[1]178-10004-10056 (2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF
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[40]ROCKCOM
[41]178-10004-10056
[43]ASSASSINATION FILES
[44]MISC, ROCKEFELLER COM. AND CIA FILES (9)
[46]Document Information
[48]CIA
[50]DIRECTOR, CIA
[52][Restricted]
[54]11/14/1962
[55]33
[57]CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
[58]CUBA
[60]CIA
[62]ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES
[64]MEMORANDUM
[65]Top Secret
[67]1B; 1C
[69]Redact
[70]08/04/1993
[72]39
[74]Date:
[78]at.
[81])
[83]f x
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[87]178-10004-10056
[88]SCI.
[90]Fees, 14 November 1962
[91]_ THE WaT fisuse asin
[93]MEMORANDUM FUK: Director of Central Intelligence
[95]SUBJECT .  : CIA Handling of the Soviet Build-up
[97]in Cuba,
[99]A, The Background
[101]1 July - 16 October 1962
[103]1. The USSR's decision to develop Cuba as a military
[104]base must have been made by the spring of 1962, and prepara-
[106]| tions within the USSR must ‘have been under way from that ~—
[107]time on, There also must have been planning activities in.
[109]CONTAINS
[110]SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION
[112]the "Escalante affair."
[114]Cuba, particularly reconnaissance and survey work... The
[115]only indication of these operations which has so far been
[116]found is a Single intercepted personal message on 11 April
[117]to a RusSian in Cuba who had previously been at the
[118]Kapustin Yar missile test range. This fragment was not
[119]judged solid or important enough to warrant inclusion » by
[120]itself in current intelligence publications.
[122]2. Thus, until the first evidence of the deployment
[123]began to come in late in July, Washington had no warning
[124]‘of the USSR's intention,
[125]Cuba were focussing during July on the direction Soviet~
[126]Cuban relations would take following Soviet acquiescence in
[127]Castro's assertion of his leadership of Cuban Communism in
[129]Intelligence officers dealing with
[131]This attitude was reflected in
[133]reporting on the visit of Raul Castro to Moscow early in
[134]the month, The President's Intelligence Checklist, which
[136]| i will normally be used in this memorandum as the record of.
[137]CIA reporting to the President, Secretaries of State and
[139]Defense, General Taylor,
[141]and McGeorge Bundy, reported on
[143]4 July that Raul was "probably seeking more Soviet military
[144]aid and, specifically, more advanced equipment such as the
[145]MIG-21s_ and surface-to-air missiles which the USSR is
[146]already providing to Indonesia, Egypt, and Iraq." The
[148]Checklist of 19 July, however, noted that Raul had left
[149]Moscow without the usual publicity and.communiqué, and
[151]surmised that this was "a pretty good sign that the visit
[152]was unproductive,' (The Central Intelligence Bulletin,
[153]whenever coordination permitted, carried material generally .
[154]Similar to the content of the Checklist.)
[158]TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST
[160]Gara Pa ren
[162]as
[163]« a PPA
[165]a Hae Ee pys »
[166]_ TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST °¢2 WHITE eo 7
[168]3, The Intelligence Community view of the Cuban problem
[169]in this period was crystallized in NIE 85-2-62, The Situation
[170]and Prospects in Cuba, passed by USIB on 1 August 1962, as
[171]the intelligence foundation.for MONGOOSE, This estimate
[172]Stated that:
[174]a. "By force of circumstances, the USSR is
[175]becoming ever more deeply committed to preserve
[176]and strengthen the Castro regime, The USSR,
[177]however, has avoided any formal commitment to
[178]protect and defend the regime in all contingencies,"
[180]b, "We believe it unlikely that the Bloc will
[181]provide Cuba with the capability to undertake major
[182]independent military operations overseas, We also
[183]believe it unlikely that the Blcc will station in
[184]Cuba Bloc combat units of any description, at least
[185]for the period of this estimate.” ~
[187]c. "The Soviets...would. almost.certainly
[188]never intend to hazard their own safety for Cuba's
[189]Sake," but "have sought to create the impression
[190]that Cuba was under the protection of their missile
[193]d. "We believe that the Blec will continue to
[194]limit its military assistance to Cuba /to defensive
[195]weapons7. Such a policy would not preclude the
[196]provision of. more advanced jet fighters, surface-to-
[197]air missiles, and modern radars, or even the pro-
[198]vision of a token number of IL-28 jet light bombers..."
[200]Pare
[203]TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALI Photocapy
[205]tom
[206]| a "Gerald R. Ford Librery
[209]-
[211]TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST
[213]|B. The Soviet Operation Begins
[215]4, During the last two weeks of July, Soviet ships
[216]‘carrying equipment and personnel for. the build-up made
[217]their first voyages to Cuban ports, the first arriving in
[218]the period 26-29 July.. Knowledge of some of these move—
[219]ments reached CIA through routine intelligence coverage
[220]of Soviet shipping before the ships reached Cuba. No
[221]particular significance is normally attached to such
[222]voyages. However, evidence gradually accumulated that
[223]the "behavior pattern" of these ships was similar to that
[224]of Soviet ships carrying arms to other countries, that
[225]even greater security measures than usual were in effect,
[226]that a number of the ships were coming from Baltic rather
[227]than Black Sea ports, that some of these were passenger.
[228]ships, and finally that there was a general movement of
[229]| Bloc. shipping toward Cuba: on an unprecedented scale.
[231]5. Apparently, the first recognition of unusual
[232]activity in any intelligence publication was ‘a note ina
[233]daily review of economic intelligence for CIA internal
[234]use, Commenting on an NSA report that certain Soviet
[235]Ships were en route to Cuba which had declared for other |
[236]destinations, this paper stated on 1 August that "at |
[237]lease some, if not all, of the ships involved probably
[238]are carrying additional military equipment to Cuba."
[239]This statement was in direct contradiction to ‘NS! <i
[240]ment on-the; same information, ive, , that it-tend
[241]corroborate port by the Brazilian Ambassador in Havana
[242](earlier int Htéd=byNSA) that Raul Castro had asked ©
[243]the USSR to take back excess war materiel.
[245]6, CIA was also in disagreement with DIA over inter-"
[246]pretation:of intelligence on the movement of shipping to
[247]Cuba throughout the month of August. The resulting dif-
[248]ficulties in coordination of the Central Intelligence
[249]Bulletin held up publication from 3 August to 9 August
[250]of the first item on the Cuban build-up in that publica-
[251]tion. As late as 29 August, DIA in its own daily
[252]Intelligence Summary said that "The high volume or
[253]Shipping probably reflects planned increases in trade
[254]between the USSR and Cuba..." There were further dif-
[255]ficulties resulting from CIA-DIA differences in the
[256]interpretation of photography of aircraft crates deck-
[257]loaded on Soviet ships; the record shows that CIA was
[260]\ ; Gerald R. Ford Library
[262]TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST
[264]“
[266]TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST
[268]right. Finally, it should be noted that there is a
[269]long history of CIA efforts to obtain better photo-
[270]graphy on deck cargoes and faster service in returning
[272], these pictures to Washington.
[274]7. The Checklist reported the accumulating informa-
[275]tion fully to the President. On 4 August, it stated
[276]that "Eleven Soviet. ships are on their way to Havana
[277]and we strongly suspect they are carrying arms. Such
[278]a. delivery would not be far short of the total amount
[279]of arms delivered in the‘first half of 1962." On
[280]9 August, it said "Soviet shipments to Cuba have been
[282]arriving on an unprecedented scale. since mid-July. . Some i
[284]32 vessels are involved; at least half of these we believe
[285]to be carrying arms. Five passenger ships with a total.
[286]capacity of about 3,000. persons have already arrived.
[288]Some of the personnel are said to.be Soviet technicians,
[289]and we have no reason to doubt this. We do not believe
[290]there Aare any combat troops among them."
[292]8. The DCI on 8 August briefed the Republican Policy
[293]Committee, emphasizing the arrival’ of Soviet military
[294]equipment "and technicians. Two days later, at a MONGOOSE
[295]meeting, he again stressed the importance of this. intel-.
[296]ligence and raised questions as to what purpose was behind
[297]the sudden movement of men and materiel. He said that
[298]the United States must face the possibility of the USSR
[299]locating MRBMs in Cuba as a step that it could justify
[300]because of US missile bases in places like Italy and
[301]Turkey. .
[303]9. Soviet operations in August involved primarily
[304]the establishment of surface-to-air missile and coast
[305]defense missile positions. By the middle of August
[307]CIA was receiving a large volume of agent and refugee
[308]reporting which, while understandably garbled and
[309]fragmentary, enabled analysts to pinpoint areas of con-
[310]struction and identify some of the equipment coming in.
[311]On 18 August, the Checklist reported "There are grounds
[312]for thinking that the large influx of Soviet military
[313]equipment and technicians into Cuba lately could be
[314]connected with the beginning of construction of surface-
[315]to-air missile sites. What we know so far is that
[317]the shipments have included quantities of electronic,
[318]transportation and construction €quipment,.some of it
[319]similar to Soviet equipment which showed. up in Indonesia
[320]for the building of SAM installations, and that many of the
[322]arriving Soviets are construction personnel. .'' There were .
[323]further Checklist items along the same line on 23 and 28
[324]August. Le
[325]-4- , Protocapy
[326]an -. - . soe = oe Yom
[327]Boe ; , Gerd R. For! Lirary
[329]-MAN CHTOYPUENM NYWAD OVOSOSO pier rMApaAT roan
[331]TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST:
[333]C. The July Overflight Program ny
[334]. 10, On 10 Juiy, General Taylor, motivated primarily by
[335]the extensive use of aerial reconnaissance in following Chi-
[336]“nese Communist military activities in Fukien, had. asked the
[337]DCI for a comprehensive review of aerial photography activi-
[338]ties. The end-product of this exercise was a series of mem-
[339]oranda dated approximately 16 July from the DD/I to the DCI.
[340]The one on Cuba recommended that U-2 flights over Cuba be
[341]‘continued at their current level of two a month. It cited
[342]inter alia in justification that earlier missions over Cuba
[343]had provided "conclusive evidence that recurring reports of
[344]submarines and missile bases in Cuba have been false," and
[345]that "our most important need is for any evidence of the de~
[346]ployment of SA-2 missiles and/or MIG-21s in Cuba." This
[347]proposal was approved by the Special Group on 19 July and
[348]later by the President. © — ,
[350]11. The first of the two Cuban U-2 missions authorized ~
[351]for. August was flown on 5 August, probably just too soon ‘to
[352]detect significant reflections of the Soviet équipment enter—
[353]ing the island at that time. The second mission was orig-
[354]inally scheduled for 8 August but cancelled because of weather.
[355]The next day the Special Group gave the DCI discretion to fly
[356]the second August mission "whenever the immediate situation
[357]with regard to Soviet materiel justified it." COMOR reaffirmed
[358]its requirement for the second mission on 13 August. The mis-
[359]sion was again scheduled for the period beginning on the 19th,.
[360]held up.for 9 days by weather and eventually flown on 29 August.
[361](See Para 19) . -
[364]TOP SECRET DINAR. CHESS RUFF IDEALIST Gerext R. Ford Library
[366]TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST an ae
[367]D. Promulgation of NSAM 181 and the Response ; oe Men
[369]12. On 21 August the DCI attended a meeting in Secretary
[370].Rusk's office at which were also present Secretary. McNamara,
[371]Under Secretary Johnson, the Attorney General, Generals Taylor.
[372]and Lemnitzer, and McGeorge Bundy. He told this group that in-
[373]formation available since 10 August indicated the extent of So-
[374]viet aid was much greater than previously thought, and that .
[375]this probably included highly-sophisticated electronic installa-
[376]tions or missile sites, probably ground-to-air. The DCI again
[377]raised the possibility that the Soviets would locate MRBMs in
[378]Cuba, and there developed a discussion of possible US courses
[379]- of action in case they did so. It was agreed that the DCI would
[380]fully brief the President the next day (which he did) and that
[381]Rusk, McNamara, Gilpatric, Taylor, Bundy and the DCI would dis-
[382]cuss the situation with the President on 23 August.
[384]. 13.. At the meeting of the 23rd, a number of actions were
[385]decided upon: to deal with what was agreed to be a critical
[386]problem for the United States. These actions were formalized
[388]in NSAM 181. (In addition, the President asked for a continu-
[389]ing analysis of the number and types of Bloc personnel and
[390]equipment in Cuba). Thus, by 23 August CIA had alerted the
[391]highest levels of the government to a rapidly unfolding Soviet
[392]military development in Cuba, including the: probable es tablish-
[393]ment of surface-to-air. missile sites, and the danger of surface- |
[394]to-surface missiles. Furthermore the President had taken ac-
[395]tion on the intelligence received. There was at this time no.
[396]evidence of any sort that surface-to-surface weapons were being
[397]installed--in fact, the MRBM units had scarcely started en route
[398]from the USSR--but the possibility had been discussed by the
[399]President and his advisors. a .
[401]14. ‘The paragraphs of NSAM 181 applicable to CIA dealt
[402]with: a) release of information, b) MONGOOSE, -and c) "An anal-~
[404]_. ysis /which7 should be prepared of the probable military, po-
[406]jitical and psychological impact of the establishment in Cuba
[408]of either surface-to-air missiles or surface-to-surface missiles
[409]which could reach the US." The first two subjects are outside
[410]the scope of this memorandum; the third exists as a memorandum
[411]dated 31 August prepared largely by McGeorge Bundy and the DD/I.
[412]This paper, which had the benefit of preliminary results of the
[413]29 August U-2 mission, concluded that the introduction of sur-
[414]face-to-air missiles was the "most probable present Soviet mis-—
[415]Sile activity," and that such missiles would be a serious
[416]threat to aerial reconnaissance, but not to "determined US at-
[417]tack." It stated that "surface-to-surface missiles with nu-
[418]clear warheads would constitute a very significant military
[421]from
[423]TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST
[425]TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST PROPERTY oF
[426]oo THE WHITE HOUSE grFine
[427]threat to the continental US." ‘The memorandum concluded that
[428]introduction of any missiles "will have a substantial political
[429]and psychological impact, while surface- to- surface missiles
[430]would create a condition of great alarm.
[432]“_.. “15, In a memorandum of 27 August, General Carter reported
[433]to Mr. Bundy what actions CIA was taking in response to NSAM.
[435]-181.. He named the officers responsible for the three items
[436]mentioned above and listed the following additional measures;
[438]a. Task Force W was to look into the possibility of
[439]removing restrictions on mounting clandestine operations out
[440]of Guantanamo. ;
[442]b.. The Board of National Estimates was to establish
[443]a procedure to ensure continuing analysis of the numbers and
[444]types of Communist. Bloc personnel entering Cuba, quantity and
[445]types. of Bloc equipment and its probable use, and all construc-
[446]tion, particularly missile sites.
[448]” ec. The Board ° was: also- to assess the physical and
[449]psychological dangers to the US and Latin America of missile
[450]installations in Cuba. (The two Board actions, which were
[451]later synthesized in the paper which eventually appeared on
[452]19 September as SNIE 85-3, had already been set in motion by
[453]the DD/I, in a memo to the AD/NE of 24 August) .
[455]. d. CIA was to begin immediately publishing a daily
[456]‘ paper on Cuba , including current intelligence, estimative as-
[457]-sessments and coverage of the press, to be distributed to the
[458]President, Bundy, McNamara, Gilpatric, Lemitzér, Rusk, Taylor,
[459]and Robert Kennedy. (This paper, the Cuban Highlights memoran—
[460]dum, was issued by CIA beginning 27 August, uSing a philosophy
[461]and format Similar to the Checklist. A few additional officials
[462]were later added to its distribution. It was discontinued on |'
[463]19 September, because General Carter and the DD/I concluded
[464]that sufficient emphasis was by then being given to Cuban re—
[465]porting in regular intelligence publications). ,
[467]e. CIA would arrange intelligence collection over-
[468]flights "as frequently as the situation demands." (The results
[469]of this action make up the central theme of this paper.)
[471]£. Task Force W was to prepare a plan of operations:
[472]for MONGOOSE B Plus.
[474]16. The minutes of USIB show that at its next meeting,
[476]29 August, Mr. Hilsman requested an SNIE on the military build-
[477]up in Cuba, to be submitted to USIB at its next regular meeting.
[481]TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST Prroonty
[482]ToT Gorald R. For Waray
[485]cons
[487]Poet ate.
[488]Doren AI
[490]TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST:
[492]Presumably lr. Hilsman was also acting in response to NSAM 181,
[493]In any case, the paper he requested and the Board memorandum
[494]already requested by the DD/I were combined. Successive drafts
[495]of such a paper, prepared by the ONE staff, were quickly over-
[496],taken by the photography which became available after 29 August.
[497]At the USIB meeting of 7 September, further attempts to write
[499]it were deferred until the new information could be digested,
[500]This estimate, SNIE 85-3-62, was in fact passed by USIB on 19
[501]September, Its substance will be discussed later. (See Paras,
[502]26-29) . aan :
[504]17. Also at the 29 August USIB. meeting, two other perti-
[505]nent subjects were discussed. First, General Carter and Mr.
[506]Cline raised the question of more rapid delivery from Turkey
[508]and Denmark of Navy photography of outbound Soviet ships (see
[509]para. 6). Second, General Carter informed the Board that he
[511]had two days earlier asked General Lemnitzer about the possi-
[512]bility of low-level photography using RF-101 or F8U aircraft
[514]and that Lemnitzer had replied that something "could be dug up."
[515]The conversation with Lemnitzer was the result of an instruction
[516]telephoned from out of town by the DCI, who was concerned over
[517]the long delay of the 29 August mission by weather. (The DCI
[518]departed Washington on leavevon 23 August, went first to the
[519]West Coast, left the country on 30 August for the Riviera, and
[520]returned to Washington on 23 September.) On 30 August Lemnitzer
[521]told the Special Group of this discussion with General Carter,
[522]The Group agreed to take cognizance of the matter and reopen it
[523]"when specific targets and information needs could be identified,"
[527]- i
[529]TOP. SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST
[530]| . ;
[532]Shotocopy
[533]om
[534]Garald R. Ford Library
[536]TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST = +
[538]-E, Hard Intelligence on the Build-Up (Defensive Phase)
[540]18. During the last week in August, CIA continued to
[541]follow the progress of the Soviet build-up, using shipping
[542]. information, communications intelligence, and agent and
[543]“refugee sources, The Checklist of 29 August reported that:
[545]"There is no Sign of a let-up in the movement
[546]of Soviet equipment and personnel into Cuba.
[548]"By latest count, there have during the
[549]past six weeks been some 80 voyages to Cuban
[550]ports by Bloc vessels and 20- 35 by ships
[551]under Communist charter. ;
[553]"We note that deliveries of industrial
[554]equipment, foodstuffs, and other nonmilitary
[555]items are being made largely on chartered
[556]Western ships, probably because so many
[557]Soviet ships are involved in hauling military
[558]gear."
[560]19, The first hard evidence « on what the Soviets were
[561]up to in Cuba was provided by photography of the 29 August
[562]mission, The President was told, in the Checklist of
[563]31 August that: ~—
[565]“preliminary information from the 30 fSic7 August
[566]U-2 mission shows at least seven SA-2 sites on the .
[567]western half of the island. Manning of this many
[568]sites would require some 1500-2000. Bloc troops. We
[569]are able to report on the basis of what is known so
[570]far that construction of the sites appears to be
[571]fairly advanced and that there are canvas—covered
[572]missiles in the vicinity of some sites, The existence
[573]of additional sites can probably be assumed,
[575]"The same source reveals seven or eight Soviet
[576]missile-equipped torpedo boats and an undetermined
[577]number of Soviet tanks. The Cubans have had Soviet
[578]tanks for some time, but this is our first indica-
[579]tion that they now have boats of this type. They
[580]appear to be KOMAR-class converted PT-boats, mounting .
[581]two surface-to-surface missiles with an estimated
[582]range of 35 nautical miles." —
[584]After further analysis this information appeared in the
[585]Central Intelligence Bulletin of 6 September. On the 4th
[586]and 5th, General Carter briefed a number of congressional
[587]leaders, including the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed
[588]Services Committees. In a White House statement, also of
[589]4 September, the President publicly confirmed the presence
[590]of SA-2s and KOMAR-class boats,
[594]TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST ;
[596]from
[597]Gard R. Ford Library
[599]TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST.
[601]20. The 29 August mission had confirmed the establish—
[602]ment of a misSile defense of Western Cuba, The first mission
[603]for September (of the two which had been authorized as a
[605]_routine matter by the Special Group on 19 July; see para 10)
[606]was flown on Schedule on 5 September and revealed similar
[607]defenses in Las Villas Province. In retrospect, it can be
[608]seen that the two groups of SA-2 sites surrounded the areas
[609]in. which MRBM and IRBM site construction was planned,
[610]Photography of these areas in the 29 August and 5 September
[611]missions, however, gave no recognizable evidence that any
[612]such construction was then.under way (although re-examination ©
[613]showed a few vehicles and some construction material at. .
[614]Guanajay Site 1 on 29 August). In fact, there was probably
[615]no ballistic missile equipment in Cuba at the'time (see
[616]discussion in paras, 36-39). .
[618]91. More detailed readout of the 29 August mission had,
[619]by about 6 September, led CIA analysts to suspect the presence
[621]of another kind of missile site--possibly surface-to-surface-- ~
[623]at Banes, on the northeastern coast. General Carter so-°
[624]informed the President and the Secretaries of State and
[625]Defense on 6 September. No equivalent of such a weapon had
[626]heen identified in the USSR in earlier U-2 photography.
[627]Lacking such background, further information and study were
[628]necessary to determine the characteristics and range of the
[629]missiles. Programs for both were set in motion,
[631]_... 22, .COMOR, at the request of the Secretary of State,
[633]on 9 September reviewed the vehicles available for reconnais—
[634]sance:of Banes. The next day, General Carter in a memorandum
[635]to the Secretary of Defense requested "necessary actions,
[636](including Special Group approval) to provide for the employ-
[637]ment, when directed by higher authority, of tactical-type
[639]- reconnaissance” against the cruise-missile site at Banes.
[641]At the Special Group meeting of 14 September, a JCS repre-
[642]sentative briefed on capabilities for low-level coverage of
[644]' certain targets in Cuba; hewever, the Secretary of Defense
[645]was recorded-.as not wanting the operation considered further
[646]until results of further U-2 reconnaissance of these targets .
[647]were available, i.e., General Carter's proposal had been ,
[648]overtaken by the decision. on U-2 coverage taken on 10
[649]September (see paras 24-25).. Meanwhile, further analysis
[651]of the 5 September photography had resulted in a. CIA study
[652]dated 14 September which concluded definitively that the
[653]Banes site was intended for a short-range coastal defense
[654]missile. A fully checked-out item appeared in the Central
[655]Intelligence Bulletin of 18 September. _ ~
[658]for
[659]TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST Garsld R. Ford bitsary
[661]Pores Pe wees shee st eee
[663]- TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST PROPERTY OF
[664]7 D THE WHITE HERE AP Erne
[666]. 23; One additional item was picked up by the 5 September
[667]mission, the presence of an assembled MIG-21 at Santa Clara
[668]airfield, along with several others still in crates, This
[669]was not reported by CIA in the Checklist, but was reported in
[670]‘the Central intelligence Bulletin or 8 September, © Actually,
[671]‘these MiG-21 crates (readily identifiable from photographs)
[672]had arrived in Cuba about 1 September aboard a Soviet. ship
[673]which had been photographed en route, but the, photographs were
[674]not received in Washington for several weeks, Upon the —
[675]arrival of these and photographs of other ships carrying
[676]MIG-21 crates, an item was published in the Central intelli—
[677]gence Bulletin of 27 September~-with DIA withholding con-
[678]currence (see para. 6)--that between 22 and 30 MIG-21s had
[679]been delivered to Cuba. This information was also reported
[680]in the Checklist of 27 September. — oo:
[682]' -1il-
[684]TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST | Phatomy
[685]oO Gara R. Ford Library
[687]TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST
[689]epadcau
[691]F, -The New Overflight Program
[693]24. The results of the 29 August and 5 September mis-
[694]sions, in particular the confirmation of SA-2 sites, led to
[695]‘a full review of the overflight program for Cuba. This took |
[696]“place in the White House on 10 September. Among those pre-
[697]sent were Mr. Rusk, Mr. Robert Kennedy, Mr. McGeorge Bundy,
[698]General Carter, and General Lansdale. The decisions of this
[699]meeting are crucial to the record, and some discussion of ——
[700]the atmosphere in which they were taken is required. There
[701]were three major factors:: 3
[702]a. On 30 August, a SAC U-2 had overflown Sakhalin
[703]Island. The USSR had protested on 4 September, the US had ~
[704]acknowledged the overfiight, and the incident has received
[705]major play in the world press. This had been followed on 8
[706]September by the loss of Mission GRC-127 over Communist
[707]China, accompanied by even greater publicity. As a result,
[708]most of the participants were--to varying degrees—-reluctant
[709]to chance another U-2 incident at this time. ‘This meant.
[710]that they were naturally hesitant to authorize any flights.
[711]over areas where SA-2s might be operational.
[713]‘ b. Second, there is no record that the MRBM
[714]problem was discussed. The hard intelligence gathered
[716]so far on the Soviet build-up (the Banes problem was
[718]still up in the air), was not such as to produce a sense
[719]‘of alarm or a feeling that urgent action was required.
[721]The establishment of SA-2s and. other advanced defensive
[722]systems had: been foreseen in the NIE of 1 August -and
[724]‘their probable arrival had peen fully reported during the
[725]intervening period. Hence confirmation came not as a shock,
[726]but as. a problem to be dealt with deliberately. (it may
[727]even have served to relax the sense of urgency generated by
[728]the President's decisions of 23 August, the known usually
[729]being less alarming than the unknown.) The participants
[730]therefore felt that the next step was to provide systematic
[731]coverage of the rest of Cuba, from which the full story of
[732]what the USSR had put into the island could be developed..
[733]They felt no immediate need fer re-coverage of the areas
[734]covered by the two previous missions.
[736]c. Finally, the participants were operating in
[737]the atmosphere of the time. The Cubans had been claiming
[738]that U.S. invasion was imminent. The Soviet diplomatic
[739]and propaganda apparatus was attempting to focus attention
[742]TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST Garda Font Koray
[744].
[746]TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST. ...-.--—
[748]on Berlin and hinting at a confrontation late in the year,
[749]thus creating the impression that a Berlin crisis would not
[750]come until after the US election. In fact, the USSR in its .
[751]statement of the following day (11 September) on Cuba stated
[752]this explicitly. There were vague hints of Khrushchev's in-
[753]tent to attend the UNGA in New York. Khrushchev appears now
[754]to have been throwing up a diplomatic smoke-screen behind
[755]which to carry out the deployment of strategic forces into
[757]Cuba, but those present at the meeting of 10 September did
[759]not have the benefit of. this hindsight. Furthermore, they
[761]must all have been acutely aware that Cuba was potentially
[763]the campaign issue that could most seriously damage the Admin-
[764]istration in the election campaign then beginning. ;
[766]25. At the meeting, the Secretary of State objected to
[767]the CIA proposal for two extended overflights covering the
[768]remainder of the island not covered in the 29 August and 5
[769]September missions. He insisted, instead, that coverage of.
[770]the rest of Cuba should be designed so that peripheral flights
[771]over: international waters would not be combined with over-
[772]flights of Cuban territory. To meet his’ wishes, the program
[773]was divided into four flights, two overflights and two peri-
[775]‘ pheral. One overflight was to be over the Isle of Pines and
[777]the other over the part of Cuba east of 77° West to cover.
[778]Guantanamo and Banes. One peripheral flight was to cover
[780].the north coast of eastern Cuba, the other the South coast.
[782]The overflights would be quick "in-and-out" operations, while
[783]all four were to be designed for maximun safety. (There.
[784]is apparently no written record that a decision was made not
[785]to fly over known SA-2 sites, but in obtaining approval for
[786]the tracks it was necessary to provide assurance that they
[787]did ‘not do so.) Later the DCI negotiated with the Depart-
[788]ment of State permission to extend the Isle of Pines mis-
[789]sion over the Bay of Pigs area of. Cuba proper. The Presi-
[790]dent’ approved this program, authorizing three flights in
[791]September in addition to the one remaining of the normal
[792]September allocation (Special Group action of 19 July).
[793]Thus, the record shows that the President authorized every-
[794]thing the Special Group requested.
[796]ca _ : 7 _ 2 it Phy
[798]-13— _ Oo Cengy fom?
[800]TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST
[802]TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALT SS, © EEF, a
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[805]Ine
[807]G. SNIE 85-3-62
[809]26. The lack of urgency expressed in these decisions was
[810]also reflected in the deliberations over and the content of
[811]SNIE 85-3-62, The Military Build-up in Cuba, passed by USIB
[812]on 19 September, This estimate, which was generated by the
[813]issuance of NSAM 181, must be viewed as a symptom of the state
[814]of mind in the Intelligence Community and in Washington gen-
[815]erally during.the first half of September. There were no dis-
[816]sents and no major disagreements in preparation of the final
[817]draft. Its key findings are as follows:
[819]-a. "We believe that the USSR-values its position in
[820]Cuba primarily for the political advantages to be derived from
[821]it and consequently that the main purpose of the military build-
[822]up in Cuba is to strengthen the Communist regime there against
[823]what the Cubans and the Soviets conceive to be a danger that
[824]the US.may attempt by one means or another to overthrow it..
[825]The Soviets evidently hope to deter any such attempt by enhanc-
[826]ing Castro's defensive capabilities and by threatening Soviet.
[827]military retaliation. At the same time, they evidently recog—
[828]nize .that the development of an offensive military base in
[829]Cuba might provoke US military intervention and thus defeat
[830]their present purpose." ;
[832]b. “The Soviets themselves are probably still uncer-
[833]tain about their future military program for Cuba. Indeed
[834]they probably intend to test US and Latin American reactions
[835]as they go along." - So
[837]--e. “As the build-up continues, the USSR may be tempted
[838]to establish in Cuba other weapons represented to be defensive
[839]in purpose but of a more 'offensive' character: e.g., light bomb-
[840]ers, submarines, and additional types of short-range surface-to-
[841]surface missiles...."
[843]* ‘d, “However, they are well aware that the question of
[844]offensive as opposed to defensive weapons in Cuba has become a
[845]major political issue.”
[847]; e. "The establishment on Cuban soil of Soviet nuclear
[848]striking forces which would be used against the US would be in-
[849]compatible with Soviet policy as we presently estimate it. It
[850]would indicate a far greater willingness to increase the level
[852]of risk in US-Soviet relations than the USSR has displayed. thus
[853]far...However, Soviet military planners have almost certainly
[855]considered the contribution which Cuban bases might make to the
[858]. Pholocopy
[859]TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST ‘Goreit od LE
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[867]Veithie
[869]TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST | ~ jipicz
[870]Soviet strategic posture and, in that connection, the feasibility
[871]and utility of deploying nuclear delivery systems to Cuba. There-
[872]fore, this contingency must be examined carefully, even though ©
[873]it would run counter to current Soviet policy."
[875]f. “Soviet planners might see some utility in deploy-
[876]ing MRBMs and IRBMs to Cuba in order to supplement the limited
[877]number of ICBMS now believed to be operational in the USSR and
[878]to reach targets beyond the range of submarine-launched misSiles."
[880]— g. "The establishment on Cuban Soil of a significant
[881]strike capability with such weapons would represent a sharp de-
[882]parture from Soviet practice, since such weapons have so far
[884]not been installed even in Satellite territory...The Soviets
[885]might think that the political effect of defying the US by sta-
[886]tioning Soviet nuclear striking power in so menacing a position
[887]would be worth a good deal if they could get away with it, How-
[889]ever, they would almost certainly estimate that this could not -
[891]be done without provoking a dangerous US reaction."
[893]h.. "Although the Soviets may see some military advan-—
[894]tages in Cuba as a strategic strike base, the risks would be ;
[895]great and the political implications would run counter to the |
[896]kind of policy they are actually pursuing in Latin America.
[898]They do not. propose to win the region for communism by military
[899]conquest, They count instead on a process of political action....'
[901]27. In commenting on these statements it must first be rec-
[902]ognized that the judgment’on the degree of risk which the USSR
[903]was willing to accept was gravely in error. It should also be
[904]recognized that the community was virtually unanimous in support
[905]of this judgment; deployment of ballistic missiles and nuclear
[906]weapons outside the USSR was without precedent. Further, while
[907]the first ballistic missiles had probably arrived in Cuba in
[908]the period 7-15 September, (see para. 37) the first reports from
[909]ground observers who had seen them had not arrived in Washington -
[910]by 19 September; there was no evidence available that MRBMS were
[911]on the way. What the estimate failed to do, however, was to give
[912]adequate weight to the pace at which Soviet operations were mov-
[913]ing and.to the great probability that the new installations were
[914]manned by Soviet personnel, The community was still thinking in
[915]terms of the rather deliberately-paced Soviet military aid pro-
[916]grams for the UAR, Iraq, and Indonesia (and indeed for Cuba in
[917]the 1960-62 period) when there was already good evidence that
[918]the Cuban program had departed from this pattern. ;
[920]- 28, Moreover, the Indonesian program too had broken the
[921]pattern only a month before, when the USSR showed itself will-
[922]ing to accept a substantially increased degree of risk for the .
[924]-15-. e , Py
[925]. f y
[926]TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST _. Sey
[927], “
[929]‘ay
[931],
[933]TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST - 7’ ¢:
[935]sake of a political gain something less than vital to Soviet
[936]interests. The original contracts for Indonesia had been
[937]‘roughly similar to those for the UAR and Iraq. They included
[938]14 SA-2 sites, 12 KOMARS, 26 TU-l6s (12 equipped with air-to-
[939]surface missiles) and 12 submarines, all to be manned by In~
[940]-donesians and to be delivered at a pace consonant with the re~
[941]quired training of personnel, However, as the crisis over
[942]West New Guinea approached its climax of. August, Soviet eager-
[943]ness to embroil the Indonesians in. open warfare with the. Dutch
[944]led them to accelerate delivery schedules and to permit the
[945]use of Soviet personnel to operate some of the weapons being
[946]provided. Six submarines manned by Soviet crews actually con-.
[947]ducted war patrols under nominal Indonesian command. Thus by
[948]mid-August. the USSR had shown itself willing to take some risk
[949]-of military engagement with an ally of the United States, al-
[950]-beit the degree of risk involved -was far less than in the Cu-~
[951]ban venture.
[953]“99. For the record, there is no evidence that the ex-
[955]-..-igtence of SNIE 85-3 had any inhibiting, influence on later de-
[957]cisions. It was not, for instance, cited to support an argu-
[958]ment against continuing overflights. Nor did it affect current
[959]intelligence reporting; this is conducted independently of the
[960]estimative process and provides a check on the continuing val-
[961]' idity of standing estimates.
[963]~16- _ . “a me
[965]‘TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST.
[969]TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST |
[971]H. Views of the DCI
[973]30. The only available record of dissent from the
[974]judgments made in Washington during the first half of
[975]‘September, both estimative and operational, is that of the
[976]DCI himself, who, although vacationing on the Riviera, was
[977]kept informed by CIA cable, On 7 September, he cabled
[978]General Carter urging frequent repeat reconnaissance missions
[979]and stating that "my hunch is we might face prospect of Soviet
[980]short-range surface-to-surface missiles of portable types in
[981]Cuba which could command important targets in Southeast US
[982]and possibly Caribbean areas," On 10 September, the DCT
[983]‘again cabled "Difficult for me to rationalize extensive
[984]costly defenses being established in Cuba...appears to me
[985]‘quite possible measures now being taken are for purpose of
[986]ensuring secrecy of some offensive capability such as MRBMs
[987]to be installed by Soviets after. present phase completed and
[988]country secured from overflights, Suggest Board of National
[989]Estimates study motives...." (The Board's response is in
[990]effect contained in SNIE 85-3.) BO °
[992]31. On 13 September and again on 16 September the DCI
[993]repeated these premonitions. In the latter cable he added.
[994]‘"Do not wish to be overly alarming this matter but believe
[995]CIA and. community must keep Government informed of danger
[996]of a surprise and also that detection of preparatory steps
[997]possibly beyond our capability once Cuba defense system
[998]operative." Finally, on 20 September, the DCI expressed
[999]reservations on the conclusions of SNIE 85-3, which had.
[1000]“peen cabled to him, saying "as an alternative I can see that
[1001]an offensive Soviet base in Cuba will provide Soviets with
[1002]most. important and effective trading position in connection
[1003]with all other critical areas and hence they might take
[1004]“unexpected risks in order to establish such a position,"
[1005]These views were provided to the DD/I and the Board of
[1006]National Estimates,
[1008]32. AS a result of the DCI's pressure there was a
[1009]renewed examination of other methods of. reconnaissance of
[1010]Cuba. (It should be noted here that this discussion was
[1011]in terms of what might be necessary after the establishment
[1012]of a complete SA-2 defense had made use of the U-2 impossible,
[1013]with the implicit thought that only at this point would the
[1014]Soviets risk the introduction of such weapons as MRBMs.)
[1016]On 19 September, at USIB, General Carter stated his desire
[1017]to use RF-101s over Cuba. He also said he thought use of
[1018]the FIREFLY drone over Cuba could be justified to the Special
[1022]TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST *
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[1025]. i
[1027]TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST
[1028]; THE WHITE 4 OF
[1029]Group, adding that "we cannot put a stop to collection in’
[1030]Cuba; otherwise the President would never know when the |
[1031]point of decision was reached.""' The Special Group at its
[1032]next meeting approved consideration of the use of FIREFLY
[1034],and COMOR forwarded to USIB on 27 September a program for -
[1036]“its use. (No FIREFLY missions have yet been attempted.)
[1038]33, Another attempt during this period to get addi-
[1039]tional coverage was the programming of ‘KEYHOLE Mission
[1040]9045 (29 September - 2 October) to photograph Cuba. The.
[1042]t
[1043]{O's Nee
[1047]results were unsatisfactory, largely because of cloud cover,
[1049]| -18-
[1050]TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST Sap
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[1057]TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST
[1058]. on a vb
[1059]: FTE
[1063]I, CIA Reporting during September
[1065]34, The progresSive uncovering of-the Soviet program in
[1066]Cuba: was reported in detail by CIA current intelligence.
[1067]‘Pertinent samples from the Checklist are; .
[1069]a, "The number of confirmed SAM sites remains at
[1070]12, but the likelihood that others are under con-
[1071]struction grows, with the latest evidence pointing to
[1072]the Isle of Pines as one of the additional locations.”
[1073](14 September) _
[1075]b. "A message interceptedyesterday on a net
[1076]serving Soviet forces in Germany called for ‘volunteers
[1077]for the protection of Cuba,' We are not sure of the |
[1078]weight to be placed on this and another iiitertept: ——
[1079]referring to the isolation of ‘volunteers.’ If valid,
[1081]_ they. would suggest that the influx of Soviet military
[1082]personnel to Cuba is not finished. We are investigating
[1083]further." (15 September) ;
[1085]c. "We have spotted two more Soviet passenger
[1086]vessels en route to Cuba. Their arrival will raise
[1087]our estimate of technicians on the scene to about
[1088]4,200, We are beginning to see some tenuous evidence
[1089]foreshadowing the appearance of SAM sites in Camaguey
[1090]Province." (18 September)
[1092]@. "The interception onsvs"Séptembermoftia signal
[1093]from 2 missile-associated radar, probably coming. from
[1094]the surface-to-air missile. site at Mariel, suggests
[1095]that the site is or soon will be operational.
[1096]° "The message asking for volunteers for service
[1097]in Cuba, which we reported Saturday, has now cropped
[1098]up on enough Soviet military radio nets to reveal that
[1099]a fairly general recruiting campaign is going on.
[1101]There is no indication yet of the numbers involved."
[1102](19 September)
[1104]e, “Evidence is still coming in on Moscow's
[1105]canvass of its military forces for volunteers to serve
[1106]in Cuba. This activity is puzzling; we have never seen
[1107]anything like it before,
[1108]. "The move. may be purely administrative: to
[1109]replace personnel who had been suddenly ordered there with:
[1110]others prepared to stay for some time. On the other hand,
[1111]it could mean another sizable increment to Soviet personnel -
[1112]in Cuba or a belief in Moscow that its people are likely
[1113]to be engaged in cembat. We are trying to get a better |
[1115]answer,"' (21 September) a
[1116]Pony
[1118]TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST La
[1120]TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST _
[1121]: ; . bog
[1123]£. "Our running account of the number of Soviet
[1124]dry-cargo vessels making the voyage to Cuba since mid-
[1125]July is now over 100. About 85 of ‘these probably were
[1126]carrying military hardware. oo
[1127]a . “The Cuban Foreign Office on Tuesday ordered
[1128]_-«~ Western correspondents to put in for new credentials by
[1129]today, telling them that all of Cuba beyond Havana's
[1130]city limits is out of bounds except. by special per-.
[1131]mission," (27 September)
[1133]35, During this peried General Carter, at the President's
[1134]jnstructions, briefed General Eisenhower on the Cuban sSitua-—
[1135]tion on 10 September. On 12 September he briefed the House.
[1136]Armed Services and Foreign Affairs Committees, Although out
[1137]of time sequence, it Should also be noted here, because the -
[1138]information presented was essentially more of the same, that
[1139]the DCI again briefed General Eisenhower on 3 October and
[1140]Congressman Cannon on 9 October.
[1144]Sy A
[1145]Bp,
[1147]i
[1149]TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST bra,
[1152]TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST _
[1154]J, The Soviet Offensive Deployment
[1156]36. At this point, it is necessary to retrace a few
[1157]ssteps in time and discuss what was actually going on in Cuba.
[1158]Examination of information now available makes it possible
[1159]to outline with a fair degree of confidence a time-table of
[1160]the Soviet program which is generally consistent. from site
[1161]to site. This begins with the construction of SAM defenses,
[1162]first in the west around San Cristobal and Guanajay, then in
[1163]central Cuba around Sagua la Grande and. Remedios, finally in.
[1165]the rest of the island. Next, in each case, comes the eviction
[1167]of local inhabitants at each site, road improvement, and the
[1168]establishment of restricted construction areas. Finally —
[1169]comes the arrival of equipment at each site according to what
[1170]appears a carefully prepared schedule. Apparently, no recog——
[1171]nizable missile equipment was moved to the MRBM sites and no.
[1172]major construction was. begun at the IRBM sites until at least
[1173]two weeks after the last 0-2 overflight of the area and until
[1174]the US had publicly. acknowledged the presence. of SA-2 sites
[1176]in Cuba. ; Oo _
[1178]37. The first large pieces of equipment for the MRBM
[1179]sites near San Cristobal were probably shipped from the USSR
[1180]on the ship Omsk, which arrived at Mariel on 7 or 8 September.
[1181]A second shipment followed on the Poltava which arrived on
[1182]15 September. This equipment was moved to San Cristobal by
[1183]truck at night, with the first convoys probably arriving at
[1184]the sites about 17 September. That is, 17 September is the
[1185]earliest date at which photography might have detected the
[1186]first MRBM equipment at San Cristobal.
[1188]38. Construction equipment and material for the
[1189]Guanajay fixed IRBM sites began to arrive at Mariel about —
[1190]mid-August, minor activity of an indefinite type was noted
[1191]there in the 29 August photography, and major construction
[1192]had probably begun by 15 September. (The fact that ship-_
[1193]ments to Guanajay started before those to San Cristobal
[1194]reflects the longer lead-time required for construction of
[1195]a fixed site). It is not possible to say how soon after: .
[1196]15 September the activity might have been recognizable from
[1197]the air as an IRBM site. ;
[1199]39, The sites in Las Villas Province were established
[1200]on 2 slightly later, but similar, time scale. Equipment
[1201]for the Sagua La Grande MRBM sites was probably landed
[1202]at Casilda, on the south coast. The most likely ship to
[1203]have carried the large items is the Kimovsk, which docked
[1207]TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST
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[1215]TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST
[1217]there on 22 September. This equipment must. have moved to
[1218]the site during the last week of September, and was probably
[1219]detectable from photography after 1 October. The Remedios
[1220]_IRBM site construction was parallel to the Guanajay schedule,
[1221]but also about two weeks behind. . Photography of 5 September
[1222]‘was negative, but road improvement began shortly thereafter,
[1223]cand aflow of construction material from the port of Isabela,
[1224]on- the north coast, began. The estimated date for the be-
[1225]ginning of major construction is about 1 October. Again
[1227]the date at which the site acquired a recognizable photo-
[1228]‘graphic signature is not determinable. ;
[1232]"FOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST
[1234]“4
[1236]TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST _
[1238]ay i. er
[1240]K. ..The. Targeting of San Cristobal BES es
[1244]Oita
[1245]Le
[1247]40, Although the sites themselves. were closed to ground
[1248]observation, the movement of equipment to them from the ports
[1249]. was in fact seen by CIA agents and by a number of individuals
[1250]who later fled. to. the US. The agents reported this informa—
[1251]tion as soon as they were able, but in most cases had to de—
[1252]pend on secret writing for communication. Hence, there was a
[1253]lag of several days at least before their information became
[1254]‘available. Refugee reports were delayed considerably longer
[1255]for other, and uncontrollable, reasons--the time of the Jin-
[1256]-dividual's decision to leave Cuba, his discovery of means for.
[1257]doing so, and his delivery to an interrogation center. Many
[1258]of the reports so received dealt with unidentifiable construc-
[1259]tion activity. Many of them, because of the time-lags noted
[1260]above, did not arrive in Washington until after 14 October,
[1261]and some are still coming in. ;
[1263]41. Nevertheless, by-about 1 October, the San Cristobal
[1264]‘area had. been pinpointed as a suspect MRBM site and photographic .
[1265]confirmation had been requested. This represents a consider-
[1266]able technical achievement.. To understand why, it is again
[1267]necessary to back-track in time. Since the moment of Castro's
[1268]triumphal march into Havana, the Intelligence Community had
[1269]been flooded with reports of Soviet weapons shipments and mis-
[1270]sile installations in Cuba. There were several hundred such
[1271]reports, claiming the presence of everything from small arms
[1272]to ICBMs, before August 1960, i.e., before the USSR had sup—
[1273]plied Cuba with any weapons at all. More specifically, CIA's
[1274]files contain 211 intelligence reports (this does not include
[1275]press items) on missile and missilé-associated activity in
[1276]Cuba before 1 Jan 1962. All of these were either totally
[1277]false or misinterpretations by the observer of other kinds of
[1278]activity. CIf analysts had naturally come to view all such
[1279]reports with a high degree of suspicion. ;
[1281]42. On 15 February 1962 an interagency interrogation center
[1282]was established by CIA at Opa Locka, near Miami, to handle Cu-
[1283]ban refugees and improv2the quality of intelligence collected
[1284]from them. It waS manned by trained bilingual interrogators
[1285]from the armed services and CIA. The establishment of Opa Locka
[1286]coincided with a sharp drop in reports of missile activity re-
[1287]ceived in Washington. When the defensive phase of the Soviet
[1288]buildup began, the volume of Opa Locka reporting rose very
[1289]rapidly, and provided good information on the types of equip-
[1290]ment coming in, on the use of Soviet personnel and on the se-
[1291]curity precautions imposed by the Soviets on this operation.
[1292](Such reports were the basis for the Checklist item cited in
[1294]para 9). |
[1295]Gy hey
[1296]Mey
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[1302]TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIS# My; ‘os
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[1306]Figs
[1308]_ 43, For the better part of two years, CIA had been check-
[1309]ing information obtained from refugee, defector, and agent
[1310]sources with NPIC whenever it was apparent that the informa—
[1311]tion was of a kind that could be verified or negated by aerial
[1312]‘reconnaissance. In May 1962, NPIC began publishing a series of
[1313]“formal listings (Photographic Evaluation of Information on Cuba)
[1315]in which these reports were evaluated in the light of photogra-
[1316]phic-coverage. In the 7 issues of this publication between 31
[1318]May and 5 October NPIC examined 138 raw reports referred to it
[1320]_ for comment. Of this total, only three cited missile activity
[1322]_ which could not be linked directly to the SA-2 and cruise mis-
[1324]Sile deployments. NPIC's evidence negated those three.
[1326]44, When the first indications of build-up began to come
[1327]in in August,xthese procedures were further tightened. CIA
[1328]current intelligence was ordered orally by the DD/I's office
[1330]on about 14 August not to publish any information on the con-
[1331]struction of missile bases in Cuba until they had been checked
[1332]out with NPIC. (This instruction was in the field of intelli-
[1333]gence technique rather than of policy; it had no relation to.
[1334]later restrictions; (see para 50). Between 14 August and mid-
[1335]October this office sent NPIC 13 memoranda asking for a check
[1336]on 25 separate reports containing information which was thought
[1337]‘to raise the possibility of Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba. A
[1338]great many more such reporis were checked with NPIC informally —
[1339]by telephone. In all cases, NPIC either lacked the necessary
[1340]coverage or made a negative finding.
[1342]_. .. 45. On 20 August, the COMOR Targeting Working Group
[1343](chaired and staffed largely by CIA) set up the first compre-
[1344]hensive card file system for Cuban targets. An example of its
[1345]procedures is the handling of targets in the Sagua La Grande
[1346]area. Based on refugee reporting, the COMOR Targeting Working
[1347]Group on 27 August pinpointed four farms in this area as sus-
[1348]pect missile sites. Readout of the 29 August coverage showed
[1349]an SA-2 site near Sagua La Grande which apparently was the basis
[1350]for the reported activity there, and the target card was changed
[1351]to show a confirmed SA-2 site. It should be noted that know-
[1352]ledge that this site was in the area could have led analysts to
[1353]misinterpret any subsequent reports of MRBM activity as part of
[1354]the SAM development,but in fact no such reports were received.
[1356]. 46. By September, the volume of agent and refugee report-
[1357]ing had become very large indeed. During the month 8&2 re-
[1358]ports on internal activities in Cuba were disseminated, exclu-
[1359]sive of telegraphic dissemination, (The CIA clandestine col-
[1360]lectors report that their output represented only the small pub-
[1361]lishable fraction of the raw material collected.) A substantial
[1363]24 . Pron
[1364]. — Carag p "Om 7 .
[1365]TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST PL
[1367]PUP oye
[1370]Snip Of
[1372]TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST 8 tse ana,
[1374]Par
[1376]proportion of these dealt with the deployment of defensive mis-
[1377]siles and related activities. Knowledge on the part of the :
[1378]analysts that such a deployment was in fact going on, plus the
[1379]normal difficulties encountered by untrained observers in tell-
[1380]‘ing an offensive missile from a defensive one, tended to throw
[1381]-a sort of smoke-screen around the Soviet offensive deployment
[1382]when it finally began. The CIA analytic apparatus, .however,
[1383]recognized and correlated the first authentic reports of MRBM
[1384]equipment ever to be received in Washington, and took action
[1385]upon them. It targeted the San Cristobal area, not as another
[1386]location where alleged missile activity should be negated by
[1387]photography, but as a suspect SS-4 site.
[1389]47. This process took about three weeks, from the date
[1390]when the first observation was made on the ground in Cuba to
[1391]the preparation of the target card. The two reports from Opa
[1392]Locka which triggered it were: ~ .
[1394]— a. An observation in Havana on 12 September of a
[1395]convoy. carrying, long canvas-covered objects which the source
[1396]identified under interrogation as resembling ss-4s. This re—-
[1397]port, which was disseminated by CIA on 21 September, contained.
[1398]sufficient accurate detail to alert intelligence analysts. —
[1400]b. An observation on 17 September of a convoy mov-
[1401]ing toward the San Cristobal area. This information, received
[1402]on 27 September, dovetailed’ in many respects with the earlier
[1403]report, :
[1405]48, The arrival of the second report led CIA analysts
[1406]to a tentative conclusion that the two observers had in. fact
[1407]seen’ the same convoy, and that there was a possibility of the
[1408]ss-4 identification. being genuine. A day or so earlier, a -
[1409]target card on San Cristobal had been prepared on the basis
[1410]of a vague report of "Russians building a rocket base." Now
[1411]this card was removed and, with the two reports cited above
[1412]and other less specific information on activity in this area
[1413]which was beginning to trickle in, a new card was prepared _
[1414]between 1 and 3 October which was in effect a priority require-
[1415]ment for photographic coverage. This card was used in the
[1416]targeting of the 14 October flight (see para 63). It read as
[1417]follows: "Collateral reports indicate the existence of a re-
[1418]stricted area in Pinar del Rio Province which is suspected of
[1419]including an SSM site under construction, particularly SS-4
[1420]Shyster. The area is bounded by a line connecting the follow-
[1421]ing four town: Consolacion del Norte (8332N/2244W); San Diego
[1422]del Los Banos (8325N/2235W); San Cristobal (8301N/2243W); and
[1423]Las Pozos (8317N/2250W). Requirement: Search the area deli-
[1424]neated for possible surface missile construction, with parti-
[1425]cular attention to SS-4 Shyster." ,
[1428]TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST Craig p Om
[1430]day
[1432]TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST
[1434]49, Ar.<ther renort, too general to be used in the process
[1436]described o7ve, is nevertheless of interest as the first good
[1437]_ information distributed on the Soviet offensive build-up. On —
[1438]20 September, CIA disseminated an agent report that Castro's
[1439]personal pilot, Claudio Morinas, had said on 9 September "We
[1440]‘have 40-mile range guided missiles, both surface-to-surface
[1441]and surface-to-air, and we have a radar system which covers,,
[1442]sector by sector, all of the Cuban air space and (beyond) as
[1443]far as Florida. There are also many mobile ramps for inter~—
[1444]mediate range rockets” ~~ cht ole : .
[1446]-26- Lo : .
[1447]. - . en >
[1448]TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST — “tray,
[1450]Aan
[1452]L !
[1453]Sold,
[1455]TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST. —
[1456]L. ‘Limitations on Publications
[1458]50. At some point, probably just after 27 September, an
[1459]item on the subject of possible strategic weapons in Cuba might
[1460]‘have been written for CIA current intelligence publications. It
[1461]could not be written because there was an injunction not to do
[1462]so. By the time that hard information began to come in early
[1463]in September, the USIB principals had become acutely conscious
[1464]of the distinction publicly made by the President between of-
[1465]fensive and defensive weapons in Cuba. . Aware that they were
[1466]dealing with an explosive political issue and aware also that
[1467]"leakage" of intelligence on offensive weapons, true or false, -
[1468]‘would seriously Limit the President's freedom of action in deal-
[1469]‘ing with what might become a major international crisis, they
[1470]had evolved a system for limiting dissemination of such infor-
[1471]‘mation. Analysis would continue and senior policy officials
[1472]would be briefed, but no material would appear in formal intel- |
[1473]ligence publications without the approval of the USIB principals.
[1474]These instructions were first issued orally, and later (on 11
[1475]October) formalized by USIB in the 'PSALM" system (X-Ray Funnel
[1476]for SIGINT). The key passages in USIB's order were: "Such
[1477]information or intelligence will be disseminated outside each
[1478]USIB intelligence component only to specific individuals on“an™ ©
[1479]EYES ONLY basis who by virtue of their responsibilities as ad-
[1480]visers to the President have a need to know," and "There is no
[1481]intent hereby, however’, to inhibit the essential analytic pro-
[1482]cess." oO
[1484]-§1, It should also be noted that the order not to publish
[1485]‘anything on missile sites without NPIC:’ corroboration (Para 44)
[1486]had never been rescinded. The effect this would have had on re-
[1488]porting in late September and October if the other ban had not
[1489]been in effect is difficult to determine. , ;
[1491]52. These restrictions did not apply to the Checklist,
[1492]but the Checklist writers drew for their Cuban information
[1493]largely on the Cuban Daily Summary, a compendium of reporting
[1494]on Cuba published by CIA. Since the Summary was affected by.
[1495]the restrictions, this practice, imposed by the sheer volume
[1496]of raw material coming in on Cuba, had the effect of cutting -
[1497]the Checklist off from information on offensive weapons.
[1499]53. Moreover, neither’ the Checklist group, nor any other
[1500]current intelligence officers, knew that the possibility that a
[1501]Soviet strategic missile base might be established in Cuba had
[1502]been raised by the DCI and seriously discussed by the President
[1503]and his advisors more than a month earlier (See Para 13). In
[1504]other words the thrust of NSAM 181 had been so watered down by
[1506]0 _ &
[1507]-27- C
[1508]; | Saya it”
[1509]TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST - : w Cray,
[1511]: . , ; . : Phor ery ;
[1512]TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALLSAE WHiTE Hous: a
[1514]te s
[1516]time and bureaucratic process that it.reached the working level
[1517]only in the form of SNIE 85-3, which held that establishment of
[1518]such a base waS most improbable. (See, however, para 29)
[1520]54, It is difficult to say whether information from ground
[1521]‘sources would have been published had there not been a blanket
[1522]injunction against it. The analysts too were sensitive to the
[1523]potential political impact of the reports they were receiving;
[1524]this would not have influenced them against publication, but
[1525]would have made thé.i want to be doubly sure, especially on a.
[1526]subject with a history reaching back to Our Man in Havana. In.
[1527]addition, rigid ce partmentation was maintained between the
[1528]COMOP.-Special Gro» organization responsible for collection and
[1529]the intelligence somponents responsible for analysis. - Few, if
[1530]‘any, CIA analysts vorking on the Cuban problem even - had IDEALIST
[1531]clearances. AS & result, they did not know that no overflights
[1532]of Pinar del Rio and Las Villas were included in the September
[1533]program, or that this program was seriously delayed. They had. ~
[1534]no way of knowing that the photographic verification they had
[1535]requested would not be Soon forthcoming, and they might well have
[1536]delayed publication from day to day in hopes of receiving it.. .
[1538]55. Nevertheless, it can be established that if the injunc-
[1539]tion against publication had not existed there would have. been
[1540]some reflection of the refugee reports in the Cuban Daily Summary,
[1541]which is not highly selective. In retrospect, it seems quite pos—
[1542]sible--but by no means certain--that they would then have been
[1543]picked up in the Checklist, but it is extremely doubtful if they
[1544]would have survived the coordination process for the Central In-
[1545]telligence Bulletin. Thus, at the most the President might have
[1546]‘Tearned that there was suspicious activity around San Cristobal
[1547]slightly more than a week before he apparently did.
[1549]56. In sum the CIA analysts believed they had done their
[1550]duty by targeting the San Cristobal area for photographic cover-
[1551]‘age, but no word of their concern over activity in this area
[1552]had appeared in an intelligence publication. It appears highly
[1553]probable that the Special Group first heard of this concern at
[1554]its meeting on 9 October, when (see para. 63) it ordered a U-2
[1555]mission which covered the area. .
[1557]57. The gap of 7-10 days between the key analytic correla-
[1558]tion of reports and the Special Group meeting can probably be
[1559]attributed to the cumbersome processes of the administrative
[1560]structure supporting the Special Group. This machinery was de-
[1561]signed to provide elaborate justifications and back-up paper
[1562]work before each decision was made, procedures reaching back
[1563]into the early history of U-2 operations over the USSR. They
[1564]were intended for the control of deliberate strategic reconnais-
[1565]Sance of the USSR, and not for a fast-moving situation such as
[1566]that in Cuba, which was rapidly becoming tactical. In fact,
[1567]after readout of the 14 October mission they were. jettisoned.
[1570]' . from
[1571]TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST Gers R. Ford Library -
[1573]“TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST
[1575]em cpfbey
[1577]M. Progress of the September Overflight Program’ Oe GEES
[1579]58.- While the MRBM and IRBM deployment continued and
[1580]the first good ground reports began to filter out of Cuba,
[1581]_the four-flight reconnaissance program approved on 10 Septem—
[1582]ber was being pushed forward. Unfortunately, this program
[1583]was seriously delayed by bad weather. Not until 26 September
[1584]could the first successful mission be flown, over Banes and
[1585]Guantanamo. (A mission was flown on 17 September but its
[1586]targets were completely cloud-covered) On 27 and 28 Septem—
[1587]ber the weather was bad again, but on the 29th the Isle of
[1588]Pines - Bay of Pigs mission was successfully flown. The
[1589]weather again turned bad until 5 October, when the south >
[1590]coast peripheral mission. was accomplished. The next day,
[1591]the north coast peripheral mission aborted, but was success-
[1592]fully completed. on 7 October. Se
[1594]59. Thus, completion of the September program took 26
[1595]days, from 12 September--the earliest date on which missions
[1596]approved on the 10th could have been flown--through 7 October.
[1597]On 20 of these days weather was bad over the areas not yet —
[1598]overflown (the criterion for launch was a forecast of less.
[1599]than 25 percent cloud cover). On four days successful mis~—
[1600]sions were flown. On one day a mission was launched but
[1601]aborted, and one day was used to alert a mission which was
[1602]launched the following day. Availability of aircraft was |
[1603]not a limiting factor. a
[1605]--§0. These missions accomplished their purpose, L.e.,.
[1606]they. established almost completely the location of SA-2
[1607]sites on the island. They did not--and, since they were
[1608]designed to avoid SAM-defended areas, could not--detect the
[1609]ballistic missile deployments then under way. The combined
[1610]effect of the Special Group decision of 10 September and
[1611]the weather conditions of the period following was to delay
[1612]consideration of what reconnaissance activities should next
[1613]be undertaken over Cuba until early October.
[1615]ma,"
[1619]TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST |
[1621]. . ~ }
[1623]TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST
[1625]; : . Pures di MT
[1626]KK. The Special Group Decision of 9 October THE WHITE HOUSE eFEE
[1627]61. By late September the delays. in accomplishing the
[1629].four-flight program, coupled with a mass of evidence that the
[1630]Soviet build-up was continuing, had generated a greatly
[1631]increased sense of urgency jn Washington, © It should again
[1633]pe noted, however, that high-level consideration of the .
[1634]possibility that MRBMs might be deployed to Cuba had always
[1635]been in terms of Soviet action after the SA-2 defense was
[1637]fully operational. There is. no documentary evidence of action
[1638]directed toward the overflight of SAM-defended areas until the
[1639]Special Group (Augmented) meeting of 4 October. At this
[1640]meeting the DCI pointed out that U-2 flights were now (before
[1641]‘the last two missions of the 10 September program) restricted
[1642]by the presence of SAM sites to the southeastern quadrant of
[1643]Cuba. According to the minutes. of this meeting "it was _
[1644]questioned /by the DCI7 whether this was a reasonable restric-—
[1645]tion at this time, particularly since the SAMs were almost
[1646]certainly not operational." The Group then ordered the NRO
[1648]to prepare an overall program for reconnaissance of Cuba for
[1650]presentation at the Group's meeting of 9 October.
[1652]62. On 6 October, COMOR provided to the NRO a memo-
[1653]“yandum entitled "Intelligence Justification and Requirements
[1654]for Overflight of Cuba" for use in this presentation. Para.
[1655]. Al, of this paper stated that "there is now a pressing and
[1656]continuing need for up-to-date. intelligence on the progress
[1657]of the Soviet arms build-up in Cuba. The very highest levels
[1659]-- ofthe government. are dependent upon. this intelligence. to
[1661]assist in making policy decisions of immediate and vital con-
[1662]cern to the nation.” Para A2., commenting on the absence of
[1663]coverage of western Cuba since 29 August, included the state-
[1664]ment that "Ground observers have, in several recent instances,
[1665]reported sightings of what they believe to be Soviet MRBMs in
[1666]Cuba, These reports must be confirmed or denied by photo
[1667]coverage." Attached to the memorandum were a number of target
[1668]lists, on which the area previously targeted around San
[1669]Cristobal appears, together with recommendations for attack
[1670]‘of particular targets by satellite, U-2, obligue, FIREFLY,
[1672]or F8U-1P/RF-101 photography. (USIB, considering this paper
[1673]on 6 October, recommended to the Special Group full coverage
[1674]of two of these lists which did not specifically include San
[1675]Cristobal, but which by its nature would have covered that
[1676]area and the other ballistic missile sites as well.)
[1679]TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST
[1681]Photocopy
[1682]Geraia Rm
[1683]- Ford Lipa,
[1687]TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST Pe
[1689]63, At the Special Group meeting on 9 October, NRO's
[1690]first recommendation was "A U-2 probe over the suspect MRBM
[1691]site as soon. as weather permits," This referred to the area
[1692]targeted by COMOR near San Cristobal (see Para 48). The
[1694]‘operation, which was to be supported by ELINT collection
[1695]aircraft off the: coast, also was designed to pass over one
[1696]of the SA-2 sites which was thought to be most. nearly opera—
[1697]tional. Thus the secondary objective was to determine the
[1698]status of SA-2 defenses in order to measure the risk involved
[1699]in getting complete U-2 coverage of Cuba as rapidly as
[1700]possible, NRO's second recommendation was therefore condi-
[1701]tional: "If there is no SA~2 reaction to the initial U-2
[1702]sortie, maximum coverage of the western end of the island
[1704]‘by multiple U-2s simultaneously, as soon as weather permits."
[1705](There were also certain other recommendations for low level,
[1706]oblique, and FIREFLY missions.) - Fs
[1708]64, . The Group. gave first priority to the San Cristobal
[1709]’ mission and recommended to the President that he approve it. |
[1710]The President gave his approval--presumably learning of the .
[1711]San Cristobal reports at this time--and the mission was
[1712]immediately mounted, It was delayed by weather, however, from
[1713]10 through 12 October. On that date operational control was
[1714]transferred to SAC, There is no reason to believe that the
[1715]transfer in any way delayed launching the mission, which SAC
[1716]flew on 14 October. The pilot did not fly the prescribed.
[1717]track, but took a course at an angle to it. Fortunately the
[1718]planned and actual paths crossed over San Cristobal, and the
[1719]primary mission waS accomplished.
[1721].65, After this mission had been approved, but before it
[1722]had been flown, CIA received on 10 October Navy. photographs
[1723]taken two weeks earlier of the Soviet ship Kasimov off Cuba.
[1724]These photographs showed clearly identifiable IL-28 crates,
[1725]which later showed up in U-2 photography of 17 Octcber--along
[1726]with a number of others which must have come in on unphoto-
[1727]graphed ships--at San Julian airfield in the western tip of
[1728]the island. The information appeared in the Checklist of
[1729]11 October. .
[1731]‘66. During this interim period, the DCI briefed the
[1732]CIA Subcommittee of House Appropriations on 10 October on
[1733]the build-up, including the IL-28s, He also commented on
[1734]“MRBMs essentially along.the lines of his cables from Nice
[1735](para 30), adding that there were many experts who did not
[1736]believe the Soviets would make such a move, but that he
[1737]differed with them, He told the Subcommittee that he had
[1738]authority for an overflight in the next day or so, General
[1740]-31- ; _ Pig
[1741]TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST : POT Lita
[1743]a
[1744]TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST
[1746]Carter said much the:same thing to Senator Saltonstall. the
[1747]following day (11 October). In reply to Saltonstall's
[1748]question about Senator Keating's charges of known MRBM sites
[1749]in Cuba, General Carter said that there were refugee reports
[1750]‘but no hard evidence, and that CIA hoped to photograph the
[1751]areas in the next day or so, General Carter also briefed
[1752]Senator Stennis on 15 October (before the photography of
[1754]the previous day was available), again along the same lines,
[1757]| . Py
[1758]TOP. SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST | erg fn
[1760]'. As the readout progressed during
[1762]“TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST
[1764]©. Notification of the President
[1766]67. By this time, photography from the 14 October
[1767]mission had arrived in Washington and readout had. begun.
[1768]The Director, NPIC, contacted the DD/I in the early evening
[1769]of the 15th to inform him that a possible MRBM site had been
[1770]identified in the San Cristobal area. The DD/I notified — .
[1771]General Carter (the DCI being out of town). General Carter
[1772]told him he would notify General Taylor and General Carroll
[1773]of DIA at dinner, and McGeorge Bundy if he was present.
[1774]the evening the information
[1775]became firmer and the DD/I decided not to wait until morning
[1776]to notify White House and State Department officials. About
[1777]2200 he passed the information to Mr. Bundy and Mr. Hilsman,
[1778]who notified the Secretary. of State. The following morning _
[1779](16 October) General Carter and the DD/I briefed Bundy in
[1780]detail and General Carter at 1100 briefed the President.’
[1782]Re] .
[1784]fl
[1788]TOP SECRET DINAR ‘CHESS RUFF IDEALIST