[1]198-10004-10076
[3]| 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
[5]JFK Assassination System
[6]Identification Form
[8]Date:
[10]6/24/201
[12]AGENCY :
[13]RECORD NUMBER :
[15]RECORD SERIES :
[17]AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
[19]ORIGINATOR :
[20]FROM:
[21]TO:
[23]TITLE :
[25]DATE:
[27]PAGES:
[29]SUBJECTS :
[31]DOCUMENT TYPE :
[32]CLASSIFICATION :
[33]RESTRICTIONS :
[34]CURRENT STATUS :
[35]DATE OF LAST REVIEW :
[37]OPENING CRITERIA :
[39]COMMENTS :
[43]HY 50955 Docld: 32276061
[45]Agency Information,
[46]ARMY
[47]198-10004-10076
[49]CALIFANO PAPERS
[51]Document Information
[53]ARMY
[54]JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR.
[56]00/00/1963
[57]123
[59]EXAMINATION OF PRINCIPAL SOURCES OF POLICY AND
[61]CONTINGENCY PLANNING ON CUBA
[62]NATIONAL SECURITY ACTIONS ON CUBA
[64]U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE CUBAN BRIGADE
[66]PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[67]Secret
[69]1B; IC
[71]Redact
[73]07/24/1997
[75]Califano Papers, Box 6, Folder 6. Indexed collection of CIA, DOD, DOS, and NSC reports.
[77]J TEK Acsossrcten Local
[79]oct of the Army EO 13596
[80]Declassify Exclude © Exempt
[82]Review Date By
[86]Page 1
[88]A
[91]me . a
[92]. apes ‘ t, )
[94]: pe v => f
[96]NO. .SUBJECT . a . . DATE
[98]i CLA Report No. CS DB-3/652, 924 9 . 17 Jan 63
[99](SECRET -NOFORN) oo
[101]2 «Memo fr McGeorge Bundy to NSC Exec: Comm(C) 22 Jan 63
[103]_w/6Incls: 1(S); 2(TS);3(S); 4(S); 5(S) and 6(S)
[105]3 Drft Memo for NSC Exec Comm, subj: US Policy 23 Jan 63
[106]Towards Cuba(TOP SECRET) (in dupe).
[108]4 .~ Memo for NSC Exec Comm, subj as above(TOP SECRET) 23 Jan 63
[110]5 Memo for NSC Exec (Gomi, subj as’ above, from 23 Jan 63.
[112]DeD Rep on ICCC (TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE) _
[113]6 DepSecDef ltr to Mr Vance, subj: US Policy Towards 23 Jan 63
[114]Cuba; Cy 2:of 6, Control #559 (TOP SECRET) w/l
[115]Incl, Coord of Cuban. Affairs Memo for NSC Exec Comm,
[116]. Subj: US Policy Toward Cuba(TOP SECRET)
[118]7 Dept of State Memo for Mr Bundy, subj: Papers for . 24 Jan 63
[119]NSC Exec Comm Mtg, 25 Jan.63.(TOP SECRET)
[121]8 National Security Actions on Cuba (Pending and _, Undtd
[122], Closed) (TOP SECRET) — :
[124]9 ; Memo to Mr Cottrell from Mr. Ford, subj: Examina- 4 Feb 63
[126]_ tion of Principal Sources of. Policy and Contingency
[127]_ Planning on Cuba (TOP SECRET- -SENSITIVE)
[129]HW 50955 Docld: 32276061 Page 2
[131]HY 50955 Docld: 322776061 Page 3 .
[135]February 4, 1963
[137]Peo +: 8/P ~ Jebn @. Pord
[139]Examinetion of Epping Sources ot * Folley
[141]z have yeviewsd the aein seurese of poldey on Guba. The problem
[143]ao ZT define it as follows:
[144]the Proble
[146]Peier te the establishnen
[147]lag Comaittes of eaban a Affeixe, | ane?
[149]. werk bec been done on Gaba,
[151]beth in the policy and eoutingerey fields. The purpose of the
[152]curvent exercige ig te review end identify the mie aources of
[153]sueh policy ami cootingency planning im en effert te deternine
[154]if any of the work previaiely doae will be ef value te the
[155]efiieers of your eommlctes af we go forward with implementation
[156]of the newly stated
[158]Cuban policy and ecbjestives.
[160]The principe! soureas of policy aad contingency plaming
[161]which wey of my aot be of value te the work of your committes ere
[162]ag follows:
[164]i. The dstiomal Security éotion Hemorendea emanating
[165]from the Waite Howes
[167]2. ‘the Actions of the Hetieaal Security Ceunci1
[168]3. The Bagie Bational gacurdty Policy o2@ the 0.2.
[169](eeu awaiting finel stages of forasl clearance
[170]before presentation te Netiossal Sacurity Council).
[171]& The Records
[173]HY 50955 Docld: 322776061 Page 4
[175]ne of the Interdepartmental Coordinet-
[177]Do
[181]8C deeieion or &
[183]4, The Reterde of Action of the Recentive Gommittee
[184]of the Setional Security Council as they pectain
[186]3. The Seporte of the dub-Gomilateae of EXGR -
[187]éuring the Guben Uriede.
[189]& The Resolutions of the Orgauizetion of American
[190]States and the Punta del Este Conference.
[192]7. Bublic Stetesante of Government Officials, in
[193]Paveiculer Proce Conference of President Zennedy
[194]of September 13, 1962.
[196]i &. Meeting of Secretary Rock with Yoredgn Ministera
[197]: ef Latin Awerice during Guben Orisis.
[199]%. Recently Approved Rew Palley Statement and
[200]Objectives es Drewa Up by the Interdepartwental
[201]Gomaltrae of Guban Agiaixs.
[203]10. Guben Guideliaca Paper.
[204](& guidelines paper es auch doos not axlat on
[205]Cubs an te the otae in a majority af other
[206]aountries. >
[208]There are well over eight volumes of material concerned with
[209]Gaba, pexrtiewlarly thet generated du
[210]thie review 1a nearing completion, aud I am eagrevating particular
[211]teportes which may be of value bo the eembers sf your comaitece
[212]#9 we go fotward with implementation of tae new policy and
[213]objectives. Im the attached decumentatium, I heve sagregated —
[214]thoge National Seewrity Council deciztons and Batdodel Security
[215]Ssetion Nenorsads ubtoh ave carried as ponding or clesed in the
[217]of ©. partment of Seta, Whete ection on a vartievlar
[219]th SaP hee been tranefarved fo ZKOOM, section
[220]reapousibility ot these decisions would epeear aed te be within
[221]the purview of your Courdinating Committees. Trom my review
[223]to date,
[225]HY 50955 Docld: 322776061 Page 5
[227]the recent Getcber crisis.
[230]. €@ date, 12 appedig Chat all of these éeeielons call for action
[231]whieh hove already been conaidered by your Gommittes. You @Lil
[233]note that ig séae iaatences gotion veegonaibilicy an aa REC
[235]decioign or RASAM bes bean trimeferrved to the Seoeeiel Group
[238]List of Pending anal Close
[240]HY 40955 Docld: 322776061 Page 6
[243]g
[245]C)
[247]|
[248]|
[249]|
[251]Page Tf
[253]32276061
[255]HY 40955 Dacld
[257]HY 450955 Dacld: 32276061
[259]Page 6
[262]483 NSC 24228
[263]5/5/64
[265]483 NSC 24224
[266]5/5/61
[268]483 NSC 24226
[271]433 NSC 2422¢
[274]453 HSC 24221
[275]5/5/61
[277]483 NSC 2422
[278]3/3/61
[280]HY 450955 Docld: 322776061 Page 9
[282]Agreed that US policy toward —
[283]Gube should eim at the downfall
[284]of Castee regime.
[286]Status
[288](Pending)
[289]According te
[290]files, out of
[291]this NSC direct-—
[292]ive grew a policy
[293]paper, to be ;
[294]hendled different!
[296]guidelines papers
[298]oa each country.
[300]ag @f 9/4/o2, uhite Beuse
[302]was ingerned that aetion on this
[304]HSC¢ divective would be reportad
[305]im eompliance with NSAM 181
[306]which transferred certaia Néc &
[307]HASAN actions to apecial group
[308]{Alexis Johazen) .
[310]Importance President
[311]attaches to obtaining,
[312]adequate iatelligence
[313]on Cuban pilitery
[314]g¢apabilicies.
[316]Importesce Prealdent
[317]attaches to publication
[319]ie free world prese of
[320]termeriet ectioens of
[322]Gsetre regime, ete. and
[324]te possible pelitice] ection
[325]to end current texroz.
[327]Reletions with Cuban
[328]Revolutionary Council
[329]should be improved.
[331]Cubsen vefagees to be given
[332]wefugea atatua; refugees in
[333]Wiaml to be relocated;
[334]vetagees to be eligible te
[335]apply for teevel privileges.
[337]Initiation of negotiations
[338]te enlarge willingness of
[340]other Aneglean states to
[342]join in ackfon ageinst Castro,
[344]setion to be
[346](Pending)
[348]veported in
[349]coupliance with _
[350]NASAM 181 |
[351](Jehusen channel)
[353](Pending)
[354]Action trang~
[355]ferred to EXCOM
[357]_ (Pending)
[358]Setion trance
[359]ferred to EXCON
[361](Pending)
[362]Action trang+
[363]fevred to EXCOM
[365](Pemiias)
[366]Section trang-
[367]ferred to EXCOM
[370]Substesce Status
[372]&B3 NSC 24622m USTA #211 expand 1 (Pending)
[374]8/3/64 ptogron, but not initiate Action trans-
[376]. éleetzonie warfare againet ferred to
[377]Caetee;, means ef propaganda Jebnson channel.
[378]should be madeoyallable Per MASAM
[379]to nemelS groupe. €iGi.
[381]463 BSE 24228 US military officers under . (Cleved}
[382]5/5/61 general guideace te be eéupleted aetion
[383]prepared by Dept of State, ag of 11/28/61.
[384]would diseuse Cagtre thresc :
[385]£o ahh bids with bee Bie orfivers.
[386]463 USC 24220 Dept of State should prepare (Closed)
[387]5/8/61 a report on a possible new $/P paper
[389]justeiank & epee tor effective “eosdible new
[390]ti~eoumunier a Beads for Antie«:
[391]Communist Action"
[393]7/28/61
[394]483 NS@ 2422p Rebert Noodmard’s assumption Clesed.,
[395](5/3/63 of vesponsibilicy of Task Force
[396]en Cuba on apnoenceneat of
[397]appointment.
[398]683 MSG 24226 Re US milleary intervention Closed.
[399]5/5/61 . wow. Do sothing which would
[400]foveclese posedbliiey allitary
[401]intervention in future.
[402]483 HSC 2422¢ He naval bleckade ox alewar Closed.
[403]5/3/64 ageiaee Cuba,
[404]683 MSC 24232 Detailed study te be aade Slesed.
[405]5/3/61 by CIA with ether Departments Bissell memo to
[406]ef possible weeknesses and éehilies
[407]vulnerabilities in eleneats 11/21/61 we:
[408]which control Cuba. "Sitnation and
[409]Preapeecte in
[410]Cabe"by Shermen
[411]. Rent 11/3/61.
[412]Gim SECRET
[414]HY 450955 Docld: 322776061 Page 10
[416]SS LS a a
[419]483 NSO 2422h
[420]5/5/62
[422]&63 NEC 24224
[423]5/5/61 .
[425]483 NSC 24291
[426]5/3/61
[428]MASAN 196
[429]10/2/62
[431]10/3/61
[433]3/44/62
[434]BA HAGAM G16
[436]8/26/62
[438]HY 450955 Docld:32276061 Page 11
[440]Glesad,
[441]DEY rereumended
[442]te Pree ocra kt
[444]Ho separate Cuban military
[445]forces should be orgenized.
[446]ie 0.3. Guben natie
[448]be encourcged enlist in OS pregran be
[449]Avwed Porees. terminsted
[450]6/30/62 dee to -
[452]modéat resulta. —
[454]ho iamedlate trade embargo
[455]én Cuba.
[457]Closed,
[458]with Preaident's
[460]éeclering otal euberge on trade
[461]with gba with exception
[462]nedieina ang feed on fueontitarian
[464]grounds .
[466]Allience for Pr
[467]strengthened,
[469]go Maite Beuse.
[471]Polley Toward non-ble
[472]ships Ried an trade (Action
[473]& peopases to
[474]take with vegetd to
[476]sbhipplag te Cubs.)
[478]Contingeacy Plenmiag for
[479]Cobs.
[481]US Government aust heve wendy
[482]4@ Waite Paper en Cuba and be
[483]Seedy to give aseletenme to
[484]Cuban Poteliote in similar
[485]effort.
[487]yea only « Lindted Dletrib=
[489]wbion. feporting te be through
[491]another chaanél and handled —
[492]petconally by Beputy USecy
[494]Jobascn _fundexatond this. authorised vesponse
[495]DE, 3 pening ESC Actions, 2
[499]Closed,
[500]Weekly report
[501]now trom ALD
[503]Pending.
[504]Action tverne~
[505]eeread ta
[507]Pending
[508]Action trane-
[509]fervad te .
[510]Jebnsen cheomel,
[512]Closed,
[513]Paper prepared
[514]and translated:
[516]“The Castro
[517]Regime ie Ceba™
[519]| BAGSMs thera
[521]CUBA HASAM 196
[522]40/22/82
[523]CUBA NAgAM 208
[525]42/6/62
[527]1/8/63
[529]HY 40955 Dacld: 32276061
[531]A RR TST a ae oe a TorTe TOPO NE A RE SOT NN
[533]Establishment of NSC Executive Closed,
[534]Committee .
[536]Cuba Gverflights. (This Report Submitted.
[538]Pxevidential directive
[540]egproved aon attached
[542]Guidelines for the Planning
[544]of Cuban Qverflights, and
[545]wequested CLA te come up with
[547]en estimate of the adequacy of
[549]such « ayetes of intelligence
[550]eellection te weet the eriteria
[552]set forth, om assumptian it ia
[553]supplemented by energetic collection
[554]of informetion by all other evaileble
[555]seana.)
[557]interdepartuental Orgenization Clesed.
[558]of Cuban Afiaixe - with
[560]cespousibliity yasted ta «
[562]Coordinator of Cuban affairs
[564]Le Department of State,
[566]Page 12
[568]4
[571]4 a
[572]a ond
[574]lo ne ~ ee ee et em - Poor che es 2 Ane = = Z
[575]HY 40955 Docld: 322776061 Page 13 . :
[578]“el
[580]Loe
[584]TOP_SECRET ATTACHMENTS
[585]DEPARTMENT OF STATE
[587]January 24, 1963
[589]MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORCE BUNDY
[590]THE WHITE HOUSE
[592]Subject: Papers for NSC Executive Committee
[593]Meeting, January 25 at 4:00 p.m.
[595]Attached are two revised papers "Summary. of
[596]Coordinator's Recommendations" and "United States °
[597]Policy Toward Cuba" which are being transmitted to -. -
[598]members of the NSC Executive Committee for considera-
[599]tion at the meeting of the Committee on Friday,
[600]January 25 at 4:00 p.m. Also attached is a new page 8
[601]‘for, the paper entitled “United States Policy Toward. ~
[602]the Cuban Brigade." The other two papers transmitted
[603]on January 22 remain unchanged and will also be. con-
[604]sidered at the Friday meeting. They are"United States:
[605]Policy in Cuba in the Organization of American States”
[606]and "Current Problems Concerning Cuba."
[608]LY, a ee
[609]Mele
[610]ne (a
[612]Executive Secyétariat
[614]Attachments:
[616]As stated.
[617]Copy No. .
[619]TOP SECRET ATTACHMENTS
[621]HW 50955 Docld:32276061 Page 14
[624]\ G a oo . @
[625]f
[627]@@m SECRET
[629]MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL" S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
[631](Prepared for the Meeting of Friday, January 25, 1963, 4 p.m.)
[633]FROM : _ Coordinator of Cuban Affairs
[635]SUBJECT: — United States Policy Toward Cuba
[637]United States Policy
[639]On November 20, the President set forth the broad guide-
[640]Lines of United States policy with respect to Cuba in _ the
[641]following words:
[643]"As for our part, if all offensive weapons systems are
[644]removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in
[645]the future, under adequate verification and safeguards,
[646]and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive
[647]communist purposes, there will be peace in the
[649]_Caribbean. And, as I said in September, ‘we shall
[650]neither initiate nor permit aggression in this
[651]hemisphere. ' ;
[653]“We will not, of course, abandon the political,
[654]economic and other efforts of this hemisphere to halt
[655]subversion from Cuba, nor our purpose and hope that
[656]the Cuban people shall some day be truly free. But
[657]these policies are very different from any intent to
[658]launch a military invasion of the island.”
[662]HW 50955 Docld:32276061 Page 15
[664]@mgm SECRET
[668]Objectives
[670]Accordingly, the objectives of United States
[671]policy with respect to Cuba are:
[673]1. Protecting the security of the United States
[674]and the other states of the Organization of
[675]American States (OAS) by assuring that
[676]offensive weapons are not reintroduced into
[677]Cuba;
[679]2. Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;
[681]3. Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive
[682]military action against other Caribbean states;
[684]‘4, Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime
[685]to direct and support subversion and insurrection
[686]within the other Hemisphere states; ee
[688]“ §. .Encouraging and supporting any developments | within
[689]Cuba that offer the possibility of sivoteing
[690]. the. Cuban Government from its support
[691]‘Soviet Communist purposes; . MP
[693]6. Encouraging and supporting any developments
[694]within Cuba that offer the possibility of
[695]replacing the Cuban Government with a regime
[696]that would break with the Sino-Soviet Bloc,
[697]it being understood that our ultimate...
[698]objective. : is replacement of the regime “by
[699]one’ fully compatible with the goals of the
[700]United States;
[702]‘Qap SECRET
[704]HW 50955 Docld: 32276061 Page 16
[706]10.
[708]@@m SECRET
[712]Maximizing the cost to the Soviet Union of
[713]supporting the Castro regime;
[715]Maximizing the political isolation of the
[716]Castro regime from other free world states,
[717]and especially from states of the OAS.
[718]Whenever possible, U. S. actions against Cuba
[719]should be multilateral, preferably based upon
[720]the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact)
[721]or on resolutions adopted by the Crganization
[722]of American States. The newly-won hemispheric
[723]solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be
[724]jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of marginal
[725]value and which might split the hemisphere;
[727]Being prepared to meet, with the employment of
[728]appropriate U. S. combat elements and/or
[729]logistical support, the wide variety of
[730]military contingencies that may arise from
[731]pursuit of the foregoing objectives; and
[733]Producing comprehensive intelligence related
[734]to the above objectives.
[736]Supporting Actions
[738]HY 50955 Docld: 32276061
[740]A.
[742]To achieve the foregoing objectives, the
[744]U. S. Government will be prepared to increase
[746]the political economic, psychological and
[747]military pressures, as appropriate opportunities
[748]present themselves or can be created. The
[750]actions listed below are those requiring immediate
[751]approval and would be initiated in the sequence
[752]set forth below. Recommendations for further
[754]SECRET
[756]Page i7
[758]on _ SECRET
[761]actions based upon the re-examination of
[762]existing programs and upon the development
[763]of new programs related to the foregoing
[764]objectives will be forthcoming. :
[766]1. In addition to current covert program, such
[767]as intelligencé collection, recruitment of
[768]Cuban officials as agents, radio broadcasts,
[769]support of the Cuban Revolutionary Council(CRC)
[770]and other exile group activities and infil-
[771]tration of propaganda materials:
[773]a. Intensify covert collection
[774]of intelligence within Cuba, ‘especially
[775]within the regime;
[777]b. Support the efforts of certain Cuban
[778]exiles, who are associated with |
[779]the original aims of the 26 of July
[780]Movement and who believe that the
[781]Castro regime.can be overthrown from
[782]within in order. that they may:
[783]1) cause a split in:the leadership
[784]of the regime at the national or
[785]provincial levels; and 2) create a _
[786]political base of popular opposition ~
[787]to the regime; and, 3) secure
[788]intelligence;
[790]c. Assist Cuban exiles in developing a
[791]capability to Launch balloons carrying
[792]leaflets and other propaganda materials
[794]_ from international waters into Cuba.
[795]. Launch propaganda balloons. after an
[796]“operational capability has been
[797]established.
[799]qm SECRET
[801]HY 50955 Docld: 32276061 Page 16
[803]HG 50955 Docld: 32276061 Page 19
[805]SECRET |
[809]With respect to the actions listed below,
[810]the results of Mr. Donovan's imminent
[811]negotiations with Fidel Castro for freeing
[812]the 20-odd American prisoners should first
[813]be ascertained, If these actions were taken
[814]before the conclusion of the negotiations
[815]they could jeopardize the release of the
[816]Americans.
[818]If these negotiations fail, or when the
[819]prisoners are recovered, proceed on the
[820]following timetable:
[822]Inform NATO and OAS twelve hours in advance
[824]of the proclamation of the four point _
[825]shipping orders. (The proclamation calls for
[826]the orders to go into effect in five days).
[827]These orders:
[829]a. Close United States ports to all
[830]vessels of a country whose vessels
[831]engage in carrying arms to Cuba;
[833]b. Close United States ports to any ship
[834]which has carried goods in the Bloc-
[835]Cuba trade within 120 days of the time
[836]it. seeks to enter a United States port;
[838]c. Prohibit all United States flag ships
[839]and all ships owned by United States
[840]nationals or residents from entering
[841]any ports of Cuba and from carrying
[842]any goods bound to or from Cuba; and
[844]GP SECRET
[846]HY 50955 Docld: 32276061
[848]Page 20
[850]te SECRET
[854]d. Prohibit any cargo sponsored by any
[855]department of the United States from
[856]being shipped on vessels owned or
[857]controlled by persons who own or
[858]control vessels engaged in the trade
[859]between Cuba and the Soviet Bloc.
[861]At the termination of the U. S. Chiefs of
[862]Mission Conference - January 20-30, or at
[864]a later date dependent on the Donovan
[865]mission, Assistant Secretary Martin, or
[866]another representative of the President
[867]will visit the Presidents of Chile, Mexico
[868]and Brazil to convey to them the importance
[869]President Kennedy attaches to maintaining
[870]hemispheric solidarity by their supporting
[871]the following resolutions:
[873]a. An OAS resolution condemning Cuba for
[874]its actions which continue to endanger
[875]the peace, deploring refusal to allow
[876]inspection, condemning the presence of
[877]Soviet troops, recommending continued
[878]surveillance and continued vigilance
[879]against subversive activities, and
[880]terminating the invocation of the Rio
[881]Treaty on the missile crisis, together
[882]with
[884]b. An OAS resolution which would
[885]recommend 1) extension of arms embargo
[886]to all items of trade except food and
[887]medicine (fall back position: extension
[888]of arms embargo to all strategic items);
[890]@@G SECRET
[892]HY 50955 Docld: 32276061
[894]Page 271
[896]ina SECRET.
[898]2) prohibition of ships of OAS
[899]member states from transportating
[900]embargoed ‘items and deny uSse-of '
[901]ports:to ships in Bloc-Cuba trade;
[903]3)* denial of Soviet over-flights and
[904]transit rights for flights to Cuba; _
[905]and 4): a.call on other states’ to mee
[906]take. similar action. ¢
[908]After obtaining the 1 maximum possible
[909]support of the key countries of Mexico,
[910]Chile and Brazil, the other OAS
[912]members will be approached in Washington
[913]and in their respective capitals,
[914]simultaneously. It should be possible
[915]for this corisultation and OAS action on
[916]the resolutions to be completed within
[917]ten days. Prior to formal COAS approval
[918]of the resolutions, we will inform our’
[919]NATO allies of the > impending OAS action.
[921]At the first NATO: meeting after ‘formal °
[923]OAS action on the resolutions, we will
[924]request that NATO include Cuba on the ;
[925]list of countries to which shipment °
[927]of. €OCOM list (strategic). items > Prohibited.
[929]After | ‘WATO decision on our cocom request’
[930]we will seek to get epreement from Free
[931]World industrial nations to prevent
[932]shipping of critical spare parts and
[933]equipment to Cuba, ‘not on the COCOM list.
[935]Sos
[937]In addition to the four point shipping
[939]resolutions, and action under Section
[941]107 of the Foreign Assistance Act, continue
[942]to press Free World nations to keep their
[943]shipping < out of: Blac- Cuba trade.
[945]eee SECRET
[947]= SECRET
[951]B. Contipency Planning
[953]New opportunities for accomplishing our
[954]objectives may arise either as a result of Bloc
[955]action in other parts of the world; as a result
[956]of aggressive moves (or isolated hostile actions)
[957]by the Castro-Communist regime itself; or as a
[958]result of uprisings or internal conflict within
[959]Cuba.
[961]Our contingency planning, which will be
[962]undertaken immediately, should include preparations
[963]for increased multilateral and/or bilateral ,
[964]political and economic measures, large scale use of
[965]Cubans who are now inside Cuba; more extensive
[966]air activity including both high and low level
[967]flights primarily directed toward surveillance
[968]and collection of intelligence, and which may also
[969]have the effect of embarrassing the Castro
[970]government and keeping the Castro forces on ,
[971]continual alert; retaliatory measures, as
[972]appropriate, including the imposition of a
[973]POL blockade; harrassment of Cuban officials in
[974]other countries; severance of communic ations
[975]to Cuba; major acts of sabotage on shipping
[976]destined for Cuba and on key installations to
[977]Cuba; intensive naval patrols; anc, ultimately,
[978]the use of U. S. military force. To the extent
[979]feasible, U. S. military forces employed against
[980]Cuba should be accompanied by U. 8. militarily-
[981]trained free Cubans and by the armed forces of
[982]those Latin American nations desirous of
[983]participating in the U. S. effort.
[985]@@8 SECRET
[987]HY 50955 Docld: 32276061 .Page 22
[989]SECRET =
[993]Our programs should be designed to encourage
[994]the Brigade members to melt back into the exile
[995]community and engage in constructive pursuits
[996]pending the liberation of Cuba. We should offer
[997]them some special assistance but not to the extent
[998]that they become a perpetual privileged class
[999]within the community, Presidential action on their
[1000]behalf would single them out unnecessarily.
[1002]SECRET
[1004]HY 50955 Doclad: 32276061 Page 23
[1006]MEMORANDUM FOR THE. NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
[1007](Prepared for the Meeting of Friday, January 25, 1753, 10 a.m.)
[1009]i
[1011]FROM: Coordinator of Cuban Affairs
[1012]SUBJECT: Summary of Coordinator's Recommendations
[1014]. \
[1015]1.
[1017]U. S.. Policy Objectives
[1018]--«* The following are the objectives of the U. S. with
[1019]respect to Cuba: ,
[1021]a. Protecting the security of the United States
[1022]and the.other states of the Organization of
[1023]American States by assuring that offensive
[1024]weapons are not reintroduced into Cuba;
[1026]b. Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;
[1028]c. Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive
[1029]military action against other Caribbean states;
[1031]d, Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime
[1032]to direct and support subversion and insurrection
[1033]within the other OAS states; _ oo
[1035]e. Encouraging and supporting any developments
[1036]within Cuba that offer the possibility of
[1037]divorcing the Cuban Government from its
[1038]support of Sino-Soviet Communist purposes,
[1040]f. Encouraging and supporting any developments.
[1041]within Cuba that offer the possibility of
[1042]replacing the Cuban Government with a regime
[1043]‘that would break with the Sino-Soviet Bloc, it
[1045](SECRET
[1047]HY 50955 Docld: 32276061 Page 24
[1049]j.
[1051]SECRET
[1055]being understood that cur ultimate objective
[1056]is replacement of the regime by one fully
[1057]compatible with the goals of the United States;
[1059]Maximizing the cost to the Soviet Union of
[1060]supporting the Castro regime;
[1062]Maximizing the politicai isolation of the
[1064]Castro regime from otner Free World states,
[1066]and especially from states of the OAS. When-
[1067]ever possible, U. S. actions against Cuba should
[1068]be multilateral, preferably based upon the
[1069]Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) or on
[1070]resolutions adopted. by the Crganization of
[1071]American States. The newly-won hemispheric
[1072]solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be
[1073]jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of marginal
[1074]value and which mighc splic the hemisphere;
[1076]Being prepared to meet, with the employment
[1077]of appropriate U. S. combat elements and/or
[1078]logistical support, the wide variety of
[1079]military contingencies that may arise from
[1080]pursuit of the foregoing objectives; and
[1082]Producing comprehensive intelligence related
[1083]to the above objectives.
[1085]2. Supvorting Actions
[1087]Actions .in support of these objectives and their
[1088]time sequence are set forth in the attached paper
[1089]entitled "U..S. Policy Toward Cuba." They include the
[1090]four point shipping regulations, OAS sanctions, NATO
[1092]HY 50955 Doclda: 32276061
[1094]SECRET RET
[1096]Page 25
[1098]SECRET
[1102]action to include Cuba on the COCOM list, and approaches
[1103]to Free World industrial nations to eliminate sale and
[1104]shipment of critical items from their Cuban trade.
[1106]Existing programs will be reviewed and further
[1107]recommendations made as necessary. Planning for the
[1108]variety of contingencies related to Cuba will be undertaken
[1109]at once, , ,
[1111]In addition to current covert programs sich as
[1112]intelligence collection, recruitment of Cuban officials,
[1113]support of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) and
[1114]other. exile activities, infiltration of propaganda
[1115]materials, and radio broadcasts, the following are.
[1116]recommended for approval and immediate initiation:
[1118]a. intensified covert collection of intelligence
[1119]within Cuba, especially within the regime;
[1121]b. support of Cuban exiles who are seeking to
[1122]return the 26 of July Movement to its
[1123]original aims.
[1125]NOTE: It should be noted that approval of the
[1126]foregoing actions may impair our ability
[1127]-to.accomplish objective b. (Removal of
[1128]remaining Soviet forces from Cuba) because
[1130]_ taking these actions could provide the
[1131]U.S.S.R. with rationale for maintaining
[1132]its forces in Cuba. Nevertheless, approval
[1133]of the foregoing actions is recommended.
[1135]3. Suban BELEaes
[1137]Brigade leaders should be induced to accept a
[1138]specially tailored civilian and military program for
[1139]Brigade members.
[1141]SECRET
[1144]HW 50955 Docld: 322776061 Page 26
[1146]SECRET
[1150]The Brigade should be disbanded as a military unit
[1151]and individual members urged to accept civilian training
[1152]or to enlist in the existing U. S. military program
[1153]for Cubans and join a Brigade reserve unit thereafter.
[1154]Our moral obligation would be discharged tc the Brigade
[1155]members and creation of a privileged class in the exile
[1156]community would be avoided.
[1158]HY 50955 Docld: 32276061 Page 27
[1160]HY 450955 Dacld: 32276061
[1162]Page 26
[1165]: “Top SECRET
[1169]THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF. DEFENSE
[1170]WASHINGTON 25, D.C.
[1172]January 23, 1963
[1174]MEMORANDUM FOR MR, VANCE
[1176]SUBJECT: United States Policy Toward Cuba
[1178]Attached is a revision of paper #2 submitted by the
[1179]Coordinator of Cuban Affairs for the meeting of the NSC
[1180]Executive Committee on the above subject, that has now
[1181]been rescheduled for Friday at 4:00 p.m... The revision
[1182]consists essentially of what is now denominated as
[1183]"ALTERNATIVE I" in the proposed statement of policy
[1184]and related courses of action with respect to Cuba, supple-
[1185]mented by the insertion of the paragraphs marked in red at
[1186]the top of page 3 and on page 7 of the revision. This
[1187]supplemental material is derived from portions of the text
[1188]of “ALTERNATIVE If" in the original paper.
[1190]At luncheon today with Alexis Johnson, I handed hiyn
[1191]the attached revision and told him Mr. McNamara's and my
[1192]reasons for suggesting the expansion of State's paper to
[1193]include the supplemental material referred to above. He,
[1194]in turn, will discuss the revision with Mr. Cottrell who will
[1195]thereafter be in touch with you. if possible, will you let me
[1196]khow by noon tornorrow where you ‘and he stand with regard
[1197]to the revised paper.
[1199]Enclosure
[1200]SIGii.
[1202]ROSWELL L. GILPATRIC
[1203]ce: Mr. McNamara
[1204]General Taylor
[1205]Mr. Yarmolinsky
[1207]Pena te RL 2 bane econ
[1209]EXCLULED FROM AUTOMATIC
[1210]REGRADING; DOD BIR 5200.10
[1211]DOES NOT APPLY
[1213]. “GA sy @o3/ cera SECRET COPY a OF ‘ COPTES.
[1215]HY 450955 Docld:322776061 Page 29
[1217]rr ae = ERS SAA SE
[1218]ea ©
[1220]KA
[1222]_
[1224]a a, ™ =e ee
[1225]\ \ oo CO) a DOD | |
[1227]_ | , 9 P SECRET
[1229]M _ . DRAFT/23 Jan 63
[1231]PY9.3 53. DUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE
[1232]us GOMMITTES
[1234]BRAM : Geordinater of Cuban Affairs
[1236]SUBS ECT: United Staten Policy Toward Cuba
[1238]Po United Stateo Policy
[1240]Vn November 20, the Preoident set forth the broad guidelines of
[1241]United Stateo policy with reopect to Cuba in the following words:
[1243]"Ac for our part, if all offensive weapons systems are
[1244]removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in
[1246]the future, under adequate verification and safeguards,
[1248]and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggrecaive .
[1249]communist purposes, there will be reace in the Caribbean.
[1250]And, ao I caid in September, 'we shall neither initiate
[1252]nor permit agerescion in thic hemisphere’.
[1254]"We will not, of course, abandon the political, econcznic
[1255]and other efforts of this hemisphere to halt subversion
[1256]from Cuba, nor our purpese and kere that the Cuban people
[1257]shall come day be truly free. But chess policies are very
[1258]different from any intent to launch 2 military invasion of
[1259]the island,"
[1261]Objectives
[1263]Accordingly, the objectives of U.S. policy with eeapect to Cuba
[1264]ARG: : . .
[1266]i, Protecting the security of the United States and the
[1267]other atates of the Organization of American States
[1268](OAS) by acouring that offensive weapons are not
[1269]reintroduced into Cuba;
[1271]‘Ge SECRET
[1273]HY 450955 Docld:322776061 Page 30
[1276]Romoval of remaining Soviet fercon from Cuba;
[1278]Proventing Cuba from taking any aggressive military
[1279]action againot othor Garibboan otaton;
[1281]Reducing the capabilitios of the Castro zeRgime to direct
[1282]and oupport oubvorcion and inourroction within the
[1283]other OAS otateo;
[1285]Zacouraging and oupporting any developments within
[1287]‘Cuba that offer the pocolbility of Mvorcing the Cuban
[1289]Government from its Ouppost of Sino-Seviot Communist
[1290]purposes or replacing the Government with a regime
[1291]which would accomplick thio purpose; .
[1293]Maximising the coct to the Soviet Union of cupporting
[1294]the Castro rogime;
[1296]Marimizing the political ioolation of the Castro regime
[1297]from other free world states, and especially from
[1298]states of the OAS. Whenever possible, U.S. actions
[1299]against Cuba cheuld be multilateral, prefe rably based
[1300]upon the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance {Rie Pact)
[1302]or on resolutions adopted by the Organization of
[1303]American States, The newly-won hemiophe ric
[1304]solidarity on the Cuban isoue chould not be joopardized
[1305]by secking OAS actions of marginal value and which
[1306]might split the hemiophoro,
[1308]Being prepared to mect, with the employment ef
[1309]Appropriate U.S. combat claments and/or logictical
[1310]oupport, the wide varioty of military contiagencies
[1312]that may orice from purouilt of tho foregoing objectives;
[1315]5
[1317]WR SECRET
[1321]Oe re ~ === STEERS eet 7
[1323]HY 450955 Docld:322776061 Page 31
[1326]cere em
[1328]Y
[1329]S
[1331]sen eT YT
[1335]Be
[1337]CY ‘(GMB SECRET ©)
[1338]3
[1340]ma
[1342]9. Producing comprehencive intolligence related te the above
[1343]objectives,
[1345]‘Our ultimate objective with beopect to Cuba remains the overthrow
[1346]of the Castro/Communiot regime and its replacement by one compatible
[1347]with the objectives of the U.S. and, where poosible, sharing the aims X
[1351]hel
[1353]of the Free World. To achieve this ebjective, the U.S. Government ay n
[1354]will be prepared to apply increacing degrees of political, oconomic,
[1355]poychological and military preaaureo, ac appropriate opportunitico prosont
[1356]themselves or can ba created, until the Cactro/Communist regime is
[1357]overthrown.
[1359]Isolating, undermining and discrediting the Castro/Communist
[1360]regime through the oxereiog of all fcacible diplomatic, econemic,
[1361]psychological aad covert actions may achieve the immediate objoctives
[1362]and could create propitious conditions in Cuba for further advance toward
[1363]our ultimate objective,
[1365]Supporting etions 7
[1366]The chowine actions chould be initiated in the sequence set forth /
[1367]below: .
[1369]1, Await reoults of Mr, Donovan's imminent nogotiation with
[1370]Fidel Cactveo for feceing the 20-0dd American prisoners,
[1371]Prior aggressive U. &, action could jeopardize their release.
[1373]2, - If theoa negotiations fail, or when the prisoners are recovered,
[1374]proceed om tho following timetable:
[1376]3. Inform NATO and OAS twelve kcurs in advance of the proclamation
[1377]of the four point chipping orders. (The proclamation calls for
[1378]tho ordora to go into effect in five days). Theoe orders:
[1380]a close United States ports to all veasels of a
[1381]country wheoe vessela engage in carzying AFMO
[1382]to Guba;
[1384]& close United States ports to any chip which has
[1385]carried goods in the bloc-Cuba trade within 120 days
[1386]of the time it cecko to onter a United States poxt;
[1388]6, prohibit all United Statco Mag chips and all ships
[1389]owned by United States nationals or residents from
[1390]entering any porto of Cuba aad from carrying any
[1391]geods bound to or from Guba; and
[1393]ER SECRET
[1397]HY 60955 Docld:32276061 Page 32
[1399]Bey
[1401]& prohibit any cargo sponsored by any
[1402]department or agency of the United
[1403]States ¢vom botag shipped on vessels
[1404]owmed ox controlled by persons who
[1405]om or control vessels engaged in the
[1406]erade batwoea Cuba and the Soviet bloc.
[1408]a
[1410]4, , At the termination of the U. S. Chiefs of Mission
[1411]Confercacc im El Salvador oa January 28230
[1412]Aseistant Seexctary Marcin will visit the Presidents
[1413]of Calle, Mexieo and Brazil co convey to chem the
[1414]importance President Rommedy attaches co maintaining |
[1415]hemispheric solidarity by cupporting the sollowiag
[1418]a. An OAS resolution condesming Cuba for its
[1419]netiens waleh' contimuc to endanger the peaco,
[1420]deploring refusal te allew iaspection,
[1421]condomaing the presence of Sevict troops,
[1422]eocemmendiag continued surveillance and i
[1423]continued vigllaace against subversive
[1424]activities, and terminating tho imyecation
[1425]of the Ris feeaty on the missile crisis,
[1426]cogecher with
[1428]b. dm OAS resolution which would ececcmmend
[1429]1) axtension of axms embargo to all items
[1430]of teade cxecat food and medicine (fall back
[1431]position; extension of ames embargo to all
[1432]atrategic items); 2) prohibition of AR
[1433]ships €com transporting eabargecd icems and
[1434]deay usc of ports to chips ia Bloe-Cuba
[1435]exade; 3) demtal of Soviet over-flights ‘and
[1436]evomeit rights for flights to Cuba; apd
[1437]&) a call om ether states bo take similar
[1438]aeCLon.
[1440]8, A€ter obtaining the wmaximua pesclble cupport of
[1441]the key countries ef Moxleo, Galle and Beagil, the
[1442]ether OAS mewboro will be approachod in Washington
[1444]HY 50955 Docld: 322776061 Page 33
[1448]OQ © |
[1450]Top SECRET
[1452]@Se
[1454]and in their respective capitals, simulcancously.
[1455]Zt should be possible for this consulcation and OAS
[1456]action on che resolutions to be completed within
[1457]ten days. Prior to formal COAS approval of the
[1458]resolutions, we will inform our NATO allies of the
[1459]impending OAS action.
[1461]At the first NATO meeting after formal OAS action
[1462]on the resolutions, we will request that NATC
[1463]include Cuba on the List of countries to which
[1464]shipment of COCcoM list (steacegic) items is
[1465]prohibited.
[1467]After NATO decision on our CCCOM request, we will
[1468]seek to get agreement from Free World industrial
[1469]nations to prevent shipping of critical spare parts
[1470]and equipment co Cuba, not on che COCOM list.
[1472]in addicion to four point shipping vesolutions,
[1473]‘and action under Sectiim LOF ck the Foreign Assistance
[1475]Act, continue tc press Prec Woertd nations to keep
[1476]theix shipping cu> of Elsce-Cuba trade.
[1478]In addition to current covert programs such as
[1479]intelligence ecilection, radio broadcasts,
[1480]vecruitment cf Cuban cfficials as agents, support
[1482]of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) activities,
[1483]and infileratic= of propagarcs materials, the
[1484]following are vocommended for approval and immediate
[1486]initiation:
[1488]a. Intensify to maximum degree possible
[1489]iatelligence and counterintelligence coverage
[1491]of Guba;
[1493]b. Support the efforts of certain Cuban exiles,
[1494]who ave associated with the original. aims of
[1495]the 26 July Movement and who believe that
[1496]the Castro regime can be overchrown from
[1497]within in order that they may: 1) cause
[1499]qm SECRET
[1501]HY 50955 Docld: 32276061
[1503]Page 34
[1506][i
[1508]a apes
[1509]Vai SECnne
[1510]Bae
[1512]a split in the leadership of the regime
[1513]at the national or »rovincial levels; and,
[1514]2) create a political base of popular
[1515]opposition to the regime; and, 3) secure
[1516]intelligence;
[1518]ec. Assist Cuban exiles in developing a
[1519]capability to launch balloons carrying
[1520]leaflets and other propaganda materials from
[1521]international waters into Cuba. Launch
[1522]propaganda balloons after an operational
[1523]capability has been established.
[1525]HW 450955 Docld: 32276
[1527]061
[1529]Page 35
[1532]Q en”
[1534]‘ Tn addition to these immediate actions, we should make
[1536]preparations now so that we are able to seize Opportunities for more
[1537]positive action towards our ultimate objective of the overthrow of
[1538]the Castro/Communist regime. These opportunities may arise °
[1539]either as a‘result of Bloc action in other parts of the world, asa i
[1540]result of aggressive moves (or isolated hostile acts) by the Castro/ j
[1541]Communist regime itself; or as a result of uprisings or internal / ‘
[1542]conflict within Cuba. We should prepare contingency plans to deal
[1543]with these situations, '
[1547]| . i
[1549]Our contingency planning should include preparations for large- }
[1551]scale use of Cubans inside Cuba; more extensive air activity including |
[1552]both high and low level flights primarily directed toward surveillance
[1553]and collection of intelligence, and which may also have the effect of
[1554]embarrassing the Castro government and keeping the Castro forces on *
[1555]continual alert; retaliatory measures, as appropriate, including the
[1556]imposition of a POL blockade; harrassment of Cuban officials in other
[1557]countries; severance of communications to Cuba; major acts of |
[1558]sabotage on shipping destined for Cuba and on key installations in
[1560]Cuba; intensive naval patrols; and, ultimately, the use of U.S, .
[1561]military forces. {
[1563]We should be in a position to respond with open military support
[1564]{to include such items as materiel, advisors, training, and Special
[1565]Forces support and, if necessary, up to the full range of military
[1566]forces), to a request for ezeistan-o from any anti-Castro/Communist
[1567]group or groups in Cuba which demonstrate an ability to survive,
[1569]which threaten the present regime, and whose alms are compatible
[1570]with those of the U.S.
[1573]i
[1575]To the extent feasible, U.S. military forces employed against
[1576]Cuba should be accompanied by U.S. militarily -trained free Cubans
[1577]and by the armed forces of those Latin American nations desirous of
[1578]participating in the U.S. effort. ;
[1580]tee SECRET
[1582]HY 450955 Docld: 322776061 Page 36
[1584]o> a
[1585]— a
[1587]HY 450955 Docld:322776061 Page 37
[1589]He ee
[1593], is Ll wok
[1594]; MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE
[1595]NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
[1597]on (Prepared for the Meeting of Thureday, January 24, 1963, 10 a.m.) co
[1599]- FROM : Department of Defense Representative. on: the Inter = cm 7
[1600]departmental Coordinating Committee On Cuba My,
[1602]-°° SUBJECT: United States Policy Toward Cuba
[1604], "Policy mo —
[1605]Our ultimate objective with respect to Cuba remains the . : =: |
[1606]| overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime and its replacement -
[1608]by. one compatible with the objectives of the U. S.. and, where —
[1610]- possible, sharing the aims of the. Free World, . To achieve this.
[1611]“objective, the U.. S. Government will apply increasing degrees. of |
[1612]. political, economic, paychological. and military pressures, as
[1614]‘ appropriate opportunities present themselyes or can be created,
[1615]7 %
[1617]_ until the. Castro/Communist regime is overthrown, Our immediate 7
[1618]; objectives are to isolate the Castro/Communist regime from the Free a Poe
[1619]: World and from . the Bloc; weaken it economically; promote internal wie
[1620]° dissension, erode its domestic political, gupporti frustrate ite ssub- he
[1621]versive activities; negate its. influence in. the hemiepheres increase
[1623]“the cost ‘to the Bloc. of custaining | the regime; and obtain. a the withdrawal pe
[1625]ke.
[1627], Sof Russian troops from Cuba,
[1629]EXCLUDED PRO AUTOMATIC FRORADING “)
[1630]“DOD DIR 5200.10 DOSS HOT APPLY =,
[1634]HW 509055 Docld: 32276061 “Baye 38
[1636]ty ae
[1638]Isolating, undermining and discrediting the Castro/Communist on
[1640]regime through the exercise of all feasible diplomatic, economic,
[1641]psychological and covert actions may achieve the immediate objectives
[1643]a . and could create propitious conditions in Cuba. for further advance
[1645]- ‘toward our ultimate objective.
[1647]We should be. ina position to respond with open military sup- a
[1648]port (to include such items as material, advisors, training, and
[1650]“Special Forces: support and, 3 if necessary, up to. the full range of
[1652]fompaste wit those of.the U.S. i”
[1654]Invasion of Cuba by U. ‘S. military forces, as distinguished.
[1656]from military support upon weauee° of indigenous forces, should
[1658]hemaephere,, This does not t preclude appropriate | Ue Ss. retaliation
[1660]HW 50055. Docld: 32276061. Page 39
[1663]' To the extent feasible, U. S. military forces. employed
[1665]© “against Cuba should be accompanied by U. s. militarily- ~trained
[1667]desirous of participating in the UL.S. ‘effort.
[1669]Intensive, comprehensive and continuing intelligence
[1671]"og the national intelligence. effort.
[1673]Whenever possible, U,.S, actions against Cuba should be
[1675]7 multilateral, preferably based upon the Treaty of Reciprocal
[1677]7 Cuban issue should not be jeopardized by seeking’ OAS actions. of
[1679]“marginal value and which might split the hemisphere. | _
[1680]Overt. and covert annexes of specific actions in support 0 of |
[1684]., this policy » will be’ prepared.
[1686]Discussion
[1688]“6
[1690]HW 50955 Docld:32276061 Page 40,00 ~ 7.0 _ S
[1692]* free Cubans and by the armed forces of those. Latin American nations 7 7
[1694]gathering in depth on Cuba should be identified asa primary objective 7 fa.
[1696]oo Assistance (Rio Pact) or on resolutions adopted by the Organization — a _
[1698]“\of American States. The newly-won hemispheric solidarity o on. the a a
[1701]-and military actions. .Such actions might include. leaflet dropping; —
[1702]. propaganda urging sabotage, strikes, and opposition to the regime; ,
[1703]a psychological operations urging defections; large scale training of.
[1704]«Cubans in. the U. S. and the use of such Cubans inside Cuba; extensive -
[1705]- : air activity including both high and low level flights primarily directed
[1706]toward surveillance and collection of intelligence, and which may also .
[1707]have-the effect of embarrassing the Castro government and keeping -
[1709]_ the Castro forces on continual alert; retaliatory measures, as appro~., =
[1711]; priate, including the imposition of a POL blockade; harrassment of.
[1712]- Cuban officials in other countries; severance of communications. to ©
[1714]Cuba; major acts of sabotage on shipping destined for Cuba and on .-
[1716]key installations in Cuba; intensive naval patrols; and, ‘ultimately, - a a
[1717]- the use of U.S. military forces.” a a _ Se So o Te ce fe
[1718]In addition, this course of action would involve a broad gamut ..
[1719]of carefully timed political, economic, psychological and covert. actions, : v : a :
[1721]: such a as OAS. sanctions, Caribbean security arrangements, intensified
[1723]” surveillance. of and publicity concerning Castro/ Communist subversive: seat
[1725]i
[1727]- activities | in ‘Latin America, application of Four Point shipping restric- | 7
[1729]tions and other economic: sanctions, and ¢ a series of actions designed
[1731]- ‘to. obtain, “to. the ‘greatest. extent possible,’ multilateral approval of and : 7
[1733]‘ participation i in the campaign to unseat ‘the Castro/Communist regime,
[1735]ne
[1737]Se a ee te Ce Cae
[1739]seremenaene i
[1741]HW 50955 DocId:32276061 Page 41
[1743].
[1745]This course of action has the advantage of attaining the
[1747]‘objective more rapidly and.under more controlled conditions than. °°"
[1749]” the alternative stated by the Coordinator. Indeed, this may be the cps j
[1750]_ _only course of action that will accomplish the ultimate objective. 7 a. - oo “|
[1752]: : It involves greater risks; and, in the short run, a greater expenditure _
[1754]of money and material and far greater numbers of personnel,
[1756]From. the standpoint of international politics,. the U.. S,
[1758]owill probably be subjected to criticism for aggression fromthe 2: 2"
[1759]“uncommitted nations. ' It. is difficult to predict | the reaction of
[1760]; ‘the Latin. American governments, They may attack the U.S. for = a
[1762]“intervening” or they may react: favorably {as- they did during the
[1764]missile crisis). To a large ‘extent, the reaction of the nations
[1769]“
[1771]i
[1772]an
[1776]an
[1777]J
[1778]|
[1780]throughout the world, and particularly the Latin American nations, -
[1781]will depend upon how adroitly these actions are handled. For - _
[1782]example, there may even-be advantages to the fact that our active “e
[1783]policy and the courses of action. under it may eventually become |
[1784]Impossible to conceal, | if properly handled, the overt aspects of ,
[1785]this policy may serye! not E only: to ) mitigate any unfavorable reactions _
[1787]. from other countries, but also to gain, ‘particularly in Latin America,
[1789]a ; \ increasing appreciation of the threat of Castro/ Communist Cuba.
[1791]Ww -50955 Boold:32276061 Page 4a
[1793]The active pursuit of our objective will make it clear that
[1795]“ "the UL S.. will not permit.the maintenance of a communist base in pen.
[1796], “the hemisphere. From the standpoint of military posture, the - |
[1797]_ more active approach may be subjected to counteractions from
[1798]. ' the Sino-Soviet Bloc elsewhere. As we increase the pressures
[1799]on Castro/Communist Cuba and the extent of our commitment to
[1801]overthrow the Tegime, Ue 5S. prestige becomes more deeply
[1803]involved. . The further we ¢ progress along this route, the more |
[1805]The successful execution of this policy will require careful |
[1806]timing : and | coordination of our actions and the development of detailed oa et
[1808]While such plans would be- designed to bring about the over="
[1810]. plans. =.
[1813]. throw ‘of the Castro regime within a given time frame for planning
[1815]: purposes, they would have to. be sufficiently flexible to accommodate.
[1819]=. changes to the international situation,
[1820]. j :
[1822]we),
[1824]os *. ’ Bape
[1826]In any case, at.crucial points along the way,.it will be neces=" :
[1827]sary for the highest levels of our Government to review the actions 7
[1828]already taken and those contemplated and to assess the advantages
[1830]of ‘continued and escalated activity against the. disadvantages and
[1832]sgh CO BR
[1834], dangers of such activity. -
[1836]‘HW 50955 Docld:32276061 Page 43
[1838]eee S Senet
[1840]Commitment to this course of. action does not exclude the
[1841]— possibility of actively pursuing the isolation of of the ‘Castro regime o
[1843]. from the Bloc. a 3 . 7” ~
[1845]' Coordinator's Recommendation
[1847]I do not concur | in the policy recommended by the Coordinator. — a:
[1848]| The objectives stated in the ( ‘Coordinator! & paper do not sufficiently ~ 7
[1849]‘commit the U. S. to the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime. .
[1850]> The Coordinator! r) paper degonds too much upon events outside the
[1851]_ ne - control of the U. S,. Government and does not sufficiently contemplate
[1853]“the creation of opportunities to effect the downfall of the Castro/_
[1855]: ‘Communist regimes. The specific actions recommended in the
[1857]Coordinator’ 5 paper are . consistent with the policy recommended in 7.
[1859]this paper and, in many. cases, would be "among the initial steps that |
[1861]would be taken in executing that t paler, we
[1863]‘Recommendation vale
[1865]1 recommend. that the e policy. stated above be adopted as ‘the. a
[1867]y United States policy tow: : rd Cuba,
[1869]HW 50955 DocTd:32276061 “Page 44:
[1871]¢ C) ReP=SECRET QC
[1873]DRAFT/23 Jan 63
[1875]MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE
[1876]: COMMITTEE
[1878]FROM : Coordinator of Cubam Affairs
[1880]SUBJECT: United States Policy Toward Cuba
[1882]United States Policy
[1884]On November 20, the President set forth the broad guidelines of
[1885]United States policy with respect to Cuba im the following words:
[1887]so “As for our part, if all offensive weapons systems aré
[1888]removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in
[1889]the future, under adequate verification and safeguards,
[1890]and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive
[1891]communist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean.
[1892]And, ae I said in September, ‘we shall neither imitiate
[1893]nor permit aggression im this hemisphere’.
[1895]"We will not, of course, abandon the political, economic
[1896]and other efforts of this hemisphere to halt subversion
[1897]from Cuba, nor our purpose and hope that the Cuban people
[1898]shall some day be truly free. But these policies are very
[1899]different from any intent to launch a military invasion of
[1900]the island, “
[1902]Objectives . 2
[1904]Accordingly, the objectives of U.S. policy with reapect to Cuba
[1905]are: ,
[1907]i, Protecting the security of the Umited States and the
[1908]other states of the Organization of American States
[1909](OAS) by assuring that offensive weapons are not
[1910]reintroduced into Cuba;
[1912]7 sateen nes a eye EE
[1913]ye
[1915]HY 50955 Docld: 322776061 Page 45
[1917]O @OT SECRET O
[1919]Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;
[1921]Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive military
[1923]action against other Caribbean states;
[1925]Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime to direct
[1926]and support subversion and insurrection within the
[1927]other OAS states; ,
[1929]Encouraging and supporting any developments within
[1930]Cuba that offer the possibility of divorcing the Cuban
[1931]Government from its support of Sino-Soviet Communist
[1932]purposes or replacing the Government with a regime
[1933]which would accomplish this purpose;
[1935]Maximising the cost to the Soviet Union of supporting
[1937]_ the Castro regime;
[1939]Maximizing the political isolation of the Castro regime
[1940]from other free world States, and especially from
[1941]states of the OAS. Whenever possible, U.S. actions
[1942]against Cuba should be multilateral, preferably based
[1943]upon the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact)
[1945]or on resolutions adopted by the Organization of
[1946]American States. The newly-won hemispheric
[1947]solidarity on the Cuban issue should net be jeopardized
[1948]by seeking OAS actions of marginal value and which
[1949]might split the hemisphere.
[1951]Being prepared to meet, with the employment of
[1952]appropriate U.S. combat clemente and/or logistical
[1953]support, the widd varisty of military contingencies
[1955]that may arise from Pursuit of the foregoing objectives;
[1956]and;
[1958]HY 50955 Docld:322776061 Page 46
[1961]a OQ. WP SECRET O
[1963]3
[1965]9, Producing comprehensive intelligence related to tac above
[1966]objectives. ‘
[1968]Our ultimate objective with respect to Cuba remains the overthrow ~
[1969]of the Castro/Communict regime and its replacement by onc compatible
[1970]with the objectives of the U.S. and, where poooible, sharing the aimo
[1971]of the Free World, To achieve thio objective, the U.S. Government
[1972]will be prepared to apply increacing degroes of political, sconomic,
[1973]psychological and military pressures, as appropriate eppertunitico procont
[1974]themselves or can be created, until the Castro/Communist regime is
[1975]overthrown,
[1977]Isolating, undermining and discrediting the Castro/Communict te
[1978]regime through the exercioe of all feanible diplomatic, economic,
[1979]poychelogical and eevert actioas may achieve the immediate objectives
[1980]and could erento prepitious coniitieas im Cuba fos furthor advances toward
[1981]our ultimate objective.
[1983]Supporting Actions
[1985]The following actions should be initiated ia the sequence set forth
[1986]below:
[1988]1, Await results of Mz. Donovan's imminent negotiation with
[1989]Fidel Castro for freeing the 20-0dd American prisoners.
[1990]Prior aggressive U. S. action could jeopardize their release.
[1992]2, If these negotiations fail, or when the prisemers ars recovered, |
[1993]proceed on the following timetable:
[1995]3, Inform NATO and OAS twelve hours im advance of the proclamation
[1996]of the four point shipping orders. (The proclamation calle for
[1997]the orders to go into effect in five days}, These orders:
[1999]a clese United States ports to all vessels of a
[2000]country whose pesesls engage in CaErying arEAo
[2001]e Cuba;
[2003]b. cleas Uaited Statoo porto to any chip which bas
[2004]carried goods im the blec-Guba trade within 120 days
[2005]of the time it seeks to onter a United States port;
[2007]ic. prohibit all United States flag chips and all ships
[2009]i owned by United States nationals or residents from
[2011]entering any ports of Cuba and from carrying any
[2012]goods bound to or from Cuba; and “
[2014]Gee SECRET
[2016]HY d0955 Docld: 322776061 Page 47
[2018]re
[2022], Qo.
[2024]Se
[2026]é prohibit any cargo sponsored by aay
[2028]department or agency of the United
[2030]States frem belag shipped on vessels
[2032]ewned or controlled by persons who
[2034]own or control vessels engaged in the
[2036]trade between Cuba and the Sewlet bloc.
[2037]8 the coralantion of the U. 8. Exiogo 8 ilsoten
[2038]Conforcace fa BL Salvader ea Jonmary
[2039]Assistant Secretary Martia will visic the Presidents
[2040]ef Calle, Mexico and Brazil to convey to them the
[2041]importance President Kennedy attaches to malataining
[2042]hemispheric solidarity by supporting the following
[2045]a. 4m OAS resolution condeaming Cuba for its
[2046]actions which centinue to endamger the peace,
[2047]deploring refusal to allow inspection,
[2048]condeming the presense 6£ Seviet troeps,
[2049]recommending continued surveillanse and
[2050]continued wigilence against subversive
[2051]activicies, and terminating the invocation
[2053]- of the Rilo Treaty on the missile crisis,
[2055]together with
[2057]db. Am OAS resolution which would recommend ©
[2058]1) extension of arms embargo to all items
[2059]ef trade except food and medicine (fall back
[2060]position: extensica of args embargo te all
[2062]'  eteacogie fecneds 2). peohibielen of AR
[2064]‘ships eem traneporting embargead iteas and
[2066]deny use o£ ports to ships im Bloe-Cuba |
[2067]trade; 3) deaial of Soviet evor-flights and
[2068]transie rights for flights te Cuba; aad —
[2069]6) ao call om ether states to take similar
[2070]aetion.
[2072]' A€eer obtalning the maximum pessible support of
[2073]the key countries ef Mexico, Chile and Brazil, the
[2074]ether OAS menbers will be approached in Washiagton
[2076]HY 40955 Docld: 322776061 Page 48
[2079]| | GE) SECRET
[2080]<5
[2082]and in theixy respective capitals, simultaneously, —
[2083]It should be possible fer this consultation and OAS
[2084]action on the resolutions to be completed within
[2085]ten days, Prior te formal COAS eppreval of the
[2086]resolutions, we will imform our NATO allies of the
[2087]depending OAS action.
[2089]~ 6. At the Cirse RATO meeting after formal OAS action
[2090]eon the resolutions, we will request that NATO
[2091]imelude Guba on the list. of countries to which
[2092]. shipment of COGOM List (strategic) items ie
[2093]prokibitod.
[2095]7, A&tor NATO deelolon on our COCOM request, we will
[2096]sack to get agreement from Free World industrial
[2097]nations te prevent shipping of critical spare parts
[2099]3 Of immeme eo (Gaba, Ree Ca the COC WAGE 0° .
[2101]in. eddiedon: ee four point. chipping resolutions,
[2103]and. action under Section 107 of the Foreign Assistance
[2104]Aet, continue te press Free World nations to keep
[2105]thelr shipping ouc ef Bloc-Cuba trade.
[2107]In addicion to current covert programs such as
[2108]intelligence collection, radie broadcasts,
[2109]xecruitment of Cuban officials as agents, support ,
[2110]of the Cuban Revolutionary Coumeil (CRC) activities,
[2111]and. infiltration ef prepaganda’ materials, the
[2112]following are regonmended for approval and immediate
[2117]Go Intensify to maced masa éegree possible
[2118]yj ; intelligence and counterintelligence coverage
[2119]a of Guba;
[2121] & Support the efforts ef certain Cuban exiles,
[2123]who ave associated with the original aims of
[2124]- ghe 26 July Movemsat and who believe that
[2125]|: «  @he Castze zogime cam be overthrewa. praraey 3)
[2126]_ withia im order that they may: 1) cause
[2129]Pn
[2131]@e@_ SECRET
[2132]a Geo
[2134]a split in the leadership of the regime
[2135]at the national or »rovincial levels; and,
[2136]2) create a political base of popular
[2137]opposition to the regime; and, 3) secure
[2138]intelligence;
[2140]Assist Cuban exiles in developing a
[2141]capability to launch balloons carrying
[2142]leaflets and other propaganda materials from
[2143]international waters into Cuba. Launch
[2144]propaganda balloons after an operational
[2145]capability has been established.
[2147]HY 40955 Dacld: 32276061
[2151]Page 50
[2154]In addition to these immediate actions, we should make
[2155]preparations now so that we are able to seize opportunities for more
[2156]positive action towards our ultimate objective of the overthrow of
[2157]the Castro/Communist regime. These opportunities may arise
[2158]either as a result of Bloc action in other parts of the world, as a
[2159]result of aggressive moves (or isolated hostile acts) by the Castro/
[2160]Communist regime itself; or as a result of uprisings or internal
[2161]conflict within Cuba. We should prepare contingency plans to deal
[2162]with these situations.
[2164]Our contingency planning should include preparations for large-
[2165]scale use of Cubans inside Cuba; more extensive air activity including
[2166]both high and low level flights primarily directed toward surveillance
[2167]and collection of intelligence, and which may also have the effect of
[2168]embarraasing the Castro government and keeping the Castre forces on
[2169]continual alert; retaliatory meagures, as appropriate, including the
[2170]imposition of a POL blockade; harrassment of Cuban officials in other:
[2171]countries; severance of communications to Cuba; major acts of
[2172]sabotage on shipping destined for Cuba and on key installations in
[2173]Cuba; intensive naval patrols; and, ultimately, the use of U.S.
[2174]military forces,
[2176]We should be in a position to respond with open military support
[2178](to imclude such items as materiel, advisors, training, and Special
[2180]Forces support and, if necessary, up to the full range of military
[2181]forces), toa request for assistance from any anti-Castre/Communist a
[2182]group or groups in Cuba which demonstrate an ability to survive,
[2184]which threaten the present regime, and whose aims are compatible
[2186]with those of the U.S.
[2188]To the extent feasible, U.S. military forces employed against
[2189]Cuba should be accompanied by U.S. militarily -trained free Cubans
[2190]and by the armed forces of those Latin American nations desirous of
[2191]participating! in the U.S. effort.
[2192]i
[2194]€EP SECRET /
[2196]HY 50955 Docld:322776061 Page 51
[2199]ALTERNATIVE II
[2201]United States Policy i :
[2203]1. Our ultimate objective with respect to Cuba is
[2204]the overthrow of the Castro/Commnist regime and ‘its
[2205]replacement by one compatible with the objectives of the
[2206]U.S. and, where possible, sharing the aims of the Free
[2207]World. \To achieve this objective, the U.S. Government
[2208]will apply increasing degrees of political, economic,
[2210]‘psychological and military pressures, as appropriate
[2211]opportunities present themselves or can-be created,
[2213]until the Castro/Communist regime is overthrown.
[2215]2. Our immediate objectives are to isolate the
[2216]Castro/Communist regime from the Free World and from
[2217]the Bloc; weaken it economically; promote internal
[2218]dissension, erode its domestic political support;
[2219]frustrate its subversive activities; negate its influence
[2220]in the hemisphere; increase the cost to the Bloc of
[2221]sustaining the regime; and obtain the withdrawal of Russian
[2222]troops from Guba.
[2224]3. Isolating, undermining and discrediting .the
[2225]Castro/Communist regime through the exercise of all
[2226]feasible diplomatic, economic, psychological and
[2227]covert actions may achieve the immediate objectives
[2228]and could create propitious conditions in Cuba for
[2229]further advance toward our ultimate objective,
[2231]4. We should be in a position to respondwith open
[2232]military support (to include such items as materiel,
[2233]advisors, training, and Special Forces support and,
[2234]if necessary, up to the full range of military forces),
[2235]to a request for assistance from any anti-Castro/Communist
[2236]group or groups in Cuba which demonstrate an abllity to
[2237]survive, which threaten the present regime, and whose
[2238]aims are compatible with those of the U.S.
[2240]5. Invasion of Cuba by U.S. military forces, as
[2241]distinguished from military support upon request of
[2242]indigenous forces, should not be undertaken in the
[2243]absence of aggression or other Castro/Commmist and/or
[2245]Soviet
[2249]HY 40955 Docld:322776061 Page 52
[2252]- 8 ~
[2254]Soviet actions that threaten the peace or security of the
[2255]hemisphere. This does not preclude appropriate U.S.
[2256]retaliation for isolated hostile acts by the Castro/ ,
[2257]Communist or Soviet forces.
[2259]6. To the extent feasible, U.S. military forces
[2260]employed against Cuba should be accompanied by U.S.
[2261]militarily-trained free Cubans and by the armed forces
[2262]of those Latin American nations desirous of participating
[2263]in the U.S. effort.
[2265]7. Intensive, comprehensive and continuing intelligene
[2266]gathering in depth on Cuba should be identified as a pri
[2267]objective of the national intelligence effort.
[2269]8. Whenever possible, U.S. actions against Cuba
[2270]should be multilateral, preferably based upon theTTreaty
[2271]of Reciprocal Assistance (Ric Pact) or on resolutions
[2272]adopted by the Organization of American States. The
[2274]‘ newly-won hemispheric solidarity on the Cuban issue
[2276]should not be jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of:
[2277]marginal value and which might split the hemisphere.
[2279]Overt and covert annexes of specific actions in @&
[2280]support of this policy will be prepared.
[2282]Discussion
[2284]The active pursuit of our ultimate objective in-
[2285]volves a phased and controlled series of political,
[2286]economic, psychological and military actions. Such
[2287]actions might inclgde leaflet dropping; propaganda urging
[2288]sabotage, strikes, and opposition to the regime; psycho-
[2289]logical operations urging defections; large scale training
[2290]of Cubans in the U.S. and the use of such Cubans inside
[2291]Guba; extensive air activity including both high and low
[2292]level flights primarily directed toward suyveillance and
[2293]collection of intelligence, and which may also have the
[2295]effect
[2297]ep SECRET
[2299]HY 450955 Docld: 32276061 Page 53
[2302]| WW §0955
[2304]eG? SECRET
[2307]A
[2308]Y
[2310]effect of embarrassing the Castro government and keeping the
[2311]Gastro forces on continual alert; retaliatory measures, as
[2312]appropriate, including the impesition of a POL blockade;
[2313]harrassment of Cuban officials in other countries;
[2315]severance of commmications to Cuba; major acts of
[2316]sabotage on shipping destined for Cuba and on key
[2317]installations in Cuba; intensive naval patrols; and,
[2318]ultimately, the use of U. S. military forces.
[2320]In addition, this course of action would involve a
[2322]_ broad gamut of carefully timed political, economic, psy-
[2324]chological and covert actions, such ae OAS sanctions,
[2325]Caribbean security arrangements, intensified surveillance
[2326]of and publicity concerning Castre/Comaunist subversive
[2327]activities in Latin America, application of Four Point
[2328]shipping restrictions and other economic sanctions, and
[2330]a series of actions designed to ebtain, to the greatest
[2331]extent possible, multilateral approval of an participation
[2332]in the campaign to unseat the Castro/Communist regime.
[2334]This course of action has the advantage of attaining
[2335]the objective more rapidly and under more controlled
[2336]conditions than the alternative stated by the Coordinator.
[2337]Indeed, this may be the only course of action that will
[2338]accomplish the ultimate objective. It involves greater
[2339]visks; and, in the short run, a greater expenditure of
[2340]money and material and far greater numbers of personnel.
[2342],- From the standpoint of international politics, the
[2344]ww. &. will probably be subjected to criticism for
[2345]‘aggression from the uncomaitted nations. It is difficult
[2347]“to. predict the reaction of the Latin American fovernments.
[2351]Z
[2352]f
[2354]They may attack the U. S. for “intervening or they may react
[2355]favorably (as they did during the missile crisis). To a
[2357]vAarge extent, the reaction of the nations throughout the
[2358]‘world, and particularly the Latin American nations, will
[2360]depend upon how adroitly theee actions are handled. For
[2361]example, there may even be advantages to the fact that our
[2362]active policy and the courses of action under it may
[2366]Bocld: 327776061 Page 54
[2369]ME SECRET
[2372]eventually become Impossible to conceal. If properly
[2373]hendled, the overt aspects of this policy may serve not
[2374]only to mitigate any unfavorable reactions from other
[2375]countries, but alse to gain, particularly in Latin
[2376]Awerica, increasing appreciation of the threat of Castro/
[2377]Communist Cuba.
[2379]The active pursuit of our objective will make it clear
[2380]thet the U. 5. will net permit the maintenance of a
[2381]communist base in the hemisphere. From the standpoint of
[2382]military posture, the more active approach may be
[2383]subjected to counteractions from the Sine-Soviet Bloc
[2384]elsewhere. As we Increase the pressures on Castro/Communist
[2385]Guba and the extent of our commitment te overthrow the regime,
[2386]U. &. prestige becomegmore deeply involved. The further
[2387]we progress along this route, the more significant will be.
[2388]the loss of U, 5. prestige if we alter or abandon it.
[2390]The successful execution of this policy will require
[2391]careful timing and coordination of oux actions and the
[2392]development of detailed plans. While such plans would be
[2393]designed te bring about the overthrow of the Castro regime
[2394]within a given time frame for planning purposes, they
[2395]would have to be sufficiently flexible to accommodate
[2396]changes to the international situation.
[2398]In any case, at crucial points along the way, it will
[2399]be necessary fer the highest levels ef our Government to
[2400]review the actions already taken and these contemplated and
[2401]to assess the advantages of continued and escalated
[2402]activity against the disadvantages and dangers of such
[2403]activity.
[2405]Commitment to this course of action dees not exclude
[2406]the possibility of actively pursuing the isclation of the
[2407]Castro regime from the Bloc.
[2409]eB SECRET _
[2411]HY 50955 Docld:322776061 Page 55
[2414]‘wee SECRET
[2417]COORDINATOR'S RECOMMENDATION
[2418]ea EEE PEA SSE NRA EP SeeaM HORACE
[2420]iI recommend approval of Alternative I.
[2422]STATEMENT OF DOD REPRESENTATIVE
[2423]SR ARTETA mA IER fo eer aa tac
[2425]I do not concur in the policy recommended by the.
[2426]Coordinator, Alternative I dees not make the overthrow
[2427]of the Castro/Communist regime an objective of the U. §.
[2428]In addition, Alternative I does not sufficiently
[2429]contemplate the creation of opportunities to effect the
[2430]downfall of that regime. The specific actions
[2431]recommended in Alternative I are consistent with the
[2432]policy recommended in Alternative IT and, in many cases,
[2433]would be among the initial steps that would be taken
[2434]im executing that poliey. I recommend adoption of
[2435]Alternative II.
[2437]HY 450955 Docld:322776061 Page 56
[2440]an
[2441]Ny
[2443]()
[2445]HY 40955 Docld:322776061 Page 57
[2447]oo rn pe Te
[2448]ee. SECRET .
[2450]"MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY ‘COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMME TTEE
[2452]Prepared, ‘for ‘the > Meeting of Thursday, January, 2, 1963, 10 Be asm.) ook
[2454]a FROM = “Coordinator of Cuban ‘Affairs:
[2456]Super: United States Poliey.’ ‘Tovar cuba Q
[2458]Oe! 3 .
[2460]“There | are - submitted ‘for your consideration two “alternative :
[2462]‘statements of policy and related courses of action with respect’
[2464]-to Cuba. . Alternative I was prepared by the Department — of State.
[2465]oe, Alternative Il was prepared by the Department of Defenses’.
[2466]* Coordinator! s Recommendation that Alternative I be approved,
[2468]‘and the Department. ‘of Defense | non-éoncurrence “appear at the.
[2470]- "end of this paper.
[2472]ALTERNATIVE I:
[2474]ated | ‘States Policy
[2476]ines of United States Policy » with, A respect to. Cuba, in the.
[2477]following words: a a er
[2479]'As ‘for | our ‘part, ‘te ‘all ‘offensive ‘weapons. ‘systems
[2481]are removed from ‘Cuba and kept out.o of ‘the hemisphere —
[2483]-in the future, “under ‘adequate verification and safe~
[2484]‘guards, a and if Cuba is not used | for the export of.
[2485]aggressive communist. purposes, there will be peace ‘in |.
[2486]‘the Caribbean, ; And, as [> said in ‘September, . "we | shall -
[2487]either initiate. nor: “permit aggressi n ine this i
[2489]hemisphere’ a
[2491]"We will’ ‘not, “of course, “gbendon ‘the political,”
[2492]‘economic and other efforts of this hemisphere to-
[2493]halt subversion from Cuba, “nor our . F Purpose. and
[2495]é.
[2497]AW 50955 DovTd: 32276061. Page [5B ee
[2499]The. op
[2501]‘On November 20,. “the President. ‘set “forth ‘the ‘proad- guides on
[2504]| @gp SECRET
[2508]‘and hope that the Cuban people shall some day be
[2509]truly free. But these policies are very different — .
[2511]- >. from any. intent: fo _taunch a military. invasion, of the
[2512]vi ieland. " ee ne oS en:
[2514]9 Objectives ;
[2516]ve ‘Accordingly,’ the’ objectives, of ve. 8. “policy with |
[2517]respect. to Guba are: ; a
[2519]“L. Protecting the security of the United States and.
[2521]"+. the other states of the Organization of American.
[2522]States (OAS) by assuring that offensive. weapons ..
[2524]al are not reintroduced into Cuba; mE ats
[2526]Removal, of venaining Soviet forees from ‘Guba;
[2528]3.) Preventing Cuba. from taking : any “ageressive ailicary
[2529]action against other Caribbean states; -
[2531]“Reducing ‘the capabilities ‘of the Castro regime | ‘to
[2533]‘the other OAS states; me, Oe Be
[2535]* Encouraging and supporting any developments. within os
[2536]Cuba that offer the possibility of. divorcing: the
[2537]“Cuban Government from its, support of | SinoeSoviet :
[2538]‘Communist purposes or replacing the .Government with |
[2540]a regime which. would accomplish this Purpose.
[2542]‘Maximizing the: cost to the. Soviet ‘Union of.
[2543]Supporting. the Gastro regimes. ee
[2545]“Maximizing the political isolation of the noe
[2546]~~ Castro regime: from other free world states, and
[2547]especially from § states of. the OAS; .
[2549]. Being prepared ‘to: mest, with the employment of
[2550]~ appropriate U. $4: combat. elements_ and/or logistical
[2551]‘support, the wide variety’ ‘ of/eontingencies that. a
[2552]may arise: from pursuit of the foregoing objectives;
[2554]HW “50955 Docid:32276061 Pa
[2556]‘direct and support subversion and insurrection within _—
[2560] Q@BBRSECRET
[2561]Be
[2563]Oe Producing. conprehensive intelligence related
[2564]to the above objectives... pe .
[2566]Supporting Actions.
[2568]coe The following actions should be intttated in the .
[2569]_ Sequence set forth below:
[2571]Le Await results of Mr. Donovan! s inminent negotiation .
[2572]‘. s with Fidel Castro for freeing the 20-odd American
[2573]-.. prisoners. Prior aggressive U.S. action. could -
[2574]_» jeopardize - their releases wy tt
[2576]. te these negotiations fail, or: when: the: ‘prisoners... +
[2577]“are recovered, Proceed « on the following timee~
[2578]“tables oo! %, to
[2580]“Inform NATO. and OAS. ‘twelve ‘hours in advance of i
[2581]© the proclamation of the four point shipping orders...”
[2582]» (The proclamation calls for the orders to, BO into.
[2583]effect: in five days). These orders? °
[2585] elose United States ports ‘to: yal vessels. :
[2586]- of a country whose vessels engage in a
[2587]“earrying arms.to Cuba; 6 +>" “
[2588]‘close United States ports. to ‘any ship -
[2589]which has carried goods in the bloceCuba
[2591]trade within 120 days .of the time it seeks:
[2592]to enter a United ‘States: ports. a
[2594]“prohibit. all ‘United States ‘flag ‘ships and
[2595]- all ships owned by United States nationals
[2596]or residents. from entering any ports of
[2597]_ , Cuba and “from carrying. any goods bound to
[2599]HOE from Cuba; and. wes
[2600]ar
[2602]@WP SECRET.
[2604]CNW. 50955 . DocTd:32276061 . Page 60.
[2607]de prohibit any cargo sponsored by any
[2608]department or agency of the United
[2609]ee “States. from being shipped on vessels
[2610]eee ae . owned oF controlled by persons who wo |
[2611]"own or control vessels engeged. in the |,
[2612]‘trade between Cuba and- the Soviet blee.
[2614]At the termination of the U.S. Chiefs of Mission ~~
[2615]Conference in E1 Salvador on January 28-30. ee
[2616]-' Assistant Secretary Martin will visit’ the Presidents -
[2617]’ of Chile, Mexico and Brazil to convey to them the oe
[2618]7 importance President Kennedy attaches to maintaining -
[2619]“ hemispheric solidarity by supporting the following ,
[2620]‘resolutions: | Ne
[2622]Sa. An OAS resolution condemning Cuba for its
[2623]wo actions which continue to endanger the peace, ©
[2624]. deploring refusal to allow inspection, me
[2625]-eondemning the presence of Soviet troops,
[2626]- recommending continued surveillance and /
[2627]“ ceontinued vigilance against subversive.
[2628]~~ aetivities, and terminating, the ingocation a
[2629]_... o£ the Rio Treaty on the missile.crisis, 9.
[2630]“> gogether with 90 nr ne
[2631]* An OAS resolution which would recommend 1
[2632]-L) - extension of ‘arms. embargo to all items
[2633]of trade except food and medicine (fall back .—
[2634]position: . extension of arms embargo to all
[2635]strategic dtems);. 2). prohibition of AR
[2636]“ships fro transporting embargoed items and
[2637]‘deny use of ports to ships in Bloc-Cuba
[2638]“trade; .3)- denial of Soviet. over-flights and
[2639]7, transit rights for flights to Cuba; and
[2640]““" 4) ‘acall on other states to take similar
[2642]actions on
[2644]‘After obtaining the maximum possible support of
[2645]“a: the key countries of Mexico, Chile and Brazil, the
[2646]“other OAS members will be approached in Washington
[2649]rage Ol. | a ' SECRET
[2652]SECRET
[2656]~~ and in their respective capitels, simultaneously. a
[2657]It should be possible for this consultation and OAS’ **.
[2658]action on the resolutions to be completed within
[2660]. ten days. Prior to formal COAS approval of the ~.
[2661]ee -oa5. J. vesolutions, we will inform our NATO allies of. the
[2663]oe eves 8. impending OAS action. * o a
[2665]; wo 5" 6 At the first NATO meeting after formal OAS action -
[2667]ye , ss 1, on the resolutions, we will request that NATO ° .
[2669]_ ne , include Guba on the list of countries to which |
[2671]’ shipment of COCOM list (strategic) | items is.
[2672]prohibited. ;
[2674]7.° After NATO decision on our COCOM request, we will
[2675]“geek to get agreement from Free World industrial
[2676]', nations to prevent shipping ‘of critical spare parts
[2677]+ and equipme nt to Cuba, - not on | the coceM Aiste
[2679]‘e-—-iIn addition to four’ point shipping resélations,
[2680]“and action under Section 107 of the Foreign Assistance
[2681]— Aet, continue to press Free World nations to keep .
[2683]oo their shipping out of Bloc-Cuba | trade. wh
[2685]“In addition to current ‘covert programs - ‘such as ae
[2686]. intelligence collection, radio broadcasts, ee
[2687]. reeruitment of Cuban officials as agents, support
[2689]Of the Cuban Revolutionary Cor uncil, (CRC) activities
[2691]and infiltration of propaganda materials, the »
[2692]following are recomended for. epproval: and immediate |
[2693]initiation:. Ste ee are
[2695]-- Tatens ify to maximum degree possible
[2696]intelligence. and counterintelligence coverage
[2697]of Cubas Foe TE oo
[2698]© Support the efforts of | certain. Cuban exiles,
[2699]: who are associated with.the original aims of
[2700]~ the 26. July Movement and who believe that
[2701]_ i the Castro regime can be overthrown from
[2702]ce within’ ‘in \ order that hey may? 1) - cause
[2704]lb lee ge a
[2708]“HW/90955 Docld:32276061 Page 62 |
[2711]50955": Docld:32276061 |
[2713]Assist Cuban exiles in developing a.
[2715]: ~eapability I has been established.
[2717]SECRET
[2719]aba
[2721]a split in the leaders! nip. of the regime .
[2723]. at the national or provincial levels; and).
[2725]2} ereate a political. base of popular -
[2727]. opposition to. the regime; and, 3); secure
[2728]a intelligence; ; ; oe
[2730]capability to launch balloons carrying
[2731]leaflets and other propaganda materials fvom
[2733]» imternational waters into Cuba. Launch
[2735]propaganda balloons after an operational
[2738]be created,
[2739]Tere
[2741]2. Our immediate ©! : _
[2742]Castro/Communist regime fror: Ere vom
[2743]the Bloc; weaken it sconomir
[2744]‘dissension, erode its domest
[2745]_ frustrate its sebversive act
[2746]“in the nemisphere ; increase the cost
[2748]ustaining the regime; and obtain +h
[2749]trope. from Cuba, ... .
[2751]3. Isolating, undermin
[2753]feasible diplomatic, economic, ads
[2754]covert actions may achieve the inme a ay 5
[2755]and could create propitious conditions in Caba for
[2756]further advance toward our ultimate objective, re
[2758]_ 4. We should be ir a position to respon?
[2759]ttary ‘support (to inciude such items as mat:
[2760]ore, training, and “+ Forces support
[2761]es . ‘ange of military “88 } es
[2763]2e (rom any anti-Castro/Commmi«:
[2764]whic. demonstrate an ability to
[2765]sed th threate:: the gresent regime, and whose |
[2766]tible with those of the U.$.
[2768]wees, as
[2770]a
[2773]“other Castro/Comi.'
[2775]. ° . . a
[2776]‘HW 50955 Docld: 32276061 Page 64 i 8
[2778]sencche peace or sec
[2779]mot preclude appropriat
[2780]“hostile acts by the C
[2782]empioyed aga Z
[2784]_militer?ty- <t ined, free Gsbans and by the, arned
[2785]. of, those acti asierican aations desirous of ‘pat
[2786]in the U.S, effort.
[2788]7. Intensive, comprehensive and continuing 2: ¢,
[2789]_ gathering in depth on :@ should be identified as a pxix
[2790]objective of the natios ince.lligence effort.
[2792]3%, actions against Cuba .
[2793]~ably based upon thelTreaty
[2794]- Pact) or on reeoiufions
[2795]tion of American States
[2796]sa Marity on the ‘Cuban
[2798]8. Sihenever poss
[2800]“newly-won hemispher
[2801]should not be jeopa:
[2802]marginal value and which ‘night split the
[2804]Overt and covert annexes of specif’:
[2805]support of this policy will be prepare«:
[2807]Discussion
[2809]The act!
[2810]‘volves a phased
[2811]economic, neyehological “snd military aétions.
[2812]actions might’ inclgde leaflet Gropp ins
[2813]sabotage, strikes, and opposicion to
[2814]‘logical operations urging defections
[2815]‘of Subans.in the U.S. anc’ the use of * gach “Cub
[2816]‘Cuba; extensive air activit% including both hi ‘
[2818]level flights primarily directed toward surveil ian:
[2819]eter idection of: ‘intelligences and which ay” also have the
[2821]~~ ~ oe effect
[2825]| HW 50955 Docld:32276061 Page 65. — Jo ee
[2827]trPolss and,”
[2829]. H
[2830]the use or U.
[2832]broad gx awe of on efuliy t big
[2833]chological and covert 2ctiz
[2834]Saribbean security arrange:
[2835]of and publicity concerning Sa
[2836]ectivities in Latin America, app laewche
[2837]shipping restrictions and other economic senc cions, and
[2838]a series of actions ssigned to obtain, to the Breet est
[2839]extent possible, rx:
[2840]in the camealgn to us
[2842]4
[2843]4
[2844]|
[2845]BI
[2846]i
[2847]4
[2848]al
[2849]i
[2850]1
[2851]i
[2853]; io This course of action has the advantage of attaining
[2854]Fee o, the ebjecuive more rapidly and under more ce vatrolled
[2856]. conditions than the alternative stated by chs Coordinator,
[2857]indeed, this may be the only course of acting that will
[2859]4 ' gecemplish the ulcimate objective, it inve greater
[2860]yo: *. gisks; and, in the short run, a greater exp: ture of
[2861]oa ae money and material end far Bre numbers o£ -sergonnel.
[2863]sCional politics, the
[2865]> eriticism for
[2867]as. It is difficult
[2868]LB American governments,
[2869]xvening™ or they may react .
[2870]“he aissile eri neuen oe :
[2872]_ From the standpoint
[2873] S. will probably be sur
[2874]«geression from the wncommit
[2875]| ‘go predict the reaction of :
[2876]| They may attack the U. S.
[2877]1
[2879]i
[2881]Favera ably Aes eee did during ¢
[2883]{NW 50955 Dochy: 32276061 Page 66
[2885]wel. .L£ properly
[2886]policy may serve not
[2887]seiy to micigate any uniavorable reactions from other
[2888]acumtvies, but alse to sain, ticularly in Latin
[2889]‘erica, increasing appreciation ek the: threat of Castro/
[2890]Comeunist Cuba. -
[2892]The active pursuit of our objective will make it clear
[2893]‘ thet the U. 8. will net permit the maintenance of a
[2894]. communist base in the hemisphere. rom the standpoint of
[2895]“military posture, the more active approach may be —
[2896]“ subjected to counteractions from the Sinc-Soviet Bloc
[2897]° elsewhere. As we increase the pressures on Castro/Commnist
[2898]> Cuba and the extent of our commitment to overthrow the regime,
[2899]-U. S. prestige becomegmore deeply involved. The further ,
[2900]we progress along this route, the more significant will be |
[2901]' the loss of U. S. prestige if we alter or abandon it.
[2902]The successful execution of crhkis policy will require
[2903]' careful tiaing and ccordination of ovr setions and the
[2904]development of detailed plans. While plans would be
[2905]designed to bring about the overthrow of the Castro regime
[2906]within a given time frame for planning purposes, they
[2907]_ would have to be sufficiently flexible to accommodate
[2908]“ ghanges to the internationsi situation.
[2910]In any case, at crucial noints along the way, it will
[2911]be necessary for the highest levels of our Government to
[2913]review w the actions already texen and those contemplated and
[2914]toe assess the advantages of continued and escalated |
[2917]‘ty against the disadvantages and dangers of such
[2918]aA : . : . . ‘
[2919]ra
[2921]action does ist exclude
[2922]ng the isolatisn of the
[2924]WW 50955 Bocld: 32276061 Page 67°
[2926]| GR PY ATS
[2928]Ut RS COMMENDATION
[2930]acer
[2932]“?'--LT xecomnend approval of Alternstive I,
[2934]2
[2936]Seb tee
[2938]STATEMENT UF DOD REPRESEN TAT:
[2939]ie ecient a acmenrnt onan tage it eet ERS
[2941]2:
[2943]ats
[2945]; . I do not concur in the policy recommended by the -
[2946]_. Goordinator, Alternative I does not make the overthrow _
[2947]of the Castro/Communist regime an objective of the U. S..
[2948]in addition, Alternative 1 does not sufficientiy
[2950]contemplate the creation oi opportunities to effect the
[2951]' downfall of that regime. The speclfile actions
[2953]# would be among the initial steps that would &
[2955]daw 50955° Doct: 32
[2957]recomnended in Alternative I are consistent with the’™
[2958]policy recommended in Alter:x fe iL-and, in wany cases,
[2960]'. in executing that policy. I recommend adoptic:. of
[2961]- Alternative II. 7 os
[2963]; an a : E27 prey pares
[2964]. ee Mere es
[2965]é a vot,
[2967]276061 Page 68°
[2970]; HW $0955 Docld: 32276061
[2972]Page 69
[2974]. e@ . SECRET, Dot Draf¢23 Jan 63
[2975]MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL"S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
[2976](Prepared for the Meeting of Friday , January 25, 1963, 4 p.m.),
[2979]SUBJECT: United States Policy. Toward Cuba
[2981]United States Policy _ 7
[2982]On November 20, the President set forth the broad guidelines
[2983]of United States policy with respect to Cuba in the following
[2984]words : |
[2985]"As for our part, if all offensive weapons systems are
[2986]removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in
[2987]the future, under adequate verification and safeguards,
[2988]and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive
[2989]communist purposes, there will be peace, in the Caribbean.
[2990]And, as 1 said in September, ‘we shall~néither initiate
[2991]nor permit aggression in this: hemisphere. '
[2992]“We will not, of course, abandon the political, economic:
[2993]and other efforts of this hemisphere to halt subversion
[2994]-from Cuba, nor our purpose and hope that the Cuban people
[2995]shall some day be truly free. But these policies are very
[2996]different from any intent to launch a military invasion of |
[2998]the island.
[3000]Objectives
[3005]Accordingly, the objectives of U.S. policy with respect to
[3007]_ Cuba are:
[3009]HY 50955 Docld:32276061. Page 70
[3012]4
[3013]A
[3014].
[3016]@ ee oe .
[3017]ee. SECRET _ al
[3018]1. Protecting the security of the United States and the .
[3019]other states of the Organization of American States
[3020](OAS) by assuring that offensive weapons are not
[3021]reintroduced into Cuba; _ .
[3022]2. Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;
[3026]3. Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive military
[3028]EASA plat hetdeath Set tigtowad® auptvaste.. Des Daslbag tS tang cag b a it neice ee
[3029]ENE hL eet StL SS titer Mit ae iy Latch a lena a lla ais calle ee tk and atin i le Snalate atti adis
[3031]action against! other Caribbean states!
[3033]|
[3035]Ae Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime to direct
[3037]Hemisphere
[3039]other DAS states;
[3041]‘ and support subversion and insurrection within the
[3043]’ 5. Encouraging and supporting any developments within. .
[3044]Cuba that offer the possibility of divorcing the Cuban |
[3045]Government fom its support of Sino-Soviet Communist
[3046]purposes; * | | |
[3047]6. Encouraging and supporting any developments within
[3048]Cuba that offer the possibility of replacing the Cuban
[3049]Government with a regime that vould break with the
[3050]\ : Sino-Soviet Bloc, it being understood that our
[3051]ultimate objective is replacement of the regime by
[3052]one fully compatible with the goals of the United
[3053]States; | ‘
[3054]7. Maximizing] the cost to the Soviet Union of supporting
[3056]|
[3057]the Castro) regime; —
[3059]MW 50955 Docld:32276061 Page 71 | , : ; 8.
[3061]& - | | - — a ; &
[3062]| fifty SECRET |
[3065]8. Maximizing the political isolation of the Castro
[3066]regime from other free world states, and especially
[3067]from states of the OAS. Whenever possible, U. s.
[3068]actions: against Cuba. should be multilateral,
[3070], preferably based upon the Treaty of Reciprocal
[3072]. Assistance. (Rio Pact) or on resolutions adopted by.
[3073]the Organization of American States, The newly-won
[3074]hemispheric solidarity on the Cuban issue should not
[3075]be jeopardized |by seeking OAS actions of marginal
[3076]value and which might split. the hemisphere.
[3078]9. Being prepared to meet, with the employment of
[3079]appropriate U.S. combat elements and/or logistical
[3080]support, the wide variety of military contingencies
[3081]that may arise from pursuit of the foregoing objectives;
[3083]. and; . | | | | |
[3084]“10. Producing comprehensive intelligence related to the
[3086]5
[3088]-above objectives.
[3090]"supporting Actions | | .
[3091]A. To achieve the foregoing objectives, the U.S. Govern-
[3093]ment will be prepared to increase the political, \ economic, /
[3094]psychological and military pressures, as appropriate
[3096]a | | opportunities
[3098]. ge SECRET
[3100]HW 50955 Docld:32276061 Page 72
[3105]Ll 4e
[3107]| opportunities present themselves or can be created, The actions
[3108]listed below are those requiring immediate approval and would
[3109]be initiated in the sequence set forth below. Recommendations=
[3110]for further actions based upon the re-examination of existing
[3111]programs and upon the development of new programs related to
[3112]the foregoing objectives will be forthcoming.
[3113]1. In addition to current covert program,. such as
[3115]intelligence collection, recruitment of Cuban
[3117]officials as agents, radio broadcasts, support of
[3118]the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) and other
[3119]exile group activities and infiltration of propaganda .
[3120]materials: |
[3121]a) continue to intensify covert collection of
[3122]intelligence within Cuba, especially within
[3123]the regime;
[3124]b) Support the efforts of certain Cuban exiles,
[3125]who are associated with the original aims of
[3126]the 26 of July Movement and who believe that
[3127]- the Castro regime can be overthrown from
[3128]within in order that, they may: 1) cause a
[3129]split in, the leadership of the regime at the
[3131]national or provincial levels; anc#2) create
[3133]HY 50955 Docld: 32276061 Page 73
[3135]re
[3136]. .  @i SECRET ©
[3138]a political base of ‘popular opposition to
[3139]the regime; and, 3) secure intelligence;
[3140]e.. Assist Cuban ‘exiles in | developing a capability
[3141]to launch balloons carrying leaflets and other
[3142]propaganda materials from international waters
[3143]into Cuba, Launch propaganda balloons after an
[3144]operational capability has been established.
[3145]WiTw KESPECT T0 THE ACH ONS LISTED BELO, THE
[3146]2. Awet, results of Mr. Donovan' s imminent negotiations
[3147]with Fidel ai Fe for freeing the 20-odd American
[3148]prisoners Le Oe TLE: cet tetow, ES bee
[3149]active quit. taken before the conclusion of the, negotiationgygbuta
[3150]jeopardize the release. le Loesteceaug
[3151]3. If these negotiations fa¥l, or when the prisoners are
[3152]recovered, proceed on the following timetable:
[3153]4, Inform NATO and OAS twelve hours in advance of the
[3154]proclamation of the four point shipping orders, .
[3155](the proclamation calls for the orders to go into
[3156]_ effect in five days). These orders:
[3157]a. close United States ports to all vessels of
[3158]a country whose vessels engage in carrying arms
[3159]to Cuba; ° a | .
[3160], b. co
[3162]QB SECRET
[3164]WW 50955 DocId:32276061 Page 74
[3167]on | at —_ . |  @
[3168]| _ Qe SECRET
[3170]b. close United States ports to any ship which has
[3171]carried. goods in the bloc+Cuba trade within 120
[3173]days of the time it seeks to enter a United
[3175]S9 CTSA TD ee tree per git en ernment
[3177]‘States port;
[3179]ears
[3181]e
[3183]c.é prohibit all United States flag ships and all
[3185]i
[3187]i
[3189]e
[3190]a
[3191]fe
[3193]‘ships owned by United States nationals or residents
[3194]from entering any ports of Cuba and from carrying
[3196]any goods bound to or from Cuba; and
[3198]SP Oma rede IE
[3200]on
[3202]norman yore
[3204]y
[3210]HW 50955 Docld: 32276061 Page 75
[3212]ee SECRET
[3213]~J- ,
[3214]d. prohibit any cargo sponsored by any department
[3215]or agency of the United States from being shipped
[3216]on vessels owned or controlled by persons who own
[3217]or control vessels engaged in the trade between
[3218]‘Cuba and the Soviet bloc. |
[3219]5. At the termination of the U. S. Chiefs of Mission Conference
[3220]January 20-30, or at a later dateg dependent on the Donovan
[3221]mission, Assistant Secretary Martin, or another representa-
[3222]‘tive of the President will visit the Presidents of Chile,
[3223]Mexico and Brazil. to convey to them the importance
[3224]President Kennedy attaches to maintaining hemispheric
[3225]solidarity by their supporting the following resolutions:
[3226]a. ‘An OAS resolution condemning Cuba for its actions
[3227]'. which continue to endanger the peace, dep loring
[3229]refusal to allow inspection, condemning the presence
[3231]any
[3233]of Soviet troops, recommending continued surveillance
[3234]- and continued vigilance against subversive
[3235]activities, and terminating the invocation of the
[3236]Rio Treaty on. the missile crisis, together with
[3237]“b. An OAS resolution which would recommend 1) extension
[3238]of arms embargo to all items of trade except food
[3240]oe. SECRET
[3242]HY 50955. DoclId: 32276061 Page 76
[3244]qm SECRET
[3245]. . -8-
[3246]and medicine (fall back position: extension of
[3247]arms ‘embargo to ‘all ‘strategic items); 2) prohibit-
[3248]ORS AremGer Holes
[3249]ion of 4 ships, from transporting embargoed items
[3250]‘ oe and deny use of ports to- ‘ships in Bloc-Cuba trade; -
[3251]3) denial of Soviet over-flights and transit
[3252]rights for flights to Cuba; and
[3253]4) a call on other states to take similar |
[3254]action. 7 | |
[3255]' 6. After obtaining the maximum possible’ support of the key
[3256]countries of Mexico, Chile and Brazil, the other OAS
[3257]. members will be approached in Washington and in their
[3258]respective capitals, simultaneously. It should be
[3259]possible for this consultation and OAS action on the
[3260]resolutions to be completed within ten days. Prior to
[3261]formal COAS approval of the resolutions, we will inform
[3262]our NATO allies of the impending OAS action..
[3263]7. At the first NATO meeting after formal OAS action on the
[3264]* resolutions, we will request that NATO include Cuba on the
[3265]list of countries to which shipment of COCOM list (strategic’
[3267]items is prohibited.
[3269]8. After NATO decision on our COCOM request, we will seek
[3271]HY 50955 Docld: 32276061 Page 7 = .
[3272]. . ms OUrOTT
[3276]to get agreement from Free World industrial nations
[3278]to prevent shipping» of critical spare parts and equipment |
[3280]to Cuba, not on the COCOM list. 7 a
[3281]Ape |
[3283]9, En addition to, four point shipping resolutions, and
[3285]action under Section 107 of the Foreign Assistance Act,
[3287]continue to press Free ‘World nations to keep their
[3289]deci, necnneenanpas 4 emt SER TRON PLD TEE TE
[3291]shipping out of Bloc-Cuba trade.
[3293]f ‘Be Contingency Planning
[3295]New 7 opportunities for accomplishing our objectives may arise
[3297]fr. either as a result of Bloc action in other: parts of the world; as a
[3298]4
[3300]result of aggressive moves (or isolated hostile actions) by the
[3302]‘internal conflict within Cuba.
[3306]| Castro~ -Communist, regime itself; or as a result of uprisings or
[3310]Our contingency planning, which will be undertaken immediately,
[3312]\ should include preparations | for increased multilateral and/or
[3313]. ;
[3314]bilateral political and. economic measures, large scale use of
[3316]Cubans who are nop/ inside Cuba; more ‘extensive air activity
[3318]7 ~ including both high and Low level flights primarily directed toward
[3320]|| surveillance and collection of intelligence, and which may also
[3323]‘ have the effect of embarrassing the Castro government and keeping
[3325]the Castro forces on continual alert; retaliatory measures, as
[3327]appropriate, including the imposition of a POL blockade; harrass-
[3329]AW 30955 Docld: 32276061
[3331]Page 7&
[3333]@® SECRET.
[3335]S0955 Bocld: 32276061 Page 79
[3337]| QP SECRET
[3341]ment of Cuban officials in other countries; severance of
[3342]‘communications to Cuba; major acts of sabotage on shipping _
[3343]"destined. for Cuba’ and on key’ installations in Cuba; intensive
[3344]naval patrols} and, ultimately, ° the use of U. ‘S. military
[3345]force. To the extent. feasible, v. Ss. military forces employed
[3347]against Cuba should be accompanied by U. 8, militarily-trained
[3349]free Cubans and by the armed forces of those Latin Anerican nations.
[3351]art
[3353]desirous of participating in: the U.S. effort.
[3355]«oe
[3358]@P_SECRET  ofraff23 Jan
[3360]oe - a, . ¥ . _ = i
[3361]- pee FOR THE cane is COUNCIL"S EXECOTIVe comarrez:
[3363]AO ye 1G O81 1563, Y. P om a
[3365]- FROM . Coordinator ° Cuban Affairs
[3367]SUBJECT: ‘United States Poltey Toward Gaba
[3369]United States Policy —
[3370]On November 20, the President set forth the broad guidelines [aa
[3372]a ‘of United Statea poltey. wich respect to Cuba in the following
[3374]words!
[3376]“As for our part, if all offensive weapons systems are
[3378]renoved from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in
[3379]the future, under adequate verification and safeguards,
[3380]and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive
[3381]commynist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean,
[3382]And, ag I said in September, ‘we shall neither initiate |
[3383]nor permit aggression in thie hewlsphere.
[3385]We will not, of course, abandon the political, economic
[3386]_and other efforts of this hemi sphere to halt subversion
[3388]_ from Guba, nor our purpese and, hope thet the Cuban people
[3390]. shall sone day be truly free. But these policies are very
[3392]different from any intent to launch a military invasion of
[3394]the feland.. . | | _
[3395]“Oblectives | | — | a
[3397]- Accordingly, the objectives of U.S. policy with respect to
[3399]“Cuba are i
[3402]4, ‘Protecting the security of the United States and the
[3403]| other states of the Organization of American States
[3404](OAS) by assuring, that offensive weapons are not
[3405]| reintroduced into Cuba; .
[3406]2, Removal of remaining Soyiet forces from Cuba;
[3407]3, Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive military
[3408]action against, other ‘Caribbean states}
[3409]Reducing - the capabilities of the Castro regime to ‘direct
[3410]and semen and insurrection within the
[3411]other OAS avatess
[3412]Encouraging: and supporting any developments within
[3413]Cuba that offer the possibility of divorcing the. Cuban
[3415]Government from tes support of Sine-Soviet Communist
[3417]t
[3419]. purposes;
[3420]Encouraging and supporting any developments within
[3421]Gaba that offer the possibilicy of replacing the Cubap
[3422]Government with a regine that would break with the | |
[3423]Sino=Soviet Bloc it being understood that our |
[3424]witimate objective is replacement of the regime by
[3426]one fully compatible with the goals of the United
[3428]States;
[3432]- Maximizing the cost #@ the Soviet Union of supporting
[3434]the Castre regime;
[3436]A,
[3438]Maximizing the political isolation of the Castro
[3440]regime from other free world states, and especially
[3442]. from states of the OAS, Whenever possible, U.S.
[3444]actions against Cuba should be multilateral,
[3445]preferably based upon t the Treaty of Reciprocal
[3446]Assistance (Rio. Pact) or on resolutions adopted by
[3447]the Organization of American States, ‘The newly-won -
[3449]hemispheréc solidarity an the Cuban issue should not
[3451]be jeopardized. by. seeking OAS actions of marginal
[3453]value and which might split the hemisphere.
[3455]Being prepared to meet, with the employment of
[3457]appropriate U. Ss. “combat. elements and/or logistical
[3459]support, the wide variety of military cone ingencies
[3461]that may arise from pursuit of the foregoing objectives;
[3462]and; . _
[3464]Producing comprehensive intelligence related to the
[3466]above objectives.
[3468]Supporting Actions
[3470]To achieve the foregoing objectives, the U.S. Govern-
[3472]. Ment will be prepared to increase the political, .economic,
[3474]psychological and military pressures, as appropriate
[3476]opportunities:
[3478]aaa SECRET
[3481]present themselves or can be created. The actions
[3483]- opportunities
[3484]oval and would
[3486]ow are those requiring immediate appr
[3488]listed bel
[3489]t forth below. Recommendations:
[3491]-pe initiated in the sequence se
[3493]etions based upon the re-examination of existing
[3495]for further &
[3496]t of. new programs related to.
[3498]progrems and upon the developmen
[3500]the foregoing objectives will be forthcoming.
[3502]1. tn addition to current covert program, | such &
[3504]intelligence collection, recruitment of Cuban
[3506]officials as agente, radio broadcasts, support of
[3508]the Cuban Revolutionary Coune!1 (cRE
[3509]and infiltration of propaganda
[3511]) and. other
[3513]exile group “activities
[3516]atensify covert collection of
[3518]a) continue ‘to! fn
[3520]intelLigence within Guba, especially within
[3522]the regime} _
[3523]in Cuban exiles,
[3525]b) Support the ‘efforts of certa
[3527]who are associated with the original aims of
[3529]the 26 of July Movement and who believe that
[3531]the Castro regime can be overthrown from
[3533]within in order that they may? 1) cause &
[3535]split in the leadexship of the regime at che
[3537]national or. provincial levels; afd. 2} cweshes |
[3539]wm mevse,
[3540]a be,
[3542]a political base of popular opposition to |
[3543]the regime; and, 3) secure intelligence;
[3545]— Assist ‘Cuban exiles in developing a capability
[3546]to launch balloons carrying leaflets and sther.
[3547]propaganda matertals from international. waters
[3549]into Cuba, Launch propaganda balloons after an
[3551]operat ional capability has been established.
[3553]2. Await results of. Mr. Denovan' @ imminent negotiations
[3555]zapubelshios 2,
[3557]with Fidel’ Castro for freeing the 20-0dd American
[3558]prisoners, Any of the actions Lteted below, if
[3560]see Fark aC I seh
[3562]taken before the conclusion of tre negotiations could
[3564]ry S
[3566]jeopardize their release.
[3568]od ote
[3570]If these negotiations fail, or when the prisoners are
[3572]recovered, proceed on the following timetable;
[3574]&. Inform NATO and OAS twelve hours in advance of the
[3576]Pe eer eT ee
[3578]proclamation of the four point shipping orders.
[3580](The proclamation calls fer the orders to go taco
[3582]effect in five days). These orders:
[3583]a. close United States ports to all vessels of 4 i
[3585]a country whose vebiels engage im carrying arms
[3587]to Cuba;
[3588]be:
[3590]a2 bots he
[3591]. Lett ate
[3593]- =" 6 - :
[3595]b. close United States ports ‘to any ship when hae
[3597]carried. pode. ‘in the blossCuba trade within 122
[3599]days of. the ine te seeks to enter. a United
[3601]States ports
[3603]prohibit. all United States lag entps end all
[3605]ships owned by United ‘States nationals ox residents
[3607]“from entering any ports of Cuba and from carrying
[3609]any: good ‘Wound. te or from Cubs; and
[3613]cad
[3614]a
[3618]<e
[3620]Q
[3622]or
[3624]3
[3628]the
[3634]lo
[3636]9
[3638]st
[3640]a
[3642]ned
[3645]6.
[3647]and medicine (fall Back position: extension of
[3648]‘arms embargo to all strategic items); 2) prohibit
[3649]Lon of AR. ‘ships from transporting embargoed items
[3650]and deny. use of ports to ships in Bloc- Cuba trade;
[3651]3) . “denial, of Soviet over-flights and transit
[3652]rights for. flights. to Cuba; and
[3653]4) a call oni other states to take similar
[3654]action, -_
[3655]After obtaining, the maximum possible. support of the key
[3656]countries of Mexico, Chile and Brazil, ‘the other OAS
[3657]members will be approached in Washington and in their
[3658]respective capitals, simultaneously. Ic should be
[3659]possible for this consultation and OAS action on the
[3660]resolutions to be completed within ten days. Prior to
[3661]formal COAS approval of the resolutions, we will infora
[3662]our NATO allies of the impending OAS action.
[3663]At the first NATO meeting after formal OAS action on the
[3664]resolutions, we will request that NATO include Cuba on the.
[3666]list of countries to which shipment of COCOM list (strategie)
[3668]items is prohibited.
[3671]. om ) SECRET
[3672]po
[3673]to get agreement from Free World industrial nations
[3674]to prevent shipping of critical spare parts and equipment
[3675]to Cuba, not on. the cocom, list: .
[3676]9; dn addition to: four point shipping resolutions, and
[3677]action under Section 107, of: the Foreign Assistance Act,
[3679]continue to press, Free World. nations to keep their
[3681]shipping out of Bloc~Cuba, trades
[3683]B. Contingency Planning —
[3685]New opportunities for ‘accomplishing our objectives may arise
[3686]either as a result of Bloc ‘action ‘in other parts of the world; as a
[3687]result of aggressive moves “(or Asolated hostile actions) by the
[3688]Castro-Communist regime itself; or as a result of uprisings or
[3689]internal conflict within Cuba.
[3691]Qur contingency planning, which will be undertaken immediately,
[3692]should include preparations for increased multilateral and/or
[3693]bilateral political and economic measures, large scale use of
[3694]Cubans who are nop inside Cuba; more extensive air activity
[3695]including both high and Low level flights primarily directed toward
[3696]aurveillance and collection of. intelligence, atid which may aleo
[3697]have the effect of embarrassing the Castro government and keeping
[3699]the Castro forces on continual alert; retaliatory measures, as
[3705]-ment of Cuban officials in other countries; severance of
[3707]communications to Cuba; major acts of sabotage on shipping
[3709]destined for Cuba and on key installations in Cuba: intensive
[3711]naval patrols; and, ultimately, the use of U. S. military
[3713]force, To the extent feasible, U. S. military forces employed
[3715]against Cuba should be accompanied by U. S. militarily-trained
[3717]desirous of
[3719]a a
[3721]HY 50955 Docld:322776061 Page 90
[3723]og (wim evisiws)
[3724]; =P OENTIAL
[3726](WITH TOP £2 7RET “NCLOSURES)
[3731]January 22, 1963 .
[3733]. Mo ONDUt FOR: Tne Honoval e Mele... ce “ume,
[3734]oe . .
[3735]foo a Te : All Members of she NSC Executive Committee
[3736]aeees ae . 3 CUBA - Back-up ?apers and a Summary of-
[3738]Recommendations of the Coordinator
[3739]of Cuban iffairs
[3741]; The enclosed navers are submitted by the Coordinator
[3742]of Cuban Affairs.
[3744]1. Summary of Coordinator's Recommendations.
[3745]2. United States Policy Toward Cuba.
[3747]3. United States Policy. in Cuba in the Organization
[3748]‘of American States.
[3750]4. United States Policy Toward the Cuban Brigace.
[3751]5. Current Problems Concerning Cuba.
[3753]It is understood that the recommendations will be
[3754]considered by EXCOM at their meeting at 10 a.m. on
[3755]Thursday, January 24.
[3757]Enclosures:
[3759]As stated.
[3761]CONFIDENTIAL
[3762]_ (WITH TOP SECRET ENCLOSURzS,
[3764]HW 50955 Docld: 32276061 Page 91
[3766]x BE
[3767]. SECRET
[3769]MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
[3771](Prepared for the Meeting of Friday, January 25, 19532, 10 a.m.)
[3775]FROM : Coordinator of Cuban Affairs
[3777]SUBJECT: Summary of Coordinator's Recommendations
[3779]1. _U. S. Policy Objectives
[3781]The following are the objectives of the U. S. with
[3782]respect to Cuba:
[3784]a. Protecting the security of the United States
[3785]and the other states of the Organization of
[3786]American States by assuring that offensive
[3787]weapons are not reintroduced into Cuba;
[3789]b. Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;
[3791]c. Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive
[3792]military action against other Caribbean states;
[3794]d. Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime
[3795]to direct and support subversion and insurrection
[3796]within the other OAS states;
[3798]e. Encouraging and supporting any developments
[3799]within Cuba that offer the possibility of
[3800]divorcing the Cuban Government from its
[3801]support of Sino-Soviet Communist purposes;
[3803]f. Encouraging and supporting any developments
[3804]within Cuba that offer the possibility of
[3806]replacing the Cuban Government with a regime
[3807]that would break with the Sino-Soviet Bloc, it
[3809]SECRET
[3811]NW 50955 Docld: 32276061 Page 92
[3813]Ps,
[3815]SECRET
[3817]Ja
[3819]being understood that cur ultimate objective
[3820]is replacement of the regime by one fully
[3821]compatible with the goals of the United States;
[3823]Maximizing the cost to the Soviet Union of
[3824]supporting the Castro regime;
[3826]Maximizing the political isolation of the
[3827]Castro regime from otner Free World states,
[3828]and especially from states of the OAS. When-
[3829]ever possible, U. S. actions against Cuba should |
[3830]be multilateral, preferably based upon the
[3831]Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) or on
[3832]resolutions adopted by the Crganization of
[3833]American States. The newly-won hemispheric
[3834]solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be
[3835]jeovardized by seeking CAS actions of marginal
[3836]value and which might split che hemisphere;
[3838]Being prepared to meet, with the employment
[3839]of appropriate U. S. combat elements and/or
[3840]logistical support, the wide variety of
[3841]military contingencies that may arise from
[3842]pursuit of the foregoing objectives; and
[3844]Producing comprehensive intelligence related
[3845]to the above objectives.
[3847]2. Supvorting Actions .,
[3849]Actions in support of these objectives and their
[3850]time sequence are set forth in the attached paper
[3851]entitled "U. S. Policy Toward Cuba." They include the
[3852]four point shipping regulations, OAS sanctions, NATO
[3854]HY 50955 Docla: 32276061
[3856]SECRET
[3858]Page 93
[3860]HW 50955
[3862]SECRET
[3866]action to include Cuba on the COCOM list, and approaches
[3868]to Free World industrial nations to eliminate sale and
[3869]shipment of critical items from their Cuban trade.
[3871]Existing programs will be reviewed and further
[3872]recommendations made as necessary. Planning for the
[3873]variety of contingencies related to Cuba will be undertaken
[3874]at once.
[3876]In addition to current covert programs such as
[3877]intelligence collection, recruitment of Cuban officials,
[3878]support of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) and
[3879]other exile activities, infiltration of propaganda
[3880]materials, and radio broadcasts, the following are
[3881]recommended for approval and immediate initiation:
[3883]a. intensified covert collection of intelligence
[3884]within Cuba, especially within the regime;
[3886]b. support of Cuban exiles who are seeking to
[3887]return the 26 of July Movement tc its
[3889]original aims.
[3891]NOTE: It should be noted that approval of the
[3892]foregoing actions may impair our ability
[3893]to accomplish objective b. (Removal of
[3894]remaining Soviet forces from Cuba) because
[3895]taking these actions could provide the
[3896]U,S.S.R. with rationale for maintaining
[3897]its forces in Cuba. Nevertheless, avproval
[3898]of the foregoing actions is recommended,
[3900]3. Cuban Brigade
[3902]Brigade leaders should be induced to accept a
[3903]specially tailored civilian. and military program for
[3904]Brigade members.
[3906]SECRET
[3908]Docld: 32276061 Page 94.
[3910]a ~
[3912]The Brigade should be disbanded as a military unit
[3913]and individual members urged to accent civilian training
[3914]or to enlist in the existing U. 5. military program
[3915]for Cubans and join a Brigade reserve unit thereafter.
[3916]Our moral obligation would be discharged tc the Brigade
[3917]members and creation of a privileged class in the exile
[3918]community would be avoided.
[3920]SECRET
[3922]HY 50955 Docld:32276061 Page 95 -
[3924]se. SECRET
[3926]MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATICNAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
[3928](Prepared for tne Meeting of Friday, January 25, 1963, 4 p.m.)
[3930]FROM : Coordinator of Cuban Affairs
[3932]SUBJECT: United: States Policy Toward Cuba
[3934]United States Policy
[3936]On November 20, the President set forth the broad guide-
[3937]lines of United States policy with respect to Cuba in the
[3938]following words:
[3940]"As for our part, if all offensive weapons systems are
[3941]removed from Cuba and kent out of the hemisphere in
[3942]the future, under adequate verification and safeguards,
[3943]and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive
[3944]communist purposes, there will be peace in the
[3945]Caribbean. And, as I said in September, ‘we shall
[3946]neither initiate nor permit aggression in this
[3947]hemisphere. '
[3949]"We will not, of course, abandon the political,
[3950]economic and other efforts of this hemisphere to halt
[3951]subversion from Cuba, nor our purpose and hope that
[3952]the Cuban people shall some day be truly free. -But
[3953]these policies are very different from any intent to
[3954]launch a military invasion of the island."
[3956]oor SECRET
[3958]HY 50955 Docld: 32276061 Page 96
[3960]GOP SECRET
[3964]Objectives
[3966]HY 50955 Docld: 32276061
[3968]Accordingly, the objectives of United States
[3969]policy with respect to Cuba are:
[3971]1.
[3973]Page 97
[3975]Protecting the security of the United States
[3976]and the other states of thé Organization of
[3977]American States (OAS) by assuring that
[3978]offensive weapons are not reintroduced into
[3979]Cuba3
[3981]Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;
[3983]Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive
[3984]military action against other Caribbean states;
[3986]Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime
[3987]to direct and support subversion and insurrection
[3988]within the other Hemi gphere states;
[3990]Encouraging and. ‘supporting any developments within
[3991]Cuba that offer the possibility of divorcing
[3993]the Cuban Government from its support of Sino-
[3994]Soviet Communist purposes;
[3996]Encouraging and supporting any developments
[3997]within Cuba that offer the possibility of
[3998]replacing the Cuban Government with a regime
[4000]that would break with the Sino-Soviet Bloc,
[4002]it being understood that our ultimate
[4003]objective is replacement of the regime by
[4004]one fully compatible with the goals of the
[4005]United States;
[4007]@e secart
[4009]10.
[4011]@ SECRET
[4015]Maximizing the cost to the Soviet Union of
[4016]supporting the Castro regime;
[4018]Maximizing the political isolation of the
[4019]Castro regime from other free world states,
[4020]and especially from states of the CAS.
[4021]Whenever possible, U. S. actions against Cuba
[4022]should be multilateral, preferably based upon
[4023]the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact)
[4024]or on resolutions adopted by the Crganization
[4026].of American States. The newly-won hemispheric
[4028]solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be
[4029]jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of marginal
[4030]value and which might split the hemisphere;
[4032]' Being prepared to meet, with the employment of
[4034]appropriate U. S. combat elements and/or
[4035]logistical support, the wide variety of
[4036]military contingencies that may arise from
[4037]pursuit of the foregoing objectives; and
[4039]Producing comprehensive intelligence related
[4040]to the above objectives.
[4042]Supporting Actions
[4044]HY 50955 Doclda: 32276061
[4046]A,
[4048]To achieve the foregoing objectives, the
[4050]U. S, Government will be prepared to increase
[4052]the political economic, psychological and
[4053]military pressures, as appropriate opportunities
[4054]present themselves or can be created. The
[4056]actions listed below are those requiring immediate
[4057]approval and would be initiated in the sequence
[4058]set forth below. Recommendations for further
[4060]SECRET
[4062]Page 98
[4064]@Qp SECRET
[4068]actions based upon the re-examination of
[4069]existing programs and upon the development
[4070]of new programs related to the foregoing
[4071]objectives will be forthcoming.
[4073]1. In addition to current covert program, such
[4074]as intelligence collection, recruitment of
[4075]Cuban officials as agents, radio broadcasts,
[4076]support of the Cuban Revolutionary Council(CRC)
[4077]and other exile group activities and infil- .
[4078]tration of propaganda materials:
[4080]a. Intensify covert éollection
[4081]of intelligence within Cuba, especially
[4082]within the regime;
[4084]b. Support the efforts of certain Cuban
[4085]exiles, who are associated with
[4086]the original aims of the 26 of July
[4087]Movement and who believe that the
[4088]Castro regime. can be overthrown from
[4089]within in order that they may:
[4090]i) cause a split in the leadership
[4091]of the regime at the national or
[4092]provincial levels; and 2) create a
[4093]political base of popular opposition
[4094]to the regime; and, 3) secure
[4095]intelligence;
[4097]c. Assist Cuban éxiles in developing a
[4098]capability to launch balloons carrying
[4099]leaflets and other propaganda materials
[4100]from international waters into Cuba.
[4101]Launch propaganda balloons after an
[4102]‘operational capability has been
[4103]established,
[4105]SECRET
[4107]HW 50955 Docld: 32276061 Page 99
[4109]HY 30955) Docld: 32276061
[4111]@ SECRET
[4115]With respect to the actions listed below,
[4116]the results of Mr. Donovan's imminent
[4117]negotiations with Fidel Castro for freeing
[4118]the 20-odd American prisoners should first.
[4119]be ascertained. If these actions were. taken
[4120]before the conclusion of the negotiations
[4121]they could jeopardize the release of the
[4123]‘Americans.
[4125]Page 100
[4127]Lf these negotiations fail, or when the
[4128]prisoners are recovered, proceed on the
[4129]following timetable:
[4131]Inform NATO and OAS twelve hours in advance
[4132]of the proclamation of the four point
[4133]shipping orders. (The proclamation calls for
[4134]the orders to go into effect in five days).
[4135]These orders:
[4137]a. Close United States ports to all
[4138]yessels of a country whose vessels
[4139]engage in carrying arms to Cuba;
[4141]b. Close United States ports to any ship
[4142]which has carried goods in the Bloc-
[4143]Cuba trade within 120 days of the time
[4144]it seeks to enter a United States port;
[4146]ec. Prohibit all United, States flag ships
[4147]and all ships owned by United States
[4148]nationals or residents from entering
[4149]any ports of Cuba and from carrying
[4150]any goods bound to or from Cuba; and
[4152]SECRET
[4154]ee SECRET
[4158]d. Prohibit any carge sponsored by any
[4159]department of the United States from
[4160]being shipped on vessels owned or
[4161]controlled by persons who own or
[4162]control vessels engaged in the trade
[4163]between Cuba and the Soviet Bloc.
[4165]5. At the termination of the U. S. Chiefs of
[4166]Mission Conference - January 20-30, or at
[4167]a later date dependent on the Donovan
[4168]mission, Assistant Secretary Martin, or
[4169]another representative of the President
[4170]will visit the Presidents of Chile, Mexico
[4171]and Brazil to convey to them the importance
[4172]President Kennedy attaches to maintaining
[4173]hemispheric solidarity by their supporting
[4174]the following resolutions:
[4176]a. An OAS resolution condemning Cuba for
[4177]its actions which continue to endanger
[4178]the peace, deploring refusal to allow
[4179]inspection, condemning the presence of
[4180]Soviet troops, recommending continued
[4181]surveillance and continued vigilance
[4182]against subversive activities, and
[4183]terminating the invocation of the Rio
[4184]Treaty on the missile crisis, together
[4185]with
[4187]b. An OAS resolution which would
[4188]recommend 1) extension of arms embargo
[4189]to all items of trade except food and
[4190]medicine (fall back position: extension
[4191]of arms embargo to all strategic items);
[4193]Po SECRET
[4195]HY 50955 Docld: 32276061 Page 101
[4197]HG 50955 Docld: 32276061
[4199]Page i102
[4201]SECRET
[4203]=~J=
[4205]2) “prohibition of shi 3 Of OAS.
[4206]‘member * states. “from evdveporteting
[4207]embargoed © ‘items and deny use of
[4208]ports ‘to ships: ‘in Bloc-Cuba trade;
[4209]3) “denial of Soviet ovér- flights and
[4210]transit rights for flights to Cuba;
[4211]and 4) “a call on other states to
[4212]take similar action.
[4214]After’ obtaining the maximum ‘possible
[4216]support of the key countries of Mexico,
[4218]@ and Brazil, the other OAS”
[4220]inembers will be approached in Washington
[4222]and. in their respective capitals,
[4224]simultaneously. ‘It ‘should be possible
[4226]‘for this’ consultation and OAS action on
[4228]‘the resoluti fons, to be completed within
[4230]Prior: ‘to formal COAS approval
[4232]Of the’ resolutions, we will inform our ©
[4233]NATO allies of the impending OAS action.
[4235]‘at thé first: NATO meeting ‘after formal
[4237]OAS action on the resolutions, we will
[4239]Yequest . that NATO includé Cuba on the
[4241]list of countries’ to which shipment’
[4243]PE OSE (strategic) items prohibited.
[4245]shipping of critical spare parts “ahd
[4246]equipment to Cuba, not on the COCOM list.
[4248]In addition to the four point shipping
[4249]resolutions, and action under Section
[4251]107. of the Foréign Assistance Act, continue
[4252]to press Free World nations to keep their
[4253]shipping out of Bloc-Cuba trade.
[4255]@g@ SECRET
[4257]B.
[4259]HW 50955 Docld: 32276061
[4265]Contigency Planning
[4267]New opportunities for accomplishing our
[4268]objectives may arise either as a result of Bloc
[4269]action in other parts of the world; as a result
[4270]of aggressive moves (or isolated hostile actions)
[4271]by the Castro-Communist regime itself; or as a
[4272]result of uprisings or internal conflict within
[4273]Cuba. |
[4275]Our contingency planning, which will be
[4276]undertaken immediately, should include preparations
[4277]‘for increased multilateral and/or bilateral
[4278]political) and economic measures, large scale use of
[4279]Cubans whto are now inside Cuba; more extensive
[4280]air activity including both high and low level
[4281]flights. primarily directed toward surveillance
[4283]* and collection of intelligence, and which may also
[4285]vhave the ‘effect of embarrassing the Castro
[4286]“government and keeping the Castro forces on
[4287]continual alert; retaliatory measures, as
[4288]appropriate, including the imposition of a
[4290]POL blockade; harrassment of Cuban officials in
[4291]other countries; severance of communic ations
[4293]to Cuba; major acts of sabotage on shipping
[4294]destined for Cuba and on key installations to
[4295]Cuba; intensive naval patrols; anc, ultimately,
[4296]the use jof U. S. military force. To the extent
[4297]feasible, U. S. military forces employed against
[4298]Cuba should be accompanied by U. S. militarily-
[4299]trained free Cubans and by the armed forces of
[4300]those Latin American nations desirous of
[4301]participating in the U. S. effort.
[4303]oe SECRET
[4305]Page 103
[4307]oo —  SecRET
[4308]MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
[4310](Prepared for the Meeting of Thursday, January 24, 1963, at 10 a.m)
[4312]‘FROM + Sterling J. Cottrell, Coordinator of Cuban Affairs.
[4314]SUBJECT: United States Policy re Cuba in the Organization of
[4315]American States. .
[4317]2 8, invoked the RIS “MSaty’ on’ Setober’22, "19625" int
[4318]thereto. “se Council of the OAS {COAS) continues to.act provisi
[4319]ally as tue Organ of Consultation under that Treaty. (0G)
[4321]Acting in this capacity, the COAS/OC on October 23 unanii
[4322]cassed'a resolution calling for the withdrawal of ali. cffensi
[4323]apons from Guba, recommending that member states take such ac
[4324]including the use of armed force, as might be necessary to preve
[4325]continued receipt of military supplies from the USSR and to prever::
[4326]the missiles in Cuba from threatening the peace of the hemisphere.
[4327]In accordance with the resolution of the COAS/OC, the U.S. insti-
[4328]tuted its quarantine. Argentina, Venezuela and the Dominican
[4329]Republic cooperated with us inthe quarantine and 3 others offered
[4330]their assistance. and facilities.
[4332]With the conclusion of the U.S.-Soviet talks in New York, the
[4333]Cuban problem reverts to the OAS context. With the Organ of Con+
[4334]sultation still in being and committees of the Council continuing
[4335]to concern themselves with subversion and possible. extension of
[4336]economic sanctions, the other American Republi¢s are waiting for
[4337]some lead from the U.S. as to what further steps could be taken,
[4339]COURSES
[4341]SECRET
[4343]HY 50955 Docld: 32276061 Page 104.
[4345]SECRET
[4347]2
[4349]COURSES OF ACTION |
[4351](1) Continue the Coas/oc in being ‘under the Rio Treaty but
[4353]‘take no further action at present.
[4355]Considerations:
[4357]The Rio Treaty was invoked and the COAS/OC brought into being
[4359]for the specific purpose of considering the October missile crisis.
[4360]If the purpose is considered fulfilled, the COAS/OC should either
[4361]be terminated or its authorization enlarged to deal with changed
[4362]circumstances.
[4364](2) Under the Rio Treaty seek a resolution in COAS/OC_which
[4366]condemns Cuba for its actions which continue to endanger the peace, .
[4368]deplores refusal to allow inspection, condemns the presence of
[4369]Soviet troops and recommends continued surveillance and continued
[4370]vigilance against subversive activities.
[4372]Considerations:
[4374]This would promote U.S. objectives vis-a-vis Cuba and would —
[4375]represent one feasible, approprite, immediate step. following the
[4376]conclusion of the U.S.-Soviet New York talks.
[4378]Although the language would have to be negotiated, it is
[4379]believed that unanimity or near-unanimity could be obtained.
[4381]Recent statements by Cuban leaders calling for armed insur-
[4382]rection in Latin America would be exploited in this connection.
[4384]It could be criticized for not constituting sufficiently
[4385]vigorous action on the problem of Soviet troops, but it would put
[4386]the OAS on record against their continued presence in the hemis-~
[4388]phere and dramatize Castro's continued military subservience to
[4389]_ the Soviet Union.
[4391]' (3) Terminate the COAS/OC on the missile crisis. This
[4392]would still leave COAS with its responsibilities under Resolutions
[4393]‘TI and VIII of Punta del Este. (Which provided for a Special Consul-
[4394]tative Committee on Sgcurity and a a Special ala to study» ‘the
[4395]further suspension of trade. )
[4397]Considerations:
[4399]This step could be considered logical, since the COAS/OC was”
[4400]called into being to deal only with the October missile crisis.
[4402]Taken
[4404]SECRET
[4406]‘HW 50955 Docld:32276061 Page 105
[4411]Considerations:
[4413]action.
[4416]_ SECRET
[4420]Taken by itself, this course of action might maise doubts
[4421]concerning the inter-American legal basis under which we are
[4422]continuing our surveillance. ;
[4424]Psychologically, if this were the only action taken, it would
[4425]appear aS though the OAS considered the crisis over, the presence
[4426]of Soviet troops unimportant, and its principle of verification
[4427]surrendered (on-site inspection and -re~introduction of offensive
[4428]weapons) O
[4430](4) Combine (2) and (3).
[4432]Considerations:
[4434]. This combination of actions is feasiblesand is likely to
[4435]obtain unanimity or near-unanimity.
[4437]The termination'of the COAS/OC makes strong language in the
[4438]resolution more acceptable to the "soft" minority.
[4440]Termination of the OOAS/OC, even accompanied by the proposed
[4441]resolution, is open to some of the criticism indicated under (3).
[4442]‘Much of this could be mitigated if, however, the action is accom
[4443]panied by the action suggested in (9), which imposes economic
[4444]sanctions, ,
[4446]_ (5) Seek .to enlarge the basis on which the Rio Treaty was
[4447]invoked to encompass the presence of Soviet troops and seek a
[4448]Fesolution in COAS/OC calling for their withdrawal.
[4452]With adequate consultation and preparation, we should be able
[4453]to obtain a substantial majority. .
[4455].. Such action would’ give a better basis for urging such addi-
[4456]tional steps as (6) and (7) and (8).
[4458]It would seem undesirable to take this course by itself unless
[4459]we seriously contemplate taking some additional strong enforcement
[4461](6) In addition to (5 seek authorization under the Rio
[4462]Treaty for collective action, including the use of armed force,
[4464]to bring about the withdrawal of Soviet troops in Cuba if the
[4466]- OAS call is not heeded. :
[4468]Considerations:
[4470]SECRET
[4472]HW 50955 DBocld:32276061 Page 106
[4474]4
[4475]4
[4476]|
[4477]|
[4478]a
[4479]i
[4480]if
[4482]i
[4483]4
[4484]|
[4485]4
[4487]Considerations:.
[4489]; This action should be seriously considered only if we are
[4490]determined to use all possible means to obtain removal of Soviet
[4491]troops. ;
[4493]While it should be possible with adequate consultation and
[4494]preparation to obtain a substantial majority for further political
[4495]and ecoriomic sanctions to help bring about the withdrawal of Soviet .
[4496]troops, it would be difficult to-obtain the necessary 2/3 majority
[4497]for authorization of the.use of armed force.
[4499](7) Seek a resolution in.the COAS/Octo sever_all diplomatic
[4500]and consular relations with Guba (probably possible o in con-
[4502]Considerations:
[4504]_ This would be consistent with general U.S. policy to increase
[4505]the isolation of Cuba, but contrary to some present policies ;
[4506]encouraging the maintenance of certain diplomatic missions in Cuba.°
[4508]Although we could probably obtain the necessary 2/3 vote for
[4509]such action (particularly if couched as a recommendation) it would
[4510]be stoutly resisted by Mexico and Brazil and opposed by Chile,
[4511]Bolivia and Uruguay, whose contrary arguments’ would have some appeal.
[4513]Probably no more than maximum of 15 votes could be obtained
[4514]for this. . : ;
[4516](8) Seek_a resolution in the COAS/OC to sever all. economic.
[4517]and commercial relations and all communications with Cuba .
[4518](probably possible only in conjunction with (5) or (11).
[4520]Considerations:
[4522]The severance of all economic and commercial relations would
[4523]go beyond our current embargo on trade with Cuba which provides
[4524]for the exception on humanitarian grounds of the export from the
[4525]U.S..to Cuba of certain foods, medicines, and medical supplies.
[4526]Such action would: expose us to charges of inhumanity and would
[4527]probably nullify our. public statements that we have no quarrel
[4528]with the Cuban people. ,
[4530]A momber of telecommunications between Latin America and
[4532]_ Europe are routed through Cuba. Prohibition of these services
[4534]would interrupt commnications vital to many of our Latin American
[4535]friends. Further, U.S.. communications with Cuba should be main-
[4536]tained to facilitate the transmission of messages in the national
[4537]interest and those for humanitarian reasons. _—
[4539]These
[4540]SECRET
[4542]HW 50955 Docla: 32276061 Page 107
[4544]HY 50955
[4546]@ SECRET & |
[4547]5
[4549]These considerations would make it extremely difficult to
[4550]obtain a 2/3 majority in the COoAS/OC.
[4552](9) Seek resolution in . COAS under Resolution. VIII of Punta
[4553]del Este which would recommend: .
[4555]~(a) extension of arms embargo to all items of trade except
[4556]food and medicine (Fall back position: extension of
[4557]arms embargo to all strategic items);
[4559](b) prohibition of AR ships from transporting embargoed
[4560]items and deny use of ports to ships in Bloc-Cuba trade;
[4562](c) denial of over-flights and transit rights to Soviet air-
[4563]eraft on bloc-Cuba runs. (Points (b) and (c) could also
[4564]be added to No. (8).)
[4566]Considerations:
[4568]This is feasible and consistent with our objectives, and could
[4569]be taken independently of other steps.
[4571]With adequate consultation and preparation, near-unanimity.
[4572]should be possible. Brazil would probably not go along. The actual
[4573]effect of extending the embargo so far as Latin America is concerned
[4574]4s more psychological than practical because Latin American countries
[4575]ship little except food to Cuba. But it would show forward movement
[4576]and would provide a useful argument with our allies if it included an
[4577]appeal to other Free World nations to take similar steps. .
[4579]It would offer a helpful (though not necessary) basis for U.S. |
[4580]unilateral steps in’controlling shipping, implementing 107 of the
[4581]Foreign Assistance Act, and for ‘urging other states to control Soviet
[4582]flights to Guba. |
[4584](10) Intensify through COAS and. SCCS programs of recommended
[4585]controls over subversive activities. Seek. COAS resolution warning .
[4586]Castro that continued subversive activity may 2 result in action
[4587]under Rio Treaty. a ;
[4589]Considerations:
[4591]The course described in the first sentence of (10) is being.
[4592]presently pursued under the decision taken at Punta del Este and
[4593]should be continued... However, it would be difficult to get unani-
[4594]mous or near unanimous support for the warning resolution because
[4595]of the reference to the Rio Treaty
[4597]Myatt
[4599]Docla: 32276061, Page 108, +
[4602]den hin gins AW ea Paha SER al
[4604]SE a ERAT ant Bene IB wi eb
[4606]‘MW 50955 Docld:32276061 Page 109. |
[4608]SECRET
[4609]“
[4611](11) Invoke Rio Treaty on basis of Castro's continued
[4613]subversive activities. ,
[4614]Considerations:
[4616]If we desire to institute more vigorous collective sanctions vs.
[4617]the Castro regime for its subversive activities, it would be. neces-
[4618]sary to invokethe Rio Treaty since the present functions given the
[4619]COAS and Special Consultative Committee on Security (SCCS) under
[4620]Resolution II of Punta del Este provide authority only for surveil-
[4621]lance and recommendations to governments for control measures.
[4623]The primary threat of Castro is his subversive activities in
[4624]the hemisphere. Should the level of Castro-directed subversive -
[4625]activities in the Hemisphere increase appreciably, this would become
[4626]a more feasible and desirable course. This becomes an increasing
[4627]possibility in view of Castro's recent speech inciting insurrection
[4628]in Latin America.
[4630]The basis of any such action should consist of the production
[4631]of hard evidence of the direct involvement of the Cuban regime in
[4632]subversive activities in the hemisphere. There is, however, in«
[4633]sufficient hard evidence available at this time to obtain COAS
[4634]menue (A U.S. project to collate all available evidence is under
[4635]way - oo
[4637](12) Assign the functions and operations of the Advisory _
[4639]Defense Committee (ADC) to the Inter-American Defense Board {IADB}.
[4641]This could be done: 7 ;
[4643](a) by amending the OAS Charter to assign ADC functions to.
[4644]the IADB; ;
[4646]. (ob) by the CoAS seeking the advice of the IADB; or
[4648](ce) having the OAS member governments designate their
[4649]representatives on the IADB to serve also on the ADC.
[4651]Considerations:
[4653]As to (a), the proposed amendment would have to be referred
[4654]to the Quito Conference (whose date has not been set). Moreover,
[4655]amendment of the Charter is a difficult and tortuous process and
[4656]requires ratification by 2/3 of the member governnents.
[4658]As to (b), this-is a feasible course of action which the
[4660]' COAS/OC could take without specific authority. It might be diffi-
[4662]cult, however, depending on the circumstances, to persuade the
[4663]Council of the desirability of such action, —
[4665]As.
[4666]SECRET © .
[4668]—— SRORET .
[4672]As to (ce), member governments could take this course on an_
[4673]individual basis, but it would be necessary to convince them that
[4674]“exceptional circumstances" prevailed which would justify this fl
[4675]. action under the OAS Charter. ST ,
[4677]COORDINATOR'S RECOMMENDATION |
[4679]In selecting the optimum combination of actions to take with
[4680]respect to the OAS, the political feasibility and international |
[4681]complications were key factors which I have carefully considered. |
[4683]Courses of action: (2) (3) (4) (9) (10) and (12) would advance
[4684]us toward our objective, would. be politically feasible, and would
[4685]involve minimum adverse international efféets. We could probably.
[4686]obtain a near-unanimous vote in thé OAS for these courses except |
[4687](10) and (12)...
[4689]Courses (2) (5) (6) (9) (10) (411) and (12) would advance us
[4690]considerably further toward our objective, but (6) and (11)
[4691]particularly could create a split in hemispheric unity, and would
[4692]involve adverse international effects, including alprobable acute
[4693]confrontation with the USSR.
[4695]I believe courses (1) (7) and (8) will not serve our best
[4696]interests at this time.
[4698]T recommend that we take immediately courses (4) and (9).
[4700]Course (4) calls for (a) a COAS/OC resolution under the Rio
[4701]Treaty which condemns Cuba for its actions which continue to
[4702]endanger the peace, deplores refusal to allow inspection, condemns
[4704]- the presence of Soviet troops and recommends continued surveil-
[4705]lance and continued vigilance against subversive activities, and
[4706](b) terminate the coas/OC on the missile crisis. This would still
[4707]leave COAS with its responsibilities under Resolutions II and VIII
[4708]of Punta del Este which provided for a Special Consultative
[4709]Committee on Security and for the COAS to study the further suse.
[4710]pension of trade. oo ,
[4712]— .
[4714]Course: (9) calls for a resolution in COAS under Resolution
[4716]VIII of Punta del Este which would recommend:
[4718](a) extension of arms embargo to all items of trade except
[4719]food and medicine (Fallback position: extension of
[4720]arms embargo to all strategic items);
[4722](b)
[4724]ERE QTE ARON EOE RTE eC NN MI ETE TE TTS IT AUT IIH GT TE FUME LET WALES CTE ERE REE TES
[4726]SECRET
[4728]oe BREET
[4730]HY 50955 Docld: 32276061 Page 110
[4733]8.
[4735](ob) prohibition of AR ships from transporting. embargoed items
[4736]and deny use of ports to ships in Bloc-Cuba trade;
[4738]“ (e) denial of overflights and transit rights to Soviet air-
[4739]eraft on Bloc-Cuba runs.
[4741](a) a call upon other Free World nations to take similar
[4742]actions.
[4744]Rationale
[4746]- ‘The steps I recommend would start movement forward towards our
[4747]objective, carrying the OAS with uss without committing us to any
[4748]‘further action.
[4750]' After these initial measures are in effect, 1 we should assess
[4751]the situation and determine the feasibility of moving forward with
[4752]any of the remaining courses of action, or any new courses which
[4753]may be opened ‘to us by events.
[4755]‘I believe we should. develop our pressures steadily and gradu
[4756]ally, bringing the OAS along with us, and keeping the situation
[4757]under constant review for the optimum opportunity. to initiate
[4758]additional measures.
[4760]‘I do not: believe we should take’a track now utiich will break
[4761]heint spheric cuilty$ We may need unity later in. an. emergency.
[4763]Neither do I “Believe we should push the OAS into probable
[4764]acute confrontation with the USSR at this time.
[4766]_ Both. of. sthese prices the U. 5. may find it necessary to: pay.
[4767]: for action, ata later date ‘but not NOWs in my opinion..
[4769]SECRET
[4771]HY 50955 Doclda: 32276061. Page 1a
[4773]we ® _ ®
[4775]SECRET -
[4777]MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTLVE COMMITTEE
[4779](Prepared for the Meeting of Thursday, January 24, 1963, at 10 a.m)
[4781]FROM 3 Coordinator of Cuban Affairs
[4783]SUBJECT: — Cuban Brigade
[4785]PROBLEM
[4787]“To determine the future of the Cuban
[4789]Brigade (participants in the Bay of
[4790]Pigs invasion recently released from
[4791]Cuban prisons), and other Cubans who
[4792]participated in or trained for the
[4793]invasion. To determine the future of
[4794]existing Cuban training programs.
[4796]DISCUSSION
[4798]Approximately 1500 Cubans participated in the Bay
[4799]of Pigs invasion (known as Brigade 2506), the great
[4800]majority of whom were captured. In December 1962 over
[4801]1100 were released. —_
[4803]- & decision on the future of the Cuban Brigade and
[4804]- other Cubans trained militarily by the U. S. must logically
[4805]_proceed from whatever over all policy the U. 5. adopts
[4806]‘toward Cuba. .
[4808], A trained Cuban Brigade would be of relatively _
[4809]marginal military value because of its quantitative
[4810]Limitations and restricted military capability, but its
[4812].” SECRET
[4814]HW 50955 Docld:32276061 -Page 112
[4816]Leth NCb bee haba tee eaten A aS Dey tac Eo nt TLRS et ie oS
[4817], «
[4819]2 HW 50955 Docld: 32276061 Page 113
[4821]SECRET
[4825]politico-psychological value as a symbol of Cuban
[4826]resistance to Castro/Communism may more than compensate
[4827]for its limited military utility.
[4829]Any moral responsibility to the Brigade must be
[4830]weighed.
[4831]COURSES OF ACTION
[4832]Three courses of action appear |
[4833]feasible with respect to the
[4835]'Brigade's future.
[4837](1) Induce the Brigade to disband as a military
[4839]unit, with no: further U. S. special assistance.
[4841]If this policy were adopted, Brigade members and
[4842]their families would be eligible for the benefits now
[4843]accorded to all needy Cuban refugees in the Miami area
[4844](approximately 105,000). These benefits are equivalent
[4845]to those received by American citizens in Dade County,
[4846]Florida who are in need. The principal ones include:
[4847]financial grants of up to $100 per month for a family
[4848]and up to $60 a month for an individual; hospitalization
[4849]and out-patient facilities at county and private hospitals
[4851]for acute illnesses; distribution of surplus food commodities;
[4853]employment counseling; resettlement, including transportation
[4854]and a transition grant; foster care for unaccompanied
[4856]' children; special English and refresher courses for doctors
[4858]and Lawyers at University of Miami; a student loan program
[4860]. for Cubans attending U. S. universities provides .
[4862]vp to $1,000 a year; supplemental assistance to Dade
[4863]County, Florida, is provided by HEW to cover 50 percent of
[4864]cost of educating Cuban refugee children in primary |
[4866]and secondary schools; payment for a substantial part
[4868]of special language courses and vocational training; and
[4870]_ physical examinations and inoculations at time of
[4872]entry into the U. 5.
[4874]SECRET
[4879]DOD has a program providing for enlistment in the
[4880]a U. S. Army of those Cuban nationals between the ages of 18
[4881]and 30 who pass entrance requirements. (A similar program
[4882]for the Navy covers ages 18-26). The program provides
[4883]20-22 weeks of training at the conclusion of which they
[4884]are transferred as individuals to U. S. Reserve ‘status.
[4885]They are not required to know English. A‘two week period.
[4886]for resettlement is also provided at the termination of
[4887]the training.
[4889]Another DOD program enables former officers of the
[4890]Cuban Army, Navy and Air Force to volunteer on a highly
[4891]selective basis for programs in the U. &. Armed Forces.
[4892]Training periods are from 20 to 36 weeks. English is
[4893]necessary.. The officers are in civilian status. They
[4894]receive a salary from the Cuban Revolutionary Council and
[4895]a per diem through DOD from AID funds which are no longer
[4896]available. :
[4898]Considerations:
[4900]This course of action would provide the simplest and
[4901]most economical way of disposing of the problem, provide
[4902]equal treatment for all eligible Cuban refugees; equivalent
[4903]to benefits offered to American citizens.
[4905]Individual Cubans could continue to be accepted for
[4906]service in the U. S. Armed Forces and their language, skill
[4907]and country knowledge could be distributed through various
[4908]U. S. units which might be used in an invasion.
[4910]The unsatisfactory aspects of this course are that
[4911]it would appear to run counter to expectations of the Brigade
[4912]as a result of Administration statements and actions; it:
[4913]would result in substantial loss of whatever "mystique"
[4914]the Brigade possesses, which might be useful in unifying
[4915]Cuban refugees; and a phasing out of this kind would
[4916]probably engender some adverse political. reaction
[4917]domestically as well as from the Brigade and its
[4918]sympathizers: Also it might have an undesirable effect
[4919]on opinion in Latin America and other parts of the .
[4920]Free World concerning the determination of the United States
[4922]SECRET _
[4925]a
[4926]po
[4927]OES
[4928]b
[4929]. he
[4930]Re
[4931]i
[4933]Ee
[4935]‘a
[4936]Ey
[4937]be
[4938]e
[4940]i
[4941]4
[4943]HW 50955 Docld:32276061 Page 114 .
[4945]- SECRET
[4947]when
[4949]to unseat the Castro regime, and would lend weight to
[4951]arguments that the U. S. may be leaning toward coexistence
[4952]with the Castro regime.
[4954](2) Train the Brigade and Cubans in training as a
[4955]unit. Maintain and support them as a military reserve
[4956]component of the U. S. Armed Forces.
[4958]Considerations:
[4960]Under this course of action whater "mystique" the
[4962]. Brigade possesses in the anti-Castro community could perhaps
[4963]‘be exploited in the struggle for Cuban liberation, and used
[4965]to bring about greater unity in the Cuban anti-Castro exile
[4969]‘community.
[4971]It would constitute an immediate political and
[4972]psychological advantage by demonstrating to the Cubans
[4973]within Cuba, to the Cuban exile community, and to Latin
[4974]Americans, the U. S. determination to establish a
[4975]striking force symbolic of U. S. intent to overthrow the
[4976]present Cuban regime.
[4978]It would satisfy one of the principal desires expressed
[4979]by top Brigade leaders and would promote prestige and esprit
[4981]_ among its members. It would appear to be in consonance with
[4983]the statements and actions of the Administration in
[4984]connection with. the future of the Brigade.
[4986]But it would inevitably become a focal point for
[4987]Cuban exile political activities in the Miami area, and
[4988]morale, discipline and esprit. would be difficult to
[4989]maintain over the long term without early employment to
[4990]retake Cuba. It could generate domestic political and
[4991]military criticism by incorporating organized alien groups
[4992]in the U. S. armed forces reserve: component. There is a
[4994]SECRET
[4996]HY 50955 Docldad: 32276061 Page 115
[4998]ry 2
[5000]SECRET
[5002]756
[5004]risk that an impulsive, irrational act by Brigade members,
[5005]as members of the U. S. reserve forces, could be a source of
[5006]serious embarrassment to the U.S .
[5008](3) Tailor a special civilian and military program -
[5009]for Brigade members. Encourage the Brigade to continue —
[5010]as_a ''fraternal'' unit similar to the "Flying Tigers".
[5011]Encourage those Brigade members who enter the current
[5013]military training program for Cubans to establish a
[5014]Brigade military reserve component which other U. S.
[5015]militarily-trained Cubans could join.
[5017]Under existing authority, HEW could provide the
[5018]following additional benefits for Brigade members in
[5019]need, over and above those now offered: special emp Loy-
[5020]ment counseling and placement service; extended student
[5021]loans to provide for all institutional costs such as
[5022]tuition, books, etc., even if this exceeds $1,000 per
[5023]year (living costs to be provided by another agency);
[5024]expanded vocational training in the Miami area; increased
[5025]financial assistance to needy persons while in training;
[5026]increased distribution of surplus food (with approval —
[5027]of the Department of Agriculture).
[5029]The following additional programs could be under-
[5030]taken by HEW upon Presidential determination that such
[5032]_ action would contribute to the defense and security
[5034]of the United States or advance its foreign policy
[5035]interests: scholarship grants for students; loans for
[5036]vocational training anywhere in the United States; an
[5037]expanded training program similar to a G. I. Bill of
[5038]Rights, in the United States and/or abroad. The cost
[5040]of these additional programs, assuming an expenditure
[5042]of $2,5 500 ‘per person per year would be about $2.5 million.
[5044]SECRET
[5046]HW 50955 Docld: 32276061 Page 116
[5050]SECRET
[5052]-J~
[5054]Establishment of additional programs, after a
[5055]Presidential determination, would increase’ costs even
[5056]more, and be subject to wider criticism as “unnecessary”
[5058]‘privileges for Brigade members. .
[5060]COORDINATORS 'S RECOMMENDATION
[5061]1. I recommend course (3), a specially tailored
[5062]program for Brigade members.
[5064]2. I recommend against a Presidential determination
[5065]providing broader privileges for Brigade members.
[5067]3. I recommend no change in existing U. S. military
[5069]training programs for Cubans, except that a Brigade reserve
[5071]unit should be authorized and other Cuban reservists should
[5073]be permitted to join. —
[5075]4. I recommend that the Brigade be induced rather than
[5076]forced to accept this proposal, and intend.to arrange ©
[5077]consultation with them immediately if this course of
[5078]action is approved.
[5080]Rationale
[5082]Lacking an immediate military use for the Brigade we
[5083]should disband the Brigade as such. Since we may in the
[5084]future desire the presence in the U..S.. Armed Forces of
[5085]militarily-trained Cubans, we should encourage Brigade:
[5086]members to enlist in the existing. military training |
[5087]program for. Cubans and to enter-a U.S. Reserve Unit
[5089]thereafter.
[5091]SECRET.
[5093]an 50955 BDoclda: 32276061 Page 117
[5095]SECRET ©
[5099]Our programs should be designed to encourage
[5100]the Brigade members to melt back into the exile
[5101]community and engage in constructive pursuits
[5102]pending the liberation of Cuba. We should offer
[5103]them some special assistance but not to the extent
[5104]that they become a perpetual privileged class
[5105]within the community, Presidential action on their
[5106]behalf would single them out unnecessarily.
[5108]SECRET
[5110]AW 50955 Doclda: 32276061 Page 116
[5112]SECRET
[5114]‘ MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL" S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
[5116]a0,
[5118]oO (Prepared for the Meeting of Thursday, January 23, (1963 at 10 a.m)
[5120]FROM : Coordinator of Cuban Affairs
[5122]SUBJECT: Current Problems Concerning Cuba
[5124]Ll. Verification of withdrawal of missiles.
[5125]' 2. Removal. of Soviet troops: from Cuba.
[5127]3. Release of all Americans in Cuban prisons PRE
[5128]Mr. Robert. Geddes, British subject married to a
[5129]Joc U. S. citizen. ae
[5131]~ +. & © Cuban subversive activities in the Western
[5132]Hemisphere. : .
[5133]poo ce — p. dd wade ;
[5134]: : De Future activities of Mr, Donovan. Af
[5136]6. Policy on low-level aerial surveillance as a
[5137]political weapon against the Castro regime.
[5139]7. Policy re such Cuban groups as Alpha 66, Cuban
[5140]Revolutionary Council and exile groups.
[5142]8. Preparation of a’ Psychological Annex to the basic X
[5143]' paper on U. S. Policy Toward Cuba.
[5145]7 9. Policy on extent of attributability acceptable in -
[5146]intensified intelligence collection; Policy on
[5147]illegal infiltration and exfiltration.
[5149]| ; 10. ‘ Policy on resumption of KLM, Mexicana and Iberia
[5150]_ flights to Cuba.
[5154]HY 50955 Docld: 322376061 Page. 119
[5157]‘ a“
[5159]HY 50955 Docld: 32276061 Page 1270 .
[5161]QE
[5162]s,
[5163]= hissdgdumeat consists or
[5165]a
[5167]CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GkMcuee le —Sepies, z
[5169]° _Utie moatertal contatus information affecting the National Defense of the United Guates within the meaning of the Fsptenare Laws, Tithe
[5170]18, U.S.C, Gees. 793 and TH4, the trancmiasion or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorised petson {a probibited by law.
[5172]S-E -C- R-E~T: . .
[5173]“NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/CONTROLLED DISSEM/BACKG TROUND USE ONLY
[5177]THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION, SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL CF CONTENT 1S TENTATIVE,
[5179]country Cuba. a "REPORT NO. = CS DB-3 /652,924
[5180]"SUBJECT Analysis of the Cuban © DATE DISTR. . 17 January 1963.
[5181]a Situation by the Italian . . a
[5182]Embassy in Habana .. : “ NO. PAGES 4
[5183]eo : REFERENCES RD~W-2088 GO :
[5184]Te ce a - RD-W-2107 4
[5185]DATE OF - | 6 December 1962 | . :
[5186]INFO - co
[5187]PLACE & italy, Rome . . } pedeed |
[5188]DATE ACQ. (21 December 1962) | ; FIELD REPORT NO.
[5190]al
[5192]source: -.-A qualified, astute observer (B) who has contacts in the
[5193]Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Appraisal of :
[5194].Content: 2, that the document is genuine, ~ | . : oo
[5196]The following is a translation of a report dated
[5197]. a 6 December 1962 sent by the Italian Embassy in,
[5198]ee Habana to the Italian Ministry of Foreign Aftairs,
[5200]In my dispatch of 9 November I reported on some of the.
[5201]_ conSiderations. regarding the consequences which the recent
[5202]‘> erisis could have on the international position of Cuba. I
[5203]'. ‘will now add some comments on the ‘conjecture which has been
[5204]reported by some members of our representations. , Soe
[5206]1) The possibility that there will-soon be a loosening of -
[5207]: . the political and economic ties with the USSR appears to me .
[5208]_.t0 be nil at this time. The fuct that the talks with Mikoyan
[5209]were long-and-difficult and that Castro expressed in private
[5210]- his opinion on Khrushchev (wishing that Stalin were still
[5211]alive) does not mean that he can and will renounce ‘that |
[5212]Soviet assistance which is vital to him. This assistance
[5213]cannot be replaced by the Chinese.
[5215]Certainly the Chinese Ambassador to Habana will have a
[5217]‘done everything possible to convince Castro to resist (and
[5219]in fact the latter held firm on the question of inspéction).
[5220]“Certainly the activity of the Chinese representation here is
[5221]intense. But the Peiping Government cannot replace the USSR
[5223].in economic assistance. It does not seem probable to me
[5225]that /China7 can furnish more than it has furnished to date,
[5227]which consists of second quality foodstuffs, yather shoddy ©
[5229]Po :  gemeeR-EeT .
[5230]' NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/CONTROLLED DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY.
[5232]herr 1
[5234]GIour ya
[5236]“ LGecheded free yoo}
[5240]! . Se . estate Weuibeetion
[5243](Note: Washington distribution Indleatod by “X") Fleld distribution by “F203.
[5245]HY 50955 Docld:32276061 Page 171
[5247]FE a RT EER AR RE EERE
[5249]oN
[5251]. . > S-E-C-R-E-T
[5252]NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DIS _M ABROAD/CONTROLLED DISSE%,3ACKGROUND USE ONLY &
[5254]& o
[5258]“wool and silk material, and many trifles of which the stores ;
[5259]im Habana are full. AS for machinery and spare parts, /China7
[5261]is not in a position to compete with that merchandise supplied
[5263]by the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland. : ;
[5265]In substance Castro, even if he cannot exactly be defined
[5267]aS pro~Khrushchev, is tied to the USSR in.such a way that he
[5268]cannot for any reason release himself. I recall in this”
[5269]regard that on 2 November, after the visit of U Thant during
[5270]the most acute moment of the crisis in Cuban-Soviet relations,
[5271]he declared, "We are above all Marxist-Leninists and friends ; : ;
[5273]Of the USSR. There will be no breaches in our relations. Lf
[5275]Given this, I feel that the statements of the vice director ©
[5276]of TASS as reported by the Embassy in Helsinki are a ‘good aa
[5277]resume of the situation, i.e., a) Soviet leaders have for ~ a
[5278]some time felt perplexed with regard to Castro's character a
[5279]and person because he is reluctant to be "guided" docilely by ._.
[5280]Moscow.’ b) The USSR will continue ‘to give all its economic ot
[5282]support to Cuba because otherwise its prestige would suffer a. - y
[5283]grave , blow particularly in Latin America. ,
[5285]2) Also excluded, it appears to me, is the possibility that .
[5287]_ ° the revo luv ionary regime of Castro can be changed into.a . CoA
[5288]“- "Pitousi” regime. It is comprehensible that, as Ambassador me 4
[5289]Zoppi reported, some "non-aligned" countries and even some
[5290]Latin American countries desire’Such a change and ‘are doing
[5291]everything possible to provcke it. It is also possible that
[5292]* gome Cubans share these sentiments, But, in my opinion, it
[5294]is impossible that such a change can take- place while Castro -
[5296]is in power. AS I pointed out in my previous report, it is
[5298]not in Castro's temperament to become "non-aligned",' to
[5300]imitate anyone, and even less to’take Tito as a model.
[5302]Therefore Castro would have to be eliminated, and this
[5304]possibility seems very remote.
[5306]3) As I noted in my 9 November report it is difficult for
[5307]Castro to remain calm. Therefore the revolutionary regime
[5308]will continue with all means at its disposition to disseminate -
[5309]subversive propaganda in the whole continent, as demonstrated
[5310]-by the fact that all the states of Latin America (including
[5311]Mexico) are taking Strong meaSures against the dissemination
[5312]of thie propaganda. But it is doubtful that today Castro can
[5313]do much more and that he constitutes a real menace to the
[5314]security of other countries, if only because he lacks the.
[5315]necessary funds, I tend to. share tHe opinion of the
[5316]Ambassador -to Brazil that the Cuban leaders are trying to
[5317]concentrate all their subversive efforts in one country, and
[5318]that they have selected Venezuela for various reasons, includ-
[5319]ing the old ill feeling between Castro and Betancourt. I note
[5320]in passing that, according to what was told me by the afore-
[5321]_- mentioned Ambas ssador, ‘during the recent meeting of the OAS the
[5322]- Venezuelan representative accused the Cubans of promoting the’
[5323]_ recent attempts in his country but, when asked to furnish
[5324]' proof, he was unable to do so. He
[5326]It would certainly be highly desirable if a serious
[5327]pressure action on Cuba could be exercised within a purely
[5328]Latin American framework as pointed out by our Embassy in
[5330]Ba ‘ .
[5331]. . ae :
[5332]\ De er
[5335]No FOREIGN DISSEN/NO DISSEM. ABROAD/CONTROLLED DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY
[5341]) BW 50955 Docld:32276061 Page 122
[5343]i
[5345]_ ‘
[5346]NQ-- FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DLUUEM
[5348]NN  §_BeclRUE-?
[5350]o
[5352](= 3 - CSDB-3/652 ,924
[5356]Buenos Aires. But it is an extremely remote possibility. The.”
[5358]ABROAD/CONTROLLED DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY
[5360]countries which could do it do not have the necessary material —
[5362]means. <A partial scluticn would worsen the situation and a
[5363]definitive solution could be directed only by Washington. [-
[5365]. think therefore that only pressure which is accompanied by.
[5366]“material Strength can obtain results in Cuba. : ; -
[5368]In conclusion, in judging the Cuban situation it is
[5370]necessary first to keep in mind the personality and temperament
[5371]of Fidel Castro, the influence which he has on a part of the. —
[5373]" population, and finally his deep-rooted hate of the United
[5374].. States. - It is useless to say that the Cuban revolutionary
[5375]‘regime, purged of some fanaticism, could be a good example —
[5377]*-for other Latin American countries. This would not take into
[5379]. Daily Worker, "this is a battle to tho death with the United
[5381]_ adversary."
[5383]"account the mentality of the Cuban leaders and particularly
[5385]their. chief, who accepts council from no one and intends to.
[5387]imitate no one. Furthermore it is too late to select another.
[5389]path. AS Guevara said the other day in an interview for the
[5391]States in which the most possible damage must, be done to the.”
[5393]Undoubtedly, after the events of October and November,
[5395]day and therefore the revolutionury regime needs the
[5397]“ assistance of the whole Communist world. Only last night a
[5398]a commercial mission headed by Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, who. 7+ 0.7:
[5399]“heads ‘the most important institution of the country ~ the wo 05)
[5400]“Institute for Agrarian Reform - left. The mission will go-°
[5401]«first to Moscow and then to Peiping. It is evident that ;
[5402]“new agreements must be negotiated, as well as new credits,
[5404]n
[5406]. . Fidel Castro is in a descending parabola. But how long this
[5407]., Gescent will last no one can say today, The only certa@in  —
[5408]thing is that the economic Situation is getting worse every...
[5410]ports
[5412]to permit the Cubans to last through 1963,-which will cer-
[5413]‘tainly be the most difficult year,
[5415]But economic assistance cat permit this country to
[5417]'. survive, not resolve its problems. - For a definitive solu-
[5419]tion it would be necessary in the first place for the Cubans
[5421]~.to learn to work seriously and to use intelligently the
[5423]machines which they have, Agricultural production, princi-~
[5425]“ pally sugar cane, aS has been recognized even by the.
[5427]. ..fanaties of industrialization, constitutes the basis of
[5429]-the Cuban economy. But how can they hope for a good
[5431]“which should last ten years are ‘unusable after two years?
[5433]sent
[5435]harvest if, for example, the tractors furnished by Hungary
[5437]~{t is not possible to forecast the fall of the regime
[5438]solely on the basis of economic factors. The people suffer
[5440]+ from an insufficiency of food and clothing. But? for another
[5442]year they will find a,way. to get by.
[5444]Summed up, the decisive and at the same time prudent
[5445]policy. followed by the United States in the recent months
[5447]"is the best and perhaps the oniy policy. After the danger
[5449]of Strategic weapons has. been €liminated, the wisest measure
[5450]is to let the situation mature. Certainly Fidel Castro will
[5452]§~E-C-R-E-T OO .
[5454]woe
[5456]SOLAS
[5458]NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO, DISSEM ABROAD/CONTROLLED DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY .
[5460]penne SE
[5462]5
[5464]so - —_ o
[5466]HW 50955 Docld:32276061 Page 123
[5469]ee Cc S-E-C-R-E-T Ne oe
[5470]NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DYSSEM ABROAD/CONTROLLED DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY.
[5472]-4-° — -CSDB-3/652, 924
[5474]‘present Some more “headaches" to the United States; but the ~.
[5475]atmosphere is changed and -even without counting on the ,
[5476]hypothetical coup d'etat of-Castro which would force the Bones,
[5477]~ Solution of the probiem - one can hope for a perhaps not too
[5478]distant day when all will get tired of him. So long as the
[5479]‘Cubans. insist on the known five points and the United States
[5480]. . refuses any puarantees, so long as the USSR is obliged to .
[5481].: feed Castro to permit his Survival, the less uncomfortable...’
[5482]‘position appears to me-to be that of the. Government.ins':. —
[5483]|, Washington. . , : rr
[5485]oy, .
[5487]Jee S-E-C-R-E-T _ 7
[5488]WO. FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/CONTROLLED DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY
[5490]S
[5492]Se ™
[5494]| HW 50955 Docld:32276061 Page 1274