[1]157-10005-10297 | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
[3]WETe _ mo Y,
[4]WEI nd
[5]Ao | G(3(B — Pate:10/05/9°
[6]A GIy JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM age:
[7]C Ws a IDENTIFICATION FORM
[9]AGENCY : SSCIA
[10]RECORD NUMBER : 157-10005-10297 . CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
[11]a DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
[12]RECORDS SERIES : ok. RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
[13]- IN THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED
[14]AGENCY FILE NUMBER ; mS a
[16]DOCUMENT FEORMATION ~
[17]ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
[19]FROM :
[20]TO:
[22]TITLE :
[23]SELECT COMMITTEE - ASSASSINATION REPORT (UPDATED OCT 16, 1975):
[24]DATE : 09/01/75
[26]PAGES : 678
[27]SUBJECTS :
[29]SELECT COMMITTEE ASSASSINATION REPORT (CLASSIFIED) TABS A-J
[30]| "AB A: PROLOGUE
[31]“=~ TAB B: INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
[33]TAB C: COVERT ACTION o
[35]TAB D: CUBA 7
[37]TAB E: CONGO
[39]TAB F: EXECUTIVE ACTION CAPABILITY
[41]TAB G: DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
[43]TAB H: CHILE
[45]TAB I: SOUTH VIETNAM
[47]TAB J: FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS =:
[49]TAB K: RECOMMENDATIONS
[51]TAB L: EPILOGUE
[53]DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[54]CLASSIFICATION : T
[55]RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED ,
[56]CURRENT STATUS : P {f
[57]DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/05/93 ,
[59]OPENING CRITERIA :
[61]COMMENTS. : .
[62]COMMITTEE'S DRAFT REPORT |
[63](UPDATED OCTOBER 16, 1975)
[65]TOS MM COR NOTE TOE owe
[67][R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED
[68]. HW 50955 Docld: 32202487 Page 1
[70]Date: 10/05/93
[71]Page:2
[72]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[74]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[76][R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED
[77]HW 50955 Docld:32202487 Page 2
[79]1) (, adate)
[81]Oetober 16, 1975
[83]C SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE - ASSASSINATION REPORT
[84]Se ET A ADO ENALLON REPORT
[86]TABLE OF CONTENTS
[88]TAB A: Prologue
[89]TAB B: Introduction and Summary
[90]TAB C: Covert Action as Vehicle for Foreign Policy Implementation
[91]TAB OD: Cuba
[92]lL. Introduction
[93]2. At What Level Were the Castro Plots Authorized or
[94]' Known About Within the CIA
[95]3. The Question of Authorization Outside the Central
[96]Intelligence Agency in the Eisenhower Administration
[97]4. The Question of Authorization During the Kennedy
[98]Administration, Pre-Bay of Pigs
[99]_— 5. The Question of Authorization During the Kennedy
[100]Administration, Post-Bay of Pigs
[101]8 The Qt of lotr he fe 163 Apres pled
[102]7. The Question of Authorization in che Johnson Administratic
[103]TAB E: Congo
[104]TAB F: Executive Action Capability
[105]TAB G: Dominican Republic
[106]TAB H: Chile
[107]TAB I: South Vietnam preset
[108]TAB J: Findings and Conclusions — tats
[109]TAB K: Recommendations aa ro
[110]TAB L: Epilogue . @ 4
[112]oN
[113]On &
[114]\.
[116]HY 50955 Docld: 32202487 Page 3 -
[120]Diy tid: WF id Soe i
[121]taken during the Bay of Pigs operation) present Castro with a
[122]contaminated diving suit* (Colby, 5/21, pp. 38-39).
[124]The Inspector General's Report dates this
[125]operation in January 1963, when Fitzgerald replaced Harvey as
[126]Chief of Task Force W, although it is unclear whether Harvey or
[127]Fitzgerald conceived of the plan (I.G., p. 75). It is likely
[128]that the activity took place earlier, since Donovan had completed
[129]his negotiations by the middle of January 1963. Helms characterized
[130]the plan as "“cockeyed" (Helms, 6/13, p. 135).
[132]TSD bought a diving suit, dusted the inside
[133]with a fungus that would produce a chronic skin disease (Madura
[134]foot), and contaminated the breathing apparatus with a tubercule
[135]bacillus (I.G., p. 75). The Inspector General's Report states
[137]that the plan was abandoned because Donovan gave Castro a different
[139]diving suit on his own initiative (I.G., p. 75). Helms testified
[141]that the diving suit never left the laboratory (Helms, 6/13, p. ae
[142](e) AMLASE
[144](1): Origin of the Project
[146]In March 1961, an officer of the Mexico
[147]City CIA station met with a highly-placed Cuban official to determine
[148]if he would cooperate in efforts against the Castro regime (I.G.,
[150]p. 78). The Cuban, referred to by the cryptonym AMLASH-1, had been
[152]rr an Eee
[153]*Donovan was not aware of the plan.
[155]HY 50955 Docld: 32202487 Page 4
[159]39
[161]{PAID pee or
[162]oN PL, SUMED Brae
[164]Sucked pupa a 1965, stated
[166]that B-l had given AMLASH-1 a Silencer and that AMLASH-1 had
[168]"small, bighly concentrated explosives." on February 11, 1965
[170]}\Station cabled that AMLASH-1 would soon receive “one
[172]‘pistol with silencer and one FAL rifle with a silencer from B-l's
[174]secretary" (I1.G., p. 103). A subsequent cable reported that
[175]"B-1 had three packages of special items made up by his technical
[176]people and delivered to AMLASH-1} in Madria” (I.G., p. 103
[178]In June 1965, Ci# terminated all contact with
[179]AMLASH-1 and his associates because of reports that his activities
[181]were widely known (I.G., pp. 104-105).
[183]"4, Bel is to be in Cuba one week before the elimination
[184]of Fidel, but no one, including AM/LASH-1 will know
[185]B-1l's location.
[187]"S. B-1 is to arrange for recongition by at least five Latin
[188]American countries as soon as Fidel is neutralized and
[189]a junta is formed. This junta will be established even
[190]though Raul Castro and Che Guevara may still be alive
[191]and may still be in control of the part of the country.
[192]This is the reason AM/LASH-1 requested that B-1 be able
[193]to establish some control over one of the provinces so
[194]that the junta can be formed in that location.
[196]"6. One month to the day before the neutralization of Fidel,
[197]B-1 will increase the number of commando attacks to a
[198]maximum in order to raise the spirit and morale of the
[199]people inside Cuba. [In all communiques, in all radio
[200]messages, in all propaganda put out by B-1 he must relate
[201]that the raid was possible thanks to the information
[202]received from clandestine sources inside Cuba and from
[203]the clandestine underground apparatus directed by "PM,
[204]This will be AM/LASH~1l's war name."
[206]HY 50955 Docld: 32202487 Page 5
[208]Meru 2
[210]Pending (1) "Re
[211]Editing and ¢
[213]SAO EO Ly AVS ee
[214]write per Subcommitte.
[215]2) Insertion of
[217]Gottlieb and Tweedy Testimony
[219]TABLE OF CONTENTS -- ~
[221]CONGO
[223]Introduction
[225]Dulles Cableai Leopoldville That "Removal'"'
[227]of Lumumba is an Urgent Objective in “High
[229]Quarters"
[231]Page
[232]1
[233]L
[235]CIA Encouraged Congolese Efforts to "Eliminate"
[237]Lumumba, Who Was Viewed as a "Grave Danger" Even
[238]After Being Deposed and Placed in U.N. Protective
[240]Custody ...
[242]The Plot to Assassinate Lumumba
[244].€a) Dulles Cabled Again for "Elimination"
[246]14
[248]of Lumumba, and a Messenger Was Sent to
[250]Congo With a Highly Sensitive
[253](b) [Gott1ieb\ Delivered Lethal Substance to
[254]Hedgman in the Congo for the Assassi-
[256]nation of Lumumba: September 1960
[257](c) Hedgman Testified That (Gottlied| Told
[259]Him That President Eisenhower Had
[261]Ordered the Assassination of Lumumba
[263](d) Headquarters Makes the Assassination
[265]Plot "Highest Priority" and Authorizes
[267]Steps in Furtherance of It
[269](e) The (Chief of \Station Moves Forward
[270]With Assassination Plot .....,
[272](i) The Chief of) Station Testified
[273]That He Reqtfested and Received
[275]Confirmation of the Assassination
[277]Plan from Headquarters
[279]15
[281]18
[283]22
[285]24
[287]31
[289]31
[291](ii) The (Chief of |Station Took "Explora-
[293]tory Steps"-in Furtherance of the
[294]Assassination Plot and Testified
[296]That He Destroyed Cable Traffic
[297]Related to the Plot te ke te
[299]HY 50955 Docld:322024687 Page 6
[301]34
[305]Page
[306](£) Testimony of Bisseil and Tweedy About the
[307]Degree of Support for and Perpetration of the
[308]Assassination Plot... ... 2.2... DL, . 4h
[309](i) Tweedy Had No Recollection of the Operation
[310]To Poison Lumumba... .......,.22.., 4l
[312](ii) Tweedy Testified That He Discussed With
[313]Bissell the Feasibility of Assassinating
[314]Lumumba and Ile Cabled Hedgman About Gaining
[315]Access to Lumumba for the. Purpose of
[316]Assassination... 2... ee, 4a
[318](iii) Bissell Testified That le Did Not Recall
[319]Whether the Assassination Operation Had
[320]‘loved from Planning to Implementation
[321]But it Was Not Against Agency Policy to
[323]Send Poisons to the Congo 48
[324]5. The Question of a Connection Between the Assassination
[325]Plot and Other Actions of CIA Officers and Operatives
[326]in the Congo... .......062.20.2-20220242., . 52
[327](a) O'Donnell 's )Operations in the Congo .....,....., 53
[328]( (i) Tweedy and the Chief of Station Agreed That
[329]say a Senior Case Officer Should be Sent to
[330]the Congo to Concentrate on the Assassi-
[332](ii) Bissell Discussed Assassination of
[333]Lumumba With (O'Donnell) and Sent Him
[334]to Congo: October-November 1960 ......... 54
[335](iii) Bissell Testified That He Asked(0'Donnell)
[336]to Plan and Prepare for an Assassination
[337]Operation a 59
[338]Civ) (0'Donnell) Arrived in the Congo and
[339]earned That a Virus Was in the
[340]Station Safe ..... 60
[341](v) (0'Donnell) Planned to "Neutralize"
[342]Lumumba by Turning Him Over to
[343]Congolese Authorities and Requested
[344]the Assignment of Agent QJWIN to
[345]‘Leopoldville as His Alter Ego toe ee 65
[346](b) Agent QJWIN's Mission in the Congo: November-
[347]December 1960 ...., ee 67
[349]on,
[351]HW 50955 Docld:32202487 Page 7
[353]DRAFT: OCTOBER 6, 1975
[355]TOP SECRET
[356]Frederick D. Baron For Tlnroen
[358]For Internal Committee
[359]Use Only
[361]D. CONGO
[362]1. Introduction
[364]The Committee has received solid evidence of a CIA
[365]plot to assassinate Patrice Lumumba. The plot proceeded to
[366]the point where lethal substances and instruments specifically
[367]intended for use in an assassination were placed in the hands
[368]of the CIA kniet of |station in Leopoldville by an Agency
[369]scientist. .
[371]_ Although these instruments of assassination were never
[372]used, a number of questions are presented by the Lumumba case
[373]which reflect general issues that run throughout the Committee's
[374]assassination inquiry. First, did CIA officers and operatives |
[376]C in the Congo take steps to attempt the assassination of Lumumba?
[379]Second, how high in the United States government was the
[380]source of authorization for the CIA assassination plot? Finally,
[381]was the CIA connected in any way to the events that actually led
[382]to the death of Lumumba while in Congolese custody?
[384]A thread of historical background is necessary to weave these
[385]broad questions together with the documents and testimony re-
[387]ceived by the Committee.
[389]HW 50955 Docld:32202487 Page &
[391]HYW 50955
[395]Stanleyville, and he was imprisoned. The central government of
[396]the Congo transferred Lumumba on January 17, 1961 to the custody
[397]of authorities in the province of Katanga, which was asserting its
[398]own independence at that time. Several weeks later, the Katangese
[399]authorities announced Lumumba's death,
[401]There are various accounts of the circumstances and timing
[402]of Lumumba's death. The United Nations investigation of the inci-
[403]dent concluded that Lumumba was killed on January 17.%*
[405]2. Dulles Cables Leopoldville That ''Removal" of Lumumba
[407]ig an Urgent Objective in “Uist Quseeeee oma
[409]Shortly after the Congolese declaration of independence
[410]from Belgium on June 30, 1960, the.CIA assigned a new Chief of|
[411]Station to the Congo. The \chies of| Station said that the briefings
[412]he received at CIA headquarters in preparation for his departure
[413]contained no discussion of the possibility of assassinating Patrice
[414]Lumumba (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 8). On his brief return to head-
[415]quarters in connection with Lumumba's visit to Washington in late
[416]July, the thief of|station again heard no discussion of assassi-
[417]nating Lumumba (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 9).
[419]During August, great concern about Lumumba's political
[420]strength in the Congo was growing among the foreign policy-makers
[421]of the Eisenhower Administration.** This concern was nurtured
[423]* Report of the Commission of Investigation, 11/61, UN
[424]Security Council, Official Records, Supplement for October,
[425]November, and December.
[427]** See Section 5, infra, for full discussion of the prevailing
[428]anti-Lumumba attitude in the United States government as shown by
[430]minutes of the National Security Council and Special Group and the
[431]testimony of high Administration officials.
[433]Docld: 32202467 Page 9 . .
[435]a by intelligence reports such as that cabled to CIA headquarters
[436]by the new phiet of\Station:
[438]EMBASSY AND STATION BELIEVE CONGO EXPERIENCING
[439]CLASSIC COMMUNIST EFFORT TAKEOVER GOVERNMENT.
[441]MANY FORCES AT WORK HERE: SOVIETS ... COMMUNIST
[442]PARTY, ETC. ALTHOUGH DIFFICULT DETERMINE MAJOR
[443]INFLUENCING FACTORS TO PREDICT OUTCOME STRUGGLE
[444]FOR POWER, DECISIVE PERIOD NOT FAR OFF, WHETHER
[445]OR NOT LUMUMBA ACTUALLY COMMIE OR JUST PLAYING
[446]COMMIE GAME TO ASSIST HIS SOLIDIFYING POWER, ANTI-
[447]WEST FORCES RAPIDLY INCREASING POWER CONGO AND ;
[448]THERE MAY BE LITTLE TIME LEFT IN WHICH TAKE ACTION
[449]TO AVOID ANOTHER CUBA.... (CIA Cable(IN 39708,
[450]Leopoldville to Director, 8/18/60.)
[452]This cable also stated the (Chief of| Station's operational "OBJECTIVE
[453]{OF] REPLACING LUMUMBA WITH PRO WESTERN GROUP" (CIA Cable, 8/18/60).
[454]Bronson Tweedy, then Chief of the Africa Division of CIA's clan-
[455]destine services, replied the same day that he was seeking State
[456]Department approval for the proposed operation based upon "OUR
[457]BELIEF LUMUMBA MUST BE REMOVED IF POSSIBLE" (CIA cable (out 59743)
[458]Tweedy to Leopoldville, 8/18/60). On August 19, Richard Bissell,
[459]Director of CIA's covert operations branch, signed a follow-up
[460]cable to Leopoldville: "YOU ARE AUTHORIZED PROCEED WITH OPERATION"
[461](CIA Cable OUT 59959, Director to Leopoldville, 8/19/60).
[463]Several days later, the niet of| Station reported that a plan
[464]to assassinate Lumumba had been proposed to President Kasavubu by
[466]Congolese leaders:
[468]ANTI-LUMUMBA LEADERS APPROACHED KASAVUBU
[469]_ WITH PLAN ASSASSINATE LUMUMBA ... KASAVUBU
[470]REFUSED AGREE SAYING HE RELUCTANT RESORT
[471]VIOLENCE AND NO OTHER LEADER SUFFICIENT
[472]STATURE REPLACE LUMUMBA. (CIA Cable (IN 4276y),
[473]Leopoldville to Director, 8/24/60.) ;
[475]HY 50955 Docld:32202467 Page 10 . —
[477]a
[478](~
[480]HY 50955
[482]The next day, Allen Dulles personally signed a cable* to
[484]the Leopoldville iChief of| Station which stressed the urgency of
[486]_
[488]"removing'’ Lumumba:
[490]IN HIGH QUARTERS** HERE IT IS THE CLEAR-
[491]CUT CONCLUSION THAT IF LLL [LUMUMBA] CON-
[492]TINUES TO HOLD HIGH OFFICE, THE INEVITABLE
[493]RESULT WILL AT BEST BE CHAOS AND AT WORST
[494]PAVE THE WAY TO COMMUNIST TAKEOVER OF THE
[495]CONGO WITH DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE
[496]PRESTIGE OF THE UN AND FOR THE INTERESTS OF
[497]THE FREE WORLD GENERALLY. CONSEQUENTLY
[499]WE CONCLUDE THAT HIS REMOVAL MUST BE AN
[500]URGENT AND PRIME OBJECTIVE THAT UNDER EXISTING
[501]CONDITIONS THIS SHOULD BE A HIGH, PRIORITY OF
[502]OUR COVERT ACTION. (CIA Cable, (QUT 62966),
[503]Director to Leopoldville, 8/26/60.)
[505]Dulles cabled that the (Chief of] Station was to be given "WIDER
[506]AUTHORITY" -- along the lines of the previously authorized opera-
[508]tion to replace Lumumba with a pro-Western group -- "“ENCLUDING
[510]EVEN MORE AGGRESSIVE ACTION IF IT CAN REMAIN COVERT" (CIA Cable,
[512]8/26/60). “WE REALIZE THAT TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY MAY PRESENT
[513]THEMSELVES TO YOU,"' the cable continued (CIA Cable, 8/26/60).
[515]* Cables issued under the personal signature of the DCI are
[516]a relative rarity in CIA communitations and call attention to the
[517]importance and sensitivity of the matter discussed.
[519]** As discussed in Section 5(c), infra, Richard Bisell testified
[520]that Allen Dulles would have used the phrase "higher quarters" to
[521]refer to the President (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 48)..
[523]Docld: 32202487 Page 11
[525]SR
[527]Dulles also authorized the expenditure of up to $100,000 ''TO
[528]CARRY OUT ANY CRASH PROGRAMS ON WHICH YOU DO NOT HAVE THE OPPOR-
[529]TUNITY TO CONSULT HQS" (CIA Cable, 8/26/60). He assured the
[530]chief of\Station that the message had been "SEEN AND APPROVED AT
[531]COMPETENT LEVEL" in the State Department (CIA Cable, 8/26/60).
[532]But the Director of Central Intelligence made a special point
[533]of assuring the [Chief of\ Station that he was authorized to act
[534]unilaterally in a case where the United States Ambassador to the
[535]Congo would prefer to remain uninformed:
[537]TO THE EXTENT THAT AMBASSADOR MAY DESIRE
[539]TO BE CONSULTED, YOU SHOULD SEEK. HIS CON-
[541]CURRENCE. IF IN ANY PARTICULAR CASE, HE
[543]DOES NOT WISH TO BE CONSULTED YOU CAN ACT
[545]ON YOUR OWN AUTHORITY WHERE TIME DOES NOT
[547]PERMIT REFERRAL HERE (CIA Cable, 8/26/60).
[548]This mandate raises a question as to whether the DCI was contem-
[549]plating a particular form of action against Lumumba which the
[550]Ambassador would want to be in a position to “plausibly deny"
[551]United States involvement. DDP Richard Bissell testified that he
[552]was “almost certain" that he was informed about the Dulles cable
[553]shortly after its transmission and that it was his “belief" that
[554]the cable was a circumlocutious means of indicating that the
[556]President wanted Lumumba to be killed (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 33,
[557]64-65) .*
[559]* See Section 5(c), infra, for additional testimony by Bissell
[560]on the question of authorization for the assassination effort
[561]against Lumumba.
[563]HY 50955 Docld: 32202467 Page 12
[565]C to a remark by the Chief of Station that implied that he might
[566]assassinate Lumumba:
[568]TO COS COMMENT THAT LUMUMBA IN OPPOSITION IS
[570]ALMOST AS DANGEROUS AS IN OFFICE, [ THE
[572]CONGOLESE POLITICIAN] INDICATED UNDERSTOOD
[574]AND IMPLIED MIGHT PHYSICALLY ELIMINATE
[576]LUMUMBA. (CIA Cable, (IN 49679 ,) Leopoldville
[578]to Director, 9/7/60.) -
[579]The cable continued to report that the Chief of Station had offered
[580]to assist this politician "IN PREPARATION NEW GOVERNMENT PROGRAM"
[581]and assured him that the United States would supply technicians
[582](CIA Cable, 9/7/60).
[584]As the chaotic struggle for power raged, the Chief of por”
[586]the Africa Division succinctly summarized the prevalent U. Ss,
[588]apprehension about Lumumba's ability to influence events in the
[590]- Congo by virtue of personality, irrespective of his official
[591]position: |
[593]LUMUMBA TALENTS AND DYNAMISM APPEAR OVER-
[595]RIDING FACTOR IN REESTABLISHING HIS POSITION
[597]EACH TIME IT SEEMS HALF LOST. IN OTHER WORDS
[599]EACH TIME LUMUMBA HAS OPPORTUNITY HAVE LAST
[601]WORD HE CAN SWAY EVENTS TO HIS ADVANTAGE ,
[603](CIA Cable, (OUT 69233,) Director to Leopoldville,
[605]9/13/60).
[607]The day after Mobutu's coup, the Chief of Station reported
[608]that he was serving as an advisor to a Congolese effort to "elimi-
[609]nate" Lumumba due to his "fear" that Lumumba might, in fact, have
[611]~ been strengthened by placing himself in UN custody, which afforded
[612]a safe base of operations:
[614]HY 50955 Docld: 32202467 Page 13 . - oe
[616]HY 50955
[618]-LO-
[620]' STILL DIFFICULT DETERMINE WHETHER MOBUTU HAS
[621]SUFFICIENT CONTROL ARMY TO ENFORCE DECISIONS
[622]ANNOUNCED NIGHT 14 SEPTEMBER. STATION ADVISED
[623][TWO MODERATE CONGOLESE POLITICIANS] TRY WORK
[624]WITH [KEY CONGOLESE CONTACT] IN EFFORT ELIMI-
[625]NATE LUMUMBA. FEAR UN PROTECTION WILL GIVE
[626]LUMUMBA OPPORTUNITY ORGANIZE COUNTER ATTACK.
[627]ONLY SOLUTION IS REMOVE HIM FROM SCENE SOONEST.
[628](CIA Cable, (IN 13374,) Leopoldville to Director,
[629]9/15/60.) :
[631]On September 17, another CIA operative in the Congo met
[632]with a leading Congolese senator. At this meeting, the senator
[633]requested a clandestine supply of small arms to equip some
[635]Congolese Army troops. The cable to CIA headquarters concerning
[637]the meeting reported:
[639][CONGOLESE SENATOR] REQUESTED CLANDESTINE
[640]SUPPLY SMALL ARMS TO EQUIP ... TROOPS
[641]RECENTLY ARRIVED LEOP[OLDVILLE] AREA ...
[642][THE SENATOR] SAYS THIS WOULD PROVIDE CORE
[643]ARMED MEN WILLING AND ABLE TAKE DIRECT
[644]ACTION ... [SENATOR] RELUCTANTLY AGREES
[645]LUMUMBA MUST GO PERMANENTLY. DISTRUSTS
[646][ANOTHER CONGOLESE LEADER] BUT WILLING MAKE
[647]- PEACE WITH HIM FOR PURPOSES ELIMINATION
[648]LUMUMBA. (CIA cable, (i 14228,) Leopoldville
[649]to Director, 9/17/60.)
[651]The CIA operative told the Congolese senator that "HE WOULD EXPLORE
[652]POSSIBILITY OBTAINING ARMS" and recommended to CIA headquarters
[653]that they should
[655]HAVE [ARMS] SUPPLIES READY TO GO AT
[657]NEAREST BASE PENDING [UNITED STATES ]}
[659]DECISION THAT SUPPLY WARRANTED AND NECES-
[660]SARY (CIA Cable, 9/17/60) .*
[662]* This recommendation proved to be in line with large scale
[663]planning at CIA headquarters for clandestine paramilitary support
[665].€0 anti-Lumumba elements. On October 6, 1960, Richard Bissell and
[667]Bronson Tweedy signed a cable concerning plans which the |Chief of~
[668]Station was instructed not to discuss with State Department repre-
[669]sentatives or operational contacts:
[671]continued on next page : _
[672]Footnote. so} Page gy pag ) . :
[676]HW 50955
[678]-Ll-
[680]Several days later, while warning a key Congolese
[681]leader about coup plots led by Lumumba and two of his supporters,
[683]the Chief of Station
[685]URGED ARREST OR OTHER MORE PERMANENT DISPOSAL
[686]OF LUMUMBA, GIZENGA, AND MULELE (CIA Cable,
[687](IN 15643>) Leopoldville to Director, 9/20/61).
[689]Gizenga and Mulele were Lumumba's lieutenants who were
[691]leading his supporters while Lumumba was in UN custody.
[693](Footnote continued from previous page)
[695][IN] VIEW UNCERTAIN OUTCOME CURRENT DEVELOP-
[696]MENTS [CIA] CONDUCTING CONTINGENCY PLANNING
[697]FOR CONGO AT REQUEST POLICY ECHELONS. THIS
[698]PLANNING DESIGNED TO PREPARE FOR SITUATION
[699]IN WAY [UNITED STATES] WOULD PROVIDE CLAN-
[700]DESTINE SUPPORT TO ELEMENTS IN ARMED
[701]OPPOSITION TO LUMUMBA.
[703]CONTEMPLATED ACTION INCLUDES PROVISION ARMS ,
[704]SUPPLIES AND PERHAPS SOME TRAINING TO ANTI-
[705]LUMUMBA RESISTANCE GROUPS.
[707](CIA cable (our 04697, ) Director to Leopoldville,
[708]10/6/60.) :
[710]Doclda: 3227027487 Page 15
[713]4. The Plot to Assassinate Lumumba
[715]In the Fall of 1960, a scientist from CIA headquarters
[716]delivered to the bhies of\Station in Leopoldville lethal bio-
[717]logical substances to be used to assassinate Patrice Lumumba.
[718]The Chief of Station testified that after requesting and receiving
[719]confirmation from CIA headquarters that he was to carry out the
[720]scientist's instructions, he proceeded to take “exploratory steps"
[721]in furtherance of the assassination plot. The |ohies of \Station
[722]testified that in the course of his discussion with the CIA
[723]scientist, fidney coctnied | he was informed that President Eisenhower
[724]had ordered the assassination mission against Patrice Lumumba.
[725]lcottiienls mission to the Congo was poth preceded and followed by
[726]‘general cables urging the "elimination" of Lumumba sent from CIA
[728]headquarters in an extraordinarily restricted "Eves Only" channel --
[730]including two messages under the personal signature of Allen Dulles.
[732]The lethal substances were never used by the (Chie of!
[733]Station. But despite the fact that Lumumba had placed himself in
[734]the protective custody of the UN peace-keeping force shortly
[735]before the poisons were delivered to the /Chief of| Station, there
[736]is no clear evidence that the assassination operation was termi-
[737]nated before Lumumba's death. There is, however, no direct evidence
[739]of a connection between the CIA assassination plot and the events
[741]which actually led to Lumumba's death.*
[743]* See Section 6, infra, for a discussion of the evidence about
[744]the circumstances that Ted to Lumumba's death in Katanga.
[746]HY 50955 Docid: 32202467 Page 16 . a
[750](a) Dulles Cables Again for "Elimination" of Lumumba ,
[751]and a Messenger is Sent to Congo With a Highly
[752]Sensitive Assignment
[753]On September 19, 1960, several days after Lumumba placed him-
[754]self in the protective custody of the United Nations peacekeeping
[755]force in Leopoldville, Richard Bissell and Bronson Tweedy signed
[756]a cryptic cable to Leopoldville to arrange a clandestine meeting
[757]between the(Chies of) Station and "€idney) Braun," who was traveling
[758]to the Congo on an unspecified assignment:
[759]. Gra") SHOULD ARRIVE-APPROX 27 SEPT. . . WILL
[760]ANNOUNCE HIMSELF AS ‘(SID) FROM PARIS". . . IT
[761]‘URGENT YOU SHOULD SEE ['{SID"] SOONEST POSSIBLE
[762]AFTER HE PHONES YOU. HE WILL FULLY IDENTIFY
[763]HIMSELF AND EXPLAIN HIS ASSIGNMENT TO YOU.
[764](CIA Cable, (QUT 71464) Bissell/Tweedy to Chief
[765]of Station, 9/19/60.) °
[766]C. The cable bore a highly unusual sensitivity indicator --
[767]LE" .
[768]“PROP" -- that restricted circulation at CIA headquarters to the
[770]Chief of the Africa Division.*
[772]* In a letter of September 23, 1975, the Chief of the CIA Review
[773]Staff informed the Committee that "PROP" was normally used ''to
[775]denote sensitive personnel matters" (Seymour R. Bolton to Frederick
[776]A. 0. Schwarz and Frederick D. Baron, 9/23/75. It appears that this
[777]sensitivity indicator, while created for other purposes, was utilized
[778]by Bissell, Tweedy, and the Chief of Station to restrict distribution
[779]of their communications about an assassination operation. The cable
[780]traffic cited in this report that was sent through the PROP channel
[781]did not touch upon personnel matters except in terms of recruiting
[782]additional CIA officers and agents for the assassination operation.
[784]HW 50955 Docld:32202467 Page 17 . a
[788]( The Bissell/Tweedy cable informed the Chiet of )station that
[789]he was to continue to use this indicator for
[790]ALL [CABLE] TRAFFIC THIS OP, WHICH YOU
[791]INSTRUCTED HOLD ENTIRELY TO YOURSELF.
[792](CIA Cable, 9/19/60.)
[793]The (Chief of)Station -- referred to herein as "Hedgman"* --
[794]testified to a clear, independent recollection of receiving such
[795]a cable. Hedgman stated that in September of 1960 he received a
[796]“most unusual" cable from CIA headquarters (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp.
[797]43). The cable advised, in his words, that:
[798]someone who I would have recognized would
[799]arrive with instructions for me.... I
[800]believe the message was also marked for my
[801]eyes only... and contained instructions
[802]ry that I was not to discuss the message with
[803]\ | anyone. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 12-13.)
[804]Hedgman said that the cable did not specify the kind of instruc-
[805]tions he was to receive, and it "did not refer to Lumumba in any
[806]way" (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 12). .
[807]Three days after the Bissell/Tweedy message that Hedgman was
[808]to meet "Sid" in Leopoldville, Bronson Tweedy uses the same sensi-
[809]tivity indicator on a cable sent to Hedgman on an "Eyes Only"
[811]basis (CIA Cable, our 74837, Tweedy to Leopoldville, 9/22/60).
[813]= * Due to fear of reprisal from Lumumba's followers, the( Chief
[814]of Station for the Congo from mid-summer 1960 through 1961 testi-
[815]fied under the alias "Hedgman" (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 2; 8/25/75,
[816]p. 4).
[818]HW 50955 Docld: 32202467 Page 18
[820]ll,
[822]-L7-
[824]C Tweedy's cable indicated that a third country national would be
[826]required as an agent in the PROP operation:
[828]IF DECIDED SUPPORT FOR PROP OBJECTIVES,
[829]BELIEVE ESSENTIAL SUCH BE PROVIDED THROUGH
[830]THIRD NATIONAL CHANNEL WITH [AMERICAN]
[831]ROLE COMPLETELY CONCEALED. (CIA Cable,
[832]9/22/60.)
[834]Tweedy expressed reservations about two agents that the station
[835]was using for other operations and said "WE ARE CONSIDERING A
[836]THIRD NATIONAL CUTOUT CONTACT CANDIDATE AVAILABLE HERE WHO MIGHT
[837]FILL BILL"* (CIA Cable, 9/22/60). Despite Tweedy's concern about
[838]the two existing station contacts, he indicated that the (chief of )
[839]station and his "colleague" -- presumably the man identified as
[840]("sia")ho was to arrive in the Congo shortly to explain the PROP
[842]operation to Hedgman -- were to be afforded considerable latitude
[843]in exercising their judgment on the conduct of the operation:
[845]YOU AND COLLEAGUE UNDERSTAND WE CANNOT READ
[847]OVER YOUR SHOULDER AS YOU PLAN AND ASSESS
[849]OPPORTUNITIES. OUR PRIMARY CONCERN MUST BE
[851]CONCEALMENT [AMERICAN] ROLE, UNLESS OUT-
[853]STANDING OPPORTUNITY EMERGES WHICH MAKES
[855]CALCULATED RISK FIRST CLASS BET. READY
[857]ENTERTAIN ANY SERIOUS PROPOSALS YOU MAKE
[859]BASED OUR HIGH REGARD BOTH YOUR PROFESSIONAL
[860]JUDGMENTS. (CIA Cable, 9/22/60.)
[862]oe ;
[863]_ - * This is probably a reference to agent QJWIN, who was later
[864]dispatched to the Congo. His mission is discussed in Sections
[865], and , infra.
[867]HW 50955 Docld: 32202467 Page 19 : : -
[871]On September 24, Allen Dulles personally issued a cable to
[872]Leopoldville expressing in absolute terms his desire to “eliminate”
[874]Lumumba :
[876]WE WISH GIVE EVERY POSSIBLE SUPPORT IN
[877]ELIMINATING LUMUMBA FROM ANY POSSIBILITY
[878]RESUMING GOVERNMENTAL POSITION OR IF HE
[879]FAILS IN LEOP(OLDVILLE], SETTING HIMSELF
[880]IN STANLEYVILLE OR ELSEWHERE. (CIA Cable,
[882]( ovr 7357), Dulles to Leopoldville, 9/24/60.)
[884]Dulles had expressed a similar view three days before in the
[886]presence of the President at an NSC meetings stating: )
[888]“Mobutu appeared to be the effective power in \
[889]j the Congo for the moment but Lumumba was not \
[890]| yet disposed of and remained a grave danger /
[891]\ as long as he was not disposed of. (NSC f
[892]\ Minutes, 9/21/60)
[894]a |
[895](b) (Gottlieb Delivers Lethal Substances to the (Chief of)
[896]station “in the Congo for the Assassination of Lumumba
[897]the (Chief of) Station reported through the PROP channel to Bronson
[899]Tweedy that he had made contact with the man dispatched to Leopoldville
[901]with a highly sensitive assignment on September 26. (CIA Cable
[903]IN 18989), Leopoldville to Tweedy, 9/27/60) This was the same
[904]id
[906]HW 50955
[908]week in which Dulles cabled about the "elimination" of Lumumba
[909]and made his statement to the NSC about the "grave danger" that
[910]existed as long as Lumumba was not "disposed of".
[911]Hedgman testified about the identity of("s1D") -- the messenger
[912]referred to in the first cable through the PROP channel:
[913]Q: ‘Who was the messenger who arrived?
[915]Hedgman: Mr. (Sidney Gottlieb \
[916]Ly - Jf
[918]DoclId:32202467 Page 20
[920]- 19 -
[922]@ ~ Q; And at that time, you knew who he was?
[923]Hedgman, I recognized him as an officer of the
[924]gency ... . . I believe he referred to the
[925]fact that I had received a message and that he
[926]was the person concerned. (Hedgman, 8/21/75,
[927]pp. 15-16)
[929]4
[931]The message carried by (Gottlieb, then Science Advisor to
[933]DDP Richard Bissell,) was unmistakeably clear according to Hedgman:
[935]Hedgman: It is my recollection that he advised me, or
[936]my instructions were, to eliminate Lumumba.
[938]Q: By eliminate, do you mean assassinate?
[940]Hedgman: Yes. I would say that was .. . my under-
[941]standing of the primary means. I don't think it was
[942]probably limited to that, if there was some other way
[943]of doing it.
[945]Q:. Of doing what?
[947]ee Hedgman: Of removing him from a position of political
[948](~ threat. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 17-18.)
[950]Hedgman said that he and (Gottlieb) also may have discussed non-
[951]lethal means of removing Lumumba as a "political threat", but
[952]he said, "I cannot recall with certainty on that" (Hedgman,
[953]8/21/75, p. 28).
[955]He clearly recalled the discussion of assassination,
[957]however:
[959]Q: And what did Mr. (Gocciici) inateate with regard to
[960]thé possibility of physically ‘eliminating him?
[962]Hedgman: It was my understanding that that was
[963]probably expected of me. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 18.)
[965]And again:
[966]Q: I take it that once you started discussing these
[967]lethal agents, there was no doubt in your mind that
[969]eye the kind of elimination he was there particularly to
[970]Coe discuss was killing Lumumba?
[972]HY 50955 Docld:32202467 Page 21
[974]>,
[978]Hedgman: There was no doubt in hy mind that
[980]this was one of the way{s], and probably what
[981]they thought was the only way that would work
[982](Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 25).
[985]Hedgman explained Gottlieb provided him with poisons as a means
[987]of assassination:
[989]Re And what did he tell you with regard to
[990]ow that might be accomplished?
[992]Hedgman: ... He brought some biological agents.
[994]I assume that that's the correct word. But in
[996]any case, poisonous agent with him, which he
[998]passed to me.... mo,
[1000]Q: These were lethal biological substances?
[1002]Hedgman: Yes. That was my understanding
[1004]asa non-expert. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 18-19.)
[1005]Hedgman testified that he received "rubber gloves, a mask, and a
[1006]syringe" along with the poisons and that Gottlieb )instructed hin
[1008]in their use (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 20-21). Hedgman indicated that
[1010]this paraphernalia was for administering the poisons to Lumumba:
[1012]HW 50955
[1014]Q: [When ne ({Gottlieb]) came to the Congo
[1016]to give you lethal biological agents for
[1018]the assassination of Lumumba, was it clear
[1020]at that time that the means for administering
[1021]those biological agents was to inject them™ °° ©
[1022]into a substance that was to be ingested by
[1023]Lumumba, whether it be food, or drink, or
[1024]toothpaste or any other substance that was
[1026]to be ingested?
[1028]Hedgman: That's my recollection, yes,
[1029](Hetenan, 8/21/75, p. 82; accord. p. 24.)
[1030]Hedgman said that the means of assassination was not restricted
[1031]to use of the poisons provided by (Gottlied):
[1032]This was not a sine gua non that I employ this. _
[1034]If there were another method, another way, it
[1035]would have been acceptable. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 19.)
[1037]Bocld: 322024387 Page 22
[1041]‘For example, Hedgman testified that he may have “suggested"'
[1042]shooting Lumumba (co Gottlieb) as an alternative to poisoning
[1043](Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 27-29). |
[1044], There was a firm requirement, however, that the means of assassi-
[1046]nation should not be traceable to the United States:
[1048]The biological substance, or specimens, what .
[1049]have you, I think it was up to my judgment,
[1051]and if there was a better Way ~- certainly.
[1053][T]he point I now recall was in no way, if I
[1055]implemented these instructions, no way could
[1057]it be traced back to the United States. It
[1059]had to be a way which could not be traced
[1061]back ... either to an American or the United
[1063]States government. (lHedgman, 8/21/75, p. 19.)
[1065]Hedgman said Gottlieb] assured him that.the poisons were pro-
[1067]duced to meet this requirement:
[1069]f ' I believe I raised the point that poisons left
[1070]Nae ' txaces in the human body, which could be found
[1071]on autopsy ... I believe that I was assured
[1072]that these ... lethal agents would [leave]
[1074]normal traces found in people that die of
[1075]_certain diseases. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 23.)
[1077]Hedgman said that he had an “emotional reaction of great sur-
[1078]prise" when it first became clear that Gottlieb) was there to discuss
[1079]an assassination plan (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 30). But the (Chiet of )
[1080]Station said that he did not give any indication that he would not
[1081]carry out the instructions (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 46). Instead, he
[1082]told Gottlieb jhe “would explore this" (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 46)
[1083]and left him with the following impression:
[1085]I think it would be a fair impression that he would
[1087]take away the thought that I was going to look into it
[1088]and try and figure if there was a way ... I believe I
[1090]om,
[1092]HY 50955 Docld: 32202467 Page 23 . 8
[1096]( stressed the difficulty of trying to carry
[1097]hos out such an operation. (Hedgman, 8/21/75,
[1098]-)
[1100]p. 47
[1102]The cable that Hedgman sent to headquarters reporting his
[1103]initial contact with(Gottlieb was clearly an affirmative response
[1104]to the assignment. thef Chief of) Station said that he and (Gottlieb)
[1105]were "ON SAME WAVELENGTH ."' (CIA Cable IN 18989, Leopoldville to
[1106]Tweedy, 9/27/60.) Hedgman’ was "afraid" that |Mobutu's |government
[1107]was "weakening under" foreign pressure to effect a reconciliation
[1108]with Lumumba , and said:
[1110]HENCE BELIEVE MOST RAPID ACTION CONSISTENT
[1111]WITH SECURITY INDICATED. (CIA Cable, 9/27/60.)
[1113]ce
[1115](c) Hedgman Testified That (cottiied) Told Him That
[1117]President Eisenhower Had Ordered the Assassination
[1118]of Lumumba
[1122]Hedgman testified that in the course of their meeting in~
[1124]Leopoldville, (Dr. Gottlieb) informed him that President Eisenhower
[1126]had authorized the assassination of Lumumba:
[1128]Q: Did you raise with him the question of authori-
[1129]zation of such instructions to you?
[1131]Hedgman: Yes, I did. That's my quite strong
[1132]recollection, that I did.
[1134]Q: What do you recall in essence was what you
[1135]said to him?
[1137]Hedgman: In essence, I think I must have ... pointed
[1138]out that this was not a common or usual Agency tactic,
[1139]and I may have probably said that I never heard of
[1141]_ it being done, which I had not, never in my training
[1142]or previous work in the Agency had I ever heard any
[1143]references to such, in my recollection at least, such
[1144]methods. And it is my recollection I asked on whose
[1145]authority these instructions were issued. :
[1147]Q: And what did Mr. Gotttiet) reply?
[1149]HW 50955 Dockd:32202487 Page 24 . _
[1153]Hedgman cautioned that he was recalling events long past:
[1155]Hedgman: Gentlemen, after fifteen years, I cannot
[1156]bet per cent certain, but I have always, since
[1157]that date, had the impression in my mind that these
[1158]orders had come from the President. (Hedgman,
[1159]8/21/75, p. 34.) 23.
[1161]But he left no doubt about the strength of his "impression":
[1163]: fou have a very firm recollection that he
[1164](Téotelieb) represented to you that the President
[1165]of the United States directed the assassination of
[1166]Patrice Lumumba, is that correct?
[1168]Hedgman: That's my recollection. Yes. (Hedgman,
[1169], p. 102; accord, p. 34.)
[1171](d) Head uarters Makes the Assassination Plot "Highest
[1173]Pelority" and Authorizes Stese ie Forth eae eee,
[1175]On the basis of his talks wien("sid, Hedgman listed a
[1176]number of "possibilities" for covert action against Lumumba. At
[1177]the top of the list was the suggestion that a particular agent
[1178]be used in the following manner:
[1180]"HAVE HIM TAKE REFUGE WITH BIG BROTHER.
[1182]WOULD THUS ACT AS INSIDE MAN TO BRUSH UP
[1184]DETAILS TO RAZOR EDGE. (CIA Cable, 9/27/60.)
[1186]Hedgman indicated that he would begin to follow this course by re-
[1187]calling the agent to Leopoldville. (CIA Cable, 9/27/60.) He in-
[1188]formed headquarters: "PLAN PROCEED ON BASIS PRIORITIES AS LISTED
[1189]ABOVE, UNLESS INSTRUCTED TO CONTRARY" (CIA Cable, 9/27/60) «
[1191]On September 30, the Chiet of) Station urged that head-
[1193]quarters authorize “exploratory conversations" with this agent .so
[1195]HY 50955 Docld: 32202467 Page 25 . oe
[1200]The same day, through the PROP channel, Hedgman received
[1201]authorization from headquarters to proceed with his top priority
[1203]plan:
[1205]ORLZED HAVE EXPLORATORY TALKS
[1206]WITH (CH OMROMEEYTO ASSESS HIS ATTITUDE
[1207]‘ACTIVE AGENT OR CUTOUT ROLE.
[1208]... APPRECIATE MANNER YOUR APPR CH TO
[1209]PROBLEM. (CIA Cable, (OUT 73900,) Fields ito
[1210]Leopoldville, 9/30/60.) :
[1212]In this cable, (Glenn Fields,| Assistant Chief of the Africa Division,
[1213]expressed a "HOPE ... FOR MODERATE HASTE" (CIA Cable (our 75900,)
[1214]Fields to Leopoldville, 9/30/60.) ; .
[1215]According to the report of the (Chief of| Station, (Gottlieb)
[1216]left the Congo to return to headquarters on October 5 in view of
[1217]the “EXPIRATION DATE HIS MATERIALS" (CIA Cable (IN 24171) Leopoid-
[1218]or ville to Tweedy, 10/7/60). The "expiration" of Gottlieb's)
[1219]"materials" probably refers to the date beyond which the substances
[1220]would no longer have lethal strength. Although the relation of
[1221]the "expiration date" to (Gottlieb's)departure is unclear from the
[1222]cables, it probably signifies that some of the biological substances
[1223]had lost their toxicity. Nonetheless, the Chiet of) Station indi-
[1224]cated that (Gottlieb) Left some biological substances that were still
[1226]lethal and that he intended to proceed with the assassination
[1228]operation:
[1230]ULNESS. ({CHIEF OF STATION]) PLANS CONTINUE
[1231]TRY IMPLEMENT OP. (CIA Cable IN 24171,)
[1232]Leopoldville to Tweedy, 10/7/6 .) ‘
[1234](oy ry cane ITEMS OF. CONTINUING USE-
[1236]Bocld: 32202487 Page 26 . Lo.
[1241](- By this point, Hedgman had conducted his “exploratory con-
[1243]° versation" with the agent who was his best candidate for gaining
[1244]access to Lumumba (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 60). Hedgman testified
[1245]that the subject he "explored" was the agent's ability to find a
[1246]means to inject poison into Lumumba's food or toothpaste (Hedgman,
[1248]8/21/75, p. 60):
[1250]I believe that I queried the agent who had
[1251]access to Lumumba, and his entourage, in
[1252]detail about just what that access, what
[1253]access he actually had, as opposed to speak-
[1254]ing to people. In other words, did he have
[1255]access to the bathroom, did he have access
[1256]to the kitchen, things of that sort.
[1258]I have a recollection of having queried him
[1259]on that without specifying why I wanted to
[1260]know this. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 48.)
[1262]On October 7, the fries of \Station reported to headquarters
[1264]on this meeting:
[1266]CONDUCTED EXPLORATORY CONVERSATION WITH
[1267]{AGENT] ... AFTER EXPLORING ALL POSSIBILITIES
[1268][AGENT] SUGGESTED SOLUTION RECOMMENDED BY
[1269]HQS. ALTHOUGH DID NOT PICK UP BALL, BELIEVE
[1270]HE PREPARED TAKE ANY ROLE NECESSARY WITHIN
[1271]LIMITS SECURITY ACCOMPLISH OBJECTIVE.
[1273]Hedgman testified that his exploratory steps left him with
[1274]doubts about the wisdom or practicality of the assassination plot:
[1275][C]ertainly I looked on it as a pretty wild
[1276]scheme professionally. I did not think that
[1277]it ... was practical professionally. —
[1278]~ Certainly ... to keep the U.S. out of it....
[1280]I explored it, but I doubt that I ever reall
[1281]expected to carry it out. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 111.)
[1283]HY 50955 Docld:32202467 Page 27
[1287]However, his cables indicate that he was planning to con-
[1288]tinue to implement the operation and sought the resources to do
[1289]it successfully. He urged headquarters to send him an alternate
[1290]operative for the assassination mission in ‘the event that they
[1291]found his first choice unacceptable:
[1293]IF HQS BELIEVE [AGENT'S CIRCUMSTANCES]
[1294]BAR HIS PARTICIPATION, WISH STRESS NECES-
[1295]SITY PROVIDE STATION WITH QUALIFIED THIRD
[1296]COUNTRY NATIONAL. (CIA Cable{IN 24171,
[1297]Leopoldville to Tweedy, 10/7/60.)
[1299]Tweedy cabled the (niet of )station the same day that he "HAD
[1300]GOOD DISCUSSION. YOUR COLLEAGUE 7 OCT" -- presumably referring to
[1301]a de-briefing of(Gottlieb}upon his return to the United States.
[1302](CIA Cable our 78336), Tweedy to Leopoldville, 10/7/60.) Tweedy
[1303]indicated that he was
[1305]CONSIDERING DISPATCHING THIRD COUNTRY
[1306]NATIONAL OPERATOR WHO, WHEN HE ARRIVES,
[1307]SHOULD THEN BE ASSESSED BY YOU OVER
[1308]PERIOD TO SEE WHETHER HE MIGHT PLAY
[1309]ACTIVE OR CUTOUT ROLE ON FULL TIME BASIS.
[1310](CIA Cable OUT 78336, Tweedy to (Chief of )
[1311]Station, 10/7/60.) . .f
[1313]This expression of support for the operation was followed by
[1314]an extraordinary pair of cables from headquarters on October 15,
[1315]1960. One of these cables was issued by a desk officer in CIA's
[1316]Africa Division and released under Bronson Tweedy's signature, as
[1318]Division Chief, and sent to Leopoldville through standard CIA
[1320]channels, which would allow for distribution of the message to
[1322]BW 50955 Docld:32202467 Page 26
[1324]appropriate personnel in thé CIA Statidén and the United States
[1325]embassy. This cable ... generally discussed the possibility of
[1326]covertly supplying certain Congolese leaders with funds and
[1327]military aid (CIA Cable bur 81476) Director to Leopoldville,
[1328]10/15/60). This cable atso delimited the kind of action against
[1330]Lumumba that would be authorized:
[1332]ONLY DIRECT ACTION WE CAN NOW STAND BEHIND
[1333]IS TO SUPPORT IMMOBILIZING OR ARRESTING
[1334][LUMUMBA], DESIRABLE AS MORE DEFINITIVE
[1335]ACTION MIGHT BE. ANY ACTION TAKEN WOULD
[1336]HAVE TO BE ENTIRELY CONGOLESE. (CIA Cable
[1337](OUT 81476,) Director to Leopoldville,
[1338]10/15/60.)
[1340]On the same day that this message was dispatched, a second
[1341]cable was sent to Leopoldville. This cable was issued personally
[1343]by Bronson Tweedy and sent in the special PROP channel for
[1345]XN
[1347]Hedgman's "EYES ONLY" (CIA Cable our 81396) Tweedy to Chieg of)
[1348]Station, 10/15/60). -_
[1350]YOU WILL NOTE FROM CABLE THROUGH NORMAL
[1351]CHANNEL CURRENTLY BEING TRANSMITTED A PARA[GRAPH]
[1352]ON PROP TYPE SUGGESTIONS. YOU WILL PROBABLY RE-
[1353]CEIVE MORE ALONG THESE LINES AS STUMBLING BLOC
[1354][LUMUMBA] REPRESENTS INCREASINGLY APPARENT ALL
[1355]STUDYING CONGO SITUATION CLOSELY AND HIS DIS-
[1356]POSITION SPONTANEOUSLY BECOMES NUMBER ONE CON-
[1357]SIDERATION.
[1359]RAISE ABOVE SO YOU NOT CONFUSED BY ANY
[1360]APPARENT DUPLICATION. THIS CHANNEL REMAINS FOR
[1361]SPECIFIC PURPOSE YOU DISCUSSED WITH COLLEAGUE AND
[1362]ALSO REMAINS HIGHEST PRIORITY. (CIA Cable [ovr
[1363]81396} Tweedy to(Chief of) Station, 10/15/60)
[1365]Thus, Tweedy resolved the apparent duplication of cables by indi-
[1367]cating that communications about the assassination mission were
[1369]HW 50955 Docld: 32202467 Page 29 . oo.
[1371]HY 50955 Docld: 32202467 Page 30
[1375]restricted to the PROP channel and that the assassination
[1376]mission was to move forward. He went on to request Hedgman's
[1377]reaction to the prospect of sending a senior CIA case officer to
[1378]the Congo on a "DIRECTED ASSIGNMENT ... TO CONCENTRATE ENTIRELY
[1379]THIS ASPECT" (CIA Cable (ur $1396) Tweedy to Chiet of) Station,
[1380]10/15/60). This referred to CIA officer/Justin O'Donnel] who
[1381]testified that in late October he was asked by Richard Bissell to
[1382]undertake the mission of assassinating Lumumba.*
[1384]In the course of suggesting the assignment of an additional
[1385]officer to the Congo, the cable provided insight into the reason
[1386]that the assassination mission had not progressed more rapidly
[1387]under the Chief of Station:
[1389]SEEMS TO US YOUR OTHER COMMITMENTS TOO HEAVY
[1390]GIVE NECESSARY CONCENTRATION PROP. | (CIA
[1391]Cable (OUT 81396) Tweedy to (Chief of) Station,
[1392]10/15/60.) - ‘
[1394]Again, in contradiction of the Limitations on anti-Lumumba
[1395]activity outlined in the cable sent through normal channels,
[1396]Tweedy's cable also proposed a plan to kidnap Lumumba :
[1398]POSSIBILITY USE COMMANDO TYPE GROUP FOR
[1399]ABDUCTION [LUMUMBA], ELTHER VIA ASSAULT
[1400]ON HOUSE UP CLIFF FROM RIVER OR, MORE
[1401]PROBABLY, IF [LUMUMBA] ATTEMPTS "ANOTHER
[1402]BREAKOUT INTO TOWN ... REQUEST (chi VIEWS.
[1404](CIA Cable OUT 81399), Tweedy to (Chief of )
[1405]Station, 10/15/60.) ; /
[1407]'
[1409]a
[1410]= * For a full account of the meeting between Bissell and
[1411](0: Donnell and O'Donnell’ '5) subsequent activities in the Congo, see
[1412]ection 5(a), infra.
[1414]oN
[1418]|
[1421]N,
[1423]HW 50955 Docld: 32202467 Page 31 ; oo.
[1425]-3L-
[1427]This series of cables sent during, and after
[1428](sottiied)'s visit to the Congo demonstrated a clear intent at CIA
[1429]headquarters to authorize and support rapid Progress on the assassi-
[1430]nation mission. The cables also show an intent to severely re-
[1431]strict knowledge of the assassination operation among officers in
[1432]CIA's Africa Division and among United States personnel in the
[1433]Congo, including those who were aware of and involved in other
[1435]covert activities.
[1437](Ce) The (Chief of )Station Moves Forward With Assassination
[1440]The testimony of the Chieg of) Station, taken fifteen
[1441]years after the events in question and without benefit of review
[1442]of the cables discussed above, was compatible with the picture
[1443]derived from the cables of a fully authorized and tightly restricted
[1444]assassination operation. Hedgman's testimony is at variance from
[1445]the cables only with respect to the lack of. vigor with which he
[1446]claims to have pursued the assignment which he dealt with in an
[1447]affirmative, aggressive manner in the cables,
[1449](i) ghe Chief of Station Testified That He Requested
[1450]rose onlirmation of the Assassination
[1452]Pian from adquarters
[1454]Hedgman testified that, after receiving Gottlie})'s
[1455]instructions, he cabled CIA headquarters seeking confirmation that
[1456]he was to carry out Gortiied}'s instructions (Hedgman, 8/21/75,
[1458]p. 36). Hedgman did not recall whether he identified Gotetier) by
[1459]name, and he doubted that he "would have" mentioned the President
[1461]in such a cable (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 36, 43).
[1463]g
[1469]Hedgman described the extraordinary security precautions he
[1470]took cabling his request for confirmation of the assassination in-
[1474]There was some special channel ... because
[1476]it was handled differently than any other
[1477]normal message. For example, it was not puc
[1478]on a regular cable form, which, you know,
[1480]you have several copies for your various files.
[1481]And it was my recollection that IL personally
[1482]carried the message to the communicator to
[1483]encrypt, and that was worded in a doublt-talk
[1484]way that even the communicator would not
[1485]necessarily know what it was about."
[1486](Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 42-43.)
[1488]This description approximates the PROP channel that was used for
[1489]all cables relating to the assassination mission.
[1491]Hedgman testified that soon after cabling his request for con-
[1492]firmation that he was to carry out the assassination assignment,
[1493]he received an affirmative reply from headquarters:
[1495]I believe I received a reply which I interpreted |
[1496]co mean yes, that he was the messenger and his
[1497]instructions were ... duly. authorized.
[1498](Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 37-38.)
[1499]Despite the cryptic nature of the cables, Hedgman said "I was con-
[1500]vinced that yes, it was right." (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 44, 50.)
[1502]Hedgman did not recall receiving any indication, either from
[1503][Gottiseb lor by cable, that he was to await further authorization
[1504]-before using the poisons (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 38). Hedgman ex-
[1505]pressed some uncertainty about whether he "had an absolute free
[1506]hand" to proceed with an assassination attempt without receiving
[1508]"final confirmation" (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 38, 47, 53).
[1510]HW 50955 Docld:32202467 Page 32 . : so
[1514]( Hedgman summarized his testimony on this question in his
[1516]second appearance:
[1518]I probably had authority to act on my own
[1519]but... it was possible that I had to go
[1520]back and get clearance for my action.
[1521]siesgmen. 8/25/75, p. 11; see also 8/21/75,
[1522]p. 39.
[1524]Hedgman testified, however, that a “policy decision" had been
[1525]made -- that assassination had been "approved" as "one means" of
[1527]eliminating Lumumba as a political threat (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 52).
[1529]I thought the policy decision had been made
[1531]in the White House, not in the Agency, and
[1533]that the Agency had been selected as the
[1534]Executive Agent, if you will, to carry out
[1536]a political decision. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 52.)
[1538]( Although Hedgman assumed that the President had not personally
[1539]selected the means of assassination, he testified that he was under
[1540]the impression that the President had authorized the CIA to do so
[1542]and to proceed to take action:
[1544]Hedgman: ... I doubt that I thought the
[1545]President had said, you use this system.
[1546]But my understanding is the President had
[1547]made a decision that an act should take
[1548]place, but then put that into the hands of
[1549]the Agency to carry out his decision.
[1551]a; Whatever that act was to be, it was
[1552]clearly to be assassination or the death
[1553]of the foreign political leader?
[1555]Hedgman: Yes.
[1556]Q: Instigated by the CIA, initiated by the CIA?
[1558]— Hedgman: Certainly if those -- if (pr. Gottlieb} s
[1559](Os Lethal agents were employed, that would have been
[1561]the result, yes. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 104.)
[1563]‘HW 50955 Docla:32202487 Page 33
[1565]HY 50955
[1569]Nonetheless, Hedgman said he had no "desire to carry out:
[1570]these instructions" (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 106). Whether or not
[1571]he felt there was authority to attempt an assassination without
[1572]seeking final confirmation, he said that he would have checked
[1573]with headquarters before taking action:
[1574]I think probably that I would have gone back
[1575]and advised that I intended to carry out and
[1576]sought final approval before carrying it out
[1577]had I been going to do it, had there been a
[1578]way to do it. I did not see it as ... a :
[1579]matter which could be accomplished practically
[1580]certainly. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 51-52.)
[1581]He proceeded to affirm that his reason for seeking a final approval
[1582]would have been to receive assurances about the practicality of the
[1583]specific mode of assassination that he planned to use (Hedgman,
[1584]8/21/75, p. 53).
[1585](ii) The [Chief of }/Station Took "Exploratory Steps!’ in
[1586]Furtherance | the Assassination Plot and Testified
[1587]That He Destroyed Cable Traffic Related to the Plot
[1589]Hedgman testified that after Gottlieb's) visit, he locked
[1591]the lethal substances in the bottom drawer of his safe, "probably"
[1592]sealed in an envelope marked “Eyes Only" with his name on it
[1593](Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 48-49). He said that his secretary was
[1594]the only other person with access to the safe and that she would
[1595]not have examined a package marked in this fashion (Hedgman, 3/21/75,
[1596]p. 49).
[1598]Hedgman testified that it was "possible" that he pre-
[1600]served the poisons in his safe until after Lumumba's death; at any
[1602]Docld:322024387 Page 34 -_
[1604]os.
[1606]art
[1608]HY 50955
[1612]The cable traffic conforms to Hedgman's recollection. For
[1613]two months after (cocelieb's arrival in the Congo, a regular stream
[1614]of messages flowed between the Leopoldville Chief off Station and
[1615]headquarters through the PROP channel. In late September and early
[1616]October the cables concerned the initiation of Hedgman's top priority _
[1617]plan -- recruiting the aid of a particular agent thought to have
[1618]sufficient access to Lumumba's entourage to be able to poison
[1619]Lumumba.* In mid-October, Tweedy notified the Chief of) Station
[1620]that the assassination mission remained "HIGHEST PRIORITY", and
[1622]he suggested sending additional personnel to Leopoldville to in-
[1624].tensify "CONCENTRATION" on this operation (CIA Cable OUT 81396, Tweedy
[1626]to Chief of/Station, 10/15/60) .**
[1627]These cables were followed by Hedgman's report to Tweedy on
[1629]October 17 that the agent he had picked for the assassination mission
[1631]* CIA Cable (IN,18989, (Chief of )Station to Tweedy, 9/27/60;
[1632]CIA Cable (IN 20857, (chief of) stati to Tweedy, 9/30/60; CIA Cable
[1633]OUT 75900, Fields to (Chief £)Station, 9/30/60; CIA Cable (nN 24171)
[1634]Chief of )Station to Tweedy, 10/7/60. See Section , supra, for
[1635]ull treatment of these cables. ~~
[1637]** See Section , supra, for more complete text of this
[1638]cable.
[1640]Docldad: 3227027457 Page 35
[1642]es
[1644]HY 50955
[1648]HAS NOT BEEN ABLE PENETRATE ENTOURAGE.
[1650]THUS HE HAS NOT BEEN ABLE PROVIDE OPS
[1652]INTEL NEEDED THIS JOB. (CIA Cable
[1654](IN 28936,)(Chief of)Station to Tweedy,
[1656]10/17/60.) ‘ ,
[1657]Hedpman testified that this operative left Leopoldville "sometime
[1658]in October" which terminated their discussions about gaining access
[1659]to Lumumba for the purpose of assassinating him (Hedgman, 8/21/75,
[1660]p. 61). the (Chief of) Station continued to communicate with head-
[1662]quarters about finding a means ‘to move forward with the assassina-
[1664]tion operation and securing the hecessary manpower to do so.
[1666]Hedgman confirmed Tweedy's view that although the assassination
[1667]operation was still his highest priority, he was overburdened with
[1668]responsibility for other operations so that he could not concentrate
[1669]on the progress of the assassination mission:
[1671]ALTHOUGH MAINTAINING PRIORITY INTEREST THIS
[1672]OP, ABLE DEVOTE ONLY LIMITED AMOUNT TIME,
[1673]VIEW MULTIPLE OPS COMMITMENTS. (CIA Cable,
[1674](IN 28936, 10/17/60.)
[1676]Due to his workload, the Chief of) Station responded enthusiastically
[1678]to Tweedy's suggestion of an additional case officer:
[1679]BELIEVE EARLY ASSIGNMENT SENIOR CASE OFFICER
[1680]HANDLE PROP OPS EXCELLENT IDEA ... IF CASE
[1681]OFFICER AVAILABLE [CHIEF OF) STATION] WOULD
[1682]DEVOTE AS MUCH TIME AS POSSIBLE TO ASSISTING
[1684]D DIRECTING HIS EFFORTS. (CIA Cable
[1685](tN 28936 ,) 10/17/60.)
[1687]Docld: 32202487 Page 36
[1689]HW 50955
[1693]The (chiet of) Station concluded this cable with the following
[1694]cryptic recommendation, reminiscent of his testimony that he
[1695]may have "Suggested" shooting Lumumba to Gottlied as an alternative
[1696]to poisoning (liedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 27-29):
[1698]IF CASE OFFICER SENT, RECOMMEND HQS
[1700]POUCH SOONEST HIGH POWERED FOREIGN MAKE
[1702]RIFLE WITH TELESCOPIC SCOPE AND SILENCER.
[1704]HUNTING GOOD HERE WHEN LIGHTS RIGHT.
[1706]HOWEVER AS HUNTING RIFLES NOW FORBIDDEN,
[1708]WOULD KEEP RIFLE IN OFFICE PENDING OPENING
[1710]OF HUNTING SEASON. (CIA Cable (tu 28936.)
[1712]10/17/60.) :
[1714]The first sentence of Hedgman's recommendation clearly refers
[1715]to sending a sniper rifle to the Congo via diplomatic pouch. The
[1716]‘rest of the message is probably an oblique reference to the
[1717]possibility of shooting Lumumba at the “OPENING OF HUNTING SEASON" --
[1718]in other words, at the first opportunity to find Lumumba outside
[1719]the residence where he remained in UN protective custody. This
[1720]interpretation is bolstered by a report sent the next month by
[1721]the Chies of Station through the PROP channel for Tweedy's “EYES
[1722]ALONE." Hedgman's cable described the stalemate which prevailed from
[1723]mid-September until Lumumba's departure for Stanleyville on
[1725]November 27; Lumumba was virtually a prisoner in UN custody, but
[1727]inaccessible to CIA agents and the Congolese:
[1729]TARGET HAS NOT LEFT BUILDING IN SEVERAL
[1730]WEEKS. HOUSE GUARDED DAY AND NIGHT BY
[1731]CONGOLESE AND UN TROOP.... CONGOLESE
[1732]TROOPS ARE THERE TO PREVENT TARGET'S
[1733]ESCAPE AND TO ARREST HIM IF HE ATTEMPTS .
[1734]UN TROOPS THERE TO PREVENT STORMING OF
[1735]PALACE BY CONGOLESE. CONCENTRIC RINGS
[1736]OF DEFENSE MAKE ESTABLISHMENT OF OBSER-
[1737]VATION POST IMPOSSIBLE. ATTEMPTING GET
[1739]Docldad: 3227027457 Page 37 . _
[1741]Saree
[1745]COVERAGE OF ANY MOVEMENT INTO OR OUT OF
[1746]HOUSE BY CONGOLESE.... TARGET HAS DISMISSED
[1747]MOST OF SERVANTS SO ENTRY THIS, MEANS SEEMS
[1748]REMOTE. (CIA Cable CN 42478) (Chief. of
[1749]Station to Tweedy.) , ’
[1750]Hedgman testified that all of his cable traffic about the
[1751]assassination question would have been sent with the same
[1752]extraordinarily stringent security precautions -- presumably re-
[1754]ferring to the PROP channel -- which concerned Gottlieb" 9 visit
[1756]and the confirmation of authorization for his instructions:
[1758]i
[1760]I would have sent in a special channel
[1761]anything dealing with Lumumba, at least
[1762]that would touch upon his removal’ in one
[1763]way or another. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 62.)
[1765]The (hier of Station also testified that sometime before
[1766]leaving the Station, he destroyed all cable traffic relating to
[1767]the assassination mission (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 89). Hedgman's
[1768]best recollection was that he had received instructions to destroy
[1769]those cables (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 96). Hedgman said he had never
[1770]before in his tenure as Chief of Station in the Congo destroyed
[1771]cable traffic because of its sensitivity (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 91).
[1772]But he stated that the cables relating to assassination were
[1774]destroyed because of their extremely sensitive nature.* He said
[1776]* It is possible that copies of cables dealing with such a
[1777]sensitive operation were also destroyed at CIA headquarters.
[1779]HW 50955 Docld:32202467 Page 38
[1781]“om,
[1783]HW 50955 Docld:32202467 Page 39
[1787]that eventually
[1789]I destroyed a great deal of traffic, because
[1790]the Congo was a highly sensitive area in
[1791]which -- at one period I recall we had all
[1792]of our files in the burn barrels. I mean,
[1793]when you wanted a file, you went over and
[1794]dug it out of the burn barrell. (Hedgman,
[1795]8/21/75, p. 91.)
[1797]At the conclusion of his testimony about the assassination
[1799]plot, the bhies of) Station was asked to give a general characteri-
[1801]zation of the advisability of the plot and the tenor of the times
[1803]in which it took place. His response indicated that although he
[1805]was willing to carry out what he considered a duly authorized
[1807]order, he was not convinced of the necessity of assassinating
[1809]Lumumba:
[1811]I looked upon the Agency-as an executive
[1812]arm of the Presidency.... Therefore, I
[1813]suppose I thought that it was an order
[1814]issued in due form from an authorized
[1815]authority.
[1817]On the other hand, I looked at.it as a
[1818]kind of operation that I could do without,
[1819]that I thought that probably the Agency’
[1820]and the U.S. government could get along
[1821]without. I didn't regard Lumumba as the
[1822]kind of person who was going to bring on
[1823]World War ILI or something.
[1825]I might have had a somewhat different
[1826]attitude if I thought that one man could
[1827]bring on World War III and result in the
[1828]deaths of millions of people or something,
[1829]but I didn't see him in that light. I saw
[1830]him'as a danger to the political position
[1831]of the United States in Africa, but
[1832]nothing more than that. (Hedgman, 8/21/75,
[1833]pp. 110-111.)
[1837](f) Testimony of Bissell and Tweedy About the Degree
[1838]oF Support for and Ter etration of the Assassination
[1839]PIE en ERE Resa etnation
[1840]There is a great variance between the testimony of Richard
[1841]Bissell and Bronson Tweedy and the picture of the assassination
[1842]plot presented by the Chiet of\ Station and the cable traffic from
[1843]the period. While the weight of the evidence demonstrates that
[1844]the assassination effort was the “highest priority" at CIA head-
[1845]quarters among operations in the Congo, Bissell has no direct
[1846]recollection of fottLieb's) mission to the Congo and Tweedy can
[1847]recall nothing more than consideration of the feasibility of an
[1848]assassination attempt.
[1850](i) Tweedy Had No Recollection of the Operation
[1851]To Polson Lumumba
[1853]As Chief of the Africa Division, Bronson Tweedy was the principal
[1854]liaison at CIA headquarters with the nies of} Station in Leopoldville
[1855]for all instructions, plans, and progress reports concerning the
[1856]effort to assassinate Lumumba, which were communicated through the
[1857]Special PROP channel. Most of the reports and recommendations
[1858]cabled to headquarters by the Chief of) Station on the assassination
[1859]operation were marked for Tweedy's "Eyes Only.”
[1861]Tweedy personally signed both the cable which initially informed
[1862]the bhiet of) Station that "SID") would arrive in Leopoldville, with _
[1863]an assignment (CIA Cable our 71464), Bissell/Tweedv to (Chieg of)
[1867]HY 50955 Docld: 32202467 Page 40
[1869]HW 50955
[1873]Station, 9/19/60) and the cable of October 7 indicating that he
[1874]had debriefed Got e1ied) upon his return from the Congo (CIA Cable
[1876]Gut 78336), Tweedy to Chief of)Station, 10/7/60). Tweedy was also
[1877]the “Eyes Only" recipient of Hedgman's reports on (Gottlieb's)
[1878]arrival in the Congo (CIA Cable (IN 18989} (Chief of Station to
[1879]Tweedy, 9/27/60) and the subsequent communications about the plan
[1880]which emerged from the discussions between Gorttier) and Hedgman
[1881]as the top priority -- infiltration of an agent into Lumumba's en-
[1882]Courage to administer a lethal poison to the Congolese leader (CIA
[1883]x XN
[1884]Cable Gn 20857 Chief of) Station to Tweedy, 9/30/60; CIA Cable,
[1886]Chief of) Station to Tweedy, 10/7/60; CIA Cable, (Chief of) Station
[1887]to Tweedy, 10/17/60). .
[1888]Tweedy testified, however, without benefit of reviewing these
[1889]cables, that he had no knowledge of the plot to poison Lumumba: .
[1890]%. Do. you have any knowledge of a messenger
[1891]from CIA headquarters having to go to the Congo
[1892]to provide the Chief of)Station in the Congo
[1893]with instructions to carry out the assassination
[1894]of Lumumba, if possible, and also provide him
[1895]with the tools to carry out such an assassination,
[1896]namely, poisons and medical equipment for admin-
[1897]istering them?
[1899]Mr. Tweedy. No, I do not. (Tweedy, 9/9/75, pp. 30-31)
[1901]errr eae tenn nnn tye peer,
[1903]* See Sections 4(a) - 4(e) for full treatment of the cables sent
[1904]in the PROP channel between Tweedy and the (Chief of) Station in
[1907]BDocld: 32202487 Page 41 . _-
[1909]HW 50955
[1913]'
[1915]When asked his opinion about the truth of the testimony received
[1916]by the Committee that poisons were delivered to the Congo by
[1917](cottsieb), who carried instructions that they were to be used in
[1918]the assassination of Lumumba, Tweedy replied:
[1920]There is nothing in my experience with the
[1922]Agency which would really bear on that
[1924]point whatsoever. (Tweedy, 9/9, pp. 39-39)
[1926]Tweedy added that if Gottlieb) went to the Congo as a courier,
[1927]"I will bet I knew it, but I don't recall it" (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 35),
[1928]Tweedy testified that it was “perfectly possible" for lethal bio-
[1929]logical substances to have been sent to the Congo, "but I don't
[1930]recall it" (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 30).
[1932]In response to a question about whether he knew about a cable
[1933]from headquarters informing Hedgman that a messenger was to come to
[1934]the Congo with instructions for him, Tweedy said that he would be
[1935]“very surprised if I didn't [know], but I certainly have no recoll-
[1936]ection of it whatsoever (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 31).
[1938]Tweedy said that he "was not going to gainsay" the testimony of
[1939]the Chief of) Station that a cable was sent to headquarters through
[1940]a special channel requesting confirmation that the instructions
[1941]were to be carried out but he did not recall it (Tweedy, 9/9, Pp.
[1942]32-33).
[1944]Tweedy. commented that rather than questioning the truth of the
[1946]testimony of the (Chief of) Station, * the discrepancies in their
[1948]ae ee ender orange pee
[1950]X Tweedy expressed a high regard for the general credibility of the
[1951](Chief of} Station. Tweedy said that he never had occasion to doubt
[1952]Hedgman'’s veracity or integrity, adding, "I would trust his memory
[1953]and I certainly trust his integrity." (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 36)
[1955]Docla: 32202487 Page 42
[1959]testimony could be attributed to his own lack of recall:
[1961]I’really am having trouble with this. I had to
[1963]be reminded of so many things. . .[T]he things
[1964]that I recall the most vividly about all my
[1965]African experiences were. . . the things I was
[1967]basically concerned with all the time, which was
[1968]putting this division together and the rest of
[1969]it. When it comes to operational detail I start
[1970]fuzzy and you would have thought with something
[1971]like thinking about Mr. Lumumba in these terms,
[1972]that I would have gone to bed and got up thinking
[1973]about Lumumba, I can assure you this wasn't the
[1974]case. (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 34)
[1976]fe ky
[1977]Tweedy was firm, however, in his disbelief that "Gort lie) would
[1978]have left instructions with the Chief of Station which would have
[1979]empowered [him]. . . to go out and assassinate Lumumba, without any
[1980]further recourse or reference to headquarters" (Tweedy, 9/9, pp. 32,
[1981]36). Tweedy said:
[1982]In such a matter of this kind; headquarters would
[1984]have wanted to have a last.word up to the last
[1985]minute. (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 36)
[1987](ii) Tweedy Testified That He Discussed With Bissell
[1988]the Feasibility of Assassinating Lumumba and He
[1989]Cabled Hedgman About Gaining Access to Lumumba
[1990]For the Purpose of Assassination
[1992]Despite Tweedy's lack of recollection about the actual plot to
[1993]poison Lumumba, he did recall exploring the feasibility of an assass-
[1994]. ination attempt.
[1996]Tweedy testified that he had discussed the subject of assassina! in:
[1998]Lumumba “more than once" with Richard Bissell in the fall of 1960
[2000](Tweedy, 9/9; pp. 14-15). Tweedy stated that he did not know
[2002]HW 50955 Doclda: 32202487 Page 43 , , .
[2004]HW 50955
[2008]whether Bissell had consulted with any "higher authority" about
[2009]exploring the possibilities for assassinating Lumumba (Tweedy,
[2011]9/9, p. 28). Generally, Tweedy said, when he received an instruc-
[2013]tion from Bissell he would proceed to implement it on the assump -
[2015]tion that it was fully authorized above the level of DDP:
[2017]I would proceed with it on the basis that he
[2018]was authorized to give me instructions and it
[2019]was up to him to bloody well know what he was
[2020]empowered to tell me to do. (Tweedy, 9/9, p.13)
[2022]Tweedy characterized his discussions with Bissell about assass-
[2023]inating Lumumba as "contingency planning" (Tweedy, 9/9/75, p. 28):
[2025]Tweedy. . . .I think it came up in the sense that
[2026]Dick would have said we probably better be
[2027]thinking about whether it might ever be necessary
[2028]or desirable to get rid of Lumumba, in which case
[2029]we presumably should be in position to assess
[2030]whether we could do it or not successfully. —
[2032]Q. Do it, meaning carry off an assassination?
[2034]Tweedy. Yes, but it was never discussed with him
[2035]in any other sense but a planning exercise, ...
[2036]never were we instructed to do anything of this
[2037]kind. We were instructed to ask whether.such a
[2038]thing would be feasible and to have the (Chief of)
[2039]Station be thinking along those lines as well.
[2040](Tweedy, 9/9, p. 15)
[2042]Tweedy said that the planning that he undertook pursuant to his con-
[2043]versation with Bissell included "a few" cables that he remembers
[2044]sending to the Chief of) Station asking him
[2046]to keep in mind what sort of access one might ever
[2048]have had to Lumumba. . .[{in] the eventuality that
[2050]we might wish to get rid of Mr. Lumumba personally.
[2051](Tweedy, 9/9, pp. 19-21)
[2053]Docla: 322024387 Page 44
[2057]Tweedy did not recall inquiring about gaining access to Lumumba for
[2058]the purpose of abducting him from UN custody (Tweedy, 9/9, p.. 24);
[2059]rather he "supposed" that various means of assassination were
[2061]being explored: .
[2063]Q. Would this be access to shoot him or would this
[2064]be access to his personal food or drink or toiletries?
[2066]Tweedy. I suppose all those types of things might
[2067]have been considered. (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 23)
[2069]Q. In your discussions with Bissell, about the
[2070]feasibility of an assassination operation, did
[2071]poisons come up as one_ means that was being con-
[2072]sidered and which the (Chiet of) Station should explore?
[2074]Tweedy. I am sure it must have. After all, there
[2075]are not many ways of doing it. Shoot a man, poison
[2076]him, of course you could, I suppose, stab him or
[2077]something like that. But basically you are talking
[2078]. about a contingency plan which I assume has the best
[2079]( possibility of protecting the involvement of the U.S.
[2080]“ae Government and if you want to do it in a manner which
[2081]would be as distant, if that is the right word, as
[2082]possible, I think poison would then stand high on
[2083]the list of possibilities.
[2085]Tweedy did not "recall specifically" the response from the (Chief
[2086]of Station, but said he was "sure" that he received "a serious
[2087]answer. . . a disciplined reply to an instruction’ from headquarters"
[2088](Tweedy, 9/9, pp. 23,27).
[2090]Although Tweedy did not recall sending or receiving cables in a
[2091]special channel concerning the ‘messenger" to the Congo or confirm-
[2093]ation of his instructions, he acknowledged that the cables exploring
[2095]access to Lumumba for the purpose of assassination would have been
[2097]HY 50955 Doclda: 32202487 Page 45 : - oe
[2099]sent in a channel that was even more closely restricted than the
[2100]normal CIA ‘cable traffic (Tweedy, 9/9, pp. 22, 32-33). Tweedy
[2101]said destruction of such cable traffic would have been left to the
[2102]discretion of the (Chief of) Station and he did not know whether
[2103]Hedgman destroyed the Station's copies (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 22).
[2105]Tweedy said "I would be surprised if I didn't” have a conver-
[2106]sation with Gidney Gottlieb} about "anything in his inventory that
[2107]could possibly be used, including lethal biological substances
[2108](Tweedy, 9/9, pp. 68-69). Tweedy "suspected" that "the first
[2109]conversation along these lines would undoubtedly have been held
[2110]between Dick Bissell and Gidney Gottlieb}, " which Tweedy then would
[2111]have "followed-up" (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 69).
[2113]Tweedy maintained that the period in which he explored the
[2114]means of access for assassinating Lumumba remained "a planning
[2115]interval and at no point can I recall that I ever felt it was im-
[2116]minent that somebody would say ‘go'" (Tweedy, 9/9. pp. 18-19):
[2118]Tweedy. It was always my assumption that at the
[2119]time. anything like this should occur there would
[2120]have been some kind of real focus on the problem
[2121]at probably a very considerable policy level with-
[2122]in the Agency. . . and it never occurred to me that
[2123]I-would get a call or Bissell would ask me to come
[2124]down to his office and sya go to it. Nor were we
[2125]ever in a position where he said that I would
[2126]merely implement plan so-and-so. We never got
[2127]that far.
[2129]Q. You didn't have any action plans for the
[2131]assassination of Lumumba that you had prepared or
[2132]~ were aware of? ;
[2134]HY 50955 Doecld: 32202487 Page 46 . . -
[2136]HW 50955
[2140]Tweedy. No. Planning, yes, but nothing that
[2141]ever got anywhere. (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 19)
[2143]It is difficult to reconcile the cable traffic with Tweedy's
[2144]testimony that no action plans were launched and that no authoriz-
[2145]ation for implementing the assassination operation, authorization
[2146]for Hedgman's approach to his agent to explore access to Lumumba's
[2147]entourage is in accord with Tweedy's description of his inquiries
[2148]about gaining access to Lumumba.
[2150]However, the fact that Tweedy was personnaly informed that the
[2151](chies of) Station "PLANS CONTINUE TRY IMPLEMENT op" (CIA Cable {IN
[2152]24171)(chies of) Station to Tweedy, 10/7/60) is harder to reconcile
[2153]with his statements that a "go ahead" on the operation was never
[2154]imminent, especially in light of Tweedy's PROP cable the next week.
[2155]which told che (chief of) Station that Lumumba's
[2157]DISPOSITION SPONTANEOUSLY BECOMES NUMBER ONE
[2158]CONSIDERATION. . . THIS CHANNEL REMAINS FOR
[2159]SPECIFIC PURPOSE. YOU DISCUSSED WITH COLLEAGUE
[2161]AND ALSO REMAINS HIGHEST PRIORITY (CIA Cable
[2162]OUT 81396) Tweedy toChief of) Station, 10/15/60)
[2164](iii) Bissell Testified That He Did Not Recall
[2166]Whether The Assassination Operation Had
[2168]Moved From Planning To Implementation
[2170]But It Was Not Against Agency Policy to
[2172]Send Poisons to The Congo
[2174]Richard Bissell testified that he did not remember discussing
[2176]the feasibility of assassinating Lumumba with Bronson Tweedy, but it
[2177]seemed “entirely probable" to him that such discussions took place
[2179](Bissell, 9/10, pp. 3-4).
[2181]Docld:32202487 Page 47
[2183]HW 50955
[2187]Bissell said he "may have" given Tweedy specific instructions about
[2188]steps he was to take to further an assassination plan, but he did
[2189]not remember to do so (Bissell, 9/10,p.4). Bissell said that
[2190]exploring access to Lumumba --"almost certainly" seeking information
[2191]from the Chiet of) Station about access for poisoning ~~ would have
[2192]been a "key part" of his "planning and preparatory activity" but
[2194]he had no specific recollection of cable communications on this
[2195]subject (Bissell, 9/10, pp. 6-8). Bissell remembered that he was
[2196]aware that the Chief of) Station had an agent thought to have direct
[2197]access to Lumumba (Bissell, 9/10, p. 80).
[2199]Bissell testified that he "most certainly" approved any cables
[2200]that Tweedy sent to the nies of) Station seeking information about
[2201]gaining access to Lumumba but it was so sensitive a matter (Bissell,
[2202]9/10, p. 8) Bissell added:
[2204]I think Mr. Tweedy, on the basis of an oral author-
[2205]ization from me, would have had the authority to
[2206]send such a cable without my signing off on it.
[2207](Bissell, 9/10, p. 8) —
[2209]Bissell believed that Tweedy would have known of (Gottliet)'s trip
[2210]to the Congo, although it-was possible that Tweedy was “cut out of
[2211]knowledge of the specific operation" (Bissell, 9/10, p. 21).
[2212]Bissell’s lack of recollection of discussing his assignment to
[2214]Gustin O'Donnellj*with Tweedy was the reason for his speculation that
[2216]% Bissell's assignment to(0'Donnel}) is discussed in Sections 5(a)
[2218](i) and 5(a)(ii), infra.
[2220]Docld: 32202487 Page 48 . . oe
[2224]Tweedy might have been unaware of the true purpose of (Gottlieb )s
[2225]visit (Bissell, 9/10, pp. 20-22). .
[2227]Bissell did not recall cables concerning the dispatch of a
[2228]messenger and subsequently confirming that his instructions were
[2229]to be followed, but he said "This sounds highly likely. . . I
[2230]would expect, given the background, that the confirmation would
[2231]have been forthcoming" (Bissell, 9/10, p. 43).
[2235]Tt was '‘very probable," according to Bissell, that he discussed
[2237]the assassination of Lumumba with (Sidney Gott lied), who was then
[2238][nis Science Advisor \(Bissell, 9/10, p. 14). Bissell said that on a
[2239]number of occasions he discussed with Gottlict) "the availability
[2241]of means of incapacitation, including assassination" (Bissell, 9/10,
[2243](. p. 60).
[2245]Although he had no "specific recollection," Bissell assumed
[2246]that, if Gottlieb) went to the Congo, he had approved the mission,
[2247](which “might very well" have dealt with the assassination of
[2248]Lumumba} (Bissell, 9/10, pp. 18, 20, 4h). Despite his absence of
[2249]specific recollection of these events, Bissell said, "There is
[2250]nothing in mind that I remember that would be in conflict" with the
[2251]testimony of the (Chies of) Station chat (octiieb) carried poisons to
[2252]the Congo (Bissell, 9/10, p. 35).
[2254]Bissell testified that it would not have been against CIA policy
[2256]in the fall of 1960 to send poisons to the Congo (Bissell, 9/10, p. 35).
[2258]HY 50955 Docld: 32202467 Page 49
[2260]~53L-
[2262]He classified "the act of taking the kit to the Congo. . . as still
[2263]in the planning stage" (Bissell, 9/10, p. 49). Bissell acknowledged,
[2264]however, that the dispatch of poisons and paraphernalia with which
[2265]to administer them was an extraordinary event:
[2267]It would indeed have been rather unusual to send
[2269]such materials -- a specific kit. .-. of this .
[2271]sort -- out to a relatively small station, unless
[2273]planning for their use were quite far along.
[2275](Bissell, 9/10, p. 37).
[2277]"Nonetheless, Bissell said that he “probably believed" that he
[2279]had sufficient authority at that point to direct CIA officers to
[2280]move from the stage of planning to implementation (Bissell, 9/10,
[2282]pp. 60-61). In light of his absence of a specific recollection of
[2284]these events, he stated that "if it be taken as established that Mr.
[2286]n re
[2287]( . (Cottiied) took specific instructions ‘to implement,’ " Gottlieh)
[2288]‘vould not have been acting beyond the mandate given to him by
[2289]Bissell and it would show that the assassination plot “had then passed
[2290]into an implementation phase" and that “authorization was given"
[2292](Bissell, 9/10/ pp. 39, 41, 49).
[2294]HW 50955 Docld: 32202487 Page 50 a
[2298]ection Between the Assassination
[2300]3. The Question of a Conn
[2301]Plot and Other Actions of CIA Officers and Operatives
[2303]in the Congo
[2305]Gustin 0" Donel), a senior CIA officer in the clandestine
[2306]operations division in 1960, testified that during this period he
[2307]had been asked by DDP Richard Bissell to go to the Congo to carry
[2308]out the assassination of Lumumba (Donne) 6/9/75, pp. 11-12). -
[2309](o‘Donnet1) said that he refused to participate in an assassination
[2310]operation, but proceeded to the Congo to attempt to draw Lumumba
[2311]away from the protective custody of the UN guard and place him in
[2312]the hands of Congolese authorities (0 Donne1) 6/9/75, pp. 13-14).
[2314]Shortly after ('Donnel}'s arrival in the Congo he was
[2315]joined by a CIA agent with a criminal background who was used the
[2316]following year by the CIA as part of a program to develop a stand-by
[2317]assassination capability. Late in 1960, one of the operatives of
[2318]the Chies of Station in Leopoldville approached this agent of
[2319](0'Donne1 ly s with a proposition to join an "execution squad” (CIA
[2320]Cable (iu 18739, Leopoldville to Director, 12/7/60).
[2322]Despite the fact that 6" Donne) was initially approached
[2324]to be part of the plot to assassinate Patrice Lumumba, it is un-
[2325]likely that (0'Donnet} was actually involved in the implementation
[2326]of that plot by the (Chief of) Station. Whether there is any connec-
[2327]tion between the assassination plot and either of the two operatives ~-
[2329]QJWIN and WIROGUE -- is less clear.
[2331]HW 50955 Docld:322024687 Page 51 . . 8
[2333]Meee
[2335]on™,
[2337]HW 50955 Docld:32202487 Page 52
[2341](a) (Q'Donnell\'s Operations in the Congo
[2342](i) Tweedy and the (Chief of)Station Apreed That a
[2343]; Senior Case Geese see }st be Sent to the Congo
[2344]to Concentrate on the Assassination Operation
[2345]In early October, 1960, several cables sent in the
[2346]specially restricted PROP channel dealt with a plan to send a "senior
[2347]case officer" to the Congo to aid the Chief of) Station with the
[2348]assassination operation.* On October -7, Bronson Tweedy informed
[2349]Hedgman that he "WOULD EXPECT DISPATCH TDY [TEMPORARY DUTY] SENIOR
[2350]CASE OFFICER RUN THIS OP" by supervising a third country national
[2352]operative (CIA Cable (our 78336), Tweedy to(chief of) Station, 10/7/60).
[2354]On October 15, Tweedy requested Hedgman's reaction to the sugges-
[2355]tion of dispatching the senior case officer as soon as possible to
[2357]concentrate on the assassination operation (CIA Cable OUT 81396),
[2359]_Tweedy to niet of) Station, 10/15/60). Two days later, the Chief
[2361]of) Station replied affirmatively:
[2363]BELIEVE EARLY ASSIGNMENT SENIOR CASE OFFICER
[2364]HANDLE PROP OPS EXCELLENT IDEA. (CIA Cable
[2365](m8 28936), (Chief of) Station to Tweedy).
[2368]The (Chief of Station advised that his responsibilities for “MULTIPLE
[2369]OPS" had restricted the amount of time he was able to devote to the
[2371]assassination operation (CIA Cable, 10/17/60).
[2373]** See Section 4(e), supra, for full treatment of these cables.
[2375]C . (ii) .Bissell Discussed Assassination of Lumumba With
[2377]( O'DonneTT jand sent Him to Congo: October-November 1960
[2378]; — Oe ober=-November 1960
[2380]Probably shortly after the Cniet off Station's cable of
[2382]October 1? requesting the assignment of a senior case officer to
[2384]concentrate on the assassination operation, Richard Bissell broached
[2386]the subject with CIA officer Gustin O'Donnell),
[2388]At that time, (0'Donnel1) was the Deputy Chief of a com-
[2389]ponent of the Directorate of Plans -- the CIA's covert action arm
[2392](O'Donnell), 6/9/75, p. 8).
[2394]AL
[2396]o XN :
[2397](sustin O'Donnell) testified that in October of 1960, he
[2398]was asked by Richard Bissell to undertake the mission of assassi-
[2400]nating Patrice Lumumba (P'Donnell), 6/9/75, pp. 11-12; 9/11/75,
[2401]pp. 19, 43):
[2405]sei (o'Donnel): lle called me in and he told ne
[2406]‘he wanted to po down to the Zelgian Congo,
[2407]the former Belgian Congo, and to eliminate
[2409]Lumumba
[2411]Q: What did you understand him to mean by
[2413]eliminate?
[2414](o'bonne1): To kill him and thereby eliminate
[2415]nis infTuence.
[2417]Q: What was the basis for your interpreting his
[2418]remarks, whatever his precise language, as
[2419]meaning that he was talking about assassination
[2420]rather than merely neutralizing him through
[2422]some other means?
[2424](O'Donnel): [t was not neutralization . .
[2425]‘Clearly the context of our talk was to kill
[2426]him. (P'Donnel}), 6/9/75, pp. 11-12.).
[2428]p'Donnel!) reacted strongly to Bissell's instruction:
[2429]I told him that I would absolutely not
[2430]( have any part of killing Lumumba. . He said,
[2432]I want you to go over and talk to\Sidney © ‘
[2433]'Gottlied). (O'Donnel), 6/9/75, p. 12.)
[2435]HY 50955 Docld: 32202467 Page 53 : -
[2439](cottlieb) was a CIA scientist who was at that time the/Science
[2441]Advisor /tol Bissell (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 14).
[2442](0' Donnell) said it.was "inconceivable that Bissell would direct
[2443]such a mission without the personal permission of Allen Dulles"
[2444][co donne 1, | 9/11/75, p. 44), But the question of authorization
[2445]was never raised by Bissell:
[2446]I assumed that he had authority from Mr. Dulles
[2447]in such an important issue; but it was not dis-
[2448]cussed, nor did he purport to have higher
[2449]authority to do it. @ Ponneny) 6/9/75, p. 15.)
[2450](0 Donnel}) promptly met with (Gottlieb) and testified that he was
[2451]“sure that Mr. Bissell had called (ottliet) and told him I was coming
[2452]over" (e' Donnel}, 6/9/75, p. 13; 9/11/75, p. 7). (0: Donnell} said
[2453]that ‘fottLiet) told him ‘that there were four or five ... lethal
[2454]means of disposing of Lumumba" (O' Donnel}), 6/9/75, p. - (0 Donel
[2455]recalled that "one of the methods was a virus and the others in-
[2456]cluded poison" 'bonner), 6/9/75, p. 12; 9/11/75, p. 7). (O'Donnell)
[2457]said that Gottlieb) "didn't even hint ... that he had been in the
[2458]Congo and that he had transported any lethal agent to the Congo"
[2459](6'Donne1}), 9/11/75, p. 7-A).
[2460]After speaking with Gottlieb) (O'Donnell) said:
[2461]I then left his office, and I went back to
[2462]Mr. Bissell's office and I told him in no
[2463]way would I have any part in the assassina-
[2464]tion of Lumumba ... and reasserted in
[2466]absolute terms that I would not be involved
[2467]in a murder attempt. (P"Ponnel1) 9/11/75, p. 43.)
[2469]HW 50955 Docld: 32202467 Page 54
[2471]Suhr
[2473]HW 50955
[2477]x. (o'Donneti) said that in one of his two conversations with
[2478]Bissell about Lumumba, he raised the prospect "that conspiracy
[2480]to commit murder being done in the District of Columbia might be
[2481]in violation of federal law" (6 'Donne1}), 6/9/75, p. 14). He said
[2482]that Bissell “airily dismissed" this prospect (6 donnett) 6/9/75,
[2483]p. 14).
[2485]Despite his refusal to participate in assassination, (O'Donnel?)
[2486]agreed to go to the Congo on a general mission to "neutralize"
[2487]Lumumba "as a political factor" (@'Donnel}), 9/11/75, pp. 43-44) :
[2489]C said I would go down and I would have no
[2491]compunction about operating to draw Lumumba
[2492]out [of UN custody], to run an operation to
[2493]neutralize his operations which were against
[2495]Western interests, against, I thought,
[2496]American interests. ( ‘Donnel)), 6/9/75, p. 13.)
[2498](O'Donnell) added that his objective was to
[2500]neutralize Lumumba's influence ... and his
[2501]activities against [a Congolese leader],
[2502]whom at that time you might say was our close
[2503]instrument, he was the man we had put our
[2505]_ chips on. (O'Donnel), 9/11/75, p. 20.)
[2507]Bissell also recalled that; after their discussions about assassi-
[2508]nation, (O'Donnell) went to the Congo "with the assignment ... of
[2509]looking at other ways of neutralizing Lumumba" (Bissell, 9/10/75,
[2510]p. 53).
[2512]Although (0'Donnel} did not formulate a precise plan until he
[2514]reached the Congo, he discussed a general strategy with Bissell:
[2516]Doclda: 3227027487 Page 55
[2518]~5]-
[2520]Me. lo'Donnet}) I told Mr. Bissell that I
[2521]wou e willing to go down to neutralize
[2523]his activities and operations and try to bring
[2524]him out fof UN custody] and turn him over to
[2525]the Congolese authorities, that is correct.
[2527]Senator Mondale: Was it discussed then that
[2528]his Life might be taken by the Congolese
[2529]authorities?
[2531]Mr. (O'Donnel): It was, I think, considered
[2532]im tne -- not to have him killed, but then
[2533]it would have been a Congolese being judged
[2534]by Congolese for Congolese, crimes. . Yes,
[2536]I
[2537]think it was discussed. (P' Donel), 6/9/75,
[2538]p. 38.) \
[2540]There was a "very, very high probability" that Lumumba would re-
[2541]ceive capital punishment at the hands of the Congolese authorities,
[2542]\ - .
[2543]according to ("Donel (O'Donnell), 9/11/75, p. 24), But (O'Donnell)
[2544]/ . ,
[2545]“had no compunction about bringing him out and then having him
[2546]tried by a jury of his peers" (@'Donnel1), 6/9/75, p. 14).
[2547]Although (O'Donnel had expressed his aversion to assassination
[2548]to Bissell and had undertaken a more general mission to "neutralize"
[2549]Lumumba's influence, it was clear to him that Bissell was still
[2550]interested in the assassination of Lumumba:
[2551]in leaving at the conclusion of our second
[2552]discussion ... he said, well, I wouldn't
[2553]rule out that possibility -- meaning the
[2554]possibility of the elimination or the killing
[2555]of Lumumba -- I wouldn't rule it. In other
[2556]words, even though you have said this, don't
[2557]rule it out.... There is no question about
[2558]it, he said, I wouldn't rule this other out,
[2559]Meaning the elimination or the assassination
[2560](©'Donnel1) 9/11/75, p. 45).
[2562](O'Donnel) had a distinctive recollection that after his second dis-
[2564]cussion of Lumumba with Bissell, he met with Richard Helms in order
[2566]HY 50955 Docld:32202467 Page 56 . Loo.
[2570]to make his opposition to assassinating Lumumba a matter of
[2572]record (©'Donnel1), 9/11/75, pp. 44-45):
[2574][I]n the Agency, since you don't have
[2575]documents, you have to be awfully canny
[2576]and you have to get things on record, and
[2577]I went into Mr. Helms' office, and I
[2579]said, Dick, here is what Mr. Bissell
[2580]proposed to me, and I told him that I
[2581]would under no conditions do it, and Helms
[2582]said you're absolutely right. (O'Donnel),
[2583]6/9/75, pp. 15-16). \ /
[2585]Richard Helms testified that it was “likely" that he had such a
[2587]conversation with (0'Donnel}) and he assumed that (0'Donneli)'s version
[2588]. : ~ A
[2590]of their conversation was correct (Helms, 9/16/75, pp. 22-23).*
[2592]William Harvey testified that ('Donneli) had informed him
[2594]about the conversations with Bissell:
[2596]( . \
[2597]= ite. (O'Donnell) came to me and said that he
[2598]had ‘been approached by Richard Bissell
[2599]to undertake an operation in the Congo, one
[2600]of the objectives of which was the elimina-
[2601]tion of Patrice Lumumba. He also told me
[2602]that he had declined to undertake this
[2603]assignment. (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 9.)
[2604]Harvey said that in a later conversation with Bissell, Bissell told
[2605]him that he had asked (O'Donnell) to undertake such an operation
[2606](Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 9).
[2607](0'Donneti) said that within forty-eight hours of his second dis-
[2608]cussion with Bissell, he departed. for the Congo )(0 "Donnell, [9/11/75 ,
[2609]pp. 45-46). .
[2610]* Helms testified that he did not follow-up n this conversa-
[2611]Po tion in any way. He did not recall why (O'Donnell) had gone to the
[2612]es Congo or what his mission was (elms, 9/16/75, pp. 32-33).
[2614]HW 50955 Docld:32202467 Page 57 ; _
[2616]a
[2618]-59-~+
[2620](iii) Bissell Testified That he Asked (O'Donnell) to Plan
[2621]and Prepare for an Assassination Operation
[2622]and rrepare for an Assass ac ton’~peration
[2624]_ Bissell remembered "very clearly" that he and 6 ‘Donne 1)
[2625]discussed the assassination of Lumumba in the fall of 1960 (Bissell,
[2626]6/9/75, p. 75) and that (O'Donnel) reacted negatively (Bissell,
[2627]9/11/75, p. 18). According’to Bissell, 0 Donne) said that he
[2628]thought that assassination “was an inappropriate action and that
[2629]the desired object could be accomplished better in other ways"
[2630](Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 54).
[2632]Bissell also confirmed the fact that he had asked
[2634]6" Donnell to see; (Sidney Gottlieb (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 44).
[2636]Bissell differs with (0' Donnel1)'s account on only one
[2637]important point -- the degree to which Bissell's initial assign-
[2638]ment to! 0" DonnelL)contemplated the mounting of an operation as
[2639]opposed to contingency planning. @: Donnel!) flatly testified that
[2640]Bissell requested him to attempt to kill Lumumba. In his first
[2641]testimony on the subject, Bissell said that he asked b: 0" Donnel1)
[2643]"to investigate the possibility of killing Lumumba" (Bissell,
[2644]6/11/75, p. 54; see also pp. 53; 75). In a later appearance,
[2645]however, Bissell stated that 0" Donne11) “had been asked to plan
[2646]and prepare for" the assassination of Lumumba (Bissell, 9/10/75,
[2647]p. 24).
[2649]Bissell said that after his conversations with [o Donnell), he
[2650]felt that it would be necessary to "postpone" the assassination
[2652]operation because, "given (0° Donne) S reaction, there was a risk
[2654]HW 509545 Docld:32202487 Page 58 : -
[2656]fe
[2658]HY 50955
[2662]that the planning of such an operation would be blown" (Bissell
[2664]9/10/75, p. 25). Despite his impression that he might have de-
[2666]activated assassination operations against Lumumba at that time
[2668]Bissell could not preclude the possibility that the Hedgman/
[2669]e, . :
[2671]\Gobblieb\ poison plot continued to move foward:
[2675]{[T]his had been in my mind a very sensitive
[2676]assignment to him, limited -- with the
[2677]knowledpe of it limited very narrowly even
[2678]within the Agency. And it is difficult to
[2679]separate recollection from inference on -
[2680]occasion. But I seem to recollect that
[2681]after this conversation with him, I wanted
[2682]this put very much on the back burner and
[2683]inactivated for quite some time. ow that
[2684]doesn't rule out the possibility that some
[2685]action through completely different channels
[2686]might have gone forward. But the best of
[2687]my recollection is, I viewed this not only
[2688]as terminating the assignment for him, but
[2689]also as reason for at least postponing any-
[2690]thing further along that line. (Bissell,
[2691]9/10/75, ‘pp. 25-26).
[2693]In Tweedy's mind, (0'Donne11)'s eventual mission to the Congo was
[2694]linked to assessing the possibility for assassinating Lumumba
[2696]rather than to a general plan to draw Lumumba out of UN custody
[2698](Tweedy, 9/9/75, p. 26).
[2700]Civ) (2 Donnell) Arrived in the Congo and Learned That
[2701]Virus Was In the Station Safe
[2703]On October 29, the Chies of Station was informed’ through **"*:
[2705]the PROP channel that (Justin O'Donnel) was soon to arrive in Leo-
[2706]poldville "IN FURTHERANCE THIS: PROJECT" (CIA Cable our 86798, Fields)
[2707]to (chiet of) Station, 10/29/60). On November 3, 0" bonnet} arrived
[2709]Bocld: 322024387 Page 59
[2711]ems
[2715]in Leopoldville {CIA Cable Gn 38052), Leopoldville to Director,
[2716]11/4/60). (chief of) Station ‘Hedgman testified that he had been
[2718]made aware by cable that (0' Donnell) was coming to the Congo
[2720](Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 49). Hedgman said it was "very possible"
[2722]that as a new Chief of) Station he took the dispatch to the Congo
[2724]of a senior officer Like (0'Donneli) as a signal that CIA headquarters
[2725]was "dissatisfied with my handling" of Gottlieb) instructions
[2726](Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 42). .
[2728]Hedgman had a general picture of (0'Donnel})'s mission:
[2730]TI understood it to be that -- similar to
[2731]mine, that is, the removal or neutrali-
[2732]zation of Lumumba ... I have no clear .
[2734]recollection of his discussing the assassi-
[2735]nation. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 54.)
[2737]x
[2739]Hedgman said that he had no recollection of ©'Donnel}) indicating
[2740]one way or the other whether he was considering assassination as
[2741]a means of "neutralizing" Lumumba (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 55).
[2742]Hedgman said, “in view of my instructions, I may have assumed that
[2743]he was" considering assassination (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 55). Gen-
[2744]erally, however, Hedgman perceived ©'Donne1}) as being unenthusiastic
[2745]about his mission (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 56, 88-89).
[2747]wien (0 Donnell) arrived in the Congo, he met with the (chiet of)
[2748]Station, who informed him that there was "a virus in the safe"
[2749](O'Donnel, 9/11/75, p. 7-A; 6/9/75, p. 16). O'Donnell said he
[2751]ra
[2753]assumed it was a “lethal agent" (O'Donnel 1, 6/9/75, p. 37), although
[2756]Hedgman was not explicit:
[2758]I knew it wasn't for somebody to get his polio
[2759]shot up to date, (O'Donnel 1), 6/9/75, p. 16.)
[2761]s
[2763]HW 50955 Docld:32202467 Page 60
[2765]HY 50955
[2769]He added that if the virus was to be used for medical purposes,
[2770]‘it would have been in the custody of the State Department"
[2771]personnel, not the CIA station (@' Donnell), 6/9/75, p. 36).
[2772](0'Donnet1) said that he did not recall that Hedgman mentioned
[2774]the source of the virus (O'Donnel), 9/11/75, p. 8).* But (0'Donne11)
[2775]assumed that it had come from(Sidiey Gottlied)'s office:
[2777]It would have had to have come from Washington,
[2779]in my estimation, and I would think, since it
[2781]had been discussed with Gottlie} that it
[2783]probably would have emanated’ from his office.
[2784](O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 28.) -
[2786]Hedgman did not recall discussing ‘Gottliet)'s trip to the Congo
[2787]with (0'Donne1)), but "assumed" that he did so (Hedgman, 8/21/75,
[2788]pp. 60-61). |
[2790]@'Donnet} was "certain" that the virus had arrived before he
[2791]did (Q'Donne1t), 6/9/75, p. 24). He was surprised to learn that
[2792]such a virus was being held at the Leopoldville station because
[2793]he had refused an assassination mission before departing for the
[2794]Congo (®' Donnell), 6/9/75, p. 17).
[2796](O'Donnell)stated that he knew of no other instance where a
[2798]lethal biological substance was in the possession of a CIA station
[2800](6' Donel) 9/11/75, p. 50). He assumed that its purpose was
[2802]assassination:
[2806]When \O'Donhelljwas informed about Hedgman's testimony on
[2807]the visit of (Gottlieb) to the Congo and the plot to poison Lumumba,
[2808]he said, "I believ absolutely in its credibility" (O'Donnell)
[2809]9/11/75, p. 53). (O'Donnel) found nothing in the facts as he knew
[2810]them, nor in Hedgman's character to raise a question about that
[2811]testimony. (O'Donnell) regarded Hedgman as "an honest and a decent
[2812]man" (O'Donnel), 9/11/75, p. 19) -- “a totally truthful man"
[2813](O'Donnel), 9/11/75, p. 56). .
[2815]Docld:32202487 Page 61
[2823]My feeling definitely is that it was for a
[2824]specific purpose, and was just not an all-
[2825]purpose capability there begin held for tar-
[2826]gets of opportunity, unspecified targets.
[2827](O'Donnel 9/11/75, p. 49.)
[2829]At several points, (0'Donnel}) stated that he did not think that
[2830]Lumumba was the target specified for the use of the virus (0'Donne11)
[2832]6/9/75, p. 17; 9/11/75, p. 48). But he allowed for that possibility:
[2834]I supposed it was for a lethal operation, very
[2835]possibly Lumumba, but very. possibly in connec-
[2836]tion with other people. (O'Donnell), 6/9/75,
[2837]p. 24; accord. 6/9/75, p. 17.)
[2839]His final word on the subject was that he assumed that the “specific
[2840]f
[2841]purpose" of the virus was the assassination of Lumumba (0'Donne11)
[2843]9/11/75, p. 50).
[2845](¢"Donnett) said that the (Chief of\Station never indicated that
[2847]f
[2848]f
[2850]~@'Donnelt\was to employ the virus (O'Donnell; 9/11/75, p. 52). In
[2852]5
[2855]fact, (0'DonneLy testified that Hedgman "never discussed his assassi-
[2856]nation effort, he never even indicated that this was one." (6'Donne1})
[2858]9/11/75, p. 54.)
[2860]While Hedgman has no direct recollection of discussing his
[2861]assassination operation with-(0'Donne11), he "assumed" that he had
[2862]at least discussed with (O'Donnell) the problem of gaining access to
[2863]Lumumba for the purpose o£ assassinating him (Hedgman, 8/21/75,
[2865]/ 5
[2866]pp. 55, 60). (0'Donnell} testified, however, that because he was
[2868]"morally opposed to assassination" he would “absolutely not" have
[2870]HY 50955 Docld: 32202467 Page 62
[2874]explored the means by which such access could be gained, nor would
[2875]he have undertaken a mission to the Congo if it involved assess-
[2876]ment of the situation for an assassination operation by someone
[2877]else (O'Donnell), 9/11/75, p. 26).
[2879](0'Donneti) was "sure" that he "related everything" to Medgman
[2880]about his conversations with Bissell concerning the assassination
[2882]f . .
[2883]of Lumumba (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 46). Hedgman, however, had no
[2885]recollection of learning this from ('Donnet) (iedgnan 8/21/75,
[2886]p. 56).
[2887]Beyond this, (0 'Donnell) said that his discussions of assassi-
[2889]nation with Hedgman were general and philosophical, dealing with
[2891]“the morality of assassinations" (© 'Donnet}) 9/11/75, pp. 46, 54):
[2893]From my point of view I told him I had
[2894]“ee moral objections to it, not just qualms,
[2895]but objections. I didn't think it, was
[2896]the right thing to do. ()'Donnel),
[2897]9/11/75, p. 9). ‘
[2899]Cc,
[2902]When asked to characterize Hedgman's attitude toward assassination
[2904]based on those discussions, |0' Donnell) said:
[2906]Io will answer your question just as fairly
[2907]and as scrupulously as I-can. I have a
[2909]great deal of respect for Hedgman. And if
[2911]he said something, I would believe him to
[2913]be speaking the truth as he knew it without
[2914]shading it.... The best I could say, I.
[2915]think, would be this, that he would not have
[2916]been opposed in principle to assassination in
[2917]the interests of national security.... I
[2918]know that he is a man of preat moral per-
[2919]ception and decency and honor, and so forth.
[2920]And that it would disturb him to be engaged in
[2921]something like that. But I think I would
[2922]have to say that in our conversations, my
[2924]- memory of those, at no time would he rule it:
[2925]f° ' out as being a possibility. (O'Donnell)
[2927]* 9/11/75, p. 18.) \ !
[2929]HW 50955 Docld:32202487 Page 63
[2933],
[2935]- (v) (o'Donne11\ Planned to "Neutralize" Lumumba by Turnin
[2937]( : Him Over ‘to Congolese Authorities and Requested the
[2939]~ Assignment of Agent OJWIW to Leopoldville as His
[2940]Alter Ego
[2942]After Gustin O'Donnel) arrived in the Congo, he formu-
[2943]lated a plan for "neutralizing" Lumumba by drawing him away from
[2945]the custody of the UN force which was guarding his residence:
[2947](0'Donneti): {[W]hat I wanted to do was to
[2948]“get him out, to trick him out, if I could,
[2949]and then turn him over ... to the-legal
[2950]authorities and let him stand trial. Be-
[2952]cause he had atrocity attributed to him for
[2953]which he could very well stand trial.
[2955]Q: And for which he could very well have
[2959]received capital punishment?
[2961](o:DonneL I} Yes. And I am not opposed to
[2962].capital punishment. (@'Donnely, 9/11/75,
[2963]pp. 20-21.)* 7 4
[2965]To implement his plan, b'Donne1}) made arrangements to rent "an ob-
[2966]an
[2968]servation post over the palace in which Lumumba was safely ensconced"
[2970]* According to an earlier report from the Cnies of) Station, it
[2971]was the view of the Special Representative of the Secretary General
[2972]of the United Nations that arrest by Congolese authorities was /‘JUST
[2973]A TRICK TO ASSASSINATE LUMUMBA" (CIA Cable Leop . . Chief
[2974]of)Station to Director, 10/11/60). The (Chief of) Station proceeded
[2975]to recommend Lumumba's arrest in the same cable:’ ;
[2977]STATION HAS CONSISTENTLY URGED [CONGOLESE] LEADERS
[2978]ARREST LUMUMBA IN BELIEF LUMUMBA WILL CONTINUE BE
[2979]THREAT TO STABILITY CONGO UNTIL REMOVED FROM
[2980]SCENE (CIA Cable, 10/11/60).
[2982]HY 50955 Doecld: 322024687 Page 64
[2984]“™.
[2986]HW 50955
[2990](' Donnell} 6/9/75, p. 20).* (Donnell) also "spotted" a member
[2991]of the UN guard and made his acquaintance to recruit him for an
[2992]attempt to lure Lumumba outside UN protective custody (@'Donnet¥)
[2993]6/9/75, p. 20; 9/11/75, p. 21). ;
[2995](o'Donnei} said that he cabled progress reports on his plan to
[2997]CIA headquarters (0'DonneLY), 9/11/75, p. 26). We also said that
[3001]he informed the (Chief of Station about his plan (6 'Donnet}), 9/11/75
[3002]5 58). . / Ok -
[3004]In connection with his effort to draw Lumumba out of UN cus-
[3005]tody, (O'Donnell Jarranged for a CIA agent, whose code name was
[3009]QJIWIN, to come to the Congo to work -with him ('Donne1)), 9/11/75,
[3010]p. 19):
[3012]What I wanted to use him for was .
[3013]counter-espionage[.]... I had to screen
[3014]the U.S. participation in this ..; by
[3015]using a foreign national whom we knew,
[3016]trusted, and had worked with ... the
[3017]idea was for me to use him as an alter
[3018]efzo. (O'Donnell) Tr., pp. 19-20.) ©
[3020]In mid-November, two cables from Leopoldville urged CIA head-
[3021]f
[3022]quarters to send QJWIN as soon as possible (CIA Cable EN 41261),
[3023]Leopoldville to Director, 11/11/60) with this message:
[3024]LOCAL OPERATIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRE
[3025]IMMEDIATE EXPEDITION OF QJWIN TRAVEL TO
[3027]LEOPOLDVEILLE. (CIA Cable IN 41556),
[3028]Leopoldville to Director, 11/13/60.)
[3030]* A cable from the (Chief of) Station to Tweedy in mid-November
[3032]reported that the double guard of United Nations and Congolese
[3033]troops around Lumumba's residence thwarted this plan: "CONCENTRIC
[3034]RINGS OF DEFENSE MAKE ESTABLISHMENT OF OBSERVATION POST IMPOSSIBLE"
[3035](CIA Cable (IN 42478), (Chief of) Station to Tweedy, 11/14/60) .
[3037]Doclda: 3227027487 Page 65
[3043]The cables contained no exploration of this sense of urgency about
[3045]the "operational circumstances."
[3047](b) Agent QJWIN's Mission in the Congo: November~-December
[3048]T
[3050]QUWIN was a foreign citizen with a criminal background,
[3051]recruited in Europe (Memorandum to CIA Finance Division, Re:
[3052]Payments to QJWIN, 1/31/61), and supervised by CIA officer (mien
[3053]Silwciny In November 1960, at(0'DonnelI)'s request (O'Donnel), 6/9/75,
[3057]p. 19), agent QJWIN was dispatched to the Congo by (Qiliyes to under-
[3059]take a mission that "might involve a large element of personal risk."
[3061](CIA Cable/IN 36814, 11/2/60.)*
[3063]_
[3065]A dispatch from the CIA headquarters on his pending trip
[3066]to Africa made clear the high degree of sensitivity accorded to
[3068]his mission:
[3070]In view of the extreme sensitivity of the ob-
[3071]jective for which we want him to perform his
[3072]task, he was not told precisely what we want
[3073]him to do.... Instead, he was told ... that
[3074]we would like to have him spot, assess, and
[3075]recommend some dependable, quick-witted
[3076]persons for our use.... It was thought best
[3077]to withhold our true, specific requirements
[3078]pending the fina] cision to use [him].
[3080](CIA Dispatch, QR 147, 11/2/60.)
[3082]* Part of the purpose in dispatching QJWIN to Africa was to-
[3083]send him from the Congo to another African country for an unspeci-
[3084]fied mission. QJWIN's mission to this country is not explained
[3085]in the cable traffic between CIA headquarters and the various sta-
[3086]tions that dealt with him.
[3088]There is no indication in CIA files as to whether QJWIN com-
[3089]pleted this mission. (O'Donnell) said he had no knowledge of any
[3090]mission that would have taken QJWIN to this country ( ‘Donnell,
[3091]9/11/75, pp. 32-33). Ne
[3093]0955 Docld: 32202467 Page 66 . se
[3095]Nine
[3099]This message itself was deemed too sensitive to be retained
[3100]at the station: ‘this dispatch should be reduced to eryptic
[3101]necessary notes and destroyed after the first reading." (CIA
[3103]2
[3104]Dispatch, (ER 147, 11/2/60.)
[3106]QJWIN arrived in Leopoldville on November 21, 1960 (CIA Cable
[3108]f *
[3109]{TH 49486; 11/29/60) and returned to Europe in late December 1960
[3111](CIA Cable (QUT 54710), Director to Leopoldville, 12/9/60).
[3112]The CIA Inspector General's Report said that QIWIit
[3113]i o>
[3114]had been recruited earlier eRArmold Dives
[3115]for use in a special operation in the Congo
[3117]{the assassination of Patrice Lumumba] to be
[3118]run by(Justin O'Donnel. (I.G. Report, p. 38.)
[3122]However, both (0'Donnet) and Bissell testified that (O'Donnel) re-
[3123]fused to be associated with an assassination operation.* Instead,
[3124](0’Donnei1) said he went to the Congo to attempt to snatch Lumumba
[3125]from the protective custody of the U.N. guard and place him in
[3127]the hands of the Congolese army. @'Donnety), 6/9/75, pp. 13-14,
[3129]37.)
[3130]f “
[3131]According to (O'Donnel), QJWIN was a man who was capable of
[3133]undertaking an assassination mission:
[3135](o'Donnel?: ... I would say that he would not
[3137]‘be a man of many scruples.
[3139]Q: So he was a man capable of doing anything?
[3140](o'Donnel): I would think so, yes.
[3141]Q: “and that would include assassination?
[3142](0'Donnel)): I would think so.
[3143](O'Donnel), 9/11/75, pp. 35-36.)
[3145]% See Sections 5(a)(ii) and 5(a)(iii) above.
[3147]Docla: 32202487 Page 67 . . .
[3152]( But (0' Donnell) had no knowledge that QJNIN was ever used for an
[3153], assassination mission (p' Donnel), 9/11/75, pp. 36, 42).
[3154]fo" ‘Donne1l) said that, as far as he knew, he was the only CIA
[3155]officer with supervisory responsibility for QJWIN and QJWIN did
[3156]not report independently to anyone else (0'Donnel}), 9/11/75, p. 28).
[3157]When asked if it was possible pas QJWIN had a mission independent
[3158]of that he was performing for 6: Donnell), he said:
[3159](0'Donnel i: Yes, that is possible -- or
[3160]Tt “could have been that somebody contacted
[3161]him after he got down there, that they
[3162]wanted him to do something along the lines
[3163]‘of assassination. I don' E know. e 9"DonneL
[3164]9/11/75, p. 29.)
[3165]But he discounted this possibility as “highly unlikely” because it
[3167]would be a departure from standard CIA practice -- placing an agent
[3169]officer 6" ‘Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 29).
[3171]Despite 0" Donnell''s doubt that QJWIN had an independent line
[3172]of responsibility to the Chief of) Station, a cable of November 29
[3173]shows that Hedgman was aware of WIN's activities.
[3175]In that cable, the Chief of) Station reported through the PROP
[3176]channel to Tweedy that QJWIN had begun implementation of a plan to
[3177]“PIERCE BOTH CONGOLESE AND UN GUARDS" to enter Lumumba 's residence
[3178]and ''PROVIDE ESCORT OUT OF RESIDENCE" (CIA cable (tN 49486) (Chief
[3179]of) Station to Tweedy, 11/29/60). (0" Donne11) said that he had directed
[3181]- QJWIN to make ‘the acquaintanceship of the member of the UN force
[3183]whose help he sought for the plan to snatch Lumumba from UN custody
[3185]HW 50955 DocId: 32202487 Page 68
[3187]ina position of knowledge superior to that of his supervising -
[3191](9 ‘Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 21). But Lumumba had left UN custody at
[3192]this point to travel toward his stronghold at Stanleyville. This
[3193]did not deter QJWIN:
[3195]VIEW CHANGE IN LOCATION TARGET, QJWIN
[3197]ANXIOUS GO STANLEYVILLE AND EXPRESSED
[3199]DESIRE EXECUTE PLAN BY HIMSELF WITHOUT
[3201]USING ANY APPARAT (CIA Cable, 11/29/60).
[3202]It is unclear whether this latter "plan" contemplated assassina-
[3203]tion as well as abduction. An affirmative xeply from headquarters
[3204]came through the PROP channel the next day which was also suscep-
[3205]tible of interpretation as an assassination order:
[3207]CONCUR QJWIN GO STANLEYVILLE.... WE ARE
[3209]PREPARED CONSIDER DIRECT ACTION BY QJIWIN
[3211]BUT WOULD LIKE YOUR READING OW SECURITY
[3213]FACTORS. HOW CLOSE WOULD THIS PLACE [UNITED
[3215]STATES] TO THE ACTION? (CIA Cable QUT 98314)
[3217]Chief of Africa Division to €hief of)Station,
[3219]11/30/60.) . :
[3221](o'Donne1}) said that agent QJWIN's stay in the Congo was "co-
[3222]extensive with my own, allowing for the fact that he came after I
[3223]did." 6" Donne1y), 6/9/75, p. 19.) (0'Donnely said he left the
[3224]Congo around the time of Lumumba's death in Katanga at the hands
[3225]of Congolese authorities. ‘Donnell, p. 20.) QJUWIN left in
[3226]December shortly after Lumumba was captured by the Congolese army.
[3228]In a memorandum to arrange the accounting for QJWIN's activities
[3229]in the Congo, William K. Harvey -- under whom ('Donne1}) had worked
[3230]- before being detached for assignment to the Congo -- noted the
[3232]success of QJWIN's mission: "QJWIN was sent on this trip for a
[3234]HY 50955 Docld: 32202467 Page 69
[3236]-~71L-
[3238]( specific, highly sensitive operational purpose which has been
[3239]completed"! (Memorandum for Finance Division from William K. Harvey,
[3240]1/11/61). (0'Donnelt) explained Harvey's reference to the fact that
[3241]QJWIN's inission had been "completed" by saying that once Lumumba
[3242]was in the hands of the Congolese authorities "the reason for
[3243]the mounting of the project ... had become moot" (P'Donnel1),
[3244]9/11/75, p. 35). When asked if he and QJWIN were responsible for
[3245]Lumumba's departure from UN custody and subsequent capture, (' Donne11°
[3246]said: ‘Absolutely not" p" Donnel, 9/11/75, p. 35). Harvey did not
[3247]recall the meaning of the memorandum, but he assumed that (0' Donnell) s
[3248]return from the Congo constituted the "completion" of QUJWIN's
[3250]mission (Harvey, affidavit, p. ).
[3252]Despite the indication in the Inspector General's Report that
[3254],
[3256]Neate QJIWIN may have been recruited initially for an assassination mission
[3257]and the suggestive language of the cables at the end of November,
[3258]there is no clear evidence that QJWIM was actually involved in any
[3259]assassination plan or attempt. The CIA officers who were involved
[3260]in or knowledgeable of an assassination plot against Lumumba gave
[3262]_ no testimony that tended to show that QJWIN was related to that plot.
[3264]The (Chief of \Station had a "vague recollection" that QJWIN
[3265]was in the Congo working for (Justin O'Donnell). (Hedgman, 8/21/75,
[3266]p. 95.) But Hedgman did not recall why QJWIN was in the Congo. |
[3267](Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 95.) QJWIN was not a major operative of
[3268]Hedgman's. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 95.) Richard Bissell and Bronson
[3270]Tweedy did not recall anything about QJWIN's mission in the Congo
[3272]HY 50955 Docld: 32202467 Page 70
[3274]C
[3276]HW 50955 Docld:32202467 Page 7il
[3278]infra; on the "Executive Action Capability."
[3280]-~-72-
[3282](Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 54-57; Tweedy, 9/9/75, pp. 54, 61).
[3283]William Harvey, from whose division QJWIN was on loan for
[3284]his Congo assignment, had no specific knowledge of WIN's activities
[3286]in the Congo:
[3288]I was kept informed of the arrangements for
[3289]QJWIN's trip to the Congo and, subsequently,
[3291]of his presence in the Congo. I do not know |
[3292]specifically what QJWIN did in the Congo, . I
[3293]do not think that I ever had such knowledge....
[3294]If QJWIN were to be used on an assassination -
[3295]mission, it would have been cleared with me,
[3297]I was never informed that he was to be used
[3298]for such a mission. (Harvey affidavit, p. )
[3300]He stated that (Wanokl sien probably wrote the memoranda con-
[3301]cerning QJWIN and submitted them for HARVEY's signature (Ilarvey
[3302]affidavit, p. >.
[3303](c) QJWIN's Connection to Project ZRRIFLE
[3305]After leaving the Congo in early 1961, QUWIN was used by
[3306]CIA officer William Harvey as the principal asset in Project ZRRIFLE,
[3307]a project which included research into a capability to assassinate
[3308]foreign leaders.* QJWIN's role in Project ZRRIFLE was to "SPOT"
[3309]figures of the European underworld who could be utilized as agents
[3310]by the CIA if required. Harvey stated that before the formation
[3312]of Project ZRRIFLE:
[3314]* For a full treatment of Project ZRRIFLE, see Section
[3318](Sees wker had not previously used .
[3319]IWIN as an assassination capability or
[3321]even viewed him as such. (Harvey affi-
[3323]davit, p.
[3324]Although Harvey also had discussions with (Sidney Gottlieb) in connec-
[3325]tion with Project ZRRIFLE, he believed that Gottlieb) never mentioned
[3326]to him either QJWIN's activities in the Congo or Cottlieb)'s own
[3327]trip to Leopoldville (Harvey affidavit, Pp. ). Harvey had con-—
[3328]sulted with seminal Sililweny
[3330](Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 52).
[3332]about the initiation of Project ZRRIFLE
[3334]The Chief of} Station in Leopoldville testified that he had
[3335]never heard of Project ZRRIFLE, nor was he aware of any CIA project
[3336]to develop the capability of assassinating. foreign Leaders.
[3337](Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 93.) Furthermore, Hedgman said that he was
[3339](cor “quite certain" that he never discussed assassination capabilities
[3340]or assets with Harvey at any time. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 95.)
[3342]ZY
[3343]SHbivergpcame to the Congo on a counter-
[3345]Hedgman testified that (ignore
[3346]intelligence mission during his tenure, but they did not discuss
[3347]the plan to assassinate Lumumba. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 92.)
[3349]An interesting note on the value accorded Qawin by the CIA.
[3350]and the inherent predicament for an intelligence agency that emp loys
[3351]Ann ord! Dies)
[3352]in 1962, The CIA had learned that QJWIN was about to go on trial
[3354]hoodlums is found in a cable from CIA headquarters tof
[3356]in Europe on smugg Ling charges. The cable suggested:
[3358]IF ... INFOR TRUE WE MAY WISIl ATTEMPT QUASII
[3360]CHARGES OR ARRANGE SOMEHOW SALVAGE QJWIN .FOR
[3362]OUR PURPOSES. (CIA Cable (OUT 73943), 4/18/62.)
[3365]$5 Docld: 32202487 Page 72
[3367]Nee
[3369]HY 50955
[3373](d) Agent QJWIN Was Asked By Hedeman's Operative WIROCUE
[3374]to Join an "Execution Squad”; December 1960
[3376]The one incident where there is an explicit reference to
[3377]assassination in connection with QJWIN involved his contact with
[3378]WIROGUE, another asset of the Congo station.
[3380]WEIROGUE was an "essentially stateless" European) who was
[3381]"a forger and former bank robber" fana had‘ fought with the French
[3382]Foreign Legion] (Inspector General Memorandum, 3/14/75.) He was
[3383]sent to che Congo after being given plastic surgery and a toupee
[3384]by the CIA so that he would not be recognized by Europeans traveling
[3385]through the Congo. (I1.G. Memorandum, 3/14/75.) WIROGUE was
[3387]assessed by the CIA as a man who "LEARNS QUICKLY AND CARRIES OUT
[3389]ANY ASSIGNMENT WITHOUT REGARD FOR DANGER" (CIA Cable (ou 865544
[3391]Africa Division to Leopoldville, 10/27/60).
[3393]The niet of) Station described WIROGE as "a man with a
[3394]rather unsavory reputation, who would try anything once, at least."
[3395](Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 96.) Hedgman used him as "a general utility
[3396]agent" because "I felt we needed surveillance capability, develop-
[3397]ing new contacts, various things." (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 96,)
[3398]liedgman supervised WEROGUE directly. and did not put WIROGUE in
[3399]touch with Justin O'Donnel), (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 97.)
[3401]A report on agent WIROGUE, prepared for the CIA Inspector
[3402]General's office in 1975, described the training and tasking he
[3404]received:
[3406]Docldad: 3227027457 Page 73 : . foe
[3410]( On 19 September 1960 two members of Africa
[3411]MS Division met with him to discuss "an opera-
[3413].tional assignment in Africa Division." a
[3415]connection with this assignment, WIROG /l
[3417]was to be trained in demolitions, small arms,
[3419]and medical immunization.... In October 1960
[3421]a cable to Leopoldville stated that ,
[3423]Headquarters [had] ... intent to use him as
[3425]utility agent in order to "(a) organize and
[3427]conduct a surveillance team; (b) intercept
[3429]packages; (c) blow up bridges; and (d) execute -
[3431]other assignments requiring positive action.
[3433]His utilization is not to be restricted to
[3435]Leopoldville." (I.G. Memorandu, 3/14/75.)
[3437]WIROGUE made his initial contact with Hedgman in Leopoldville on
[3438]December 2, 1960 (CIA Cable (Gn 18739) 12/17/60). He was given two
[3439]instructions by Hedgman: (1) to "build cover during initial period;"
[3440]and (2) to “spot persons for [a] surveillance team" of intelligence
[3442]assets in the province where Lumumba's support was strongest. (CIA
[3444]Cable fix 18739), 12/17/60.)
[3446]Soon after receiving these instructions, agent WIROGUE approached
[3447]QJWIN and asked him to join an "execution squad." This incident is
[3448]described by Leopoldville (Chief of) Station’ Hedgman in a cable to
[3449]CIA headquarters (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 99):
[3451]JWIN WHO RESIDES SAME HOTEL AS WIROGUE REPORTED |
[3452]LATTER TOLD HIM HE HAD LIVED ALASKA, AN, SOUTH |
[3453]AMERICA, GERMANY AND OTHER PARTS EUROP QIWIN
[3454]SAID WIROGUE SMELLED AS THOUGH HE IN INTEL BUSINESS,
[3455]STATION DENIED ANY INFO ON WIROGUE. 14 DEC QJIWIN
[3456]REPORTED WIROGUE HAD OFFERED HIM THREE HUNDRED DOLLARS
[3457]PER MONTH TO PARTICIPATE IN INTEL NET AND BE MEMBER
[3458]“EXECUTION SQUAD.'' WHEN QJWIN SAID HE NOT INTERESTED,
[3459]WIROGUE ADDED THERE WOULD BE BONUSES FOR SPECIAL JOBS.
[3460]UNDER QJWIN QUESTIONING, WIROGUE LATER SAID HE WORK-
[3462]_ INF FOR [AMERICAN] SERVICE.
[3464]. IN DISCUSSING LOCAL CONTACTS, WIROGUE MENTLONED
[3465]“ QJWIN BUT DID NOT ADMIT TO HAVING TRIED RECRUIT HIM.
[3466]( THEN. [CHIEF OF STATION] TRIED LEARN WHETHER WIROGUE
[3467]; HAD MADE APPROACH LATTER CLAIMED HAD TAKEN NO STEPS.
[3468](CHIEF OF STATION] WAS UNABLE CONTRADICT, AS DID NOT
[3469]WISH REVEAL QJWIN CONNECTION [CIA]. (CIA Cable,
[3470]MW 50955 Docla:32202se9p@hgvthle to Director, 12/17, 60.) o
[3474]( The cable also expressed Hedgman's concern about WIROGUE's
[3476]actions:
[3478]. LEOP CONCERNED BY WIROGUE FREE WHEELING
[3479]AND LACK SECURITY. STATION HAS ENOUGH HEAD-
[3480]ACHES WITHOUT WORRYING ABOUT AGENT WHO HOT
[3481]ABLE HANDLE FINANCES AND WHO NOT WILLING
[3482]FOLLOW LHSTRUCTIONS. IF HQS DESIRES, WILLING
[3483]KEEP HIM ON PROBATION, BUT IF CONTINUE HAVE
[3484]DIFFICULTIES, BELIEVE WIROGUE RECALL BEST
[3485]SOLUTION. (CIA Cable, Leopoldville to Director,
[3487]12/17/60.)
[3489]WIROGUE's attempt to recruit QJWIN for an execution squad is
[3490]explained by Hedgman as a mistake and by the actions of QJWIN as
[3491]an unauthorized, unexpected contact which he did not initiate.
[3493]f
[3494]The Chief of) Station testified that he had not instructed
[3497]WIROGUE to make this kind of proposition to QJWIN or anyone else.
[3499]“oo
[3501]sn (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 100.) He added:
[3503]I would like to stress that I don't know what
[3504]WIROGUE was talking about as a[n] "execution
[3505]squad," and I am sure he was never tasked to
[3507]go out and execute anyone. (Hedgman, 8/21/75,
[3508]p. 100.)
[3510]Hedgman suggested that WLROGUE may have concocted the idea of an
[3512]execution squad:
[3514]His idea of what an intelligence operative
[3515]should do, I think, had been gathered by
[3516]reading a few novels or something of the
[3517]sort. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 100.)
[3518]Gustin O'Donnell) had no knowledge of an attempt by anyone
[3520]connected to the CIA to recruit an execution squad and no recollec-
[3522]HW 50955 Doecld: 32202467 Page 75
[3526]( tion of WIROGUE 6" Donne1}) 9/11/75; pp: 39-42). (0'Donnetl} men-
[3527]| tioned that agent QJWIN was considered for use on a “strong arm
[3528]squad," but said that this was for purposes more general than
[3530]. . )
[3531]assassinations: .
[3533]surveillance teams where you have to go
[3534]into crime areas ... where you need a
[3535]fellow that if he gets in a box can fight
[3536]his way out of it. (O'Donnel) 9/11/75,
[3537]p. 36). \ J
[3539]Richard Bissell recalled nothing of the WIROUGE approach to
[3540]QJWIN (Bissell, 9/11/75, p. 71). Bronson Tweedy did recall that
[3541]WIROGUE was "dispatched on a general purpose mission" to the Congo
[3542](Tweedy, 9/9/75, p. 63). But Tweedy testified that WIROGUE would
[3543]“absolutely not" have been used on an assassination mission against
[3544]Lumumba because “he was basically dispatched, assessed and dealt
[3545]with by the balance of the Division" rather than by the two people
[3546]in the Africa Division -- Tweedy himself and his deputy Glenn
[3547]Fields ->) who would have known that the assassination of Lumumba
[3548]was being considered (Tweedy, 9/9/75, pp. 64-65).
[3550]The (Chief of Station said that if the WIROGUE incident was
[3551]connected to an actual assassination plan, he would have transmitted
[3552]a message in a more narrowly restricted channel than that in which
[3553]this cable was sent. His cable on WIROGUE's approach to QJWIN was
[3554]sent to headquarters with a security designation that allowed much
[3555]wider distribution than the PROP cables that he ‘sent and received
[3556]concerning the Goterier) assassination assignment. (Hedgman, 8/21/75,
[3558]p. 102.) In contrast, he limited distribution of the cable about
[3560]HY 50955 Docld:32202467 Page 176 : : -
[3564]‘a WIROGUE only as a CIA officer would “normally do ... when you
[3565]speak in a derogatory manner of an asset." (Hedgman, 8/21/75,
[3566]p. 101) .
[3568]The Chief of) Station Maintained that WIROGUE's proposition
[3569]to QJWIN to join an “execution squad" could be attributed to.
[3570]WIROGUE's "freewheeling" nature. Hedgman said:
[3572]I had difficulty controlling him in that he
[3573]was not a professional intelligence officer
[3574]as such. le seemed to act on his owm without
[3575]seeking guidance or authority ... I found
[3577]he was rather an unguided missile ... the
[3578]kind of man that could get you in trouble: be-
[3580]fore you knew you were in trouble..
[3581](Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 96-97).
[3583]But Hedgman did not disavow all responsibility for WIROGUE's actions:
[3585]Ce {I}£ you give a man an order and he carries it
[3586]id 2
[3587]out and causes a problem for the Station, why
[3588]then as (Chief of) Station, well, you accept
[3590]responsibility.“ (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pb. 97.)
[3592]In sum, the niet of) Station testified that despite the fact
[3593]that the CIA was interested in the assassination of Lumumba during
[3594]this. period, agent WIROGUE's attempt to form an “execution squad"
[3595]was an unauthorized, maverick action, unconnected to the CIA. assassi-
[3596]nation plan.
[3598]Nonetheless, the fact that WIROGUE was to be trained in “medical
[3599]immunization" (1.G. Memorandum, 3/14/75) raises the possibility ,
[3600]that he was connected to the plot to assassinate Lunumba by means
[3602]of lethal biological substances. The 1975 report on WIROGUE’s case
[3604]HY 50955 Doclda: 32202487 Page Tf? . -
[3610]by the Inspector General's office leaves this question open. The
[3611]report concludes with the statement that "WIROGUE/1 spent most of
[3612]his time trying to develop contacts and was not directly involved
[3613]in any particular operation." (I.G. Memorandum, 3/14/75.) But,
[3614]when the report was circulated in the Inspector General's office,
[3615]the following comment was handwritten by Scott Breckinridge, one
[3617]of the principal authors of the 1967 report on CIA involvement in
[3619]assassination attempts: "ROGUE's pitch is too clear to be dis-
[3620]carded out of hand as ‘exceeding instructions.'" (1.G. Memorandum,
[3621]3/14/75)
[3623]6. The Question of Whether the CIA Was Involved in Bringing
[3624]About Lumumba’s Death in Katanga
[3626]There is no direct evidence of CIA involvement in bring-
[3627]ing about Lumumba's death in Katanga. The CIA officers most closely
[3628]connected to the plot to poison Lumumba testified uniformly that
[3629]they knew of no CIA involvement in Lumumba 's death.
[3631](a) Lumumba's Escape from UN Custod , Capture b
[3633]Congolese Army, and Imprisonment ae Thyeit [te
[3637]The strongest hint that the CIA may have been involved
[3638]in the capture of Lumumba by Mobutu's troops after his departure
[3639]from UN custody on November 27, was contained in a PROP cable from’
[3640]the Chiet of) Station to Tweedy on November 14 (CIA Cable IN 42478,
[3641](Chief of) Station to Tweedy, 11/14/60). In the cable, Hedeman re-
[3642]ported that an agent of his had learned that Lumumba's
[3644]POLITICAL FOLLOWERS IN STANLEYVILLE DESIRE THAT
[3646]HE BREAK OUT OF HIS CONFINEMENT AND PROCEED TO
[3648]THAT CITY BY CAR TO ENGAGE IN POLITICAL ACTIVITY.
[3649](CIA Cable, 11/14/60.)
[3651]HY 50955 Docld: 32202467 Page 78
[3653]HY 50955
[3657]The €nief of) Station was confident that he would have foreknowledge
[3658]of Lumumba's departure and that action plans were prepared for that
[3660]eventuality:
[3662]DECISION Oi] BREAKOUT WILL PROBABLY BE MADE
[3664]SHORTLY. STATION EXPECTS TO BE ADVISED BY
[3666][AGENT] OF DECISION WHEW MADE.... STATION
[3668]HAS SEVERAL POSSIBLE ASSETS TO USE IN EVENT . -
[3669]OF BREAKOUT AND STUDYING SEVERAL PLANS OF
[3671]ACTION. (CIA Cable, 11/14/60.)
[3673]There is no other evidence, however, that the CIA actually
[3674]gained prior knowledge of Lumumba‘s plan to depart for Stanleyville.
[3675]In fact, a cable from Leopoldville on the day after Lumumba's
[3676]escape betrays the station's complete ignorance about the circum-
[3677]stances of Lumumba's departure (CIA Cable bes 48484), Leopoldville
[3678]to Director, 11/28/60). . |
[3680]But the same cable raises at least a question as to whether
[3682]the CIA was involved in the capture of Lumumba enroute by Congolese
[3684]troops:
[3686]{STATION] WORKING WITH [CONGOLESE GOVERNMENT ]
[3687]TO GET ROADS BLOCKED AND TROOPS ALERTED .
[3688][BLOCK] POSSIBLE. ESCAPE ROUTE. (CIA Cable,
[3689]11/28/60.)
[3691]A cable of December 2 reporting Lumumba's capture militates
[3692]against CIA involvement, however, because it portrays the Conpolese
[3693]forces as the source of the station's information (CIA cable (tN 10643;
[3694]Leopoldville to Director, 12/3/60).
[3696]The (Chief of) Station testified that he was "quite certain that
[3698]there was no Agency involvement in any way" in Lumumba's departure
[3700]Doclda: 322024687 Page 79 - : Loe
[3702]HW 50955 Docld:32202467 Page 60
[3706]from Uil custody and that he had no foreknowledge of Lumumba's
[3708]plan (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 63-64). He stated that he consulted
[3710]with Congolese officers about the possible routes Lumumba might
[3712]take to Stanleyville, but he was "not a major assistance" in track-
[3714]ing down Lumumba prior to his capture (lledgman, 8/21/75, p. 65).
[3715]Despite the fact that (O'Donnel) had planned to draw Lumumba
[3717]out of UN custody and turn him over to Congolese authorities, he
[3719]insisted that Lumumba escaped by his own devices and was not tricked
[3721]by the CIA ($" Donel) 9/11/75, p. 22).
[3723](b) Transfer of Lumumba to Katanga Where He Was Killed:
[3724]January I7, L966
[3726]The contemporaneous cable traffic shows that the CIA was
[3727]kept informed of Lumumba's condition and movements in January of
[3728]1961 by the Congolese and that the CIA still considered Lumumba
[3730]a serious political threat. But there is no direct evidence of
[3732]CIA involvement in bringing about Lumumba's death in Katanga.
[3734]* Excerpts from cable traffic of January 1961 and from the
[3735]testimony of CIA officers Hedgman, Tweedy, (O'Donnell,) and Helms
[3736](investigative report) should be inserted. \ °
[3738]HW 50955
[3742]Group
[3743]agreed that planning for the Congo would not necessarily
[3744]rule out "consideration" of any particular kind of ac-
[3745]tivity which might contribute to getting rid of Lumumba.
[3746](Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 25 August 1960)
[3747]The next day CIA Director Allen Dulles, who had attended the Special
[3748]Group meeting, personally cabled to the Chief of) Station in Leopold-
[3749]ville that Lumumba's "REMOVAL MUST BE AN URGENT AND PRIME OBJECTIVE
[3750]. A HIGH PRIORITY OF OUR COVERT ACTION' (CIA Cable our 62966)
[3751]Dulles to Leopoldville, 8/26/60). Dulles added: “YOU .CAN ACT ON
[3752]YOUR OWN AUTHORITY WHERE TIME DOES NOT PERMIT REFERRAL HERE."
[3753]Although the Dulles cable does not explicitly mention assassina-
[3754]tion, Richard Bissell -- the CIA official under whose aegis the as-
[3755]sassination effort against Lumumba took place -- testified that, in
[3756]his opinion, this cable was a direct outgrowth of the Special Group
[3757]meeting and signaled to him that the President had authorized assas-
[3758]Sination as one means of removing Lumumba (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 33-
[3759]34, 61-62; see Section. 7(c), infra). Bronson Tweedy, who bore the
[3760]primary administrative responsibility for activities against Lumumba,
[3761]testified that the Dulles cable confirmed the policy that no measure,
[3762]including assassination, was to be overlooked in the attempt to re-
[3763]move Lumumba from a position of influence (Tweedy, 10/9/75, pp. 4-5).
[3764]On September 19, 1960, Bissell and Tweedy cabled the (Chief of).
[3766]Station to expect a messenger from CIA headquarters. Two days later,
[3768]in the presence of the President at a meeting of the National Security
[3770]Bocld: 322024387 Page 31
[3772]Council, Allen Dulles stated that Lumumba "would remain a grave
[3773]danger as long as he was not yet disposed of" (Memorandum, 460th
[3774]NSC Meeting, 9/21/60). Five days after this meeting, a CIA scien-
[3775]tist arrived in Leopoldville and provided the (hiet of) Station
[3776]with lethal biological substances, instructed him to assassinate
[3777]Lumumba, and informed him that the President had authorized this
[3778]operation.
[3780]Two mitigating factors weaken this chain just enough so that
[3781]it will not support an absolute finding of Presidential authoriza-
[3782]tion for the assassination effort against Lumumba.
[3784]First, the two officials of the Eisenhower Administration re-
[3785]sponsible to the President for national security affairs testified
[3786]( - that they knew of no Presidential approval for, or knowledge of, an
[3787]; assassination plot.
[3789]Second, the minutes of discussions at meetings of the National
[3790]Security Council and its Special Group do not record an explicit
[3791]Presidential order for the assassination of Lumumba. The Secretary
[3792]of the Special Group maintained that his memoranda reflect the ac-
[3793]tual language used at the meetings without omission or euphemism
[3794]for extremely sensitive statements (Parrott, 7/10/75, pp. 18-19).
[3795]NSC staff executives stated, however, that there was a strong pos-
[3796]sibility that a statement as sensitive as an assassination order
[3797]would have been omitted from the record or handled by means of euphe-
[3799]mism. Several high Government officials involved in policy-making
[3801]HY 50955 Docld: 32202467 Page 82
[3803]7/21/60). Nonetheless, the attitude toward Lumumba even at these
[3804]early meetings was vehement:
[3806]Mr. Dulles said that in Lumumba we were faced with a
[3808]person who was a Castro or worse . . . Mr. Dulles went
[3810]on to describe Mr. Lumumba's background which he de-
[3812]scribed as "harrowing" . . . It is safe to go on the
[3814]assumption that Lumumba has been bought by the Commun-
[3816]ists; this also, however, fits with his own orienta-
[3818]tion. (NSC Minutes, 7/21/60)
[3819]The President presided over the other two NSC meetings. After look-
[3820]ing at the records of those meetings, Johnson was unable to deter-
[3821]mine with certainty which one was the meeting at which he heard the
[3822]President's statement (Johnson, 9/13/75, p. 16).
[3824]However, the chronology of meetings, cables, and events in the
[3826]Congo during this period makes it most likely that Johnson's, testi-
[3827]mony refers to the NSC meeting of August 18, 1960.
[3829]The meeting of August 18 took place at the beginning of a series
[3831]‘of events that preceded the dispatch of a CIA scientist to Leopold-
[3833]ville with poisons for the assassination of Lumumba.* The Septem-
[3835]ber 7 meeting took place in the midst of this series of events.
[3838]* The major events in the series, each of which is discussed in de-
[3839]tail in other sections of the report, may be summarized as follows:
[3840]The week following the NSC meeting of August 18, the Special Group
[3841]was informed of the President's “extremely strong feelings about the
[3842]necessity for very straightforward action" and the Group agreed to
[3843]consider “any particular kind of activity which might contribute to
[3844]getting rid of Lumumba" (Special Group Minutes, 8/25/60). At this
[3845]meeting, DCI Allen Dulles commented that "he had taken the comments
[3846]referred to seriously and had every intention of proceeding as vig-
[3847]orously as the situation permits" (Special Group Minutes, 8/25/60;
[3848]see Section 7(a) (iii), infra). The next day, Dulles senk an "Eyes
[3849]Only" cable under his personal signature to the/Chief of station in
[3851]HW 50955 Docld:32202467 Page &3
[3855]HW 50955
[3857]The NSC meeting of August 18, 1960, was held three weeks before
[3858]the “quasi-coup" in the Congo -- the dismissal of Lumumba by Kasavubu
[3859]-- which Johnson remembers as taking place "not long after" he heard
[3860]the President's Statement. The only other meeting at which Johnson
[3861]could have heard the statement by the President was held on Septem-
[3862]ber 7, two days after this event.
[3864]Robert Johnson's memorandum of the meeting of August 18, 1960,
[3866]indicates that Acting Secretary of State C. Douglas Dillon* introduced
[3870]* Leopoldville, indicating that it had been concluded in "HIGH QUAR-
[3871]TERS" that Lumumba's "REMOVAL MUST BE AN URGENT AND PRIME OBJECTIVE
[3872]AND THAT . . . THIS SHOULD BE A HIGH PRIORITY OF OUR COVERT ACTION"
[3873](CIA Cable OUT 62966, Dulles to(chies of/Station, 8/26/60). The Dul-
[3874]les cable added:
[3876]WE WISH GIVE YOU WIDER AUTHORITY |. - INCLUDING EVEN MORE
[3877]AGGRESSIVE ACTION IF IT CAN REMAIN COVERT . _ YOU CAN
[3878]ACT ON YOUR OWN AUTHORITY WHERE TIME DOES NOT PERMIT RE-
[3879]FERRAL HERE. (CIA Cable, 8/26/60) (See Section 2, Supra,
[3880]for more complete treatment of this cable.)
[3882]On September 19, a CIA scientist was dispatched from headquarters
[3883]to the Congo on an extraordinarily Sensitive assignment (CIA Cable
[3884]OUT 71464, Bissell/Tweedy to (Chief of)Station, 9/19/60: see Section
[3885]4(a), Supra). On September 21, in the Presence of the President at
[3886]an NSC IReeting, Allen Dulles stated that Lumumba "remained a grave
[3887]danger as long as he was not disposed of" (NSC Minutes, 9/21/60; see
[3888]Section 7(a) (iv), infra). Finally, on eptember, 26, the CIA scien-
[3889]tist arrived in the Congo, Provided thef Chief of Station with lethal
[3890]biclogical substances, instructed him to assassinate Lumumba, and in-
[3891]formed him that the President had Ordered the DCI to undertake an ag-
[3892]Sassination effort (see. Sections 4(a)-4(c), supra). The (Chief of)
[3893]Station stated thar he received confirmation from CIA headquarters
[3894]that he was to follow the instructions he had been given (see Section
[3896]4(e) (i), supra).
[3898]we In 1960, Dillon served as Undersecretary of State, the “number two
[3900]position in the State Department," the name of which subsequently
[3902]changed to Deputy Secretary of State. In this Position, he frequently
[3903](Continued)
[3905]Bocld: 322024387 Page 84
[3909]on September 21, 1960, Allen Dulles stressed the danger of
[3910]Soviet influence in the Congo. Despite the fact that Lumumba
[3911]had been deposed from his Position as Premier and was in UN
[3912]custody, Dulles continued to regard him as a4 threat, especially
[3913]in light of reports of an impending reconciliation between
[3914]Lumumba and the Ppost-coup Congolese government:
[3915]Mobutu appeared to be the effective Power in the
[3916]Congo for the monent but Lumumba Was not yet
[3917]disposed of and remained a grave danger as long
[3918]as he was not disposed of. (NSC Minutes,
[3919]9/21/60.)
[3920]Three days after this NSC meeting, Allen Dulles sent a
[3921]Personal cable to the/ Chief of Station)in Leopoldville which
[3923]included the following message:
[3924]uo WE WISH GIVE EVERY POSSIBLE SUPPORT IN ELIMINATING
[3925]( LUMUMBA FROM ANY POSSIBILITY RESUMING GOVERNMENTAL
[3926]POSITION OR IF HE FAILS IN LEOP[OLDVILLE] , SETTING
[3927]HIMSELF IN STANLEYVILLE OR ELSEWHERE. (CIA Cable,
[3928](our 73573, Dulles to Leopoldville. 9/24/60.)
[3929]On September 26, (Sidney Gottlieb), under assignment from
[3930]CIA headquarters, arrived in Leopoldyille (CIA Cable (iw 18989),
[3931]Leopoldville to Director, 9/27/60), provided the (Chief of)
[3932]Station with poisons, instructed him CoO assassinate Lumumba ,
[3933]and assured him that there was Presidential authorization for
[3934]this mission (see Sections 4(b)-4(e), upra).
[3935]Marion Boggs, NSC Deputy Executive Secretary, who wrote
[3937]the memorandum of the discussion of September 21, did not
[3939]interpret Dulles’ remark as referring to assassination:.:.
[3941]HY 50955 Docld: 32202467 Page 65
[3943]ft Eh
[3947]Other Eisenhower Administration officials who were active
[3948]in the Special Group in late 1960--Assistant Secretary of
[3949]Defense John N. Irwin II, Undersecretary of State for Political
[3950]Affairs Livingston Merchert, and Deputy Secretary of Defense
[3951]James Douglas--stated that they did not recall any discussion
[3952]about assassinating Lumumba (Irwin affidavit, 9/22/75, pp. 1-2;
[3954]Merchant atfidavit, 9/8/75, p. 1; Douglas affidavit, 9/5/75).
[3956](c) Richard Bissell Testified That, Despite His Lack of
[3957]a Specific Recollection, He Strongly Inferred”
[3958]That the Assassination Effort Against Lumumba Was
[3959]Authorized by President Eisenhower and Allen Dulles
[3960]Richard Bissell's testimony on the question of high-level
[3961]authorization for the effort to assassinate Lumumba is prob-
[3962]lematic. Bissell insisted that he had no direct recollection
[3963]of receiving such-authorization and that all of his testimony
[3964]on this subject "has to be described as inference" (Bissell,
[3966]9/10/75, p. 48). Bissell began his testimony on the subject
[3968]by asserting that it was on his own initiative that he instructed
[3970](sustin O'Donnell) to plan the assassination of Lumumba (Bissell,
[3971]6/11/75, pp. 54-55). Nevertheless, Bissell's conclusion--based
[3972]on his inferences from the totality of circumstances relating
[3973]to the entire assassination effort against Lumumba--was that an
[3974]assassination attempt had been authorized at the highest levels.
[3975]of the government (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 32-33, 47-49, 60-62,
[3976]65).
[3978]HY 50955 Doclda: 32202487 Page 86
[3980]_ AW 50955
[3984]As discussed above, Bissell testified that the minutes
[3985]of meetings of the Special Group on August 25, 1960 and the
[3986]NSC on September 21, 1960 indicate that assassination was con-
[3987]templated at the Presidential level as one acceptable means
[3988]of "getting rid of Lumumba'' (see Sections 5(a) (ii) and 5(a) (iii),
[3990]supra).
[3992]There was "no question", according to Bissell, that the
[3994]cable from Allen Dulles to che(chier of )Station in Leopoldville
[3996]on August 26, which called for Lumumba's removal and authorized
[3997]Hedgman to take action without consulting headquarters, was a
[3998]direct outgrowth of the Special Group meeting Dulles had
[3999]attended the previous day (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 31-32). Bissell
[4000]was "almost certain" that he had been informed about the Dulles
[4001]cable shortly after its transmission (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 12).
[4002]Bissell testified that he assumed that assassination was one of
[4003]the means of removing Lumumba from the scene that is contemplated
[4004]within the language of Dulles' cable (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 32):
[4006]It is my belief on the basis of the cable drafted
[4008]by Allen Dulles that he regarded the action of
[4010]the Special Group as authorizing implementation
[4012][of an assassination] if favorable circumstances
[4014]presented themselves, if it could be done covertly.
[4016](Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 64-65.)
[4018]Dulles’ cable signalled to Bissell that there was Presi-
[4020]dential authorization for him to order action to assassinate
[4022]Lumumba (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 61-62):
[4024]Bocld: 322024387 Page 387
[4028]Q: Did Mr. Dulles tell you that President Eisenhower
[4029]wanted Lumumba killed?
[4031]Mr. Bissell: Tf am sure he didn't.
[4033]Q: Did he ever tell you even circumlocutiously
[4034]through this kind of cable?
[4036]Mr. Bissell: Yes, I think his cable says it in effect.
[4037](Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 33.)
[4039]As for discussions with Dulles about the source of autho-
[4040]rization for an assassination effort against Lumumba, Bissell
[4041]Stated:
[4043]I think it is probably unlikely that Allen Dulles
[4044]would have said either the President or President
[4045]Eisenhower even to me. I think he would have said,
[4046]this is authorized in the highest quarters, and I
[4047]would have known what he meant. (Bissell, 9/10/75,
[4048]p. 48.) ;
[4049]When asked if he had sufficient authority to move beyond the
[4050](acr consideration or planning of assassination to order implementa-
[4051]tion of a plan, Bissell Said, “I probably did think I had [such]
[4052]authority" (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 61-62).
[4053]When informed about the (Chief of )station's testimony
[4054]about the instructions he received from (Goce Liel), Bissell said
[4055]that despite his absence of a specific recollection: .
[4056]I would strongly infer in this case that such an
[4057]authorization did pass through me, as it were,
[4058]if Gid ttlieb) gave that firm instruction to the
[4059]Stationf Chief- (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 40.)
[4061]Bissell said that the pcr would have been the Source of this
[4063]authorization (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 40),
[4065]HY 50955 Doclda: 32202487 Page 68
[4069]‘Bissell did not recall being. informed by (Cote1ied) that
[4071]botetied)had represented to the(Chief of) Station that there
[4073]was Presidential authorization for the asSassination of Lumumba
[4074](Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 46). But Bissell said that assuming he
[4075]had instructed Gotetied)eo carry poison to the Congo, "there
[4076]was no possibility" that he would have issued such an instruc-
[4077]tion without authorization from Dulles (Bissell, 9/10/75,
[4079]P- 47). Likewise Bissell said he "probably did" tell (ote 1ied)
[4080]that the mission had the approval of President Eisenhower
[4081](Bissell, 9/10/75, P. 47). This led to Bissell's conclusion
[4082]that if, in fact, the testimony of the(Chieg of) station about
[4083](Coveried)'s actions is accurate, then Gortlied)'s actions were
[4085]fully authorized:
[4087]Ce . Q: In light of the entire atmosphere at the Agency
[4088]i Mr.
[4090]that the President had instructed the DCI to
[4091]carry out this mission would not have been beyond
[4092]the pale of Mr. Gottliet)'s authority at that
[4093]point? Sor:
[4095]Bissell: No, it would not. (Bissell, 9/10/75,
[4096]Pp. 65).
[4098]Bissell further Stated:
[4099]Knowing Mr. Gottlieb) it is literally inconceivable
[4100]to me that hé would ‘have acted beyond his instruc-
[4101]tions. (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 41.)
[4103]With respect to his assignment to Gustin O'Donnel) to “plan
[4105]and prepare for" the assassination of Lumumba (Bissell, 9/10/75,
[4107]Pp. 24) Bissell testified that "it was my own idea to give
[4109]. HW 50955 Docld:32202487 Page 99
[4113]i
[4115]q (° Donnell) this assignment" (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 50). But he
[4117]‘said that this specific assignment was made in the context
[4119]that an assassination mission against Lumumba already had autho-
[4120]rization above the level of DDP (Bissell, 9/10/75, p
[4121]also pp. 32-33, 47-48, 60-62).
[4123]50; see
[4125]HY 50955 Docld:32202467 Page 90
[4127]that, while he could have created the capability on his own, any
[4128]urgings would have come from Bundy or Walt Rostow. In a later
[4129]@#ppearance, however, Bissell said he merely informed Bundy of
[4130]the capability and that the context was a briefing by him and
[4131]not urging by Bundy. Bundy said he received a briefing and
[4133]Save no urging, though he raised no objections. Rostow said he
[4134]never heard of the project.
[4136]William Harvey testified that he was “almost certain"
[4137]chat on January 25 and 26, 1961, he met with CIA officials/ Sidney
[4138]Gottlieb | the new Chief of CIA's Technical Services Division, and
[4139]Gerold SLives
[4141]of creating a capability within the Agency for “executive action"
[4143]a CIA recruiting officer, to discuss the feasibility
[4145](Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 52). After reviewing his notes of those
[4147]meetings ,* Harvey testified thar they took place after his initial
[4149]* As to the.dat of these notes, Harvey was asked whether his no-
[4150]tations "'25/14Sid GY a ( »26/1$ER sindicate that he spoke to [Sidney
[4151]a
[4153]¢ Gottlieband GENS Silver) in 19617 ag Opposed to 1962, Harvey testi-
[4154]fied as follows. oy"
[4156]Q: And is it your judgment that that is January 26, 1961 and
[4157]is about the subject of Executive Action?
[4159]Harvey: Yes, it is,
[4161]Q: And it followed your conversation with Mr. Lissell that
[4162]you have recounted?
[4164]Harvey: ., , - (Wjell, when I first looked at this, [ thought
[4165]this, well, this has got to be ‘62, but LI am almost certain
[4166]now that it is not. IF this is true, this might place the
[4167]~ first discussion that I had with Dick Bissell in early
[4168]January and this is difficult to pinpoint because there were
[4169]several such discussions in varying degrees of detail] during
[4170]the period in the spring, and very early in '61 to the fall
[4171]of '61 period, but-f did find out fairly early on that Silwer)
[4172]( . " oe .
[4174]@ 955 Docld:32202487 Page 91
[4176]discussion of executive action with Bissell, which, he said,”
[4177]might have transpired in “early January" (Harvey, 6/25/75, p.
[4178]52). When Bissell was shown these notes, he agreed with Harvey
[4180]about the timing of their initial discussion (Bissell, 7/17/75,
[4182]p. 10).
[4184]had -- or t t?dissell had discussed the question of assassi-
[4186]nation with (ge
[4187]least, had ¢¢
[4188]discussed the matter with @h
[4190]and this discussion, at the very
[4191]I, know Bissell already had
[4192]Lwer [larvey, 6/25/75, p. 52),
[4196]llarvey had also testified that, after receiving Bissell's initial in-
[4197]structions to establish an executive action capability:
[4199]the firse thing I did... was discuss in theoretical
[4200]terms with a few officers whom Crusted quite implicitly
[4201]the whole subject of assassination, our Possible assets,
[4202]Our posture, going back, if you will, even to the funda-
[4203]mental questions o£ A, is assassination a proper weapon
[4204]of an American intelligence Service, and B, even if you
[4205]assume that it is, is it within our Capability within
[4207]the framework of this government to do it effectively
[4209]and properly, securely and discreetly, (Harvey, 6/25/75,
[4210]Pp. 37-A, 38). ©
[4213]The Inspector General's Report connected (FAMED) anu Foceies| Co the
[4214]early stages of the executive action Project as follows:
[4216]Harvey says that Bissell had*41lread discussed certain
[4217]aspects of the problem with Gtwold Silwe:\ERe with JSidney 3
[4218]-° - Gottlieb Since (aR tas already cut in, Harvey used
[4219]him in éveloping™the njGotcts Agtion Capability...
[4220][
[4222]Harvey's mention of him. Gottlieb]] in this connection
[4223]may explain a notation tf Dr.\ Gunn that larvey instructed
[4224]Gunn to discuss techniques with] Goctlieblwithout associa-
[4225]ting the discussion with the Castro Operation. (L.G.
[4227]It is evident from the Cestimony of tlarvey and, Bissell that the turn-
[4228]Over to Harvey of the Roselli contact in November 196] was discussed
[4229]4S pare of ZRRIFLE (see Section (d) , infra), Thus, their initial
[4230]discussion of executive action can, at the least, be dated before
[4231]Noveiaber 1961 and the "25/1" and "26/1" hotations would have to
[4233]refer to January 1961.
[4235]£55 Docld: 32202487 Page 92
[4237]bring a CIA officer together with the criminal syndicate (Bissell,
[4239]6/11/75, pp. 19-20). Harvey did not recall any mention of the
[4241]White House or any higher authority than the DDP in his November
[4243]meeting with Bissell (Harvey, 7/11/75, pp. 60-61).
[4245]Although Richard Helms was briefed and given
[4246]administrative responsibility (as DDP) for Project ZR/RIFLE three
[4247]months later, he did not recall that ZR/RIFLE was ever contemplated
[4248]aS a Capability to assassinate Castro (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 55).
[4249]Asked whether the actual assassination efforts against Castro were
[4250]related to ZR/RIFLE (executive action), Helms testified: "In my
[4251]mind those lines never crossed" (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 52). However,
[4252]Bissell's testimony leaves more ambiguity: "the contact with the
[4253]Syndicate which had Castro as its target . . . folded into the
[4254]ZR/RIFLE project . . . and they became one" (Bissell, 6/11/75,
[4256]P. 47). When asked by Senator Baker whether the executive action
[4257]“capability . .. for assassination" was “used against Castro",
[4258]Bissell replied that it was “in the later phase". (Bissell, 6/11/75,
[4259]Pp. 47). The instruction from Bissell to Harvey on November 15;
[4260]1961, however, Preceded the reactivation of the ClA~syndicate assas-
[4261]ination operation against Castro by approximately five months.
[4263](iii) Use of Agent QJ/WIN in Africa
[4265]QJ/WIN was a foreign citizen with a criminal back-
[4267]ground who had been recruited by the CIA for certain sensitive
[4269]Programs involving Surreptitious entries which Pre-dated Project
[4271]HY 50955 Doclda: 32202487 Page 93
[4273]see
[4277]ZR/RIFLE. Harvey testified that QJ/WIN's function after the advent
[4278]of Project ZR/RIFLE in 1961 was restricted to the "spotting" of.
[4279]potential assets for "multi-purpose" covert use.
[4281]However, in the Fall of 1960--before Harvey was
[4282]assigned to create Project ZR/RIFLE by Richard Bissell--agent
[4284]Sasa
[4286]QJ/WIN had been dispatched to the Congo by Gana whi
[4288]his
[4290]Supervising CIA case officer in Europe. William Harvey, as the
[4291]Chief of the CIA Foreign Intelligence staff on which GRR worked.
[4292]had ordered QJI/WIN's mission to the Congo (CIA Dispatch (apm) 147,
[4293]11/2/60) and arranged the financial accounting for the mission
[4294]afterward (Memorandum Co Finance Division from William K. Harvey,
[4295]1/11/61). [QJ/WIN's activities in the Congo are treated in detail
[4296]in the discussion of the Lumumba case; see Section ——? Supra. ]
[4298]There are two factors which may raise a question as
[4299]to whether QJ/WIN was being used in an ad hoc Capacity to develop
[4300]an assassination capability before ZR/RIFLE was formally initiated,
[4301]First, there is 2 Similarity in the cast of characters: Harvey,
[4302]qu/win, CRS and \Gortlieb were connected with the Lumumba Matter
[4303]and reappear in connection with the subsequent development of
[4304]ZR/RIFLE. Second, Bissell informed Harvey that the development of
[4305]an assassination Capability had already been discussed with Gye
[4306]and Gottlieb |before Harvey's assignment to ZR/RIFLE (Harvey, 6/25/75
[4307]p. 52; I.G, Report, pp. 37-38).
[4309].Nevertheless, there does not appear to be any firm
[4311]evidence of a connection between QJ/WIN and the plot to assassinate
[4313]Lumumba,
[4315]Documents indicate that consideration was given within
[4317]the CIA to airdropping rifles into the Dominican Republic.
[4319]aa)
[4321]oO 1
[4322]SOMME TTA of the CIA
[4324]LD)
[4326]At a June 21, 1960, meeting wit
[4328]Western Hemisphere Division, Ambassador Farland reportedly
[4329]suggested possible sites for the drops.
[4330](CIA memo, 6/21/60)
[4331]Documents also indicate that a meeting was held
[4332]around the end of June 1960 between Assistant Secretary
[4333]of State for Inter-American Affairs Roy R. Rubottom and
[4334]Col. J. C. King, Chief of CIA's Western Hemisphere Division.
[4335]Apparently King sought to learn the Assistant Secretary's view
[4336]regarding “To what extent will the u.s, government participate
[4337]in the overthrow of Trujillo.” A number of questions were
[4338]( raised by King, among them:
[4339]"oe. Would it provide a small number of sniper rifles
[4340]Or other devices for the removal of key Trujillo people
[4341]from the scene?"
[4343]King's handwritten notes indicate that Rubottom's response to
[4346]that question was "yes" (CIA memo of 6/28/60; King affidavit)
[4347]On July 1, 1960, a memorandum directed to General Cabell, the Acting
[4348]Director of Central Intelligence, was prepared for Colonel King's
[4349]signature and, in his absence, signed by his principal deputy,
[4350][ Rudy Gomez \{I.G. Report, p. 26). The memorandum stated that
[4351]a principal leader of the anti-Trujillo opposition had asked
[4352]Ambassador Farland for a limited number of arms to precipitate
[4353]trujillo's overthrow, and recognized that such arins
[4354]( * Neither King nor Rubottom recalls such a meeting, nor does
[4356]either recall any proposal for supplying sniper rifles.
[4358](Rubottom affidavit, King affidavit.). . no
[4360]f pdb, _— bet yey j
[4361]Pps Pocld:32202487 Page 95 f{ ii}. re AG aid
[4364]Trujillo government could be successful unless it involved
[4366]Trujillo's assassination.
[4368]He communicated this opinion to both the State Department and
[4369]the CIA. In July 1960, he advised Assistant Secretary Rubottom
[4371]that the dissidents were
[4372]"le. in ne way ready to carry on any type of revolutionary
[4374]activity in the foreseeable future except the
[4376]assassination of their Principal enemy."
[4378](Dearborn to Rubottam letter, 7/14/60)
[4380]Tt is uncertain what portion of the information provided
[4381]by Dearborn to State waS passed above the Assistant Secretary
[4382]level. Through August of 1960, only Assistant Secretary Rubottom,
[4383]his Deputy, Lester Mallory, and Staff Assistant [Frank Devine,
[4385]to
[4386]were, within the Latin American Division of the Department,
[4390]aware of Dearborn's "current projects." (devine to Dearborn
[4391]— letter, 8/15/60) *
[4392]. By September 1960, Thomas Mann had replaced Roy Rubottom
[4393]as Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, and (Prank
[4394]Devine] had become a Special Assistant to Mr. Mann. While
[4395]serving as Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary, | Devine|
[4396]reportedly spent ninety percent of his time coordinating State
[4398]activities in Latin America. It was in this capacity that
[4399]ane
[4401]Devine maintained almost daily communication with Epea
[4402]and other officials of the CIA's Western Hemisphere Division
[4403](Devine, p.7)
[4405]*Déarborn's candid reporting to State during the summer of 1960
[4406]raised concern with the Department and ne was advised that certain
[4407]Specific information should more 4Dpropriately come through "tne
[4408]other channel" (presumably, CIA communications). Dearborn was
[4409]_ advised that his cables to State were distributed to at least 19
[4410]Ns different recipient offices, {Id.)
[4413]1 wo coe 4
[4414]Lot Lob an
[4416]55 Docld:322024387 Page 96
[4420]A955 Docld: 322023487 Page q7 |
[4422]wd Yee i Bees tes Ay ky cheb Bi
[4423]bd War ks Rey bee top Sb a
[4425]have asked us for a few sandwiches, hardly °
[4427]more, and we are not prepared to make them
[4429]available. Last week we were asked to furnish
[4431]three or four pineapples for a party in the
[4433]near future, but I could remember nothing in my in-
[4435]structions that would have allowed me to contri-
[4437]dute this ingredient. Don't think I wasn't
[4439]tempted. I have rather specific guidelines
[4441]to the effect that salad ingredients will be
[4443]delivered outside the picnic grounds and will
[4445]be brought to the area by another club.
[4447](Dearborn letter to [Deving), 3/16/61)
[4448]After reviewing his "picnic" lettér, together with the requests
[4449]in the Marcn 14 and IS cables discussed above, Dearborn con-
[4450]cluded during his testimony before the Committee that the
[4451]“pineapples" were probably the requested fragmentation
[4452]grenades and the restriction on delivering salad ingredients
[4453]outside of the picnic grounds was, almost certainly, meant to
[4454]refer to the requirements of the January 12 Special Group
[4455]orcéer that arms be delivered outside the Dominican Republic,
[4456](Dearborn 7/29, pp. 25-27)
[4458]2. The Passage of Pistols
[4460]a. Pouching to the Dominican Republic
[4462]In a March 15, 1961 cable, [chiet of| Station Gas reported
[4464]that Dearborn had asked for three .38 caliber pistols for issue
[4465]to several dissidents. In reply, Headquarters cabled: "Regret
[4466]no authorization exists to Suspend pouch regulations against
[4467]shipment of arms" and indicated that their reply had been coor=
[4468]dinated with State. {HQS to Station cable, 3/17/61) The
[4469]Station |chief \then asked Headquarters to seek the necessary
[4470]authorization and noted that at his last two posts, he had
[4472]received pistols via the pouch for "worthy Purposes” and,
[4474]yuo.
[4476]ho. : i
[4478]Porm . moe, : .
[4480]fl rs | Bo
[4483]wat is aie
[4485]therefore, he knew it could be done. (Station to Hqs cable,
[4486]3/21/61) Two days later, Headquarters cabled that the Pistols
[4487]and ammunition were being pouched. However, the Station
[4488][chiet| was instructed not to advise Dearborn. (Hqs. to Station
[4489]cable, 3/24/61)*
[4491]b. Reason for the CIA Instruction
[4493]oy Not to Tell Dearborn
[4496]fae testified that he believed the "don't tell Dear-
[4497]born the pistol is being pouched" language Simply meant that
[4498]the sending of firearms through the “iplomatic pouch was not
[4499]7]
[4501]something to be unnecessarily discussed. (Grea pp. 78,79)
[4503]ta
[4504]od
[4506]Dearborn Said he never doubted the pouch was used, since he knew
[4507]VERS had no other means of receiving weapons. (Dearborn,
[4508]7/29, p. 33)
[4509]c. Were the Pistols Related to Assassination?
[4510]ee WO ASSASSination?
[4511]Dearborn testified that he had asked for a single Pistol
[4512]for purposes completely unrelated to any assassination con-
[4513]Sideration, (Dearborn, 7/29, pp. 29-31) He said he had been
[4514]approached by a Dominican contact who lived ina remote area
[4515]and was concerned for the safety of his family in the event
[4517]of political reprisals. Dearborn testified that he had believed
[4519]* “The Inspector Generail’s Report, issuea in connection with
[4520]a review of these events, concludes that:
[4522]“There is no indication in the EMDEED operational files
[4523]that the pistols were actually pouched. The request
[4525]for pistols appears to have been overtaken by a sub-
[4526]sequent request for submachine guns." (I.G. Report, p. 60)
[4528]le. This conclusion is difficult to understand in light of the March
[4529]fo: 24, 1961, Headquarters to Station cable, which provides:
[4531]"C. Pouching: revolvers-and ammo--requested TRUJI 0462
[4532](in 20040) on 28 March. Do not advise (name Dearborn deleted)
[4533]pocta: 5S40$4Ba tenga bsbeing pouched. Explanation follows."
[4536]o
[4538]the man's fears were well~founded and had promised to seek a
[4539]pistol.”
[4541]Although there is no direct evidence linking any of these
[4542]pistols to the assassination of Trujillo, a June 7, 1961, CIA
[4543]memorandum, unsigned and with no attribution as to source,
[4545]states that two of the three pistols were Passed by lowen! to
[4546]7 }
[4550]mo. Winey” Ram United States citizen who was in direct
[4552]contact with the action element of the dissident group. It
[4554]should also be noted that the assassination was apparently con-
[4555]ducted with almost complete reliance upon hand weapons. Whether
[4556]one or more of these .38 caliber Smith & Wesson pistols
[4557]eventually came into the hands of the assassins
[4559]and, if so, whether they were used in connection with the
[4560]assassination, remain open questions.
[4562]as weapons for self-defense Purposes and they never
[4564]Both Dearborn and testified that they regarded the pistols:
[4565]considered them in any way connected with the then-current
[4567]i °
[4568]assasSination plans, (Dearborn 7/29, p.70; ren) pp.38,73)
[4569]However, none of the Headquarters cables inquired as to the
[4570]Purpose for which the handguns were sought and (ans cable
[4572]Stated only that Dearborn wanted them for passage to dissidents.
[4574](Station to Has cable, 3/15/61) Indeed, the March 24, 1961,
[4576]*Dearborn is clear in hie recollection that ne asked {omen to
[4577]request only one pistol. (Dearborn, 7/29, PP-30,31) [fe
[4578]on the other hand, testified that if his cables requés?
[4579]pistols for Dearborn then Dearborn must have asked for three
[4580]Pistols .03(@@wen} p.72)
[4582]The pistols’were, however, apparently sent in one package
[4583](HUS to-Station cables,3/27/61 and 3/24/61) and Dearborn testi-
[4584]fied that, what he believed to be the one gun, came “wranped
[4585]up" and that he passed it. | (Dearborn, -7/29,p.30)
[4588]iT Ni ~ Besa | i
[4590]cable advising that the pistols were being pouched is the
[4592]very cable which was sent in response to a request by the
[4593]dissidents for machine guns to be used in an assassination
[4595]effort which had been previously described to Headquarters,
[4597]As with the carbines discussed below, it appears that little,
[4599]if any, concern was expressed within the Agency over Passing these
[4601]weapons to would-be assassins,
[4603]3. Passing of the carbines
[4605]a. Request by Cuan and “Dearborn and Approval. by. CIA
[4607]In a March 26, 1961 cable to CIA Headquarters, Bb actos
[4608]for permission to Pass to the dissidents three 30 caliber M1
[4609]carbines. The guns had been left behind in the Consulate by
[4610]Navy personnel after the U.S. broke formal diplomatic relations
[4611]in Auyust 1960. Dearborn testified that he knew of and concurred
[4612]in the proposal to Supply the carbines to the dissidents.
[4613](Dearborn 7/29, pp. 42,43) on March 31, 1961 CIA Headquarters
[4614]cabled approval of the request to pass the carbines. (Hqs to
[4615]Station cable, 3/31/61)
[4617]b. Were the Carbines Related to Assassination?
[4619]The carbines were passed to the action group concace ETI | April 7,
[4621]1961. (Station to Hos cable, 4/8/61) Eventually, they found
[4623]their way into the hands of one of the assassins, Antonio
[4625]de la Maza. (Station to HOS cable, 4/26/61; I.c. Report
[4628]PP. 46, 49) Both Dearborn ond (BiB testitiea that the
[4630]re 2 .
[4631]carbines were at'allstimes viewed’ ‘as ‘strictly a token show
[4633]Docld: 322027487 Page 100
[4635],
[4637]Wha -@acibaic |
[4639]of support, indicating u.s, Support of the dissidents’ efforts
[4641]O23
[4642]to overthrow Trujillo. (Dearborn 7/29, PP. 46-48; Go. 39
[4644]c. Failure to Disclose to State Department
[4645]Officials in Vasnington
[4647]There is no indication that the request or the passage
[4648]of the carbines was disclosed to State Department officials in
[4649]Washington until several weeks after the passage. In fact, on
[4650]Avril 5, lieadquarters requested its Station to ask Dearborn
[4651]not to comment in correspondence with State that the carbines
[4653]and ammunition were being passed to tke dissidents. This cable
[4655]was sent while] was in Washington, and it indicated that
[4656]upon his return to the Dominican Republic, he would explain
[4657]tne request. The Station replied that Dearborn had not com-
[4658]mented on the éarbines and ammunition in his correspondence
[4660]witii State and he realized the necessity not to do so. (Station
[4662]to HQS cable, 4/6/61)
[4664]Dearborn testified, however, that he believed, at the
[4665]time of his April 6 cable, that someone in the State De-
[4666]partment had been consulted in advance and had approved the
[4668]passage of the carbines (Dearborn 7/29, p. 44)
[4670]Docld: 32202487 Page 101
[4672]3. Requests For and Pouching of the Machine Guns
[4673]aE 03
[4675]2] :
[4676]a. fiwery Requests Machine Guns (for Use
[4677]Ssassination
[4679]The Station (hie#) suggested that Headquarters consider
[4681]pouching an M3 machine gun on February 10, 196 1
[4682]Station to HQ9S cable, 3/15/61). The request was raised again
[4684]in March but no action was taken. On March 20, 1961, Sas cabled
[4685]a dissident request for five M3 or comparable machine guns
[4686]Specifying their wish that the arms be sent via the diplomatic
[4687]pouch or similar means. The dissidents were said to feel that
[4688]delivery by air drop or transfer at Sea would overly-tax their
[4689]resources. (Station to HQS cable, 3/20/61)
[4691]The machine guns sought by the dissidents were clearly
[4692]identified, in G2 « cable, as being sought for use in connec-
[4693]tion with an attempt to assassinate Trujillo. This plan was to
[4694]Kill Trujillo in the apartment of his mistress and, according
[4696]\ : to (Cran cable:
[4697]4
[4699]" To do they need five M3 or comparable machine-
[4700]guns. and 1500 rounds ammo for personal defense in
[4701]event fire fight. Will use quiet weapons for basic
[4702]job." “(d.)
[4704]In essence, CIA's response was that the timing for an
[4705]assassination was wrong. a. told that Precipitious or
[4706]uncoordinated action could lead to the emergence of a leftist,
[4707]Castro-type regime and the "mere disposal of Trujillo may create
[4708]more problems than solutions." It was Headquarters' position
[4709]that:
[4711]...we should attempt to avoid Precipitous action
[4713]by the internal dissidents until Opposition group
[4715]and HQS are better Prepared to support /assassination/*,
[4716]effect a change in the regime, and cope with the after-
[4717]math."' (HQS to Station cable, 3/24/61)
[4719]Word supplie y CIA in previously sanitized cable.
[4722]See geet
[4724]The cable also stated
[4725]to deliver machine guns and
[4727]they developed a capability
[4729]-22.
[4730]that Headquarters was prepared
[4731]ammunition to the dissidents when
[4733]fo received them, but that security
[4735]considerations precluded use of U.S. Facilities aS a carrier.*
[4736]s thereaft n April 6, 1961, whil in Washi
[4737]r i
[4738]oon, ereafter, on Apr ; , While repey| 2S in Washington
[4739]for consultation with Headquarters, he reported on events in
[4740]the Dominican Republic and
[4741]“especially on the insistence of the Enory (dissident]
[4742]leaders that they be provided with a limited number
[4743]of small arms for their own Protection (specifi-
[4745]cally, five M3 caliber -45 SMG's)." (CTA memo
[4746]for the record, 4/11/61)
[4748]b. Pouching the Machine Guns is Approved
[4749]by Bissell
[4751]Accordingly, on April 7, 1961, a Pouch Restriction Waiver
[4752]Request and Certification was submitted seeking permission to
[4753]pouch "four M3 machine guns and 240 rounds of ammunition on a
[4754]Priority basis for issuance to a small action group to be used
[4756]for self Protection." (Pouch Restriction Waiver Request 4/7/61)
[4758]The request, submitted on.behalf of the Chief, Western
[4760]Hemisphere Division, further provided:
[4762]"B. A determination has been made that the issuance
[4763]of this equipment to the action group is desirable
[4764]if for no other reason than to assure this important
[4765]group's continued cooperation with and confidence in
[4767]* This same cable of March 24, 1961, Is the one which advised
[4768]that the revolvers and ammunition were being pouched,
[4770]an bog
[4771]Vad cite Ads
[4773]Tate Port a rat
[4775]“ .
[4777]Ovo advised Headquarters that
[4779]had informed him that Antonio de la Maza was
[4781]— yOing to attempt the assassination between April 29 and May 2.
[4783]Cuca also reported that this attempt would use the three
[4784]carbines passed from the American Consulate, together with
[4785]whatever else was available. (1a.)
[4787]In response to the April 26 cable, Headquarters restated
[4788]that there was no approval to Pass any additional arms to the
[4789]dissidents and requesteda(EBen) to advise the dissidents that the
[4790]United States was simply not prepared at that time to cope with
[4791]the aftermath of the assassination. (See C/S comments,
[4793]Station to HQS cable, 4/27/61) ‘the following day, April 27,
[4794]1961, CW peptica that, based upon further discussions with
[4795]the dissidents, "We doubt statement U.S, government not now
[4796]prepared to cope with aftermath will dissuade them from
[4797]attempt." (Station to HOS cable, 4/27/61)
[4799]Dearborn recalls receiving instructions that
[4800]an effort be made to turn off the assassination attempt and
[4802]testified that efforts to carry out the instructions were
[4803]unsuccessful. . In effect, the dissidents informed him that
[4804]this was their affair and it could not be Curned off to suit
[4806]the convenience of the U.S. government.
[4808](Dearborn, 7/29, p.52)
[4810]Docld: 32202487 Page 104
[4814]additional Support, coupled with fact ref,
[4815]C items [the carbines] already made available
[4816]to them for Personal defense; station authori-
[4817]zed pass ref. A items {the machine guns] to
[4818]Opposition member for their additional bro-
[4819]tection on their Proposed endeavor,” (Draft of Hos
[4820]to Station cable, 5/2/61).
[4822]The cable was never sent.
[4824]In his testimony before the Committee, Bissell characteri-
[4825]zed his reasoning for recommending release of the machine guns
[4826]as:
[4830]. . having made already a considerable
[4831]investment in this dissident group and its
[4832]plans that we might as well make the addi-
[4833]tional investment." (Bissell, 7/22, p.127)
[4834]7
[4835]The following day, May 3, 1961, [Ray Herbert,, Deputy Chief
[4837]of the Western Hemisphere Division of CIA, who frequently acted
[4838]as liaison with the State Department in Matters concerning
[4839]covert operations in the Dominican Republic, met with Adolph
[4840]Berle, Chairman of the State Department's Interagency Task Force
[4841]on Latin America.
[4843]A Berle memorandum of the meeting states that jHerbert
[4845]informed Berle that a local group in the Dominican Pepublic
[4847]‘wished to overthrow Trujillo and sought arms for that purpose,
[4849]The menorandum continued:
[4851]. “On cross examination it Geveloped that the
[4852]real plan was to assassinate Trujillo and they
[4853]wanted guns for that purpose, Lulerbert |wanted
[4854]to know what the policy should be. ,
[4856]"I told him I could not care less for Trujillo
[4857]and that this was the general sentiment. But
[4859]we did not wish to have any thing to do with any,
[4860]assassination plots anywhere, any time. Herbert |
[4861]Said he felt the same way." (Berle, Meno"of
[4862]Conversation, 5/3/61)
[4864]HY 50955 Docld: 32202467 Page 105
[4866]j :
[4867]MW 50955 Docld:32202487 bage 106
[4869]3
[4870]a
[4873]Copies of Berle's memorandum were sent to Wymberly Coerr;
[4875]the Acting Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs,
[4877]and to Special Assistant |Frank Devine].
[4879]Both Herbert and Devine|, who had been in almost daily
[4880]contact with each other since August of 1969, had been advised
[4881]of the assassination plans of the dissident group. -In fact,
[4882]lHerbert|, along with Bissell, had Signed off on the Proposed
[4883]cable of May 2, releasing the machine guns for passage.
[4885]C. Special Group Meetings of Jay 4 and May 18, 1961
[4887]On the day following the Berlefilerbert meeting, the
[4888]Special Group met and, according to the minutes:
[4890]“The DCI referred to recent reports of a new
[4891]anti-~Trujillo plot. He said we never know if
[4892]one of these is going to work or not, and asked
[4893]what is the status of contingency Planning should
[4894]the plot come off. Mr. Bundy said that this point
[4895]is covered in the Cuba paper which Will be discussed
[4897]at a high level in the very near future.” (Special
[4898]Group Minutes, 5/4/61)
[4900]Once again, the cryptic reporting of Special Grouo Minutes
[4901]makes subsequent analysis as to the Scope of matters discussed
[4902]Speculative. It is not known to what extent and in what detail
[4903]Allen Dulles referred to "recent reports" of a new anti-Trujillo
[4904]plot. Certainly, the most recent report of such a plot was
[4905]Dearborn's April 30 cable -- disclosing an imminent ASSaASSination
[4906]attempt potentially utilizing U.S.~supplied weapons,
[4908]On May 18, 1961, the Special Group again considered the
[4910]situation in the Dominican Republic and, according to the
[4912]i. - ' |
[4914]to. continue to take the Same line until he received contrary
[4916]instructions which clearly indicated they had been cleared in
[4918]advance by the State Department itself. This cable from State was
[4920]approved by Under Secretary Bowles. (Department to Dearborn, 5/16/61)
[4921][ray Herbert\ referred to Dearborn's Nay 16 request in a
[4923]memorandum he sent to \pevine|on the same date and asked to be
[4925]advised as to the Department's policy concerning passage of
[4927]the machine guns. [Herbert] noted that when this request was
[4929]last taken to the Department, Berle made the decision that the
[4931]weapons not be passed. (Memo to ARA from CIA, 5/16/61)
[4933]Devine responded to hierbert's) memorandum on the same day,
[4934]. a
[4936]advising /iierbert| that the Department's policy continued to be
[4938]negative on the matter of passing the machine guns.* [Herbert's )
[4939]attention was directed to the January 12, 1961 Special Group
[4941]limitation concerning the Passage of arms outside of the
[4942]i
[4944]Dominican Republic. aA copy of |Devine's| memorandum to fitexbert |
[4946]Le
[4948]was forwarded to the Office of the Under Secretary of State,
[4949]to the attention of his personal assistant, Joseph Scott.
[4950](Devine to herbert memo, 5/16/61)
[4952]E. Dearborn in Washington for Consultation --
[4953]Drafting of Contingency Plans
[4954]a ane SANS
[4956]Ata meeting of the National Security Council on May 5, 1961,
[4957]the question of u.s, Policy toward the Dominican Republic was
[4958]considered and it was:
[4960]“Agreed that the Task Force on Cuba would
[4961]Prepare promptly both emergency and long-~
[4962]range plans for anti-~communist intervention
[4963]in the event ofcrises in Haiti or the
[4965]( Fr
[4966], By Hay 27, 1961 Dearborn was advising the State Department that
[4967]the roup was no longer requesting the arms and had accepted the
[4969]fact that it must make do with what it had. (Dearborn to State
[4973]“oN
[4975]fact, we feel that the transfer of arms would
[4976]Serve very little Purpose and expose the United
[4977]States to great danger of association with
[4978]assassination attempt."
[4979]The cable, as revised by Goodwin and approved by President
[4980]Kennedy, was sent to Dearborn on May 29, 1961. (State Dept.
[4982]to Dearborn cable, 5/29/61)
[4984]vil, May 30, 1961 and Immediately Thereafter:
[4986]A. Trujillo Assassinated
[4988]Late in the evening of May 30, 1961, Trujillo was ambusned
[4989]and assassinated near San Cristobal, .Dominican Republic. The
[4990]assassination closely paralleled the Plan disclosed by the
[4991]action group to American representatives in the Dominican Republic
[4992]and passed on to officials in dashington at both the CIA and
[4993]the State Department. (Dearborn cable to State, 5/30/61) The
[4994]assassination was conducted by members of the action group, to
[4995]whom the American carbines had been passed, and such sketchy
[4996]information as is available indicates that one or more of the
[4997]carbines were in the possession of the assassination group when
[4998]Trujillo was killed. (I. G. Report, Pp. 60-61). This evidence indicat:
[4999]however, that the actual assassination was accomplished by
[5000]handguns and shotewris. (I.G. Report, p.61l)
[5002]B. Cables to Washington
[5004]After receiving the May 29 cable from Washington, poth Consul
[5008]General Dearborn and Station |chies GMM) sent replies, According
[5010]to Dearborn's testimony, he did not regard the May 29 cable
[5011]aS a cnange in U.S. policy concerning Support for assassinations.
[5012](Dearborn 1/29/75, p. 74),
[5014]a rn
[5015]Hist Stes teu heles |
[5016]Docld:32202487 Page 108
[5020]He interpreted the May 29 cable as Saying:
[5022]",..we don't care if the Dominicans assassinate
[5023]Trujillo, that is all right. But we don't want
[5024]anything to pin this on usS, because we aren't
[5025]doing it, it is the Dominicans who are doing
[5026]it." (Dearborn, 7/29, p. 104)
[5027]Dearborn testified that this accorded with what he Said had
[5028]always been his personal belief: thae the U.S. should not be
[5029]involved in an assassination and that if an 4Ssassination
[5030]occurred it would be Strictly a Dominican affair. (Dearborn
[5032]7/29, pp. 100, 101) - |
[5033]In contrast the CIA Station |chier, @MMN) aia regard the
[5034]“tier cable as manifesting a change in U.S. policy, Particularly on
[5035]the questionof Supplying arms. G5 >. 120) He believed the
[5036]May 29 cable was the final word in U.S. policy on this matter
[5037]and consequently felt that the government had retreated from
[5038]its prior position, of offering material Support: to the dissi-
[5039]dents, and had adopted a new position of withholding such sunnort.
[5041]i responsive cable to Headquarters stated:
[5043]"HQS aware extent to which U.S. government already
[5044]associated with assassination. If we are to at least
[5045]cover up tracks, CIA personnel directly involved in
[5046]assassination preparation must be withdrawn."
[5047](Station to HQS cable, 5/30/61)
[5050]If.
[5052]IIl.
[5054]Iv.
[5056]ARAYA FOS GNA
[5057]SCHNEIDER REPORT
[5059]Summary
[5061]The President's Initial General Instruction
[5062]and Background
[5064]A. September 15 White House Meeting
[5065]B. Background: Tracks I and II
[5066]C. CIA Views of Difficulty of Project
[5067]CIA's Implementation of Track II
[5068]A. Evolution of CIA Strategy
[5069]1, The "Constitutional Coup" Approach
[5071]2. Military Solution
[5073]B. The Chile Task Force
[5075]C. The Use of the(arny nesache and Tnteragency
[5077]Relations
[5078]Dd. The (False Flag \Base
[5079]E. Chief of Station
[5080]CIA Efforts to Promote a Coup
[5081]A. The Chilean Conspirators
[5082]B. Contacts Prior to October 15
[5084]C. October 15 Decision
[5086]D. Coup Planning and Attempts After October L5
[5088]E. The Killing of General Schneider
[5089]F. Post October 22 Events
[5091]CIA/White House Communication During Track II
[5092]A.. September
[5094]B. October
[5096]C. December
[5098]D. Did Track If End?
[5100]Eos,
[5101]SE ae
[5103]46
[5105]Page
[5107]17
[5108]17
[5109]17
[5110]18
[5112]19
[5114]26
[5115]27
[5116]29
[5117]29
[5118]30
[5120]34
[5121]36
[5122]39
[5123]4]
[5124]43
[5126]45
[5128]54
[5130]8
[5132]Ue
[5134]~L7-
[5136]\ ILI. <CIAts Implementation of Track II
[5137]rn A. Evolution of CIA Strategy
[5138]— . an: SE A Otrategy
[5140]The President's instruction te the CIA on September 15 to prevent
[5142]Allende's assumption of power was given in the context of a broad U.S, : —_—
[5143]Government effort to achieve that end. The September 15 instruction
[5144]to the CIA involved from the beginning the promotion of a military coup
[5145]d'etat in Chile. Although there was talk of a coup in Chilean military
[5146]circles, there was little indication that it would actually take place e
[5147]? without active U.S. encouragement and support.
[5148]There was much talk among Chilean officers about
[5149]the possibility of some kind of coup...but this
[5150]was not the kind of talk that was being backed by,
[5152]you know, serious organizational, planning.
[5153](Karamessines testimony, Aug. 6, 1963, p. 32)
[5155]1, The "Constitutional Coup" Approach a
[5156]ee Loup Approach
[5157]Although efforts to achieve a political solution to the Allende
[5158]( victory continued Simultaneous with Track If, the Agency premised its
[5159]activities on the assumption that the political avenue was a dead end.
[5160]On September 21, CIA Headquarters cabled its Station in Santiago:
[5161]Purpose of exercise is to prevent Allende assump-
[5162]tion of power, Paramilitary legerdemain has been
[5163]discarded. Military solution is objective.
[5164]' (Hqs. 236, Sept. 21, 1970, para. 3)
[5165]The initial Strategy attempted to enlist President Frei in promoting
[5166]a coup to perpetuate his presidency for six more years. The Agency
[5168]decided to promise “help in any election which was an outgrowth of a
[5170]Successful military takeover." (Nov. 18, 1970 Helms memo to Kissinger)
[5172]7
[5174]Under this plan Frei would invite the military to take over, dissolve the
[5176]4
[5178]Congress, and Proclaim a new election. (s private U.S. citizen who had
[5181]5
[5183]been a conduit for CIA funds to Frei's 1964 campaign was sent to see his ) ; ’
[5184]; i
[5189](wien this message on:September 24, (Task Force Log, September 23) )
[5190]Thomas Karamessines, the Deputy Director for Plans, testified:
[5191]Ly So this was in a sense not Track II, but in a a
[5192]va sense another aspect of a quiet and hopefully s-
[5193]non-violent military coup....This was abandoned
[5194]when the military were reluctant to push Frei
[5195]publicly...and, number two, Frei was reluctant
[5196]to leave on his own in the absence of pressure
[5197]from the military....There was left as the only
[5198]chance of success a straight military coup.
[5199](Karamessines testimony, Aug. 6, 1975, p. 6)
[5200]At the same time, the Station in Santiago reported:
[5201]Strong reasons for thinking neither Frei nor
[5202]Schneider will act. For that reason any scenario
[5203]in which either has to play an active role now
[5204]appears utterly unrealistic. Overtures to lower
[5205]echelon officers (e.g., Valenzueha) can of course
[5206]be made. This involves promoting Army split.
[5207](Stn. to Hqs. 424, September 23, 1970)
[5208]2. Military Solution
[5209]President Frei's failure even to attempt to persuade his own party
[5210]. ( convention on October 3-4 from reaching a compromise with Allende ended
[5211]ere
[5212]all hope of using him to prevent an Allende presidency. (November 18
[5213]memo, Helms to Kissinger, page 16) Thus, by the beginning of October, t
[5214]it was clear that a vehicle for a military solution would have to be
[5215]found in the second echelon of Chilean officers, and that the top leader-
[5216]ship of the Armed Services, particularly General Rene Schneider, censti-
[5217]tuted a stumbling block. (Santiago 424, September 23, 1970; Santiago 439,
[5218]September 30, 1970) The Agency's task was to cause a coup in a highly
[5219]unpromising situation and to overcome the formidable obstacles represented
[5220]by Frei's inaction, Schneider's strong constitutionalism, and the absence
[5222]of organization and enthusiasm among those officers who were interested
[5224]oy MD fe ~ a ‘ -f + 4 | id
[5225]ex cia ete re (dy poem
[5227]in a coup.
[5229]. ww ears a
[5230]A three-fold program was set into motion: “aA fi yes
[5231]8 ‘
[5233]C |
[5235]EERE Ss Te ARS
[5240]Y a a
[5242]ee Joavsa'a A. Phillips » pater of Station/in Rio de Janeiro, \was summoned
[5244]AN "back to Washington to head the operation. With the exception of the
[5245]A
[5246]Division Chief, William Broe, his deputy[ Jones Flannery\ and the head a *.
[5247]of the Chile Branch, no other officers in the Division were aware of the _
[5249]task force's activities, not even those officers who normally had respon-
[5251]sibility for Chile. The task force had a special communications channel to
[5253]Santiago and Buenos Aires to compartment cable traffic about Track II.
[5255](November 18, 1970, Helms to Kissinger memo, page 3) Most of the mm
[5256]Significant operational decisions were made by Phillips, Broe and
[5257]Karamessines, who met on a daily basis.
[5259]It should be noted that all those involwed with the task force des-
[5260]cribed the pressure from the White House as intense. Indeed, Karamessines
[5261]has said that Kissinger “left no doubt in my mind that he was under the
[5262]heaviest of Pressure to get this accomplished, and he in turn was plac-
[5266]ing us under the heaviest of pressures to get it accomplished. (Kara-
[5267]messines testimony, August 6, 1975, page 7) The Deputy Chief of the
[5268]Western Hemisphere Division) Janes Flannery, | testified that pressure was ae
[5269]"as tough as I ever saw it in my time there, extreme." (Flannery| ceses- noe
[5270]mony, July 15, 1975, page 20) Broe testified that "I have never gone
[5271]through a period as we did on the Chilean thing. I mean it was just .
[5272]constant, constant....Just continual pressure....1t was coming from the
[5273]White House." (Broe testimony, August 4, 1975, page 55)
[5275]C. The Use of the/army /accache and Interagency Relations
[5279]The CIA Station in Santiago had inadequate contacts within the
[5281]Chilean military to carry out its task. However, [the U.S. Aray| At-
[5283]| <TH wore
[5285]tache in Santiago! Colonel Paul winere,] knew the Chilean military
[5286]: tt, a .
[5288]te
[5289]Hn
[5291]r
[5293]ok Seng ee 5
[5296]. LY
[5297]es ANE ay
[5298]wow le ns
[5300]_ wn , cn Cc an
[5301]very well due-to his |five years of service there and| his broad personal
[5303]tees
[5305]among the Chilean officers, Following a Proposal by the Chief
[5307]1
[5308]of Station, the CIA decided to enlist Colonel Wimeret \in collecting in-
[5310]telligence concerning the possibility of a coup and to use him as a
[5311]channel to let the interested Chilean military know of U. §, support
[5313]for a coup. Karamessines described this procedure for the Committee:
[5315]have, but which we felt confident that our military represen-
[5316]tative in Chile had....And we got the approval of the DIA to
[5317]enlist the cooperation of (Colonel Wimert}in our effort to pro~
[5318]cure intelligence, ~ -
[5319](Karamessines testimony, August 6, 1975, p. 6)
[5320]To obtain Wimerti's Services, CIA officials Prepared a suggested mes—
[5322]Sage for the Director of DIA to send to the[ ray [at cache in Santiago
[5323]through CIA communications channels, Because the DIA Director, General
[5324]Donald V,. Bennett, was in Europe on official business, the Deputy
[5325]Director of Central Intelligence, General Cushman, invited DIA Deputy
[5326]Director Lt. General Jammie M. Philpott to his office on September 28,
[5327]1970.* During that neeting, General Cushman requested the assistance of
[5328]the lirny Jactache, and General Philpott signed a letter which authorized
[5329]trangnigston of a message directing the (army| Attache:
[5331]++-to work closely with the CAS chief, or in his absence,
[5333]his deputy, in contacting and advising the principal mili-
[5334]tary figures who might Play a decisive role in any move which
[5335]might, eventually, deny the presidency to Allende.
[5337]' Do not, repeat not, advise the Ambassador or the Defense At-—
[5338]tache of this message, or give them any indication of its
[5339]portent. In the course of your routine activities; act in
[5340]accordance with the Ambassador's instructions. Simultaneously,
[5341]I wish--and now authorize you--to act in a concerted fashion
[5342]with the CAS chief,
[5344]- ts” - : ms
[5345]ey .
[5347]Fa
[5349]* General Bennett returned to-théd United States on the ‘evening of October
[5352]10, 1970. General Philpott was*
[5354]cting Dfrector in Bennett's absence.
[5358]VL a “
[5360]he
[5362]<3
[5364]Eg
[5366]Sea
[5368]poo -22-
[5369]ann
[5371]“— ? -
[5373]at ON
[5375]. "This message is for your eyes only, and should not be dis~
[5377]4 Sel \ cussed with any person other than those CAS officers who will
[5379]Me " ' " be knowledgeable. CAS will identify them. (Headquarters 380
[5380]: to Santiago)
[5382]For this and all subsequent messages intended for the [sswy Jateacke,
[5383]the secret CIA communications channel was used.
[5385]Both General Philpott and Thomas Karamessines testified that ini-
[5386]tially the (Army! attache would be used only to "obtain Or procure” in~
[5387]telligence on Chilean military officers.* (Philpott, Pp. 11; Karamessines,
[5388]P. 6) The September 28, 1970 message to the/Aray] Attache, however, did
[5389]in fact trigger his deep involvement in the coup attempt. According to
[5390]the Attache's testimony, he received day-to-day instructions from the
[5391]Chief of Station, and on occasion, the COS would show him messages
[5392]ostensibly from Generals Bennett and/or Philpott, directing him to
[5393]take certain actions. The COS also transmitted messages from the [army }
[5394]Attache to these Generals.
[5396]General Bennett testified that he never had knowledge of Track It
[5397]and that he never received any communication relating thereto, nor did
[5398]he ever authorize the transmission of any messages to the army Attache.
[5399]General Philpote also testified that he had no recollection of anything
[5400]connected with Track LI after his initial meeting with General Cushman
[5401]on September 28. (Philpott, p. 16)
[5403]U. S. Army Colonel Robert c. Roth, who in September and October 1970
[5404]was the Chief of the Human Resources Division, Director of Collection, DIA,
[5406]ee ere a eer eeeecemniennnnee
[5408]* In this connection it should be noted thac when questioned about
[5409]this letter, General Philpott testified that. he recalled.signing
[5410]an authorization such as that contained in the first. paragraph of
[5412]Headquarters 380 but that he did not recall .the authorizations and
[5414]instructions in paragraphs two and a al
[5415]“wh a das a
[5417]‘A
[5420]Bains 23-00 ue as
[5422]testified that he recalled working for Generals Bennett and Philpott on
[5423]“a priority requirement to identify Chilean personalities who might be
[5424]helpful in preventing the election of Allende as President of Chile."
[5425](Roth, Vol. I, P- 6) Though Roth recalls ho mention of Track II as such,
[5426]the goal of this mission is identical to that described in the message
[5427]of September 28 bearing Philpote's signature.
[5429]Beginning on October 15, Roth kept a chronology of his activities
[5430]connected with Chile. This chronology reflects that there was a meeting
[5431]on October 21 regarding the preparation of biographic material on Chilean
[5432]generals which focused on their willingness to Participate in a military
[5433]coup. Generals Bennett, Philpott, and a CIA representative attended.
[5435]The chronology also shows that on October 21, Roth delivered a message to
[5437]Mr. Broe to be sent by CIA channels.* A message was sent to cor. Wimertc \
[5438]that same day, ostensibly from General Bennett, which authorized:
[5439]FYI: Suspension temporarily imposed on MAP and FMS has
[5440]been rescinded. This action does not repeat not imply
[5441]change in our estimate of situation. On the contrary,
[5442]it is intended to place us in a posture in which we can
[5443]formally cut off assistance if Allende elected and situa-
[5444]tion develops as we anticipate. Request up date on situa-
[5445]tion. (Santiago 446; Ref: Headquarters 762) (Headquarters
[5446]934, 21 October 1970)
[5447]Roth testified that this DIA project ended on October 23 when he
[5449]followed Philpott's instructions to deliver biographic information on
[5451]Chilean figures to Mr. Broe at CIA. Philpott also instructed him that
[5453]At ra rere anne
[5455]* Roth believes that General Philpott directed him to deliver this
[5456]message and also pressed him on several occasions to seek a re-
[5457]sponse from Broe to an earlier message to (Colonel Wimer ce]. (Roth,
[5458]Vol. II, p. ) ,
[5460]er
[5462]on
[5463]oR
[5466]( of the CIA and that DIA would perform normal support functions." (Roth,
[5468]Both Bennett and Philpott testified that the activities described
[5469]by Roth were routine DIA activities. However, Colonel Roth testified;
[5471]I believe my impression at the time, or my recollection, is
[5472]that I was informed that there was concern at the highest
[5476].Q. Tt was your sense at the time that you were working on a
[5477]project that if it had not been initiated by, at least had
[5478]the attention of or concern of, the highest level?
[5482]* Roth's chronology alse indicates that Philpott had asked that Broe
[5483]be queried on two or three occasions regarding a report from Winer?)
[5484]and that Philpott instructed that only he (Philpott) would communi-
[5486]cate with Cushman if the need arose, (Roth, p. 11) Roth also testi-
[5488]_: fied that Philpott advised him that communications with Wimert \would
[5489]. be by CIA channels. (Roth, p. 41)
[5491]PRMD (AE ars om
[5493]f
[5494]Wap oof Oty i
[5497]vi.
[5500](..
[5503]oe had
[5505]Colonel Roth. That was my impression at the time,
[5506]Q. You understand from your work in the Defense Department
[5507]that the highest level of government usually indicated the
[5508]President of the United States?
[5509]Colonel Roth. I would assume that.
[5510]The CIA produced copies of several messages which identify
[5511]Generals Bennett and Philpott as either the sender or recipient. Among
[5513]these documents is a message relating to Track If which bears Philpott's
[5515]Purported signature. (Undated Message. ca. 14 October 1970) General
[5517]Philpott admitted that the signature appears to be his but doubted that
[5519]it was and he could not recall signing it, or having seen it, (Philpeec,
[5521]p. ) CIA also produced messages of. October 14 (Headquarters 762)
[5522]and October 21 (Headquarters 934) conveying instructions from General
[5523]Bennett to the [Army JActache. General Bennett testified he did not
[5524]authorize these messages:
[5525]Tt is. beyond the responsibilities which I had in the military
[5526]assistance area. It goes beyond the responsibility which I
[5527]action of this magnitude, This message would not have been
[5528]Signed by me. (Bennett testimony, p. 21)
[5529]According to Karamessines, only the White House had the authority to
[5530]issue the directives contained in those messages (Karamessines testi~-
[5532]mony, p. 84)
[5534]The Department of Defense was unable to provide any documents bear-
[5536]ing on the issue of inert} Track II instructions or responses. A
[5538]DOD file search under the direction of General Daniel oO. Graham, the
[5539]Present Director of DIA, Produced no copies of communication documents
[5541]for the September-October 1970 period. (Graham, P- 6) However, Roth
[5543]testified that detailed aie for the record which he prepared on
[5545]'
[5548]his activities are missing ; ‘from the | files. (oth, Vo Il, Pp. )
[5550]i sae
[5551]flee.
[5555]UF il
[5556]oe |
[5560]my’
[5561]_#
[5565]ot ed
[5567]messages to Generals Bennett and/or Philpott and in never sending a
[5568]message without Proper authorization. Mr. Karamessines was Particularly
[5569]forceful in this regard:
[5570]-+-I can recall no instance in my experience at the Central
[5571]Intelligence Agency in which a Message was received for an
[5572]individual, an officer of the B0vernmenc anywhere, in what-
[5573]ever department, which was not faithfully, directly, promptly
[5574]and fully and accurately delivered to that officer, or to his
[5575]duly authorized representative,
[5576](Karamessines testimony, p. 79)
[5577]We may have Played tricks Overseas, but it stopped at the
[5578]water's edge, and we didn't play tricks among ourselves or
[5579]among our colleagues within the Agency or in Other agencies,
[5580]. (Karamessines testimony, p. 79)
[5581]We could not remain in business for a day...if this had been
[5582]the practice of the Agency. [t would have been ho time at
[5583]all before we would have been found out, a single instance
[5584]of the kind of thing you are Suggesting might have taken
[5585]Place would have Put us out of business,
[5586](Karamessines testimony, p. 80)
[5588]Dr. Kissinger denied he was ever informed of the Army ‘Attache's
[5589](7
[5590]“
[5591]role or that he authorized any messages to be sent to the [Army Mat tache,
[5593](Kissinger testimony, p. 22)
[5595]statements of the senior CIA, DIA and White House officials. There are
[5597]four possibilities that could explain the conflict. First, Generals
[5599]Bennett and Philpott were cognizant of Track It and communicated their
[5600]general instructions to the /Arny [at tache, This Possibility would be
[5601]contrary to their sworn testimony. Second, General Bennett was not aware
[5603]of Track IL but General Philpott was and communicated Reneral instructions to
[5604]the /Arny |Attachie. This Possibility is Supported by Roth's testimony
[5606]but would be contrary tc Philpotr's Sworn testimony and his duty to
[5608]keep General Bennett informed. Third, the CIA acted on its own + and,
[5610]after receiving initial authority, from General Philpott, comopted and ordered
[5612]took - n . .
[5614]mys +
[5615]TN.
[5617]prey
[5620]7 yh 26>
[5622]a
[5623]the [Army Attache without further informing any member of the Department
[5624]4 of Defense of the White House. This possibility would be contrary to
[5625]the sworn testimony off David Phitlips,| William Broe, Thomas Karamessines,
[5626]and William Colby. Fourth, members of the White House staff authorized —
[5627]the CIA to convey orders to the hrny| Attache on the basis of high or
[5628]highest government authority. Further, that the White House staff
[5629]directed that the krmy \Attache's superiors in the Pentagon not be in-
[5631]formed. This possibility would contradict the sworn testimony of Dr. ‘6
[5633]Kissinger and General Alexander Haig.
[5635]f \
[5636]D. The /False Flag Base )
[5637]a
[5639]In order to minimize the risks of making contact with the dissident
[5640]Chilean officers, the task force decided in late September to set up a
[5641](“False Flag Base," Ji-e., to send four staff officers to Chile posing as room
[5642]“Nationals of other countries to supplement Colonel Wimert' s contacts
[5644]or zt with Chilean military officers (* )civen the limitations of the Station's
[5646]resources and (colonet Wimert's \visibility, Headquarters felt the use of
[5648]wR te
[5650]("raise Flag officers" \was necessary because "We don't want to miss a
[5651]. - } —
[5652]y
[5653]chance." /One of these officers posed as a (STUzMNA ntelligence officer
[5654]\ _
[5655]so that “any flap would be a GraziifarSone." (Headquarters 363, oa
[5657]September 27, 1970) )
[5660]/ *The use of "False Flag Officers" is not, according to David Phillips, \
[5662]H “an unusual practice," either by the CIA or. Eqrpige intelligence os }
[5663]services. (Phillips testimony, pp. 47~48) ‘ Pp ctre. \ ;
[5665]pO, vA : ee
[5666]F
[5668]oops
[5673]The False Flaggers were compartmented from each other and reported
[5674]separately on their contacts ‘to a "deep cover" CIA of ficer|in Santiago
[5676]who in turn reported to the Station. According to the testimony of the
[5678]oe a
[5680]Chief of Station, they received their instructions from Washington and —
[5682]not from him. (Chief of Station testimony (Felix), August 1, 1975, p. 27) }
[5685]E. Chief of Station
[5687]Although most of the Station officers in Santiago did not know of
[5688]Track II, the Chief and Deputy Chief of Station were knowledgeable and a
[5689]the Chief of Station initiated contacts on his own with Chilean officers. i 7
[5690]The COS has testified that he regarded Track II as unrealistic:
[5692]tohad Left no doubt in the minds*ef my colleagues
[5694]and superiors that I did not consider any kind of \
[5695]intervention in those constitutional processes : oe. :
[5696]desirable....And one of the reasons certainly for my : ‘y
[5697]last recall (to Washington) was to be read: the riot ie
[5698]act--which was done in a very pleasant, but very
[5699]intelligible manner. Specifically, I was told at
[5700]that time that the Agency was not too interested in
[5701]continuously being told by me that certain proposals
[5702]which had been made could not be executed, or would
[5703]be counterproductive. (Chief of Station (Felix)
[5704]testimony, August 1, 1975, p. 10) a .
[5706]nae
[5708]The Chief of Station's objection to Track IL did not go unnoticed.
[5709]The following instruction to the COS was sent on October 7: "Report
[5711]should not contain analysis and argumentation but simply report on
[5713]action taken." (Headquarters 612, 7 October) Very simply, Headquarters
[5715]wanted the Station to take orders quietly as was the Agency itself.
[5718]“om,
[5720]7 ol ener a ~-29-
[5722]CIA Efforts to Promote a Coup
[5723]A. The Chilean Conspirators
[5724]Anti-Allende coup plotting in Chile centered around several key
[5725]individuals. Ome of these was retired General Roberto Viaux, the General
[5726]who had led the "Tacnazo" insurrection a year before. Following the
[5727]“Tacnazo” revolt, and his dismissal from the Army, Viaux retained the
[5728]support of many non-commissioned and junior officers as well as being
[5729]the recognized leader of several right-wing civilian groups. (CIA :
[5730]Briefing Paper, "Special Mandate from the President on Chile," July ~~
[5731]15, 1975)
[5733]Another individual around which plotting. centered was General Camilo
[5735]Valenzuela, Commander of the Santiago Garrison. General Valenzuela was *:
[5737]in league with several other Getive et officers a
[5740]re adit
[5743]iEnOw MINS ealnygcademy, : F :
[5744]Cire) cu Report on Chilean Task Force Activities, November 18, *
[5746]1970) All of these officers, with the possible cxceorson ot GSS : es) ‘ .
[5748]were in contact with Viaux as well.”
[5750]*This revolt was engineered by Viaux ostensibly for the purposes of drama-
[5752]cizing the military's demand for higher pay, but was widely interpreted as
[5753]an abortive coup. ;
[5755]**The record of meetings between Viaux and the active duty military | officers
[5756]is incomplete. The record does show, however, that Viaux met with 2:
[5757]dueicaparound October 7. (Chile Task Force Log, October 7). On Oc
[5759]ober 12
[5760]Taux met with General Valenzuela (Chile Task Force Log, 14 October) .) One
[5762]U
[5764]cable from Santiago indicates that (Admibsiggieadopmay have been a member.
[5765]of Viaux's inner cirgle of conspirators 0b (Station 545, 16 October 1970). y -
[5766]At the very least, eto in contact with Viaux. . i - a
[5767]rst! e . ~ ts ‘ pe
[5769]Although a distinction can be made between the.Viaux and Valenzuela groups,
[5770]as CIA witnesses did throughout their testimony before the Committee, the
[5771]principal distinction between the two was that the latter was led by active duty
[5772]military officers. The two groups were in contact with each other. The
[5774]record also indicates that they worked together in at least two of the three
[5776]Schneider kidnap actempts -
[5778]oe ¥, ~IQ-
[5780]. . s* ws fe
[5781]A mh \ how of
[5783]- Loe
[5784]. ‘ Nae
[5785]sf a
[5788]. ee) - There was considerable communication among the various plotting
[5789]elements. As Thomas Karamessines testified:
[5790]--L might add here that it seemed that a good
[5791]dozen or more, maybe 20 Chilean senior officers tee
[5792]were privy to what was going on (in addition to :
[5793]President Frei nd) they were all talking to one
[5794]another exchanging views and trying to see how
[5795]best to mount the kind of coup that they wanted
[5796]to see take place. (Karamessines testimony, p. 10)
[5797]B. Contacts Prior to October 15
[5798]The CIA's initial task in Chile was to assess the potential within
[5799]the Chilean military to stage a coup. It recognized quickly that anti-
[5800]Allende currents did exist in the military and the Carabineros (police),
[5801]but were immobilized by "the tradition of military respect for the
[5802]Constitution" and "the public and private stance of General Schneider,
[5803]Commander in Chief of the Army, who advocated strict adherence to the
[5804]Constitution.” (CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities, 18 Novem-
[5805]eo ber 1970, p. 17) The Agency's task, then, was to overcome "the apolitical,
[5806]constitutional-oriented inertia of the Chilean military." (Ibid, p. 2)
[5807]Since the very top of the Chilean military, embodied by General &.
[5808]Schneider and his second-in-command, General Prat, were hostile to the
[5809]idea of a coup against Allende, discreet approaches were made to the
[5810]second level of general officers. They were to be informed that the U.S.
[5811]Government would support a coup both before and after it took place.”
[5812](Headquarters to Station 611, 7 October 1970) This effort began in
[5814]f \ .
[5815]earnest on October 5 when Colonel Wimert )informed both an Army General
[5817]("Station's priority contact") an an Air Force General of the pro~coup
[5818]me fie Ss coe 3
[5819]ae |
[5820]ha : i . Diy 7 frames
[5822]*the military officers were told, for example, that should Allende be 7 B
[5824]prevented from taking office, "The Chilean military will not be ostra- —
[5826]cized, but rather can continue to count on us for MAP support and main-
[5828]tenance of our close relationship." (Hqs. 075517, 7 October 1970)
[5832]Rig werd ee Mar then yp on Gy Stee Pegs oe ee
[5833]PE ROO a eta FE
[5835]4
[5837]“73
[5841]U.S. policy. (Santiago 469, October 5; Santiago 473, October 6)"
[5843]XX
[5845]of the Carabineros that “the U.S. Government favors a military solu-
[5847]tion and is willing to support it in any manner short of outright
[5850]military intervention. (Task Force Log, 9 October) (Ga Bue nea
[5851]informed the COS that there was no chance of a coup by the Chilean
[5852]Army high command. (Task Force Log, 10 October)
[5854]On October 7, ‘Colonel wimert \approached members of the War Academy
[5856]in Santiago who in turn asked him to provide light weapons. This was
[5858]f N\
[5860]f \ ?. “
[5861]‘Colonel Wimert!s first contact with the Army (Ca Gollenei whom he
[5862]: Sd .
[5866]would ultimately pass-three submachine guns «on October 22. At this
[5868]meeting, the f ; eM) told (Colonel Winert] that. he and his colleagues
[5870]were
[5872]trying to exert force on Frei to eliminate
[5873]Gen. Schneider to either replace him, send
[5874]him out of the country. They had even stud-
[5875]ied plans to kidnap him. Schneider is the
[5876]main barrier to all plans for the military
[5877]to take over the government to prevent an
[5878]Allende presidency. (Santiago 483, 8 October)
[5880]* according. to the CIA's wrap-up report on Track II, between October 5
[5882]and October 20, the CIA Station and che (Army Attache--for the most part
[5883]the latter--made 21 contacts with key military and Carabinero officials.
[5884](CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities, 8 November 1970)
[5886]w* | megrereioreerE fo Sox
[5887]In his testimony, (Colonel Wimert) indicated that the \Gee footone!
[5889]affiliated with General GEREN" (Wimert Yestimon : a able
[5890]sent to Headquarters on October 18,° in which the Casares request
[5891]for three submachine guns was made, the Station indicated that Wimert)
[5892]believed the Army officer, and his companion, a vay aan rere in
[5893]league with Admiral (MENGG06 (station 562, October 18}~-At another point
[5894]in his testimony, \Wimert jstated, "There was Valenzuela here and the Navy
[5895]Captain’ and the Army (t.’ Colonel} and the Air Fotce General over here."
[5896](Wimert )testimony, p. 107) :The Committee has been unable to determine my
[5898]the exact affiliation of the Arny Ce. Colone mv lowever, as previously ,
[5899]stated, both General (Ganaesy” nd Adinirangiitrado)were affiliated with
[5901]General Valenzuela and Admiral [itrado iwas in contact with General Viaux.
[5905]r
[5907]z
[5909]aT
[5911]|
[5918]a EA The next day, October 8, Headquarters cabled the Station in response
[5919]. i /.. geo = .
[5920]( to the( Wimert fs (Galas) meeting. Headquarters took note of Schneider's
[5922]resistance to coup plans and stated:
[5926]».-This would make it more important than _
[5928]ever to remove him and to bring this new
[5930]state of events...anything we or Station
[5932]can do to effect removal of Schneider? We
[5934]know this rhetorical question, but wish
[5936]inspire thought on both ends on this matter.
[5937](Hqs. 628, 8 October)
[5939]During the first week of intensive efforts chances of success
[5941]Tee Im
[5942]| me
[5944]looked unusually bleak. The Chile Task Force Log commented:
[5946]frresident Frei and |the highest levels of the
[5947]armed forces unable to pull themselves together
[5948]to block Allende. The Chilean mMitary's tradi-
[5949]tion of non-intervention, Frei's reluctance to
[5950]tarnish his historical image, General Schneider's
[5951]firm constitutional stand, and most importantly,
[5952]the lack of leadership within the government and
[5953]military are working against a military takeover.
[5954](Task Force Log, 8 October)
[5956]2
[5958]The following day the Station made reference to the “rapid(ly) waning
[5960]chances for success." (Santiago 487, 9 October) This pessimism was not
[5961]dispelled by their simultaneous judgment: "Station has arrived at Viaux
[5962]solution by process of elimination." (Santiago 504, 10 October) Three
[5963]days later the Task Force agreed: "We continue to focus our attention
[5964]on General Viaux who now appears to be the only military leader willing
[5965]to block Allende." (Task Force Log, 13 October)
[5967]If Viaux was the CIA's only hope of staging a coup, things were bleak
[5969]rae
[5971]Z \.
[5972]indeed. His own colleagues, General‘s(Wuenta and Walenzuela described him
[5973]oN og
[5977]as "a General without an army." (Santiago 495, 9 October) Yet in the :
[5979]first two weeks of October he came to be regarded as the‘ best hope for. Was”
[5981]carrying out the CIA's Track II mandate. yf _ F
[5983]— os eect nd
[5990]4
[5993]Although (Colonel Wimert |was instructed not to involve himself with
[5997](~ a Viaux because of the high risk involved (Santiago 461, 5 October), he
[5999]served initially as a contact to Viaux through /an (eee nititary
[6001]Attache. The |@QEEHEITS) reported on October 5 that Viaux wanted several
[6002]hundred paralyzing gas grenades to launch a coup on October 9. (Santiago
[6003]476, 6 October) Headquarters turned down the request, concluding that
[6005]a “mini~coup at this juncture would be counterproductive" and Viaux
[6006]should postpone his plans, “while encouraging him in a suitable manner
[6008]to maintain his posture so that he may join larger movement later if
[6010]it materializes."
[6012](Headquarters 585, 6 October)
[6013]The primary purpose of the ("False Flag hase"|was to contact Viaux,
[6014]and it very rapidly relieved (Wimert and the (AEEEHEMERS Attache) of that +
[6015]task. Viaux reiterated his demand for an air drop of weapons to the
[6016]“False Flagger!,": and again the response was the same: reject the demand
[6017]( for arms, but encourage him to keep planning. In essence the Agency
[6018]was buying time with Viaux: "We wish to encourage Viaux to expand and
[6019]refine his coup planning. Gain some influence over his actions."
[6020](Headquarters 689, 10 October) To achieve this latter purpose, Head-
[6021]quarters authorized passing $20,000 in cash and a promise of $250,000
[6023]in life insurance to Viaux and his associates, as a demonstration of
[6025]U.S. support. (Headquarters. 729, 13 October)
[6027]On October 13, Headquarters again indicated its concern over Schneider
[6028]by asking: "What is to keep Schneider from making statement in early
[6029]hours which will freeze those military leaders who might otherwise join
[6031]Viaux?" (Headquarters 729, 13 October) The Station's response later that
[6033]same day was "Viaux intends to kidnap Generals Schneider and Prats within — ; i{
[6035]hort t
[6037]a the next 48 hours in order to precipitate a coup." (Santiago 527,
[6042]ae poor bey S
[6043]AY . ‘* .
[6044]i eas Oc Ober) * This Viaux kidnapping of Schneider was reported by the Sta-
[6046]4!
[6048]tion "as part of a coup that included Valenzuela." (Station 529, 13 October)
[6049]( At about this time the Station began to receive encouragement from its
[6051]other contacts. On October 14, ten days before the Chilean Congress was
[6053]LL
[6054]to vote, the Task Force Log concluded:
[6055]Now we are beginning to see Signs of increasing
[6056]coup activity from other military quarters,
[6057]specifically,an Army General (name deleted),
[6058]Admiral @EMEAd) the forces in Concepcion and ;
[6059]Valdivis /and perhaps even Frei and Gs 0G ‘,
[6060](Task Force Log, 14 Octobér) w
[6061]C. October 15 Decision
[6062]To summarize, by October 15, General Viaux had advertised to his con-
[6063]tact a desire to proceed with a coup, had ifdicated he would deal with
[6064]the Schneider obstacle by kidnapping him, had met at least once with Gen- >
[6065]era Eeyore Valenzuela and had once postponed his coup plans.* vom
[6067]On October 15 Thomas Karamessines met Henry Kissinger and Alexander
[6068]( ; Haig at the White House to discuss the situation in Chile. According
[6070]to the Agency's record of this meeting, Karamessines “provided a run-
[6071]4 i]
[6073]down on Viaux, the (BB ccrine with/f¢isitead
[6075]» and, in some detail,
[6076]‘ ,
[6078]the general situation in Chile from the coup-possibility viewpoint."
[6079](Memorandum of Conversation/Kissinger, Karamessines, and Haig, 15 October
[6080]1970) A decision was made at the meeting "to de-fuse the Viaux coup plot,
[6082]at least temporarily:"
[6084]* The reason for Viaux postponing his coup plans was the subject of a cable
[6085]from Santiago to Headquarters:
[6087]We discount Viaux's statement that he had called off his coup at-
[6088]tempt because of (False Flag Officer} s impending visit. Other re-
[6089]porting indicated Viaux probably not able or intending move this
[6090]weekend. (Santiago 499, 10 October)
[6094]“4
[6096]“18
[6098]Sih
[6100]There is also reason to believe that General Valenzuela was instrumental
[6101]in persuading Viaux to postpone. According to the Chile Task Force Log:
[6103]|
[6105]Station reported that on 12 October General Valenzuela met
[6106]with General Viaux and attempted to persuade him not to at-
[6107]tempt a coup." (Chile Task Force Log, 14 October)
[6109]: E274 spon wo te he
[6110]e090 $e * DR ot BE oer aoe Re ee Te
[6115]“\ \ ft was decided by those present that the Agency
[6116]7. must get a message to Viaux warning him against
[6117]’ any precipitate action. In essence the message
[6119]should state: "We have reviewed your plans and
[6120]based on your information and Ours, we come. to
[6122]the conclusion that your plans for a coup at
[6123]this time cannot succeed. Failing, they may re-
[6124]duce your capabilities in the future. Preserve —
[6125]your assets. We will stay in touch. The time
[6126]will come when you with all your other friends
[6127]can do something. You will continue to have
[6128]our support.” (15 October Memorandum of Conver-
[6129]sation, Kissinger, Karamessines, Haig)
[6131]The meeting concluded, according to the Agency's record, "on Dr. *
[6132]Kissinger's note that the Agency should continue keeping the pressure
[6133]on every Allende weak spot in sight--now, after the 24th of October,
[6134]after 5 November, and into the future until such time as new marching
[6136]orders are given. Mr. Karamessines stated that the Agency would comply.'**
[6138]Paarl
[6139]my
[6141]The following day CIA Headquarters cabled the results of the White
[6142]House meeting to the Station in Santiago:
[6144]2. It is firm and continuing policy that Allende
[6145]be overthrown by a coup....We are to continue to
[6147]generate maximum pressure toward this end utiliz-
[6148]ing every appropriate resource.
[6150]3. After the most careful consideration it was
[6151]determined that a Viaux coup attempt carried out ; —
[6152]by him alone with the forces now at his disposal
[6153]would fail. Thus it would be counterproductive
[6154]to our Track Two objectives. It was decided that
[6155]CIA get a message to Viaux warning him against
[6156]precipitate action. (Headquarters 802, 16 Octo~
[6157]ber)
[6159]The message was supplemented by orders to "continue to encourage him
[6160](Viaux) to amplify his planning; encourage him to join forces with other
[6161]coup planners." (Headquarters 802, 16 October) The message concluded:
[6163]“There is great and continuing interest in the activities of
[6165]0 —_
[6166](ext) Valenzuela et al and we wish them optimum good fortune." (Ibid.) E
[6167]Cr
[6169]x -
[6170]Secretary Kissinger's recollection of the October 15 meeting is not ‘ ‘
[6171]in accord with that of Mr. Karamessines or the cable (Headquarters 802)
[6173]that was sent the following day to the Station in Santiago. This mat-
[6175]ter will be discussed in Part V of this report.
[6180]*Two coup plotters, Generals (6% x
[6181]persuade General Schneider to change his dnti-coup position on October 15.) °
[6183]Q
[6185]oy A | =36-
[6188]ejon October L?. The@ilagihiay responded that it did not
[6189]matter because they had decided to proceed with the coup in any case.
[6191]y
[6192](Santiago 533, 17 October) At the final meeting of the CIA/"False
[6193]- . \
[6195]rather:
[6198]Flagger") and Viaux's inewawyon October 18, the Agency was in-
[6200]formed that the coup would proceed on October 22, "and that the abduc-
[6201]tion of General Schneider is first link in chain of events to come."
[6202](Santiago 568, 19 October) An "emergency channel" of communication
[6204]with Viaux was maintained. (Report on CIA Chilean Task -Force Activities,
[6205]18 November 1970, page 21) ~
[6207]As previously stated, by mid-October things suddenly looked brighter
[6210]for a coup being mounted by the high-level Chilean military contacts.
[6212]4s a CIA overview statement in Track II stated:
[6214]Coup possibilities afforded by the active
[6215]duty militar feroup led by General Valenzuela
[6216]and Admiral (iiirada) had always seemed more
[6217]promising than" the capabilities of the Viaux
[6218]group. These military officers had the abil~
[6219]ity and resources to act providing they de-
[6220]cided to move and organized themselves ac~
[6221]cordingly. ;
[6222](CIA Briefing Paper, "Special Mandate from
[6223]the President on Chile," July 15, 1975, p. 5)
[6225]By mid-October those military officers appeared to be moving in
[6226]this direction.
[6228]On the evening of October 17, Colonel Wimert)met with the Army(t?
[6229]ok. .
[6231]GoronelN\and the Navy Serpent) They requested 8 to 10 tear gas grenades,
[6233]Pa *
[6235]ou .
[6236]and Caria), made one last attempt to
[6238]The Station reported that the meeting turned out: to be a “complete fiasco.
[6239]Schneider refused to listen to General @anaWes\eloquent presentation of
[6240]Communist action in Chile...and adament in maintaining his non-involvement
[6241]stance." (Santiago 548, 16 October)
[6243]OF ERE ab, Sea iin i eae
[6245]jo
[6247]pee
[6249]as
[6251]1 Re
[6253]r
[6258]. ‘three “45-caliber machine guns and 500 rounds of ammunition. The Navy
[6260]by serial numbers as having been issued to him. Therefore unable to
[6261]use them." (Santiago 562, 18 October) (colonel Wimert land the Chief
[6263]of Station have testified that the officers wanted the machine guns
[6265]for self-protection. The question, of course, is whether the arms were
[6266]intended for use, or were used, in the kidnapping of General Schneider.
[6267]The fact chat the weapons were provided che @OMCSTETEN) and the Navy
[6269]recon.
[6270]Gaptaiin Err that Viaux associates were convicted of the Schneider killing
[6272]f
[6273]7
[6275]suggests that the guns were not involved.
[6277]The machine guns and ammunition were seat from Washington by diplo-
[6278]matic pouch on the morning of October 19, although Headquarters was
[6279]puzzled about their purpose: "Will continue make effort provide them
[6281]but find our credulity stretched by Navy)
[6283]Gaptad 7 eading his troops
[6285]‘EE
[6287]with sterile guns. What is special purpose for these guns? We will
[6288]try send them whether you can provide explanation or. not." (Headquarters
[6290]854, 18 October) The first installment was delivered to the aray QE
[6292]x, '
[6294]OO
[6295]eStore) and the savy CE, late in the evening of October 18 and con~
[6297]sisted of the six tear gas grenades intended originally for Viaux.*
[6299]* As previously stated, after October 15 CIA efforts to promote a coup in
[6300]Chile focussed on the active duty military officers--Valenzuela, et. al.--
[6301]rather than Viaux.g6An example of this Ss ift_in focus was the decision to
[6302]provide the Army Cowonelly and the Army (Gapivaim) the tear gas grenades
[6303]originally intended for Viaux. A cable from Santiago explained the purpose of
[6304]this action: . - 0
[6306]Station plans give six tear gas grenades to
[6308](Colonel Wimert) for delivery to Armed Forces
[6310]officers (deletion) instead of having(False
[6312]Flag Officer) deliver them to Viaux group.
[6314]Our reasoning is chat Wimert)dealing with a
[6316]active duty officers. Also’False Flagger)
[6318]leaving evening 18 October, and will not be
[6320]replaced but(Wimert) will stay here. Hence
[6322]important that(Wimert) credibility with Armed
[6324]Forces officers be strengthened.
[6325](Santiago 562, 18 October)
[6327]‘A/S
[6329]‘ea.
[6333]ae yt . ‘, “
[6335]hots : _
[6337]“sy ! That same day, General Valenzuela informed/Colone1 Wimert) that he,
[6339](General Huerta, Admiral Tirado and an Air Force General’ were prepared
[6340]7
[6342]\ “
[6344]coo
[6346]“tO sponsor a coup. (CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities, 18
[6347]November 1970) Their plan was to begin with the kidnapping of General
[6348]Schneider on the following evening, October 19, at a military
[6350]dinner being given for Schneider ,* after which Schneider would be flown
[6352]to Argentina, Frei would resign and leave Chile, Admiral [Tirado \rould
[6356]head the military junta, and dissolve Congress. With respect to the
[6358]kidnapping of Schneider, the cable reports: -
[6360]General Viaux knowledgeable of above operation
[6361]but not directly involved. He has been sent to
[6362]Vina to stay with prominent physftian. Will be
[6363]Seen in public places during 19 and 20 October
[6364]to demonstrate fact that above operation not his
[6365]doing. Will be allowed to return to Santiago at
[6366]end of week. Military will not admit involve
[6367]ment in Schneider's abduction which is to be 4
[6368]blamed on leftists. (Santiago 566, 19 October)
[6370]( “ The kidnapping of the evening of October 19 failed because General Schneider
[6372]left in a private vehicle, rather than in his. official car, and his police guard
[6374]failed to be withdrawn, but the Army /f Nassured') colonel Wimert [that an-
[6376]other attempt would be made on October 20. (Santiago 582, 20 October)
[6378]\ Colonel Wimert| was authorized to pay Valenzuela $50,000 “which was the price
[6381]agreed upon between the plotters and the unidentified team of abductors."
[6383]Se
[6384]\ .
[6386]* The("False Flag Officer’) who was in contact with Viaux at the time
[6388]the Valenzuela plan was given to” Colonel Wimert) apparently understood ;
[6390]that Viaux was involved in the October 19 attempt. He stated: ,
[6392]Q. Were you told any of the details of how
[6393]the (Viaux) kidnapping would be carried out? oO mee:
[6395]Mr. Sarno. They indicated it was going to be
[6396]at some sort of a banquet which the General
[6397](Schneider) would be attending.
[6399](Sarno testimony, p. 37)
[6401]Fee ate RS cee re tie gee gee oT -
[6402]sits he} Gre ea a Ee:
[6404]a
[6406]on,
[6408]co,
[6410]st, 4
[6411]: - Ewy gat mee:
[6412]EEE cre ee Oe ok
[6414]“uo.
[6416]Force Log, 20 October)
[6418](Colonel Wimer q)'s testimony and the cable. traffic do
[6419]clearly establish the i
[6421]was affiliated (see page 31 wo CIA statements on Track I
[6422]weapons, and therefore the
[6426]failed and the Task Force concluded
[6428]Since Valenzuela's group is apparently having
[6429]considerable difficulty executing even the first
[6430]step of its coup plan, the prospects for a coup
[6431]succeeding or even occurring before 24 October
[6432]now appears remote. (Task Force Log, 22 October)
[6434]The Killing of General Schneider
[6437]In the early morning hours of October 22 (2 am), /Colonel Wimert )
[6438]livered the three submachine guns with ammunition to the Arm
[6440]in an isolated section of Santiago. *
[6442]Ry
[6444]entity of the group to which the(@iiz
[6446]COME
[6448]---The only assistance requested by Valenzuela
[6449]to set the plan /of October 19/ into motion
[6450]through Schneider's abduction was several sub~
[6451]machine guns, ammunition, a few tear gas grenades
[6452]and gas masks (all of which were provided) plus
[6453]$50,000 for expenses (which was to be passed upon
[6454]demand.
[6455](CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities,
[6456]18 November 1970, p. 22)
[6458]-..Three sub-machine guns, together with six gas
[6459]cannisters and masks, were passed to the Valen
[6460]zuela group at 2 am on 22 October. The reason
[6461]why they still wanted the weapons was because
[6462]there were two days remaining before the Congress
[6463]decided the Presidential election and the Valen-
[6464]zuela group maintained some hope they could still
[6465]carry out their plans. oN
[6466](CIA Briefing Paper, "Special Mandate from the
[6467]President on Chile," p. 7, July 15, 1975)
[6469]tie the
[6470]olonely to the Valenzuela group:
[6472]_  but(Wimert)insisted that the kidnapping be completed before he paid the
[6473]money. (Task Force Log, 20 October) At the same time General Valenzuela
[6474]assured Colonel Wimert) that the military was now prepared to move. (Task
[6476]The second abduction attempt on the 20th also
[6478](‘a
[6483]aa > 4 At about 7 am that day the group that intended to kidnap General
[6485]C Schneider met to discuss last-minute instructions. According to the
[6487]findings of the Chilean Military Court which investigated the Schneider
[6489]“EN
[6491]killing, neither the neoy CHEB ro: the Navy ORE were there.
[6493]Shortly after 8 am,General Schneider's car was intercepted, on his
[6495]way to work, by the abductorsand he was mortally wounded when he drew
[6497]his handgun in self-defense. The Military Court determined that hand
[6499]gurs had been used to kill General Schneider, although it also found . Me
[6501]that one unloaded machine gun was at the scene of the killing.
[6502]The first Station reports following the Schneider shooting said
[6504]"Military Mission sources claim General Schweider machine gunned on
[6506]way to work" (Santiago 587, 22 October) and "Assailants used grease 7
[6508]guns." (Santiago 589, 22 October) The submachine guns had previously
[6510]been described as “grease guns." Thus the initial reaction of the Station
[6512]was that Schneider had been shot with the same kind of weapons delivered
[6514]co
[6516]rears
[6518]3
[6519]‘ie. Galena
[6521]several hours earlier to the Army =) Santiago then informed
[6523]Headquarters "Station has instructed(Col. Wimert) to hand over $50,000
[6525]if Gen. Valenzuela requests (Santiago 592, 22 October), thus indicating
[6527]that the Station thought the kidnapping had been accomplished by Valen-
[6529]zuela's paid abductors. Later that day, the Station cabled Headquarters:
[6531]* The Military Court determined that those who participated in the
[6532]shooting of General Schneider on October 22 were part of the Viaux-led
[6533]conspiracy. The Court also found that this same group had participated
[6534]in the October 19 and 20 kidnap attempts.
[6536]In June 1972 General Viaux was convicted for complicity in the plot
[6538]culminating in the death of General Schneider. He received a 20-year
[6540]prison sentence for being “author of the crime of kidnapping which re-
[6542]sulted in serious injury to the victim," and a five-year exile for con-
[6544]spiring to cause a military cou Also convicted on the latter charge
[6546](were) Generals Valenzuela snd EE They received sentences of three
[6547]o
[6549]‘years in exile.
[6551]| “ATE ewe mee
[6554]Sea
[6558]2! ‘Station unaware if assassination was pre-
[6560]ac meditated or whether it constituted bungled
[6562]abduction attempt. In any case, it important
[6563]to bear in mind that move against Schneider
[6564]was conceived by and executed at behest of
[6565]Senior Armed Forces officers. We know that
[6566]General Valenzuela was involved,, We also
[6568]near certain thg, Admi ral Gers? Army Goupe
[6569]polonel vehi re tng and involved.
[6571]ehave reason for'be leveing that General
[6572]Viaux and numerous associates fully clued in,
[6573]but cannot prove or disprove that execution
[6574]or attempt against Schneider was entrusted to
[6575]elements linked with Viaux. Important factor
[6576]to bear in mind is that Armed Forces, and not
[6577]retired officers or extreme rightests, set
[6578]Schneider up for execution or abduction....
[6579]All we can say is that attempt against Schneider
[6580]is affording Armed Forces one last opportunity
[6581]to prevent Allende's election if they are willing
[6582]to follow Valenzuela's scenario...
[6584](Santiago 598, 22 October)
[6586]F. Post October 22 Events
[6588]The shooting of General Schneider resulted immediately in a declara-
[6590]tion of martial law, the appointment of General Prats to succeed Schneider
[6592]as Commander in Chief, and the appointment of General Valenzuela as chief
[6594]of Santiago province. These Measures, and others taken, caused the Chile °
[6596]Task Force to make the following initial judgment:
[6598]With only 24 hours remaining before the Congressional
[6599]runoff, a coup climate exists in Chile....The attack
[6600]on General Schneider has produced developments which
[6601]closely follow Valenzuela's plan....Consequently the
[6602]plotters’ positions have been enhanced.
[6604](Chile Task Force Log, 22 October)
[6606]On October 23, Director Helms reviewed and discussed Track If:
[6608]It was agreed...that a maximum effort has been achieved,
[6609]and that now only the Chileans themselves can manage a
[6610]successful coup. The Chileans have been guided to a
[6611]point where a military solution is at least open to
[6612]them. (Task Force Log,~ 24’ October):
[6616]fe nme Oo
[6618]Spee renee bean
[6621]A. September ital er caFi
[6623]September 18 ane »
[6625]Helms and Karamessines met with Kissinger at the White House. As
[6626]Helms' notes of the September 15 meeting indicate, Kissinger wanted a ..
[6627]plan within 48 hours. In the meeting on the 18th, according to CIA —_—
[6628]records, there was little discussion of a military coup. Rather the
[6629]conversation focused on "what economic leverage could be exercised in
[6630]the Chilean situation...." (Memorandum/Meeting with DDP, 18 September)
[6632]The efficacy of economic pressure continued to be a subject of con~ S
[6633]cern during the Last days of September. Apparently that pressure was
[6635]viewed as another inducement to Frei to opt for the "Frei gambit."
[6639]September 21
[6640]The 40 Committee met. The Select Committee has no confirmation
[6642]that Chile was on the agenda at this meeting. Karamessines' calendar : ppm
[6644]confirms that he attended; presumably Kissinger, the 40 Committee chair-
[6646]man, also attended, although the Committee has not been able to review
[6648]his calendar. All that can be said about this meeting--and the meetings :
[6650]of the Senior Review Group, which Kissinger also chaired--is that the i
[6652]meetings afforded Karamessines and Kissinger an opportunity to meet
[6654]privately and discuss Track II if they desired. In all these instances
[6656]save the 40 Committee meeting on September 22, the Committee has no
[6657]evidence to confirm that such a private Kissinger/Karamessines neeting
[6658]actually took place. That the CIA prepared a memorandum of conversa~
[6659]tion for the private meeting on the 22nd but has been able to find none
[6661]for other meetings may provide some support for the argument that no
[6663]other such private meetings occurred.
[6665]jun
[6667]September 22 , an
[6670]Kissinger asked Karamessines to stay behind ante et a G0 Gora ead a
[6671]Lee Bh
[6673]. me EX “
[6674]meeting called to discuss Track I. The two bet aus Boa Tl actions,
[6676]ceria the contacts with then-Chilean- ~President Fret.) According to
[6679]<r ae | Kissinger told Karamessines that “our
[6681]andling of the Problem during the earlier meeting had been perfect
[6682]and he added we were doing fine and keep it up.” (Memorandum for
[6683]the Record/Chile, 22 September 1970, by Thomas Karamessines)
[6685]B. October
[6687]October 5
[6689]A cable sent to Santiago, released by Karamessines, requested a
[6690]report on how the Station planned to contact the three Chilean Generals
[6691]-frrats,) Valenzuela /and CEE -naned in a cable of September 30.
[6692](Headquarters 449) The October 5 cable indicated that the report was
[6693]needed for a discussion with Kissinger on October 6. (Santiago 556,
[6695]5 October 1970) Karamessines Presumed such aa meeting had taken place,
[6696]although he had no specific memory of it. (Karamessines testimony,
[6697]pp- 69-70) His calendar for October 6 indicates that he attended a 40
[6698]Committee meeting on Chile. (Karamessines calendar) Kissinger
[6699]chaired the 40 Committee. .
[6700]October 6 .
[6702]‘The Station reported that General Viaux was “ready to launch golpe
[6703]evening 9 October, or morning 10 October." (Santiago 472, 6 October.
[6704]1970) “In response, CIA Headquarters labeled the prospective coup one
[6705]“with scant chance of Success which will vitiate any further more seri-
[6706]ous action." The Station was directed to try to "stop ill-considered
[6707]action at this time." (Headquarters 585, 6 October 1970)
[6709]Kissinger testified he had not been informed of the Viaux pian,
[6710]Supporting his recollection with the fact that the CIA memorandum of
[6711]an October 10 conversation between Karamessines and Haig (see below)
[6713],
[6715]makes no mention of any previous’ plots. (Kigsinger testimony, p. 24)
[6720]t
[6721]' iF
[6724]tee gare
[6726]- 47a -
[6729]It seems to me, although the records don't re~
[6730]flect it, that there waS a meeting in September
[6731]a very brief one, in which I must have been
[6732]told that there was a Specific program going
[6733]underway. That probably would have been by
[6734]Henry (Kissinger) and -perhaps with Karamessines
[6735]there. I am not sure. (Haig testimony, p: 12)
[6737]October 10
[6738]Karamessines discussed the Chilean situation by telephone with General
[6739]Haig. He indicated that the Station had "made direct contact with a number
[6740]of the senior military officers, especially those who had been reportedly
[6741]very activist-minded and had received pessimistic reactions from ali."
[6742]- 2
[6743](Memorandum (MUBELT, by William Broe, 10 October 1970)
[6744]Haig recalled the. telephone conversation with Karamessines on the 10th.
[6745]His recollection accords with the CIA memorandum of conversation,
[6746]I do know, and I know that from looking at the
[6747]record this morning, that Karamessines made a
[6748]telephone call to me in which he gave a’ progress
[6749]report. I recall that. It was in effect a nega-
[6751]tive progress report, that they were just not com
[6752]ing up with it. (Haig testimony, p. 12)
[6756]_ 7 ‘ . : . — 5 a uy
[6758]7
[6760]rd
[6762]4 ‘o) Maig indicated to the Committee that he would have Passed along the
[6763]. Substance of that conversation to Kissinger, and that in general his
[6764]role at the time was one of a conduit to Kissinger:
[6766]Zo am quite confident that, given my own concep~
[6768]tion of my role at that time, that I would have
[6770]conveyed that information to Henry,...
[6772](Haig testimony, p. 13)
[6773]Rk
[6775]Q. If Mr. Karamessines was unable to see Dr.
[6776]Kissinger, and talked to you, what degree of
[6777]latitude did you have concerning what you would
[6778]Pass on to Dr, Kissinger?
[6780]General Haig. At that time I would consider I
[6782]had no degree of latitude, other than to convey
[6783]to him what had been given to me. (Ibid., p-. 15)
[6785]October 14
[6787]A cable to Santiago for Colonel Wimert} ostensibly from General
[6789]. 7
[6791]Bennett, authorized (Wimert|to select two Chilean general officers and
[6792]convey to them the following message: "High authority in Washington
[6793]has authorized you to offer material Support shore of armed interven-
[6794]tion to Chilean Armed Forces in any endeavors they may undertake to
[6795]prevent the election of Allende On October 24,..," (Headquarters to
[6796]Station cable 762, October 14, 1970) Karamessines testified that in
[6797]this case "high authority" would have been Kissinger or the President,
[6798]for no one else could have given (wimert) such broad authorization.
[6799]Karamessines Presumed that the message had been drafted in, or at
[6800]least cleared with, the White House. (Karamessines testimony, p. 91)
[6802]However, Kissinger did not recall having authorized the October l4th
[6803]cable. He found the Sequence of events puzzling: having been told on
[6805]the 10th that little was happening, he would have expected in the
[6807]7
[6808]t
[6809]i.
[6811]4
[6813]re
[6815]1
[6817]an
[6820]° - a. a re |
[6824]October 15
[6826]Karamessines met with Kissinger and Haig at the White House to dis-
[6828]cuss Track II. According to the CIA memorandum of conversation, Karamessines
[6830]C}
[6831]gave a run-down on viaux, Cry and Psi “the general situation in
[6833]Chile from the coup~possibility viewpoint." It was concluded that Viaux
[6834]did not have more than one chance in twenty-~perhaps less-~to launch a
[6835]successful coup. Kissinger ticked off the list of negative repercussions
[6837]from an unsuccessful coup. The CIA record of the meeting continues:
[6839]5. It was decided by those present that the
[6840]Agency must get a message to Viaux warning him
[6841]against any precipitate action. In essence our
[6842]mesSage was to state: "We have reviewed your
[6843]plans, and based on your information and ours,
[6844]we come to the conclusion that your plans for a
[6845]coup at this time cannot succeed. Failing,
[6846]they may reduce your capabilities for the future.
[6847]Preserve your assets. We will stay in touch.
[6848]The time will come when you with all your other
[6849]friends can do something. You will continue to
[6850]have our support."
[6852]6. After the decision to de=fuse the Viaux coup
[6853]plot, at least temporarily, Dr. Kissinger instruc-
[6854]ted Mr. Karamessines to preserve Agency assets in
[6855]Chile, working clandestinely and securely to main-
[6856]tain the capability for Agency operations against
[6857]Allende in the future.
[6859]8. The meeting concluded on Dr. Kissinger's note
[6860]that the Agency should continue keeping the pres-
[6861]sure on every Allende weak spot in sight~-now,
[6862]after the 24th of October, after 5 November, and
[6863]into the future until such time as new marching
[6864]orders are given. Mr. Karamessines stated that
[6865]the Agency would comply.
[6867](Memorandum of Conversation/Dr. Kissinger, Mr.
[6868]Karamessines, Gen. Haig at the White House, 15
[6869]October 1970)
[6871]tha a |
[6876]He
[6878]‘ \ . .
[6880]meeting on the .l5th_(see below) to have discussed the Yesults of the
[6881]NTA LN
[6883]‘ qj phOctober 14th message. But the CIA record makes no mention of any
[6885]ty jo Fee SCs BEER
[6887]such ‘discussion. (Kissinger testimony, p. 53)
[6889]he
[6890]ae be
[6891], é
[6892]October 14 —
[6893]The Senior Review Group met to discuss Chile. (Karamessines calendar)
[6894]October 15
[6895]Karamessines met with Kissinger and Haig at the White House to dis-
[6896]cuss Track II. According to the CIA memorandum of conversation, Karamessines Mi
[6897]gave a run-down on Viaux, 4c a3and {libes and "the general situation in ~
[6898]Chile from the coup~possibility viewpoint." It was concluded that Viaux
[6899]did not have more than one chance in twentye-perhaps less--to launch a
[6900]Successful coup. Kissinger ticked off the list of negative repercussions
[6901]from an unsuccessful coup. The CIA record of the meeting continues:
[6903]5. It was decided by those present chat the
[6904]Agency must get a message to Viaux warning him
[6906]against any precipitate action. In essence our
[6908]MesSage was to state: "We have reviewed your
[6910]plans, and based on your information and ours,
[6912]we come to the conclusion that your plans for a
[6914]coup at this time cannot succeed. Failing,
[6916]they may reduce your capabilities for the future. —
[6917]Preserve your assets. We will stay in touch.
[6919]The time will come when you with all your other
[6921]friends can do something. You will continue to
[6923]have our support."
[6925]6. After the decision to de-fuse the Viaux coup
[6927]plot, at least temporarily, Dr. Kissinger instruc-
[6929]ted Mr. Karamessines to preserve Agency assets in
[6931]Chile, working clandestinely and Securely to main- :
[6933]tain the capability for Agency operations against .
[6934]Allende in the future. ’
[6936]8. The meeting concluded on Dr. Kissinger's note
[6938]that the Agency should continue keeping the pres-
[6940]Sure on every Allende weak Spot in sight--now,
[6942]after the 24th of October, after 5 November, and pers
[6943]into the future until such time as new marching Pe:
[6944]orders are given. Mr, Karamessines stated that _—
[6946]the Agency would comply. : ,
[6947](Memorandum of Conversation/Dr. Kissinger, Mr.
[6948]Karamessines, Gen. Haig at the White House, 15
[6949]October 1970)
[6951]E eR oat Rs CRIMES At ceren pee rch :
[6952]PASE EON ae
[6954]SA eh go
[6958]. -50-
[6959]Pan 4h
[6961]Kissinger in his testimony before the Committee, regarded the CIA
[6963]{i *". memorandum of conversation as substantially correct, although somewhat
[6964]4 more detailed than he would have remembered. (Kissinger testimony, p. 52)
[6965]He believed the Agency had been told to “stand down and preserve your
[6966]assets,"
[6968]Kissinger believed that the gist of the October 15th meeting as ©
[6969]recorded in the CIA memorandum was incompatible with the order the CIA
[6970]issued to its Station the next day, an order ostensibly based on the
[6971]October 15th meeting. And, he noted, in writing its memorandum of the
[6972]meeting of the 15th, the CIA had a “high incentive to preserve the maxi-
[6973]mum degree of authority." (Ibid., pp. 55-5@) The October lé6th order °
[6974]indicated that Track II had been reviewed at "high USG level" the previous t
[6976]day, and stated:
[6978]2. It is firm and continuing policy that Allende
[6979]be overthrown by a coup. It would be much prefer- -
[6980]( able to have this transpire prior to 24 October
[6981]*nase= but efforts in this regard will continue vigorously
[6982]beyond this date....
[6984]6
[6985]4, There is ergatvand continuing interest in the
[6986]activities of i (polesy \Valenzuela et al
[6987]and we wish them optimum good fortune.
[6989](Headquarters 802, 16 October 1970)
[6990]Kissinger recalled the October 15th conversation as “turning off
[6991]the coup plans rather than giving a new order to do them." (Kissinger
[6992]testimony, p. 56) Haig agreed in his testimony.
[6994]The conclusions of that meeting were that we had
[6995]better not do anything rather than something. that
[6996]was not going to succeed....My ‘general feeling
[6997]was, I left that meeting with the impression that ;
[6998]there was nothing authorized." ~*~ , ;
[7000](Haig testimony, p. 13) pre.
[7001]: mee . hot
[7003]eee yt ar Eee
[7004]2 RR Ae i
[7006]TE SN
[7008]my Loage L[urther warned that "the US must not appear publicly in
[7009]the matter, thus civing the ‘kiss of death! to its Friends”
[7010](Cable, Lodya to Uarriman, 8/26/63).
[7012]* AY-56855 Docld: 32202467 Page 141
[7016]In a cable on August 25, CIA |chief of |Seation [ohn Richardson\
[7017]reported the result of a conference among himself, Lodge, True-
[7018]heart, General Harkins (Commander, Military Assistance Command,
[7019]Vietnam (MACV) and General Weede (Chief of Staff, MACV). They
[7020]accepted Deptel 243 "as a basic decision from Washington and
[7021]would proceed to do their best to carry out instructions", (I.G.,
[7022]C, pp. 7-8) but believed that Diem would refuse to remove his
[7023]brother from his position in the government.
[7025]Early in the morning of August 26, 1963, the Voice of America
[7026]in South Vietnam placed the blame on Nhu for the August 21 raids.
[7027]and absolved the army. The broadcast also reported speculation
[7028]that the United States contemplated Suspending aid to the South
[7029]Vietnamese Government (Pentagon Papers, Pp. 212) .* Later on that
[7030]same day, Lodge presented his credentials to Diem. CIA officers
[7031]Conein and [Spera| were told to see Generals Khiem and Khanh,
[7032]respectively, and to convey to them the substance of Deptel 243,
[7033]but to remind them that "we cannot be of any help during initial
[7034]action of assuming power of state. Entirely their ow action,
[7035]win or lose" (BATG 0304, 8/26/63).
[7037]A message from the White House on August 29 authorized
[7038]Harkins to confirm to the Vietnamese Generals that the United
[7039]States would support a coup if it had a good chance of succeeding,
[7040]but did not involve United States armed forces. Lodge was autho-
[7042]rized to suspend United States aid at his discretion. (Deptel 272,
[7044]8/29/63.) A cable from the President to Lodge on the same day stated:
[7046]¥*In a cable to Harriman, Lodge complained that the VOA broadcast
[7047]*“ had “complicated our already difficult problem" by eliminating
[7048]pes “the possibility of the generals' effort achieving. surorise."
[7049]( Lodye further warned that “the US must not appear publicly in
[7050]: the matter, thus civing the 'kiss of death' to its Eriends”
[7051](Cable, Ledce to Marriman, 8/26/63).
[7053]HY 50955 Docld: 32202467 Page 142
[7057]against a coup, but suggested that alternative leadership should be
[7058]identified and cultivated. The recommendations were promptly +
[7059]approved by the President. (Pentagon Papers, pp.215-}16)
[7061]On October 3 Conein contacted Minh. ‘finh explained that a
[7062]coup was being planned, anda requested assurances of American
[7063]Support if it were successful. (tinh outlined three courses of
[7064]action, one of which vas the assassination of Sien's brothers,
[7066]Nhu and Can (Conein, p.25; cable, Saigon to Director, 10/5/63).
[7067]oO
[7069]The {acting Chief of the cra\station, (33s Edgesntke)\ cabled on
[7071]October 5 that he had recommended to Lodge that "we do not set
[7072]ourselves irrevocably against the assassination plot, since the
[7073]other two alternatives mean either a blood bath in Saigon or a
[7074]protracted struggle" (Cable, Saigon to Director, 10/5/63).
[7076]A cable from the Director, CIA to Saigon responded that:
[7078]“(w)e certainly cannot be in the position of stimulating,
[7079]approving, or Supporting assassination, but on the other
[7080]hand, we are in no way responsible for stopping every
[7082]such threat of which we might receive even partial know-
[7083]ledge. We certainly would not favor assassination of Diem.
[7084]We believe engaging ourselves by taking position on this
[7085]matter opens door too easily for probes of our position
[7087]re others, re support of regime, et cetera. Consequently
[7088]believe best approach is hands off, lowever, ,ye naturally
[7089]interested in intelligence on any such plan,"
[7093]* The other courses of action were the encirclement of Saigon
[7094]by various military units and direct confrontation between military
[7095]units involved in the coup and loyalist units.
[7097]** Colby, who was then Chief, Far Eastern Division, drafted
[7098]this cable for McCone. Colby testified:
[7100]"Q: So you were on notice as of that date that the Director
[7101]personally opposed any involvement by the CIA in an assas-
[7102]Sination?-
[7104]“Colby: I certainly was." (Colby, p. 57)
[7106]BDocld: 32202487 Page 143
[7111]-9.
[7113]McCone testified that he met privately with the President and
[7114]the Attorney General, taking the position that “our role was
[7115]to assemble all information on intelligence as to what was
[7116]going on and to report it to the appropriate authorities, but
[7117]to not attempt to direct it" (McCone, P. 62). He believed the
[7119]United States should maintain a "hands off attitude" (McCone,
[7121]P. 62). MeCone testified:
[7123]"I felt that the President agreed with my position, des-
[7124]pite the fact that he had great reservations concerning
[7125]Diem and his conduct. I urged him to try to bring all
[7127]the pressure we could on Diem to change his ways, to
[7128]encourage more support throughout the country. My precise
[7129]words to the President, and T remember them very clearly,
[7130]was that Mr. President, if I was manager of a baseball
[7131]team, I had one pitcher, I'd keep him in the box whether
[7133]he was a good pitcher or not. By that I was saying that,
[7135]_ it did." (McCone, pp. 62-63.)
[7136]McCone stated that he did not discuss assassination with
[7137]the President, but rather “whether we should let the coup go
[7138]Or use our influences not to". He left the meeting believing
[7140]that the President agreed with his “hands off" recommendation
[7143](McCone, pp. 62-63). MeCone cabled SEED on October 6:
[7145]"McCone directs that you withdraw recommendation to
[7146]ambassador (concerning assassination plan) under McCone
[7147]instructions, as we cannot be in position actively con-
[7148]doning such course of action and thereby engaging our
[7149]responsibility therefore" (CIA to Saigon, [DIR 73661,] 10/6/63).
[7151]In response, the CIA Station in Saigon cabled headquarters:
[7153]“Action taken as directed. In addition, since DCM
[7154]Trueheart was also present when original recommendation
[7155]« was ade, specific withdrawal of recommendation at McCone's
[7156]— instruction was Also conveyed to Trueheart. Ambassador
[7157]— Lodge commented that he shares McCone's opinion." (Saigon
[7158]Ne to cra, [sate 1463,\ 10/7/63)
[7160]moo) 6=6Docld: 32202487 Page 144
[7164]None of the informed sources give any indication of direct or .
[7166]indirect involvement of the United States.*
[7168]* It must be noted that on October 30, 1963, Ambassador Lodge
[7169]notified Washington that there might be a request by ked leaders
[7170]for evacuation, and suggested Saipan as a point for evacuation
[7171](Saigon Station Cable /No. 2036), 10/30/63). Conein was charged
[7172]with obraining the airplane... Between 6: and 7:00 on the
[7173]morning of November 2, Minh and Don asked®Conein,to procure an
[7174]aircraft, Conein relayed the request to (availdeomiteh), Acting
[7175]Chief of |Station at the Embassy, who replied that it would not
[7176]be possible to get an aircraft for the next twenty-four hours,
[7177]since it would have to be flown from Guam. Conein testified
[7178]that Smith told him that Diem could be flown only to a country
[7179]that offered him asylum and that the plane could not land in
[7180]any other country. There were no aircraft immediately avail-
[7181]able that had sufficient range to reach a potential country
[7183]of asylum (Conein, p..54). .
[7185]G75 = Docld: 32202487 Page 145
[7187]“lL? pre a po oo
[7188]peor yg | COE mon ge ey
[7190]HW sy Mey sly i.
[7192]Rw ears he: ota? &b
[7194]er ir Bes Mes i
[7196]< United States "as [a] matter of general policy cannot condone
[7198]assassination", although he did state that if the coup succeeded ;
[7199]the United States would support the plotters.
[7200]d. Lumumba
[7201]The chain of events revealed by the documents and
[7202]testimony is strong enough to permit a reasonable inference
[7203]that the assassination plot was authorized by the President.
[7204]It is absolutely clear that Allen Dulles authorized the plot.
[7205]The juxtaposition of discussions concerning "disposing of"
[7206]Lumumba and taking “straightforward action" against him at NSC
[7207]and Special Group meetings with Dulles’ cable to the Congo,
[7208]Bissell's representation co febtetied | about “highest authority"
[7209]( — and the delivery of poison to the Congo can be read to support
[7210]an inference that the President and the Special Group urged
[7211]the assassination of Lumumba.
[7213]Robert Johnson's testimony that he understood the President
[7214]to have ordered Lumumba's assassination at an NSC meeting does,
[7215]as he said, offer a “olue” about Presidential authorization
[7216]which, however, should be read in light of the uncertain record
[7217]of the meetings Johnson attended and the contrary testimony of
[7218]others in attendance at the meetings, including the President.'s
[7219]national security advisors. The fact that both the{ Chief of |
[7220]Station and (Gott 1ib|were under the impression that there was
[7222]Presidential authorization for the assassination of Lumumba
[7224]is not in itself direct evidence of such authorization because
[7226]HW 50955 Docld:32202487 Page 146
[7228]“A
[7230]a airy ~17A-
[7232]eT oar
[7233]ary Bie
[7234]ciog Obs
[7235]this impression was derived solely from) Gott Lieb's] meetings
[7236]with Bissell and Tweedy. Neither (Gore1ieb [nor the {Chief of |
[7237]Station had first-hand knowledge of Allen Dulles' statements
[7238]about Presidential authorization. Richard Bissell assumed
[7239]that such authorization had been conveyed to him by Dulles,
[7240]but Bissell had no specific recollection of any event when.
[7241]this occurred.
[7243]The evidence leads us to conclude that DDP Bissell and
[7244]DCI Dulles knew about and authorized the plot to assassinate
[7245]Lumumba. However, we are unable to make a finding that
[7246]President Eisenhower intentionally authorized an assassination
[7248]effort against Lumumba because of the lack of absolute certainty
[7250]in the evidence.
[7252]HW 50955 Docld: 32202467 Page 147
[7254]<8
[7255]; pote AC oe is
[7256]er Ban Gove om
[7257]“i Ex) vss Oo Apa -19-
[7258]BARRE nia es
[7259]ee Gee 3 ~
[7260]4 First, it assumes that Dulles himself knew of the plots, a
[7262]matter which is not certain. Second, it assumes that Dulles
[7263]went privately to the two Presidents--a course of action
[7264]which Helms, who had far more covert action experience than
[7265]Bissell, testified was precisely what the doctrine of
[7266]plausible denial forbade CIA officials from doing. Third,
[7267]it necessarily assumes that the Presidents would understand
[7268]from a “circumlocutious" description that assassination was
[7269]being discussed.
[7270]The chain of assumptions is far too speculative for the
[7271]Committee to make findings inplicating Presidents who are not
[7272]able to speak for themselves. Moréover, it is inconsistent
[7273]( with Bissell's other testimony that "formal and explicit"
[7274]approval would be required for assassination,* and contrary
[7276]to the testimony of all the Presidential advisors, the men
[7278]closest to both Eisenhower and Kennedy.
[7280]* If the evidence concerning President Eisenhower's order
[7281]to assassinate Lumumba is correct, it should be weighed against
[7282]Bissell's testimony concerning circuulocutious briefings of the
[7283]Presidents in the Castro case. First, the Lumumba case would
[7284]imply that President Eisenhower and Dulles did discuss such
[7285]matters bluntly and not circumlocutiously. Second, the Lumumba
[7286]example indicates that the President would discuss such matters
[7287]openly in an appropriate forum, and would not need to be
[7288]approached privately. Third, it can be inferred from Bissell's
[7289]testimony in the Castro case that if President Eisenhower had
[7290]told Dulles that he approved of the plot, Dulles would not have
[7291]told anyone else of that fact. Yet JGottlieb™s| testimony in the
[7292]Lumumba case states that he had been told 6f Presidential autho-
[7293]rization for assassination by Bissell, who in turn assumed he
[7295]on was told by Dulles. :
[7297]HY 50955 Docld: 32202467 Page 148