[1]157-10002-10056 | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
[4]Date:09/30/93
[6]AGENCY :
[7]RECORD NUMBER :
[9]RECORDS SERIES :
[10]MEMORANDUM
[12]AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
[14]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[15]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[16]AGENCY INFORMATION
[18]SSCIA
[19]157-10002-10056
[21]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[23]ORIGINATOR : CIA
[24]FROM : SCHLESINGER, ARTHUR JR
[25]TO : THE PRESIDENT
[26]TITLE :
[27]CIA REORGANIZATION
[30]SUBJECTS :
[32]CIA
[33]; COVERT ACTION
[35]PARAMILITARY WARFARE
[37]CUBA
[39]POLICY CONTROL
[41]DOCUMENT TYPE :
[43]PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[45]CLASSIFICATION : S
[47]RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
[48]CURRENT STATUS : P
[49]DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/30/93
[51]OPENING CRITERIA :
[53]COMMENTS :
[54]Box 244
[55]. Folder 7
[57]Page:1
[59]Exhibit 5 to R. Goodwin testimony on 7/18/75
[61][R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED~
[63]HW 50955 Docld: 32281896 Page i
[65]LF, Supevartleng an Seuey
[67]Clandestina activities ahold ba acacsaed pet eniy in the contes
[68]of theiy xeletienghip bo aa apen socloty yet aloe ta the comext of their
[69]relstionabip to United Snaies foroign pasicy.
[71]CiA uperetions haves 104 noon bald effectivery worardinaze to U.S.
[72]fercagn policy. .
[74]: lL. Clandcsting intolligencs aollectian ia, bY charter, {roa from
[76]senate tiepartramne coabrel. This fact axpoees American foreign policy
[77]nen CIA ie Heceverad zearuiting
[79]wa mltile ss of eu be ered ainents wv
[81]sexte ov develuping Sources in w fvisedly count? ye The recert
[82]mhon GEA, withert notice to tha Cengul Genorad,
[83]tried ta satrraye & magmber of tha Spactal Branch ef the Singa pers
[84]Police grovices as ineisuctive exancpla. After ounpllessions cf
[85]Qudicraus commlasdtye incinding an attempt to pubject the recrult to
[86]e lle-dstector tent, it ts pod cut that the rocrest knd leng dincs
[87]infermed bie suparissé of tha CIA approach and wee leading OLA
[88]Imo atrep which, witie SPT. groduced cengiiiezable emharrios-
[90]ment to relations betwaon the US and the Glngny
[91]Ee me
[93]- .
[94]ees! ae Cot ® Sak,
[96]There havs been teovbles of n comparable cart
[97]presser rorrmens eure Sapo Non ree RG mite ee
[98]tania Weert mee Noe Pi CNIUeES ations we
[100]CIA bas said that, in sath exass, neither the Erekogey ner the Dapest-
[101]49 type of operation.
[103]ment in Washington ic nermelly isformed of th
[104]4 tn phost, no ona knows how many potential problems for US foreign
[105]“| policy «~ end how rach potgntiel frictlon with islendiy etatee -- are
[107]d peing created ct this amen? hy CIA clandestine toteliigence epsreiion
[108]i| Surely theca is on argument fox peviniating Sinte te grcide whether the
[109]Sy (| ndvantase ts be goingd by the npsration 12. fxs gho irfocmution derivat
[110]fyorn om agent within the fpecial Branch of tos Singapore Pelier) eut-
[111]woighn the tiek (6. So» exsenorating to lecal govuramert ane sieakioy
[112]ite confidence beta in our gurpeese aod in cer gen3ah, Clarrdeutine
[113]intolligoncs eparations nhoulst plainly be clantod Eoth with tha Dapere:
[114]mort of Sinte and (cave for encectiocal inglantas and gu agreement of
[116]the Beeratary of State) with abe local U.S. Lit CHOOT»
[118]J4
[120]In part and excise as shown,
[122]n & Change | classify to,
[124](1 With concurrence of
[126]1 Declassity
[130]| “DEPARTMENT OF STATE
[131]Ss!
[133]FPC/HDR by
[135]_ wey oo A a |
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[138]SECRET PS
[140]Ge it bas meant too that the Gtate Denertment, etten apprical ef an
[141]operation only in ite letar atagen, ia under srent prencurs to
[142]endorse the cperetion a8 already mounted becaues of the alleged
[143]evil consequences cf onercletug avete, weal remember Tom
[144]iann’s remezk the day the decision xns mada to go ahaad on Cuba:
[145]"lL would nevar have favored ininintian this cperatian: bet, since it
[146]kas gone ag far ac it has, Ido not think wa ean riek calling it off."
[147]Moreover, 02 & that whan there is increaging pramium en activierm,
[148]States, when it questions CLA cparationa or lnitistlves, casta taalf tn
[149]apriesy, siaey, nogaiive rele. The advoceta cf clandestine actlwities .
[150]seema ‘tough’ and rcalighe! the appensat hee te invoke euth istonoizlos
[151]ea the reputation of the United State, werld public epinfan, "What
[152]do we cay inthe United Motions ?", ote., art osemes bonelessly
[153]idealletic, legaliatia end ‘acde, *
[155]The reqult of ClA's inttiative in covert politics] enerations has boon
[157]to cronte situations which have forced pelicy en the State Department,
[159]Thie woe not the ortsinal idee behind CIA. As Allen Dulisa wrets
[161]in Ne 1947 memorandum ¢o tha Sonate Armed Servises Commiltas,
[163]_ "Tha Central litelligeace Agency should kava nothing to do with policy. ”
[164]Yat, in the ysare since, CIA haa, tn effact, ‘made’ celicy in many
[165]parte of the wo7ld, <A number of powarnmerts etill in power kvow
[167]G that thay have evan been targets ef CLA attempta o& everthraw ~~ not
[169]& Btate of mind calculated to ctimulate friendly feelings teward the
[171]United States. Indoageia, of courea, la a prime cuarople.
[173]This experience guggtats thet the present sysiaim by which CIA notifies
[174]State of a prolected covert operation is tnaceqemte to preiset US
[175]trtereate, There mort be seme means by which Stete can bea infozmod
[176]ef such cocrationa a¢ an early enough etaga ta affect the conception
[178]ond preliminary planning ¢€ the eperatinn, Ctherwise CLA will con-~
[179]tinve to confremt Oiske with propesitiona having potential imapnce on
[180]foreign posicy but as toe late a point to subject that impact te reascn.
[181]alle contrch,
[183]2 k we
[185]ete SED IES ecnarr ners eae. RE arn eal
[186]o With concurrence of
[188]& _ Ne 3 or i. aoa Peclassify Ol In part a excise si
[189]ss JECET: Eo iais Seavert | ) jdoneuell
[190]FPC/HDR by < | t eLL AGS
[192]Sia pl oo : Rite o Le an
[193]EW 50955" “Doe 139981896 Page| 3
[195]SEL E
[198]Gri anally the age of eapta “Departenand cove; lor
[199]norncnaa was supposed to be eteletly limited aad tempgrary.
[200]mien -Corren-Jeckaon report stated fn 1943, "The CAA shovla = ff
[201]Uinta Pepartrient cover a9 4 olmplo answer te al’ tts problena;
[202]wrocesl to daveles ie own ovteide cwver anf eventually in
[203]uraugh increaged efficiency of its oveggeas persennrl, ff
[204]mper ita dimands upon the Siate Lppartment.” hang
[205]ly inerveaaod ite requisitioda low official cover.
[207]i wolede CLA haa we
[210]ona why CLA nag abag@ened lta original jatentign
[211]f{ develozing eytter erkvate caver. (fie easier to arrange covet
[212]Rovourn Seis; itis sive; 4 ig Fraie': ax, it fecilitates chs
[213]Reaves erity of operations 82 GK er 14 of comounications; it ingures &
[214]% auple. 3 it the allect is te further the
[216]Pleaganter ise fox the CIA
[217]GIA encroachmant on the tvaditionalfyunctiong af Stato.
[219]: BT cy.
[220]ae Sing OS Bo
[222]He Ley oF nee bogus to mova into arens = Pratithont EOPOr oa
[223]accu pied by State, Tho CLA mon doing overt interzal eee Sal Tee ew
[224]epty sber these in the Embhacoy's political socttoolipmloee NOCLA ba
[225]eon cought to rmonopelina contact with carted Rene cllaica Ryerodjatt-
[226]Hes, among thera the Pranident of tha National Aenerstly, x
[228]ne top Deo of [tha rama tnbasay, a fect wal) mown locelly; anit
[230]DEPARTMENT OF STATE
[232]Del he Se 3 Wy etatn elaas’n (1 Change] ctasalfy 1 .cencze
[234]| So : Gi With concurrence of a=
[235]7 il : 4 PA Creer (1 Deslassity-S- part a Kes ¢. -ag shown
[236]| FPC|/HDR Te pth ie.
[238]tes Pass Sets eee "oe
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[244]CR ,
[245]at EPA
[246]* gle gee = Class’n ARTME, Ch MENT OF STATE
[250]th eonourrence o ranee| Classify tg,
[252]Che
[254]ermB gletion fer Berrien, R ig presoing t have CLA
[255]poeple given the rash of Couneeliig,, Balers State kesne contrel of
[256]pose an more of its pragumed overtess prrgennsl, and befsre GAS
[258]ae EY g
[259]over the lecnl CAS atetlou naminally promised in eS Dizectiy
[261]cf Gancery 19, (961, and {b} to review ths current cas a ation «tht
[262]anpye toa steady redaction ef CAB personel. = ,
[264]=P Faramilitar es I gather, ia regerded tn soma quarters
[265]asa purely technic WoNOT, eagily detachable trem pelicy aod there.
[266]foro a proper functica of the Depasiment of Defense, Yot there ia
[267]almest ao CIA Cuncebon mews pecullerly dependant on the pollaicead
[268]coatexs than pasamilifncy warlors.
[270]& These are arvoral soizons fer this. Fer one thing, a naramisitacy
[271]optyation ie lo ta otturs @ layge end alizribetalia eperetion and thareb;,
[273]ag suggested above, ciavkes with the preaupreritions of eur epen
[274]sockety. (These congsideratiens nead net sepiy, hewavery, to tha
[275]tvoiniag ef, cay, the Bouth Vietonmede in quarrilla tacties er ts the
[276]exeport of alrosdy ozlgting querriila activities,} For ancther, ian
[277]moral and political price af direct paremilitery Asilure is acute for
[278]va. Communtats, when they stimulate paramilitary activity,
[279]doing what the world exsects froma thems when we de lk, we aoraar
[280]to keftray ous cwn prefeesed princinics and therefers canecs aftord te
[281]éorpoand delipqortncy by defeat, Merenver, a9 tro reqent Alssrian
[282]epleeds chewad, enca we convince the werld that we ere ceommitiod to a
[283]paramilitery endecyer, we will bo blamed foe sii eovie ef hbisan., And,
[284]ng the recent tractera-dJee-prlzcuera exiecde showed, when we do ind
[285]mon to poasihle deoth, wa etnact Ughtly waite them aff and clogs tho
[286]booke, Ths Cermrauntets, on ths other haw, hava no ecremice about
[287]Uequideting a losing shears, ;
[289]eesti Rear iv eae BRS
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