[1]A ARAAN
[2]1704-10332-10008 | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
[4]Assassination Records Review Board
[5]600 E Street NW - 2nd Floor - Washington, DC 20530
[6]{202) 724-0088 + Fax: (202) 724-0457
[8]CIA
[9]O OBy
[11]D CTI
[12]August 23, 1995 Reuss Ficario ANDIOS
[13]HAND DELIVERED Copy prov: ded te
[14]John A. Hartingh IB
[15]Inspector-in-Charge CIP sy F t
[16]JFK Task Force
[18]Federal Bureau of Investigation
[19]10th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue, N. WwW.
[20]Washington, D.C. 20535
[22]RE: Foreign Government Liaison
[23]Dear John:
[25]This morning, Jack Tunheim, Phil Golrick, and I met with Kenneth Duncan and several
[26]State Department representatives regarding how best to implement the JFK Act as to
[27]information obtained from foreign governments through liaison channels. We had a
[28]very constructive discussion of the affirmative role the State Department could play ‘in
[29]encouraging foreign governments, through appropriate diplomatic channels, to agree to
[30]the release of such information pursuant to the JFK Act. The Review Board believes
[31]that Section 10(b)(2) of the JFK ‘Act contemplates that the State Department play:
[32]precisely such a role.
[34]As for now, we will hold i in abeyance requests for evidence on foreign liaison
[35]postpdnements, to which the FBI has not yet responded. This will give us the -
[36]opportunity irtthe near future to work with the State Department and the FBI to.’
[37]establish orderly procedures to persuade the foreign governments in question that it is
[38]in our countries’ mutual interests to release liaison information in assassination records.
[39]Until such procedures are in place, we request that the FBI not make further contact
[40]with foreign law-enforcement or other government officials regarding the release of
[41]liaison information in assassination records.
[43]_ 1 *
[45]Boaro Memecns: John R. Tunheim, Chair - Henry F. Graff - Kermit L. Hall « William L. Joyce »Anna K. Nelson
[46]Executive Director: David G. Marwell
[48]13-00000
[50]Mr. John A. Hartingh.
[51]August 23, 1995
[52]Page 2
[54]Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any question.
[56]ir Research and Analysis:
[57]and Acting General Counsel _
[59]cc: Kenneth A. Duncan
[60]Department of State
[63]08 os
[65]wa 2 Secret
[66]o
[67]So wi
[69]13 February 1996
[71]Note to: Bob Skwirot,
[72]ARRB Staff
[73]Subject: Liaison related documents.
[74]Reference: Phone call between Ellie and Jeremy,
[75]12 February 1996
[76]Attached are a list and documents (13) which show :
[78]liaison relationships between the CIA and host services.
[79]They illustrate the problem of protecting liaison while
[80]releasing stations. These Documents were acted on by -the.
[81]Board at the January 5 meeting. “a a
[85]3
[87]Attachments as stated
[89]OFFICIAL USE ONLY WHEN SEPARATED FROM ATTACHMENTS
[91]Secret
[93]vs ; SECRET
[95]-10040: Although the Board continues to protect the
[96]liaison cryptonym in both paragraphs, the text shows Station
[97]cooperation with the Swedish service.
[99]104-10017-10058: Although the liaison cryptonym remains ~~
[100]protected, Paragraph 4 indicates liaison with the Swedish
[101]service.
[103].104-10018-10089: Board has made a determination to release
[104]“your liaison” in Paragraph 1 in addition to identifying
[105]Stockholm Station.
[107]104-10018-10091: With release of Stations (Stockholm,
[108]Helsinki, Copenhagen, and Oslo), text reveals liaison with ;
[109]the respective local services. ad _
[111]v
[114]104-10017-10036: Although the liaison cryptonym is
[115]protected, the context of the cable clearly shows Station
[116](if released) has a liaison relationship with the Swedish
[117]service. .
[119]104-10015-10425: The text of this cable from Rome,
[120]responding to a multi-Station message, states that liaison
[121]traces will follow. Once the identification of the Station
[122]is released, the existence of a liaison relationship with
[123]the Italian service in November 1963 is revealed.
[125]104-10015-10420: Cable from Oslo in clear text indicates “no
[126]liaison” traces; therefore, if the identification of the
[127]Station is released, it will acknowledge the liaison
[128]relationship between the Station and the Norwegian service.
[130]104-10015-10159: Paragraph 4 contains information that will
[131]show that Oslo Station had a technical operation directed
[132]against the Cuban target in Norway in November 1963. Also
[133]context of the cable reflects that the following Stations
[134]have a relationship with their local liaisons: Paris, Rome,
[135]\ Madrid, Copenhagen, Oslo, Helsinki, Brussels, the ;
[136]Netherlands, London, and Ottawa.
[138]CL BY 0563956 }
[139]REASON L.5(d)
[140]DECL X5; X5
[141]DRV LIA 3-87
[143]SECRET
[145]13-00000
[147]SECRET
[149]w :
[150]104-10015-10225: Paragraph 2 of the cable reflects that Rome
[151]Station had a technical operation in conjunction with the
[152]Italian liaison. Please note: The Board continues to protect
[154]the cryptonyms.
[156]104-10015-10230: Cable reflects that Station had the access
[157]to photograph US passports at the Amsterdam Schipol: Airport.
[158]it can be implied that. that capability is due to a liaison.
[159]relationship with the Dutch service. ;
[161]104~-10015-10255: Cable reflects The Hague Station had a
[162]photo operation in the Netherlands. When reviewed with 104-
[163]10015-10230, it will be clear that the operation refers to
[165]the Schipol Airport operation.
[167]104-10018-10088: Cable clearly shows that both Oslo ad.
[168]Stockholm Stations have a liaison relationship. in their
[169]respective countries if the Stations are released.
[171]as
[173]104-10018-10080: At the bottom of Page 2 of the cable is the
[174]phrase “assume Stockholm still planned ask its liaison to
[176]interrogate.” Release of Station and this phrase clearly
[177]reflects a liaison relationship with the Swedish service.
[179]CL BY 0563956 4
[180]REASON 1.5(d)
[181]DECL X5; X5
[182]DRV LIA 3-87 -
[184]SECRET
[186]13-00000
[188]SECRET
[190]From the Desk of‘Linda C. Cipriani ~>
[192]NOTE FOR: J. Barry Harrelson
[194]FROM: (linda C. Cipriani’).
[196]DATE: 04/29/96 04:26:36 PM
[197]SUBJECT: Memo re Mexican Liaiscn (S)
[199]cL By \2224130° 7)
[200]CL REASON 1.5(d)
[201]DECL ON X1
[202]DRV FM LIA 3-82
[204]The following is a draft memo for Jeff. (Bob Caudle’is looking at it now so there may be more changes. Please let me know if there is
[205]anything incorrect here. | have a feeling Jeff will want a meeting with me rather than just the memo. Also, knowing him, he may want
[206]to deal with Tunheim on this directly since he was involved in this. { will let you know.
[208]1. Action: That you advise as per paragraph 7.
[210]2. Background: You will recall that you spoke with
[211]Chairman Tunheim of the JFK Board about the attached cable and
[212]the importance of protecting the phrase ("with _Mexicans*) because
[213]it gives away (iaison involvement in a(tel-tap) operation. At
[214]its 16 April meeting, at which I was present, the Board
[215]reconsidered its initial decision, but determined that the phrase
[216]could be released.
[218]3. It had just come to HRG's attention that this same
[219]cable was released in full by the Board, with no objection by
[220]CIA, in September 1995. CIA probably did not contest this
[221]release bécdtse an excerpt from this cable, containing the phrase
[222]at issue, had been inadvertently released @ven-pxrier-te-that. It
[223]is,. therefore, no longer possible for CIA to argue before the
[224]Board for the protection of this phrase in|the current cable or
[226]to appeal this release to the White House. to he Nahonal Archwes in hug q3
[228]4. CIA is now in somewhat of an embarrassing position
[229]because it has strenuously argued that the release of this phrase
[230]would cause "clear and convincing damage" to the national
[231]security only to find that this phrase has been released with CIA
[232]acquiescence for at least seven months ,with-ne-ostensible damage.
[233]Conceivably, the Board could see this incident as a justification
[234]of their second-guessing our damage assessments, and could give
[235]us a much more difficult time in the future.
[237]SECRET
[239]13-00000
[241]' documents going to the Board to wee msure—ehat—He
[243]SECRET
[245]5. On the other hand, CIA could use this situation as a
[247]way to highlight the problems HRG has had with the JFK review
[249]process - that documents are being reviewed and released to the
[250]National Archives in such quantity and speed that it is difficult
[251]for CIA to-focus on any one document and, more importantly, how
[252]seemingly innocuous information in one document can actually be
[253]quite significant in relation to prior or subsequent releases.
[254]Since September, when this cable was originally released, the
[255]issue of protecting Mexican liaison has become increasingly
[256]important because of other releases on this subject and because
[257]of your appearance before the Board in February.
[259]6. Furthermore, this prior release should not impair our
[260]ability to continue to protect the fact of (Mexican involvement? in
[261]this (€el-tap! operation. Although we ed to the Board ans
[262]ancy aueehe phrase “with; Mexicans'gives that relationship away, *
[264]“does not -~im=facts>. directly do so. In fact, the reason”
[265]ent the Board's insistence that this phrase should be released
[266]was Sho—very fect that—the | cable did N NOT directly state that the
[268]“their arguments to cont inue to protect “the (liaison relationship.
[270]7. Our only recourse is to acknowledge to the Board that
[271]CIA has no basis to bring an appeal to the President since this
[272]cable has already been released in full. , We should, however,
[273]maintain our position that we believe this -information,is
[274]damaging especially in light of releases to National Archives
[276]- and that we never would have acquiesced to the
[278]release in September if we knew then what would be released on
[279]this subject in the ensuing months. Although this message does
[280]not necessarily need to be conveyed by you to Tunheim and could
[281]be handled by John Pereira and David Marwell, given your past
[282]dealings with the Board on this issue, you may prefer to do this.
[284]8. In order to avoid problems like this in the future, HRG
[285]is immediately dedicating several personnel to the task bf
[286]reviewing boxes of documents and determining what our releases
[287]have been‘onm one eaese Wap Sibjects. HRG will also be double
[289]duplicates ‘of >
[290]prior releases are—beimg—-sent. You should be aware, however, .
[291]that. there is only a rudimentary CIA computer index listing o Oral pro)
[292]releases and that it is impossible to do—aceurat’” computer » ;
[293]searches about our releases on specific subjects. Although HRG
[294]personnel are extremely knowledgeable on what has been released,
[296]with over 220,000 CIA documents currently in the collection, it
[297]is suprising that mistakes like this have not happened more
[299]often, Ove no ebwsorluke OSSuraumce ¢ tb COM Vrc pers AQa VN ,
[301]a
[303]ce:
[305]SECRET
[307]13-00000
[308]SECRET
[310]15 October 1996
[312]MEMORANDUM FOR: Assassination Records Review
[314]Board
[315]FROM: John F. Pereira
[316]Chief, Historical Review Group
[317]SUBJECT: Foreign Government Information
[318](Australia _
[320](We request that this memorandum be returned to CIA once the
[321]Board has completed its deliberations on the issues discussed
[322]below.)
[324]1. (S) Issue: This memorandum will address CIA's position
[325]on the review and declassification of foreign government
[326]information | that appears in the JFK collection. This issue has
[328]Board of\ australian liaison,;documents. The Agency believes it is
[329]important to address this issue at this time because this is the
[330]first instance that this type of foreign liaison document has
[331]been reviewed by the Board and it is possible that such
[332]information will appear again in CIA's collection. This memo
[333]will, therefore, focus on the larger issue of a United States
[334]Government (USG) agency's legal obligations in the dissemination
[335]and declassification of foreign government information but will
[336]also address the specific issue of the ‘six “Australian documents"
[337](documents: 104- 10012-10078, 104-10012-10079, 104-10012- 10080, ;
[338](104- 10012- 10081, 104- -10009- 10222, 104- 10009- 10224).
[340]2. (S) Conclusion: : CIA does not object to the release of the
[341]information in these‘ “six! documents, but is only concerned about
[342]protecting foreign government information. Therefore, the Agency
[343]does not object to the release of the four CIA documents in the
[344]redacted form proposed by the Board. With regards to the two >
[345]Australian letters, the Agency has no authority to unilaterally
[346]‘agree to their release in any form. Pursuant to its legal
[347]obligations, CIA ordinarily seeks the consent of the foreign
[348]government prior to declassifying their information. ‘However,
[349]‘for reasons described herein, it isnot possible to even seek the
[351]- consent of the Australians at this time, nor would it be likely
[352]- that the Australians would give it. Rather than going to the
[353]Australians against its better judgment or requesting the
[354]CL BY: 2224130
[355]CL REASON: 1.5(d)
[356]DECL ON: X5
[357]DRV FM: LIA 3-82
[358]SECRET
[360]13-00000
[361]SECRET
[363]' SUBJECT: Foreign Government Information
[365](Australia >
[367]President to “agree ‘to the unilateral_deciassification of foreign >
[369]jovernment:. information, CIA proposes. ‘that the release of the 2
[371](haste an, documents. be either Postponed | fora short time or that 2,
[372]a a
[374]Se a ame ry,
[376]a substitution be made.
[377]es a aa
[379]UN ee
[381]3. (U) Legal Authorities: The procedures governing the
[382]declassification and dissemination of foreign government
[383]information are set out in Executive Order 12958, as well as
[384]Director of Central Intelligence Directives (DCIDs). Executive
[385]Order 12958 defines foreign government information as including
[386](1) information provided by a foreign government, or any element
[387]thereof, with the expectation, expressed or implied, that the
[388]information and/or the source of the information, are to be held
[389]in confidence; or (2) information produced by the United States
[390]pursuant to or as a result of a joint arrangements with a foreign
[391]government, or any element thereof, requiring that the
[392]information, the arrangements, or both, are to be held in
[393]confidence. Id., at §1.1(d)
[395]4. (U) Foreign government information is subject toa
[396]classification determination under E.O. 12958, section. 1.5(c).
[397]When so classified, U.S. government agencies are obligated to
[398]protect that information from unauthorized disclosure. The E.O.
[399]requires. that foreign government information shall either retain
[400]its original classification or be assigned a U.S. classification
[401]that shall ensure a degree of protection at least equivalent to
[402]that required by the entity that furnished the information. Id.,
[403]at 1.7(e). Furthermore, agencies are required to safeguard
[404]foreign government information under standards that provide a
[405]degree of protection at least equivalent to that required by the
[406]originating government. Id., at 4.2(g).
[408]5. (U) Pursuant.to his authority as head of the
[409]intelligence community to protect all classified information from
[410]unauthorized disclosure, the Director of Central Intelligence has
[411]issued Directives (that is, DCIDs) setting out the procedures for
[412]the declassification and dissemination of foreign government
[413]information. Intelligence obtained from another government or
[414]from a combined effort with another government, may not be
[415]released or authorized for release without its consent. DCID 5/6
[416]attachment § C.3. Furthermore, the release of intelligence that
[417]would be contrary to agreements between the U.S. and foreign
[418]countries is expressly prohibited. Id., at § C.5.
[420]6. (U) Finally, the very fact of intelligence cooperation
[421]between the U.S. and specifically named foreign countries and
[422]government components is classified SECRET unless a different
[423]classification is mutually agreed upon. DCID 1/10-1. Such
[424]information may be declassified only with the mutual consent of
[425]the U.S. and the foreign government whose interests are involved.
[427]DCID 1/10-1.
[429]2
[431]SECRET
[433]13-00000
[435]SECRET
[437]' SUBJECT: Foreign Government Information
[438](Australia)
[440]the U.S. ae the foreign government whose interests are involved.
[441]DCID 1/10-
[443]7. (U) National Security Considerations: The importance of.
[444]such coordination with foreign governments prior to the release
[445]of their information cannot be overemphasized. Should CIA, or
[446]for that matter any (USG) agency fail to coordinate where
[447]required, not only would it be a violation of the aforementioned
[448]E.O. and directives, but it would chill relationships it has
[449]developed with foreign services over the years. If such lack of
[450]coordination became known, foreign services would hesitate to
[451]share crucial intelligence information with CIA if they believed
[452]it would be released, in spite of any agreements or U.S. laws to
[453]the contrary, without their consent. Furthermore, the U.S. could
[454]not expect foreign services to safeguard U.S. government
[455]information that it shares with its liaison partners in order to
[456]pursue authorized intelligence and foreign policy objectives.
[458]8. (S) According to its legal obligations described herein,
[459]CIA coordinates the dissemination and/or release of: foreign
[460]government information. Its obligation to do so is similar to
[461]its obligation to coordinate declassification efforts with
[462]another USG agency should the CIA possess any of that agency's
[463]documents. For example, CIA could not declassify and release to
[464]the public FBI information located in CIA files without
[465]coordinating with that agency. Similarly, CIA has no authority
[466]to unilaterally declassify foreign government documents or ,
[467]information in its files.
[469]eee: : strakia:—As—two of the documents‘
[470]lt iss issue here are letters from the Australian service (104-10009-
[471]10224, 104-10012-10080), CIA is legally obligated by E.O. and
[472]agreement with the Australians to seek the consent of the
[473]Australians prior to their release, even in redacted form. The
[474]issue of coordinating with the Australian service is a timely
[475]one. In most cases, CIA would not have an objection to going to
[476]the foreign government and seeking their consent for declas-
[477]sification. However, several events that have occurred in the
[478]last few months depict just how seriously Australia considers any
[479]indication that the U.S. is unable to protect from release their
[480]classified information. Based on the incidents described |
[482]below, it is CIA's position that even asking the Australians ‘for
[484]consent to release would threaten the current relationship.
[486]* Within the last year, a demarche was made by the Australian
[487]government expressing strong concern that U.S. declas-
[488]sification legislation expressly spell out that no information
[489]provided to the USG by the Australian service be declassified
[490]without its permission. A copy of this demarche is provided
[491]for the Board's review. (See attached.) It is worth noting
[492]that this demarche is not_between_intelligence-services—but————
[494]3
[496]SECRET
[499]13-00000
[500]SECRET
[502]‘ SUBJECT: Foreign Government Information
[504]‘Australia 5
[506]: ather—between governments ==—it-was—literally—delivered—by—
[507]| the Australian Ambassador to the National Security Council and
[508]i to the U.S. Ambassador to Australia. The manner in which the
[509]Australians treated the demarche demonstrates that the
[511]‘ protection of classified information is receiving top priority
[513]in the Australian government and is not just a concern of
[515]their intelligence community.
[518]e On two recent but separate occasions the Australian service |
[520]passed to CIA information indicating that there would be
[521]| assassination attempts on two non-U.S. citizens. CIA |
[522]' requested that it pass this information on to the targets, but |;
[523]the Australians refused. They argued that the information was |
[524]not specific enough and would endanger a source. The |
[525]Australians stated that if they believed the information was |
[526]useful, they would pass it themselves. The Australians were |
[528]concerned that CIA had even asked to pass on this information,
[529]and questioned what they perceived as CIA's willingness to
[530]share their information with third parties. Finally, they
[532]; stated that the easiest way to protect their information was
[534]i simply not to pass it to CIA anymore.
[536]e Just this month, a senior official of the Australian service
[537]approached the CIA with accusations that a former Agency
[539]| i employee allegedly may have disclosed their. classified
[541]information. The Australians believe that this disclosure
[543]{ may be related to the loss of all agent reporting sources
[545]| in a country of particular interest to them. The DDCI
[547]promised the head of the Australian service to launch an
[549]investigation into the matter.
[551]* The Australian service recently expressed grave concern to CIA
[552]about a book published by an American USG official which
[554]| alludes to a relationship between the CIA arid the Australian
[556]service. Even though this book was not an official CIA
[558]acknowledgment of a liaison relationship, to the Australians,
[559]this incident called into question the CIA's ability to protect |
[560]that relationship.
[562]10. (S) Under the circumstances, it would be an affront to ,;
[563]the Australians: to be asked for their consent in light of the
[564]above events which have all occurred in the last year. The t
[565]Australians would not only be extremely upset with CIA, but would |
[566]certainly deny their consent. Should the Australians deny their
[567]consent, CIA would have no authority to agree to the release of
[569]r | the information and would be obligated to-do all it could to
[570]Prevent disclosure. It_is_crucial_not—only—to_CIA!s_mission_but_
[572]LL. ft te to See _ a
[576]4
[578]SECRET
[580]13-00000
[581]SECRET
[583]‘ SUBJECT: Foreign Government Information
[585]Qustralia |
[586]m
[588](7 aiso-to-the-conduct~ of _US~ foreign —~ relations that thé usG is seen | |
[589]as abiding by its agreements with foreign services as. well as its \
[591]{j own laws on the release of information. :
[593]' 11. (S) Finally, the importance of maintaining good :
[594]' relations with the Australians cannot be overemphasized. As a :
[595]result of our valuable relationship with our Australian liaison ‘
[596]| counterparts, the USG receives a large volume of finished if
[597]; intelligence. Due to our shrinking resources, much of this i
[598]‘ information would not be available to U.S. policy makers were it i
[599]not provided by the Australians. Additionally, we work together
[600]' with the Australians around the world on joint collection !
[602]- activities that cover the full spectrum of USG intelligence i
[603]j priorities. Finally, there are several critical collection i
[604]it
[606]]
[610]t
[612]efforts vital to the USG where we do not have the entrée to
[613]. collect intelligence independently. In these cases, we rely
[615]; entirely on the continued good will of the Australian services to
[616]provide us with the assistance necessary to meet U.S.
[617]policymakers' needs. . 7
[619]| 12. (S) In light of all the above, CIA submits the be
[620]; following two proposals for the Board's consideration. First, {
[621]the Board could postpone these two documents from release for a |
[622]short period (we propose 10 months) at which time CIA can
[623]reassess its relationship with the Australians. It is possible |
[624]that the relationship with CIA and Australia could change so that:
[625]it would be possible to seek their consent for release in full. |
[626]However, should we seek the consent of the Australians at a
[627]future date and the Australians object to the release of the ;
[628]i | documents, we would ask that the Board seriously consider any ;
[629]- negative reaction from the Australians in its deliberations and
[630]| abide by their desires. A second option would be for CIA to.
[631]coordinate with the JFK Staff a substitution or some sort of | |
[632]This ,
[634]1
[637]4 summary of the Australian documents for immediate release.
[638]summary would hide the fact that the letter came from the
[639]Australian service, but would reveal what the subject of the
[641]letter was. This would avoid the problem of having to go the
[642]Australians to seek their consent, which we would have to do even,
[644]| in the case of redactions. 7
[646]| 13. (U) Should the Board reject these proposals, CIA is \ \
[648]agreeable solution. We strongly believe, however, that any
[649]approach which suggests that the U.S. Government may ignore its
[650]obligations and commitments to foreign governments would
[651]seriously undermine the vigorous and healthy diplomatic as well
[652]as intelligence relationships that we currently enjoy.
[654]\ willing to work with the Board to reach another mutually
[656]14. (S) With regard to the remaining four documents (104-
[657]10012-10078, 104-10012-10079, 104-10012-10081, 104-10009-10222,
[658]Sat 2 i dbtce id hte eaetacgsonmnee Otho
[660]C = nae
[662]5
[664]SECRET
[666]13-00000
[668]SECRET
[670]‘ SUBJECT: Foreign Government Information
[672]Australia
[673]government. As such, CIA consents to the release of these
[675]documents with the redactions proposed by the Board.
[677]15. (S) Proposal for Future Coordination: With regards to
[679]any other foreign government information that may exist in the
[680]files, CIA proposes that it approach its liaison services to
[681]request their consent in the release of their information when it
[682]would be appropriate to do so. Although recent events with
[683]Australia make it impossible for CIA to approach them at this
[684]time, this may not be so with other services. In cases were CIA
[685]believes, because of the nature of the relationship, that it
[686]would not be possible to request the consent of the service, CIA
[687]proposes that the documents either be postponed from release or
[688]that CIA and Board's staff coordinate a summary.
[690]Attachment
[692]6
[694]SECRET
[696]13-00000
[698]Attached is a copy of the Australian Demarche on U.S. legislation on declassification.
[700]This was given to the U.S. Ambassador to Australia, Ambassador Perkins by Philip
[702]Flood, then Director of the Office of National Assessments (ONA), in September 1995.
[704]This demarche was also given to Sandy Berger at the National Security Council by
[706]Australian Ambassador to the United States Don Russell on 4 August 1995.
[708]re,
[710]13-00000
[712]( OO AUSTRALIAN COMMENTS ON
[714]BXECUTIVE ORDER 12958 —
[715]CLASSIFIED NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
[717]The Australlan government wishes to register Its concern over the 17 April Exccutive
[718]Order on Classified Natlonal-Security Informuation.and the apparent omission of any
[719]explicit provision to protect foreign-sourced information or documentatlon from
[720]automatic declassificatlon once it is over 25 years old,
[722]The Australian government understands and supports the democratic principles and
[724]commitment to open government which underpin the Exeoutive Order. We too are
[725]improving access to government information, but are maintaining provisions to
[726]protect fore!gn-sourced Information —tneluding U.S, information. .
[728]We do not agree that these principles can be applied by one foreign zovernmetit to the
[729]information or documentation of-another government without prior consultation and
[730]‘clearance. Australlan-sourced information was and continues to be passed to the U.S,
[731]government on the understanding that it will be protected. We adopt precisely the
[732]same approach to information that tho U.S, shares with us.
[734]Omission of such consultation would, in the cyes of the Australian government, not
[735]be in keeping with the 1962 U.S.-Australla General Security: of Information
[736]agreement or the many other bilateral and multilateral intelligence co- operation und
[737]information sharing agresments.
[739]The failure to protect ‘sensitive Austrailan-sourced information about, for example,
[740]our intelligence operations, could have ramifications for our relations with regional
[741]countries and compromise Intelligence sources and methods (upon which the U.S.
[742]depends in part).
[744]Australian concems could be addressed if provision for clearance with originators of
[745]~ foreign-sourced material was embodled in the Information Securlty Oversight Office
[746]c Implementation directive to U.S. agencies.
[748].— such an approach should not impede or delay the declasslfication process —
[749]Australia is not seeking this, Por example, categorics of sensitivity for Australia -
[750]could be identified. A reasonable ime Limit could be put on Australian response
[751]time after which the U.S. could be free to declassify (we have @ similar
[752]urrangement with the U.K.).
[755]13-00000
[757]SECRET ——
[758]Central Intelligence Agency
[760]a >
[762]28 January 1997
[764]Mr. David G. Marwell
[766]Executive Director
[768]Assassination Records
[769]Review Board
[771]600 E Street, NW
[773]Washington, DC 20530
[775]Dear David:
[777]This is to acknowledge your letter of 3 January 1997 to the
[778]Director of Central Intelligence concerning the Assassination
[779]Records Review Board's recent formal determinations with respect
[780]to CIA Records.
[782]The appropriate Agency components have again reviewed the
[783]documents that the Board has decided to release either totally or
[784]with some information. postponed. While the Agency does not plan
[785]to appeal to the President for additional postponements at this
[786]time, we ask that the Board reconsider its decisions with respect
[787]to six documents. These documents contain information relating to
[788]foreign government provided data, foreign liaison relationships,
[789]and intelligence sources--information. that we believe merits
[790]protection under current standards set by the Board. A,list. of
[791]these, six documents, together with Agency comments concérning
[792]them, “is enclosed.
[794]We plan no further action on these documents pending
[795]discussion with your staff and review by the Board.
[797]‘47 John F. Pereira
[798]Chief, Historical Review Group
[800]Enclosure.
[802]UNCLASSIFIED WHEN
[803]SEPARATED FROM ENCLOSURE
[805]13-00000
[807]SECRET
[809]ENCLOSURE
[811](We request that this enclosure be returned to CIA once the
[812]Review Board has completed its deliberations on the issues
[813]discussed below.)
[815](U) The Central Intelligence Agency requests that the
[816]Assassination Records Review Board reconsider its determination
[817]on the six documents listed below: :
[819](U) 1. 104-10012-10080 and 104-10009-10224
[820](substitute--language for a foreign country document) .
[822](S) The foreign government in question has expressed
[823]strong-.concern about USG and CIA‘s inability to keep secrets,
[824]and current relationships are very tense. If we are required to
[825]release the date and/or narrow the geographic choices too
[826]closely, the foreign government will be able to identify the
[827]document as theirs. Because this document is scheduled for
[828]another review in July 1997, we request that the ARRB reconsider
[829]the inclusion of the date of the document and designation of the
[830]‘country of origin as “Pacific Rim Country”, and accept our
[831]originally submitted wording.
[833](U) 2. 104-10051-10106 (release of location)
[835](S) We request reconsideration of the release of the
[836]location identified in the last three words in the eleventh line,
[837]paragraph eight. This CIA base currently is undeclared to the
[839]host government.
[842](U) 3. 104-10055-10072 and 104~-10054-10007 (foreign
[843]government activity/VTiaison) .
[845](S) Regarding the release of the reference to the passport
[846]camera.on page 3, it is not the USG's position to confirm that a
[847]foreign government undertakes such activity. In addition this is
[848]an on-going operation. Further, releasing the words in question
[849]would establish a strong inference that the two Agency officers
[850]were permitted by foreign officials to inspect the camera, thus
[852]i ae
[854]. CL BY: \OT85904™"
[855]DECL ON: Xl
[856]CL REASON: 1.5(c)
[858]DV FM: «AHB 70-9 MULTIPLE
[860]1 *
[862]13-00000
[864]SECRET
[866]tending to confirm the liaison relationship. We request that the
[867]last seven words of line four, paragraph “h*, be replaced with
[868]substitute wording such as “the public security facilities”.
[870](U) 4. 104-10004-10213 (source)
[872](S) We request that the ARRB reconsider releasing the word
[873]“agent” in this context (page 32); suggested substitute,
[874]“contact.” Nielson was not a paid agent of the REDSKIN project
[875]and does not appear to have worked for the Agency in any other
[876]capacity. To describe him as a CIA agent could cause danger
[877]either to him or his family, especially if they are still in
[878]Russia. .
[880]te
[882]13-00000
[884]SECRET
[886]Assassination Records Review Board
[887]600 E Street NW - 2nd Floor - Washington, DC 20530
[888](202) 724-0088 + Fax: (202) 724-0457
[890]September 5, 1997
[892]BY COURIER
[894]Mr. John Pereira
[896]Director
[898]Historical Review Group
[900]Center for the Study of Intelligence
[901]Central Intelligence Agency
[902]Washington, DC 20505
[904]Re: Request to CIA to contact liaison channels regarding LIENVOY intercepts of
[905]Oswald telephone calls in Mexico City
[907]Some time ago the Review Board requested informally that CIA contact its liaison
[908]channels in Mexico City for information related to Lee Harvey Oswald. During your
[909]recent visit here we discussed with you the feasibility of your making such contacts. I
[910]am writing in response to your request that we memorialize our request and provide
[912]' some background information.
[914]The Review Board believes that all reasonable steps should be taken to account for all
[915]telephonic intercepts of Oswald during his visit to Mexico City in September-October
[917]1963. There is evidence that CIA intercepted some telephone calls through an operation
[918]named LIENVOY fonducted jointly with components.of the Mexican government.) We_ |
[919]. . > . Toe . Y liaison
[920]felophoric e, specifica lly the actual recordings of Oswald’s telephone calls to the
[921]“Soviet Embassy during the period of September ‘through October 3, 1963.
[923]The Review Board previously has sought information from the Mexican Government
[924]through appropriate diplomatic channels. For reasons that are obvious to those
[925]familiar with Mexico City issues, the Review Board could not raise with Mexican
[926]officials:nor with the U.S. State Department the possible existence of additional tape
[927]recordings that might be in the hands of certain officials. Thus, at the behest of the
[928]Review Board, the Department of State requested that the Mexican federal government
[930]and local government agencies conduct general searches of their files for records
[931]related to the assassination of President Kennedy. The Mexican government responded
[933]SECRET
[937]Boaro Memeens: John R. Tunheim, Chair » Henry F. Graff + Kermit L. Hall « William L. Joyce * Anna K. Nelson
[938]7 Executive Director: David G. Marwell
[941]13-00000
[943]SECRET
[945]Mr. John Pereira
[946]September 5, 1997
[947]Page 2
[949]by sending copies of the same documentation and correspondence. that the GOM had
[950]made available to the Warren Commission in 1964.
[952]The basis for our interest in your contacting appropriate Mexican officials is found in
[953]CIA document 104-10004-10199, which was reviewed by the Board on September 19,
[954]1995. On page 5 of this document (not including the cover sheet) information that the
[955]Board agreed to protect, due to the sensitivity of sources and methods involved,
[957]{suggests that the Mexican security forces may have had their own copy of the October 1 “}
[958]intercept on Lee Harvey Oswald. It is unclear whether this statement refers to the
[959]transcript or to an actual tape containing the phone call. Nevertheless, it provides
[960]enough evidence to warrant additional inquiries on this matter.
[962]For your reference we are enclosing copies of the reference documents as well as copies _
[963]of the correspondence between the DOS and the Mexican government:
[965]We would appreciate your contacting appropriate officials to determine what i
[966]fesponse to this request by November 14, 1997. We are fully aware of the sensitivity of
[967]is type of request and do not wish to take any action that would compromiselexisting,}
[969]intelligence operations) If necessary, we would be pleased to discuss with you. ways in
[970]which we might further elaborate on this request, including person-to-person
[971]discussions with appropriate officials either herelor in Mexico.
[973]Thank you for your continued assistance and cooperation.
[975]Sincerely yours, 7 \
[977]T. Jeremy Gunn /
[979]General Counsel and Associate Director
[980]for.Research and Analysis
[982]ce: J. Barry Harrelson, HRG. _
[984]Enclosures
[986]SECRET
[988]13-00000
[991]Cert SECRET
[992]. CL BY{6T1637_|
[993]CL REASOW: Section 1.5 C
[994]DECL ON: X1
[995]orv FRM: COV 2-87
[996]15 January 1998
[997]MEMORANDUM FOR: John Pereira @ DCI °
[998]Fred Wickham @ DO
[999]Lee Strickland @ DA
[1000]FROM: J. Barry Harrelson
[1001]JFK Project Officer
[1002]OFFICE: CSI/HRG
[1003]SUBJECT: ARRB 22 January Meeting -- Agenda
[1004]REFERENCE:
[1006]1. The following items are on the ARRB meeting agenda for 22 January 1998:
[1008](S) A. Reconsideration of the (State Cover.) The ARRB staff has advised that briefings by senior CIA and{o alg
[1009]not required. However, the Agency‘and Staté\are welcome to make a presentation if it will add to the information being presented in the
[1010]“evidence memorandum”. The evidence memorandum must be at. ARRB no later than Tuesday 20 January. Mr. Gunn has suggested
[1011]we may want to have individuals standing by for questions. The current plan is for Lee SUaEREaT Sad me to be available at 600 E. St.
[1012]NW.. to answer any questions. -
[1014]{AlUO) © B,. Office of Personnel Files i in the Sequestered Collection (Microfilm). The ARRB staff will recominend to the Board that
[1015]personnel files:he, deglared NBR (Not Believed Relevant) and their release postponed until 2017. The Agency position is that the privacy
[1016]of each individual clearly outweighs the public interest, most of the information in these files has no relevance to the assassination story,
[1017]and any related information exist elsewhere in the collection. At ARRB staff request HAP is preparing five OP files for review by Board
[1018]members. .The ARRB-staff will prepare a memorandum for public release describing the files; their memo will be coordinated with the
[1019]Agency prior to release.
[1021](AIOU)-_ C. Non-related files/documents in the Sequestered Collection (Microfilm). The ARRB staff will recommend that the files a
[1022]and documents (approximately 35,000 pages) designated non-related by C1A during the 1994 review of the microfilm be declared NBR
[1024]"and released in 2017. !f the.recommendation is accepted by the Board, the ARRB staff will prepare an unclassified description of the
[1025]records for public release. This too will be coordinated with the Agency prior to release.
[1027]DB: Other possible items:
[1029](AIUD) i. ARRB Request # CIA 1--- The ARRB staff may request that the DO documents at issue in this request be
[1030]declared Assassination Records to be released in full or sanitized form.
[1032]SECRET
[1034]13-00000
[1036]oe
[1038]et SECRET
[1040](S) it. Crypt LINCUCR) -- ARRB staff did not find our evidence m memo on this crypt persuasive. They are expected to
[1041]recommend that teBoardr Board reaffirm its decision to release.
[1043](AIUO) iii. 1967 1G report on "Castro Assassination Plots” -- ARRB has requested that an updated version be released to NARA by
[1044]the end of January. Any disagreements between the Agency and ARRB staff may be added to the agenda. HRP and
[1045]DO reviewers are currently re-reviewing the report.
[1047](U) 2. If you have any questions about any of these items please call me.
[1048]ce: (Eileen Wukitch}@ DO
[1049]; Becky Rant @ DA
[1051](nda Ciprianij@ DCI
[1052]Sent on 15 January 1998 at 05:24:34 PM
[1054]SECRET