[1]14-001
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[5]104-10236-10056
[6]: az | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
[9]eS ‘ 10 October 1961
[11]MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD) -————-
[12]SUBJEGT: Meeting with Dr, MIRO Cardona on 6 October
[14]1, Dr, MIRO arrived about 9:50 a.m. for the mecting.we had
[15]set at 10:00; again he was driven by his secretary whom he introduced,
[16]As during the first meeting, she remained outside in the car.
[17]mecting lasted until 12:00 noon, ;
[19]-Our
[21]2. First, Dr. MIRO handed me a note-in-longhand listing the
[22]topics discussed with me on § October, These points are? .
[24]a, Groups conducting propaganda, etc. with Agency support
[25]should receive their support and be coordinated through the Council.
[27]‘be A propaganda campaign should be waged by the Council -
[28]aimed at: .
[30](1) Cuba, via a long wave radio station in Key West. ,
[31](2) Cubans in Miami and other Ue Ss. areas by?
[32]{a) Subsidizing Diario de las Americas.
[33](b) Contracting for time on radio atations.
[35](3) Latin America, with a plan such as the "Operacion
[38]c, Underground Activities.
[40](1) Provision of monthly funds to Courcil for procuring
[41]Cuban pesos to send to the seven-odd resistance
[42]groups in Cuba through reliable channels (such as ©
[43]previously sent through the Italian Embassy).
[45]e
[47]Sata |
[50]g
[51]t
[52]8
[54]yg AS
[60]J :
[61]eeag -- Biot te,
[63]jon as outlined in plan presented
[64]A ober, - i 7 :
[66]'o,: an officer of the Academy, Captain
[67]4 nu) MONTEAGUDO, He stated
[68]‘group and had been prisoners. .
[70]the plan for clandestine operations in Cuba,
[72]he stated that 300 men could be counted upon for commando action, part
[73]of them here, part in Cuba. He reiterated that a commando operation
[74]was essential to bolster morale among the anti-Castro elements in Cuba
[75]and in exile as well as to conduct sabotage that would further weaken °
[76]Cuban economy and the Communist regime. He said that for this operation
[77]U. S. help would be necessary in providing weapons, ammo, demolitions,
[78]equipment, and funds. He proposed that if this plan was considered to
[79]have merit, that J arrange to have someone meet with his military men
[80]to work out the detaila. After all preparations had been made and
[81]materiel provided, etc. the operation would be purely a Cuban affair,
[82](NOTE: Plan turned over to Thompson at our nm eting at 15:30 on
[84]& October for transmission. )-
[86]4. Request for Arms, etc, to send to Escambray
[88]Dr.MIRO remarked that over a month ago he had made a request
[89]to Clark for arms for the anti-Castro insurgents in the Escambray, but
[90]to date had heard nothing relative to the request. He commented wryly,
[91]"] ask but never hear an answer." He said that the fighters there should
[92]be supported, Dr. MIRO stated that he had a boat (provided by us) and
[93]a means for delivery of the arms, Osvaldo RAMIREZ is chief of the
[95]Escambray group. ;
[96]COMMENT: Has anything been done about this request?
[98]5. Information on Arma Received by Castro Regime
[100]Dr. MIRO handed me a long report which he said was brought
[101]to him by the Argentine Ambassador to Cuba when the latter came to the
[102]U. S. at the time of President FRONDIZI's visit, He said the Ambassador
[103]would not divulge the source of the information but commented, "You will
[106]*Report turned over to Thompson on 6 October.
[110]Ps
[112]hs.
[113]he:
[115]we
[117]14-0000
[119]a De
[120].
[122]om
[124]SEGGE
[126]4
[128]. MIRO said there was no way to determine the accuracy
[129]of the figures given of planes, guns, etc, received from the Soviet bloc
[130](and ‘Italy and Canada): but ever. if the figures were exaggerated 100 per
[131]cent, they would still: be impressive, an
[133]. He added that Castro is daily becoming stronger militarily
[134]with weapons and with a large militia of close to 300, 000 being trained -
[135]to use them while the economy continues to deteriorate. Perhaps only
[136]half the militia would be effective, But that is sizeable. Thus, he said,
[137]the longer the delay in positive military action to overthrow Castro, the
[138]greater will be the task, ‘We must act soon, vigorously and effectively,
[139]to insure victory, Another defeat would be disastrous and would make
[140]Cubans, Latin Americans and others bolieve Castro to be invincible,
[141]Then would core accommodations and even worse, the implanting of
[142]Castro-backed regimes in the hemisphere. And the U..S. would suffer.
[143]worst of all, being discredited for defeat and "guilt of interference, "'
[144]"In the UN no nation would stand beside the U. S,"
[146]6. Proposal that Council go to Cuba with Commando Group and
[148]Establish a Government on Cuban Soil
[150]Dr. MIRO then declared that he was convinced that Castro
[151]would never be overthrown by all the propaganda, the sabotage, commando
[152]raids, guerrilla activities, rupture of diplomatic relations and deteriorating
[153]economy, and that it was inconceivable to establish a government-ir-exile
[154]for nothing would come of it; that the only solution for defeating the
[155]Castro regime was for the Revolutionary Council to ,0 to Cuba and estab-
[156]lish a government on Cuban soil, ask recognition by all friendly countries
[157]and military assistance of its principal ally, the U, S,, and that the U.S.
[158]: be ready to intervene immediately with its Forces, 'This’would all have
[160]. to take place in a matter of 48 hours, otherwise it would fail. I recognize
[161]that this is a bold plan, but boldness is necessary, There will be many
[162]risks, many may be killed, As for myself, I don't care if Idie. Ihave
[163]lost all my personal possessions and my son is a prisoner." He reiterated
[164]that all must be well prepared in advance, there must be no vacillation,
[165]everytning must proceed rapidly. First, a commando raid in force to
[166]seize a piece of Cuban territory, preferably near Guantanamo, and imme-
[167]diately the members of the Council go ashore, proclaim a provisional
[168]government, broadcast by radio to all nations an appeal for recognition
[169](and cables prepared in advance would also be sent out), request U, S,
[170]assistance, and the U. S. should furnish such assistance at once in ade-
[172]quate strength to ensure victory.
[174]Wain |
[176]14-0000
[178]Pd
[182]- SEG
[184]Before such an action is. undertaken, the enemy must be
[185]softened by propaganda, sabotage, raids, underground action, and the ~
[186]mass of the people of Cuba must be prepared to accept the provisional
[188]* government through propaganda, increased knowledge of the Council
[189]‘and its + unifying ‘efforts, . Sarre
[191]«. MIRO asked me what I thought of this project; did I think
[192]that Castro. could be overthrown in any other way. I admitted that :
[193]strong military action appeared necessary. I stated further that
[194]of course his plan would have to be studied at the highest government
[195]levels, He proposed that he might elaborate a plan with his military .
[196]ors,and I suggested that he do this so that it might be examined
[198]and considered.
[200]Dr. MIRO declared that he was convinced that this-Communist
[202]: dagger in the side of the States could only be eradicated by éuch action,
[204]that the U.S. is and will be blamed for all anti-Castro propaganda,
[205]sabotage, etc, and that enemy states will denounce it for intervention’
[206]in Cuba, but that if the U. S. goes to the aid of a friendly revblutionary
[207]tegime established in the country and helps it defeat the Soviet-backed
[208]Communist regime, all friendly governments will applaud,
[210]. "I have no personal political ambitions, " declared MIRO.
[211]ny merely am trying to chair the Council, whose mission is to unify the
[212]anti-Castro.elements inside and outside of Cuba, If the team isn't con-
[213]sidered effective, then change the pitcher. But I believe the Council must
[214]establish itself on Cuban soil, and soon, _ Time is against us.""'The Punta
[215]del Este agreement will backfire against the U, S, if Castro is allowed
[216]to remain in Cuba. Ina year, after the politicos of the countries re-
[217]ceiving U. S. aid have gotten their hands on U. S. gold, they will say,
[218]‘Thanks to Castro, we got this.' And they will spend it as in the past
[219]with no benefits to the social and economic welfare of the people, "
[221]. 7. Views about the Judges and Lawyers
[222]|
[224]: Iqueried Dr, MIRO as to his views relative to the judges and
[225]lawyers and their future status, He said he hoped that they could all
[226]reunite and that they could be given assistance as in the past. He de-
[227]clared that Dr, ALABAU was not qualified to be a justice and that he was
[228]doing nothing but making politics and trying to discredit the Council
[229]and MIRO and VARONA, Dr, MIRO declared that he, as Prime Minister
[231]' in the early days of the Caetro government, had named ALABAU to the -
[233]Seren
[237]14:00000
[239]“Ns enact
[240]si a
[242]judicial position,
[244]8 Members of the Revolutionary Council
[246]. Dr. MIRO remarked that he had a meeting of the Councit on”
[247]10 October, I asked what elements now composed it and what he pro-
[248]posed to add. He named the following as presently in the Consejo:
[250]Rescate
[252]30 de Noviembre
[253]MRR ;
[254]Accion Democratica. _ : \
[255]20 de Mayo .
[256]AAA Independiente
[257]MDG
[259]Montecristi
[261]He said he had invited to join:
[263]_
[264]Unidad Revolucionaria
[266]and awaited their reply.
[268]He would also like te have the Workers, Students, and the
[269]Professionals (Doctors, Lawyers, etc.) come into the Council. He be-
[270]lieves Batistianos and Comunistas and elements unwilling to cooperate
[271]should be excluded, but that all ether groups should be brought together
[272]under the Council,
[274]He contends that all anti-Castro activities, except clandestine
[275]and military, should be coordinated by members of the Council, but that
[276]the excepted activities should be known only to him (MIRO).
[278]9. Probable Argentine Rupture of Relations with Cuba
[280]Dr, MIRO declared that he believed imminent the Argentine
[281]rupture of relations with Cuba. He said the Argentine Ambassador to
[282]Cuba (Juho AMOEDO) was ordered to return to Havana (he had been
[283]vacationing in the U. S. after FRONDIZI's visit); that VLLLANUEVA, a
[284]Secretary of the Argentine Embassy in Cuba was coming to see MIRO
[285]today; and further that he (MIRO) had received a phone call last night
[287]14-0000
[289]' from.a Spaniard (Nicanor FERNANDEZ) in Buenos Aires, urging MIRO
[290]to go to Buenos Aires to arouse anti-Castro sentiment of the people, |
[291]Le . -inasmuch as some Argentine action against Cuba appeared imminent. |
[292]te (FERNANDEZ said he had already written MIRO a letter.) MIRO says;
[293]: "Of course, I cannot go. Ihave the Consejo meeting on the 10th, .
[294]Furthermore, Iam going to New York.on October 11th or 12th for the
[295]SIP (Socieded Interameriicana de Prensa) meeting and have been allotted
[296]12 minutes to adaress the meeting. " .
[298]10, MIRO to attend Homage to LACERDA (Brazilian whe
[299]Precipitated QUADROS' resignation) on October 15
[301]Dr. MIRO said he planned to remain in New York City (after
[302]11 and 12 October SIP meeting) until October 15th to attend the homage
[303]for LACERDA, the Governor of Guanabara province in Brazil, MIRO
[304]probably will stay at the Park Chambers Hotel, but will advise Clark
[306]of his location.
[308]I commented that I would probably remain in Washington next
[309]week in view of his plans, but that I might go to New York City to meet
[310]with him; if go, 1 would get in touch with him and arrange a meeting
[311]time and place through Clark,
[313]11. Propaganda Commission
[315]I asked Dr. MIRO about his ideas on the future organization
[316]and structure of the Propaganda Commission, He stated that it is out-
[317]side the Consejo and not under his direct control, although the Council
[318]accountant has been passing funds to it. He said CABTRILLO’ had resigned
[319]as head of Propaganda and that he would like CONTE AGUERO to handle
[320]it. He’ claimed that MESTRE had not done anything with propaganda.
[322]12. MIRO's Views Relative to Supreme Court Juatice or PRIO
[323]being Recognized as Head of a Provisional Government
[325]Ilasked Dr, MIRO if he believed that there were many anti-
[326]Castro Cubans (both in and out of Cuba) who favored PRIO, or the head
[327]of the Supreme Court to. be the provisional president if a government were
[328]to be established on Cuban soil.- Dr, MIRO declared that the revolution
[329]is a fact, and that practically nobody wants to go back to any former
[330]regime. The people in Cuba would resist any such possibility. He de-
[332]heal
[334]14-0000
[336]> 25
[338]i
[339]a
[340]4
[341]4
[342]Po
[344]“re
[348]Vidaid
[349]nounced PRIO's activities against the Council and its efforts to unify
[350]the anti-Castro elements, He said that the people should be given an
[352]opportunity to elect their chief of state after Castro's overthrow and
[353]reestablishment of order in the island. | ;
[355]13. Offices-of Council {Consejo Revolucionario)
[357]When questioned about his business and private telephones,
[358]MIRO eaid, "The business phone is algo in my house. I have no office
[359]except in my house, but that phone is always busy (JEfferaon 2-4680),
[360]So use the other phone (JEfferson 4-2751) when you wigh to call me. "
[362]"I need to have a small office somewhere away from my home
[363]because all the activities there are driving my wife crazy. I want to : .
[364]find something modest so that no accusation can be made of ostentation = eee
[365]merely a room for myself, one for my secretary, and one for meetings. oO
[366]of the Council, etc, The FRD had a place but at that place.also was the
[367]press, the refugee center, etc, It would not be satisfactory. The FRD
[368]is now practically dead. It was the forerunner of the Consejo.as the
[369]unifying agency of the anti-Castro resistance, " ;
[371]14; MIRO's Views on. Coordinating the Activities of Other Exile
[372]Groups :
[374]After Dr. MIRO reiterated his view that he should be the
[375]channel for funds and coordinating the activities of groups outside the
[376]Consejo such as the Students, FORD (Labor), etc., I said that I under-
[377]stood that some of these elements were unwilling to function under the-
[378]Consejo; and that in view of that situation, did he consider that an
[379]Activity Committee might be organized with a delegate from each of
[380]these groups and under the chairmanship of a member of the Consejo.
[381]This would serve to coordinate their activities, give them a tie-in with
[382]the Consejo, yet not make them subservient to it. Dr. MIRO replied
[383]that this would merely set up another Consejo outside of and parallel to
[384]the existing Consejo, I did not pursue this further, not having enough
[385]background of these organizations to be able to discuss the matter
[386]effectively, |
[388]15, Telephone Conversation with MIRO on 7 October
[390]Before my departure from Miami for Washington on 7 October,
[391]I telephoned to Dr, MIRO froin the airport, He appreciated the call and
[392]asked if 1 had seen in the morning paper the action taken yesterday by
[394]rome
[396]brains
[398]44-0000
[400]- UT
[402]the ALABAU Lawyers’ group in proclaiming Julio CARCERAN (one
[404]of the chief justices in exile) as "President of Cuba at War."' He ex
[405]pressed his indignation at thie unilateral "political" move by ALABAU
[406]and his adherents: “among the exiled lawyers and judges. He added his
[407]best wishes to me and reminded me that he would probably go to New
[408]York on October llth or 12th for the SIP (Sociedad Interamericana de
[409]Prensa) meeting. 1 replied that 1 would appreciate if he would contact
[411]. Clark after his arrival to give his location in New York City, and that
[413]Clark might have a request from me for an appointment with him, if
[414]this seemed desirable. 1 suggested that in future phone conversations.
[415]I would be known as JUANITO, He agreed with pleasure that this would
[416]be a good Procedure. I wished him Godspeed and he replied likewise
[417]tome. — . -
[419]16, Comment
[420]During these first two meetings I endeavored to establish
[421]myself favorably with Dr, MIRO and therefore refrained from bringing
[422]up details of budget or opposition to any of his specific proposals,
[423]Ilistened, asked various ,uestions, and he talked at length.
[425]In future meetings, after Ihave gained further background and
[427]’ Rave more policy guidance, I shall be able to discuss with him specific
[429]issues and endeavor to reach agreements or compromises, as may be
[430]required,
[432]Clo, cp