[2]| 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
[4]104-10232-10019
[6]N
[8]c
[9]wa .
[12]‘ -
[14]DISPATCH |
[16]Chief of Station, JMWAVE
[18]LUAU AT CMG . ~
[20]SECRET PROCESSING
[22]MARAED FGM INCA HII
[23]nO WADELING WEEE
[24]OLY Qualify
[27]CAs 1UOGE IRL Z IS
[29]Chief, WH Division a ———
[31]“*""JMZIP/Operational - Contact with Dr, MIRO Cardona
[33]ing
[35]INFO
[37]FROM
[39]ACTION RAQLIRGD RUFEHENCES
[41]For your information, transmitted herewith is a report of contact with
[42]subject written by Theodore F. PASSAVOY, and a memoof WH/4 comments.
[44]{END OF DISPATCH)
[46]Copy jen AA BG TL
[47]MW. Cae
[49]DATE TYPto
[51]19 Oct 6
[53]Ctra Cr SYMBOL AND AUMLER
[55]UFGW-606
[57]Attachment - |
[59]© Ros tuianad ie” TTT
[61]4
[62]J
[63]i}
[65]' HEADQUARTERS PLE NUMBER
[67]19-124-25
[70]14.90000
[74]10 Cetovor 1961
[76]MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
[78]SUBJECT: Mosting with Dr, N:UkO Cardona on 6 Cctobor
[80]1, Dr. MIRO arrived about 9:50 a.m. for the meeting we had
[81]set at 29:60; ayain he waa driven by his secrotary whom he introduced.
[82]As during tha (irat meeting, cha remained outside in the car, Cur
[84]““mosting lasted unt{! 12:09 noon.
[86]2 Fivet, De, MIRC handed me a aote In longhand Heting the
[87]topics discussed with mo on 5 Uctober, These points aro:
[89]a. Groups conducting propayanda, ete. with Aroncy support
[90]should reccive their eupport and be cousdinated through the Council.
[92]b, A propazanda campaiin ohauld be waged by the Council
[95](1). Cuba, via a long wave radio station in Koy W eet,
[96](2) Cubans fa Miami and other U, 3, areas by:
[97]{a) Subsidizing Diario de las Amaricag.
[98]' (b) Contracting for time on radio stations.
[100](3) Latin America, with a plan such as the Operacias
[101]Grista,"'
[103]¢, Underground ctivities.
[105](1) Provision of monthly funda to Council for procuring
[106]Cuban peavs to eond to the seven-odd resistance
[107]groups in Cuba through rellable channels (such as
[108].previously sent through the Walian Cmbassy),
[110]tf-ooa0a
[112]COAT
[114]enki
[116](2) Commando action as. outlined in plan presented
[117]to ine on 6 Cetober,
[119]3. Commando Plan
[121]Thon Dr, MIRO handed me a plan (in English) for clandestine
[122]action prepared by hie military collaboratars, whom he named as
[123]Colonel Manue! VARELA Castro, an officer of the Academy, Captain
[124]Enrique DESPAIGNEZ, and Colonel (inu) MONTEAGUDO, He stated
[125]that they were of the BARQUIN group and had heen prisoners,
[127]With respect to the pian for clandestine operations ia Cuba,
[128]he stated that 300 men could be counted upon for coramando action, part
[129]of them here, part in Cuba, Ho reiterated that a commando operation
[130]was eascntial to boleter morsie arnung tho anti-Castro elements in Cuba :
[131]and in exile ag well as to conduct sabotage that would further weaken
[132]Cuban economy and the Communist regimes, He aaid that for this operation ‘
[133]U. 5. help would be neceonary tn providing woapons, ammo, demolitions,
[134]equipment, and funds. He proposed that if thie plan waa considered to
[135]have merit, that arrange to have somoone muct with hia military men —
[136]to work out the detaile, After all proparatiuns had been made and
[137]matcrial provided, etc. the operation would be purely a Cuban affair,
[138](NOTE: Plan turned over to Thompaon at our oe eting at 15:35 on
[139]6 October for transmiszion. ) :
[141]4. Request for Arms, ctc. to send to Eacambray
[143]Dr.MIRO yemarked that over a rnonth ago he had made a request ;
[144]to Clark for arms for the anti-Caatro inagurgenta in the Esca:mbray, but ;
[145]to date had heard nothing rolative to the request, He commented wryly, :
[146]“Taak but never hear an answer." He said that the fishtera there should
[147]bs cupported. Dr. MIKO stated that he had a boat (provided by us) and
[148]@ means for delivery of the arms, Cevaldo RAMIREZ is chief of the
[150]Eecambray group. |
[151]COMMENT: Has anything been done about this request?
[153]3, Infurroation on Arms Received by Castro Regime
[155]Dr. MIRO handed me a long report which he said was brought
[156]to him by the Argentine Avibassador to Cuba when the latter came to the
[157]U. S. af the time of Fresident FRONDIZI's visit.” He said the Ambassador
[158]would not divulge the sourca of the iaformation but commented, “You will
[160]know, " .
[161]* Report turned over to Thompson on 6 October. 1
[163]2
[165]14-0000
[167]¢ tee
[169]snencl
[171]Dr. MIRO sald there wag no way to determing the accuracy
[172]of the (tgurea given of planes, guna, ete, received from ths Soviet blee
[173](and Ltaly and Canada) but even if-the figurea were exaggerated 100 por
[174]Cont, they would still be impreosive, ,
[176]He added that Castro is daily bocoming stronger militarily
[177]with weapons and with a largo militia of close te 300, 060 being trained
[178]to use them while the econumy coutinues to deteriorate, Perhaps only
[179]half the militia would be effective. But that is siseable. Thus, he said,
[180]the langer the delay in positive military action to overthrow Castro, the
[181]greater will be the task, “We muaet act soon, vigorously and effectively,
[182]to lisurs victory. Another defeat would be disastroua and would make
[183]Cubans, Latin Americana and others bolleve Castro to be invincible,
[184]Then would come accommadationsa and even worse, the implanting of
[185]Castro-backod rayimas in tha hemisphere. And the U. S. would auffer
[186]worst of all, being discredited for defeat and “guilt of interference, "
[188]oe tt
[190]“In tha UN no nation would stand beside the U, 3,
[192]6, Proposal that Council go to Cuba with Canimando Group and
[193]Establish a Government on Cusan Sal) .
[195]Dr. MIRO then declared that he was convinced that Castro
[196]would never ba overthrown by all tne Propacsands, the sabota.s, commaada
[197]raids, guerrilla activities, rupture of diplomatic relations and deteriorating
[198]economy, ard that it was inconceivable to establish a Rove Png at-ir exile
[199]for nuthing would ¢: me of it, that the only solution far defeating the
[201]. Castro regime waa fer the Revolutionary Council to go to Cuba and estab-
[203]lish &@ yovernment cn Cuban soll, aak recoynitioa by all friendly count+ive
[204]and military aasistance of its priripalally, the U. 5., and that the UL8,
[205]be voady to intervene immediately with ite Forcea, ‘This would all have
[206]to take place in a cautter of 48 hours, otherwise {t would fall. 1 recognise
[207]that this lo a bold plan, but boldness is necessary. There will be many
[208]Fiaka, many may be killed, As for myself, I don't care it I dic. Thave
[209]loat all my personal possessions and my son is a prisoner, '' He reiterated
[210]that all neust be well prepared in advance, there must be no vacillation,
[211]everything muat proceed rapidly, Firet, a commando raid in force to
[212]ceize a piece of Cuban territory, preferably noar Guantanamo, and imme.
[213]diately the members of the Council go ashore, proclalin a provisional
[214]government, broadcast by radio to all natinne an appesl for recognition
[215](and cableo prepared in advance weuald alao be sent out), request UL 3.
[216]assistance, and ths U, 3. should furnish ouch assistance at once in ade-
[218]quate atrongth to ensure victery,
[220]oP ge Tarte e't oe a BS eee pe
[222]as cat
[224]wage or”
[226]14-0000
[228]Before such an action [a undertaken, tae enemy must be
[229]softened by propaganda, sebotage, raids, underground action, and the
[230]mags uf the people of Cuba must be prepared to accept the provisional
[231]government through propayanda, increased knowledge of the Council
[233]and ite unifying efforts.
[235]Ov, 1URO asked are what Il thought of this project; did 1 think
[236]that Castro could be overthrown in any uther way. admitted that
[237]strong inilitary action appeared nocessary. I stated further that
[238]of course hia plan would have to bs studied at the highest sovernment
[239]levela, He prepesed that he inisht elaborate a pian with nis militar y
[240]collaborators,and I suzsested that he do thie 30 that it might be examined
[242]and considerad,
[244]Dr, MIAG declared thar he waa convisced that this Coinmuntat
[245]dagger in the side of the Statea could only be eradicated by such action,
[246]that the U.s. ig and will be blarned for al! ant{-Castro propazanda,
[247]sabotage, stc. and that enemy states will denouace It for intervention
[248]in Cuba, but that if the U. 5. goes ta the ald of a friendly revolutionary
[249]regizae established in the country aad helpa it defeat the Sovint-backed
[250]Comrouaist regime, all friendly governments will applaud.
[252]“thave no persanal political arnbitiona, ° declared hilkKO,
[253]“Limerely am trying to chair the Coureil, whose ciisaion ia to unify the
[254]anti-Castro elemeats inside and cutaide of Cuba, [If the team ian't cone
[255]sidored effective, then changs the pitcher. Hut 1 believe the Council must
[256]establish itself on Cuban evil, and soon, Time is against us.""Thas unta
[257]del Fete agreeinent will backfire ayninat the U, 5. if Castro is alowed
[258]to remain in Cuba. Ina year, after tha politicos of the countries ro-
[259]cetving U, 3, sid have gotten thetr hands on U. 4. gold, they will say,
[260]‘fharke te Castro, we got this.' And they will epend it as in the past
[261]with no benefita to the accial and economic welfare of the paople.”
[263]7. Views about the Judges and Jawyers
[265]T queried Dr. MIRC ae to his views relative to tha fudges and
[266]lawyers and their future gtatue. He said he honed that they could all
[267]reunite and that they could be given assiztance as in the past. Ne de-
[268]clared that Dr, ALABAU was not qualified to be a justice and that he was
[270]fMoing nothing but making politica and trying to discredit the Council
[272]and MIRC anl VARGNA. Dr. MIRC deciared that he, ag Prime Minister
[273]in the early daye of the Castro geverument, had named .LABAU to the
[275]“
[277]CG r
[279]C Spr |
[280]Oeil
[282]Supreme Court, but that now he considered 4LABAU unfit to hold any
[283]judicial position.
[285]8. Mambers of the Revolutionary Council
[287]Dr. MIRO remarked that he had a meeting of the Council on
[289]10 Cetober. I asked what elements now composed it and what he pro-
[290]posed to add, He named the following as presently in the Consejo:
[292]Rescate
[294]30 da Noviembre
[296]MRR
[298]Accion Dermocratica
[300]20 de Mayo :
[302]AAA Independienta
[304]MDC ;
[306]Montecristi
[308]He gaid ho had invited to join:
[310]MRP
[311]Unidad Revolucionaria
[313]and awaited their reply.
[315]Me would also like to have the Workers, Studentsa, and the
[316]Professionals (Doctors, Lawyers, otc. ) come into the Council, He be-
[317]lieves Batistianos and Comunistas and elements unwilling to cooperate
[318]should be excluded, bet that all other groups should be brought together
[320]under ths Council,
[322]He contends that all anti~Castro activities, except clandestine
[323]and milltary, phould bs coordinated by members of the Council, but that
[324]the oxcapted activities should be known only to him (MTRO),
[326]9. Probabie Argantine Rupture of Relations with Cubs
[328]Dr. MIRO declared tast he believed imminent the Argentine
[329]rupture of relations with Cuba. He said the *rgentine Ambassador to
[330]Cuba (Julio AMGEDU) was ordered to return to Havana fhe had boon
[331]vacationing in the U. 5S, after FRONDIZIs visit); that VILLANUEVA, 8
[332]Secretary of the Argentins Embaasy in Cuba was coming to see MIRO
[333]today; and further that he (MIRO) had received a phone call last night
[336]er)
[337]Con ow
[339]Wake de 4
[341]from a Spaniard (Nicanor FERNANDEZ) in Buenos Aires, urging MIRO
[343]_ to go to Buenos Airea to arouse antl-Caatro sentiment of the people,
[345]inasmuch aa somé Argentine action against Cuba appearod {mminont.
[346](FERNANDEZ said he had alroady written MIRC a letter.) MIRO oaya,
[347]“Cf course, Icannot go. Ihave the Conaajo meeting on the 10th,
[348]Furthemmora, Iam going to Now York on October 11th or 12th for the
[349]SIP (Socieded Interamoricana de Prensa) meeting and have beon allotted
[351].12 minutos to addréss the mooting. "
[353]10, MIRO to attend Homage to LACE RDA {Brazitian who
[354]Precipitated QUADKO.! rooiynation) on Cetober 15
[356]Dr. MIRO said he planned to remain in New York City (alter
[357]11] and 12 Cctober SIP mesting) unti) October 15th to attend the homage
[358]for LACERDA, the Governor of Guanabara province in Brasil, MIRO
[359]probably will stay at the Park Chambera Hotel, but will advise Clark
[361]of hia location. .
[363]I commented that ! would probably romain in Washington next
[364]week in view of his plane, but that I might go to New York City to meet
[365]with him; if #0, I would get in touch with him and arrange a meoting
[367]timo and place through Clark.
[369]hl. Propazanda Commiasion
[371]tasked Dr. MIRO about his ideas on the future organization
[372]and atructura of tha Propaganda Commission. He stated that it ia out-
[373]side the Consejy and not undor his direct control, although the Council
[375]accountant has been passing funds to it. He said CAR RILLG had. roaigned
[377]as head of Propaganda and that he would like CONTE AGUERG te handle
[378]{t. He claimed that MESTRE had not done anything with propaganda,
[380]12, MIROts Views Relative to Supreme Court Justice or PRIO
[382]being Recognized as Head of a Provisional Guvernment
[384]Tasked Dr, MIRC if he believed that there were many anti-
[385]Castro Cubans (botk in and ont of Cuba) who favored PRIU, or the head
[386]of the Supreme. Court to be the provisional president if a government were
[387]to be ostablished on Cuban soil. Lr, MIAO declared that the revolution
[388]{a a fact, and that practically nobody. wants to go back to any former
[389]Frogime. The people in Cuba would rogist any such poasibility, He de-
[391]14.90000
[394]Gia
[396]nounced PRIO's activities against the Council and ita efforts to unify
[397]the anti-Castro slemente. He said that the seople should be given an
[398]opportunity to elect thelr chic! of state after Castro's overthrow and
[400]reestablishment of ordor in the ieland:
[402]13. Cifices of Council (Consejo Revolucionario) ,
[404]When questioned about his business and private telephones,
[405]MIRO paid, “The business phone is aloo In my house. I have no office
[406]except in my house, Sut that phono is always busy (JEMorson 2-4680),
[407]So use the othor prone (JEffergon 4-2751) whan you wish to call me."
[409]'t need to have a amall office somowhere away from my home
[410]because all the activities there are driving my wile crasy. I want to
[411]find something modest so that no accusation can be made of ostentation -
[412]morely a room for myself, one for my socretary, and one for meetings.
[413]of the Council, ete. The FRD had a place but at that piace also waa the
[414]pross, the refugee centar, ste, I would not be satiafactory, The FRD
[415]ie now practically dead, It was tha forerunner of the Consejo as the
[416]unifying agency of the anti-Castro reaistance, " :
[418]14, MIRO'a Views on Coordinating the Activities of Cther Exile
[419]Groups
[421]After De, MIRO reiterated his view that he should be the
[422]channel for funds and coordinating the activities of groupa outside the
[423]Conesjo such as the Students, FOXD (Labor), etc., I said that I under-
[424]stood that aonmw of these slemente were unwilling to function under the
[425]Consejo; and that in view of that situation, did he considar that an
[426]Activity Committee might be organised with a delegate fram each of
[427]thease groups and under the chairmanship of a member of the Congajo,
[428]This would serve to coordinate their activities, give there a tie-in with
[429]the Consejo, yet not make them subservient to it. Dr. MIRO replied.
[430]that this would merely eet up ancther Consejo outside of and parallel to
[431]the oxisting Consejo. I did not pursue thie further, not having enough
[432]background of these organisations to be able to ciscasa tho matter
[434]effectively.
[436]15. Telephone Conversation with MIRO on 7 Cetoder
[438]a
[439]Before my departure fram Miami for ¥ashington on 7 October,
[440]I telephoned to Dr, MIRO [rom the airport. He appreciated the call and
[441]asked if I had seen in the morning paper the action takea yesterday by
[443]14.90000
[446]o. E wed
[447]the ALABAU Lawyors' group in proclaiming Jullo CARCERAN (one
[448]of the chiof justicos in exile) as "President of Cuba at War." He ex-
[449]pressed his indignation at this unilateral "political move by ALABAU
[450]and his adhereats among the cailed lawyers and Judges. Hoe added hie
[451]best wishes to ra9 and reminded me that ho would probably go te New
[452]York on Octobor 11th or 12th for the SIP (Sociodad Interamericana de
[453]Prensa) meeting. I replied thst I would appreciate if he would contact
[454]Clark after his orrival to give his location in New York City, and that
[455]Clark might have a request from me for an appointment with him,
[456]this seemed daasirable. I suggested that in future phone conversations
[457]I would be known as JUANITO, He agreed with pleaguro that thia would
[458]be a good precedura. I wished him Godspeod and he replied likewise
[460]to me,
[461]16. Comment
[463]During these first two meetings I endeavored to establish
[464]myself favorably with Dr, MIRO and therefore refrained from bringing
[465]up details of budget or opposition to any of his specific proposals,
[466]LHstened, acked various questions, and he talxed at length.
[468]In future meetings, after [have galned further background and
[469]havo more policy guidance, I shall ke able to discuss with him epecific
[470]igsues and endeavor to reach agreamenta or compromises, as may be
[472]required.