[1]176-10036-10173 | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
[3]« JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[4]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[5]AGENCY : NARA
[6]RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10173
[7]RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
[8]AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
[9]ORIGINATOR : WH
[10]FROM : Bundy
[11]TO : Lodge
[12]TITLE :
[13]DATE : 10/30/1963
[14]PAGES : 4
[15]SUBJECTS :
[16]DOCUMENT TYPE :
[17]CLASSIFICATION :
[18]RESTRICTIONS :
[19]CURRENT STATUS :
[20]DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
[21]OPENING CRITERIA :
[22]COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 201: Vietnam,10/29/63-10/31/63, CIA
[23]Reports. Box 2
[25]rn ‘CAS 7747
[27]SEE LPRITI 7D
[28]VER ST Ku Ug - Bo
[30]‘October 30, 1963
[32]F DOWNGRADED Fo
[34]ALS
[36]hereee
[38]TOP-SECRET
[40]EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR LODGE
[42]' FROM McG. Bundy, White House
[44]1, Our reading your thoughtful 2063 leads us to believe a
[45]significant difference of shading may exist on one crucial point (see _
[46]next para) and on one or two lesser matters eagily clarified,
[48]2. We do not accept as a basis for U. S. policy that we have
[50]. no power to delay or discourage a coup. In your paragraph 12 you say
[52]that if you were convinced that the coup was going to fail you would of
[54]course do everything you could to stop it. We believe that on this same
[56]-basis you should take action to persuade coup leaders to stop or delay
[58]any operation which, in your best judgment, does not clearly give
[60]high prospect of success . We have never considered any betrayal
[62]of generals to Diem, and our 79109 ‘explicitly rejected that course. We
[64]recognize the danger of appearing hostile to generals, but we believe that
[66]our own position should be on as firm ground as possible, hence we cannot
[67]impli€D LN YouUR MESSAGE -
[69]limit ourselves to pr oposition that only conviction of certain failure
[71]justifies intervention. We believe that your standard for inter vention
[73]should be that stated above. |
[75]3. Therefore, if you should conclude that there is not clearly a
[77]high prospect of success, you should communicate this doubt to generals
[79]in a way calculated to persuade them to desist at least until chances are
[81]OR-SECRET EYES ONLY
[83].. _ (oH [Ole
[84]( oo ge i -
[86]- ZOPSECRETEYES ONLY = - 2 -
[87]better. In such a communication you should use the weight of U. S. best
[89]' advice and explicitly reject any implication that we oppose the effort of the
[90]generals because of preference for present regime. We recognize heed to
[91]bear in mind generals' interpretation of U.S. role in 1960 coup attempt, and
[92]your agent should maintain clear distinction between strong and honest advice
[94]given as a friend and any opposition to their objectives.
[96]4, Wath Peapect to money-for Soup-gFOUP:. ou ate-atithorided.tp
[97]ee =F nena} SS OQ
[98]acdisbursements aszyoy"consider sectte..ad-cifective-j——
[100]rr,
[102]4 R. We continue to be deeply interested in up-to-the-minute ‘
[103]assessment of prospecte and are sending this before reply to our CAS 79126.
[104]we Yant continuous exchange latest assessments on this topic.
[106]S.@& To clarify our intent, paragraph 7 of our 79109 is rescinded
[107]and we restate our desires as follows:
[109]a. While you are in Saigon you will be chief of country
[111]team in all circumstances and our only instruction is that we are
[112]sure it will help to have Harkins fully informed at ali stages and to
[113]‘use advice from both him and Smith in framing guidance for coup
[114]contacts and assessment. We continue to be concerned that neither
[115]Conein nor any other reporting source is getting the clarity we would
[116]like with respect to alignment of forces and level of determination
[117]among generals. |
[119]be “When you leave Saigon and before there is a coup, Truehart
[121]“will be chief of the country term. Our only modification of |
[123]existing procedures is that in this circumstance we wish
[125]TOP-SECRET EYES ONLY -3- 10/30/63
[127]all instruction to Conein to be conducted in immediate
[128]consultation with Harkins and Smith so that all three know
[129]what is said to Conein, Any disagreement among the three on
[130]such instructions should be reported to Washington and held
[131]for our resolutionwhen time permits.
[133]Ce If you have left and a coup occurs, we believe
[134]that emergency situation requires, pending your return, that
[135]direction of country team be vested in most senior officer with
[136]experience of military decisions, and that officer in our view
[137]is Harkins, We do not repeat not intend that this switch in final
[138]responsibility should be publicized in any way, and Harkins will of
[139]course be guided in basic posture by our instructions, which follow
[140]in paragraph t. Thus we do not believe that this switch will have
[141]the effect suggested in your paragraph 8,
[143]é. This paragraph contains our present standing instructions
[144]for U. S. posture in the event of a coup.
[146]a. U. S. authorities will reject appeals for direct
[147]intervention from either side, and U,S, -controlled aircraft and .
[148]other resources will not be committed between the battle lines
[149]or in support of either side, without authorization from Washington,
[151]b. In event of indecisive contest, U. S, authorities may
[153]in their discretion agree to perform any acts agreeable to both sides,
[155]POR-SECRET EYES ONLY
[157]0G
[159]- a 7
[161]ob 10a
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[164]such as removal of key personalities or relay of information.
[165]In such actions, however, Ue Ss. authorities will strenuously avoid
[166]appearance of pressure on either side. It is not in the interest
[167]- of USG to be or appear to be either instrument of existing
[168]government or instrument of coup,
[169]c. In the event. of imminent or actual failure of coup,
[170]U. 5. authorities may afford asylum in their discretion to those
[171]to whom there is any express or implied obligation of this sort.
[172]We believe however that in such a case it would be in our interest
[173]and probably in interest of those seeking asylum that they seek
[174]protection of other Embassies in addition to our own, This point
[175]should be made strongly if need arises.
[176]' d, But once a coup under responsible leadership has |
[177]begun, and within these restrictions, itis. in the interest of the U.S.
[178]: Government that it should succeed.,.
[179]76. We have your message about return to Washington and =
[181]GU paw bis comment |
[182]im, we suggest that #& be kept
[184]as low-key and quiet as possible, and we also urge that if possible
[186]you keep open the exact time of your departure. We are strongly
[188]sensitive to ereat disadvantage of having you out of Saigon if this
[190]should turn out to be a-week of decision, and if it can be avoided.
[192]we would prefer not to see you pinned to a fixed hour of departure now,
[193]HHH
[197]. my .
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