[1]14-00000
[3]104-10103-10079 ! 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
[5]. Me.
[7]SECRET - SENSITIVE
[8]Draft Memorandum to the DCI from William Harvey
[10]Dated 27 November 1962
[12]This is not a controlled item
[14]toes a
[16]14-0000
[18]abnemactibaomenns — am
[20]j
[21]4
[23]habe.
[25][o SECRET - sworn]
[27]az November 1962
[29]Note: Discussed 27 Heyesher
[30]18962 by DD/F with PCI
[31]end approved generei!:
[32]im principle by PCr,
[33]Pully concurred (to
[34]by BD/P.
[36]anioraDow FoR: Director of Central Intelligence”
[38]THROUGH: = Deputy Director (Plens)
[39]SUBJECT: Operstional Pien for Continuing
[41]Opere tions 4geinst Cube
[43]os ‘Actions Tite memorandua 18 for. your information
[44]- and pursuant to your request. - ‘Recommendations for action ere
[45]conteined ia Prrograph V below. The purpose of this memernorus
[47]is to delineate an operational plen for the action which we |
[49],belleve should be taken by CIA agsinst Cube for tie prodictabls
[51]future. In summary the plan provides. for ccatinuting, even
[52]intensifying, the intelligence effort sgeinst Cubs and for
[54]the reorientation of the current effort into s long term
[56]denied sren type of operation of the highest priority.
[58]I. ASSUMPTIONS:
[60]‘A. The United States Government will give public
[62]assurances that, provided no nuclesr or offensive weapons fre
[64]present or re-introduced into Cuba, end proy ided Cubs dces
[65]“not take action’ to threaten the pence. ond security: of the
[67]Western Hetaisphere, the United States goes not ingend t Dean
[68]LETIP tS
[70]invade Cuba ox support an Anvasion of. Cuba. A soumes Fo
[72]ad BECRET — SENSITIVE | PAPER GO.
[74]14-0000
[76]io - - B, Theso assurances will preclude any ‘meaningful CIA
[77]| ; action ‘on a phased basis ‘to provoke a revolt inside Cube, since
[78]unless ‘there are major changes in operational and internal con-
[79]: ditions: in Cuba, euch a revolt if provoked would be totally
[81]deatroyed by Cuban counteraction in a matter of hours or, at
[83]for daye unions. support a. aby. & jiajor. ‘United States
[85]f , | he " non-tavasion assutances
[86]re a ‘practical matter will, preclude invading Cuba on’ the pretext
[87]ofa contrived provocation such 2S an attack on Guantanamo,
[88]. ee CIA, operations involving a. high noise level and a
[89]_ddmtiact: elenent of ‘attributabfiity, particularly paranilitery,
[90]* querrdlig,:. and conimando type operations ‘will be unacceptable
[91]ag a matter of. ‘policy.
[92]. De The Castro-communist regime will remain in power for
[93]the indefinite future with its security and control apparatus
[94]relatively intact and with the capability not only of crushing
[95]unsupported resistance activity, ‘but of ‘making operational
[96]. conditions in Cuba increasingly difficult. While it is
[97]possible that recent and future developments including the
[98]Soviet action in removing the offensive weepons. from Cube ney
[99]7 serve to weaken and discredit Castro, there is as yet no hard
[100]indication: that the. control of the Castro-communist regime over
[101]Cuba has been substantially weakenod.
[103]The United States ‘assurances of. no invasion ‘and no
[107]- gupport ofan invasion will, in effect, constitute giving te
[109]Castro. and his regime a certain degree of Senctuary. This will
[112]14-0000
[114]ye severely demage the morale and motivation of anti-regine Cubens
[116]both Angide end outside of Cubs, which will make: it ‘Aneressingiy
[118]_ recruited, and continue or intensify our intelligence and other
[120]efforts against Cuba and the Castro-communi st regime.
[122]EZ | difficult for us to. recruit agents, ‘maintain sgents already
[123]| oe Despite. ‘the: above factors Higher Authority probably
[125]_ ee ‘against. ‘cata’ ‘and may even 1 cont Lie to contend thet the ultimate.
[126]objective ie the overthrow of the Castro-comunist regime.
[127]‘This. 46 an unrealistic objective, however, except. on a very |
[129]{ long-term, bosis. a8 ‘the: United. States Governsient, we ‘believe,
[131][ . will be unwilling ta the: innedinte future to commit: troops
[133]a . _ to ‘Support ‘such, an overthrow. The United Btates Governxent
[135]a it
[137]an Ate overt, dealings with the Cuban, exiles probably will not —
[139]g. tie sbove, factors to then. an the context. or with the
[140]“pluntness: stated here,
[142]"Ge. In view of these factors, the so-cslled “Ipgck Tro",
[144]. course of action, 1.6., unlimited support of Cuban exiles
[146]and exile groups with no real control. or objective purposes
[147]‘in the hope that these groups wilt be able to shake the
[149]Castro regine y. Ail, although unrealistic, become increzs ing ty
[150]attractive et various ‘levels in the United Ststes Government.
[152]Be AB & “matter eof policy, political pressures and —
[154]economic. pressures, short. of blockade, raids, and ‘aggressive
[156]es there
[157]4.
[159]‘sabotage against Cuba will ‘be ‘continued.
[162]14-0000
[164]Ve I. in view of the above assumptions prramilitary, commando
[165]- and sabotage .o ‘operstions, except in ‘rare selective instences —
[166]' . WALL serve Little purpose; nino they wild be counter-product tve
[167]: since, it “undertaken, they will make the collection of intol}li-
[168]. gence more dtefioult and should only be undertrken in those very
[169]| few instances. where an unusually high return can be demonstrrted,
[170]Regardiean of what other pressures are placed on CIA for -
[171]action against Cube, it would eppear clear. that Higher Authority
[172]wilh insist on a continued, even intensified, {utelligence
[173]coverage of Cuba.
[174]“In view of. ‘the policy ftectors, en iacreased use of
[175]“notte, real estate end. ‘peeing: outside the United States,
[176]. particularly in ‘Latin Anerice, will be both necessary snd
[177]desirable.
[179]~ 0: 7: Ke Adequate serial reconneissance of Cuba will continue.
[181]eS “in “OBJECTIVES:
[182]. Based on the above essumptions, the following objectives:
[183]‘appear to be proper for continuing CIA operations against
[184]Cuba:
[185]A Take all feasible clandestine action to isolate
[186]and aggist in tsolating the Castro-conmunist regime in Cuba
[187]from. the rest of the Western Hemisphere and the rest of the
[188], Free World. |
[189]Be! ” To. ‘the maximum extent. t posmibie, ‘discresit the Castro- .
[190]ae communist reg ine in Cuba and in the Festern Hemisphere. and the
[191]_ " xest of the world. |
[195]14-0000
[197]rv,
[199]. c. Mnintein through clandestine moans, short of commando —
[200]- and guerrilia type operations, ‘the ‘maxioum economic and ,
[201]politicel pressures’ on the Cuban regine and econory not only
[202]_ for the purpose of hampering‘ the Cuban regine, but for the
[203]additional: purpose of Ansuring the maximum possible drain on
[205]“ Bles : ‘resources, used | to, Support, Cubae gas
[207]D. Maintain. ‘maxim ‘possible’ intelligence and counter -
[208]“AmteLligence coverage of ‘Cuba, ‘Anoluding particular ‘emphasis
[210]. ons
[212]' ae Capabilities and. intentions of the. government.
[213]; Be * Activities of the. Cuban G-2 and its other
[215]security orgaus.
[216]3. ‘Boviet’ and Bloc activities: in Cuba.
[218]4.0 State of potential. resistance, including the
[220]i / morale, and teuper of ‘the ‘populace.
[221]a va “Militia ond wilitary order of battle and equip-
[223]. 6. The leci of power and of possible stresses
[224]‘and strains in the power centers in the ‘Cuban goverunont.
[225]- 7, Relationships between Cuba, USSR, Red Chine,
[226]the Bloc, Latin American nations snd other "re Wor ld
[227]‘end uncommitted nations. .
[228]8.. The level of and the weaknesses in, the Cuben
[229]a ,
[231]14-0000
[233]en? Trke maximum action to induce a split in the Cubsn
[234]— regine ond maintein the capability of capitalizing. innodintely
[235]through clandestine means to the extent possible on any
[236]: aignificent uprising, revolt, resistance, split in the regina,
[237]“or strains ond stresses among Cuban leadership or An: Cuben/
[238]oy Boe, relationships,
[239]a ITT, - OPERATIONAL, PLAN: |
[240]Espionage and Intelligence Collection - ALL fersible _
[241]. ‘effort should be undertoken to continue end intensify intelli-
[242]_ gence: ¢ collection concerning Cuba. The status of our intelli-
[243]_ gence ‘eollection, and elated operational activity, at the
[244]: present ‘time and its development ‘during the past eix months
[245]is delineated .1n detail in Attachment A, which was preprred tc
[246]serve as the basis for the iG's report on this particular
[247]| matter to the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign
[248]Intelligence. “You will note that this lengthy - docuzent
[249]bresks down under numerous sub-beadings the intelligence
[250]coverage which has been developed. by the Clandestine Service.
[251]Set out below aro specifics of operational action it is
[252]proposed to take to continue ond, as possible, incresse {n-
[253]telligence coverage of Cuba. .
[254]1. Intelligence Exploitation « of Refugees: As you
[255]know, with the quarantine and the cessstion of air
[257]_ ytravel the ‘heavy’ flow of Cuban refugees has dwindled
[259]“plmost. to nothing. In v lew of this and in connection
[261]~G~
[263]14-0000
[265]. with the cont ingency plonning for supporting any poneible
[266]mplitary action an Cuba, the .Opa-Locke. Interrogation *
[268]7 Center as such was dismantled,’ although. the personnel
[269]of the ‘Center have been retained intect. In order to
[271]"| Fevestablish the flow of intelligence from refugees,
[273]ae ts Proposed that Pan American Airweys and KIM be
[274]_ -* tadueea te ‘to. relnstitute their regular: flights from
[275]"Havana. -to Miami. This should be done s8 soon aa
[277]7 possible after the settlement of. the current negotintions
[279]and UN digcussions. Coincident with this, _the Opa-Locka
[281]refugee interrogation center will be re-established
[283]“with the game personnel.
[285]: 2. Resident Agents in Cuba: Every effort: will be
[287]made to continue to exploit to the fullest, preserve the
[288]wiability of. and, where necessary, re-catablish conmunica-
[289]theas. with the 131. recruited agents now. resident in Cuba.
[290]“To an extent, the’ speed and effectiveness of this effort
[291]7 will of course depend upon the stringency of future
[292]. Cuban security and control sction, which it is impossible
[294]2s yet to accurstely forecast.
[296]3. Third Country Operations: The priority on re-
[298]cruiting agents in third countries for dispatch to Cube
[300]| Will be reiterated ond etrengthened and every effort
[301]“WALL, be made to increase this coverage, both. through
[302]the. development of additional resident agents in Cubs
[305]14-0000
[307]d , . _
[308]4, .Sdeisany Operations: We will continue to press
[310]the [aison services who sre sssisting ua in the effort
[312]3 and through the development of additional legal travellers.
[313]1
[315]| against Cuba for additional coverage, including the
[317]i recruiting of regents within their own rrens for joint
[319]{ dispstch to Cuba. The services>most effectively co-~
[320]opereting at this point in this connection ere the
[322]British, Dutch, French, Spanteh, Itelian, Greek,
[324] ‘Urugusyia, Canadian, Chilean, and Israelis Direct
[326]approaches to several of these Services) either by you
[327]personally or in your name, ns you prefer, ere
[328]being separately recommended. Personal representation
[330]} by you to the servicés>underlined sbove would be useful.
[331]In addition, we will re-survey all other ddaison_ services ~
[332]. with which we are in contact and reiterate to those
[334]appearing to have any assets usable against Cuba our
[336]extreme interest in maximum coverage of this problem.
[338]| In connection with the ‘gon yproblem generally, we will
[339]| endeavor to induce «ll of the WWaison services to mate
[340]greater use of their Hhational assets, both inside and
[341]| outside cf Cuba, Perticular attention will be given to
[342]| possible utilizetion of the Vatican, /
[343]a » 1.8. Maritime Operations: In eddition to increasing
[345]{ efforts to get at serman agents end other naritime
[347]sesets through {inison services, we will continue our
[348]unilateral third country efforts to recruit seamen and
[350]-
[352]14-0000
[354]| _ prerticularly Cuban seanen, to increane the twenty
[356]. officers and crew members sboard six Cubsn vessels we rre
[357]now running as controlled agents.
[359]. 6. Penetration of Cuban Installations Abropd: At
[361]the present time we sre running 12 Cuben diplomats
[363]stationed outside Cube as controlled agents znd have vinhle
[365]~ operations aimed st an additional 20 Cuban diplomats.
[369]We propose to continue pnd intensify the current progren
[370]of attempting to recruit or defect every Cuben official
[372]represeutstive ebrornd to whom we can gein access rnd
[374]concerning whom we have any reason to believe gs
[375]susceptibility to approach exists. These additions!
[376]penetrations will be attempted both through Qnilateret
[377]operations end where eppropriate in conjunction with
[378]9, Audio Penetrations of Cuban Installations
[380]4
[382]Abroad: At the present time we have sudio and/or
[383]telephone tap coverage of Cuban officirl installations
[384]in Chile, Itsly, Mexico, The Netherlands;, England,
[386]Uruguay, Greece, Spain, France, and Cenaca,) No
[388]mejor expansion of this coverage is presently
[390]contemplated, but we will continue to survey rdditicnrt
[392]targets of opportunity and wherever pessible instell
[394]coverage in those cases where the additional intelli-
[395]“gence fon this type of source over and above whet we
[397]are now receiving would eppeer to make such Installirtion
[398]‘ worthwhile. |
[403]14-0000
[405], Gommunicetions Intelligence: Ve wlll continuc
[406]our present CIA Close Support coverage from the KOLA
[408]station in Wicmd at the seme level end will cont inue
[409]to press NSA for cdditional coverage of Cuban comaunticr~
[410]tions. As the current situstion “nermelizes"” it should
[412]ba possible for NSA to reinstitute end perhaps even
[414]increase their seaborne intercept coverage of. Cuban
[416]cosrunicetions.
[418]9. Communist Party Operations: A complete survey
[419]bas been made world-wide of all Communist Party
[421]penetration operations and wherever any such penetration
[423]- can be directed against Cuba either by dispatching the
[425]sgent to Cuba or by pointing the agent sgsinst Cubrn
[426]targets, this will be done, except in those cases where
[428]such action would result in unaeceptabl¢prejudice te
[430]‘the operations in the srea where the agent is now based.
[432]It igs believed that the. most lucrative field for the
[434]redirection of such operations to the Cuban target will
[436]be Latin America where there sre 65 penetrations of
[438]verious communist parties. Of this 65, the survey
[439]we bave conducted indicstes that 23 have some direct
[440]pertinent access to Cuban targets. All of these 272 will
[442]be directed against these targets unlesa in any case
[444]~ tthere. ere , oversiding ‘reasons. to, Bae. contrary, The
[447]14-0000
[449]10 “[ilegs ly infiltrated Agents: The two ;
[451]sdccoustu1 black: infiltrated teas (COBRA and AMTORRID)
[453]whieh hsve produced: substantial intelligence will be
[455]continued, resupplied, end roinforced but pointed
[457]“primarily at continued intelligence collection and rt
[459]the recruituent for intelligence collection purposes of
[461]other. Cubans who already are legally resident in Cubs
[463]in the areas where the terns are operating (Pinar del
[465]‘Rio and Oriente). In addition, on the most careful Ly.
[467]selected basis, where it appears feasible, ‘additional
[469]_.. agents. and teens will be. infiltrated black into Cuba
[471]‘in an effort te. duplicate the performance of the COBRA
[473]end AMTORRID teams and particularly to. recruit ‘and, ee
[475]Possible, train additional agents legally resident in
[477]“Ad. Exfiltration: As feasible, sgents and potentir1
[479]" recruits now in Cuba will. be exfiltrated tor
[481]: . training, indoctrination, supplying with communications,
[483]-Bnd motivation. They will then be re-infiltrated inte
[485]Cube, primarily on intelligence missions. Where possible,
[487]this will be done through legal trave) channels, but
[488]where this is not possible, it will be done wherever
[490]. feasible through our black infiltration-extiltration
[492]- fachiities, primarily our maritine assets.
[497]14-0000
[499]a to: weaken, subvert. ox.
[501]. _
[502]vt
[503]Lys pete
[504]rps ah
[506]. ion a _
[507]B, Much of the: above effort, as noted will be primarily
[509]directed towards developing all possible evidences’ ‘of stress
[511]or strain within: the regine ond between the regine and other
[513]_ antions, particularly the Bloc, An intensive program will
[515]be continued _to_teke advantage of any possible opportunity
[516]Lit the. xe ing in any spible_
[518]ae fashion, | This is basteaily: a Jong: ‘tern effort. A great dea)
[519]of work. already has. gone into this and the current
[520]status ef this progran and the proposed . further expldtation
[521]of. ‘the ‘numerous’ leads: we ‘have developed ic being. made, in
[522]“the. dutereste of brevity in’ this menorandum, the subject of
[524]‘p separate ‘compilaticn. the effectiveness of sssets aime rt
[526]actually splitting the regine, i.e., 2 palrce revolt, will of
[528]course: depend, to: an extent, on the willingness of the United
[529]. «States Government to support them and it is entirely possible
[530], that’ any: ‘guch effort might: fail unless supported with militery
[532]forces which on ‘the basis of the. sseumptions in Paragraph I
[533]above would appear unlikely.
[535]- Babe botsge: On the basis of the sesumptions set cut.
[536]above, comasndo type sabotage, minor sabotage, and other
[538]acta of sabotage inside Cuba would appear to serve little
[540]purpose end should. not. be undertaken except in the rare
[542]instances where an opportunity is presented with ecceptabte
[544]risk: to: do major ‘damage to the: Cuban e@conony . At. is proposed
[546]' to contidue. searching for such limited opportunities, ‘put.
[548]Bo. ) aative or wide scale program ig contemplated.
[550]rr -I12=
[551]yh NPB a Gea Ae BM a a
[553]egg eh Le
[555]14-0000
[557]VY , aN
[559]D, Paranilitar, Coumndo, and Guerriile ratiority:
[560]Given the Assumptions tn Paragraph I above, no wide scale
[561]program of such activity should be ‘undertaken, However, we
[562]: propese to maintain in being our present facilities and
[564]the onpebliity of undertaking such operations in order to
[566]. fully exploit any ‘substantial change in internal Cuban con.
[567]ditions or ‘any substantial revolt or uprising Which might occur.
[568]R. Economic Warfare: It is proposed ‘to contime snd _
[570]| intensify the program @lready undertaken to deny through
[572]‘clandestine eud covert means critical materials to the Cuben
[573]- 7 _ Sconomy, ‘This: consists primarily of denial operations, possibly
[574]- some preclusive buying and iadusing frimdly U.S. and allied
[575]firns and governnents to prevent the Shipmenta of strategic
[576]materials, to Cuba.
[580]Fs OF. Sounterintelligence: _The current couaterintelligence
[581]) oe and counterespionage program against the Cuban G-2 and —
[582]_ related services will be continued end as possible intensified.
[583]“This: program has developed substantially and it should be
[584]possible within the coming months to increase its effectiveness
[585]considerably in countering not enly Cuban but Bloc intelli.
[586]: gence. operations mounted against United States Llnterests
[587]from Cuba, — oe
[588]. G. Political Action, Propaganda, Paychologicn1 Warfare:
[589]: ous in this field the following tasks will be continued and where
[590]appropriate intensified: _
[591]wood Assist and support State in any feasible acticn.
[592]. wl3-
[595]14-0000
[597]to develop end exploit current OAs and Letin Anericrn .
[601]attitudes favorable” to the containment rnd/or overthrow
[603]of the Crstro~communist regine,
[605]2, Assist State in ‘the development of post-Cratre
[606]concepts, ‘leaders, end political _g¥roups.
[608]Xs Stimulate, support. and guide covertly the
[610]“ Propagende and political action activities of the cRC
[612]end other Cuban political Groups fnd individuals, ra
[613]eppropriate, who offer a potential for impact inside
[614]Cuba. | |
[616]- Ge Develop,’ maintain and exploit the will of the
[618]; Cuban people to resist Castro-communian, making maximun
[620]use of the downgrading of Castro ond his regime during —
[621]the missile erisis.
[623]38. Diacredit and ridicule Castro and his regine
[625]fn Cuba, in the Henisphere end @lsewhere, with emphosis
[627]on the theme tho missile crisis denonstrsted con-
[629]‘clusively that Castro 46 nothing but a mere pawn of
[630]Soviet ‘inperialisa,
[632]. 6 Continue "Radio Anericas" and other. CIA-
[633]Sponsored Cuban exile radio broadcasts +: appropriate.
[634]7. Launch propaganda balloons after an operationn}
[636]capability has been established and policy authority is
[638]Granted to conduct propagania: balloon operations,
[640]8., Contime the infiltration of propagands materin1
[642]into Cuba via open mails, legal travellers and couriers,
[644]‘with special emphasis on selective black eperations.
[646]~14-.
[650]14-0000
[652]H. Exploitation of Exile Groups: We will cont inue sO
[654]the clrhdestine exploitation of exile groups for intelligence
[656]collect inn, _psychologien1 warfare and other approved missions,
[658]‘As fecoible, we will aot to mount es much ef this effort es
[659]poasibie from areas outside the continental United States, rnd
[660]particularly fron Latin America. If Higher Authority decides
[662]“on | a “Track Two" “concept” or on. any, ‘pimilar concept which
[664]contemplates heavy uncontrolled and oply generally directed
[666]sction operations of Cuban groups against Cubs, it ig belleved
[668]that’ efforts should be made to transfer 88 much 58 possible
[669]os of the. responsibility for this non-Clandestine, non-intel ligence
[670]“type operation into the political field, which is the province
[672]. (Of the Department of State. _In this connection, it is believed
[674]‘it would be rdvisable to press for tho creation within the
[675]Pepartuent of State of an office of Cuban Exile Affairs tec
[677]|
[678]| tenae the overt government relationships with Cuban exile
[680]| Groups.
[681]- IV. ORGANIZATIONAL AND PROCEDURAL CHANGES:
[682]Maxinun dup lomentation of the above plan which provides
[683]for the most intensive feasible collection of intelligence,
[684]the implomentationof related programs as outlined, and the
[685]muintenance of capabilities to exploit targets of opportunity
[687]ag well as take advantage of any future substantial changes
[689]"An internal Cuben conditions will, it is believed, permit
[691]and make advisable the following:
[693]14-0000
[697]A, & gradual but substantial reduction in the expenditures
[698]and pergonnel of Task Force W. ew
[699]B, Consideration of the re-positioning of Task Force W
[701]within the Clandestine Service, possibly ss @ major coapenent
[703]of the WH Divinion under different diraction.
[705]Cc, The abolition of the operational Mongoose mechanian,
[706]D, The removal of the past frauework which required
[708]detailed considerntion by the Special Group (Augnentea) of
[710]even minor operations) deteils and decision by committee on
[712], points which it. is believed are completely within the purvier
[713]of the. DCI and those officers to whom he delegates decision.
[714]Ve ‘RBCOMMENDED ACTION:
[716]A. Your concurrence in the above general operational plan
[718]is recomended.
[720]B. It is recommended that you discuss this plan with
[722]the Special Group (Augmented) and secure its concurrence.
[724]c. It is recomended that you secure from the Special
[725]Group (Augmented) policy approval to attempt to induce Fan
[726]American Airways and KL to resume their flights between Hian!
[727]tnd Hsvena ot the appropriate tine. .
[729]Dp. It is recommended that if any “Trock Two" concept
[730]is proposed, you endesvor to transfer to the Department of
[731]State all possible ‘overt aspects of this type of uncontrolled
[735]14-0000
[737]vat is recomended. that! the Mongoose operations
[738]nechaniea be abolished. .
[739]¥. «a you concur in this concept, specific recommendations
[740]will be nade to you. concerning. the re-positioning of Teak Forae |
[741]ow M within the ‘D/P. Coors ge aS
[743]WILLIAM K. HARVEY
[744]| Chiet » Task Force W
[748]14-0000
[750]at ' woe ;
[751]Prafsiary
[753](43 Now, 1962
[755]. mento ‘of he’ «'Ovba'eerncny wal int a drain
[756]. “on Bloo resources,
[757]; 2. ‘ ximua coverage of Cuban inteiliger: »
[758]- “THIS pocuusnt IS _ . ARs
[760]i IN. CS HISTORECAL - . te
[763]_ PAPER) BO. 1)
[765]po. NOT ‘DESTROXY— _
[766]4 Yr
[767]6 or eplit
[770]ag
[773]14-0000
[775]| AS SITWE
[776]x -
[777]i oa Cuban-Bloe relationshiys.
[781]Rf A See ma aoe
[782]"Provide ‘the: fanzine tabelligence coverage of Syhe
[784], with particular onphats ca the following!
[786]| Me
[788]ae og Soviet/Cuban « and Ghinese/Cohen relationsh'pe.
[792]~ Be Kconoatc.
[794]+. Rebaetoats
[795]| Asotet: and support State in any feasible action to
[797]<davelap active ons. and Latin-Averican country auppt t
[798]the cont
[799]for the o Sih
[801]“SUSIE
[803]y GROUP 1
[805]Excluded trom eotomatic
[806]Scvngrading and
[807]Ltles ‘Siticaton
[810]14-0000
[812]er centers” of the Griben.
[813]P, ae ge & te
[816]14-0000
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[826]e
[828]“who have potential access tn significant Ankerrent dion
[830]Oe vaky Cosme fee sion hiewsd « ge clwea\ Thhg pit ron
[831]Expansion of commmisations atelligence partlauter-
[833]ne
[835]ay in the: o2, police, and militia nate. (thir
[838]Exely ta. tr. 4 automatic
[841]t:
[843]cS opating
[845]14-0000
[847]_ ah Maintain, refcgaa debriefing 7 progreus.
[848]ni Nas ons arviees"
[850]Monti e ue
[851]“UWacadion’
[852]pahols Wa n
[854]7 roe atari ae unter
[855]SENSHTIVE. \ = HE
[857]rasing and
[859]14-0000
[861]Po, FB SEER
[862]: a SENSITIVE
[864]AROUP 4
[867]i syed