[1]PROCESSING = - :
[3]pcr TS
[5]PLISHED |
[7]NO INDEXING REQUIRED |
[8]a ONLY QUALIFIED
[10]: ; a HEADQUARTERS DESK
[12]a4 . i . CAN JUDGE INDEXING *
[14]Chief of Station, JMWAVE /((L ———
[16]BET Operational /TYPIC/AMTRUNK
[18]Project AMTRUNK Operational Review...
[20]7ETioa REQUIRED - AO 7 ene SRTORITY
[22]a
[24]ACTION: Request Headquarters decision on continuation or
[25]termination of Project: AMTRUNK,
[27]l. Attached herewith is an operational review of and progress
[28]‘report on the AMTRUNK team for the period of 4 through 31 March. .
[29]Station views on the operation are summarized below, .
[31]' 2. The AMTRUNK operation has the following disadvantages or weak-
[34]nesses;
[36]CERN SC oe VarSr OTT) oS Toor ts ee SF WOnde these nee nts
[37]st cooperate aga KUBARR only When it is to| their advantage. It
[38]is believed that if the. operation were to develop, control would
[39]diminish rather than increase in the advancedistages of the operation,
[40]since the need for KUBARK assistance will decrease as operational
[41]successes increase. It is believed tha oO
[42]' wbesitation “selling out" the ope to any one of the major re-
[43]tf cal groups at any ©: at he felt it advantageous to
[44]do so. It is believed that, if he is not already doing so, he is
[45]most likely to collaborate with either the Segundo Frente del Es-
[46]cambray, headed by.Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, or the MRP faction headed
[47]by Manuel Ray. -In the meantime AMICE/27 will attempt to have his
[48]own way with the operation. . He helieves Dal LE dS. eceiying spe
[49]ention because of his ZRMETAL connections, and he will not ob
[50]behind KUBARK's back to .AMT! APE/1. and ODA
[51]a oT uthoritvi if the dperation or KUBARK handling of the|
[52]AMTRUNKS does not progress td his liking. Since TRUNK/1, according
[53]to AMCAPE/1,"masterminded" tHis operation in the first place, ilt may -
[54]be assumed that the AMTRUNKS |will withhold nothing! from AMTRUNK/1,
[56]. 2h
[58]a de Exotest AAI TKUAK
[60]“ scitivgeiwn, (9-6-9443
[61]me: o.- fie i. f
[63]a: / WHR SCY
[65]Distribution: . a
[66]3 = C/SAS w/attchs Saye 7 | ra
[67]C/SAS w/attchs Maca!
[69]wee ere ye
[71]——_DESENSITIZ
[73]rt 45
[75]DATE DISPATCKZD
[77]App f
[79]Relat]
[81]«ee . Po wee “rr
[83]«) a Rahs
[84]SN An
[87]CQNTINUATION OF -
[88]DISPATCH
[90]. . ‘ ; is . .
[91]. Notas SSPE LCA LAG) Ns 5 . ATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
[93]B. This operation has avery high "flap potential” if any AMTRUNK
[94]agents are picked up by. only will
[95]KUBARK stand to suffer, but ODACID will be tied directly in to the
[96]operation, ‘as may. also QKFLOWAGE, by whom AMTRUNK/1 is employed,
[97]and AMCAPE/] and his newspaper The latter could prove to be most
[98]embarrassing ‘and § 5 ully recognized as a possibility, if
[99]not a probability, in the event any of the AMTRUNK team fall into
[101]C. The security of this operation has certain questionable aspects.
[102]’ At least six people were told about the operation in varying degrees
[103]prior to the time the team was safehoused. f th rent
[104]AMICE/27 and AMICE/14, did not satisfactor:
[105]di j" if
[107]TOCERTaREEGYTT on.of an unknown nature from his KUBARK con-
[109]tacts. An undercurrent of friction has recently developed between
[110]_ AMICE/14 and AMTRUNK/3 which manifested itself in a fistfight on
[112]29 March. This was precipitated by AMTRUNK/3 who called -AMICE/14
[113]the Cuban term for a homosexual, the ultimate insult to a Cuban.
[114]This in turn gives rise to the question whether AMICE/14, with a
[116]_ possible history of homosexual activity (see UFGA-8411), has made
[117]‘such an approach. to AMTRUNK/3. -
[119]D. The commitments made to AMICE/27 or which AMICE/27 claims were
[120]- - made to him are a matter of concern to the Station. This is an
[122]¢ ' area over which future misunderstanding or aggravation might easily
[123]develop.
[125]E. The Phase 1 landing point appears highly risky. It is within
[126]five miles of a cruise missile site ‘radar, and.in an area frequently
[128]patrolled by sea. RABEL. Pet |
[130]arene : ; 2 Tack of co: L in the AMTRUNK operation,
[131]poss y of the two operations crossing or targetting on the Same
[132]individual will be present.
[134]3. In examining the strengths of the AMTRUNK operation, the AMTRUNK
[135]group as a whole represents superior agent materiel. T of the
[136]four have been outstanding in training. They appear to have a
[137]number of fairly weil SIScSd SonEaete ST the inside whom they ex-
[138]pect to be able to call on for assistance. Although they have
[139]been out of ,direct touch with a numbex of these contacts for periods
[140]ranging thon. to two years, this is frequently. the case in this type
[141]of operation
[143]’The objective of the operation is worthwhile.
[145]iew and the sevantages and
[147]mee ere rete and planning w
[148]quarters' decision is to continue. with the operation at this Lime, ‘|
[149]operational plans ‘for Phase I and Phase II will be submitted as
[151]formulated. .
[152]‘END OF MESSAGE )
[154]NS.
[155]¢ dy. .
[157]PAGE NO.
[159]: . 3.60" 530 USE Previous EDITION. - SECRET | conrinueD” 2.
[162]jr
[164]CWS
[165]-6 - 33
[167]SALA
[170]6
[172]f
[174]19
[176]Ragoved from Progeot
[177]PE 8D F-49
[178]. Pent 7 Pod:
[180]es Clavsificas’
[182]\ 31 March 1963
[184]an PROJECT AMTRUNK OPERATIONAL REVIEW
[187]STATUS REPORT ON TRAINING AND PROCESSING, 4-31 MARCH.
[189]. The AMTRUNK Team, consisting of AMICE/27, AMICE/14, AMTRUNK/2,
[190]‘and AMTRUNK/3 were safehoused on 4 March 1963 at Safesite #7164 -
[192]on Plantation Key. Andrew S. PARMERS, KUROAR instructor from
[193]headquarters, was already at the training site when the team
[194]was brought there by the two case officers, Irving N. PEGGINS
[195]and Hobart J. VANDEBORN, PARMERS remained at the safesite
[196]until 16 March during which time he conducted training in
[197]Clandestine methods and techniques. This training included
[198]security, cover and compartmentation, clandestine communica-
[199]tions, agent spotting, selection, recruitment and management,
[200]and operational planning and reporting. The training included
[201]group discussion and participation in a series of ‘appropriate
[202]operational situations, several problems, and daily physical
[203]training. During this two week period, either PEGGINS or
[204]VANDEBORN visited the safesite every day, spending an average
[205]of two or three hours with the group in operational dis- |
[206]cussions and processing. During the week of 18 thru 23 March,
[208]‘both case officers spent a majority of the time with the group,
[209]‘debriefing them in detail on their operational contacts, workin
[211]out operational details of their infiltration, and continuing
[212]their training on an informal basis. The week of 25 through
[213]30 March was spent in PM-type training with emphasis on compass
[215]-and map reading, including two night problems, and on weapons
[217]familiarization and firing. During the period under dis-
[218]cussion the AMTRUNK group were all LCFLUTTERED, were assessed
[219]by the KUROAR assessment team, were given an initial series
[221]' of immunizations, were issued clothing, were processed: for
[222]_alias documentation, were processed for disguises, and were
[224]further processed on cover and finance problems. The reé-
[225]sults of the LCFLUTTER examinations were sent to headquarters
[226]under cover of UFGA-8111, on 13 March 1963. Based on DIR ,
[227]26430, no further LCFLUTTER is planned at the present time.
[228]Transmitted as attachment "A" to this dispatch is PARMERS
[229]report on his training of the AMTRUNK group, transmitted as
[230]attachment "B" are the results of the assessments of the
[231]AMTRUNK group, and transmitted as attachment "C" is the
[233]training report for the week of 25 March.
[235]AMTRUNK MISSION OBJECTIVE.
[239]i ENA Sa aes Le
[242]14-00000
[244]fe . : ¢ A secondary and subordinate
[245]i ce terre is to eee climate prevailing among the
[246]populace in Havana for organizing resistance elements capable
[247]of either passive or active sabotage. This secondary mission
[248]is exploratory in nature only, throtigh the first phases of
[249]the project. In order t6 daécomplish the foregoing missions,
[250].the operation Has been split into two initial phases , which
[252]'
[258]will.be Gompartmented from each othér.
[260]the, he black _infiltration of AMTRUNK/2 and 3°01 h_ coast
[261]; of Havana. province. These two individuals ut to go into
[262]Havana fora period of of approxima telyt and then
[264]pe ack in Sy tetvins ‘through ‘the “keys area oe the north coast
[266]of Matanzas. Thése two individuals. will likewise go into
[267]eriod of several weeks and then exfiltrate black:
[269]These two ‘phases are discussed in | detail in following para~
[271]_fi igures in Havana. ‘The following paragraphs discussing these
[272]“phases aré not designed to be operational plans. Detailed
[273]operational plans for each phase will be forwarded as de=
[274]veloped,
[276]; make initial ‘contacts. among.certain select high level military.
[277]A. AMTRUNK Personnel
[278]1" l. , ‘2 is ajgdy year old Cuban Who is mature for his
[279]years, anc eres experienced in eclandéstine opera-
[280]tiéns. He attendedéG@aEn University in Havana for
[282]1
[283]1
[285]two years, majoring “in So¢ial Studies. Prior to Fidel's
[286]takeover A/2 was allied to student elements of the Partido
[287]Autenti¢o which upheld the constitution of 1940, He supported
[288]the revolution against Batista till it became apparent. that
[289]Castro had Gast his lot for a Communist regime. During his
[290]university years from 1959 to 1961 he was actively engaged
[291]in supporting anti=+Castro groups with weapons and materials.
[292]Following thé Playa Giron invasiond great many in the Havana
[293]underground were rolled up but A/2 avoided compromise, He
[294]continued in this | Work through 1961 and finally aeit Cuba
[295]Tm Althotigh A/2.does not consider
[296]elf an he has beén cooperative throucnout
[297]j aie 1é “tS ‘a pensive individual who displays good
[298]. judgement.. His present attitude towards KUBARK appears to
[299]be one of “wait and see" i the meanwhile, he is” con~
[301]ce i, re ac aie ete. ee te ee tne Ter Mae compet i RE a AIP rem og
[304]14-0000
[307]pervererd
[308]i
[310]“quite loyal to rere Ais quick wit is. ‘apbea ling to his
[311]fellow team membérs. He worked undér A/2 in the underground
[312]aS an action type, principally engaging in sabotage. His
[313]underground work began while he was in secondary school
[314]when in 1958 he supported the révolution against Batista,
[315]In late 1960 he sided with the counter=revolutionaries and
[316]began full timé Anti-Castro activities, After the crack
[317]down following the Bay of Pigs invaSion he avoidéd detection
[318]afid continued to engagé in ‘underground activities, Finally
[319]when the si tion bécame hopeless hé left Cuba by air for
[320]Se} 1962. While A/3 has performéd satisfactorily
[321]ing up to date, his performance falls far short
[322]of the other three members. A/3 feels KUBARK should onl _
[324]pe * Fortunately his
[325]role in this ‘operation is comparatively minor and hé appears.
[326]willing to Comply with whatever A/2 decides. Nevértheless,
[327]aboot contre. of. A/3 offers _ problems in the future .
[329]SO B. TAREE
[331]Conduct black infiltration landing at Punta La Jijira
[332]us 3785 I) and establish contact with the farm manager at
[334]2. Through contacts of A/3 obtain transportation for A/2
[335]to Guanaba or Havana,
[337]3. Although not definite, A/3 may remain at his
[338]cao and train assets in maritimé reception and clandestine
[339]“communications. Having compléted this he would thén be ex-
[341]filtrated at Punta Jijira.
[343]4, A/2 will go to Havana and obtain Safehouse and operational
[344]support through his contacts.
[346]5. A/2 will contact and develop two potential assets with
[347]high level connections within the Rebel Army.
[349]6. A/2 Will tYain support ard opérational asséts in ¢landes-
[350]tine communications as well as arrange for transportation for
[351]his exfiltration..
[353]a Exfiltration of A/2 at Punta La Jijira or Puerto Escondido
[354](AMS 3885 II).
[357]14-0000
[359]INFIL-EXFIL PLANS
[361]1. The tentative date for the infiltration of A/2 and 3 at
[362]Punta La Jijira.is 18 May 1963. The infiltrees will make
[363]their way to, isuacherswe farm one kilometer from the coast
[364]and from there A/2 will ‘be provided with tranSportation to ¢go
[365]‘to Guanabo or Havana,
[367]2. The exfiltration of A/3 Will occur three days after his
[368]infiltration, This arrangment, aS yet, is not definite.
[370]3. ‘The exfiltration of A/2 is tentatively Planned for 31
[371]May 1963 at Punta La Jijira or Puerto Escondido. A/3 fééls
[372]that Puerto Escondido would afford a more secure point for
[373]exfiltration but that a reconnaisanéce of the area would beé
[374]necessary before final decision is reached. Prearranged
[375]telegram Signal would indicate his préference.
[377]4, The above dates fall within a favorable moon phasé for
[378]maritimé operations. In addition the infil-éxfil schedulé
[379]will Allow for an éxtra margin beyond the 10 days which A/2
[380]considers the minimum accéptable period of time to make his
[381]contacts..,
[383]OPERATIONAL ASSETS __WITHIN CUBA
[385]ls Following the successful infiltration of A/2 and 3 the
[386]two men will ies ex
[387]PRE ae
[389]ee z
[390]F f KER from’ the point
[391]of infiltration. tact with the manager of
[392]the farm named && a) years of agé,
[393]is married and has an elem ntary school education. He has
[395]_ Avs will depend upon
[397]He was jailed for a "brief period in the past “for counter=
[398]revolutiotiary activities.
[401]14-0000
[403]2.
[405]e, Another
[406]single, Sth g
[407]the form of fi
[408]in the past.
[409]Havana. He owns ‘a Eon EGTEREO sec
[411]of Havana. Subject will be ‘contacted by “A/3 if he needs
[412]t6 be safehoused in Havana,
[414]B. age 21,
[417]THe following assets would bé contacted by A/2 after
[419]arriving in Havana. They will be contacted in thé order
[420]listed, Théir function will be t6 provide safehouses and
[422],A/2 has maintained correspondénce With QfENDEZ
[424]vehicles for A/2,
[426]{ 28 years of age, born in Havana,
[428]A ‘met her when she was a Student at the Universit
[429]of Havana majoring in So¢ial Sciences. Presently she
[430]lives with Her aunt in Havana and A/2 Has maintained cor-
[431]réspondence with her. She has hélped previously in
[432]providing safehousing for the underground. She also has
[434]avana:. GiGdgt has nélped We in. acti cesqnemsam activi-
[435]ties préviousl ‘He has a brother, two daughters and
[436]€@ son now residing in the U.S, His daughters live in'
[438]- New Jersey and were last seen by A/2 about Six months
[440]ago. Subjéct was a member of the Partido Pueblo Cubano:
[441]an anti-Batista group, and was a professor of medrese :
[442]at the University of Havana up until 1961 when he Tre-__
[443]Signed. — is also a close friend of @PSszyEGRIN®
[445]fidante during Castro' s takeover, - @ENDEZ’ has an apart-
[446]ment and two cars and has previously helped A/2 in under-
[447]ground activities. He has a daughter who works for the
[448]government but is not. sympathetic to the regime, The
[449]husband of this daughter, howevet, works. for i
[451]born in Havana, single.
[452]runs a shall private
[453]in Havana. She was ALR" Ss
[457]14-0000
[459]¢ EB AM : ae Fete te) born in Havana, single,
[460]mother “and father “deceased. ‘Shé_i ended the University
[461]of Havana and Villanova fronctgeae
[463]Havana.
[464]lives ing
[466]3. The following two opérational assets will be contactéd by
[467]A/2 after he is saféhousSed in Havana. Their function will be
[468]to spot Army officers disaffected with the Castro Regime.
[470]3 married. Subjéct
[472]r TD in ‘the Rebel Army but is not
[473]presently on active duty. Hé was a friend 6f Castro's
[475]. during the revolution and A/2 claims he still maintains
[477]- some contact With Fidel. Hé also claims (AES has been
[479]working in a limited fashion against Fidel and was
[481]originally associated with thé MRR and Monte C¥isto
[482]groups, €VAES primary interest has beén trying to or=
[483]ganize his friends within, the Rebel Army against Fidel,
[484]A/2 féels@AES is a véity discreet individual who has
[485]not been identified as an anti=Castro organizer by
[486]the G=2, A/2 clainis to be a close friend of 3
[487]trusts him complétely, A/2 saw and talked to°URED in
[488]prior to his flying out of PBRUMEN as a refugee.
[490]age oar 1 GOB sérved in the
[491]According to. A/2,
[493]Cane Scr gos). “Following “the disappearance Of
[494]ore OUR ES was removed from the post and pre=+
[496]sently lives on “an Army pension as well as royalties
[497]from property confiscated by the goverriment. He said
[498]<OUARTE started working against Gastro within the |} MRP
[500]sééretary of the "MRD and became quite involved :
[501]plotting against Fidel, A/2 auee stated that ait was
[503]MRE that he was 3186, a KUBARK agent. “Eventually
[504](QUAREE) was placed on a G-2 suspect list, but according
[505]“to A/2@GERED was able to évade detection. Subject
[506]has goed connections Within the Rebel Army and re-
[507]voOlutionary government, A/2 trusts this individual
[508]and. has ‘Confidence din him as a botential operational
[510]SEP RTE Na See ET OPI egg he rag mee a BE
[512]14-0000
[514]Lae
[516]- c, A/2 ihay also attémpt to contact the f6llowing
[518]Operational asSet if he has an opportunity to make
[519]contact. .
[521]former member of ‘the Partido. Pueblo ‘Cubano. He
[522]fought With Raul Castro in thé Sierra CriStobal. Are
[523]Following the Castro takéover he servéd as @eade Sis
[524]one of thé military zones within Havana province,
[525]Eventually | he was given Lesser assignments | and. A/2
[527]COVER _AND > CoMMNECATTONS
[529]1. Cover —
[531]A/2 will be isstied documentation claiming he is an employee
[533]of a loéGal brewery in Havana. A/3 on the othér hand will bé
[534]issued documentation as a bus driver within the city of Havana.
[535]Both will also be isstied drivers licenses and Additional
[537]items such aS immunization certificates, Cuban receipts, ete,
[538]Thé two men will also be outfitted with diSguises.
[540]“2. Communications
[542]Primary communications Will be established through an SW
[543]system. Both tien will be given SW instruction and will be
[544]issued accommodation addresses in Miami, This instruction
[546]and these addressés in turn will be passed on to the recruited
[547]assets in PBRUMEN for usé as the operation develops. Pre-
[548]arranged signals will also be dévised for usé by the team via
[549]telegram.to indicate their progress and Génfirm their place
[550]and timé of exfiltration. Both mémbérs will also be given an
[551]OWVL System to provide them with quick instructions in case
[553]of an emergency.
[555]OPERATIONAL AND SECURITY EVALUATION
[557]1. The operational aspécts of Phase I portrays a mission which
[558]has Gonsiderable potential but also considérable risk. The
[559]area of infiltration is within five miléS of a cruisé missile
[560]site and its accompanying radar. In addition boat patrols are
[561]kAOWn to work this portion of ‘the coast at frequent intérvals,
[562]‘Once infiltrated the team will not have to travel far before
[563]their ‘first contact. However, A/3 is leary of staying at His
[564]persorarm for any length of time and he does not Want his
[565]‘@atnen to know of his présénce in Cuba. For this réason the
[566]“farm will not be able to sérve as a saféhouse, A/2 plans on
[567]leaving the farm the same day lands. This presents the
[569]problem of what to do-with-A/ On approach is to také A/3
[576]td Guanabo or Havana and safehouse Him. This, however, may
[577]jeopardize the opération becausé A/3 lacks the maturity and
[578]patience nécessary to stay put while A/2 goes about his busi-
[580]‘ness. He may take advantage of his visit to Havana to under=
[582]take a clandestine assigriient on his own. When A/2 and 3
[583]step ashore in Cuba; Control will vanish. Fortunately A/2
[585]-haS a sufficient resource of judgement to ¢6 about his busi=
[587]mess COmpetently. Unfortunately A/3 gives no such indication.,
[588]For this reason an attempt will be made to stéer A/S towards
[589]developing assets around his. Carne: em with maritime
[590]reception capabilities, _
[592]2, A/2, on the other Hand, appears to have a sufficient numbe
[593]of supporting assets to provide for his saféty while in Havana
[594]However, hé has not seen (WAS and WARE for over a year. In
[595]addition both men are presently outside of the Cuban Army
[597]organization and this position may dampen their effectiveness
[599]in rééruiting. within the Army. Station reports ond Teh)
[600]flict with A/2's evaluation of this man. While there is no
[601]evidencé to verify that DUARTE 9 is pro=réegime,. there has been
[602]a récent report on him from rom AMLEO/3 which claims ¢ is ah
[603]opportunist who might work for the highest bidder. B'S
[604]rebuttal to thesé remarks is that @ @UARTH has asS$isted him in
[606]' the past’ and when the chips were down. he continued to aid him
[608]in his underground neh of ga _This still jeaves a question
[610]evaluation. | Both A and A/3 cannot be considered truly se-
[611]curity conscious. While safehotised A/2 wroté a letter to a
[612]contact in Miami which Was to be transmitted by his ¢ase
[613]officer. Thé letter gave ai indication that A/2 waS sSéeking
[614]. contacts in Havana and conveyed the impréssion that a trip
[615]Was in the dfing. A/2 has written several other letters
[617]not séen by his C Os which might have given the same inpres=
[619]3 : freely
[621]aca ae that would take them
[622]first to Miami a and then to Cuba. Once there they would go
[623]fathe z ew, and begin to make contacts. A/3 also
[624]stated that a man hamed QUARTER) would be one of their con-=
[625]tacts. This loosé talk Coupled with A/3's attitude that
[626]KUBARK é6xXists only to serve him makes him 4 tharginal candi-=
[627]daté for this operation. However , if A/3 is exfiltrated
[629]“.three-days after his entry into Cuba, the operation will
[630]“. gain, his usefulness and éliminate somé of the risk he
[632]presents.
[635]3. ' The above evaluation stresses the operational and security
[636]weaknesses in this operation. In contrast to these weaknesses
[637]are the positive considerations of this mission. A/2 has the
[639]intelligence, competence, and confidence to approach and re-
[641]cruit two assets with the potential for developing anti-~regime
[642]operations at a high level within the Cuban Army, The results
[644]‘which these anti~regime activities can accomplish is a matter
[646]: Iv.
[648]for conjecture but it appears that they carry potential.
[649]Nevertheless, if the operation continues, it will bear close
[650]watching in terms of security and control for these factors
[651]will jeopardize the operation as well as KUBARK's position
[652]if not properly contained.
[654]PHASE II |
[655]A. AMTRUNK PERSONNEL
[656]. beeen a)
[658]; from y high class family.
[659]His father, now deceased, was a prominent individual in law
[660]and politics and was at one time a senator. A/27 himself
[662].graduated from law school in Habana and was a practising
[664]lawyer. In 1959 he became legal adviser to Camilio Cienfuegos.
[666]Following the disappearance of Cienfuegos in October 1959,
[668]A/27 began to engage in counter-revolutionary activities,
[669]In May 1961, at which time he‘held the position of Under-
[670]Secretary of Public Works, he felt that his underground
[672]‘activities. had come. to the attention of the government and
[676]he took refuge along with his wife in the Venezuelan Embassy.
[677]He was given safe conduct from the Embassy to PBPRIME in late.
[678]1961. Subject is intelligent, articulate, and highly moti-
[679]vated. He has some experience in counter-revolutionary
[681]activities and has demonstrated an excellent capacity for
[683]learning clandestine techniques. He has a very large ego,
[684]and aristocratic pride, is very sensitive, and is quick to
[686]take offense ie tS Atank to state that he has a low opinion
[687]| of -KUBARK 2 a KUBARK agent and he deeply ren
[688]sents any implication that he is working for KUBARK. He
[690]states that he is working for the overthrow of the sresent
[692]regime in his own country and that he will accept KUBARK aid
[693]and advice but will not accept KUBARK control. His attitude
[694]although not hostile, is frequently critical, and he pre-'
[695]sents a difficult handling problem,
[697]2, AMICE/14 is a 26 year old Cuban citizen who is also a
[699]_ Yaw graduate of the University. of Havana, He has been in-
[701]‘volved much of his adult life in clandestine activities.
[703]: |
[707]Subject arrived by small boat in June 1961 in PBPRIME .He
[709]is highly motivated, is intelligent and objective, and has
[710]a very highly developed security consciousness, developed
[711]from his counter-revolutionary experiences, From January
[712]to July 1961 he made four, bi ogiesiefiltration/exfiltration
[714]trips to and from CubaggagePEPRIiME, and has an excellent
[715]Knowledge of the nortf@premmrenzeas area. He is easy to work
[717]19-628" 7
[719]. ee i re
[722]7 - 10 _
[724]with and has evidenced ‘little of the hostilities or anti-
[725]KUBARK feelings shown by AMICE/27, _ °
[727]3. AMTRUNK/4.. Subject is a GB year old. fisherman from the
[728]area who took refuge in PBPRIME in February 1963.
[729]He had previously assisted A/14 in infils and exfils and will
[731]- be used as a maritime guide.
[733]- INFIL-EXFIL PLANS
[735]TASKS
[737]1. Make preliminary black maritime infiltration by small
[738]boat onto Cinco Leguas Key (AMS Map 4085 III) to contact
[739]individuals who formerly assisted AMICE/14 in infil-exfil
[741]‘operations. - -
[743]2... Through contacts on Cinco Leguas Key, organize a ratline
[744]into the mainland, including making arrangements for trans-
[745]portation into Havana. - 7
[747]3... Through the mechanism established above, move to Havana
[749]'- and obtain safehousing and operational support.
[751]4. Make all necessary arrangements for subsequent exfil-
[752]tration and future infiltrations. —
[754]5. Approach and recruit two-key individuals with contacts
[756]- among important military figures,
[758]6... Establish internal and external communications,
[760]7.. Exfiltrate from Phase II.
[762]It is
[763]and AM
[765]-inco Le
[767]/4-into the « KeyS area on or about
[768]Subjects. will take a small boat with Silent motor
[771]23 April.
[772]nto e Keys area and remain in the area for approximately
[774]three days, during which time they will remain black, keep
[776]the boat hidden in the mangroves, and contact individuals
[778]known to them on Cinco Leguas,: They will make arrangements
[779]with contacts at that point to re-activate contacts of AMICE/14
[780]on the mainland at Casualidad (Map 4085 III, Grid Square 1747)
[781]and contacts in the town of Marti and Cardenas, Plans will be
[782]: Lout at this with these contacts for a second in=
[783]zee >Dthetatter part of May. at which time ANICE
[784]and AMIC will again go into Cinco Leguas and expect to be
[785]‘passed on through these contacts to Havana, Subjects will
[786]exfiltrate by small boat on or about 26 April and will be met
[787]by the parent craft in open water to the north of Cayo Cruz
[788]del Padre (Map sheet 4085 IV). ‘