[1]14,0001
[2](104-1
[3]rs
[5]0210-10037,
[7]Tt gt
[8]FU TE or bd)
[9]ne
[11]y
[13]uo 2025 RELEASE U F '
[14]ml i NDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 i
[15]Fa
[17]an
[20]a
[22]FILE sreteysumpersvouuve: CASE dan VUR [YP MAVOWI LL, (Ee
[24]Sesh tha te Tre neni A ne ene
[26]_ desea: (228 Mee STUDY gy
[27]Quek) frees LY
[29]. esp aT a L fuk
[31]INCLUSIVE DATES: PRRTS Dy TE + be | 4
[33]cusTODIAL uNIT/LOCATION: — SE ee _
[35]DATE | DATE ‘
[36]RECEIVED ! neronneD | [REVIEWED BY (PRINT NANE) 1 SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL.
[38]WJ U id ra
[40]{7
[41]oo] ‘
[43]Li MAY 7
[45]a
[46]fa
[48]hey ee le my
[50]Ny
[52]rai Annes aetanghae Ais ida edn ebBEbist elt nace petheteabeet rece ca eetenendees seeadentad ld a
[56]oarbracnie dies accent ractaaa tay eee
[58]Pees
[59]ARTS Teter lB
[61]NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE
[63]cence eae Te ne ERE TREE SAME Torre rmram eminem RTT ae SETHE Tees conte
[66]H 400000
[68]WPA Sty et Se
[70]Aa
[72]aK ok
[73]neg andl sate io aya ine Sipe
[76]The Case of Yuriy Ivanovich
[78]NOSENKO
[80]February 1967
[83]14-0000
[85]The Bona Fides of NOSENKO
[87]I. INTRODUCTION
[88]II. SUMMARY OF OPERATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
[89]A. Introduction
[90]B. First Geneva Phase (June 1962)
[91]C. Second Geneva Phase (January-February 1964)
[92]D. Post-Defection Handling (February 1964 to Present)
[93]III. OPERATIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES ,
[94]A. Earlier Information on NOSENKO in Geneva
[95]B. Reasons for NOSENKO's Presence in Geneva
[96]“4. TDY in 1962
[97]. 26 The 1964 TDY
[98]C. Motivations and Intentions of NOSENKO
[99]1, Introduction ,
[100]2. Collaboration in 1962
[101]a. Readiness to Report to CIA
[102]b. Attitude Toward Defection
[103]; ec. Motivation
[104]; 3. Decision to Defect (January 1964)
[105]4. The Letter of July 1964
[106]D. Pattern of Activity in Geneva
[107]1. Introduction
[109]2. Official Duties in Geneva
[111]3. Visits to the KGB Legal Residency
[112]4. Association with TSYMBAL
[114]5. Association with Other Soviets
[116]6. Availability for Meetings with CIA
[117]= ‘Timing of Defection . ,
[119]F. The Recall Telegram
[121]TOP SEcrey
[123]MPP eter nets:
[127]o 7D f&® F&F WwW WwW Ww
[131]Sreare
[133]sade Sh dct bere cassis
[137].
[139]G. Soviet Official Reactions 40
[140]H., Reactions of NOSENKO's Family 42
[141]I, Repercussions Within the KCB 44°
[142]1. SENSITIVE SOURCE 44
[143]2. SEISITIVE SOURCE 46
[144]3. SGURCE 46
[145]4. KGB Handlers of Agents 47
[146]IV. NON-KGB ASPECTS OF NOSENKO's LIFE 48
[147]. A. Introduction , : 48
[148]RB, NOSENKO's Pre-KGB Autobiography 48
[149]. C. Personal Affairs Since Entering the KGB 79
[150]- 1. Family Life 79
[151]1 2. Venereal Disease 80
[152].* 3, Affiliation with Communist Party Organs 81
[153]4. Statements to Others by NOSENKO 82
[154]’ D. Soviets! Statements About NOSENKO g3 - X44
[155]V. NOSENKO's KGB CAREER Ses
[156]A, Introduction 85
[157]*B. Entry into the KGB 86
[158]1. Date of Entry 86
[159]2. Circumstances and Procedures of Entry 89
[160]C. To June 1955 (American Department) 93
[161]1. Introduction 93
[162]; 2. Operations Against Correspondents 93
[163]a. KGB Files on SHAPIRO, GILMORE, SALISBURY, 93
[164]and WHITNEY a :
[165]b. Agents Reporting on Correspondents 94
[166]c. Information from Other Sources 95
[167]3. Operations Against Military Attache Personnel 96
[169]- a. Agents Reporting on Military Attaches
[171]caeeeceeeyiang it enthanetaltne ene
[175].
[177]a
[179]aredtbecd adlasen
[181]woes latSed tl Wilt nt
[186]- bonne are a annem cannes tn
[187]nan en ayant
[189]June 1955 to January 1960 (Tourist Department)
[191]1.
[192]2.
[193]3.
[195]4.
[197]NOSENKO's Targets
[198](i) MICKELSON
[199](id) MEARNS
[201](1414) RICHARDS |
[203](iv) FELCHLIN
[204](v) BENSON
[205](vi) STROUD
[207](vii) MULE
[209](viii) ENG of BENSON, STROUD and MULE
[210](ix) CARDELLA
[211](x) VAN LAETHEM
[213]Introduction
[215]Soviet Homosexual Agents
[217]Other Soviet Agents
[219]Operations with Foreign Visitors
[221]a.
[223]b.
[225]Attempted Entrapment of MALIA (1955)
[226]Recruitment of BURGI (1956)
[227]Approach to @ (1957)
[229]Contact with Gana GE (1957)
[231]Recruitment of 4
[233]Recruitment of HARRIS (1958)
[234]Compromise of KRAFT (1958)
[236]Recruitment of DREW (1959)
[238]Recruitment of # (1959)
[239]Recruitment of & 1959)
[240]Recruitment of (1959)
[242]Recruitment of
[244]Compromise of BARRETT (1959) ..
[246]. Compromise of WILUERFORD (1959)
[248]. y ~
[250]EE es TP SE et os
[252]Beka tien in ates +
[255]= Fore agit SPT ae FET
[257]99
[259]100
[260]100
[261]101
[262]103
[263]103
[264]104
[266]104
[268]106
[269]107
[270]107
[271]107
[272]109
[273]112
[274]112
[275]113
[276]120
[277]121
[278]121
[279]122
[280]123
[281]123
[283]124
[285]124
[287]124,
[288]125.
[289]126.
[290]127
[294]a
[295]2
[297]2
[299]a
[300]a
[301]3
[304]14-00000
[306]5, The FRIPPEL Case (1959-63) 129
[308]a. NOSENKO's Information 129
[309]b. FRIPPEL's Information . 133
[310]6, Lee Harvey OSWALD (1959-60 and 1963) 136
[311]a. Statements to the FBI 137
[312]b. Statements to CIA 141
[313]a) KGB Interest in OSWALD . 141
[314](ii) KGB Interest in Marina OSWALD 142
[315](iii) OSWALD's Marriage and Departure 142
[316]from the USSR
[317](iv) OSWALD's Visit to the Soviet 143
[318]Embassy in Mexico
[319]{v) NOSENKO's Comments on Possible 144
[320]KGB Involvement in the Assassination
[321]7, Supervisory Responsibilities and Knowledge 145
[322]of Tourist Operations
[323]a. Information from NOSENKO 145
[324]b. KGB Knowledge from George BLAKE 146
[325]c. GOLITSYN's Tourist Document 147
[326]8. TDY's to London (1957 and 1958) 150
[328]January 1960 to January 1962 (American Department) 152
[330]1, Introduction 152
[331]2. NOSENKO's Transfer to the U.S. Embassy 153
[332]Section
[333]3. Duties and Knowledgeability 157
[334]a. Introduction ~ 157
[335]b. Functions as Deputy Chief and Acting 158
[336]Chief of Section
[337](i) Access 158
[338](44) Duties 159
[340](444) Additional Duties in KOVSHUK's 163 _
[342]Absence
[346]a F-
[347]ba!
[349]Ba F
[351]Reng
[352]SO Rep e,.
[353]ee ee ee fi gh 4 a te ene dete at te
[356]ec. Supervisor of All Code Clerk Operations
[357](i) Introduction
[358](ii) Approach to STORSBERG
[359](a) NOSENKO's Information
[360](b) Information from STORSBERG
[361](c) Information from PREISFREUND
[362](a) Information from GOLITSYN
[363](e}) Information from Cther Sources
[365](iii) TDY's by KOSOLAPOV on Code Clerk
[366]Cases
[368](a) Introduction
[369](b) False Identity for Travel
[371](c) The Early 1960 TDY (JENNER
[372]Case)
[374](a) The November 1966 TDY (GARLAND
[375]Case)
[377](iv) KCB-Polish UB Activities Against
[378]MORONE
[380](a) Introduction
[381](b) NOSENKO's Information
[382](c) Information from Other Sources
[384](v) Developmental Operation Against
[385]WIVUS
[387]{a) Introduction
[388](b) Information from NOSENKO
[389]ec) Information from Other Sources
[390](vi) Approach to KEYSERS
[391]. a 7 . . (a) Introduction
[392]_ . “(b) Information from NOSENKO
[394](e) Information from Other Sources
[396]a. 7 NOSENKO' 8 Responsibilities for Coverage
[397]of ABIDIAN
[399](4) Introduction
[401]B RQA AS . Ma,
[402]Weak! eT. fe Seen
[404]slate et oy Gib BTA tae oe Be Soke git
[406]186
[407]186
[408]187
[410]196
[412]201
[414]201
[416]201
[418]209
[420]209
[421]209
[422]211
[424]213
[425]' 213
[427]213
[429]senate aA Conamlteie sls dele
[431]a
[432]a
[433]j
[435]4
[440]14-0000
[442]aa Se ale rae
[444]ge
[446]h.
[448](ii) Duties as Case Officer
[450](441) ABIDIAN's Letter Mailings
[452](iv) ABIDIAN’s Servicing of the Pushkin
[453]Street Lead Drop
[455]Supervisor of Activities Against American
[456]Service Attaches
[458]Knowledge of the Target
[460](4) Introduction
[462](1i) Physical Premises
[464](iii) CIA Personnel Under Embassy -Cover
[466]Electronic Operations Against the U.S.
[468]' Embassy
[470](i) Introduction
[471](4i) Microphones in the Chancery
[472](a) NOSENKO's Sources
[474](b) Number and Locations of
[475]_ Microphones
[477](c) Receptivity and Audibility of
[478]Microphones
[480](a4) Amount, Type, and Value of
[481]Production
[483](i4i) Microphones in the North Wing
[484](iv) Monitoring/Jamming Beam
[486]Handler of KGB Agents
[488]4. Overseas Assignments
[490]a.
[492]F, January 1962 to January 1964 (Tourist Department)
[493]1. Date of Transfer
[495]"2. Punctions and Activities.
[497]Attempt to Obtain Assignment to Ethiopia
[498](1960) .
[500]U.S. Visa Application (19€0)
[501]The Cuba TDY (1960)
[502]The Bulgaria TDY and the LUNT Case
[504]5. Transfer to the Tourist Department
[506]236
[508]240
[509]240
[510]240
[511]242
[512]248
[514]248
[515]248
[516]249
[517]252
[519]257
[521]260
[523]267
[524]270
[525]272
[526]274
[528]274 -
[530]‘274
[532]276
[534]' 279
[536]284
[538]st Bie Saltire Ubon.
[540]said
[544]chat SU web attd ene eather
[546]sat enka aks vane te fe
[548]thee
[553]eet Se PETE Pc a een ETRE HRS AEST BRE ETE MR At ToT gt ey
[555]FE ESOS ROI ERT REA ORS MME + oe nine lend ce
[558]-
[559]Page ‘ j
[560]3. NOSENKO's Agents 287
[561]a. Arsene FRIPPEGL 287 .
[562]bp. dohan PRELSFREVUAD 263
[563]c. VOLKOVY and YEFREMOV 288 5
[564]a. 289
[565]e. Marina RYTOVA 283
[566]4. Approach to W. EE, JCHNZON 289
[567]@. NOSENKO's Information 239 : 2
[568]b. Information from JOHNSON : 292
[569]5. Attempt to Recruit PRALNS 233
[570]a. intormation frem NOSENKO 293
[571]b. Information from BRAUNS 294
[572]6. The SVENCHAUISKIY Case 295
[573]a. Information from NOSENKC 295
[574]b. Information from Other Sources 296
[575]7. KOTEN's Arrest and the KGE Agent BExgoe 298
[576]a. Information from NOSENKO 298
[578]b. Information from Other Sources Concerning 300
[580]KOTEN
[581]SENSTOTE S0u0RCE
[583]c. GEE
[585]Peporting on [REESE 302
[587]8. Arrest Of BARGHOORN 304
[588]a. Information frou NOSENKO 304
[589]b. Information from BARGHOORN 308
[590]9. GRU Agent: John Andrew SHUBIN 310
[591]a. Introduction 310
[592]b. NOSENKO's Information 310 :
[593]c. Information from Of & Sensitive Source 311 ;
[594]a. Information from Other Sources 312
[595]10. BOLSHAKOV, Robert Kennedy, and the Cuban 313 : a
[596]Missile Crisis : £
[597]a. Introduction 313 : s
[598]. ee |
[599]; off “3
[600]Cp
[601]AN
[602]it j
[603]pos “4
[605]i ° - t “A
[606]: TOP SECRET 4
[607]. cod
[610]14-0000 R
[612]ee ere Wat RE At ae Ut, te SPR aye A bapa eT beer gtk amt : : : ; “pA ete,
[614]a “page i :
[615]b. Soviet Sources During the Crisis 315
[616]: Cc. NOSENKO's Statements on BOLSHAKOV 316 .
[617]; ad. Information from WRERE) Sensitive Source 318 1
[618]: G. NOSENKO's KG8 Promotions and Awards 319 ;
[619]H iT
[620]i l. Rank 319
[621]2. Awards and Decorations 322
[622]H. NOSENFKO's Relationship with GRIBANOV 327
[623]1. Information trom NOSEMKO 327
[624]i a. Summary : 327
[625]b. Details 327
[626]2. Informaticn 336
[627]I. Confirmation from Cther Sources 3338
[628]1. Introduction 338
[629]2. SENSITIVE SOURCE 338
[630]3. Ey eee Bs, sensitive source 340
[632]5. 2S Source : 342
[633]6. GAMKRELIDZE 342
[634]7. GCOLITSYN 343
[635]8. 345
[636]9. 347
[637]10. eS 347 :
[638]11. Soviet Journalist KOROLEV 347
[639]; | | WI. PRODUCTION : 349 :
[640]7 A. Positive Intelligence Information : 349
[641]; B. Soviet Intelligence Personalities 350 3
[642]C. KGB Headquarters 352 oe . 7
[643]. 1. Structure and Functions 352 ‘ y
[644]2. Modus Operandi : ; ; 359
[645]3. Staff Procedures _ 360
[646]Cn
[647]wee Poa “A
[648]TOP SECRET = : 4
[649]~ sa . we 1
[653]D. KGB. Activities.
[655]“ab
[657]1. "@perations Against Americans .
[658]2.- Tabulation of American Leads
[659]‘az Successful Recruitment Approaches
[660]b. Development Operations
[661]¢. Unsuccessful Approaches
[662]a. Investigations
[663]3. Selected Cases of Recruited Americans
[665]a. "SASHA"
[667](i) NOSENKO's Information on the
[668]Agent
[670](ii) NOSENKO's Sourcing
[672](iii) GOLITSYN's Lead to “SASHA"
[673]b. “ANDREY" (Dayle W. SMITH)
[675](i) Introduction
[677](ii) NOSENKO's Information - 1962
[679](iii) NOSENKO's Information - 1964
[681](iv) | NOSENKO's Sourcing
[683](v) Results of Investigations
[685]ec. KGB Agent in Paris (Sgt. Robert Lee
[686]JOHNSON)
[688](4) Introduction
[690](44) The Lead from NOSENKO
[692](iii) NOSENKO's Sourcing
[694](iv) | JOHNSON and MINTKENBAUGH
[696](v) information from Cther Sources
[697](a) JOHNSON's Statements
[699](b) MINTKENBAUGH's Statements
[701]“ayes > SOHNSON ;
[702](e) Soviet Concern about Mrs.
[703]JOHNSON's Illness .
[705](c) Hedwig JOHNSON's Statements
[707]- (a) Mental Condition of Hedwig
[709]412
[711]413
[712]413
[713]413
[714]416
[715]419
[716]419
[717]427
[719]427
[720]428
[721]433
[723]"436
[725]437
[727]alata ads
[729]Sait
[731]stele Step ibec tbh taki ae.
[733]2
[736]14-0000
[738](vi) Damage by JOHNSON to U.5.
[740]Interests
[742]Unsuccessful Approaches to U.S. Citizens
[744]a.
[746]The HARMSTONE Case
[748](4) Introduction
[750](ii) Information
[751](iii) Information
[752]Edward Ellis SMITH
[753]() Information
[754]fii) Information
[755](iii) Information
[756]The BINDER Case
[758](4) Information
[760](ii) Information
[762]from NOSENKO
[764]from Other Sources
[766]from NOSENKO -
[767]from GOLITSYN
[769]from SMITH
[771]from NOSENKO
[773]from BINNER
[775]Operations Involving Other Westerners
[779]Tabulation
[781](4) Introduction
[783](ii) Agent Leads
[785](a) Afghanistan (1)
[787]1b) Argentina (2)
[789](c) Australia (1)
[791](a) Austria (3)
[793](e) Belgium (6)
[795](£) Brazil (2)
[796](g) Canada (5)
[797](h) Egypt (1)
[798](i) Finland (9)
[799]gj) France (9)
[801]Qk) Germany: (9)
[803](1) Greece
[805]TOP SECEE
[807]Sate RT seated tt
[809]Data betatl
[811](1)
[813]463
[814]463
[815]463
[816]464
[817]465
[818]468
[819]468
[820]463
[821]469
[822]470
[823]470
[824]470
[825]474
[826]474
[827]474
[828]475
[829]475
[830]475
[831]476
[832]476
[833]477
[835]. 479
[837]479
[839]Sees sre
[841]fe Rea timate: ncHlages.
[843]3
[844]2
[845]H
[847]a
[848]a
[849]i
[850]Js
[851]3
[852]i
[853]t
[855]2 tai Sova akin ae tined:
[858](441)
[860](m) India (2)
[862](n) Indonesia (1)
[864](o) Iran (1)
[866](p) Israel (2)
[868](q) Italy (6)
[870](cr) Japan (8)
[872]{s) Mexico (2)
[873](t+) The Netherlands (2)
[875](a) Norway (1)
[877](vy) Peru (1)
[879](w) Sweden (3)
[881](x) Switzerland (2)
[883](y) Tunisia (1)
[885](z) United Kingdom (7)
[887](aa) Uruquay (1)
[889](bb) Venezuela (1)
[891]Investigations and Development
[893]Cases
[895]b. The VASSALL Case
[897](i)
[898](ii)
[899](i4i)
[901]Information from NOSENKO
[902]Information from GOLITSYN
[904]Information from VASSALL
[908](1)
[909](ii)
[910](iid)
[911](iv)
[913](i)
[915]Introduction
[917]Information from NOSENKO
[918]Activities in Germany
[920]Cperation in Canada
[922]_ @e _Introduction
[924]-. ‘The BELITSKIY Operation
[926]b. information from NOSENKO
[928]- Statements in 1962
[930]Serre verona
[932]Stanuh.. eae Seba les
[934]22 wlaie.
[936]et sAltataet
[940]Bane wei A
[942]sible habit Ai Li
[944]Jeu te a
[947](ii) Statements in 1964
[949](i44)}%' BELITSKIY Photograph 521
[951]Information ‘grom Other Sources 522
[953]Investigations 530
[955]Compromise of POPOV 530 :
[957](4) Introduction 530 | .
[959](ii) CIA Operation with POPOV 530
[961](iii) Cause and Date of Compromise 532 . - it 4
[962](a) Information from NOSENKO $320 4
[963](b) Informaticen from ee sour 2 : :
[964](c) Infromation from the 533
[966]CHEREPANOV Papers :
[968](a) Information from GOLITSYN = 533 : '
[970]Compromise of PENKOVSKIY ~ 535 .
[972](4) Introduction 535
[974](ii) Resume of the PENKOVSKIY Case 535 .
[976](iii) Statements by NOSENKO 536 i
[977](a) 536. ;
[978](b) Reports on the Compromise 538 .
[980](iv) Information from GiRaiem SENSITIVE 544 DURCE
[982]ieee Oo ts ede
[984](v) Information from “Q6@EERZEPSENSITIVE 544 SOURCE -
[985](vi) Information from 545 Source
[986](vii) Information from Seas 545 |
[987](viii) formation from* 546 1 i
[989]§ a i 4
[990](ix) Information from Official KGB . 546 | an {
[992]Report . weed Apenemnasy
[993](x) Information from WYNNE 546 '
[994]Compromise of CHEREPANOV 548 4
[995](i) Introduction 548
[997](ii) Earlier Information on CHEREPANOV 548 |
[999](441) Reports by Americans
[1001]553
[1005]d.
[1007]e.
[1009]-(y) information from & +
[1011](iv) Information from NOSENKO.
[1013]source
[1015](vii) Information from
[1017](viii) Infermation froa We sensitive
[1018](ix) Contents of CHEREPANOY Package
[1020](x) NOSENKO's Comments on the
[1021]CHEREPANOV Paipecs
[1023]Reports on KAZAN-KCMAREK
[1024](i) Introduction °
[1025](ii) Statement by i.CSENKO
[1027](iii) Statement
[1029]Alfred SUELINGER s
[1030]the FBI
[1032]Suspected Source of
[1034](i) Introduction
[1036](i) NOSENKO's Information
[1037]SanS ITIVE SURE
[1039](iii) GRD Information
[1041](iv) SLESINGER's Information
[1043]6. Technical Penetrations o1 the West German
[1045]Embassy
[1046]° a. Introduction
[1047]: >. Information from NOSCNKS
[1048]: c.
[1049]d, Evidence of Technical Penetration
[1051]a.
[1053]b.
[1057]"¥.S. Evaluations
[1059]~ “G). NSA Report
[1061]9. Cryptologic Successes Against the U.S,
[1062]Enkessy
[1064]Introduction
[1066]Information from NOSENKO
[1068](4) Br -aking U.S, Ciphers
[1070](ii).
[1071](iii)
[1073]Handling Deciphered Cables
[1075]Methods of Cryptologic Attack.
[1077](vi) Information from FREE sensitive
[1078]papas arias
[1080]571
[1081]571
[1082]572
[1083]573
[1084]574
[1086]574
[1087]576
[1088]378
[1089]530
[1091]583
[1093]583
[1095]585
[1097]585.
[1099]587
[1103]i
[1104]A
[1105]4
[1106]4
[1107]4
[1109]4
[1110]a
[1111]4
[1116]Se
[1118]PSE OT £S Teg
[1120](ii) USIB Security Comnittee Report 593 | 3
[1122]E, NOSENKO and GOLITSYN - 594 4
[1123]1. Introduction oe 594 ‘ 4
[1125]2. Background Information on GOLITS‘t! 594 | ‘4
[1127]3. GOLiTSYN Leads and Information from NOSENKO 595 4
[1129]&@. Microphones in the U.S. Emrassy 595 , d
[1131]b. Other Leads Corroborated by NOSENKO 596 ;
[1133]sans eeate demise
[1135]ec. Leads Conflicting with NOSENKO Reports 597
[1139]a. Leads to Cperations Against U.S. Embassy 597
[1140]Not Covered by NGSENKO
[1142]4. NOSENKO's Information on GOLITSYN 599
[1143]F. Surveillance of Soviets in the United States 609 7
[1144]1. Information from NOSENKO : 600 ;
[1145]2. Information from Other Sources 601 ; :
[1147]b. sensitive source . 602 " 4
[1148]c. CHEREPANOV Document 602 ;
[1149]L VII. SPECIALISTS’ ASSESSMENTS OF NOSENKO . 603
[1150]: ' A. Opinions on Intelligence and Personality 603 \.
[1151]. 1. Graphological Analysis 603 |
[1152]2. Reports by Psychologist 605
[1153]a. Psychological Testing Results 605
[1155]b. Alternative Psychological Explanations 609
[1157]Tate eet ok
[1159]ec. Psychological Interrogation 611
[1161]tte yt Ane
[1163]3. Report by Psychiatrist 613
[1165]'
[1166]i
[1167]“os B. Views of Intelligence Personnel
[1168]. 1. Statement by DERYABIN
[1170]a. Introduction
[1173]--Remarks by CIA Handlers .
[1175]“ae Introduction
[1177]+ cayenne nt tort ena it eRe ept mevaht i Baty sce tage nem BO
[1178]Lot a vee “ye
[1180]na
[1182]14-0000
[1184]id
[1185]Bele Page F
[1186]ld _ =
[1187]mo b. NOSENKO's Conduct in Meetings 626 , :
[1189]c. NOSENKC'g Behavior Urder Interrogation 627
[1190](4) Introduction 627 :
[1192](14) Manner of Recounting Events 627 { :
[1194]i
[1195](iii) Evasion, Imorovisation, and Other 628 I
[1196]Defenses :
[1197]d. Additional Observations 630 ,
[1198]: '
[1199](i) inquisitiveness about CIA 630
[1200](44) Acceptance of Contrary Information 631 :
[1201]from Other Sources ,
[1202]e@. Discussions with NOSENKO about his own 631
[1203]Performance :
[1204]C, Polygraph Testing 632 °
[1205]1. Test in April 1964 632
[1206]2. Test in October 1966 on Lee Harvey OSWALD 638
[1207]a. Introduction 638 .
[1208]'
[1209]b. Results 638 '
[1212]tien see tee e
[1214]2
[1215]wet Re : _—
[1216]“eR QINEC NEE erremapET eR eee
[1217]Fay le ln cite
[1220]ne
[1222]2
[1225]1.
[1227]2.
[1229]_
[1231]NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES:
[1233]A. Introduction
[1237]KGS Crgasization, Personalities,
[1239]B, Evaluation of Production
[1241]Operational Leads
[1243]a, Introduction
[1245]b. Operations Involving Americans
[1247](i)
[1249](iz)
[1251](aiid
[1253]c. Operations Involving Other Westerners
[1255](i)
[1257](ii5
[1259]Consis
[1261]Introduction
[1263]Discussion
[1265]a. Introduction
[1267]b. Discussion
[1269]c. Remarks
[1271]The BELITSKIY Case
[1273]a. Introduction
[1275]be. Discussion
[1277]c. Remarks
[1279](i)
[1280]rete)
[1282](iii)
[1284]me)
[1285](4a) |
[1286]an)
[1288]a)
[1289]Go
[1290](iii)
[1292]. tw)
[1294]Investigations
[1296]Compromise of POPOV
[1298]Introduction
[1299]Discussion
[1301]Remarks"
[1303]Compromise of PENKOVSKIY
[1305]Introduction
[1306]Discussion
[1308]Remarks
[1310]"Compromise of CHEREPANOV .
[1312]Introduction
[1314]The Summary on LANGELLE -
[1316]Remarks
[1317]TA OF nO
[1319]Completeness, Accurary, Detail an
[1320]tency of Reporting
[1322]Damage to the Soviets
[1324]importance Or Usefulness
[1326]Technical Operations Against the U.S. Enkassy
[1328]‘The Operational Plan in Draft
[1330]7
[1332]‘ALYSIS AND pocenprrcnr-alaaaanary vi
[1334]647
[1336]665
[1338]re rn
[1340]4
[1342]os
[1343]4
[1347]Relbube sitdmauw-.
[1349]veel cot oI
[1351]Lott wi daitaten
[1353]a Hae RE eae oe athe
[1356]_ Evaluation of Sourci J
[1357]1. Introduction
[1359]2. Discussion
[1361]3. Remarks 677
[1362]D. Examination of NOSENKO's Intelligence Carcer (678 ; 4
[1363]1. Introduction 678 *s “9
[1364]ore : 2. Naval GRU Service 679 ‘ 4
[1365]@. Introduction 679 ' _
[1366]- b. Discussion - 679 | i
[1367]* c. Kemarks 682 i 4
[1368]3. Entry into the KGB ; . 683 4
[1370]e a. Eligibility 683
[1372]b. Date of Entry : 683.
[1374]. ec. Circumstances of Entry 684 :
[1375]d. Remarks 685 _ :
[1376]4. Initial Service in the U.S. Embassy Section 685 ‘ 4
[1378]: 4. Introduction 685 ’ A
[1379]; b,. Work Against American Correspondents 686 | , 5
[1380]. ec. Work Against Army Attaches 686
[1381]i d. Additional Reporting 690
[1382]' e. Remarks ; ; 690 {
[1384]: 5. Tourist Department (June 1955 to January 1960) 692 ‘ |
[1385]‘ a. Introduction 692 i
[1386]oS me _ be The Early Period (1955 to 1958) 692 3
[1387]- (i) General - 692 i
[1388]| : (ii) The BURGI Case 693 il
[1390]c. Promotion to Deputy Chief of Section _ 695 :
[1392]ad. Knowledge of Section's Staff and Agent
[1393]Personnel 7 . , ;
[1395]e. Knowledge of Section's Activities
[1396]a) BLAKE
[1397]“€ii) GOLITSYN Document
[1399]‘ (iii) Tourist Agents |
[1401]NOSENKO's Tourist Paper
[1403]ge The OSWALD Case
[1405]Te
[1406],
[1410]ade adel iter cbt aa ieas PFE REO amd ep at egtten fe gem de tee amin agen en
[1413]seth aaleen Raa eR Nemes in. ous
[1416]“iy Dice RS oe Spi ia oe
[1417]GCreratioaal Accivi
[1419]“ a <i} . Cereral - oe 698
[1420]va (ai) - The Homosexuals YEFREMOV and YOLKOV 698 i. :
[1421](,ii) Homosexual Entraprént Operations 699 if 4
[1422]Civ) The Agent PRIPPEL 9700 | 4
[1423]o i. kKemarks _ 702 i 4
[1424], i 6. u.s. En.bassy Section (1960-1361) 705 : _ a.
[1425]° a. introduction 705 4
[1426]b. Entry anto the Section: 705 y 4
[1427]c. Functions as Deputy Chief 706 j
[1428]: a. Knowieéseanility as Deputy and Acting Chief 707 F
[1429]G. Knowledgeability of U.S, Eckassy bhysical 703 i
[1431]£. Knowledgeabi lity ehout American intelligence 709 ;
[1432]Personnel : ' ;
[1433]g.- Knowledgeability of KGB Code Clerk Cpe .tions 709 j
[1434](i) the SYTORSBEKG Case 711i :
[1435](ii) 'The JENNER Case 713 | |
[1436](421) The GARLAND Case) 714 | }
[1437](iv) The MCRONE Cese 715 |
[1438]a (v) The KEYSERS Case 717 |
[1439](vi) Other Code: Clerk Cases ’ 718
[1440]i
[1442]1 4
[1445]h. Responsibility for and Knowledge of ABIDIZN 720
[1447]i i. Repocting on ABIDIAT's Visit to the Pushkin 722
[1448]Street Dead Drop
[1450]j. Responsibility of Supervising Military Attache 725
[1452]Operations .
[1453]k. TOY to Bulgaria and the LUST Case 726
[1454]| “qhe U.S. Visa and the Cuba TDY os 727 :
[1455]1. Personal Handling of Agents 729
[1456]¢i) YEFREMOV and VOLKOV 729
[1457](iid #RIPPEL TR
[1458](iii) | DMITRIYEV, 18
[1459](iv) RYTOVA oe 729
[1460]- - &) LEVINA g 7
[1461](vi) | Sohan PRE1SFREUND
[1463]wi Ga
[1465]‘Transfer ‘to the Tourist ‘bepartment
[1470]E.
[1472]Introduction
[1473]Absences from Moscow
[1474]Personal Perticipation in Operations
[1475](i) The ¥.E, JOHNSON Provocation
[1476](ii) The BARGHCORN Provocation-Arrest
[1477](iin) The Approach to BRAUNS
[1478](ivi The Arrest of KOTEN
[1479]d. Agexts Handled by NOSENXO
[1480](i) FRIPPEL
[1481](ii) SVENCHANSKIY
[1482]e. ‘The GSWALD Investication
[1483]£. The CHEREPANCV Investigation
[1485]g. Remarks
[1487]Examination of Other Aspects of NOSENKO's Biography
[1489]1.
[1491]KGB Awards and Ranks
[1492]a. Awards
[1494]b. Ranxs
[1496]c. Remarks
[1497]Affiliation with Comaunist Party Organs
[1498]a. Introduction
[1500]b. Discussion
[1502]ec. Remarks
[1503]Schooling
[1505]a. Introduction
[1507]b. Discussion
[1509]ec. Remarks
[1511]Appraisals of NOSENKO, His Motivation, and Other
[1512]Operational Circumstances ~ Se
[1514]1.
[1515]2.
[1519]Introduction
[1521]NOSENKO
[1523]Motivation
[1524]Operational Circumstances
[1525]a. Presence in Ceneva (1962)
[1527]b. Presence in Geneva (1964)
[1529]738
[1531]739
[1532]739
[1533]740
[1534]740
[1535]741
[1536]742
[1537]742
[1538]742
[1540]742
[1542]- 743
[1544]744
[1545]144
[1546]744
[1547]744
[1549]746
[1551]746
[1553]748
[1555]|
[1556]4
[1557]4
[1558]|
[1559]3
[1562]4
[1565]cee Behe
[1570]va0eap 73.53 to KGB Kel.cency and Avadladbisaaly = 4.”
[1572]‘a. Timing of 1962 Contact 982
[1574]e. Willingness to Meet CIA. 753
[1576]f. The Recall Telegram oo 753
[1578]“gq. Remarks 753
[1580]G. Sources Supsorting NOSENXO 756
[1582]1, Introduction 756
[1584]. 2. Corresoration of NOSENKO's Intelligence Career 756
[1585]3. Remarks , 757 ; 4
[1586]re H. Alternative Fxplanatiors . 7159 4
[1587]: 1. Intrcduction 759 . 4
[1589]2. First Alternative ‘ 759
[1590]a. Faulty Memory ’ 759 ;
[1592]a b. Selective Memory 75S
[1594]: c. Embellishment. 761
[1596]° ad, ‘Combination of Above 762 !
[1597]e. Insanity 763 i 5
[1598]3. Second Alternative 763 | ]
[1599]: 4, Third Alternative . 763 | |
[1600]5. Remarks 764 :
[1601]. “Ie Summary ef Conclusions . 765 | 4
[1602]| ——
[1605]ILLUSTRATIONS
[1607]: Photograph of NOSENKO and his father,
[1609]a the Minister of Shipbuilding
[1611]\ Photograph of NOSENKO and NCSENKO's Family
[1612]Finnish Travel Manifests: March-April 1960
[1613]Finnish Travel Manifest: November 1960
[1614]TDY Authorization
[1616]: Translation of TDY Authorization
[1618].. ,
[1620]Facing Page 11
[1622]Facing Page 43
[1624]Facing Page 194
[1625]Facing Page 197
[1626]Facing Page 319
[1628]“Facing Page 320
[1630]dewly ARBRE dee aint eat, ae
[1632]a
[1637]2 et
[1639]em LAR EY Cae oe
[1641]+ eben sentences
[1643]Bee
[1645]NOSENKO is ‘evaluated and analyzed.
[1647]I. INmopuerToH
[1648]This review presents the facts and observetions which bear
[1649]on the bona fides of the Sovict defector Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO,
[1651]The highlights of NOSE%KO's biography, as he has given it to -
[1653]CIA, are as follows: He was born 20 October 1927, the first son
[1654]of Ivar Isidorovich NOSENKC, shipyard worker who in 1939 was to
[1655]become Soviet Minister of Shipbuilaing. After Graduating in 1951
[1656]from the Institute cf International Relations in Moscow, where
[1657]he specialized in internatiunal law and the English language,
[1658]NOSENKO entered the Chief Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the
[1659]Soviet Navy, serving first as a translator essigned to the intel-
[1660]ligence staff of the Seventh (Far Eustern) Fleet and then as a
[1661]senior translator and political officer at en intellicence unit
[1662]of the Fourth (Baltic) Fleet. In mid-March 1953,. immediately
[1663]following STALIN's death, O3ENKO left the Naval GRU to-become a
[1664]junior case officer in the KCB. He was assigned to:the U.S.
[1665]Embassy Section of the American- Departuent, KGB Second Chief
[1666]Directorate, from 1952 to mid-1955. During this pericd he was
[1667]initially responsible for operational accivity surrounding Am-
[1668]erican journalists in Moscow and later for operations against
[1669]U.S. Army Attaches at the-fmbassy. When transferred to the newly
[1670]Organized Tourist Departmen: of the Second Chief Direcrorate in
[1671]1955, NOSENKO had as his targets vi-itors to the Soviet Union
[1672]from the United States and the countries of tne British Common-
[1673]wealth. Having handled a nuimoer of successful tourist opera-
[1674]tions, NOSENKO in 1958 was promoted to Deputy Chief of the
[1675]section responsible for operations against American, 8ritish,
[1676]and Canedian nationals, Eighteen months later NiUSENKO returned
[1677]to the U.S, Embassy Section as its Deputy Chier. Between January
[1678]1960 and January 1962 he was second-in-charge of all KGB activ-
[1679]ities against the U. S. Embassy in Moscow and personally super-
[1680]vised operations against the Embassy Security Officer, the
[1681]Second Chief Directorate’s most important counterintelligence
[1682]target at the time, and against American code clerks, collec-
[1683]tively the Directorate’'s most important recruitment targets.
[1685]At ths-ec December 1961 NOSENKO again was transferred to
[1686]the’Tourist Department, this time as Chief of the American-
[1687]Britign-Canadian Section. Six months later he was made Deputy
[1688]Chief of the Tourist Department, and in mid-1963 he became its
[1689]First Deputy Chief.
[1691]From the time he first contacted CIA in Geneva ,in 1962,
[1693]_ NOSENKO's status has been under examination. Only now, three
[1695]years following his defection in Fepruary 1964, is Gefinitive
[1696]study of the bona fides question possible: the voluminous and
[1697]diverse reports by NOSENKO, coupled with collateral information,
[1698]required that much time for assimilation, correlation, investiga-
[1699]tion, and evaluation. NOSENKO's own testimony, interspersed with
[1700]representative subsidiary cases stemming from or related to his
[1701]reports, constitutes a larse part cf the evidence. This review
[1702]also draws upon statements and actions by other Soviets, colla-
[1704]tions with materials from other sources, and opinions by special-.
[1706]ists of various kinds. These factual elements are presentec
[1707]without comment or interpretation, except in the penultimate
[1708]section of the review where the evidence on the bona fides of
[1712]2
[1713]4
[1716]caressa ah Staats
[1718]or Sanneteinar ARM ltn
[1723]t
[1727]7 ASTER «aR RARER AR J nena manimenn sence Hn Remini reenter mutts & arth ee enna Se tate et eet
[1729]2.
[1731]This review is presented in the following format:
[1733]2 Part IIs A summary of developments in the KOSENKO case from
[1735]1962 to the present, including hi3 clandestine
[1736]meetings with CIA, his defection, and the subsequent
[1737]debriefings and interrogations,
[1739]Pert III: A discussion of the operational circumstances of
[1740]NOSENKO's 1962 contact with CIA and his defection
[1741]two years later. Included is discussion of CIA's
[1742]information concerning NOSENKO prior to his First
[1743]contact in Geneva, ROSENKO's explanation of the -
[1744]reasons for his presence in Geneva in 1962 and 1964,
[1745]NOSENKO‘s motivations first for establishing clendes-
[1746]tine contact with American Intelligence and later for
[1747]‘defecting to the United States, NOESENKO's pattern of
[1748]activity 1n Geneva in 1962 and 1964, and the reactions
[1749]of the Soviets. both official and unofficial, to the
[1750]defection,
[1752]Part IV: The non-KG3 aspects of NOSENKO's life, both before
[1753]and after he joined Soviet State Security Service,
[1754]as he described them and as others have reported them.
[1756]Part Vs The positions and responsib.Llities of NOSENKO in the
[1757]KGB, the operations with which he was associated,
[1758]his travels abroad. the awards and promotions which
[1759]he received and other Soviet sources' statements
[1760]on these points.
[1762]Part VI: NOSENKO‘s production, especially in counterintelli-
[1763]gence matters not dissussed in the preceding section.
[1764]Key cases are discussed in detail and other leads
[1765]are summarized,
[1767]Part VII: Specialists’ assessments of NOSENKO: by the CIA
[1768]: graphologist who studied his handwriting; by the
[1769]CIA psychologist and psychtatrist who examined him;
[1770]by the former KGB officer Peter DERYABIN; by the CIA
[1771]case officers who handled him: and by the CIA poly-
[1772]graph operator who tested him.
[1774]Part VIII: Interpretation of the evidence and conclusiens about
[1775]the bona fides of NOSENKO.
[1777]Part IX: The implications of the conclusions in Part VIIT for
[1778]certain other sources, -
[1780]There ere several sources currently or formerly associated
[1781]with the Soviet Intelligence services who are repeatedly referred
[1782]to in this review. They include the following:
[1784]- Anatoliy Mikhailovich GOLITSYN, a KGB officer who
[1785]-defected in Helsinki to U.S. authorities on 15 December
[1787]1962. sensitive. source
[1789]sensitive source
[1791]wg Wi
[1793]ORUNSNON SET Te
[1795]weer ee
[1797]Bae ee ay
[1802]i
[1804]Har mnctilhnis ces
[1806]14-0000
[1808]CRA Re oe Be ee Bee whey ee Bp AOE ee eR seen EE ae er aM ce eden any aren rin REC oo
[1811]a eng ata
[1814]:3 5,0) 7 * = Aleksandr Nikolayevich CHEREPAYOV, a KGB officer
[1815]eo whoes case iu reviewed in Part VI.D.7.c.
[1817]4
[1819]former «|
[1820]Directorate
[1824]All pertinent material received by CIA prior ta 15 Jenvary
[1825]1967 has been taken into occount in chis review of NOSENKO's
[1826]bona fides,
[1828]we eenne
[1830]8
[1831]ms
[1833]ienenenanetatedeabe henieeaamaieneat ememeemmmaemenntemmmnmetneeemeammemnemetnatann name mma remanent thet eT
[1835]ot bow
[1836]i
[1837]doe
[1838]'
[1839]ET RCH EE
[1840]wee cana Nimh ia
[1842]TGP SECREF
[1844]4
[1846]: .
[1847]Ant anger emer coe
[1848]Bes hte
[1850]14-0000
[1852]“JY, ‘SUMMARY OF CPERATIONAL DEVELGPMENTS —
[1854]oA Introduction
[1856]:. ’ Prem the CIA side, the KOSEKKO case can be divided into '
[1857]three periods: the first Geneva phase of June 1962, the second
[1858]Geneva phase of January-February 1964, and the post-defection
[1860]handling of NOSENKO from Ferruary 1964 to date. The rest of.
[1862]Part II is separated into these three periods accordingly.
[1864]The NOSENKO case ovened on 5 June 1962 in the corridors of
[1865]the Palais des Nations in Geneva during the United Nations Dis-
[1866]armament Conference. A then-unidentified Soviet, known to him
[1867]by sight from conference ncetings,. approached U.S. Foreign Ser- 4
[1868]vice Officer David MARK with the suggestion that they get to-
[1869]gether for a talk tha following day. In the late afternoon of
[1870]6 June, the same Soviet motioned MARK aside and said that he
[1871]would like to taik to him privately as soon as possible. He
[1872]told MARK that he was “net going to pump him for information,
[1873]‘but simply wanted to teli 1 some things." A luncheon meeting
[1874]was arranged for 9 June, alchough the Soviet clearly preferred
[1875]an earlier date. MARK advised CIA of the appointment, explain-
[1876]ing that he thought the upproach so unusual that it might be
[1877]an offer of cooperation or defeztion. He said he belicved the :
[1878]Soviet to be Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO, a member of the Scviet ;
[1879]delegation to the arms talxs. |
[1881]i
[1883]-
[1884]B. Firat Geneva Phase (June 1962) ; oo i
[1886]H
[1888]the,
[1890]+ ta been i
[1892]Able etl bes =
[1894]At the 9 June lunchecen with MARK, NOSENKO told MARK that
[1895]he, NOSENKO, was a XGB ccunterintelligence officer sent to
[1896]Geneva to ensure the security of the Soviet delegation. He knew : i
[1897]that MARK had previously served in Moscow and believed he was
[1898]connected with American Inteiligence.* He needed approximately
[1899]900 Swiss francs immediately to cover KGB operational funds which
[1900]he squandered on liquor ana a prostitute in Geneva, and he offered |
[1901]for this amount to sell two pieces of information to American H
[1902]Intelligence. The first of these was the identity of a former
[1903]U.S. Embassy employee in Moscow who was a KGB agent an’, as of |
[1905]wi belted Tia Started dee
[1907]1962, was “near ciphers” in the Washington area; the second was
[1908]the identity of a Soviet in Nosccw who, although ostensibly a
[1909]CIA agent, was actually planted on American Intelligence. Al-
[1910]though NOSENKO at first told MARK that he would stop at the sale
[1911]of these two items, he later stated: "I know you won't let me
[1912]alone now." At another point NOSENKO said: "I will not work in
[1913]Moscow, but I come out about once a year." NOSENKO also gave |
[1915]sabe ee tate Ro DE anton
[1917]MARK a brief chronological account of his personal and profes-
[1918]sional past. MARK explained’ that although he was not an intel-
[1919]ligence officer, he could place NCSENKO in contact with the
[1920]Intelligence Chief in Geneva later that same day.
[1922]RY
[1924]SR Salar Dette ac octronte
[1926]MARK introduced NOSENKO to a CIA officer at 2000 hours that
[1927]evening, and a three-nour reeting followed at a CIA safehouse in
[1928]Geneva. Describing himseif as a KG¥ Major experienced in opera-
[1929]tions against the. Ameriéan Embassy in Moscow and against tourists
[1930]and other travellers to the Soviet Union, NOSENKO told the CIA
[1932]* Another Soviet source, S@ygpeperms has also reported that the :
[1933]_ KGB suspected MARK to ke an American Intelligence officer; a
[1934]‘although he has never served in CIA, MARK did engage in a num ~ x
[1935]_ber of operational support activities on behalf of CIA while
[1936]stationed at the U.S. Embassy in Hoscow-
[1939]4.
[1941]. officer of his financial difficulcies and repeated his offer to
[1942]“7%, gell two items of information. He said that the need for money
[1943]was his inmediate motive for contactirg CIA, althcugh in the en-
[1944]suing discussion he said also that he was dissatisfied with the
[1945]Communist regime in the Soviet Union. NOSENKO emphasized, never-
[1946]: theless, that he had no intention of heccming an American agent--"
[1947]‘ this was to be a one-time transaction, and after that he would
[1948]have no further contact with CIA,
[1951]renee
[1953]‘ Despite this original reticence, NOSENXO supplied consider-
[1954]able biographic information on himself and also discussed in
[1955]general terms certain additional KGB operations as well as KGB :
[1956]organization and operational methods in Mesecow, He understocsl, 5
[1957]as he had told MARK earlier in the day. that CIA ‘souid wane more !
[1958]information than the two atems which he originaily offered, and
[1959]he agreed to meet again two days later.
[1961]stad ae tlthdaans casa attbEC
[1963]NOSENKO met CIA representatives four more times in Geneva
[1964]in June 1962. alwavs in the same saferouse. With the second
[1965]meeting on 11 June. his initial reservations disappeared almost
[1966]entirely. He answered most questions put to him on KGB organi-
[1967]zation and operations. most of his information seeing concerned
[1968]with the Second Chief Direccorate. responsible for counterintel- ;
[1969]Jagence and security within the USSR, NOSENKO seemed to be what 5
[1970]he claimed to be: a KGB officer in a sensitive position with i 4
[1971]knowledge of important KGB operations, . :
[1973]NOSENKO rerurned to Moscow on 15 June, having promised to
[1974]do everything within the limits imposed by person ral security con-
[1975]siderations to collect information of interest; the areas of CIA
[1976]interest had been ouriined to him. The only restrictions he
[1977]placed on his cooperation were his absolute refusal to permit
[1978]operational contact with him inside the USSR and his request
[1979]that no mention of his collaboration be made in correspondence
[1980]to Moscow. He promised to notify CIA. via an adé@ress he was
[1981]given, when he came to the West again,
[1983]: Cc... Second Geneva Phase _ (January-Februar y. 1964) -
[1985]: NOSENKO accompanied the Soviet deiecation to a later ses-
[1987]sion of the Disarmament Conference (one having gone by in the
[1989]: interim without hig participation). arriving in Geneva on
[1991]i . 19 January 1964, The next day he sent a cable to his CIA accom-
[1993]: . modaction address announcing his presence, At the first of the
[1995]i ; new series of meetings on 23 January he announced that he had
[1996]decided to defect to the United States citing as reasons his
[1998]_ continuing disaffection with the Soviet regime and the fact that
[1999]he probably would not have further opportunities to travel to the
[2000]West in the foreseeable future. Although he impi1ed that he
[2001]wanted to defect as soon as possibile. he agreed to remain in
[2002]‘place in Geneva for at least two or-three weeks while arrange=- -— —_- 2
[2003]ments for his reception were being made in Washington, NOSENKO
[2004]had brought a large amount of new information, much of it in’
[2005]scribbled notes, on KGB operational activity collected in the
[2006]18 months since his last meeting with CIA. Twelve more meetings
[2007]were held in a Geneva safehouse over the next twelve days, yary-
[2008]ing in length from one anda half to six hours.
[2010]BD. Post-Defection Handling (February 1964-Present)
[2012]: On 4 February, four days before the date tentatively
[2013]selected for NOSENKO's defection, he reported that.a cable had-
[2014]been received from KGB Headquarters ordering his immediate re- |
[2015]turn to participate in a KGB conference on foreign tourism to —
[2017]an fat we eta Dae
[2019]se tment ceetegneghe tana
[2021]|
[2022]|
[2023]|
[2024]|
[2025]|
[2028]the Batis.
[2030]Bath © Shine 8 kay 4 EE ale cabeigange ce ARB ety han matte iar
[2032]nd WOSENKO was driven across the border to Germany that same
[2034]: (7%: aight. Debriefings resumed in a Frankfurt safehouse. The de-
[2035]» . | e@&sion was reached on 11 February to bring. NOSENKO to the :
[2036].. 1» United States, and in the early even.ng of 12 February he and
[2038]a . dis CIA escorts arrived in Washington via commercial aircraft,
[2039]sav s.* thence to a safehouse in the Washington area,
[2041]the Soviet Union 2. Bxfiltration plans.vere,.then-iaplemented,—s-« ;
[2043]Bret:
[2045]At the request of the Swiss and Soviet Governments, NOSENKO © i
[2047]met on 14 February with representatives of their respective I
[2049]. Washington Embassies in the offices of the U.S. Immigration and i
[2050]_— Naturalization Service. He told both that he had defected of ot
[2052]: : his own free will after careful consideration and that he had no. : |
[2054]i
[2056]1
[2058]baad iatiile.
[2060]desire to return to the Soviet Union. In answer to the questions
[2061]of the Soviet representatives, he orally renounced his status and
[2062]‘ rights as a citizen of tne USSR.
[2064]wet
[2066]CIA completed its initial debriefings of NOSENKO on 18 Febru- 4
[2067]ary, and on 24 February he was introduced to representatives of ; ;
[2068]the FBI for questioning. At abcut the same time, there was a
[2069]marked decline in NOSENKO's discipline: He became evasive and
[2070]uncooperative, refusing te answer some of the questions of his
[2071]debriefers, both CIA and FBI; his nightlife.in Washington and
[2072]nearby cities was punctuated by drinking bouts, crude behavior,
[2073]and cisputes with his security escort. He explained these : :
[2074]actions by saying that he was under great tension as a result of : 4
[2075]his defection, abandonment of his wife and children, and the
[2076]disgrace that he had brought to his family name. It was against :
[2077]this background that CIA acceded to NOSENKO's demand for a vaca~ '
[2078]tion. On 12 Maren, therefore, NOSENKO left Washington with a :
[2079]‘CIA case officer and two CIA security guards for a two-week .
[2080]vacation in Hawaii. There his behavior deterioriated still fur-
[2081]ther: He drank heavily and almost constantly; he engaged in !
[2082]sexual acts with a number of prostitutes; he was loud and crude 1
[2083]in publ‘c places; and he spent money extravagently ($800 on . :
[2087]wee eseanbsiniten
[2089]one prostitute) and conspicuously (a $100 bill for a restaurant
[2090]tip). .
[2092]Jit eet lbia Mba Seiten
[2094]During NOSENKO's absence, cdnsultations were held with
[2095]the FBI concerning steps to be taken to restrict his movements
[2096]and activities. Both agencies feared that his behavior would :
[2097]bring about unwanted attention and publicity, perhaps police
[2098]arrest, and that doubts about his bona fides, which were be-
[2099]coming known to a widening group of people in the U.S. Govern-
[2100]ment, might be inadvertently revealed to NOSENKO himself. The !
[2101]; FBI on ] April said it would “not interpose objection" ‘to ‘the i
[2102]: CIA plan to limit NOSENKO's freedom of movement. The Acting ‘
[2103]: Attorney General, the Department of State, and the White House j
[2104]: were also notified of the CIA plan at this time. ;
[2106]seedy wth a Eee sete,
[2108]L ; In the morning of 4 April NOSENKO was driven to another. '
[2109]safehouse in a Washington suburb, ostensibly only. for a poly-
[2110]jo... .- QgYyaph examination. At the safehouse NOSENKO was given a rou-
[2111]; tine polygraph examination, lasting over three hours; he
[2113]. oo + an ee
[2115]y
[2116]|
[2117]| . -* See Parts III E and III F for further discussions of this
[2118]cable.
[2119]i
[2121]14-0000
[2123]|
[2125]—- ss
[2127]"reacted significantly” to questions concerning his intentions
[2128]in defecting tn the United States and other related matters.* -
[2129]He was then told that he would remain at this safehouse, which
[2130]thencefcrward was his regular placa of residence. Since this
[2131]time NOSENKO has had contacts with CIa personnel only, has been
[2132]under full-time guard, and has not been permitted access to
[2133]news media.
[2135]Detailed interrogation of, NOSENKO was begun on 4 April 1964
[2136]in order to obtain information which he had been reluctant to
[2137]give in debriefings, and to clarify contradicticns in what he
[2138]had already reported. This phase of the interrogations was termi-
[2139]nated on 24 April 1964. .
[2141]Despite the searching nature of the questions and the im-
[2143]‘plicit and explicit doubts of his veracity, NOSENKO proved him-
[2145]self willing to answer, or to try to answer, questions put to
[2147]- him. Because much more information pertinent to the question of
[2149]his. bona fides had to be obtained, a new phase of interrogation
[2150]was begun in mid-May 1964. Different interrogators were intro-
[2151]duced and questioning was resumed in a neutral, non-hostile man-
[2152]ner. The period of neutral questioning continued until mid-Novem-
[2155]After further consultations with the FBI, a new sound of
[2156]hostile interrogations began on 26 January 1965. NOSENXO was
[2157]questioned for a total of about 140 hours by individual interro-
[2158]gators and by interrogation teams consisting of two or three
[2159]men, and he was directly challenged on many of his previous re-
[2160]ports. He admitted that certain of his earlier statements had
[2161]been incorrect, and that ne could not explain contradictions in
[2162]his testimony. Nevertheless, NOSENKO maintained he had keen
[2163]basically truthful, and that he had come to the United States
[2164]solely for the reasons he had originally given. This interro-
[2165]gation was broken off on 5 March 1965.
[2167]Questioning of NOSENKO during the summer and autumn of 1964
[2168]and the interrogations of January and February 1965 concentrated
[2169]on the pexiod of his claimed service in the U.S. Embassy Section
[2170]of the American Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate, from
[2171]January 1560 to January 1962, Among the reasons for selecting
[2172]this particular period were the comparatively large amount of
[2173]collateral information available against which NOSENKO's state-
[2174]ments could be checked; the importance of the U.S. Embassy and
[2175]its personnel as.the outstanding KGB Second Chief Directorate
[2176]targets; their importance from the standpoint of American .
[2177]security; and the extent of NOSENKO's knowledge about the aéti-
[2178]vities of the U.S. Embassy Section, in his capacity as its
[2179]Deputy Chief. . -
[2181]In keeping with Soviet practice, CIA asked NOSENKO in
[2182]February 1965 to sign a series of interrogation reports, so-
[2183]‘called “protocols,” most: of which concern: the- period of: his
[2184]Claimed service in the American Department. . These_were written
[2186]by the CIA interrogators, and they were designed to incorporate
[2188]*—See Part VII.c. for a further discussion of the polygraph.
[2189]tests. : - Se oe _
[2192]i a
[2195]de ndebaa atte, 8 dataset
[2197]teeta intention
[2200]14-0000
[2202]NOSERKO's exact statements and meaning on various specific sub-
[2203]Sects. The protocols were in no way presented to HOSENKO as
[2204]documentary portions of a "confesaion,” but rather as distilled
[2205]and final statements of what he did end did not know concerning
[2206]particular topics. NOSENKO wes asked to read each page of each
[2207]protocol carefully and to sign his name at the bottom te indi-
[2208]cate that: he underatood and agreed with its contents; he was
[2209]allowed the use of a dictionary and was permitted to ask any
[2210]questions and make any changes that he wished. (Amendmants were
[2211]entered by the interrogators and were initialed >y NCSENKO.)
[2212]NOSENKO was asked, after reading.each page and after completing
[2213]the entire protocol, whether he understood what was written there
[2214]and whether there were any more changes he wished to make. He ,
[2215]was then asked-to sign and date the statement, "I have read and ,* F
[2216]understood this report and certify it as correct," at the end of . ,
[2218]the final page. With one exception, which will be noted later, ¥ d
[2219]he did so calmly and without objections, although on one or two - st .
[2221]of them he remarked that his statements were presented in such
[2223]a manner as to make them look foolish; although invited to do
[2225]so, he was not able to suggest any.changes of fact or presenta-
[2226]tion which would. make them more accurate. Commenting cn the .
[2227]use of interrogation reports, NOSENKO said on 4 March 1965:
[2229]"My life story is absolutely correct. Anytning I have signed ;
[2230]is absolutely correct. 1 absolutely understand what I am doing . J 4
[2231]when I am signing any paper. This is an official document, and ;
[2232]I fully understand what I'm doing when I sign it as being abso- : F
[2234]lutely correct."
[2236]: In May 1965 a CIA psychologist questioned NOSENKO in detail
[2237]on his life from birth until 1953, when he said he entered the
[2238]KGB, -in an attempt to gain additional insights into his charac-
[2240]ter and personality. A
[2241]a]
[2243]Further questioning was conducted from 26 July until 14 August
[2244]1965 with the participation of Peter DERYABIN, a former KGB offi-
[2245]cer. These interrogations, the first to be held in Russian,
[2246]were for the purpose of using DERYABIN's first-hand experience
[2247]in the KGB to obtain a clearer understanding of NOSENKO's per-
[2248]sonal and professional background. .
[2250]: : There were no further debriefings or interrogations until
[2251]i 18 October 1966. On this date NOSENKO was polygraphed on the
[2252]case of Lee Harvey CSWALD. ; :
[2254]po. During the period 19-25 October 1966, NOSENKO was questioned for
[2255]! seven days on specific aspects of selected topics ranging from his
[2257]i identity to his involvement in and knowledge of specific KGB opera-
[2258]tions. Questioning was in both Russian and English.
[2260]woe a CO CE A ke see ee at
[2262]|
[2266]i
[2268]i
[2270]j
[2273]H
[2275]i.
[2277]bo .
[2278]Pa
[2280]| -
[2281]Be.
[2285]PUA eo -
[2287]A. Earlier Information on NOSENKO ‘in Genéva
[2289]_ photograph at two separate points on hia TDY route to Cuba.
[2291]Seca OPERATIONAL CIRCCHSTANCES
[2293]HOSENKO'e nane first came to tho attention of CIA in October
[2294]1960 when he applied at the American I[zbassy in Moscow for a visa
[2295]to enter the United States as a member of an automotive delega-
[2296]tion. The following sonth CIA obtained copies of his passport
[2298]There was no indication of intelligence effiliation, and when I
[2299]NOSENKO arrived under true name with the Soviet delegation in en
[2300]Geneva in Karch 1662. he was accorded no more than the interest : I
[2301]routinely given by Western intelligence services to Soviets :
[2302]travelling abroad.* After arriving in Switzerland, however, but :
[2303]before establishing contact with CIA, NOSFNKO was involved in
[2304]at least two incidents which brovght him to the special notice I
[2305]of the British, Lwiss, American, and possibly the West German
[2306]services.
[2308]The first of these occurred in April 1L9€2. At a cocktail
[2309]party in Geneva, NOSENKO met a female sccretary employed by the
[2310]British Foreign Office. Me saw her several days later in the ;
[2311]corridors of the Prlais des Nations aud asked her to have dinner i
[2312]with hin, and a date was made for several evenings later. Ac- Be
[2313]cording to the sceretary's later account as repurted by her : i
[2314]superiors: "They talked about Marxism, the Chinese, Yugoslavia, ; 4
[2315]and love; NOSENKO was obviously smitten with her, became verbally i i
[2316]amorous, and told her that he would like to take her off to a.
[2317]desert island.'"' The girl felt that NOSFNKO probably was not
[2318]interested in her for intelligence purposes, but seemed to be . :
[2319]genuinely attracted by her. From her conversations with NOSENKO a ;
[2320]she was able to report that "he had been in submurines during
[2321]the war and, according to himself, had risen to the rank of !
[2322]Commander. He was e member of the Communist Party. His father i
[2323]was in the Ministry of Shipping. Ne himself had served in the i
[2324]Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1948 and 1949 ond had apparently
[2326]'
[2327]i
[2329]coed nt Sabine digs Nabe Sete
[2331]visited England but had not been stativnced tf "' NOSENKO
[2332]also told her that he was acquainted with of the
[2333]2 Spublishing house in Lundon.** When NOS O became too
[2334]persistent in his attentions, the secretary reported the contact ;
[2335]to her superiors, was withdrawn immediatcly from Switzerland, :
[2338]and later resigned from the Foreign Officc.
[2340]This same incident also brought NOSENKO to the attention
[2341]of the Swiss service, which later reported it to CIA, without
[2342]details, as an attempt on NOSENKO's part to recruit the girl.
[2344]ween oats lab wen
[2346]*Although NOSENKO was described in reports (held by CIA) con-
[2348]cerning recruitment approaches to fmcricans in Moscow prior to
[2350]tis first arrival in Geneva, there was no basis in these re- :
[2351]ports to identify the Soviet described as NOSENKO. Tie name cece becifers
[2352]NOSENKO did not appear in these earlier reports. 1 oe
[2354]fc a ta
[2356]ache renee
[2358]is auc Was one of NOSENKO's targets during a 1957 trip
[2359]to Soviet Union. NOSENKO used the. alias NIKOLAYEV in his en)
[2360]contacts with Sg and, in CIA debriefings, gave this. as the od
[2361]reason he was forced to use the name NIKOLAYEV in the two trips
[2362]he made to London in 1957 and 1959. The secretary knew NOSENKO
[2363]by >) name, (Sce Parts V.D.3.d. and V.E.8. for discussion of
[2368]CA
[2370]NOSENKO's interest in her was not only sexual, but also in
[2372]hg-to-this-report;~“after-a-time-it-be 2 "
[2373]information to which she had access in the course cf her duties."
[2374]A officisl in Geneva told CIA that LOSENKO had definitely
[2375]tried to recruit the secretary and that he attempted to cbtain
[2376]“disarmament secrets” from her. ; .
[2378]At his seoond reeting with CIA on 11 June 1962, XOSENKO
[2379]described the same incident, in the context cf reporting a pcs-
[2380]dkle KGB penetration of British counterintelligence: “I decided
[2381]to try to take this English girl to bed, And this had nothing
[2382]to do with work. No, it was simply (sex)...And Yurxha {Yuriy
[2383]GUK, First Chief Directorate officer in Geneva} said to me: —
[2384]‘Listen, Yura. Se careful, because we have people cven in
[2385]british counterintelli,ence.'" NOSENKO described the incident
[2386]as follows:
[2388]“After I had been here a week or two there was a
[2389]reception for members of the delegation and at it I saw
[2390]a certain English girl. Then RUSK gave a reception and she
[2391]was there again. I came to the reception, she saw me,
[2392]and I went up to her. She said that it was very nice to
[2393]make my acquaintance, and that's all, M.S. ROSOV (TSY!IGAL)
[2394]was there. He saic to me: ‘Yura, it looks to me lixe you
[2395]are coing to bed with that girl.’ J answered: ‘What do
[2396]you mean, Mikhail Scepanovich? “She just interests me.'
[2398]I had aiready decided to try to get ner in |.ed...But,
[2399]listen further. After this she used to qo to tie Disarma-
[2400]ment Conferences. Weli, to mako it short, I asked this
[2401]girl for a date. She is Scottish, Scottish, net English,
[2402]and works in an office here. We agreed to reet ata
[2403]restaurant. I asxe:i my friends which restaurant here is
[2404]the best, where there isn't a crowd. We went to the restau-
[2405]rant and sat there all evening--all alone. ‘ihcre were just
[2406]the two of us. The restaurant is under the ground and is
[2407]called 'Day and Night' in Russian, "Jour et huit.' We
[2409]sat there and then she asked me.where we could reet ayain.
[2410]A day later we met again, Again in the restaurant and then
[2411]we took a walk. She got me bothered and then gave me the
[2412]brush-off. I called her once, She wasn’t at home. I
[2413]called again. Again she was out. I called a third time.
[2414]She wasn't there. She thought that I was an intelligence
[2415]officer and that I was interested in her for this reason.
[2416]This, honestly, wasn't so. TI had only one thing in mind.
[2417]She was quite a woman...But the English yirl felt that
[2419]she was being developed. I met three times with her.
[2421]Three times we were at the restaurant and she told them
[2422]Iher superiors] this. She knew that I am Russian. She
[2423]told them this and they [NOSENKO whistled, apparently sig-
[2424]nifying that they terminated the relationship] at once.
[2426]She knew from the very beginning that I am Russian, from
[2427]the very beginning. In short, I told her a lot of things--
[2428]well, you know--so to get her into bed. Well, we were
[2429]walking on the quay and I said to her: "How about going
[2430]up to your place?’ she answered: 'I can't." ‘Why?’ I
[2431]gaid, ‘I'll take off my shoes: and come on tiptoe." She
[2432]answered: ‘Is it: possible for me’ to come to you?! 1.
[2434]said: ‘You can't come to my place. There would be a
[2435]knock on the door at once. The Swiss would tell the
[2436]Americans and that would be the end. I can't do this.'
[2438]So all I could do was have her. next to the parapet. But
[2439]the English felt--and nothing was heard about this, but
[2441]H
[2442]Fi
[2444]as
[2445]4
[2446]<4
[2447]a
[2450]a
[2451]a
[2452]3
[2454]i
[2456]beet Ri ee ee +
[2458]4
[2460]a
[2462]%,
[2464]cee a
[2467]ce oh ac er
[2469]she. is no longer here. She gqct into. i
[2470]"for he ause maybe they have “Because
[2471]they--the Foreign Uffice--keep. ealy. .< Speaking honeshly,.
[2472]as a human being, T.am concerned that they might fire -
[2473]‘her. Because there was nothing more to it than this one-
[2474]thing.”
[2476]The second event bringing NOSDNYC to special notice occurred
[2477]at about the same time thac NOS O establi contact with oe
[2478]CIA and may, in fact, have been the incident which he said drove °| oy
[2480]him to contact Pavid MARK On 15 after .
[2481]_ NOSENKO approached MARK) ; the :
[2482]ov a permanent representative oie i
[2484]host at luncneon, American Ambassacor TUBBY, that two girls
[2486]from the Ba~Ta-Clan Club, a strip-teaso bar in Geneva, had come
[2488]é consulate apparently seeking visas. The girls
[2490]two Soviets, one about 30 and the other akcut 40
[2492]sited the club recently (no date was provided by ;
[2493]- According to the girls, @ERReGE Bsaid, the i
[2495]two Soviets had attempted to pass themseiv off as Americans
[2497]and had spent “hundreds" of francs @rinking at the club. The
[2499]name which Gage ari gave Ambassador TUBBY for one of these
[2500]Soviets "sounded ULISENKOV." 9 Fro. their descriptions, the
[2502]two qoviess were Inost certainly NOSENKO and Lis friend A.K. KIS-
[2503]LOV,.* his firss neeting with CIA NOSENKO said that a week
[2505]and a nate earlicr he spent 1500 Swiss francs in a single night
[2507]of drinking and women with KISLOV. ‘he necessity of repaying
[2509]this mone y, taken from KGB operational funds, was the inmediate
[2510]cause of his contact with CIA, according to NCSEUF
[2512]ct
[2513]oO
[2514]e
[2515]- Q.
[2516]foe ant
[2517]be
[2518]a
[2520]had told o
[2523]POPE T Ee eek ue NE ete guenmegianerye Aire eee eps yo
[2525]ee ' a ns . .
[2527]*See Part III.D. for furthér information on KISLOV.
[2530]"4, TDY in 1962 -
[2532]w Reasons
[2534]_ renee rasimew it rnetnenicening meet abner sonic
[2535]for ROSENKO's Presence. in Geneva (1962 and 1964)
[2537]When NOSENKO arrived in Geneva forthe first tine on
[2538]10 March 1962, he wan listed officially as a Soviet Ministry of
[2540]' Foreign Affatys “export” with the Delegation to the disarmament
[2542]talks. Early during his second meeting with CIA on 11 June 1962,
[2543]NOSENKO was asked to oxplain precisely why he had been sent out
[2545]‘to Geneva. He repliod as follows: "Right now, I came to pro~
[2546]vide counterintelligence support to the Disarmament Delegation....
[2548]There is a special [kGB}] department for delegations, a special
[2549]one, recently created, And-the chief of this departrent is
[2550]simultaneously a deputy chief of the [Second Chief] Directorate.
[2551]He is both chicf of the department and deputy chief of the
[2552]directorate so that there will be a person who can be held re-
[2553]sponsible if anything happens. Understand? The chief of the
[2554]directorate [O.. GNRIMANOV|] hated to sign all sorts of recom—
[2555]mendations and so on, when somcone can run off in Belgium or
[2556]wherever he may be. ‘This happened nore than once, and he was
[2557]summoned before the [CPsu! Central Committee. Therefore, he
[2558]decided to create a now position. Tne person holding it is
[2559]simultaneously chic! of the department and deputy chief of the
[2560]directorate and personally signs off on all matters concerning
[2562]. exits [from the USSN|], This was in order to avoid being called
[2564]on tie carpet...so that blame would fall not on the chief of
[2565]the directorate, but on his deputy, who is in charge of this
[2566]department and who signed off...
[2568]“This department," NOSENKO continued, “is concerned with
[2569]departures abroad, that is, it checks all Sovict citizens who
[2571]intend to travel abrond, both alone and as members of delegations.
[2573]Since GOLITSYN [defected] in Finland, we have an order that no
[2574]delegation is to be let out without an operational worker, not -
[2575]a single delegation,,, With me it happened as follows: I was
[2576]not planning to go. They told me: ‘You are going.’ I said:
[2577]‘I can't. I have a section. I have 15 people there, all
[2578]operating people. Am I supposed to dump them? What can I do?’
[2579]"No, you are going,' was the reply. ‘And what did the chief
[2580]order?' I asked. Tho chief {NOSENKO was referring to GRIBANOV
[2581]when he spoke of the “chief".] said: . 'GROMYKO is going this
[2582]time, the Minister of Foreign Affairs is going, and somebody
[2583]on an appropriate level must go with him. Not a case officer,
[2584]not a senior case officer, not a deputy, but the chief of a
[2585]section, or the deputy chief of a department, or a department
[2586]chief." Well, I was the most junior section chief. I was
[2587]called in to my chiof, my immediate chief, who is concerned
[2588]with the Seventh Department. They had told him that it would
[2589]be for a month and on this basis he gave me permission. And
[2591]I have been here sinco 10 March."
[2593]Later during this second meeting NOSENKO volunteered that
[2595]_in addition to his sceurity officer functions in Geneva, he had
[2599]United States on numerous occasions since 1942, when he was
[2601]a special assignment to check on P.F. SHAKHOV, a senior advisor
[2602]to the Soviet Delegation,* SHAKHOV had been noted in contact
[2604]*CIA records show that SHAKHOV has served in and visited the
[2606]assigned. at the Soviet Consulate General in New York. He
[2608]crate Ob ee F
[2610]deatakiten
[2614]LA th ne ek th cans Heeb oe
[2616]ethene tee
[2619]l
[2622]th David MARK, believed by the KGB to be a CIA officer; =
[2623]NOSENKO reported, and on this basis the KGB suspected that ~
[2624]SHAXHOV might be an American age-t. NOSENKO described the
[2626]. various ways he had tested these suspicions in Geneva. He
[2627]first gave SHAKHOV disinformation and looked for indications
[2628]that he passed it on to American contacts. Next, SHAKHOV was
[2629]told to perform countersurveillance tasks during a meeting by -
[2630]NOSENKO with an imaginary agent, while other KGB officers
[2631]checked for signs tiiat SHAKHOV had forewarned the Americans
[2632]about the meeting. Finally, NOSENKO revealed to SHAKHOV the
[2633]location of a KGB "dead drop" and checked back five days later.
[2634]to see whether the specially prepared materials which had. been
[2635]placed in it had been disturbed in any way. NOSENKO'sS con-~
[2636]clusion from all this, he told CIA, was that SHAKHOV was ab-
[2637]solutely free of suspicion, and it was his intention to report
[2638]this finding when he returned to KGB Headquarters. tg
[2640]i
[2641]i
[2643]b
[2645]EWR VELA
[2647]B
[2649]On later occasions NOSENKO reported that SHAKHOYV had
[2650]previously served with the Ministry. of Foreign Affairs in the
[2651]United States and that during this period he acted as an agent-
[2652]recruiter for the KGB. In 1966 NOSENKO named one person whon
[2653]SHAKHOV had spotted and developed in the United Statcd, Ges
[2654]See SHAKHOV, according to NOSENKO, was not and never :
[2655]haa been a KGB officer. Asked why SHAKHOV was permitted to 3
[2656]travel abroad when he was suspected of being an Ancrican agent,
[2657]NOSENKO explained that since SHAKHOV belonged to the Ministry
[2658]of Foreign Affairs, the KGB could do nothing about his trips
[2660]casi ssatihie.
[2662]wh noah Le
[2664]"bt the
[2666]weenie alte
[2668]abroad. "There was ne proof, only suspicions," and furthermore,
[2669]SHAKHOV was a member of the personal staff of the head of the
[2670].Sovict Delegation, S.K, TSARAPKIN. : 54
[2672]NOSENKO was questioned again about his 1962 assignment to
[2673]Geneva during the February 1965 interrogations. His answers
[2674]were incorporated in a "protocol" which NOSENKO certified as
[2675]being correct on 26 February 1965. The protocol states:
[2676]“GRIBANOV had nothing at all to do with my assignment to Geneva
[2677]in 1962. I think that the fitness report written about me for
[2678]this trip was signed by (F.D.] BOBKOV, since he was the Deputy
[2679]Chief of the Second Chief Directorate who supervised the
[2680]Seventh [Tourist] Department. I did not personally discuss
[2681]this trip with GRIBANOV before ny departure from Moscow. My
[2682]candidacy for this assignment was supported by [S.G.] BANNIKGV,
[2683]the Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, who super-
[2685]; vised the work of the Eleventh [Soviet Delegations] Department
[2686]' _ which had the investigative file on SHAKHOV. BANNIKOV was
[2687]iooG concerned with the question of who should go as case officer on
[2689]Lactobebhitall lew asin hes ve
[2691]BC RnMRRE Ee Tn6) Tae we mS NOE
[2693]: _ attended the 1945 Conference on International Organization in San
[2694]foc Francisco, the 1955 Paris Summit Conference, and many disarmament ;
[2695]is, . . conferences over the years, and he has attended a number of ses- —_ '
[2697]Son ee ertentrie H
[2701]aah pide nse tee
[2703]| - sions of the UN General Assembly. Most recently SHAKHOV arrived
[2705]: in New York as a member of the Soviet Mission to the UN in 1963.
[2707]: The Soviet defectors PETROV and DERYABIN have reported that. ;
[2708]Be, SHAKHOV's face ig familiar to them; RASTVOROV identified ‘him as
[2710]: an MVD officer whom he is certain he saw at MVD Headquarters in |
[2711]Moscow; and ntified m as an “employee o
[2713]_ KGB." 5 »\howaver, Saray said that SHAKHOV is "clean, a
[2715]' ‘pure diplomat'"\and that, to his knowledge, SHAKHOV was nof en-
[2717], @aged in any Soviet intellig pee activity gf that time.
[2719] e¥or further particulars on
[2720]|, Part VI.D.6 : .
[2723]‘this trip because SHAKHOV, who was. suspected cf possibly being.
[2724]a Western agent, was to be in the delegation. When the Eleventh
[2725]Department was looking for a case officer to rake this trip
[2727]they wanted to have a chief of section because of the serious~
[2728]ness of the SHAKHOV case. When they asked in the Seventh ‘
[2729]Department [V.D.] CHELNOKOV agreed that I should take the as-
[2730]signment. There was no background or neightorhood investigation
[2731]conducted on me in connection with ny being approved for this
[2732]trip.* My assignment was approved by the Eleventh Department,
[2733]by the Personnel Office of the Second Chief Directorate, by
[2735]the Central Personnel Office of the KGB and by the Certral
[2736]Committee of the CPSU." : .
[2738]NOSENKO was asked why he had been selected to make this
[2739]trip immediately after assuming the duties of the Chief of the
[2740]American Tourist Section, on the eve of the tourist season,
[2741]and at a time when he had no deputy. He explained that it
[2742]was not thought that the assignment would last so long, and
[2743]CHELNOKOV, his superior and friend, had decided to let him go
[2745]as a "treat."
[2747]During interrogations of October 1366 NOSENKO was ques-
[2749]- tioned further about his 1962 assignment to Geneva as a security
[2750]officer. He said that in this capacity he would necessarily
[2751]know the identity of all other KGB officers serving with the
[2752]Soviet Disarmament Delegation in Geneva. There were only,
[2753]besides himself, the KGB First Chief Directorate officers M.S.
[2754]7SYMBAL and I.S. MAYOROV. (CIA, however, has tentatively
[2755]identified three other delegation members as KGB staff officers:
[2756]A.K. KISLOV, observed in Washington ard in Moscow in what
[2757]appears to have been KGB operational activity; V.G. FILATOV, who
[2758]served as an alternate handler in the KGB operation with the
[2759]NATO officer Georges PAQUES; and Oleg GRINEVSKIY
[2760]of the permanent Soviet Delegaticn whot handled a Gee ;
[2761]double agent during this same conference.) NOSENKO incsiuced
[2762]GRINEVSKIY in the list of his own agents in Geneva in 1962
[2763]and said that, in Moscow, GRINEVSKIY was handled by an offi-
[2764]cer of the Intelligentsia and Correspondents Department of
[2765]the Second Chief Directorate. KXISLOV, according to NCSENKO,
[2767]_ was an operational contact in Moscow of the Austria~Germany~
[2768]-.Seandanavia Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate
[2770]and was used in operations against the West German Embassy
[2772]there, NOSENKO also said that KISLOV had been a KGB operational
[2774]contact during his earliex tour in the United States but was
[2775]neither then nor later a KGB officer. He characterized FILA-
[2777]TOV as a Ministry of Foreign Affairs.official and stated that
[2779]he is “definitely not an intelligence officer." ;
[2781]_ NOSENKO was also requestioned during these interrogations
[2782]on his investigation of SHAKHOV. After saying on the morning
[2783]of 19 October 1966 that he had been personally told by the
[2785]*"NOSENKO has said that in 1960 he was turned down for a‘per-
[2786]manent assignment to Ethiopia because of his excessive drink-
[2787]ing. (See Part V.E.¢.a) _ :
[2789]ovtnteattiew ties, 09 »
[2791]deamerdor. +
[2793]SF on Aint oh
[2795]i
[2796]4
[2797]3
[2798]a
[2799]4
[2802]e,
[2806]“4 ar
[2812]1A S000"
[2814]toteenayptnnes te
[2816]ia
[2817]Wy
[2819].._ the only. one he cited.
[2821]Napiity Chief of” “hee seeene Chie? Diréctorate-that-the SHA (HOV ~
[2822]investigation was the main reason for his assignment to Geneva
[2824]in 1962, NOSENKO later in the day stated: "My main task was to-
[2826]check the security of the delegation, plus SHAKHOV, You can’t.
[2827]separate these tasks."
[2829]In this questioning NOSENKO described the basis for the
[2830]suspicions of SHAKHOY, the lack of results from earlier inves-
[2831]tigations, and his own preparation for this assignment. He
[2832]said that as a representative of the Soviet Delegations De-
[2833]partment of the Second Chief. Directorate, M.G. SITNIKOV had
[2834]conducted investigations-of SHAKHOV in Geneva in 1961, but
[2835]SITNIKOV was unable to resolve the questions concerning him.
[2836]Because of the failure of these early efforts, the KGB decided
[2837]to send "a senior guy" to the Disarmament talks in 1962, and
[2838]NOSENKO was chosen. "to finish things up." ‘Before leaving Mos-
[2839]cow in March 1962, NOSENKO therefore discussed the SHAKHOV
[2840]case with: SITNIKOV and with one (fnu) LYALIN, the Soviet Dele—
[2841]gations Department officer in charge of the SHAKHOV case; he
[2842]also read various materials-on the case, including an investi-
[2843]gative plan drawn up by LYALIN. NOSENKO's description of these
[2844]preparations provided the basis for the quest iofing which
[2845]followed:
[2847]Question: Why was SHAKHOV under suspicion in June 1962?
[2849]KOSENKO; He was working with different delegations at
[2850]different conferences and, being in Geneva,
[2851]it was noticed that there was something which
[2852]can he described as a connection with David
[2853]MARK, who was considered a CIA officer.* Also,
[2854]little, little, little things before.
[2856]When did SHAKHOV and MARK first meet? How did
[2857]it begin?
[2859]Question
[2861]NOSENKO: In '60 or '61 there was a’contact with MARK.
[2862]I don't remember who reported it. The report
[2863]was maybe from SITNIKOV in Geneva. MARK was
[2864]known to the Second Chief Directorate as the
[2865]Rezident [CIA Chief of Station] in Moscow.
[2866]After Woscow he went to Geneva, and it was con-
[2867]Sidered he must be the Rezident in Geneva.
[2868]All the KGB officers going there were told to
[2869]pay attention to hin.
[2871]Question: What about the report?
[2872]NOSENKO: Maybe the officers saw the two going to the
[2874]toilet. Maybe there was.a contact. The file
[2875]said "maybe." I was sent to Geneva to carry
[2877]*As stated earlier, MARK was not a CIA officer in Moscow,
[2878]although he did perform certain clandestine tasks for CIA. He
[2879]had no CIA missions in Géneva in 1962. Within the context of
[2881]‘discussion of NOSENKO's security officer duties during October
[2883]1966, NOSENKO was asked to name any CIA officers he knew to-be
[2884]present in Geneva during the 1962 disarmament talks. MARK was
[2888]Ceag ME taster ait eign «PDN
[2890]cit cee ante se elaate ones
[2892]sm attihni ee
[2894]dibs bdssn
[2896]denis.
[2900]SUT eee
[2902]Frere ts ae
[2904]LR Bate nieabate
[2906]4
[2907]3
[2912]little things. MARK maybe tursed his head a...
[2913]certain way when SHAKHOV was talking. [S.M.]--
[2914]GOLUBEY, formerly of the Fourteenth [Covnterin-
[2915]tell‘ gence] Department, was in the Soviet Dele-
[2916]gation with SHAKHOV,* He noticed little details.
[2917]When the officers in the United States decided
[2918]to terminate SHAKHOV {as an agent], they wrote
[2920]@ report on him which said he was Liking life
[2922]in the U.S.--American products, money. He was
[2923]pictured as not good and, in addition, he was
[2924]not wanting to work as an agent.
[2926]2. The 1964 TDY
[2928]NOSENKO's 1964 trip to Geneva, commencing on 19 January, was
[2930]also in the capacity of security officer with the Soviet Dis-
[2931]armament Delegation. He said he was the only security officer
[2932]for the group, which consisted of about 25 persons, and again
[2933]he was officially listed as an "expert." NOSEXKO reported that
[2934]he had three or four agents within the delegation and an equal
[2935]number of operational contacts. The only person whom he was
[2936]instructed to watch in particular was A.A. TKACHEY, an inter-
[2937]preter, who had travelled to Austria in 1960 ard 1961 and who,
[2939]the KGB had noted, was in the habit of going about by himself.
[2940]Other than this, according to NOSENKO, his responsibilities
[2941]were general in nature.
[2943]NOSENKO explained during the February 1965 interrogations
[2944]how he was selected for this TDY. The protocol he signed on
[2945]26 February 1965 states: “GRIBANOV hac absolutely nothing to
[2946]do with my:assignment to Geneva in 1964. The fitness report
[2947]on me for this trip was signed by [F.D,] BOBKOV. For the 1964
[2948]trip no decision of approval of the Central Committee of the
[2949]CPSU was required for me or for any other members of ‘the dele-
[2950]gation who had been approved for the 1962 trip. It was ny own
[2951]personal wish to make this trip in 1964 and I had discussed the
[2952]question with [V.D,] CHELNOKOV even in 1963 and had received
[2953]his agreement. I had also talked about this with {M.v.]
[2954]KHLOBUSTOV«; and [G.] PANCHENKO [both of the Soviet Delegations
[2955]Department]. After it had been decided that I would go, in
[2956]about the beginning of January 1964, [N.T.] ZHARIKOV, the Chie?
[2957]of the Department, suggested that a case officer might not be
[2958]‘required with this delegation. KHLOBUSTROV, PANCHENKO, and
[2959][A.G.] KOVALENKO [Chief of the Tourist Department and NOSENKO's
[2960]immediate supervisor} supported me for the assignment as a
[2961]‘personal favor to me." ‘With regard to GRIBANOV's knowledge pf
[2962]his assignment to Geneva this second time, NOSENKO said'that he
[2963]feared that if GRIBANOV learned about the TDY he would have said,
[2965]‘= :-"What, again?" and would not have permitted him to go. It was
[2967]for this reason that NOSENKO did not discuss the trip with GRI-
[2968]BANOY, he said, and he did not believe that GRIBANOV, in fact,
[2969]knew anything about it. ° Loo _
[2971]u
[2973]’ *GOLUBEV was also identified by Gay as a First chief Directo- —
[2975]rate counterintelligence officer. According to Gieryr was
[2976]one of several KGB officers forced to leave the Unite tates
[2978]-.4n 1964 because he was well known to NOSENKO.. There is no re-
[2979]cord in CIA files that GOLUBEV has ever been to Switzerland.
[2981]put measures to check... There vere many little,
[2983]“d
[2984]4
[2985]“4
[2990]sali wee Aeabert need
[2992]4
[2996]Tn
[2998]a en fee edt
[3000]eet Bache ts
[3002]4
[3005]ypstuerzae
[3007]C. Motivations and Intentions of NOSENXO
[3009]1. Introduction
[3011]_ NOSENKO has not indicated that his professional status in
[3012]the KGB, his standard of living in the Soviet Union, or his
[3013]family life prompted him to volunteer to American Intelligence
[3014]in 1962 and to defect to.the United States in 1964. He initially.
[3015]told CIA that he had been. unusually successful during his ten-
[3016]year carcer as a KGB counterintelligence officer; his closest
[3017]friends and the people whom he admired most were members of the.
[3018]KGB; he enjoyed his work. The NOSENKO ‘family held a high social
[3019]position, and. their economic situation was "luxurious by. Soviet
[3020]standards." NOSENKO described his family life as close and
[3021]harmonious. He spoke with fondsess and pride about his two
[3022]daughters, of his wife's: tolerance and understanding, of the
[3023]companionship she gave him; He.expressed love and a sense of
[3024]responsibility for his widowed szother, who heavily cepended
[3025]upon him after the death of his father in 1956. The elder
[3026]NOSENKO won his son's aduwiration for having worked his way up
[3027]from an apprentice pipefitter in a shipyard to the position of
[3028]Soviet Minister of Shipbuilding. The NOSENKO nane is hcnored
[3029]in the home town of Nikolayevsk, where the shipyard has been
[3030]renamed for the former minister and where a statue of him has
[3031]beén erected in the town square. By his own account, NOSENKO
[3032]thus had had a rewarding home life and a successful and enjoy
[3034]“able career in the KGB.
[3036]‘2. Collaboration in 1962
[3038]At the outset in 1962, NOSENKO said he wanted to limit his
[3039]reports to two items of information. Before the first meeting
[3040]with CIA was over, he went beyond these two items to give de-
[3041]tails on the KGB Second Chief’ Directorzte and nther operations,
[3042]and he offered to meet again. (Four more meetings ensued in
[3044]1962, with NOSENKO providing additional information on the KGB.)
[3046]He would not defect, NOSENKO said, unless his personal safety
[3047]was endangered by the KGB. Motivations in coming to Americen
[3048]Intelligence, according to NOSENKO, were his financial emergency
[3049]in Geneva and his disaffection for the Soviet regime.
[3051]a. Readiness to Report to CIA
[3053]During his 9 June meeting with David MARK, NOSENKO said he
[3054]realized, even before talking to representatives of American
[3055]intelligence, that they would not be satisfied with the two
[3057]items of information alone--he expected them to insist on more.
[3059]He was introduced by MARK to a CIA case officer later the sane
[3060]day, and at the start of the meeting, the following dialogue
[3061]took place: .
[3063]XOSENKO: You see, I am not plannirg to be your agent...
[3064]and don't think that I am going to work with
[3065]you in Moscow. No. No...
[3067]Case As you have’ said, I am-an intelligence officer
[3068]Officer: as are you. And I think that we will understand
[3069]. one another.
[3071]NOSENKO: You want to place our relationship on an agent
[3072]basis. . ..
[3076]ree ere rere er
[3080]|
[3083]i
[3085]a
[3087]a
[3089]ava staalie eal age
[3093]svete boa at andi LS
[3095]cei lke ete ah ode a
[3097]von ne Seb ated a
[3099]t
[3104]Case
[3105]Officer:
[3109]Case
[3110]Officer:
[3114]Case
[3115]Officer:
[3117]i se NOSENKO:
[3119]Of course.
[3121]Never in my life I will go in contact [with |
[3122]CIA] in Moscow or the USSR, never in my life.
[3123]I also know about Langelle and POPOV;* I know
[3124]this matter.. When it was abroad it was fine,
[3125]but when you decided to mect him in Moscow...
[3126]You want more than I came with the intention
[3127]of saying. You want to change this to a long-
[3129]_term relationship. Understand me. I am now
[3131]the chief of a section. Before my departure
[3132]{from Moscow] a decision was being reached--
[3133]and I have just spoken with my wife in Moscow--
[3134]I am supposed to become the deputy chief of a
[3135]department. Do you understand what this is?
[3137]Why are you telling me this?
[3139]Because I wanted to come [to C1A] only for a
[3140]business deal, to give you these two cases,
[3141]to receive money for this, and that's all.
[3142]Goodbye. Perhaps, sometime, when I come
[3143]abroad, we will meet one another and perhaps
[3144]I will give you somethi..3. God knows. But
[3145]I don't want te do this now. I don't want
[3147]to and I am not prepared within myself for this...
[3149]I am giving two interesting cases. The most
[3150]interesting ones. I say to you honestly, the
[3151]two most interesting ones. in the first of
[3153]then PANDREY''**), I took nb part. In the second
[3154][ BELITSK1Y***] I took part, even here.
[3156]I want you to understand that these two matters
[3157]that you spoke to Mr. MARK about are of great
[3158]importance to us. But I don't have to tell you
[3159]that. You know that. But we are not going to
[3160]play like children. You know nerfectly well
[3161]that it is worth every franc... What I want
[3162]to tell you is this: of course I will ask you
[3163]more, and of course 1 want to know as much as
[3164]you know. If you refuse to answer, that's your
[3165]business. :
[3167]Y will tell what I am able to tell. What I
[3168]know, I will tell. Of course, you yo.;self
[3169]understand that there are things concerning our
[3170]internal system that I cannot report to you.
[3171]You yourself understand this.
[3173]*The compromise: of the CIA ‘source in the GRU, P.S, POPOV, is
[3174]_discussed in Part VI.D.7.a.' .
[3176]; **The case of "“ANDREY," the KGB eryptonyn | for the agent Dayle
[3177]. SMITH, is discussed in Part VI.D.3.b.
[3179]“e**BELITSKIY, a KGB-controlled double agent, is discussed in
[3181]Part VI. D. 6
[3183]<n RE RR REE erinee:
[3185]ventana beatiaaE be a Seabee
[3187]j
[3188]i
[3189]4
[3190]x
[3191]q
[3192]4
[3193]i
[3195]w tem pertain aban tate
[3198]‘and generally the functions and operating techniques of the
[3200]., respectively. NOSENKO did not supply the names at this time. eo
[3202]owimuaWihen..the.CIA.officer said the. he understood NOSENKO had
[3203]been in the KGB since shortly after the war, NOSENKO, without” ””
[3204]further prompting, gave a detailed statement of his own personal
[3205]past and his professional career. ‘In tunis statement he described
[3206]his education, his service in the GRU, his entry into the KGB
[3208]various components of the KGB Second Chief Directorate in which
[3209]he had served, along with the inclusive dates of his service
[3211]in each. This account was very similar to that given MARK
[3212]earlier in the day. Still without prompting, he discussed
[3213]several specific KGB operations against Americans inside the
[3214]Soviet Union, one involving the recruitment of a Yale University
[3215]professor on the basis of homosexual compromise and the other
[3217]an unsuccessful attempt to recruit an American code clerf.-
[3218]NOSENKO said he was personally involved in both cases.*
[3220]The question of his further assistance was then raised
[3222]again: The CIA officer asked NOSENKO to tell more about the \ 4
[3223]Yale professor, but NOSENKO demurred, stressing that the agree- . i 3
[3224]ment involved only two pieces 6f information and ignoring the : j
[3225]fact that he had already given considerably more: :
[3227]A
[3229]NOSENKO:. I have told you enough for this day, and I vill
[3230]tell you only these two cases which I wanted to
[3231]tell you, and it is enough for this day.
[3233]Case How do you imagine that this is enough? You
[3234]Officer: know that we work much the same way. : |
[3236]ie.
[3238]NOSENKO: Yes.
[3240]Case You know what interests us, of course.
[3241]Officer:
[3242]NOSENKO: I know it. Today I gave only two things.
[3243]Let's meet one another [again].
[3245]Case Good. But let me say this: What you tell me
[3247]Officer: ‘Issyour business. I am not going to try to !
[3248]bring any pressure at all...There is no argu-
[3250]ment about it. I am not going to say: ‘Please |
[3252]f
[3254]i
[3258]seas winch Seabees
[3262]2 Galan Medal dition
[3264]see us in Moscow.' I don't want to see you
[3266]in Moscow because it's too difficult. It is
[3267]completely impossible. That's it. No more on
[3268]that subject.
[3270]NOSENKO: I said to David [MARK] before meeting you that
[3271]I don't want to meet anyone anymore, not anyone.
[3273]Case All right. Agreed. °
[3274]Officer:
[3277]i
[3278]A
[3280]NOSENKO: In another place. I don't know whether I will
[3281]come back here in a month or not...I personally
[3282]don't want to, either, because my wife will be
[3284]_Moaning at home. But-I am afraid they will make
[3285]me come, because I know-the delegation. I know
[3287]*Richard BURGI and Joseph MORONE; see Parts: V.D.$.b. and V.E.3.c.,
[3289]seer
[3291]en Ei atinem ace Lite brite dere Be
[3293]‘person was responsible for the compromise... Next time."
[3295]"In that case we can meet.
[3296]Case . ':::You know that I would not bring any pressure.
[3297]Officer:. That's something we understand because we are
[3299]': both in this business. ‘You and I are in the
[3300]game business, so you can't--
[3302]NOSENKO: Let me interrupt. Why are we bargaining so
[3304]. now? So that I will say something more to
[3305]you. I said: ‘Let's meet again.' Maybe I
[3306]will tell [more]. Now I will give you only
[3307]these two items because we have made a deal.
[3308]I will tell you about these two cases. Let's
[3309]meet again, if you insist. I understand that -
[3310]you want more. Well, I will think a bit about
[3311]what I know. ;
[3313]Case That's all right.
[3314]Officer: .
[3316]NOSENKO: We can meet when I am abroad perhaps...You must
[3318]‘ understand me. This has not.come to me simply.
[3319]I had time tbh think for a long time. I thought
[3320]for a long time. You see, it's very difficult
[3321]for me, very difficult for me. and after I go
[3322]it will also be very difficult for me.
[3324]Case But you knew that when you came. Why did you
[3325]Officer: come to us? Why to the American rezidentura
[3326](CIA Station} and not to the British?
[3328]NOSENKO: I came here because you are strong, strong...
[3329]You don't have to explain to’me. I know what
[3330]makes me go. ‘I told you it is hard for me.
[3332]I still need to think. That's all. But I
[3334]can no longer take a step back because the step
[3335]forward has already been taken. I won't re-
[3336]fuse if we meet before my departure. If you
[3337]like, on Monday, on Tuesday, any day. Monday
[3338]is better for me. Not Sunday, because I have
[3339]to be there with my own [people].
[3341]This exchange was followed by a lengthy description of the two
[3342]leads which NOSENKO had come to sell, the BELITSKIY and the
[3343]"ANDREY" cases, °
[3345]As NOSENKO was about to leave this first meeting, his case
[3346]officer asked when they might meet again. NOSENKO suggested
[3347]that they meet two days later, on Monday., around noontime as
[3348]it would be easier for him to get away unnoticed at lunchtime.
[3349]He then said that the case officer was probably trying to get
[3351]. everything down on tape and asked that this be stopped because
[3353]of the risk to his secvrity resulting from such a permanent re-
[3354]cord of their conversations. NOSENKO said: "I will not tell
[3355]you. anything particularly interesting. But I can tell you some-
[3357]thing. But not today. ‘I can tell how LANGELLE blew POPOV--not
[3359]LANGELLE, but because of whom and why we found him--for your
[3360]future use, so that you will know how to operate. But LANGELLE
[3361]was not guilty. It was not LANGELLE who was guilty. Another
[3365]eA EL oa
[3367]fe
[3369]j
[3370]i
[3371]A
[3373]Lethe ae cate te
[3378]BR Eee lal Bhd imide
[3380]ai
[3384]“or of the degree of this cooperation was never raise aga ne ©
[3386]“the very start’ of the second neeting;—~ on tl-dune;~he- said rere
[3387]“I am tortured all the time by a single thought. | Everything .
[3389]“now depends upon you, only on you. The slightest careless move
[3391]“by your people and it will be the end of me.“ Although he
[3393]sometimes voiced moral compunctions, from this point on NOSENKO
[3394]expressed his primary personal concern as being his own secu-
[3395]rity vis-a-vis the KGB. :
[3397]b. Attitude Toward Defection
[3399]While willing to meet with CIA representatives during
[3400]future trips outside the Soviet Union, which he estimated would
[3401]occur about once a year, NOSENKO in 1962 refused tc consider
[3402]defection except in circumstances where his personal security
[3403]would be endangered. Wis devotion to his'wife and children, and
[3404]the probability that the KGS would take reprisals against them
[3405]if he fled were, he said, the primary considerations behind this
[3406]‘yefusal. (Without elaborating on the reasons, NOSENKO said on !
[3407]another cccasicn that he would not want to leave the USSR even i
[3408]on a permanent KG3 assignment and accompanied by his family.) ne
[3409]Other considerations included his widowed mother's dependence _ |
[3410]on him and his love of Russia and the Russian people, as opposed H
[3411]to the regime. For these reasons, NOSENKO said, he could not |
[3412]defect as PETROV, GOLITSYN, and KHOKLOV had done. ;
[3414]@. ‘Motivation a , . . Lai
[3416]NOSENKO told David MARK on 9 June 1962 that he wanted to
[3417]contact American Intelligence because he was in trouble over
[3418]the loss of KGB operational funds, for which he had to account
[3419]prior to his imminent departure for the Soviet Union. His KGB
[3420]career would be ruined if he was caught misusing this money,
[3421]NOSENKO added, and because he had nowhere else to turn, he was
[3422]willing to sell two items of information to MARK. The amount
[3423]needed to cover the loss was 900 Swiss francs, or about $210,
[3424]and this was the price asked for the information.
[3426]NOSENKO's statements of motivation to his CIA case officers
[3427]during subsequent meetings are given below:
[3429]9 June 1962: In his first meeting with a CIA officer NO-
[3431]SENKO. asked whether MARK had relayed the reasons why he wanted
[3432]to meet with American Intelligence. He then very briefly re-
[3434]. peated what he had told MARK concerning the loss of his opera~
[3436]"* And he doesn't sense any improvement [in his position] within the
[3438]tional funds. The case officer remarked that there must be
[3439]something more to it, upon which NOSENKO said that this was not,
[3440]in fact, his main motivation: "I have been working in this
[3441]business’ for a long time and I know what I am doing. I have
[3442]heard more than is written [in the newspapers]. A reorganization
[3443]has been started in the USSR. In short, they have begun to do
[3444]away with the ministries and the sovnarkhozy. But this is pre-
[3445]‘mature. Right now our agriculture is falling apart at the seams
[3446]and our industry is at the point of collapse because this re-
[3447]organization, this innovation, is too early. And this is not
[3448]just me, a young man, talking. I mingle with ministers, with my
[3449]father's friends, and I hear what they are saying. :And how much
[3450]does a worker earn? 600-800 rubles in old money, now 60-80.
[3452]total population. ‘These are empty words only. We have exceeded
[3453]the United States in per capita production of butter and milk. .
[3455]‘. But how can it be said that we have surpassed you when they are
[3457]gli. ls
[3459]ana dibs
[3463]oe
[3465]whence EL dintiaiatonsishs 6
[3467]4
[3468]st
[3469]“g.
[3470]4
[3471]i
[3474]14-0000
[3476]pe tee te eer etree eine RE FR ae es cg canet eens anes
[3478]_ on the wrong track. Aluo, look at the serious situation in
[3480]’ they have had floods. These rains are also very sertcus. It
[3482]‘I do not believe in what is being done. I do:not believe-in
[3484]: luxurious. Her apartment is enormous--150 square meters. For
[3485]' America this is nothing, but for Moscow this is enormous. We
[3487]internal resentment (nadlom), and you feel that some big mistakes
[3488]have been permitted, that management ag a whole is somehow off
[3490]Czechoslévakia now, in Gecmany--in the GDR. It is very se¥ious.
[3491]Ih Poland they have just had a poor harvest. Everywhere: there
[3493]means that the system, the whole socialist system cannot [cope?--
[3494]one word on the tape cannot be distinquished here]. Do you
[3495]understand what is wronq? Faith in the future is being lost. A
[3496]Why have I told you this? Because under other circumstances : -
[3497]perhaps I would not have come to this. So this is the reason : a
[3498]for what has happened to me. This is perhaps the incident that
[3500]drove me into contact with you. It all somehow grew within me.
[3502]God knows,"
[3504]re ensebeietan, Ringers a
[3506]11 June 1962: During the second meeting, NOSENKO himself
[3507]raised the Issue of motivation. His case officer had just said
[3508]that CIA would respect his wishes in connection with a particu-
[3509]lar request when GSENKO said: "Speaking of respect, how can
[3510]there be respect? I don't even respect myself for what I have
[3511]done. But, but, take the press bulletin, the communique of ;
[3512]the Summit Conference in Moscow on various questions. Again : ; i
[3513]lies, lies, lies, to show that we have had great successes. I
[3514]can't sce them [the successes]. No, excuse me, I know somewhat
[3515]more than the rank and file Soviet man because I work under this 4
[3516]system. JI can see what is’ being dene and what is not baing done.
[3517]Lies, more lies. This was my mood. I say, ‘How much is it pos-
[3518]sible to deceive the people, the Soviet people? How far can
[3519]you go?7' Our people ure very poor. It is somewhat difficult
[3520]to arouse a people such as this. If we stir ourselves up we
[3521]will know how to stand up for ourselves. But I feel for my
[3522]people. How often can you say that things wiil be good; how
[3523]often can you say that we have achieved big successes? Where
[3524]are they? Show me them. I can see no trace of them. This is
[3525]what I say...that there is resentment in my soul. Do you under=
[3526]stand? A terrible resentment. I love my country. You may say
[3527]that this is nothing. But I tell you that I cannot act like
[3528]GOLITSYN, like KHOKLOV, like PETROV, because I want to be there. .
[3529]I want to be with my family, That's all. But I feel that not 3
[3530]only the government is making mistakes. I feel that there are
[3531]faults throughout the entire system of socialism. ‘hat I mean
[3532]is that things are bad in Czechoslovakia, things are bad in Po-
[3533]land, things are bad with KADAR [in Hungary], they are starving
[3534]in China. This means that there are great mistakes. Well,
[3535]that's all. What did you want to ask me, please?"
[3537]wins
[3539]senna? surdrbe ales tall tncarbale toe
[3541]q
[3542]3
[3543]4
[3545]At the close of this meeting, NOSENKO stressed that money
[3547]was unimportant as a motive for a continuing relationship: "My
[3549]name must not be used anywhere, even in your offices. Understand?
[3551]It would be the end of me, I am not afraid of this. The devil
[3553]with them. Because I have had such a life. I lost my father, ’
[3554]everything. Why do I say this? I did not come to you simply ; seat nncaetett
[3555]because I needed money. I don't need it. I came because Tt am
[3556]resentful inside. Do you understand this internal resentment?
[3558]robbs dave, see
[3560]hans
[3562]a
[3563]4
[3565]this. Listen to me. Let me speak honestly. Have I not had the
[3566]chance to live as a person should? My father was a big man. He 1
[3567]had a dacha and a state-owned automobile... I have my own Volga . :
[3568][automobile]. My mother was given a dacha for life... It's
[3570]Bs
[3573]14-0000,
[3575]as
[3577]_” NOSENKO said that he realized that the reason he had given for
[3579], , Headquarters. ae
[3581]Biways.bad.a lot of money,.especially.during..the ware :Salaxy inne
[3582]OF 15,000 or 20,000-pius--25,009, There was much money. She is
[3583]a rich woman. She has paintings by Ayvazovekiy, Makovakiy. Even
[3584]if she had insufficient. money, she could always sell her posses-
[3585]Sions. What do I want to say? That I've never wanted for money.
[3586]Never...As I said, perhaps the thing which drove me to you was not
[3587]. Money, but this great, great resentment.”
[3589]The subject of motivation was not discussed
[3590]curing the third and fourth meetings with NOSENKO. As he was
[3591]about to leave the Geneva safehouse after the fifth and final
[3592].session, however, NOSENKO again touched on the economic inequi-
[3593]ties existing inside the Soviet Union and raised a new reason for
[3594]cooperating with CIA,. his basic sympathy for the American people.
[3596]coming to us, his need for money, was "not good." Before he
[3598]_ and his case officers parted, KOSENKO said, he wanted to em-
[3599]phasize "without attempting to justify himself" that he had
[3600]"always felt a certain sympathy toward the American people.” He
[3601]explained that it was not the technical progress of the United
[3602]States which attracted him, nor was it the high standard of
[3603]living of the American people. It was rather the openness and
[3604]directness with which the Americans whom hz had met and seen
[3605]‘handled themselves. As examples he cited his American targets
[3606]in Moscow and Secretary of State Dean RUSK, whom he had seen in
[3608]. Geneva. ’ 3
[3610]i
[3611]3
[3612]4
[3613]d
[3614]a
[3615]"a
[3616]“4
[3620]7
[3621]i
[3623]Although NOSENKO did mention the difficult economic situa- =
[3624]tion in the USSR on a few other occasions, he did not relate }
[3625]these remarks specifically to his motives for volunteering to H
[3626]CIA. The above excerpts are representative of his total state- :
[3627]ment on motivation during the 1962 meetings.
[3629]3. Decision to Defect (January 1964)
[3631]On arrival for his first meeting with CIA during the second
[3632]Geneva phase, on 24 January 1964, NOSENKO said that after long
[3633]and careful consideration since the 1962 meeting series, he had
[3634]decided to defect. He once again criticized the Communist regime
[3635]along the same lines as during earlier meetings, but his immedi-
[3636]ate motivation seemed to hava nothing to do with this. NOSENKO
[3637]explained that he had recently been promoted to the position of
[3638]First Deputy Chief of the Seventh (Tourist) Department of the KGB
[3639]Second Chief Directorate, and that because of the stature and
[3640]responsibilities of his new job, there would be *-w opportunities,
[3641]‘if any, for him to visit the West in the future. Therefore, he
[3642]had decided to seize the opportunity at hand and to flee to the
[3643]United States at once, leaving his family behind.’ He foresaw no
[3644]possibility of his wife and children being permitted to leave the
[3645]USSR for the "next twenty years." NOSENKO told CIA that "the
[3646]hardest thing is to part with my family." He had, however, care-
[3647]fully considered their fate as the close relatives of a defector, et
[3648]aa he knew that, because of his mother's position in Soviet so~. : a
[3649]ciety, no harm would come to them,
[3658]4
[3659]Bt Z
[3661]. Whereas. NOSENKO declared his intent to-defect immediately,
[3662]the CIA case officers at this first meeting in 1964 persuaded
[3663]him to remain in place for at least two or three weeks on the
[3664]grounds that, first, CIA would benefit much from this, and
[3666]. Second, arrangements for his transfer to and reception in the
[3667]United States would have to be coordinated in advance with CIA
[3669]ty
[3671]14-09000°
[3673]jo
[3674]j
[3675][
[3677]_ in the United States. In this connection, he said, he would
[3678]prefer to act as a CIA consultant, particularly on counterintel- :
[3679]_ligence matters because he was a specialist in this field; he ee
[3681]‘recruiting other Soviets.
[3683]™ Por ets ems re
[3685]"During this first meeting NOSENKO made no monetary request
[3686]of CIA and asked only for reasonable assurance of a secure future *% °:
[3690]would be able to give CIA leads and assistance in spotting and
[3692]The next five meetings with NOSENKO were devoted exclusively
[3693]to debriefings on the activities of the KSB Second Chief Direc-
[3694]torate. Althorgh his impending defection was mentioned, his
[3695]reasons for taking this step were not discussed. In the mean-
[3696]time, NOSENKO's first CIA handler flew to Washington for dis-
[3697]cussions regarding the defection and, on his return, told . i
[3698]NOSENKO that the CIA leadership had asked why, specifically, ;
[3699]NOSENKO had decided to come to the United States at that tima.
[3701]The answer was that NOSENKO, "after coming back and seeing that
[3703]there was no more chance to come to the West, or little more -
[3704]chance," felt that this was his one opportunity to come and make
[3706]his life with the Americans. Therefore, he was going to seize
[3708]the opportunity while he had it. Asked about this, NCGSENKO con-
[3710]firmed that this was his reason, and added: "I may never have
[3712]another chance, and in addition, I've had sufficient time since
[3714]our last meeting here in Geneva [1962] to weigh everything and to x
[3715]consider everything." Later in this same meeting, NOSENKO again :
[3716]mentioned his lack of interest in money and his feelings about
[3717]Geserting his family: "I understand [that it will be difficult
[3718]to adjust to a new life in America} and know that for some time :
[3719]I will be sick within. And I know that a certain pericd of 3
[3720]time must elapse before this can heal. I even spoke to you ‘
[3721]bluntly about my [financial] security. I am absolutely un-
[3723]mercenary and have never had any appreciation for money or ‘
[3724]wealth...My most difficult and sorest spot of all is my family. : :
[3726]ci dihdaiteie no
[3730]This is the nost basic and most difficult spot of all. And I . 4
[3731]know perfectly well that I must go through an illness over 4
[3732]this. For this the only and the best doctor is time. I don't j
[3734]‘1
[3736]expect to have a new family there. Of course, I don't know--
[3737]but at least I'm speaking from the way I feel now. I have a
[3739]strong liking for children--nct only for my own, but for ail
[3741]children and, losing my own, I am fully conscious how I must
[3743]suffer through this. In time I will get used to it. I know
[3745]one can get used to almost anything."
[3747]At this meeting, NOSENKO agreed to remain in place for
[3748]approximately another week, and the tentative date of 8 Febru-
[3749]ary was selected for the defection.
[3751]NOSENKO's motives for the defection were not. mentioned
[3752]for five more meetings. Then, on 4 February 1964, he telephoned
[3753]the Geneva safehouse to say he wanted to defect at once. Ar-
[3754]riving shortly thereafter, he announced that he had been or- :
[3755]dered to return to Moscow the following day and, therefore, had : nes
[3756]to leave Switzerland before morning. He stated his reasons
[3757]formally in an asylum request, written at the time:
[3759]"This decision was made by me, not now, at the
[3760]moment I write this r2quest, but several years ago.
[3761]._. Having worked for many years in the KGB and knowing
[3762]" more than the average soviet citizen about the policy of
[3763]the Soviet government, about the direction which this
[3764]‘government has chosen to take, and about the law and
[3765]order in the USSR, I have come to the decision that
[3768]and work for the welfare of
[3770]4. The Letter of July 1964 |
[3772]The most complete explanation given by NOSENKO of his
[3773]motives for first contacting CIA and«later defecting to the-
[3774]United States is contained .in a letter to his CIA case officer
[3776]<= dn July 1964. He described this letter as "an exposition of
[3778]? all those reasons and roct causes which led to the decision |
[3780]to leave the Soviet Union” and further explained that “every- i
[3782]thing put down here is lacking in a whole series of lesser L-
[3784]details which to a greater or lesser degree played their : . i
[3786]3 xole.“ Nevertheless, he said, he had tried in this letter !
[3788]> “to set down the main things to show how, when, and why the
[3790]decision was born, grew, and hardened within m2 to completely i
[3792]alter the course of my life.” This letter is preserted below
[3794]in its entirety. Most of the biocraphical and operational
[3796]details mentioned in the letter are covered separately in other a
[3798]parts of this paper. : . : i
[3800]saved
[3802]ay BE a
[3803]wnteaes tie.
[3805]Bw anoe: Se tee at
[3807]"1, My life, my childhood and youth passed in ;
[3808]very comfortable circumstances since the positicn of i
[3809]my father gave us the opportunity to live without lacking .
[3810]£0€ anything. And the only difficult periods of my ;
[3811]life (before the death of my father) were: study in :
[3812]the naval schools in kuybyshev, Baku and Leningrad; :
[3813]and the beginning of my working life, the pericd in :
[3814]the Far East (1950-1952). The opportunity to be
[3815]always well-dressed, to have a sufficient amount :
[3816]of money, to have my own car, to be able to use the ,
[3817]car given me by. my family and also my father's car, ;
[3818]the opportunity to travel to the South and to vaca- '
[3819]tion in the best sanitariums, dachas, and so forth;
[3820]all this unquestionably left its mark on me and. be- © .
[3821]came something of a habit. After the death of ry i
[3822]; father, my successful progress in-my work gave me a
[3823]: higher salary, and although I did not have all that i
[3824]which I had while my father was alive, still I did not sos i
[3825]experience any serious difficulties. But already I
[3826]wanted to live still better.
[3828]A eerste deans emt Act eed
[3830]nmetar satin Diya adit me
[3832]"2. Up to 1953, over the course of my entire
[3833]life--at school, in the Institute, at work, at home
[3834]in the family--it was always pounded into my head
[3835]that STALIN was a great genius, that he was good, keen,
[3836]etc., and the thought never occurred to me to question
[3837]his words or his deeds because everything that he
[3838]: : ; . said, and everything he did,were completely axiomatic.
[3839]7 The arrestSand trials only involved traitors and it...
[3840]H was considered and explained that the people who — ‘
[3841]suffered innocently, especially in 1937 and 1938, “
[3842]suffered only because at the head of the NKVD in 1937,
[3843]1938, was the betrayor of the people YEZHOV. Not
[3844]: even the shadow of doubt fell on the name of STALIN.
[3845]i .: Soon after STALIN's death in 1953 I read a certain
[3846]: . document given me by my father. This was a secret
[3847]i 2 8.) . + letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU on the et
[3848]io. ou 7 2. “ease of the doctors;' it was not.addressed to all _— =
[3849]wb o's ¢Ommunists but only to members and candidate members pel.
[3850].’ @£ the Central Committee. I was deeply shaken by this . TP
[3851]- : letter which described in detail how these people, . wo,
[3853]wen OPRELY
[3854]Te? Seote!
[3856]ae ptt Bag OE ot anblinanti ms atin ed
[3859]—the cult of STALIN and -mich that I heard in the KGB
[3861]» tried, as an engineer, to prove that a certain deci-~
[3863]“important specialists in the field of medicine, were
[3864]brought to such a condition that they condemned them-
[3866]selves; that is, they confessed to things which had
[3867]never happened, to things which they had never done.
[3868]They were simply forced to give the evidence which was
[3870]needed _by the ‘Investigators.: ~The secret lstters-o1
[3872]about the reign of STALIN, all this left its mark and I
[3873]forced me to think deeply about the real truth and to i
[3874]look at everything more critically. Already I no +t
[3875]longer had faith in all those ideas which for years : |
[3876]b
[3877]|
[3879]had been pressed into my head.
[3881]"3. The new leaders (KHRUSHCHEV and Company)
[3882]used the same methods but already diluted with the
[3883]water of democracy, with playing up to the people Q
[3884]and attempts to convince them that a new era would - it
[3885]arise, a new and better life, and that now the Party ; !
[3886]was always going to concern itself with the welfare
[3887]of tne people. In fact, it was a struggle for power
[3888]and the use of all. means in this struggle,“even
[3889]microphones (they listened to the conversations of ;
[3890]BERIYA and his friends; later they listened to the mo
[3891]conversations of MOLOTOV, MALENKOV, KAGANOVICH, and :
[3892]others). -KHRUSHCHEV'sS endless blabbing about suc-
[3893]cesses, when in fact they didn't exist, the figures
[3894]about how the USSR had. passed the USA in the produc- ‘
[3895]tion of butter and milk, when in the stores they were
[3896]available cnly infrequently. The endless promises : :
[3897]of a better life when in fact nothing of the sort is
[3898]taking place. All this similarly forced me to re-
[3899]evaluate not only the events which were taking place
[3900]in the country, but already the entire adeclogy of
[3901]the Party, its external and internal course.
[3903]ethan
[3905]sean sat thes oD
[3907]' "4. The events in Novocherkassk where about 20,000 |
[3908]to 25,000 people rose up and the way in which this |
[3909]popular indignation was suppressed by trocps with many
[3910]casualties. This also made a deep impression on me.
[3912]t
[3916]When I was resting in the summer of 1961 in Nikolayev,
[3917]from my relatives--my father's brothers--I understood
[3918]well the real relation of the workers both to the
[3919]leadership and to the Party as a whole. At the same
[3920]time I saw how the workers really lived, how they eat,
[3921]what they have and what they san buy with their wages.
[3924]sudnbe leds we ental aamstevas .
[3926]"5. QI heard a great deal from my father about
[3927]the domestic policies of KHRUSHCHEV in regard to the
[3928]development and the course of construction in industry, ©
[3929]about his complete illiteracy in engineering techno-
[3930]logy and industrial economics, about incorrect deci-
[3931]sions in regard to many industries, and this was not | Fh Be sé
[3932]only the opinion of my father, but also of other impor-
[3933]tant leaders in various fields of industry (MALYSHEV,
[3934]VANNIKOV, AKOPOV, and others). But-no one dared to
[3935]open his mouth and when in December 1955 my father
[3939]sion would be incorrect, he received such a rebuff.
[3940]from KHRUSHCHEV. that he was profoundly shaken and in
[3941]the opinion of my mother this brought him to his ill-
[3942]ness in.1956 and his death in August 1956. :
[3945]14-0000
[3947]tee lege
[3949]i
[3950]H
[3951]i
[3954]1
[3955]y
[3957]Hungary sh
[3959]‘Gn 1956 after the death of STALIN and while I was ae me df
[3961]-. > that I would not be able to work in the KGB unless I .
[3962]Wg a-member of the Party....And if I worked somewhere ‘.
[3964]“‘She-events in-Germany~and especially 10. czmsasce
[3965]cowed with absolute clarity the bankruptcy -
[3967]of communist ideology. What was especially important
[3968]for me was the fact that in these countries it was: ©
[3969]a protest not of individuals or groups, but of the:
[3970]entire people who could no longer @ndure a regime
[3971]imposed on them by force. Here it is necessary to
[3972]emphasize that the life of the people in these coun~
[3973]tries was much better than that of the people in the
[3974]USSR (1 saw for myself how people live in Czecho-
[3975]slovakia, in Germany, and beyond any doubt they live
[3976]better than the entire people of the Soviet Union).
[3978]Bs
[3979]i q
[3981]_ 7, The split of the international communist
[3982]movement became for me a clear fact and confirmed
[3983]my opinion that the theory of communism is a theory
[3984]built on sand and that it is practiced according to
[3985]the needs of the leadership of the Party at a.given i
[3986]stage of life and that in reality full material wel-
[3987]fare would never be enjoyed by the people but cnly
[3988]by the leadership and the Party and the government. : i
[3990]See ee
[3992]"g. Working in the KGB I came to understand
[3993]much and became conscious of the contradiction between
[3994]the internal and external course of the USSR. Such ;
[3995]questions as disarmament, the ban on atomic weapons, the : i
[3996]positicen of the USSR in the United Nations--all these ad i
[3997]are used only in the interest of propaganda and as : :
[3999]a screen for carrying out of the policies needed by. . |
[4000]the communist party. (I was myself present at the ; :
[4001]negotiations in Geneva and saw the ‘politics of the i
[4002]Soviet delegation.) :
[4004]"9, My trips abroad opened my eyes wide to the ;
[4005]true reality. With my own eyes, I saw how people '
[4006]jive, how much they earn, how they can dress and live :
[4007]on their wages, and I paid special attention to the
[4008]life of ordinary people and not to that of scientists, |
[4009]engineers, etc. And all the propaganda about the i
[4010]enormous armies of unemployed in the countries of the |
[4012]i
[4013]I
[4014]'
[4016]a Rh eT A ele eee
[4018]West, about the ‘heavy exploitation’, and the ‘un-
[4019]believably difficult life' flew immediately out of
[4021]my head. And that which I met with in my work, the
[4022]sending of Soviet citizens abroad--who gets sent where
[4023]and how, etc.--this finally debunked this propaganda.
[4024]Many of my acquaintances~-GUK, CHURANOV and others--
[4025]think back with great pleasure about life abroad.
[4027]ovina on AEE isla
[4029]. , "10, I entered the KOHSOMOL completely without
[4030]‘thinking about it. The time came, the right age, and- ; a ; a
[4032]I became a Komscmolnik like all the others. It was
[4034]different in regards to the Party: I joined the Party
[4036]working in the KGB and already at that time there was
[4037]a lack of faith and indecisiveness in me. My father
[4038]continually inststed on this, saying that without the
[4040]Party I would never move ahead and would not have ~
[4041]success in life. But I myself understood and saw
[4043]else, I would truly never move ahead in my career
[4045]Aan MED Get Rew “eae LE
[4047]eh aaron de tm ate DA kee nena arr RIN HE Ag ge . a
[4049]. unless T entered the Party. But From Che GELy Des REE ET eae Mia
[4050]ginning of my entry into the Party, I deeply hated
[4052]all the Party talmudism and dogmatism. All the
[4054]Party meetings were literally a torture. Especially
[4056]when I became the deputy chief of the section, the
[4058]chief of the section, and the deputy chief of the
[4060]department, because then I had to speak at these
[4062]meetiags. Because this meant to lie, to twist my
[4064]soul, and to attempt to show myself as deeply dedi- t
[4065]cated to the Party and its course.
[4067]"11. In 1960 my oldest girl's asthmatic attacks
[4068]became worse. The question of a change of climate
[4069]was raised. At that time the SCD needed to send an
[4070]officer to Ethiopia for two to three years to conduct
[4071]counterintelligence work among the Soviet specialists
[4072]there. It cost me a great deal of effort to personally
[4073]talk GRIBANOV into letting me go. The Party and work i
[4075]i 4
[4076]i i
[4077]i
[4079]references had been confirmed, all the questionnaries . ! j
[4080]were already filled out, the photos had been submitted; : I
[4081]that is, all the formalities had been accomplished. i :
[4083]But at the very last moment the Central Personnel of
[4085]the KGB began to protest against my go&ng with my _!
[4087]family to Ethiopia. The reason for this was that from
[4089]the house check made at my place of residence they
[4091]received information that I sometimes came nome in
[4093]a drunken condition and on this ground had quarrels
[4095]with my wife. A tour abroad with my family was neces~
[4097]gary because of the health of my daughter (since 1963
[4099]the illness has become better) and also it would :
[4100]have been advantageous from the financial point of :
[4101]view. From this time on I understood that Personnel
[4102]Wold not let me go abroad with my family.
[4104]"12, Knowing many officers in the FCD, i began
[4105]to understand that being sent abroad is entirely :
[4106]determined, not by knowledge, experience in work and :
[4107]success, but only by the absolute ‘cleanliness' of ;
[4108]the person's autobiography and complete assurance as
[4110]to his limitless dedication to the Party and the
[4111]“government. But not only being sent abroad but the |
[4112]assignment of personnel in the First and Second Chief i
[4113]Directorates and the entire KGB depends on the reasons |
[4114]|
[4116]wee thd Metis md OB a
[4118]indicated by me and also on good reiations with the
[4119]kadership and good connections with workers in Central
[4121]Personnel.
[4123]"13. I lived about 11 years with my wife and our }
[4124]: Life was not a hell. It is true that there were i
[4125]quarrels and basically they boiled down to the fact — aot |
[4129]that she took an extremely unfavorable attitude to-
[4130]wards my delays at work and also when I would be de-
[4131]layed with some of my friends and acquaintances after
[4132]work and would come home with a few drinks under my
[4133]belt. Of course, I loved an@ love.my.children and only
[4134]the fact that they are taken care of financially until
[4135]they grow up and have received an education to some
[4136]extent consoled me in taking the decision to leave the
[4137]USSR. What do I have in mind when I speak of financial
[4138]‘security? After the death of my father, the family
[4139]received a large monetary allowance, plus the money
[4145]ihrer LOY
[4146]glk en ee ee See
[4148]ae a eee)
[4151]~ borrow from (at this time GUK was’‘pimselif in finan-
[4153]- decision to leave the USSR at the first opportunity
[4155]“would be of the maximum value for you. My assignment
[4156]_-to- the position of deputy chief of the Seventh Depart~
[4158]that my mother had saved and valuable property, etc.
[4159]yother inany “times offered’ to’ divide all this: in ==
[4160]three parts: for me, my brother, and for her, but I~
[4161]suggested that we not do this before her death. And,
[4163]of course, my mother will not leave my children without
[4164]attention, and my share of the property and the money
[4165]will be given to my children. ; . a
[4167]"14, If the defections of =PETROV, RASTVOROV and
[4168]DERYABIN passed without evoking any particular _ ‘
[4169]thoughts, the defection to the United States of GOLIT=-
[4170]SYN, whom I had heard of as an intelligent person and
[4171]a capable officer, undoubtedly caused me to think
[4172]very deeply. Because to act thus, it is necessary
[4173]to have not only boldness and decisiveness, but also
[4174]great. strength of will. And already I put to myself
[4175]the question, will I be able to act thus in view of
[4176]the dissatisfactions and disillusionments which had
[4177]accumulated inside of me?
[4179]"15. Being in Geneva in 1962, not long before
[4180]my departure I myself of my own desire entered into
[4181]contact with you. The reason for this was the loss
[4182]of money received by me for operational expenses. TI
[4183]would have been unable to accumulate such a sum of
[4184]money before my departure and there was nobody to
[4186]cial difficulty and at the same time he was already
[4187]preparing for his return home). To tell the truth
[4188]about the loss of the money would have meant that it
[4189]would be necessary to explain where and in what cir-
[4190]cumstances it had been lost. This would have risked
[4191]expulsion from the KGB and a serious reprimand from
[4192]the Party. Not to tell the truth, to think up some
[4193]sort of a story--they wouldn't believe, and worst of
[4194]all, they might think that I had appropriated the
[4195]money, that is, stclen it. And this would be for me
[4196]the worst of all and I would,’ of course, in such
[4197]event have told the truth,
[4199]"16. To tell the truth, it was only after my
[4200]return home from Geneva in 1962 that I gradually, not
[4201]immediately, began fully to realize all the seriousness
[4202]of my contact with you and its full meaning. And
[4203]although I did not give you any promises cr assurances
[4204]about our continued contact in the future, I under-
[4205]stood that you sooner or later would set yourself the
[4206]task of continuing our contact. And here it was that
[4207]weighing up all the reasons and causes which I have
[4208].indicated above that in 1962 I took for myself the
[4210]and that I started to work towards being sent on a trip. -
[4211]abroad. : ; :
[4213]“17. Of course, I wanted to come abroad with some
[4214]sort of ‘baggage’, that is, with materials which could .
[4215]be useful and necessary for you. In this entire period : 4
[4216]up to January 1964 I tried to collect information which : 5
[4218]‘ment in-July 1962 gave me a greater. opportunity than ~
[4219]before. But at the same time this assignment almost: _
[4221]soe ein MEERA petal Beas acre ingha seta 2 ae etek
[4223]1400000 . : 7 . .
[4224]weegcluded the possibility of a trip abroad ane Le wai
[4225]mmly with great difficulty that I was able to get away —
[4226]_ for the trip in January 1964.. It was necessary to con-
[4227]_ vince CHELNOKOV and then to ask CHELNOKOV to convince
[4228]7 BOBKOV and in 1963 tc convince KOVALENKO. In this i
[4229]: advanced many reasons: that I had not spent all the -
[4230]"money (in foreign currency);.that the medicine which
[4231], I bought for my daughter had proven very successful ©
[4232]“7 "" an@ that I needed to buy some more medicine to carzy
[4233]“ * ‘out one more series of treatments; that this trip
[4234]would not be a long one and that since I was already
[4235]the deputy chief of the Department I would not be able
[4236]to travel abroad any more arid so, therefore, this trip
[4237]would probably be my last. Of course, all this was —
[4238]said at convenient moments and outside of work.
[4239]Things were easier with the Eleventh Department (which
[4240]deals with trips abroad) because I was on good terms ; Lo, j
[4241]with PENCHENKO who covered Switzerland, besides which ~ : 3
[4242]when I came back from Geneva in 1962 I had prought him
[4243]a number of presents.
[4245]"18. The publication in 1963 by the foreign press : ;
[4247]of the VASSALL case put me on my guard since in the .
[4248]newspaper Times it said outright that the English
[4249]learned about him thanks to the Americans who learned :
[4250]about VASSALL in the spring of 1962. Fortunately, the ;
[4251]leadership of the FCD,as I learned from GUK, CHURANCV, :
[4252]and TARABRIN, cama to the conclusion that here the
[4253]Americans had been helped by GOLITSYN. But at the :
[4254]same time the FCD was not completely sure of this.
[4255]But the publication in the American press of Alsop's
[4256]articles on the CIA alarmed me extremely. This ar-
[4257]ticle in one spot said plainly that as far as is known
[4258]the KGB does not have any sources in the CIA while at
[4259]the same time the CIA has penetrated the KGB. From
[4260]this moment, Ido not concea 1s fact, egan to
[4262]- 7" " " ¢ee) afraid that the KGB would somehow learn of my con-
[4263]tact with you. This article deeply ‘interested’ the
[4264]KGB. : : :
[4266]chatted aut Re ee ee
[4268]got: a pass in the Second Department and went in order |
[4269]to look at him myself. For sometimes it is enough 4
[4270]to simply look at a man, to see how he holds hinselif 4
[4271]and to hear how he speaks in order to form some sort 4
[4273]j
[4274]|
[4275]"19. During the clased trial of PENKOVSKIY I :
[4277]: o of an initial opinion of him. Personally, I liked how
[4278]: . a PENKOVSKIY held himself at the trial; I liked his ap-
[4279]pS pearance and I understood that everything which had.
[4280]been said in the KGB about him and-the sort of person
[4281]they were trying to make him out to be (that he was
[4282]morally degraded, that he had descended and sunk into
[4284]a swamp) that all this was nonsense, bluff, and chatter.
[4285]And PENKOVSKIY, the same as GOLITSYN, gave me a feeling
[4286]of. greater confidence in the correctness of the deci-
[4287]sion taken by me to leave the Soviet Union.
[4289]1 4 :
[4290]+ R
[4292]1 . : : w
[4293]' : a r. : ,
[4295]26 July 1964 Signed: Yu. NOSENKO"
[4297]eT ee
[4299]TOP SECRET
[4304]ann enetaec arpa we 7 OS ENO ° a ACE iyietes- “ta Geneve seep RL ET
[4305]i. Introduction
[4307]The extent to which NOSENKO made himself available for
[4308]meetings with CIA in Ceneva in 1962 and 1964 is reviewed here
[4309]in connection with his statements about the KGB duties assigned
[4310]to him for these trips, his visits to the XGB Legal Residency,
[4311]and his personal assoc1ation with other Soviets. Although
[4312]NOSENKO was not precise about how he spent his deys and nights
[4313]in Geneva, he did indicate that he was his own boss, disposed
[4314]of his time as he saw fit, and for the most part had little to
[4315]do. At the first meeting with CIA in 1962 he accounted for his
[4316]freedom of movement by saying: "Tt can come and co as Ipleage
[4317]at any time. (Ambassador) ZORIN knows wno I am, almost the
[4318]entire delegation knows who I am, pecause I don't need to pre-
[4319]tend. Nobody pays any attention to me. They know thet T am
[4320]not a Ministry of Foreign Affai.s man (at the conference
[4321]sessions). I sit, listen, leaf through some papers. For this
[4322]reason I can leave the conference at any time, cr I do not come
[4323]at all, and no one will sey a word to me." CIA made no attempt
[4324]to place NOSENKO under surveillance in 1962 and 1964, and there
[4325]is no evidence from other sources confirming or disproving
[4326]HOSENKO's statements about his activities while away from the
[4327]CLA safehouse. ,
[4329]2. Official Duties in Geneva
[4331]In 1962 NOSENKO said he was the sole KGB officer in the
[4332]94-man Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference and 4s
[4333]such he was responsible for the security and behavior of the
[4334]entire delegation.” To assist him in carrying out these security
[4335]officer functions, NCSENKO had the services of a number of
[4336]coopted informants of the KGB who were serving in the delega-
[4337]tion. In addition, NOSENKO had the specific mission of check-
[4338]ing on suspicions atteched to one of the delegation members,
[4340]P. F. SHAKHOV** but ry the time he established contact with CIA,
[4341]he said, this assignment had already been completed.
[4343]In 1964, NOSENKO said his only operational task then was to
[4344]hendle the general security responsibilities for the Soviet
[4345]delegation, as he had done in 1962. There was no specific
[4346]mission such as the ome concerning SHAKHOV in 1962.
[4348]NOSENKO nas described his investigations of SHAKHOV, but
[4349]he has never indicated either that he conducted security checks
[4350]: of other delegation members in 1962 an@ 1964, or that he re-
[4351]i ceived any security-type information (except on SHAKHOV) from
[4352]‘ the KGB cooptees. who were supposed to be reporting to him.
[4353]‘ Likewise, NOSENKO hes not said that he prepared communications
[4354], for KGB Headquerters regarding his clandestine assignments in
[4355]Geneva.
[4357]3, Visits to the KG3 Legal Residency
[4359]Virtually every day, NOSENKO told CIA in 1962, he went to
[4360]the KGB Legal Residency in Geneva, and if he stayed away for
[4361]more than a day or two, the Legal Resident, S. I. GAVRICHEV,
[4362]would invariably ask NOSENKO where he had been keeping himself.
[4364]2
[4366]; . * I.S. MAYOROV and M.S. TSYMBAL also arrived with the delega-
[4367]gery tion in March 1962 but had left Geneva by the time NOSENKO
[4368]“  goncacted CIA. ; ; L Oe ake
[4370]i
[4374]| _- #® SHAKHOV is discussed further in Part Iii.3.%.
[4375]{. . ys Saattnte
[4378]14-0000
[4380]. GAVRICHEV, according to NOSENKO, treated him with deference, ~ OFS
[4381]and shortly a etter his Ser tvat-10-Geneva-in- March 1962;-NOSENKO--resamnicm —
[4383]gave a lecture on counterintelligence - ‘to the assertled members
[4385]of the Legal Residency. This lecture was given at GAVRICHEV's
[4387]request, althouch it was only after some hesitation on ‘the part
[4388]of. the Legal Resident that all of his subordinates were brought
[4389]together to heaf NOSENKO. (In return for hélping the Legal
[4390]Residency to perform counter-surveillance on; several occasions,
[4391]NOSENKO said, he was sometimes allowed by GAVRICHZV to have the
[4392]use of an operational car and driver to go shopping and. carry
[4393]out other private errands.) ;
[4395]Similarly, in 1964, NOSENKO said he was making nearly daily
[4396]visits to the Legal Residency. During the 1964 meetings NOSENKO
[4397]stated that it was his close relationship with :-M.&, TSYMBAL*
[4398]which made it possible for him to have visited the Geneva Legal
[4399]Residency so frequently, both in 1962 and 1964. “According to
[4400]the strict rules," NOSENKO told CIA, "an officer in a status
[4401]such as mine should not even go to the Residency. In this case
[4402]it is only because I.am deputy chief of a department and GAV-.
[4403]RICHEV knows my position perfectly well (it is not lower than
[4404]his), and because I have such a sympatnetic personal relation-
[4405]ship with TSYMBAL," He then went on to say that TSYMBAL “sort
[4406]of escorted me to the Residency. They coulé have simply said:
[4407]‘You are here om a mission, we have our own mission, and we
[4408]have nothing in common.'" But, NOSENKO indicated, this was
[4409]not.the case, thanks to TSYMBAL's intervention.
[4411]4. Association with TSYMBAL
[4413]At the secord meeting with CIA in 1962 NOSENKO volunteered
[4414]information on TSYMBAL's KGB background and his current missions
[4415]in Geneva, then alluded to his having spoken with TSYMBAL in
[4416]Geneva but without placing any particular emphasis on this
[4417]relationship.
[4419]In 1964, however, NOSENKO claimed that their relationship
[4420]was close, explained that it was TSYMSAL (again in Geneva at
[4421]the same time) wno gained NOSENKO's admission to the Legal
[4422]Residency, and said that he had twice gone to see TSYMBAL off
[4423]on train trips, once on 24 January when TSYMBAL wert to Bern
[4424]and again on 28 January when TSYMBAL left Lausanne for Rome.
[4425]NOSENKO told CIA he had been dealing with TSYMBAL since 1960
[4426]or 1961. At that time "We were looking over some candidates
[4427]for recruitment and came across some whose background would
[4428]have made them suitable for the Special (Illegals) Director-
[4429]ate...Then when we came (here) in 1962 for the Disarmament
[4430]Conference, I got to know him a little better - more from the
[4432]. human side. He seemed to take a liking to me for scme reason.
[4434]We had’ met in Moscow before, of course, but just in the hall.
[4435]or in the dining room. He used to say: ‘Stop in and see me,'
[4436]and I would answer: 'Well, it's kind of awkward for me to
[4438]- hang around the Special Directorate - what am I supposed to he
[4440]doing here?' He would say: 'Oh, comeon, stop in.' But I
[4442]' 4
[4444]TSYMBAL appeared in Geneva under .the last-name alias
[4445]"ROGOV" and was identified by NOSENKO as Chief of the
[4446]Illegals Directorate, KGB First Chief Directorate... Since
[4447]1956, TSYMBAL was known by CIA to be the true name for
[4448]ROGOV, and GOLITSYN reported in..1961. that TSYMBAL was
[4449]Chief of the Furopean Department, KGB First Chief
[4450]& Directorate.. .
[4452]cdot eee es eek ee SO
[4454]Peat heen wee
[4456]Dohen
[4458]ome Sein A eto
[4462]14-0000
[4464]‘*#** The BELITSKIY case is discussed in greater length in —
[4466]° fe***See Parts II.B. and II.C.2.c.
[4468] @dan't." NOSENKO also said that TSYMBAL had asked him several
[4470]times to transfer to the First Chief Directorate and had
[4472]‘ suggested that he might be assigned to the United States. In
[4473]fact, NOSENKO added, he had got into some difficzlty with 0. Me
[4475]GRIBANOV, Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, cyvirtue of |
[4476]TSYMBAL's efforts in 1962 to have NOSENKO transferred and his
[4477]leaving the impression with GKIBANOV that NOSENK® (who was still
[4478]in Geneva) nad agreed to this action,
[4480]Questioned in April 1964 about his association with TSYMBAL,
[4481]NOSENKC stated that he met TSYMBAL for the first time several
[4482]days before their departure for Geneva. Besides saying again
[4483]that he saw TSYMBAL almost daily at the Legal Residency and
[4484]that TSYMBAL's assistance enabled him to enter the Legal Resi-
[4485]dency, NOSENKO reported that in 1962 he went out with TSYMBAL
[4486]several times a week to eat lunch or dinner; sometimes they were
[4487]joined by I. S. MAYOROV,* sometimes by A. K. KISLOV (see next
[4488]section), and sumetimes the two ate alone. During the 1966
[4489]interrogations, NOSENKO said that, while he had seen TSYMBAL
[4490]on a daily kasis in 1962, he saw him only twice in 1964. once
[4491]when TSYMBAL travelled to Geneva from Bern for ore or two days
[4492]and later when NOSENKO saw TSYMBAL ‘off for Rome from Lausanne.
[4494]5. Association with Other Soviets
[4496]. ROSENKO said in 1962 that the other Soviets he saw most
[4497]often were A. K. KISLOV and Yu. I. GUK.** KISLOV, with NOSENKO
[4498]was one of the four members of the Soviet delegation staying
[4499]at the Hotel Ariane in Geneva, and was said to be head of the
[4500]American Section of TASS and a genuine correspondent.*** During
[4501]the 1962 meetings with CIA, NOSENKO reported that KISLOV was.
[4502]not a KGB officer and made no reference of his having any
[4503]affiliation with the KGB. NOSENKO did say, however, that he
[4504]had arranged for KISLOV's name to be given the KGB double
[4505]agent B. Ye. BELITSKIY**** to use as a notional source of
[4506]information on Soviet disarmament policy: BELITSKIY was to
[4507]pass this information to his CIA contacts. NOSENKO made
[4508]numerous references to drinking and carousing with KISLOV,
[4509]specifically with recard to a night in early June - when
[4510]NOSENKO was robbed of or squandered his operational funds,
[4511]which brought him to CIA - and on the night of 10 June 1962
[4512]when NOSENKC squandered 2000 Swiss frances (the money CIA had
[4513]given him) on wine and women.***** In giving NOSENKO the
[4514]money to defray these personal expenses, the CIA handlers
[4515]expressed to him their concern over the dangers to his security
[4516]arising from KISLOV's knowledge of this inexplicable source of _
[4517]income... NOSENKO replied that.there was ‘no need to be concerned’
[4519].since KISLOV was'."too drunk -ta-know what is going on," and - in:
[4520]any event he constituted no .threat. ‘
[4522]_F MAYOROV, according to NOSENKO, was visiting Geneva in
[4524]order to have operational meetings with agents.
[4526]ae Both KISLOV and GUK are mentioned in the discussion of
[4527]the “ANDREY" case (see Part VI.D.3.b.).  GUK was also a
[4528]friend of GOLITSYN, who reported extensively on GUK's
[4529]“<eareer in the KG3 including his service in the United
[4530]States. : : teeta
[4532]“eee In'October 1966 WOSENKO named’all the Soviets Living ‘at
[4534].the Ariane, without mentioning KISLOV. -
[4536]Part VI.D.6.
[4538]a meen
[4544]oioud eithliasd iterated dibs.
[4546]1 ee wlthee nadia babe be wos bene
[4549]14-0000
[4551]' in Moscow prior to his departure for Geneva in 1962 in order
[4553]very friendly. Por the first time, NCSENKO reported that .
[4554]KISLOV had been, a KSB operational contact while in the United
[4555]States, that he had been introduced to KISLOV by a KGB officer
[4557]to be able to exploit him during the Geneva Conference, and
[4558]that after returning from Geneva. KISLOV had been recruited as.
[4559]8 KGB agent on the basis of a favorable report NOSENKO had
[4560]prepared.
[4562]Often during the 1962 meetings NOSENKO spoke of his “big,
[4563]big friend” GUK, whom he described as the Deputy Legal Resident
[4564]in Geneva and the only "strong officer" in the KGB Legal Resi-
[4565]dency. He implied that his friendship with GUK, a former member
[4566]of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, was of longstanding. NOS-
[4567]ENKO related that he and GUK were together nearly every day in
[4568]Geneva. They often went out together to chat and have a few
[4569]Grinks, and as a consequence, NOSENKO was able to elicit infor-
[4570]mation about some of GUK's operations there. In 1964 NOSENKO
[4572]‘told CIA he found it difficult to obtain information on the
[4574]activities of the Geneva Legal Residency because he no longer:
[4575]had a good friend there like GUK, who had been reassigned to
[4576]KGB Headquarters. when questioned later in 1964 about his
[4577]relationship with GUK, NOSENKO said he had come to know GUK
[4578]well only during his 1962 IDY in Geneva,
[4580]6. Availability for Meetings with CIA
[4582]In speaking to David MARK on 6 June 1962, NOSENKO expressed
[4583]displeasure over MARK's insistence on deferring their luncheon
[4584](at which NOSENKO sought contact with American Intelligence)
[4585]until three days later. When the first meeting with CIA did
[4586]take place on 9 June 1962, NOSENKO stayed. for three hours,
[4587]and it was at his suggestion that another meeting was scheduled
[4588]for 11 June. This second meeting in 1962 lasted seven hours.
[4589]NOSENKO remained in Geneva until 15 June, and in the interim
[4590]he met CIA officers three more times for over seven hours
[4591]altogether. He offered to meet again on the day of his de-
[4592]parture, but this proposal was rejected as needlessly endan-
[4593]gering his security.
[4595]From the first 1964 meeting on 23 January to his defection
[4596]on 4 February, NOSENKO was met a total of 13 times, the sessions
[4597]lasting for five or six hours. He was able to come to the CIA
[4598]safehouse every day but one, and this opportunity was skipped
[4600]- at the request of the CIA handlers. By mutual consent, most
[4602]of the meetings started in the afternoon, but on two occasions
[4604]. NOSENKO arrived as early as 0930 hours; several meetings went
[4606]on until past midnight. . NOSENKO appeared to be totally at
[4607]the disposal of CIA, to be the master of his time, and to have
[4608]no other demands for his attention except for the visits to
[4610]the XGB Legal Residency, "looking in" on an occasional session
[4611]of the Disarmament Conference, and attendance at a reception.
[4613]- TOP SEgnEL
[4615]cent ye fee er gle ae pn eRe
[4617]maemrT 1964" ROSENKO Confirmed “that” he “had “spent mich “time with
[4618]KISLOV in Geneva two years before and that they had become
[4620]ad
[4622]pod
[4623]i
[4624]|
[4627]eta! ok
[4628]a
[4630]feeb Leas aie. He wy
[4632]sn tbecaiaaics
[4634]mnioulibeiesaiatiardtesidhi Hakan
[4636]ones, samme tec ede iMate
[4638]weslith ee Ret dilards a aeietathedbicad deioah anal ow 6
[4640]Shad
[4643]ORR Raye a
[4646]E. Timing of Defection
[4648]After telling CIA on 24 January 1964 cf his decision to
[4649]defect, NOSENKO at the same meeting concurred when-CIA gave
[4650]operational and administrative reasons for hin to stay in
[4651]‘place until the middle of February. During the week that: fol-
[4652]lowed, the date of the defection was moved up to 8 February
[4653]in accordance with NOSENKO's wishes and with his reports in-
[4654]dicating that less information of value would be forthcoming
[4655]than CIA had at first thought. On-4 February, however,
[4656]NOSENKO reported that he was being recalled to Moscow for a
[4657]conference cn tureign tourism in the USSR, and he therefore
[4658]placed himself in CIA custody on that date,* Details on
[4659]the timing of NOSENKO's defection are given in the following
[4660]paragraphs,
[4662]At the 24 January iceting tne CIA case officers agreed
[4663]in principle with NOSENKO's decisicn to defect,. NOSENKO ;
[4664]felt that it wculd be best for hia to disappear from Geneva
[4665]without a trace, leaving all his personal possessions be- i }
[4666]hind; he assured that CIA could exfiltrate hia from Switzer 3
[4667]land to the United States, lie wanted to carry out this 3
[4668]plan as soon as.possible, but the Cid officers encouraged :
[4669]him--and NOSENXO agreed--to remain in place for at least | |
[4670]three weeks more. The reasons given NOSENKO for this re-
[4671]quest were: |
[4674]t
[4676]- The desire to get information on the local KGB
[4678]. Legal Residency and the Soviet delegation to the Dis-
[4680]armament Conference while he still had access to this
[4681]information;
[4683]a cera een IME DIES an cro oe do
[4685]« The value of having NOSENKO present when O.M.
[4686]GRIBANOV made a visit to Geneva about 7 February a :
[4687]visit known to CIA only through NOSENKO;**
[4688]|
[4690]-e The potential value to be derived from NOSENKO's
[4691]in place spotting of CIA recruitment targets among the
[4692]Soviet representation in Geneva;
[4694]wetci Sic t Natae Satb Ria
[4696]- The necessity of making arrangements, accept-
[4697]able to NOSENKO, for his defection and resettlement.
[4699]- The events which followed NOSENKO's agreement to remain ; ,
[4700]in place for a short time longer are chronicled below: ;
[4701]. . 7” oles 5 ee
[4703]* The report of NOSENKO's recall to Moscow for the con-
[4704]ference on tourism is discussed further in Part II1.F,.
[4706]i
[4707]i
[4708]i
[4709]i
[4710]i
[4712]seg eT
[4714]GRIBANOV was in 1964 the Chief of the KGB Second Chief ,
[4715]Directorate and, according to NOSENKO and other sources, a
[4716]the sponsor cf NOSENKO's rapid rise in State Security. .. .
[4717]Several. GE@GNeT sources, have reported that GRIBANOV son be
[4718]was fired from the KGB as a result of NOSENKO's de-. ~ :
[4720]fection (Part III.1.). NOSENKO's relationship with
[4721]GRIBANOV is discussed in Part V.H.
[4726]-used its cwn batteries and generator, and therefore the
[4728]-he was told were enroute from Washington, He explained that
[4730]® From:2 to 10 February 1964 GRIBANOV was in Paris, where
[4732]"a See Part VI.D.7.c for further details on CHEREPANOV,
[4734]26 January 1964; In a three-and-a-half hour meeting,
[4735]NOSENKO emphasized that although he agreed that it was . oo aan
[4736]necessary and useful for him to remain in place until the —~ Do ;
[4737]GRIBANOV visit to Geneva, he wanted to defect as soon as
[4738]possible thereafter, h
[4740]not be coming to” Geneva after all, for KGB Chairman
[4741]SEMICHASTINYY was apparently reluctant to permit him to
[4742]travel beyond Vienna. NOSENKO said that he would probably
[4743]have definite information on GRIBANOV's trip by the end
[4745]of the week,
[4747]7
[4749]|
[4750]28 January 1964: NOSENKO reported that GRIBANOV might “ '
[4752]I
[4754]smtouibecdd a deanstsl tow.
[4756]alee,
[4758]30 January 1964; At the seventh meeting of the series, ; i
[4759]NOSENKO Said that there now appeared to be littie likeiihood
[4760]that GRIBANOV would visit Geneva or Paris.* Therefore, he ; i
[4761]wanted to defect right away, As reasons he cited the
[4762]emotional strain of any further delay and the fact.that he
[4763]and his Case officers were wasting their time working -
[4764]against the local KGB Legal Residency, which had no worth-
[4765]while or promising targets, Ile also felt that nothing of ;
[4766]value could be obtained from the Soviet delegation because i i
[4767]“TSARAPKIN himself doesn't know what he will say until he : 3
[4768]is told by Moscow the day before," The CIA handlers, however, : ‘
[4769]delayed the defection for one week by cbtaining NOSENKO's ! :
[4770]agreement to assist in an audio operation: CIA propcsed to
[4771]install listening devices in the offices of the KGB Legal
[4772]Residency, and NOSENKO said he would check certain physical
[4773]aspects of the delegation buildings. As the best time for
[4774]the defection, he suggested Saturday mcrning, 8 February,
[4775]because he probably would not be missed until the following
[4776]Monday. This date was tentatively scheduled, and NOSENKO
[4777]again repeated his desire simply to "disappear without a
[4778]trace." He also asked about exfiltration plans.
[4782]tee ND Sabet EON sha
[4784]sat b cmabe, sta haere dM nadots te +
[4786]51 January 1964: NOSENKO reported the results of his
[4787]reconnaissance of the KGB Legal Residency in cennection with
[4788]the proposed audio operation, which would invoive microphone
[4789]transmitters operating on a carrier current. He told CIA he
[4790]had accidentally overheard in the Residency that the building
[4792]scheme would not work. He repeated his willingness to remain-
[4793]in place until the arrival of the CHEREPANOV Papers™, which
[4795]he had felt pressure at the previous meeting because of an
[4797]imminent move by the delegation from its. hotel to the. Soviet
[4799]villa outside Geneva; at the villa his disappearance would
[4801]be noticed more quickly. This move, he had now learned, had ne
[4802]been postponed pending the arrival of a housekeeping officer
[4804]from Moscow. ; . . o
[4806]he was seen on the street with a Soviet identified by .
[4807]NOSENKO as a KGB counterintelligence officer... There is
[4808]no evidence. that he visited Switzerland,
[4810]PPI TR se teas
[4815]1 February 1964: At NOSENKGC's request, it was firmly
[4816]agreed that tne detection would take place in the rorning
[4817]of 8 February, NCSENKO said that he assumed that exfil-
[4818]-.tration would be by automobile to West Germany and thence
[4819]by plane to the United States.* His case officers .con-
[4820]firmed that this was correct.
[4822]3 February 1964: | .OSENKO reviewed tne CHEREPANOV materials, .
[4823]whe defection was stili scheduled for Saturday, 5 February.
[4825]- 4 February 1964; NOSENKO telephoned the Geneva safe-
[4827]Shouse from his hetel room in the carly afternocn and said:
[4829]u"I want to come now and not go pack,"' After arriving he
[4830]‘explained that when he dropped by the KGB Legai Residency fol-
[4831]-lowing the morning session of the bisarmament Conference,
[4833]he read a cable ordering him to return to Moscow inmediately
[4834]to prepare for a KGB conference on foreign tourism in the
[4835]Soviet Union,** The residency was arranging for a ticket for
[4836]NOSENKO to fly to Moscow via Paris the following day, and a
[4837]replacement was being readicé to assune NOSENKO's duties as
[4838]security officer for the Soviet Delegation in.Geneva; he was
[4839]not- told who the replacement would be, Before he had left
[4841]for Geneva in January, NUOSENKO then related, the Soviet Gevern-
[4843]“ment had been doliberating the question of expanding foreign
[4844]tourism in the USSR and had agreed to open a aunoer of new.
[4845]cities and tourist itineraries in this connection, SEMICHASTNYY
[4846]had now decided that it was tine to call a conference to
[4847]discuss new “tactics and strategies" for handling the in-
[4848]creased number of tourists expected. Since NOSENKO had been
[4849]placed in charge of the entire conference, he was directed
[4851]to leave at once to prepare a basic report on the KGS handling
[4852]of tourists; the report weuid be read to the conference either
[4853]by himself or by someone from the leadership of the KGB of
[4855]the Second Chief Directorate, OSENKU explained that he was
[4856]the only one who could do this jeb as Lt, Col. A.&. KOVALENKO,
[4857]the KG8 Headquarters Department senior officer, was a rel-
[4858]atively new man in this line of operations, having been
[4860]there only four or five years, perhaps less. NOSENKO also
[4861]told CIA that “by great coincidence’ he had learned, just be-
[4862]fore the cable arrived, he was being moved to the Soviet
[4863]yillga on the morning of 5 February, Ie had arranged for a
[4864]Soviet chauffeur to bring a car around at 6930 hours the
[4866]next morning for the move. His absence would be noted at
[4867]that time, and therefore "the sain thing is to cross the Swiss
[4868]border before morning.” NOSENKO felt, nowever, that there
[4869]would be ccnsiderabie confusion among the Soviets in Geneva
[4870]for a time following his disappearance, .and that there would
[4871]be no real concern until the evening.. To foster Soviet un-
[4872]certainty he had left his clothing lying around his hotel
[4874]house, NOSENKO estimated the first Soviet queries to Swiss
[4876]. ‘Reyes damn ne tstane darren me vee
[4878]room and had brought no personal effects to the CIA safe- er
[4880]4
[4881]3
[4882]t
[4883]4
[4884]4
[4885]t
[4887]oe tanta eileet fh
[4889]en meme
[4890]8
[4891]vicibainittl Biedet ealeliantta.
[4893]rate te nantes
[4895]tile ee
[4896](
[4899]14-0000
[4901]37.
[4902]authorities would probably be made. late on 5 February or early
[4903]on the 6th. . ;
[4905]- : NOSENKO was driven to Frankfurt the night of 4 February
[4907]> and remained in a safehouse there until 11 Pebruary, when press = - i
[4909]~ publicity about the defection and Soviet demands for an immedi- me |
[4911]poe ate interview with NOSENKO prompted the Director of Central In- — .. .
[4913]_ telligence to order that he be brought to Washington as soon as oT |
[4914]possible. He arrived in the evening of 12 February. . 4 |
[4916]hat
[4921]‘questioning on this point, NOSENKO voluntarily signed a
[4923]33.
[4924]F. The Recall Telegram
[4926]On arriving at tne safenouse at 1615 on 4 February 1564
[4927]NOSENKO reiated that on the preceding day, 3 February, he nad
[4928]been to the KGB “Legal Pesadency duriny the day and again in
[4929]the evening. ("e hud met with CTA from 1200 to 1800 hours
[4930]on 3 Pebruary.) He relatud t as of that time “averything
[4931]was quiet and peaceful," an: he received four personal letters
[4932]from Moscow. NOSENEG suid that on the morning of 4 Pebruary
[4933]he had again stoppc. in the Resiaeniey, but ":
[4934]going on." Later i Gu, after
[4935]a session of the bi: fer NOS
[4936]the coded teleyran aC veh Yaiv fron Moscow , i
[4937]ordering iim to cetucn liwodictely to Moscow te participate i
[4938]in the contere Louris’
[4940]LJ, how
[4942]ROL
[4944]zoates, however, what no cable
[4945]“Moscow to Geneva from the late
[4947]-afternoon.of 3 Februnry 19€4 until the morning of 5 February, 7 .
[4949]the day. after the cefection. (Two priority cables’ of: unusual
[4950]length, 247 and 297 groups, were transmitted to Geneva at -
[4951]“1901 and 1915 hours Greenwich time on 3 February; there “was
[4952]no traffic on 4 February; and the next méssage passed was a
[4954]‘routine cable originated by Moscow at 0755 hours on 5 February.) _ oo |
[4956]On 26 October 1966, while being questicned about the
[4957]circumstances of nis defecticn, NOSENKO was asxed about this
[4958]telegram which reculled him to Moscow. NOSENKC said that
[4959]there was no such telegram, am! that he had inveated it in
[4960]order to defect as soon as possible because he was nervous
[4961]and afraid his contacts with Anerican Intelligence 21n Geneva
[4962]might be noticed by Soviet autierities. After cetailed
[4964]statement with the fcllowing wording.
[4966]., "On .4..February 1964, L.told my CIA contact in
[4967]- Geneva that a telearam from KG3 Headquarters in Moscow —
[4969]‘TOP SERET
[4971]cement one th Shah adnan
[4977]sreamt ar enbensbilee td!
[4979]city inert end ts en Eh ae
[4982]14-0000
[4984]q
[4987]e
[4988]a> The hape—sein Sanbame tN
[4990]had been coceived in the KGS Residency in Geneva ~~"
[4991]recalling me irmediately to.Moscow, I said at che
[4992]time thet this telegram said that I was recalled —
[4993]to participate in a conference.to pler KGB activity
[4994]egainst tourists for the 1964 season. I meinteined
[4995]this story as fact throughout eubsequent interviews
[4996]and interrogationa by American euthorities in 1964
[4997]and 1955. No such telegram ever existed. Ho tele- -
[4998]grem was received in Geneva. I admit that the story
[4999]was a lie. I myself invented this telegram in order
[5000]to hasten my defection. I was nervous and efraid
[5001]that my contacts with American Intelligence might be
[5002]noticed," . ~
[5004]“yop SECKEL
[5006]2 nga iRTE nts oy ERAN 4 Rare eenamioasit at
[5008]tee le ra
[5010]cate inte te eames
[5012]ets ah lta 9
[5016]mab ante
[5019]14-00000
[5021]Soviet Official Reactions
[5022]‘whe Chief of the Soviet ..Deleqation:to the Dis--=  "- .
[5023]; armament Conference notified the Soviet Ambassador in Bern © LES
[5024]: shortly before noon on 6 February 1964 that NOSENKO had dis- eo
[5025]- appeared, correctly placing the date as 4 February; they - , , .
[5026]speculated that. he might have been “poisoned” or: injured in
[5027]a car accident.*. Two more days passed without Soviet authorities.
[5028]making any additional public or private statements on the subject.
[5029]Later events showing Soviet official reactions to NOSENKO's de-
[5030]fection are presented below in:chronological order:
[5032]8 February: A Soviet spokesman in’ Geneva reported to
[5033]Swiss police that NOSENKO, an "expert" temporarily assigned to
[5034]Geneva, had been missing for four days. se
[5036]wade sat
[5038]9 February: Evening news bro#dcasts in Geneva carried ;
[5039]reports attributed to both Soviet and Swiss sources that NOSENKO !
[5041]had disappeared. 2 ‘
[5043]cost Bias sale REE en,
[5045]10 February: Unidentified Soviet sources were quoted in {
[5046]the press as having said it was presumed that he had defected. :
[5048]: AU, S. Department of State press release was issued iden- ;
[5049]“tifying NOSENKO as a KGB officer and acknowledging his request _ : : i
[5050]. for political asylum in the United States, ; ; : 4
[5052]11 February: The Department of State was advised informally ; :
[5053]by Ampassador DOBRYNIN in Washington that a Soviet note to be : :
[5054]delivered later would ask how NOSENKO had left Switzerland, | ;
[5055]request his release, and demand an immediate interview with him.
[5057]gation to the Disarmament Conference, read a statement at a press
[5058]conference in which he strongly condemned the Swiss authorities
[5059]for permitting NOSENKO's "kidnapping" and for hindering efforts
[5060]to locate him. TSARAPKIN demanded that immediate steps be taken
[5061]to return NOSENKO to Soviet custody.
[5063]nin sue Sie estates Hho
[5065]17 February: S. K. TSARAPKIN, the head of the Soviet Dele- |
[5066]|
[5068]t
[5070]: At simultaneous press conferences in Sern and Geneva, the |
[5071]: Swiss rejected these accusations of non-cooperation and noted
[5073]! the Soviet delay in advising the police of NOSENKO's disappear- .
[5075]i ‘ance and Soviet failure to cooperate with Swiss authorities in
[5077]locating NOSENKO.
[5079]fa Wate coed
[5081]The Soviet note predicted by DOBRYNIN was delivered to
[5082];the State Department, and a noncommittal reply was given to
[5083]* Apparently no effort was made to notify Moscow immediately.
[5084]Special intelligence shows that no cable traffic was passed _ a be 3
[5085]from Geneva to Moscow from 1630 hours on 3 February until : ; 5
[5086]1900 hours on 7 February: at 1915 hours on the 7th, the
[5088]Geneva Residency transmitted a short top priority cable to
[5089]Moscow, Likewise, after one routine cable on 4 February, .
[5090]the Bern Residency sent no traffic to Moscow on 5 February.
[5091]Seven cables, at least four of which were of routine pre-
[5093]. eedence, were sent to Moscow.on 6 February; thereafter there :
[5094]was no traffic from Bern to Moscow until the early morning ., oan)
[5095]-of 10 February. . : : - 4
[5098]14-0000
[5100]‘ Soviet queries concerning the requested interview and the
[5102]means of NOSENKO's departure from Switzerland.
[5104]. The Swiss Enbassy asked for a meeting with NOSENKO in
[5105]order to obtain assurance that the defection had been volun-
[5106]tary. Arrangements were made to have NOSENKO meet with Swiss.
[5107]and Soviet representatives in Washington as scon as possible, -
[5109](NOSENKO arrived in Washington at 2130 hours this same
[5110]evening.)
[5112]13_ February: NOSENKO said he had no objection to talking
[5113]to the Swiss, but he would see the Soviets only if necessary.
[5115]14 February: In Moscow, Ambassador KOHLER was summoned
[5116]to the office of Soviet Foreign Minister GROMYKO, who read
[5117]him a «statement deploring the "evasive" reply of the State
[5119]- Department to Soviet inquiries in Washington and terming the
[5121]whole event of NOSENKO's disappearance a "gross provocation
[5122]by American Intelligance organs." GROMYKO repeated the demand
[5123]for NOSENKO's immediate release from American custody.
[5125]The Counselor of the Swiss Embassy, Jean-Louis NATURAL,
[5126]interviewed NOSENKO at the Washington offices of the U.S.
[5127]Immigration and Naturalization Service late in the afternoon.
[5128]The Soviet confrontation immediately afterwards was handled
[5129]by Minister Counselor G, M. KORNIENKO, second to Ambassador
[5130]DOBRYNIN at the Soviet Embassy, and Third Secretary V. F.
[5131]ISAKOV, a recent arrival in Washington. (ISAKOV had been a
[5132]member of the Soviet Delegation to the 1962 Disarmament
[5133]Conference in Geneva, where NOSENKO said he had first met. him.)
[5134]NOSENKO told both the Swiss and the Soviets that he had defected
[5135]of his own free will after careful consideration and that he
[5136]had no desire to return to the Soviet Union. In response to
[5137]KORNIENKO's questions, he specifically renounced his status and
[5138]rights as a Soviet citizen.
[5140]a
[5142]4
[5145]mere 1)
[5147]eeeetilenalbaiabin a eaintee
[5154]42.
[5156]H. Reactions of NOSENKO's Family
[5158]Two women who said they were the mother and wife of NOSENKO
[5159]called at the American Embassy in Moscow on five occasions
[5160]between 24 February and 23 March 1964,* and NOSENKO, who on
[5161]the basis of physical descriptions confirmed their identities,
[5162]said he had no doubt that the KGB had directed them to do this
[5163]in order to pressure him to return. The women expressed dis-
[5164]belief that NOSENKO had voluntarily betrayed his family and his
[5165]country. They sought a personal mceting with him in the United
[5166]States or erywhere else, submitted letters for him, and returned
[5167]to the Umbassy to ask whether he had replied; the younger Mrs.
[5168]NOSENKO explained that she required some definite statement in
[5169]writing from her husband so that she could plan her own future
[5170]and thac of the NOSENKO children.
[5172]NOSENKC proposed to respond to his family's letters by
[5173]writing two of his own, one wnich would be intended for KGB
[5174]consumption and the other for his wife alone. The first of
[5175]these would state NOSENKO's irrevocable decision to remain in
[5176]the United States and to sever ail ties with his family and
[5177]homeland. The second letter would be read by Mrs. NOSENKO in
[5178]the Embassy, left there, and not reported to the KGB; in it he
[5179]would express hope for a reunion, ask her to wait for him, and
[5180]tell her to indicate her willingness to join him in the West
[5181]by writing either "yes" or "no" on the letter itself. Although
[5182]NOSNEKO prepared both letters, only the first was cent to his
[5183]wife; it was mailed from Washington to the NOSENKO home in
[5184]Moscow on 7 April 1964.
[5186]From March 1964 nothing was heard from NOSENKO's relatives
[5187]until mid-1966, when Yuriy Dmitriyevich KOROLEV,** a Soviet
[5188]journalist, visited Paris and spoke with representatives of the
[5189]French magazine Paris Match. KOROLEV indicatec that he would —
[5191]¥~ Only once before had members of a defector’s family called
[5192]at a foreign embassy in Moscow. Following the defection of
[5193]Yuriy Vasilyevich KROTKOV in England in September 1963, his
[5194]wife appeared at the British Embassy to make inquiries about
[5195]him. KROTKOV, an admitted agent of the KGB Second Chief
[5196]Directorate, is believed by MI-5 and CIA to remain under
[5197]KGB control. o
[5199]** CIA records show that KOROLEV was employed at the Soviet
[5200]Pavilion of the Brussels World's Fair in 1958 as a photo-
[5201]correspondent for the Soviet publication Sputnik. He visited
[5202]Japan in 1963 and the United States in February-March 1965,
[5203]at the invitation of Life magazine, as a,photographer for
[5204]Novosti, a Soviet news agency. On the latter trip he was to
[5206]_ be accompanied; by Feliks Avramovich ROSENTAL, an interpreter
[5207]but no record of ROSENTAL's arrival is available. KOROLEV
[5209]is believed to be identical:waith Yuriy KOROLEV who, as of
[5210]1964, was employed part-time for the United Press Inter-
[5211]national correspondent in Moscow, Henry SHAPIRO. Both
[5213]NOSENKO and GOLITSYN have identified SHAPIRO as an agent
[5214]of the KGB Second Chief Directorate (see Part V.C.).
[5216]shednesall
[5219]14Q0000°
[5221]|
[5223]a re
[5225]‘Like to serve as a stringer for the French journal and proposed
[5226]‘that he begin with a story on the life of the family of a.
[5227]-"Sovtet secret agent." Ag KOROLEV spoke only broken French
[5229]and Enclish, the magazine staff did not seriously pursue the
[5230]matter at that time. ae
[5232]On 10 October 1966, however, KOROLEV again appeared at the . :
[5233]Paris Match offices, this time with one Feliks ROSENTAL who acted
[5234]as his - interpreter. He displayed a photo spread showing NOSENKO's
[5236]wife and family going about their daily affairs in Moscow, and
[5238]he submitted a-one-page document in English which gave a short. | an
[5240]account of NOSENKO's background. The document said in part:
[5241]"NOSENKO's family consists of a wife, 35, two daughters, 10 and
[5242]12, a mother and a younger brother. The family is not prose-
[5243]cuted (sic) but feel very badly about the incident {the defec-
[5244]tion). Very soon the wife will apply to the International
[5246]Lawyers Organization for a divorce and compensation. It is
[5247]possible that this case will be given much publicity. His wife
[5248]has not heard from him since he defected, but it is obvious
[5250]._ that he is still in the USA." The document, which was in no way
[5252]represented as coming from a Soviet Government source, also said
[5253]that additional photographs of .NOSENKO's family in Moscow could
[5255]' be obtained and that an interview with the family and with others
[5257]knowing NOSENKO could be arranged for a Paris Match correspon-
[5260]* According to information available to CIA, a divorce from
[5262]a defector from the Soviet Union, who is legally considered
[5263]to be an enemy of the state, is granted automatically upon
[5264]the wife's request. There is. no known precedent for either
[5265]Soviet-inspired publicity or divorce difficulties in any -
[5266]previous Soviet defection.
[5268]moe Lo: peat to Ren,
[5274]4
[5275]i
[5277]3
[5283]t Illi.)
[5285]‘(See Pa
[5287]yen ©
[5288]Sa TT
[5289]eyes at be tes
[5290]v
[5292]SETS MATCH
[5298]submitted to P
[5300]ographs
[5302]-
[5304]Pho
[5305]Subject 's' wife, elder dauyhter and younger daughter (circa 1965)
[5306]SECRET
[5308]pe ndovmie ate oe ene
[5310]T 1 statment nearer mena MEE gmat Oe
[5312]14-0000
[5318]Photogravh of Subject from Photograph of Subject from pass-
[5319]passport used for temporary port used on assignment to Geneva :
[5320]assignments to England in in 1964 (see Part III.B.2)
[5321]1957 and 1958 (see Part V.D.8&)
[5323]Subject (February 1964) “Subject's father, the Minister
[5324]of Shipbuilding (1953) ©
[5326]NT a
[5328]8
[5330]v
[5332]14-0000
[5334]lL. BY FRA constiive scurer
[5335]feouliive cource Lo ,
[5336]According to GPA, it was the “unanine ts
[5337]the KGB leadership and. of “KGB officers Quits wet eee
[5338]that “NOSENKO could do a tremendous amount of hern.co tae
[5339]KGB," and that this damage would be severe for “several
[5340]years to cone." As a direct result, QQ BeBe, new
[5341]rogulations were promulgated to increase kod opezational
[5342]security in Moscow and abroad.
[5344]In addition, the defection brought about the dismissal
[5345]from the KGB of persons close to NOSENKO and tue recall of
[5346]nany officers abroad -- GW ee es LR RE Baa Patan
[5347]©EEEM -- known to and presumably eompromised by NOSENKO, *
[5349]Five months after NOSENKO disappeared from Geneva, in.
[5350]July 1964, AR. Wpsaid that 15 KCb officers had already been
[5351]fired, Among them were GRIBANOV*4 and a nunoer of his depytics
[5353]*#* See Part V.H. regarding NOSENKO's relationship with
[5354]GRIBANOV.
[5356]4
[5362]samara be
[5364]ink Maa ENo i boabasol be
[5366]Label Sase
[5368]Reeeotecy Te
[5371]’ ineluding cne General BANUIK Since NOSENKO was GRIBANOV's
[5375]personal friend and protege, stated it had been decided
[5376]that GRIBANGY should have been aware of NOSFNKO's plans and
[5377]ultimately responsible. @@Mgi@reported further
[5379]Seiad tect that GRIBANCV had been cismissed from the KGB
[5380]and the Communigt Party immediately after the defection, ad-
[5381]ding that GRIBANOV had personally authorized NOSENXO's 1964
[5382]trip to Geneva, despite the fact that he had received a sum-
[5383]Mary statement of NOSENKO's capabilities and activities which
[5384]contained enough" compromising material" to prevent suc —_
[5385]trip under normal conditions.*" @& pe 1k reported.
[5386]having learned that GRIBANOV was the chicr of security at TO
[5387]a military plant outside Moscow and is considered 4 "“nothing."*** : x
[5388]Others dismissed from the KGB included GUK and Ye.A. TARABRPIN, : ;
[5389]Chief of the 2ritish Department, First Chief Directorate. ****
[5391]a
[5392]we ibbe bap ote abbas...
[5396]ptemk tan alee He
[5398]ae According to NOSENKO in 1965, it was BANNIKOV who sup-
[5399]ported his candidacy for the 1464 trip to Geneva; as
[5400]far as he knew, NOSENKO said, GRIBANOV was not involved.
[5401]Earlier, however, NOSENKO stated that his 1964 trip had
[5402]been approved by GRIBANOV.
[5404]. wt
[5405]pate etait the Laeame G tee
[5407]*** Reportedly GRIBANOV continued an operational contact with
[5408]a Western Ambassador in Moscow until as recently as the
[5409]autumn of 1964. This is a type of activity in which
[5410]GRIBANOV was often engaged while serving as Chief of the
[5411]Second Chief Directorate.
[5413]1
[5415]ce cdoameae teaiaeda tht ands
[5417]“as#* In 1962 NGSENKO told CIA: "“GRIBANOV and I are very friendly i
[5419]socially and we have often caroused together unofficially...
[5420]He is very friendly and we often go out drinking together."
[5421]. Under interrogation in April 1964 NOSENKO was asked speci-
[5422]__fically whether he had ever gone out socially with GRIBANOV
[5423]after working hours. He replied that he had done so on one
[5424]occasicn and that TARABRIN was present at the time. In
[5425]February 1965 NOSENKO was asked the same question and this
[5426]time answered that he had seen GRIBANOV three times socially,
[5427]; most recently in October or:November 1963; TARABRIN, he saidy,
[5428]was the only cther person present on these three occasions; ..
[5429]all three outings began as drinking. parties .in Moscow res- . -
[5430]taurants and the latter two ended at the homes cf girls
[5431]NOSENKO had been asked to procure. Although 3 indicated
[5432]that TARABRIN was Chief of the British Department at the
[5433]time he was fired, NOSENKO said he had held this position
[5434]only until 1963, when he became Deputy Chief of the newly
[5435]established Service No. 2 (Counterintelligence) of the
[5436]- First Chief Directorate. Do Cote ..
[5438]~ TOP SECRET
[5441]bt 7 '
[5442]a
[5445]i
[5446]4
[5447]i
[5448]H
[5449]i
[5451]+.
[5452]Ye
[5454]z. & source
[5456]At the time of NOSENKO's defection, ES@eum told CIA in
[5457]1964, he was in training for an illegals assignment in the
[5458]West, but these plans were cancelled partly because of the
[5459]KO case and partly for other reasons not specified to
[5460]; mm One of his handlers informed Gam RB that the
[5461]NOSENAO matter was very scricus, that the NOB was on a
[5462]“najor alert" as a result, vad that all missions had been
[5463]halted to make readjustments. °
[5465]source
[5467]In Geneva at the time of NOSENKO's defection, Seyiae
[5468]reported to CIA that just afterwards V.S.MEDVEDEV from tne
[5469]Exits Commission of the CPSU Central Committee* travelled to
[5470]Geneva to speak to the Soviets stationed there and to Soviet
[5471]d- legates to the Disarmament Conference. MNEDVEDEV under-
[5472]scoted the seriousness of the defection and urged greater
[5473]vigilance against such acts. CewEERB also reported that
[5474]the defection caused the recall cf Nina Ivanovna YEFREMEYEVA,
[5475]a KGB secretary in Geneva, and arcng the Sovicts there it was
[5476]Tumored that some 60 Soviet officials then stationed abroad
[5477]would be transferred from their assignments in consequazice of
[5478]the NOSENKO affair. V.A. POCHANKIN, a KGB cfficer with the
[5480]“Soviet representation in Geneva, speculated to
[5482]® that he had been completely exposed by NOSENKO and
[5483]efore would have to return to Moscow. Y.I, GUK , said
[5484]gues, who had known and reported on GUK for years, was
[5485]discharged from the KGB because he had recommended NOSENKO's
[5486]travel to Geneva, and according to one rumor, the chief of
[5487]the department where NOSENKO had been employed would lose his
[5488]job. (This would be A.G,KOVALENXO who, according to NOSENKO,
[5489]was Chief of the Tourist Department at the time of the de-
[5490]fection.) : 7
[5492]_* NEDVEDEV, a nGB ofticer formerly stationed in New York City,
[5494]to be one of those from the CPSU Central
[5496]was said SG% ;
[5497]Committee who conduct interviews with KGB personnel gotag
[5498]abroad. identified MEDVEDEV, then a Couns
[5499]selor at the Sovict Mission to the United ‘Nations, -as ‘the -
[5501]Communist Party organizer and possisly.a member of the KGB,
[5503]“but his role is not important and he works mainly. with
[5504]the Ministry. of Forcign Affairs." - re
[5506]oe
[5508]ater wee Le tk te
[5510]TOPSEGRET
[5512]ays swab gene abla Bete
[5514]ce lied int te oye Seb,
[5518]snes wetlilake coencalle.
[5520]tos Bad ayo an
[5521]muedulald dada Bidet: one
[5525]oo, _
[5526]- win Huai dba iciasie ih so
[5528]wench ceateatinareroens
[5531]14-0000
[5533]4. KGB Handlers of Agents
[5535]. icon of uKO's defection was scen in FGB's:
[5536]handling of the scoject of 7 i reccived fron
[5537]NOSENKO and Buvias usic agent.*® n 31 March 1964,
[5538]‘was questioned cy two of the KGB CFtic . possible sur-
[5539]veillince and was asked to provide passport photographs so
[5540]: that “escape” documents could be supplied to him ana his
[5541]At this same meeting, the KGB officers announced that
[5542]was being put on reserve status for an nspecified periou
[5543]told him that this decisicn had iezen mad2 about two months
[5544]earlier (i.e., about the time of NOSENKG's defecticn). At the
[5545]next meeting in November 1964, the Soviet hanclers admitted to :
[5546]. MBthat they had "some connection" with NOsSM . Al- 3
[5547]thouj:. sOSENKO probably could not identify s a KGB Lot Jot
[5548]agent, they said, there was a poss bility th ew “what : , 4
[5550]A reflect
[5552]G
[5554]we [the KGS) are doing in Canada.” 4
[5556]Also, in Paris, Sergeant Robert JCHNSON was told of = 4
[5558]NOSENKO's defection by his KGB case officer and was instructed :
[5560]to destroy anything which could identify him with Soviet Intel- .
[5562]ligence. Although the Soviet told JCANSON that there was. 7 :
[5564]nothing to worry about, he was evidently disturbed by the de~ . i 4
[5566]fection, JOHNSON said.** . at - j
[5568]i 4
[5570]j 4
[5572]. + an {
[5573]i
[5574]|
[5577]vated pRISA teatiiti e Lede See
[5579]BT Sas NOY
[5582]14-0000
[5584]Pe iWaewNON@KGB ASPECTS OP-NOSENKO'S~£
[5585]A.” Introduction
[5587]The biography of NOSENKO is built largely upon his ownwatate-
[5588]ments ‘to CIA, but certain portions of it have been substantiated
[5589](as well as contradicted) by other Soviet sources. Given first
[5590]below is the NOSENKO autobiography for the pericd preceeding his
[5591]entry into the #06, then follows a surmary of his statements
[5592]about his non-professional | life since becoming a KGB officer, and
[5593]‘Qtinally there is presented a review of what other sources have
[5594]said on these subjects... A separate section of this paper, Part V,
[5595]discusses NOSENKO's career in the KGB.
[5597]Be NOSENKO's Pre-KGB Autobiography
[5599]Although several other sources have since NOSENKO's defec~
[5600]tion furnished fragmentary information concerning NOSENKO's early.
[5601]personal history, NOSENKO himself has, of course, been the prin-
[5602]cipal source on this topic. He volunteered information during
[5603]the 1962 meetings, during debriefinges in early 1964, and under
[5604]interrogation in April 1964, in 1965, and in 1956.° These vari-
[5605]ous accounts are arranged in separate columns in the following
[5606]table, and. they are organized chronologically from NOSENKO's
[5607]birth to his alleged entry into the KGS. The first column in
[5608]the table cpntains statements which NOSENKO made during the June
[5609]1962 meetings in Geneva; these were taken from the transcripts
[5610]of the meetings and, for the most part, are in NCSENKO's own
[5611]words. The column headed "1964," derived from the April 1964
[5612]interrogation, reflects a number of changes in his story before
[5613]and during that interrogation. Most of the information given
[5615]' in the "1965" column was taken from discussions with NOSENKO,
[5617]mainly on his early years, by a CIA psychologist in May of that
[5618]year; however, material from the February 1965 interrogation
[5620]and from DERYABIN's interrogation in duly and August has also
[5621]been included when it was not covered in the psychologist's ques-
[5622]tioning: and when NOSENKO signed protocols certifying his state-
[5623]ments to be correct. The "April 1966" column is comprised of
[5624]remarks by NOSENKO in a signed autobicgraphy submitted to CIA
[5626]at that time. The final column presents the results of the.
[5627]October 1966 interrogation as they pertain to NOSENKO’s early
[5628]life. From column to column appear inconsisténeies and contra-
[5629]dictions with regard to dates and locations furnished by NOSENKO,
[5630]although in 1964, again in 1965, and most recently in October
[5631]1966 NOSENKO has said that he was "now" telling the truth. The
[5632]table shows where he has admitted having previously lied about
[5633]certain events and where he seems to have forgotten his earlier
[5634]statements to CIA about the occurrence of other events affecting
[5636]his life.
[5638]This tabulation of NOSENKO's autobiography concludes in
[5639]Part V.A., in which are quoted the various dates and circum-
[5640]stances concerning his entry into the KGB which NOSENKO has
[5641]given in 1962, 1964, 1965, and 1966.
[5643]crake tion The dere ead EE
[5645]d
[5647]we anand Ee Hey
[5649]4
[5650]al
[5651]4
[5654]June 1962.
[5656]- "I was born in
[5657]ay ikolayev, my father
[5658]worked as a senior
[5659]mechanic at:.a plant
[5661]fand took. evening
[5663]icourses. Then he
[5665]- graduated from the
[5666]SNikoleayev Ship-
[5668]"My father was
[5669]Bisent to Leningrad,
[5670]fto the Sudomekh
[5671]plant, a small
[5672]yplant in Lenin-
[5673]. grad. “He was at
[5674]qthe plant for half
[5675]fa year and then be-
[5676]came director.
[5677]lenis was 1936-1937.
[5678]Then he was sent -
[5679][te the Baltic
[5680]Shipyard in Lenin-
[5681]grad as Chief En-
[5682]igéneer., He was
[5683]-pthere.less than a
[5684]¢ year." .
[5686]1964
[5688]Born 30 October
[5689]1927 in Nikolayev,
[5690]Ukraine, USSR, where
[5691]he lived with family
[5692]until 1934.
[5694]building Institute.” |
[5696]In 1934, at age
[5697]six, entered the
[5698]“zero” (anlevoy)
[5699]class, equivalent
[5700]to kindérgarten,
[5701]in Nikolayev.
[5703].
[5705]Moved to Lenin-
[5706]grad in 1935,
[5707]where father was
[5708]first appointed
[5709]chief engineer and
[5710]later director of
[5711]Sudomekh, Lived
[5712]at several ad-
[5713]dresses and at-
[5714]tended several
[5715]schools. [Note:
[5716]Soviet press
[5717]stated elder NOs’
[5718]SENKO was chief
[5720]‘ engincer of “Se-
[5723]in Leningrad during
[5725]49.
[5726]1965
[5728]Born 1927 in Niko-
[5730]layev where father
[5731]wags a student at the
[5732]Shipbuilding Insti-
[5733]tute. Father from
[5734]simple peasant back-
[5735]ground, while
[5736]mother's parents
[5737]were nobility.
[5739](May)
[5741]Entered the
[5742]“vero” class in
[5743]Nikolayev in Septem=-
[5744]ber 1934, two months
[5745]before his seventh
[5747]birthday. (May)
[5749]Moved to Lenin-
[5750]grad, probably in
[5751]Spring of 1935, At-
[5752]tended three years
[5753]of school there,
[5754]completing First
[5755]Class in 1935-36,
[5756]Second Class in
[5757]1936-37, and Third
[5758]Class in 1937-38.°
[5759](May) 7
[5763]April 1966
[5765]"I, NOSENKO,
[5766]Yuriy, Ivanovich,
[5767]was born 30 Octo-
[5768]ber 1927 in Niko-
[5769]layev, an oblast
[5770]center in the
[5771]Ukrainian Repub~-
[5772]lic of Soviet
[5773]Russia." .
[5775]"In September
[5776]1934, in Niko-
[5777]layev, I entered
[5778]the ‘zero’ class.
[5779]My father was
[5780]already in. Lenin-
[5781]grad, where he
[5782]was working at
[5783]the Sudomekh
[5784]Shipyard."
[5786]“Shortly there-
[5787]after he [father]
[5788]found an apartment
[5789]and, interrupting
[5790]my studies, I
[5791]travelled to Lenin-
[5793]grad with my mother,
[5795]I did not begin
[5797]studies in the First
[5799]Class until Septen-
[5800]ber 1935 as there
[5801]were no 'zero'
[5803]classes in the Lenin-
[5805]grad schools. I
[5806]finished the Third
[5807]Class in Leningrad
[5808]in 1939."
[5810]layev, the son of
[5812]October 1966
[5813]Born 1927 in Niko- |
[5815]Ivan Isidorovicn
[5816]NOBENKO and Tamara
[5818]Georgievna NOSENKO. -
[5820]Lived in Leningrad
[5822]from 1935 to 1938.
[5824]eae a lea a
[5826]‘June 1962
[5828]— "In 1938 my
[5829]father was assigned
[5830]“t0 Moscow as Deputy
[5831]Peoples' Commissar.
[5832]I}was only.a little
[5833]‘boy. In 1939 he
[5834]was appointed
[5835].Peoples' Commiséar,
[5836]later Minister, of
[5837]6 Shipbuilding
[5838]Ihdustry and re-
[5839]mained such until
[5840]s death in 1956."
[5842]1964
[5844]50.
[5845]1965
[5849]- yector of Baltic
[5851]Shipyard in 1938.]
[5853]NOSENKO's father
[5855]was appointed Pirst
[5856]Deputy to the
[5857]Peoples! Commissar
[5858]of the Shipbuilding
[5859]Industry and then
[5861]_ became Commissar.
[5863]Family returned to
[5864]Moscow, and NOSENKO
[5865]entered 10-year
[5866]school located on
[5867]Ulitsa Bol'shaya
[5868]Polyanka. (Note:
[5869]Soviet press re-
[5870]ported that I.I.
[5871]NOSENKO became
[5872]Deputy Commissar in
[5873]1939 and Commissar
[5875]‘in 1940.)-
[5877]Completed the
[5878]Sixth Class at
[5879]School No. 585..
[5880]Went to Sochi:- with
[5881]parents for vaca-
[5882]tion and was there.
[5883]when war broke out.
[5884]Returned to Moscow
[5885]the next day.
[5887]In 1938 the elder
[5888]NOSENKO ‘was named
[5889]First Deputy to the
[5890]Peoples' Commissar
[5891]of Shipbuilding and
[5892]the: family returned
[5893]to Moscow. NOSENKO
[5894]entered a school on
[5895]Bol'shaya Polyanka.
[5896]lle completed the
[5897]Pourth Class in 1938-
[5898]1939 and the fifth
[5899]class in 1939-1940.
[5900](May)
[5902]NOSENKO finished
[5903]the Sixth Class at
[5904]the 10«year school
[5905]on Bol'shaya Pol-
[5906]yanka during the
[5907]1940-1941 academic
[5908]year. Then he
[5909]travelled on vaca-
[5910]tion to Sochi,
[5911]where the family
[5912]stayed at a “rest
[5913]home" of the Coun-
[5914]cil Ministers.
[5915]Learned of war's
[5916]outbreak on the _.
[5917]radio while there
[5919]April 1966
[5921]"In 1938 my
[5922]father was summoned
[5923]to Moscow and he be=-
[5924]gan to work in the
[5925]Peoples' Commissariat
[5926]of the Shipbuilding
[5927]Industry. Having
[5928]finished the Third
[5929]Class, I moved to
[5930]Moscow with my
[5931]mother at the end
[5932]of the summer.”
[5934]"In 1941 I completed
[5935]the Sixth Class at
[5936]the 585th middle
[5937]school and went to
[5938]Sochi for a vacation.
[5939]with my father and
[5940]mother. On 21 June,
[5941]during our vacation
[5942]in the south, the war
[5943]began and for this _
[5944]reagon my parents and
[5945]I returned to Moscow
[5946]the next day."
[5948]y
[5951]wee AH
[5953], "I studied
[5954]irst in a school
[5955]Of the Navy.
[5956]There I sailed
[5957]aboard boats and
[5958](No
[5959]Mate given.)
[5961]“June 1962
[5963]1964
[5965]Enrolled in
[5966]Moscow Special
[5967]Naval School, but
[5968]studies did not be-
[5969]gin in Moscow be-
[5970]cause cf the war
[5971]and immediate plans
[5972]to evacuate the
[5973]school. In Sep-
[5974]tember 1941 NOSEN~
[5975]KO spent one week
[5976]digging trenches
[5977]with a group from
[5978]the school, and cn.
[5979]10 October he
[5980]travelled with the
[5981]rest of the school
[5982]to Kuybyshev.
[5984]There ha began his
[5985]studies in the
[5986]Seventh Class.
[5988]In June 1942
[5989]completed the
[5990]Seventh Class at
[5991]the Moscow Special
[5992]Naval School in
[5993]Kuybyshev. Re-
[5994]turned to Moscow in
[5995]July with about
[5996]three other boys
[5997]from the school.
[5998]Prevailed on father
[5999]to allow transfer
[6000]to “real military
[6001]school" and enrolled
[6002]in the Leningrad
[6004]51.
[6005]1965
[6006]and returned to
[6008]Moscow the next day
[6009]by train. (May)
[6011]Enrolled in the
[6012]Moscow Special Naval
[6013]School which was
[6014]evacuated to-Kuyby~
[6015]shev, attended the
[6017]°1941-42 school year
[6019]in Kuybyshev.
[6020](May)
[6022]In summer 1942
[6023]returned from Kuy~
[6024]byshev to Moscow on
[6025]leave. While there
[6026]somehow learned
[6027]that Special Naval
[6028]School to ba moved
[6029]from Kuybyshev to
[6030]Achinsk, Siberia.
[6031]Did not want to go
[6032]so far away from
[6034]home, so enrolled in
[6035]Leningrad Naval Prep
[6036]School, Baku. Spent
[6038]April 1966
[6040]"In October 1941
[6041]my mother and I
[6042]were evacuated to
[6043]Chelyabinsk, where .
[6044]I completed the
[6045]Seventh Class in
[6046]June 1942." (Note:
[6047]NOSENKO here added
[6048]a year to his life
[6049]which he had not
[6050]mentioned earlier.
[6051]To accommodate this
[6052]change he subtracted
[6053]a year from the
[6054]time he spent at the
[6055]Naval Preparatory ~
[6056]School in Baku.
[6057]below. ] 7“
[6059]See
[6061]"I completed the
[6062]Seventh Class in
[6063]Chelyabinsk. In
[6064]the beginning of
[6065]the summer of 1942
[6066]I moved from Chel-
[6067]yabingk to Gor'kiy
[6068]and soon after this
[6069]returned to Moscow.
[6070]In Moscow I was ac@-
[6071]cepted in the Spe-
[6072]cial Naval School
[6073]which in August
[6074]1942 was evacuated
[6075]to Kuybyshev. There
[6077]October 1966
[6079]Went to Chelya- |
[6080]binsk from Moscow in ~_
[6081]1941, after the start «
[6082]of the war. :
[6084]Was in Gor'kiy for... -
[6085]a time in the summer ' .
[6086]of 1942.
[6088]. {gine 1962
[6090]1964
[6092]Naval Preparatory
[6093]School which had
[6094]been evacuated
[6096]from Leningrad to
[6097]Baku. Spent summer
[6098]vacation at home in
[6099]Moscow with parents.
[6101]After 3 1/2
[6102]months in Moscow,
[6103]left by train for
[6104]Baku with a group
[6105]of about 30 other
[6106]students in Octo-
[6107]ber,. The trip
[6108]lasted 14 days. .
[6109]Route not recalled.
[6110]Arriving in Baku
[6111]joined Prep School
[6112]and spent about
[6113]a month in “quaran-
[6114]tine." Then as-
[6115]signed to the Ninth
[6116]Training Company,
[6117]in the Third Course,
[6118]equivalent to the.
[6119]Eighth Class. —
[6120](Note: The loscow-
[6121]Rostov railroad
[6122]line was cut by the
[6123]Germans by this
[6124]time.
[6125]sible route at this
[6127]time would have been
[6129]The only pos-
[6131]$2.
[6132]1965
[6134]summer with parents
[6135]in Moscow. (May)
[6137]Went to Baku by
[6138]train in October.
[6139]Trip took two weeks.
[6140]Spent first four to
[6141]six months in Baku
[6142]in "quarantine,"
[6143]which was similar to
[6144]American bodtcamp.
[6146]‘Enrolled in the First
[6148]Course, equivalent
[6149]to the Eighth Class.
[6150](May)
[6152]a long and circuitous
[6154]one via Tashkent i
[6156]April 1966
[6158]I entered the Eighth
[6159]Class."
[6161]{In Kuybyshev; see
[6162]above entry.]
[6164]ne eet ts
[6166]October 1966
[6169]June 1962
[6171]OER R ET etn agter
[6173]1964
[6175]Took military
[6176]oath, [Note: NO-
[6177]SENKO was 15 years
[6178]old at this time,
[6179]by law too young to
[6180]take oath. This
[6181]point stressed in
[6182]April 1964 inter-
[6183]rogations.}
[6185]Completed Third
[6186]Course (Eighth
[6187]Class) in June
[6188]1943. Took no
[6189]vacation but spent
[6190]summer working at
[6191]the school in Baku.
[6192]In September 1943
[6193]began new school
[6194]year in the Second
[6195]Course, equivalent
[6196]to Ninth Class.
[6198]Along with 15 or
[6199]20 classmates, a
[6200]NOSENKO .submitted a
[6201]collective letter .
[6202]asking to be sant
[6204]sony cytes genet ane aepee
[6206]bee Sa
[6207]53.
[6208]1965
[6210]Took military
[6211]oath at end of
[6212]"quarantine" period.
[6213]Oath administered to
[6214]make boys feel a
[6216]‘part’ of service al-
[6218]though too young.
[6219]Oath taken between
[6221]days, i.e., after
[6222]October 1942 and be-
[6223]fore November 1943.
[6224]NOSENKO certain he
[6225]celebrated 15th
[6226]birthday in Baku in
[6227]1942. (May)
[6229]Completed First
[6230]Course in June and
[6231]spent summer of 1943
[6232]at school. Entered
[6233]Second Course at the
[6234]Naval Prep School in
[6235]Baku in September
[6236]1943. (May)
[6238].- Since 1942 NO=-
[6239]SENKO had had an
[6240]“obsession” about
[6241]getting into the
[6242]war. Students from
[6244]April 1966
[6246][Studying in
[6247]Kuybyshev., See
[6248]above entries.) _
[6250][Completed |
[6251]Eighth Class in
[6252]Kuybyshev.]
[6254]"During the summer
[6255]of 1943 I returned
[6256]to Moscow on vaca-
[6257]tion. The Special
[6258]Naval School was to
[6259]be evacuated from
[6260]Kuybyshev to
[6261]Achinsk and there-
[6262]fore, not wanting —
[6263]to go to Achinsk, I
[6264]enrolled in the
[6265]Naval Preparatory
[6266]School in Baku.
[6268]"While at the
[6269]Naval Prep School
[6270]in Baku, in Octo-
[6271]ber 1943, I joined
[6272]the KOMSOMOL.”
[6274]October 1966
[6276]"I took the mili-
[6277]tary oath in Baku.
[6278]time. This was in
[6279]1943,"
[6281]1
[6282]was 15 years old at the
[6284][No month: given; )}
[6286]TE Mie hema mene cea Minin ritgeeplnnien, SRS Dit ae Pate 28) oo. a
[6288]et ee etek Anemone paren
[6291]" June 1962
[6293]wemenere pean miatems 4yesé +
[6297]1964
[6299]to the front be-
[6300]cause they had
[6301]heard that stu~
[6302]dents at the Frunze
[6303]Higher Naval School
[6304]had gone. Request
[6305]caused an uproar
[6307]'. and investigations.
[6309]Permission denied.
[6311]Joined KOMSOMOL.:
[6313]- In January, to-
[6314]gether with class-
[6315]mate Yura RAD-
[6316]CHENKO, NOSENKO
[6317]went to the city
[6318]military commis-
[6319]sariat in Baku to
[6320]inquire about
[6321]joining a Marine
[6322]detachment. They
[6323]were turned down .
[6324]and thereupon ran
[6325]away from the Naval
[6326]Prep School. Tra-
[6327]velling by boxcar,
[6328]the two went to
[6329]Stantsiya Lazarev-
[6330]skaya via Tbilisi
[6331]and from there
[6332]walked to Tuapse in
[6333]search of the mili-
[6337]$4.
[6338]1965
[6340]April 1966
[6342]the Frunze Higher
[6343]Schuol had gone to
[6344]the front in 112
[6345]and some of the
[6346]older boys at the
[6347]Prep School went in
[6348]early 1943. Fired
[6349]up, NOSENKO and
[6350]about eight others
[6351]filed a petition to
[6352]be allowed to fight.
[6353](May)
[6355]{See above entry.)
[6357]"I studied in Baku
[6358]only for half the
[6360]‘After receiving a
[6361]scolding from school
[6362]authorities for school year because
[6363]having submitted the I ran away from:
[6364]petition, NOSENKO and school, home to Mos-
[6365]several other boys cow, in the begin-
[6366]began to plot to run ning of 19441"
[6367]away to the front.
[6369]When the time came in
[6370]early 1944 only one
[6372]other boy, RADCHENKO, .
[6373]would accompany him. '
[6374]The two slipped out
[6376]of school, made their
[6378]way to the railway.
[6379]station, and found a
[6380]freight train heading
[6381]toward Tuapse. On
[6382]arriving in Tuapse
[6384]they were arrested
[6386]almost immediately
[6388]ton Se pees
[6390]October 1966. |
[6392]The story about
[6394]' going to or toward
[6395], the front was a lie,
[6396]“NOSENKO said.
[6399]ne ise punter np yrmnnen + foe tyne agente gt rte
[6405]~ $5.
[6407]June 1962 1964 ‘ 1965 April 1966
[6409]tary front. Ar- at the station, sever-
[6411]riving in Tuapse, al days later they
[6413]they were arrested were returned to Baku
[6415]and were then re- where they managed to
[6417]turned ‘to Baku under escape. They then
[6419]guard. In Baku, travelled to Moscow
[6421]they managed to es- using: false documents .
[6422]cape again before and were arrested at - :
[6424]being returned to the:the train station on
[6425]Prep School. After arrival. (May)
[6426]hiding a few days at
[6428]the home of a girl~
[6430]friend, NOSENKO and
[6432]RADCHENKO travelled
[6434]to Moscow by train,
[6436]using forged docu-
[6438]mentation obtained
[6440]by a friend in the
[6442]Naval Prep Scheol.
[6444]They were arrested at
[6446]the Moscow Railroad
[6448]Station by military
[6450]police who had been
[6452]alerted by authori-
[6454]ties in Baku. ‘NO-
[6456]SENKO's father bailed :
[6457]him out. (Note: 1
[6458]Previous accounts ‘
[6459]varied widely. NO- '
[6460]SENKO originally said
[6462]he had participated
[6464]in the battle for
[6466]Novorossiysk with his
[6468]entire class from the
[6470]“Prunze Higher Naval
[6472]School." This battle
[6474]actually took place in
[6476]September 1942. Ona
[6478]later occasion, NOSENKO
[6482]i
[6484]Seg Te rewetapeete ro ceroengpe ere
[6486]1965
[6487]said that he and
[6491]bat near Tuapse.}
[6493]Took Ninth Class
[6494]exams after stucying
[6495]as an "external stu-~-
[6496]dent" at the Gorniy
[6497]Institute in Moscow.
[6498]Passed these and
[6499]through father's in-
[6500]fluence was trans~—
[6501]ferred back to the’
[6502]Naval Prep School,
[6503]which had just moved
[6504]back to Leningrad
[6505]from Baku. Tra-
[6506]velled to Leningrad
[6507]to join his class in
[6508]September.
[6510]Studies did not.
[6511]start at once. NO-
[6512]SENKO and others
[6513]lived in Narva and
[6514]worked in the woods.
[6516]56.
[6517]1965
[6519]Did not want to
[6520]return to Baku as
[6521]ashamed to face class-
[6522]mates after failure
[6523]to get’ to front. Re-
[6524]mained at home and
[6525]attended adult educa-
[6526]tion courses at Gorniy.
[6527]Institute and had
[6528]special tutors in math
[6529]and Russian grammar.
[6530]Finished Ninth Class
[6531]in spring or summer
[6532]and travelled in fall
[6533]to Leningrad to rejoin
[6534]class in Prep School.
[6535](May)
[6537]Arriving in Lenin~-
[6538]grad NOSENKO was as-
[6539]signed to a group
[6540]made up of stragglers
[6541]and was sent to the
[6542]forest near Lenin-
[6543]grad to cut wood for
[6544]the winter supply at
[6545]the school. Condi-
[6546]tions were terrible--
[6547]the work was hard and
[6548]the weather was cold,
[6549]camp, and miserable.
[6550](May)
[6552]April 1966
[6554]"In Moscow I
[6555]finished the Ninth
[6556]Class as an exter-
[6557]nal student at
[6558]Gorniy Institate
[6560]and at the end of
[6561]the summer of 1944...
[6562]was enrolled in the
[6563]Naval School in Len-
[6564]ingrad and travelled
[6565]there in the month
[6566]of August.”
[6568]—, i -
[6570](ee BENS aa
[6574]. S7. :
[6575]1964 1965 April 1966
[6576]Studies in Tenth About three or
[6578]Class of Naval Pre~ four days before the
[6579]paratory School com- boys were to return
[6580]manced in November to Leningrad a car.
[6581]1944. : was sant for NOSEN- .
[6582]KO. 52 returned to
[6583]Leningrad to stay
[6584]in the HBotol Astoria -
[6585]with his father who
[6586]was wisiting with a
[6587]' delegation. After
[6588]this he went back to
[6589]achool, somatime in
[6590]Movember. (May)
[6592]At the end of Somatime- in Febru- "In the be-
[6593]April 1945, NOSENKO ary or March, a fé- ginning of 1945 1
[6594]was chot in the Hand mele acquaantance of accidentally shet
[6595]at a party by a = an unknown Wavy offi- myself through the
[6596]jealous ycurg offi- cer-began to flirt hand and spent
[6597]cer and was hospita- with NOSENKO. The of-about a month re-
[6599]lized. In the ent. £icer became angry, cuperating in the |
[6601]suing investigation drew hia gun and shot Navy hospital.°
[6603]he protected the NOSENKO through the
[6605]real culprit by pre- hand. The officer
[6607]tending that he had was apolegetic, and
[6609]shot himself acci- NOSENXO promised ‘not
[6611]Gantally vhile to report the inci-e
[6613]Cleaning @ gun. He dent. Tho wound
[6615]maver aayw the offi grew worse, however,
[6617]cer again, ; and NOSENXO was forced
[6619]' to enter tha hospital.
[6621]Ha told tho docter
[6622]that be had accident-
[6623]ally shot ‘himself with
[6624]@ souveniec: gun. He
[6625]was hoapitalized for
[6626]about three weeks.
[6627](May)
[6629]ipdmre cee miaens  one aninenaettemmaeace RRQETR ATER ASET net ~evtyengme ame
[6631]NOSENKO shot him-
[6632]self through the hand. -
[6634]cicental and was not
[6635]an attempt to avoid
[6637]‘military duty. [Notes
[6639]NOSENKO made this state=
[6641]- ment in response to
[6643]a direct question. The.
[6645]question was based on
[6646]& report from epaa
[6648]> source CQVETE that
[6650]NOSENKO shot hinsel£
[6652]to avoid being sent to
[6653]the front while at=-
[6654]tending a “naval college
[6655]in Leningrad in 1942,°]
[6658]1944
[6660]June 1962
[6662]"I finished the
[6663]Naval School, then
[6664]was in the Navy. I
[6665]fought," (boyeval--
[6666]presumably in World
[6667]War II). “In 1945
[6668]I was demobilized."
[6670]perl
[6672]1964
[6674]While in the hos-
[6676]plied for release
[6677]from military ser-
[6678]vice. This was as-
[6679]sisted by father's
[6680]friends. After
[6681]release from the
[6682]hospital he did not
[6683]want to return to
[6684]school. He called
[6685]his father and then
[6686]spent a week with
[6687]friends of the
[6688]family in Leningrad
[6689]before getting a
[6690]room in a dormitory
[6691]at the Leningrad
[6692]Shipbuilding Tekh-
[6693]nikum. Despite
[6694]failure to return to
[6695]the Naval Prep
[6696]School, NOSENKO was
[6697]erédited with satis-~
[6698]factory completion
[6699]of the school year
[6700](Tenth Class). In
[6701]June he passed the
[6702]exams for the Second
[6703]Course at the Ship~
[6704]building Tekhnikum.
[6705]He then went to the
[6706]District Military
[6707]Commissariat and was
[6708]demobilized. He
[6709]received his mili-
[6710]tary reserve regis-
[6711]tration and a certi-
[6712]ficate of satisfac-
[6713]tory completion of
[6715]tee
[6717]Stn ersten ERVIN TnnETE RSE ot
[6719]In the hospital
[6720]NOSENKO decided he
[6721]could not return to
[6722]school as he was
[6723]asha:ed of the type
[6724]of girls he had been
[6725]with the night of
[6726]the accident and
[6727]could not stand the
[6728]thought of being
[6729]made an example of
[6730]by the school KOMSO-
[6731]MOL organization.
[6733]He left the hospital
[6734]in civilian clothes
[6735]and stayed with a
[6736]friend of his father.
[6737]He obtained a state-
[6738]ment: that he had
[6739]attended the Naval
[6740]Prep School, which
[6741]was just a report of
[6742]his courses and an
[6743]average of his marks
[6744]up to that time. Ags
[6745]the son of a minister
[6746]it was then easy for
[6747]him to enter the
[6748]Shipbuilding Tekh-
[6749]nikum whefe, with
[6750]special tutoring, he
[6751]was able to complete
[6752]the Tenth Class in
[6753]the summer. (May)
[6755]April 1966
[6757]"After this (hand
[6759]shooting] incident I.
[6761]id notcuwant to go
[6762]back to the school
[6763]and began to study
[6764]at the Shipbuilding
[6765]Tekhnikum in Lenin-
[6766]grad, in the Second
[6767]Course, in order to
[6768]complete the Tenth
[6769]Class. In May or
[6771]June 1945, with the _
[6772]help of the Director -
[6774]of the Tekhnikum, I
[6775]received documenta-
[6776]tion certifying that
[6777]I had completed the
[6778]Second Course which
[6779]made it possible fpr
[6780]me to enter the In-
[6782]national Relations]
[6783]and I returned to my
[6784]parents in Moscow."
[6786]SORE Maa ORT
[6788]eeemmemremen cm ae nate ry
[6790]ae 4
[6795]59, |
[6796]June 1962 1964 1965 April 1966
[6798]ten year's schooling.
[6799](Note: A biographi-.
[6800]cal statement was
[6801]drawn up on the basis
[6802]of NOSENKO's state-
[6804]February 1964 and ap- so
[6805]proved by NCSENKO as
[6806]correct in February ; :
[6807]1964. This state . a - Be
[6808]ment said that he com- - : ne
[6809]pleted his 10-ear ed- . ; pps te
[6810]ugation at the Baku . ao uo
[6811]school in the spring
[6812]of 1943 and thereby anf
[6813]became eligible to 4
[6814]enter.a higher edu- . _ .
[6815]cational institution. ; Bo, fos 4
[6817], . . ca
[6819]as
[6821]a Oar
[6823]sae beset 4
[6827]From 1943 to 1°45, the
[6829]statement continucd,
[6831]NOSENBO attended the
[6833]Frunze Higher Naval
[6835]School (a counterpart
[6837]of Anmapolis). After
[6839]three years there,
[6841]he decided to leave
[6843]the Navy, was demobi-
[6845]lized. and entered the
[6847]Institute of Interna- . '
[6848]tional Relations. In
[6849]October 1966, NOSENKO
[6850]said he had lied about
[6851]attending Frunze Academy.]
[6853]Ts CHUB A alan AISLE. A ne ee
[6855]“After the war I NOSENKO decided NOSENKO decided he *In July 1945 I
[6857]went to study at he did not want to would like a career entered the Insti-
[6858]the Inatitute of study further at the in the foreign ser- tute of International
[6859]International Rela- Shipbuilding Tekhni- vice ard returned to Relations." :
[6860]tions...In 1945 I kum and returned to Moscow, where he
[6862]‘was demobilized. Moscow where he passed the entrance
[6867]emma yvagmeretteseser ems oe stamnummarcig eam eae on
[6869]Been bate eben te nee canine tee oo a4
[6871]be ze ; . 4 ‘ 60.
[6872]‘ a June 1962. 1964 1965 April 1966
[6874]fT ; passed the entrance exams for the IIR.
[6875]q examinations for (May)
[6877]the Institute of
[6879]International Re-
[6881]lations (IIR). The
[6883]exam consisted only
[6885]of a composition,
[6887]dictation, and a
[6889]pe oo Ean Dp ane ee GRA EEO MS RTA, amas iT Ig UNE RAED BAG A weed
[6891]interview. . : en
[6893]Travelled to Travelled to East oy ,
[6894]Germany with his Germany in August 1945 _ x
[6895]father who was with father's delega- : *
[6896]leading a delega- tion. Given tempo- ,
[6897]tion. For the pur- rary commission as oy :
[6898]pose of the trip senior lieutenant for an — ort
[6899]‘only, NOSENKO was the trip. Continued to : =
[6900]issued a uniform wear uniform on return, . ow :
[6901]and documents ‘even to classes at the er
[6902]showing him to be a institute. Entered in- 3
[6903]senior lieutenant. stitute on return from an
[6905]When he returned to Germany and chose to oa
[6906]Moscow he continued specialize in English . ee Te
[6907]to pass himself off language and U.S. area oo : ;
[6908]as an officer who studies for reasons he . : : ae .
[6909]had seen combat in could not recall. (May) ot ee
[6910]the war and eventu-
[6912]ally got into ee
[6913]trouble at the in- , : ao
[6914]stitute because of : ao Loa
[6915]this. Began studies ; : Pa tas
[6916]in Faculty of In- oo pe
[6917]ternational Law and > : oo. (ee
[6918]English language in : soe
[6919]September.
[6921]fe tee hee te
[6923]Ep eel ache e recut te
[6926]ot cits ar ane
[6928]June 1962
[6932]about .his present
[6933]“wife.] "This is my.
[6934]second wife. I was
[6935]married before... I
[6936]cannot say that I
[6938]61.
[6940]1964.
[6942]Completed first
[6943]year at Institute
[6944]of International
[6945]Relations.
[6947]Began second
[6948]year at IIR.
[6950]Completed second
[6951]year at IIR. Com-
[6952]missioned junior
[6953]lieutenant in Re-
[6954]serves.
[6956]Began third year
[6957]at IIR. .
[6959]While studying
[6960]at the IIR NOSENKO
[6961]was dating Augus-
[6962]tina Konstantinovna
[6963]TELEGINA, the
[6964]daughter of a lieu-
[6965]tenant general.
[6967]1965
[6969]With help of tem-
[6970]porary documents used
[6971]for the trip to Ger-
[6972]many, NOSENKO managed
[6973]to exempt himself from
[6974]compulsory military
[6975]training during his
[6976]first two years at IIR.
[6977]When it was found that
[6978]his claims of active
[6979]duty were false, he
[6980]was commissioned a jun-
[6981]ior lieutenant in the
[6982]Reserves along with
[6983]his classmates. (May)
[6985]In third year at
[6986]IIR NOSENKO began to
[6987]specialize in Inter-
[6988]national law. (May)
[6990]"I was a friend
[6991]and companion of
[6992]TELEGINA for some
[6993]months before her
[6995]in connection with
[6996]STALIN's campaign
[6998]April 1966
[7000]“While I was
[7001]studying at the In-
[7002]stitute, at the end
[7003]I married -
[7004]father was arrested Augustina Konstanti-
[7005]novna TELEGINA, who
[7006]was born in 1929"
[7008]of 1947,
[7010]~ In 1947. commis- .
[7011]sioned a juntor lieu-
[7012]tenant in the re-
[7013]serves. Diu not under=
[7014]go any military train- |
[7015]ing. After complet- —
[7016]ing second year at
[7017]the Institute, began
[7018]to do military trans-
[7019]lations to avoid
[7020]military service.
[7026]June 1962
[7028]can
[7030]1964
[7032]TELEGIN was ar~
[7033]rested by STALIN,
[7034]and NOSENKO married
[7035]Augustina soon
[7036]afterwards,-in about
[7037]November 1947,
[7039]| loved her a great
[7040]# deal,..The war had
[7041]( just ended. I
[7043]| wanted peace, I
[7045]f wanted a guiet
[7047]4 corner. I wanted
[7048]| someone to look
[7049]after, me...and
[7051]L 80 we became ac=
[7053]| quainted. We
[7055]. aw each other for
[7056]about two weeks.
[7058]pF Let's get married.
[7059]| XY married her.
[7060]That’s ail." [Hotes
[7062]NOSENKQ: did not +
[7063]| date this marriage a
[7064]¥ other than to im- .
[7066]fF ply it was richt
[7068]after the war;
[7070]4 it is included
[7072]| here to place it
[7074]in the context of
[7076]‘% later statements.)
[7078]Broke off mar-~
[7080]', rdage after several
[7081]months when he found
[7082]his wife in flax
[7083]rante delicto with
[7084]fer brother. The
[7085]two were separated,
[7087]§ who is lying with but not divorced, at
[7089]% my wife? Her older this time. {[Note:
[7091]} brother. well, I. As with other dates
[7093]' slammed the door, connected with the
[7094]left, and did not go TELEGINA marriage,
[7096]>~ aback. Never went... NOSENKO has been im-
[7097]_back. That was all, precise here: in
[7099]"One Monday...at
[7100]10 o'clock [ZX came
[7101]home early from
[7102]work). Suddenly I
[7103]heard--I. approached
[7104]on tietoe--What is
[7105]this? In my bed,
[7107]-
[7111]Oa ange eRe aye ote Leryn tee
[7113]ver aad Roa .
[7115]‘os 2965~- April 1966
[7116]against assoclates
[7118]of Marshall ZiHUKOV.
[7120]However, we never
[7122]planned to marry.
[7124]After the arrest,
[7126]however, I decided
[7128]to marry her in .
[7130]order to show my :
[7131]strength of char-
[7132]acter. I cannot ree
[7133]member the date of ©
[7134]the marriage, which
[7135]was my first, I
[7136]think that it hap-
[7137]pened in 1947, but
[7138]do not know what
[7139]season or how long
[7140]after the arrest
[7142]of TELEGIN." (In-
[7143]terrogation Pro-
[7144]tecol Signed in
[7146]' February 1965.)
[7148]“Ona morning-- "I lived with my
[7149]I cannot remember the first wife until 1949,°
[7150]date or season, but
[7151]it was in the first : . .
[7152]half of 1948--I came
[7153]early and unexpected
[7154]from my studies at
[7155]the Institute of In-
[7156]ternation Relations +
[7157]te the apartment of my
[7158]wife's mother, where .
[7160]Y sometimes met my
[7162]wife, and surprised
[7163]her in sexual inter-
[7167]NN oe Mae ici Ee Nae eer ye
[7169]because she was
[7170]pregnant at the time,"
[7171](Protocol signed
[7172]February 1965.)
[7174]err
[7176]eT EE . SES SRE In SEE new enn ennpnieeie Sree ane mem ape 1S yoy ommaneee ROUUnEE as ETD sot 7 P
[7177]. St |
[7178]. so 6 3 . .
[7179]June 1962 1964 1965 April 1966 : October 1966 hy,
[7180]* Bye bye...Well, April 1964 he said course with her |
[7181]gf you can imagine my on another occa- brother. I walked
[7182]F horror.” [Note: sion that he found out without comment. : —_ |
[7183]Portions of the his wife with her The ‘next day I re- 7 . :
[7184]¢ tape of this con- brother sometime turned to our apart- . ayy i
[7185]? versation are un- prior to June 1947.] ment where my wife “ - ne
[7186]k readable, It is and I continued to :
[7187]& clearly implied that live together, al- : a : |
[7188]% this scene took though our relation- : / i
[7189]* place at NOSENKO's ship was strained. : . :
[7190]fown home.) . I stayed with her _ |
[7191]. : t
[7193]|
[7194]_
[7195]Completed third : f
[7196]ae year at IIR. ‘ a
[7197]. i
[7198]“A child was . - " Girl with hare
[7199]8} born who might lip and cleft a
[7200]. § have been mine and "palate born to TELE~ :
[7201]f who might not have . GINA. NOSENKO de- 4
[7202]A been mine. God cided deformity was a
[7203]¥ knows. There was ; due to her incest- :
[7204]-€ still no child when uous relationship :
[7205]f I left. Well, I with her brother.
[7206]£ helped out. I Subsequently gave
[7207]; gent money. That's his wife a little . ,
[7208]all. But I didn't . money to help sup- . :
[7209]f see either her or | port the child, but :
[7210]the child." (Note: never considered it Q
[7211]& NOSENKO provided no his. Marriage a
[7212]® date for the above.) : cooled still further, e
[7214]but NOSNEKO continued
[7215]to live in the apart-
[7216]ment. (May)
[7219]MRR EE Ieneet tortie ter eng eee any nate = . : ie:
[7220]serneefoenarmesre dino e ; e _ascomtiggeniieemengainonce
[7222]- June 1962 1964 1965 April 1966 = ‘October 1966 .
[7223]Began fourth year : 7
[7224]at IIR.
[7225]Completed fourth i a
[7226]year at IIR. : i
[7227]: a.
[7228]Successfuliy de- . ; ; fe ce
[7229]fended his thesis on : 7 . . a ; mos “ @ a
[7230]the subject of “Dip- : yo .: . Lo. r ) a
[7231]lomatic Immunity." ; et a, : ae uA OF
[7232]Completed English . NOSENKO was through Dts FE Se a
[7233]language studies. .with courses at the ; a
[7234]. Institute in January . _ th a) Ube.
[7235]1950 and had already : . 7 _ 2 EES ot
[7236]defended his thesis rn Ms Looe, Fat tee
[7237]on “Diplomatic Imnu~ : ; vos a aa Poa
[7239]nity." The last
[7240]half-year at the In-
[7241]stitute was relatively |
[7242]free because the
[7243]students were given
[7244]time to prepare for
[7246]the state exams which
[7247]were requifed for
[7248]graduation. (May)
[7250]In March or . Before taking his "In the spring The Placement Com-
[7251]April 1950 NOSENKO final state exams, of 1950 before mission sent NOSENKO
[7252]was interviewed by NOSENKO went before the beginning of to the MGB where he was
[7253]the assignments the placement board. the state examina- told he was not a .
[7254]commission of the Here they talked tions a personnel suitable candidate. The
[7255]IIR and was tenta- about his possible placement commis- xeason was for "little
[7256]tively assigned to assignments and al- sion was created at things. TI was drunk
[7257]the GRU. Ip May though no definite the Institute and several times, only an
[7259]1950 he went to the decision was reached I declared to it my average student, etc.” ,
[7261]ks tee
[7264]June 1962
[7266]Fadl oat thet atta
[7268]1964,
[7270]CRU Pevsonnel De-
[7271]partment for an
[7272]interview with
[7273]Colonel KALOSHIN
[7275]on the instructions
[7276]of the chief of
[7278]the "secret unit"
[7279]at the IIR.
[7281]SOON a tere ae rete
[7283]65.
[7284]1965
[7286]it was suggested he
[7287]go into the-Navy.
[7288]After this, but
[7289]before the state
[7290]exams, NOSENKO
[7291]visited a special
[7292]section of the Navy
[7293]Ministry to give
[7294]them special docu-
[7295]ments for a secu-
[7296]rity check. Al-
[7297]though it was not
[7298]stated, NOSENKO be-
[7299]lieved he was slated
[7300]for Navy Intelli-
[7301]gence. (May)
[7303]Sete ayes et cetacpernnne
[7305]cba le le en ne Nee oo
[7307]April 1966
[7309]wish to work in
[7310]some sort of mili-
[7311]tary organization.
[7312]Soon thereafter
[7314]the chief. of. the
[7315]Institute's svecial
[7316]section gave me a -
[7317]telephone number
[7318]and told me to call
[7319]it, The number was
[7320]K-6...and I rea-
[7321]lized that the MGB
[7322]was interested
[7324]in me since these
[7325]numbers belonged ~
[7326]to the MGB. I
[7327]called the aumber
[7328]and was told to
[7329]come to the MGB...
[7330](at the MGB] con-
[7331]cered my bio-
[7332]graphy and my
[7333]knowledye of the
[7334]English language..
[7335]Nothing was said
[7337]about where.it was..
[7339]intended .for.me to
[7340]work....Later the
[7342]' chief of the In-
[7344]stitute's special
[7346]section told.me my..
[7347]qualifications were ..;
[7350]the MGB."
[7352]_ interrogators would
[7354]October 1966 -
[7356]NOSENKO said he did
[7357]not mention this
[7358]earlier because his
[7360]not have believed that — ne
[7361]the MGB first turned §° -:. 0°
[7362]him down and they later
[7363]accented him in 1953.
[7365]_ ay
[7367]| .
[7369]e]
[7371]te
[7373]ean te
[7374]a
[7376]Ei
[7379]j
[7382]: °Y finishod
[7383]the Institute of
[7384]‘International Ree
[7385]lations in 1950,
[7386]after this 7
[7388]_jworked in the GRU
[7389]‘of the Navy.°
[7391]1964
[7393]Took stata
[7394]exams for comple-
[7395]tion of the Insti-
[7396]tute. Passed
[7397]three of them but
[7398]¥lunked HMarxisn-
[7399]Leninism. Advissd
[7400]GRU and was told to
[7401]call_back when he
[7402]had. his XYIR diplo-
[7403]ma. He was ailowed
[7405]. to take the Navy
[7407]physical exam,
[7408]which lasted three
[7409]days.
[7411]Passed exams. on
[7412]second try and re-
[7413]ceived diploma of
[7414]completion of IYR.
[7415]Contacted Colonel
[7416]KALOSHIN of GRU Per-
[7418]Genet: eat
[7419]f
[7421]| ESSE rene
[7422]4 68,
[7424]1965
[7426]Aiter failing
[7427]the stata exam
[7428]NOSENKO had someone
[7429]in his father's
[7430]office call the
[7431]GRU to see what he
[7432]should do. It
[7433]turrsd out that the
[7434]security check
[7435]would take a long’
[7436]time and NOSENKO
[7437]was told to check
[7438]back after he had
[7439]paesed the exam.
[7440](May)
[7442]NOSENKO checked
[7443]back with GRU Per-
[7444]sonnel after passing
[7445](May)
[7447]his exams.
[7449]Octoer 1966
[7451]April 1966
[7453]"During the _
[7454]summer of 1950, -
[7455]while the stats
[7456]exams were under-
[7457]way, I began to.
[7458]process for entry : , a .
[7459]into the Navy GRU. : : ee
[7460]My processing . sy : oe
[7461]took place through a . fae
[7462]Colcnel KALOSHIN, 7 _ *
[7463]the Chief of the
[7464]GRU Personnel De-
[7465]partment. Up
[7466]until March 1951
[7467]I repeatedly
[7468]visited the Minise
[7469]try of the Navy...
[7470]I ¢illed out
[7471]guestionairas in
[7472]duplicate, wrote
[7473]two autobiographies
[7474]end submitted
[7475]copies of my diplo~
[7476]ma.® [Note: NO-
[7477]SENKO in his 1966
[7478]autobiography did
[7479]not mention
[7480]having failed the
[7481]exam in Marxiem-
[7482]Leniniasn.)
[7484]nagtgiisehe ee ne
[7486]Dp Bees ao
[7488]"Z submitted
[7489]caples of my diplo-
[7490]ma to GRU Personnel.®
[7491]{See above entry.]
[7492]NOSENKO processing
[7493]for GRU entry.
[7497]67.
[7498]‘Sane 1962 1964 1965 April 1966
[7500]Giploma, trans-
[7501]cript of grades,
[7502]and other neces-
[7503]sary papers.
[7504](Note: Previously
[7505]in 1964 NOSENKO
[7506]stated that he
[7507]graduated from the sot ;
[7508]v0 IIR, which at that :
[7509]- time was a four-
[7510]year course, in
[7511]mid-1949 and "just _
[7512]loafed around" for . .
[7513]a year. He later ~ a
[7514]changed the com~
[7515]pletion date to |
[7516]late 1949 or early oo
[7517]1950. Then he ° . i : “a
[7518]_changed this to : |
[7519]| |
[7522]aN atidape ter
[7524]Sete Sat wenn
[7526]say that he failed .
[7527]exams in 1949 and _ Y
[7528]had been forced to :
[7529]wait an entire
[7531]year before he
[7533]could retake them 4
[7534]in 1950, Finally oe,
[7535]he gave the version ;
[7537]above. ]
[7539]“When they of- Entered on ac- In the autumn of {See abové entries.]
[7540]fered me [assign- tive duty with the 1950 received orders Still processing for =
[7541]ments in} Moscow, Navy on 17-19 Sep- transferring him GRU entry. :
[7543]% Leningrad and the' tember 1950, when from the Reserve to x
[7544]# Far East I took he recuived orders active duty. Offered z
[7545]a the Far East so. transferring him a choice of duty r
[7546]@ that nobody could from a junior lieu- posts, NOSENKO chose : j
[7547]F say that Yuriy NO- tenant in the Re- to go to the Far East . i
[7549]%.SENKO took advan-.. serves to a junior “in order to prove he
[7551]on oO 7 “. oe -
[7552]3 a er eee . RS kL) ate, ke ST oe od
[7557]June 1962
[7559]position.”
[7561]in
[7564]"I worked
[7565]éthe field of
[7566]formation in the.
[7568]3Far Fast, in the
[7569]city of Sovetskaya
[7570]4Gavan...in the ;
[7571]ifield of informa-
[7573]fcept, etc. All
[7574]fyour movements,
[7575]fwhen you moved
[7576][vessels to Che-
[7577]amul'po, Korea,
[7578]$the Korean opera-
[7579]ztion...we knew all
[7580]ithe ships there be-
[7581]fcause you talked on
[7582]- 4the air. You
[7583]}transmitted. We
[7584]knew each division,
[7585]fits name, its num-
[7587]Be ert Sele a
[7588]wee
[7590]1964
[7592]age of his father's lieutenant on ac-
[7594]tive duty. Re-
[7595]ceived orders to
[7596]the Intelligence
[7597]Staff of the Seventh
[7598]Far East Fleet,
[7599](Note: In an eare-
[7600]lier version, NO-
[7601]SENKO said he en-
[7602]-fered the GRU in
[7603]1949, having fin-
[7604]ished the Insti-
[7605]tute of Interna-
[7606]tional Relations
[7607]the same year.]
[7609]On approxi-
[7610]“mately 1 October
[7611]1950 NOSENKO left
[7612]Moscow by train for
[7613]the Far East. The
[7615]“trip to Bukhta -
[7617]Postovaya (near
[7618]Sovetskaya Gavan),
[7619]where his unit was
[7620]stationed, took nina
[7621]or ten days. Ag-
[7622]signed to work in
[7623]the Information
[7624]Section under Cap-
[7625]tain Second Rank
[7626]KHAYTOV. Duties
[7627]included transla-
[7628]tions from Ameri-
[7629]can Naval litera-
[7630]ture and making
[7631]summaries of
[7633]American Navy OB in
[7635]pee uemenigge ee barge one Stee eee
[7637]“ages
[7638]“7 68,
[7639]1965
[7641]os
[7643]was now ready to
[7644]make a man of him-
[7645]self...in the country
[7646]God forgot." (May)
[7648]Arriving at his
[7649]duty station NO~-
[7650]SENKO was assigned
[7651]to the Information
[7652]Section. He liked
[7653]the work and did a
[7654]good job despite
[7655]the rigorous con-
[7656]ditions. During his
[7657]seevice here he rem
[7658]ceived special
[7659]mention as an out=
[7660]standing officer.
[7661]There were 300 to
[7662]350 intercept opera-
[7663]tors there. NO-
[7664]SENKO and other
[7665]officers analyzed
[7666]the take as well as
[7667]information received
[7668]from Sakhalin and
[7669]Vladivostok. (May)
[7671]April 1966
[7673][See above entries]
[7674]Still processing
[7675]for GRU entry.
[7677]a
[7679]oo Dap OUD tbe Ete,
[7681]Gctober 1966
[7683]2 Ae ne scar meen stamee ony tae a:
[7686] grengemmione er
[7688]. June. 1962 1964
[7690]Far East. There was
[7691]a unit involved in
[7692]radio intercept of
[7693]American Naval tar~
[7694]gets in Korean area,
[7695]but NOSENKO was not
[7696]personally concerned
[7697]with this work.
[7700]this to Moscow. I
[7701]don't know what
[7703]‘was done with this
[7705]’ dhformation after
[7707]is. So, we were
[7708]eoncerned with
[7710]Aformation.”
[7712]Promoted to the
[7713]rank of lieutenant.
[7715]After about seven
[7716]months in the Far
[7720]April 1966
[7724]"On 12 March 1951
[7725]two orders were is-
[7727]East, NOSENKO was pro-sued by the Naval
[7729]moted to lieutenant.
[7730]This was April 1951.
[7731]Normally one is pro-
[7732]moted from junior
[7733]lieutenant to lieu-
[7734]tenant only after a
[7735]year's service in
[7736]grade. This can be
[7737]reduced
[7738]in the Far East.
[7739](3 May)
[7741]to six months
[7743]Ministry; one con-
[7744]cerning my enlistment
[7745]in the Navy and the
[7746]other assigning me
[7748]as a translator to
[7749]the Intelligence
[7751]Unit of the Seventh
[7752]Fleet (Military Unit
[7753]70176). The following
[7754]day at KALOSHIN's
[7755]instructions I re-
[7756]ported to the Moscow
[7757]City Military Com-
[7758]mission where 1 was.
[7759]issued my passport
[7760]and my voyen bilet.
[7761]The Commission also
[7762]issved me temporary
[7763]duty orders and tra-
[7764]vel documents. On
[7766]16 or 17 March I left
[7767]Moscow for my duty.
[7768]post. I arrived at.
[7769]Bukhta Postavaya at
[7770]the end of March and
[7772].was made to obtain |
[7774];, October 1966
[7776]"I lied when I: :
[7777]said I started in the ~
[7778]GRU in-1950. It was.
[7779]really March 1951.°
[7780](Note: . No effort
[7782]a reason for this
[7784]lie or to question. :
[7785]NOSENKO on its im-
[7786]plications for his
[7787]earlier statements
[7789]about promotions, ete, )
[7790]"I was on active een
[7791]duty in Sovetskaya —~ us
[7792]Gavan~--Bukhta Posto-.- |
[7793]vaya from 1951 to :
[7794]1953."
[7796]. 438038 ddd
[7798]7
[7799]7
[7801]a.
[7803]June 1962
[7805]- mail to divorce TELE- planning to divorce
[7807]mepteags
[7809]ane alec Trae ree
[7811]1964 April 1966
[7812]began work in the
[7813]Information De=-
[7814]partment of the
[7815]Intelligence Unit
[7816]of the Seventh
[7817]Fleet.
[7819]NOSENKO involved
[7820]in apprentice work
[7821]in the Agent-Intel-
[7822]ligence Section at
[7823]Bukhta Postovaya.
[7824]This involved going
[7825]out to sea on sub-
[7826]chasers to pick up
[7827]and drop off, and
[7828]conducting meetings
[7829]with agents from
[7830]Hokkaido and Sak-
[7831]halin. NOSENKO did
[7832]not actually meet
[7833]agents, but was
[7834]merely along to learn
[7835]how they were picked
[7836]up at sea. :
[7838]Filed action by NOSENKO was
[7840]GINA in Moscow court his wife before he '
[7841]and published inten- left Moscow but did
[7842]tion notice in a local not start proceedings
[7843]Sovetskaya Gavan news— because he was afraid
[7844]paper in January or she would bring
[7845]February. charges against him
[7846]in the KOMSOMOL. .
[7847]Sometime in late 1951
[7848]or early 1952.he
[7849]published his notice
[7852]June 1962
[7854]1964
[7856]Left Bukhta
[7857]Postovaya and re-
[7858]turned to Moscow
[7859]on leave. Arrived
[7860]at the end of
[7861]April and reported
[7862]to KALCSHIN. Re-
[7863]quested transfer
[7864]from the Far East.
[7866]cet tne ten a AA
[7868]71.
[7869]1965
[7871]of intent in a local
[7872]newspaper and for-
[7874]- warded the neces-
[7876]sary papers to Mos-
[7877]cow. (May)
[7879]On 1 May 1952
[7880]NOSENKO's father was
[7881]to observe his 50th
[7882]birthday. NOSENKO's
[7883]two-ycar tour in the
[7884]Far East would not
[7885]be up until October
[7886]or November 1952, and
[7887]he was not entitled ©
[7888]to any leave until
[7889]it was ended. How=-
[7890]ever, his section
[7891]chief was very under-
[7892]standing and ar-
[7893]ranged for him to
[7894]leave in April’ so
[7895]that he could be in
[7896]Moscow for the birth-
[7897]day celebration.
[7898]NOSENKO flew to
[7899]Khabarovsk where he
[7900]had a “two-day
[7901]drunken orgy" with
[7902]another Naval offi-
[7903]cer. He then con-
[7904]tinued on to Moscow
[7905]in time for the May
[7906]Day and birthday
[7907]celebrations. The
[7908]next day he reported
[7909]to the Navy Ministry
[7910]and was told to re=-
[7914]stone
[7916]“At the end of
[7917]April 1952 I left
[7918]Sovetskaya Gavan on
[7919]leave, arriving in
[7920]Moscow on 28 April,
[7922]Wap at ae war eamntn te
[7924]SRP ERNE agora ha a TEE ca a
[7926]. June 1962
[7928]fbr worked in the
[7929]ag Fast until 1952,
[7930]hén suddenly I
[7932]Fell i11. In the
[7933]Pag East. It was
[7934]this way. Then I
[7936]arrived in Moscow,
[7937]I went to the
[7938]doctor. They began
[7940]Clear lungs,
[7941]lutely. They
[7942]examined ‘me one day,
[7943]t days, three
[7944]days. Clear, abso-
[7945]ltely clear. Then
[7946]bY accident, right
[7947]vooen my collar-
[7949]ne, a small, small,
[7950]rhund spot was.
[7954]found and it turned
[7955]out to be on a
[7956]biocod vessel. It
[7957]thrned out to be at
[7958]avery early stage.
[7959]At that time they
[7960]had just discovered
[7962]streptomycin and I
[7964]was confined at
[7965]the Hertzen Sani-
[7966]torium near Mos-
[7967]w, - was there
[7968]lor two months. I
[7969]alt fine but they
[7971]1964
[7973]NOSENKS was on
[7974]leave during May
[7975]and June 1952 and
[7976]lived during this
[7977]time at the home ©
[7978]of his parents at
[7979]No. 4 Ulitsa
[7980]Gor'kogo in Mos-
[7981]cow. He received
[7982]one month leave
[7983]for his 1951 ser-
[7984]vice in the Far
[7985]East and the
[7986]other for his
[7987]1982 service
[7988]there. [Note:
[7989]NOSENKO did not
[7990]mention having had
[7991]tuberculosis
[7992]during any inter~-
[7993]rogations or state~
[7994]ments in 1964. Ac-
[7995]cording to his 1966
[7996]statements, he
[7997]spent only one
[7998]year, March 1951 to
[7999]April 1952, in the
[8000]Far East.)
[8002]1 ape samen sty apmeneg ntti
[8009]1965
[8011]turn at the end of
[8012]his leave for reas~
[8013]signment. (May)
[8015]NOSENKO was on
[8016]leave during May
[8017]and June. No de-
[8018]cision had been .
[8019]yeached with re-
[8020]gard to whether
[8021]he would return to
[8022]Sovetskaya Gavan
[8023]or not and he was
[8024]"at the disposal"
[8025]ef the” Naval Minis-
[8026]try during this
[8027]period. After the
[8028]leave, NOSENKO
[8029]waited another
[8030]month until his as-
[8031]signment was de~
[8032]cided upon. (May)
[8033][Note: NOSENKO did
[8034]not, mention having
[8035]been hospitalized
[8036]in this period.)
[8038]cr neremmepneenr amg 0
[8040]April 1966
[8042]"while on leave
[8043]I became il] with
[8044]tuberculosis and
[8045]spent almost two
[8046]months in a sani-
[8047]torium near Mos~
[8048]cow." [Notes In
[8049]another statement,
[8050]written a week
[8051]earlier, NOSENKO
[8052]said that in
[8053]Sovetskaya Gavan
[8054]“adrunkeness and
[8055]the severe condi-
[8056]tions had their
[8057]effect on my
[8058]health and led to
[8059]an outbreak of
[8060]tuberculosis in
[8061]May 1952.")
[8063]NOSENKO confirmed
[8064]that he was at the
[8065]Herzen Sanitorium
[8066]during this period
[8067]and said that as a i
[8068]result of his illness —
[8070]-he was "coughing
[8072]up a half a glass of
[8073]blood. at a time."
[8074]His treatment con-
[8075]gisted of shots of
[8076]streptomycin.
[8079]fyuly-
[8081]ai
[8083]June 1962
[8084]gave me shots of
[8085]streptomycin every
[8086]hour for two months
[8087]and stopped this
[8088]disease at once.
[8089]After this I had
[8090]check-ups for five.
[8091]years, was car=-
[8092]ried on their books
[8093]until 1957. It was
[8094]nothing."
[8096]"They offered
[8097]me the opportunity
[8098]to study in the
[8101]tic Academy. I
[8103]oO aT eT Cesare Ee + biahoa y rape eee ce
[8105]1964
[8107]went and took a look
[8109]‘at the courses they
[8110]had to offer--Marx-
[8111]ism, Philosophy,
[8112]History, and so on.
[8113]Well, what did I
[8114]need this for? I
[8115]already knew this.
[8116]I said: .'No, I
[8117]won't go.'"
[8119]"after my ill-
[8120]ness and after the
[8121]Far East I received
[8122]orders to the Bal-
[8123]tic. On the Bal-
[8124]tic there is a city
[8125]which was formerly
[8127]a Te re .
[8131]Following his
[8132]regular leave
[8133]NOSENKO was or-
[8134]dered by the Navy
[8135]to proceéd to
[8136]Berlin and Rostok,
[8137]but refused to go
[8139]. During the summer
[8140]of 1952 NOSENKO was
[8141]offered assignments
[8142]to the Military-
[8143]Diplomatic Academy,
[8144]to a special Navy
[8145]espionage school,
[8146]and to Germany, but
[8147]turned all of them
[8148]down for various
[8149]reasons. He re~
[8150]jected the opvortun-
[8151]ity to attend the
[8152]Military-Diplomatic
[8153]Academy because. he
[8154]had already had
[8155]96 per cent of the
[8156]courses in the In-
[8157]stitute. (May)
[8159]NOSENKO received
[8161]orders to Sovetsk and month of July the
[8163]"During the
[8165]NOSENKO was offered
[8166]an opportunity to
[8167]attend the Military~
[8168]Diplomatic Academy,
[8170]‘but did not want to go..
[8172]Besides, he failed the.
[8173]physical examinations.
[8174]for entrance when sugar
[8175]was discovered in his
[8176]faeces. NOSENKO drank
[8177]too much. Lo
[8179]NOSENKO. was shown
[8180]& map of. Kalinin-
[8182]arrived there in late Personnel Departe.: {gradskaya Oblast ~~
[8184]August or early Sep-
[8185]tember 1952. In
[8187]Sovetsk NOSENKO was
[8188]assigned a political
[8190]“7 wee
[8192]ment of the GRU
[8193]reached a deci~
[8194]sion concerning
[8196]the place of my
[8198]showing Primorsk to be
[8199]where he said Sovetsk:
[8200]should be located.
[8202]NOSENKO continued to ee
[8205]June 1962
[8207]the German city of
[8208]Pillau and is now
[8209]called Primorsk."
[8210]There NOSENKO was
[8211]involved in the
[8212]formation of
[8213]*“agent-observation
[8214]‘posts." Suitable
[8215]dandidates were
[8217]among the crews of
[8218]‘ghips. They were
[8219]-then formed into
[8220]groups of three
[8221]men each and were
[8222]trained in radio-
[8223]@peration, daemon -
[8224]ation, etc.
[8225]fter this the
[8226]roups split up
[8227]d.their mem-.
[8229]j@parate ways. In
[8230]ase of war the
[8231]groups were to be
[8232]eformed and sent
[8233]ehind enemy lines
[8234]In sabotase and
[8236]gions. [Note:
[8237]The former German
[8239]SEER em maT re"
[8241]1964
[8243]74.
[8244]-. 1965
[8246]when he learned that officer's job and
[8248]the Naval Intelli-
[8249]gence Points (MRP's)
[8250]in Germany were
[8251]closing down
[8253]and that his final
[8254]assignment was not
[8255]definite. He then
[8256]tocx more leave
[8257](unauthorized)
[8259]until about 29 July
[8261],when he lefc for
[8263]y, gence Point
[8265]Bérts and ren
[8266]ported for duty to
[8267]the Intelligence
[8268]Staff of the Fourth
[8269]Baltic Fleet,
[8271]He was assigned to
[8272]a Naval Intelli-
[8276]set up in Sovetsi,
[8277]a Saat town nest
[8278]Baltaysk. There he
[8279]prepared area
[8280]training materials
[8281]for and carried
[8282]supplies to agents,
[8284]but did not actually
[8286]deal with or train
[8287]them directly.
[8288]{[Note: Previously
[8290]helped train
[8291]sailors for wartime
[8292]agent missions.
[8294]His main task was
[8295]to prepare the
[8296]training plan for
[8297]the sailors, to
[8298]instruct them in
[8299]subjects such as
[8300]"The Foreign Policy
[8301]of the USSR," and
[8302]generally to see to
[8303]their needs. {May)
[8305]April 1966
[8307]further assignment
[8308]and I was ordered
[8309]to the Naval Intel-
[8310]ligence Point of
[8311]the Fourth Baltic
[8312]Flect Intell igenca
[8313]Unit in Sovetsk,
[8314]Kaliningradskaya
[8315]Oblast. Sovetsk
[8317]is located before
[8318]you go out on the.
[8319]spit of land where ~
[8320]Baltiysk (Pillau)
[8321]stands. I arrived
[8322]aun Sovetsk in
[8323]August 1952 and
[8324]began. to work in
[8325]the Naval Intelli-
[8326]gence Unit as a
[8327]senior translator.
[8328]Shortly before
[8330]my arrival the In-
[8331]telligence Point
[8332]had been moved
[8334]from Rostok, in
[8335]Germany, to Sovetsk.
[8336](Note: It was
[8337]clear from NOSENKO's
[8338]earlier descrip-
[8339]tions that the
[8340]"“Sovetsk” which .NO-
[8341]SENKO described is,
[8343]r
[8345]October 1966
[8347]say that he was as-
[8348]signed to Sovetsk
[8349]in the summer of
[8350]1952. He was asked
[8351]why, as a son of a
[8352]minister and a& a
[8354]patient under treat=-
[8356]ment for tuberculo-
[8357]sis, he was not as-
[8358]signed to the Black
[8359]Sea or somewhere
[8360]else with a healthy
[8361]climate. NOSENKO
[8362]explained that there
[8364]“were no positions
[8366]available "elsewhere.®
[8368]in fact, Primorsk,
[8369]a smali village on
[8370]the coast. The
[8371]only place called
[8372]Sovetsk in Kalinin-
[8373]gradskaya Oblast
[8375]Gity of Pillay is during the April
[8377]now called Baltiysk,, 1964 interrogations
[8379]fot Primorsk; the NOSENKO said that he
[8381]a : : 2
[8382]atter is a small had received training
[8384]Fy near Moscow and was
[8385]then sent to Rostok
[8386]and Sassnitz before
[8388]wee
[8391]1400000 2
[8393]& No date given
[8394]for divorce.
[8396]1964
[8398]going to Bal-
[8399]tiysk/Sovetsk. He
[8400]then said this was
[8402]"a lie.and gave
[8404]the version above.
[8405]The reason for the
[8406]lie, NOSENKO said,
[8407]was that he knew
[8408]we “woulda't be-
[8409]lieve the truth"--
[8410]that he had suc-
[8411]cessfully refused
[8412]the assignment to
[8413]Germany. ]
[8415]In mid-August or
[8416]September 1952 NO-—
[8418]-SENKO returned to
[8420]Moscow from-the Bal-
[8421]tic for 7 to 10
[8422]days to complete
[8423]divorce proceedings
[8424]he had initiated
[8426]in the Far East.
[8427]This was not
[8428]counted as leave,
[8429]but as official
[8430]business, He then
[8431]returned to Sov-
[8432]etsk.
[8434]soca Spleen one permet
[8436]78.
[8437]19658
[8439]"Sometime ufter my
[8440]return to Moscow from
[8441]Sovetskaya Gavan, I
[8442]carried through with
[8443]my intention to
[8444]divorce. My di-
[8445]vorce was noted in
[8446]my Officer's Book-
[8447]let and nowhere
[8448]else. I turned this
[8449]document in to the
[8450]KGB Personnel office
[8451]when I began my KGB
[8452]Service and since
[8453]then have had_no re-
[8454]cord of the divorce.
[8455]I continued to pay
[8456]alimony to Augustina.
[8457]TELEGINA (one quarter
[8458]of my salary) until
[8459]I left the USSR in
[8461]April 1966
[8463]is about 40 kilo-
[8464]meters inland, and
[8465]NOSENKO himself ..
[8466]had saiduin 1962...
[8467]that he served.in
[8468]Primorsk. Pe
[8470]1
[8473]June 1962
[8475]‘(See next entry.]
[8477]"In the be-
[8479]the beginning.
[8481]3 ginning of 1953
[8482]3 - I came to Moscow
[8484]. [fron Primorsk]..
[8485]S was '53, in
[8487]1964
[8489]NOSENKO did
[8490]not like his work
[8491]in Sovets
[8492]and wanted to re-
[8493]turn to Moscow to
[8494]arrange for a
[8495]transfer. He
[8496]asked for annual
[8497]leave which the
[8498]unit commander re-
[8499]fused to give him
[8500]as he had none due.
[8501]NOSENKO thereupon
[8502]went to Admiral
[8503]GOLOVKO in Bal-
[8504]tiysk and with his
[8505]help obtained
[8506]leave because of
[8507]the elder NOSENKO's
[8508]influential po-
[8509]sition. NOSENKO
[8510]then returned to
[8511]Moscow shortly
[8512]before New Year's.
[8514]"TI arrived back
[8515]in Mescow in Decem-
[8516]ber 1952, just be-
[8517]fore New Year's. I
[8518]had vacation for
[8519]the month of Janu-
[8521]76.
[8522]1905
[8524]1964. She kept the
[8526]April 1966
[8528]name NOSENKO even after
[8530]she remarried.”
[8532](Note:
[8534]This is placed here for
[8536]comparisoh with his
[8537]1964 statement. ]*
[8539]NOSENKO disliked
[8540]his job as a politi-
[8541]cal officer and was
[8542]disdainful of the
[8544]low educational level
[8546]of those he was
[8548]called upon to train,
[8550]as. well as of the
[8551]"whale stupid" pro-
[8552]gram. He remained
[8553]in Sovetsk only
[8555]until ecember 1952,
[8556]when he obtained
[8557]leave to spend the
[8558]holidays with his
[8559]parents in Moscow.
[8560](May)
[8562]In January NOSEN-
[8563]KO and his parents
[8564]went to visit the
[8565]family of General
[8566]KOBULOV at KOBULOV's
[8567]dacha in Usov. NO-
[8569]"T remained in
[8570]Sovetsk @ Short time
[8571]and returned to Mos-
[8572]cow at the end of
[8573]the year [1952] witb
[8574]the aim of changing
[8575]my place of work...
[8576]While in Sovetsk I
[8577]received the rank of
[8578]lieutenant of the
[8579]Administrative Ser-
[8580]vice." (Note: See
[8581]1965 entry for the
[8582]spring of 1951.]}
[8584]"On 1 January 1953
[8586]my parents and I were
[8588]guests at’the dacha
[8589]of KOBULOV who at
[8591]that time was working
[8592]in GUSIMZ in East Ber-
[8594]NOSENKO was divorced from TELFGINA during his leave before ening to Sovatsk (Mav and June 1952). °
[8596]Layee ane seg ne rete eee parent
[8598]October 1966
[8600]“ENS dO
[8602]A?
[8605]ee ee OU TONES pee ete ee
[8607]©. ayne 1962
[8608]in January. Well
[8610]I came on leave to
[8612]Moscow, I was
[8614]there at my father' s
[8616]‘dacha, near Moscow.
[8617]‘KOBULOV came to
[8618]visit us at the
[8619]dacha...3 conver-
[8620]sation started.
[8621]He asked: ‘What
[8622]are you doing?'
[8624]am working in the
[8625]GRU...I came home
[8626]‘on leave.’ KOBU-
[8627]LOV asked: ‘How
[8628]do you like your
[8629]work?’ I said:
[8630]"Speaking frankly,
[8631]I don't." ‘Well,’
[8632]he said, ‘you
[8633]better come work
[8634]with us....Look,
[8635]drop in to sce me
[8636]for a minute some-
[8637]time.' KOBULOV.
[8638]was First Deputy
[8639]to BERIA and a :
[8640]Fetter friend of my
[8643]0 dl tt AO
[8647]ary. At the end
[8648]of January, at the
[8649]end of my vacation
[8650]I went back to GRU
[8651]Personnel and saw -
[8652]KALOSHIN...I told
[8653]him I did not like
[8654]my job, all that
[8655]typing, and he
[8656]saud: 8 ‘Well,
[8658]wait a while.
[8660]Look around.’ I
[8661]was at the dispo-
[8662]sal of the Person-
[8663]nel Department all
[8664]of February. I
[8666]had no work at all.
[8667]And since I was
[8669]_hot working, I
[8671]did not get any
[8673]pay for this month.
[8674]During this vacation
[8675]I was living with
[8677]my father and mother
[8678]on Gor'kiy Street."
[8680]"After. the New
[8681]Year I went to this
[8682]sanitorium, Kubinka,
[8683]78 or 78 kilometers -
[8684]from Moscow, and f
[8685]was there January
[8687]+ sty pares regimen carer mcenemgngeeTerr — ~asgmepers Lani”
[8688]ARR
[8690]“97,
[8691]1965
[8693]SENKO and KOBULOV :
[8694]discussed. NOS ENKO! 5...
[8697]-with his Sovetsk
[8698]assignment and KOBU-"
[8700]LOV suggested the
[8702]Ro ossibility of
[8703]OSENKO getting.
[8705]into State. Securizy”
[8707]work. = (Ma ay)
[8709]"IT met my [second]
[8711]wife [Lyudmila
[8712]KOZHEVNIKOVA). for. the
[8714]first time’at the
[8715]Herzen "House of
[8716]Rest," one of the
[8718]April 1966
[8720]lin with. the: WISMUTH
[8721]company,..This.was.the *
[8723]first time. I.met:
[8726]“member “how the ‘con-
[8727]versation came around
[8729]to me, but I told
[8730]KOBULOV about my
[8731]work in the Naval
[8732]GRU and my desire to
[8734]change my place of -4
[8735]-. work. He promised to
[8736]find me.a place .in the _.
[8737]MGB, but this promise
[8739]was ‘empty conversation. "
[8741]"From the end.of
[8743]January to the middle
[8744]of March ‘I-waes under
[8746]treatment ae the
[8747]Sanitorium near .Mos-
[8748]cow where I had been
[8750]er.
[8752]138038 dO
[8754]Teese een n ie ttt Pe tenant ears tse
[8755]: pe 3 ” .
[8757]78.
[8759]June 1962 1964 ; 1965 April 1966 October
[8760]and part of Febru- "Houses of Rest" of during the summer of |
[8761]ary. After that I the Council of Minis- 1952. Here I became =
[8762]was home." [Note: ters. I was resting acquainted with my te
[8763]This statement was there for several second wife, Lyudmila -
[8764]made on 8:dApril. days. She was there Yulianovna KOZHEV- .
[8765]As no attempt was too. It's about NIKOVA. . we
[8766]made to reconcile 65-70 kilometers
[8767]it with the pre- from Moscow, not far :
[8768]vious entry, made from Kubinka.° I
[8769]on 6 April, and be- was waiting for my
[8770]cause NOSENKO of- | status to be re-
[8771]fered no explana-' .solved...I didn't : :
[8773]‘ tion, both are want to stay alone
[8775]included here. ] at the dacha [his
[8777]father's]. She was »
[8778]studying philology :
[8780]in the third course. oof
[8781]at Moscow State Uni-
[8783]versity. She had :
[8784]been seriously ill . “
[8785]with tuberculosis
[8787]when she was 17 and
[8789]still required. treat- Lt
[8790]ments." (Interro- , 7
[8791]gation,.12 February
[8793]1965) [Note: NOSEN-
[8795]KO's explanation :
[8797]of his presence at '
[8798]the "House of Rest"
[8800]was given in response
[8802]to.the specific .....
[8804]question: "What
[8806]were you doing there?")}*
[8808]7
[8810], ; eS
[8811]ay 1965 NOSENKO said: "I met my wife in a House of Rest. I had been at Sosno in January but didn't like it.
[8813]tried Dyatkino and met her.
[8815]See June 1942 entry: Red Star, on 14 January 1967, reported that seven "special naval schools" were. established
[8816]in’ 1940 in Leningrad, Moscow, Vladivostok, _Gorkiy, Kiev, Odessa, and Baku, There is no indication that any of
[8818]i
[8819]233
[8821]sandbags
[8823]+ ad tees
[8826]j
[8828]73. —— eo.
[8829]Cc. Personal Affairs Since Entering the KGB
[8831]1. Family Life
[8833]The Soviet intérnal passport which NOSENKO carried to
[8834]Geneva in 1964 confirms his claim that he married Lyudmila
[8835]KOZHEVNIKOVA on 27 June 1953. (They married approximately .
[8836]six months after he says he first met her at a sanatorium or. ~
[8837]“yest home" outside Moscow and about three months after he
[8838]says he joined the kG3.) Immediately after their marriage
[8839]the couple moved into the home of NOSENKO's new in-laws at
[8840]Ulitsa Serafimovich 2, Moscow, where they lived until obtain-
[8841]ing their own apartment on Narodnaya Ulitsa in January 1955.*
[8842]KOZHEVNIKOVA's father is Yulian Wikolayevich KOZHEVNIKOV, a
[8843]metallurgical engineer by training, who held the position of
[8844]First Deputy Chairman of the State Scientific Research Com-
[8845]mittee (GKKNIR) of the RSPSR at the time of NOSENKO's defec-
[8848]NOSENKO said that he has two daughters by this second
[8850]marriage. According to his: passport, the eldest of these,
[8851]Oksana, was born on 21 August 1354’ and the other, Tamara, on
[8853]13 July 1958.*** NOSEUKO in 1962 displaved to his CIA handlers
[8855]a photoyraph of the two girls and their mother and made a par-
[8856]ticular point of noting the close physical resemblance between
[8860]* On 23 April 1964 NOSENKO was questione? on the various
[8861]apartments he occupied in Moscow. He seid that, from the
[8862]time of his marr:age to TELEGINA until his departure for
[8863]his first GRU post in the Far Fast, he lived in an apart-
[8864]ment on Meshchanskaya Ulitsa. He gave up this apartment,
[8865]he said, in 1950, when his Navy orders came through.
[8866]Having made this statement, NOSENKO was then asked why
[8867]the 1951 Moscow telephone directory still listed him at
[8869]the Meshchanskaya Ulitsa address. He replied that he could
[8870]not explain but that he was considered to have vacated the
[8871]house in 1950. (He later said he movec to the Far East in
[8873]1951 - see Section IV.B.) NOSENKO then said that the
[8875]previous tenant at Narodnaya Ulitsa 13 had been one Nikita
[8877]ISHCHENKO. Although the phone then in the apartment was
[8878]switched to NOSENKO's name for billing purposes, NOSENKO
[8879]never bothered to have the change entered in the Moscow
[8881]phone book; he said that this would have required a visit
[8883]to a downtown office, the filling out of numerous forms,
[8885]etc.; besides he added, he did not use the telephone any~
[8886]way. Therefore, NOSENKO said, from 1955 until his defec-
[8888]tion in 1964, the telephone in his apartment was listed
[8889]under the name of ISHCHENKO. He has repeated this story
[8890]during subsequent questionings. The 1961 Moscow phone
[8891]directory carries no listing for NOSENKO; it does list
[8893]+ | JSECHENKO but gives his address as Krasnokholmskaya
[8895]i Naberezhnaya, not Narodnaya Ulitsa. . .
[8897]/ #& -@he GKKNIR of the RSFSR is now the GNTK. PENKOVSKIY worked
[8899]-under cover in the GKKNIR of the USSR. |
[8901],##* | NOSENKO has also given his second daughter's year of birth
[8902].- » as 1957.° In 1962. he told CIA that the older daughter was
[8903]~then studying in the first class at school; in 1965, how-
[8905]ever, he said she began school in the fall of 1962.
[8909]q
[8910]4
[8911]if
[8912]s
[8914]A MARC Ra we wert teh
[8917]Oksana and himself. He said that he and his wife refer to her
[8918]as his “double” (kopiya). His wife, in a letter after the _.
[8919]defection, referred to Oksana as NOSENKO's kopiya.
[8921]NOSENKO's father; the Shipbuilding Minister, died of
[8922]stomach cancer in August 1956, three years after NGSENKO says
[8923]he entered the KGB Second Chief Directorate. The period of
[8924]time surrounding his father's death was, according. to NOSENKO,
[8925]a turning point in his personal and professional life. It was.
[8926]then that he "found himself" after an irresponsible past.
[8927]@rinking and wenching, and indifference to his work.
[8929]2. Venereal Disbasle
[8931]The incident which NOSENKO has most often cited as an
[8932]example of his irresponsibility in the period prior to 1956
[8933]involved his illegal use. of KGB alias documents to cover treat-
[8934]ment for a case of goncrrhea he contracted in 1954, at the time
[8935]his wife was pregnant with their first child.. The CIA psycho-
[8936]logist who questioned NOSENKO in May 1966 submitted the follow-
[8937]ing summary of NOSENKO's statements about’ this incidgent, which
[8938]are about as given earlier (during the April 1964 interroga-
[8939]tion): .
[8941]"A girl friend he had known in Lenincrad since 1945 cane
[8942]to visit relatives in Moscow in 1954. (She called him, and he
[8943]spent some time with her. She was not a prostitute, and he
[8944]had slept with her before, so he thought nothing of it. Later
[8945]he developed what he feared was a venereal disease. Since his
[8946]wife was pregnant, he was safe both from discovery and the
[8947]danger of infecting her. He searched frantically around Moscow
[8948]for a private doctor wnro treated such diseases, but could not
[8950]find one, Some of his friends at the office suggested a central
[8952]clinic that would require no documents. He went here but when
[8953]confronted with a request for documents, had the choice of
[8954]showing his KGB certificate or using a false passport he had
[8955]for business. He tried to talk the doctor into letting hin
[8956]go home to get his documents, but the doctor said ne would have
[8957]to be accompanied by a member of the militia; otherwise he
[8958]might not come back. He was required to take treatment of a
[8959]conmunicable disease. He was forced to give the false document.
[8960]He..came back for treatment about three times and was ordered
[8961]to report back in two weeks for a final check. They also
[8962]demanded the name of the girl, but he claimed he had only just
[8963]met her and did not know who she was. He forgot to go back
[8964]and a nurse visited tne safehouse about two times and left
[8965]a-note for him to report. However, he did not go to the safe-
[8966]house so knew nothing of the note. In the false passport was
[8967]a listing. of where the named person worked, a fictitious
[8968]_ factory. As the result of the clinic inquiries, the request
[8969]for information got into the hands of the section which made
[8970]the documents. NOSEMKO was called before the deputy chief of
[8971]the Directorate and severely criticized. He explained what
[8972]had happened and was given five days of house arrest. However,
[8973]the chief of his section had also gotten word of the infraction
[8974]and sentenced him to fifteen days of house arrest without even
[8975]talking to him. Ee told his wife he was going on a trip and
[8976]moved into the administrative room near the office to serve
[8977]his term, In the meantime, the Secretary of the KGB Party
[8981]TEP SECRET.
[8984]4
[8985]4
[8986]a anne 3S Bice Sain
[8988]a
[8989]4
[8990]i
[8991]3
[8992]3
[8993]a
[8994]a
[8995]t
[8996]i.
[8998]as dalam taaaad EOS ee A
[9001]an
[9002]t.
[9004]wrattbte dianiden. widens
[9012]Committee called NOSENKO's father on the phone and told him
[9013]the whole story. NOSENKO's father never told either NOSENKO's
[9014]wife or mother of the incident, but did chide MOSENKO about
[9016]it. The incident was brought before the Komsomol and discussed.
[9017]A written reprimand for. immoral conduct-unauthorized use of
[9018]official documents was placed in his record. This was also
[9020]a final warning meaning that any other infraction would result
[9021]in expulsion. ..He made the statement that he had been punished
[9022]for this incident many times. He could not immediately apply
[9023]for party membership; the incident was broucht up repeatedly
[9025]in Komsomol-meetings and@ even in party meetings (after he was
[9026]accepted) as a horrible example; and it kept him from being
[9027]promoted from Senior: Lieutenant to Captain. (The Deputy-
[9028]Director who gave him five days was a member of the promotion
[9030]commission.) "
[9032]Although there have been slight changes and contradictions
[9033]in NOSENKO's numerous accounts of this story {the house arrest
[9034]Was variously reported as 5, 10, and 15 @zeye) it remained
[9035]basically consistent until the October 1966 interrogations
[9036]when he said for the first time that he contracted gonorrhea
[9037]from the girl in Leningrad in 1945 rather than 1954, In 1954,
[9038]he said, he again was infected, this time by a prostitute whom
[9040]he picked up in the vicinity of the Lenincrad Railroad Station
[9041]in Moscow. When the KGB required that he reveal the source,
[9042]_NOSENKO said, he ascribed the latter case to the original girl
[9043]‘from Leningrad. During the October 1966 interrogations NOSENKO
[9044]- also told CIA for the first time that he had had venereal
[9045]disease on two other occasions while studying at the Institute
[9046]of Internatfonal Affairs.  —-
[9048]He later began to "feel more a part of the KGB," and as
[9049]a junior KGB case officer, he personally recruited Richard
[9050]BURGI in the first successful recruitment operation ‘carried .
[9051]out by the newly-created Tourist Departmert of the Second Chief
[9052]Directorate.* “And in 1956," NOSENKO said in 1964, "before
[9053]my father's death, I was made a candidate for membership in
[9054]the Communist Party and, exactly 15 days later, was assigned
[9056]the rank cf Senicr Case Officer. I developed a pride in my-
[9057]self, (a feeling) that Ican. do things. Ycu know how it is.
[9058]When a person feels that he can, that he has some support,
[9059]then he works much better. ‘le has more initiative and so
[9061]forth."
[9063]3, Affiliation with Communist Party Organs
[9065]NOSENKO said that his formal participation in Communist
[9066]Party activities began in late 1943 or early 1944 when he.
[9067]joined the Komsomol at the Naval Preparatory School in Baku.
[9068]This step was a casual one, and he has said that he took it
[9069]without much thought, mainly because all his friends were
[9071]“4
[9073]* See Part V.D.4.b. for a description of the BURGI recruit-
[9074]_ ment operation. Until 1966 NOSENKO claimed to CIA that
[9075]he had received an award for his participation in this
[9077]operation. In the October 1966 interrogations he retracted
[9079]’ this and said that he never received eny KGB award for the
[9080]BURGI or any other operation. oo 4 -
[9082]4
[9084]j
[9086]or
[9087]4
[9091]- ot
[9093]ad
[9095]tat
[9096]4
[9098]4
[9099]4
[9100]4
[9101]H
[9102]q
[9104]be GRRL Say
[9108]_'** See Part V.F.9. : : . ;
[9109]- ##*PREISFREUND: is disctissed. in detail in Part V.E.4.a..
[9111]82.
[9113]joining. When NOSENKO entered the KG3 in the spring of 1953,
[9115]he transferred routinely to the Komscmol organization there
[9116]and became Secretary of the Komsomol Organization of the
[9117]Second Chief Directorate. This was a small orgasization
[9118]consisting, NOSENKO thought, of about 17 KGB employees; he
[9119]remained its secretary until June or July 1954, when he got
[9120]into the trouble over illegal use of operational documents.
[9121]According to NOSENKO, “Immediately after this incident the
[9122]Bureau of the Komsomol was gathered, and I was immediately
[9123]removed from the position of Secretary." A week later, a
[9124]"strict reprimand" was entered in NOSENKO's Komsomol records.
[9126]In October 1954, on the eve of his 27th birthday, NOSENKO
[9127]was forced out of the Komsomol for over-age.* At that time,
[9128]the “strict reprimand" he had received several months earlier
[9129]was remitted on NOSENKO's petition, and he was permitted to
[9130]leave the organization with a clean record. He was not per-
[9131]mitted to join the Communist Party immediately, however.
[9132]NOSENKO described the situation on 15 April 1964 as follows:
[9133]“Yow I had to prove myself. Not being a candidate for Party
[9134]membership, I asked them for assignments to show my eagerness,
[9135]to prove myself. I also asked the Party Organization of the
[9136]Second Chief Directorate for some ‘putlic service' (obshchest-
[9137]venniy) assignments. I collected newspapers." For a year,
[9138]NOSENKO "made qood" by running errands and performing other
[9139]such tasks, until it was decided that he was suitable for
[9140]Party membership. He applied in January 1956 and was accepted
[9141]as a candidate member of the Party in June the same year?
[9142]full membership was granted in 1957. For over a year, from
[9143]October 1954 until January 1956, NOSENKO said, he had the
[9144]Gistinction of being the only employee of the KGS who was
[9145]neither a Komsomol nor a Party member or applicant.
[9147]4. Statements to Others by NOSENKO
[9149]Before giving CIA the foregoing details, NOSENKO had
[9150]talked about himself to several non-Soviets, including persons
[9151]invoived in cases which are reviewed in other portions of this
[9153]per. NOSENKO informed the recruitment target Horst BRAUNS
[9154]that he had two daughters.** He advised Ivan Ivanovich PREIS-
[9155]FREUND, a Finnish citizen used in the recruitment approach to
[9156]a U.S. Army sergeant in Moscow, that he was married, his
[9157]father was dead but his mother was living, he had served in
[9158]the Navy, and he had two children. PREISFREUND met the
[9159]"little girls" ard later reported to CIA that, although
[9161]““NOSENKO was a “woman-chaser," he loved his daughters very
[9163]much.*** With one KGB agent in particular, Arsene FRIPPEL,
[9164]NOSENKO was especially forthcoming: he told FRIPPEL of his
[9166]*. According to the Statutes (Ustav)of the Komsomol in effect
[9168]in 1954, the maximum age for a Komsomol member at that-time
[9170]was 25. On this basis, NOSENKO should have been excluded
[9171]in October 1953, upon reaching his 26th birthday. When
[9172]this was explained to NOSENKO by DERYABIN in July 1965,
[9174]- NOSENKO replied that he was certain he left the Komsomol
[9175]in 1954 upon reaching the age of 27, that he was sure the
[9177]maximum age was 26 at that time, and that no special
[9178]exceptions were madé in his case. ; -
[9180]4
[9181]4
[9182]-“§
[9183]4
[9185]a
[9187]i
[9189]2
[9191]d
[9192]4
[9194]4
[9197]t
[9199]Aides aud eed ett oe
[9203]at ate Vote us
[9204]PRT cr er ee
[9209]14-00000
[9211]service in the Soviet Navy; he dwelt at length on his father's
[9212]work in the Soviet shipbuilding industry; and while using the
[9213]alias "NIKOLAYEV" with FRIPPEL, he mentioned that his father
[9214]had been employed in the town of Nikolayev. On one occasion
[9215]NOSENKO and his wife dined at FRIPPEL'3 home.* NOSENKO told
[9216]his recruitment target George DREW in April 1959 that he had
[9217]two daughters. mo,
[9219]p- Soyiets' Statements About NOSENKO
[9221]Portions of the NOSENKO autobiography have been supported .
[9222]and other portions contradicted by the statements of several ;
[9223]Soviets following the defection. The Soviets' remarks dealing
[9224]with NOSENKO's KGB career are reviewed in Part V.I., but with 3
[9225]reference to other aspects of- the background of NOSENKO:
[9227]- Letters to NOSENKO in Geneva from his wife (who i
[9228]later went to the U.S. Smbassy after his defection) in- oe 4
[9229]clude a reference to one of the daughters as his “double” q
[9230]und two other personal letters in his. possessicn at the :
[9231]time of his defection, Yu. I. GUK and‘G. I. DUCHKOV, ;
[9232]referred to visits to NOSENKO's wife add children, t
[9234]- A XGB officer in Vienna, Vladimir TULAYEV, told 4
[9236]a CIA double agent that NOSENKO, whom he knew well, came 4
[9237]* €rom a wonderful family, loved his wife and children, '
[9238]and earned a good salary. . TULAYEV later told the agent iH
[9239]that he had "friends who knew NOSENKO well. "** :
[9241]» © A Soviet diplomat in Buenos Aires, Feliks KOVALEV,
[9242]said to a CIA agent that NOSENKO had twice married, had
[9243]a good family background, was the son of a Minister in
[9244]the government, was notorious. for his “adventurous"
[9245]nature, and was "famous for his character."
[9247]j
[9248]|
[9250]- The Soviet Navy defector Nikolay ARTAMONOV said
[9251]he attended a naval preparatory school with NCSENKO in
[9252]1944 to 1946. (ARTAMONOV's description of the school
[9253]and of the dates involved, however, differs from
[9255]NOSENKO'sS. ensitive source
[9257]. - % reported NOSENKO is the son of a former i
[9258]Soviet Government Minister, attended naval college, shot 4
[9259]himself ta avoid going to the front with the rest of his
[9260]class, was graduated from the Institute in 1950, and
[9261]contracted venereal disease in 1950 but through his
[9263]i ‘father's influence avoided damage to his career. sensitive
[9265]£39 from conversations with fellow officers WESeiy He ~
[9266]has indicated that he does not know NOSENKO. : a
[9268]*FRIPPEL is discussed more fully. in Part V.D.5.
[9270]** In October 1966 NOSENKO failed to identify TULAYEV either . are
[9271]by name or photograph and said he didn't know him. - a
[9274]1400000
[9276]: a)
[9277]. : oo . gensitive source . co an
[9278]i = B said that when NOSENKO was a young man,~ he oo:
[9279]attended the GRU Military-Diplomatic Academy and then spent. -:
[9280]a short time, perhaps a year, in ‘the Information. Department. 5,
[9281]at GRU Headquarters. NOSENKO ted been a “very undisciplined. =~
[9282]Tee . person" while in the GRU and "not very good, "é con-
[9283]tee - tinued, and he was discharced from the GRU. However, his
[9284]oe father, an "influential person in the Ministry of Ship-
[9285]: building," was able to get NOSENKO transferred to the KG3.
[9286]GETS said he did not know NOSENKO personally, but
[9287]learned this information from "various persons" (unnamed) rn
[9289]eran .
[9291]in Moscow. : v
[9293]; . The thumbnail biography of NOSENKO which KOROLEV
[9295]: and ROSENTAL submitted to the editors of Paris Match in
[9297]ae _| .Q@etober 1966 (see Part III.H.) stated that NOSENKO was . .
[9299]oO “closely acquainted with the country's leaders, families. y
[9300]and homes" and that his “father who died several years ° : a
[9301]ago was an important official in the Party and state
[9302]organs." The document went on to say that "NOSENKO's . - 4
[9303]family consists cf a wife, 35, two daughters, 10 and 12,
[9305]mother and a brother (younger) ." KOKOLEV and ROSENTAL
[9307]also provided photographs purporting to be of NOSENKO's
[9309]wife and daughters.
[9310]source
[9312]% said she heard from her KGB friend
[9313]NOSENKO's father was a Minister or @
[9314]General of Ukrainian origin and that his mother was.Jewish
[9315]and “was always involved in some blackmarketeering." She
[9316]also said that she heard NOSENKO was a "civilian," not a
[9318]au!
[9320]ean iliamb tints Saliba ae
[9322]TTS
[9324]y. G. SVIRIN that
[9328]4
[9330]. KGB officer, but was connected somehow with the KGB, (She i i
[9331]could not explain this connection other than to say that i 4
[9333]all Soviets permitted to meet foreigners are either ‘ » 0 2
[9334]officers or "relatives" of tha KGB.) : | a
[9336]! a
[9338]i 4
[9340]sedate