[1]DARAAN
[2]\q04-10332-10074 | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 | a
[6]| _ od
[7]SUMMARY OF AUGUST 1996 REVIEW BOARD ACTIONS ON
[8]SECURITY CLASSIFIED HSCA TESTIMONY OF
[10]JOHN SCELSO
[11](180-10131-10330)
[13]ar
[15]19; 9, 11, 22 Review 05/1997, "CIA
[16]Employee." —
[18]Protect first four 10/2017, "Operational
[19]words of line 5;. Details."
[20]release rest of line.
[22]52; 11 R_ (see release on
[23]Rae 141)
[25][5252123 | 21 & 23 R@R
[27]oe a
[29]55; 25. 10/2017 “Describes
[30]technical operation."
[32]56; 4-7 Release line 4; 10/2017, “Describes
[33], | protect all of line 5; | intelligence operation in
[34]release lines 6 & 7 Mexico City."
[36]10/2017, “Describes
[37]intelligence operation in
[38]Mexico City."
[40]| postpone from 4th
[41]word in line 19
[42]through the third
[43]word in line 21;
[44]release rest of lines
[46]10/2017 "Describes
[47]technical operation."
[49]10/2017 "Describes
[50]individuals."
[52]10/2017 "Describes
[53]technical operation."
[56]13-00000
[58]57; 20-23 protect last three
[59]words on line 20;
[60].. release lines 21-23.
[62]10/2017, “Describes
[63]intelligence operations "
[64]and 4th - 6th words. | "Describes a group of
[65]online il. people."
[67]sia RO
[69]57; 17-19 10/2017 "Describes
[70]technical operation."
[72]10/2017, “Describes
[73]intelligence operation"
[75]Release line 10,
[76]postpone Ist, 2nd,
[81]57; 24 10/2017, "Describes
[82]intelligence operation"
[83]58; 2-3 Release 2017,
[84]“Describes intelligence
[85]operation."
[87]22
[88]68; 13 Scelso language and
[89]identifier.
[90]83; 14-15 10/2017 “Describes
[91]individual."
[92]83]8.- Po Release date 08/2006;
[93]Crypt."
[94]83; 22-23 Po 10/2017 "Describes |
[96]Release 2017, “No
[97]suitable substitute
[98]language"
[99]Release 2017, “No
[100]suitable substitute
[101]language"
[104]13-00000
[105]a
[107]140; 23 — date 08/2006, |
[110]Release 2017, "No
[111]suitable substitute
[113]Pop language"
[115]ais [RT
[116]84; 17 10/2017 "No suitable
[117]substitute language."
[118]84; 19 P “ 10/2017 "Describes
[119]; . technical operation."
[120]85; 10 Release date 08/2006.
[121]“crypt” .
[122]85; 19 "crypt"
[123]86; 12 Release date 08/2006.
[124]- "crypt"
[125]86; 15 10/2017. "describes
[126]personnel
[127]87; Scelso language and
[128]date.
[130]Release date 08/2006.
[131]"description."
[132]106; 11 Release date 08/2006.
[135]/140;20 20
[139]Release a "CIA
[140]Installation in Western
[143]13-00000
[145]Scelso date. Sub.lang.
[146]"location".
[148]Review 05/1997 "CIA
[149]Employee."
[151]CIA team disk 8\ scel_act.wpd_
[153]13-00000
[154]. ; SECRET
[156]27 September 1996
[158]MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director
[159]Assassination Records Review Board
[161]FROM: — John F. Pereira
[162]Central Intelligenge Agency
[164]SUBJECT: Reconsideration of Releases in Scelso
[165]Testimony and Lopez. Report
[167](We request that this memorandum be returned to CIA
[168]once the Board has completed its deliberations on the issues
[169]discussed below.)
[171]a. (8). Issue..._This _memo..is to request. that. the JFK. __-
[172]Board reconsider its decision to release certain information
[173]contained in the HSCA testimony of John Scelso and _in the
[174]Lopez Report. Specifically CIA requests that /the phrases
[176]f "political action program" (pg. 64 ScelIso | Testimony, Pg.
[178]+177, 178 Lopez Report); "Mexican police" (pg. ‘85 :Scelso.
[180]Testimony) ; and "is exposed by Agee in his book" (pg. 141.
[182]Scelso Testimony) f be postponed-from— réléase. We also offer
[184]some~suggéestions for substitute language which we believe
[186]will not detract from the JFK assassination story, yet still
[187]protect the information at issue.
[189]a a en ae re
[191]oo eon 3p SE ees
[193]Ir. Mexican Political Action Program
[195]"We were running, at that time, a vast political action
[196]program in Mexico City to try to swing Mexico around from
[197]its Leftist direction to a middle of the road direction and
[198]it succeeded. I don't know whether you informed yourself
[199]about the magnitude of our political action program there at
[200]the time -- absolutely enormous"
[202](Scelso, 64; Lopez, PP. 177, 178)
[204]2. (S) From the early 1950's to the mid-1960's,
[205]Mexico City Station conducted a political action campaign to
[206]minimize leftist influence on and within the Mexican
[207]Government. The campaign utilized student groups, a front
[208]group of progressive businessmen, and Catholic lay group
[209]writers and operatives in political action and media
[210]placement efforts. The Station currently does not have a
[211]political action program designed to influence_Mexican
[212]_ -——" CL, BY 122241307
[213]ae Cl BY 2224 “ITS (ec)
[214]DECL ON X1
[215]DRV FM LOC 3-82
[216]LIA 3-82,HUM 4-82
[218]SECRET
[220]13-00000
[222]\. held that because there has been no official confirmation,
[224]. Sek Soe
[226]. . SECRET
[228]SUBJECT: Reconsideration of Releases in Scelso
[230]Testimony and Lopez Report
[231]politics, nor has it undertaken such activity anytime in the ae
[232]recént past.—Nevertheless,; any public-confirmation—by-the
[233]U.S. Government of those activities would risk an adverse
[234]reaction. Such adverse reaction would impact on current
[236]Mexico City Station operations and be harmful to U.S.
[237]interests. Any ~
[238]DINED end oly CRAG
[240]3. (S) As has-been described to the Board in previous Ae
[241]briefings by the -Menmeat Besa : , Mexicans guard their A ‘
[242]sovereignty carefully. Nothing will infuriate them more
[244]than allegations of CIA meddling in their internal politics.
[246]In fact, earlier this year, the Mexican Government postponed
[248]“a visit to Mexico by the DCI for fear that it might be
[250]perceived (and exploited) by the Mexican media.and political
[251]opposition as the CIA being called in to assist with
[253]handling the problem of the Peoples' Revolutionary Army.
[257]4. (S) The fact that the CIA activity to which the
[258]Mexicans would object occurred more than 30 years ago will drool 0
[259]not lessen the reaction. Release of the Scelso comments |
[260]would risk an adverse reaction from the Mexicans, which Tag, it
[261]would likely include calls for an examination by the Mexican she t
[262]Government of current CIA activities. This could lead to
[263]increased scrutiny of Station operations and personnel and
[264]could jeopardize our unilateral activities. It could also
[265]have a chilling effect on activities conducted jointly with
[266]the Mexican services, who will be reluctant to engage in
[267]programs that could become subject to public scrutiny and
[268]political debate. \
[270]5. (S) Furthermore, the fact that these statements
[271]were made by Scelso amounts to an official confirmation of A)
[272]the underlying facts, making it very difficult for CIA to deopte’
[273]protect the same or similar information from further release | ADLURRO,
[274]in the future. Speculation in books, articles, and other ,
[275]publications, or disclosures by Congress are often perceived
[276]by the public as evidence that that information is in the Four
[277]public domain and therefore is no longer classified. The
[278]CIA has nevertheless been able to legally protect the
[279]information from unauthorized disclosure. The courts have
[281]{i.e. declassification by the appropriate CIA official) the
[282]CIA may continue to protect from release Lhe. .
[283]the information at issue even when there. has been widespread "
[284]public discussion on the issue in questi
[286]6. (S) In this case, should there question raised
[287]as to the classification status of docu Zs on the
[288]political program referred to by Scelso, it would be
[289]difficult to convince a court that such information had not
[290]been declassified because of the release. by the Board.
[291]Scelso was a long-time.CIA employee who was in charge of the
[292]| investigation by the Agency into the assassination of the (shee?
[294]\ a a ae
[295]ty | 2 ET Gud
[297]SECRET ee
[299]AIP
[303]13-00000
[304]. SECRET
[306]SUBJECT: Reconsideration of Releases in Scelso
[307]; Testimony and Lopez Report
[308]f— President; and his testimony was taken under oath, with the
[309]T knowlédge—of-the-Agency;—and—in a classified setting.
[310]Furthermore, the attached letter to Louis Stokes, Chairman
[311]of the Select Committee on Assassination from former Acting
[312]DCI Frank Carlucci also indicates that Scelso was acting as
[313]an official of the CIA. The DCI states that any classified
[314]testimony made by Agency staff before the Committees would
[315]be considered "authorized provision" of the information.
[316]This was to ensure that "all persons respond fully and
[317]truthfully" to the Committee. Carlucci's letter, especially
[318]taken together with the first few pages of Scelso's
[319]testimony, make it clear that Scelso was speaking as an
[320]official of the CIA. New
[322]7. (S) A court would, therefore, probably find that
[323]Scelso's statements were not just merely speculation by a
[324]former Agency employee, but in fact, were official
[325]confirmation of the political action program. Anything
[326]suggesting official confirmation of classified information
[327]would lead a judge to the conclusion that the information at
[328]issue had been declassified by the CIA. This would make it
[329]\ very difficult for CIA to continue to protect this
[330]information from unauthorized disclosure. When confusion
[331]arises as to the classification status of information, it
[332]could lead to complicated legal proceedings and protracted
[333]and unnecessary litigation at great expense to all parties.
[335]IL. Liaison with Mexico
[337]"We did not have any source of Cuban employees. We only had
[338]Mexican police"...We had a whole reporting set up there with
[339]that, two of them, who watched things like that. (Scelso pg.
[340]185).
[342]8. (S) Release by the Board of Scelso's comments about
[343]the Mexican police in conjunction with surveillance coverage
[344]of the Mexico City airport could similarly have a chilling
[345]effect on our current liaison relationship with the Mexicans.
[346]The Station has worked, and continues to work, with liaison
[347]against compatible targets, including tracking the arrival
[348]and departure at the Mexico City airport of targets of |
[349]interest. Although the targets have obviously changed since
[350]the time that Scelso is speaking of, these surveillance
[351]operations are ongoing. The success of these current joint
[352]operations could be threatened by any revelation today of
[353]Mexican cooperation with the CIA in the past.
[355]9. (S) CIA objects to this release on similar grounds
[356]as stated in the prior section - disclosure of the: Scelso
[357]comments would constitute official acknowledgment by CIA of
[358]the assistance provided by Mexican liaison to the Agency.
[359]Such acknowledgment could affect not only current operations
[362]yO > - an er ene —.
[363]; Te
[364]eT pe EEE et
[366]a
[370]“Mee ba eee ES ete
[372]ce 3
[374]SECRET
[376]13-00000
[377]SECRET
[379]SUBJECT: Reconsideration of Releases in Scelso
[380]Testimony and Lopez. Report.
[381][ “described above, but also result in reluctance by Mexican in
[382]—~liaison to provide similar assistance in-the future.” The ene
[383]Mexican Government would likely be subject to criticism by
[384]groups and individuals opposed on nationalism and
[385]sovereignty grounds to such close cooperation with the U.S.
[387]Government and, even more’ so, with the CIA. The continued
[388]success of CIA cooperation with the Mexicans, whether it be Oy an
[390]with the-Rxesidemi, the intelligence service, or \
[391]depends on the fact that those relationships are, and Wari cur
[392]continue to be, secret. |
[394]DURA
[396]: 10. (S) CIA requests that the Board continue to _ an y
[397]withhold this phrase from release and substitute in "other
[398]sources" or. something similar to this. Omitting the fact
[399]that the airport information was obtained from Mexican
[400]counterparts would probably leave the impression that the
[401]information was obtained unilaterally. Although this still
[402]presents some risk to national security, it does achieve
[403]some level of protection to the Station's equities with
[405]liaison.
[406]IIr. Phillip Agee
[407]| (S) "That is, the variety and number of telephone
[409]taps, surveillance teams, photo operations and other
[410]. technical operations is exposed by Agee in his book. That
[411]exceeds anyplace else that we had in the world by a lot...
[413](Scelso, pg. 141)
[415]’ 11. (S) CIA objects to the release of the highlighted
[417]i phrase because, for reasons described in Section 1, it
[419]amounts to official CIA confirmation of the existence of a
[421]teltap operation conducted jointly with the Mexicans and
[423]with close collaboration with the President of Mexico. As
[425]this Board is well aware, CIA has consistently requested,
[427]! the protection of liaison involvement in this teltap
[429]: operation. As the Board has agreed with CIA's position on
[431]i this matter, the only issue is whether this statement
[432]reveals what we have agreed meets the criteria for continued
[434]f protection under the JFK Act.
[436]: 12.  (S) For. the Board's convenience, several relevant
[438]pages from Agee's book (Inside the Company: CIA Diary) are
[440]attached. These pages explain in great detail the teltap
[441]operation and the fact that it was conducted jointly between
[442]the CIA and the Mexicans. Although such disclosures by
[443]former employees are disturbing, they do not amount to
[444]official confirmation of the underlying information.
[446]\ Standing by itself, Agee's book can be dismissed by the
[448]\ Agency as speculation, and do not compromise CIA's ability
[449]Scelso's testimony,
[451]to keep the information classified.
[452]however, amounts to official confirmation of Agee's book,
[454]a a ,
[456]4 = .
[457]t atest te es
[459]—— ee ge ce et wee ee TT
[463]4
[465]SECRET
[468]13-00000
[469].¢ ‘ Oo SECRET
[471]- SUBJECT: Reconsideration of Releases in Scelso.
[472]Testimony and Lopez Report
[473]oo and does effect the Agency's ability to protect the.
[474]w-——----- information from—further release. Equally troubling is™ the”
[475]fact that Scelso's testimony could be read to confirm not
[476]only what is accurate in Agee's book, but also what is
[478]inaccurate.
[480]12. (S) Furthermore, the language used by Scelso is.
[481]clear. The use of the phrase "exposed by Agee in his book"
[482]does not allow for any other interpretation except that
[483]Agee's description of the teltap is accurate. If Scélso had
[484]used other language, such as "has been written about
[485]elsewhere", the existence of the joint teltap operation
[486]would be protected. We request that the Board protect the
[487]phrase as it is and use the above substitute language. Such
[488]substitute language would not alter the story of the JFK
[489]Assassination, yet would still allow for the protection of
[490]the joint operation. :
[492]13.  (S) While the connection between Agee's book and r|
[493]Scelso's testimony may at first seem attenuated, anyone {
[494]‘involved in the review process conducted by this Board will |
[495]know that it is not. Many individuals follow the decisions
[496]of this Board closely, and Agee's writings about the CIA are |
[497]also well known. It is to be expected that those who read
[498]the Scelso report would then turn to > Agee! s book. 4
[500]WA
[502]John F. Pereira
[504]SECRET
[506]13-00000
[508]SECRET
[510]From the Desk of:Linda C. Cipriani f
[512]NOTE FOR: J. Barry Harrelson
[513]FROM: Linda C. Cipriani
[514]DATE: 09/26/96 12:22:04 PM
[515]SUBJECT: Agee Memo - New draft
[517]Here it is... with Jeremy's improvements. Please read it carefully as | had to rush through this. Some of Jeremy's comments were slight
[518]wording changes so as not to offend "the Board" so you may not notice much change. The biggest substantive change was an my FOIA
[519]section (| have skillfully crafted this section to avoid the use of that four letter word!). Please note there is one more paragraph now
[520]because | did add a bit about Scelso being an “official”. And don't forget to attach to Stokes-DC1 latter which | will fax back to you.
[522]Have fun - and let me know if you need help.
[526]_ AGEEMEMO.DOC
[528]ce:
[530]SECRET
[532]13-00000 Loe
[533]| SECRET
[535]“23 August 1996
[537]Note For: Fred Wickham, DO
[538]’ Eleanor Neiman, DO
[539]‘Mike Luce,’ DO/Mexico
[540]:Valerie Patterson,’ DO/EA
[541]jChristine Hegeman; DO/EA
[542]‘Linda Cipriani; 6Ocec
[544]From: J. Barry Harrelson, CSI/HRG
[545]Subject: Meeting with ARRB Staff
[547]1. Thursday afternoon I met with Dave Marwell,
[549]Executive Director for the ARRB, and two of his staff,
[551]Jeremy Gunn and Mary McAuliffe. I briefed them on the four
[552]releases in the Lopez Report and Scelso Testimony that had
[553]been identified as_potential appeal items, and on the
[555]Agency's concerns} re_ the Australian documents? I requested
[556]_that_ the Board reconsider the release of the statements, on °
[557]{Mexico City political action programs, Scelso's comment on >
[558]JAgee, the reference to the Mexican Police as a source and vs
[559](Warrenton as site of the Agency' s Record Center ,° a
[561]2. Maxwell agreed to send a “staff recommendation” to
[562]the Board recommending that they delay the release of these
[563]four items to hear additional evidence from the Agency. The
[564]rest of the Lopez Report and Scelso Testimony would be
[565]released on schedule. If the Board accepts the staff's
[566]recommendation, the four items will be addressed at the next _
[567].. Washington meeting (27 September). If the Board rejects the
[569]staff's recommendation, then we have the option of appealing
[570]to the President. Marwell and Gunn seemed confident that ~~~
[571]the Board would agree to delay the release.
[573]3. ‘Gunn requested that the Agency's additional
[574]evidence on these four items (if provided in writing) be to.
[575]the ARRB staff by 23 September. The Agency can also brie :
[576]the Board members at. the 27 September meeting. As I” a
[578]‘ understand -it; DO/Mexico* (Mike LY Pp will be preparing -
[579]_ evidence’ memos © “oni “political action programs” and “Mexican >
[580]] police” ‘issues and O0GC (Linda C.) will take the ‘lead_on —
[582]{ Agee: T will contact the DA/TRO- (Don Hatch) on the/ Warrenton ’ oe
[583]issue. Bae
[585]4. Concerning{t he > Australian documents,, Marwell agreed
[586]to delay Board action until thé 16 October meeting. The
[587]Agency's proposal on these documents should be sent to the
[589]ARRB staff as soon as possible.
[591]cL By: (611637. * CL REASON: 1.5(c)
[592]DECL ON: X1-» ~~ DRV FM: MULTIPLE ~
[594]SECRET
[596]13-00000
[598]“Dehn Sc|et.sa (pseudo ny on)
[599]Lethe HSeA le Moy 1973 _
[601]a ee
[603]‘is acpeseck Gey hie back ‘ P: i4|
[605]~The. Phrase. HF feleasert cauld Khe
[607]) .
[608]tTteqethec Wot Greve been try ang
[609]tes prerect = primarily Cha solat- teltap
[610](seth the Mexicans and clase. col-
[611]laboration cin he, Pres identtiR ot
[612]Mexico, TE alsa qwes creclence
[613]es ee MRouny cleaq oct ews of Ager,
[614]istiuch the Agency has necher
[616]Car rwned nor cd med .
[618]i belong a Votsen
[619]| : Zhrouws cur atcess a ane po oh :
[620]Centrol Heme - eye
[622]Please. (erred the attached pages as dehermuned —
[624]fellows hiqhliqhted passages a as Cik Sclncthad —
[625]‘ armotnon 4D the. Board, redacted _
[627]Berackeked passages FYI as Bocas upheld delehors |
[629]largest relthop coverage. 5 Bo limes PP: S52, a, 56, 57 7
[631]iS) Oekte re “iQ anodic Redieed Peacd members |
[633]13-00000
[635]“*<"4V@8 HSCA (RG 233)
[637]29024 (202) SSn-24H5
[639]REPORTERS BULEDERS, UASiomeron » ase,
[642]a
[645]c
[646]o
[648]ba
[652]“4
[654]am
[656]“Oo
[660]WER 1-64
[662]been handled in any different manner?
[664]‘Mr. Scelso. It would have been in the case of dissimina-
[665]tion of information about him, but I do not think that any
[666]operational action would have been taken to apprehend him or
[667]to contact him or to try to force him back to the United
[668]States.
[670]Mr. Goldsmith. What about in terms of -- how would the
[671]dissemination have been treated differently?
[673]Mr. Scelso. Well, it simply means that we would have
[674]disseminated any additional information that we got.
[676]Mr. Goldsmith. Did Headquarters ever criticize the
[677]Mexico City station for failure to send this information?
[679]Mr. Scelso. No. That was not because we were trying to:
[680]go easy on them, it is simply because it is in the nature of
[681]the business. What you are trying to do is engage, as I used
[683]to say, in important illegal manipulations of society,
[685]secretly.
[687]We were running, at that time,
[691]program in Mexico City) covery
[693]Leftist direction ‘toa middle. of thé
[694]‘ cyl asses cehtel bese . : coe - owe
[696]ssucceédéd.’ I’do not know whether you informed yourself
[697]Se eee ES
[701]ed
[702]about the magnitude of our political action program there at
[704]Vole
[706]the time -- absolutely enormous.
[708]We were trying ta follow the Soviets and all the satel-
[710]lites and the Cubans. At the same time, the main thrust of
[712]WOL845,
[715]13-00000
[716]ut : wt, 1-
[719]N)
[721]a | Mr. Scelo. Yes.
[722], 2 Now, why did they not report everything they found out?
[723]- j
[724]; ; : Mr. Goldsmith. Answer your own question.
[725]| ‘ Mr. Scelo. The telephone center envoy was manned by
[726]i
[727]- 3 [:pEincipally;Hekxican supervision offfan american JOE Mexican- ake
[728]3 -) American. These people were just inundated with information
[729]= 7 and apparently did not extract this and transmit it back to
[730]: : Washington.
[731]¢ ¥ ( The later contacts with the Cuban Embassy, and so on,
[732]e 4
[733]= ‘G which only were divulged after the assassination. It is an
[734]z : | enormous problem. Mexico had one of the biggest and most -
[735]os #
[736]= os active telephone intercept operations in the whole world
[737]e
[738]z = | and the job of processing this material is just impossible.
[739]: i Mr. Goldsmith. Let's go through this step by step,
[740]E ‘s : although I was not going to do this at this time. I am going
[741]. 's i. to modify the line of inquiry somewhat.
[742]° m4 Do you know how many telephone intercepts there were
[743]: a in the Mexico City station?
[744]z "| Mr. Scelo. How many lines were being tapped?
[745]5 zo | Mr. Goldsmith. Yes, at the Cuban and then at the Soviet.
[746]cme I Mr. Scelo. JI think there are about @0?lines being tapped
[748]ye altogether: That is just the number that sticks in my mind.
[750]a Mr. Goldsmith, Thirty -medning“a" total of thicty from ,|/,
[751]both the Soviet and the Cuban?
[752]Mr. Scelo. And various security suspects.
[754]SeCueT rat SS
[756]13-00000
[758]vee Sees i
[759]atoeie . au a Pia
[762]- i |
[764]a i | Mr. Goldsmith. Would the security suspects to related
[766]“ :
[768]1
[769]po
[771]@ 24 to the Soviet or Cuban?
[773]d :
[777]9 3 Mr. Scelo, Some of them were American Communists
[781]a. 4 | living there whom we tapped at the specific request of J.
[783]4 H a
[785]3 o i
[787]' Zz $4 Edgar Hoover.
[790]a 4 | Mr. Goldsmith. Of those thirty lines how many, at your ole
[792]a 74 best estimate, would have been for the Soviet and Cubans?
[794]- | |
[795]s ai Mr. Scelo. However many outside telephone lines they
[796]go i had.
[797]e i
[798]~ id 4 Mr, Goldsmith. You think just about every outside
[800]Soon | phone? .
[801]F334 | Mr. Scelo. I think they tapped all the outside lines.
[802]>a + .
[803]= d
[804]- 2 ¥ Mr. Goldsmith. How certain of that are you?
[805]= q : .
[806]= 4 a ,
[807]ers y Mr. Scelo. Well, this is just based cn my recollection,
[809]E 13 ! going back 15 years.
[810]| | |
[811]= 42 4 Mr. Goldsmith. In any event, your earlier comment was
[812]~ 4
[813]“oI | that the telephone surveillance operation in Mexico City
[814]= ia was one of the most extensive in the world?
[815]a ; -
[816]= Fy Mr. Scelo. Yes. And of course, they taped a great
[817]= 20 | deal which they could not exploit. They cculd not later
[818]vo tt i listen to it; they did not have time. They used to listen
[819]ry pan . .
[820]ra 22 to it sort of spottily, you seer and attemst then to exploi
[821]23 what was the most important.
[823]Mr. Goldsmith. Your answer to my earlier question as
[825]to why the information on Oswald was not sent to the
[827]OEGRET
[829]101834
[831]'
[832]as
[834]13-00000
[835]“a
[836]os
[837]N
[838]Go
[839]x
[841]Yu
[843]x
[844]a
[845]a
[847]et
[848]c
[849]u
[850]wu
[851]z
[852]4
[854]t
[857]2024 (202) S$n249N5
[859]b.c.
[861]UASHTMTOM
[863]REPOS DUM
[865]390 Vr SRE, Soa,
[867]Ca
[868]r
[869]t,
[870]a
[873](Pause)
[875]Mr. Scelo. Yes.
[877]Mr. Goldsmith. I have a few questions to ask you on
[879]that. This refers to the envoy operation thhatawas
[881][joint operation conducted “by ‘the Mexicans and the .aiiericang]
[883]Ole
[885]and I believe this indicates that there were 30 lineg; iin;
[886]fact, connected at one timé, so that your early testimony
[888]was, in all likelihood, accurate.
[890]I am going to have to ask you also to*read the section
[892]marked number 3, Oswald coverage.
[893]Mr. Scelo. What is that report, if I may ask? ;
[895]Mr. Goldsmith. This is taken from the 1977 Inspector
[897]General Report.
[899]Mr. Scelo. I see.
[901]Mr. Goldsmith. Please read the section marked Oswald
[903]Coverage through to the end of the paragraph on page 162.
[905](Pause)
[907]On page 161, the section where it says? “Oswald Cover-
[909]Seer
[911]age. In'mid=62, ifeneve WeRiGan officer 3 in i charge’ Of ‘the™ envoy.”
[913]Nee
[915]envoy “Tistéhing post ror” ‘the “telephone numbers” of: the™ “gSviet ;
[916]Cuban and satellite embassies in anticipation of possible .
[917]coverage, ?. |
[919]The question I have for you is as follows. t would jle
[921]seem, from the earlier paragraph, that [theslias sc Ae
[924]13-00000, Waitin
[927]= was already in effect, so why would it have been necessary
[928]e + | for[the Mexican officer in chargef)+o ask fene American officer -|
[929]é 2 1 for the telephone numbers? .
[931]3 4 Mr. Scelo. [the Mexicans were.
[933]> at .
[935]é Es 3 things at “that time, not these targets, ~ ; They -were- tapping é
[936]“ F ; | other Mexicans, and so on.3 We had our own unilateral tap -
[937]« __. moe ven
[939]; & 5 L operations |
[941]Z | Mr. Goldsmith. I understand that.
[943]' * 3 Mr. Scelo. -- on those important targets.
[947]Mr. Goldsmith. So, are you saying that prior to 19627:
[949]- . |
[951]= |
[953]= 1; 1 [the liaison operations fwith the Mexicans jfdid not cover the
[954]= +4 4 Soviet, Cuban and satellite embassies?
[956]g \
[958]= oud Mr. Scelo, That is wnat that says. I do not really
[959]Zou, i xrecall. That would have been in mid~62%% That was just
[961]= ts about the time I was coming onboard in the Mexico desk.
[963]5 ts 1 And I do not recall what the previous status was.
[965]I do recall that they certainly did ask --[ aie
[967]ee a rt 1 HS SHUNT CHe WER re:
[968]y . a |
[970]o»
[972]JAA TU STHERT, Sou,
[974]t 15
[975]POE Mr. Goldsmith. It indicates that/ the. liaison operation.
[976]a4 had taps on 30 lines.“ If it was. not“the Sovi.
[978]BS!
[979]£27 i: i satellite embassies, it makes us wonder what it could have
[980]oN
[982]72: been.
[984]zs Mr, Scelo. Mexican politicians and security suspects; &
[986]22: Mexican Communist Party people. There were three or four or
[988]TOI §38 .
[990]: SECRET
[992]13-00000 mg tea a
[993]weysis i a 1-141
[995]33)
[997]Mr. Goldsmith. Is the Mexico City's station's Operations
[999]re
[1001]one of the most sensitive of all of the stations at the Agency?
[1005]Mr. Sceiso. ° It was then. That is, the variety and
[1007]number of telephone taps, surveillance teams, photo oPer ations
[1011]i
[1013](
[1014]i
[1017]a
[1019]and other technical operations is(exposed by Agee infhis +;
[1021]K) That exceeds anyplace else that we had in the world
[1025]by a lot. ‘There is no other station in the world that has
[1027]|
[1029]that good operations.
[1030]Then cand Caracas. frnat got to be real good. Nothing
[1032]like it in Europe.
[1034]os)
[1036]Mr. Goldsmith. I would like to draw your attention to a’
[1038]cable which, unfortunately, I do not have with me. The cable
[1040]is referred to in Book 5 of the Senate report, written by
[1042]Thomas Karamessinas to the Mexico City station in which he
[1044]i
[1046]Keproaucea from the holdinga of the Nati
[1047]1onal Archive
[1048]: 8 HSCA (RG 2
[1050]indicated and said the arrest of Sylvia Deran would jeepordize
[1052]REPOMT CHS BUELDING, YASUTNGTON, B.C. 20024 (202) 5Sn-2445
[1054]On
[1056]U.S. freedom of action.
[1058]|
[1059]. {
[1061]noe A
[1062]as '
[1063]2 Do -you remember that cable?
[1064]e ia:
[1065]s Mr. Scelso. Yes. * -
[1067]x i Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know why it was sent?
[1068]¢ i ry
[1069]S 201
[1070]° i Mr. Scelso. At that time, we were not sure that Oswald .
[1071]4 .
[1072]ard i
[1073]oe i might not have been a Cuban agent, aiid the arrest of a
[1074]f27 2
[1075]oN foreign consular person was quite a serious matter under
[1080]international ‘law.
[1083]ts
[1085]cae wk Mewed Raitt Mee Sebat SSS Skate es Kinwe oo wl
[1087]Although Sylvia Duran was a Mexican citizen, I believe,
[1089]we
[1092]nevertheless, I did not think -- Karamessinas may not have
[1094]SE Br BET 101923 |
[1097]a BTERET YR Test
[1099]Appendix :1
[1101]* Alphabetical and numerical listing of CTA employees,
[1102]agents and collaborators arid organizations controlled,
[1103]financed and thfluenced by the CIA,
[1105]ACOSTA VELASCO, JoRGE. Nephew of Ecuadorean President, Jose
[1107]' Maria Velasco. Minister’ of the Treasury and Minister of
[1108]Government. Informant and Political-action agent of the Quito
[1109]Station, : ;
[1111]AGENCIA ORBE LATINOAMERICANO, Feature news service serving
[1112]most of Latin America, Financed and controlled by the cra through
[1113]the Santiago, Chile, station, .
[1115]AGRIBUSINESS DEVELOPMENT.INC. (LAAD). Provided cover forcra
[1116]Officer Bruce Berckmans, q.v. .
[1118]AGUERRONDO, MARIO, Uruguayan Army colonel and former Monte-
[1119]video Chief of Police. Close Station liaison collaborator.
[1121]AIR AMERICA. CIA-owned airline for paramilitary Operations, mainly
[1122]in the Far East, a
[1124]ALARCON, ALBERTO, Guayaquil businessman and Liberal Party actiy.
[1125]ist. Principal agent for CIA student Operations. in Ecuador, Ctypto-
[1128]ALBORNOZ, ALFREDO. Ecuadorean Minister of Government Gnternal
[1129]security), Close collaborator of the Quito Station. —
[1131]ALLEN, JOHN. CIA Operations officer at Camp Peary training base,
[1132]formerly assigned in the Near Rast,
[1134]ALLIANCE FOR ANTI-TOTALITARIAN EDUCATION. Propaganda
[1135]mechanism of the Montevideo station, -
[1137]ALMEIDA, WILSON, Publisher and editor of Voz Universitaria, @.¥., &
[1138]university student newspaper. Propaganda agent for the Quito
[1139]station,
[1141]commercial delegation to Brazil and Uruguay. Recruited by the cra
[1142]in Montevideo before return to Cuba, : .
[1144]AMADOR MARQUEZ, ENRIQUE. Labour and Political-action agent of
[1145]Guayaquil base. Minister of Economy.
[1147]AMAYA QUINTANA, ENRIQUE. Leader of the Peruvian Movement of
[1148]the Revolutionary Left (MIR), recruited in Guayaquil as a penetra-
[1149]tion agent. Resettled by the cra in Mexico,
[1151]AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL
[1152]EMPLOYEES, The US member of the Public Service International
[1154]599
[1156]SAN
[1159]HEMICAL
[1160]ONAL EEDERATION.OF PETROLEUM AND CH!
[1161]Taree cues GEES ‘The rxs for this industry set up originally by
[1162]Thec1a though GacUS Ol Wackers International Union.
[1164]INTERNATIONAL.
[1166]ariat ronal wodknes. Used taythe Cia for labour operations. a
[1167]eae ONAL EDERATEOLOF WOMEN LAWYERS. Organization .
[1169]lice training
[1171]: WOKICE &CADEMY. cta-controlled po!
[1172]a er a covet kx Washington DC. Formerly the Inter-
[1173]a otican Poli Acadeny. founded in Panama by the Panama
[1175]mrER ATTONALEOLICESER VICES scHOOL. CIA training school for
[1176]1 i
[1178]foe in Washiesion. weer commercial cover. :
[1179]a eEMATIONAL STUDEXY CONFERENCE (asc). See coonconee)
[1180]OF K NIONS OF STUDEN .
[1181]ING SECRETARIAT OF RATIONAL u j cose
[1182]TRADE SECRETARIATS. A generic deseri
[1183]a native trade-saion organizations having as members ne
[1184]national unioes worizrs.ia a particular industry. There are 2
[1185]ramet have been Seed by the cra for labour operations.
[1186]sane = hendquartecs in:Eorope, others in the US but close rela-
[1187]i sateined with toc ECF TU in Brussels.
[1188]tone a are ORT WORKERS FEDERATION (TF). The
[1189]sa inate Gade secreauiat for transport industries. Used by
[1190]labowroperstioss. See JOAQUIN (GACK)OTERO.
[1191]oo papaya Anoetiean married to Ecuadorean. Quito sora
[1192]nee rote mer RACES stn Luis Toroella, q.¥-, and served a8
[1193]scriber znd courke fer telephone-tap operation. Cryp!
[1195]Sart EXE, Welssquista leader and Quito station penetration
[1196]JA ’
[1198]en garuno. Socretary-General of the Inter-Americao
[1199]JA S
[1201]Regioml Later Orgaszation (ORI), 4-V-s in Mexico City. cia
[1202]crza,-. Moutexéleo poli commissioner in charge of move
[1203]Aen A Nombied oO tiea, Montevideo station liaison.
[1205]jones, neRs&. Agent of the Montevideo station used in operation to
[1207]break tends: spsicxwol thie Embassy of the United Arab Republic
[1209]RAMISGNES, TEQNEHS. Assistant Depuly Director for Plans and
[1210]KA
[1212]later Depete Diecese for Plans.
[1214]612
[1216]ULTURAL - |
[1217]EEDERATIGMOF PLANTATION, AGRIC -_
[1218]AND ALLIED WOSKERS (crraaw). The international trade secret
[1220]KAUFMAN, WALT2R 3, Chief of Mexico branch of Western Hemi-
[1222]sphere Division,
[1223]KINDSCHI, JACK. Cra operations officer in Stockholm using non-
[1224]official cover of Washington DC public relations firm Robert Mullen
[1225]Co. Assigned to Mexico City with same cover,
[1227]KING, COLONEL, J. C. Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division of the: .
[1229]Dp?.
[1231]KLADENSKY, OTTO, Quito Oldsmobile dealer and station agent for’
[1232]intelligence on the Czech diplomatic mission. Also the cutout to
[1233]Reinaldo Varea Donoso, Ecuadorean Vice-President, q.v. Crypto-
[1235]- NyM: ECTOSOME Jater DICTOSOME,
[1237]LABOR COMMITTEB FOR DEMOCRATIC ACTION, Propaganda mech-
[1238]anism of tbe Montevideo station,
[1240]LADD, RAYMOND, Quito station administrative officer also in charge
[1241]of certain operations, .
[1243]LADENBURG, ARTHUR. CIA operations officer in Mexico City under
[1245]. non-official cover, Later assigned to Santiago, Chile,
[1247]LIBIDINAL, Mexico City station postal intercept operation. True
[1248]cryptonym and true names of agents unknown. :
[1250]LICALLA. One of three observation posts overlooking the Soviet
[1251]Embassy in Mexico City. Names of agents forgotten.
[1253]LrcoBRa. Cryptonym for operations targeted by Mexico City station
[1254]against the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRD) and the
[1255]Mexican Foreign Ministry and Ministry of Government,
[1257]LicowL~I. Owner of small grocery store near Soviet Embassy, Mexico
[1258]City. CIA agent. True nanie forgotten. ied
[1260]Licozy-1. Double-agent of Mexico City station against the as. True -
[1262]name forgotten.
[1263]L1cozyY-3. Double-agent of Mexico City station against the KGB. True
[1264]name forgotten,
[1265]Licozy-5. Double-asent of the Mexico City station against the KGB.
[1266]True name forgotica.
[1267]LipENY. Mexico City station unilateral telephone-tapping operation.
[1268]Tre cryptonym and true names of agents unknown.
[1269]LIEMBRACE. Mexico City station surveillance team. Names of team
[1270]members
[1271]LIENVOY. Joint telephone-tapping operation between Mexico City
[1272]station and Mexican security service. Names of agents un-
[1273]known,
[1275]LIFIRE, Mexico City station travel control and general investigations
[1276]feam. True names unknown.
[1278]LILINK, An operation in Mexico City to provide non-official cover for
[1280]613
[1282]a ta ean
[1285]13-00000
[1287]nym: LISAMPAN) is still in the ‘interference-complaint¢ itutions in Santa Barbara. Reports on plans for this trip are
[1288]stage. immediately to the White House. : ;
[1290]Another important operation directed against the Cubans te} The station also has its own unilateral telephone-tapping
[1291]sophisticated provocation that won the CIA Intelligence MSy¥aeeee tion which is limited to special cases where the involvement
[1292]for Stan Archenhold,{ the case officer who conceived i Bf the Mexicans is thought to be undesirable. Connections for this
[1293]operation consisted of a series of letters sent to the Cuban int goperation are made outside the exchanges by telephone company
[1294]gence service in. their Mexico City Embassy from a person‘ engineers who work as station agents, as in the case of the bugging
[1295]_ purported to be a cla officer trying to help them. The fe ‘ef the Cuban Embassy (LISAMPAN). However this is restricted as
[1296]_ purport to implicate Joaquin Ordoqui, a respected, old-g jar as possible in order to avoid damaging relations with the
[1298]leader. of the Cuban Communist Party and a high-ranking jyifaq Mexicans in the event of discovery.
[1300]tary leader, as a c1a agent, The letters are based on informagy"y Travel control, general investigations and occasional surveil-
[1301]‘from Carlos Manuel Pellecer, the Guatemalan exile and peneiig? are the duties ofa six-man team called L1rirg, They obtain
[1302]tion agent, who was closely associated with Ordoqui and Marcay: fiight-travel lists from the airport, which are passed daily to the{_
[1303]Rodriguez when all three lived in Mexico City during the la, | station and take photographs of passengers to and from com-
[1304]1950s. The letters continue to be sent to Cuban intelligence'y, ¢ munist countries and of their passports as they pass through
[1305]though Ordoqui was arrested in 1964, and the desired contr @ immigration.
[1306]versy and dissension in the Cuban revolutionary leadership Another eight-man surveillance team, known as LIEMBRACE,
[1307]followed. ‘ has vehicles (including a Volkswagen photo-van) and radio-
[1309]As the cover of Sherry, the chief of the Cuban operations gp, | communications equipment and is mainly concerned with Sovict/
[1310]tion, is in the Embassy consular section, he has been able to mey satellite and Cuban targets. It is administered by Jim Anderson, t
[1311]several of the Cuban consular officers directly. However, his maj, | ho also controls another eight-man team (i1RICE), similarly
[1312]agent for direct assessment of the Cubans is Leander Vourvoulig | equipped, which deals with the Mexican revolutionaries and other
[1314]Consul of Greece and President of the Consular Corps. miscellaneous targets.
[1315]Postal interception is mainly directed towards the mail.from
[1317]. communist countries, but can occasionally be used to
[1319]Support Operations pondence from selected Mexican adresse, Set Comes
[1320]The support operations must also be detailed. fhe joint oper. As in every station, a variety of agents assists in support tasks
[1321]tion for telephone tapping, LIENVOY, is effected In Cooperation § Which they perform in the course of their ordinary jobs. For
[1323]@ Mexican author ‘a capacity for about fory processing the immigration papers for station non-official cover
[1324]lines. The station provides the equipment, the technical assistane,§ personnel, for example, Judd Austin,t one of the US lawyers in
[1325]couriers and transcribers, while the Mexicans make the conn: Goodrich, Dalton, Little and Riquelme (the principal law firm
[1326]tions in the exchanges and maintain the listening posts. In adé} Serving American subsidiaries) is used. The Executive Vice-
[1327]tion to monitoring the lines of the communist diplomatic mission President of the American Chamber of Commerce in Mexico
[1328]and those of Mexican revolutionary groups, LIENVOY also coven City, Al Wichtrich,t channels political information to the station
[1329]special cases. For years the telephones of ex-President Cardenas that he picks up in his normal work with American and Mexican
[1330]and his daughter have been tapped, and recently tapping bs businessmen. For technical support the station has an officer of
[1331]started on that of Luis Quintanilla, a Mexican intellectual whos TSD under Embassy cover with a workshop and qualifications
[1332]planning a trip to Hanoi with the publisher of the Miami Nea§ audio, flaps and seals, and photography.
[1333]and with a fellow of the Center for the Study of Democrat :
[1335]532
[1337]Y
[1340]that they were engaged in political activities. The Chinese had:
[1342]fact, been using the NCNA office for propaganda and support,
[1343]pro-Chinese revolutionary organizations in Mexico and Ceni@
[1344]A 2 Cot
[1346]Central American Exiles
[1348]Mexico has traditionally been a haven for political exiles from
[1350]Central American countries including communists and other
[1352]extreme leftists. Several Central American parties, including thy
[1354]Guatemalans, maintain liaison sections in Mexico City in orde
[1355]to keep lines open to the Soviets, Cubans and others. They
[1356]operate semi-clandestinely for the most part in order to avoid
[1357]repression from the Mexican government.
[1359]Washington DC
[1360]20 December 1966
[1362]Because of the strategic importance of Mexico to the US, its size
[1363]and proximity, and the abundance of enemy activities, the
[1364]Mexico City station is the largest in the hemisphere. Altogether
[1365]the station has some fifteen operations officers under State
[1366]Department cover in the Embassy political section, plus about
[1367]twelve more officers under assorted non-official covers outside the
[1368]. Embassy. In addition, a sizeable support staff of communications
[1369]Officers, technical services, intelligence assistants, records clerks
[1370]‘and secretaries bring the overall station personnel total to around
[1372]fifty.
[1373]Liaison Operations,
[1375]Dominating the station operational programme is the LITEMPOt
[1376]project which is administered by Winston Scott,t the Chief of
[1377]Station in Mexico City since 1956, with the assistance of Annie
[1378]Goodpasture,f a case officer who has also been at the station for
[1379]some years. This project embraces a complicated series of opera-
[1380]tional support programmes to the various Mexican civilian
[1381]security forces for the purpose of intelligence exchange, joint
[1383]524
[1385]‘perations and constant upgrading of Mexican internal intelli-
[1386]collection and public security functions,
[1387]+ At the top of the L1TEMPo operation is the Mexican President,
[1388]Gustavo Diaz Ordaz,} who has worked extremely closely with the
[1389]gation since he became Minister of Government in the previous
[1390]jnistration of Adolfo Lopez Mateos} (1958-64), Scott had
[1391]giso developed a very close working relationship with Lopez
[1392]Mateos, and, since Diaz Ordaz became President two years ago,
[1393]Scott has been working closely with the current Minister of
[1394]Government, Luis Echeverria.{ Thus the LiTEMPO project
[1395]focuses at the top on the President and the current Minister of -
[1396]Government who will be the second consecutive choice of PR1
[1397]faders to pass from internal security to the presidency,
[1399]Scott's chummy relationship with Diaz Ordaz none the less has
[1400]its problems. In 1964 Fulton Freeman went to Mexico City as
[1401]Ambassador to crown a Foreign Service career that had started
[1402]in the same Embassy in the 1930s. He is expected to retire after
[1403]the 1968 Olympic Games. At the time of his assignment to Mexico
[1404]City Freeman’s expectations of meaningful diplomatic relations
[1405]with Diaz Ordaz collided with the President’s preference for deal-
[1406]ng with Scott, and Freeman was relegated to protocol contacts
[1407]with the President while his diplomatic talents focused on the
[1409]Foreign Minister. The problem of who would deal with the Presi- _.
[1411]dent was confused somewhat by the Ambassador's insistence, not
[1412]fong after arrival, on a detailed briefing about the station opera-
[1413]tional programme, which Scott refused. Eventually both Scott
[1414]and the Ambassador visited the White House, where President
[1415]Johnson settled matters according to the wishes of the Agency
[1416]and of his friend Diaz Ordaz. Scott continued, of course, to work
[1417]with the President and the Ambassador never got the full briefing
[1418]he had demanded, Since then the relations between Scott and the
[1419]Ambassador have warmed, but the Ambassador forbids any
[1420]station operations directed against the Mexican Foreign Ministry.
[1421]While Scott frequently meets the President and the Minister of
[1422]Government, two non-official cover case officers handle the day-
[1423]to-day contact with the chiefs of the security services subordinate
[1424]to Echeverria. One of these officers is a former FBI agent who
[1425]worked in the legal attaché’s office in the Mexico City Embassy
[1426]- the legal attaché is usually the ret office in an American
[1427]oe 525
[1432]embassy. The FB! officer had left the FBI to come with the stath 5
[1433]but pains have been taken to conceal his c1A employmen
[1435]order to avoid the bad blood that would result from the ciate
[1436]‘stealing’ of an FBt officer, The two non-official cover officers afg™
[1437]the equivalent of an A1p Public Safety mission but in Mexico thi
[1438]. function is performed secretly by the station in deference to Mex}.
[1440]can nationalist sensitivities - as is the case in Argentina,
[1441]the LITEMPO project we are currently providing advice and equip...
[1442]ment for a new secret communications network to function be”
[1443]tween Diaz Ordaz’s office and principal cities in the rest of thy
[1445]country. Other joint operations with the Mexican security seq’.
[1447]vices include travel control, telephone tapping and repressiyg
[1448]action. > oy
[1450]The station also prepares a daily intelligence summary for Diaz
[1451]Ordaz with a section on activities of Mexican revolutionary orga.
[1452]nizations and communist diplomatic missions and a section oa
[1453]international developments based on information from head.
[1454]quarters. Other reports, often relating to a single subject, are
[1455]passed to Diaz Ordaz, Echeverria and top security officials, These
[1456]reports, like the daily round-up, include information from statiog
[1457]unilateral penetration agents with due camouflaging to protect the
[1458]identity of the sources. The station is much better than are the
[1459]Mexican services, and is thus of great assistance to the authoritig
[1460]in planning for raids, arrests and other repressive action. we
[1462]Liaison between Scott and the Mexican military intelligence
[1463]services consists mainly of exchange of information, in order to
[1464]keep a foot in the door for future eventualities. The US militay
[1465]attachés, moreover, are in constant contact with their Mexicag
[1466]military intelligence counterparts and their reports are received
[1467]regularly by the station.
[1469]Stan Watson,} the Mexico City Deputy Chief of Station, has
[1470]been meeting with a South Korean c1a officer. who was recently
[1471]sent under diplomatic cover to monitor North Korean sounding
[1472]for establishment of missions in Mexico and Central Ameria
[1474]Communist Party Operations
[1476]The station cp section consists of two case officers, Wat
[1477]Thomast and Ben Ramirez} both under Embassy cover, pls
[1479]526
[1481]ffwo case Officers outside the station under non-official cover: Bob
[1482]priscoll,t a retired operations officer now working under con-
[1483]a
[1485]jract, and Julian Zambianco who was transferred from Guayaquil
[1486]40 Mexico City about a year ago. These officers are in charge of
[1487]agent and technical penetrations against the revolutionary organi-
[1488]zations of importance, The quality of this intelligence is high,
[1489]although not as high as it was before 1963. In late 1962 Carlos
[1490]Manuel Pellecer,} the station's most important communist party
[1491]penetration-agent, broke openly with communism by publishing
[1492]a book. He was a leader of the Guatemalan Communist Party
[1493](eo) and had been Minister of Labor in the Arbenz government
[1494]during. the 1950s. However, after the Agency-sponsored over-
[1495]throw of the Arbenz government Pellecer made his way to Mexico
[1496]City where for years he was the station's best source (cryptonym
[1497]LINLUCK) on all the revolutionary organizations in Mexico, not
[1498]just the Guatemalan exiles. His book, of course, was financed by
[1499]the station and distributed by the Agency all over Latin America.
[1500]Pellecer is still being used by the Mexico City station as a propa-
[1501]ganda agent, as with other former penetration agents who form-
[1502]ally break. with communism without revealing their years of work
[1503]as spies — Eudocio Ravines,} the well-known Peruvian defector
[1504]from communism is a parallel case. Another book by Pellecer,
[1505]also financed by the station, has just appeared. This book is a
[1507]| continuation of cr exploitation of the Marcos Rodriguez and
[1509]Joaquin Ordoqui cases in Cuba, and is aimed at denigration of the
[1510]Cuban revolution. .
[1512]The station also collects information about communists from
[1513]the US living in Mexico. Many of them arrived during the Mc-
[1514]Carthy period and some have subsequently become Mexican
[1515]citizens. Information about them is mainly of interest to the FBI,
[1516]which calls them the American Communist Group in Mexico
[1517]City (acGMc). Information collected about them includes that
[1518]obtained through the LIENVoY telephone-tapping operation des-
[1519]cribed below, oO .
[1521]The station also receives copies of reports from FBI penetration
[1522]operations against Mexican revolutionary organizations. Mexico
[1523]is the only country in Latin America, except Puerto Rico, where
[1524]the FB1 continued operations against the local left when the CIA
[1525]took over in 1947, The FBI intelligence is of high quality,
[1527]527
[1530]Soviet/Satelli
[1531]Beteite Operations ainst the Soviets with varying degrees of effectiveness and
[1532]ability. Several of these agents are suspected of having been
[1533]ited by the Soviets for use as double agents against the
[1534]jon. Two of the most important of the current access-agents
[1535]Katherine Manjarrez, t Secretary of the Foreign Press Associa-
[1536]gon, and her husband — both of whom are targeted against the
[1537]. Hausman and Robert Steele.t A number of sensitive opera ‘goviet ‘press attaché and the Tass correspondent. Others are
[1538], . poowL-1f and LiovaL-1.f ° ; ;
[1539]- p1cowL-I is the owner of a tiny grocery store situated in front
[1540]“of the Soviet Embassy where the Soviets buy odds and ends in-
[1541]duding their soft drinks - Tsp is studying ways of bugging a
[1542]wooden soft-drink case or the bottles themselves, More import-
[1543]i all five are owned got, LICOWL-I is involved at.the moment in an operation against
[1544]the station. Several years ago films Were made of Soviets con. “| the Embassy zavhoz (administrative officer), who spends consider-
[1545]cover naa Eatden, but attempts by Russian lip-readers to dis |) able time chatting with the agent, Because Silnikov, the zavhoz,
[1546]cover their conversations were unsuccessful. From one of the Jf hes been on the prowl for a lover — or so he said to LicowL-I -
[1547]front OP's, radio contact is maintained with the LIEMBRACR T the station decided to recruit a young Mexican girl as bait: An
[1548]surveillance team for Signalling when a particular Soviet Survejl.. | appropriate girl was obtained through BESABER,{ an agent who
[1549]lance target leaves the Embassy, his route and other data, Photog js normally targeted against Polish intelligence officers and who
[1550]are regularly taken from all the OP's of Soviets and their families | runs a ceramics business specializing in souvenirs. By loitering at
[1551]raphe ators to the Embassy, When visitors use vehicles, photo. | y1cowL-I's store the girl attracted Silnikov’s attention, and a
[1552]graphs are taken of their licence Plates for tracing. Occasionally hot necking session in a back room at the store led to several
[1553]Meee CALLA OF is used for electronic monitoring, since it is} rious afternoon sessions at the girl's apartment nearby -
[1554]close to the Embassy, but so far attempts to pick up radiations | obtained especially for this operation. Silnikov’s virility is as-
[1555]from Soviet cryptographic equipment have been unsuccess. fonishing both the girl and the station, which is recording and
[1556]ies photographing the sessions without the knowledge of the girl,
[1557]In addition to the LTEMBRACE surveillance team, several other Although promiscuity among Soviets is not abnormal, relation-
[1558]support operations include coverage of the Soviets. Through the ships with local girls are forbidden. Eventually it will be decided
[1559]NVOY,operation, Soviet telephones are constantly monitored, whether to try blackmail against Silnikov or to provoke disrup-
[1560]fad through the LiriRE travel-control operation Photographs of | tion by sending tapes and photos to the Embassy if the blackmail
[1561]travel documents are obtained along with data on arrivals and isrefused. _
[1562]departures, Monitoring of Mexican diplomatic communications LIOVAL-If is not as interesting a case but is more important.
[1563]reveals requests for Mexican visas by Soviet officials, including The agent is an American who teaches English in Mexico City
[1564]the diplomatic couriers. In addition, Ns is also monitoring and is an ardent fisherman. Through fishing he became acquain-
[1565]several communications Systems involving ‘burst’ transmissions ted with Pavel Yatskov, the Soviet Consul and a known senior
[1567]Thé largest section in the station is that i ietfeatete
[1568]¢ Tar Covering Soviet/sas,
[1569]optrations. It has four case Officers, three intelligence tsa
[1571]. from the UssR to as yet unidentified agents believed to be in | xapofticer~ possibly the Mexico City rezident (KGB chief). Yats-
[1573]Mexico ~ possibly Soviet intelligence officers assigned abroad as kov and the agent spend one or two week-ends per month off in
[1574]‘illegals’, with false identity and non-official cover. the mountains fishing and have developed a very close friendship.
[1575]528 -. 529
[1578]13-0000
[1580]When Yatskov is transferred back to Moscow -- he has af,
[1581]been in Mexico for some years — we shall decide whether to
[1582]defect him through LIOVAL-1, Recently Peter Deriabin,t
[1583]well-known kGp defector from the 1950s who is now a US Gy
[1584]and full-time c1a employee, went to Mexico City to study mt
[1586]voluminous reports on Yatskov written by LIOVAL-1. He cas?
[1587]cluded that there is a strong possibility that LiovAL~1 has
[1588]recruited by Yatskov and is reporting on Paul Dillon, the s
[1589]officer in charge of this case, Nevertheless, the operation ¢,
[1590]tinues while the counter-intelligence aspects are studied
[1592]. . es
[1593], The station double-agent cases against the Soviets, Licozy-j +f pond
[1595]Licozy-3} and Licozy-5,{ are all being wound up for
[1596]of productivity or problems of control. One of these agen;
[1598]Licozy-3, is an American living in Philadelphia who wag re
[1599]ctuited by the Soviets while a student in Mexico, but who Teported
[1601]the recruitment and worked for the Mexico City Station. Hg
[1602]worked for the rar after returning to the US — the Soviet Cane
[1603]officer was a UN official at one time — but recently Soviet interest
[1604]in him has fallen off and the ¥B1 turned the case back over to the
[1606], Agency for termination. _
[1607]Against the Czechs and the Poles many of the same types of
[1609]operation are targeted, Access agents, observation posts, tel.
[1610]Phone tapping, surveillance and travel control are continuous
[1611]although with somewhat less intensity than against the Soviets,
[1612]In the Yugoslav Embassy the code clerk has been recruited by the
[1613]crAas has one of the Embassy’s secretaries.
[1615]Until the New China News Agency (NCNA) office was closed
[1616]last month by the Mexican government, the Soviet/satellite sec.
[1617]tion of the station was responsible for following the movements
[1618]of the Chinese communists. Telephone intercepts through
[1619]LIENVOY and occasional surveillance by the L1RICB team were
[1620]directed against them, but the most important intelligence col.
[1621]lected against them was from the bugging of their offices. The
[1622]audio operation was supported by the Far East Division in head-
[1623]quarters, who sent an operations officer and transcribers to
[1624]Mexico City. Now that the NCNA offices are closed, the audio
[1625]equipment will be removed and the station will continue to
[1627]follow up the many leads coming from the bugging operation.
[1629]530
[1631]gn Operations
[1633]Be Cuban operations section consists of two case officers,
[1634]pa Sherry and Joe Piccolo, and a secretary under Embassy
[1635]: paver and one case officer under non-official cover. An observa-
[1637]son post for photographic coverage and radio contact with the
[1638]IEMBRACE surveillance team is functioning, as well as LIENVOY
[1640]hone monitoring and LiFiRE airport travel control, Through
[1641]fo LIFIRB team the station obtains regular clandestine access
[1643]4p the Prensa Latina pouch from Havana, and copies of corres-
[1645]ence between pL headquarters in Havana and its correspon-
[1646]gents throughout the hemisphere are forwarded to the stations
[1648]Through the LiTeMPo liaison operation the Mexican immi-
[1649]gration service provides special coverage of all travellers to and
[1650]fom Havana on the frequent Cubana flights. Each traveller is
[1651]photographed and his passport is stamped with arrival or depar-
[1652]jure cachets indicating Havana travel. The purpose is to frustrate
[1653]the Cuban practice of issuing visas on separate slips of paper in-
[1654]gead of in the passport so as to obscure travel. Prior to each
[1655]Cubana departure the station is notified of all passengers so that
[1656]pame checks can be made, In the case of US citizens, the Mexican
[1657]givice obliges by preventing departure when requested by the
[1659]ion.
[1661]othe most important:current operation targeted against the
[1662]Cuban mission is an attempted audio penetration using the tele-
[1663]phone system. Telephone company engineers working in the
[1664]LIDENY tapping operation will eventually install new wall-boxes
[1665]for the Embassy telephones in which sub-miniature transmitters
[1666]with switches will have been cast by Tsp. At the moment,
[1667]however, the engineers are causing deliberate interference in
[1668]Embassy telephones by technical means in the exchange, Each .
[1669]time the Embassy calls the telephone company to complain of
[1670]interference on the lines, the engineers report back that every-
[1671]thing in the exchange is in order. Eventually, as the interference
[1672]continues, the engineers will check street connections and finally
[1673]arrive to check the instruments in the Embassy. They will find the
[1674]wall-boxes ‘defective’ and will replace them with the bugged
[1675]boxes cast by Tsp. Right now, however, this operation (crypto-
[1677]331
[1679]13-00000, . wm ee ka 3
[1683]Mr. Goldsmith. What do you mean, things like this
[1685]3
[1687]happened all the time?
[1689]Mr. Scelso. Planes were held for travellers who woule
[1691]otherwise miss them, for Cuban officials, and so on.
[1693]ta
[1695]tod
[1696]a en a ee a
[1698]Mr. Goldsmith. Did the Agency ever actually investigate,
[1700]this particular matter?
[1702]Oo
[1704]=r.
[1706]Mr. Scelso. It investigated to the extent that there
[1710]RUEFORTERS BKULLDING, UASHTIGTON, D.C. 20024 (2027) $54-2305
[1712]was nothing heft to investigate. The plane was gone. The
[1714]Pr)
[1716]man was on it. He had not identified himself before he left. |
[1718]is)
[1720]x
[1724]Py
[1726]We had very complete coverage of’ the Mexico City Airport:
[1728]Reproduced trom the holdings of the Nation
[1729]al Archives
[1730]; HSCA (RG 223)
[1732]|
[1733]|
[1735]i | and watched the Cuban flights closely, but where it sometimes
[1736]2 | happened that an important Cuban official would comé late,
[1737]{-
[1738]1 i he would go directly to the plane without going through
[1739]t
[1740]ve i travel controls. |
[1741]i . :
[1742]se | At that time, the man was gone. There was no picture
[1743]4
[1744]ts : of him. Nobody looked at his passport. Period.
[1745]st tf
[1746]a 5 i Mr. Goldsmith. You did not bother to ask any Cuban
[1747]2 73 : employees in the Airport about the man?
[1748]S y
[1749]Ro) i
[1750]= 3! e _-We-did_not have source of Cuban
[1751]= an Mr Scelso. We not he APY. SO
[1752]= 2 | employees.\ We only had\/Mexican police TO
[1753]| a | 7
[1754]41 Mr. Goldsmith. Were any of them questioned about nim?
[1755]oS
[1756]aE7 int Mr..Scelso. Yes, this was a.routine thing. We had a
[1757]aN i ;
[1758]42 whole reporting set.up there with*that,; two of them, who
[1760]watched things: liké”this. But the report from :them was that
[1765]the man had just gone on the plane and they did not know who
[1767]SEVRET 101967,
[1769]ALIZASIN ALPORTING COMeaty
[1771]nt baa sien bee cnt med Sa etles iene fees Slee!
[1773]13-00000
[1775]The. hop=z. Report
[1777]HscA Summer om“ of Ssvcole aud te ate
[1779]Wexice Ci
[1780]ee eerie eee,
[1782]Wation , andes Ann covers
[1783]is so. CIA Coett , ott is ~the—
[1784]Archies ex Cit aldiags
[1786]teltap COdETEg S & Bo lines
[1788]id antic Afar) ef Savest- oCcials
[1789]fa. qettend
[1791]identiticetien of Cuban oicicls
[1792]tog etted
[1795]13-00000
[1797]Classification: _
[1798](This form is to be used for material extracted
[1800]from ClA—controlled documents.)
[1804]was in operation on only four of those days. This .
[1806]“Committee has not been able to establish or disprove
[1808]the possible inference that LILYRIC covered those
[1810]days. when there was no coverage from LIMITED because
[1812]the production and logs from the LILYRIC base were
[1814]not’ made available for review. That material was
[1816]requested but has not been made available. 141/ An
[1818]explanation of why this material is missing was
[1820]requested on 7/25/78.142/ The CIA's explanation stated
[1822]* that the photographs and logs “may have been destroyed
[1824]ee in a purge of Mexico City Station files and that the
[1825]folders for the destroyed material were reused to
[1826]forward more recent photographic material to
[1827]Headquarters for retention. "143/ The’ folders which
[1828]once contained the production were located at the
[1830]ton, NOES
[1832]Records Center but,
[1834]National Archives"
[1835]wat tones nvenives
[1839]according to the CIA's explanation, the folders
[1840]contained production material from 1967.144/ Because
[1841]the CIA has not provided the photographic production
[1842]and logs from the LILYRIC for examination, no
[1844]precise determination detailing the effectiveness of
[1845]the coverage of the Soviet compound can be made. |
[1847]c
[1849]Classification: __~ |
[1850]roe Se i : — 168.
[1852]7
[1854]o a ee a
[1855] Cnifiad by daceg ton
[1857]SEF = LEE
[1860]13-00000 . -.
[1862]ore
[1864]“oh
[1868]esse. of | J
[1870]she’
[1872]oenewor  eew  E I o
[1874]Classification:
[1876](This form is to be used for material extracted
[1877]- from ClA—controlléd documents.)
[1881]surveillance project.189/ - Even though Mr. Scott was
[1882]the nominal case officer, the “routine case officer
[1883]functions" were performed by Ms. Ann Goodpasture.190/
[1884]An American technician was stationed in the listening
[1885]post to maintain the equipment and to protect the
[1887]Station's interests there.191/ Ms. Goodpasture's
[1889]duties in this operation ranged from meeting with
[1891]the technician/officer inside the base for the purposes.
[1893]of daily supervision of the operation to handling the
[1895]TG,
[1897]collection and distribution of the tapes and transcripts.192/
[1899]Ms. Goodpasture worked in this capacity until 1968.193/
[1901]staffed by Mexican . kewwotticarshat/ This listening
[1903]erie ne
[1905]post covered up to thirty? lines at one time. 195/
[1907]b. Analysis ‘and Reporting of Information
[1909]Obtained
[1911][ir Herbert’ Manette was responsible for the
[1913]) analysis, processing, and daily review of the Soviet
[1915]transcripts.196/ The transcripts were reviewed on a
[1916]daily basis by [Barbara” wané11.f Jes: rare w would
[1918]Classification: _- i
[1919]ooo gs
[1921]nu
[1922]wate | os
[1924]NOE,
[1930]NI,
[1933]NOTRE
[1935]WH,
[1937]NETS,
[1939]ys a a a a a aa la la El
[1941]13-00000 -cumenr - Losey rd Aer Air aa ucmmmr aac Aunagy
[1945]“ee ea QL i .
[1946]ope H 23 : fe f ~~ *
[1947]Classifica ion Ue Seta
[1949](This form is to be used for material extracted
[1950]from ClA—controfled documents.)
[1952]RE,
[1956]GER,
[1958]It should be noted, though, that an examination of
[1960]the project files shows that Americans in contact
[1962]“OSTA.
[1964]with Communist diplomatic institutions were routinely
[1966]reported to Headquarters for name traces and dissemination
[1968]SORPAT
[1970]to the intelligence community.203/ .
[1972]3. Telephone Lines Covered
[1974]This Committee has made an attempt to determine
[1976]which telephone lines at the Soviet and Cuban
[1978]'
[1980]diplomatic compounds were subject to this electronic
[1982]intercept operation in September and October of 1963.
[1984]The monthly operational report of this project for
[1986]the month of September lists the following phones
[1988]as targets of the operation: 204/
[1990]SMITA,
[1992]14-42-37 Cuban Embassy
[1993]14-92-14 _ Cuban Embassy
[1994]25-07-95 Cuban Embassy
[1995]14-13-26 Cuban Embassy
[1996]15-60-55 Soviet Embassy (Chancéry) ale
[1997]15-61-55 Soviet Embassy (C! r) o
[1998]15-69-87 Soviet Embassy (Military Attache) E
[1999]15-61-07 Soviet Embassy (Commercial’ Office) '
[2000]15-12-64 Soviet Embassy (Film Representative)
[2001]The report notes that lines 14-92-14 and 25-07-95 at {
[2002]the Cuban Embassy were disconnected on 23 September
[2003]1963.205/ The monthly report for October says that.
[2004]Lteation, EVA AIST eve 5 |
[2005]ney ae Classification: ; 2a RE 172 |
[2007]aye,
[2008]be tae Aiea td Be doh te
[2010]CEES amy $a) L&E SEE SEE SESE JE AE
[2012]13-00000
[2016]Noten ees
[2018]Classification: Fe
[2021]lise ad. J
[2022](This form is to be used for material extracted
[2024]from ClA—<ontrolled documents.)
[2028]in a chronological file.292/ One copy of the Cuban
[2029]transcripts was routinely sent to Headquarters on
[2031]a weekly basis.293/
[2033](g) Format of Transcripts
[2035]The format of the transcripts that Mr. Tarasoff
[2037]produced was much the same as those of the Spanish.
[2039]language transcripts described above.294/ Mr.
[2041]Tarasoff's transcripts were from Russian into English.295/.
[2043]Many of Mr.. Tarasoff's transcriptions bear the notation
[2044]“(previously transcribed)" after the meter number
[2045]referring to the reel footage location of a
[2046]conversation.297/ Mr. Tarasoff indicated that this
[2047]notation meant that the conversation had already been
[2048]transcribed from a.tap on another embassy phone:
[2050]"Previously transcribed" means, for instance,
[2052]I went to the embassy first and the embassy
[2053]number was 605055. Now this number 501264
[2054]belonged to the film's office. So consequently
[2055]if that particular ‘call went out of the main
[2056]building to the films office and it had been
[2057]transcribed before, that is exactly what I
[2058]would do, put down “previously transcribed".
[2060]So there. was no question of doing it twice.298/
[2062]bo Cusitled by derivaiion:
[2064]18?
[2066]SOOT. TETRTPETR,
[2070]NITNC,
[2072]EEN TOT
[2074]aimee nen,
[2076]13-00000
[2078]Classification:
[2080](This form is to be used for material extracted
[2081]from ClA—controlled documents.) — :
[2085]7
[2087]subject to the intercept operation. It should be
[2089]noted, though, that there were five lines tapped in
[2091]. the Cuban compound in 1964.212/ They were:
[2093]14-42-37 The Ambassador's private telephone
[2094]25-07-95 The Chancery
[2096]14-13-26 The Chancery
[2098]25-09-14 The Commercial Office
[2100]11-28-47 The Consulate
[2102]One CIA employee who was involved in Cuban
[2103]operations in Mexico City remembered that there were
[2104]taps on the telephone of the Cuban Consulate.213/ It is
[2105]possible that the employee, Mr. PhiTlips, who, ‘Was stationed
[2106]in Mexico City from 1961 to 1966, was incorrect, after
[2107]a fifteen-year hiatus, in placing this tap in 1963.214/
[2108]As the above notes, an examination of the project
[2109]files fails to support: Mr. Phillips' memory,
[2111]although those files do show that the Consulate
[2113]telephone was tapped in 1964.
[2115]4. Production from Operation
[2117]The intercept listening post operated from
[2119]approximately 7:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m. every day.215/
[2121]Classification: _.
[2124]| Classified.by derivation:
[2126]TOG 174
[2128]lev
[2132]“GE GA GR SER GA
[2134]“Ga.
[2136]TER, EHP. “UE.
[2138]NERS,
[2141]13-90000- if” er Pers a mi” - ae Pe
[2142]TAR
[2143]Classifications: {241 SS :
[2144]oar :
[2145]i tiie GJS yhde
[2146](This form is to be used for material dass
[2147]from ClA—controlled documents.)
[2149]Sardis
[2151]nara.
[2153]~ 177 7
[2155]tert oh.
[2157]Q: Had the information concerning Oswald‘’s visit
[2158]to the Cuban Embassy in addition to the Soviet
[2159]- one, that Oswald had been requesting a visa,
[2160]if it had been sent to CIA headquarters, would
[2161]his case prior to the assassination have been
[2162]handied in any different manner?
[2164]A: It would have been in the case of dissemina- -
[2165]tion of information about him, but I do not
[2166]think that any opérational action would have
[2168]. taken to apprehend him or to contact him or
[2169]Ps to try to force him back to the United ‘States.
[2171]Q: ...how would the dissemination have been
[2172]treated differently?
[2174]A: Well, it simply means that we would have dis-
[2175]seminated any additional information that we
[2176]got. 657/
[2178]It cannot be determined with exactitude whether or
[2180]not this additional information about Oswald was reported
[2182]TED.
[2184]to Headquarters. In all likelihood it was not. The Chief
[2186]of the Mexico Desk was asked whether or not the Station
[2188]UEP,
[2190]was ever criticized for this failure to report in the
[2192]face of a specific request to do so by CIA Headquarters.
[2194]WEEN,
[2196]He said:
[2198]Ko. That was not because we were trying to go
[2199]easy on them, it is simply because it is in the
[2200]nature of the business. What you are trying to
[2201]do is engage, as I used to say, in important il-
[2202]Tegal manipulations of society, secretly.
[2204]action, program in an Mexico.Cityj to try to ;
[2205]i swing Mexico around from its Leftist” direction »
[2206]to a middle of the road directionsand: it.
[2208]{tiea 3f were running, at that time, a vast/poli-
[2213]Classification: “00 aa wf
[2214]ie VIA bee alt
[2217]13-00G00- - °°. 1 ee
[2219].
[2221]Classification:
[2223](This form is to be used for material extracted
[2224]from ClA—controlled documents.)
[2226]— - 178 - oe
[2227]Be a I do not know whether formed yourself about
[2228]we, ; the magnitude of our/political action program at.
[2229]: ; ; the time--absolutely enormous. ;
[2230]We were trying ‘to follow the Soviets and
[2231]all the satellites and the Cubans. At the same
[2232]time, the main thrust of the Station's effort
[2233]was to attempt to recruit Russians, Cubans and
[2234]satellite people. 658/
[2235]Perhaps the nature of the CIA Mexico City Station's |
[2236]handling of the Oswald case prior to the assassination
[2237]can best be summed up in Dave Phillips' response when
[2239]he was asked how he would characterize that handling:
[2241]“At the very best, it is not professional, at the. best.“ 59/
[2243]V. Mexico City Station Reporting of Information Concerning
[2244]Oswald After the Assassination .
[2245]A. Reporting of information concerning the photograph
[2247]of the Mexico Mystery Man
[2249]Even though some people in the Station clearly dis-
[2250]associated the photograph that was described in MEXI 6453
[2251]from Oswatd after receiving the 10/11 cable, 656/ it is
[2252]clear that some people still considered it possible for 7
[2253]some reason that the photograph was of Oswald. Tn Octo-
[2254]ber, Ann Goodpasture had argued this very point with Win-
[2256]ston Scott. 657/ On the day of the assassination, the
[2258]“it Was sending
[2260]Mexico City Station cabled Neer ea UE 9
[2262]Classification: u ive ‘
[2263]as soon as possible “copies of only visitor “to 9,3
[2265]Par a’ .
[2268]Classified by derivation:
[2270]a a aa
[2272]Ue
[2274]ORR SFT,
[2276]TNO,
[2278]SUT,
[2280]13-00000
[2282]SECRET hk Wee
[2284]pO
[2285]From the Desk of Linda C. Cipriani -
[2287]we
[2289]NOTE FOR: John F. Pereira
[2290]J. Barry Harrelson
[2291]Eleanor E. Neiman @ DO
[2292]Fredrick C. Wickham @ 00
[2293]eeuemae
[2294]Johnny L Goins.@ 00
[2296]Fred Crawford @o oo
[2297]FROM: Linda C. Cipriani ?
[2298]DATE: 04)24/96 12:15:25 PM
[2299]SUBJECT: Interview with John W. (S}
[2300]CL By 22 9704130 , )
[2301]CL Reasoii 1. 5(c}
[2302]DECL On X14
[2303]ORV FM Hum 4-82
[2305]Attached is an MFR summarizing my meeting with Mr. Whitten. On a more personal note, Mr. Whitten is an extremely
[2306]charming and interesting gentleman. The meeting with him went much better than [ had hoped, but it was also rather emotionally
[2307]distressing for both Jeremy and {. Mr. Whitten broke dawn several times during the meeting and was obviously feeling very scared.
[2308]Although Jeremy is sure that the Board will do the right thing here, we both agreed that Mr. Whitten is without doubt someone who
[2309]should be protected even if it means going to the President.
[2313]WHITTMFR.DOC
[2317]SECRET
[2319]13-00000
[2320]1
[2322]SECRET
[2324]17 May 1996
[2326]- MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
[2328]SUBJECT: Interview with John Whitten (S)
[2330]1. On 22 April 1996, from approximately 1000 to 1600,
[2331]‘Jeremy Gunn, General ‘Counsel of the JFK Revi oard, and I spoke
[2332]' with Mr. John Whitten at the U.S. embassy in/Vienna). Gunn
[2333]conducted the interview by showing Whitten various documents and
[2334]‘his prior testimony before the HSCA. Mr. Whitten was eager to
[2335]‘help the Board .in any way he could and even offered to come to
[2336]'the US if need be. Gunn concluded that it would probably not be
[2337]useful to take Whitten's deposition at a later date. Although
[2338]Whitten had in general a good memory, Gunn felt he did not add
[2339]‘anything of significance to his prior testimony before the HSCA.
[2340]After the interview, Mr. Whitten took us to his apartment and
[2341]then later to a restaurant with his wife. We left Mr. Whitten
[2342]: about 1900. (S)
[2344]2. . Mr. Whitten was extremely worried and upset about the
[2345]release of his name and on several occasions in the interview was
[2346]on the verge of tears. Although I was expecting him to be angry
[2347]‘with CIA and the Board, instead, he clearly felt hurt and
[2348]' betrayed. His obvious physical problems add_to this feeling of
[2349]being vulnerable. Physically he is not well; he is paralyzed on
[2351]‘his left side and has great difficulty walking. On a map, he
[2352]pointed out his apartment and indicated what he believed to be
[2353]-serious threats to his safety should his affiliation with CIA
[2354]‘become known. Within a block of his apartment, he pointed out
[2356]ithe headquarters.of the PKK, the ANgECHIst party and = bar where 7
[2357]‘many Middle Easterners wi uld congregate He-then -pointed—ou
[2358]sé places to us. when we went
[2360]Oo his apartment. He made it
[2361]clear that there was no way he could defend himself from any.
[2362]‘attack. (S)
[2364]3. Mr. Whitten also stated that he has been retired for
[2366]almost as long as he worked for the CIA, and that he has a
[2367]completely different life. now in {Vienna/ He. and his wife have
[2368]_ lived in Wienna) approximately 25 years. He is a member of
[2370]arious musical and art societies. He sings in a prominent
[2371]¢@Vienna}Men's Choir. He has published various articles on music
[2373]. (his Specialty is Johann Stra He has received many medals
[2374]-for his work in the arts jin ‘Vienna which we saw when we went to
[2375]‘his apartment. (S)
[2377]4. Mr. Whitten is also greatly worried about the fact that
[2378]he committed perjury en applying for/Austrian? residency by
[2379]stating he worked forthe State Department! He believes this
[2381]CL BY: (2224130 ;
[2382]CL REASO c
[2383]DECL ON: Xl
[2385]DRV FM: HUM 4-82
[2387]SECRET
[2389]13-00000
[2391]LY SECRET
[2393]SUBJECT: Interview with John Whitten (S) |
[2395]could subject him to criminal penalties in/Austria./ He stated on
[2396]several occasions, should his affiliation bédédéme known, he would
[2397]have to leave jAustria. On other occasions, he stated that he
[2398]would turn himsélf in to the (Viennese authorities and offer his
[2399]services as a consultant to the pdélice or intelligence service.
[2400]He obviously was extremely distraught and was voicing what he
[2401]believed were his options should his name be released by the
[2402]Board, although he had not decided on a particular course of
[2403]action. On the other hand, Mr. Whitten was adamant that no
[2404]matter what happens he would never betray the CIA by telling
[2405]anyone about his work as an intelligence officer. (S)
[2407]5. By the end of the evening, Mr. Whitten stated that he
[2408]felt much better about the state of events. On several occasions,
[2409]I had assured him that CIA was doing everything. to protect him
[2410]and Gunn had stated he would argue for his protection to the
[2411]Board. He. clearly looked upon Gunn and I as his allies in this
[2412]process and. even stated that he had a "wonderful" day talking to
[2413]us. We left him, I believe, feeling happy and confident all would
[2415]' turn out well. (S)
[2417]6. After our meeting with Whitten, I spoke with Gunn
[2418]about how this issue would be handled by the Board. Gunn
[2419]believed that it was more than likely that the Board would agree
[2421], to protect him and that he would make the strongest argument he
[2423]’ could to them. The Board will make its decision in it's next
[2425]/ meeting in mid-May. Gunn did not think it would be necessary for
[2427]; anyone from CIA to come down to that meeting. We agreed that
[2429], should the Board make the reprehensible decision of releasing
[2430]Whitten's name, that we could not imagine a stronger case on
[2432]‘which to bring an appeal to the President. (S)
[2434](Linda C. Cipriani {
[2438]2
[2439]. SECRET
[2441]13-00000
[2443]1
[2445]’ .
[2447]SECRET
[2449]SUBJECT: Interview with John Whitten (S)
[2451]DCI/OGC/LD/LCipriani:/76124 (17 May 96)
[2452]Distribution:
[2453]Original - Original
[2455]1 - Registry
[2456]1 - Lit File
[2458]3
[2459]SECRET
[2461]13-00000
[2463]Pod
[2465]« . SECRET
[2467]24 April 1996
[2469]_ MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
[2470]SUBJECT: Interview with John Whitten (Ss)
[2472]1. On 22 April 1996, from approximately 1000 to 1600,
[2473]Jeremy Gunn, General Counsel of the JFK Revi ard, and I spoke
[2474]with Mr. John Whitten at the U.S. embassy in/Vienna/ Gunn.
[2476]' conducted the interview by showing Whitten ‘various documents and
[2477]his prior testimony before the HSCA. Mr. Whitten was eager to
[2478]‘help the Board in any way he could and even offered to come to
[2479]the US if need be. Gunn concluded that it would probably not be
[2480]‘useful to take Whitten's deposition at a later date. jMthough
[2481]Whitten had in general’a good memory, Gunn felt he did not add
[2482]‘anything of significance to his prior testimony before the HSCA.
[2483]‘After the interview, Mr.. Whitten took us to his apartment and
[2484]‘then later to a restaurant with his wife. We left Mr. Whitten
[2485]‘about 1900. (S) . :
[2487]2. Mr. Whitten was extremely worried and upset about. the
[2488]release of his name and on several occasions in the interview was
[2489]on the verge of tears. Although I was expecting him to be angry |
[2490]with CIA and, the. Board, instead, he clearly felt hurt and
[2491]betrayed. His obvious physical problems add to this feeling of
[2492]being vulnerable.  =Physically he is, not well; he is paralyzed on
[2494]..s. his left. side..and.-has-great-..difficulty~ walking «On-a~map;~ heer
[2495]* pointed out his apartment and indicated what. he. .believed to be.
[2496]‘serious threats to his safety should his affiliation with CIA |
[2497]‘become known, Within a block of a" paxtment, he ointed out
[2498].the hea quarters of the PKK, the Anarchist party and a ‘bar where
[2499]many Middle Easterners would congregate,” He then pointer
[2501]‘these places to us when we went to his apartment. He made it
[2502]- ‘clear that there was no way he could defend himself from any
[2503]‘attack. (S)- . To
[2505]3. Mr. Whitten also stated that he has been retired for
[2506]‘almost as long as he worked for the CIA, and that he has a
[2507]‘complete different life now in)-Vienna? He and his wife have
[2508]lived in Vienna? approximately 25 years. He is a member of
[2509]various musiGal and art societies. He sings in a prominent
[2510]Vienna?Men's Choir. He has published various articles on music +
[2511](his “specialty is Johann Strauss). He has received many medals ~
[2512]for his work in the arts/in Vienna jwhich we saw when we went t
[2513]his apartment. (S)
[2515]. 4. Mr. Whitten is also greatly worrie out the fact that
[2516]he committed perjury whe plying for /Austrian/residency by
[2517]stating he worked for)}the State Department,» He’ believes this
[2519]CL BY: an
[2520]. - CL REASON: 1.5(c)°. 3"
[2521]a DECL ON: X1 ~ 7°
[2522]; DRV FM: HUM 4-82
[2524]SECRET
[2528]13-00000
[2530]- Board, although he
[2531]‘action. On the other hand, Mr. Whitten was adamant that no
[2532]. Matter what happens he would never betray the CIA by telling
[2533]. anyone about his work as an intelligence officer. (S)  ..
[2535]” 7 SECRET
[2537]SUBJECT: Interview with John Whitten (S).
[2539]_ could subject him to criminal penalties infaustria j He stated on
[2541]' geveral occasions, should. his affiliation become known, he would
[2542]_ have to leave{Austria} On othe asions, he stated that he
[2544]would turn himself in’ to the’Viennese/authorities and offer his
[2545]services as a consultant to the police or intelligence service.
[2546]He obviously was extremely distraught and was voicing what he
[2547]believed were his options should his name be released by the
[2548]fad not decided on a particular course of
[2550]5. By the end of the evening, Mr. Whitten stated that he
[2551]felt much better about the state of events. On several occasions,
[2552]I had assured him that CIA was doing everything to protect him ;
[2553]and Gunn had stated he would argue for his protection to the
[2554]Board. He clearly looked upon Gunn and(_/as his allies in this
[2556]‘process and even stated that he had a "wonderful" day talking to
[2558]us, We left him, I believe, feeling happy and confident all would
[2559]turn out well. (S)
[2561]6. After our meeting with Whitten, I spoke with Gunn
[2563]about how this issue would be handled by the Board. Gunn
[2564]a
[2566]‘believed that it was more than likely t
[2568]t the Board would agree
[2569]to protect him and that he would make the strongest argument he
[2571]‘could to them. The Board will make its decision in (it's) next
[2573]meeting in mid-May. Gunn did not think it would be nécessary for
[2575].anyone from CIA to come down to that meeting. We agreed that
[2576]... should. the -Board--make.the-reprehensible decision. of--releasing
[2577].Whitten's name, that we could.not imagine a stronger case on .
[2579]which to bring an appeal to the President. (S)
[2581]' Qpinda C. Cipriani).
[2582]OGC/LD
[2584]SECRET
[2586]13-00000
[2588]| Jeremy Gunn, General Counsel of t
[2590]SECRET
[2592]24 April 1996
[2594]MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
[2596]SUBJECT: Interview with John Whitten (S)
[2598]1. On 22 April: 1996, from approximately 1000 to 1600,
[2600]e JFK Revi Board, and I spoke
[2601]with Mr..John Whitten at the U.S. embassy inj Vienna}.. Gunn .
[2602]conducted the interview by showing Whitten various documents an
[2604]- his prior testimony before the HSCA. Mr. Whitten was éager to
[2606]_ help the Board in any way he could and even offered to come to
[2607]the US if need be. Gunn concluded that it would probably not be
[2608]‘useful to take Whitten's deposition at a later date. though
[2609]Whitten had in general a. good memory, Gunn felt he did not add
[2610]anything of significance to his prior testimony before the HSCA.
[2611]. After the interview, Mr. Whitten took us to his apartment and
[2612]-then later to a restaurant with his wife. We left Mr. Whitten
[2614]‘about 1900. (S) -
[2616]2. Mr. Whitten was extremely worried and upset about the
[2617]release of his name and on several occasions in the interview was
[2618]on the verge of tears. Although I was expecting him to be angry
[2620]‘with CIA and the Board, instead, he clearly felt hurt and j
[2621]betrayed. His obvious physical problems add to this ‘feeling of
[2622]being vulnerable. Physically he is not well; he is paralyzed on
[2623]his left side and has. great. difficulty walking: On-a map, he
[2624]pointed out his apartment and indicated what he believed to be
[2625]serious threats to his safety should his affiliation with CIA
[2627]ih e known. Within a block of his apartment, he pointed out
[2628]the headquarters of the PKK, the Anarchist party and a bar where)
[2629]many Middle Easterners would congregate,/” He then pointed out
[2630]“thése places to us when we went to his apartment. He made it
[2631]Ghear that there was no way he could defend himself from any
[2632]-attack. (S . -
[2634]3. Mr. Whitten also stated that he has been retired for
[2635]‘almost as long as he worked for the CIA, and that he has a
[2636]completely different life now in/Vienna He and his wife have
[2637]lived iniVienna) approximately 25 years. He is a member of
[2638]various musical and art societies. He sings in a prominent
[2639]{ Vienna}Men's Choir. He has published various articles on music
[2640]‘(his specialty is Johann Strauss). He has received many medals
[2641]‘for his work in the arts} in Vienna) which we saw when we went to
[2642]his apartment. (S)
[2644]4. Mr. Whitten is also Jing for tacsten about the fact that
[2646]fhe committed perjury applying for Austrian) residency by
[2647]stating he worked forlthe State Department? e believes this
[2649]CL BY: 2224130
[2650]CL REASON: 1.5(c)
[2651]DECL ON: X1
[2653]DRV FM: HUM 4-82 _
[2655]SECRET
[2657]13-00000
[2659]SECRET
[2661]SUBJECT: Interview with John Whitten (S)
[2663]could subject him to criminal penalties in fAustria} He stated on
[2664]several occasio ould his affiliation bécome known, he would
[2665]have to leave jAustria}. On other.occasions, he stated that he
[2666]would turn himself in to the {Viennese} authorities and offer his
[2667]services as a consultant to the police or intelligence service.
[2668]He obviously was extremely distraught and was voicing what he
[2669]believed were his options should his name be released by the
[2671]Board, although he had not decided on a particular course of
[2673]action. On the other hand, Mr. Whitten was adamant that no
[2674]matter what happens he would never betray the CIA by telling
[2675]anyone about his work as an intelligence officer. (S)
[2677]S. By the end of the evening, Mr. Whitten stated that he
[2678]felt much better about the state of events. On several occasions,
[2679]I had assured him that CIA was doing everything to protect him
[2680]and Gunn had stated he would argue for his protection to the
[2681]Board. He clearly looked upon Gunn and(/as his allies in this
[2682]process and even stated that he had a "wonderful" day talking to
[2683]us. We left him, I believe, feeling happy and confident all would
[2684]turn out well. (S)_. ;
[2686]6. After our meeting with Whitten, I spoke with Gunn
[2687]about how this issue would be handled by the Board. Gunn
[2688]believed that it was more than likely that the Board would agree
[2689]to protect him and that he would make the strongest argument he
[2691]7 could to them. The Board will make its decision in (it's) next
[2693]meeting in mid-May. Gunn did not think it would be nécessary for
[2694]anyone from CIA to come down to that meeting. We agreed that
[2695]should the Board make the reprehensible decision of releasing ---
[2696]Whitten's name, that we could not imagine a stronger case on
[2698]_ which to bring an appeal to the President. (S)
[2700]' {pinda Cc. Cipriani .
[2701]CI/OGC/LD
[2703]2
[2704]SECRET
[2707]13-00000
[2708]SECRET
[2710]20 November 1995
[2712]MEMORANDUM FOR: Eleanor Neiman —
[2714]{ Sue A. Burggraf 7?
[2716]FROM:
[2717]SUBJECT: Per _our telecon, here is a copy of the cable that came in on Friday
[2718]i from | Vienna)
[2720]REFERENCE:
[2722]* Document displayed with Header, Body, ‘and Footer zones"
[2723]Print this cable
[2725][- Edit cable Categorize cable
[2726]CATEGORIES:
[2728]ROUTE SUBJECT: RESPONSE FOR JFK ASSASSINATION RECORDS COLLECTION ACT
[2729]ROUTE COMMENTS:
[2731]SECRET 1716482 NOV 95 STAFF
[2733]t
[2734]i CITE VIENNA 28456
[2736]|
[2737]| TO: DIRECTOR.
[2738]LIMIT CHIEF/OCC INFO OCC/OSG, CHIEF/PCS, C/EUR/SA, EUR/LGL,
[2740]FOR:
[2742]7 OGC/OSD, OGC/OFLD
[2743]; | SLUGS: WNINTEL _ cee
[2744](or TT ee nse ce er etm
[2745]SUBJECT: RESPONSE FOR JFK ASSASSINATION RECORDS COLLECTION ACT
[2746]95 2040015 ?
[2748]Pes “DIRECTOR 493642
[2749]B. DIRECTOR 493658 95 2040060 /
[2751]TEXT:
[2752]1. ACTION REQUIRED: NONE, FYI. oe os
[2755]a ON 14 NOVEMBER 1995, C/O. NOBLEHORSE DELIVERED REF TEAR LINE -
[2756]“INFORMATION AS REQUESTED. REF IDEN THEN ASKED FOR TIME TO FORMULATE
[2757]‘HIS THOUGHTS AND SUBMIT THEM ON PAPER. ALTHOUGH NOBLEHORSE '
[2759]if EXPLAINED THAT WE WOULD PREFER HE PASS THE RESPONSE DIRECTLY TO C/O, i
[2760]/} HE WAS APPARENTLY SO ANGERED OVER THE CONTENTS OF REF, THAT HE LATER
[2761]TRIED TO CONTACT BERT MILLS DIRECTLY AND WITHOUT SUCCESS. ON 15 i)
[2765]2.
[2767]i]
[2768]: NOVEMBER, REF IDEN PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING RESPONSE IN WRITING, WHICH
[2769]( IS BEING POUCHED TO HQS VIA TM 902-825: ae
[2770]we OO ve _
[2771]We Nev a4, 1995 os
[2775]: TO [BERT 41 MILLS}
[2777]SECRET
[2779]13-00000
[2783]SECRET
[2785]I OBJECT VIOLENTLY TO THE REVELATION OF MY NAME REGARDLESS OF
[2786]THE LAW. HERE ARE SOME REASONS:
[2788]i. __I EMIGRATED To ‘AUSTRIA . TWICE, FIRST IN 1971 AND AGAIN IN 1983?
[2789]{BOTH TIMES/I HAD TO FILL OUT_AND. SWEAR_TO_LENGTHY FORMS ABOUT MY
[2790]“BACKGROUND._JI USED MY RETIRED STATE COVER BOTH TIMES, THEREBY »
[2791]COMMITTING | PERJURY TWICE UNDER_AUSTRIAN LAW. "MY OLD FRIENDS” IN HIGH
[2792]—PLACES: ‘WHO MIGHT HAVE “BEEN _ABLE TO PROTECT ME HAVE ALL RETIRED OR,
[2793]EVEN MORE, DIED. ; AUSTRIAN JUSTICE IS NOTORIOUSLY IMMUTABLE. DO YOU
[2795]WANT ME TO GO TO JAIL?
[2797]2... LIVING SINCE _RETIREMENT: IN AUSTRIA FROM 1971 TO 1980 AND FROM \
[2798](1983 TO THE PRESENT, I HAVE ACHIEVED HIGH POSITIONS IN VIENNA'S \
[2799]MUSICAL BODIES, BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE JOHANN STRAUSS _ SOCIETY AND ?}
[2800]\ VICE PRESIDENT OF T VIENNA MEN'S SINGING SOCIETY, AND/I AM ~
[2801]PERSONALLY KNOWN TO/ SEVERAL RECENT AUSTRIAN PRESIDENTS / MANY
[2802]REPORTERS AND RADIO FIGURES. I SUFFERED A DISABLING STROKE IN
[2803]DECEMBER 1993 AND MY WIFE AND I, BOTH 75, CAN CONTINUE TO EXIST HERE
[2804]BECAUSE OUR 2000 SQ. FT. APARTMENT IS WITHIN WALKING DISTANCE OF 2
[2805]POST OFFICES, SEVERAL SMALL SUPER MARKETS, MY FAMILY PHYSICIAN, OUR
[2806]DENTIST, MY UROLOGIST, AND AN EYE DOCTOR AND OPTICIAN. WE ARE
[2807]WITHIN WHEEL CHAIR DISTANCE OF THE CONCERT HALLS AND THE OPERA.
[2808]WHERE CAN YOU DUPLICATE THIS FOR ME?
[2810]/DURING_MY_ ACTIVE CAREER IN VIENNA AROUND 1959 Tr INTERROGATED AND _‘\
[2812]/BRoxe AN INTELLIGENCE SWINDLER WHO HAD BEEN A NAZI ASSASSIN.” I aan)
[2813];PROMISED HIM SECRECY IF HE CONFESSED, BUT THE US ARMY PUT OUT A
[2815]/ "BURN NOTICE“ ON HIM, FORCING HIM TO MOVE TO GERMANY. I AM SURE a
[2816]“—WO@ULD_LOVE_TO_FIND_ME_AND..SHOOT_ME... -
[2818]4. [| VIENNA/IS 5 FULL OF ISLAMIC TERRORISTS. THERE HAVE BEEN SEVERAL
[2819]ASSASSINATIONS, EVEN OF A CITY COUNCILMAN, BY THEM IN RECENT YEARS.
[2820]UNDER( AUSTRIAN} LAW, I, AS A FOREIGNER, CANNOT EVEN GET A PISTOL
[2822]LICENSE. YOU MUST KNOW ABOUT THE KIDNAPPING AND KILLING OF OUR
[2823]COLLEAGUES AROUND THE WORLD.
[2825]4. I HAVE TWICE TESTIFIED BEFORE HOUSE AND SENATE COMMITTEES ABOUT
[2826]THE KENNEDY ASSASSINATION. THEIR FULL REPORTS SIMPLY CALLED ME THE
[2827]"DESK OFFICER" AND THAT HAS SEEMED TO SATISFY EVERYONE. NEEDLESS TO
[2828]SAY, IF YOU DO EXPOSE MY NAME, I WILL NOT EVER TALK TO ANY
[2829]JOURNALISTS OR SO-CALLED HISTORIANS.
[2831]5. IF MY NAME IS EXPOSED, I WILL OBVIOUSLY HAVE TO LEAVE VIENNA,
[2832]WITH THE WHOLE HOUSE FULL OF FURNITURE, PICTURES, LIBRARY, CLOTHING,
[2833]ETC. WHICH I PACKED AND PAID TO HAVE MOVED OVER HERE IN 1983.
[2834]BECAUSE OF MY STROKE, I WILL BE UNABLE TO DO ANY PACKING AND THE
[2835]MOVE WILL BE VERY EXPENSIVE. WHERE CAN I RESETTLE IN A 2000 SQ FT.
[2836]APT. SO CONVENIENTLY LOCATED.
[2838]6. MY WIFE AND I LOVE LIVING HERE FOR MANY REASONS, AND LEAVING
[2839]WOULD BE A CRUEL AND NEEDLESS FATE.
[2841]7. j%II REGARD THIS LAW AS DISHONORABLE AND UNWORTHY OF THE UNITED
[2842]STATES OF AMERICA. IF YOU DECIDE AGAINST ME, I WANT TO APPEAR
[2843]BEFORE THE BOARD AND EVEN THE PRESIDENT, WHOM I HAPPEN TO ADMIRE. I
[2844]WILL PAY MY OWN WAY BACK TO DO SO. I SERVED IN WWII AND NEVER
[2845]SPARED MYSELF; IN THE OUTFIT I WORKED HARD, WAS FEARLESS IN DEALING
[2846]WITH MY SUPERIORS (CORD MEYER AND DICK HELMS CAN TESTIFY TO THAT)
[2847]AND MY ADVERSARIES. I WOULDN'T EVEN THINK OF THREATENING TO EXPOSE
[2848]THINGS TO PRESSURE YOU. I WILL BE EMPLOYING AN ATTORNEY OR TWO,
[2849]FAMILIAR WITH OUR AFFAIRS, TO REPRESENT ME. I WILL NOT DENY, THAT I
[2850]CONSIDER YOU AND EVERYONE ELSE IMPLEMENTING THIS LAW TO BE ENGAGING
[2851]IN DISHONORABLE CONDUCT, UNWORTHY OF OUR GOVERNMENT SERVICE.
[2853]SECRET
[2855]13-00000 |
[2857]‘IS TRUE.
[2859]‘SECRET
[2861]8. £IN THE LATE 1960'S WHILE SERVING IN VIENNA UNDER TOM | pan
[2862]KARAMISSINIS; I WAS” ORDERED BY HQ TO REVEAL—TO-AUSTRIAN-MILITAR :
[2864]LLIGENCE THAT A LOW-RANKING AUSTRIAN DIPLOMAT SERVING AS THEIR
[2865]INFORMANT IN BUDAPEST HAD ALSO BEEN RECRUITED BY US AND WAS REPORTI
[2866]NG TO US. .I REFUSED TO CARRY OUT THIS ORDER AND OFFERED MY
[2867]RESIGNATION. TO ME, IT WAS DISHONORABLE TO BETRAY A YOUNG AGENT WHO
[2868]HAD ACCEPTED OUR RECRUITMENT AND PUT FAITH IN OUR PROMISE OF
[2870]- SECRECY. TO MY MIND AN AGENCY WITHOUT PRINCIPLES CANNOT SURVIVE AND
[2872]INDEED SHOULD NOT SURVIVE. TOM KARAMISSINIS, PERHAPS ONE OF THE
[2873]LAST HONORABLE MEN TO SERVE WITH US IN HIGH POSITION, FIRED A STRONG
[2874]BLE BACK AND THE SHAMEFUL ORDER WAS RETRACTED.
[2876]9. I HAVE INVESTED ABOUT $50,000 IN MY APARTMENT, IN KEY MONEY AND
[2878]IMPROVEMENTS. I LEAVE, I WILL LOSE ALL OR MOST OF THIS. OUR
[2879]LAST MOVE TO aie COST ME ABOUT $15,000 IN SEA FREIGHT AND
[2880]INSURANCE. NEVER GET ON MY KNEES AND ASK TO BE MADE WHOLE IF
[2882]YOU EXPOSE ME, BOT I MAY REPORT TO THE COURTS. I AM A RETIRED
[2883]MEMBER OF THE VIRGINIA BAR.
[2885]10. LET ME REGALE YOU WITH AN EXAMPLE OF HOW THE HISTORIANS
[2887]MINDLESS DRIVE TO KNOW EVERYTHING CAN LEAD TO A PROUD COUNTRY'
[2888]DISGRACING ITSELF. DURING WWII WHEN WE WERE INTERROGATINGROERNAN
[2889]POW'S, WE PROMISED ~WOULD-EVER-LEARN—THEY-HAD—"SPILLEI
[2890]IR-GUTS; *— ALL BELIEVED WE WERE BEING HONEST. BUT ALMOST
[2892](25 YEARS AFTER WWII THE BRITISH DECLASSIFIED ALL THE ADI(K) REPORTS
[2894](THAT'S WHAT THEY WERE CALLED, AND EVEN THE “ROOM CONVERSATIONS,”
[2895]TRANSCRIPTS OF THE CONVERSATIONS POWS HAD IN THEIR ROOMS, EVEN
[2897]- INCLUDING THE EXTREMELY VALUABLE SPEECHES MADE BY HIGH-RANKING
[2898]-LUFTWAFFE OFFICERS TO THEIR HIGH-RANKING FELLOW POW'S AT
[2900]"COCKFOSTERS" MANSION. NEWCOMERS WERE VISITED BY THE OLD HANDS FOR
[2901]A MONTH TO MAKE SURE THEY WEREN'T STOOL PIGEONS, BEFORE THEY WERE
[2902]GIVEN THE PRIVILEGE OF ADDRESSING THEIR FELLOW OFFICERS ON SOME
[2903]IMPORTANT ASPECT OF THE WAR. THE EXCELLENT BRITISH MIKES
[2905]ALL UP.
[2907]IN RECENT YEARS, AT LEAST ONE LUFTWAFFE VETERAN ASSOCIATION,
[2908]THAT OF J.G.2, THE RICHTHOFEN GESCHWADER, SENT PEOPLE TO LONDON TO
[2909]GET COPIES OF THE INTERROGATION REPORTS OF THEIR PILOTS: . THEY DID
[2910]IT CHRONOLOGICALLY AND WERE SO SHOCKED AT THE VAST AMOUNT OF VITAL
[2911]DATA REVEALED BY THEIR BUDDIES THAT, IN ACUTE REVULSION, THEY
[2912]STOPPED LOOKING. I ASSUMED THEN THAT "EVERYONE" HAD "TALKED," WHICH
[2914]il. I AM 75 YEARS OLD PARTLY PARALYZED ON MY LEFT SIDE FROM A
[2915]STROKE IN DEC. 1993. I WAS NEARLY FULLY REHABILITATED WHEN, IN MAY
[2916]1994, I WAS HIT BY CONSTANT MUSCLE SPASMS ALL UP AND DOWN MY LEFT .
[2917]SIDE. THIS RATHER RARE CONDITION, BASICALLY A SUDDEN SUPER-HUMAN
[2918]TIGHTENING OF ALL THE MUSCLES, WITH AFTER EFFECTS LASTING UNTIL THE
[2919]NEXT SPASM, HAVE MADE IT INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT FOR ME TO STAND UP,
[2920]WALK, OR EVEN SIT UP FOR VERY LONG. IN A FEW DAYS, WHEN ALL THE
[2921]MANY MEDICINES ARE HERE, WILL BEGIN A. 20-WEEK HOMEOPATHIC CURE FOR
[2922]THE SPASMS UNDER DR. SCHRAMM, A LEADING SPECIALIST HERE. I CAN'T
[2923]VERY WELL LEAVE FOR 20 WEEKS. .
[2925]YOU WILL BE CONTACTED MOMENTARILY BY ONE. OF MY ATTORNEYS. I
[2927]_WILL ALSO BE IN TOUCH WITH MY CONGRESSMAN AND SENATORS.
[2929]WITH BITTER RESOLVE,
[2930](SIGNED - REF B IDEN)
[2932]3. REF IDEN HAD ALSO ATTEMPTED TO. PUT THE ABOVE INTO
[2934]"CABALESE," BUT BECAME TOO TIRED TO FINISH IT. NONETHELESS, REF
[2935]IDEN ALSO REQUESTED THAT THE CONTENTS OF THIS MESSAGE ALSO BE PASSED:
[2937]. SECRET
[2940]13-Q0000 .
[2942]a
[2944]SECRET
[2946]1. SAW SUBJ IN HIS APT NOV 14. CORDIAL
[2948]2. REASONS: SUBJ HAS EMIGRATED PRIVATELY TO; AUSTRIA TWICE, 1971 }
[2950]JAND 1983, USING RETIRED STATE COVER ON SWORN AUSTRIAN FORMS ‘cHUs 7
[2952]a
[2955]COMMITTING PERJURY TWICE BY AUSTRIAN LAW: ~ HIGH OFFICIAL HERE WHO
[2956]COVERED FOR HIM Now" DEAD. “WOULD FACE © “SCANDAL TRIAL, JAIL, AND
[2957]DEPORTATION.
[2959]3. SUBJ PROMINENT IN LOCAL MUSIC CIRCLES, RADIO, TV, AND POLITICS
[2960]AND MILITARY, GREAT SCANDAL POTENTIAL. —
[2962]‘4. SUBJ INVESTED 50 THOUSAND DOLLARS IN APT AND WOULD LOSE IT IND
[2964]HURRIED DEPARTURE, PLUS EXPENSE OF MOVING EFFECTS TO Z1, AND OWN
[2965]FARES. : ;
[2967]5. SUBJ NOW 75 HAD CRIPPLING STROKE DEC. 93. WIFE ALSO 75 ABLE TO
[2968]CARRY ON BECAUSE STORES, DENTIST, DOCTOR, UROLOGIST OF SUBJ, POST
[2969]OFFICE ALL IN WALKING DISTANCE OF APT. CANNOT DUPLICATE THIS IN 21.
[2971]6. SUBJ WOULD BE ENDANGERED BY ISLAMIC GROUPS HERE WHO HAVE
[2972]ASSASSINATED SEVERAL INCL ONE CITY COUNCILMAN. EMBASSY GETS
[2973]HREATENING PHONE CALLS. /AS FOREIGNER SUBJ DENIED AUSTRIAN PISTOL
[2974]{ PERMIT. SUBJ ALSO ENDANGERED BY FORMER NAZI ASSASSIN AND INTEL SWI
[2975]{| NDLER HE INTERROGATED AND BROKE 25 YEARS AGO, PROMISING HIM SECRECY; °
[2976](BUT US ARMY PUT OUT BURN NOTICE, FORCING_NAZT TO MOVE TO GERMANY. ;
[2977]7. SUBJ HAS TESTIFIED FULLY BEFORE HOUSE AND SENATE COMMITTEES,
[2978]TERMED "DESK OFFICER," OWN ROLE MINOR. ALTHO PUT IN CHARGE OF
[2979]AGENCY INVESTIGATION BY HELMS THEN DDO, HIS WORK WAS SABOTAGED BY
[2980]ANGLETON WHO WITHHELD HUNDREDS OF BEST FBI REPORTS AND CONFERRED
[2981]DAILY WITH FBI WITHOUT PRESENCE OF SUBJ, ALL IN FLAGRANT VIOLATION
[2982]OF HELMS ORDERS.
[2984]8. SUBJ AVERS HE WILL NEVER THREATEN TO EXPOSE AGENCY. EVEN IF
[2985]SURFACED WILL DENY EVERYTHING. .
[2987]4. FILE: 785-120-034.
[2988]CL BY: 2618711
[2989]cL REASON: | “1.5 (C)
[2991]DECL ON: Xl
[2992]DRV FROM: HUM 4-82.
[2994]END OF MESSAGE SECRET
[2998]SECRET
[3000]13-00000. |
[3002]le Tat Le _ uy
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[3020]| Paz ie Ceaael A Toe we Lg
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[3025]B 2evterat prral reeed Zi Ce Pasi by Derwe
[3027]We rd toed o's Ff. Wy -—_
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[3041]1300000.
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[3048]sR AEG Elias Foe Wf,
[3049]2 Lapel maps one C Corel MPege—
[3050]ot A LG tito Sore
[3052]offer
[3054]13-00000
[3056]Baim ot
[3059]lh lo, and We Tf
[3062]13-00000
[3064]GoD rosscay oP 2
[3066]& . MO er : |
[3068]Lisotgh  D p
[3069]oe far be ey - A~a- far tage , ata a |
[3070]OTE OT.
[3072]13-00000 st;
[3074]a 7 SEGRE EA c my ;
[3075]. zi rayy Dene yas on © ak, walt ny oe
[3077]Engine |
[3078]| Gal bate racks
[3080]ne |
[3082]13-00000
[3084](), SAW SUL INES APT NOVIN, Conpip,
[3086]f,
[3091]AK SUBS HAS PRE wu IT TEN PLEA'TO Repub: “Nn Dee cove
[3093]£7971 AND 1983, AS/NG- RE TIRED STATE COVER OW
[3095]2. REASONS! SUBS PIAS EMIGRATED, TC iPUSTR/A Twice,
[3097]i SWORN AUSTR AY FORMS Thus COMMITTING PERRY
[3098]TWICE ‘BY ALSTRIAN L At / PHEH OFFICIAL AER wth o
[3100]COVERER FOR Him VOW DizAp, WELLLD FACE SEAN DAL
[3101]TRIAL, JAIL AND DE POR TATUM. .
[3103]3, bubs PROMINENT IN LacAL MuUSle CIRCLES
[3104]RADIO, TV AWD POLITICS. Gy
[3105]SCANDAL POTENTIAL,
[3107]% SUB) INVESTED 30 THOusAND DOLLARS (NM API ANS
[3108]WOKLD LOSE rr UN MORRIEO DEPARTURE , PLKs
[3109]EXPENSE OF MOVING EFFEcTs To 24, AND OWN FAR Ls.
[3111]5, SUuBs Now 75 HAD CRIPPLING STROKE DEE 93,
[3112]WIFE ALSO 7S ABLE TO CARRY OW BECAUSE STORES,
[3114]“UB, LS OFFICE
[3115]Ait ia WALKING DISTANCE Be APF: ‘Canna |
[3116]DupPLeicaTE THts JN 24
[3117]6, SUBS WOLLD BE END/INGERE D By ISLAM te
[3118]GRouPS HERE Who AAVE ASSASSINATED
[3120]SEVERAL (NCL OWL Ciry COUN CLL MAY. EMBaAssy
[3121]Ba GETS TYRE A Pew Ine PHONE CALLS “AS FORE) GneR
[3122]“SUBS SREP ED AUSTRIAW PISTOL PERMIT? SsuUBY
[3123](ALSO PF ENOANGEREO BY FORMER NAZI ;
[3124]I ASSHSSIV AND INTEL SWINDLER HE INTERR o— |
[3125]i GATED ANP BROKE 25 YEARS ACB PROMISING /,
[3126]Fr [fim SECRECY; BUT ARRFPR ts ARMY PUT |
[3128]t CUT PURN NOTICE, Fo RING WAZ LO MOE Be
[3130]NY GERMANY — ao _ ae
[3132]AND MILITARY, GREAT
[3134]7, OLB HAST. ESTIIE D MeL y PEPORE ous
[3135]OFFICERS OWN ROLE Mi bee ALTHO Purin
[3137]CHARGE OF AGENCY /NWVEST; CA
[3138]THEN DRO His Lar TION BY HEL ms
[3140]13-00000
[3142]WITH FB/ WITHOUT PESENCE OF SUBS, ALL ae
[3143]—FLAGRANT VIOLATION OF HELMS ORDERS,
[3145]$. SUBJ AVERS HE WILl NEVER THREA TIE, AY -
[3147]To EXPOSE AGENCY, VEN (E CUR FAC ZD Wwihra
[3148]DENY. EVERY THING
[3150]a J
[3154]2 —
[3156]13-00000
[3158].
[3160]-
[3162]Subj: Gn Scelso testimony
[3164]Date: Octl2 TueSun 19961995 18:46 EDT
[3166]From. 74030.3022@CompuServe.comM
[3168]A-From: 74030.3022@CompuServe.COM (ed dolan)
[3169]To. dickkovar@aolcom (Dick Kovar)
[3171]Dick, this is what Chuck Briggs requested.
[3173]Date: 06-Oct-96 02:36 EDT
[3174]From: (The name of this person is unimportant]
[3175]Subj: Ex-ClA Agent Adds Fuel to Kennedy Assassination Fire
[3177]Ex-CIA Agent Adds Fuel to Kennedy Assassination Fire
[3178]By Michael Dorman
[3179](c) 1996, Newsday
[3181]The chief CIA investigator of President John F. Kennedy's assassination has
[3182]testified that another high CIA official - noted for seeking conspiracies -
[3183]disobeyed orders in repeatediy conferring with the Warren Commission shortly
[3184]after the murder. The witness also said a colleague once told him that the CIA
[3185]official, the late
[3187]James Angleton, “has ties to the Mafia
[3189]Almost 33 years after the assassination, the identity of the witness, who held
[3190]various top-secret CIA jobs, ts considered so sensitive that federal authorities
[3191]insist on withholding his true name. He is known only by the alias “John
[3192]Scelso.”
[3194]While Scelso testified before the House Select Committee on Assassinations in
[3195]1978, his 192-page testimony was kept secret until now. It has just been sent to
[3196]the National Archives by the Assassination Records Review Board, a federal -
[3197]agency that screens assassination documents and makes public those that do not
[3198]endanger national security.
[3200]sceiso's testimony, which criticized operations of the CIA, FBI, Secret Service
[3201]and other agencies, likely will renew debates, especially among conspiracy
[3202]theorists, on the assassination and how it was investigated.
[3204]when Kennedy was assassinated on Nov. 22, 1963, Scelso was chief of aClA
[3206]13-00000
[3208]v
[3210]38/8/1996 Amarica Online: Dick Kovar Page 1
[3212]branch
[3214]responsible for operations in Mexico and Central America. Richard Helms, the CIA
[3215]chief of clandestine services and later the agency's director, placed Scelso in
[3216]charge of the assassination investigation. Angleton, a counterintelligence
[3217]official with close ties to FB! Director J. Edgar Hoover, “immediately went
[3219]Into action to do all the investigating,” Scelso testified, criticizing the
[3221]move sharply.
[3223]“Helms called a meeting at which Angleton and a lot of others were present and
[3224]told everybody that | was in charge and that no one should have any
[3226]conversations with anyone about the Kennedy case without my being present -
[3227]which was violated from the word ‘go’ by Angleton, who dealt with the FBI and
[3228]the Warren Commission and (warren Cornmission member and former CiA Director
[3229]Allen) Dulles himself, .. Angleton ignored Helms’ orders. | tried to get Helms
[3231]to make him obey and Heims said, You go tell him. ”
[3233]Angleton, who died in 1987, spent much of his career searching for conspiracies
[3234]- believing that there was a Communist mole in the CiA - and was presumed by
[3235]other CiA officers to have tried to press a conspiracy theory on the warren
[3236]Commission. The commission found no evidence of a conspiracy. Angleton.was
[3237]fired
[3239]in 1975, Years later, a mole was found - Aldrich Ames - but he had entered the |
[3240]CIA after Angleton's dismissal.
[3242]At one point in the 1978 House testimony, committee attorney Michael Goldsmith
[3243]asked, “Do you have any reason to belfeve that Angleton might have had ties to
[3244]organized crime?”
[3246]“Yes,” replied Scelso, who is now retired and lives abroad, government sources
[3247]Sald, He said the Justice Department once asked the CIA to determine the true.
[3248]names of people holding numbered bank accounts in Panama because the Mafia was
[3249]hiding Las Vegas “skim” money there. “We were in an excellent position to do
[3250]this and toid them so - whereupon Angleton vetoed it and said, ‘That is the
[3251]bureau's (FBI's) business.’ " Sceiso said he discussed the situation with
[3253]another CIA officer. “And he smiled a foxy smile and said, “Well, that’s
[3255]Angleton’s excuse. The real reason 1s that Angleton himself has ties to the
[3257]Mafia and he would not
[3259]want to doubie-cross them.’ ”
[3261]On another subject, Scelso gave Kennedy conspiracy theorists a slight plece of
[3263]13-00000
[3264]so 10/8/1996 America Online: Dick Kovar Page 2
[3268]ammunition. A Soviet defector, Yuri Nosenko, was known to have told
[3269]investigators. that Lee Harvey Oswald - fdentified by the Warren Commission as
[3270]Kennedy's assassin - was not a Soviet agent. But Scelso said: “| later heard
[3271]that Nosenko was discovered to have been dissembling, not being on the level.
[3272]That information was imparted to me by CIA officers.” —
[3274]Based on the information CiA headquarters had on Oswald before the assassination
[3275]- chiefiv that he nad been in the Marine Corps and defected to the Soviet Union,
[3276]then returned - Scelso said he saw no reason to pay him special heed. “Oswald
[3277]just seemed ta me to be a small-potatoes defector,” he said..But he conceded
[3279]that significant information about Oswald - known to CIA agents in Mexico City,
[3280]for exampie - had not reached headquarters before the assassinatton.
[3282]It dealt chiefly with Oswald's visits to the Soviet and Cuban embassies in
[3283]Mexico City and his attempts to obtain a Cuban visa two months before the.
[3284]assassination. Scelso said the information failed to reach Washington because of
[3285]Simple overwork and bureaucratic delays in the Mexico City office. He revealed
[3286]that all the outside telephone lines at the Soviet and Cuban embassies were
[3287]tapped by American agents and that calls Oswald made to them were recorded.
[3288]After Oswald was arrested, Sceiso revealed, agents compared audiotapes made
[3289]while he was in custody with the wiretaps and determined that he was the same
[3290]man who had visited the embassies,
[3292]Distribution:
[3294]Z
[3296]To: j. dolan > 174030,3022) Dickford Cohn > [76226, 1572]
[3299]From 74030.3022@Compuserve.COM Tue Oct 8 18:45:41 1996
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