W, the CIA action arm of Operation Mongoose. Ile testified 7
[7002]_ that he never heard of the Roselli assassination operatio
[7004]. rar
[7005]Pp. 15-16). . V
[7007]HY 50955 Docld:324233539 Page 151
[7009]- 16 -
[7011]ao " The January 19, 1962 Meeting at Which the Attorney General Was -
[7013]Quoted As Saying Cuba Should Have the "Top Priority" in the United States Government .
[7014]On January 19, 1962, a meeting attended by Lansdale, probably Helms, Helms’ Executive
[7015]Assistant George McManus, and other representatives of the agencies involved in
[7016]Mongoose, took place in Attorney General Kennedy's office.* (McManus, p. 6).
[7018]Notes taken at the meeting by McManus contain the following passages:
[7020]"Conclusion Overthrow of Castro is Possible”
[7022]“~
[7024]") ‘a solution to the Cuban problem today
[7025]carried top priority in U.S. Gov/ernmen/t.
[7026]No time, money, effort -- or manpower is to.
[7027]be spared.'"
[7029]: i "'Yesterday ... the President had indicated to
[7030]. _him' that final chapter had not been written --
[7031]its got to be done and will be done.”
[7033](McManus ‘Ex. 1, Memorandum, January 19, 1962, p..2). McManus
[7035]stated that the words "the top priority in the U.S. Gov/ernmen/t -- no
[7037]_ time,money, effort or manpower is to be spared" had been spoken by, the: ‘
[7041]Attorney General (McManus, pp. 8-9).
[7043]*/ Others who attended the meeting were Brig. Gen. Craig, representing
[7044]the Joint Chiefs, Don Wilson of USIA, Major Patchell of the Secretary
[7045]of Defense's office, and Frank Hand of CIA.
[7047]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 152
[7051]Helms stated that those words reflected the "kind of atmosphere" on which he
[7052]relied for his perception that assassination was implicitly ‘authorized. (Helms,
[7053]7/17, p. 60-61.) McManus, who wrote the memorandum, agreed that Robert Kennedy
[7054]"was very vehement in his speech" and "really wanted action'' but McManus disagreed
[7055]with Helms perception, stating that "it never occurred to me" that the words
[7056]quoted above from Robert Kennedy included permission to assassinate Castro. (McManus,
[7057]p. 9.) Nor did the spirit of the meeting as a whole give McManus any idea that
[7059]assassination was either contemplated or authorized. ‘(Tr., p. 9-10.)*
[7061]5. General Lansdale's Mongoose Planning Tasks
[7062]On January 18, 1962, Lansdale assigned 32 planning tasks to the agencies parti- -
[7064]cipating in Mongoose. (Lansdale Ex. 3, Program Review of the Cuba Project.) Ina
[7065]memorandum to the working group member's , Lansdale emphasized that "it is our job to put
[7066]the American genius to work on this project, quickly and effectively. This demands a
[7068]change from the business as usual and a hard facing of the fact that we are in a com-
[7070]aN
[7072]owed
[7074]bat. situation--where we have been given full command.'' (Lansdale memorandum, 1/20/62,
[7076]p. 1.)
[7077]The 32 tasks comprised a variety of activities, ranging from intelligence collec-
[7079]tion to planning for "use of U. S. military force to support the Cuban popular
[7081]_*/ With respect to the question of priorities and emphasis in the Kennedy —
[7082]Administration, there was a great deal of. proof. showing that Cuba
[7083]indeed had a high priority and the very existence of a high level
[7084]eroup like the Spécial Group Augmented further demonstrates its
[7085]importance. MacNamara, for example, stated that. "we were hysterical
[7086]about Castro at the time of the Bay of Pigs and thereafter." (In
[7087]the same context, MacNamara stated "I denti_ believe we contemplated
[7088]assassination.) (MacNamara, p. 93). Similarly, General Lansdale in-
[7089]formed the members of his. inter- ~agency committee that Mongoose "demands
[7090]a change from business-—as-usual and a hard facing of the fact that
[7091]ia i in a combat situation where we have been given full command.”
[7093](red » Ex. » Memorandum, January 20, 1962, from Lansdale).
[7095]a
[7097]fe wt the other hand, Sorensen testified that "there were lots of top
[7101]priorities, and it was the job of some of /us/ to continually tell
[7102]various agencies their particular subject was the top priority" and
[7103]although Cuba was "important" it was "fairly wekl down’on the 1%st of
[7104]the President's agenda." (Sorensen, p. 12). For example, when told
[7106]Nt that his first letter to Khruschev in the secret correspondence that
[7107]lasted two or three years would be "the single most important docu-
[7108]ment you will write during your Presidency ," _ President Kenndy said,
[7109]"Yes, we get these every day over here." -(Sorensen, p. 12).
[7111]HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 157
[7113]movement'' and developing an “operational schedule for sabotage actions inside
[7114]Cuba.'"" (Lansdale Ex. 3, p. 5, 7.)*
[7115]a In focusing on intelligence collection, propaganda and various sabotage actions,
[7116]. Lansdale's tasks were consistent with the underlying strategy of Mongoose to build
[7117]gradually towards an internal revolt of - the Cuban people. (See p. above.)
[7118]‘Lansdale transmitted a copy of the tasks to Robert Kennedy on January 18, 1962,
[7120]with a handwritten note stating 'my review does not include the sensitive work I
[7122]have reported to you; I felt you preferred informing the President privately.”
[7126]testified that this did not refer to assassinations and that he "never took
[7128]Lansdale
[7129]up assassination with either the Attorney General or the President .""** ‘Lansdale
[7130]testified that he could not precisely recall the nature of this "sensitive work"
[7131]but that it might have involved a special trip he made under cover to meet Cuban
[7133]leaders in Florida and to assess their political strengths. (Lansdale, p. 30.)
[7135]*There was testimony regarding one Lansdale plan that a witness thought was an example
[7136]of Lansdale's “perspicacity'' in planning operations. Parrott, the Secretary to the
[7137]Special Group Augmented, testified: ,
[7139]"I'll give you one example of Lansdale's perspicacity. He
[7140]had a wonderful plan for getting rid of Castro. This plan
[7141]consisted of spreading the word that the Second Coming of
[7142]Christ was imminent and that Christ was against Castro (who)
[7143]was anti-Christ. And you would spread this word around Cuba,
[7144]and then on whatever date. it was, that there would be a mani-
[7145]festation of this thing. And at that time--this is absolutely
[7146]true--and at that time there would be an American submarine
[7147]which would surface just over the horizon off of Cuba and send
[7148]up some starshells. And this would be the manifestation of the
[7149]Second Coming and Castro would be overthrown..."
[7151]"Well, some wag called this operation--by this time Lansdale was
[7152]something of a joke in many quarters--and somebody dubbed this
[7153]- Elimination by Illumination. (Parrott, p. -)
[7155]**Harvey testified that he never received any instructions from Lansdale to under-
[7156]take assassinations, although as noted below (p. ), in August 1962 asked
[7158]Harvey to consider the feasibility of a plan for the "liquidation" of Cuban leaders.
[7159](Harvey, 7/ /75, p. ) .
[7161]BW 50955 Docld:324273539 Page 154 Sr ream rn ee ess
[7163]ag -
[7165]~. Lansdale also referred, in a memorandum to the Attorney General on
[7166]“January: 27, 1962, to his feeling that "we might uncork the touchdown
[7167]play" "independently of the institutional program we are spurring.”
[7168]‘(Lansdale Ex. hi, pl). Lansdale testified that in this memorandum the
[7169]phrase "touchdown play” was a “breezy way of referring to "a Cuban
[7170]-revolt to overthrow the regime” rather than to a Castro assassination.
[7173](Lansdale, -p.45)./ The examples of such "plays cited in the memorandum
[7175]“ey The testimony was as follows:
[7177]"The Chairman: What precisely dideyou mean by “uncork the:
[7178]touchdown play independently of the institutional programs
[7179]we are spurring?" ~
[7180]"General Lansdale: Well, I was holding almost daily meet-
[7181]ings with my working group, and -- in tasking, and: finding
[7182]how they were developing plans I was becoming more and more
[7183]- ; concerned that they kept poing back to doing what JT felt were
[7184]: ) . pro forma American types of actions rather than actively ex-
[7185]ploring how to pet the Cubans into this, and to have them
[7186]undertake actions. ;
[7188]Um me, the touchdown play was a Cuban revolt to over-
[7189]throw the rerime. I did not feel that we had potten into
[7190]“the real internal part of getting Cubans into the action,
[7191]and I was concerned about that."
[7192]"Senator Baker: ‘In the same context, is it fair to say that
[7193]the name of the game was to © get rid of Castro or his regime .
[7195]foe
[7197]"General Lansdale: Yes."
[7199]"Senator Baker: All right, now what was the touchdown play
[7200]that you had in mind here?"
[7202]"General Lansdale: Well, it was a revolt by ‘the Cubans
[7204]themselves ... a revolution that would break down the police
[7206]controls of the state and to_drive the top people out of
[7208]power and to do that, there needed to be political actions
[7210]cells, psychological propaganda action cells, and eventually
[7212]when possible, guerilla forces developed in the country in
[7214]Ve a safe place for a new government to set up and direct the
[7215]revolution that would eventually move into Havana and take over.
[7216](Lansdale, pp. hs5- 56).
[7218]et
[7221]HW 50955 Docld:324273539 “Page 1595 ~~
[7223]- 20 -
[7224](e.g., "stir up workers in Latin America and Cuba," work through “ethnic
[7225]language groups ," "youth elements," or families through the Chureh") do
[7226]not contain anv indication of assassination. (Lansdale, Ex. 4, p. 1.)
[7228]| On January 19, 1962, Lansdale added an additional
[7230]task to those assighea on January 18. This "Task 33" involved a plan to.
[7231]"incapacitate" Cuban sugar workers during the harvest by the use of chemical
[7232]warfare means. (Lansdale, p. 29). Lansdale testified that the plan in-
[7233]volved the use of non-lethal chemicals to sicken Cubans temporarily and
[7234]keep them away from the fields for a 24-48 hour period “without ill effects."
[7235]After initial approval for planning purposes (with the notation that it
[7236]would require “policy determination" before final approval), the plan was
[7237]ultimately cancelled after a study showed it was not feasible and before de-
[7239]bate by the SGA. (Lansdale, p. 2°, Special Group Minutes, 1/39/62, p. 1.)
[7241]Lansdale's 33 tasks were approved for planning purposes
[7243]by the Special Group on January 30, 1962 (Minutes of Special Group meeting,
[7244]1/30/62, p. 1). Thereafter, on February 20, 1962, Lansdale detailed a
[7246]six phase schedule for Mongoose, designed to culminate in October, 1962,
[7247]with an "open revolt and overthrow of the Communist regime." (Lansdale
[7249]Ex. 11, Program Review of the Cuba Project, 2/20/62, p. 2). As one of the
[7251]operations for the "Resistance" phase proposed for September, 1962, Lansdale
[7253]listed "attack on the cadre of the regime, including key leaders." (Id., p. 151).
[7255]Lansdale's plan stated:
[7257]ee fe
[7258]_*/ Lansdale's’ memorandum described the "touchdown spl
[7259]"It may be a special effort which professional labor
[7260]“operators can launch to stir up workers in Latin America
[7261]and Cuba. It-may be through ethnic-language groups; Spain
[7262]has an untapped action potential. It could be a warming—up a
[7263]of the always lively youth element in Latin America and
[7264]-_ Cuba, through some contacts specially used. It could be with
[7265]Le the families through the Church, with families resisting the
[7266]disciplined destruction of social justice by the Communists. It-
[7268]could be an imaginative defection project which cracks the top
[7269]echelon of the Communist gang now running Cuba." ;
[7271]HY 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 156
[7273]- Zi -
[7275]"This should be a ‘Special Tarpet' operation ...
[7276]Gangster elements might. provide the best recruit-
[7277]ment potential for actions against police -- Ge
[7278]/intelligence/ officials." (Id., p. 151). _*/
[7280]Lansdale testified that early in -the Mongoose opera-
[7281]tion he had suggested to the working level representatives of the Mongoose
[7283]agencies that they get in touch with "criminal elements" to obtain intelli-
[7285]ia
[7287]gence and “possible actions against the police structure” in Cuba. (Lans-
[7289]dale, p. 104). But Lansdale conceded that his * proposal to recruit
[7290]gangster elements ‘for’ atiacks..on' "key leaders": contemplated the targeted
[7291]“killing of individuals, in addition to the casualties that might occur in
[7292]the course of the revolt itself. (Lansdale, p. 107).
[7293]These 33 plans of Lansdale were, however, never
[7294]approved for implementation by the Special Group Augmented. As
[7295]discussed below in greater detail (see p. ), the Special Group Augmented
[7296]Py tabled Lansdale's. six phase plan altogether in February 1962, and directed
[7297]Lansdale to plan for and conduct an intelligence collection plan only.
[7299](Memo, 3/2/62; Minutes of Special Group Augmented Meeting, 3/5/62). -
[7301]a. Lansdale's Rejection of a Suggestion That a Propaganda
[7302]Campaign, Including Rewards for Assassination, Be Explored
[7304]On January 30, 1962, the representative of the Defense Department and the
[7305]Joint Chiefs on the Mongoose Working Group forwarded for Lansdale's. con-
[7306]sideration "a concept for creating distrust and apprehension in the Cuban
[7308]. Communist Hierarchy" (Lansdale Ex. L, Memorandum, 1/30/62, from Craig
[7309]to Lansdale, p. 1). This concept, titled Operation Bounty, was described as
[7310]a "system of financial rewards, commensurate with position and stature,
[7311]for killing or delivering alive known Communists." (Id., p. 2) Under the
[7313]concept, leaflets would be dropped in Cuba listing rewards, which a
[7315]. 3 ~ *7aAn earlier reference to use of gangster-type elements had appeared
[7316]~ in a CIA memorandum for the Special Group on January 24, 1962. Commenting
[7317]on Task 5 of Lansdale's original 32 tasks (which called for planning for
[7318]“defection of top Cuban government officials"), the CIA memorandum note
[7319]that planning for the task will "necessarily be based upon an appeal made
[7320]inside the island by intermediaries” and listed -"crime syndicates" along
[7321]with other grouns as possible intermediaries.
[7323]HY 450955 Docld: 32423539 Page i57
[7325]were proposed as-ranging from $5,000 for an "informer" to $100,000 for
[7327]“government officials.” A reward of "“2e" was Listed for vastro nim-
[7329]self. (Id., p. 3). Lansdale testified that price was designed "to deni-
[7331]grate ... Castro in the eyes of the Cuban population.” (Lansdale, Tr. 26).
[7332]Lansdale testified that he "tabled" this concept when
[7334]he received it, on the ground that "I did not think that it was something
[7336]that should be seriously undertaken or supported further." (Lansdale, p. 26).
[7338]Lansdaie did not bring the proposal before the Special Group Augmented.
[7340]6, The Control Svstem.for. Monsoose Operations.
[7342]In establishing the Monzoose Operation ©
[7343]on November 30, 1961, President Kennedy had emphasized that the Special
[7344]Group should be "kept closely informed" of Mongoose activities. (memo-
[7345]randum. by the President, 11/30/62; cdoawin, p. ).
[7346]In practice, as Samuel Halpern, Harvey's Executive Assistant on ,
[7347]- the CIA Mongoose Task Force W testified, this resulted in the submission
[7348]of "specific detailed plans for every activity carried out by the task
[7349]force." (Halpern, p. 16). Halpern testified that those plans were sub-
[7350]mitted "in nauseating detail:"
[7351]|
[7352]"It went down to such things, as the gradients on the
[7353]beach, and the composition of the sand on the beach
[7354]“in many cases. Every single solitary thing was in
[7355]those plans, full details, times, events, weaponry,
[7356]how it was going to happen, who was going to do fret 5
[7358]- the full details of every single thing weSdi¢.
[7359]. (Halpern, p. 17). F<
[7363]Harvey similarly characterized the control process (Harvey, 6/25,
[7364]p. 123),. as one which required the submission of "excruciating detail" and
[7366]where it was understood. that the Special Group Augmented was to be given
[7368]ha
[7370]HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page i156
[7372]~ 23 -
[7373]an opportunity to debate and decide after. weighing the strengths and
[7375]weaknesses of any given proposed action. (Harvey, 6/25, pp. 114, 12h).
[7377]a. The Documentary Evidence
[7379]The documentary evidence illustrates the tight control pro-
[7381]cedures set out for Mongoose by the Special Group Aupmented. For example,
[7382]as discussed above (yp. ), Lansdale initially submitted 32 specific tasks
[7383]with his “basic concept" on January 18, 1962 for consideration by
[7385]the Special Group Augmented. (Lansdale Ex. 3) After consideration
[7387]of Lansdale's concept and the 32-tasks in February. the Special Croup fro / /
[7388]Comm on
[7389]Augmented ordered Lansdale to cut back Itis plan to Limit it to an on
[7391]he A...
[7393]intelligence collection program for the Narch-Mav 1962 period, rather
[7397]than the five-stage plan to culminate in an October “popular revolution”
[7399]as originally conceived by Lansdale. (Memo 3/2/62,.by Lansdale) In
[7400]approving. the intelligence collection: program, the Special Groun Aug-
[7402]y mented pointed out that:
[7403]" any actions which are not specifically spelled
[7404]out in the plan but seem to be desirable as the pro-
[7405]“ject propresses, will be brourhte to the Special Group
[7406]for resolution." (ielms:Ex. 1, 7/18, p.1)
[7408]In addition, the Guidelines for the Mongoose program
[7409]emphasized the Special Group Augmented's responsibility for contr
[7411]prior approval of important operations:
[7413]"The Special Group (5412 Augmented) is reshoq
[7414]for providing policy puidance to the Cionpooke “iroject,
[7415]; for approving, important operations and for monitoring
[7416]- ; progress. (Guidelines for Operation Nonpoose, March 1b,
[7417]: 1962, p.2) ; oe
[7419]© z
[7421]Further indication of the Mongoose control process is the request piven
[7422]p, i 8
[7424]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 159
[7426]- 24 -
[7428]to Helms a month prior to Harvey's trip to meet Roselli in Miami. Pur-
[7429]fog suant to the discussion at the Special Group's mecting on March 5, Helms
[7430]was asked to estimate “for each week as far into the next twelve months
[7432]as possible . . . the members and type of agents you will establish
[7436]inside Cuba . . . (and) brief descriptions . . . of actions contemplated.”
[7438](Memo to lielms from Lansdale, March 5, 1962)
[7440]Moreover, the approved plan for Operation Mongoose, as of
[7442]the time of Harvey's meeting with Roselli in Miami required that any
[7443]proposal to supply arms and equipment to’ particular. resistance
[7445]groups inside Cuba “be submitted to the Special Group for decision,
[7447]" -
[7449]ad hoc | (Lansdale Memo to
[7451], April 31, 1962, p. ).
[7453]And the Guidelines for the Mongoose program emphasized that, after specific
[7454]tasks were approved by the Special Group Augmented and given to participating
[7455]agencies by Lansdale, normal command channels were to be observed. As the
[7456]Guidelines stated:
[7458]During this period, General Lansdale will continue
[7459]as Chief of Operations, calling directly on -the
[7460]participating departments and agencies for support
[7461]and implementation of agreed tasks. The heads of
[7463]west these departments and agencies are responsible for
[7464]performance through normal command channels to
[7465]higher authority. Sf (Guideline for Operation Mon-
[7466]goose, March 14, 1962, p.2)
[7468]_¥ Whe initial draft of these. Guidelines had referred to the President but
[7469]was later amended to read’ "higher authority." (Draft Guidelines, March
[7470]- 5, 1962, p.2) The minutes of the consideration of these Guidelines were
[7471]also amended with respect to the manner in which the Guidelines were approved.
[7472]On March 16, 1962, a Memorandum for Record of "Discussion of Operation
[7473]Mongoose with the President” of the Special Group (Augmented) stated:
[7475]"In the presence of the Special Group (Augmented)
[7476]the President was given a progress report on Operation MON-
[7477]COOSE. The guidelines dated March 14, 1962 were circulated
[7478]and were used as the basis of the discussion. After a. *
[7479]py prolonged consideration of the visibility, noise level and
[7480]or! ‘risks entailed, General Lansdale and the Special Group (Aug-
[7481]mented) were given tacit authorization to proceed in accordance
[7482]with the guidelines. ;
[7484](footnote cont'd.)
[7486]HW 50955 DocId:32423539 Page 160
[7488]-~ Dua -
[7490]om. In a Memorandum to McCone on April 10, 1962, Harvey recognized that the
[7491]Special Group Augmented control. process required advance approval of "major
[7493]operations going beyond the collection of intelligence.”
[7495]But Harvey stated
[7496]that these "tight controls" were unduly "stultifying:”
[7498]"To permit requisite flexibility and professionalism
[7500]for a maximum operational effort against Cuba, the
[7502]right controls exercised by the Special Group and the
[7504]present time-consuming coordination and briefing pro-
[7506]cedures should, if at all possible, be made less
[7508]restrictive and less stultifying." (Memo, April 10, 1962, .
[7509]Harvey to McCone, p.¥) *
[7511]Even as the Cuban Missile Crisis approached, and the pressure to
[7512]\ - .act against the Castro regime increased through a “stepped up" Mongoose
[7513]pian, the Special Group continued to insist on prior approval of sensitive
[7514]operations. Thus, when the Special Group Augmented on September. 14,
[7516]1962, approved in principle a proposed set of operations,
[7520]However, a note at the bottom of this memorandum, dated March 22, 1962,
[7521]stated: .
[7523]This minute was read to the Special Group
[7524](Augmented) today. The Group was unanimous in feeling
[7525]that no authorization, either tacit or otherwise, was
[7526]. given by higher authority. The members of the Group
[7527]\ asked that the minute be amended to indicate that the
[7528]. “Group itself had decided to proceed in accordance with
[7529]{ the Guidelines. ae Ot . a
[7531]“HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 1+ or oe
[7533]=- £4) -
[7534]Bundy, speaking to the Group,
[7536], ; "l.. made it clear that this did not constitute
[7538]a blanket approval of every item in the paper. and
[7540]that sensitive ones such as sabotage, for example,
[7542]will have to be presented in more detail on a case
[7544]by case basis." (Memo of Special Group Augmented
[7546]meeting, September 14, 1962, p. ).
[7548]Helms and the members of the ‘Special Group Augmented differed on
[7549]whether or not these control requirements were consistent with Helms' per- .
[7550]ception that assassination was permissible without a direct order. We
[7551]discuss that testimony below at
[7553]7. The Pattern of Mongoose Action. The documentary evidence and the
[7555]testimony reveal that the Kennedy Administration pressed the Mongoose opera-
[7556]tion with vigorous language. and although the collection of intelligence
[7558]information was the central objective of Mongoose up until August ie
[7560]sabotage and para military actions were conducted.% eagnus >, anh vege
[7562]major sabotage. operation aimed at a large Cuban seer s yand Ahi
[7563]sabotage operations. As Lansdale described them in his testimony, the
[7564]cahotave acts involved ‘blowing up bridges to stop communications and
[7565]blowing up certain production plants: (Lansdale, p. 36). And during
[7567]the Missile Crisis in the fall of 1962, sabotage was increasingly urged.
[7569]_*/ In early March, 1962, the SGA recognized the need to begin "preliminary
[7570]actions ... involving such things as spotting, assessing and training
[7571]action-type agents" but the Group agreed that it must "keep its hand
[7572]tightly" om these actions. The Group saw, however, that such control
[7573]might not be completely effective and recognized "that many of the
[7574]“agents infiltrated would -be of an all- -purpose type; that is, they would
[7575]be trained in paramilitary skills, as well as those of exclusively
[7576]intelligence concern. It was noted that once the agents are within the
[7577]country, they cannot be effectively controlled from the U.S., although
[7578]every effort will be made to attempt such control.” (Minutes of
[7579]Special Croup meeting, March 5,. 1962).
[7581]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 162
[7583]~ 26 -
[7584]At the sane time, however, the recerd shows that the Special Sroup Aug-
[7586]mented turned away from proposed Sabotage and similar violent action throughout
[7587]1962, including the period of the Nissile Crisis. (See p. above.) Thus, Helms
[7588]noted in a memorandum of a meeting on October 15, 1962, that Robert Vennedy in ex-
[7589]pressing the “general dissatisfaction of the President” with Mongodse, "pointed out
[7590]that (Mongoose) had been underway for a year...that there had been no acts of sabo-
[7591]tage and that even the one which had been attempted had failed twice". (Memorandum
[7592]by Helms, October 16, 1962, p. 1.) Similiarly a memorandum to Helms by his Execu-
[7593]tive Assistant (who spent full time on Cuba matters), which reviewed the Mongoose
[7594]program in the aftermath of the Missile Crisis, stated:
[7596]"During the past year, while oneeof the options of the
[7598]project was to create internal dissension and resistance
[7600]leading to eventual U.S. intervention, a review shows
[7602]that policymakers not only shied away from the military
[7604]intervention aspect but were generally apprehensive of
[7606]sabotage proposals. (McManus, Ex. 2, p. 1, MeManus, p. ll).
[7607]| Harvey testified that this assessment of the Special Group Aue~
[7609]; Pp p Aug
[7610]mented's position was an accurate one, (Ilarvey, 6/25, p. ). This is
[7611]also borne out by the record of Mongoose activity. For example, after
[7613]Lansdale’s initial six. phase plan to overthrow: Castro by the fall of 1962,
[7615]the single phase approved for January ‘August.1962 was described by Lans-
[7617]dale as "essentially an intelligence collection" effort. (Memorandum,
[7619]ch
[7621]. £ i mde
[7622]the "immediate priority objective of U.S. efforts \ A coming’ months."
[7624](Taylor Ex. 3, p. 2, Guidelines for Operation Monddose , March 14, 1962).
[7625]The, Guidelines further stated that although other covert actions would be
[7626]undertaken concurrently with intelligence collection, these were to be, on
[7628]. a stale “short of those reasonably calculated to inspire a revolt" in'Cuba.
[7629](Id., p. 2). And the Special Group stipulated that Mongoose action beyond
[7631]the acquisition of intelligence "must be inconspicuous." (Memorandum,
[7632]: 7
[7634]3/2/62, Lansdale, p. 3).
[7636]AY 50955 Docld: 32423539 “Page 163° ° ~~
[7638]~ 27 -
[7640]With the scheduled conclusion of that intelligence collection
[7641]po phase in August 1962, the Special Group Augmented considered whether to
[7642]adopt a "stepped-up Course B plus," which, in contrast to Phase I, was
[7643]designed to inspire a revolt against the Castro regime. (Memorandun for
[7644]the Special Group Augmented, 8/8/62, from Lansdale, p. 1). Initially, the
[7646]Special Group Augmented decided against this course and in favor of a "CIA
[7648]variant,"
[7650]at a meeting of Special Group Augmented principals on August 10,
[7651]1962. (Minutes of Special Group Augmented meeting, August 10, 1962). The
[7652]"CIA variant," which was proposed by MeCone on August 10, posited more
[7653]limited actions to avoid inciting a revolt and sought not Castro's over~
[7654]throw, but a split between Castro and "old-—line Communists. (ta., p. 2).
[7656]The onset of the Missile Crisis caused an initial reversion to the
[7658]‘stepped-up Course B plan, but ultimately, however, an order was issued on
[7660]October 30, 1962 to halt all sabotage operations. (Lansdale, Ex.8, Memo
[7662]ae py Lansdale, 10/30/62) |
[7664]Thus, on August 20, Taylor told the President that the Special
[7665]Group Augmented perceived no likelihood of.an overthrow of the Castro govern-
[7666]ment by internal means without direct U.S. military intervention, and
[7667]that the Special Group Augmented favored a more agressive Mongoose program.
[7669]| (Memo from Taylor to President.) Shortly thereafter ,-on
[7671]August 23, McGeorge Bundy issued NSC Memo Number 181 to Lansdale and Taylor
[7672]stating that, at the President's directive, "the line of activity projected
[7673]for Operation HONGOOSE Plan B plus should be developed with all possible
[7674]speed." One week later, on August 30, the CIA was instructed by the Special
[7675]Group Augmented to submit a list. of possible sabotage targets they might
[7676]propose | and it was noted that this list could serve as the limit for action
[7680]on the Agency's own initiative: "The Group, by reacting to this list, could
[7684]Sag
[7686]define the limits within which the Agency could operate on its own initiative."
[7688]Special Group Augnented Minutes of August 30, 1962.)
[7690]HW 50955 Docld:32473539 Page 164
[7694]Thus, at a-Special Group Augmented meeting on October 4, 1962, Robert
[7695]Kennedy stated that the President "is concerned about progress on the Mongoose
[7696]program and feels that more priority should be given. to trying to mount sabotage
[7697]operations". And Robert Kennedy urged that "massive activity" be undertaken
[7698]within the Mongoose framework. In line with this proposal, the Special Group
[7699]Augmented decided that "considerably more sabotage" should be undertaken, and that
[7700]"all efforts should be made to develop new and imaginative approaches with the pos-
[7701]sibility of getting rid of the Castro regime". (Minutes of Special Group Aug-
[7702]mented meeting, October 4, 1962, p. )*. On October 30, 1962, however, the
[7703]order to stop all sabotage operations was issued (Lansdale, Ex. 8).**
[7707]* The SGA also decided on October 4, 1962, that Robert Kennedy would: chair
[7708]the Group's meetings "for the time being." (Id., p. ). Subsequently,
[7709]at a meeting on October 16, 1962, Robert Kennedy stated that he was
[7710]going to give Mongoose "more personal attention" in view of the lack of
[7711]propress and would hold daily meetings with the working group represen-
[7712]tatives, i.e., Lansdale, Harvey, and ‘the other Agency members. (Harvey,
[7713]Ex. 12, Memorandum of Meeting, October 16, 1962, by Helms, p. 1). Helms
[7714]testified that he did not recall any such daily meetings with the
[7715]Attorney General, but he had the impression there may have been several
[7716]at first, but then they ceased. (Helms, 7/17/ > pp. 54-55).
[7718]**Harvey testified that he had a "confrontation" with Robert. Kennedy
[7719]at the-height of the Missile Crisis concerning Harvey's order that
[7720]agent teams be sent into Cuba to support -any conventional U.S. mili-
[7721]tary operation that might occur. Warvey stated that Robert Kennedy
[7722]“took a great deal of exception" to. this order’ And ‘a a pesulte
[7723]ordered Harvey to stop the agent operations | (iaryes., 7/ll,.
[7724]Elder, McCone's assistant at the time, similarly sdescribed) t ‘ine a
[7725]~ dent and stated that, although Harvey had attempted to get duidance'i
[7726]from top officials during the Missile Crisis, Harvey "earned another
[7727]black mark as not being fully under control". (Elder, p. 34-35.)
[7729]HW 50955 Docld:32473539 Page 165
[7731]-28a-_
[7733]- As Sorensen (a member of the Executive Committee established to deal with
[7735]the Missile Crisis) testified, even though Cuba was the ''No. 1 priority" dur-
[7737]ing the Missile Crisis, and "all alternatives, plans, possibilities were ex-
[7738]haustively surveyed" during that time, the subject of assassination was never
[7739]raised in the high-level. National Securzty Council Executive Committee (of which
[7741]Helms was not a member) that was formed to deal with the Missile Crisis.
[7743](Sorensen, 7/21, p. 11.)***
[7745]There are references in the Special Group Augmented records to attacks
[7746]on Soviet personnel in Cuba. ‘The record of the SGA meeting on September 9,
[7747]1962, states: ;
[7749]“Tt was suggested that the matter of attacking and
[7750]harassing of Soviet personnel within Cuba should be
[7751]considered." (SGA Minutes, 9/9/62, p. ).
[7753]Earlier, on August 31, 1962, Lansdale had included, a task "to provoke
[7754]incidents between Cubans and Bloc personnel -to exacerbate tensions,
[7755]‘in a proposed projection of actions: for Phase II of Mongoose. (Nemo~
[7756]‘randum to SGA, 8/31/62, from Lansdale, Action No. 47). The Special Group
[7757]thereafter decided, as ameans of “emphasizing such activity" to replace
[7758]‘that task with one to "cause‘actions by Cubans against Bloc personnel ,"
[7759]i and to note that "consideration will be given to provoking and conducting
[7760]LL? physical attacks on Bloc personnel." (Memorandum to Taylor, Rusk, and
[7761]MacNamara , 9/12/62, from Lansdale, ‘PP. 1-2).
[7763]HY 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 166
[7767]Ee The Issue of Authority Outside the Agency
[7769]This section discusses the evidence as to whether there was authorization
[7770]from outside the Agency for the assassination activity that took place during
[7771]the Mongoose operation.
[7773]TR. 7/17, p.4)
[7775]As discussed below in detail, both Helms and the Kennedy Administration
[7776]officials agreed that no direct order was ever given for Castro's assassina-
[7777]tion and that no one outside the Agency (including MeCone) was informed
[7778]about the assassination activity. Helms testified, however, that he believed
[7779]the assassination activity was permissible and that it was within the scope
[7780]of the authority given to the Agency. McGene and the other Kennedy Admini-
[7782]stration officials disagreed, testifying that assassination was not permissible
[7783]without a direct order and that a Castro assassination was not within the
[7785]authorized bounds of the Mongoose operation.
[7789]*_4 In April 1962, when the poison pills were given to Reselli in Miami,
[7790]Helms was the CIA Deputy Director in charge of covert operations and reported
[7791]to MeCone , the CIA Director. Helms had succeeded Bissell in this job,
[7792]following Bissell's retirement in February, 1962, as a consequence of the
[7793]failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion. Helms testified that, after the Bay”
[7794]of Pigs, "Those of us who were still (in the Agency) were enormously anxious
[7795]to try and be successful at what we were veing asked to do by what was then >
[7797]a relatively new Administration. We wanted to earn our spurs with the
[7799]President and with other officers of the Kennedy Administration.” (Helms
[7801]As set forth below, Helms testified that while he doubted whether
[7802]he was initially informed that Harvey gave poison pills to Roselli and. did
[7803]io not recall having authorized a Castro assassination -in that form, nevertheless,
[7805]Helms had authorized the 1962 assassination plot because “we felt that we
[7807]HW 50955 Docld: 32423539  Payée i67T"" cas mene emer eee
[7810]were operating as we were supposed to operate, that these things if
[7812]not specifically authorized, at least were authorized in general terms.”
[7814]é (Helms, 6/13, p.61)
[7815]. heer
[7816]. ; é oe
[7817]a. Ets Perception of Autnority / v (RO oe (fur ee
[7819]Helms testified that based upon the “intense’- pressure exerted by the
[7821]Kennedy Administration to overthrow Castro it was his perception that the CIA
[7823](ielms, 6/13, ‘p. 137: ilelms, 7/17, p. 62, 7/17, p. 4-5.) Melms testified that
[7824]this authority, as hé perceived it, was implicit in the U. S. policy and attitude
[7825]towards Castro. (Helms, 6/13, p. 165.) ‘As Helms testified:
[7827]“IT believe it was the policy at the time to get rid of Castro
[7828]and if killing him was one of the things that was to be done
[7829]in this connection, that was within what was expected."
[7830](elms, 6/13, p. 137.)
[7832]*The extent to which pressure in fact existed "to do something about Castro" is
[7833]discussed in detail in the section immediately above dealing with Operation Mon-
[7834]goose, its strategy of causing an internal revolt of the Cuban people against
[7835]Castro, the strict control system established by the Special Group Augmented, and
[7836]the pattern of intelligence collection and sabotage activity actually authorized
[7837]and undertaken.
[7839]HW S0955 Dorld:32423539 Page 163°
[7841]HY 409545
[7843]iielms testified that "I remember vividly (the pressure to overthrow
[7844]Castro) was very intense,” (Helms, 6/13, p. 26.) Helms stated that this pres-
[7845]sure intensified during the period of Operation Mongoose during late 1961 and
[7846]throughout 1962, and then continued. on through much of 1963. (itelms, 6/13, p. 27.)
[7848]a
[7850]As these pressures rose, "obviously the extent of the means that one thought
[7852]were available, obvious increased too." (llelms, 6/13, p. 26.)
[7854]Helms stated that during the Mongoose Operations period "it was made abundantly
[7856]clear...to everybody involved in the operation that the desire was to get rid of
[7858]the Castro regime and to get rid of Castro...the point was that no limitations
[7860]were put on this injunction.” (lielms, 7/17, p. 16-17). In Helms' testimony,
[7862]the following exchange occurred: .
[7863]"Senator Mathias: 'Let me draw an example from history.
[7864]When Thomas A. Beckett.was proving to be an annoyance,
[7866]as Castro, the King said who will rid me of this man.
[7868]He didn't say to somebody go out and murder him. He said
[7869]who will rid me of this man, and let it go at that.
[7871]"Mr. Helms: ‘That is a warming reference to the problem."
[7873]"Senator Mathias: 'You feel that spans the generations
[7874]and the centuries?!
[7876]"Mr. Helms: ‘I think it does, sir.!
[7878]“Senator Mathias: ‘And that is typical of the kind of thing
[7879]which might be said, which might be taken by the director or
[7880]by anybody else as presidential authorization to go forward?!
[7882]"Mr. Helms: 'That is right. But in answer to that, I re-
[7883]alize that one sort of grows up in [the] tradition of the
[7884]time and I think that any.of us would have found it very
[7885]difficult to discuss assassinations with a President of the
[7886]U.S. I just think we all had the feeling that we're hired
[7887]out to keep those things out of the oval office.'
[7889]- "Senator Mathias: ‘Yet at the same time you felt that some
[7890]spark had been transmitted, that that was within the per-
[7893]"Mr. Helms: ‘Yes, and if he had disappeared from the scene
[7894]they would not have been unhappy.'" (Helms Tr.- 6/13,~pp. 72-73)
[7896]a
[7898]Docld:324935TT" Payer tEs nee ores mening nahn! ute tet ee a
[7902]Nelms said that although he never was told by his superiors to hill Castro
[7903](ilelms, 7/17, p. 15), there was at the same time never any injunction laid down
[7904]-by the Fennedy Administration that proscribed a Castro assassination: “No member
[7905]of the Kennedy Administration...ever told me that (assassination) was proscribed,
[7907](or) ever referred to it in that fashion..." (Helms, 7/71, p. 18.) “Nobody ever
[7909]said that (assassination) was ruled out..." ¥/Gelms MATS
[7910]Nelms stated that during the Mongoose period,
[7911]assassination of Castro, “with all the other things going on at that
[7913]time...seemed to be within the permissible part of this effort. (lelms, 6/13,
[7915]p. 99.) "In the perceptions of the time and tue things we were trying to do this
[7917]was one human life against many other. Ruman lives that were heing lost."
[7921](Helms, 6/13, p. 64.)%
[7923]“As Helms declared: "In my 25 years in the Central Intelligence Agency, I always
[7924]thought I was working within authorization, that I was doing what I had been
[7925]asked to do by proper authority and when I was operating on my own I was doing
[7927]‘what I believed to be the legitimate business of the Agency as it would have been
[7928]expected of me." (Helms, 6/13, p. 30-31.)
[7930]*kAs set out above (p._ ), Helms stated: "...people were losing theirmlives
[7931]oN in raids, a lot of people had lost their life at the Bay of Pigs, agents were
[7932]i, being arrested left and right and put before the wall and shot. (Helms, 6/13,
[7934]p. 64.)
[7936]HY 50955 DoclId:32423539 Page i7o
[7938]bp. Helms' Testimony That He Had No Direct Order to Assassinate
[7939]Castro and Did Not Inform the President or the Special Group
[7940]of the Assassination Activity
[7942]Uelms testified that there was no direct order to assassinate Castro.
[7943]ile said that bis perceptions of authority did not reach the point where he could
[7945]testify that he had specific instructions to kill Gastro. As he put it:
[7946]. "I have testified as best I could about the atmosphere
[7947]“of the time, what I understood was desired, and I don't
[7948]want to take refuge in saying that I was instructed to
[7949]specifically murder Castro. . ." (Helms, 6/13, p.88).
[7951]On the question of whether the President was informed of any
[7952]assassination plots, Helms pointed out that "nobody wants to embarrass a
[7953]President of the United States (by) discussing the assassination of. foreign
[7954]leaders in his presence" (6/13, p. 29), and that the Special Group was "the
[7958]mechanism that was set up. . .to use as a circuit breaker so that these
[7960]things did not explode in the President s face and that ee Was, ert ,
[7961]SERRE
[7963]responsible for them." (6/13, ‘Pe 29). Howevé $
[7965]woe BR ee .
[7966]Fa } ; that he had "no knowledge that a Castro assas anati mn was ever authorized
[7967]by the Special Group (Augmented)" (6/13, pp.28-29).
[7969]In addition, Helms said he never informed the Special Group Augmented
[7971]or any member of that Group: that Harvey had given the pills to Roselli
[7973]in Miami "because I am not even sure I knew about it at the time.” (Helms,
[7974]7/18, p.18).*/ Helms also stated he never told Robert Kennedy about any
[7975]assassination activity and my “presumption: is he wasn't informed" (Helms,
[7976]6/13, p.58), and that "Harvev kept (the Roselli pill plot) pretty much
[7978]in his back pocket." (Helms, 6/13,pp.57-58).
[7980]Helms further testified that although Robert Kennedy was “constantly
[7982]in touch" with him in 1962 and 1963, Robert Kennedy never instructed Helms
[7984]set,
[7985]%.
[7987]honed
[7989]HY 50955 Daocld: 32423539 Page if1
[7991]ao. to assassinate Castro:
[7993]"The Chairman. 'Since he was on the phone to you
[7994]: repeatedly did he ever tell you to kill Castro?’
[7996]"Mr. Helms. 'No.'
[7997]“he Chairman: ‘He did not?!
[7999]"Mr. llelms : yet in those words, no.'" (Helms,
[8000]T/T, p-13)2/
[8002]| efi pe T
[8004]Jt.
[8007]Mette on ee
[8009]we gave
[8011]* Helms. “immediately y reiterated after this exchange. “that his perception of
[8012]authority for a Castro assassination. rested on the pressure exerted by the
[8013]Administration against Castro. The exchange between the Chairman and Helms
[8014]continued as follows:
[8016]"The Chairman: ‘Well, did he ever tell you in other words
[8017]that clearly conveyed to you the message that he wanted
[8018]to kill Castro?’
[8020]"Helms: ‘Sir, the last time I was (before the Committee), I
[8022]did the best I could about what I believed to be the parameters
[8024]under which we were working , and that was to get rid of Castro.
[8026]And I don't, I am sorry to say .. . see how one would have
[8028]expected that a thing like killing or murdering or assassinating
[8030]5 would become part of a large group of people sitting around a
[8032]7 ; table in the United States Government. I can "t imagine any
[8033]Cabinet officer wanting to sign off .on something like that. I
[8034]can't imagine anybody wanting something in writing saying I
[8035]have just charged Mr. Jones to go out and shoot Mr. Smith."
[8036](Helms, 7/17, pp- 13-14)
[8038]Poms
[8040]BW 50955 Docld:324273539 Page i172
[8042]ce. Helms Testimony that he. Doubted Whether he had
[8044]Authorized a Specific Assassination Attempt or was Informed
[8045]of the Passage of Ehe PUTTS
[8047]There is some doubt whether Helms ever authorized a specific attempt
[8048]at. Castro's assassination, or. was informed of the passage of the pioson
[8049]pills to Roselli in April, 1962. Although Helms testified that Harvey
[8050]regularly reported to Helms on Harvey's Mongoose work (Helms, 6/13, p-95),
[8051]and Helms "would have thought" that Harvey would have reported to Helms
[8052]the transfer of the pills into Cuba. (Helms, 6/13, p.105), Hels does not
[8053]recall Harvey ever telling him that the pills were delivered to Roselli.
[8054](Helms, 7/17, p.22). . |
[8056]Thus, as indicated above, Helms tesfified he never informed the Special
[8057]Group Augmented or any member of that Group that Harvey had given the pills
[8058]to Roselli in Miami "because I am not even sure I knew about it at the time."
[8060](Helms, 7/18, p. 18.)* And with respect to the pills, Helms testified that,
[8062]a
[8064]although he agreed to the - ccowstoniel
[8066]implicit authorization for assassinatiog
[8068]call having okayed the killing of Castro myself in that form." (Helms, 7/17,
[8070]Ps 9.)
[8072]ad. Helms' Perception of Robert Kennedy’ s Position on a Castro”
[8073]Assassination
[8075],
[8077]In testifying as to his perception of authority, Helms emphasized the
[8079]particular role played by Robert Kennedy in pressing for progress and results
[8081]*/ Helms’ testimony that he may not have been informed that the pills were
[8082]delivered is corroborated by Harvey's testimony. Harvey testified that
[8083]when he returned from Miami he reported to Helms on his contacts with
[8084]Roselli. But ilarvey said that he only "briefed Helms generally", on the
[8085]subjects of Harvey's takeover of the Roselli operation, the prospects
[8086]of the operation, and the fact that Harvey had dropped Maheu and “Giancana ©
[8087]from the operation. (Harvey, 6/25, p-65).
[8089]on
[8091]ste
[8093]HW 50955 Docld:32493539 Page VFS = ~
[8095]Robert Kennedy often talked directly with Helms and other CIA officials
[8096]working on the Mongoose program, outside of the Special Group Augmented
[8097]s channels. (Helms, 7/17, p.13; 7/18, pp.60-61).. As Helms stated:
[8099]"I can say absolutely fairly we aré constantly in
[8100]touch with each other in these matters. The Attorney
[8101]General was on the phone to me, he was on the phone
[8102]to Mr. Harvey, to Mr. Fitzgerald, his successor. He
[8103]was on the phone even to people on Harvey's staff, as
[8104]I recall it." (Helms, 7/17, p.13).
[8106]Helms said that although he did not know whether a Castro
[8107]assassination would have been morally acceptable to Robert Kennedy,
[8108]Helms believed that Robert Kennedy "would not (have been) unhappy if
[8109](Castro) had disappeared off the scene by whatever means." (Helms,
[8110]7/17. p.17~18). And Helms stated that Robert Kennedy never told him
[8112]“that a Castro assassination was ruled out. (Helms, 7/17, p.21).
[8114]However, Helms further testified that although Robert, Kennedy was
[8115]"constantly in touch" with Helms and their exchanges were marked by de-
[8117]: oy : _ tailed, factual, and highly specific discussions on anti-Castro operations.
[8119]'
[8121]Robert Kennedy never raised the subject of a Castro assassination and never
[8122]instructed Helms to assassinate Castro.** Helms further testified that he had
[8123]no knowledge that Robert Kennedy "was ever asked to specifically approve
[8125]an assassination plot.” (Helms, 6/13; p. 57.)-
[8129]* Q: "So it was your impression that he was sort of setting th
[8130]the group's action or activity." ,
[8131]A: "Oh, yes...there wasn't any doubt about that.
[8132]interested in this and spent a great deal of
[8133]6/13, p. 22.) :
[8134]**kThe telephone records of the Attorney Gene 3 LES Yhdicate frequent
[8135]contact between the Attorney General: aml Helms” and’ Yiéling stated that his
[8136]conversations with Robert Kennedy were cand iid" and that "he and I used to.
[8137]deal in facts most of the time. (Helnig, 6/18, p-63.) Helms testified as
[8138]to the level of detail in his talks with Robert Kennedy: ;
[8140]"For example, we had projects to land sabotage teams.*/
[8141]Well, (the Attorney General would ask) have you got the a
[8142]team organized, did the team go? Well, no, we've been
[8143]ad delayed a week because the weather is bad or the boats
[8144]don't run, or something of this kind. It even got down
[8145]to that degree of specificity." (Helms, 7/17, p.40)
[8147]BW 50955 DoclTd:324939539 Page 174i
[8149]And, as stated above, Helms also testified that "Harvey kept Phase 2
[8150]Ts (the Roselli pill operation) pretty much in his back pocket '' and that al-
[8151]though Helms stated “I do not know this for sure,’ he testified it was”
[8152]his "presumption" that Robert Kennedy was not informed of the PHase 2
[8153]operation.* (Helms, 6/13, p.' 57-58.)
[8155]e. Helms' Testimony as to Why He Did Not Obtain a Direct
[8156]Order . ,
[8158]Helms testified that assassination "was not part of the CIA's policy"
[8159]or a part of CIA's "armory", (ilelms, 6/13, p. 87-88.) And, in his own
[8160]view, Nelms said that he "never liked assassination”. (And, in fact, banned
[8162]its use years after he became CIA Director.) ((Helms, >)
[8164]Moreover, Helms testified that he had serious reservations regarding the
[8165]CIA.working with underworld figures. (Helms, 7/18 p.31). When Harvey
[8167]. Paes
[8168]progsed to contact Roselli to see if gangstes }
[8170]id, be.
[8171]4} developed, Helms "had very grave doubts abou 1
[8173]underworld figures. (Helms, 6/13, p-33; 7/18, p.31).
[8175]Despite these reservations, Helms did not seek approval for
[8177]the assassination activity because he said assassination was not
[8179]. a subject that he felt should be aired with higher authority. (elms, 7/18, ViGk
[8181]pp.31-32). With respect to the question of obtaining express authority
[8183]i
[8184]‘& elms based this presumption on a review of relevant documents at the
[8186]time of his testimony. (Helms, 6/13, p.58).
[8188]HW 50955 Docld:324293539 Page i75 °° 7
[8190]from the Special Group or Special Group Augmented, Helms stated: "...
[8192]a, I didn't.see how one would have expected that a thing like killing or
[8193]murdering er assassination would become a part of a large group of people
[8194]sitting around a table in the United States Government.” (Helms, 7/17,
[8195]p. 14). And with regard to informing the President or obtaining explicit
[8196]authority from him, Helms stated that “nobody wants to embarrass a-Presi-
[8197]dent of the United States (by) discussing the assassination of foreign
[8199]leaders in his presence." (Helms, 6/13, p. 29).
[8201]Thus, in the following exchange Helms stated that it "wouldn't have
[8203]occurred to me to ask" for clarification or express authority for assass-
[8204]. ~
[8206]ination activity from Robert Kennedy or the Special Group:
[8208]"Senator Huddleston: "...it did not occur to you to
[8209]inquire of the Attorney General or of the Special
[8210]Group or of anyone that when they kept pushing and
[8212]: asking for action...to clarify that question of
[8213]_ _ whether you should actually be trying to assassinate?"
[8215]"Mr. Helms: "I don't know whether it was in training
[8216]experience, tradition or exactly what one points to,
[8217]but I think to’go up to a Cabinet officer and say,
[8219]am I right in assuming that you want me to assassinate .
[8220]Castro or to try to assassinate Castro, is a question
[8221]it wouldn't have occurred to me to ask."
[8223]KKK
[8225]"Senator Huddleston: "... (because assassination has such
[8226]serious consequences) seems to fortify the thought that
[8227]I would want to be dead certain, I would want-to hear
[8228]it from the horse's mouth in plain, simple English language
[8229]; before I would want to undertake that kind of activity.
[8230]- (Helms, 7/17, pp.51-52).
[8232]Helms also pointed out his reason for not, eekt
[8234]in the following ‘exchange: .
[8236]"Senator Morgan: "In light of your previous statement
[8237]that. this is a Christian country and that this Committee
[8238]has to face up to the prime moral issue of whether or not «
[8239]killing is...acceptable...don't you think it would have
[8240]2 . taken affirmative permission or authority to kill, rather
[8241]: than just saying it was not eliminated from the authority
[8242]or you were not restricted...?"
[8244]HY 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page i176
[8246]foam
[8256]~ 36 -
[8258]"Mr. Helms: "...killing was not part of the CIA's policy.
[8260]It was not part of the CIA's armory...but in this Castro
[8261]operation...1 have testified as best I could about the
[8262]atmosphere of the time, what I understood was desired (and)
[8263]that this was getting rid of Castro, if he had been gotten
[8264]rid of by this means that this would have been acceptable
[8266]to certain individuals...f was just doing my best to do
[8268]what I thought I was supposed to do." (delms, 6/13. pp.87-88).
[8270]When asked why he did not seek clarification from. the Special
[8271]Group, its members, or Robert Kennedy whether it was "in fact, the
[8273]policy of the U.S. Government to actually kill Fidel Castro,' Helms
[8275]answered "I don't know..."
[8277]..There is something about the whole chain of episodes
[8278]in conncection with this Roselli business that I aw
[8279]simply not able to bring back in a coherent fashion.
[8280]And there was something about the ineffectuality of all
[8281]this, or the lack of conviction that anything ever
[8282]happened, that I believe in the end made this thing
[8283]simply collapse, disappear. And I don't recall what I
[8284]was briefed on at the time. Maybe I was kept currently
[8285]informed and maybe I wasn't, and today I don't remember
[8286]it...But I do not recall ever having been convinced
[8287]that any attempt was really made on Castro's life. And
[8288]since I didn't believe any attempt had been made on
[8290]_. Castro's life, I saw no reason to pursue the matter
[8291]further." (Helms, 7/18, pp.31-32).
[8293]f. lelms' Perception of the Relevance of Special Group
[8294]Controls to Assassination Activity
[8296]The evidence concerning the control system established by the.
[8297]Special Group for the Mongoose Operation is discussed above (see ps
[8298]Helms stated, however, that the control system established by the
[8300]Special Group for Mongoose was not intended to apply to assassination
[8301]activity. (Helms, 7/18, p.2L). Thus, with respect to the Special Group
[8302]Augmented's decision on March 5, 1962 that major operations going beyond
[8304]ASHE
[8306]the collection of intelligence must’ receive “eRe pvagens
[8308]stated that this referred to “rather specific i fp
[8309]Group had on its agenda" -from the outset of Mongoose. (eins, 18,
[8311]p.21). Since. assassination was not among such items, Helms state
[8313]HW 50955 Docld:324293539 Page i177
[8317]that the Special Group would not have expected assassination
[8318]activity to come under this particular policy. (Helms, 7/18,
[8319]p.21). And with respect to the Special Group Augmented's desire
[8320]to "keep its hands tightly on preliminary actions" leading
[8321]towards sabotage and other actions beyond intelligence collection,
[8322]Helms stated that was the kind of injunction "that appears in all
[8323]kinds of governmental minutes of meetings." (Helms, 7/18, p.l?).
[8324]Helms said he regarded these as "general injunctions: rather than
[8325]an "all inclusive injunction™ to keep the Group informed of all matters.
[8326](Helms, 7/18, -.17).
[8328]Helms said he recognized, however, that there were limits on
[8329]permissible activity during Mongoose. */ (Helms, 7/18,p.9). Thus,
[8330]Helms stated that although there were "no limitations" on actions
[8332]to remove Castro during Mongoose, there were restraints on sabotage
[8334]operations and he did not understand the absence of specific limitations
[8335]to authorize more drastic actions, such as committing the U.S. military
[8336]to an invasion of Cuba. (Helms, 7/18, p-9).
[8338]In addition, Helms testified that he saw no need to inform the
[8339]Special Group of the Harvey-Roselli operation because that operation was
[8340]characterized by “ineffectuality" and a “lack of conviction that anyshing
[8341]ever happened." (Helms, 7/18, p.32). Helms stated he did neigh 4 ~
[8343]Soe
[8345]- any attempt had been made on Castro's life by virtue oie re
[8347]in Miami with Roselli. (Helms, 7/18, p.32).
[8349]. man
[8351]seer ap 9
[8352]f Sa)
[8353]*/ Helms testified, that. although loss of 1" was implicit in the
[8354]Mongoose operations,
[8355]"T think there was an effort made not to take tacks
[8356]that would recklessly kill a.lot of people and not ~
[8357]achieve very much. I think there was an effort, if you
[8358]had a sabotage operation, not to throw a Lot of hand
[8359]grenades into a city, but rather take out Che power:
[8360]plant which would actually damage the economy of the
[8361]country. There was an effort made to find devices that
[8363]would seem to have a useful end. (Helms, 7/17, p.63-64).
[8367]a. yet
[8369]HY 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page ifé
[8371]2. Harvey's Testimony Concerning Authority
[8373]co a. Harvey's Perception of Authorit
[8374]Harvey stressed that at all times he was acting as a line officer re-
[8375]porting to his immediate superior within the Agency, the Deputy Director for
[8376]covert actions (first Bissell, then Helms.)* (Harvey, 6/25, p. 83).
[8377]Similarly, Harvey also pointed out that his information with respect
[8378]to authorization from outside the agency came from the Deputy Director:
[8380]"(a)t no time during this entire period...did I ever personally
[8381]believe or have any feeling that I was either free-wheeling or
[8382]end-running or engaging in any activity that was not in response
[8384]to a considered, decided U. S. policy, properly approved, admittedly,
[8385]perhaps, or through channels and at levels I personally had no in-
[8386]volvement in, or first-hand acquaintance with, and did not consider
[8387]it at that point my province to, if youwill, cross-examine either
[8388]the Deputy Director or the Director concering it." (Harvey 6/25,
[8390]p- 83:) ,
[8392]pee
[8395]ad
[8397]HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page i79
[8399]39
[8401]Thus, Harvey relied upon his superiors within the Agency for authority.
[8402]Indeed, Harvey indicated that his perception of the authorization for the
[8404]1962 assassination activity may have come from the period when Allen Dulles
[8406]was DCI. As Harvey stated:
[8408]"But I had every right to believe organizationally,
[8409]humanly, whatever way you want to put it, that nothing
[8410]that was being tald to me by Bissell had not in fact
[8411]come to him from /Allen Dulles/.
[8413]But Harvey made clear that this did not imply that McCone knew of or au-
[8415]thorized the assassination activity:
[8417]"The Chairman: 'That doesn't necessarily mean that be-
[8418]cause the previous director had knowledge that Mr. McCone
[8419]had knowledge. It is not like a Tovenant that runs in
[8421]‘the land."
[8423]'Mr. Harvey: 'No, of course not, and they don't always
[8424]brief their successors.'" (Harvey, 6/25, p. 85.)
[8426]HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 1680
[8428]_ b. Harvey and the Special Group Augmented
[8430]_ Harvey ‘testified that he never informed the Special Group Augmented,
[8431]or any of its members individually, of the ongoing assassination plots. As
[8432]we described earlier, the Special Group Augmented and its Mongoose program
[8433]began its Cuba activities in late 1961 through 1962. Harvey attended .many
[8435]of the Special Group Augmented meetings as the CIA's representative. | He
[8437]testified that at no time was assassination discussed at any of the meetings,
[8439]except for the August 10, 1962 meeting. * a LAME Kr S&S
[8440]. ; . ; CK
[8441]We took substantial testimony covering the April/May 1962 period when il
[8442]the underworld contact was reactivated, the pills were passed to Roselli and /
[8443]. bes 7e
[8444]delivered to Cuba. Harvey had been appointed several months earlier as head ‘n¢
[8445], Bun by
[8446]of the CIA's Task Force W, which operated under the Special Group Augmented as. +
[8448]the CIA's action arm for Mongoose activities. oo err
[8450]oy In the latter part of April, Harvey went to Miami where the CIA had its
[8452]large: (at least 200 persons) JM/WAVE Station. As Harvey testified, in addition
[8453]to his meeting with Roselli and the delivery of the poison pills, Harvey's trip.
[8454]had other totally unrelated (in Harvey's view) purposes as well:
[8455].this was one of a number of periodic trips for the
[8456]purpose of reviewing in toto...the actual and potential |
[8457]operations at .the Miami base...and this covered the whole ge
[8459]gamut from personnel administration, operational support 4."
[8460]in the way of small craft [and] so on.."(Harvey., OES .
[8461]ne Sage?
[8463]pp- 15-16).
[8464]The Special Group Augmented expected to receive a 2 PGR ervey on
[8466]his April trip to Miami. On April 19, 1962, while wasein Miami, Lansdale
[8468]told the Special Group Augmented that: As
[8470]he
[8471]"Upon the return of Mr. Harvey from his current field visit,
[8472]more specific information on the status of ayent training
[8473]and operations should be made available.’ -(Nemorandum for
[8475]he * This meeting and the testimony concerning it is treated in. depth in the
[8476]section, infra, pp.
[8478]HY 50955 ° Docld: 324293579 “Page iar
[8480]‘the Special Group, April 19, 1962, from Lansdale, p-_____). «On April 26,
[8481]1962, the Special Group Augmented was informed by Lansdale that Harvey
[8483]was in Florida "initiating a new series of agent infiltrations" and would
[8484]return to Washington on April 30. (Memorandum for the special Group
[8485][Augmented/, April 26, 1962, from Lansdale.) At the Special Group meeting
[8487]on the same day General Taylor requested that Harvey "attend the next meet~
[8488]ing and report on agent activities." (Memorandum for the Record, April 26,
[8489]1962, by McCone.) The next day, April, 26, 1962, Harvey was sent a memorandum
[8490]informing him of General Taylor's request as.well as the fact that MeCone
[8491]wanted to meet with Harvey and Lansdale “immediately on your return to dis-
[8493]cuss the Task Force activities,” (Memorandum for Action, Elder to Harvey,
[8495]April 27, 1962.)
[8496]Harvey did report to the Special Group upon his return but did not
[8498]mention his meeting with Roselli or the delivery of the pills and the wéapong,
[8499]. ; can Ea
[8500]Harvey testified that when he reported to the Special Group, Augm it
[8502]on his trip to Miami, he did not inform them or, indeed an,
[8504]outside the Agency, that he had given the pills {to ageqli.
[8505]o , A aA
[8506]ay
[8508]p. 16.)* And when McCone asked Harvey: to brief Him on what Harvey had done.
[8509]in Miami, Harvey did not tell McCone of the pills.As indicated above,
[8511]Harvey did not believe it was necessary to do so. (Harvey, 7/11, p. 17.)*
[8513]® tlarvey testified with respect to why he did not brief the Special Group Augmented,
[8514]- in the. following exchange:
[8516]"0Q.:, Did you believe that the White House did not
[8517]want the Special Group to know?!"
[8519]'A.: ‘Well, I would have had no basis for that belief,
[8520]but I would have felt that if the White House (tasked)
[8521]this (operation to the CIA) and wanted the Special
[8522]Group to know about it, it was up to the White House
[8523]to brief the Special Group and not up to.me to brief-
[8525]i o3 . them, and T would have considered that I would have-
[8527]ee - been very far out of line and would have been subject
[8528]to severe censure.'® (ilarvey Tr. 7/11, p. 77).
[8530]HW 50955 Docld: 32423599 "Page Ase" Sony te geen so te inten ng en ne re
[8534]The minutes of the May 3, 1962, Special Groyp Augmented meeting make no
[8535]bld mention of Harvey's above-related plot activities. The minutes of that meet-
[8536]ing show that on his return from Miami, Harvey gave a progress report to the
[8537]Special Group Augmented on "agent teams'' and the "general field of intelli-
[8538]gence". (Harvey, Ex. 3, Memorandum of Special Group Augmented Meeting, May
[8539]1962, p. 1.) Harvey reported that three agent teams had been infiltrated and
[8540]that 72 actual or potential reporting sources were also in place. (Harvey Ex. 3,
[8541]p. 1.) | .
[8542]Shortly after the May 3 meeting, General Taylor went to see the President to
[8544]give him what he called a "routine briefing" (Taylor Tr. » DP. ).
[8546]General Taylor's memorandum of his briefing of ‘the President similarly makes
[8547]no reference to Harvey's contacts with Roselli or the delivery of pills and
[8549]- guns. (Memorandum for Record May 7, 1962, by General Taylor.) Taylor testified
[8550]that he had never heard of Harvey delivering pills to poison Castro, or of any
[8552]assassination attempts. (Taylor Tr. ', p. 42.)
[8554]HW 50955 Doceld:324293539 Page 183
[8556]3. Testimony of Kennedy Administration Officials
[8558]In addition to examining the actual nature of the Mongoose operation (discussed
[8559]; above at p.- __), we took considerable testimony from Kennedy Administration offi-
[8560]cials on the question of authority for a Castro assassination in the Mongoose
[8561]period. Set out in the section below is the testimony of the Kennedy Administra-
[8562]tion officials principally involved in the MOngoose operation and the Special Group
[8563]Augmented , all of. whom testified the assassination plots were not authorized. These
[8564]were McCone, the Director of CIA and a member of the Special Group Augmented; | :
[8565]General Taylor, Chairman of the Special Group Augmented; General Lansdale, Chief of
[8566]Operations for Mongoose; Special Group Augmented members Bundy and Gilpatric; Secre-
[8567]tary of State Rusk; and Secretary of Defense McNamara. Their testimony focused on
[8568]the principal issues raised by Helms, including: (1) whether any authority for a
[8569]Castro assassination existed; and (2) whether they had knowledge of any Castro assassi-
[8570]nation activity.* ww ar I
[8571]In the succeeding section we discuss the August 10, 1962, meeting where %. oie)
[8572]of a Castro assassination was raised.
[8573]a. Testimony of McCone
[8574]McCone testified that at no time during his service in the Kennedy Adninistration
[8575]as DCI (1961-1963), did President Kennedy, Robert Kennedy or any member of the Cabi- -
[8576]net or White House staff discuss with him any Castro assassination plans or operations.
[8577](McCone, p. Aa, }
[8579]As discussed above in greater. detail, McCone, the Director of Central Intelligence
[8581]2
[8583]and Helms immediate superior, testified he did not authorize and was not informed
[8585]about, the assassination activity. (McCone, p. 3.)
[8587]*In addition, the Committee questioned the Kennedy Administration members as to the
[8588]likelihood that. an assassination order might have been given to Helms by Robert ~
[8589]Kennedy through a "back channel", outside the normal chain of command; however,
[8590]Helms subsequently appeared and testified that no such order was ever’ ‘given. by
[8591]Robert Kennedy. (See p. _—— above. )
[8593]BW 50955 Docld:32493599 “Page 18a”
[8595]McCone, pointed out that Although tne Cuban problem was dalscusseda in terms |
[8596]of "dispose of Castro," or "knock off Castro’, these terms were meant to refer _
[8597]to "the overthrow of the Communist Government in Cuba’! and not a Castro assassi-
[8599]nation. (McCone, p. 44; McCone Ex. 4, memorandum April 14, 1967, to Helms.)
[8601]McCone further stated that "it is very hard for me to believe”
[8602]that Robert Kennedy would: have initiated a Castro assassination activity
[8603]without consulting with the Special Group Augmented. (MeCone, p. 52).
[8604]b. ‘Testimony of Taylor -
[8605]Taylor served as Chairman of the Special Group Augmented
[8606]during the Mongoose Operation (Taylor, 7/9, p. ). In addition, Taylor
[8607]also served as President Kennedy's Military Representative and Intelligence
[8608]Advisor after the Bay of Pigs until his appointment as Chairman of the
[8609]Joint Chiefs of Staff in November 1962. (Taylor, 7/9, p. 3; Bundy, 7/11,
[8610]p. 25). |
[8611]Taylor testified that a Castro assassination plan was
[8613]? "never" submitted to the Special Group Augmented, either orally or in Pep EIR
[8615]writing. (Taylor, p. 41). Taylor further testified that he and the
[8616]Special Group Augmented were never told of the passage of the poison
[8617]pills to Roselli in April 1962, and that the passage of these pills
[8618]without the knowledge of the Special Group Augmented was "entirely,
[8619]completely out of /the/ context and character of the way the /Special
[8620]Group Augmented/ operated or the way it would accept" that an operation
[8621]was properly authorized. (Taylor, p..43). And Taylor testified that
[8622]although the Special Group Augmented was "certainly anxious for the
[8623]downfall of Castro" an "assassination never came up” in the meetings
[8625]‘and discussions of the Special Group Augmented. (Taylor, p. 62).
[8627]oo”
[8628]af
[8630]With respect to whether President. Kennedy or Robert
[8632]ca
[8633]Ned
[8635]Kennedy or Robert Kennedy might have bypassed the Special Group Aug-
[8637]mented to deal directly with Helms or CIA officers to assassinate
[8639]‘AW 50955 Docld:32493539 Page 165
[8641]Castro, Taylor testified that this would have been "entirely con=
[8642]tradictory to every method of operation I ever saw on the part of
[8643]- the President and his brother." (Taylor, p. 45). Taylor stated "the
[8644]| President and the Attorney General would never have gone around" the
[8645]Special Group Augmented. (Taylor, p. kg),
[8647]Although Taylor acknowledged that Robert Kennedy
[8648]frequently pushed for more direct action during Mongoose, Taylor
[8649]stated that "there was no suggestion /ot/ assassination” in these urgings.
[8650](Taylor, p. 67). Taylor testified that Robert Kennedy dealt directly
[8652]with Lansdale outside Special Group Augmented channels "only for the
[8653]purpose of imparting his own sense of urgency” but "never" would
[8654]Robert Kennedy have done so on substantive issues:
[8656]"Senator Hart of Colorado: But on substantive issues,
[8658]he wouldn't, in effect, been dealing behind your back?"
[8660]"General Taylor: Never. Never. That was not his way."
[8661](Taylor, p. 53). _*/
[8663]c. Testimony of Lansdale
[8665]Lansdale testified that he "was very certain” that
[8667]he never discussed a Castro assassination with either President Kennedy
[8669]The evidence showed, however, that there were occasions when the
[8671]_ Attorney General dealt with those concered with Mongoose without
[8672]consulting General Taylor. Tor example, as discussed in greater den,
[8673]tail (in the section on Mongoose operations) on January 18, 1962;° am ASS,
[8675]_ General Lansdale sent a copy. of his program review to Robert_} inedy a
[8676]attached to which was a cover memorandum indicating that other “'sénsi-
[8677]tive work" not in the review was to be dealt with. only between the
[8678]President, the Attorney General, and Lansdale. The nature of that
[8680]work (which Lansdale testified involved political contacts in the Cuba
[8681]exile community) is discussed at. p. _ above.
[8683]HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 166
[8685]or Robert Kennedy:
[8687]"The Chairman: You do not recall ever having discussed with
[8689]the Attorney General a plan or a proposal to assassinate
[8691]_ Fidel Castro?"
[8693]"General Lansdale: No. And 1 am very certain Senator, that
[8695]such a discussion never came up...neither with the Attorney
[8697]General or the President." (Lansdale, p. 18.)* -
[8699]Lansdale further testified that the plausible deniability concept had no part
[8701]in the fact that he never discussed a Castro assassination with President Kennedy
[8702]or the Attorney General.** .Lansdale testified that he "had doubts" that. assassina-
[8703]tion was a "useful action, and one which I had never employed in the past, and dur-
[8704]ing work in copying with revolutions and I had considerable doubts as to its utility
[8705]and I was trying to be very pragmatic." (Lansdale, p. 31.). When asked if he thought
[8706]the President was not aware of efforts to depose Castro and his government by any .
[8707]means including assassination, Lansdale answered "T am certain he was aware of ef-
[8709]forts to dispose of the Castro regime. I am really not one to “guess what he knew |
[8711]of assassinations, because I don't know." (a., p. 32.)
[8713]See!
[8715]With regard to the Castro assassination attempts, Lansdale testified that
[8716]Harvey "never" told him that Harvey was attempting to assassinate Castro. (Lansdale,
[8718]p. 24.) Lansdale stated:
[8720]"T had no knowledge of such a thing. I know of no order
[8721]or permission for such a thing and I was given no infor-
[8723]mation at-all that such a thine was going on by people
[8724]who I have now learned were involved with. it."
[8726](Lansdale, p. 58). */
[8728]¥/ ‘Thus, when Lansdale was questioned | about. the "touchdown plays”
[8729](discussed in detail above at Pp. ‘), there was this testimony:
[8733]Senator Baker: Now do you completely rule out the possibility
[8734]that the touchdown play had to do with the possible assassination
[8735]efforts against Fidel Castro?" ; ,
[8737]"General Lansdale: Yes ... I never discussed, nor conceived, nor:
[8738]received orders about an assassination of Castro with my dealings ©
[8739]with either the Attorney General or the President." oe NA, %
[8741]*%/ "Senator Baker: Is that ‘the redson you didn't, because : -of the* SS
[8742]: principle of deniability?" say’
[8743]eet - Dee
[8745]Ove "s
[8747]"General Lansdale: No, it wasn't. The subject. never ‘ame up,
[8748]and I had no reason to bring it up with him. ;
[8750]HY 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 167
[8752]47
[8753]As discussed- below in detail at pp __, after the subject
[8754]- of a Castro assassination was raised at the August 10, 1962 meeting ‘of the
[8755]Special Group Augmented, Lansdale directed Harvey to prepare a plan for the
[8756]"liquidation" of Cuban leaders. However, no such plan was ever prepared and,
[8757]as the IG Report concluded, the August 10 meeting was "unrelated to any actual
[8759]attempts at assassination." (IG, p. 118).
[8761]With respect to the possibility that Robert Kennedy
[8762]might have by-passed the SGA and Lansdale to deal directly with Agency
[8763]officials on a Castro assassination, Lansdale testified:.
[8765]"T never knew of a direct line of communication
[8767]between the President or the Attorney General and Harvey
[8769]apart from me on this....” ~
[8771]During the course of the Committee's investigation
[8772]into these allegations of assassination efforts by the U.S. government,
[8773]toy however, General Lansdale spoke with several reporters concerning the
[8774]subject of a Castro assassination plan in L962. Lansdale's coments to
[8775]the reporters are dealt with helow in connection with the August Lu,
[8777]1962, meeting of the Special Group.
[8780]_*/ "Senator Huddleston: ‘You never had any reason to believe that
[8781]the Attorney General had dealt directly with Mr. Harvey?"
[8783]"General Lansdale: I hadn't known about that at all, no...”
[8784]"senator Huddleston: ...You have no reason to believe that he
[8785]might have broached (a Castro assassination) with the Attorney
[8791]know it."
[8793]"Senator Huddleston: You had no “reason to be ve. “that there’
[8795]was any kind of activity going on in relation stosCuba: outside aan
[8796]fan of what you were > proposing or what was ene Special
[8797]a
[8800]"General Lansdale: No, I was supposed to know it all, and I
[8802]had no indication that I did not know it all (except for one
[8803]_ operation by Harvey unrelated to assassinations).
[8805]BW 50955 Docld:32473533 Page Tet ~~ SE ato se rues ca eae ee eng er meme canna gee ao ga ca amen yee seas nas
[8807]d. Testimony of Bundy
[8809]Bundy served as President Kennedy's Special Assistant
[8811]for National Security Affairs throughout the Kennedy Administration.
[8812](Bundy, p. 2). In addition, Bundy participated in the planning that
[8813]‘led to the creation of Operation Mongoose and was a member of the
[8814]Special Group Augmented. (Bundy, pp. 34, 87). |
[8816]. Bundy testified that the matter of a Castro assassination
[8817]Was "mentioned from time to time” over the period 1961-1963 but "never to
[8818]me that I can-recall by the President." (Bundy, p. 73). Bundy emphasized
[8820]that the question came up "as something to talk about rather than to
[8822]consider." (Bundy, p. 73.)
[8824]4 Bundy testified that it was his conviction that "no
[8826]~ one in the Kennedy Administration, in the White House ... ever gave
[8827]any authorization, approval, or instruction of any kind for any effort
[8828]to assassinate anyone by the CIA." (Bundy, p. 54). Bundy testified
[8829]that he knew and worked on an intimate basis with both President Kennedy
[8831]and Robert Kennedy during the entire Kennedy Administration, and testi-
[8833]fied that it was "incredible" that they would have authorized a Castro
[8835]Were
[8837]HW $0955 Docld:32423539 Page’ i689
[8839]assassination, either explicitly or implicitly as a result of pressure
[8841]they exerted in the anti-Castro effort:
[8843]"The Chairman: Based upon that acquaintanceship, do you
[8844]believe, under any of the circumstances that occurred
[8845]during that whole period, either one of them would have
[8846]authorized the assassination of Fidel Castro?”
[8848]"Mr. Bundy: I most emphatically do not ... If you have
[8849]heard testimony that there was pressure to do something
[8850]about Cuba, there was. There was an effort, both from the
[8851]President in his style and from the Attorney General in
[8852]his style to keep the government active in looking for
[8853]ways to weaken the Cuban regime. There was. But if you,
[8854]as I understand it, and not even those who pressed the
[8855]matter most closely as having essentially been inspired
[8856]by.the White House can tell you that anyone ever said to
[8857]them, go and kill anyone. ,
[8859]Let me say one other thing about these two men, and
[8860]that is that there was something that they really wanted done,
[8861]they did not leave people in doubt, so that on the one
[8862]hand, I would say about their character, their purposes,
[8863]and their nature and the way they. confronted international
[8864]affairs that I find it incredible that they would have
[8866]os ordered or authorized explicitly or implicitly an assassi- =
[8867]: nation of Castro. I also feel that if, contrary to every-~
[8868]thing that I know about their character, they had had such a
[8869]decision and such a purpose, people would not have been in
[8870]any doubt about it." (Tr. 98-99).
[8874]Bundy was asked "have you any way to explain’ to the Com-
[8875]mittee, as to why Mr. Helms would testify that he...had no doubts,
[8876]that the Agency was fully authorized to proceed to not only develop
[8877]schemes, but to engage in active attempts to assassinate Castro?"
[8878]Bundy replied: "I have no explanation of that." (Bundy, pp. 99-100) -
[8880]Bundy further testified that despite the extreme sense of
[8881]urgency that arose during the Cuban Missile Crisis, Castro's assassi-
[8882]nation was never discussed, and it was "totally inconsistent" with the
[8884]policies and actions taken by the President and Robert Kennedy in that
[8886]HY 50955 Docld:324273539 Page Tou"
[8889]- 50 -
[8891]crisis for them to have authorized a Castro assassination. (Bundy, p. 95,
[8892]97-98) .* |
[8894]Bundy further stated that he was never told by anyone that. assassination
[8895]efforts were underway against Castro, that underworld figures were hired by
[8896]the CIA in this regard, or that Harvey was engajed in Castro assassination ac-
[8898]tivity. (Bundy, p. 63.)
[8902]Bundy testified that he heard about the concept of "exccutive action” Ww yl
[8903]"Some time in the early months of 1961". (Bundy, 7/11/75, p. 4.) But since
[8905]this was presented to him as an untargeted canability only he did -not '"dis-
[8907]courage or dissuade" the person who briefed him on this. (Bundy, p. 4, 7, 10.)
[8908]When asked if he -had any recollection of any specific covert plans that involved
[8910]poisons in conjunction with activities against Cuba, Bundy stated
[8912]~ "T have no recollection of any specific plan. I do
[8914]have a very vague, essentially refreshed recollection
[8915]that I heard the word poison at some point in connec
[8916]tion with a possibility of action in Cuba. But that
[8917]is as far as I have been able to take it in my own ; o
[8919]memory. (Bundy, p. 42).
[8921]Bundy stated further that this recollection relating to poison involved a
[8923]proposal that seemed "impractical" because it was going to kill a large group
[8925]of people in a headquarters mess, or something of that sort.” (Bundy,p.42-43),
[8927]_*/ Bundy stated:
[8929]WMA ST
[8930]... the most important point I want to make. f"is that
[8931]I find the notion that they separately, privatély encouraged,
[8932]ordered, arranged efforts at assassination totally incon-
[8933]sistent with what I knew of both of them. And, as an
[8934]example, I would cite -- and one among very many -- the role
[8935]played by the Attorney General in the Missile Crisis, because
[8936]it was he who, most emphatically, argued against a so-called
[8937]surgical air strike or any other action that would bring
[8938]death upon many, in favor of the more careful approach which
[8939]was eventually adopted by the President in the form of a
[8940]quarantine or a blockade." (Bundy, p. 98).
[8942]- u
[8944]au.
[8948]pitta,
[8950]HY 50955 DocId:32423539 Page 191
[8952]With respect to the possibility that Robert Kennedy
[8953], may have authorized assassination outside of Special Group Augmented
[8954]channels, Bundy stated that although Robert Kennedy did spur people
[8955]to greater effort during Mongoose, "he never took away from the
[8956]existing channel of authority its authority or responsibility.”
[8957](Bundy, pp. 47-48). Bundy further testified that there existed be-
[8958]tween Robert Kennedy and Maxwell Taylor (the Special Group Augmented
[8959]Chairman) "a relation of real trust and confidence.” In view of this
[8960]relation, Bundy stated it was his opinion that Robert Kennedy would
[8961]not have by-passed Taylor to develop a "pack-channel” relationship.
[8963]with someone else to assassinate Castro. “(Bundy, p. 87).
[8965]fe ~ s,
[8966]io
[8967]e. Testimony of MacNamara
[8968]- MacNamara, served as Secretary of Defense throughout
[8969]sented the Department of Defense as a member of the Special G ou
[8970]. . . . . ° at .
[8971]the Special Group Augmented during the Mongoose Operations
[8972]‘ AEM
[8974]i}
[8976]HY 50955 Docld: 334934539 Page 199 "
[8978]McNamara stated that he had no knowledse or information of any proposal
[8980]iy for the assassination of Premier Castro coming from President kennedy or
[8982]Robert Kennedy. (ClcNamara, 7/11/75, p. 4.) "e did note that "we were hysteri-
[8983]cal about Castro at the time of the Bay of Pigs and thereafter, and that there
[8985]was pressure from (President Kennedy and Robert Kennedy) to do something about
[8987]Castro. But I don't believe we contemplated assassination. We did, however,
[8990]contemplate overthrow.” (McNamara, ?. 93.)
[8992]There occurred during McNamara's testimony an exchange which is appropriate
[8994]to set out in full because of the manner in which it captures the dilemma posed
[8996]by the evidence on the question of authority:
[8998]"The Chairman. We also have réceived evidence from
[8999]your senior associates that they never participated in
[9000]-the authorization of an assassination attempt against .
[9001]Castro nor ever directed the CIA to undertake such
[9002]5 attempts.
[9003]Lo We have much testimony establishing the chain of
[9004]command where covert action was concerned, and all of
[9005]it has been to the effect that the Special Group or
[9006]the Special Group Augmented had full charge of covert
[9007]operations, and that in that chain of command any proposal
[9008]of this character or any other proposal having to do
[9009]with covert operations being directed against the
[9010]Castro regime, or against Castro personally, were to
[9011]be laid before the Special Group Augmented and were not
[9012]to be undertaken except with the authority of that
[9013]group and-at the direction of that group.
[9014]Now, at the same time we know from the evidence
[9015]that the CIA was in fact engaged during the period
[9016]in a series of attempts to assassinate Castro.
[9017]Now, you see what we are faced with is. this dilemma a}
[9018]- Either the CIA was a rogue elephant rampaging out of Ae
[9019]control, over which no effective direction was being
[9020]given in this matter of assassination, or, theré
[9022]HW S0955 Docld:324293539 Page 193
[9024]- oo 7
[9026]some secret channel circumventing the whole structure)
[9027]of command by which the CIA and certain officials in
[9028]the CIA were authorized to proceed with assassination
[9029]plots and assassination attempts against Castro. Or the
[9030]third and final point that I can think of is that
[9031]somehow these officials of the CIA who were so engaged
[9032]misunderstood or misinterpreted their scope of authority.
[9033]Now it is terribly important, if there is any way that we
[9034]can find out which of these three points represented what
[9035]actually happened. That is the nature, that is the
[9036]quandary.
[9037]Now, is there anything that you can tell us that would
[9038]assist us in finding an answer to this central question?
[9040]Mr. McNamara. T can only tell you what will further your
[9041]uneasiness. Because I have stated before and J believe
[9042]today that the CIA was a highly disciplined organization,
[9043]fully under the control of senior officials of the govern-
[9044]ment, so much so that I feel as a senior official of the
[9045]government I must assume responsibility for the actions
[9046]of the two, putting assassination aside just for the
[9047]moment. But I know of no major action taken by CIA during
[9048]the time I was in the government that was not properly
[9049]authorized by senior officials. And when I say that I
[9050]want to emphasize also that I believe with hindsight we
[9051]authorized actions that were-contrary to the interest of the
[9052]Republic but I don’t want it on the record that the CIA
[9053]ay was uncontrolled, was operating with its own authority
[9054]co, and we can be absolved of responsibility for what CIA
[9055].did, again with exception of assassination, again which
[9056]I say I never heard of.
[9057]The second point you say that you have, ‘you know that
[9058]CIA was engaged in a series of attempts of assassination. |
[9059]TI think to use your words. I don't know that. I accept
[9060]the fact that you do and that you have information I was
[9061]not aware of. I find that impossible to reconcile. I just
[9062]can't understand how it could have happened and I don't
[9063]accept the third point, that they operated on the basis
[9064]of minunderstanding, because it seems to me that the
[9065]McCone position that he was opposed to it, tts, clear
[9066]recollection and his written memo of 1967 gia Dat strongly
[9067]opposed to it, his statement that Murrow opp Sed
[9068]._ eliminate any point of misunderstanding. Solfg
[9069]reconcile. CTR. 38-41)
[9071]McNamara further stated that "I find it almost snconcinnhi A D
[9072]. le BD) :
[9073]assassination attempts were carried on during the J Konnedy Acninis tPty
[9077]‘Sa
[9079]4
[9081]HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page i194
[9083]LS 4-
[9085]days without the senior members know it, and I understand the contradiction that
[9086]i 3 this carries with respect to the face." (McNamara, p. 4.) He further emphasized
[9087]that for the President or Robert: Kennedy to have approved a Castro assassination
[9088]was "totally inconsistent with everything I know about the two men." (McNamara
[9089]p. 90.) |
[9090]f. Testimony of Gilpatric
[9091]Gilpatric served as Deputy Secretary of Defense throughout the Kennedy Admini-
[9092]stration. (Gilpatric, p. 5; Gilpatric Ex. 1, p. 5.) In that capacity, Gilpatric
[9093]represented the Department of Defense as a member of the Special Group and the
[9094]Special Group Augmented during the Mongoose operation. (Gilpatric, p. 5.)
[9095]Gilpatric testified Ehat he understood the mandate of
[9096]the Special Group during Mongoose was not to kill Castro, but to "so under-
[9098]mine, SO disrupt the Cuban system under Castro that it could not be
[9100]. :
[9101]boas
[9103]aa effective."* (Gilpatric, p. 28). Gilpatric emphasized that “it was the
[9104]system we had to deal with" and words such as "get rid of Castro” were
[9106]-gaid "in the context of the
[9108]and was presiding over, but
[9110]patric, p- 29). - ; ; CR gt
[9112]TE
[9114]* Initially in his first appearances before the Committee Mr. Gilpatric
[9115]was unable to recall any of the events or characters involved in Operation
[9116]Mongoose. He failed to recall that General Lansdale was the Chief of
[9117]Operations for the project, or Lansdale's involvement in the Special
[9118]Group’ Augmented even though Gilpatric recommended Lansdale for pro-
[9119]motion to Brigadier General. Gilpatric testified that the lapse of time,
[9120]approximately fifteen years, had impaired his menory on these events.
[9121](Gilpatric, pp. 6-9.) (Insert possible proposed additional language by
[9122]Smothers.) ;
[9124]BE
[9126]HWY S0955 Doold:32493539 Page Toy ~~" wes ; Fone Se ee net cee
[9128]Gilpatric said that he knew of no express restriction
[9129]that would have barred the killing of Castro. But Gilpatic testified that
[9130]he understood "There were limits on the use of power" and that these pre-
[9131]cluded the use of assassination. (Gilpatric, p. 31). Thus, while Gil-
[9132]patric said that it was "perfectly possible" that one might reasonably
[9133]have inferred assassination was authorized, nevertheless, the limits on
[9134]action set down by the Special Group Augmented would have
[9135]required that specific efforts be made by one receiving general instructions
[9136]to clarify whether those instructions authorized assassination.*/ He added
[9137]that “within our charter, so to speak, the one thing that was off limits
[9138]was military invasion." (id. p. 45). In this context ef the Uoncanse
[9139]charter, Gilpatric, when asked whether th® "killing of castro by a para-
[9140]military group (would) have been within bounds.'' he responded, "T know of
[9141]no restriction. that would have barred it." (Id.) In response to a ques~
[9142]tion as to whether there was any concern for the limits on the activities
[9143](3 of personnel involved in these raids jand infiltration efforts, Gilpatric
[9145]said:. "No, to the contrary. The complaint that the Attorney General had, posit
[9146]if we assume he was reflecting the Peesident's views on it, [was that/ the —
[9147]steps taken by the CIA up to that point, fand/ their plans were too petty, -
[9148]were too minor, they weren't massive enough, they weren't going to be ef-
[9150]fective enough.” (Id., p. 47.) However, as discussed above at p. ;
[9152]on March 5, 1962, the Special Group Augmented had agreed, with respect to
[9154]"action-type"- agents, that it "must keep its hand tighely! on these agents’
[9156]activities, and although once such agents were inside cub ‘they could not
[9158]be "effectively controlled," the Group would make "every effort...to attempt
[9160]such control."
[9162]*/ In Gilpatric’s testimony, there was the following exchange: ;
[9163]“Senator Huddleston:...1t's on the basis of these words that’.
[9164]_ everybody admits were used, like replace or get rid of, on_ 7p.
[9165]ad the basis of these kinds of conversation alone that /Helms/ Pa
[9166]; was firmly convinced and that apparently went right down _
[9167]through the whole rank of command, firmly convinced that he
[9168]had the authority to move against the life of a head of: state.
[9169](Footnote continued on next page.).
[9171]BW 50955 Docld:32493539 Page 196 ~~ semen ees oo oe
[9173]Gilpatric testified that "it was not unusual" for Presi-
[9174]dent Kennedy and Robert Kennedy to. deal directly with people at various
[9175]levels in the Executive Branch. (Gilpatric, p. 58). With respect to Mon-
[9176]goose, Gilpatric said that Robert Kennedy was the “moving spirit" (Gil-
[9177]patric, p. 11). But Gilpatric stated that Robert Kennedy's role was ")prin-
[9178]cipally to spur us on, to get going, get cracking.” (cilpatric, p. 47). Thus,
[9179]although Robert Kennedy frequently complained that. the plans of the CIA and
[9180]Mongoose weren't "massive enough" and that "we should get in there and
[9181]‘do more," Gilpatrie pointed out that Robert Kennedy was not making specific
[9183]proposals in these urgings, and the result he desired was a general one
[9185]t ~
[9187]"to limit the Castro regime's effectiveness," rather than any specific measure.
[9189](Gilpatric, p. 47).
[9191]g. Testimony of Rusk
[9193]PG Dean Rusk served as Secretary of State throughout the
[9194]Kennedy Administration, ‘Rusk participated in a number of Special Group
[9196]Augmented meetings during the Mongoose operation. (Rusk, p. ).
[9198](Footnote continued from previous page.)
[9200]Now this disturbs me, and I don't know whether our councils of govern-
[9201]ment operate that, way in all areas or not, but if they do then it seems
[9202]to me it would raise a very serious question as to whether or not the
[9203]troops are petting the right orders."
[9205]; "Mr. Gilpatric....1 thought there were limits on the use of power
[9206]- "that was one of them.
[9208]“Senator Huddleston. And going beyond that would require that som
[9209]body make a specific effort to make sure he understood precise elySulra te
[9210]they were talking about, would that be your interpretation?"
[9212]Mr, Gilpatric. It would." -(Gilpatric, p. 31).
[9214]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 197 ~~ oo : re 2 memes
[9216]Rusk testified that'he had never been infcrmed of any
[9217]—, Castro assassination plans or undertakings and had no knowledge of any
[9218]such activity. (Rusk, p. 52). h
[9219]Rusk further testified that he found it "very hard to
[9220]believe” that President Kennedy or Robért Kennedy would have, in the course
[9221]of urging action against Castro, sanctioned the use of any measure against
[9222]Castro.*/ Rusk said that, while it was "possible" that a ‘person, in good
[9223]faith, might have thought specific courses of action were authorized from
[9224]the emphasis given to taking action against Castro, nevertheless Rusk testi-
[9225]fied that with respect to a Castro assassintion,
[9226]"Tt would have been an abuse of) the-President and the
[9227]Attorney Ceneral if somebody had thought they were
[9228]getting that without confirming that this was, in fact,
[9229]an official, firm policy. decision. (Rusk, pp. 98-99).
[9230]With respect to vhether President Kennedy or Robert
[9231]Kennedy might have communicated directly with Helms or Harvey ona Castro
[9232]assassination effort, Rusk testified that, based on his experience and the
[9233]manner in which foreign affairs matters were handled, I don't see how it could
[9235]have happened." (Rusk, p. 99) .**/
[9237]x} "Senator Huddleston..,(Do) your contacts with Robert Kennedy or Presi-
[9238]dent Kennedy, indicate to you that they were agitated to such an extent
[9239]about Cuba and Mongoose progress that in a conversation with someone
[9240]urging them to get off their rear-end and get something done that they
[9241]might convey the message that they meant anything, go to any length to
[9242]do something about the Castro regime?
[9244]"Mr. Rusk. I find it very hard to believe that Robert Kennedy standing
[9245]- alone, or particularly Robert Kennedy alleging to speak fo yresigene
[9246]Kennedy, would have gone down that trail..." . se
[9248]~~ something of informal, subterranean, whatever kinds of cthee Beh thous
[9249]from the highest level to Helms would have been possible without his.
[9250](Footnote continued on following page.)
[9252]BW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 198
[9254]h. Testimony of Sorensen
[9258]Sorensen served as a Special Assistant to President Kennedy during
[9259]the entire Kennedy Administration. Sorensen was a member of the National Security
[9260]Council Executive Committee that dealt with the Missile Crisis, although he
[9261]was not involved with Mongoose. -
[9263]Sorensen testified that in his daily personal meetings with the
[9264]President and at all the National Security Council meetings he attended, there
[9265]was "not at any time any mention -- much less approval by him -- of any U.S.-
[9266]sponsored plan to assassinate any foreign leaders" (Sorensen, p. 4). Based
[9267]upon his close contact with President Kennedy, Sorensen stated that it was his
[9268]opinion that:
[9270]"such an act (as assassination) was totally foreign to his
[9271]character and conscience, foreign to his fundamental reverence
[9272]i for human life and his respect for his adversaries, foreign to
[9273]ond his insistence upon a moral dimension in U.S. foreign policy
[9274]and his concern for his country's reputation abroad, and
[9275]foreign to his pragmatic recognition’that so horrendous but
[9276]‘inevitably counter-productive a precedent committed by a
[9278]country whose own chief of state was inevitably vulnerable."
[9280](Sorensen, p. 5).
[9282](Footnote continued from previous page.)
[9284]knowledge, and he said he felt that was. incredible, he didn't think it
[9285]- was possible. <n
[9286]Do you think that it would be likely that an informal geser around
[9287]channels, say to Helms or to Harvey-- ! . :
[9288]The Chairman. Over a three-year period. Pa
[9289]’ Senator Mondale. Over a three-year period would have been possible
[9290]without your being informed?
[9291]Mr. Rusk. Theoretically, Senator, one would have to say itGs. possible.
[9292]Senator Mondale. But based on your experience? “
[9293]Mr. Rusk. In terms of practicality, probability and so forthy me ‘don't =
[9294]see how it could have happened. . rs
[9295]You know those things, in these circles we were moving in could not’
[9296]be limited in that way. You know the echoes would come back.” “yo-"3
[9298]oe
[9300]EW 50955 DovlTd:32473539 Pagé 199°"
[9302]ry, The August 10, 1962 Meeting
[9303]. t .
[9307]t
[9308]oy As indicated above (see p. ), the question of a Castro assassination
[9309]was raised at a meeting of the Special Group Augmented on August 10, 1962. oosr
[9310]Thereafter, on August 13, 1962, Lansdale directed Harvey to include ina . thn Be
[9311], 7 ‘ 1 : AL Cuvee
[9312]proposed plan for Phase II of Mongoose a plan for the "liquidation of leaders" rat {oo
[9314]ty
[9316]as an‘option. We took considerable testimony and examined the documents
[9317]relating to the August 10 meeting, the nature of the discussion of a Castro
[9318]assassination, and Lansdale's subsequent request for a contingency plan.
[9320]. . You wk
[9322]At the outset, it should be noted that the documents and testimony OT
[9323]showed that discussion of a Castro assassination at the Agust 10, 1962 meeting
[9324]had no connection to the assassination activityeundertaken by Harvey and
[9325]Roselli, or any other Castro assassination plans or efforts. As the CIA
[9326]Inspector General found:
[9328]"The subject (of a Castro assassination) was raised
[9329]_ : at a meeting at State on 10 August 1962, but it is
[9330]_ unrelated to any actual attempts at assassination.
[9331]It did result in a MONGOOSE action memorandum by
[9332]Lansdale assigning to CIA action for planning
[9333]liquidation of leaders. (IG, p. 118).
[9335]The finding of the Inspector General is supported both by the chrono-
[9336]logy of the Castro assassination efforts and the testimony of Harvey. The
[9337]chronology shows that it was three months prior to the August 10, 1962 meet-
[9338]ing that Harvey gave Roselli the poison pills for use against Castro, and
[9339]that shortly thereafter (and well before August 10, 1962) Harvey was informed
[9341]. that the pills were inside Cuba. (see Pp. _. above). Moreover, after the
[9342]August 10, 1962 meeting there was no Castro assassination activity during
[9344]the remainder of 1962. (see p. above) ._
[9346]In addition, Harvey (who attended the August 10, 1962 meeting. and
[9348]HW O50955 Docld: 324235353 Page 200
[9350]an)
[9351]iD
[9353]HW 50955
[9355]recalled that the question of a Castro assassination was raised) declared
[9356]that the discussion was not related to his assassination activity with Ro-
[9357]selli. (Harvey, 7/11, pp. 48-50). Harvey further testified that he did not
[9358]view the August 10, 1962, discussion of a Castro assassination as authoriza-
[9359]tion for the Roselli operation because "the authority, as I understood it,
[9360]for this particular operation went back long before the formation" of the
[9362]Special Group Augmented. (Harvey, 7/11, p. 49).
[9364]1. The Contemporanesus Documents , Z
[9366]a. Lansdale's Aueust 13, 1962 Memorandum
[9368]Following the August 10, 1962 meeting, Lansdale sent a memorandum on
[9369]August 13, 1962, to Harvey and the other members of Lansdale's interagency
[9370]working group .*/ (Lansdale Ex. 15, Memorandum from Lansdale, August 13, 19623.
[9371]The Memorandum began by stating: "In compliance with the desires and guidance
[9372]expressed in the August 10 policy meeting on Operation Mongoose, we will
[9374]produce an outline of an alternate Course B for submission." (Lansdale
[9376]Ex. 15, p. 1).
[9378]i
[9380]Lansdale further set out his concept] of what was required: "I be-
[9382]lieve the paper need contain only a statement of objectives and a list of
[9384]implementing activities. The list of activities will be under the heading
[9385]of: Intelligence, Political, Economic, Psychological, Paramilitary, and
[9387]Military." (Lansdale Ex. 15, p. 1).
[9389]* In addition to Harvey, copies of Lansdale's August 13, 1962, memorandum were
[9390]sent to Robert Hurwitch (State Dept), Gen. Benjamin Harris (Defense Dept) and
[9391]Don Wilson (U.S. Information Agency}. (Lansdale Ex. 15.)
[9393]In his testimony, Gen Harris identified a document drafted by the Mongoose Work-
[9394]ing Group. in the Defense Dept shortly before the August 10 meeting. The document
[9395]listed a number of steps that could be taken in the event of an intensified. Mon-
[9396]goose program that might involve U. S. military intervention. One such st€p was
[9397]"assassinate Castro and his handful of top men.'' (Harris Ex. 4.) Gen. Harris
[9398]stated that this was "not out of the ordinary in terms of-contingency planning...
[9399]it's one of the things you look at. (Harris, p. 37.) There was no evidence that
[9400]this document was distributed outside the Defense Dept's Mongoose working group.
[9402]Docld: 324735395 Page 201
[9404]Lansdale's memorandum then assigned to Harvey papers on the following
[9405]‘ subjects by the means of the following passage, which contained a deleted
[9407]phrase:
[9409]"Mr. Harvey: Intelligence, Political, fsords deleted/,
[9410]Economic, (sabotage, limited deception), and Paramilitary."
[9411](Lansdale, Ex. 15, p. 1). :
[9413]According to a memorandum by Harvey to Helms the following day, August
[9414]14, 1962, the words deleted from the above-quoted passage were "including
[9415]liquidation of leaders." (Lansdale Ex. 16, Memorandum by Harvey, August 4,
[9417]1962, to Helms).
[9419]b. Harvey's August 14, 1962 Memorandum
[9423]When Harvey received Lansdale's’ August 13 memorandum, Harvey wrote
[9424]a memorandum to Helms attaching a copy of Lansdale's August 13 Memorandum, anc
[9425]_ noting that Harvey. had excised the words "including liquidation of leaders."
[9427]on, (Lansdale Ex. 16, Memorandum, August 14, 1962, from Harvey to Helms). Har~-
[9429]vey's Memorandum stated: .
[9431]"The question of assassination, particularly of
[9432]Fidel Castro, was brought up by Secretary McNamara
[9433]at the meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) in
[9434]Secretary Rusk's office on 10 August. It was the
[9435]obvious consensus at that meeting, in answer to a
[9436]comment by Mr. Ed Murrow, that this is not a sub-
[9437]ject which has been made a matter of official
[9439]‘record. I took careful notes on the comments at
[9440]this meeting on this point, and the Special Group
[9441](Augmented) is not expecting any written comménts
[9442]or study on this point. (Lansdale Ex. 16).
[9444]- Harvey's memorandum further stated that, on receipt of Lansdale's
[9445]memorandum, Harvey had called Lansdale's office and pointed out "the inad-
[9447]missibility and stupidity of putting this type of comment in writing in such
[9449]HW 50955 Docld:324293539 Page 202
[9451]“UE
[9453]7
[9455]a document,” and that the CIA “would write no document pertaining to this
[9459]and would participate in no open meeting discussing it." (Lansdale Ex. 16,
[9461]P- 1).
[9463]c. The Minutes of the August 10, 1962 Meeting
[9465]The minutes of the August 10 meeting contain no reference to the sub-
[9466]ject of a Castro assassination. (Memorandum for Record, Special Group Aug-_
[9467]mented Meeting, August 10, 1962, by Parrott, hereafter referred to as the
[9468]"August 10 Minutes"). Parrott, the author of the August 10 Minutes, testi-
[9469]fied that he did not recall a discussion of dsaussination at. that meeting,
[9470]but the fact that the minutes do not reflect such a discussion is not an
[9471]indication that the matter did not come up. (Parrott, p- 34). Parrott
[9472]pointed out that his minutes "were not intended to be a verbatim transcript
[9474]of everything that was said," since the purpose of his minutes was "to
[9476]interpret what the decisions were and to record those and to use them as
[9478]a useful action document." (Parrott, 34-35). Parrott testified:
[9479]"we had 15 or 16 people (at the August 10, 1962
[9480]meeting)...all of them well informed, all of
[9481]them highly articulate. ;
[9482]This meeting, as -I recall, went on for several
[9483]hours...Now I'm sure that particularly in a
[9484]group like this that there were a great many ©
[9485]proposals made that were just shot down :
[9486]immediately.” (Parrott, p. 34-35).
[9487]Parrott further testified that he did not record proposals that were
[9488]. quickly rejected at the August 10 meeting. (Parrott, p. 35). Parrott
[9490]stated that, although he had no recollection ofa discussion of Castro's
[9492]assassination at the August 10 meeting, he would infer from the related
[9494]HW 50955 Doclda: 32423539 “Page” 203°"
[9497]documents (the Lansdale and Harvey Memoranda of August 13 and 14) that the
[9498]a subject was raised but "it never got off the ground....Therefore, I did not
[9499]record it." (Parrott, p. 35).
[9500]The documents and testimony of Parrott suggest séveral possible in-
[9501]ferences with respect to the nature of the discussion of a Castro assassination
[9502]at the August 10 meeting. First, as indicated by the Lansdale and Harvey
[9504]memorandum, it is possible that a contingency plan was requested but that it
[9506]was decided not to make this "a matter of official record." (Lansdale
[9507]Ex. 16, p. 1). However; if it had been decided to commission a written lens ble
[9509]contingency plan, as Lansdale requested Harvey prepare, it is difficult to cle ms ramseimy
[9511]ET ee
[9513]see how this request could have: been reconcilédewith a decision to make to
[9515]written record. ; ; oo
[9517]: ; , con SS TI
[9519]Second, it is possible that, as Parrott's testimony indicated, the de ah 2
[9521]—— Jan
[9523]subject was raised but quickly rejected. This inference is apparently con- h :
[9525]. , : dans
[9527].
[9529]fod sistent with the fact that the subject did not appear in Parrott's minutes, lows 3
[9533]and perhaps, although less so, with Harvey's August 14 Memorandum. Harvey's a are
[9534]Memorandum states that the Special Group Augmented "is not expecting any ~
[9535]written comments ct study on this point." (Lansdale Ex. 16, p. 1).
[9537]Before takniAg to the testimony on these questions, we discuss the
[9539]context of the August 10 discussion of a Castro assassination as reflected
[9541]in the minutes of the August 10 Meeting.
[9543]- d. The August 10 Meeting
[9545]The August 10 Meeting was held to decide upon a further course of action
[9547]to succeed the intelligence collection phase of Mongoose which was scheduled
[9549]to conclude in August. (4cCone, p. 34). As a policy meeting, there were in
[9551]HW 50955 DocId:32423539 Page 204°
[9553]© Ge
[9555]attendance a larger number of officials than usually participated in Special
[9556]Group Augmented meetings. The Meeting was chaired by Secretary of State
[9557]Rusk (and held in his office), and attended by a total of 15 officials,
[9558]including the principals of the agencies taking part in Mongoose, i.e.,
[9559]Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, CIA Director McCone, and USIA Director
[9560]Murrow.
[9562]At the August 10 meeting, General Lansdale proposed that a "stepped-up
[9563]Course B" be adopted for Mongoose, (August 10 Minutes, p- _). ‘This plan
[9564]involved operations to "exert all possible diplomatic, economic, psychologi-
[9565]cal, and cther overt pressures to overthrow the Castro-Communist regime, without
[9566]overt employment of U.S. military.” (Memorandua for Special Group Augmented,
[9567]August 8, 1962, p. 1).
[9569]However, the Special Group Augmented decided against consideration of
[9570]the "stepped-up Course B". In the discussion of Lansdale's Course B proposal,
[9571]- Rusk "emphasized the desirability of attempting to create a split between .
[9573]Castro and old-line Communists". (August 10 Minutes, p. 2). In addition,
[9575]McNamara questioned whether the practice of building. up agents. in Cuba would
[9577]not lead to actions that "would hurt the U.S. in the eyes of world opinion".
[9579](August 10 Minutes, p. 2) (A remark which seems inconsistent with McNamara ~- Pots iT
[9581]at the same Meeting raising the question of assassination in any sense‘ of peel
[9582]; WAL
[9583]advocacy). The Minutes state that McNamara's concern "led to the suggestion. nena
[9584]by General Taylor that we should consider changing the overall objective rd Msc) pn
[9585]- _ : _ _ . | pray
[9586]/of Mongoose/ from one of overthrowing the Castro regime" to one of causing or
[9588]Sport
[9589]. re
[9591]its failure. ‘(August 10 Minutes, p. 2).
[9593]Hence, in lieu of Lansdale's "stepped-up Course B", the Special Group has wonldw
[9595]bur + val
[9597]it. ‘* tue ( .
[9599]| 7 . . . , wld
[9601]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 205
[9603]Augmented chose a plan advanced by McCone that assumed Castro's continuance
[9604]ro in power and had the more limited objective of splitting off Castro from
[9606]“old-line Communists’.* (August 10 Minutes, p. 2). The decision and "action"
[9607]of the Special Group Augmented at the August 10 meeting was stated as follows:
[9609]“The principal members of the Special Group felt,
[9611]after some discussion, that the CIA variant should
[9613]be developed further for consideration at next Thurs~
[9615]day's meeting of the Special Group. McCone was asked
[9617]to stress economic sabotage, and to emphasize
[9619]measures to foment a Castro-oldline Communist split."
[9620](August Memorandum, p. 2).
[9623]"Action to be taken:
[9624]CIA to prepare a new version of ies variant plan,
[9625]in accordance with the above-summarized discussion.
[9626]This should be ready by Wednesday, August 15."
[9627](August 10 Memorandum, p. 3).
[9629]It was therefore in this context that Lansdale's August 13 Memorandum
[9630]to Harvey stated that "in compliance with the desires and guidance expressed
[9631]in the August 10 policies meeting on Operation Mongoose, we will produce an
[9632]outline of an alternate Course B. "Indeed, pursuant-to the August 10 decision
[9633]to adopt McCone's proposal for.a more limited plan that assumed Castro's
[9634]continuation in power, Lansdale's memorandum stated that a CIA paper titled
[9636]"Operational Plan (Reduced Effort) will be used as the starting basis."
[9638](Lansdale Ex. 15, p. 1).
[9640]- */ The August 10 Minutes show that McCone pointed out that the stepped-up
[9642]Course B "will risk inviting an uprising, which might result in a Hungary
[9643]type blood bath if unsupported". (August 10 Minutes, p. 2). MecCone
[9644]“emphasized that the stepped-up plan should not be undertaken unless the
[9645]U.S. is prepared to accept attributability for the necessary actions,
[9646]including the eventual use of military force" (August 10 Minutes). The
[9647]August 10 Minutes further stated that, in McCone' s view, the CIA variant
[9648]“would avoid all of these dangers because it would not invite an uprising”
[9650](August 10 Minutes, p. 2). a
[9652]Seow
[9654]HW 50955 Docld:3242939539 Page 206 ~—
[9656]In view of the issues raised by these documents we took testimony
[9657]from the principal participants in that meeting. In particular, we discuss
[9658]below the testimony as to whether Lansdale's request for an assassination
[9659]plan reflected the desire of the SGA or was contemplated by the SGA's decision
[9660]to proceed with a plan of "reduced effort" that posited Castro's continuance
[9662]in power.
[9664]2. The Testimony
[9665]As set out below, Harvey, McCone, and Goodwin recall the question of
[9666]a Castro assassination was raised at the August 10 meeting.* We discuss
[9667]that testimony, first with respect to the August 10 meeting itself, and,
[9671]second, with regard to the action that followed that meeting.
[9673]a. Testimony as to the August _10 Meeting
[9674](1) _ Testimony of McCone
[9676]McCone testified that the question of a "liquidation" or removal of
[9679]ae Castro and other Cuban leaders arose at the August 10 meeting in the context
[9680]of "exploring the alternatives that were available" for the next phase of
[9681]“Mongoose. (McCone, p. 33). McCone testified that he did not recall who
[9682]made this suggestion, but that he and Mr. Murrow took “strong exception”
[9683]to the suggestion. A memorandum of McCone's recollection of the August 10
[9684]Meeting, written in 1967,**/states:
[9685]*/ Other participants (Rusk, McNamara, Bundy, and Gilpatric) did not recall
[9686]> the August 10 discussion.
[9687]ek / On April 14, 1967, after McCone left the CIA, the dictated a memorandum
[9688]of his recollection regarding the August 10, 1962 meeting. The memoran-
[9689]dum was prompted by a telephone call from the newspaper columnist, Jack
[9690]‘Anderson, who at that time was preparing a column on Castro assassination |
[9691](Continued on the following page.)
[9692]-
[9693]Set
[9695]HW 50955 Docld:324273539 Page 207
[9697]"T took immediate exception to this suggestion,
[9698]stating that the subject was completely out of
[9699]bounds as far as the USG (U.S. Government) and
[9700]CIA were concerned and the idea should not be
[9702]discussed nor should it appear in any papers,
[9703]as the USG could not consider such actions on
[9704]moral or ethical grounds." (McCone Ex. 4).
[9706]McCone testified that there was no decision at the August 10 meeting
[9707]|
[9709]that assassination should not be part of any program, but :that "the subject
[9711]Was just dropped" after his objection. (McCone, p. ).| McCone's 1967
[9712]i
[9714]hd 4
[9716]memorandum stated that ;
[9717]"Art no time did the suggestion receive serious Wh.
[9718]consideration by the Special Group (Augmented)
[9720]nor by any individual responsible for policy.’
[9722](McCone, Ex. 4). i
[9723]-
[9724]i
[9726](2) Testimony of Harvey
[9728]Harvey's testimony that the August 10 discussion wag unrelated to any
[9729]. |
[9731]actual Castro assassination activity is discussed above (see p. ). With
[9732]. t
[9734]a . | ;
[9735]4 respect to that discussion itself, Harvey testified that it was his recollection
[9737]that the question of a Castro assassination was raised by' Secretary McNamara.
[9739](Harvey, p- 30). Harvey said it was his impression that McNamara raised the
[9741]question as one of "shouldn't we consider the elimination, or assassination"
[9743]of Castro. (Harvey, p. 30). , |
[9745]With respect to the reaction of the Special Group Augmented to this.
[9747]_ (Footnote continued from the previous page.)- . Palen ft,
[9749]attempts, implicating President Kennedy and Robert Kennedy. After talking
[9750]with Anderson on the telephone, at Robert Kennedy's request, McCone dic-
[9752]_ tated the April 14, 1967 memorandum, which stated that at one of several
[9753]Mongoose meetings on August 8, 9 or 10, 1962, "I recall a suggestion being
[9754]made. to liquidate top people in the Castro regime, including Castro."
[9756](McCone, Ex. 4, p. 1).
[9758]oon,
[9760]HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 206
[9762]HY 409545
[9766]suggestion, Harvey testified:
[9768]"T think the consensus of the Group was to sweep
[9769]that particular proposal or suggestion or question
[9770]or consideration off the record and under the rug
[9771]as rapidly as possible. There was no extensive
[9772]discussion of it, no discussion, no back and forth
[9773]as the whys and wherefores and possibilities and
[9774]so on.” .
[9776](Harvey, p. 30).
[9778](3) Testimony of Coodwin |
[9780]Goodwin testified that he had a recollection of "limited certainty"
[9782]that the subject of a Castro assassination was raised at the August 10
[9784]meeting .*/
[9786]Goodwin testified that "I am unable to say with an certainty who it
[9788]was" who raised the subject of a Castro assassination at the August 10
[9790]meeting. (Goodwin, 7/18, p. 8)**/
[9792]i
[9794]*/ In a staff interview prior to his testimony, Goodwin recalled the date
[9796]of the meeting at which a Castro assassination was raised as falling in
[9797]early 1961, after the Bay of Pigs. (Memorandum of Staff Interview with
[9798]Goodwin, May 27, 1975, p. 2). After reviewing the Minutes of the August
[9799]10, 1962 meeting and. the Lansdale and Harvey memoranda of August 13 and
[9800]14, respectively, Goodwin testified that he had “misplaced the date of
[9801]the meeting in my own memory.’ (Goodwin, 7/18, p. 7). In placing the
[9802]incident on August 10, 1962, Goodwin stated
[9804]"Now, of course, you know, it may not be. That's the best
[9805]recollection I now have. It's a little better than the earlier
[9806]one, but it's not certain.” (Goodwin, 7/18, p. 8).
[9808]**/In a magazine article in June 1975, Goodwin was quoted as stating that
[9810]at one of the meetings of a White House task force on Cuba it was McNamara
[9811]who "said that Castro's assassination was the only productive way of deal-
[9812]ing with Cuba." (Branch and Crile, "The Kennedy Vendetta," Harpers,
[9813]July, 1975, p- 61). In his testimony on July 18, 1975, Goodwin stated:
[9814]“that's not an exact quote" in the article, and explained further:
[9815](Footnote continued on following page.)
[9817]Docld:324273539° Paye 209 wees
[9819]tod
[9821](4) Testimony of McNamara
[9822]CN McNamara testified that, although he had no recollection of the question
[9823]of a Castro assassination being raised at the August 10 meeting, he did
[9824]express opposition to any assassination attempt or plan when he spoke with
[9825]McCone several days after the August 10 meeting. (McNamara, p. 7,8).
[9826]McNamara's testimony with respect to his conversation with McCone is dis-
[9828]cussed below with the testimony as to actions after the August 10 meeting:
[9830]b. Pestimony as to Actions After the August 10, 1962 Meeting
[9831](1) Testimony of McCone
[9833]McCone, testified that he called McNamara after he received Lansdale's
[9837]August 13 Memorandum and,
[9839]“insisted that that Memorandum be withdrawn
[9840]because no decision was made on this subject, and
[9841]since no decision was made, then Lansdale was
[9842]quite out of order in tasking the Central In-
[9843]telligence Agency to consider the matter."*/
[9845]tet
[9847](Footnote continued from the previous page.)
[9849]"T didn't tell (the author of the magazine article)
[9850]that it was definitely McNamara, that very possibly. it
[9851]was McNamara. He asked me about McNamara's role, ‘and
[9852]‘I said it very well could have been McNamara."
[9853](Goodwin, 7/18, p. 33).
[9855]If Goodwin's recollection was as uncertain as he swore it was in his
[9856]testimony, it is difficult to understand how he could have spoken in the terms
[9857]he testified he did to the author of the magazine article, particularly in
[9858]view of Goodwin's statement that “it's not a light matter to perhaps destroy
[9859]a man's career on the basis of a fifteen year old memory of a single sentence
[9860]that he might have said at a meeting without substantial certainty in your
[9861]own mind /and/ I do not have that." (Goodwin, pp. 34-35).
[9863]*/ McCone's 1967 Memorandum stated:
[9864]"Immediately after the meeting, I called on Secretary McNamara
[9865]personally and re-emphasized my position, in which he heartily
[9866]agreed. I did this because Operation Mongoose~~an interdepartmental
[9867]affair-~was under the operational control of (the Defense Depart- x.
[9868]ment)... (McCone EX. 4).
[9870]oo
[9874]HW 50955 Docld:324273539 Page 210
[9876]HW 450955
[9882]MeCone also testified that McNamara agreed that the Lansdale Memorandum
[9883]should be withdrawn for the same reason expressed by McCone, i.e. because the
[9884]topic of a Castro assassination had not been given consideration by the Special
[9886]Group Augmented. (McCone, p. 39).
[9888](2) Testimony of Harvey
[9890]As discussed above (see p. __) Harvey's Memorandum of August 14, 1962
[9891]states that upon receiving Lansdale's August 13 Memorandum, Harvey demanded
[9892]that Lansdale excise the words referring to "liquidation of leaders." Har-
[9893]vey's Memorandum further stated that “the Special Group (Augmented) is not
[9894]expecting any written comments or study on this point." This latter passage
[9895]raises the issue whether. Harvey meant to state that the Special Group Aug-
[9896]mented authorized a Castro assassination plan or activity but that no written
[9898]record should be made. In his testimony, Harvey clarified this point by
[9900]stating that the Special Group did not express a desire to proceed with the
[9902]‘suggestion of a Castro assassination:
[9904]"Senator Schwei:ker:...was it understood in an
[9905]z sy ° .
[9906]cmvritten way" that (assassination) was to pro-
[9911]"Mr. Harvey: t to my knowledge, no..... TO. th
[9912]If there was any ‘wnwritten understanding on | “ans
[9913]the part of the members of the Special Group ~ ~ -
[9915]concerning this, other than what was said at the
[9916]meeting, I do not know of it..."
[9917](Harvey, pp. 30-31).
[9918]Harvey further testified that shortly after the August 10 meeting,
[9919]McCone told Harvey that he had called McNamara to state that assassiantion
[9921]should not be discussed and that he had told McNamara that if he was involved
[9923]in such. matters, he might be excommunicated from his church. (Harvey, p- 25).
[9925]|
[9927]SAM DEN DER eee Seat eee!
[9932](3) Testimony of McNamara
[9934]‘ McNamara testified that he did not recall any discussion of a Castro
[9935]assassination at the August 10 meeting, but that-he did express opposition
[9936]to any assasssination attempt when McCone telephone him after Lansdale's
[9937]August 13 memorandum was brought to McCone's attention. (McNamara, P. 7,8).
[9938]McNamara stated that
[9940]"T agreed with Mr. McCone that no such planning
[9941]should be undertaken." (McNamara, p. 8).
[9943]McNamara stated further that
[9945]"T have no knowledge or information about any other
[9946]plans or preparations for a Castro assassination.
[9947](McNamara, p- 7).
[9951](4) Testimony of Elder
[9953]Elder, a career CIA officer, served as McCone's Executive Assistant
[9955]from May 1962 until McCone's departure from the Agency in April 1965. Elder
[9957]ry
[9958]ae testified that he was present when McCone telephone McNamara after the August
[9960]10 meeting. Elder stated that McCone told McNamara
[9962]"the subject you just brought up, I think it is highly
[9963]improper. I do not think it should be discussed. It
[9965]is not an action that should ever be condoned. It is
[9967]not proper for us to discuss, and I intend to have it
[9969]expunged from the record."
[9971](Elder, p- 23).
[9973]Elder testified that.this was the essence of the conversation but that he
[9975]remembered “several exact phrases, like "would not be condoned’: and 'im-
[9977]- proper'". (Elder, pp. 23, 24).*/
[9979]er
[9981]*/ Elder,.who stated he heard both McCone and McNamara’ 'S pact of the tele-
[9982]phone conversation via a speaker phone, said that McNamara "just more
[9984]or less accepted what Mr. McCone said without comment or rejoinder.'
[9985](Elder, p. 24).
[9989]Law
[9991]HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 212.0
[9993]-T2-
[9995]When Harvey later received Lansdale's August 13 memorandum, McCone
[9996]a spoke to Harvey in Elder's presence, and "McCone made his views quite clear
[9997]in the same language and tone...that he used with Mr. McNamara.” (Elder,
[9998]p. 25). Elder testified that Harvey did not tell McCone that Harvey was
[9999]engage in the Castro assassination effort at that time. (Elder, p. 25).
[10000]Elder also described a meeting he had with Helms in Elder's office
[10001]shortly after the August 10 meeting to convey to Helms McCone's views re-
[10002]garding the subject of assassinations. Elder stated: .
[10004]"J told Mr. Helms that Mr. McCone had expressed
[10006]his feeling to Mr. McNamara and Mr. Harvey that
[10007]assassination could not be condoned and would not be
[10008]approved. Furthermore, I conveyed Mr. McCone's
[10009]statement that it would be unthinkable to record. -
[10010]in writing any consideration of assassination
[10011]because it left the impression that the subject
[10013]had received serious consideration by governmen-
[10015]tal policymakers, which it had not. Mr. Helms
[10016]responded, 'I understand.‘ The point is that
[10018]I made Mr. Helms aware of the strength of Mr.
[10019]McCone's opposition to assasination. I know that Mr.
[10020]Helms could not have been under any misapprehension ~
[10021]about Mr. McCone's feelings after this conversation."
[10022](Elder Affidavit, 8/_/75, p. __).
[10024](5) Testimony of Lansdale
[10026]Lansdale testified that he recalled that the subject of Castro's
[10028]assassination surfaced at the August 10 meeting, but that the "consensus was
[10030]...hell no on this and there was a very violent reaction.” *‘(Lansdale, p. 20).
[10032]ai enna a VO arngsn
[10034]PAC ORIOL
[10036]With respect to why he asked Harvey on August 13 for a Castro assasination Tb At mg A
[10037]. lag
[10038], - woe . nen/df f : f
[10039]- plan, Lansdale testified: Aue
[10041]"Senator Baker: Why did you, three days later
[10042]if they all said, hell no, /go/ ahead with it?"
[10044]HW 50955 Docldiavddasso “Page Sie
[10046]mE
[10048]"General Lansdale:...the meeting at which they
[10050]said that was still on a development of my original
[10051]os. task, which was a revolt and an overthrow of a
[10053]? regime. At the same time, we were getting intelligence
[10055]‘accumulating very quickly of something very different
[10056]taking place in Cuba than we had expected, which was
[10057]the Soviet technicians starting to come in and the
[10058]possibilities of Soviet missiles being placed there...
[10059]At that time, I thought it would be a possibility
[10060]someplace down the road in which there_would be some
[10061]possible need to take action such as /assassination/.' ‘*/
[10062](Lansdale, p. 21). ;
[10064]Lansdale stated that he had only one brief conversation with Harvey
[10065]after the August 13 memorandum in which Harvey stated "he would look into it...
[10066]see about developing some plans" but that was the Last Lansdale ever heard
[10067]of the matter. (Lansdale, p. 124). Lansdale stated that with the develop-
[10069]ment of the Missile Crisis, Mongoose "yas being rapidly shifted out of con-
[10071]sideration" and thus ST wasn't pressing for answers... it was
[10073]very obvious that another situation was developing that would be handled
[10074]quite differently in Cuba." (Lansdale, P. 124).
[10076]Lansdale testified that he was "very certain" that a discussion of a
[10077]Castro assassination plan or proposal never came up in his discussions with
[10078]Robert Kennedy or with President Kennedy, and that he had originated the
[10080]request to Harvey for plan without discussing the matter with anyone:
[10082]4)
[10084]"o:...Why, if it is true that assassination ‘idea
[10085]was turned down on August 10, you sent out your
[10086]memo of August 13?"
[10088]"General Lansdale:..-.I don't recall that thoroughly,
[10089]I don't remember the reasons why I would."
[10091]"Q: Is it your testimony that the August 10 meeting
[10093]turned down assassinations as a subject to look into,
[10095]and that you nevertheless asked Mr. Harvey to look _ -.
[10096]into it?” -
[10098]"General Lansdale: 1 guess it is, yes. The way you
[10099]put it to me now has me baffled about why I did it.
[10100]\ I don't: know." (Lansdale, pp. 123-124.
[10102]HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 214
[10104]"Senator Baker:...did you originate this idea of
[10105]laying on the CIA a requirement to report on the
[10106]~ feasibility of the assassination of Castro or did
[10107]; someone else suggest that?"
[10108]"General Lansdale: I did, as far as I recall."
[10110]"Senator Baker: Who did you discuss it with before
[10111]you laid on that requirement?"
[10113]"General Lansdale: I don't believe I discussed it with
[10114]anyone."
[10116]“Senator Baker: Only with Harvey?"
[10117]“General Lansdale: Only with Harvey."
[10118]“Senator Baker: Did you ever discuss it with Helms?"
[10120]"General Lansdale: I might have, and I don’t believe
[10121]that I did. I think it was just with Harvey."
[10123]"Senator Baker: Did you ever discuss it with Robert
[10126]“General Lansdale: No, not that I recall."
[10128]"Senator Baker: With the President?"
[10130]"General Lansdale: No."
[10131](Lansdale, pp. 19-20).
[10133]HY 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 215
[10135]c. Testimony of News Reporters as to Lansdale's Comments on
[10137]oa the August 10 Meeting
[10139]During the Committee's investigation, news reports concerning the
[10140]August 10 meeting and Lansdale's request for a Castro assassination plan
[10141]appeared in the press. Two of these reports were based on statements made
[10142]by Lansdale to David Martin of the Associated Press and Jeremiah O'Leary
[10143]of the Washington Star-News. In view of the apparent conflict between
[10144]Lansdale's testimony to the Committee and what. Lansdale was reported to: have
[10145]said to Martin and O'Leary, the Committee invited these reporters to testify
[10146]as to Lansdale's statements to them. Martin testified under a subpoena
[10147]issued by the Committee pursuant to Senate,Resolution 21. O'Leary appeared
[10148]voluntarily but ‘stated the policy of his newspaper with regard to disclosing
[10149]news sources precluded him from any comment going beyond that contained in
[10150]a prepared statement he read under oath. O'Leary's statement declared that
[10152]SY ; his news report "represents accurately my understanding of the relevant in-
[10153]formation I obtained from news sources." (O'Leary, page 5).
[10154]We discuss below Martin's testimony and the news reports as they compare
[10156]to Lansdale's testimony.
[10158]-(1) The Martin News Report
[10160]Martin's news report stated, in its lead paragraph:
[10162]"Retired Maj. Gen. Edward G. Lansdale
[10164]said Friday that acting on orders from
[10165]President John F. Kennedy delivered
[10167]through an intermediary, he developed
[10169]plans for removing Cuban Premier. Fidel
[10170]Castro by any means including assassination."
[10171](Ex. 2 to Martin Affidavit)
[10173]Martin testified that this lead paragraph was accurate and that it was
[10174]a conclusion which he drew based upon the totality of his interview on
[10176]% May 30, 1975 with Lansdale. (Martin, pp. 19~20) In contrast, Lansdale
[10178]3
[10181]fie
[10183]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 216 ~ Fata mem sweeten Ga oo ere ce ange cme memerens so
[10185]-T6-
[10187]testified that, after reading Martin's report in the press, he told Martin
[10188]“your first sentence is not only completely untrue, but there is not a
[10189]single thing in your story that says it is true.” (Lansdale, p. 65)
[10190]As discussed above (see p. __), Lansdale testified that on his own initiative
[10191]he had originated the request to Harvey without discussing the matter with
[10192]anyone and that a Castro assassination plan never came up in his discussions
[10193]with Robert Kennedy (or with President Kennedy). . . ; :
[10194]In view of Martin's testimony that the lead paragraph of his report
[10195]was a conclusion based on the totality of his interview with Lansdale, it
[10196]should be noted that the remainder of Martin's story does not state that
[10197]Lansdale was ordered by President Kennedy ‘or Robert Kennedy to develop
[10198]plans for a Castro. assassination. The report quotes Lansdale as stating
[10199]"TI was working for the highest authority in the land...the President”
[10200]and goes on to state that Lansdale said he did not deal directly with
[10202]i the President but. ‘worked through" an intermediary more intimate to the
[10203]President than Bundy.*/ It can be noted that the phrases "working for” r
[10204]. °
[10205]and "yorking through" are not the same as the lead paragraph's conclusion Tne "fi
[10206]that Lansdale was "acting on orders" to develop a Castro assassination plan.
[10207]In addition, supséquent paragraphs in the Martin ‘report indicate that Lansdale
[10208]said: the decision to include. assassination in his planning was Lansdale's
[10209]own, as he testified it was to the Committee. Thus, the Martin report states
[10210]Lansdale said that assassination was "one of the means he /Tansdale/
[10211]considered," that it was Lansdale's . belief that assassination would not have
[10213]been "incompatible" with his assignment, and that Lansdale said ny just wanted
[10215]to see if the U.S. had any such capabilities."
[10217]ro */ The Martin report states that Lansdale refused to provide this —
[10219]eee intermediary's name for the record. In respecting the confidentiality
[10220]of news sources, the Committee didnot seek to ask Martin what was said
[10221]off the record to him in the course of his newsgathering efforts. (Martin,
[10222]p. ). -
[10224]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 217
[10226]-TT-
[10228]Moreover, in his testimony as to the conversation with Lansdale on
[10230]Fa May 30, 1975 that was the basis for his report, Martin said he did not
[10231]‘specifically ask Lansdale if he had acted on orders with regard to an
[10232]assassination plan, nor did Lansdale say he acted on orders. Rather,
[10234]Martin asked Lansdale "sho were you working for?"*/- When Martin did
[10235]specifically ask Lansdale in a subsequent conversation on June 4, 1975
[10237]if he had acted on orders, Martin testified that Larisdale stated that
[10239]he had not. In this subsequent conversation on June 4, 1975, Martin
[10241]said he asked: Lansdale specifically, "were you ever ordered by President
[10242]Kenriedy or any other Kennedy to draw up plans to assassinate Castro?”
[10243](Martin, p. 21). Martin testified that Lansdale replied "no" and that
[10244]his orders were "very broad." (Martin, p. 21). Martin further testified
[10245]that in this June 4 conversation he asked Lansdale whether "any assassination
[10246]planning you aia was done on your own initiative," and that Lansdale replied
[10247]"yes." (Martin, p. 21). Martin stated that it was his belief that his
[10249]June 4 conversation was at variance with Lansdale's statements to nim .
[10251]on May 30, 1975. (Martin, p. 21). It may also be the case, based on
[10252]Martin's testimony as to the differences between the questions he posed to
[10253]Lansdale on May 30 and on June 4, 1975, that he and Lansdale may have |
[10255]. . . ; rR
[10256]misunderstood each other. : . ent ow
[10258]pe re A
[10260]*/ Martin testified that his conversation with Lansdale on May 30, 1975
[10262]involved two subjects: 1) "what were you (Lansdale) doing in August 1962"
[10263](Martin, p. 16), and 2) "who were you working for." (Martin, p. 17).
[10264]Martin stated. that in the first portion of the conversation dealing with
[10265]Lansdale's activities in August 1962, Lansdale stated, according to
[10266]Martin, "I just wanted to see if the U.S. had any such capabilities" and
[10267]that this included "assassination" as well as other méans of disposing
[10269]gN of Castro. As to the second portion of the conversation, Martin stated
[10271]Ne he. asked Lansdale "who were you working for" and Lansdale replied "on that .
[10273]project I was working for the highest authority in the land." (Martin, p. 18).
[10275]HW 50955 Docld:32493539 Page 216
[10277](2) The O'Leary Report.
[10279]O'Leary's news report read as follows in its lead paragraphs:
[10281]"Retired Maj. Gen. Edward G. Lansdale has named
[10282]Robert F.- Kennedy as the administration official
[10283]who ordered him in 1962 to launch a CIA project
[10284]to work out all feasible plans for "getting rid
[10285]of" Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro.
[10287]"Lansdale, in an interview with the Washington
[10288]Star, never. used the word “assassination” and
[10289]“gaid it was not used vy Kennedy, then the attor-
[10291]ney general. ~
[10293]But he said there could be no doubt that "the
[10295]project for disposing of Castro envisioned the
[10296]whole spectrum of plans from overthrowing the
[10298]Cuban leader to assassinating him."
[10300]off - O'Leary's report also stated that "Lansdale said he was contacted
[10302]"In his. appearance before the
[10304]by Robert Kennedy in mid-summer of 1962....
[10305]Committee, O'Leary pointed out that this reference to the mid-summer of
[10306]1962 modified the reference in the lead paragraph of his report. (O'Leary,
[10308]p. 13).
[10310]In his testimony, Lansdale said he submitted a statement to the
[10312]Washington Star stating that this report was “a distortion of my
[10313]remarks." (Lansdale, p.61). Lansdale testified that he stated to
[10314]the Washington Star that "perhaps someplace in the planning there
[10316]is something about what to do with 4 leader who would threaten the
[10318]HY 50955 Docld: 32423539 “Page 319
[10320]=(Y-
[10322]lives of millions of Americans /with Soviet Missiles/...but I can
[10323]say I never did receive any order from President Kennedy or from
[10324]Robert Kennedy about taking action against Castro personally."
[10325](Lansdale, pp.61-62). Lansdale further testified that he told
[10326]O'Leary that he did take orders from Robert Kennedy, but made clear
[10327]that "it was on a very wide-ranging type of thing." (Lansdale, p.62).
[10328]Lansdale testified as follows concerning his statement to the Star
[10329]following the O'Leary report:
[10331]"After the story appeared, the... Washington Star
[10333]‘asked me what wide-ranging things were you talking
[10337]"TJ said there were economic matters and military
[10339]matters and military things and they were very
[10341]wide-ranging things. I said perhaps all O'Leary
[10343]was thinking of was assassination. I was
[10345]thinking of far wider than that." (Lansdale, pp.62-63)
[10347]O'Leary's report makes clear that Lansdale did not state that
[10349]Robert Kennedy instructed Lansdale to develop an assassination
[10350]plan. The O'Leary report states:
[10352]"Lansdale said he is certain Robert Kennedy's
[10354]instructions to him did not include the word
[10356]"assassination." He said the attorney general,
[10358]as best he could recall, spoke in more general
[10360]terms of exploring all feasible means and
[10362]practicalities of doing something "to get rid
[10363]of" Castro. ;
[10365]In view of the above, it appears that although he may have been
[10366]imprecise in his conversations with O'Leary and Martin, Lansdale never-
[10367]theless did not tell them that he was ordered to develop an assassination
[10368]plan by Robert Kennedy or the President. As discussed above (see p. __);
[10369]Lansdale testified that he never discussed a Castro assassination with
[10370]President Kennedy .or with Robert Kennedy. Lansdale's reported statements
[10372]that he was ordered to plan to "get rid of Castro by all feasible means”
[10375]XN
[10377]ee -ig also consistent with Lansdale's testimony, as well as that of the other
[10379]witnesses, with respect to the objective of the Mongoose operation. As
[10381]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 220
[10383]Poe
[10384]discussed above in section > however, it was the testimony of all
[10386]ne witnesses except Helms that such statements aia not include assassination.
[10387]Lansdale's statements to O'Leary and Martin appear consistent with his
[10388]sworn testimony that it was his own idea to request an assassination plan
[10389]from Harvey and that he did not discuss this idea with anyone except Harvey.
[10390](see p. ___ above). With respect to this latter point, however, it is
[10391]a fact that Lansdale's request for an assassination plan followed almost
[10392]immediately after the August 10 meeting, where the question of a Castro
[10393]assassination was raised. Hence, it is not unreasonable to conclude that
[10394]the raising of the question of a Castro assassination at the August 10
[10395]meeting prompted Lansdale to request an assassination plan (although it
[10396]was the finding of the IG Report as well as the testimony of Harvey that
[10398]the August 10 meeting had no relation to the question of authorization for
[10400]the 1962 assassination plot).
[10402]ste”
[10404]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 271
[10406]HW 50955 DoclId:32493539 Page 222
[10408]; “at
[10409]* 1. The 1963 Assassination Plot 7 i
[10411]porate Heims testimony on "9/12/75)
[10413]H. The Question of: Authorization for the 1963 Assassination Plot
[10414]STE ie
[10416]for the delivery of the ‘poison pen to AM/LASH on November 22, 1963, and reviews
[10417]certain policies of the Kennedy, Administration: during 1963 which are relevant to:
[10418]that question. */ (The facts relating to the poison pen plot are set out at PPe
[10419]‘ above).
[10420]2. The Issue of Authority |
[10421]_ Much of the testimony of Helms and the Kennedy Administration members dis-
[10422]cussed in the preceding section (see pp. _—site -_ is relevant ‘to the question
[10423]of authorization for the 1963 assassination activity. Once again there was no
[10424]evidence that anyone above the Agency was informed about or specifically authorized
[10425]the plot.
[10426]As in the case of the 1962 assassination'‘plot, however, Helms testified that
[10427]he believed the 1963 assassination activity was permissible in view of his”
[10428]‘perception of continuing pressure exerted by the Administration to overthrow Castro
[10429]fand his perception that there were no Limits placed on the means that could be
[10430]used to achieve Castro's downfall. (Helms, 9/11/75, pp. 11-13) ./
[10431]The testimony of Helms and the Kennedy Administration members on the issue
[10432]of whether the pressure to overthrow. Castro made assassination permissible with-
[10433]out a direct order is discussed. in detail in the preceding section and is not re~
[10434]peated here. Before turning to Helms! specific testimony relating to AM/LASH
[10435]dncluding his view that AM/LAsh was not seen as a potential assassin) we
[10436]discuss below the Kennedy Administration Cuba policy in 1963. In ;
[10438]*/The evidence showed that the "scelence-fiction" devices of an exploding sea
[10439]shell and a poison diving suit were abandoned at the laboratory stage within the
[10440]| TA and that no authorization was sought for their development or eventual use.
[10441]dence, the focus in this section is on the activity involving the delivery | of the
[10442]poison pen to AM/LASH. .
[10445]general, the 1963 covert action program and pressure was less
[10447]intense than it had been in 1962.
[10449]3. The Kennedy Administration's Policy Towards Cuba in 1963
[10450]- (a) Organization |
[10451]The Mongoose Operation was disbanded following the Cuban
[10452]; Missile Crisis. An interagency "Cuban Coordinating Committee"
[10454]was established within the State Department with responsibility
[10455]for developing covert action proposals.- (Bundy, 7/11/75, p. 148.) -
[10456]The review and approval function was taken from the Special Group
[10457]Augmented (which passed out of existence) and was placed under
[10458]the Special Group, chaired by Bundy. (Bundy, 7/11/75, p. 148.)
[10460]U.S. policy towards Cuba in 1963 was also treated in the
[10462]National Security. Council's Standing Group, the successor to
[10464]at
[10466]‘the Executive Committee which had dealt with the Missile Crisis.
[10467]Members of: the Standing Group included Robert Kennedy, McNamara,
[10468]McCone, Bundy and Sorensen. . .
[10469]We discuss below four aspects of the Kennedy Administration's
[10470]1963 Cuba policy. These are: (1) the Standing Group's discus-
[10471]‘sion of possible. developments in the event of Castro's death;
[10472](2) the Standing. Group ' s discussion of policy options; (3) the
[10473]covert action program approved by the Special Group ; and (4) the -
[10474]diplomatic effort to explore the possibility of reestablishing re-
[10476]lations with Castro. The first three of these took place in the
[10478]Spring or ‘early Summer of 1963; the fourth aspect -- the effort
[10479]to communicate with Castro -- took place at-the same time as the
[10480]\ 4. 1963 assassination activity.
[10482]HW 50955 Docld:324293535 Page 223
[10484](b) The Discussion, of the Contingency of Castro's Death
[10486]“In the Spring of 1963, the Standing Group discussed con-
[10487]tingency planning in the event of Castro's death. The documen-
[10488]tary evidence and testimony indicated that Castro's death was
[10489]discussed as a contingency which might occur independent of
[10491]U.S. action. The Group found that the possibilities for
[10492]favorable developments to the United States should Castro die
[10493]‘were "singularly unpromising”. (Summary Record of Standing Group
[10494]Meeting, May 238, 1963, p. 1).
[10496]The discussion stemmed from a. memorandum by Bundy which >
[10497]discussed “possible new directions" for U.S. Cuban policy. (Bundy
[10498]Memorandum ‘to the Standing Group, April 21, 1963). The memoran-
[10500]yO dum distinguished between (i) events which might. occur indepnen-
[10501]dently of U.S. action and (ii) steps the U.S. might “initiate”
[10502](Bundy memorandum, p. 2.) a a
[10504]‘When the Standing Group discussed the . Bundy memorandum,
[10506]. Robert Kennedy proposed a study of the "measures we would take
[10507]following contingencies such as the death of Castro or the shoot-
[10508]ing down of a u-2." (Bundy Ex. 6E, Summary Record of NSC Stand-
[10509]ing Group Meeting, April 23, 1963, p. 2). " The downing of a U- 2
[10511]had been listed in the Bundy memorandum as a subject for contin-
[10512]gency planning under the category of steps for which the U.S
[10514]‘must “await events" as distinguished from “initiate actions".
[10516]Bundy's follow-up memorandum, an agenda for a further Stand-
[10518]ate
[10520]ing Group discussion of Cuban policy, listed the ‘subject of a.
[10522]oe Ld Lik. he es 2U
[10524]TTT see memes sien matane nm seenerie tain aSslin emt OEANER RONEN EON Ne nq ee et ee
[10526]HW 50955 Docld: 324239539 Page 274
[10528]Castro death contingency under a category comprising subjects
[10529]not involving U.S. initiatives, e.g., “occurrence of revolt
[10530]or repression in the manner of Hungary", attributable inter-
[10531]ference by Castro in other countries", and "the reintroduction
[10532]of offensive weapons". (Bundy Ex. 6-G, 4/29/63).
[10533]| After the meeting of April 23, 1963, the Standing Group
[10534]assigned to CIA's Office of National Estimates*/ the task of
[10535]estimating possible developments if Castro should die. (Bundy
[10536]Ex. 6-H, Memorandum for Members of the Standing Groun, May 2,
[10537]1963). 7
[10538]The resulting paper analyzed the various forces which would
[10539]come into play in Cuba after Castro's death, including the
[10540]my likely behavior of Castro's top aides, Raul Castro and Che
[10541]Guevara, as well as possible Soviet reaction. ~ (Bundy Ex. 6-1,
[10542]Draft Memorandum by: Office of National Estimates titled "Develop-
[10543]ments in Cuba and Possible U.S. Actions in the Event of Castro's
[10544]Death", pp. 2-5, hereafter called the "ONE paper"). The ONE
[10545]Paper concluded that "the odds are that upon Castro! s death, his
[10546]brother Raul or some other figure in the regime would, with Soviet
[10547]backing and help, take over control". **/
[10549]* /The Office of National Estimates is the research division of the.
[10550]CTIA: responsible for analyzing foreign intelligence. The Office is
[10551]‘not part of the CIA's covert: operations organization.
[10553]*«*/The ONE Paper also saw little chance that a government disposed
[10554]‘Eowards the United States would be able to come to power without ex-
[10555]tensive U.S. military support: “Anti-Moscow Cuban nationalists would
[10556]require extensive U.S. help.in order to win, and probably U.S. military.
[10557], 3 intervention." (Bundy-Ex. 6-1, p. ii). ;
[10559]me
[10561]Re
[10563]a means ee ee en EE I ene SEG Ns BOON RRNA: NTS RST REAR AARON ET EEA NI ARTUR ELON EATERS ASPET MAH ME MI RANE aR at at
[10565]FW 50955 Docld:32423599 Page 225
[10568]In addition, the ONE Paper warned that the United States
[10569]would most likely be blamed if Castro should die by another's
[10570]‘hand. "If Castro were to die by other than natural causes the
[10571]U.S. would be widely charg zed with complicity, even though it
[10572]is widely known that Castro has many enemies". (Bundy Ex. 6-I,
[10573]p. 4.) — 7
[10575]The ONE Paper also identified a number of possible U.S.
[10576]-actions in the event of Castro's death, ranging along a spec-
[10577]trum that included no U.S., initiatives, action to support a
[10578]povernment in exile, quarantine and blockade, and outright
[10579]_ invasion. | (Bundy Ex. 6-L, pp. 7-12.)
[10581]On May 28, 1963, the Standing Group discussed the ONE Paper.
[10583]“) ‘The Standing Group found that “all of the courses of action
[10584][open to the U.S. should Castro die] were singularly unpromising"
[10585](Summary Record of NSC Standing Group Meeting No. 7/63, May 28,
[10586]1963, p. 1). | |
[10587]Bundy agréed that the Standing Group “certainly posed the
[10588]question" in the Spring of 1963 as to what. would happen if Castro
[10589]died or were killed. (Bundy, 7/11/75, p. 130.) But he testified
[10590]_that he had no recollection ofa Castro assassination being on
[10591]the minds of Standing Group members when they discussed this
[10593]contingency. -(Bundy, 7/11/75, p. 14.)*/
[10595]*/As indicated above p. . y, Bundy did ‘recall that over the
[10596]period 1961 and 1963 "the subject of a Castro assassination was a.
[10597];  } mentioned from time to time by different individuals", but said that
[10598]; he was not aware of "much discussion in the Spring, of 1963 23.,n that
[10599]subject” (Bundy, 7/11/75, p. 140.) .
[10601]2 in Ae eee mE tenet nM one ten amen Rene ee Re
[10603]HW 50955 Docld: 32423539. “Page 226
[10605]Bundy testified, however, that one reason for getting an
[10606]estimate of this kind was to get it on record that we should
[10607]not be "fussing'' with questions of assassination and that it
[10608]was not a sound policy. (Bundy, 7/1/75, p. 142.)
[10610]. Bundy further testified that it was not untisual to assess
[10611]the implications of a foreign leader's possible death, giving
[10612]the cases of Stalin and DeGaulle as examples. In the case of
[10613]Castro, Bundy said he felt it was only prudent to attempt to
[10614]assess. the question of-a post-Castro Cuba since Castro was
[10615]such a "dominant figure". (Bundy, 7/11/75, Pp. 145.)
[10617](c) The Standing Group's Discussion of U.S. Policy
[10619]Towards Cuba
[10620]> The Standing Group's documents indicate it continued to
[10621]assume the desirability of harassment, but recognized there
[10622]were few practical. measures the U.S. could take that were
[10623]likely to achieve Castro's overthrow. |
[10624]In his April 21, 1963 memorandum on ''Cuban Alternatives”
[10626]Bundy identified three possible new alternatives: (1) forcing:
[10627]"a non-Communist solution in Cuba by all necéssary means", -
[10628](2) insisting on "major but limited ends", or. (3) moving "in
[10629]the direction of a. gradual development of some form of accommo -
[10630]‘dation with Castro". (Bundy Memorandum to the Standing Group,
[10631]April 21, 1963, p. 3.) These alternatives were discussed at
[10633]Standing Group meetings on April 23 and May 28, 1963.
[10635]HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 227
[10637]Sorensen, who participated in these meetings, testified
[10638]that the "widest possible range of alternatives" were dis-
[10639]cussed, but that "Nassassination was not even on the list"
[10640](Sorensen, 7/21/75, p. 4.) He said that consideration of
[10641]possible options such as forcing “a non-Communist solution
[10642]in Cuba by all necessary means" did -not encompass assassina-
[10645]"'this] could not have included or implied assassina-
[10647]-tion. Instead, it- expressly referred to ‘the develop-
[10649]ment of pressures' and ‘gradual escalation of the con--
[10651]frontation in Cuba' to, produce an overthrow ofthe
[10652]regime, including 'a willingness to use military force
[10654]‘to invade Cuba’. Such a course was obviously not
[10655]adopted by the President, and in any event expressed
[10656]an approach far different From fosassination® (Soren-
[10658]sen affidavit, 7/25/75, P. A) .*
[10660]S The record of the first Standing, Group discussion of Bundy 's
[10664]memorandum shows that a number of alternatives were discussed (none
[10666]of which involved assassination) but no conclusions were reached.
[10667]On May 28, 1963, the’ Standing Group met again. McCone argued
[10669]for steps to "increase economic hardship" in Cuba, supplemented
[10671]by sabotage to "create a situation in Cuba in which it would be
[10673]possible to subvert military leaders to the point of their acting
[10675]*/ The Bundy memorandum also used the phrase "all necessary measures"
[10676]‘to describe the steps the U.S. was willing to take to "prevent" a di-
[10677]rect military threat to the U.S. or to the Western Hemisphere from Cuba.
[10678]Sorensen explained the meaning of this phrase in the context of the
[10679]April 23 discussion of Kennedy Administration policy.
[10681]"this phrase] could not by any stretch of semantics
[10682]'or logic have included assassination or any other
[10683]. initiative. It reflected the purely defensive posture -
[10684]a - implemented six months earlier when long-range. missiles~
[10685]re _ and other offensive weapons were placed in Cubay tos! ay
[10686](Sorensen affidavit, 1125179 ape f od 7
[10689]pies
[10691]HW 50955 Docld:33493539 Page 228
[10693]to overthrow Castro". (Summary Record of NSC Standing Group
[10694]Meeting No. 7/63, May 28, 1963, p. 1.) McNamara said that
[10695]sabotage would not be “conelusive"” and suggested study of
[10696]“economic. pressures which could upset Castro." Robert Kennedy
[10697]said "the U.S. must do something against Castro, even though
[10699]we do not believe our actions would bring him down", ‘(id.,
[10701]p. 2) In conclusion, Bundy summarized by stating that the task”
[10702]was ''to decide now what actions we would take against Castro,
[10703]acknowledging that the measures practical for us to take will
[10704]not result in his overthrow".: (Id. p. 2.) : |
[10706]Cd) The Special | Group’ s Authorization of a Sabotage Pro-
[10708]gram Against Cuba
[10710]ae During the first six months of 1963, Little, if any,
[10711]“sabotage activity against Cuba was undertaken.*/ However, on
[10713]. June 19, 1963, following the Standing Group's discussion of Cuba
[10714]policy in the Spring, President Kennedy approved a Cuba sabotage
[10716]- program. **/ (Memorandum for the Special Group, 6/19/63, p. 1.)
[10718] %*/ At an April 3, 1963.meeting on Cuba, Bundy stated that no
[10719]sabotage operations were then underway because the Special Group "had
[10720]decided . . . that such activity. is not worth the effort expended on
[10721]it." (Memorandum of Meeting on Cuba, 4/3/63, p. 1).
[10723]*x/ The sabotage program approved on June.19, 1963 was directed at
[10724]“four major segments of the Cuban economy", (1) electric power; (2)
[10726]. petroleum refineries and storage facilities; (3) railroad and high-.
[10727]way transportation and (4) production and manufacturing. (Memoran-
[10728]dum for the Special Group, June 19, 1963, p. 1) Operations under this
[10729]program were to be conducted by CIA-controlled Cuban agents from a
[10730]U.S. island off Florida and it was to complement a similar effort de-
[10731]signed to "develop internal resistance elements which could carty out
[10732]sabotage." (Id., p. 2. »
[10734]Nt
[10736]HW 50955 Docld:32493539 Page 299
[10738]a
[10740]HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 230
[10742]significant defections and other byproducts of -unrest".- (Id
[10744]i |
[10745]feet
[10746]i 7
[10748]In contrast to the Mongoose program, which sought to build
[10750]toward an eventual internal revolt, the 1963 covert action
[10752]' program had a more Liniited objective, i.e., "to nourish a
[10754]spirit of resistance and disaffection which could lead to
[10755]p. 2.)
[10756]After the initial approval, particular intelligence and
[10758]sabotage operations were submitted to the Special Group for
[10760]‘specific prior authorization. On October .3;. 1963, the Special
[10762]. Group approved fine operations in .Cuba, including several
[10764]sabotage operations. And on October 24, 1963, thirteen major
[10766]sabotage operations were approved to be undertaken in the
[10768]period November 1963 through January 1964, including the sabo-
[10770]tage of an electric power plant, an oil refinery, and a sugar
[10771]mill. (Memorandum, July 11, 1975, CIA Review Staff, to Select
[10773]Committee, on "Approved CIA Covert Operations into Cuba."').
[10775]_(e) The Diplomatic Effort to Explore an, Accommodation With
[10777]Castro
[10779]As early as January 4, 1963, Bundy proposed to President
[10781]. Kennedy that the possibility of communicating with Castro be
[10783]explored. (Bundy Ex. 6, Memorandum to the President, January 4,
[10784]1963, p. 3.) Bundy's memorandum on "Cuba Alternatives" to the
[10785]Standing Group on April 23, 1963, also listed the "oradual de-
[10786]velopment of some form of accommodation with Castro" among
[10788]policy alternatives. (Bundy memorandum, p. 3).
[10791]= 10 -
[10793]And, at a meeting on June 3, 1963, the Special Group agreed. -
[10794]it would be a “useful endeavor" to explore "various possibili-
[10795]ties of establishing channels of communication to Castro"
[10796](Memorandum of Special Group meeting, June ‘6 ,. 1963, p.-2).
[10798]In the Fall of 1963, William Atwood was a Special Advisor»
[10799]to the U.S. Delegation to the United Nations with the rank
[10800]of Ambassador. (Atwood, 7/10/75, p. 3.) Atwood testified aad
[10801]that during the period of September -November, 1963, he held a
[10802]series of talks with the Cuban Ambassador to the United Nations
[10803]to discuss opening negotiations on an accommodation between
[10804]' Castro and the United States. (Atwood, pp. 5-9.)
[10805]Atwood testified that at the outset he informed Robert
[10807]an Kennedy, who told him that the effort “was worth pursuing" . (Atwood,p.6).
[10809]Neat
[10811]Atwood said he: regularly reported on the talks to the White
[10812]House and to. his superior at the United Nations, Adlai Steven-
[10813]son. ‘(Atwood pp. 6-7.) Atwood further stated that he was told
[10814]by Bundy that President Kennedy was in favor of "pushing towards
[10815]an opening toward Cuba" to take Castro "out of the Soviet
[10816]fold and perhaps wiping out the Bay of Pigs and maybe petting
[10817]- back into normal". (Atwood, p. 7- 8 )
[10818]Atwood stated that. he believed the only people who knew of
[10819]his contacts’ with the. Cubans were the President, Harriman, Steven-
[10820]son, Robert Kennedy, Bundy, Bundy's assistant, and journalist Lisa |
[10821]Howard. / Gloward had initially placed. Atwood in contact with the
[10822]Cuban Ambassador after reporting to Atwood that during a
[10824]Eo
[10826]trip to Cuba she had learned Castro was anxious to establish
[10828]Mee
[10830]HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 231° °°
[10832]/- 11 -
[10834]communications with the United States. Thereafter Howard
[10835]served as an intermediary in arranging Atwood's meetings with
[10836]the Cubans. (Atwood, pp. 4, 18)).
[10838]. Atwood also testified that he arranged for a French
[10839]journalist, Jean Daniel ,. to visit the White House prior to.
[10840]Daniel's scheduled trip to see Castro. (Atwood, p. 19.)
[10841](According to an article by Daniel in December, 1963, Daniel
[10842]met with President Kennedy on October 24, 1963, They discussed
[10843]the prospects for reestablishing U.S.-Cuba relations and
[10844]President Kennedy asked Daniel to report back to him after
[10845]seeing Castro.)*/
[10847]_ | Atwood's efforts reached their high point on November 18,
[10848]af 1963, when Atwood spoke by telephone with a member of Castro's
[10849]‘staff in Cuba. (Atwood, >. 3). Pursuant to White House in-
[10850]structions, Atwood informed Castro's staff member that the
[10852]“U.S. favored preliminary negotiations at the U.N. (rather than
[10853]‘in Cuba as proposed by the Cubans), and that the U.S. desired
[10855]to work cut an agenda for these talks, (Atwood, pp. 8-9).
[10857]After receiving Atwood's report om this conversation, Bundy told
[10858]Atwood that after the Cuban agenda was received, President
[10860]Kennedy wanted to see Atwood to “decide what to say and
[10862]*«/ Daniel, Unofficial Envoy: A Historic Report from Two Capitals,
[10864]New Republic, December I[4, 156377 Saniel was WiEb Casteo wien Castro
[10865]Ly receiver the report of President Kennedy's assassination. Daniél,
[10866]2 ‘w” .When Castro Heard the News, (New Republic, December 7, 1963).
[10870]SOE MN BEAST
[10872]far amet ng SR HR Sn cee antes ney een a aE ne ne seep teen oe
[10874]HW 50955 Docld:32493539 Page 232
[10876]- i -
[10879]Q t ye hte a EEE
[10880]" Ud., pe 9.)
[10882]: whether to go or what we should do next Four |
[10883]‘days later, on November 22, 1963, (the same day. AM/LASH was given
[10884]the poison pen), Jean Daniel was meeting with Castro. On that
[10885]same day, President Kennedy was assassinated. With the change of
[10886]Administrations, Atwood's talks with the Cubans became less fre-
[10887]quent and eventually ended in early 1964. (Atwood, Pp. 10.)
[10889]i 4. Testimony on the Question of Authorization for the
[10891]AM/LASH Poison Pen Device
[10893](a) Testimony of Helms
[10895]Ci). The October 29 Meeting and the Use of Robert
[10896]Kennedy's Name Without Obtaining Tis Approval -
[10898]As discussed above in detail €see pp. ), Fitzgerald met
[10900]with AM/LASH on October 29, 1963, in a foreign capital. Fitz-
[10901]gerald represented to AM/LASH that he was the personal represen-
[10903]. 7 tative of Robert Kennedy, and gave AM/LASH assurances of full sup-
[10904]‘port should AM/LASH succeed in overthrowing Castro.
[10906]The IG Report states that, according to Fitegerald, Helms and
[10907]Fitzgerald discussed the planned meeting with AM/LASH and Helms de-
[10908]‘cided ' ‘Lt. was not “necessary to seek approval from Robert Kennedy for
[10909]Fitzgerald to speak in his name". (IG, pp. 83-89).. In his testimony,
[10910]lielms stated he did not recall such a discussion with Fitzgerald, but
[10911]that he believed he had pre-existing authority to deal with AM/LASH
[10912]with respect to "a change in government''(as opposed to assassination)
[10913]and that this made it unnecessary to obtain Robert Kennedy's approval.)
[10914]ny felt so sure chat if-T went to see Mr. Kennedy that he would have
[10916]*/The following. exchange occurred in Helms' testimony:
[10918]- iB
[10920]of i "Sen. Hart of Michigan: Dealing with respect to ‘what?
[10921]{2 - A change in government, or assassination?"
[10922]3 oO j Mr. Helms: A change in government, Senator Hart. This is
[10924]_what we were trying to do. (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 132)
[10926]aad a wh (se
[10928]HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 239
[10930]aid yes, that I didn't think there was any need to." (Helms ,
[10932]8/13/75, py 132.)
[10934]Gia een
[10936]Helms said his view was that AM/LASH was a political
[10937]action agent, not a potential assassin, and that the meet-
[10938]ing with AM/LASH and his decision not to contact Robert
[10939]Kennedy should be viewed in that light:
[10941]-given this Cuban of his standing and all
[10942]the history...of trying to find someone inside Cuba
[10943]who might head a government and have a group to. re-
[10944]place Castro...this was so central to the whole theme
[10945]of everything we had been trying to do, that I. find.
[10946]it totally unnecessary to ask Robert Kennedy at that
[10947]point (whether) we should po ahead with this. This
[10948]is obviously what he had been pushing, what every-
[10949]body had been pushing for us to try to do...let's
[10950]get on with-.doing it. * (Helms, 6/13/75, pp. 117-118) ,?
[10952]-(ii) The Delivery of the Poison Pen on November 22
[10953]While Helms ‘stated that. the. delivery of a poison pen to
[10955]_ AM/LASH was not part of an assassination plot, Helms testified
[10957]*/As discussed above (see PP. +), there was conflicting testi-
[10958]mony from CIA officers as to whether they viewed AM/LASH as an
[10959]assassin and as to the purpose of giving him the poison pen. The docu-
[10960]mentary evidence, however ,. indicates that AM/LASH in 1963 was-intent
[10961]upon assassinating Castro, that the CIA officers knew of this, -and,
[10963]-in addition to offering a poison pen, told AM/LASH they would
[10964]supply him with high powered rifles with telescopic sights. (see
[10966].?p. , above).
[10968]Helms testified that because. Amlash 'was the asset we were looking
[10969]for, (wye didn't want him to blow himself or blow anything else by
[10970]getting involved in something like this [assassination] and have it
[10971]fail. We wanted him to stay in place." (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 131).
[10972]Helms stated that ‘at no time was it the idea of [the AM/LASH- 1] case
[10973]officers, or those people in the chain pens to use [AM/LASH-1] to
[10974]assassinate Castro. (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 135).
[10976]Helms further stated ".,.there was an enormous amount of
[10977]temporizing with this fellow to keep him on the team, to keep him
[10978]' working away at this job, but to try and persuade him that this was not
[10979]the way to go.about it. (Helms , 6/13/75, p. 135). Helms testified
[10980]that AM/LASH-1 was given the poison pen "because he was insisting on
[10981]; ¥ something and this was a temporizing gesture rather than giving: him
[10982]>“ some kind of a gun he had asked for....
[10986]~ 14 -
[10988]that he believed Castro's assassination was within the scope of the CIA's
[10990]authority. /(Helms, 9/12/75, pp. 11-12).7 As in the case of the 1962 plots,
[10991]Helms based this on the vigor of the Administration's policy towards Cuba
[10993]fand his perception that there were no limits put on the means that could
[10995].be used in the effort against Castro. (Helms, 9/12/75, pp. 11-12). Thus,/
[10996]Helms testified that after the missile crisis the U.S. continued to conduct
[10997]covert actions whose purpose was "to overthrow Castro." (Helms, 6/13/75,
[10999]p- 24.) /Helms was asked whether it was his opinion that the offer of the poison
[11000]pen to AM/LASH was authorized because it came, within the scope of the 1963 pro-
[11002]gram against Castro. Helms. responded:
[11003]fT think the only way I know hew to answer that is that I
[11004]do not recall when things got cranked up in 1963 any dramatic
[11005]changes or limitations being put on this operation. There
[11006]ye was still an effort by whatever device, and perhaps only.
[11007]. slightly differently oriented at this time, to try to get rid
[11008]of Castro...But I donot recall specific things being said,
[11009]now, (we are not) going to'do this, we're not going to do that,
[11010]and we're not going to do the. other thing, and we will do just
[11011]these things."/
[11013]Teel
[11015](b) ‘Testimony of Administration Officials
[11017]As with the Mongoose period, the Administration officials agreed that
[11018]they were not informed about any assassination plot and that there was no order that
[11019]Castro be assassinated. Again, they disagreed with Helms’ position that an assassi-
[11020]nation plot could be undertaken without express authority.’ The only added part
[11021]relating to the AM/LASH plot was certain testimony which asserted that it was in-
[11023]conceivable that the President would have approved an assassination plot at the very
[11025]‘same time he had authorized talks to explore the possibility.of improved relations |
[11027]with Castro.*/
[11029]*/Rusk testified that "T find it extraordinarily difficult’to believe" and that "I~
[11030]y Just can't conceive" President Kennedy would have authorized the passage of an assas~
[11031]sination device for use against’ Castro while Atwood was exploring the possibility
[11033]HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 235
[11035]Since.Helms did not claim any higher specific authorization for or
[11036]knowdedge of the AM/LASH assassination plot, however, the additional issue
[11038]posed by that testimony does not really arise.
[11040](continued)
[11042]of normalizing relations with Castro. (Rusk, 7/10/75, p.°85). Similarly, Bundy
[11044]testified he "absolutely" did not believe President Kennedy would have authorized:
[11046]or permitted an assassination device to have been passed at the same time a
[11047]possible rapprochment with Castro was being pursued. (Bundy, 7/11/75, p- 151).
[11049]On the other hand, when the possibility of exploring better relations with
[11050]Castro was initially raised (but before any talks were begun) Bundy indicated -
[11051]that it could be explored on a "separate track" while other proposed actions,
[11052]such as sabotage, were going on. (Agenda for Special Group meeting of 4/29/63,
[11053]p. 2.)
[11055]HW 50955 Docld:324293539 Page 236
[11058]Subcommittee Meeting .
[11059]9/9/75. Approved Draft.
[11061]d. The Question of Authorization in the Johnson Administration
[11063]1. Summary of the Assassination Activity. As discussed above (see pp. __)s 7
[11064]the Agency delivered arms to AM/LASH in Cuba in March and June 1964. In early —
[11065]1965 after AM/LASH became more insistent that a Castro assassination was neces-
[11066]sary and had asked for a silenced weapon, the Agency put AM/LASH in contact with
[11067]the leader of an anti-Castro group, B-1, with the intention that AM/LASH obtain
[11068]such a weapon. Thereafter, the Agency learned that AM/LASH had veceived a
[11069]silencer and other special equipment from B-1 and was preparing to assassinate |
[11070]Castro. 7
[11072]2. The Issue of Authorization. The issue of authority in the Johnson Admini-
[11073]stration is similar to that in the Kennedy Administration. During this phase of
[11074]the AM/LASH plot, Helms continued as Deputy Director for covert operations, and
[11075]the principal members of the Kennedy Administration continued in their positions
[11076]in the relevant period of the Johnson Administration (Robert Kennedy left the
[11077]Administration in the midst of this period, on | }.* Helms' testimony
[11078]that he believed a Castro assassination was within the scope of the CIA's authority
[11079]in view of Administration policy towards Cuba applied to the AM/LASH operation in
[11080]both 1963 and 1964-65. (Helms , 6/13/75, p. 137-138.) Again, there was no evidence
[11082]’ that McCone or anyone above the Agency specifically authorized or knew about the
[11083]1964-65 plot. We discuss below four other natters occurring during the Johnson
[11084]Administration: (1) the covert action program against Cuba in 1964-1965; (2)
[11086]the Special Groups' action in investigating reports of Cuban exile underworld
[11088]*Rusk (Secretary of State), McNamara (Secretary of Defense), McCone (Director
[11089]_of Central Intelligence); ‘and Bundy (Special Assistant for National Security
[11090]and Chairman of the Special Group).
[11092]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 237
[11094] SEbiouie
[11096]plots to assassinate Castro; (3) Helms' report to Rusk that CIA was not in-
[11097]volved with AM/LASH in a Castro assassination plot; and (4) Helms' briefing
[11099]of President Johnson on the 1967 IG Report on alleged CIA assassination plots.
[11101]3. The Covert Action Program Against Cuba: in 1964-1965. According to the 7
[11102]minutes of a Special Group meeting on April 7, 1964, which he chaired, President
[11103]Johnson decided to discontinue the use of ClA-controlled sabotage raids against
[11104]Cuba.* (Memorandum of Special Group Meeting, April 7, 1964, p. _ A memoran-
[11105]dum by McCone indicated that in deciding this question, President Johnson abandoned’
[11106]the objective of Castro's overthrow. **
[11108]At. the April 7, Special Group meeting, Rusk had emphasized his opposition to
[11109]the use of sabotage raids, stating his belief that they were unproductive, and
[11110]had a “high noise level" that called attention to them. In addition, Rusk stated
[11111]that “he suspects the Cuban exiles who actually conduct the raids of. possible
[11112]‘wishing to leave fingerprints pointing to U. S. involvement in order to increase
[11114]that involvement.'' (Memorandum of Special Group Meeting, April 7, 1964, page.2.)
[11116]' *A memorandum by Bundy on April 7, 1964, listed seven aspects of the covert action
[11117]program which had been in effect. These were: (1) collection of intelligence,
[11118](2) covert propaganda to encourage low risk forms of active and passive resistance;
[11119](3) cooperation with other agencies in economic denial; (4) attempts to identify
[11120]and establish contact with potential dissident elements inside Cuba; (5) indirect
[11121]economic sabotage; (6) ClA-controlled sabotage raiding; and (7) autonomous opera-
[11122]tions. (Memorandum for the Record of the Special Group, April 7,.1964, p. 1-2.)
[11124]**at the April 7, 1964, meeting Rusk and Bondy opposed continuation of sabotage
[11126]. actions by CIA-controlled assets as "unproductive'' and.impractical. McCone dis-
[11127]agreed, noting that the covert action program relied on a "well-planned series
[11128]of sabotage efforts’. (Memorandum of Special Group Meeting, April 7, 1964, p. 3.)
[11129]In this connection, Bundy noted that since the approval of the current sabotage
[11130]in June 1963 "policymakers..:had turned sabotage operations on and off to such
[11131]an extent that (the sabotage program) simply does not, in the nature of things,
[11132]appear.feasible". (Id., p. 2.) ; ,
[11134]HY .50955 Docld:32423539 Page 236
[11136]3. . oie Vaya
[11137]| a Se COUR AVAL
[11138]“4, The Special Group Investigation of Reported Castro Assassination Plots .
[11140]by Cuban Exiles. On June 10, 1964, Helms informed McCone ‘by memorandum that
[11143]Agency officials had learned of several plots of Cuban exiles to assassinate
[11144]Castro and other Cuban: leaders. (Memorandum, Helms to McCone, June 10, 1964.)
[11145]Several of the plots, according to the memorandum , involved "people apparently
[11146]associated with the Mafia". Reportedly the exiles had offered people associated
[11148]_ with the Mafia $150,000 to perform the deed. In his memorandum, Helms stated that
[11150]“the sources of the reports were parties to the plots and in submitting the in-
[11151]formation to Agency officers were presumably seeking legal immunity should the
[11152]plots succeed. (Id., p. 1.)
[11154]_- Helms' memorandum, however, made no mention of any of the CIA assassination
[11156]plots against Castro.*
[11158](Footnote continued from previous page.)
[11160]In a memorandum the day after President Johnson's decision to stop CIA-controlled
[11161]sabotage operations, McCone stated: ''the real issue to be considered at the
[11162]meeting and by the President was a question of whether we wished to implement |
[11164]the policy (outlined in certain memoranda) or abandon the basic objective of bring-
[11165]ing about the liquidation of the Castro Communist entourage and the elimination
[11167]of Communist presence in Cuba and thus rely on future events of an undisclosed
[11168]nature which might accomplish this objective". (Memorandum by McCone, April 8,
[11169]1964, p. __-) :
[11171]In the context of the Special Group's discussion, McCone's use of the words "liqui-
[11172]dation" and “elimination'' appears to be another example of inartful language. A
[11173]literal interpretation of these words leaves one with the impression that assassina-
[11174]tion was contemplated. But the context of the discussion does not, bear out such an
[11175]interpretation. Thus in specifying what he meant by ‘future events of an undisclosed
[11176]nature'' McCone pointed to “extreme economic distress caused by a sharp drop in
[11178]sugar prices", and ‘other external factors". (Id, p. 8.) McCone testified that .
[11179]such references as the "elimination" or "liquidation" of the Castro regime did not |
[11180]refer to assassination. (McCone, p. ___.) .
[11182]**Moreover, according to Bundy, no one from the CIA or anyone else informed him at
[11183]the meetings that "in earlier years there had been a relationship with...persons
[11184]allegedly involved with the criminal syndicate--in order to accomplish the assassi-
[11185]mation of Fidel Castro" (Bundy , p. 71.)
[11187]“ee
[11189]HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 239
[11191]Ch
[11192]4 STi NY
[11194]Indeed, it stated that "Agency officers made clear to each of the sources that
[11196]_ the United States Government would not under any circumstances , condone the
[11198]HY 50955
[11200]planned actions". (Id., p. LD)
[11202]When the Special Group considered the information in Helms memorandum on
[11204]- June 18, 1964, McCone stated he was "somewhat skeptical" and proposed :additional
[11206]investigation, but “others, including Mr. Bundy, felt that the U. S. was being
[11207]put on notice and should do everything in its power to ascertain promptly the
[11209]veracity of the reports and then undertake prevention". (Memorandum of Special
[11210]Group Meeting, June 18, 1964, )- In a memorandum on the June 18 meeting, McCone
[11212]indicated he had dissented from the Special Group" s decision, stating his be-
[11214]lief that the Special Group was “overly exercised" and that he was inclined to
[11216]dismiss the matter as 'Miami cocktail party talk". McCone noted, . however, that
[11218]the Special Group "was more concerned than I and therefore planning to discuss
[11219]the subject with the Attorney General and possibly Mr. Hoover". (Memorandum
[11220]June 18, 1964, p. 1.).
[11222]The Special Group decided that the reports be transmitted to the Attorney
[11223]General "as a matter of law enforcement". (Id.) Robert Kennedy was informed of
[11224]this matter a few days later and stated that the Justice Department would investi-
[11225]gate. (Memorandum of Meeting, 22 June 1964.) Thereafter the FBI conducted an
[11227]investigation, the results of which were submitted to the Special Group on
[11229]August .19, 1964, by McCone.* (Memorandum, “August 19, 1964, McCone to Bundy.)
[11231]*McCone's memorandum sunmarized seven FBI reports on its investigation. The FBI
[11232]found that: several of the persons it interviewed stated they had knowledge of
[11233]the exile's plots and had reported the information to the CIA.: Others inter-
[11234]viewed denied knowledge of the plans.
[11236]Docld:32423539 Page 240
[11240]5, lelms' Report to Rusk that CIA was not Involved with Amlash in a
[11242]Castro Assassination. Plot
[11243]“In March 1966, Helms reported to Rusk by memorandum on the CIA's re-
[11244]lations with Amlash. (Rusk Ex. 7, Memorandum, March 7, 1966, Helms to Rusk). . -
[11245]In this report, Helms stated that the CIA's contact with Amlash was for "the
[11246]express purpose" of intelligence collection. (Id.). Noting Cuban press
[11247]claims that Amlash and a second Cuban had been involved with the CIA in a
[11248]Castro assassination plot, Helms stated:
[11249]| The Agency was not involved with either of
[11250]these two men in a plot ‘to assassinate
[11251]Fidel Castro, as claimed in fa Cuban news
[11252]_telease/ nor did it ever encourage either
[11253]of these two persons. to attempt such an act.
[11254](Rusk Ex. 7, p. 1).
[11255]The Helms memorandum to Rusk made no mention of che fact that CIA officers,
[11256]with Helms! knowledge, had offered a poison pen to Amlash on November 22, 1963,
[11257]that CIA had supplied arms to Amlash in 1964, or that CIA had put Amlash in touch
[11258]with B-l to enable him to obtain a silenced weapon to assassinate Castro.
[11260]In his testimony, Helms stated that this memorandum to Rusk was > ‘inaccurate!
[11261]and "not truthful". (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 115.)
[11263]The CIA's copy of the Helms' memorandum to Rusk contains a typed notation
[11264]in which HeIms' signature was recommended by the CIA's then Deputy Director for
[11265]Plans, Thomas Karamessines. (Rusk EX. 7, p. Z.) Helms testified that the day
[11267]. before his June 13, 1975, testimony to. the Committee he had asked Karamessines
[11269]| why the memorandum to Rusk had been written as it was. Helms stated he and Kara-
[11270]messines concluded they did not know the reason but Helms speculated that "it
[11271]may be until we conducted (the 1967 IG investigation) somewhat later we didn't
[11273]have the facts straight, or maybe we had the facts straight then but we did not
[11275]“have them straight later''. ‘“(Helms, 6/13/75, p. 115.)
[11277]HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 241
[11279]ane
[11280]|
[11282]Mute LE LL
[11284]6. Helms' Briefing of President Johnson on the 1967 Inspector General's |
[11286]Report. Drew Pearson's article in the spring of 1967 alleging U. S. involve-
[11287]ment in plots to assassinate Fidel Castro prompted President Johnson to re-
[11289]quest Helms, who by then had become the DCI, to conduct an. investigation. The
[11290]result was the Inspector General's Report of May 23, 1967. (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 35.)
[11291]After receiving the report, Helms briefed the President “orally about. the contents".
[11292](Id. at 36.) During his testimony, Helms was shown his handwritten notes apparently
[11293]prepared for his briefing of the President. Those notes carried the story through
[11294]mid-1963. When asked if he told President Johnson that, according to the 1967
[11295]study, the efforts to assassinate Fidel Castro had continued into Johnson's
[11296]presidency, Helms replied, "I just can't answer that, T just don't know. I can't
[11297]recall having done so". (Id. at 38.) He did note that it would not have
[11299]occurred to him to brief President Johnson on the 1964 AM/LASH gun deliveries
[11300]because "I don't think one would have approached the AM/LASH thing as an assassina-
[11301]tion plot against Castro". (Id. at 39.) Helms had testified that AM/LASH was an
[11302]intelligence and political action agent. (Helms, _.» P» __.) The IG Report
[11304]however, treated the AM/LASH operation as an assassination plot. (IG, p. -~ .)
[11306]7, Helms Testimony on Authorization in the Johnson Administration. In his
[11308]testimony, Helms was, asked if the Agnecy regarded "whatever marching orders.
[11310]they had obtained prior to the dealth of “President Kennedy as still being valid
[11312]and operative'' when President Johnson succeeded to the office. Helms replied:
[11314]HY 50955 Daocld: 32423539 Page 242
[11316]| Suara li U wie
[11318]This is not very clear to me at this Stage. A lot
[11319]of the same officers were serving President Johnson
[11320]as they: served President Kennedy, and.:.I can't re-
[11321]call anymore whether there was any specific issue
[11322]about whether this was taken up with President
[11323]Johnson at any meeting or any session. If it had
[11324]been,.I would have thought there would have been
[11325]records someplace." (Helms, 6/13, p. 139.)
[11327]When asked whether President Johnson had been informed of or had authorized
[11328]continuing efforts to assassinate Castro, Helms. replied indirectly that "the
[11329]Special Group would have continued to consider these. matters, and I would have
[11330]assumed that whoever was chairing the Special Group would have in turn reported
[11331]to the President, which was the usual practice". (id.)
[11333]But the records of the Special Group do not show any consideration of a
[11334]Castro assassination or of the AM/LASH plot during the Johnson Administration
[11336]' (or earlier). And, as discussed above, there was no evidence that McCone or
[11338]anyone above the Agency was informed of or specifically authorized the AM/LASH
[11340]plots.
[11342]HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 243
[11344]araeSs Peed CO voy. ougeommd tiee LU/ LUy 73
[11345]Pending (1) Rewrite per Subcommittee
[11346]Editing and (2) Insertion of
[11347]Gottlieb and Tweedy Testimony
[11349]TABLE OF CONTENTS
[11351]Page
[11352]D. CONGO.
[11353]1. Introduction | So ce ee . woe ee ee : tees 1
[11354]- 2. Dulles Cabled Leopoldville That "Removal"
[11355]of Lumumba is an Urgent Objective in "High
[11356]Quarters" a 3
[11357]3. CIA Encouraged Congolese Efforts ‘to , "Eliminate!
[11358]_ Lumumba, Who Was Viewed. as a "Grave Danger" Even
[11359]After Being Deposed a and Placed in U.N. Protective
[11360]Custody .. Cpe ee So ee ee 8 :
[11361]' 4. The Plot to Assassinate » Lamunba . ee cee ke 14.
[11362].(a) Dulles Cabled Again for “Elimination”
[11363]' of Lumumba, and a Messenger Was Sent to
[11364]Congo With a Highly Sensitive a .
[11365]Assignment ... a
[11366](b) Gottlieb Delivered Lethal Substance to
[11367]Hedgman-in the Congo for the Assassi- -
[11368]nation of Lumumba: September 1960... .... . 18
[11369](c) Hedgman Testified That Gottlieb Told
[11370]Him That President Eisenhower Had ;
[11371]Ordered the Assassination of Lumumba . 2... 1.) 22
[11372](d) Headquarters Makes the Assassination
[11373]Plot "Highest Priority" and Authorizes
[11374]Steps in Furtherance of It 2
[11375](e) The Chief of Station Moves Forward .
[11376]With Assassination Plot 2...) eee BL
[11377](i) The Chief of Station Testified
[11378]' That He Requested and Received .
[11379]Confirmation of the Assassination
[11380]Plan from Headquarters ee kee ee ew. BL
[11381](ii) The Chief of Station Took "Exp lora-
[11382]tory Steps" in Furtherance of the
[11383]Assassination Plot and Testified
[11384]That He Destroyed Cable Traffic
[11385]Related to the Plot’... rc
[11387]HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 244 —
[11391](£). testimony of Bissell and Tweedy About the
[11392]Degree of Support for and Perpetration of the
[11393]sO AsSassiriation Plot . rr
[11395](i)
[11397](ii)
[11399](iii)
[11401]5. The Question of a Connection Between the Assassination.
[11403]Tweedy Had No Recollection of the Operation
[11404]To Poison Lumumba . coe ee ee
[11406]Tweedy Testified That He Discussed With
[11408]Bissell the Feasibility of Assassinating.
[11410]Lumumba and He’Cabled Hedgman About Gaining
[11411]Access to Lumumba. for the Purpose of
[11414]Bissell Testified That Ne Did Not Recall
[11415]Whether the Assassination Operation Had.
[11416]Moved from Planning to Implementation
[11417]But it Was Not. Against Apency Policy to -
[11418]Send Poisons to the Congo foe.
[11420]‘Plot and Other Actions of CIA Officers and Operatives
[11421]in the Congo soe ee ee eee
[11423]‘ (a) O'Donnell's Operations in the Congo
[11425](i)
[11427](ii)
[11429](iii)
[11431](iv)
[11433](vy)
[11435]Tweedy and the Chief of Station Agreed That
[11436]a Senior Case Officer Should be Sent to
[11438]the Congo to Concentrate on the Assassi-~
[11439]nation Operation ;
[11441]Bissell Discussed Assassination of
[11442]Lumumba With O'Donnell and Sent Him
[11443]to Congo: October-November 1960
[11445]Bissell Testified That He Asked O'Donnell
[11446]to Plan and Prepare for an Assassination
[11448]Operation.
[11450]O'Donnell Arrived in the Congo and |
[11451]Learned That a Virus Was -in the
[11452]Station Safe hoe ee
[11454]‘O'Donnell Planned to "Neutralize!
[11456]Lumumba by Turning Him Over to
[11457]Congolese Authorities and Requested
[11458]the Assignment of Agent QJWIN to
[11459]Leopoldville as His Alter Ego
[11461](b) Agent QIWIN's Mission in the Congo: November-
[11462]December 1960 : coe re
[11464]BW 50955 Docld: 32423539
[11466]Page 245
[11468]a
[11470]41
[11472]— 4&8
[11474]52
[11475]53.
[11477]54
[11478]59
[11480]60
[11482]67
[11486]. {e) -QIWIN' s_ Connection to Project ZRRIFLE
[11488]-(d) Agent QJWIN Was Asked By Hedgman' s Operative
[11489]WIROGUE to Join an "Execution Squad":
[11490]Decembes 1960 - coe ee ee
[11492]6. The Question of Whether the CIA Was Involved in
[11493]' Bringing About Lumumba * s Death in Katanga ,
[11495]. (a) Lumumba's Escape from UN Custody, Capture .
[11496]_ by Congolese Army, and Imprisonment at ©
[11497]Thysville: November .27-December 3, ‘1960
[11499](b) Transfer of Lumumba to Katanga Where the
[11500]Was Killed: ‘January 17, 1960 to ‘
[11502]7. The Question of the Level at Which the Assassination
[11504]Plot -Was Authorized
[11506](a). High- -Level } Meetings at Which’ “Getting I Rid
[11507]of Lumumba" is Discussed .
[11508]Ci) Dillon Testified That the Question of
[11509]' Assassination Was Raised at Pentagon
[11510]Meeting: Summer 1960 | .
[11512](ii) Robert Johnson Testified That He Heard
[11513]the President Order Lumumba ' s Assassi-:
[11514]nation at an NSC Meeting ..
[11516](iii) The President! s "Extremely Strong
[11517]Feelings" Lead the Special Group to
[11518]Consider Anything That Might Get Rid
[11520]of Lumumba and Dulles Cables. for Lumumba 's_
[11522]Removal: August 25-26, 1960
[11524](iv) USC Meeting of September 21, 1960: Dulles
[11525]Said Lumumba Would Remain a Grave Danger.
[11526]Until "Disposed Of". bok
[11528](b) Testimony of Eisenhower White House Officials
[11529]That They Knew of No Presidential Consideration
[11530]of Assassination
[11532](c) Richard Bissell Testified That He “Strongly
[11533]Inferred" That the Assassination Effort Against
[11534]Lumuiba Was Authorized By President Eisenhower
[11535]and Allen Dulles Loe Lo.
[11537]HW 50955 Docld:324293539 Page 246
[11539]Page
[11540]72
[11542]74
[11543]79
[11544]79
[11545]81.
[11547]82
[11549]«84
[11551]84
[11553]8& .
[11555]LOL
[11556]106
[11558]110
[11560]114
[11562]‘DRAFT: OCTOBER 6, 1975. _ : +. TOP_SECRET
[11564]Frederick D. Baron For Internal Committee
[11566]‘Use Only -
[11568]D. CONGO
[11570]1. Introduction
[11572]The Committee has received solid evidence of a CIA
[11574]plot to assassinate Patrice Lumumba . The plot proceeded to .
[11575]the point where lethal substances’ and instrumerits. specifically
[11576]intended for use in an. assassination were placed in the hands
[11577]of ‘the CIA Chief of Station in Leopoldville by an Agency
[11578]scientist. _
[11580], Although» ‘these instruments of assassination « were never
[11581]used, a number of questions are presented by the Lumumba case
[11582]which reflect general issues that run throughout the Committee's
[11583]assassination inquiry. First, did CIA officers and operatives
[11585]in the. Congo take steps to attempt the assassination of Lumumba?
[11587]Second, how high in the United States government was the
[11588]source’ of authorization for the CIA assassination plot? Finally,
[11589]was the CIA connected in any way to the events that actually led
[11590]to the death of Lumumba while in ‘Congolese custody? .
[11592]A thread of historical background is necessary to weave these
[11593]broad questions together with the documents and testimony re-
[11595]ceived by the Committee.
[11597]HW 50955 Doold:32473539 Page 247
[11599]-?-
[11601]In the summer of 1960, there was a great deal of concern
[11602]at the highest levels in the United States government: about the
[11603]role of Patrice Lumumba in the Congo.? Lumumba , who served briefly
[11604]as Premier ‘of ‘the newly independent nation, was viewed with alarm
[11605]by United States foreign policymakers because of what. they perceived:
[11606]as his magnetic public appeal and his: leanings toward the Soviet -
[11607]Union. |
[11609]Under the leadership of Lumumba and the new Président,
[11611]Joseph Kasavubu, the Congo. declared its independence from Belgium
[11612]_on. June. 30, 1960. In the turbulent month that followed, Lumumba
[11613]“threatened to invite Soviet troops to hasten the withdrawal of
[11614]Belgian armed forces. The United Nations Security Council re-
[11615]quested a Belgian withdrawal and dispatched a neutral force
[11617]‘to the Congo to preserve order. In late July, Lumumba visited
[11618]Washington and received pledges of. economic aid from, Secretary
[11620]of State Christian Herter. At the beginning of September,
[11622]Soviet airplanes, trucks, and technicians were arriving in the
[11623]province where Lumumba's support was strongest.
[11625]By mid-September, Lumumba sought protection from the UN.
[11626]guard in Leopoldville after losing a struggle over the leadership.
[11627]of the government with Kasavubu and Joseph Mobutu, Chief. of Staff
[11628]of the Congolese armed forces. In early December, Mobutu's troops
[11630]captured Lumumba whike he was traveling toward. his stronghold at
[11632]* Since the period in which the events under examination occurred,
[11633]~. the names of many geographical units and governmental institutions
[11634]‘have changed. For instance, the nation formerly known as the Republic
[11635]of the Congo is now the Republic of Zaire and the present capital city,
[11636]Kinshasa, was known then as Leopoldville.. For the sake of clarity in
[11637]dealing with many of the documents involved in this. Section, the names
[11638]_used in this report are those which applied in the early 1960' s, con-
[11639]temporaneously with the events under consideration.
[11641]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 246
[11645]Stanleyville, and he was imprisoned. ‘The central government of
[11646]the Congo transferred Lumumba on January 17, 1961 to the custody
[11647]of authorities in the province of Katanga, which was assérting its
[11648]own independence at that time. Several weeks later,. the Katangese
[11649]authorities announced Lumumba ' s death. . .
[11651]‘There: are various accounts. of the. circumstances and. timing
[11652]of Lumumba's death. The United Nations investigation of the inci-
[11653]dent concluded that Lumumba was killed on January 17.*
[11655]2. Dulles Cables Leopoldville That "Removal" of Lumumba
[11656]is an. rgent Objective in 1g uarters
[11658]Shortly after the Congolese declaration of independence
[11660]from Belgium on June 30, 1960, the CIA assigned anew Chief of
[11661]Station ‘to the. Congo. “The. Chief of Station said that the briefings
[11662]he received at CIA headquartérs in preparation for his departure:
[11663]contained no discussion of the possibility of assassinating Patrice ©
[11664]Lumumba (Hedgman, 8/21/75, Pp. 8). On his brief return to head-
[11665]quarters in. connection with Lumumba 's visit to Washington in late
[11666]July, the Chief of Station again heard no discussion of assassi-
[11667]nating Lumumba (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 9).
[11668], During August, great concern about Lumumba's political
[11669]strength in the Congo was growing among the foreign policy- makers
[11670]of the Eisenhower Administration. ** This concern was nurtured
[11671]* Report of the Commission of. Investigation, 11/61, UN
[11672]Security Council, Official Records, Supplement . for October,
[11673]November, and December.
[11674]** See Section 5, infra, for full discussion of the prevailing
[11675]~ . anti-Lumumba attitude in the United States government as shown by
[11677]minutes of the National Security Council and Special Group and the
[11678]‘testimony of high Administration officials.
[11680]HWY 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 249
[11682]by intelligence reports such as that cabled to CLA headquarters
[11684]by the new Chief-of » Station:
[11686]EMBASSY AND STATION BELIEVE CONGO EXPERIENCING:
[11687]CLASSIC COMMUNIST EFFORT TAKEOVER GOVERNMENT . .,
[11688]MANY FORCES AT WORK HERE: SOVIETS ... COMMUNIST
[11689]PARTY, ETC. ALTHOUGH DIFFICULT DETERMINE MAJOR
[11690]INFLUENCING FACTORS TO PREDICT OUTCOME STRUGGLE
[11691]FOR POWER, DECISIVE PERIOD NOT FAR OFF. WHETHER
[11692]OR NOT LUMUMBA ACTUALLY COMMIE OR JUST PLAYING .
[11693]COMMIE GAME TO ASSIST HIS. SOLIDIFYING POWER, ANTI-
[11694]WEST FORCES RAPIDLY INCREASING POWER CONGO AND
[11695]THERE MAY BE LITTLE TIME LEFT IN WHICH TAKE ACTION
[11696]TO AVOID ANOTHER CUBA.... ° (CIA Cable: IN 39706,
[11697]Leopoldville to Director, (8/18/60. —
[11699]This cable also stated the Chief of Station's operational "OBJECTIVE
[11700][OF] REPLACING LUMUMBA WITH PRO WESTERN GROUP" (CIA Cable, 8/18/60).
[11701]Bronson Tweedy, then Chief of the Africa Division of CIA’ s clan-.
[11702]. destine services, replied the same day that he was seeking State
[11703]Department approval for the proposed. operation based upon “OUR
[11704]BELIEF LUMUMBA MUST BE REMOVED ‘IF POSSIBLE" (CIA Cable Out 59741,
[11705]“Tweedy to. Leopoldville, 8/18/60). On August 19, Richard Bissell,
[11706]Director of CIA's covert operations branch, signed a follow-up
[11707]cable to Leopoldville: "YOU ARE AUTHORIZED PROCEED WITH OPERATION" |
[11708](CIA Cable OUT 59959, Director to Leopoldville, 8/19/60) _
[11709]Several days later, the Chief of Station reported that a plan
[11710]to assassinate Lumumba had been proposed to President Kasavubu by
[11712]Congolese leaders:
[11714]: ANTI-LUMUMBA LEADERS APPROACHED KASAVUBU
[11715]_ WITH PLAN ASSASSINATE LUMUMBA ... KASAVUBU
[11716]REFUSED AGREE SAYING HE RELUCTANT RESORT
[11717]VIOLENCE AND NO OTHER LEADER SUFFICIENT .
[11718]STATURE REPLACE LUMUMBA. (CIA Cable IN 42761,
[11719]Leopoldville to Director, 8/24/60.)
[11721]HW 50955 DociId: 324273539 Page 250
[11723]' This incident indicates that the CIA was aware that there was
[11725]' some Congolese support for the assassination of Lumumba, but that
[11726]the moderate President of the Congo still respected Lumumba and
[11728]"refused to consider assassination. | 7 | .
[11730]- On August 25, 1960, Allen Dulles attended a meeting of the
[11731]Special Group -- the National Security Council subcommittee re-
[11732]sponsible for the planning of covert operations.* In response to
[11733]the outline of some CIA plans for political actions against
[11734]Lumumba, such as arranging a vote of no confidence by the Congolese
[11735]Parliament, the Special Assistant to the President for National
[11736]Security Affairs reported that the President:
[11738]had expressed extremely strong feelings .
[11739]on the necessity for very straightforward
[11740]-action in this situation, and he wondered
[11742]whether the plans as outlined were sufficient
[11743]to accomplish this. . (Special. Group Minutes, 8/25/60.)
[11745]After this discussion, the Special Group
[11747]finally agreed that planning for the Congo
[11748]would not necessarily rule out "consideration"
[11750]' of any particular kind of activity which might
[11751]contribute to getting rid of Lumumba. ,
[11752](Special Group Minutes, 8/25/60.)
[11754]* This Special Group meeting and the testimony about its
[11755]significance on the issue of authorization is discussed in detail
[11756]in Section 5 (iii), infra. ——
[11758]HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 251
[11760]The next day, . Allen Dulles personally signed a cable* to -
[11761]the Leopoldville Chief of Station which stressed the urgency of
[11763]"removing" “Lumumba :
[11765]IN HIGH QUARTERS** HERE IT IS THE .CLEAR-
[11766]CUT CONCLUSION THAT IF LLL [LUMUMBA] CON-.
[11767]TINUES TO HOLD HIGH OFFICE, THE INEVITABLE
[11768]RESULT WILL AT BEST BE CHAOS AND AT WORST
[11769]PAVE THE WAY TO COMMUNIST TAKEOVER OF THE
[11770]CONGO WITH DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE
[11771]PRESTIGE OF THE-UN AND FOR THE INTERESTS OF.
[11772]THE FREE WORLD GENERALLY. CONSEQUENTLY
[11773]WE CONCLUDE THAT HIS REMOVAL MUST BE AN 7
[11774]_URGENT AND PRIME OBJECTIVE THAT UNDER EXISTING
[11775]CONDITIONS THIS SHOULD BE A HIGH PRIORITY OF
[11776]OUR COVERT ACTION. (CIA Cable, OUT 62966,
[11777]Director to Leopoldville, 8/26/60. )
[11779]_ Dulles cabled that the Chief of Station was to be given "WIDER
[11780]AUTHORITY" -- along the lines of the previously authorized opera-_
[11782]“tion to replace Lumumba with a pro- Western’ group ~~ “INCLUDING
[11783]EVEN MORE AGGRESSIVE ACTION IF IT CAN REMAIN COVERT" (CIA Cable,
[11784]8/26/60). “WE REALIZE THAT TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY MAY PRESENT
[11785]THEMSELVES TO YOU," the cable continued (CTA Cable, 8/26/60).
[11787]% Cables issued under the personal signature of the DCI are
[11788]a relative rarity in CIA communitations and call attention’ to the
[11789]importance and sensitivity “of the matter discussed.
[11791]** Ags discussed in Section 5(c), infra, Richard, Bisell testified
[11793]that Allen Dulles would have ‘used the phrase “higher quarters" to
[11794]refer to the President (Bissell, 9/10/95, p. 48).
[11796]HW 50955 Docld:324293539 Page 252
[11798]‘Dulles also authorized the expenditure of up to $100, 000 "TO
[11799]CARRY OUT ANY CRASII PROGRAMS ON WHICH YOU DO’ NOT HAVE, THE OPPOR-
[11800]TUNITY TO CONSULT Has" (CIA Cable, 8/26/60) - He assured the
[11801]“Chief of Station that the message had been "SEEN AND APPROVED AT
[11802]COMPETENT LEVEL" in the State Department (CIA Cable, 8/26/60).
[11803]But. the Director of Central Intelligence made a special point
[11804]of assuring the Chief of Station that he was authorized to act
[11805]unilaterally in a case where the United States Ambassador to the —
[11806]Congo would prefer to remain uninformed: a
[11807]TO THE EXTENT THAT AMBASSADOR MAY DESIRE
[11808]_ TO BE CONSULTED, YOU SHOULD SEEK HIS CON-
[11809]CURRENCE, IF IN ANY PARTICULAR CASE, HE
[11810]DOES NOT WISH.TO BE CONSULTED YoU CAN ACT
[11811]ON YOUR OWN AUTHORITY WHERE TIME DOES NOT
[11812]PERMIT REFERRAL HERE (CIA. Cable, 8/26/60).
[11813]This mandate raises a question as to whether the DCI .was. contem-
[11814]plating a particular form of action against Lumumba which the
[11815]Ambassador would want to be in a position to “plausibly deny"
[11816]United States involvement. DDP Richard Bissell testified that he
[11817]was “almost certain" that he was informed about the Dulles cable
[11818]shortly after its transmission and that it was his "belief" that
[11819]the cable was a circumlocutious means of indicating that the .
[11820]President wanted Lumumba to be killed (Bissell, 9/19/75, pp. 33,
[11821]64-65)
[11823]* See Section 5(c), infra, for additional testimony by Bissell
[11824]on the question of authorization for the assassination effort
[11825]against Lumumba .
[11827]HY 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 253
[11831]3, CIA Encourages Congolese Efforts to "Eliminate" . :
[11832]' Lumumba, Who is Viewed as a "Grave Danger” Even After
[11833]"+ Being Deposed and Placed in UN Protective Custody ~
[11835]on September 5, 1960, President Kasavubu dismissed
[11836]Premier Lumumba from the government despite the strong support _
[11837]for Lumumba that existed in the Congolese Parliament. After losing ~
[11838]the ensuing power struggle with Kasavubu and’ Mobutu,’ who seized
[11839]the government by a military coup on September 14, Lumumba sought
[11840]‘protection from the United Nations. peace-keeping force. The
[11841]evidence indicates that’ the ouster of Lumumba from the government
[11842]did not alleviate the concern about him in the United States. govern-
[11843]‘ment. — - . |
[11844]Rather, the CIA and high Eisenhower Administration
[11845]officials* continued to view him as a threat, at least’ until
[11846]early December when he was captured by Mobutu's troops and im-
[11847]prisoned. During this period, CIA officers in the. Congo advised
[11848]and aided Congolese contacts known ‘to have any intent to kill
[11849]Lumumba. They also opposed the resumption of the democratic process ©
[11850]after the coup. -~ by reopening the Parliament -- because of the
[11851]likelihood that this would return Lumumba to power,
[11852]The day after Lumumba was deposed by Kasavubu, two CIA
[11853]officers met with a high level Congolese politician who had a
[11854]close relationship to the Leopoldville Station. The Station re-
[11856]ported to CIA headquarters that the politician had made a response
[11858] * A detailed treatment of the expressions of continued concern
[11859]_ over Lumumba.at the National Security Council Level is set forth
[11860]in Section , infra. me
[11862]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 254
[11864]to a remark by the Chief of Station that implied that he might
[11865]assassinate. Lumumba:
[11867]TO'COS COMMENT THAT LUMUMBA IN OPPOSITION Is .
[11869]ALMOST AS DANGEROUS AS IN OFFICE, [THE
[11871]CONGOLESE POLITICIAN] INDICATED UNDERSTOOD
[11873]AND IMPLIED MIGHT PHYSICALLY ELIMINATE:
[11875]LUMUMBA. (CIA Cable, IN 49679, Leopoldville
[11877]to Director, 9/7/60. ). a,
[11879]The cable continued to report that the Chief of Station had offered |
[11880]to assist this politician "IN PREPARATION NEW GOVERNMENT PROGRAM" -
[11881]“and assured him that the United States would supply technicians
[11882](CIA Cable, 9/7/60) .
[11884]As the chaotic struggle for power raged, the Chief of
[11885]the Africa Division succinctly summarized the prevalent U. S.
[11886]apprehension about Lumumba's ability to influence events in the
[11887]Congo by virtue of personality, irrespective of his official
[11888]position:
[11890]LUMUMBA TALENTS AND DYNAMISM APPEAR OVER-
[11892]RIDING FACTOR IN REESTABLISHING HIS POSITION
[11894]EACH TIME IT SEEMS HALF LOST. IN OTHER WORDS »
[11896]EACH TIME LUMUMBA HAS OPPORTUNITY HAVE LAST
[11898]. WORD HE CAN SWAY EVENTS TO HIS ADVANTAGE.
[11899](CIA Cable, OUT 69233, Director to Leopoldville,
[11900]. » 9/13/60). ;
[11902]The day after Mobutu's coup, the Chief of Station reported
[11903]that he was serving as an advisor to a Congolese effort to "elimi -
[11904]nate" Lumumba due to his "fear" that Lumumba Might, in fact, have
[11906]_ _ been’ strengthened by placing himself in. UN custody, which afforded
[11908]“a safe base of operations:
[11910]HW 50955 Dacld:32493539 Page 2545
[11914]STILL: DIFFICULT DETERMINE WHETHER MOBUTU HAS.
[11915]SUFFICIENT CONTROL ARMY TO ENFORCE DECISIONS
[11916]ANNOUNGED NIGHT 14 SEPTEMBER. STATION ADVISED
[11917]-[TWO MODERATE CONGOLESE POLITICIANS] TRY WORK
[11918]WITH. [KEY CONGOLESE CONTACT] IN EFFORT ELIMI-
[11919]NATE LUMUMBA. FEAR UN PROTECTION WILL GIVE
[11920]LUMUMBA OPPORTUNITY ORGANIZE COUNTER ATTACK.
[11921]ONLY SOLUTION IS REMOVE HIM FROM SCENE SOONEST. |
[11922](CIA Cable, IN 13374, Leopoldville to: Director,
[11923]9/15/60.) i a -
[11925]On September 17, another CIA operative in the Congo met
[11926]with a leading Congolese senator. At this meeting, the ‘senator _
[11927]“yequested a clandestine supply of small arms to equip some _
[11928]Congolese Army. troops,. The cable to. CIA headquarters coricerning
[11930]the meeting reported:
[11932][CONGOLESE SENATOR] REQUESTED CLANDESTINE
[11933]SUPPLY SMALL ARMS TO EQUIP ‘,.. TROOPS
[11934]RECENTLY ARRIVED LEOP[OLDVILLE] AREA ...
[11935][THE’ SENATOR]. SAYS THIS WOULD PROVIDE CORE
[11936]. ARMED MEN WILLING AND ABLE TAKE DIRECT
[11937]ACTION... [SENATOR] RELUCTANTLY AGREES
[11938]‘LUMUMBA MUST GO PERMANENTLY. DISTRUSTS :~
[11939]. [ANOTHER CONGOLESE LEADER] BUT WILLING MAKE
[11940]PEACE WITH HIM FOR PURPOSES ELIMINATION
[11941]LUMUMBA. (CIA Cable, IN 14228, Leopoldville -
[11942]to Director,. 9/17/60.) 7 . ;
[11944]The CIA operative told the Congolese senator that "HE WOULD EXPLORE
[11945]POSSIBILITY OBTAINING ARMS" and recommended to CIA headquarters
[11947]that they should
[11949]HAVE [ARMS] SUPPLIES READY TO GO AT
[11950]NEAREST BASE PENDING [UNITED STATES]
[11951]DECISION THAT SUPPLY WARRANTED AND NECES-
[11952]SARY (CIA Cable, 9/17/60) .* —_
[11954]* This recommendation proved to be in line with large scale
[11955]. planning at CIA headquarters for clandestine paramilitary support
[11956]to anti-Lumumba elements. On October 6, 1960, Richard Bissell and
[11957]Bronson Tweedy signed a cable concerning plans which the Chief of
[11958]Station was instructed not to discuss with State Department repre-
[11959]sentatives or operational contacts: :
[11961](footnote continued on next page) -
[11963]te ret en ener ee ab
[11965]HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 256
[11969]Several days later, -while warning a key Congolese
[11970]leader. about coup plots led by Lumumba and two of his supporters,
[11972]_the Chief of Station
[11974]URGED ARREST OR OTHER MORE PERMANENT DISPOSAL
[11975]_ OF LUMUMBA, GIZENGA, AND MULELE (CIA Cable,
[11976]IN 15643, Leopoldviile to Director, 9/20/61).
[11978]Gizenga and Mulele were Lumumba ' s lfeutenants who were
[11980]léading his’ supporters while Lumumba was in UN custody.
[11982]- (Footnote continued from previous page) -
[11984]‘(LIN]VIEW UNCERTAIN OUTCOME CURRENT DEVELOP -
[11985]MENTS. [CIA] CONDUCTING CONTINGENCY PLANNING
[11986]. FOR CONGO AT REQUEST POLICY ECHELONS. THIS
[11987]_..PLANNING DESIGNED TO PREPARE’ FOR SITUATION.
[11988]_ IN. WAY [UNITED STATES] WOULD PROVIDE CLAN-
[11989]DESTINE SUPPORT TO ELEMENTS IN ARMED
[11990]' OPPOSITION TO LUMUMBA, ;
[11992]CONTEMPLATED ACTION INCLUDES PROVISION ARMS,
[11993]SUPPLIES AND PERHAPS SOME ‘TRAINING TO ANTI-
[11994]LUMUMBA RESISTANCE “GROUPS...
[11996](CIA Cable OUT 04697, Director to Leopoldville,
[11997]10/6/60. )
[11999]HG 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 257
[12003]Throughout the fall of 1960, the CIA continued to view
[12004]. ‘Lumymba as a serious political threat while he remained in UN
[12005]protective ‘custody..* One concern was that. if the Parliament --
[12007]which had been closed by the coup -- were re-opened and the moderates
[12009]* Both Richard Bissell and Bronson Tweedy, then Chief of the
[12010]CIA Africa Division, confirmed that the CIA continued to view
[12011]Lumumba as a threat even after he placed himself in UN custody
[12012](Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. ; Tweedy, 9/9/75, pp. ). Both
[12013]Bissell and Tweedy referred to two factors to substantiate this
[12014]view: first, Lumumba was a spellbinding orator with the ability
[12015]to stir masses of people to action; and second, the UN forces did
[12016]not restrain Lumumba's freedom of movement and the. Congolese army
[12017]surrounding them were often lax in maintaining their vigil.
[12019][Quote/Cite from transcripts. ]
[12021]HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 256
[12025]failed to obtain a majority vote, the “PRESSURES. FOR [LUMUMBA'S]
[12026]RETURN WILL. BE: ALMOST IRRESISTABLE" (CIA Cable, IN 33499,
[12027]~“Leopoldville to Director, 10/26/60) .* Another general concern |
[12028]at CIA headquarters was that foreign powers would intervene in
[12029]the Congo: and bring Lumumba to- power (CIA Cable, OUT 81720, Director
[12030]to ‘Leopoldville,. 10/17/60) . ‘Similarly, throughout this period
[12031]Lumumba was viewed by CIA officials and the Eisenhower Adminis-
[12032]tration** as a stalking horse for "what appeared to be a Soviet..
[12033]effort to take over the Congo" (Hedgman, 8/21/75, Pp. 10, 45).
[12034]. During this period, the Leopoldville station continued to
[12036]maintain close’ operational relationships with, and offer aid to,
[12038]although there is no direct evidence that aid was provided for the
[12040]specific purpose of ‘assassination.
[12042]* A CIA Cable Cin 37289) -from Leopoldville to the Diréctor
[12043]on November 3, 1960 returns to this theme: the opening of the
[12044]Congolese Parliament by the United Nations is opposed. because it
[12045]“WOULD PROBABLY RETURN LUMUMBA TO- POWER . "
[12047]** See Section , infra, on such analysis at high-level policy”
[12048]meetings. :
[12050]KEK A Congolese security officer in liaison with the CIA on an
[12051]attempt to tap Lumumba's phones "IMPLIED HE TRYING HAVE [LUMUMBA] ©
[12052]KILLED BUT ADDED THIS MOST DIFFICULT AS JOB WOULD HAVE BE DONE
[12053]BY AFRICAN WITH NO APPARENT INVOLVEMENT WHITE MAN. (CIA Cable,
[12054]IN 34367, Leopoldville to Director, 10/28/60.) .
[12056]HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 259
[12058]HY 50955
[12062]4. The Plot to Assassinate Lumumba
[12064]In, the fall of 1960, a scientist from CIA headquarters
[12068]delivered to the Chief of Station in Leopoldville lethal bio-
[12070]logical substances to be used to assassinate Patrice Lumumba
[12072]The Chief of Station testified that after requesting and receiving
[12073]confirmation from CIA headquarters that he was to carry out the
[12074]scientist! iz) instructions, he proceeded to take. “exploratory steps"
[12075]in: furtherance: of ‘the assassination plot. The Chief of Station
[12076]testified that in the-course of ‘his: discussion with the CIA
[12077]scientist, Sidney Gottlieb, he was: informed that President Bisenhower
[12078]had ordered the assassination mission against Patrice Lumumba
[12079]Gottlieb's mission to the Congo + was: both preceded. and followed by
[12080]general cables urging the "elimination" ‘of Lumumba sent from CIA
[12081]headquarters, in an extraordinarily restricted "Eves Onlv" channel _
[12083]including two messages under ‘the personal signature of Allen Dulles.
[12085]The lethal substances were never used by the Chief of
[12087]Station. But despite the fact that Lumumba had placed himself in
[12089]the protective custody of the UN peace- keeping force shortly
[12090]before the poisons were delivered to the Chief of Station, there
[12092]‘is no clear evidence that the assassination operation was termi-
[12094]nated before Lumumba's death. ‘Thete is, however, no ) direct evidence |
[12095]of a connection between. the CIA assassination plot and the events
[12097]which actually led to Lumumba's death.*
[12099]* See Section 6, infra, for a discussion of the evidence about»
[12101]_ the circumstances ‘that Ted to Lumumba's death in Katanga.
[12103]Docld: 32423539 Page 260
[12105]HY 50955
[12107]-15-.
[12109](a) Dulles Cables Again for Eiiminat tion" of Lumumba,
[12110]= and a Messenger is’ Sent. to Congo | With a ‘Highly
[12112]Sensitive Assignment
[12114]On. September 19, 1960, several days after Lumumba placed him-
[12115]self in the. protective custody of the United ‘Nations peacekeeping
[12116]force ‘in Leopoldville, Richard Bissell -and Bronson Tweedy signed -
[12118]a eryptic cable to Leopoldville to arrange a clandestine meeting
[12119]between the Chief of Station and "Sidney Braun," who was traveling :
[12120]to the Congo. on an unspecified assignment : | .
[12122]["SID"] SHOULD ARRIVE APPROX 27 SEPT. . . WILL ©
[12123]ANNOUNCE HIMSELF AS. "SID FROM PARIS"... . IT.
[12124]URGENT YOU SHOULD SEE ["SID"]. SOONEST POSSIBLE
[12125]-AFTER HE PHONES YOU. HE WILL FULLY IDENTIFY
[12126]HIMSELF AND EXPLAIN HIS ASSIGNMENT TO YOU.
[12128]‘(CIA Cable,- OUT 71464, Bissell/Tweedy to Chief
[12129]of Station, 9/19/60.) ©
[12131]‘The cable bore a highly untisual sensitivity indicator +
[12132]"PROP" -- that restricted circulation at CIA headquarters. to the
[12134]Chief of the Africa. Division.*
[12136]* In a letter of September 23, 1975, the Chief of the CIA Review
[12137]Staff informed the Committee that "PROP" was normally used "to
[12139]denote sensitive personnel matters" (Seymour R. Bolton to Frederick
[12140]A. QO. Schwarz and Frederick D. Baron, 9/23/75. It appears that this
[12141]‘sensitivity indicator, while created for other purposes, was utilized
[12142]by Bissell, Tweedy, and the Chief of Station to restrict distribution
[12143]of their communications about an assassination operation. The cable
[12144]traffic cited in this report that was sent through the PROP channel
[12145]did not touch upon personnel matters except in terms of recruiting
[12146]additional CIA. officers and agents for the assassination operation.
[12148]Docld: 32423539 Page 261
[12152]The Bissell/Tweedy cable informed the Chief of Station that
[12153]he was to continue to use this indicator for — _— te
[12154]‘ALL [CABLE] TRAFFIC THIS OP, WHICH YOU
[12155]' INSTRUCTED HOLD ENTIRELY TO YOURSELF .
[12156]ACTA Cable, 9/19/60.
[12157]The Chief. of Station -- referred to herein as "Hedgman'* -- .
[12158]testified to a clear, independent recollection of receiving such
[12159]a cable. Hedgman stated that in September . of 1960 he received a
[12160]"most unusual" cable from CIA headquarters (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 11
[12161]43). The cable advised, in his words, that:
[12162]someone who I would have recognized would
[12163]arrive with instructions for me,
[12164]believe the message was also marked for my
[12165]' eyes only -,. and contained instructions
[12166]that Iwas not to discuss the message with
[12167]anyone.  (Hedgman, 8/21/75, PP. 12-13.)
[12168]‘Hedgman said that the cable did- not specify. the kind of. ‘instruc-
[12169]tions he was to receive, and it "did not refer to Lumumba in any
[12170]. way" (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 12).
[12171]Three days after the Bissell/Tweedy message that Hedgman was .
[12172]to meet "Sid" in Leopoldville, Bronson Tweedy uses the same sensi-
[12173]tivity indicator on a cable sent to Hedgman on an "Eyes Only"
[12175]basis (CIA Cable, OUT 74837, Tweedy to Leopoldville, 9/22/60).
[12177]- * Due to fear of reprisal from Lumumba's “followers, the Chief
[12178]of Station for the Congo from mid-summer 1960 through’ 1961 testi-
[12179]fied under the alias "Hedgman" (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 2; 8/25/75,
[12180]Pp. 4).
[12182]i
[12184]HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 262
[12186]a
[12190]On September 24, Allen Dulles personally issued a cable to
[12191]Leopoldville expressing in absolute terms his.desire to "eliminate":
[12192]Lumumba: . . |
[12194]WE WISH GIVE EVERY POSSIBLE SUPPORT: IN
[12195]ELIMINATING LUMUMBA FROM ANY POSSIBILITY
[12196]RESUMING GOVERNMENTAL POSITION OR IF HE
[12197]FAILS IN LEOP[OLDVILLE],. SETTING HIMSELF
[12198]_ IN STANLEYVILLE OR ELSEWHERE . (CIA Cable,
[12199]OUT 73573, Dulles to Leopoldville, 9/24/60. )
[12201]Dulles had expressed a similar view. three days | before. in ‘the
[12202]“presence of the President at an NSC meeting, stating: -
[12204]Mobutu appeared to be the. effective power in
[12205]the Congo. for the moment but Lumumba was not
[12206]yet disposed of and remained a grave danger .
[12207]as long as he was not disposed of. ~ (NSC
[12208]‘Minutes, 9/21/60) ;
[12210](b) Gottlieb Delivers Lethal Substances - ‘to the Chief of |
[12211]Station | in the Congo” for the Assassination of Lumumba of Lumumba
[12213]The Chief of. Station reported. through the PROP channel to Bronson
[12214]Tweedy that he had made- contact with the man dispatched to Leopoldville
[12215]with a highly sensitive assignment on September 26. (CIA Cable
[12217]IN 18989, Leopoldville to Tweedy, 9/27/60) This was the same
[12219]week in which Dulles cabled about the "elimination" of Lumumba
[12221]and made his statement to. the 1 NSC about the " ‘erave danger" ‘that
[12222]existed as long’ as Lumumba was ‘not “disposed of", .
[12224]Hedgman testified about the identity of "SID" -- the messenger
[12225]; referred to in the first cable through the PROP channel:
[12227]-Qr ‘Who was the messenger who arrived?
[12229]-Hedgman:. Mr. Sidney Gottlieb’
[12231]HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 263
[12235]Tweedy's cable indicated that a third country national would be
[12236]' required as an agent in the PROP operation:
[12237]IF DECIDED SUPPORT FOR PROP OBJECTIVES,
[12238]BELIEVE ESSENTIAL SUCH BE PROVIDED THROUGH
[12239]THIRD NATIONAL CHANNEL WITH [AMERICAN]
[12240]ROLE COMPLETELY CONCEALED. (CIA Cable,
[12242]9/22/60.)
[12244]Tweedy expressed reservations about two agents that’ the station
[12245].was using for other operations and said "WE ARE CONSIDERING A
[12246]- THIRD NATIONAL CUTOUT CONTACT CANDIDATE. AVAILABLE HERE WHO MIGHT
[12247]‘FILL BILL"* (CIA Cable, 9/22/60). Despite Tweedy's concern about.
[12248]the two existing station contacts, he indicated that the Chief of ©
[12249]station and his “colleague” ~- presumably the man identified as
[12250]"Sid" who was to arrive in the. Congo shortly to explain the PROP
[12251]operation to Hedgman -- were to be afforded considerable latitude
[12252]“in exercising their Judgment on the conduct of the operation:
[12254]YOU AND COLLEAGUE UNDERSTAND WE CANNOT READ .
[12256]- OVER YOUR SHOULDER-AS YOU PLAN AND ASSESS _.
[12257]OPPORTUNITIES. OUR PRIMARY CONCERN MUST BE
[12258]CONCEALMENT [AMERICAN] ROLE, UNLESS OUT-.
[12260]' STANDING OPPORTUNITY EMERGES WHICH MAKES
[12261]CALCULATED RISK FIRST CLASS BET. READY
[12262]ENTERTAIN ANY SERIOUS PROPOSALS YOU MAKE
[12264]- BASED OUR HIGH REGARD BOTH YOUR PROFESS IONAL
[12265]_ JUDGMENTS. (CIA Cable, 9/22/60. » ,
[12267]SRR TERE eee ee
[12268]_~ -° * This is probably a reference to agent QSWIN, who was later
[12269]dispatched to the Congo. His mission is ~ discussed in Sections
[12270], and= , infra. ;
[12272]HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 264
[12274]219 =
[12276]Qs And at that time, you, knew who'he was?
[12278]Hed many /I recognized him as an officer of the
[12279]gency... . I believe he referred to the
[12281]‘fact that I had received a message and that he
[12283]‘was the person concerned. (Hedgman, 8/21/75,
[12284]pp. 15-16) oe
[12286]The message carried by Gottlieb, then’ Scienve Advisor to
[12289]DDP Richard Bissell, was unnistakeably clear according to > Hedgman :
[12291]“Hedgman: It is my recollection that he advised me, or
[12292]my instructions were, to eliminate ‘Lumumba .
[12294]Q: By eliminate, do you mean assassinate?
[12296]Hedgman: ‘Yes. - L- would say that was . . . my under-
[12297]_ standing of the primary means. I don't think it was
[12299]probably limited to that, if there was .some other way
[12301]of doing it. . , ., ;
[12303]Q: Of. doing what?
[12305]Hedgman: Of removing him from a position of political -
[12306]threat. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 17- “18. )
[12308]Hedgman said that he and Gottlieb. also may have discussed non-
[12309]‘lethal means of removing Lumumba as a “political threat", but
[12310]he said, "I cannot recall with certainty on that" (Hedgman,
[12311]8/21/75, p. 28). | _ | .
[12313]He clearly recalled the discussion of assassination,
[12314]however: | | | | .
[12316]Q: And what did Mr. Gottlieb indicate with regard to
[12317]the possibility of physically eliminating him?
[12319]Hedgman: It was my understanding that that was
[12320]probably expected of me: (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 18.)
[12321]and again: .
[12323]Q: I take it that once you started discussing these
[12324]-Tethal agents, there was no doubt in your mind that
[12325]the kind of elimination he was there particularly to
[12326]discuss was killing Lumumba?
[12328]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 265
[12332]Hedgman: There was no doubt in my mind that
[12333]this was one of the way[s], and probably what
[12334]. they thought was the only way that would work
[12336](Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 25).
[12338]_ Hedgman explained Gottlieb provided him with poisons as a means
[12339]of assassination: .
[12340]_And what did he tell you with regard to
[12341]ow that might be accomplished?
[12342]_Hedgman: ... He brought some biological agents.
[12343]i assume that that's the correct word. But in
[12344]_ any case, poisonous agent with him, which he
[12345]passed to me.... , _
[12346]Q: These were lethal biological substances?
[12347]Hedgman: Yes... That was my understanding
[12348]as a non-expert. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp- 18-19.)
[12349]Hedgman testified that he received "rubber gloves, amask, and a
[12350]syringe” along with the poisons and that Gottlieb instructed him
[12351]in their use (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 20-21). Hedgman indicated that
[12352]this paraphernalia was for administering the poisons to Lumumba: —
[12353]‘Q: [W]hen -he [Gottlieb] came to the Congo
[12354]to give you lethal biological agents for
[12355]the assassination of Lumumba, was it clear
[12356]at that time that the means for administering
[12357]‘those biological agents was to inject them
[12358]into a substance that was tobe ingested by:
[12359]Lumumba, whether it be food, or drink, or
[12360]toothpaste or any other substance that was
[12361]to be ingested? re
[12362]Hedgman: That's my recollection, yes.
[12363]Uiedginan , 8/21/75, p. 82; accord. p. 24.)
[12364]Hedgman said that the means of assassination was not restricted
[12365]to use of the poisons provided by Gottlieb:
[12366]This’ was not a sine qua non that I employ this,
[12368]If there were another method, another way, it
[12369]_ would have been acceptable: (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 19.)
[12371]HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 266
[12375]. For example, HNedgman testified that he may have “suggested”
[12376]shooting Lumumba to Gottlieb as an alternative to poisoning
[12377](Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 27-29).
[12379]There was a firm requirement, however, that the means of assassi-
[12380]nation should not be traceable to the United States:
[12381]The biological substance, or specimens, what
[12382]have you, I think it was up to my judgment,
[12383]and if there was a better way -- certainly.
[12384][T]he point I now recall was in no way, if I
[12385]implemented these instructions, no way could
[12386]it’ be traced back to the United States. It
[12387]had to be a way which could not be traced
[12388]_ back ... either to an American or the United
[12389]States: government. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 19.)
[12390]Hedgman said Gottlieb assured him that the poisons were pro-
[12392]duced to meet this requirement:
[12394]I believe I raised the point that poisons left
[12395]traces in the human body, which could be found
[12396]on autopsy ... I believe that I was assured
[12397]that these .., lethal agents would [leave]
[12398]normal traces found in people that die of
[12399]certain diseases. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 23.)
[12401]Hedgman said that he had an “emotional. reaction of great sur-
[12402]prise" when it first became clear that Gottlieb was there to discuss
[12403]an assassination plan (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 30). But the Chief of
[12404]Station said that he did not give any indication that he would not.
[12405]carry out the instructions (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 46). Instead, he
[12406]told Gottlieb he "would explore this" (Hedgman,’ 8/21/75, p. 46)
[12407]and left him with the following impression:
[12409]I think it would be a fair impression that he would
[12411]take away the thought that I was going to look into it .
[12412]and try and figure if there was a way ... I believe:I
[12414]BW 50955 Docld:324293539 Page 267
[12418]stressed the difficulty of trying to carry
[12419]out such an operation. (Hedgman, 8/21/75,
[12420]= “op. 47.) ;
[12422]The cable that Hedgman sent to headquarters reporting his.
[12423]initial contact with Gottlieb was clearly an affirmative response
[12424]to the assignment. The Chief of, Station said that he and Gottlieb
[12425]were "ON SAME WAVELENGTH." (CIA Cable IN 18989, Leopoldville to
[12426]Tweedy, 9/27/60.) “Hedgman’ was "afraid" that Mobutu's government
[12427]was "weakening under" foreign pressure to effect a reconciliation
[12429]with Lumumba , and said: oo .
[12431]HENCE BELIEVE MOST RAPID ACTION CONSISTENT
[12432]WITH SECURITY INDICATED. (CIA Cable, 9/27/60.)
[12434](c) Hedgman Testified That Gottlieb Told Him That
[12436]President Eisenhower Had Ordered the Assassination
[12437]of Lumumba .
[12439]Hedgman testified that in the course of their meeting in
[12440]Leopoldville, Dr. Gottlieb informed him that President Eisenhower
[12442]had authorized the assassination of Lumumba:
[12444]Q: Did you raise with him the question -of authori-~ -
[12445]zation of such instructions to you? ,
[12447]Hedgman: Yes, I did. That's my quite strong
[12448]recollection, that I did. _ . °
[12450]-Q: What do you recall in essence was what you
[12452]said to him?
[12453]Hedgman: In essence, I think I must have ... pointed
[12454]out that this was not a common.or usual Agency tactic,
[12455]and I may have probably said that I never heard of
[12457]_ _ it being done, which I had not, never in my training
[12459]or previous work in the Agency had I ever heard any —
[12460]references to such, in my recollection at least, such
[12461]methods. And it is my recollection I asked on whose
[12462]authority these instructions were issued. —
[12464]Q: And what did Mr. Gottlieb reply?
[12466]HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 266
[12468]wT hin ae meat ee oe Eee tence
[12472]= Hedgman: It is my recollection that he identi-
[12473]Fi at the. President, and I cannot -- the President.
[12474]of the United States -- and I cannot recall .
[12475]whether he said "the President,'' or whether he
[12476]identified him. by. name. (Hedgman, 8/21/75,
[12477]pp. 30- 31.)° a an
[12479]Hedgman continued to- explain that he was told “something to the —
[12480]effect that the President had instructed the Director" (ledgman,
[12481]8/21/75, pp. 32, 34). Hedgman was clear that the ultimate source
[12482]of authority for the assassination mission was ‘the President:
[12483]Your understanding then was that these ©
[12485]instructions were instructions coming to you
[12487]from the office of the President?
[12489]Hedgman:-. That's correct.
[12491]a: Or that he had instructed the Agency, an nd
[12492]ey were passed on to you?
[12494]Hedgman: That's right.
[12496]Q: You are not the least unclear whether or
[12497]not you became aware with a very clear’ im-
[12498]pression that the President's name had been
[12499]invoked. in some fashion? -
[12501]Hedgman: Yes. I came --. certainly that is my
[12502]recollection. —— .
[12504]Q: You have no doubt about that?
[12505]Q: At the time.
[12506]Hedgman: At the time, I certainly felt that I
[12508]was under instructions from the. President, yes.
[12509]_ Gledgman, 8/21/75, pp. 32-33.). .
[12511]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 269
[12514]Hedgman cautioned that he was recalling events Long past:
[12516]fedgman: Gentlemen, after fifteen years, I cannot
[12517]e100 per cent certain, but I have always, since
[12518]that date, had the impression in my mind that these
[12519]orders had come from the President. (Hedgman,
[12520]8/21/75, p. 34.) .
[12522]- But he left no doubt. about the strength of his "impression":
[12524]: You have a very firm recollection that he
[12525]Pottiien| represented to you that the President
[12526]- of the United States directed the assassination of '
[12527]. Patrice. Lumumba, is that correct? .
[12529]- Hedeman: That's my recollection. Yes. (Hedgman,
[12530]3, p. 102; accord, p. 34.) ; . :
[12532].(d) Headquarters Makes the Assassination Plot "HG hest
[12533]Priority” and Authorizes Steps In Rirtherance of Te:
[12534]' Qn the basis of his talks with "Sid," Hedgman listed a
[12535]number of "possibilities" for covert action against Lumumba. At _
[12536]the top of the list was the suggestion that a particular agent. ;
[12537]be. used in the following manner:
[12538]HAVE HIM TAKE REFUGE WITH BIG BROTHER.
[12539]WOULD THUS ACT AS INSIDE MAN TO BRUSH UP . :
[12540]DETAILS TO RAZOR EDGE. (CIA Cable, 9/27/60.)
[12541]Hedgman indicated that he would begin to follow this course by re-
[12542]calling the agent to Leopoldville. (CIA Cable, 9/27/60.) He in-
[12543]formed headquarters: "PLAN PROCEED ON BASIS PRIORITIES AS LISTED
[12544]ABOVE, UNLESS INSTRUCTED TO CONTRAR’ " (CIA Cable, 9/27/60),
[12545]- | On September 30, the Chief of Station urged that head-
[12547]_ quarters authorize "exploratory conversations" with this agent so.
[12549]HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 270
[12553]that he could proceed with the > plan that was his top priority:
[12554]NO REALLY ALRTIGHT OP POSSIBLE WITH ASSETS
[12555]NOW AVAILABLE. MUST CHOOSE BETWEEN CANCELLING
[12556]OP OR ACCEPTING CALCULATED RISKS OF VARYING
[12557]DEGREES ,
[12559][IN] VIEW NECESSITY ACT IMMEDIATELY, IF’ AT"
[12561]ALL, URGE HQS AUTHORIZE EXPLORATORY CONVER-
[12563]SATIONS TO DETERMINE IF -[AGENT] WILLING TAKE:
[12565]ROLE AS ACTIVE AGENT OR CUT-OUT THIS OP. |.
[12567](WOULD APPROACH ON HYPOTHETICAL BASIS AND NOT
[12569]REVEAL PLANS.) IF HE APPEARS WILLING ACCEPT
[12571]ROLE, WE BELIEVE IT NECESSARY REVEAL ‘OBJEC-
[12573]TIVE OP TO HIM,
[12575]... REQUEST HQS REPLY [IMMEDIATELY] . (CIA
[12577]Cable, IN 20857, Leopoldville to. Tweedy,
[12579]9/30/60. )
[12580]‘Hedgman's cables -- sent for Tweedy's "Eyes Only" in the PROP
[12581]channel -- indicated that the assassination operation had been
[12582]mounted, They show that a specific. operational plan had been set
[12583]in motion to the extent that Hedgman thought that it would have
[12584]to be clearly "cancelled" by headquarters before hé would stop
[12585]proceeding with the plan. Hedgman's description of the means
[12586]‘of maintaining the security of the operation could be taken as
[12587]a reference to a lethal biological agent which would be slow to
[12588]‘take effect or which would leave no traces:
[12590]ALTHOUGH TOO EARLY SEE SPECIFIC DETAILS
[12592][AGENT'S] PART IN OP, BELIEVE RISK MINI-
[12594]MIZED IF HE LEAVES AREA BEFORE EFFECTS OP
[12596]ARE APPARENT. (CIA Cable, IN 20857,
[12597]Leopoldville to. Tweedy. )
[12599]HW 50955 Doocld:327493539 Fage ?71
[12601]a bee sind hd thasmn kth sent nendnibaie te riaceaninadtenlaunstaice tata abnde nema
[12602]: sine Sdnsenccncaie de et toed hts ed pe
[12603]- rs fe aan me ttt «rath se thee is int nh tn eee ens
[12607]The same day, through the PROP channel, “Hedgman received
[12608]authorization from headquarters to proceed with his. top priority
[12611]YOU, ARE AUTHORIZED HAVE EXPLORATORY TALE cS -
[12612]WITH SCHOTROFFE TO ASSESS HIS ATTITUDE
[12613]TOWARD POSSIBLE ACTIVE AGENT OR CUTOUT ROLE.
[12614].«. APPRECIATE MANNER YOUR APPROACH TO
[12615]PROBLEM. (CIA Cable, OUT 73900, Fields to
[12616]Leopoldville, 9/30/60. yo,
[12617]In this cable, Glenn Fields, Assistant Chief of the Africa Division,
[12618]expressed a "HOPE... FOR MODERATE HASTE" (CLA Cable our 75900,
[12619]- Fields to Leopoldville, 9/30/60. -
[12620]| According to the report of the Chief of Station, Gottlieb
[12621]left the Congo to return to headquarters on October 5 in view of ©
[12622]the "EXPIRATION DATE HIS MATERIALS" (CIA Cable IN 24171, Leopold-
[12623]ville to Tweedy, 10/7/60). The ' ‘expiration" ‘of Gottlieb’ s _
[12624]"materials" probably refers to the date beyond which the substances —
[12625]would no longer have lethal Strength. Although the relation of
[12626]the "expiration date" to Gottlieb's departure is unclear from the.
[12627]cables, it probably Signifies that some of the biological substances
[12628]. had lost their toxicity. Nonetheless, the Chief of Station indi-
[12629]cated that Gottlieb left some biological substances that were still
[12630]lethal and that he intended to proceed with the assassination
[12631]operation: | .
[12632][SID] LEFT CERTAIN ITEMS OF CONTINUING USE-
[12633]- FULNESS. [CHIEF OF STATION] PLANS CONTINUE -
[12635]TRY IMPLEMENT OP. (CIA Cable IN 24171,
[12636]Leopoldville to Tweedy, 10/7/60.)
[12638]BW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 272
[12642]By this, point, Hedgman had conducted his "exploratory con-
[12643]versation" -with the agent who was his best candidate for gaining
[12644]access to Lumumba | (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p.~ 60).. Nedgman testified —
[12645]that the subject he "explored" was the agent's ability to find a
[12646]means to inject poison into Lumumba s food or toothpaste. (Hedgman, '
[12648]8/21/75, p. 60): Oo _ - . a
[12650]I believe that I queried the agent who had
[12651]_ access to Lumumba, and his entourage, - in.
[12652]detail about just what that access, what
[12653]access he actually had, as opposed’ to speak-
[12654]ing to people. In other words, did he. have
[12655]-access to the bathroom, did he have. access
[12656]to the kitchen, things of that sort,
[12658]I have a recollection of having queried him .
[12659]on that without specifying why I wanted to
[12660]know this. (Hedgman , 8/21/75,. p. 48.)
[12662]On October 7, the Chief of Station reported to headquarters
[12664]on this méeting:
[12666]‘CONDUCTED EXPLORATORY CONVERSATION WITH
[12667][AGENT] ... AFTER EXPLORING ALL POSSIBILITIES:
[12668][AGENT] SUGGESTED SOLUTION RECOMMENDED BY
[12669]HQS. ALTHOUGH DID NOT PICK UP BALL, BELIEVE
[12670]HE PREPARED TAKE ANY ROLE NECESSARY WITHIN
[12671]LIMITS ‘SECURITY ACCOMPLISH OBJECTIVE.
[12673]Hedgman testified that his exploratory steps left him with
[12674]doubts about the wisdom or practicality of the assassination plot:
[12675][C]ertainly I looked on it as a pretty wild
[12676]scheme professionally. I did not think that
[12677]it... was practical professionally.
[12679]_ ' Certainly ... to keep the U.S. out of it....
[12681]I explored. it, but I doubt that I ever really
[12682]expected to carry it out. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 111.)
[12684]HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 273
[12688]However, his cables indicate that he was planning to con-
[12689]tinue: to implement the operation and sought the resources to do
[12690]it successfully. He urged headquarters to send him an alternate ..
[12691]operative for the assassination mission in the event that they
[12692]found his first choice unacceptenie: 7
[12694]IF HQS BELIEVE [AGENT'S CIRCUMSTANCES }
[12695]BAR HIS PARTICIPATION, WISH STRESS NECES-
[12696]SITY PROVIDE STATION WITH QUALIFIED THIRD
[12697]COUNTRY NATIONAL, (CIA Cable IN 24171,.
[12698]heopoldvithe to Tweedy, 10/7/60.) .
[12700]Tweedy cabled the Chief of Station the same day that he "HAD.
[12701]GOOD DISCUSSION YOUR COLLEAGUE 7 OCT" -- presumably referring to
[12702]a de-briefing of Gottlieb: upon his return to the United States.
[12703](CIA Cable OUT 78336, Tweedy to Leopoldville, 10/7/60.) Tweedy
[12704]indicated that he was CO
[12706]CONSIDERING. ‘DISPATCHING THIRD COUNTRY
[12707]NATIONAL OPERATOR WHO, WHEN HE ARRIVES,
[12708]SHOULD THEN. BE ASSESSED BY YOU OVER
[12709]PERIOD TO SEE WHETHER HE MIGHT PLAY
[12710]ACTIVE OR CUTOUT ROLE ON FULL TIME BASIS.
[12711](CIA Cable’ OUT 78336, Tweedy to Chief of
[12712]Station, 10/7/60. )
[12714]This expression of support for the operation was followed by
[12715]an extraordinary pair of cables from headquarters on October 15,
[12716]1960. One of these. cables was issued by a desk officer in CIA's
[12717]Africa Division and released under Bronson Tweedy's signature, as
[12719]‘Division Chief, and gent to Leopoldville through standard CIA
[12721]channels, which would allow for distribution of the message to
[12723]HY 450955  Docld: 32423539 Page 274
[12725]teteemnbtan i at itt endnote an tacit Leet Athen ADAM cece note Metin d te A ANNE OS eM aM UE Ce Atig Aue ee eee
[12729]‘appropriate personnel in the CIA station and the United States
[12730]embassy. This cable ... generally discussed the possibility of .
[12731]covertly supplying certain Congolese leaders with funds and
[12732]military aid (CIA Cable OUT 81476, Director to Leopoldville,
[12733]10/15/60). This cable also delimited the kind of action against
[12735]Lumumba that would be authorized:
[12737]ONLY DIRECT ACTION WE. CAN NOW STAND BEHIND.
[12738]IS TO SUPPORT IMMOBILIZING OR ARRESTING
[12739][LUMUMBA], DESIRABLE AS MORE DEFINITLVE
[12740]ACTION MIGHT BE. ANY ACTION TAKEN WOULD
[12741]HAVE TO BE ENTIRELY CCONGOLESE.. (CIA Cable
[12742]QUT 81476, Director to Leopoldville,
[12743]10/15/60. )
[12745]On the same day that this message was dispatched, a second
[12746]cable was sent to Leopoldville. . This. cable was issued personally
[12747]by Bronson Tweedy and sent in the special PROP channel for
[12749]~Hedgman' Ss “EYES ONLY" (CIA Cable OUT 81396, Tweedy to Chief of
[12750]Station, 10/15/60).
[12752]YOU WILL NOTE FROM CABLE THROUGH NORMAL
[12753]CHANNEL CURRENTLY BEING TRANSMITTED A PARA[GRAPH]
[12754]ON PROP TYPE SUGGESTIONS. YOU WILL PROBABLY RE-
[12755]CEIVE MORE ALONG THESE LINES AS STUMBLING BLOC —
[12756][LUMUMBA] REPRESENTS INCREASINGLY APPARENT ALL .
[12758]' STUDYING CONGO SITUATION. CLOSELY AND HIS DIS-
[12759]POSITION SPONTANEOUSLY BECOMES NUMBER ONE CON-
[12760]SIDERATION
[12762]RAISE. ABOVE ‘so YOU NOT CONFUSED BY ANY
[12763]APPARENT DUPLICATION. THIS CHANNEL REMAINS FOR
[12764]SPECIFIC PURPOSE YOU DISCUSSED WITH COLLEAGUE AND
[12765]ALSO REMAINS HIGHEST PRIORITY. (CIA Cable OUT
[12766]81396, Tweedy to Chief of Station, 10/15/60).
[12768]Thus, Tweedy resolved the apparent duplication of cables by indi-
[12770]cating that communications about the assassination mission were
[12772]HW 50955 DocId: 32423533 ‘“Bage 275
[12774]tte Oh cabal earth tht nett praneenne nine te
[12776]_ ~30-
[12778]restricted to the PROP; channel and that the assassination
[12780]mission was to move forward. He went on to request Hedgman' S:
[12781]reaction to the prospect of sending a senior CIA case officer to
[12782]the Congo. on a "DIRECTED ASSIGNMENT ... TO CONCENTRATE ENTIRELY
[12783]THIS ASPECT" (CIA Cable OUT 81396, Tweedy to Chief of Station,
[12784]10/15/60). This referred to CIA officer Justin 0' Donnell, who
[12785]testified that in late October he was asked by: Richard Bissell to
[12786]undertake the mission of assassinating Lumumba .’
[12788]“In the course of suggesting the assignment of an additional
[12789]officer to the Congo, the cable provided insight into the reason
[12790]that the assassination mission had not progressed more “rapidly
[12791]under the Chief of Station:
[12793]SEEMS TO US YOUR OTHER COMMITMENTS ‘TOO HEAVY
[12794]GIVE NECESSARY CONCENTRATION PROP. (CIA
[12795]Cable OUT 81396, Tweedy to Chief of Station,
[12796]10A15/60. )
[12798]Again, in contradiction of the limitations on anti-Lumumba
[12799]activity outlined in the cable. sent through normal channels,
[12800]Tweedy's cable also proposed a plan to kidnap Lumumba:
[12802]POSSIBILITY USE COMMANDO TYPE GROUP FOR
[12804]- ABDUCTION [LUMUMBA], EITHER VIA ASSAULT
[12805]ON HOUSE UP CLIFF FROM RIVER OR, MORE
[12806]PROBABLY, IF [LUMUMBA] ATTEMPTS. ANOTHER
[12807]BREAKOUT INTO TOWN ... REQUEST YOUR VIEWS.
[12809](CIA Cable OUT 81396, Tweedy to Chief of
[12810]Station, 10/15/60. )
[12812]*« For a Full account of the meeting between Bissell and
[12813]O'Donnell and O'Donnell's. subsequent activities in the Congo, see
[12814]Section (a), infra.
[12816]HW 50955 Docld:32493539 Page 276
[12822]This series of cables sent | during, and after
[12823]Gottlieb's visit to the Congo demonstrated a clear intent at CIA.
[12824]headquarters to authorize and support -rapid progress on the assassi-
[12825]nation mission. The cables also show an intent to severely re-.
[12826]strict knowledge of the assassination operation among officers in
[12827]CIA's Africa Division and among United. States personnel in the .
[12829]- Congo, including: those who were aware of and involved in other |
[12830]covert activities. -
[12832](e) The Chief of Station Moves Forward With Assassination
[12833]PTO as
[12835]The: testimony of the Chief of Station,’ taken fifteen
[12836]years after the events in question and: “without benefit of review
[12837]of the cables discussed above, was compatible. with the picture
[12838]derived from the cables of.a fully: authorized and | tightly restricted
[12839]assassination operation. Hedgman ' s testimony is at variance from
[12840]the cables only with respect to the lack of vigor with which he
[12841]claims to have pursued the assignment which he dealt with in an
[12842]‘affirmative, aggressive manner in the ‘cables. | |
[12844](i) The Chief of Station Testified That He Requested
[12845]and Received Confirmation of the. Assassination
[12847]Plan from Hea quarters
[12849]Hedgman testified that, after receiving. Gottlieb's
[12851]instructions, he cabled CIA headquarters seeking confirmation that
[12852]he was to carry out. Gottlieb's instructions (Hedgman, 8/21/75,
[12853]Pp. 36). Heédgman did not recall whether he identified Gottlieb by
[12854]_ name, and. he doubted that he "would have" mentioned the President
[12856]‘in such a cable (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 36, 43).
[12858]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 277
[12862]iledgman described the extraordinary security precautions he
[12863]took cabling his request for confirmation of the assassination in-
[12865]‘There was some special channel ... because
[12866]it was handled differently than any other
[12867]normal message. For example, it was not put
[12868]on a regular cable form, which, you know,
[12869]'‘you have several copies for your various. files.
[12870]And it was my recollection that I personally .
[12871]carried the message to the communicator to
[12872]encrypt, and that was worded in a doublt- talk
[12873]way that even the communicator would ‘not
[12874]necessarily. know what it was about." -
[12875](Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 42-43.)
[12876]This description approximates the PROP channel that was used for
[12877]all cables relating to the assassination. mission.
[12878]Hedgman testified that soon after cabling his request for con-
[12879]firmation that he was to carry ‘out the assassination assignment,
[12880]he received an affirmative: reply from headquarters:
[12881]L believe I received a reply which I interpreted .
[12882]to mean yes, that he was the messenger and. his ‘
[12883]instructions were ... duly authorized,
[12884](Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 37-38.)
[12885]Despite the cryptic nature of the cables, Hedgman said "I was con-
[12886]-vinced that yes, it was right." (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 44, 50.)
[12887]Hedgman did not recall receiving any indication,: either from
[12888]Gottlieb or by cable, that he was to await further authorization
[12889]before using the poisons (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 38). Hedgman ex-
[12890]7 pressed some uncertainty about whether he “had an absolute free
[12892]hand" to proceed with an assassination attempt without receiving |
[12894]"final confirmation" (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 38, 47, 53).
[12896]HW 50955 Docld:32493539 Page 278°
[12900]Hedgman summarized his testimony on this question in his.
[12902]second appearance:
[12904]TT, probably had authority to act on “ny own
[12905]but ... it was possible that I had. to go
[12906]' back and get clearance for my action. .
[12907](Hedgman, 8/25/75, p. 11; see also 8/21/75,
[12909]_Hedgman testified, however, that a "policy decision" had been
[12910]made -- that assassination had been "approved" as "one means" of
[12912]eliminating Lumumba as a political threat (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 52).
[12914]I thought the policy decision had been made
[12916]in the “White House, not in the Agency, and
[12918]that the Agency had been selected as the
[12919]Executive Agent, if you will, to carry out
[12921]a political decision. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 52.)
[12923]Although Hedgman assumed that the President. had not personally
[12924]selected the means of assassination, he testified that he was under
[12925]the impression that the. President had authorized the CTA to “do so
[12927]and to proceed to take action:
[12929]Hedgman: ... I doubt that I thought the
[12930]President had said, you'use this system.
[12931]‘But my understanding is the President had .
[12933]-made a decision that an act should take.
[12934]place, but then put that into the hands of
[12935]the Agency to carry out his: decision.
[12937]Q: Whatever that act was to be, it was
[12938]clearly to be assassination or the death
[12939]of the foreign political leader?
[12941]'Hedeman: Yes.
[12943]~ Qt Instigated by the CIA, initiated by the CIA?
[12944]Nedgman: Certainly if those -- if-Dr. Gottlieb's —
[12946]lethal. agents were employed, that would have been
[12947]the result, yes. ‘(Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 104.)
[12949]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 279 . -
[12951]bse Nee ete hain Wy bemnanin niente Rath nadine ante sata NeCmnNN tiene! mtherheP arts ented te et eateebee ee ee rte anon
[12955]Nonetheless, Hedgman said he had no "desire to carry. out |
[12956]these instructions" (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 106). ‘Whether or not
[12957]he felt there was authority to attempt an assassination without
[12958]‘seeking final confirmation, he said that he would have checked
[12959]| with headquarters before taking action:.
[12960]I think probably. that I ‘would have gone. back
[12961]and advised that I intended to carry out and
[12962]sought final approval before carrying it out
[12963]had I been going to do it, had there been a
[12964]way to do it. I did not see it as ... a
[12965]matter which could be accomplished practically,
[12966]certainly. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 51-52.)
[12967]He proceeded to affirm that his reason for seeking a final approval
[12968]would have been to receive assurances about the practicality of the’
[12969]specific mode of assassination that he planned to use (Hedgman,
[12970]8/21/75, p. 53)...
[12971](ii) The Chief of Station Took "Explorator Steps" in
[12972]Furtherance of the Assassination Plot and Testified
[12973]That He Destroyed Cable Traffic ¢ Related to the Plot to the Plot
[12974]Hedgman testified that after Gottlieb's visit, he locked
[12975]the lethal substances in the bottom drawer of his safe, "probably".
[12976]sealed in-an envelope marked "Eyes Only" with his name on it
[12977](Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 48-49). He said that his secretary was.
[12978]the only other’ person with access to the safe and that. she would
[12979]not have examined a package marked in this fashion (Hedgman, 8/21/75,
[12980]‘p. 49).
[12981]Hedgman testified that it‘was "possible" that he pre-
[12983]served the poisons in his safe until after Lumiumba's death; at any
[12985]HY 50955 DocId:32493539 Page 260
[12987]“ . ” . we pence tas tiene nee eve ae Fae EM ne cette He RAEN eer EC peel ete Cibo nimoneenAt ated Sean te nn oe
[12989]rate, they were not disposed of before Lumumba was “successfully
[12990]“neiitralized" by being captured and imprisoned by the Congolese
[12991]government * (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 85-86) at the beginning of
[12992]“December, 1960. Hedgman said that he does not recall taking the . .
[12993]~ poisons out of his safe on any occasion other than when he disposed .
[12994]of them on the banks of the Congo River:
[12995]I think that I took them out: probably in a
[12996]briefcase, or an air bag of some sort, and
[12997]I believe that the things like the rubber
[12998]gloves and the mask were thrown away in a
[12999]bushy area or something where, you. know, if
[13000]they were found, it didn't matter that much.
[13001]-I believe I buried the other matters.
[13002](Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 84.)
[13003]Hedgman testified, however, that in the intervening months,
[13004]while the poisons were in his safe, he took "exploratory steps"
[13005]in furtherance of the assassination plot (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 60).
[13006]He said that he sent ‘several cables to’ CLA headquarters, after his
[13007]request for confirmation of the assassination instructions, which
[13008]“probably reflected further steps I had taken" (Hedgman, 8/21/75,
[13009]pp. 59- 60). | - .
[13010]Hedgman stated that his cables. to headquarters on this matter
[13011]were essentially ' ‘progress: reports" on his attempts to find a means .
[13012]of. access to ‘Lumumba (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 50). He also said that
[13013]he “would bet on the fact that there was at least one or two more
[13015][cables] back"’ to him from CIA headquarters in response (iiedgman ,
[13017]~ 8/21/75, Pp. 50).
[13019]BW 50955 DoclId: 32423539 Page 261
[13023]The cable traffic conforms to Hedgman's. recollection, For
[13024]two’ months after Gottlieb's arrival in the Congo, a ‘regular stream ;
[13025]of messages flowed between the Leopoldville Chief of Station and
[13026]headquarters through the PROP channel. In late September and early
[13027]October the cables concerned the initiation of Hedgman's top priority
[13028]plan -- recruiting the aid of a particular agent thought to have_
[13029]‘sufficient access to Lumumba 's “entourage to be able to poison.
[13030]Lumumba . * In mid- October, Tweedy notified the Chief of Station
[13031]that the: assassination mission remained "HIGHEST PRIORITY", and
[13032]he. suggested sending additional personnel to Leopoldville to in-
[13033]tensify "CONCENTRATION" on this operation (CTA Cable OUT 81396,. Tweedy
[13034]to Chief of Station, 10/15/60). we
[13035]These cables were followed by Hedgman's report to Tweedy on
[13037]October 17 that the agent he had picked for the assassination mission
[13039]* CIA Cable IN 18989, Chief of Station.to Tweedy, 9/27/60;
[13041]- CIA Cable IN 20857, Chief of Station to Tweedy, 9/30/60; CIA Cable
[13042]OUT 75900, Fields to Chief of Station, 9/30/60; CIA Cable IN 24171,
[13043]‘Chief of Station to Tweedy, 10/7/60. See Section , supra, for.
[13044]“full treatment of these cables. —
[13046]** See Section _ supra, £or more complete text of this |
[13047]cable. ,
[13049]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 262
[13051]a neers SER is ne nee ecerneere ie mete ie 7 aE ate amentantS Palen ee oe me a
[13055]HAS NOT BEEN ABLE PENETRATE ENTOURAGE ..
[13057].THUS HE HAS NOT BEEN ABLE PROVIDE OPS
[13059]INTEL NEEDED THIS JOB. (CIA Cable ;
[13061]IN 28936, Chief of Station to Tweedy ,
[13063]10/17/60. )
[13064]Hedgman testified hat this operative, left Leopoldville “sometime |
[13065]in October" which terminated their discussions about gaining access
[13066]to Lumumba for the purpose of. assassinating him (Hedgman, 8/21/75,
[13067]p- 61). . The ‘Chief of Station continued to communicate with head+ |
[13069]quarters about finding a means to move forward with the assassina- _
[13071]tion operation and securing the necessary manpower to do so.
[13073]Hedgman confirmed ‘Tweedy's view that although the assassination
[13074]operation was still his highest priority, he was. overburdened with
[13075]responsibility for other operations..so that he could not concentrate
[13076]on the progress of the assassination mission: _
[13077]ALTHOUGH MAINTAINING PRIORITY INTEREST THIS
[13078]OP, ABLE DEVOTE ONLY LIMITED AMOUNT TIME,
[13079]VIEW MULTIPLE OPS COMMITMENTS. (CIA Cable,
[13080]IN 28936, 10/77/80.)
[13081]Due to his workload, the Chief. of Station responded enthusiastic cally
[13082]‘to Tweedy ' s suggestion of an additional case officer: .
[13083]BELIEVE EARLY ASSIGNMENT SENIOR CASE OFFICER
[13084]HANDLE PROP OPS EXCELLENT IDEA ... IF CASE
[13085]OFFICER AVAILABLE [CHIEF OF STATION] WOULD
[13086]DEVOTE AS MUCH TIME AS POSSIBLE TO ASSISTING
[13088]AND DIRECTING HIS EFFORTS. (CIA Cable
[13089]. IN 28936, 10/17/60.)
[13091]BW 50955 Docld: 324793539 Page 263 , -
[13095]The Chief of Station concluded this cable with the following
[13096]cryptic recommendation, reminiscent of his testimony that he
[13097]‘May have: "suggested" shooting Lumumba to Gottlieb as an alternative
[13098]to poisoning (ledgman, 8/21/75, pp. 27-29):
[13099]IF CASE OFFICER SENT, RECOMMEND HQS~ ; . coe,
[13100]POUCH SOONEST HIGH POWERED FOREIGN MAKE — ; >.
[13101]RIFLE WITH TELESCOPIC SCOPE AND SILENCER.
[13102]HUNTING GOOD HERE WHEN: LIGHTS RIGHT.
[13103]HOWEVER AS HUNTING RIFLES NOW FORBIDDEN,
[13104]WOULD KEEP RIFLE IN OFFICE PENDING OPENING
[13105]OF HUNTING SEASON. (CIA Cable IN 28936,
[13106]10/17/60.) oO coe ;
[13107]The first sentence of Hedgman's recommendation clearly refers
[13108]to sending a sniper rifle to the Congo via diplomatic pouch. The
[13109]rest of the message is probably an oblique reference to the
[13110]possibility of shooting Lumumba at the "OPENING OF HUNTING SEASON" --
[13111]in other words, at the first opportunity to find Lumumba outside
[13112]_the residence where he remained in UN protective custody. This
[13113]interpretation is bolstered by a report sent the next month by
[13114]the Chief of Station through the PROP channel for Tweedy 's “EYES .
[13115]ALONE." Hedgman's cable described the stalemate which prevailed from’
[13116]mid-September until Lumumba's departure for Stanleyville on >
[13117]November 27; Lumumba was virtually a prisoner in UN custody, but
[13119]inaccessible to CIA agents and the Congolese:
[13121]- TARGET HAS NOT LEFT BUILDING IN SEVERAL
[13122]WEEKS. HOUSE GUARDED DAY AND NIGHT BY
[13123]CONGOLESE AND UN TROOP....° CONGOLESE .
[13124]~ , TROOPS ARE THERE TO PREVENT TARGET'S
[13125]. ESCAPE AND TO ARREST HIM IF HE ATTEMPTS.
[13126]UN TROOPS THERE TO PREVENT STORMING OF
[13127]PALACE BY CONGOLESE. CONCENTRIC RINGS»
[13128]OF DEFENSE MAKE ESTABLISHMENT OF OBSER-
[13129]VATION POST IMPOSSIBLE. ATTEMPTING GET
[13131]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 264 _
[13135]COVERAGE OF ANY MOVEMENT INTO OR OUT OF
[13136]HOUSE BY CONGOLESE.... TARGET HAS DISMISSED
[13137]™ MOST OF SERVANTS SO “ENTRY THIS MEANS SEEMS
[13138]REMOTE. (CIA Cable IN 42478, Chief of
[13139]- Station to Tweedy . )
[13140]‘Hedgman testified that all of his cable traffic about the
[13141]assassination question would have been sent with the same
[13142]extraordinarily stringent security precautions -- presumably. re-
[13143]ferring to the. PROP channel | -- which concerned Gottlieb’ s visit
[13144]and ‘the confirmation of authorization for his instructions:
[13145]I. would have sent in a special channel
[13146]anything dealing with Lumumba, at least
[13147]that would touch upon his. removal in‘one
[13148]way oz another. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 62. ).
[13150]The Chief of Station also. testified that sometime before
[13151]leaving ‘the Station, he destroyed all cable traffic relating to
[13152]the assassination mission (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 89). Hedgman's _
[13153]best recollection was that he had received instructions to destroy
[13154]those cables (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 96). Hedgman said he had never
[13156]- before in his tenure as Chief of Station in the Congo destroyed
[13157]cable traffic because of its sensitivity (Hedgman, 8/21/75, -p. 91).
[13158]But he.stated that the cables relating to assassination were
[13160]destroyed because of their extremely sensitive nature.* He said
[13162]* It is possible that copies of cables dealing with such a
[13163]sensitive operation were also destroyed at CIA headquarters.
[13165]HW 50955 Docld:324293539 Page 265
[13167]nner angptanere eer ae ee on ne cine ee tte cent Cen bani eaa tata etntete snag Meta NM
[13171]that eventually
[13173]oat
[13175]I destroyed a great deal of traffic, because
[13176]the Congo was a highly sensitive area in
[13177]‘which -- at one period I recall we had all
[13178]of our files in the burn barrels. I mean,
[13179]when you wanted a file, you went over and
[13180]dug it out of the burn ‘barrell. (Hedgman,
[13181]8/21/75, p. 91.).
[13183]At the. conclusion of his. ‘testimony about the assassination
[13184]plot, the Chief of Station was asked to give a general characteri~
[13185]zation of the advisability of the plot and the tenor of the times
[13186]in which it took place. His response indicated that although he
[13187]was willing to carry out what he considered a duly authorized
[13188]order, he was not convinced of ‘the necessity of assassinating
[13190]Lumumba :
[13192]I looked upon the Agency as an executive
[13193]arm of the Presidency.... Therefore, I |
[13194]suppose I thought that it was an order
[13195]issued in due form from an authorized
[13196]authority.
[13198]On the other hand, I looked at. it as a
[13199]‘kind of operation that I could do without,
[13200]that I thought that probably the Agency.
[13201]and the U.S. government could get along _
[13202]without. I didn't regard: Lumumba as the
[13203]kind of person who was going to _bring on
[13204]World War III or something .
[13206]‘I might have had a somewhat different
[13207]attitude if.I thought. that one man could
[13208]bring on World War IIT and result in the
[13209]deaths of millions of people or something,
[13210]but I didn't see him in that light. I saw
[13212]him-as a danger to the political position
[13213]> a of the United States in Africa, but
[13214]; ' nothing more than that. (Hedgman, 8/21/75.,
[13215]pp. 110-111.)
[13217]HW 50955 DocId: 32423539 Page 266
[13219]adie wane ceed pe testes tacts eee ae caer Seta semaine pat anya Ge oneal cain nA vei eat ednChaTh to scon sae tana re wi ad
[13221](£) Testimony of Bissell and Tweedy About the Degree
[13222]a of Support. for and Perpetration of the Assassination
[13224]Plot
[13226]There is a great variance between the testimony of Richard
[13227]Bissell. and Brorison Tweedy ‘and the picture of the assassination
[13228]plot presented by the Chief of Station and the cable traffic from.
[13229]the period. While the weight of the evidence demonstratés that.
[13230]the assassination effort was the “highest pricrity" at CIA head-.
[13231]quarters among operations in the Congo, Bissell has no direct
[13232]recollection of Gottlieb's mission to the Congo and Tweedy can
[13233]recall nothing more than consideration of the feasibility of an
[13234]assassination attempt. |
[13236]CG)
[13238]Tweedy Had No Recollection of the Operation
[13239]To Poison Lumumba , ,
[13241]As Chief of the Africa Division, Bronson Tweedy was the principal |
[13242]liaison at CIA headquarters with the Chief of Station in Leopoldville
[13243]. for all instructions, ‘plans, and progress reports concerning the
[13244]effort to assassinate Lumumba, which were communicated through the
[13245]special PROP channel. Most of the reports and recommendations
[13246]cabled to headquarters by the Chief of Station on the assassination |
[13247]operation were marked for Tweedy's "Eyes Only."
[13248]Tweedy personally signed both the cable which initially informed
[13249]the Chief of Station that "SID" would arrive in Leopoldville, with -
[13251]an assignment (CIA Cable OUT 71464, Bissell/Tweedy to Chief of
[13253]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 267
[13255]eee i tn alana mene em tet tent tment anata aaa aerate eA i SP INSEL TH TE NETHER OM
[13259]Station, 9/19/60) and. the cable of October 7 indicating that he
[13260]had debriefed Gottlieb upon his. return from the Congo (CIA Cable
[13261]OUT 78336, Tweedy to Chief of Station, 10/7/60) . Tweedy was also
[13262]the “Eyes | Only" recipient of Hedgman' s reports on Gottlieb! s
[13263]arrival in the Congo (CIA Cable IN 18989, Chief of Station to
[13264]Tweedy, 9/27/60) and the. subsequent communications about the plan
[13265]which emerged from the discussions between. Gottlieb and Hedgman
[13266]as the top priority -- infiltration of an agent into Lumumba ' s en-
[13267]tourage to administer a lethal poison to the Congolese leader (CIA
[13268]Cable IN 20857, Chief of Station to Tweedy, 9/30/60; CIA Cable, —
[13269]Chief of Station to Tweedy, 10/7/60; CIA Cable, Chief of Station
[13270]to Tweedy, 10/17/60). |
[13271]; Tweedy testified, however, without benefit of reviewing these
[13272]cables, that he had no knowledge of the plot to poison Lumumba :
[13273]. Do you have any knowledge of a messenger |
[13274]from CIA headquarters having to go to the Congo
[13275]to provide the Chief of Station in the Congo
[13276]with instructions to carry out the assassination
[13277]of Lumumba, if possible, and also provide him
[13278]with the tools to carry out such an assassination,
[13279]namely, poisons and medical equipment for admin-
[13281]istering them?
[13283]Mr. Tweedy. No, I do not. (Tweedy, 9/9/75, pp. 30-31)
[13285]ale
[13286]a
[13288]See Sections 4(a).- 4(e) for full treatment of the cables sent
[13289]in the PROP. channel between Tweedy and the Chief of Station in
[13290]‘ Leopoldville.
[13292]HW 50955 Docld:32493539 Page 288
[13296]When asked his opinion about the truth of the testimony received
[13297]by the Committee that poisons were delivered to the Congo by
[13298]Gottlieb, who carried instructions that they were to be used in .
[13299]-the assassination of Lumumba, Tweedy replied: |
[13300]“There is nothing in my experience with the
[13301]Agency which would really bear on that
[13302]point whatsoever. (Tweedy, 9/9, pp. 29-39) .
[13303]tweedy added that if Gottlieb went to the Congo. as a courier, .
[13304]"I will bet I knew it, but I don't recall it" (tweedy, 9/9, p. 35).
[13305]Tweedy testified that it was "perfectly possible" for lethal bio--
[13306]“logical substances to have been sent to the Congo, “but I don't
[13307]recall it" (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 30).
[13308]In response to a question about whether he knew about a cable
[13309]. from headquarters informing Hedgman that a messenger was to come to
[13310]the Congo with instructions for him, Tweedy said that he would be
[13311]“very surprised if I didn't [know], but I certainly have no recoll-
[13312]ection of it whatsoever (Tweedy, 9/9, Pp. 31). .
[13313]‘Tweedy said that he ‘was not going to gainsay" the testimony of
[13314]the Chief-of Station that a cable was sent to headquarters through
[13315]‘a special channel requesting confirmation that the instructions
[13316]were to be carried out but he did not recall it (tweedy, 9/9, pp.
[13317]32-33). -
[13318]Tweedy commented that rather than questioning the truth of the -
[13320]testimony of the Chief of Station,* the discrepancies in their
[13322]* Tweedy expressed a high regard for the general credibility of the
[13323]Chief of Station. Tweedy said that he never had occasion to doubt
[13324]Hedgman's veracity or integrity, adding; "T-would trust his memory
[13325]and I certainly trust his integrity." (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 36)
[13327]HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 269
[13329]testimony could be attributed to his own lack of recall:
[13331]I‘really am having trouble with this. [f had to
[13333]be reminded of so many things. . .[T]he things
[13334]that I recall the most vividly about all my
[13335]African experiences were. . . the things I was
[13337]basically concerned with all the time, which was
[13339]putting this division together and the rest of
[13341]it. When it comes to operational detail I start ae
[13342]fuzzy and you would have thought with something oo
[13343]like thinking about Mr. Lumumba in these terms,
[13345]that I: would have ‘gone to bed and got up thinking
[13347]about Lumumba, I can assure you this wasn't the
[13349]case. (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 34)
[13351]Tweedy was firm, however, in his disbelief that "Gottlieb would
[13352]have left instructions with the Chief of Station which would have
[13353]| empowered [him]. . . to go out and assassinate amumba, without any
[13354]further recourse or reference to headquarters" (Tweedy, 9/9, pp. 32,
[13355]36). Tweedy said: | | -
[13356]In such a matter of this kind, headquarters. would
[13357]have wanted to have a last word up to the last
[13359]minute. (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 36)
[13361]Ci) Tweedy Testified That He Discussed With Bissell
[13362]the Feasibility of Assassinating Lumumba and He
[13364]Cabled Hedgman About Gaining Access to Lumumba
[13365]For the Purpose ot a
[13367]° p Assassination
[13368]Despite Tweedy's lack of recollection about the actual plot to
[13369]‘poison Lumumba, he did recall exploring the feasibility of an assass-
[13370]ination attempt. 7
[13371]Tweedy testified that he had discussed the subject of assassinating
[13372]Lumumba “more than once" with Richard Bissell in the fall of 1960
[13374](Tweedy, 9/9,. pp. 14-15). Tweedy stated that he did not know
[13376]BY 50955 Docld: 32423539 - Page 290
[13380]whether Bissell had consulted with any “higher authority" about
[13381]exploring che possibilities for assassinating Lumumba (Tweedy ,
[13382]9/9, p. 28). Generally, Tweedy said, when he received an instruc-
[13383]tion from Bissell ‘he would proceed to implement it on the assump-
[13384]tion that it was fully authorized above the level of DDP:
[13386]I would proceed with it’ on the basis that he
[13387]was authorized to give me instructions and it
[13388]was up to him to bloody well know what he was
[13389]empowered to tell me to do. (Tweedy, 9/9, p.13)
[13391]Tweedy characterized his discussions with Bissell about assass-
[13392]inating Lumumba as “contingency planning" (Tweedy ,-9/9/75, p. 28):
[13394]Tweedy. .:. .1 think it came up in the sense that
[13395]Dick would have said we probably better be
[13396]thinking about whether it might ever be necessary
[13397]or desirable to get rid of Lumumba, in which case~
[13398]we presumably should be in position to assess
[13399]whether we could do it or not successfully.:
[13401]QQ. Do it, meaning carry off an assassination?
[13403]Tweedy. Yes, but it was never discussed with hin
[13404]in any other sense but a planning exercise, .
[13406]- never were we instructed to do anything of this
[13407]kind. We were instructed to ask whether such a
[13408]thing would be feasible and to have the Chief of
[13409]Station be thinking along those lines as well.
[13410](Tweedy, 9/9, p- 15)
[13412]_ Tweedy said that the planning that he undertook pursuant to his con-
[13413]versation with Bissell: included "a few" cables that he remembers
[13414]sending to the Chief of Station asking hit
[13416]‘to keep in mind what sort of access one might ever
[13417]have had to Lumumba. . .[in] the eventuality that
[13419]we might wish to get rid of Mr. Lumumba personally.
[13420]_ (Tweedy, 9/9, pp. 19-21) ;
[13422]HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 291
[13426]Tweedy did not récall inquiring about gaining access to Lumumba for.
[13427]the purpose of abducting him from UN custody (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 24); -
[13429]‘ yvather he "supposed" that various means of assassination were
[13430]being explored: | | .
[13432]Q. Mould this be access to shoot him or would this
[13433]be access to his personal food or drink or toiletries? |.
[13435]Tweedy,” I. suppose all those types of things might
[13436]have been considered. (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 23).
[13438]_Q. .In your discussions with Bissell, about the
[13439]feasibility of an assassination operation, did
[13440]poisons come up as one means that -was being con-
[13441]sidered and which the Chief of Station should explore? ,
[13443]Tweedy. I am sure it must have. “After all, there |
[13444]are not many ways of.doing it. Shoot a man, poison
[13445]him, of course you could, I suppose, stab him or
[13446]something like that. But basically you are talking
[13447]about a contingency plan which I. assume has the best
[13448]possibility of protecting the involvement of the U.S.
[13449]Government and if you want to do it in a manner which
[13450]would be as distant, if that is the right word, as
[13451]possible, I think poison would then stand high on
[13453]the list of possibilities. ;
[13455]Tweedy did not "recall specifically" the response from the Chief
[13456]of Station, but said he was "sure" that he received "a serious
[13457]answer. . . a disciplined. reply to an instruction from headquarters"
[13458]“(Tweedy, 9/9, pp. 23,27). |
[13460]' Although Tweedy did not recall sending or receiving cables in a
[13461]special channel concerning the "messenger" to the Congo or confirm-
[13463]ation of his instructions, he acknowledged ‘that the cables exploring
[13465]access to Lumumba for the purpose of assassination would have been
[13467]HY 50955 Daocld: 32423539 Page 292
[13469]ene ee in een quar mn deem ee cme ah ET ages ate tes cme enn nein vote wing Heer nt SLA ERAS EASA ati oat abuaaa tte BOER AR fo
[13471]-47 -.
[13473]sent in a ¢hannel that was even more closely restricted than the
[13474]‘normal CIA ‘cable traffic (Tweedy, 9/9, pp. 22, 32-33). Tweedy
[13475]said destruction. of such cable traffic. would have been left to the
[13476]discretion of the’ Chief of ‘Station and he did not know whether
[13477]Hedgman destroyed - the Station's copies (Tweedy, 9/9; D. 22).
[13479]Tweedy said: "IT would be surprised if I-didn't" have a conver -
[13480]sation with Sidney Gottlieb about "anything in his inventory that
[13481]could possibly be. used, including lethal biological substances
[13482](Tweedy, 9/9, pp. 68-69). Tweedy ' ‘suspected” that "the ‘first
[13484]conversation along. these Lines would undoubtedly have been held
[13485]between Dick Bissell and Sidney Gottlieb, " which Tweedy then would
[13486]have "£ollowed= -up" (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 69).
[13488]Tweedy maintained that the period in which he explored the
[13489]means of access for assassinating Lumumba remained "a planning
[13490]interval and at no point can I recall that I ever felt it was im-
[13491]minent that somebody. would say ‘go'" (Tweedy, 9/9. pp. 18- 19):
[13493]Tweedy. It was always my assumption that at the
[13494]time anything like this’ should occur there would
[13495]have been some kind of real focus on the problem |
[13496]at. probably a very considerable policy level with-
[13497].in the Agency. .- and it never occurred to me that
[13498]I would get a call or Bissell would ask me to come
[13499]‘down to his office and sya go to it. Nor were we
[13500]ever in a position where he said that I would.
[13501]merely implement plan so-and-so. We never got
[13503]that far.
[13505]Q. You didn't have any action plans for the
[13507]assassination of Lumumba that you had prepared or
[13508]‘were aware of? ;
[13510]HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 293
[13514]_ Tweedy. No. Planning, yes, but nothing that
[13515]ever got anywhere. (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 19)
[13517]It is difficult to reconcile the cable traffic with ‘Tweedy’ $s
[13518]testimony that no action plans were. Launched and that no authoriz-
[13519]ation. for implementing the. assassination operation, “authorization
[13520]‘for Hedgman's approach to his agent to explore access to. Lumumba."s
[13522]. entourage is in. accord with Tweedy's description of his inquiries
[13523]about gaining access to Lumumba . , a
[13525]“However, the fact that Tweedy | was personaly ‘informed that the.
[13526]Chief of Station "PLANS CONTINUE TRY “IMPLEMENT OP" (CIA Cable IN -
[13527]24171, Chief of Station -to Tweedy , 10/7/60) ‘is harder to reconcile
[13528]with his” statements that a "go ahead" on the operation was never
[13529]imminent ,, especially in light of Tweedy ' s PROP cable the next week
[13530]which ‘told the Chief of Station that Lumumba's
[13532]DISPOSTTION | SPONTANEOUSLY BECOMES NUMBER ONE.
[13533]CONSIDERATION. . . THIS CHANNEL REMAINS FOR
[13534]’ SPECIFIC PURPOSE YOU DISCUSSED WITH COLLEAGUE
[13535]AND ALSO REMAINS HIGHEST PRIORITY (CIA Cable .
[13536]OUT 81396, Tweedy to Chief of Station,,. 10/15/60)
[13537](iii) Bissell Testified That He Did Not Recall
[13539]Whether the Assassination Operation Had
[13540]Moved From Planning To. Implementation —
[13542]But It Was Not Against Agency — to.
[13543]Send Poisons to. The Congo ;
[13545]Richard Bissell testified that he did not remember dincussing
[13547]the feasibility of assassinating Lumumba with Bronson Tweedy, but it
[13548]“seemed “entirely probable" to him that such discussions took place
[13550]- (Bissell, 9/10, pp. 3-4).
[13552]HY 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 294 -
[13554]etna cee tem mS nes i ete eek HEL NER FN Een an AE NaN tiara mY Mae me me Bm MASTER enedliepursansbe enseeb aheAe aeons mentee EIA ES IY SA MMNCA a MaTidtd ns
[13556]Bissell” said. he "may. have'’ given ‘Tweedy specific instructions about:
[13557]steps he was to take to further an assassination plan, but he did’
[13558]not remember to do so (Bissell, 9/10,p. 4). Rissell said that
[13559]exploring access to Lumumba --"almost certainly" seeking information
[13560]from ‘the. Chief of Station about access for poisoning | -- would have
[13561]been a "key part" of his "planning and preparatory activity” but
[13562]_ he had no specific recollection. of cable communications on this
[13563]subject (Bissell, 9f10, pp. 6+8). Bissell ‘remembered that he was
[13564]aware that the Chief of Station had an agent thought to. have direct
[13565]access to Lumumba. (Bissell, 9/10, p- 80).
[13566]| Bissell testified that he “most certainly" approved any cables
[13567]that Tweedy sent to the Chief of Station seeking information about
[13568]gaining © access to Lumumba but it was so sensitive a matter (Bissell,
[13569]9/10, p. 8) Bissell added:
[13570]I think Mr. Tweedy, on “the basis of an oral author -
[13571]ization from me, would have had the authority to
[13572]send such a cable without my signing off on it.
[13573](Bissell, 9/10, p. 8)
[13574]Bissell. believed that Tweedy would have known of Gottlieb's trip.
[13575]_-to the Congo, although it .was possible that Tweedy was. “cut out of
[13576]knowledge of the specific operation" (Bissell, 9/10, Pp. 21).
[13577]Bissell's lack of recollection of discussing his, assignment to
[13579]* Justin O'Donnell*with Tweedy was the reason for his speculation that |
[13581]ale
[13584]Bissell's assignment to O'Donnell is discussed in Sections 5(a)
[13586](i) and 5(a) (ii), infra.
[13588]HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 295
[13590]ee ee eect eee utaneetetennct ant ee Tete NER a eg gen grata ate came at ats AIP AE aetna ee
[13594]Tweedy might have been unaware of the true ‘purpose of Gottlieb's
[13595]visit (Bissell, 9/10, pp. 20-22). . _
[13596]| Bissell did not recall cables concerning the dispatch of a
[13597]messenger and subsequently confirming that his instructions were
[13598]to be followed, but he said "This sounds highly likely. . 1
[13599]; would expect, given the background; that che confirmation would.
[13600]“have been forthcoming" (Bissell, 9/10, p. 43). . .
[13601]7 It was "very probable, " according to Bissell, that he discussed -
[13602]_ the assassination of Luthumba with ‘Sidney Gottlieb, who was then
[13603]his Science Advisor (Bissell, 9/10, -p. 14). Bissell said that on a
[13604]number of occasions he discussed with Gottlieb "the availability
[13605]of means of incapacitation, including assassination" (Bissell, 9/10,
[13606]p. 60). | | |
[13607]Although he had no "specific recollection," Bissell assumed
[13608]that, if Gottlieb went to the Congo, he had approved: the mission,
[13609](which "might very well" have dealt with the assassination of
[13610]Lumumba) (Bissell, G/10, pp. 18, 20, 44)... Despite his absence of
[13611]specific : recollection. of these: events, Bissell said, "There is
[13612]nothing. in mind that I remember that would be in conflict" with the
[13613]testimony of the Chief of Station that. Gottlieb carried poisons to
[13614]' the ‘Congo (Bissell, 9/10, p. 35).
[13615]Bissell testified that it would not have been against CIA policy
[13617]in the fall of 1960 to send poisons to the Congo (Bissell, 9/10, p. 35).
[13619]HW-50955 Docld:32493539 Page 296 a oo _
[13621]nes pene ee vem natant bce ae bone ee cane ates inde Let seat tins ents ttbaatc anim Sens Tn Se tat ae vein tie
[13625]He’ ‘Slassified "the act of taking the kit to the Congo. . . as still |
[13626]“in: the planning stage" (Bissell, 9/10, Pp. 49). Bissell acknowledged,
[13627]however , that the. dispatch of poisons and paraphernalia with which
[13628]to administer them was an extraordinary. event:
[13629]It would indeed have been rather unusual to send
[13630]such materials -- a specific kit. . . of this -
[13631]sort.-- out to a rélatively small station, unless
[13633]. planning for their use were quite far along.
[13634](Bissell, 9/10, p. 37). ;
[13636]Nonetheless, Bissell said that he “probably believed" that he
[13637]had sufficient authority at that point to direct CIA officers ‘to
[13638]move from the stage of planning to implementation (Bissell, 9/10,
[13639]pp. 60-61). In light of his absence of a specific recollection of
[13640]these events, he stated that "if it be taken as established that Mr.
[13641]Gottlieb took specific instructions: ‘to implement, ' " Gottliet.
[13642]would not have been acting beyond the mandate given to him by
[13643]Bissell and it would show that the assassination plot "had then passed
[13644]‘into an implementation phase" and that’ "authorization was given"
[13646](Bissell, 9/10/ pp. 39, 41, 49).
[13648]HW 50955 Docld:32493539° Page 297
[13652]5. The Question of a Connection Between the Assassination
[13653]Plot and <Seher ‘Aetions_of CIR OFFisers and Dpsrstives
[13654]in the Congo
[13655]Justin O'Donnell, a senior CIA officer in the clandestine
[13656]- operations division in 1960, “testified that during. this period he
[13657]had been asked by. DDP Richard Bissell to Bo to the Congo to. carry
[13658]out the assassination of Lumumba (oO! Donnell, 6/9/75, ‘pp. 11-12). _
[13659]O'Donnell said that he refused to participate in an assassination |
[13660]operation, but | proceeded to the Congo to attempt. to draw ‘Lumumba
[13661]away from the protective custody of the UN guard and place him in
[13662]+ the hands. of Congolese authorities (O' Donnell, 6/9/75, pp. 13- 14).
[13663]Shortly after 0 Donnell’ s arrival in the Congo” he was
[13664]. joined by a. CIA agent with a criminal background who. was used the
[13665], following year by the CIA as part: of a program to develop a stand- -by
[13666]_ assassination ‘capability. Late in 1960, one of the operatives of
[13667]the Chief of Station in Leopoldville approached this agent of
[13668]Qo! Donnell's with a proposition to join an “execution squad" (CIA
[13669]Cable IN 18739, “Leopoldville to Director, 12/7/60).
[13670]Despite the. fact that O'Donnell was “initially approached
[13671]to be part of the plot to assassinate Patrice Lumumba, it is un-
[13672]likely that 0° Donnell was actually involved in the implementation
[13673]of that plot by the Chief of Station. Whether there is any connec-
[13674]_ tion between the assassination plot and either of the two operatives ~-
[13676]“QJWIN and WIROGUE -- is less clear.
[13678]HW. 50955 Docld:32493539 Page 296
[13680]-53-.
[13682](a) Q! Donnell! s Operations in the Congo
[13684](4) ‘Tweedy and the. Chief of Station Agreed That a
[13685]Senior Case Officer Should be Sen “Sent. to the » the Congo
[13686]to! Concentrate on the Ass Assassination. Operation
[13688]In early. October, 1960, several cables sent “in the
[13689]specially restricted PROP ‘channel dealt with a plan to send a. "senior -
[13690]ease officer" to the Congo to aid the Chief of Station with the. .
[13692]assassination operation.* On October 7, Bronson Tweedy informed —
[13693] Hedgman that he "WOULD. EXPECT DISPATCH TDY [TEMPORARY DUTY] SENIOR ~
[13694]CASE ‘OFFICER RUN THIS OP" by supervising a third country national
[13695]operative (CIA Cable our 78336, Tweedy to Chief of ‘Station, (10/7/60).
[13696]On October 15, Tweedy requested Hedgman' s reaction ° to. the sugges-
[13697]tion of dispatching the senior case officer as soon as possible to
[13698]concentrate on the assassination operation (CIA Cable OUT 81396,
[13699]Tweedy to Chief of Station, 10/15/60) . Two days later, the Chief
[13700]of Station replied affirmatively:
[13701]BELIEVE EARLY ASSICNMENT SENIOR CASE OFFICER
[13702]HANDLE PROP OPS EXCELLENT IDEA. (CIA Cable
[13703]IN 28936, Chief of Station to Tweedy).
[13704].The Chief of Station advised that hig responsibilities for “MULTIPLE
[13705]Ops" had restricted the amount of time he was able to devote ‘to the
[13707]assassination operation (CIA Cable, 10/17/60).
[13709]“%* See Section 4(e), supra, for full treatment of these cables.
[13711]HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 299 . . -
[13713]eee ven ve y= teeneen sacs MESA ae tect oats Seah Score tenes EME EE Se ams aoe
[13715]vie eae centenarians aA mena hare ener mace einen RE A an eA ean ee A
[13717](ii).
[13719]Rhee Am eect ee le Nar t Ere a tests RRB eRE EAI Ty Tare oe
[13723]Bisset Discussed Assassination of Lumumba: With .
[13724]O'Donnell and Sent Him to fim to Congo: “October- Noveiber 1960
[13726]‘Probably shortly after the Chief of Station's cable of
[13728]October. 17 requesting the assignment. of a senior case officer to
[13730]concentrate on the assassination operation, Richard Bissell broached
[13732]the subject with CIA officer Justin 0' Donnell.
[13734]At that time, 0° Donnell was the Deputy chief of a com-
[13736]ponent of the Directorate of Plans -- the CIA's covert action arm .
[13738]O'Donnell,
[13740]6/9/75, p. 8).
[13742]Justin on Donnell testified that” in October of 1960, he
[13744]was ‘asked by ‘Richard Bissell to undertake the mission of assassi-
[13746]nating: Patrice Lumumba (0' Donnell, 6/9/75, pp. ‘li-12; 9/11/75,°
[13748]pp. 19, 43):
[13750]HY 50955 Dacld: 32423539
[13752]O'Donnell: We called me in and he told me
[13753]he wanted to so down -to the Belgian Conso,
[13754]the former Belsian Conga, and to eliminate
[13756]Lumumba
[13758]O: What did you understand him to mean by
[13759]eliminate?
[13761]0! Donne! h: To kill him and thereby climinate
[13763]Q: What was the basis for your interpreting his:
[13764]remarks, whatever his precise language, as
[13765]meaning that he was talking about assa 1ssination
[13766]rather than merely neutralizine him through
[13768]some other means?
[13770]O'Donnell: Tt was not neutralization ..
[13771]Clearly the context of our talk was to kill
[13772]him. (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, pp. 11-12.)
[13774]O'Donnell reacted strongly to Bissell's instruction:
[13776]“L told him that I would absolutely not
[13778]have any part of killing Lumumba. [le said,
[13779]I want you to go over and talk to Sidney
[13780]Gottlieb. (0' Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 12.)
[13782]Page 300
[13786]Gottlieb was a CIA scientist who: was at that time ‘the Science |
[13787]Advisor to Bissell (Bissell, 9/10/75, Pp. 14). |
[13788]- O'Donnell said it was "inconceivable that: Bissell would direct.
[13789]such a mission without the personal. permission of Allen Dulles"
[13790](O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 44), But the question of authorization ~_
[13791]‘was never raised by Bissell: | . |
[13792]I assumed that he had authority from Mr. Dulles:
[13793]in such an important issue, but it was not dis-
[13794]eussed, nor did he purport to have higher. . ;
[13795]authority to do-it. (0' Donnell, 6/9/75. p. 15.)
[13796]O'Donnell promptly met with Gottlieb and rectified that he was
[13797]“sure that Mr. Bissell had called Gottlieb and told him I was coming
[13798]over" (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 13; 9/11/75, p. 7). O'Donnell said
[13799]that Gottlieb told him "that there were four or five ... Lethal
[13800]means of disposing of Lumumba" co! Donnell, 6/9/75, p- 13).- O'Donnell
[13801]recalled that "one of the methods was a virus and the others in-
[13802]cluded poison" (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, Pp. 12, 9/11/75, p. 7). O'Donnell
[13803]_ said that Gottlieb "didn't even. hint cee -that he had been in the
[13804]Congo and that he had - transported any lethal agent to the Congo"
[13805](0' Donnell, 9/11/75, ‘Dp. 7-A). . .
[13806]After speaking with Gottlieb, O'Donnell said:
[13807]I then left his office, and I went back to
[13808]Mr. Bissell's office and I told him in no
[13809]way would I have any part in the assassina-
[13810]tion of Lumumba ... and reasserted in
[13812]absolute terms that I would not be involved
[13813]_— in a murder attempt. (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 43.)
[13815]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 301
[13817]LDN eaeneeuraniernne to ae caies arta Rectan tthe, mad «Ser ietat as arcears tinge cbetancv tse ba SA bs SORA T a Rint SAP eT ta tt hr atatet ca
[13823]0'Donnell said that in one of his two conversations with |.
[13824]Bissell about Lumumba , he raised the prospect “that conspiracy
[13825]to commit murder being done in the District of Columbia might be
[13826]in violation of federal law" (O' Donnell, 6/9/75, pe 14). .He said
[13827]‘that Bissell "airily dismissed" this prospect (9' Donnell, 6/9/75,
[13828]p. 14). _ | — | |
[13829]Despite his refusal to. participate in assassination, O'Donnell ©
[13830]agreed to go te the Congo on a general mission to "neutralize"
[13831]Lumumba "as a political factor" ("Donel 9/11/75, pp. 43-44) :
[13832]I said I would go down and I would have no
[13833]compunction about operating to draw Lumumba
[13834]out [of UN custody], to rum an operation to -
[13835]‘neutralize his operations which were against
[13837]Western interests, against, I thought,
[13838]American interests. (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, P. 13. a
[13840]O'Donnell added that his objective was to
[13842]neutralize Lumumba's influence ... and his
[13844]activities against [a Congolese leader],
[13846]whom at that time you might say was our close.
[13848]instrument, he was the man we had put our:
[13850]chips on. (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 20.)
[13851]Bissell also recalled that, after their discussions about assassi-
[13852]nation, O'Donnell went to the Congo “with the assignment vee Of 7
[13853]looking. at other ways of neutralizing Lumumba" (Bissell, 9/10/75,
[13854]p. 53).
[13856]Although O'Donnell did not formulate a precise plan until he
[13858]reached the Congo, he discussed a general strategy with Bissell:
[13860]HY 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 302
[13864]Mr.-O'Donnell: I told Mr. Bissell that I
[13866]a would be willing to go down to neutralize
[13868]. his activities and operations and try to bring
[13869]him out [of UN custody] and turn him-over to
[13870]the Congolese authorities, that is correct.
[13872]Senator Mondale: Was it discussed then that
[13873]is Tife might be taken by the Congolese -
[13874]authorities? a _
[13876]Mr. O'Donnell: It was, I think, considered
[13877]Tm the -- not to have him killed, but then
[13878]it- would have been a Congolese being judged
[13879]by Corigolese for Congolese crimes. Yes, I .
[13880]think it was discussed. (O'Donnell, 6/9/75,
[13881]‘p. 38.). 7
[13883]There was a "very, very high probability" that Lumumba would re-
[13885]ceive capital punishment at the hands of the Congolese authorities,
[13887]according -to O'Donnell (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 24). But O'Donnell
[13888]"had no compunction about bringing him out and then having him
[13889]tried by a jury of his peers’ (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 14).
[13891]_ Although O'Donnell had expressed his aversion to. assassination
[13892]to Bissell and had undertaken a more general mission to "neutralize"
[13893]Lumumba's influence, it was clear to him that Bissell was still
[13894]interested in the assassination of Lumumba : |
[13896]in leaving at the. conclusion of our second
[13898]- discussion ... he said, well, I wouldn't
[13900]rule out that possibility -- meaning the.
[13901]possibility of the elimination or the killing
[13902]of Lumumba -- I wouldn't rule it. In other
[13903]words. even though you have said this, don't
[13904]rule it out.... There is no question about
[13905]it, he said, I wouldn't rule this other out,
[13906]meaning the’ elimination or the assassination
[13907](O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 45). _
[13909]~ O'Donnell had a distinctive recollection that after his second dis-
[13911]cussion of Lumumba with Bissell, he met with Richard Helms in order
[13913]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 303
[13915]ee nustins aetncancs weit to bA chieks MAERALSL Ahlen lb Raabe tt WN nr marae s atest ata Sone 8
[13917]HY 50955
[13921]to make his opposition to assassinating Lumumba a matter of
[13923]‘yecord (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, pp. 44-45):
[13925][I]n the Agency, since you don't have
[13926]documents, you have to be awfully canny
[13928]and you ‘have to get things on record, and:
[13929]I went into Mr. Helms’ office, and I
[13931]said, Dick, here is what Mr. Bissell
[13932]proposed to me, and -I told him that 1 ;
[13933]would under no conditions do it, and Helms
[13934]said: you're absolutely right.. (O'Donnell,
[13936]6/9/75, pp. 15-16).
[13938]Richard Helms testified that it was “likely” that he had such a
[13940]conversation with O'Donnell and he assumed that O'Donnell's version
[13942]. of their conversation was correct (Helms , 9/16/75, pp. 22-23).* |
[13944]‘William Harvey testified that O'Donnell had informed him
[13946]about the conversations with Bissell:
[13948]Mr. O'Donnell came..to me and said that he
[13949]had been approached by Richard Bissell
[13951]to undertake an operation in the Congo, one
[13952]of the objectives of which was the elimina-
[13953]tion o£ Patrice Lumumba. He also told me
[13954]that he had declined to undertake this .
[13955]assignment. (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 9.)
[13957]Harvey said that in a later conversation with Bissell, Bissell told
[13958]him that he had asked O'Donnell to undertake such an operation
[13959](Narvey, 6/25/75, p. 9).
[13961]O'Donnell said that within forty-eight hours of his second dis-
[13963]cussion with Bissell, he departed for the Congo (O'Donnell, 9/11/75,
[13965]pp. 45-46).
[13967] * Wlelms testified that he did not follow-up on this conversa-
[13968]tion in any way. He did not recall why O'Donnell had gone to the
[13969]Congo or what his mission was (ilelms, 9/16/75, pp. 32-33). |
[13971]Docld: 32423539 Page 304
[13975](iii) Bissell Testified That he Asked | 0! Donnell to Plan ~
[13976]oo - and Prepare (Lor an Assassination Operation
[13978]“Bissell remembered "very clearly" that he and O'Donnell
[13979]discussed the assassination of Lumumba in the fall of 1960 (Bissell,
[13980]6/9/75, p. 75) and that |0' Donnell reacted negatively (Bissell,
[13981]9/11/75, Pp. 18). According to Bissell, 0" Donnell said that ‘he
[13982]thought that assassination "was an inappropriate action and that.
[13983]the desired object could be accomplished better in other ways"
[13984](Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 54).
[13986]Bissell also confirmed’ the fact that he had asked
[13988]-Q'Donnell to see Sidney Gottlieb (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 44).
[13990]. ‘Bissell differs with O'Donnell's account on only one
[13991]important point -- the degree to which Bissell's initial assign-
[13992]‘ment to O'Donnell contemplated the mounting of an operation as
[13993]opposed to contingency planning. 0' Donnell flatly testified that
[13994]Bissell requested him to attempt to kill Lumumba. In his first
[13995]testimony on the subject, Bissell said that he asked 0' Donnell
[13996]"to investigate the popstbtliey of killing Lumumba" (Bissell,
[13997]6/11/75, p. 54; see also pp. , 75). In a later appearance, »
[13999]. however, Bissell stated that O'Donnell “had been asked to plan
[14001]and prepare for" the assassination of Lumumba (3B issell, 9/10/75,
[14002]p. 24). a
[14003]Bissell said that after his conversations with O'Donnell, he
[14005]felt that it would be necessary to 'postpone". the assassination
[14007]~ operation because, "eiven O'Donnell's reaction, there was a risk
[14009]HW 50955 Docld:324273539 Page 305
[14011]-60- oO a
[14013]‘that the planning of suci) an operation would be blown" (Bissell,
[14014]9/10/75, p. 25). Despite his impression that he might have de-
[14016]“activated assassination operations against Lumumba at that’ time,
[14018]Bissell could not preclude the possibility that the Hedgman/
[14020]Gobblieb poison plot continued to move foward:
[14022]{T]his had been in my mind a very sensitive
[14023]assignment to him, Limited -- with the
[14024]knowledge of it Limited very. narrowly even
[14025]within the Agency. And it is difficult to
[14026]separate recollection from inference on
[14027]oceasion. But| Tt seem to recollect that
[14028]after this conversation with him, I wanted
[14029]this put very fuch on the back burner and
[14030]inactivated for quite. some time. ‘low that. .
[14031]doesn't rule out the possibility that some
[14032]action through completely different channels
[14033]might have gone forward. But the best of
[14034]my recollection is, I viewed this not only
[14035]as terminating the assignment for him, but
[14036]also as reason for at least postponing any
[14037]thing further along that line. (Bissell,
[14038]9/19/75, PP- 25-26) .
[14040]In Tweedy's mind, o'Donnell's eventual mission to the Congo was
[14041]Linked to assessing the possibility for assassinating Lumumba
[14042]rather than to a general plan to draw Lumumba out of UN custody
[14044](tweedy, 9/9/75, p» 26)- |
[14046](iv) O'Donnell Arrived in the Con o and Learned That
[14048]a Virus Wals in the Station Sale
[14050]On Octobey 29, the Chief of Station was informed through
[14051]the PROP channel that Justin O'Donnell was soon to arrive in Leo-
[14052]poldville “ON FURTHERANCE THIS PROJECT" (CIA Cable ouT 86798, Fields
[14054]- _ to Chief of Station, 10/29/60). On November 3, O'Donnell arrived
[14056]HW 50955 DociId: 32423539
[14058]Page 306
[14060]in Leopoldville (CIA Cable IN 38052, Leopoldville to Director,
[14061]11/%/60) . Chief of Station Hedgman testified that he had been
[14062]made aware by cable that O'Donnell was coming, to the Congo.
[14063](Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 40). ‘Hedgman said it was "very possible"
[14064]that a as a new Chief of. Station he took the dispatch to the Congo
[14065]of a senior officer like 0' Donnell as a signal that’ CIA headquarters.
[14066]was "dissatisfied with my handling" of Gottlied's instructions.
[14067]_ Gledgman , 8/21/75, Pp. 42).
[14069]ltedgman had a general picture of OQ! Donnell’ s mission:
[14071]I understood it to be that -- similar to
[14073]mine, that is, the removal or neutrali-
[14074]zation of Lumumba ... I have no clear
[14076]recollection of his discussing the assassi-_
[14077]nation. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 54.)
[14078]Hedgman said that he had no recollection of O'Donnell indicating
[14079]one .way or the other whether he was considering assassination as
[14080]a means of "neutralizing" Lumumba (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 55). .
[14081]Hedgman said, "in view of my instructions, I may have assumed that
[14082]he was" considering assassination (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 55). Gen-
[14083]erally, however, Hedgman perceived O'Donnell as being unenthusiastic
[14084]“about his mission (ledgman, 8/21/75, pp. 96, 88-89).
[14086]When 0'Donnel1 arrived in the Congo, he met with the Chief of
[14087]Station, who informed him that there was " ‘a virus in the safe"
[14088](O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 7-A; 6/9/75, p. 16). O'Donnell said he
[14089]assumed it was a "lethal agent" (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 37), although
[14091]Hedgman was not explicit:
[14093]I knew it wasn't for somebody to get his polio
[14094]shot up to date. (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 16.)
[14096]HW 50955 Docld:324293539 Page 307
[14100]He added that if the virus was to be used for medical purposes
[14101]"it "would. have been in the custody of the State Department"
[14102]personnel, hot. the CIA station (O' Donnell,. 6/9/75, p. 36).
[14104]-O' Donnell said that he did not recall that Hedgman mentioned |
[14105]the source of the virus (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, Pp. 3) .* But o' Donnell
[14106]assumed that it'had come From Sidney Gottlieb 's officer
[14108]_ It would have had-to have come from Washington,
[14110]in my estimation, and I would think, since it
[14112]had been discussed with Gottlieb that it
[14114]probably. -would have emanated: from his office.
[14116](0' Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 28. )
[14117]Hedgman did not ‘recall discussing sottlicb's trip to the Congo
[14118]with O'Donnell, but "assumed" that he did so (Hedgman, 8/21/75,
[14119]pp. 60-61).
[14121]O'Donnell.was "certain" that the virus had arrived before he —
[14122]did (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 24). He was surprised to learn that
[14123]such a virus was being held at the Leopoldville station because
[14124]he had refused an assassination mission before departing for the
[14125]Congo (o' Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 17)... |
[14127]. 0" Dennell stated that he knew of no other instance where 4
[14128]lethal biological substance was in the possession of a “CIA station
[14129](O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 50). He assumed that its. purpose was
[14131]assassination:
[14133]ti
[14135]* When O'Donnell was informed about HNedgman's testimony on
[14136]the visit of Gottlieb to the Congo and the plot to poison Lumumba ,
[14137]he said, "I believe absolutely in its credibility" (O'Donnell ,:
[14138]9/11/75, Pp. 53). O'Donnell found nothing in the facts as he knew
[14139]them, nor in Hedgman ' s character to raise a question about that
[14140]testimony. O'Donnell regarded Hedgman as “an honest anda decent
[14141]man" (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 19) -- "a totally truthful man"
[14143](O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 56).
[14144]HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 308 -
[14146]sememesnspciietantmamanSert nes bat cine weraes in oretenain tte nina items om easds sainieche cade semen sea nein Sanaa nism aha AS CTA Ae atttrs tame ama manana tame aren A
[14150]My feeling definitely is that it was for a:
[14151]specific purpose, and was just not an all-
[14152]purpose capability there begin held for tar-
[14153]gets of opportunity, unspecified targets.
[14154](O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 49. )-
[14155]At several points, O'Donnell stated that he did not think that
[14156]Lumumba was the target specified for the use of the virus (O'Donnell,
[14157]6/9/75, p. 17; 9/11/75, p. 48). But he allowed for that possibility: ”
[14158]“I supposed it was for a lethal operation, very -
[14159]possibly Lumumba, but very possibly in connec-
[14160]tion with other people. -(O' Donnell, 6/9/75,
[14161]p. 24; accord. 6/9/75, P. 17. -
[14162]His final word on the subject was ‘that he assumed that the "specific
[14163]purpose” of the virus was the assassination of Lumumba (O'Donnell,
[14164]9/11/75, p. 50). .
[14166]0! ‘Donnell said that the Chief of Station never indicated that
[14167]O'Donnell was to employ the virus (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, Pp. 52). In
[14168]fact, O'Donnell testified that Hedgman ‘never discussed his assassi-
[14169]nation effort, he never even indicated that this was one." - (O'Donnell,
[14170]9/11/75, p. 54.)
[14172]While Hedgman has no direct recollection of discussing his
[14173]assassination operation with Q' Donnell, he “assumed” that. he had
[14174]at least discussed with O'Donnell the problem ‘of gaining access to
[14175]Lumumba. for the purpose of assassinating him (Hedgman, 8/21/75,
[14177]p. 55, 60). O'Donnell testified, however, that because he was.
[14179]morally opposed to assassination" he would ¢ ‘absolutely not" have
[14181]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 309
[14185]explored the means by which such access could be gained, nor would
[14187]he have undertaken’a mission to the Congo if it involved assess-~
[14189]ment of the situation for an assassination operation by someone
[14191]else (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 26). -
[14193]O'Donnell was "sure" that he "related everything" to Hedgman
[14195]about his
[14197]conversations with Bissell concerning the assassination
[14199]of Lumumba (O'Donnell; 9/11/75, p. 46). Hedgman, however, had no
[14201]‘recollection of learning this from O'Donnell (iiedsman, 8/21/75,
[14203]p. 56).
[14205]Beyond this, O'Donnell said that his discussions of assassi-
[14207]nation with Hedgman were general and philosophical, dealing with
[14209]"the morality of assassinations" (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, pp. 46, 54):
[14211]From my point of view I told him I had
[14212]moral objections to it, not just qualms,
[14213]but objections. I didn't think it was
[14215]. the right thing to do.- (9'Donnell,
[14217]9/11/75, p. 9).
[14219]When asked to characterize Hedgman's attitude toward assassination
[14221]based on those discussions, 9'Donnell said:
[14223]HY 40955 Dacld: 32423539
[14225]I will answer your question just eas fairly
[14227]and as serupulously.as I.can. I have a |
[14228]great deal of respect for Hedgman. And if
[14230]he said something, I would believe him’ ta_
[14232]be speaking the truth as he knew it without
[14233]shading it.... The best I could say, I _
[14234]think, would be this, that he would’ not have
[14235]been opposed in principle to assassination in
[14236]the interests of national. security.... I
[14238]know that he is a man of «reat moral per-
[14239]ception and decency and honor, and so forth.
[14240]And that it would disturb him to be engaged in
[14241]something like that. But I think I would
[14243]have to say. that in our conversations, my .
[14244]memory of those, at no time would he.rule it
[14245]‘out as beine a possibility. (O'Donnell,
[14246]9/11/75, p. 18.)
[14248]Page 310
[14250]dome ee Maenh be 8 Sneha Peace Sat PA ESR al nc CAs me Madan Med anos a hcSS TENE oe
[14254]- “(y) O'Donnell Planned to "Neutralize" Lumumba b Turning,
[14255]flim Over to Congolese Authorities and Requested the
[14256]= Kssienment of Agent OJWIN to Leovolavitte as His
[14257]co, Alter Ego - os
[14258]After Justin 0* Donnell arrived in the Congo, he formu-_
[14259]lated a plan for "neutralizing" Lumumba by drawing him away from
[14260]the custody of the wn force whch was guarding his residence:
[14261]O'Donnell: [wJhat I wanted to do was. to
[14262]get him out, to trick him out, if I could,
[14263]and then turn him over ... to the legal
[14264]authorities and let him stand trial. Be-
[14265]cause he had atrocity attributed to him for
[14267]"which he could: very well stand trial.
[14269]Q: And for which he could very well have
[14270]received capital punishment?
[14272]Q! Donnel L: ‘Yes. And L am not opposed to
[14273]capital punishment. ~ (O'Donnell, 9/11/75,
[14274]pp. 20-21.)* ;
[14275]To implement his plan, O'Donnell made arrangements. to rent “an ob-
[14277]servation post over the palace in which Lumumba was safely ensconced"
[14279]x According to an earlier report from the Chief of Station, it:
[14280]was the view of the Special Representative of the Secretary General
[14281]of the United Nations that arrest by Congolese authorities was "JUST
[14282].A TRICK TO ASSASSINATE LUMUMBA" (CIA Cable Leop ' Chief
[14283]of Station to. Director, 10/11/60). The Chief of Station proceeded
[14284]to recommend Lumumba's arrest in the same cable:
[14286]STATION HAS CONSISTENTLY URGED [ CONGOLESE] LEADERS
[14287]ARREST LUMUMBA IN BELIEF LUMUMBA WILL CONTINUE BE
[14288]THREAT TO STABILITY CONGO UNTIL REMOVED FROM
[14289]SCENE (CIA Cable, 10/11/60).
[14291]HY 50955 Daocld: 32423539 Page 311
[14295](O'Donnell, 6/9/75, Pp. 20).* O'Donnell also “spotted” a member
[14296]of the UN guard and made his acquaintance to recruit him for an
[14297]attempt to lure Lumumba outside UM protective custody (0' Donnell,
[14298]6/9/75, p. 20; 9/11/75, p.~ 21).
[14300]O'Donnell said that he cabled prog ress reports on | his plan to.
[14301]CIA headquarters (o! Donnell,: O/LL/75, p. 26). He ‘also. said that.
[14302]he informed the. Chief of Station about - his plan. (ar Donnell,  97uits,
[14304]p. 56). .
[14306]In connection with his effort to draw Lumumba out. of UN. cus-
[14307]tody, O'Donnell arranged for a CIA agent, whose code name was
[14308]QJWIN, to come to the Congo to worle with him (O'Donnell, 9/11/75,
[14309]p. 19): | |
[14311]What I wanted to use him for was ..
[14312]counter-espionage[.].... I had to screen
[14313]the U.S. participation in this ... by
[14314]. using a foreign national whom we knew,
[14315]trusted, and had worked with ... the
[14316]idea was for me to use him as an alter
[14317]ego. (O'Donnell Tr., PP. 19-20. -
[14318]In mid-November, two.cables from Leopoldville ‘urged CIA: head-
[14319]quarters to. send QJWIN as soon as possible (CIA Cable IN ‘41261,
[14320]Leopoldville to Director, 11/11/60) ‘with this message:
[14321]LOCAL OPERATIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRE
[14322]IMMEDIATE EXPEDITION OF QJWIN TRAVEL TO
[14324]LEOPOLDVILLE. (CIA Cable IN 41556,
[14325]Leopoldville to Director, 11/13/60.)
[14327]* A cable from the Chief of Station to Tweedy in mid-November
[14328]reported that the double guard of United Nations and Congolese
[14329]troops around Lumumba's residence thwarted this plan: “CONCENTRIC
[14330]RINGS OF DEFENSE MAKE ESTABLISHMENT OF OBSERVATION POST IMPOSSIBLE"
[14331](CIA Cable IN 42478, Chief of Station to Tweedy, 11/14/60).
[14333]HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 312 “
[14335]The cables contained no exploration of this sense of urgency. about.
[14337], waar rr t
[14338]the "operational circumstances.
[14340](b)° Agent QJIWIN's Mission in the Congo: November-December
[14342]QJWIN was a foreign citizen with a criminal background ,.
[14344]recruited in Europe (Memorandum to CIA Finance. Division, Re:
[14345]Payments to QJWIN, 1/31/61), and supervised. by CIA officer Arnold
[14346]“Silver. In November 1960, at o' Donnell’ S request. (0" Donnell, 6/9/75,
[14347]p. 19), agent QJIWIN was.dispatched ‘to the Congo by Silver, to under- —
[14348]take a-mission that “might involve a large element of personal risk."
[14349](CIA Cable IN 36814, 11/2/60 ye |
[14350]‘A dispatch from the CIA headquarters | on his pending trip
[14351]to Africa made clear the high degree of sensitivity accorded to
[14353]his mission:
[14355]In view of the extreme sensitivity of the ob-
[14356]jective for which we want him to perform his
[14358]task, he was not told precisely what we want
[14359]him to do..... Instead; he was told ... that
[14361]_ we would like to have him spot, assess, and
[14362]recommend some dependable, quick-witted
[14363]persons for our use..... It was thought best
[14364]to withhold our true, specific requirements
[14365]pending the final decision to use [him].
[14366](CIA Dispatch, AUDW-147, 11/2/60.)
[14368]* Part of the purpose in dispatching QJWIN to Africa was to
[14369]send him from the Congo to another African country for an unspeci-
[14370]fied mission. QJWIN's mission to this country is not explained
[14372]in the cable traffic between CIA headquarters and the various sta-
[14373]tions that dealt with him.
[14375]_ There is no indication in CIA Files as to ) whether QJWIN com-
[14376]pleted this mission. O'Donnell said he had no knowledge of any
[14377]mission that would have taken QJWIN to this country (0' Donnell,
[14378]O11ITS, PP. 32-33).
[14380]HY 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 313
[14384]This message itself was deemed too sensitive to be retained
[14385]“at ‘the station: “this dispatch should be reduced to cryptic
[14386]“necessary, notes and destroyed after the first reading." _ (CIA
[14387]Dispatch, “AUDW-147, 11/2/60. ) .
[14388]QIWIN arrived in Leopoldville on November 21, 1960 (CIA Cable
[14389]IN 49486, 11/29/60) and returned to Europe in late December ‘1960 |
[14390]| (CIA Cable OUT 54710, Director to Leopoldville, 12/9/60).
[14391]The CIA Inspector General's Report said that QJWIN
[14392]had been recruited earlier by Arnold Silver
[14393]'.for use in a special dperation in the Congo
[14394]'. {the assassination of Patrice Lumumba] to be
[14395]run by Justin O'Donnell. (1.G. Report, p. 38.) _
[14396]However, both O'Donnell and: Bissell testified that’ O'Donnell re-
[14397]fused to be associated with an assassination operation. * Instead, ©
[14398]O'Donnell said he went to the Congo to attempt to snatch Lumumba
[14399]from the protective custody of the U.N. guard and place him in
[14400]the hands of the Congolese army. (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, pp. 13-14,
[14401]37.) | Ot
[14402]. According to O'Donnell, QJVIN was a man who was capable of
[14403]undertaking an assassination mission: |
[14404]O'Donnell: ...1 would say that he would not
[14405]be a man of many scruples.
[14406]Q: So he was a man capable of doing anything?
[14407]‘O'Donnell: ‘I would think so, yes. |
[14408]_ Q: “And that would include assassination?
[14410]O'Donnell: I would think so.
[14411](O'Donnell, 9/11/75, pp. 35-36.)
[14413]* See Sections 5(a) (ii). and 5(a) (iii) above.
[14415]HY 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 314
[14419]But O'Donnell had no knowLedge that QIWIN was ever used for an
[14420]assassination mission (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, po. 36, 42).
[14421]O'Donnel said that, as far as he knew, he was the only CIA
[14422]officer with supervisory responsibility for QJWIN and QJWIN did
[14423]not report independently to anyone else (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, Pp. 28).
[14424]When asked if it was possible that QJWIN had a mission independent .
[14425]of that he was performing for O'Donnell, he said: -
[14426]O'Donnell: Yes, that is possible -- or
[14427]it could have been that somebody contacted
[14428]him after he got down there, that they
[14429]wanted him to do something along the lines
[14430]of assassination. I don't know. (O'Donnell, ©
[14431]9/11/75, p. 29.)
[14432]But he discounted this possibility as “highly unlikely" because it
[14433]would be a departure from standard CIA practice --. placing an agent
[14434]in.a position of knowledge superior to that of his supervising .
[14435]officer (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 29).
[14436]Despite O'Donnell's doubt that QJWIN nad an independent line
[14437]of responsibility to the Chief of Station, a cable of November 29
[14438]shows that Hedgman was aware of WIN's activities. .
[14439]In that cable, the Chief of Station reported through the PROP
[14440]channel to Tweedy that QJWIN had begun implementation of a plan to
[14441]“PIERCE BOTH CONGOLESE AND UN GUARDS" to enter Lumumba’ s residence
[14442]and "PROVIDE ESCORT OUT OF RESIDENCE" (CIA Cable IN 49486, Chief
[14443]of Station to Tweedy, 11/29/60). O'Donnell said that he had directed
[14444]a QUWIN to make the acquaintanceship of the member of the UN force
[14446]whose help he sought for the plan to snatch Lumumba from UN custody
[14448]HW 50955 Docld:329423539 Page 315 , . ~
[14452](O' Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 21)... But Lumumba had left UN custody at
[14453]this. point to travel toward his strongholé at Stanleyville. This:
[14454]did not deter QUWIN: .
[14456]‘VIEW CHANGE IN LOCATION TARGET, QJWIN
[14458]ANXIOUS GO STANLEYVILLE AND EXPRESSED
[14460]DESIRE EXECUTE PLAN BY HIMSELF WITHOUT
[14462]USING ANY APPARAT (CIA Cable, 11/29/60)..
[14463]It is unclear whether this latter ' plan” contemplated assassina-
[14464]tion as well as abduction. _ An affirmative reply from headquarters
[14465]came through the PROP channel the next day which was also. suscep-
[14466]tible of interpretation as an assassination order:
[14468]CONCUR QJIWIN GO STANLEYVILLE. . WE ARE
[14470]PREPARED CONSIDER DIRECT ACTION BY QJWIN
[14472]BUT WOULD LIKE YOUR READING ON SECURITY
[14474]FACTORS. .HOW CLOSE WOULD THIS PLACE [UNITED
[14476]STATES] TO THE ACTION? (CIA. Cable OUT 98314,
[14478]Chief of Africa Division to Chief of Station,
[14479]11/30/60.)
[14483]O'Donnell said that agent QJWIN's stay in the Congo was “co-
[14484]extensive with my own, allowing for the fact that he came after I
[14485]did." (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 19.) O'Donnell said he left the
[14486]Congo around the time of Lumumba's death in Katanga at the hands »
[14487]of Congolese authorities. (O'Donnell, p. 20. ) QJWIN left in
[14488]“December shortly after Lumumba was captured by the Congolese army.
[14489]In a memorandum to arrange the accounting for QJWIN's activities
[14490]_in the Congo, William K. Harvey “- under whom 0' Donnell had worked
[14491]_ before being detached for assignment to the Congo -- noted the
[14493]success: of QIWIN's mission: "QJWIN was ‘gent on this trip for a
[14495]HY 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 316
[14499]specific, highly sensitive operational purpose which has been -
[14500]completed" (Memovandum for Finance Division from William K. Harvey, —
[14501]1/11/61). 0" Donnell explained Harvey’ s reference to the fact that .
[14502]QUWIN's mission had been ' ‘completed" by saying that once Lumumba
[14503]was in the hands of the Congolese. authorities “the reason for
[14505]. the mounting of the project ... had become moot" (O'Donnell, .
[14507]9/11/75, ‘P. 35). When asked LE he and QJWIN were responsible for
[14508]Lumumba ' s departure from UN custody and subsequent capture, .O' Donnell
[14509]said: “Absolutely not" (O'Donnell, 9/31/75, p. 35). Harvey did not
[14510]recall the meaning of the memorandum, but he assumed that 0' Donnell" s
[14512]return from the Congo constituted the “completion of > QIN s
[14513]mission (Harvey, affidavit, pe. ).
[14515]' Despite the indication in the Inspector General's Report that.
[14516]_QUWIN may have been recruited initially for an assassination mission
[14517]and the suggestive language of the. cables at the end of November,
[14518]there is no clear evidence that QJWIN was actually involved in any
[14520]assassination plan or attempt, The CIA officers who were involved
[14521]in or knowledgeable of an assassination plot against Lumumba gave
[14522]‘no testimony that tended to show that QJWIN was related to that plot.
[14523]The Chief of Station had a "vague recollection" that QJWIN’
[14524]was in the Congo working for Justin O'Donnell. (Hedeman, 8/21/75,
[14525]p. 95.) But Hedgman did not recall why QJIWIN was in the Congo.
[14526](Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 95.) QJWIN was not a major operative of
[14527]. Hedgman's. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p.. 95.) Richard Bissell and Bronson
[14529]Tweedy did not recall anything about QJWIN's mission in the Congo
[14531]HY 450955. Docld: 324233539 Page 347
[14533]Gissell, 9/10/75, pp. 54-57; Tweedy, 9/9/75, pp. 54, 61).
[14534]~~ William Harvey, from whose division QJIWIN was on loan for
[14535]his Congo assignment, had no specific knowledge of WIN" Ss: activities
[14536]in the Congo: .
[14537]I was kept informed of the arrangements for
[14538]QJIWIN's trip to the Congo and, subsequently,
[14539]of his presence in the Congo. I do not know |
[14540]specifically what QJWIN did in the Congo. I
[14541]do not, think that I ever had such knowledge....
[14542]‘LE QUWIN were to be used on an assassination
[14543]mission, it would have been cleared with me.
[14544]. I’was never. informed that he was-to be used
[14545]' for such a mission. (Harvey. affidavit, p. .)
[14546]. He stated that Arnold Silver probably wrote the memoranda con-
[14547]- cerning QUWIN and submitted them for HARVEY's signature (llarvey
[14548], affidavit, p. +.
[14549](c) QJWIN's Connection to Project ZRRIFLE
[14550]After leaving the Congo in early 1961, QJWIN was used by
[14551]CIA officer William Harvey as the principal asset in Project: ZRRIFLE,
[14552]a project which included research into a capability to assassinate
[14553]foreign leaders.* QJWIN's role in Project ZRRIFLE was to "SPOT"
[14554]figures of the European underworld who - could be utilized as agents
[14555]by the CIA if required. Harvey stated that before the formation
[14557]of Project ZRRIFLE:
[14559]~ * For a Full treatment of Project ZRRIFLE, see Section
[14560]infra, on the "Executive Action Capability.’ ~~
[14562]HW 50955 DocId:32423539 Page 313
[14564]seats ee ne ee en ate Ate ReMANO AES a RE Ne ce a
[14566]“Arnold Silver had not previously ised
[14568]QJWIN as an assassination capability or
[14570]even viewed him as such. (Harvey affi-
[14572]davit, pe
[14574]Although Harvey also had discussions “with Sidney Gottlieb in connec-
[14576]tion with Project ZRRIFLE, he believed that Gottlieb never mentioned
[14577]to him either QJWIN' s activities in the Conge or Gottlieb’ $s own
[14578]trip to Leopoldville (Harvey affidavit, p. ). Harvey had con-
[14579]suited with Arnold S Silver about the | initiation of. Project. 2RRIFLE
[14580](Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 52). .
[14582]‘The Chief of Station in Leopoldville testified that he-had
[14583]never heard of Project ZRRIFLE, nor was he aware of any. CIA. project
[14584]to develop the capability of assassinating foreign leaders.
[14586](Hedeman, 8/21/75, p. 93.) Furthermore, Hedgman said that he was.
[14587]“quite certain" that he never. discussed assassination capabilities
[14588]or assets with Harvey at any time. Gledgman, 8/21/75, ‘P. 95. )
[14589]“Hedgman testified that Arnold Silver came to the Congo on a counter-
[14590]intelligence mission during his tenure, but they did not discuss
[14591]the plan to assassinate Lumumba. (Hedgman , 8/21/75, p.. 92.)
[14592]| An interesting note on the value accorded QJWIN. by the CIA
[14593]‘and the. inherent predicament for an intelligence agency. that employs.
[14594]hoodlums ‘is found in a cable ‘from CIA headquarters to Arnold Silver
[14595]in 1962. The CIA had learned that QsWIn was about to go on trial
[14596]in Europe on smuggling charges. The cable sunmeated:
[14597]- , = IF - INFOR TRUE WE MAY WISH ATTEMPT QUASI
[14599]CHARGES. OR ARRANGE SOMEHOW SALVAGE QJWIN FOR
[14600]OUR PURPOSES. (CIA Cable OUT 73943, 4/18/62.)
[14602]HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 319
[14606](d).. Agent QJWIN Was Asked By Hedgman's operative. WIROGUE
[14608]to Join an Execution quad: December L96t
[14610]The one. incident where there is an explicit. reference to
[14612]. assassination in connection with QIWI, involved his contact with
[14613]- WIROCUE, another asset of the Congo station. |
[14614]WIROGUE, was an ' ‘essentially stateless" European. who was
[14615]a a forger and former ‘bank robber" and had fought. with the French
[14616]Foreign Legion. . (Inspector General Memorandum, 3/14/75.) He was.
[14617]sent. to the Congo after being given plastic surgery and a toupee
[14618]bythe CIA so that he would not be recognized by Europeans traveling
[14619]through the Congo. (I.G. Memorandum, 3/14/75.) WLIROGUE was .
[14620]assessed by the CIA as a man who "LEARWS QUICKLY AND CARRIES OUT
[14621]ANY ASSICHMENT WITHOUT REGARD FOR DANCER" (CIA Cable our 86554,
[14622]Africa Division to Leopoldville, 10/27/60).
[14624]. The Chief of Station described WIROGE as "a man with a
[14625]rather unsavory yeputation, who would try anything once, at least."
[14626](Hedgman, 8/21/75, D. 96.) Hedpman used him as "a peneral utility
[14627]agent" because "I felt we needed surveillance capability, develop-
[14629]ing new contacts, various things." (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 96.)
[14630]Hedgman supervised WIROGUE directly. and. did not put WIROGUE in
[14631]‘touch with Justin o' Donnell, (Nedgman, 8/21/75, p. 97.) |
[14633]A report on agent WIROGUE, prepared for the CLA Inspector
[14634]General's office in 1975, described ‘the training and tasking he
[14636]received:
[14638]HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 320
[14640]oe recente cecenrnentnmed baad tetera A tee ance ae in ements Sanh tain Mee sean So
[14644]_On 19 September 1960 two members of Afvica
[14645]- Division met with him to discuss “an opera-
[14647]tional assignment in Africa Division." In,
[14649]‘connection with this assignment, WLROGUE/1_
[14651]was to be trained in demolitions, small arms,
[14653]and medical immunization,... In October 1960,
[14655]a cable to Leopoldville stated that
[14657]Headquarters [had] ... intent to use him as
[14659]utility agent in order to "(a) organize and-
[14660]‘conduct.a-surveillance team; (b) intercept -
[14661]packages; (c) blow up bridges; and (d) execute ; .
[14662]other assignments requiring positive action.
[14664]‘His utilization is not to be restricted to
[14666]Leopoldville."' (1.G. Memorandu, 3/14/75.) ..
[14668]. WIROGUE made his initial contact with Hedgman in Leopoldville on -
[14670]December 2, 1960 (CIA Cable IN 18739 , 12/17/60), He was given two
[14672]instructions by Hedgman: (1) to “build cover during initial period; "
[14674]‘and (2) to “spot persons for -[a] “surveil lanve team" of intelligence -
[14676]assets in the province where Lumumba's support was strongest. (CIA 7
[14677]Cable IN’ 18739, 12/17/60. )
[14679]Soon after receiving these instructions, agent WIROGUE approached
[14680]QJWIN and asked him to join an "execution squad. "This incident is
[14681]described by Leopoldville Chief of Station Hedgman in a ‘cable to
[14683]CIA headquarters (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 99):
[14685]QJWIN WHO RESIDES SAME HOTEL.AS WIROGUE REPORTED
[14686]‘LATTER TOLD TIM HE HAD LIVED ALASKA, JAPAN, SOUTH
[14687]AMERICA, GERMANY AND OTHER PARTS EUROPE. QJWIN
[14689]SAID WIROGUE SMELLED AS THOUGH HE IN INTEL BUSINESS.
[14690]STATION DENIED ANY INFO ON WLROGUE. 14 DEC QJWIN
[14691]REPORTED WIROGUE HAD OFFERED HIM THREE’ HUNDRED DOLLARS
[14692]PER MONTH TO PARTICIPATE IN INTEL RET AND BE MEMBER
[14693]EXECUTION SQUAD." WHEN QJWIN SAID HE NOT. INTERESTED,
[14694]WLIROGUE ADDED THERE WOULD BE BONUSES FOR SPECIAL JOBS.
[14695]UNDER QJWIN QUESTIONING, WIROGUE LATER’ SAID HE WORK-
[14696]INF FOR [AMERICAN]. SERVICE.
[14698]IN DISCUSSING LOCAL CONTACTS , WIROGUE MENTIONED
[14699]QJWIN BUT DID NOT ADMIT TO HAVING TRIED RECRUIT HIM.
[14700]THEN [ CHIEF OF STATION] TRIED LEARN WHETHER WIROGUE
[14701]HAD MADE APPROACH LATTER CLAIMED HAD TAKEN NO STEPS.
[14702]{CHIEF OF STATION] WAS ‘UNABLE CONTRADICT, AS DID NOT
[14703]WISH REVEAL QJWIN ‘CONNECTION {CIA]. (CLA Cable,
[14705]Leopoldville to Director, 12/17, 60.) Lo
[14707]HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page
[14711]"The cable also. expressed Hedgman's concern about WIROGUE 's
[14712]actions: -
[14713].. LEOP CONCERNED. BY WIROGUE FREE WHEELING
[14714]AND: LACK SECURITY. STATION HAS ENOUGH HEAD-
[14715]ACHES WITHOUT WORRYING ABOUT AGENT WHO HOT |
[14716]ABLE HANDLE FINANCES AND. WHO NOT WILLING :
[14717]FOLLOW LNSTRUCTIONS. IF HQS DESIRES, WILLING
[14718]KEEP HIM ON PROBATION, BUT IF CONTINUE HAVE |
[14719]DIFFICULTIES, BELIEVE WIROGUE RECALL BEST
[14721]SOLUTION. (CIA Cable, Leopoldville to Director,
[14722]12/17/60.) - . .
[14724]WIROGUE 's attempt. to recruit QJWIN for an execution squad is
[14725]explained by Hedgman asa mistake and by the actions of QIWIN as
[14726]an unauthorized, unexpected contact which he did not initiate.
[14728]The Chief of Station testified that he had not instructed
[14729]WIROGUE to make this kind of proposition to QJWIN or anyone else.
[14730](Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 100.) He added:.
[14732]I would like to stress that I don't know what
[14734]‘WIROGUE was talking about das a[n] “execution
[14736]squad,'' and I am sure he was never tasked to |
[14738]go. out and execute anyone.  (iledgman, 8/21/75,
[14740]p. 100.) , :
[14741]Hedgman suggested that WIROGUE may have concocted the idea of an
[14742]execution squad:
[14744]His idea of what an intelligence operative
[14746]should do, I think, had been gathered by
[14748]reading a few novels or something of the
[14750]sort, (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 100.)
[14752]Justin O'Donnell had no knowledge of an attempt by anyone
[14754]“connected to the CIA to recruit an execution squad and no recollec-
[14756]HY 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 322 a ~
[14758]ee ae ee eee teat imine attra ipa thats macht nts aap EN ie Neda tte ae heer tea Ae ae ite ta elit NE teat Bae Tee RS fe se vena MA NT NR
[14762]tion of WIROGUE (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, pp. 39-42). O'Donnell mei
[14763]tiotied that agent’ QIWiN was considered for use on a "strong arm :
[14764]squad," put’ said that this was for purposes more general than
[14766]"assassinations: |
[14768]surveillance teams where you have to go
[14769]into. crime areas ... where you need a
[14770]fellow that if he gets in a box. can fight
[14771]his way out of it. (O'Donnell, 9/11/75,
[14772]p. 36). | ee
[14773]Richard Bissell recalled nothing of the WIROUGE approach “to.
[14775]— QUWIN (Bissell, 9/11/75, p. 71). Bronson Tweedy did recall that
[14776]WIROGUE was "dispatched on a general purpose mission" to the Congo
[14777](Tweedy, 9/9/75, p. 63). But Tweedy testified. that WIROGUE would
[14778]“absolutely not" have been used on an assassination mission against
[14779]Lumumba because “he was basically. dispatched, assessed and dealt
[14780]with by the balance of the Division" rather than by the two people
[14782]in the Africa Division -- Tweedy himself and his deputy, Glenn
[14783]Fields, -- who would have known that’ the assassination of Lumumba
[14784]was being: considered (Tweedy , 9/9/75, pp. 64- 65). |
[14786]The Chief of Station said that if the NIROG 3UE incident wag
[14787]connected to an actual assassination plan, he would have transmitted
[14788]a message in a more narrowly restricted channel than that in which
[14789]‘this cable was sent. His cable on WIROGUE 's approach to QJVIN was
[14790]sent to headquarters with a security designation that allowed much
[14791]wider distribution than the PROP cables that he sent and received
[14792]‘concerning the Cottlieb assassination assignment. (Heidgman, 8/21/75,
[14794]-p, 102.) In contrast, he limited distribution of the cable about
[14796]HY 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 323
[14800]WIROGUE only as a CIA officer would "normally do ... when you
[14801]speak in a derogatory manner of an asset." (Hedgman , 8/21/75,
[14802]p. 101) |
[14804]. The Chief of Station maintained that WIROGUE's proposition.
[14805]to QJIWIN to join an “execution squad" could be attributed to
[14807]WIROGUE!s "freewheeling" nature, Hedgman said: .
[14809]I had difficulty controlling him in that he
[14810]was not a professional intelligence officer
[14811]as such. He seemed to. act on his own without
[14812]seeking. guidance or authority ... I found
[14814]he was rather an unguided missile ... the
[14815]kind of.man that could get-you in trouble be-
[14817]fore you knew you were in trouble....
[14818](Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 96-97).
[14820]But Hedgman did not disavow all responsibility for WIROGUE's actions:
[14822][I]f you give a man an order and he carries it
[14823]out and causes a problem for the Station, why
[14824]then as Chief of Station, well, you accept
[14825]responsibility. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 97.)
[14827]In sum, the Chief of Station testified that despite the fact
[14828]‘that the CIA was interested in the assassination of Lumumba during
[14829]this period, agent WIROGUE's attempt to form an "execution squad"
[14830]was an unauthorized, maverick action, unconnected to the CIA assassi-
[14831]nation plan.
[14833]Nonetheless, the fact that WIROCUE was to be trained in "medical
[14834]immunization" (1.G. Memorandum, 3414/75) raises the possibility
[14835]that he was connected to the plot to assassinate’ Lumumba by means»
[14837]of lethal biological substances. The 1975 report on WIROGUE's case
[14839]HY 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 324 . a
[14841]pete de ty tate RSS UR ELUM AE ba aT LAAT eA sea ne
[14843]pace dest nung teas -tosinsne onmnetedees 2 ment RT YE HS EAC tee a eat
[14847]by the Inspector General's office leaves this question open. The
[14848]report concludes - with. the statement that 'WIROGUE/1 spent most. of
[14849]his time trying to develop contacts and was not directly Se
[14850]| in any particular operation.' (1.G. Memorandum, 3/14/75. )- t,o
[14851]when: the report was circulated in the Inspector General ' Ss office,
[14852]the following comment was handwritten by Seott Breckinridge, one
[14854]of the principal authors of the 1967 report on CIA involvement in
[14856]assassination attempts: "ROGUE 's. pitch is too clear to be dis- -
[14857]carded out of hand as ‘exceeding | instructions. ' (1.6. Memorandum,
[14858]: 3/14/79) |
[14860]6. . The Question of Whether the CIA Was Involved in Bringing
[14861]About: Lumumba's Death in Katanga
[14863]There is no direct evidence of CIA involvement in bring-
[14864]ing about Lumumba 's death in Katanga. The CIA officers most closely
[14865]connected to the plot to poison Lumumba testified uniformly that
[14866]they knew of no CIA involvement in Lumumba's death. |
[14868](a). Lumumba's Escape from UN Custody, capeare by
[14870]Conzolese Army, and Imprisonment at Thysville:
[14872]Novenber 27=Jesenber 3, 1960
[14874]The strongest hint that the CIA imay have been involved.
[14875]‘in the capture of Lumumba by Mobutu's troops after his departure
[14876]from UN custody on November 27, was contained in a PROP cable from.
[14877]the Chief of Station to Tweedy on Jovenber 14 (CIA Cable IN 42478,
[14878]Chief of Station to Tweedy, 11/14/60). In the cable, Hedgman re-
[14879]ported that an agent of his had learned that Lumumba's
[14881]: POLITICAL FOLLOWERS IN STANLEYVILLE DESIRE THAT
[14882]‘HE BREAK OUT OF HIS CONFINEMENT AND PROCEED TO.
[14884]‘THAT. CITY BY CAR TO ENGAGE IN POLITICAL ACTIVITY.
[14885](CIA Cable, 11/14/60.)
[14887]HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 325
[14891]The Chief of Station was confident that he would have foreknowledge
[14892]of: Cumumb a,’ Ss: departure and that action plans were prepared for that
[14893]eventuality’ .
[14894]DECISION ON BREAKOUT WILL PROBABLY. BE MADE
[14895]SHORTLY. STATION EXPECTS TO BE ADVISED BY
[14896][AGENT] OF DECISION WHEN MADE.... ‘STATION
[14897]HAS SEVERAL POSSIBLE ASSETS TO “USE IN EVENT
[14898]’ OF BREAXOUT. AND STUDYING SEVERAL -PLAHS or
[14899]ACTION. (CIA Cable, 11/14/69. )
[14901]There is no other evidence, however, that the CIA actually _
[14902]“gained prior knowledge of Lumumba' Ss plan to depart for Stanleyville,
[14903]In fact, a cable from Leopoldville on the day after Lumumba ' s
[14904]escape betrays the station's complete ignorance about the circum-
[14905]stances of Lumumba's departure (CIA Cable Lit 484864 , Leopoldville
[14906]to Director, 11/28/60).
[14908]But the same cable raises at least a question as to whether
[14909]the CIA was involved in the capture of Lumumba enroute by Congolese
[14910]troops:
[14912][STATION] WORKING WITH [CONGOLESE GOVERNMENT]
[14913]TO GET ROADS BLOCKED AND TROOPS > ALERTED
[14914]-[BLOCK] POSSIBLE ESCAPE ROUTE. (CIA Cable,
[14915]11/28/60. )-
[14917]A cable of December 2 reporting Lumumba's:- capture militates
[14918]against CIA involvement, however, because it portrays the Congolese
[14919]‘forces as the source of the station's information (CIA Cable IN 10643,
[14920]Leopoldville to Director, 12/3/60). .
[14922]The Chief of Station testified that he was "quite certain that
[14924]there was no Agency involvement in any way" in Lumumba's. departure
[14926]HY 50955 Daocld: 32423539 Page 326
[14930]from ua custody and’ that he had no foreknowledge of Lumumba's
[14931]plati (Hedgman, 8/21/75, PP. 63-64) .~ He stated that he consulted
[14932]“with Congolese. officers about the possible. routes Lumumba might
[14933]take to Stanleyville, but he was "Hot a ‘major assistance" in track-
[14934]ing down Lumumba prior. to his capture (Hedgman, 8/21/75, >. 65).
[14935]Despite the Eact that 0" Donnell had planned to draw Lumumba
[14936]out of UN. custody and turn him.over to Congolese authorities, he
[14937]insisted that Lumumba escaped by his own devices and was not. tricked
[14939]by the CIA (O' Donnell, 9/11/75; p. 22).
[14941](b) Transfer of Lumumba to Katanga Wh Where He Was Killed:
[14942]January I7, 1960 — —
[14944]‘The. contemporaneous cable traffic shows that the CIA was
[14945]kept informed of Lumumba 's condition and movements in January of.
[14946]1961 by the Congolese and that the CIA still considered Lumumba
[14948]"a serious political ‘threat. But there is no direct evidence of ;
[14950]CIA involvement in bringing about Lumumba 's death. in Katanga.
[14952]* inocupts from cable traffic of January 1961 and from the
[14953]testimony of CIA officers Hedgman, Tweedy, O'Donnell, and Helms
[14954]Ginvestigative report) should be inserted.
[14956]EW 50955 Docld:32473539 Page 327
[14958]_ SECTION 7: Rewritten per
[14959]“82-0. “Subcommittee Instructions,
[14960]10/20/75 (FDB)
[14962]«7. The’ Question of the Level at which ‘the Assassination Plot -
[14963]Was_ Aut orize
[14965]The chain ‘of events revealed by the documents and. testimony
[14966]is strong enough to permit a reasonable inference that the assas-
[14967]sination plot was authorized by the President. It is clear that
[14968]‘Allen Dulles authorized the plot. |
[14969]At the least,. the chronological relationship between strong
[14970]‘Presidential or other White House expressions of hostility to
[14971]Lumumba and CIA steps toward the assassination of Lumumba is close
[14972]enough to make it appear that Dulles thought he was acting in’ re-
[14973]sponse. to pressure from above in approving assassination as one |
[14974]means of removing Lumumba from the political scene. | |
[14975]Nevertheless, there is enough countervailing testimony ‘by
[14976]Eisenhower Administration officials and. enough ambiguity in the
[14977]records of high-level. policy meetings to raise a doubt as to whether
[14978]President Eisenhower intended an assassination effort against Lumumba.
[14979]The chain of significant events in the Lumumba case ‘begins with.
[14980]the testimony that President Eisenhower made a statement. at ‘a meet-
[14981]ing of the National Security Council in the Summer or early Fall of
[14982]1960 that came across to one staff member in attendance as an order
[14983]for the assassination of Patrice Lumumba. The next link is a memo -
[14984]randum of the Special Group meeting of August 25, 1960, which indi-
[14985]cated that when the President's “extremely strong feelings on the
[14987]necessity for very straightforward action" were conveyed, the Special
[14989]HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 326
[14993]Group
[14994]agreed that planning for the Congo would not necessarily
[14995]rule out "consideration" of any particular kind of ac-
[14996]tivity which might contribute to getting rid of ‘Lumumba.
[14997](Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 25 ‘August 1960)
[14998]The next day CIA Director “Allen Dulles, who. had attended the Special
[14999]Group meeting, personally cabled to the Chief of ‘Station in Leopold- —
[15000]ville that Lumumba’ s “REMOVAL MUST BE AN URGENT ‘AND PRIME OBJECTIVE
[15001]. . A HIGH PRIORITY OF OUR COVERT ACTION" (CIA Cable OUT 62966,
[15002]Dulles: to Leopoldville, 8/26/60) . Dulles: added: "YOU CAN ACT ON ©
[15003]“YOUR OWN AUTHORITY WHERE TIME DOES NOT PERMIT REFERRAL HERE." |
[15004]Although the Dulles cable does not. explicitly’ mention assassina-
[15005]tion, Richard Bissell. -- the CIA official under whose aegis the as-
[15006]sassination effort against Lumumba took place -- testified that, “in
[15007]his. opinion, this cable was a direct outgrowth of the Special Group’
[15008]meeting, and signaled to him that the President had authorized assas-
[15009]sination as one means of removing Lumumba (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 33-
[15010]34, 61-62; see Section 7(c), infra). Bronson Tweedy, who bore the
[15011]primary administrative responsibility for activities against Lumumba,
[15012]testified that the Dulles cable confirmed the policy that no measure,
[15013]including assassination, was to be overlooked in the attempt to re-
[15014]move Lumumba from a position of influence (Tweedy, 10/9/75, pp. 4-5).
[15015]On September 19, 1960, Bissell and Tweedy cabled the Chief of
[15017]Station to expect a messenger from CIA headquarters. Two days later,
[15019].in the ‘Presence of the President at a meeting: of the National Security
[15021]HWY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 329
[15023]oa aceite tans ents wap aria mney att eae LENCE eae atm et mart TERRA AEE SS AEM NN tht ENON MSR PARADENET ANE ae | RNS eat Naain a mG
[15025]nee ceannem etree pamnlanete AE rk te lew Sate re
[15029]Council, Allen Dulles stated that Lumumba "would remain a grave
[15030]‘danger as long as he was not yet disposed of" (Memorandum, 460th
[15031]NSC Meeting, 9/21/60). Five days after this meeting, a CIA scien-
[15032]tist’ arrived in Leopoldville: and provided the Chief ‘of Station.
[15033]with lethal biological substances, instructed him to assassinate:
[15034]Lumumba, and informed him that the President had authorized this
[15035]operation. |
[15037]Two mitigating factors weaken this chain just enough so that.
[15038]it will not support an absolute finding of Presidential authoriza-
[15039].tion for the assassination effort against Lumumba. —
[15041]‘First, the two officials of the Eisenhower Administration re-
[15042]sponsible to the President for national security affairs testified
[15043]that they knew of no Presidential approval for, or knowledge of, an
[15044]assassination plot. | .
[15046]“Second, the minutes of discussions at meetings of the National
[15047]Security Council and its Special Group do not reeord an explicit
[15049]-_ Presidential order -for the assassination of Lumumba. The. Secretary
[15050]of the Special Group maintained that his memoranda reflect the ac-
[15051]tual language used at the meetings without omission. or euphemism
[15052]for extremely sensitive statements (Parrott, 7/10/75, pp. 18-19).
[15054]NSC staff executives stated, however, that. there was a strong pos-
[15055]sibility that a statement as sensitive as an assassination order
[15056]would have been omitted from the record or handled by means. of euphe-
[15058]mism. Several high Government officials involved in policy-making
[15060]HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 330
[15062]cnet a reweieae eceere te abet ehtatmn EN ae o ME Ree intra tema A TF pcm oe
[15064]and planning for covert operations testified that the language in
[15065]these minutes clearly indicated that assassination was contemplated
[15066]at the NSC as one means of eliminating Lumumba as a political
[15067]threat; “other officials testified to the contrary. .
[15068](a) High-Level. Meetings at which "Getting Rid of Lumumba"
[15069]Was Discussed ; ;
[15071](iy Dillon Testified that the Question of Assassina-
[15072]tion Was Raised at Pentagon Meeting: Summer 1960
[15074]In late July 1960, Patrice Lumumba visited the United
[15076]States and met with Secretary of ‘State Christian Herter and Under-
[15077]secretary of State C. Douglas Dillon. While Lumumba was in ‘Washing-
[15078]ton, D.C., Secretary Herter pledged aid to the newly formed Govern-
[15079]ment of the Congo (New York Times, 7/28/60, Pp: dL.
[15081]According to Dilton, the impression that Lumumba left
[15082]with the Government. officials was that of an irrational, almost
[15083]psychotic personality:
[15085]When he was in the State Department meeting, either with
[15086]me or with the Secretary in my presence .'’. . he would.
[15087]never look you in the eye.. He looked up at the sky. And
[15088]a tremendous flow of words came out. He spoke in French,
[15090]and he spoke it very fluently. And his words didn't ever
[15091]have any relation to the particular things that we wanted
[15093]to discuss... . . You had a feeling that he was.a per-
[15094]son that was pripped by this fervor that I can only char-
[15095]-acterize as messianic . ..-. [H]e was just not a rational
[15097]being. (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 24.)
[15098]Dillon said that the willingness of the United States Government _ to
[15100]work with Lumumba vanished after these meetings: -
[15102]HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 331
[15104]ese ans © Uber oN aE Mn mate batae alte hee SRE ge RE He ne
[15106]~86-.
[15108]ae [Thhe impression that was left was .. . very bad, that
[15109]this was an individual whom it was impossible to deal
[15110]with. And the feelings of the Government as a result
[15111]of this sharpened very considerably at that time . .
[15112]We [had] hoped to see him and see what we could do to
[15113]come to better understanding with him. (Dillon, 9/2/75,
[15114]pp. 23-24, ) _
[15115](Dillon testified that. shortly after Lumumba" s visit to Washing~
[15116]ton, in late July or August, he attended a meeting at the Pentagon
[15117]_ where representatives of the State Department, Defense Department,
[15118]Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the CIA were present (Dillon, 9/2/75, pp.
[15119](17-20, 25-26).* . | |
[15120]According to Dillon, "a question regarding the possibility of
[15121]an assassination attempt against Lumumba was briefly raised" at the
[15122]meeting (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 15; see also 17, 25). Dillon did not
[15123]recall anything about the language used in raising the question ©
[15124](Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 30). Dillon assumed that when the subject of
[15125]Lumumba's assassination was raised, "it was turned off by the CIA"
[15126](Dillon, 9/2/75, Dp. 30). Dillon said that "che CIA people, -whoever
[15127]they were, were negative ‘to any such action" (Dillon, 9/2/75, p.-18).
[15128]This opposition "wasn't moral," according to Dillon, but rather an
[15129]objection on the grounds that it was "not a possible thing" (Dillon,
[15131]9/2/75; p.- 18). Dillon said the CIA reaction "might have been" made
[15133]out of the feeling that the group was too large for such a sensitive
[15135] * Dillon was’ unable to recall the precise date of this meeting (Dil-
[15136]lon, 9/2/75, pp. 25-26). oo
[15138]HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 332
[15142]‘discussion (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 60).
[15144]Dillon was clear about the fact that Mtop level" CIA people.
[15145]were in attendance, although he did not remember who lodged the
[15146]negative reaction to the assassination question (Dillon, 9/2/75,
[15147]pp. 22, 25). “He said-it “would have to have been either Allen.
[15148]Dulles, or possibly [General] Cabell’. . _ most likely Cabell"
[15149](Dillon, 9/2/75, -p- 25). He added that it was ‘very likely" that
[15150]Richard Bissell was in attendance (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 21).
[15152]Dillon stated that this discussion could not have served. as.
[15153]authorization for an actual assassination effort against Lumumba
[15154](Dillon, 9/2/75, Pp. 31). But he believed that the expression of.
[15155]-concern typified a prevalent: attitude toward Lumumba that might .-
[15156]have justified the CIA's development of a capability to assassinate
[15157]him: | | ee
[15159]“think they could have decided they wanted to develop
[15161]the capability . . . just by knowing the concern that |
[15163]everyone had about Lumumba... . - They wouldn't have —-
[15165]had to tell anyone about that. That is just developing
[15167]their own internal capability, and then they would have
[15169]to come and get permission. (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 30).
[15170]Dillon testified that he had never heard any mention of the plot to
[15171]poison Lumumba; nor, by implication, had he heard even a hint that
[15172]the CIA asked permission to mount such an operation (Dillon, 9/2/75,
[15173]p. 50). But after being informed. of the poison plot, Dillon made
[15175]the following comment about the .Pentagon meeting he attended:.
[15177]HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 333
[15181]= ~ T think it is .. . likely that it might have been
[15182]the beginning of this whole idea on the CIA's: part that
[15183]they should develop such a capacity. And maybe they
[15184]didn't have it then and went to work to develop it be-
[15185]ginning in August. (Dillon, . 9/2/75,. Pp. 61) _
[15186]Dillon said that it was unlikely. that. formal notes were taken at. the
[15187]meeting or preserved because it was a small "ad hoc" group rather
[15188]than an official body (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 18). Such interdepartmen-
[15189]tal meetings were “not unusual," according to Dillon’ (Dillon, 9/2) °
[15190]75, p. 20). | | |
[15191]The only officials Dillon. named as probable participants other
[15192]than the CIA representatives were Deputy Secretary of Defense James
[15193]Douglas and Assistant Secretary of Defense John N. Irwin It (Dillon, -
[15194]9/2/75, pp. 19, 21). Douglas stated’ that it was possible that he
[15195]attended such a meeting at the Pentagon, but he does not recall it
[15196](Douglas affidavit, 9/5/75). Nor does he recall the question of
[15197]Lumumba's assassination-ever being raised in his presence (Douglas
[15198]affidavit, 9/5/75). _ Likewise, Irwin stated that it was "likely"
[15199]that he attended the meeting - to which Dillon referred; but he did
[15200]not remember whether he was present "at any. meeting at the Pentagon
[15201]- where the question of assassinating Patrice Lumumba was raised"
[15202]‘(Irwin affidavit, 9/22/75, p. 3).
[15204](ii) Robert Johnson Testified That He Heard the Presi-
[15205]dent Order Lumumba’s Assassination at an NSC
[15207]Meeting
[15209]Robert H. Johnson, a-member of the National Security
[15211]HY 50955 Docld:324233539 Page 354
[15213]cin an ar matense qunennnmcne wedmeesnlanestoamstaisctanessancettinaies oe we ameanten ¢ aM oe ET Rem ce
[15217]Council staff from 1951 to January 1962, offered what. he termed a
[15218]"clue" to the extent of Presidential involvement in the decision to
[15219]assassinate Lumumba (Johnson, 6/18/75, pp. 4-5) .* Johnson re-
[15220]counted the following occurrence at an ‘NSC meeting in the Summer
[15221]‘of 1960 which began with a briefing, on world. developments by the
[15223]Director of Central Intelligence:
[15225]ree eT TA
[15227]* Robert Johnson introduced his testimony with the following state-
[15228]ment: mo . : : ,
[15230]. ... I would like to preface my remarks by pointing out
[15231]that my decision to offer testimony to this committee has
[15232]involved for me a profound personal, moral dilemma. In
[15234]my role as a member of the NSC Staff for ten and one-half
[15235]years, I was privy to a great deal of information that in-
[15236]‘volved relationships of confidentiality with high officials
[15237]of the United States government. I have always taken very |
[15238]seriously the responsibilities implied in such relation- —
[15239]ships. . :
[15241]These responsibilities extend, in my view, far beyond
[15242]questions of security classification or other legal or /
[15243]foreign policy concerns. They relate to the very basis of
[15244]human society and government -- to the relationships of
[15245]trust without which no free society can long survive and
[15246]no government can operate.
[15248]. Ihave been forced by recent. developments; however, to
[15249]‘weigh against these considerable responsibilities my broad-
[15250]er responsibilities as a citizen on an issue that involves
[15251]‘major questions of public morality, as well as questions
[15252]-of sound policy. Having done so, I have concluded, not
[15253]without a great deal of reluctance, to come to your commit-
[15254]tee with information bearing upon your inquiry into govern-
[15255]ment. decisions relating to. the assassination of foreign
[15256]leaders. (Johnson, 6/18/75, pp. 4-5) ,
[15258]After his tenure on the staff of the National Security Council,
[15260]Robert Johnson served from 1962 to 1967 on the Policy Planning Coun-
[15261]cil at the Department of. State. _
[15263]BW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 335
[15267]a - At some time during that discussion, President Eisen- |
[15268], hower said something --. 1 can no longer remember his words
[15269]-- that came across to me as an order for the assassina-
[15270]tion of Lumumba who was then at the center. of political
[15271]. conflict and controversy in the Congo. There was no dis-
[15272]‘eussion; the meeting simply moved on. I remember. my sense
[15273]of that moment quite clearly because the President's state-
[15274]ment came as a great shock to me.. I cannot, however, re- |
[15275]construct the moment’ more specifically. _ ,
[15277]Although I was convinced at the time -- and’ remained
[15278]convinced when I thought ‘about it later’-- that the Presi-
[15279]‘dent's statement was intended as an order for the -assas-
[15280]sination of Lumumba, I must confess that in thinking about
[15281]the incident more recently I have had some doubts. ‘As is
[15282]well known, it was quite uncharacteristic of President
[15283]Eisenhower to make or announce policy decisions in NSC
[15284]meetings. Certainly, it was strange. if he departed from
[15285]‘that normal pattern on a subject so sensitive as this. |.
[15286]Moreover, it was not. long after this, I believe, that Lu-
[15288]‘'mumba was dismissed as premier by Kasavubu in-an action
[15289]‘that was a quasi-coup. ~I have-come to wonder whether what
[15290]I really heard was only an order for some such political
[15291]action. All I can tell you with any certainty at the
[15292]present moment is my sense of that moment in the Cabinet
[15293]Room of the White Hause. (Johnson, 6/18/75, pp. 6-7)
[15295]Johnson "presumed" that the. President made his ‘statement while "Look-
[15296]ing toward the Director of Central Intelligence" (Johnson, 6/18/75,
[15297]p. 11). He was unable to recall with any greater specificity the |
[15298]words used by the President (Johnson 9/13/75, p. 10).
[15300]When asked about the strength of the possibility that he had
[15301]heard only a general directive for the political.overthrow of Lumumba,
[15302]Johnson testified that. it was his clear impression at the time of the
[15303]meeting, and has remained. so for the fifteen years since, that he had
[15304]heard an assassination order:. |
[15306]2: . . Would it be fair to say that although you al-
[15307]ow for the possibility that a coup or some more general
[15309]HY 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 336 .
[15311]De Ee ee teat REE SENET ge a neta Sein Marea A TRIAL ER MUN AM SRE Ret Be Te a oe ok
[15313]pirat acrwr wei Seed nese es neta mt DN AaB BIRR NAMEN SHE SY eotgg tee tee EN na Sereda ae AE eam I Hse, Soe wna or Ee a
[15315]-Gj-.
[15317]“« political action was being discussed, it is your clear
[15318]‘impression that you had heard an order for the assassi-
[15319]nation of Lumumba?
[15321]Johnson: It was my’ clear impression at the time.
[15322]Q: And it remains your impression now?
[15323]Johnson: It remains my impression now. I have reflect
[15324]ed on this other kind of possibility, but that is the
[15325]sense . ... that persists. (Johnson, 9/13/75, pp. 24-25)
[15326]Johnson’ explained that his allowance for the possibility that he had
[15327]heard an order for a coup did not disturb his recollection of hear~-
[15328]ing an. assassination order:
[15329]It was a retrospective reflection on what I had heard,
[15330]and since this coup did occur, it occurred to me that
[15331]it was possible that that°is what I heard, but that
[15332]_ would not change my sense of the moment when I heard
[15333]the President speak, which I felt then, and I continue
[15335]to feel, was a statement designed to direct the dispos-_.
[15336]al, assassination, of Lumumba. (Johnson, 9/13/75, p. 12)
[15338]Johnson stated that. the incident provoked a strong reaction.
[15339]from him:
[15341]I was surprised . . . that I would ever hear a President
[15342]say anything like this in my presence or the presence of
[15343]a group of people. I.was startled. (Johnson, 6/18/75,
[15345]‘p. 13) . a -. ,
[15347]A succinct summary of Johnson's testimony was elicited by Senator
[15348]Mathias in the following exchange:
[15350]“Mathias:. . . . What comes across is that you do have a
[15351]memory, if not of exact words, but of your own reaction .
[15352]‘really to a Presidential order which you considered to
[15353]be an order for an assassination.
[15355]Johnson: That is correct.
[15357]“Mathias: And ‘that although precise words have escaped
[15359]HY 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 337
[15361]we ue ete ee ne ee mae manana tiie tantQe EAE A GT nT Meine shay weer en ak a atta ae em tae snes ot temmetsbed ied PTE RATE CR HE NIC ee A HE te Sey
[15365]oe, you in the passage of fifteen years, that sense of shock
[15366]remains?
[15368]Johnson: Right. Yes, sir. (Johnson, 6/18/75, p. 8)
[15370]After the meeting, Johnson, who was responsible for writing the
[15371]"memorandum of the discussion, consulted with a senior official on
[15372]the NSC staff to determine how to handle the President's statement
[15373]in the memorandum and in the debriefing of the NSC Planning Board .
[15375]that followed each meeting: .
[15377]I suspect -- but no longer have an exact recollection --
[15378]“that I omitted it from the debriefing. 1 also do not re-
[15379]call how I handled the subject in the memo of the meet-
[15380]ing, though I suspect that some kind of reference to the.
[15381]President's statement was made. (Johnson, 6/18/75, p. 7).
[15383]‘In his second appearance, Johnson reiterated that it was "quite like-
[15384]‘ly that it was handled through some kind of euphemism or may have
[15386]been omitted altogether” (Johnson, 9/13/75, p. 21).*
[15388]eT NTT
[15390]* In 1960, Johnson .was Director of the Planning Board Secretariat --
[15391]third in command on the NSC staff. He attended NSC meetings to take
[15392]notes on the discussions whenever one of the two senior NSC officials
[15393]was absent. ,
[15395]Johnson testified that the person with whom he consulted about the
[15396]manner of recording the President's statement in the minutes was one
[15397]of the two top NSC staff officials at that time: NSC Executive Secre-
[15398]tary James Lay or Deputy Executive Secretary Marion Boggs (Johnson,
[15399]9/13/75, pp. 12-13). Johnson could ‘not recall which of ‘the two offi-
[15400]cials he had consulted, but he “inferred" that it must have been the
[15401]"top career NSC staff person present" at the meeting where he heard
[15402]the President's statement (Johnson, 9/13/75, p. 12). At both of the
[15403]NSC meetings. where the President and Johnson were present for a dis-
[15404]cussion of Lumumba -- August 18 and September 7 -- James Lay was ab-
[15405]sent and Marion Boggs served as Acting Executive Secretary.
[15407]Marion Bogg's statement about his method of handling the situation
[15408]described by Johnson is in accord with. Johnson's testimony: ,
[15410]HW 50955 Doold:32473539 Page 3338
[15412]-93- .
[15414]As Johnson stated, his testimony standing alone is "a clue,
[15415]rather than precise evidence of Presidential involvement in decision-
[15416]making with respect to assassinations" (Johnson, 6/18/75, p. 5). To
[15418]determine the significance of this "clue,' it must.be placed in the
[15419]“context of the records of the NSC meetings attended by. Johnson, |
[15420]testimony about’ those meetings, and the series of events that pre-.
[15422]ceded the dispatch of poisons to the Congo for Lumumba's assassina~
[15424]' tion. | co .
[15425]In the Summer of 1960... there were four NSC meetings where de-
[15426]velopments in the Congo were discussed at which Robert Johnson was
[15428]present. The President was not in attendance at two of those occa-,
[15430]sions -- July 15 and July 21 (NSC Minutes, 7/15/60; NSC Minutes,
[15432]I have no independent. recollection of being consulted by.
[15433]Mr. Johnson about how to handle in the memorandum of dis-
[15434]cussion any sensitive statement regarding Lumumba. I ‘am
[15435]not saying I was not consulted; merely that I do-not re-
[15436]member such an incident. If I had been consulted, I
[15437]would almost certainly have directed Mr. Johnson to omit
[15438]the matter from the memorandum of discussion.. (Boggs
[15440]affidavit, 10/10/75, p. 2) :
[15442]James Lay, who attended other NSC meetings where Lumumba was discuss-~
[15443]ed (e.g., September 21, 1960), also confirmed the fact that NSC min-
[15444]utes would not be likely to record a statément as sensitive as a
[15446]Presidential order for an assassination, if such an order were given:
[15448]If extremely sensitive matters were discussed at an
[15449]NSC meeting, it was sometimes the practice that the
[15450]official NSC minutes would record only the general
[15451]subject discussed without. identifying the specially
[15452]sensitive subject as the discussion. In highly
[15453]sensitive cases, no reference to the subject would
[15454]be made in the NSC minutes. (Lay affidavit, 9/8/75,
[15456]p. 2) .-
[15458]HY 509055 Doold: 324293539 Page 339
[15460]ene ie ee emacs une wear Raplne n  ne ne anagem toe mteadtanananthe WE Steam baa Sine na AR Tata a AB a OR eee Thee on
[15462]7/21760).. © Nonetheless, the attitude toward Lumumba even at these
[15463]early meetings was vehement: . a
[15464]Mr. Dulles said that in Lumumba we were faced with a
[15465]person who was a Castro or wotse . . . Mr. Dulles went
[15466]on to describe Mr. Lumumba's background which he de-
[15467]scribed as "harrowing" . . . It is safe to go on the
[15468]assumption that Lumumba has been bought by the Commun-
[15469]ists; this also, however, fits with his own orienta-
[15470]tion. (NSC Minutes, 7/21/60)
[15471]‘The President presided over the other two NSC meetings. After look-
[15472]ing at the records of those meetings, Johnson was unable to deter-
[15473]mine .with certainty which one was the meeting at which he heard the
[15474]President's statement (Johnson, 9/13/75, p. 16). .
[15476]However, the chronology of meetings, cables, and events in the
[15477]Congo during this period makes it most likely that Johnson's testi-
[15478]mony refers to the NSC meeting of August 18, 1960.
[15480]The meeting of August 18 took place at the beginning of a series
[15481]of events that preceded the dispatch of a CIA scientist to Leopold-
[15482]ville with poisons for the assassination of Lumumba.* The Septem-
[15484]ber 7 meeting took place in the midst of this series of events. _
[15486]* The major events in the series, each of which is discussed in de-
[15487]tail in other sections of the report, may be summarized as follows:
[15488]The week following the NSC meeting of August 18, the Special Group
[15489]was informed of the President's "extremely strong feelings about the
[15490]necessity for very straightforward action" and the Group agreed to
[15491]consider “any particular kind of activity which might contribute to
[15492]getting rid of Lumumba" (Special Group Minutes, 8/25/60). At this
[15493]meeting, DCI Allen Dulles commented that "he had taken the comments
[15494]referred. to seriously and had every intention of proceeding as vig-
[15495]orously as. the situation permits" (Special Group Minutes, 8/25/60;
[15496]see Section 7(a)(iii), infra). The next day, Dulles sent an "Eyes
[15497]Only" cable under his personal. signature to the Chief of Station in
[15499]HW 50955 Docld:324293539 Page 340
[15501]The NSC meeting of August 18, 1960, was held three weeks before .
[15502]a the “quasi-coup" in the Congo -- the dismissal of Lumumba by Kasavubu -
[15503]-- which Johnson remembers as taking place “not long after" he heard
[15504]the President's statement. . The only other meeting .at which Johnson
[15505]“could have heard the statement by the President was held on Septem-
[15506]ber 7, two days after this event. | |
[15507]| Robert Johnson's memorandum of the meeting of August 18, 1960,
[15509]indicates that Acting Secretary of State C. Douglas Dillon* introduced
[15511]tg lt RY
[15513]* Leopoldville, indicating that it had been concluded in "HIGH QUAR-
[15514]TERS" that Lumumba's "REMOVAL MUST BE AN URGENT AND PRIME OBJECTIVE
[15515]AND THAT . . . THIS SHOULD BE A HIGH PRIORITY OF OUR COVERT ACTION"
[15516](CIA Cable OUT 62966, Dulles to Chief of Station, 8/26/60). The Dul-
[15517]les cable added: =
[15519]_ WE WISH GIVE YOU WIDER.AUTHORITY .. . INCLUDING EVEN MORE |
[15520]AGGRESSIVE ACTION-IF IT CAN REMAIN COVERT . .. YOU CAN
[15521]AGT ON YOUR OWN AUTHORITY WHERE TIME DOES NOT PERMIT RE-.
[15522]FERRAL HERE. (CIA Cable, 8/26/60) (See. Section 2, supra,
[15523]for more complete treatment of this cable.) ;
[15525]On September 19, a CIA scientist was dispatched from headquarters
[15526]to the Congo on an extraordinarily sensitive assignment (CIA Cable
[15527]OUT 71464, Bissell/Tweedy to Chief. of Station, 9/19/60; see Section
[15528]4(a), supra). On September 21, in the presence of the President at _
[15529]an NSC meeting, Allen Dulles stated that Lumumba “remained a grave
[15530]danger as long as he was not disposed of" (NSC Minutes, 9/21/60; see
[15532]“Section 7(a) (iv), infra). Finally, on September. 26, the CIA scien-
[15533]tist arrived in the Congo, provided the Chief of Station with lethal
[15534]biological substances, instructed him to assassinate Lumumba, and in-
[15535]formed him that the President had ordered the DCI to undertake an as-
[15536]sassination effort (see Sections 4(a)-4(c), supra). The Chief of
[15537]Station stated that he received confirmation From CIA. headquarters
[15538]that he was to follow the’ instructions he had been given (see Section
[15539]4(e) (i), supra).
[15541]*k In 1960, Dillon served as Undersecretary of State, the “number two
[15542]position in the State Department," the name of which subsequently
[15544]changed to Deputy Secretary of State. -In this position, he frequently
[15545]- ; (Continued)
[15547]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 341
[15549]‘the discussion of U.S. policy toward the Congo. In the course of
[15550]his remarks, Dillon maintained that the presence of United Nations
[15551]“troops in the Congo was necessary to prevent Soviet intervention at
[15553]Lumumba's request: . .
[15555]If . . . Lumumba carried out his threat to force the UN
[15556]out, he might then offer to accept help from anyone.
[15558]The elimination .of the UN would be a disaster which,
[15559]‘Secretary Dillon stated, we should do everything we
[15560]could to prevent. .If the UN were forced out, we might .—
[15561]be faced by a‘situation where the Soviets intervened by
[15562]invitation of the Congo. (NSC Minutes, 8/18/60)
[15564]The discussion then continued to raise the spectre of an alliance be-
[15565]tween Lumumba and the Soviet Union: |
[15567]- Secretary Dillon said that he {Lumumba ] was working to
[15568]serve the purposes of the Soviets and Mr. Dulles pointed
[15569]out that Lumumba was in Soviet pay. (NSC Minutes, 8/18/
[15570]60)
[15572]In this context, the following exchange between President Eisenhower
[15573]and Secretary Dillon was recorded:
[15575]The President said that the possibility that the UN would
[15576]be forced out was simply inconceivable. We should keep
[15577]the UN in the Congo even if we had to ask for European
[15578]troops to do it. We should do so even if such action was
[15579]used by the Soviets as the basis for starting a fight.
[15580]Mr. Dillon indicated that this was State's feeling but
[15581]that the Secretary General, and Mr. Lodge doubted whether,
[15582]if the Congo put up really determined opposition to the
[15583]UN, the UN could stay in. In response, the President
[15584]stated that Mr. Lodge was wrong to this extent '-- we were
[15585]talking of one man forcing us out of the Congo; of Lumum-
[15586]ba supported by the Soviets. There was no indication, the
[15590]served as Acting Secretary of State and either attended or was
[15591]kept informed about NSC and Special Group: meetings. Dillon
[15593]later served as Secretary of the Treasury under President Kennedy.
[15594](Dillon, 9/2/75, pp. 2-4.)
[15596]HW 50955 Docld:32423539— Page 342
[15598]-97-.
[15600]woe President: stated, that the Congolese did not want
[15601]UN support and the maintenance of order. Secretary
[15602]Dillon reiterated that this was State's feeling
[15603]about the matter. The situation that would be
[15604]created by a UN withdrawal was altogether too -
[15605]ghastly to contemplate. (NSC Minutes, 8/18/60) -
[15606]‘This is the only statement about Lumumba which the memorandum of 7
[15607]‘the meeting attributed to the President. _
[15609]As reported, it clearly does not contain an order for the
[15610]assassination of 1 Lumumba. But the statement does indicate extreme.
[15611]Presidential concern focused on Lumumba: The President was so
[15612]disturbed by the situation in the’ Congo that he was willing to.
[15613]risk a fight with the Soviet Union and he felt that Lumumba was
[15614]the "one man" who was _responsible for this situation, a man who -
[15615]did not represent the sentiments of the. Congolese people in the
[15616]“President' s estimation. |
[15618]After reviewing NSC documents and being. informed. of Robert
[15619]Johnson's testimony, Douglas Dillon stated ‘his "opinion that it
[15620]is most .likely that the NSC. meeting of August 18, "1960 is the
[15621]meeting referred to by Mr. Johnson." (Dillon affidavit, 9/15/75.)
[15622]However, Dillon testified that he did not “remember such a thing"
[15623]as an explicit Presidential order for the assassination of
[15624]Lumumba (Dillon, 9/2/75, p.- 32). Dillon explained how he thought
[15625]the President may have expressed himself about Lumumba:
[15627]| Dillon: . |. . . It could have been in view of this
[15629]feeling of everybody that Lumumba was [a] very
[15631]difficult if not impossible person to deal with, and
[15632]was dangerous to the peace and safety of.the world,
[15634]HY 450955 Docld: 32423539 Page 343
[15636]emcee el Hebinea weresianane ie Sanu sansa eaten te wags a wticystinaeata, Sindteanatanatansnancir wedeaune® Sekt RSA RSGS eaemaeae eeu ARRAN BEEE a cer seo ete
[15640]a that the President expressed himself, we will have.
[15641]to do whatever is necessary to get rid of him. I-
[15642]don't know that I would have taken that as a
[15643]clearcut.order as Mr. Johnson apparently did. And.
[15644]I think perhaps others present may have interpreted
[15645]it other ways. (Dillon, 9/2/75, pp. 32-33.)
[15647]Q: Did you ever hear the President make such a
[15648]remark about Lumumba, let's get rid of him, or let's
[15649]take action right away’ on this? ,
[15651]Dillon: I don't remember that. But certainly this
[15652]was the general feeling of Government at that time,
[15653]and it wouldn't have been if the President hadn't
[15654]agreed with it. (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 33.)
[15656]Dillon said that he would have thought that such a state-
[15657]ment "was not a direct order to have an assassination" (Dillon,
[15658]9/2/75, p. 33). But he testified that it was "perfectly
[15659]possible" that Allen Dulles would have translated suci strong
[15660]Presidential language about "getting rid of" Lumumba into
[15661]authorization for an assassination effort (Dillon, 9/2/75,.
[15662]pp. 34-35):
[15664]“I think that Allen Dulles would have been quite
[15665]responsive to what he considered implicit autho-
[15666]rization, because he felt very. strongly that we
[15667]‘should not involve the President directly in
[15668]things of this nature. And he was. perfectly
[15669]willing to take the responsibility personally
[15670]that maybe, some of his successors wouldn't have
[15671]‘been. And so I think that this is a perfectly
[15672]plausible thing, knowing Allen Dulles. (Dillon,
[15673]9/2/75, p. 34.) _
[15675]Marion Boggs, who attended the meeting of August 18; as
[15677]Acting Executive Secretary of the NSC, stated after reviewing
[15679]the Memorandum of Discussion at that meeting:
[15681]HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 344
[15685]se L« recall the discussion at that meeting, but have no
[15686]independent recollection of any statements or dis- -
[15687]cussion not summarized in the memorandum. Specifically,
[15688]I have no recollection of any statement, order or
[15690]reference by. the President (or anyone else present _
[15692]at the meeting) which could be interpreted. as favor-
[15693]ing action by the United States to bring. about the
[15694]assassination of Lumumba.* (Boggs affidavit, 10/10/75,
[15695]pp. 1-2.) .
[15697]The Memorandum of Discussion at the NSC meeting of Septem- -
[15698]ber. 7, 1960--the only other meeting at which Johnson could have
[15699]heard the President's statement--records only a brief, general
[15700]discussion of developments in the Congo (NSC Minutes, 9/7/60).
[15702]As part of Allen Dulles' introductory intelligence briefing on
[15703]world events, the Memorandum related his remarks on the .situation
[15704]in the Congo following Kasavubu's dismissal of Lumumba from his —
[15705]position in the government (NSC Minutes ,. 9/7/60, Pp. 4). Neither
[15707]the length nor the substance of the record of this discussion
[15708]indicates that Lumumba's role in the Congo received. the same
[15709]intense kind of consideration as the NSC had given it on August.
[15711]18.%** There is no record of any statetient by. the President
[15713]* Boggs. added:
[15715]"Based on my whole experience with the NSC, I would have
[15716]considered it highly unusual if a matter of this nature
[15717]tad been referred to in a Council meeting where a number
[15718]of persons with no ‘need to know' were present." (Boggs
[15719]affidavit, 10/10/75, p. 2.) .
[15720]_ o#* The NSC minutes of the meeting of September 7, deal with
[15721]the discussion of the Congo in two pages (NSC Minutes, 9/7/60, .
[15722]pp. 4-5). By comparison, the August 18 meeting required an
[15724]HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 345
[15726]cope ne ec Sa ae ernrneTaetnaee rar 9 met tne S airegus apcaminmesten etnvinche maa arttedgr ate ne hs pa ti NN BE ARENT Ma tae AR
[15730]duritig this “discussion (NSC Minutes, 9/7/60, pp. 4-5). -
[15731]‘Nevertheless, in the course of his briefing Dulles
[15732]expressed his’ continuing concern over, the amount of personnel
[15733]and equipment that was being sent to the Congo by the Soviet
[15734]Union,. primarily to aid Lumumba (NSC Minutes, 9/7/60, P- 5).
[15735]“Dulles concluded this part of his briefing with an. observation
[15736]| that demonstrated that Lumumba's dismissal from the government
[15737]had not lessened the extent to which he was regarded at the
[15738]NSC as a potent political threat in any power struggle in the
[15739]Congo: | | | —— i
[15740]| “Mr. Dulles stated that Lumumba always seemed’ to
[15741]come out on top in each of these struggles.
[15742](NSC Minutes, 9/7/60, p.-5.) ,
[15744]The day after this NSC-meeting, Gordon Gray made a pointed
[15745]“reminder of the President's concern about the Congo to Allen
[15746]“Dulles at a meeting of the: Special Group: .
[15748]Me. Gray said that he hoped that Agency people in.
[15749]the field are fully aware of: the top-level feeling
[15751]in Washington that vigorous action would, not be
[15752]amiss. (Special Group Minutes, 9/8/60.)
[15754]There ‘are three possible interpretations of the failure.
[15755]of NSC records to reveal whether the President ordered the
[15757]assassination of Lumumba ‘at oné of these meetings. First, an
[15759]extraordinarily lengthy. (fifteen pages) summary of discussion
[15760]on the Congo and related policy problems in Africa, indicating
[15761]that this topic was the focal point of the meeting (NSC
[15762]Minutes, 8/18/60, pp. 1-15). co
[15764]HWY 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 346
[15768]assagsination order could have been issued but omitted from
[15769]‘the records. Robert Johnson testified that it was "very
[15771]likely" that the Presidential statement he heard ‘would have
[15773]been handléd by means ofS a euphemistic reference or. by
[15775]complete omission ' "rather ‘than given as fa]... direct quo-
[15776]tation" in the Memorandum of Discussion (Johnson, 9/13/75,
[15778]>. 14). Second,-as illustrated by Douglas Dillon's testimony,
[15779]the President could have made a general statement about. "getting
[15780]tid of" Lumumba with the intent to convey to Allen Dulles that
[15781]there | was implicit authorization for an assassination effort.
[15782]Third, despite ‘general discussions about removing Lumumba , the
[15783]President may not have intended to order the assassination of
[15784]Lumumba even. though Allen Dulles may have thought an assassina-
[15785]tion. effort had been authorized. The three White House staff
[15786]members responsible | to the President for national security,
[15787]affairs testified that there was no such order. Gordon Gray,
[15788]“Andrew Goodpaster, and John Eisenhower weré all in attendance
[15790]at the NSC meetings of August 18 and September 7.*
[15792](iii) The President's "Extremely Strong Feelings" Led
[15794]Fhe Special Group to Consider Anything That Mi ht
[15795]Get Rid of Gatiumba: August 25, 1960_
[15797]On August 25, 1960 five men** attended a meeting of the
[15801]* See Section 7(b), infra, for a general treatment of the
[15802]testimony of Gray ,. Goodpastex and Eisenhower.
[15804]“k There were four standing members of the Special. Group at
[15805]this time: Allen Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence; Gordon
[15807]HW 50955 Docld:32493539 Page 347
[15811]Special Group, the subcommittee of the National Security
[15812]Council responsible for planning covert operations. Thomas
[15813]Parrott, a CIA. officer who served as. Secretary to the Group,
[15814]began the meeting ‘by outlining. the CIA operations that had
[15815]been undertaken in Nmounting an anti-Lumumba campaign in the
[15816]Congo" (Special Group Minutes, 8/25/60). This campaign involved
[15817]covert operations through certain Labor. groups and "the planned
[15818]attempt .-. . to arrange a vote of no confidence in Lumumba"
[15819]in the Congolese Senate (Special Group Minutes, 8/25/60) .
[15821]The outline of this campaign evoked the following dialogue:
[15823]The Group agreed that the action contemplated is
[15825]very much in order. Mr. Gray commented, however, -
[15827]that his associates had expressed extremely strong
[15828]feelings on the necessity for very straightforward
[15829]action in this situation, and he wondered whether the
[15830]plans as outlined were sufficient to accomplish this.
[15832]Mr. Dulles replied that he had taken the comments
[15833]reférred to seriously and had every intention of pro-
[15834]‘ceeding as vigorously as the situation permits or
[15835]requires, but added that he must necessarily put himself .
[15836]in a position. of interpreting instructions of. this kind
[15837]within the bounds of necessity and capability. It was
[15838]finally agreed that planning for the Congo would not
[15839]necessarily rule ott ‘consideration’ of any particular
[15840]kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid
[15841]of. Lumumba. (Special Group Minutes, 8/25/60, p. 1.)
[15843]Both Gordon Gray and Thomas Parrott testified that refer-
[15845]ence to Mr. Gray's "associates" was a euphemism for President
[15847]Gray, Special Assistant to the President for National Security
[15848]Affairs; Livingston Merchant, Undersecretary of State for Political
[15849]Affairs; and John N. Irwin IT, Assistant Secretary of Defense.
[15851]Also in regular attendance was Thomas A. .Parrott, Secretary to
[15853]. the Special Group. - OS
[15855]BY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 348
[15857]_-104-
[15859]| Eis@nhower which” was employed to preserve "plausible deniabil-
[15860]-ity'" by the President. of discussion of covert operations
[15861]memorialized in Special Group Minutes (Gray, 7/9/75, Pp- 07;
[15862]Parrott; 7/10/75, pp. 8-9). 7 .
[15864]The four living participants at the meeting have all stated
[15865]‘that. ‘they do not recall any discussion of or planning for the
[15866]assassination of Lumumba (Merchant affidavit, 9/8/75, P. 1; .
[15868]“qewin affidavit, 9/22/75, pp. 1-2; Gray, 7/9/75, pp. 27, 32;
[15869]Parrott, 7/10/75, pp. 25-26). Gray said that he did not con--
[15870]sider the President's desire for ‘very straightforward action".
[15871]to include “any thought in his, mind of assassination" (Gray,
[15872]I/9/75, p. 32). Parrott testified to the same effect, maintain-
[15873]ing that. he would have recorded a discussion of assassination
[15874]in explicit terms in the Special Group Minutes | ‘if such a dis-
[15876]~ cussion had taken place (Parrott, 7/10/75, PP. 26~- 27).
[15878]John N. Irwin IT acknowledged, however , ‘that while he did
[15879]not have any direct recollection of the substance of that meet-
[15880]ing", the reference in the minutes to ‘the planning for "getting
[15881]rid of Lumumba" was "broad enough to cover a discussion of
[15882]assassination" (Irwin affidavit, 9/22/75, p. 2).
[15884]Irwin's “interpretation is shared by Douglas Dillon and
[15886]"Richard Bissell--two high government officials who were not
[15887]participants at this Special Group: meeting but who were involved
[15888]-in the planning and policymaking for covert operations in the
[15890]Congo during this period.
[15892]HY, 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 349
[15896]~As a participant in National Security Council meetings
[15898]of this period, Dillon said that he would read the Special
[15899]Group minutes of August, 25, 1960, to indicate that assassina-
[15900]tion was within the bounds of the kind of activity that might
[15901]be used to "get rid of" Lumumba (Dillon, 9/2/75,. Pp. 42).
[15902]Dillon noted that the reference in the minutes to the fact
[15903]‘that Allen Dulles stated that he “had taken. the comments
[15904]_referred to seriously" probably pointed to the President's
[15905]statement at the previous NSC meeting at which Robert Johnson
[15906]‘took notes (Dillon, 9/2/75, pp. 39-40).
[15908]When asked whether. the CIA would have the authority to
[15909]mount an assassination effort against Lumumba on the basis of
[15910]the discussion at the Special Group, Dillon said:
[15912]They. would certainly have the authority to plan.
[15913]It is a close question whether this would be
[15914]enough to actually go ahead with it. But cer-
[15915]tainly the way this thing worked, as far as I ©
[15916]know, they didn't do anything just on their own. -
[15917]Il think they would have checked back at least ©
[15918]with the senior people in the State. Department
[15919]or the Defense Department. (Dillon, 9/2/75;
[15920]p. 43.) © a
[15922]Dillon said that if the CIA checked with the State Depart-
[15923]ment, it might have been done in such a way that it would not
[15924]appear on any record (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 43). Dillon added that
[15925]"to protect the President as the public representative of the
[15927]/ U.S. from any bad publicity in connection with this", Allen
[15929]' Dulles “wouldn't return to the President" to seek further
[15931]HW 50955 Docld:32493539 Page 350
[15933]ce cen ee eee Se cent a eae ci crenata a mete neg ems cos ae mamtae means utermmananitiatsaiaratisiaseninaedhs SW abies sabato SR
[15935]Chua Son abs tac Scag nev cee mb cee an Mee eee ata nae ene RR nbn ST ane garner a neta ew wee wert a ein earn cient he On Rae ee ee
[15937]- -106-
[15938]approval if an assassination operation were mounted (Dillon,
[15939]9/2160, pp-- 42-43).
[15941]Richard Bissell stated that in his opinion the language
[15942]of the Special Group Minutes of. August 25, 1960 indicated
[15943]that the assassination of Lumumba was part of a general
[15945]strategy at the NSC: and within the CIA for removing Lumumba
[15946]from the political scene (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 29, 32).
[15947]Bissell added: BS |
[15949]The Agency had put a top priority, probably, on
[15951]a range of different methods of getting rid of
[15952]. Lumumba in the sense of either destroying him
[15954]physically, incapacitating him, or eliminating
[15956]his political influence. - (Bissell, 9/10/75,
[15958]p. 29.) —_ ;
[15960]Bissell pointed to the special Group Minutes of August 25,
[15961]1960 as a “prime example" of the circumlocutious manner in
[15962]which a topic like assassination would be discussed by high .
[15963]| government officials: 7 | |
[15965]Bissell: When you use the language that no particu-
[15966]lar means were ruled out, that is. obviously what it
[15967]meant, and it meant that to everybody in the room.
[15969]Meant that if it had to be assassination, that. that
[15971]was a permissible means. os
[15973]You don't use language of that kind except to mean
[15974]in effect, the Director is. being told, get rid of
[15975]the guy, and if. you have to use extreme means up
[15977]to and including assassination, go ahead. (Bissell,
[15978]9/10/75, pp. 32-33.)
[15980]Bissell added that this message was, "in effect", being given
[15981]“to Dulles by the President through his representative Gordon
[15982]Gray (Bissell, 9/10/75, p.. 33).
[15983](iv) NSC Meeting of September 21, 1960: Dulles Said —
[15985]Lumumba Would Remain a Grave Danger Until
[15986]TTR
[15987]“Disposed Of"
[15989]‘In the course of his intelligence briefing to the NSC’
[15991]HW 50955 ‘pocld: 32423539 Page 351
[15995]on September 21, 1960, Allen Dulles stressed the danger of
[15996]- Soviet influence in the Congo. Despite the fact that Lumumba
[15997]had been deposed from his position as Premier and was in UN -
[15998]‘custody, Dulles continued to regard him as a threat, especially
[15999]in light of reports of an impending reconciliation between
[16000]' Lumumba and the post-coup Congolese government:
[16001]Mobutu appeared to be the effective power in the
[16002]Congo for the monent but Lumumba was not yet
[16003]disposed of and remained a grave danger as’ long
[16004]as he was not disposed of. (NSC Minutes, a
[16005]9/21/60.) | . oo
[16006]‘Three days after this NSC meeting, Allen Dulles sent a
[16007]personal cable to the Chief. of Station in Leopoldville which
[16008]included the following message: |
[16009]| WE WISH GIVE EVERY POSSIBLE SUPPORT IN ELIMLNATING
[16010]LUMUMBA FROM ANY POSSIBILITY RESUMING GOVERNMENTAL
[16011]POSITION OR IF HE FAILS IN LEOP[OLDVILLE] , SETTING
[16012]“HIMSELF IN STANLEYVILLE OR ELSEWHERE. (CIA Cable,
[16013]OUT 73573, Dulles to Leopoldville, 9/24/60.)
[16014]On September 26, Sidney Gottlieb, under assignment from
[16015]CIA headquarters, arrived in Leopoldville (CIA Cable IN 18989,
[16016]Leopoldville to, Director, 9/27/60), provided the Chief of
[16017]Station with poisons, instructed him to assassinate Lumumba,
[16018]and assured him that there was Presidential authorization for
[16019]-this mission (see Sections 4(b)-4(c), supra).
[16020]Marion Boggs, NSC Deputy Executive Secretary, who wrote
[16022]the’ memoraridum of. the discussion of September 21, did not
[16024]interpret Dulles' remark as referring to assassination:
[16026]HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 352 |
[16030]- I’ have ‘examined the memorandum (which I prepared)
[16031]‘summarizing the discussion of the Congo at the
[16032]September 21, 1960 meeting of the NSC. Lt recall the
[16033]discussion and believe it is accurately and adequately
[16034]summarized in the memorandum. . T have no recollection:
[16035]of any discussion of a possible assassination of Lumumba |
[16036]‘at this meeting. With specific reference to the state-_
[16037]ment of the Director of. Central Intelligence... . I
[16038]believe this is almost a literal rendering of what. Mr.
[16039]Dulles said. My own interpretation of this statement
[16040]was that Mr. Dulles was speaking in the context of
[16041]efforts being made within the Congolese government to
[16042]force Lumumba from power. I did not interpret it as
[16043]referring to assassination® (Boggs affidavit 10/10/75,
[16044]pp. 2-3.) ot
[16046]Boggs was not, however, in a position to analyze Dulles’
[16048]remark in light of the actual planning for covert operations
[16050]that took place during this period because Boggs was not privy
[16052]to most such discussions (Boges affidavit, 10/10/75, p-. 2). 7
[16053]ce Douglas Dillon, who attended this NSC meeting as.
[16055]- Acting Secretary of State, said that he did not recall the dis-
[16056]cussion (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 47). ‘Dillon said that the minutes
[16057]"could mean chat" assassination would have been one acceptable
[16058]means of "disposing of" Lumumba, although he felt that “setting
[16059]him out {o£ the Congo] or Locking him up" would have been a.
[16060]preferable disposition of Lumumba at that point since he was
[16064]* NSC Executive Secretary James Lay, who was also present
[16065]at the meeting of September 21, 1960, stated: "I cannot recall
[16067]whether there was any discussion of assassinating Lumumba at
[16068]any NSC meetings.'' (Lay affidavit, 9/8/75, p.. 1.)
[16070]HW 50955 Docld:32493539 Page 353
[16072]already out “of office (Dilton, 9/2/75, p. 48).* When reminded
[16073]of the fact that Lumumba's movement and communications were
[16074]not restricted by the UN force and. that ‘the: Congolese army
[16075]“continued to seek his arrest long after the ‘NSC meeting , Dillon.
[16076]acknowledged that during ‘this. period ‘Lumumba: continued to be
[16077]"viewed by the United States as a potential threat and a volatile
[16078]. force in the. Congo: |
[16079]. He had:this tremendous ability to stir up
[16080]a crowd or a group. And if he could have gotten
[16081]‘out and started to talk to a battalion of the
[16082]Congolese Army, he probably would have had them
[16083]-in the palm of his hand in five minutes. (Dillon,.
[16084]9/20/75, p. 49. ).
[16086]John N. Irwin II, who attended the. NSC meeting as Assistant.
[16087]Secretary of Defense, stated that although he had no recollection
[16088]of the discussion, the language of the minutes was "broad enough
[16089]‘to cover a discussion of assassination" (Irwin affidavit,
[16090]9/22/75, p. 2). .
[16092]Richard. Bissell testified that, based. upon his understanding
[16093]of the policy of the | NSC toward Lumumba even after Lumumba was
[16095]in UN custody, he would read the minutes. of September 21 to indi-
[16097]cate that assassination was contemplated "as one possible means"
[16098]So
[16100]* See Section 3, supra, for discussion of CIA cable traffic
[16101]indicating that Lumumba continued to be regarded as capable
[16103]of taking over the government after he was deposed and that
[16104]pressure to "eliminate" m did not: cease. until his death.
[16106]HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 354
[16108]HY 50955 Docld: 32423539
[16110]_-110-
[16112]of “disposing of" Lumumba. (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 70.) Bissell
[16113]was not present at. the NSC meeting (NSC Minutes, 9/21/60) -
[16114]Bissell's. opinion stands in opposition to, that of Gordon
[16116]Gray, the President’ ‘s National Security Advisor, who likewise
[16118]testified that he could not remember the NSC discussion in which
[16120]he participated (Gray, 7/9/75, P- '57). When asked to interpret
[16121]the reference to “disposing of" Lumumba , Gray said he “put. it in
[16123]_ the, same category . as ‘get rid of! ‘eliminate’ " (Gray, 7/9/75,
[16125]Pp. 57). Early in. his: testimony, Cray “stated that "assassination
[16127]could have been on the minds of some people when they used
[16129]these words 'eliminate' ox ‘pet rid oft" (Gray; 7/9/75, Pp. 17).
[16131]; Nonetheless, when asked to comment on the minutes of the NSC
[16132]meéting of September 21, he said: "It. was not my impression —
[16133]that we had in mind the assassination of Lumumba" (Gray, 7/9/75,
[16135]p. 57).*
[16137]: John Eisenhower, who attended the NSC meeting as Assistant
[16138]White House Staff Secretary, said that he had no “direct
[16139]recollection" of the discussion but he found the minutes of ©
[16141]the meeting consonant with his “recollection ‘of the atmosphere"
[16142]at the time: ‘the U.S. position was very much anti- -Lumumba"
[16143](Eisenhower, 7/18/75, p- 9). He said:-
[16145]I would not -conjecture that the words "disposed of"
[16146]meant an assassination, if for no other reason than
[16148]if I had something as nasty as this to plot, L wouldn't
[16149]do it in front of 21 people . . the number present
[16150][at]. the meeting. Eisenhower, 7/18/75, p. 10.) °
[16152]Page 355
[16154]nn mR RERRRETE ESTE
[16156]-1lil-
[16158]b) Testimony of Eisenhower White House Officials That.
[16159]They Knew of No Presidential Consi eration of
[16162]The two members of President Eisenhower's staff who were
[16163]responsible for national security affairs--Gordon Gray and
[16164]Andrew Goodpaster--both made general disclaimers of any knowledge.
[16165]of Presidential consideration of assassination during their
[16166]tenure.
[16168]Gordon Gray served as Special Assistant to: the President
[16169]for National Security Affairs, in which capacity he coordinated
[16170]the National Security Council and represented the President at
[16171]Special Group meetings. Gray testified that he did not recall
[16172]President Eisenhower "ever saying anything that contemplated
[16173]killing Lumumba” (Gray, 7/9/75, p. 28).* When asked to inter-
[16174]pret phrases from the minutes of particular NSC. and Special
[16175]“Group meetings such as “setting rid of" or “disposing of"
[16176]Lumumba , Gray stated: .
[16178]It is the intent of the user of the expression or
[16179]the phrase that is controlling.and there may well
[16180]have been in the Central Intelligence Agency plans
[16181]and/or discussions of assassinations, but . . . at.
[16182]the level of the Forty Committee [Special Group
[16183]or a higher level than that, the National Security
[16184]Council , there was no active discussion in any way
[16186]planning assassination.
[16188]L agree that assassination could have
[16190]i
[16192]* At the outset of his testimony on the subject, Gordon Gray
[16193]acknowledged that he did not have a clear, independent: recollec-
[16194]tion of Lumumba's role in the Congo (Gray, 7/9/75, pp. 25-26).
[16196]HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 356
[16200]been on the minds of some people when they used
[16201]these words ‘eliminate’ or ‘set rid of’ ..°.
[16202]am just trying to say that it was not seriously
[16203]considered as a program of action by the Presi-
[16204]dent or even the Forty [Special] Group. (Gray, -
[16205]7/9475, P- 17.) ; oe
[16207]Andrew Goodpaster, the White House Staff Secretary to
[16208]President Eisenhower, said that he and Gray were the “principal
[16209]channels" between the President and the CIA, outside of NSC
[16210]meetings (Goodpaster, 7/17/75, p. 4). Goodpaster was responsi-
[16212]“ple for “handling with the President all matters of day-to-day
[16213]operations in the general fields of international affairs and .
[16214]security affairs" (Goodpaster, 7/17/75, Pp- 3). He regularly,
[16215]attended NSC meetings and was listed among the participants at
[16217]the NSC meetings of August. 18, 1960 and September 21, 1960.
[16219]When asked if he ever heard about any assassination effort
[16220]during the Eisenhower Administration, Goodpaster replied
[16221]unequivocally:
[16223]Lo at no time and in no way did 1 ever. know
[16224]of. or hear about any proposal, any ‘mention of
[16225]such an acitvity. .--: [ijt is my belief that
[16226]had such a thing been raised with the President
[16227]other than in my presence, I would have known
[16228]about-it, and... - it would have been a matter
[16229]of such significance and sensitivity that I am
[16230]confident that... ; I would have recalled it had
[16231]such a thing happened. —(Goodpaster, T{V7LTS5,
[16232]p. 3.)
[16234]John Eisenhower, the President's son who served under Good-
[16236]paster as Assistant White House Staff Secretary, stated that
[16238]' the use of assassination was contrary to the President's philos-
[16240]HY 450955 Daocld: 32423539 Page 357
[16242]— — ce eneninern arena bot en pm nap yrarnsiestentacen aistonennimaneat nn ctuyeand yhusnainten 2ohnenns abaSnnen aceasta ia mamas a Smee
[16246]ophy that “no man: is indispensable” (Eisenhower, 7/18/75, p. 14.)*
[16247]As a participant at NSC meetings who frequently attended dis-
[16248]cussions. in the Oval Office relating to national security affairs,
[16249]John Eisenhower testified that nothing that came to his atten~ |
[16250]-tion in his experience at the. White House "ean be construed in
[16252]my mind in the remotest way to mean any Presidential knowledge
[16254]of or concurrence in any assassination plots or plans" (Eisenhower,
[16256]7/18/75, Pp. 4)-
[16258]it
[16260]~* Douglas Dillon testified that the subject of assassination
[16261]never arose in his "direct dealings with either President
[16262]Eisenhower or President Kennedy (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 22). He was
[16263]asked by a member of the Committee, however, to speculate upon
[16264]the general philosophical approach that Presidents Eisenhower
[16265]. and Kennedy would have taken to decisionmaking on the question
[16266]of using assassination as a tool of foreign policy: |
[16268]Senator Hart (Colorado): LI would invite your speculation at
[16269]this point as a Sub-Cabinet officer under President Eisen-
[16270]hower, and as a Cabinet Officer under President Kennedy, T
[16271]think the Committee would be interested in your view as to
[16272]the. attitude of each of them toward this subject, that is
[16273]to say, the elimination, violent elimination of foreign
[16274]leaders? oo _
[16276]Dillon: Well, that is a difficult thing to speculate on
[16277]in a totally different atmosphere. But I think probably
[16278]both of them would have approached it in a very pragmatic
[16279]way, most likely, simply weighed the process and con-
[16280]sequence rather than in a ‘way that was primarily of a
[16281]moral principle. That is what would probably have been
[16282]their attitude in a few. cases. Certainly the idea that
[16283]this was going to be a policy of the u.s., generally
[16284]both. of them were very much opposed to it. (Dillion,
[16285]9/2/75, PP- 22-23.) .
[16287]Dillon served as Undersecretary of State in the Eisenhower
[16288]Administration and as Secretary of the Treasury under Kennedy.
[16290]HW 50955. Docld: 32423539 Page 356
[16292]HY 50955
[16294]Docld: 32423539
[16298]. “Other Eisenhower Administration officials who were active
[16299]in the Special. Group in late 1960--Assistant Secretary of. |
[16300]Defense John N. Irwin il, Undersecretary of State for Political
[16301]Affairs Livingston Merchent “and Deputy Secretary, of Defense
[16302]James Douglas--stated that they did not ‘recall any discussion
[16304]about: assassinating Lumumba (Irwin, affidavit, 9/22/75, PP- 1-2;
[16306]"Merchant atfidavit, 9/8/75, p. 1; Douglas affidavit, 9/5/75).
[16308]‘(c) Richard Bissell Testified That, Des ite His Lack. of
[16309]: a Specific Recollection, He Strongl
[16311]That the Assassination E
[16313]ort Against Lumumba Was
[16314]thorized by President Eisenhower and Alien Dulles
[16316]Authorized by President 2
[16318]Richard Bissell’ 8 testimony on the question. of high-level |
[16319]authorization for the effort to assassinate Lumumba is prob-
[16320]lematic. Bissell insisted that he had no ditect recollection
[16322]of receiving such authorization. and that all of his testimony
[16324]on this subject "has to be described. as inference” (Bissell,
[16326]9/10/75, p- 48). Bissell began his. testimony on the subject
[16328]by asserting that it was on his own, ‘initiative that he instructed
[16329]justin O'Donnell to plan the assassination of Lumumba (Bissell,
[16330]6/11/75, pp. 54-55). Nevertheless, Bissell's conclusion--based
[16332]on his inferences from the totality of circumstances relating
[16334]“to the entire assassination effort against Lumumba-.-was that an.
[16336]assassination attempt had been authorized at the highest -levels
[16338]of the government (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 32-33, 47-49, 60-62,
[16340]65).
[16342]Page 359
[16344]ee ee semen ain eA NEMO A
[16346]HY 450955
[16348]so cauenetnnene me ST ne ok a amas amt ne meee pn wt ntaniaainn, oot em DEM adn et SNH we TET
[16352]wAs discussed. above, Bissell testified that the minutes
[16353]of meetings of the Special Group on August 25, 1960: and the
[16354]NSC on September 21, 1960 indicate that assassination was con-
[16356]templated at the Presidential level as one acceptable means »
[16358]of “getting rid of Lumumba” (see Sections 5(a) (ii) and 5(a) (iii), °
[16360]supra) .
[16362]' There was "ho question", according to Bissell, chat the -
[16363]cable Eom Allen Dulles co the Chief of Station in Leopoldville
[16364]on August 26, which ealled for Lumumba's removal and authorized
[16365]Hedgman to take action without consulting neadquarters, was a.
[16366]direct outgrowth of the Special Group meeting Dulles had
[16367]attended the previous day (Bissell, 9/10/75, PP. 31-32). Bissell
[16369]was "almost certain" that he had been informed about: the Dulles
[16371]-eable shortly after its: transmission (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 12).
[16373]‘Bissell testified that he assumed that assassination was one of.
[16375]the means of removing Lumumba from the scene that js contemplated
[16376]within the language of Dulles’ cable (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 32):
[16378]It is my belief on the basis of the cable drafted
[16380]by Allen Dulles that he regarded the action of
[16382]the Special Group as authorizing implementation
[16384]fof an assassination] if favorable circumstances
[16386]presented themselves, if it could be done covertly.
[16388](Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 64-65.)
[16390]Dulles’ cable signalled to Bissell that there was Presi-
[16392]dential authorization for him to order action-to assassinate
[16394]Lumumba (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 61-62):
[16396]Docld: 324233539 Page 360°
[16400]Did Mr. Dulles tell you that President Eisenhower
[16401]wanted Lumumba killed? Lo
[16403]‘Mr. Bissell: I am sure he didn't..
[16405]Q: Did he ever tell you even circumlocutiously |
[16406]through this kind of cable? - i
[16408]Mr. Bissell: Yes, 1 think his cable says it in effect.
[16409](Bissell, 9/10/75, P. 33.) . . :
[16411]As for discussions with Dulles about the source of autho-
[16412]‘ization for an assassination effort against Lumumba, Bissell
[16413]stated: .
[16414]think it is probably unlikely that Allen Dulles
[16415]would have'said either the President or President
[16416]Eisenhower even to me. I think he would have said,
[16417]this is authorized in the highest quarters, and I
[16418]would have known what he meant. (Bissell, 9/10/75,
[16419]p. 48.) _
[16421]When. asked if he had sufficient authority to move beyond the
[16423]- consideration or planning of assassination to order implementa-_
[16425]tion of a plan, Bissell said, “I probably did think L had [such]
[16427]authority" (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 61-62).
[16428]When informed about the Chief of Station's testimony
[16429]about the instructions he received from Gottlieb, Bissell said
[16430]that despite his absence of a specific recollection:
[16431]T would strongly infer in this case that such an
[16432]authorization did pass through me, as it were,
[16433]4f Sid Gottlieb gave that firm instruction to the
[16434]Station Chief. (Bissell, 9/10/75, P- 40.)
[16436]Bissell said that the DCI would have been the source of this
[16438]authorization (Bissell, 9/10/75, pi 40).
[16440]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 361
[16442]“-LL7-
[16444]-Bissell: did not recall being informed by Gottlieb that
[16445]Gottlieb had represented to the Chief of Station that there
[16446]‘was Presidential authorization for the assassination of Lumumba
[16447](Bissell, 9/10/75, Pp. 46). But Bissell said that assuming he
[16448]had instructed Gottlieb to carry poison to the Congo, "there
[16449]was no possibility” that he would have issued such an instruc-
[16450]tion without authorization from Dulles (Bissell, 9/10/75,
[16451]p. 47). Likewise Bissell said he "probably did" tell Gottlieb
[16452]that the mission had the approval of President Eisenhower
[16453](Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 47). This led to Bissell's conclusion
[16454]that if, in fact, the testimony of the Chief of Station about
[16455]Gottlieb's actions is accurate, then Gottlieb's actions were
[16456]fully authorized:
[16457]Q: In light of the entire atmosphere at the Agency
[16458]and the policy at the Agency at the time, Mr..
[16459]Gottlieb's representation to the Chief of Station
[16460]that the President had instructed the DCL to
[16461]carry out this mission would not have been beyond
[16462]the pale of Mr. Gottlieb's authority at that
[16463]point?
[16465]Bissell: No, it would not. (Bissell, 9/10/75,
[16466]p- 65) . ;
[16468]Bissell further stated:
[16469]Knowing Mr. Gottlieb, it is. literally inconceivable
[16470]to me that he would have acted beyond his instruc-+
[16471]tions. (Bissell, 9/10/75, P- 41.)
[16472]With respect to his assignment to Justin O'Donnell to "plan
[16474]and prepare for" the assassination of Lumumba (Bissell, 9/10/75,
[16476]p. 24) Bissell testified that “it was my own jdea to give
[16478]HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 362
[16480]~L18-.
[16481]O'Donnell this assignment” (Bissell, 9/10/75, P- 50). But he
[16482]said that this specific assignment was made in the context
[16483]‘that an assassination mission against Lumumba already had autho-
[16484]rization above the level ‘of DDP (Bissell, 9/10/75, PB. 50; .see
[16486]also pp. 32-33, 47-48, 60-62).
[16488]HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 363
[16490]LULALL OT" Ps Os Foy)
[16492]The "Executive Action'' Capability
[16494]Along with the question.of authorization for actual assas—
[16496]sination attempts , the Committee considered the extert and nature:
[16497]of authorization for a CIA project which included, as one element,
[16498]the development. of an assassination capability.
[16499](a) Introduction .
[16500]Sometime in early 1961, _ Richard Bissell (Deputy Director
[16501]of Plans). instructed William Harvey, who was at that time the |
[16502]Chief of one of CIA's Foreign Intelligence staffs, to establish
[16503]an “executive action capability" which included research into a
[16504]capability to assassinate foreign leaders. (Bissell 6/9/75, . >. 51;
[16505]Harvey 6/25/75, PP. 36-37. a At some time within ‘the same period, |
[16506]Bissell and McGeorge Bundy (Special Assistant to. the President fot
[16507]ey National Security Affairs) had a conversation about the matter.
[16508]Bissell, Harvey and Helms all agreed that the “generalized”
[16509]capability was never used" (Bissell 6/9/75, p. 87; Harvey 6/25/75,
[16510]p. 45; Helms 6/13/75, p. 52). 00 a hui & Corn itt
[16511]; "Executive action” is a CIA euphemism, defined ‘by the
[16512]testimony before the Committee : as a project for. research, into
[16513]"developing means for overthrowing foreign political leaders, includ-
[16514]ing a “capability to perform assassinations". (Harvey 6/25/75,
[16515]>. 34.) Bissell indicated that executive action covered a "wide
[16516]spectrum of actions" to "eliminate the effectiveness" of foreign
[16517]leaders, with assassination as the "most extreme’ action on the
[16519]spectrum (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 32). The Inspector General's Report.
[16521]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 364°
[16525]cea described executive action asa "general stand-by capability” to
[16526]carry out assassination when required (I1.G., D. 37). The project
[16527]was given the code name ZR/RIFLE by the CIA.*. .
[16529]A single agent ('asset"), given the cryptonym QJ/WIN, :
[16530]was placed under Harvey's supervision for the ZR/RIFLE project,
[16531]but never used in connection with any actual assassination efforts.
[16532]Richard Helms described QJ/WIN's "capability":
[16534]"T£ you needed somebody to carry out murder, IT guess you
[16535]had a man who might be prepared to carry it out.'"' (Helms,
[16536]6/13/75, p. 53). :
[16537]: Harvey did use agent QJ/WIN, however , to spot “individuals
[16538]with criminal and underworld connections in Eurepe for possible
[16540]multi-purpose use" (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 50). For example, QS /WIN
[16542]reported that a potential asset. in the Middle East was "the leader
[16544]wet
[16546]2 of a gambling syndicate!’ with "an available pool of assassins"
[16547](CIA file, ZR/RIFLE/Personality Sketches).
[16548]- However, Harvey testified that:
[16550]“during the entire existencé of the entire ZRRIFLE project
[16551]no agent was recruited for the purpose of assassina-
[16553]tion, and no even tentative targeting or. target list was
[16555]ever drawn." (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 45.) °
[16557]Project ZR/RIFLE involved, generally, assessing the
[16559]problems and requirements of assassination and developing a stand-
[16561]* ZR/RIFLE was a eryptonym relating to two programs. One was
[16562]the executive action assassination capability. The other was —
[16563]another program which is not part of the subject matter of this
[16564]report. (William Harvey had been in charge of the CIA section
[16566]~ with general responsibility for such programs.) This second
[16567]program was. genuine, but it was also to provide a cover for any, |
[16568]‘executive action operation. (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 49.) ° ,
[16570]“pore,
[16572]HW 50955 Doold:32423539 Page 365
[16574]“by assassination capability; more specifically, it involved ~
[16575]"spotting" potential agents and "researching" assassination
[16576]techniques that: might be used (Bissell, 7/17/75, p. Ll and 6/9/75,
[16577]p. 73; Harvey, 6/25/75, pp. 37-A, 45). Bissell characterized |
[16578]Project ZR/RIFLE as "internal and purely preparatory" (Bissell,
[16580], 7/22/15, p. 32). The 1L.G. Report of 1967 found "no indication
[16581]in the file that the Executive Action Capability of ZR/RIFLE-|
[16582]-QJ/WIN was ever used", but said that “after Harvey took: over the
[16583]Castro operation, he ran it as one aspect of ZR/RIFLE". (rc.
[16585]pp. 40-41.)* | an
[16587](b) The Question of White House Initiation, Authorization,
[16588]or Knowledge of the Executive Action Project)
[16590]‘There is general agreement, on one fact: at some point in
[16592]early. 1961 Bissell discussed the executive action capability, with’
[16593]Bundy. . The timing of that conversation and whether “the white
[16594]House" urged that a capability. be created were matters on which
[16595]the evidence varied widely. :
[16596]Harvey testified that Bissell had told him ‘that “the
[16598]| White House" had twice urged the creation of such a capability
[16600]and the Inspector General's. “Report quoted notes of ‘Harvey' S (no
[16601]longer in existence) to that effect, Bissell did not recall any
[16602]specific conversation with the "White House". However, his initial
[16604]testimony assumed thé correctness of Harvey' s “notes, and stated.
[16606]* A discussion of whether ZR/RIFLE was related to the actual
[16607]assassination efforts against Castro is found at Section (d), *
[16608]infra.
[16610]HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 366
[16612]that, while he could have created the capability on his own,, any
[16613]urgings would have come from. Bundy or Walt Rostow. In a later
[16614]appearance, however , Bissell said he merely informed Bundy of.
[16615]‘the capability and that the context was a briefing by him and
[16616]not urging by Bundy. Bundy said he received. a briefing and’
[16617]gave no urging, though he raised no objections. Ros tow said he
[16618]never heard of the project. |
[16619]| William Harvey testified that he was "almost certain" pepe
[16620]that on January 25 and 26, 1961, he met with CIA officials Sidney nc, i,
[16621]Gottlieb, the new Chief of CIA's Technidal Services Division, and | | 7
[16623]Arnold Silver, a CIA recruiting officer, to discuss the feasibility
[16625]of creating a capability within the Agency for "executive action"
[16627](Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 52). — After reviewing his notes of those :
[16629],  meetings,* Harvey testified that they took. place after his ‘initial |
[16632]i
[16634]i
[16635]t
[16637]* As to the date of these notes, Harvey was asked whether his no-.
[16638]. tations "25/1-Sid G" and "26/1-AS" indicate that he spoke to Sidney.
[16639]Gottlieb and Arnold Silver in. 1961, as opposed to 1962.- Harvey testi-
[16640]fied as follows: — a
[16642]Q: And is it your judgment that. that is January 26, 1961 and
[16643]is about the subject of Executive Action?
[16645]“Harvey: Yes, it is.
[16647]Q:. And it followed your conversation with Mr.. Bissell ‘that
[16648]you have recounted? t ;
[16650]Harvey: . . . [WJell, when I first looked at this; I thought =~
[16651]this, well, this has got to be '62, but I am almost certain ©
[16652]. now that it is not. .If this is true, this might place the
[16653]~ _ first discussion that I’had with Dick Bissell in early
[16654]_ January and this is difficult to pinpoint because there were.
[16655]several such discussions in varying degrees of detail during
[16656]; the period in the spring, and very early in ‘61 to the fall
[16657]4 of ‘61 period, but I did find out fairly early on that Silver
[16659]Ne
[16661]HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 367°
[16663]discussion of executive action with Bissell, which, he said,
[16665]might have transpired in "early January”. (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 7
[16666]52). When Bissell was ‘shown these notes, he agreed with Harvey
[16667]about the timing of their initial discussion (Bissell, 7/17/75,
[16669]p.. 10).
[16671]had -- or that. Bissell had discussed the question of assassi-
[16672]nation with Arnold Silver, and this discussion, at the very
[16673]least, had to take place after I know Bissell already had
[16674]discussed Che matter with Silver. (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 52)..
[16676]llarvey had also testified that, after receiving Bissell's initial in-
[16677]structions to establish an executive action capability;
[16679]the first thing I did . . . was discuss in theoretical:
[16681]terms with a few officers whom I trusted quite implicitly
[16683]the whole subject of assassination, our possible assets, .
[16685]our posture, going back, if you will, even to the funda-
[16687]mental questions of A, is assassination a proper weapon:
[16689]of an American intelligence service, and B, even if you
[16691]assume that it is, is it within our capability within a tt
[16692]the framework of this government to do it effectively: |
[16693]and properly, securely and discreetly. (Harvey, 6/25/75,
[16694]pp. 37-A, 38). : . oo! _
[16696]The Inspector General's Report connected Silver and Gottlieb to the
[16697]early stages of the executive action-project as follows:
[16699]Harvey says that Bissell had already discussed certain
[16700]aspects of the problem with Arnold Silver and with Sidney
[16701]Gottlieb. Since Silver was already cut in, Harvey used _
[16702]him in developing the Executive Action Capability.... —
[16703]Harvey's mention of him [Gottlieb] in this connection ©
[16704]may explain’a notation by ‘Dr. Gunn that Harvey instructed
[16705]Gunn to discuss techniques with Gottlieb without associa-
[16706]ting the discussion with the Castro operation. .CL.G.
[16707]Report, pp. 37-38). a ;
[16709]It is evident from the testimony of Harvey and Bissell that the turn-
[16710]over to Harvey of the Roselli ‘contact in November 1961 was discussed
[16711]as part of ZRRIFLE (see Section (d), infra). Thus, their initial
[16712]discussion of executive action can, at the least,-be dated befére
[16713]November 1961 and the "25/1". and "26/1" notations would have to
[16715]refer to January 1961. .
[16717]HW 50955 Docld:32493539 Page 3668 ~
[16719]27 — , Harvey testified that the "executive action" ccapabilicy
[16720]was intended to include assassinations (Harvey, 6/25/75, Pp. 35).
[16721]His cryptic handwritten notes ‘of the January 25/26-meetings, pre-
[16722]served at the CIA, contain phrases which suggest a discussion of .
[16723]assassination--and Harvey confirmed this interpretation: "Last
[16725]‘resort and a confession of weakness”, "the
[16727]"never mention word assassination". . (Harvey,
[16728]Ex. Ly 6/25/75). > | | i
[16729]The Inspector General's Report did not mention these
[16730]notes, or their dates. However, in describing Richard Bissell's
[16731]“initial assignment of the "executive action" project to Harvey,
[16732]it referred to another set of Harvey ' s notes, which were destroyed
[16733]after the preparation of the Report. The excerpt from these notes
[16734]~.# quoted Bissell as saying to Harvey, “The White House had twice
[16735]urged me- to create such a capability" (1.G., P. 37). Harvey also.
[16736]“testified that this "urging" was mentioned in his. initial dis- |
[16737]cussion of " ‘executive action’ "with Bissell (Harvey, 6/25/75, P. 37).
[16738]However, the’ testimony from Bissell and White House aides in the
[16739]Kennedy and Eisenhower Administrations is in conflict with Harvey! Is
[16741]testimony as to whether such " "urging" had in fact been given to
[16743]Bissell.
[16745]i
[16747]* liarvey.' s notes also contained a phrase which gupgests his con-
[16748]cern that any U.S. assassination attempts might breed retaliation
[16749]from other governments: “dangers of RIS (Russian Intelligence
[16750]Service) countér-action and monitor if they. are blamed. _ (iarvey,
[16751]Ex. 1, 6/25/75; Bissell, Ex. 1, 7/17/75).
[16753]Ne
[16755]fe,
[16757]BY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 369 °° °°
[16759]The following testimony reparding the relationship _
[16760]between "the White House" and the executive action capability
[16761]was obtained by the Committee: |
[16762]Harvey: ‘Harvey testified that his missing notes indica-
[16764]ted that Bissell mentioned White House urgings to develop an execu-
[16766]tive’ action capability (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 37). Harvey said that
[16767]he "particularly rememberfed]" that Bissell said that he received
[16768]"more than one" urging from the White House (larvey, 6/25/75,
[16770]pp. 36-37; /AL/75, p.- 59). However, he had no. direct. evidence
[16772]that Bissell actually had any such discussion with “the White House. =
[16773]‘Ho specific individual in the White House was named to Harvey |
[16775](Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 31). Moreover, he said that it would have been
[16776]fy "improper" for him to haye asked Bissell who he had talked to and |
[16777]~ "grossly improper" for Bissell to have volunteered that name
[16779](Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 37). oo oT
[16781]issell: Bissell specifically recalled assi
[16782]to investigate the capability (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 51). However,
[16783]Bissell did not recall Ma specific conversation with anybody in
[16784]the White House as the origin" of his instruction ‘to Harvey. (Bissell,
[16785]6/9/75, >. 51). .
[16787]During the course of several appearances before the 1
[16788]Committee, Bissell's testimony varied as to whether or not he had
[16789]been urged by the White House to develop an executive action
[16790]capability. |
[16792]'
[16793]t
[16794]1
[16796]. i
[16797]i 4 . :
[16799]HY 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 370
[16801]In. his initial appearances’ before the Committee on June 9 and:
[16802]11, 1975, Bissell made statements that tended to indicate that white
[16804]House authorization had been given. In response to the “twice urged"
[16806]quotation of Harvey's notes in the Inspector General's Report,
[16807]Bissell said, "I have no ‘reason to believe that Harvey's quote is
[16808]wrong." (Bissell, 6/9/75, p..51). - Bissell accordingly said in his
[16809]initial testimony that’ as far as che knew, it was true that he was
[16810]asked by the White House to create a general stand- by, assassination
[16811]capability. | (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 49),
[16813]Based again upon llarvey's missing notes (white House urging")
[16814]and his initial statement that. he had no reason to challenge | their:
[16815]accuracy, Bissell initially g Zave the opinion that McGeorge Bundy
[16816](Id., 6/9/75, p. 49), Special Assistant to President Kennedy | for
[16818]oe National Security Affairs, and Walt Rostow (Id., p. 51), Deputy
[16819]Assistant to President Kennedy during 1961, were the two people from
[16821]whom such a request was ‘most likely to have come (Id., ?p. 53) because
[16823]' they were "the two members of the White House staff who were closest:
[16824]to CIA Operations.’  aa., p. 54) . oo
[16826]At another point in his initial testimony, Bissell said that
[16827]the creation of the capability ° "may have been initiated within che ar
[16830]Agency" (Id., p. 81). And still later he said: “there is little
[16832]a
[16834]doubt in my mind that Project RIFLE was discussed with Ros tow and
[16835]possibly Bundy" (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 46). |
[16836]_ When Bissell returned to the Committee on 1 July 1? and 22, his |
[16838]testimony, given in light of information gained since his earliét
[16840]HW 50955 Docld:324273539 Page 371
[16842]appearances, was that there was no White House urging. for the creation
[16844]of the executive action project, although tacit approval for the
[16846]"research" project was probably given by Bundy after it was, established.
[16847]First, he was shown the Harvey notes which had been preserved
[16848]and which, without any mention of the White House, indicated llarvey
[16850]had received his assignment prior. to January 25/26, 1961.- Those |
[16852]dates ~~ just 5 days after the change of administration ~- made
[16854]Bissell. conclude that. it was “very unlikely that that. _assignment
[16856]to [Harvey] was taken as a result of White louse urging or consul -
[16858]tation" Gissell, MLIITS, p. 10). ‘Bissell said that Bundy did
[16860]not have any influence on the performance of his Agency duties before
[16862]‘the. Presidential inauguration (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 23). Bissell
[16864]added that he did not remember meeting with anyone in the .new ad-
[16866]-ministration on matters prior to the inauguration (Bissell, 122175,
[16868]‘p. 23).
[16870]Second, when he returned in July, Bissell also said he | was con-
[16872]vinced by telephone conversations with stow and Bundy that based
[16874]“upon Rostow's duties -- which, in 1961, had nothing to do with
[16876]. .
[16882]HY 50955
[16884]covert action -- he "never discussed" executive action with Rostow
[16886](Bissell, 7/17/75, p. 1 T2175, p. 22).
[16888]As for Bundy, Bissell! s final testimony (after telephone con-
[16889]tact with Bundy) “was that he believed that he had informed Bundy |
[16891]about the ‘capability after it had been created (Bissell, 7/17/75,
[16893]pp. 10- Ll; 7/22/75, pp..21-22). But Bissell confirmed his original —
[16895]_-testimony (6/9/75, pp. ) that he did not brief Bundy on the
[16897]Docld:32423539 Page 37T2
[16901]actual assassination plots against Castro already undertaken. by the.
[16903]CIA (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 47; 7/22/75, p. 31). Bissell was: “quite
[16904]certain” that he would not have expected Bundy to mention the
[16906]executive action capability to the President. (Bissell, 7/22/75,
[16908]c
[16910]p. 35). Bissell. testified:
[16912]Q. Would. you think the development of a capability to:
[16913]kill foreign leaders was a matter of sufficient impor-:
[16914]tance to bring to the attention of the President? :
[16916]Bissell: In that context and at that. time and given the
[16917]limited scope of activities within that project, I. would.
[16918]not, (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 35). ,
[16920]- Bissell said that he -and Bundy spoke about an untargeted
[16922]"capability" rather than, the plan or approval for an assassination...
[16924]operation (Bissell, 7/17/75, . ld)... Bissell ‘said that although |
[16925]he does not have a specific. recollection, he “might have" mentioned
[16926]Castro, Lumumba , -and Trujillo in the course of a discussion of
[16928]executive action "because these were the sorts of individuals at:
[16930]that moment in Aistory against ‘whom such a capability might possibl
[16934]HY 50955
[16936]have been employed. " (Bissell, 6/11/75, pp. 50- ‘S1).
[16937]Bissell said his: impression was that Bundy, in addition to. ex-
[16939]pressing no unfavorable reaction to the ‘project, might have actual
[16941]“given a more affirmative reaction (Bissell, 7/22/75, pp. 25, 28).
[16943]Bissell testified that he might have interpreted Bundy’ s reaction.
[16945]- a8 approval fox the executive. action concept (Bissell, 7/22/75, D.
[16947]Q: .... I think the testimony of this witness is going
[16948]further in saying what you received from (Bundy). was,
[16949]in your view, tantamount to approval?
[16951]- Bissell: IT, at least, interpreted it as ‘you can call .
[16952]it approval, or you could. say no objection. “He (Bundy) |
[16954]Docld:324293599 Page 373
[16956]y
[16958]7.
[16960]30).
[16964]eo. was briefed on something that was being done, as I now —
[16965]7 -believe, on the initiative of the Agency. His (Bundy's)
[16967]comment is that he made no objection to it.. I suspect
[16969]that his reaction was somewhat more favorable -than that, |
[16971]but this is a matter that probably someone listening to
[16973]“the conversation on which.such a person could have had
[16975]differing interpretations. (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 33)...
[16977]Bissell's testimony on any conversation with. Bundy regarding
[16978]executive action was speculative reconstruction from first appearance ~
[16979]to last because he had no "clear recollection" of the events (Bissell,
[16980]7/22/75, pp. 29, 36). But Bissell maintained that more "formal and
[16981]specific. and explicit approval would have been required” before any
[16982]"actual overt steps in use of the capability." | (Bissell, 7/22/75,
[16983]op. 31)...
[16985]Bissell said that Harvey's notation about White House urgings
[16986]“to develop an executive action capability may have been a slightly
[16987]confused account of a conversation subsequent to the initiation of
[16988]the project in which Bissell relayed Bundy ‘s reaction to Harvey 7
[16989](Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 25).
[16991]Bissell testified that the development of an executive action
[16992]capability was ."undoubtedly" initiated within the Agency (Bissell,
[16993]7/22/75, p. 22). He had acknowledged om his first day of testimony - :
[16995]that this. would not have been unusual:
[16997]it was the normal practice in the: Agency and an impor- | ‘
[16998]tant part of its mission to create various kinds of
[16999]' capability long before there was any reason to be certain ; .
[17000]whether those would be-used or where or how or for what
[17001]purpose. The whole ongoing job of ... a secret intelli-
[17002]gence service of recruiting agents is of that character...,
[17003]So it would not be particularly surprising to me.if the °
[17007]HW 50955 Docldig2493539 Page 374
[17011]aN decision to create ... this capability had been taken an
[17012]Q : without an outside request. (Bissell, 6/9/75, pp. 67-68) .*.
[17013]Bundy ; / McGeorge Bundy also testified that he hada conversation
[17014]with Bissell, during which the executive action capability was dis-
[17015]‘cussed (Bundy, pp. 4-5). oo Bundy 's testimony comports with =.
[17016]Bissell's on the fact that they spoke about an untargeted capability,
[17018]‘rather ‘than an assas$ination operation (Bundy, pp. 4-5). But Bundy
[17020]said that the capability included "killing the individual" (Bundy ,
[17022]c
[17024]p. 5).** Bundy's impression was that the CIA was "testing my’ reaction,
[17025]not “seeking authority" (Bundy , p. 15). Bundy summarized his testi-
[17026]mony by saying:
[17028]L am sure I gave no instruction, But it is only. fair to
[17029]add that I do not recall that I offered any impediment |
[17030]either. (Bundy, p. 10) | :
[17032]od _ Bundy said that he did not take steps to halt the development of
[17034]the executive action capability or "pursue the matter. at all" (Bundy,
[17035]p. 19) because he was satisfied
[17037]that this was not ‘an operational activity, and would not
[17038]become such without two conditions: first, that there
[17039]be a desire or a request or a guidance that there should
[17040]be planning against some specific individual; and second,
[17041]that there should be a decision to move: against the indi-
[17042]‘vidual. (Bundy, p.'7). _ ; . ,
[17044]* For example, Bissell testified that on his own initiative, he
[17045]had reduested a cit or ntcer to-go to the Congo to 'inake plans and
[17046]develop the capability" for an assassination attempt against ;
[17047]if orderéd (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 55).. PE SBainse Lumumba,
[17049]oe ** Bundy also testified that he had a vague recollection of hearing
[17050]about poison in relation to Cuba, but he did not connect this to the
[17051]conversation about executive action, (See footnote, p. 6, Kennedy —
[17052]Pre-bay of Pigs section, supra.) ne
[17054]1
[17056]HW 50955 Docld:32493539 Page SYS. OCCT ce tenn nee pein ete bee
[17060]vo. “Bundy testified that he believed that neither of these conditions had
[17064]been fulfilled. (Bundy, p. 7).
[17065]Bundy recalled ‘the conversation as taking place "sometime in the 7
[17066]early months of 1961." (Bundy, p. 4). When questioned about the
[17067]dates in Harvey's notes, “Bundy rated the chance that the conversation |
[17068]about executive action took place before. January 25 -- when: Harvey
[17069]was already “discussing the project at. the CIA pursuant to Bissell" Ss
[17070]directive -- as" ‘near zero" because the new Administration had been
[17071]in office less than a week and he had been preoccupied with other:
[17072]problems, including the Berlin crisis and reorganizing the National -
[17073]Security staff (Bundy, p. 9). | |
[17074]Bundy ‘testified that he did not brief the President onthe |
[17075]"executive, action project: . |
[17076]- 7 : “Chairman: And you have testified that you did not take
[17078]' the - matter to the President?
[17080]Bundy: As far as I can recall, Mr, Chairman,
[17081](Bundy, p. 16)
[17083]Bundy ‘explained that the division-of cesponsibility for national
[17084]' security affairs excluded Ros tow from jurisdiction over covert: opera-
[17085]‘tions, making it unlikely that Ros tow would be briefed on 4 project.
[17086]like Z2RRIFLE (Bundy, p.-11; Rostow, p. 11).
[17087] Rostow: Rostow testified that he was "morally certain” that:
[17088]during, his entire tenure in government, he never heard a reference |
[17089]to executive action’ or “such a capability or such an intention to.
[17091]act by the U.S." ' (Rostow, pp. 10, 13).
[17093]HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 376 ~°
[17097]Goodpaster and Gray: The responsibility for national security
[17098]affairs during the latter. part of the Eisenhower Administration. was
[17099]borne by Andrew Goodpaster and Gordon Gray. “However ,. there was no
[17100]evidence which raised the name of either man in connection with the
[17101]development of an executive action capability. Both Goodpaster and
[17102]Gray testified to having no knowledge of it. (Goodpaster, p. 11;
[17104]Gray, p.. 56.)
[17106](c) Authorization or Knowledge o£ Executive Action Project
[17109]“Richard Bissell said he was “quite certain" that Allen
[17110]Dulles had full knowledge of the executive action. project for two
[17111]reasons = first, it “would have come to the’ DC's. attention" at the —
[17112]time of the transfer of William Harvey between components of the
[17114]Agency to work on Cuban operations;* and second, Bissell “would
[17116]imagine" it was mentioned to Dulles at the initiation: of che project
[17117](Bissell, 7/22/75, Pp. 35). ‘Bissell and larvey briefed Richard Helms
[17118]on Project ZRRIFLE when he became DDP (Bissell, 6/11/75, Pp. 153; Warvey,
[17119]7/11/75, p. 63). But Bissell did not recall briefing John. MeCone.
[17120]about the project when McCone took over as DCI (Bissell, 1117/75,
[17121]p. 11). McCone’ testified that ‘he had’ no ‘knowledge of such a. project a
[17122]. (MeCone, p. 43).
[17123]William Harvey said. it was assumed that. the project was;
[17124]within the parameters permitted by. the DCI. But larvey testified
[17126]that officially advising the DCI of the existence of the project
[17128]ce Harvey ' S transfer to Cuban operations was not. conpleted until
[17129]late in 1961.
[17131]HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 “Page pep ret mt rs nen ee ern areata ett
[17135]was '‘a bridge we did not cross" and would not have crossed until
[17136]“there was either specific targeting or a specific operation or-a.
[17137]specific recruitment. ne (Harvey, 6425/75, p. 59).
[17139](d) - The Question of Whether r Project ZRRIFLE was Connected
[17141]to Any Actual Assassination Plots
[17143]‘The Committee ‘has sought. to determine whether the CLA de-
[17144]velopment: of an executive action capability was related in any. way to 7
[17145]the actual assassination efforts. One question raised by this
[17146]inquiry is. whether the participants in the assassination operations
[17147]might have perceived the executive action capability as in-some way
[17148]lending legitimacy to. ‘the actual assassination efforts. .
[17150](i) Conversation Between Bissell and Bundy
[17152]- In his early testimony, Bissell said he did not have
[17154]a recollection of whether he discussed the names of Castro, Lumumba,
[17155]and Trujillo with anyone in the White House in the course of discussing
[17156]the project to develop. an executive: action capability (Bissell, 6/11/75,
[17158]p. 51). “However, Bissell testified that ait was "perfectly plausible
[17160]that I. would have used examples" (Bissell, 6/11/75, Pp. en). le con-
[17164]in such a “discussion of a capability, I might-well have
[17165]used the three names that I just gave, because these were
[17167]_ the sorts of individuals at that moment in history against
[17168]whom such a capability might possibly have been employed. "
[17169](Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 51).
[17171]Bissell and “Bunay both testified, however , that
[17173]their discussion of the development of the capability. for agsassina-
[17175]tion did not. involve any mention of actual assassination plans « or
[17179]sore,
[17182]HY 450955 Docld: 32423539 Page 378
[17184]_ -16-
[17186]attempts (see detailed treatment at Section (b), supra). There
[17187]is no testimony to the contrary. The account of this conversa-—
[17189]tion raises a question as to whether Bissell acted properly in
[17191]; ; 6 x
[17192]withholding from Bundy the fact that assassination efforts
[17193]bunt 2
[17194]against Castro had already been mounted.and were moving forward. ne
[17195]pups
[17196]Bundy was responsible to a new President for national security ao
[17197]Gory
[17199]affairs and Bissell was his principal source of information ‘about: vor Tp
[17200]covert operations at the CIA.
[17202](ii) Bissell's Instruction to Take Over Respons ibility.
[17203]for Underworld Contact: November L961
[17205]Both Bissell and Harvey recall a meeting in Novenber
[17206]1961 in which Harvey was instructed to take over the contact with!
[17207]John Roselli (Bissell, 6/11/75, pp. 19, 47; Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 865
[17208]y and 6/11/75, Pe 19) --which had been used for thé initial poison pill
[17209]plot as part: of Project ZR/RIFLE. Harvey's notes placed the meeting
[17210]on November 15, 1961 (1.G., p. 39), during the period in which Harvey,
[17211]\ was freed from his duties on another Agency staff to take over
[17212]direction of Task Force W, the locus of CIA activity against the
[17213]Castro regime. . . |
[17214]According to. Bissell and Harvey, the November. meeting,»
[17215]involved only. the planning and research ofa capability ‘ather than:
[17216]a targeted operation against Castro (Bissell, 7/17/75, p. 13;
[17217]Harvey, 7/11/75, p. 60). But Bissell. acknowledged that the purpose
[17218]of: the Roselli contact had been to assassinate Castro, and that Mit
[17220]is a fair inference that there would have been no reason to maintain
[17222]we
[17226]HW 50955 Doold:32423539 Page 379 -
[17230]it [the contact unless there was some possibility of reactivating
[17231]that operation" (Bissell, 6/11/75, >. 19). Bissell stated that
[17233]- because the “assassination plot against Castro involving the syndicate
[17235]had been stood down after the Bay of Pigs’. . . and there
[17236]‘was no authorization to purste it ‘actively . . . the re
[17237]sponsibility that was given to him [Harvey] was that of
[17238]taking over an inactive contact. "" (Bissell, 7/17/75, pi 14)
[17240]_ Bissell said that he had, in effect, asked Harvey to stand watch over
[17241]the contact in case any-action. should be. required and further testi-
[17243]fied that it was never required.
[17245]The Inspeétor General's Report stated: "After
[17246]Harvey took over the Castro operation, he ran it as one aspect
[17247]of ZRRIFLE." (1.G., p. 40). Harvey recalled that during a dis-
[17248]cussion with Bissell of the creation of an executive action capability,
[17249]+" Bissell advised him of "a then going operation" involving the names »
[17250]_ of Maheu and possibly Roselli and Giancana, “which was a part. of the
[17251]Agency" s effort to develop - 2. a capability for executive action."
[17252](Harvey, 7/11/75, pp. 55, 61). Harvey said that at the time of
[17253]this discussion, the operation } had been "in train" for "approxi-
[17254]mately two years or perhaps -18 months ." (Harvey, 7/11/75, p. 54).
[17255]| Although his "net impression" was that both the
[17256]“exploratory project” and the"specific operation" were "fully
[17257]authorized and approved", Harvey said he could not testify that |
[17259]"specific White Ilouse authority. for this given operation was implied
[17260]_ or stated". -(Harvey, 7/11/75, p. 54.) Bissell does net recall
[17262]telling anyone in the White House that something. had been done “to
[17264]HY 30955 Daocld:32423539 Page 380
[17268]bring a CIA officer together with the criminal syndicate (Sissell,
[17269]6/11/75, pp. 19-20). Harvey did not recall any mention of the
[17270]White House or any higher authority than the DDP in his Novémber
[17271]meeting with Bissell (Harvey, 7/11/75, -pp. 60-61). |
[17273]| Although Richard Helms was briefed and given
[17274]administrative responsibility (as DDP) for Project ZR/RIFLE three’
[17275]months later, he did not recall that. ZR/RIFLE was ever contemplated |
[17276]as a capability to assassinate Castro (Helms, 6/13/75; p. 35).
[17277]Asked whether the actual assassination: efforts against Castro were
[17278]related to ZR/RIFLE (executive action), “Helms testified: "In my
[17279]mind those lines never crossed" (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 52).. However,
[17280]Bissell's testimony leaves more ambiguity: "the contact with the |
[17282]syndicate which had Castro as its target . . . folded into. the
[17284]er
[17286]ZR/RIFLE project . : . and they became one" (Bissell, 6/11/75,
[17287]P- 47). -When asked by Senator Baker whether the executive action |
[17288]"capability . .. for assassination" was used against Castro”
[17290]Bissell replied that it was "in the. later phase". (Bissell, sain,
[17291]p-. 47). The instruction from Bissell to Harvey on “November 15,
[17292]1961, however, preceded the reactivation of the CIA-syndicate “assas-
[17294]‘ination operation against Castro by approximately five months. —
[17296](iii) Use-of Agent QU/WIN in Africa
[17298]QJ/WIN was a foreign citizen witha criminal back-
[17299]ground who had been recruited - by the CIA for certain sensitive ~
[17301]programs involving surreptitious entries which pre-dated Project
[17303]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 361
[17305]HY 50955
[17309]ZR/RLIFLE. Harvey testified that QJ/WIN’s function after the advent
[17310]of Project ZR/RIFLE in 1961 was restricted to the "spotting" of.
[17311]potential assets for "multi-purpose" covert use. .
[17313]However, in the Fall of 1960--before Harvey was
[17314]assigned to create Project ZR/RIFLE by Richard Bissell--agent
[17315]QJ/WIN had been dispatched to the Congo by Arnold Silver, his
[17316]supervising CIA case officer in Europe. William Harvey, as the
[17317]Chief of the CIA Foreign Intelligence staf£ on which Silver worked,
[17318]had ordered QJ/WIN's mission to the Congo (CIA Dispatch AUDW-147,
[17319]11/2/60) and arranged the financial accounting for the mission
[17320]afterward (Memorandum to Finance Division from William kK. Harvey,
[17321]1/11/61). [QJ/WIN's activities in the Congo are treated in detail
[17322]in the discussion of the Lumumba case; see Section _, supra. |
[17324]There are two factors which may raise a question as
[17325]to whether QJ/WIN was being used in an ad hoc capacity to develop.
[17326]an assassination capability before ZR/RIFLE was formally initiated.
[17327]First, there is a similarity in the cast of characters: Harvey,
[17328]QJ/WIN, Silver, and Gottlieb were connected with the. Lumumba matter
[17330]and reappear in connection with the subsequent development of
[17332]ZR/RIFLE. Second, Bissell informed Harvey that the development of
[17334]an assassination capability had already been discussed with Silver
[17335]and Gottlieb before Harvey's assignment to ZR/ RIFLE (Harvey, 6/25/75,
[17336]p. 52; 1I:G. Report, pp. 37-38).
[17338]‘Nevertheless, there does not appear to be any firm
[17339]evidence of a connection between QJ/WIN and the plot to assassinate
[17341]Lumumba.
[17343]Docld:32423539 Page 382
[17345]R448
[17347]Agreed to by drafting
[17348]; subcommittee on
[17349]Sunmary . , August 28, 1975*
[17351]FINAL DRAFT
[17353]Rafael Trujillo was assassinated by a group of Dominican dissidents on
[17354]May 30, 1961. | .
[17356]Trujillo was a brutal dictator, and both the Eisenhower and
[17357]Kennedy Administrations encouraged the overthrow of his regime by Dominican
[17358]dissidents. Toward that end the highest policy levels of both Administrations
[17359]approved or condoned supplying arms to the dissidents. Although there is no
[17360]evidence that the United States instigated any assassination activity, certain
[17361]evidence tends to link United States officials to the assassination
[17362]plans.
[17364]Material support, consisting of three pistols and three carbines, was
[17365]supplied to various dissidents. While United States' officials knew that the
[17366]dissidents intended to overthrow Trujillo, probably by assassination, there
[17367]is no direct evidence that the weapons which were passed were used in the
[17368]assassination. The evidence is inconclusive as to how high in the two
[17369]‘Administrations information. about the dissidents' assassination plots
[17370]had been passed prior to the spring of 1961. .
[17372]Beginning in March of 1961, the dissidents began asking United States
[17373]officials for machine gims. By the time four M-3 machine gums were shipped to
[17374]the CIA Station Chief in the Dominican capitol in April, it was well known
[17375]that the dissidents wanted them for use in connection with the assassination.
[17376]Thereafter, however , permission to deliver the machine guns to the dissidents
[17377]was denied, and the guns were never passed. ‘Two days before the assassination,
[17378]President Kennedy personally authorized a cable to the U.S. Consul General
[17379]¥ The second paragraph tnder V-Avd.c. and the paragraph under VIT.C. were
[17381]drafted pursuant to the directions of the Subcommittee but have not been
[17382]reviewed by the Subconmittee.
[17384]HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 383
[17386]in the Dominican Republic stating that the United States government, as a
[17387]matter of general principle, could not condone political assassinations, but
[17388]at: the same time indicating the United States continued to support the dissi-
[17389]dents and stood ready to recognize them in the event they were successful
[17391]in their endeavor to overthrow Trujillo.
[17393]HW 50955 Donld:32493539 .Page 364
[17397]spate oe HT 73
[17398]mr got . eo,
[17400]us ‘ oy he vk
[17402]fy . Mat Wend
[17407]IT. Background .
[17408]™ Rafael Trujillo came to power in the Dominican Republic
[17409]in 1930. For most of his tenure, the United States government
[17411]supported him and he was regarded. throughout much of the
[17412]Caribbean and Latin America as a protege of the United States.
[17413]Trujillo's rule, always harsh and dictatorial, became more
[17414]arbitrary during the 1950's. As a result, the United States
[17416]‘States' image. was increasingly tarnished'in the eyes of many
[17417]Latin Americans.
[17419]Increasing American awareness of Trujillo's brutality
[17420]and fear that it would lead to a Castro-type revolution caused
[17421]U.S. officials to consider various plans to hasten his abdi-
[17422]cation or downfall.
[17424]As early as February 1960 the Eisenhower administration
[17425]gave high level consideration to a program of covert aid to
[17426]Dominican dissidents. _ (Special Group minutes, 2/10/60).
[17428]. In April 1960 President Eisenhower approved a contingency plan
[17429]for the Dominican Republic which provided, in part, that if the
[17431]situation deteriorated still further:
[17433]"| .the United States would immediately take political action to
[17434]remove Trujillo from the Dominican Republic as soon
[17436]as a suitable successor regime can be induced to take over
[17437]with the assurance of U.S. political, economic, and
[17439]-- if necessary -- military support." (Memo from
[17440]Secretary of State Herter to the President, 4/14/60;
[17441]Presidential approval indicated in Herter letter to
[17442]Secretary of Defense Gates, 4/21/60.)
[17444]Simultaneously, the United States was trying to organize
[17446]hemispheric opposition to the Castro regime in Cuba. Latin
[17448]be ae as
[17450]HY 50955 Docld:324233539 Page 365
[17452]HW 50955 Docld:324273539 Page 366
[17454]American leaders, such as President Betancourt of Venezuela,
[17456]pressed the United States to take affirmative action against
[17458]Trujillo to dispel criticism. that the U.S. opposed dictator-
[17460]ships of the left only. A belief that Castro's road to power
[17461]was paved by the excesses of Batista led to concern that the
[17463]bominican Republic might also eventually fall victim to a
[17465]Castro-style Communist regime. (Rusk, pp. 8,9)
[17467]I. Initial Contact with Dissidents and Request for. Arms
[17468]During the spring of 1960, the U.S. ambassador to the
[17469]Dominican Republic, Joseph Farland, made initial contact with
[17470]dissidents who sought to free their country from Trujillo's
[17471]grasp. They asked for sniper rifles. Although documentary
[17472]evidence indicates that a recommendation to provide these
[17474]rifles was approved both within the State Department and the
[17476]CIA, the rifles were never provided.
[17478]A.. Dissident Contacts
[17480]Ambassador Farland established contact with a group of
[17481]dissidents regarded as moderate, pro-U.S. and desirous of
[17483]establishing a democratic form of government.* (Farland
[17485]affidavit) Prior to his final departure from the Dominican
[17487]Republic in May 1960, the Ambassador introduced his Deputy-Chief-
[17489]of-Mission, Henry Dearborn, to the dissident leaders, indicating that
[17491]Se rte a a ee aemeracnnnecnangenl -aneeatnee aerate ee AONE AR AAT A 1
[17492]* This loosely-organized group, with which contact was es-
[17493]tablished, was referred to in cables, correspondence, and
[17494]memoranda as “the dissidents" and is so referenced herein.
[17497]ry i a co at asa Fa
[17499]vet
[17504]-3- _ .
[17506]Dearborn could be trusted. Then on June 16, 1960, CIA
[17507]Headquarters* cabled a request that Dearborn become the "communi-
[17508]cations link" between the dissidents and CIA. The cable /stated/
[17509]that Dearborn's role had the “unofficial approval of /Assistant
[17510]Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Roy R./ Rubottom"
[17511](Emphasis in original.) (HOS to Station cable 6/16/60).
[17513]‘Dearborn agreed. He requested, however, that the CIA
[17514]confirm the arrangement with the dissidents as being that the
[17515]U.S. would "clandestinely" assist the opposition to "develop
[17516]effective force to accomplish Trujillo overthrow,'' but would
[17517]not “undertake any overt action itself against Trujillo
[17518]government while it is in full control of Dominican Republic"
[17519](Station to HQS cable 6/17/60). CIA Headqaurters confirmed
[17520]Dearborn's understanding of the arrangement (HQS to Station
[17522]cable 6/19/60).
[17524]B. The Sniper Rifles
[17526]puring the course of a cocktail party in the Dominican
[17527]Republic, a leading dissident made a specific request to Ambas-
[17528]Sador Farland for a limited number of rifles with telescopic
[17529]sights. The Ambassador promised to pass on the request (Farland
[17530]affidavit) He apparently did so after returning to Washington
[17532]in May 1960 (CIA memorandum for the record, 6/7/61).
[17534]* As used herein "Headquarters" refers to deadquarters of the
[17535]Central Intelligency Agency; "Department" indicates the
[17536]Department of State.
[17538]HW 50955 Docld:32473539 Page 3687 be
[17542]Documents: indicate that consideration was given within
[17543]; the CIA to airdropping rifles into the Dominican Republic.
[17544]At a June 21, 1960, meeting with Ned Holman of the CIA
[17545]Western Hemisphere Division, Ambassador Farland reportedly
[17546]suggested possible sites for the drops.
[17547](CIA memo, 6/21/60) .
[17548]Documents also indicate that a meeting was held
[17549]around the end of June 1960 between Assistant Secretary
[17550]of State for Inter-American Affairs Roy R. Rubottom and
[17551]Col. J. C. King, Chief of CIA's Western Hemisphere Division.
[17552]Apparently King sought to learn the Assistant Secretary's view
[17553]reyarding "To what extent will the U.S. government participate
[17554]in the overthrow of Trujillo.” A number of questions were
[17555]raised by King, among them:
[17556]"eo. Would it provide a small number of sniper rifles
[17557]or other devices for the removal of key Trujillo people
[17558]from the scene?" .
[17559]King's handwritten notes indicate that Rubottom's response to
[17560]that question was "yes" (CIA memo of 6/28/60; Kind affidavit)
[17561]On July 1, 1960, a memorandum directed to General Cabell, the Acting
[17562]Director of Central Intelligence, was prepared for Colonel King's
[17563]‘signature and, in his absence, signed by his principal deputy,
[17564]Rudy Gomez (1.G. Report, Pp. 26). The memorandum stated that Afars p~-
[17565]a principal leader of the anti~Prujilio GpROSTEION had GSK
[17566]Ambassador Farland for a limited number of arms to precipitate
[17568]Trujillo's overthrow, and recognized that such arins
[17570]* Neither King nor Rubottom recalls such a meeting, nor does
[17571]either recall any proposal for supplying sniper rifles.
[17573](Rubottom affidavit, :King affidavit.).
[17575]. nde,
[17576], : Mob bbs rm
[17577]BW 50955 Bocld: 32423539 Page 366 Poe { ao
[17580]HW 50955 Docld:32493539 Page 389 —
[17582]Vaid) tue
[17583]Unset gna SEY Bs aA Bon
[17585]"pyresumably would be used against key members of the Trujillo
[17587]régime." The memorandum recommended that the arms be provided,
[17588]since the fall of the Trujillo regime appeared inevitable,
[17590]and therefore U.S. relations with the opposition should be as
[17592]close as possible. ''Providing the arms as requested would
[17594]contribute significantly toward this end."
[17595](CIA memo, 7/1/60)
[17596]Specifically, the recommendation was to deliver to dissidents
[17597]in the Dominican Republic 12 sterile” rifles with teles-.
[17598]copic sights, together with 500 rounds of ammunition.
[17599]| Paragraph 4 of the memorandum stated:
[17600]"4, Approval for delivery of these arms has
[17601]been given by Assistant Secretary of State
[17603]Roy Rubottom, who requests that the arms be
[17605]placed in hands of the opposition at the earliest
[17606]possible moment." (Id.}
[17608]Gomez's’ recommendation was concurred in by Richard
[17609]Helms, as Acting DDP, and approved by General Cabell,
[17610](1.G. Report, p. 26). |
[17612]The kind o£ arms approved, sterile rifles with
[17613]telescopic sights, together with the statement that they would
[17614]be presumably used against key members of the Trujillo regime
[17615]clearly indicated the “targeted use" for which the weapons were
[17616]intended. (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 77).
[17618]On July 1, 1960, a cable was sent to Dearborn by CIA
[17619]Headquarters informing him of “the plan ‘to airdrop 12
[17621]telescopically-sighted rifles into the Dominican Republic. The
[17623]€’Sterile” rifles are “untraceable” rifles. (3issell, 7/22/75,p.69)
[17633]cable inquired whether the dissidents had the eapability to
[17634]realign the sights if thrown off by the drop. ‘On July 14,
[17635]1960, Dearborn replied that the dissident leaders were against
[17636]any further action. in the Dominican Republic until after re-
[17637]solution by the OAS of a Venezuelan complaint then pending
[17638]against Trujillo. The. dissidents reportedly believed that
[17639]sufficiently strong action by the OAS could bring Trujillo's
[17640]downfall without further effort on their part. (Station to
[17642]HQS cable, 7/14/60) The 12 sniper rifles were never furnished
[17643]-to the dissidents. | |
[17645]On August 26, 1960, Dearborn cabled Deputy Assistant
[17647]Secretary of State Lester Mallory reporting on a meeting between
[17648]a dissident leader and John Barfield, the Consulate's political
[17649]officer. The dissident leader was reported to have lost.
[17650]enthusiasm for an assassination attempt and was then speaking
[17651]of an invasion from Venezuela. However, by September 1, 1960,”
[17652]dissidents were again speaking about the possible provision to
[17653]them of arms. This time the request was for 200 rifles. For
[17654]the next several months, consideration centered on providing _
[17656]200 to 300 guns.
[17658]II. Summer and Fall of 1960
[17660]In August 1960, the United States severed diplomatic
[17661]relations with the Dominican Republic and recalled most of its
[17662]personnel. Dearborn was left as Consul General and de facto
[17664]CIA Chief of Station. , Consideration was given both to providing
[17666]HY 50955 Docild: 32423539 Page 390
[17668]arms and explosive devices and to the use of high level
[17669]emissaries to persuade Trujillo to abdicate. By the end of
[17670]the year, a broad plan of general support to anti-Trujillo
[17672]forces, both within and without the country, was approved.
[17674]A, Diplomatic Development ~-
[17675]Withdrawal of U.S. Personnel
[17677]Events occurring during the summer of 1960 further in-
[17678]tensified hemispheric opposition to the Trujillo regime. In
[17679]June agents of Trujillo tried to assassinate Venezuelan Presi-
[17680]dent. Betancourt... As a result, the OAS censured the Trujillo
[17681]government. At the same time, in August 1960, the United
[17682]States broke interupted diplomatic relations with the Dominican
[17683]Republic and imposed economic sanctions.
[17685]With the severance of diplomatic relations, the United
[17686]States closed its Embassy. Most American personnel, including
[17687]the CIA Chief of Station, left the Dominican Republic. With
[17688]the departure of the CIA Chief of Station, Dearborn became
[17689]de facto CIA Chief of Station and was recognized as such by
[17690]both CIA and the State Department. Although on January 20,
[17691]1961, a new CIA Chief of Station came to the Dominican Republic,
[17692]Dearborn continued to serve as a link to the dissidents.
[17694]B. Dearborn Reports Assassination May be Only
[17695]Way to Overthrow Trujillo Regime
[17697]Dearborn came to belicve that no effort to overthrow the
[17699]HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 391
[17701]HW 50955 Docld:32493539 Page 392°!
[17703]Trujillo government could be successful unless it involved
[17704]trujillo's assassination.
[17706]He communicated this opinion to both the State Department and
[17707]the CIA. In July 1960, he advised Assistant Secretary Rubottom
[17708]that the dissidents were
[17710]in ne way ready to carry on any type of revolutionary
[17711]activity in the foreseeable future except the
[17712]assassination of their principal enemy."
[17713](Dearborn to Rubottam letter, 7/14/60)
[17714]It is uncertain what portion of the information provided
[17715]by Dearborn to State was passed above the Assistant Secretary
[17716]level. Tnrough August of 1960, only Assistant Secretary Rubottom,
[17717]his Deputy, Lester Mallory, and Staff Assistant Frank Devine,
[17718]were, within the Latin American Division of the Department,
[17719]aware of Dearborn's "current projects." (Devine to Dearborn
[17720]letter, 8/15/60)"
[17721]By September 1960, Thomas Mann had replaced Roy Rubottom
[17722]as Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, and Frank
[17723]Devine had become a Special Assistant to Mr. Mann. While
[17724]serving as Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary, Devine
[17725]reportedly spent ninety percent of his time coordinating State
[17726]activities in Latin America. It was in this capacity that
[17727]Devine maintained almost daily communication with Ned Holman
[17729]and other officials’ of the CIA's Western Hemisphere Division
[17731]' (Devine, p.7)
[17733]¥Dearborn’s candid reporting to State during the summer of 1960
[17734]raised concern with the Department and he was advised that certain
[17735]specific information should more appropriately come through "the .
[17737]other channel" (presumably, CIA communications). Dearborn was
[17738]advised that his cables to State were distributed to at least 19
[17740]different recipient offices. (Id.)
[17742]_
[17747]Ra
[17748]re es a
[17749]Fe dice web <a Fre 4 aah My
[17750]OR eee Ge ber ev en kn
[17751]Mann solicited Dearborn's comments concerning plans -
[17752]under discussion for forcing Trujillo from power. Dearborn
[17754]replied in a detailed letter which concluded:
[17756]"One further point which I should probably not even
[17757]make. From a purely practical standpoint, it will
[17759]be best for us, for the OAS, and for the Dominican
[17760]Republic if the Dominicans put an end to Trujillo
[17761]before he leaves this island. If he has his millions
[17762]and is a free agent, he will devote his life from
[17763]exile to preventing stable: government in the D.R., to
[17764]overturning democratic governments and establishing
[17765]dictatorships in the Caribbean, and to assassinating
[17766]his enemies. If I were a Dominican, which thank
[17767]heaven I am not, I would favor destroying Trujillo as
[17768]being the first necessary step jn the salvation of
[17770]my country and I would regard this, in fact, as my
[17771]Christian duty. If you recall Dracula, you will
[17772]remember it was necessary to drive a stake through
[17774]his heart to prevent a continuation of his crimes.
[17776]I believe sudden death would be more humane than
[17778]the solution of the Nuncio who once told me he thought
[17779]he should pray that Trujillo would have a long and
[17780]lingering illness." (Dearborn to.Mann letter, 10/27/60)
[17782]Cc. Efforts to Convince Trujillo to Abdicate
[17784]Throughout the fall of 1960, efforts were made on both the
[17785]diplomatic and economic fronts aimed at pressuring Trujillo
[17786]into relinquishing control, and ideally, leaving the Dominican
[17787]Republic. The use of high level emissaries, both from within
[17788]and without the ranks of government, was considered. (Special
[17789]Group Minutes, 9/8/60; Mann to Dearborn corres., 10/10/60)
[17790]None of the efforts proved successful, and at the end of 19690
[17792]Trujillo was still in absolute control.
[17794]D. CIA Plans of October 1960
[17796]A CIA internal memorandum dated October 3, 1960 entitled
[17798]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 393
[17800]seb. Ye
[17802]ce _
[17803]ae H) é no
[17804]nd . 4 ar
[17805]Bi et lO =. ,
[17806]ca t ° a ; “ a }
[17807]& Aer Ren est thks Ed
[17809]"Plans of the Dominican Internal Opposition and Dominican
[17810]Desk for Overthrow of the Trujillo Government" set forth plans
[17811]which “have been developed on a tentative basis which appear
[17812]feasible and which might be carried out..covertly by CIA with
[17813]a minimal risk of exposure." These plans provided, in part,
[17814]for the following:
[17816]"a. Delivery of approximately 300 rifles and pistols,
[17818]together with ammunition and a supply of grenades, to
[17820]secure cache on the South shore of the island, about
[17822]14 milesEast of Ciudad Trujillo.
[17824]“b. Delivery to the same cache described above, of an
[17826]electronic detonating device with remote control.
[17828]features, which could be planted by the dissidents in
[17829]“such manner as to eliminate certain key Trujillo
[17831]henchmen. This might necessitate training and intro-
[17832]ducing into the country by illegal entry, a trained
[17833]technician to set the bomb and detonator." (Emphasis
[17834]added) (CIA Memorandum, 10/3/60)
[17836]E. December 1960 Special Group Plan of Covert Action
[17838]On December 29, 1960, the Special Group considered and
[17839]approved a broad plan of covert support to anti-Trujillo forces.
[17840]The plan, presented by Bissell, envisioned Support to both
[17841]Dominican exile groups and internal dissidents. The
[17842]exile groups were to be furnished money to organize and under-
[17843]take anti-Trujillo propaganda efforts and to refurbish a yacht
[17845]for use in paramilitary activities. Bissell emphasized
[17847]HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 394
[17849]to the Special Group that "the proposed actions would not,
[17851]of themselves, bring about the desired result in the near
[17852]future, lacking some decisive stroke against Trujillo himself."
[17853](Special Group Minutes, 12/29/60) .
[17855]Iv. January 12, 1961 Special Group Approval of “Limited
[17856]Supplies of Small Arms and Other Material”
[17858]. *
[17859]On January 12, 1961, with all members present, the
[17860]Special Group met and, according to its Minutes, took the
[17861]following action with respect to the Dominican Republic:
[17863]Mr. Merchant explained the feeling of the Department
[17864]of State that limited supplies of small arms and other
[17865]material should be made available for dissidefits in-
[17866]side the Dominican Republic. Mr. Parrott said that we
[17867]believe this can be managed securely by CIA, and that
[17868]the plan would call. for final transportation into the
[17869]country being provided by the dissidents themselves.
[17870]The Group approved the project." (Special Group Minutes, 1/12/61)
[17872]A, Memoranda Underlying the Special Group Action
[17874]On January 12, 1961, Thomas Mann sent a memorandum to
[17875]Under Secretary Livingston Merchant. The memorandum , sent
[17876]through Joseph Scott, Merchant's Special Assistant, reported
[17877]on the disillusionment of Dominican dissidents with the United
[17878]States for its failure to furnish them with any tangible or
[17880]concrete assistance. Further, it reported:
[17882]Opposition elements have consistently asked us to supply
[17883]them with ‘*hardware®’ of various types. This has included
[17884]quantities of conventional arms and also, rather persis-
[17885]tently, they have asked for some of the more exotic items
[17886]and devices which they associate with revolutationary
[17887]effort. (Mann to Merchant memo of 1/12/61)
[17889]* “The members. of the Special Group were at the time: Livingston
[17890]Merchant, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs; Gordon
[17891]Gray, Advisor to the President for National Security Affairs;
[17892]John N. Irwin, Deputy Secretary of Defense; and Allen Dulles,
[17893]Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
[17894]|
[17895]Bo
[17896]HW 50955 Docld:32493539 Page 395 (3 ~~ iA tae bee
[17900]Mann suggested for Merchant's consideration and, if he |
[17902]approved, for discussion by the Special Group, the provision
[17904]of token quantities of selected items desired by the dissidents.
[17906]Mann specifically mentioned small explosive devices which would
[17908]place some "sabotage potential" in the hands of dissident
[17910]elements, but stated that there "would be no thought of
[17912]toppling the GODR (Government of Dominican Republic)
[17914]by any such minor measure." (Mann to Merchant memo, 1/12/61)
[17916]This memorandum was drafted on January 11 by Mann's Special
[17918]Assistant for CIA liaison, Frank Devine.
[17920]A covering memorandum from Scott to Merchant, forwarding
[17921]Mann's memo, waS apparently taken by Merchant to the Special
[17922]Group meeting. Merchant's handwritten notations indicate that
[17923]the special Group "agreed in terms of Tom Mann's meno”
[17924]and that the Secretary of State was informed of that
[17925]decision by late afternoon on January 12, 1961. (Scott -
[17926]to Merchant memo, 1/12/61) !
[17928]There is no evidence that any member of the Special Group,
[17929]other than Allen Dulles, knew that the dissidents had clearly :
[17930]and repeatedly expressed a desire for arms and explosives to | p-
[17931]be used by them in assassination efforts.” While it is, of
[17932]course, possible that such information was passed orally to
[17933]some or all of the members of the Special Group, and perhaps
[17935]even discussed by them on January 12, 1961, there is no
[17937]*Various CIA cables, including those dealing with the sniper
[17938]rifles, indicate that copies were sent to the DCI, Allen Dulles.
[17942]Potts
[17943]“hd vat
[17944]ko be |
[17948]eaeetes
[17950]7
[17952]BE an
[17955]HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 396
[17957]documentary evidence of which the Committee is aware which
[17958]would establish this to be the case.
[17960]On January 19, 1961, the last day of the Eisenhower
[17961]administration, Consul General Dearborn was advised that
[17962]approval had been given for supplying arms and other material
[17963]to the Dominican dissidents (HOS to Station cable, 1/19/61).
[17964]Shortly thereafter, Dearborn informed Devine that the
[17965]dissidents were "delighted" about the decision to deliver
[17967]"exotic equipment." (Dearborn to Devine cable, 1/31/61)
[17971]Vv. January 20, 1961 - April 17, 1961
[17972](the Kennedy Administration Through the Bay of Pigs)
[17974]On January 20; 1961, the Kennedy administration took
[17975]office. Three of the four members of the Special Group (all
[17976]except Allen Dulles) retired.
[17978]Prior to the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion .on April
[17980]17, 1961, a number of significant events occurred. These
[17981]events included meetings with Dominican dissidents in
[17982]which specific assassination plans were discussed, re-
[17983]quests by dissidents for explosive devices, the passage by
[17984]U.S. officials of pistols and carbines to dissidents inside
[17985]the Dominican Republic, -and the pouching to the Dominican
[17986]Republic of machine guns which had been requested by the
[17988]dissidents for use in connection with an assassination attempt.*
[17990]a g 0 7 eine +
[17991]*As indicated in the post-Bay of Pigs section, infra, permission
[17993]to pass those machine guns was denied and the guns were never
[17994]passed.
[17997]5
[17999]by EY
[18001]‘|
[18004]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 397
[18008]These events are discussed below under subheading A.
[18010]Evidence reflecting the degree of knowledge of those events
[18011]’ possessed by senior american officials is treated thereafter.
[18012]As used herein, “senior American officials” means individuals
[18013]in the White House or serving as members of the Special Group.
[18015]A. Specific Events Indirectly Linking U.S.
[18016]to Dissidents' Assassination Plans
[18018]1.. Assassination Discussions and Requests for Explosives
[18020]At meetings held with dissident leaders in New York City
[18021]on February 10 and 15, 1961, CIA officials were told repeatedly
[18022]by dissident leaders that "the key to the success of the plot
[18023]{to overthrow the Trujillo regime] would be the assassination of
[18024]Yrujillo." (CIA memo for the record, 2/13/61) Among the requests
[18025]made of the CIA by dissident leaders were the following:
[18026](a) Ex-FBI agents who would plan and execute
[18027]the death of Trujillo.
[18028](b) Cameras and other items that could be used
[18029]to fire projectiles.
[18030](c) A slow-working chemical that could be rubbed on the palm
[18031]of one's nand and transferred to Trujillo in
[18032]a handshake, causing delayed lethal results.
[18033](dd) Silencers for rifles that could kill from a
[18034]distance of several miles. (Id.)
[18036]Other methods of assassinatiny Trujillo proposed by dissidents
[18038]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 396
[18040]at the February 10 or February 15 meetings included. poisoning
[18041]Trujillo's food or medicines, ambushing his automobile, and
[18042]attacking him with firearms and grenades. (CIA memo for the
[18043]record, 2/13/61; 2/16/61) * .
[18045]The dissidents! “latest plot", as described in the February
[18046]CIA memoranda, was said to involve the planting of a powerful
[18047]bomb, which could be detonated from a nearby electric device,
[18048]along the route of Trujillo's evening walk. (Id.)
[18050]On March 13, 1961, a dissident in the Dominican Republic
[18051]asked for fragmentation grenades “for use during the next week
[18052]or so." This request was communicated to CIA Headquarters
[18053]on March 14, 1961, and was followed the next day by an additional
[18054]request for 50 fragmentation grenades, 5 rapid-fire weapons,
[18055]and 10 64 mm anti-tank rockets. ‘his furtner request was also
[18056]passed on to CIA Headquarters. (Station to HOS cable, 3/15/61)
[18057]There is no evidence that any of these arms were supplied to
[18058]the dissidents.:
[18060]The documentary record makes clear that Frank Devine at
[18061]the State Department was also advised of related developments
[18062]in a March 16, 1961, “picnic” letter from Dearborn who complained
[18063]that his spirits were in the doldrums because:
[18065]- . the members of our club are now prepared
[18066]in their minds to have a picnic but do not have
[18067]the ingredients for the salad. Lately they have
[18068]developed a plan for the picnic,which just might
[18069]work if they could find the proper food. They
[18071]* There is no record that the CIA responded affirmatively to
[18072]any of these requests and the CIA officer who drafted the
[18073]February 13.memorandum stated the view that some of the ques-
[18074]tions raised by the dissidents did not reguire an answer.
[18076]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 399
[18078]have asked us for a few sandwiches, hardly -
[18079]more, and we are not prepared to make them
[18080]available. Last week we were asked to furnish
[18081]three or four pineapples for.a party in the
[18082]near future,but I could remember nothing in my in-
[18083]structions that would have allowed me to contri-
[18084]bute this ingredient. Don't think I wasn't
[18085]tempted. I have rather specific guidelines
[18086]to the effect that salad ingredients will be
[18087]delivered outside the picnic grounds and will
[18088]be brought to the area by another club.
[18089](Dearborn letter to Devine, 3/16/61)
[18090]After reviewing his “picnic” lettér, together with the requests
[18091]in the March 14 and 15 cables discussed above, Dearborn con-
[18092]cluded during his testimony before the Committee that the
[18093]"yineapples" were probably the requested fragmentation
[18094]grenades and the restriction on delivering salad ingredients
[18095]outside of the picnic grounds was, almost certainly, meant to
[18096]refer to the requirements of the January 12 Special Group
[18097]order that arms be delivered outside the Dominican Republic.
[18098](Dearborn 7/29, pp. 25-27)
[18100]2. The Passage of Pistols
[18102]a. Pouching to the Dominican Republic
[18104]In a March 15, 1961 cable, Chief of Station Owen reported
[18105]in
[18106]that Dearborn had asked for three .38 caliber pistols for issue
[18107]to several dissidents. In reply, Neadquarters cabled: “Regret
[18108]no authorization exists to suspend pouch regulations against
[18110]shipment of arms" and indicated that their reply had been coor-
[18112]dinated with State. (HQS to Station cable, 3/17/61) The
[18114]Station Chief then asked Headquarters to seek the necessary Wil
[18116]x
[18117]authorization and noted that at his last two posts, he had Wwe
[18118]received pistols via the pouch for "worthy purposes” and, they
[18120]pr
[18122]1.
[18124]t
[18126]WW 50955 DocId:32423539 Page 400 93 4ii. i:
[18129]therefore, he knew it could be done. (Station to Hqs cable,
[18130]3/21/61) Two days later, Headquarters cabled that the pistols
[18131]and ammunition were being pouched. However, the Station
[18132]Chief was instructed not to advise Dearborn. (Hgs. to Station
[18133]cable, 3/24/61)*
[18135]b. Reason for the CIA Instruction
[18136]Not to Tell Dearborn
[18138]Owen testified that he believed the “don't tell Dear-
[18139]born the pistol is being pouched" language simply meant that
[18140]the sending of firearms through the diplomatic pouch was not
[18141]something to be unnecessarily discussed. (Owen, pp. 78,79)
[18142]Dearborn said he never doubted the pouch was used, since he knew
[18143]Owen had no other means of receiving weapons. (Dearborn,
[18144]7/29, p. 33)
[18146]c. Were the Pistols Related to Assassination?
[18148]Dearborn testified that he had asked for a single pistol
[18149]for purposes completely unrelated to any assassination con-
[18150]sideration. (Dearborn, 7/29, pp. 29-31) He said he had been
[18151]approached by a Dominican contact who lived in a remote area
[18152]and was concerned for the safety of his family in the event
[18154]of political reprisals. Dearborn testified that he had believed
[18156]¥ “The inspector General's Report, issued in connection with
[18157]a review of these events, concludes that:
[18159]"There is no indication in the EMDEED operational files
[18160]‘that the pistols were actually pouched. The request
[18162]for pistols appears to have been overtaken by a sub-
[18163]sequent request for submachine guns." (1.G. Report, p. 60)
[18165]This conclusion is difficult to understand in light of the March
[18166]24, 1961, Headquarters to Station cable, which provides:
[18168]"C. Pouching} revolvers=and’ ammourequested YRUI 0462
[18169](in 20040) on:28 March. Do not advise(name Dearborn deleted)
[18170]HW 50955 Docla:32496836 BPadeahal being pouched. _ Explanation follows."
[18172]HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 402: :
[18174]the man's fears were well-founded and had promised to seek a
[18175]pistol. |
[18177]Although there is’no direct evidence linking any of these
[18178]pistols to the assassination of Trujillo, a June 7, 1961, CIA’
[18179]memorandum,. unsigned and with no attribution as to source,
[18180]states that two of the three pistols were passed by Owen to
[18181]Lorenzo "Wimpy" Berry, a United States citizen who was in direct
[18182]contact with the action element of the dissident group. It
[18183]should also be noted that the assassination was apparently con-
[18187]ducted with almost complete reliance upon hand weapons. Whether
[18189]one or more of these .38 caliber Smith & Wesson pistols
[18190]eventually came into the hands of the assassins
[18191]and, if so, whether they were used in connection with the
[18192]assassination, remain open questions.
[18194]Both Dearborn and Owen testified that they regarded the pistols
[18195]as weapons for self-defense purposes and they never
[18196]considered them in any way connected with the then-current
[18197]assassination plans. (Dearborn 7/29, 3.70; Owen, pp.38,73)
[18198]However, none of the Headquarters cables inquired as to the
[18199]purpose for which the handguns were sought and Owen's cable
[18201]stated only that Dearborn wanted them for passage to dissidents.
[18203](Station to HOS cable, 3/15/61) Indeed, the March 24, 1961,
[18205]*pearborn is clear in his recollection that he asked Owen to
[18206]request only one pistol. (Dearborn, 7/29, pp.30,31) Owen,
[18208]on the other hand, testified that if his cables requested three
[18209]pistols for Dearborn then Dearborn must have asked for three
[18210]pistols. (Owen, p.72)
[18212]The pistols were, however, apparently sent in one package
[18213](HYS to Station cables,3/27/61 and 3/24/61) and Dearborn testi-
[18214]fied that, what he believed to be the one gun, came "wranped
[18215]up" and that he passed it. . (Dearborn, -7/29,p.30)
[18217]i
[18219]Vow “Baeebaid
[18221]cable advising that the pistols were being pouched is the
[18223]very cable which was sent in response to a request by the
[18224]dissidents for machine guns to be used in an assassination
[18225]effort which had -been previously described to Headquarters.
[18227]As with -the carbines discussed below, it appears that little,
[18229]if any, concern was expressed within the Agency over passing these
[18231]weapons to would-be assassins. ) a
[18232]Cutt >be.
[18233]3. Passing of the Carbines C/p
[18237]a. Request by Owen and Dearborn and Approval by CIA
[18238]In a March 26, 1961 cable to CIA Headquarters, Owen asked
[18239]_ for pérmission to pass to the dissidents three 30 caliber Ml
[18240]carbines. The guns had been left behind in the Consulate by
[18241]Navy .personnel after the U.S. broke formal diplomatic relations
[18242]in August 1960. Dearborn testified that he knew of and concurred
[18243]“iin the proposal to supply the carbines to the dissidents.
[18244](Dearborn 7/29, pp. 42,43) On March 31, 1961 CIA Headquarters
[18245]cabled approval of the request to pass the carbines. (Hqs to
[18246]Station cable, 3/31/61)
[18248]b. Were the Carbines Related to _Assassination?
[18250]the carbines were passed to the action group contact, Wimpy Berry, on April 7,
[18251]1961. (Station to HQS cable, 4/8/61) Eventually, they found
[18252]their way into the hands of one of the assassins, Antonio
[18253]de la Maza. (Station to HOS cable, 4/26/61; I.G. Report
[18255]pp. 46, 49) Both Dearborn and Owen testified that the
[18257]carbines were at‘alli.times viewed‘as strictly a token show
[18259]HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 403
[18261]of support, indicating U.S. support of the dissidents' efforts
[18262]to overthrow Trujillo. (Dearborn 7/29, pp. 46-48; Owen p. 39)
[18264]c. Failure to Disclose to State Department
[18265]Officials in Washington
[18267]There is no indication that the request or the passage
[18268]of the carbines was disclosed to State Department officials in
[18269]Washington until several weeks after the passage. in fact, on
[18270]April 5, Neadquarters requested its Station to ask Dearborn
[18271]not to comment in correspondence with State that the carbines
[18272]and ammunition were being passed to tae dissidents. This cable
[18273]was sent while Owen was in Washington, and it indicated that
[18274]upon his. return to the Dominican Republic, he would explain
[18275]the request. The Station replied that Dearborn had not com-
[18277]mented on the carbines and ammunition in his correspondence
[18279]with State and he realized the necessity not to do so. (Station
[18281]to HQS cable, 4/6/61)
[18283]Dearborn testified, however, that he believed, at the
[18284]time of his April 6 cable, that someone in the State De-
[18285]partment had been consulted in advance and had approved the
[18287]passage of the carbines (Dearborn 7/29, p. 44)
[18289]HY 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 404
[18291]3. Requests For and Pouching of the Machine Guns
[18293]a. Owen Requests Machine Guns for Use
[18294]in Assassination
[18296]~ The Station Chief suggested that Headquarters consider
[18297]pouching an M3 machine gun on February 10, 1961 (Qwen, pp. 63,64;
[18298]Station to HQS cable, 3/15/61). The request was raised again
[18299]in March but no action was taken. On March 20, 1961, Owen cabled
[18300]a dissident request for five M3 or comparable machine guns
[18301]specifying their wish that the arms be sent via the diplomatic
[18302]pouch or similar means. The dissidents were said to feel that
[18303]delivery by air drop or transfer at sea would overly-tax their
[18304]resources. (Station to HQS cable, 3/20/61)
[18306]The machine guns sought by the dissidents were clearly
[18307]identified, in Owen's cable, as being sought for use in connec-
[18308]tion with an attempt to assassinate Trujillo. This plan was to
[18309]kill Trujillo in the apartment of his mistress and, according
[18310]to Owen's cable: .
[18312]va To do they need five M3 or comparable machine-
[18313]guns. and 1500 rounds ammo for personal defense in
[18314]event fire fight. Will use quiet weapons for basic
[18315]job." (Id.) .
[18317]In essence, CIA's response was that the timing for an
[18318]assassination was wrong. Owen was told that precipitious or
[18319]uncoordinated action could lead to the emergence of a leftist,
[18320]Castro-type regime and the "mere disposal of Trujillo may create
[18322]'
[18324]more problems than solutions."" It was Headquarters’ position
[18326]that:
[18328]" ..we should attempt to avoid precipitous action
[18329]by the internal dissidents until opposition group
[18330]and HQS are better prepared to support /assassination/*,
[18331]effect a change in the regime, and cope with the after-
[18332]math." (HQS to Station cable, 3/24/61)
[18334]* Word supplied by CIA in previously sanitized cable.
[18336]HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 405
[18340]The cable also stated that Headquarters was prepared
[18342]to deliver machine guns and ammunition to the dissidents when
[18343]they developed a capability to received them, but that security
[18344]considerations precluded use of U.S. facilities as a carrier.*
[18345]Soon, thereafter, on April 6, 1961, while Owen was in Washington
[18346]for consultation with Headquarters, he reported on events in
[18347]the Dominican Republic and
[18349]“especially on the insistence of the EMOTH [dissident]
[18351]leaders that they be provided with a Limited number
[18353]of small arms for their own protection (specifi-
[18355]cally, five M3 caliber .45 SMG's). (CIA memo
[18357]for the record, 4/11/61)
[18359]b. Pouching ‘the Machine Guns is Approved
[18360]by Bissell
[18362]Accordingly, on April 7, 1961, a Pouch Restriction Waiver
[18363]Request and Certification was submitted seeking permission to
[18364]pouch "four M3 machine guns and 240 rounds of ammunition on a
[18365]priority basis for issuance to a small action group to be used
[18367]for self protection.'' (Pouch Restriction Waiver Request 4/7/61)
[18369]The request, submitted on behalf -of the Chief, Western
[18370]‘Hemisphere Division, further provided:
[18372]"3S. A determination has been made that the issuance
[18374]of this equipment to the action group is desirable
[18376]if for no other reason than to assure this important
[18378]group's continued cooperation with and confidence in
[18380]this Agency's determination to live up to its earlier
[18382]commitments to the group. These commitments took
[18383]THis same cable of March 24, 19Gl1, is the one which advised
[18384]that the revolvers and ammunition were being pouched.
[18386]HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 40
[18389]the form of advising the group in January
[18391]1961 that we would provide limited’ arms
[18393]and assistance to them provided they develop
[18394]the capability to receive it. Operational
[18395]circumstances have prevented this group from
[18396]developing the assets capable of receiving
[18398]the above equipment through normal clandestine
[18399]channels such as air drops or sea infiltra-
[18402]The Waiver Request was approved by Richard Bissell, as Deputy
[18403]Director (Plans), on April 10, 1961. (Id.)
[18404]The machine guns were pouched to the Dominican Republic and
[18405]were received by the station on April 19, 1961.* (I.G. Report,
[18406]Pp. 42; Station to Headquarters cables 4/19/61).
[18407]On Avril 10, Walter Elder, Assistant to the Director, had issued
[18409]a memorandum which stated:
[18411]"Mr. Dulles wants no action on drops of leaflets
[18412]or arms in the Dominican Republic taken without
[18414]Jos.
[18416]his approval." (Elder memorandum of 4/10/61).**
[18417]The Elder memorandum suggests that Dulles did not know that an
[18418]air drop of arms was regarded.as unfeasible and that pouching
[18420]had been approved.
[18422]B. Knowledge of Senior American Officials (pre-Bay of Pigs)
[18423]On February 14, 1961, prior to the passage of weapons,
[18425]but a month after the generalized approval of the passage
[18427]of arms by the prior administration, a meeting of
[18429]the Special Group was held with Messrs. McNamara, Gilpatric,
[18431]Bowles, Bundy, Dulles, Bissell, and General Cabell in attendance.
[18433]* Permission to pass the machine guns was never obtained and the guns
[18435]never passed into the hands of the dissidents. The matter is discussed
[18436]in detail beginning at page ;
[18438]** Elder testified that this note, sent the weekend before the Bay of Pigs
[18439]invasion of Cuba, was intended to make sure that there were no’ unusual
[18440]planes shot down or any unnecessary noise in the Dominican Republic"
[18441]prior to the Cuba invasion. (Elder, p. 51)
[18443]HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 407
[18445]The minutes state that:
[18447]“Mr. Dulles, assisted by Mr. Bissell, then summarized
[18448]for the benefit of the new members of the Special
[18449]Group the specific actions taken by the predecessor
[18450]group during the past year, and also a list of signi-
[18451]ficant projects which artedate the beginning of 1960
[18452]and which it is planned to continue.” (Special Group Minutes
[18453]of 2/14/61) ;
[18454]In the course of the discussion, the following point, among _ .
[18456]others, was made:
[18458]"“(a) Dominican Republic -~ Mr. Bundy asked that a Sag ger7 7
[18459]memorandum be prepared for higher authority on the dh. ~¢
[18460]subject of what plans can be made for a successor a ee ee
[18461]government to Trujillo."(Id.). bE meres
[18465]The request attributed to Bundy suggests that the Domini-
[18466]can Republic had been one of the matters on which Dulles and
[18468]Bissell briefed the new members. a
[18470]What is unclear from the February 14 minutes (just as
[18473]it is unclear from the January 12 minutes) is the degree to |
[18475]1
[18476]1
[18478]which the Special Group was informed concerning the means by ;
[18480]which the dissidents planned to accomplish the overthrow of
[18481]the Trujillo repime. Specifically, it is not known if
[18482]the new members of the Special Group were told that the ‘
[18483]dissident group had expressed the desire to assassinate
[18485]Trujillo. Nor is it known if the Special Group was ny
[18487]HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 408
[18489].¢ .
[18491]i B25
[18492]Heed qeholeb dls
[18494]advised that the State Department representative in the
[18496]Dominican Republic had made the assessment that the Dominican
[18497]government could not be overthrown without the assassination
[18498]of Trujillo. .
[18500]Bissell testified that he had no clear recollection
[18501]of the details of the February 14 briefing and he was unable
[18502]to say whether or not the method of overthrow to be attempted
[18503]by the dissidents was discussed. (Bissell, 7/22, pp. 101, 102)
[18504]Robert McNamara, one of the new members of the Special Group
[18505]in attendance for the briefing, has no recollection as to the
[18506]specificity in which the Dominican Republic was discussed at the
[18507]February 14 meeting. He does not recall any mention by either
[18508]Dulles or Bissell of dissident plans to assassinate ''rujilto.
[18509](McNamara atfidavit).
[18511]February Memoranda
[18513]The Secretary of State sent the President a memorandum
[18514]on February 15, 1961, in response to a request concerning pro-
[18515]gress to assure an orderly takeover “should Trujillo fall."
[18517]The memorandum advised that:
[18519]"Our representatives in the Dominican Republic
[18521]have, at considerable risk to those involved,
[18523]established contacts with numerous leaders of the
[18525]underground opposition .. . /and7. . . the CIA
[18527]has recently been authorized to arrange for delivery
[18528]- to them otttside the Dominican Republic of small arms
[18530]and sabotage. equipment."
[18532]This reference to recent authorization for delivery of Viz
[18533]arms indicates that Secretary Rusk had received some briefing [ey
[18534]. . . . . putt
[18535]concerning events in the Dominican Republic and the January 1961 her
[18537]aa ry fe Co oh ve
[18538]Py i : ve : an mt ener
[18540]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 409°.
[18543]7
[18545]ha .- 26- Seen tH
[18547]Poy wis fins
[18549]Special Group decision to provide arms to anti-Trujillo
[18550]elements. Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs,
[18551]Thomas Mann; Deputy Assistant Secretary William Coerr; and
[18552]Special Assistant Frank Devine continued in their respective
[18554]ositions throughout the transition period. The Committee has
[18555]po: g r or
[18557]been furnished no documents indicating that Secretary Rusk or
[18559]Under Secretary Bowles were specifically advised as to the a
[18560]ot 4
[18562]intentions of the Dominican dissidents to kill Trujillo; intentions
[18564]of which the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs certainly
[18566]nad knowledge. Indeed, Secretary Rusk testified that he was not
[18568]personally so advised. (Rusk, 7/10, pp. 41,42)
[18569]On February 17, 1961, Richard Bissell sent a briefing paper
[18571]on the Dominican Republic to MeGeorge Bundy, President Kennedy's
[18573]National Security Advisor. The paper made note of the out-
[18575]standing Special Group approval for the provision of arms and
[18579]equipment to Dominican dissidents and stated that the dissidents
[18583]had been informed that the U.S. was prepared to provide such
[18585]arms and equipment as soon as they developed the capability to 6
[18586]receive them. yo that Sorc
[18587]eT neal im
[18590]The briefing paper also indicated that @fssident leaders
[18591]7
[18593]had informed CIA of “their plan of action“which they felt nny eh eer
[18594]. f lm pr
[18595]be implemented if they were provided with arms for 300 men, cs (
[18597]explosives, and remote control detonation devices." Various
[18599]witnesses have testified, however, that supplying arms for 300
[18601]e
[18603]men would, standing alone, indicate a "“non-targeted" use for the
[18605]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 410!
[18607]arms (i.e., a paramilitary or revolutionary implementation as
[18608]opposed to a specifically targeted assassination use). (Bissell,
[18609]71/29, p.80),
[18611]Concerning the briefing paper, Bissell testified that:
[18612]. it is perfectly clear that I was aware at the
[18613]tine of the memorandum to Mr. Bundy that these
[18614]dissident groups were, and nad for a long time,
[18615]been hoping they could accomplish the assassination
[18616]of Trujillo. As a matter of fact, the requests since
[18617]some seven or eight months earlier was a perfectly
[18618]clear indication of that, so that fact was not new
[18619]knowledde." (Bissell 7/22, p.102)
[18621]When asked why the memorandum did not include the fact that
[18623]the dissidents intended the assassination of Trujillo, Bissell
[18625]replied: why
[18626]i “did,
[18628]"I cannot tell you, Mr. Chairman. I do not far
[18629]remember what considerations moved me. I don't
[18631]know whether it was because this was common Buwak
[18632]knowledge and it seemed to me unnecessary to acl
[18634]include it, or as you are implying, there was
[18636]an element of concealment here. I would be very
[18637]surprised if it were the latter, in this case."
[18638](Bissell, 7/22, p.101)
[18640]In response to questions concerning the lack of information
[18641]in the February 17, 1961 briefing paper concerning the uses to.
[18642]which the requested arms might likely be put by the dissidents,
[18643]Bissell stated:
[18645]"lo. . LT would say that the Agency's failure,
[18646]if there be a failure here was [not] (sic) to state
[18647]in writing that the plans of the dissidents
[18648]would include assassination attempts.
[18649](Bissell, 7/22, p.99)
[18650]Bissell's briefing paper for Bundy concluded with the
[18652]assessment that a violent clash might soon occur between Trujillo
[18654]HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 411
[18658]eee tt tee” Lo
[18660]and the internal opposition, “which will end either with the
[18661]Liquidation of Trujillo and his cohorts or with a complete
[18662]roll up of the internal opposition.” In this regard, the fear
[18663]was expressed that existing schedules for the delivery of
[18664]weapons to the internal’ opposition might not be sufficientlv
[18665]timely, and it was therefore recommended that consideration be
[18666]. given to caching the requested arms and other materials.
[18667](Bissell to Bundy memo, 2/17/61)
[18668]Thus, by the middle of February 1961, the senior
[18669]members of the new administration, and in view of the "f
[18671]ror 5
[18672]o ASKPY
[18673]higher authority" nature of Bundy's request, presumably [ra oF
[18675]Lf Gu ah Cr
[18676]President Kennedy himself, were aware of the outstanding Special
[18677]Group approval for the passage of arms and other materials to
[18678]opposition elements within the Dominican Republic. There was
[18679]no modification or recision of the “inherited” Special Group
[18680]approval and it would seem fair, therefore, to regard the
[18682]approval as having been at least acquiesced in by the new
[18684]administration.
[18686]— -
[18688]During March and early April 1961, operational levels
[18690]within both the CIA and the State Department learned of in-
[18692]3
[18694]creasingly detailed plans by the dissidents to assassinate +l,
[18697]Trujillo. There is no evidence that this information was
[18698]true
[18699]passed to the White House or to any member of the Special Group,
[18701]pee
[18703]. ee uh
[18704]HY 50955 Doclda: 3242354539 Page 412
[18706]H
[18707]except Allen Dulles.” Similarly, there is no evidence that
[18708]the passage of the pistols or the carbines or the pouching
[18709]of the machine guns to the Dominican Republic was: disclosed
[18710]to anyone outside of the CIA during this period."
[18712]VI. April 17, 1961 - May 31, 1961
[18713](Bay of Pigs Through Trujillo Assassination)
[18715]Following the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion, attempts
[18716]were made by State and CIA representatives in the Dominican
[18717]Republic to dissuade the dissidents from a precipitous assassina-
[18718]tion attempt. These efforts to halt the assassination of Trujillo
[18719]-were the result of instructions from CIA Headquarters and were
[18720]prompted by concern over filling the power vacuum which would
[18721]result from Trujillo's death.
[18723]The machine guns arrived in the Dominican Republic but
[18724]permission to pass them to the dissidents was never given and
[18725]the guns never left the Consulate.
[18727]Dearborn returned to Washington for consultation and a
[18729]contingency plan for the Dominican Republic was drafted.
[18731]Two days before Trujillo's assassination, Dearborn received
[18733]a cable of instructions and guidance from President Kennedy. clo
[18735]a i
[18736]The cable advised that the U.S. must not run the risk of associ- ‘leer
[18737]ation with political assassination, since the U.S., as a natter | hee
[18739]| Gard
[18741]of general policy, could not condone assassination. The cable [
[18742]* Gopies of CTA cables, including the March 20, 1961 cable ~~ Abeer
[18743]describing the plan to assassinate Trujillo in the apartment © \ (
[18744]of his mistress were apparently sent to the office SCO inves
[18746]of the Director of Central Intelligence.
[18748]** Although a copy of the CIA cable advising that the pistols
[18749]were being pouched was sent to the Director's office, Dulles
[18750]apparently did not receive copies of the cables approving
[18751]passage of the carbines or pouchiny of the machine guns.
[18753]HW 50955 DocId:32423539 Page 413 ©
[18755]further advised Dearborn to continue to hold open offers of
[18756]material assistance to the dissidents and to advise them of
[18757]‘U.S. support for them if they were successful in overthrowing
[18758]the Trujillo government. The cable also reconfirmed the
[18759]decision not. to pass the machine guns.
[18761]A. Decision Not to Pass the Machine Guns and Unsuccess-
[18762]ful U.S. Attempt to Stop Assassination Effort
[18764]By April 17, 1961, the Bay of Pigs invasion had
[18765]/operation was a failed/. As a result, there developed a general
[18766]realization that precipitous action Should be avoided in the aiid
[18767]‘ pominican Republic until Washington was able to give further
[18768]consideration to the consequences of a Trujillo overthrow and
[18769]the power vacuum which would be created. (Bissell, 6/11,
[18770]p.113) A cable from ‘deadquarters to the Station, on April 17,
[18771]1961, advised that it was most important that the machine guns
[18772]not be passed without additional Headquarters approval.
[18773]The machine guns arrived in the Dominican Pepublic on April
[18774].19, 1961, and Headquarters was so advised. The earlier ad-
[18775]monition that the machine guns should be held in Station custody
[18776]until further notice was repeated in a second cable from Slead-
[18777]quarters, sent April 20, 1961. This decision was said to have
[18778]been "based on judgment that filliny a vacuum created by assas-~
[18779]sination now bigger question than ever view unsettled conditions
[18780]in Caribbean area." (f10s. to Station cable, 4/29/61)
[18782]The dissidents continued to press for the release of the
[18784]machine guns and their requests were passed on to Headyuarters
[18786]HW 50955 , DoclId:32423539 Page 414
[18788]in cables from Dearborn and Owen. (Station to HOS cables
[18789]4/25/61) On April 25, 1961, Owen advised ‘Headquarters that
[18790]Wimpy Berry had informed him that Antonio de la Maza was
[18792]going to attempt the assassination between April 29 and May 2.
[18794]: Owen also reported that this attempt would use the three
[18795]carbines passed from the American Consulate, together with
[18796]whatever else was available. (Id.)
[18798]In response to the April 26 cable, Headquarters restated
[18799]that there was no approval to pass any additional arms to the
[18800]dissidents and requested Owen to advise the dissidents that the
[18801]united States was simply not. prepared at that time to cope with
[18803]‘the aftermath of the assassination. (See C/S comments, |
[18804]“Station to HUS cable, 4/27/61) The following day, April 27,
[18805]1961, Owen replied that, based upon further discussions with
[18806]the dissidents, “We doubt statement U.S. government not now
[18807]prepared to cope with aftermath will dissuade them from
[18808]attempt." (Station to HOS cable, 4/27/61)
[18810]Dearborn recalls receiving instructions that
[18811]an effort be made to turn off the assassination attempt and
[18813]testified that efforts to carry out the instructions were
[18814]unsuccessful. In effect, the dissidents informed him that
[18816]this was their affair and it could not be turned off to suit
[18818]the convenience of the U.S. government.
[18820](Dearborn, 7/29, p.52)
[18822]HW S0955 Docld:324293539 Page 415
[18824]HW 50955 DoclId:32493539 Page 416.
[18826]‘On April 30, 1961, Dearborn advised Headquarters that
[18828]the dissidents had reported to him the assassination attempt
[18830]‘was going to take place during the first week of May. The
[18832]action group was reported to have in its possession three carbines,
[18833]four to six 12-gauge shotguns and other small arms. Although
[18834]they reportedly still wanted the machine guns, Dearborn advised
[18835]Headquarters that the group was going to go ahead with what they
[18836]had, whether the U.S. wanted them to or not. (Station to HQS
[18837]cable, 4/30/61) a
[18838]Dearborn's. cable set forth the argument of the action
[18840]group that, since the U.S. had already assisted the group to
[18841]some extent and was therefore implicated, the additional assistance
[18842]of releasing the machine guns would not change the basic re-
[18843]lationship. The cable concluded:
[18845]‘Owing to far-reaching political implications
[18847]involved in release or non release of re-
[18849]quested items, Headquarters may wish discuss fore-
[18850]going with State Department." (Id.)
[18852]B. Further Consideration of Passing Machine Guns
[18854]In reponse, a cable was drafted at CIA Headquarters authori-
[18855]zing passage of the machine guns. The cable which was sent
[18856]to Allen Dulles, with Bissell's recommendation for its dispatch,
[18857]provided:
[18859]"Since it appears that opposition group has
[18860]committed itself to action with or without
[18863]po . Soa gt
[18866]- 33-0 |
[18868]additional support, coupled with fact ref.
[18870]a C items [the carbines] already made available
[18871]to them for personal defense; station authori-
[18872]zed pass ref. A items [the machine guns] to
[18873]opposition member for their additional pro-
[18874]tection on their proposed endeavor." (Draft of HOS
[18875]‘to Station cable, 5/2/61).
[18877]The cable was never sent.
[18879]In his testimony before the Committee, Bissell characteri-
[18880]zed his-reasoning for recommending release of the machine guns
[18881]as:
[18883]mo . , having made already a considerable
[18884]investment in this dissident group and its
[18886]plans that we might as. well make the addi- per O
[18887]tional investment." (Bissell, 7/22, p.127)
[18889]The following day, May 3, 1961, Gere Fapaty cuss
[18890]of the Western Hemisphere Division of CIA, who frequently acted
[18891]as liaison with the State Department in matters. concerning
[18892]covert operations in the Dominican Republic, met with Adolph
[18893]Berle, Chairman of the State Department's Interagency Task Force
[18894]on Latin America.
[18896]A Berle memorandum of the meeting states that Herbert
[18897]informed Berle that a local yroup in the Dominican Republic
[18898]wished to overthrow Trujillo and sought arms for that purpose.
[18899]The memorandum continued:
[18901]"On cross examination it developed that the
[18903]real plan was to assassinate Trujillo and they
[18904]wanted guns for that purpose. ilerbert wanted
[18906]to know what the policy should be.
[18908]"IT told him I could not care less for Trujillo
[18909]and that this was the general sentiment. But
[18911]we did not wish to have any thing to do with any
[18912]assassination plots anywhere, any time. Herbert
[18914]said he felt the same way." (Berle, Memo of
[18915]Conversation, 5/3/61)
[18917]HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 417
[18919]Copies of Berle's memorandum were sent to Wymberly Coerr;
[18920]the Acting Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs,
[18921]and to Special Assistant Frank Devine.
[18923]Both Herbert and Devine, who had been in almost daily:
[18925]contact with each other since August of 1960, had been advised | de
[18928]they
[18930]cable of May. 2, releasing the machine guns for passage. | hel
[18934]of the assassination plans of the dissident group. In fact,
[18936]Herbert, along with Bissell, had signed off on the proposed
[18938]C. Special Group Meetings of May 4 and May 16, 1961
[18940]On the day following the Berle-Herbert meeting, the
[18941]Special Group met and, according to the minutes:
[18943]"The DCI referred to recent reports of a new
[18944]anti-Trujillo plot. He said we never know if
[18946]one of these is going to work or not, and ashed (
[18947]what is the status of contingency planning should wpa
[18948].the plot come off. Mr. Bundy said that this point thes
[18950]is covered in the Cuba paper which will be discussed
[18951]at a high level in thé -very-near—future." (Special
[18952]Group Minutes, 5/4/61) ;
[18954]Once again, the cryptic reporting of Special Group Minutes
[18955]makes subsequent analysis as to the scope of matters discussed
[18956]speculative: It is not known to what extent and in what detail
[18958]'
[18959]Allen Dulles referred to "recent reports" of a inew anti-Trujillo
[18960]plot. Certainly, the most recent report of such a plot was
[18961]Dearborn's April 30 cable -~- disclosing an imminent assassination
[18962]attempt potentially utilizing U.S.-supplied weapons.
[18964]On May 18, 1961, the Special Group again considered the
[18966]: i
[18967]situation in the Dominican Republic and, according to the
[18968]|
[18970]. 7
[18971]HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 416
[18973]minutes:
[18974]" Cabell [Deputy DCI] noted that the
[18975]internal dissidents were pressing for the
[18976]release to them of certain small arms now in
[18977]U.S. Hands in the Dominican Republic. He
[18978]inguired whether the feeling of the
[18979]Group remained that these arms should not be
[18980]passed, . The members showed no inclinatjon to
[18981]take a contrary position at this time.
[18982](Emphasis supplied) (Special Group Minutes,
[18983]5/18/61)
[18984]D. Final Requests by Dissidents for Machine Guns
[18985]“On May 16, 1961, Dearborn cabled the State Department,
[18986]attention Acting Assistant. Secretary Coerr, with an urgent
[18987]request from the dissidents for the machine guns. The cable
[18988]_ advised that the assassination attempt was scheduled for the
[18989]night of May 16 and that, while the chances of success were
[18990]80 percent, provision of the machine guns would reduce the
[18991]possibility of failure. The dissidents reportedly stressed
[18992]to Dearborn that if the effort failed,due to U.S. refusal to
[18993]supply the machine guns, the U.S. would be held’ responsible
[18994]and would never be forgiven. Dearborn reported that he had
[18995]informed the dissidents that, based on his recent conversations
[18996]in Washington, he was reasonably certain that authorization
[18997]could not be obtained for nanding over machine guns. (Dearborn
[18998]to State cable, 5/16/61)
[19000]A return cable from the State Department to Dearborn, sent
[19002]the same day, confirmed Dearborn's judgment. It instructed him
[19004]¥"jhere was no meeting of the Special Group at which the Domini-
[19005]can Republic was discussed between May 4 and May 18. The language
[19006]“attributed to General Cabell as to whether the feeling of the
[19007]Group remained not to pass the arms, tends to suggest that the
[19009]question of passing these arms must have been raised prior to
[19010]the May 18 Group meeting ,. ,Pernaps at, the, May 4, 1961 meeting.
[19012]HW S0955 “Docld:324293539 Page 419
[19014]payee
[19015]nd ete
[19017]to continue to take the same line until he received contrary
[19018]instructions which clearly indicated they had been cleared in-
[19019]advance by the State Department itself. This cable from State was
[19020]approved by Under Secretary Bowles. (Department to Dearborn, 5/16/61)
[19022]. Ray Herbert referred to Dearborn's May 16 request in a
[19023]memorandum he sent to Devine on the same date and asked to be
[19024]advised as to the Department's policy concerning passage of
[19025]the machine guns. Herbert noted that when this request was
[19026]last taken to the Department, Berle made the decision that the
[19027]weapons not be passed. (Memo .to ARA from CIA, 5/16/61)
[19029]. Devine responded to Herbert's memorandum-on the same day,
[19030]advising Herbert that the Department's policy continued to be
[19031]negative on the matter of passing the machine guns.” Herbert's
[19032]attention was directed to the January 12, 1961 Special Group
[19033]limitation concerning the passage of arms outside of the
[19034]Dominican Republic. A copy of Devine's memorandum to Herbert
[19035]was forwarded to the Office of the Under Secretary of State,
[19036]to the attention of his personal assistant, Joseph Scott.
[19038](Devine to Herbert memo, 5/16/61)
[19040]E. Dearborn in Washington for Consultation --~-
[19041]Drafting of Contingency Plans
[19043]At a meeting of the National Security Council on May 5, 1961,
[19044]the question of U.S. policy toward the Dominican Republic was
[19045]considered and it was:
[19047]“Agreed that the Task Force on Cuba would
[19048]prepare promptly both emergency and long-
[19049]range plans for anti-communist intervention
[19050]in the event of crises in Haiti or the
[19054]By May 27, 1961 Dearborn was advising the State Department that
[19056]the roup was no longer requesting the arms and had accepted the
[19058]fact that it must make do with what it had. (Dearborn to State
[19059]HW 50955 DocDaiaee331992 Wage) 420
[19061]carmeneece
[19063]Jrath abe
[19065]Dominican Republic. Noted the President's -
[19066]view that the United States should not
[19068]initiate the overthrow of Trujillo before
[19070]we knew what government would succeed him,
[19072]and that any action against Trujillo should
[19074]be multilateral." (Record of Actions bv
[19075]Wational Security Council, 5/5/61)
[19077](Approved by the President, 5/16/61)
[19079]Although the precise dates are uncertain, Dearborn was
[19080]recalled to Washington to participate in drafting of these
[19081]contingency plans and recommendations. Dearborn was in Washing-
[19082]ton at least from May 10 through May 13, 1961.
[19084]While in Washington, Dearborn met with State
[19085]Department personnel and with Richard Goodwin and Arthur
[19086]Schlesinger of ‘the White House staff. When testifying before
[19087]the Committee, he was unable to recall the substance of
[19088]his discussions with Goodwin and Schlesinger, aside from his
[19089]general assumption that the current situation in the Dominican
[19090]Republic was discussed. Tie did not recall any discussion with
[19091]Goodwin or Schlesinger concerning arms, either those which had
[19092]been passed to the dissidents or those which were being sought.
[19093](Dearborn, 7/29, pp. 58-61) Dearborn left the meeting at the
[19095]White House, however, with the firm impression that Goodwin nad been
[19096]reviewing cable traffic between Washington and the Dominican
[19097]Republic and was very familiar with events as they then stood.
[19099](Dearborn, 7/29, p.62)
[19101]HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 421
[19103]HW 50955 Donld:32493539 Page 499
[19105]-On May 11, 1961, Dearborn prepared a two-page draft~
[19106]document which set forth ways in which the U.S. could overtly
[19107]aid and encourage the opposition to Trujillo. The draft noted
[19108]that means of stepping up the covert program were considered
[19109]in separate papers. (Dearborn draft docunent of May 11, 1961)
[19110]Tnis Dearborn draft of May ll, 1961, was apparently used as a
[19111]basis for portions of the "Dominican Republic -- Contingency
[19112]Paper" discussed below.
[19116]Two documents entitled, “Program of Covert Action for the
[19117]Dominican Republic" were provided to the Committee staff£ from
[19118]State Department files. Each appears to be a draft of the
[19119]covert activities paper described in bearborn's May ll, 1961 -
[19120]memorandum. One draft recommended an expanded U.S. offer to
[19121]deliver small explosive devices and arms. (Document indicating
[19122]it was attached to “Dominican Republic -- Contingency,” dated
[19123]5/12/61 and beariny Nos. 306~308). The other draft is very
[19124]similar except that it concludes that delivery of arms within
[19125]the Dominican Republic to members of the underground is not
[19126]recommended. (Document from State Dept. files bearing No. 310).
[19128]Attached to the second draft was a one-page document which
[19130]Frank Devine believes he wrote.” Tt listed eight numbered
[19134]"Ll. The USG should not lend itself to direct. 7)
[19136]points including the following:
[19138]political assassination.
[19139]a
[19140]"2, US moral posture can ill afford further
[19142]tarnishing in the eyes of the world.
[19148]od ‘
[19150]= 39 -
[19152]: th if
[19154]” "3. We would be encouraging the action, supplying
[19155]the weapons, effecting the delivery, and then
[19157]turning over only the final execution to
[19158]Cc
[19160](unskilled) local triggermen.
[19162]"4, So far we have seen no real evidence of action
[19164]capability. Should we entrust ourselves and
[19165]‘our reputation to this extent in the absence
[19166]thereof?
[19168]"7, Can we afford a precedent which may convince
[19169]the world that our diplomatic pouches are used
[19170]to deliver assasSination weapons?" (Document
[19171]from State bepartment files bearing No. 313)
[19173]Tne other points raised in document No. 313 related to the
[19174]Likelihood that any such involvement by the U.S. would ultimately
[19175]be revealed.
[19177]On May 15, 1961, Acting Assistant Secretary Coerr sent to
[19178]Under Secretary Bowles a document entitled "Covert Action Pro-
[19179]grams Authorized With Respect to the Dominican Republic". That
[19180]document outlined the existing Special Group approvals for covert
[19181]assistance to Dominican dissidents and, while making no recommen-
[19182]dation as to further policy, suggested that the Special Group
[19183]review the outstanding approvals and communicate to interested
[19184]agencies the status of such authorizations. (State Dept. document
[19186]from Coerr to Bowles, 5/15/61)
[19188]During this period a document dated May 13, 1961, was
[19192]iF
[19193]i.
[19196]HY 50955 Docld:32493539 Page 423
[19198]prepared at the request of Richard Goodwin and was thereafter
[19200]circulated within the State Department. (This document,
[19201]entitled "Program of Covert Action for the Dominican Republic"
[19202]reported:
[19203]"CIA has had in the direct custody of its Station)
[19204]in Ciudad Trujillo, a very limited supply of
[19205]weapons and grenades. In response to the urgent
[19206]requestsfrom the internal opposition leaders for
[19207]personal defense weapons attendant to their.
[19208]‘ projected efforts to neutralize TRUJILLO, three. /
[19209](3) 38 Cal revolvers and three (3)carbines with |
[19210]accompanying ammunition have been passed by secure |
[19211]means to the opposition. ‘The recipients have i
[19212]repeatedly requested additional armed support."
[19213]This memorandum is the first direct evidence of disclosure to
[19214]anyone on the White House staff of the fact that arms had been
[19215]passed to dissidents in the Dominican Republic.
[19216]The original ribbon copy of the memorandum has the above
[19217]“quoted material circled in pencil and the word "neutralize"
[19218]is underscored. Goodwin testified before the Committee that
[19219]he circled the above paragraph when first reading the memorandum
[19220]because the information concerning passage of the arms was new
[19221]to him and struck him as significant. (Goodwin 7/18, pp. 438,49)
[19223]Under the heading of "Possible Covert Actions Which ‘Require
[19225]the memorandum to Goodwin indicated
[19227]Additional Authorization,’
[19228]that the CIA had a supply of four 45 caliber machine guns and
[19229]a small number of grenades currently in the direct custody of
[19230]the Station in Ciudad Trujillo and that a secure means of passing
[19232]these weapons to the internal opposition "for their use in:
[19234]* See Scott to Bowles memorandum of May 19, 1961, enclosing copy
[19235]of Goodwin: memorandum.
[19237]. - tan. : a ce EE
[19238]HW 50955 Docld:32493539 Page j424°'- FE
[19240]HW 50955 Docld:32493539 Page sod ey pid
[19242]eee one
[19244]personal defense attendant to their projected efforts to re-
[19245]move Trujillo" could be developed by the Station. The memo-
[19246]randum made no recommendation to approve or disapprove passage
[19247]of these weapons... (Id.)
[19249]On May 15, 1961, Bundy forwarded to Goodwin another
[19250]memorandum. This one, entitled "The Current Situation in and
[19252]Contingency Plans for the Dominican Republic," had been received
[19253]by Bundy from the State Department. Attached was an under-
[19255]lying document which began:
[19257]"Recent reports indicate that the internal
[19258]Dominican dissidents are becoming increasingly
[19259]determined to oust Trunillo by any means, and
[19260]their plans in this regard are well advanced."
[19261]The May 15 memorandum stressed that it was highly desirable
[19262]for the U.S. to be identified with and to support the elements
[19263]seeking to overthrow Trujillo. The attachment
[19264]recommended that Consul. General Dearborn inform the dissidents
[19265]that if they succeed “at their own initiative and on their own
[19266]responsibility in forming an acceptable provisional government
[19267]they can be assured that any reasonable request for assistance
[19268]from the U.S. will be promptly and favorably answered." (Documents
[19270]from State Dept. files bearing Nos. 279-286).
[19272]F., Drafts Leading to and Final Cable of May 29, 1961
[19274]A copy of Dearborn's cable of May 16, 1961, requesting
[19275]urgent State Department guidance, was forwarded to Richard
[19276]Goodwin. At the specific request of Goodwin,
[19278]the State Department replied to Dearborn on May 17,
[19283]and advised him to keep in mind the President's view, as
[19285]expressed at the May 5 National Security Council Meeting, that
[19287]the United States should not initiate the overthrow of Trujillo
[19288]before knowing what government would succeed him. (Depart-
[19290]ment to Dearborn, 5/17/61)
[19292]Dearborn responded on May 21, 1961, pointing out that kyo?
[19294]for over a year State Department representatives in the havral
[19296]Dominican Republic had been nurturing the effort Ip 2617
[19298]to overthrow Trujillo and had assisted the dissidents in
[19299]numerous ways, all of which were known to the Department. It
[19300]was, Dearborn stated, “too late to consider whether United
[19301]States will initiate overthrow of Trujillo." Dearborn invited
[19302]further guidance from State. |
[19304]In response to Dearborn's request for guidance, the State
[19305]Department drafted a reply on May 24. The draft discussed a
[19306]conflict between two objectives:
[19308]"(1) To be so associated with removal Trujillo
[19309]regime as to derive credit among DR dissidents
[19310]and liberal elements throughout Latin America;
[19312]"(2) To disassociate US from any obvious inter-
[19313]vention in Dominican Republic and even more so
[19315]from any political assassination which might
[19316]occur."
[19321]k Veet)
[19322]BY 50955 Bocld: 32423539 Pag Va dg?
[19324]It was said to be the Department's considered opinion that
[19325]"former objective cannot, repeat not, easily override latter."
[19326](State Dept. to Dearborn cable, 5/24/61 - not sent)
[19328]This State Department draft was forwarded to Under Secretary
[19330]Bowles with the comment that Goodwin considered it "too negative"\
[19331]and that he would try his hand on a draft "for Bundy to present
[19332]tomorrow morning.“ (Memo from Achilles to Bowles, 5/24/61)
[19333]A May 26, 1961, memorandum from Bowles to Bundy begins:
[19334]"Following up on our discussion of the Dominican
[19335]Republic at yesterday's me€ting of the Special
[19336]Group, I am forwarding you a draft telegram which
[19337]we would like to send to Henry Dearborn, our Consul
[19338]General in Ciudad Trujillo, supplementing the
[19339]guidance he will be receiving on the recently
[19340]approved contingency plans."
[19341]Minutes of the Special Group meeting on May 25, 1961 do not,
[19342]however, reflect any discussion of the Dominican Republic.
[19343]If, as Bowles' memorandum suggests, a discussion concerning
[19344].the Dominican Republic did occur at the May 25 meeting, it is
[19345]not known wnat the discussion involved or what decisions,
[19346]if any, were made.
[19347]Richard Goodwin personally prepared alternate drafts to
[19348]the proposed State Department cable to Dearborn. Goodwin testi-
[19350]fied that it was his intent in revising the cable to communicate
[19352]to Dearborn, President Kennedy's personal belief that the United
[19354]Ne Z e o7 er
[19356]States:
[19358]" . . . didn't want to do anything that would
[19359]involve us further, the United States further,
[19360]in any effort to assassinate Trujillo."
[19361](Goodwin, 7/19, p.32)
[19363]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 427
[19365]At the same time , Goodwin's draft raised the issue of
[19367]further covert action and transfer of arms to the dissidents
[19368]and advised Dearborn to hold out the arms as being available’
[19370]to the dissidents pending their ability to receive them.
[19372]Ecce poles nto. 7
[19373]. It was the twofold intent of the cable as revised by
[19375]x
[19378]Goodwin, (1) to express the desire to remain in the good graces
[19380]of the dissidents who, it was believed, would constitute the
[19381]New government following Trujillo's assassination, and (2)
[19382]to avoid any action which might further involve the United
[19383]‘States in the anticipated assassination. This dual purpose
[19384]is clearly evident in the cable which. advised:
[19388]. we must not run risk of U.S. association
[19389]with political assassination, since U. S. as ine matter
[19391]in doubtful situation." (Emphasis added)
[19392]. een
[19393]RR y
[19394]x x *k On GAL 2
[19395]"Continue to inform dissident elements of U.S. ar
[19396]support for their position." ; Lote,
[19398]According to Goodwin, the underscored material was inserted in
[19400]the cable at the specific direction of President Kennedy.
[19402]\pere om Ge ~~ GF Orem
[19404]SAE (Oe €
[19406](Goodwin, 7/10, pp. 22, 23).
[19408]With respect to the four machine guns which were in the
[19409]Consulate and which had been repeatedly requested by the
[19410]dissidents, the cable advised Dearborn that the U.S. was unable
[19411]to transfer these arms to the dissidents. Dearborn was
[19412]instructed to:
[19414]"rell them that this is because of our suspicion
[19415]that method of transfer may be unsafe. In actual
[19418]HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 428
[19420]; fact, we feel that the transfer of arms would
[19421]7 serve very little purpose and expose the United
[19422]States to great danger of association with
[19423]assassination attempt.”
[19424]The cable, as revised by Goodwin and approved by President
[19425]Kennedy, was sent to Dearborn on May 29, 1961. (State Dept. —
[19427]to Dearborn cable, 5/29/61) -
[19429]Vil. May 30, 1961 and Immediately Thereafter:
[19430]A. Trujillo Assassinated .
[19432]Late in the evening of May 30,
[19434]ra
[19436]$61, Trujillo was ambusned
[19437]and assassinated near San Cristobal, Dominican Republic. The
[19438]assassination closely paralleled the plan disclosed by the
[19440]action group to American representatives in the Dominican Republic
[19441]and passed on to officials in Washington at both the CIA and
[19443]the State Department. (Dearborn cable to State, 5/30/61) The
[19444]assassination was conducted by members of the action group, to
[19445]whom the American carbines had been passed, and such sketchy
[19446]information as is available indicates that one or more of the
[19447]carbines were in the possession of the assassination group when
[19448]ftrujillo was killed. (I. G. Report, pp. 60-61). This evidence indicate
[19449]however, that the actual assassination was accomplished by
[19451]. handguns and shoteuns. _  (1.G. Report, p.61)
[19453]B. Cables to Washington
[19455]After receiving the May 29 cable from Washington, both Consul
[19456]General Dearborn and Station Chief Owen sent replies. According
[19457]_to Dearborn's testimony, he did not regard the May 29 cable
[19458]as a change in U.S. policy concerning support for assassinations.
[19460](Dearborn 7/29/75, p. 74).
[19464]. AN
[19465]HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 439
[19469]' He interpreted the May 29 cable as saying:
[19471]" .,we don't care if the Dominicans assassinate
[19472]Trujillo, that is all right. But we don't want
[19473]anything to pin this on us, because we aren't
[19474]doing it, it is the Dominicans who are doing
[19475]iti" (Dearborn, 7/29, p. 104)
[19477]Dearborn testified that this accorded with what he said had
[19478]always been his personal belief; thaé the U.S. should not be
[19479]involved in an assassination and that if an assassination
[19480]occurred it would be strictly a Dominican affair. (Dearborn
[19481]7/29, pp. 100, 101)
[19482]In contrast the CIA Station Chief, Owen, did regard the
[19483]cable as manifesting a change in U.S. policy, particularly on
[19484]the questionof supplying arms. (Owen p. 120) He believed the
[19485]May 29 cable was the final word in U.S. policy on this matter
[19486]_ and consequently felt that the government had retreated from
[19487]its prior position, of offering material support to the dissi-
[19488]dents, and had adopted a new position of withholding such sunnort.
[19489]Owen's responsive cable to Headquarters stated:
[19490]"HOS aware extent to which U.S. government already
[19491]associated with assassination. If we are to at least
[19492]cover up tracks, CIA personnel directly involved in
[19494]assassination preparation must be withdrawn.”
[19495](Station to HQS cable, 5/30/61)
[19497]i ss aS
[19498]Me
[19500]HY 450955 Docld: 32423539 Page 430
[19502]-47 -
[19504]be
[19505]ea
[19507]Immediately following the assassination, all CIA
[19509]personnel in the Dominican Republic were removed from the
[19510]country and within a few days Consul General Dearborn vas
[19511]back in Washington: The State Department cabled the CIA station
[19512]in the Dominican Republic to destroy all records concerning
[19513]contacts with dissidents and any related matters, except not to
[19514]destroy the contingency plans or the May 29, 1961 cable to Dear-
[19515]born. (HQS to Station cable, 5/31/61.
[19517]Cc. Immediate Post-Assassination Period
[19519]The U.S. Consulate in the Dominican Republic was quick
[19520]to dispatch its early reports that Trujillo had been assassinated,
[19522]and the U.S. communications network transmitted the report to
[19524]President Kennedy in Paris. The President's Press Secretary,
[19526]assassination, preceeding by several hours release of the news |
[19528]Pierre Salinger, made the first public announcement of the
[19530]in the Dominican Republic. Secretary of State Rusk testified /
[19531]that when he learned of Salinger's announcement he was most con-|
[19532]cerned. Rusk said that Trujillo's son Ramfis was also in Paris
[19533]and he was afraid that Ramfis, upon first learning of his
[19535]father's death from the press secretary to the President of the
[19537]\ U.S., might try to retaliate against President Kennedy. (Rusk,
[19539]a ee
[19541]. 32, 33.)
[19543]nat
[19544]Lyne f
[19546]HY 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 431
[19548]SCHNEIDER REPORT
[19550]Page
[19551]I, Summary L |
[19552]Il. The President's Initial General Instruction 6 —
[19553]and Background
[19554]A. September 15 White House Meeting 6
[19555]B. Background: Tracks I and II 8
[19556]C. CIA Views of Difficulty of Project 15 7
[19557]III. CIA's Implementation of Track II 7 _
[19558]A, Evolution of CIA Strategy i
[19559]1. The "Constitutional Coup" Approach iv
[19560]2. Military Solution | ; ~ 18 k
[19561]B. The Chile Task Force 19 .
[19562]C. The Use of the Army Attache and Interagency 20 ——
[19563]Relations
[19564]D. The False Flag Base 26
[19565]E. Chief of Station 27
[19566]Iv. CIA Efforts to Promote a Coup 29 r
[19567]. A. The Chilean Conspirators 2g —
[19568]B. Contacts Prior to October 15 | 30
[19569]C. October 15 Decision 34 bee
[19570]D. Coup Planning and Attempts After October 15 36
[19571]E. The Killing of General Schneider 39
[19572]F. Post October 22 Events 4]
[19573]V.  CIA/White House Communication During Track IT 43
[19574]A.. September oO oy to er
[19575]B. October 46 a me
[19577]C. December . . 34
[19579]D. Did Track II End? 54
[19582]“SEL SCHNEIDER REPORT
[19584]“On September 4, 1970, Dr. Salvador Allende Gossens won a plurality
[19586]in Chile's Presidential election* Since no candidate had received a
[19588]ier ee
[19590]majority of the popular vote, the Chilean constitution required that
[19592]a joint session of its Congress decide between. the: first and-second place
[19593]finishers. This constitutional requirement had, in the past, been pro-
[19594]forma. The Congress had always selected the candidate who received
[19596]highest popular vote. The date set for the Congressional joint session
[19600]was October 24, 1970.
[19601]On September 15, 1970, President Richard Nixon informed CIA Director
[19603]Richard Helms that an Allende regime in Chile would not be acceptable to
[19605]the United States. The CIA was instructed by President Nixon to play a
[19607]J [fe anh
[19608]direct role in organizing a military coup d'etat in Chile to prevent .
[19610]TO fe ttand pang vy J as heck
[19612]at . .
[19613]Allende's accession to the presidency. phe Agency ‘was to take this action
[19615]without coordination with the Departments of State or Defense and without
[19617]informing the U.S. Ambassador in Chile. While coup possibilities in
[19619]general and other means of seeking to prevent Allende's accession to
[19621]power were explored by the 40 Committee throughout this period, the 40
[19622]Committee was never informed of this direct CIA role. Nor did it ever
[19623]approve that role. The only institution to which the Agency was to re-
[19625]port, both for informational and approval purposes, was the White House.
[19627]*pr. Allende, a long-time Senator and founder of the Socialist Party in
[19629]Chile, was a candidate of Popular Unity Coalition. The Coalition was made i
[19630]up of Communists, Socialists, Social Democrats, Radicals, and dissident Foo ,
[19631]Christian Democrats. Allende was a self-proclaimed Marxist and was making Mite
[19633]‘his fourth try for the presidency. His opponents were Radomire Tomic Romero,
[19635]Dr. Allende's margin of victory was 39,000 votes out of a ‘total of 3 mil-
[19637]candidate of the ruling Christian Democratic Party, and Jorge Alessandri i
[19639]Rodriquez, candidate of the right-wing National Party. Dr. Allende won ‘ae
[19641]36.3% of the popular vote; Alessandri was second with 35.3% of the vote. - nae
[19644]lion votes cast in. the election. The incumbent President, Eduardo Frei
[19645]Montalvo, a Christian Democrat, was ineligible for re-election. Chilean
[19646]law prohibits Presidents from succeeding themselves. ;
[19649]in practice, this meant that the CIA was to keep the President's Assis-
[19650]‘tant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, informed of its
[19651]activities.
[19653]Between October 5 and October 20, 1970, the CIA made 21 contacts
[19654]with key military and Carabinero (police) officials in Chile. Those
[19655]Chileans who were inclined to stage a coup were given assurances of
[19656]strong support at the highest levels of the U.S. Government, both be-
[19657]fore and after a coup.
[19659]One of the major obstacles faced by all the military conspirators
[19660]in Chile was the strong opposition to a coup by the Commander-in-Chief
[19661]of the Army, General Rene Schneider; who ingisted the constitutional
[19662]process be followed. As a result of his strong constitutional stand,
[19663]the removal of General Schneider became a necessary ingredient in the
[19664]coup plans of all the Chilean conspirators. Unable to have General
[19665]Schneider retired or reassigned, the conspirators decided to kidnap
[19667]him. An unsuccessful abduction attempt was made on October 19, 1970, y,y
[19669]Sf,
[19671]‘by a group of Chilean military officers whom the CIA was actively sup~ Ke
[19672]fa | nad
[19674]porting. A second kidnap attempt was made the following day, again un-
[19675]successfully. In the early morning hours of October 22, 1970, machine
[19676]guns and ammunition were passed by the CIA to the group that had failed
[19678]on October 19. That same day General Schneider was mortally
[19680]wounded in an attempted kidnap on his way to work. The attempted
[19682]kidnap and the shooting was apparently conducted by conspira-
[19684]tors other than those to whom the CIA had provided weapons earlier
[19686]in the day. a
[19688]f
[19691]’ mo mH ST
[19693]oy A Chilean military court found that high-ranking military officers,
[19695]both active and retired, conspired to bring about a military coup and
[19696]to_kidnap General Schneider. Several of the officers whom the CIA had
[19697]contacted and encouraged in their coup conspiracy were convicted of con-
[19699]spiring to kidnap General Schneider. Those convicted of carrying out
[19701]the actual kidnap attempt and the killing of General Schneider were assoc-
[19703]iates of retired General Roberto Viaux, who had initially been thought by
[19705]the CIA to be the best hope. However, later the CIA discouraged General
[19706]Viaux because the Agency felt other officers, such as General Camilo
[19708]Valenzuela, were not sufficiently involved. General Viaux was convicted by the
[19710]military ‘court and received a twenty-year prison sentence for being
[19712]the "intellectal author" of the Schneider kidnap attempt. General i
[19713]Valenzuela was sentenced by the military court to three years in exile ; —
[19714]for taking part in the conspiracy to prevent Allende's assumption of
[19716]office. The military court found that the two Generals had been in
[19718]contact throughout the coup plotting.
[19720]a Te
[19721]; FE
[19722]The principal facts leading up to the death of General Schneider (all —
[19723]of which are discussed in more detail below) are as follows:
[19724]1. By the end of September 1970, it appeared that the only feasible
[19725]way for the CIA to implement the Presidential order to prevent Allende from
[19726]coming to power was to foment a coup d'etat.
[19727]2. <All of the known coup plots developed within the Chilean mili- :
[19728]. ; i
[19729]tary entailed the removal of General Schneider by one means or another. :
[19730]3. United States officials continued to encoyrage and support Chilean rt.
[19731]plans for a coup after it became known that the: first step would be to | 7
[19734]kidnap General Schneider.
[19736]ES Re LT
[19738]Senie.T page 139
[19742]a ~4-
[19746]A, ” Two unsuccessful kidnap attempts were made, one on October 19,
[19747]the other on October 20. Following these attempts, and with knowledge
[19748]of, their failure, ‘the CIA passed three submachine guns and ammunition
[19749]to Chilean officers who still planned to kidnap General Schneider.
[19751]5. In a third kidnap attempt on October 22, apparently conducted
[19752]by Chileans other than those to whom weapons had been supplied, General
[19753]Schneider was shot and subsequently died. The guns used in the abor-
[19754]tive kidnapping of General Schneider were, in all probability, not those
[19755]supplied by the CIA to the conspirators. The Chilean military court
[19756]which investigated the Schneider killing determined that Schneider had
[19757]been murdered by handguns, although one machine gun was at the scene of
[19758]the killing.*
[19760]6. While there is no question that the CIA received a direct
[19761]instruction from the President on September 15th to attempt to foment
[19762]a coup, the Committee received sharply conflicting testimony about
[19763]whether the White House was kept informed of, and authorized, the
[19764]coup efforts in Chile after October 15. On one side of the conflict
[19765]is the testimony of Henry Kissinger and General Alexander Haig; on the
[19766]other, that of CIA officials. Kissinger testified that the White House
[19767]stood down CIA efforts to promote a military coup d'etat in Chile on
[19768]October 15, 1970. After that date, Kissinger testified--and Haig agreed--
[19769]that the White House neither knew of, nor specifically approved, CIA
[19770]coup activities in Chile.- CIA officials, on the other hand, have testi-
[19772]fied that their activities in Chile after October 15 were known to and
[19776]The Committee has not been able to determine whether or net ~
[19777]the machine gun at the scene of the Schneider killing was one of the
[19779]three supplied by the CTIA.
[19781]ore
[19784]. *
[19785]thus authorized by the White House.
[19786]This conflict in testimony, which the Committee has been unable
[19788]to. resolve through its hearings or the documentary record, leaves, un-
[19790]answered the most serious question of whether the CIA was acting
[19791]pursuant to higher authority (the CIA's view) or was pursuing coup
[19792]activities in Chile without sufficient communication (the Kissinger/
[19794]Haig view).
[19797]The basic issue is whether or not the CIA informed the White House of *
[19799]its activities. In context, informing was tantamount to being authorized.
[19801]No one who testified believed that the CIA was required to seek step-by-
[19803]step authorization for its activities; rather the burden was on the White
[19804]House to object if a line of activity being pursued by the CIA seemed
[19806]unwise. Both Kissinger and Haig agreed that. if the CIA had proposed a persua-
[19807]sive plan to them, it almost certainly would have been approved. The CIA
[19809]did not believe it needed specific White House authorization to transfer wea~
[19810]pons to the Chileans; in fact, CIA. Deputy Director (Plans) Thomas
[19811]Karamessines testified that he did not formally approve the transfer,
[19813]but rather that in the context of the project it was clear that the
[19815]Agency had the authority to transfer weapons and that it was clear to
[19816]Karamessines' subordinates that he would approve their decision to do
[19818]so. He believed he probably was informed before the weapons actually
[19820]were sent. . OO ~ _
[19825], athe President's Initial General Instruction and Background
[19828]A. September 15 White House Meeting
[19830].- On September 15, 1970, President Nixon met with his Assistant for
[19832]PAS
[19834]National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, CIA Director Richard Helms,
[19836]and Attorney General John Mitchell at the White House. The topic was
[19837]Chile. Handwritten notes taken by Director Helms at that meeting re-
[19839]flect both its tenor and the President's instructions:
[19841]1 in 10 chance perhaps, but save Chile!
[19842]_ worth spending
[19843]not concerned risks involved
[19844]no involvement of Embassy
[19845]$10,000,000 available, more if necessary
[19846]full-time job--best men we have
[19847]game plan =
[19848]make the economy scream
[19849]48 hours for plan of action
[19851]In his testimony before the Select Committee, Director Helms recalled
[19852]coming away from the meeting on September 15 with:
[19854]... (the) impression...that the President came down
[19856]very hard that he wanted something done, and he
[19858]didn't much care how and that he was prepared to
[19860]make money available....This was a pretty all- . -
[19861]inclusive order....I1f I ever carried a marshall's re
[19862]baton in my knapsack out of the Oval Office, it | a
[19863]was that day.* (Helms testimony, July 15, pp. 6,10, LL)
[19865]* Director Helms also testified that the September 15th meeting with
[19866]President Nixon may have been triggered by the presence of Augustin
[19867]Edwards, the publisher of the Santiago daily El Mercurio, in Washing-
[19868]ton. That morning, at the request of Donald Kendall, President of
[19869]Pepsi Cola, Henry Kissinger and John Mitchell had met for breakfast
[19870]with Kendall and Edwards. (Mitchell calendar) The topic of conversa—
[19871]tion was the political situation in Chile and the plight of El Mercurio
[19872]“and other anti-Allende forces. ° According to Mr. Helms:
[19874]I recall that prior to this meeting (with the President)
[19875]the editor of El Mercurio had come to Washington. and «(ee 0™
[19876]I had been asked to go and talk to him at one of the ,
[19877]hotels here, this having been arranged through Don a ben
[19878]Kendall, the head of the Pepsi Cola Company....I have — i
[19879]this impression that the President called this meeting —
[19880]where I have my handwritten notes because of Edwards'
[19881]presence in Washington and what he heard from Kendall
[19882]about what Edwards was saying about conditions in
[19883]Chile and what was happening there.
[19885](Helms testimony, July 15, pp. 4-5)
[19887]BP SS ar in
[19891]Howeyeris,"none ‘of | the CIA officers believed that assassination was within
[19893]the guidelines Helms had been given.
[19895]my t
[19897]Senator Hart of Colorado. ...did the kind of carte
[19899]q
[19901]A blanche mandate you carried, the marshall'’s baton
[19903]that you carried out in a knapsack, to stop Allende i.
[19905]from assuming office, include physical elimination? hai
[19906]. UG
[19908]Mr. Helms. Well, not in my mind, because when I be-
[19909]came Director, I had already made up my mind that we
[19910]weren't going to have any of that business when I was
[19911]Director, and I had made that clear to my fellows, and
[19912]I think they will tell you this.
[19914]The following day, September 16, Director Helms called a meeting
[19916]at the CIA to discuss.the Chilean situation. At this meeting, he re-
[19918]lated to his colleagues his understanding of the President's instruc- a
[19921]2. The Director told the group that President
[19923]Nixon had decided that an Allende” regime in Chile
[19925]was unacceptable to the United States. The Presi- We
[19926]dent asked the Agency to prevent Allende from com-
[19927]ing to power or to unseat him. The President
[19928]authorized $10,000,000 for this purpose, if needed. Lane
[19929]Further, the Agency is to carry out this mission
[19931]without coordination with the Departments of State
[19933]cr Defense. :
[19935](Memorandum/Genesis of the Project, 16 Sept. 1970)
[19937]Henry Kissinger's recollection of the September 15 meeting with
[19938]President Nixon is in accord with that of Richard Helms.” Although
[19939]Dr. Kissinger did not recall the President's instructions to be as
[19940]precise as those related by Director Helms, he did testify that:
[19942]...the primary thrust of the September 15th meeting
[19944]was to urge Helms to do whatever he could to prevent
[19945]Allende from being seated. (Kissinger testimony, p. 13) ; ,
[19947]kid
[19950]The documents, and the officials from whom the Committee has heard
[19951]testimony, are in substantial agreement about what President Nixon
[19952]authorized on September 15, namely CIA involvement in promoting a
[19953]military coup d'etat in Chile. There is not, -however, agreement
[19954]about what was communicated between the CIA and the White House--
[19955]and hence what was authorized by the latter~-in the week between
[19956]October 15 and the death of General Schneider, October 22. This
[19957]matter will be discussed in Part V of this report on the Schneider
[19958]killing. .
[19960]ca: cal
[19962]|
[19965]‘It is clear that President Nixon wanted him (Helms)
[19966]ay to encourage the Chilean military to cooperate or
[19967]vr to take the initiative in preventing Allende from
[19968]taking office. (Kissinger testimony, p. 12)
[19970]Operationally, the CIA set the President's instructions into motion
[19972]on September 21. On that day two cables were sent from CIA Headquarters
[19974]to Santiago informing the CIA Chief of Station (COS) of his new directive:
[19976]3. Purpose of exercise is to prevent Allende as-
[19977]sumption of power. Parliamentary legerdemain has
[19978]been discarded. Military solution is objective.
[19980](Hqs. to Stn. 236, 21 September 1970)
[19982]RAK
[19984]B. (Track Two)--This is authority granted to CIA
[19985]only, to work toward a military solution to problem.
[19986]As part of authority we were expltcitly told that
[19988]40 Committee, State, Ambassador and Embassy were
[19990]not to be told of this Track Two nor involved in any
[19991]matter. (Hqs. to Stn. 240, 21 September. 1970)-
[19993]B. Background: Tracks I and If
[19995]United States Government concern over an Allende regime in Chile
[19996]did not begin with President Nixon's September 15 instruction to the
[19997]CIA. * For more than a year, Chile had been on the 40 Committee's agenda.
[19998]At an April 15, 1969, meeting of the 303 Committee (the predecessor of
[19999]‘the 40 Committee) the question arose as to whether anything should be
[20000]done with regard to the September 1970 Presidential election in Chile.
[20002]"an election operation will
[20004]At that time,Director Helms pointed out that
[20006]k
[20008]Covert U.S. Government involvement in large-scale political action
[20009]programs in Chile began with the 1964 Presidential election. As in
[20010]1970, this was in response to the perceived threat of Salvadore
[20011]Allende. Over $3 million was spent by the CIA in the 1964 effort.
[20013](Colby testimony,. July 14, 1975, nm. 5}
[20018]pot be- effective, unless an early enough start is made. . On March 25,
[20020]3.1970, the 40 Committee approved . a joint Embassy/CIA proposal recom- .
[20022]mending that "spoiling" operations--propaganda and other activities-—~
[20024]be, undertaken by the CIA in an effort to prevent an election victory
[20025]by Allende's Popular Unity (UP) Coalition. A total of $135,000 was
[20026]authorized by the 40 Committee for this anti-Allende activity. On
[20027]June 18, 1970, the U.S. ‘Ambassador to Chile, Edward Korry, submitted a
[20029]two-phase proposal to the Department of State and the CIA for review.
[20031]The first phase involved an increase in support to the anti~Allende
[20032]campaign. The second was.a contingency plan to make “a $500,000 effort
[20033]_in Congress to persuade certain shifts in voting on 24 October 1970."
[20035]Phase IT was, stated simply, a proposal to bribe Chilean Congressmen to
[20037]vote against. Allende should he win a plurality in the September 4 elec-
[20038]tion. On June 27, 1970, the 40 Committee increased funding for the
[20039]anti-Allende "spoiling" operation to $390,000. A decision on Ambassador
[20040]Korry's bribe proposal was deferred pending the results of the September 4
[20042]election.
[20044]The 40 Committee met twice between the time Allende received a plural-
[20045]ity of the popular vote on September 4 and President Nixon issued his
[20046]instruction to Director Helms on September 15** at both these meetings the - , peor
[20047]question of U.S. involvement in a military coup against Allende .was raised.
[20048]Kissinger stressed the importance of these meetings when he testified be-
[20050]fore the Select Committee: | .
[20052]' &This and other references. to 40°Committee discussions and actions regard- -
[20053]e ing Chile are contained in a memorandum provided to the Committee by the
[20054]\F ¢ CTA entitled "Policy Decisions Related to Our Covert Action Lnvelvement
[20055]: » ® in the September 1970 Chilean Presidential Election," dated October 9, 1970.
[20056]A On August 25, 1975, we subpoenaed all White House/National Security Council
[20058]Nei \ documents and records relating to the effort by the United States Goyern-
[20059]\ ment to prevent Salvadore Allende from assuming office. On September 4, the
[20061]Committee received, Af. documents from the White: House relating to Chile cover-
[20066]**Following the September 4 election, the CIA's Directorate of Intelli-
[20067]gence circulated an intelligence community assessment of the impact of
[20068]an Allende government on U.S. national interests. That assessment, |
[20069]dated September 7, 1970, stated:
[20071]Regarding threats to U.S. interests, we conclude that:
[20073]1. The U.S. has no vital national interests within Chile.
[20074]There would, however, be tangible economic losses.
[20076]2. The world military balance of power would not be sig-
[20077]nificantly altered by an Allende government.
[20079]3. An Allende victory would, however, create consider-
[20080]-able political and psychological costs: :
[20082]‘as Hemispheric cohesion would be threatened by |
[20083]the challenge that an Allende government
[20084]would pose to the OAS, and by the reactions
[20085]that it would create in other countries. |
[20086]We do not see, however, any likely threat
[20087]to the peace of the region. ;
[20089]b. An Allende victory would represent a defin-
[20090]ite psychological set-back to the U.S. and
[20091]a definite psychological advance for the
[20092]Marxist idea. (Intelligence Memorandum/
[20093]"Situation Following the Chilean Presidential
[20094]' Election," CIA's Directorate of Intelligence,
[20095]7. September 1970)
[20098]_ -10-
[20100]I think the meeting of September 15th has to be
[20101]seen in the context of two previous meetings of
[20102]the 40 Committee on September 8th and September
[20103]var 14th in which the 40 Committee was asked to look
[20104], ‘at the pros and cons and the problems and pros
[20105]pects of a Chilean military coup to be organized : Se
[20106]with United States assistance. ; : ae
[20107](Kissinger testimony, p. 5)
[20109]‘According to the’ summary of the 40 Committee meeting on September
[20110]8, the following was discussed:
[20112]...all concerned realized that previous plans for
[20113]a Phase II would have to be drastically redrawn....
[20114]The DCI made the point, however, that congressional
[20115]action against Allende was not likely to succeed
[20116]and that once Allende was in office the Chilean
[20117]opposition to him would disintegrate and collapse
[20118]rapidly. While not advocating a specific course
[20119]of action, the Director further observed that a
[20120]‘military golpe against Allende would have very
[20121]little chance of success unless undertaken soon.
[20122]Both the Chairman and the Attorney General supported
[20123]‘this view....At the close of the. ..-meeting the
[20124]Chairman directed the Embassy to prepare a "cold-
[20125]blooded assessment" of:
[20127]1) the pros and cons and problems and pros--
[20128]pects involved should a Chilean military
[20129]coup. be organized now with U.S. assistance,
[20130]and ;
[20132]¢ 2) the pros and cons and problems and pros-
[20133]: pects involved in organizing an effective : 7
[20134]future Chilean opposition to Allende. —
[20136](CIA Memorandum/Policy Decision Related to Our
[20137]Covert Action Involvement in the September 1970 ‘ . prt
[20138]Chilean Presidential Election, 9 October 1970) —
[20140]Ambassador Korry responded to the 40 Committee's request for a
[20141]"eold-blooded assessment" on September 12. He stated that "We [the
[20142]Enbassy/ believe it now clear that Chilean military will not, repeat
[20143]not, move to prevent Allende's accession, barring unlikely situation
[20145]_ of national chaos and widespread violence." The Ambassador went on to
[20147]say that "Our own military people /a re] unanimous in rejecting possi-
[20152]bility of meaningful military intervention in political situation."
[20154]He concluded by stating: “What we are saying in this ‘cold-blooded
[20156]assessment’ is that opportunities for further significant USG action
[20158]vt
[20160]with the Chilean military are nonexistent." (Memorandum/Ambassador's
[20161]Response to Request for Analysis of Military Option in Present Chilean
[20162]Situation, 12 September 1970)
[20164]The CIA's response was in the same vein. Viron Vaky, Kissinger's
[20165]assistant for Latin American affairs on the NSC staff, summarized the
[20167]GIA's "cold-blooded assessment" in a memo to his boss: "Military ac~
[20169]tion is impossible; the military is incapable and unwilling to seize
[20170]power. We have no capability to motivate or instigate a coup." (Memo-
[20171]randum for Dr. Kissinger/Chile--40 Committee Meeting, Monday--September 14,
[20173]September 14, Viron P. Vaky)
[20175]On September 14, the 40 Committee met to discuss these reports -and
[20176]what action was to be taken:
[20178]Particular attention was devoted to a CIA prepared
[20179]review of political and military options in the
[20181]_ Chilean electoral situation based on the Embassy
[20182]and Station's "'cold-blooded assessment." The Com-
[20183]mittee focused on the so-called "Rube Goldberg"
[20184]gambit which would see Alessandri elected by the
[20185]Congress on October 24th, resigning thereafter to
[20186]leave Frei constitutionally free to run in a second
[20187]‘election for the presidency. .
[20192]Ambassador Korry was asked to go directly to President
[20193]~Prei to see if he would be willing to commit himself to
[20194]ren this line of action. A contingency of $250,000 was
[20195]i approved for "covert support of projects which Frei or
[20196]his trusted team deem important." It was further agreed .
[20197]that a propaganda campaign be undertaken by. the Agency veo
[20198]to focus on the damage of an Allende takeover.... ;
[20200](CIA Memorandum/Policy Decision Related to Our
[20202]Covert Action Involvement in the September 1970
[20204]Chilean Presidential Election, 9 October 1970)
[20206]Following the September 14 Forty Committee meeting and President
[20208]Nixon's September 15 instruction to the CIA, U.S. Government efforts ; i
[20209]to prevent Allende from assuming office proceeded on two cracks. Track ,
[20210]L comprised all covert activities approved by the 40 Committee, in-
[20211]cluding the $250,000 contingency fund to bribe Chilean congressmen as
[20212]well as propaganda and economic activities. These activities were
[20214]designed to induce the opponents to Allende in Chile to prevent his.
[20216]assumption of power, either through political or military means. Track
[20218]*The terms Track I and Track II were known only to CIA and White House
[20219]officials who were knowledgeable about the President's September 15 order
[20220]to the CIA. The Committee sent letters to various senior officials in- i
[20221]quiring if they were, in fact, not knowledgeable of the Track II activities. i
[20222]Those letters were sent to Secretary of State William Rogers, Secretary of aa
[20223]Defense Melvin Laird, Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard, Under-
[20224]secretary. of State for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson, Chairman of
[20226]the’ Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Thomas Moorer, NSC Staff Member for
[20227]Latin America Viron P. Vaky, Director of the State Department's Bureau
[20229]of Intelligence and Research Ray S. Cline, and the Deputy Chief of Mission
[20230]in Santiago Harry W. Shlaudeman. Thus far the Committee. has received
[20231]written responses from Messrs. Moorer, Johnson, Vaky, Shlaudeman and Cline.
[20232]All except Cline have indicated that they had no knowledge of the Track IT
[20233]activity at the time; Cline indicated he heard of the activities in a
[20234]general way, from his subordinate who handled 40 Committee work and from
[20235]former associates at the CIA. In oral communications with Committee
[20236]staff members, Secretaries Rogers and Laird have indicated they were unaware 2
[20237]of Track II. ; ; , ~~
[20239]HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 445
[20241]. nde
[20243]oo
[20245]oy A ok oe :
[20246]I activities -in Chile were undertaken in response to President Nixon's
[20248]“September 15 order and were directed towards actively promoting and
[20250]encouraging the Chilean military to move against Allende. In his testimony
[20252]+ tee Be
[20253]a
[20255]before the Committee, Kissinger stressed. the links between Tracks a
[20257]‘I and II:
[20259]...There was work by all of the agencies to try to
[20260]prevent Allende from being seated, and there was |
[20261]work by all of the agencies on the so-called Track
[20262]I to encourage the military to move against Allende
[20263]...the difference between the September 15th meet-
[20264]ing and what was being done in general within the ©
[20265]government was that President Nixon was encouraging
[20266]a more direct role for the CIA in actually organiz-
[20267]ing such a coup. (Kissinger testimony, p- 13)
[20269]Tracks I and II did, in fact, move togefher in the month after
[20270]September 15. The authorization to Ambassador Korry, who was formally
[20271]excluded from Track II, to encourage a military coup became broader and a
[20272]broader. In the 40 Committee meeting on September 14, he and other.
[20274]“appropriate members of the Embassy Mission" were authorized to inten-
[20275]sify their contacts with Chilean military officers to assess their
[20277]willingness to support the "Frei gambit"--a voluntary turn-over of
[20279]power to the military by Frei, who would then have been eligible to
[20281]run for President in new elections. (Memorandum/Policy Decisions Related
[20282]to Our Covert Action Involvement in the September 1970 Chilean Presiden-
[20283]tial Election, 9 October 1970)
[20285]In a situation report to Dr. Kissinger and Assistant Secretary :
[20286]Charles Meyer on September 21, Ambassador Korry indicated that in order
[20287]to make the Frei gambit work, "if necessary, General Schneider would
[20289]Ba:
[20294]HW 50955 Docld: 32493539
[20296]“13.
[20298]vo. have to be neutralized, by displacement if necessary.'"™
[20300](Korry to
[20301]Meyer and Kissinger/Situation Report, 21 September 1970) In testifying,
[20303]Kissinger felt the Korry report indicated "the degree to which Track
[20305]‘I and Track II were merging, that is to say, that individuals on Track _
[20306]I were working on exactly the same problem as the CIA was working on
[20307]Track 11." (Kissinger testimony, p- 21)
[20309]Ambassador Korry's activites in Chile between September 4 and
[20311]October 24 support Kissinger's view that the line separating Track I
[20313]and Track II often became blurred. — For example, the Ambassador was
[20314]authorized to make his contacts in the Chilean military aware that if
[20315]Allende were seated, the military could exp@ct no further military
[20316]assistance (MAP) from the United States. Later, in response to his own
[20318]recommendation, Korry was authorized to inform the Chilean military that
[20321]all MAP and military sales were being held in abeyance pending the outcome
[20322]of the Congressional election on October 24. On October 7, Ambassador
[20323]Korry received the following cable from Kissinger and Under Secretary
[20325]In this same situation report, Ambassador Korry related a message that a
[20326]he had sent to President Frei through his Defense Minister indicating
[20327]the economic pressures that would be brought to bear on Chile should ©
[20328]Allende assume office.
[20329]Frei should know that not a nut or bolt will be
[20330]allowed to reach Chile under Allende. Once
[20331]Allende comes to power we shall do all within
[20332]our power to condemn Chile and the Chileans to /
[20333]utmost deprivation and poverty, a policy designed :
[20334]for a long time to come to accelerate the hard
[20335]features of a Communist society in Chile. Hence,
[20336]for Frei to believe that there will be much of :
[20337]an alternative to utter misery, such as seeing :
[20338]Chile muddle through, would be.strictly illusory. ; t
[20339]The use of economic instruments as levers on Frei and the Chilean in
[20340]military was a persistent subject of White House/CIA discussions ; e
[20341]and of instructions to the field. Helms' notes: from the September ‘a —
[20343]15 meeting with the President and Kissinger included the notation
[20344]“nake the economy scream." Economic leverage was the primary
[20345]topic of a September 18 White House meeting involving Kissinger,
[20346]Helms and Karamessines.
[20348]HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 447
[20350]of State U.rAlexis Johnson:
[20351]b
[20353]2, ...you are now authorized to inform discreetly
[20354]the Chilean military through the channels available
[20355]to you that if a successful effort is made to block
[20356]- Allende from taking office, we would reconsider’ the
[20357]cuts we have thus far been forced to make in Chilean
[20358]MAP and otherwise increase our presently programmed
[20359]MAP for the Chilean Armed Forces.... If any steps
[20360]the military should take should result in civil dis-
[20361]order, we would also be prepared promptly to deliver
[20362]support and material that might be immediately re-
[20363]quired. (Hqs. to Stn. 075517, 7 October 1970)
[20365]The essential difference between Tracks I and II, as evidenced by
[20366]instructions to Ambassador Korry during this period, was not that Track
[20368]II was coup-oriented and Track I was not. Both had this objective in
[20369]mind. The difference between the two tracks was, simply, that the CIA's
[20371]direct contacts with the Chilean military, and its active promotion and
[20373]support for a coup, were to be known only to a small group of individuals
[20374]in the White House and the CIA. Kissinger testified that Track II
[20375]matters were to be reported directly to the White House "for reasons
[20377]of security." (Kissinger testimony, p. 14) Thomas Karamessines, the
[20378]CIA's Deputy Director for Plans at the time and the principal CIA
[20379]contact with the White House on Track II matters, testified on his
[20380]understanding of why State, Defense, the 40 Committee and Ambassador
[20381]Korry were excluded from Track II: . .
[20383]That was not a decision that we made. But the
[20385]best I can do is suggest that there was concern
[20386]about two things. Number one, that there might
[20388]be serious objections lodged, for example, by
[20390]the State Department particularly if Track 2
[20392]were to be laid out at a Forty Committee meeting.
[20394]And the only other thing I can contribute to that
[20396]is that it was felt that the security of the
[20397]activity would be better protected if knowledge
[20399]of it were limited. (Karamessines testimony, p. 122)
[20401]Ke wean,
[20407]t
[20410]Be
[20411]t
[20414]en -15-
[20416]os \
[20418]- ; . oy 7 , a
[20419]C. CIA Views of Difficulty of Project
[20421]nd
[20423]On one point the testimony of CIA officials who were involved in
[20425]Track If is unanimous: they all said they thought Track II was unlikely
[20429]to succeed. That view ran from the working levels of the Agency to the
[20430]top. They all said they felt they were being asked to do the impossible,
[20431]that the risks and potential costs of the project were too great. At
[20433]the same time, they felt they had been given an explicit Presidential
[20435]order, and they tried to execute that order.
[20436]A few excerpts from the testimony follow:
[20438]Richard Helms, CIA Director -
[20440]+»emy heart sank over this meeting, because...the
[20441]possibility of bringing off something like this
[20442]‘seemed to me at that time to be just as remote as se
[20443]anything could be. In practical terms, the Army us
[20444]'was constitutionalist....And when you look here at | ;
[20445]the time frame in which the man was suddenly asking poco
[20446]you to accomplish something, it seemed really almost
[20447]inconceivable....
[20449]What I came away from the meeting with
[20450]the distinct impression that we were being
[20451]asked to do almost the impossible and trying
[20452]to indicate this was going to be pretty tough.... ;
[20453](Helms testimony, July 15, 1975, pp. 6-7)
[20455]‘David Phillips, Chief, Chile Task Force -
[20457]-.-it is my feeling that the odds are unaccept-
[20458]able, it is something that is not going to work,
[20459]and we are going to be burned if we get into it ,
[20460]-..what are the chances of pulling off a.coup :
[20461]successfully, or in any way stopping Allende from
[20462]assuming the presidency?...we never even got to
[20464]two chances out of 20. (Phillips testimony, p. 16)
[20466].--Il assure you that those people that I
[20467]was in touch with at the Agency just about univers-
[20468]ally said, my God, why are we given this assignment?.
[20469](Phillips testimony, p. 53)
[20471]i
[20473]i
[20478]mexy,) Deputy Chief, Western Hemisphere Division -
[20480]James Fla
[20482]There was just no question that we had to make
[20483]this effort, no matter what the odds were. And
[20484]I think that most people felt that the odds were
[20485]just pretty long. (Flannery testimony, p. 20)
[20488]. -16-
[20489]Further, CIA officials believed their judgment of the endeavor's
[20490]_. difficulty was known to the White House. Helms commented on the Septem-
[20491]ber 15th meeting: "So realizing all of these things, I'm relatively
[20492]certain that day that I pointed out this is going to be awfully tough."
[20494](Helms testimony, July 15, 1975, p. 16) Karamessines recalled pointing
[20496]out to the President that "the Chilean military seemed to be disorganized
[20498]and unwilling to do anything. And without their wanting to do something, 3 °
[20500]there did net seem to be much hope."' (Karamessines testimony, p. 10). be
[20501]| meat
[20502]a
[20504]nW 56888 “Hneta: 39493539 Page 450°
[20506]-L17-
[20508]“4 TIL., 4CLA'S Implementation of Track II
[20510]A. Evolution of CIA Strategy
[20512]The President's instruction to the CIA on September 15 to prevent ce
[20514]Allende's assumption of power was given in the context of a broad U.S. _—_—
[20515]Government effort to achieve that end. The September 15 instruction
[20516]to the CIA involved from the beginning the promotion of a military coup
[20518]d'etat in Chile. Although there was talk of a coup in Chilean military
[20520]circles, there was little indication that it would actually take place
[20521]without active U.S. encouragement and support.
[20523]There was much talk among Chilean officers about
[20524]: the possibility of some kind of coup...but this
[20525]- was not the kind of talk that was being backed by,
[20526]you know, serious organizational planning.
[20527](Karamessines testimony, Aug. 6, 1963, p. 32)
[20529]1. The "Constitutional Coup" Approach —
[20530]Although efforts to achieve a political solution to the Allende
[20531]victory continued simultaneous with Track II, the Agency premised its
[20532]activities on the assumption that the political avenue was a dead end.
[20533]On September 21, CIA Headquarters cabled its Station in Santiago:
[20534]Purpose of exercise is to prevent Allende assump-
[20535]tion of power. Paramilitary legerdemain has been
[20536]discarded. Military solution is objective.
[20537](Hqs. 236, Sept. 21, 1970, para. 3)
[20538]The initial strategy attempted to enlist President Frei in promoting
[20539]a coup to perpetuate his presidency for six more years. The Agency
[20540]decided to promise “help in any election which was an outgrowth of a
[20541]successful military takeover." (Nov. 18, 1970 Helms memo to Kissinger)
[20543]Under this plan Frei would invite the military to take over, dissolve the
[20545]Congress, and proclaim a new election. A private U.S. citizen who had
[20547]been a conduit for CIA funds to Frei's 1964 campaign was sent to see him .
[20549]Rete ee
[20551]MMT WT ere
[20552]Id: 32499539 Page 451
[20554]HW 50555 Doc
[20558]with this message oni September 24. (Task Force Log, September 23)
[20560]: Thomas ‘Karamessines, the Deputy Director for Plans, testified:
[20563]So this was in a sense not Track II, but in a
[20564]ao ™ sense another aspect of a quiet and hopefully
[20565]non-violent military coup....This was abandoned
[20566]when the military were reluctant to push Frei
[20567]publicly...and, number two, Frei was reluctant
[20569]to leave on his own in the absence of pressure
[20570]from the military....There was left as the only
[20571]‘chance of success a straight military coup.
[20573](Karamessines testimony, Aug. 6, 1975, p. 6)
[20575]At the same time, the Station in Santiago reported: _ OY ay
[20576]Strong. reasons for thinking neither Frei nor
[20577]Schneider will act. For that reason any scenario
[20578]in which either has to play an active role now .
[20579]appears utterly unrealistic. Overtures to lower
[20580]echelon officers (e.g., Valenzueha) can of course
[20581]be made. This involves promoting Army split.
[20582](Stn. to Hqs. 424, September 23, 1970)
[20583]2. Military Solution
[20584]President Frei's failure even to attempt to persuade his own party
[20585]convention on October 3-4 from reaching a compromise with Allende ended
[20586]all hope of using him to prevent an Allende presidency. (November 18
[20587]memo, Helms to Kissinger, page 16) Thus, by the beginning of October, fr
[20588]it was clear that a vehicle for a military solution would have to be
[20589]found in the second echelon of Chilean officers, and that the top leader-
[20590]ship of the Armed Services, particularly General Rene Schneider, censti-
[20591]tuted a stumbling block. (Santiago 424, September 23, 1970; Santiago 439,
[20592]September 30, 1970) The Agency's. task was to cause a coup in a highly
[20593]unpromising situation and to overcome the formidable obstacles represented ;
[20594]by Frei's inaction, Schneider's strong constitutionalism, and the absence
[20596]of organization and enthusiasm among those officers who were interested
[20598]in a coup.
[20600]A three-fold program was set into motion:
[20602]Wé
[20604]TA Dea eS
[20606]‘Ae
[20611]a. Collect intelligence on coup-minded officers;
[20613]“.b. Create a coup climate by propaganda, disinformation, —_
[20614]* | ST Er
[20615]and terrorist activities intended to. provoke the left to DOT RT
[20616]give a pretext for a coup;*(Hqs. 611, October 7, 1970) Ly af
[20617]lu r
[20618]c. Inform those coup-minded officers-that the U.S. Govern- S Wer
[20619]a
[20621]ax
[20623]ment would give them full support in a coup short of direct COI ET
[20625]U.S. military intervention. (Has. 762, October 14, 1970)
[20626]B. The Chile Task Force
[20627]Because of the highly sensitive nature of the operation, a special
[20628]task forcé was created in the CIA's Western Hemisphere Division to manage it.
[20629]The task force was placed under the daily direction of the Deputy Direc-
[20630]tor for Plans, Thomas Karamessines, and a group of the Agency's most
[20632]experienced and skilled operators. were detailed to the task force.
[20634]*A cable sent from CIA Headquarters to Santiago on October 19 focused
[20635]on.creating an appropriate justification for a coup. The cable stated:
[20637]1. It still appears that Ref A coup has no pretext or justification
[20638]that it can offer to make it acceptable in Chile or Latin America. It
[20639]therefore would seem necessary to create one to bolster what will prob-
[20640]ably be their claim to a coup to save Chile from communism...You may.
[20641]wish include variety of themes in justification of coup to military for
[20642]their use. These could include but are not limited to: A) Firm intel.
[20643]that Cubans planned to reorganize all intelligence services along
[20644]Soviet/Cuban mold thus creating structure for police state....B)Economic
[20645]situation collapsing....C)By quick recognition of Cuba and Communist
[20646]countries Allende assumed U.S. would cut off material assistance to
[20647]Armed Forces thus weakening them as constitutional barriers. Would then
[20648]empty armories to Communist Peoples Militia with task to run campaign of
[20649]terror based on alleged labor and economic sabotage (Use some quotes
[20650]from Allende on this.)
[20651]2. Station has written some excellent prop guidances. Using themes
[20652]at hand and which best known to you we are now asking you to prepare
[20653]intel report based on some well known facts and some fiction to justify
[20654]coup, split opposition, and gain adherents for military group. With wet “
[20655]appropriate military contact can determine how to "discover" intel report
[20656]which could even be planted during raids planned. by ‘Carabineros. .
[20657]3. We urge you to get this idea and some concrete suggestions to plote:\.ti% *
[20658]ters as soon as you can. Coup should have a justification to prosper.
[20660](Headquarters 882, 19 October 1970)
[20663]\ 20
[20665]“David 'A. Phillips, Chief of Station in Rio de Janeiro, was summoned
[20667]* back to Washington to head the operation. With the exception of the
[20669]Division Chief, William Broe, his deputy James Flannery and the head
[20671]“Spears | ot os ace oe
[20673]wu SOs PB CTE:
[20675]of the Chile Branch, no other officers in the Division were aware of the
[20676]task force's activities, not even those officers who normally had respon-
[20677]sibility for Chile. The task force had a special communications channel ta
[20678]Santiago and Buenos Aires to compartment cable traffic about Track Il.
[20679](November 18, 1970, Helms to Kissinger memo, page 3) Most of the
[20680]significant operational decisions were made by Phillips, Broe and
[20681]Karamessines, who met on a daily basis.
[20683]It should be noted that all those involwed with the task force des-
[20684]cribed the pressure from the White House as intense. Indeed, Karamessines
[20685]has said that Kissinger "left no doubt in my mind that he was under the
[20686]heaviest of pressure to get this accomplished, and he in turn was plac-
[20687]ing us under the heaviest of pressures to get it accomplished." (Kara-
[20688]messines testimony, August 6, 1975, page 7) The Deputy Chief of the
[20689]Western Hemisphere Division, James Flannery, testified that pressure was
[20690]"as tough as I ever saw it in my time there, extreme." (Flannery testi-
[20691]mony, July 15, 1975, page 20) Broe testified that "I have never gone
[20692]through a period as we did on the Chilean thing. I mean it was just
[20693]constant, constant....Just continual pressure....It was coming from the
[20694]White House." (Broe testimony, August 4, 1975, page 55)
[20696]C. The Use of the Army Attache and Interagency Relations
[20698]The CIA Station in Santiago had inadequate contacts within the
[20699]Chilean military to carry out its task. However, the U.S. Army At- &
[20701]tache in Santiago, Colonel Paul Wimert, knew the. Chilean ‘military
[20704]very well’ due ohis five years of service there and his broad personal’
[20705]We GS Ee . .
[20709]: contacts among the Chilean officers. Following a proposal by the Chief
[20711]" of Station, the CIA decided to enlist Colonel Wimert in collecting in-
[20712]telligence concerning the possibility of a coup and to use him as a
[20713]channel to let the interested Chilean military know-of U. S. support
[20714]for a coup. Karamessines described this procedure for the Committee:
[20716]We also needed contact with a wider segment of the military,
[20718]the senior military which we had not maintained and did not
[20720]have, but which we felt confident that our military represen-
[20722]tative in Chile had....And we got the approval of the DIA to
[20724]enlist the cooperation of Colonel Wimert in our effort to pro-
[20726]cure intelligence.
[20728](Karamessines testimony, August 6, 1975, p. 6)
[20730]To obtain Wimert's services, CIA officials prepared a suggested mes-—
[20731]sage for the Director of DIA to send to the Army Attache in Santiago
[20732]through CIA communications channels. Because the DIA Director, General
[20734]Donald V. Bennett, was in Europe on official business, the Deputy
[20735]Director of Central Intelligence, General Cushman, invited DIA Deputy
[20736]Director Lt. General Jammie M. Philpott to his office on September 28,
[20737]1970.* During that meeting, General Cushman requested the assistance of
[20738]the Army Attache, and General Philpott signed a letter which authorized
[20739]transmission of a message directing the Army Attache:
[20741]+..to work closely with the CAS chief, or in his absence,
[20743]his deputy, in contacting and advising the principal mili-
[20745]tary figures who might play a decisive role in any move which
[20747]might, eventually, deny the presidency to Allende.
[20749]Do not, repeat not, advise the Ambassador or the Defense At-
[20751]tache of this message, or give them any indication of its
[20753]portent. In the course of your routine activities, act in
[20755]accordance with the Ambassador's instructions. Simultaneously,
[20757]I wish--and now authorize you--to act in a concerted fashion
[20758]with the CAS chief.
[20760]* General Bennett returned to“ thé, United States’ on ‘the ‘evening of October
[20761]10, 1970. General Philpott Was’ ing Director in Bennett's absence.
[20764]es
[20766]od
[20767]ERS
[20768]Hi
[20770]pera ¢ he ate
[20772]HY 50955 Docld: 32423539
[20775]* General Bennett returned to™
[20777]at
[20779]very well duexto his five years of service there and his broad personal
[20780]Sook Sa de
[20782]ye
[20784]contacts among the Chilean officers. Following a proposal by the Chief
[20785]"of Station, the CIA decided to enlist Colonel Wimert in collecting in-
[20786]telligence concerning the possibility of a coup and to use him as a
[20787]channel to let the interested Chilean military know of U. S. support
[20789]for a coup. Karamessines described this procedure for the Committee:
[20791]We also needed contact with a wider segment of the military,
[20792]the senior military which we had not maintained and did not
[20793]have, but which we felt confident that our military represen-
[20794]tative in Chile had....And we got the approval of the DIA to
[20795]enlist the cooperation of Colonel Wimert in our effort to pro-
[20796]cure intelligence. i
[20798](Karamessines testimony, August 6, 1975, p. 6)
[20800]To obtain Wimert's services, CIA officials prepared a suggested mes-
[20802]sage for the Director of DIA to send to the Army Attache in Santiago
[20803]through CIA communications channels. Because the DIA Director, General
[20804]Donald V. Bennett, was in Europe on official business, the Deputy
[20805]Director of Central Intelligence, Genéral Cushman, invited DIA Deputy
[20806]Director Lt. General Jammie M. Philpott to his office on September 28,
[20807]1970.* During that meeting, General Cushman requested the assistance of
[20808]the Army Attache, and General Philpott signed a letter which authorized
[20810]transmission of a message directing the Army Attache:
[20812]--to work closely with the CAS chief, or in his absence,
[20813]his deputy, in contacting and advising the principal mili-
[20814]tary figures who might play a decisive role in any move which
[20815]might, eventually, deny the presidency to Allende.
[20817]Do not, repeat not, advise the Ambassador or the Defense At-
[20818]tache of this message, or give them any indication of its.
[20819]portent. In the course of your routine activities, act in
[20820]accordance with the Ambassador's instructions. Simultaneously,
[20821]I wish--and now authorize you--to act in a concerted fashion
[20822]with the CAS chief.
[20824]7 eh é
[20825]10, 1970. General Philpott Wa
[20827]i a _ on
[20828]United States o
[20829]cting Director in Bennett's absence.
[20831]n the ‘evening of October
[20833]HY 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 456
[20836]This ‘message is” for your eyes only, and should not be dis-
[20837]vA cussed with any person other than those CAS officers who will
[20838]“be knowledgeable. CAS will identify them. (Headquarters 380
[20839]to Santiago)
[20840]For this and all subsequent messages intended for the Army Attache,
[20841]the secret CIA communications channel was used.
[20843]Both General Philpott and Thomas Karamessines testified that ini-
[20844]tially the Army Attache would be used only to "obtain or procure" in-
[20845]telligence on Chilean military officers.* (Philpott, p. 11; Karamessines,
[20846]p. 6) The September 28, 1970 message to the Army Attache, however, did . ——
[20847]in fact trigger his deep involvement in the coup attempt. According to
[20848]the Attache’s testimony, he received day-to-day instructions from the
[20850]y 7 ehtet of Station, and on occasion, the COS would show him messages which
[20852]\ w Cee 7
[20853]ostensibly from Generals Bennett and/or Philpott, directing him to L099 ,
[20855]take certain actions. The COS also transmitted messages from the Army
[20856]Attache to these Generals. | .
[20858]General Bennett testified that he never had knowledge of Track II
[20859]and that he never received any communication relating thereto, nor did a
[20860]he ever authorize the transmission of any messages to the Army Attache.
[20861]General Philpott also testified that he had no recollection of anything
[20862]connected with Track II after his initial meeting with General Cushman
[20863]on September 28. (Philpott, p. 16)
[20865]U.S. Army Colonel Robert C. Roth, who in September and October 1970
[20867]was the Chief of the Human Resources Division, Director of Collection, DIA,
[20870]I
[20871]* In this connection it should be noted that when _questioned about
[20872]this letter, General Philpott testified that he recalled. signing ma
[20873]an authorization such as that contained in the first. paragraph of ee
[20874]Headquarters 380 but that he did not recall. the’ authorizations and
[20875]instructions in paragraphs “Tae 2, ae pemmeer
[20877]at
[20879]HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 457
[20881]testified that he recalled working for Generals Bennett and Philpott on
[20882]"a priority requirement to identify Chilean personalities who might be
[20883]helpful in preventing the election of Allende as President of Chile."
[20884](Roth, Vol. I, p. 6) Though Roth recalls no mention of Track II as such,
[20885]the goal of this mission is identical to that described in the message
[20887]of September 28 bearing Philpott's signature,
[20889]Beginning on October 15, Roth kept a chronology of his activities
[20890]connected with Chile. This chronology reflects that there was a meeting
[20891]on October 21 regarding the preparation of biographic material on Chilean
[20892]generals which focused on their willingness to participate in a military
[20893]coup.. Generals Bennett, Philpott, and a CIA representative attended.
[20895]The chronology also shows that on October 21, Roth delivered a message to
[20896]Mr. Broeé to be sent by CIA channels.* A message was sent to Col. Wimert
[20897]that same day, ostensibly from General Bennett, which authorized:
[20898]FYI: Suspension temporarily imposed on MAP and FMS has
[20899]been rescinded. This action does not répeat not imply
[20900]change in our estimate of situation. On the contrary,
[20901]it is intended to place us in a posture in which we can
[20902]formally cut off assistance if Allende elected and situa-
[20903]tion develops as we anticipate. Request up date on situa-
[20904]‘tion. (Santiago 446; Ref: Headquarters 762) (Headquarters
[20905]934, 21 October 1970) : :
[20907]Roth testified that this DIA project ended on October 23 when he
[20909]followed Philpott's instructions to deliver biographic information on
[20911]Chilean figures to Mr. Broe at CIA. . Philpott also instructed him that
[20913]Roth believes that General Philpott directed him to deliver this
[20914]message and also pressed him on several occasions to seek a re-
[20915]sponse from Broe to an earlier message to Colonel Wimert. (Roth,
[20916]Vol. II, p.- )
[20918]HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 456
[20920]“any further action on the subject would henceforth be. the responsibility
[20922]of the CIA and that DIA would perform normal support functions." (Roth,
[20924]p- 8)*
[20926]Both Bennett and Philpott testified that the activities described |
[20927], by Roth were routine DIA activities. However, Colonel Roth testified: .-
[20929]I believe my impression at the time, or my recollection, is
[20930]that I was informed that there was concern at the highest |
[20931]U.S. Governmental level over the possible election of Allende,
[20933]‘that. DIA then had a priority responsibility of coming up with
[20934]the identities of key Chilean personalities that would be help-.
[20935]ful, and so forth. I have nothing specific as to the nature of
[20936]the instructions or the channels through which they came.
[20938].Q. It was your sense at the time that you were working on a
[20939]project that if it had not been initiated by, at least had
[20940]the attention of or concern of, the highest level?
[20942]* Roth's chronology also indicates that Philpott had asked that Broe ;
[20943]be queried on two or three occasions regarding a report from Wimert a
[20944]and that Philpott instructed that only he (Philpott) would communi-
[20945]cate with Cushman if the need arose. (Roth, p. 11) Roth also testi-
[20946]_: fied that Philpott advised him that communications with Wimert would
[20947]be by CIA channels. (Roth, p. 41)
[20951]~,
[20953](-
[20955]BP
[20957]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 459
[20959]Colonel Roth. That was my impression at the time.
[20961]Q. You understand from your work in the Defense Department
[20962]that the highest level of government usually indicated the
[20963]President of the United States?
[20965]Colonel Roth. I would assume that.
[20967]The CIA produced copies of several messages which identify
[20968]Generals Bennett anid Philpott as either the sender or recipient. Among
[20969]these documents is a message relating to Track II which bears Philpott's
[20971]purported signature. (Undated message. ca. 14 October 1970) General
[20973]Philpott admitted that the signature appears to be his but doubted that
[20974]it was and he could:not recall signing it, or having seen it. (Philpott,
[20975]p- ) CIA also produced messages of October 14 (Headquarters 762)
[20977]and October 21 (Headquarters 934) conveying instructions from General
[20979]Bennett to the Army Attache. General Bennett testified he did not
[20980]authorize these messages:
[20982]It is beyond the responsibilities which I had in the military. .
[20983]assistance area. It goes beyond the responsibility which I
[20984]had in terms that I’ would have to get the authority or the
[20985]approval of the Secretary through the Chairman for covert
[20986]> action of this magnitude. This message would not have been
[20987]signed by me. (Bennett testimony, p. 21)
[20990]x,
[20993]According to Karamessines, only the White House had the authority to a pene:
[20994]issue the directives contained in those messages (Karamessines testi-
[20995]mony, p. 84)
[20997]The Department of Defense was unable to provide any documents bear~
[20998]ing on the issue of Wimert's Track [I instructions or responses. A
[21000]DOD file search under the direction of General Daniel 0. Graham, the
[21002]present Director of DIA, produced no copies of communication documents
[21004]_. ; for the Sep tember-October 1970 period. (Graham, p. 6) However, Roth
[21006]testified that detailed memoranda for’ the record which he prepared on
[21007]POM AT ty, . 2 ott a4 +
[21008]i . fhoOR be wee :
[21009]. } pe 4 hoy a - a
[21010]his activities are missing ;from the files: (Roth Vol: I, p. )
[21011]y a i” \ on
[21013]a
[21015]HW 50955 Docld:32473539 Page 460
[21017]“CIA officials maintain that they acted faithfully in transmitting
[21018]messages to Generals Bennett and/or Philpott and in never sending a
[21020]message without proper authorization. Mr. Karamessines was particularly
[21022]forceful in this regard:
[21024].-.-I can recall no instance in my experience at the Central
[21025]Intelligence Agency in which a message was received for an
[21026]individual, an officer of the government anywhere, in what-
[21027]ever department, which was not faithfully, directly,. promptly
[21028]and fully and accurately delivered to that officer, or to his
[21029]duly authorized representative.
[21031](Karamessines testimony, p- 79)
[21033]We may have played tricks overseas, but it stopped at the
[21035]water's edge, and we didn't play tricks among ourselves or
[21037]among our colleagues within the Agency or in other agencies.
[21038](Karamessines testimony, p. 79)
[21040]- We could not remain in business for a day...if this had been
[21041]the practice of the Agency. It would have been no time at
[21042]all before we would have beén found out, a single instance
[21043]of the kind of thing you are suggesting might have taken
[21044]place would have put-us out of business.
[21046](Karamessines testimony, p. 80)
[21048]Dr. Kissinger denied he was ever informed of the Army Attache's~
[21050]role or that he authorized any messages: to be sent to the Army Attache. _ wed
[21052]> (Kissinger testimony, P- 22) : =
[21053]‘The investigation to date has not resolved the conflict between the poor
[21054]_ : pee
[21055]Statements of the senior CIA, DIA and White House officials. There are '
[21056]a . —
[21058]four possibilities that could explain the conflict. First, Generals
[21060]- Bennett and Philpott were cognizant of Track II and communicated their
[21062]general instructions. to the Army Attache. -This possibility would be
[21063]1
[21065]contrary to their sworn testimony: Second, General Bernett was not aware
[21067]of Track II but General Philpott was and communicated peneral instructions to ~ bins
[21069]the Army Attache. This possibility is supported by Roth’s testimony
[21071]but would be contrary to Philpott's sworn testimony and his duty to - : .
[21072]y ; ty —
[21074]keep General Bennett informed. Third, the CIA acted on its own
[21076]after receiving initial authority from General Philpott, co-opted and ordered
[21078]» and,
[21080]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 461
[21084]wee
[21086]4
[21088]“the Army Attache without further informing any member of the Department
[21089]of Defense of the White House. This possibility would be contrary to
[21090]the sworn seems wot David Phillips, William Broe, Thomas Karamessines,
[21092]So opaet by hah pn fA te | me
[21094]h, members of the White House staff authorized —
[21096]and William Colby.
[21097]the CIA to convey orders to the Army Attache on the basis of high or
[21098]highest government authority. Further, that the White House staff
[21100]directed that the Army Attache'’s superiors in the Pentagon not be in-
[21102]ares
[21105]oR
[21107]formed. This possibility would contradict the sworn testimony of Dr.
[21109]Kissinger and General Alexander Haig.
[21111]D. The False Flag Base
[21113]In order to minimize the risks of making contact with the dissident
[21115]Chilean officers, the task force decided in late September to set up a
[21116]"False Flag Base," i.e., to send four staff officers to Chile posing as —
[21117]nationals of other countries to supplement Colonel Wimert's contacts
[21119]a with Chilean military officers. Given the limitations of the Station's
[21121]resources and Colonel Wimert's visibility, Headquarters felt. the use of T.
[21122]"False Flag Officers" was necessary because "We don't want to miss a ci Fe
[21123]chance." One of these officers posed as a Brazilian intelligence officer ol SAL
[21125]so that “any Flap would be a Brazilian one." (Headquarters 363,
[21127]September 27, 1970)
[21129]*The use of “False Flag Officers" is not, according to David Phillips,
[21130]"an unusual practice," either by the CIA or, foreign intelligence 7
[21131]services. (Phillips testimony, pp. 47-48) * 4 :
[21135]HY 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 462
[21139]The False Flaggers were compartmented from each other and reported
[21140]separately on their contacts to a "deep cover" CIA officer in Santiago
[21141]who in turn reported to the Station. According to the testimony of the
[21142]Chief of Station, they received their instructions from Washington and
[21144]not from him.
[21146]E. Chief of Station
[21148]Although most of the Station officers in Santiago did not know of
[21149]track II, the Chief and Deputy Chief of Station were knowledgeable and
[21150]the Chief of Station initiated contacts on his own with Chilean officers.
[21151]The COS has testified that he regarded Track II as unrealistic: |
[21153]I had left no doubt in the minds*f my colleagues
[21154]and superiors that I did not consider any kind of
[21155]intervention in those constitutional processes
[21156]desirable....And one of the reasons certainly for my
[21157]last .recall.(to Washingten) was.to be read-the riot
[21158]act--which was done in a very pleasant, but very
[21159]intelligible manner. Specifically, I was told at
[21160]that time that the Agency was not.too interested in
[21161]continuously being told by me that certain proposals
[21162]which had been made could not be executed, or would
[21163]be counterproductive. (Chief of Station (Felix)
[21164]testimony, August 1, 1975, p. 10)
[21166]The Chief of Station's objection to Track II did not go unnoticed.
[21167]The following instruction to the COS was sent on October 7: "Report
[21168]should not contain analysis and argumentation but simply report on
[21169]action taken." (Headquarters 612, 7 October) Very simply, Headquarters
[21171]wanted the Station to take orders quietly as was the Agency itself.
[21173]poem
[21177]HY 450955 Daocld: 32423539 Page 463
[21179](Chief of Station testimony (Felix), August 1, 1975, p. 27)
[21181]TES.
[21184]TH
[21186]p
[21190]Three examples of the Chief of Station's reporting bear out his
[21192]claim to have dissented:
[21194]Bear in mind that parameter of action is exceed-
[21195]ingly narrow and available options are quite
[21196]limited and relatively simple.
[21198](Santiago 424, September 23, 1970)
[21200]Feel necessary to caution against any false optimism.
[21201]It is essential that we not become victims of our
[21202]own propaganda. (Santiago 441, October 1, 1970)
[21204]Urge you do not convey impression that Station has
[21205]sure-fire method of halting, let alone triggering :
[21206]coup attempts. (Santiago 477, October 7, 1970, p.2) —
[21208]q ome
[21210]mai
[21212]pag.
[21214]v
[21217]|
[21219]HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 464
[21221]A. The Chilean Conspirators
[21223]Anti-Allende coup plotting in Chile centered around several key
[21224]individuals. One of these was retired General Roberto Viaux, the General
[21225]who had led the "Tacnazo" insurrection a year before. Following the
[21226]"Tacnazo" revolt, and his dismissal from the. Army, Viaux retained the
[21228]support of many non-commissioned and junior officers as well as being
[21230]the recognized leader of several right-wing civilian groups. (CIA
[21232]Briefing Paper, "Special Mandate from the President on Chile," July
[21233]15, 1975)
[21235]Another individual around which plotting. centered was General Camilo
[21236]Valenzuela, Commander of the Santiago Garrison. General Valenzuela was i
[21237]in league with several other active duty officers, including Admiral
[21238]Huge Tirado, Navy Commander in Chief; General Vicente Huerta, Director
[21239]General of the Carabinero (police) Corps; General Canales, Director of
[21240]the Military Academy; and General Joaquin Garcia, second in command,
[21241]Air Force. (CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities, November 18, m
[21243]1970) All of these officers, with the possible exception of Canales,
[21245]#k
[21246]were in contact with Viaux as well.
[21248]*This revolt was engineered by Viaux ostensibly for the purposes of drama~
[21250]tizing the military's demand for higher pay, but was widely interpreted as
[21251]an abortive coup. . wens need
[21253]*kThe record of meetings between Viaux and the active duty military officers
[21254]is incomplete. The record does show, however, that Viaux met with General
[21255]Huerta around October 7. (Chile Task Force Log, October 7). On October 12
[21256]Viaux met with General Valenzuela (Chile Task Force Log, 14 October). One
[21257]cable from Santiago indicates that Admiral Tirado may have been a member
[21258]of Viaux's inner circle of conspirators. (Station 545, 16 October 1970). 7
[21259]At the very least, Tirado was in contact with Viaux. 4 7 yh
[21260]. . cae i bls a
[21261]Although a distinction can be made between thé: Viaux and Valenzuela. groups,
[21262]as CIA witnesses did throughout their testimony before the Committee, the
[21263]i principal distinction between the two was that the latter was led by active duty
[21264]“ military officers. The two groups were in contact with each other. The
[21265]record also indicates that they worked together in at least two of the three
[21266]Schneider kidnap attempts.
[21268]HY 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 465
[21270]There was considerable communication among the various plotting
[21272]elements. As Thomas Karamessines testified:
[21274].-I might add here that it seemed that a good ‘es
[21275]dozen or more, maybe 20 Chilean senior officers aed
[21276]were privy to what was going on in addition to -
[21277]President Frei and they were all talking to one
[21278]another exchanging views and trying to see how
[21279]best to mount the kind of coup that they wanted
[21280]to see take place. (Karamessines testimony, p. 10)
[21282]B. Contacts Prior to October 15
[21284]The CIA's initial task in Chile was to assess the potential within phe.
[21285]the Chilean military to stage a coup. It recognized quickly that anti- —
[21286]Allende currents did exist in the military and the Carabineros (police),
[21287]but were immobilized by "the tradition of military respect for the
[21288]Constitution" and "the public and private stance of General Schneider, me
[21289]Commander in Chief of the Army, who advocated strict adherence to the
[21290]Constitution." (CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities, 18 Novem-
[21291]ber 1970, p. 17) The Agency's task, then, was to overcome "the apolitical,
[21292]constitutional-oriented inertia of the Chilean military." (Ibid, p. 2)
[21294]Since the very top of the Chilean military, embodied by General &..
[21295]Schneider and his second-in-command, General Prat, were hostile to the
[21296]idea of a coup against Allende, discreet approaches were made to the
[21297]second level of general officers. They were to be informed that the U.S.
[21299]x
[21300]Government would support a coup both before and after it-took place.
[21301](Headquarters to Station 611, 7 October 1970) ‘This effort began in
[21303]earnest on October 5 when Colonel Wimert informed both an Army General
[21305]("Station's priority contact") an an Air Force.General of the pro-coup '
[21306]. e ene hal OF tne week :
[21308]a ee
[21310]Wf . . Lae :
[21311]rot ' re b
[21313]*The military officers were told, for example, that should Allende be
[21314]prevented from taking office, "The Chilean military will not be ostra-
[21315]cized, but rather can continue to count on us: for MAP support and main-~
[21316]tenance of our close relationship." (Hqs. 075517, 7 October 1970)
[21318]HY 50955 Daocld: 32423539 Page 466
[21320]ws .
[21321]; ‘policy. (Santiago 469, October 5; Santiago 473, October 6)
[21323]Three days later the Chief of Station told General Huerta, Commander
[21325]of the Carabineros that “the U.S. Government favors a military solu-
[21326]tion and is willing to support it in ‘any manner short of outright ‘ —_—
[21327]military intervention." (Task Force. Log, 9 October) General Huerta
[21329]informed the cos that there was no chance of a coup by the Chilean
[21331]Army high command. (Task Force Log, 10 October)
[21333]On October 7, Colonel Wimert approached members of the War Academy”
[21335]in Santiago who in turn asked him to provide light weapons. This was
[21337]Colonel Wimert's first contact with the Army Lt. Colonel to whom he
[21339]KK
[21340]would ultimately pass three submachine gunseon October 22. At this
[21342]meeting, the Lt. Colonel told Colonel Wimert that he and his colleagues
[21343]were
[21345]trying to exert force on Frei to eliminate
[21346]Gen. Schneider to either replace him, send
[21347]him out of the country. They had even stud-
[21348]ied plans to kidnap him. Schneider is the
[21349]main barrier to all plans for the military
[21350]to take over the government to prevent an
[21351]Allende presidency. (Santiago 483, 8 October)
[21353]* according to the CIA's wrap-up report on Track II, between October 5
[21354]and October 20, the CIA Station and the Army Attache--for the most part
[21355]the latter--made 21 contacts with key military and Carabinero officials.
[21356](CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities, 8 November 1970)
[21360]“Tn his testimony, Colonel Wimert indicated that the Lt. Colonel was
[21362]affiliated with General Canales. (Wimert testimony, p. 52) In a cable
[21364]sent to Headquarters on October 18, in which the Lt. Colonel's request
[21366]for three submachine guns was made, the Station indicated that Wimert
[21368]believed the Army officer, and his companion, a Navy Captain, were in
[21370]league with Admiral Tirado. (Station 562, October 18) At another point
[21372]in his testimony, Wimert stated, "There was Valenzuela here and the Navy .. ;
[21373]Captain and the Army Lt. Colonel and the Air Fotce General over here." 9 ti
[21374](Wimert testimony, p. 107) The Committee has been unable.to determine’ <: 4
[21375]the exact affiliation of the Army Lt. Colonel. However, as previously ;
[21376]stated, both General Canales and Admiral Tirado were affiliated with
[21378]General Valenzuela and Admiral Tirado was in contact with General Viaux.
[21380]Bee
[21382]as See
[21384]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 467
[21386]The next day, October 8, Headquarters cabled the Station in response
[21387]to the Wimert-Lt. Colonel meeting. Headquarters took note of Schneider's
[21388]resistance to coup plans and stated:
[21390]»».«This would make it more important than
[21392]ever to remove him and to bring this new
[21394]state of events...anything we or Station
[21396]can do to effect removal of Schneider? We
[21398]know this rhetorical question, but wish
[21400]inspire thought on both ends on this matter.
[21401](Hqs. 628, 8 October)
[21403]During the first week of intensive efforts chances of success
[21405]looked unusually bleak. The Chile Task Force Log commented:
[21406]President Frei and the highest levels of the
[21407]armed forces unable to pull themselves together
[21408]to block Allende. The Chilean mflitary's tradi-
[21409]tion of non-intervention, Frei's reluctance to
[21410]tarnish his historical image, General Schneider's
[21411]firm constitutional stand, and most importantly,
[21412]the lack of leadership within the government: and
[21413]military are working against a military takeover.
[21415](Task Force Log, 8 October)
[21417]The following day the Station made reference to the "rapid(ly) waning
[21418]chances for success." (Santiago 487, 9 October) . This pessimism was not
[21419]dispelled by their simultaneous judgment: . "Station has arrived at Viaux
[21420]solution by process of elimination." (Santiago 504, 10 October) Three
[21421]days later the Task Force agreed: "We continue to focus our attention
[21422]on General Viaux who now appears to be the only military leader willing
[21423]to block Allende." (Task Force Log, 13 October)
[21425]If Viaux was the CIA's only hope of staging a coup, things were bleak
[21426]indeed. His own colleagues, Generals Huerta and Valenzuela described him
[21427]as "a General without an army." (Santiago 495, 9 October) Yet in the
[21428]first two weeks of October he came to be regarded as the’ best hope for.
[21430]. en i
[21431]carrying out the CIA's Track II mandate.
[21433]HY 50955 Daocld: 32423539 Page 466
[21436]'
[21437]t
[21448]rt a rae
[21450]Although ‘Colonel Wimert was instructed not to involve himself with
[21454]Viaux because of the high risk involved (Santiago 461, 5 October), he
[21455]served initially as a contact to Viaux through an Argentine military
[21456]Attache. The Argentine reported on October 5 that Viaux wanted several —
[21457]hundred paralyzing gas grenades to launch a coup on October 9. (Santiago
[21459]476, 6 October) Headquarters turned down the request, concluding that
[21461]a "mini-coup at this juncture would be counterproductive" and Viaux
[21463]should postpone his plans, "while encouraging him in a suitable manner
[21464]to maintain his posture so that he may join larger movement later if
[21465]it materializes." (Headquarters 585, 6 October)
[21467]The primary purpose. of the "False Flag Base" was to contact Viaux,
[21469]and it very rapidly relieved Wimert and the Argentine Attache of that
[21471]task. Viaux reiterated his demand for an air drop of weapons to the
[21473]"False Flagger," and again the response was the same: reject the demand
[21474]for arms, but encourage him to keep planning. In essence the Agency
[21476]was buying time with Viaux: "We wish to encourage Viaux to expand and
[21478]2 ied
[21480]refine his coup planning. Gain some influence over his actions."
[21481](Headquarters 689, 10 October) To achieve this latter purpose, Head~
[21482]quarters authorized passing $20,000 in cash and a promise of: $250,000
[21483]in life insurance to Viaux and his associates, as a demonstration of
[21484]U.S. support. (Headquarters 729, 13 October)
[21486]On October 13, Headquarters again indicated its concern over Schneider
[21487]by asking: "What is to keep Schneider from making statement in early 7
[21488]hours which will freeze those military leaders who might otherwise join
[21490]Viaux?" (Headquarters 729, 13 October) The Station's response later that.
[21492]same day was "Viaux intends to kidnap Generals Schneider and Prats within
[21496]the next 48 hours in order to precipitate a coup." (Santiago 527,
[21498]HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 469
[21500]tion "as part of a coup that included Valenzuela." (Station 529, 13 October)
[21501]At about this time the Station began to receive encouragement from its
[21502]other contacts. On October 14, ten days before the Chilean Congress was
[21503]to vote, the Task Force Log concluded:
[21504]Now we are beginning to see signs of increasing
[21506]coup activity from other military quarters,
[21507]specifically, an Army General (name deleted),
[21509]Admiral Tirado, the forces in Concepcion and 7 .
[21510]Valdivis and perhaps even Frei and Ossa. i
[21511](Task Force Log, 14 October) ; es
[21513]Cc. October 15 Decision
[21515]To summarize, by October 15, General Viaux had advertised to his con-
[21516]tact a desire to proceed with a coup, had ifidicated he would deal with
[21517]the Schneider obstacle by kidnapping him, had met at least once with Gen~ "
[21518]erals Huerta and Valenzuela and had once postponed his coup plans.* —
[21520]On October 15 Thomas Karamessines met Henry Kissinger and Alexander
[21521]Haig at the White House to discuss the situation in Chile. According
[21522]to the Agency's record of this meeting, Karamessines’ "provided a run-
[21523]down on Viaux, the Canales meeting with Tirado, and, in some detail, .
[21524]the general situation in Chile from the coup-possibility viewpoint."
[21525](Memorandum of Conversation/Kissinger, Karamessines, and Haig, 15 October
[21526]1970) A decision was made at the meeting "to de-fuse the Viaux coup plot,
[21527]at least temporarily:”
[21529]* The reason for Viaux postponing his coup plans was the subject of a cable
[21530]from Santiago to Headquarters:
[21532]We discount Viaux's statement that he had called off his coup at- ‘
[21533]‘tempt because of False Flag Officer's impending visit. Other re- x . oy
[21534]porting indicated Viaux probably not able or intending move this ma
[21535]weekend. (Santiago 499, 10 October) oS fer
[21537]There is also reason to believe that General Valenzuela was instrumental be
[21538]in persuading Viaux to postpone. According to the Chile Task Force Logs ; —
[21540]Station reported that on 12 October General Valenzuela met
[21541]with General Viaux and attempted to persuade him not to at-
[21542]tempt a coup." (Chile Task Force Log, 14 October)
[21544]HW 50955 Docld:32473539 Page 470—
[21548]\ It was decided by those present that the Agency
[21549]. ' must get a message to Viaux warning him against
[21550]°y any precipitate action. In essence the message
[21551]should state: "We have reviewed your plans and
[21552]based on your information and ours, we come to
[21553]the conclusion that your plans for a coup at
[21554]this time cannot succeed. Failing, they may re-
[21555]duce your capabilities in the future. Preserve —
[21556]your assets. We will stay in touch. The time
[21558]will come when you with all your other friends
[21560]can do something. You will continue to have
[21562]our support." (15 October Memorandum of Conver-
[21564]sation, Kissinger, Karamessines, Haig)
[21566]' The meeting concluded, according to the Agency's record, "on Dr.
[21568]Kissinger's note that the Agency should continue keeping the pressure —
[21569]on every Allende weak spot in sight--now, after the 24th of October,
[21570]after 5 November, and into the future until such time as new marching
[21572]-
[21574]orders are given. Mr. Karamessines stated that the Agency would comply."*
[21576]The following day CIA Headquarters cabled the results of the White
[21579]House meeting to the Station in Santiago:
[21580]2. It is firm and continuing policy that Allende
[21581]be overthrown by a coup....We are to continue to | :
[21582]generate maximum pressure toward this end utiliz- ;
[21583]ing every appropriate resource.
[21585]3. After the most careful consideration it was
[21586]determined that a Viaux coup attempt carried out —
[21587]by him alone with the forces now at his disposal
[21588]would fail. Thus it would be counterproductive
[21589]to our Track Two objectives. It was decided that
[21590]CIA get a message to Viaux warning him against
[21591]precipitate action. (Headquarters 802, 16 Octo- ‘
[21594]The message was supplemented by orders to
[21596]‘continue to encourage him
[21597](Viaux) to amplify his planning; encourage him to join forces with other
[21598]coup planners." (Headquarters 802, 16 October) ‘The message concluded:
[21600]"There is great and continuing interest in the activities of Tirado,.
[21602]Canales, Valenzuela et al and we wish them optimum good fortune.” (Ibid.)
[21604]* . . oe .
[21605]Secretary Kissinger's recollection of the October 15 meeting is not HS
[21606]ae in accord with that of Mr. Karamessines or the cable (Headquarters 802)
[21607]that was sent the following day to the Station in Santiago. This mat-
[21608]ter will be discussed in Part V of this report.
[21610]HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 471
[21612]x 4 A ie. aa
[21614]‘ Oe
[21616]“Dp Coup Planning and Attempts After October 15
[21618]The decision to "de-fuse" General Viaux was passed to Viaux's’
[21619]father-in-law on October 17. The in-law responded that it did not. Ne
[21620]matter because they had decided to proceed with the coup in any case, __
[21621](Santiago 533, 17 October) At the final meeting of the CIA "False
[21623]Flagger" and Viaux's father-in-law on October 18, the Agency was in-
[21625]formed that the coup would proceed on October 22, "and that the abduc-
[21627]tion of General Schneider is first link in chain of events to come."
[21628](Santiago 568, 19 October) An "emergency channel" of communication
[21629]with Viaux was maintained. (Report on CIA Chilean Task Force Activities,
[21630]18 November 1970, .page 21) - |
[21632]As previously stated, by mid-October things suddenly looked brighter
[21634]. *
[21635]for a coup being mounted by the high-level Chilean military contacts.
[21637]As a CIA overview statement in Track II stated:
[21639]Coup possibilities afforded by the active
[21640]duty military group led by General Valenzuela
[21641]and Admiral Tirado had always seemed more
[21642]promising than the capabilities of the Viaux
[21643]group. These military officers had the abil- *
[21644]ity and resources to act providing they de- —
[21645]cided to move and organized themselves ac-
[21646]cordingly.
[21648](CIA Briefing Paper, "Special Mandate from
[21650]the President on Chile," July 15, 1975, p. 5)
[21652]By mid-October those military officers appeared to be moving in
[21653]this direction.
[21654]On the evening of October 17, Colonel Wimert met with the Army Lt. ve.
[21656]Colonel and the Navy Captain. They requested 8 to 10 tear gas grenades, e
[21659]*Two coup plotters, Generals Canales and Garin, made one last attempt to (A i war..
[21660]persuade General Schneider to change his anti~coup'position on October 15,.! 4
[21662]The Station reported that the meeting turned out: to be a "complete fiasco.
[21663]Schneider refused to listen to General Canales’ eloquent presentation of | _—
[21664]Communist action in Chile...and adament in maintaining his non-involvement
[21666]stance." (Santiago 548, 16 October)
[21668]va
[21670]HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 472
[21674]three “45~caliber machine guns and 500 rounds of ammunition. The Navy
[21676]. Captain said he had three machine guns himself "but can be identified
[21678]by serial numbers as having been issued to him. Therefore unable to
[21679]use them.” (Santiago 562, 18 October) Colonel Wimert and the Chief —
[21680]of Station have testified that the officers wanted the machine guns
[21682]for self-protection. The question, of course, is whether the arms were
[21683]intended for use, or were used, in the kidnapping of General Schneider.
[21685]The fact that the weapons were provided the Lt. Colonel and the Navy
[21687]Captain and that Viaux associates were convicted of the Schneider killing
[21688]suggests that the guns were not involved.
[21690]The machine guns and ammunition were seat from Washington by diplo-
[21692]matic pouch on the morning of October 19, although Headquarters was
[21694]puzzled about their purpose: "Will continue make effort provide them
[21695]but find our credulity stretched by Navy Captain leading his troops
[21697]with sterile guns. What is special purpose for these guns? We will
[21699]try send them whether you-can provide explanation or not." (Headquarters
[21701]854, 18 October) The first installment was delivered to the Army Le.
[21703]Colonel and the Navy Captain late in the evening of October 18 and con-
[21705]sisted of the six tear gas grenades intended originally. for Viaux.*
[21707]* As previously stated, after October 15 CIA efforts to promote a coup in
[21709]Chile focussed on the active duty military officers--Valenzuela, et. al.--
[21711]rather than Viaux. An example of this shift in focus was the decision to’
[21713]provide the Army Lt. Colonel and the Army Captain the tear gas grenades
[21715]originally intended for Viaux. A cable from Santiago explained the Purpose | of a
[21716]this action: :
[21718]Station plans give six tear gas grenades to
[21719]Colonel Wimert for delivery to Armed Forces
[21720]officers (deletion) instead of having False
[21721]Flag Officer deliver them to Viaux group.
[21722]Our reasoning is that Wimert dealing with
[21723]active duty officers. Also False Flagger : 2
[21724]leaving evening 18 October, and will not be © ;
[21725]replaced but Wimert will stay here. Hence , a.
[21726]important that Wimert credibility with Armed
[21727]Forces officers be strengthened.
[21729](Santiago 562, 18 October)
[21731]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 473
[21733]MR BB
[21735]‘ That same. day, General Valenzuela informed Colonel Wimert that he,
[21737]General Huerta, Admiral Tirado and an Air Force General were prepared
[21738]to sponsor a coup. (CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities, 18 . ee
[21739]November 1970) Their plan was to begin with the kidnapping of General
[21740]Schneider on the following evening, October 19, at a military
[21742]dinner being given for Schneider,* after which Schneider would be flown
[21743]to Argentina, Frei would resign and leave Chile, Admiral Tirado would
[21745]‘head the military junta, and dissolve Congress. With respect to the
[21747]kidnapping of Schneider, the cable reports:
[21749]General Viaux knowledgeable of above operation
[21751]but not directly involved. He has been sent to
[21752]Vina to stay with prominent physfcian. Will be
[21753]seen in public places during 19 and 20 October -
[21754]to demonstrate fact that above operation not his i
[21755]doing. Will be allowed to return to Santiago at
[21756]end of week. Military will not admit involve-
[21759]ment in Schneider's abduction which is to be % :
[21760]blamed on leftists. (Santiago 566, 19 October)
[21761]The kidnapping of the evening of October 19 failed because General Schneider
[21762]left in a private vehicle, rather than in his. official. car, and. his police guard
[21764]failed to be withdrawn, but the Army Lt.Colonel assured Colonel Wimert that an~ .
[21765]other attempt would be made on October 20.. (Santiago 582, 20 October)
[21766]Colonel Wimert was authorized to pay Valenzuela $50,000 "which was the price
[21767]. agreed upon between the plotters and the unidentified team of abductors."
[21768]* The "False Flag Officer" who was in contact with Viaux at the, time
[21769]the Valenzuela plan was given to Colonel Wimert apparently understood i
[21770]that Viaux was involved in the October'19 attempt. He stated: \
[21771]Q. Were you told any of the details of how .
[21772]‘the (Viaux) kidnapping would be carried out? a RE
[21773]Sarney They indicated it was going to be F
[21774]at
[21776]at some sort of a banquet which the General
[21777](Schneider) would be attending.
[21779](Garno “testimony, p. 37)
[21781]HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 4?f4
[21785]re ren) 24
[21787]i
[21789]4 : Sy
[21791]but Wimert, ‘insisted that the kidnapping be completed before he paid the
[21793]money. (Task Force Log, 20 October) At the same time General Valenzuela
[21794]assured Colonel Wimert that the military was now prepared to move. (Task
[21795]Force Log, 20 October) The second abduction attempt on the 20th also
[21796]failed and the Task Force concluded
[21798]Since Valenzuela's group is apparently having
[21800]considerable difficulty executing even the first
[21802]step of its coup plan, the prospects for a coup
[21804]succeeding or even occurring before 24 October . wi
[21805]now appears remote. (Task Force Log, 22 October) we.
[21807]E. The Killing of General Schneider
[21808]In the early morning hours of October 22 (2 am), Colonel Wimert
[21809]delivered the three submachine guns with ammunition to the Army Lt.
[21811]Colonel in an isolated section of Santiago.*
[21813]*al though Colonel Wimert's testimony and the cable traffic.do not
[21814]clearly establish the identity of the group to which the Lt. Colonel
[21815]was affiliated (see page 31) two CIA statements on Track II tie the
[21816]weapons, and therefore the Lt. Colonel, to the Valenzuela group:
[21818].-The only assistance requested by Valenzuela ,
[21819]to set the plan /of October 19/ into motion
[21820]through Schneider's abduction was several sub-
[21821]machine guns, ammunition, a few tear gas grenades
[21822]and gas masks (all of which were provided) plus
[21823]$50,000 for expenses (which was to be passed upon
[21824]demand.
[21826](CIA. Report on Chilean Task Force Activities,
[21827]18 November 1970, p. 22)
[21829]...Three sub-machine guns, together with six gas
[21830]cannisters and masks, were passed to the Valen-
[21831]zuela group at 2 am on 22 October. The reason
[21832]why they still wanted the weapons was because
[21833]there were two days remaining before the Congress
[21834]decided the Presidential election and the Valen-
[21835]zuela group maintained some hope they could still Pasa
[21836]carry out their plans. oe
[21838](CIA Briefing Paper, "Special Mandate from the
[21840]President on Chile," p. 7, July 15, 1975) ~ _
[21842]gst a ae ek di
[21843]ER e
[21845]HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 475
[21847]pope ~4u-
[21848]pe ;
[21849]4 .- ot 1 wa
[21851]: : AF poe cee
[21852]ts ¢ At about -#% am that’ day the group that intended to kidnap General
[21854]Schneider met to discuss last-minute instructions. According to the
[21856]findings of the Chilean Military Court which investigated the Schneider Sets
[21858]Ae
[21860]killing, neither the Army Lt. Colonel nor the Navy Captain were there.
[21861]Shortly after 8 am, General Schneider's car was intercepted, on his
[21862]way to work, by the abductorsand he was mortally wounded when he drew
[21864]his handgun in self-defense. The Military Court determined that hand
[21866]gurs had been used to kill General Schneider, although it also found
[21867]that one unloaded machine gun was at the scene of the killing.
[21869]The first Station reports following the Schneider shooting said
[21870]"Military Mission sources claim General Schmeider machine gunned on
[21871]way to work" (Santiago 587, 22 October) and "Assailants used grease Be
[21872]guns." (Santiago 589, 22 October). The submachine guns had previously
[21874]Ww
[21876]been described as "grease guns." Thus the initial reaction of the Station
[21878]was that Schneider had been shot with the same kind of weapons delivered
[21879]several hours earlier to the Army Lt. Colonel. Santiago then informed
[21880]Headquarters "Station has instructed Col. Wimert to hand over $50,000
[21882]if Gen. Valenzuela requests (Santiago 592, 22 October), thus indicating
[21884]that the Station thought the kidnapping had been accomplished by Valen-
[21886]zuela's paid abductors. Later that day, the Station cabled Headquarters: ..,--
[21888]* The Military Court determined that those who participated in the
[21889]shooting of General Schneider on October 22 were part of the Viaux-led
[21890]conspiracy. The Court also found that this same group had participated
[21891]in the October 19 and 20 kidnap attempts.
[21893]culminating in the death of General Schneider. He received a 20-year
[21894]prison sentence for being "author of the crime of kidnapping which re- +
[21895]sulted in serious injury to the victim,"’ and a five-year exile for con-
[21896]spiring to cause a military coup. Also convicted on the latter charge
[21898]a were Generals Valenzuela and Tirado. They received sentences of three
[21899]years in exile.
[21901]j
[21905]i
[21909]'
[21911]t
[21912]In June 1972 General Viaux was convicted for complicity in the plot om
[21914]Be
[21918]HY 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 476
[21924]“Station unaware if assassination was pre-
[21925]meditated or whether it constituted bungled
[21926]abduction attempt. In any case, it important
[21927]to bear in mind that move against Schneider
[21928]was conceived by and executed at behest of
[21929]senior Armed Forces officers. We know that
[21930]General Valenzuela was involved. We also
[21931]near certain that Admiral Tirado, Army Lt.
[21932]Colonel and Navy Captain witting and involved.
[21933]We have reason for believeing that General
[21934]Viaux and numerous associates fully clued in,
[21935]but cannot prove or disprove that execution
[21936]or attempt against Schneider was entrusted to
[21937]elements linked with Viaux. Important factor
[21938]to bear in mind is that Armed Forces, and not
[21939]retired officers or extreme rightests, set
[21940]Schneider up for execution or abduction....
[21941]All we can say is that attempt against Schneic
[21942]is affording Armed Forces one last opportunity
[21943]to prevent Allende's election if they are will
[21944]to follow Valenzuela's scenario.g
[21946](Santiago 598, 22 October)
[21948]F, Post October 22 Events
[21949]The shooting of General Schneider resulted immediate]
[21951]tion of martial law, the appointment of General Prats to)
[21952]t
[21953]t
[21954]as Commander in Chief, and the appointment of General Val
[21955]i
[21956]of Santiago province. These measures, and others taken,.
[21958]Task Force to make the following initial judgment:
[21960]With only 24 hours remaining before the Congre
[21961]runoff, a coup climate exists in Chile....The
[21963]on General Schneider has produced developments
[21965]closely follow Valenzuela's plan....Consequent
[21966]plotters' positions have been enhanced. ;
[21967](Chile Task Force Log, 22 Octot
[21969]On October 23, Director Helms reviewed and discussed
[21971]It was agreed...that a maximum effort has beer.
[21973]and that now only the Chileans themselves can
[21975]successful coup. The Chileans have been guide
[21977]point where a military solution is at least of
[21979]them. (Task Force Logy~ 24 Octok
[21980]x 2 i
[21982]R,
[21984]4 Poo
[21987]Although it
[21989]" prediction of ¢
[21990]an abduction at
[21991]constitutional
[21992]Dr. Allende wa:
[21994]died the next <
[21998]HY 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 477
[22002]A io ACstaa
[22004]sAlthough it was not immediately clear to CIA observers, the Station's
[22006]prediction of October 9 that the shooting of Schneider (as a result of
[22007]an abduction attempt) would "rally the Army firmly behind the flag of
[22008]constitutionalism' was correct. (Santiago 495, 9 October) On October 24 _—_
[22010]Dr. Allende was confirmed by the Chilean Congress. General Schneider
[22012]died the next day.
[22014]fe
[22015]y
[22016]i
[22020]Soy CIA/White House Communication During Track It
[22021]The testimony given to the Committee by Henry Kissinger and General
[22022]Haig conflicts with that given by CIA officials. >
[22023]Kissinger and Haig testified that on October 15, 1970, the White —
[22024]House stood downCIA efforts to promote a military coup d'etat in Chile.
[22025]Both testified that after that date they were neither informed of, nor
[22026]authorized, CIA Track II activities, including the kidnap plans of
[22028]General Schneider and the passage of weapons to the military plotters.
[22030]By contrast, CIA officials testified that they operated before and
[22031]after October 15 with the knowledge and approval of the White House.
[22033]The conflict pertains directly to the period after October 15, but
[22034]it bears on the degree of communication between the White House and the
[22035]CIA in the earlier period as well. For instance, Henry Kissinger testi-
[22036]fied that he was informed of no coup plan which began with the abduction
[22037]of General Schneider. He was aware of General Viaux's plan-~-which he
[22038]and Karamessines decided on October 15 to try to forestall--but did not
[22039]know that it was to begin with Schneider's abduction.
[22041]CIA officials, especially Thomas Karamessines, stated that there was
[22042]close consultation throughout Track II between the Agency and the White
[22043]House. Karamessines testified that he met with Kissinger some six to .
[22044]ten times during the five weeks of Track II (Karamessines testimony,
[22045]page 66); and that he kept Kissinger generally informed of developments.
[22046](Lbid., page 56) The Committee has records of two meetings between A
[22048]-Karamessines and Kissinger and of one telephone conversation between r
[22050]Karamessines and Kissinger’s deputy, General Alexander Haig. Karamessines'
[22052]daily calendar indicates that three other meetings with General Bate.
[22053]rey NET a
[22054]took place-—but does not establish with re the. topic wae
[22056]Ry,
[22058]HW 50955 DoclId: 32423533 Page 479
[22060]i.
[22062]A. September ees x
[22064]September 18 . |
[22066]Helms and Karamessines met with Kissinger at the White House. As
[22068]met
[22069]i. A
[22071]Helms’ notes of the September 15 meeting indicate, Kissinger wanted a be
[22072]plan within 48 hours. In the meeting on the 18th, according to CIA
[22074]records, there was little discussion of a military coup. Rather the
[22075]conversation focused on "what economic leverage could be exercised in
[22077]the Chilean situation...." (Memorandum/Meeting with DDP, 18 September)
[22079]The efficacy of economic pressure continued to be a subject of con-
[22080]cern during the last days of September. Apparently that pressure was
[22082]viewed as another inducement to Frei to opt for the "Frei gambit."
[22084]Ce
[22086]September 21
[22088]The 40 Committee met. The Select Committee has no confirmation
[22089]that Chile was on the agenda at this meeting. Karamessines' calendar pe
[22090]confirms that he attended; presumably Kissinger, the 40 Committee chair-
[22091]man, also attended, although the Committee has not been able to review
[22092]his calendar. All that can be said about this meeting--and the meetings
[22093]of the Senior Review Group, which Kissinger also chaired--is that the
[22094]meetings afforded Karamessines and Kissinger an opportunity to meet
[22095]privately and discuss Track II if they desired. In all these instances
[22096]save the 40 Committee meeting on September 22, the Committee has no
[22097]evidence to confirm that such a private Kissinger/Karamessines meeting
[22098]actually took place. That the CIA prepared a memorandum of conversa-
[22099]tion for the private meeting on the 22nd but has been able to find none
[22100]for other meetings may provide some support for the argument that no
[22101]other such private meetings occurred.
[22103]September 22
[22105]Kissinger asked Karamessines to stay behind
[22107]ate af
[22108]ES %
[22112]meeting called to discuss Track I. The two “actions,
[22114]eg gegrussea ite
[22116]especially the contacts with then-Chilean-President Frei. According to
[22118]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 460
[22120]and he added we were doing fine and keep it up." (Memorandum for
[22122]the Record/Chile, 22 September 1970, by Thomas Karamessines)
[22124]SOPRA,
[22125]hes?
[22127]B. October / . , . —
[22129]October 5
[22131]A cable sent to Santiago, released by Karamessines, requested a
[22133]report on how the Station planned to contact the three Chilean Generals
[22135]~-Prats, Valenzuela and Huerta--named in a cable of September 30.
[22137](Headquarters 449) The October 5 cable indicated that the report was
[22138]needed for a discussion with Kissinger on October 6. (Santiago 556,
[22139]5 October 1970) Karamessines presumed such «a meeting had taken place,
[22140]although he had'no specific memory of it. (Karamessines testimony, a
[22141]pp. 69-70) His calendar for October 6 indicates that he attended a 40 ~
[22142]Committee meeting on Chile. (Karamessines calendar) Kissinger
[22143]chaired the 40 Committee.
[22144]' October 6
[22146]The Station reported that General Viaux was “ready to launch golpe
[22147]evening 9 October, or morning 10 October." (Santiago 472, 6 October
[22148]1970) “In response, CIA Headquarters labeled the prospective coup one
[22149]“with scant chance of success which will vitiate any further more seri-
[22150]ous action." The Station was directed to try to “stop ill-considered
[22151]action at this time." (Headquarters 585, 6 October 1970)
[22153]Kissinger testified he had not been informed of the Viaux plan,
[22155]supporting his recollection with the fact that the CIA memorandum of
[22158]a
[22159]1
[22160]4
[22161]4
[22162]4
[22163]4 em cee
[22165]is
[22166]| id
[22168]an October 10 conversation between Karamessines and Haig (see below)
[22170]foes a ya gy
[22173]makes no mention of any previous plots. (Kissinger testimony, p. 24). 3 i
[22174]. bebo, . .
[22175]betta fs . a
[22177]AS
[22179]he
[22181]HY 50955 Daocld: 32423539. Page 461
[22183]~G fm
[22185]. Similarly, Kissinger. did not remember having been informed that the
[22187]CIA had called off a coup it. regarded as premature. He stated:
[22189]My perception at that period was that if they
[22190]had a coup they would come...back to us before
[22191]triggering it...at no time during the period
[22192]did they, in.fact, tell us...that they had a
[22193]coup that might be ready to go. And, indeed,
[22194]they generally told us the opposite.
[22196](Kissinger testimony, pp. 25-26)
[22198]As Karamessines' calendar indicated, there was a 40 Committee meet—
[22200]ing on October 6. He attended this meeting, along with Richard Helms '
[22202]and William Broe of the CIA. According to the minutes of that meeting,
[22203]CIA efforts to promote a military coup in Chile were not discussed.
[22204]However, in an exchange with Charles Meyer, who was then the State De-
[22206]-partment's Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs, Dr. Kissinger
[22208]stressed the desire of "higher authority" (President Nixon) to prevent
[22209]‘Allende's assumption of office. According to the minutes:
[22211]Mr. Meyer pointed to the need to determine a post-Allende
[22213]position such as proposed in NSSM 97.. It was agreed that =
[22215]an early NSC meeting was desirable on that subject. Mr. || po
[22217]Kissinger said this presumed total acceptance of a fait _
[22218]M7 accompli and higher authority had no intention of conced- . be
[22220]ing before the 24th; on the contrary, he wanted no stone : °
[22222]left unturned. (Memorandum for the Record/Minutes of the.
[22224]Meeting of the 40 Committee, 6 October 1970, 7 October
[22226]1970) ,
[22228]October 8
[22230]Karamessines met for lunch with General Haig. (Karamessines calendar) |
[22232]In his testimony, Haig recalled being aware that the CIA was in touch —
[22234]with two differenct groups of military plotters. He believed there must |
[22235]have been another meeting in which the CIA informed him of its on-going . oS
[22237]contacts.
[22239]at
[22241]HY 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 462
[22245]' It seems to me, although the records don't. re-
[22246]flect it, that there was a meeting in September,
[22247]a very brief one, in which I must have been
[22248]told that there was a specific program going . ae.
[22249]underway. That probably would have been by —
[22250]Henry (Kissinger) and perhaps with Karamessines
[22251]there. I am not sure. (Haig testimony, p. 12)
[22253]October 10
[22255]Karamessines discussed the Chilean situation by telephone with General
[22257]Haig. He indicated that the Station had "made direct contact with a number
[22259]of the senior military officers, especially those who had been reportedly
[22260]very activist-minded and had received pessimistic reactions from all."
[22261](Memorandum/FUBELT, by William Broe, 10 October 1970)
[22263]‘Haig recalled the telephone conversation with Karamessines on the 10th.
[22265]His recollection accords with the CIA memorandum of conversation. ont
[22267]I do know, and I know that from looking at the
[22268]record this morning, that Karamessines made a
[22269]telephone call to me in which he gave a progress
[22270]report. I recall that. It was in effect a nega-
[22271]tive progress report, that they were just not com-
[22272]ing up with it. (Haig testimony, p. 12)
[22274]HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 463
[22278]4
[22280]15th. (see below) to have discussed the results of the
[22282]meeting .on the
[22283]; any
[22285]October 14th message. But the CIA record makes no mention of any
[22287]such discussion. (Kissinger testimony, p. 53)
[22289]October 14
[22290]The 40 Committee met to discuss, among other topics, Chile. In ad-
[22291]dition to the 40 Committee principals (Kissinger, John Mitchell, David
[22292]Packard, Alexis Johnson, Admiral Moorer), the meeting was attended by.
[22294]Karamessines, William Broe and General Robert Cushman of the CIA, Charles
[22296]Meyer from State, Viron Vaky, and Ambassador Korry, who had returned to
[22297]Washington from Santiago for a short period of consultation.
[22298]According to the minutes of that meeting, Kissinger asked Karamessines
[22300]to give a rundown on the latest developments and present situation in Chile.
[22302]Karamessines pointed out that "a coup climate does not presently exist.)
[22304]He noted that "the unpredictable General Viaux is the only individual seem
[22305]ingly ready to attempt a coup and...his chances of mounting a successful
[22306]one were slight." Ambassador Korry: agreed with Karamessines' assessment
[22308]and stated that "as of now it seemed almost certain that Allende would Be
[22310]be voted into office on October 24th." Kissinger then observed that :
[22312]"there presently appeared to be little the U.S. can do to influence the
[22313]Chilean situation.one way or another." .Other participants at the meet-— ben
[22315]‘ing concurred. (Memorandum for the Record/Minutes of the Meeting of the. ; r,
[22317]40 Committee, 14 October 1970, 16 October 1970)
[22319]AW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 464
[22323]October 15
[22325]Karamessines met with Kissinger and Haig at the White-House to dis-
[22327]cuss Track II. According to the CIA memorandum of conversation, Karamessines
[22328]gave a run-down on Viaux, Canales and Tirado and "the general situation in
[22329]Chile from the coup-possibility viewpoint." It was concluded that Viaux
[22331]did not have more than one.chance in twenty--perhaps less--to launch a
[22333]successful coup. Kissinger ticked off the list of negative. repercussions
[22335]from an unsuccessful coup. The CLA record of the meeting continues:
[22337]5. It was decided by those present that the’
[22338]‘Agency must get a message to Viaux warning him
[22339]against any precipitate action. In essence our
[22340]message was to state: "We have reviewed your
[22341]plans,’ and based on your information and ours,
[22342]we come to the conelusion that your plans for a
[22343]coup at this time cannot succeed. Failing,
[22344]they may reduce your capabilities for the future. ; ot ~—
[22345]Preserve your.assets. We will stay in touch.
[22347]The time will come when you with all your other
[22349]friends can do something. You will continue to
[22351]have our support."
[22353]6. After the decision to de-fuse the Viaux coup
[22354]piot, at least temporarily, Dr. Kissinger. instruc-
[22355]> ted Mr. Karamessines to preserve Agency assets in
[22356]Chile, working clandestinely and securely to main-
[22357]tain the capability for Agency operations against ; : -
[22358]Allende in the future. . Bs
[22360]8. The meeting concluded on.Dr. Kissinger's note
[22361]that the Agency should continue keeping the pres-
[22362]sure on every Allende weak spot in sight~-now,
[22363]after the 24th of October, after 5 November, and
[22364]into the future until. such time as new marching
[22365]orders are given. Mr.: Karamessines stated that
[22366]the Agency would comply.
[22368](Memorandum of Conversation/Dr. Kissinger, Mr.
[22369]Karamessines, Gen. Haig at the White House, 15
[22370]October 1970) ;
[22372]HW 50955 DocId: 32423539 Page 465
[22376]on
[22378]s testimony before the Committee, regarded the CIA
[22380]memorandum of conversation as substantially correct, although somewhat
[22382]more detailed than he would have remembered. (Kissinger testimony, p. 52)
[22384]oo
[22386]He believed the Agency had been told to "stand down and preserve your
[22387]assets."
[22389]Kissinger believed that the gist of the October 15th meeting as
[22390]recorded in the CIA memorandum was incompatible with the order the CIA
[22392]issued to its Station the next day, an order ostensibly based on the
[22394]October 15th meeting. And, he noted, in writing its memorandum of the
[22395]meeting of the 15th, the CIA had a “high incentive to preserve the maxi-
[22396]mum degree of authority." (Ibid., pp. 55-54) The October 16th order
[22398]indicated that Track II had been reviewed at "high USG level" the previous
[22400]day, and stated:
[22402]2. It is firm and continuing policy that Allende
[22403]be overthrown by a coup. It would be much prefer-
[22404]able to have this transpire prior to 24 October
[22406]but efforts in this regard will continue vigorously
[22407]beyond this date.... ,
[22409]Pee EL
[22411]4. There is great and continuing interest in the
[22412]activities of Tirado, Canales, Valenzuela et al
[22413]and we wish them optimum good fortune.
[22414](Headquarters 802, 16 October 1970) _
[22415]Kissinger recalled the October 15th conversation as “turning of £ oy
[22417]the coup plans rather than giving a new order to do them." (Kissinger
[22419]testimony, p. 56) Haig agreed in his testimony.
[22421]The conclusions of that meeting were that we had
[22423]better not do anything rather than something that
[22425]was not going to succeed....My general feeling '
[22427]was, I left that meeting with the impression that ;
[22429]there was nothing authorized.”
[22431](Haig testimony, p. 13) Ee
[22434]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 466
[22437]44 October-10-October 22 (approximate)
[22439]Karamessines and one or two others went with Kissinger to speak with
[22441]the President, after a larger meeting. Karamessines believed this meeting
[22443]took place between October 10 and 24. (Karamessines testimony, p. 89) —
[22445]According to Karamessines, the "President went out of his way to impress
[22447]all of those there with his conviction that it was absolutely essential
[22449]te
[22450]that the election of Mr. Allende to the presidency be thwarted." As
[22452]they were leaving the Oval Office, the President took Karamessines aside
[22454]to reiterate the message. (Karamessines testimony, p. 8)
[22455]October 19
[22457]Station cabled Headquarters early in the morning, advising that
[22459]Xe
[22461]the tear gas had been passed and outlining the Valenzuela coup plan,
[22463]|
[22464]b
[22465]Fa
[22466]po
[22467]i.
[22469]beginning with the kidnap of Schneider. In testimony before the Com-
[22470]mittee, Karamessines indicated he certainly would have reported the
[22471]Valenzuela plan to Kissinger "very promptly, if for no other reason
[22473]than that we didn't have all that much promising news to report to
[22474]P &
[22476]the White House.... (Karamessines testimony, p-. 72)
[22478]And as I say, if for no other reason we would have |
[22479]wanted to get this kind of hopeful report to the
[22480]White House as soon as possible, and it would be my
[22481]best estimate now that that is precisely what we
[22482]did. (p. 72)
[22484]a ce
[22486]i
[22487]|.
[22489]i
[22490]i
[22491]H
[22493]In the afternoon of the 19th, Karamessines met with General Haig
[22494]for an hour at the White House. (Karamessines calendar) By then,
[22496]Karamessines would have had in hand the cable outlining the Valenzuela
[22498]“Te the meeting with the President occurred after October 15, that
[22499]would lend credence to the testimony of CIA officials that they were
[22500]not directed to end their coup:efforts in the October 15th meeting.
[22501]Unfortunately, the Committee has. not had access to the daily calendars
[22502]of President Nixon or Secretary Kissinger, which might pinpoint the *
[22503]date of the President's conversation with Karamessines. Those calen-
[22504]dars, along with other White House documents bearing on Track Il, have
[22508]. been subpoenaed. FEO ee 3
[22510]HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 467
[22512]“IL-
[22514], plan, since the cable had arrived that morning. However, General Haig
[22515]had no recollection of the meeting with Karamessines on the-19th. Nor
[22517]dfd he believe he had been informed of. the Valenzuela: plan. "This
[22519]x
[22521]is all very new to me. I hadn't seen any of this, and I was not familiar
[22522]with this particular plan...or $50,000, or any of the characters that
[22523]are described in here." (Haig testimony, pp. 38-39) .
[22525]Similarly, Kissinger testified that he had not been informed of
[22526]the Valenzuela plan. He said he "was informed of nothing after October get
[22527]15th...." (Kissinger testimony, p. 65) He indicated that, according a
[22528]to his daily calendar, he had no conversation with either Karamessines
[22529]or Helms between the 15th and the 19th. (Lbid., p. 53) He indicated
[22530]that he never knew that the CIA was in the process of passing guns and Bash
[22531]tear gas to Chilean military conspirators. He said "...there was no
[22532]further meeting on that subject. In anybody's record, mine or theirs
[22533](the CIA's), none of the information from the 16th on was familiar to me."
[22535](Ibid., p. 62) .
[22537]Kissinger further testified he did not know that the United States j
[22538]was dealing with Chilean officers who plotted a coup which involved
[22539]the abduction of General Schneider:
[22541]Senator Hart of Colorado. I am not sure that
[22543]the record clearly shows you answer to the direct
[22544]question of whether you knew or did not know that
[22545]we were negotiating with military officers with
[22546]regard to a plot that did involve the abduction
[22548]of General Schneider.
[22550]Secretary Kissinger. I said I did not know.
[22551](Kissinger testimony, p. 86)
[22553]Nor did General Haig believe he had been informed of any abduction
[22555]plans before the fact.
[22559]HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 466
[22561]2s Were you aware during that period of time
[22562]“Of the plans to kidnap General Schneider?
[22564]General Haig. I was aware after the fact....
[22566]Q. But you were never informed prior to his .
[22567]attempted abduction? —_—
[22569]General Haig. I don't believe I was at all.
[22571]October 20
[22572]A cable to the Station indicated that "while awaiting word on whatever
[22574]events may have occurred 19 October, please let us know what you can on
[22576]interim basis....Headquarters must respond during morning 20 October to
[22577]queries from high levels." (Headquarters 883, 20 October 1970) Karamessines
[22578]testified that the references to “high levels" in the cable of the 20th
[22580]meant White House officials, probably Kissinger. He felt quite certain
[22582]that Kissinger would have been briefed in advance about Valenzuela's plan
[22584]for the 19th and so would have been expected to ask what happened on the
[22585]morning of the 20th. (Karamessines testimony, p. 73) In contrast, Kissinger
[22586]interpreted that cable in precisely the opposite light. He felt it indicated
[22588]that he had not been informed of the Valenzuela plan in advance. When
[22590]news of the Schneider kidnap reached the White House, Kissinger believed
[22591]he would have had "somebody pick up a telephone and say, 'What is this
[22592]all about?'” (Kissinger transcript, p. 68)
[22594]October 22
[22596]Karamessines met with Haig at the White House. (Karamessines calendar)
[22598]General Haig remembered that word of the shooting of Schneider came’ as 7
[22599]“a great shock" to him, and he believed that Karamessines had told him -
[22600]about it in their meeting on the 22nd. He thought that Kissinger either ie
[22601]was present at the meeting or that he, Haig, had gone inmediately in to oe
[22604]Kissinger's office to relate what Karamessines' had told him/ (Haig testi 4}
[22606]go
[22610]{ mony, p. 36)
[22612]HY 50955 Daocld: 32423539 Page 469
[22616]C. December
[22618]December 2
[22619]A memorandum, dated December 2, 1970, from Helms to Kissinger stated
[22621]that Helms had given a recapitulation on Track’ II to Attorney General - wt
[22623]Mitchell, who would deliver it personally to Kissinger. A handwritten
[22625]note on the memorandum reads: "sent to Kissinger via DCI (Helms)."
[22627](Helms memorandum for Kissinger, 2 December 1970) The report, which
[22629]was dated November 18, 1970, contained a full account of CIA activities ;
[22630]during Track II, including the several plans to kidnap Schneider and m
[22632]the passage of weapons to the Chilean conspirators. (Report on CIA
[22633]Chilean Task Force Activities, 15 September to 3 November 1970, 18
[22635]November 1970) . ~
[22637]In his testimony to the Committee, Kissinger did not recall receiv- :
[22638]ing the report, although he doubted that he would have read such an Lemuel
[22639]“after action" report in any case. He testified that he could not find
[22640]it in his files, in contrast to his finding a CIA report on Track I,
[22642]dated November 19, 1970. Kissinger was puzzled by. a number of aspects of _.. ae
[22644]the memorandum and report: why there were two reports, why the report
[22645]of the 18th apparently was only called to his attention on the 2nd of
[22646]December, and why it was to be delivered through Mitchell. - (Kissinger
[22647]testimony, pp. 71, 74)
[22648]D. Did Track II End?.
[22650]The Committee also received conflicting testimony about whether or
[22652]not Track II ever ended, formally or in fact. As noted above, Kissinger indi-
[22654]cated that Track II was supposed to have ended, as far as he was concerned, on
[22656]October 15. It was formally terminated, according to Kissinger, by a new Presi-
[22658]1
[22660]dential marching order issued prior to the October 24 vote of the Chilean Congress."
[22662]te
[22664]- fad
[22667]2
[22669]|
[22671]pO poo
[22673]re
[22675]HY 50955 Darld: 324273539 Page 490
[22677]po NE ES 55.
[22679]eg A,
[22681]However, CIA officials from whom the Committee took testimony believed
[22682]that there had been no such definitive end to Track [f. It merely
[22683]tapered off, to be replaced by a longer-term effort to effect a change
[22685]of government in Chile... Karamessines' testimony was most explicit:
[22687]Mr. Karamessines. I am sure that the seeds that
[22689]were laid in that effort in 1970 had their impact
[22691]in 1973. I do not have any question about that
[22693]in my mind either. (Karamessines testimony, p. 26)
[22694]HEE
[22696]Q. Was Track II ever formally ended? Was there
[22698]a specific order ending it?
[22700]Mr. Karamessines. As far as I was concerned,
[22701]Track II was really never ended. What we were
[22702]told to do in effect was, well, Allende is now
[22703]President. So Track II, which sought to prevent
[22704]him from becoming President, was technically out,
[22705]it was done. But what we were told to do was to
[22706]continue our efforts. Stay alert, and to do what
[22707]we could to contribute to the eventual achieve-
[22708]ment of the objectives and purposes of Track II.
[22709]That being the case, I don't think it is proper
[22710]to say that Track II was ended.
[22712](Ibid., pp. 128-129)
[22714]When informed of Karamessines' testimony that Track II was never
[22715]ended, Kissinger testified:
[22717]The Chairman. Would you take issue with that,
[22718]with the (Karamessines) testimony?
[22720]Secretary Kissinger. Totally....It is clear
[22721]that...after October 15th that there was no
[22722]separate channel by the CIA to the White House
[22723]and that all actions with respect to Chile were
[22724]taken in the 40 Committee framework. There was
[22725]no 40 Committee that authorized an approach to
[22726]or contact with military people, no plots which
[22727]Iam familiar with, and all the covert operations
[22728]in Chile after Allende's election by the Congress
[22729]were directed towards maintaining the democratic
[22730]opposition for the 1976 election. And that was ;
[22731]the exclusive thrust, and if there was‘’any further’,
[22732]contact with military plotting, it was: totally*
[22733]. : . unauthorized and this is the first that I have
[22734]: heard of it. (Kissinger testimony, pp. 75-77)
[22736]4 . - . ° e : A . . :
[22737]-' The: Committee does not have this new "marching order" in its possession.
[22739]TE gee
[22741]od
[22743]dies
[22745]|
[22747]HY 50955 Daocld: 32423539 Page 491
[22749]7 fo
[22750]7 ‘hou (C fa / (Draft--9/8/75)
[22752]A. § y Tey etlpnry on 3 THRE
[22755]South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother,
[22756]Ngo Dinh Nhu, were assassinated during a coup by Vietnamese
[22757]generals on November 2, 1963. Evidence before the Committee
[22759]_indicates that the United States Government offered encourage- .
[22760]ment for the coup, but neither desired nor was involved in the
[22761]assassinations.- Rather, Diem's assassination appears to have
[22762]been a spontaneous act by Vietnamese generals, engendered by
[22763]anger at Diem for refusing to resign or put himself in the
[22764]custody of the leaders of the coup.
[22766]On one occasion, General Duong Van Minh ("Big Minh") out-
[22767]lined to a CIA officer the possible assassination of Nhu and
[22768]another brother, Ngo Dinh Can, as one of three methods being
[22769]considered for changing the government in the near future.
[22770]Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge and Deputy Chief of Mission William
[22771]Trueheart were informed of this possibility by the Saigon Chief
[22772]of Station, who recommended that "we do not set ourselves
[22774]. irrevocably against the assassination plot, since the other two
[22775]alternatives mean either a bloodbath in Saigon or a protracted
[22776]struggle which would rip the Army- and the country asunder" (CIA
[22777]cable SAIG 1447, Saigon Station to DCI, 10/5/63). Upon being
[22778]informed, Director McCone sent two cables. The first stated
[22779]"“[wle cannot be in the position of stimulating, approving, or
[22780]supporting assassination", and the second directed that the
[22781]recommendation be withdrawn because "we cannot bé in position
[22783]a
[22785]actively condoning such course of action and thereby engaging
[22787]HW 50955 Docld:32473539 Page 492
[22789]our responsibility therefor" (CIA cable, DCI to Saigon 10/5/63);
[22790]CIA cable DIR 73661, DCI to Saigon, 10/6/63).
[22792]B. The Abortive Coup of August 1963
[22794]On Hay 8, 1963, South Vietnamese troops in the City of Hue
[22795]fired on Buddhists protesting against the Diem Government, killing
[22796]nine and wounding fourteen. This incident triggered a nationwide
[22797]Buddhist protest and a sharp loss of popular confidence in the
[22798]Diem regime. |
[22800]On May 13, United States Ambassador Frederick is. Nolting
[22801]met with Diem and outlinéd steps which the United States desired
[22802]nim to take to redress the Buddhist grievances and. recapture
[22803]public confidence. These steps included admitting responsibility
[22804]for the Hue incident, compensating the victins, and reaffirming
[22805]religious equality in the country. (Pentagon Papers, p.208) on
[22806]June 3, Madame Whu, the wife of Diem's brother, Nhu, publicly
[22807]accused the Buddhists of being infiltrated with Communist agents;
[22808]Truenart protested her remarks to Diem and threatened to dis-
[22809]associate the United €tates from any repressive measures against
[22810]the Buddhists in the future (Pentagon Papers, p.308). Shortly
[22812]. thereafter, Madame Shu commented on the self-iimmolation of Quang
[22814]* Senator Gravel Edition, The Pentagon Papers, Tne Defense Depart-
[22815]ment fiistory of United States becisionnaking on Vietnam, po. 297-
[22816]£98, Volume II, Beacon Press, Boston (hereinafter cited as Pentagon
[22817]Papers). Foxwer Public Affairs Officer of the U.S. Embass y in
[22818]Saigon, John Mecklin},in his book, Mission in Torment, An Intimate
[22819]Account of the U.S. Role in Vietnam, Doubleday and Company, 1965,
[22820](hereinafter cited as Mecklin, at pages 158-60 described the vul-
[22821]nerablility of the Buddhists to Communist infiltration during this
[22822]period noting that it’ "offered a classic Opportunity for a Communist
[22823]sleeper ploy."
[22825]HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 493
[22829]Duc and other Buddhist monks by stating that she would like to
[22830]furnish mustard for the monks' barbecue. On June 12,. Trueheart
[22831]told Diem that Quang Duc's suicide had shocked the world and
[22832]again warned that the United States would break with his govern-
[22833]ment if he did not solve the Buddhist problem. (Pentagon Papers,
[22834]p. 208.)
[22836]Lucien Conein, a CIA officer in Saigon,* testified that the
[22837]Buddhist uprisings were the catalyst that ultimately brought
[22838]down the Diem regime (Conein, pp. 42-44). These events led the
[22839]United States to apply "direct, relentless, and tablehammering
[22840]pressure on Diem such as the United States has seldom before
[22842]attempted with a sovereign friendly government." (Mecklin, p. 169)
[22844]By July 4, 1963, Generals Minh, Don, Kim, and Khiem had
[22845]agreed on the necessity for a coup. * *
[22847]In his final meeting on August 14 with Ambassador Nolting,
[22848]Diem agreed to make a public statement offering concessions to
[22850]the Buddhists. This statement took the form of an interview
[22852]* Conein testified that he had known the Generals involved
[22853]in the coup
[22854]“for many years. Some of them I had known back even in
[22855]World War IIT. Some of them were in powerful positions,
[22856]and I was able to talk to them on a person to person basis,
[22857]not as a government official." (Conein, p. 17.)
[22859]** Conein's After-Action Report stated that:
[22861]"The majority of the officers, including General Minh,
[22862]desired President Diem to have honorable retirement from
[22863]the political scene in South Vietnam and exile. As to.
[22865]Ngo Dinh Nhu and .Ngo Dinh Can, there was never dissention.
[22866]The attitude was that their deaths, along with Madame Ngo
[22867]Dinh Nhu, would be welcomed.'' (Conein After-Action Report,
[22868]p. LO.)
[22870]HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 494
[22873]with the columnist, Margurite Higgins, in which Diem asserted
[22874]that his policy toward the Buddhists had always been conciliatory .
[22876]and asked for harmony and support of the government.
[22878]Shortly after midnight on August 21, 1963, Whu ordered forces
[22879]loyal to him to attack pagodas throughout Vietnam, arresting monks
[22880]and sacking the sacred buildings. Over thirty monks were injured
[22881]and 1,400 arrested. The American Embassy was taken by surprise
[22882]and viewed the attacks as a shattering repudiation of Diem's
[22886]promises to Nolting. (Pentagon Papers, p.210)
[22888]On August 24, 1963, the State Department sent a cable
[22889](Deptel 243) to the new ambassador in Vietnam, Henry Cabot. Lodge.
[22890]The telegram was prepared by Roger Hilsman, Assistant Secretary
[22891]of State for Par Bastern Affairs, and Under Secretary of State
[22892]Averell Harriman, and was approved by President xennedy. (Pentagon
[22893]Papers, 2235) Deptel 243 told Lodge to press Diem to take
[22895]“prompt dramatic actions” to redress the grievances of the
[22896]Buddhists.
[22898]‘We must at same time also tell key military leaders
[22900]that US would find it impossible to continue support
[22902]GVN (Vietnamese Government) militarily and economically
[22903]unless above steps are taken immediately which we
[22904]recognize requires removal of the Mhu's from the scene.
[22906]We wish give Diem reasonable opportunity to remove Nhu's
[22907]but if he remains obdurate, then we are prepared to accept
[22908]the obvious implication that we can no longer support
[22909]Diem. You may also tell appropriate military commanders
[22910]we will give them direct support in any interim period
[22912]of breakdown central government mechanism... - Con-
[22913]currently with above, Ambassador and country teams should
[22914]urgently examine all possible alternative leadership and
[22915]make detailed plans as to how we might bring Diem's
[22916]replacement if this should become necessary i.
[22918]* Conein testified that the raids might have been timed to oceur
[22919]when no American Ambassador wés in Vietnam (Nolting had left a few
[22920]Gays before and his replacement, Lodge, had not yet arrived) (Conein,
[22921]p.2l1). ‘
[22923]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 495
[22925]-5-) —_ _
[22926]In a cable on August 25, CIA Chief of Station John Richardson
[22927]reported the result of a conference among himself, Lodge, True-
[22928]heart, ‘General Harkins (Commander, Military Assistance Command,
[22929]Vietnam (MACV) and General Weede (Chief of Staff, MACV). They
[22930]accepted Deptel 243 "as a basic decision from Washington and
[22931]would proceed to do their best to carry out instructions", (1.G.,
[22932]C, pp. 7-8) but believed that Diem would refuse to remove his
[22933]brother from his position in the government.
[22934]Early in the morning of August 26, 1963, the Voice of America
[22935]in South Vietnam placed the blame on Nhu for the August 21 raids *
[22936]and absolved the army. The broadcast also reported speculation
[22937]that the United States contemplated suspending aid to the South
[22938]‘Vietnamese Government (Pentagon Papers, ?p. 212) .* -_Later on. that
[22939]same day, Lodge presented his credentials to Diem. CIA officers
[22940]Conein and Spera were told to see Generals Khiem and Khanh,
[22941]respectively, and to convey to them the substance of Deptel 243,
[22942]but to remind them that "we cannot be of any help during initial
[22943]action of assuming power of state. Entirely their own action,
[22944]win or lose" (SAIG 0304, 8/26/63). |
[22945]A message from the White House on August 29 authorized
[22946]Harkins to confirm to the Vietnamese Generals that the United
[22947]. States would support a coup if it had a good chance of succeeding,
[22948]but did not involve United States armed forces. Lodge was autho-
[22949]rized to suspend United States aid at his discretion. (Deptel 272,
[22951]°8/29/63.) A cable from the President to Lodge on the same day stated:
[22953]¥In a cable to flarriman, Lodge complained that the VOA broadcast
[22954]had “complicated our .already difficult problem" by eliminating
[22955]“the possibility of the generals' effort achieving surprise.
[22956]Lodye further warned that “the US must not appear publicly in
[22957]the matter, thus giving the ‘kiss of death' to its friends”
[22958](Cable, Lodge to Narriman, 8/26/63).
[22960]HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 496
[22964]"I have approved all the messages you are receiving from
[22965]others today, and I emphasize that everything in these
[22967]~ messages has my full support. We will do all that we can
[22968]to help you conclude this operations successfully ...
[22969]Until the very moment of the go signal for the operation
[22970]by the Generals, I must reserve a contingent right to
[22971]change course and reverse previous instructions. While
[22972]fully aware of your assessment of the consequences of
[22973]such a reversal, I know from experience that failure is
[22974]more destructive than an appearance of indecision. I
[22975]would, of course, accept full responsibility for any such
[22976]change as I must also bear the full responsibility for this.
[22977]operation and its consequences.” (Cable, §/29/63).
[22979]In.a reply cable, Lodge stated:
[22980]"1. I fully understand that you have the right and
[22981]responsibility to change course at any time. Of course
[22982]I will always respect that right.
[22983]2. To be successful,.this operation must be essentially
[22984]a Vietnamese affair with a momentum of. its own. Should
[22985]this nappen you may not be able to control it, i.e., the
[22986]“co signal” may be given by the generals." (Cable, Lodge
[22987]to President, 6/30/63)
[22989]A cable from Saigon dated August 31, 1963, stated:..
[22990]"This particular coup is.finished . - . Generals did
[22991]not feel ready and did not have sufficient balance of
[22992]Forces .. . . ‘there is little doubt that GNV (South
[22994]Vietnamese Government) aware US role and may have con-
[22995]siderable detail . .. ." (SAIG 0499, 8/31/63)
[22997]Deptel 243 and the VOA broadcast set the tone for later
[22999]relations between the United States representatives and the
[23001]generals. Big Minh, who had initial doubts about the strength
[23003]of American support, grew in confidence.
[23005]C. The November 1963 Coup
[23007]American dissatisfaction with the Diem regime. became
[23008]increasingly apparent. On September 8, AID Director David Bell,
[23009]- in a television interview,. stated that Congress might cut aid
[23011]to South Vietnam if the Diem government did not change its course
[23013]HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 497
[23017]‘(Pentagon Papers, p. 214). Lodge suggested a study to deter-
[23018]mine the most effective methods of cutting aid to topple the
[23019]regime (Pentagon Papers, p. 214). On September 12, with White
[23020]House approval, Senator Church introduced a resolution in the
[23021]Senate condemning the South Vietnamese Government for its
[23022]repressive handling of the Buddhist problem and calling for an
[23023]end to United States aid unless the oppressive measures were
[23024]curtailed (Pentagon Papers, pp. 214-215).
[23026]In mid-September 1963, two proposals for dealing with Diem
[23027]were considered by the Administration. The first contemplated
[23028]increasingly severe pressure to bring Diem in line with American
[23029]policy; the second involved acquiescing in Diem's. actions,
[23030]recognizing that Diem and Nhu were inseparable, and attempting
[23031]to salvage as much as possible. It was decided to adopt the
[23032]first proposal, and to send Secretary of Defense McNamara and
[23033]General Taylor on a fact-finding mission to Vietnam. (Pentagon
[23035]Papers, p. 215.) :
[23037]On October 2, McNamara and Taylor returned to Washington
[23038]and presented their findings to the National Security Council.
[23039]Their report confirmed that the military effort was progressing
[23040]favorably, but warned of the dangers inherent in the political
[23041]turmoil and recommended bringing pressure against Diem. This
[23042]pressure would include announcing the withdrawal of 1,000
[23043]American troops: by the end of the year, ending support for the
[23044]forces responsible for the pagoda raids, and continuing Lodge's
[23046]policy of remaining aloof from the regime. The report recommended
[23048]HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 496
[23052]against a coup, but suggested that alternative leadership should be
[23054]identified and cultivated. The recommendations were promptly -
[23055]approved by the President. (Pentagon Papers, pp.215~]16)
[23056]On October 3 Conein contacted Minh. Minh explained that a
[23057]coup was being planned, and requested assurances of American
[23058]support if it were successful. Minh outlined three courses of
[23059]action, one of which was the assassination of Dien's brothers,
[23060]. . *
[23061]Nhu and Can (Conein, p.25; cable, Saigon to Director, 10/5/63).
[23062]The Acting Chief of the CIA Station, David R. Smith, cabled on |
[23064]October 5 that he had recommended to Lodge that “we do not set [| aaa
[23065]ourselves irrevocably against the assassination plot, since the
[23066]other two alternatives mean either a blood bath in Saigon or a
[23067]protracted struggle" (Cable, Saigon to Director, 10/5/63).
[23068]A cable from the Director, CIA to Saigon responded that:
[23069]“(w)e certainly cannot be in the position of stimulating,
[23070]approving, or supporting assassination, but on the other
[23071]hand, we are in no way responsible for stopping every
[23072]such threat of which we micht receive even partial know-
[23073]ledge. We certainly would not favor assassination of Diem.
[23074]We believe engaging ourselves by taking position on this
[23075]matter opens door too easily for probes of our position
[23076]re others, re support of regime, et cetera. Conseyguently
[23078]believe best approach is hands off. lWUowever,,we naturall
[23080]interested in intelligence on any such plan.’
[23082]‘* The other courses of action were the encirclement of Saigon
[23083]by various military units and direct confrontation between military
[23084]units involved in the coup and loyalist units.
[23086]** Colby, who was then Chief, Far Eastern Division, drafted
[23087]this cable for McCone. Colby testified:
[23089]"Q: So you were on notice as of that date that the Director
[23090]_ personally opposed any involvement by the CIA in an assas-
[23094]"Colby: I certainly was." (Colby, p. 57)
[23096]BW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 499
[23098]McCone testified that he met privately with the President and
[23100]the Attorney General, taking the position that “our role was
[23101]to assemble all information on intelligence. as to what was
[23102]going on and to report it to the appropriate authorities, but
[23103]to not attempt to direct it" (McCone, p. 62). He believed the
[23104]United States should maintain a “hands off attitude" (McCone,
[23105]Pp. 62). McCone testified:
[23107]"I felt that the President agreed with my position, des-
[23108]pite the fact that he had great reservations concerning
[23109]Diem and his conduct. I urged him to try to bring all
[23110]the pressure we could on Diem to change his ways, to
[23111]encourage more support throughout the country. My precise
[23112]words to the President, and I remember them very clearly,
[23113]was that Mr. President, if I was manager of a baseball
[23114]team, I had one pitcher, I'd keep him in the box whether
[23115]he was a good pitcher or not. By that I was saying that,
[23116]if Diem was removed we would have not one coup but we
[23117]would have a succession of coups and political disorder
[23118]in Vietnam and it might last several years and indeed
[23120]it did." (McCone, pp. 62-63.)
[23122]McCone stated that he did not discuss assassination with
[23123]the President, but rather "whether we should let the coup go
[23124]or use our influences not to". He left the meeting believing
[23125]that the President agreed with his “hands off" recommendation
[23127](MeCone, pp. 62-63). McCone cabled Smith on October 6:
[23129]"MoCone directs that you withdraw recommendation to
[23131]. - ambassador (concerning assassination plan) under McCone
[23132]instructions, as we cannot be in position actively con-
[23133]doning such course of action and thereby engaging our
[23134]responsibility therefore” (CIA to Saigon, DIR 73661, 10/6/63).
[23136]In response, the CIA Station in Saigon cabled headquarters:
[23138]"Action taken as directed. In addition, since DCM
[23139]Trueheart was also present when original recommendation
[23141]« was imade, specific withdrawal of recommendation at McCone's
[23142]instruction was Also conveyed to Trueheart. Ambassador
[23143]Lodye commented that he shares McCone's opinion." (Saigon
[23144]to CIA, SATG 1463, 10/7/63)
[23146]HY 50955 Daocld: 32423539 Page 500
[23150]Conein, the CIA official who dealt directly with the Generals ,*
[23151]testified that he was first told of McCone's response to the
[23152]assassination alternative by Ambassador Lodge around October 20
[23153](Conein, p. 35). Conein testified (but did not so indicate in
[23154]his detailed After-Actiou Report) that he then told General Don.
[23155]that the United States opposed assassination, and that the
[23156]General responded, “alright, you don't like it, we won't talk
[23157]about it anymore" (Conein, p. 36). | |
[23159]The United States increased pressure on Diem to mend his :
[23160]ways. On October 17, General Richard: Stillwell (MACV J-3)
[23161]informed Secretary Thuan that the United States was suspending
[23163]_ aid to the special forces units responsible for the pagoda
[23165]raids until they were transferred to the field and placed under
[23166]Joint General Staff (JGS) command (Pentagon Papers, p. 217).
[23167]On October 27, Lodge traveled to Dalat with Diem, but did
[23168]not receive any commitment from Diem to comply with American
[23169]requests (Pentagon Papers, p. 219).
[23171]On October 28, Conein met with General Don, who had
[23172]received assurance from Lodge that Conein spoke for the United
[23174]States. Don said that he would make the plans for the coup
[23176]* Conein described his role as follows:
[23178]"My job was to convey the orders from my Ambassador and
[23179]the instructions from my Ambassador to the people who
[23180]were planning the coup, to monitor those individuals who
[23181]were planning the coup, to get as much information so
[23182]that our government would not be caught with their pants
[23183]down" (Conein,-pp. 38-39).
[23185]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 501
[23189]available to the Ambassador four hours before it took place,
[23190]and suggested that Lodge not change his plans to go to the
[23191]-United States on October 31. (1.c., Cc, p. 37; Pentagon Papers,
[23192]p. 219.)
[23193]On October 30, Lodge reported to Washington that he was
[23194]powerless to stop the coup, and that the matter was entirely
[23195]- in Vietnamese hands. General- Harkins disagreed and cabled his
[23196]opposition to the coup to General Taylor (Pentagon Papers,
[23197]p. 220). A cable from Bundy to Lodge dated October 30 expressed
[23198]White House concern and stated that "[wle cannot: accept conclu-
[23199]sion that we have no power to delay or discourage a coup"
[23200](Cable, Bundy to Lodge, 10/30/63). A subsequent cable on that
[23201]same day from Washington instructed Lodge to intercede with
[23202]the Generals to call off the coup if he did not believe it
[23204]would succeed. The instructions prescribed "
[23206]strict noninvolve-
[23207]ment and somewhat less strict neutrality". (Pentagon Papers,
[23208]p>. 220.) | |
[23210]Late in the morning of November 1, the first units involved
[23211]in the coup began to deploy around Saigon. The Embassy was
[23212]given only four minutes' warning before the coup began (MACV
[23213]cable to Joint Chiefs of Staff 8512, 11/1/63).. An aide to
[23214]Don told Conein to bring all available money to the Joint
[23215]General Staff headquarters. Conein brought 3 million piasters
[23217](Approximately $42,000) to the headquarters, which was given
[23219]to Don to procure food for his troops and to pay death benefits
[23221]BW 50955  DoclId: 324273539 Page 502
[23223]to those killed in the coup (Conein,. 6/20, p. 72) .* . -
[23225]Conein was at the Joint General Staff Headquarters during
[23226]most of the coup (1.G., C, pp. 41-42). At 1:40 p.m., the
[23227]Generals proposed that Diem resign immediately, and guaranteed
[23228]him and Nhu safe departure (Conein After-Action Report, p. 15).
[23229]The palace was surrounded shortly afterwards, and at 4:30. p.m.
[23230]the Generals announced the coup on the radio and demanded the
[23231]resignation of Diem and Nhu. Diem called Lodge and inquired
[23232]about the United States" position. Lodge responded that the
[23233]United States did not yet have a view, and expressed concern
[23234]for Diem's safety (Pentagon Papers, p. 221).
[23236]According to Conein's report, Minh told Nhu that if he and
[23237]Diem did not resign within five minutes, the palace would be
[23238]bombed. Minh then phoned Diem. Diem refused to talk with him
[23239]and Minh ordered the bombing of the palace. Troops moved: in
[23240]on the palace, but Diem still refused to capitulate. Minh
[23241]offered Diem a second chance to surrender half an hour later,
[23243]telling him that: if he refused he would be "blasted off of the
[23245]earth". Shortly before nightfall an air assault was launched
[23246]on the Presidential Guard barracks. (Conein After-Action Report,
[23247]pp. 17-18.)
[23249]At 6:20 on the morning of November 2, Diem called General
[23252]x
[23254]CIA had apparently considered passing money to the coup
[23255]leaders in early October (Colby, 6/20, p. 21). Om October 29,
[23256]Lodge calbed that a request for funds should be anticipated
[23257](Lodge to State, No. 2040, 10/29/63; and 2063, 10/30/63).
[23258]Conein received the money on October 24, and kept it in a safe
[23259]in his house.
[23261]HW 50955 Docld:324293539 Page 503
[23265]Don at the Joint General Staff headquarters and offered to ”
[23266]surrender if he and. Nhu were given safe conduct to an airport.
[23267]Shortly afterwards, Diem offered to surrender unconditionally
[23268]and ordered the Presidential Guard to cease firing. According
[23269]to Conein, an escort for Diem appeared in front of the palace
[23270]at 8:00 a.m., but Diem and Nhu were not present (Conein After-
[23271]Action Report, p. 24). .
[23273]At 10:30 a.m. the bodies of Diem and Nhu were reported to
[23274]be at the Joint General Chiefs' headquarters. Conein declined
[23275]to view the bodies because he feared that doing so might damage
[23276]United States interests (Conein, p. 57).
[23278]The details of Diem's and Nhu's deaths are not known.*
[23280]* Conein specualted that Diem and Nhu escaped through a tunnel
[23281]from the palace and.fled to a Catholic Church in Chalon. He
[23282]opined that an informant must have identified them and called the
[23283]‘General Staff Headquarters (Conein After-Action Report, p. 23).
[23284]Another CIA source states that Diem and Nhu had left the palace
[23285]the previous evening with a Chinese businessman and arrived at
[23286]the church at 8:00 on the morning of November 2. Ten minutes
[23287]later they were picked up by soldiers .and forced. into an army
[23288]vehicle (Cable, Saigon to State, No. 888). Minh originally told
[23289]Conein that Diem and Nhu had committed suicide, but Conein
[23290]doubted that Catholics would have taken their own lives in a
[23291]church (Conein, p. 56). The Inspector General's Report states
[23292]that on November 16, 1963, a field-grade officer of unknown
[23293]reliability gave the CIA two photographs of the bodies of Diem
[23294]and Nhu in which it appeared their hands were tied behind their
[23295]backs (1.G., C, pp. 43-44). The source reported that Diem and
[23296]Nhu had been shot and stabbed while being conveyed to the Joint
[23297]General Staff headquarters.
[23299]HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 504
[23303]None of the informed sources give any indication of direct or
[23305]indirect involvement of the United States.*
[23307]* It must be noted that on October 30, 1963, Ambassador Lodge
[23308]notified Washington that there might be a request by ked leaders
[23309]for evacuation, and suggested Saipan as a point for evacuation
[23310](Saigon Station Cable No. 2036, 10/30/63). Conein was charged
[23311]with obraining the airplane. Between 6:00 and 7:00 on the
[23312]morning of November 2, Minh and Don asked Conein to procure an
[23313]aircraft. Conein relayed the request to David Smith, Acting
[23314]Chief of Station at the Embassy, who replied that it would not
[23315]be possible to get an aircraft for the next twenty-four hours,
[23316]since it would have to be flown from Guam. Conein testified
[23317]that Smith told him that Diem could be flown only to a country
[23318]that offered him asylum and that the plane could not land in
[23320]‘any other country. There were no aircraft immediately avail-
[23321]abte that had sufficient range to reach a potential country
[23322]of asylum (Conein, p. 54). . ;
[23324]HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 505
[23326]ee ia TABLE OF CONTENTS
[23328]IV. Findings and Conclusions
[23330]A. Findings Concerning the Plots Themselves .
[23332]1.
[23334]Officials of the United States
[23335]Government Initiated Plots to
[23337]Assassinate Fidel Castro and
[23338]Patrice Lumumba ........
[23340]No Forei n Leaders Were Killed As
[23341]A Result of Assassination Plots
[23342]Initiated b Officials of the
[23343]United States _ cok ee
[23344]American Officials + ungouraged or
[23346]Were Privy to Coup Plots Which
[23347]Resulted in the Death of Trujillo,
[23348]Diem, and Schneider toe eee
[23350]The Plots Occurred in a Cold War
[23352]Atmosphere Perceived to be of
[23353]Crisis Proportions . .......,
[23354]American Officials Had Exa erated
[23355]Notions About Their Ability to
[23357]Control the Actions of Cou Control the Actions of Coup Leaders
[23359]CIA Officials Made Use of Known Under-
[23361]world Figures in Assassination
[23362]Efforts ......... . 2.4
[23364]3A
[23366]B. Conelusions Concerning the Plots Themselves . . 5
[23368]Ll.
[23372]HW 50955 Docld: 32423539
[23374]The United - States Should Not Engage
[23375]in Assassination
[23377]a. Distinction Between Targeted
[23379]Assassinations Instigated by
[23380]the United States and Support
[23381]for Dissidents Seeking to
[23383]Overthrow Local Governments.
[23385]b. The Setting In Which the Assas-
[23387]Sination Plots Occurred Explains,
[23389]But Does Not Justify Them
[23391]Page 506
[23393]HY 50955 Docld: 32423539
[23395]ae vat
[23396]udbs B
[23398]FO etree
[23399]ye ed Oe
[23400]ot t
[23402]|
[23404]“The United States Should Not Make
[23406]Use of Underworld Figures for
[23407]Their Criminal Talents 7.
[23409]Findings and Conclusions Relating to
[23410]the Issues of Authorization and
[23411]Contro toe ee ee a
[23413]Ll.
[23415]The Command and Control System for
[23416]Assassinations Was. Such That the
[23418]‘Plots Could Have Been Undertaken
[23420]Without Express Authorization...
[23422]Findings Relating to the Level at
[23423]Which-the Plots Were Authorized
[23425]a. Diem.
[23427]b. Schneider
[23428]c. Trujillo
[23429]d. Lumumba
[23431]e. Castro .
[23433]CIA Officials Involved in the Assassina-
[23435]tion Operations Perceived. Assassination
[23436]To Have Been A Permissible Course of
[23438]Action
[23440]The Failure In Communication Between
[23441]Agency Officials In Charge Of The
[23442]Assassination Operations And Their ‘
[23443]Superiors In. The Agency. And In The
[23444]Administration Was Due To: .
[23446](a) The Failure of Subordinates To
[23447]Disclose The Operations to
[23448]Their Superiors; and... .
[23450](b) The Failure of Superiors To
[23452]Give Precise Orders Regarding The
[23453]Nature of Permissible Operations
[23455]and to Make Clear That Assassina-
[23457]tion Was Precluded in the Climate
[23458]of Violence Engendered by the
[23460]Aggressive Covert Actions
[23461]Sanctioned by the Administrations
[23463]Page 507
[23465]10
[23469]14
[23471]15
[23472]15
[23473]16
[23474]16
[23475]17
[23476]18
[23478]20
[23480]26
[23482]26
[23484]26
[23486]11
[23488]HW 50955 Docld: 32423539
[23490]Oo POS PRET
[23492]anda b
[23494]“
[23496](a) Agency Officials Failed On.
[23497]Several Occasions to Reveal
[23498]The Plots To Their Superiors
[23499]Or To Do-So With Sufficient -
[23501]Detail and Clarity
[23503]Castro .-
[23505]Trujillo
[23506]Schneider
[23508](b) On Occasion, Administration Officials
[23509]: Gave Vague Instructions to Sub-
[23511]ordinates and Failed to Make Sufficiently
[23513]Clear That Assassination Should Be
[23515]Excluded From Consideration... .
[23517]Schneider .
[23518]Lumumba .
[23519]Castro
[23521]Practices Current at the Time in Which
[23522]the Assassination Plots Occurred Were
[23523]Revealed by thé Record to Create the
[23524]Risk of Confusion, Rashness, and ;
[23525]Irresponsibility in the Very Areas Where
[23526]Clarity and Sober Judgment Was Most
[23527]Necessary toe ee eee ee kt
[23529](a) The Danger Inherent in Overextending
[23530]the Doctrine of Plausible Denial :
[23532]'(b) The Dangers of Using "Circumlocution"
[23534]and "'Euphemism .
[23536](c) The Danger of Generalized Instructions.
[23537](d) The. Danger of "Floating Authorization".
[23539](e) The Problems Connected With Creating
[23540]New Covert Capabilities . re
[23542]Page 506
[23544]27
[23545]27
[23546]34
[23547]36
[23549]37
[23550]38
[23551]38
[23552]39
[23554]46
[23555]47
[23557]48
[23559]49
[23561]50
[23563]50
[23567]Approved, Drafting Subcommittee,
[23568]10/8/75 (Lumumba sections open
[23569]to’ possible reconsideration)
[23571]IV. Findings and Conclusions
[23573]In evaluating the evidence and arriving at findings and
[23574]conclusions, the Committee has been guided by the following |
[23575]standards. We believe these standards to be appropriate to
[23576]_the constitutional duty of a Congressional committee.
[23578]1. The Committee is not a court. Its primary role is
[23579]not to determine individual guilt or innocence, but rather
[23580]to draw upon the experiences of the past to better propose
[23581]guidance for the future.
[23583]2. It is necessary to be cautious in reaching conclusions
[23584]because of the amount of time that has passed since the events
[23585]reviewed in this report, the inability of three Presidents and
[23586]many other key figures to speak for themselves, the conflicting
[23587]and ambiguous nature of much of the evidence, and the problems
[23588]in assessing the weight to be given to particular documents
[23589]and testimony. |
[23591]3. The Committee has tried to be fair to the persons
[23592]involved in the events under examination while at the same
[23593]time responding to a need to understand the facts in sufficient
[23594]detail to lay a basis for informed recommendations.
[23596]With these standards in mind, the Committee has arrived at
[23598]the following findings and conclusions.
[23600]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 509
[23602]A. Findings Concerning the Plots Themselves
[23604]Ll. Officials of the United States Government Initiated
[23606]Plots to Assassinate Fidel Castro and Patrice Lumumba
[23608]The Committee finds that officials of the United States
[23609]Government initiated and participated in plots to assassinate
[23610]Patrice Lumumba and Fidel Castro. .
[23612]The plot to kill Lumumba was conceived in the latter half
[23613]of 1960 by officials of the United States Government, and quick-
[23614]ly advanced to the point of. sending poisons to the Congo to be
[23615]used for the assassination. .
[23617]The effort’ to assassinate Castro began in 1960 and continued
[23618]until 1965. The plans to assassinate Castro using poison cigars,.
[23619]exploding seashells, and a contaminated diving suit did not
[23620]advance beyond the laboratory phase. The plot involving under-
[23621]‘world figures reached the stage of producing poison pills,
[23622]establishing the contacts necessary to send them into Cuba,
[23623]procuring potential assassins within Cuba, and, according to one
[23624]witness, delivering the pills to the island itself. In the
[23625]1960 plot involving a Cuban pilot and in the AM/LASH episode FT
[23626]from 1963-1965, the CIA gave active support and encouragement |
[23627]to Cubans whose intent to assassinate Castro was known, and
[23629]provided the means for carrying out the assassination. -
[23631]a
[23633]HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 510
[23635]2. No Foreign Leaders Were Killed As a Result of Assas-
[23637]sination Plots Initiated by Officials of the United
[23638]States
[23640]The poisons intended for use against Patrice Lumumba
[23641]were never administered to him, and there is no evidence that
[23642]the United States was in any way involved in Lumumba's death
[23644]at the hands of his Congolese enemies. The effort to assas-
[23646]sinate Castro failed. De Le Cron £, 7 Aap. A men?
[23647]3. American Officials Encouraged or Were Privy t
[23648]Coup Plots Which Resulted in the Death of Trujillo,
[23650]Diem, and Schneider
[23651]American officials clearly desired the overthrow of
[23652]Trujillo, offered both encouragement and guns to local dissi-
[23653]‘dents attempting his overthrow, and supplied them with pistols
[23654]and rifles. KRW KS fray wel Cefjpreg
[23655]American officials offered encouragement to the Vietnamese
[23656]generals who. plotted Diem's overthrow, and a CIA official in
[23657]Vietnam gave’ the generals money after the coup had begun.
[23658]However, Diem's assassination was neither desired nor suggested
[23659]‘by officials of the United States. .
[23660]The record reveals that the United States officials
[23661]offered encouragement to the Chilean dissidents who plotted
[23662]the kidnapping of General Rene Schneider, but did not desire
[23663]or encourage his death. Certain high officials did know that
[23665]the dissidents planned to kidnap General Schneider.
[23667]HW 50955 Docld:32493539 Page 511
[23669]~3A-
[23671]/ ora ff "0 Cn «
[23673]i?
[23675]As Director Colby testified before the Committee, the death of
[23677]a foreign leader is a risk forseeable in any coup attempt. In
[23678]the cases we have considered, the risk of death was known in
[23679]varying degrees. It was widely known that the dissidents in
[23681]the Dominican Republic intended to assassinate Trujillo: the
[23682]contemplation of coup leaders to assassinate Nhu, President
[23684]Diem's brother, was communicated to the upper levels of the
[23685]United States Government; while the CIA and perhaps the White
[23686]House knew that the coup leaders in Chile planned to kidnap
[23687]General Schneider, it was not anticipated that he would be killed,
[23688]‘although the possibility of his death should have been recognized
[23690]as a-forseeable risk of his kidnapping.
[23692]4. The Plots Occurred in a Cold War Atmosphere Perceived
[23693].. to be of Crisis Proportions
[23695]The Committee fully appreciates the importance of
[23696]evaluating the assassination plots in the historical context
[23697]within which they occurred. In the preface to this report, we
[23698]described the perception, generally shared within the United
[23699]States during the depths of the Cold War, that the country
[23700]faced a monolithic enemy in Communism. That attitude helps
[23701]explain the assassination plots which we have reviewed,
[23702]although it does not justify them. Those involved neverthe-
[23703]less appeared to believe they were advancing the best inter-
[23705]ests of their country.
[23707]HW 50955 Docld:32493539 Page 512
[23709]9. American Officials Had Exaggerated Notions About
[23710]Their Ability to Control the’ Actions of Coup Leaders
[23712]Running throughout the cases considered in this report
[23713]was the expectation of American officials’ that they could
[23714]control the actions of dissident groups which they were support-
[23715]ing in foreign countries. Events demonstrated that the United
[23716]States had no such power. This point is graphically demonstrated
[23717]by cables exchanged shortly before the coup in Vietnam.
[23718]Ambassador Lodge cabled Washington on October 30, 1963, that he
[23719]was unable to halt a coup; a cable from Bundy in response stated
[23720]that "We cannot accept conelusion that we have no power to delay
[23722]or discourage a coup." The coup took place three days later.
[23724]Shortly after the experience of the Bay of Pigs, CIA
[23725]headquarters requested operatives in the Dominican Republic
[23726]to tell the dissidents to "turn off" the assassination attempt,
[23727]because the United States was not prepared to "cope with the
[23728]aftermath."" The dissidents replied that the assassination
[23729]was their affair and that it could not be turned off to suit
[23731]the convenience of the United States Government.
[23733]HW 50955 Docld:324273539 Page 513
[23737]6. CIA Officials Made Use of Known Underworld Figures
[23739]in Assassination Efforts
[23741]Officials of the CIA made use of persons associated
[23742]with the criminal underworld in attempting to achieve the
[23743]assassination of Fidel Castro. These underworld figures were
[23744]relied upon because it was believed that they had expertise and
[23745]contacts that were not available to law-abiding citizens.
[23747]Foreign citizens with criminal backgrounds were also used
[23748]by the CIA in two other cases that we have reviewed. In the
[23749]development of the Executive Action capability, one foreign
[23751]‘national with a criminal background was used to "spot" other
[23752]members of the European underworld who might be used by the CIA
[23753]for a variety.of purposes, including assassination if the need
[23754]should arise. In the Lumumba case, two men with criminal back-
[23755]grounds were used as field operatives by CIA officers in a
[23757]volatile political situation in the Congo.
[23759]B. Conclusions Concerning. the Plots Themselves
[23760]1. The United States Should Not Engage. in Assassination
[23762]We cannot condone the use of assassination as a tool
[23763]of foreign policy. Aside from pragmatic arguments against the
[23764]use of assassination supplied to the Committee by witnesses with
[23765]extensive experience in covert operations, we find that assas-
[23767]sination violates moral precepts fundamental to our way of life.
[23769]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 514
[23771]In addition to considerations, there were several
[23772]practical reasons advanced for not assassinating foreign
[23773]leaders. These reasons are discussed in the section of
[23774]this report recommending a statute making assassination
[23775]a crime.
[23777]a. Distinction Between Targeted Assassinations
[23779]Instigated by the United States and Support
[23780]for Dissidents Seeking to Overthrow Local
[23782]Governments
[23784]Two of the five principal cases investigated
[23785]by the Committee involved plots to kill foreign leaders
[23786](Lumumba and Castro) that were instigated by American
[23787]officials. Three of the cases (Trujillo, Diem, Schneider)
[23788]involved killings in the course of coup attempts by local
[23789]dissidents. These latter cases differed in the degree to
[23790]which assassination was contemplated by the leaders of the
[23791]coups and the degree to which United States officials
[23792]motivated the coups.
[23794]The Committee concludes that targeted assassinations
[23796]instigated by the United States must be prohibited.
[23798]HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 515
[23800]ha
[23802]Coups involve varying degrees of risk of assassination.
[23803]The .possibility of assassination in coup attempts raises
[23804]questions concerning the propriety of United States involve-
[23805]ment in coups, particularly in those where the assassination
[23806]of a foreign leader is a likely prospect.
[23808]This country was created by violent revolt against a
[23809]regime believed to be tyrannous, and our founding fathers
[23810](the local dissidents of that era) received aid from foreign
[23811]countries. Given that history, we should not today rule
[23812]out support for dissident groups seeking to overthrow tyrants.
[23813]But passing beyond that principle, there remain serious
[23814]questions: for example, whether the national interest of.
[23815]the United States is genuinely involved; whether any such
[23816]support should be overt rather than. covert; what tactics
[23817]should be used; and how such actions should be authorized
[23818]and controlled by the coordinate branches of government.
[23819]The Committee believes that its recommendation on the question
[23820]of covert actions in support of coups must await the Committee's
[23821]final report which will be issued after a full review of ..
[23823]covert action in general.
[23825]HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 516
[23827]b. The Setting In Which the Assassination Plots
[23829]Occurred Explains, But Does Not Justify Them
[23831]The Cold War setting in which the assassination
[23833]plots took place does not change our view that assassination
[23834]is unacceptable in our~society. In addition to the moral and
[23835]practical problems discussed elsewhere, we find two principal
[23836]defects in any contention that the tenor of the period justifi-
[23837]ed the assassination plots: _
[23839]First, the assassination plots were not necessitated by
[23840]imminent danger to the United States. Among the cases studied,
[23841]Castro alone posed a threat to the United States, but pe
[23843]only during the period of the Cuban missile crisis. Recrs 's AD Petey »
[23845]ee.
[23846]assassination—had_been planned | by. ae CTA Tong before that.
[23848]crisis, and was not advanced by policymakers as a possible
[23849]course of action during the crisis. .
[23851]Second, we reject absolutely any notion that the United
[23852]States should justify its actions by the standards of totali-
[23853]tarians. Our standards must be higher, and this difference is
[23854]what the struggle is all about. Of course, we must defend our
[23855]democracy. But in defending it, we must resist undermining
[23857]the very virtues we are defending.
[23859]HY 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 517
[23861]Two documents which have been supplied to the Committee
[23862]graphically demonstrate attitudes which can lead to
[23863]tactics that erode and could ultimately destroy the very
[23864]ideals we must defend.
[23866]The first was written in 1954 by a special committee form-
[23867]ed to advise the President on covert activities. The United
[23868]States may, it said, have to adopt tactics "more ruthless than
[23869][those] employed by the enemy" in order to meet the threat from
[23870]hostile nations. The report concluded that "long standing
[23871]American concepts of American fair play must be reconsidered."*
[23873]Although those proposals did not involve assassinations,
[23874]the attitudes underlying them were, as Director Colby testified, |
[23875]indicative of the setting. within which the assassination plots
[23877]were conceived. (Colby, 6/4/75, p. 117)
[23879]* The full text of the passage is as follows:
[23881]. another important requirement is an aggressive
[23882]covert psychological, political, and paramilitary
[23883]organization far more effective, more unique, and,
[23885]if necessary, more ruthless than that employed by the
[23886]enemy. No one should be permitted to stand in the
[23887]way of the prompt, efficient, and secure accomplish-
[23888]ment of this mission. :
[23890]The second consideration, it is now clear that we
[23891]are facing an implacable enemy whose avowed objective
[23892]is world domination by whatever méans at whatever
[23893]cost. There are no rules in such a game, Hitherto
[23894]acceptable norms of human conduct do not apply. If
[23895]the U. S. is to survive, long standing American con-
[23896]cepts of American fair play must be reconsidered.
[23898]HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 516
[23900]We do not think that traditional American notions of
[23901]fair play need be abandoned when dealing with our adversaries.
[23902]It may well be ourselves that we injure most if we adopt
[23904]tactics ‘more ruthless than the enemy"
[23906]A second document which represents an attitude which we
[23907]find improper was sent to the Congo in the fall of 1960 when
[23908]the assassination of Patrice Lumumba was being considered. The
[23910]chief of CIA's Africa Division recommended a particular agent --
[23912]'
[23914]WIROGUE -- because
[23916]He is indeed aware of the precepts of right
[23917]and wrong, but if he is given an assignment
[23918]which may be morally wrong in the eyes of the
[23919]world, but necessary because nis case officer
[23920]ordered him to carry it out, then it is right,
[23921]and he will dutifully undertake appropriate
[23922]action for its execution without pangs of con-
[23923]science. In a word, he can rationalize all
[23924]actions. (Memo dated / /60; Bissell Tr.,
[23925]6/11/75, p. )
[23927]The Committee finds this philosophy is not in keeping with the
[23928]ideals of our nation.
[23929]2. The United States Should Not Make Use of Underworld
[23930]Figures for Their Criminal Talents
[23931]We conclude that agencies of the United States must not
[23932]use underworld figures for their criminal talents* in carrying
[23934]out their operations. In addition to the corrosive effect
[23936]*Pending our investigation of the use of informants by the FBI and
[23937]other agencies, we reserve judgment on the use of known criminals
[23938]as informants. We are concerned here only with the use of persons
[23939]known to be actively engaged in criminal pursuits for their
[23940]expertise in carrying out _eriminal acts.
[23942]HY 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 519
[23944]upon our government,* the use of underworld figures involves
[23945]the following dangers: .
[23947]a. The use of underworld figures for "dirty business"
[23948]gives them the power to blackmail the government and to avoid
[23950]prosecution, for past or future crimes. For example, the
[23951]Peizpece
[23952]ZA
[23954]their involvement with the CIA to avoid prosecution7™ The CIA (| #* r
[23955]rer rene Ae am . ?
[23957]figures involved in the Castro assassination operation used
[23959]also contemplated attempting to quash criminal charges against
[23960]QJWIN in a foreign tribunal.
[23962]b. The use of persons experienced in criminal tech-
[23963]niques and prone to criminal behavior increases the likelihood
[23964]that criminal acts will occur. Agents in the field are neces-
[23966]sarily given broad discretion. But the risk of improper
[23968]activities is increased when persons of criminal background
[23969]i
[23971]are used, particularly when they are selected precisely to take
[23973]t
[23975]advantage of their criminal skills or contacts.
[23977]|
[23978]*The corrosive effect of dealing with underworld ‘figures is
[23979]graphically demonstrated by the fact that Attorney General Robert
[23980]Kennedy, who had devoted much of his professional life to fight-
[23981]ing organized crime, did not issue an order against: cooperating
[23982]with such persons when he learned in May 1961 that the CIA had
[23983]. made use of Sam Giancana in a sensitive operation in Cuba.
[23985]In May 1962, when the Attorney General learned that the
[23986]operation had involved assassination, he did, according to
[23987]a CIA witness, inform those briefing him that underworld
[23988]figures should not be used before checking with him first,
[23989]but failed to direct that, they must never be so used.
[23991]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 520 i
[23993]- 12
[23995]c. There is the danger that the United States Govern-
[23996]ment will become an unwitting accomplice to criminal.acts and
[23997]that criminal figures will take advantage of their associa-
[23998]tion with the government to advance their own projects and
[23999]interests.
[24001]d. There is a fundamental impropriety in selecting
[24002]persons because they are skilled at performing deeds which the
[24003]laws of our society forbid.
[24005]The use of underworld figures by the United States Govern-
[24006]ment for their criminal skills raises moral problems comparable
[24007]to those recognized by Justice Brandeis in a different context
[24008]five decades ago:
[24010]Our government is the potent, the omnipresent
[24012]teacher. For-good-or for ill, it teaches the
[24014]whole people by its example. Crime is con-
[24015]tagious. If the Government becomes a law-
[24017]breaker, it breeds contempt for law; it in- ™ A ae
[24018]vites every man to become a law unto himself.
[24020]To declare that in the administration of the thy
[24021]criminal law the. end justifies the means -- :
[24023]to declare that the Government may commit Ype reg
[24025]crimes in order to secure the conviction of
[24026]the private criminal -- would bring terrible
[24027]retribution. Against this pernicious doctrine
[24028]this Court should resolutely set its face.
[24029]Olmstead v. U. S., 277 U.S, 439, 485 (1927)
[24031]HY 50955 Docld: 324235539 Page 521
[24033]C. Findings and Conclusions Relating to the Issues of Authori-
[24035]zation and Control
[24037]In the introduction to this report, we set forth in
[24038]summary form our major conclusions concerning whether the
[24039]assassination plots were authorized. The ensuing discussion
[24041]elaborates and explains those conclusions.
[24043]The Committée analyzed the question of authorization for
[24044]the assassination activities from two perspectives. First,
[24045]the Committee examined whether officials in policymaking
[24046]positions authorized or were aware of the assassination
[24047]activities. Second, the Committee inquired whether the
[24048]officials responsible for the operational details of the
[24049]plots perceived that assassination had the approval of
[24050]their superiors, or at least was the type of activity that
[24052]their superiors would not disapprove.
[24054]No doubt, the CIA's general efforts against the regimes
[24055]discussed in this report were authorized at the highest
[24057]levels of the government. -But the record leaves serious
[24059]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 522
[24061]J
[24063]HY 50955
[24067]doubt concerning whether assassination was authorized by
[24069]the Administrations. Even if. the plots were not expressly
[24070]authorized, it does not follow that the Agency personnel _ 4
[24071]believed they were acting improperly.
[24073]1. The Command and Control System forAssassina-
[24075]tions Was Such That the Plot§ Coul ave
[24081]Been Undertaken Without Express Authorization
[24083]As. emphasized throughout this report, we are
[24084]unable to draw firm conclusions concerning responsibility
[24085]for the assassination plots. Even after our long investiga-
[24086]tion, it is unclear whether the conflicting and inconclusive
[24088]state of the evidence is due to the system of plausible
[24090]denial and its attendant doctrines, or whether there were
[24092]in fact serious shortcomings in the system of authorization
[24093]which made it possible for assassination efforts to have
[24094]been undertaken by agencies of the United States Government
[24095]without express authority from officials outside of those
[24096]agencies. . |
[24098]Our preeminent finding is that assassination could have
[24099]been undertaken by an agency of the United States Government
[24101]without it having been uncontrovertibly clear that there was
[24103]Docld: 32423539 Page 523
[24107]explicit authorization from the highest level. The command
[24109]A fl tv tO
[24110]and control system revealed by the record grade tr possible for
[24112]: . . TT TT Te pe
[24113]the CIA to have engaged in assassination activities without
[24115]express authorization by officials outside the Agency.
[24119]the ambiguity and imprecision in the record illustrates
[24120]the dangers of a "plausible denial" system in which the precise
[24121]level of authorization may be difficult to ascertain. While
[24122]there is no evidence that the “plausible denial" system has
[24123]succeeded in shielding decision makers in the cases considered
[24124]in this report, the possibility that a system exists which
[24125]might permit those responsible for authorizing major operations
[24126]to escape responsibility is disturbing. Responsible government
[24127]requires that public officials be held accountable for their
[24128]decisions.
[24130]2. Findings Relating to the Level at Which the Plots Were
[24132]Authorized
[24134]a. Diem
[24136]We find that neither the President nor any other
[24137]official in the United States Government authorized the assas-
[24138]“sination of Diem and his brother Nhu. Both the DCI and top
[24139]State Department officials did know, however, that the death
[24140]of Nhu at least at one point had been contemplated by the coup
[24141]leaders. To the contrary; when the possibility that the coup
[24143]- leaders were considering assassination was brought to the
[24145]HY 50955 Daocld: 32423539 Page 524
[24151]attention of the DCL, he directed that the United States
[24152]would have no part in such activity, and this information
[24153]was relayed to the coup leaders.
[24154]b. Schneider
[24156]We find that neither the President nor any other
[24157]official in the United States Government authorized the assas-
[24158]sination of General Rene Schneider. The CIA, and perhaps the
[24159]White House, did know that coup leaders contemplated kidnap-
[24160]ping, which, as it turned out, resulted in Schneider's death.
[24162]bow. wer, “ArsuiiSfer 6 we Heath partes
[24164]The Presidents and other senior officials in
[24165]the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations sought the overthrow
[24166]of Trujillo and approved general actions to obtain that end.
[24168]The DCI and the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-
[24170]American Affairs knew that the Dominican dissidents intended
[24171]to assassinate Trujillo, but the date at which the dissidents'
[24172]intent to assassinate was communicated to higher levels of
[24173]the government responsible for formulating policy is less
[24174]clear. The record does establish that. in the Spring of 1961
[24175]senior American officials, including the President, learned
[24176]that the dissidents intended to assassinate Trujillo and that
[24177]they desired machine guns for that purpose. The Special Group
[24178]disapproved passage of those weapons and the President himself,
[24180]in a telegram, reaffirmed that decision, indicating that the
[24182]HW 50955 DonlTd’32493539 Page 525
[24184]| nnn,
[24187]United States "as [a] matter of general policy cannot condone
[24189]assassination", although he did state that if the coup succeeded,
[24191]the United States would support the plotters. fre e f
[24192]d. Lumumba , Fre ve
[24193]CLA
[24195]The chain of evénts revealed by the documents and a
[24197]testimony is strong enough to permit a reasonable inference
[24199]that the assassination plot was authorized by the President.
[24201]It is absolutely clear that Allen Dulles authorized the plot.
[24203]. The juxtaposition of discussions concerning “disposing of"
[24204]Lumumba and taking "straightforward action" against him at NSC
[24205]and Special Group meetings with Dulles’ cable to the Congo,
[24206]Bissell's representation to Gottlieb ‘about “highest authority",
[24207]and the delivery of poison to the Congo can be read to support
[24208]an inference that the President and the Special Group urged
[24210]_the assassination of Lumumba.
[24212]Robert Johnson's testimony that he understood the President
[24213]to have ordered Lumumba's assassination at an NSC meeting does,
[24214]as he said, offer a "clue" about Presidential authorization
[24215]which, however, should be read in light of the uncertain record
[24216]of the meetings Johnson attended and the contrary testimony of
[24217]others in attendance at the meetings, including the President's
[24218]national security advisors. The fact that both the Chief of
[24219]Station and Gottlieb were under the impression that there was
[24220]Presidénti Orizatioyw for the assassination of Lumumba
[24222]is not in itself direct evidence of such authorization because
[24224]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 526 -
[24226]a ie - -17A-
[24227]8 wh
[24228]MY ae Wace » r
[24230]this impression was derived solely from Gottlieb's meetings
[24231]with Bissell and Tweedy. Neither Gottlieb nor the Chief of
[24232]Station had first-hand knowledge of Allen Dulles' statements
[24233]about Presidential authorization. Richard Bissell assumed
[24234]that such authorization had been conveyed to him by Dulles,
[24235]but Bissell had no specific recollection of any event when
[24236]this occurred. .
[24237]The evidence leads us to conclude that DDP Bissell and
[24239]DCI Dulles knew about and authorized the plot to assassinate
[24240]Lumumba. However, we are unable to make a finding that
[24241]President Eisenhower intentionally authorized an assassination
[24243]effort against Lumumba because of the) lack of absolute certainty
[24245]in the evidence. ) ~ —
[24247]ee Sp
[24249]wm
[24251]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 527
[24255]e. Castro
[24258]There was no evidence from which the Committee
[24260]cane
[24262]could conclude that Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, or Johnson,
[24263]their close advisors, or the Special Group authorized the
[24264]assassination of Castro.
[24266]We find that the effort against Castro was clearly autho-
[24267]rized through the level of DDP. It is not certain whether
[24268]Allen Dulles knew about the plots, although Bissell and
[24269]Edwards were of the opinion that he did, and the credibility
[24270]of their beliefs is buttressed by the fact that Dulles knew
[24271]about the Lumumba assassination plot, which was planned and
[24272]attempted at the time of the early Castro plots. We can find
[24273]no evidence that McCone was aware of the plots which occurred
[24274]during his tenure. His DDP, Richard Helms, testified that
[24275]he never discussed the subject with McCone and was never
[24277]expressly authorized by anyone to assassinate Castro.
[24279]The only suggestion of express Presidential: authorization
[24280]for the plots against Castro was Richard Bissell's opinion
[24281]that Dulles would have circumlocutiously informed Presidents
[24282]Eisenhower and Kennedy after the assassination had been plan-
[24283]ned and was underway. The assumptions underlying this opinion
[24285]are too attenuated for the Committee to adopt it as a finding.
[24287]HY 450955 Docld: 32423539 Page 526
[24289]pe ioc a
[24293]First, it assumes that Dulles himself knew of the plots, a
[24294]matter which is not certain. Second,.it assumes that Dulles
[24295]went privately to the two Presidents--a course of action
[24297]which Helms, who had far more covert action experience than
[24299]Bissell, testified was precisely what the masa i 4k
[24300]Third,
[24302]plausible denial forbade CIA officials from doings
[24303]it necessarily assumes that the Presidents would understand
[24304]from a "“circumlocutious" description that assassination was
[24306]being discussed. C
[24308]The chain of assumptions is far too speculative for the
[24309]Committee ‘to make findings inplicating Presidents who are not
[24310]able to speak for themselves. Moreover, it is inconsistent
[24311]with Bissell's other testimony that "formal and explicit”
[24312]approval would be required for assassination,* and contrary
[24313]to the testimony of all the Presidential advisors, the men
[24315]closest to both Eisenhower and Kennedy.
[24317]* If the evidence concerning President Eisenhower's order
[24318]to assassinate Lumumba is correct, it should be weighed against
[24319]Bissell's testimony concerning circumlocutious briefings of the.
[24320]Presidents in the Castro case. First, the Lumumba case would
[24321]imply that President Eisenhower and Dulles did discuss such
[24322]matters bluntly and not circumlocutiously. Second, the Lumumba
[24323]example indicates that the President would diseuss such matters
[24325]‘openly in an appropriate forum, and would not need to be:
[24327]approached privately. Third, it can be inferred from Bissell's
[24328]testimony in the Castro case that if President Eisenhower had
[24329]told Dulles that he approved of the plot, Dulles would not have
[24330]told anyone else of that fact. Yet Gottlieb's testimony in the
[24331]Lumumba case states that he had been told of Presidential autho-
[24332]rization for assassination by Bissell, who in turn assumed he:
[24333]was told by Dulles. : ,
[24335]HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 529
[24339]Helms and McCone testified that the Presidents under
[24340]which they served never asked them to consider assassination.
[24341]There was no evidence whatsoever that President Johnson.
[24342]knew about or authorized any assassination activity during his
[24344]Presidency. —
[24346]3. CIA Officials Involved in_ the Assassination Opera-
[24348]tions Perceived Assassination To Have Been A Permis-
[24350]sible Course of Action
[24352]The CIA officials involved in the targeted assassination
[24353]attempts testified that they had believed that their activities
[24354]had been fully authorized.*
[24356]In the case of the Lumumba assassination operation,
[24358]Richard Bissell testified that he had no direct recollection
[24359]of authorization, but after having reviewed the cables and
[24360]Special Group minutes, testified that authority must have
[24361]flowed from Dulles through him to the subordinate levels in
[24362]the Agency.
[24364]In the case of the assassination effort against Castro,
[24365]“Bissell and Sheffield Edwards testified they believed the
[24366]operation involving underworld figures had been authorized
[24367]by Dulles when they briefed him shortly after the plot had been
[24369]initiated. William Harvey testified he believed that the
[24371]* The lower level operatives, such as O'Connell and the .
[24372]AM/LASH case officers, are not discussed in this section, since
[24373]they had clear orders from their immediate superiors.
[24375]HY 50955 Daocld: 32423539 Page 530
[24379]plots "were completely authorized at every appropriate level
[24380]within and beyond the Agency", although he had "no personal
[24381]knowledge whatever of the individuals’ identities, times,
[24382]exact words, or channels through which such authority may
[24383]have passed". Harvey stated that he had been told by Richard
[24384]Bissell that the effort against Castro had been authorized
[24385]“from the highest level", and that Harvey had discussed the
[24386]plots with Richard Helms, his immediate superior. Helms
[24387]testified that although he had never discussed assassination
[24388]with his superiors, he believed:
[24390]that in these actions we were taking against
[24391]Cuba and against Fidel’ Castro's government in Cuba,
[24395]that they were what we had been asked to do. . . . In
[24396]other words we had been asked to get rid of Castro
[24397]and . . . there were no limitations put on the means,
[24399]and we felt we were acting well within the guidelines
[24401]that we understood to be in play at this particular
[24403]time.
[24405]The evidence points to a disturbing situation. Agency
[24406]officials perceived the effort to assassinate Castro to have
[24407]been within the parameters of permissible action, but Adminis-
[24408]tration officials (including McCone) responsible dlc nm rele
[24410]| A ef fio hen
[24411]ing policy were not aware of the effort an did not authorize
[24412]; n
[24413]it. The explanation may lie in the fact that orders concerning
[24414]overthrowing the Castro regime were stated in broad terms that
[24415]were subject to differing interpretations by those responsible
[24417]for carrying out those orders. .
[24419]The various Presidents and their senior advisors
[24421]we
[24423]HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 531
[24425]POEs ON Pos REE -29-
[24426]Ge ig BOP Peg f]
[24428]strongly opposed the regimes of Castro and Trujillo, the
[24429]accession to power of Allende, and the potential influence
[24430]of Patrice Lumumba. Orders concerning action against those
[24431]foreign leaders were given in vigorous language. For example,
[24432]President Nixon's orders to prevent Allende from assuming
[24433]power left Helms feeling that "if I ever carried a marshall's
[24434]baton in my knapsack out of the oval office, it was that day."
[24435]Similarly, General Lansdale described the Mongoose effort
[24436]against Cuba’as "a combat situation", and Attorney General
[24437]Kennedy emphasized that "a solution to the Cuban- problem
[24438]today carries top priority". Helms testified that the
[24439]pressure to "get rid of |Castro and the Castro regime]'' was
[24440]intense, and Bissell testified that he had been ordered to
[24441]"get off your ass about Cuba".
[24443]It is possible that there was a failure of communiéa-
[24444]tion between policymakers and the agency personnel who were
[24445]experienced in secret, and often violent, action. Although
[24446]policymakers testified that assassination was not intended |
[24447]by such words as "get rid of Castro", ‘some of their sub=
[24448]ordinates in the Agency testified that they perceived that
[24449]assassination was desired. and that they should proceed with-
[24450]out troubling their superiors. .
[24452]The 1967 Inspector General's Report on assassinations
[24454]appropriately observed:
[24456]HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 532
[24458]HY 50955
[24462]The point is that of frequent resort to. synechdoche --
[24463]the mention of a part when the whole is to be under-
[24464]stood, or vice versa. Thus, we encounter repeated
[24465]references to phrases such as "disposing of Castro",
[24466]which may be read in the narrow, literal sense of assas-
[24467]sinating him, when it is intended that it be read in
[24468]the broader, figurative sense of dislodging the Castro
[24469]regime. Reversing the coin, we find people speaking
[24470]“vaguely of "doing something about Castro'' when it is
[24471]clear that what they have specifically in mind is
[24472]killing him. In a situation wherein those speaking
[24473]may not have actually meant what they seemed to say or
[24474]may not have said what they actually meant, they should
[24475]not be surprised if their oral shorthand is interpreted
[24476]differently than was intended.
[24478]Differing perceptions between superiors and their sub-
[24479]ordinates were graphically illustrated in the Castro context.*
[24480]McCone, in a memorandum dated April 14, 1967, reflected as
[24481]follows: |
[24483]Through the years the Cuban problem was discussed in
[24484]terms such as "dispose of Castro", "remove Castro",
[24485]"knock off Castro", etce., and this meant the overthrow
[24486]of the Communist government in Cuba and the replacing
[24488]of it with a democratic regime. Terms such as the
[24489]above appear in many working papers, memoranda for the
[24490]record, etc., and,°as stated, all refer to a change in
[24491]the Cuban government.
[24493]* "Senator Mathias: Let me draw an. example from history.
[24494]When Thomas A'Beckett was proving to be an annoyance, as
[24495]Castro, the King said, ‘who will rid me of this turbulent
[24496]priest?'. He didn't say, ‘go out and murder him'. He said,
[24497]‘who will rid me of this man', and let it go at that.
[24499]1
[24500]"Mr. Helms: That is a warming refererice to the problem.
[24502]"Senator Mathias: You feel that spans the. generations
[24503]and the centuries?
[24505]"Mr. Helms: I think it does, sir.
[24507]"Senator Mathias: And that is typical of the kind of «=
[24508]thing which might be said, which might be taken by the
[24510]Docld: 32423539 Page 533
[24512]sre gS
[24514]pre PT 6
[24515]eM BRA Ss baw,
[24520]Helms, who had considerable experience as a covert operator,
[24521]gave precisely the opposite meaning to the same words, interpret-
[24522]ing them as conveying authority for assassination.
[24524]Helms repeatedly testified that he felt that explicit
[24525]authorization was unnecessary for the assassination of
[24526]Castro in the early 1960's, but he said he did not construe
[24527]the intense pressure from President Nixon in 1970 as pro-
[24528]viding authority to assassinate anyone. As Helms testified,
[24529]the difference was not that the pressure to prevent Allende
[24530]from assuming office was any less than the pressure to remove
[24531]the Castro regime, but rather that "'L had already made up my
[24532]mind that. we weren't going to have any of that business when
[24534]I was Director.”
[24536]Certain CIA contemporaries of Helms who were subjected
[24537]to similar pressures in the Castro case rejected the thesis
[24538]that implicit authority to assassinate Castro derived from
[24539]the strong language of the policymakers. Bissell testified
[24540]that he had believed that "formal and explicit approval"
[24542]would be required for. assassination, and McManus testified
[24544]director or by anybody else as presidential ‘authorization to
[24545]go forward?
[24547]“Mr. Helms: That is right. But in answer to that, I
[24548]Yvealize that one sort of grows up in-tradition of the time
[24549]and I think that any of us would have found it very difficult
[24550]to discuss assassinations with a President of the U.S. I
[24551]just think we all had the feeling that we were hired out to
[24552]keep those things out of the oval office. .
[24554]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 534
[24558]that "it never occurred to me" that the vigorous words of
[24560]the Attorney. General’ could be taken as authorizing
[24561]assassination. The differing perceptions may have resulted
[24562]from their different backgrounds and training. Neither
[24563]Bissell (an academician whose Agency career for the six years
[24564]before he became DDP had been in the field of technology) nor
[24565]McManus (who had concentrated on intelligence and staff work)
[24566]were experienced in covert operations.*
[24568]The perception of certain Agency officials that assas-
[24570]_sination was within the range of permissible activity was
[24571]reinforced by the continuing approval of violent covert actions:
[24572]against Cuba that were sanctioned at the Presidential level
[24573]and by the failure of the successive administrations to make
[24574]clear that assassination was not permissible. This point is
[24576]one of the subjects considered in the next section.
[24578]* Of course, this analysis cannot be carried too far. In
[24579]the Lumumba case, for example, Johnson and Dillon, who were
[24580]Administration officials with no covert operation experience,
[24581]construed remarks as urging or permitting assassination, while
[24582]other persons who were not in the Agency did not so interpret
[24583]‘them. oO, .
[24585]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 535
[24587]4. The Failure In Communication Between Agency Officials
[24588]In Charge Of The Assassination Operations And Their Superiors
[24590]In The Agency And In The Administration Was Due To:
[24592](a) The Failure of Subordinates To Disclose The
[24594]Operations To Their Superiors; and
[24596](b) The Failure of Superiors to Give Frecise Orders
[24598]Regarding the Nature of Permissable Operations and to Make
[24600]Clear That Assassination Was Precluded in the Climate of
[24602]Violence Engendered by the Aggressive Covert Actions
[24604]Sanctioned by the Administrations.
[24606]While we cannot find that officials responsible for
[24607]making policy decisions knew about or authorized the assassina-
[24608]tion attempts (with the possible exception of the Lumumba case),
[24609]Agency operatives at least through the level of DDP neverthe-
[24610]less perceived assassination to have been permissible, This
[24611]failure in communication was inexcusable in light of the gravity
[24612]of assassination. The Committee finds that the failure of
[24613]Agency officials to inform their superiors was reprehensible,
[24614]and that the reasons that they offered for having neglected
[24615]to inform their superiors are umacceptable. The Committee
[24616]further finds that Administration officials failed to be
[24617]sufficiently precise in their directions to the Agency and
[24618]that their attitude toward the possibility of assassination
[24620]was ambiguous in the context of the violence of other activities
[24622]that they did authorize. )0 ays y Kelle nw
[24623]y 2 >
[24624]fu CORTE g
[24626]HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 536
[24628]a BA FPN -27--
[24630](a) Agency Officials Failed On Several Occasions To Reveal
[24632]The Plots To Their Superiors, Or To Do So With Sufficient
[24633]Detail and Clarity
[24635]Several of the cases considered in this report raise
[24637]questions concerning whether. officials of the CIA sufficiently
[24638]informed their superiors in the Agency or officials outside the
[24639]Agency about their activities.
[24641]Castro
[24643]The failure of Agency officials to inform their superiors
[24644]of the assassination efforts against Castro is particularly
[24645]troubling. | |
[24647]Richard Bissell testified that he and, Sheffield Edwards
[24648]told Allen Dulles only "ci rcumlocutiously" and only after
[24649]the project had begun about the operation which used members
[24650]of the underworld. Both Bissell and his successor as DDP,
[24651]Richard Helms, testified that. they never discussed the opera-
[24652]tion with John McCone or any officials outside the CIA. The
[24653]two officials directly responsible for the operation--Edwards
[24655]and William Harvey--testified that. they never discussed the
[24657]the, f
[24658]Finwes
[24660]level of DDP. McCone testified that he was never consulted about Mev,
[24661]+o f
[24663]operation with McCone or any Government official above the
[24664]the operation, and that Dulles never briefed him-on its
[24666]existence. On the basis of the testimony and documentary
[24668]evidence before the Committee, it is uncertain whether Dulles
[24670]HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 537
[24674]was ever made aware of the true nature of the underworld
[24676]operation, and virtually certain that it continued into
[24678]McCone's term without his or the Administration's knowledge
[24680]- Or approval.
[24681]“ES
[24683]On the occasions when Richard Bissell had the opportunity
[24685]to inform his superiors about the assassination effort against
[24686]Castro, he either failed to Thtorn eXen Oy misled them,
[24688]Bissell testified that he and Edwards told Dulles and
[24689]“Cabell about the assassination operation using underworld
[24690]figures, but that they did so "“circumlocutiously", and then
[24691]only after contact had been made with the underworld and a
[24693]price had been offered for Castro's death.
[24695]Bissell further testified that he never raised the issue
[24696]of assassination with officials of either the Eisenhower ‘or
[24697]Kennedy Administration. His reason was that since he was under
[24698]Dulles in the chain of command, he would normally have had no
[24699]duty to discuss the matter with the Presidents or other Adminis-
[24700]tration officials, and that he assumed that Dulles would have
[24701]circumlocutiously spoken with Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy
[24702]about the operation. These reasons are insufficient. It was
[24703]inexcusable to withhold such information from those responsible
[24704]for formulating policy on the unverified assumption that they
[24706]might have been circumlocutiously informed by Dulles, who
[24708]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 536
[24712]himself had not been straight-forwardly told about the operation.*
[24713]The failure to either inform those officials or to make
[24714]certain that they had been informed by Dulles was particularly
[24715]reprehensible in light of the fact that there were many occasions
[24716]= on which Bissell should have informed them, and his failure to
[24717]do so was misleading. In the first weeks of the Kennedy Adminis-_
[24718]tration, Bissell met with Bundy and discussed the development
[24719]of an assassination capability within CiA--executive action.
[24720]But Bissell did not mention that an actual assassination attempt
[24721]was underway. Bissell appeared before the Taylor-Kennedy Board
[24722]of Inquiry which was formed to report to the President on the
[24723]Bay of Pigs and the Cuban situation, but testified that he did
[24724]not inform the Commission of the assassination operation. As
[24725]chief of the CIA directorate concerned with clandestine operations
[24726]and the Bay of Pigs, Bissell frequently met with officials in
[24727]‘the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations to discuss Cuban
[24728]- | Ses Flay The
[24729]operations, and his advice was frequently sought. He did not
[24730]tell them that the CIA had undertaken an effort to assassinate.
[24732]Castro, and did not ask if they favored proceeding with the.
[24734]* Even assuming that Bissell correctly perceived that Dulles
[24735]understood the nature of the operation, it was inexcusable for
[24736]Bissell not to have briefed Dulles in plain language. Further,
[24737]even if one accepts Bissell's assumption that Dulles told the
[24738]Presidents, they would have been told too: late, because Bissell
[24739]"guessed" they would have been told that the operation "had
[24740]been planned and was-being attempted".
[24742]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 539
[24746]effort. He was present at the meeting with Dulles and Presi-
[24747]dent Kennedy at which the new President was briefed on covert
[24748]action in Cuba, but neither Dulles nor Bissell mentioned “the
[24749]assassination operation that was underway.
[24750]The failures to make forthright disclosures to policy-
[24751]makers continued during the time that. Richard Helms was DDP.
[24752]‘Helms' failure to inform McCone about the underworld operation
[24753]when it was reactivated under Harvey and poison pills were
[24754]sent to Cuba was a grave error in judgment, and Helms' excuses
[24755]are unpersuasive. In May of 1962, the Attorney General was
[24756]told that the CIA's involvement in’an assassination plot had
[24757]terminated with the Bay of Pigs. Not only did Edwards, who
[24758]had briefed the Attorney General, know that the operation had
[24759]not been terminated, but Helms did not inform the Attorney
[24760]General that the operation was still active when he learned
[24761]that the Attorney General had been misled. Helms did not
[24762]inform McCone of the plot until August 1962, and did SO then
[24763]in a manner which indicated that the plot had been terminated
[24765]before McCone became Director. Helms' denial that AM/LASH
[24767]had been involved in an assassination attempt in response to
[24768]Secretary of State Rusk's inquiries was, as Helms testified,
[24769]“not truthful". |
[24771]. When Helms briefed President Johnson on the Castro plots,
[24772]he apparently described the activities that had occurred during
[24774]prior administrations but did not describe the AM/LASH opera- *
[24776]HY 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 540
[24778]tion which had continued until 1965. Helms also failed to
[24779]inform the Warren Commission of the plots because the precise
[24780]question was not asked. yy
[24782]Helms told the Committee that he had never raised the
[24783]assassination operation with McCone or Kennedy Administration
[24784]officials because he had assumed that. the project had been
[24785]previously authorized, and that the aggressive. character of
[24786]the Kennedy Administration's program against the Castro regime
[24787]made assassination permissible even in the absence of an
[24788]express instruction. He added that hé had never been convinced
[24789]that the operation would succeed, and that he would have told
[24790]McCone about it if he had.ever believed that it would "go
[24791]anyplace".
[24793]Helms' reasons for not having told his superiors about
[24794]the assassination effort are unacceptable; indeed, many of them
[24795]were reasoris why he should have sought express authority.
[24796]As Helms himself testified, assassination was of a high order
[24797]of sensitivity. Administration policymakers, supported by
[24798]intelligence estimates furnished by the Agency, had emphasized
[24799]on several occasions that successors to Castro might be worse
[24800]than Castro himself. In addition, the Special Group Augmented
[24801]required that plans for covert actions against Cuba be sub-
[24802]mitted in detail for its approval. Although the Administration
[24803]was exerting intense pressure on the CIA to do something about
[24804]Castro and the Castro regime, it was a’serious error to have «
[24806]MC Cone 2G Leer re Arr
[24808]a
[24810]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 541
[24814]undertaken so drastic an operation without obtaining full and
[24815]equivocal permission.
[24817]William Harvey, the officer in charge of the CIA's attempt
[24818]using underworld figures. to assassinate Castro, testified. that
[24819]he never discussed the plot with McCone or officials of the
[24820]Kennedy Administration because he believed that it had been
[24821]fully authorized by the previous Director, because he was
[24822]uncertain whether it had a chance of succeeding, and because
[24824]“he believed that.it was Helms', not his, duty to inform higher
[24826]authorities.
[24828]Nonetheless, the Committee believes there were occasions
[24829]on which it was incumbent on Harvey to have disclosed the
[24830]assassination operation, As head of Task Force W, the branch / |’
[24831]of the CIA responsible for covert operations in Cuba, Harvey .
[24832]reported directly to General Lansdale and the Special crown clan,
[24833]Augmented. The Special Group Augmented had’ made known that Mw ¢ Ls
[24834]covert operations in Cuba should be first approved by it, bo
[24835]by explicit instruction and by its practice that particular
[24837]operations be submitted in "nauseating detail". Yet Harvey.
[24839]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 342°
[24843]~ did not inform either General Lansdale or the Special Group
[24844]Augmented of the assassination operation, either when he was
[24845]explicitly requested to report to MeCone, General Taylor,
[24846]and the Special Group on his activities in Miami in April
[24847]1962, or when the subject of assassination was raised in the
[24848]August 1962 meeting and McCone voiced his disapproval.
[24850]The Committee finds that the reasons advanced for not |
[24851]having informed those responsible for formulating policy
[24852]about the assassination operation were inadequate, misleading,
[24853]and inconsistent. Some officials viewed assassination as.
[24855]- too important and sensitive to discuss with superiors, while
[24856]others considered it not sufficiently important. Harvey
[24857]testified that it was premature to tell McCone about the
[24859]underworld operation in April 1962, because it was not
[24861]sufficiently advanced, but ‘too late to ‘tell him about it in
[24862]August 1962, since by that time he had decided to terminate
[24864]it. On other occasions, officials thought disclosure was
[24865]someone else's responsibility; Bissell said he thought it was
[24867]up to Dulles, Harvey believed it was up to Helms, but Helms i]
[24869]remarked that Harvey "kept Phase II pretty much in his back j
[24870]. t
[24872]pocket". — re | (tip r (Au
[24877]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 543
[24881]The Committee concludes that the failure clearly to
[24883]inform policymakers of the assassination effort against
[24885]Castro was grossly improper. The Committee believes that
[24887]it should be incumbent upon the DDP to report such a
[24889]sensitive operation to his superior, the DCI, no matter how
[24891]grave his doubts might be about the possible outcome of the
[24892]operation. It follows that the DCI has the same duty to
[24893]accurately inform his superiors.
[24895]. Trujillo.
[24896]In the Trujillo case there were several instances in
[24897]which it appears that policymakers were not given sufficient
[24898]information, or were not informed in a timely fashion.
[24899]At a meeting on December 29, 1960, Bissell presented a
[24901]pian to the Special Group for supporting Dominican exile groups
[24902]arid local dissidents, and stated that the plan would not bring
[24903]down the regime without "some decisive stroke against Trujillo
[24904]himself". At a meeting on January 12, 1961, the Special Group
[24905]authorized the passage of "limited supplies of small arms and
[24906]other material" to Dominican dissidents under certain conditions.
[24907]At this time, the fact that the dissidents had been contemplating
[24908]the assassination of Trujillo had been knovai in the State Department
[24909]at the level of the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-
[24910]“American Affairs, and by senior officials of. the CIA,. including the DCT.
[24912]Yet the memorandum supplied to Under Secretary Merchant, which
[24914]HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 544
[24918]was said to have been the basis upon which the Special Group
[24919]agreed to the "limited supply" of small arms, did not mention
[24921]assassination. To the contrary, it spoke of "sabotage potential"
[24922]and stated that there "would be no thought of toppling the
[24923][government] by any such minor measure [as the supplying of
[24924]small arms]."
[24926]| On February 17, 1961, Richard Bissell sent a memorandum
[24927]on the Dominican Republic to McGeorge Bundy. Bissell knew
[24928]that the dissidents planned to assassinate Trujillo, but his
[24929]memorandum did not mention assassination. It indicated that
[24930]the dissidents’ "plan of action" included arms for 300 men.
[24931]Those involved agreed that support of this nature suggested a
[24932]non-targeted paramilitary plan, not an assassination.
[24934]| The passage of the carbines was approved by CIA head-
[24935]quarters on March 31, 1961. The State Department was apparently
[24936]unaware of this passage for séveral weeks. The pouching of the |
[24937]machine guns was not disclosed outside the CIA.
[24939]The State Department official from whom the CIA sought
[24940]permission to pass the machine guns stated that on “cross
[24941]examination" the CIA official conceded that the purpose was
[24942]assassination. The CIA official then agreed the United States
[24943]should have nothing to do with assassination plots "anywhere ,
[24944]anytime'', even though the previous day he and Bissell had signed
[24945]a draft cable permitting the passage of the machine guns for
[24947]use in connection with a planned assassination.
[24949]HY 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 545
[24953]Schneider
[24955]The issue here is not whether the objectives of the CIA were
[24956]contrary to those of the Administration. It is clear that Presi-
[24957]dent Nixon desired to prevent Allende from assuming office, even
[24958]if that required fomenting and supporting a coup in Chile. Nor
[24959]did White House officials suggest that tactics employed (includ-
[24960]ing as a first step to kidnapping General Schneider) would have
[24961]been unacceptable as a matter principle. Rather, the issue posed
[24962]is whether White House officials were consulted, and thus given
[24963]an opportunity to weigh such matters as risk and likelihood of. suc-
[24965]cess, and to apply policy-making judgments to particular tactics.
[24966]The record indicates that up to October 15 they were; after Octo-
[24967]ber 15 there is some doubt.
[24969]The documentary record with respect to the disputed post-
[24970]October 15 period gives rise to conflicting inferences. On the one.
[24971]hand, Karamessines' calendar shows existence of at least one White
[24972]House contact in the critical period prior to the kidnapping of
[24973]General Schneider on October 22. However, the absence of any sub-
[24974]stantive memoranda in CIA files--when contrasted -with several such
[24975]memoranda describing contacts with the White House between Septem-
[24979]ber 15 and October L5--may suggest | a _lack of. significant | communi-
[24981]‘cation on the part of the CLA as well as a lack of careful super-
[24983]vision on the part of the White’ House.
[24985]HY 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 546
[24989]The standards applied within the CIA itself suggest a
[24990]view that action which the Committee believes called for
[24991]_top-level policy discussion and decision was thought of as
[24992]permissible, without any further consultation, on the basis
[24993]of the initial instruction to prevent Allende from assuming
[24994]power. Machine guns were sent to Chile and delivered to
[24995]military figures there on the authority of junior CIA officers
[24996]without consultation even with the CIA officer in charge of
[24997]‘the program We find no suggestion of bad faith in the action
[24998]of the junior officers. But it necessarily establishes that
[25000]. ee
[25002]passage of machine guns. And it also suggests an attitude
[25003]within the CIA toward consultation which was. unduly lax.
[25004]Further, this case demonstrated the. problems inherent in giving
[25005]an agency a ''blank check" to engage in covert operations
[25006]without specifying which actions are and are not permissible,
[25008]and without adequately supervising and monitoring these
[25010]activities once begun. ©
[25012](b) On Occasion, Administration Officials Gave Vague
[25014]Instructions to Subordinates and Failed to Make Sufficiently
[25016]Clear That Assassination Should. Be Excluded From Consideration.
[25017]While we cannot find that high Administration officials
[25018]expressly approved of the assassination attempts, we have
[25020]noted that certain agency officials nevertheless perceived
[25022]HW 50955 Docld:324293539 Page 547
[25024]a -~38-
[25026]Lay
[25029]assassination to have been authorized. Although those officials
[25030]were remiss in not seeking express authorization for ee
[25031]: : 2 ° z
[25032]activities, their superiors were also at fault for giving mn oe Veh,
[25033]ho a a
[25034]vague instructions and for not explicitly ruling out assassina- on 7
[25035]tion. No written order prohibiting assassination was issued
[25037]een,
[25038]until 1972, and that order was an internal CIA dir j i
[25040]by Director Helms.
[25042]Schneider
[25043]As explained above, there is no evidence that assassina-
[25044]tion was ever proposed as a method of carrying out the Presi-
[25045]dential order to prevent Allende from-assuming office. The
[25046]- Committee believes, however, that the granting of carte
[25047]blanche authority to the CIA by the Executive in this case
[25048]‘may have contributed to the tragic and unintended death of
[25049]‘General Schneider. This was also partially due to impositing
[25050]an impractical task to be accomplished within an unreasonably
[25051]short time. Apart from the question of whether any inter-
[25052]vention was justified under the circumstances of this case,
[25053]the committee believes that the Executive in any event should
[25055]have defined the limits of permissible action.
[25057]Lumumba
[25059]We are unable to make a finding that President
[25060]Eisenhower intentionally authorized an assassination
[25061]effort against Lumumba because of the lack of absolute
[25063]‘certainty in the evidence. However, it appears that the
[25065]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 546
[25069]strong language used in discussions at the Special Group and
[25070]NSC, as reflected in minutes of relevant meetings,
[25071]led Dulles to believe that assassination was desired. The
[25072]minutes contain language concerning the need to “dispose of"
[25073]Lumumba, an “extremely strong. feeling about the necessity
[25074]for straight forward action", and a refusal to rule out any
[25075]activity that might contribute to “petting rid of" Lumumba.
[25076]Castro |
[25077]The effort to assassinate Fidel Castro took place in an
[25078]atmosphere of extreme pressure by Eisenhower and Kennedy
[25079]Administration officials to discredit and overthrow the Castro
[25080]regime. Richard Helms recalled that:
[25081]“I remember vividly [that the pressure] was very
[25082]intense. And therefore, when you go into the record,
[25083]you find a lot of nutty schemes there and those nutty
[25084]schemes were borne of the intensity of the pressure.
[25085]And we were quite frustrated."
[25086]Bissell. recalled that:
[25087]"During that entire period, the administration was
[25088]extremely sensitive about the defeat that had, been
[25089]afflicted, as they felt, on the U.S. at the Bay of
[25090]Pigs, and were pursuing every possible means of ‘
[25091]getting rid of Castro."
[25092]Another witness, Samuel Halpern, stated that sometime in
[25093]the Fall of 1961 Bissell was
[25094]“chewed out in the Cabinet Room in the White House by
[25095]both the President and the Attorney General for, as he
[25096]put it, sitting on his ass and not doing anything about
[25098]getting rid of Castro and the Castro Regime."
[25100]General Lansdale informed the agencies cooperating in Operation
[25102]HY 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 549
[25104]Mongoose that "you're in a combat situation where we have
[25105]been given full command". Secretary of Defense McNamara
[25106]confirmed that "we were hysterical about Castro at the time
[25107]of the Bay of Pigs and thereafter".
[25109]Many of the plans that were discussed and often approved
[25110]contemplated violent action against Cuba. The operation
[25111]which resulted in the Bay of Pigs was a major paramilitary
[25112]onslaught that had the approval of the highest government
[25113]officials, including the two Presidents. Thereafter, Attorney
[25114]General Kennedy vehemently exhorted the Special Group Aug-
[25115]mented that "a solution to the Cuban problem today carried
[25116]top priority - . . no time, money, effort--or manpower is
[25117]to be spared. '"* Subsequently, Operation Mongoose involved
[25118]propaganda and sabotage operations aimed toward spurring a
[25119]revolt of the Cuban people against Castro. Measures that
[25120]were considered by the top policymakers included incapacita-
[25121]ting sugar workers during harvest season by the use of
[25122]chemicals; blowing up bridges and production plants; sabotaging
[25123]merchandise in third countries--even those allied with ”
[25124]the United States--prior to its delivery to Cuba; and arming
[25126]insurgents on the island. Programs undertaken at the urging
[25128]* The Attorney General himself took. a personal interest
[25129]in the recruitment and development of assets within Cuba,
[25130]on occasion recommending Cubans to the CIA as possible recruits
[25131]and meeting in Washington and Florida with Cuban exiles
[25132]active in the covert war against the Castro government.
[25134]HW 50955 DocId:32473539 Page 550
[25136]-4L-
[25138]of the Administration included intensive efforts to recruit
[25139]and arm dissidents within Cuba and raids on plants, mines,
[25140]-and harbors. |
[25141]Discussions at the Special Group and NSC meetings might
[25143]well have contributed to the perception of some CIA officials
[25144]that assassination was a permissible tool in the effort to
[25145]overthrow the Castro regime. At a Special Group meeting in
[25146]November 1960, Under Secretary Merchant inguired whether
[25148]any planning had been undertaken for "direct, positive action"
[25149]against Che Guevarra, Raul and Fidel Castro. Cabell replied
[25150]that such a capability did not exist, but might well have.
[25151]left the meeting with the impression that assassination was
[25152]not out of bounds. One phase of Lansdale's plans, which
[25154]was submitted to the Special Group in January 1962, aimed
[25156]at inducing “open revolt and overthrow of the Communist
[25157]regime’, and included in the final phase an “attack on the
[25158]cadre of the regime, including key leaders". The proposal
[25159]‘stated that "this should be a ‘Special Target" operation
[25160]Gangster elements might provide the best recruitment potential
[25162]against police. Several minutes from Special Group
[25163]meetings contain language such as “possible removal of
[25164]Castro from the Cuban scene'’. Although Lansdale's proposal
[25165]was shelved, the type of aggressive action contemplated was
[25167]not ruled out.
[25169]On several occasions, the subject of assassination was
[25171]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 551
[25175]discussed in the presence of senior Administration officials.
[25176]While those officials never consented to actual assassina-
[25177]tion efforts, they also failed to indicate that assassinatio
[25178]was impermissible as a matter-of principle. did rhe, Clin x
[25179]In early 1961, McGeorge Bundy was informed of a CIA
[25180]project described as the development of a capability to
[25181]assassinate.* Bundy raised no objection and, according to
[25182]Bissell, may have been more affirmative. Although Bissell
[25183]stated that he did not infer authorization from Bundy 's
[25184]remarks for the underworld plot against Castro that was then
[25185]underway, the fact that he believed that. the development
[25186]of an assassination capability had been approved by the White
[25187]House (which he subsequently told to Harvey) may well have
[25188]contributed to the general perception that assassination was
[25189]not prohibited. |
[25190]Documents indicate that in May 1962, Attorney General
[25191]‘Kennedy was told that the CIA had sought to assassinate
[25192]Castro prior to the Bay of Pigs. According to the CIA
[25194]officials present at the briefing, the Attorney.General
[25196]* Bundy, who was National Security Advisor to the President,
[25197]_ had an obligation to tell the President of such a grave
[25198]matter, even though it was only a discussion of a capability
[25199]to assassinate. His failure to do so was a serious error.
[25201]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 552
[25205]indicated his displeasure about the lack of consultation
[25206]on the impropriety of the attempt itself.* There is no
[25207]evidence that the Attorney General told the CIA that it must
[25208]not engage in assassination plots.
[25210]At a meeting of the Special Group Augmented in August
[25211]1962, well after the assassination efforts were underway,
[25212]“Robert McNamara is said to have raised the question of .
[25213]whether the assassination of Cuban leaders should be explored,
[25214]and General Lansdale issued an action memorandum assigning
[25215]the CIA the task of preparing contingency plans for the
[25216]assassination of Cuban leaders. While McCone testified
[25217]that he had immediately made it clear that assassination
[25218]was not to be discussed or condoned, Harvey's testimony
[25219]and documents which he wrote after the event indicate that
[25220]Harvey may have been confused over whether McCone had
[25221]objected to the use of assassination, or whether he was only
[25223]concerned that the subject not be put in writing. In any
[25225]* Documents show that the Attorney General, Robert Kennedy,
[25226]‘learned in May of 1961 that the CIA had used underworld
[25227]figures in an operation against Cuba. The documentary record
[25228]further reflects that the Attorney General was not told that
[25230]the operation had involved assassination efforts until May
[25231]of 1962, and that the operation was then described to him
[25232]as having been terminated in May 1961. There is no evidence’
[25233]that the Attorney General suspected the true nature of the
[25234]operation until that briefing, or that he learned that it
[25235]had not in fact been terminated. While it is curious that
[25236]the Attorney General would not have inquired further into
[25237]the nature of the operation when he discovered that Sam
[25238]Giancana had been involved in it, there is no evidence that *
[25239]he did.
[25241]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 553
[25245]event, McCone went no further. He issued no general order
[25246]banning consideration of assassination within the Agency.
[25248]One of the programs forwarded to General Lansdale by
[25249]the Defense Department in the Mongoose program was entitled
[25250]“Operation Bounty” and envisioned dropping leaflets in Cuba
[25251]offering rewards for the assassination of Government leaders.
[25253]“Although the plan was vetoed by Lansdale, it indicates that
[25254]persons in agencies other than the CIA perceived that assas-
[25256]sination might be permissible.
[25258]Whi e ambivalence of Administration _ofSicials does
[25259]not extusé the misleading conduct by Agency officials or
[25260]justify their failure to seek explicit permission, it dis-
[25261]played an insufficient concern about assassination which
[25262]may have contributed to the perception that assassination
[25263]was an acceptable tactic in accomplishing the Government's
[25265]‘general. objectives. , a We CoG
[25267]With the exception of the tight guidelines issued by ~~ on “ Se
[25269]“the ‘Special Group Augmented concerning Operation Mongoose,“ “yy
[25270]precise TInitations were never imposed on the CIA requiring Oa.
[25271]pride permission for the details of other proposed covert
[25272]operations against Cuba. No general policy banning assas- —
[25273]sination was promulgated until Helms' intra-agency order
[25274]in 1972. In light of the number of times in which the
[25275]subject of assassination arose, Administration officials
[25277]were remiss in not. explicitly forbidding such activity. 2
[25279]HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 554
[25283]The Committee notes that many of the occasions on
[25284]which CIA officials should have informed their superiors
[25285]of the assassination efforts but failed to do so, or did
[25286]so in a misleading manner,. were also occasions on which
[25287]Administration officials paradoxically may have reinforced
[25288]the perceotion that assassination was permissible.
[25289]For example, when Bissell spoke with Bundy about an
[25290]executive action capability, Bissell failed to indicate that
[25291]an actual assassination operation was underway, but Bundy
[25293]‘failed to rule out -assassination as a tactic.
[25295]In May of 1962 the Attorney General was misleadingly told
[25296]‘about the effort to assassinate Castro prior to the Bay of Pigs,
[25297]but not about the operation that was then going on. The Attorney
[25298]General, however, did not state that assassination was improper.
[25300]When a senior administration official raised the question
[25301]of whether assassination should be explored at a Special Group
[25302]meeting, the assassination operation should have been revealed,
[25303]but a firm written order against engaging in assassination should
[25304]also have been issued by McCone if, as he testified, he had ex-
[25306]-hibited strong aversion to assassination.
[25308]at
[25310]HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 555
[25314]6. Practices Current at the Time in Which the Assas-
[25316]sination Plots Occurred Were Revealed by the Record to
[25317]Create the Risk of Confusion, Rashness, and Irresponsibility
[25319]in the Very Areas Where Clarity and Sober Judgment Was
[25320]Most Necessary.
[25322]Various witnesses described elements of the system
[25323]within which the assassination plots were conceived. The
[25324]Committee is disturbed by the custom that permitted the
[25325]most sensitive matters to be presented to the highest levels
[25326]of Government with the least clarity. We find this dis-
[25327]turbing, and view the following concepts as particularly
[25328]dangerous:
[25330](1) _ The extension of the doctrine of "plausible denial"
[25332]beyond its intended purpose of hiding the involvement of
[25334]the United States from other countries to an effort to. vy >
[25336]shield higher officials from knowledge, and hence, responsi- Ce,
[25337]ta: . : ee,
[25339]bility for certain operations. 8 i.
[25343](2) The use of circumlocution or euphemism to describe
[25344]serious matters--such as assassination--when precise meanings
[25345]ought to be made clear.
[25347](3) The theory that general approval of broad covert
[25348]‘action programs is sufficient to justify specific actions
[25350]such as assassination or the passage of weapons.
[25352]HY 409545 Doocld: 32423539 Page 556
[25356](4). The theory that authority granted, or assutied to
[25357]be granted, by one director or one administration could be
[25358]presumed to continue without the necessity for reaffirming
[25359]the authority with successor officials.
[25361](5) The creation of capabilities without careful
[25362]review and authorization by policymakers, and the risk that
[25363]such capabilities might be used without further authoriza-_
[25364]tion.
[25366](a) The Danger Inherent in Overextending the Doctrine
[25367]of Plausible Denial .
[25369]The original concept of plausible denial envisioned
[25370]implement ing covert actions in a manner calculated to conceal
[25371]American involvement if the actions were exposed. The
[25372]doctrine was at times a delusion andar times a snare. It
[25373]was naive for policymakers to assume that sponsorship of
[25374]actions as big as the Bay of Pigs invasion could be concealed.
[25376]' The Committee's inquiry into assassination and the public
[25378]‘disclosures which preceded it demonstrate that when the
[25380]tates resorted to cloak and dagger tactics, its h
[25382]as ultimately expose In addition, the likelihood of
[25383]reckless action is substantially increased when policymakers
[25384]believe that their decisions will never be revealed.
[25385]Whatever can be said in defense’ of the original pur-
[25387]pose of plausible denial--a purpose which intends to conceal
[25389]U.S. involvement from the outside world--the extension of
[25391]HY 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 557
[25395]the doctrine to the internal decision-making process of
[25396]the Government is absurd. Any theory which, as a matter
[25398]of doctrine, places elected officials on the periphery of SPS a7
[25399]. . . ee . ACC
[25400]the decision-making process is an invitation to error, an Ave ¢
[25402]7
[25404]abdication of responsibility, and a perversion of democratic
[25406]government. .
[25407](b) The Dangers of Using 'Circumlocution" and
[25408]“Euphemism" .
[25410]According to Richard Bissell, the extension of plausible
[25411]denial to internal decisionmaking required the use of cir-
[25412]cumlocution and euphemism in speaking with Presidents and
[25413]other senior officials. .
[25415]Explaining this concept only heightens its absurdity.
[25416]On the one hand, it assumes that senior officials should be
[25417]shielded from the truth to enable them to deny knowledge if
[25418]the truth comes out. On the other hand, the concept assumes
[25419]that senior officials must be told enough, by way of double
[25420]talk, to grasp the subject. As a consequence, the theory
[25421]fails to accomplish its objective and only increases the
[25422]risk of misunderstanding. Subordinate officials should des-
[25424]~ eribe their proposals in clear, precise, and brutally frank
[25425]language; busy superiors are entitled to and should demand
[25426]no less. | .
[25428]Euphemism. may actually have been preferred--not because
[25430]HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 556
[25434]of plausible denial--but because the persons involved
[25435]could not bring themselves to state in plain language what
[25436]they intended to do and may have, in some instances, assumed,
[25437]rightly or wrongly, that the listening superiors did not
[25438]want the issue squarely placed before them. Assassinate,
[25439]murder and kill are words many people do not want to speak
[25440]or hear. They describe acts which should not even be pro-
[25441]posed, let alone plotted. Failing to call dirty business
[25442]_ by its rightful name may have increased the risk of dirty
[25443]business being done. -
[25445](ec), The Danger of Generalized Instructions.
[25447]Permitting specific acts to be taken on the basis of
[25448]general approvals of broad strategies (e.g., keep Allende
[25449]from assuming office, get rid of the Castro regime) blurs
[25450]responsibility and accountability. Worse still, it increases
[25451]the danger that subordinates may take steps which would
[25452]have been disapproved if the policymakers had been informed.
[25453]A further danger is that policymakers might intentionally
[25454]use loose general instructions to evade responsibility for
[25455]embarrassing activities.
[25457]In either event, we find that the gap between the
[25458]general policy objectives and the specific actions under-
[25459]taken’ to achieve them was far too wide.
[25461]It is important that policymakers review the manner in
[25463]HY 50955 Doold:32493539 Page 559
[25467]which their directives are implemented, particularly when
[25468]the activities are sensitive, secret, and immune from’
[25469]public scrutiny.
[25471](d) The Danger of "Floating Authorization"
[25473]One justification advanced by Richard Helms and William
[25474]Harvey for not informing John McCone about the use of under-
[25475]world figures to assassinate Fidel Castro was their assertion
[25476]that the project had already been approved by McCone's
[25477]predecessor, Allen Dulles, and that further authorization was
[25478]unnecessary, at least until the operation had reached a more
[25479]advanced stage.
[25481]Similarly, most of the actions taken in the Trujillo
[25482]case during the early months of the Kennedy Administration
[25483]were authorized by the Special Group on January 12, 1961,
[25484]at the end of the Eisenhower Administration,
[25486]The idea that authority might continue from one adminis -
[25487]tration or director to the next and that there is no duty
[25488]to reaffirm authority with successors inhibits responsible
[25489]decisionmaking. Circumstances may change or judgments differ.
[25490]New officials should be given the opportunity to review
[25491]significant programs.
[25493]| (e) The Problems Connected with Creating New Covert
[25494]Capabilities -
[25496]The development of a new capability raises numerous
[25498]problems. Having a capability to engage in certain covert =
[25500]HW 50955 Docld:324293539 Page 560
[25504]activity increases the probability that it will occur,
[25505]since the capability represents a tool that is available
[25506]for use. There is the further danger that authorizing a
[25507]capability may be misunderstood as authorizing its use
[25508]without need for obtaining explicit authorization.
[25510]Of course, an assassination capability should never
[25512]have been created in the first place.
[25514]HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 561
[25518]Approved by
[25520]Drafting .
[25521]4 Subcommittee
[25522]10/8/75
[25523](with possible reservation
[25525]V. RECOMMENDATIONS . as to language of -statute)
[25526]During our long investigation of assassination, a number of vital issues~
[25528]came into sharp focus.
[25529]Above all, stood the question of assassination. Our recommendations on
[25530]other issues should await the completion of our continuing investigations and
[25531]‘our final report. But we need no more information to convince us that a flat
[25532]ban against assassination should be written into law. — : : ~
[25533]We condemn assassination and ‘reject it as an instrument of American
[25534]policy. Surprisingly, at present there is. no statute making it a crime to assas-
[25535]_sinate a foreign official outside the United States. Hence, for the reasons |
[25536]set forth below, the Committee recommends the prompt enactment of a statute mak-
[25538]ing it a Federal crime to commit or attempt an assassination, or to conspire to
[25540]do so.
[25542]A. General agreement that the United States must not engage: in assassina-
[25544]tion. Our view that assassination has no place in America's arsenal is shared by
[25545]the Administration.
[25546]‘President Ford, in the same statement in which he asked this Committee to
[25547]deal with the assassination issue, stated: |
[25548]I am opposed to political assassination. This administration
[25549]has not and will not use such means as instruments of national
[25551]policy. Presidential Press Conference, June 9, 1975, Weekly
[25552]Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. II, No. 24, p. 611.
[25554]The witnesses we examined uniformly condemned assassination. They denounced
[25555]it as immoral, described it as impractical, and reminded us that an open society,
[25556]most of all, runs the risk of the assassination of its own leaders. As President
[25557]Kennedy was reported to have said: "we can't get into that kind of thing, or we
[25558]would all be targets." (Goodwin 7/18/75, p. 4)
[25560]The current CIA Director and his two predecessors testified emphatically
[25562]that assassination should be banned. Thus, Colby said:
[25564]BW 50955 Docld:324273539 Page 562
[25568]With respect to assassination, my position is clear. I
[25569]just think it is wrong. And I have said so and made it
[25570]very clear to my,subordinates. (5/21/75, p. 89)
[25574]Colby's predecéssor, Helms, although himself involved in an earlier plot,
[25575]said he had concluded assassination should be ruled out for both moral and
[25576]practical reasons:
[25578]As a result of my experiences through the years, when I be- |
[25579]came Director I had made up my mind that this option...of
[25580]killing foreign leaders, was something that I did not want
[25581]to happen.on my watch. My reasons for this were these:
[25583]There are not only moral reasons but there are also
[25584]"some other rather practical reasons.
[25586]It is almost impossible in a democracy to keep any-
[25587]thing like that secret.... Somebody would go toa Con-
[25588]gressman, his Senator, he might go to a newspaper man, what=
[25589]ever the case may be, but it just is not a-practical alterna-
[25590]tive, it seems to me, in our society.
[25592]Then there is another consideration...if you are going
[25593]to try by this kind of means to remove a foreipn leader,
[25594]then. who is going to take his place running that country,
[25596]_and are you essentially better off as a matter of practice
[25598]j when it is over than you were before? And I can give you I :
[25600]think a very solid example of this which happened in Vietnam
[25601]when President Diem was eliminated from the scene. We then
[25602]had a revolving door of prime ministers. after that for quite:
[25603]some period of tiem, during which the Vietnamese Government
[25604]at a-time in its history when it should have been strong was
[25605]nothing but a caretaker, government....In other
[25607]words, that whole exercise turned out to the disadvantage of
[25609]‘the United States.
[25611].. there is no sense in my sitting here with all the ex-
[25612]perience I have had and not sharing with the Committee my
[25613]feelings this day. . It isn't because I have lost my cool,
[25614]or because I have lost my. guts, it simply is because I don't
[25615]think it is a viable option in the United States of America these
[25617]days.
[25618]Chairman Church. Doesn't it also follow, Mr. Helms -- I:
[25619]_ agree with what you have said fully -- but doesn't it
[25621]also follow on the practical side, apart from the moral side,
[25622]that since these secrets are bound to come out, when they do,
[25623]they do very grave political damage to the United States in
[25625]the world at large? I don’t know to what extent the Russians
[25627]HW 50955 Docld:324293539 Page 563 ,
[25631]involved themselves in political assassinations, but under
[25632]their system they at least have a better prospect of keep-
[25634]“ ing it concealed. Since we do like a free society and
[25635]since these secrets are going to come’ out in due course, the:
[25636]revelation will then do serious injury to the good name. and
[25637]reputation of the United States.
[25639]Would you agree with that?
[25640]Mr. Helms. Yes, I would. -
[25642]; The Chairman. And finally, if we were to reserve to our-:
[25643]selves the prerogative to ‘assassinate foreign leaders, we may in-.
[25644]vite reciprocal action from foreign governments who assume
[25645]that if it's our prerogative to do so, it is their prero-
[25647]_gative as well, and that is another danger that we at least
[25649]. invite with this kind of action, wouldn't you agree?
[25651]Mr. Helms. Yes, sir. (6/13/75, pp. 76-78)
[25652]Similarly, John McCone said he was opposed to assassinations
[25654]because:
[25656]I didn't think it was proper from the standpoint of the U.S.
[25657]Government and the Central Intelligence Agency. (6/6/75, p.:15)
[25659]B. CIA Directives Banning Assassination. In 1972 and 1973, Helms and
[25661]1
[25663]then Colby issued internal CIA orders. banning assassination. In his order, Helms
[25664]said:
[25666]It has recently again been alleged in the press that CIA:
[25667]engages in assassination. As you are well aware, this is not
[25668]the case, and Agency policy has long been clear on this issue.
[25669]To underline it, however,’ I direct that no such activity or
[25670]operation be undertaken, assisted or suggested by. any of our.
[25671]personnel....(Memorandum,. Helms to Deputy Directors, 3/6/72)
[25673]Colby, in one of a series of orders in August 1973 arising out of the Agency's
[25675]own review of prior ‘questionable activity," issued an order which stated:
[25676]CIA will not engage in assassination nor induce, assist or
[25678]suggest to others that assassination be employed. (Memorandum, Colby
[25679]to Deputy Directors, 3/29/73)
[25681]HW 50955 Docld:32493539 Page 564
[25685]Cc. The need for a statute. Commendable and welcome as they are, these
[25686]CIA directives are not sufficient. Administrations change, CIA directors change,
[25687]and someday in the future what was, tried in the past may once again become: a tempt-
[25688]ation. Assassination plots did happen. It would be irresponsible for us not to do
[25689]all that we can do to prevent their happening again. ‘Laws express our society's.
[25690]values; they deter those who might be tempted and stiffen the will of those who »
[25692]‘want to resist. |
[25694]The statute we recommend , which is printed as an appendix to this report,,,
[25695]makes it a criminal offense for persons cubject to the jurisdiction of the United
[25696]States 1) to conspire, within or outside the United States, to assassinate a |
[25697]foreign official; 2) to attempt to assassinate. a foreign official, or 3) to assas-
[25698]Sinate a foreign official.
[25700]Present law makes it a crime to kill, or to conspire to kill, a foreign
[25701]official or foreign official guest while such a person is in the United States.
[25702]18 U.S.C. 1116; 18 U.S.C. 1117. However, there is no law which. makes it a crime
[25703]to assassinate, or to conspire ‘or attempt to assassinate, a foreign of ficial
[25704]while such official is outside the United States. Our. proposed statute is thus |
[25705]designed to close this gap in the law. |
[25707]Subsection (a) of the proposed statute would punish conspiracies formed
[25708]within the United States; subsection (b) punishes conspiracies outside of the
[25709]United States. Subsection -(b) is) necessary to eliminate the loophole which would
[25710]otherwise permit persons to simply leave the United States and conspire abroad. ,
[25711]Subsections (c) and (da), respectively, make it an offense to attempt to kill or
[25712]to kill a foreign official outside the. United States.
[25714]Subsections (a) through (d) specifically apply to any "officer or employee
[25716]of the United States" to make clear that the statute punishes conduct by U.S.
[25718]HY 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 565
[25720]government personnel, as well as conduct by private citizens having no relation
[25721]to the-U.S. government. In addition, subsection (a), dealing with conspiracies ,
[25722]within the United States; applies to “any other person," whether or not a United
[25723]States citizen. Noncitizens who conspire within the United States to assassi-
[25724]nate a foreign official clearly come within. the jurisdiction of U.S. Law. Sub- -
[25725]sections (b) through (d), which deal with conduct outside the United States, apply
[25726]to U.S. citizens, and to officers or employees of the United States, whether or.
[25727]not they. are citizens. Criminal. liability for conduct outside the United States
[25728]of persons who are not U. S. citizens or-who do ‘not hold a Position as a officer
[25729]or employee of the United States are matters for the law of the place where such
[25730]conduct takes place.
[25732]The term "foreign official" is defined in subjection (d) (2). The de fini-
[25733]tion makes it clear that the offense’ may be committed even though the official
[25734]belongs to an ingurgent Force) an unrecognized government, of a non-governmental
[25736]political party. Our investigation -- as well as the reality of international ;
[25737]for assassination.*/ | -
[25739]The offenses are limited to conduct aimed at such persons because of their
[25740]official duties or status, or their political views, actions, or statements. Thus,
[25741]for example, a conspiracy to kill or the killing of a foreign official, which is
[25742]not politically motivated would not be’ punishable under this statute.
[25744]The definition of official in section (d) (2) also provides that such per-
[25745]son must be an official of a foreign government or movement ‘with which the
[25747]United States is not at war or against which the United States Armed Forces have
[25749]*/For example, Lumumba was not an official of the Congolese government at the
[25750]time of the plots against his life, and Trujillo, though the dictator, held no
[25751]official governmental position in the latter period of his regime.
[25753]HY 50955 Daocld: 32423539 Page 566
[25757]not been introduced into hostilities or situations pursuant to the provisions of
[25758]the War Powers Resolution." This definition makes it clear that, absent | a decla-
[25759]ration of war or the “introduction of United States Armed Forces pursuant to the |
[25761]War Powers Resolution, the killing of foreign officials is a criminal offense.
[25763]finsert discussion of paramilitary aspect /
[25765]kK RR
[25767]In the course of our hearings, some witnesses, while strongly condemning
[25768]assassination, asked whether, asa mat ter: of theory, assassination should absolutely .
[25769]be ruled out in a time of truly unusual national emergency. Adolf Hitler was
[25770]cited as an example. .Of course, the cases with which we were concerned were not
[25771]of that character.*/ In a grave emergency, the President has a limited power to
[25772]act, not in violation of the law, but in accord with his own responsibilities
[25773]under the Constitution to defend the Nation. As the Supreme Court has declared, the
[25774]Constitution “is not a suicide pact." Kennedy v. Nendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144,
[25776]160 (1963).
[25778]Abraham ‘Lincoln, in an unprecedented emergency, claimed unprecedented
[25779]power based on the need to preserve the nation:
[25781]...my oath to preserve the Constitution to the best of.
[25782]my ability, imposed upon me the duty of preserving, by
[25783]every indispensable means, that government -- that
[25784]nation -~ of. which that Constitution was the organic law.
[25785]‘Was it possible to lose the nation, and yet preserve the
[25786]Constitution? By general law life-and limb must be pro-
[25787]tected; yet often a limb must be amputated to save a life;
[25788]but a life is never wisely given to save a limb. I felt
[25789]that measures, otherwise unconstitutional, might become
[25790]lawful, by becoming indispensable to the preservation of
[25791]the Constitution, through the preservation of the nation
[25793]_e+e+ The Complete Works of Abraham Lincoln, Vol. Xs
[25794]pp. 65-66 (Nicolay and Hay, Eds. 1894).
[25796]*/Indeed, in the only situation of true national: crisis -~ the Cuban missile
[25797]crisis -- assassination was not even considered.
[25799]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 567
[25803]Of course, whatever the extent of the President's own constitutional
[25804]powers, it is a fundamental principle of our constitutional: system that these.
[25805]powers are checked and limited by the Congress, including the Congress' power
[25806]of impeachment. As a necessary corollary, any action taken by a President pur-—
[25807]suant to his limited inherent powers and in apparent conflict with the law
[25809]_ must be disclosed te the Congress. Only thea may the Congress judge whether the acm -
[25810]‘tion truly represented, in Lincoln's phrase, an "indispensable necessity" to.
[25811]the life of the Nation.
[25813]As Lincoln explained in submitting his extraordinary actions to the Congress
[25814]for. ratification: "In full view of his great responsibility he has, so far,
[25815]done what he has deemed his duty. You will now, according to your own judgment,
[25816]perform. yours." (Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session, July 4,
[25818]1861).
[25820]AW 50955 DoclId: 32423539 Page 566
[25822]; . ; ‘ Approved by Drafting
[25823]Subcommittee on 9/9/75 |
[25825]EPILOGUE — , .
[25827]We do not believe that the acts which we have examined represent the
[25828]real American character. They do not reflect the ideals which have given.
[25829]the people of this country and of the world hope for a better, fuller,
[25830]fairer. life. We regard the assassination plots as aberrations.
[25832]| We must not adopt the. tactics o£ the enemy. Means are as important.
[25833]as ends. Crisis makes it tempting to ignore the wise restraints that axe
[25834]men free. But each time we do sO; @ach time the means we use are wrong,
[25835]our inner Strength, the Strength which makes us free, is lessened.
[25836]| Despite our distaste for what we have seen, we have great faith in
[25837]this country. The story is sad, but this country has the strength to hear
[25838]itvand to learn from it. We must remain a people who confront our mistakes
[25839]and resolve not to repeat them. If. we do not, we will decline; but, if we
[25841]do, our future will be worthy of the best of our past. — a
[25843]HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 569