[1]180-10131-10325) | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
[3]JFK Assassination System : Date: 10/19/20
[6]Agency Inform ition
[8]AGENCY: HSCA
[9]RECORD NUMBER: = 180-10131-10325
[11]RECORD SERIES: SECURITY CLASSIFIED TESTIMONY
[13]“AGENCY FILENUMBER: 014725
[15]Document Info: mation
[17]ORIGINATOR: HSCA
[18]FROM: TOVAR, BERNARD HUGH .
[19]TO:
[21]TITLE: DEPOSITION OF BERNARD HUGH TOVAR..
[23]DATE: 06/29/1978
[24]PAGES: 48
[27]: CIA, METHODOLOGY
[29]TOVAR, BERNARD HUGH, TES] IMONY BEFORE THE
[30]COMMITTEE ;
[32]OSWALD, LEE, RUSSIAN PERIO ), DEFECTION TO RUSSIA
[34]DOCUMENT TYPE: TRANSCRIPT
[35]CLASSIFICATION : Top Secret
[36]RESTRICTIONS: 3 ;
[37]CURRENT STATUS: — Redact
[38]DATE OF LASTREVIEW: 03/26/1997
[40]OPENING CRITERIA :
[42]COMMENTS : Box 5 - .
[44]v9.1 , 1
[46]NW 48331 DocId:32277210 Page 1
[49]BI
[50]al
[53]el
[59]Ol”
[61]PAGE
[63]TAD erport
[65]Bernard Hugh Tovar
[67]‘TESTIMONY OF:
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[90]‘ASSASSINATION OF JOHN F. KENNEDY
[92]‘Thursday, June 29, 1978
[94].U. S. House of Representatives,
[96]|
[97]| John F. Kennedy Subcommittee of
[98]| Washington, D. C.
[99]| eposition of: -
[101]i — BERNARD HUGH TOVAR
[103]lealies for examination by stiff counsel for the subcommittee,
[105]second and D. Streets, Southwest, Washington, D. Ce, beginning at j
[107]b: :00 o'clock P- m., before Albert Joseph LaFrance, a Notary Publici
[108]i
[110]|
[111]1
[112]|
[113]t
[114]I
[116]|
[120]|
[121]bursuant to notice, in the oj'fices of House Annex II, Room 3370,
[122]|
[123]|
[124]|
[125]|
[126]iin and for the District of Columbia, when were present on behalf |
[128]f the respective parties:
[130]or the Subcommittee:
[132]MICHAEL GOLDSMITH, ESQ. Staff Counsel
[133]ELIZABETH WOLF
[134]For the Deponent:
[136](There was-representaticn by counsel)
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[144]Bernard Hugh Tovar.
[146]_ today. You are here voluni:arily today?
[148]Script of a deposition to he made available to a witness and
[150]to waive the right actually to receive a copy of the transcript.
[152]lUr DEGREL 2
[154]TESTIMONY’ OF HUGH TOVAR
[155]Mr. Goldsmith. State your name for the record.
[157]Mr. Tovar. I sign my name B. Hugh. My full name is
[159]|
[160]i
[161]i
[162]Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Tovar, my name is Michael Goldsmith,
[163]oo | |
[164]Senator Staff Counsel of the Select Committee on Assassinations.
[165].
[166]I.have ‘been designated by he Committee to take your deposition)
[167]| | |
[168]i
[169]| |
[170]Mr. Tovar. Yes. * \
[171]Mr. Goldsmith. You hive the right to have counsel present.
[172]: . . \
[173]Do you waive that rigkt? ‘
[175]Mr. Tovar. Yes.
[177]Mr. Goldsmith. Have vou read a copy of the Committee's
[179]supporting resolution?
[180]Mr. Tovar. Yes.
[182]Mr. Goldsmith. Have vou had a chance to read Rule Number
[183]4?
[185]Mr. Tovar. I have.
[187]‘Mr. Goldsmith. The Committee rules provide for the tran--
[189]actually be delivered for s:etention by any witness that. gives
[191]the Committee’ a statement. However, by virtue of the arrange-
[192]i
[194]ment that the Committee has; worked out with the CIA, the Agency;
[196]has asked us to request Agency employees testifying before us,
[197]; .
[199]iur Ocul
[201]The reason for that is because the transcript frequently
[203]i
[204]|
[205]|
[206]|
[207]2 | will contain classified information and the Agency prefers for |
[208]3 that information to be kept in our secure area here. “So I i
[209]@ 4 would “like to ask you to waive your right to receive a copy of |
[210]5 _ your statement but in so doing, I want to assure you that you,
[211]6 | will be given a right to review. the. transcript for accuracy, |
[212]: ° make comment upon it and if necessary, to give an additional !
[214]$ | Mr. Tovar. I agree. |
[215]10 | Mr. Goldsmith. I would like to inform you that the court
[216]N | reporter will provide you “vith a transcript and the transcript |
[217]12 will be certified by the reporter as a complete, accurate and 2
[218]-. 13 true record of all the tes:imony that you give here today. |
[219], e td ! Now, you are employed by the CIA, is that’ correct? |
[220]18 | Mr. Tovar. Yes. |
[221]16 . Mr. Goldsmith.. I had given you earlier a copy of a. letter, .
[222]i7 | dated 23 March 1978 from M:. Carlucei to the Chairman of this :
[223]13 | Committee. Have you had a chance to read that letter? :
[224]19 | Mr. Tovar. I have. !
[225]20 | Mr. Goldsmith. Do you understand it? |
[226]; 21 | Mr. Tovar. I underst.ind it. 7
[227]o 22 | Mr. Goldsmith. ‘hen { think we are ready to proceed to :
[228]ied 13 | the substance of the questioning. What is. your present position
[229]7 14 : with the CIA? |
[230]- 38 Mr. Tovar. I am the chief of the Counterintelligence
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[237]qos oe SS ee
[239](Ur SLAC
[240]Staff of the Directorate o:} Operations.
[242]|
[243]|
[244]|
[245]Mr. Goitdsmith. How long have you been working in that |
[246]capacity? | |
[247]Mr. Tovar. Ever since: a year ago April. |
[248]Mr.. Goldsmith. How long have you been working with the :
[249]Agency? |
[250]Mr. Tovar. Thirty: yeers.
[251]Mr. Goldsmith. What vas your assignement prior to becom-
[252]ing Chief of the CI Staff? |
[253]Mr. Tovar. I was recently returned from overseas where I
[254]was Station Chief in Bangkck and three years before that,
[256]Chief of the Station in Lacs.
[258]Mr. Goldsmith. Prior to assuming your position as Chief
[260]33
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[273]-of- the CI Staff had you hat. extensive experience in the area of!
[274]counterintelligence? .
[276]Mr. Tovar. No, not perticularly. We don't as a rule
[277]Specialize. We are normally generalists. I do not consider
[278]myself a counterintelligence expert.
[280]Mr. Goldsmith.. Durin¢. the years 1959 to '63 what position, —
[281]did you occupy with the Agency?
[283]Mr. Tovar. In :1959 I was Chief of Station in Kuala: -
[284]Lumpur in Malaysia. .
[286]In 1920, I came back end I was originally Deputy Chief and
[287]then Chief of the Branch ir. Far East. Division which controls |
[288]operations in. the Phillipires, Malaysia, Indonesia, Australia,._
[290]'
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[312]New Zealand, and Oceania. That was until 1964.
[314]i
[316]i
[318]i
[320]| |
[321]Mr. Goldsmith. Have '70u had a chance to review CIA |
[322]document number 1817 and tie pages that follow it? H
[324]Mr. Tovar. Yes, I have read these. I had not read these.
[326]They were released by one of my subordinates, Mr. Friedlander.
[327]. Mr. Goldsmith. Are you telling us that today is the first;
[329]chance you had to read then?
[331]|
[332]1
[333]. . : 1
[334]Mr. Tovar. I did not read. them this time. They went to
[335], !
[336]Mr. Goldsmith. They were prepared by whom?
[337]Mr. Tovar. Jack Friedlander, Chief of Operations. They
[340]|
[341]|
[342]i
[343]|
[344]1
[345]you, to the Committee but { have since read them. i
[346]: |
[347]i
[348]|
[350]1
[351]7 ; , |
[352]were signed by him, not prepared by him. They would have been |
[353]|
[354]originated probably by Mr. Kowalski or Mr. Bradley, I am not
[356]sure which. I think Kowaliki almost certainly. ,
[358]1817 was a response by thé Agency to an inguiry by the ©
[360]Mr. Goldsmith. The memorandum which is labeled CIA No.
[361]1
[362]i
[364]Committee as to whether it was standard operating procedure for
[365]the Agency =) debrief what in effect were repatriated defectors
[366]I believe it is fair to sav by way of summary that the memo
[367]gays that it was not in fact standard operating procedure
[368]during the years 1959 to 153 to debrief such individuals, ‘Is
[370]that correct?
[374]j
[376]i
[378]|
[382]|
[384]i
[386]7 |
[387]Mr. Tovar. Insofar a: I understand it. My knowledge is.
[388]. . |
[390]limited to what I see here before me in the paper. During this:
[392]period in question I was not involved, so I didn't know what _
[394]1Ur weal
[396]4 the current policy was then.
[398]What I have been told: since by those. who should -know is
[399]that there was no policy as set: forth here.
[401]Mr. Goldsmith. Do. you know what the criteria were for
[403]selecting the 117 individuals whose files were reviewed?
[405]|
[406]|
[407]|
[409]|
[410]|
[411]Mr. Tovar. Wo. I think someone mentioned the other day
[412]that the names were incorporated ina memorandum I think ori- |
[413]ginionially by the FBI but’ :: would not certify to that. |
[415]Mr. Goldsmith, Mr. Tovar, since you have no direct | :
[416]knowledge as to the manner in which this memo was prepared and,
[417]for example, you don't know the criteria that was used for |
[418]choosing these 117 people, I am not going to ask you questions |
[419]pertaining to that document:. .I would like to request that you |
[420]communicate with the Office of Legislative Counsel at the |
[421]Agency and tell them the individual who was involved in the |
[422]actual direct. preparation of the document so that I could runs
[423]some time with him.
[425]Mr. Tovar. The document, of course, is over my signature,)
[426]so I stand behind the document. I am responsible for what |
[427]was Said there. If it is .ncorrect then I am incorrect in |
[428]leeting that document out. I have no personal first hand know-|
[429]ledge of the research he did to. arrive at the conclusion here
[431]t
[432]j
[434]|
[435]which he presented to me and I éndorsed. I am prepared to stand
[437]‘behind it but I will give ‘ou his name. 7
[438]Mr. Goldsmith. I wan: to ask you some questions about thei
[440]mw 40001 Docld: 32277210 Page 3 THpP SECRET i
[444]. . ‘
[445]te
[447]2
[448]a
[451]_ NW 48331 Docld:3
[453]' review of the files of 117 US persons who had "defected" to
[455]‘under the name Thomas Morr:.dian.M-O-R-R-I-D-I-A-N. While you
[458]_
[462]document. CIA no. 1818 indicates that CI Staff has completed a
[464]the USSR between 1959 and ‘63 and since returned to the United
[465]States. Is that correct? '58 to '63?
[466]Mr. Tovar. Yes.
[468]Mr. Goldsmith. I wou..d like you to review the statement
[470]read that paragraph, I will. state for the record thst the way.
[471]the memo is set forth it indicates that it was not standard
[472]operating procedure to deb:-ief such individuals, that of 117
[473]people whose files were reviewed only ten were debriefed.
[474]Then it proceeds to list the ten individuals who in fact were
[475]debriefed. |
[477]I have now requested lir. Tovar to read the first summary
[478]which is right next to the name of the first person who was
[479]debriefed. |
[481]Mr. Tovar. Yes sir.
[483]Mr. Goldsmith. When’ did that individual defect?
[485]Mr. Tovar. 1947 is. the :year“he!went to.the-USSR. I
[486]assume ‘that “is the year he defected, if that is the term.
[488]Mr. Goldsmith. So that in fact that individual was not
[489]someone who defected between 1958 and 1963?
[491]Mr. Tovar. That is correct. |
[493]Mr. Goldsmith. Let us look at the next individual under
[495]B,. Joseph Marshall.
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[513]2 ee
[515]. vidual defected?
[517]vir OLbREL _ | 8
[519]Mr. Tovar. Yes sir.
[521]Mr. Goldsmith. “When did Mr. Marshall defect?
[523]Me. Tovar. It is not clear. He was born in the US in
[524]1897, He said he was employed in Hawaii in 1921. ‘There is no
[525]indication whence he went i:o the USSR.
[527]Mr. Goldsmith. There :.s no indication he defected between
[528]*58 and '63?
[530]Mr. Tovar. No. He was arrested by the Soviets in 1945.
[531]Conceivably he might have defected after that.
[533]Mr. Goldsmith. The letter non, Tommaro $-G-0-V-I-0.
[535]Would you please read that section and tell us when this indi-
[537]Mr. Tovar. Again, he went to the USSR with his parents
[538]in the 1930s. No indication when he defected. He left the
[539]USSR in 1960. No way of telling. ,
[541]Mr. Goldsmith. This individual: did not defect between
[542]"58 and '63?
[544]Mr. Tovar. At last we: have no indication he did. one
[545]would assume to the contrary.
[547]Mr. Goldsmith. Lette: "pe, Mary Mackler,.will you please |
[548]vead the first summary and tell us when she defected?
[550]Mr. Tovar. There is ro indication when she defected.
[551]She went to the USSR with rer parents in 1931. Sometime after,!.
[553]married a Soviet. -
[555]|
[556]|
[557]|
[558]i
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[581]'
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[586]|
[587]Mr. Goldsmith. Again, no indication she defected between
[588]|
[589]|
[593]| "58 and '63?
[595]2 Mr. Tovar. No. :
[596]3 | Mr. Goldsmith. Would you look at letter "E". Sonia and |
[597]@ 4 | Fréd A-S-I-N-I-A-N, When did they defect? | |
[598]5 | ‘Mr. Tovar. ‘They renounced their US citizenship in 1948.
[599]| So I assume that is the operative year. |
[600]? Mr. Goldsmith. Will -ou look at the letter “F" “now? |
[601]a | Mr. Tovar. Jack Kuraiski. |
[602]9 | Mr. Goldsmith. When did he defect? 7
[603]10} . Mr. Tovar. He recoun2ed his US citizenship in "34 and :
[604]"| departed USSR I assume in 1934. |
[605],
[606]oe 12 Mr. Goldsmith. ‘The point I am trying to make is that the |
[607]-e 13 memo responding to the Comnittee's inquiry makes reference to |
[608]7 | ten individuals who defected between the years '58 and 163, |
[609]‘Si Ttothen proceed. to provide us with ten names. But in fact,
[610]16 |
[612]if we continue to look through the list we will see that seven
[614]of the ten individuals did not defect during that time period.
[618]|
[619]H 4
[620]| |
[622]* Some of them did return ducing that time period. |
[623]aan Mr. Tovar. And were jebriefed. ; .
[624]20| Mr. Goldsmith. And were debriefed. |
[625]21 | Mr. Tovar. Contacted.
[626]| ; .
[627]eo 22 Mr. Goldsmith. Of th: ten, perhaps three or four returned
[628]2 ; 3 during the relevant time p2riod. I asked those questions
[629]24 | Mainly to draw your attention to the fact that the response
[633]4
[635]given. was not really --
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[661]|
[662]Mr. Tovar. -- precisely what you wanted?
[663]Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. :
[664]Mr. Tovar. I don't know the answer to that. I would i
[665]assume that the criteria they applied here as best they could |
[666]was when did he defect, when did he return, was he debriefed ; !
[667]er contacted? In some casus they hit one out of three, in
[668]other cases two out of three. I think they were giving the
[669]best correlation with your criteria that they could. |
[670]Mr. “Goldsmith. I understand that. My point might be then|
[671]that the introductory sect:.on should not have ‘stated that these
[672]were people in 1958 and '6:; when in fact they were not. :
[673]Mr. Tovar. You are right. That is an incorrect statement;
[675]Is your requesting memo here? That is not a very good state-
[677]|
[678]ment. |
[679]Mr. Goldsmith. Here js the letter dated April 6, 1978
[680]which I show. you just for your information to show you what the!
[681]Committee was requesting from the Agency. Jf you will look»
[683]under number two.
[685]|
[687]|
[689]Mr. Tovar. ‘Then this would appear to correlate with thet.
[690]You asked’ to indicate whetter the AGency from '58 to '63 |
[691]interviewed or debriefea fc rmer American defectors. So, the
[692]time they defected is not the’ operative consideration. ;
[693]Mr. Goldsmith. No, it. was not. :
[694]Mr. Tovar. the time of the debriefing --
[696]Mr.. Goldsmith. Yes, that would be the focus.
[700]7 | ir oborci | 1
[702]|
[703]Mr. Tovar. So these would be at. least. consistent with thak.
[705]unless there were a specif:.c counterintelligence concern.
[707]2 _ Mr. Goldsmith. Yes, --hat is true. I would like also for |
[708]| purposes of further clarif:.cation, to have you.read the letter
[709]@ 4 dated May 12, 1978 startiny with the second full paragraph.
[710]‘| It is not ‘numbered. |
[711]‘| Mr. Tovar. Yes. |
[712]| Mr. Goldsmith. I show you that only for your background
[713]a purposes, not to ask you any questions about it. In any event, |
[714]I would appreciate having t:he name of the individual who |
[716]«| prepared the memo passed al.ong to the Office of the Legislative|
[717]" Counsel. . :
[718]~ 2 Mr. Tovar. Yes sir. |
[719].. 7 Mr. Goldsmith. The response that was provided to the |
[720]- @ is | ‘Committee indicates that i:he CIA had no standard precedure for
[721]is debriefing. returning US de: ‘ectors. What was the basis for mer
[722]16 policy or actually for the absence of the policy?
[723]| Mr. Tovar. I don! t know. I can speculate only -~- not \
[724]=| having been there and not having any involvement -- 1 don't :
[725]9 | know what mentality of those in charge was at that time.
[726]20 | - Mr. Goldsmith. What vould your specilation be? |
[727]2 | Mr. Tovar. I would speculate that the contact with and |
[728]- x») || debriefing, in effect the supervision of: Americans in that ;
[729]-@ sg | category would be FBI's prerogative and the Agency as a rule !
[730]| 7 would not. have had any bas:.c interest or reason to be involved:
[731]| |
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[740]Mr. Goldsmith. Does :he Agency today have a policy of,
[742]|
[743]2 .aS a Matter of routine ope:-ating procedure, debriefing return-
[744]3 ing defectors? |
[745]@ ‘ | Mr. Tovar. None that I am aware of.
[746]s Mr. Goldsmith. Again. would you Say you relied on the
[747]2 FBI to conduct those interviews?- |
[748]; Mr. Tovar. Yes.
[749]a Mr. Goldsmith. Is thre any coordination between the
[750]Agency and the FBI so that the Bureau is informed when someone
[751]10 | in fact is returning? | |
[752]" Mr. Tovar. On Americin defectors, the type you are speak-
[753]i .
[754]12 | ing of here? _
[755]oo | Mr. Goldsmith. An American defector who is repatriated.
[756]@ ls ‘Mr. Tovar. I know of no case where they would be - |
[757]7 interested in the subject. I can't say there is a procedure
[758]" in being. Knowing the way we relate to the FBI, if we knew of
[759]i7 | a case of returning Americans, Say we learned it from an
[760]i | overseas station and it seeméd of interest, we would probably
[761]19 | refer it directly to the FI by letter.
[762]20 | | I am speculating here because I know of no case in point.
[763]7 Mr. Goldsmith. There is no standard procedure for contact
[764]. 2 | ingthe Bureau and informing them of a returning defector?
[765]-@ 93 Mr. Tovar. Not that °° am aware of.
[766]vs Mr. Goldsmith. You would be the person who would be aware!
[767]|
[769]as { of such a procedure?
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[824]‘seas. We-are staff and thit is in the military sense we suppor
[826]UP SeURei 43
[828]|
[829]Mr. Tovar. Berween tie Soviet-East European Division and | ;
[830]cI Staff we should be awar2 of it. The two were most primarily
[831]concerned with the USSR. © [ think one or the other of us would
[832]inform the Bureau. This is not our primary concern: The
[833]Americans, even when they have been naughty boys, having gone
[835]|
[836]|
[837]to USSR and decided to return, we still don't have necessarily
[839]a professional interest in that type of person.
[841]Mr. Goldsmith. What is the xesponsibility of the CI Staff
[843]within the CIA?
[845]Mr. Tovar. In a coup..e of sentences it is a little
[846]difficult. I will tell you what we do. The CI Staff has ‘two
[847]principal areas of activity. We are first of alla staff.
[849]Are you familiar with the : staff as opposed to the division? .
[851]Mr. Goldsmith. No, I am not.
[853]DDO?
[854]Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. .
[856]Mr. Tovar. You know vyenerally how we are organized?
[858]i
[859]i
[861]|
[862]i
[863]i
[865]|
[866]Mr. Tovar. You have seen the table of organization of |
[867]i
[868]1
[869]|
[870]i
[872]|
[873]Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.
[875]|
[876]Mr. Tovar. The main set of components of the Directorate |
[878]is divisions and staffs. “he divisions operate a function overt
[880]the Directorat and we support the Director, we suppor one
[882]another in an advisory capacity and in various ways. So, we
[883].
[885]are not an operating component. “We don't run spies. . We have
[889]GS o oy) o rh re w
[892]Nae”
[894]73
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[898]ay
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[906]Ur wLAE I | 44
[908]| | |
[909]a lot of activities which impact on operations but we are not ih
[910]the true sense of the term an operating element. |
[911]' So, having said that, the primary field of activity for |
[912]the CI Staff is research and analysis, and then the other, |
[913]what we refer to as operat:.ons coordination. Now, that is sort|
[914]of the term which ‘does not -- research ’and’analysi’. is clear. |
[915]We examine and analyze cases, essentially cases. We are not |
[916]scrutinizing people. We acre looking at intelligence operations;
[919]old and current, primarily things that are not terribly |
[920]current. We don't tend to follow current operations in the: 7
[921]analytic sense. We take o..d cases and look them over to see :
[922]if mistakes were made, to .see ifve can derive lesssons from |
[923]mistakes made in the past. We :publish papers for the Agency's |
[924]community at. Large, all-in the R&A field... 7. 5°
[926]On the! othér:side we sunction in the sense of a true staff,
[928]i
[929]c
[934]We keep our fingers on the activity of the Directorate overseas
[935]We monitor what they are doing, not in the sense of being
[936]spooky but we simply read «he correspondence. We are given
[938]normal distribution of mosi: correspondence coming hack from —
[940]overseas. We keep a hand on the pulse of counterintelligence
[942]activities abroad. ; oO oo
[944]To do this, we obviously have to have reasonable currency
[946]on operational activity ac::oss the board. So, we are generally!
[948]aware of the operational patterns of activity that prevail in
[950]various overseas stations. On that basis we are in a position
[952]i)
[953]'
[954]|
[955]4
[956]t
[957]i
[958]U
[962]oe |
[964]to advise the DDO or Directorate as to the level of performance!
[965]the kind of activity conducted, the quality, the proper or
[967]improper degree of emphasis. We maintain an overview on behalf
[969]of DDO.
[971]- = _ re et et
[973]i
[975]3 “Mr. Goldsmith. Is your concentration oriented towards
[976]6 counterintelligence threats of a foreign nature?
[977]? | Mr, Tovar. Yes, totally. |
[978]3 Mr. Goldsmith. You would not be concerned at all with
[979]3 counterintelligence threats domestically?
[980]| 7 Mr. Tovar. None whatsoever.
[981]n | Mr. Goldsmith. Is it correct to say that would be the
[982]. 12 responsibility of the Bureiiu?
[983]a ag | Mr. Tovar. Absolutely.
[984]e | I1-|_~__tte.-Goldsmith. Now;—l.ee-Harvey Oswald returned from the
[985]i coe,
[986]5 | Soviet Union in 1962. While in the Sovietion Union he worked
[987]“| as a worker ina radio factory. Upon his return I imagine there
[988]a7 was someone concerned about: his being a counterintelligence
[989]a threat. Is it fair to say, and I do not want to ask you tendin)
[990]19 | questions but: would it. be Yair to say that would be more :
[991]20 | the responsibility of the Iureau rather than the Agency upon {
[992]2 | his actual return? |
[993]ot 2 | Mr. Tovar. Yes, the cuestion whether or not. he was, let — ;
[994]aud 3 | us say, a counterintelliger.ce threat. |
[995]_ . Mr. Goldsmith. KGB acjent? ,
[998]Mr. Tovar. That would be a Bureau concern, no question
[1002]NW 48331 DocIa:
[1004]we
[1006]po77210 page 17 TAP CEPRET
[1008]ivr HeuRaei - 16
[1010]| |
[1012]| about that. |
[1013]2 Mr. Goldsmith. However, would the Agency make any effort |
[1014], a to interview Osald while Oswald was entroute from the Soviet |
[1016]: @ ‘ | Union to the United States?  «* ti. | |
[1017]s| Mr. Tovar. You are Speaking of what the Agency might have|
[1018]6 | done in '63 or '62? |
[1020]z . Mr. Goldsmith. ‘62. |
[1021]g “Mr. Tovar. Again, we are speculating concerning the
[1023]| intelligence of the men who were in charge then. Today I. |
[1024]7 would like to think we woud be interested in what he is doing.;
[1025]OW | At the time: I. don't know. I would think, why not. On the |
[1026]2 other hand, I couldn't say they would or should be interested. i
[1027]7 a) It was not their primary p::ecise prerogative. I think if ‘they
[1028]@ ls | could, as I assume they. did, the Bureau would discharge its ;
[1029]s| responsibilities. vis-a-vis any American: of questionable )
[1030]ts | propensity, I should think they would be deferring to the |
[1031]i7 | Bureau. .
[1032]a Mr. Goldsmith. “That would be the aspect of Oswald where
[1033]7 there was a concern taht he posed | a ‘counterintelligence threat.,
[1034]20 | What about the fact that Oswald May have had positive intelli-
[1035]21 | gence information that wou..d have been helpful to the Agency?
[1036]a 2 | That would not be within the jurisdiction of the Bureau? |
[1037]” e %3 : Mr. Tovar. I think in that context it might have been !
[1038]|
[1039]|
[1040]|
[1041]|
[1043]appropriate for the Agency. if the assumed the point you made, :
[1045]t
[1047]. ; i
[1049]to seek an interview with him, I think the appropriate 1
[1050]; H
[1052]NW 48331 pocrachaa77a10 Page 18 THD CEPRET
[1054]an
[1058]Ss) —~ _
[1059]a Oo rt) st
[1063]an
[1064]sz3 an
[1066]NW 48331 poota:4a277010 Pave 19 TRE REGRET
[1068]. wees os == - = =
[1070]tur DLA |
[1072]17
[1074]vehicle for that would have. been the Domestic Contact Division
[1075]which I think handled most of the contacts referred to in this
[1076]memorandum. |
[1078]Mr. Goldsmith. What is the function of the Domestic
[1079]Contact Division?
[1081]Mr. Tovar. They are -cesponsible for intelligence that
[1082]can be checked properly and legally in the United States *..0
[1083]normally through American pusinessmen or American persons and
[1084]nonofficials who travel ab:-oad and acquire intelligence of
[1085]interest. This is not jus: USSR. It could be any other
[1086]country. Their primary field of activity is to contact and
[1087]debrief on a vluntary basi:, if they so choose to respond,
[1088]Americans who return from overseas.
[1090]Mr. Goldsmith. I notice that the Committee's inquiry
[1092]concerning the CI's policy as to returning American defectors
[1094]was routed to your staff, cr Staff. When the memo was prepared!
[1096]by the CI Staff for the Committee, was it done with the thought
[1098]of representing the éntire agency or just the CI Staff?
[1100]Mr. Tovar. It is difficult for us to presume to speak for
[1101]the entire agency; I thin< on this matter we are. speaking for
[1102]the Directorate of Operations, not for the entire Agency.
[1104]Mr. Goldsmith. Fine. That is really the area with which
[1105]I was concerned: anyway, Directorate of Operations.
[1107]Mr. Tovar. The only other element of the Directorate of
[1109]Operations that would be of an interest in this type of thing,
[1111]which might be construed a3 having an interest in this type —
[1112],
[1117]18
[1119]of activity, would be the SC Division. On this I think the
[1121]Mr. Tovar. In the asecne of a policy, of a guideline, a
[1123]|
[1124]|
[1125]2 |
[1126]7 cI staff could be considered as speaking for the Directorate.
[1127]wa | a Mr. Goldsmith. Is the Domestic, Contact Division part of
[1128]@ ; the CI Staff?
[1129]. Mr. Tovar. No, part of the Directorate of Operations. |
[1130]| ‘Mr. Goldsmith. The response of the Agency dated April |
[1131]| 20, 1978, which appears in CIA Number 1818, indicates. that
[1132]to)
[1133]| contact seems ‘to be based on opportunity and circumstance. |
[1134]. Then it goes on to-say only ten of the 117 persons have had
[1135]7 any contact with CIA. Would it be possible for you to go into
[1136]‘ more dtail on what is méant. by opportunity and circumstance? ©
[1137]i | ;
[1138]|
[1140]procedure, internal instruction which says you will debrief
[1142]Americans who return from having resided in the USSR, in the
[1144]"absence of that, this thing is left to chance obviously. I
[1146]i
[1147]|
[1148]- |
[1149]16 i |
[1150]i cannot explain to » you how the names of these 11 ‘passed the desk|
[1151]“| of “whoever was in charge at. the time, but assuming they did, ; |
[1152]* | my guess, and it is wally only a guess, would be that the
[1153]in person who read that, whate:ver document it was, would say, !
[1154]20 | “Hmmph! He looks like, he might’ be interesting", and perhaps |
[1155]“| would then get in contact with CCD and suggest if they get in !
[1156]. @ ° | contact with a person, let us say he is known to “be living in |
[1157]~~ ° | New York, suggest that they might want to seek out his Location
[1158]aT and if possible interview lim.
[1161]HW 48331 DocIa: 32277210 Page 20 | TAP CEPRET
[1163]J
[1166]in
[1168]16
[1170]7
[1175]_
[1177]J
[1178]n
[1179]am
[1181]HW 48331 Docta:4
[1183]‘the assassination of the P:-esident, there has arisen a group of
[1185]have reviewed releases made under the Freedom of Information
[1187]it. that Oswald received unusuil treatment at the hands of the CIA.
[1189]BUr Dpeudti  — os 19
[1191]“I think it would be a matter of chance in-the sense that.
[1193]the analyst or whoever it vas who reviewed that document, might
[1195]react, and yet he or she m.ght not, too, depending on how they
[1197]woke up that morning. It :.s sheer whimsy.
[1198]Mr. Goldsmith. Let me explain to you why the question
[1199]whether or not it was standard operating procedure to debrief
[1201]returning defectors is important to the Committee. Since
[1202]researchers who have reviewed the Warren Commission Report and
[1204]|
[1205]1
[1206]|
[1207]|
[1208]|
[1209]|
[1210]|
[1211]Act by the CIA and the FBI. '
[1213]Having reviewed these materials the argument has been made
[1215]One example of this unusual treatment is that there is no
[1216]record of Oswald having been debriefed by the CIA upon his
[1217]return. For that reason, ve are focusing on this issue. Is
[1218]there any way you can give us guidance on how to respond to
[1219]that question?
[1221]Mr, Tovar. I can't becuase I am sphculating every step
[1222]along. the way. I would hesitate to say more than Oswald
[1223]simply didn*t connect with whoever happened to be looking --
[1224]let us assume his name appeared. Was his namde in the list?
[1226]Mr. Goldsmith. Now That is the list of people who were
[1227]debriefed. |
[1229]Mr. Tovar. One huridr2d seventeen?
[1231]|
[1232]|
[1233]|
[1234]|
[1235]|
[1236]|
[1237]|
[1238]|
[1239]|
[1240]|
[1241]|
[1242]|
[1243]|
[1244]|
[1246]p277010 Page 21 | THp CEARET
[1248]avr OeUuAni | o
[1250]i “Mr. Goldsmith. I haven't seen the list of 117 people.
[1252]2] Mr. Tovar. What is tis? ;
[1253]a | Mr, Goldsmith. ‘That is a list of 350 odd people I was
[1254]@ ; | going to ask you about. However, since you don't have knowledge
[1255]| of the 117, I am not going to ask -ou about them. |
[1256]6 | Mr. Tovar. If Oswald's name was on the list, I can't |
[1257]; explain why he might not have been contacted. Maybe he dian’ |
[1258]a appear attractive or interesting enough. I don't know what |
[1259]: a information might. have been given with these namés on the list,
[1261]io such as a memo from the FBI or State Department, whoever had !
[1262]nN | originated it, what they said that would have titilated the
[1263]1 | analyst who might have seen it that would have elicited a |
[1264].. 2 response on the part of thes analyst who would say “Ah, let us |
[1265]@ oi look into this further." !
[1266]ist Mr. Goldsmith. ‘In particular, a lot of focus has been
[1267]. given to Mr. Robert Edward Webster, who appears in CIA Number
[1268]| 1820 who defected approximately the same time that Oswald did
[1269]1a | and returned at approximat.2ly the same time that Oswald did and
[1270]| who was debried by the CIA for two weeks in Virginia.
[1271]20 | Mr. Tovar. I didn't ‘cnow that he was. It doesn't say so
[1272]21 | here. |
[1273]a 2! Mr. Goldsmith. That joes not indicate the extend of the
[1274]i . ;
[1275]@ %3 debriefing. That information was obtained independently by
[1276]|
[1277]|
[1279]this Committee.
[1281]2
[1282]n
[1285]en -
[1287]Mr, Tovar. The name neans nothing to me so I can't -
[1289]HW 46331 Docld: 32277210 Page 22 Tap CECRET
[1291]UP HEGRE! - | 21
[1293]enlighten you on it.
[1295]| a
[1296]2 | - Mr. Goldsmith. ‘Does che CIA have any affiliation with.
[1297]3 | ' erganizations in the United States who might be responsible for
[1298]: @ : | debriefing someone? |
[1299]— 5 | Mr. Tovar. Not that am aware of. |
[1300]6 | Mr. Goldsmith. In other words, if anyone is going to be |
[1301]7 | debriefed it would be by the Domestic Contact Division? |
[1302]8 Mr. Tovar. In the in-:elligence sense. In the sense of |
[1303]9 | elucidation of datelligenc:, DCD would do it. A different type
[1304]10 of inquiry, personal inves::igation, the office of Security, on
[1305]nN | whoever itoworks through, would ‘be the one. a |
[1306]WR | : The one we are talkiny about, DCD is the only organization
[1307].. i3 | I know of. I can visualiz: a circumstance under which operating
[1308], e 14 | components might seek out in individual or might have in times
[1309]18 past but I can't think of a case in point in my own recollec- :
[1310]16 tion. I would say, given ‘he strictures on our operating in
[1311]17 | the United States, we would rely upon DCD to do it if they had
[1312]a | any positive intelligence connotation. If it were of an
[1313]19 : operational nature today, she Foreign Resourees Division might.
[1314]20 pursue it. |
[1315]1 | Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.
[1316]ae 29 Mr. Tovar. It is the division level of the Directorate.
[1317]@ | 3 | It is the division which seeks in the United States to develop
[1318]24 | potential intelligence assets for : abroad” I think I had ©
[1319]a6 better defer to the other people on that. That is roughly where
[1322]i
[1324]NW 48331 Dootass2277210. Page 23 TAD CEP OCT
[1328]wen re oe ee ee : a
[1330]2.
[1334]RW 48331 pocta:s2277210 Page 24 THe QFPRET 7 .
[1336]several volumes to it -- which relates to an individual. It
[1342]22
[1344]|
[1345]it stands. They certainly would not have interest in debrief- |
[1346]ing defectors that I am aware of. .
[1348]. Mr. Goldsmith. In anv event, for the purposes of summary,j
[1349]there is today no standard operating procedure of interviewing
[1350]returning defectors?
[1352]i
[1353]Mr. Tovar. Right, insofar as I am aware, there is none. |
[1355]Mr. Goldsmith. There is no standard operating procedure
[1357]between the Bureau and the CIA which would coordinate any ef fork
[1359]to contact returning defect:ors and share information?
[1360]g
[1362]Mr. Tovar. None that I am aware of.
[1364]Mr. Goldsmith. Turning to another area which I would like
[1366]to gt into briefly, would vou define what a 201 file is?
[1368]Mr. Tovar, A 201 file is a file or files -- it could be
[1370]might pose a dicotony, a 201 file and project file. A project
[1371]file might deal with an act:ivity, say collection operations in
[1372]Timbucktu, a broad. scale o: activity involving several numbers
[1373]of people, there might be several 201 files, A, B, C, who were
[1374]associates in that project. The 201 file would be on the
[1375]individual himself.
[1377]; Mr. Goldsmith. Ti would contain primarily biographic
[1378]information?
[1380]My, Tovar. No. It would contain a much vaster -- some
[1382]of them might contain one sheet of paper with name, rank and
[1384]; — i |
[1385]‘date of birth. But if the association with him developed and |
[1386]. . : - i
[1391]_ oa . a
[1395]a
[1397]a
[1398]n
[1399]mes:
[1401]wo o i | a
[1405]became more extensive, it :night contain a considerable amount
[1406]of information. If he became involved with this ope-ation it
[1407]might include operational naterial, intelligence operations
[1408]as well, all part of the 2)1 complex. .
[1410]' The point I am making is that it is an individual file
[1412]‘aS opposed to an activity file.
[1413]Mr. Goldsmith. If you.wanted to learn about the operation
[1415]‘that an individual was involved in, would you go to his 201
[1417]file or to his operations file?
[1419]Mr. Tovar. I would g..to the 201 file first. There might
[1421]not be an operations file. In'fact, in the vast majority of
[1423]the 201 cases there are no operational files because there is
[1425]no hard and fast rule on wien you open a 201 file or who opens
[1427]a 201 file.
[1428]If I, for example, am overseas and I become interested in
[1430]a person who looks to me to have considerable promise from the
[1432]. operational standpoint, sav a local foreign type, I might give
[1434]my own local checks, I might examine my own files to see if I
[1435]know anything about him. Then I say to headquarters "here is
[1436]Joe Doe. He is interestin to me for. these reasons. Will you
[1437]please check against. headquarters records and other agencies
[1438]ana let me know if you hav: anything of interest on him."
[1440]I might not ask for a 201 file. Headquarters might then,
[1441]because they thought he wa; interesting, open a 201 file.
[1443]Conversely, I might likewise say this looks terribly interest-
[1445]7
[1447]NW 48331 poota:42277210 Page 25 THe QL PRET
[1449]ln (; Sa i ~—e
[1453]ing Please open a 201 file and give me all of the information
[1457]2 you can collect on: him." .
[1458]3 | Mr. Goldsmith. I understand that the fact that someone
[1459]j
[1460]@ 4 | has a 201 file does not mein at all that the individual was
[1461]5 |: involved in any operations of the Agency. If you;wanted toget
[1463]é| information of an operational nature, would you go both to the
[1464], 201 file and operations file? ) |
[1465]3 | ) Mr, Tovar. Assuming -:here was information of an opera~ -
[1466]a tional nsture?
[1467]10 Mx. Goldsmith. Yes. . ; . :
[1468]nde Mr. Tovar.. Yes, indecd we would.
[1469]aT Mr. Goldsmith. If soneone is an agent of the CIA -- I |
[1470]-. ia | am not referring now to case officers or staff agents -- some- |
[1471]is | one is a field agent for the Agency, would that fact be indi- |
[1472]1s | cated in the 201 file? |
[1473]is Mr. Tovar. Yes.
[1474]| Mr. Goldsmith. In the Directorate of Operations someone
[1475]e might open up a 201 file on an individual if the person was |
[1476]is | of a potential positive intelligence significance? !
[1477]20 | Mr. Tovar, Or counte: intelligence, either one. |
[1478]2 | : Mr. Goldsmith. — That was going to be my question. The
[1479]a 2 CI Staff in particular, when would you have occasion to open a }
[1480]-@ 13, | 201 file? |
[1481]2 | Mr. Tovar. CI staff would not necessarily be the only one!
[1482]|
[1483]2 | !
[1486]to open a.201 file. In the case of a person of CI interest,
[1488]NW 48331 poorash2077210 Page 26 TAD , CEPOLCT
[1490]. ~
[1492]a. .
[1494]_
[1497]~ oa 0 o
[1500]NW 48331 Docla:’
[1504]SEE
[1506]se i integrated in the files of the Directorate or it is in the
[1508]ivr oceaci | 25
[1509]| |
[1510]lied
[1511]a field station might have a counter~-person I described earlier,
[1513]and become interested in him because he did have some CI
[1515]a
[1517]attraction or interest. The station itself or the division wou
[1518]open the 201 file. It woud not be us. The CI Staff as a rule
[1519]is not involved in that type of thing.
[1521]At this stage of the yame since we are not operating and
[1523]we are not out soliciting new contacts, we are not working in
[1527]that sense of the term, we don't to my: knowledge originate 201
[1528]files.
[1529]Mr. Goldsmith. The C: Staff does not open up 201 files?
[1530]Mr. Tovar. There is no reason that we couldn't,
[1531]Mr. Goldsmith. As a pratical matter?
[1532]Mr. Tovar. As practical matter it does not work that way.
[1534]Our research is primarily -‘ocused upon established cases, cases
[1536]that may:even be dead, terminated, or dormant, or even current
[1538]in certain cases, but as a .¥ule not very many | 201 file is
[1540]opened by someone else. We: may examine those files and review
[1541]them. We do review other ictivities. But the 201 file would
[1542]be in existence. They ’.whould not be created by ourselves.
[1544]In former days when C:: Staff files were segregated from
[1545]therest of the Directorate it might have been different. I
[1546]don't: know.
[1548]Mr. Goldsmith. When was that?
[1550]Mr. Tovar. Say prior to 1974, 1957. Today our foles are
[1552]2277210 Page 27 | TAD CEPRET
[1554]tur LUM 26
[1556]| Process of being integrate. We have been working on this.
[1558]three years to make sure, when you go to the central files and
[1560]research a name, if there .s something in the CI Staff reposi-
[1564]This is one of our major f:.nal exercises in the past two or
[1566]tory that will turn up when you are making a check of the
[1568]*| index.
[1569]7 | ‘Mr. Goldsmith. Will nost 201 files be open as a result of;
[1570]8
[1572]|
[1573]|
[1574]|
[1575]information coming into headquarters from the field, one of
[1576]i
[1578]1
[1579]|
[1581]_§ | the field stations?
[1582]10 1 Mr. Tovar. Yes, the vast majority. In years before when |
[1583]ny they has such programs as MH Chaos, I assumed they opened 201 |
[1584]12 | files of their own. —
[1586]Mr. Goldsmith. What :.s that?.
[1588]|
[1589]| |
[1591]| Mr. Tovar. MH Chaos-program? —— - remem er rnrnnns wea o
[1593]. . . 4
[1597]| Mr. Goldsmith. For the record, will you indicate what that
[1598]i)
[1600]i
[1601]16 program is?
[1605]7 | “Mr. Tovar. I frankly would rather not becuase I don't :
[1607]13 | know the precise definition of the program. It was a program |
[1609]19 | which. has been described ir. the press as domestic surveillance.
[1611]39 Whether that is the correct: proper designation, I don't know. |
[1613]21 | Our CI Staff does not normi:lly Open a 201 file. We don't have !
[1615]_ 22 | occasion to. 2
[1617]ao . . : mf
[1619]ed | %3 | Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know what the term CI/SIG stands” |
[1620]24 | for? |
[1625]t
[1628]Mr. Tovar. Counter I:telligence/Special Investigative
[1629]. ‘ 7 i
[1631]Pe te
[1633]HW 45331 - DocId:
[1635]sovme Page 08 . | THe QEPRET ;
[1639]4
[1641]W
[1642]o
[1644]HW 48331 Doora:42277210 Page 29 THe QEPRCT
[1646]‘on the subject, but I have been given to understand that was one
[1648]Rs Se ee eae a.
[1650]ivr OVLLALI | 27
[1651]| |
[1652]Group, I think it is. Invastigative or investigations, I don't!
[1654]know which.
[1655]Mr. Goldsmith. Is that group still in existence today?
[1656]Mr. Tovar. No.
[1658]Mr. Goldsmith. When iid it go out of existence?
[1661]|
[1662]Mr. Tovar. I don't k10w exactly. Before my time. I :
[1663]think it ended in '73, '74,,'75. I am not sure. _ |
[1664]Mr. Goldsmith. Do yo. know what the function of that |
[1665]group was? | . |
[1667]Mr. Tovar. Only in a very vague sort of way. I have hear
[1669]8
[1671]‘ about it, it was the inves:igative group in the CI Staff that
[1673]investigated whatever the 7I Staff did in those days. I can't
[1675]‘they did but I would be hesitant to make a general definition
[1677]of their function.
[1679]1
[1680]|
[1681]|
[1682]speak to that with any first hand knowledge... I know some things
[1683]|
[1684]Mr. Goldsmith. Do yo: know whether the function of that
[1685]. i
[1686]i
[1687]1
[1689]group was to investigate Ayency employees who were suspected
[1691]of having been penetrated?
[1693]Mr. Tovar. © I think, because I have seen nothing in writing
[1697]of their functions in the sontext of their responsibilities |
[1698]that was included. But I oam no authority on the subject. !
[1699]Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether CI/SIG would have |
[1703]occasion to open a 201 fil?
[1705]Mr. Tovar. I don't know. I can speculate. I don't know,’
[1708]I
[1709]|
[1710]i
[1712]28
[1714]7
[1718]Mr. Goldsmith. What vould your speculation be?
[1720]|
[1721]2 | | ae 7
[1722]Mr. Tovar. I would speculate in the days when they were
[1723]: functioning they probably did. You have a very unauthoriative
[1724]- ) | ‘ | witness on that subject. |
[1725]>| Mr. Goldsmith. What is the relationship if any between
[1726]| ;
[1727]6 | the Office of Security and the CI Staff?
[1728]a Mr. Tovar. We have basically different functions. The
[1729]S| Office of Security is unde:: the Directorate of Administration
[1730]: and is responsible for the personnel and physical security of
[1731]ie | the entire division.: It.focuses on personnel security and
[1732]ul physical security.
[1733]12 | The CI staff as I described it, is an element of DDO
[1735]-. 17'| concernea with research and analysis and ‘operation and coordi-
[1736]._ :-I-wations “The relation between us and the Office of Security is i
[1737]is simply that between us and another fraternal element of the
[1738]| Agency which has responsib:.lity which sometimes comes close
[1739]17 | together.
[1740]i Mr. Goldsmith. Does che Office of Security maintain
[1741]9 | files which contain information of a derogatory nature on
[1742]t .
[1743]20 | individuals, not necessari'::y limited to Agency employees?
[1744]af Mr. Tovar. To my knowledge they don't. My assumption is
[1745]e@ 22 ii Ihave never seen what ..s in their files -- my assumption is
[1746]at 33 that they have files only on Agency personnel. I. cannot
[1747]2 | visualize circumstances under which they would maintain infor-
[1748]a
[1750]25 % mation on people who are not in the Agency or who had not been
[1752]RW 48331 DocIa?$227721
[1754]0 Page 20 TAP CEPDET
[1758]ky
[1762]Wee a
[1765]o
[1767]2
[1768]a
[1771]Office of Security files on Lee Harvey Oswald.
[1773]‘Security may be different today from what it was in 1959 with
[1775]HUF S2UREI a9
[1776]applicates for employment and then left.
[1777]Mr. Goldsmith. Is the Office of Security interested in
[1779]Maintaining information so that if in the future an individual
[1781]was being considered for employment in some capacity with the
[1783]Agency the Secuirty Office: would have that information on
[1784]him?
[1785]Mr, Tovar. I cannot visualize that heppening today.
[1786]Mr. Goldsmith. I wou!.d like to ask you to read CIA 0786,
[1788]which is a document that this Committee obtained from the
[1790]Mr. Tovar. That sort of suggests they maintained such =|
[1791]information then. I still cannot visualize there doing it
[1792]today.
[1794]Myr. Goldsmith. | Do you think the function of the Office of
[1796]regard to maintaining such files?
[1797]Mr. Tovar. The funct:.on, I would use the term function,
[1799]I would say the policy of -c:he Office as far as the way the
[1801]office operates today. I «don't know what they do intrinsically.
[1802]I cannot visualize their maintaining that kind of current .-.°
[1804]records today. Maybe this is historic, it was in the files
[1806]since 1969. With the injunction against destroying files,
[1807]the files remained.
[1808]If it was John Q. Doe appearing today in a similar context
[1810]I would not visualize the Office of Security maintaining this
[1813]i
[1814]t
[1815]i
[1816]i
[1817]i
[1818]t
[1819]a
[1820]'
[1821]t
[1822]i
[1823]i
[1824]i
[1826]mu 49501 Deota:boo77010 Page 31 TAD GEPotT
[1828]in
[1830]22
[1834]24
[1836]NW 43331 DocId: rachaarraso Page 32 TAD QEPOCT
[1840]-Came over and it indicatea that he was available for discussionj
[1842]ivr wEUNKEd 8 30
[1844]kind of document.
[1846]‘Mr. Goldsmith. To whom would. this document go today?
[1848]Mr.. Tovar. ‘You mean from the State Department?
[1850]Mr. Goldsmith. Yes, a State Department document. Which
[1851]is indicating that an American citizen is giving information,
[1852]intelligence information t> a: foreign country, to whom in the
[1853]CIA would that document go?
[1855]Mr. Tovar. I am not sure it would come to the CIA at all
[1856]because the CIA does not -have responsibility for that type of
[1857]person. I think it would jo to the FBI,
[1859]“Mr. Goldsmith. Even though the individual is overseas?
[1861]Mr. Tovar. Yes. He is an American..- ‘Again, this is
[1862]speculation. I don't know what moves the person who releases
[1863]cables to the Moscow Embassy today. He might decide or some~
[1864]body here in State Securit; might decide that CIA should see
[1865]this. In.that event, it pcobably would go to the Office of
[1866]Security as a matter of information...
[1868]Mr. Goldsmith. Would information contained in this type
[1869]of telegram normally lead -o the opening of a 201 file?
[1871]Mr. Tovar. I would tiink not.
[1873]Mr. Goldsmith. Why not?
[1875]Mr. Tovar. There is nothing that suggests here this
[1876]is going to be of continuing interest to the CIA, This is -
[1878]1959. Let us say in 1962 ‘che man came back and another message!
[1880]an
[1882])
[1883]a a a nw
[1886]te
[1889]an
[1892]o
[1895]n
[1900]or was of interest and so wn and maybe there are reasons for
[1902]debriefing, I can visualize a 201 being opened if the matter
[1904]-were of apparent continuiny interest. I can see no reason why
[1906]a 201 would be opened in this case.
[1907]Mr. Goldsmith. What :.£ this telegram was followed by a
[1908]aable indicating that the adividual haa decided to defect?
[1909]Mr. Tovar. What do you mean? He is applying for Soviet
[1911]citizenship, so he is defec:ting here?
[1913]Mr. Goldsmith. You a:te correct. I withdraw the question.
[1915]Mr. Tovar.. I think basically my point is that it is a
[1916]fact that a 201 need not be: opened up on this type -- this is
[1917]a casual piece of informat:.on. If one could eliminate the
[1918]name Lee Harvey Oswald, wh:.ch raises flages, it is John Doe
[1919]and there is nothing in th:.s -- someone might say what an SOB
[1920]this is but there is nothing to indicate anything but an
[1921]unfortunate incidental event, I would say today, “why bother:.
[1922]We have enought to do without opening 201 files on péople of
[1923]that nature." The encyclopedic approach is not one that we
[1924]try to appiy.
[1926]Bear in mind, I am do:ng a lot of speculating here. I
[1927]perhaps shouldn't.
[1929]Mr. Goldsmith. You really aren't aware of what the
[1930]procedure would be in 1959 for dealing with a telegram like
[1932]this?.
[1934]Mr, Tovar. No. I woild still say today I would not expe
[1936]7 on
[1938]NW 48331 poeta:s2277210 Page 33 TAD CECDET
[1940]'
[1941]|
[1942]|
[1943]|
[1947]o ne 2 ce i ee a ne a ee ees
[1949]24
[1951]Ly)
[1952]. —_—
[1954]a
[1956]NW 48331 Docra:4
[1958]that kind of document to be retained in Agency files anywhere.
[1960]Mr. Tovar.
[1962]citizens?
[1964]concerned with Americans o:' counterintelligence interest. If
[1965]an overseas station is informed by somebody that an American
[1967]is contacting the Soviets and is apparently engaged in what
[1969]2277210 Page 34
[1973]You know, inter-departmentiil correspondence is firing paper in
[1974]all directions all the time on an informational basis. That
[1975]. does not mean it is retained.
[1977]Mr, Goldsmith. With ‘regard to
[1978]your testimony is moreorle:s speculation but you are saying
[1979]that today you don't think that this type of document would be
[1981]retained and have any spec:.al significance?
[1983]I don't think so.
[1985]trying to visualize circumstances under which it could be
[1987]is nothing of immediate counterintelligence interest. I don’t
[1989]know who would retain it o:: why.
[1991]Mr. Goldsmith. _For the purpose of clarification, if the
[1993]Mr. Tovar. You are asking is it?
[1994]' Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.
[1996]. Mr. Tovar, Primarily yes, but not solely. We are
[1998]looks like espionage, we would become interested. That is
[2000]TAD GLeDErT
[2002]32
[2004]this document, after 1959
[2006]I am scratching my head:
[2008]retained. There is nothing of interest to the Agency. There .
[2010](CI asked that of the CIA, by that I mean the counterintelligen
[2011]aspect of the CIA concerned primarily with a foreign counter-
[2013]intelligence threat, in otehr words, foreign nationais, foreign
[2015]ce
[2017]oo
[2019]no
[2021]“~~
[2023]a
[2026]_ c=) ied o |
[2027]ee eg a a a eee ee
[2029]2
[2030]n
[2033]| NW 48331 Docta:52277210 Page a5 TAD CLAOLT
[2035]1UP DEUKEI
[2037]33
[2039]|
[2040]espionage I.am talking abou:. —
[2041]Mr. Goldsmith. I understand,
[2042]Mr. Tovar. You realise of course with the sensitivity | ;
[2043]of Americans investigation:; of Americans we have to be an we |
[2044]|
[2046]are extremely careful in making the determination as to when a
[2048]person is of counterintell:.gence interest. . We have very strict!
[2050]rules and regulations on the consideration of investigations,
[2051]considerations retaining information, the rights ofa person.
[2052]The criteria are very stringent. they are under esecutive
[2053]order and Attorney General guidelines. We don't approach this
[2054]casually at all. It is proscribed activity. |
[2056]"Mr. Goldsmith. Both is to Americans?
[2058]Mr. Tovar... Prima:ily Americans. The Attorney General
[2060]is not concerned essential:.y with non-US persons. Our focus od
[2062]sensitivity is on US persons who are US citizens or residents,
[2063]aliens or US entities, organizations, which are primarily
[2064]‘American in composition:
[2066]Mr. Goldsmith. Again, would you focus outside the-borders
[2067]of the United States? |
[2069]Mr. Tovar. yes. Ins:.de USviis FBI.
[2071]Mr. Goldsmith. Before: when you made reference to a
[2072]station overseas, you becane aware of an American who might
[2073]be involved in espionage for another country, you were refer-
[2074]ring to an American who wa: living abroad, is that correct?
[2076]Mr. Tovar. Yes, or t::aveling abroad.
[2078]en ne eee ee pe ee ee ee a te ne cr en ee
[2080]1Ur oeuReh st
[2084]| |
[2085]} Mr. Goldsmith. I would like to show you CIA. Number 788 |
[2086]~ 2 | which is the field personality file request form that was used -
[2087]a to open Oswald's 201 file. In the middle of the page there is
[2088]” ) . 4 | box which states -the term ‘Other identification". I£ someone |
[2089]— 5 wrote the number or letter "AG" down, what does that stand for?!
[2090]‘| | Mr. Tovar. I have no idea. What are they referring |
[2091]a to here? I cannot think o7 anything. : | |
[2092]7 Mr. Goldsmith. The form also indicates that Oswald's |
[2093]a file was restricted. Do you know of any reason. why Oswald's
[2094]10 | file would have been restr:.cted? |
[2095]ni . Mr. Tovar. Where is chat? . |
[2096]12 Mr. Goldsmith. Here. | |
[2097]oe 13 Mr. Tovar, No, I don't know. I don't know what criteria |
[2098]. @ id | they would have used at thit time or even. today for that matter,
[2099]is | to open a restricted file. Bear in mind, there is a lot of
[2100]y
[2101]16 | latitude given to the individual who opened these things. He
[2102]17 | ‘could be a very. junior ana!.yst who for reasons of his own
[2103]a decided he would do it this way. Supervision would not neces-
[2104]19 | sarily get down there very closely behind him. |
[2105]20 | Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know what the inter-agency source
[2106]21 | register is?
[2107]= 2 | Mr. Tovar. yes.
[2108]0 %3 | Mr. Goldsmith. What :..s that?
[2109]xu | Mr. Tovar. As I unde:-stand it, it is a register maintainet
[2112]1
[2113]t
[2114]|
[2115]i
[2116]|
[2117]|
[2118]|
[2119]a
[2120]ag & in which other agencies of the government register their
[2121]|
[2122]|
[2124]HW 48331 . pocta:ba277210 Page 6 The | OQEPOCT
[2126]| a bu? SEKLI 35
[2127]interest in a person. Let us take, for example, you are eel
[2129]interdsted in Mr. Smith. et us say you check Mr. Smith with
[2131]the CIA and with the other agencies and in so doing you wish’
[2133]. i
[2136]to have him recorded under the ISR, Inter Agency Source
[2137]Registry, the entry of his name in the ISR will normally flag
[2139]for the Army Intelligence and you are in Germany and you become
[2140]prior interest on the part of somebody in the government, in
[2144]i
[2150]|
[2151]I don't know what this symbol is but they put two asterisks .
[2152]i
[2154]|
[2156]i
[2158]|
[2160]if
[2162]|
[2164]|
[2166]|
[2168]i
[2170]1
[2172]8 this case you are in the A:-my.
[2173]9
[2174]10 which indicates to anybody else who’ checks that name later the
[2175]nl us Army has.a prior interest in that person. |
[2176]7 Mr. Goldsmith. What J:ind of interest would that be?
[2177]i3 : Mr, Tovar. Intelligence interest to me, potential
[2178]| |
[2180]intelligence interest. Again, the ISR may have ramifications
[2182]that I am not aware of. In my experience the ISR has been the
[2184]i
[2185]4
[2187]_ place we go to check, say, a new or potentially new source to
[2189]i see if there is ny other p:-eviously established government
[2191]|
[2193]. Military rely upon this ve:-y heavily because we coordinate the ile
[2195]interest in the person which means keep your hands off. The
[2197]clandestine intelligence operations.
[2199]‘Mr. Goldsmith. Would an ISR index be checked prior to
[2200]opening up a 201 file as a matter of routine?
[2202]Mr. Tovar. 'It has been so many years since I have done
[2204]‘this. The way we have become mechanized today I would assume
[2206]4
[2207]i
[2208]|
[2209]|
[2210]|
[2211]|
[2212]|
[2214]|
[2215]|
[2219]Wino moa tes Se
[2221]that a normal file check through the central files of the
[2225]|
[2227]NW 48331 DocId:32277210 Page 37 TRAD Clfrorr
[2231]36
[2233]|
[2234]Directorate would include or would turn up anything that was |
[2235]in the ISR. I am just not sure. how it works. |
[2236]Mr. Goldsmith. If. someone were an agent of another
[2237]intelligence organization vould that be indicated in the 201
[2239]|
[2240]file? , 7 |
[2242]. ‘ .
[2243]ot wet
[2246]-. = Sree mes
[2248]6 Mr. Tovar. If it were: an agent, agent of another service,
[2249]; that would be inthe ISR:only if it: had been of interest to |
[2250]8 "another agency which said "Put Joh Doe's name in the ISR and |
[2251]9 | indicate he is a US Army intelligence source," at the very |
[2252]10 | least a person of interest to the US Army Intelligence Agency.
[2253]VY rt would not be there if the Army had not put it in. So you |
[2254]32 | might not know. , |
[2255]. i3 Again, I think aimed ane any agent ‘of the military would rely
[2256] d (4 upon the ISx, I would thin}: almost certainly would be entered |
[2257]is ! in the ISr, because they want to maintain control of ity to- |
[2258]16 make sure nobody else gets in the way arnd interferes - with their
[2259]17 operations. :
[2260]' | |
[2261]13 | Mr. Goldsmith. So if someone were an agent it would in |
[2262]19 | all ‘Likelihood be indicated: in the ISR and assuming the ISR |
[2263]20 is checked by a CI person prior to opening up the file, he woul
[2264]21 | take note of that ‘fact? |
[2265]= 22 | Mr. Tovar, Say that again. Some of this is pretty fuzzy |
[2266]; ® 33 to me. I don't want to mislead you by extrapolating from my :
[2267]_ 24 | - Own ignorance. !
[2268]|
[2269]ac of
[2271]an
[2273]Mr. Goldsmith. If someone is an agent of another °:
[2275]|
[2277]NW 48331 poctai!32277210 Page 38 THAD CEPLOCT
[2279]md
[2281]Oo.
[2285]_
[2286]i
[2288]22
[2290]73
[2292]24
[2294] ]
[2295]a
[2298]YY
[2300]HW 48331 Docta:4
[2302]a ee es
[2307]uP otbaci 37
[2309]intelligence service, that fact would be noted in the ISR?
[2311]“Mr. Tovar. Another U3 intelligence service?
[2313]Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.
[2315]Mr. Tovar. A US milizary intelligence service only, yes,
[2316]the military intelligence service would normally be registered
[2317]in the ISR. Other than th military, the FBI. intelligence
[2318]assets would not be regist:2red in the Isr to my knowledge,
[2320]_ Mr. Goldsmith. “ But tie military tends to make that list-
[2321]ing?
[2323]Mr. Tovar. In my. experience the miltiary has been the
[2324]primary element involved in the use and the exploitation of the
[2325]ISR. Let me interpose ano'-her point here, I am not an expert
[2327]in these procedures and I iam way out of touch. You live most.
[2329]of your life overseas, you don’t do these things-back-at-—--———
[2331]headquarters. These procedures may be quite different in
[2333]actuality. I am groping through my memory to see how they were’
[2335]dealt with on an active basis.
[2337]A fellow like Bill Donnelly might enlighten you much more
[2339]than I could about the ISR.
[2341]Mr. Goldsmith. I understand that. I think you can tell
[2343]i am not pressing you for <letail on it.
[2345]Mr. Tovar. I would 1: ke to help you. I am prepared to
[2347]‘specualte as I have been doing on things that are somewhat =~
[2348]oeyond my direct experience: and direct responsibility. There
[2350]is a limit.
[2352]Mr. Goldsmith. Now, :.£ someone checking IS-R notes that
[2354]2277210 Page 30 | ‘TAD QPADET
[2359]4
[2361]in
[2363]22 |
[2364]33 i
[2368]a
[2369]n
[2375]4
[2377]HW 48331 DocTd:4
[2379]a ee rs
[2381]1UF acunrl
[2383]an individual isa military ‘intelligence agent would the fact
[2384]of that agency status be nated and a 201 file opened on that
[2385]individual?
[2387]Mr. Tovar. I am not sure. I would think it would be.
[2388]Again, I .am speculating. [ think almost certainly if I were
[2389]doing a file check on a person whose name came from one of the
[2390]field stations ana it turned up the fact he was already -
[2391]“registered in the ISR,.if a person is of interest let us say,
[2392]to the US Army Intelligenc:, that would automatically sort of
[2393]proscribe further attempts on my part to go in and get involved
[2394]I think a notation would b: made in the 201 file. _ : |
[2396]Mr. Goldsmith. AS a practical matter ‘that would be a good
[2397]reason for making. the nota :ion?
[2399]Mr. Tovar. Yes.
[2401]Mr. Goldsmith. Does che CIA regularly use the ISR?
[2403]Mr. Tovar. We maintain it as I understand it.
[2405]- Mr. Goldsmith. So if someone is an agent of. the CIA,
[2406]would that fact be noted in the ISR?
[2407]Mr. Tovar. No, I don't believe it would. again, you
[2408]can check on that to make certain, Donelly I think can help
[2410]Much better on it. I cannot visualize all our sensitive source
[2412]being registered there.
[2414]|
[2415]|
[2416]|
[2417]|
[2418]5
[2419]|
[2420]|
[2421]a
[2423]Mr. Goldsmith: Do yoa know how internal memoranda prepare
[2426]by James Angleton when he ‘vas head of the CI:Staff, how interna]
[2428]i
[2429]i
[2430]|
[2431]i
[2433]2277210 Page 40 | TRAD QEPOTT
[2435]iUP SEGRE! a,
[2437]paperwork relating to the JFK assassination was prepared and
[2439]subsequently stored?
[2441]3 - Mr. Tovar. No, I really don't. I have no idea. I have
[2442]” ry 4 seen no documents on that subject. I have seen nothing either
[2443]5
[2445]originated or approved or signed by him. You realize that any
[2447]current-job. Until ‘you poeple became interested, we were not
[2449]dealing with them on a dai..y basis.
[2451]i
[2452]|
[2453]|
[2454]i
[2455]|
[2456]i
[2457]|
[2458]i files on this subject are dead files. I am just doing my
[2459]|
[2460][
[2461]|
[2462]|
[2463]i
[2464]i
[2465]i
[2467]—14-]| -Staf£;-what-would-happen-to~your personal papers?
[2469]9 Mrs Goldsmith. What happens to the personal files of an
[2470]ld individual such as Angletons or even yourself after leaving the
[2471]oY CI staff? | :
[2472]12 Mr. Tovar. After lea‘ring the staff or leaving the Agency?
[2474]{ .
[2476]@ . i3- | _ Mr. Goldsmith. Let us take the first after leaving the cr
[2477]i
[2478]|
[2480]'Mr. Tovar. The personal file, official file on the person
[2482]i
[2483]“| in the Agency is retained by the Office of Personnel.
[2485]a Mr. Goldsmith. That vould givern your personal |. file, |
[2487]| your personal papers. Wha: about internal memos, soft copy |
[2489]19 | type files, what would happen to them? .
[2491]20 | Mr. Tovar. Having been only one element of the organiza |
[2493]| tion during my career, it is hard to say. : _ |
[2495]a 2 | Mr. Goldsmith. I am not talking now about personnel file.
[2496]@ 3 | -I am talking about soft copy, working files that an individual
[2497]2 | may maintain. - |
[2499]26 . | ‘Mr. Tovar. You mean che files he himself as an individual,
[2503]HW 48331 DocId:'32277210 Page 41 THAD CEMDET
[2505]o
[2509]G
[2511]Lo)
[2513]<3
[2515]24
[2517]ac
[2519]NW 48331 pocta: 52277210 Page 42 TAD iN SEP RET
[2523]ivr DLUNEI 40
[2524]maintained?
[2526]Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.
[2528]_ Mr. Tovar. Most individuals don't maintain: personal. files, |
[2530]I don't think. I would say, for example, anything I write,
[2532]I dictate a memorandum and I send it to anybody you want to
[2534]name, in a sense that is my work, I have done it but I don't
[2535]keep a personal file on that. That goes into my office file.
[2536]It is part of the office cironological file which is maintained
[2537]by my secretary. Let us say multiply that by-500,000 over.a
[2538]period of years the foles jrow. At the time I leave I am -
[2539]incidental in a sense. I just happen to be the person in the -
[2540]job at the time. The files will still be there.
[2542]There is a normal retirement and destruction under normal
[2544]|
[2546]|
[2547]|
[2548]|
[2549]|
[2550]|
[2551]|
[2552]|
[2555]conditions, retirement and destruction program which eliminates
[2557]the accumulation of excessive useless material. i
[2559]Mr. Goldsmith. Most »aperwork would go in this office _
[2563]Mr. Tovar. Yes, anything of significance would go in the
[2564]office chrono file. Anyth:.ng I write to the Directorate of
[2565]Operations, DDO, CI, it is normally part of the chrono files.
[2566]If I want it, it is there. It is my own file in the sense that:
[2567]when r am on the job I have total | access to. it. If Ir left
[2568]the job and wanted to ‘Look at it six months later, it is “still
[2569]in the fole and I would as}: somebody who took my place could I
[2571]see what I wrote. I would not take it with me.
[2573]iUPr OCLAZ! on
[2575]meant that everything is filed in a chronological order?
[2576]Mr. Tovar. Not necessarily. Here you ought to consult
[2577]my secretary. There might be a subject breakdown. Ordinarily
[2579]hte front office, we don't main-ain a lot of files. There is
[2581]no point: in it. Let us say something I signed off on, here
[2582]is a case in point, memos that are signed on my behalf or
[2583]that I might have signed, if I were there that day, I would
[2584]not maintain that in my front office as a rule. That would
[2585]probably be maintained by che office of origination. I think
[2586]if I signed it my secretar; would certainly maintain a log of .
[2587]things that had gone throujh me for signature. But I don't
[2588]think, I could be wrong on this, I don't think as a rule she
[2589]would maintain a routine im2morandum just because I happened to
[2590]sign it because I sign. so many things on.that staff. I sign
[2591]off on a host.of things which are not really ny creation. I
[2592]am representing the staff as a whole.
[2594]Mr. Goldsmith. Do yo: know when Mr. Angleton left the CI
[2596]Staff?
[2598]Mr. Tovar. Yes. I an not certain of the precise date.
[2600]position of Chief, Counterintelligence?
[2601]Mr. Goldsmith. Yes,
[2603]Mr. Tovar. I-believe he may have retmained in the office
[2605]for several. months after tiat before he finally retired.
[2607]|
[2608]|
[2610]y
[2613]nv 48331 pocta:$2277210 Page 43 THe QEPRET
[2615]Mr. Goldsmith. If it is an office chrono file does that —
[2617]Ld
[2619]rs
[2622]a
[2624]NW 48331 pocta:52277210 Page 44 THD OCrorTy
[2626]there were probably all kinds of drafts, scratchings and sort
[2628]iUr DLUALI 12
[2630]Mr. Goldsmith. Do yo1 know whether, after Mr. Angleton
[2631]left the cI Staff, any typ2 of followup was done by that staff
[2632]on the Nosenko issue? . |
[2634]Mr. Tovar. Followup ‘vork?
[2636]Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. For example, one of the issues, the
[2637]key issue. with regard to M:. Nosenko was his bona fides.
[2639]Mr. Tovar. Yes, indeed. - 7 i . |
[2641]Mr. Goldmsith. After Mr. Angleton left was any additional
[2643]analytical work done on thit issue?
[2644]Mr. Tovar. A very de-:ailed study was done by my predecessb
[2645], |
[2646]George Kalaris. A very thorough analysis was made of. the whens 7
[2648]Nosenko question.
[2649]Mr. Goldsmith. Are you referring to the Hart Report?
[2650]Mr. Tovar. Yes.
[2651]Mr. Goldsmith. Other than the Hart report was any type °
[2653]followup work or analytica:. work done after Mr. Angleton's
[2655]wee DL ee
[2657]departure?
[2659]Mr. Tovar. I don't know. for certain. The Hart Report is
[2661]a thick piece of paper. In the preparation of that report
[2663]of preliminary jobs. All shat I know would be in the context 7
[2664]of:that report. All I know would be same representations in
[2665]response to the Director's inquiry or your inquiry or someone
[2667]else's inquiry as to what happened, what did it say, what does
[2669]it mean, that type of thiny, but really correlary efforts.
[2671]ivr? Hela a 43
[2673]Mr. Goldsmith: Think for a moment on the Nosenko issue.
[2675]ne
[2677]a | As Chief of the CI Staff, if it were demonstrated to you very
[2679]Clearly that the story given ‘by Mr:-.Nosenko on Lee Harvey
[2681]as
[2683]dictions, it was in many ways simply incredible, what impact
[2684]would that have on the Agency's assessment of Mr. Nosenko as
[2685]being a bona fide rather than a dispatched defector?
[2687]‘Mr. Tovar. Well, it is difficult to answer: You are
[2689]|
[2691]|
[2693]a . . |
[2694]@ 4 | Oswald was full of contradictions and in addition to contra- |
[2695]|
[2697]| |
[2699]posing a question in a nar:cow sense. You are focusing on one
[2701]|
[2703]on oo | oO.
[2704]nip ce se ee a
[2706]oO
[2708]point, Nosenko vis-a-vis Oswald and contradictions that may
[2709]emerge there. I would answer by saying that again I am not an |
[2711]expert on Nosenko. I don':: profegs to have a full grasp of
[2713]I would say that ques:ion alone would not be enough to
[2715]satisfy me that the inquiry had been made carefully. “There is:
[2717]a
[2719]i
[2723]his bona fides or anything related to it. |
[2724]|
[2726]i
[2728]t
[2730]t
[2732]much more to it than what Josenko had to say about Oswald.
[2733]There are more aspects. about the bona fides issue, more than ar
[2734]a
[2736]could give you today. |
[2737]t
[2739]; .
[2741]Mr. Goldsmith. I hav2 read the Hart Report. ; i
[2743]. '
[2745]. : ]
[2747]i
[2749]Mr. Tovar. He tried =o deal with the whole consideration,
[2752]9 .G a ~
[2754]the whole Oswald, the handling, the methodology. He did not
[2755]go into every jot and tittle of the issue.
[2757]Mr. Goldsmith. In fast, the Hart Report did not mention
[2759]Py
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[2780]9
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[2816]"yw as331 pocra:b2277210 Page 45 TAD O&POCT
[2822]22
[2824]73
[2828]1
[2829]4
[2831]NW 48331 Docta:52277210 Page 46 - THD EROET
[2833]iVvP ofuRel — | 44
[2835]i
[2836]\ Oswald issue is untrue, cainot be believed, would that have any)
[2838]| impact on the Agency's ass2ssment of him as a bona fied?
[2839]Mr. Tovar. The first reaction would be I would be deeply
[2841]| distressed and.concerned, [ would want to know more about it.
[2843]You have to exptrapolate from me to the Agency. Other people
[2845]further and convinced ever;thody, the point you made is valid,
[2846]then you would have --
[2848]|
[2850]l
[2851]i]
[2852]have views on this other tian myself. If you carried this thing
[2853]|
[2854]|
[2855]Mr. Goldsmith. We ar2 talking hypothetically now. Let
[2856],
[2858]us go beyond you. If it were demonstrated to the Director of
[2860]|
[2861]the Central intelligence Ayency that the story given by Nosenko
[2863]. . |
[2864]on Oswald -- I am not talking about any of the other information
[2865]he gave, but on Oswald -- simply cannot be believed because,
[2867]A, part of it is incredibl:, B, it is full. of contradictions,
[2869]what effect do you think tiat would have on the Agency's
[2871]assessment of him as a bona fide defector?
[2873]Mr. Tovar. I literally don't know, I am not sure what
[2874]the comparative weight of chat point would be when considered’
[2875]against the backdrop of th: full Nosenko question,
[2877]Mr. Goldsmith. “As Chief of the CI Staff, you would
[2878]personally be troubled by chat?
[2880]Mr. Tovar. Yes, I think I would be troubled by it. I
[2881]would be troubled. I would be troubled that our current
[2883]assessment is wrong. That would trouble me.
[2885]mn
[2887]Again, I would say, loo, if this is a serious proposition
[2889]j ur ay a Pr i | 45
[2891]you are making, let us say you adduced a number of analysts
[2893]i
[2894]| |
[2895]2 who examined this thing thoroughly and were in a position of
[2896]3 | Making that kind of judgment, I would say, "I want to have
[2897]; e 4 | these analysts talk to my analysts because I am not in a posi-
[2898]§ | tion to make that kind of judgment." |
[2899]6 Mr. Goldsmith. First of all, I am not making the statement
[2900]? | ‘that Nosenko's story on Oswald is inaccurate in any way. |
[2901]a | Secondly, even if the’ story is inaccurate, I don't want:
[2902]t
[2903]$ to suggest that because of that anyone on this Committee has |
[2904]10 any feeling that that means Nosenko is not bona fide. My |
[2905]nN | question is really very linited. A, if it were demonstrated |
[2906]: : . . i]
[2907]12 | that the story on Oswald is inaccurate, what impact would that |
[2908]_ 13 have on your overall assessment? |
[2909]e ty Mr. Tovar. You mean demonstrably inaccurate? |
[2910]1s Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. | |
[2911]16 | Mr. Tovar. It would have to be examined. It would have |
[2912]7 | to be examined the full panoply: of the whole Oswald issue. :
[2913]12 _Tswould say weiwill get this team of analysts and we will
[2914]19 | fight it out. We are talking about hypothesis. !
[2915]20 | Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. I would prefer to stay away from the
[2916]31 ! term "fighting it out" because there is no one here who is in |
[2917]- 29 the posture of making a fighting isstie out of it. ° |
[2918]hd “4 i I no longer have any questions. I.will have questions to 1 |
[2919]14 | ask whoever on your staff participated in the preparation of . |
[2920]25 the memo that we discused earlier.
[2922]NW 48331 DocId:42277210 Page 47 ; TAD QEPDOET :
[2924]46
[2928]Normally whenever a witness has an opportunity to testify
[2929]before the Committee at a iearing, the Committee gives him five
[2930]minutes at the end to make a statement. This is not a hearing.
[2931]However, if you would like ‘to make a statement for the record,
[2932]‘feel free to do so. If no:, you will be given a chance to
[2933]verify the record for accuracy. .
[2935]Mr. Tovar. Since I have no position to present and no
[2936]point to make it is probably improper to make a statement.
[2938]The only think I would reiterate is that I have been sort of
[2940]speculating here in many respects. Bear in mind there is an
[2942]area here where I have a purview that is perhaps. valid. We
[2945]2 are talking about a lot of things which are way beyond my |
[2946]; 43 | immediate experience and certainly my current responsibility.
[2948], e 14 I would say, take some of my speculation with a grain of J
[2949]Ht
[2950]1s | salt, because I don't mean to be dogMatic on these things. |
[2951]16 | The procedure for handling the 201 file, there are some GS-7
[2953]7 | girls down the line who could tell you much more about the 201
[2954]ail files than I would ever be able to compile for you. ‘They are |
[2956]19 | the ones you really should talk to.
[2958]30 | Things like the ISR, = know the ISR-in a limited framework|
[2959]z1 | from the standpoint of a guy overseas who is dealing frequently!
[2960]- 22 | with the military and registers military sources in the ISR. |
[2961]-@ 13 | and checks the ISR either on behalf of the military or to see’ |
[2962]34 ! if they have. already regis::ered prior interest, and so on. There
[2963]35 I may. be other aspects of the thing that you should ge more -- :
[2965]|
[2966]1
[2967]i
[2968]|
[2970]NW 48331 pocta:52277210 Page 48 Thp OQEARET
[2972]Ur DCUREE
[2974]47
[2976]|
[2977]|
[2978]| professional advice on. |
[2979]oo
[2981]I think your question: have been reasonable, I have found
[2983]no objection to try to mee: you more than halfway on it.
[2984]Mr. Goldsmith. Fine. Thank you very much.
[2985](Whereupon, at 3:20 P.m., the deposition was concluded.)
[2988]|
[2989]|
[2993]pe uw
[2995]i
[2996]3
[2997]a
[3002]o be *) o ~
[3003]te eeup te = === 1: ee wre er rs 2 8 ae ee ee
[3005]NW 48331 pocrachaarrai9 Page 49 THe QFARCT
[3007]tur WDLUHE I
[3009]by any of the parties to the action in which this deposition
[3011]48 .
[3012]| _
[3013]“CERTIFICAT:3 OF NOTARY PUBLIC
[3014]2 I, Alfred Joseph LaFr.ince, the officer before whom the
[3015]3 foregoing deposition was taken, do hereby certify that the |
[3016]7 e “| witness whose testimony appears in the foregoing deposition |
[3017]5 was duly sworn by me; that the testimony of said witness was |
[3018]6 | taken by me in stenotype to the best of my .ability and there-- |
[3019]7 after reduced to typewriting under my direction, that said |
[3020]: deposition is a true record of the testimony given by said. |
[3021]9 | witness; that I am neither. counsel for, related to, nor employed
[3025]|
[3026]11 | was taken; and further that: I am not a relative or employee :
[3029]2 | of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties thereto, H
[3030]3
[3032]nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of the
[3033]action.
[3035]Notary Public in and for the
[3037]t
[3038]16 District of Columbia
[3039]17 My Commission expires Novernber 14, 1980.. |
[3040]- 4 ; i
[3041]13 |
[3042]|
[3043]te
[3045]i
[3046]I j
[3048]20 |
[3049]2 | :
[3050]. 6d
[3051]6 | :
[3053]oo
[3054]2 | |
[3055]| |
[3058]™ 46331 peoratbrrrn Page 50 THp OLPOCT 7 . . ‘