[1]176-10033-10151 | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
[3]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[4]IDENTIFICATION FORM -
[6]BN
[8]AGENCY :
[11]RECORD SERIES :
[12]AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
[14]RECORD NUMBER
[16]NARA
[18]Church Committee
[20]ORIGINATOR :
[22]FROM :
[24]: Bundy, McGeorge
[26]TITLE :
[30]PAGES :
[32]SUBJECTS :
[34]DOCUMENT TYPE :
[36]: Declassified
[37]RESTRICTIONS :
[39]TO
[41]DATE
[43]CLASSIFICATION
[45]CIA
[46]Bissell
[48]Briefing Paper/Dominican Republic
[49]5
[51]Paper, Textual
[53]CURRENT STATUS :
[55]-DATE OF LAST REVIEW
[58]OPENING CRITERIA : ;
[59]COMMENTS :
[62]SEGHET
[63]BRIEFING PAPER ON THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
[65]I. Situation
[67]Following the break in diplomatic relations in August 1960
[68]U.S./Dominican relations have worsened steadily, and the anti-U. S. sentiment
[69]of the GODR was brought sharply into focus by the appearance of pickets
[70]outside our consulate on 5 January in protest against the OAS vote to
[71]extend trade sanctions against the Dominican Republic. The pickets
[73]‘bore signs condemning the interventionist policy of the U. S. and calling -
[75]for the expulsion of Consul General Dearborn, whom they labeled a spy.
[77]The Dominican radio and press continued to censure President Eisenhower
[79]as being responsible for the present state of affairs, while maintaining
[81]a reserve concerning President Kennedy, apparently adopting a "wait and see"
[82]attitude, although it has previously expressed some reservations regarding
[84]the President's choice of advisers on Latin America.
[86]On 26 Jamary the GODR ordered the expulsion of U. S. Vice Consul
[87]James A. McNamara on the ground that he was mafting derog@tory remarks
[88]about the country; however, it is probable that this expulsion was. in
[89]retaliation and anger over the belief that the U. S. had provided information
[90]to Venezuela on Trujillo's efforts to overthrow or assassinate President
[92]Batencourt.
[94]It is thought by some informed observers that the outcome of the
[95]sugar legislation which comes up for renewal in the U. S. Congress in
[96]March 1961 will be all-important to the future of U. S./Dominican relations.
[97]Some say that the Trujillo government cannot last another six months if ,
[98]they do not get their share of the Cuban windfall sugars and rumors are
[99]circulating in Ciudad Trujillo that if they are deprived of the windfall
[100]the GODR plans to expropriate American properties and terminate U. S.
[101]consular relations.
[103]II Operational Summary
[105]A. General It will be recalled that on 2 January 1961 the
[106]Special Group authorized the Agency to provide dissident exiled Dominican
[107]groups with limited arms and equipment provided their delivery to elements
[108]within the Dominican Republic was effected by Dominicans. Immediately
[109]following this decision we indicated to witting leaders of the VRD
[110](EETANCOURT - FIGUERES - ORNES Group) and the FCR (Internal Dissident
[111]Group withwhom DEARBORN ig in touch) that we were prepared to provide them
[112]a limited supply of arms and equipment provided they developed the
[113]capability to introduce same into the Dominican Republic.
[115]On 27 January Station Caracas was authorized to inform
[117]President BETANCOURT the U. S. is now providing financial support and
[119]technical guidance to VRD activities cirected by Horacio ORNES,
[121]A
[123]SECRET
[127]- SECRET
[131]specifically for ship repairs, recruiting and training crews, locating ;
[132]sites and facilities for future PM activities, strengthening the political
[133]organization of the VRD and propaganda. On 30 January Station Caracas
[135]was authorized to inform BETANCCURT that Headquarters was prepared
[137]to consider providing arms and equipment to any bona fide resistance element
[138]with whom adequate contact can be established. BETANCOURT was to be ,
[139]encouraged to recommend any new individuals or groups he considered useful
[141]to further objectives of the project. Station Caracas reported that President
[142]. BETANCOURT was gratified to receive the above information.
[144]In Headquarters contact with FOR exiled leaders, they disclosed
[145]their plan of action which they.felt could be implemented if they were
[146]provided with arms for 300 men, explosives, and remote control detonation
[147]devices. They also claimed to have a small boat infil-exfil capability.
[149]On the other hand the VRD, while claiming no internal organization, claimed
[151].. a sea and air capability and are the chosen instruments. of President
[153]BETANCOURT and Jose FIGUERES.
[155]B. Frente Civica Revolucionatia (FC)
[157](1) We have recently been in touch with key exiled leaders of
[158]the FOR and they have expressed a willingness to assemble a small cadre
[159]in Puerto Rico. It is contemplated that they will develop maritime
[160]capability, be in touch with their internal counterparts through
[161]W/T facilities, and develop plans for implementing the internal group's
[162]plan of action. In view of their reluctance to deal directly with the
[163]ORNES Group (VRD) and in the interests of security we plan to keep
[164]them compartmented for the time being.
[166](2) Through our Station in Ciudad Trujillo we are attempting
[167]to ascertain the details of the FCR's plan of action and develop a stay~
[168]behind communication capability.
[170]C. Vanguardia Revolucionaria Dominicana (VRD)
[172](1) We are actively supporting the VRD (the ORNES group) in
[173]repairing and outfitting their yacht so as to develop an arms delivery
[174]capability. It is estimated that it will take from 45 to 60 days to complete
[175]this work. Additional time may be needed to recruit and train a crew.
[177](2) Support is also being given to the VRD's propaganda and
[178]organizational activities. A program is being developed with the hope that
[180]the VRD can develop their own contacts and sources of information within
[181]the Dominican Republic.
[183]D. Possibility of Developing a Boycott Capability
[185](1) During the summer of 1960 WH Division made use of Fernando
[186]MUNIZ Silva, Dominican exile in Puerto Rico and at the time head or the
[188]SECRET
[190]i)
[192]eS HE
[193]| | .
[195]Syndicate of Free Dominican Labor in Exile (SLIDE), to organize picketing
[196]activities in San Juan against Ships carrying cargo to or from the
[197]Dominican Republic. The picketing had some success and showed promise of -
[198]becoming a threat to the Dominican economy, but was finally broken up by
[199]the International Longshoremens Association ({LA), at least one officer
[201]of which was reportedly in the pay of Trujillo.
[203](2) Inasmuch as the ILA has recently abrogated its contract
[204]with the Dominican unions under pressure from George Meany it is felt that
[205]now would be a good time to consider resumption of picketing activities. in
[206]San Juan, in the hope that such action might spark similar activities in
[207]other ports. Trujillo has demonstrated an awareness of the importance of
[208]smooth labor relations in foreign ports and it is felt that a blow
[210]_at this time from international labor would do much to bring the
[211].dictator to his knees.
[213](3) It should be noted that the Department of State last summer
[214]disapproved any approach to U. S. unions on this subject. WHD feels
[215]that perhaps this announced policy should now be reviewed in the light of
[216]more recent developments and an attempt be made, through covert channels
[217]if necessary, to build up an international shipping boycott against the
[218]GODR.
[220]III Conclusions
[222](1) In many respects initial talks with FCR and VRD leaders
[223]reveal that they over-estimate their own capabilities. Neither has an
[224]immediate capability to introduce arms into the area or a firm plan of action.
[226]_ (2) That we have indicated to both organizations our willingness
[227]to help has been a boost to their morale and has also precipitated a
[228]noticeable withdrawal from earlier claims of "all we need is arms and a
[229]little help and we can do the job".
[231](3) Recent reports on internal conditions in the Dominican
[232]Republic clearly point out that the country is rapidly approaching a
[233]stage of complete economic paralysis, a situation that has created
[234]feelings of tension and desperation, not only among the opposition
[235]elements but within the ranks of the Trujillo clique itself. While sources
[236]within the middle class express fears of eventual liquidation of that
[237]class by the dictator and his son Ramfis, it is not likely that Trujillo
[238]will move until he lears of the outcome in late March 1961 of congressional
[239]action on the windfall sugar quota. If such action is favorable to .
[240]Trujillo, it is probable that he will contime to rule uneasily for an
[241]indefinite period unless material outside pressure is brought to bear
[243]SECRET
[245]Rea
[247]SELL
[249]ots we
[250]2 “h-
[251]of Y |
[253]against him. If, however, his windfall is taken from him, it is the
[255]firm opinion of this Division that a. violent reaction on his part will
[257]shortly thereafter be felt which will end either with the liquidation of
[258]Trujillo and his cohorts or with a complete roll-up of the internal opposition.
[259]While the organization of delivery capabilities described elsewhere in this
[260]memorandum is proceeding according to schedule, it is now feared that
[262]these capabilities will not be ready for use until the aporopriate time, |
[264]i.e., prior to 1 April, has passed and until there may no longer exist
[265]internal assets with which to deal. WH Division, therefore, recommends
[267]‘that consideration:: be given to the immediate use of sea capabilities
[269]now employed by WH/l to cache the requested arms and other material
[271]on land areas contiguous to the Dominican coast from whence, as informed
[272]FCR elements claim they can do, infiltration of the arms can be carried
[273]cut by members of the internal FCR by the use of fishing vessels.
[275]SECRET