[1]157-10014-10178 | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
[2]JFK Assassination System Date: VWH2015
[3]Identification Form
[5]Agency Information
[7]AGENCY:  SSCIA
[8]RECORD NUMBER: = 157-10014-10178
[10]RECORD SERIES: MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE
[12]AGENCY FILE NUMBER:  07-M-85
[14]Document Information
[16]ORIGINATOR:  SSCIA
[17]FROM:
[18]TO:
[20]TITLE:
[22]DATE: 00/00/1975
[23]PAGES: 161
[25]SUBJECTS :
[26]CASTRO, FIDEL
[27]LUMUMBA, PATRICE, ASSASSINATION
[28]CIA
[30]DOCUMENT TYPE: REPORT
[31]CLASSIFICATION: — Declassified
[32]RESTRICTIONS: = 1B; 1C
[33]CURRENT STATUS: = Redact
[34]DATE OF LAST REVIEW: — 05/31/2000
[36]OPENING CRITERIA :
[38]COMMENTS : CC Box 73
[40]vo. 1
[41]HY. 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 1
[43]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[45]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[47]Date
[48]Page
[50]08/07/95
[52]AGENCY
[54]RECORD NUMBER
[55]RECORDS SERIES
[56]AGENCY FILE NUMBER
[58]SSCIA
[60]AGENCY INFORMATION
[62]4~10178
[64]MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE
[68]07-M-83
[70]ORIGINATOR
[71]FROM
[73]TO
[75]TITLE
[76]DATE
[78]PAGES
[79]SUBJECTS
[81]DOCUMENT TYPE
[82]CLASSIFICATION
[83]RESTRICTIONS
[84]CURRENT STATUS
[86]DATE OF LAST REVIEW
[87]OPENING CRITERIA
[88]COMMENTS
[90]n
[91]ep
[92]QD
[93]be
[96]00/00/75
[97]161
[98]LUMUMBA,
[100]ee 8 8¢ ca
[102]CIA
[103]CASTRO,
[104]REPORT
[105]REFERRED
[107]POSTPONE
[108]01/19/99
[110]cC Box 7
[112]PATRICE, ASSASSINATION
[114]FIDEL
[116]TOP SECRET
[118]D IN FULL
[120]3
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[124][R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED.
[126]Page 2
[128]| DATE-TIME-LOCATION: August 20, 1975 ~ 12:30-3:30 p. nm, =.
[129]Room 608, Carroll Arms ‘
[131]PRESENT! Burton Wides, Rhett Dawson, Frederick Baron
[134]‘MEMORANDUM
[136]TO: _ Files
[137]FROM: Frederick Baron
[138]DATE : August 20, 1975
[140]SUBJECT: Interview with Congo Chief of Station: Lumumba Assassination
[141]Plan and Related Events in the Congo
[143]Staff Members Present: Burton Wides, Rhett Dawson,
[144]Frederick Baron
[146]The following is a summary of the contents of an interview
[147]conducted with a former CIA officer concerning a period (1960-1961)
[148]in which he was Chief of Station in the Congo. The interview was
[149]conducted from 12:30 p.m. to 3:30 p.m. today in Room 608 of the
[150]Carroll Arms Hotel. |
[152]At the request of the Chief of Station (COS), we agreed to
[153]take his testimony under alias. He will be referred to hereinafter
[155]as "COS".
[157]COS GOES TO CONGO AND RECEIVES MESSENGER FROM HEADQUARTERS
[159]COS said that he arrived in the Congo. as Chief of Station in
[160]early July (probably the 10th or 11th) 1960. COS said that before
[161]he left Headquarters for the Congo he did not talk with either
[162]Richard Bissell (DDP) or Bronson Tweedy (Chief, Africa Division)
[163]about the prospect of assassinating Patrice Lumumba. Soon after
[164]arriving in the Congo, COS was asked to return to Headquarters in
[165]late July for briefings. He said there was no talk of assassination
[167]at those meetings, either.
[169]HW 50955 Docld: 32423566 Page 4
[173]After his return to the Congo, probably in early September,
[174]COS received a cable from Headquarters that said, in his words,
[175]"someone IL would recognize would appear to give me instructions for
[176]a mission I would carry out." Soon thereafter Sidney Gottlieb
[177]arrived in the Congo to meet with COS. COS recognized Gottlieb
[178]from the Technical Services Division at the CIA, and it was made
[179]clear that Gottlieb was the messenger referred to in the cable.
[181]| Gottlieb and COS met in COS's new apartment. COS dated this
[183]meeting by the fact that he had moved into this apartment in early
[184]September, 1960 . COS said that Gottlieb informed him that lethal
[185]biological agents had been developed for the assassination of
[186]Lumumba. COS believes that Gottlieb brought a poison virus and
[187]probably two other lethal biological agents with him in his bag.
[188]But COS said it was possible that the biological weapons arrived
[189]shortly thereafter. COS said that Gottlieb also provided rubber
[190]gloves, a gauze mask, and probably a hypodermic syringe -- equipment
[191]for administering the poisonous substances. The poisonous substances
[192]were to be injected into food, drink, toothpaste, or anything else
[193]that Lumumba might ingest. COS did not remember the appearance of
[194]the biological agents themselves, but he did recall that there were
[195]approximately three different types of lethal substances provided
[196]to him.
[198]COS said that he was "taken aback" by Gottlieb's assignment
[199]to him of the assassination of Lumumba. COS said that he was a
[200]junior Chief of Station, and he wanted to make sure to "pin down"
[202]the chain of authority for this assignment because "I had never
[204]HY 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 5
[208]heard of anything like this." COS's best recollection was that he
[210]had the following interchange with Sidney Gottlieb:
[212]cos: Where did this brilliant idea come from?
[214]Gottlieb: The top.
[216]cos; Who at the top?
[217]Gottlieb: The Director has instructions from President
[219]Eisenhower.
[221]COS said that he could not recall the exact language of the
[222]interchange, although this was his best, recollection. He said
[223]Gottlieb made it clear that the President wanted to find a way to
[224]remove Lumumba from the scene. He said that when Gottlieb explained
[225]the source of authorization for the assassination plot, he made it
[226]clear that the President was the source. COS said it was possible
[227]that Gottlieb used a euphemism, but it was more likely that he
[228]mentioned either "President Eisenhower" or "the President." In
[229]response to a question from the staff to paraphrase again the import
[230]of Gottlieb's instruction to him, COS said that Gottlieb told him
[231]something to the effect that "I am giving you instructions on highest
[232]authority to assassinate Lumumba any way you can." COS said that
[233]Gottlieb did not insist that the assassination had to take place by
[234]means of the biological agents he was supplying.
[236]COS said that this was not an exploration of the possibility
[237]of assassination or the establishment of a mere capability for assassi-
[238]nation. "They were serious about it .. . it was clear that the
[240]policy decision to assassinate Lumumba had been made." COS said
[242]HW 50955 Docld: 32423566 Page 6...
[244]he was not awaiting any further "go signal" in order to proceed
[245]with the assassination operation. .
[247]COS said that Gottlieb told him that there was to be no connec-
[248]tion with the United States if the biological agents were to be
[249]employed. COS had an asset in the Congo that he considered for
[250]use as an intermediary in this project, although he never moved
[251]forward to make the asset knowledgeable of the project. COS said
[252]that, whether or not he used an intermediary to accomplish the
[253]assassination, Gottlieb made it clear that "I was to do it or find
[254]a way to do it."
[256]COS asked Gottlieb when the lethal biological agents would
[257]lose their potency. Gottlieb said this would happen over a long
[258]period of time. COS said that he did not remember exactly what
[259]the substances looked like, nor whether Gottlieb brought it in his
[260]bag, and this would not be surprising because "in those days there
[261]were no customs checks in the Congo.”
[263]COS locked the virus in a safe at the Station to which only
[264]he had access. He remembers taking the virus from the safe sometime ~
[265]later -- probably after the arrest or death of Lumumba -- to dispose
[266]of it by burying it near the Congo River. COS said that he had no |
[267]training in chemistry and felt ill-equipped to deal with poisons.
[269]COS asked Gottlieb if the poison left traces. Gottlieb told him
[270]that it left the traces of a normal disease.
[272]COS said he was never subjected to great pressure to use the
[274]poison. COS added that, when he spoke with Gottlieb, "I don't
[276]HW 50955 Docld: 32423566 Page 7
[280]think I agreed to use it." Although he also said that he did not
[281]tell Gottlieb that he would refuse to use it. |
[283]cOS said that even though Gottlieb had told him that clearance
[284]for the assassination of Lumumba had come from the President and
[285]the DCL, he wanted verification from Headquarters of an assignment
[286]of such magnitude. COS said: "I responded to Headquarters with a
[287]double-talk message, saying that I had met the messenger and re-
[288]questing confirmation. I then received a cable containing double-
[289]talk confirmation, something like ‘your assumption confirmed. '"
[291]COS said "I never knew who was sending me these cables. They
[292]also said ‘Director’ and I sent my cables with a special slug. My.
[293]cables were probably marked to 'Director" which is never actually
[294]seen by the DCL. COS thought that he destroyed his copy of cables
[295]on this subject on instructions contained in those cables. He said
[296]that only a single copy of the cables had existed at the Congo
[297]Station. COS said that he was instructed by Gottlieb that he was
[298]not to discuss this assassination mission even with his own deputy.
[299]cOS said that he did not discuss the operation with Glenn Fields.
[300]He also said that he would not have discussed the operation with
[301]Dr. Lester Houck because Houck was removed as Branch Chief in early
[302]fall due to dissatisfaction with his performance.
[304]COS said that he thought an assassination effort was "a bad
[305]idea, both morally and practically." However, cos said that he
[306]may not have expressed his grave concern to Gottlieb because he was
[307]so taken aback at receiving the assignment. cOS thought that he
[309]told Gottlieb that he did not have.a good means of access to Lumumba .
[311]HW 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 6 x
[315]COS recalls raising the subject of assassination with
[316]Gottlieb on subsequent occasions outside the Congo only in the
[317]context of his (COS's) feeling: ‘Thank God I never had to use it."
[318]cOS did not remember if Gottlieb mentioned Richard Bissell as
[319]a source of authority or approval for the assassination operation.
[320]COS-does not recall that anyone other than the President and the
[321]DCI were indicated as the source of authority for the assassination
[323]operation, -
[325]O'DONNELL IS DISPATCHED FROM HEADQUARTERS TO THE CONGO
[327]COS recalled the fact that Justin O'Donnell arrived in the
[328]Congo from CIA Headquarters approximately in October of 1960. COS
[329]said that O'Donnell “came to eliminate Lumumba." COS did not re-
[330]call whether O'Donnell recalled a conversation with Richard Bissell.
[332]COS said that, in anticipating O'Donnell's arrival, he had
[333]the impression that O'Donnell was coming to aid in the removal of
[334]Lumumba. COS said, "I wondered if Headquarters thought I was drag-
[335]ging my feet and that I might be relieved."
[337]COS said he did not remember discussing his meeting with
[339]Sidney Gottlieb with O'Donnell but he simply does not have a
[340]specific recollection, COS said he would not dispute O'Donnell's
[341]testimony that COS had made O'Donnell aware that a poison virus
[342]was.in his safe. COS said that assassination was "not excluded"
[343]as one of the means of removing Lumumba that O'Donnell might use. i
[344]But COS said that he was not certain that assassination was included
[346]as one of O'Donnell's tools. COS said that he may have discussed
[348]HW 50955 Docld: 32423566 Page 9
[350]with O'Donnell a plan to snatch Lumumba from “protective custody."
[351]But he does not specifically remember this.
[353]COS said that "O'Donnell did not seem to do anything most of
[354]the time, and I didn't take him very seriously. He spent a lot of
[355]time drinking." COS said that he was not aware of any action
[356]O'Donnell took to carry out an assassination or a "snatch" of
[357]Lumumba . |
[359]COS said that the assassination plan had struck him from the
[360]beginning as a bad idea, so he moved slowly on it. "I showed some
[361]action to Headquarters by sending cables, but never pushed it.”
[363]COS said that he asked-O'Donnell to clear with him any major
[364]actions he was contemplating in the Congo. COS believes that
[365]O'Donnell was in the Congo from September until approximately
[367]Christmas.
[369]LUMUMBA 's ESCAPE
[371]COS said that Lumumba's escape from "protective custody" was
[372]a surprise to him. He said that the CIA Station had nothing to do
[373]with it, although they investigated the incident.
[375]COS said "I was in touch with many official Congolese about
[376]where Lumumba was and how he got out. But T did not get much good
[377]information. It was assumed that Lumumba was going to Stanleyville.
[378]‘The Congolese flew troops to points that he would have to pass on
[379]this route. I remember reviewing maps of these routes with the
[380]Congolese." | ;
[382]COS added, "I left the Congo for Rome because of the prospect
[384]that Lumumba might start an uprising against ‘white devils.’ But
[386]HW 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 10
[390]when I arrived in Rome I read that Lumumba was captured. I learned
[391]from Mobutu and Casavubu that Lumumba would be imprisoned in Thys-~ a,
[392]ville.
[394]COS MEETS WITH BISSELL, TWEEDY, AND KARAMESSINES IN ROME
[396]In November 1960, while Lumumba was at large, COS flew to Rome
[397]to meet with Richard Bissell, Bronson Tweedy and Thomas Karamessines
[398](then Chief of Station in Rome) for a briefing session on events
[399]in the Congo. The meeting took place at Karamessines' house. COS
[400]remembers a general discussion of events surrounding Lumumba's
[401]escape and of the situation in the Congo, but he dees not recall
[402]any specific discussion of assassination. He said, "Perhaps we
[403]did discuss assassination, I simply don't recall. I was tired. [I
[405]had flown all day. And I wasn't in favor of assassination,"
[407]BRONSON TWEEDY =
[409]cos assumed that Tweedy was knowledgeable of the assassination
[410]plan. However, he does not recall specifically discussing the plan
[411]with Tweedy prior to the delivery of the poison or while he was in
[412]possession of the poison. COS said, "I did talk with Bronson’
[413]Tweedy much later about it to the effect that 'thank Cod nothing
[414]was ever done.'"
[416]COS did not remember whether Tweedy came to the Congo before
[418]Lumumba's death. COS thought that he must have'come later. COS
[419]said, however, that if Tweedy had come earlier he probably would
[421]- have asked Tweedy about the assassination mission.
[423]HY 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 11
[427]COS INFORMS DCI.SCHLESINGER OF ASSASSINATION PLAN
[429]COS said that in response to Schlesinger's request for reports
[430]on "questionable activities" within the Agency, COS met with him,
[431]cos said that he informed Schlesinger verbally that he had received
[432]instructions to try to assassinate Lumumba. COS said that he did
[433]not mention a poison virus to Schlesinger. COS said that Schlesinger
[434]did not make a response to this information. COS was unaware of
[436]any follow-up that was taken due to his briefing of Schlesinger,
[438]OTHERS KNOWLEDGEABLE OF THE ASSASSINATION PLAN
[440]COS said that he assumed that TWEEDY, BISSELL, and DULLES were
[441]witting of the assassination plan. COS said that he did have
[442]occasion to see ALLEN DULLES from time to time, but he does not
[443]remember discussing assassination in any form with DULLES .
[445]cos said, “I might have mentioned the assassination plan to
[446]COLBY when he became Director." However, COS does not have any
[447]specific recollection of a conversation with COLBY.
[449]COS does not think he informed RICHARD HELMS of the assassina-
[450]tion plan. ;
[452]COS said that he was never interviewed by the INSPECTOR GENERAL
[453]in 1967 in the preparation of the IG Report on Assassinations.
[455]COS said that he never discussed the assassination plan with
[457]ARNOLD SILVER.
[459]PROJECT ZRRIFLE AND AGENT QJWIN
[461]ee .
[462]COS said he never discussed the assassination plan with William
[464]Harvey (the Director of Project ZRRIFLE). COS said he never discussed
[466]assassination capabilities or assets with Harvey.
[468]HY 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 12
[472]COS did not recall agent QJWIN. He did recall that O'Donnell
[473]may have brought an asset into the Congo to help him. He said,
[474]however, that based on our representation that QJWIN was in the
[476]Congo in the fall of 1960, he must have known of QJWIN's activities.
[478]WIROGUE
[479]COS does not remember the true name of agent WIROGUE nor why
[480]or how he came to the Congo. When his recollection was refreshed
[481]by seeing cable traffic, COS said that WIROGUE was a difficult man.
[482]to handle. For .a short time, WIROGUE became a major in the Congolese
[483]Army. COS said that he had wanted ROGUE to pull together a sur-
[484]veillance team. COS did not recall discussing WIROGUE with 0' Donnell.
[485]COS's only specific recollection is of being in WIROGUE 's
[486]apartment and discussing an assassination squad. COS does not
[487]think that he mentioned the use of QJWIN in connection with this
[488]"execution squad." COS said that it was conceivable that he had
[489]approached WIROGUE with the idea of using him against Lumumba.
[490]But COS remembers he came to mistrust WIROGUE and felt that WIROGUE
[491]did not know what he was doing. COS also said it was unlikely
[492]‘that he would have sent the cable about WIROGUE's approach to |
[493]QJWIN in ordinary CIA channels as he did if he thought this related
[494]to the actual assassination mission. Instead, it was merely
[496]evidence that WIROGUE was out of control.
[498]. MOVING LUMUMBA TO KATANGA , , -
[499]COS recalled that troops in Thysville mutinied while Eumumba
[501]was being held there. COS was in contact with various Congolese
[503]HY 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 13
[505]~L1-
[507]officials and discovered that Casavubu and Mobutu had decided to
[508]fly to Thysville to put down the munity. COS attempted to con-
[509]vince them not to go together. They did succeed in putting down
[510]the mutiny. _—
[512]COS did not learn that Lumumba was to be moved to Katanga
[513]until after it happened. cos said his discussions with Mobutu
[514]about Mobutu's intentions for Lumumba left COS with the impression
[515]that Lumumba might be executed.
[517]cos said that Jack Hasey was the Acting Base Chief in
[518]Elizabethville, and was succeeded by David Whipple, who became
[520]Base Chief in Katanga. COS also said that Ambassador Clare H.
[521]Timberlake worked closely with COS, but they never discussed with
[523]him the general question of assassination.
[525]TESTIMONY UNDER ALIAS
[527]At the outset of the interview, the Committee staff agreed ©
[528]to honor COS's request to testify under alias. COS, who is still
[529]in private enterprise in Zaire, said he would be in personal
[530]danger there if he were linked to this story, He said, "They
[531]might make me take the big high jump. I've been on the ‘zap list!
[533]before."
[535]HW 50955 Docld: 32423566 Page 14
[537]ARPIDAVEL Villon. “Ub |
[539]° UNITED STATES OF AMERICA —— See 47
[540]DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SS:
[542]BY
[544]ot, c. Douglas Dillon, being first duly sworn, do upon oath
[545]depose and state:
[547]._From June 1959 until early January 1961, I served as Under |
[548]Secretary of State. During approximately, 35-40 percent of ;
[549]‘that time, I served as Acting Secretary of State because of
[550]Secretary Hexrter's absence from Washington.
[552]Secretary Herter, who preceded me as Under Secretary of State,
[553]had served as the State Department: representative on the 54/12
[554]Committee, a predecessor of the present Forty Committee. When
[555]I became Under Secretary, the President asked me to retain my a
[556]earlier responsibilities for foreign economic policy. Accord-
[557]ingly, the Number 3 position in the Department of State was |
[558]designated as Under Secretary for Political Affairs. Robert |
[559]Murphy was appointed to this position and took over the State
[560]Department's responsibilities on the nate Committee.
[562]Because of the frequency of my service as Acting Secretary of
[563]State, I was kept regularly informed of important 54/12 Com-
[564]Mittee decisions. On occasion I met with the 54/12 Committee
[565]and participated in its deliberations..
[567]During this entire period I have no recollection of any dis-
[568]cussions or decisions looking toward the assassination of
[569]either Generalissimo Trujillo or Prime Minister Castro.
[571]On one occasion in late July or early August. of 1960, shortly
[572]after Patrice Lumumba's visit to Washington, I attended a meet-
[573]-ing in the Pentagon at which the overall Congo problem was dis-
[574]cussed. During the discussion, which covered.a great variety
[575]of matters, my recollection is that a question regarding the
[576]possibility of an assassination attempt against Lumumba’ was
[577]briefly raised. The CIA representative indicated that the Agency
[578]did not undertake this sort of operation. This ended considera-
[579]tion of ‘this subject. With this. one exception I never heard any
[580]discussion of assassination attempts against anyone.
[582]TRE ye
[584]Dated this A/ ay of May, 1975.
[588]‘ae Ly ia
[589]Cc. Dougla illo
[591]Subscribed and sworn to before me
[593]this.-Vy day of May 19753
[595]co
[597]a
[599]Pea Eto
[602]ra
[605]2:
[606]mi
[608]oats Wwe
[610]oy! - So cw “att
[611](LES Public Te ye
[612]_ District of Columbia
[614]HW 50955 Docld: 32423566 Page 15
[616]MEMORANDUM
[618]TO: William G. Miller
[619]; Fritz Schwarz
[621]Curt Smothers
[622]Bill Bader
[623]Burt Wides
[624]Rhett Dawson
[626]‘FROM: - Frederick Baron
[628]RE: Douglas Dillon Interview
[630]DATE: August 28, 1975
[631]I ‘spoke today by phone with Douglas Dillon, who was on vacation
[632]in Maine, concerning a paragraph in an affidavit he supplied to the
[633]' Rockefeller Commission on May 21, 1975. The paragraph records Dillon's
[634]recollection that
[635]"On one occas jon in late July or early August of 1960, shortly
[636]after Patrice Lumumba's visit to Washington, I attended a.meet-
[637]ing in -the Pentagon at which the overall Congo problem was dis-
[638]cussed. During the discussion, which covered a great variety of
[639]matters, my recollection ts that a question regarding, the possi-
[640]bility of an assassination attempt against Lumumba was briefly
[641]raised. The CIA representative indicated that the Agency did |
[642]not undertake this sort of operation. This ended consideration
[643]of this subject. With this one exception I never heard any
[644]discussion of assassination attempts against anyone.
[645]I explored the subject of this meeting generally with Mr. Dillon on the
[646]phone and set an appointment for him to review documents and testify on
[647]Tuesday, September 2, at 3:00 p.m. in Room.G 308.
[648]On the phone Dillon gave the following background information
[649]on the meeting at the Pentagon:
[650]L. This was hot a small meeting; eight or ten people attended.
[652]He did not think it was a meeting of a small body. He said it- was
[654]not a Special Group meeting or NSC meeting. But he was.clear that
[656]HW 50955 Docld:324293566 Page 16 7}
[658]“coo¢muewes a high-level meeting du to the participants.
[660]=== «62. ~-He believes the participants included the Secretary of
[661]iisvense because Dillon's recollection is firm on the fact that
[663]comin. ummeeting took place in the office of the Secretary of Defense.
[665]—ion did not rémember whether Allen Dulles attended the meeting,
[667]me ed ES
[669]ne said "top CIA people were present". Dillon said Richard
[671]zonsell was probably present. Dillon does not’ recall a man named
[673]sensqek
[675]Johnson, nor does he recall whether such a man was present
[677]sae Ieeting, but he said: that we might be able to refresh his
[679]courmmilection by giving him more backgreund on Robert Johnson.
[681]o-ni1.did not mention on the phone the nature of Robert Johnson's
[683]coomrrctimony before the Committee; I simply asked if Johnson was
[685]sent at the meeting.)
[687]3. The mention of the subject of assassinating Lumumba was
[689]- ._tinited States, which had "convinced us that Lumumba was
[691]_ cshopathic, not in a well=balanced mental state. ‘After his
[693]umm -.t we wondered whether there was any way.of changing the scenery :
[695]che Congo." Dillon said the subject was raised in the general
[697]sooo. sent of "eliminating Lumumba", but the discussion did not
[699]scomcceed.as far as mentioning means to be used.
[701]coc. 4. Dillon said that the response of the "CIA representative"
[703]wo. not necessarily a moral objection to assassination but was
[705]—-ooom in the sense of indicating that the CIA did not have that
[706]un of capacity".
[707]oo Dillon did not recall who the CIA representative was who
[709]vz the remark.
[711]HW 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 17
[716]g
[717]be
[718]u
[719]te
[721]September 23, 1975, |
[722]7
[723]Dear Mr. Dawson:
[724][ enclose herewith Mr. Dillon's ‘Signed and notarized
[725]affidavit. . | |
[726]| Sincerely yours, .
[728]Dorothy de Borchgrave
[730]Mr. Rhett Dawson
[731]Senate Select Committee
[733].. Room G-308'
[734]New Senate Office Building
[735]Washington, D. C. 20510
[737]Oo > CR ime bon,
[739]oe ae ~~ a _ ~e a i
[740]A . . a :
[741]ony Fue
[742]Cina. wat a
[743]go”
[744]; forked al =
[745]G
[747]HY 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 16
[749]15 sep 26 5
[751]t ’ pr Stee.
[752]LLEp] COM Tipe
[755]Nat Need Soe
[757]State of New York
[760]county of Meee fpetn—
[762]auly sworn, deposes and
[764]ent. consist
[765]o the Senate
[768]ached staten
[770]ing of
[772]says:
[773]counsel t
[775]pased upon.
[776]eby adopt
[777]o my direc
[779]to tntelliz
[780]and yatify
[781]t y~nowledee-
[783]n septembe
[785]ry 15; 1975; and 1 het
[786]at which is true and
[788]him ©
[789]correct t
[791]“this stateme
[793]: x Ny
[794]sworn to pefore me this a)
[795]day of Septempen LOTS.
[799]Ce _ Cs lire a _—
[801]CECILIA A. VERDON
[802]Notary poste siete cf New York
[803]23h 10% 135
[804]qualified 19 York County
[805]rch 30, 197
[807]Commission Expi hee W we
[809]Hy 509
[810]O55
[811]F Docld: 327475566 Pag
[812]e 19
[814]STATEMENTS BY C: DOUGLAS DILLON
[816]TO. RHETT DAWSON ON SEPTEMBER 15, 1975
[818]“J, Cc. Douglas piilon, do wish to make the following
[819]statement. - . __
[821]1. On September 15, 1975 1 was shown by Rhett Dawson,
[822]Counsel, Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations
[823]With Respect to Intelligence Activities, what he represented to
[824]me to ‘be documents of the National Security Council of the below
[825]dates:
[827]Exhibit 1. Minutes of the 451st Meeting
[828]. of the
[829]National Security Council . ;
[830]held in the Cabinet Room of The White House
[831]on Friday, July 5; 1960, 9:00-11:00 a
[833](1960, 9200-1100 Fe
[834](Approved by the President on July 19; 960).
[835]Exhibit: 2. Memorandum of Discussion at the 452nd Meeting
[837]of the National Security Council, a ;
[838]Thursday, July 21, 1960.
[840]“Exhibit 3, Memorandum of Discussion at the 456th Meeting
[841]of the National Security Council,
[842]Thursday » August 18, 1960
[844]Exhibit 4. Minutes of the 456th Meeting
[845]; of the
[846]National Security Council .-
[847]held in the Cabinet Room of The White House
[848]on Thursday, August 18, 126), 9:00-11:00 a.m.
[850](Koproved by the President on Kugust 24, 1960)
[852]Exhibit 5. Minutes of the 458th Meeting
[853]of the
[854]National Security Council
[855]held in the Cabinet Room of The White House
[856]on 4 cinesday, September 7, 120%: 2:30-4:30 p.m
[858]n_Wednesce sptembe 1960, 2:99
[859]: {hpproved by the President on September 15, [960
[861]Exhibit 6. Memorandum of Discussion at the 460th Meeting
[862]of the National Security Council,
[863]Wednesday, September 21, 1960
[868]HW
[869]50955 ' Soora:30409566 Page 20°
[873]2. The documents shown to me do not in any way refresh my
[874]recollection beyond the statements contained therein as to events related to the °
[875]Congo in the summer and early fall of 1960. I still do not have an independent
[876]recollection of any specific conversation regarding the assassination of Patrice
[877]‘Lumumba other than that described in my affidavit to the Rockefeller Commission
[878]and in my testimony before the Select Committee on September 2.
[880]/ 3. [Twas informed by Mr. Dawson that Mr. Robert Johnson has testified
[881]that he recollected a statement by President Eisenhower at an NSC meeting which >
[882]he construed as being an order for the assassination of Lumumba. After seeing
[883]the documents listed above Tam of the opinion that it is most likely that the NSC
[884]meeting of August 18, 1960 i is the meeting referred to by Mr. Johnson. Although
[885]the record shows that I was present at that meeting I have no personal recollection
[886]of any such statement or order by the President.
[888]4, [note that as to the Memorandum of. Discussion at the 456th Meeting
[889]_ of the National Security Council, Thursday, August 18, 1960 (reference C, above)
[890]a page or pages immediately before the second page of the exhibit seem to be missing,
[891]5. [tis my understanding that the six exhibits noted above, will be
[893]appended to this affidavit for filing by the Select Committee,
[895]Prepared by me on this 23rd day of September, 1975.
[897]Rhett Dawson,
[899]Counsel
[901]Senate Select Committee to Study
[902]Government Operations With Respect to
[903]Intelligence Activities
[905]HW 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 21 I
[907]MEMORANDUM
[909]To: The Files INVENTORIED:
[910]From: Frederick D. Baron on 3}3//17 _
[911]p&
[912]BY —.. — a
[913]Date: September 5, 1975
[914]Re: Interview with James Douglas on Lumumba Assassination Case.
[916]I spoke by phone today with James Douglas, who was
[917]Deputy Secretary of Defense in the Eisenhower Administration
[918]from early December 1959 until January 21, 1961.
[920]Mr. Douglas served under DOD Secretary Thomas Gates.
[922]I interviewed Mr. Douglas because of a reference to him
[923]in Douglas Dillon's testimony (Dillon, p.19). Dillon said that
[924]in a phone conversation with Gates about the Pentagon meeting
[925](at which Dillon said someone raised the question of assassi-
[926]nating Lumumba) Gates named James Douglas as a person likely
[927]to have attended such a meeting.
[929]Never Heard Suggestion of Assassination
[931]Mr. Douglas said that during his tenure in office, he
[932]never heard a suggestion of the assassination of Lumumba raised
[933]in his presence. "I never heard speculation that it was even
[934]on anyone's mind," he said.
[936].Pentagon Meeting
[938]Mr. Douglas does not recall a meeting at the Pentagon
[939]in the summer of 1960 (as recounted by Douglas Dillon) where
[940]the question of assassinating Lumumba was raised. Mr. Douglas
[941]says that it was possible that he attended such a meeting, but
[942]he has’ no recollection of it.
[944]Special Group Meetings
[946]Mr. Douglas attended Special Group meetings with some
[947]regularity. Frequently, however, these meetings were attended
[948]by Mr. Irwin, who was Assistant Secretary of Defense for Inter-
[949]national Security Affairs during that period. Douglas said
[950]that Irwin was "more actively in contact with the State Depart-
[951]ment and the CIA during this time." (Irwin is now practicing
[952]law in New York.)
[954]Mr. Douglas said that the question of assassination of
[955]Lumumba was not raised in his presence at a Special Group meeting.
[957]x
[959]HY 509545. .DopId:32423566 Page 22
[962]HW 50955  DocTd:32493566 Page 23 0 0,
[964]Memo to Files
[965]‘September 5, 1975
[966]Page Two
[968]I read to him a quote from the Special Gropp minutes of
[969]September 8, 1960. -Douglas was in attendance at this
[970]meeting. Mr. Gordon Gray was quoted as saying that he hoped
[971]that CIA people were "fully aware of the top-level feeling
[973]in Washington that vigorous action would not be amiss."
[974]Douglas had no independent recollection of this remark or the
[975]discussion to which it related.
[977]Note:
[979]I indicated to Mr. Douglas that it probably would not
[980]be necessary to call him to testify on the Lumumba matter.
[981]Mr. Douglas' phone numbers are: (617) 693-1353 (until September
[982]29) and (312) 726-2452 (office in Chicago).
[984]cc: Rhett Dawson
[985]Burt Wides
[986]Fritz Schwarz
[987]Curt Smothers
[989]FDB/dsm
[991]MEMORANDUM
[993]To: The Files INVENTORIED:
[994]From: Frederick D. Baron ox 3]
[995]BY bo
[996]Date: September 5, 1975 ;
[997]Re: Interview with James Douglas on Lumumba Assassination Case.
[999]I spoke by phone today with James Douglas, who was
[1000]Deputy Secretary of Defense in the Eisenhower Administration
[1001]from early December 1959 until January 21, 1961.
[1003]Mr. Douglas served under DOD Secretary Thomas Gates.
[1005]I interviewed Mr. Douglas because of a reference to him
[1006]in Douglas Dillon's testimony (Dillon, p.19). Dillon said that
[1007]in a phone conversation with Gates about the Pentagon meeting
[1008](at which Dillon said someone raised the question of assassi-
[1009]nating Lumumba) Gates named James Douglas as a person likely
[1010]to have attended such a meeting.
[1012]Never Heard Suggestion of Assassination
[1014]Mr. Douglas said that during his tenure in office, he
[1015]“never heard a suggestion of the assassination of Lumumba raised
[1016]in his presence. "I never heard speculation that it was even
[1017]on anyone's mind," he said.
[1019]. Pentagon Meeting
[1021]Mr. Douglas does not recall a meeting at the Pentagon
[1022]in the summer of 1960 (as recounted by Douglas Dillon) where
[1023]the question of assassinating Lumumba was raised. Mr. Douglas
[1024]says that it was possible that he attended such a meeting, but
[1025]he has’ no recollection of it.
[1027]Special Group Meetings
[1029]Mr. Douglas attended Special Group meetings with some
[1030]regularity. Frequently, however, these meetings were attended
[1031]by Mr. Irwin, who was Assistant Secretary of Defense for Inter-
[1032]national Security Affairs during that period, Douglas said
[1033]that Irwin was “more actively in contact with the State Depart-
[1034]ment and the CIA during this time." (Irwin is now practicing
[1035]law in New York.)
[1037]Mr. Douglas said that the question of assassination of
[1038]Lumumba was not raised in his presence at a Special Group meeting.
[1040]BW 50955. Docld:32423566 Page 24
[1042]HW 50955 . Docld:32423566. Page 25
[1044]Memo to Files
[1045]September 5, 1975
[1046]Page Two
[1048]I read to him a quote from the Special Gropp minutes of
[1049]September. 8,.1960. Douglas.was in attendance at this
[1050]meeting. Mr. Gordon Gray was quoted as saying that he hoped
[1051]that CIA people were “fully aware of the top-level feeling
[1053]in Washington that vigorous action would not be amiss."
[1054]Douglas had no independent recollection of this remark or the
[1055]‘discussion to which it related. _
[1057]Note:
[1059]I indicated to Mr. Douglas that it probably would not
[1060]be necessary to call him to testify on the Lumumba matter.
[1061]Mr. Douglas' phone numbers are: (617) 693=1353 (until September
[1062]29) and (312) 726-2452 (office in Chicago).
[1064]ce: Rhett Dawson
[1065]Burt Wides
[1066]Fritz Schwarz
[1067]Curt Smothers
[1069]FDB/dsm
[1072]- Ke f
[1073]FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN ~ i —_ \W iR wl)
[1074]JOUN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN 777 IX - gs 4 - ae
[1075]PHILIP A. HART, MICH. HOWARD H. BAKER, JR * * le . - ao
[1076]* WALTER fe-}oNDALE, MINN. BARRY GOLDWATER, AW‘,
[1077]WALTER D. HUDOLESTON, KY. CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
[1079]Shnvamrreoon Manna s Sowemamsre Wkwited Btafes Denate
[1081]WILLIAM G, MILLER, STAFF DIREGTOR
[1082]FREDERICK A. 0. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL,
[1083]CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL
[1085]ICC
[1087]SELECT COMMITTEE TO
[1088]STUDY. GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
[1089]RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
[1091](PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 06TH CONGRESS)
[1093]WASHINGTON. D.C. 20510
[1095]1l October 1975
[1097]t
[1098]j
[1100]i
[1103]on 38/77
[1104]. : . + cca, H
[1105]Mr. John N. Irwin II a ay C :
[1107]Patterson, Belknap and Webb — oo
[1108]30 Rockefeller Plaza
[1109]New York, New York 10020
[1111]Dear Mr. Irwin:
[1113]Thank you. for sending the rewritten version of your affida-
[1114]vit. All of the changes you have made are perfectly satis-
[1115]factory and accurately reflect my understanding of the state-
[1116]ments you made ‘on September 22.
[1118]I am enclosing the statement with my signature so that.you
[1119]may .proceed to sign and swear to Lt.
[1121]Due to the sensitivity of the subject matter, it. would be
[1122]appreciated if you will not retain a copy-of the affidavit. A
[1123]copy will remain on file at the Committee and accessible to you
[1124]at any time.
[1126]I look forward to receiving the sworn statement. Once
[1127]again many thanks for your cooperation and careful attention
[1128]to this matter.
[1130]Sincerely, . O
[1131]Pdr relen vaae oe.
[1134]Frederick D. Baron 7
[1135]Special Assistant to the
[1136]Chief Counsel
[1138]HW 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 26 9
[1140]STATEMENTS OF JOHN N. IRWIN Il
[1142]TO FREDERICK D. BARON ON SEPTEMBER 22, 1975
[1144]Throughout 1960 and until the end of the Eisenhower
[1145]Administration, 1 served as Assistant Secretary of Defense:
[1146].for International Security Affairs. My current business —
[1147]address is c/o Patterson, Balknap & Webb, 30 Rockefeller
[1148]Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10020.
[1150]1. On September 22, 1975 in my office I reviewed with
[1151]Mr. Baron the following documents in-an attempt to refresh
[1152]my recollection on discussions that took place at certain
[1153]governmental meetings: the Memorandum for the Record of
[1154]the Special Group. meetings of June 30, 1960 and August
[1155]25, 1960; the Memorandum for the Record of the National
[1156]Security Meetings of July 21, 1960, August 18, 1960, and
[1157]September 21, 1960; and the Record of Action of the NSC
[1159]7 Meetings of July 15, 1960 and September 7, 1960. These
[1160]documents indicate that I attended all of these meetings
[1161]except the NSC meeting of August 18, 1960, which Mr. Hadyn
[1162]Williams of ISA attended. I also reviewed the affidavit
[1163]of C. Douglas Dillon dated May 21, 1975 which refers, inter
[1164]alia, toa meeting at the Pentagon in the summer of 1960.
[1166]2. Even after attempting to refresh my recollection
[1167]by reviewing the above-mentioned documents, I still have no
[1169]direct recollection of the discussions which they memorialize.
[1171]HW 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 27 ES
[1173]I do not recall any discussion of any assassination plan
[1174]connected to.-the United States Government during the entire
[1175]course of my government service. I do not recall ever
[1176]hearing of the.CIA adopting any assassination plan, nor do I
[1177]recall ever hearing the President make a statement that
[1178]could be construed as an order for the assassination of
[1179]Patrice Lumumba.
[1181]3. In answer to a question from Mr. Baron I said that
[1182]in my opinion the language used in the Memorandum for the
[1183]Record of the Special Group Meeting of August 25, 1960 is
[1184]sufficiently broad so it could be interpreted to cover a
[1185]‘discussion of assassination:
[1187]tt was finally agreed that planning for the
[1188]Congo would not necessarily rule out "con-
[1189]sideration" of any particular kind of activity
[1190]which might contribute to getting rid of
[1191]Lumumba.
[1192]However, I do not remember any such discussion, nor do I have
[1193]any direct recollection of the substance of that meeting.
[1195]4. In answer to a question from Mr. Baron I said that
[1196]in my opinion the language used in the Memorandum for the
[1197]Record of the NSC Meeting of September 21,°1960 is. sufficiently
[1199]broad so it could be interpreted to cover a discussion of
[1201]assassination:
[1203]HY 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 26 7
[1205]Mobutu appeared to be the effective power
[1207]in the Congo for the moment but Lumumba.
[1209]was not yet disposed of and remained a
[1211]grave danger as long as he was not dis-'
[1213]posed of.
[1214]However, I do not remember any such discussion, nor do'I
[1215]have any direct recollection of the substance of that
[1216]meeting. | |
[1218]5. Although Hadyn Williams probably reported to me
[1219]on the substance of the NSC Meeting of August 18, 1960, I
[1220]do not have any recollection of such a report, nor do I have
[1221]any other recollection of learning by another source of any
[1222]of the substance of the discussion at that meeting.
[1223]| 6. It is possible that I was present at the meeting
[1224]at the Pentagon to which Mr. Dillon's affidavit refers. How-
[1225]ever, I do not remember if I were at this particular meeting;
[1226]nor do I remember attending any meeting at the Pentagon where
[1227]the question of assassinating Patrice Lumumba was raised.
[1228]7. In answer to a question from Mr. Baron I said
[1230]that in my opinion it would be improper for the Director
[1231]of the Central Intelligence Agency to undertake an assassi-
[1233]nation operation without an express directive from the
[1235]President.
[1237]; . . ; yp.
[1238]Prepared by me on this / th day of October , 1975
[1240]Frederick D. Baron
[1241]Special Assistant to the Chief Counsel
[1242]Senate Select Committee to Study
[1244]Governmental Operations with Respect
[1245]to Intelligence Activities
[1247]HY 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 29 C
[1249](n- C- L Gg wy FI - .
[1251]File:
[1253]September 23, 1975
[1255]Mr. John N. Inwin IT
[1256]Patterson, Bellknap & Webb
[1257]30 Rockefeller Plaza
[1258]New York, New York 10020
[1260]Dear Hr.- Irwin:
[1262]Enclosed please: find a copy of the statement I
[1263]prepared as a result of our recent discussion.
[1265]Please feel free to make any additions.or correc~
[1266]tions in the statement. It would be appreciated if you
[1267]would mall a sworn copy of your statement to me as soon
[1269]as possible.
[1271]Thanks very much for your help in this matter.
[1273]Sincerely,
[1275]Frederick D. Baron
[1276]Special Assistant to the
[1277]Chief Counsel :
[1279]Enclosure
[1281]FDB/do
[1283]bee : wei Dynes,
[1285]Fai bo Soe speepe 2
[1287]HW 50955 Docld:32493566° Page ‘30
[1289]STATEMENTS OF JOUN N. IRWIN IL
[1290]TO FREDERICK. D. BARON ON SEPTEMBER 22, 1975
[1292]Throughout 1960 and until the end of the Eisenhower Admin-
[1293]istration, I served as Assistant Secretary of Defense. My
[1294]‘current business address is c/o Patterson, Bellknap. & Webb, 30
[1296]Rockefeller Plaza, New York, New York. 7
[1298]1. ‘On September 22, 1975 in my law. office I reviewed the
[1299]following documents to refresh my recollection on discussions that
[1300]took place at certain governmental meetings: the Memorandum for
[1301]the Record of the Special Group meetings of June 30, 1960 and
[1302]August 25, 1960; the Memorandum for the Record of the National
[1303]Security Meetings of July 21, 1960, August 18, 1960, and
[1304]September 21, 1960; and the Record of Action of the NSC meetings
[1305]of July 15, 1960 and September 7, 1960. As indicated in these
[1306]documents, I attended all of these meetings except the NSC
[1307]‘meeting of August 18, 1960, where I was represented by Mr. Hadyn
[1308]Williams. I also reviewed the affidavit of Cc. Douglas Dillon
[1309]‘dated May 21, 1975 which refers, inter alia, to a Meeting at the
[1310]Pentagon in the summer of 1960. . .
[1312]2. Even after attempting to refresh my recollection by
[1313]reviewing the above-mentioned documents, I still have no direct
[1314]recollection of the discussions which they memorialize. I do
[1315]not recall any discussion of any assassination plan connected to
[1317]the United States government during the entire course of my
[1319]HY 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 31
[1321]government service. I do not recall whether I ever heard of the
[1322]CIA adopting any assassination plan; nor do I recall whether I
[1323]ever heard the President make a statement that could be construed
[1324]as an order for the assassination of Patrice: Lumumba.
[1326]3. It is my opinion as a former member of the Special
[1327]Group and as a participant in the meeting of August 25, 1960 that
[1328]the following language from the Memorandum for.the Record is broad
[1329]enough: to cover a discussion of assassination:
[1331]It was finally agreed that planning for the
[1332]Congo would not necessarily rule out "con-
[1333]sideration" of any particular kind of activity
[1334]which might contribute to getting rid of
[1335]Lumumba, : ;
[1336]However, I do not remember. any such discussion. I do not have
[1337]any direct. recollection of the substance of that meeting.
[1339]4, It is my opinion as a frequent participant in WSC
[1340]meetings and as a participant in the meeting of September 21,
[1341]1960, that the following language-from the Memorandum for the
[1342]Record is broad enough to cover a discussion of assassination:
[1344]Mobutu appeared to be the effective power
[1345]in the Congo for the moment but Lumumba was
[1346]not yet disposed of and remained a grave
[1347]danger as long as he was not disposed of.
[1348]However, I do not remember any such discussion. I do not have
[1349]any direct recollection of the substance of that meeting.
[1350]- 5. Although Hadyn Williams probably reported to me on the
[1352]substance of the NSC meeting of August 18, 1960, I do not have
[1354]HW 50955 Docld:32493566 Page 32
[1356]any recollection of such a report nor do I have any other recol-_
[1357]lection of learning by another source of any of the substance
[1358]of the discussion at that. meeting.
[1360]6. It is likely that I was present. at the meeting at the
[1361]Pentagon to which Mr. Dillon's affidavit refers. However, I do
[1363]“not remember if I was at this particular meeting, nor do I re-
[1365]menber whether I was present at any meeting at the Pentagon where
[1366]the question of assassinating Patrice Lumumba was raised.
[1368]7. It is my general opinion that it would be improper for
[1369]the Director of Central Intelligence to undertake an assassination
[1371]operation without an express directive from the President.
[1373]Prepared by me on this 22nd day of September, -1975.
[1375]Frederick D. Baron,
[1376]Special Assistant to the Chief Counsel
[1377]Senate Select Committee to Study
[1378]Governmental Operations With Respect. to
[1379]Intelligence Activities
[1381]HW 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 33
[1383]HY 409545
[1385]“State of New York
[1387]County of
[1389]SS:
[1391]Nene See St
[1393]JOHN N.° IRWIN II, being duly sworn, deposes and says:.
[1395]I have read the attached statement consisting of three pages
[1397]prepared by Frederick D.-Baron, Counsel to the Senate Select
[1399]Committee te Study Governmental Operations With Respect. to
[1400]Intelligence Activities, based upon my conversation with him
[1402]on September 5, 1975, and I hereby adopt and ratify this state-
[1404]ment which is true and correct to my direct knowledge,
[1406]John N. Irwin IL
[1408]Sworn to before me this |
[1409]day of September, 1975, . :
[1411]Notary Public
[1413]Docld: 32473566 Page 34
[1415]WW 509557:
[1417]@1d:32493566 Page 35
[1419]pte Or Be @ - WhToln cee
[1421]SUBITCTs ASSASSINATION OF LUMUMBA
[1422]PARTICIPANTS : MR. JOHESON AKD MR, WILLIAM G. MILLER
[1424]DATE: JUNE 10, 1975
[1426]Mr. Robert Johnson whe is now at the Overseas Development Council
[1427]for the curmer, telephone 234-8701, was a member of the National Security
[1428]Council staff working on Asian affairs in the lest two years of the
[1429]Figenhower Administration and the first year of the Kennedy Administration.
[1430]He said that on occaston, when people were on vacation, he was assigned
[1431]the. task of taking notes eat HSC meetings. In July or August of 1960,
[1432]ir. Johnson hed the task of note toking. After a review of world evente,
[1433]by Director of CIA Dulles, which included a description of Mr. Lumumba 's
[1434]activities in Africa, Eisenhower turned to Dulles during the meeting in
[1435]the full hearing of all those in attendance, and said something to the effect
[1436]that Lusamba should be eliminated. According to Mr. Johneon, there was
[1437]a stunned silence for about 15 seconds and the meeting continued. He
[1438]eaid he wrote the notes and that if they still exist, they are probably
[1439]in the Eisenhower Presidential papers. He said that notes generally in
[1440]presidential papers, official documents of the NSC, remain with the NSC.
[1441]He said that the impression at the time was cone of great shock. He ceaid
[1442]he had heard of nothing like that since, He eaid &t was uncharacheristic
[1443]of Elsenhower to speak of anything of substance during R&C meetings,
[1444]reserving judgaent to private meetings. He dcee not remember exectly
[1446]who wae at the meeting beyond Herter and Dulles, and possibly James lay,
[1448]Gordon Grey end Robert EMory.
[1452]Be
[1454]I asked if he would be willing to &ey this under gvorn testimony.
[1456]He said that paving gone this far he would, but he cautioned that 15
[1458]years hed passed and he could not youch for the exaet wording, although
[1460]'
[1462]i
[1464]|
[1466]nis menory of the 4nypact of the meeting 4s firm.
[1468]|
[1470]\ My. Johnson called one hour after the meeting gay ing that upon
[1471]| . :
[1473]i
[1474]|
[1476]reflection, he would prefer not to testify. if at all possible unless it
[1478]| yas absolutely escential. He fears retribution, saying that such
[1479]| testinonies in the past have plackballed people who were interested in
[1481]yorking for the government « Again, he cited people who had testified
[1482]for the right cause such as the Podd case- He said he would testily
[1484]if it were deened to be absolutely necessary put he ada cant to raise
[1486]| this question.
[1492]HY 40
[1493]94545 Docld: 32423566 Page 36
[1495]MEMORANDUM
[1497]PROVES T ORT ED:
[1499]To: The Files
[1501]From: Frederick D. Baron
[1503]Date: September 5, 1975"
[1505]Re: Interview with Robert Johnson regarding the Lumumba Case.
[1507]I interviewed Robert Johnson by phone this afternoon
[1508]to supplement the earlier interview (June 10, 1975) and
[1509]examination (June 18, 1975) that the Committee conducted
[1510]with him. At the beginning of the conversation I explained
[1511]there were a number of questions raised by his interview
[1512]and examination that needed to be answered on the record.
[1513]Because it was inconvenient for him to make a trip to Washington
[1514]in the near future and becawse of the limited amount of addi-
[1515]tional information he was able to provide, we agreed that I
[1516]would memorialize the important points of our interview in the
[1517]form of an affidavit to which Mr. Johnson would swear.
[1519]‘The following points are related as faithfully as
[1520]possible in the manner in which Mr. Johnson made them:
[1522]lL. I never heard of a CIA plot assassinate Lumumba
[1523]with lethal biological substances.
[1525]2. To the best of my recollection, President EFisen-
[1526]hower turned toward Allen Dulles when he made
[1527]the statement relating to Lumumba about which I
[1528]have testified.
[1530]3. After the meeting at which I heard the statement
[1531]by President Eisenhower which I described in my
[1532]testimony on June 18, 1975, I must have consulted
[1533]James Lay (Executive Secretary of the NSC) for
[1534]advice on how to treat the President's statement
[1535]in my memorandum of the meeting. Mr. Lay was
[1536]meticulous about including in the record some form
[1537]of reference to every major subject that was dis-
[1538]cussed at NSC meetings. So we probably included
[1539]the President's statement in some form, but in
[1540]what form I do not know. In general, these memo-
[1541]randa would be as complete as we could make them.
[1542]Nevertheless, on something as sensitive as this,
[1543]we may have decided to handle it with euphemism.
[1545]4, The NSC meeting of September 21, 1961 is probably
[1546]not the meeting at which I heard the President's
[1548]HY 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 37 t
[1550]Memo for the Files
[1551]Page Two
[1553]HY 450955 Dacld: 3274273566
[1555]September 5, 1975
[1557]statement in reference to Lumumba. Based on Mr.
[1558]Baron's representation that I am not listed (either
[1559]by name or position) among the participants in the
[1560]Memorandum of record, I am convinced that I heard
[1561]the President's statement at a different meeting.
[1563]After hearing Mr. Baron read portions of the minutes
[1564]of the NSC meeting of September 21, 1961 to me, I
[1566]do have a recollection of some of the subject matter
[1567]that was discussed at that meeting. This would not
[1568]be unusual, however, because as a member of the NSC
[1569]Planning Board I received a debriefing on the sub-
[1570]ject matter of each NSC meeting. I do not, however,
[1571]have a recollection of the statement by Mr. Dulles
[1572]as related in the minutes of the meeting: "Lumumba
[1573]was not yet disposed of and remained a grave danger
[1574]as long as he was not disposed of.
[1576]Page 36
[1578]= (Xe 2- 4 we at
[1579]: A
[1582]STATEMENTS BY JAMES LAY : DN Bhd.
[1584]TO FREDERICK D. BARON ON SEPTEMBER 8, 1995-—_
[1586]I was the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council
[1587]throughout 1960. My summer address is Route 2, Box 273-A, Stanley,
[1588]Virginia 22851.
[1590]1. TL am unable, after all these years as Executive Secretary’
[1591]of the ‘NSC and subsequently of the United States Intelligence Board,
[1592]to recollect the substance of discussions relating to the Congo in
[1593]NSC meetings during 1966. My principal function at NSC meetings
[1595]was as the official recorder of the minutes of these meetings, and
[1596]not as a policymaker. I cannot at this: time recall the substance
[1598]of any specific discussions or decisions relating to Patrice Lumumba
[1599]in NSC meetings during this period.
[1601]2. I cannot recall whether there was any discussion of assas-
[1602]sinating Lumumba at any NSC meetings.
[1604].3. I do not recall whether President Eisenhower ever made a
[1605]remark at an NSC meeting that could have been construed ag an order
[1606]to assassinate Lumumba. |
[1608]4. 1 do not recollect whether any reference was made at any
[1609]NSC meeting to an assassination plan ‘or attempt in which the United
[1610]States was engaged.
[1612]5. In 1960 Robert Johnson was a member of. the NSC Staff as
[1613]the notekeeper at NSC meetings in the absence of Deputy Executive
[1614]Secretary Marian Boggs, who normally took the notes and prepared a
[1616]first draft of the official NSC minutes subject to my review and
[1618]if
[1620]HW 50955. Docld:32493566 Page 39°. ~~
[1622]revision for circulation to the NSC members for approval.
[1624]| 6. If extremely sensitive matters were discussed at an NSC
[1625]meeting, it was sometimes the practice that the official WSC
[1626]minutes would record only the general subject discussed without
[1627]identifying the specially sensitive subject or the discussion.
[1628]In highly sensitive cases, no reference to the subject would be
[1629]made in the NSC minutes.
[1631]| According to my recollection at this time, there was-no
[1633]fixed procedure for recording the discussions of these sensitive
[1634]matters which were usually discussed in a very limited attendance.
[1635]Some of these discussions were of a general nature which did not
[1636]need to be recorded. Others were of such importance that a full
[1637]record was drafted by me and my deputy, as he attended, and circu-~
[1638]lated by highly classified memorandum to each of the NSC members
[1639]for approval. In some cases, only a record of the conclusions and
[1640]decisions, if any, were similarly drafted and approved. As approved
[1641]by the NSC members and finally the President, the record of these
[1642]extremely sensitive matters were circulated on a very strictly con-
[1644]trolled distribution.
[1646]Prepared by me on this 8th day of September, 1975:
[1648]wa S PDP. B
[1650]fina Ln Ain few VP Derr
[1651]Frederick D. Baron
[1652]Special Assistant to the Chief Counsel ©
[1653]Senate Select Committee to Study
[1655]Governmental Operations With Respect
[1656]to Intelligence Activities
[1658]Oo
[1660]HW 40955. BocId: 32423566. Page 40. .
[1663]“State of Virginia )
[1665], Ss:
[1666]-- County of fig )
[1668]JAMES. LAY, being duly.sworn, deposes and says: [I
[1669]have read. the attached statement consisting of two pages pre-
[1670]pared by Frederick D. Baron, Counsel to the Senate Select
[1671]Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to
[1672]Intelligence Activities, based upon my conversation ‘with him
[1673]on September 8, 1975, and I hereby adopt and ratify this state-
[1675]ment which is true and correct to my direct knowledge.
[1677]BRACES
[1678]James Lay
[1680]Sworn to before me this JL th
[1682]day of September, 1975.
[1684]Notary Public
[1685]PNEECOMMISSION -EXPIRES AUGUST. 20.3407
[1687]4
[1689]HW 50955 Docld: 32423566 .Page.41 ..
[1691]4 | EO RG LOC)
[1693]SEL COM
[1694]File:
[1696]September 23, 1975
[1698]Mr. James Lay
[1699]Route 2, Box 273-A
[1700]Stanley, Virginia 22851
[1702]Bear Mr. Lay:
[1704]Enclosed please find a copy of the statement I é
[1705]prepared as a result of our recent discussion. ~
[1706]Please feel free to make any additions or correc-
[1707]tions in the statement. It would be appreciated Lf you
[1708]would mail a sworn copy of your statement toe me as soon
[1709]as possible. oe ;
[1711]Thanks very much for your help in thig matter.
[1713]Sincerely,
[1715]Frederick BD. Baron
[1716]Special Assistant to the
[1717]Chief Counsel :
[1719]Enclosure
[1721]bee: Rhett Dawson
[1722]Fritz Schwarz
[1724]FDB/do
[1726]aw 50955 Docld: 32423566 Page 42
[1728]STATEMENTS BY JAMES LAY
[1730].TO FREDERICK D. BARON ON SEPTEMBER 8, 1975.
[1732]I was the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council
[1733]chroughout. 1960. My summer address .is Route ‘2, Box 273-A, Stanley,
[1734]Virginia 22851. | .
[1736]1. Iam unable, after all these years as Executive Secretary
[1737]of the NSC and subsequent ly of the. United States Intelligence Board,
[1738]to recollect the substance of discussions relating to the Congo in
[1739]NSC meetings during 1960. My principal function at NSC meetings
[1740]was as the official recorder of the minutes of these meetings, and_
[1741]not asa policymaker. I cannot at this time recall the substance
[1742]of any specific discussions or decisions relating to Patrice Lumumba.
[1743]in NSC meetings during this period.
[1745]2. I cannot recall whether there was: any discussion of assas-
[1746]sinating Lumumba at any NSC meetings. |
[1748]3, I do not recall whether President Eisenhower ever made a
[1749]remark at an NSC meeting that could ‘have béen construed as an order
[1750]to assassinate Lumumba.
[1752]4. Ido not recollect whether any reference was made at any
[1753]NSC meeting to an assassination plan or attempt in which the United
[1754]States was engaged.
[1756]5. ° In 1960 Robert Johnson was a member of the NSC Staff as
[1757]the notekeeper at NSC meetings in the absence of Deputy Executive
[1758]Secretary Marian Boggs, who normally took the notes and prepared a
[1760]first draft of the official NSC minutes subject to my review and
[1762]HW 50955 Docld:32493566 Page 43 , : 7
[1764]be. i fe : . ay . . -2-
[1766]revision for elrculation to the NSC members for approval.
[1768]6.. Lf extremely sensitive matters were discussed at an NSC.
[1769]meeting, it was. sometimes the practice that the official NSC
[1770]minutes would record only the general subject discussed without
[1771]identifying. the specially sensitive subject or the discussion.
[1773]In highly sensitive cases, no reference to the subject would be
[1774]‘made in the NSC minutes.
[1776]According to my recollection at this time, there was no’
[1777]fixed procedure for recording the discussions of these sensitive
[1778]matters which were usually discussed ina very limited attendance. |
[1779]Some of these discussions were of a general nature which did not.
[1780]‘need'to be recorded, Others were of such importance that a full
[1781]record was drafted by me and my deputy, as he attended, and cireu-
[1782]lated by highly classified memorandum to each’ of the NSC members
[1783]for approval. In some cases, only a record of the conclusions and
[1784]decisions, if any, were similarly drafted and approved. As approved
[1785]by the NSC members and finally the President, the record of these
[1786]extremely sensitive matters were circulated. on a very strictly con-
[1788]trolled distribution,
[1790]Prepared by me on this 8th day of September, 1975,
[1792]Frederick D: Baron ,
[1793]“Special Assistant to the Chief Counsel
[1794]Senate Select Committee to Study
[1795]Governmental Operations With Respect
[1796]to Intelligence Activities
[1798]HW 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 44 -
[1800]State of Virginia /
[1801]SS:
[1803]County of
[1805]JAMES LAY, being duly sworn, deposes and says: L
[1806]have read the attached statement consisting of two pages pre-
[1807]“pared by Frederick D. Baron, Counsel to the Senate Select
[1808]Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to
[1809]‘Intelligence Activities, based upon my conversation with him
[1810]‘on September 8, 1975, and I hereby adopt and ratify this state-
[1812]ment which is true and, correct. to my direct knowledge.
[1814]James Lay
[1816]Sworn to before me this
[1817]. day of September, 1975
[1819]Notary Public
[1821]HY 50955 Docld: 327423566 Page 45
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[1925]HW 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 49
[1927]STATEMENT BY "ROBERT MARANA" i
[1928]TO FREDERICK BARON ON NOVEMBER 14, 1975 a ila oe
[1932]PO nan
[1934]i
[1936]Tama current ‘employee of ‘the Central Intelligence
[1937]Agency. My current address is c/o Review Staff, Central In-
[1938]‘telligence Agency, Langley, Virginia.
[1940]Ll. In -1960, I was employed by the CIA and one of my
[1941]responsibilities in the course of my employment was to serve as
[1942]the case officer at Headquarters for an agent who operated under
[1943]the eryptonym "WIROGUE . “Tread most of the cable traffic re-
[1944]lating to WIROGUE until the. point of ‘the termination of his re-
[1945]‘lationship with the Agency. .
[1946]| 2.  To'the best of my knowledge, I participated in all.
[1947]training that WEROGUE received in preparation for his assignment
[1948]to the Congo in 1960.
[1950]3. WIROGUE was not trained in medical immunization in
[1951]my presence. I am not aware that he was provided with any such
[1952]training.
[1954]| 4. -I have no knowledge of any CIA plot to assassinate
[1955]Patrice Lumumba, I have no knowledge that WLIROGUE was ever
[1956]connected to a plot to assassinate Lumumba, nor have I heard
[1957]"any hint or suggestion of such a connection.
[1959]5. ‘I hereby affirm that “Robert Marana" is an alias which
[1961]is registered at the CIA along with my true identity. My true
[1963]signature is affixed to this affidavit. The Senate Select
[1965]HW 50955 DoclId: 32423566 Page 50
[1967]Committee will receive a copy of this affidavit.,.from which
[1969]my true signature will be deleted. This statement will remain
[1971]on file at the CIA and will be available for verification purposes |
[1973]for not less than five years.
[1975]Frederick D. Baron, Special Assistant
[1976]to the Chief Counsel, Senate Select
[1978]. Committee to Study Governmental
[1980]Operations With Respect to Intelligence
[1981]Activities Se
[1983]HW 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 51
[1985]Hy 50955 eld:32423566 Page 52
[1987]i. J
[1989]INVENTO RIED:
[1991]MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES ey ON IA
[1993]LI
[1994]From: Gregory rreverton {| (M
[1996]| Subject: Kennedy Library Tape Recording of March 13, 1963
[1997]National Security Council Meeting
[1999]August®29-;--£9-25. Dee
[2001]On this date, I listened to a portion of the tape
[2002]of the March 13, 1963 meeting of the National Security
[2003]Council (President present). I listened to it several
[2004]times in order to check it against the Library trans-
[2005]cript of that meeting.
[2007]The relevant portion of the statement by John McCone
[2008]reads as follows:
[2010]"With respect to Cuba, the thinking in the Agency is...
[2012]we have to first get rid of the Soviets’...troops, and
[2014]as stated ((several words garbled)) and use every resource we
[2015]have available--political, diplomatic, otherwise--to accom-
[2016]plish that. Once that is done, then we believe that the
[2017]monolithic structure of the Castro regime can be broken up.
[2018]Maybe we'll have to catalyze it a little bit. But we think
[2019]that there are enough indicators of distress within the
[2020]military and within his political organization so that
[2022]once the Soviets are out some...military coup can be..
[2024]will be brought about which will remove the Castro
[2025]government, and with a strong possibility of replacing
[2027]that government with a government more favorable to our
[2028]interests in the Western Hemisphere. Now, this is...
[2029]there's a lot of ifs connected with that, but it seems
[2031]to use, after having thought about this a good deal, that
[2032]some guch action as that is a more probably course of
[2033]action that would be successful than to try to out..to
[2034]envisage an uprising on the part of the population in the
[2035]absence of the military...With the military and security
[2036]forces on behalf of Castro, they can very easily frustrate
[2037]and defeat any civilian uprising. I think, as time goes
[2038]on, that our principal problem is going to be dealing
[2040]with the future of Cuba and the future of Latin America.
[2042]I think the problems of the Bay of Pigs and the October
[2043]incident and the missiles will disappear, and more and
[2045]more attention is going to be brought on the part of the
[2046]people on the Hill...is going to be...is how we're going
[2048]to dispose of this problem."
[2050]Then the President speaks.
[2053]io - .
[2055]as
[2058]NATIONAL SECURLTY INFORMATION
[2060]_ .. . ORIGINAL AL
[2061]. rem SARE Unauthorized Disclosure Subject
[2062]a BM Es 3
[2063]it a‘ Sle was Vol.l OF 3 to Criminal Sanctions
[2065]PIOIS
[2067]INVENTORIED:
[2069]The United States Senate
[2071]Report of Proceedings
[2073]Hearing held before
[2077]Senate Select Committee to Study Governmen
[2079]Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities
[2081]Tuesday, September 2, 1975
[2083]Washington, D.C.
[2085](Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over
[2086]to the Committee for destruction)
[2088]WARD & PAUL
[2090]410 FIRST STREET, S. E.
[2091]WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003
[2093](202) 544-6000
[2095]50955 Docld:32423566 Page 53
[2097]SHELBURNE: Lyndh . . A
[2099]TOP SECRET
[2101]1 WRT CONTENTS
[2103]2 Testimony of: Page
[2105]z Cc. Douglas Dillon ; 2
[2107]Phone (Area 202) 544-6000
[2109]8 Exhibits
[2110]9 Exhibit No. 1
[2112]10 Exhibit No. 2 35
[2114]tyhibi No.
[2115]ll Exhibit No 3 37
[2117]12 Exhibit No. 4 ; 44
[2119]13 Exhibit No. 5
[2121]WARD & PAUL
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[2148]Phone (Area 202) 544-6000
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[2156]WARD & PAUL
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[2175]HY 40955 Dactld:3
[2177]‘TOP SECRET
[2179]EXECUTIVE SESSION
[2180]Tuesday, September 2, 1975
[2182]United States Senate,
[2183]Select Committee to Study Governmental
[2184]Operations with Respect to
[2185]Intelligence Activities,
[2186]Washington, D.C.
[2187]The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:00 o'clock
[2188]p.m., in Room 608, Capitol Hill Hotel, Senator Gary W. Hart
[2189]presiding.
[2190]Present: Senator Hart of Colorado (presiding).
[2191]Also present: Frederick Baron and Rhett Dawson,
[2192]Professional Staff Members.
[2193]Mr. Baron. Would you state your name and address for the
[2194]record, please?
[2195]Mr. Dillon. My name is C. Douglas Dillon. And my address
[2196]is Far Hills, New Jersey.
[2197]Mr. Baron. Mr. Dillon, we have a few formalities that we |
[2198]must go through with every witness.
[2199]I want to know first of all if you are aware that you have
[2200]the right to counsel here today?
[2201]Mr. Dillon. Yes, I am aware.
[2203]TOP SECRET
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[2237]HW 50955 Docld:
[2239]TESTIMONY OF C. DOUGLAS DILLON 7 2
[2241]TOP SECRET
[2243]Mr. Baron. And are you aware that you may cease answering
[2244]questions at any point to seek advice of counsel?
[2246]Mr. Dillon. I am glad you have so notified me.
[2248]Mr. Baron. And are you vuluntarily appearing here today
[2249]without counsel?
[2251]Mr. Dillon. Yes, I am.
[2253]Mr. Baron. Are you also aware that you have all of your
[2254]constitutional rights intact here before the Committee,
[2255]including your Fifth Amentment rights?
[2257]Mr. Dillon. I am glad to know that.
[2259]Mr. Baron. Mr. Dillon, could you please give the
[2261]‘Committee a general idea of your position in the Government
[2263]from, say, late 1959 until March of 1961?
[2265]Mr. Dillon. In late 1959 I was Under Secretary of State,
[2267]which was the number two position in the State Department.
[2269]And I continued in that position until 1961.
[2271]My duties as such were two-fold. One was the position as
[2272]the First Deputy to the Secretary of State, and Acting
[2273]Secretary in his absence from time to time, in which capacity
[2274]I had to be fully aware at all times of moreorless everything
[2275]that was in the ken of the State Department, so I could fill
[2276]in for the Secretary of State as necessary. And in those
[2277]days the Secretary was absent a good deal of the time, because
[2278]there were travels abroad, and various reasons. I think I
[2279]mentioned in my affidavit that I think I served as Acting
[2281]Secretary at least a third of the time during that period.
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[2318]My other duty, which was a more particular duty, was to be
[2319]in charge of the economic side of our foreign policy, which
[2320]included economic areas of the State Department, and also
[2321]included oversight and general direction of the ICA, which
[2322]was the name at that time of the Foreign Aid Agency. And I
[2323]had the responsibility for Congressional relations of the
[2324]Foreign Aid Program, and for getting the Legislation passed
[2325]each year, for not the detailed operation, there was a directo
[2326]of the ICA but I had the general oversight of it. And also a
[2328]military program, which was not under the ICA, but which was
[2330]-xun through the Defense Department, and I was the senior State
[2332]Department official involved in that area.
[2334]So I had those two aifferent functions. And for that
[2335]reason the setup in this area of working with the CIA and on
[2336]intelligence matters was somewhat different than it had been
[2337]prior to that. Prior to my advent as Under Secretary the
[2338]Under Secretary had always ahndled that. Mr. Herter, who was
[2339]my immediate predecessor, handled it, and Mr. Hoover before.
[2340]When I became: Under Secretary I became so under a new law that
[2341]had been passed in 1958, at which time I was promoted to
[2342]Deputy Under Secretary to the new position, which was called
[2343]Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, which was the
[2344]number three job in the Department. That legislation provided
[2345]that this third Under Secretary could either be an Under
[2347]Secretary for Economic Affairs, as I was, or an Under Secretar
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[2357]8 1 for Political Affairs, the implication being that he would be
[2358]8 :
[2359]: 2 the Under Secretary for Political Affairs if the Under
[2360]i 3 Secretary, the number two fellow, handled the eocnomic area,
[2361]5 4 which Mr. Herter did, not when I was first appointed as Under
[2362]5 Secretary for Economic Affairs, but then when I became Under
[2363]6 Secretary I took with me the economic responsibilities.
[2364]y | So The number three fellow was named Under Secretary for
[2365]8 Political Affairs. It was Mr. Murphy first, and then Mr.
[2366]9 Merchant. And they handled in each case all the details of
[2367]10 the Special Group.
[2368]Ll Mr. Barron. And the liaison with the CIA?
[2369]; 12 Mr. Dillon. And the liaison with the CIA. That was not
[2370]‘ 13 handled at the Assistant Secretary level, a great deal of it
[2371]14 was done at the Assistant Secretary level, but when it got
[2372]45 above that, it went to the Under Secretary of Political
[2373]16 Affairs. On the other hand, when things were really important,
[2374]W I was notified, because I had to know about them if an
[2375]18 "emergency came up whilte the Secretary was out of town. But
[2376]. 19 that was not my particular problem.
[2377]: 20 Mr. Barron. So you would be kept notified of major
[2378]: 21 developments in the Special Group by Mr. Murphy or Mr.
[2379]i 22 Merchant? .
[2380]4 23 Mr. Dillon. Yes, major developments.
[2381]: 24 And I do remember over that year of sitting in occasionall
[2382]: 25 on meetings that I presume were on that. But they all dealt
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[2421]with economic assistance to the various political groups in
[2422]different countries when they needed help.
[2423]Mr. Barron. Did you attend National Security meetings
[2424]regularly?
[2426]Mr. Dillon. I attended National Security meetings quite
[2427]regularly whenever I was in town, eith in --
[2429](Off the record discussion)
[2431]Senator Hart. Mr. Dillon, ao you swear that the testimony
[2432]you are giving is the truth, the whole truth and nothing but
[2433]the truth, so help you. God?
[2435]Mr. Dillon. I do.
[2437]Senator Hart. Justtfor the record, you also understand
[2438]that all of the testimony you have given will be covered by
[2439]the oath?
[2441]Mr. Dillon. That is correct.
[2443]Senator Hart. I am sure the Staff has advised you of your
[2444]constitutional rights?
[2446]Mr. Dillon. They have.
[2448]Mr. Barron. Would you read back the witness' last answer?
[2450]The witness' last answer was read.)
[2452]ur. Dillon. Either in the capacity as Acting Secretary of
[2453]State if the Secretary was out of town, or as one of the
[2454]Assistants when he was in town because of the fact that I had
[2455]overall supervision of the Foreign Aid, both military and
[2457]economic programs, at that time, and therefore, it was
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[2464]TOP SECRET
[2466]important that I be fully aware of everything that went on at
[2468]8
[2469]3 1
[2470]$ National Security meetings. And they took place as you know,
[2471]a
[2472]2
[2473]8 at that time on a regular basis every Thursday, I think it was.
[2474]< 3
[2475]2 morning.
[2476]oO
[2477]a 4
[2478]Mr. Baron. Andtwhere.did. they take* place? ss: 2: sjie-Y
[2479]5
[2480]Mr. Dillon. In the Capitol Room at the White House.
[2481]6 ;
[2482]Mr. Baron. Were you in a position as Under Secretary of
[2483]7
[2484]State to be aware of every major CIA operation against a
[2485]8
[2486]foreign leader or a foreign government?
[2487]9
[2488]Mr. Dillon. I think if there were any such things I would
[2489]10
[2490]assume that I would have been aware of them.
[2491]11
[2492]Mr. Baron. Would you have also have been aware of any
[2493]12 ee
[2494]3 communications or orders running from the President to the
[2495]z 13 ;
[2496]a Director of Central Intelligence?
[2497]sud
[2498]Mr. Dillon. Only if they had been.given.in my presence
[2499]15
[2500]and. I had. heard of them. I wouldn't necessarily be aware of
[2501]16 . ;
[2502]them otherwise. If the President had wanted the State
[2503]1?
[2504]Department to be aware of it, ~~ and they usually did, there
[2505]18 . - . .
[2506]was pretty good coordination there, Gordon Gray was his Special
[2507]19 . —— as a
[2508]3 Assistant and would; keep:everybody notified. But that weraien
[2509]oO
[2510]S 20 ; :
[2511]* wouldn't necessarily mean that we knew of every particular
[2512]E 21
[2513]é thing.
[2515]d Mr. Baron. In what manner were you made aware of major
[2516]a 23 saga
[2517]2 CIA covert activities?
[2518]2 24
[2519]é Mr. Dillon. I think if they were major they were all
[2520]oO
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[2558]discussed at one time or another in the National Security
[2559]Council, or they at least knew about them at that time, becaus
[2560]the major activity that was just getting underway at that time
[2561]was very much aware of the development of the capability to
[2562]move against Cuba.
[2564]Mr. Baron. And what was the nature of your awareness of
[2565]that development?
[2567]Mr. Dillon. We discussed it quite frequently. And it was
[2568]the setting up of camps in Central America that trained Cuban
[2569]exiles, and the development of plans for their use. They were
[2570]rather general in nature, but 6f which I was aware of in some
[2571]detail. But at that time we all knew that those plans would
[2572]not be| ready and the capability wouldn't be ready until
[2573]sometime next year. So if a decision was to be made to use “!:
[2574]them, it would have come in the following Administration.
[2576]Mr. Baron. Were you aware of the development of any CIA
[2577]plans or efforts to assassinate Fidel Castro?
[2579]Mr. Dillory. No, not at all.
[2581]Mr. Baron. Did you hear any discussion of that subject?
[2583]Mr. Dillon. None:whatsoevér.is: © A.28 uy
[2585]“Mir «Baron s/Sosal though. you-wereawarevofsCIA- covert
[2586]activities against.thé+Cuban régime, -you:.were: completely
[2587]unaware of tany..assassindtion. effort against CaStro?.;
[2588]1M. Dillons .cThe major activity-was.the-butlding up of.
[2590]this: capacityvamong..the .Cubah:exilés, .orisupposed capacity,
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[2628]to invade: Cuba and cause a change in regime.
[2630]Mr. Baron. Turning back to your position in the
[2631]Government, isn't it true that shortly before the change of
[2632]Administrations you resigned from the State Department in
[2633]contemplation of resuming Government service in the Kennedy
[2634]Administration as Secretary of the Treasury?
[2636]Mr. Dillon. Yes.
[2638]I might as well explain that in some detail, because it
[2639]was an unusual situation.
[2641]That fall, I think it was in October, just prior to the
[2642]election in early October, due to some mishap in London, the
[2643]Bank of England failed to support the price of gold ata
[2644]given moment, and it shot up from the support price of $35 an
[2645]aounce to maybe $49 or $50. And there was great perturbation
[2646]in the financial markets over this, the first time that it
[2647]had happened since the thirties when the price had been set.
[2648]And there began to be an outflow of gold from the US at the 2»
[2649]rate of over a $100 million a week, which seemed very big in
[2650]those days. And it was very disturbing.
[2652]That continued through the election. And if anything, it
[2653]intendsified after the election.
[2655]During the election, of course, as a member of the
[2656]Republic Administration while the State Department was not
[2657]involved in the election campaign, it was specifically exempt
[2659]from having anything to do with it -- I was obviously a
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[2694]supporter of Vice President Nixon, who was seeking election at
[2695]that time. Nevertheless, about two or three weeks after the
[2696]election, about three weeks after the election, I received a
[2697]telephone call one day in my office from Pierre Salinger, whom
[2699]I did not know. And he told me on the telephon that Senator
[2701]Kennedy -- whom I knew slightly, because he was on the Foreign
[2702]Relations Committee -- would like to come and see me that
[2703]night.
[2705]And I said, that was very foolish. I am at his disposal,
[2706]I will go see him.
[2708]He said, that is not what the Senator said. He wants to
[2709]come to see you.
[2711]And r said, very good. I will be home all night.
[2713]So Senator Kennedy did show up at 9 o'clock. And he told
[2714]me that he was very concerned about this loss of gold and the
[2715]lack of confidence in the financial stability of the US and
[2716]the world. And he wanted to rectify this. And nobody trusted
[2717]him because the campaign had been made on the basis that he
[2718]was going to disrupt everything, and didn't have anything
[2719]about finances.
[2721]And so whatshe.wanted was to appoint someone whom he
[2722]thought would carry weight around the world, and yet who was
[2723]sympathetic to his idea of keeping the economy moving. And
[2724]he had read some speeches Iv had made at one time or another
[2726]in my economic capacity with the State Department which
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[2732]10
[2733]° pretty much paralleled his thinking. And I had been quite
[2734]g .
[2735]3 ag : :
[2736]$ contrary to Vice President Nixon's campaign on that issue
[2737]g 2
[2738]“ where he talked about growthmanship and the path to push our
[2739]cs 5 .
[2740]@ growh.° And I mentioned, I believe, in the Rockefeller Report
[2742]that at that time that we had to grow at five percent a year
[2743]5
[2744]if we wanted to produce and not have unemployment, and so
[2745]6
[2746]forth.
[2747]7 : . °
[2748]And I had seen Kennedy's economic speech which he made in
[2749]8 .
[2750]Philadelphia at the end of October, and I thought it was just
[2751]5 .
[2752]great, there was nothing I could find wrong with it. Of
[2753]10
[2754]course, nobody had read it and nobody paid any attention to
[2755]11
[2756]it. And I don't think he had ever given it, but it had béen
[2757]12
[2758]- 3 released, he had been there and madesa speech and said some of
[2759]ge 13 }
[2760]3 it. And it was very carefully prepared, and was quite dull
[2761]x
[2763]14 .
[2764]° an ary as a result. It was written largely or suggested
[2765]“15
[2766]largely, I found out later, by Professor Samuels, who was the
[2767]16 . 7 :
[2768]Dean of all economists at that time. And I couldn't find
[2769]17 . .
[2770]anything wrong with that.
[2771]18
[2772]And he said he could not make any offer of this, and wasn't
[2773]3 19 doing that, but he wanted me to think about this because he
[2774]. 20 thought it was absolutely essential to safegard the currency
[2775]2 e1 and all that.
[2776]* 22 Well, this came as a great surprise to me. TI had made
[2777]- 23 |
[2778]3g all my plans to go back home.
[2779]7)
[2780]HB 24 To make a long story short, I talked to various people,
[2782]+ 25
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[2828]including Bob Anderson, who was then Secretary of the Treasury
[2829]And he said I: should do this. And quite a few people did.
[2830]And also the President-elect was good enough to say if I did
[2831]do this he would work with me, and I would be his top economic
[2832]advisor, and if there were any differences in economic advice
[2834]that he would side with the Treasury unless the thing was
[2836]serious enought to lead to a parting of the ways. And one
[2837]commitment that he wanted from me was that if there was that
[2838]it would not be a silent parting of the ways. And that was a
[2839]very easy thing for me to agree to.
[2841]And on or after I had come back from a final meeting of
[2842]the OACD in Paris at which the Convention was signed, at
[2843]which I had been a leading negotiator, early in December I
[2844]had a call from him when IT got back that morning saying that
[2845]he wanted me to come over to his place, that he wanted to do
[2846]this if I would agree.
[2848]So I went to President Eisenhower and told him of my
[2849]meeting abroad and told him I was going to see Senator
[2850]Kennedy -- which he didn't like very much . And I saw him.
[2852]And we talked about certain financial things that might be a
[2853]problem, which I told him about, which they turned out not to
[2854]be.
[2856]And he then right away, that morning, much to my surprise,
[2857]went out on the front stoop of the house in Georgetown and too
[2859]me out there with Robert Kennedy, whom I had never met before
[2861]TOP SECRET
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[2865]- Dillon Exhibit S weptember 21, 1960
[2867]MEMORANDUM
[2869]SUBJECT: Discussion at the 460th Meeting TO
[2870]\ of the National Security Council,
[2871]Wednesday, September 21, 1960
[2873]Present at the 460th NSC Meeting were the-President of the
[2875]United States, presiding; the Acting Secretary of State (Dillon);
[2877]the Secretary of Defense; and the Acting Director, Office of
[2879]Civil and Defense Mobilization (Patterson). Also present at the
[2881]Meeting and participating in the Council Actions below were the
[2883]Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget;
[2885]the Attorney General (Items 1 and 2); the Secretary of Commerce
[2887]j Ttens 1, 2 and 3); the Acting Secretary of the Interior (Bennett)
[2888]Items 1 and 2); Mr. Tom Killefer for the President, Export-Import
[2890]Bank of Washington (Items 1 end 2); and the Chairman, Council on
[2892]Foreign Economic Policy (Item 3). Als& attending the Meeting were
[2894]the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Steff; the Director of Central Intel-
[2896]ligence; the Special Assistants to the President for National Secu-
[2898]rity Affairs and for Security Operations Coordination; Assistant
[2900]Secretary of Defense John N. Irwin,II; Mr. Robert Packard for the
[2902]Department of State; Mr. Knight McMahan, Central Intelligence Agency;
[2904]=, the White House Staff Secretary; the A: Assistant White House Staff |
[2905]Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NS NSC; end the |} Deputy Executive
[2906]Secretary, NSC.
[2908]There follows a summary of the discussion at the Meeting
[2909]and the main points taken.
[2911]1. WESTERN SUROPEAN DEPENDENCE ON MIDDLE FAST PETROLEUM
[2912](NSC Action No. 2080; Memos for NSC from Executive Seer Stary
[2913]same subject, dated March 26, 1959, and June 28, 1960; NSC
[2914]6011; Memos for NSC, same subject, dated August. 9 and 29,and
[2915]September 19, 1960)
[2917]Mr. Gray introduced the subject to the Council. (A copy of
[2918]Mr. Gray's Briefing Note is filled in the Minutes of the Meeting
[2919]and auother copy is attached to this Memorandum).
[2921]At the conelusion of Mr. Gray's presentation, the President
[2922]said he had received the most glowing reports on the prospects
[2923]for petroleum production in Libye. He had been told that the
[2924]Libyan reserves exceeded even the Sahara reserves. He asked
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[2963]untile that day, and announced both of us at once. So I was
[2964]announced as of the middle of December as the future Secretary
[2965]of the Treasury.
[2967]That rather limited my capacity in the State Department.
[2968]But I did continue for two or three more weeks to wind things
[2969]up and make a proper turnover.
[2971]And then I resigned from the State Department in January
[2972]and continued that preparation for the new job.
[2974]And that is how that happened.
[2976]Mr. Baron. So you left the State Department -- you said
[2977]earlier to me on January 2nd or 3rd?- 7
[2978]%s Mtv: Difbon.. OF 4thooer: 5tho;2sometime:in .the'.first. fouri:.
[2979]ore:fiveetor six days: “And aftér-that one thing I ought to
[2980]make clear is that President Kennedy had a great interest in
[2981]the authority of the Presidency in foreign policy. And I
[2982]think he was under the impression that Secretary Dulles had
[2983]probably dominated President Eisenhower in some asptects,
[2984]which I don't think was an accuare description of what
[2985]happened at all, but it was a generally held one at that time.
[2986]So he wanted to take over this very much himself. And so he
[2987]put in some new people there.
[2989]And we came to be very close, and worked very well
[2991]together. And I had the greatest admiration for him.
[2993]He never at that time or later ever asked me anything about
[2995]my experience at the State Department or any foreign policy
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[3001]‘TOP SECRET -
[3002]> thing, I was not used in any transitional sense at all.
[3003]: : Mr. Dawson. To include the Bay of Pigs plan?
[3004]z 2 Mr. Dillon. Totally. That was rather a surprise to me.
[3005]< ° And I think I might. have been of some: help to him if he had,
[3006]6 :
[3007]. 7 because i: had. beensaware-of "it right-up through January, and i
[3008]° particular I was aware, at least that is my understanding at
[3009]6 the time, that there was always an ultimate background in the
[3010]? use of our naval air if those peophe got in trouble. And I
[3011]8 don't think that was ever made clear to President Kennedy.
[3012]9 And that was too bad. And when it was made clear to him he
[3013]10 reacted violently against it, and I rather doubt if he would
[3014]it “have allowed the thing to be unleashed if he had known this
[3015]5 ie much about it.
[3016]e
[3017]2 18 Senator Hart. Aside from the regular 54-12 meetings, did
[3018]$ 14 you have contact with the CIA in any other: capacity on a
[3019]18 routine basis?
[3020]16 Mr. Dillon. No, not on a routine basis.
[3021]Ww Senator Harts. Occasional basis?
[3022]18 Mr. Dillon. Yes. Because, for instance, I went back --
[3023]3 19 when we were flying earlier, when we were flying US missions,
[3024]: 20 for instance, they had to be cleared by the State Department,
[3025]3 a1 or the Defense Department, or by the CIA, and finally by
[3026]: Pe the President. And that was all handled through Goodpastor,
[3027]; 29 he was then a colonel, at the White House. So I did in that
[3028]E 24 capacity a couple of times, as Acting Secretary, have to clear
[3029]3 25
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[3066]those things and talk with Allen Dulles about them. And so
[3067]from time to time there were those moreorless informal
[3068]contacts. But they were not routine and regular. They were
[3069]generally on this basis of when I was Acting Secretary and
[3070]they needed something from the State Department.
[3072]Senator Hart. I don't want to interrupt the flow of
[3073]questions by the Staff on this sequence, but we may want to
[3074]get some questions on your experience during the US situation
[3075]on the Doctrine of “Plausible Deniability”.
[3077]Mr. Dillon. That is something I feel I have a good deal
[3078]to say about.
[3080]Senator Hart. You can proceed here sequentially.
[3082]Mr. Baron. Just one other question before we turn to your
[3083]affidavit. And that is, you were indicating that when you
[3084]joined the Kennedy Administration you were not consulted for
[3085]advice on your State Department expértence.
[3087]Mr. Dillon. Until the time of the missile crisis, when
[3088]they got together a new, what we called an EXCOM, Executive
[3089]Committee. At that time, whether it was the result of the Bay
[3090]of Pigs thing, or just the fact that the President knew me
[3091]better, and we had been working together for a longer time, he
[3092]called me in right at the beginning, and I had a: very active
[3093]role in this period.
[3095]Mr. Baron. But at the beginning of the Kennedy Admini-
[3097]stration I take it you were not asked for advice on Congo
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[3134]affairs nor kept abreast of developments in the Congo?
[3136]Mr. Dillon. No, nor any other foreign policy, except as
[3137]itefell under the monetary area, with one exception. And this
[3138]was economic entirely. That is, the President, because of
[3139]my past experience in the handling of this matter, asked me,
[3140]moreorless as a favor, because he didn't believe the Treasury
[3141]should really handle this, but he asked me if I would head the
[3142]US effort or set up the Alliance for Progress. And there was
[3143]going to be a meeting down in Uruguay, Puntal del Este. And
[3144]so I did do thta.. And that was the only foreign policy job
[3145]I did. And that was economic in nature.
[3147]Mr. Baron. Let me show you now a copy of your affidavit
[3148]to the Rockefeller Commission which concerns among other
[3149]things a meeting that was held in the Pentagon where the
[3150]Congo was discussed. First, let me ask you if that is a true
[3151]copy of your affidavit?
[3153]Mr. Dillon. It so appears.
[3155]Mr. Baron. Do you recall this meeting where, as you have
[3156]affirmed: "On one occasion in late July or early August of
[3157]1960, shortly after Patrice Lumumba's visit to Washington,
[3159]I attended a meeting in the Pentagon at which the overall
[3160]Congo problem was discussed. During the discussion, which
[3161]covered a great variety of matters, my recollection is that
[3163]a question regarding the possibility of assassination attempt
[3164]against Lumumba was briefly raised. The CIA representative
[3166]indicated that the Agency did not undertake this sort of ©
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[3202]operation. This ended consideration of this subject. With
[3203]this one exception I never heard any discussion of assassina-
[3204]tion attempts against anyone."
[3206]Do you recall this meeting now?
[3208]Mr. Dillon. Yes, I recall just what I said there. And I
[3209]think probably should expand on that a little bit, because
[3210]in looking at it it is not as clear as I would like it to be.
[3212]When I mentioned the assassination attempt it was not
[3213]necessarily limited to -- or it might have been CIA personnel .
[3215]It also included encouraging one of the many factions that
[3217]‘might not like him there to take action on their own, with
[3219]CIA encouragement.
[3221]Senator Hart. what kind of encouragement, material
[3222]support, financial support?
[3224]Mr. billion. That, or moral support, if they did the US
[3225]would recognize them if they became the head, and would help
[3226]them.
[3228]Senator Hart. Was there any discussion that you can
[3229]recall of the passage o- weapons?
[3231]Mr. Dillon. No, no detail like that. This was very brief,
[3232]very general, and just turned off by the CIA people at that
[3233]time.
[3235]Mr. Baron. So this mention of assassination could have
[3236]included a CIA sponsored assassination attempt?
[3238]Mr. Dillon. It could have, yes.
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[3286]Mr. Baron. And it was a more general reference --
[3288]Mr. Dillon. It was a very general way of getting some-
[3289]where. In one of those other papers something was said about
[3290]getting rid of Lumumba. That was really moreorless the
[3291]objective, not necessarily to have him leave the earth, but
[3292]just to get him out of the Congo and away.
[3294]Mr. Baron. Your:.clear impression that the suggestion
[3295]contemplated assassination as one means of getting rid of
[3296]Lumumba?
[3298]Mr. Dillon. As a possibility.
[3300]Mr. Baron. And let's fill in some of the context of the
[3301]meeting. Do you recall where this meeting took place?
[3303]Mr. Dillon. I think it took place in the Office of the
[3304]Secretary of Defense.
[3306]I may say that after you spoke on the telephone the other
[3307]day I called Mr. Gates, who was Secretary of Defense at that
[3309]time, and who was a friend of mine then, and has continued to
[3311]be, and asked him if he had any recollection of this particula
[3313]meeting. And he says he did not. But I do think it took
[3314]place in his office. And I don't recall whether he was there
[3316]or not. Tt could be that he wasn't even there. But I think
[3318]it was in his own office that it took place.
[3320]Mr. Baron. When we spoke before you said that you thought
[3321]he probably was in attendance. Is that still your feeling?
[3323]Mr. Dillon. Well, because it was in his office. I don't
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[3363]remember him being there or saying anything. All I remember
[3364]is the location, and the fact that the subject came up, and
[3366]the fact that there were a number of people there -- I don't
[3367]remember who they were -- and the fact that the CIA people,
[3369]whoever:. they were, were negative to any such action.
[3371]Mr. Baron. About how many people were in attendance?
[3373]Mr. Dillon. I would say five or six, because I saw them
[3374]sitting around the desk, I would say five or six, or it
[3375]could have been seven or eight, no more.
[3377]Mr. Baron. Was this the meeting of any official body?
[3379]Mr. Dillion. No, I don't think so. It was not aomslties
[3380]note-taking type of meeting. It was not sitting around the
[3381]table with somebody as the Chairman.
[3383]Senator Hart. It was ad hoc, in other words?
[3385]Mr. Dillon. It was ad hoc.
[3387]Senator Hart. Would you be able to characterize the
[3388]nature of the CIA opposition? Was it vehement, violent,
[3389]casual?
[3391]Mr. Dillon. No. It was just more orless silent, and
[3392]"there is nothing we can do." It wasn't moral.
[3394]Senator Hart. There was no policy objection?
[3396]Mr. Dillon. It wasn't stated in that way. It was just
[3397]saying, no, it is not a possible thing.
[3399]Mr. Baron. You mentioned on the phone to me that rather
[3401]than acméral objection, as you have just said, it might have
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[3410]> been an objection on the grounds that the CIA did not have the
[3411]8
[3412]e t capability to perform such an operation?
[3413]e 2 Mr. Dillon. It could have been, it may have been just
[3414]: ° _something that they couldn't do, and therefore there is no
[3415]5 ;
[3416]7 “ use talking about it.
[3417]° Mr. Dawson. The subject matter of the meetingwas probahl
[3418]6 something which the Secretary of Defense had a leading! role |
[3419]° in designing a policy for, right?
[3420]8 Mr. Dillon. I don't recall the details of what was
[3421]9 ahppening at that time in the Congo. But I do have a basic
[3422]10 recollection that over this period of time it was a pretty
[3423]it difficult situation, with UN forces in there, and all sorts
[3424]3 12 of troubles down in the southeastern part where the copper
[3425]: 1s mines were, and trying to get people out 50 they wouldn't get
[3427]3 14 killed. There was always contingency planning, whether we
[3428]16 would have to use any of our forces for another evacuation
[3429]16 or something else. So it was a very mixed up and sort of a
[3430]W hot situation at that time.
[3431]18 So certainly various people in the Defense Departmen would
[3432]3 19 be interested. Mr. Gates, when I spoke to him, said that he
[3433]: 20 personally had not given primary attention at any time to the
[3434]: ei Congo. He said it might have been Jim Douglas, who, as I
[3435]; ae mentioned to you there, was listed as attending one of those
[3436]; RS - meetings. And I don't recall exactly what his title was at
[3437]: a4 that time, but he had been, I think, Secretary of the Air
[3438]3 25
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[3447]Force, and maybe still was at that time.
[3449]: i Mr. Baron. Was it a regular occurance to convene such
[3451]Bd .
[3453]a 2 meetings at the Pentagon?
[3455]‘ 5 Mr. Dillon. We had a very close relationship between the
[3457]é 4 State Department and the Pentagon at that time. And it was
[3458]5 not unusual, because of the fact that generally there would
[3459]6 be a representative of the Joint Chiefs present, and they were
[3460]7 both over there, and if for any reason it seemed reasonable, we
[3461]8 would do that. Now, usually I think the man who was responsible
[3462]9 would be this number three person in the State Department, he
[3463]10 would go to the Pentagon for many of?the meetings, the
[3464]11 briefings and things like that which would be in the area of
[3466]: 12 the Joint Chiefs, and so forth. He was there a great deal.
[3468]; 13 I wasn't there in my capacity.
[3470]Q
[3472]< 14 Mr. Baron. Do you have any idea why you were in
[3473]15° attendance at this particular meeting?
[3474]16 Mr. Dillon. It might also have had something to do with
[3475]17 the thing that I was talking with them about all the time, a
[3476]18 totally different subject, which was military aid. That could
[3478]9 19 well have been.
[3480]s 20 Mr. Baron. Do you recall any of the other participants at
[3482]Qa
[3484]8 21 the meetina?
[3486]E 22 Mr. Dillon. Not by name.
[3488]; 23 On the telephone you.asked me about Bissell, whether he
[3490]é 24 “might! have been there. And I answered, in all probability he
[3492]it
[3494]: O5 might have, because I knew him, in fact I have known him for
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[3533]many years, all my life. But when I was down here at that tim
[3534]I knew he had a high position in the CIA, and was in charge
[3535]of all this sort of stuff, and he was at a number of meetings.
[3536]there, orteven at the White House. He was an advisor to Mr.
[3537]Dulles. So I say that is very likely.
[3538]| Mr. Baron. By this sort of stufé would you mean covert
[3539]actions?
[3540]Mr. Dillon. Covert actions or anything that was important
[3541]enough in that general field to involve Mr. Dulles, The CIA,
[3543]the President. He was a person there, one of the people that
[3545]was talxed to about it. There were three people. There were:
[3547]really at that time Allen Dulles, General Cabell, and Bissell.
[3548]‘Mr: Baron. Was it your general impression that this was
[3550]a high level meeting -- a sufficiently high level meeting so
[3552]that Allen Dulles might have been in attendance?
[3554]Mr. Dillon. He could have been.
[3556]Mr. Baron. And are there any other people who would have
[3557]been likely candidates to have been in attendance at the
[3558]meeting?
[3560]Mr. Dillon. Tf imagine there must have been some represen
[3561]tative of the military there. But I don't know who it would
[3562]have been. But there must have been someone else if the
[3563]Secretary of Defense.was there. Now, Erwin, since he didn't
[3564]allow these things, he might have been there. That is just
[3566]supposition.
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[3611]Mx. Baron. And I believe you had said to me before that
[3612]despite your absence of a clear recolleciton as to which CIA
[3613]people were there, it was clear to you that some top level
[3614]CIA people were there?
[3616]Mr. Dillon. Top enough, so that something like this could
[3617]be raised and moreorless dispdésed of without even: thinking
[3618]of it any further.
[3620]Senator: Hart. Let-me insert a question, if I might. This
[3621]is a philosophical question.
[3623]First of all, factually, in any of the dealings, formal or|
[3624]informal, that you ever had with President Eisenhower or
[3626]President Kennedy, did the subject of assassination ever
[3630]Mr. Dillon. As far as I know, as I recall, in dealing
[3632]directly with either of them, no.
[3634]Senator Hart. I would invite your speculation at this
[3635]point as a sub-Cabinet officer under President Eisenhower,
[3636]and as a Cabinet Officer under President Kennedy, I think
[3637]the Committee would be interested in your view as to the
[3638]attitude of each of them toward this subject, that is to say
[3639]the elimination, violent elimination of foreign leaders?
[3641]Mr. Dillon. Well, that is a difficult, thing to speculate
[3642]on in a totally different atmosphere. But I think probably
[3643]both of them would have approached it in a very pragmatic way
[3645]most likely, simply weighed the process and consequence
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[3678]rather than in a way that was primarily of a moral principle.
[3679]That is what would probably have been their attitude in a few
[3680]cases. Certainly the idea that this was going to be a policy
[3681]of the US, generally both of them were very much opposed to
[3682]it.
[3684]Senator Hart. Off the record just a second.
[3686](Off the record discussion) |
[3688]Mr. Baron. To return to the setting at the meeting at the
[3689]Pentagon, I wonder if you could fill in the nature of the
[3690]discussion that was taking place on the Congo before this
[3692].
[3693]prospect of assassination was raised at the meeting?
[3695]Mr. Dillon. I don't recally recall it, except that it
[3697]was bemoaning the general presence of Lumumba and the
[3699]difficulty of working anything ait with him, or the impossi-
[3701]bility of working anything out with him, and the exploration
[3703]of other possibilities.
[3705]Mr. Baron. Did you date this meeting by any particular
[3706]event which took place?
[3708]Mr. Dillon. Yes. I dated it only because it must have
[3709]taken place after, and presumably shortly after, Lumumba's
[3710]visit to Washington, because the impression that was left was
[3711]that it was very bad, that this was an individual whom it was
[3712]impossible to deal with. And the feelings of the Government
[3713]as a result of this sharpened very considerably at that time.
[3715]I don't think it would have possibly have occurred before he
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[3751]came. We hoped to see him and see what we could do to come to
[3752]better understanding with him.
[3754]Mr. Baron. why did he strike you as being impossible to.
[3755]deal with in any way? |
[3757]Mr. Dillon. Well, what I really recall was the impression
[3758]he made rather than the individual things he said. When he wa
[3759]in the State Department meeting, either with me or with the
[3760]Secretary in my presence, he spoke in a mannter that seemed
[3761]almost messianic in quality. And he would never look you in
[3763]the eye. He looked up at the sky. And a tremendous flow of
[3765]words came out. He spoke in French, and he spoke it very
[3767]fluently. And his words didn't ever have any relation to the
[3768]particular things that we wanted to discuss. And it was just
[3769]like ships passing in the night. You had a feeling that he
[3771]was a person that was gripped by this fervor that I can only
[3773]characterize as messianic. And he was just not a rational
[3775]being.
[3777]Mr. Baron. When we talked earlier I believe you
[3778]charaterized his personal power almost as psychotic, is that
[3779]right?
[3781]Mr. Dillon. That is right.
[3783]Mr. Baron. So that after he departed from the US you
[3784]and others at a high-level in the State Department were,
[3785]extremely concerned about this man continuing in a position
[3787]in the Congo?
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[3826]Pia. ew
[3828]Mr. Dillon. That is right.
[3830]Mr. Baron. Do you recall who raised the question or the
[3831]prospect of assassination of Lumumba at this meeting?
[3833]Mr. Dillon. I don't. It very likely could have come from
[3834]somewhere, either from the State Department or possibly from
[3835]the Defense Department in the international affairs areas,
[3836]someone just throwing out this question. Now, I said the
[3837]State Department. There was probably someone there besides
[3838]myself. Because it wasn't usual to just:be alone talking
[3839]about this.
[3841]Mr. Baron. Do you recall whether this was raised as a
[3842]question or as a suggestion?
[3844]Mr. Dillon. Wo, as a question.
[3846]Mr. Baron. And who was the CIA representative that you
[3847]mentioned in your affidavit that responded as indicated that
[3848]this was not within the capability of the CIA?
[3850]Mr. Dillon. That I don't recall. But I imagine it would
[3851]have to have been either Allen Dulles, or possibly Cabell,
[3852]but I think most Likely Cabell.
[3854]Mr. Baron. We have a record of the fact that Lumumba met
[3855]with Secretary Herter in Washington on the 27th of June 1960.
[3856]Does that accord with your memory as to the probable date of
[3857]this conversation? It would be shortly after Lumumba's visit.
[3859]Mr. Dillon. Shortly after his visit. And that must have
[3861]been it. And the record that you had must have been the
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[3902]record of the meeting that I attended that I referred to
[3903]earlier. The dates that were given in this affidavit were
[3904]supplied to me on the basis that it was shortly after his
[3905]visit. So they looked up when his visit was, and that is why
[3906]they put this in. All I recall of the place and date is that
[3907]when I saw him off at the airport it was very hot. So it must
[3908]have been the summer, July or August.
[3910]Mr. Baron. Let me fill you in onva-few-other events that
[3911]were happening from mid to late July, and ask you if this
[3912]refreshes your recollection as to the sense of urgency that
[3913]might have existed at a meeting such’as the one you attendec 2
[3914]in reference to getting rid of Lumumba. It appears that on
[3915]the i2th of July the US had sent a carrier, the Wasp, to the
[3917]Congo, although’ we had refrained from sending troops to the
[3919]Congo. Then on the 20th of July Ambassador Lodge indicated
[3921]that it was the US position that the UN would be urged to do
[3923]everything possible to keep Soviet troops out of the Congo.
[3924]Then on the 22nd of July Lumumba signed a 50-year
[3925]contract with CINCO, a large American resources company. But
[3926]that contract was disavowed by the finance minister of the
[3927]Congo the following day, on the 26th of July -- I am sorry, it
[3928]was disavowed on the 26th of July, which wasn't the following
[3929]day. And it was in’that setting that Lumumba then came to
[3930]Washington. .
[3931]While he was in Washington apparently Secretary Herter
[3933]pledged aid to the Congo. And Mr. Detweiler, who was the
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[3969]in with that sort of general recollection, that it was
[3971]“remember this particular contract with this company. In fact,
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[3976]Head of the 6IMCO Company that had this huge contract in the
[3978]Congo, met with people at the State Department to discuss the
[3980]situation as to whether the contract was going to be performed
[3981]or not in the Congo. .
[3983]Do you recall any of that background? And does that
[3984]refresh your recollection about the urgency of thessituation
[3985]at that time?
[3987]Mr. Dillon. No. The only thing I recall is that there
[3988]were -- which I think I mentioned maybe earlier in our informa
[3989]conversations ~- that there were talks at the time about the
[3990]possibility of using US military force in one way or another
[3992]-- I think the fact that the Wasp was ordered there fits righ
[3993]something that we were very worried about. And I don't
[3995]I don't think I have ever heard of Gimco,;
[3997]Mr. Baron. Did you have an independent recollection of
[3998]the ordering of the Wasp to the Congo ~- or to the shores of
[3999]Africa?
[4001]Mr. Dillon. Not of that one particular thing. But I do
[4002]remember that there was consideration of the use of military
[4003]-~- I think there was some talk about airlift capacities and
[4004]things of that nature,too, at that time.
[4006]Mr. Baron. Again to refresh your recollection, I believe
[4008]CIMCO, C=I:M-c-0O, stands for the Congo International Goncocue.
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[4053]Management Corporation, which was a US corporation. And they
[4054]had signed a resources development contract in the Congo.
[4056]Mr. Dillon. It must have been a company that was just
[4057]Formed for that purpose or soemthing, it sounds like.
[4059]Mr. Baron. Do you recall a visit from Ambassador
[4060]Timberlake, who was at that time the US Ambassador to the
[4061]Congo, to Washington shortly before your meeting at the
[4062]pentagon?
[4064]Mr. Dillon. No. But it think it would have been normal,
[4065]with Lumumba, who was then Prime Minister, coming here, and
[4066]our concern about the situation, for the Ambassador to come
[4067]back prior to Lumumba's visit or simultaneous with it, to.
[4068]brief the Department on the latest developments there. That
[4069]was sort of standard operating practice. When the head of a
[4070]government comes usually the Ambassador comes with him to do
[4071]that.
[4073]Mr. Baron. Would it fit with your memory that the CIA
[4074]Chief of Station and the US Ambassador had come back to
[4075]Washington shortly before Lumumba's visit in preparation for
[4076]his visit to report upon events in the Congo?
[4078]Mr. Dillon. It is not my memory, because I don't
[4079]remember that. But what I can say is that that would have
[4080]been standard practice, and I would have been surprised if
[4081]they hadn't.
[4083]Mr. Baron. What kind of reports would you have been
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[4110]getting at that time from the CIA Chiet of Station and the US
[4111]Ambassador?
[4113]Mr. Dillon. Well, we would have been getting whatever
[4114]reports the US Ambassador sent, the reports from the Chief of
[4115]Station would go to the CIA, and we would not get those except
[4116]in the edited form that the CIA would give them to us.
[4118]Mr. Baron. Did you receive urgings from the US Ambassador
[4119]from the CIA as a result of their briefings from the Chief of
[4120]Station in the Congo to undertake political action in the
[4121]Congo toward removing Lumumba from a position of power due to
[4122]reports that Lumumba was heavily influenced by the Soviets?
[4124]Mr. Dillon. I do know that he was supposedly influenced
[4126]by the Soviets. But my impression of seeing him was that he
[4128]certainly wasn't controlled by them or anyone else, he was
[4130]so far gone himself that nobody could rely on him as an
[4131]individual. I don't recall any pati¢alar urgins from the
[4132]Ambassador, although I think they would have been natural,
[4133]because this was a very difficult situation, and he was there,
[4134]and if he had been not warning against something, that would
[4135]have been very unusual.
[4137]Mr. Baron. Aside from the recent visit of Lumumba and
[4138]the personal impression that he had made upon yourself and
[4139]the Secretary of State, there were other reasons, were there
[4140]not, to have a sense of urgency about removing him?
[4142]Mr. Dillon. There were all sorts of difficulties that I
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[4181]don't recall. But there were those problems down around the
[4182]copper mines, and Katanga, there was a revolution down there
[4183]of sorts, And there were many difficulties in the Congo at
[4184]that time.
[4186]Mr. Baron. Do you recall anything else about the language
[4187]that was used in raising the question of assassination at the
[4188]meeting?
[4190]Mr. Dillon. No, I am sorry, I don't recall really anythin
[4191]but what is in the affidavit, but just the subject came up
[4192]generally as a question, and it was turned off by the CIA.
[4194]Mr. Baron. Would the manner in which the question of
[4195]assassinating Lumumba was raised at that meeting have served
[4196]as sufficient authorization for the CIA to proceed to develop
[4197]the capability to assassinate Lumumba after that meeting?
[4199]Mr. Dillon. Well, I don't think they really needed any
[4200]authorization to develop the capabilities if they didn't use
[4201]them. And certainly it would not have been enough authoriza-
[4202]tion by a long shot for them to start doing that. But I thin
[4203]they could have decided they wanted to develop the capability
[4204]in this area irrespective of this, just by knowing the concer
[4205]that everyone had about Lumumba in the area. That they could
[4206]have done. They wouldn't have to tell anyone about that.
[4207]That is just developing their own internal capability, and
[4208]then they would have to come and get permission.
[4210]Mr. Baron. Would the same thing hold true for the
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[4247]development of a generalized assassination capability at the
[4249]CIA -- that such a capability could be developed without
[4251]specific authorization from authority outside the CIA?
[4252]Mr. Dillon. Yes, I would think so.
[4254]Mr. Baron. But it is clear to you that the discussion at
[4256]the meeting at the Pentagon that you attended would not in
[4257]itself have served as an authorization for an actual assassi-
[4258]nation effort against Lumumba? |
[4260]Mr. Dillon. Not at all.
[4262]Mx. Baron. Did you ever hear the phrase "Executive Action’
[4263]during your entire tenure in Government?
[4265]Mr. Dillon. No. The first time I ever heard it, I was
[4266]on the Rockefeller Commission.
[4268]Mr. Baron. Were you aware that the CIA undertook a projec
[4270]‘which was run under the crytonum ZR RIFLE to develop the means
[4272]for carrying off an assassination if required?
[4274]Mr. Dillon. No, I didn't.
[4276]tie. Baron. And your first knowledge of any such project
[4277]was during your service on the Rockefeller Commission?
[4279]Mr. Dillon. That is right.
[4281]Mr. Baron. Earlier today we discussed Robert Johnson,
[4282]who was a member of the NSC Staff in the late fifties and
[4283]serving until early 1962. Do you recall whether Robert
[4284]Johnson participated in this meetingat the Pentagon?
[4286]Mr. Dillon. No, I don't recall. I wouldn't think so,
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[4322]because I wouldn't think there was necessarily anyone from the
[4323]National Security Staff. And as I said also earlier, I don't
[4324]personally remember Mr. Johnson myself at all.
[4326]Mr. Baron. As I represented to you earlier, Mr. Johnson,
[4327]in testimony before the Committee, indicated that he was
[4328]present at a NSC meeting in his capacity as a notetaker,
[4329]at which the President made a remark that clearly indicated
[4330]to Mr. Johnson that he had ordered the assassination of
[4331]Lumumba. And Mr. Johnson said there was a silence -- Mr.
[4332]Johnson himself was shocked, but no one at the meeting reacted
[4333]explicityly, and the meeting simply proceeded. He places
[4334]this meeting in the summer of 1960, and said that it happened
[4335]at some point before the coup in which Mobutu took power on
[4336]Septemb er 14th of 1960. Were you present at such a meeting?
[4338]Mr. Dillon. If you mean was I present at a meeting where
[4339]a recall the President ordering the assassination of Lumumba,
[4340]I don't remember such a thing. But I think that I was probabl
[4341]present at most of the Security Council meetings at that time.
[4342]It being in August I might have been away for a week possibly
[4343]for a vacation, and I might have missed one. But otherwise
[4344]I would have been there. It could have been in view of this
[4345]feeling of everybody that Lumumba was very difficult if not
[4346]impossible person to deal with, and was dangerous to the peace
[4347]and safety of the world, that the President expressed himself,
[4349]we will have to do whatever is necessary to get rid of him.
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[4397]T don't know that I would have taken that as a clearcut order
[4398]as Mr. Johnson apparently did. And I think perhaps others
[4399]present may have interpreted it other ways. But I am pretty
[4400]sure that if the President had said you go and get rid of him,
[4402]shoot him or something -- I just can't conceive of him
[4404]doing that. But I can conceive of him saying, let's take
[4406]action and get this situation rectified, which is moreorless
[4407]along the lines of the various memoranda you have shown me.
[4409]Mr. Baron. Did you ever hear the President make such a
[4410]remark about Lumumba, let's get rid of him, or let's take
[4411]action right away on this?
[4413]Mr. Dillon. I don't remember that. But certainly this
[4414]was the general feeling of Government at that time, and it
[4415]wouldn't have been if the President hadn't agreed with it.
[4417]Mr. Baron. So although you have no recollection of being
[4418]present at the meeting that Robert Johnson recounts, you
[4419]would find his testimony at least plausible?
[4421]Mr. Dillon. It is possible. But I would think anything
[4422]like this was not a direct order to have an assassination,
[4423]but let's take sgome.action to get rid of Lumumba, get him
[4424]out of office.
[4426]Mr. Dawson. Would that be adequate, implicity authoriza-
[4429]Mr. Dillon. It would have been up to the CIA as to what
[4431]they thought. And they could have well thought that. That
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[4471]is an imponderable which runs through all of this, whether it —
[4472]is Lumumba or Castro. And you won't be able in the Castro
[4473]area, or particularly in this areay to run it down, because
[4474]the people aren't here anymore. But the person who really mad
[4475]that decision for the CIA was Allen Dulles.
[4477]Mr. Dawson. I guess I was asking for your expert opinion
[4478]on the command and control structure as to what adequate,
[4479]implicit authorization would have been?
[4481]Mr. Dillon. I think that Allen Dulles would have been
[4482]quite responsive to what he considered implicit authorization,
[4483]because he felt very strongly that we should not involved the
[4484]President directly in things of this nature. And he was
[4485]perfectly willing to take the responsibility personally that
[4487]maybe some of his successors wouldn't have been. And so I
[4489]think that this is a perfectly plausible thing, knowing Allen
[4491]Dulles.
[4493]Mr. Dawson. And you were aware that that was the way the
[4494]system worked at that time?
[4496]Mr. Dillon. It was the way he worked; because he had a
[4497]very strong feeling of protecting the President from getting
[4498]too closely involved with anything that was unpleasant and
[4499]of this nature.
[4501]Mr. Baron. So from your knowledge of Allen Dulles it is
[4502]conceivable that he would have taken Presidential language
[4504]such as, get rid of Lumumba, and translate it into an
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[4539]authorization for an assassination within the CIA?
[4541]Mr. Dillon. It is possible. And the same thing with
[4542]Castro, when that came-along the following year. That is
[4543]perfectly possible.
[4545]Mr. Baron. Mr. Secretary, I would like to show you a
[4546]series of minutes from the Special Group and ask you if those
[4547]refresh your recollection as to the attitude of the US toward
[4548]the Congo in the summer and fall of 1960. The first, which
[4549]we will call Exhibit 2, is dated 30 June 1960.
[4551](The above referred to document
[4552]was marked Dillon Exhibit No. 2,
[4554]for identification.)
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[4593]Mr. Baron. and this document refers to the election of
[4594]Joseph Ileo to the Presidency of the Senate of the Congo, and
[4595]recounts a report by General Cabell that the US assisted Ileo
[4596]financially and “may have secured some influence with this
[4597]potentially useful individual."
[4599]Did you ever see these minutes at the time they were made?
[4601]Mr. Dillon. ‘No, I don't think I ever did.
[4603]Mr. Baron. Do you recall having a report of this meeting
[4604]from Mr. Merchant who would have been State Department
[4605]representative at the meeting?
[4607]Mr. Dillon. No, I don't recall. I don't think I would
[4608]have, because this wouldn't have seemed to me to be important
[4609]enough to necessarily have been brought to my attention.
[4611]Mr. Baron. Were you aware that Joseph Ileo was a signi-
[4612]ficant figure in Congo politics?
[4614]Mr. Dillon. I don't recall him at all now.
[4616]Mr. Baron. Let me represent to you, to refresh your
[4617]recollection, that in September of 1960, after Lumumba was
[4618]taken out of power by Kasavubu and Mobutu, he was replaced as
[4619]Prime Minister of the Congo by Joseph Ileo.
[4621]Mr. Dillon. I didn't realize that.
[4623]Mr. Baron. Do you have any refreshed recollection now of
[4624]the relationship between the US and Joseph Ileo?
[4626]Mr. Dillon. No.
[4628]Mr. Baron. Generally speaking, would you have been
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[4669]notified by Mr. Merchant or Gerdon Gray about what transpired
[4670]at a Special Group meeting?
[4672]Mr. Dillon. Not by Gordon Gray. That wasn't his job.
[4673]But it would be by Mr. Merchant if it was considered to be
[4674]something that was of enough importance that it might be
[4675]something that I would have to act on or know about in my
[4676]capacity as Acting Secretary of State, whenever that arose.
[4678]Mr. Baron. Were you aware that the US was supplying
[4679]financial support or other kinds of support to "Moderate"
[4680]polititions within the Congo who would be opponents of Lumumba
[4682]Mr. Dillon. Not in detail, but certainly the general
[4683]fact that we would be doing that, yes.
[4685]Mr. Baron. Let me show you now minutes from a Special
[4686]Group meeting of 25 August 1960. Which we will marke Exhibit
[4687]3.
[4689](The above referred to document
[4690]was marked Exhibit No. 3 for
[4692]identification.)
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[4740]Mr. Baron. For the record, these minutes refer to a
[4741]report by Thomas Parrott, who was the Secretary of the Special
[4742]Group on CIA activity in relation to the Congo. Mr. Parrott
[4743]outlines three CIA operations in the Congo which make use of
[4744]trade unions in Ehe Congo and include the prospect that a
[4745]vote of no confidence in Lumumba would be arranged.
[4747]Following that report by Mr. Parrott there is a paragraph
[4748]which describes the action of the Group as follows: "The
[4749]Group agreed that the action contemplated is very much in
[4751]order. Mr. Gray commented, however, that his associate had
[4753]expressed extremely strong feelings on the necessity for very
[4755]straightforward action in this situation, and wondered whether
[4756]the plans as outlined were sufficient to accomplish this.
[4757]Mr. Dulles replied that he had takenthe comments referred
[4758]to seriously and had every intention of proceeding as
[4759]vigorously as the situation permits or requires, but added
[4760]that he must necessarily put himself in a position of inter-
[4761]preting instructions of this kind within the bounds of
[4762]necessity and capability. It was finally agreed that .::.5
[4763]planning for the Congo would not necessarily rule out
[4764]‘consideration' of any particular kind of activity which
[4765]might contribute to getting rid of Lumumba."
[4767]Do you recall receiving a report of that meeting?
[4769]Mr. Dillon. No, I don't, that particular meeting. But
[4771]you would have to ask Mr. Gray about that. I don't know who
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[4806]they referred to as his associate, that is the key point. He
[4807]worked for the President.
[4809]Mr. Baron. Let me represent to you that we have testimony
[4810]from Thomas Parrott, who took the minutes. for this meeting and
[4812]r
[4814]other Special Group meetings, that when he used the phrase
[4816]"Mr. Gray's associate or Mr. Gray's friend," he was referring
[4818]euphemistically to the President.
[4820]Mr. Dillon. That is what I would moreorless have assumed.
[4821]But as long as you have that testimony, my assumption is
[4822]probably correct. And it follows the same way, that Mr.
[4823]Dulles said he would take any comments referred to seriously.
[4824]And then he talks about those as instructions and the same
[4825]thing. And it would seem to be that. And that must refer to
[4826]the same meeting that your friend Mr. Jchnson testified to,
[4827]which I presume took place before this. They are talking
[4828]‘about something that happened before this day, where he had
[4830]said his associate had expressed strong feelings about the
[4832]matter, and Mr. Dulles said he would take the comments
[4834]referred to seriously.
[4836]Mr. Baron. So it is your impression that Mr. pulles had
[4837]heard comments by the President previous to this meeting?
[4839]Mr. Dillon. Certainly.
[4841]Mr. Baron. Comments which called for “very straight-
[4842]forward action?"
[4844]Mr. Dillion. Yes, I think that is certainly what this
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[4887]said. So I think that whatever records there are of NSC
[4888]meetings before that, that they may not have kept such records
[4889]in detail. And that meeting -- if you can find any meeting
[4890]that Mr. Johnson took the notes of just prior to that, that
[4892]is probably the meeting.
[4894]Mr. Baron. So you would assume that the language used
[4895]by the President, heard by Mr. Johnson, which indicated to
[4896]Mr. Johnson that an assassination was at the least acceptable
[4897]means of getting rid of Lumumba, is probably the language
[4898]referred to here by Mr. Dulles?
[4900]Mr. Dillon. It would sound so, seems so.
[4902]Mr. Baron. And would you also assume, from your knowledge
[4903]of Special Group meetings and the way the minutes were written
[4904]up, that very straightforward action could be a euphemism for
[4905]assassination?
[4907]Mr. Dillon. No, I wouldn't necessarily think that. It
[4908]would just mean strong action to do something to get rid of
[4909]Lumumba, it could be a revolution, it could be anything. I
[4910]think it comes here that they would not necessarily rule out
[4911]consideration of any particular activity. I would think, if
[4912]they were really going to mount something, they probably would
[4913]have come back to the Group. But they might not have. And
[4914]again, getting back to Mr. Dulles, I do not think he would
[4915]have gone back to the President and said, now, I have got the
[4917]capability to assassinate Lumumba, and I am going to do it
[4919]TOP SECRET
[4921]41
[4923]Fe
[4925]»P SECRET
[4927]3 1 next week if I have your permission, sir. He wouldn't have
[4928]3 2 done that. Because where I particularly remember this, or
[4929]3
[4930]é 5 get the feeling particularly strong, is dating back to
[4931]E 4 something that Senator Hart mentioned, the U-2 incident.
[4932]5 Allen Dulles’ strong desire was to take the whole responsi-
[4933]6 bility for that, and resiaqn, and be fired in disgrace,
[4934]9 publically, in order to protect the President.. But the
[4935]8 President totally refused to accept any such way of handling
[4936]9 it.
[4937]10 Mr. Baron. So that says something not only about the
[4938]i character of Allen Dulles, but the character of the President?
[4939]; 12 Mr. Dillon. Of both, yes. |
[4940]é 43 Mr. Baron. That the President would be inerested in
[4941]14 taking responsibility for the orders that he had given?
[4942]1s Mr. Dillon. Yes. He was very strong that way. And Mr.
[4943]16 Dulles was so strong in wanting to protect the President that
[4944]7” he was willing to go out in disgrace, public disgrace after
[4945]18 ten years or more of service to the Government, just to pro-
[4946]19 tect the President, although there was nothing that he had
[4947]: 20 responsibility for, primary. responsibility.
[4948]3
[4949]: oy Mr. Baron. From your knowledge of Special Group meetings
[4950]: 22 and minutes, it is your reading of this sentence that "it
[4951]z
[4952]4 23 was finally agreed that planning for the Congo would not
[4953]: - 24 necessarily rule out consideration of any particular kind
[4954]: 25 of activity which might contribute to getting rid of Lumumba ®
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[4994]-- you would read that senterice to indicate that an assassina-
[4995]tion was within the bounds of the kind of activity that might
[4996]be used to get rid of Lumumba?
[4998]Mr. Dillon. Yes, I would.
[5000]Mr. Baron. And you were commenting before that Mr. Dulles
[5001]might be expected by, say, some members of the Special Group,
[5002]to return to the Special Group if an assassination were being
[5003]mounted?
[5005]Mr. Dillon. Not only that, but anything being mounted,
[5007]I mean whatever action to get rid of Lumumba, I think he would
[5008]probably come back and say what we are doing.
[5010]Mr. Baron. But it is also your statement that, due to
[5011]the mode of operating of Allen Dulles, and his character,
[5012]it is quite conceivable that he wouldn't have returned to the
[5013]Special Group with such an operation?
[5015]Mr. Dillon. That might be, although it is more likely
[5016]that what he really said was that he wouldn't return to the
[5017]President.
[5019]Mr. Baron. In order to protect the President?
[5021]Mr. Dillon. In order to protect the President. I think
[5022]he had looked on other officials in the Government as quite
[5023]different from the President,, all of the, in other words, as
[5024]expendable, and he probably would be less likely to go and
[5025]do things totally on his own. And his whole idea was to
[5027]protect the President as the public representative of the uS
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[5061]from-.any bad publicity in connection with this or any other
[5062]similar thing. |
[5064]Mr. Baron. But based on the discussion at this meeting
[5065]you would assume that the CIA would have the authority to
[5066]proceed to mount an assassination effort against Lumumba?
[5068]Mr. Dillon. 'No, I said that they would certainly have the
[5069]authority to plan. It is a close question whether this would
[5070]be enough to actually go ahead with it. But certainly the way
[5071]this thing worked, as far as I know, they didn't do anything
[5073]just on their own. TI think they would have checked back at
[5075]least with the senior people in the State Department or the
[5077]Defense Department.
[5079]Mr. Dawson. Would they have done that in such a way that
[5081]it would be available to appear on the public record at any
[5083]time?
[5084]Mr. Dillon. Maybe not. It might have just been a call
[5086]from the Secretary of State, Mr. Herter, or possibly the
[5088]‘Secretary of Defense.
[5090]Mr. Baron. Do you have any independent recollection --
[5092]Mr. Dillon. -~- and Gordon Gray. Tf think they would have
[5093]kept him notified, because he was sort of central in this
[5094]thing, they wouldn't do anything without his at least knowing
[5095]about it.
[5097]Mr. Baron. Did you have any independent recollection of
[5099]being made aware of this Special Group meeting that we have
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[5139]been discussing before you saw the minutes today?
[5141]Mr. Dillon. No, I did not.
[5143]Me. Baron. Let me show you now what we will marke as
[5144]Exhibit 4, which is minutes of the Special Group of September
[5145]38, 1960, and point you toward the passage on the second page
[5146]that refers to the Congo.where Gordon Gray indicates that
[5147]"there is top level feeling that: vigorous action would not: be.
[5148]a mistake."
[5150](The above réferred:to documen
[5151]was marked Dillon Exhibit No.
[5153]4 for identification.)
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[5190]Mr. Baron. Do you have any independent recolleciton of
[5191]being made aware of this meeting?
[5193]Mr. Dillon. No, I do not.
[5195]Mr. Baron. Is this consonant with your understanding of
[5196]the policy at the highest levels of the American Government
[5197]toward Lumumba at this time?
[5199]Mr. Dillon. It fits inis with what I understood was the
[5200]general policy that we were very concerned with.
[5202]Mir. Baron. Do you recall that at this period of time, in
[5203]early September, Lumumba had just been deposed, and there was
[5204]a struggle going on between Lumumba and Kasavubu for power
[5205]which culminated in.a coup on September 14th by Mobutu and
[5207]on the 13th of September Lumumba entered the protective
[5209]custody of the United Nations forces in Leopoldville, do you
[5211]f
[5213]‘recall that chain of events?
[5215]Mr. Dillon. .No. I knew that at some point there was a
[5216]change in government. I don't recall the detail of it at this
[5217]time.
[5219]Mr. Baron. Are you aware that in early September Soviet
[5220]planes and Soviet trucks had gone to Stanleyville?
[5222]Mr. Dillon. If you tell me that is the case, I think it
[5223]does refresh my memory, because I do know -- I do remember
[5224]that we were very concerned about that sort of action by the
[5225]Soviets. |
[5227]Mr. Baron. And were you aware that Stanleyville was the
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[5265]stronghold of Lumumba and his supporters?
[5267]Mr. Dillon. No, I don't recall that.
[5269]Mr. Baron. Dut you do recall that at that point there was
[5270]concern at higher levels in the State bepartmentover the
[5271]connection between bumumba and the Soviets?
[5273]Mr. Dillon. Yes, very much so.
[5275]Mr. Baron. Let me show you Exhibit 5, which is "minutes
[5276]of the National Security Council meeting of September 21,
[5277]1960.
[5279](The above referred to document
[5280]was marked Dillon Exhibit No. 5
[5282]for identification.)
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[5288]ake)
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[5321]Mr. Dillon. Yes, I Seecnow that I attended this as Acting
[5322]Secretary of State, this particular meéting.
[5324]Mr.. Baron. And do you recall the discussion reported in
[5325]those minutes of affairs in the Congo, that there was the
[5326]fear of Egyptian influence on the Congo situation on the part
[5327]of Lumumba, and that there was some pressure being brought to
[5328]reconcile Kasavutu and Lumumba?
[5330]Mr. Dillon. No, I don't recall any of the details of this
[5331]meeting. I don't recall the meeting itslef. But it fits
[5332]right in with the general feeling about the problem, the way
[5333]you looked at the Congo problems.
[5335]Mr. Baron. The minutes refer to a visa application for
[5337]Lumumba. Would that have been in connection with Lumumba's
[5339]desire to come to the US to be recognized as the legitimate
[5341]representative of the Congo Government before the United
[5342]Nations? |
[5344]Mr. Dillon. It would certainly refer to his desire to cor
[5345]to the United Nations to get out of the Congo, where he had
[5346]been deposed. Whether he cared much whether we recognized
[5347]him as the legitimate representative or not I would doubt.
[5348]I don't think he had much interest in what we recognized.
[5349]But I think it does show that he wanted to get out. And this
[5350]was a way cf getting.out.
[5352]And he also probably wanted to go to the UN and make a big
[5354]complaint there.
[5356]TOP SECRET
[5358]TOP SECRET
[5360]Mr. Baron. The last paragraph of those minutes quote
[5362]8
[5363]8 1
[5364]= Mr. Dulles as saying: "The Soviet ships off the African
[5365]a
[5366]2
[5367]co
[5368]3 Coast were apparently awaiting a clarification of the situation.
[5369]a Mobutu appeared to be the effective power in the Congo for the
[5370]a 4
[5371]moment, but Lumumba was not yet disposed of and remained a
[5372]5
[5373]grave danger as long as he was not disposed of."
[5374]6 +
[5375]Did Mr. Dulles make those remarks?
[5376]9
[5377]Mr. Dillon. I don't recall those particular remarks.
[5378]8 , ;
[5379]But he could have. But again, there my own interpretation,
[5380]9
[5381]"@isposed of" wouldn't necessarily only be assassinated, it
[5382]10
[5383]would be gotten out of the Congo to some place where he was
[5384]li
[5385]neutralized and couldn't come back in, and you could be sure
[5386]3 12
[5387]2 he was done with.
[5388]’ 13
[5389]a Mr. Baron. But assassination would have been one of the
[5390]3 14 |
[5391]_ means of disposing of Lumumba, that would have been acceptable?
[5392]15
[5393]Mr. Dillon. I guess the word “disposed” could mean that.
[5394]16 .
[5395]But that strikes me as rather surprising, because I would
[5396]17
[5397]think once he was out of office, our concern would have been
[5398]18
[5399]deescalated to some extent, it would have been more to find
[5400]” 19
[5401]8 some way, which should have been perfectly possible, of
[5402]8
[5403]5 20
[5404]a getting him out, or locking him up, or anything.
[5405]g 21 .
[5406]& Mr. Baron. Let me represent to you that the report of
[5407]g 22 , , _ ;
[5408]uj the United Nations investigation of the circumstances
[5409]wi .
[5410]2 23
[5411]3 surrounding Lumumba's death, which was not reported until
[5413]2 24
[5414]ic February of 1961, indicated that at this time, in late
[5415]. :
[5416]+ 25 ,
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[5453]September of 1960, Lumumba was in the custody of the United
[5454]Nations troops, who were actually protecting him at his
[5455]residence in Leopoldville, not restraining him from leaving,
[5456]but there was a Congolese guard surrounding the UN troops -
[5457]who were prepared to arrest Lumumba if he did leave his
[5458]residence.
[5460]Mr. Dillon. I think I recall that now, because it is
[5461]rather unusual circumstances.
[5463]Mr. Baron. And then apparently in the middle of October
[5464]the UN had refused to surrender Lumumba to the Congolese army;
[5465]who had come withian:arrest warrant for Lumumba. Is it your
[5466]understanding that during this period of time, even after
[5467]Lumumba was in the protective custody of the United Nations,
[5468]he was still considered a potential threat and volatile force
[5469]in the Congo by the US?
[5471]Mr. Dillon. I would imagine so. And I would not be at
[5472]all surprised if.the then rulers or officials of the
[5473]Congolese Government that succeeded Lumumba were concerned
[5474]about it, because he had this tremendous ability to stir up a
[5475]crowd or a group. And if he could have gotten out and starte
[5476]to talk to the battalion of the Congolese Army, he probably
[5477]would have had them in the palm of his hand in five minutes.
[5479]Mr. Baron. We had testimony from a CIA officer, who said
[5480]he had been dispatched to the Congo by CIA Headquarters for
[5481]the purpose of trying to secure Lumumba's escape from UN
[5483]: 42423566 _ 104 TOP SECRET
[5485]50
[5487]TOP SECRET
[5489]custody, and place him in the hands of the Congolese Army,
[5491]o
[5492]$ 1
[5493]3 where the CIA officer's expectation was that Lumumba would
[5494]a 2
[5495]3 _ receive a trial, and probably capital punishment at the hands
[5496]aS oo) :
[5497]5 of the Congolese Army. Does this mission of the CIA officer
[5498]& 4 -
[5499]seem to conform to your own idea of US policy at that time
[5500]5
[5501]toward Lumumba?
[5502]6
[5503]Mr. Dillon. Yes, I think very much so.
[5504]1
[5505]Mr. Baron. Now, we also have testimony that the CIA
[5506]8
[5507]Chief of Station in the Congo was visited by a representative
[5508]9
[5509]from CIA Headquarters who supplied him with lethal biological
[5510]10
[5511]agents and the equipment with which to administer these
[5512]il .
[5513]substances for the purpose of assassinating Lumumba, and that
[5514]12
[5515]ro]
[5516]F he, the Chief of Station, was charged with such a mission,
[5517]13
[5518]Fa which obviously he never carried out successfully. Have you
[5519]5 14 .
[5520]oO ever heard any mention or even a hint of such an operation?
[5521]15
[5522]Mr. Dillon. No, I never have.
[5523]16
[5524]Mr. Baron. Would such an operation seem consonant with
[5525]17
[5526]the kinds of discussions that had been recounted in those
[5527]18
[5528]Special Group meetings?
[5529]” 19 ,
[5530]3 Mr. Dillon. Well, to the extent particularly that one
[5531]5 20
[5532]a document you have showed me --~
[5533]2g 21
[5534]g ; Mr. Baron. The August 23rd meeting?
[5535]= 22
[5536]Mr. Dillon. Yes -~ if assassination is a real possibility
[5537]a 23
[5538]5 as that indicates, this would be a way to do it. But I never
[5539]rd 24
[5540]i heard of it at the time, and I didn't realize that there was
[5541]3 25
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[5577]any such capacity for the use of biological things. I read
[5578]about that and heard about it in the Rockefeller Commission ~:
[5579]with Castro, but not about this.
[5581]Mr. Dawson. Would you expect to be told about the
[5582]operational detail?
[5584]Mr. pittbn. Not in detail. But I am rather surprised
[5586]i
[5587]that it went this far and in my position I didn't know some-
[5588]thing about it. It may be that they felt that it was so tight
[5589]that there was no need to tell anyone except the Secretary of
[5590]State. I assume Secretary Herter would have known about it.
[5592]Mr. Baron. Would it be possible that the CIA would feel
[5593]that the "plausible deniability" would have covered someone
[5594]in your position?
[5596]Mr. Dillon. It could have, if they felt that they had a
[5597]clearcut --
[5599]Mr. Baron. ~~ mandate to proceed with an assassination
[5600]operation?
[5602]Mx. Dillon. It is possible. That is just supposition,
[5603]but it is possible. It may not really have been Mr. Dulles’
[5604]decision.
[5606]Mr. Baron. Were you aware of any connection between the
[5607]CIA and the actual death of Patrice Lumumba?
[5609]Mr. Dillon. No.
[5611]Mr. Baron. Were you aware of any CIA sponsorship for the
[5613]coup which brought Mobutu into firm control of the Government
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[5651]in mid-September of 1960?
[5653]ur. Dillon. No, I was not aware of that.
[5655]Mr. Baron. And were you aware of any CIA plan to snatch
[5656]Lumumba from UN protective custody and place him in the hands
[5657]of the Congolese Army?
[5659]Mr. Dillon. No, I wasn't aware of that.
[5661]Mr. Dawson. Mr. Secretary, Mr. Baron has asked a lot of
[5662]questions about some of the factual parts of this. And I
[5663]would like to follow up on some of your statements about
[5664]Director Dulles' willingness to protect the President. I
[5665]think you made a very interesting and forthright observation,
[5666]that he was very interested in keeping the President protected
[5667]from things which may cause embarassment to him.
[5669]Mr. Dillon. Not personally, but that he though would
[5670]cause great embarrassment to the nation as well as to just
[5671]the Presidency, whereas if it was some individual, it is just
[5672]because it is the terrible Mr. Dulles and the terrible CIA,
[5673]it is not the nation. And the President is the nation. So
[5674]that it was a fairly deep feeling which went beyond cereurnt
[5675]personality institutionally to the Presidency, which should
[5676]not be involved in this sort of thing.
[5678]Mr. Dawson. Did you investigate what may have been the
[5679]basis for your feeling, which is your current feeling, that
[5680]that was his way of operation?
[5682]Mr. Dillon. I think that it was primarily -- I had known
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[5716]in mid-September of 1960?
[5718]Mr. Dillon. Wo, I was not aware of that.
[5720]Mr. Baron. And were you aware of any CIA plan to snatch
[5721]Lumumba from UN protective custody and place him in the hands
[5722]of the Congolese Army?
[5724]Mr. Dillon. No, I wasn't aware of that.
[5726]Mr. Dawson. Mr. Secretary, Mr. Baron has asked a lot of
[5727]questions about some of the factual parts of this. And I
[5728]would like to follow up on some of your statements about
[5729]Director Dulles' willingness to protect the President. I
[5730]think you made a very interesting and forthright observation,
[5731]that he was very interested in keeping the President protected
[5732]from things which may cause embarassment to him.
[5734]Mr. Dillon. Not personally, but that he though would
[5735]cause great embarrassment to the nation as well as to just
[5736]the Presidency, whereas if it was some individual, it is just
[5737]because it is the terrible Mr. Dulles and the terrible CIA,
[5738]it-is not the nation. And the President is the nation. So
[5739]that it was a fairly deep feeling which went beyond
[5740]personality institutionally to the Presidency, which should
[5741]not be involved in this sort of thing.
[5743]Mr. Dawson. Did you investigate what may have been the
[5744]basis for your feeling, which is your current feeling, that
[5745]that was his way of operation?
[5747]Mr. Dillon. I think that it was primarily -- I had known
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[5782]him well over his eight years in the Foreign Service, and also
[5783]in the State Department. But it was highlighted because this
[5784]experience in the U-2, in the first few days of this I was
[5785]Acting Secretary of State, and I had to bear the brunt of a
[5786]lot of that mix-up.
[5788]Mr. Dawson. Was Mr. Dulles generally a responsible
[5789]individual in whom the President placed great trust?
[5791]Mr. Dillon. Very much so, great trust.
[5793]Mr. Dawson. In his relationship with the President do
[5794]you believe that President Fisenhower was aware of Mr. Dulles'
[5795]desire to protect him, President Eisenhower, from a great
[5796]embarrassment?
[5798]Mr. Dillon. I would think so. Of course, the U-2 thing
[5799]made him aware of that, because it was not only Mr. Dulles'
[5800]view, but it was also the view of the State Department that _
[5801]this was the correct procedure, that the President should take
[5802]whatever action was necessary eithér with Mr. Dulles or with
[5803]senior officials in the State Department, and blame them for
[5804]both, but not to accept the responsibility himself if nothing
[5805]happened. And he disregarded our strong feelings on that.
[5807]Mr. Herter had just gotten back from a NATO meeting in
[5808]Turkey, and he made a special trip out to Camp David to urge
[5809]this on him, to warn him before he did assume responsibility
[5811]himself. But to no avail. Hagerty was very strong for the
[5813]' President taking responsibility, because I think he had a
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[5861]little different view of this. I think he had a view that
[5862]the press looked on the President as someone who was not in
[5863]full charge of the State Department at time, and he thought
[5864]this would contribute to that, which would be very bad for
[5865]the President. So we were thinking of it more from the
[5866]international aspect. We had the contrary feeling.
[5868]Mr. Baron. Did the President's trust in Allen Dulles
[5869]diminish significantly after the U-2 affair.
[5871]Mr. Dillon. No, because there was nothing wrong with the
[5873]U-2 affair, except that the President had authorized it
[5875]specifically, it was flying on the day after he authorized it.
[5876]The only bolix that came was in the after events, where this
[5877]silly press release announcement was put out by NASA, I guess
[5878]it was, that this plane had just been sort of flying around and
[5879]got lost, or something like that. And we really had a very
[5880]difficult time about that at the morning meeting where the
[5882]news came to us, which was out in the Virginia hills. The
[5883]President had a meeting of a restricted nature afterwards,
[5884]including me and Allen Dulles, the Secretary of Defense, and
[5885]Colonel Goodpastor.
[5887]Ang he put me in charge of handling the whole thing, and
[5888]gave me the responsibility. And he wasn't fully briefed on
[5889]all the cover stories or anything of this nature. And I
[5890]went back to the State Department and was working diligently
[5892]on this and talking to Mr. Dulles as to what we would say.
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[5929]And the next thing we knew suddenly the President told
[5931]Colonel Goodpastor to say that this was descended from the
[5933]State Department.
[5935]And the next thing we knew the statement came out from
[5936]the US from NASA which made no sense at all.
[5938]And of course what had happened was that Hagerty -- that
[5939]had been the routine thing, and when it came up Hagerty was
[5940]to refer the press to NASA, and NASA, if they were referred,
[5941]had the cover story.
[5943]Anca Goodpastor -- I never quite found out what happened
[5944]in the White House, whether Goodpastor didn't get to Hagerty
[5945]or Hagerty didn't pay any attention to them, either way was
[5946]more likely, because Hagerty was way senior to Goodpastor
[5947]at that time, and they had done this, and he didn't know, he
[5949]had been at that little meeting with the President, he didn't
[5951]know that it was supposed to be in the State Department. And
[5953]that got everything off upside down. So we were trying to
[5954]explain how the US Government had put out this silly statement
[5956]which bore no relation to the facts, when we knew the facts.
[5958]And of course at that time the Russians hadn't yet
[5959]announced that they had the pilot or anything. But we knew
[5960]that was likely, too. We knew that would happen. I think it
[5961]followed electronically. And but it was because of this
[5962]White House bolix that htis had happened.
[5964]Mr. Dawson. The basis for Dulles' willingness throughout
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[6013]this period to protect the President was also -- I guess there
[6015]was some impact made upon his willingness after the U-2 crisis
[6017]Mr. Dillon. We still felt strongly that that had been a
[6018]mistake, because it put Khrushchev in a position where he
[6019]felt he had to break off the talks in Paris with the President
[6020]and so forth, which we felt would not have been the case
[6021]otherwise.
[6023]So this didn't change Mr. Dulles at all, it made him even
[6025]stronger in wanting to protect the President, because he knew
[6027]the President was difficult to protect.
[6029]Mr. Dawson. During the period following the U-2 crisis
[6030]you saw Director Dulles brief the Government on intelligence
[6031]operations?
[6033]Mr. Dillon. He did this at every National Security
[6034]Council meeting. The format of the meetings were that the
[6035]meeting would be called to order by the President, and then
[6036]he would turn to Mr. Dulles for the intelligence briefing,
[6037]which was the first item of business in all those meetings.
[6039]Mr. Dawson. On those occasions did Mr. Dulles attempt to
[6041]tell the President enough where he would have some idea of
[6043]wnat was going on, but not tell him directly what was
[6044]happening?
[6046]Mr. Dillon. Most of the briefings were about intelligence
[6048]what other people were doing and what was happening. And it
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[6095]would only be exceptional when they would deal with what we
[6096]were doing ourselves.
[6098]Mr. Dawson. Dealing with the latter, when Mr. Dulles
[6099]wanted Presidential approval to mount an operation, how did he
[6100]go about achieving that or gaining that approval?
[6102]Mr. Dillon. I don't really know. I do know in regard,
[6103]to the U-2 flights, which had a very special procedure set up
[6104]whereby a piece of paper had to be signed in each case by the
[6105]Director of Central Intelligence, the Secretary of State, the
[6106]Secretary of Defense, ar Acting Secretary of Defense, and then
[6107]taken to the President and approved by him before the flight
[6108]could take place. And that was handled by General Goodpastor
[6109]rather than through Mr. Gray.
[6111]Mr. Dawson. Did that change after the U-2 crisis?
[6113]Mr. Dillon. Wo, that was the procedure.
[6115]Mz. Dawson. He knew what he was approving very clearly?
[6117]Mr. Dillon. He had been right up to this time and that
[6118]was the case with the U-2. After the U-2 crisis there weren't
[6119]any more U-2 flights, and that procedure came to a sudden end.
[6121]Mr. Dawson. In other intelligence operations which you
[6122]brought up which were required to be brought before the
[6123]Special Group --
[6125]Mr. Dillon. I don't recall that there were any. But if
[6126]it was needed, I don't know who would do it, but it would be
[6128]through the person who would know the most about it. And
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[6177]that would be General Goodpastor, because he was very close
[6178]to the President, although he was a relatively junior officer
[6179]at that time, he was a young colonel -- I think he may have
[6180]even been a major when he started there in the White House.
[6181]But he was sort of Staff Secretary to the President on all
[6182]those relations with the Pentagon and the CIA and the State
[6183]Department. If you wanted to see the President on something
[6185]important, it was generally through General Goodpastor rather
[6187]‘than through Gordon Gray. And Gordon Gray handled most of
[6189]the detailed mechanics of setting up meetings, and that sort
[6190]of thing. He was not as much a personal assistant to the
[6191]President. And that job was held by General Goodpastor.
[6193]Mr. Dawson. But in circumstances where the President was
[6194]going to be made aware of attempts to overthrow a government,
[6195]in front of a number of people like the Special Group of the
[6196]National Security Council, were you privy to some of those
[6199]Mr. Dillon. I don't ever recall one.
[6201]Mr. Dawson. You don't recall instances where an attempt
[6202]or discussion to overthrow a government or anything more
[6203]sinister than an assassination was brought up?
[6205]| Mr. Dillon. No, except the discussion of preparing a
[6206]capacity to invade Cuba. That was considered. “and we have
[6207]the minutes on that. That was considered a number of times
[6209]and reported a number of times.
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[6248]_ Mr. Dawson. After an intelligence operation blows, in
[6249]the sense that it is uncovered in connection with the Govern-
[6250]ment of the US is found, are you aware that oftentimes a
[6251]routine order goes out to estand down intelligence, to take
[6252]positiveactions in that area, are you aware of that standard
[6253]operating procedure?
[6255]Mr. Dillon. I don't quite understand what your question
[6256]is there.
[6258]Mr. Dawson. After the U-2 crisis did we for a period of
[6259]time stop agressive intelligence actions against the Soviet
[6260]Union?
[6262]Mr. Dillon. Yes, I think that was natural.
[6264]Mr. Dawson. That was my question. That is a routine
[6265]matter?
[6267]Mr. Dillon. That was a natural thing. Obviously we
[6268]stopped the U-2 flights because we knew they had the capacity
[6269]to shoot them down, and so it was no use doing it again.
[6271]And I would imagine we probably eased off on the electronic
[6272]flights along the coasts of the Soviet Union, and kept them
[6273]further away, or disconinued them for awhile.
[6275]Mr. Dawson. Are you aware of a similar stand down order
[6276]having been issued after Lumumba was captured?
[6278]Mr. Dillon. No.
[6280]Mr. Baron. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned earlier that you
[6282]might have been away from Washington in August of 1960 when
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[6322]this Special Group meeting took place on August 25th, is that
[6323]correct?
[6325]Mr. Dillon. Yes, there is a possibility, hecause August
[6326]was the month, if one was going to take any time off in the
[6327]summer, it was likely to be in August.
[6329]Mr. Dawson. It was best to take it off during August
[6330]because of the miserable summers?
[6332]Mr. Dillon. Yes. And my family had a summer place where
[6333]I had gone since childhood in Maine, and it was easy to get to
[6334]I do have enough recollection to know I was there a couple of
[6335]times when I had to get back for a Security Council meeting
[6336]and there were certain weather problems from the Coast of
[6337]Maine. I recall one time, it could have been this year, or it
[6338]could have been a year earlier. But I know I was there those
[6339]summers for a few days. And it could have been in August.
[6341]Mr. Baron. In reference to the meeting at the Pentagon
[6342]that was the subject of your affidavit, you mentioned to me
[6343]before we began this testimony today that from what you have
[6344]read recently, it is your impression that the remark of the
[6345]CIA representative at that meeting which, as you have said,
[6346]in effect turned off the suggestion of an assassination
[6347]attempt against Lumumba, might have been made simply because
[6348]the group was too large for such a discussion?
[6350]Mr. Dillon. It might have been -- I said that because of
[6352]what I have learned since, and I have learned more today --
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[6399]but they did try to develop such a capacity versus Castro.
[6400]But as I have thought about it since we talked, I think that
[6401]is less likely. I think it is more likely that it might have
[6402]been the beginning of this whole idea on the CIA's part that
[6403]they should develop such a capacity. And maybe they didn't
[6404]have it then and went to work to develop it beginning in
[6405]August.
[6407]Mr. Baron. So wittingly you have been present at the
[6408]creation?
[6410]Mr. Dillon. The early stages, yes.
[6412]Mr. Baron. I have no further questions.
[6414]I would simply like to say that the Committee is extremely
[6415]appreciateive of your coming here today. This is obviously
[6416]a difficult and unpleasant subject to discuss. And you have
[6417]been tremendously informative on it. So thank -you very much.
[6419]Mr. Dillon. I wish I could be more so. But the details
[6420]of what happened at that time, the day to day details, have
[6421]really departed from my mind. It is only those few relatively
[6422]unusual things that I still recall. And any way I can help
[6423]I am glad to.
[6425]Mr. Baron. There may be one way you can help right now.
[6426]I know that before we: started today Bill Miller, the Staff
[6427]Director of the Committee, indicated that the Committee would
[6428]be interested’ in hearing you out at great length on policy
[6430]recommendations in the intelligence field gathered both from
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[6468]your experience in the State Department and the Treasury
[6469]Department, and also your recent service on the Rockefeller
[6470]Commission. But I wondered specifically, in reference to the
[6471]assassination area, where we faced the need to tie up our
[6472]investigations as soon as possible, and perhaps make some
[6473]recommendations aS soon as possible, do you have any specific
[6474]suggestions?
[6476]Mr. Dillon. No, I don't think so. I think that the recor
[6477]has shown that this is the type of thing that the US
[6478]Government or any of its branches cannot and should not engage
[6479]in. And I doubt very much that there will be any repitition
[6480]of this sort of thing that took place in the early sixties,
[6481]which I guess was predicated on the belief that something like
[6482]that could be done in exceptional circumstances without its
[6483]being surfaced and being connected with the US. And I think
[6484]even those who believed that such action was morally proper
[6485]and might have been in the best intersts of both the US and
[6486]the world would think that the costs were too heavy if it was
[6487]ever traced back to the US. And the record seems to show that
[6489]it does get traced back. So I think that there will be a
[6491]general agreement among those who are the type of people who
[6492]would ordinarily think that such a thing should not be though
[6493]of as US Policy.
[6495]Mr. Baron. Are there any institutional changes that you
[6497]would suggest to prevent the use of assassination as a tool
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[6550]of foreign policy?
[6552]Mr. Dillon. The only thing is, -- I don't know just what
[6553]institutional changes are really necessary, but there should
[6554]be the clarification that the Special Group, or whatever
[6555]name it is given for the Committee, would have to approve any
[6556]action by the CIA, whether it is assassination or military
[6557]action or anything else, in writing. I think that would be
[6558]fine. I think it is naivete to have the idea that the
[6559]President has to approve anvthing like that. I tend to agree
[6560]with Mr. Dulles that you shoulé not cet the President
[6562]personally involved in details of operations that might be
[6564]a
[6566]right. If am not judging just about
[6568]fe
[6570]on the sedge of what
[6571]assassinations, but in any covert operation. The law now is
[6572]that the President has to approve any covert operation. I
[6573]think that the result now will be that there wouldn't be
[6574]any. I think there may be times when we will need them, but
[6575]not violent ones. I have in mind such things as financial
[6576]help and such things as that. But I don't think the President
[6577]ought personally to sign the checks.
[6579]Mr. Baron. Thank you again.
[6581](Whereupon, at 5:15 p.m., the Committee was adjcurned,
[6583]subject to the call of the Chair.)
[6585]TOP SECRET
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[6590]arripavizy = Yyllon Uh" |
[6592]UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ,
[6593]DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SS:
[6595]I, C. Douglas Dillon, being first duly sworn, do upon oath
[6596]depose and state:
[6598]From June 1959 until early January 1961, I served as Under
[6599]Secretary of State. During approximately 35-40 percent of
[6600]that time, I served as Acting Secretary of State because of
[6601]Secretary Herter's absence from Washington.
[6603]had served as the State Department representative on the 54/12
[6604]Committee, a predecessor of the present Forty Committee. Whén
[6605]I became Under Secretary, the President asked me to retain my
[6606]earlier responsibilities for foreign economic policy. Accord-
[6607]ingly, the Number 3 position in the Department of State was
[6608]designated as Under Secretary for Political Affairs. Robert
[6609]Murphy was appointed to this position and took over the State
[6610]Department's responsibilities on the 54/12 Committee.
[6612]Secretary Herter, who preceded me as Under Secretary of State, Ee
[6613]i
[6616]Because of the frequency of my service as Acting Secretary of
[6617]State, I was kept regularly informed of important 54/12 Com-
[6618]mittee decisions. On occasion I met with the 54/12 Committee
[6619]and participated in its deliberations.
[6621]During this entire period I have no recollection of any dis-
[6622]cussions or.decisions looking toward the assassination of
[6623]either Generalissimo Trujillo or Prime Minister Castro.
[6625]On one occasion in late July or early August of 1960, shortly
[6626]after Patrice Lumumba's visit to Washington, I attended a meet-
[6627]ing in the Pentagon at which the overall Congo problem was dis-
[6628]cussed. During the discussion, which covered a great variety
[6630]of matters, my recollection is that a question regarding the
[6631]possibility of an assassination attempt against Lumumba was
[6632]briefly raised. The CIA representative indicated that the Agency
[6633]did not undertake this sort of operation. This ended considera-
[6634]tion of this subject. With this one exception I never heard any
[6635]discussion of assassination attempts against anyone.
[6637]. | - Dated this A/ day of May, 1975.
[6639]Sif | a
[6642]C. Botgfas Dillion =
[6643]Subscribed and sworn to before me of ie
[6644]this-gy day of May 197535 ent Ak "
[6645]A ae a WO?
[6646]fe xe Qe 7 Ate r
[6647]i
[6649]Notary Publix " or ve
[6651]2 a .
[6652]District of Columbia | i
[6654]ote re ted nh ge ENR
[6655]pete ay Doe tne nh ee ho rier,
[6657]BW 50955) Bocld:32423566 Page 120
[6659]\, - Ne =
[6660]; . ; war UM me |
[6662]a
[6666]30 June 1960
[6668]MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
[6670]SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Graup Meeting, 3%. dune 1960 a
[6671]|
[6673]PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Gray, Irwin, Gen, Cabell
[6675]ad
[6676]7
[6678]3, Conga _
[6680]Gen. Cabell mentioned briefly the fact of the election of Joseph Nea
[6681]to the Presidency of the Congo Senate, and the fact that we had assisted
[6682]him financially. He indicated that we in no way intend to claim full
[6683]. credit for his election but, particularly in view of the very close
[6684]contest, we might have had some effect; and in any case we may have em
[6685]secured some influence with this potentially useful individual.
[6687]a /
[6688]NY f/7. Cuba
[6690]In an informal conver
[6691]Mr. Gray expressed the opinion that
[6692]all that it can afford to take from the Cas
[6693]and abroad is probably
[6695]sation after Gen. Cabell's departure,
[6697]the U.S. has taken publicly about -
[6699]tro government; that public oo
[6700]beginning to feel that there is
[6701]far this country can be pushed around; that this may
[6702]countries to take a similar tack; and that the
[6703]ffective economic and other action the harder we
[6705]opinion both here
[6706]mo limit as to how
[6707]encourage other small
[6708]longer we delay with e
[6709]may make it for ourselves.
[6711]with the stipulation that
[6713]Mr. Merchant and Mr. Irwin agreed,
[6714]n until it is prepared
[6716]the United States should not take affirmative actio
[6718]to follow through on a substantial scale.
[6719]oo Z
[6720]ifc- THOMAS A. PARROTT
[6721]3 PROPERTY ;
[6723]0
[6724]D tle THE WHITE HOU G20
[6726]Det
[6727]| erpnry Gyre pull
[6728]* | Foacg 7 Lice Boy
[6730]a vie
[6732]HW 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 1231
[6734]to insist on a more precise spelling out of individual or group
[6735]views,
[6737]Mr. Parrott also said that Mr, Macy had raised a related
[6739]point which Mr. Barnes and he had agreed had validity, and that
[6741]Mr. Barnes had undertaken to assure Macy that it would be given
[6742]adequate attention by the interagency planning group. This was a
[6743]concern expressed as to planning for the support - fiscal and otherwise -
[6744]of a new Cuban government immediately after a successful overturn
[6746]of the present one. Mr. Merchant said that he agreed fully with the
[6747]necessity for making contingency plans of this sort, and had in fact
[6748]directed three weeks ago that State officials begin to draw them up.
[6750]Ny » i} . °
[6751]CON OH ann th
[6753]THOMAS A. PARROTT
[6755]a
[6757]ergs
[6758]Sa om
[6762]HW 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 122
[6764]Le
[6766]HW 50955
[6768]know enough about the political attitudes of the members of the Frente,
[6769]particularly as to basic freedoms, their attitude toward restoration
[6771]of seized American property, etc. (In answer to this, Mr. Gray had
[6772]pointed out that the Frente is composed of people who have broken
[6773]with Castro, at least on the basic philosophies.)
[6775]in an attempt to clarify the situation with respect to the first
[6776]point, Mr. Parrott told the Group about last Monday's meeting with
[6777]Mr. Macy, at which Mr. Barnes had covered in considerable detail
[6778]all aspects of the Cuban project. He said that he was ata loss to
[6779]understand how Macy could have received the impression that CIA
[6780]is not aware of dissident groups. He went on to say that in answer
[6781]to Mr, Macy's question as to the outlook, Mr. Barnes had stated -
[6782]and had developed at considerable length - the thesis that our view
[6783]was one of limited optimism, and that he had explained in detail just
[6784]why this is so; this explanation had included specilic comrnents on the
[6785]steps that have been, and are being, taken to identify such groups and
[6786]to assess their apparent leaders. Mr, Parrott said further that the
[6788]‘point had been made forcibly to Macy that it would be out of the question V
[6790]for CLA to attempt to mount an invasion of Cuba by itself, without the
[6791]participation of large numbers of disaffected individuals within the
[6792]country.
[6794]On the second point, Mr, Dulles said that we do know a good
[6795]deal about the basic political sympathies of Frente members, and
[6796]cited as an example the position that had been taken as to the inclusion
[6797]of certain ultra-conservative groups. He said that the Frente had
[6798]issued a statement of its aims, which he summarized very broadly aan
[6799]as being to preserve the principles of the revolution. He said that as _
[6800]to specific stands on restoration of U.S. property rights, etc., this
[6801]was thought to be unwise because it would give the Frente the appearance
[6802]of being a tool of the Americans. He agreed, however, that Mr. Stans!
[6803]point was a valid one to bear in mind and said we would certainly do
[6804]80. He added that he expects to lunch with Mr. Stans in the near future
[6805]and would take that opportunity to discuss these matters further, as
[6806]appropriate.
[6808]Mr. Parrott said that there was no disagreement that the political
[6809]ideas of these individuals must be constantly assessed and must be
[6810]clearly established before the operation actually comes off. He
[6811]added, however, that it should be borne in mind that once these
[6812]politically-screened individuals had issued their general statement
[6813]of objectives, our primary operational task hag been to hold the FRD
[6814]together, and that at this particular stage it would not be practical
[6817]PRM re rai ay PRO: meee bE
[6818]A ea Pepys SATA oy PCO bic ie Ge et
[6819]GLUE R + £4 pid THE WHITE RUSSEL Cre
[6820]tes Le b I
[6822]Bocld:32423566 Page 1233
[6826]A V4. Cuba
[6828]‘The DCI summarized the progress we have made in establishing
[6829]contact with certain dissident groups within Cuba. In this connection
[6830]he also noted the apparent fulfillment of a sabotage requirement which
[6831]had been levied on one of these groups as a test of its capabilities
[6832](after this action had been cleared with the Special Group).
[6834]” He also said that we hope to have a paramilitary force of
[6835]' approximately 500 people ready to operate by November. In answer
[6836]to Mr. Irvin's question, he outlined two possible ways of initiating
[6837]the tactical combat phase,
[6839]Mr. Gray then told the Group of a talk he had had with the
[6840]Director of the Bureau of the Budget. The latter had told Mr. Gray
[6841]that he had discussed the Cuban project with Mr. Macy and that as
[6842]a result of this discussion he, Mr. Stans, had two reservations that
[6843]he would like Gray to look into.
[6845]*’ One of these had to do with the statement by Macy that in his
[6846]discussion with CIA representatives in connection with the latest
[6847]withdrawal from the Reserve, he had received 'no evidence" that any
[6848]effective resistance had been identified within Cuba. (Mr. Gray had
[6849]answered that in the formal presentation last week, Mr. Dulles and
[6850]Mr. Bissell had mentioned a number of such groups. )
[6852]The second point had to do with a feeling that we might not
[6854]PROPE
[6855]THE WHITE nuuSe QE REGE
[6857]BW 50955 DocId: 32423566 Page 124
[6859]outstanding intelligence, ability or drive, but that he is obviously
[6860]well motivated. Mr. Irwin asked whether there might be other
[6861]individuals of similar, although naturally lesser, stature in the church
[6863]hierarchy who could be useful.
[6865]Mr. Merchant commented that the Catholic Church in Black
[6866]Africa is not a very substantial force. Mr. Dulles concurred in this,
[6867]but added that this would be something to keep in mind as appropriate.
[6871]PRUE as
[6873]THE WHITE HOUSES be
[6875]HW 50955 DoclId:32423566 Page 125
[6877]25 August 1960
[6879]MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
[6880]SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 25 August 1960
[6882]PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Gray, Irwin, Dulles
[6884]‘l. Congo
[6886]Mr. Parrott outlined broadly three (or as Mr. Dulles later
[6887]described them "2 1/2") operational lines that we are following in
[6889]mounting an anti~Lumumba campaign in the Congo. These included:
[6891]operations through the chief advisor of the Christian Trade Unions;
[6893]the planned attempt of a Socialist labor Senator to arrange a vote of
[6895]no contidence in Lumumba; and a brand new contact with an alleged
[6897]leader of certain independent labor groups. He emphasized that the
[6898]latter had just come up and that we are now in the process of assessing
[6900]the bona fides and capabilities of the individual.
[6902]The Group agreed that the action contemplated is very much.
[6903]in order. Mr. Gray commented, however, that his associates had
[6904]expressed extremely strong feelings on the necessity for very
[6905]straightforward action in this situation, and he wondered whether
[6906]the plans as outlined were sufficient to accomplish this. Mr. Dulle
[6908]S
[6910]replied that he had taken the comments referred to seriously and had
[6912]every intention of proceeding as vigorously as the situation permits
[6913]or requires, but added that he must necessarily put himself ina
[6915]position of interpreting instructions of this kind within the bounds of
[6917]necessity and capability. It was finally agreed that, planning for the
[6918]Congo would not necessarily rule out "consideration" of any particu
[6919]kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid of Lumumba.
[6921]lar —
[6923]Mr. Irwin commented that certain individuals in Defense have
[6925]given thought to the possibility of using high officials of the Catholic
[6927]Church in Africa to promote the general objectives of the West. In
[6928]this connection, he cited a preliminary assessment which had been
[6929]made of the Negro Cardinal recently appointed by the Pope ~ the
[6931]assessment being that the individual in question is a man of not
[6933]Lo ijt
[6934]PROPERLY i CIR on
[6935]. a _ ne how
[6936]“THE WHITE HUUSt Boeke Ln
[6938]NYG ae gebyes
[6939]oht Sane Rial NO LOT
[6941]HW 50955
[6943]Bocld:32423566 Page 126
[6947]“4, Dominican Republic
[6949]Mr. Dulles inquired whether Mr. Merchant wanted. to discuss
[6950]the proposal to dispatch a letter to Trujillo suggesting that the latter
[6951]retire’ from office. At Mr. Merchant's request, the DCI stated his
[6952]opinion, which was to the effect that he had considerable reservation
[6953]as to the efficacy or wisdom of sucha letter. ‘He said that it seemcd
[6954]to him much more useful to make a personal approach,which not only
[6955]stood a chance of being more effective, but also could be denicd,
[6957]‘He pointed out that a personal approach had been attempted some time
[6958]apo, but that the individual in question had not been able to carry it
[6959]off. He suggested that the approach might best be made by an
[6960]unofficial American, and that Mr. Pawley would be a better bet than
[6961]the previous individual, ;
[6963]Mr. Merchant said that he realized his own name had been
[6964]suggested, and that he was far from enthusiastic about the idea. He
[6965]said further that he has a visceral feeling against asking a Chief of
[6966]State to get out of office - either through tie medium. of a letter or
[6967]personal contact - particularly when we do not know who might succeed
[6968]him. Mr. Merchant conceded with good humor the validity of Mr.
[6970]Gray's wry comment that Mr. Merchant's ethics and his pragmatism)
[6972]. o
[6973]Wray S wry Comimen
[6975]might be somewhat intertwined.
[6977]Mr. Gray said that he was entirely opposed to having any U.S.
[6978]official sign such a letter. He thought that an unofficial letter might
[6979]be a different matter.
[6981]The conclusion of the Group was that it would be worth the
[6982]effort to get Mr. Pawley to attempt a direct approach to the Benefactor;
[6983]it was noted that the chances of success are perhaps less than even,
[6984]but that no great harm could result.
[6986]“5, Contro
[6988]ene came
[6990]There was a brief discussion of developments in the Congo and
[6991]the possibilities of effective action there. Mr. Gray said that he
[6993]hoped that Agency people in the field are fully awareof the top-level
[6994]feeling in Washington that vigorous action would not be amiss.
[6996]Xp . aoe
[6997]che ocd ct
[6998]THOMAS A, PARROTT
[6999]- PRG
[7001]THE WHITE fyee>
[7003]HW 50955 Docld:324273566 Page 1237
[7005]os Mr. Dulles said he believed a warrant had been issued
[7006]for the arrest of Lumumba. Aside from Lumumba, Mobutu appears
[7007]to be the only man in the Congo able to act with firmness. A
[7008]recent attempt to assassinate Mobutu had failed. Mr. Dulles
[7009]then reported that we had attempted to provide Mobutu with
[7010]funds but that the guards protecting Mobutu bad relieved our
[7011]messenger of the funds. We cannot get funds to Mobutu because
[7012]he does not have complete control over his guards. A new
[7013]development has been Mobutu's creation of a council of advisers,
[7014]most of whom are graduate students. The old ministers have
[7015]been turned out of office and their offices have been taken
[7016]over for the council, which is intended to carry on for a temp-
[7017]orery period. Mr. Dulles reported that the USSR had suffered
[7018]a severe blow to its prestige in the Congo. However, he had
[7019]been surprised at the ease with which the Soviets were forced
[7020]out of the Congo. He believed that the Soviet diplomats,after
[7021]departing from the Congo, went to Accra but he did not know
[7022]whether they had moved on toward the USSR. Mr. Gray asked
[7023]whether the Soviets were really quitting the Congo. Secretary
[7024]Dillon said the Soviet press has not Yet admitted that the
[7025]Soviets have quit the Congo. Mr. Dulles said the Soviet diplo-
[7026]mats indicated to the press before leaving that.they would be
[7027]back. Secretary Dillon believed it was clear that the Soviets
[7028]had not given up in the Congo. Mr. Dulles reported that the
[7029]Soviet diplomats left the Congo so hurriedly that the Soviet
[7030]men merkings which they painted over the Congo markings on their
[7031]planes were still wet when they left. Mr. Dulles seid the
[7032]Soviet ships off the African coast were apparently awaiting
[7033]a clarification of the situation. Mobutu appeared to be the
[7034]effective power in the Congo for the moment but Lumumba was
[7035]not yet disposed of and remained a grave danger as long as
[7036]he was not disposed of. aan —__-
[7038]Mr. Dulles observed that the situation in Laos was still
[7039]confusing and that little progress had been made toward the
[7040]settlement of the crisis during the past week. The threctening
[7041]situation in Sam Neua Frovince, however, had been quieted as
[7042]a result of the dispatch of Laotian parachute troops to that
[7043]area. ‘The situation remains troublesome because Pathet Lao
[7044]and Viet Minh forces could intervene at any time. The problem
[7045]of the conflicting governments in Laos is no nearer a settie-
[7047]- . ment. The King has requested that General Cuane and General
[7048]Phoumi call upon him. A skirmish between Fhoumi's forces and
[7049]Vientiane forces has been reported at Pak Sane, but little
[7050]bloodshed resulted. Apparently, Fhoumi has adopted tactics
[7051]of carrying on a war of nerves against Vientiane. There has
[7052].. been firing across the Mekong River into the city and Phoumi
[7053]apparently intends to starve out the government. Meanwhile,
[7055]15. TOP SECRET
[7057]a a ee . Ty ag Moy
[7058]a aa wa 7 ‘ .
[7060]BW 50955 DoclId:32423566 Page 128
[7062]kept under continuing scrutiny by all interested
[7064]™ departments and agencies to ensure that it serves
[7065]the vurposes of retarding the growth of the war
[7066]potential of the Sino-Soviet Bloc and reducing its
[7067]unity. ~ Noted that, with respect to paregreph ll of
[7068]NSC 5701/3, U.S. export controls over such materials,
[7069]equipnent, technology and services as can be unilater-
[7070]ally controlled by the United States may be imposed
[7071]not only to achieve a worthwhile adverse impact on
[7072]the war potential of the European Soviet Bloc, but
[7073]also to serve other U.S. policy objectives, especially
[7074]with regard to technology and services.
[7076]NOTE: The action in b above, as approved by the President,
[7077]subsequently transmitted to all holders of NSC 5704/3.
[7079]5. SIGNIFICANT WORLD DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING U.S. SECURTTY
[7081]Mr. Dulles said he would first summarize developments in
[7082]the Congo. Several African states were making frantic efforts
[7083]to save Lumimbea. An intercepted message between Egypt and Ghana
[7084]indicates that Nasser is urging the UAR, Ghana, and Guinea to
[7085]concentrate their forces in Leopoldville and bring pressure to
[7086]bear for the maintenance of Lumumba as Prime Minister. Mr.Dulles
[7087]remarked that the bulk of the UAR forces now in the Congo had
[7089]“s been placed advisedly in north Equateur Province, while the
[7091]Guinea forces were in the northern part of Leopoldville Province.
[7092]Intercepted messages also indicated that Nasser had asked that
[7093]a council be formed in Leopoldville consisting of the diplomatic
[7094]representatives of the UAR, Ghana, and Guinea in that city. The
[7095]UAR Ambassador to the Congo had been directed, in concert with
[7096]the Ambassadors of Ghana, Guinea and Morocco to attempt to per-
[7097]suade Kasavubu to effect a reconciliation with Lumumba. On Sep-
[7098]tember 20 Kasavubu had announced that he had reached no egreement
[7099]with Lumumba but the latter had later displayed a piece of paper
[7100]purporting to be en agreement with Kasavubu.
[7102]Secretary Dillon reported that Lumwaobe had requested a visa
[7103]for travel to New York as the representative of the Congo to
[7104]the UN and had also requested a visa as an official of the Govern-
[7105]ment of the Congo. We had denied both requests for visas. How- _
[7106]ever, if. Lumumba asked for a visa to visit the U.S. as a private
[7107]eitizen, we would have difficulty in turning him down.Mr.Dillon
[7108]added that the Congo Government declares it will arrest Lumumbe
[7109]if he attempts to leave the country.
[7111]1h. "TOP SECRET
[7113]HW 50955 DocId: 32423566 Page 129
[7117]~Sanewsnt eretiie
[7118]Special Group 2¢
[7120]MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
[7122]SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Mesting, § September 1960
[7124]PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Douglas, Gray, Dulles
[7128]1, Supply Drop to Cuban Dissidents
[7130]Mr. Parrott outlined the proposed supply drop to Cuban
[7131]dissidents inthe Escambray. After brief discussion, the Group
[7132]approved the project as presented. Mr. Parrott asked whether
[7133]approval could be granted at this time for continuing missions of
[7134]a similar nature to this group or other bodies of dissidents. The
[7136]agreed to this, with Mr. Dulles stating that the other
[7138]members could be notified by telephone, without the necessity of
[7139]convening a meeting.
[7141]HY 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 130
[7143]N
[7145]i Cr Rom Ey . .
[7146]“ vi. 9 mM 75 CUBA apa O14
[7147]fe. .
[7151]PEDEL CASTRO INPERVIENED WY DAGENS IZHES
[7153]Stockholm DAGERS YHEPER in Swedish 3 dul 75 pp 1, 12 LD
[7155]Longer Wants To Assassinate Net]
[7157]fexcerpts] Havana, 2 July--For a man who has for many years been on the CIA death
[7158]list, Cuba's leader Fidel Castro Looked remarkably unconcerned, He sat ona sofa
[7160]in the Swedish Embassy a few nours: before Olof Paline'ts departure from Cuba and when
[7161]attempts to assassinate him, he raised
[7163]' .
[7164]| (vats Holmberg interview with Cuban Prime Minister Castro: “'The United States No
[7166]: he was questioned. about the CIA's repented
[7167]: | poth hands to the ceiling in a gesture of resignation:
[7169]“Good Lord," he said. "We have known ail. that for a long time. It seems a little
[7170]ridievious," Fidel said, "to hear today of disclosures of new assassination plans when
[7172]here in Guba we already knew of them,
[7173]oe .
[7174]“vet what is now being disclosed in the United States is only a small part," he said.
[7175]"te could deseribe a dozen simt{lar assassination plans and we will also do so when if
[7177]‘the U.S. investigations are over."
[7179]‘But he did not belLeve that he ran the risk of being assaguinated by the CIA any
[7181]longer.
[7183]"yf there are such plans today, we at least, do not know of then," he said. "TF
[7184]believe that the United States is no longer so interested in assassinating me--and
[7185]Tt believe that it has accepted the Cuban revolution as a fact and that sooner or
[7187]later it must come to an agreement with us.
[7189]"Bat no one can be absolutely certain," he said.
[7191]Raised Eyebrows
[7193]“What Fidel Castro said while seated on the Swedish Embassy sofa will cause some
[7195]| oat eyebrows to be raised in many countries which Cuba has accepted as international
[7197]i .- allies.
[7199]: ._: One of the key phrases of Olof Palme!sLatin American trip has been “a new economic
[7201]: world order." Jt is a term which embraces small countries! rights to control their
[7202]natural resourees, and in both tne o4] power, Venezuela, and the potential oil power,
[7203]Mexico, Olof Palme's hosts have adopted the concept with enthustasm.
[7205]When Pidel Castro explained his om skepticism concerning talk of "a now economic
[7207]after dinner at the Swedish Embassy, he did so in a violent attack on
[7209]world order”
[7210]the world's oll-producing countries.
[7212]fle believed that a new world order could not be created by the introductton of new
[7214]privileges for aA new proup of countrics.
[7216]The Poor Are Affected
[7218]orn \ eraniea . fent to a tina .
[7219]y | VETS P insuffielent to demand that all countries have control over their own ray
[7221]fe.
[7223]an matertals,” he sata. "All privileges are created at another's expense, and today
[7225]' 14 19753" 4a not the industrialised countries which are affected by the ofl countrics'
[7226]JUL “profits but the poor countries which do not have ofl, .
[7228]in
[7231]RENT ea
[7234]HW 50955 Docld:324273566 Page 131
[7236]cee Sones Geo nee mgt Ae bad ofS Ba we a ttn eet nt SMS ee
[7237]sro rae
[7239]Bie! q 4 sud
[7241]oO . SL AA S18
[7243]Yh. 9 Jul 75 : Q2 CUBA _
[7245]GA 7 :
[7246]MHow can you compare cocoa and o11?7" he asked "hat benefit is Lt to countries Like
[7247]Sri Tanta and Tanzania that all countries control their vay materials when all this
[7248]neans to them is that they must pay more for both off and industrial goods?
[7250]"Tam not speaking for nyself," he explained. "ue receive oil from the USSR on favorable |
[7251]terms, -But if the of] countrics demand, solidarity from the Whird World, they must ;
[7252]concern thenselves with the problems of the Third Vorld. They are, as yet, reluctant
[7254]to do this. _ :
[7256]"mare has the oil revenue gone?" he asked, and he answered the question.
[7258]"It has been deposited in the economies of the industrial world and has been used for
[7259]aras purcrases. The industrialized countries will emerge from the economic crisis stronger
[7260]than ever. It will be the developing countries which will be affected." —_
[7262]Thay Do Not Dare
[7263]_ Fidel Castro fell silent and he looked at the Swedish journalists with an expression of 7
[7264]_ genuine alara, cre sO ts
[7265]‘Dg you think I am speaking too severely?" he asked worriedly. "Bub you must under--
[7267]puand that someone must talk about this. There is no one else who dares, since all
[7268]are hoping for loans from the oil countries," ; . oa
[7270]And he gave those wno sat next to him. a comforting slap on the back. Lo . . ot
[7271]-In yarions Udtin American countries Latin America is deseribed today as a changing : ‘:
[7272]and in both Mexico and Venezuela Olof Palne Listened to the revolutionary
[7274]continent,
[7276]and anti-imperialist diatribes which are inereasingly:part of both these countries! a, .
[7277]official language. - ; . ; a ” :
[7278]Pidel Castro did not appear especially impressed by this change. Ne did not mention Loe 7 eee
[7279]Mexico and Veneyuela at all when he was asked about the prospects for social revolution — : _
[7281]in South Ameriea--but he did mention the military governments of Peru and Panama. ~ oo :
[7282]Better Than Nothing : ce . ; . : : oa
[7284]"No path toward revolution can be ruled out," he said, "and we aro witching the :
[7285]progressive regimes in Peru and Panama with great interest, It is meiniingless to i
[7286]diseuss whether an armed struge#le is necessary for revolution--all that can be aald
[7287]ia that a revolution must be based on real force, whether it be in Chile op Cuba,"
[7288]Ho mmiled sadly when-asked for his opinion of the governments in Venezuela and Mexico,
[7289]vnich, by their own assurances, are revolutionary, and he thought for a long time
[7290]before answering: "It is better than nothing."
[7292]Someone asked if it is true that Cuba is receiving econoiatc aid from the ussr in
[7293]conflict with its own ideology and that it his its "stomach in Moscow and its head in
[7297]Fidel Castro was ooviously upset by the question. ; 7 .
[7299]Cuban revolution," he said, “it vas us, But the
[7301]‘rt was not they who contrived the
[7302]and wa cannot forget that. We have not com-
[7304]: USSR helped us when no one elses would,
[7305]. promised with either the USSR or anyone else, and who else could have helped us?
[7307]The United States?”
[7309]panne
[7311]HW 50955 DocId: 32423566 Page 132
[7313]THE EVENING STAR (Washington), Monday, S September 1963, .
[7314]Pour Star Edition, Page B 4, Columns 4 - 5 .
[7316]"Goldwater's Toughness Challenged by Castro"
[7318]by Daniel Harker, Ap Staff Writer
[7321]'
[7323]Y denouncing wha
[7324]Cuban territory,
[7326]"J... Bitteri t he called recent U.S.
[7327]| Prompted’ raids on
[7329]Mr. Castro said:
[7331]"We are prepared to fight them and answer
[7332]in kind. u.s. leaders should think that if
[7333]they are aiding terrorist plans to eliminate
[7335]Cuban leaders, they themselves Will not be
[7336]safe, _ _
[7338]"The U.S. is always ready to negotiate
[7339]and make promises which later it will not honor.
[7340]-- This has happened to Promises made during the
[7341]October crisis. They have been broken as can
[7342]be seen with new attacks. .
[7344]"But I warn this is leading ‘to a very. ; _ oe
[7345]dangerous Situation that could lead toa 7
[7346]- Worse Crisis than October's
[7350]_ (From an. improm tu interview given b Castro at a Brazilian
[7351]P PB Y
[7352]' Embassy reception this week. ] ‘ ;
[7354]nepet ad
[7355]ie Ci sot .
[7356]JuL 14 1915
[7358]42
[7359]HW 50955 DoclId: 32423566 Page 133
[7361]ty oe
[7363]SINE-PICAYUNE, New Orleans, Monday, 9 September 1963, page 7,
[7364]Columns-5 - 7
[7366]HW 50955
[7368]"Castro Blasts Raids on Cuba. Says U.S. Leaders
[7369]Imperiled by Aid to Rebels."
[7371]Thais item was introduced by an editor's note
[7372]referring to the fact that Castro had turned
[7373]up ata Brazilian Embassy reception Saturday
[7374]night (7 September) where he had submitted to
[7375]én impromptu interview. Harker's account of
[7376]the interview reached New York Sunday after-
[7378]‘noon.
[7380]“Havana (AP) ~ Prime Minister Fidel Castra_
[7381]Said Saturday night: ‘U.S. leaders would be
[7382]in danger if they helped in any attempt to do
[7384]_ away with leaders of Cuba.'"
[7386]"Bitterly denouncing what he called
[7387]recent U.S. prompted raids on Cuban territory,
[7388]Castro said:. 'we are prepared to fight them
[7389]and answer in kind. JU.s. leaders should think
[7390]that. if they are aiding terrorist plans to
[7392]' @liminate Cuban leaders, they themselves will .
[7393]' not be safe.'" : :
[7395]“...-World affairs +... Seemed to be
[7397]- entering a more peaceful climate a few days
[7399]ego, but now this trend has changed with
[7401]attacks." |
[7403]"'The U.S. is always ready to negotiate
[7404]and make promises which later it will not honor.
[7405]This has happened to promises made during the
[7406]October crisis. ‘They have been broken as can
[7407]be seen with new attacks. | :
[7409]"But I warn this is leading to a very
[7411]Cangerous situation that could lead to a worse
[7412]crisis than October's....'" a
[7414]RECENTER Full
[7415]| JUL 14 1915
[7417]Bocld: 32423566 Page 134
[7419]ff ame 4 “ it
[7420]Ch) Mid- 1956,
[7423]Proydnor
[7425]revolutionary araup, Tavler Sague, e@ "gansta,
[7426]j vac through Punta Hieacas zone in Matanzas
[7428]ajdast Gastro ond other Lerrorism and sabotage. TNT,
[7429]revolvers. and cutometic pistols. a high-powered rifie, and large quantities
[7430]of anmunttion were supplied by the O24.
[7432]us counterravelubionary groups were trained and armed by
[7433]sated theouch the north of Havana, to assassinate Castro
[7435]vo infiltrated to coordinate the activittes of various
[7436]onary groups directed by the CIA inside Cuba. weaponry
[7437]tic weapons, high-powered mfles with scopes, ammunition,
[7439]UBTS ¥
[7440]countearraya Tut
[7442]and explosives.
[7444](3) June, 1961, the "Frente hayeluctonario Democratico"” (FRD) met with individual
[7445]infiltrated into Cuba with instructions for a plot against Castro. Jeeps .
[7447]1
[7448]with bazookas were placed tn @ ysrage at an intersection in Havana and a
[7449]truck with grenades was placed in sports city. Pian was to ambush Castro
[7450]ad other leaders. Two particlpants -- Gulliermo Caula Ferrer and Higinto.
[7451]Monendaz -- said when arrested that the CIA was in charge, and that contact
[7452]was maintained through Cuantanaio and the Swiss Embassy.
[7454]In duly, 1961, after Bay of Pigs, CIA worked to eansolidate counterrevolutionary
[7455]groups inte the "Unidad Resistencia” (united Resistance) organization. Jose
[7456]Pujais Mederas made an undercover visit to the United States te meet with CIA
[7457]officers Jim Bender {er Boulding), Harold Bishop and Carl Hitch. There Mederos
[7458]was appointed head of CIA operations in Cuba in place af the arrested Aldredo
[7459]Izaguirre. Programs includad “selfaggression” against Guantandmo to jJustity
[7460]counter-attacks on other countries to provoke war against Cuba.
[7461](4) igh tho infiltration of CIA agents Emilio Adolfo Rivero
[7463]le fRaul} and Jorge Garcia Rubio (Tony). and others,
[7464]e grcup developed a plot against Castro during the
[7465]tion In Oriente Province.
[7467]duly 26, 1961, the same group planned another plot tne same day against
[7469]Castro during a rally at Revolution Square, Meetings were held at the
[7471]Guanterianea Naval Gase, where war material, including large quantities
[7472]of small arms, was supplied by base conmmender Captain Car] £. Schenweias.
[7475]ait
[7476]et
[7478](68) Also
[7480]in July, 1961, pletting against Castra was undertaken by representatives
[7481]oF "3d de Noviembre," "Movimente Bavelucionario de] Pueblo,” and “Frante
[7482]Revoluctonario Uemucratice." The assassination attempt was to be carried |
[7483]gut near the home af Celiz Sanchez Manduley in Vedado. CIA tnstructions
[7484]cane through contacts abroad with Tony Varona, Manuel Ray and Aurellano
[7486]Sanchez Arange, and through agmiral Burke and CIA agents on Guantanamo.
[7487]Weapons included explosives. mortars, high-powered rifles. and 30-caliber
[7488]machine guns.
[7490](7) Séptember 13, 1961. the same groups listed in (6) above, in contact with the
[7491]"ovinienta de Recuperacion Revelustonarta" (MER), led by Juan dose Martare
[7492]Silva, made an attempt on the life of Dr. Carlos Rafael Rodriguez when he
[7493]was returning from Matanzas to Havana. They worked with a CIA agent th
[7494]Matanzas and a counterrevolutionary band there. Weapons inciuded automatic
[7495]handguns, machine guns, and a high-powered riffe with telescopic site.
[7497]{8} October 4, 1961, the MRR and “IT Frente del Eseambray,” under CIA direction,
[7498]agreed upon a plan for sabotage in Havana, timed to coincide with the return
[7499]of Cuban President Osvalda Torrado from Punta del Este. A bazooxa was to be
[7500]Fired toward the President at the former presidential palace ‘rom a nearby
[7501]apartaent butiding, with the withdrawal covered by launching grenades against
[7502]the public. Meapans recovered inc -d autumatic rifles and grenade launchers.
[7504]Lyte
[7505]PURE
[7507]mn
[7509]HY 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 135
[7511](9) In early 1962, with CIA instructions through Guantanamo, Jorge Luis Cuervo
[7512]Calvo reorganized several groups into the “Union de Unidades RevoTuctonartas"
[7513](UDUR). A meeting was held to plan an uprising and discuss arrangements which
[7514]had been made to receive equipment through Guantanamo. CIA was pressing
[7515]both attempts against Castro and staged acts of agression against Guantanamo.
[7516]Calvo outlined "Plan Z" -- a scheme to kit] Foreign Minister Raul Roa, and
[7517]then attack other Cuban leaders who would attend the burial. ‘The authors "
[7518]of the plan are listed as Cay Hernandez and Cay Gispert and members of the
[7519]DRE organization headed by Julio Hernandez Rojo, listed as a CIA agent
[7520]infiltrated into Cuba. Weaponry included a double-barreled shotgun,
[7521]explosives, grenades, and demolition timing devices, one labeled "Block
[7522]Demalition, M5 Al."
[7524]In 1963 another consolidation of groups was carried out with CIA direction from
[7525]abroad through agent Nino Diaz. The umbrella group was "Rasistencia Civica
[7526]Anticomunista” (RCA), and it incorporated the "Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional"
[7527](ELN), "Movimiento de Recuperacton Revoluctonaria" (MRR), and "Agrupacion
[7528]Montecrist?,” among others. The overall objective, as instructed by the CIA,
[7530]was to create the imaression of a strong internal resistance to Castro, and to
[7531]inspire a deciston for armed intervention at the meeting of OAS presidents. Again,
[7532]instructions came through Guantanaino.
[7534](10) March 13, 1963, the RCA initiated a plan to assassinate Castro from a house
[7535]near the Univeristy of Havana, by firing a mortar. People arrested included
[7536]Samuel Carballo Morerio, identified as a CIA agent. Attacks were to be made ~-
[7537]simultaneously on the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution and on
[7538]- National Revolutionary Militia sites. Bazcokas, mortars and machine guns
[7539]were taken. °
[7541](11) Apri? 7, 1963, the RGA developed a plan involving sixteen men armed with
[7542]pistols and fragmentation grenades, who were to attack Castro at the Latin
[7543]Anerican Stadium. Those arrested were Enrique Rodriguez Valdes (known as
[7544]"Mulgado"}, Ricardo Lopez Cabrera, Onorio Torres Perdomo, and Jorge Carlos
[7545]Espinosa Escarles.
[7547](12) duly 26, 1963, the RCA grouping planned to assassinate the Minister of the
[7548]Armed Forces, Raul Castro, at Revolution Square during the 26th of July
[7549]celebration. Leading these groups involved in the plot was Ibrahim Machin
[7551]ernandez.
[7553]September 28, 1963, another group was formed through a relationship with
[7555]CIA agent Pierre Gwen Diez de Ure, who was a French citizen living in
[7557]Cuba. Their plan was to dynamite sewage pipes under the presidential palace.
[7558]de Ure confessed that he had been working for and giving information to the
[7559]CIA for a period of two years. .
[7561](13
[7565](14) March, 1964, a plan to assassinate Castro by Marto Salabarria Aguiar, a
[7566]"gangster," who had contacts with the CIA through its agent Br. Bernardo
[7567]Milanes Lopez, who sought support in Spain from Tony Varona and Juan Bosch,
[7568]listed as friends of Salabarria. The CIA gave Salabarria weapons and "great
[7569]sums of money” for a scheme which invelved installing a 30 or 50 caliber
[7570]machine gun th a vehicle and waiting for Castro to pass by.
[7572](15) Mid-1964, another plan to assassinate Castro was formulated by members of
[7573]“Movimiento de Liberacton Nacional," part of the RCA block controlied by the
[7574]CIA. The effort involved CIA agents Alberto and Ramon Grau Sierra, members
[7575]of a network headed by Ramon and Maria Leopoldina Grau Alsina, who attempted
[7576]to poison Castro in 1965. The mid-1964 plan called for throwing grenades
[7577]at Castro at the Latin American Stadium. Nine men were involved.
[7579]September, 1964, members of “Ejerctto de Liberacion Nacianal” (ELN) and "Frente
[7581]Interna de Liberacion" (FIL), who had been engaged in intelligence for the CIA,
[7582]began, under CIA instructions, to seek unification.
[7584]HY 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 136
[7586]al
[7588]{16} One af the members of tris Geaups f ames to Cubiiles Perez, told Angel Miguel
[7589]Aranctoia Vira. Rolando Gel dos hen ols aad others af a plot against Castro
[7590]to accur a® Ti Sh. ¥edado.
[7592](17) tn early 1965, counterrevalutioneries Julio nar Cruz mecihias Fermin Gonzalez
[7593]Carballo and Giraida k aide Uiego Setanc -- manbers of an RCA sub-group
[7594]Known as ‘elte de Liberactan Nacional” ~- were working on a plot against
[7595]Castro in Santiego de las Veqat. This pian was dropped in favor of a plan
[7596]to hit Castro at the Latin Averican Stadium, with another group in a nearby
[7597]butiding set up to Fire machine guns imte the crowd to create panic and
[7598]facilitate the escape.
[7600](18) In June, 1985. thers was an arrest of the group esaded by Ramon and Marta
[7602]Leopaldina Grau Aisina (see (15) abovel, which Was pare of the "Rescate"
[7604]sand “Movimiento Anticommuniste Revaluctenaria’ (MAR} grougs sponsored by the.
[7605]CIA, Maria Leapoldina Grau nad received CIA ints ructions far poisoning
[7606]Castro at the Havana Libre Hot ei. Jesus Companiond Souza and Santos de la
[7607]Caridad Perez Nunez, members of MAR, were to carry out the poison tng. When
[7608]thts attemot fatied, another 509 capsule bottie oF poisan was sent by Tony
[7609]Varona. Marta Alsina, also knawn as “Poltta," also race tved weapons with
[7610]Silencers and special assassination orojecti tes frem the CIA,
[7612](iS) in duly of 1965, there wets cn arrest of a group which represented another
[7613]CIA attempt to orgentze count orrevolutionaries, this time under the name
[7614]"Unidad Resistencia." This group deve Toned a plan to assassinate Castro
[7615]with a Thompson submachine gun at Vita Nouva's rastaursnt, firing also at
[7616]the Ministry af Interlor across the straet to create confusion and permit the
[7617]escapes. Equipment included weapons and communications gear
[7619](20) Also in 1965, there was an arrest of former Cuban commander Rolando Cubela
[7620]Secades. Cubele was recruited during a trip to Madrid hy CLA agents Manuel
[7621]Aytine, Jorge Robreno ("The Nagichan }, Luis Enrique Trasancos. and Carlos
[7622]Tepeding. The tianning alsa involved an official et the Cuban Embassy in
[7623]Madeid, dose Luts Gonzales Gal lavrata, and Albarto Blanco for "61 Laco").
[7625]In Madrid, Artie promised boats, eapons and ynen for an invasion af Cuba
[7626]within 72 howrs to support the ass sination of Castro. Before returning
[7627]to Cuba, Cubaia recetyed from tai larrets a rifle with a telescopic site and
[7628]silencer,
[7630](21) In mid-1965, two o¥oups » with CIA connections and contacts in the United
[7631]States, the "Commences L' and the “Movimiento 30 de Noviembre,” planned
[7632]te infiltrate Sube. That effort was given up, end Instead they Fired from
[7633]gunboats at the "senoelarship zone" in itvamar and at the Riverta Hotel. fn
[7637]the dipactton of the presidential residence.
[7639](22) In Mav, 1966, these same groups were inflltrated into the Monte Barreto
[7640]zone in Havana with the mission of ansassinating Castro. In the action
[7641]Armande Romero Maritnez and sande :i19 Hermlata Diag Garcia were killed, and
[7642]Anténio Cuesta Valie ~~ head o Conant tos i", and Eugenio Enrique Zaldivar
[7643]Cardanas were arrastec nese. er had been trained in Puerto Rico by the
[7644]CIA, and some had been trvolved in the bomperdment of the "San Pascual,"
[7646]a merchant vessel anchtorec at the Cafbarien Pert in was Villas Province.
[7648](23) On March 37. 1967, three Infittrators fram the United States -- Felix
[7650]Asencia crecne, Wil fredc Martine: haz, and Gustava Avaces Alvarez ~- WEre
[7651]arrested while attemoting to lana by Gayo 3 Fragess. Thely planned activity
[7652]ssinate Castra ane conduct : Systanat) c sabotage to create the image
[7653]voTu tionary graugs in me United
[7655]ef a papular uprising, to help counter
[7656]States got official backing.  Thes a : had been trained d by t the CIA
[7657]through "M-d0-77," "HECE." “Las Dinas iyevos..” Comandos LL." "Alpha~56," and
[7658]ather organ izations. They bad airtemacic rifles, boats, piastte exolosi ves.
[7659]and communications equipment.
[7661]HW 50955 Docld:32493566 Page 137 zd
[7663](24) In 1971, a plan was prepared to assassinate Castro on a visit to Chile.
[7665]The main protagonist was Jesus Dominguez Benitez, known as “The Islander,"
[7666]who had been arrested by the FBI in 1968 for promoting terrorist actions
[7667]inside the United States. In 1970 he had participated In an unsuccessful
[7668]attempt to infiltrate Cuba through Oriente Province and had sought refuge
[7669]at Guantanamo, where he was arrested for bond violation. Nonetheless, he
[7671]_-was free in 1971, to participate with the CIA, Chilean fascists, and Cuban
[7672]counterrevolutionaries in a scheme to assassinate Castro using a gun concealed
[7673]4n a television camera. He obtained Venezuelan press credentials from Cuban_
[7674]exiles in that country. The plan was aborted. Those involved in the plot
[7675]feared for their lives because the plan did not insure their escape.
[7677]Hid
[7679]HW 50955 Docld:32493566 Page 138 Ag
[7681]CLOSING STATEMENT FROM CUBA DOCUMENT
[7683]We consider that the analysis of the informations we offer,
[7684]the publicly known, and the ones that the American authorities
[7685]possess and have not been published, allows us to affirm that
[7686]the physical elimination of Cuban Revolutionary leaders,
[7687]aspecially the Prime Minister Fidel Castro Ruz, has been
[7689]a reiterate] policy of the United States through its subver-
[7690]sive agencies, making use of Cuban counterrevolutionaries,
[7691]U.S. citizen and all kind of corrupted individuals, inside
[7693]the country as well as abroad, witheut taking into considera-
[7694]tion the victims that would result from these actions.
[7696]With this purpose, they have provided the participants with
[7697]a great num of weapons, explosives, technical means of
[7698]transportation and communication for the accomplishment
[7700]‘of their plans.
[7702]These are some of the connoted and proved facts of the
[7703]numerous subversive activities that the CIA has carried out
[7704]aimed to the assasgination of the leaders of the Revolutionary
[7705]Government of Cuba.
[7707]HY 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 139 18
[7709]LOP
[7711]THE WHITE HOUSE
[7712]SECRET-SENSITIVE WASHINGTON
[7713]YES ONLY
[7714]November 12, 1964
[7716]MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY
[7717]SUBJECT: Shipments of Contaminating Elements to Cuba
[7718]l. Irefer to your interest in hearing more about the
[7720]Fitzgerald operation which involves the current shipment
[7721]of contaminating elements to Cuba and which is aimed at
[7723]bringing about a breakdown of a substantial amount of
[7725]Cuban machinery.
[7727]2. Attached is a copy of a memo which I believe you drafted
[7728]‘for a meeting with the President on April 7, 1964, Item 5
[7729]would appear to cover the type of operation which Fitzgerald
[7730]is now conducting.
[7732]_Thave not come across any minutes of the April 7 meeting.
[7734](As I recall it, you intentionally kept the attendance restricted
[7735]and were the sole attendee from the NSC staff.) While.I do
[7736]not recognize the handwriting or the doodles on the attached
[7738]- memo, they indicate that Themn2 Wes. approved. My own
[7740]strong recollection of the feller from the meeting was
[7742].that Items 1 through 5 were O.K, and that the only serious
[7744]: “82,
[7746]Fa,
[7748]An.
[7750]problems concerned Items 6 and 7.
[7752]3. Iassume that you still want to hear a status report on the
[7753]Fitzgerald operation at the Special Group meeting today and I
[7754]will pass this word to both Des and Peter Jessup.
[7756]IT think this operation is probably too far down the road to stop,
[7757]if indeed we do want to stopit. In any event, you will be able
[7758]to find this out, by some gentle questioning, when Des gives
[7760]Ca
[7761]Ka Gordon Chase
[7763]ao pt crm at OK PY?
[7764]™ 4 TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE - EYES ONLY.
[7766]his status report.
[7768]Copy’
[7770]funden Ro Iahasan
[7774]HW 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 140
[7776]Pay
[7782]ee re ~ ~ : eee sane see see as TS cee A A oe. aos rere
[7783]TOP SECRET | April 7, 1964
[7785]Memorandum for Discussion of Covert Program Against Cuba
[7787]U.S. covert operations against the Castro regime have recently
[7788]been reviewed in the Special Group (54/12), and a number of
[7790]issues are presented which require discussion and decision ata .
[7791]higher level,
[7793]The present covert program is designed in support of a general
[7794]policy of intense economic and political isolation of Castro,
[7795]accompanied by methods short of war to get rid of the Castro
[7796]regime. Parts of the program authorized in July 1963 have in
[7797]fact been held up for various reasons, and it is now important to
[7798]decide whether or not certain substantial and expensive activities
[7800]- Should be (a) actively continued; {b) held in readiness; (c} reduced,
[7801]or (d) abandoned,
[7803]Covert programs against Cuba fall into the following categories:
[7805]ME -
[7807]tates 1. Collection of intelligence, to include the infiltration and ex
[7808]RL
[7810]filtration of agents-and covert supply of agent operations.
[7811]—rRecommendation: It is unanimously recommended that this pro-~
[7812]9 ree
[7814]“gram be continued.
[7815], .
[7817]Lig A
[7822]Sek
[7825]Lie
[7826]at
[7827]Bw: Pars
[7829]“2, Govert propaganda aimed to encourage low-risk forms of
[7831]active and passive resistance and to stimulate tension within the
[7832];j>, regime and between Cuba and the Soviet bloc.
[7833]Qh Recommendation: It is recommended that these programs be
[7834]“~~ continued with regular review of their operational guidelines.
[7838]3. Cooperation with other agencies in economic denial by selec-
[7839]tive economic action with respect to products critical to the Cuban
[7841], /> economy. |
[7842]YO Recommendation: It is recommended that this program be con- /
[7843]tinued. ; ; . /
[7844]; f
[7845]4. Attempts to identify and establish contact with potential - “
[7846]dissident elemenjs near the power centers of the regime, bee
[7847]Q Ww Recommendation: It is recommended that this program be con-
[7848]XM tinued, :
[7850]TOP SECRET _— feo
[7852]7 Ste RIE ea pe
[7854]dundan 8. johnson Ligrary |.
[7856]aD.
[7858]HW 50955 Docld:324273566 Page 141
[7860]tu
[7863]TOP SECRET , So
[7865]ty
[7867]5. Indirect economic sabotage with a low level of visibility and
[7868]detection. Programs of this sort involve possible overseas
[7869]sabotage of Cuban ships and possible addition of contaminating
[7871]. yin .
[7872]: We elements to sensitive Cuban imports (not food).
[7873]“ Recommendation: It is recommended that these programs be
[7874]continued. .
[7876]conducted five raids in the summer and fall of 1963, before
[7877]x -authority for such raids was suspended for political reasons. .
[7878]“3 Recommendation: Opinion is divided on this issue and it is recom-
[7879], \ mended that higher authority hear the arguments of different parties.
[7881]f 6, ClA~controlled sabotage raiding apparatus in Florida which
[7883]aS,
[7885]7. ClA-supported (but not directly controlled) autonomous Cuban
[7886]exile groups operating from Central America. These groups will
[7887]begin operations soon unless action is taken to try to stop them.
[7888]Recommendation: Again opinion is divided and it is recommended
[7889]that higher authority hear the arguments.
[7891]., ae
[7893]ard
[7897]a
[7898]te
[7900]HW 50955 DoclId: 32423566 Page 142
[7902]TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY ‘THE WHITE HOUSE
[7904]WASHINGTON
[7906]March 4, 1965
[7908]MEMORANDUM FOR MR, BUNDY
[7910]. SUBJECT: Special Group Meeting - Cuba
[7912]Here is some miscellaneous information with regard to your Special Group
[7913]meeting this afternoon on Cuba.
[7915]1. Artime Cut-off - As you know, State is pressing to cut off Artime, largely
[7916]because of his recent irresponsible activity. CIA opposes State on this one
[7917]for the usual reasons, ‘DOD, reportedly, will also take a somewhat reluc-
[7919]' tant line on cutting off Artime. Vance may express the view that a cutoff
[7920]will drive Artime up the wall and that he will go off and do something that
[7921]could cause us real trouble vis-a-vis our present conflict with the East.
[7922]For example, he might go off and sink a Soviet ship. DOD would probably
[7923]prefer that we phase him out slowly and keep a dialogue going over the course
[7924]of the next few months. The advantage of this would be twofold - First, it
[7925]would keep Artime quiet; second, his residual power to hurt us, when we
[7926]finally do cut him off, will be reduced,
[7928]On this one, Iam inclined towards the DOD view.
[7930]2, Pesticides - The CLA will probably propose a deal whereby we arrange
[7932]to have diluted Cuban pesticides, State and DOD are both likely to oppose this
[7933]one for such reasons as the following: First, it will mean going to the Dutch
[7934]Government; it is questionable whether we want to bring up such a proposal
[7935]with that government, especially if we think the odds are high that we will be
[7936]turned down. Second, there is the moral issue of whether or not we should
[7937]dilute pesticides which were given to the Cubans during the prisoner exchange.
[7938]Third, it would be highly embarrassing if this one ever leaked out from one of
[7939]the many bases that would have to be touched.
[7941]I don't like this one either,
[7943]3. Support to RECE - One question which will arise today is whether or not to
[7944]start giving some low-risk support to RECE, While State and DOD, at the
[7945]working levels, originally were in favor of it, they seem to have changed their
[7946]position. One reason - some of the arguments which are spelled out in the
[7948]TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY
[7950]| Copy |
[7951]Lwnden 8. Johnson Library
[7953]HWY 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 143 9 “~
[7956](
[7957]TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY ‘
[7959]Mr. Bundy. -2- March 4, 1965
[7961]attached memo on the subject. Another reason - State does not want to com-
[7962]promise its position on Artime (i.e., If you give aid to RECE, how can you stop
[7964]aid to Artime?),
[7966]State and DOD will probably propose that, in turning down RECE, we give
[7967]them $17,000. The RECE people apparently had to tap a program fund of
[7968]its small contributors to keep going administratively over the last couple
[7969]months when Bosch cut them off; they want to return this money to the:
[7970]small contributors, Arguments in favor of giving them the money are:
[7972](a) it will lessen the shock of giving RECE a negative reply, (b) they will
[7973]not look bad among the exiles (we don't want them to look bad because they
[7974]are "good guys"'), and (c) part of RECE's problem has not been their fault.
[7975]We have not been able to give RECE as prompt an answer as we would have
[7976]liked,
[7978]I continue to be in favor of not getting involved with RECE; Llagree that
[7979]$17,000 is a small price to pay for a kiss-off,
[7981]4. Keating Gimmick - Both DOD and State are cold to the idea of having
[7982]Keating (I understand this now may be changed to Donovan) stir up trouble
[7983]between the Soviets and the Cubans. DOD feels that such goings-on might
[7984]_be interpreted as some sort of Vietnam play. State feels that such a man
[7985]wouldn't get received at a high level; also, there are other ways to do the
[7986]job if it needs doing, :
[7987]; x
[7989]While Ladmire CIA's ingenuity and I sincerely think we should keep them
[7990]invention-minded, I must say that this one sounds like a Rube Goldberg con-
[7991]traption. Iam against it.
[7993]5. CIA's Paramilitary Capability - Both DOD and State will probably oppose ©
[7994]CIA's proposal to drop its paramilitary capability. I agree with State and DOD
[7996]that, with the present world situation as it stands, this is a good capability
[7997]to keep on hand if we possibly can. I would agree to an abandonment of this
[7998]capability only if it were demonstrated that we could crank it up again ina
[7999]very short space of time. ;
[8001]EC
[8003]Gordon Chase
[8005]we ttees chan ot
[8007]TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY -
[8009]Copy’
[8011]/ : Lyndon B. Johnson Library
[8013]HW 50955 DocId: 32423566 Page idd
[8016]TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE
[8018]12 November 1964
[8020]MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY
[8022], SUBJECT: Policy Toward Cuba
[8024]In the attached paper the JCS recommended to the SecDef that
[8025]he forward the Army study entitled, "Square Dance" to the inter -
[8026]departmental Coordinating Commitiee for Cuban Affairs for appropriate
[8027]interagency coordination as a basis for further consideration by the
[8028]JCS. ;
[8030]In the course of preparing a Chairman's position on "Square
[8031]Dance,'' I pointed out that the covert operations proposed would involve
[8032]serious injury to Cuban civilians, and probably should not be elected
[8033]without very serious provocation -- perhaps greater than that required
[8034]to justify invasion. In addition, even if consistent with US values on
[8035]“just! international behavior, it is highly unlikely that we could under-
[8036]take such operations without having our role discovered and resulting
[8037]in serious international liabilities. Finally, even if "Square Dancc"!
[8038]were successfully implemented, there would be no guarantee that the
[8039]Cuban government would change its position. More likely, Soviet aid
[8040]and control would be increased.
[8042]As you are aware, Bill Smith participated in this study, though |
[8043]aderstand he did not subscribe to all of its contents. I recommend,
[8044]“however, that the White House remain aloof from formal consideration
[8045]of "Square Dance! at this stage. Then if the Coordinating Committee
[8046]and the JCS should recommend action in accordance with study proposals,
[8047]we can consider their recommendations without any precommitment.
[8049]a 2
[8050]Oo [CP
[8052]NS, R.‘C, BOWMAN
[8053]oN
[8055]TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE
[8056]bony
[8057]Lyndon 3B. Jonson Library
[8059]oa)
[8061]HY 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 145 “hn
[8063]TOP Sl DRET INFORMATIC | -
[8064]COVER SHEET COPY NO.
[8066]L. .
[8067]oe 5 pares
[8068]THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE : |
[8070]INFORMATION COVER SHEET
[8072]OFFICE OF
[8073]TOP SECRET
[8075]The attached TOP SECRET information contains data the security aspect of which is paramount, and unauchor-
[8077]zed disclosure of which would cause EXCEPTIONAL GRAVE DANGER TO THE NATION. Special care in the handling, cus-
[8079]} tody, and storage of the attached information must be exercised in accordance with the security regulations,
[8080]to.
[8082]Tris cover sheet is NOT A RECEIPT but a record of persons who have read all or any part of the document(s) iden-
[8084]cifted Sy number shove.
[8086]Each person receiving the attached TOP SECRET information shel! sign and fill in the information requirad
[8089]REMARAS
[8091]RELEASED (lodicate portions and all of dacumenis read)
[8093]focument| attached hereto.
[8097]|
[8098]a nt + oe
[8099]3 authorized one year from
[8101]$0 FCM Gu  anewern, a
[8103]{When attachments are semovead, this rac+
[8104]TOP SECRET INFORMATION
[8105]COVER SHEET
[8107]x
[8108]oe
[8109]co
[8110]C
[8111]a
[8112]o
[8114]o
[8116]ait
[8118]wy)
[8121]Es
[8122]a
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[8124]oO
[8125]m
[8126]oO
[8127]us
[8128]S
[8129]m
[8133]ta ume tasai fied)
[8134]a uan $4
[8136]Copy
[8137]Lyndon B. Joanson Library
[8139]HY 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 146 2 QO
[8141]pO
[8142]oo
[8144]Qe eign
[8146]. , a ila Roe DS
[8147]TOP SE SECRET - SENSITIVE NO, 2
[8148]JCS 2304 /eku-1 _ : DISTRIBUTION G
[8150]30 October 1964
[8152]Pazes 2 - 8, incl.
[8154]Reference: JCS 2304/eh4
[8156]1, At their meeting on 6 November 1964, after making
[8157]amendmen nts, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the recom-
[8158]mendations in paragraph 12 of this report. -
[8160]2. This Decision replaces pase 2, Holders are requested
[8161]to substitute the additional revised page 7, and revised
[8162]white pages 3 and’ 5, incorporating the amendments, and to
[8163]destroy the Superseded pages in accordance with security
[8164]regulations
[8166]3. The memorandum in the Enclosure, tegether with its
[8168]Appendices A; B, and C) was forwarded as JCSM-9l2-G4,
[8170]ae dated — November . 1968, to: the Secretary of Defense,
[8173]os
[8174]ihe)
[8175]ct
[8177]he Commandant hed expressed direct concern of
[8179]che Marine Cores in this matter, the provisions of.Titie 16,
[8181]US Cede, 141 (c) applied :and were followed.
[8183]DISTRIBUTION:
[8185]Gen. Wheeler (C/7cS) Gen. Burchinal (D 38)"
[8187]Gen. Johnson (CSA) Gen. Manhart (VD/JS).._
[8189]Sdm. McDonald (CNO) Adm, Davis (DD/S) ee
[8191]Gen. LeMay (C3 anny fdm. Mastin J-3)
[8192]Emrick (J-5)
[8194]HW 50955 Docld:324293566 Page 147 a ah
[8198].
[8199]4 Ore SEC RE T.
[8201]SQUARE DANCE (U)
[8203]THE PROBLEM
[8204]1. To respond to a memorandum* by the Cnier of Starr,
[8205]US Army, tc consider a proposal that the Joint Chiefs of
[8207]Staff recommend to the President that the United States
[8209]KF WM
[8211]covertly attack the Cuban sugar industry.
[8212]FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM
[8213]2, On 21 March 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Staff in responding**5
[8214]to a Presidential request for new ideas relative to Cube, 6
[8215]stated that the President would be advised of any new and 7
[8217]promising courses of action which could possibly bring pressure &
[8219]Na)
[8221]upon the Cuban regime.
[8223]3. On 1 September 1964, the Chief of Staff, US Army, sent 1c
[8225]a memorandum*, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarding. a ii
[8226]study on the feasibility of undermining the Castro regime ie
[8227]by covertly attacking she Cuban sugar industry. The Chief i8
[8228]of Staff, US Army, we commenced tnabt tne Toint Starr accomplish ae
[8229]interage aney coordination ‘on the 3% ndy proposals; and thas 15
[8230]the Joint Chiefs of Staff approve the study and forward it 16
[8231]by memorandum to the President, informing him that the Joint 17
[8232]Chiefs of staff support the conclusions and recommendaticns i8
[8233]of the study and consider that the outline program therein ig
[8235]provides.an adequate framework for the development of detailed 20
[8236]supporting programs and plans for participating agencies. , el
[8238]“4. on 2 October 1964, the Operations Deputies considered 22
[8239]the ‘recommendations of the Chief of Staff, US Army, and aereed 23
[8240]to refer the matter to the Joint Staff for the preparation 24
[8241]of a report. . en 7 2
[8243]—ERELESHGSRE Eo UES BION ap me Song eras rem
[8244]** Enclosure to JCS 2304/218-3 | 7 Copy”
[8245]aS Lyndon B. “Johnson Library
[8247]TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE IVE
[8248]J-5 2304/2443 So 3
[8250]Toy TOP SECRET.
[8252]HW 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 148 en ae
[8254]TOP SECRET ~ SENSITIVE .
[8256]5. On 5 October 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were
[8257]presented with a briefing on the study and discussed some
[8258]of the issues of the proposed actions.
[8260]DISCUSSION
[8262]6. For discussion, see Appendix A.
[8264]| CONCLUSIONS
[8266]7. The Joint Chiefs of Staff continue to believe that the
[8267]ultimate US ob jective toward Cuba must be to establish a
[8268]government in Cuba that is acceptable to the United States.
[8270]8. The. proposal to covertly attack the Cuban sugar
[8271]industry is within existing or attainable capabilities and
[8273]rits consideration by other appropriate governmental
[8274]agencies as another option, in concert with other actions,
[8275]for causing the collapse of the Castro regime.
[8277]9. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that there are
[8278]possible political consequences which could result from
[8280]proof of US involvement in a program such as that proposed.
[8282]Hi
[8283]Hs
[8285]10. -The rdepartmental Coordinating Committee for
[8286]_ Cuban Affairs is the proper agency to accomplish the inter-
[8287]agency coordination.
[8289]11. The study should be forwarded to ‘the Secretary of
[8290]Defense “for referral to the Interdepartmental Coordinating
[8291]Com meittee for “Cuban Affairs for comment and recommendation
[8292]preliminary to submission to the President by the Joint
[8293]Chief's of Starr. . | |
[8295]"RECOMMENDATIONS
[8296]+2. It is recommended that:
[8297]a. The memorandum in the Enclosure, together with its
[8298]Appendices A, B, and Cy, which reflects the above conclu-
[8300]8ions be forwarded to, the, Secretary: of Defense,
[8302]TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE
[8303]JCS 2304 /244-1 ee
[8305]BW 50955 Docld:32473566 Page 149 Oo I / .
[8307]af or WwW SRC] IQ 1s a
[8309]Ne] oN OHO WY
[8311]10
[8313]HW 50955
[8315]TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE
[8317]b. This paper NOT
[8318]unified or specified
[8320]c. This paper NOT
[8321]to NATO activities.
[8323]ad. Tnis paper NOT
[8325]Delegation, United Nat
[8327]pe forwarded to the’ commanders of
[8328]commands .
[8330]be forwarded to US officers assig sned
[8332]be forwarded to the Chairman, US
[8334]sions Military Staff Committee.
[8336]Action Officer: Captain J. 0. Sherman, USN
[8337]J-5, Extension 78926.
[8339]Copy | a
[8340]“Ayan 6 Jobson Library”
[8342]TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE
[8343]ICS 2304/244-1
[8345]Docld: 32423566 Page 150
[8347]. a me - . A ALNID Pe ff Taran
[8349]OBO
[8351]Coy WN
[8353]: . . - ig ye
[8354]| AW 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 151 foe
[8356]on
[8357]oo
[8358]on
[8360]TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE
[8362]ENCLOSURE
[8364]DRAFT
[8366]MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
[8368]Subject: Cuban Actions (U)
[8370]1. On 21 March 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in respond-
[8371]/ing toa Presidential request for new ideas relative to Cuba,
[8372]stated that the President would be advised of any new and
[8373]promising courses of action which could possibly bring
[8374]pressure upon the Castro regime.
[8376]2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have completed a review of a
[8377]study which examines world sugar economics and the vulner-
[8378]abilities of Cuba's sugar industry. The study proposes an
[8379]outline program which would undermine Castro's economy,
[8380]deprive him of convertible currency, and cause political
[8381]instability in Cuba through covert attacks against Cuba's
[8382]sugar industry coupled with US stabilization actions on tite
[8383]world sugar market. Basically, the proposal envisions a
[8384]three- to six-year program, beginning with a 30 per cent
[8385]reduction of anticipated 1966 Cuban sugar production, by
[8386]introducing aerlally from off-shore, a sugar cane plant
[8387]parasite, Bunga. © Subsequently, the economic and political
[8388]disturbances’ caused by this attack could be exacerbated and
[8389]‘exploited by such measures as spreading hoof~and~mouth disease
[8390]among ‘draft animals, controlling rainfall by cloud seeding,
[8391]mining canefields, burning cane, ana directing other acts
[8392]of conventional sabotage against the cane milling and
[8393]transportation systems.
[8395]pe we
[8396]GROUP. 1. re
[8398]* Selboto apes AUTOMATIC.
[8399]DOWNGRADE 2 Pay DECL ASSIFICATIO
[8401]_tyndon | iB. Jonson ‘Ubrary
[8403]TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE ._ i
[8404]JCS 2308/2uH-1 — le GN _ Enclosure
[8406]“POP SRORE
[8407]H pat ee
[8409]) onees A
[8411]apt
[8414]| | SECRE|
[8416]7]
[8418]3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff continue to believe that the
[8420]ultimat te US ooJec etive toward Cuba wust be to establish ao
[8421]government in Cuba that is acceptable to the United States.
[8422]The concent of attacking the Cuban sugar industry by covert -
[8423]means would furnish another option to the United States in
[8425]bringing abouts the collapse of the Castro regime.
[8427]4, Although the Joint Chiefs o
[8429]bey
[8430]cr
[8431]sa)
[8432]a)
[8433]ry
[8436]oO
[8437][@)
[8438]G3
[8440]lw
[8443]ct
[8444]ry
[8445]O
[8447]possible political consequences from proof of the US involve-
[8448]ment in suena a program, they believe that proposais related
[8449]te the expansion of US influence over the world sugar market,
[8450]the stabilization of the free market, and the covert intro-
[8451]duction ve Boas ase os Cuba, merit serious consideration.
[8452]Other forms of attack proposed in the study.mignt be taken
[8454]subsequently to.exploit resulting economic and polit cical
[8456]turbulence. Additional discussion is provided in Appendix A
[8458]5. it is recommended that the attached draft memorandum
[8459](Appendix B) and study {Appendix ¢) be forwarded to the
[8460]Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee for Cuban Affairs
[8461]for appropriate interagency coordination and comment as a ‘
[8462]ws a
[8464]»asis for consideration of further recommendation by the
[8466]Joint Chiefs of Staff..
[8468]. Copy” ob :
[8469]8 ‘Johnson Library |
[8471]TOP SECRET - SE ENSETIVE To 0 i Enclosure
[8472]FES 2304 /eH4 1 oe . ‘ : a
[8473](Revised by Decision 3. Novenber 1954)
[8475]yD. SE
[8476]yet LE nD) es \e
[8478], re He
[8480]wt.
[8482]RW 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 152 , “YY no ° co, a -
[8484]RPO GR ape
[8485]TOR SECRiat
[8487]TOP SECRET
[8489]APPENDICES A, B, AND C
[8491](6 pages)
[8493], co oe on
[8495]TOP. SECRET - SENSITIVE ‘Lyndon. B “Johnson Library oe
[8496]«JCS 2308/elia eB f sppensices A, B, end C
[8498]cold
[8499]ok
[8501]SECRET
[8503]i
[8504]5
[8505]el
[8506]rf
[8507]e>
[8509]toe
[8511]BW 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 153 3 .
[8515]a ey TD aacTst Not Ta) rye
[8516]yo rif is % ‘
[8517]Aas ila C, IGN ba ak
[8519]APPENDIX A
[8521]CONSIDERATIONS OF A PROPOSAL TO ATTACK.
[8522]COVERTLY THE CUBAN SUGAR INDUSTRY
[8524]1. The ultimate success of the proposed program would
[8525]depend, in part, upon the effectiveness of the economic
[8526]controls for the stabilisation of world sugar prices.
[8528]It would serve no purpose to reduce Cuba's total annual
[8529]production of sugar if a subsequent rise in the price of
[8530]sugar could net the Castro regime the same amount of
[8531]convertible currency as it had before the program was
[8532]undertaken, The arguments and rationale in favor of the
[8533]economic proposals in the study appear to have validity.
[8534]However, world economics is a most complex subject and
[8535]involves many variable factors, The important points on
[8536]economic controls should be coordinated with appropriate
[8537]agencies in the government having responsibility for such
[8538]matters,
[8540]Ce Assuming that success of the actions of the outline
[8541]program can be achieved, it must be acknowledged that this
[8542]would not assure the downfall of the Castro Government, or
[8543]that af it did fall, a government friendly to the United
[8544]States would be installed, Russia has too much at stake,
[8545]politically, to allow an overthrow of a communist regime
[8546]for economic reasons alone, Success of the proposed actions
[8547]would, however, create serious difficulties for the Castro
[8548]Government and would be an additional means of exerting
[8550]pressure against that government.
[8552]Copy.
[8553]Lyndon 8. Johnson Library
[8555]TOP SECRET — SENSITIVE 1 Appendix A
[8557]HW 50955 Docld: 32423566 Page 154 1D :
[8559]4
[8561]t
[8563]HW 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 155 if
[8564]f
[8566]TOP SECRET — SENSITIVE
[8568]5
[8570]3. There are disadvantages to the program proposed by
[8571]the study. The approval for implementation of such a
[8572]concept would introduce a new dimension into cold war
[8573]methods and would require a major change in national
[8574]policy. There is the possibility of retaliation in the
[8575]event of discovery. There is also an obvious political
[8576]risk associated with this proposal, should any credinle
[8577]evidence of US involvement ever be obtained, the political
[8578]loss to the United States would be great, Quite apart
[8579]from the propaganda impact of such discovery, the influence
[8580]of the United States in international organizations such
[8581]as the United Nations and the Organization of American
[8582]States would be impaired seriously.
[8584]4, Nevertheless. it is the responsibility of the Joint
[8585]Chiefs of Staff to keep the Secretary of Defense and the
[8586]President apprised of the capabilities of the military
[8587]establishment. The subject study presents measures which
[8588]should be considered, and if found to be acceptable after
[8589]coordination with appropriate government agencies it would
[8590]represent another option for positive actions against the
[8591]Castro regime. |
[8593]5. NSAM 213% dated & January 1963, established a
[8594]committee to coordinate the management of all aspects
[8595]of US policy toward Cuba, The President looks to the
[8596]Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee for Cuban Affairs
[8597]for the effective coordination of the execution of policy
[8598]decisions and for timely recommendations on new courses
[8599]of action, The subject study should be referred to this
[8600]committee for the necessary coordination preliminary to
[8601]reporting to the President.
[8603]So Copy
[8604]* Enclosure to JCS 2304/]yiadon B Johnson Library
[8606]POP SECRET - SENSITIVE — 2 Appendix A
[8608]FOUTS TA er ies (ALT To mere
[8609]Po ya sot t : : :
[8611]ine)
[8613]ta
[8615]~“
[8617]oe
[8619]HW 50955
[8621]1, ~ a, ™ . ee iis a
[8622]have a responsibilicy to
[8624]advice to the Comronder in Chief and the
[8626]Secretary of Defense. It is appropriate, therefore, that
[8627]a matter such as the provcscals under consideration, bec
[8628]sent to the Secretary of Defense with the recommendation
[8630]basis for considerstion of further recommendations by tne
[8632]TA tat ener wa)
[8633]foinsy Chiefs of
[8635]Copy
[8636]Lyndon B. Johnson Library
[8638]TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE 3
[8639]Samm Ws ata , OMe aiahe Sh
[8640](Revised by Decision - 9 November L9o4
[8642]Bocld:32473566 Page 156 {oO
[8644]Anoendix
[8646]ra
[8650]4A
[8652]Ov WN fr Ww N teed
[8654]O32
[8656]HW 50955
[8658]Docld: 32473566 Page 157
[8662]APPENDIX B
[8664]DRAFT
[8666]MEMORANDUM TOR THE COORDINATOR, INTERDEPARTMENTAL
[8667]COORDINATING COMMITTEE FOR CUBAN APFATRS
[8669]Subject: Cuban Actions (U)
[8671]1, On 21 March 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed
[8672]the President that they would continue to review the probier
[8673]of putting addit ional pressures on Castro and that the
[8674]President would be advised if any new and promising courses
[8675]of action were uncovered.
[8676]2, The Joint Chiefs of Staff have forwarded a study on
[8678]the feasibility of undermining the Castro regime by attack-
[8680]“ing the Cuban sugar industry. The study examines the world
[8682]sugar market and the vulnerabilities of Cuba's sugar industry,
[8683]and proposes a phased interagency program which would:
[8685]a, Initially reduce Cuban sugar production by
[8686]approximately 30 per cent from the anticipated 1956
[8687]production level.
[8689]bd. Expand US influence in the world sugar market
[8691]by assignment of quotas and other actions to insulate
[8693]ct
[8695]a
[8697]oO
[8700]free market from the effects of Cuban sugar losses,
[8701]3. Apart from econcmic measures, the proposals made in
[8702]the study are within existing or attainable military capa-
[8703]bilities, Several actions are proposed. Key among these
[8704]is the introduction into Cuba of Bunga, a plant parasite
[8705]against sugar cane. It appears feasible to introduce
[8709]gradually Bunga into Cuba and maintain a bas for plaus
[8711]a
[8712]Se
[8714]te
[8716]disavowing US involvement,
[8718]GROUP 1 )
[8720]i
[8725]EXCLUDED 29D wuronarrc DOWNGRADING
[8727]Lyndon BECfoipason™ Kid rary
[8729]TOP SECRET - SENSITTVE 4 Appendix
[8731]9 Hsia Gee ees a
[8733]MOP SECRET -
[8735]4, Mindful of the risks attending such actions, che Joint 1
[8736]Chie®’s of aff hseve reviewed the voroposals of the stucky and 2
[8737]believe that they offer an ontion for exerting new pressures 3
[8738]against Castro. They believe that prostossls related to the 4
[8739]expansion of US influence over the world sugar market, the 5
[8741]tabilization of the free market, snd the covert introduction 6.
[8742]of Bunga into Cube, merit serious consideration, Cther forms 7
[8743]of attack croposed in the study might be t avien subsequent Ly 8
[8744]to exploit resulting economic and political turbulence 9
[8746]. 5. the study is forwarded nerewith wlth es request that ane)
[8747]the concept and actions proposed in the outline proeram of il
[8748]the study be coordineted by your committee with other movern~ 12
[8749]mental depertments end agencies, Upon eccompletion of your 13
[8750]review and coordination, it is fu egher requested thet your 14
[8751]comments made available to the Seeretary of Defense and 15
[8752]the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 16
[8754]TOP SECRED - SENSTLTVE
[8755](Revised oy Dect
[8757]HW 50955 Docld:32493566 Page 1538
[8759]Copy
[8760]Lydon B. Joinson Library
[8762]w i Suara) ep Fes
[8763](CS RY hy Ay
[8765]RY ad
[8767]No
[8769]aey hy kB Patsy) ie mys
[8770]HAD a a GIR
[8772]TOP SECRET — SENSITIVE
[8774]APPENDIX C
[8776]Army Report on
[8778]SQUARE DANCE (U)
[8780](See Attachment to JCS 2304/ahe4.,
[8781]beginning on page 6 of the white attachment)
[8783]: Copy
[8784]Lyndon B. Johnson Library
[8786]TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE 6 , Appendix ©
[8787]a ed BV geo aay
[8788]HW 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 159 7 if Qe
[8790], , *
[8792]com
[8794]TOP SECRET:
[8796]TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE 5. CORY NO.
[8800]5 November 196. ; a DISTRIBUTION. G.
[8802]“NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES
[8803]to. the -
[8804]HOLDERS OF JcS 2304/2u4-1
[8805]78 Report by the J-5
[8806]| on
[8808]SQUARE DANCE (U)
[8809]FIRST CORRIGENDUM
[8810]At the request of. the originator, holders are requested
[8812]to substitute the attached revised page 7, and destroy the
[8814]superseded page in accordance with security reguiations.
[8816]: R, C. FORBES
[8817]J. BE. MANSFIELD
[8819]Joint Secretarlat
[8821]‘UNCLASSIFIED Without Attachment
[8823]RORR
[8825]ist Cooris to Jcs 2304/e44-1
[8827]6 TOP SECRET
[8829]EW 50955 Docld:32493566 Page 160
[8831]IS -a@ - 2-h
[8832]TOP SECRET — SENSTIVE * c
[8834]él July 1975
[8838]. on 33
[8839]MEMORANDUM FOR SENIOR STAFF 6c
[8840]BY
[8842]SUBJECT: Inspection of Classified Documents at LBJ Library Related to
[8843]Covert Actions Against Cuba
[8845]FROM: Loch Jotinson
[8847]Among the many documents which IT examined at the Johnsen Library in sam
[8848]Texas this past week is one that I find particularly alarming. I wish
[8849]bo draw it to your attention.
[8851]The document in question is from the JCS to the Secretary of
[8852]Defense, dated 30 October 1964. The subject is a proposed covert
[8853]action against Cuba, with the code name SQUARE DANCE,
[8855]On 21 March 1964, the JCS responded to a Presidential request for
[8856]new ideas relative to Cuba by advising the White House that any new
[8857]promising courses of action to undermine the Castro regime would be
[8858]brought to the President's attention. Apparently their first bright
[8859]new idea was SQUARE DANCE, outlined in the 30 October document (attached).
[8860]The proposal envisioned the destruction of the Cuban economy by intro-
[8861]-ducing aerially from off-shore a sugar cane plant parasite called
[8862]Bunge. The program would begin with a 30 per cent reduction of antici-
[8863]pated Cuban sugar production (see page 6) and within three-to-six :
[8864]years the ruination of the sugar industry would be achieved. ‘The re
[8865]economic and political disturbances caused by this attack could be fale
[8866]exacerbated and exploited," continues the JCS memo, "by such measures
[8867]as spreading hoof-and-mouth disease among draft animals, controlling
[8868]rainfall by cloud seeding, mining canefieids, burning cane, and direct- be
[8869]ing other acts of conventional sabotage against the cane milling and
[8870]transportation systems" (6, emphasis added). In sum, SQUARE DANCE
[8871]"would furnish another option to the United States in bringing about
[8872]the collapse of the Castro regime" (7). :
[8874]In Appendix A of the SQUARE DANCE proposal, the memo notes that ~
[8875]the approval for implementation of the program “would introduce a new
[8876]dimension into cold war methods and would require a major change in
[8877]national policy." Indeed it would—or at least one hopes we have not
[8878]used such methods before! The proposal is nothing less thon a variant
[8879]of germ warfare which would heve had serious consequences for the
[8880]civilian population. , ; oe
[8882]At this point we do not know what happened to the SQUARE DANCE
[8883]concept. It may never have been implemented at all, even partially.
[8884](The covering memo written by Bowman, an NSC staffer, to Bundy suggests
[8885]that the White House was skeptical toward the idea.) To me, though,
[8887]HY 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 161
[8889]the mere writing of this kind of propose] is a reprehensible first step
[8890]toward the worst kind of foreign policy mischief. I find it even more
[8891]repugnant than contingency plans for assassination. These are not the
[8892]kinds of recommendations which should filter up to the White House from
[8893]the intelligence community. The agencies must have a better sense of
[8894]what is acceptable policy, legally and morally. As in the Huston Plan,
[8895]the White House was confronted here with a series of illegal and un-
[8896]ethical options. ‘The result of SQUARE DANCE would have been parasitic
[8897]death for the major plant and animal life in Cuba. The feeble efforts
[8898]of the CIA to direct assassination attempts against Castro pale by
[8899]comparison with this Army proposal for covert action.
[8901]{ believe SQUARE DANCE deserves our attention. If assassination
[8902]is unacceptable, surely too is the widespread destruction of plant
[8903]and animal life through covert germ warfare, Somehow (probably through
[8904]hearings and restrictive legislation) the Congress must drive home the
[8905]point that there are legal and moral limits to American foreign policy.
[8906]These Limits may not be easy to define, but we must try.
[8908]Note: On the third page of the second attachment (a "Memorandum for
[8909]Discussion of Covert Program Against Cuba" written by Bundy) reference
[8910]is made to "possible addition of contaminating elements to sensitive
[8911]Cuban imports (not food})." The cover memo from Gordon Chase (NSC
[8912]staffer) indicates that'this proposal received Presidential backing.
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[8917]ASSASSINATION ALLEGATIONS: Castro
[8919]‘Newspaper accounts report that prior to-the
[8920]April 17, 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, the CIA either directly
[8921]or thr/ Robert Maheu inlisted the aid of Sam Giancana and
[8922]Johnny Réselli in organizing assassination attempts against
[8923]Castro. The first attempt on Castro's life was on or
[8924]about 3/13/61. The first attempt used poison and it was
[8925]hoped that with Castro dead,the invasion planned and
[8926]executed 3/17/61 would have a greater chance for success.
[8927]There were five more attempts made on Castro's life after
[8928]3/17/61. The last was in late February or early March of
[8929]1963.
[8931]Allegations(from Newspaper sources):
[8932]1) The CIA either directly or through Robert Maheu
[8933]enlisted Sam Giancana who enlisted Johnny Roselli to «=
[8935]organize an assassination team directed at Fidel Castro.
[8937]2) Johnny Roselli headed several missions against
[8938]through
[8939]Castro from late March or April 1961 / late February or
[8941]March 1963.
[8943]3) That RFK learned of this CIA-Mafia plan and aborted it.
[8945]es
[8946]4) Rosetli recétived poison capsul/ from the CIA which
[8948]he gave to Cubans assigned the task of poisoning Castro
[8950]HW 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 163
[8952](2)
[8953]C4, con't.)
[8955]before the Bay of Pigs. One of the Cubans was related
[8957]to one of Castro's cooks.
[8959]5) The assassination was intended to take place before
[8960]invasion
[8961]the planned Bay of Pigs/in order to insure that CIA
[8963]operation's success.
[8965]6) The CIA has extended services to Giancana which
[8966]included a break-in of Comedian Dan Rowan's Las Vegas
[8968]apartment.
[8970]7) Roselli worked under the direct supervision of CIA
[8972]agents William Harvey and James O'Connell.
[8974]8) Individuals allegedly involved directly or indirectly
[8975]with Cuban Refugees:
[8977]Roselli
[8979]Maheu
[8981]Hunt
[8983]Liddy
[8985]Gilancana
[8987]James O'Connel
[8988]William Harvey
[8990]AOU uw MH
[8992]Questions:
[8994]1) Who was COS of JMV wave in Miami from 1960-1963?
[8996]2) Was there any positive effort among Cuban nationals
[8997]to determine if there were any Castro intelligence
[8999]agent information?
[9001]AW 50955 Docld:324273566 Page 164
[9003](3)
[9005]3)
[9007]4)
[9009]5)
[9010]6)
[9011]7)
[9013]8)
[9014]2
[9016]10)
[9018]Did any contacts or agents within the Cuban refugees
[9019]ever speak of or sequest an attempt to be made on
[9020]Castro's life? If so, how was the situation handled?
[9022]In preparation for the Bay of Pigs was the assassination
[9023]or neutralization of Castro seen as a desirable and
[9024]positive step towards the success of the invasion?
[9026]Were any private raids against Cuba conducted by
[9027]Cuban nationals?
[9029]Was the CIA aware passively or were such matters
[9030]made known to the agency by the Cuban nationals in
[9031]advance?
[9033]Did the CIA clear such actions?
[9035]Was the CIA aware of Roselli's actions?
[9037]Did the CIA through whatever means enlist the aid of
[9041]At any time has the CIA been associated with Sam
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