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[48]14-0000
[50]an ee NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER
[52]a
[54]A. Introduction
[56]During his 11 or 12 years' service in the KG3 Second Chief
[57]Directorate, NOSENKO said, he rose from case officer ty deputy
[58]chief of a department and from lieutenant to lieutenant colonel
[59](or, as he has stated more recently, only to the rank 9£ captain).
[60]An English speaker, he had specialized. in operations against
[61]American targets in the USSR as he Steadily advanced to higher
[62]positions in the U.S, Embassy Section of the American Department
[63](from entry on duty with the KGB in 1952 or 1353 until 1955,
[64]and from January 1960 to January 1962) and in the Tourist Depart - .
[65]ment (from June 1955 to January 1960, and from January 1962 until
[66]the defection). His duties took him to England in 1957 and 1958,
[67]Cuba in 1960, and Bulgaria in 1961 as well as to Switzerland in
[68]1962 and 1964; also, NOSENKO made numerous trips within the USSR
[69]in connectioci with operations, inspections, ard conferences,
[70]Commendations, twice accompanied by bonuses, were awarded to him :
[71]by the KGB Chairman in 1956, 1959, and 1961 and by the head of : :
[72]the Second Chief Directorate in 1957 and 1958: he was Gne of 3
[73]70 Second Chief Diracterate officers awarded the Order wf the . |
[75]‘Red Star in 1962; and in the Same year he received a meal for
[76]completing ten years of “irreproachable service, "* Thus,
[77]according to NOSENKO, his defection ended a promising career
[79]marked by promotions, responsible positions, extensive travel,
[80]and many honors.
[82]NOSENXO has discussed a large number of KGB operations, in-
[83]eluding some in which he had a personal role, either ag a par-
[84]ticipant or as a supervisor, and others conducted by other KGB
[85]personnel in the First and Second Chief Directorate about which
[86]he learned through his professional and persoral contacts,. . j
[87]Those in which he played a personal role are covered in this
[88]part of the paper, All are included in Part VI, The text of
[89]the paper distinguishes the information from collateral sources
[90]and investigations from the details which NOSENKO has provided
[91]oh the same topics. : .
[95]aver nate eee
[97]eRe ades EE tee
[99]SS
[100]NOSENKO has admitted recently, however,
[101]any awards at all in the KGB,
[104]B. Entry into the KGB
[106]NOSENKO has provided a wide range of dates for his entry
[107]on duty with the KGB and has offered disparate descriptions of . .
[108]the circumstances and procedures involved in his becoming a ar
[109]KGB staff officer, His statements on these two topics are To :
[110]presented under separate headings below. . ; :
[112]1. Date of Ertr
[114]A range of dates between early 1952 and 2 April 1953 has
[115]been given by NOSENKO as the time when he entered on duty with
[116]the KGB, but he has been most consistent in placing his entry
[117]in the month of March 1953.* in summary, he has said the
[118]beginning of 1952 (statement of 31 January 1964), May 1952 with
[119]no day (statement of February 1964), 5 or 7 September 1952
[120](statement of 6 April 1964)..March 1953 with no day (statements
[121]of 9 June 1962, 24 April 1966 and. 27 October 1966), 12 or 15 or
[122]17 March 1953 (statement of 8 April 1964), 13 or 15 March 1953
[123](statement*of 26 July 1965). ard 2 Aprii 1953 (statement of
[124]-17 April 1966). When last questioned about this subject, on
[125]27 October 1966, NOSENKO acknowledged that he had lied when he
[126]had earlier reported his entry as occurring in 1952, His state-
[128]. ments about the entry date are arranged in chronological order
[129], below,
[132]°F
[134]4
[138]snub eh oe bist CREG Sn
[142]ck belies a wale
[144]9 June 1962 (first CIA meeting with NOSENKO): “in the
[145]beginning of 1953 I came to Moscow /fFrom duty with the GRU in
[146]Primorsk/, This was 1953, in the beginning. in January. Well,
[147]I came on leave to Moscow. I was staying ac my father's dacha
[148]there... I was then in the Navy GRU. So I ceme to Moscow on
[149]leave and, while I was home_near Moscow at my father's dacha,
[150]ce, ; - {General Bogdan Zakharovich/ KOBULOV’* dropped in on us. A con-
[151]oe versation simply began. He said: ‘What are you doing?' I said:
[152]‘I'm working in GRU. I worked in the Far East and now I'm work-
[153]ing in the Baltic. I came kere on leave.’ KOBULOV said: 'How
[154]do you like the work?’ I replied: ‘Well, speaking honestly, I
[155]don't like the work.' ‘Well,' he said, 'You better come to work
[156]with us, Where do you want to co? Into antelligence or counter-
[157]intelligence?'... I did not want to go into intelligence. I
[161]4
[163]i . * Several of NOSENKO's remarks about his date of entry into
[164]_ the KGB were made during CIA questioning about how and
[166]: when he first learned of the KGB agent “‘ANDREY": the lead -
[167]i ‘esa | to "ANDREY" was one of the two pieces of information which rr ec
[168]H NOSENKO offered to sell when he approached CIA in 1962
[169]H (see Part II.B.); the "ANDREY’ case is discussed at
[170]i greater length in Part VI.D.3.b. - , :
[171]|
[172]i
[174]sails bdladtaaent ~
[176]'** Other sources have reported that KOBULOV was expelled ;
[178]from the State Security apparatus in 1946 and that he did
[180]not return to a position of authority until a few days
[182], after Lavrentiy BERIYA became MGB-MVD. Minister on 9 or
[184]' 10 March 1953. As of 1952, KOBULOV was working in East
[186]Germany for both Wismut A.G., a uranium ore-mining con-
[188]- cern, and for the Soviet contingent to the Allied Control
[190]' . Commission. KOBULOV was arrested at the same time as
[191]BERIYA, along with others in the KGB. See Part V.B.2.
[192]for further references to KOBULOV,. . : Loe -
[194]ea
[199]a
[203]ty.
[205]-eonsider that only people who have seven, even ten years’ ex-
[206]perience in counterintelligence work should be sent so intelli-
[207]gence. After this, let them go into positive intelligence.
[208]Then they know how counterintelligence operates... Well, when
[209]KOBULOV asked me where I wanted to work, I answered: ‘It is
[210]better, of course, to go into counterintelligence.' ‘Well,' he
[211]said, ‘Good. Look, drop in to see me for a minute sometime.’
[212]This was simple conversation. Nothing official. A week later
[213]I got a telephone call. They were calling from Personnel and
[214]told me to stop by. I went. ‘Come into this room,' /they told
[215]me/, ‘it's not necessary to fill out a questionnaire (anketa).
[216]We have already obtained your personal fiie from the GRU, Go
[217]directly to the central entrance, A pass has already been
[218]-issued for your the pass is already there. Go to the Secre-
[219]tariat of Bogdan Zakharovich KOHULCV,' Well, I went. KOBULOV
[220]had been summoned somewhere high up in the government, and his
[221]assistant received me. ‘How_about working in the American De-
[222]partment?' he /the assistant/ asked. ‘Well, good. Go there
[223]right.now,! Well, I wert to the Second Directorate... His
[224]ZKOBULOV's/ assistant sent me directly to the Second Directo-
[225]rate, the American Department, the First Section, working with
[227]American correspondents...in ‘53, in March, in March '53. STALIN
[229]had just died."*
[231]i
[232]i
[233]4
[235]4
[236]id
[237]“3
[239]wiianedimile
[242]87.
[244]“31 January 1964: Yuriy Ivanovich GUK was reassigned from.
[246]_the KGB_Second Chief Directorate "in something lixe 1952,"
[247]“WOSENKO said, "exactly just about the time when I came from
[249]the GRU to the KGB, He was already gone by that time."*
[251]February 1964: After his defection on 4 February 1964,
[253]-NOSENKO prepared an official statement about his biography.
[255]He said that he had entered the KGB in 1952, and he shifted
[257]‘the dates of most of the events during the. 1945-1955 period. one |
[259]year backwards from the version given in 1962. This was dis-
[260]cussed with NOSENXO, and. he repeated the new dates; he then
[261]studied and approved an official statement on his biography
[262](for the Intelligence Community) which contained the new dates,
[263]including his claim that he entered on duty with the KGB in
[264]about May 1952. : :
[266]6 April 1964: Confronted with the above inconsistencies,
[267]NOSENKO said that he returned to Moscow in August 1952 and during
[268]the same month had a conversation with KGB persornel about getting
[269]a job. The interview continued with the following dialogue:
[271]Question: You came (to Moscow) in January?
[273]NOSENKO: No, it wasn't January, it was the second part of
[274]1952. Yes, before that I was in the GRU...
[275]Maybe - if I tell you 7 - 7 September - maybe
[276]it was 5, I don't know. :
[278]Question: ...What date did you enter on duty with KGB?
[279]NOSENKO: I don't remember.
[280]Question: Early September 1952?
[282]NOSENKO: Early September 1952, yes... I came and the
[284]first few days was sitting in a room with
[285]KUTYREV, RAKOVSKIY, and GROBOV, in Room 615.
[286]Yes, it was 7 September when I had joined...
[288]7 or 5... And so the first few weeks I had been
[289]reading cases, studying forms; I worked like
[290]that (during) December, January, February...
[291]No, it was March, yes, after STALIN's death,
[292]after the reorganization. And at the end of
[294]March I was transferred to the attaches cases...**
[296]_*® This would place the entry date some time at the beginning
[298]of 1952, for the KGB defector GOLITSYN has reported that
[299]GUK was transferred from the Second Chief Directorate in
[302]** NOSENKO later settled on June or July 1954 as the time of, .
[303]_ this transfer. Part V.C. covers the period when, according
[304]°* - . ¢@ NOSENKO, he was engaged in operations against the U.S.
[306]: military attaches in Moscow. oo ,
[308]iene.
[310]tie
[311]Sitti
[313]sad ead ie be thar
[315]at ebed nev evel
[317]conti ate abst ti tes
[319]ts Shabba ik
[321]4
[322]3
[323]a.
[324]Ae
[325]a
[326]q
[327]4
[330], @ April 1964: The interrogator pointed out to NOSENKO that
[331]he had on different occasions dated his entry into the KGB as
[332]‘January 1952, March 1953, and in September 1952. The questioning
[333]continued: oo ey
[335]Question: Which is the truth? ~ ty
[337]NOSENKO: After the death of STALIN, in_March 1953. Why
[338]did I say it /the other dates/? You see, I~
[339]finished the Institute in 1949.. Then I defended
[340]my diploma, and then came the State exams. I
[341]passed all the exams except one - “Foundations o
[342]Marxism-Leninism! the philosophy. And I had to
[343]take all the examinations over again. All of oo a
[344]them. -I took four, passed three, flunked one. 4
[345]Just the same, all four had to be taken over |
[346]again. For that reason 1 graduated, cr I received
[347]the diploma from the Institute in 1950, although
[348]officially I graduated in 1949. This is an un- i
[349]pleasant ching and I did not want to mention it. :
[350]And right after that I was sent to the GRU.* The
[351]rest is just as I told you, word-for-word. This
[352]was the only thing. And then, after I said it,
[354]I did not want to correct it. To twist around
[355]again. And the mistake I made was about my work
[356]in the KGB. It was not 1952, of course, but . i
[357]1953... It was 12 or 17 or 15 March. KOBULOV ;
[358]accepted me right away. STALIN was still not :
[359]dead and I was already accepted. March 1953,
[360]about the 15th, about 15 March 1953.
[362]3
[363]9
[364]a
[365]a
[366]if
[367]A
[368]‘a
[370]seb tee eh ee tee woven
[372]Py
[374]26 July 1965: "At the end of 1952 I came to Moscow from
[375]Sovetsk in Primorskiy Kray; near Baltiysk. I had worked in the
[376]Naval Intelligence Point (MRP) there. My aim in coming to
[377]Moscow was to cet out of this work in the MRP. I couldn't
[378]stand that work. I couldn't stand that work... I arrived in
[379]Moscow at the end of 1952, December... I don't remember exactly
[380]the date of the order appointing me an officer in the KGB, It
[381]was 13 or 15 March 1953.” :
[383]ae APS here mee et
[385]a
[389]- 17 April 1966 (letter to CIA case officer): “From August '
[390]- 4952 until 1953 I worked at the Intelligence Point of the Naval
[391]i _ Intelligence cf the 4th Fleet in, Sovetsk, where I received the
[392]{ . rank of lieutenant of the Administrative Service. From 2 April
[393]“ 3953 until 4 February 1964 I worked in the Second Chief Direc-
[395]torate of the MGB-KGB,."
[397]renewable. lt t=.
[399]: ; 24 April 1966 (signed autobiographical statement): "In
[400]- _ the middle of March /1953/ KOBULOV's assistant, Colonel
[401]ae -  SAVITSKIY called me at home and told me to come to see KOBU- ety
[402]— LOV... I worked in the First Section, First /American/ Depart-
[403]ment from the middle of March 1953 until July 1955."
[405]a ; 27 October_1966: NOSENKO reaffirmed that he. entered the
[406](4, .. KGB in mid-March 1953, He said that he had lied when he earlier.
[407]‘ae said that he had joined the KGB in 1952, and that he knew he was
[408]/.°. lying at the times he made these statements. Asked why he had -
[409]- lied, he replied: “There was no sense." NOSENKO then went on
[410]. to explain that because he was only an average student and
[411]because he was a heavy drinker, he had been found unsuitable
[413]T-Since April 1966, NOSENKO has said he joined the GRU in
[414]1951, a year later. . . oo ae :
[417]14-0000
[419]by the KGB entry commission when he first applied in 1950.
[420]Therefore, NOSENKO continued, he hed been trying to conceal
[421]this fact from CIA by moving events back a year, for he thought
[422]CIA would not have believed him if he reportea that he was
[423]first rejected by the KGH and was later accepted. ;
[425]2. Circumstances and Procedures of Entry
[427]Although NOSENKO has consistently associated his entry into
[428]the KGB with his discussions with General KOBULOV,* he has been : -F
[429]inconsistent concerning the content of their conversation, when
[430]it occurred, its relationship in time to other events (see
[431]Part IV.B.), and where it took place, at his father's dacha or
[432]at KOBULOV's dacha. Also, whereas NOSENKO said in 1962 that
[433]there were virtually no administrative formalities prerequisite
[434]to his entry, he recalled in 1964 tnat he had had conversations
[435]with various KGB personnel officers and (at home) had completed
[436]a KGB questionnaire and a biographic form. NOSENKO was question-
[437]ed at length on these points during 1964 and 1965. As a resvlt,
[438]he provided lengthy descriptions of his various interviews at .
[439]KGB Headquarters and of the questionnaire and other documents he
[440]completed. In April 1966, however, NOSENKO reverted to his boo
[441]original statement of 1962: There were no interviews with KGB
[442]personnel officers, and he implied that he had filled out no i 3
[443]official forms. His various statements are presented in chrono-
[444]logical order below.
[446]canlia
[448]rn coset =
[449]adaware able Se aN as
[451]oe Wintietivedincaat datanb ddtee
[453]9 June 1962: "KOBULOV was at our dacha. Well, he is a great 7
[454]friend of my father, He was First Deputy to BERIYA, and my |
[455]father was Minister of the Shipbuilding Industry... A conversa- i :
[456]tion simply began. He said: 'What are you doing?’ I said: 'I'm
[457]working in GRU. I worked in the Far East and now I'm working
[458]on the Baltic. I came here on leave.' KOBULOV said: ‘How do
[459]you like the work?' I replied: ‘Well, speaking honestly, I
[461]ae don't like the work.' ‘'Well,' he said, ‘You better come to work
[462]oY with us. Where do you want to go? Into intelligence or counter-
[463]7 intelligence?'... I did not want to go into intelligence. I
[464]consider that only people who have seven, even ten years’ ex-.
[465]perience in counterintelligence work should be sent to intelli-
[466]gence. After this, let them go into positive intelligence. Then
[467]they know how counterintelligence operates...Well, when KOBULOV
[468]-asked me where I wanted to work, I answered: ‘It is better, of
[469]course, to go- into counterintelligence.' ‘Well,' he said,
[470]‘Good. Look, drop in to see me for a minute sometime.' This
[471]was Simple conversation. Nothing official. A week later I
[472]got a telephone call. They were calling from Personnel and
[473]told me to stop by. I went. ‘Come into this. room,' /they told
[474]me/, ‘it's not necessary to’ fill out a questionnaire (anketa).
[475]: We have already obtained your personal file from the GRU. Go
[476]s4. +. +.  @ireetly to the central entrance. A pass has already been _ ned
[477]: issued for you; the pass is already there: Go to the Secre-. a
[478]tariat of Bogdan Zakharovich KOBULGV.' Well, I went. KOBULOV ~
[479]had been summoned somewhere high up in the government, and his
[480]assistant received me. 'Hew about working in the American De- . ;
[481]partment?' he /the assistant/ asked. ‘Well, good.. Go there. | bo
[482].. Fight now.' Well, I went to the Second Directorate... His “
[483]. ZKOBULOV's/ assistant sent me directly to the Second Directo-
[484]rate, the American Department, the First Section; working with
[485]_ American correspondents." mo ve A
[489]* See Part V.B.1. for further references to. KOBULOV.
[491]14-0000
[493]i
[494]va
[495]I:
[496]f
[497]j
[500]1.
[503]8 April 1964: "It: was February {1952]. KOBULCV was in
[504]Pebruary - in Moscow. He was our friend. He said: '0.K.,
[505]George. 1'11 help you if you want, with the KGB.' I remember
[507]-exactly. Yes. It was-in February. I saw him at the cottage... - -*
[509]By this timé=i had been in Moscow six weeks... KOLULOV was in
[510]February. He went to see my father at the Ministry. It was
[512]the end of the day. It was late and my father invited him to
[513]come along to’ the summer home. It happened to be a Saturday.
[514]KOBULOV's wife: stayed in Germany. He was just here for a short
[515]TDY.* My father invited him to spend. Saturday night. and Sunday
[516]at the dacha... On Sunday we were playing billiards and KOBULOV
[517]asked me what I was doing. I told him ‘nothing,’ that I was at
[518]the disposal of the {GRU} Frersonnel Department. I said: ‘I
[519]don't want to go back to Baltiysk, to the Baltic Sea, because I
[520]don't like the work there. I'm not doing anything there. I get
[521]no satisfaction from the work.‘ He said: ‘well, you should be
[522]utilized somehow... Do you want me to call the KGB Personnel -
[523]them look you over?’ I told him: "All right.' He called, and
[524]he must have given our number to them, our home phone. I was
[525]called subsequently by the Personnel Department of the KGB. In
[526]February. They told me to come see them at House No. 12. They
[527]had a pass for me... So I went. Picked up my pass and went....
[528](NOSENKO next gives a description of his route to the KGB build-
[530]ing, his. receipt of a pass, and his visit to the Central KGa
[531]‘personnel Office.] They talked to me. This man - I don't know
[533]who or what he was - asked where I worked before and all that.
[534]He said: 'O.K. We'll request your file from GRU. We will check
[536]. you out and will let you know whether or not we will take you.'
[538]That's all.” NOSENKO was asked whether he completed any forms
[539]or questionnaires. "No. Not there. They gave me three copies
[540]of forms to take home. There were so many questions. About my
[541]parents, my education, my residences, addresses. I filled all
[542]this out... Finally I completed all three copies and called
[543]them. I was told that this time I would not need a pass,. that
[545]I should just go to the entrance, and the person [the personnel
[546]officer] would. come down-and take the papers from me. I went,
[547]brought the papers, and he took them from me, and also three
[549]copies of my handwritten autobiography... Then I was called by
[551]the personnel people once more. And at that time another
[552]officer talked to me, and this time I knew who was talking to
[553]me, because I was told to yo to talk to ROZHENKO [first name
[554]‘unknown, later identified as a Section Chief in the Personnel
[555]Department]. This was in March... Just as soon as STALIN died,
[556]KOBULOV came back from Germany immediately. He must have been
[557]summoned by BERIYA or someone. And so, in just a few days -
[558]evidently he did not forget ~ I gota call. It was Bogdan
[559]gZakharovich's assistant. He told me to go to the central
[560]entrance, that I didn't need a pass. I remember it as if it
[561]just happened. I went in the uniform of a lieutenant, but with
[562]a civilian overcoat. This was, maybe, the 10th of March... I
[563]sat down [in KOBULOV's office]. I thought it would be for five
[564]minutes. I waited there almost two hours, The assistant came
[565]out a few times and told me that Bogdan zakharovich is very,
[566]very busy, but that he would give me an escort. Some senior
[567]lieutenant came up to me and told me to follow him... We went —
[569]“yp to the sixth floor of the old building. I remembér: it as
[571]though it just happened. I sat there about five or seven
[572]minutes. Then I was told to go in. I announced myself. He
[573]said: ‘Yes, I know. Sit down. My name is SHUBNYAKOV, Fedor
[575]Grigoryevich." He told me he was the Deputy Chief of the”
[577]- Second Chief Directorate and that they had talked things over
[579]and decided. He said that they wanted to offer me a position.
[580]in counterintelligence, in the First Department, the American |
[582]¥WOSENKO had been told by his interrogator shortly before -
[584]that KOBULOV had been stationed in Germany and not in Moscow. _
[586]eodoat sialic tation.
[588]th
[593]1
[595]a
[596]3
[597]q
[598]d
[599]at
[600]3
[601]i
[605]He was filling in for the Chief of the First. Department...
[606]He took-me to his office... dell, they decided to put me in
[608]Department... “Then he asked /A. Phd GORBATENKO to come in.
[610]the First /U. S. Embassy/ Section and called Yev¢ geniy KOZLOV,
[611]the Chief of the Section.- He ceme in and said‘ Well, hello;
[612]Yuriy Ivanovich. I heard of you. Well, if you're finished
[613]with him, I'11 take him along wath me and show him around.'*
[614]He took me and talked to me for a while and then told me to
[615]report... Either the 12th or the 17th. I don't remember,”
[617], d5 April 1964: NOSENKO again described the KGB question-
[618]naire and autobiographic forms he had filled out at home and
[619]recalled that he had also signed a secrecy agreement in the
[620]personnel office. He also remembered that he had made several
[621]additional phone calls to the KGS personnel office and described
[622]his second visit there to talk ts ROZHENKO: “At the end of
[623]February I was told again to sttp in the Pass Office and pick up
[624]a pass and go to the same floor, but another room. They told me
[625]I would have to talk to ROZHENKO today. He was a Cnief of
[626]Section, of the Personnel Section, So we had a talk. It was
[627]the same thing again: He said: 'Tell me about yourself.‘ But
[628]he just wanted to look me over. -And after that they said: ‘All
[629]right, we_have not gotten all your documents yet from your
[631]fmilitary/ district. So wait.'"
[633]26 April 1965: NOSENKO recounted his conversation with
[634]KOBULOV, saying that it took piace at KOBULOV's dacna in Usov,
[635]where he and his parents were visiting in January 1953, NOSENKO
[636]continued: "I was called at my family's dacha in February.
[638]They said it was State Security calling and that I was to
[639]report. I did this on the next day. Probably I then reported.
[641]to House No. 12. As officer talked to me about my” education,
[642]service, and so on. Biographic questions. Then he gave me a
[643]blank for my autobiography and a four to six-page anketa (bio-
[644]graphic form). I filled these cut at home. The next day I
[645]called in and was told to come to the Eighth Entry. The officer
[646]came down, and 1 gave him the forms and photographs of myself.
[647]They said they would call me. i did nothing from January to
[648]March. January was leave. In February and March I was at GRU
[649]Personnel's disposal." After STALIN's funeral NCSENKO was
[650]summoned to KOBULOV's office. His assistant, SAVITSKIY, told
[651]NOSENKO to wait. After more than an hour had passed, SAVITSKIY
[652]sent him to SHUBNYAKOV's office. There he learned that he would
[653]be assigned to the U.S, Embassy Section and was introduced to
[654]the Chief of the American Department, GORBATENKO, The official
[655]order appointing NOSENKO was issued the same day, the 13th or
[657]15th of March 1983,
[659]24 April 1966 (signed autobiographical statement: Again
[660]NOSENKO said that he had spoken with KOBULOV at the KOBULOV
[661]dacha and set the date at 1 January 1953. The document con-
[662]tinued as follows: "I saw KOBULOV for the second and last time
[663]on the day of STALIN's funeral in my father's office in the
[664]Ministry of Shipbuilding in March: 1953. “I had come from the
[665]sanitorium to Moscow and dropped in to see my father at work... |
[667]' In his office I ran into KOBULOV as they were gathering to go
[669]to the Dom Soyuzov for the funeral. KOBULOV said he would
[671]“ eoncern himself with the question of my entry inte the KGB.
[672]“The same day I returned to the sanitorium, and several days
[674]‘later, having completed my treatment, I returned to Moscow.
[676]In the middle of March, KOBULOV's assistant, Colonel SAVITSKIY,
[678]einer onesat eninge ices Sener”
[680]deh rear ene,
[682]nema at et
[684]i
[686]3
[687]4
[689]5
[690]s
[694]14-D0000 ae oF
[696]92.
[698]a galled me at heme and told me to come see KOBULOV. KOBULOV .
[699]co didn't see me and SAVITSKIY directed me to the Deputy Chief
[700]-_ : (x.@£.the Second Chief Directorate, Colonel SHUENYAKOV...
[701]. ° SHUBNYAKOV told me that an order had been signed appoir.ting
[702]Se .me @ case officer in the First Section of the First Depart-
[703]3 “ment, Second Chief Directorate. SHUBNYAKOV called the Chief
[704]. : i oF the First Department, Lieutenant. Colonel GORBATENKO, and
[705]teal _«- introduced me. Then I went to the First Department and was
[707]med .~ introduced to the Deputy Chief of the First Department and the ..
[709]? Chief of the First Section, KOZLOV. KOZLOV. sdid_I would_take
[711]: over the cases of Senior Case Officer, Captain /Anatoliy/
[713]! PORMOZOV and suggested that I. begin work the same day. I was
[714]accepted for work in the MVD in precisely this way. It is
[715]necessary to note that none of the workers of the MVD Personnel
[716]Administration spoke to me, either before or after the signing
[717]of the order assigning me to the Second Chief. Directorate of
[719]the MVD."
[721]wo niles
[723]x
[725]el
[728]asaeasbn b B
[730]wfelined Baek
[732]Bee ale
[734]Abhi tetetaneteen
[736]Feet ces
[738]14.0000
[742]Serb N AN Ti
[744]C. To June 1955 (American Pepartment)
[745]1. Introduction *.” pe
[747]' .with STEIGER and Edmund STEVENS, both of whom were American
[749]93.
[753]Depending upoi which date he has given fer entering the KGB,
[754]NOSENKO's first assignment in the U.S. Embassy Section of the
[755]American Department, working on American correspondents living
[756]in Moscow, lasted for about six to eighteen months. From that
[757]job, he said, he moved in 1954 to operations against U.S.. Mili-
[758]tary Attaches assigned to the Moscow Embassy, remaining in the
[759]game section until being transferred in June 1955. His activi-
[760]ties, as NOSENKO described them, and pertinent collateral infor-
[761]mation on his targets while he was in the U.S. Embassy Section
[762]are reviewed below. , ;
[764]2. Operations Against Correspondents
[766]On the day cf his acceptance into the KSB, NOSENKO was
[767]taken directly to the offices of the U.S. Embassy Section.
[768]There he met the section chief, V.A. KOZLOV, wno told NOSENKO
[769]that he would take over the work of the departing case officer,
[770]Captain Anatoliy TORMOZOV, in operations against American cor-
[771]respondents in Moscow.
[773]a. KGB Files on SHAPIRO, GILMORE, SALISBURY and WHITNEY
[775]When NOSENKO reported for work the following day, accord-
[776]ing to statements made on 8 April 1964, he found a desk in Room
[778]615, “There were three other guys sitting there. At first I
[780]was running traces, and at the same time I was reading. the files
[781]on journalists... I think there were seven files in all, and I
[782]didn't see any other." NOSENKO listed these files as those on
[783]Henry SHAPIRO, Eddy GILMORE (as well as one cn GILMORE's wife
[784]SEREBRYAXOVA and her sister CHERNYSHEVA), Harrison SALISBURY
[785]and Thomas WHITNEY.*
[787]During the 1962 meetings with'CIA, NOSENKO identified
[788]SHAPIRO as an "old agent of ours." He said that WHITNEY “worked
[789]for.us while he was in Moscow and gave us some material, but he
[790]refused to work for us when he left the country and would not
[791]contact us in the United States." GILMORE, NOSENKO said, was an
[793]active recruitment target in 1953 and 1954, but NOSENKO did not
[795]know whether he was recruited. Likewise, he did not know the
[796]status of SALISBURY as of 1953.
[798]NOSENKO stressed that the files he was given to’ read during
[799]the early period of his KGB service were developmental files
[800](delo formulyar) rather than the operational files of the agents.
[801]The developmental files were less sensitive, and from them "you
[802]would never be able to figure out whether he [the subject of
[803]the file) is an agent or not." NOSENKO explained that, once a
[804]person becomes an agent, another file is set up, and these agent
[806]7 a - ; ; ..
[807]*"“NOSENKO made clear that he was not the case officer responsi-
[808]ble for the more important correspondents: "KOZLOV himself
[810]SHAPIRO, with SHAPIRO's wife. I also know that KOZLOV was
[811]working with WHITNEY and with (Andrew J.] STEIGER... For
[813]each of these persons there was an operational file which I
[814]did not see." According to. NOSENKO, he was in no way involved.
[816]correspondents “recruited as agents by the KGB. =
[818]was working with them, the chief of the section himself--with _
[820]kta LUBE a Odom
[823]14-0000
[825]Sear
[827]an. eee
[829]either orally or in writing. If, for example, [V.H.] KOVSHUK
[831]_ Selected and handled the agent who was placed in SHAPIRO's office
[832]_ @8 a secretary; this agent had earlier worked in the offices of
[833]_ Moscow News, an English-language newspaper published in Moscow.
[835]files were held by the chief of the section, KOZLOV. NOSENKO
[836]Btated that he read the files on these seven persens "slowly
[837]and made some extracts for myself in my personal log--such things
[838]as notations of their dates of arrival, things I could not remem- eels ‘
[839]ber." He was also given the files.on the agents surrounding . _ |
[840]these correspondents, their drivers, maids, and ccoks. oe
[842]b. Agents Reporting on Correspondents
[845]NOSENKO said he was responsible for haridling the agents who. : i
[847]were reporting on SHAPIRO, WHITNRY, SALISBURY and the GILMOREs
[848]and met with them regularly to learn whether "anything was new, . a
[849]who did SHAPIRO meet, what might be interesting in his behavicr, : a ?
[850]what might be suspicious in his behavior, who he is contacting,
[851]etc." He then reported to KOZLOV and would sometimes prepare 4
[852]written report of his conversations with the agents. Asked to
[853]describe these meetings, NOSENKO replied: "Let us take the same
[854]Case o£ SHAPIRO. Y would meet drivers about three times. a month
[855]or even two times. At the meeting I would ask the driver what
[856]was new in SHAPIPRC's behavior since our last meeting, whether
[858]et Bolla ended Neb hee
[860]SHAPIRO had suspicious contacts with foreigners, akout his meet-
[862]ings with Russians, were they conducted openly or, perhaps, was
[863]SHAPIRO walking behind the person he met, And then the man
[864]{agent} would begin his report. Of course, if he spots anything
[865]suspicious he calls immediately, and I would see nim the next
[866]morning. Otherwise, I would tell him at the meeting that I
[867]would see him again in about ten days or in two weexs, but if
[868]there was something interesting he should call immediately.
[870]It was the same with the maid and the cook. Upon returning to
[871]the office I would have to report to KOZLOV about my meetings,
[873]slab nan ee te ed
[875]{also of the U.S. Embassy Section) had a meeting with his agents, Do
[876]he too had to report immediately to KOZLOV or as soon as conveni-
[877]ent to both. If the meetings were taking place late in the day
[878]and lasted until midnight or later and. there were no written
[879]materials submitted at the meeting, I could go heme and then re-
[880]port the next morning." - ,
[882]mvthlnalisn atm b avltigte omit
[884]agents surrounding the correspondents. "At first he was teach-
[885]ing me. Then he would go in cases when something interesting
[886]would begin to develop, even when it hadn't yet begun to develop
[887]but when there may have been a hint in a case of some other case
[888]officer." ,
[890]KOZLOV accompanied NOSENKO to meetings with the various :
[891]B
[892]i
[894]NOSENKO's agent network consisted mainly of domestic and i
[895]clerical personnel in contact with the correspondents and their boo.
[896]families. Asked to describe them, he said on 15 April 1964: . a
[897]"My first agent was a woman agent, a cook, who was working at
[898]GILMORE's place. She also worked at the Associated Press later. {
[899]Her codename was 'AGLODINA', a funny one. My second agent was ~ H
[900]a chauffeur whose codename, I think, was 'SERGEY'. I think. he '
[901]was driving WHITNEY. Then I also had SHAPIRO's chauffeur, a
[902]funny little fellow. In other words, charwomen, chauffeurs, | °.
[903]this was my.agentura [agent network]." Although NOSENKO was’
[904]able to give'a breakdown of this network in terms of the number
[905]and type of agents targetted against particular individuals, he
[906]had forgotten their true names and could not-provide detailed
[907]personality information on any of them.. He explained: "I don't
[908]remember now. They all passed by like a river because they were
[909]turned over often." NOSENKO did recall that it was he. who
[911]sak Baia
[914]He first identified GILMORE's cook, "AGLODINA," as Yelena
[915]S. KOSIENKO in the fall of 1965, while reviewing a list of Sov-
[916]jets employed by Americans in Moscow. He. told CIA at that time
[917]‘that he had taken over KOSIENKO from TORMOZOV upon entering the
[918]U.S. Enbassy Section in 1953, and that she subsequently worked
[919]for and reported on GILMORE'’s successor, Richard KASISCHKE. |
[920]NOSENKO said that KOSIENKO "never provided any interesting in-
[921]formation.”
[923]NOSENKO estimated that he was responsible for handling 10
[924]to 12 agents in operations against the correspondents. This,
[925]he said, was a normal load, although more experienced case offi-
[926]cers might have as many as 15. In April 1964 NOSENKO broke his
[927]agentura down as follows:
[929]Target , Agents
[931]Eddie GILMORE Two agents, the cook and the driver;
[932]: one operational contact, a part-time
[933]cleaning girl; and a girlfriend of
[934]GILMORE's sister-in-law, who reported
[935]on the sister-in-law and GILMORE's
[937]wife.
[938]Thomas WHITNEY One agent, his driver.
[939]Henry SHAPIRO Three agents, SHAPIRO's secretary
[941]and his cahuffeur, plus an old woman
[942]who was a relative of SHAPIRO's wife
[943]and lived with the SHAPIROs in Mos-
[944]cow. (The secretary and chauffeur
[945]later worked for Kenneth BRODNEY and.
[946]reported on him to NOSENKO; BRODNEY
[947]temporarily took SHAPIRO's place in
[948]Moscow.)
[950]Harrison SALISBURY Two agents, SALISBURY's driver, "SER-
[951]GEY" and a part-time cleaning girl.
[953]NOSENKO classified two other of his agents as "neutral," in
[954]that they did not have specific targets on whom to report. The
[955]first of these was the director of MOSGRAN, a Russian-language
[956]training program for foreigners in Moscow, His cryptonym was
[957]"RAKETA," but NOSENKO could not recall his true name. The sec-
[958]ond, “VOLODINK,“ was a female teacher in this same program who
[959]instructed some of the correspondents, including BRODNEY, and
[960]Embassy employees in their homes; he could not recall the true
[961]name of "VOLODINK.” When NOSENKO was relieved of his responsi-
[962]bility for the correspondents in 1954, he turned over all of his
[964]‘agents to other case officers in the U.S. Embassy Section with
[966]the exception of "RAKETA" and “VOLODINK,” whom he continued to
[967]handle in his work with military attaches. -
[969]c. Information from Other Sources -
[971]SHAPIRO was identified as a KGB agent. by GOLITSYN in 1961,
[972]before the lead was received from NOSENKO, and he had previously
[974]> been suspected as such on the basis of his long stay in Moscow,
[975]-- his wnusually good access to Soviet information sources, and his-
[977]marriage to a Soviet national. SHAPIRO was mentioned as a KGB
[979]se citehla ed AMD EME Ckt
[981]anita
[983]i
[984]4
[986]Bisco modes idea a
[988]Te aaa a
[990]agent by a eryptonym (known to NOSESKO_ and contirmed by GOLI ‘
[991]eppearing in the CHEREPANOV papers." Be
[993]The KGB defector Nikolay: KHOKLOV’ had earlier identified the.
[994]Polish-born wife of WHITNEY’as a KSB agent, an allegation which.
[995]she denied, and it had been ‘long assumed that WHITNEY too had
[996]reached some sort of accommodation with the KGB because of this
[998]fact and because of the > Leng, duration (of his tour as a correspond-
[1000]ent in Moscow.
[1002]GILMORE also had been suspected by CIA before NOSENKO's in-
[1003]formation was received. He served in Moscow for: 12 years, from
[1004]1941 to 1953, and 1s married to a Soviet national.
[1006]SALISBURY served two short tours, of about one year each,
[1007]in Moscow during the 1950's. During the second of these, he
[1008]became enamored with the Pole who was to become WHITNEY's wife
[1009](see above) and was during this period a subject of criticism ky
[1010]other American correspondents in Moscow for his pro-Soviet arti-
[1011]cles, When WHITNEY married the Pole shortly after STALIN's
[1012]death, SALISBURY returned to the United States and his articles
[1013]took on an anti-Soviet tone.
[1015]WOSENKO claimed no involvement with | the other two American
[1016]correspondents whom he identified as KGB agents, STEVENS and
[1017]STEIGER, both the subjects of a considerable amount of derogatory
[1018]information in CIA files. They are discussed in Part VI.D.z.
[1019]under the heading of NOSENKO's American ieads.
[1021]3. Operations Aqainst Military Attache Personnel
[1023]Some time in the first half of 1954 NOSENKO was, relieved of
[1024]his responsibilities for the correspondent cases, and from then
[1025]until his transfer from the American Department he handled KGB
[1026]Second Chief Directorate operacions against the officer person-
[1027]nel of the U.S, Military Attache's office. NOSENKO's account of
[1028]the turnover of the correspondent files to his successor and of
[1029]the acceptance of the attache files is presented below,
[1031]- 8 April 1964: "I took over the Military Attache cases
[1033]from Nikolay KHRENOV... When I was leaving in 1955, I turned
[1035]the attache files over to Valeriy BUDYLDIN."
[1037]- 10 April 1964: "I made a mistake... I said I accepted
[1038]the cases from KHRENOV when I was taking on the Militery Attache
[1039]work, This is not right. KHRENOV was not working in the First
[1040](U.S, Embassy) Section; he was working in the First (American)
[1041]Department. I took over the cases from--let's see, there was
[1042]ZHUKOV and Vladimir Aleksandrovich CHURANOV, and here was my
[1043]table. (desk), and I accepted the cases from Pavel Fedorovich
[1045]’ PANKRATOV. This was in the beginning of 1954.”
[1047]- 15 April 1964: NOSENKO said that he thought he turned
[1048]over the correspondent files to,.F.V. KISLITSYN (who returned: :.
[1049]to the USSR from Australia in‘May 1954). NOSENKO asked when::
[1051]the PETROV's defected in Australia; he explained that he was
[1053]eae Dogs ane
[1055]See Part V.D.7.c. for a detailed discussion of the CHEREPANOV
[1057]Papers.
[1059]BEd teens
[1061]a sects sa ec cica iba Eaten
[1063]i
[1064]a
[1065]4
[1068]1400000
[1070]not sure about KISLITSYN and could have given them to another
[1072]officer. “If KISLITSYN came {back from Australia] in 1953, then
[1074]it was to KISLITSYN. Otherwise, it was someone else,®
[1076]= 18 June 1964: "“KISLITSYN came into the First Section in
[1077]1954 and I gave him the files on American correspondents. BUDYL-
[1078]DIN also joined the section this year and took the files on the
[1080]Attache and his assistants from PANKRATOV. BUDYLDIN left
[1081]later that year and turned those filea over to me... Yuriy
[1082]LEONTIYEV joined the section in 1955, and I gave him the files
[1083]on the Army Attache and his assistants."
[1085]NOSENKO has also been indefinite as to the date he. assumed
[1086]responsibilities for the attaches. As noted above, he said on
[1087]10 April 1964 that he received the files in the beginning of
[1088]1954. He had earlier said that he worked on the correspondents .
[1089]"only about six months." If the date of March 1953, which ne
[1090]most often gave for his entry ‘nto the KGB, is correct this would
[1091]place the turnover in the fall of 1953. On other occasions he
[1092]has said specifically that he turned over the correspondent cases
[1093]and began work against the attaches in January 1954, on still
[1094]others that this occurred in May 1954. In February 1965, NOSENKO
[1095]said that he could not remember when he changed assignments.
[1099]4
[1100]1
[1101]g
[1103]14-0000)
[1105]- 98.
[1107]a. Agents Reporting on: Military Attaches
[1109]. . Asked in April 1964 to describe the agent network
[1110](agentura) at his disposal in operations against U.S. Mili- H
[1111]tary Attaches during this period which began in 1954, NO- © t
[1112]SENKO replied: “There were two maids, a cook, drivers*... : |
[1113]about ten persons, plus the agent ‘SERVIZNIY' and the one 7 - }
[1114]with the code name 'DMITRIYEV'.,. These additional two ; be
[1115]agents, about 12 or 13 agents altogether.“ With one ex- : A : os
[1116]ception, this network remained constant until NOSENKO trans= : a ae
[1117]ferred from the U.S. Embassy Section in mid-1955. He met : |
[1118]each agent about once a week, except for the chauffeurs who
[1120]were met three times a month in a safehouse or on the
[1122]street. According to NOSENKO, this network was "just a
[1124]supporting agentura, which vary seldom was worthwhile," the }
[1125]main source of information on the Military Attaches being the :
[1126]microphones in their offices.** .
[1128]i ible
[1130]ss
[1132]wee se hawe et Lata dale
[1134]Newly added to the network while NOSLNKO held this
[1135]position was a maid inserted to report on Army Attache Earl
[1136]L,. MICKELSON and his successor, Fillmore K. MEARNS. Her . ,
[1137]name, .NOSENKO thought, was NOVIKOVA. She was an English-
[1138]speaking university graduate but "hid her knowledge of : i
[1139]English in order to overhear conversations or read letters : ot
[1140]without taking them outside." :
[1142]: Besides NOVIKOVA, NOSENKO named one other maid who was : :
[1143]his agent, Mariya NEVEROVA, code nane "SHVEDOVA," and she :
[1144]Was targetted against the Assistant Army Attache, Ira
[1145]RICHARDS. He described NEVEROVA as a “little, old,’ thin”
[1146]oman," from whom he never obtained anything of interest.
[1147]They met in a safehouse on Kuznetskiy Most.
[1149]Of the KGB agents among the chauffeurs, NOSENKO identi-
[1150]fied Nikolay SHNYRYEV, who was used by various of the at-
[1151]. taches. "He reported where they went, what they said,
[1152]whether they took notes or photographs, whether they had
[1153]unusual packages with them, and so on."
[1155]When viewing photographs in September 1964, WOSENKO t
[1157]. dGentified Vladislav VOROBYEV as the agent "SERVIZNIY." He
[1158]had been working in the Embassy since its establishment,
[1159]starting first as a messenger boy and, in NOSENKO's time,
[1160]performing clerical tasks. VOROBYEV had no direct connec-
[1161]‘tion with the Military Attaches, and NOSENKO said he himself
[1162]did not know why he had been given VOROBYEV to handle in
[1163]1954. The main function of this agent was delivering to
[1164]NOSENKO copies of the unclassified telephone listings of the
[1165]Embassy, issued monthly.
[1167]“DMITRIYEV's" true name may have been Dmitriy KUKOLEV:
[1168]NOSENKO saw this name on a 1962 phone list and thought, but ;
[1169]was not sure, that this was his agent. . An electrician who an . sot
[1170]worked on the Embassy's electrical wiring systems and eleva- : Ss
[1171]tor, "DMITRIYEV" reported to NQSENKO on antenna wires and
[1173]sing bang ©
[1175]. 8 ~The Military Attaches used a pool of. five drivers at random, |
[1176]NOSENKO said. Apart from the permanent driver for the senior
[1177]- attache, none were targetted. against individual members of the
[1179]attache office. ©  ~
[1180]&* See Part V.E.3.g. on electronic operations against the U.S.
[1181]Embassy. a . . oe, .
[1183]we
[1185]ERS oO ne NTE I tn RRNA RNS
[1187]other wires he had observed in the. Embassy as well as on the
[1188]-gecurity measures on the top floors. Like VOROBYEV, “DMITRI-
[1189]YEV" had no direct connection with the Hilitary. Attaches.
[1191]In September 1964 NOSENKO was shown a sertes of 260 bio-
[1192]graphic cards on Soviet citizens employed by the American En-
[1193]bassy in Moscow. Each card contained a photograph of the per-.
[1194]son involved and short bicgraphic notes, including his name
[1195]and job in. the Embassy. The first time.he went through these: ’.
[1196]cards, NOSENKO was permitted to see only, the photographs; NO~ > ie
[1197]SENKO did not identify the photographs of SHNYRYEV and KUKOLEV . - \o
[1199]- but said that the face of VOROBYEV was familiar, adding that
[1200]‘ he thought his name was VOROBYEV., When shown the biographic
[1202]information on SHNYRYEV and KUKOLEV, he identified each of them
[1203]as his agents during the 1954-1955 period in the American De- : .
[1204]partment and equated them to the cryptonyms given previously. ‘
[1205]In the case of SHNYRYEV, when shown the bicgraphic information,
[1206]which listed SHNYRYEV as “chauffeur for the Military Attache,"
[1207]NOSENKO exclaimed: “Oh my God, this is my own agent." He
[1208]later said it was a good photograph of SHNYRYEV.
[1210]4
[1212]wethadbdins
[1214]“
[1219]f
[1221]dv inid Abell cie wot
[1223]b. NOSENKO's Targets -
[1225]. As the Second Chief Directorate case officer responsible ;
[1226]-for operations against American Military (Army) Attaches sta- . ;
[1227]tioned in Moscow,* his main task was not to recruit them but !
[1228]rather was to prevent the attaches from collecting intelligence.
[1229]He has used this statement about his main task (identical with i
[1230]that of other U.S. Embassy Section officers working against t
[1231]the Army and Navy Attaches) to support his claim that no U.S.
[1232]Armed Forces Attaches vere recruited by the KGB from 1953 un-
[1233]til his defection in 1964. He has also said that this is one
[1234]reason he knows relatively little about the personal backe
[1235]grounds of his various targets during this period--the empha-
[1236]; sis was on surveillance instead of development for recruitment—
[1237]“ purposes. Asked in February 1965 to list the Army Attache per~
[1238]gonnel for whom he was directly responsible during 1954 and
[1239]° 1955, NOSENKO gave the following names: "MICKELSON, MEARNS,
[1241]ean ated oe cuelabae ne
[1243]RICHARDS, FELCHLIN, BENSON, MULE, STROUD, and CARDELLA."** His
[1244]knowledge of the activities of these targets and of KGB action
[1245]against them, coupled with information from other sources, is
[1246]discussed in the following paragraphs.
[1248]van SU HROR acd cenneuteba ddan ss
[1250]WNaval Attaches were handled by ZHUKOV during this period, NO-
[1251]SENKO said, while Air Attaches were initially handled by CHURA-
[1252]NOY, When CHURANOV left the section in early 1954, he turned
[1253]over the Air Attache files to PANKRATOV, who turned them over
[1254]later in the year to KHRENOV. : :
[1256]poe **This is the order given by NOSENKO. The list comprises two
[1257]be generations of Army Attaches in Moscow and is neither in al-
[1258]phabetical order nor in terms of date of service in Moscow.
[1259]It is, however, in descending order of rank from Colonel MICKEL=
[1260]SON through Captain MULE ‘to ‘Chief Warrant Officer CARDELLA. —
[1261]Questioned about these officers in a different: context, NOSENKO 6 |
[1262]indicated knowledge of their ranks. Not mentioned by NOSENKO toe ~ |
[1263]_ was George VAN LAETHEM, Assistant Army Attache in Moscow from ies
[1264]- August 1951 to August-1953 (prior to the time when NOSENKO said ©) §
[1265]_he was responsible for work against the military attache office). = oye
[1266]VAN LAETHEM returned to Moscow in 1955, however, and was ate ; vot
[1267]tached to the Army Attache staff again from 19 March to 19 May
[1268]+ 1955, during which time NOSENKO claimed he was still responsible —|
[1269]_ for this group. . . Se re
[1271]hauchidbtuad igeioe
[1273]5 aeiase a eA AAR AME Tom THT de yee
[1276]14-D0000 . RE ES
[1278]. , ; — 00 :
[1279]acc a ae ate be 7 en eRe ec HOMES SESE RIAU MIRCEA I 8 SRP sss
[1281](i) MICKELSON
[1283]NOSENKO has identified Earl L. MICKELSON as a colonel
[1285]and the Military Attache in Moscow during 1954 and 1955,
[1286]PANKRATOV was the case officer originally handling MICKEL-
[1287]SON, and the case was turned over to NOSENKO in 1954.
[1288]When asked about agents who might have been working against
[1289]MICKELSON, NOSENKO said that there was one cook, a KGB
[1291]. operational contact whose name he did not recall, and
[1293]-  MICKELSON's maid, whose name NOSENKO believed was NOVIKOVA;
[1294]the cook and NOVIKOYA went to work for MICKELSON after NO-
[1295]SENKO had left the U.S. Embassy Section, In addition to
[1296]these two, the only other source reporting on MICKELSON was
[1297]his chauffeur, whose name. NOSENKO also did not remember.
[1298]NOSENKO said that the KGB learned nothing interesting about — .
[1299]MICKELSON from concealed microphones, telephone taps, or H
[1300]surveillance, and that no operational approach or recruit-
[1301]ment was attempted. There was, in fact, no anteresting or :
[1302]derogatory information on MICKELSON from any source. t :
[1306]f
[1307]Fo ae adel in neath al
[1309]Sentences
[1311]According to information in CIA files, MICKELSON was
[1312]involved in at least two incidents inside the Soviet Union
[1313]which NOSENKO has not reported. In May 1954 he was arrested
[1314]in Tbilisi on the (false) charge of having photographed 4
[1315]bridge, but he persuaded the Militia not to press charges.
[1316]In August 1954 MICKIISON was arrested again for illegal
[1317]photographs souti of KHARKOV; on this occasicn he was held
[1318]for two hours before being released. 7 i
[1320](ii) MEARNS
[1322]NOSENKO identified Fillmore K.. MEARNS as MICKELSON's
[1323]replacement and said that he was the responsible case of- a
[1324]ficer. There were two agents and one operational contact
[1325]working against "EARNS. Of these, NOSENKO could recall the
[1326]name only of NOVIXOVA, the same maid who reported earlier on
[1327]MICKELSON. Besides being told to attempt to overhear MICKEL-
[1328]SON's conversations NOVIKOVA was instructed to search his
[1329]clothing and tu copy any notes she might find, but she
[1330]never overheard or found anything of interest to the KGB.
[1331]NOSENKO recalled that MEARNS' personal effects were searched
[1332]by the KGB while they were being shipped to Moscow from the
[1333]United States, and that all his service records had been
[1334]discovered and photographed.* NOSENKO described MEARNS
[1335]as being more "active" in Moscow than MICKELSON had been and
[1336]said that information from concealed microphones showed °:
[1337]him to have a strong character. Nothing of interest con-
[1338]cerning him was received from these microphones or from tele-
[1339]phone taps. ,
[1341]Ves
[1346]a ene an
[1348]a AUC
[1350]CIA has no derogatory or otherwise significant informa-
[1351]i. tion on MEARNS, who replaced MICKELSON.
[1353]‘ (ii4) RICHARDS
[1354]: , NOSENKO identified Ira B. RICHARDS as a lieutenant
[1356]ea colonel who served as the Assistant Army Attache in Moscow.
[1357]: ; NOSENKO’ said that he was the case officer working against
[1359]1 - ®NOSENKO has told this same story about MICKELSON. i
[1361]sea meant ate
[1362]oo Mme dome
[1364]ARNE alle Boca en
[1366]poe ce ene AE.
[1368]DEL pane een etione eis me erate ade eee ett ee Tea oe
[1371]ast aha EER On RRP NS ot HORA or tll EA PS ON a sit geo
[1373]14-D0006
[1375]aa CERI ani ee hagisie diets TF
[1377]Aare rae
[1379]101.
[1381]RICHARDS. The one agent reporting on RICHARDS whom NOSENKO
[1382]could name was the maid Mariya NEVEROVA, KGB cryptonym
[1383]“SHVEDCVA," but she had never provided any worthwhile in-
[1384]formation about RICHARDS. In addition, some Soviet drivers
[1385]reperted on RICHARDS, but nothing useful was obtained from i
[1386]then.
[1387]i
[1388]t
[1391]Ay.
[1392]vintualadylaaeand
[1394]According to CIA records, RICHARDS served in Moscow
[1395]from July 1954 to July 1956. There was a microphone in the
[1396]office which he shared first with MICKELSON and later with
[1397]MEARNS. RICHARDS confirmed that Mariya NEVEROVA was his
[1398]maid and described her as a "mousy" woman who had a heart
[1399]attack during the period sne was employed by him. (This
[1400]incident was not recalled by NOSENKO.) For about four
[1401]months of his Moscow tour, RICHARDS took Russian-language
[1402]lessons from Ludmila GROMAKOVA in his apartment. During
[1403]these lessons, KICHARDS often discussed labor conditions and, ,
[1404]wages in the United States and, on one occasion, had her ;
[1405]record her speech on his tape recorder. GROMAKOVA was preg~
[1406]nant and unmarried at the tine. (NOSENKO has named GROMAKOVA
[1407]as a KGB agent in another context but has not mentioned her
[1408]contacts with RICHARDS.) * RICHARDS identified one “Volodya"
[1409](i.e., first name Vladimir) as his principal driver. About
[1410]62 years old in 1954, Volodya was the son of a rich jeweler
[1411]in Moscow during the Revolution. Volodya himself was well
[1412]educated and, on one occasion while picnicking outside Mos-
[1413]cow, he spoke intelligently with RICHARDS about the Revolu-
[1414]tion, propaganda, and news media. (NOSENKO did not know of
[1415]Volodya.) Purther details from RICHARDS are given in the
[1416]following,section on FELCHLIN.
[1418]PepCrew tr] ee reenter. Cand
[1420]eS acelateacee
[1424](iv) FELCHLIN
[1428]NOSENKO identified Howard L. FELCHLIN as a lieutenant
[1429]colonel who served as Assistant Army Attache in Moscow and
[1430]stated that he was FELCHLIN's case officer. FELCHLIN was in {
[1431]the Soviet Union during 1954 and part of 1955, until being
[1432]declared persona non grata. NOSENKO did not recall the
[1433]name: of any agents specifically targetted against FELCHLIN,
[1434]although he thought FEL_.CHLIN must have had a maid and she
[1435]wenuld have been a KGB agent. Additionally, NOSENKO said,
[1436]the Assistant Military Attaches shared a pool of cars and
[1437]drivers, and these were his agents. Unable to recall the
[1438]precise date of FELCHLIN's expulsion, NOSENKO related it to
[1439]some event regarding Soviets stationed in the United States
[1440]for which the Soviet Government decided to reply in kind.
[1441]HNOSENKO was imprecise as to the pretext used to expel FELCH-
[1442]LIN, but said the action was based on information which had
[1443]been accumulated from a number of sources and incidents.
[1445]‘ For example, FELCHLIN had been caught taking some photographs
[1446]and a report had been written; along with other similar
[1447]indications of FELCHLIN's activities and reports of agents
[1448]in contact with PELCHLIN, the report was filed away for pos-
[1449]sible future use. NOSENKO was questioned further on FELCH-
[1450]LIN during the February 1965 interrogations. He said then
[1451]that FELCHLIN alone had been declared persona non grata,
[1453]and that no other attaches had been involved. NOSENKO
[1455]Ene Dees
[1459]3
[1461]i.
[1462]i
[1464]4
[1465]a
[1469]Fs See Part V.E.3.d., which discusses coverage of John ABIDIAN
[1470]to whom she also taught Russian. .
[1472]em a a ee a toe
[1475]14-0000
[1479]= RT SORTS Re a a ape aR aN She Satan et eee ee AEST EO
[1480]102.
[1482]explained his having but few details concerning this action
[1483]by the fact that it took place after NOSENZO had trans-
[1484]ferred from the American Department to the Tourist Depart-
[1485]ment in June 1955. MNCSENKO knew nothing of FE
[1486]background.
[1488]Other sources have reported that FELCHLIN visited the i
[1489]USSR as a merchant seaman and a diplomatic courier before |
[1490]arriving in duly 1953 as Army Attache. He served in the H
[1491]latter capacity for one year, until July 1954, when he was |
[1492]asked to leaye the country. (He had previously served in
[1493]Austria and West Germany and had been in official, contact |
[1494]with known GRU officers at both posts, as well as in the
[1495]United States.) During his entire tour in Moscow he was
[1496]the subiect of intensive KGB interest. Shortly after his oe ;
[1497]arrival, in September 1953, FELCHLIN, with fellow Assistant . :
[1498]Army Attache Martin J. MANHOFF, and two Air Force attaches ;
[1499]took a train trip to Siberia, the first such trip permitted 4
[1500]American attaches in many years. Six months later, on i ;
[1501]25 March 1954, the Soviet newspaper Trud carried an article
[1502]saying that FELCHLIN and his companions had lost some of
[1503]their “spy documents" on the. train, FELCHLIN said this
[1504]charge was false. On another eccasion, while travelling
[1505]with a British Miiitary Attache, FELCHLIN returned to his
[1506]train compartment to find a scantily clad Soviet female in
[1507]his bunk, (NOSENKO recalls neither of these incidents.)
[1508]In June 1954, while in the company of Lieutenant Colonel F.J,
[1509]YEAGER, an Assistant Army Attache, FELCHLIN was arrested in
[1510]Kiev by a Soviet Army officer for photographing a military
[1511]target. (NOSENKO has never mentioned YEAGER's name; when
[1512]told the name and asked for an identification, NOSENKO
[1513]said that he had heard it and that he thought YEAGER was
[1514]the Air Force Attache.) A large crowd gathered and, after
[1515]some jostling, FELCHLIN and YEAGER were taken to a Militia
[1516]station where they were ordered to signa confession. They
[1517]were held eleven hours, and their arrest caused the american
[1518]ambassador to deliver a strong protest note. FELCHLIN was
[1519]told on 3 July 1954 that he had 48 hours to get out of the
[1520]Soviet Union. No specific charges were mentioned. Major |
[1522]Woe ies athhiabide BERR sae
[1524]carer
[1526]cate Decca ate
[1528]Walter A. McKINNEY, the U.S. Air Attache and one of FELCHLIN'S
[1529]travelling companions at the time the “spy notes" were f
[1530]allegedly lost, was declared persona non grata at the same
[1531]time.*
[1533]i
[1535]eee ae ete a tet hn,
[1537]FI
[1539]‘S
[1540]4
[1541]a
[1542]4
[1544]Queried concerning SHNYRYEV, RICHARDS and FELCHLIN
[1545]immediately recognized his photograph and name as one of the
[1546]general chauffeurs assigned to the Office of the Military
[1547]Attache at the Moscow Embassy; RICHARDS was taken on his
[1548]first trip outside Moscow by SHNYRYEV. He remarked that the
[1550]My
[1552]¥ Ambassador BOHLEN successfully insisted, against initial
[1553]Soviet refusal, that his personal plane be allowed into the
[1554]USSR to fly FELCHLIN and McKINNEY out. In February 1965
[1555]NOSENKO was asked to describe the unusual circumstances
[1556]under which FELCHLIN left. NOSENKO said he could not, in-
[1557]asmuch as he was no longer in the American Department at
[1558]the time. Told that the expulsion took place in 1954,
[1559]NOSENKO said this was not the correct date.
[1561]eee sc
[1563]Tow ARR ater tt
[1566]14-0000
[1568]aaa: SGPC O's
[1570]103.
[1572]attaches referred to SHNYRYEY as either "Nikolay Perviy”
[1573](Nicholes the First) or "Nikolay Vtoroy" (Nicholas the
[1574]Second) to distinguish him from the other chauffeur with
[1575]the same name. FELCHLIN said that SHNYRYEV drove primarily
[1576]for the Military Attache himself, but sometimes drove for
[1577]the AssiStant Military Attaches, and he remembered that
[1578]SHNYRYEY was not well, suffered from war wounds, and had
[1579]continuing chest or lung trouble. (Asked whether SHNYRYEV
[1580]had any medical problem, NOSENKO said he was not aware of
[1581]any.)
[1583]a
[1584]i
[1586]i
[1588]et ha aetna Moone
[1590]FELCHLIN said his maid Dora FiDOPOVA (not specifically
[1592]named by NOSENKO) was in her 50's. when she spoke with
[1594]FELCHLIN about a job, she asked for shout 120 rubles a month, . ;
[1596]which seemed excessive, so PELCHLIN offered BO. PEDOROVA :
[1598]refused and iefit. ‘two days later she returned and accepted.
[1600]She spoke little English. Other maids came to the back
[1602]door of FELCHLIN's apartment to “chit” with her, and sus-
[1604]pecting that they were reporting to FELOROVA, PELC ULIN
[1606]teased her about it. FEDORJVA's previous employer at the
[1608]Embassy gave her full name to columnist Drew PEARSON with
[1610]@ statement that sne was one of the chief spies and the lceal t
[1611]"boss" cf the Embassy network. PEARSOU printed the allega-
[1613]tion. In the sunmer of 1953 or 1954, according te PELCHLIN,
[1615]the maid approached FELCHLIN wath the article, waved it in
[1617]his face, and accused him of beirmy PEARSON'S source. (NO-
[1619]SENKO did not reccegnize FELOROVA's name and did not recall
[1621]hearing cr reading of this incident.)
[1623]Pee Abe eee teria le a 6
[1625](v) BENSON {
[1627]NOSENKO identified his target John S, BENSON as a
[1628]major and Assistant Army Attache in Moscow. He did not
[1629]recall the names cf any agents working against BENSON but
[1630]said that BENSON was with MULE and STROUD (see below) in
[1631]Stalingrad in 1955 wwnen ali three were caught by the KGE
[1632]with electronic "spying" devices. They were declared per-
[1633]sona non grata. The KGS had no other derogatory information
[1635]n BENSON from any cther source.
[1637]“oO
[1639](vi) STROUD
[1642]ee tee Be
[1644]NOSENKO identified William R. STROUD as a captain and an
[1645]Assistant Army Attache. The only agents working against him
[1646]» were the Military Attaches‘ drivers. From concealed micro-
[1647]phones, the KGB Second Chief Directorate learned before
[1648]STROUD's arrival in Moscow that he was an expert in the use of
[1649]. electronic spying apparatus. He was with BENSON and MULE
[1650]in Stalingrad and was declared persona non grata along with
[1651]them (see below). Other than this, FOSENKO said, the KGB
[1652]knew nothing unusval or interesting about STROUD from any
[1653]source.
[1655]1
[1656]i
[1658]CIA files show that STROUD was, with BENSON and MULE,
[1659]the victim of the Soviets' seizure of technical equipment
[1660]in Stalingrad and was declared persona non grata on 7 May
[1661]' 1955. On 31 January 1955 he travelled to Kharkov from Mos-
[1662]cow with First Secretary Frank SISCOE to interview an Ameri-
[1663]can defector living there. (According to NOSENKO, SISCOE
[1664]was suspected by the KGB of being a CIA officer; SISCOE was,
[1665]-, 1, dn fact, a CIA cooptee.)
[1668]Soy yn aera Pee Se ceo
[1670]pier enema AEDS ee nS atte eee
[1672]ST eet en FP BR RR ed Ut bes
[1675]14-0000 10 4,
[1677]EME EATS SI pe Me PNR RPT MSE ESPN BARES SN TER ET IT PRI a NS ala Bra MNS 6 ERT
[1679](vii) MULE . 7 4
[1681]NOSENKO identified Walter MULE as an Assistant Army
[1682]Attache and said that he was the case officer responsible
[1683]for him. NOSENKO described an operational approach to MULE,
[1684]in which he himself participated: In 1953 or 1954 there
[1685]had been several defection 2pproaches to Soviets in the
[1686]United States on the basis of money and the promise of a
[1687]new life. After the KGB Second Chief Directorate decided to
[1688]try the same measures, MULE was selected because he was only
[1689]a captain despite his lengthy service in the Aray and because
[1690]material from concealed microphones indicated that he was
[1691]often disparaged by the other attaches. When MULE received
[1692]letters from home, he threw them in the trash, and the
[1693]maids turned these over to the KGB; from this mail it was
[1694]understood that MULE did not have a house in the United
[1695]States but lived with his family in a trailer. The father
[1696]of two children, MULE had sent his wife from Moscow to Ger- a . H
[1697]meny for an abortion, as a third child would have imposed
[1698]too great an economic burden. On the basis of all this the
[1699]KGB appointed N.M. BURODIN, a recruiter of the American De~
[1700]partment, to attempt to defect MULE, Together with BORODIN,
[1701]KOVSHUK, and L.A. LEBEDEV (from the Second Chier Directorate's :
[1702]special technical section) NOSENKO travelled to Leningrad i
[1703]for the operation. LEBEDEV installed a ciock containing a
[1704]concealed camera as well as microphones in MULE's hotel
[1705]room, and BORODIN entered the room to await MULE's return.
[1706]When MULE started to enter the room, he caught sight of :
[1707]BORODIN and tried to back out, but NOSENKO anc and KOVSHUK '
[1708]closed. the door from, the hali and prev
[1710]vented nis, escape. *
[1711]Tne “MULE thé Facts the KGB had accdmulated
[1712]bout” “HIS 1aCK of success in the Army, the disdain of his
[1714]thee ttle ted ied come
[1716]fellow attaches, und his shortage of money end then offered \
[1717]him a job as a "consultant." BORODIN had either $5,000 or
[1718]$10,C00 in an envelope to encourage MULE to accept. Ac- \
[1720]cording to NOSENKO, MULE refused outright, telling BORODIN
[1721]to get out, that he would not talk to hin, and that he was
[1722]a captain in the American Army. |
[1724]CIA files show that MULE reported this incident. He
[1725]said that he was locked in his hotel room and subjected to |
[1726]a recruitment attempt by an MVD agent calling himself Jack
[1727]SIEGAL, who offered him $10,000 for "work" on a long-range
[1728]basis.. SIEGAL emphasized that MULE would not be required :
[1729]to procure documents from the Embassy, and according to
[1730]MULE, SIEGAL was aware of facts concerning MULE's personal /
[1731]life that could have been obtained only from listening de- /
[1732]vices in MULE's apartment or office. SIEGAL left after about
[1733]20 minutes, having warned MULE not to report the incident.
[1734]CULE was unable to identify NOSENKO's photograph.
[1735]a en eee
[1737]i (viii) PNG of BENSON, MULE, and STROUD ; !
[1739]After NOSENKO had been transferred to. the Tourist De-
[1740]partment in 19535, BENSON, MULE and STROUD were the targets
[1741]of a KGB operation which resulted in all three men being
[1743]wether anne: ween
[1745]*Precisely the same role was played by NOSENKO in the re-
[1746]cruitment approach to James STORSBERG, according to NOSENKO.
[1747](See Part V.E.3.c.ii.)
[1749]|
[1752]pny th SP Bisctanecsemapnranrtcnmenen nme ore ot or
[1754]me F
[1759].
[1760]4
[1763]‘+ pfece of electronic equipment which American Intelligence ~ .
[1765]BE EE Fate
[1767]declared persona. non grata, NOSENKO gave the following
[1768]account of this inéidcnt: For some time the Second Chief
[1769]Directorate had beon trying to acquire a small, convenient
[1771]officers vere known tu be using during their travels inside |
[1772]the Sovict Union, As early as the beginning of 1954, the *
[1773]American Department had been given authorization from the
[1774]Central Courittee of the Communist Party to steal tais
[1775]equipment from the Americans, provided that the success of ':
[1776]such an operation was assured: Before his transfer to the" -
[1777]Tourist Department in 1955, NOSENKO hiaself had helped to
[1778]develop plans for the vperation and had even arranged an
[1779]abortive ettespt to steal the equipment from an attache at
[1781]a railroad station outside Moscow. While BENSON, MULE,
[1783]and STROUD were or one of their trips (after NOSENKO's trans €
[1784]fer) it was learned that they had the equipment with them, i
[1785]and the KCB decided to take it from them in Stalingrad.
[1787]To carry out the operation, Lieutenant General P.V. EDOTOV,
[1788]then Chief of the KGB Sccond Chief Directorate, and A,M.
[1789]GORBATENKO, Chier of the American Department, flew with
[1790]other personnel from the American Department to Stalingrad.
[1791]The hotel rooms of BENSON, STROUD and MULE were watched
[1792]‘constantly from a visual observation post, and it. was noted
[1793]that they never ate in the hotel restaurant but always in
[1794]their rooms. It was also noted that the apparatus was
[1795]placed under a pillow before they began to eat. while they
[1796]were seated at the table having dinner, therefore, the KGB
[1797]officers suddenly entered the room and seized the equipment.
[1798]In order to partially cover the illegality of this act, it
[1799]was decided to make a show of expelling BENSON, MULE and
[1800]STROUD from the Soviet Union, and this was done via the
[1801]persona non grata action.
[1805]t
[1807]Wada titer Babee tbl
[1809]According to information from other sources, the equip-
[1810]ment was seized from BENSON, MULE, and STROUD on 5 May 1955,
[1811]and the three were declared persona non grata on 7 May (a
[1812]month before NOSENKO ciained to have transferred to the
[1813]Tourist Department).* When the 7 May date was given to
[1814]NOSENKO during the February 1965 interrogations, he replied
[1815]that the operation was handled at a higher level, that he
[1816]did not directly participate in it, but that he had been
[1817]involved in the earlier planning to seize the equipment. | ;
[1818]It was pointed out to him that he had always sald he was in
[1819]the Tourist Department at the time of this operation, and
[1820]that he had consistentiy said that he transferred from the
[1821]American to the Tourist Department in June 1955. -NOSENKO
[1822]shrugged, but offered no comment. 7 os :
[1824]ee LAM cath ad acca lees
[1826]svat teas dogs Sanaa
[1828]rae
[1830]*TheGigmsource Kaarlo R. TUOMI, who served in the United
[1831]States as a GRU Illegal from 1958 to 1963, reported to CIA
[1832]in.1964 that while working as a KGB informant in Kirov in
[1833]- the early 1950's, he was targetted against three U.S. Mili-
[1834]tary. Attaches travelling on a train. TUOMI believed thet.” .-
[1835]- he might have contributed information leading to the three
[1836]: Americans (as he later read in the Soviet press) being de-
[1837]clared persona non grata. It would appear that TUOMI's
[1838]targets were BENSON, MULE, and STROUD. :
[1840]vet abe ag
[1843]106.
[1845](ix) CARDELLA
[1847]* NOSENKO said that in 1954 and 1955 there was an admini-
[1848]strative officer in the Embassy by the name of James CARDELLA.
[1849]The KGB had no interesting or unusual information cencerning
[1850]CARDELLA from any source, ard NOSENKO could say nothing more
[1851]about hin. oon mo,
[1853]CIA files show that Chief Warrant Officer CARDELLA served
[1854]in Moscow from September 1953 until June 1955. Other than the
[1855]fact that a microphone was discovered in CARDELLA's Moscow Em-
[1856]bassy office in 1964, no significant collateral information
[1857]concerning him is available.
[1859](x) VAN LAFRTHEM
[1861]NOSENKO identified George VAN LANTHEM as an Assistant Air.
[1862]Attache at the U.S. Embassy against whom an cperation was at-
[1863]tempted in 1953 or 1954. Ne said that during this period a,
[1864]Russian actress, Alla LARIONOVA, was placed on a train going
[1865]from Berlin to Moscow with the mission of striking up an acquain-
[1866]tance with VAN LAETHEM which could be followed up in Moscow.
[1868]She succeeded in meeting him and gave him her address-and tele-
[1870]phone: ‘number. Although she was certain that she would hear from
[1871]him, he never did call her in Moscow. NOSHNKO said tnat he had
[1873]heard about this from P.F. PANKRATCY, the case officer handling
[1875]LARIONOVA. He added that CHURANOY was the case officer respon-
[1877]sible for VAN LAETHEM, as he was for all members of the Air At-
[1879]tache's office at that time. NOSENKO knew of no other interest
[1881]or activity concerning VAN LAETHEM.
[1883]CIA records show that VAN LALTEEM was not an Assistant Air
[1884]Attache but an Assistant Army Attache, serving in Moscow from
[1885]March 1951 to March 1953.* As cryptographic security officer
[1886]and officer in chargz of the Embassy code room, he had super-
[1888]‘visory responsibility for the military code clerks and mechanics,
[1890]including Dayle SMITH, and he was on fairly close personal terms
[1891]with Sergeant Roy RHODES until the latter's departure from Mos-
[1892]cow in January 1953; VAN LAETHEM's duties also carried respon-
[1893]sibility for sensitive electronic activities in the Embassy.**
[1894]He was again in Moscow from 19 March to 19 May 1955 (at a time
[1895]when NOSENKO claims to have been the KGB case officer for U.S.
[1896]Army Attaches). Although this trip was always intended to he
[1898]_ only a TOY, it was represented to the Soviets as a PCS Assistant
[1900]Army Attache assignment because of the extremely sensitive na-
[1901]ture of his business there. He was project officer for. the en-
[1902]tire electronics program at the Embassy, and went to Moscow to
[1903]review the operations including the planned use of the new
[1904]electronic equipment which was seized from BENSON, MULE, and
[1905]STROUD in Stalingrad in May 1955 (see above). .
[1909]_® “Although VAN LAETHEM completed his two-year tour in Moscow in
[1911]March 1953, just at the time NOSENKO said he: entered the KGB;
[1912]he was succeeded in his post by Walter MULE, for whom NOSENKO
[1914]“" has claimed full responsibility. Thus, the fact of his osis
[1915]' tion as Assistant. Army Attache_ana MULE’S. predecessor would
[1917]‘presumably be available to NOSENKO. .
[1919]“Each time NOSENKO gave CIA the story of the recruitment of
[1921],,Each reference to Roy RHODES was followed by a statement that
[1922]**it-was through RHODES that the KGB learned of the existence of
[1924]access to such information.
[1926]“ WANDREY® in the June 1962 meetings, he related it to Roy RHODES.
[1928]special electronic equipment -in the U.S. Embassy. RHODES had no
[1931]i
[1934]3
[1936]4
[1937]|
[1938]4
[1939]4
[1941]oe het Aca Aa eentaabenas bee
[1943]Seen’,
[1945]i
[1946]4
[1948]3
[1950]sac UPrecit ibaa lisbon arn
[1953]— 107.
[1955]‘ was created to operate with and sgainst foreign travellers.
[1957]2. Soviet Homosexual Agents.
[1959]D. June 1955 to January 1960 (Tourist Department)
[1961]1. lotroduction -
[1963]By his account’ NOSENKO served in the Amer ican-Canadian-:
[1964]British Section of the Tourist Department,* KGB Second Chief
[1965]Directorate, from June 1955 (shortly: after, the department
[1967]in the USSR) until his transfer to another department in
[1968]that directorate in January 1960. He wasS.a case officer |
[1969]until appointed Deputy Chief of the Section about June 1958.
[1970]In statexents made prior to April 1966, NOSENKO claimed to
[1971]have been twice promoted during this four and one-half year
[1972]period--to captain in July 1956 and to major in August or
[1973]September 1959--but in a signed statement of April 1966 he
[1974]said he remained a captain from 1956 until his defection.
[1976]. ,NOSENKO has described his personal and- direct partici-
[1977]pation in the section' s activities as consisting of:.
[1979]i
[1980]4
[1981]4
[1984]i
[1985]j
[1986]-Recruitment of two Soviet. nationals as homosexual I
[1987]agents,** with NOSENKO their handler from the outset until ‘ !
[1988]they were dropped in 1962 or 1963.
[1990]-Recruitment and handling of Soviets as agents tar- :
[1991]getted against American tourists; their number varied fron j
[1992]eight to 14 and many were employed by Inturist. i
[1994]-Operations involving :4 foreigners who visited the
[1995]USSR for various lengths of time. |
[1997]-Recruitment and handling of the American Express Com- |
[1999]pany representative in Moscow, whom NOSENKO continued to
[2000]meet following his reassignment in January 1960.
[2002]4
[2003]a
[2004]4
[2006]-Decision in October 1959 that Lee Harvey OSWALD was .
[2007]of no operational interest to the KGB, and subsequent par- _ ot
[2008]ticipation in the KGB investigation of OSWALD" s activities
[2009]in the USSR.
[2011]Each of these categories is discussed separately below.
[2013]: Because he had been seen meeting a foreigner ina
[2014]public lavatory in Moscow, NOSENKO said, the KGB concluded
[2015]that A.1I. VOLKOV might be a homosexual and hence of some
[2016]operational value. The KGB therefore mounted an operation
[2017]which verified this possibility in 1987: A homosexual agent
[2018]of the Moscow Criminal Investigations Department provoked .
[2019]VOLKOV into a compromising ‘situation... Then VOLKOV, who had - 7
[2020]previously been a KGB agent but was at this time deactivated; °
[2021]was called to KGB Headquarters where, after NOSENKO interro-
[2022]gated hin, he admitted his homosexuality and agreed” to
[2024]we)
[2026]" *These | components : are also known as the. First’ Section: and .
[2027]- Seventh Department, respectively.
[2029]. -**tThis tern refers to agents whose homosexuality: is ex-
[2030]; ploited py .the KGB against certain male targets. .
[2032]NOSENKO's proposal to work for the KGB nmong homosexuals.
[2034]VOLKOV helped NOSENKO the following year to recruit a hoao- .
[2036]sexual acquaintance, Aleksey (patronymic not recalled).
[2037]YEFREMOV. The two agents subsequently worked as a team
[2038]against foreigners under NOSENKO's direction; in addition
[2040]-to specific targets, they had the general assignment of
[2042]associating with foreign visitors in Moscow for the pur-
[2043]pose of spotting possible homosexuals. NOSENKO described
[2044]on 12 June 1962 his use of these agents: “Although I am
[2046]a chief of section there I have all sorts of.agents. I
[2047]have a good agent apparatus. I have beautiful girls,
[2048]beautiful girls, whom I can use as I like--anything you
[2049]want. I have homosexuals, pederasts, and, in particular, 1
[2050]have one special pair. I am afraid they are known to both
[2051]you and the British. I permitted this pair to work in
[2053]general [without specific assignments]. TI send them. out to,
[2055]look on their own. I give them money and tell them te go
[2056]out. ‘Stroll about. Here are theater tickets. ‘Look around,
[2057]but only Americans. Look for American pederasts.' They are
[2058]& couple, that is, they love each other. They are able to
[2059]do anything desired, cither active or passive, anything.
[2061]They call me at night: ‘Yuriy Ivanovich. There is a mister
[2062]so-and-so here. He wants to go to bed with us.'' I say:
[2064]“*Well, let him. We'll talk about it tomorrow.' So the next
[2066]day-they go to a special hotel room. Wo make photographs.
[2067]Then we think about what he represents. Is he worth it?
[2068]Then, as Chief, I recommend that he be recruited or not--
[2069]depending on his position, that he can give, what he can
[2070]tell. If he can give something, I say: ‘Well, let's have
[2071]a go figrat'|. After this, I speak to these boys: ‘Well,
[2072]go to bed with him again, one or both of you, as you wish.
[2073]Do whatever is wanted.' All this is seen [observed by the
[2074]KGB]. The [hotel] administrator enters. ‘What are you
[2075]doing?' The administrator calls the Militia. An akt is
[2076]drawn up. ‘Well, you are a foreigner. This is not our
[2077]business. We don't know what to do with you.' Then the
[2078]Chief arrives: ‘What's up. Aha, I see.' Well, then a con-
[2079]versation begins: ‘Listen, what shall we do? Pederasty is
[2080]punishable by three to five years and now, on the basis of
[2082]recent legislation, by up to eight. Understand, if your
[2084]friends find out that you are a pederast--and how can they
[2085]help but find out?..."
[2087]When NOSENKO moved from the Tourist Department to the
[2088]Second Chief Directorate's American Department in January
[2089]1960, he took VOLKOV and YEFRENOV with him. They were
[2090]never used against targets in the U.S. Embassy; but, NOSENKO:
[2091]said, the Tourist Department “used to call me on homosexual
[2092]prospects." VOLKOV and YEFREMOV continued as active KGB
[2093]agents until some time in 1960 or 1961, after which they
[2094]could not be used further since they had become too well
[2095]known, and NOSENKO finally retired their files to KGB
[2096]archives in 1962 or 1963. The last operation in which these
[2097]two agents participated was: during January 1962.
[2099]During interrogation on these agénts, NOSENKO ‘has been
[2101]- . unable to tell. where they lived in Moscow, their family
[2103]situation, or other such details. He said that he never
[2104]met either in a safehouse (always on the street) and never
[2105]met either of them alone, without: the other: being present.
[2107]} i
[2108]i
[2109]4
[2110]t
[2112]Lets akan
[2114]: 4, bois at
[2115]ce SE ash eal ga
[2117]a
[2119]- 109.
[2121]NOSENKO has described eleven KGB approaches to Americans ©
[2123]- based on compromising evidence obtained with the assistance
[2125]. Of VOLKOV and/or YEFREMOV and several other cases in vhich
[2126]Americans. were suspected of being homosexuals on the basis
[2127]of the evaluation of these two. Additionally, CIA records
[2129]- indicate that at least. six Americans, not reported on by
[2130]NOSENKO, have had contacts with one or both of these agents
[2132].in Moscow. Of these six, three were CIA agents, one a U.S,
[2133]graduate student, another a psychiatrist visiting Soviet
[2134]institutions, and the last. Charles W. THAYER, the well-known
[2135]diplomat and author. With one or possibly two exceptions, all
[2136]the contacts of VOLKOV and YEFREMOY reported by NOSENKO. or ;
[2137]other sources took place during the period from April to” ~ | : .
[2138]November 1959. The known exception was the KGB approach to . ; i
[2139]W.E. JOHNSON in January 1962;* the possible exception was | sO
[2140]the contact with the American psychiatrist, which took place {
[2141]in 1959 or early 1960 but cannot be dated precisely. Finally, ; ; |
[2142]NOSENKO has described the contacts between VOLKOV, YEFREMOV, Lad
[2143]and the American Robert BARRETT in the. summer of 1959 but :
[2144]doeg not know of their contacts in the summer of 1961, mae S , :
[2145]shortly before BARRETT was approached on the basis of con-~ me 4
[2147]' promising information obtained in 1959.** ‘
[2149]wont fittbabarecdutiaactelnas.
[2151]“3. Other Soviet égents ct . :
[2153]The Tourist Department, just established when NOSENKO
[2154]was transferred to it in mid-1955, had no agent network for
[2155]operations against American and British tourists. Conse- i
[2156]quently, NOSENKO said, he and the other case (officers had i
[2157]to “start from the beginning.” a . |
[2159]|
[2161]cients
[2163]As a first step, NOSENKO was introduced by a fellow
[2165]officer to a number of "trusted persons" in Inturist; these
[2166]were not agents, he explained, but "just persons Known to
[2167]me the KGB so that a KGB man could approach one of them with
[2168]: questions about somebody or something." NOSFNKO began to
[2170]collect information on these individuals and others with the
[2171]aim of formalizing their recruitment; by the end of 1955,
[2172]he estimated, he had a network of about eight agents, all
[2174]_ of then Inturist interpreters. During the following four |
[2178]|
[2180]years, the number of agents whom NOSENKO handled varied:
[2181]Agents would be transferred from one case officer to another,
[2182]. some would leave Inturist, and "things were sort of changing
[2183]‘all the time, bacK and forth." In 1956, NOSENKO said, he had
[2184]about ten agents, in 1957 there were. about 12, in 1958 about .
[2185]‘eight, and at the end of 1959 (when he was preparing to return
[2186]; to the American Department) he had approximately 12 to 14.
[2187]. . .NOSENKO has provided information on five: of these agents, : 1. an
[2188]ey ’" ° @ll of whom he says he recruited from within Inturist during | pO Ee
[2189]1855. These were: — a
[2191]Larissa SOBOROVA; An: Inturist interpreter and. one of oe ;
[2192]the first Inturist agents recruited by NOSENKO.: SOBOROVA :
[2193]- was NOSENKO’S agent until 1959 (when she married and retired)
[2194]-...’ and reported to him on all foreigners with whom she worked as
[2196]<a interpreter. She worked with NOSENKO in the operation
[2198]rr re
[2200]*See Part . ‘Ve F.4
[2201]#*See Part Vv. D.4.m.
[2205]against Ee Pierre the summer of 1957.*
[2207]“ WOSENKO reported specifically on her possible sexual involve-
[2208]ment with two other tourists, one American and the other British,
[2209]during 1957-1953. NCSENKO.menticred at one point that he “even
[2211]tola Larissa about his last name."
[2213]— Vladiair KUROMTSEV: KG3 cryptonym “LESZDEV," recruited
[2214]in 1955. (NOSENKC has also said that MUROHTSEV had been a
[2215]Second Chief Directorate ayent "since 1958,") MUROMTSEY wag
[2216]called into the army in akout 1959 and was senc to some Soviet
[2217]Air Force academy in Central Asia, where he dorked as an inter-
[2218]» preter for Syrian students studying there. During this period,
[2219]. his file was helé by the local KGF in Central Asia. Later he
[2220]returned to Moscow and sas reactivated by the Second Chief
[2221]Directorate.
[2223]seutstbdubeRh aah
[2225]Pied
[2227]= tmenetecrennnre tee mane
[2229]- Nikolay ROGOV: KGS cryptonym “Gzero,” recruited in 1955,
[2230]ROGOV had formerly peen 42 “confidential contact” of the KGB.
[2231]He worked in the central office of Inturist which assigned
[2232]interpreters to British ana Americen citizens visiting the
[2233]Soviet Unicon.
[2235]ne mo
[2236]costal cae nat aida 0
[2238]5 . ’
[2239]- Natalya SHULGINA: Recruited by NOSENKO in 1955, an
[2241]Inturist interpreter. Shown SHULGINA's photscraph on 6 February
[2243] °9964, NOSENKO failed to recognize yir when he was given her nene,
[2245]-- “ however, he sai@ that this was a Second “hye Drréctorate agent,
[2246]on whom Boris RELITSKIY had reported to C1lA,** NC3ENKO's only °
[2247]other statement on SHULGINA was made on 17 Aprii 19€4, when
[2248]discussing the agents he acquired in 1955. He eaid: “So, for
[2249]exemple, I had this SORUROVA. then 1 had MUROMTSEV, TI recruited
[2250]him. Who else? Natalya SHULGINA, KUENSAROVA, Well, enyway, '
[2251]during this short peried. during 1955 untid the end of ‘55, I }
[2252]had about eight pesple, all of them traaslatets from Inturist." hs
[2253]NOSENKXO therefore said he handled SHULGIUNA and tnplied shat _be
[2254]recruited her. (Information from other sources indicates that :,
[2255]SHULGINA worked for two ycars as secretary/interpreter for the
[2256]NEC correspondent in Moscow, Irving R, LEViNE. who arrived in : i
[2257]the Soviet Union in July 1955. aAlthouzh there 13 no evidence
[2258]that SHULGINA was directly involved. the KGB attempted to re-
[2259]eruit LEVINE in Kovember 1955, She has travelled abroad twice,
[2260]the first time to Paris in i956 and the secend time as an inter-
[2261]preter at the Brussels Fair in the sunmer of 1958, As NOSENKO
[2262]Po indicated, BELITSKIY reported on SHULGINA, wno hs said was a
[2263]elose friend. BELITSKIY said that she was directly involved,
[2264]probably as the principal, in a sexual entrapment operation,
[2265]‘in the recruitment of a member of the British Parliament.
[2266]BELITSKIY reported to CIA on SHULGINA in October 1962; NOSENKO .
[2267]said his last connection with the BELITSKIY case. was in Geneva . .
[2268]‘ gn the spring of 1962.) an ae . a
[2270]wet A cals OM ada ahaha at
[2272]a ceed oat BA ab ie ye
[2274]we ep cee at ". Tamara KUNGAROVA: Inturist interpreter recruited in eee a
[2275]i 1955 (according to NOSENKO's statement in April 1964 - see _ a
[2276]i above on SHULGINA). In October 1964, NOSENKO said she was trans-
[2278]i ferred as an agent to the Tourist Department by the British
[2280]are discussed in Part V.D.4.d.
[2282]**NOSENKO reported in 1962 that the KG3 controlled BELITSKIY,
[2283]a source of CIA (see Part .VI.D ee Se le
[2286]- Commonwealth Department in 1957 or the beginning of 1958.
[2288]| Operation against an American professor, which did not
[2289]reach the point of a recruitment approach. Between 1957
[2290]. or 1958 and 1960 she was working against an American tourist
[2291]‘named Philip NIELSEN who was suspected of connection with
[2293]lieved there was no recruitment. Mrs. NIELSEN died in 1965,
[2295]_ target..
[2297]. about 1960, when she became an instructor in the Greek
[2299]- She reported to NOSENKO any information which she obtained
[2301]‘of Agriculture to interpret during meetings between Soviet
[2303]. once participated in a conversation he had with Iowa farmer
[2305].., States and was used by the KGB Legal Residency in Washington,
[2307]*NIELSEN was, in fact
[2309]jpeg aaa ila sinh isnt
[2311]In 1957 or 1959 she was involved in a sexual compromise
[2313]CIA and who was under study for recruitment by the KGB.* —
[2314]KUNGAROVA later married NIELSEN and the two “lived “in ty +:
[2315]England. The KGB was still interested in NIELSEN at the
[2316]time NOSENKO left the Tourist Department, but NOSENKO be~
[2318]Besides those in Inturist, NOSENKO has named several :
[2319]other agents whom he recruited or was given while in the . oe
[2320]Tourist Department. These included tha following: ; i
[2322]~Aleksey A. DMITRIYEV: KGB eryptonym "TOMO," a can- |
[2323]didate member of the Academy of Sciences USSR anda speciale .
[2325]ist on Japan and Thailand. DMITRIYEV speaks Japanese and
[2327]English and worked at the Japanese exhibition in Moscow.
[2329]NOSENKO did not indicate how. DMITRIYEV was used cperationally !
[2330]or how he was connected with the American-Canadian-~British
[2332]ros cnes ms sition setealel woghadee
[2336].-(fnu) IVANOV: A lawyer employed by the Institute of
[2337]Foreign Trade in Moscow. NOSENKO did not personally re- !
[2338]cruit this agent. IVANOV moved to Moscow from the Baltic .
[2339]area and his previous handlers there notified the Center,
[2340]suggesting that the agent might be of use in the capital.
[2341]NOSENKO contacted IVANOV and later turned him over to the
[2342]British Commonwealth Department of the Second Chief Direc-
[2343]torate whicu, NOSENKO believed, “planted him in the British
[2344]Trade Mission or something like that."
[2346]oan eet oe a he ae
[2348]-Marina RYTOVA: KGB cryptonym "KRYMOVA," born about
[2350]1923 or 1924 and educated at the Military Institute of
[2351]Foreign Languages, a special school which also had Communist
[2352]students from foreign countries. There she studied military
[2353]subjects as well as foreign languages. She speaks English
[2354]and Greek well. NOSENKO could not recall who recruited her,
[2355]but she was turned over to him by I.4. KONSTANTINGV, a
[2356]Tourist Department case officer, in 1956 or 1957. At that
[2357]time she was working as an interpreter at the Russian :
[2358]Permanent Exhibit in Moscow and continued in this job until
[2360]language school of the Institute of International. Reélations.:.
[2361]on foreign delegates or foreign tourists who visited the
[2362]Exhibit in Moscow. As she was often invited by the Ministry
[2364]officials and delegates from America, England,,and Greece,
[2365]she also reported.this information to NOSENKO. RYTOVA
[2366]served several times as an interpreter for KHRUSHCHEV and:
[2367]GARST, In 1959 or 1960 she was sent. as-interpreter with a.
[2368]small delegation which visited GARST's farm in the United
[2370]'
[2374]in contact. with CIA at the time (see. -
[2376]pthoee et
[2377]“dp. .
[2379]Part VI.D.2.)., ||
[2382]See Part V.D.5. for further
[2384]D.C., to report on observations. enroute and while there. -
[2386]RYTOVA is married to a man. who vorke in cne of the military
[2387]effices in Moscow and is a captain ora major. They have *.
[2389], one daughter, approximately 14 years old.
[2391]_ -¥evgeniya ("Jane") DANKO: KGB cryptonym “OKSANA."
[2392]She worked in the American Express Company offic¢ in Moscow
[2393]for Arsens FRIPPEL and leter for FRIPPEL's successor,
[2394]Michael JELISAVCIC.* DANKO: was handled by I.A. KONSTANTINOV
[2395]from about 1955 to 1957-and was then turned over to NOSENKO.
[2396]She reported on JELISAVCIC, who was not approached, according
[2397]to NOSENKO. ae oo
[2399]4. Operations with Foreign Visitors
[2401]NOSENKO said he participated in 14-operations with
[2402]foreign visitors to the USSR while a member of the American-
[2403]Canadian Section of.the Tourist Department. Nine of these
[2404]operations resulted in recruitmenis (excluding one who later
[2405]was recruited by another element of the KGB, but including
[2406]another whom NOSENKO classified as a borderline case). Of
[2407]the remaining five operations which did not end with a re-
[2409]- cruitment, no approach was contemplated by the KGB in one
[2411]case, one target rejected NOSENKO's proposal, the KGB was
[2412]unable to obtain compromising material for an approach to a
[2413]third, and for political reasons the KGB decided against
[2414]approaching the final two.
[2416]Although the information from NOSENKO on the timing of
[2417]these operations does not always agree with that from other
[2418]sources, these cases can be grouped chronologically as
[2419]follows: 1955 ~ one; 1956 ~ one; 1957 - three; 1958 = two;
[2420]and 1959 — seven. The operations in 1955, 1956 and, with.
[2421]one exception, 1959 were homosexual provocations. The re-
[2422]cruitment of Arsene FRIPPEL in 1959 was based on heterosexual
[2423]compromise.
[2425]These fourteen operations are summarized briefly below
[2426]in the approximate order in which the cases began. For
[2427]each case, NOSENKO's information is followed by a summary of
[2428]the results of CIA investigations. The description of the
[2429]BURGI case is more detailed than the others, for reasons in-
[2431]-dicated in the text.
[2433]a. Attempted Entrapment of MALIA (1955)
[2435]- - KOSENKO's Information: Martén MALIA, a graduate ‘student,
[2436]spent about four months in the USSR in 1955 and was sus-~
[2437]pected of having connections with American Intelligence.
[2439]“~~ moward the end of his stay, while under surveillance, MALIA
[2440]_ was observed in contact with a Soviet citizen believed to
[2442]be a homosexual. The Soviet was detained by the KGB, and
[2443]NOSENKO eventually obtained a.confession that he had had .
[2445]_ homosexual relations, with MALIA, After. NOSENKO. had arranged -
[2446]for the Soviet to introduce MALIA to a-KGB homosexual agent, ~
[2448]the latter enticed MALIA to a specially equipped hotel room
[2449]in Moscow; NOSENKO was on the scene (but not directly in
[2450]‘touch with MALIA) when the introductions:were made in a
[2452]a 23 weed os tree?
[2454]ne a eS ee ee
[2456]‘details on FRIPPEL and JELISAVCIC.
[2458]Saree rrremenren: sapere
[2460]aealidaddisles
[2464]estnened SPC Te
[2468]pcb Sibi mete nant ob “elege wth
[2470]aye t
[2471]ane Rae Seonir tse. Sesto OE COOT
[2474]Moscow restaurent, and from an observation point in a
[2475]neigrboring hotel rooa he watched the KGB agent and MALIA
[2476]having relaticns. With MALIA insisting on the lights being:
[2477]; turned off, however, .4t was impossible to obtain compro-
[2478]ae miging phctcgraphs (the KGB did not yet have infra-red
[2479]photographic equipmont, NOSENKO said) and therefore no re«
[2480]a cruitment approach was made to MALIA. During this and a
[2482]-- - 4 later trip to Moscow in 1961, MALIA was "yery cautioug,"
[2484]; and the KGB never again succeeded in exploiting MALIA's
[2485]homosexuality for a recruitment approach.
[2487]a Investigation Results: MALIA, a U.S. Navy intolligence
[2488]~ officer during World War. 11, has visited the Soviet Union
[2490]in 1955 and twice tn 1962. While buying books for the
[2491]Library of Congress and. several universities in 1955, MALIA |
[2492]travelled over 10,000 miles throughout the USSR, which was
[2493]sufficiently unusual at the time to attract press publicity. .
[2494]in 1955 and 1962 he nad contacts with dissident Soviet :
[2495]citizens and clandestinely brought to the est literature i
[2496]for fublishing abrord. In December 1963 MALIA was the
[2497]subject of an attack in the Soviet press which charged that
[2498]during 1662 he had “spent his time in Moscow looking for
[2499]dissension in the ranks of young intellectuals at druvken -
[2500]debauches." MALIA lad been in periodic contact with CIA
[2501]An recent years; in the spring of 1963 he claimed to have '
[2502]had'no involivezents with blackmarketeers, hor.ogexuals, or |
[2503]females iunide the Soviet Union at any time. ile made a i i
[2504]similar statencnt toRageRyes in October 1963. MALIA has - Ff :
[2505]not been interviewed in connection with NOSENKO's informa- i
[2506]tion about him. \
[2508]ey Sy
[2509]weensell antl able bi on
[2513]b. Recruitment of BURGI (1956) : : '
[2515]NOSENKO's Information: At the first meeting in 1962
[2516]and despite his stated fear for his own security and his
[2517]deternination to discuss only the two leads he wished to sell i
[2518]CIA, NOSENKO described his recruitment of Yale Professor
[2519]Richard BURGI on the basis of a homosexual provecation oper~
[2520]ation which began in Moscow and culminated with an approach
[2521]in Kiev in June 1956. NOSENKO reported that he received a
[2522]Jetter of commendation (blagodarnost') and a bonus of one : ;
[2523]month's pay for this recrulfwent, Lut in 1966 ne retracted |
[2525]this claim. The BURGI case was the first operation in which
[2526]NOSENKO had direct contact with a foreign target of the KGB, H
[2527]and NOSENKO said he counted it as a turning point in his i
[2528]. - personal and professional life: It was with this success-
[2529]. ful operation, NOSENKO stated, that he “began to grow" from - .
[2531]; ' & spoiled’ playboy into a responsible and effective counter- aa bet
[2532]intelligence officer. The BURGI operation was the first :
[2533]recruitment carried out by the Tourist Department after it coat ee
[2535]set oss "ws was created in 1955, according to NOSENKO. In 1964 NOSENKO :
[2536]reported for the first time that his superior, A.S. KOZLOV,
[2537]Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department, had also taken part -
[2538]in this operation, but that he, NOSENKO, was the ‘responsible . Cet
[2539]case officer. In August 1965, when asked who had recruited: To
[2540]BURGI, NOSENKO: replied: "“KOZLOV and NOSENKO."~ Asked who - .
[2541]recruited him first, NOSENKO said: "KOZLOY, naturally, He
[2542]. Was the Deputy Chief of the Department.- The collection of
[2543]> the materials [in preparation for the approach] was in the
[2545]- hands of Case Officer NOSENKO." Because of ‘the personal and
[2546]general significance ascribed to this operation by NOSENKO,
[2547]it is discussed in detail here: a oo :
[2549]fact
[2554]In August 1365 NOSENKO reported that at the time of
[2555]BURGI's arrival in the USSR, his file contained a copy of
[2556]his visa application (anketa), “maybe” an excerpt from a
[2557]cable sent by the Soviet Embassy in the United States saying
[2558]that a visa had been granted, 2 routine note from Inturist
[2559]giving BURGI's anticipated date of arrival and his itinerary
[2560]inside the Soviet Union, and the results of traces of the
[2561]general KGB Archives and of the First Chief Directorate
[2562]archives. NOSENKO himself ran the traces, which proved to
[2563]be negative; there was no information on record concerning
[2564]BURGI, and since no other names were mentioned in the
[2565]material available on BURGI, no other traces were made. The
[2566]KGB interest in BURGI derived exclusively from the fact that
[2567]he was a professor of Slavic studies and therefeore had con~
[2568]tact with students who might some day work for the U.S.
[2569]State Department, American Intelligence, and othcr target
[2570]organizations. NOSENKO did not recall who first suggested
[2571]an attempt to recruit him. .
[2573]When BURGI arrived in the Soviet Union, he came in
[2574]contact witi a number of KGB agents, and their reports were
[2575]placed in the unofficial file maintained by NOSENKO.* NO-
[2576]SENKO could not recall in 1965 how many such agents there may
[2577]have been, theiy names, or what they might have reported
[2578]concerning BURGI. (BURGE had an Inturist interpreter but
[2579]NOSENKO did not know whether he was & KGB agent.) From some
[2580]source, name forgotten by NOSENKO, the KGB cbtained indica-
[2581]tions that BURGI was a homosexual, and it was decided to
[2582]try to obtain the grounds for recruitment by homosexual com-
[2583]promise, NOSENK® therefore approached Yu.A, LOPUKHOV, an
[2584]officer of the Britis: Department who handled the homosexual
[2585]agent Viktor BELANOYSKIY, and asked permission to use his
[2586]agent in setting up the compromise. After permission had
[2587]been received to mount an operation on this basis, LOPUKHOV
[2588]ond NOSENKO met with BELANOVSKIY and instructed him to make
[2589]BURGI's acquaintance in a hotel dining room. The compromise
[2590]proceeded according to plan: BELANOVSKIY met BURGI, the
[2591]fact of mutual homosexuality was recognized, and BURGI was
[2592]invited to BELANOVSKIY's hotel room where homosexual acts
[2593]took place and photographs were made. NOSENKO was in the
[2594]adjoining room and directed the compromise. He did not meet
[2595]BURGI at this point, however,
[2597]As the result of NOSENKO's special request, the com-
[2598]promising photographs were ready by the following day. A
[2599]veport of the compromise and a request for permission to
[2601]‘attempt recruitment were then submitted to NOSENKO's superiors.
[2603]The request came back with the approving signatures of O.¥M.
[2604]GRIBANOV and A.S, FEKLISOV, the Chief of the American Depart-
[2605]ment of the First Chief Directorate, which had expressed
[2606]interest in using BURGI in the United States. BURGI's itin-
[2607]erary called for him to fly from Moscow to Kiev a short
[2609]while after this episode and, having called the Kiev KGB with
[2610]instructions, NOSENKO and KOZLOV flew there the day before to
[2611]prepare the operation. BURGI arrived the next morning and
[2612]was met at the airport by (fnu) KHODAKOVSKIY, an officer of
[2613]the Second Directorate in Kiev who operated under Inturist
[2615]*NOSENKO explained that no official files were kept on tourists
[2616]until 1960--only "collections of materials."
[2618].
[2622]4
[2623]4
[2624]j
[2625]a
[2629]4.00000
[2631]cover. NOSENKO was unable to recall how the car was ac-
[2632]quired, whether it was a KGB or Iniurist yehicle, who the
[2633]driver was, whether he was in the employ of the local KGB,
[2634]or other details.
[2638]In accordance with the operational plan, the local KGB
[2639]officer told BURGI enroute to the city that all the hotels
[2640]in Kiev were full at the moment because of various confer-—
[2641]ences, but that Inturist had arranged for him to stay for
[2642]about a day in a private apartment im the center of town; a
[2643]he would be moved to a hotel as soon as possible. When the .
[2645]ear arrived at the apartment building on Kreshchetik Ulitsa
[2646]in Kiev, NOSENKO, KOZLOV, V.S. PETRENKO, a local KGB officer,
[2647]and (fnu) KASTYKAITE. a woman housekeeper, were waiting for
[2648]them. NOSENKO could not remember how or whether he intro-
[2649]duced himself to BURGI. The recrnitment conversation, he
[2650]said, was handled by “KOZLOV-NOSENKO," but NOSENKO had for-
[2651]gotten by 1965 who said what: "I don't remember wnat I
[2652]talked about and I don't remember what KOZLOV talked about.
[2653]Many things were discussed. It started with how he Liked
[2654]his stay inithe Soviet Union... Then we slowly proceeded
[2655]to say how unfortunate it was that information had been re- :
[2656]ceived about his conduct in Moscow. We told him that his
[2657]homosexual activities were known, that this was punishable
[2658]under Soviet law according to article.so-and-so of the :
[2659]eriminal code, ete., that he was not a diplomat, had no : 1
[2660]diplomatic immunity, that he could be taken to court ac- ; :
[2661]cording to the Soviet law... well, he was scared, confused,
[2662]upset, and felt uncomfortable. Then we slowly proceeded to
[2663]say that all that could be smoothed out, but, you understand,
[2664]the basis was prepared for the man to say: ‘All right, I
[2665]agree to help.'... We showed him the pictures. He was
[2666]embarrassed of course--he was naked. Then we prepared the
[2667]basis: ‘You have a noble task. You teach; you have stu-
[2668]dents; the students might become future specialists on
[2669]Russia or might work as diplomats, etc., but many of these
[2670]students could be used by intelligence. They might be sent
[2671]somewhere with special tasks. Maybe you will tell us who
[2672]among the students is preparing for government service,
[2673]how they are distributed, etc.'... During the first conver-
[2674]sation everything was made completely clear... He was not
[2675]at all willing to help or work for Soviet Intelligence. He
[2676]was told that he must understand that in this case ‘helping
[2677]Soviet Intelligence’ was a very broad term. JI remember that
[2678]I told him: ‘Understand, nobody is going to ask you that
[2679]you help our friends over there, or me, if I should be there,
[2680]or that you do anything bad or conduct any kind of subver-
[2681]sive activities, that you organize explosions or murder.’
[2682]After the Soviet Union, he was supposed to go to italy,
[2683]to visit the Russicum of the Vatican, and here KOZLOV
[2684]grabbed the subject and began to ask questions about this
[2685]school. He told us a bit about the Russicum and we asked
[2686]him to write about it and he wrote down some names of the
[2687]_ professors who teach Russian subjects..." According to
[2688]‘ NOSENKO, the discussion lasted about five hours; at its end.
[2689]BURGI signed a short statement that he agreed ''to assist . .
[2690], the organs of Soviet Intelligence."’ NOSENKO first said that
[2691]. : it was he who took this statement from BURGI but later said
[2692]BS he could not remember whether he or KOZLOV did this. BURGI
[2693]was then taken to a hotel.
[2695]Heats nave
[2697]nated sditalt eden
[2699]1
[2701]ane eee oe RS TE
[2703]|
[2704]|
[2706]Fe entree cetem ne
[2710]ea one ee
[2711]3
[2716]i Bapiaiibigol iva acciaawleaa
[2718]il6.
[2720]This was the first time NOSENZO met BURGI. ‘Following
[2721]- the recruitment, he moved tnto the same hotel, a floor
[2722]; above PURGI, and for the remainder of BUNKGI's stay in Kiev
[2723]* became his constant companton and guide. An attempt was . °
[2724]made"to snooth out all the dirty business that had teen
[2725]brought up during tha recruitment talk." NOSENKO took
[2726]- * BURGI to an old cathedral in Kiev; with KOZLOV and PZTRENKO
[2727]they visited a kolkhoz and the writer SHEVCHENKO's grave in
[2728]nearby Kaniv. The subject of homosexuality “as not raised
[2730]; again. From Kiev, BURGI went directly to the West, without 4
[2731]; returning to Moscow. Before the approach, NOSENKO had 4
[2732]' visited the Amesican Department of the First Chief PDirecto- {
[2733]rate end had arranged with its chief, WEKLISOV, for 2 ree AL 3.
[2734]contact plan in Mew York City should BURGI be reeruited. { a
[2735]Before he left BURG was briefed on these avranjements, j
[2736]which calied lor a first meeting in the New York Public : 4
[2737]Library. BURGI was given a recognition siunad end a KGB 4
[2738]eryptonym, but the latter was nor diseussed with Kim. 4
[2739]About five days after returning to Moscow, NOSENKO j
[2741]turned over #1] his matorials on whe BURGI speration to the ; ;
[2742]First Chief Directorate. Somewhat latev sy GUSKOV, i 4
[2743]Chief of the Ak nadian-British Tourist Section, i i
[2744]KOZIOV, and “GSENHO visiced FERLISCO¥ in the Firet Chief ! 4
[2745]Directorate and oxpressed an interest in further cuvelop- i i
[2746]ments in the case, FEKLISOY told then that RBUHGI hed ar- ' i
[2748]rived for his first moeting, but the KGB had not established
[2749]contact; the first meeting in New York City took place the
[2750]second or third time BURG] appeared and the New York Legel
[2751]Residency continued to meet with him until the Revolution -in
[2752]Hungary in late 1956. NOSENKO Later heard from someone in
[2753]the American Department, First Chief Directorate that the
[2754]case was closed, For their roles in this first recruitment
[2755]ef the Tourist Department, NOSENKO said in 1965, he ana
[2756]KOZLOV received letters of commendation and ponuses of one
[2757]month's pay by order of KGB Chairman SEROVY: PETRENKO was
[2758]given a letter of commendation and half a month's salary;
[2759]and even KASTYKAITE, the housekeeper, got a commendation.
[2761]In October 1966, however, NOSENKO said his only KGB award
[2762]was for his lengevity of service.
[2764]Investigation Results: BURGI was first intervieved on
[2765]22 hove ber 1957 concecnine his reeruitwent vy the XB.
[2766]Rar ea ¥ MESES SOAS cs ETN hl ee Bae Ey
[2767]2S 2h Rosters rata Mi eke we apatue wees see
[2769]: . paces =
[2770]eet ne ene LEE EEE eee ee err
[2774]fe a
[2776]ag
[2782]Cae
[2785]1400000,
[2787]cremains
[2789]ora,
[2791]nm = tee aaa es meee esi mT RE
[2793]i
[2794]L
[2795]i
[2796]i
[2797]i
[2801]STOR ERT rae wenege:
[2804]14-0000
[2806]Poin
[2808]:ndcr' oc his.
[2810]a NOSENKOQ™S EeeGunt).
[2811]; re - .
[2812]3 ng iP As :
[2813]s q
[2814]4
[2815]j
[2816]F|
[2817]° 4
[2818]H
[2819]4
[2821]i
[2822]a
[2823]z \
[2824]. ,
[2825]“} on
[2826], wun, than Comnereral activities as te: SR. rig-ually.
[2827]: the responsibie case of ?icer TRiN of . 1
[2828]; the Sixth Seetionr ‘ot che Tourist ae Lig section
[2829]: - was then responsible for operations oveign sean vn. ‘
[2830]Since VEXKENIKIN spoke no German and & known to
[2831]speak English, SOSENKO was selected to sas epproach
[2832]because he “knew English a little." When asked why a German-~
[2833]speaking KCB case officer was not used, NUSENKO ars*ered:
[2834]"The higher-ups ssid ‘yo work « tase, to and that és
[2835]‘all." After beirg rebuffed by Mm “fake saw hin .
[2836]Several more times. during the if it. oo, but when 3
[2837]"+s NOSENKO attempted te rencw contact upon Qe return to ,
[2838]“es “the Soviet Unton in 1958, the latter refuse vce him. ve
[2840]“ “Investigation Results: WQRBRD os. isterviewed by
[2841]‘CIAf on 19"July 1555, and, white scnci yo uneco mMerative,
[2842]De described aticild approach" in Mosco. duriag 1956 or 1957).
[2843]hoo lee: .which-may be. the one-deoscribed by. NOSENKO. . (He. wes pot |.
[2844]: questioned on the identities of the. Sovicts involved.)  ~
[2845]acy ae a . . eine
[2847]wake
[2849]. pore ee tee ees
[2852]14-0000
[2856]Jeyeed Commercia. repres: Werth tranny aad”
[2857]- gas recently renortedt to have vepdiiatcd a sivable shirping
[2859]its
[2861]with the Suvic
[2863]“Tore
[2865]“+
[2867]tines one
[2869]sp.
[2871]Jee Ware
[2872]Chief Pirectoraie
[2874]acquaintance ana
[2876]Lice, bus SOSENKO Rin-
[2878]wage
[2882]att yet Acacr be u
[2884]officer, ¥. ARKHIPOV, mado
[2886]handled the entire operation asi
[2888]self wlavec a role. It had sone becn determined that
[2890]1 wad 2a fordness for girl ENKO therefore presented ‘
[2891]himscif to iim, using the newac UESERoV' or MSERGEYEV" and
[2893]--- posing as a painter, and told GRR hat he could findioyomen
[2895]ms for him. A party was arranged, witn «a KGB agent as
[2897]*See Part, V.0.8 for more discii sof this. point.
[2901]s described,
[2903]*sThis incident.
[2905]in Part. THT.As
[2910]" asked
[2912]122.
[2914]‘date and a Second Chic? Directorate secretary as. NOSENKO'S
[2915]F r
[2917]Late the evening MOSESKU and tite date texcused
[2918]and Phea sesual relativre with the tex Y
[2920]Photegrapr secae wero tannin by. the ROD
[2921]SENKO and aw ose anotnet the nowt day.
[2922]nounecd. tha: wv: nad sone artictés, ceneres and the itac,
[2924]that he want to vcll cn the rkcet. NOSENKO offered
[2926]to arrange the sule acd took (toe ¢ dingy section of
[2927]“Moscow. AS they arcived befor. 2 smabi howse. NCTENKO -
[2929]sella, Art this
[2930]an aporeacned and
[2932]vo wive fizc. the thin
[2933]fh Of2icer poring as. 2°
[2934]for blackaneketeuring.
[2935]station,. ras recruited hy Kos. &
[2936]the Touris: : tment. undas threat of imprisyonneat.
[2937](it was DUSAL wae
[2939]m cnt r}
[2940]nrrested the tac
[2942]a
[2946]d had the photofrephs tal previous
[2947]evening.) hero was no teether contact with avter
[2948]he left the CSSR, however, teon on his ret ye Oslo hea
[2950]publtched an crtdicte in watch he deserthbod J.is experiences,
[2952]Paes
[2954]“put not all of then.
[2956]inverti
[2958]NOSKEKO's Information: 8OSENAY in 1S82 recruited Giselia
[2959]NARRIS, an exployce of the Americnoa “xpress Coupany in Sale
[2960]Lake City, based on ker romantic and sexual involvement with
[2961]a Soviet citizen. The Seviet teld HARRIS that he was in
[2962]trouble with Soviet authorities and persuaded her to acccnpany
[2963]hin to the police. HARRIS agrecd to meet and cooperate with
[2964]the Soviets if they estabJished contact with her in Salt Lake
[2965]City, but the case was turned over to the First Chie? Directo-
[2966]rate, and NOSENKO was unaware of any further contact with her.
[2968]vmamermeretie | merres
[2970]Poeeraniers]
[2972]Levtvhatioet act?
[2975]14-0000
[2977] NOSENZO's Information: Virgil KRAFT, a clergyman from the
[2978]: “Chicego area, visited the Soviet Unicn as a tourist in 1957 or
[2979]1952, and NOSEN®S was acsiqned to bo the responsible case offi-:
[2980]cer. During an earlier trip to the US&R, the KGS had learned,
[2981]KRAFT had been intimate with a Seviet woman. NOSENKO arranged
[2982]for her to come to Moscow from hiey, waera 5.2 was living in
[2983]1957 or 1954, in orcer to compromise “RAPT. Although his wife
[2984]was accompanying him in Moscow, KRAFT and the Sovict woman were
[2985]intimate in the latter's recom in the Gr-nd Hotel. NOSENKO was
[2986]present at the tine supecvising the operation, Photegraphs
[2987]were taken. Then militiazen broke into che room, -finding KRAFT
[2988]- and the woman in the nude; a recruitment. approach was then made
[2989]: ' by DUBAS, the Chief of the Tourist: Department. -(NOSENKO had
[2990]been the case officer and had handled the operation thus far,
[2991]but he tock no part in the confrontation cr recruitment approach
[2992]“because DUBAS wanted it for himself.") Although the recruit-
[2993]ment was not firm, KRAFT and BUBAS "had an agreement" that i
[2994]nothing would be done about the compromise if KRAFT did not
[2995]criticize the Soviet Union in lectures about his trip there :
[2996]which he was to give in the United States. DUBAS ayain con-. i
[2997]tacted KRAFT when he came to Moscow in 1963, end after this his i
[2998]file was turned over to the First Chief Directorate, NGSENKO
[2999]récalieé that the first Chief Directorate "said that KRAFT was
[3000]not in a good reyion of the United States. Ard also it smelled
[3001]ike he had spoken of the apnroacn made to hin." Therefore,
[3002]WOSENKG concluded, he probably had not keen contacted in the
[3003]United Stites. -
[3007]sina sanb oh Rigatoni Sued bclte a
[3009]Tn
[3011]BEF On Me eT ne OL Ona
[3013]Siccpeeeeeet omens teeeentanael
[3015]“fh. Reeruitment of DREW (1959)
[3017]t _ ° NOSENKO'S Information: Geerge DREW, an Rrerican who : .
[3019]“yisited the Sovict Union in the spring of 1959, ha@ originally: | _
[3021]peen the respensibility of V.M. IVANOV, a case officer of the os
[3022]section dealing with American and Canadian tourists. By chance,
[3024]_ however, BREW became involved with NOSENKG's homosexual agents oboe, Menecas
[3025]hey reported this oo
[3027]VOLKOV and YEFREMOV (see Part v.D.2), and th
[3028]to NOSCENKO, then the deputy enief of the section. NOSENKO and
[3030]IVANOV discussed the case with DUBAS and possibly GUSKOV, the
[3031]section chief, and NOSENKO flew alone to Leningrad to make the
[3032]approach. (IVANOV ‘was not considered ‘to be sufficiently ex-
[3033]oo _ perienced and his English was not gocd.) NOSENKO arranged for 7
[3034]; 1+ - DREW to be compromised in a Leningrad hotel room with a homo- =
[3035]..ie-gexual agent of the local KGB handled by a Leningrad officer, .
[3036](fnu) PERELETOV. Using the aame "My, SERGEYEV," NOSENKO
[3039]14.00000° FS”
[3041]- ” oe Aad
[3042]alone..ro¢ruited DREW in an office ef the hotel. The KGB First
[3043]‘Chief Directorate was interested in CREN's recruitment ke |
[3045]seause he might be able te spet othes homcsexucis, pussibly some
[3046]in the U.S. Government. : oO
[3048]Resale
[3050]St
[3054]Recruitment of Ks 41959)
[3056]. , 4
[3058]NOSENKO'S nfort veson: In dh or possibly July 1959 , 1 i
[3060]NOSENKO personally recruited a QigeistAe subject", opie heaneae re 5
[3062]QF ee s in a room of the mot@f"Astoria in Leningrad arcer !
[3063]@xattdgyhud been compromised by NOSENEO'’s homosexual agants VOL-
[3065]KOV and YEFREMOV (see Parc wlp.2.). The case’ was then turned 4
[3067]over to Yc. A. TARABRIN, at that tine Caief ef the British De- 3
[3069]partment of the Firs: Chier Pirectoiate. t iMQ furnished 4
[3071]. no more infermation on this case and did not 7 its current g
[3073]; . tstus, but he believed the G8 hus not been in contact with i
[3075]; iy stp subsequently. 4
[3077]tTaivestigation
[3079]CP
[3081]Results:
[3083]j. Recruitment of CB (1935 ;
[3085]NOSENKO'sS Information: Ey himself NOSENXO revruited aay
[3087]Te, Se ce EN “eapin the “eva! ov vo (mow the Bucharest)
[3088]fo Hotel in iloscew in July 14%, afte. GEReBR had been compromised
[3089]by either VOLKOV or YLPREI homesexuai 4 (see Part
[3091]V.D.2.)-. GSR is a Giay ‘nand his case was also :
[3093]turned over to TARABRI*. :
[3095]; .
[3097]I a
[3099]ae NOSENKO's Information: SENK
[3100]eruited the Moscow representative o
[3102]: . NOSENKO explained his involvement with British nationals
[3104]: _....,. by saying that, after 1958, the Tourist Department had two
[3106]i ’ geographic sections, one dealing with U.S. and UK citizens —
[3108]_, and the other with tourists from other countries. NOSENKO _
[3110]“>: Was involved in the first of these, "so they“assigned them 4
[3111]to me. nn oe, “ ed
[3114]7225,
[3116]Si ; ENFO did not 2
[3117]pol in Mosec# during the cusner of 1999, o0:,
[3118]approach wiz tased cn hisosexuali compron.se any
[3120]visited the
[3121]-Qfuxual agents
[3122]grasent to be
[3123]Vio. e.i, Accidentally
[3124]voplvicns to NOSENKO.
[3125]sted authority
[3127]a recruit
[3129]OOH
[3130]Soyvict Un
[3131]FOLECV and
[3132]come rcqu
[3133]met >
[3134]NOSE
[3135]to take covrre:i
[3139]Mont «epprcach, and the case to
[3140]SAENS hod ty of A.A.
[3142](a
[3143]VELITSEIY, another secifice:.) Phet
[3144]homosexual relaticrs octwoen \ ; two suparate
[3145]occasions in Hoscow. NS velioad to Gengorod
[3146]he wes “arrested” hy KOS offacers (pesing as mijitianen) while
[3147]he was engnecd in relavions with a ho nt of opera-
[3148]tional contect From Cudcssa. HOSERLO ene to bring
[3149]this homosexual to Uengcrod; he did not 1 his name,
[3151]buken of
[3153]as
[3155]“y
[3158]but supsiied CIA with a physical deseription.  (NOSENEO could
[3160]6
[3162]give ne background on the agent and when asked why not, said
[3163]he "wasn’t interestcd. MERTENS was n brought before
[3164]NOSENKO, who recruited niin during a se on Lasting approxi-
[3165],Mately five hours. NOSENnO later trav with MERTENS when
[3166]he visited ivov and Minsk before leavil USSR. NOSENKO
[3167]’ said that he had used the name "George" ™ ENS, but he
[3169]-could not recall what Inst name he had «:-
[3171]get
[3173]z
[3176]Invéstigation Results: GR SRIREP are ct fs aad
[3178]@—NOSENKO EXplained chat the Tourist Department in 1959 had
[3180]a section dealing with commercial representatives, which.
[3182]: was responsible fer the man, but had asked NOSENKO's
[3183]section for help. “they said they didn't have any agents
[3185]or anything and didn't know what to cc. So. somebody said,
[3187]‘Well look, why don't you ask the chief-of the section? :
[3189]. He's a specialist on homosexuals and can arrange every—
[3190]‘thing for you.' So I wound up handling the case, and TARA-
[3192]BRIN (of the First Chief Directorate) said I should report
[3194]“to him.” In-this passage NOSENKO seemed to be-referring.
[3196]to himself, although he said he was ‘eputy chief of the
[3198]section; the chief cf the section at that time, M.A. LEONOV,
[3200]- is not known to have participated in operations stemming. -
[3201]from the homosexuality of the prospective agents.. :
[3205]pet wate thy caked das
[3207]tee etl Mn oe
[3210]4000007 Ro e+
[3212]bye bd 2 te
[3213]DENG Bs
[3215]by ¥5e a ae
[3218]gona)
[3220]Comprerndse cf :
[3222]NOSENKO's Infermation: Bosc. 2 UARRETT, a quide at the U.S. 3
[3223]Exhibition in Nescow in 1999, had vecome friendiy with the horce %y 4
[3224]sexual agents VELEOV and YRFRIMNOV (seo Part W.0.2.), whom he ! 3
[3225]met at the fairground. Although BRBBETE was not a honesexual, 4
[3226]VCLEOV succeeccd--after a long period of develorment-cin involve od
[3227]ing nim in homosexual acts, which were photographed by FGb i 3
[3231]adjoining hotel case
[3232]. {or arranging the
[3234]worn taken, and
[3236]hact been much con-
[3238]necause of the
[3240]tiny: for VOLKOV. to
[3242]J that he “had te ;
[3244]then well" because “they i
[3246]ration. fhe photographs
[3248]them rn 1359 becauss
[3250]recruitment of U.S.
[3252]persennel from a
[3254]VCLKOV and YEFPRIMOV, MOSENKO wes
[3256]compromise, Was present when thet I
[3258]has cescribed the occeasien in cerail.
[3260]‘plaining among une photographic tecani
[3262]“amount sf time y were forced
[3264]' succead in his mission, aml NOSEUN4C
[3266]provice them with drinks and trost
[3268]were a big help" to him in this cp
[3270]were good, but the KGis was unable to use
[3272]of a general ban placed by SHELEFIS on t
[3274]Fehibition guides due to the poss |
[3276]CuURV's planned visit to the United States.* (625
[3278]however, thac BARKE?T was recruited on the basis of the 1959 .
[3279]7 phetegraphy wien he returned with another exhibition in 1961.
[3280]ae whis recruitment was carried our vy aotnuer component of the
[3282]KGB Second Chief virectorate, aud NOSLSKO had noching to do ‘
[3284]with it.**)
[3287]q
[3288]a
[3289]A
[3290]JS
[3291]‘g
[3292]A
[3293]4
[3295], See the discussion of the WILLERFORD case, below, for addi-
[3297]_, tional information on SHELEPIN's prohibition.
[3298]wt *#* In 1961, shortiy before his recruitrent, BARPETT had osten-
[3299]“to: - gaibly accidental contact with YOLKOV and YEFREMOV in Moscow.
[3300]: NOSENKO has not mentioned this.
[3302]ma vee, Doane ered
[3304]etme ye ee ne oe
[3307]n. Compromise of: WILLEPPORD cee
[3309]NOSERKO 's- Thformetioa: ¥Yrederick WLILLERPGPD was , BARRETT'S
[3310]roommate ,during the 1959 exhibition in Hoscow. initially he
[3311]Was a target of the lecal HGE ovyanization for the city of
[3312]Moscow, which keiieved WILLERFORD to Le-an PEL agent and had
[3313]been collecting aterials on him. At the Sane time and, with-
[3314]out knowing of the interest of the leval organization, VOLKOY
[3315]and YEFRENOV had mede WILLERFORD's acguaintcnce, and NOSRNKO
[3316]had arranged fer cOmpromising photogrupi:s of ORD and
[3317]YEFREMOV in a Moscow hotel room. NOSENKO watehad WILLERFORD
[3318]and YEFRAMOV through a two-way mirror and wag able to-describe
[3319]the scene in detail. It was only after this compromising mater
[3320]ial hed been obcained that NOSENKO learned cf the local KGB's
[3321]interest in WILLERYORD. OSENKG'’s department and the local KGS
[3322]unit thea made a joint requese for operational appreval to
[3323]approach WILLERPCED, but permissicn was refused because of the
[3324]general ban on recruiftmént ipproiches: ae this time; —the-case
[3325]file was ¥Etdlned by the Hoocow RCS ‘organization, and NOSENKO
[3327]did not know whether WLLLERFORD has teen apprceached subsequently.
[3329]Note: There is a simi slarity between NOSENKO'S descrip-
[3330]ticn of the ban on recruitment approaches in 1959, which
[3331]prevented the Tourist E fren taking advantage
[3333]of its compremising p! phy of BARFET?’ and WILLER=
[3334]FORD, and information provided by the earlier defector,
[3335]GOLITSYN. GOGLITSYN reported chat en american employed
[3337]at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, possibly a code clerk, was
[3338]prepared for recruitment on the basis of homosexual com-
[3339]‘premise during 1959 and 1966. According to information
[3341]he said he iearned from U.s. Embassy Section case offi-
[3342]cer, G.I. GRYAZNOV, the KGB had chotegraphs of the
[3343]American in various stages of a homosexual act, and
[3345]there was no questicn about the recruitment being achieved:
[3346]"The only question was to where." At the time, however,
[3347]SHELEPIN had just become Chairman of the KGS and was
[3348]stressing ideological rather than blackmail recruitments.
[3349]He was shown these particular phctogrechs but decided that
[3350]‘an appreacnh on their basis would be too crude and that
[3351]another way should be found. although SHELEPIN did not
[3352]exclude the use of these photographs sone time in the
[3353]future, according to GOLITSYN, he had reservations against
[3354]using them at that time for fear of the propaganda reper-:
[3355]cussions if the attempt should fail and be exposed pub-
[3356]licly. GOLITSYN did not know whether the recruitment was
[3357]subsequently carried out. The essential differences. be-
[3358] » tween this account and that of NOSENKO are that GOLITSYN
[3359].- implied the tan was in effect at least into 1960 and that
[3363]GOLITSYN appeared to ke speaking of a general prohibition, |
[3365]i
[3366]i
[3367]H
[3368]j
[3370]so otcpatthas SEES Ait ws
[3372]4
[3373]4
[3374]i
[3375]4
[3377]potter ba oaidts etter, eederes ob
[3382]: : . whereas NOSENKO related the ban specifically and only to
[3383]ae . ‘the U.S. Exhibiticn at Sokolniki Park which ended on
[3384]4 September 1959.* :
[3388]* In speaking of the 1959 U.S. Exhibition at Sokolniki
[3389]ae Park, Moscow, Samu told ¢ that both the.
[3390]KGB and the GRU launched an ra effort to recruit
[3391]Americans employed at the Exhibition. All officers at GRU
[3392]Headquarters were assigned to this task, and some were used
[3393]by the KGB in an attempt to ccmpromise the Americans;
[3395]V.A. GRUSHA (identi ficd by NOSENKO as a KGB officer special-
[3396]izing in American operations of the Pirst Chief Directorate)
[3397]directed many of these KGB activities in which GRU person-
[3398]nel were involved. As a resuit of this endeavor, "more
[3399]than one American” was recruited, and Qigeyae indicated
[3400]‘that the technique of compromise-~such as “bed pictures
[3401]was employed. When questioned on this subject
[3402]Bits] Nien reported that to handle the Exhibition, the
[3403]cpsu Centra! Comnittee issued a special directive to form
[3405]a committee headed by the KGB (GRUSHA was: in charge of cone
[3407]ue. . Saas contributed personnel. Its purposes were two-
[3408]’ : fold: protective, that is, to prevent propaganda, to dis-
[3410]rupt presentations, and’ to conduct - ‘counterintelligence .
[3412]and to coat.
[3414]3
[3415]sevens mete
[3417]S
[3418]z
[3419]7
[3420]i:
[3421]“4
[3422]i
[3423]i
[3425]: 2
[3426]4
[3427]4 4
[3428]i 4
[3431]j
[3432]; 4
[3433]i A.
[3435]j
[3437]H
[3439]14-0000 7 Wt toa +3
[3441]-S. She FRIPPEL Case (1939-196 3}
[3442]weeny As a member of the Tourist Department, NOSENKO in 1959
[3443]rpersonally took part in the veeruitment of the Averican Express
[3444]“Company representative in Moscow, Arsene FRIPPEL, fe continued
[3446]to be one of this agenc's two KGB handlers after trunsferring
[3447]to the American Department in 1960, and FRIPPEL was asked to
[3448](report on the U.S. Embassy as well as on two- Embassy offvcials
[3449]in particular. FRIPPEL left the Moscow job in i961 but returned
[3450]“on trips to the USSR in 1262 and 1963, when NOSENEO met him.
[3451]|The caly recruited American WHOA WOSEUES avey handled as_
[3453]EhLS,
[3455]Rts
[3456]q 1nE accounts 4.
[3457]; PEEL Glifer in several de- +
[3458]teils, but both agree that FIPPEL provided the KGB with no i
[3459]significant information, ‘hese two versiens are presented sepa-
[3460]rately helow. oa . ; L.
[3462]bila cnacadttlel .
[3464]i
[3466]4, NOSENKO's Informatica
[3468]NOSENKO first mentioned FRIVPEL luring the third meeting
[3469]in Geneva in 1€62 while cascussing KGB successes in tioscow: }
[3470]"There was another ayent {KGh crypconym] ‘ARTUR.’ He was not
[3471]a correspondent, ie knew me as George, Yuriy Ivanovich, and
[3472]my last name as NIOLAYEV, He was a permanent representative,
[3473]not in the Fmbassy, but cf the Anerican Ixpross Company in Mos-
[3474]cow. PRIPPEL. Arthur FRIPPRL. But he also has the eryptonyn
[3475]‘ARTUR.' He liked drinking, always drank. He was also strongly
[3476]attracted to women, I provided him with veantiful women... Well,
[3477]we decided to have a taix with him. Why? ‘hat could he give? .
[3478]He new works in the American Express Company {main office in
[3479]New York City]. A new department has now “sen oryaniczed for
[3480]the Soviet Union and the Pecp@s' Nemoeruicies. And he is chief
[3481]of the Gepartment... He is no lorgeor in Mcscow, but he was here
[3482]two and a half or three years. We hepe that he will return.
[3483]We are waiting for him to come hack. ‘We know that the company
[3484]wants to send him‘again, because he knows the Russian language
[3485]very well. He is, in fact, an emigre, this PRIPPEL. And he
[3486]also did a gcod and intelligent job of establishing relations
[3487]with Inturist. Ne had very good relationships with ANKULINOV,
[3488]the Chairman of Inturist, and with other people, hoth the chiefs
[3489]and the low-level workers... But, why was FRIPPEL recruited?
[3491].I was interested in knowing precisely Ly whem, by name, and how
[3492]approaches were being made to our deleyations (in the United
[3493]States], i.e., I was interested in him from the point of view.
[3495]'of counterintelligence, not intelligence. What kinds of
[3496]approaches are taking place to cur people in America and by
[3497]whom? This is what interested us. But he didn't know anything.
[3499]“ He’ couldn't say anything. He provided only superficial infor-
[3500]: mation, nothing more."
[3504]ne
[3506]4
[3507]4
[3510]~ NOSENKO was then asked whether FRIPPEL would not have been
[3511]useful for coverage ,of. Americans visiting the Soviet Union.
[3512]He replied that the KGB had already had great success in this
[3513]by other means and launched into 2 long description of the .
[3514]methods of covering foreign tourists in the USSR.” |;
[3516]-": ‘. NOSENKO was present in the adjoining room when FRIPPEL was
[3517]. Compromised by a Soviet female agent, Klara Konstantinoyna — oo
[3518]_GORBACHEVA. NOSENKO described the compromising scene in detail.
[3519]‘as well as the attempt by.a KGB technician to take motion pic-
[3520]: tures of these activities through a two-way mirror, and the
[3521]“confrontation with the militiamen who broke into the room.
[3523]idee oe
[3525]TOP SECRET
[3527]ayenite We MN
[3530]¥ See Part V.E.3. regarding NOSENKO's duties in. the U.S.
[3532]Embassy Section.
[3534]After returning to Geneva in 1964 and during subsequent’
[3536]debriefings and interrogations, NOSENKO made the following
[3537]' additional statements concerning the FRIPPEL case: De
[3539]~ Although he had personally recruited FRIPPEL, he
[3540]did not do so'#lone; Col, V.0. CHELNOKOV, Deputy Chief
[3541](and later Chief) of the Tourist Department, was present;
[3542]he and NCSENKO "carried out the recruitment together” in
[3543]early September':1959. NOSENKO was, hcewever, FRIPPEL's
[3544]case officer. -* ; :
[3546]: - NOSENKO attricuted his involvement. in the FRIPPEL
[3547]recruitment to the following: "In 1952, after 1958,
[3548]when I became the Deputy Chief of the section, my area.
[3549]of activity was narrowed down, I didn't handle all the
[3550]tourists at that time. I worked as the Deputy Chief of
[3551]the section and 1 had my own little area--for example, the
[3552]permanent representative of the American Express Company,
[3553]and besides that I kegan to collect all the material on
[3554]all American tourist firms which have anything to do with
[3555]Inturist and who send tourists to the USSR."
[3557]- FRIPPZL never provided any information of value to
[3558]Soviet tourist operations.
[3560]- When NOSENKO began to work in the U.S. Embassy
[3561]Section of the American Department in 1460, he took FRIPPEL
[3562]with him because FRIPPEL was acquainted with some Ameri-
[3563]cans at the Embassy. NOSENKO was asked to question FRIPPEL
[3564]about the U.S. Embassy and such Embassy officers as George
[3565]WINTERS and Lewis W. BOWDEN, but FRIPPEL never told NOSENKO
[3566]anything along this line.*
[3568]~- FRIPPEL provided no interesting information during
[3569]NOSENKO's two meetingd with him in 1962 and 1963, when
[3570]FRIPPEL returned to the Soviet Union as a tour guide.
[3572]- NOSENKO met “pretty steadily“ with FRIPPEL during
[3573]the period to January 1961, and once NOSENKO and his wife,
[3574]in company with CHELNOKOV and his wife, had diriner at
[3575]FRIPPEL’s home, where they met Mrs. FRIPPEL. Odette
[3576]FRIPPEL was unaware of her husband's status as a KGB agent,
[3577]and therefore NOSENKO and CHELNOKOV used Inturist cover
[3578]for their acquaintance with FRIPPEL. Although unusual for
[3579]KGB Second Chief Directorate case officers to visit agents
[3580]in their homes with wives present, NOSENKO explained that
[3581]he went because he "was invited," and CHELNOKOV went "be-
[3582]cause he was also involved in the recruitment.”
[3584]- First as Deputy Chief of a section of the Tourist
[3585]Department and later as Deputy Chief and Acting Chief of
[3586]the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department,
[3587]NOSENKO continued to meet with FRIPPEL in Moscow hotels
[3588]and restaurants. Throughout this period, he was almost’.
[3589]invariably accompanied by CHELNOKOV: “Perhaps one time
[3590]I met with FRIPPEL alone, otherwise it was always with
[3592]roe
[3596]vewtinmintlenata be iettlbalieckse taal Ebi
[3600]hd Sues.
[3602]131. .
[3604]‘ CHELNOKOV." Usually NOSENKO would arrange these meetings
[3606]with FRIPPEL at CHELNOXOV's request and the two continued
[3608]to meet with FRIPPEL, despite his lack of production, be-
[3610]cause they “kept hoping he would give something.” Ina
[3611]different context, but speaking of CHELNOKOV, NOSENKO ex-
[3612]plained: “You see, never-mind if you are a chief ora
[3613]deputy chief of a department, you must have one, two, or
[3614]three agents. GRIBANOV insists, so that you don't forget
[3615]how to work. The Chiefs of the [Second Chief] Director-
[3617]ate do not cemand that they have 12 or 13 agents, but they |
[3619]must -have two or three. They will have important agents
[3620]or those in leading positicns." ; :
[3622]- NOSENKO continued to act as FRISPEL's case officer
[3623]after FRIPPEL had left the Soviet Union and NOSENXO had
[3624]been transferred and promoted to the position of Deputy
[3625]Chief of the Tourist Department. He met twice with FRIP-
[3626]PEL during this latter period when FRIPPEL visited the ~
[3627]Soviet Union as a guide with groups of foréign visitors.
[3629]Both of these meétings were handled by NOSENKO alone, with-
[3631]out CHELNOKOV.
[3633]~- The first meeting took place in the summer of 1962,
[3634]after NOSENKO had returned to Moscow from Geneva. FRIPPEL
[3635]had arrived in the Soviet Union as a guide for some Ameri-
[3636]can journalists. (NOSENKO was unable to give the compo- ©
[3637]sition of the journalist group or to recall where they
[3638]Stayed in Moscow and where else they ‘travelled in the Sov-
[3639]jet Union.) NOSENKO contacted him in Moscow to learn what
[3640]questions the newsmen intended to ask KHRUSHCHEV during
[3641]a scheduled interview; subsequently NOSENKO acknowledged
[3642]that standard practice required visiting journalists to
[3643]submit their intended questions for KHRUSHCHEV in writing
[3644]to Soviet authorities prior to interviews. After the
[3645]interview, he recontacted FRIPPEL to learn the reaction.
[3646]of the journalists to their talk with the Soviet leader.
[3647]NOSENKO could not recall their specific reaction to the
[3648]KHRUSHCHEV interview but did remember that they were
[3649]“satisfied." Another reason for contacting FRIPPEL,
[3650]NOSENKO added in a later discussion, was to learn whether
[3651]any of the journalists might hve joined the group at the
[3652]last moment in the United States, which might suggest
[3653]intelligence connections on their part.*
[3655]~ NOSENKO met. FRIPPEL alone for the second and last
[3656]time during March 1963. Since FRIPPEL was a guide for
[3657]tourists aboard the ship "Olympia," which stopped for a
[3658]day in Yalta and Odessa, NOSENKO flew to Odessa from Mos-
[3659]cow and accosted FRIPPEL in the lobby of the hotel where
[3660]the tourists were having dinner. Finally able to get away
[3662].
[3664]* NOSENKO had Garlier said on-several occasions that one of
[3665]the things KGB sources in foreign tourist companies abroad .
[3666]were instructed to report to the KGB was any last-minute
[3668]additions to a tour group to the USSR; this might signify
[3670]intelligence affiliation. . . oo
[3672]AGP Seogey
[3674]=)
[3675]amd eiseandii, coal
[3677]4
[3678]4
[3680]q
[3681]i
[3682]4
[3684]manent cots
[3689]o.
[3691]from his group, FRIPPEL called on NOSENKO in the latter's °
[3692]hotel room, and the two drank and talked,  NOSENKO had. .
[3693]given FRIPPEL a bottle of vocka as a gift, and FRIPPEL
[3694]Baid he wanted to give NOSENKO some whiskey in return.:
[3695]They drove in NOSENKO's car to the port, where NOSENKO
[3696]waited in the car while FRIPPEI. went aboard for the
[3697]whiskey. (He had invited NOSENKO to visit the ship but
[3698]could not obtain a pass for hin.) When FRIPPEL returned.
[3699]he brought another American, so NUSENKO had to invent for
[3700]himself a sutitable cover (Inturist) on the spot. ‘The three
[3701]returned tc the hctel and crank some more, everyone getting
[3702]drunk. During this contact, FRIPPEL reperted "nothing of
[3703]importance," and his most interesting news was that he
[3704]might again ve raassigned to Moscow in Decerber 1963 as
[3706]the Americen Express Company representative. *
[3708]sannerbiatitle a
[3710]- On 3 February 1964, wnile reviewing the CHEREPANOV
[3711]papers** in Geneva, NOSENKG wis asked about the following
[3712]pasgage which appearad in tie *GB operational plan against :
[3713]BoybEN, dated Tcebruary 1965 end signed by V.A. KUSKOV cf :
[3714]the.U.S5. Embassy Section: “He (DOWDEN) shewed himself
[3715]to be an indisecreet person... Ircnically, cne uay as
[3716]though by chance, he :} blurce:} out to our agent ;
[3717]SHMEPOVA {the fact of} ercpis" affiliation with Ameri- . 5
[3718]can Intelligence." *** IKO confirmed that the "ARTUR" .
[3719]ef the Cu NOV papers Was PRIPPEL, but he said he }s \
[3720]“gould not say" whether ¥F?PPEL had any affiliation with , er
[3721]American Intelligence. ; : 4
[3725]: 1
[3726]w-XIGSENRO said he later read a report that FRIPPEL had been i j
[3727]reassigned, and it was therefore unlikely that his agent t 3
[3728]would return to Moscow; this report was submitted by ~ | 4
[3730]V.V. KOSTYRYA (alias VLADIMIROV), a member of the KGB Legal i 4
[3731]Residency and overtly an Inturist cmployve in New York City, i i
[3733]' wlio was a former Second Chief Uirectorate colleague of
[3734], NOSENKO.
[3736]** The CHEREPANOV Papers are discussed in detail in Part
[3737]VI.D.7.c. a,
[3739]*#** There is no other report of BOWDEN making such a remark
[3740]and no basis for it. Although never contacted by or
[3741]associated with CIA in any way, FRIPPEL during 1960 was
[3742]under consideration for operational use in Moseéw, and
[3744]_in this ccanection backargund inguiries about him were
[3745]: submitted to t2,FRi. ‘hs OSTEAUP ieee ce eine
[3746]+= ne)
[3750]While in the Soviet Union in August 1962 and shortly be-
[3751]E — fore his recruitment on homosexual grounds {see Part
[3752]a - -¥¥.p.2.), the American Spencer ROBERTS was approached on
[3753]the beach at Sochi by a young Soviet male. ROBERTS and A
[3754]the Soviet, who spoke French, svon became friends, and ;
[3755]. the Soviet told ROBERTS that he had been used as an agent
[3756]: in several cperations against French-speaking foreigners
[3757]- §n the USSR. One of these was FRIPPEL, the Soviet said,
[3758]adding that FRIPPEL was suspected by the KGB of being an
[3759]American Intelligence agent. NOSENKO, who has provided
[3760]‘much detail on the ROBERTS case, did not. mention the .
[3761]- gnidentified Soviet in this context or while discussing
[3762]' PRIPPEL. -— : Lo: oo. woe, oo.
[3764]mimeceib dpe tain sini Serene Hs a
[3766]Save we)
[3767]Wuu ane
[3769]2 AUP bein te rcatenbi’
[3771]setae a! Bestia des
[3775]Spel cea,
[3777]en ann nents ae
[3779]¥— Gee Yart ilz.- ‘s emphatic refusal boos
[3780]during the meetings to have a racks with cia in-
[3781]sice the Soviet Union. During the Ccteher 1966 incerrcaations,
[3782]NGSENKO said that in 1°62 he had “absolutely no icea® concern--
[3783]..-. dmg the possibility of ClA.using PRIPPE!L.as.an intermediary
[3784]for contact inside the Soviet Union, 7 . ou. .
[3790]tioned on the
[3792]#e In February
[3793]_ Depar tines ia
[3794]PEL applied: for a new
[3795]to cepart the united $
[3796]-'POlympia® fora ernis
[3798]toox place. , my
[3799]Novewker 1961 FRIF+ a ;
[3800]that ne intended -" -
[3801]iZ-aboar? the -
[3802]Sovres Union. é
[3811]x
[3813]at
[3815]ROSENKO said it was “impossible” that he should have to
[3816]request permission to board the vessel.
[3818]In February 1965, KOSENKXO did not recall having told FRIP-
[3819]PEL these details of his life and said that, if he had done
[3820]so, it was while he was drunk, ”: :
[3824]i
[3825]t
[3826]j
[3827]J
[3829]ee tnt tit kage let Manat
[3833]j
[3834]r.
[3836]i
[3838]4
[3840]6. Lee Harvey OSWALD (1959-60 and 1963).
[3842]As in the FRIPPEL case, NOSENKO was:.involved with Lee
[3843]Harvey OSWALD during both periods of his ‘assignment to the
[3844]Tourist Department of the Second Chief Directorate (1955-
[3846]1960 and 1962-1964).* While Deputy Chier Of the American-
[3847]British-Canadian Tourist Section, NOSENKO had a direct hind
[3849]in the decision in October 1959 that USWALD was of no oper-
[3850]ational interest to the KGB And should be returned immediately
[3851]to the United States. Before President Kennedy's assassi- .
[3852]nation in November 1963, when NOSENKO was again in the .
[3853]Tourist Department as its Doputy. Chief, he was present. at the
[3854]time the KGB Second Chief Virectorate iearned of OSWALD's -
[3855]application to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City to re-enter
[3856]the USSR. After the assassination, he also played a role in
[3857]the KGB investigations of OSWALD's activities during residence
[3858]in the Soviet Union from October 1959 untii June 1902.
[3860]Collateral information relating to OSWALD's stay in the
[3861]Soviet Union, and particularly concerning any connections he
[3862]may have had with Soviet intelligence, is meager and indirect.
[3863]It derives almost entirely from indications cf primary
[3864]interest by the KGB (among all Soviet Government organs) in
[3865]every defector to the USSR, aad from infererces which may be
[3866]drawn from certain entries in OSWALD's "Historical Diary" and
[3867]certain statements made by his wife, Marina, during inter-
[3868]views on behalf of the Warren Commission. After President
[3869]Kennedy's death, the Soviet Government provided the United
[3870]States with official documents and letters pertaining to
[3871]OSWALD's defection to the USSR, his suicide attempt, his
[3872]marriage, and other events inside the Soviet Union. This
[3873]information from the Soviet Government generally agrees with
[3874]the information from NOSENKO. The materials furnished by
[3876]the Soviet Government make no mention o* any Soviet Inte)-
[3878]ligence interest, or lack thereof, in OSWALD.
[3880]In this sense NOSENKO's information is unique: It was
[3881]and remains the only such information available on the 32
[3882]months of OSWALD's life in the USSR.** NOSENKO's access to
[3884]W—¥or continuity of presentation, botn periods Of NUSENKO's
[3885]alleged involvement, 1959-1960 and 1963, are discussed in
[3886]this part of the paper, :
[3888].-**® Independent sources, however, reported on visits by OSWALD
[3890]to tne Soviet and Cuban Embassies in Mexico City between 29
[3891]September and 5 October 1963 and on his (apparently overt) con-
[3893].\ tact with a KGB officer under Consular cover at the Soviet =.
[3894]- Embassy there. NOSENKO originally said he knew nothing of any
[3895]. guch contact. In October 1966 he revised this to say that
[3897]OSWALD did not have contact with the KGB in Mexico City, NOSENKO
[3898]explained that he had been sitting in the office of Tourist De-
[3899]partment Chief, K.N. DUBAS, when a cable arrived at Moscew Head-
[3900]quarters from the KGB legal. Residency in Mexico. The cable,
[3902]. which NOSENKO said he did not personally see, reported that
[3904]OSWALD had visited the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. requesting
[3905]permission to return to the USSR and that he had dealt with — .
[3907]'. Soviet Foreign Ministry personnel only. ;
[3910]eke
[3912]Re ele
[3914]cncandichatwalf adel’ ina. Sui
[3916]teeta tald ean oc etal wad che we
[3918]aed thine dolla cate Ci ata a.
[3923]information on £CB involvement with
[3924]tine of OSVALD's request to sin i
[3925]-clusively from the claimed fect that he, NOSENAG, +
[3926]Chief cf the KGB Section” dealing with Agircican te
[3927]at thet tice. [le scid he kne. cf later developrents
[3928]of his position as Renucy Chief of the Touris: users
[3930]Crom wid- 1902 until bed. The ceatral chem ak Nest!
[3931]formation, os given to CiA avd the FSI, is ria: tne
[3932]determined ag varly cs 16 Gctoser 1555, when OSUALS
[3933]first declatation cf inteuc to nan the USSR,
[3935]wes “not nortal™ and there: tyvashed its hands™ ov
[3937]ives xe
[3938]18 Deputy
[3940]catirely. Accofelng x , owe had no epeveti
[3942]debrief him during spent ‘ALCON
[3944]or during his trip erely tre kilicag
[3946]President,
[3951]ow od Lathe Mer stnad Natalie ,
[3953]y wi ALPES
[3956]American Embassy cn
[3957]hospital, Fren his
[3958]received permission
[3960]cle Ratti
[3962]preven \ erin)
[3964]ship at.the
[3965]. loaving the
[3966]on concluded he
[3967]i onva years
[3968]the tine
[3970]ta renounce his U.
[3971]31 Octcber,
[3973]de in -thersce
[3974]ny i18a%,.
[3976]to-year basis about =
[3978]he tioved to. Minsk.”
[3980]Bn ghee ethene
[3992]a
[3993]3
[3995]TNCCOERNO Tater toa Cin on one Goeasien That P
[3997]skimmed the file’ and on another that he had it in his pos- “5
[3999]sessicn about 20 minutes. in October i296 he again said that
[4001]he read the file and that while doing so hw saw = picture cf
[4003]. OSWALD for the first time, ‘NOSENKC. added that. he. pever met
[4005]2 . + .., OSWALD personally. : :
[4006]ro. y 8 In October lyod (NG
[4008]SEXKO said he leained ‘that Si:
[4010]a poor shat from Vo V.KRIVOSHEY, a fellow KGB officer who had ¥
[4011]beentold this while visiting Minsa. : . x
[4012]Led
[4015]gaan ER I EES
[4017]wnoibabibtt
[4019]one etn
[4020]ohana Cied wars Sram,
[4022]b, Statements to CIA
[4024]On the basis cf the FBI interviews of NOSENKO and the
[4025]similar information which he had previously provided CIA,
[4026]further debricfings were conducted by CIA on 3 and 2?. July
[4028]7964, New and explanatory infcrmation received during these
[4029]debriefings is presented below. :
[4031]ee BRAT alee
[4033]i
[4035](i) KGB Interest_in OSWALD _ |
[4036]Until CSWALD mentioned to the Inturist guide his desire
[4038]to remain in the Sovict Union, he WES treated routinely by . |
[4039]the KCB, When OSWALD mice his request, this was reported
[4040]imaediately to the Tourist Department, and it was from this
[4041]moment that the KGB began to pay attenticn to hin, Ail
[4042]available materials on him were thereupon collected and
[4043]examined--the visa application, Inturist reports, interpreters' |
[4044]reports, reports fro: hotel agents, and the results of e
[4045]check of KGB Archives. KRUPNOV interviewed the interpreter
[4046]to whom OSWALD had stated his desire. Although the KGB con-
[4047]sidered it possible that OSWALD might be an American agent,
[4048]the KGB did nothing to investigate this possibility as "this
[4049]would be done after the person is allowed to stay in the
[4051]" Soviet Union." Surveillance of OSWALV was not increased
[4052]after his request, and OSWALD was not interviewed by the
[4053]KGB in an attempt to establish his intentions. There was
[4054]no attempt to debrief OSWALD because “he was not an inter-
[4055]esting person and-wasn't normal," OSWALD wa's never questioned *
[4056]on his past nor asked to write an autobiography.** From the
[4058]- +. ... ROSEN provided details on this point «0 CIA (see Delow) and
[4059]made a similar statement when asked in 1964 why KGB agent .
[4060]Tamara KUNGAROVA had been permitted to marry an American (her own
[4061]developmental target) and then emigrate to England; See Part V.D.5.
[4062]®*& When he appeared at the U.S. Labassy to renounce his citizens.
[4063]ship on 31 October 1959, OSWALD told the counsellor officer that
[4064]he had been a radar operator in the Marine Corps and had told a
[4065]Soviet official that he would give the Soviets any information
[4066]concerning the.-Merines and radar which he possessed. :
[4068]Ce gi gman te
[4070]ps .
[4072]*” materials and reports. immediately available it was decided — -
[4074]. \Jeave the USSR when ais visa expired, . OSWALD's suicide
[4076]‘interest or contact with. OSWALD after the initial assess-
[4078]_important, The KGB never considered recruiting her as an
[4080]“ would probably
[4082]“(iii) OSWALD's Marriage and Departure from the USSR
[4084]_ OSWALD as fear of becoming involved with an unstable -per--
[4085]son. ; a : Oo
[4087]that something wes not’ quite normal about OSWALD, and the.
[4088]KGB therefore had Inturist tell him that he would have to
[4090]attempt supported the Tourist Department's feelirg that ;
[4091]it had been right in deciding to refuse OSWALD's request =‘ oo r
[4092]for citizenship, particularly as the hospital also re- oe .
[4094]ported that he was not normal, and the Tourist Department = — . . |.
[4095]decided: “We will do nothing; we don't want to know hin."
[4097]Inturist was subsequently told: "'There is no KGB interest
[4099]in him. Do what you want'... The KGB thought that he was
[4101]of no interest for the country or for the KGB, that he was.
[4103]not normal, and that he should leave the country." The
[4105]Tourist Department and the KGB in general thereupon "washed
[4107]their hands" of this matter, ‘
[4110]i
[4111]me
[4112]Pi
[4113]2
[4115]there anything in OSWALD's file to indicate that the KGB
[4116]attempted to debrief him on his past service in the U.S.
[4117]Marine Corps or other matters; this was because "he is a
[4118]very little person and also it is felt that he is not nor-
[4119]mal, so the KGB is afraid to do this with him."* The GRU ;
[4121]was not informed of OSNALD's defection, Neither was any
[4122]attempt made to exploit OSWALD for propaganda purposes
[4124]in Moscow or in Minsk. In short, there was no intelligence
[4126]at tars alasnidas
[4128]AQ
[4129]i
[4130]There was never any operational use of OSWALD nor was . oS |
[4132]einen seal Spat ote
[4134]ment of abnormality.
[4136]poorenerne
[4138](ii) KGB Interest in Marina OSWALD : a
[4140]The XGB had no knowledge or interest in Marina (nee
[4141]PRUSAKOVA) until she and OSWALD applied for permission to
[4142]register marriage, In fact the KGB did not know that she
[4143]was a friend of OSWALD until this point, for there was no
[4144]surveillance on OSWALD to show that he knew her. When the
[4145]KGB learned of their relationship, checks were made of the
[4146]Archives of the Minsk KGB as well as neighborhood checks and
[4147]checks at her place of employment. The people where she
[4148]lived and worked and went to school considered her a simple
[4149]girl, not very clever, only fair in her studies, not an active
[4150]member of the KOMSOMOL. She was a simple "philistine,” an
[4151]uncultured girl more interested in gossip than in anything
[4153]siete aie wick cew Kot
[4156]eR NORE stent renmtrinyrmine na =
[4157]na SEBS
[4159]informant on. OSWALD "because it was considered dangerous to
[4161]recruit a wife to report on her husband." Nor was it con-
[4163]sidered to recruit her for use after she arrived in the
[4165]United States, "because she would tell him and also. she ,
[4166]tell the Americans, based on the assessment :
[4168]of the type of person she was." “bo po
[4170]2 SBR ee ae, oy
[4172]i
[4174]; NOSENKO was asked why there were so few difficulties
[4175]in the way of Marina's marriage to a foreigner and her
[4176]departure from the Soviet Union. lie replied: “"The Soviet
[4177]law allows any Soviet citizen to marry a foreigner, It was
[4179]W-NOSENKO subsequently defined this KUb reservation about od
[4181]wee ty
[4183]kk te
[4188]asy” n this case because OSWALD was already living and. -
[4189]working in the Soviet Union. It would be sore difficult,
[4190]of course, with tourists or others who are in. the Soviet
[4191]‘Union only for a short period and Want: to. marry Soviet.
[4192]. Citizens."* | Asked whether it. is not. unususliy difficult
[4193]| for Soviet citizens to leave the Soviet Union, NOSENKO
[4194]- explained: "In this. case it was easier becausé Marina
[4195]- Was already married to a foréignéer."”. NOSENKO was fext :
[4196]asked what: Office or level of the Government or Party’ . >
[4197]“must make the final decision regarding Marina's marriage ;
[4198]to OSKALD. He described the procedure -a$ follows: "They
[4199]would come to the Regional Registration Office to apply
[4200]to register their marriage, [There] they will be told
[4201]that they will have to wait a week or two while they think
[4202]it over to be sure they want to get marriec, During this
[4203]period the necessary checks are conducted, The Regional -: i
[4204]Office would call the Militia, and the Militia would call
[4205]the Minsk KGB, The Minsk KGB said that it is all Tight
[4206]for them to get married--that the KGB has no objection,
[4207]But it is the law that allows them to be married. There
[4208]are no formal approvals necessary," ,
[4210]wo Tai SS fa
[4214]Wabi. ban evetileaibice
[4216]Concerning the decision to permit the ccuple to leave
[4217]the USSR, NOSENKO said on 3 July 1964 that the decision
[4218]would be made cn the local level, in Minsk, and that there i
[4219]is no need to check in Moscow. On 27 July 1964 he corrected
[4220]this statement to say that, while local authorities make :
[4221]the decision, it must be approved in Noscow by, he thought, :
[4222]the Ministry for the Preservation of Public Order (MOOP), i
[4224](iv) OSWALD's Visit to Soviet Enbassy in Mexice
[4226]Asked whether he had any information oa OSWALD's. visit
[4227]to *:xico in September 1963, NOSENKO said that he knew oncy
[4228]that OSWALD had applied at the Soviet Embassy there to come |
[4229]to the Soviet Union. The Mexico €ity Legal Residency of the
[4230]KGB reported his visit to Headquarters by cable, requesting
[4231]inforr:*ion; this was the first that the KGS First Chief
[4232]Directorate had heard of CSWALD. M.1, TURALIN, Deputy Chief
[4233]of Service Number Two (KGB counterintelligence abroad),
[4234]thereupon phoned V.K, ALEKSEYEV, Chief of the Sixth Section
[4235]of the Tourist Department, whom TURALIN knew personally, to
[4236]‘learn whether any information was available. NOSENKO believed
[4237]that ALEKSEYEV then came to V.D. CHELNOKOV or A,G. KOVALENKO
[4238]-to. ask about OSWALD, and NOSENKO thought that he himself was
[4239]prescnt at the time, ALEKSEYEV was given the background on
[4241]‘ OSWALD, including his suicide attempt and the fact that he
[4242] W@S not considered normal, and was told to advise the First —_
[4244]Chief Directorate that OSWALD should not be permitted to re-
[4245]enter the Soviet Union, ALEKSEYEV then telephoned TURALIN
[4246]to relay this message, NOSENKO did not know to whom OSWALD
[4247]had spoken at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico.City, and he knew
[4249]By the time OSWALD applied for permission to marry, he had
[4251]already written the American Embassy. in Moscow, through Soviet
[4253]mails, of his desire to return to the United. States. The letter, |
[4255]- dated 5 February 1961, was mailed’ from Minsk’ aad was received by —
[4256]the Embassy in Moscow on 13 February, The OSWALDs - were
[4258]Married on 30 April 1961. .~ BR ot aye,
[4262]valesanlioe witch
[4265]tatives
[4267]o-contacts“between OSWALD: and “Cubans” or” represen
[4268]of the Cuban Governzent there or elsewheres =
[4270](v) NOSENKO's Comments on Possible KGB Involverent in the |
[4271]| Assassinztion ; j ; j Loe
[4272]When first discussing the OSWALD case with NOSENKO on 23
[4274]January 1964, a CIA case officer commented: “It isa very un-
[4276]fortunate thing that these prior events occurred in the Soviet
[4277]Union," (NOSENKO apparently. misunderstood the case officer's
[4278]intent, which was not to imply that the KGB was behind the
[4279]assassination, dy that tho fact of OSWALD's "defection"
[4280]Placed the USSR under probably tunround dc suspicion.) NOSENKO's
[4281]inmediate response to this remark was: "That is not correct,
[4282]This is putting a false color to it, I am your friend, I am
[4283]completely with you, and I will continue to work with you and :
[4284]agzcinst the Soviet Union in all respects. But the truth %
[4285]Should always remain the truth. No matter how I may hate: ,
[4286]anyone, I cannot speak against my convictions, and since I
[4288]know this case I could unhesitantly sign off to the fact that _ :
[4289]the Soviet Union cannot be tied into this in any way, I say ¢
[4291]this because I know they were frightened of this man [OSWALD]
[4293]and that everything should havé bzen said to him or that he
[4295]should have been in any way worked on, in any was. [by the KGB}
[4297]-eGod forbid!... I know this because I sat on this matter for
[4299]several days after the tragic matter occurred to the President,
[4300]_To_investigate in detail if anything had been done, particularly
[4302]by the local authorities, that is, by the local KGB in .
[4303]Belorussia..., I had to make a complete investigation and . :|
[4304]even sent several workers down there to investigate--not : i
[4305]trusting official papers. Even without specific orders 1 had ‘
[4306]to make a complete investigation on my end of things because oF
[4308]this is a serious matter when the head of a government is. :
[4309]assassinated.., If you want to know, it would be a greater — :
[4310]advantage to the Soviet Union if the President were still.
[4311]Kennedy because he was a personage who was a realist and looked
[4312]at many things in the eye boldly... In the history of any
[4313]intelligence service there have been assassinations of one
[4314]-kind or another. I can say this: That in our organization,
[4315]not even speaking of myself, many persons were shocked by
[4317]the assassination--to think that this should happen in the
[4318]twentieth century and in, of all places, the most powerful
[4319]government in the world,” ,
[4321]2
[4323]wtedinse th ey
[4327]seveniademnbcar nen et SET BRL el.
[4329]Detaled ih cre rnind mn tetoee we
[4331]i
[4332]I
[4335]_which had theretofore concerned itself with operational. activity .
[4337]a. _ Information from NOSENKO _ ,
[4339]‘In June 1958 there was a reorganization within’ the. Tourist
[4340]Department of the Second Chief Directorate. The Second Section,
[4342]‘against foreign tourists from ail countries, was broken down into
[4344]separate sections; one section.dealt with tourists from the United.
[4346]States, Canada, and Great Britain, the other with tourists from
[4348]Europe, Latin America, and all other countries, NOSENKO said ; pol:
[4350]that he was promoted at this time to the position of Deputy Chief a: Sars
[4352]of the first of these new sections. ; Po.
[4355]NOSEKKO's involvement in at least one major case, Lee Harvey
[4356]OSWALD, stems entirely from his having held this position. It
[4357]is also on this basis that he was able to claim awareness of all : 4
[4358]recruitments from among American tourists from mid-1958- until he
[4359]returned to the American Department at the beginning of 1960.
[4360]His knowledge about recruitments is based additionally, he said,
[4361]on the fact that some time between May and October 1959, during
[4362]the tourist season, he was ordered by Ye. S. KIRPICHNIKOV, °
[4363]GRIBANOV' 8 secretary, to gather facts for GRIBANOV concerning the
[4364]use of tourist cover by foreign intelligence organizations during
[4365]the period from 1955 through 1958, NOSENKO gathered this material
[4366]from earlier annual reports of the Tourist Department and by talk- i 5
[4367]ing | with various case officers in the department, * ; ‘ :
[4369]' On the basis of his general and supervisory experience in : :
[4370]the Tourist Department as well as his research for this paper, 3
[4371]NOSENKO had the following to say about Tourist Department opera-
[4372]tions prior to 1960 (taken from the protocol he signed on this
[4373]subject on 25 February 1965):
[4375]during this period and very little was known by the KGB
[4376]about the use of tourism by Anerican Intelligence at the
[4377]time I wrote the report in 1959. No agents were definitely
[4378]uncovered among American tourists during the years 1958 or
[4379]1959 and, until 1960, no tourists were ‘caught in the act'
[4380]of mailing letters, servicing deaddrops or contacting.
[4381]agents, except one whose name I remember as McGUIRE. I do
[4383]i
[4384]t
[4385]“Operations against tourists were developing slowly
[4386]|
[4387]i
[4389]0 doe E tS ee
[4391]Asse
[4393]®* Questioned on this paper in February 1965, NOSENKO said he
[4395]did not remember whether he discussed it with GRIBANOV, nor
[4397]_ could he recall any examples of the material he included in
[4399]it, what the paper said about -CIA tourist operations, or what
[4401]other U.S. Intelligence organizations were using tourism as
[4403]‘an operational cover in this period. He did remember,. how-
[4405]ever, that it incorporated statistical data on the growth . 4
[4406]of foreign tourism, i
[4409]not. know any details concerning the operational activity.
[4410]_,, Which led to the discovery of McGUIRE's letter mailing. *
[4412]: "I know of no case in which an American tourist was
[4413]definately uncovered as an agent of Anerican Intelligence
[4414]and thereafter approached for recruitment by the KGB during
[4415]this period. :
[4417]. "YE do not know of any such American tourists who were
[4418]CIA agents, and who were recruited by the KGB during this
[4419]period.
[4421]“In addition to McGUIRE, the Seventh Department de-
[4422]veloped suspicions concerning a number of tourists, but
[4423]didn't learn of any specific intelligence connections.
[4424]Some were taking pictures, others were disseminating
[4425]literature. Although various operational measures were
[4426]taken against them, including vyemka {covert baggage
[4427]search) end the use of KG3 agents, none of these tourists
[4428]received real operational developmenc.'
[4430]b. KGB Knowiedge from George ELAKE
[4432]During the first week of June 1959, a three-day meeting was
[4433]held in London, ingland, between representatives of CIA and the
[4434]British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS, commonly referred to as
[4435]MI-6) on the subject of ‘legai-cravel” mtelligence operations
[4436]against the USSR. At the conclusion of this meeting there was
[4437]drawn up a 19 page document summarizing what had been discussed
[4438]at the meetings. This summary spelled our CIA operational doc-
[4439]trine pertaining to tourist operazions, including agent-spotting
[4440]techniques, criteria for agent seiection. agent assessment, agent
[4441]training, and tasks to be carried out by tourist agents @auring
[4442]the coming (1959) tourist season. It stressed CIA's reliance
[4443]on tourists for the spotting, recontacting, assessing, and
[4444]communicating with clandestine assets in the Soviet Union. A
[4445]copy of the document as well, presumably,as other British docu-
[4446]ments relating to the joint meetings was given to George BLAKE,
[4447]who has admitted having made a photographic copy which he passed
[4448]to the KGB. He gave the KGB this information in the summer of
[4449]1959.
[4451]* One Robert Alan MCGUIRE, a former: staff empioyce-of CIA, .
[4452]travelled to the Soviet Union as a tourist during April and’
[4453]May 1958. Although he was debriefed on his return, he had
[4454]no connection with CIA in preparation for this trip and
[4455]mailed no letters for CIA inside the USSR, While in the
[4456]Soviet Union, McGUIRE was approached on numerous occasions
[4457]by Soviets seeking blackmarket deals. American girls, and
[4458]assistance in defecting to the Americans. While en route to
[4459]Leningrad, his brief case was overtly searched by a customs:
[4460]employee, who confiscated a Radio Liberation script. McGUIRE
[4461]reported that he was compelled to sign a document which stated
[4462]that the script had been confiscated, but the reasons for the
[4463]action were left blank. NOSENKO, who has reported none of.
[4464]these details, appears to have confused MCGUIRE with Edward
[4465]McGOWAN, a CIA agent who mailed a letter in Minsk in August
[4467]. 1958 and was detected doing so by the KGB; NOSENKO said ~~.
[4469]MCGUIRE mailed a letter in Minsk in 1959...
[4471]wd ete vot | Shad ce ite ateabaad
[4473]NTHe niet = eden ed,
[4475]eciceabeal AWS ain
[4477]i
[4479]3
[4480]j
[4483]A second joint meetin
[4484]mitted providing the KGB with a copy of the 2I-page summary of
[4485]the sessions.* St Coe le. oo
[4487]eT sH re ig
[4489]¢. GOLITSYN's Tourist Document
[4491]Khen he defected to C1A in December 1961, GOLITSYN brought
[4492]with him a top secret MGB document dealing with the use by
[4493]American Inteiligence of tourists fer espionaye inside the Sov-
[4494]det Union ana with KGS countermeasures.** This study relied
[4495]heavily upon the two dvcuments supplied to the KGB by BLAKE,
[4496]and although it purports to be a study of American tourist cpera-
[4497]tions during 1960, it cites as exampics many cascs which occurred
[4498]in earlier years. In these examples, the American agents de--
[4499]tected by the “4G are named and their coerational roles accurately
[4500]Gescribed. (AS noted above, NOSENKO gaia that McGUIRE/HcCGOWAN -
[4501]was the only American definitely Jetermined to hav2 intellicence
[4502]connections prior to 1960.) Cited belew are excerpts frem the
[4503]GOLITSYN document, along with additional information from CIA
[4504]recores and investigations. .
[4506], whe document states: "MeGCwAN, Edward, born i935, passing
[4507]himself off aS a post-graduate student vf Harvard University,
[4508]in Moscow, after a thorcugh check [for surveillance] sent an
[4509]espicnage letter containing secret writing. Further investiga-
[4510]tion of McGOWAN showed that he specialized for a long period of
[4511]time on Russian and Polish questicns at the Russian Researca
[4512]Center of Harvard University, «5 ch is a branch of CIA. Us
[4513]to the USSR at the expense of PCCKEFELLER and MORGAN, who ar
[4514]financing the so-called ‘Research! work cn Russia.”
[4516]came
[4517]e
[4519]WOTRYS Cecurred ata time that NOSUNKO claims to nave been in
[4520]the American Department. buring the 1962 meetings in Geneva,
[4521]when NOSENKO said ne was Chief of the American fourist Section,
[4523]é was aSxed about BLAME, He replies only that BLAKE had been
[4525]an agent of the British Department of the Second Chief Direc-
[4527]orate” and that he was not ncariy as valuable as the Canacian
[4529]‘bohassadocBei age” cr "the other Englishman" (VASSALL) .
[4531]t the time of mis defection, NOSENKC said he was First Deputy
[4533]Chief of the entire Tourist Department. Asked about BLAKE
[4535]after his defection, !OSUNKO replied: “Who's EPLAXE?" During
[4537]the February 1965 interrogaticns, NOSENKO was first asked
[4538]whether the KGR had received any significant information con-
[4539]cerning the use of courism as operational cover by CIA during
[4541]1260 and 1961, when he was in the jmerican Department, and
[4543]was then asked specifically whether the KGB obtained docu-
[4545]mentary information on this subject from an agent source, He
[4547]_replied "no" to both questions. .. '
[4549]** This document was transmitted from KGB Headquarters in Moscow
[4550]to the KGB Legal Residency in Helsinki on 7 April 1961. In
[4551]content it is similar to the general description of the docu-
[4553].ment which NOSENKO said he himself wrote. NOSENKO said in
[4554]1964 that he knew GOLITSYN had passed CIA this report and that
[4555]it had been written in the Tourist Department. . « .
[4557]wy on this’save subject took’ p_ace an. oo
[4560]i
[4562]1
[4568]arcane bth heli 2b Tasca
[4570]a
[4573]During his trip to the Soviet Union. in the summer..of 1958,
[4574]“MCGOWAN mailed in Minsk an operational letter containing secret
[4575]‘writing. In the CIA debriefing upon his return to’ the United...
[4576]States, McGOWAN described a number of incidents in the USSR. - On,
[4577]20 August 1958, for example, while staying at the Metropol Hotel-
[4579]in Moscow, McGOWAN met Alan BALLARD* and Gertrude. SAMUALS, fel-
[4580]low Americans, and the three of them were .phcotcyraphed by a sur-_
[4581]veillance team when leaving the hotel. Within several days of
[4583]his arrival in Moscow, McGOWAN found he wes incempatible with
[4585]his female Inturist interpreter/guide and succeeded in having
[4587]her replaced. ifig new guide was V.L. ARTEMO¥, who assured that-
[4588]McGOWAN had female companionship for the remainder of his visit. ws
[4590]The document from GOLITSYN also states: "SIMARD, Lionel, i
[4591]- born in 1939, a college instructor, expressed an abnormal inter-
[4593]est towards military literature of the USSR; ne made contact
[4595]with Soviet citizens and attempted to slip into the area of ship- ¢
[4596]building factories in Leningrad. Later it was recorded that this
[4598]*pedagogue', while in Moscow, sent espionage letters containing
[4599]secret writing, The letter contained the ccordinates of a deac-
[4600]drop for an American agent."
[4602]wo pene detndeabintisl.,
[4604]SIMARD went to the USSR as a CIA agent in August 1959, and
[4605]he believed that he was under complete KGB ceverage while there,
[4606]He was in and out of Moscow four times during his trip, and each ;
[4607]time he was assigned hotel rooms known to contain various KGB i
[4608]observation equipment. On one occasicn SIMAPD was introduced to
[4609]and went out to dinner with Svetlana K. IVANOVA, who attempted ‘ A
[4610]to cultivate him.*** The characterization of his activities in | j
[4611]the GOLITSYN cocument is correct. NOSENKO has not mentioned ! H
[4612]SIMARD. :
[4614]Meee wate bee
[4616]Another part of the document supplied by GOLITSYN says:
[4617]“An American, Whitmore GRAY, born 1932, an assistant professor
[4618]at Michigan University, sent three espionage letters containing
[4619]secret writing, wnile in Kiev. In Stalingrac he was cetained
[4620]while he was photographing a military factory."
[4622]GRAY arrived in Kiev on 3 November 1959 after having been
[4623]trained by CIA in countersurveillance and briefed on his letter-
[4624]mailing missicn and other assignments in the Soviet Union. Be-
[4625]tween midnight that night and one o'clock the next morning he mailed
[4626]four operational letters. No surveillance was noted during the
[4628]¥ NOSENKO reported on a 1959 trip to the Soviet Union by
[4630]BALLARD, but said he was not aware of earlier ones.
[4632]** This is the same ARTEMOV identified by NOSENKO as a fellow
[4633]ease officer in the U.S. Embassy Section of the American De-
[4634]partment and as the man with whom he worked on the BELITSKIY
[4635]case in Geneva in 1962. ARTEMOV appeared again in operations
[4636]against American tourists in 1959 when he was assigned as
[4637]Iinturist guide/interpreter for a group of Americans which in-
[4638]cluded a CIA officer. On one occasion, when.,.this officer re--
[4639]turned unexpectedly to his hotel from the ‘theater’ to-which
[4640]ARTEMOV had escorted him, he caught ARTEMOV searching his
[4641]hotel room. NOSENKO has not mentioned these contacts of :
[4642]ARTEMOV, which took place at the time he said he was Deputy’
[4643]Chief of the section dealing with American tourists, In «* _—
[4644]October 1966, in answer to a specific question, NOSENKO stated °
[4645]that ARTEMOV never had any connection. with the American Section
[4646]of the Tourist Department. . .
[4648]“NOSENKO has identified IVANOVA as an: -agent of the U.s.: ‘Embassy
[4649]Section of the American Department, but has not described her:
[4650]earlier activities against. tourists.
[4652]_ wae
[4655]‘he left Kiev and later in Yalta. .He. was. ‘approached on’ 17 Novem-
[4657]"group, John Milton FRANCIS, born 1934, an instructor of Russian
[4658]at a college of Yale University; when in Odessa with a group of
[4660]"ut GRAY detected surveillance daily ‘thereafter until
[4662]Kgs"
[4664]ber in Saku by an attractive woman who persistently offered her
[4665]services despite his refusal, and on.18' November by a girl in
[4666]Tbilisi who occupied'a seat next to his in a theater and made
[4667]similar overtures. ‘GRAY was’also approached by blackmarketeers
[4668]and by purportedly disaffected young men. On 13 November he
[4669]was arrested in Stalingrad while. photographing ‘industrial in-
[4670]stallations and was reieased after interrogation and~ confiscation
[4671]of his film. NOSENKO made no references to GRAY. .
[4674]The KGB document elsewhere states: "A guide of a tourist
[4676]tourists-~American students--separated himself from. the group —
[4677]and.travelled through the city alone. ina notebook which was
[4678]lost by him, notes and sketches were found which pointed to the ,
[4679]fact that he utilized his trip-for the purpose of selecting i-
[4680]suitable places for the placing cf deaddrops, or for checking ; }
[4681]those deacddrops which were earlier selected by American agents. . .
[4682]In Moscow he selected routes which were used.to check and dis- — :
[4683]discover the existence. of surveillance, utilizing passable backyards
[4685]and following skillful methods. At the present time FRANCIS is -
[4687]the chief interpreter of the State. Department, servicing Soviet .
[4688]delegations in the USA." y
[4690]i
[4691]a
[4692]A
[4693]4
[4694]3
[4695]3
[4696]4
[4697]5
[4699]FRANCIS did have such a mission in 1958 and brought back a
[4700]notebock with sketches of the sites he selected. He did not
[4701]mention losing his notebook. In 1954 and 1955 FRANCIS was in .
[4702]frequent contact with V.V. KRIVOSHEY in Berlin; KRIVOSHEY, who _ _ 4
[4703]served there until the late 1950's, has been identified as a KGB : : ,
[4704]First Chief Directorate officer who later became an officer in .
[4705]the Correspondents Department, KGB. Second Chief Directorate.* f
[4706]FRANCIS was also a student of Richard BURGI at Yale in 1956, the .f
[4707]year that NOSENKO was involved in BURGI's recruitment (see Part
[4709]Phe a ats Ho
[4711]V.D.4.b.). NOSENKO has not mentioned the FRANCIS case and did
[4712]not recognize his name.
[4714]canna helene Ubi
[4716]Besides these and other examples in the document GOLITSYN ,
[4718]gave CIA, there are indications of KGB awareness of the clandes- H
[4719]tine activities of many other CIA contacts who travelled to the i
[4720]Soviet Union as tourists during the period from 1955 to 1960. |
[4721]i
[4723]4
[4725]wee
[4727]Pessecenn bic
[4729]seine Shade
[4731]eS
[4732]i
[4734]*¥-KRIVOSHEY was a participant in the. Sgt. Robert Lee JOHNSON
[4735]case to which NOSENKO provided the, lead. (see Part VI.D.3.c.).
[4737]sae Pees Fol oe ep re
[4741]‘TDY's to London (3957 and 1953} -
[4742]NOSENKO reported that his first ocfisiaut cravel outside
[4743]‘the Scviet Union occurred in the fall of 2 ./ ‘raen ae was
[4745]selected to accompany uw group of athletes . ia nad been invited
[4747]to visit London, As he explained on & Avrit 1904, it is
[4748]necessary for a sccurity officer to accousa.y way sucn dcle-
[4750]- gation, and the Eleventh Departnent of ths Jeco.d thief birec-
[4751]torate, responsible for recruiting Secoud Chief Jirectorate
[4752]officers for this purpose, telephoned a... ..0005, Cuiel
[4753]of the Tourist Departrent, to request ai el licey who spoke
[4754]English, DUBAS asked NOSEXKO whether Ge vais te uake the
[4755]trip. NOSENKO replied: “why not? Ll have never ben abroad
[4756]yet," 0SENKO consequeniiy travelled te London, using the
[4757]alias Yuriy tvaunovich SITKOLAYEV ang posing as "Lie uevputy
[4758]chief of tie delegation, lie was speciricaliv instructed to
[4759]observe one menber of the delegation, a vonan nites HYARIMYATE,
[4760]whose father had been hitled in a Soviet prison and whose
[4761]political reliability (nas uncertain, Additionally, ie had
[4762]the general task of watching ali siembers of tue-delegaticn
[4763]for possibly suspicious contacts with foreigners. Tan dese-
[4764]gation consisted of approximately 09 persons ane te help hin
[4765]in carrying out these duties, / MY was assigned thres or
[4767]four agents and several operaticnual contacts anong the deie
[4769]gation. members, lie was the only staif security officer
[4771]making this trip.
[4773]he second trip to London tock place a year later, in
[4774]the fall of 1958, again as a security watchdog, inis time
[4775]he accompanied 2 delegation of li or 12 boxers, and again he
[4776]used the alias AIKOLAYEV and the cover position of deputy
[4777]chief of the celcgation, NOSENKU was the only sccurity oc-
[4778]ficer with the deicgaticn, and he had two agents and two
[4779]operational contacts anong the boxers. this asuignnent was
[4780]general; noocdy in particular was kept under observation,
[4781]and the KGB had no derogatory informaticn concerning any
[4782]members of tne dcicgation,
[4784]NOSENKO has associuted his use of the NIKOLAYEV alias
[4785]in London with the use of the same name with the S3ritish
[4786]subjects itis and GSB (see Part V.D.4.d.) shortly before
[4787]the first of these two trips. On 17 April 1964 NOSENKO ex-
[4788]plained this situation as follows: "With S ft
[4789]Toused the name NIKOLAYEY, Yuriy Ivanovich, a representative
[4790]of the Ministry of Culture. And then when the question was
[4791]raised of sending me in 1957 with the delegation to iingland,
[4792]I was forced to go there as NIKOLAYEVY. I was forced to,
[4793]And again under the cover of the Ministry of Culture, Be-
[4794]- Cause [of this] I went as the assistant ead of the dele-
[4796]- gation, representing the Ministry of Culture. I didn't
[4798]go under my own nanc because it was decided that when
[4800]these people eae came back to England, they
[4801]would tell who they were with [report their contacts in
[4803]the USSR}. They would probably question Oren especially
[4805]as one who usec to work in intelli igence. + aki would say:
[4806]‘There was this man from the Ministry of Culture, NIKOLAYEV..
[4807]lie was with us all the time, even went to Leningrad with
[4808]us." So they would say: 'Iicw does he look (what docs he
[4809]look like}]?' ie would say: ‘lie locked’ so-and-so." So,
[4811]a
[4813]I
[4818]vorbis ban ak he
[4820]Sepa IM ae ete SEE ETH TARR
[4822]re
[4824]Ne
[4826]a
[4833]of course,.I- would’ go.‘there the same year. I'd go.there, and. .-
[4834], they would Took at me and say: ‘Ilicw come this’ man--his name is’
[4835]‘NOSENKO, ana-yet he is very similaz.to the: one described by
[4837]‘1. That was why it was decided I have to go again’ under the nema
[4838]““NIKOLAYEV. Just.a, matter of conspiracy. Since I already becaze -
[4839]known “as NIKGLAYEV to the Eritishers, this would bs-noticeable.*
[4843]. .£
[4844]. . 5
[4847]of ccurse, I would go th
[4848]they would look at me an
[4850]ere the sane year, I'd go thera, and
[4851]this man--his name is
[4852]2 one de
[4853]ave .toO.go again uncler the none
[4854]Since I already hesare
[4855]this would te neticeable.® .
[4857]‘How come
[4858]NOSENY.O, and yet he is verv similar to th
[4859]That was why it was. decided I h
[4860]NIKCLAYEV. Just a matter of conspir
[4861]known 28 NIKOLAYCV to the British
[4863]ceseenSihgrste he dd Ai lib
[4865]pave thes HM a tft abs eat ere
[4867]ih,
[4869]the
[4872]B January 1960 to January. 1962 (american, Department)
[4873]". 1. Introduction
[4875]NCSENKO claims to have served as Deputy Chief -of the U.S.
[4876]Embassy Section of the American Department, GB Second Chief
[4877]Directorate, from sometime in January 1960 until the first days
[4878]of January 1962.* This section, in his. words, was working ~
[4880]against "the most important counterintelligence target in the
[4882]Soviet Union," the permanent Anerican representation in Moscow.
[4883]It regarded every Américan stationed there as a possible spy-
[4884]and, simultaneously, as a taraet for eventual compromise and
[4885]recruitment. —
[4887]The functions of the U.S. Embassy Section were described by
[4889]_NOSENKO as being, first, to control all contacts by Embassy per-
[4891]sonnel with Soviet citizens; second, to evaluate information
[4892]collected from all possible sources on American Embassy employees;
[4893]and third, to use this information as a basis for planning and
[4894]carrying out recruitment approaches. The Americans' personal-
[4895]ities, jobs, personal relationships, weaknesses, daily routines,
[4896]security precautions, contacts with Soviet citizens, and the
[4897]major and minor scandals ‘in their Moscow lives formed the basis
[4899]‘for this work. To gather such information, the section's officers
[4901]directed and debriefed large numbers of agents and informants,
[4902]including the indigenous employees of the Embassy, Soviet citizens
[4903]moving in Embassy social circles, and third-country nationals with
[4904]American contacts; the officers also assigned tasks to and assim-
[4905]flated the reports from the numerous surveillance teams at their
[4906]Gisposal, and they read and tried to-exploit materials from tele-
[4907]phone taps and microphones. placed in the offices and homes of
[4909]the Americans. Each officer had a limited number of American
[4911]targets and attempted to become thoroughly familiar with -achr
[4913]annually, they submitted detailed operational plans to exploit
[4915]the knowledge they had gained of their target. During 1960 and
[4916]1961, NOSENKO said, special emphasis was placed within the section
[4917]on "identifying intelligence officers at the Embassy and active
[4918]development of them, the acquisition of ciphers, and the detailed
[4919]and painstaking study of code clerks, creating the conditions on
[4920]the basis of which they can be recruited."
[4922]As Deputy Chief of this section, NOSENKO has said, he had
[4923]access to all information concerning its activities: "Nothing
[4924]was hidden" from him. On this basis, he expressed certainty
[4925]that in 1960 and 1961 the KGB did not recruit any Americans
[4926]associated with the Embassy, that no Americans assigned to the
[4927]Embassy were being handled in Moscow as KGB agents in this.
[4928]period, and that, in fact, the KGB had recruited no American
[4929]Embassy personnel since "ANDREY."** From continuing friendships
[4930]with his fellow-officers of 1960 and 1961, NOSENKO has also
[4931]claimed certainty that there were no KGB recruitments from the
[4932]time he left the section in January 1962 until the January 1964
[4933]trip to Geneva. .
[4934]* In debriefing and interrogating NOSENKO, CIA placed partic-
[4936]ular emphasis on his activities during the period January
[4938]1960 to January 1962, since this information was of ‘special
[4939]importance to U.S. Government security. :
[4941]* See Part VI.D.3.b. for a discussion of the case of the KGB |
[4942]+ agent “ANDREY" (Dayle SMITH), whose recruitment has been
[4943]variously. dated by NOSENKO between the years 949 ana 1953.
[4945]cnwetftienbt tarrione rte
[4947]a awdathe tise
[4949]eesmntah abetiiattediies
[4953]sebdatte cabbie at alesse aoe
[4957]+ es aaairig eMC tees
[4959]ete he
[4961]whawswe
[4963]4
[4966]14-0000
[4968]‘Pourist Department's American Section because (as he explained: --
[4969]ion 29 January 1965) the Tourist Department, which had earlier...
[4970]' operated against members of delegations and various other a
[4972]. RYTOVA, and the homosexuals YEFREMOV and VOLKOV, NOSENXO turned
[4974]“PIMOFEYEV. and the latter to V. D. CHELNOKOV, Deputy Chief of the”.
[4976]“to the Soviet Union in 1962 and 1963.** x
[4978]nedtIhT1S PRS" OHS FBPTSCEN-NOSENKO™US"Deputy-Chiet-Of-the
[4980]eategories of foreign visitors, was being reorganized in January,
[4981]1960 €or work against tourists alone and the Deputy Chief slot. o :
[4982]was eliminated.” With the exception of A. A. DMITRIYEV, Marina ns
[4984]over all of his agents to another officer in the section named ; a
[4985]TIMOFEYEV. NOSENKO said on 29 January 1965 that he had two. 4 Le
[4986]separate files on his agent Arsene FRIPPEL, a developmental file ee
[4987]and an operational file, and:that he turned the former over to SO
[4989]Tourist Department. During later.interrogations, however, NOSENKO
[4991]has said that he continued to handle FRIPPEL while in the U.S.
[4992]Embassy Section and was the case officer during FRIPPEL's visits
[4994]2. NOSENKO's Transfer to the U.S. Embassy Section
[4996]In December 1959, while serving as Deputy Chief of the
[4997]American-Britisn-Canadian Section of the Tourist Department,
[4998]NOSENKO learned from K. N. DUBAS, the department Chief, of plans
[4999]to transfer him to the U.S. Embassy Section as Deputy Chief.
[5000]NOSENKO said he was cpposed to the move and wanted to remain in :
[5001]the Tourist Department: "I was used to it there and wanted to i
[5002]continue, I wanted to stay in the Tourist Department. . This I
[5003]fthe transfer/ was no promotion. Here I was the Deputy Chief :
[5004]of section and would be the same there. But, of course, its more -
[5005]important there. The American Department is, of course, the most !
[5006]important. But here I was working against American tourists.
[5007]This is also important. Furthermore, I showed Znad, proven/ my-
[5008]self there in '55, ‘56, '57, '58, and '59 and was considered to
[5009]be not a bed case officer. And here, in the american Department, .
[5011]I must show /prove/ myself with new pecple." NOSENKO therefore i
[5012]asked DUBAS in December 1959 to "please fight for me to stay." f
[5013]DUBAS later told NOSENKO that he had twice spoken to Second |
[5015]i
[5017]Chief Directorate Chief O. M. GRIBANOV on his behalf, but to
[5018]no avail. In January 1960 the official orders transferring
[5019]NOSENKO were issued. .
[5023]Rise.
[5025]On the day NOSENKO reported to V. A. KLYPIN, Chief of the
[5026]American Department, to begin his new job, he was told to report
[5027]to GRIBANOV's office. To GRIBANOV NOSENKO again expressed mis-
[5028]givings about the change of assignment. GRIBANOV replied that
[5029]DUBAS had spoken to him about this but that he, GRIBANOV, “had
[5030]his own plans and that was all.” GRIBANOV told NOSENKO that
[5032]* There was no change in the functions of NOSENKO's section,
[5033]however; as before, it continued to be responsible for
[5034]operations against tourists from the United States,
[5035]England, and Canada. :
[5037]ae FRIPPEL has reported that NOSENKO: continued to meet him
[5038]until he left the Soviet Union. in January 1961 and again
[5039]when he returned as a guide to tourist groups twice in
[5040]1962 and once again in 1963; see Part V.D.5.
[5042]“he thought NOSENKO could-bring."fresh air" to the U.S. Embassy
[5044]."to operations against American code clerks, the “number one
[5046]“154.
[5048]Section's operations and that he was to pay particular attention
[5050]target."* Neither GRIBANOV nor KLYPIN told NOSEXKO why he had _
[5051]been selected for this position or who had recomnended him for
[5052]it.
[5054]NOSENKO was asked on 17 April 1964 whom he had relieved
[5055]upon reporting for duty in the U.S. Embassy Section. He replied:
[5056]"Nobody." He was then asked to identify the persons from whom
[5057]he had assumed certain of his Cuties as Deputy Cnief of the
[5058]section (these are ciscussed in detail below). “OSENKO said that
[5059]he took the responsibility for maintaining the section file on
[5060]the security of the U.S. Embassy from the Chief of the section,
[5061]V. M. KOVSHUK.** Regarding his responsibility as case officer for
[5062]the Security Officer of the Embassy, NOSENKO explained that be-
[5063]cause former Security Officer Russell LANGELLE had been declared
[5064]persona -non grata in OctoLer 1959 and because his successor John
[5065]ABIDIAN was not to arrive until Merch 1960, no ore in the section
[5066]had this responsibility wher he, NOSENKO, arrived in January . i
[5067]1960. Asked who had been LAYGELLE's case officer, NOSENKO re- . x
[5068]plied: “LANGELLE was handled by seversl people - by /A.S./ MALYU- a
[5069]GIN, then after that by /V.A./ KUSKOV, then by KOVSHUK, then
[5071]bay
[5073]seen ib ia cats deans A:
[5075]pete hae Lee
[5077]* In late December 1961, GOLITSYN also commented on this subject
[5078]to his CIA handling officer: "The task of strengthening of
[5079]wor: against the Americans has been a standing requirement, a
[5080]both in the past and most particularly at this time. This CC
[5081]work was particularly intensified after the appointment of
[5082]SHELEPIN to the KGB... In 1960, it was cecommended in the
[5083]KGB to intensify the work acainst the Americans at the U.S.
[5084]Embassy in Moscow, and against American colonies in other
[5085]countries... This question of intensifying work against the
[5086]Americans was up before the Collegium of the KGB, Thereafter,
[5087]there was a directive from SHELEPIN regarding the intensifi-
[5088]cation of work against the American cipher-clerks.”
[5090]atta dts MUR, alle cate a
[5092]|
[5094]**There is an apparent contradiction between NOSENKO's desig-
[5096]nation of KOVSHUK 25 Chief ofthe Firat (0.8 ss Sec
[5097]tion if 1960 and information earlier supplied by pabaseyy Ne
[5098]GOLITSYN told CIA of a conversation he had with KOVSHUK in
[5099]January 1961 in Moscow (see Part V.E.3:c.2. concerning a
[5100]recruitment approach to the American code clerk James STORS-
[5101]BERG) but at that time described KOVSHUK only as an American
[5102]Department officer, without indicating his position. The
[5103]only time that GOLITSYN has given a position for KOVSHUK was
[5104]in the context of questioning concerning KHRUSHCHEV's "Secret
[5105]Speech" denouncing STALIN in 1956; ,GOLITSYN: said that ac this
[5106]time KOVSHUK was Chief of the American Department (sic) of
[5107]the Second Chief Directorate. On 16 February 1962 GOLITSYN
[5108]identified Vladimir PETROV as. Chief of the "section concerned
[5109]- with the American Embassy of the American’ Department of the
[5110]. Second Directorate” in 1960., NOSENKO had identified PETROV
[5111]as Chief of the Second Section of the American Department,
[5112]‘Which was concerned with the penetration of U.S. intelligence
[5113]operations inside the Soviet Union.
[5116]14-0000
[5120]‘He is an Armenian. His Deputy -is Colonel Mikhail BAKHVALOV."
[5122]officers who had been assigned to-the American Department | ~- .«
[5124]PIN. Yes. LANC ; s before my “tivo” : ins
[5125]on 24 Jtine 1964, NOSENKO stated: © “In1959 and. possibly in 1958,
[5126]Mikhail Pedorovich BAKHVALOV was the Deputy Chief of the U.S.) -
[5127]Embassy Section. I replaced him in this position in 1960 and |
[5128]he went to the Fifth (Zastern Countries) Department as Deputy” -
[5129]Chief,"* On 8 September 1964 NOSENKO volunteered for. the first oe Bot aed ;
[5130]time that BAKHVALOV, as Deputy Chief of the section, had been =~ fo oe
[5131]the case officer for LANGELLE, Under interrogation in early ~ a
[5132]1965, NOSENKO added’ that. BAKHVALOV had also been responsible for — 4
[5133]maintaining the file on the security of the U.S. Embassy. At ; eA
[5134]this time he explained his earlier statement by saying that BAKH-. E
[5135]VALOV had left the section before his arrival and had given the Sg
[5136]file to KOVSHUK to hold for his successor. The file continued to y-
[5137]be charged officially to BAKHVALOV, however, even though he.was | :
[5138]no longer in the section, and NOSENKC arranged for the official - so
[5139]change of custody siortly after reporting for duty (see Part V.E.
[5141]3.£.). NOSENKO said further, in January 1965, that BAKHVALOV
[5143]had shared responsibility for supervising code clerk operetions -
[5145]with KOVSHUK before tiOSENKO arrived to assume these duties him-_
[5147]self. NOSENKO had been given a number of opportunities prior
[5149]to 24 June 1964 to identify BAKHVALOV as his predecessor, bu
[5151]he did not do so. These are summarized below: .
[5155]RY eon it ale Gi
[5157]ye eae TR Te
[5159]25 January 1964: In a discussion of the Fifth (Eastern
[5160]Countries) Department of the Second Chief Directorate. NOSENKO
[5161]said: "the Chief of this department is Colonel Artem DAVIDYAN.
[5163]bee be Abe dh penttadine
[5165]27 February 1964: NOSENKO was shown a photograph of V.A.
[5166]ALEKSEYEV, a Soviet who was in Japan from July to September- .
[5167]1961 as a member of a trade delegation, NOSENKO immediately uo
[5168]recognized the face as that of the Deputy Chief ef the Fifth
[5169]Department of the Second Chief Directorate. He said that he
[5170]did not know this person's last name, but that his first name
[5171]and patronymic were Mikhail Fedorovich. shen shown the last
[5172]name ALEKSEYEV, NOSESKO recognized it as an alias, but pro-
[5173]vided no further information concerning his true identity or
[5174]earlier service in the American Department. ;
[5176]ae ieedanh SEE aa ICE bed ee e+
[5178]10 June 1964: NOSENKO was asked to list in writing the
[5179]names of KGB officers who had received various awards for
[5180]their service. He wrote: "The following got either the
[5181]Order of the Military Red Banner or the Order of the Red Star,
[5182]I'm not sure which: Mikhail BAKHVALOV, Deputy Chief of a
[5183]section in an unremembered department of the Second Chief
[5184]Directorate."
[5186]wake haben catdiiee.
[5188]18 June 1964: NOSENKO was asked to list all the
[5192]abasbawd era's ne.
[5194]for each year since he joined the KGB. He named the chiefs an’
[5196]and deputies of the U.S. Embassy Section from 1953 through ae
[5197]1956. When he came to 1957, however, he said that he could ; Ct Bee Staged
[5198]not provide accurate information as to which officers were :
[5199]assigned to the section for that year through 1959 (he was
[5201]” a
[5202]a ‘
[5205],
[5207]. With reference to the Fifth Department, NOSENKO has
[5208]_furnished only one other item of information: he re-
[5209]ported: that in 1958, or as late as the fall of 1959,
[5210]the Israeli Section was transferred to this department:
[5211]“after having been a component of the American Depart-
[5212]ment. ; _ .
[5215]4.005007
[5217]1956 and January. 1960, when NOSENKO said he had returned. He’
[5218]provided 14 names, but BAKHVALOV's was not among them, Asked
[5219]...to name the officers who had left the section in the same period,
[5221]‘aliegealy in the Tourist Department in ‘this period)” and could
[5222]not describe their functions. On this basis. NOSENKO was then
[5223]asked to list the officers who had joined the section between.
[5225]he named five, again omitting BAKHVALOV,
[5227]sot cheba
[5229]ae eth GEAR Fany weenebtibeb dates
[5233]dave
[5235]|
[5236]3
[5237]3
[5238]4
[5240]4
[5242]Hom es ee a ne a cr
[5245]. 3. Duties: and Knowledgeability aa
[5247]ree. Introduction.
[5249]Shortly after reporting for duty. in. “the U.S. ‘Enbassy’’
[5250]Section and following his. short discussion with GRIBANOV, \
[5251]NOSENKO met with Department Chief KLYPIN. and. Section Chief ,
[5252]KOVSHUK to discuss his responsibilities and functions in. ; i
[5253]the section, Repeating what GRIBANOV had already said, ; l
[5254]KLYPIN stressed that NOSENKO's most important single respon-. f
[5255]yt, sibility in ‘the section would be supervision. of all KGB
[5257]aay operational activity against American military and. State on
[5258]Department code clerks stationed in Moscow. As for.the . oo
[5259]other Americans at the Embassy, KLYPIN suggested a division a r
[5260]of labor. under which KOVSHUK would be responsible for super-
[5262]vising operations against State Department personnel and | 4
[5264]NOSENKO would Supervise work against <he Arny, Air Force, ; | 24
[5266]and Naval attaches and their assistants.* NOSENKO was also : 4
[5268]made respnnsible for maintaining certain files in the section. i
[5270]On 19 February 1965 NOSENKO signed an interrogation proto-- 4
[5272]col. which he agreed contained a listing of his principal . i
[5274]responsibiliciies during 1960 and 1961. It read in part: :
[5276]"During' the egtire eriod in tke First [U.S. . :
[5278]Embassy] Section, ‘irst [American] Department in : :
[5280]1960 and 1961 my position was Deputy Chief of Section. :
[5282]My responsibilities were the following: :
[5284]t 4
[5286]-General Deputy to the Chief of the First Section, ; j
[5288]: . ; Vladislav Mikhaylovich KOVSHUK, and Acting Chief of _ ;
[5289]fA tyaae Section in his absence.
[5291]«Immediate supervisor for the operational work
[5292]against American code clerks. In this capacity I '
[5293]closely guided the work of case officers Gennadiy
[5294]GRYAZNOV and Vadim KOSOLAPOV. ; :
[5296]Case officer for U.S. Embassy Security Officer,
[5297]John ABIDIAN.
[5299]I
[5300]-For about the first six months of 1960, super- Eo.
[5301]visor of the work against the offices of the U.S. Mili- foes
[5302]tary, Naval, and Air Attaches.
[5304]-I maintained the file on American Embassy security.
[5306]~-I maintained the log books for the reports sent
[5308]‘to the First (U.S. Embassy] Section by the Operational
[5309]Technical Directorate, KGB, based on the information
[5310]obtained from all the microphones installed in the
[5312]. American Embassy. I read all the reports:and gave the
[5314]_ a pertinent reports to the appropriate case officers in
[5316]the Section. In my absence this work was done by KOVSHUK
[5317]or GRYAZNOV.** —
[5319]*NOSENKO mentioned his responsibility for supervising at-
[5320]tache operations for the first time in 1965. These functions”
[5321]ere discussed below. .
[5323]Foe, ge.
[5325]a **The final sentence was added at NOSENKO's request at the
[5326]time the protocol was signed.
[5329]: ‘-.During this period I was the agent handler for
[5330]‘agents 'SHMELEV’, ‘GRIGORIY', 'PROKHOR', ‘ARTUR’ and
[5331]*SARDAR'. * Loe Be : SO tae
[5333]. “Throughout this entire period I sat in room 618
[5334]of KGB Headquarters at House Number 2, Dzhershinskiy” .
[5335]Square, Moscow. GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV shared this. of-
[5336]fice with me throughout most of this period. "
[5338]iit,
[5340]‘b. Functions as General Deputy and Acting Chief of Section. :
[5341](i) Access
[5343]sein Peni e merits aidan
[5346]Since his defection NOSENKO has maintained under re-
[5347]peated interrogation that as general deputy to KOVSNUK, with
[5348]the responsibility of taking over in KOVSHUK's absence, he
[5349]had acces. to all information on the section's activities
[5350]and was obliged to keep current. on this information. On
[5351]this basis he has been able to assure his questioners that
[5352]the KGB was completely unsuccessful in its attempts to re-
[5353]cruit Americans assigned to the Enbassy in these two years.
[5354]NOSENKO has also said at various times that his access to
[5355]section files and his discussions with section officers made
[5356]it certain that there were also no successes fron 1953 to i
[5357]1960 and from January 1962 to January 1964. His statements ‘
[5358]‘on this subject during the February 1965 were distilled in :
[5359]a pro rocon which NOSENKO signed on 20 ) February (quoted in : , i.
[5360]full : 3
[5362]Mibniticid bbs.
[5364]A
[5366]4 we LAS the only Deputy to the Chief of the
[5368]American Embassy Section, First Department, Second
[5370]Chief Directorate, KGB, Vladislav Mikhaylovich KOV- 4
[5371]SHUK, from January 1960 to January 1962, one of my func. _ oh
[5372]tions was to serve as KOVSHUK's general deputy and to : a
[5373]assume the rights and responsibilities of Chief of the me
[5374]Section during KOVSHUK's absence. In order to perform +
[5375]this function I had the right and the obligation of t
[5376]knowing the- details about every important activity of
[5377]the section against the American Embassy and its per-
[5378]sonnel. No activity of this nature was withheld from
[5379]me.
[5381]"2. As Deputy Chief of the Section I know defi-
[5382]nitely that no U.S. officials serving in the Embassy
[5383]ch were agents of the KCB or reporting unofficially in
[5384]fo any way to the KGB during my service in the Section.
[5385]: There were no approaches or recruitments made by the
[5386]‘Section during the period January 1960 to January 1962
[5387]against personnel of the American Embassy, including
[5388]personnel of the State Department, the offices of the
[5389]Military Attaches (Army, Navy, and Air), the Department
[5390]of Agriculture and USIA, including Marine guards, Army
[5391]sergeants, State Department code clerks and Army code
[5392]clerks except against STORSBERG and KEYSERS, both un-
[5393]successful approaches.. : ee,
[5395]i
[5396]i
[5397]i
[5399]*VOLKOV, YEFREMOV, Johan PREISFKEUND, FRIPPEL, and =
[5400]respectively, who are discussed: in other parts
[5402]paper. At other times NOSENKO has named additional agents |
[5404]he handled in this period; they are discussed below.
[5407]+a408q0
[5409]a
[5411]_ “3, "There: were no “approaches. or recruitnents :
[5412]made. against any employees of the United States. -:
[5414]‘ Government who were assigned to the ‘American. Embassy ©
[5415]on temporary duty during this period. I have read and
[5416]understood this report and certify it as correct."
[5418](ii) Duties
[5420]- On 29 January 1965, NOSENKO was questioned concerning
[5421]his supervisory duties.as Deputy Chief of the section, par-
[5422]ticularly his function of supervising activity against code
[5423]clerks. The transcript of this discussion is ‘quoted here: -
[5425]Question: To which of the major responsibilities you have
[5426]mentioned did you have to devote the most time?
[5428]' Answer: I don't know.
[5429]Q: What was the most important?
[5430]A: Everything was important.
[5431]Q: . Whom did you supervise in the American Embassy
[5432]Section?
[5433]AE GRYAZNOV, KOSOLAPOV, [Vladimir] DEMKIN, and later
[5435][Yevgeniy] GROMAKOYSKIY who worked with DENKIN.
[5436]Then there was [N.A.] GAVRILENKO, [I.Ya.| KURI-
[5437]LENKO; and BELOGLAZOV: working with the Attaches.
[5439]Q: They were all in the First Section?
[5441]A: Yes. ,
[5443]Q: What were their responsibilities?
[5445]A: -GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV had all the code clerks. .
[5446]DEMKIN was charged with all persons living in ‘
[5447]Americe House, except code clerks. GROMAKOVSKIY
[5448]helped him. GAVRILENKO had the Air Force Attaches
[5449]and [their] assistants, and also he had the plane
[5450]of the Ambassador. He must think about watching
[5451]the pilots who were living in a hotel. KURILENKO--
[5452]Army Attache and assistants; BELOGLAZOV--Navy ;
[5453]Attache, assistants, and Marines.
[5455]:Q: What is your understanding of the meaning of the
[5457]. word | “supervisor"?, :
[5458]‘A: Persoraiiy to be at the head, to direct.
[5459]°Q:° 7 7 So, : > wr aesponsaviiities of supervising all
[5461]th. work a:adscsi an! ine code clerks, this meant
[5462]that ooo. a te tue ead of this work, that you were
[5463]direc: ing ints work, that you, were participating.
[5464]+ in discussio s'concerning this work, and in these
[5465]discussions you were talking about what measures
[5466]. were necessary.
[5468]rages
[5470]Beant
[5474]oe shai ABAD a
[5476]wooo Bi age a Led eater.
[5478]4
[5480]paid eet
[5482]4
[5484]setae bbe we Hw be Meads ba
[5487]14-0000
[5489]as
[5491]at]
[5493]oe
[5495]“little questions which the case officer must de--
[5496]‘cide himself. When it was necessary. ae oF
[5498]And. participating personally. when nec
[5500]‘cer appears. But, maybe, for the sake of the file, ~ .
[5502]Tupting?y “when necessary sy because” theres:
[5506]Yes...
[5508]What sort of case officer questions were you
[5509]ansver ing?
[5511]All kinds. If I couldn't answer them, if ny
[5512]authority isn't enough for this, it is necessary
[5513]to discuss them with KOVSHUK. I was discussing .
[5514]with KOVSHUK, with KLYPIN, with [KLYPIN's suc- p
[5515]cessor as Chief Of the Amcrican Department,
[5517]S.N.] PEDOSEYEV. Several tines, not once, we
[5519]were Giscussing questions with GRIBANOV. Also, j
[5520]coucerning measures, concerning future steps. i
[5521]When it was necessary. .
[5526]What other duties did you have as a supervisor? : .
[5528]~ saawaitiacind od Te labs,
[5530]I told you. When it was necessary I was going : .
[5531]to agent meetings with case officers. When it j
[5532]was necessary. Or, besides, I net perso ally i
[5533]with "PROKHOR’ [PREISFREUND| or ‘£23 et ei :
[5534]“PROKHOR" was working agninst STORSURGS, 'SARDAR" . i
[5536]x
[5538]against ZUJUS. I was working nyself with them.
[5539]You personally worked agents "PROKHOR" and "SARDAR"?
[5541]Yes.
[5543].
[5545]When did you find it necessary to go to an agent | 4
[5546]mecting with a case officer?
[5548]Well, for cxanmple, DENKIN would come to me and
[5549]say: "You know Ella [UMANETS, an agent in
[5550]America House]. Ella said that NORONE had looked i
[5552]at her and was smiling." This is just an [hypo- j
[5553]thetical] example....Okay, I am going with hin, Jon
[5555]hearing Ella myself,.[to learn} what happened,
[5556]jwhether] it is possible to make something or not.
[5558]You met Ella and talked with her?
[5559]Yes, with DEMKIN. Very, very difficult to say,
[5561]why and how we are going. When it was necessary
[5562]to go. .
[5564]As a rule did you try to make it a practice to ae
[5565]visit the agents of the section who were working tO
[5566]against the American target?
[5568]Yes, I am telling you. There was such an‘agent,
[5569]Inga [VARLAMOVA]. GRYAZNOV was meeting with her.
[5571]It might be necessary to go to meet her. But, we : pe
[5572]‘knew how Inga was afraid of intelligence. And, ar
[5573]you see, they don't like it when a new case offi- hose
[5576]1400000,
[5580]“e: -""- gyou do not believe GRYAZNOV. ‘No. But, you see, -
[5582]meeting apartment) is an apartment occupied by a tenant who
[5584]‘it was necessary to. go, to hear her.. Not because —
[5586]' to hear from the source jemphasized], directly, _
[5587]what is going on, and how it is going on, to get
[5588]a feeling. Because the source will tell the case.
[5589]officer, then the case officer will tell you.
[5590]Maybe sometimes he will not give you every detail,
[5592]nie i
[5594]teig tall aiid said Bane.
[5596]every intonation. But in some cases, it is neces- j
[5597]sary to feel this. But, of course, it depends on } a
[5598]the agent, on the target, whether you will go or oo. 4
[5599]not go. It's very difficult, again, to say. : |
[5600]Q: Could you say that you met 50 per cent of the -
[5601]section's agents?
[5602]A; No, I can't say. . a
[5603]Q: Fifty per cent or 75 per cent? . j
[5604]A: I can't answer you. . 7 i
[5605]Q: What about your functions as a supervisor in re- :
[5607]gard to safehouses, to "K.K.'s" and "Ya.K.'s",*
[5609]A: Oh. I myself had a file on my flat, a yavochneaya
[5610]kvartira, which I brought from the Seven
[5611][Tourist Department]. It was my own. GRYAZNOV
[5612]had his own yavochnaya kvartira. KOSOLAPOV had
[5613]also his own yavochnaya_kvartira. And not one of
[5614]us had a conspirative apartment. :
[5616]a
[5618]ered 3 ad
[5620]Q: And you took the "Ya.K.'' from...
[5622]A: (Interrupting.) Which I had from the Seventh.
[5623]And, by the way, when 1 was leaving the First
[5624][ American} Department, 1 took this file again
[5625]to the Seventh.
[5627]se eV es
[5629]Q: And not one of you had a conspirative flat.
[5631]A: No, artes the section had only--how many?--
[5632][P.I.] MASSYA had one conspirative. [V.P.]
[5633]Rae had one conspirative, and then there was
[5634]one conspirative flat, where, in fact, an agent }
[5635]was living. In the First Section there were :
[5636]three or four conspirative flats.
[5638]. QQ: .- But among you, GRYAZNOV, and KOSOLAPOV there was i
[5639]Lo none? , 4
[5640]As Only "Ya.K.'s"”. . a an 4
[5642]so. : poet ee coe . nee ce a as t sega, Baye “8
[5643]*A "K.K." [konspirativnaya kvartira--conspiratorial apart- : : 4
[5644]ment) is de¥Finéd by ROSESRO as 'a Safehouse ‘or apartment owned — 7 %
[5646]and maintained 'by the KGB. A "Ya.K." (yavochnaya kvartira-~
[5647]is perhaps subsidized-by the KGB and absents himself when
[5649].,. there is a need to use the apartment for meetings or other
[5650]/ activities. The "K.K." is used for more sensitive operational —
[5651]-. purposes, he said.
[5653]vont BF 2 oe 162
[5655]taheenrect te
[5658]Who kept a record of these three?
[5659]The case officers.
[5660]Where was your "Ya. Ko"?
[5662]Vorovskogo Strect.
[5664]And where was GRYAZNOV's?
[5666]S A: GRYAZNOV's was on Kachalogo Street.
[5667]Q: And KOSOLAPOV's? , ,
[5668]Ati Don't remember. Don't remember. (Pause.) It
[5669]me an-® was in the vicinity of the Suvorovskiy Boulevard. ad
[5670]KOSOLAPOV's or DEMKIN's. In the region. of Arbat a
[5671]Square. KOSOLAPOV's or DEMKIN's. KOSOLAPOV's. 4
[5672]DEMKIN's I don't remember. 4
[5673]Q@: And you didn't have any responsibility for super- 4
[5674]vising the activity that went on at these flats? y
[5675]A: 1 don't understand. i
[5676]i
[5677]Q: : Was there some central control of the use of. the 4
[5679]A: What kind of control? j
[5680]; Q: Who would be using then, when they would be using
[5682]them, under what conditions? ;
[5684]WER Adie eth
[5686]| A: No. The case officer who was working with it
[5687]decides how to use this flat or how not to use
[5688]it, et cetera, et cetera. Besides that, very
[5689]often we were using rooms in hotels.
[5693]Q: So GRYAZNOV would take any of his operational
[5694]activity to his "Ya.K."?
[5696]He would also meet with his agents, with his
[5697]operational contacts in hotel rooms. KOSOLAPOV
[5698]was meeting his agents in his own “Ya. K."'3 NO—
[5699]SENKO was meeting his agents or operational con-
[5700]tacts in his own "Ya.K.".
[5702]Could GRYAZNOV or KOSOLAPOV ever: use these "Ya.K.'s" -
[5703]without your knowing about it? oe ss
[5705]Of course. It's their owz flat. . ot . :
[5707]ON ta et dy ee
[5709]But you're supervising their work?
[5711]Must I kéep them like alittle, little child? |.
[5712]No,’ no, They don't have to report to me; "Today
[5713]I go to meet my agent at my flat."
[5715]They can use them whenever they like without checking
[5716]- with you as supervisor? . : . ”
[5718]= of course, of course. They are meeting their own
[5719]- agents. So : . a :
[5721]. , You have no idea who: they are meeting, or when
[5722]_they-are meeting them? Soe eh i OE
[5724]¥hen: they are meeting an active development agent, hy
[5726]they tell me afterwards. They are telling "this,
[5727]this, this, this" and I am answering "this, this,
[5728]this." But usually they are going to meet maids
[5729]‘or they don't have to report. There is nothing
[5730]active and there is....The file is going on.
[5732]What about operational vehicles? Automobiles?
[5733]You see, we had one automobile for the whole
[5734]department. Besides this, we could apply, when
[5735]necessary, to the officer on duty for the Second
[5736]Chief Directorate and he would give a car, be-:
[5737]cause he has a number of cars at his disposal.:
[5739]Approximately how much of your time did you spend
[5740]supervising GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV?
[5742]I can't say.
[5744]‘Yas it the most important function?
[5746]‘Yes, it was important. All work in the First
[5748]Section was important. This was the most impor-
[5749]tant. But one day I could devote the whole day
[5750]to code clerks, the next day maybe half the day,
[5751]maybe two hours in the day. The rest of the day
[5752]I will be absent. I will be meeting with KLYPIN,
[5753]or 1 will be having a meeting with surveillance,
[5754]or I will be at ancther place. The third day,
[5755]again, maybe the whole day, maybe part of it.
[5757]No, I can't tell you. It depends on the situa-
[5758]tion.
[5760](411) Additional Duties in KOVSHUK's Absence
[5762]As Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section, one of
[5764]NOSENKO's responsibilities was to serve as Acting Chief
[5765]when KOVSHUK was absent from the office. NOSENKO recalled
[5767]leave p
[5769]*- that he fulfilled this function during KOVSHUK's two 30-day
[5770]eriods in 1960 and 1961, but he did not remember
[5772]when this leave occurred in those years. He also served as
[5773]Acting Chief for about a month in the summer of 1960 when
[5775]KOVSHUK was in the KGB hospital with heart trouble and for a
[5777]week or two some time in 1961 when KOVSHUK was ill again..
[5779]’ NOSENKO was unable to recall any operational or. inspection
[5781]trips that KOVSHUK made in 1960 or 1961, and the only other
[5782]specific time that he could remember KOVSHUK being absent
[5783]was for several days in connection with preparations for
[5784]President Eisenhower's planned visit to the Soviet Union in
[5786]1960.
[5788]NOSENKO's description of -his duties in KOVSHUK’s ab-"
[5789]: tees. was summarized in a protocol which
[5790]ae 3
[5792]. °."Y do not remember any particularly important ;
[5793]operational decisions I made as Acting Chief of Sec-
[5794]_ tion, nor any unusual things that happened during
[5796]he signed on -3, March
[5800]“4
[5802]1 ene serene
[5805]a
[5807]4
[5808]4
[5809]3
[5810]4
[5812]ene od SE nk eae
[5814]y
[5815]anemia HHL wa rlbiedaad adie +
[5818]1400000 T° ‘ soe . end ore . oh te. are ae aot 5 Aa
[5820]these times. The only specific responsibility KOVSHUK ".
[5821]_ head. which I. handled in his absence was to report to -
[5823]the Chief of the First Department about all mail going ok
[5824]out of the First Section. I did not meet- any of KOV- .
[5825]Lo SHUK's agents during his absences because there was. ‘no
[5826]3 necessity to do so. His only Russian agent whoa 1°
[5827]remember was Ilya GLAZUNOV (.KGB cryptonym “VRUBEL" | ,
[5828]whom he transferred to FEDYANIN in 1960, I thisk. The
[5829]only other agent of KOVSHUK's whom I vemember was the
[5830]correspondent Edmund STEVENS.* The only. thing that was
[5831]‘different for me as Acting Chief of the Scction was a
[5832]that I had to go every day tv see the Chief of the De= -.  - 4
[5833]partment. a}
[5835]An dtrciach ad ttt
[5837]se igeshitnhvanapren meme seu magtancn
[5839]on Sd
[5841]c. Supervisor of all Code Clerk Operations
[5842](i) Introduction
[5844]Among the numerous KGB activities against American code
[5845]clerks in Moscow which NOSENKO has discussed are five opera~
[5846]tions wherein the KGB intended or effected approaches for ;
[5847]recruitment/defection ‘purposes. According to NOSENKO, none
[5848]was successful... The five major cases are reviewed separately ,
[5849]below, one of them in tae context of duty trips abroad by .
[5850]NOSENKO' s subordinate KOSOLAPOV, ** . d
[5852]Ne teaan 6 aekal Ts nh edi
[5854]NOSENKO said that, upon assuming responsibility for
[5855]supervising operations against American code clerks, he
[5856]found a very "difficult situation." Prior to the assignment
[5857]of KOSOLAPOY to the U.S. Embassy Section in late 1959, all
[5858]operations against code clerks had been handled by A.S, MALYU-~ :
[5859]GIN, but during MALYUGIN's two years of effort. there had }
[5860]beer no operational approaches and no successes. When Poa
[5862]stent tee
[5864]Z
[5866]cine teeny falls Ue atisbreenee
[5868]*The Edmund STEVENS case is.discussed in Part V.C.2.
[5870]**GOLITSYN on 20 March 1962 identitied KOSOLAPOV's photograph
[5871]as that of a veteran KCB officer with whom ke was personally
[5872]‘acquainted. GOLIISYN said that KOSOLAPOV had entered the KGB
[5873]in about 1952 and had served for two or three years as a
[5874]member of the First [American] Department of the KGB First
[5875]Chief Directorate under United Nations cover in New York City;
[5876]subsequently he had worked for two or three years in the
[5877]First Chief Directorate at KGB Headquarters. According to
[5878]GOLITSYN, the bachelor KOSOLAPOV was transferred to the KGB i
[5879]Second Chief Directorate some time prior to 1960 in line with. ; j
[5880]- a KGB policy for only married men to be sent abroad. As of: : 4
[5882]od
[5884]et Vata RS 2S wilt eat
[5886]avers peda reer n on
[5888]1960, GOLITSYN said, KOSOLAPOV was working against code clerks
[5889]stationed in the American Embassy in Moscow. He added that
[5890]KOSOLAPOV speaks excellent English. Prior to GOLITSYN's
[5891]identification, CIA had no indication of intelligence acti-
[5892]. a vity on KOSOLAPOV's part. Between February 1953 and Aprii
[5893]j 1955 he was assigned to the United. Nations: Secretariat Trans-.. . :
[5894]So lation Unit as a translator; in August 1958 he had been an ne ae
[5895]interpreter at the Geneva Conference on Nuclear Test Detection; | q
[5896]in September 1959 he accompanied KHRUSHCHEV on his trip to ~
[5897]the United States (see Part V.E.3.d. which desoribes the ~
[5898]. Yole of NOSENKO's target. John ABIDIAN in connection with the
[5899]_ _KHRUSHCHEV trip). KOSOLAPOV's English is flawless.
[5902]REE EA ET
[5904]Cpe pe ee aos ~ SP YR Leen : PPh pt gee tote erten
[5906]KOSENKO took Over tixen wire no active devclopzental opera~
[5907]tdons ngainst Ciule vppeRy uncterway, and the only agents or”
[5908]operational contau(y seine used against thes. were poorly
[5909]educated maids ail svper Bkes, none of vhon had accomplished
[5910]See eee te ATPON bbs, » foreign agent3 were bing used
[5912]nM operations Bes bens ‘poo Ners and at the tine
[5913]NOSENKO had nu ageieit cade roc Persone House, or in
[5914]tne Embassy, viel wonsd te used in these operstions.
[5916]to the U.S. Estansy 6 otiuna as a second assistant to NOSENKO
[5917]in his code cl<ih w tivities, From this point on, NOSENKO,
[5918]KOSOLAPOV, and Ch¥sseoy phered the same KGB Neadquarters
[5919]office (Roca Gli), nore ali KGB files on Ancricen code
[5920]clerk:, as welt i ‘ye fh1ee on agents available for work
[5921]against then, were essed ty one iarie sife, accessible to
[5922]all three officers, xogtszo supervised all of the sectiun's
[5923]work along these iyas, and no provocations, compromises,
[5924]recruitment atlesus, or seeeuitments could have been planned
[5925]or carried Out Vithewrt tin prior knowlege and agreement
[5927]wsien TLL ddadieod gle.
[5929]iecardaste ls:
[5931]- AGOLITSYN fargt seq GRYAZNGV an a case officer of the
[5932]Anerican Departacni, second Chier Directorate, on 31 Decen-
[5933]ber 1961, lic etl w* that time that ne had been personally ;
[5934]acquainted with Girézeoy yince 1945 and that, as of tho i
[5935]spring of 1960, Ghiis.ay wis “working only against code : !
[5936]clerks of the Auerinen Embassy in Moscow.” GRYAZNOV had
[5938]In January v5 fouruary of 1960 GRYAZNOVS was essigaed a
[5939]i
[5940]|
[5941]i
[5945]travelled tO Cha i feu States at sane ‘ i '
[5946]GOLITSYN tdded, 47 ->a~-nyemge ere Bee Por |
[5947]Fag PT SI i : es ead +
[5948]a taeda BG “Be 4 of
[5949]ope zak, bit : ps ess On | doo,
[5950]§ June 1962 Geilis rn told CIA that — had been a classmate of :
[5952]GRYAZSOV during tot and 1946 at the "SMFRSiI" counterintelli-
[5953]gence echool tn Mor ows he deseribed GRYAZNOV as a specialist
[5954]in operations @ydisent American code clerks, saying that :
[5955]GRYAZNOV was "Very »sportenced" and had nad "some successes."
[5956]As an example, he ttu of having spoken to GRYAZNOV in the F
[5957]spring of 1960 wikis, ne, GOLITSYN, was visiting the U.S,
[5958]Embassy Section of én. American Department in connection with |
[5959]his forthcoring anuiynment as a First Chief Directorate
[5960]counterintelligene.: articer in Helsinki. GOLITSYN had com—
[5961]plained to GRYA‘NWuy that the KGB had no U.S. assets in Helsinki
[5962]oe at the tine, ail ty CIA he quoted GRYAZNOV as replying:
[5963]i ; " “Maybe we will help you." According to GOLITSYN, GRYAZNOV
[5964]oS, went on to explain that he was handling an agent, a code
[5965]oi... @lerk in the U4, fyyassy in Moscow, wio wes about to be ,
[5966]transferred, perlieys to Helsinki; he told GOLITSYN that the = © "7"
[5967]RGB had receitven iformation from this American code clerk
[5968]and classified itis a a “real agent." NOSENKO has not .
[5969]mentioned such an tyvent (iho Has yet to be identified) and
[5970]. has denied that ths GH had any agents in the U.S. Embassy |
[5971]at this tine. GOLitsyN identified a photograph of G.I. LAPIN,
[5972]_ Who travelicd with tie Maiseyev Dance troup to the United
[5973]States and Canada i 1958, as being identical with GRYAZNOV,
[5974]_\CIA had no prior thdication of intelligence activities by |.
[5975]GRYAZNOV, under the alias LAPIN, and had no traces on GRYAZNOV
[5976]n true name. gs, ot : ee ; .
[5980]‘ q
[5986]b
[5988]had been no such success with American military ciph
[5990]when he was in Moscow. If KOSENKO went anay on w te tu 4
[5991]said, he would‘have been told about any such autivigy Naw
[5992]his return. Ss y pad.
[5994]When XOSENKO took over responsibility for dparat ne i ;
[5996]against code clerks, he read available files on targngn vo i
[5997]agents, discussed the situation with “ALYUGIN, bry y "H
[5998]U.S. Embassy Section case officer responsible for Lt y nA
[5999]of America House), GRYAZNOV, and KOSOLAPOV, and repay) iene
[6001]findings and recommendations to his supertors, movi gages
[6003]KLYPIN. Several changes were made as a result, fy Vighyy,, 4
[6004]ducing a new program for the work of the sectigi, a a hee ot ab wamene “4
[6005]suggested the use of third—country nationals Chen AM dans ( : ; .
[6006]and not Sovict) for agent work against code clerin; 4), ti. tomomreatnes ; 4
[6007]with this suggestion, be personally recruitcd Ailing, (tht to : 4
[6008]tary officer, <EaZ7aF, eryptonym "“SARDAR"), aera 4
[6009]him against the Amcrics House, (After his first ray Via ted |
[6011]as specifically targetted against military cons yy tt 3
[6012]Matthew 2UJUS.) Another such agent directly hemltod are ;
[6013]SENKO was the Finnish businessman Johan PREISFUNtUL, in en i
[6014]figured in the case of the military cede clerk Jemen pete ij
[6015]BERG, NOSENKO-also suggested initiating activity guajiay :
[6016]clerks prior to their arrival in the USSR and PVOCAT A Gy tnde i
[6017]proposed that operational measures be undertakon ar Whey 3
[6018]operational poss4bilities be studied in Helsinhi, th. nfs {
[6019]through which most of the code clerks passed an thea, o v i
[6020]to Moscow. nl J i
[6022]Finally, according to NOSENKO, none of the uporayy,
[6023]against code clerks was successful during the two Year yo
[6024]spent as Deputy Chicf of tho American Fabassy Heatdun. yin
[6025]did the KGB have any success between January 10653 ody,
[6026]ary 1964, when NOSENKO left Moscow for Geneva. ilu tbwveqe
[6027]that GRYAZNOV would have told him if any succengful dupe ;
[6028]had taken place during this latter period. "UDF UR hog
[6030]weit attain item ele
[6032](141) Approach to STORSBERG
[6034]From the start of his association with CIA, NOS\4;
[6035]emphasized that the primary mission of the U.A, Frbas..
[6036]tion in 1960 snd 1951, during his incumbency as bupy
[6037]of Section, was the recruitment of an American mbites,
[6038]grapher. He has cxplained the special stress pincod yA 1b be=
[6039]_requirement (vis-a-vis the recruitment of Stain DOA ane fits
[6040]code clerks) by saying that, while the KGB had brokuy neat
[6041]U.S. State Department cipher systems and could read at pein
[6042]messigcs up_fo_and Including those classified. “giere pi, fneeee |
[6046]Avg ' _ :
[6047]HBG bee gor * on a
[6049]‘remained secure in this period. NOSENKO also hag as
[6050]repeatedly that. the KGB had not been able to reeruty any A
[6051]can code clerk, cither State Department or military, upd merle
[6052]the years since the recruitment of “ANDREY" in 1989. % neg
[6054]a aan
[6056]*See Part VI.D.3.b., which discusses the "ANDREY* Chay,
[6061]rts. ea
[6063]On the several operations against military code clerks
[6064]which. KOSENKO has described and in which he has claimed a
[6065]personal role, his greatest detail and emphasis has been given
[6066]to the case of James Harry STORSPERG. In 1962 NOSENKO said
[6067]that, in line with GRIKANOV's instructions that he pay parti-
[6068]cular attention to code clerk operations, he Gevoted most of
[6069]his time for almost a year to the STORSBERG operation, and
[6070]played a persona) role in the unsuccessfui KGE approach; he
[6071]descrited in the first person his conversation with STCRSBERG.
[6072]During the 1964 to 1966 period, KUSENKO denied not only that
[6073]he had personally participated in this way but also that he
[6074]had ever claimed to have dcdcne: he continued to say, however,
[6075]that he supervised the cperation from beginning to end. Ac-
[6076]cording to NOSENKO, =his operation got under way with the re-
[6078]“eruitmernt of a third-neational agent (Johan PREISFREUND, a
[6080]Finn) some time in the first, half of 1960, Tne specific aim
[6082]in using this agent was to involve STORSBERG in compromising
[6084]detivities, which would then form the basis for the approach.
[6085]The operation dregged on through 1969 ana until the spring,
[6086]summer, of autum: of 1961; at this time N.S. SKVORTSOV, a KGB
[6087]officer, was introduced in the guise of a wealthy French busi-
[6088]nessman to continue the development of compromising iunforma-
[6089]tion. PEREISFREUND was then withdrawn from the operation,
[6090]Several weeks later STORSEERS wa: approached, principaily on
[6091]the basis of his financial need, sut he rejected the KGB bid
[6092]and the ¢peratior.was over. NOSENKO was certain that STORS-
[6093]BERG had not reported the epproach and said that the KG3 would
[6094]use this fact as an additionsl eiement of pressure should
[6095]STORSBERS again te posted outside the United States. NOSENKO
[6096]also kr.ew that GCLITSYN had reported to CIA concerning KGB
[6097]modus operandi in this case as well as PREISFREUND's part in
[6098]it.
[6100]GOLITSYN in early 1962 had, in fact, told CIA about
[6102]PREISFREUND having been used by the KGB in an operation again
[6103]an American stationed in Moscow, Contrary 29 NOSENKO's infor
[6105]mation, be said that this American hed been epproached--and
[6106]@cruited--by the KGB at the end of 1960.
[6107]aa .
[6109]A second item from GOLITSYN may also relate to the STORS~-
[6111]. BERG operation: GOLITSYN told:of learning in the sprirg of
[6113]1960 that the KGB had developed a military code clerk in Mos-'
[6114]cow to the point that recruatment was virtually assured. Ac-
[6115]cording to U.S. Army records, only two military code clerks
[6116]were stationed there at that time, STORSBERG and his superior
[6117]William S. HURLEY, the military communications officer who
[6118]additionally performed cryptographic duties. NOSENKO has -
[6119]said that there «as no KGS operation against HURLEY, and
[6121]“HURLEY has reported no approach. |
[6123]In addition to the detailed information given by NOSENKO
[6124]on this case, the FBI and Army Intelligence have ‘interviewed
[6126]" STORSEERG (who confirmed NOSENKO's account and denied recruit-
[6127]‘ment) and CIA has talked to the KGB agent PREISFREUND (who
[6128]also generally. confirmed the information iven by NOSENKO
[6130]but-did not know the outcome of the case). The results of
[6132]. these interviews, together with information from GOLITSYN and —
[6133]/from other sources, are summarized in this.
[6135]order below.
[6139]z
[6140]A
[6141]i
[6142]3
[6143]i
[6145]4
[6148]x
[6150]4
[6151]4
[6152]i
[6153]t
[6156]14-0000
[6158]ger Pan |
[6160]PRAT ASE RSME OBOE REE aCe eRe swe inn 2 ARE eR Oa eg ggg ct ee
[6162].
[6164]January 1960: STORSSERG arrived in Moscow (this date was
[6165]suppiied by the inter:ogator and was accepted
[6166]~ by BOSENKO es accurate, which it is).
[6168]Early 1960: PREISFREUND was recruited by KOVSHUK. (This
[6169]was consistent with earlier statements, and
[6170]NOSENKO had always said ne first met PREISFREUND
[6171]a Week 7 recruicment, On 21 Octo- 4
[6172]S *KO said that he and , :
[6173]Sf ‘un the middle of 1960, 4
[6175]in the summer cz 1960. He subsecuently stayed !
[6176]with tne qenera: Gate mid-i9€0_') :
[6178]Summer 1969: PREISFREUND First supplied a woman to STCRSBERG,
[6179]Early 196i: Compromisir of STCORSRERG and a
[6181]Soviet femal obtained at the Hotel
[6183]Peking in
[6185]About May EIEFREUND wes withdsa.n from the operation
[6186]1961: ORTZOV, alias MITHAUD, was introduced.
[6187](NCSENXO dated this by ssying it was about
[6188]three weeks before the approach to STORSBERG.)
[6189]June 1961° Unsuccessful XGE approach to STORSBERC in the
[6191]Leningrad Hotel, Moscow. (Earlier on 20 October
[6192]1966 NGSENKO had said that the approacn was made
[6193]“a ronth or a month anc 2a half betore STORSBERG
[6194]left Moscow," Told that STORSBERG was reassigned
[6195]in November 1961, NOSENXO said that the approach
[6196]was in “June 1961, 1.e., five months before
[6197]STORSBERG's departure date. STCREBSERG has re-
[6198]ported that the approach was in Gcrober 1961;
[6200]see below.)
[6202]NOSENKO was questioned further on the STORSSERG case later
[6203]in the October 1966 interrceatiors. He asserted on 21 October
[6204]that he had first met PREISFRELND in the summer of 1960 and
[6205]that he continued to meet with him in his case officer capacity
[6206]after the unsuccessful approach to STORSBERG. HKe saw PREIS~
[6207]FREUND most recentiy. he said. im Moscow during 1963. NOSENKO
[6208]also explained how PREISFREUND first came to knew his true
[6209]name: Initially NOSENKO was introduced to PREISFREUND only
[6210]by first name and catronymic. Yuriy <vanovich: en one occasion,
[6211]however, NOSENKO was visiting PREISFREUND's hotel room in
[6212]Moscow and “lost his XGB certificate’ there. Thereafter
[6213]PREISFREUND knew him as NOSENKO, On 25 October 1966, NOSENKO
[6215]i repeated his earlier statements that the STORSBERG case was
[6217]the only one in which PREISFREUND participated, although he
[6218]May have reported casually on other Americans he met during
[6220]his visits to America House. For the first time he specific-
[6221]ally named GRYAZNOY as the case officer holding the operational
[6222]file on STORSSERG, He continued to maintain that he, NOSENKO,
[6223]supervised the operation against STOKSBERG,
[6225]i
[6226]i
[6227]H
[6229]i
[6231]woe ined
[6232]oh, ~? ~
[6235]arn oe es
[6237]14.00000. -
[6238]i
[6240]Selection
[6242]erenarereytst
[6244]aa ae wiitiliokty wine os
[6246]4
[6248]Bi iba
[6250]ee SED sot,
[6252]i cee Ct a
[6254]"This is in reference to NOSEKSO's statement that PREISFFEUND
[6256]- invelved STORSBERG in speculation which PREISFRUEND also
[6257]ot : claimed; sec also GOLITSYN's second lesi, discussed below.
[6259]“demands made of PREISFREUND by the KGB. PREISFREUND added:
[6261]| ¥"Kecording to NOSENKO, this was Irina LEBEDOVSKAYA, an
[6263](c) Information from PREISFREUND
[6265]CIA initially interviewed PREISFREUND on 8 July 1965 in
[6266]Helsinki. (NOSENKO himself had suggested that PREISFREUND
[6267]would confirm his story of the STORSBERG case.) During this
[6269]first meeting with him, PREISFREUND correctly identified photo-
[6270]graphs of KOVSHUK, NOSENKO, and STORSBERG. He maintained, how-
[6271]ever, that his relationship with KOVSHUK and NOSENKO was strictly
[6272]on a business level, that he had never had anything to do with :
[6273]the KGB, and that he did not know what the initials "KGB" stand. .-
[6274]for. Toward the end of this meeting, PREISFREUND allowed that
[6276]he may have been unwittingly involved in some activity acainst
[6277]STORSBERG and agreed to tell the "entire truth” the following day.
[6279]ces eetenereeep te
[6281]On 9 July 1965 PREISFREUND described how he had been caught
[6282]in a blackmarket opgraticn in Moscow and was, on this basis, re-
[6283]cruited by KOVSHUK “either at the end of 1959 or early 1960." ;
[6284]Several weeks later, he said, he was approached by NOSENKO who '
[6285]explained that KOVSHUK was unavailable and that the KGS wanted
[6286]him, PREISFREUND, to arrange an introduction between STORSBERG
[6287]and a Soviet female, Irina, the daughter of a Soviet general.*
[6289]PREISFREUND then left Moscow, and when he returned about two
[6291]months later, he took STO2SBERG to che Peking Restaurant, where ;
[6292]the introduction was effected. PREISFREUND, STORSBERG, Irina, :
[6293]and another girl then went to PREISFREUND's hotel, where STORS- :
[6294]BERG and Irina were intimate. |
[6298]PREISFREUND said on 10 July 1965 that he was fairly certain ;
[6299]his vecruitment took place in early 1960, probably in March or _— :
[6300]April. At the time KOVSHLK had refused to explain what: the KGB |
[6301]wanted him to do; he said only that they would talk about it a”
[6302]later but assured PREISFREUND that he would not be asked to
[6303]undertake anything detrimental to Finnish interests; nor did
[6304]KOVSHUK establish any means of communications with PREISFREUND,
[6305]telling him only that the KGB would know where to find nim.
[6306]PREISFREUND subsequently visited the USSR on several occasions,
[6307]but no contacts were made. Just as he was beginning to believe
[6308]that the affair had been forgotten, NOSENKO contacted him at
[6309]his room in the Berlin Hotel in Moscow. Asked tc explain his
[6310]earlier statement that NOSENKO first met with him two weeks
[6311]after the recruitment, PREISFREUND said he could not remember
[6312]exactly how long it was, but that it was definitely on another
[6313]trip to Moscow and that it was probably several months later.
[6315]2 wan nada Ayr ta le
[6317]PREISFREUND was asked how he had first met STORSBERG. . He
[6318]first replied that it had been at America House and recalled,
[6319]that NOSENKO had simply told him to go there and "find Jim;"
[6320]it was only with some difficulty that he finally managed to
[6321]strike up an acquaintance at the bar. On second thought, PREIS-—
[6322]PREUND said, he may have first met STORSBERG at the sauna in
[6323]the Finnish Embassy in Moscow through a mutual Finnish acquaint-
[6324]ance. Throughout this initial period, NOSENKO and KOVSHUK made
[6325]repeated promises that once the introduction of STORSBERG to
[6326]the Soviet female had been accomplished, there would be no more
[6328]agent of the U.S. Embassy Section who was. handled by A.V
[6329].SUNTSOV.. .. . -.. 7 re et
[6331]14-0008, 4 Gt
[6333]-
[6335]-me about helping me out in iny cusiness ‘and 50.0N,. ‘but they never
[6336]did a damn thing for me, “On the contrary. The comly promise they:
[6337]“kept was that I would not. be asked to'’do anything except the
[6339]_ signed visas. He was told this was correct and was asked for
[6340]>the true name. PREISPREUND replied: “GOLUB? Yes?"
[6342]“that the Soviet authorities suspected him of complicity in
[6344]‘coming trip.*** He said that he was F2 reicularly concerned about
[6346]"Both. NOSENKO and FOVSHUK: used. to “make. all. ‘sort of. promises ‘to.
[6348]STORSBERG job. But, as for the rest of it, they didn’ t help me
[6349]at all.”
[6351]. PREISPREUND was eventually successful, he said, in introduce
[6352]ing STOPSBERG to Irina as NOSENVO wished and the three of then
[6353]returned to PREISFRELO's hetel room on a summer evening. PREIS~
[6354]FREUND slept in the hotel corridor while STORSBERG and Irina
[6355]shared his bed. We told his CiA interviewers on 16 July 1965 ‘
[6356]that at one poiat during the evening he cauyht a glimpse of | . i
[6358]no epee ne iene ecimnremnar 1a
[6360]NOSENKO in the corridor wearing a rubber. apren and from this de-
[6361]duced that NOSENNO hal been teking surreptitious photographs of
[6363]STORES BERG and Trins vogether.* On ord
[6364]SHUK, it was the last time he
[6366]:rs from NOSENKO ara nove
[6367]IHERG, **
[6369]meeting PREISEREUNS
[6371]Toward the end of the i0
[6372]2 recruitment and
[6374]said that about six nontia «
[6376]the beginning of his involveme GS. "The jcb," he i
[6377]said, "dragged cut & long time i that this was 4
[6378]the only operation in-wnich he parc foipoted and that he aad :
[6380]toid to the beet of his ability all he knew of it. He acmitted
[6381]that he was a heavy drinker and said thet for thiz reazon he
[6382]could not be Sure abcut his dates. PHREISFRNUND added that he
[6383]would not have forgotten, however, if he had performed other
[6384]services for the K&B.
[6386]PREISFREUND was shown GOLIUSYN's photograph and remarxed:
[6387]“das he here ‘lin Finland)? I doa't know nin." Shown the photo-
[6388]graph during a later meeting, he said that he had once invited
[6389]a large group of Soviets to go fishing with him in Finland and
[6390]that this perscn may have been acong them. When given the name
[6391]KLIMOV, which GOLITSYN used in Finland in 1960 and 1961, and
[6392]told that it was an alias, PREISFREUND asked whether KLIMOV had
[6394]At the close cf the 10 July 1°55 meeting, PREISFREUND men-
[6395]tioned to his interviewers that he was planning to travel to
[6396]Leningrad by automotile with his family for about five days,
[6397]beginning on or about 23 July. He said that he had learned from
[6398]his business contacts in Moscow and from hotel personnal there
[6400]NOSENKO's defection and was therefore apprehensive of the forth-
[6402]* ROSELKO has not mentioned this.
[6404]‘ee ‘PREISFREUND could not date this ‘occasién precisely; he said
[6405]it was eae before the | time he. ner e caused a
[6407]sions with v. Ya. CRE
[6408]Guards), Directorate § : :
[6409]‘sentative of that servi ° for whom
[6410]PREISFREUND was. working during. “his frequent visits. to the
[6411]Cnviet Union. CHEKALOV. told .the. representative of the @agr”
[6413]of American ‘Intelligence.
[6415]14-00000 . * -
[6417]what his response should be if the KGS accused him of confessing
[6418]to American Intelligence and asxed his interviewers to brief —
[6419]him in this regard. Ouring the final CIA meeting on 13 July
[6420]1965 PREISFREUND said that he had decided that the situation
[6422]was too dangerous; he would not be going to the USSR after all.
[6423]Reliable information shows, however, that he did go to the Sov- i i
[6424]jet Union several days later, returning to Helsinki on 24 July oe :
[6425]1965. .
[6429]I ee
[6434]er
[6437]14-0000 a a EE ee YY 4
[6439]aaa ||) SECRET + anes RTE ALR GINO OL i AAD AES SO ga NEON te FP 4 SR RENAE NS
[6441]tee a
[6443], . 4
[6444]7 boon al
[6446]|
[6447]6
[6448]182. i
[6449](d) Information from GOLITSYN
[6451]GOLITSYN, who had served the ¥GB most recently as a counter-
[6452]intelligence officer in Heisinki during 1966 and 1961, reported
[6453]separately two possibly related leads to operations against Am-~-
[6454]erican personnel assigned to the United States Enbassy in Moscow,
[6455]One of these was a developmental operation against a military
[6456]code clerk which the KGB felt was aimost certain of success, the.
[6457]other a recruitment approach to an Emoassy employee which GOLIT-
[6458]SYN was told had beén successful. GOLiTSYN learned these two oo 4
[6459]items of information from different Kivu Second Cnief Directorate |
[6460]officers at different times.
[6462]Font base ne nee aitinte ebb
[6464]GOLITSYN provided the first of these leads on 23 December i
[6465]1961, when he reported information he said he Learned during 3
[6466]conversations with his perscnal friend GRYAZNOY at KGR Heada-
[6468]quarters in Moscow some time between April and July 1966.* At
[6470]that time GOLIPSYN was visiting the American Pepartihent of the
[6472]Second Chief Directorate in connection vith his preparations
[6474]for assignment in Helsinki as a First Chief Cirrectcrate counter-
[6476]intelligence officer. GRYAZNOV told GOLITSY: that he, GRYAZNOV,
[6478]had personally prepared an cperation involving an American mili-
[6480]tary code clerk to the point that the KGB was "99 per cent sure"
[6482]that the recruitment approacn to this code clerk would be suc-
[6484]cessful. GOLITSYN subsequently narrcewed the time of his conver-
[6486]gation with GRYA2NOV down tc "April or May 1960" and quoted
[6488]GRYAZNOV as saying that the KGB "is certain that the recruitment :
[6489]is preparea and will be successful." GOLITSYN also said that .
[6490]the recruitment plan for this operation "evidently involved a .
[6491]woman," but could provide no further details. During these same
[6492]talks, according to GOLITSYN, GRYAZNOV said that although the
[6493]KGB had earlier recruited U.S. Department of State code Clerks
[6494]in Moscow, this would be the first recruitment of a code clerk
[6495]in the office of the American Military Attache since the estab-
[6496]lishment of the Second Cniecf Directorate's American Department
[6497](in the 1940's). i
[6499]GOLITSYN reported on the second operation on 26 February
[6501]1962, while discussing the KGB agent PREISFREUND. GOLI'TSYN
[6502]said that he first met PREISFREUND when the latter went to the
[6503]Soviet Embassy in Helsinki in connection with an application
[6504]for travel to the USSR. On several later occasions, GOLITSYN
[6505]said, the two men had drinks together in Helsinki cafes.
[6506]According to GOLITSYN, PREISFREUND had been used in the recruit-
[6507]ment in Moscow of at least one American who “could have been a
[6508]code clerk or a diplomat." He also knew that the recruitment
[6509]had been accomplished "in 1960, at the end of 1960" and that
[6511]. PREISFREUND, having met the target at America House in Moscow,
[6512]had helped to set up the target for the recrurtment approach
[6513]by involving him in speculatory activities and by arranging his
[6514]introduction to various KGB female agents. GOLITSYN thought
[6515]that PREISFREUND had dropped out of the case after “he had helped
[6516]to create the circumstances" and had not taken a direct part in
[6518]t
[6519]i
[6522]a
[6524]I ®Acecording to NOSENKO, he himself was GRYAZNOV's superior at :
[6525]} : this time. NOSENKO did not recall visits by GOLITSYN to the
[6526]U.S. Embassy Section in 1960.
[6528]Veber one
[6530]183.
[6532]the approach, which «as made by KGB officers.
[6533]by the FBI on 18 Jun ; 2 é
[6535]AS
[6537]Thie second leac, GOLITSY! said, stemmed frcm his conversa-
[6538]tions with KOVSNUK whom he said was the "assistant" (chief) of
[6539]--the American Department,* while GOLITSIN was temporarily in Moscow
[6540]during "December 1960."** GOLITSYN related that he had visited
[6541]the American Department to request permission to use PREISFREUND
[6542]operationally in Helsinki. This request was refused with the
[6543]explanaticn: “You see, he (PREISFREUND) helped us in one recruit-
[6544]ment now, and it is necessary to be cereful for amut six months
[6546]_ : i
[6547]apliidis, osdaciviticisias  abealllly
[6549]jase boar wnnebdL Biba,
[6551]* GOLITSYN could mean either Pemoshchik (assistant)or Zames-itel' ;
[6552](deputy). The CHEREPANOV papers snow that KOVSHUK was Deputy :
[6553]Chief of the Department as late us 1959, NOSENKO said that, as 3
[6554]a result of a drinking incident, ZOVSHUK was demoted from De- A
[6555]puty Chief of the American Department to Chief of its American : _ ot
[6556]Embassy Section in 1959 and hetd this position until early 1962,
[6558]GOLITSYN said he had known KOVSIUK for about ten years and i
[6559]characterized him as a capable officer with about 15 years of ‘
[6560]KGB experience, at least ten of them in the American Department,
[6562]Seconé Chief Directorate. In about 1956, according to GOLITSYN, :
[6563]KOVSHUK was handling KG3 agent Henry SHAPIRO. CiA records show |
[6564]that in addition, KOVSHUK was involved in the Mcscow and Wash- fos
[6565]ington phases of the "ANOREY" case (he was identified by Dayle '
[6566]SMITH; see Part VI.BD.3.b.) and in the Zevelopment in Moscow of :
[6567]CIA officer George WINTERS (who identified his photograph; see i
[6568]Part VI.D.7.c.). According io NOSEWKO, KOVSHUK took personal
[6570]part in the recruitments of Roy REODES and Dayle SMI7H, in the
[6572]approach to Army Attache Walter MULE, code clerk Louis MANNHEIM,
[6574]State Department Officer Richar2 HARMSTONE, and code clerk
[6576]James STORSBERG, and in the interrogations of CIA officers
[6578]Russell] LANGELLE and Richard JACOB,
[6580]be tanestbadeisngy atone
[6582]elit Les
[6584]**GOLITSYN's passport and travel records heid by CIA confirm that | 4
[6585]GOLITSYN travelled only twice to the Soviet Union after his :
[6586]arrival in. Helsinki on 20 July 1960. The first of these trips
[6588]_ was on 19 January 1961, «hen he flew directly from Helsinki to
[6590]Moscow; he returned to Helsinki by rail a week later, on 28
[6592]January. GOLITSYN's second trip to the Soviet Union was from
[6594]9 to 15 April 1961, when he appears to have spent all or most
[6596]ef this period in Leningrad. A Finnish national, whom GOLITSYN
[6598]had been developing in Helsinki, has reported that he met with
[6600]GOLITSYN in Leningrad on a daily basis from 10 through 13 April
[6602]1961. Moreover, GOLITSYN has never mentioned being in Moscow
[6604]during this time. ‘Since GOLITSYN remained in Helsinki from
[6606]April until December 1961, when he defected, it appears that
[6608]he erred by one month in reporting the date of his conversa- ‘
[6610]- tiona in the American Department and that he learned of the :
[6612]*.geecond lead some time during the week of 19 January 1961. This.
[6614]is the same conversation of which NOSENKO spoke several times ~
[6616]in 1962 and subsequently (see above). NOSENKO has always
[6618]Maintained that’ he was’ out of Moscow on leave at the time of
[6620]" GOLITSYN's visit and that this was in the summer of 1961. When
[6622]he was told in February 1965 that GOLITSYN was in Moscow. in..
[6624]January i961, NOSENKO replied that CIA was either wrong or |.
[6626]Was attempting to deceive him. NOSENKO declined to change. -
[6628]his. story of the summer leave. ke
[6631]isa.
[6633](e) Information from other Sources
[6635]; Infornation available to CIA indicates that the Attaches of"
[6636]the three U.S. military services represented in Moscow shared :
[6638]a single cryptographic center as of 1960 and 1961 and that,
[6639]except for overlapping assignients during periods of turnover,
[6641]there was normally only one military code clerk assigned to the
[6642]_ Embassy at any particalar time. This military coce clerk was
[6644]responsible for enciphering and deciphering the traffic of all
[6645]In practice, at least one other men-
[6647]three military services.
[6648]Ler of the Attache staff in Moscow has held a cryptographic
[6650]clearance and has been trained and has performed the function -
[6652]of back-up for the military code clerk during periods of the
[6653]latter's absence from the Moscow Embassy or inability to per-
[6654]form his functions for other reasons. ‘
[6656]STORSBERG was the only military code clerk assigned to the
[6657]Moscow Embassy from February 1960, when his predecessor, Everett
[6658]HOBSON, was reassigned, until September 1961, when his successor,
[6659]Mathew Z2UJUS, arrived. STORSBERG himself arrived in Moscow in
[6661],
[6663]January 1960 and departed in November 1961.
[6665]4
[6667]During the period of STORSBERG’s tour in Moscew, back-up
[6668]cryptographic duties
[6670]a number of occasions, including the night of the approach to
[6672]STORSBERG, and he could be loosely termed a code clerk.* Addi-
[6673]tionally, he performed repair work on the cryptographic machines
[6674]and directed certain other sensitive activities at the Embassy.
[6676]HURLEY's tour in Moscow began shortly before: STORSBERG's, in
[6677]December 1959, and he served there until June or July 1962.
[6679]The only other person performing official functions in the
[6680]1960-1961 period was James KEYSERS,
[6682]military code room during the
[6683]who arrived in Moscow on 22 December 1960 and was assigned to
[6685]the office of the Air Force Medical Officer. As a concurrent
[6686]secondary assignment, KEYSERS worked as a clerk-typist in the
[6688]office of the Air Attache. Prom February until mid-April 1961,
[6689]as a collateral duty, KEYSERS worked in the joint military code
[6690]room where he was in training to serve as back-up cryptographer.
[6692]He was relieved of this duty in April 1961 for reasons of low
[6694]¥—ithough NOSENKO has distinguished between STORSBERG's func-
[6695]tion as "military code clerk" and HURLEY's duties as “mili-
[6697]tary code machine mechanic,” he said on one occasion that
[6698]he considered both to be within the general category of
[6700]"military code clerks." NOSENKO reported that there was no
[6702]KGB operation against HURLEY.
[6704]se renner a nape
[6706]were performed by the Military Communica-
[6707]tions Officer, CWO-2 HURLEY. HURLEY performed these duties on
[6709]ine bide aber HIS CI RL a
[6711]4
[6713]|
[6718]14-0000
[6720]ine on
[6723]185.
[6725]aptitude and lack of interest; in June 1961 he was removed from
[6726]Moscow because of reported homosexual activities.*
[6728]ene ere
[6730]i
[6731]|
[6732]NOSENKO has described an cperation against KEYSERS (see |
[6733]7 ' below), but because of the date of KEYSERS* arrival in Moscow, i
[6734]he must be ruled out as a candidate for the first of GOLIT-
[6735]SYN's two leads discussed above. On the basis of available
[6736]information, it appears that the subject of this lead must f
[6737]have been either STORSBERG or HURLEY, the only two "military |
[6739]4
[6740]1
[6742]code clerks" in Moscow in the spring of 1960, The subject
[6743]of GOLITSYN's second lead could have been STOPSBERG, HURLEY,
[6744]or, in fact, anyone else at the Enbassy, although GOLITSYN
[6745]suggested that he might be a code clerk and might be a mili-
[6746]tary man. 3y his statement that there was no KGB operation
[6747]against HURLEY, together with his description of the opera-
[6748]tion against STORSBERG beginning in the spring of 1960 and
[6749]his (and PREISFREUND's) assertion that PREISFREUND took part
[6750]in only one operation for the KGB--that against STORSBERG--
[6751]‘ NOSENKO has said in effect that both of GOLITSYN's leads were
[6752]: to the STORSBERG cperation, which ended in failure. This con-
[6753]oo" €licts with GOLITSYN's report that PREISFREUND was involved
[6754]: in a successful recruitment operation in late 1960. There are
[6755]also inconsistencies between the NOSENKO and GOLITSYN leads .
[6756]as regards the progress. of the operation. .GOLITSYN reported Pen
[6757]_ that recruitment of a code clerk was. "99 per cent" assured
[6758]in May-June 1960, whereas NOSENKO and PREISFREUND describe
[6759]-an operation which, at best, was just becoming active at that Le
[6760]time. GOLITSYN, in reporting his second lead, said that the *
[6761]. operation in which PREISFREUND participated culminated "in 4
[6762]- late 1960;" NOSENKO reported that the only’ operation in which
[6763]PREISFREUND took part ended in an unsuccessful approach to
[6764]STORSBERG in “mid-1961° or,..on other occasions, in "autumn
[6765]1961." MT
[6767]wacdasieciil
[6772]14-0000
[6774]TDY's by KOSOLAPOV on Code Clerk Cases:
[6776](444)
[6777](a) «Introduction
[6779]. According to NOSENKO, the U.S. Embassy Section officer
[6780]KOSOLAPOYV travelled only once to Helsinki, and KOSOLAPOV at:
[6781]that time succeeded in his mission of accompanying--together
[6782]with a KGB female agent--a suspected American code clerk, Paul
[6783]Prancis JENNER, by train to Moscow. (The KGB later learned
[6784]that JENNER was nct a code clerx but a pouch clerk who also met
[6785]couriers at the Moscow airport, NOSENKO said, and this KGB igen-
[6786]tification of JENNER's specialty is confirmed by U.S, Department
[6787]of State files.) The report by NOSENXO on KOSCLAPOV is contra-~
[6788]dicted Ly two sources, travel records available to CIA and the
[6789]KGB defector GOLITSYN.
[6793]Sith
[6799]A
[6801]Statements made by JENNER in 1960 and 1962 parallel those i
[6802]of NOSENKO in 1964 and 1965 to the extent that two young Soviets,
[6803]aman and a woman, did converse with him on the train, and later
[6804]JENNER did encounter the same woman at a Moscow airport. Never- - |
[6805]theless, travei records contradict NOSENKO's statement that
[6806]KOSOLAPOV was the Soviet male aboard the train with JENNER on the
[6808]' 24-hovr journey. : .
[6812]Although NOSENKO insisted that KOSOLAPOV was on a single
[6813]TDY to Finland, in early 1960, travel records show that KOSOLA-
[6814]POV (under a different identity) went to Helsinki in both the
[6815]Spring and fall of 1960. Travel records on the second Helsinki
[6816]TDY Sy KOSOLAPCV, on which NOSENKO has not reported, are borne
[6817]out by GOLITSYN. GOLITSYN said that KOSOLAPOV, in order to lay
[6818]the groundwork fcr a future relationship in Moscow, accompanied
[6819]a U.S. Embassy code clerk by train from Helsinki about November
[6820]196C, or perhaps as late as the beginning of 1561. Again on
[6821]the basis of travel records, it has been determined that on
[6822]16 November 1960 KOSOLAPOV was a fellow passenger of an American
[6823]code clerk named John W. GARLAND on the daily train from Hel-
[6824]sinki to Moscow.
[6826]EEN eRe peeneee ene T He ni en
[6828]rasta yre bent te
[6830]The following discussion of the TDY's of KOSOLAPOV is
[6831]divided into three parts: KOSOLAPOV's false identity for
[6832]travel, the early 1969 TDY, and the November 1960 TOY. Each
[6833]part incorporates the information from all sources, including
[6834]NOSENKO. . .
[6836](b) Palse Identity for Travel
[6838]Vadim Viktorovich KOSOLAPOV was born in Perm' on 19 Febru-
[6839]ary .1928. According to travel records, one Viktor Dmitriyevich . a
[6840]KOLOSOV, born in Perm‘ on 19 March 1927, was in Finland from
[6841]31 March to 2 Arril 1960, in Finland from 12 to 16 November 1960,
[6842]-and in Denmark from 25 October to 1 November 1961.* In July 1965,
[6843]Johan PREISFREUND (see Part V.E.3.c.ii.,on STORSBERG operation)
[6844]identified for CIA a photograph of KOLOSOV as that of a KGB offi-
[6845]cer named Vadim (last name unknown) who approached him in Moscow
[6847]-. FNOSENKO reported that KOSOLAPOV travelled to Copenhagen in
[6849]- 1961 to recontact the YOUNGERs, an American man and wife who
[6851]"were arrested for espionage and recruited by the KGB while_
[6852]touring the USSR in 1961 (see Part VI.D.2.).0° 2 3
[6855]14-0000
[6857]in the fall of 1954 to ask whetlier ne knew anything about NOSENKO's
[6858]defecticn. Shewn KOLGSOV's photograph in Octcher. 1966, NOSENKO
[6859]innediately icentified Ain ‘as: KOSOLAPOV. a “4
[6862]atiy Cin prepare
[6864]Toteccs, wien KessakO read if signed, corroborating its accu- |
[6865]racy. This protccol reads: | ; . aa
[6866]“I do not knew about this trip of KOSOLAPOV's to i 4
[6867]Helsinki in Novemker 1969, I do not know that he i 3
[6869]accompanied a cciz clerk back to Moscow at thut time.
[6871]be od
[6873]“Y wos KOSCLAPCV's direct supervisor from January $
[6875]1960 to January 13€2 anc would have to know and approve 4
[6877]any operaticrai cwravel by KOSOLAPSY outsice the USSR. 4
[6879]In the case of his trip in March 1960 to Helsinki te : “4
[6880]accompany Paul JE TR, I talked with him about it, and -
[6881]then approved after he wrote it, tne cable to the Hei- :
[6883]» Sinki rvesidenzura (Legal Residency) informing thei of j
[6884]his mis¢cic i course received ais report after” 4
[6885]the trip. i
[6887]1 2
[6889]' "Normaliy, I would know about iprvove this trip ‘ ?
[6890]in advance. If I were away at the ¢ , rormally I i j
[6891]would hava heard about the trip upon ry re EUurn. How= !
[6893]ever, I cont: rement anything about wiis in either
[6895]hetore or after nos CV's trip to leinxi- If ther i {
[6896]were further developments in this case, i certainly | '
[6897]would have known about them."* : r 4
[6899]a
[6901](c) The Early 21960 TDY (JENNER _Case 3
[6902]| |
[6904]i
[6906]SENKO reminded Ais interviewer that he had travelled to
[6907]Cuba in November 1960. He was toid that CIA travel records
[6908]show that he trensitt ted Amsterdam cn a direct flight to Cuba
[6909]from Moscow on 15 November 1960, three days after KOSOLAPOV - panne ste
[6910]arrived in Helsinki. NOSENKO was then asked if he would have
[6911]learned of the trip in any case, whether or not he was in
[6912]Moscow, and he stated. that -he would have... 0. | :
[6915]14-D0800 |
[6917]NOSENYO was interrogated by CIA on the JENNER case on
[6918]15 February 1965. On the basis of this interrogation, a proto-
[6919]col was drawn up in question-and~answer form, incorporating
[6920]NOSENKO's reepenses, end cn 1% February 1965, NOSENKO signed «: :
[6921]the protecol, atteuting to its accuracy. ‘he following is taken ‘
[6922]from this signed statement: -
[6924]Question: Did you supervise the work against JENNER?
[6926]NOSENKO: Yes.
[6928]Question: Did you read the file oa JENNER? |
[6930]|
[6932]NOSENKO: I dont remember.
[6934]NOSENKO: Yes, I read materiais on JENNER, everything which
[6936]westion: Did you read re,orts on JEWNER? '
[6938]~ di
[6940]NOSENKO 1 ia JENUE |
[6941]cane into the section on JENNER and the other code '
[6942]clerks.
[6944]Question: Did you ever see JENNER personally?
[6945]NOSENKO: Yes. We had his enketa [visa application]. .
[6946]Question: What was the operational plan on JENNER?
[6948]NOSENKO: Sefore his arrival we had onty the anketa, nothing
[6949]more. He was listed as secretary/arcaivist, * and
[6950]there was a date on this anketa which was the date
[6951]he was dve to cross the’ Finnish border--the ‘middle
[6952]of the month, the 15th. It was the beginning of
[6953]_ 1960, not long after I had arrived in the First
[6954]‘lie, - 4s 6 Department. We decided to create an active opera-
[6955]: ; tion. We knew the date, and we thought he was to
[6957]¥ The position Of secretary/archivist at the U.S. Embassy in
[6958]_ in Moscow was usuezlly occupied by a code clerk, but as pre
[6959]:  whously stated, this was not true in. JENNER'S .case.
[6962]i
[6963]H
[6965]i
[6966]H
[6967]i
[6969]H
[6975]be a code clerk, We wanted to send KOSOLAPOV to Hel-
[6976]- ginki with ‘the mission of returning with JENNER on: - |
[6977]the same train; during which time XOSOLAPOV was to
[6979]study his behavior. JENNER was young and so was
[6980]KOSOLAPOV. : . pee a
[6981]How old was JENNER at the time?
[6983]I don't know. We sent GRYAZNOV's agent, a ballerina,
[6985]to Vyborg as part of this operaticn. I think her
[6986]first name is Yeva, but I don't remember her last
[6988]- mame; her code name was "SOLISTKA"... She was placed
[6990]Question:
[6996]Question:
[7000]Question:
[7004]-. Question: .
[7006]4
[7008]on the train in Vyborg as if she nad been visiting
[7009]someone there and was returning to Moscow. The main
[7010]idea was to place an agent near JENNER before he
[7011]even arrived in ‘ioscow. .We wrote a proposal to the
[7012]Chairnan of the KGB-giving the reasons for doing this.
[7013]We explained that we had usually only one year in
[7014]which to work. The agent "SOLISTKA” met JENNER and
[7015]spoke with him. KOSOLAPOV also became acquainted
[7016]with JENNER and spoke with him, but I can't say that
[7017]they were all speaking together at one time. She
[7018]gave JENNER a telephone number.
[7020]A KGB telephone number?
[7022]Of course not; it was her own telephone number, but
[7023]he didn't call her. We then noticed that he wasn't
[7024]working in the code room but in the mail room. 0O.K.,
[7025]that was interesting too. We waited one or two
[7026]months for the call to come, but nothing happened.
[7027]When JENNER once went to the railroad station or
[7028]airport alone to meet the couriers, we sent her with
[7029]GRYAZNOV by car in an attempt to have them meet
[7030]again. JENNER saw her but aid not approach [her].
[7031]Instead, he turned in the other direction. Only
[7032]later did we learn that he is a very quiet person.
[7033]There was nothing else on JENNER at all except a
[7034]suspicion that he may have been a homosexual, but
[7035]there was no proof. He was like a child.
[7037]How much time did you have between the time of the
[7038]anketa's arrival and the time of JENNER'S arrival?
[7040]A month, plenty of time to prepare.
[7042]A month?
[7044]-Well, approximately a month. The usual approval
[7046]from the Central Committee was necessary so that
[7047]KOSOLAPOV could go abroad. .
[7049]Who wrote this?
[7051]I prepared the kharakteristika’lofficial form) on
[7052]KOSOLAPOV for this TDY and gave it to the Personnel
[7053]Office. oy re :
[7055]JENNER?
[7057]Whose idea was it for this Helsinki operation against ‘
[7059]i
[7060]i
[7061]i
[7063]lie
[7065]werbalbbDesielie! eile) tea ote
[7067]sonia debead lait, Ledeen bi,
[7071]oe ha nndig anal hg Shao Creal oo
[7073]bidet.
[7075]a aman db ie
[7081]“ WISENKO:
[7091]Question:
[7093]_ NOSENKO:
[7095]=“.
[7097]“It was the idea of ‘the group. |
[7099]“pid you advise KOSOLAPOV on: what his
[7101]before he left--what: he was to
[7103]Iwas discussing this case with GRYAZNOV and xOSO-
[7105]“role was. to be
[7106]do?
[7108]LAPOV, and maybe we discussed it with KOVSHUK on the
[7110]day. before KOSOLAPOV left.
[7112]Was “SOLISTKA" an experiencac agent?
[7114]She had been working before 19
[7115]for how long.
[7117]Who handled her before GRYAZNO
[7118]I don't know.
[7120]How did you coordinate this tr
[7122]- other units, for example, with
[7124]Directorate (FCD)?
[7126]KOSOLAPOV wrote a cable saying
[7127]for two or three days.
[7129]Did you approve this cable?
[7131]I didn't sign it, but I read i
[7132]to KLYPIN for his signature.
[7133]KOSOLAPOV took it to the Secon
[7134]FcD.
[7136]What cover did KCSOLAPOV use f
[7137]I don't remember.
[7139]What name did KOSOLAPOV use?
[7141]I don't remember if he used hi
[7143]“What other correspondence was
[7145]Correspondence?
[7147]60, but I don't know
[7149]Vv?
[7151]ip of KOSOLAPOV'Ss with =
[7152]the [KGB] First Chief
[7154]that he was coming
[7155]t, and then we took it
[7157]Once it was signed,
[7158]d [European] Department,
[7160]or this trip?
[7162]Ss own name or.another.
[7164]there?
[7166]What other cables or letters were sent'to or rev
[7167]ceived from the Helsinki Rezidentura {Legal Resi-
[7169]dency of the KGB] concerning this operation, KOSOLAPOV'S
[7171]trip?
[7173]Only this cable, nothing else.
[7174]cuss with the Rezidentura the
[7176]- : KOSOLAPOV was to dis-
[7178]possibility of obtaining
[7180]their help in Helsinki with the work against code
[7181]clerks, to seewhat agents they had, or. to study the
[7183]situation, the possibilities.
[7185]against the code clerks in hotels and restaurants,
[7186]' to use girls... TR
[7188]with whom was KOSOLAPOV to speak in Helsinki?
[7190]oY 4
[7192]‘We wanted to use agents
[7194]i
[7195]t
[7196]‘|
[7201]14-p0600
[7205]Question:
[7209]Question:
[7210]. NCSENKO:
[7211]Question:
[7213]NOSENKO 3
[7215]Question:
[7217]Question:
[7219]Question:
[7222]Question:
[7225]' Question:
[7227]Question:
[7231]He spoke with the Resident. and the teputy Resident.
[7232]He discussed this question with them.and they said.
[7234]oe Also on 15 February 1965 NOSENKO made the following addi-
[7235]: tional statement not included
[7238]they would see about it, but we were told that the,
[7239]Residency has more important questions. - :
[7241]What was more important than the work against code
[7242]clerks?
[7244]They didn't tell us.
[7246]| eee epee tie»
[7248]at
[7250]Well, wasn't there some sign, some hint as to what
[7251]was so important?
[7255]me
[7257]te
[7259]Coée clerks in Helsinki would be more important for
[7260]them; this-is the work of the FCP.
[7262]How did KOSOLAPOV know how to find JENNER, to. recog-
[7263]nize him and make costact?
[7265]Reatrarty cas copra er
[7267]KOSOLAPOV ‘had his photograph, knew his name, and
[7268]with the help of the Residency, I think, they found : i
[7269]out at the railroad station who was going on the
[7271]train. Then they bought a ticket on the same train : s
[7272]for KOSOLAPOV. We knew JENNER must cross on the ‘ i
[7275]When did KOSOLAPOV leave for his trip to Helsinki? . i
[7276]I don't know. : i
[7277]When did he return?
[7279]I don't know, don't remember.
[7281]How long was KOSOLAPOV gone in all?
[7283]About one week, not more than one week counting
[7284]travel time.
[7286]How did KOSOLAPOV travel to Helsinki?
[7288]By train, both ways.
[7290]was he alone on the way down or did someone go with
[7291]him?
[7293]How did you arrange for "SOLISTKA" to board the howe i
[7295]He was alone. an o, ; |
[7296]right train? : : aah
[7298]GRYAZNOV sent "SOLISTKA" alone to Vyborg and had the oo rp ofe,
[7299]local KGB:officers there meet her and place her on” | . i
[7301]the correct train. They knew the date and would  - we
[7302]establish the fact that KOSOLAPOV > was on that train
[7304]before Placing her aboard...
[7306]in the protocol: “The agent was
[7307]She was GRYAZNOV's agent even before 1960. GRYAZ-
[7309]NOV. briefed her for the. mission...” ROSOLAPOV wrote a. report. on
[7312]clap fRAS
[7314]tee
[7316]his: trip.
[7320]_ gave a report: to GRYAZNCY, “but there: was ‘Rothing: there, either.*
[7322]: NOSENKO was ‘questioned « on "20° ‘October "1966 ‘about’ his. respon- .
[7323]sibility for and knowledgeability of. KGB. operations against —
[7324]American code clerks.
[7326]He was required to give only brief answers, a
[7328]without discussion, to specific questions. The CIA questions. i
[7330]and his answers were as: follows:
[7338]Question:
[7342]Question:
[7346]Question:
[7352]Question:
[7356]Question:
[7360]Question:
[7364]Question:
[7367]Dia you supervise all ‘code ‘clerk operations in 1960
[7368]and 1961?
[7370]Yes.
[7372]Were GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAP:V your subordinates during
[7373]this period?
[7375]Yes.
[7377]Kow many times did KOSOLAPOV travel to Helsinki in
[7378]order to travel to Moscow on the train with Ameri-
[7380]can code clerks?
[7382]I know of one.
[7384]When was that? Which one?
[7386]set abie th es tleteae tye
[7388]Don't remember. 15 March or April 1960,
[7390]Which code clerk?
[7394]It wasn't a code clerk. When he arrived it was found i
[7395]that he worked with the mail. He came as a secre- i
[7396]tary/archivist and the First [U.S. Embassy] Section :
[7397]thought he is a code clerk. Found out later that he pos
[7398]worked on the mail.
[7400]ne ab te era
[7402]JENNER?
[7404]Yes.
[7406]Bo you know of any others?
[7408]No. What do you mean?
[7410]Only one? ; - . . a oe
[7412]Only one--JENNER.
[7414]Was the operation successful?
[7416]No it wasn't successful. But it. was interesting.
[7417]It was the first: “try to send an | officer ‘to Helsinkig®
[7421]When ‘aia it happen? . oe _ Tose, en ar
[7423]- First part of: 1960. I think apeconinately: 15 March
[7425]or April.
[7427]* Other: than, the trip t to meet JENNER, did } KOSOLAPOV
[7428]make other" trips abroad?’ :
[7430]14-00000
[7432]oe te
[7435]st
[7439]2
[7440]1
[7444]vos : Helsinki, that he was going to Helsinki.:.-
[7446]\ oe . . x
[7448]"we went to Copenhagen to meet this couple ithe YOUNGERS)
[7450]and was in the United States at one of the General
[7452], Assemblies. That's all. That was in the ‘50's. No.
[7453]_others. : ~ Ce a
[7455]‘Did KOSGLAPOV personally meet JENNER?
[7456]Yes.
[7457]Did you read his report of this meeting?
[7459]Yes.
[7461]on 26 October 1966 NOSENKO was shown the KOLOSOV photo-
[7463]the first time, the following discussion ensued:
[7465]Do you know the person in this photograph, number 17
[7466][Vixtor Dmitriyevich KOLOSOV, empioyee of Vneshtorg,
[7467]born 19 March 1927 in Perm, USSR)? .
[7469]KOSOLAPOV, Vadim KOSOLAPOV, the former case officer
[7471]of First Chief Directorate, First Department. From-
[7472]'59, the end of '59, case officer of the First Depart-
[7473]ment, Second Chief Directorate.
[7475]We have information that a Viktor--
[7476](interrupts) Vadim Viktorovich.
[7478]Anything else you want to say about the name?
[7479]KOSOLAPOV.
[7481]Concerning his travel to Helsinki by train in March
[7482]of 1960 under cover of Vneshtorg, does that mean
[7483]anything to you?
[7485]I was telling you that there was trip when he was
[7486]returning with Paul JENNER.
[7488]JENNER, the code clerk?
[7490]He was secretary/archivist, but he wasn't working as
[7491]a code clerk. He was working with mail. _ '
[7493]Well, according to official records he arrived in
[7494]Helsinki by train from.Moscow. so
[7496]mF
[7499]“Yes.
[7501]Yoon
[7503]On the 3ist of March 1960.
[7505]TNS +
[7507]“mM
[7509]Yes. ae
[7511]And he went to meet JENNER, to come back on the
[7512]train with him. Right?
[7514]‘= was ‘thinking and I'm not sure. ‘60 or ‘61. I'm:
[7515]‘not sure. "G0 or '61. I'm not sure. I'm not sure
[7517]*60 or ‘61. I was telling '60, but i‘m net sure.
[7518]Anyway, I cannot tell exactly. I know he was in
[7523]ye
[7524]A tne.
[7526]co i
[7528]Fes
[7530]i
[7531]i
[7532]H
[7533]H
[7536]i
[7538]Fl
[7539]4
[7541]a
[7542]a
[7544]4
[7546]Zein
[7548]14-0000 | *
[7550]2CRET.
[7552]_ Finnish Travel Manifests for 31 Haren anc! 2 April 1960 (See.
[7554]‘Part V.E.3. e.iii) ; an
[7556]31 March 1960 :
[7558]fatale O Geet ee
[7562]Lonticle watkastaji-te, yo ts Toperta jouee homme . 1
[7566]| Keedcap Tertoleosc ee . Lm 4 :
[7567]a '22,.05.27 | Rsittom it. - Mets. Ie 7
[7569]. Laspcatcea: - - Seren
[7570]8.12.26 | Jzezsam Jaeasua-tosr. alee (sort. vis.
[7572]syractritecores  |Rsgv.vits.)
[7574]‘ inemtaeand, Alses Tiltcla
[7575]. Udearpiatett, Golia _
[7578]st | - JUK SEGRE), .
[7579]se ate ALG RGR EA EE Mad 2 RRR REA TELS NE A
[7581]PEE DORR ES BEN RPE ETD “3 a
[7583]194. .
[7585]Question: It’s 1960. He made a trip in 1960, in March, to
[7586]Helsinki by train using this name, KOLOSOV, and us-
[7587]ing thig cover, Vneshtorg, and we also have a report
[7588]from official Finnish sources that he left Helsinki
[7589]by train on 2 April 1960 and went to Moscow. | “"\
[7591]NOSENKO: I don't remember the dates. Con't remember. Must
[7592]be 15 March or 1 April, 15 March or 1 April,
[7594]Question: No, he didn't arrive until 31 March. We have the
[7595]official record on his travel. We have his photo
[7596]here, which you just Saw.
[7598]<i eepeee merinentereae temyyetine
[7599]oe ee CSS et
[7601]NOSENKO: On the visa certificate, anketa, wich this picture i ‘ ‘
[7602]of Paul JENNER, it was sald tnat he must come; we : |
[7603]knew that he must come 1 April or 15 March, or some- -
[7604]thing of this kind. }
[7606]Question: But we have the official records showing KOLOSOV's,
[7607]or KOSOLAPOV's, arrival on 31 March.
[7609]NOSENKOtr I cannot give you any details. All T nave saic,
[7610]everything what I knew. If you need scmethinyg on
[7611]KOSOLAPGV, I will try to remember.
[7613]Question: The interesting thing is KOLOSOV, or KOSOLAPOV, left
[7614]Helsinki on 2 April. JENNER, Paul JENNER, according
[7615]to the same official sources, left Heisinki by train
[7616]to go to Moscow on the 3lst. Two days before.
[7618]NOSENKO: They were going in one train.
[7620]Question: They weren't even on the same train.
[7621]NOSENKO: Here, please, they were going in one train.
[7622]Question: KOSOLAPOV remained in Helsinki.
[7624]i NOSENKO=s (interrupts) KOSOLAPOV in one even carriage, in one
[7625]: even carriage with Paul JENNER, Then...
[7627]: Question: (interrupts) How do you know this for sure?
[7629]NOSENKO: I was reading his report after his coming. I was
[7630]reading also the agent's report of the female agent
[7631]who was put in this carriage, in this carriage in
[7632]this train, and at the station Vyborg, the first
[7633]Soviet station, Vyborg, where she was taken by
[7635]' GRYAZNOV, and was put in the same carriage, and she
[7637]: was acquainted with JENNER. And later, it was a
[7638]try, as I was telling, to show her to JENNER, but
[7639]JENNER didn't want to have a contact with her.
[7640]That's all. It was finished... And she was acquainted
[7641]with him and was speaking with JENNER, and KOSOLAPOV
[7642]himself was speaking with JENNER... I was reading
[7643]KOSOLAPOVts otchet [official account] about his [trip].
[7645]_ a Question: That's quite possible. It’s quite possible that they
[7647]- : gave you a report to read concerning this. But it .
[7649]ye, is a fact that official records show that the two men. +
[7650]_ were not on the same train. They were two days apart.
[7652]ry
[7654]SOSENKO : No (whispered).
[7657]WHS ZMZO: Ll don’t mow.
[7658]paella
[7660]** NOSENKO has mentioned
[7664]Question: JENNER Jeft on the 3ist.
[7666]I dcoa't know. I don't know. Maybe
[7667]this is a mistake of Pannish officials. i cen’t
[7668]but he was on the same train and he was return-
[7670]know,
[7671]xi with Paul JENNER. The sare train,
[7673]ing from Helsir.
[7674]“te te TEL SLED.
[7676]The remaining information on KOSOLAPOV's TDY in early 1960
[7678]comes from other sources:
[7680]- After arriving in Moscow on 1 April 1960, JENNER
[7681]reported that he was acproached on the train from Helsinki
[7682]by two young Russians, “a bey anc a girl, probably uni-
[7683]versity students."* The two Russians struck up a conver
[7684]gation and were soon paiting him on the question of racial
[7685]discrimination in the United States. They said that they
[7686]might see JENNER in Moscow. About three months later, on
[7687]29 June, SENKER was performing his normal duty of escort
[7688]ing Enbassy couriers to Sneremetevo Airport when he was
[7689]again approached by the kussian girl, Yuli, who acted
[7690]surprised to see hin and asked him to go outside to talk.
[7691]Yuli explained that she was waiting to say goodbye to a
[7692]friend wno was leaving on a flignt to irkutsk (JENNER had
[7693]seen tne Irkutsk flight Gapart a half hour earlier) and
[7694]told JENNER that her male companion on the train trip to
[7695]Moscow, Yura, had returned to his studies in Vyborg.
[7696]Interspersed with yuli's questions concerning JENNER'Ss
[7697]impressions and personal activities in Moscow were others
[7698]about how often he came to the airport and how he liked
[7699]his job at the Embassy. When JENNER said he must leave,
[7700]she geve him her telephone number in Moscow and insisted
[7701]that he call her.** She advised JENNER that "it would be
[7702]better if you did not mention our conversation to anyone."
[7704]jon about his Soviet companions on
[7705]the Moscow journey, JENNER also told U.S. Department of
[7706]State security officials about sexual advances made Ly
[7707]his first maid in Moscow and about provocative clothing
[7708]worn by his second maid. (NOSENKO has not indicated that
[7709]either of these two women was u KGB agent, but has said
[7710]in another context that ail maids of American code clerks
[7712]were KGB agents or informants.)
[7714]ed that I. Ye. SERGEYEV, a
[7715]1 in Helsinki, contacted
[7717]~- Besides informat
[7719]- CIA investigations show
[7720]KGB officer and the Soviet Consu
[7722]the police chief there on 31 Mare
[7723]ance in locating an American named Paul F. JENNER who was
[7725]due to arrive in Helsinki the day before.*** SERGEYEV
[7726]explained that he had some "business" with JENNER, but he
[7728]¥—KOSOLAPOV was 32 years of age at the time.
[7730]several times that GRYAZNOV's agent
[7731]“SOLISTKA" gave JENNER her telephone number.
[7733]the Helsinki police chief as a Soviet
[7735]Intelligence agent from “about 1945 on.”
[7737]h 1960 to ask his assist-
[7739]|
[7744]wet tt thine thet tnt
[7746]ay
[7748]ore
[7750]antes sii CHABa atl ado te
[7752]nck rte sat Lanne tad hee
[7755]4
[7756]4
[7757]i
[7761]cteet a ba OE cee
[7764]14-0000
[7770]OR EONS IEE PRE REIS RTE GEL ELIA IM I BE LTE AEE ALANS BIEN
[7772]St a ai ae Se
[7774]136.
[7776]did not specify its nature. Reportecly this was the first
[7777]time that SERGEYEV had made such a request cf the police
[7778]chief.?
[7780]tL
[7782]= CIA travel records sho: that GENNER arrived in Hel- a
[7783]sinki en route to Moscow on 3% March 1960 and ceparted Ly as
[7784]train the following day. KCSCLAPOV arrived in Helsinki F “
[7785]the same day that JENNER left, 31 March 1960, and remained : 3
[7786]there until 2 April 1969 when he too cepartec for Mosccw
[7787]py train. The Finnish train manifest for 31 March 1940
[7788]indicates that there was only cone passenger abcard the
[7789]daily train leaving Helsinki ior Moscow on this cate,
[7790]Paul JENNER, listed as a U.S. citizen and secretary/archi-~
[7791]vist. The manifest for 2 April 196C carries the name
[7792]Viktor KOLOSSOV (KOSCLAPOV) and shows that no Americar
[7793]citizens were aboard.
[7795]TEN a cmweiest
[7797](d) The November 1960 TDY (GARLAND Case)
[7799]Apart from denying that it ever took place, NCSENKO has saic
[7800]nothing about a trip to Helsinki by KOSOLAZOV in November 1360,
[7801]but GCLITSYN said such a trip cecurred anc related it te an in-
[7802]cipient KGB operation against an American code clerk.
[7804]GOLITSYN was not posted to the KGB Legal Residency in itel-
[7805]inki until July 1960, i.e., ater KCSOLAPSV's first trip to
[7806]elsinxi, under the KOLOSOV alias. He has reported that at
[7807]about the end of 1960, about November or possibly ty the begin-
[7808]ning of 1961," the KGB Second Chief Directorate sent a telegvam
[7809]to the Helsinki Legal Residency. The teicgram advisec that an
[7810]American code clerk would arrive in Helsinki in tra.sit to
[7811]Moscow; the responsible case officer would te KOSCLAPOV, who
[7812]was being sent to Helsinki under an alias anc under Vneshtorg
[7813]cover; KOSOLAPOV was to strike up an acquaintance to be con- ;
[7814]tinued with the American in Mosccw. 4
[7816]i
[7820]The following extracts are from the transcript of GOLITSYN's
[7821]further remarks on this subject in early 1962:
[7823]Question: You say that around November 1960 KOSOLAPOV came }
[7824]to Finland? ;
[7826]GOLITSYN: Came to Finland. \
[7828]Question: He came under cover?
[7830]GCLITSYN: Yes.
[7832]Question: Under a new identity? With an alias?
[7834]GOLITSYN: Yes, as an employee of Trade Union (Vneshtorg).
[7835]But, of course, there may be scme different dates.
[7836]Jaybe November. I suppose [believe] it was the
[7837]end of 1960 or it can be the beginning cf 1961.
[7838]And he waiting for some days, a week or so.
[7840]a ae
[7842]Question: In Helsinki? a .
[7844]Sh Similar request to the police chief was made by SERGEYEV
[7845]with regard to GARLAND (see below).
[7847]1
[7849]a TOP SECRET
[7851]ORT
[7853]14-0090
[7855]tn) pees srrenytepen ne tee
[7857]ope
[7859]yet
[7861]SECRET
[7863]eS.
[7865]DI TET
[7867]et
[7869]Luettelo niatitstafista, joka
[7870]Oude hee
[7874]entreaties
[7876]ea
[7878]Sutuy ja erunienet Amoi wa arvo | Syniymbeiba
[7880]7 awe
[7882]qoo.min,
[7883]Kirjotlise
[7885]‘divl. kur,
[7887](irouray tove, Tonnes
[7889]a,Parve, Falf
[7891]pubyencarttt
[7893]f
[7894]s‘Moresev, Aloxenéra
[7896]Ct e'Otobamayert, Ale "
[7903]: giriostals LOLS
[7905]t Aipl.sur. [27.00.07
[7907]y wiCariand, John Jr, athtoorh |f£.05.25
[7909]tito oiht, jdirl.
[7911]Ht
[7913]\ a! RoatelLadnoan, Auta Ikmard kirvesmioa {14.11.19
[7915]wiCksanon, Yrans Ouar afin, asant {25,095.00
[7916]. : Dheoy
[7917]: i UtIrmonen, Nokes Juhant 4 Inninop.Kand2l Ol» %
[7921]» |
[7923]ita | : seen
[7925]R an | :
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[7941]ica .
[7945]“ae
[7950]ape BY
[7952]Junntla sseapuont Suopmcont
[7953]Tihindt Suomesta
[7955]Finnish Travel Manifest for 16 November 1960
[7956](See Part V.E.3.c.4ii)
[7960]Voto yhikonat.
[7966]Keuttakuliau,.
[7968]e
[7970]Ulkoanlainminioterid,
[7971]Fulmoic, 8.0.00, Hea.
[7973]4,Lin§n, 20.00.80, kao
[7974]Rival torin®.23.G) Hic
[7977]14-0000
[7979]ash =
[7981]GOLITSYN: | Yes. Maybe. § four. days; Then we knew that the Aneri-.
[7982]’ ean Embassy took a ticket for him (the American. tar- |
[7984]Be 1...) get) for the train... _ And KOSOLAPOV took a ticket.
[7985]oR . . _ “ an the same.compartment. And before the departure
[7987]me : : we knew exactly from ‘the guide [conductor] of that
[7988]train that it’s the same person--[I'm not certain -
[7989]whether he was a} code clerk or not a code clerk*--
[7990]but his name, his real name. It was listed. And I
[7991]was at the railroad station at that time. I went = -)
[7992]to see off the delegation, the Soviet delegation. **
[7994]Question: See them off?
[7996]GOLITSYN: Yes, the delegation. And I asked him, KOSOLAPOV:
[7997]“Who is this perscn? I suppose [he is an) American?"
[7998]I suppose {believe} he said: “He's a fat man, a
[7999]young fat man."
[8002]v
[8004]Question: The American? " 5
[8006]GOLITSYN: Yes. And I suppose [believe KUSOLAPOV said] bespecta- .
[8007]cled.*** " And KOSOLAPOV and these persons were .. . :
[8008]smiling and looked through the window before depart~
[8009]ure.
[8011]Question: In the compartment? The train compartment? :
[8013]GOLITSYN: Yes, and then this other person visited Helsinki from i
[8014]KOSOLAPOV's division [the U.S. Embassy Section, Ameri-
[8015]can Department, Second Chief Directorate].****
[8017]Qvestion: When was this?
[8019]GOLITSYN: It was in surmer or maybe September or so of 1961. Hy
[8020]And I asked him. I reminded him about his case...
[8022]. te
[8023]saraincins Shea pike oats
[8025]Question: Who was this? Do you remember?
[8027]GOLITSYN: I don’t remember because he changed his name. If
[8028]‘know him but I... And I asked him how fs that case
[8029]that I helped KOSOLAPOV with? And he did not want
[8030]: “ to discuss it. That's why I came tothe conclusion
[8031]ts that this case was a success. Otherwise he would
[8032]: have told [me]. And I am not sure but I can try to rec-
[8033]ognize this person in pictures. :
[8035]FM ke ait te tn
[8036]we eee Cattle cine
[8038].
[8040]Question: You think that you could? a nS :
[8041]* When he first gave this lead, GOLITSYN identified the . hone
[8043]American as a code clerk.
[8045]#* GOLITSYN was not asked details ofthis delegation. There
[8046]were eight Soviets, including KOSOLAPOV, on this train.
[8048]*&* KOSOLAPOV's description does not fit John GARLAND; it is,
[8049]“*. however, a fairly accurate characterization of Paul JENNER.
[8051]#4*® NOSENKO has not mentioned this TDY, and the. KGB officer
[8052]j ‘remains unidentified
[8055]mr 4 Little of one of ny
[8058]; friends.
[8060]Question: He looks a little like your friend?
[8062]GOLITSYN: Yes.
[8064]Question: Which one? KOSCLAFOV? -
[8065]GOLVTSYN: No, no, TAis American
[8067]She Finnish raisroiad mon
[8068]from Helsinki to Moscow or
[8069]cf eight Soviets shear 3
[8070]only American, OG2KLAnG
[8071]Sinki on 14 Nove: :
[8072]the duties of supervai
[8073]the U.S. Encessy.
[8075]i
[8076]ano) Nasco to assume
[8077]au: Grsortinent f¢ode room in
[8079]et. SERGEYRY 9
[8081]‘.k police c
[8083]arsive there on
[8085]Ag he had wath
[8086]the KGh i. Biden,
[8087](and KGS accent, according to
[8088]help in locating GARLAND. &
[8089]14 hovemcer.
[8094]GARLAND wos first Interviewed : the i bassy
[8095]Security Officer an Moscow ian cemnection swith the » GOLITSY% lead
[8096]on 17 June 1962. In this interviow © denied having mec
[8097]any Soviet of KOSCLAP iV & physical ior during the Hel-
[8099]Sinki-to-Moscow train trip and iso having ever been
[8101]spproached by Soviet Lntellicen: July 1963 Garth 2
[8102]nterviewed by the rel eens rx PETE
[8103]s ate r CE
[8105]was
[8107]-NOSENKO on 28 Jenuary 1964 identified 20 Americans em-
[8108]ployed by the U.S. Embassy in Moscow «ho were of interest to
[8109]‘the KGB because they were suspect intelligence officers or
[8110]agents, or because they feli into some other category of in-
[8111]terest to the KGR. He gave a short statement concerning each
[8112]. of these 20 persons. One of them was CARLAND, aout whom
[8113]a NOSENKO said: "code clerk, but.nothing doing.’ NCSENKO was
[8114]: -." asked on 2 September 1964 to ceview this list for the purpose |
[8115]- O£ supplying any additional inforination re might have concern- .
[8116]‘"ing the individuals named, NOSENKC srared:: “As with all ccée
[8117]- clerks, they were studying him (GARLAND) in. order to. gather
[8118]“enough material to make a recruitment. The case officer was
[8119]-KOSOLAPOV. I don't remember the names or descriptions of any
[8120]agents, and I didn't heer of any derogatory information. As
[8121]-. far as I know, there was no operatacral. approach and no re-..
[8122]2, @rudement.," Although he could not recali whether he had read’
[8123]“the KGB file on GARLAND or noc. NOSENKO on 15 February 1965 said:
[8124]he thought that he must. have read. current materials” concerning
[8125]GARLAND as they came into the U.S. Embassy Section.: NOSENKO —
[8126]also said that. there was ro operatrona! plan drawn up for GARLAND -
[8127]“because the KGB ‘had no derogatory information whatsoever corncern-
[8128]ing him. NOSENKO has not provided additional’ ‘information con-=:
[8129]: cerning GARLAND, - whom: he -had presumably never. seen, and was un:
[8131]a
[8133]tended
[8135]hasheiobdy, Mishacittind
[8140]to recall any background information concerning GARLAND or any -
[8142]199,
[8144]details on his travels and Acquaintances, while stationed in Hos-—
[8145]cow. rr er Era wep Z Pa :
[8147]In the context of discussion of KOLOSOV/ROSOLAPOV" travels :
[8148]to Helsinki, NOSENKO's interrogator pointed out on 26 October one :
[8149]1966 that CIA was aware of a second trip there which NOSENKO had ee:
[8150]not reported. The following is a transcript of this portion of ae
[8151]the discussion on that date:
[8153]Question: Well, we started to look for other trips by KOSO-
[8154]LAPOV, or KOLOSOV, and we did run across another
[8155]trip, again by KOLOSOV, using the same alias.
[8157]NOSENKO: To Copenhagen?
[8158]Question: No. This’was a trip to Helsinki.
[8160]NOSEKKO: Oh, I don't know. Maybe after, after ‘61 maybe.
[8161]I don't know--'62, '63, I don’t know.
[8163]caidas tad dati Se
[8165]Question: No, this was in 1960. When you say you were in
[8166]the First (U.S. Embassy] Section, First [American}
[8167]Department, Second Chief Directorate. He was on
[8168]the train, according to cf£ficiai records, on 16 Noven-
[8169]ber 1960, going from Helsinxi to Moscow.
[8171]pet eee te ha ibd ed ee le,
[8173]NOSENKO: I know about one, he has took trip, when he was re-
[8174]turning from Helsinki with Paul JENNER.
[8176]Question: We looked at everybody else, all the other records
[8177]; concerning this train trip tu see who was on the
[8178]train with KOSOLAPOV or KOLOSOV. KOLOSOV was the
[8179]name he used.
[8181]essed Cpt isk te,
[8185]Question: We found there was one American on that train with
[8186]* KOLOSOV going from Helsinki to Moscow.
[8188]NOSENKO: Yes? And his name? If it is not secret, if you can
[8189]say, of course?
[8191]Question: One of your targets, an American code clerk.
[8193]NOSENKO: He was, I know, going from Helsinki, only with Paul :
[8194]a JENNER. ;
[8196]Question: You don't know this man's name?
[8198]ne ee
[8200]NOSENKO: (silence) .
[8201]Question: Well, we. checked © further and we found::6ut ‘that . re a
[8202]> GOLITSYN: had told us about a trip. : .
[8204]When he was returning from Heisinki’ with Paul JENNER?
[8205]GOLITSYN was then out, yes?® ‘ ,
[8212]-Question:.
[8216]Question:
[8220]Question:
[8224]Question:
[8228]“Question:
[8231]Question:
[8233]NOSENKO: -
[8235]Question:
[8237], ,
[8240]Question:
[8242]_Yes, I understand. And KOSOLAFOY must tell him about: —
[8244]This is not Paul JENNER. This is a different time
[8246]Ho. There wasn't such a one...’
[8248]him. ‘There was a study of him, yes, but there wasa't
[8250]GOLITSYN told us that KOSOLAPOV was travelling to,
[8251]Helsinki to meet .a cede clerk in November..1960.
[8252]You understand what I'm telling, you? yo
[8254]the code clerk, but we found out that Paul JENNER i3 an
[8255]not a code clerk when he began to work at the Embassy. ar
[8257]of year--
[8259](interrupts) When he began to work in Embassy.
[8261]This is not March 1960. This is November 1960. A
[8262]different time. It's the sane year, but a different
[8263]time.
[8265]I know only about his trip when he was returning with
[8266]Paul JENNER. .
[8268]Well, how do you explain that this man, who's suppesed
[8269]to be under your supervision in the Embassy Section,
[8271]is aboard this train with this American code clerk, i
[8272]one of your targets, in November 1960?
[8274]I know only about one trip [by] KOSOLAPOV to Hel-
[8275]sir%é, when he was returning with Paul JENNER, about
[8276]whow he was thinking also that he was a code clerk.
[8277]Yes.
[8279]KOSOLAPOV or KOLOSOV was not on the same train with
[8280]SVENNER, We have the names; we have the facts; we
[8281]have the official records. We also have GOLITSYN's
[8282]information about November 1960. GOLITSYN went with
[8283]KOSOLAPOV to the train station to see him off.
[8285]i
[8287]i
[8288]i
[8289]4
[8292]He must. He was working as a case officer of counter-
[8293]intelligence, of the Fourteenth Department. Of course
[8294]he must, of course he must. And KOSOLAPOV must speak
[8295]with him.
[8297]KOSOLAPOV spoke with GOLITSYN, and KOSOLAPOV rode
[8298]with this American code clerk from Helsinki on the
[8299]train back to Moscow. Sut GOLITSYN was not in Hel-
[8300]sinki when JENNER was there. It wasn't JENNER.
[8304]Witn Paul JENNER I know, but I don't know of anybody Y
[8305]else... You are giving me such a big bluff. I don't :
[8306]know, I don't know, I don't know.
[8308]It's no bluff. Do you have any idea who this other
[8309]code clerk was?
[8311]Well, I'll tell you who it was... Did you ever hear
[8312]the name GARLAND? toes pet .
[8314]Yes, I heard GARLAND. And there wasn't any approach
[8315]made to GARLAND. There wasn't any attempt to recruit
[8317]recruitment or something else... — oop tte
[8319](a) Introduction
[8321]juch reliable and sensitive information that, with the assist-~.
[8323]: “€rom the Moscow Embassy while the latter was visiting Warsaw. ~
[8325]‘order to obtain further compromising materials on this American.
[8327]KG8-Polish UB Activities Against MORONE. . -
[8329]In 1961 CIA iearned from a Polish source who furnished
[8331]ance of its Polish counterpart, the Office of Security (UB),
[8333]the KGB in November 1960 began using a female agent against : :
[8334]Joseph MORONE, a U.S. Department of State cede clerk assigned os
[8335]to the American Embassy in Moscow in August 1360. The woman Co
[8336]accompanied MORONE on a train trip from Moscow, became inti-
[8338]mate with him in Warsaw, returned tc Moscow twice in February
[8340]1961, and there had sexual relations with him, The compromising
[8342]scenes of MORONE and the Polish UB agent were photographed.
[8344]This information cn the KGB operation was received by CIA soon
[8346]after the woinan's second visit to Moscow. On the basis of this
[8348]report, MORONE was interviewed and polygraphed in Oslo in May
[8350]i961, and he was transferred to Lisben from Moscow in August
[8352]1961. .
[8354]NOSENKO gave'a few details on the same case, without men-~
[8355]tioning the name of the KGB target, during the 1962 meetings in
[8356]Geneva. In 1964 and 1965 he furnished more particulars on the
[8357]MORONE case, identifying three KG agents (besides the Polish
[8358]female) who participated in the operation, NOSENKO, however,
[8359]said that two cf them added no information of us2 to the KGB
[8360]against MORONE, and that he was unable to remember what the third :
[8361]agent reported: statements by other sources indicate that re- i
[8362]garding MORONE all three agents could have acquired information i
[8363]of operational potential for the KGB. NOSENKO has not reported,
[8364]as have other sources, that. a fourth KGB agent named Ella UMANETS
[8365]was in contact with MORONE, or that the KGB officer SKVGRTSOV~~
[8366]posing as MICHAUD--was with MORONE at America House on at least
[8367]one occasion, the night when STORSBERG says he was approached
[8368]by the KGB (see above). NOSENKO has ccnfused the MORONE case
[8369]with another by saying that a fifth XGB agent was directed
[8370]against MORONE, whereas she was apparently directed against the
[8371]American code clerk ZUJUS (see below). The sensitive source of
[8372]the original report on MORCNE stated that a KGB officer "VOLODYA"
[8373]“QWiladimir, last name unknown) personally met the Polish female
[8374]agent when she arrived in Moscow, and NOSENKO said that the
[8375]KGB officer was his subordinate KOSOLAPOV. NOSENKO at first
[8376]claimed a KGB photographic technician supporting the case re-
[8377]ported to him, but he retracted this remark after CIA shawed
[8379]bey ata
[8382]Gace
[8384]hatin phanion Beste
[8386]‘him that travel records on NCSENKO made it impossible for the
[8388]technician to have spoken to him as he described. According to
[8389]NOSENKO, MORONE was reassigned from Moscow before the KGB could.
[8390]take further steps against the code clerk, and he speculates
[8391]MORONE's transfer was prompted by American authorities' concern
[8392]over his relationship with one of the KGB female agents.
[8396]‘(b) NOSENKO's Information
[8398]At his first meeting with CIA on.9 June 1962 NOSENKO made
[8399]a passing reference to an operation in which he had placed a
[8400]female agent of the Polish service in contact with an American
[8402]Later, NOSENKO said, he brought the same female to Moscow.in-..- ~... 5
[8404]ow .
[8409]Asked on 11 June 1962 whether he had had foreign agents
[8410]working against the U.S. Embassy, NOSENKO described his. having
[8411]introduced the idea-of using such agents to :develop-Americans.”.
[8412]-afraid of contacts with Russian girls. .He said that he himself .
[8413]had several of these third-national ‘agents, that he sometimes
[8414]would ask the German and Polish services to supply him with
[8415]agents, and that it was unnecessary for him to explain their :
[8416]intended use in operations against Americans. NOSENKO then | :
[8417]gave an example: “Listen, the serazants [enlisted men] who -- .,
[8418]lived in America House had a custom--it was to? far to go-to ,
[8419]America, so where did they go to rest fon leave]? To Finland
[8420]or Poland. Why Poland? Because they can find wonen there, the
[8421]rate of exchange is gOod, and so ou. What do we do? We planted
[8422]a female Polish agent [on an American} in Poland. Then she
[8423]comes to Moscow. We arranged a chance meeting, anc things de-
[8424]veloped. Once two guys, a Marine guard and a coje clerk went to
[8425]Warsaw, They were cn leave for a weex and a half. We knew
[8426]when they would be coing. I mace an imrediate phone call to
[8427]Warsaw. ‘Give me a woman,’ I said. ‘Geta gced whore for me
[8428]there, a pretty one but not one who strikes the.eye particu-
[8429]larly.' Well, they vent me such a girl. And I placed this
[8430]Polish agent on the same train, in the same car, even in the =~ noes
[8431]same compartment. ‘The train left. One of the Americans, the —
[8432]one in whom we were particularly interested, the code clerk,
[8433]wanted the girl and there, in the compartment, shey went to bed
[8434]together wh le the other American slept. I toid the Poles in
[8435]arsaw to give the girl an apartment and to get photographs.
[8437]They arranged an apartment and he came there. Everything was
[8438]O.K. After a week and a half he returned to Mescow, We did
[8439]not rush things. A month passed. Two months. Let's not rush,
[8440]I said. A half a year went by. I insisted thet nothing further
[8441]may be done any earlier. Then 1 said, ‘All right, let's give
[8442]him this girl, this Pole.' She arrived [in Moscow} and they met
[8443]one another. I created the conditions: we created the condi-
[8444]tions. They slept with one another once, twice. A [Soviet]
[8445]girlfriend showed up. The same thing. And he also began to
[8446]sleep with the girlfriend. Tne Pole left and he was with this
[8447]wRussian, and she was our agent. You see, first the boys are.
[8448]afraid of Russians. But (we gave hin] a Pole and then transe
[8449]ferred him te a Russian.”
[8455]6 a et EA Mee
[8457]Bg
[8459]Rua ye
[8461]3
[8463]NOSENKO stated on 1 February 1964: “I remember we were
[8464]working on one of the members of the guard of the American Em-
[8465]bassy, who was going to Warsaw for a good time, for a few days’
[8466]relaxation.* We wrote to our advisors [XGB officers attached
[8467]‘to the Polish UB] to do éverything possible--to get a pretty
[8468]Polish girl for the fellow and to photograph any intimate
[8469]scenes. The Poles introduced the guard to the giri, they did
[8470]have intimate relations, but they gave us photographs without ~ Lown
[8471]any intimate scenes. Just how they are sitting togéther, how
[8472]he is kissing her--that's all. Well, we got these photographs
[8473]and some time went by and then we asked that the: Poles send - . '
[8475]us this Polish girl so that she could meet him in Moscow. They.
[8477]|The guard referred to is Frank BEGGS, a marine enlisted man —
[8478]. whe accompanied MORONE to Warsaw. The. facts, however, seem
[8479]to relate to MORONE, who has described his enctunter with
[8480]the Polish girl and her subsequent recontact in Moscow.
[8481].., BEGGS has also reported (see below) that: MORONE met a Polish
[8482]" girl/on ‘the train to Warsaw and that: she-later contacted.him
[8483]*.- $m Moscow: BEGGS has denied that. he, himself, was. contacted .
[8484]“ by any such girl in the Soviet: Union after the trip to Warsaw
[8485]with MORONE. : ee a nn?
[8488]1400000 “yt ws t,
[8490]Coe 5 UP
[8492]we setts debs.
[8494]' *ROSERKO “has 3igo mentioned a” prior Lbitios on racrurtment
[8495]attempts Guring the 1959 pokolr iki exhibition perause of the
[8496]need to avoid incidents afii Rance ts, Bu SOV LEG fed at Lor ships.
[8498]GOLTTS Sect told, CIA af. such. aspre
[8500]employee’ in, ‘i560 “Beclause i di 3 ;
[8501]. JEISENECWER®. to ‘the: Sovi md ’ Ma Le t a .
[8503]. We -2Soviet- relations. deter Loratcd.s.
[8504]*. 1960 and most of 1961 they remained? very s
[8505]‘pressures and hard lines: ‘ct lminated, Ln th
[8506]wali ‘building in. Beri 5
[8509]\. working against MORGNE was ROSEREO' s “Gubors: nat @ and Specials
[8511]ist in tode clerk operations, KOSOLAPOV:.: KOSENKO read the file
[8513]On MORONE and saw his visa. photograph, but he never saw him in..
[8515]__ person and so could not provide a physical descripticn. “NCSENKO
[8517].. had discussed the MORONE case with KOSOLAPOV and GRYAZNOV on a. ~
[8518]number of oceasions.
[8520]BOSENKO said that the KGB agents working on MCRONE were:
[8522]- Svetlana IVANOVA , a maid or waitress at America —
[8523]House who reported to DEMXIN, the case officer responsi-
[8524]ble for Americans living there, on everything she saw or
[8525]heard concerning MORONE. KOSOLAPGY visited her several
[8526]times with DEMAIN to discuss MORONE, and ‘ioSEN"O hinself
[8527]met her once or.twice in cre of the twe sate apartments : ;
[8528]that DEMKIN had at his cispssal. NCSENFO did act recall! og
[8529]any specific infermation on MORONE which was interestin
[8530]or useful from this source.
[8532]- Eee 2g DE an Egyptian encleved at the
[8533]Egyptian Libassy who was an agent of the Sixth (Under-
[8534]Geveloped Countries) Departeent of the *G3 Secen4a Chief :
[8535]Directorate rae visited ‘America House and met MORON,
[8536]but he dic not report anything of value vhat NOSENKO re-
[8537]membered.
[8541]Han
[8543]r
[8545]we he bedbetes wae lactone Te
[8547]~ Ons of two East German females imported for use
[8549]against the inhabitants of America House. In early i960
[8550]GRYAZNOV went te Hast Beriin to obtain two Cernan women ‘
[8551]who could be used for this purpose. The tirst of these i
[8553]a was Hanna, blonde, documented a3 a West German travelliag 3
[8555]to Moscow. NOSZNKO never met her but instructed PREIS-. _ 3S
[8556]FREUND (see the STORSBERG case) to taxe her to America” .
[8557]Eouse and leave her on her own. Hanna went several tines
[8558]to America House in 196], but NOSENKO can recall nothing
[8559]that she ray have repcrted on MORONE. The other East Ger-
[8560]man girl was documented as an Austrian. NOSENNO never
[8561]met her but recalled that she was asked fer her cocuments
[8562]at America House on her first or second visit there. She
[8563]replied that she had left them at her hctel, left America
[8564]House, and never returned. NOSENKO did net remember the
[8565]time when this incident occurred, beyond the fact that he
[8566]was still in the U.S. Embassy Section and that ABIDIAN
[8568]' a was the Embassy security officer at the time.* : :
[8570]army an Italian Seg at the Anerican
[8571]’ Embassy and KOSOLAPOV's agent,’ reported everything he ‘
[8573]heard or saw about Americans to KOSOLAFOV. NOSENKO re- ;
[8574]had said about MORONE
[8576]-_ called nothing specific that
[8578]: * CIA has no information concerning such an incident in 1960-
[8580]: : 1961, but the circumstancés described by ‘XOSENKO seem to
[8582]i: . : apply to those surrounding a relationship between a woman
[8584]! : named Lillian (last name not known) and the military code
[8585]Clerk ZUJUS. These details are given in Part V.E.3.c.(v).
[8587], Im anylevent, the incident involving Lillian occurred after
[8589]the date when NCSENKO says he was transferred from the U.S.
[8591]:- Embassy Section. At the time, Hugh MONTGOMERY rather than.
[8593]ABIDIAN was. the Embassy Security Officer :
[8595]wee
[8598].-From one of these agents, or possibly in some other man-
[8599]“ner, the KGE learned that MORONE was planning to goon leave |
[8600]to Warsaw. NOSENKO, KOSOLAPOV, and GRYAZNOV thereupon 2ecided
[8601]to employ a Polish female agent in an attempt tc compromise his.
[8602]KOSOLAPCV wrote the draft of the cperationa!l plan for the attezpt,
[8604]which was approved by GRIBANOV after some editing by NCSENKO : |
[8606]and KOVSHUK, chief cf the section. ZGSGLAPOV next met with a. a
[8607]Polish UB counterintelligence officer in KGB Headquarters to :
[8608]Giscuss the pian. The Fole was tcid that the target was a U.S.
[8609]Exbassy employee, but not that he was a code clerk; this fact
[8610]was deliberately kept from the Foles.
[8612]aconccal ES
[8614]As a result of this meeting, a Polish girl was obtained
[8615]by the Polish UB and sent to Mosccw ky train. Upen her arrival
[8616]she was met by KCSOLAPOV, who tcor her to a Moscow hotel, where
[8617]he gave her instructions concerning mer role in tne operation.
[8618]The girl was told to mect MGRULH on the train, flirt witn hin,
[8619]have him fail in love with her, continue the association, and
[8620]Study him. She was to teil him that she had becn in Moscow as
[8621]@ guest ef her uncie, a member ‘of the volishn Trade Representa-
[8622]tion in Moscow, an? that she could test him ayain on her next
[8624]visit.
[8626]sae ath i's oa Ca Ea baibives
[8628]Arrangenents wore mace wi Ocerational Technical
[8629]Directorate for a technician ec tn ine crain in the
[8630]compartrent next to that of MOF BEGGS ind for av.aio and
[8631]visual (but not photegsaphic)
[8633]and BEGGS left Moscow. :
[8634]succeed in making NORONE's :
[8635]rom the Operaticnal Teciaical
[8637]9 the day after the train
[8639]NOSENKO did not recall wh
[8641]The Polish agent did, hevever,
[8642]acquaintance, and the technici
[8643]Directorate reporte2’ pack to NOS
[8645]reached Warsaw.* The technician told } KO the girl had en- :
[8646]cased in sexval intercourse durin: the The technician —
[8647]also reported that the tape recordings othtaincd were of pos
[8649]quality.
[8650]* Because the KGS still lacked ccmpromising materials, KCSO-
[8651]LAPOV prepared a paper requesting that the girl again be brought
[8652]+o Moscew and permission to acquire compromising photegrephy
[8653]during her visit. The requests were approved by higher KGB
[8654]authority. When the girl arrived, KOSOLAPOV met her alone and
[8655]_ took her to the Hotel Peking, to a specially equipped room. ;
[8656]‘fhe girl called MORONE at Ancrica Hause, and MORONE subsequently ' |
[8657]visited her in the hotel room two or three times, during which jl
[8658]photographs were taken. These were placed in the KGB's file on
[8659]“MCRONE. He Gid not fall in love with the girl, as the KGB had 4
[8660]‘hoped, and she had no further contacts with hin. . . :
[8662]4
[8664]oeerenereene weentaprmerteese
[8666]* CIA travel records show that NOSENKO transitted Amsterdam on
[8667]1960-on a throush flic!
[8671]retorn oon uma approximareiy 11 Lecezrer 1360, When told
[8672]this, NOSENKO stated that instead of talking to the teche::
[8674]- mician himself, he may have read the report and seen the film
[8676]., strips after his return. . ;
[8678]1 *
[8680]cow to Cubs
[8687]206.
[8689]“although the KGB had. the. compromising photography, it was-
[8690]felt that there were insufficient materials for a recruitment
[8691]approach tio MCPOME. The KGB wanted to trap him in the apart- ;
[8692]ment of a Soviet woman, to catcn him in something that is defi- ~~
[8693]nitely prohibited. For this purzose, Svetlana IVA.OVA (see
[8694]above) was supposed to lure MORCNE into the city, but befcre
[8696]anything further cozld be done, the Americans ordered MORONE
[8697]out of Moscow before the end of his tour, possibly because they
[8698]were concerned about his association with IVANOVA. Therefore,
[8699]NOSENKO said, the KGB made no operational approach to MORONE
[8700]and no recruitment of him.
[8704]{c) Infornmaticn from Cther Sources |
[8706]A sensitive Polish source reported in 1961 that on 8 Novem-
[8707]ber 1960 a Polish female, an experienced English-speaking agent
[8708]of the Polish UB, arrived in Moscow wnere she was met: by a KGB
[8709]case officer named "VOLODYA." She stayed at the Hotel Warsaw
[8710]in Moscow. The ¥GB case officer, apparently from the American
[8711]Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, on 10 November
[8712]1969 pointed MORONE out to this agent at a railroad station in
[8713]Moscow. Under KGB instructions, the Folish female met MORONE
[8714]on the train te Warsaw, wnere intimacies began. In Warsaw on 4
[8715]12 November 1960 she was quite friendly with MORONZ, but pur- . j
[8716]suant to instructions, she refused all overtures to engage in 3
[8717]intimacies. The next day she took MORONE to a Polish UB safe- ’
[8718]house suitably prepared for clandestine photography, and reveal- .
[8719]ing photographs of an intimate nature were taken of MORONE 2 .
[8720]and herself. The female agent again travelled to Moscow on : . :
[8721]5 February 1961 and stayed at tne Peking Hotel. Further com-
[8722]promising photographs were taken of her and MOPONE on this
[8723]trip. The female agent travelled to Moscow a third time and
[8724]on 12 and 13 February 1961 more photographs were taxen of her
[8725]and MORONE.
[8727]ta ape atittvwisbian Satta.
[8731]woe et a yg, eter aT eee
[8733]GOLITSYN was questioned on the basis of this lead on
[8734]16 February 1962:
[8736]4 Question: Do you know anyone in the American Department of
[8737]the Second Chief Directorate who worked against the
[8738]American Embassy and used the name "VOLODYA?"
[8740]rare wee naetepliiin Sioa
[8742]GOLITSYN: Yes, I know CHURANOV. He worked at one time against . \
[8743]; the U.S. Embassy. Later he worked against.the .- ;
[8744]British Embassy and later he was sent to Denmark..
[8746]Question: When was he sent? Do you know?
[8748]7
[8749]i
[8750]a
[8751]i
[8753]GOLITSYN: It was in '57 until probably '60... I suppose that
[8754]ee : he will continue to work now in the First Chief
[8755]eo Directorate. He. transferred there, from the Second...’
[8757]Question: Do you know anyone who used the name “VOLODYA" in
[8758]the Second Chief Directorate in Moscow in the fall
[8759]of 1960?
[8761]GOLITSYN: There is another person. It is [Vladimir Ivanovich].
[8762]; i. . PETROV. He is the employee of the American Department,
[8763]Second Chief Directorate who works against the Ameri~ .
[8764]:).e@an Embassy. He evidently knows English. ...and he -
[8765]~ worked in the American Department. I. know him and I
[8766]* met him in 1960. He was. Chief of the American Section
[8767]' the Embassy Section... Coe, : aera
[8770]14-0000. “+.
[8774]rn oo. es a Be
[8775]~ Question: Well, in VOLODYA, itr. “interested in a KGB case: offi-: :
[8776]mo ao cer whe Would be working agai mat merican code clerks ©
[8777]eS Te ‘.. , am the’.fall o£. 1960, er
[8778]wes : GOLITSYN: Yes he (PETROV) is the chief of this section, That. -
[8779]~ ~~ ds why. te in the Chief o. this section where GRYAZNOV
[8780]Works. GOLITGYN hed carlier ifentified GRYAZNOV as
[8781]a code clerk specialist in th? U.S. Embassy Gection.]
[8785]GOLITSYN:s Yes, he wis an assistant at ene time, but is not
[8786]{new], and then there was the resrqanization and he
[8787]became a little “liguidated" {dowigraded in position).
[8789]In an October 1962? interview, foilowing his withdrawal from
[8790]Moscow, MORONE stated that ha had travelled with Frank BEGGS
[8791]Warsaw on 12 Nevember 1960, On the train he saw a polish girl
[8792]cutsice their comnartment and asned her wast languages she spox?
[8793]Later she entered his compartment, and when he tried to engage
[8794]in sexual relations with her, she slapped his face. A day or
[8795]two after they arrive in Warsaw, the girl c untacted him at his
[8796]hotel, and he went to her reom where they ud sexual relations,
[8797]According to MORONE, he had sexval relations with at least two
[8798]other women while in Warsaw. He cad EGGS returned to Moscow
[8799]without incident. On 6 february 1961 th: Falish girl from the
[8800]train called him at America House, and the following day he
[8801]visited her in her room at the Peking Hotel, where they had
[8802]several drinxs and sexual relations. On tiis occasion or earlier
[8803]the girl told him that she had an uncle in Moscow, MORONE Lad
[8804]den:ed being approached or reeruited hy Soviet Intelligence, a
[8806]statement which was supported by a polygraph examination admini-
[8807]stered in 1961. (Further details on this interview of MORONE
[8808]are inserted in a later paragrach contuining information from
[8809]MORONE's associates in Moscow.)
[8811]pitea aden diebatal Bhs,
[8814]3
[8815]4
[8816]i
[8818]The Marine guard BEGGS has cenfirmed MORONE's account in
[8819]general, with the exception that he hus stated that the two
[8820]travelled to Warsaw on 13 Noverker 1966 and that, after meeting
[8821]the Polish girl on the train, MORONE and she got into the lower
[8822]bunk in their train Cor a Ee They arrived in Warsaw on
[8824]oy 14 November and returned the 20 BEGGS had heard from MORONE
[8825]. : that the latter had been recon vasted by the Polish girl in Mos-
[8826]OO cow in Pebruary 1961.
[8828]The U.S. military code cork STORSBEAG'haw’ xépocted that
[8829]MORONE was acquainted with "Michel MICHAUD" (SKVOPTSOV}), who
[8830]laid some groundwork | for the KS B approach to STCRS2ERG in the
[8832], win Fenrasiy 1555) NOSENKO said that SKVORTSOV undoubtedly met
[8833]other Americans on his visits to America House, but he did. .
[8834]‘not remember who they were. He added that the KGB would not.
[8835]be interested in SKVORTSOV's contacts with other code clerks
[8836]because "we told him not to squander his forces, to concen~
[8837]erate | on. Jim [STORSBERG} . Jim \ was his target Bor
[8842]Pe en ee
[8844]MOSCKE's Yellow code clerks and residents of Anerica House
[8845]have deseribed him as a heavy dvinker, a heavy gambler, and a
[8846]Jadies' ran. Various reperts indicate that 7 involved
[8847]in a currency-speculation ring operated by Aes SENG CA
[8848]KGB accent mentioned by lcs Q,,and MOPONE his confirmed tnat,
[8849]on at least cone occasion, Se TH arranged the intreduction of
[8850]MGRGNE and other code cler i
[8852]tions with cne cf them in Wa, )s Apartment in the syring of
[8853]1962.
[8855]eperen
[8857]iE was also said to be a clese friend cf the Embassy
[8858]E Bidentified by ‘ics:
[8860]as Sat oor KO as an agant cf KOSO-
[8861]LArOV, bun act ticned by himvin connectign with the MORONS
[8862]ceration. (MORKONE admitted that along with other Americans,
[8863]he ~ade it a common practice to purchase rubles illegally from
[8864]Yor ‘One report states that" ae asked a Marine guard to
[8865]uésiver blachmarket rubles ts MORU.: he ,svace Department
[8867]code reom, & restricted arca to which
[8869]number cf reports indicate thac MORONE wab "sexually intimate
[8870]with Svetlana IVANOVA, CEMXIN's ageat, and with Ella UMANDTS,
[8871]another ECS agent at America House identified by NOSENKO but
[8872]not menticned by him in cenrecticn with MORONE. (MORONE denies
[8873]having had relations with NOVA bui said that he told his
[8874]friends that he had been intimate with her. He said, however,
[8875]that he knew both IVANOVA and UMANETS well and that he had onc2
[8876]asked IVANOVA toarrange dates for him.and another code cierr
[8877]with two Russian females. IvaAtova did, and sexual relations
[8878]ensted. MORONE has also itted sexual relations with a nun-
[8879]ber of weren from varicus Western embassies in Moscow.)
[8881]Shad no access. a
[8883]woe Te neta te eat nee
[8885]o Eoviet females. MOROVE had rela-
[8887]wand
[8891]catsemeeen,
[8893]3
[8894]4
[8895]i
[8896]1
[8899]TR EER IT IIa EERE BARRE SS. STR sg
[8901]BE Raa Re the “cain agent" in the KGB devclopnental opera-
[8903]OEE RED
[8905]Develconenta
[8906]Introduction
[8907]‘NOSENKO reported that he perscaaily recruited and handled
[8909]U.S. Arny Sergeant Matthew Peter ZUJUS, althaugi
[8911]the officer responsible for the ZUJUS case. a
[8912]a HA military orficer posted to Moscow for training, «© -
[8913]was used only in tais operation, bur NOSENKO continued to meet.
[8914]him even after transferring from the U.S, Embassy Section to
[8916]the Tourist Departrent. While being interrezited in February
[8917]1965, NOSENKO said that @@h could vovch for his bona fides,
[8919]and he stiggested that Cla approach 2 ™ for this purpose.
[8922]GRYAZNOV was
[8924]2ZUJUS arrived in Moscow in Septezber 1961 to assune
[8925]tho military code clerk duties of STORSBEXG (see above),
[8926]and he remained there until January 1963, After initially
[8927]confusing ZUJUS with James KLYSERS**, NCSENKU first described
[8928]the KGB operation against hin in February 1964, According
[8929]to NOSENKO, neither BND nor any other source supplicd sig-
[8930]nificant information to the KGB, and the GB therefore did not
[8931]attempt to recruit WWJUS, Claiming not to know the nanes of
[8932]MGB agents besides ata: who particigated in the opsration,
[8933]NOSENKO nevertheless@in other contexts has mentioned two
[8934]fenale agents who reportedly associated with zuJUS. One is
[8935]Ella UMANSTS, the other an East German woman posing as an
[8936]Austrian. NOSENKO indicated the latter was in contact with
[8937]MORONE (see above}, whereas it is clear chat ZUJUS was the
[8938]Ancrican code clers who met this woman, .The date that she
[8939]and ZUJUS were together, however, falis dusing the suaner
[8940]of 1962 when, NOSENSO said,he was no loiger engaged in
[8941]operations against the U.S. Embassy.
[8942](>) Information from NOSEXKO
[8944]The first reference by NOSEXKO to. the ZUJUS case was
[8945]made on 2 February 1964:
[8947]NOSENKO: With respect to ZUJUS, I'}] tell you exactly what we
[8948]tried to do with him because I spotted this in some
[8949]notes, This mistake [confusion of KEYSERS and 2UJUS]
[8950]nade me so mad. I completely forgot about ZUJUS
[8951]until I saw my little note. In 1901 1 recruited a
[8953]wad Ww EMASCUS, “SRE Hees meee
[8954]hs 3
[8956]= S e go ce artorme:
[8957]corres _-+ .quainted with ZUJUS. The reason why they had some-
[8958]thing in common was that sometime earlier ZUJUS had
[8959]been stationed in Lebanon and the Syrian himself was
[8960]from Damascus, which is a relatively short distance
[8961]away.;, Here js, his name. He wrote it out hinself.
[8962]Ee * and he wrote out his own address
[8964]ac
[8968]ede
[8970]Hohe bed seeded ne
[8972]enbnctebansasiiagienue abe
[8975]14-0000
[8977]RAS ae SE
[8979]here {on one of the notes NOSEDSKO brourht with hin
[8980]to the meeting]. We did not work with nin, and we
[8981]retired the case to fmehives, and did not turn him
[8982]over to anyone. He “ea eae a Bae ‘an
[8983]is ery fe EN pA nae se i iA I
[8985]1 AE Ath ER U oy a Cand the “
[8986]beginning of 1962. And when T was ‘leaving Moscow :
[8987]to come here for the Disarmament Conference in 19462
[8989]I turned him over for contact to GrYAZNOVY, I said
[8991]goodbye to hin and he was scheduled to Leave the
[8993]USSR permanently in April, back to Syria.
[8995]Fi
[8996]4
[8997]4
[8998]i
[8999]4
[9001]4
[9002]3
[9004]Question: Whet did you do against ZUJUS? | , }
[9006]NOSINKO: Nothing at all. He ea was merely studying
[9007]and devloping him. During the conversation [at
[9008]Americr House} they even spoke of how nice it
[9009]would be to have some Lebanese vedka, and we
[9010]speciaily had some shippped in from the [KGB Legal]
[9011]Residency {in Beirut], and the Syrian brought
[9012]it to ZUJUS saying it had come from Lis friends.
[9013]ZUJUS by character is a very quiet, uncexcitable,
[9014]calm person... Nothing disturrs him.
[9016]Oi
[9017]» over to the First Chief
[9018]or
[9020]Question: Why didn't you turn
[9021]Directorate?
[9023]NOSENKO: There was no reason for this because he was a
[9025]e ps a If we were to turn him over to
[9026]anyone EPC have been to the GRU. But we
[9027]decided to hell with it and put the case into
[9028]our Arehives.
[9030]Question: Dice ray soo @BJUS when you fecruited hin?
[9032]NOSENKO: ‘No, he didn't hardly know anyonc--even by nene. :
[9033]So we showed him phutofraphs. end wren he said
[9034]that he had met ZUJUS. then we directed him to
[9035]develop 2UJUS and not to pay attention to any~
[9036]one else... If you want to approach him you
[9037]can use ny name, simply Yuriy Ivanovich.
[9039]NOSENKO then proposed a false-flag recruitment
[9040]whereby a CIA representative would approach u 4
[9041]that he was from the KGB. A year later NOSENKO
[9042]that if C1lA talked to Pe the latter would be able to :
[9043]{ vouch for NOSENKO's bona tides. an
[9045]Speaking of his own agents on 20 April 1964, NOSENKO
[9046]said: er sm. ..1 took with nie, even though I had
[9047]transferre @ Seventh {Tourist| Department [in January
[9048]1962]. But it had been decided that no ore else knuw him ; - j
[9049]from the First [American! Department; it. would have taken . :
[9050]some time before anyone would get used to him. But he was
[9051]already working in the development of .ZUJUS. So they [the
[9052]First Department] said that they were asking me to continue
[9053]meetang with him, and they were counting on my cooperation.
[9054]They also promised to speak to CHELNOKOV [Chief of the
[9055]Seventh Department] so that I would not have to stop [j
[9056]meetings with ZUJUS."
[9058]on
[9059]Lape Bodin tnecbs
[9061]1 +
[9063]TOP SECRET
[9065]stew we MATINEE Le ott 9 ane a RI OLE EEA ER ARIE sll Nn ent om
[9067]Faeooop 1, § ~
[9075]: when reviewing lists of enpioyzes of the U.S, Exbassy: . .:
[9076]between 1260 and 1961, NOSENKO cn 19 September 1964 iden- —:
[9077]tified ZUJUS 3s STORSBERG's replacecent and said that the
[9078]case officer working agaigst hin was. GRYAZNOV. fie said that
[9079]his (NCSENKO's) agent SER vas working, against ZUJUS, but
[9080]that he did not know the names of other agents involved, nor
[9081]of any unusual or interesting inforrnation ccncerning his,
[9082]although he had read the Second Chief Directcrate file on
[9083]ZUJUS. There was no information on LUJUS froa KGB micro-
[9084]phones, telsphone taps, or surveillance. The KGB, NOSENKO
[9085]stated, did not make an operaticnal approach to ZUJu
[9086]and did not recruit hin.
[9088]KOSENKO reported on 2 february 1965 that he hiaself ;
[9089]had supervised GRYAZNOV's handling cf the cpeyation and :
[9090]personally handled the main agent, a aire NOSENKO 4
[9091]read ali current reports on LUJUS as They Ca.2 into. the : 4
[9092]U.S. Exbassy Section, and he discussed the case with : 3
[9093]GRYAZNOV, KOSOLAPGV, DEMKIN (the case offices responsible :
[9094]for the America liouse) aad his superiors, GRYAZNOV wrote
[9095]the cperationel plan,on ZUJUS, hich calied for thoroug. :
[9096]developzent by Siero in order to learn everything
[9097]possibie about hi. ae entug lly to introduce an agent
[9098]to ZUJLS through ‘@! oyetaeas to invite ZUJUS to a
[9099]restaurant in March @"Apririys2, and a "friend was to,
[9100]be introduced to 2UJUS at that tine. This had not been
[9101]accomplished as of NOSENKO's departure for Geneva in 1962,
[9103]steed
[9105]Progress was slow because 2UJUS was quiet and reserved ‘
[9107]and cften stayed atone, even in America ltouse, plus the fact
[9108]that although Wievaand ZUJUS were egguainted, they did not
[9109]become good friends. On the days@Bauay was to visit Acerice
[9110]im in hotels or restaurants (never in
[9111]every week or two, depencing
[9112]They would meet again the
[9114]a uo s report on which Americans were
[9115]drinking heavily and which were caressi the girls {roa
[9116]foreign enbassies in Moscow, Although went to America
[9117]House once cr twice 4 month and drank there with ZUJUS, he
[9118]reported little of interest, The KGB learned something
[9119]about Z2UJUS's fanily in the United States, the details of
[9120]which NOSENKO did not recall; NOSENKO was sure, however,
[9121]that there was nothing unusual or interesting about ZUJUS'Ss
[9122]family background, NOSENKO stated that the KGB was not
[9123]‘aware of any vices or vulnerabilities that ZUJUS may have -
[9124]had, There was no recruitment and no approach by the
[9125]KGB--if there had been, even after NOSENKO left che U.S.
[9126]Embassy Section, his friend GRYAZNOV would have fold hin Lame nt
[9128]ace
[9130]eet non
[9133]t
[9135]abecut it.
[9136](c) Infernation from Other Sources _
[9138]In connection with a security investigation at the U.S.
[9139]Embassy in Moscow, ZUJUS prepared a statement in January 1963
[9140]which acknowledged his having had sexual relations with only aan
[9141]one woman in Moscow, an employee of the Finnish Embassy. eel
[9142]During 2 routine debriefing by U.S. Army authorities later in .- 0 1h
[9143]1963, however, ZUJUS said that he had once had sexual relations :
[9144]with a girl who said she was an Austrian. The U.S... Embassy
[9145]Security Officer. reported in the summer of 1962 that, 2UJUS.
[9146]had been intimate with an. Austrian wonan, Lillian (last:
[9148]own), who had.gone to America House‘ with ‘saneone ©
[9151]yapoooo, pee at cet
[9153]from the United Arab Republ cand had. returned: atone: a
[9155] Z2UJUS was a cryptographer, the manager ‘of America House
[9157]‘who learned from the Austrian. tmbassy that no passport
[9158]had been issued to this woman. ‘The Security Cificer went
[9160]few days later, when she waS,picked up ty ZUJUS. Since
[9161]decided to interview the woman. . She teld hin that she
[9162]was from Vienna and was travelling witha her ercloyer, a
[9163]Czech, The manager then reported to the Security Officer,
[9165]to America House, and asked Lillian for her passport,
[9166]she replied that she had forgetten it, and she then left
[9167]saying she was going to her hote: fcr the passport, She
[9168]never returned to Ancrica fluuse.*
[9170]The U.S. Arny report
[9172]2USUS was interviewed by a CIA representative in
[9174]November 1955, Askeu whether ne had ret y vantionals. of
[9175]Near Eastern countrics while in Moscow, eUuds named anong
[9176]Others 2 person from Peirut whe hac besn in Damascus or a
[9177]person from Damascus wha had been in beirut--he could not
[9178]remember which. ZUJUS s2id that he had been acting as
[9179]goornman at America Hcuse when this persen entered, and that
[9180]the two "shet the breeze" fer about 1s sinuteis. 2UJUS could
[9182]“not vecall what they had talxed avout, Lut their conver-
[9184]saticn apparently cid not interest the visitecr, because he
[9185]left after a short while and went to tne bar, cUJUs may
[9187]have seen the man on several other occasions, but he could
[9188]supply ne additional information. ZuJUS Jid not recall. that.
[9189]this persen gave hin Lebanese vodka, but did say he favored.
[9190]this beverage, 7ZUJUS said that he dic nct know this man's
[9191]name or why he was in Hoscew, and he could provide no physical
[9192]description.
[9194]ZUJUS said that, as manager of the America club, he had
[9195]frequent dealings with Ella UMANETS (a long-time agent named
[9196]by NOSENKO}. ZUJUS often used her as an interpreter in his
[9197]dealings with other Soviet employees of America House and was
[9198]able to provide a considerable amount of backyround infor-
[9199]mation concerning her. He repeated his earlier statements
[9201]‘that he had never deen approached or- recruited by Soviet Intel-
[9203]ligence.
[9205]- ¥ See oe NOSENKO's account of the KCD using one Of two
[9206]~ East German woucn, who represented thenselves es
[9207]Austrians, at America: House | in an operation against.
[9208]MORONE...- 7
[9210]et RR RE
[9212]Bes
[9214]on
[9216]a tithe
[9218]aria et ta
[9220]se thum cist lied iin che.
[9222]cheese ay
[9224]dmat healt Dabbalee Seiad war
[9226]waitin shew.
[9229]14-0000
[9231]Vt MARTE R IE Hg EM GRE ALAS
[9233]aS a oe
[9235]AP ARMA RO a IN aR ene? Ihe eT BOERS Be ea,
[9238]7
[9239]ire)
[9240].
[9243](vi) Approach to KEYSERS
[9244](a) Introduction
[9246]U.S. Arny Specialist Fifth Class James KEYSERS began his
[9247]tour in Moscow on 20 December Iy€0 us en assistant to the
[9248]Embassy Medical Officer, Donald C, MARTIN, an Air Force cEp-
[9249]tain; as an additional duty he was assigned administrative
[9250]functions in the office of the Air Attiche, For a short per-
[9251]iod in early 1961 KEYSERS was trained to perform backeup
[9252]cryptographic duties under Jurces STOXSBERG in the military
[9253]code room, but he was relieved of this in Anril 1963. because i
[9254]of low aptitude, laziness, and lack of interest, Because of
[9255]his admitted homosexual tendencies, coupled with his attitude
[9256]and behavior, KEYSERS was removed from ‘loscow by his American : fo
[9257]superiors in June 1961, The decision tc transfer him was
[9258]made on 13 June, and KEYSER® was informed of it the fol-
[9259]lowing day; approximately two hours before leaving America
[9260]House for the airport on 16 June, KEYSERS received a letter
[9261]from the KGB suggesting that he jefect, This was followed
[9262]by an approach to him at the Noscew airport, :
[9264]NOSENKO has ciaimed that he was the KiB cfficer who
[9265]spoke to KEYSERS on this occasicn and has said that this
[9266]incident was his only face-ts-face contact with an American
[9267]target during his 1966-1961 period of service in the U.S,
[9268]Embassy Section (excepting the alleged brief encounter with
[9269]STCRSBERG--See above), MOSENXO Sas confused the KEYSERS and
[9270]ZUJUS cases, but correcte 1 this error prior to defecting. :
[9271]In most particulars NOSENKO § account of the case matches the 2
[9272]details from KEYSERS and other sources. Hcwever, whereas
[9273]NOSENKO stated (without indicating how the KGB obtained its
[9274]information) that the KGB knew KEYSERS had not told American
[9275]authorities or having received the letter, KEYSERS did so
[9276]before leaving Moscow; this conversation tcok place in an : j
[9277]Embassy room where a kGB microphone was then located, i
[9279](b) Information from NOSENKO '
[9281]NOSENKO first spoke of the case, without naming
[9282]KEYSERS, on 12 June 1962: “Now I remember, He came to Mos-
[9283]cow, to the Embassy, He was to replace the military cipher
[9284]clerk (STORSBERG].® We sensed at once [that he was a homo-
[9285]sexual]. Well, everything was thrown at him, I stayed with
[9286]this case constantly, I didn't spend time on anything olse.
[9287]We chased hin all over Moscow but were iate. We were in an
[9288]operational car, It happened like this. When there was
[9289]traffic, you couldn't get through. Whether we went up the
[9290]left side or on the sidewalk where people were walking, in
[9291]the opposite direction, no matter. Therefore we vero late, | '
[9295]Jate (i1.@., could not catch him at anything). But‘ such
[9297]Althougn REYSERS trained tn Voscow to assume back-up
[9299]Cryptographic duties, he was not STORSBERG's replace-
[9300]Ment; Mathew 2UJUS, who arrived in Seotember 1961, was,
[9302]smalsdas sre tater lear Uh at
[9304]. KEYSERS was assigned to Moscow as a replacement for
[9305]1° Staff Sergeant J.C. BRADLEY, «ho had earlier been ree
[9306]; turned from Moscow for reasons of homosexuality,
[9308]word
[9309]en
[9310]MLS
[9313]a
[9315]“4
[9318]214.
[9320]things happen. But we were not mistaken about this fellow.
[9321]He proved to be a homosexual. ie soid himself, so to say. The
[9322]; American ice ballec (ice Capades tour) arrived. There vere .
[9323]ae many such fellows (homosexuals) with it, and he was extremely Jf
[9324]; drunk, and was embracing and kissine a man. The Americans also
[9325]saw this. And decided not to... I thought, whet to do? Let's
[9326]write him a letter, in real English, on an English typewriter.
[9327]We'll send this letter to his rocm. We knew that he was supposed
[9328]to leave today, today. Ard we wrote it: ‘Lasten. they know
[9329]about you, You heve reen veught. [It will go very bedly for you
[9330]back there. Come on. Stay here. We are waiting for you
[9331]answer.' Weli, as 1s customary, you had sémeone accompany him.
[9332]The Assistant Military Attache escorted him. I Gorn't remember
[9333]who right now. Perhaps it was NIXON, NIELSON. 2 lieutenant
[9334]colorel. What was his naze?* He accotpanied him to Finiand
[9335]ard then returned by piane. Well, there was no answer from
[9336]him to this letter. And it was already the last moment, and
[9337]suddenly--'Lasten, they ave taking you away. wait, they know
[9338]who you are, what you are, it's all over, If that's the way
[9339]it is, stay here.’ No answer. What to do? Here's what happened:
[9340]We got into a car. ‘They (KGB surveillance) hei reported that he
[9341]and the Assistant Military Attache had puiled@ our from Kropotkin-
[9342]skaya Naberezhnaya (America House) for the airport to take the
[9343]plane. So we put on ali speed to get there iirst. We got there
[9344]first, in order to have got to him. No. It was WILSON." The
[9345]-anterview then continued: NOSENKO was asked wno had accompanied
[9346]KEYSERS to the airport. He replied:
[9348]4
[9349]4
[9351]j
[9352]i
[9354]'
[9356]aT
[9360]"Yes, Lt. Col. WILSON, I believe. He didn't leave him
[9361]for a moment at tne airport. I am turning eround here, walking
[9362]there. There is coffee there and cognac. He didn't leave him.
[9363]I must separate them. O.K. So {f said ‘What about their
[9364]documents? Make some pretext to separate them.’ They were
[9365]‘peparated for two minutes. I approached him and said: ‘Hello,
[9366]helle, what acout the letter? You think about it?' He said
[9367]something to the Assistant Military Attache, that ‘they tried
[9368]to approach me.' So he was in Moscow in all only three or
[9369]four months. He gave himself away you see. If this ice ballet
[9370]had not come we would have worked on mim. At the start we did ;
[9371]not know who he was or what he was,. 1.e.. we knew that he came’ _
[9372]: to replace the military code cieck, on whom’ we had spent much :
[9373]j time." NOSENKO then moved on to a description of the STORSBERG
[9374]: operation without naming KEYSERS. — .
[9376]ae SCTE SEO STOTT
[9380]pe . After describing the recruitment approach to STICKSZSERG,
[9381]: NOSENKO reported on 24 January 1964: “Then his replacement ©
[9382]i . came. It was ZUJUS.** We began to study him carefully and
[9383]: it appears that both ourselves and the Americans, primarily
[9384]in the person of the Security Officer, discovered that he
[9386].f Lot . . : oe . ;
[9388]. . sot
[9390]-This officer's name is MASON,
[9392]See NOSENKO's statements. on 28: January and 2 February.
[9394]1964 (below)... ZUJUS did in fact replace STORSBERG, who
[9395]completed. his: Moscow tour in November. 1961,. five months
[9396]‘after KEYSERS was removed from Moscow. ~
[9399]-ballet troupe in which some of the malé members were homo- -
[9400]_sexuals, He met them in the America House and his behavior
[9402]was a homosexual, It appears. thet thete was sone visiting
[9404]towards them was reported to’ the American Security Officer | :
[9405]and at the same time our agent had reported hia to us. We : {
[9406]wanted to mount an operation against him but the Americans : ip
[9407]had already: decided to give him up, All'’we could do was. es a
[9408]to have a letter delivered to him; the letter warned hin - “ :
[9409]that he was being sent cut because he was a hcmosexual
[9411]and that he would get into consequent trouble, and an offer. i
[9412]was made to him to stay in the USSR. He did not answer !
[9413]the letter and it was just prior to his actual departure.
[9414]He was escorted to. the airport by two officers of the
[9415]Military Attache's office, At the airport--I even went
[9416]there with a group of assistants to see if we could get a
[9417]few words to him to change his mind. lie left his group
[9418]for a moment to get a drink of water. When I made this
[9419]offer to him that he would not regret it if he stayed,
[9420]that he wotld receive great benefits, he panicked and ran
[9421]back to his group and shortly thereafter he flew off. If
[9423]wis
[9425]a
[9427]a cain
[9428]oy Oe Bieta ae carrot ald re
[9430]-as follows: "I was thinking last night and I realized
[9431]‘wanted to be sure to call it to your attention today. Re-
[9433].. the code clerk, and after that a replacement came for him?
[9434]., And I said that we wanted to get a hold of hin because he
[9436]"Jim, did you think about staying perhaps? Because you
[9438]|
[9439]i
[9441]he were not spotted by you possibly we would have been abte - ae
[9442]to get at him," ,
[9444]While reviewing a list of personnel assigned to the
[9445]American Embassy in Moscow in 1963, NOSENKD said on 28
[9446]January 1964; ‘ "Matthew ZUJUS--how come? That man can't
[9447]be in Moscow, That's the homosexual code clerk ! told
[9448]you about, [the] homosexual who was urgently sent back to 3
[9449]the States with military guards. low come he is back in ’ ;
[9450]1963? In August 1963? He couldn't be there, It is :
[9451]impossible” He was asked whether he was sure cf his ;
[9452]facts, and NOSENKO answered: "Yes, this must be the i
[9453]$ame man, but this must be an error in your document.
[9455]He just cannot be in Moscow." :
[9457]NOSENKO telephoned the Geneva safehouse on 2 February
[9458]1964 and said that he wanted to come right over as he had
[9459]something important to say, The meeting with CIA opened
[9461]that 1 have made a mistake and it bothered me, so i
[9463]member when I told you we were working on Jim STORSBERG,
[9465]was a homosexual? It was not ZUJUS, but it was KEYSERS,—
[9466]In other words, everything I said about ZUJUS applies to°
[9467]KEYSERS."
[9469]"I don't remember having any face-to-face encounters
[9470](with Americans] except when KEYSERS was leaving,’ NOSENKO
[9471]stated on 17 April 1964, "When he was being taken to the.
[9472]airport we decided, ‘Why not try, in case he's aione; why
[9473]not approach him and ask hin if he wants to stay?’ And sure
[9474]enough he stood there with these two officers and then he
[9475]walked into the restaurant alone... So I imnediately ap- z
[9476]proached him right there in the restaurant. "I don’t re- x
[9477]member what his name was--I think it was Jin.) -So I. said"
[9479]know what will happen to you when you return. Say, please.’
[9480]He looked at. me and turned around.and without saying # word —
[9481]he went into the waiting room and. started talkang -rapidl
[9482]with the officers.” ... coos ; .. 8
[9484]14-0000
[9486]- : an a ; . wort aoe cTasa in
[9488]subsequent des
[9489]ies. ard his
[9491]‘ In liescow price
[9494]3 verent ia three Ag n-38 tour , }
[9495]4 ov, ait an an an anproc|eh i
[9496]a 7 wae 8 tease — ' vt fed
[9497]t seccpriiy guare eas reuse? dy
[9498]ra OLTHETS Wee 3s 9 Ae :
[9499]lee Copadcs trours vii He deaied i
[9500]a Re eset Fhac any peste oA 4
[9501]wat said he ceaiu net be ‘
[9503]root at Apecica tlhouse
[9505]3
[9507]Ren daimadrsatkecaip tte bent
[9509]ccremppaapcn see ta Tepe ame ce ee meme sient brome (nage ec
[9514]coos
[9516].
[9518]S
[9520]an
[9521]pesos
[9524]i
[9526]has teporte-
[9528]fice an
[9532]14-0000 so Lee, a
[9534]hey
[9536]eer e ans vt Se SOME 7 ROS
[9538]anteanetneticact lS) Raison ton oe
[9543]14-0000. 7”
[9545]pare ey
[9546]Bins dicta.
[9550]I
[9552]a
[9554]4
[9556]d
[9558]NOTE: Part VI.D.2., a takulation of NOSENXO'S i
[9560]leads involving American cases, includes :
[9561]several operations against U.S. cciZe
[9563]www Sterks for which he was the Supervisor; = =
[9564]. their names are Frank DAY, Robert DWELLY,
[9565]Joseph GAFFSY, John TAYLOR, and Maurice
[9566]ZWANG.
[9568]t
[9571]i4ponoo 8 i
[9575]d. © NOSENKO's Reeponsibility for Coverage of “ABIDIAN” =.
[9576](4) Introduction , ;
[9578]Pen John V. ABIDIAN served as the U.S. Embassy Security Officer
[9580]. ; oe in Moscow from 2 March 1960 until February 1962, approximately _
[9582]a the same period as NOSENKO's claimed’ service. in the U.S. Embassy
[9583]Section of the American Department, Second Chief Directorate.
[9584]During hig Moscow tour, ABIDIAN was coopted by CIA to perform a
[9585]number of operational tasks, including clandestine letter mailings
[9587]; to several CIA agents inside the Soviet Union and servicing @
[9589]i dead drop to be used only for receiving two spzcial types of
[9590]communications* from the source in the GRU, Colonel O.V. PENKOV-
[9591]SKIY.
[9593]During his 1962 meetings with CIA, NOSENKC mentioned ABIDIAN
[9594]on several occasions, identifying him as the Embassy Security
[9595]Officer and as a CIA officer. In 1962 he described ABIDIAN's
[9597]+ ereremermumeamman gave sromepreer-anaen wer
[9600]’ (zganimat'sya) with ABIDIAN. After resontacting CiA in Geneva in
[9601]January 1964 NOSENKO divulged that he nad keen the KGB case
[9602]officer responsible for coverege of ABIDIAS in Moscow? for the
[9603]first time he described then a visit made by ABIDIAN to the
[9604]PENKOVSKIY dead drop site,
[9606]The discussion below is divided into three parts: NOSENKO's
[9607]case officer responsibilities and the information he Learned
[9608]about ABIDIAN, NOSENKO's knowledge of clandestine letter mailings
[9610]a by ABIDIAN, and NOSENKO's statements on ASIDIAN and the Pushkin
[9611]Street dead drop.
[9613](ii) Duties as Case Officer
[9615]On 17 April 1964 when asked to describe his transfer from
[9616]the GZourist Department to the Anerican Department in January
[9617]4960, NOSENKO said that when he reported for duty and was inter-
[9618]viewed by V. A, KLYPIN, Chief of the American Department, and
[9619]V.M. KOVSHUK, Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section, he was told
[9620]that as one of his duties he would be the case officer in charge
[9621]of ABIDIAN, whose arrival in Moscow was expected in the near
[9622]future, NOSENKO was the only KGB officer responsible for cover-
[9623]age of and activities against ABIDIAN and, NOSENKO said, ASIDIAN
[9624]was the only American target for whom he, personally, was offi-
[9625]cially accountable while in the U.S. Embassy Section.’
[9627]NOSENKO was questioned in detail concerning ABIDIAN for
[9628]six days in January and February 1965. He produced the infor-
[9629]mation in the following paragraphs at that time. :
[9631]1. @hen NOSENKO began to work in the U.S. Embassy Section,
[9632]_ABIDIAN had not yet arrived in Moscow. The section, however,
[9634]< to NOSENKO by KOVSHUK. Among this material was ABIDIAN's visa
[9636]One type was early-warning information, the other notifi-
[9637]cation: of his forthcoming absence from Moscow. Otherwise.
[9638]5:08 Of this time, PENKOVSKIY submitted information in.
[9639]Moscow via Contacts with the British Embassy and. the :
[9640]British businessman Greville WYNNE. The PENKOVSRIY came:
[9641]is discussed at greater length in Part VI.D.7.b.
[9643]TOP SECRET
[9645]already had received some information on him, and this was given - |
[9648]verona 4 a aa a eee seg” a
[9650]at,
[9652]1
[9653]i application; the negative results of checks of KGR Headquarters
[9654]files, and a report prepared by the American Department of the
[9655]* First Chief Directorate. According to this report, based on — .
[9656]! correspondence from the KGS Legal Residencies in the Unitec «: he
[9657]: States, ABIDIAN had served asa Departmen: of State Security
[9658]« Officer concerned with the personal safety of Premier KHRUSHCHEV
[9659]2 when he visited the United States in 1959: from the way ABIDIAN
[9660]had acted at that time, the Legal Residencies concluded he was an ar
[9661]intelligence officer, probably with CIA.” NOSENKO remarked that i,
[9662]the report, combined with the fact that ABIDIAN was replacing the
[9663]known CIA officer Russell LANGELLE as Security Officer, made
[9665]IDIAN one c£ the most important counterintelligence targets
[9666]of the U.S. Fmbassy Section and therefore of the entire Second
[9667]Cnief Directorate.
[9669]wives caitvedadenien
[9671]NOSENKO personally opened the KGB file on ABIDIAN and later
[9672]assigned him the cryptonym “ARSEN, “ since this cryptonyn “had been
[9673]used by personnel of che Seventh (Surveillance) Directorate, i
[9674]KGB- Second Chief Directorate, who were working against him. . 2
[9676]NOSENKO was unsuccessful in his attempts to learn more about
[9677]the life and career of ABIDIAN. He visited the Chief of the ;
[9678]American Department of the KGB First Chief Directorate, but this
[9679]unit had no information in acdition to that already included in :
[9680]the original information report. NOSENKO requested that the KGB :
[9681]Legal Residencies in the Uniced States be asked for further de- :
[9682]tails, but they were never received. For these reasons, NOSENKO :
[9683]said that he did not know and never obtained details about ASID-
[9684]IAN's education and study abroad. date of entry into the Depart-
[9685]ment of State, promotions, personal rank. previous foreign assign- . i?
[9686]ments, military service. or status as Foreign Service Reserve,
[9687]Staff oc Officer (FSR, FSS, FSO),**
[9689]cement So ee aw
[9691]* CIA records indicate that ABIDIAN studied in Paris in 1949-50
[9692]and then secured empioyment with the Department of State as
[9693]a clerk/typist. He cemained in Paris until 1954, After spe-
[9694]cial training at the CIC schoci at Fort Holabird and the
[9696]: Secret Service School, ABIDIAN served from 1956 until leaving
[9698]: for Moscow in 1960 as a special agent in the State Depart-
[9700]: _Ment's Office of Security. A iarge part of his work‘in this-
[9701]period was arranging the security of and accompanying foreign
[9702]dignitaries visiting the United States. These included the
[9703]visits of Soviet Foreign Minister SHEPILOV in November 1956,
[9704]MIKOYAN in the spring of 1959, and KHRUSHCHEV at the end of
[9705]1959. These duties undoubtedly brought ABIDIAN into contact
[9706]with a large number of KGB officers stationed in New York and
[9707]Washington.. One of the members of the KHRUSHCHEV entourage
[9708]was KOSOLAPOV who, according to NOSENKO, joined the U.S.
[9709]Embassy Section in late 1959 and, as of January 1960, became
[9711]te, Marks... subordinate an operations against American code
[9713]tis i. Clerks.
[9715]ni
[9716]4
[9718], *#ROSENKO was. unaware of the meaning of the. initials FSR, PSS,
[9719]-and FSO, When asked whether he had. checked the Department
[9720]of: State. Biographic Register: for information on ABIDIAN's... .
[9721]“background, he replied: that this* publ rcation ‘is not. available.
[9722]dim..the U.S., Embassy Section. ‘ He ‘subsequent ly- recalled that
[9723]the Chief. of the Section; KOVSHUK,. did have a-copy dated:
[9724]about 1956, ‘which was Of no use in. gathering. information on
[9725]IDIAN...
[9728]14-0000 + 7 : os Te RS ae ee
[9730]- os)! Because ABIDIAN was ‘considered to be a‘ CIA officer, he was...
[9731]made a.“special tarcet". of surveillance from the date of his |. t
[9732]arrival. He was always under 24-hour surveiliznce by et least :
[9733]two and often three KGB teams, so thet at any hour a team was i
[9734]available to cover him if he left the U.S. #mbessy. The only t
[9735]time this intensity of coverage might heve been reduced, NOSENKO
[9736]said, was during a pericd cf about one and one-Lalf months in : a
[9737]1961, wren surveillance of the Embassy was generally reduced in po
[9739]order to allow increased coverage of #ritish tergets.* As the
[9740]responsible case officer, KUSENKO directed the sucveillance of
[9741]RBIDIAN and evaluated the operational possibilities offered by
[9742]pertinent informaticn in the surveillance reports.
[9744]Prior to ARIDIAN's arrival in Moscow, the decision was reach-
[9745]ed not to work aggressively against hin with acent contacts or
[9746]provocateurs unless ne first demonstrated some personal vulner-
[9747]ability, SCSENKO stated. It was considered better to corcentrate
[9748]on surveillance coverage ir. the hope thet, 4s LANGELLE's succes-
[9750]—== sors—he—inrght—tead-to-anetner—PGPGv there tors7—no-op erations ———
[9751]plan was written on ABIDIAN until about Cctober 1960. This plan, ;
[9752]which HOSENKO wrote, called for no direct action but did specify ;
[9753]that: 5
[9755]2 Veale tbesbi ee
[9759]- ABSIDIAN's maid, Tatyana FECCROVICH, en operational
[9760]contact of the U.S. Embassy Section, was to continue to
[9761]apply metka to ABIDIAN's clothing and NEPTUNE-80 to his
[9762]shoes.*** (She put metka on ABIDLAN's clothing approxi-
[9763]mately every 14 to 21 days throughout the time she was
[9764]employed by ARIDIAN.) The only item of operation:) in-
[9765]terest from her during this period was evidence that i
[9766]ABIDIAN wes having inzimate relations with a female em-.
[9767]ployee at the embassy. FEDOROVICH was unable to find |
[9768]personal mail or persona) papers in ABIDINI's apartment. }
[9770]Bae bb dSh Lang rants
[9772]BS KOSOLAPOV's agent, was to try to
[9773]cultiva Nand report whatever he learned concern-
[9774]ing him. never obtained significant. information ; |.
[9775]j
[9779]on ABIDIAN's repsonal life. ARIDIAN, NOSFNKO saic, was
[9781]developing uk as an informant on American personnel
[9782]oo at the Embassy. Dut NOSENKO did not recall any specific
[9783]be : report of his to ABIDIAN that would have been of interest
[9784]to the U.S. Embassy Section. NOSENKO tola CIA in 1962
[9786](ied heb alae
[9788]‘a talBidcatias,
[9790]* In another context NOSENKO said that KGB surveillance of bo i : aaa
[9791]British targets in 1961 led to the discovery of PENKOWSKIY. 4
[9793]fe
[9795]. Bo 7
[9796]***Metka and NEPTUNE-80 are surveillance techniques described : oF
[9797]_ by NOSENKO. The former. a "thief powder” applied to a
[9798]-, Clothing, leaves: a trace on anything with which it comes =
[9799]4nto contact; its use in.detecting clandestine letter :
[9800]mailings is described in greater detail below, NEPTUNE-80, ~
[9801],a substance applied to a target's shoes,. leaves a trace on :
[9802]the ground wherever he walks .and permits the KGB to carry
[9803]out surveillance long.after the target has travelled a:
[9804]particular. route. Dogs are used.to follow: he target's:
[9808]** The POPOV case is discussed. in Part VI.D.7.a.
[9811]14000
[9813]thet ABIDIAN had recruited Ree t
[9814]intelligence mission in Fra Loot
[9816]the Soviet Union ip De rs
[9817]Embassy Section tnercupon tues
[9818]First Chici Directorete.*
[9820]ag were to apply KipTUNE-80 to
[9822]-~ Pwo Umbascy chavtfe
[9825]the floorcoaras and foot
[9827]ies si
[9829]i
[9831]sary.
[9832]: i . i 4
[9833]~ All other agents end operational contacts of ike f 4
[9834]section were to be instructed tu report every detail about : H
[9835]ABIDIAN (see below). j
[9836]- feillance teins 4 instructe@ to check all ' .
[9837]pisces where ABIDIAN mighw ce ling letners.
[9839]~ Coverace of ABTOTAN's marl
[9841]heart from tnose specified iy the
[9842]two KCB acerts or operational contay
[9843]mila GACMOKOVA and “KANO” (KCB eryptonye, hare not remem
[9844]NGSENKO!, GROMOKOVA, a Languages instructor for JU. Fabassy per-
[9845]was a KG8 egant handled by ¢ 3 s ction off1-
[9846]cer NLA. GAVRILENKO ABIDIAN tcok I
[9847]Jessons from GROMOKOVA and NOSENKO did
[9848]private or cless lessons. He @id not learn anythang cf operacion- :
[9849]al significence from GROMGKOVA'S ConLlects with ABILIaN, and there i
[9850]was no regular reporting from rer, '! “KAMO" was am agent i
[9851]Mescow City KGB organization who accsacntally met ABIDIAN at the to i
[9855]Who Met AN were Lytd- : i‘
[9857]u i
[9858]trer these were i
[9860]+ REED cisinea he coneccted this story for the KGB in order to
[9861]* extricate himself when the KS5 attempted to recruit him shortly
[9862]before his departure from Moscow.
[9864]*®* NOSENKO first idencified GROMCKOVA as a KGB agent when viewing
[9865]Embassy employee lists on 28 August 1964, The list on which
[9866]her name appeared indicated she wes a Russian language teacher,
[9867]and NOSENKO said she was handled by 4.A. SAVRILENKO during 1960
[9868]an@ 1961. NOSENKO was later shown GROMCKUVA's photograph and
[9869]failed to recognize it; wnen told her name, however, he again
[9870]said she wag GAVRILESKO's agent and that she was valuable be-
[9871]cause she had a good education and was able to provide per-
[9872]sonality sketches om her students. Ke did not associate her...
[9873]with ABIDIAN until he was told by his interrogators in Febru-
[9874]ary 1965 that ABIDIAN had been one of her stucents. NOSENKO
[9875]then made the above statement concerning these lessons. ABIDIAN..
[9876]a -. . yeported that he took regular language lessons from GROMOKCVA,
[9878]: ae normally three one-half hour lessons a week. beginning shortly:
[9880]: . after his arravel in Moscow and continuing until his departure.
[9881]The first few lessons were with a group of other Embassy per-
[9882]Sonnel, and then AHIDIAN switched to private lessons for the ©
[9884]- gemainder of his tour in the Soviet Union. In reporting his
[9886]*., contacts with GROMOKOVA, . ASIDTAN said he refused to be drawn ;
[9887]’ into talking about his. Embassy responsibilities during Russian.__
[9888]‘ Janguage conversation But™kept the. topic Limited to-his.past.. ?
[9889]personal life, travel, education, his fiancee, and his: trips
[9890].@n which he saw his fiancee. ABIDIAN also: reported: that. -on |
[9891].23 June 1960 GROMOKOVA attempted to persuade him to pass a
[9892]etter to departing personnel officer Mery GORINHA for for-
[9893]‘warding. to Jean.LIEBERMAN, a former, student. — When. ABIDIAN.
[9894]refused, saying that this is. against Soviet law, .GROMOKOVA. .
[9895]tore up the letter. - tye ‘ sit
[9898]14-0000
[9900]PARES ERIE EERE SENET NES HOLE EE EER ETE LENETEEN TEE EE LDR NEE TILE DETTE BE TE
[9902]t
[9903]By
[9905]224. .
[9907]when informed that ABIDIAS gave "KANO" his
[9908]telephone number. NOSENKO recommended that ‘KaMO" try to develop
[9909]a relationship with ABIDIAN, After arguing that this was against
[9910]the policy of taking no aggressive or provocative action against
[9911]ABIDIAN, KOVSHUK and KLYPIN finaily agreed, and "KAMO" phoned
[9912]ABIDIZN twice on KGB instructions. ABIDIAN, however, refused to
[9913]meet him, and no further action was taken. *
[9915]Baku Pestaurart.
[9917]ROSENKO did not know the room number of ABIDIAN's office in
[9918]the Embassy or on what floor it was located, but said that he
[9919]could check the room number if necessary since he had a copy of
[9920]the Embassy telephone list publisned monthly with the office room
[9921]rumber of each American employee. ATDIAN'Ss office was in the
[9922]“Zone of Security” (a.e., secure office areas). A report from
[9923]some egent, wrose name NOSENKO did not recall, indicated that
[9924]there was a sign on ABIDIAN's office door which said “Security
[9925]Offi:2." NOSENKO did not kr.ow and said he was unable to deter-
[9926]mine whether AZIDIAN had a secretary. No dictation cr conversa-—
[9927]tion was heard from AVIDIAN's office because no ZGBR micropnore
[9928]was trere, and “IGSENKO said that he did not remember any specific
[9929]interesting or important information about ABIDIAN from other
[9930]microphones in the Embassy.**
[9932]NOSENKO @i@ not know the location of ABIDIAN's apartment in
[9933]the Embassy buiiding. nor how it was furnished. He said that
[9934]he Gid not consider data of this nature to be operationally
[9935]significant unless the target had shown vulnerabilities or was
[9936]under active development.
[9938]Aware that ABIDIAN travelled from the USSR two or three times
[9939]while stationed in Moscow, NOSENKO did not know to which countries
[9940]he went or the time of year when the trips were madet** Such in-
[9941]formation, he stated, would have been of interest toa him as
[9942]ABIDIZN's case officer since, like LANGELLE s earlier trips
[9943]abroad, AZIDIAN'’s trips were presumed to be for operational pur-
[9944]poses. There was, however, no possibility for the KGB to find
[9945]out where ABIDIAN had gone;**** even if the U.S. Embassy Section
[9946]did establish where ABIDIAN would travel, nothing could be done
[9948]* See below for BEIDIAN'’s account of a similar incident involv-
[9949]ing a Soviet he met while on a trip to Armenia.
[9951]** In 1960-61 the Security Officer occupied a room where an in-
[9952]operative microphone was discovered in 1964.
[9954]*t®#ABIDIAN made at least three trips abroad during his two years
[9955]in Moscow, in August 1960 he took personal leave to visit
[9956]his fiancee, a French girl, in the south of France and met
[9957]with a CIA officer while there. In February 1961 he flew on
[9958]the Ambassador's plane to Paris for meetings with CIA and
[9959]then took personal leave to visit his fiancee. In September
[9960]1961, at CIA request, ABIDIAN again flew to France and to
[9961]New York City and Washington for briefings connected with
[9962]the handling of PENKOVSKIY in Moscow.
[9964]o¢¢% hen CIA interrogators suggested that the KGB could have
[9966]. photographed ABIDIAN's passport on his return to Moscow,
[9967]BOSENKO replied that the Second Chief Directorate does not
[9968]photograph passports of foreign diplomats entering the Soviet
[9970]. Union, hile this procedure would not be impossible, NOSENKO
[9972]. added, it was not considered so important as to justify the
[9973]special effort involved. .
[9975]1 oet Ly
[9978]ot ote Poe gk ag the
[9989]* 5). about it because the foreign Legal Residencies of the KGB First _
[9990]Chief Directorate wovld not accept a request for operational
[9991]action agains: an. American. diplomat coming froma Moscow.
[9993]at
[9995]In February 1965 NOSENKO was asked a number of times
[9996]whether he knew of any occasions on which AS:DiAN took trips in
[9997]the Soviet Union outside of Moscow. He replied each time that he —
[9998]knew of no such trips and that 1f ABIDIAN had made such @ trip or
[9999]trips he would have known of them and would remember them as it
[10000]would have been his responsipility as case officer to take cer-
[10001]tain actions. Among the latter he listed:
[10003]se gee ape peemannee ne
[10004]vrata sD cbaliti PEE bad.
[10006]~ Receiving notification of ABIDIAN's request to travel
[10007]from the UPDK (the Soviet Government organization which pro-
[10008]vides services to tre diplomatic community in Moscow) .
[10010]sae cree ia aad ei satins
[10012]~ Notifying the UPDK of KGE approval for the trip.
[10014]- Notifying appropriate local KGB effices on: ABIDIAN's _ _
[10015]itinerary and civing them instructions for surveillance and :
[10016]other operational activity if desired. ;
[10018]- Receiving. reading. and filing all surveillance
[10019]reports énd reports of other Operationa! activity carried
[10020]out by iocak KGB units.
[10022]NOSENKO was certain that he took none of these steps. He stated : f
[10023]further that even if he were ebsent when such a request for travel : ;
[10024]was mede. he would nave seen all documents upor his return and
[10026]that he Gia not remember seeing such cocuments in ABIDIAN's file.
[10029]NOSEN’O's interrogators then told NOSENKO that ABIDIAN ; i,
[10030]travelled out of Moscow from 5 to 9 October 1950.* Thereupon i
[10031]NOSENKO stated that he specifically recalled having been on leave
[10032]in October 1950. He said that he could not recall exactly the
[10033]dates of this leave (which he had not mentioned before), but he
[10034]did remember that he was away exactly 30 days since he stayed at cae
[10035]a dacha near Moscow and therefore was not allowed any travel a
[10036]time. NOSENKO said further that he also remenbered that he had
[10038]* ABIDIAN made a trip with Paul A. SMITH, the Embassy's Publi- - ;
[10039]cations Procurement Officer, to Armenia between 5 and 9 Octe- - 4
[10040]ber 1960. (ABIDIAN is of Armenian origin, and speaks the’ 2
[10041]Armenian language with a high degree of proficiency.) While _ 4
[10042]there ABIDIAN visited with various churchmen and their
[10043]parishioners ard an Armenian who had repatriated from Greece .
[10044]in 1946. They attended a service in Echmiadzin celebrating nen eerie:
[10045]the anniversary of the accession of the Katolikos VAZGEN I, : :
[10046]and ABIDIAN also visited some relatives of his in or near
[10047]. oe the city of Yerevan. After returning to. Moscow, an Armenian .
[10048]Dy : whom ABIDIAN had met on this trip tried to contact ABIDIAN
[10049]' at the Embassy. but ABIDIAN refused to see him. When NOS-
[10050]ENKO was told that on 7 October 1960 ASIDIAN attended a ser-
[10051]vice celebrating the fifth anniversary of the Armenian Kato-
[10052]‘Likes, VAZGEN I, NOSENKO recalled that ABIDIAN. had gone to
[10053]‘Echmiadzin-and that an agent had reported a contact with him
[10054]‘there. This agent, NUSENKO recalled, was a priest or a monk, ....
[10055]and the report concerned only his. conversation with ABIDIAN; ao
[10056]. ‘the agent had no further contact with. him.. NOSENKO said °-
[10057]that this’ was his sole recollection concerning. ABIDIAN's — |:
[10058]trip, and that he remembered no other details. ~
[10061]14-0000
[10063]PEC DERE LS MY RRR IME RIERA BGAN TE A EN ARE NR IBGE i at ge ao abt NE NMOS IY LY
[10065]fe
[10067]copes
[10069]saree .
[10072]‘Ny wae re
[10075]tga teens Ube ape
[10077]226.
[10079]left the Soviet Union for Cubs two or three, but not more than
[10080]five, days efter his return £: leave; he could not recall
[10081]the date of his Geperture fer Csba ”
[10083]Except for the Americ ‘gan with whom APIDIAN was thought
[10084]to have been intimate. NOSENKY ~oula not name ASIDIAN's clese
[10085]American friends 1m Moscow or his close friends and professional
[10086]contacts with for¢éigners there.
[10088]NOSENYO received ard reed transcripts of all telephone calls
[10089]chat ABIDIAN made or receives et his office and epartment via the
[10090]Moscow city telepnone system. ie @id not remember the names or
[10091]nationalities of peccie wnon
[10092]because there was nothing of anc
[10093]NOSENKO Gig not learn anything £
[10096]nm these corversations.
[10097]phone transcripts about
[10098]roin Mcscow,
[10100]& NOSENKO departed Moscow for ba on 15 November 1960 and
[10101]therefore, by his own statement, would have been back from
[10102]leave by 10 November at tne earliest (five days before
[10103]Geparture). It was pointed out to NCSENKO thar. in this
[10104]case, his 30 days of leave could have becur: no earlier than
[10105]10 October and that he mu:ic therefore have been on duty on
[10106]5 October 1960 when ABIDIzZN left Moscow, In October 1966,
[10107]however, when the subject of his leaves again came up in
[10108]interrogation, he volunteered that he had lied in February
[10109]1965 when he said he had taken this leave. He said he
[10111]had no reason for this lie other than he had claimed to
[10113]be on leave “in conditions cf interrogation when lies and
[10114]truths were all a porridce.“ He told CIA. again for the
[10115]first time. that his 1960 leave was taken in January of
[10116]that year, immediately after joaning the U.S. Embassy
[10117]Section. Additional details on this January leave period
[10118]are given below, in discussion of NCSENKO's claimed
[10119]responsibility for operations against U.S, malitary
[10120]attaches in 1960.
[10122]called or who called ABIDIAN.
[10124]seen oe Peps
[10126]i
[10127]i
[10128]a
[10132]i
[10139]cle eis 9 OE ia ERE FE HE ae CACORE TEE YEE Ae SPORE RG Eee BEAL EET BR OE
[10141]227. .
[10143](444) ABIDIAN's Letter “Merlings
[10145]During the 19€2 meetings in Ceneva, MOSPKO reported KCB
[10146]knodledge of one type cf operational task RL by ABLDICN
[10147]in Mosco#d in edditicen to his cecruitment of fuser (see above).
[10148]This task, NOSEEKO said, involved mailing at least threce clan-
[10149]destine letters, in each cese to KG3 double asents.
[10151]| |
[10152]i - |
[10153]{ os j
[10155]' t
[10157]According to NOSEN on ll June 1962 GE detected all
[10158]the letters mailed ry ASIDIAN: ne saia t) wes achieved
[10159]through the use of met ailing from the Encassy,
[10160]ky Emoassy employces. LE yo mail letters
[10161]for a year and a half, beg: *BIDIAN mailed : j
[10163]several.* ABIDIAN,
[10164]Listen, we have this co
[10165]madlinas/, We have a mech
[10166]which sre mailed. Without
[10168]y Security Officer.
[10169]plete coverage of clandestine
[10170]he mechine finds the letters
[10172]machine itself.
[10174]This is a big, secret in 3. They enter
[10176]your room - you live in ao live in the - .
[10177]bassy. They /Soviet are and Simply cour
[10179]@ powder cr apply it r ciothes/. A rag, even
[10181]Ll. “ney puc it in the
[10183]and tnere 1s a crecial
[10184]cee fll setters which ere
[10185]chine, under a fotoapvarat
[10186]fiicerally a camera; NOS means sone sort of light-
[10187]gensitive device/. We new nave lz ,;machnines/ and hope to have
[10188]i100 in Moscow, And all the letters pass through the apparatus
[10189]and the machine itself selects the lctter which was mailed by
[10190]you or him. Do you understand? The machine itself finds it...
[10191]@his 18 how it was with the letters that ASIDIAN mailed. We had
[10192]them all because this machine gave chem fro us/. I even would
[10193]phone surveillance and say: ‘He's out walking around. ABIDIAN
[10194]48 out walking around, checking, cnecking.' 1 would say: ‘Drop
[10195]him. Sut give me all the letters today.’ The machine Ceter-
[10196]mines whether there is e special letter there." :
[10198]like a@ handkerchief.
[10199]ts where you mich:
[10200]ea machine et a static
[10202]medled in Moscow pass th
[10204]Three days later, et NOSENKG's fifth and final meeting
[10205]with CIA in 1962, he was asked whether he xnav to whom these
[10206]letters were addressed. XCSENKO replied: "To whem did ABIDIAY
[10207]mail letters? first he mailed a letter to a guy in Odessa.
[10208]Then ABIDIAN mailed one to still somecne else. He mailed two '
[10209]or three letters. Gne letter wes to the Saltic area. The ‘
[10210]same kind, that is we hei planted this men on you. i think |
[10212]|
[10215]it was to Riga, to our couble agent. And still, I think,
[10216]two or three other letters, also to double acents.** But we
[10218]* NOSENKO's information is substantially correct. ANGELLE
[10219]was Geclared persoia hon grata in connection with the arrest ;
[10221]: of CIA agent FOFOV in October 1959. Two letters were mailed,
[10223]' one on 9 December 1959 and the other on 22 February i960
[10225]; (one of which was to an agent now known to have been under
[10226]KGB control at the time); no more letters were mailed until
[10227]1 April 1961, when John ABIDIAN mailed one, again to a KGB-
[10229]4 controlled agent, LANGELLE's arrest, however, was not the
[10231]: €ause of this break in letter-mailings;: the suspension re-
[10233]sulted from other considerations.
[10235]ho
[10236]re a
[10240]®¢¥n 1961 ABIDIAN mailed three operational letters for CIA,
[10241]one to an agent in Son 1 April, the second to an
[10242]agent in and the third to a Gig:
[10244]i
[10246]~ TOP SECRET
[10249]‘didn't ‘uncover any acents.on ‘the tesi:3 of letters he mailed,
[10251]“There weren't any. .[ was concerned with ASIDIAN; therefore I
[10252]know. I can't tell you anything about the agent in the Baltic /
[10254]area because he was handied hy the Second Section of the Am- — . a
[10255]€rican Department, the ‘Active Line - penetration. "* ‘ :
[10257]4
[10260]\ . : _
[10261]NOSENKO has described in greeter detail how ABIDIAN was / a
[10262]detectec mailing the letter to Cdé ' While Giscussing per- oy
[10263]sonnel assigned to the American Derartment of the Second Cnief {
[10264]Directorate, he said on 24 June 196
[10265]Konstantinovich SUMIN in the Second
[10267]a
[10268]heard that 'e was there 1n 1959... He
[10269]S
[10271]te
[10272]3
[10273]na C
[10274]64 “2 farst saw Aleksey
[10276]3 Section in 1960, altnough I
[10278]s considered a specialist
[10279]secret writing... SUMIN
[10281]7]
[10283]on working against letters containing ¢
[10284]sees all the Jetters mailed py *mer.cans. even the American
[10285]tourists. ‘The letters are caight «ither by surveillance or by
[10286]use of metka. There are severe: types of metka. with different '
[10287]colors, and one typ2 witi be use fmerican Embessy personnel, —
[10288]another type on British Encassy perso: and another type for ! —_
[10290]ame FCOUF TESTS. * THE Same Type re not ys used acéinst the same
[10292]‘ group. ‘ihey are swit. hed around An exemple 1s in 1961 when
[10294]ABIDIAN mailed a letter: to an éveni in Odessa. This was a
[10296]saws nmtathettac abd ella den,
[10298]§ ba
[10299]fe)
[10300]a
[10301]a
[10302]oO
[10303]pe
[10305]‘game’ /igra - deuble agent operation’ The agent was ‘ARK-
[10307]HANGELSKIY /KGU coyptonym/ I chink. ASIDIAN
[10308]car and walk around, visiting meny shoos on Gorkiy Street. He
[10309]went to one commission shop where there was a large mirror in
[10310]the shop window. and he woula check tor survelliance. ‘He was 1
[10311]even followed to a post office and cne of the surveillance i
[10312]mer got in there ahead of sin, but he didn't do anything. Then _
[10314]used to park his
[10316]* NOSENKO has explained that the so-called"Active Line" Section
[10317]of the American Department was concerned with the penetra-
[10318]tion of U.S. intelligence, primarily by serving up KGB-
[10319]controlled agents for recraitmen:.
[10321]baeere bbb sateen Dae
[10323]“** CIA has conducted a series of tests designed to determine
[10324]whether a substance such as metka was being used as a KGB
[10325]control device For the purpcse of these tests, articles :
[10326]of clothing worn by members of the U.S, Embassy and those } “4
[10327]of other selected Western embassies were sent back to CIA :
[10329]oO Headquarters. ‘The ciothing in each case had been sent to
[10330]Soviet dry-cleaning establishments or had been permitted
[10331]to hang unattended in unrestricted areas of the Embassy or
[10332]in the apartments of Embassy employees Special filter
[10333]paper was applied to these articles of clothing. The same
[10334]paper was applied in Moscow to desk tops, safe drawers,
[10335]and the like, The paper was then subjected to ultra-violet,
[10336]. chemical, and microscopi: analysis as well as to examination
[10337]Hl . for traces of radioactivity... Results have been consistently
[10338]i _ negative with a single ex eption. One test, on one item of
[10339]. - clothing, produced a sharply positave reaction. This article
[10340]of clothing belonged to a third nacionai diplomat who was a
[10341]CIA operetionail support agert in Moscow; he was aiso the
[10342]only person known to CIA to have been a victim of radio-
[10343],active isotope tagging in correction with an operational
[10344]; task (not letter-ma1ling) which he had performed for CIA.
[10345]There were no positive reactions for this agent's clothing
[10350]SSS SOS —-She-wae—an-operatuonal conact reporring tO BRLEMOW. She . : .
[10352]SAR LE
[10354]“he walked-by a post box on thé street and was checking it. Two:
[10355]: or. three times he was fotiowed by this post rox. but the ‘sur-
[10356]veillance never saw him mail’a lecter. Still. the KGB would .
[10357]remove the conrents of the letter box and send it in. On the : :
[10358]second or third tame “CUMIN round the letter he maiLed with :
[10359]metka. He hed also mailed a cover Letter to his parents. of a 4
[10360]. course, SUMIN also knew the addiess of the agent. since it was :
[10361]"a 'game'.“
[10363]Under inverrogztion im January 1963 NCSENKO described how
[10364]metka had be applied tro AWLDIAt' s clowning oy his maid and how,
[10366]in partacula: thiz led to the distovery of the lerters ASiDIAN i .
[10367]mailed to the agent APEHANGELSKTY in Scessa and to his parents a
[10368]in the United “1éres ‘tbe following 15 taken from the protocol :
[10370]of these interrogations which HOSEXKG s:oned as being eccurate_
[10371]on 4 March 1905: :
[10373]we Hal tad abe RS
[10375]"ABIBIAN 5 maid un Moscow was Tatyana FEDOROVICH.
[10377]started to work for ALIDIA. a few ronths after his arrival,
[10378]pe:haps three months but no longer than six months after
[10379]his arrival. [: shortiy after sneé began to work ;
[10380]for ABIDIAN in ore ts yet acquainted with her, in order .
[10381]to evaluate nec and give her General instructions about :
[10382]her work for ABIDIAN, T do not ow the ¢xact date of '
[10383]this meeting but 1t was before the fail of 1960, I wrote
[10385]the operational pian on ADIDIAN in circa October 1960. {
[10386]At this time FEDOROVICH was aiready working for ASBIDIAN. H
[10387]This operational plan steced wnat FEDOROVIC: would con- fy
[10388]tinue to put metka regulariy on AHIDIAN s clothing.
[10390]i
[10391]3
[10393]“BEDOROVICH put metka on ASIDLAY s clothing during
[10394]the entire period that € worked for him. She did this
[10395]to every two o: thice weeks except for a few times when she
[10396]: was Sick or on leave No one else had access to ABIDIAN's
[10397]4 apartment and therefore no Other perser. had the possi-
[10398]bility of putting metka on his clothing.
[10400]“I have said that ASIDIAN mailed an operational
[10401]letter to the KGb asukle agent ‘ARSHANGELSKIY’. He
[10402]mailed it at the maitvox on Tverskaya Yemskaya where he
[10403]had gone several times earsier. Surveiliance did not
[10404]see ABIDIAN mail the iettér but the mailbox was con-'
[10405]trolled and the letter to “ARKHANGELSKIY: was found,
[10407]; along with a letter to ABIDIAN’s parents. Both of these
[10408]‘soos «so Jetters had metka on them. as I was toid by SUMIN. I So eee abe
[10410]. cannot remember the date that ASIDIAN mailed this letter
[10411]- or, . except that it was sometime in 1961.'*
[10413]‘*7In a CIA interview on 8 December 1964, ABIDIAN identified a
[10414]‘photograph of Tatyana FEDOROVICH as a maid who worked for
[10415]_Marion ALRFAMONTE and Myra KEMMER. Embassy secretaries, until
[10416]| KEMMER departed Moscow in approximately July 1961. There--
[10417]. after FEDOROVICH worked part-time for ALBAMONTE and part-;
[10418]time for ABIDIAN. ABIDIAN.expleined that he had no maid at
[10419]all.for the "first, year. o.. so" of his. Moscow. tour and that .
[10420]FEDOROVICH ;was:-the only maid he. employed theres: When =~.”
[10421]ABIDIAN left Moscow, she began to work for the Embassy
[10424]14-0000
[10426]eh AAA TI GR aeRO WPCA ECR RELI REI
[10428]etna = mentee g My edn ee che =
[10432]BR eR KAN an een NTE OP ge aa ORR a
[10434](continuation of footrote from preceding page)
[10436]code clerk John GARLAND (Part V.E.3.c.i.). CIA records
[10437]show that ABIDIAN mailed the first of his clandestine
[10438]letters on 1 April 1961 and his second, the one to
[10439]“ARKHANGELSKIY", on 2 July 1961. I£ ABIDIAN's recollec-
[10440]tion is correct (a review of Embassy phene lists shows that
[10441]KEMMER wes in Moscow in June 1961, but was not there in
[10442]August of that year), it appears that FPEDOROVICH could not
[10443]have been responsible for the metka which, NOSENKO said,
[10444]led to discovery of the first of these letters: also, it
[10445]is possible that she was not employed by ABID -AN at the time
[10446]the letter to “ARKHANGELSKIY" was mailed. ABIDIAN's third
[10447]clandestine letter was mailed on 1 September 1361, appaz-
[10448]ently after FEDOROVICH came to work for him. «hen NOSENKO
[10449]was told in January 1965 that FEDOROVICHa could not have
[10450]been applying metka regularly to ASIDIAN's clothing at the
[10451]time of the "“ARKHANGELSKTY" letter-mailing, he repeated
[10452]that no ome but FEDOROVICH hed the possibility of doing
[10454]so and that he was sure she hed. When nis interrogators
[10455]suggested that FEDOROVICH may have occasionally cleaned
[10456]ABIDIAN'sS apartment on an informal basis before being
[10457]formerly hired as his maid, NOSENKO said that this was
[10458]possibly the case. iCIA does not know whether tnis was
[10460]so or not, but ABIDIAN gave his interviewer the impression
[10461]in Decemrer 1964 that he did his own housekeeping until
[10462]hiring FEDOROVICH.)
[10465]Reg ee MRS
[10467]a
[10468]4
[10470]t
[10471]4
[10472]i
[10473]4
[10474]. :
[10475]i
[10478]Use 7 7 y
[10479]14-8000
[10481]ON :
[10482]a on wires si «so SER RET ATER ACESS PRRM 8
[10483]_ = Sree SIM erat Teac ea ae SORES SAP SIE . Y
[10484]ORI RCE _ iS .
[10486]TOP SECRET | :
[10488]231.
[10490]) ABIDIAN's Servicing of the Pushkin Street Dead Drop
[10494]In 1964 NOSENKO told CIA for the first time that KGB sur- _ 3
[10496]eillance had observed a visit by A3IDIAN to a probable dead 4
[10498]/ atop on Pushkin Street in Moscow at the erd of 1960. This de2d
[10499]drop figured prominently in the PENXOVSKIY case.
[10501]NOSENKO's first remarks on this subject were made on 20 April
[10502]1964: "I left /the U.S. Embassy Section’ in 1962. ‘There was an
[10503]interesting move. This address where JACOBS* was caugnt in the .
[10504]PERKOVSKIY case - the same address was visited by ABIDIAN in
[10505]1960, or at the beginning of 1961. And at that time I went there
[10506]together with /V. A./ KOZLOV, the Chief of the Surveillance
[10507]Directorate, /M. G./ MATVEYEV /Deputy Chief of the Auerican
[10508]Department/ also went there with us. We went to that address
[10509]several times, at Pushkin Street. it was very interesting, this
[10510]radiator and everything, but the only thing we did there was to
[10511]place an observation post there, end that post was there for
[10512]about three months after ABIDIAN's visit... That was in 1960,
[10513]196i... They watched for three months. The surveillance teams
[10514]had to_be occupied there for 24 hovrs every day. I was there
[10515]then /in the U3. Embassy Section for the entire time that sur-
[10516]veillance was watching the Pushkin Street site’... at the be-
[10517]‘ginning I came there two or three times, ft ceme there with
[10518]MATVEYEV once, twice with KOVSHUK: we came there with Venyamin
[10519]i KOZLOV... But no one appeared here and so they were not writing
[10521]Rey anything /meening that the Surveillance Directorate was not sub—
[10523]a Xe mitting written reports/. No one appeared. That's why, only
[10525]% es orally, KOZLOV was saying 'nothing.' A week passed - "nothing, '
[10526]4 ver the next week passed — ‘notning'... I shall tell you why ai
[10528]2 phat | Gidn't mention this to you in June i962/,. Secause I had
[10530]occasions where there were many such places, and they were
[10532]watched for nothing. And it would just pass away and ina
[10534]month it would be forgotten... So we waited a month, two,
[10536]three. Nothing. So they let it go at that and had forgotten.
[10538]Of course, the surveillance team had it_all recorded, but we °
[10539]had forgotten about that in the_First /American/ Department...
[10541]In 1962, I was in the Seventh CTourist/ Department. I trans-
[10542]ferred in January 1962," so
[10544]On the basis of information supplied by NOSENKO during
[10545]April 1964, he was questioned during January and February 1965
[10546]On ABIDIAN's visit to Pushkin Street. The following, which is ;
[10547]consistent with and somewhat more Getailed than earlier state-
[10549]od
[10550]vir piee net recorded here, is taken from these 1965 interroga- \
[10553]- amene
[10554]se og art spent BA Ee OE
[10556]- me
[10557].
[10559]- In 1961, while NOSENKO was the responsible case
[10560]officer, the KGB followed ABIDIAN from the U.S. Embassy
[10561]to @ residential building on Pushkin Street in Moscow.
[10563]A stationary surveillance post et the Embassy saw ABIDIAN
[10564]leave with the Publications Procurement Officer of the
[10565]Embassy in a chauffeured automobile, rather than in the
[10566]car he normally used. The surveillance team assigned
[10567]specifically to ABIDIAN thereupon followed the car to
[10569]@ bookstore. Both Americans entered the bookstore, but
[10571]5 Le  . o _ .
[10572]' ® Richard JACOB, a CIA officer, was apprehended while servic- 6
[10573]- ing the Pushkin Street dead drop on 2 November 1962. oh
[10578]\ FR? orn. : oO
[10579]ard fl
[10581]14-09000
[10583]7 AREY,
[10587]a . - shortly thereafter ABIDIAN left alone. He walked around .
[10588]oot. the corner and entered a residential building next to a
[10589]Lo meat market on Pushkin Street. ABIDIAN emerged after a
[10590]. few seconds. The surveillance team saw him. go in but. did
[10592]k
[10593]F
[10594]. .
[10595]not follow him, This unusual incident was reported by nn ce
[10596]i
[10597]t
[10599]the surveillance team to the KGB Seventh (Surveillance)
[10601]Directorate, and the buil@ing was inspected that same day
[10603]by the Chief of the First Department of the. Surveillance :
[10604]Directorate, KOZLOV, together with the Deputy Cnief of the
[10606]American Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, i
[10607]MATVEYEV. Taking into account the character of the building ;
[10608]and its inhabitants, the duration and. circumstances of
[10610]ABIDIAN's visit, and the. suitability of the hallway -
[10612]particularly the radiater in it - for. use as a dead drop
[10614]site, it was decided by the Jeadership of the Second Chief
[10616]Directorate and the Surveillance Directorate that a station- .
[10618]ary surveillance post should immediately be set up to cover __ .
[10620]3
[10622]atertn Guthicda.
[10626]= "this location. BeGause of the short time evailable, it was
[10627]: not possible to place this post inside the building, so it
[10629]was set up across the street. In addition, the radiator i
[10630]was checked daily to see if anything, such as a macnetic :
[10631]container, had. been concealed behind it. This stationary 3
[10632]post was maintained around the clock for 30 days, after
[10633]which it was maintained from 0800 until midnight for another
[10634]two months. If a package or magnetic container had been
[10635]found behind the radiator, which was checked every morning,
[10636]it was planned to actach to jt very thin wires to trigger
[10637]a signal should someone remoye the package. At the same
[10638]time a member of the surveillance team would be stationed
[10639]on the landing of the staircase in this building, out of: }
[10640]sight from the hallway below, During the three months :
[10641]that the post was maintained, nothing was found concealed
[10642]behind the radiator, nor were any suspicious persons seen
[10643]entering or leaving the building. The post was then dis-
[10644]continued, but the addregs was placed on a list of sus-
[10645]picious places inspected daily by the Surveillance Direc-
[10646]torate. The true significance of this location became
[10647]known to the KGB only later, after the arrest of PENKOV-
[10648]SKIY in 1962. .
[10650]fe patsa toe
[10652]et BE ot
[10654]ar ercery
[10656]po. so + « NOSENKO first heard of ABIDIAN's visit to the sus-
[10657]t , ‘pected dead drop site on the day it occurred. . He was
[10658]*. sitting in KOVSHUK's office when he received a telephone
[10659]- @all from MATVEYEV telling him of the incident. Although
[10660]NOSENKO was ABIDIAN's case officer and KOVSHUK was Chief |
[10661]of the U.S. Embassy Section, the decision to place the mo
[10662]stationary surveillance post on this location was made at
[10663]a higher level; neither of them was involved in it or in
[10664]the later decision to discontinue the post. NOSENKO him-
[10665]self visited the building on Pushkin Street the following
[10666]day or the day after, but he remained only a few. minutes
[10667]- and did not recall any details of the hallway. except that
[10668]. there was a radiator theres eee, .
[10672]ool aAs. -ABIDIAN's case officer, ‘NOSENKO recallea re-
[10673]ceiving the surveillance report of his visit to the
[10674]Pushkin Street building and placing this: report. in|.
[10675]ABIDIAN's. file. (This is the case file. which NOSENKO’
[10678]‘turned over to his successor, GRYAZNOV, about 28-28 December
[10679]1961, just before he transferred to the Tourist Department.)
[10681]- NOSENKO received no written reports on the results
[10682]of the stationary surveillance post, but he did discuss |
[10683]this matter with KOZLOV on an almost daily basis during
[10684]the first month of surveillance, periodically after that. :
[10685]These discussions took place either by telephone, or when “ :
[10686]KOZLOV was visiting NOSENKO's office, or when NOSENKO
[10687]visited KOZLOV's office in KGB Headquarters. From KOZLOV
[10688]or perhaps someone else, NOSENKO learned that the post had
[10689]been discontinued after 90 days. On the basis of these
[10690]conversations with KOZLOV, NOSENKO knew that nothing of
[10691]interest occurred during the period of the stationary sur-
[10692]veillance,
[10694]a
[10695]4
[10697]Bh ag ee oe
[10699]~- NCSENKO was in the U.3. Embassy Section during all
[10700]the period that the stationary surveil-lance—post—was-wateh= me
[10702]ing the Pushkin Street site and was there when he heard ot
[10703]from KGZLOV that the post hag been replaced by periodic :
[10704]inspections. :
[10706]- NOSENKO did not report this incident of surveillance
[10707]on the Pushkin Street dead drop site to his CIA contacts.
[10708]in Geneva in June 1962 because the post had already been
[10709]discontinued by this time without anything unusual or sus-
[10710]picious having been noted. Therefore he thought that this
[10711]incident would not be particularly interesting to the CIA.
[10713]Bera an gpeet ndben Mee *
[10715]CIA records show that ABIDIAN visited the Pushkin Street
[10716]dead drop site only once, on 30 December 1961, a year later than
[10717]NOSENKO says, in response to an apparent signal from PENKOVSKIY.
[10718]The sequence of events was as follows: On 27 December 1961,
[10719]following receipt of what seemed to be the prearranged signal
[10720]from PENKOVSKIY that the drop had been loaded, Air Force Captain
[10721]Alexis DAVISON drove from his @partment to the U.S. Embassy to
[10722]alert ABIDIAN. At about 2100 hours the same night, ABIDIAN
[10723]left in his own car for Spasso House, the Ambassador's residence
[10724]where a dance was in progress, to tell the CIA Chief of Station,
[10725]Paul GARBLER, about the signa]. ABIDIAN and GARBLER left Spasso
[10726]House with the other guests at about 0200 on 28 December in
[10727]. ABIDIAN's car and drove past the telephone pole where, as part
[10728]i of his “drop loaded" signal, PENKOVSKIY was'to leave a mark. -
[10729]Later in the morning of 28 December, ABIDIAN, again in ‘his own
[10730]car drove from the Embassy to DAJIDSON's apartment, where he
[10731]‘pow: «4. first checked the telephone pple visually from the window and pee
[10732]then walked by it for a closer examination. ‘Although it was
[10733]hot certain that the telephone calls received on 27 December .
[10734]had, ‘in fact, keen a signal from PENKOVSKIY and although no -
[10735]supplementary mark was found on the telephone pole, a decision
[10736]was reached to check the drop. Therefore, at 1115 on 30 Decem-
[10737]ber 1961, ABIDIAN with Julian F. MacDONALD, an Embassy Economics
[10738], (Officer, left the Embassy in an official car with a Soviet :
[10739]Griver and proceeded to a bookstore on the corner of Pushkin
[10740]: Street. At 1130 ABIDIAN entered the building where the drop
[10742]- site was located, determined that the drop was empty, and ;
[10743]' left one minute later -, The pair then returned to the Embassy. -
[10745].
[10746]en es
[10748]283,
[10750]ste San ie la
[10752]res CT
[10754]“These facts were outlined tp NOSENKO during the February
[10755]1965 int rrogati Tt was pointed ou that.. by his own. most _
[10758]14-0000, 4 rae
[10760]- recent account, NOSENKO had transferred from the U,S. Embassy
[10761]Section to the Tourist Department about 28 December 1961 and ; :
[10762]that his participation in a Tourist Department approach to . 7
[10763]American citizen W. E, JOHNSON on 5 January 1962 had been con- Lo
[10764]firmed by JOHNSON himself. Therefore, NOSENXO was told, much
[10766]of what he had told CIA about his own role in the Pushkin |
[10768]Street affair became untenable. NOSENKO‘'s response to this
[10770]observation is described in Part V.F.3., which discusses
[10772]NOSENKO's approach to JOHNSON,
[10774]Also during the February 1965 interrogaticns NOSENKO refused
[10775]to sign the page of a protocol which read as follows:
[10777]"I have keen told by my interrogators that ABIDIAN's
[10778]only visit to the Pushkin Street site took place on 30 Dec-
[10779]ember 1961. Therefore, I was told that:
[10781]a. I could not have placed the surveillance ee
[10782]——— areport_in AWIDIAN'S Case file because I.had— already. ~ see
[10783], turned over the file to GRYAZNOV. ;
[10785]b. I could not have received rep ports about the :
[10786]stationary surveillance wnile still 2SIDIAN's case j
[10787]officer, since I was already in the Seventh Depart-
[10788]ment in January 1962.
[10790]c. The three month period in which the sur-
[10791]veillance post was watching the Fushkin Street site
[10792]did not expire until 30 March 1962 - more than two
[10793]weeks after I left for Geneva. . ;
[10795]edad why tie ees
[10797]Thus I could not have known in June 1S€2 that the surveil- :
[10798]lence of the dead drop site tad failed to produce results
[10799]or that it had been discontinued.”
[10801]whereas
[10803]: Although he acknowledged having reported to CIA on his involve-
[10805]: ment with ABIDIAN as summarized jn the protocol, NOSENKO said
[10807]. the way in which the protocol was prepared made him "leok silly."
[10808]On no other occasion has NOSENKO refused to sign protocols
[10809]dealing with other subjects.
[10811]cennstie
[10812]cee tate ea ee MT ad diate
[10814]NOSENKO was questioned further during October 1966 concern-
[10815]ing ABIDIAN's visit-to-Pushkin Street. - NOSENKO reaffirmed that ~~ 3
[10816]ABIDIAN was under special surveillance coverage throughout his Pe
[10817]Moscow tour and that this surveillance detected his travel from j
[10818]a
[10819]H
[10821]; _the U.S, Embassy to Pushkin Street and back: he would date this
[10823]‘focus "only as “sometime in 1961." NOSENKO was asked whether KGB sur-
[10824]veillance had detected any wnugual movements by ARIDIAN during
[10825]the period just preceeding his visit to the PENKOVSKIY drop
[10826]site (a reference to his: movements on 27 and 28 December 1961
[10828]; as described above). He replied that he knew definitely that
[10829]i ; surveillance had reported nothing unusual and added that ;
[10830]: ABIDIAN had not succeeded in losing the KGB surveillance at
[10831]any time during this period.
[10835]3
[10836]4
[10837]nihBsatbe
[10839]~ On 20 October 1966 NOSENKO was asked why. in his ; opinion,
[10840]ABIDIAN had gone to Pushkin Street at the time he did. In re-
[10841]sponse, he told CIA for the first time that in about.1960 an. _
[10843]aoeboo ay 8.
[10845]American tourfat or delegation member had gone to the Pushkin» ©
[10846]Street address and that it was the “opinion of the Second Chief -
[10847]Directorate” that this American had selected it as a dead drop _
[10848]site,* it was thought that ABIDIAN went there merely to check =~ te Ege d
[10849]the suitability of the. proposed site. a o
[10851]When he was asked on 20 October 1966 whether he had visited
[10852]the Pushkin Street address several days after ABIDIAN had been
[10853]seen there, as he had earlier said, NOSENKO replied: "I don't
[10854]remember. I do not want to say that I visited the dead. drop. I.
[10855]don't remember now whether I visited it or not. It seems to me : : :
[10856]that I visited it, but I don't remember. It seems that I visited
[10857]it with KOZLOV, but I cannot say ‘yes,' and I cannot say ‘no.'"
[10859]4
[10860]4
[10862]As previously indicated, NOSENKO said that on the same day
[10863]KEIDIAN was observed on Pushkin Street (i.e., on 30 December
[10864]1961} the Chief of the KGB Surveillance Directorate, KOZLOV,
[10865]inspected the Pushkin Street building. The FBI had reported,
[10867]we ae re
[10869]... Showever, that. KOZIOV was on TDY in the United States from... Loe ee Loe. 3
[10870]15 November 1961 until leaving New York City on 30. December . ; i
[10871]1351, travelling via France. The°timing of ABIDIAN's visit to ,
[10872]Pushkin Srreet, at 0330 hours New York City (Eastern Standard)
[10873]time, would appear to preclude the possibility of KOZLOV's having
[10874]gore to the dead drop site on the day NOSENKO Said he did.
[10876]fodiens
[10878]ties gan
[10880]_ ™ The Pushkin Street dead drop site was proposed by PENKOV-
[10882]: SKIY himself in the August 1960 letter by which he initi- .
[10884]Lo ally contacted CIA. .The only xnown visits by Americans to . “ : 4
[10886]- _ this address and the only onea connected with its use asa on
[10888]‘dead drop location occurréd on 12 November and 4 December
[10890]1960, when CIA officer Eugene MAHONEY checked the address
[10891]from the outside, and on 21 January 1961; when MAHONEY
[10892]returned and entered the building to check the precise
[10894].@ead drop location. See Part V.E.3.f.. for a discussion. .
[10896]of NOSENKO's knowledge of MAHONEY. a ee
[10901]Oe Supervisor of Activities Against American Service Attaches © oe go Be
[10902]L , At the beginning of the interrogation session. on 29 , . .
[10904]ie January 1965, NOSENKO was asked to list the duties he as-
[10905]. sumed upon reporting to the U.S. Embassy Section in Jan-
[10906]wary 1969. As he had on a number of earlier cccasions, .
[10907]a NOSENKO replied that he was giver responsibility for the -~ -
[10908]supervision of code clerk operations, was made the KGB
[10909]case officer for American Security Officer John ABICIAN
[10910]who waa to arrive in the near future, and was charged - i
[10911]with the Second Chief Directorate file on the security of , i
[10912]the U.S. Embassy and his section's file ca the materiacs. .
[10913]from microphones in various Exbassy officea. Later in
[10914]this same session NOSENKO recailed--and told CIA-for the
[10915]first time--that he was also given the duty of supervising
[10916]activities against cfficers assigned to the U.S. Arny,
[10917]Navy, and Air Force Attache officea~ The pertinent : - e
[10918]portion of the 29 January 1965 interrogatica was as fol- — - . ;
[10919]Owss f
[10921]sch AB bSsnbtase
[10923]ab Bee ee net
[10925]‘Qvuéstion: Who briefed you or gave you instructions cn
[10926]what was expected of you in the Section?
[10928]NOSENKOs I was speaking with GRIBANOV and KLYPIN.
[10930]Questions Wnat did KLYPIN say?
[10932]me ott A tena
[10934]NOSENKOs That “you are Deputy Chief of Section, but I
[10936]consider that you must also pay special atten~ i
[10937]tion to code clerks. We must study them and .
[10938]make an approach to one of them, It’s necessary
[10939]to work on this.” KOVSEUK was in KLYPIN's
[10940]office and I remember also that he raised the
[10941]question: “O.K. He will supervi-e this kind
[10942]of work, but maybe he can also take tne military.
[10943]All three attaches." Well, KUYPIN did not say
[10945]_ yes and dic not say no, I couldn't say anything
[10946]because I had not begun; I didn't know how auch
[10947]work this would involva. I couldn't say. And, . ;
[10948]you see, KLYPIN said: “Let's try it a short.
[10950]: ‘ period of time.” It was that way. It was
[10951]Po 7 decided that Iwill supervise the code. clerks.
[10952]: ; : and then the three attaches, And KOVSHUK took
[10954]: ; the diplomats and a whole pile of work. But,
[10955]pw gs wee wo «1 +. Of course, in the absence of KOVSHUK I nust
[10956]; ; take everything and in ry absence, RKOVSHUK
[10957]must take everything. But later, 1,2,3 -- I |
[10958]don't remember dates -- later I was not super-_ ; . . aye
[10959]_wising the military attaches but concentrated wo Ee
[10960]only on code clerks. ; ; Tos, co
[10962]Later you were not supervising military attaches,
[10963]‘but only code clerks? - De ,
[10965]‘ehree attaches. have any questions. or any papers’.
[10966]to report to the Chief of Section, they go.to ~
[10969]me, not to KOVSHUK.. They were deciding all —
[10970]a questions with me, This is what supervising
[10972]7 a : the work on these three attaches means. They .
[10974]a were deciding all questions with me. For exe. . ae :
[10976]. _ ample, the casa officers who were working ; oo .
[10978]af - against diplomats -= KUSKOV, ARTEMOV, FEDYANIN,
[10980]CBEREPANOV -~ they were reporting any questions, ; . .
[10982]any papers, to KOVSHUK. You see, there was / ae
[10984]oO such a division {of labor]. ~ ~ : . a a
[10986]Questions Am I correct that by military attaches you .
[10987]mean Army, Navy, and Air Force? - :
[10989]abate o
[10991]NOSENKOs Yes.
[10993]33
[10995]thee SR Lteaty eevonaiet
[10997]Questions Attaches and their assistants?
[10999]NOSENKO: Yes, yes, yes.
[11001]Questions: And enlisted pers5nnel? _.
[11003]NOSENKO: DEMKIN was handling enlisted perscrnel, and he
[11004]was also coming in to me for advice.
[11006]wee ee ee elem wale
[11008]Questions Roughly how long did you have the responsibil-
[11009]ities for the attaches?
[11011]NOSENKOs (paure) I don't remember, Several nonths.
[11013]dee cet le nee oe
[11015]Questions By several, you meaneee?
[11017]NOSENKO:s Five or six.
[11019]Questions And why was this responsibility removed from
[11020]you?
[11022]RNOSENKOs I didn't have time. No time, No time. You see,
[11023]‘ besides this, which is simple to explain, ther
[11024]were too many other questions which...
[11026]eet taeda titi bo ella et
[11028]Questions What occupied most of your time?
[11030]. j
[11031]NOSENKO!. Day-to-day matters. An order from the Chief of ‘
[11032]Department to study and develop this question, oad
[11033]then this question, then this question. Then . |
[11034]something to prepare for GRIBANOV, then some-
[11035]thing to prepare for KLYPIN, for his report,
[11036]then something to prepare for myself...
[11038]Question: To which of the major responsibilities you have
[11039]mentioned did you devote the most time?
[11041]NOSENKO3 I don't know.
[11043]‘ Questione. What was most important?
[11045]HOSENKOs' . They were all important.
[11047]Can you tell‘me whexe you’ were épending most. of:-
[11048]yous time to cause the removal of your respon~ -
[11049]for. military. attaches?. et
[11051]a
[11054]Mei tet
[11056]are.
[11058]HE Voy
[11060]a ae : - 7 238.
[11062]WOSENKOS No. I can't tell‘you. _ re
[11063]Questicns Who was given the respensibility for military
[11064]; attaches? - : So,
[11065]HOSENKO: Just a moment. I think ne was... I don't re-
[11066]member how, or what date, when there appeared in
[11067]the First [American] Department a Ceputy Chief an
[11068]of Departzent. It was either before I came,
[11069]or it was in January, or it was a littie bit
[11070]later. :
[11072]Questions Who was this?
[11074]a
[11076]4
[11077]4
[11079]3
[11080]A
[11083]RNOSENKOs ALESHIN.,* And his job was such -- it was a
[11084]new one -- supervision of work against military
[11085]. intelligence officers, net only Americans, but
[11086]° of other departments aiso, the First, the
[11087]. -  Seconc, tne Third, the Fourth, the Fifth, Co=-
[11088]~ TO, ordination of the whole work against all miiitary
[11089], intelligence officers. And that's why, later, -
[11090]KLYPIN and KOVSHUK said: "Well, why are you
[11091]supervising this? Let ALESHIN do it. You are
[11092]the Deputy of che Chief." It was not only be- 4
[11093]- cause of the lack of tine. Also it wasn't con- i
[11094]venient to the case officera. They were re~-
[11095]porting to me. “hen ALESHIN would invite them i
[11096]in and they would have to report tne sama thing Gg
[11097]to hin. :
[11099]1
[11100]sea
[11102]pent Wabe  ot ae
[11104]Questicns Who were you supervising?
[11106]NOSENKOs eeeGAVRILENKO had the Air Force attaches and
[11107]assistants; KURILENKO nad the Army Attache and
[11108]assistants; and BELOGLAIQV the Naval Attache,
[11109]assistants and marines.**
[11111]During interrogations on 20 October 1966, NOSENKO
[11112]chansed his earlier statement that the only operational
[11113]file he held in the U.S, Embassy Section was that on
[11114]ABIDIAN. At the same time, he described a leave period
[11115]that he had not mentioned earlier. NOSENKO said: "When
[11116]I began to work {in the U.S, Embassy Section}, after a ~
[11117]month or 80, I took the files on the Naval attaches. And
[11119]-wonssita te iieceiso«
[11121]THOSENKO had mentioned this earlier. on 18 June 1904 he was .
[11122]Op aes asked to list the names and functions of U.S. Embassy Sec- : bo eee ne oe
[11124]waM Bre atte nee k
[11126]tion officers in 1960. He said: “In 1960 the Chief of the
[11128]First Department was KLYPIN. .MAIVEYEV was still there as
[11130]First Deputy. The Second Deputy was. Yevgeniy Nikolayevich ~~. “4
[11131]_ALESHIN, He was given the special assignzent of coordinae ~ . :
[11132]ting the activities of the Second Chief Directorate. against
[11133]. @ll foreign military intelligence activity but was assigned
[11135]to. the First Department... In the First Section, KOVSHUK
[11136]_... Was the Chief and I was the Deputy Chief. In addition to
[11138]-, general functions, I had the responsibility for supervising
[11140]-' the work against code clerks anc the Embassy Security Officer.”
[11141]“@*@ In June 1964 NOSENKO explained that Nikolay DRANOV was re--
[11142]- @ponsible for the Naval Attache‘s- office in January when © ~
[11143].WOSENKO arrived, but he was: transferred and his duties, were
[11144]taken over by BELOGLAZOV who had. been working ‘with: him
[11145]against this target. -
[11148]1400000" -
[11150]then after two months I gave then to BELOGLAZOV. I in--
[11151]mediately went cn vacation after I came.* After two weeks
[11152]I went on leave for a month. I took over the files either .
[11153]before or after the leave,*** NOSENKO was asked why he ;
[11154]had assumed responsibility only for the Naval Attaches and ; .
[11155]replied: 1t was decided by KOVSHUK. I should take only: Se — oe: a
[11156]the Navy while I was gettiag acquainted with the section. . oO “OTS
[11157]At the same time, the case officer DRANOV was retiring and : .
[11159]he handled only Naval officers. I didn't take the Army. ee |
[11161]or Air Force."
[11163]4
[11164]“4
[11166]NOSENKO was asked again on 25 October 1966 why he
[11167]was responsible only for the aval Attaches during early
[11168]1960. He answered: “I took the files only on the Navy, .
[11169]but I was working on all of them.“
[11171]a ee
[11173]a cad LetneRtees
[11175]cere EOE
[11177]©7Yn other’ contexts NOSENRO has always equated Gustody .
[11178]of a file with case officer responsibilities. There-
[11179]fore, he seems to have indicated here. that for the
[11180]" approximately two months when these files were in his et wasn
[11181]mame, he was officially the KGB case officer charged ; ms
[11182]. with the American Naval Attaches. ; .
[11183]_ #f During a subsequent ‘interrogation session, NOSENKO was
[11185]“ asked to describe the leaves he took during:1960 and
[11187]1961. He repeated that he took 4 month's leave im
[11188]- pediately upon joining the U.S. Embassy Section, “part
[11189]of January and part of Pebruary” 1960; He had gone, — co.
[11190]he said, to the Caucasus with his wife and mather. He
[11191]then addeds “You want ma to say I was not telling the ©
[11192]truth in February {1965}. when I said I. was on leave be~ .
[11193]fore. i want to Cuba. [in Nov--ber’ 1960]..: 1 -know- this." .-
[11194](See Part V.E.3.d.,. which describes: this November 1960.
[11195]“Jeave and its relationship to NOSENKO"'s: responsibilities
[11196]as cas officer for John ABIDIAN.):. 00 veces aes
[11199]1epodop.
[11201]fii, Knowledge of the Target .
[11202]“ow Introduction —
[11204]:.. Hie position and duties as beputy Chief and sometimes
[11205]Acting Chief gave NOSENKO access to, and required hin to
[11206]know, the extent of. the U.S. Embassy Section’s knowledge.
[11207]of its target. He has therefore been questioned at length .
[11208]by CIA about the locations and cccupente oz the Embascy ; !
[11209]offices as well as about the Embassy personnel whom the KGB . ; :
[11210]had identified ag CIA officera. ‘The information from
[11211]NOSENKO on these two topics is presented below,
[11213]a eine . y ved
[11215](44) Physical Premises
[11217]NOSENKO has said that tis knowledgo of the physical
[11218]layout of the Embassy cerivea both from his gencral super-
[11219]—--- -- =: yvisery function during 1960 and-1961 and from nis respons
[11220]_ gibilities as the officially registerad custodian of the
[11221]‘KGB's file on the security of the Embassy. According to
[11222]NOSEMMRO, he received the latter from his chief, KOVSHUK,
[11223]when he arrived in the section in January 1960; shortly
[11224]thereafter he arranged by a phone call to the Secretariat :
[11225]of the Second Chief Directorate *o have custody transferred © . _- ae
[11226]officially to his name from that of M.F. BAXHVALOV, his
[11227]predecessor as Deputy Chief of Section. NOSENKO explained
[11228]that BAKHVALOV had already left the section by this time
[11229]but that, under KGB prcce-lures, it was permissivle for an
[11230]officer to remain official custodian of a file belonging
[11231]to the U.S, Embassy Section, even after leaving the American - ; : {
[11232]Department, 80 long as he remained in the Seccnd Chief :
[11233]Directorate. Until he turned this file over to GRYAZNOV
[11234]approximately duriny the pariod 25 to 28 December 1961, no
[11235]one else had access to it other than KOVSHUK, Chief of the
[11236]section, and GRYAZNOV and KCSOLAPOY, who shared the office
[11237]and safe where this file was kept. :
[11239]oy whdainereatsctadid Babes
[11241]LD Rete adn
[11243]NOSENKO stated in February 1965 that he had never
[11244]studied the contents, nor had he paid any special attention
[11245]-to this file. Since he would necessarily have been in a
[11246]position to know, NOSENKO also said he is certain that no
[11247]operational analysis or planning. by himself cr others was
[11248]‘done on the basis of this file during his two years in the
[11249]section. The file consisted of two volumes, one for the old
[11250]building on Mokhovaya Street and the second--about one inch
[11251]eres thick--concerning the new Embassy building on Chaykovskiy - ose paar
[11252]: Street, which was occupied in 1953. It was used only for 7 F
[11253]reference purposes, for the KGB had concluded that it was
[11254]impoesible for a Soviet citizen to penetrate’ the secure i
[11255]areas of the Embassy because of the security precautions in
[11256]: a, effect. Apart from these file-custodial duties, NOSENKO was
[11257]: ++... generally interested in the floor plans of, the Embassy .by
[11258]_ wirtue of his position as Deputy. Chief of the section.
[11259]HOSENKO's knowledge of the Embassy premises is reflected in. - .
[11260]the CIA debriefing of February 1965, and these statements ©.
[11261]are given in the next paragraphs. =k yee sy re
[11263]cn a Rt.
[11265]Penta AY Allan anim,
[11267]om
[11269]spate
[11271]bes cap fetuses
[11273]rr are rT as a aes i feats one, aa . wok
[11274]“:PAll KGB: employees who went into the secure areas ("Zone -* -
[11275]‘of Security”) of the Embaszy on. the séventh through tenth floors*®
[11276]wens seventh Floor is not one of the secure areas; the |
[11278]eighth, ninth, and tenth are. tet
[11280]t
[11283]eee part V.E.3.c. reviews NOSENKO's knowledge of and parti-
[11285]were carefully questioned on: what they: saw, because these, -~
[11287]areas were of special interest to the KGB, 'NOSENKO knew
[11288]no KGB employees who entered the secure areas curing
[11289]1960 or 1961 and had no personal contact with any of them.
[11290]He did not remember any information that such KGB employees’
[11291]ever reperted to the KGB, except that Dmitriy I. KUKOLEV,
[11292]an electrician whom he personally handled in 1954-1955,
[11294]had observed antenna wiring in the atticr the details or
[11295]significance of the wiring were unknown to NOSENKO as of
[11296]1965.
[11298]NOSENKO personally psaced some reports by KGB agents
[11299]in the Embassy security file while he had custody of it.
[11300]None of the information, he said, was interesting, in-
[11301]portant, or useful enough for him to remember, and he
[11302]could not name the: agent sources of the KGB. In another
[11303]context and at another time, however, NOSENKO said he
[11304]had received a report from some agent (name unknown)
[11305]that there was a sign “Security Office" on the office —~
[11307]‘door of John V. ABIDIAN, the Embassy: Security officer.*
[11309]NOSENKO @id not study the Enbassy security pro-
[11310]cedures in detail and did not remember where the classified
[11311]trash wes burned. He said that nothing could be done with
[11312]this information operaticnally, because the trash was al-
[11313]ways burned by a U.S. sergeant or a Marine guard ac-
[11314]companied by an officer.**
[11316]The Embassy office or floor where any section was
[11317]located or any individual worked during the years 1960
[11318]and 1961 was not remembered by NOSENKO, This reply was
[11319]also given when he was asked about tha rooms and floors
[11320]for the offices of the ambassador, the political officers,
[11321]ABIDIAN, and the code clerks,*** NOSENKO said that he
[11322]eithor knew these locations at the time he was Deputy
[11323]Chief of the section or could nave found them in the
[11324]in the monthly Embassy phone lists; the KGB received these
[11325]regularly from agent sources, and the lists gave office
[11326]numbers and phone numbers.****
[11328]¥ There never has been such a sign} NOSENAO’s responsi-
[11329]bility for the KGB coverage of ABIOIAN is discussed
[11330]in, Part V.E.3.d.. All Soviets who enter the top three
[11331]floors of the Embassy have a marine escort. :
[11333]oe A check with two former Embassy security officers in-
[11334]dicates that there has never been such a regulation.
[11335]fhe trash is burned by the marine on duty who “in-
[11336]variably does it alone." One of the security officers
[11337]questioned said: “I can think of no reason why the Sov-
[11338]iets would think this to be the case, since whatever
[11340]. Collateral information they have on it would point to
[11341]_ the truth."
[11343]cipation in KGB operations against U.S. code clerks.
[11345]eee The telephone lists give only phone numbers, not office
[11347]:: mumbers. They do, however, provide apartment numbers.
[11349]A a ee
[11357]j
[11358]4
[11359]f
[11363]4
[11369]j
[11371]t
[11374]14-00000 - a HE wT
[11376]soe, ‘ th “4960 | a enataliie chamber® (acoustical room) arrived - ,
[11377]sat the Embassy for President Eisenhower's use.and for .
[11378]secret conversations. NOSENKO was not certain where it was ars
[11379]‘located or whether it was ever used, but he heard from an. -
[11380]unknown source that in 1960-1961 meetings were held in a oe
[11381]secure room in the "Zone of Security.” He did net know any ; ; ae
[11383]of the technical details of this room. .
[11385]The KGB accomplished only one theft cf classified
[11386]material in any form from the U.S. Embassy during 1969 . 4
[11388]_ and 1961. A charwoman (name or crypsonym not recalled), . 4
[11389]who worked as an agent for the KGB officer Viktor BELOG= ;
[11390]LAZOV, stole a bag of papers from the office of the Naval .
[11391]Attaches. Most of the papers were turn or crumpled. They -  . a
[11392]included a draft of a report of the Naval Attaches’ sighting :
[11393]of ships and factories while on a trip to Leningrad, Since 7
[11394]this report was of only routine interest to the KGB, NOSENKO - a
[11396].. Said, he was unable to recall any other details of the theft, ~ : Gy
[11397]« dneluding the date, except that the charwoman was granted © ‘
[11398]a cash award, :
[11400](iii) CIA Personnel Under Embassy Cover 3
[11402]According to NOSENKO, the Americans at the U.S, Embassy
[11403]of graatest counterintelligence interest to the KGB section
[11404]were the identified CIA officers, When questioned on 2-
[11405]September 1964 concerning his knowledge of intelligence per-
[11406]sonnel assigned to the Embassy in 1960 and 1961, NOSENKO
[11407]stated that the KGB immeciately listed any officer associated
[11408]with the offices of U.S. Armed Forces Attaches as a member
[11409]of American Military Intelligence and any diplomat.as "suspect
[11410]American Intelligence,” the latter nctaticon always meaning
[11411]CIA, One of the tasks of the section was to determine which ©
[11412]of these diplomats was the CIA "Resident" (KGB nomenclature
[11413]for.Chief of Station), which were CIA case officars, and
[11414]which were tho CIA agents or cooptees, The KGB knew that
[11415]code clerks would not be used to fulfill intelligence missions
[11416]and that the same probably held true for the Ambassador and
[11417]the Marine guards. NOSENKO on 25 February 1965 signed a pro
[11418],tocol which included his statement that, as Deputy Chief and
[11419]occasional Acting Chief of the section, he would "necessarily
[11420]know whom thea KGB knew or suspected to be a CIA. officer in the
[11421]Embassy."
[11424]d
[11426]4
[11427]2
[11429]NOSENKO has been shown lists of the names of all .
[11430]~-, American personnel assigned to the embassy during 1960 and Bo
[11431]1961 and on a number of occasions has been asked to select :
[11432]those known or suspected by tha KGB to be CIA officers. The . .
[11433]persons he so identified, together with his comments con- Lo 1
[11434]corning them were: - : :
[11436]“Boris KLOSSON: Considered to be the CIA *Resident*
[11437]’ dm Moscow during this period. NOSENKO did not know why
[11438]KLOSSON was considered as such but said: “Every officer ~
[11439]' im the First [U.S. Embassy] Section thought he was the
[11440]! Resident." KLOSSON may have taken David MARK's job,
[11441]WOSENKO said, and MARK had been suspected of being the
[11442]CIA Resident on the basis of: his. behavior under KGB.
[11443]. surveillance and of his: letter mailing. * NOSENKO aid.
[11446]14-0000
[11448]TREN Se RE ANE IT 8 ME EARLE SH SAE
[11450]7 a Rah orcs a chenmecerectrcmmecuet emranre erences ©
[11452].
[11454]243.
[11456]not récall the names of KGB agents working specifically
[11457]against. XLOSSON and never read any agent or surveil-
[11458]lance report indicating that KLOSSON was engaged in
[11459]clandestine activity, NOSENKO did net know KLOSSON's
[11460]position: in the Embassy, where he had been previously
[11461]stationed, what trips he tcok inside the Soviet Union,
[11462]where he Lived in Moscow, about KLOSSON's wife or
[11463]whether he had children with him in Moscow, anything
[11464]about his personal life, the nawos of close American
[11465]friends and his Soviet contacts. “I didn't read the
[11466]file" on KLOSSON, NOSENKO said on 3 February 1965.
[11468]The responsible KGB officer, A.M, MIKHAYLOV, "was
[11469]reading [the file]. I can't tell you why [we believed
[11470]KLOSSON was the CIA Resident], There was opinicn--his
[11471]previcus position, attitude. Little, little Getails,
[11472]I don't remember.°*
[11474]-John ABIDIAN: Consicered to be a CIA officer
[11475]on the basis of his conduct as a U.S. Departnent of
[11476]State security officer in coi:nection witn Premier
[11477]KHRUSHCHEV's 1959 visit to the United States and he-=
[11478]cause he replaced known CIA officer Russell LANGELLE
[11479]in Moscow. Surveillance established the fact that he
[11480]railed operational letters and visited a possible dead
[11481]drop site in Moscow (see Part V.E.3.d.).
[11483]“George WINTERS: Known to be a CIA cfficer and
[11484]was given special attention because of his operational
[11485]activity in the POPOV case.** WINTERS was in perscnal
[11486]contact with KCOVSHUK, who used the Ministry of Foreign
[11487]Affairs as cover. The KGB case officer responsible
[11488]for covering WINTERS was V.A. KUSKOV,.
[11490]“Steve WASHENKOs: Known to be a CIA officer. As
[11491]far as NOSENKO was aware, the KGB identified WASHENKC
[11492]as a CIA officer on the basis of his mailing one or
[11493]two letters to KGB-controlled double agents in the Baltic
[11494]area, In addition, from a KGB microphone he was over-
[11495]heard dictating an intelligence report shortly after he
[11496]xeturned from a trip in the USSR.
[11498]Lewis BOWDEN; Suspected of being a CIA officer,
[11499]but NOSENKO could not recall the reasons why.*** KOVSHUK,
[11500]under Ministry of Foreign Affairs cover, was in contact
[11501]with BOWDEN.
[11503]= See below} William MORELL was identitied Dy KLOSSON to the
[11504]Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs as a CIA officer be-
[11505]fore MORELL arrived in Moscow,
[11507]** The case of GRU Lieutenant Colonel POPOV is discussed in
[11508]Part VI.D.7.a.3; further KGS information on WINTERS is re-
[11509]viewed in Part VI.D.7.C.
[11511]*** The CHEREPANOV document; which sets forth a KGB plan for
[11512]operations against BOWDEN, lists several reasons why he
[11513]was believed to be an FBI representative in the Embassy.
[11514]NOSENKO, when reading this document in Geneva in February
[11515]1964, concurred in this opinion; he referred to BOWDEN
[11516]as FBI on later occasiony also. Sea Part VI.De7.c. on
[11517]CHEREPANOV,.
[11519]ea 1!) OE) <5: . ti -
[11521]: 4
[11525]y
[11527]J
[11530]i
[11531]4
[11532]i
[11533]j
[11534]i
[11537]St
[11541]244.
[11543]- Richard FUNKHOUSER: Suspected cf being a CIA ; oN _
[11544]officer because he is a specialist on the Soviet Union, a! Se
[11545]particularly economics. NOSMNKG did not remember the ; *
[11546]names of any agents working against FUNKHOUSER nor any
[11547]derogatory information concerning him.
[11549]_* William HORBALY: Suspected of being a CIA case
[11550]officer* because the KGB heard him, by means of micro- us
[11551]phones in the Embassy, discussiny a report he had
[11552]written, or dictating it, about his cbservations on
[11553]a trip he hac taken in the Soviet Union. NOSENKO said
[11554]that he did not know the names cf agents working
[11555]against WORBALY or whether the agents obtained deroga-
[11556]tory information concerning him. As far as NOSENKO
[11557]knew, there had been no operaticnal approach to or ~ : i
[11558]recruitment. of HORBALY. 7 ; 4
[11560]4
[11561]4
[11563]4
[11564]E
[11566]Of the seven U.S. Embassy officers designated by j
[11568]NOSENKO as known or suspected CIA personnel, three--WINTERS, . A
[11569]- WASHENKO, and HORBALY--were in fact CIA officers. When 1
[11570]’ HORBALY was first assigned to Moscow, however, he was i
[11572]detached from overt employment as an economic analyst in
[11574]CIA. %In January 1962 he severed his connect:cns with CIA
[11576]to become a full member of the Poreign Agricuitural Ser-
[11578]vice of tha Department of Agriculture. When HORBALY first
[11580]arrived in Moscow he openly discusse4 the fact that he had come
[11582]to the Embassy from CIA. While in Mcscow he had no connection
[11584]with or knowledge of CIA clandestine activities. WASHENKO was
[11586]similarly detached from overt employment as an economic analyst
[11588]with CIA when he was assigned to Moscow, but was coopted by
[11590]CIA for limited operational support activity, chiefly mailing
[11592]agent letters. After his return from Moscow he reverted to
[11594]his overt CIA employment. John ABIDIAN was a State Department
[11596]officer coopted by CIA; although not a CIA staff employee, he
[11598]was for all intents the CIA "Resident" 1n Moscow from Febru-
[11600]ary 1960 until November 1961. The remaining three--KLOSSON,
[11602]BOWDEN and FUNKHOUSER--had no affiliation with CIA.
[11606]2
[11608]PRA HNO a One ee
[11610]: During the time NOSENKO said. he belongec to the American
[11611]‘ . Embassy Section there were stationed in Moscow two CIA . : oR
[11612]: officers, Eugene P. MAHONEY and Paul GARBLER, whose status :
[11613]. as such was subsequently found to have been known to the .
[11614]KGB before their arrival in the Soviet Union. In addition, Ce te fee ape
[11615]one officer (William MORELL) was openly identified as a CIA :
[11616]employee to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs before ; .
[11617]arriving in Moscow. Furthermore, Francis STEVENS (see Page . ’
[11618]374) reported having been. asked by one of the two KGB offi- ; ,
[11619]cers trying to recruit him whether MORELL was a CIA employee;
[11620]when STEVENS replied that he did not know, the KGB officer
[11621]stated: “He openly says he does." Another officer (G. Stan-
[11622]ley BROWN), an overt CIA employee, had transferred to the
[11623]‘U.S. Department of Agriculture shortly before being assigned to
[11624]the. Embassy. The latter two were not engaged in clandestine
[11625]activities in Moscow on behalf. of CIA | but the. first. two CIA
[11626]officers were. o
[11628]stretinnine ne conerin Wee paregernen amemtamentanees clan oeaeee
[11630]: - NOSENKO. indicated that he did not ‘know about ‘the. “intel
[11631]ligence affiliation of any of theae four. persons:
[11633]Poo NOSENKO was shown a photograph. o£ MAHONEY,- whom
[11634]he did. not recognize. He was then given MAHONEY's |
[11636]mame, which he recognized as being that of an. employee
[11637]of the Administrative Section of the Embassy
[11640]14-do009
[11644]said that, other than this, he di
[11645]about MAHONEY--his previcus carea ;
[11646]Russian language, when he arrived in Mosceow, when he a nn se
[11647]departed, where he lived, his activ2t1¢s there, or | io . oy
[11648]evicence that he was ar intellig ence officer. "It _ ; fo
[11650]t
[11652]G net know anything
[11653]r, his knowledge .of the
[11655]e
[11656]c
[11658]ge
[11660]wasn't known he was a CIA officer,* NOSENKO said on
[11662]3 February 1965. “If there was evidence I would have
[11663]known. But there was none.” “CSENKO was told that
[11664]MAHONEY's CIA status had been revealed to the KGB by
[11666]a KGB penetration of British intell: gence {George
[11667]BLAKE]. He replied that he was certain that the U.S.
[11668]Embassy Section's file on MAHOLEY contained no infor-
[11669]mation from such a source concerning MARONEY, and that
[11670]had there been such informatics avaiiabie, he would
[11671]have been a special turget aid «ould have Leen handled
[11672]by one of the best officers im the section. NCSENKG
[11673]added that he could not understana why this infer- : See ke . a
[11674]Mation about MAHONEY was not givea to the section by
[11675]the KGB First Chief Dircctorate.
[11679]ay Maes Seishin,
[11681]y
[11683]~ NOSENKO identifies Paul CARSLER as a naval officer 5
[11684]who worked in the office of the Naval Attache and the md
[11685]case officer working against him as BILCGLAZOV He saic
[11686]that he could provide no other detaiis on GAPBLER.
[11687]NOSEXZO specifically said thaz ne ¢ not know the names
[11688]of any agents work2ng against CARBLER, that ne knew of
[11689]no unusual or interesting .znfermaticn concerning GARBLER
[11690]contained from concealed micrcznones, telephone taps,
[11691]or surveillance, and that he cic not know whether he
[11692]had read GARBLER's file or other "materials" ccncerning
[11694]him.
[11700]gene
[11702]a
[11704]- NOSENKO did not identify William MCRELL as a CIA
[11705]« officer.* Nor did he know that while MORELL was in the
[11706]Soviet Union, he was under direct cultivation by NOSENKO’s
[11707]superior, KOVSHUK, and by K.N. SMIRNOV, a case officer
[11708]of the KGB First Chief Directorate.
[11710]- NOSENKO did not reccgnize the name of G. Stanley
[11711]BROWN. As shown on a list which NOSENKO brought to CIA,
[11712]. BROWN shared an office with HCFBALY, wnom NOSENKO said
[11713]. nL was: a suspected CIA officer; in this office was.a KGB
[11714]: ' microphone with good reception but insignificant pro-
[11715]@uctien, accorcing ts PUSENZ.. 7% Peperteily E2l0N and .
[11716]another member of the Embassy staff were under constant 4
[11717]surveillance during a trip witnin the USS2 during 1961, .
[11718]and in the same year he travelited to Leningrad with
[11719]WINTERS, correctly identified ty NCSENKO as:‘a CIA officer.
[11723]_ CIA records show that, as a staff officer, MAHONEY served
[11724]in Frankfurt during 1955 and 1956 2:4 was connected with a . i
[11725]/ joint CIA/MI-6. project which handles the NTS, a Russian enigr2 ~ mE
[11726]organization. His work brought his into liaison in true name Ly v8
[11727]with both MI-6 and the French Service; he was known to NTS an H
[11728]Personnel PY. his true. first. name. only... _ H
[11730]° that’ in late 1960 or early ‘T9361. naa U.S. *pmbassy Section.
[11732]: . had decided to withiras the requirement for continuous.
[11733]MEE Reding NE Cin med ep nigstyeerm Dee BORE H SG. weed APA & atfice.
[11735]gave Bdeceh OT tae neces tenn bet geveut “erste bl Lad “tensed
[11737]h ualisse. BH betty. Wt
[11740]14.0000
[11742]’ Assistant General Sesvices Officer at the U.S. Embassy.
[11744]MAHONEY arrived. in Moscow on-4 October 1960 as the
[11745]His specific CIA mission there was to ‘support the handling
[11747]of PENKOVSKIY inside the Soviet Union. MAHONEY lived in
[11748]America House. From the start cf his tour he was active in
[11750]his attempts to familiarize himself with Moscow and he
[11752]frequently toured various areas of the city on foot. In
[11753]checking locations conriected with the PENKOVSKIY case,.
[11754]MAHONEY went to the Pushkin Street dead drop location on
[11755]two occasions during November and December 1960, and he
[11756]‘made a thorough examination of the dead drop itself as
[11758]well as of its related signal site on-21 January 1961.
[11759]Throughout, MAHONEY was subjected to intensive -KGB surveil-
[11760]lance. In a report dated 25 October 1960, ABIDIAN com-
[11761]mented on this as follows: "I find this type of coverage
[11762](five surveillants on a recent trip to the barter shop)
[11763]completely out of character with that which is usually
[11764]given a new arrival of similar rank. ily only inference
[11766]is that the KGB has at least strong suspicions of MAHONEY's
[11767]primary role [CIA officer]. As for surveillance on my-
[11768]self, it continues to be eccasional and extremely discreet."
[11770]George BLAKE, the KGB penecration of NI-6, was arrested
[11771]in London on 14 April 1961. Iu his confession he said that
[11772]he had passed the KGB a master list of the names of persons
[11773]connected with the joint U.S.-British project with which
[11774]MAHONEY had been connnected in Frankfurt, as well as other
[11775]materials on this project. On this basis, ‘“'AHONEY was
[11776]relieved shortly thereafter of further duties connected with
[11777]support of the PENKOVSKIY operation; he was withdrawn fron
[11778]Moscow in September 1961, less than a year after his arrival.
[11780]CIA records indicate that GARBLER was detailed to CIA
[11781]by the Navy in April 1952 and served CIA under Naval cover
[11783]gin Berlin from January 1953 until July 1955. In the fall
[11785]‘of 1955, he resigned his naval commission, and in May 1956
[11786]he was assigned as a CIA officer to the U.S. Embassy in
[11787]Stockholm. GARBLER served there until August 1959 in the
[11789]cover position of Second Secretary and Political Officer (FSR).
[11791]On 3 June 1961, he returned to active duty with the Navy,
[11793]and on 31 August 1961 his appointment was announced as |
[11794]Assistant Naval Attache to Mcscow, with the rank of Commander.
[11795]In. September 1961 his official bicgraphic data was forwarded
[11796]to the office of the Soviet Naval Attache in Washington, who
[11797]had requested this information, and the same month GARBLER
[11798]made an official call at the Soviet Embassy. GARBLER arrived
[11799]in Moscow on 29 November 1961. He was the CIA Chief of .
[11800]Station there.
[11802]Prior to his affiliation with CIA, GARBLER served in
[11803]Korea and there was acquainted with George BLAKE. In April
[11804]1960 GARBLER was a participant in joint CIA-MI-6 discussions
[11805]in Washington on-the question of tourist operations into
[11807]-the Soviet Union. (see Part V.D.8); BLAKE, who had access
[11809]to information on the agenda and participants for these talks,
[11810]-- admitted after his. arrest in 1961 that he had photographed
[11811]he minutes of this meeting and had passed them to his. Soviet.
[11813]andlers. .On this basis CIA presumed that-GARBLER.was
[11814]dentified to. the KGB prior to arriving in Moscow at the
[11818]cotta niibesi ee
[11820]. oe ENR oe
[11821]REARS NTC EE SES NE cry
[11823]1
[11826]Baka ote bt
[11828]ta udbeatelat
[11829]atte Labeled
[11832]“end of 1961. (BLAKE was arrested the previous April:) He
[11834]! was definitely identified as such in an article carried in
[11835]a in October 1963.
[11837]_ the Soviet Government newspaper Jzvestiy
[11839]. This article, entitled "A Cruel Leseon, was allegedly
[11841]written by Arthur HAMAN, an Estonian who defected to the
[11842]West in 1955 and returned to the Soviet Union in 1963; in
[11843]it HAMAN attempted to expose how “the U.S. Secret Service,
[11844]riding roughshod over Swedish sovereignty. recruits agents
[11846]for subversion and espionage against the Soviet Union and
[11847]the official U.S.
[11849]other countries...making active use of
[11851]missions in Stockholm, newsmeu: tourists..." HAAN named
[11853]GARBLER as having been involved in. this work. ‘This article,
[11855]which appeared at about the same time as the arrest of: |. ;
[11857]WENNERSTRON, described a sunber of fabricated activities
[11858]ARBLER had no connection
[11860]of CIA in Sweden and, in fact, G
[11861]with HAMAN or with anything which HANAN describes. *
[11863]ABIDIAN's visit-to the PENKOVSKLY
[11865]GARBLER's part in
[11866]in 5treet is discussed in Part
[11868]‘dead drop site on Pushk
[11869]V.E.3.d.
[11871]a Bee Page 394 fox Gther KGB operational use of HAMAN.
[11873]Baye
[11875]seta Bht tas 2
[11877]2 AE Nea Uh ae eta Wa meatenen ©
[11879]oh
[11882]g.
[11883](i) Introduction
[11885]Electronic Operations Against the U.S. Embassy
[11887]audio and other electronic operations against the U.S. Em-. a
[11888]bagsy in Moscow: The preseace of microphones in the .
[11889]-chancery buiiding, the absencé of audio-technical devices
[11890]in the north wing of the Embassy, and the exidtence of a
[11891]beam which monitors and jams transmissions from the Embassy.
[11892]Thesé are discussed separately below. Except for knowing
[11893]that a resonant cavity (wireless) ‘microphone had been found
[11894]in the American Ambassador's residence in 1953, NOSENKO
[11895]said he was unaware of audio surveillance devices and tech-
[11896]niques (other than the chancery nicrophones) in use against
[11897]the Embassy, nor did he know of any material produced by
[11898]such measures. NOSENKO told CIA on 14 May 1964 that, to . . . -
[11900]“the best of his knowledge,“ there were no wireless micro- . -
[11902]phones (i.e., carrier transmitters and radio transmitters)
[11904]in the Embassy.* His information on KGB electronic opera- .
[11906]tions against this target dated mainly from the period when
[11908]he was Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section, American .
[11909]Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate, in 1960-1961 and ; i
[11910]derives from his special responsibilities in this period;
[11912]from his 1953-1955 service in the American Department, NO- .
[11913]SENKO said, he learned only that audio installations : L
[11914]existed. ;
[11916]NOSENKO had. three basic pieces of information on KGB : 7 |
[11917]i
[11919]oy Line Strada tate
[11921](11) Microphones in the Chancery
[11923]Frequently described by NOSENKO as his most important :
[11924]information, the microphones in the chancery building were
[11925]first mentioned by him during the 1962 meetings in Geneva.
[11926]In these and subsequent debriefings NOSENKO reported in de-.
[11927]; “tail on the ways in which he acquired this information, on
[11928]i the number and locations of the microphones, the quality of
[11929]; reception, and the value of production. He has not given
[11930]the date wheo the. microphones became operative, but pre-
[11931]sumed (in agreement with the KGB defector GOLITSYN) that
[11932]_they Ware installed prior to 1953, when the chancery was oc-
[11933]ecupied by U.S. Government representatives. ** Of the 16
[11934], microphones listed by NOSENKO, he has stressed the impor-~
[11935]$ . ’ tance of the one in the office of the Minister Counsellor,
[11936]: the existence of which was earlier reported by GOLITSYN and
[11937]subsequently confirmed by technical investigations. In
[11938]- 1962 NOSENKO said that the audibility of the nine-year-old . .
[11940]*NOSENKO stated that the KGB knew the identity of American
[11942]counter-audio technicians and therefore turned off the micro-
[11944]‘phones whenever any of them arrived at the Embassy. Since
[11945]‘-—@ microphone-and-wire system cannot be turned off, this re-—
[11946]- mark suggests gither that there was an external power source
[11947]for the microphones, which NOSENKO has not mentioned, or. .
[11948]that NOSENKO himsel? did not | ‘have rodimentary knowledge of
[11949]such matters...
[11951]TA at
[11953]eethe investigations. by American technicians ‘leave ac. doubt.
[11954]that the precte arya shail systems would have hae: te be oy
[11959]‘system var
[11961]ied from very clear'4o zero: he said in 1964.
[11962]that the quality was deteriorating and that “in & year or
[11964]two they {the microphones| will be coppletely inoperative."* |
[11965]Althougkt the microphones produced a great deal of politi- —
[11966]cal intelligence, NOSENKO said, .he found nothirg worthwhile
[11967]for use against U.S. code clerks or others. of operetional
[11968]interest to him.** All pertinent details from NOSENKO and ©
[11969]other sources on the microphone system in the chancery
[11970]biiilding is presented in the fol..uwing portions of this
[11972]paper.
[11973](a) NOSENKO's Sources - oe
[11975]Nearly all of NOSFENKO's knowledge about the microphone
[11976]system in the chancery pbuilding was, te said, derived fron
[11977]two circumstances: Fitst, his responsibility as Deputy
[11978]Chief of the KGB's U.S. Embassy Section, for receiving and
[11979]disseminating transcripts of conversations there; and second,
[11980]a special meeting which he attended in his dual capacity as —
[11981]Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section and custodian of
[11982]the microphone information. Additional information was ob-
[11983]tained by NOSEXKO in 1962 and 1963 from G.I. GRYAZNOV, his
[11984]former subordinate and his successor as Deputy Chief of the
[11985]Section. In several discussions with GRYAZNOV duting this
[11986]period NOSENKO learned that some of the microphones were
[11987]dead while others had become less efficient since NOSENKO's
[11988]reassignment to the Tourist Department in Junuary 1962.
[11989]NOSENKO's statements concerning his major sources’ 6f infor~
[11990]mation on the microphones are presented in chronological
[11991]order below. .
[11993]“We are listening to everything the military attaches
[11994]say in Moscow, the Military, Navy and Air Force Attaches,"
[11996]. KOSENKO said on 11 June 1962. “All the reports go through
[11998]me. I read them....Only @ limited group of people read
[11999]these reports. They are all in the First Department of the
[12001]’ Second Chief Directorate. ho are thev? The Chief of the
[12003]Department (we don't give them to his deputies), the Chief
[12005]of the [U.S. Embassy] Section, and I--altogether three people.
[12006]Sometimes we report to GRIBANOV things we consider important.
[12007]We conceal the fact that we are listening to the Americans
[12008]from our workers in other departments, from the English
[12009]Department, from the French Department....We are listening
[12011]to the three attaches and the Minister Counsellor. Don't
[12012]even send coded cables about me (to Moscow). If you do it
[12013]will be the end of me....Only three people know that we
[12015]are listening to you. Even within the Second Chief Directo-
[12017]“yate it is a tremendous secret that we are listening. to you.”
[12019]tt ROSENKO was asked on 12 June 1962 about the form in which
[12021]he received the audio intercept reports and whether these
[12023]’ reports were delivered to his office: He answered: “No.
[12025]Here's how it is done. We have a special unit concerned
[12027]oo ees
[12028]*Tests of the KGB equipment by the American technicians
[12029]later. in 1964 resulted in recordings of high, intelligibility
[12031];in, certain instances. : >». “ty
[12033]esVulnerability data’ on Americans. in Moscow c
[12035]-gnd according to the views: of the U.S. Arny Attache whose
[12036]‘office inthe Embassy was the. aite of a microphone.
[12039]oscow could be obtained.
[12040]~ from the microphone: system, according to the damage report: .
[12041]by the Security Committee of the U.S. Intelligence Board (USIB
[12043]3
[12044]3
[12045]4
[12046]4
[12047]i
[12048]7
[12050]j
[12051]i
[12056]Question: What was the date of this? What year and month? -
[12057]“NOSENKO: Ob, I don't Fenenber, 1960...maybe the beginning
[12059]250.
[12061]with this function which is called: the Second Special
[12062]Department. It is a part of the Operationai Technical -
[12064]’ Directorate [OTU]. The Special Department has several
[12066]sections within it. Take, for example, the section under
[12067]Colonel [N.Ya.} KUZMIN. He has the entire English line,
[12068]everything. He has young girls.and boys there who have an
[12069]excellent command of English. They all sit in a room with
[12070]special equipment and listen continuously. Besides this,.
[12071]everything goes on tape and later they transcribe it. They.
[12072]listen to it two or three times so as to get every word....
[12073]{They prepare the materials.] The materials from the
[12074]American Embassy used to come to me...and 1 decided what to
[12075]keep and what not to keep. Why? A summary report would
[12076]come to me with the notation that the information in it
[12078]was Top Secret or Confidential. This was all nonsense, but- -.
[12080]J was required to return the report within two days" time.--
[12081]So, I would read through the materials to see what was use-
[12082]ful and what was not.. It’s not all suitable. And I would
[12084]"underline this { the significant items] with a pencil. No,
[12086]{1 was wrong!.:°The report first went to the thicf of de-
[12087]partment and then I underlined with a pencil what was neces-
[12088]sary and gave it back to them [the Second Special Department,
[12089]OTU]. They collected it. I signed a receipt that I had
[12090]received it from them and they gave me a receipt when 1
[12091]returned it. And then they gave me extracts. From these
[12093].extracts alcne one cannot tell where the material cane froa,
[12095]but from the report one realizes that the Americans ere
[12097]being listened to. It is necessary to have these extracts
[12099]to place in the files. We have a tile on each person working
[12100]in the Embassy, the so-called delo-formulyar {developmental
[12101]file]. We keep one on every Embassy employee."
[12103]During the second of the 1964 series of meetings in
[12104]Geneva, on 24 January, NOSENKO took a number cf notes from
[12105]his wallet. Pointing to. one of them, he said: "This piece
[12106]of paper was kept in my operational file and it represents
[12107]the statistics for the years 1960-1961, listing those micro-
[12108]phones which are actively used in monitoring conversations
[12109]in the U.S. Embassy." This list named eleven offices and
[12110]apartments in the chancery. which contained microphones.
[12111]When asked whether he had copied the list from records or
[12112]had-drawn it up from memory, NOSENKO explained that it came
[12113]from an operational review of what "listening points we had
[12114]in the U.S. Embassy."
[12116]A detailed explanation of his ‘acquisition 0 of the written
[12118]‘list was supplied by NOSENKO on 14 May 1964:
[12120]Question: ‘How did this list come into your hands? What
[12121]— caused you to write it? .
[12123]a o-
[12125]“NOSENKO: I came to KLYPIN (Chief of. the Anerican Depart-
[12127]nent] with my working notebook. KOVSHUK [Chief .
[12128]of.the U.S. Embassy Section in the Department}
[12129]was writing and he put the list on my book.
[12131]“" KOVSHUK said this one [microphone] is working
[12132]vo WELL this one badly, and so on.
[12134]of 1961. .
[12136]| At the end’ of 1960 or the beginning of 196E.
[12137]you and KOVSHUK net. in KLYPIN's office?
[12139]etna linlanie deagptitecttee entity
[12144]. NOSENKO:. Yes. Or maybe it was at a meeting. ‘It fe aif-- |.
[12146]Woes
[12148]* | 251.
[12150]aan) ce
[12152]‘ficult: to say. Maybe we went to report to KOVSHUK
[12153]in his room or maybe KOVSHUK was. writing in
[12154]KLYPIN's study room, I don't remember.
[12156]NOSENKO then described the purpose of the neeting:. To dis-
[12158]‘cuss the possibility of releusing monitor positions from
[12160]some of the chancery microphones and of assigning these re-
[12161]leased positions to. Vladimir. [patronymic unknown}. PETROV, _ _.-..
[12162]Chief of the American Department's section for work against
[12163]American tourists and delegates suspected of being con-
[12164]nected with American Intelligence; PETROV had earlicr re-
[12165]quested Englist-language monitoring positions fron the Chief
[12166]of the English-Language Section of the OTU’s Second Special
[12167]Department but had been told that all such interpreters were
[12168]already engaged on pricrity targets. At the neeting KOVSHUK
[12169]aud KLYPIN reviewed the microphone. coverage of the chancery
[12170]to decide which rooms offered.information of little value
[12172]and which monitoring positions could: be released to PETROV.
[12173]KOVSHUK drew up a list of the Embassy offices and apartments
[12174]then being covered on a full-time basis and indicated those
[12175]of lesser importance. At the end of the neeting, KOVSHUK
[12176]gave the list to NUSENKO, who retained it in his safe until
[12177]bringing it to CIA in 1964, NOSENKO has added nothing fur-
[12178]ther on the locations of microphones in the chancery building,
[12179]and much of his information concerning the quality end value
[12180]of the production by these microphones cane from this
[12182]meeting.
[12184]Since his defection, NOSENKO has spoken further on his
[12185]responsibilities in connection with the daily transcripts
[12186]received from the Second Special Department. He said on
[12187]14 May 1964: “All the materials after they were read and
[12189]‘signed were returned to the Second (Specia]j Department of the
[12191]Operational Technical Directorate. Some of the material fron
[12192]this was put in the individual file, but anyone who read
[12194]it would never know where it came from. He wouldn't know
[12195]that it came from mikes....KOVSHUK and I read all of this.
[12196]From this we gave information to those who needed it, de-
[12197]pending on their interest. If there was something inter-—
[12199]esting, it was given to KLYPIN to read. If KLYPIN saw
[12201]something intcresting he could take it ‘and give it to GRI-
[12203]BANOV. Tatyana GRISHNYAT [from the Second Special Department] .
[12205]came by car with this material. . She went to KLYPIN. Some-
[12206]times she left them with me."
[12208]A protocol signed by NOSENKO in 1965 states: "One of
[12209]my duties as Deputy Chief, First Section, First Department,
[12211]-Second Chief Directorate, was to receive, review, and give
[12213]to appropriate case officers the production from microphones
[12215]-4n the American Embassy on a daily basis. I also maintained
[12217]the control book (journal) for these trarscripts. These
[12219]"transcripts were prepared by the Operational Technical Direc-—
[12220]:torate of the KGB. Every day a.female worker of the OTU
[12222]brought me the transcripts of conversations in the Embassy
[12224]‘from the previous day. I regularly returned all of. the ori-
[12226]ginal transcripts to this female worker; they were usually
[12227]in wy possession for one day.'' In. my absence this duty was
[12228]performed by [ny superior. KOVSHUK ‘or subordinate]
[12232]3
[12233]"y
[12234]a:
[12235]K
[12236]4
[12238]4
[12239]sedan
[12241]z
[12244]14-0000
[12246]IM ROHR SSE EA ERS EEE NER
[12248]oe veigttiete oe gett elti nd
[12251]CA ARNE SSOP I CRE OORT AT SP IIE Neg PU ge
[12253]252.
[12255]oe
[12257]{b) Number and Locations of Microphenes |
[12259]The information from NCOSENKO on the number and locations
[12260]of the KGB microphones in the chancery building in the U.S.
[12261]Embassy is separated from that furnished by other sources.
[12263]NOSENKGO'’S Information
[12266]11 June 1962: [NOSENKO has just been essured that none
[12268]of the information he had givea CIA would be used without
[12270]first consulting with tim.) “Well, because vou are such
[12272]good guys, I will give you even wore. Have the Minister
[12273]Counsellor stop dictating to himself in his office....
[12274]Listen, move the. Minister Counsellor from his present office
[12275]to the north wing of the Embassy [wnere NOSENKO said there
[12276]were no listening devices; see below]. We are not listening
[12277]to the Ambassador. but move the Minister Counselior....
[12279]And we are listening to eal! your military atteches there.
[12280]All of them.-the Military Attache, tne Naval Attrche, the
[12281]Air Force Attache....We have four or five points [ fron which
[12282]we are getting intercepts!. #e hear the Minister Counsellor,
[12283]all three attachos-.-that's four points--and the fifth is
[12284]where one of the State Department employees sits. and yes,
[12285]there's another, a sixth point. We are listening to the
[12286]Agricultural Attache. [C, Staniey] BROWN is working there
[12287]row and someone else, a young man j Willian HORBALY}. So,
[12289]we are listening to these six points. This is our biggest
[12290]secret. Only a few people know this. [ was Deputy Caief
[12292]of the section and received this information. I decided
[12293]what to give the Chief of Pepartment and whar not to give
[12294]him, Do you understand? This is to say nothing about the
[12295]other departments and the [U.S.j Embessy Section itself."
[12297]12 June 1962: “We lost the microphone in the private
[12298]residence of the Ambassador. This was not THOMPSON, but the
[12299]one before him. BOHLEN was there then. We once had some-
[12300]thing there, but you found the [Great] Seal where it was
[12301]located. But in the Embassy itscl., in the Ambassador's
[12302]office, we have nothing. Inc one we hear now is {Minister
[12303]Counsellor] FREEKS. 8111 FREERS, in particular, walks around
[12304]his office and dictates. All this is recorded. Well, this
[12305]is important material."
[12307]14 June 1962: 'When I was Deputy Chief of the American
[12308]Embassy Section I received reports on the microphone material
[12309]daily. If there was something important in it, I reported
[12310]to the Chief of the department. The rest KOVSHUK and I
[12311]read and then distributed to the workers the parts that con-
[12312]cerned them. Well, the workers who were operating against
[12313]the three attaches knew about this [microphone} equipment....
[12314]Nothing was received from the code room. These machines
[12315]were working and there were no conversations. He was sitting
[12316]alone and there was nething. [NOSENKO is evidently describing
[12317]the military code room.|....There is a point there from which
[12318]we hear the Agricultural Attache. But there in nothing
[12319]there. They talk about what interests them in the field of
[12320]agriculture. Nothing interesting.”
[12322]24 January 1964: The late 1960/early 1961 list which
[12324]_ KOSENKO brought to CIA (see above) showed that the following
[12325]offices and apartments in the chancery contained sicrophénes:
[12327]TEP Seoaey
[12329]ESLER PRY OF
[12332]4
[12334]wr sli main do
[12338]seats
[12340]14-0000
[12342]eae ore “cere por mpnmcren se osecanec ls) oma) SECRET as ©... ag gt oT ay ay
[12343]wate Ear ene aa Ware
[12345]253.
[12347]“office of the “Winister Counsellor, FREERS;
[12349]“Office of the Naval Attache, HOUGHTON;
[12351]“Ofticoe of the Milatary Attache, URBAN;
[12353]"Office of the Air Attache, NEILSEN:
[12355]“Orfice of the Assisrant Air Attache, WINDSOR;
[12357]"Office of the Assistant Air Attaches, SENTO and SACHANEN;
[12359]“Office of the Assistant Military Attaches MASON, RELTZ
[12360]and WILSON;
[12362]"Office of the Political Officer, GLEYSTEEN;
[12364]"Office of Agricultural Attactes, HORBALY and BROWN;
[12365]"Military Code Roan; :
[12367]"State Department Code Room and Telaotype Office;
[12369]“Apartments of FREERS, HOUGHTON, URBAN and NEILSEN;
[12370]"Bighth Floor Bar ‘Marines)"
[12372]Altegether, sixtecn spaces are listed, but of these NOSENKO
[12373]said that the microphone in one (the Marine bar) had never
[12374]worked and that notning of importance was learned from the
[12375]microphones in the four Eabassy apartments, This leaves
[12376]eleven; when presenting tte: list to CLA, NOSENKO said that
[12377]while he was in the U.S, Embassy Section, “there were a total
[12378]of eleven listening posts.” (tn discussing the late 1960
[12379]or early 196i meeting at which KOVSHUK and KLYPI* received
[12380]the microphone coverage, NOSENKO waid on 14 May 1954 that
[12381]it was decided to celras.. the microphone positiors in the
[12382]GLEYSTEEN office, fne UGRBAT Y-BROWN of fice, the State De-
[12383]partment code room and the tcletype office. this would
[12384]leave a total of cight ‘listening posts.")
[12386]14 May 1964: Questioned on the total number of micro-~-
[12387]phones In the US. Embassy, SOSENKO said that mary’ were
[12388]installed in the chancery building pcfore the Americans moved
[12389]in, but that he did not know how many were inetailed in all,
[12390]how many wege in any one of the rooms included in KOVSHUK's
[12391]list, or where they vere located in specifie rooms. He
[12392]did recall that nost of the microphones were placed in the
[12393]outside wall, the wali rearest Cnaykovskiy Street, as most of
[12394]the offices faced this strest and the piacement of the micro-
[12395]phones near th: outer wall would make it more difficult for
[12396]American technicians to find them if they examined only the
[12398]inner walls.
[12400]January 1965: NOSENKO volunteered that there were no
[12401]fixed microphones in America House, the residence of enlisted
[12402]men at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. He said that there was
[12403]discussion during 1960 and 1961 of using the KCB agents
[12404]employed there to place temporary audio devices for one or
[12405]two days at a time in the rooms of the Americans as well as
[12406]in the Embassy garage. These plans were vetoed, however, be-
[12407]cause such devices are too easily found. For the same refae
[12409]gon, NOSENKO said, there was no attempt made in this period
[12411]to place temporary devices in Spasso House (the Ambassador's
[12412]residence) or 1n the apartments of sucn Embassy officers
[12414]os John ABIDIAN. The KGH was "afraid that they will be
[12415]@etected and that there will be a scandal.”
[12417]TOP SECRET
[12419]Fol Dae Se Sa
[12421]'
[12422]i
[12423]i
[12425]ee oe
[12429]ee earn Fe
[12431]t
[12432]2
[12434]14-0000 - _
[12436]Pr ee By Raia 4 ty dn Se AR ore Seat g i ESR Mey gi wh  1: t gp SECRET Le eer pat Mas
[12437]254. oS
[12441]Information from Oth) r Sources
[12444]In 1956.4 sensitive source yjholding a senior position
[12445]in the KGB sadBmitttd a vritten aeport to the U.S. Ambassador
[12446]in Woscow with ‘he cautionary semark: "Do not speak about
[12447]this information in the rooms of the American Embassy.”
[12448]The report itself contains a portion reading as follows:
[12449]"Because all reoms in tne Amurican Embassy in Moscow are
[12450]being monitored by the KiB, To atreongly ask that there be no
[12451]conversations and discussions conesrning this information
[12452]in the American Embassy. The flap involving the American '
[12453]direction-finding specialists" in Stasingrvad ducing the ;
[12454]sunmer of 1955 vas organizcd hy the KGE because conversa-
[12455]tions were overheard in ths r.ooms of the American Embassy.
[12456]As you know, as a vesult of this flap, the KOR seized valu-
[12457]able directice.finding ¢guipment from the American intelli-
[12458]gence officers. The KGB did not possess this type of
[12459]valuable equipment, and 1t would Lave been necessary for
[12460]Soviet technicians to xork and experiment for a tong time
[12461]in order to acquire such valuable equipment. The listening
[12462]devices ave so skitiftully anstailed in the walls, floors,
[12463]and ceilings of the roows of tne Americar Erbassy that it
[12464]is impossible to fand chem, cven with special-perpose instru-
[12469]GOLITSYN, who defected in late 1961, reported the exis-
[12470]tence of a microphone in the office of the Minister Counsellor
[12471]and said tat many wore had buen installed in the chancery
[12472]prior io 1953. %:OLL25YN was deorinfed in early 1962 and
[12473]his information on this subject “as disseminated within the
[12474]U.S. Government appeoxitately two weeks before NOSENKO'S
[12475]initial contact wits Cia.) GOFLISYN said he had learned of
[12476]the microphone in the Hinuister Counsellor's office when by
[12477]chance he happencd to sce a particuiar document in an office
[12478]at KGB Headquarters. According to COLIISYN, during one of his
[12479]visits to tae American lk partment in 1960*+ he heard and saw
[12481]*This is a referencs: to ire arrest of U.S. Military Attaches
[12482]BENSON, NULE, and SiRULD and the seizure of sensitive elec~
[12483]tronic cquipment they had witn them in Stalingrad in the '
[12484]summer of 1955. NOSENKO reported that the KGB seizure of . !
[12485]this equipment was based on information obtained from micro- : y
[12486]phones in the U.S, Embassy in Moscow. See Part V.C.3.b. (viil). 1;
[12488]*#GOLITSYN has reported that he visited the U.S. Embassy Sec-
[12489]tion of the American Department on a number of occasions in
[12490]the spring of 1960 as pact of his preparation for assignment
[12492]; to Helsinki in July of that yeayv; he has also said that he t
[12493]i returned on temporary assignment te Moscow and again con- t
[12494]sulted with U.S. Embassy Section officers in December 1960. :
[12495]With regard to the latter visits, however, GOLITSYN's pass- §
[12497]port and CIA travel records indicate that he was in Moscow on i
[12498]temporary duty for two weeks in January 1961 and that he is | i
[12499]therefore a month off in his estimate of when these visits
[12500]took place. On this basis it appears that by his statement
[12501]that this incident occurred in 1960 ‘he has not been more
[12502]specific), he could have been referring to either his visits
[12504]to the American Department in the spring of 1960 or his visits
[12505]in January 1961. aan .
[12509]ay
[12511]Fen EE IRA, AO NAINA
[12513]4
[12515]Oo TOP SECRET
[12517]14-0000
[12519]RO RTEEAREERE RPE MABE RANE SEERET ROAR eH AY “Se se sci ue AE eee Rees, Toate
[12520]; Saar se pce SR ve a. oe
[12522]255.
[12524]that a report or reports concerning the results of audio
[12525]surveillance in the U.S. Enubassy had been nisplaced-:* While
[12526]GOLITSYN was in the office, the Chief of the American De- |
[12527]partment ordered all personnel present to search for these
[12529]papers, and all the KGB officers searched again through }
[12530]their files, without success. GOLITSYN noted a large’ num !
[12531]ber of reports with red stripes across their covers, indi- - H
[12532]cating that they were the property of the Operational Teche ‘
[12533]nical Directorate, The only office in the U.S. Embassy that
[12535]GOLITSYN recalied being mentioned in connection with thi
[12537]search was. that of the Minister Counsellor.*. ° i
[12539]whe ee ee ald nae
[12541]No technical investigations were undertaken as a result
[12542]Citas yOf GOLITSYN's information, and so it was largely on the basis
[12543]Stang a. fof NOSENKO's reports that American technicians inspected the
[12544]; chancery building for the presence of microphones tn the
[12545]spring of 1964. The results have been described in the
[12546]damage report submitted by the USIB Security Committee on
[12547]7 October 1964: "On 23 April 1964, a low-impedance dynamic
[12548]microphone and associated seven-inch probe tube were dis-
[12549]covered in the wall behind a radiator in Room 1008 of the
[12550]Chancery of the U.S, Embassy in Moscow. The ceble to this
[12551]microphone was traced to a major cable run which lay several
[12552]iuches under the outside surface of the cast face of the
[12553]Chancery. This major cable run consisted of a single
[12554]twenty (20). paix and a single thirty (30) pair, lead-sheathed
[12555]augio cable which ran along the cast fuce of the Chancery
[12556]to the rcof area of the North Annex of the Embassy. At
[12557]this point, these cables were spliced into & one hundred and
[12558]one (101) pair cable along with two ten. (10). pair cables...
[12559]A number of vertical cables were found to run from the ten,
[12560]twenty, and thirty pair cabies to the various microphone
[12561]installations. Fifty (50) microphones hive been positively
[12562]identified.«* Two (2) microphones not physically located
[12566]*On 28 January 1965 NOSENKO volunteered an account of the i
[12567]loss of one of the intercept reports which the U.S. Embassy :
[12568]Section had received from the Second Special Department or
[12569]the Operational Technical Directorate “in 1960 or 1961.”
[12571]This document, according te NCSENKO, was “one of the reports i :
[12572]with [Minister Counsellor] FREERS dictating"; as 2 result of '
[12573]its loss, "the month of December, the whole month, the U.S. |
[12574]Embassy Section was in a turmoil” searching for the document. ‘
[12575]The month-long search and investigation was unsuccessful, : :
[12576]however, and. in the end, the case was closed with the con- : ‘
[12577]clusion that the document had probably been burned inadver-
[12578]tently, without a record of destruction having been drawn up.
[12579]In this account NOSENKO appears to date the incident in Decenm=
[12580]ber 1960, which approximates GOLITSYN's second series of
[12582]visits to the U.S. Embassy Section (and duplicated GOLITSIN's
[12583]erroneous estimate of when these visits took place). NOSENKO
[12584]has never reported that COLITSYN was present in the offices
[12586]of the U.S. Embassy Section during the search for this docu-
[12587]ment and, in fact, has denied that GOLITSYN visited the section
[12588]either in the spring of 1960 or in late 1960 or January 1961.
[12590]. Fhe only visit by GOLITSYN to the U.S. Embassy Section reported i
[12591]by NOSENKO was one in the spring or summer of i961, at which t
[12592]time NOSENKO claims to have been on leave; GOLITSYN was not
[12593]in Moscow at. the time. . . Lote . .
[12595]rene OF
[12596]7“
[12598]Same ne
[12600]SoPour nore vere. subsequently located, for a total of 84.
[12602]a.
[12605]oom]
[12606]&o
[12607]a)
[12608]C5
[12610]3
[12611]Coors
[12613]14-0000
[12615]53. Pb ae il Semaine ngeemcommaeran es warcoomenrn CER APY + SRN RUBIES RR eg eee wena bic aes Ek Og ERY
[12618]256.
[12620]can reasonably be presumed to be in apartment 6) based on H
[12621]the symmetry of the known installatiozs. The microphones
[12623]located were situated so that all microphcnes and probes H
[12624]were behind radiators. The microphons system discovered i
[12625]covered every outside room on floors six through ten,- with :
[12626]the exception of thuse offices with doors entering onto !
[12627]baiconies and when exterior building constructions were ad-
[12629]jacent to cutside wall sections bearing radiators."
[12631]The first microphone found was in Koom 1008, in what
[12632]is now the Army Finasce office and which in 1960-1961 was
[12633]the office of the Military Attache, where NOSENKO reported
[12634]a microphone to be. All other microphones were ultimately
[12635]traced from this discovery. There were microphones in all
[12636]rooms identified by NOSENKO, and in others besides. Two of
[12637]the latter were tocperative when found--one in to Ambassa-—
[12638]dor's office where NOSENKO said no conversations were being
[12639]heard in 1960-1961 and theother in the fecurity Office where
[12640]NOSEXKO caid there was none. The damage report concluded
[12641]that all tne microptones were installed before the U.S,
[12642]Government took possession of the chancery builuing in 1953,
[12644]j
[12645]q
[12647]t
[12648]H
[12650]he OR OE RAE SOS TE NT ARE HA
[12651]4
[12653]FREON
[12655]45
[12657]“¢
[12658]“3
[12659]4
[12660]a
[12663]14-0000
[12665]some
[12667]Te Sten we EEE caegteenatin t mentee oO teeter ts Neimneteetete th eine pentane eeeictetn Stet tenn nen Re ee AR TA nec ern eo
[12669]RELL Ee WRN! ES atiettacsungomcisnememancewratzumel UL. oebal Fst cD apo Ry eps
[12671]_, from Ninister Counsellor FREERS' office, NOSENKO said, “but
[12672]. for the last years, even in 1960 and 1961, it was very
[12674]erg atten FESS GE” RN A ahaa ed ey
[12675]yw Ty
[12676]. ope
[12678]257, : a
[12680](c) Receptivity and Audibility of Microphones
[12682]NOSENKO nade the following evaluations of the quality
[12683]of intercept received from the chancery microphone tostalla- '
[12685]i
[12687]li June 1962: “They are dying. the microphones, and
[12688]we cannot do anything about it, because we can't get into
[12689]the Embassy | to make new installations]. In that respect i
[12690]your Embassy and the british Embassy are the only cnes we
[12691]can't get into."
[12695]14 June 1962: "The most interesting materials, of :
[12696]course, ere irom the...{Note: one or two words orn the tape
[12697]are unintelligible here; from earlier and subsequent remarks,
[12698]particularly one on 24 January 1964 (see below), it is clear
[12699]that NOSENKO is speakiig of the microphone in the Minister
[12700]Counsellor's office.) And I tell you honestly that it is
[12701]becoming increasingly difficult to work with this. The
[12702]shayba {microphone;, as we call them, is fading and only two
[12704]mree people are able to make out what is being said.
[12705]That is, the tape sounds as if somewhere far, far away,
[12706]somewnere in the cellar, someone is spearing in a whisper.
[12707]It is very difficult to hear, very difficult when it is
[12708]fading. But, what can you de? They tell us categorically
[12709]and directly--KUZMIN, the Chief of the section of the Second
[12710]Special Departnent responsible for this, tells us that
[12711]soon we will not have anything there. There are a great
[12712]nunber of microphon:s there, put they don't work. J know
[12713]that there are about 20 microphones there that don't work.
[12714]They have all gone deaf."
[12716]24 January 1964: “Now, we also listened to the code
[12717]roon and the teletype orfice, but we could never get any-
[12718]thing out of the teletype office because of interference
[12720]probably speaking of machine noise|. Fron this point
[12721]pointing at the list, but not stating which microphone he
[12723]was speaking about] the reception became progressively
[12724]weaker until it finally stopped: evideatly it wore out.
[12725]Yes, there was another point in the bar on the 8th floor.
[12726]This one never worked even though it was installed. Thus,
[12727]out of the eleven points, nine were working...[NOSENKO then \
[12728]referred to information he learned in 1962 and 1963, after |
[12730]leaving the U.S. Embassy Section.] GRYAZNOV said that the
[12731]equipment is deteriorating and they are only getting snatches H :
[12732]of conversation and that in a year or two they will be com- i ;
[12733]letely inoperative. GRIBANOY is insisting on getting to i f
[12734]Precruiting code clerks at all costs.” :
[12736]“1 7-92 January:1964: "Here in HORBALY's and BRO#N's roon
[12737][oiei ena ncenine couse tae Attaches], there is no acoustical
[12738]sic] and nothing comes from here. I'll come back to this,
[12739]but they complained that they're not getting anything. [These
[12740]microphones were installed] when this building was being
[12741]built. It wasn't later after you had moved into the building,
[12742]but when the building was under construction...[NOSENKO was
[12743]asked whether more or fewer than nine microphones are now our-
[12744]rently active.] It couldn't be more, anyhow."
[12746]14 May 1964: Very interesting information was heard
[12748]~_ TOP SecreT
[12750]econo NA ae y
[12751]eR BRL Ay TR, foe conn eee EAB SECRET. occ a et Ce RTE hag Tea et
[12753]258.
[12754]difficult to hear, I was sitting with [S.G.] DMITRIYEV he . :
[12755][Deputy Chief of the English-language Section of the Second
[12756]Special Department} aad they toid me how difficult it was. |
[12757]The mike was dying. Only very experienced interpreters . :
[12758]were sitting on this. They listened 10, 15, even 20 times : ;
[12759]to the same place [on the tape|....f After 1961] GRYAZXNOV
[12760]was telling me that they were getting xzlmost nothing from
[12761]this point. [He said this} in 1962, 1963. I was thinking
[12762]you had given a command [had cautioned FREERS]. We were
[12763]getting almost nothing. I heard this from GRYAZNOV several
[12764]times in 1963. Thr mikes wore working not bad at all in
[12765]1960 and 1961 in the attache rooms--Nav Air Force...
[12767]XY don't know [how receptién was in 1962). ¥ know only that
[12768]GRYAZNOV was te%ling me in 1962 and 1963 that they were getting
[12769]Little, little, and almost nothing. He said we are losing
[12770]everything. We have no materials. We have little, little
[12771]pieces, but nothing...in generai ! from all of the micro-
[12772]phones]. NOSENKO then speculated that one reason for this
[12774]was the fact that the Americans in the Exbassy were not
[12776]saying anything significant, but he said he did not know
[12778]this to be the case. Speuking of the microphone in GLEYSTEEN's
[12779]office, fre said: ‘'There was something heard. In 1960 and
[12781]1961 it was working [ remember. Reception was gcod but
[12783]there was no secret information. The mike in HORBALY's
[12785]room was gond in 1960 and 1961....1960 and 19651--good re-
[12786]cepticn." According to SNOSENKO, receptéon was good from
[12788]the State Department code and teletype room “only always
[12790]the sounds of [teletype] machines. In 1960 and 1961--machines
[12791]only....Reception was good when conversation came through.
[12793]I don't know [avout reception in 1962 and 1963]....Reception
[12794]was good [from the military code roo) in 1950 and 1961."
[12796]ha leds tm oe a Saad.
[12798]On-site tests made by American technicians after the
[12799]1964 discoveries determined that the following microphones
[12800]in the chancery (the occupants listed are those as of Decen~- .
[12801]ber 1960) were inoperative or unintelligible, but the USIB |
[12802]damage report emphasized that it had not been pnossible to }
[12803]determine how long these microphones had neen inoperative: i
[12805]~one microphone in the apartment of the senior Naval
[12808]-Ghree microphones in the apartment of the senior Air : ;
[12809]Attache; i
[12810]~one micrephone in the apartment of the Economic Counsel-
[12814]x -the microphone in the office of the Publications Pro- i
[12816]-Yhe microphone in the Marine bar;
[12817]=the microphone in the Internal Affairs office
[12818]-the microphone in the Ambassador's office;
[12819]-the microphone in the office of the Security Officer;
[12820]=the microphone in the office of the Chief of Chancery;
[12821]~the microphone in the office of the Air Attache;
[12822]-the microphone in the office of the Assistant Air At-
[12823]tache;
[12824]=the sicrophone in the office of the Assistant Naval
[12826]nn . ethe ocicrophone in the Navy administrative office;
[12827]“a ’ ae =the microphone in the Air Force administrative office.
[12829]This list includes the office of the Ambassador (from which
[12830]HOSENKO said no intercepts vere being received in 2960 and
[12832]we ete
[12834]dee
[12837]0 a om gehen ae a ee he oe +
[12839]_ was nade in the office of the Security Officer.
[12841]259.
[12843]1961) and the office of the Security Officer (where NOSENXO
[12844]has said no microphone was installed}.* On-site recordings
[12845]made from twelve selected microphones in 1964 indicate that
[12846]the microphone in the office occupied by the Minister Counsel-
[12847]lor in 1960 was capable of producing tapes of "high intelli-_
[12848]gibility' as of 1964. The 1964 tests of the microphones in
[12849]the military and State Departuent code rooms in the office
[12851]of the Naval Attache also produced recordings of high inteili-
[12852]gibility. As pointed out ctelow, however, the possible pro-
[12853]duction by the code room microphones vould have been sharply
[12854]reduced by the installation of acousticai rceons during 1962.
[12856]*As noted in Part VI.D.3.e., NOSENKO reported that the U.S.
[12857]Embassy officer Richard HARMSTONE did not report his havang
[12858]been approached by the KGB for recruitment in May 1959.
[12860]HARYSTONE did, in fact, report the spproach, and the report
[12862]tan
[12866]F
[12867]i
[12869]4
[12872]" (a), Amount, Type, and Value of Production , le
[12874]Evaluations of the quality of production have been
[12875]given by NOSENKO as well as U.S. authorities concerned
[12876]with the microphones in the chancery building.
[12878]NOSENKO's Statements
[12880]ll. June 1962: "Well, perhaps, there would be. some kind
[12881]of fitness report [{kharakteristika]. Sometires there the
[12882]Counsellor, FREERS, who was there before McSWEENEY, dict=ted
[12883]something; he said that so-and-so has such-and-such weak-
[12884]nesses. We had not known that. We are listening to your
[12885]military attaches there. We know where they intend to travel,
[12886]what they want to find-out. Ke krow waat machinery and what
[12887]targets interest then--always....They chatter sometimes.
[12888]Some of the things they say are surprisixg [from the point
[12889]of view of security]. They discuss, among other things,
[12890]where to go, what to see, what to take with them--electronic
[12891]equipment or not. And we are hunting for this electronic
[12892]equipment end now have permissica, if we are absolutely cer-
[12893]tain that one of your people is taking electrozic apparatus
[12894]with him on an intelligence trip outside Moscow, to teke it,
[12895]to steal it. We now have authorization to take any necessary
[12896]steps to steal it. Because you now have improved your
[12897]equipment. We stole some equipment in Stalingrad in 1955,
[12898]but now you nave better apparatus....Wnaat do we do [when we
[12899]know the attaches are taking special.equipment;? Well, they
[12900]are getting ready to go aad we hear that such-—and-such data
[12901]interests them. We give them disinformation; we make them
[12902]think, for example, that there are rockets there. And there's
[12903]absolutely nothing there, understand? Absolutely nothing.
[12905]We make it appear on the radio {by spurious transmissions]
[12906]that there are rockets there; we even heve patrols standing
[12907]there and everything....They talk about interesting things,
[12908]but never in my life have I heard a conversation about agent
[12909]operatioas, not once." ; .
[12911]12 June 1962: [Speaking again about coverage of the U.S.
[12912]Service Attaches] "They say: ‘Today, let's go to such-and-.
[12913]such a place.' They go to the military attache, the two
[12914]assistants, and say: ‘This region is interesting. They have
[12915]something there.* We know it at once. I personally tele- -
[12916]phone surveillance at once and tell tne Chief of the depart
[12917]ment to come at once. He arrives and I say: ‘Throw in
[12918]three, four, five brigades [surveillance teams].' We work 2l-
[12919]most openly against the attaches....FREERS, Bill FREERS, in
[12920]particular, walks around in his office and dictates, All
[12921]this is recorded. Well, this is’ very important material. We
[12922]do not know the cipher, but he dictates Top Secret and Con~
[12923]fidential cables {in the clear]. We receive the clear text
[12925]and decide at once whether there is anything serious there or
[12927]not. If we decide that this must be reported to the [KGB]
[12928]Chairman immediately, GRIBANOV may call him right away."
[12930]‘ 94 January 1964: "Now, we also listened to the code
[12931]. an
[12933]~ get much out. of the [mwilitary] code: room;. ve. could hear [the .
[12934]code clerk James} STORSBERG. svearing on occasion, and then
[12935]he would mention a group of numbers.* This was, of course
[12937]‘poom' End. teletype office, but we could never get anything —
[12938]Because of interference [teletype ‘machine noise}....We didn't ©
[12944],
[12946]cant pace sich se
[12948]ee dee
[12951]7
[12952]d
[12954]a
[12957]“2 recorded, and we turned it-over-a
[12958]Directorate, dealing with coding and decoding." ae
[12960]-once:to the Eighth.
[12962]14 May 1964; Discussing the list drawn up by KOVSHUK
[12963]and the decision to withdraw U.S, Embassy:.Section require~ |.
[12964]ments for full-time monitoring of certain microphones, NO-
[12965]‘ SENKO quoted KOVSHUK: "We are getting information frém the
[12966]rooms of the attaches, the Counsellor, and the Agricultural
[12967]Attache, The flats [Embassy apartments]--no; the bar--
[12968]nothing. Of course, I know it is necessary to keep the room
[12969]of the code clerks in spite of the fact that there is seldon
[12970]anything received except several numbers. The code clerk is
[12971]saying aloud several numbers. But the flats you can take,
[12972]not permanently, but temporarily." NOSENKO then continued:
[12973]"XOVSHUK said to give them these flats....But you see,
[12974]nothing was going on in these flats. They weren't speaking
[12975]or we:2 talking about steak and eggs. There was nothing
[12976]of interest from an operating standpoint. Somotimes ve
[12977]heard there would be guests. Okay. There is a possibility | 7 i
[12978]to hear something. In this case we would call DMITRIYLY
[12979]{English-language Section of Second Special Department} and
[12980]say: ‘This evening, this day, this flat. Maybe we will
[12981]get something.' The mikes were working not bad at all in
[12982]1960 and 1961 in the attache rooms--Naval, Air Force. When
[12983]the man was alone we heard nothing. But when two .or three
[12984]men were sitting in the rooms, the assistants, we heard.
[12985]For example, when they returned from a trip acd discussed
[12986]what they had seen or when they were preparing for a trip...
[12987]Bui we heard nothing about agents." :
[12989]H 4
[12990]}. 3
[12992]t
[12993]i
[12994]i
[12995]4
[12996]3
[12998]Later on this occasion the following diagogue took
[12999]place:
[13001]feral que es
[13003]NOSENKO; GRYAZNOV was telling me in 1962 and 1963 that
[13004]they were getting little, little, almost nothing.
[13005]He said we are losing everything. We have no
[13006]materials. We have little, little pieces, but
[13007]nothing.
[13009]| |
[13010]| i
[13011]H 4
[13013]Question: Was he talking about the Military Attaches?
[13015]NOSENKO: In general. I think they were speaking very
[13016]: little. God knows. Then, you see, we were thinking
[13017]they were taking new measures. GRYAZNOV, -
[13018]FEDOSEYEY, and KQVSHUK considered that there was
[13019]a room-in-a-room--a room {acoustic} for the
[13020]meeting. vat
[13021]Question: When did you first hear about the room-inside-the-
[13024]NOSENKO: first it was known when, I think, Eisenhower. was oF
[13025]— going to come.* In 1960 or 1961 we had informa-. ot
[13026]Ro. (o> tion that the Embassy had such a chamber made out :
[13028]“ePresident Eisenhower's trip to the USSR was scheduled for
[13029]the summer (of 1960 but:.was cancélled.over the’ U-2 incident. .
[13030]: . 1960. i
[13033]‘ef steel....In 1960 and 1961 the mike in GLEY-
[13034]STEEN's office was working, I remember, Recep- ; oo,
[13035]tion was good, but there was no secret informa- ote ON
[13036]tion. I don't know [about reception from this oo aS
[13038]mike in 1962}.
[13040]Question: What about GRYAZNOV's statement. [concerning |
[13041]diminishing production of the Embassy micrcphones]? .
[13043]NOSENKO: This was only one common phrase. He didn't tell 4
[13044]; ~ which room. I think he was speaking about the ; oe 4
[13045]group... . . |
[13047]Question: How was production from the mikes in HORBALY's
[13048]office?
[13050]ROSENKO: Not good, but we did get something which made us
[13051]aor suspect he was connected with intelligence.
[13052]HORBALY. ;
[13054]Question: What about the code room and teletype office? oo
[13056]NOSENKO: At State, yes. Only always the sounds of machines
[13057]in 1960 and 1961. Machines only. Three times
[13058]during these two years maybe somebody said one
[13059]phrase or one of the guys said several numbers.
[13061]Question; What about the military [code] area’ .
[13065]NOSENKO: The reception was good. He [STORSBERG] seldom
[13066]spoke. Sometimes he repeated numbers to himself.
[13067]And sometimes a mechanic of code machines cane
[13068]to him, a military guy, a sergeant [Willian
[13069]HURLEY, an Army Warrant Officer). They said two.
[13070]or three phrsses. "Did you check this?" “Yes.”
[13071]"This side good." Et cetera.
[13077]. Question: In all this time that you read all this material,
[13078]a _ “—=—we—== there must have been something that impressed
[13079]; you as extremely valuable.
[13080]- NOSENKO: Extremely valuable--nothing. A little was in-
[13081]= teresting from FREERS' room. It was given to the
[13082]special group of GRIBANOV. They were writing
[13083]ye vwee mba” special information to the [KGB] Chairman to the
[13084]vo _ {CPSU} Central Committee. There were political a
[13085]: . questions, for example. oo. :
[13087]pte Me Intl rtd inten n es ot
[13089]26 January 1955: The following is taken from an inter- :
[13090]rogation protocol signed by NOSENKO: "I regularly reviewed
[13091]- all of the transcripts from microphones in the American .
[13092]Eubassy for a period of approximately two years, from Janu- re
[13093]ary 1960 to January 1962. The following is the only infor- . oe ie
[13094]7 mation which I can remember as being important, interesting - = ©. to
[13095]; OF operationally useful to the KGB: : Loos .
[13097]wit
[13100]‘From the micropnone in the office of: the. . wt
[13102]a.
[13104]inister Counsellor, FREERS, I remember that’ he oc-_.
[13105]easionally dictated cables-sbout. the. Embassy's evalu-
[13107]- ation of certain declarations or acts of the: Soviet, ;
[13108]‘, Government and advised the StateDepartment on posiy..”
[13109]. tions for negotiations with the. USSR. ‘This information
[13112]was of such importance that special reports were
[13114]written to the Central Compittee of the CPSU. How-
[13115]ever, I cannot remember ary specific incidents or
[13116]events which these cables reported nor any specific
[13118]evaluations or recommendations made in these cables. .
[13120]b. -Also from the microphone in the Minister
[13121]Counsellor's office, I remenber that he dictated fitness
[13122]reports (kharakteristiki) on.about twelve officers in
[13123]the Embassy. I cannot Fremerber who any of these offi-
[13124]cers were or any dctails from the reports. There was
[13125]nothing in these reports which was interesting or
[13126]useful to the KCB.
[13128]c. From the microphone in the Military Attache's
[13129]office I remember that the Military Attaches regularly
[13130]discussed plans for trips within the USSR and the tar-
[13131]gets that they wanted to cover. They also discussed
[13132]the results.of these trips after their return. How~
[13133]ever, I cannot remember ary information about speci-
[13134]fic trips planned by specific Nalitary Attache per-
[13135]sonnel or any specific targets that they planned to
[13136]cover or any specific resulis from any trip. I do not
[13137]remember any specific operetionaL activity taken by the
[13138]organs of the KGB against Military Attaches on trips
[13139]within the USSR which was based on information obtained
[13140]from this microphone. There was no snteresting, impor-
[13141]tant, or useful information about the personal or pro-
[13142]fessional lives or about the vulnerabilities of anyone
[13143]in the Military Attache's office (Army, Navy, and Air)
[13144]obtained from this microphone.
[13146]d. I remember that from the microphones in the
[13147]State Department code room occasionally a code clerk
[13148]would read numbers. These numbers were only of inter-
[13150]est to the Eighth Directorate (Communications and Crypto-
[13152]logy) of the KGB. I do not remember any conversations
[13153]from this microphone. There was no information from
[13154]this microphone on any of the code clerks which was |
[13155]interesting, important, or useful to the U.S. Embassy
[13156]Section, First Department, Second Chief Directorate,
[13158]“KGB.
[13160]During the approximately two years in which I daily reviewed
[13161]the production from all the microphones in the American
[13162]Embassy I do not remember any information on any American in
[13163]the Embassy which was interesting, important, or useful to
[13164]me as the Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section. except the
[13165]points noted in the above paragraphs." :
[13167]28 January 1965: “In 1960 and. 1961 I don't remember
[13169]any report from the mikes about agents. Never. Nothing
[13170]about work with agents or work with contacts. But FREERS
[13171]or WALMSLEY {Minister Counsellor 1954-1956] were dictating
[13172]interesting opinions of the Embassy. concerning the political
[13173]situation and this material was looked at by the information.
[13175]group and
[13177]then they were preparing special reports: for.
[13178]ow . . . a : a : ;
[13180]oe ae
[13181]4
[13183]4
[13184]4
[13185]i
[13187]woes litle
[13192]“4
[13194]'
[13197]" Bvaliuetton. by Others -
[13199]Theodore F. HOFFYAN, arny Attache in Moscow from May
[13200]1959 to May 1961, has been interviewed concerning the micro-
[13201]phone discoveries. (In the spring of 1961, Colonel HOFFMAN
[13202]was succeeded by Colozel URBAN as Army Attache.) While in-
[13203]Moscow, Colonel HOFFMAN occupied room 1008, where the first
[13204]microphone was found and his statements below relate to
[13205]matters presumed to be of general and specific interest to
[13206]the U.35, Embassy Section during the period when NOSENKO
[13207]claims to have been its Deputy Chief.*
[13209]“James H. STORSBERG {military code clerk] was
[13210]dating a foreign rational, 1 believe a secretary in
[13211]the British Embassy, name not recalled. On one or
[13213]- two occasions, he was needed either to decode or to
[13214]encode for dispatching a message and was not avail-
[13215]able. He would be off with his girl friends, and we
[13217]- couldn't find him, He was verbally reprimanded in ny
[13218]office in regard to the two incidents of absenteeisn.
[13220]"M/Sgt. Peter BINDER gmanager of America House]
[13221]and I discussed frequently the administrative probleas
[13222]encountered in his operation of the America House.
[13224]We also discussed the importance of hts keeping me.
[13225]informed of the conditions, personality problems,
[13226]drinking habits, and any other incident of importance
[13227]that misht occur in the America House or the America
[13228]House ciub. All discussions were conducted in ny
[13229]office.
[13231]“In May or June 1961, James C. KEYSERS [military
[13232]code clerk} was found to have allowed one or rore
[13234]male members of...a U.S. ice review entertainment group
[13236]touring the Bloc countries to spend the night in his
[13238]room at America House. He was suspected of homosexual
[13240]activities, and he admitted to me being a participant
[13241]in homosexual activities. I believe these edmissions
[13242]and my entire discussion with KEYSERS took place in
[13244]' room 9, identified now as the shielded code room, lo-
[13245]eated on the ninth floor of the Embassy. I gave
[13246]SAVAGE [-his enlisted administrative assistant] verbal
[13247]- instructions in my office to immediately prepare the
[13248]necessary paper work for removing KEYSERS from the
[13249]station and instructed him to inform ACSI by cable as
[13250]to the details of the incident.
[13252]"I remember...a discussion I held with the U.S.
[13253]Air Attache in his office [where a KGB:microphone was
[13254]located] concerning homosexual activities on the part
[13256]of two of the Air Force enlisted personnel on station...
[13258]_The discussion in his office concerned the administra-
[13259]: tive procedures necessary in Temoving the individuals
[13260]trom Station. : ; : .
[13262]*sApart from ‘his general duties. as Deputy. Chief “of: the U.S:
[13264]: Embassy Section, NOSENKO bore special responsibilities for —-
[13266]each. of the persons mentioned by Colonel HOFFMAN: .
[13267], Wised the KGB officers: aperat ing againet code ale
[13268]wesidents of Aserica House, and: ‘he, persona -
[13270]ayproaches to the: two: code: clorke: named,
[13271]“‘STORSBERG. a: diwous
[13275]none Seep i
[13277]See ee
[13279]een wt ada its
[13281]wrote nb Tecieke cnasdictnit dees)
[13283]79
[13285]howe dea Pid, ain nt tes on no
[13288] gtates: “Although there has been no’ observable indication - . or,
[13290]’.*As previously indicated, NOSENKO. said that in 1962 and 1963
[13292]- - {Summing up] "To be ‘perfectly..fraak, I would - -
[13293]assume that...some of our modus operandi, some of our co ;
[13294]targets, sone of the results, and all of our personal a ae
[13296]i
[13298]weaknesses were compromised. This is not a very de- " .
[13299]finite answer; however, it is the best estimate 1 cap Soonk..
[13300]make." . ; ; -
[13302]in ite general introduction, the USIB damage report -.
[13304]thet the Soviets have acted in any manner to the detriment.
[13306]of the United States based. upon information considered pos=- .. _ { ; j
[13307]sibly. compromised, it must be concluded that due to the ex- — ; . : 3
[13308]tensive period of penetration, the cumulative, effect has . j
[13310]rasulted in serious damage to the United States. “The i
[13311]Soviets have gained considerable knowledge as to the effective- ; 4
[13312]ness of United States operations within the,Sovict. Union, :
[13313]particularly the military attache collection progran. : , :
[13314]Soviet knowledge of U.S. enphasis upon certain intelligence’
[13316]collection areas has made it possible for them to identify
[13318]priority intelligence and probable Soviet targets and thereby
[13320]permitted them to implement specific counteractions.. The
[13322]Soviets over the years must have amassed considerable infor-
[13324]mation concerning the personal habits, problens, attitudes ,
[13325]and weaknesses of personnel assigned to tne Embassy which :
[13326]can be used by them for purposes of exploitation at any , : :
[13327]time of their choosing in the future." .
[13329]The following extract from the USIB damage report con-
[13330]cerns the declining value of the production from the micro-
[13331]phones in 1962 and 1963.*
[13333]4
[13334]z
[13335]t
[13336]i
[13340]"The security practices and procedures appear to
[13341]have followed a pattern from April 1953 to May 1960, at
[13342]. which time the first plastic room was installed. A
[13343]: change occurred in the work habits in that the nore
[13344]senior State Department officers utilized the plastic
[13345]room for sensitive discussions and dictation. The
[13346]room could accommodate only a Limited portion of the
[13347]Embassy classified discussions and accordingly, a number
[13348]of classified discussions were held outside this secure
[13349]area. In the April 1953-May 1960 period it was an ac-
[13350]cepted practice for the Ambassador and the Deputy
[13351]Chief of Mission to discuss openly in their offices
[13352]routine classified operations of the Embassy and to
[13353]dictate clessified documents and telegrams....In Sep-
[13354]tember 1962, the second acoustic room was erected for
[13355]the typing section for the handling of sensitive classi-
[13356]fied material. From December 1963 to date it was indi-
[13357]cated that no classified telegrams have been dictated Lo
[13361]he learned there was almost no production from the Embassy
[13362]microphones. One reason was the natural decline in effi-
[13363]ciency of equipment installed ten years previously; the KGB
[13364]her reasons were ‘the installation of
[13365]me : ightened security pro- ~
[13368]14-0000
[13370]: yeported that most cables were drafted in longhand or.
[13372]outside of the acoustic rooms....The military attaches -
[13373]typed, by the originator and then turned over to the -
[13374]code clerks for transmission. In certain instances
[13375]cables were dictated in the offices.. There were many
[13376]discussions in the offices relating to official duties,
[13377]office routine, proposed travel, personal observations
[13378]and normal office talk not specifically in themselves
[13379]considered classified, From 1953 to 1959, sensitive
[13380]classified matters were discussed in whispers or to the
[13381]accompaniment of external noises, such as radios and--
[13382]street noises....In 1959 a secure inner room Was cone
[13383]structed in the attache section and has since been -
[13385]utilized for classified discussions and debriefings...."
[13387]wee teeta eh a a, be rr ee boty ta ee gM :
[13389]Seren Ti eon tes
[13391]seer tire epee gee ee
[13393]2G earn neuen poe
[13396]“\(i£4i) Microphones in the hocth Wing.
[13398]According to NOSENKO, no microphones or other audio devices
[13399]were installed in the north wing (as distinct from the cnancery)
[13400]of the U.S. Embassy prior to its occupancy in 1962. (For this
[13401]reason, NOSENKO advised CIA in 1962 to transfer its sensitive
[13402]offices gradually--to protect NOSENKO's security--fron the
[13403]chancery to the north wing at the Embassy.) He has commented
[13404]several times on this subject, and these remarks are presented
[13405]below,
[13407]11 June 1962: “The Embassy is now located on Chaykovskiy
[13408]Street. When they decided to give the north wing to the Embassy,
[13409]I wrote an entire report about it. SNELEPIN was still there
[13410]then {as KGB Chairman. ~~ proposed that} equipment be installed
[13411]in the walls, gave the justification fer this, etc. SHELEPIN
[13412]wrote: ‘Is it worth it?" At the time trere was an improvement
[13413]in mutual relations (retween the Soviet Union and the United
[13414]States). SHELEPIN was a good lad, but feared that...and k2fore
[13415]this you found 18 or 20 microphones in the new building in War-
[13416]Saw,* SHELEPIN wrote: ‘is it worth it? We row have good re-
[13417]lations with America. It isn't worth it.' He didn't want com-
[13418]Plications., And. then time was lost. Two or three months passed
[13419]and we again wanted to try it. SHELEPIN also wanted to, but it
[13420]was already too late. ASIDIAN was going there all the time, the
[13421]Security Officer. It was already too late because this can he
[13422]done only while the building is being built. When the windows
[13423]and doors have been begun it is already too late... The north
[13424]wing was almost ready. We don't have anything there. So, you
[13425]should move the Minister Counsellor there. Move him to the
[13426]north wing from his present office... Don't do it at once. Do
[13427]it slowly. SGon't hurry; don't be in a hurry. Have him say that
[13428]he doesn't like this room and wants to move there... We hear
[13429]all the military attaches--the Milicary Attache, the Naval
[13430]Attache, and the Air Force Attache--in Moscow. Everything is
[13431]recorded. But again, don't do anything at once. Don't make
[13432]any (sudden) charges. Quietly transfer one and then another
[13433]there (to the north wing), the attache himself and his assist-
[13434]ants... You must be verv, very clever ard very. very foxy...
[13435]Gradually, gradually move them to the north wing of the build-
[13436]ing, to the north wing, in which we have absolutely nothing and
[13437]won't have anything." , :
[13439]' 31 January 1964: "When the construction of this right
[13440](north) wing had begun, when you started the right wing, the
[13441]new addition to the building, there was a plan to install as
[13442]many (microphones) as possible--thirty, forty--stick’ them.
[13443]everywhere. It really wasn't important how many of them would
[13444]really work. The Committee (KGB) Chairman at that time was
[13446]_SHELEPIN, He didn't co for this. Whether it. was the flap
[13447]with the Poles that happened just before that* or whether it
[13448]was something else or whether it was.the international situa-
[13450]' tion, they were afraid that this may be uncovered. But then,
[13451]later, when the building was finished, and when you were ;
[13452]. finishing or putting up the addition yourself,. at that point
[13454]. it: was. too late to put these -things ‘in.:.It was. impossible
[13456]it.“
[13458]_19 microphones: in the new U.S. Embassy in: Warsa
[13460]MNOSENKO is referring to the discovery in June of. 1960 of:
[13462]GP SECRET ©
[13464]cote = euerenieemmmpmippenis an
[13466]4
[13468]4
[13469]H
[13470]I
[13471]4
[13472]i
[13477]1400000
[13479]“After” being: ‘told. ‘by. CIA on: “31, January’ 1965. that a lead
[13480]cable had been found in the north wing, NOSFNKO said: "I
[13481]personally can assure you that nothing was ‘done in that
[13482]right. wing. Nothing, absolutely ‘nothing. There was ‘nothing
[13484]done there, so it must have been something else,"
[13486]No extensive counter-audio checks have yet been cerried
[13487]out in the north wing of the U.S, Embassy, and no wired -
[13488]microphones have been found there. Investigation of the :
[13489]microphones in the main section of the Embassy led, however,
[13490]to the discovery of other Soviet technical equipment installed
[13491]in the north wing. The USIB damage report.stated: "Three-
[13492]coaxial cables were discovered running parallel to the one~ -
[13493]hundred-and-one pair audio cable from the North Annex roof
[13494]grea to the basement of the North Annex...{All three cables
[13495]were severed by American technicians in 1964.] The cable
[13496]runs were as follows:
[13498]"l. The, first coaxial cable...terminated under six
[13499]inches of reinforced concrete in the North Annex attic.
[13500]The certer conductor was conuected to the lead sheath
[13501]of the 20-pair and of the 30 pair cable which in turn
[13502]come iroz the east face of the chancery. The shield of
[13503]the coaxial cable was uncunnected. :
[13505]"2, The second coaxial cable...followed the same path .
[13506]as the first coaxial cable. The shield was unterminated,
[13507]The center conductor was terminated in an insulated
[13508]metal grill. The grill is lccatred in the upper crust
[13510]of the North Annex attic floor with the long dimension
[13511]in juxtaposition to the old common wall between the
[13512]Chancery and the North Annex. The long diménsion is
[13513]normal to the street in front of the Embassy. The
[13515]grill is made of one centimeter steel reinforcing rods
[13516]spot welded into a mesh of 15 cm. (5.9 inches). The
[13517]overall dimensions of the grill are 14'4" by 4°7".
[13519]The coaxial cable was connected to one corner of the
[13520]grill....The grill is located as close as possible to
[13521]the old common wall and is about thirty feet below the
[13522]State Department code room. The grill ‘points’ in the
[13523]general direction of the code room as the plane of the
[13524]grill is parallel to the plane of the ground.
[13526]"3. The third coaxial cable ran along the approxinate
[13527]path of the uther coaxial cables to the block cf reine
[13528]forced concrete that contains the grill mentioned above.
[13529]This coaxial cable terminated in a four- inch piece of
[13530]fine Lits wire. The shiéld of the coaxial cable was
[13531]unterminated..." a
[13533]The damage: report added: . "The coaxial cables appear to be
[13534]of recent installation probably prior to Russian evacuation
[13536]“ef the North Annex. The outer shields of all the coaxial
[13538]cables. were carefully insulated. "
[13540]oO The coaxial ‘cables. and their terminations were evaluated
[13541]as follows. in the damage report: "All tests that ‘have been.
[13542]for] tne. indicate that the grill. work and. the lead sheaths =
[13543]f} the cables 20-and 30 patrs were used ag antennas.... ~
[13544]No function has been determined for the third. coaxial cable
[13546]which terminated. ana short piece of Lits wire...-The” ‘Location
[13550]seater emery sr eene
[13552]8
[13558]"Cc.
[13560]"d.
[13562]Ne,
[13564]roor.
[13566]Antenna for use in connection with some other
[13567]surveillance device or technique..
[13569]An alarm system to 'protect' the microphone
[13571]system.
[13573]Part of a hum removal system connected with the
[13574]_microphone installation.
[13576]Not in use,"
[13578]of the grill ‘in ‘such. close: proximity’ to. the State. Departaent -
[13579]Code. Room indicated that an operation was directed against
[13580]that area....The lead sheath may have had other uses.  ‘
[13581]possible uses that have been suggested are listed bélow.
[13583]The most likely use is as an antehna although the other pos~
[13584]sibilities have not been completely discarded.
[13586]“Antenna for collection effort directed against code
[13588]vary
[13591]“Gv)" Monitoring/Jaiming Beam
[13593]NOSENKO was questioned on 31 January 1964 about the
[13594]‘poccalled “Moscow Signal." (This is an "SY band signal
[13595]that has been directed against the top floors—-the "secure .
[13596]erea"--of the U.S, Embassy since the early 1950's from en _
[13597]apartment building located about 200 feet away. _ Detailed .
[13598]investigation of the signal has been underway since Octo-
[13599]ber 1962, but its exact pature and purpose have not yet been
[13600]established. Although there is some speculation that the
[13601]signal is meant for ‘harasezeot purposes only, the view now . .
[13602]generally accepted by U.S. technicians is that it has soma . S|
[13603]intelligezce-collection function. No change in the signal :
[13604]has beer: noted since the discovery and the cutting of the
[13606]cables referred to in the preceding section.) The inter
[13608]view went as follows: a
[13610]NOSENKO: There is a beam, there is a ray which works -.
[13611]—————~_—s agrinst the Embassy. I. know. cn 5
[13613]Question: Do you know what it is? 4
[13615]NOSENKO: No, I don't. Hut I know that they work and they
[13616]put things in, and they listen and they do some-
[13617]thing, and they... .
[13619]‘Question: (Interrupting.) Is it successful, is it working?
[13621]NOSENKO; Yes, they keep working: all’ the time. Perhaps -
[13622]periodically, but it's working. Yes, there is i
[13623]something in the back.of the Embassy on this :
[13624]Chaykovskiy Street, and there is something in
[13625]front of the Embassy, too. . :
[13627]-Question: And it is for listening in?
[13629]NOSENKO: No, it's in order to deprive you of working with
[13630]stationary equipment. .
[13632]‘ Quéstion: What do you mean--so that our receivers wouldn't
[13633]operate properly? .
[13635]NOSENKO: Look, I’m not a specialist. I don't know the
[13636]; details. I know only that the work is being
[13637]done in this particular area, in this particular
[13638]direction. But what they do, I dontt really
[13639]know.
[13641]wee ad
[13643]Question: But this is not for the purpose of obtaining in-
[13646]NOSENKO: Let's say you go on the air. So weifind out |
[13647]_ whether you're listening in on some of our com-~
[13648]_munications or sonething like this.
[13650]_To what extent would you in your. [American] De-
[13652]“partment,.in your {U.S. Embassy] tion; know-
[13653]‘about these technical. aspects? Would: you..have
[13654]to know. it?) Would you know the details of these
[13655]things? — . ; — oe
[13658]_- No. No. This is something that ‘the. ‘menbers of...
[13659]; “the (KGB) Eighth Directorate. {responsible for
[13660]eo a communications and ciphers}. should concern then~
[13661]i "selves with, the ones who work in OTU. This.
[13662]doesn't concern us in the American Department,
[13663]in the U.S. Eabassy ‘Section.
[13665]. Questioned again later,. NOSENKO said that the aignal
[13667]was tised to jam U.S. equipment working in the Embassy building.
[13668]>It was this system, he said, which. had determined that the
[13670]. Americans had intercepted some GRU agent radio communications.
[13671]~The beam was designed “both to-monitor- and to jam" trare~
[13672]‘‘aissions from the Embassy... NOSEXKO repeated that. "not being
[13674]' @ specialist" he was igcorant of the technical naturé of the
[13675]Job, or any further details.
[13677]h
[13678]od.
[13679]q
[13684]feetamgtae ce tee
[13687]cnn at ae nf EEE ED once ate sn sence a Ne ee
[13689]Because NOSENKO's true name and photographs had been submitted
[13690]to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow in connection with this visa request,
[13692]NOSENKO added, it was henceforth necessary for him to use his
[13693]true name for all travel abroad.
[13695]c. The Cuba TDY (1966)
[13697]In November 1960, after and as a result of the cancellation
[13698]of his planned trip to the United States, NOSENKC travelled with
[13699]a delegation of nickel industry experts to Cuba. He first men~
[13700]tioned this trip on 11 June 1962, during his second meeting with
[13702]"CIA. His account of his activities was given in answer to the
[13704]question of whether he had ever visited Germany: “I have been
[13706]in Germany. Yes, yes. I wag in Cuba in '6]. Well, as NIKOLAYEV.
[13707]I was there a montn and a half. This was when your Embassy was
[13708]there and we wanted to prepare*,.. Well, I looked it cver to
[13710]see what kine of people you hed working there. They asked me
[13712]to prepare, So to speak, an accounting on how things were going.
[13714]I arrived there and asked how they were working against you, just
[13715]on you. Everyone there is worxing for you. One, two, three,
[13717]five days went by... I had unlimited funds, any amcunt. I could
[13718]go to any restaurant, any show. So that's how it was with me.
[13720]The fellows reported: 'He [an funerican}] is there.' My mission
[13721]was to get a general picture. Not for one, two, or three days,
[13722]put for a month or two, to provide an opinien, I worked pretty
[13723]cleverly on trem, He [the American] would go to a restaurant.
[13724]They would say to we: ‘He is at such-and-such a restaurait and
[13725]can be cbserved there.' I would go and observe him in the mir-
[13727]ror or somehow. I am sitting in the restaurant, drinking, and
[13728]that's all. But I would watch him to see how he behaves, etc.,
[13729]etc. That is, I would begin to feel if he has the mark of an
[13730]intelligence officer. ...But this was not enough for me. I
[13731]would go ayain and again. I would see that, yes, he is an in-
[13732]telligence officer... We were asked to share our experiences
[13733]with them [the Cubans]. Tuey didn't know a thing... They had
[13734]turned ali intelligence work over to the Communist Party. The
[13735]Communist Party complicates it.”
[13737]In the final minutes of NOSENKO's last meeting with CIA in
[13738]1962 the sudject of his trip to Cuba came up again; NOSENKO re-
[13739]called that he had used the name NOSENKO for his trip to Cuba
[13740]and that his function there was that of security officer
[13742]Question: When did you travel to Cuba?
[13743]NOSENKO: 1960, November and December 1960.
[13744]Question: Under the name NIKOLAYEV?
[13746]NOSENKO : No, as NOSENKO, NOSENKO, NOSENKO. I will explain
[13747]how this happened. I was supposed to go to America,
[13748]sometime in November, with a group from Gosplan,
[13749]automotive specialists, etc. Data had already
[13750]submitted for coordination and, in particular, my
[13751]name had been given to the American Embassy there
[13752][Moscow]. But the American Embassy announced that
[13754]i... » 2 this delegation could be accepted, but a little
[13756]“-. son, later. And my passport had already been issued.
[13757]My passport had already been signed authorizing travel
[13758]abroad, but it was a service passport, not a diplomatic
[13759]one. And at this moment a delegation was supposed to
[13761]¥ ‘Ben > ~ Embassy in Havana was officially closed on 3 January
[13763]Tees.
[13765]TOP SECRET «=
[13767]TTR e
[13769]Aatbd CAs.
[13774]1
[13775]i
[13778]14-0000
[13780]|
[13782]Her: Job + was. simply ‘to. inform us. in case ‘gomethin 2g g interesting
[13783]‘happens and somebody interesting comes’ to the library, but prac-
[13785]tically nobody ever went to the library. Then, what could she
[13787]tell us akout these sergeants that were taking Russian lessons,
[13789]that she was supposed to be reporting cn? In the first place,.
[13790]they were lazy buns. They would go to a lesson once and then
[13792]..miss the next two and then perhaps go again, and again miss one
[13794]or two." In September _ 1964 NOSENKO added that LEVINA had never
[13795]been targetted ayainst any particular individual and had never
[13796]provided any interesting reports on her American contacts. At
[13797]the end of 1960 or in the beginning of 1961, NOSENKO said, she
[13798]was released from the Emtassy by Paul SMITH, possibly because
[13799]she was a little deaf and one had to epeak loudly to her to ke
[13800]understood.* NOSENKO turned LEVINA ‘over to anothér officer be-
[13802]fore he returned to the Tourist Department, and later the British
[13803]Department was planning to use her in either the British or Canad-~
[13805]ian Embassies,
[13807]+ CK tacords show that LEVINA was employed at the Embassy as
[13808]’ a librarian from January 1958 through January 1962, when she
[13810]was released. Paul SMITH was Second Secretary. of the Embassy _ .
[13812]2 “in charge of the Cultural Affairs Section and: Publications
[13813]Procurement Officer from May. 1959 until approximately Septem |
[13817]3
[13818]4
[13820]a
[13825]t:
[13827]eden eae athe.
[13829]I
[13830]4
[13831]. 4
[13832]i
[13833]4
[13836]a. Attempt to Obtain Assi nment. in Ethicpia (1960) .
[13838]During the first half of 1960, NOSENKO said, he applied for
[13839]a permanent overseas assignment to Ethiopia because doctors had
[13840]prescribed a change of climate for his daughter Oxsana's asthma. .
[13841]O.M. GRIBANGV, Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, approved
[13842]his request, but then the KGS Personnel Department turned it
[13843]down when a file review revealed potentially dangerous character
[13844]weaknesses. :
[13846]dead dan.
[13848]NOSENKO described this matter on 14 April 1964 as follows:
[13849]"“Gennadiy GRYAZNOV came to the American Cepartment of the Second
[13850]Chief Dircctorate in 1958. Before 1956 he was stucying in the
[13851]Higher Schocl of the KGB and when he finished the school in 1956
[13852]he was assigned to the KGB Personne] Department, and then he came . mo. -
[13853]to the American Department in 1958. So GRYAZNOV had very good
[13854]connections in the Personnel Department. So in 1960, when I
[13855]wanted to leave, to go abroad on permanent assignment I said to
[13856]GRIBANOV: ‘Let me go for two years to Ethiopia.’ When the Per-
[13857]sonnel Department refused to let me go, I decided I'd just have +
[13858]to know what was there in my personal file. I had to learn what :
[13859]it was that was causing all this. By that time GRYAZNOV was in
[13860]the American Department of the Second Chief Directorate and hap-
[13861]pened to be the head of the Party Organization of the entire .
[13862]‘directorate, and he at cne time had worked in the Personnel Office - : : 3
[13863]himself. He ssid: 'Give me this thing and I'1l see wnat I can _
[13864]find out about it.’ So he went tc the Personnel Department and ?
[13865]through his friend there got my personal file. Then he gave me 3
[13867]we WY tee
[13869]a call and sai@ to come over. I went to his office and he locked
[13870]the door. Of course, he couldn't give me this file, couldn't
[13872]let me hold it in my hands so to speak. So he read this case
[13874]to me, this 1954 case to me, about the woman and so forth,* and
[13875]then said that at that time they made an investigation of my
[13876]previous residence. And they found out that while I was study-
[13877]ing at the Institute [cf International Affairs] and was living.
[13878]on Pervaya Meschanskaya Street, all sorts of girls visited me;
[13879]different girls, a new girl would visit me almost every week.
[13880]This was in my file. Then this case that took place in 1954.
[13882]And then in 1960--and, incidentally, GRIBANOV mentioned this to
[13883]me also--the file said that I was drinking quite a bit, and for
[13884]this reason I had many fights with my wife. And that was all
[13885]that appeared in my file. Nothing else, whatsoever, besides
[13886]these things that I just mentioned.”
[13888]b. U.S. Visa Application (1960)
[13890]NOSENKO's true name appeared with 11 others on a 20 October .
[13891]_ 1960 request to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow for visas for members : 4g
[13892]. Of a Soviet automotive exchange delegation which was scheduled _ :
[13893]Cases : . . _ . . Lae oo wad es mae
[13895]¥—NOSENKO is referring to the incident he says took place in
[13896]..1954 when he used KGB alias documentation to conceal his true
[13897]identity while. seeking treatment for-venereal-disease.. See...
[13899]a ¢
[13901]rs
[13903]to visit “the United States in mid-November 1960;*. NOSENKO was... -
[13904]listed as an engineer. employed by the State Sciertific-Tecnnical ~~
[13905]Committee (CNTK). After defecting, NOSENKO told CIA that he had
[13906]been scheduled te accompany this delegation as a security cffi- - 4
[13907]cer but that the delegation's visit to the United States had ; ot
[13908]been postponed at the last moment. He therefore did not travel
[13910]to this country.
[13912]He further explained, on 17 April 1964, why his visa appli-
[13913]cation had been submitted in true name an¢ under a different
[13914]covers “In 1957 and 1958 I want to London as NIKGLAYEV repre-
[13915]senting the Ministry of Culture. Then in 1959 I didn't ge any-
[13916]where. ‘Then when this question came up of my going to the States
[13917]in 1960, I said: ‘I'm rot going. I've been going under the
[13918]Ministry of Culture feover}] and with sports delegations. This oi
[13919]has to be changed somehov at this paint.* So we theught about i
[13920]it and finally somebedy said: 'Loux, how about this? Perhaps 4
[13921][you can use] this committee of RULNEV's (GNiK].' Sa 1 said:
[13923]‘. "Well, it's up to you. You decice.' by that time my passport
[13924]was ready, but the Americans and the Soviets hadn't come to an
[13925]agreement yet. It was Gecided that this delegation would go to
[13926]the U.S. in 1961." NOSENKO was then asked why he coulc not
[13928]have used the NIKOLAYZV name for his trip to the United States.
[13929]He replied: "Sure, 1! could have gone a3 NIFOLAYEV, but I just
[13930]didn't want to. Pecause, look, it was krewn to us that the
[13931]British and American Incelligence exchanye information on people
[13932]they suspect of being kGb, and that the Hritish, of course,
[13934]had probably watched me when i was in England {in 1957 and 1958]
[13935]and probably there it was noticed that here's this man under
[13937]the cover cf Ministry of Culture. He's not a sportsman. It a
[13938]xind of looks suspicious. Then he goes to the Soviet Embassy. :
[13939]Also suspicious. So then I nave to go to the States. and if
[13941]I go as NIKOLAYEV I couldn't use--in that case I ccouldn’t use ;
[13943]the same cover of Ministry of Culture tecause of the type of 1 4
[13944]the delegation. I'd have to use a different cover. So I'd go * es
[13945]there and they'd say: ‘Aha, here's NIKOLAYEV under aifferent
[13946]cover now.’ But if I go as NOSENKO, the British never heard
[13947]the nane. Nobody knows the name. Everything would be 0.K."
[13948]NOSENKO was then asked why he could not have travelled under
[13949]gome other alias. He answered: “That's the way it was de-
[13950]cided, I guess so as not to get ali mixed up they decided to
[13951]gend me as NOSENKO anyway. It's up to the people who are in
[13952]charge of these operations. They are: the ones who decide."**
[13954]4
[13957]sealbsy,
[13959]*— This visa application was submitted approximately six months eT ee: :
[13960]after the KGB rejected his request for PCS assignment to :
[13961]Ethiopia.
[13963]#* With regard to his trips to England in 1957 and 15958, NOSENKO i 4
[13964]said that he had been forced to use the name NIKCLAYEV_ because a
[13965]this was the name he had used with British citizens © 2 me
[13966]hen they visited the Soviet Union in the summer of 1957; he ag,
[13967]- could not, he said, have shown up in England with another nar. . .
[13968]as , oor ErnrEree .
[13969]upon their retucn fro 2 (pee ~P2 =U :
[13970]:-Phis apparently was not a consideration when selecting a name '.
[13971]for the U.S. visa. application, ‘for.NESENKO had used. the name. “
[13972]S°SPRGEYEV in his approach to American George: DREW in 1959 (Part
[13973]suV.D. y and the. name PETERSON: when he ‘recruited Profeasor
[13974]if Gerax ENKO was in
[13975]con a
[13977]period. . NOSENKO and other: sources have: said. that.
[13978]ted that. FRIPPEL was an American agent. (see: Part
[13982]ow
[13984]Sa:
[13986]A EA POE EE EE RT ES ag SEER 1 aS et NEP CT EA SS YP Bg NI TR RESIS BOT
[13987]. if { )
[13989]276.
[13991]Because NOSENKO's true name and photographs had been submitted
[13992]to the U.S. Fmbassy in Moscow in connection with this visa request,
[13993]NOSENKO added, it was henceforth necessary for him to use his
[13994]true name fer all travel abroad. i
[13996]ce. The Cuba TDY (1960)
[13998]In November 1960, after and as a resuit of the cancellation
[13999]of his planned trip to the United States, NOSENKO travelled with
[14000]a delegation of nickel industry experts to Cuba. He first men-
[14001]tioned this trip on 1l June 1962, during his second meeting with
[14003]‘CIA. is account of his activities was given in answer to the
[14004]question of whether he had ever visited Germany: “I have been
[14006]in Germany. Yes, yes. I wag in Cuba in '6}. Well, as NIKOLAYEV.
[14007]I was there a month and a half. This was when your Embassy was
[14008]there and we wanted to prepare*... Well, I looked it cver to
[14010]see what kind of people you had working there. They asked me
[14012]to prepare, so to speak, en accounting on how things were going.
[14013]I arrived there and asked how they were working against you, just
[14014]on you, Everyone there is worxing for you. One, two, three,
[14015]five days went by... I had unlimited funds, any arcunt. I could
[14016]go to any resianurant, any show, So that's how it was with me,
[14017]The fellows reported: ‘He {an American] is there.’ My mission
[14018]was to get a general picture. Not for one, two, or three days,
[14019]but for a month or two, to provide an opinicn... I worked pretty
[14020]cleverly on trem, He [the American] would go to a restaurant.
[14021]They would say to me: ‘He is at such-and-such a restaurant and
[14022]can be observed there.' I would go and cbserve him in the mir-
[14023]ror or somehow. I am sitting in the restaurant, drinking, and
[14024]that's all. But I would watcn him to see how he behaves, etc.,
[14025]ete, That is, I would begin to feel if he has the mark of an
[14026]intelligence officer. ...But this was not enough for me. I
[14027]would go again and again. i would see that, yes, he is an in-
[14028]telligence officer... We were asked to share our experiences
[14029]with them [the Cubans]. Tey didn't know a thing... They had
[14030]turned all intelligence work over to the Communist Party. The
[14031]Communist Party complicates it.”
[14033]In the final minutes of NOSENKO's last meeting with CIA in
[14034]1962 the sudject of his trip to Cuba came up again; NOSENKO re-
[14035]called that he had used the name NOSENKO for his trip to Cuba
[14036]and that his function there was that of security officer.
[14037]Question: When did you travel to Cuba?
[14038]NOSENKOs: 1960, November and December 1960.
[14040]Question: Under the name NIKOLAYEV?
[14042]NOSENKO : No, as NOSENKO, NOSENKO, NOSENKO. I will explain
[14044]how this happened. I was supposed to go to America,
[14046]sometime in November, with a group from Gosplan,
[14048]automotive specialists, etc. Data had already been
[14050]submitted for coordination and, in particular, my
[14052]name had been given to the American Embassy there . .
[14054]{Moscow]. But the American Embassy announced that .
[14056]; this delegation could be accepted, but a little : oe
[14058]_« ater. And my passport had already been issued. _ : a
[14059]f
[14061]me
[14062]RP ke et
[14064]My passport had already been signed authorizing travel ;
[14065]abroad, but it waS a service passport, not a diplomatic
[14066]one. And at this moment a delegation was supposed to
[14068]tate eee |
[14070]= the U.S. Embassy in Havana was officially closed on 3 January 7
[14072]ane sie ee GBT pe
[14073]: .
[14075].
[14078]~ WP SERER of
[14080]14-0000
[14082]'®Just a minute. We have a man who has his passport all ready.
[14083]Bis passport has been formalized. NOSENKO. He was supposed to
[14085]_tinueds °So somebody said: ‘How about a visa?‘ And KUZNETSOV
[14087]bm Sh Git espe on resco st
[14089]277.
[14091]go to Cuba. GRIBANCV's deprty [S.S.]} BANNIKOV,
[14092]said that a worker [463 officer] should be sent.
[14093]But they decided not to send @ worker to Cuba.
[14094]"Why bother?" [they said]. "Is Cuba worth it?® A
[14095]Suddenly there was a phone call from the Central ; >
[14096]Committee [of the Communist Party]. Scmeone fron :
[14097]the Central Committce said: “No, there is a direc- ;
[14098]tive that one of our workers must ge nevertheless.”
[14100]And only two days remained before the departure of
[14102]the delegation. Who could they send?
[14104]Question: The first person they come across.
[14106]NOSENKO: Those who have passports. I had a passport. I was -
[14108]~~ ready. And they cGecided: "Get going immediately.”
[14109]We flew through imsterdam, through Gencva. We spent
[14110]é@ night in Amsterdam and then made a short stcp in
[14111]Geneva, then the Azores, Santa Maria Island, then we
[14112]were supposed to fly to Curacao, But we had a head-
[14113]wine and the pilots were evidently afraid that we
[14114]wouldn't have enough fuel. So the plane went out
[14115]of its way ana made a iunding on the isianc of Bar-
[14116]bados. This was net a Soviet plane, hut KLM, wwe
[14117]flew to Amsterdam on a TU-104 and then went by KLM.
[14118]Then from Curacao we flew to Aruba. We also spent
[14119]anight in Aruba, an interesting island; the water
[14120]nad natural surroundings are beautiful. From Aruba
[14121]we flew througa Kingston, through Jamaica, and then
[14122]to Cuba. And we flew the same route back, but we
[14123]aid not spend the night in Curacao. From Curacao we
[14124]landed in Caracas for about 40 minutes, and’ through
[14125]Pararariec--Duitcn Guianaccacrcss tue ocean, some
[14126]island or anotner there, and from there again Lis-
[14127]bon, Geneva, and Amsterdam. Sut here the entire
[14128]Gelegation flew [to Moscow] after a day or two and
[14129]I took a train through West Germany [to East Berlin].
[14131]All of NOSENKO's accounts since contacting CIA in 1964 have
[14132]been generally consistent with that given on 14 June 1562. His
[14133]Story has been as follows: In the latter part cf 1960, at the
[14134]game time as he was preparing for his intended trip to the
[14135]United States, a special delegation of nickel industry experts
[14136]from Gosplan, tne Soviet State Planning Commission, was prepar-
[14137]ing for departure to Cuba. The delegaticn was a routine one, 3
[14138]consisting mostly of engineers from various sections of the :
[14139]Soviet Union, and since there was no one under any sort of sus- ‘
[14140]picien, the Eleventh (Soviet Travellers Abroad) Department of
[14141]the Second Chief Directorate had decided that it would not be
[14142]necessary to include a security officer. Two days prior to the Lo
[14143]departure of the group, however, the Central Committee cf the :
[14144]Communist Party decided that a Second Chief Directorate case
[14145]officer must go along. Because of the short time remaining be- ]
[14146]fore the scheduled departure of the delegation, the Eleventh to
[14147]Department protested that it would be impossible to find a suit- :
[14148]able person and get all the necessary papers ready in time. At ~
[14149]this point, A.I. KUZNETSOV of the Eleventh Department said:
[14153]ry
[14155]go to the States... and his foreign passport has been issued
[14156]and signed. Why don't you take him?" NOSENKO's statement con=-
[14160]14-0000
[14162]Ibn BE
[14165]a
[14167]al!
[14169]at ad
[14171]aaa RR RET EA
[14173]gays ‘Never sind. The Cubana will give him an entry visa.’
[14174]And then I had to get a transit visa because we were flying
[14175]through Amsterdam. And this whole thing was taken care of in
[14176]two days. The Cubans gave their visa immediately anc Tae
[14177]Netherlands issgyed their visa also right away.”
[14179]NOSENKO has reported that his functions with this delega-
[14180]tion were purely of a security nature. He flew with the dele-
[14181]gation to Cuba in October or Noverber and spent abort a month
[14182]and a half there. During this time he accompanied the delega-
[14183]tion everywhere it went: “I was with the delegation. They go
[14184]to a piant--I go with chem to the plant. I was with them all
[14185]the time. They went cto ‘ifferent plants, to watch the produc-
[14186]tion. They met with some representa’ives of the so-called Insti-
[14187]tute of Agrarian Reform. They would meet with these people and
[14188]they would have many Giscussions about how to increase produc~
[14189]tion.” HOSKNKO's cover agsignaent was deputy chief of the dele-
[14190]gation and shortly before ceparting Mosccw he was introduced to
[14191]the other members as such. He had one agent within the delega-~
[14192]tion and developed several “conficential contacts” vwuring the
[14193]trip, which turned cut to be entirely uneventful and, for NOSENKO,
[14194]somewhat long and dull. ile explained that se would not have
[14195]accepted the assignment had he known how leng the trip was to be,
[14196]and that he nad really wanted to go ony t. the United States.
[14198]un his return trio to Moscow, NOSENKO was given a special
[14199]mission. As he was leaving from Havana Airport,’ the KGB Legal
[14200]Resigent in Cuba, 4.1. ALEKXSEYEV, nandead him a package with in~
[14201]structions to deliver it to Moscow. NUSENKO did npt know the
[14202]contents of the package until he arrived in Amsterdam en route
[14203]home. There the wrappings became ioose (it was bound only by
[14204]thin string) and NOSENKO toox the opportunity to determine that
[14205]it contained copies of "letters betveel. MIKOYAN and KHRUSHCHEV
[14206]concerning the prices of sugar" and drafts of agreements between
[14207]the Soviet Union and East Germany, Bulyaria, Czechoslovakia,
[14208]and Rumania. aAcriving with his Gelegation at the airpert in
[14209]Amsterdam, NOSENKO was toid that a message had keen received
[14210]from the Centra] Committee of the Communist Party instructing
[14211]that the package was to be delivered “urgently” to Che GUEVARA,
[14212]who was touring the Sateilite countries and was then in Berlin.
[14213]while the delegaticn continued on to Moscow, NOSENKO therefore
[14214]was driven to the Soviet Embassy in The Hague, and in the late
[14215]evening of his second day in The Netherlands he left by train
[14216]for East Berlin. When he arrived, however, he found that
[14217]GUEVARA had left Berlin for Hungary. NOSENKO refused to go any
[14218]further. The package was delivered to GUEVARA's deputy in
[14219]Berlin, and NOSENKO then returned to Moscow.
[14221]CIA travel records show that NOSENKO, listed. as a mineral
[14222]engineer, transitted Amsterdam en route to Cuba on 15 November
[14223]1960; and that he transitted Caracas from amsterdam on 17 Novem
[14224]ber 1960; and that on 19 November 1960 he went through Caracas
[14225]en route to Havana.* Our records also show that NOSENKO again
[14226]arrived in Amsterdam en route to Moscow from Havana on 13 Decem-
[14227]ber 1960 and that he left for Moscow on 15 December. There is
[14228]mo record that he travelled to Berlin.**.
[14230]w-€IA Obtained a photocopy of NOSENKO’s passport while he was
[14232]‘passing through Amsterdam and again through Caracas.
[14234]®% Yt appears possible that his name was not removed from the
[14236]original passenger manifest fer the 15 December flight to
[14237]Moscow and that his train trip to East Berlin went un-
[14238]noticed.
[14240]TOP seeeet
[14242]‘1
[14243]4
[14244]a
[14245]3
[14247]|
[14249]te"
[14252]Bn
[14254]san tad eke:
[14258]oe
[14260]_@. The Bulgaria TOY and the LUNT Case -
[14262]_| * In the spring of 1961, four months after returning from
[14263]Cuba, NOSENKO was sent on temporary assignment for about a.
[14264]month to Sofia, the only trip he took in other than a. security
[14265]“watchdog” capacity. According to NOSENKO, it happened this
[14266]way: “I think I first heard that I wa3 going to Bulgaria, a
[14267]week or so before I left, from S.I. YEGOROV, Chief of the
[14268]section having contact with the counterintelligence representa-
[14269]tives of the Countries of the Pecples' Democracies in Moscow...
[14270]He said: ‘You must go to Bulgaria. GRIBANOV has decided.*
[14271]He asked, ‘Do you know about this?' and I said 'No.' He said:
[14272]"KLYPIN (Chief of the American Department] mast tell you.’ But
[14273]this was the first I had heard about it. YEGOROV said that the
[14274]Minister of the Bulgarian MVR had requested the Chairman of the
[14275]KGB to send an officer from the American Department of the Sec-
[14276]ond Chief Directorate to Bulgaria for consultation with the
[14278]-'-American Department, Second Directorate of the MVR of Bulgaria._.
[14281]4
[14283]'
[14284]4
[14285]Fi
[14286]z
[14288]|
[14290]“After one or two days KLYPIN told me about it. He répeated
[14291]the same thing and after about one and a hali weeks I flew to
[14292]Sofia." The @iscussicn continued as follows:
[14294]Question: What plans were made for this trip in Moscow before
[14295]you left? What briefings or discussions were held
[14296]concerning what you were to do in Scfia?
[14298]NOSENKXO: I was told: “You are goirg for consultations. There
[14299]are KGB advisors there. They will discuss it with
[14300]you." No one was speaking with me about my trip-
[14302]Question: What discussions did you have with your department
[14303]chief, KLYPIN, about what you were to do on this
[14304]trip?
[14306]NOSENKO: Nothing. He told me: “You will go. You will see
[14307]what they are doing. You will tell them how to
[14308]work."
[14310]Question: Did you have any meetings Or discussions with the
[14311]representatives of the Bulgarian MVR in Moscow be-
[14312]fore you left?
[14314]‘NOSENKO: No.
[14316]Question: What discussions did you have with YEGOROV or his
[14317]- section about what you were going to do in Sofia?
[14319]NOSENKO: YEGOROV said: “You will go. You will tell us what
[14320]they are doing.*
[14322]Before you left Moscow for Sofia did you know any-
[14323]thing about the size of the American Department of
[14324]the Bulgarian MVR? .
[14326]te
[14328]fe
[14330]No. Nothing. we so fo,
[14331]. Did you know the names of any of the officers of the
[14332]: American Department.of the Bulgarian MVR? :
[14334]No. _
[14336]+ Flares
[14339]' NOSENKO: No, Nothing.
[14340]Question: bid ‘you know just what was the area of responsibility
[14342]of the American Department of the Bulgarian MVR?
[14344]NOSENKO: No. Nothing.
[14346]NOSENXO flew from Moscow in early April 1961 and was met .
[14347]at the airport in Sofia by A.S. KOZLOV, a former Second Chief . 3
[14348]Directorate officer whom he had known in Moscow.* The follow . : j
[14349]ing morning he was picked up in an official vehicle and wes : uo :
[14350]taken to KOZLOV's office in the Bulgarian MVR building, not far :
[14351]away. NOSENKO asked KOZLOV what was expected of him and was “3
[14352]told that "they want to know about how to work against the Ameri-
[14353]can Legation. He said he wanted me to tell them everything about
[14354]how to work, right from letter 'A.'" NOSENKO was.then intro-
[14355]duced to the Chief KGB advisor in Sofia, Mikhail YEGOROV, and
[14356]‘to the Chief of the MVR's American Department, after which he
[14357]was assigned an office in the MVR building. During the ensuing
[14358]weeks he discussed both general matters and particuler cases
[14359]with individual Bulgarian officers working agsinst the American
[14360]target. On one occasion he lectured interested MVR officers
[14361]on the principles of operations against foreign military person-
[14362]nel in Moscow, and on another he visited an MVR surveillance
[14363]post opposite tne American Legation. He discussed.KGB methods
[14364]of operations against foreign tourists. He also addressea the
[14365]entire American Department for about five hours and told them et
[14366]“what is necessary, what to pay attention to, how to work.* 4
[14367]At the end of his visit, some time in mid-May, NOSENKO conferred’ ;
[14368]with the First Deputy Minister of the MVR about what had been :
[14369]accomplished and his recommendations for improving operations
[14370]against Americans. ;
[14374]As an outgrowth of his TDY to Bulgaria, NOSENKO has pro-
[14375]vided one lead tc a case in which he said he took personal part. . “4
[14376]About two weexs after arriving in Bulgaria, around the end of :
[14377]April 1961, NOSENKO was going over lists of foreigners who were i
[14378]scheduled to visit Bulgaria* in the near future, and he came ae '
[14379]across the name Horace G. LUNT. NOSENKO recalled that a man ,
[14380]named LUNT who was a Slavic linguist had been reported to him
[14381]in 1958 or 1959 by one. of his homosexual agents, VOLKOV or ,
[14382]YEFREMOV, as a possible homosexual. He asked the Bulgarians
[14383]whether this man was a specialist in Slavic languages. When
[14384]the Bulgarian officers replied in the affirmative, NOSENKO de-
[14385]cided to check his recollection against KGB records and an
[14386]immediate phone call was placed to Moscow,; asking for traces.
[14388]miclacnctie e edad he at
[14390]3
[14391]3
[14394]ad earlier reported that KOZLOV had served as the
[14395]- Chief of the American Department, Second Chief Directorate,
[14396]until 1953 and that, until about two years before going to
[14397]Bulgaria as a counterintelligence advisor, he had been i.
[14398]_ Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department. For the two years .
[14399]immediately prior to his Bulgarian assignment, he had been
[14400]Secretary of the Party Organization of the Second Chief -
[14401]Directorate and was relieved of all other duties. Asked ..
[14402]why KOZLOV was unable to “advise* the Bulgarians. in this —-
[14403]instance, NOSENKO said that he was too busy advising on _
[14404]higher levels and that he had been:.away from the work: for
[14405]number of years. — Lod ete els
[14408]14-0006
[14410]K reply was received almost at.onces
[14412]‘told: them that if he agreed, they should chan
[14414]es aphe.
[14416]at. once “Yes.. This is the sane’
[14417]LUNT who was in Moscow. Homosexual." NOSENKO told Cia. that
[14418]the KG2 had never done anything with its knowledge of LUNT's:
[14419]homosexual proclivities and that the Bulgarian MVR had not pre-
[14420]viously known of then. me :
[14422]HOSENKO's description of what happened next is as follows:
[14423]*®YOZLCY and the Chief of the American Department were very in-
[14424]terested, KOZLOV said: ‘George {NOSENKO].- you must help them.
[14425]They never recruited an American.’ I said that I would do what
[14426]I could. The three of us went to see General DUMKGV, the
[14427]Chief of the Second Directorate, Bulgarian MVR. T asked them
[14428]if they had a homosexual agent. They checked and said they
[14429]had one who is an operational con-sact. O.k., I said, acquaint
[14430]them, prepare a flat, make the pictures. This is the first
[14431]stage. I also told them, of course, to find out how long he
[14432]had been tuere, why, who his acquaintances were, etc. ther we
[14433]wert to YEGCROV, the senior Soviet advisor, and KOZLOV. called
[14434]GRIBANOV. GRIEANOV, I later found out, was'in a meeting with
[14436]tthe department chiefs of the Second Chief Directorate and was
[14438]not in a good mood. Why, I don't know. He didn't understand
[14439]what KOZLOV was saying. GRIBANCV thought chat I, myself, wanted
[14440]to make the approach to LUNT. KOZLOV got confused on the puone.
[14441]GRIBANOV asked to speak to me. I took the phone. ‘What are
[14442]you doing?" he said. ‘You are not at home, you are abroad.
[14444]You were sent only for consultations, but you are living as if
[14445]you were at home." I said: 'O.K., 0.K. I wasn't going to do
[14446]anything.' He hung up. I told KOZLOV that even if the Bulgar-
[14447]jans were to ask me, I could not do it myself, YEGCROV became
[14448]upset. He thought our position was bad because the Bulgarians
[14449]were asking. ‘What they ask, I will tell," I said, ‘but I am
[14450]not leaving the office to go any place or do anything. I can
[14451]only advise them on how to make the record entries after he is
[14452]caught. I can dictate the questicns to he asked. But the
[14453]approach and recruitment I cannot do myself.'
[14455]“The Bulgarians never said anything to me about active
[14456]participation, but they didn't know what to do. I told them
[14457]to get two agents. Maybe LUNT wouldn't like the first one.
[14458]The Bulgarians reported that LUNT wouldn't be there long. I
[14459]told them that if they wanted to take pictures and make a pitch
[14460]later, that's one thing. But if they wanted to do it all in |
[14461]one step, that is another. I told them they should consider the
[14462]time element... The Chief cf the American Department, KOVACHEV,.
[14463]and the chief of the section dealing with tourists and American
[14464]delegations were to make the recruitment. The approach was
[14466]"* made at the end of April, I think." ee
[14468]NOSENKO went on to say: “I was in the office during the
[14470]- approach. I told them I would not leave. ‘If you need my
[14471]‘advice,’ I said, ‘come to me.’ KOZLOV and I were sitting in
[14473]his office. It was the end of April, I think, and the next
[14475]‘day I went on holiday. I don't know where or how they ‘approached
[14477]LUNT. I only advised them that after the first conversation with
[14478]him they would know if he would be willing to cooperate. f said
[14479]they should have an apartment ready... not far from Sofia. I |
[14480]ge the place right
[14481]Take him some place nice finish the. conversation.
[14482]what I suggested." ..... Sickie
[14484]‘ st
[14487]g
[14488]i
[14489]a
[14490]a
[14491]3
[14492]a
[14493]4
[14494].
[14496]1 Miata BE
[14498]4
[14500],
[14501]Toke
[14503]So ea
[14507]-. . Fhe outcome was not. known to NOSENKO,, or he said: "Io |
[14508]didn't read any report of the results,and I didn't ask to see.
[14509]one. I.took a neutral position. ._ They said everytaing. was O.R. —
[14510]‘ The next day LUNT was to meet KOVACHEV and the section chief.
[14512]I went on a little trip, the May holidays, part of 30 April, 1,
[14513]2, and 3 May. ‘then I returned they said everything was O.K. and...
[14514]that he [.UsT] “had left. I asked them what they had decided for -.
[14515]the future, a contact in the United States or not. They said
[14517]? they decided against it because he was to come to Bulgaria in
[14519]' 1962 or 1963 for a Slavic conference.”
[14521]This account, which NOSENKO gave on 6 October 1964, differs
[14522]somewhaz from what he had said earlier, -on 11.June 1962, during
[14523]his second meeting with CIA. NOSENKO claimec tnen that he per
[14524]gsonally participated in the recruitment of LNT against GRIBANOV's
[14525]wishes: "They sent me in '61 to Bulgaria. ‘The Minister of Internal
[14526]Affairs there asked for a specialist to help them. I went to
[14527]help. An {American] professor arrived, a very prominent special-
[14528]ist on the Slavic countries... They [the Bulgarians} had never
[14529]tried [to recrtit} an American. ‘Let's try,' I said. The Sov-
[14530]det advisor in Bulgaria celephoned GRIBAHNOV and reported that
[14531]NOSENKO had decided that it is possible to get this American.
[14532]GRIBANGY wes in a conference at the time. GRIBANOV said: "Where
[14533]the hell's HOSENKO? Let me talk to him... What the hell are
[14534]you doing? I sent ycu only as an advisor.' Then he hung up.
[14535]What ccuid I do? The Bulicarians had already mace all prepara-~
[14536]tions... i was embarrassed, but what could I do? I left the
[14537]office of the advisor and they ‘ere waiting for me... I de-
[14538]cided to go ahead. I was sure that it would work. I felt that ;
[14539]it could be done, that this American could be firmly recruited... f
[14540]I spit on everything and went ahead with the Bulgarians. I - f
[14541]told trem to grab him. If it will be difficult for you, tell
[14542]me and I myseif can recruit him. Weil, they began and I came
[14543]there. He [NCSENKO is speaking of himself] was under the guise
[14544]of a Bulgarian and spoke in English, although my English was
[14545]poor... I said: ‘You are a pederast.' He also proved him- :
[14546]self to be a homesexual there [in Bulgaria]... ‘Well, what will ;
[14547]society think of you, those whose know you?’ Well, what did 4
[14548]this person decide? He agreed." ;
[14550]3
[14551]ad
[14552]Ta
[14554]2
[14558]5
[14560]3
[14562]a
[14563]4
[14565]z
[14567]4
[14571]The first time NOSENKO said that he had not participated . 3
[14572]directly in this operation was on 2 February 1964, while still
[14574]; in Geneva. He volunteered the following: “In Bulgaria in 4
[14576]i ’ April and May 1961, although I did not personally participate j
[14577]poo in this, I went there, and.I helped them there with the whole
[14579]i
[14581]: a process of recruitment of this professor. I helped the Bul- . 4
[14583]ete be -.. garians with what to do and how. He was the professor of a '
[14584]philolevy, LIuT.* hoc we deer a
[14586]. NCSENKO has also varied on the timing of the operation
[14587]‘against LUNT. In the account quoted above, he said that the
[14588]approach was made the day before he left on his. May Day holi-
[14590]@ay. On 24 April 1964 he said: “I remember that it was at
[14592]the very beginning of May that this name came up. And we got Ds
[14593]the -informaticn from Moscow the same day, telling us it was L os
[14594]the. same LUNT. I went on a trip the lst, 2nd, 3rd of May. . pre
[14595]~ hat is the 30th of April, lst and 2nd of May, and the 3rd of |
[14596]May in the morning I was back. So it was in the very beginning.
[14597]after the night of the trip. And Moscow was called right away,
[14600]14-0900
[14602]given all the: data, and- they: called. back ‘right away, and: gaid:|
[14603]"Yes, this is the samé,,.LUNT who-was in Moscow...* As--soon as -
[14604]"this was established, ‘the next day the Bulgarians’ planted this.
[14605]fe _ | bomosexual cx hin. They: planted this man either next to him
[14606]co a or in the restaurant and, well, he met LUNT and they got te-
[14607]getner and decided to meet with each other the same day or the
[14608]next day. This was all.done very rapidly."
[14610]a reemee
[14612]According to Professor LUNT, the approach actually took
[14613]place on 5 May 1961, following a visit to Moscow where he had
[14614]contacted an official in the U.S. Embassy. Ee travelled on
[14615]9 May directly from Sofia to Yugoslavia, where he at once re- — i.
[14616]ported the incident to U.S. Ambassador George MENNAN,.an aca- : , 7
[14617]demic acquaintance. LUNT told the Ambassador, and later CIA, .
[14618]that he had visited Sofia on one earlier occasion, from 8 to
[14619]28 November 1960. During this first trip he became involved
[14620]with one Georgi Velev ALEKSIEV, with whom he engaged in homo-
[14621]sexual relations on at least five separate occasions and to
[14622]whem he gave U.S. travellers checks, which ALEKSIEV intended ;
[14623]to sell on the black market. On one occasion during the first :
[14624]visit ALEKSIEV was recognized and stopped by the Bulgarian’ ~~ ;
[14625]civil police while walking cn the street with LUNT. After :
[14626]leaving Bulgaria in November 1960, LUNT received two letters :
[14627]from ALEKSIEV and prior to his next visit, cn 25 April 1961, :
[14628]LUNT wrote ALEKSIEV saying he would be returning. o
[14632]Saedeas ad bas bn ee
[14634]pet deer cn tide
[14636]ee a ee ee . ae st 7
[14638]we
[14643]Be "Transfer to the Tourist: Departnent in ° January: 1962
[14645]“tn the autumn of 1961 a decision was reached, on the basis
[14647]- Of NOSENKO'’s own request, to return him to the Tourist Depart-
[14649]‘ment. GRIBANOV had originally wanted to promote NOSENKO. from
[14651]the position of Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section to the
[14653]pest of Deputy Chief cf the American Department; NOSENKO's
[14655]. Superior and friend KOVSHUK had long had hts eye on this job,
[14657]however, and was the personal choice of the Chief of the Ameri-
[14658]can Department for it. (in fact, NOSENKO said, KOVSIIUK had
[14660]once held the job, lesing it in 1959 because of some misbehavior.)
[14661]NOSENKO did not want to be placed in the difficult situation
[14662]which his own promoticn to this post would have created. NOSENKO
[14664].@escribed his transfer in the February 1965 interrogations. The
[14666]following is from a protocol signed on 26 February 1965:
[14668]"The decision for.me to return to the Seventh [Tourist]
[14669]Desartrent.in January 1962 was actually made in about Septem~
[14670]ber or October 1961. GRIBANOV planned to appoint me Deputy
[14671]Chief of the First [American] Department, but the new Chief
[14672]of the First Departnent, FEDOSEYEY,wanted KOVSKUK to take
[14673]this position. Since I did not want to be placed in this
[14674]position by GRIBANOV's order against the wishes of FEDOSEYEY,
[14675]I went to GRIBANOV and requested that I be transferred back
[14676]to the Seventh Department, in any position. I had aiready
[14677]spoken to [V.D.] CHELNOKOV, who was then Chief of the
[14678]Seventh Department, about this matter and he had suggested
[14679]that I go to GRIZANOV and ask to be returned to the Seventh
[14680]Department us Chief of the First [{American-British-Canadian]}
[14681]Section with the understanding that I would be appointed -
[14682]Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department as soon as this
[14683]position would be vacated by [B.A.} BALDIN [who was retiring
[14684]in July 1962]. ...GRIBANOV did not teli me his reasons...
[14685]for wanting to appoint me Deputy Chief cf the First Depart-
[14686]ment in late 1961 or for appointing me Section Chief and
[14687]later Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department in 1962. He
[14688]@id not discuss witin me my personal qualifications for.
[14689]each of these positions."
[14691]Aware of his impending transfer NOSENKO took the opportunity
[14693]during December 1961 to spend several hours each day in the Tour-
[14695]ist Department. There he talked with Department Chief CHELNOKOV,
[14696]familiarized himself with certain files of the American Tourist
[14698]Section, ‘aud discussed current operations and operational possi-
[14699]bilities with the officers assigned to this section. The formal
[14700]order for the transfer was signed by GRIBANOV on 24 or 25 Detem-
[14702]ber 1961 and NOSENKO officially signed over the ABIDIAN case file —
[14704]and the U.&. Embassy security file to his successor as Deputy
[14705]Chief of the American Embassy Section, G.I. GRYAZNOV, within the
[14707]-next few-days.* As he had when he transferred from the Tourist
[14709]to the American Department in 1960, NOSENKO said, he took his |
[14710]active agents and his safehouse on Vorovskiy | Street with him when
[14712]he mturned to the Tourist Department in 1962. -
[14714]Pa
[14716]. These SpeeKTE dates were arrived at under. interrogation | in
[14717]‘February 1965. On all earlier occasions NOSENKO had said :
[14718]‘ ¢hat he was transferred in January 1962 (or some later date); .
[14719]"je said in. February 1965 that he was "officially" transferred
[14720]at the end of December and reported to his new position at
[14721]“the beginning of January (see Below).
[14723]al
[14725]4
[14726]H
[14728]A
[14730]i
[14734]3
[14735]4
[14736]4
[14740]i
[14742]weoldedenec net ty
[14749]January.1962 to January 1964 (Tourist Department).
[14751]1. Date of Transfer
[14753]NOSENKO has given different dates for the time when he left
[14755]the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Departmer.t to become
[14756]Chief of the American-British-Canadian Section of the Tourist
[14757]Department. During the Geneva meetings of 1962 ne said on
[14759]-d@ifferent occasions that this occurred in January 1962 and in
[14761]February 1962; in 1964 he timed the transfer as falling between
[14762]15 and 20 January 1962; and in February 1965 NOSENKO gave the
[14763]date as 2 or 3 canuary 1962, He has also reported that he was
[14764]in the U.S, Embassy Section for three months after John ABIDIAN
[14765]serviced the Pushkin Street dead drop (on 30 December 1961, thus
[14766]placing NOSENKO in the U.S, Embassy Section until late March
[14767]1962) and that he had transferred to the Tourist Department by
[14768]the time GOLITSYN defected (which NOSENKO placed in mid-January
[14769]1962 but which actually occurred in mid-December 1961).* W.E.
[14771]JOHNSON, the target of a Tourist Department operaticn** con-
[14773]firmed that NOSENKO approached him in Moscow on 5 January 1962.
[14775]In Fabruary 1965 NOSENKO said he recalled that the correct)
[14776]date of his approach to JOHNSON was on 5 January 1962. The CIA
[14777]interviewer then reminded NOSENKO that he had earlier described
[14778]on several octasions his visit to the dead drop site on Pushkin
[14779]Street and his receipt of reports rrom the surveillance post
[14780]for three months afterwards; during all of this period, NOSENKO
[14781]had said, he was in the U.S. Embassy Section of the First Depart-
[14782]ment. NOSENKO was told that CIA records show that ABIDTAN made
[14783]only one visit to this dead drop site, on 30 December 1961, six
[14784]days before the approach to JOHNSON, He answered only that he
[14785]might have been confused, but despite any contradictions the
[14786]"facts" (his emphasis) were the important thing, not any corre~
[14787]lation of dates.
[14789]2. Functions and Activities
[14791]As Chief of the American-British-Canadian Section of the
[14792]Tourist Department (hereafter in Part V.F. referred to as the
[14793]American Tourist Section) from January to July 1962, NOSENKO
[14794]said, he was responsible for planning and coordinating all
[14795]KGB activities against such tourists in the USSR as well as
[14796]for supervising the operational work of 15 subordinate case
[14797]officers. He had no deputy. NOSENKO told CIA that he required
[14798]several months at the beginning of 1962 “to get the feel of
[14799]things"; "there were no accomplishments" on his part in the
[14800]initial period on this new job, and plans for handling the
[14801]influx of American tourists during the forthcoming 1962 season:
[14802]consisted of studying files and continuing to work against the «
[14803]tourists asin the past. NOSENKO was asked in February 1965 .
[14805]‘© Statements by NOSENKO about GOLITSYN are reviewed in
[14807]Part VI.E., and ABIDIAN's servicing of the Pushkin Street
[14808]dead drop is discussed in Part V.E.3.d.
[14810]* See Part V.F4. for details on this operation.
[14812]3
[14814]j
[14815]4
[14816]t
[14817]4
[14818]2
[14819]i
[14820]4
[14823]slices kenas.
[14825]14-0000 - i mation < :
[14826]DRI CR ea a era gOS RPL RRR ee a ge iene Mg aR a ie a eg ne a
[14827]'
[14829]s
[14831]236.
[14833]whether, in his first several, months in the Tourist Department,
[14834]he had originated any new methods for operations ageinst An-
[14836]@rican tourists. he replied that during this period he ‘nad ;
[14837]proposed a study of representatives of foreian tourist firms A
[14838]in Moscow with an eye toward the KGH attempting to recruit j
[14839]them.* This suggestion, NGSENKD said, had been accepted, j
[14841]In March 1965, NOSENKO was asked whar new knowledge con-
[14842]cerning the use of tourism for esplonag? purposes by foreign
[14843]intelligence organizations had been acquired by the KGB during
[14844]his two-year absence from the Tourist Department. He replied .
[14845]that. the KGB had noted an increase in automobile tourism and : ‘
[14846]that American Intelligence had increased its use of multinational ,
[14847]tourist groups. NOSENKO was then asked what new information
[14848]concerning the use of tourism as a cover for uspionage activity
[14849]had been obtained by the KGB from any agent source during this
[14850]period, NOSENKO answered that he neither knew of any such new
[14851]information nor had he heard of such an agent.**
[14853]NOSENKO has said that, in line with the wishes of the Chief
[14854]of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, O.M. GRIRANOY, Ae was pro-
[14855]moted to the position of Deputy Chief of the entire Tourist
[14856]Department in July 1962, immediately efter his return from
[14857]Geneva. A year later he was made Firs: Deputy Chief of the
[14858]Department, a promotion which involved only a change in title
[14859]as there was ro Second Deputy Chief at the time. Apert from
[14860]saying he was V.D, CHELNOKOV's second-in-command from July 1962
[14861]to January 1964 and as such general supervisor of all KGB tour-
[14862]to this position; NOSENKO has not been questioned specifically
[14863]concerning these duties.
[14865]NOSENKO's first operaticnal activity after transferring to
[14866]the American Touris< Section was supervision of a homosexual
[14867]approach to wW.E, JOHNSON on 5 January 1962. Additionally, during
[14868]the 1962-64 period in the Tourist Department NOSENKO tcok part
[14869]in the recruitment approach to Horst BRAUNS, in the interrogation
[14870]of Yale University Professor Frederick BARCHOORN, and in the
[14871]arrest of the American tour guide Bernard KCTEN. For a short
[14872]time in 1963 he handled the KGB agent Alexarder SVENCHANSKIY,
[14873]owner of a tourist agency in New York City*** and a Russian
[14874]language bookstore in Chicago, Illinois, By virtue of his
[14876]*- NOSENKO said at another time that he made the same proposal
[14877]in 1958-59, forming the basis of the FRIPPEL operation {see
[14878]Part V.D.5.).
[14880]** See Part V.D.7.b., which discusses the KGB agent George
[14882]BLAKE, a staf£ officer of MI-6, who confessed after his
[14884]arrest in April 1961 that he had passed to his Soviet
[14886]handlers the complete minutes of joint meetings held by
[14887]mo, CIA and MI-6 in London in June 1959 and in Washington
[14888]@uring April 1960. These meetings were held to coordinate
[14889]the American and British programs fcr leqal travel opera- : i
[14890]tions, mainly with tourists, into the Soviet Union.
[14891]i Part ¥.D.7.c. describes a top secret KGB document on
[14892]Western tourist operations in the Soviet Union which was
[14893]peepared in 1961 in the Tourist Department of the KGB
[14894]Seconda Chief Directorate. This document, which the
[14895]@efector GOLITSYN gave CXA, quoted verbatim certain
[14896]geebions of the minutes given to the KGB by BLAKE.
[14902]SCCKOTEN was frequently employed as a tour guide to the USSR
[14903]by this tourist agency. : : OO mo |
[14906]Tea clewie ciee aeons
[14908]TOP SECRET eee
[14910]14-00000,
[14912]“Gupervisozy posit! on, ‘in the ‘Tourist Department - NOSENKO. also be-
[14913]came involved with John SHUSIN, a GRU agent. (These six cases -
[14914]JOHNSON, BRAUNS, BARGHOORN, KOTEN, SVENCHANSKIY, and SHUBIN - are .
[14915]discussed below.) NOSENKO reported that his planned role in the.
[14917]approach to Natalie BIENSTOC (see Part VI,D.2.) was prevented |
[14918]by his preparations to leave for Geneva in March 1962, Finally,
[14919]NOSENKO said he participated in the KGB invescigation of Lee.
[14920]Harvey OSWALD after P-esidert KEINEDY!' 8 assassination in Novem—
[14921]ber 1963 (see Part V.D.6.).
[14923]NOSENKO has indicated that his own operational work in 1962
[14924]to 1964 was limited to those cases cited above because of the
[14925]considerable amount of time spent on temporary duty assignments
[14926]outside Moscow during these two years. In mid-February 1962,
[14927]soon after assuming the duties of Chief of the American Tourist
[14928]Section, he began to prepare for his first trip to Geneva, which
[14929]lasted from 14 March until 15 June 1962 (see Part III.B.). NOS-
[14930]ENKO estimated that he had spent a total of six months outside
[14931]Moscow in 1963 on temporary assignments. These included a two-
[14932]day trip to Odessa to meet FRIPPEL, an inspection tour of the
[14933]Leningrad KGB organization, a five-day trip to Leningrad for a
[14934]conference on border control, a week-long trip to Alma-Ata for
[14935]a conference on tourist travel with KGS representatives from
[14936]the Soviet Central Asian republics, and an eignt- or ten-day
[14937]inspection trip to the Caucasus as a member of a tean headed by
[14938]GRIBANOV. NOSENKO said he travelled to Gésrkiy Oblast on 16-17
[14939]December 1963 to. assist in the search for CHEREPANOV, who had
[14940]passed top secret documents to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow (see
[14941]Part VI.D.7.c.).
[14943]3. NOSENKO's Agents
[14945]Mhen NOSENKO returned to the Tourist Department in the
[14946]first days of 1962, he took with him the agents whom he had
[14947]been handling as Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section.
[14948]These agents are listed below with a summary of NOSENKO's com-
[14949]ments concerning their use in 1962 and 1963.*
[14953]FRIPPEL had been reassigned from Moscow in early 1961, but
[14954]NOSENKO continued to be the Second Chief Directorate case offi-
[14955]cer in charge of any future KGB contacts with him. (FRIPPEL
[14956]had no KGB contacts in New York City.) Describing FRIPPEL's
[14957]past service for the KGB on 15 June 1962, five months after he
[14958]said he transferred to the Tourist Department, NOSENKO said:
[14959]“FRIPPEL was afraid and gave practically nothing... He was
[14960]a weak agent... I recruited him but. speaking honestly, he =
[14962]“was not an agent." Nevertheless, NOSENKO said, the KGB hoped
[14964]that FRIPPEL would be reassigned to the USSR at some future
[14965]date. When FRIPPEL returned twice to the Soviet Union in
[14967]. 1963, NOSENKO met with him, ence in Odessa and once -in Moscow,
[14969]The oniy other “agent. whom NOSENKO handlea ‘during this
[14971]period was the American ) Alexander SVENCHANSKTY. (See
[14972]Part V.F.6.).
[14974]ona aKa te etic aatibiede,
[14976]Pad
[14978]ere
[14981]aernemennctes Ming hins nt ipnanneerrtactinnentatannineenint cents +
[14983]a
[14987]o 7 ipo such meeting.
[14989]PRUE APNE Ei, ie eo
[14991]288.
[14993]put FRIPPEL provided nothing useful on theze occasions.*
[14994]Whereas NCSENKO had normally met FRIFPET in the company of
[14995]CHELNOKOV during FRIPPEL's Moscow tour, he went alone to tne
[14996]tivo 1963 meetings. .
[15000]After GOLITSYN's cGefection, NOSEUKO said, the KG3 considered
[15001]PREISSREUND compromised to American Intelligence and therefore
[15002]ineligible for further use against Anericans at the Embassy in
[15003]Moscow. For this reeson NOSENKO was told by the U.S, Embassy
[15004]Section to continue to t.andle PREISFREUND while serviag in the
[15006]_ Tourist Depertment, but as PREISTREUND spcke only Finnish and
[15007]Russian, he was of no use against Enclish-spesking tourists.
[15009]- Although NOSENKO met with PREISFREUND on the latter's visits to
[15011]“Moscow in 1952 end 1953, this agent wes not used operationally.
[15013]c. VOLKOV and YEPRINOV:
[15015]ROSENKO'sS two homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV tcok
[15016]part in the entrapment aporoach ta W.EL JOHNSON several days
[15017]after NOSENKO returned ta the Tourist Department. This was
[15018]their first operational activity since 1959, for they had not
[15019]been used in any homosexual operations while HOSSIKO was in the
[15020]U.S. Embassy Section, it was, according to NOSENKO, the last
[15021]tine they were engaged in KGB activity. At the end of 1962 or
[15022]beginning of 1963 they were terminated, and their files were
[15023]sencn by NOSENKO to KGB archives. NOSENMKO explained that VOLKOV
[15024]and YEFREMOV had become too well known for their operational
[15025]activities to be of further use to the Second Chief Directorate,
[15027]2. Gaear
[15029]When NOSENKO was transferred to the Tourist Department,
[15030]he was instructed by the Americar Department Chief, S.M.
[15031]FEDOSEYEV, and V.M. KOVSHUK, Chie Enbassy Section,
[15032]to continue to handle AP ReRaS 4 KEES GAR
[15033]studying in Moscow. NCS ad personally crui techies Se
[15034]and had used him in the development cf U.S, military code
[15035]clerk Matthey ZIJUS (see Part V.E.3.c.) in 1901, an operation
[15036]which was still underway at_the time of NOSENKO's transfer.
[15037]NOSENKO continued to meet GPRS curing the first months of
[15038]1962, end he recalled that in February or March of that year
[15039]he instructed GEE to attempt to arrange a social meeting
[15040]with ZJJUS in a Moscow restaurant so that znother KGB egent
[15041]could be introduced to the KGB target. This meeting had not
[15042]taken place by Merch 1962, when NOSENKO left for Geneva. Just
[15043]before leaving Moscow, around 12 March 1962, NCSENKO turned
[15044]5 \ over to G.I. GRYAZNOV, according to NOSEIKO, tnen the
[15045]peputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section. GSS) was scheduled
[15046]to finish his studies in Moscow in May 1962, and NOSENKO be-
[15047]lieved he left at that time to return to Syria.
[15050]© PRIPPEL reported a meeting with NOSENKO and CHELNOKOV
[15051]im Odessa in early 1962, and the records of the State
[15052]Department Passport Office indicate that FRIPPEL intended
[15053]'@o visit the USSR at that time. NOSENKO said there was
[15054]See Part V.D.5.
[15057]a
[15060]3
[15061]H
[15064]TINOV of the Tourist Department in 1956. or 1957. At that time-
[15066]-tourist Wallace Everett JOHNSON on 11 June 1$52:° He did not name
[15068]“Churches and... insulted us, Russia, and the coverrment horribly.
[15070]_ are you? How about our connection in the States? And our
[15072]-° Magina RYTOVA: 70 1 0-% ~ Doran
[15073]Marina RYTOVA was turned over to NOSENKO by I.A. KONSTAN-
[15075]Exhibition in Moscow. In 1960 or 1961 she. became an instructor
[15077]of the Greek language at the Institute of International Relations,
[15079]and some time in 1962 she got a job at the school of the Central
[15081]Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Thereafter |
[15083]she ceased all agent work. NOSENKO was officially registered as .
[15084]her case officer until his defection in 1964. He cid not andi- . :
[15085]cate that RYTOVA took part in ary operations, from January 1962 ;
[15086]until she began work for the Central Committees. - |
[15088]she was working as an interpreter at the Russian Permanent - : _ |
[15090]on ab staacetbaht
[15092]negara ta theweien +
[15094]4. Approach to W.E. JOHNSON
[15097]-NOSENKO first referred to his approach to the American
[15099]JOHNSON at this time: "In January of this year I recruited (an
[15100]American/. I cannot reinember his name. He is from California,
[15102]a Baptist, a young guy, healthy, somewhat fac, and he turned out
[15103]to be a homosexual.* He loved men. I have an agent network
[15104]capable of anything and, in particular, althoush I head a section
[15105]there, I have a good agent apparatus, i.e., + have beautiful
[15106]girls... and I have young pederasts, homos2xuals._ In partic-
[15107]ular, I have one special pair /VOLKOV and YEFREMOV/ - I'm afraid
[15108]that they are known to you and the English... Here is what
[15109]happened. He gave me a signature. I told him: ‘Write it your- 2
[15110]self.’ So he typed it on a typewriter, I said: 'No, I don't
[15111]want it typed. write it out longhand.'... Fe had a very re-
[15112]actionary attitude toward the Soviet Union. His attitude was
[15113]such that he insulted us terribly. He visited Baptist groups,
[15115]He sent letters, and we read them all - awful letters, i.e., the
[15116]government is lousy and everything here is poor. i said to him:
[15117]‘Write, damn it, that the best country /in the world/ is the :
[15118]Soviet Union, that the best government is the Soviet Government. r
[15119]Write, write.' In general he did everything /I asked/ but then, | }
[15120]right away, he ran to the Embassy_and told everything. This
[15122]was in January of this year /1962/. He told everything. I : !
[15123]know that he told. But he gave me his signature that he would :
[15124]help the Soviet security organs, etc. I know this. I was i
[15125]there. I decided to go to the hotel where he was staying. I i
[15127]sat down and waited. Surveillance was on the joo. ‘Tell me ; |
[15129]when he comes,' /I ordered/. I sat down, ‘He_has come,’ ithe — Uy cbt aera
[15130]surveillance_team reported/. ‘where is he?' /I asked/. ‘In ; : ,
[15131]his room,' /they said/. ‘We'll wait,‘ /I replied/. They re- . 7 :
[15132]ported that he had gone to eat in the restaurant and I went : |
[15133]there at once. He was sitting alone. I approached him: : en
[15134]‘Hello, how are you?' I didn't say anything to him, _I knew
[15136]that he had told everything in the Embassy. /T said:/ ‘How .
[15138]Hier cee
[15140]2 beste
[15142]work in the States? what do you think about it? I said to
[15143]him: ‘Will you work? Can you: give us something importent or
[15144]mot?’ He answered: ‘I have nothing.’ I. said: ‘And if I
[15146]'* Other sources, personal acquaintances of JOHNSON, have.
[15148]reported JOHNSON! s having homosexual tendencies
[15150]make: “at. public. that” ‘you are a ‘pederast, what wild’ héppen then?’
[15151]‘No,’ ne said, ‘I will do: anything you.want.’ But I couldn’ t
[15153]- tell him that I knew that he had reported everything. I said:
[15155]‘Listen, brother, I don't believe you. You ere a bad person.'
[15156]We Gecided that we couldn't do anything with him. ‘Go home,
[15157]damn yor,’ I said. ‘But if you write one insulting erricle
[15158]about Ru :3sia I will find you, even in the U.S.' He is a
[15159]Baptist and writes articles, a bright guy. And I left. He.
[15160]pushed eside his food and ran to a pay telephone and called .
[15161]@the Embassy/: ‘This afternoon in a restaurant George was
[15162]frightening me.‘ We know ke called the Embassy. de heard
[15163]everything."
[15165]NOSENKO's first reference to JCHNSON in 1964 was at a meet-
[15166]ing on 2 february, when he produced a note ‘bearing that name and
[15167]the date 5 January 1962. (“Here I have a name jotted down,
[15168]Everett wallace /sic/ JOHNSON," NOSENKO said. "The date was
[15170].5 January 1962, but what took place i havé absolutely no recol-
[15171]- lection. I don't think it was a recruitment, but it was some
[15172]‘sort of tontact, or he was being’ studied or worked on, or some-
[15174]thing like that. But I remember nothing."
[15176]NOSENKO next mentioned his epproach to JOHNSON on 17 April
[15177]1964. Although not immediately recalling JCHNSON's name, he
[15178]eventually remembered that “it was scmething like JOHNSON,
[15179]JOHNSTON, or something that sterts with a ‘J'" and that he was
[15181]@ Raptist from the California coast. NOSEYKO placed the opera-_
[15183]ticn sometime in the summer of 1962, after his return to Moscow
[15184]from Geneva, because he also remenbered wearing "just a coat, ~
[15185]no overcoat at the time." JOHNSON, who had come to the Soviet
[15186]Union as a tourist, was known to be a socialist, and on this
[15187]basis the KGB Second Chief Directorate considered him as a
[15188]recruitment target. When the Second Chief Directorate checked
[15189]whether the KGB First Chief Directcrate would have any use for
[15190]JOHNSON as an agent, however, it learned there was no interest
[15191]in JOHNSON: He had no access to important information, and he
[15192]lived too far from the KGB Legal Residencies in the United
[15193]States for convenient contact.
[15195]Several days later KGB surveillance observed JOHNSON
[15196]mailing some letters in Moscow, When read by the KGB they were
[15198]found to be_"so bitter toward the Soviet Union, angry, critical,.
[15200]that they /the KG3/ decided something had to be done" to stop.
[15201]him from writing letters and making anti-Soviet statements on
[15202]his return to the United States. At about the same time there
[15204]‘was some sign that JOHNSON was a homosexual, and it was decided
[15206]to entrap him on this basis. The sole reason was to halt
[15207]JOHNSON's criticism of the USSR ~ no recruitment was attempted,
[15208]because neither the First nor the Second Chief Directorates
[15209]had any use for him as an agent and because the KGB had detere
[15210]mined that he probably would not accept a recruitment proposal
[15212]‘anyway. NOSENKO did not know why he was selected to make the
[15213]_ @pproach to JOHNSON, except. that "BOBKOV said I should go."
[15215](FP. D. BORBKOV, a Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate,
[15217]_ Supervised the activities of the Tourist Department.) NOSEN-
[15218]. KO's homosexual agerts. VOLKOV and YEFREMOV were selected to
[15219]Compromise JOHNSON, ac
[15222]*"- In 1962 NOSENKO implied that the KGB received: its first
[15223]indication of ‘JOHNSON:
[15225]i
[15226]i
[15228]A
[15230]bisbah Site darbed dummiabuss,
[15232]vs hesmeedbeait Lan
[15241].of him. Let's see that. his trip is cut off.'"-
[15243]* BOSENKO: _ No, it: doesn't. concern JOHNSON’ at all. .I remember
[15245]JOHNSON beceme acquainted with VOLKOV and YEFREMOV at the ee
[15246]I
[15248]Metropol Hotel. They told JCHN3SON that they had recently ar-
[15250]‘rived in Moscow and invited JOHNSON to visit their hotel room.
[15252]JOHNSON agreed because "they understood each other right away. i
[15253]They knew they were the same (i.e., homosexuals) and so he came, |
[15254]and when they were engaged in their business, our people walked i
[15255]in on them under the disguise of the hotel administrator and ; :
[15256]one militiaman," Photographs of the incident had been taken,
[15258]but these had not been developed at the time of this, the first
[15259]confrontation of JOHNSON. A report describing the circumstances
[15261](an akt) was prepared, and JOHNSON was then transferred to another
[15263]room, By this time, NOSENKO had arrived at the hotel from his
[15265]office, ard he went into the room where JOHNSON was waiting in
[15267]accordance with KGB orders, NOSENKO discussed the situation
[15269]with JOrciscn, then asked him to type and sign a statement that
[15271]he would "not say anything derogatory about the Soviet Union."
[15273]JOHNSON did as he was told.
[15275]The following day, after the incriminating photographs had
[15276]been developed, NOSENKO approached JOHNSON in the cafe of the
[15277]Metropol Hotel and esked him whether he intended to Keep his
[15278]promise. when JOHNSON said that he planned to do so, NOSENKO
[15279]presented him with an envelope containing copies of the photo-
[15280]Graphs and said that they would be leaked to the foreign press
[15281]if JOKNSON were to break his promise. The KGS later- learned
[15282]that JOHNSON had visited (or phoned, according to a later ver-
[15283]sicn) the U.S, Embassy and assumed that he had reported the
[15284]approach. NOSENKO did not recall what name, if any, he had
[15285]used during this operation.
[15287]Questioned further on 24 April’ 1964, NOSENKO said that,
[15288]upen his arrival at the hotel immediately after the compromise,
[15289]the militiaman described the incident to him in JOHNSON's pre-
[15290]sence. Addressing JOHISON, NOSENKO had said: "How come? How
[15291]could you do such a thing? What are we going to do now? After
[15292]all, this is punishable by court and... people are given from
[15293]five to eitht years for such relations. It used-to. be three
[15294]to five, not it’s from five to eight." Frightened by this,
[15295]JOHNSON had written and signed his promise not to denigrate
[15296]the Soviet Union in the future, ; po
[15300]NOSENKO was asked whether the KGB would mount such an _ i
[15301]Operation against any foreigner who wrote uncomplimentary
[15303]mieieesteast S Gcbstar tine «
[15305]1
[15308]a
[15309]4
[15311]weber Std
[15313]d
[15314]d
[15315]a
[15316]4
[15317]“y
[15319]letters and articles about the USSR. He replied: "They don't - Fe cera 7
[15321]jump on everyone, and not everyone writes this. way. And not :
[15322]everything that is written this way cets into their hands. :
[15324]In this case there was a coincidence. - There was something we
[15325]could hit him on. For instance, if the fact that he. is a -
[15326]homosexual didn't come to our attention, they would probably
[15327]just say: ‘All right, to hell with him. we have to get rid
[15329]thile discussing the approach to JOHNSON on 30 January
[15330]the following dialogue took: place: ae . _
[15332]1965;
[15334]WOSENKO: This: (the ‘appréach)’ took place’in the ‘summertime.
[15335]we OF M62 or 63.0 POS my
[15336]Question: In your notes,’ you. have. the. date 5 January 1962
[15338]it was: summer; I think it was:."63 ; sini.
[15341]_“Yeourse,. pecause we haver' t seen “him yet.” -But even. that ‘first -
[15342]-eignal is very. helpful, So if he goes on a Soviet plane, they
[15343]will start watching him from the time the flight starts. - Now,.
[15344]as soon as he crosses the border, he willbe watched by the :
[15345]order guards; he will. be watched the entire route of his travel. .
[15346]“This is a very important busiress, because the main task in re-.
[15347]gard to tourists is to uncover within the gef.eral flow of tourists
[15348]those persons wao are of interest from the operational point of
[15349]view... Let's just say that this person is processing a group
[15350]of American tourists who are going to the Soviet Union, and,
[15351]when the processing is almost finished, another person is added
[15352]to the group. Nebody knows this person in the group... but he
[15353]was added_at the last mirute. So this is an indication. This is
[15354]what he /the agent/ was taught to pay attention to when he was
[15355]being trained in Moscow... Now, if some official government
[15356]agency mekes a request that a man ke sent to the Soviet Union as
[15357].a tourist, this immediately arouses suspicion of course... In
[15358]such things he has been trained... He comes to Moscow once or
[15359]twice a year. You know, such a little Jewisn fellow - an emigre
[15360]“from Russia - in the past, you know, scared of everything. The i
[15361]. . last time he came he told us: ‘You know, I'm thinking about it 3
[15362]. oe all the time,' he says. So they esked him: ‘Are you afraid?
[15363]ahy are you shaking?’ He says, ‘Well, T'm not afraid: I'm not
[15364]shaking. But why should I be caught like an idiot...' His
[15365]pseudonym is 'NIUD' and his last name is SVEXCHANSKIY. Kell,
[15366]I'll give you all this later." :
[15368]NOSENKO told CIA on 14 February 1964 that SVENCHANSKIY was
[15369]recruited in 1961 and that in 1963 he, NOSENKO, had taken over a
[15370]the handling of this agent from Tourist Department case officer : o
[15371]Ye. N. NOSKOV.* SVENCHANSKIY had sent the KG3 many open code a
[15372]messages such as those described above, and a number of these ;
[15373]messages have been considered to have been of definite opera- ‘ :
[15374]tional interest. NSOSENKO identified SVENCHANSKIY as the presi-
[15375]dent of “Afton Tours" in New York City and the owner of a
[15376]‘Russian-language bookstore in Cnicago.
[15378]i . There was some concern on the part of the KGB at the time
[15379]of the recruitment in 1960 or 1961, NOSENXO reported on 1 March:
[15380]1965, because SVENCHANSKIY nad had contacts with AMTORG in New
[15381]York City. The KGB suspected he was an FBI agent, but in con-
[15382]tacting SVENCHANSKIY in 1960 or 1961, NOSKOV decided that this
[15383]was not so and therefore recruited him. (Asked how it was de- ©
[15384]: termined that SVENQIANSKIY was not an FBI agent, NOSENKO re-
[15385]i plied: "NOSKOV felt it:" he had no further explanation.) The
[15386]recruitment was based mainly on an agreement that. Inturist
[15387]i... . + would send more business to SVENCHANSKIY if he cooperated. rr er
[15388]sO NOSENKO also said SVENCHANSKIY had been arrested. for black- ; : _
[15389]marketeering, but he did not elaborate on this statement.- ;
[15390]NOSENKO took over the case froni NOSKOV in September 1963, and
[15391]to his name was entered ‘in the single-volume file of SVENCHANSKIY it
[15392]ool: as the handling officer as of that date. Together with NOSKOV, $
[15393]NOSENKO subsequently had two meetings with SVENCHANSKIY when }
[15394]: the latter travelled to the Soviet Union, one in September a - }
[15395]“ena one towards the. end. of 1963. : _ . te ee |
[15396]; oe 4 ae
[15397]7
[15399]Information from Other Sources: -
[15401]ga records reflect: ‘that. Alexander: ‘SVENGHANSKIY wa was “born
[15402]March 1909: in. Theodosia. cage gore ‘He: inmigrated to. the.
[15405]14-0000
[15407]‘father's papers in 4929: Wis’ cabliest “exployers were the "ALL-
[15411]297
[15413]Russian ‘Textile Syndicate” from February 1928 te March 1931, / a
[15414]by AMTORG in New York City from April 1932 to May 1942, and by ‘ oo
[15415]the Soviet Government burchasing Commission in Washington from | us
[15416]May 1942 until December 1942. Uucing the Second World war,
[15417]SVENCHANSKIY served in the U.S, Ariny Air Force as “official “ :
[15418]translater” at the dhite Horse Air Base in Alaska, where he had te
[15419]frequent ccntacts ween members of Soviet aircraft crews. Fromm . :
[15420]October 1946 until December 1952, when he was dismissed for re- Hy
[15421]fusing to answer questions by the McCarran .Cc:inmittee concerning
[15423]alleged subversive activity, SVENCHANSKIY was employed at United
[15425]Nations Headquarters as a radio officer, broadcasting to the
[15427]USSR. As of early 1965, SVENCHANSKIY was liated as president of
[15429]Afton Tours, inc., New York City, and president of Cross World
[15431]Books and Periodicals, Chicacso. Afton Tours is a branch of the . q
[15432]Package bxpress and Travel Agency, which is a registered agent
[15433]of Inturist. Cross world Books and Periodicals wes registered
[15434]in 1961 as an agent of Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga, tne Soviet Foreign
[15435]Trade famini stration dealing with the cistrikurion and sale of
[15436]Russian-language books, periodicals, films, and visual aids.
[15437]SVENCHANSKLY nas mace numerous trips to the USSR, including one
[15438]in August and Septenrer 1903,
[15440]paatsllbsl Neb Bigtinr disci “ok
[15442]a ca Aypeteds 2,
[15444]Allegations of SVENCHANSKIY's Communist sympathies and pro-
[15446]bable Soviet espionage a pei ES me date pack <3, io
[15447]Force service in Alaska, 4yatury stds ;
[15448]mt £ his strong pro-Suviet bi as anu Suspiciously close Ccon-
[15450]2 with Soviets. In Aujust 1950 Harry GOLD, then in prison
[15451]as an ae@mitted Soviet agent, linked SVENCHANSKIY to the Soviet
[15452]espionage retwork in the United States.* GOLD stated that in.
[15453]March 1942 SVENCHANSKIY, under the name of SWIN, had been in-
[15454]strumental in introducing his “co-conspirator” Abraham BROTHMAN
[15455]to “another AMTORG man to engage in industrial espionage." A
[15456]CIA report of 14 November 1950 cites a “tested source" (a Czech
[15457]National employed et the United Nations) as stating: "I believe
[15458]that Alexander SVENCHANSKIY, employed in the Radio Section of
[15459]the Russian Divisioa of the United Nations, isa Communist and
[15461]Lee
[15463]take tea gyeto
[15465]beth PENTLEY, KALAXEVICH hee. since emigrated to “the Soviet
[15467]Union; he was identified as an agent of the KGS Second Chief
[15469]Directorate by COLITSYN and by NOSENKO, Virtualiy all the i !
[15470]individuals with whom SVENCHANSKIY has entered into business Jd
[15471]arrangements since leaving the United Nations have or had con- .
[15472]nections with the U.S. Communist Party or with the Soviet 4 :
[15474]Intelligence Services. His business dealings. have also brought
[15475]him into frequent contact with Soviet officiels in this country,
[15476]including a number of identified intelligence officers. (two of
[15477]them reported on + by NOSENKO) . _ _
[15481]the story of ‘SOLD's ‘testimony under “the headline "“Ex-U.N,
[15482]‘ Aide linked to’ Spy Ring by Gold: . the Times reported. that
[15483]-GOLD: had executed an affidavit to this’ effect the week: ‘
[15485]: feo 14 . . . i
[15486]ee oo, me
[15487]* The (21 October 135] dition of ‘the New York Times carried, ;
[15489]i
[15490]i
[15493]|
[15495]|
[15498]USSR in the fall of i¢e3 Almost at
[15500]from KGB Heedquarters and “the
[15502]An FBI 1
[15503]SVEN SHANSKIY &
[15505]NOSENKO wac asked in Ceneva Gn 25 January 1564 whether he
[15506]had been involved in the arrest of an rist in the
[15507]3 resoynized
[15509]= MP,
[15510]. POUre an
[15512]this as the cese of fernira ROLES a
[15513]New York City {end hence an 5 SVENCHANEKIY =
[15514]see below) who nad besa apprehended cn exual charges in Kiev.
[15515]CSENZO explains that, »hiie had no> personaliy perticipated
[15516]in the errest and hat never mec KGTON, ne hee supervised the case
[15518]Tana was report
[15520]NCOSENKO said that Kort had long boon @ momoer of the Am-
[15521]erican Communist Party and was a frequent visiter to the Soviet
[15522]Union after World War IIT. On these trips he had a large number
[15523]of contacts with dissident literary tigaures an} with soviet
[15524]citizens in general, perticvlarly among Russian Jews.** Because
[15525]of these many suspiciou. contacts, both the nog rere ane the
[15526]Second Chief Diiectorates hac come to the conclusion that KOTEIN
[15527]might well pe a provocation agent planted in or recruited from
[15528]the ranks cf the Communist barty of the United States. More-
[15529]ever, on the eve of KOVEN’s 1953 trip, the Tourist Department '
[15531]learned froma Vib. BARKOVYSKILY of the First Chirel Directorate's
[15533]Scientific and Technical (S&7) Directorate tit KOTEY was
[15535]‘rying with him the aceé ax cf relatives of an important
[15537]gent of the KGB's Cece Legal Pesidercy, and that KOTEY .
[15538]mncendea@ to visit them while in the USZ%, NOSENKO said he dic :
[15540]not know the name of this agent ere
[15542]This agert was a naturalized Anerican citizen, about 40 :
[15543]to 45 years ola, an n engineer born in Russia, who was employed ar
[15544]in an “interesting industrial company or technical organization
[15545]in the New York City area." For scme time he had been working
[15547]* CIA told NOSENKO of this information about SCKCLOW. in March
[15548]1965. He recalled that a woman named Sonya worked for .
[15549]SVENCHANSKIY but said that “we considered thac he (SVEN- A.
[15550]CHANSKIY) was doing it (spotting the tourists)." NOSENKO :
[15551]did not know of any Soviet Intelligence ties to, SQKOLOA.
[15553]“NOSENKO hes ‘explained in another context that the. Second
[15554]Cniek Directorate. is wary, of forexgn < contacts with. Soviet:
[15556]ce Bre debit nat canbe
[15559]‘here, the situation is right, the decision must be made right
[15561]actively for the $ Legal Residency: and haa provided the:
[15562]- KGB with "good, solia ormation” with “very valuaslke material
[15563]for technical intelligernce;:" at the same time the agent had been -
[15565]asking to be repatriated to the USSR, to become a Soviet citize:
[15566]but the KGB had been putting him off in order to continue to
[15568]exploit his access. Since the amount and quality of the agent's
[15570]production hed recently deteriorated, the KGB decided to accede
[15571]to his request for repatriation. Now, however, the acent de-
[15573]clined, saying that “he was not ready to go just yet. First he
[15574]was practically begging to cone to the Soviet Union ard now he
[15576]was balking." This by itself appeared suspicious to the KGB, kut
[15577]in addition, it was about this time that the egent came into con-
[15579]tact with KCTEN NOSE!::KO learned from BARKOVSELY that KOTEN.
[15580]“used to go to some booxstore that sells Soviet literature and
[15581]through a saleslady in this story whom KOTEV knows, he became
[15582]acquainted with the agent. who also used to go to this store.
[15584]After that, he used to meet with the agent without the saleslady."
[15586]On the basis of these incidents the First Chief Directorate
[15587]suspected that KOTEN had been directed specifically to this store
[15588]in order to meet and “work on" the egent and that, having learned
[15590]that the agent had relatives “in Stantsiya Loo, akout 17 kilo-
[15591]meters from Sochi... he had evidently received tne assignment
[15592](to visit the relatives) from American Intelligence. Evidently
[15593]they had gotten on the trail of this agent and were checking on
[15594]him." The KGS also had suspicions concerning the relatives,
[15596]former kulaks who were still well-off financially. It was know.
[15598]to the KGB, for example, that the agent had written his sister
[15599]in Stantsiye Loo that he wanted to return to the Soviet Union,
[15600]and she had replied: "Is there any sense in your coming here?"
[15602]KOTEN arrived in Moscow and then travelled to Sochi. From
[15603]there he sent a telegram to the agent's sister and her husband
[15605]in Stantsiya Loo, asking them to come to Sochi to see him. When
[15607]they arrived at KXOTE!'s hotel. however, the hotel administrator
[15608]told them that “OTEN was on an excursion and refused to allow
[15610]ae meeting. KOTON then took it upon himself to travel to Stant-
[15611]siya Loo where he eventually contacted and spoxe to the rela-
[15612]tives. In the course of. this meeting KOTEY took photographs
[15614]of the sister and her husband and recorded a message from the
[15615]sister to the agent on a tape recorder he had brought along.
[15616]From this the KGB deduced that "U.S. Intelligence wants to get
[15617]documentary data" and it therefore decided to “try to get hold
[15618]of KOTEN."
[15620]There had already been some indication during XOTEN's
[15622]‘earlier trips to the USSR that he was a homosexual, but the
[15624]KGB had taken no action because KOTEN was believed to be a
[15625]loyal Communist Party member. With these recent developments,
[15626]the situation had now changed. Although NOSENKO's superiors.
[15628]were absent from KGA Headquarters at the time, immediate action.
[15630]was required. NOSENKO consequently "took the whole thing on-
[15632]myself because everybody got excited, . Everybody said: ‘Let' 8
[15634]go. American Intelligence. is active, none of our ‘bosses are
[15636]now.'" By this time: KOTEN had travelled to Thilisi, and there
[15637]a homosexual KGB agent managed to. entice him. into relations. -
[15639]ina public park. These were suitably documented, ané he was ~
[15641]then | Picked: UP. by the local Militia. (In. the: ‘absence. of: his.
[15643]3
[15644]4
[15645]4
[15646]a
[15648]sidingianinadstc dation. dit
[15650]oo ee Faia att a
[15655]Seen a
[15657]‘superiors and fearing the bos
[15659]i
[15660]i
[15661]i
[15662]if
[15663]i
[15664]1
[15666]‘return there in the future and that he
[15668]insisted that  Mileav. acts in a public pies
[15669]end that the KGh not pacticipatys ¢ ap orenensicn.)
[15670]After question Ly the Milatia. : 5 permitted ta con-
[15671]tinue tis itinerary to Riu. whore te was sche ivled to stay
[15673]for two Gays before’ lesving the USSR
[15675]ehe Paret Chicf Dire torate, waich
[15676]increasingly concerned that the Ga petent of the #3 LAL Cr 4s
[15677]Residency “ould te apprehended by 2 TPL, wanted to get G2 OLt
[15678]of the United Sestes cefore thin happenec. ‘io ‘establis: the
[15679]true purpose" of KC s presence in the USSE and whether he w2s
[15680]an American agent, 4& well as to hold him untii the GB agent ha
[15681]arrived safely in the YSSKR (as NOSENKG told the FEI on 24 Feb-
[15682]ruary 1964), ic wes requested that VOTE! ce detained in the
[15683]Soviet Union, ‘The ducisien was made to arrest him at once on
[15684]the basis cf the cempromising materials cotained in Thilisi.
[15685]Following the arrest Ly the Kiev Militi KOTEI wes turned over
[15686]to the KGB for interrogation} the purpe NCSENKO said, was to
[15687]"break him,” to secure tie zdmission t. heacras an American
[15688]intelligence agent. At the same tine STs the GRY agent
[15689]hed failed to xcep a nuuber cf scheduled meetings with nis KSB
[15690]case officer, and the Legal Residency teared that something nad
[15691]gone wrong. He did eventually appear. h ERK
[15693]Meanwhile. was growing
[15695]svever, and NOSEAKO has
[15696]descrined the gupsequent meetings as follows: “They asked him:
[15697]‘are you going to leave the States?’ Ha said: ‘Well, I aon't
[15698]knew. I heave tu think about it seme more.’ So we said: ‘No,
[15699]you have to leave or else we will wash our hands of the whole
[15700]affair.’ £0 ne sard: You know T[ was thinking of leaving with
[15701]my wife, but my wife does not want to ieave.' To make a long
[15702]story shert, they scent three meetings trying to talk him into
[15703]leaving, and he kept hesitating. He Gicn't seen to want to
[15704]leave, so then they tole him: Loox, we are creaking off con-
[15705]tact with you. If you decide to go. you krow how to do it.
[15707]You are to 9° from the United States to some place in Europe
[15708]and go to the Soviet Embas>y there. They will give us 3 eignal
[15709]and the visa will ke issued to yon. But as far 2s we're con-
[15710]cerned, we're breaking contact with you.‘”
[15712]After this, according to NOSENXO. the KCB released KOTEN
[15713]when the Americen Communist Party and other organizations
[15715]‘strongly protested his arrest and imprisonment.
[15717]b. Information from Other Sources _Conserning KOTEN
[15719]; At the time of his arrest KOTEN wes an instructor of
[15720]Russian at New York University director of the Liprary for
[15721]Intercultural Studies. and a regular contributor ts the New
[15722]World Review and the magazine Jewish Life- S8oth the Library .
[15723]for Intercultural Studies and Jewish Life have been designated
[15724]“Copmunist fronts" by the House Committee cn Un-American
[15726]- Activities: the Hew World Review has. been cited as a propa-
[15727]_ ganda organ of the Soviet Government. KOTEN has said that,
[15729]te his. arrest and imprisonment in the USSR, he hopes to
[15730]“still loved the
[15731]Russian people and believed in the basic humanitariantsm of
[15735]ee Regarding the arrest th o"York Times on 29 Auguat .
[15736]1963 carried an article under : (~Sa- iide Missing -
[15738]4
[15742]q
[15743]i]
[15750]can tour
[15752]#¢ Rermar? Le.
[15753]3°23 August,
[15756]Kate: of
[15758]toscow, securist travel
[15759]4 been arscestec
[15761]POAT: 7 Mage
[15762]ust) e -he eed
[15764]BS
[15766]offense teokK pl
[15767]28 September 15
[15768]26 August, had voen rele.
[15769]Vienna: whe c.ticle ais note
[15771]¢ ecu
[15772]we et
[15774]ported Mr. Koter.'s release, Dut daciin gd te
[15775]end circumstences of his arre.t."
[15777]yy NEEOLEAN, a New ¥
[15778]allegedly
[15779]S ouy @n
[15781]- Eda GLASFR, a
[15782]office mahacer of the Four Continents
[15783]book Ouclet an New York, termed tre
[15784]“fant ic’ and “far ication.” |
[15786]nae
[15788]who returned to whe Uni
[15789]Li bein, neié, stat
[15790]we bat ne (SVENCHAIS#1tY)
[15791]would be cleared tp and
[15793]XK.
[15794]Moscow white
[15795]morals chacge
[15796]had been oss’
[15797]that HOTEN wo
[15799]ivy
[15801]Fbl sources reported thet AvTin er made che follew:a
[15804]‘remarks concerning his errs
[15806]r
[15808]seat
[15810]14.00068
[15812]wig ote OT
[15813]Adc tgs Sy
[15816]1400000
[15818]meena aye
[15821]14-0000,
[15823]i
[15824]a
[15826]a
[15828][.!
[15830]© g, Arrest of BancHiCony.
[15832]Be Information, ‘fron KOSENKO-
[15834]At the first of the 1964 neéetings in Geneva NOSES “KO
[15835]described the provocation and arrest of. Yale University
[15836]Professor Frederick BARGHOORN in-‘Late 1963; he was ques-.-
[15837]tioned farther on this case on 3 February 1964 and again
[15838]while waiting in Frankfurt to leave for the United States.
[15839]NOSENKO's most comprehensive statement, from which the
[15840]following paragraphs vere largely drawn, was made on 9 June
[15841]1964.* On this last occasion NOSENKO said that the pure
[15842]pose of the KGB oferation ageinst BARGHOORN was to retaliate
[15843]for Persone non grata action taken against three Soviets os
[15844]in Néw City in the case of John W. BUTENSO and to “egy
[15845]secure a “hostage in exchange for a fourth Soviet in the .
[15846]BUTENKO case who was jailed. In Geneva, however, NOSENKO
[15847]maintained that the operation against BARGHOORN “was to
[15848]discourage future arrests such as that of IVANOV [the
[15849]jailed Soviet], not because of any special importance of
[15850]IVANOV himself."
[15852]NOSENKO said that in 1963 four KGB First Chief Direc-~
[15853]torate officers assigned to the New York Legal Residency
[15854]were caught in operational activity in the United States.
[15855]Of the four, three had diplomatic immunity, but one was a
[15856]chauffeur and had only a service passport. The three
[15857]Soviet diplomats were held three or four hours by the
[15858]fnerican authorities and then released. IVANOY, the chauf-
[15859]feur, was arrested since he did not hrave diplomatic immunity.**
[15861]GRIBANOV, Chief of the KGB Second Chief Directorate,
[15862]learned of this arrest probably the next day and was directed
[15863]by KGB Chairman SEHICHASTNYY to take "necessary measures." ; . ;
[15864]GRIBANOV thereupon called to his office NOSEXKO; A.G, Ne
[15865]KOVALENKO, Chief of the Tourist Department; and G.I. GRYAZ=
[15866]NOV and Ye.M. RASHCHEPOV, both Deputy Chiefs from the Ameri-
[15867]can Department. After explaining the arrest, GRIBANOV
[15868]asked what information the Second Chief Directorate had on
[15869]any American--U.S. Embassy employee or tourist--that could
[15871]*The detail of NOSENKO's information on the BARGHOORN case
[15873]reflects both the extent of the CIA debriefings and the
[15875]depth of his knowledge of this case. He did, in fact, fur-
[15877]nish much of this information during his first 1964 meeting
[15879]with CIA. NOSENKO was also able to describe at length. oe :
[15880]BARGHOORN's professional background, which gave rise to KGB
[15882]suspicions of intelligence affiliation, and he provided the
[15884]general outlines of cther operational activity centering
[15886]‘around BARGHOORN during his 1963 trip to the Soviet Union.
[15888]**Three Soviets were arrested in Englewood, N.J., on 30 Octo-
[15889]ber 1963 during a clandestine meeting with the KGB agent,
[15890]BUTENKO, an American engineer. Two of the Soviets, G.A.
[15892]| PAVLOV and Yu.A. ROMASHIN, were members of the Sovict Mis-
[15893]sion to the United Nations; they. claimed diplomatic immuni-
[15895]ty and were released; a few: days later ‘they were declared -
[15896]persona non grata along with a third Soviet, V.I. OLENEV,. ..
[15897]who was Damed in the charges. by the U.S. Government; but was *
[15898]not: “AETORG. ai _ Another Soviet citizen, I. AL OY,
[15900]wasted.
[15902]wah Pace
[15904]Wyse
[15907]-gerve as material for an-arrest:. RASHCHEPOV and
[15908]- gaid that at that very moment there were three or four -
[15909]American military attaches in Rostov and that, in the
[15910]opinion of the American Department, these officers might
[15911]be carrying electronic apparatus, It was known that they.
[15913]had cameres, that they had been taking photccraphs, and that
[15915]they had been observed taxing notes. If permitted, they -
[15916]could be arrested in Rostov before they took the return
[15917]plane to Moscow. GRIBANOV wanted to know what other pos-
[15918]sibilities existed and instructed the two representatives
[15919]of the American Department to write a report on this. He
[15920]also told them to request permission to arrest and search
[15921]the military attach2s.
[15923]GRIBANOV then asked what pertinent information was held
[15924]by the Tourist Department. He was told that there were re-
[15925]latively few American tourists in the Soviet Union at that
[15926]time;* these included BARGHOORN, who was mentioned to GRI-
[15927]BANOV along with one other (name not. recalled). . NOSENKO and
[15928]KOVALENKO reported, however, that the KGB had no. "strong"
[15929]materials against them. They were ordered to maze an ime
[15930]‘ mediate study of the situation and to report back to GRI-
[15932]BANOV as soon as possible. .
[15934]Returning to the Tourist Department, NOSENKO and
[15935]KOVALENKO gathered the entire American Tourist Section in
[15936]their office. In a general discussion, it was decided that
[15937]BARGHOORN was the only American on whom the KGB had anything
[15938]worth consideration. All the materi#ls on BARGHOORN were
[15939]gathered together, and NOSENKO 2nd KOVALENKO took them to
[15940]GRIBANOY, explaining that he was the only possibility.
[15941]GRIBANOV read all the materials and was pleased with them}...
[15942]he was sure that BARGHOORN was connected with American
[15943]Intelligence. He then asked what could be done. NOSENKO
[15944]and KOVALENKO reported that BARGHOORN was then in Tbilisi
[15945]and that, in fact, Ye.N. NOSKOV (case orficer, American
[15946]Tourist Section) was in Tbilisi with a woman doctor from
[15947]the KGB Operational Technical Directorate for the purpose
[15948]of working against BAPGHOORN; the doctor had some special
[15949]item which had been used to make BARGROORN so violently sick
[15950]to his stomach that he had to be hospitalized. While he
[15951]was in the hospital, a careful search had been nade of his
[15952]belongings, but nothing of operational interest had been
[15953]found. In addition, a KGB agent was placed in BARGHOORN's
[15954]room as a patient; he made anti-Soviet statements ard offered
[15955]BARGHOORN "materials," but BARGHOORN did not rise to the
[15956]bait. At the time of this meeting with .GRIBANOV, BARGHOORN
[15957]was scheduled to fly from Tbilisi to Moscow the following
[15958]morning, and the KGB knew from a phone tap that he had an
[15959]appointment with Theodore ORCHARD of the British Embassy
[15960]at the Hotel Metropol the following evening.
[15962]. It was GRIBANOV who raised the possibility of giving
[15963]_ “materials” to BARGHOORN in Moscow.. NOSENKO said that this
[15964]. would be a provocation, but GRIBANOV replied that this made
[15965]no difference to him. . He instructed NOSENKO and KOVALENKO
[15967]Led 3, =
[15969]on another. occasion “WOSENKO. estimated. their. num’ er at
[15970]about 60.0 0
[15972]Sapte chee etme o
[15974]F assseenbed ade
[15976](ee
[15978]vadies fe.
[15982]. aSdibsbebahties walate tsaenes
[15985]14-0000
[15987]> (go leeate an agent ‘who ¢ould: be. used to pass the. damaging”:
[15989]ae materials to BARGHOORN and told them to write a summary of . —
[15990]BARGHOORN's background with a proposal that the Second...
[15991]Chief Directorate arrest him “when he obtaiis materials
[15992]which are of interest to Americah, Intelligence." This was
[15993]to be sent in letter form to SCMICHASTNYY over GRIBANOV's
[15994]signature; the letter was not ‘to indicate haw BARGHOORN
[15995]was to receive the materials (i.e., the-fact of provocation
[15996]was not to be mentioned). .
[15998]GRIBANOV took a one-page letter on BARGHOORN, along oo Late
[15999]with a similar letter from GRYAZNOY and RASHCHEPOV con~ . oe
[16000]cerning the military attaches, to SEMICHASTNYY. While
[16001]the four--NOSZNKO, KOVALENKO, GRYAZNOV ard KOVALENKD=—
[16002]were waiting ix GRIBANOV's office for his return, GRYAZNOV
[16003]received a telephone call from the local KCB organization
[16004]in Rostov informing him that the military attaches were in
[16005]the air on their way back to Moscow. Shortly thereafter, -
[16007]GRIBANOV returned with the news that the Chairman of the KGB
[16008]had approved the arrests of the military attaches as well
[16009]~ * ag BARGHOORN. ({KHRUSHCHEV was absent from Moscow at the
[16010]time, but SEMICHASTNYY had called BREZHNEV and secured his
[16011]approval. *) .
[16013]When GRIBANOV learned from GRYAZNOV that the military
[16014]attaches were already on their way back to Moscow, he be~
[16015]came furious and sent GRYAZNOY out "to do the jab or die."
[16016]Meanwhile, arrangements were made with the "Department c"
[16017](the KGB element responsible for disinformation, subordinate
[16018]to the First Chief Directorate) to provide some materials
[16019]on rockets which could be passed to BARGHOORN., While these
[16020]were being picked up, NOSENKO and KOVALENKO returned to
[16021]their office to plan the provocation.
[16023]BARGHOORN was placed under immediate surveillance upon
[16024]his arrival in Moscow. At 1810 hours a radio message was
[16025]received from one of the surveillance cars that BARGHOORN
[16026]had gone to the U.S. Embassy, and it was decided that the
[16027]begt agent (name not recalled, aged 25 to 30 years) would be
[16028]placed in contact with him as soon as he came out. The
[16029]KGB knew BARGHOORN had an appointment with ORCHARD of the
[16030]British Embassy at 1900 hours, but at 1900 hours a report
[16031]was received that BARGHOORN had left the U.S, Embassy in
[16032]the American Ambassador's car. He was alone but for the
[16033]Soviet driver. Nothing could be done while BARGHOORN was in
[16034]the moving car. A check on ORCHARD established that he was
[16035]in the downstairs hall of the hotel waiting. It was there-
[16036]fore decided to approach BARGHOORN when he left the car at : rs
[16037]the hotel. ; .
[16038],
[16039]8
[16040]*NOSENKO placed these events on the day before BARGHOORN re-
[16041]_ turned to Moscow from Tbilisi and on the day before BARGHOORN
[16042]_. Was arrested. As indicated below, BARGHOORN returned from
[16043]. Alma-Ata to Moscow on 25 October 1963 and was arrested on
[16044].31 October 1963, six days later. CIA records show that on.
[16045].30 October, the day before the arrest, XHRUSECREV greeted -
[16046]Laotian Premier SOUVANNA Phouma on his arrival in Moscow and
[16047]later in the day attended a luncheon in his honor. On. 31 . .
[16048]‘October, the day. of the arrest, KHRUSHCHEV and SOUVANNA at~
[16049]_ tended: a-performance of. Swan Lake‘ in Moscow... BREZHNEV was...
[16050]pot seen in. Moscow from 29 October until. 2.Novembe.
[16053]14-0090 -,
[16055]307.
[16057]He .
[16058]Beye r Ho sooner had BARGHOORN stepped out of the. car ‘than
[16059]the" agent approached. ‘You are an American?" the agent
[16060]- asked. "Yes." "Please take it," the agent said. The.
[16061]agent put the packet containing the materials on rocketry
[16062]o ~».1 dn” BARGHOORN's inside coat pocket and then ran off.
[16063]tho dre tive.
[16065]si BARGHOORN had ‘taken only one or two steps when he was
[16066]'peized by NOSKOV and Petr POPTSOV, another case officer of
[16067]_:', the American Tourist Section, and told he was under arrest.
[16068]_; .& surveillance car pulled up. BARGHOORN was placed in the.
[16069]ear, handcuffed (on GRIBANOV's orders, because the Soviets
[16070]arrested in the United States had received similar treat-
[16071].,ment) and driven to the 50th Section of the Militia, where
[16072]a room had been prepared.
[16074]L. 1. YEFREMOV and K,.G. KRUPNOV from the American
[16075]Tourist Section were- waiting at the Militia station, KRUPNOV
[16076]to interrogate RBARGIHOORN and YEFREMOV to be the interpreter.
[16078].When BARGHOORN was brought into the station, an "incident
[16079]report" form was filled out, and a resolution was prepared
[16080]requesting permission to hold him 48 hours, Between 0290
[16081]and 0300 hours BARGHOORN was taken to the KGB inner prison.
[16082]At 0400 hours the Tourist Department case officers were
[16083]released with instructions to report for duty at 0930
[16084]hours. NOSENKO and the others went home.
[16086].. ‘1+ pa, KRUPNOV began the questioning in Russian at 1000
[16088]-. +. . hours the next day. Although BARGHOORN speaks good Russian,
[16089]YEFREMOV remained in case he would be needed to interpret.
[16090]NOSENKO entered the room sevcral times during these sessions.
[16091](Although NOSENKO did not want to reveal his face to BARG-
[16092]HOORN because he knew BARGHOORN would be released, GRIBANOV’
[16093]had.told KOVALENKO that NOSENKO should be there when they
[16094]reached the point where BARGHOORN was to tell how he obtained
[16095]the damaging materials.) The first. sessions concentrated
[16097]: on general matters, such as BARGHOORN's life history. *
[16099]re ‘After one and one half hours of questioning, BARGHOORN
[16101]rage. agreed that the materials were on him when he was arrested,
[16102]“but he maintained that they had been placed on his person.
[16104]_He said that he thought they were "newspapers or something,"
[16106]ae ’"that: he did not know what they were. -The closed package
[16107]os (> * was then opened and shown to BARGHOORN; it contained about
[16108]_ . 0°), 720 to 25 pages of information on missiles. ."BARGHOORN
[16110]“was ‘not, of course, given a close look" at the materials.
[16112]TLL On Ey AOR Beat
[16113]her BNeO GS sure!
[16115]_*In_ October 1966, NOSENKO stated his certainty that he had
[16116]a _been present on the day after the arrest. At this interro-
[16117]. “ost of t. -gation NOSENKO said KRUPNOV quest ioned BARGHOORN "concerning
[16118]MOSENKO, - 3 “personal background, employment, etc." Then NOSENKO asked
[16120]* vaiid.U.S. BARGHOORN whether he had had the incriminating materials -
[16122]to’ she FEL con -h. his person at the time of his arrest,. When BARGHOORN
[16124]cculd.te tigamftted this, NOSENKO left.. As noted- below, BARGHOORN.
[16126]mentatyvon. peported that the materials. were not discussed at this par
[16127]- tiqusar interrogation. ta Coe .
[16130]a a en
[16132]The. CIA interviewer ‘then read to him, the. report
[16134]the date of the. approach as 5 Jaauary 1962, the date ‘contained
[16135]in NOSENKO's notes, and indicated that NOSZIKO used the name
[16136]NIKOLAYEV. (see below). Acknowledging that "maybe". he had used’
[16137]the name Georgiy Ivanovich NIKOLAYEV with. JOHNSON, NOSENKO
[16138]said: "I don't know why I made this mistake with the dates. I
[16140]think it (the approach) was the first or second. day that -I was in
[16142]the Seventh (Tourist) Department. I saw myself that he had
[16143](homosexual) intercourse... Your date is absolutely right, but
[16144]this reminded me that it was soon after I had come in the
[16145]Seventh (Tourist) Department. Is this important?"
[16147]Question: How long had you been in the Seventh Lepartment?
[16149]NOSENKO: Now I remember that it was immediately > one or two
[16150]“ days. I know I returned in January 1962. I, knew I
[16152]would be going to the Seventh (Separtment) alréady in
[16153]December. I was visiting the Seventh already then.
[16154]I had not ‘too many papers to°turr over to the First °
[16155]{American Department), and now I remember that I
[16156]moved to the Seventh immediately (NCSENKO's emphasis)
[16157]after 1 January 1962.
[16159]b. information from JOHNSON:
[16161]JOHNSON reported to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow on 5 January
[16162]1962 that he experienced an "incident with Soviet plainclothes-
[16163]men in the Hotel Metropol earlier that day." UCHNSON, who
[16164]arrived in Moscow on 31 December 1961, told the consular officer
[16165]that “he was dining alone in the Hotel Metropol restaurant the
[16166]evening of 4 January when he was joined at his table by a 5oviet
[16167]citizen who identified himself as a doctor from Riga. (This
[16168]was NOSENKO's homosexual agent VOLKOV.) According to JOHNSON,
[16169]little conversation transpired because the Riga ‘doctor’ spoke
[16170]English poorly. Before JOHNSON left, however, the 'doctor'
[16171]said he would like to chat with him and knew a student who
[16172]spoke English well. JOHNSON then agreed to come by the ‘doc-
[16173]tor's' room at the Metropol at 10:00 a.m. the next day. JOHNSON
[16174]said that he dropped by the ‘doctor's' reom abeut 10:00 the
[16175]morning of January 5. Soon after he entered, the '‘doctor' and
[16176]his ‘student’ friend (NOSENKO's homosexual agent YEFREMOV)
[16177]began to make homosexual advances to him. He stated that he
[16178]protested and was rising to leave when two plainclothesmen
[16179]suddenly appeared in the room and announced that all were under
[16180]arrest. JOHNSON was then taken to another room where he was
[16181]asked to sign a statement in Russian... He signed this state-
[16182]ment and was taken to a man in a third room who identified him-
[16183]self as the Chief of Police, Georgiy Ivanovich NIKOLOV.* The
[16184]police chief first told him that Soviet law had been violated
[16185]and that he, JOHNSON, could be imprisoned for three, five, or
[16186]perhaps even eight years. After proceeding in this vein for
[16188]*® | NOSENKO frequently used the operational pseudonym Yuriv
[16189]Ivanovich NIKOLAYEV. He has said that he was normally
[16191]. called Georgiy, a variation of Yuriy, by family and friends
[16192]in Moscow. . : ,
[16194]ce ee ne see
[16196]Nene me neece nes ieemmrenenigl Ment
[16198]te ese wed,
[16201]_a few minutes, the police chief remarked that it was in his power
[16202]to dismies the whole affair, provided JOH<350N would do him a :
[16203]favor. The favor turned out to k2 a signed comnitment that he
[16204]would not speak ill of the Soviet Union when he returned to the
[16205]United States.” : a . -
[16209]In the afternocn of 8 January, JOMNSON calleu the Embassy
[16210]to say that he had been recontacted by the Cnief of Police, who
[16211]reminded him of his pledge and showed him for pictures,
[16212]said: “I den't xnow where they got them, 3
[16213]During the interviews by the FBI Re
[16214]1965, JOHNSSH repeated substantially tr é:
[16215]to dery that he nad actually been compromised. In addition tc
[16216]letters to his parents, ‘JOHNSCN siid he wrote to about 20 other
[16217]People, mostly “minister Friends" abroad; apparently he die not :
[16218]tell the FBI of their content. Shown pictures of VOLKOV ara
[16219]NOSENKO’on 13 May 1965, JORNSON said he had seen VCLKOV “some :
[16220]where" and suggested that the photograph of NOSENKO was thet of
[16221]& younger man whom he hed seen in Dyakarta in 1962-1963.
[16223]Sas story, continuing.
[16226]5. Attempt to Recruit BRAUNS
[16228]a. Information from NOSENKO:
[16230]NOSENKO made the following statement or 2 February 1964:
[16231]"In 1962 come U.S. citizen by the name of Eorst BRAUNS came to
[16232]the Soviet Vnion. I mentioned him to you in 1962 but at that
[16233]time could not recall his name.* we tried to recruit him but
[16234]did not succecd. He lived somewhere in Leningred, and in 1942
[16235]he went back with the German troops to Germany. And he served - :
[16236]in the.German Army, and after the war Le chengea his name and i
[16237]went to the USA and became a U.S. citizen. He is eitner a
[16238]skilled mechanic or a worker. His real name is different.- it is
[16239]Russian ~- kecause he changed his name when tie was in Germany."
[16243]mee o
[16245]NOSENKC wert into the operation against BRAUNS in greater
[16246]detail on 17 April 1964: "This was /K.G./ KRUPNOV's case.
[16247]This fellow was a Russian and lived prior to the war in Lenin-
[16248]grec. In 1942 he was in Tikhvin, near Leningrad,.when the
[16249]a : Germans came, and when the: Germans were retreating they took
[16250]; him along and some other people, local people, and so he found
[16251]himself in Germany. Now, in Germany, as he told his story, ne — -
[16252]“.. “Was kept in various prison camps and when the war was over he oo
[16253]worked in West Germany and_then, in 1956 or 1957 or 1958 - rf
[16254]: don't, remember. /which year/ - he came to the United States and
[16255]i . settled down. hy we became interested in this fellow...
[16256]° ZNOSENKO thought his name was something like ‘BRUNKS' or
[16257].. "BRONX!/ is because he came from Russia. ‘So, according to
[16258]. Soviet law, he never lost his Soviet citizenship... Leaving
[16259]., With the Germans is interpreted as treason, as being a traitor
[16260]“ @£ your country. So there was something to talk to him about. -
[16261]_, Besides, KRUPNOV found out either in the Information Section .
[16262]“@F some other section /cf the KGB First Chief Directorate/,
[16263]that the: man is. working in. some: very interesting. company that
[16264]‘makes computers:or adding machines or-some other instruments,
[16266]weer
[16268]REN a nen ar astce steno rT,
[16270].But. when :I talked. to him he already left-the company. He
[16271]wasn't working ith this: company. any more.-.' “
[16276]“they. called t hint to. ‘inturists ey gave. hin’ -room in the
[16277]inturise, Zdorel/. Then KRUFNCS cransferred hin from the Inturist
[16278]to another hotel, put him ina room an the hotel, and sticted
[16279]talking to him... Txen he left him in his room and callec uz up -
[16280]said that ne needed help, thet ke can'c do anything with the
[16282]mon, I thought that he would ce arle to handle him ali by hin-
[16283]self, so I saia to KOVSHUK:* ‘I'm serry. I thought he'd be able
[16284]to handle it. He tells me that he doesn" t seem to get anywhere,
[16285]so I guess I'c have to go help Aim.’ 7 got tiere and I sea that
[16286]the man :s scared stiff. He joesnict talk about anything, doesn's
[16287]want to listen to any cf these reasons. Ho wes told that, after
[16289]all, he ag a traitor to his country, that he wene with the Ger-
[16290]TSNSeee This fellow was a coward, a real coward, so he gave his
[16291]censent, he agreed to help us.
[16293]so 7 felt -that this
[16294]the next Gay KRUFNOV
[16295]Tourist Deparemer.t/.
[16297]mt of his .5 cuite
[16299]"The next day he
[16300]acreement wasn't very
[16301]end. I went to see CIELS
[16302]Ana I told } el that this
[16303]sheky. io pure “shout it. co follow threugh? If
[16304]so, then we'll 19 to Leningrad. £9
[16306]Caiied the mar. and th O 6an pet esed to raik to
[16307]was told te go. Se 2 /tO beningre
[16308]i went tc atel recom. He pocket the “door, and he wv
[16309]let me in. The only thing, fortunately for us, the lock in
[16310]the gwoor watn't a very yood one, so we called a locksmita, and
[16311]he founc a key tnat opencd the dvor., S5 we entered che roon,
[16312]end we started tzlking to him. The fellow was terribly scared
[16314]Ste
[16316]he was sheking. £9 it was quire srvictus that he would never work
[16317]fer us. So we finally decided: ‘Look, it’s okay. We don't want
[16319]anything from you. Go ahead, in mave. CGoodoye.' And that was
[16320]all; that was the end of it. I darn't kuow whether it was 8aO0KS
[16321]Or BRONX or. some name like that which he used in the States,
[16323]but his true name was Ivslov."
[16325]In February 1965 NOSENKO said he had forgotten how he came
[16327]“to be involved in the BRAUNS cese. He also said that he dia
[16329]mot Know why BRAUNS had visited che Soviet Union, and that he
[16330]could not name any Soviet citizens with whom FRAUNS was in con-
[16331]tact in Moscow.
[16335]Interviewed by the FE
[16337]‘NOSENKO. is “‘@pparently in errer.. At this. cime.. he has re-
[16339]ported, V.M. K KOVSHUK was not _in the. Touris’
[16340]“in the Americas ‘Department...’ “He may mean “Vv
[16341]Chief £ the Touris
[16343]Department but.
[16344]~ CHELNOKCY,
[16346]scan oo cee aettne
[16350]3
[16351]a
[16353]2
[16355]3
[16357]2
[16365]Jaf
[16366]oe
[16370]ROSENKY prov ided the
[16372]i *o Alexardar SVSSICHANSKIY, KSB
[16373]. Cryptinwn "AnD," on ts Jan
[16375]a
[16376]ry (464 an the course. of discussion.
[16377]b
[16379]‘ of ESB use of foreign travel hureau persennel to spot tcurists.
[16380], Of possible cperationai incerest. ‘Nell, here's an example: — z
[16381]- One. of cur agents is.the directer of a smell-tovrist agency, ' “
[16382]' ,NCOSENKO said, “He takes the tourist's application farm which
[16383]hes a phciograph, and if he suspects the tourist of having ties
[16384]to. American, Intelligence, he, vill.mceve the photo-slightly, for...
[16385]- : om the, £ifth ere Says ‘nation .
[16386]: ; : faprt. the end, where
[16387]camp oO gency ‘ia. :
[16389]te alls F
[16391]be.
[16392]tth a
[16394]ist/ is, sutpe
[16396]a ce
[16399]wt nina a
[16401]a Following BARGHOORN's admission, another resolution
[16402]- was drawn up by’ KRUPNOV and signed by ‘KRUZNOV, KOVALENKG,
[16404]and GRIBANOV. NOSENKO and KAUPNOV then took it to the. office.
[16405]of the Chief Prosecutor where the incident report, the first
[16406]interrogation, and the first and second resolutions were
[16407]reported to (fnu) MISHUTIN (or MEISHUSTIN), the First Deputy
[16408]to the Chief Prosecutor. GRiBANOV further directed that all
[16409]materials on EBARGHOORN, including information from KGB
[16410]Archives, be given to the Department of Prosecution of the
[16411]KGB so that they could begin the legal proceedings against
[16412]BARGHOORN, After this, all- interrogations were conducted
[16413]by this department; KRUPNOV.. was dropped from the case,
[16414]but YEFREMOV continued to act as interpreter.
[16418]b. Information from BARGHOORN
[16420]BARGHOORN, who had made five earlier trips to the :
[16421]Soviet Union since 1956, arrived there on 2 October 1963. . ;
[16422]The purpose. or his vasit, as stated in his visa application, ; ;
[16423]was to gather information for a book on how effectively the
[16424]Soviet Union was operating as a result of its political ed~
[16425]ucation and political system. His itinerary took hin to
[16426]Leningrad from 2 to 7 October, to Moscow from 7 to 10 Octo-
[16427]ber, Tbilisi from 10 to i7 October, and short visits to
[16428]Tashkent, Bukhara, Samarkand, and Alm2-Ata from 17 to 25
[16429]October. He flew from Alma-Ata to Noscow on 25 October and
[16430]was scheduled to leave for Warsaw on 31 October. On the
[16431]Latter date he was arrested and held by tne KGB until : .
[16432]16 November when, at President Kennedy's intervention, he . . :
[16433]was released and left the Soviet Union. BARGHOORN had no
[16434]intelligence mission.
[16436]Upon his return to the United States, BARGHOORN was
[16437]debriefed by the U.S. Department of State and by CIA, His
[16438]information indicated a high degree of KGB operational ine
[16439]terest in him throughout the trip, including. encounters with
[16440]at least five probable KGB agents during his first week
[16441]there: an attractive waitress who invited him to “do the
[16442]town,” a disenchanted intellectual in Leningrad, an attrac-
[16443]-tive unattached girl who sat next to him on the flight from
[16444]Moscow to Tbilisi, and two young Armenians whom he met his
[16445]first day in Tbilisi.* The two Armenians were instrumental
[16446]in the drugging described by NOSENKO, At dinner in his
[16447]hotel on the day he arrived in Tbilisi, BARGHOORN met a.
[16449]nan young man claiming to be a student at the Leningrad Music . .- Oo
[16450]Conservatory. They left the hotel for @ walk and ran into ce Oe nies Set
[16451]a friend of the student, a second young Armenian, and the a
[16452]three of them went to a. cafe for coffee. None was available,” - “lee on
[16454]*Questioned about this in February 1965, NOSENKO said that
[16455]: BARGHOORN, as a suspected American Intelligence agent, wes
[16456]- ‘of operational interest throughout the trip. He vaguely re-
[16457]: called the girl on the plane but either did not know or had
[16458]. forgotten details of any other specific activity... NOSENKO .
[16459]said that none of this activity was directly related to the. -
[16460]“provocation operation, which. was: based. ona. last-minute de- -
[16461]eision. es oo _ , ;
[16466]but the young student went to the kitchen. "to arrange things,
[16468]and shortly thereafter "three foul-tasting cofiees” appeared...
[16469]Within an hour, BARGHOORN was .in the hospital, acutely- ill.
[16471]He wag assigned, to a room where.there was another patient,
[16473]and a woman doctor took care of his. case. fle was in the
[16474]hospital for four days. During this period his. clothes,- :
[16475]notes, and other possessions were held by hospital authori- -
[16476]ties, . 7
[16478]Upon his return to Moscow by air on 25 October,. BARG-
[16479]HOORN checked into the Metropol Hotel. The. next six days.
[16480]were occupied by sightseeing and appointments connected with
[16481]his research, In the late afternoon of 31 October he called
[16482]on friends at the U.S, Embassy for cocktails, and at. 1910,
[16483]already 10 minutes late, he left in the Ambassador's car for
[16484]a dinner appointment (prearranged. by telephone) at the Metro-
[16486]pol with Theodore ORCHARD, a british diplomat.
[16488]BARGHOORN's account of the subsequent events closely
[16489]parallels NOSENKO's. Having been handed the incriminating
[16490]materials, he was arrested, handcuffed, and taker to Militia
[16491]Station No. 58, where he was questioned briefly by a uni-
[16492]formed Militia officer. The KGB was called. Within 30
[16493]minutes a KGB captain (BARGHOORN thought his name night
[16494]have been GORBUNSKIY) arrived and began to question him,
[16495]assisted by an interpreter named YEFREMOV.* All question
[16496]were asked in Russian, and BARGHOORN answered nost of them
[16497]in English. The package of materials was opened and con-
[16498]tained, according to BARGHOORN, 13 or 14 photographs of
[16499]rockets, This session lasted until about midnight and
[16500]centered around BARGHOORN's possession of the photographs
[16501]and his "intelligence mission," He was then taken to the
[16502]Lyubyanka prison. .
[16504]Interrogations were conducted the next morning by the
[16505]original KGB officer together with his "chief," whom BARG-
[16506]HOORN subsequently identified by photograph as NOSENKO. The
[16508]"| questioning concerned BARGHOORN’s biography, and nothing was
[16510]asked about the compromising materials. The following day
[16511]the case was turned over to a KGB colonel identified as (fnu)-
[16512]PETRENKO, and BARGHOORN did not see NOSENKO or the other KGB
[16513]officer again. At this and subsequent sessions, BARGHOORN
[16514]was questioned further concerning the circumstances of his
[16515]arrest. BARGHOORN described NOSENKO as “clever and quick-
[16516]witted" and as giving "the impression that he vas not a
[16518]dedicated careerist, but opportunistic and adaptive; he - _
[16520]seemed not to care about what he was. ‘doing, but doing a good. :
[16521]job nevertheless."
[16523]*Asked why YEFREMOV used his true name during the. interro-
[16525]gations, NOSENKO said this was necessary for legal reasons,
[16526]that he had to sign documents connectéd. with the interroga-
[16527]tions. BARGHOORN confirmed that. YEFREMOV had participated .
[16529]throughout the. entire series of- interrogations and had.
[16531]-signed interrogation. reports. attesting ‘to the accuracy ‘of
[16532]"translation, . . . . ;
[16534]cians, Sine eteciiede tea et
[16539]iia.
[16541]ohn Andres ShUUEN and his voar of birth
[16542]es which NUSEMKO brought te the 1964
[16544]in Geneva. SOSENKO icentivied SEUBIN as @
[16545]ef Russias extraction, a Ressian speaker,
[16546]rofessor in New Yor Caty. aceording to
[16547]rsonally isvolved in SHUAIN's fourth trip
[16548]62 or 1963. SHlUBIN had become Enown to
[16549]gent: during his third visit te tae Soviet :
[16551]Sere
[16553]bodein te pAb wrote, GD
[16555]fessor of cconemics at New Yor Lay
[16556]kaown to the FRI Pte ak 6s
[16557]2 Ae UP na ae
[16559]eee aT Sie
[16561]pe erer es LEN Sy cape eae
[16562]he che following paragraphs
[16563]srmation irom NCSENKO and other sources on
[16565]os =
[16567]ormation
[16569]been iaprecise on daring SHUBIN's third
[16570]t Unions Hse said en 25 Januiry 19614 tnat -
[16571]cow some time during the poriod i953 to
[16572]11964 NOSESKO said ae was unsure of the
[16573]t by SHUPLN but thoucat it occurred in
[16574]any event, prier tu i9su aud wrhiie ne was
[16575]tour of duty (June 1955 to January 1960)
[16576]t De part: tL. SOSENKO indicated on 26 June
[16577]LITSK tae ease officer in the Tourist
[16579]sible for SHUBEN, and since at another time i :
[16580]VELITSKIY ctransivrred ivom th department . : :
[16582]-would apesac that he was placing the date : 4
[16583]trip es sume tine before ihe transfer. .
[16585]rted that ‘SHUBIN was placed under surveil-
[16586]during the third trip. He Las of fered : :
[16587]as to why: On 25 January 1964 NOSENKO ° Lo, > "
[16588]as that SHUBIN had visited the Soviet :
[16589]pree-on 2-February 1964 he-exprained the -- ;
[16590]dilance as having been founded on the KGB's
[16594]ing for this trip, as yariously given by
[16595]nflict with the fact that SHUBIN had no ‘
[16596]rt between 1940 and 12 June 1961, according “
[16597]xplanation for this discrepancy, however,
[16598]JBIN went ta the USSR without valid docu-
[16602]wiadihik edited tnras@ine ane 6 sete
[16606]YN's own admission about having gone to — . Lo
[16607], there is no other evidence of his travel ‘
[16608]ion prior to 19461, .. i
[16611]14200000
[16613]RUBIN, «hose fath
[16615]Lo: ,eles On Zo Fe
[16616]After geceivings
[16617]intornstics of
[16619]“7 oe
[16620]: oe
[16622]Sree TS
[16624]aie Tone
[16625]Ay x
[16628]BOLSHAKOV, Robert! Kennedy, and the Cuban Missile ‘cris is.
[16630]a. Introduction -
[16632]NOSENKO volunteered at his second meetmg with CIA
[16633]in January 1964 that G.N. BOLSHAKOY was his “old friend"
[16634]and that he was a colonel in the GRU. On. 26 January,
[16635]1 February, and 19 August 1964 he again raised BOLSHAKCV's
[16636]name, emphasizing that he was a GRU officer and a "good
[16637]friend." In the 1 February interview, after displaying an.
[16638]initial reluctance to discuss with CIA such a “sensitive”
[16639]subject, he provided a number of details on BOLSHAKOV's
[16640]alleged relationship in 1962 with the then Attorney General,
[16641]Robert Kennedy. His information on this subject, he said,
[16642]derived from his friendship with BOLSHAXOV in Moscow, where
[16643]BOLSHAKOV was reassigned (in December 1962 following -a tour
[16644]in Washington as Novosti correspondent and editor of the
[16646]magazine USSR). NXOSENKO claimed a personal role in this
[16648]affair, in that: he personally proposed to the KGB leader-
[16649]ship that the KGB. take over BOLSHAKOV's former (GRU) con-
[16650]tact with Robert Kennedy.
[16652]NOSENKO claimed that an information channel of con-
[16653]munication between BOLSHAKOV and-the Attorney Ceneral had
[16654]developed at Kennedy's initiative. He described in detaii
[16655]the circumstances of their introduction at a social function
[16656]by a journalist (whom he did not name). He said that he
[16657]"thought" that the Kennedys knew that BOLSHAKOV was a
[16658]‘military intelligence officer," and he implied that they
[16659]regarded these private conversations with BOLSHAKOV as a
[16660]useful instrument of diplomacy. According to NOSENKO, the
[16661]KGB knew that CIA was not aware of this relationship--it
[16662]was “obvious” that Robert Kennedy wanted it that way.-
[16663]NOSENKO claimed that after BOLSHAKOV left the United States
[16664]“during the Cuban missile crisis,"* no one took over his
[16665]Tole as a confidential channel to the White House. After
[16666]the assassination of the President, NOSENKO continued, the
[16667]Kennedy family tried to reestablish the relationship through
[16668]their close triend, the artist William. WALTON, during the
[16669]latter's visit to Moscow in December 1963. NOSENKO reported
[16670]that he had urged that the KGB try to take over the Robert
[16671]Kennedy operation from the GRU and that he hed proposed two
[16672]plans which would have enabled this to take place, the -
[16673]second involviag WALTON. Neither came to fruition, however.
[16674]Referring to the Cuban missile crisis, NOSEXKO said that the
[16678]coe peuaeneee a dope ese
[16680]GRU had “played dirty" with BOLSHAKOV by forcing him to “tell
[16681]Robert" that there were no offensive missiles in Cuba. whereas :
[16683]there actually were such weapons there,
[16685]According to other sources, BOLSHAKOV left Washington
[16686]for Moscow on 3 August 1962 and returned on 2 October 1962.
[16687]On 23 August, about the time that CIA was reporting urgently
[16688]to the President that "something new and different" was
[16689]going on with respect to Soviet. aid to Cuba, Ambassador
[16690]DOBRYNIN assured Theodore SORENSEN (Special Counsel to the
[16691]President) that the United States had no need to fear Soviet
[16693]OL eddie wae oe
[16696]14-00000  '* -
[16698]_ iL ueeFEKLESOVE who-served in- Washington under the alies ‘FOU
[16700]activity in Cuba. On 4 September FOBRYVEN gave Robert — | a,
[16701]Kefmedy "an unusual personal message fron: KURUSHCHEV for —. Lo
[16702]the President’:  KHKUSHCHLV pledged that he would not stir’ :
[16704]up any incidents before the upcoming U.S. cleetions. On
[16706]tho-same day, the President stated publicly chat the United
[16708]States had no proof of a Soviet. offeasive missile capability
[16710]in Cuba. Also on the sane day, the Soviet Union sent @
[16712]narsh pote to the U.S, Government concerning the (uninten-
[16714]tional) violation of Soviet airspace by an Am-rican U-2-
[16716]plane on 36 August; the note -threatened “appropriate re-
[16718]teliatory mezsures" against U.2 bases should such: ineideats
[16720]be repeated. The following day (5 September) U-? flights
[16722]over Cuba were tenporarily suspended, and they did not re- H
[16723]sume until 14 October, Cn 6 September DORRYNIN again told . :
[16724]SORENSEN that the Soviets had “done nothing naw" in Cuba
[16726]and gave his assurances that all their steps"were defensive
[16728]in nature Ord did not represent any threat to...the United
[16730]States." On 13 October DCBRYNIN irformed Chester BOWLES (a
[16732]Special Representative and Advisor to the President) thut
[16734]the USSR would never send offensive weapons to Cuba, Sinti-
[16736]lar assurances were given by KHRUSHCHEY to U.S. Ambassador
[16738]YOHLER in Moscow on 16 Octcber (the same day that the Presi-
[16740]dent was shown the U.~2 photographs which revealed the pre-
[16742]sence of offensive missiles) and by Foreign Minister GRONYXO
[16744]to President Kennedy in person on 18 October.
[16746]BY. See race'
[16748]Vw tise ak, uth
[16750]pea racigt
[16752]_- Also on 18 October, the FRI_ reported,
[16753]PRE OTIE ER ES : Ba ost
[16755]Pag tee SRE HE ay
[16756]ee 3
[16757]BOLSHAKOY told shington correspondents Joseph ALSOP acd
[16758]Charles BARTLETT that the Soviets had no offensive wi aprons
[16759]in Cuba, and satd he had been instructed hy KURVSHCEEV and
[16760]MIKOYAN on 1 October (the day before nis departure fron
[16761]Moscow) to inform Provident Kenedy of this fact. CIA hes
[16762]-po indicetion that BOLSHAXOV dulivercd this mzssage to the .
[16763]President, or ever dircetly to the Attorney Ceneral, or
[16764]that, prior to iis neeting with BEGLOY in New York City.
[16765]he nade any remar : Rest
[16766]Bppeen ee hve wee SE Oe
[16767]“ yeport of BOLSHAKOV's having played any role in the Cuban
[16768]missile crisis beyond making these remarks to ALSOP ard
[16769]BARTLETT, Discussions at the White House, State Departzert,
[16771]G3.
[16772]Siteeee he)
[16774]and Defense Department about the crisis culminated in the —_ os
[16776]- decision to—impose-a blockade. on.Cuba; this decision was :
[16777]announced by President Kennedy over nationvide television - 000
[16778]and radio on 22 October 1962. Soviet overturcs for a peace= ee
[16779]ful settlement of the situation were initiated or 26 Octo- .
[16781]ber by the KGB Legal Resident in Washington, A.S. FEKLISOV, ** ’
[16782]in contacts with tho American journalist John SCALT. FEKLI-
[16783]SOV's proposals were along tha same lines as those received
[16785]*BEGLOV came to the United States to attend the “Third Un- .
[16787]official US~USSR Conference of Public Figures," held at
[16789]Andover, Massachusetts, from 21 to 27 October 1962... Also...
[16790]present at. this conference was Boris BELITSKIY,. identified.
[16792]by: NOSENKO four months carlier as a. KCB-controlled.:source
[16793]- Of CIA. (see Part VI.D,6.). BELITSKIY" indicated at that” - .
[16794]‘time that BEGLOV might bo affiliated w Who the KGB
[16796]wis the suthor-of one of- the. <ncumentsa. among. the " CHEREP:
[16797]_.. papers: (see Part VI.D.7.c.). et
[16800]' at the White House. late that right Jin a secre
[16802]vletter: from
[16803]KIRUSHCHEV. At a facewell party for BOLSHAKOV in Decéenber
[16804]3962, Presidential Press Secretary Plerre SALINGEH asked
[16806]BOLSHAKOV who would “do his work.'' FOLSHAKOY srerlied that . .
[16807]no one would do precisely the same job, but that if SALINW. to
[16808]GER had "anything special to say," he might contact A,I,
[16809]ZINCHUK, * ; .
[16811]b. Soviet Soure:3 During the Crisis
[16813]NOSENKO has rot indicated that BOLSEAKOV had an infor- .
[16814]matlon-collection role during the Cuban missile crisis. As : ‘ i
[16815]for Soviet sourcss at this time, NOSENKO stated on several | . !
[16816]occasions in 1964, if different contexts, that the KGR “had :
[16817]not had luck in getting intelligence from high places in
[16818]the U.S. Government" in October 1462, On sore than one oc-=
[16819].casion he said that the KUB agent "SASIIA"** was unable to ~
[16820]furnish any information of value in this révard. He said
[16821]this on 25 February 1964 and again while being questioned
[16822]about “SASHA on 4 August 1964. On the latter date NOSENKO -
[16823]said: "During the Cuban missile crisis the [KCB] First
[16825]Chief Directorate, the Intelligence, couldn't tell what the
[16827]U.S. will do. KNRUZHCHEV'** was rot satisficd with the work
[16829]of the Intelligence, No agents were producing inforsaticna
[16831]on this." NOSENKO co:.tinuecd by saying that "SASHA" reo .
[16832]ported nothing to the KGB during the Cuban missile crisis.
[16834]In fact, “he couldn’: know anything. 1 heard that this was
[16836]very tightly held information, here wore just 2 few
[16838]peoplo around President Kennedy who knew the plans, and they
[16840]. Were sworn to keep it seeret."
[16842]*ZINCHUK was: idcetificd ty DERYABIN by name ard photograph
[16843]in October 1954 as a KCB staff officer. NOSENKO has said ,
[16844]that ZEINCHUK was a KGB cooptce rather than a staff officer.
[16846]**For-a discussion-of-the "SASHA" case, see Part VILD.3.d.. °° ~~ 7 rare
[16848]***Speaking before the Suprene Soviet on 12 December 1962,
[16850]KHRUSHCHEV said that the decision to negotiate with the : ;
[16851]United States for a peaceful settliment of the Cuban situa— , H
[16852]tion had beer influenced by “information fron our Cuban .
[16854]‘comrades and other [unspecified] sources." This informa-
[16856]tion had been received, KHRUSHCHEV stated, on the morning oo ne
[16857]of 27 October 1962 (Moscow time). .AS previously indicated, ,
[16858]however, KHRUSHCHEV's secret and conciliatory letter to:
[16860]the President was received at the White House.on the night
[16862]of 26 October 1952. Lo ; :
[16865]aL” NOSENKO's Statements on BOLSHAKOV i
[16869]NOSENKO repeatedly enphasized POLSHAKOV's GRU affilia-
[16870]tion and the fact that the KCB was in no way involved in
[16871]-¢his channel to the U.S. Coverrment via Robert Kennedy. . |
[16872]He first volunteered BOLSHAKGV's name during a discussion .
[16873]of the use of Novosti as a cover organization for Soviet ©
[16874]Intelligence officers. “Yuriy BOLSHAKOV of the GRU also
[16875]sits there," he said. “He is a colonel and a friend of -
[16876]mine." Two days later, out of context with the preceding |
[16877]discussion, he introduced the name again: ‘‘Then there is
[16878]this BOLSHAKOV. He is from GRU who was in the United
[16879]States."' NOSENKO then commented that this was "a very in-
[16880]teresting case" and added: "We shall talk about it later." ; :
[16881]When his case ofiicer trereupon turned to anotner tcpic, :
[16882]NOSENKO immediately interrupted to say: “I know BOLSHAKOV
[16883]very well. He is my old friend...] met him through Yuriy —
[16884]GUK...[who]was with him in the United States...and we are
[16885]‘now very good friends, He calls me up and consults me for
[16886]advice... On 1 February 1964 NOSENKO said he thought the
[16887]Kennedy family knew BOLSHAKOV to be a military inteiligence
[16888]officer; “yet for some reason they chose him’ as a channel
[16889]between the U.S. and Soviet Governments. BOLSHAKOV, NO-
[16890]SENKO added, “reported direetiy" to the Chief of the GRU
[16891]concerning his exchanges with Robert Kennedy.
[16893]we neta abil as al ne Stra ARO,
[16895]NOSENKO said BOLSHAKOV was introduced to Robert Kennedy
[16897]. by an American journalist (unnamed) at 2 reception in the
[16899]United States. The journalist invited BOLSHAKOV to go for
[16901]a walk, and as they strolled “down an alley," there was a
[16903]man sitting on a bench dircetly ahzad of them. "The jour-
[16905]nelist said: ‘Listen, Ceorge BOLSHAKOV], are you acquainted -
[16907]with Robert Kennedy, the brother of the President and the
[16909]Chief of the Department of Justice?’ BOLSHAKOV said: ‘No.
[16911]Of course, | have heard of hin.‘ ‘Would you like me to :
[16912]introduce you?' ‘Of course,' BOLSEAKOV said, ‘please do.' ,
[16913]He led him to the man on the bench. There was this feeling :
[16914]that all this had been pr2-arranged.” . t
[16916]This. contact"was at the personal desire of Bob Kennedy...
[16918]- BOLSHAKOV was called ia for this. As you know, the whole . '
[16919]idea of this contact was to pass information to Kennedy
[16921]from KIRUSHCHEV and from Kennedy to KHRUSHCHEY....It happened
[16922]to be BOLSHAKOV, but it was not BOLSHAKOY who sought to
[16923]have the meeting..-.Then the relationship grew. BOLSHAKOV
[16924]was.a visitor in Robert Kennedy's house. They would first
[16925]talk about ordinary things, and thea the conversation cel ae -
[16926]turned to other matters..-Robert Kennedy. did not say: . a re
[16927]*Please tell KHRUSHCHEY so-and-so." He would say: ‘You
[16928]know, some of these problems seen insolvable." And BOL-
[16929]SHAKOV would say: ‘And you know, at home they think this
[16930]and that way...’ without actually saying that this was coming
[16931]from KHRUSHCHEV. But, of course, this was clear without | :
[16932]explanations. It was ar exchange of views on important poil-
[16933]tical questions of the moment. He was like an intermediate :
[16934]point...” NOSENKO commented that he personally thought . .
[16935]that it was a “case of mutual tfeelers' being sent out by ot wo te ts,
[16936]both sides—exploring somé given current political situation.” . cot
[16938]Sav bad ce bee ke
[16940]instigators |
[16942]ae . . 7
[16944]After BOLSHAKOV left Washington, KOSENKO stated,:"no
[16945]‘replaced him.as a chanrelr to the U.S. Government. Asked
[16947]“whether ZINCHUK could: have taken over upon. BOLSHAKOV"s-~--
[16950]1400000,
[16952]departure, NOSEXKO’ said: "Oh, no... There is no.contact. |
[16953]‘like there was befcre. It was broken at the time BOL-.
[16954]SHAKOV left. ZINCHUY was an agent or a coopitce....No,
[16955]there is no such contact since BOLSHAKOYV left. He passes
[16956]“no more messages.’ ee
[16958]Referring to the Kennedy-BOLSHAKOV ‘contacts; NOSEXKO-
[16959]“told CIA on 26 January 1964: “You have shown. considerable
[16960]interest in him 'BCLSIIAKOV], even after his return to the
[16961]Soviet Union...because all this was done by by-passing CIA.” | ;
[16962]He said on 1 February 1964: “It was pretty obvious-that ~~ oo, : 3
[16963]this relationship between BOLSHAKOV and Robert Kennedy had © . : 3
[16964]nothing to do with C1lA, and CIA was not witting of it. It
[16965]was at the perscnal desire of Bob Kenredy."" The KGS
[16966]determined that CIA was ucaware of the exchange between
[16967]Kennedy and BOLSHAXOV, NOSENKO reported, because when BOL-
[16969]SHAKOV was subsequently invited to a reception at the U.S.
[16971].. Embassy. in Moscow, two CIA officers--Kenneth A, KERST and
[16972]Malcolm A, TOON*--tried to elicit information from him.
[16973]about his relatiorship with President Kennedy. “The most.
[16974]important thing" they had tried to find out, according to
[16975]NOSENKO, was whetker the President and. BOLSHAKOV had met
[16976]personally. Althsugh BOLSHAKOV did ‘not admit the fact to
[16977]them, he did have one meeting with President Kennedy—-"he
[16978]was brought in a car...and was taken through a back door
[16979]into the White House," NOSENKO said.
[16981]Bae ache SS ate Cte i.
[16983]NOSENKO reported that Willinm WALTON visited Moscow ‘in Decem-
[16984]ber 1963 and at that time went to BOLSHAKOYV, whom'he had “
[16985]“previously met at the home of Robert Kennedy. Part of
[16986]their conversations, he continued, related to Robert Kennedy's
[16987]future political plans: ‘WALTON said that Boboy...did not
[16988]expect at present to become a candidate for the vice presi-
[16989]dency. He was, perhaps, according to WALTON, thinking of
[16990]running for Governor of Massachusetts..." NOSENKO said he
[16991]felt that there were "some feelers sent out on the part of
[16992]WALTON--not exactly questions, but just a passing of opinion.
[16993]WALTON was trying to sound them out, but I think that every-
[16994]thing was left without an answer....My personal opinion. was
[16995]_ that these things were told to WALTON so that ke could pass
[16996]’ them on as, so to speak, Bouby's plans for the future."
[16997]Another topic covered in the WALTON~BOLSHAKOV discussions,
[16998]NOSENKO added, was the assassination of President Kennedy.**
[16999]“As I remember, it was WALTON's opinion~-and his opinion re-
[17000]flected the opinion of the Kennedy family--that there was ; _
[17001]——pr7n 7 po Russiap involvement “in the murder-of-the-Presidents— No — ———-——:->7-- tira
[17002]; suspicion at all." ; oe ; :
[17003]NOSENKO proposed two plans whereby the EGB could take :
[17004]over the GRU's channel to President Kennedy. Under the . . mT, i
[17005]first of these plans, the Soviet Minister of Justice would :
[17006]personally invite the Attorney Gencral ‘to come’ to the Soviet. _
[17007]Union. There the KGB would “set him up in private. living = =~ i |
[17008]quarters, give his everything he wants. .+SO that. he would be... wg j
[17010]*Neither KEKST, who NOSENKO said was. “guapected by ‘the. KGB.
[17011]of being the. CIA Chief of Station ‘in Moscow, nor ‘TOGN: ws "
[17012]. affiliated: with cra in any mere a . ; a ae
[17016]TF SECRET
[17020]pleased....Not’ to make an gent « or couptes: out of ht a a a es
[17021]Lut just to prozote a rapprechenent." In addi t a," Codey the * Pro 5%
[17022]baésis of what LOLSHAKOV had totd NUSENKG about "obert | :
[17023]Kennedy's taterest in a Sovier hallsrina, this: len called
[17024]for the two to vv brought together, and the ballertra, who
[17025]“ds quite free in her behavior sith the oppos tic sei,”
[17026]would dco “everything necessary for’ the State. Se fore
[17027]NOSEXKO's superiors could make a decision on this plan, :
[17028]the Fresident was assassinated and the ratter vas dropped. 2
[17029]*OSENKO conceived his second plan during WALTON's trip to
[17030]¥oscow in becember .19€3: "BOLSHAKOY told me that ho wag
[17031]going. to meet WALTON, and asked se whether te bad an ine
[17032]terest in it....I told the chiefs about ut and said: ‘Let's
[17033]utilize WALTON oursclvcs. Why should we let the GRU use
[17034]hin?'' NOSENKO suggested: that tne KGB “tell BOLSHAKOV
[17035]that we are scrking on WALTON--that-this ‘s a Number One
[17036]target o5 far rs we are concerned, ROLSHAKOV will do any-~
[17037]thing we ask him,” However, “the boss.said: ‘Well, you : - . Te
[17038]~Rnow, it will worsen relations between the KGB and’ the GRU,
[17039]48 long as they are working op it, let then do it.'"
[17041]odie,
[17043]WF aelect “a paint,
[17045]NOSENKO indicated that if the KGB had actually essuned
[17046]authority for the operation in Moscow iroa the GRU, as he
[17047]liad proposed, the KGB Legal Pesidency in Washington would
[17048]Nave then taken over, and "sumeone new" probably would have
[17049]been sent from KGS Headquarters to develop the association.
[17050]this KGB officer would have beta "Someone with a broacer
[17051]outlook who covid carry himself well in social contacts."
[17053]d. Inforration frog pa a
[17055]In addition to NOSESKO, one other Scepiet source had
[17056]Hep iicy & BOL SHAKOY as f® GRU ofricer. E . n
[17058].
[17060]another nenber of the ; .
[17061]"recently" turned over to BOLSHAKOY an informant who was
[17062]“an Aner Sager grnernopdent based in Washington. This jour-
[17064]nalist, £2 Mies had accompanied Vice President Nixon
[17065]to the USSR in July 1939 and while there had agreed to coop-
[17066]. erate by "furnishing political information." ‘BOLSHAKOV was
[17067]| ; to “concentrate all of his efforts on this one contact."*
[17069]idea nade Le aes te oe
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[17161]pho C1 Laan
[17163]peg Gar
[17165]¥ ney Tray te
[17167]Guaas Avenue ge
[17168]Tipn6ees 9 Mucsay .- - *—--. Ss
[17172]Hus, cee ensopuunae
[17174]Hew
[17178]oH cTA FOC. JAPCTBENVOW beSUACHUCTHT
[17181]Asanc wa pactod ( tu Bomsuanpusny & ian
[17183]ys.
[17186]eee, itera Bey Prvomacifomn Thao manana
[17187]“Sl: of Cu. Spm smep
[17188]Front Temporary Duty Authorization Reverse
[17189]December 1963 vt
[17191]i}
[17192]|
[17193]1
[17195]SECRET
[17198]Committee for State Security
[17199]Under the Council of Ministers
[17200]7 USSR .
[17201]“1S December 1963_ |
[17204]® oS ivLength of tem- i
[17205]we on . . |
[17207]“porary assign-
[17208]hent: — 15 days
[17209]through: ecemoer
[17211]“Authorization: directive of
[17213]|
[17214]: Effective on presentation of
[17215]‘identity decument No.: NK- 2513
[17217]Chief $s. /GRIBANOV of Directorate
[17218]: of Department
[17220]“Committee. for State Security
[17221]Front |
[17223]Issued to: Lieutenant Colonel: :
[17224]ee S«) an
[17226]ae ; uriy Ivanovich. ,
[17227]'. For duty to: TREN of Gor’ kaya
[17228]. Oblast
[17230]Chief of a Chief Directorate
[17232]under the. Council of Ministers, USSR
[17234]we te on emendloc mney rman
[17236]NOTATIONS OF PRESENCE - IN’ PLACES ”
[17237]OF TEMPORARY DUTY .
[17239]“Arrived in city of Gor'kiy 16 December 1963":
[17240]“Arrived in city bf Shakhun' ye. 17 XII ‘ages
[17242]Did not use free quarters"
[17244]s./Chief ‘of Shakhun' ye Chief Militia |
[17246]Section, Militia Major
[17248]“Departed Shakhun'ye 17/X11-63
[17249]Did not use free quarters"
[17251]s./Chief of Shakhun'ye chiet Militia:
[17253]Section, Militia Major
[17255]"Left nogr kiy 17 December 1963
[17256]Did not use free quarters"
[17258]s./ (iMegibie) |
[17260]Reverse (endorsements only)
[17262]TDY authorization for Lieutenant Colonel Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO
[17263]in connection with the search for CHEREPANOV
[17265]5
[17267]'
[17268]'
[17269]i}
[17270]i
[17272]——(illegibag
[17276]ve mt
[17278]i
[17279]|
[17282]:-@,  ROSENKO"s- KGB Promot ions.and Awards.
[17284]“1.” Rank
[17286]_NOSENKO has. been questioned at length concerning hig _.
[17288]“progress tnrough the KG3 ranks, from lieutenant to lieuten—.
[17290]“ant colonel. He has volunteered additional information.on
[17291].this subject himself, iis various statements follow in
[17292]chronological order.
[17294]11 June 1962: "As a Chief of Section, I now receive
[17295]2,500 [rublés per month], plus 700 for my rank, for major,
[17296]plus pay for longevity. 1 receive more t..an 4000, i.e.,
[17297]450-470-460 [rubles per month] in new money. This is
[17298]enough for me...J am now a major but I should receive
[17299]Lieutenant colonel soon. I nave already completed my time
[17300]in grade. We have a system of tine in grade. From major
[17301]to lieutenant colonel it is necessary to have four years...
[17303]- 7" My time fn grade was up “in December, in-December”of last ~
[17305]i
[17307]year [1961]."
[17309]23: January 1964: At the first of his 1964 meetings
[17310]with CIM in Geneva NOSENKO had in his possession the ten-
[17311]porary duty authorization which he said he had been issued
[17312]in December 1963 to travel from Moscow to Gorkiy Oblast in
[17313]connection with the search for CHZREPANOV.* This official
[17314]KGK paper had been signed by O.M. GRKIBANOV, Chief of the
[17315]Second Chief Directorate, and authorized. "Licutenant Colonel
[17316]Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO to visit the local KGB organiza-
[17317]tion in Gorkiy Oblast on official business between 15 and
[17318]30 December 1963."" It bore official stamps of arrival and
[17319]departure in December 1963, as attested by officials in the
[17320]town of Shakhunya.
[17322]10 February 1964: In Frankfurt, while awaiting ex-
[17323]filtration to the United States, NOSENKO was asked to review
[17324]a biographic statement which had been prepared by his case
[17325]officers on the basis of statements he had made during the
[17326]1962 and 1964 meetings in Geneva. NOSENKO went over the
[17327]-biography carefully, noted several changes, and then stated
[17328]that it was correct. The biography included the information
[17329]that NOSENKO had served in the U.S. Embassy Section of the
[17330]American Department as a senior lieutenant from 1952 [sic]
[17331]to 1955, that he was promoted to. captain in 1956, to major
[17333]in 1959, and to lieutenant colonel in November 1963, shortly -
[17335]before leaving Moscow for Geneva. to
[17337]set nee antl Rang ld
[17339]“}
[17341]|
[17344]saeeneiteesnee me mene come fe ve
[17346]a
[17348]8 April 1964: NOSENKO was questioned about the date
[17349]when He bécame a senior lieutenant, and he replied: "I
[17350]think in the end of '55 or the beginning of '54 I got the
[17351]senior lieutenant." ,
[17353]‘ Question: That's less than a year after you entered the
[17354]service [KGB]. :
[17356]_ #See Part VI.D.7.c. for a description of this search snd
[17357]_-. ef KOSENKXO'’s claimed part in it.
[17362]"=" = <-NOSENKO? ~ Well, I had the GRU service. © That counts” two
[17363]. — years, as military service, of course. it was. - we,
[17364]considered as a continuance of military service. wo . _
[17366]_ Question: .So you got it when? At the end of 19537 - oo. Do ee.
[17370]i coe, oo
[17371]"NOSENKO: . At the end of ‘53 or beginding of '54. Then I
[17372]: got captain in 1956. oe
[17374]tie
[17376]: Question: When in 19567... . _
[17378]NOSENKO: I don't remember. You see, they are not given !
[17379]exactly in February or in March. Sometimes the _ i
[17380]scheduled time passes before they give it. So,
[17382]'56.-Captain, '59--Major, and '63--...
[17384]: 16 June 1964: Asked to list in chronological order the
[17385]date Of his promotions within the KGB from the date of
[17386]entry, NOSENKO stated: “I began in the GRU as a junior
[17387]lieutenant. While in the GRY I became a lieutenant, and 1
[17388]entered the KGB with this rank in 1953. Not long after I
[17389]entered the KGB I became a senior lieutenant, but 1 don't
[17390]know the month. It was still 1953. In 1956 I was promoted
[17391]to the rank of captain. I don't know the month. I became
[17392]a major in 1959. I don't know the’month. In October 1963
[17393]I wes made # licutenant colonel....Personnel called me on
[17394]the .elephone and said I had been promoted, Later 1 was
[17395]told that GRIBANOV wanted to see me. I went to his office,
[17396]but, of course, I didn't let him know that I already knew
[17398]. that 1 had been promoted. He gave me his congratulations.
[17399]You never see the attestation. It goes into your official
[17400]file."
[17402]26 January 1965: While discussing his role as case
[17403]offictr Tor U.S. Embassy Security Officar John ABIDIAN,
[17404]NOSENKO volunteered out of context that he had never offi-
[17405]cially been a major. He explained this situation as
[17406]follows: Having been promoted to the rank of senior
[17407]lieutenant in April 1953, he vecame eligible for the rank
[17409]- Of captain in 1956. When this time came, however, he was
[17410]+, not promoted because a senior KGB official held against
[17411]ce him his illegal use of KGB documents to cover_treatment for
[17412]gonorrhea in 1954. NOSENKO therefore remained a senior
[17413]lieutenant until 1959, when he would have been eligible
[17414]for promotion to the rank of major had he received his —
[17415]captaincy on schedule. Although GRIBANOV had promised NO-_
[17416]SENKO that he would be promoted directly from senior lieu-
[17417]tenant to major, skipping the rank of captain, an admini-
[17418]strative error was made by the KGB Personnel Office, and
[17419]NOSENKO found when the orders were issued that he had inw ee
[17420]stead been promoted only to captain. Instead of rectifying -
[17421]i this mistake, GRIBANOV persuaded NOSENKO that it would be
[17422]: to his advantage to remain a captain until he became eligible :
[17423]for promotion to lieutenant colonel in 1963. NOSENKO-there- Fe,
[17424]fore was a captain from September or October 1959 until oo 4
[17425]October 1963 when; as promised by GRIBANOV, he was promoted . SS .
[17427]eS eA Hater on be
[17429]1
[17430]si a
[17433]KGB osition because of his- close. cteet ion, ea with ‘GRIBANOV,. <
[17435]ai rant: “dn “this’ manner &
[17436]turned out: that ‘he never offictally held the’ rank of major.*
[17440]10 August 1965: Under questioning by. DERYABIN, NOSENKO ©
[17442]’ yepeated the chronology of his promotions. given an 26 January oe +
[17444]1865, He again explained that he:was put up for captain tn . . 5
[17445]1956, but this time said that the-.promotion had been blocked . So. ot
[17446]on the grounds that he should be made to wait because of : : Soe
[17447]shortcomings in his work. Asked why he had told CIA that he
[17448]had been a major during the 1962 meetings and again in the
[17449]“biography prepared’ in Frankfurt, NOSENKO replied that he
[17450]thought the true story would not be believed.
[17452]1
[17453]ch tee dahon ds Hote te
[17457]17 April 1966: In a voluntary statement, NOSENKO wrote :
[17458]the following: “Yn March 1951, with the rank of junior lieu- '
[17459]tenant, I started service in Naval Intelligence of the Seventh . , . .
[17460]Flect in Sovetskaya Gavan....From August 1952 until 1953, 2. oe =
[17461]worked ut the intelligence base of the Naval Inte lligence i ee
[17463]the Fourtt Fleet in Sovctsk, where I received the rank of
[17464]lieutenant of the Administrative Service....In 1956 I reer
[17465]the rank of senior licutenant [in the KGB], . in December 195
[17466]the.rank of cnptain, and at the end of 19623 I I vas vremiended
[17467]for the rank of major. I have never held the rank of lieuten—
[17468]ant colonel] ond the travel erder which you know of, with the
[17469]rank of lieutenant colorcl, was ygilled out erroneously. **
[17471]19 April 1966: In a new version of his autobiography,
[17472]NOSENKO included the following statement: “in July 1956. % -
[17473]became a candidate member of the CPSU, soon after which I rew
[17474]ceived a promotion at work: I became a senior case officer
[17475]and was given the rank of senior licutenant. In August 1957
[17476]I was accepted into the CPSU, and during the second half of
[17477]1958 was appointed Deputy Chief of the Second Section, Seventh
[17478]Department. On 29 Decenber 1959 I was promoted to the rank of
[17479]captain. a —
[17481]26 October 1966: "I lied when I said I was a lieutenant wok
[17482]colonel in 195%.” Twas only a captain." Asked why he had : :
[17484]-,» Said in 1962 that he was then a major, NOSENKO replied: :
[17486]“There was no conversation about rank in 1962 About my po-
[17487]‘sition, I said I was in the Tourist Department. That's all." jj
[17489]To. summarize what NOSENKO has said about his ranks while
[17490]‘serving in the KGB: He became a senior licutenant in 1952, ‘ . :
[17491]April 1953, 1954, or 1956; a captain in 1956 or September/Octo-= : : ie
[17492]ber/December 1959; a major in December 1958 or 1959; and a :
[17493]lieutenant colonel in October/November 1963. (The latter a
[17494]claim was verified by the official KGB document listing him as
[17495]a lieutenant colonel as of December 1963.)- On the other hand, a
[17496]_ NOSENKO has indicated that his highest rank in the KGB was - SO : oo
[17497]' captain, and that he never advanced to a majority or a lieu- .- .
[17498]tenant colonelcy.
[17500]4
[17501]i
[17502]wen yaataee genres
[17504]7
[17506]*At about this tine, in early 1965, & y
[17507]NOSENKO was only a captain and had advanced to nis senior. .
[17509]reported
[17511]Se ae
[17513]& shortly after .NOSENKO's: defection,
[17515]eived: information from fellow KGB officers whitch ~
[17517]made it vappeay Atte ¢ certain" that. NOSENKO vas: a lieutonsay:.
[17519]eolonel,:. m wet a _ - wa, oe oe
[17522]- ” ov)
[17524]_ Not long after reestablishing contact with CIA in-
[17525]_ January 1964, NOSENKO Mentioned that he had received the
[17526]J Order of Lenin "shortly after the 1962. meetirgs" in Geneva
[17527]:-as a reward for the ideas which he had developed to "en-.. |.
[17528]- large the experience and improve the quality” of KGB Second. :
[17529]. Chief Directorate. staff personnel in Moscow.* During the . Yo.
[17530]- Pirst series of interrogations,.NGSENKO on 6 April 1904. — :
[17531]claimed that he was awarded the Order of Lenin in 1963 for:
[17532]his work in the Tourist Department, KGB Second Chief Direce —— Coes
[17533]torate, after receiving the Order of the Red Banner in 1962 ;
[17534]for his performances while in the American Department. ,
[17536]The following discussion of the subject took place on
[17537]6 April 1964;
[17539]ne - + NOSENKO:- Yes;—I-received a big: gold medal. -—-- - Skee aie oon:
[17540]Qucstion: It was the Order of Lenin?
[17542]NOSENKO: It was at first the Order of the Red Ranner-—the
[17543]Red Star, I mean.’ In '63 I received the Order
[17544]of Lenin. In '63.
[17546]Question; What for?
[17548]NOSENKO; GRIBANOV decided that whoever is working a long
[17549]a period in tie Second Chief Directorate--[V.D, ]
[17550]CHELNOKOV got one, [A.G.] KOVALENKO got one-—
[17552]many, many [received the Order of Lerin],**
[17554]Question: You received the Order of Lenin for this brilliant
[17555]service?
[17557]NOSENKO: No. For working in the Scventh [Tovrist] Depart-
[17558]ment, which is considered good.
[17560]Question: What is good? Were there recruitmeats? What
[17563]NOSENKO: You must know that the main task of the Seventh
[17564]Department is rot recruitrents. The main task is
[17565]countering the intelligence activities of the op-
[17566]position.
[17568]Question: So, the Chief and the Deputy Chief of the Seventh ‘ i
[17569]Department got the Order of Lenin? 2
[17571]NOSENKO: Yes. j
[17573]*NOSENKO has described the Order of Lenin as the highest. :
[17574]decoration for which a KGB officer can be eligible. — “ Se
[17576]**In June 1964 NOSENKO said. that the only Second Chief Direc-
[17577]. torate officer whom he. knew to have. received this award. was
[17579]¥.A. CHURANOV, Chief of the British Embassy Section, who re- ;
[17580]_ eruited William. John VASSALL (se@ PART. VI.D.5.b.). On the . :
[17581]_. game general topic, NOSENKO: asked. his CIA case officer whether __. . ob.
[17583]he, the CIA officer, had received. a medal for his: part t
[17584]Me asked this-in January
[17586]_. the: 1962 meetings with NOSENKO.
[17587]“= in& Gene oo 7
[17590]contaminate ee
[17592]Question:
[17596]Question:
[17600]Question:
[17604]Question:
[17608]Question:
[17612]Question:
[17614]NOSENKO: -
[17616]CHELNOXOV and. KOVALENKO?
[17618]Yes. And CHURANOY got avd of and--who else?
[17619]{(S.M. |) FEDOSEYEV got ard ¢ .{ KOVSHCK also got
[17620]the Order, the secend time. ihe first time he
[17621]got it several years ago, -and this wis the second
[17622]time.
[17624]When did you get the Order of the Ked Star?
[17625]Red Star J’ pot---1l don't know for what.
[17627]But then one year Jater they gave you another
[17628]one, beeause this lider of the Red Star] wasn't
[17631]Because the awards are given out--now, wait one
[17632]moment; up until 1961], if there were any awards
[17633]for the Chekists [KLUB personnel] it was very rare,
[17634]and they were onls avarded fur a specific thing.
[17635]Such as CHURASOV, for instance. Me was rewarded
[17636]for aw specific decd ithe recruitment of VASSALL].
[17637]But in 1962, 1963--these first years--whether it
[17638]was the idea of the Party to encourage the
[17639]workers, they decided to let SAKHAROVSKIY [Chief
[17640]of the KGB First Chief Directorate] declare his
[17641]medals and GRIBANOV to ceclare’ bis medals. They
[17642]get together with their deputies and decide to
[17643]whom they will give thes. They don't say to
[17644]whom--they say, for instince: ‘One order to your
[17645]department; you decide “no Should have it.’
[17647]Like that. Then we vould get together, f[
[17648]CHELNOKOV, KOVALENKO, ard se decided [who would
[17649]get one]. In our departuentr, fV.t.} YAKOVLEV
[17650]got a medal. Who clse got a medal? In 1962, I
[17651]got one, and then LEONOV who was Chief of the
[17652]Second Section --Le gut the Order of the Red Star.
[17653]We decided on these individuals. As far as we
[17654]ourselves were concerned. tnut decision was made
[17655]by GRIBANOV and his ceputy.
[17657]Did the Seventh Department catch any spies?
[17659]Well, as I have already told you, there was this
[17660]Italian fellow BP. This was considered a
[17661]good case because the First Department Later-~
[17662]the Seventh Department cas only’ involved at the
[17663]time of the arrest--began mecting with him.
[17665]So you got the Order [of the Red Banner| in 1962
[17666]because of your work in the Tourist Department?
[17668]I think in 1962 GRIBANOV gave it to me not for
[17669]the Seventh Departmént, but for my work in the
[17670]First [American| Departrent in 1960, 1961.
[17672]You think so? .
[17674]F think so.
[17677]» FosENKo: It was just:done et the order: of. the Chairman.
[17678]Question: And the Order of Lebin, was the sata? .
[17680]KOSENKO; - The sane,’ Well, the way it saye,--"Por work well
[17681]done for the organs ofthe KGB" there ia no indi~ |
[17682]cation exactly what it io for. “_ wt —
[17684]; NOBENKO admitted on 8 April 19643 "In 1964 {in ‘Geneval . oe
[17686]-1 told 9 116 about the Order of Lenin... Bhy?. 10 ged Bu.
[17687]borst." NOSENKO.then explained what be aaid to be the true
[17688]circunstances and gave. the reason for whiob he wes to have. -
[17689]received this decoration. GRIBANOV, NOSENKD ateted, had
[17690]prozised in 1983 thet NOSENKO, CHELNOXOV, and FKOVALENKO .
[17691]would get the Order of Lenin: "He aaid: ~'I am submitting
[17692]‘your names fox the Order of Lenin for orsating ths TaOPS -_
[17693]fcentrat Operational Communications fyatem of the Socond
[17694]Chief Directorate}, ‘for thig new thing you have tried to FF i
[17695]create in tourist work.' But Decemher Tees] had gone by.- -
[17696]I left {for Goneva] and nothing happoaed."* ~~ oO :
[17698]NOSENKO was asked on 15 April 1964 to list tho dates,
[17699]reasons, and types of awards, decorations, and bonuses te
[17700]had received during hia KGB crareer, as well as to indicate
[17702]. from whom he had received eaoh of these. Hie reply was .
[17704]. as follows: "I received nothing in 1953, 1954, and 1955,
[17705]In 1986 I received a commendation and one month's pay.
[17706]SEROY, the Chairman of the KGB, awarded ne this for the
[17707]recruitment of Richard BURG! [aee Part V.D.4.b.] while I’
[17708]was working in the Seventh [Tourist] Department of the
[17709]Send Chief Directorate. It was signed by the Chairmen,
[17710]and GRIBANOV told me about it. As usual, this Order of.
[17711]the Chairman of the KGB waa circulated, and I snd ail case
[17712]officers saw my name listed. There is no certificate or
[17713]anything. “sonnel just makes-a note in your official file.
[17714]that on a certain date you received the commendation froa.
[17716]the Chairman of the KGH. .
[17718]‘From 1956 on, I received something almost every year,
[17720]but it was nothing special. Perhaps it was the KGB annivere
[17722]sary or May Day or Army Day. In. 1957 or 1958, I got someon Te
[17723]thing from GRIBANOV, Maybe it was the 40th anniversary of Te
[17724]the Soviet Army. I don’t remember. It was given to se and. Se
[17725]& group of people in the hall [auditorium] between the third ee i
[17726]and fourth ficora [of the KGB Headquartera building]. PER= ; “4
[17727]FILYEV, Deputy Chief. of the Second Chief Directorate, sade ; §
[17729]_ the presentations —§ - , Lon . _ _ .
[17731]ae "In 1959 I received a commendation and one wonth’s = - - ..
[17733]_ . pay from SHELEPIN, Chairman of the KGB, for several Yee . op?
[17734]-/- - --emultments,/ among them the professor frou Tennessee { MERTENS ]., ae ; an
[17736].. .'. DREW, FRIPPEL, and three British people, Thore were @ix in: ~
[17738]se afte mom wae
[17740]*NOSENKO later reverted to hia original’ atatenent, which. -
[17741]_Pelated the award to. his efforts to “inspire” the. work of
[17742].. the Tourist Department. ss oo, ae
[17745]-
[17747]all: three Americans and. three Britash. t can't remember the
[17748]‘British names just now. * .
[17750]. “In 1960 1 cot a commendation Eom: GRIBANOV’ for good work
[17751]in general. A lot of officers got this. In 19€1 I received
[17752]the Order of the Red Scar. With a group of case cfficers I got
[17753]this for general gocd work in the Second Chief Directorate,
[17754]KOVALENKO and KOYSHUK oot this too. IVASHUTIN gave it .to me
[17756](made the presentation). Personnel maxes a note in your official
[17758]file, put you car teke the medal and the little certificate that
[17759]goes with it and either keep ic ac home or in your study reom
[17760](office) .**
[17762]"In 1962 I got a commendation from GRIEAOV for general
[17763]good work. I also received the Unbiemished Service Award
[17765]-for.ten years'-services: -They counted this from Octobér 1950,
[17767]when I ‘joined tne GRU, and they were late by two yeers in
[17768]giving it tome. This 15 not unusual. SHCHERBAK, Deputy
[17769]Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, gave it to me in the
[17771]* See Parts V.D,4,i.and h.. Part V.D.5., and Parts ¥.3.4.i.,
[17772]j-, and k., respectively, for descriptions of these recruit-
[17773]ment operations érd NOSENKO‘s ‘role in cthem.: NOSENKO also
[17774]said during interrogation by DERYABIN :on 10 August °1965
[17775]that, in 1959, his name was submitted for the.Order of the
[17776]Red Banner in connection with these recruitments, but that
[17777]he did not get it, probably because he was trensferred to
[17778]the First Department at that time (January 1950). NOSENKO
[17779]has described the Order of the Red Banner as the third
[17780]‘highest award a KGB officer may receive. Asxed what KGB
[17781]officers had received this award, NOSENKO said on i0 June
[17783].,1964 that GRISANOV, SAKHAROVSKIY, and several other hiagh-
[17784]ranking KGB officers were awarded 1t for the amportant role
[17785]they played in smashing the Hungarian Revolution in 1956,
[17787]** On 15 April 1964 NOSENKO had said that he received the
[17788]Order of the Red Star, along with a group of other Second
[17789]Chief Directorate officers, at the end of December 1962.
[17791]He recalled this because they were planning the. presenta-
[17792]tion for the anniversary of the KGB on 20 December, but
[17794]the presentation was delayed and was not made until the
[17795]end of the month. NOSENKO and about 70 other officers of
[17796]the Second Chief Directorate, including KOVSEUK and G.I
[17797]GRYAZNOV, received the award “simply for achieverents, for
[17798]good resuits in work.” | NOSENKO told. DERYASIN in August 1965
[17799]that the order accompanying his award had read: “For ex-
[17800]ceptional performance of mission.* . When asked what mission
[17801]was involved, NOSENKO replied that the award was just for
[17802]good work in general. .
[17804]+ sanpeckom amperes =e a
[17806]Hates wltdltcged mtieuititiere
[17809]: hall along: ‘with rt ‘certificate ‘Tn: 1963 I received. an
[17810]commendation from GRIBANOV for ‘general good work. Also,’
[17811]GRIBANOV told me that I, along with some others, was to’
[17812]receive the. Order of. Lenin on 20 December 1963, the KGB
[17813]anniversary date, but I left for Geneva,**l was to re-
[17814]ceive it for arousing [ inspiring] the Seventh Department. ”
[17816]NOSENKO said on 26 October 1966 that he never re-
[17817]ceived any KGB award or decoration for his operational ©
[17818]work. The only awards he received during his KGS career,
[17819]he said, were a Red Army anniversary medal-and the award
[17820]for satisfactory completion of ten years of service, —
[17822]. S¥NOSENKO'’s wording here reflects earlier intensive ques-
[17823]tioning concernirg the ten-year service medal. NOSENKO said
[17824]on 15 April 1964: "In 1962 I had ten years of service in
[17825]the KGB and got 2a medal for unblemished service. It is
[17826]usually given for ten years and to KCB men only....That was
[17828]in 1962. I hac ten years of service then." When it was 2
[17830]pointed out that, according to his: most recent statenent,
[17831]he had joined the KGB in March 1953 and therefore would :
[17832]have had only nine years of service in 1962, NOSENKO said he
[17833]did not understand why but that he was certain that he had
[17834]been given the medal. after his return from Geneva in 1962.° .
[17835](The 1962 date is consistent with NOSENKO's earlier statements
[17836]that he joined the KGB in 1952.). The following day, 17 April”
[17837]1964, NOSENKO said that he. remembered why he had received
[17838]. the medal in 1962 rather than 1963; this medal, he recalled,
[17839]-is-awarded to servicemen as well. as KGB officers, and prior —
[17840]military service is taken into account in computing the --
[17841]service time for the latter, NOSENKO.had:entered the :GRU.
[17842]. &4n 1950 and therefore. should have received. the .ten-year”
[17843]“; medal in 1960. ° Because-o...a: mix-up ‘in. the- EGB- Personnel--~
[17844]- Department | he.. did. not: receive it until 1962, . ; :
[17848]ba cretitece
[17850]BRS, ete,“
[17853]14-0096.
[17855]_-. «He. NOSENKO's Relationship with-GRISANOV.  —~
[17857]“15 “Information from NCSENKO
[17858]a. Summary ,
[17860]From the time of his first meetings with CIA in 1962, NOSENKO
[17861]maintained that he had a close personal and professional relation-
[17862]ship with Major General 0.M. GRIBANOV, Chief of tre Second Chief:
[17863]Directorate, NOSENKO has described recruitment approaches in. which
[17864]he and GRIBANOV took part together, conversations they had on opera-
[17865]tional matters, the role which GRIBANOV played in his rank promo-
[17866]tions and receipt of various awards, and his.afterhours carousing
[17867]with GRIBANOV and First Chief Directorate countcrinteiligence
[17868]officer Ye.A, TARABRIN. NOSENKO has also frequently mentioned the
[17869]role which GRIBANOV played in nig, NOSENKO's, professional advance-
[17870]ment within the KGB: GRIBANOV was wholly respensible, against
[17871]NOSENKO's wishes, for his appointment to the position of Deputy ’
[17872]Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department in
[17873]January 1909; later, when NOSENKO rejected his offer to make hin
[17874]Deputy Chief of the entire American Department, GRIBANOV arranged
[17875]his return to the ‘fourist Department as Chief of the ‘American
[17876]Tourist Secticr. and his later appointment as Deputy Chief of the
[17877]Tourist Department, ;
[17879]NOSENKO's remarks concerning nis direct involvement with
[17881]GRIBANOV in operations against Americans are-included in other
[17883]= parts of this paper. Among them are his early statements on the
[17884]approach to code clerk James STORSSERG (Part V.E.3.c.), hig 1962
[17885]account of the arrest and attempt to recruit Cla cfficer Fussell
[17886]LANGELLE (Part Vi.D.7.a.), and Aig early reports on the attempt to
[17887]recruit CIA officer Edward Ellis SMITH (Part VI.D.2.). In all
[17888]three cases NOSENKO subsequently denied having played the role he
[17889]originally attributed to nimself and denied having had personal
[17890]contact with the Americans involved. NOSENKO has also altered his
[17891]original accounts to say that he received no awarés or decoration
[17892]for operational activity and that he had not received the promo- -
[17893]tions he claimed. : “.
[17895]b. Details
[17897]The statements of NOSENKO given below concern primarily his .
[17898]personal relationship with GRIBANOV and how GRIBANOV assisted
[17899]his rapid rise within the organization of the Seccnd Chief Direc~.
[17900]torate. ; i
[17902]12 June 1962: "Oleg Mikhaylovich GRIBANOV is a great guy. ‘
[17903]A real pal. We, so to Say, used to meet one ancther illegally
[17904]and had women together... GRIBANOV wrote a fitness report on
[17905]_ me. It was the very best that can be given, brilliant. GRIBANOV '
[17906]. Wrote the very best fitness report on me. He had an excellent ; : 1
[17907]: regard for me, excellent... I am supposed to beccme Deputy Chief =. |
[17908]of [the Tourist} Department. I believe that GRIBANOV is promot- i
[17909]ing young pecple, new people, who already have experience, good . _ ot
[17910]experience, who have made recruitments. .I know two or. three-{of | f
[17911]the people he is moving ahead]. I personally have about 12 re- : .
[17912]eruitments, four-or five of them were British and the rest Ameri-
[17913]cans. He [GRIBANOV] has his eye on me in particular, and the
[17914]question-of my advancement is right. now under consideration... I
[17915]will be Deputy Chief of Department. You must give thought to the |
[17918]oon CA PE ANN ot i nn ant ee
[17920]fact that T have been. ‘talking with ‘you. “You can ruin everything.
[17922]I have a career. I have bright prospects. vy boss GRIBANOV, ny
[17923]highest boss, has a very high degree of respect. for me. «He some-
[17924]times bawls me out and I-- Well, I make it look like. this is un-.
[17925]pleasant for me. But, in fact, it is a plessant thing because, on
[17926]inside, I am glad he is bawling me out and not someone else. I
[17927]know that if he bawls me out he has a high regard for me. He -
[17928]sometimes calls me personally {to his office] and suys: ‘You
[17929]come with me. I have to meet an ambassador.’ I go with him.
[17931]We arrive and have the conversation. He is there all night. He
[17932]comes out and says: ‘Well, where shall we go for a drink?' 1
[17933]know beforehand {that he will say this] and everything is ready
[17934]at the Aragvi Restaurant. We go there. ‘Well, what shall we
[17935]drink!' [GRIBANCY says}. I answer: ‘Well, Oleg Mikhailovich,
[17936]cognac, of course! He is the highest chief. ‘{f:'don't drink
[17937]cognac. I'11 have vodka,' I say. ‘Well, we'll have vodka then,'
[17938][GRIBSANOV says]..." One of NOSENKO's CIA handlers suggested at
[17939]this point that GRIBANOV seemed to treat NOSENKO as an older
[17940]brother would. ‘NOSENXO replied: "That's his attituce toward me."
[17942]23 Aprid 1964
[17943]Question: «Did you ever go to GRIBANOV's house?
[17944]NOSENKO: ‘I never went in the house. I have driven to it.
[17945]Question: Did he ever come to your house?
[17946]NOSENKO: No.
[17948]Question: Were you ever out at night with him, after work?
[17949]If so, how, under what circumstances?
[17951]NOSENKO: After work? Yes, once.
[17953]Question: Who else was there?
[17955]‘NOSENKO: TARABRIN.
[17957]Question: What was the occasion?
[17959]NOSENKO: No specific reason. GRIBANOV called me at midnight.
[17960]I could hear that he was already drinking; he asked
[17961]me how long it would take me to get dressed and come
[17963]' down to the Praga Restaurant, first private room..
[17964]Afterwards we wanted to go somewhere else to finish
[17965]the evening... GRIBANOV was sloppy drunk, lay down
[17966]to rest, he needed a couple of hours of sleep. I
[17967]drove him and TARABRIN home, got him there at ‘6s 00
[17968]a.™., gave him some pills to help him: :
[17970]Question: When did you first personally meet GRIBANOV?
[17972]_NOSENKO: I might have seen him in 1953. or 1954, but I did not
[17974]have a chance to speak to him then. Once I was in two
[17975]- gxoup operational discussions (about 15 people present)
[17976]. about work against Military Attaches..in 19545 - that was
[17977]the. first time I: ever. ‘Spoke to. him.. oo .
[17979]7
[17980]3
[17982]i
[17983]q
[17985]let eel paler
[17987]TOP SECRET ©
[17990]NOSENKO: I don't remember. He gathered groups of people. ..
[17992]. NOSENKO: He may not have actually written. them, but he signed
[17994]’. SHUBNYAKOV, rather than GRIBANOV, was the Deputy: Director of. the
[17996]a 52g
[17998]Question: ‘when did you first have’ any personal conversation with
[17999]him? , :
[18001]Maybe I was with him with KOZLOV and others in Tourist
[18002]Department [i.e., between 1955 and 1969).
[18004]Question: When did you develop a personal relationship with him?
[18006]s.
[18007]i
[18008]t
[18009]H
[18011]NOSENKO: It is difficult to say how it got started. I was
[18012]still working in the Seventh Department. It was in . =
[18013]1958, or maybe 1957. KOZLOV suddenly called me and ; :
[18014]said 1 should immediately report to GRIBANOV. I did, 7 :
[18015]‘and GRIBANOV said.I should quickly be ready to go to . :
[18016]a reception with him at the Indian Embassy, with him
[18017]and Vera [Ivanovna] ANDREYEVA. .
[18019]Question: Why you?
[18021]“NOSENKO: I don't know... (pause) Oh, yes, this is the story.
[18023]this is it, this is why he started favoring me.
[18025]Earlier, some time in 1953, I knew some girls, Nina on
[18026]Pokrovskiy Boulevard and her girliriend, Rina GUDKOVA,
[18027]friends of (Yu.I.] GUK and [V.M.] KOVSHUK and [V.A.)
[18028]CHURANOV, CHURANOV was a friend of TARABRIN, who was
[18030]a friend of GRIBANOV. Through TARABRIN he got acquainted
[18031]with these girls, and TARABRIN brought them to GRIBANOV's
[18032]dacha one night. The girls were talkative and‘ told me
[18033]all about it, and said they'd told CHURANOV. I told
[18034]CHURANOV who warned me not to mention it. I never did,
[18035]and GRIBANOV learned about this and liked it;.he re-
[18036]marked once: "You are not a gossiper..."
[18038]Question: How did ke find out that you knew and didn't tell any-
[18039]one?
[18041]NOSENKO: 1 don't know, but he did.
[18043]Question: Who wrote your fitness reports?
[18045]NOSENKO: My last one was written by [V.D.] CHELNOKOV. The one
[18046]before that by {(V.A.] KLYPIN, in the First Department.
[18047]Before that in the Seventh Pepartment it was written
[18048]by [K.N.]} DUBAS, before him by [V.A.] KOZLOV, then
[18049]{S.V.] PERFILYEV and before then, in the Pirst Depart-
[18050]ment, by [A.M.}] GORBATENKO.
[18052]Question: Did GRIBANOV ever write a fitness report on you?
[18054]them, those reports written in connection with pro- -
[18055]motions to higher jobs or for trips abroad, or general
[18056]reviews of personnel. mo, Sos .
[18060]15 ‘Februar 965 (from a protocol’ signed: 20 February 1965):
[18061]"Before I joined the KGB in 1953 I had never heard the name of - . a
[18062]Oleg Mikhaylovich GRIBANOV. and knew nothing: about him. As. [F.G.]J . {
[18064]Second Chief Directorate: responsible for supetvising the acti-
[18065]vitieo. of the. First’Department. of the Directorate, where I: worked,
[18068]it may have been several months after I began my. KG3 service’: rat
[18069]GRIBANOV first came to my attention. ft don’t knew when I first’
[18070]saw GRIBANOV but it may have been approximately 1953 ata meeting -
[18071]before May Day or the 7 November holiday. I’ would not necessarily
[18072]remember this as I frequently met much more important people, who
[18073]were friends of my father, and Se€ing GRIPANOV wouldn‘t have been
[18074]particularly important to me.. Sometimes during 1955 and 1955, it
[18075]was necessary to obtain the signature of a Deputy Chief of the
[18076]Second Chief Directorate on a cable that. I’ had written and, if:
[18077]SHUBNYAKC’Y was absent at the time, I would take it to GRIBANOV
[18078]for approval. Though I was only a junior case officer at the
[18079]time, I would take the cable, after it had been aprroved ky the
[18080]Chief of Section and the Chief of Department, directiy to GRISANOV,
[18081]who would simply sign it with no discussion. I do not renember how
[18082]many times I toox cables to GRIBANOV nor do I remenber the contents
[18083]of any specific one of them. The first meeting with GRIBANOV that
[18084]I specifically remember was in the summer of 1956. 1 think it was
[18085]in June. I had returned from Kiev with KOZLOV and, after writing
[18086]@ Spravka on BURGI, PERFILYFV, KOZLOV, and I went co see GRIBANOV.
[18087]‘KOZLOV didn't introduce me to GRIBANOV at that time, Dut GRIBANOV
[18088]knew that I was NOCSENKO because the plan for the BURGI operation -
[18089]said that I would participate and because PERPILYeV had made an
[18090]appointment for the three of us to speak to GRIBANUV at this time.
[18091]The meeting lasted about 30 or 40 minutes. GRIBANOY read the re-
[18092]port on SURGI's recruitment and asked some questions. KOZLO9V
[18093]answered some of these and I answered others. Other than asking
[18094]what Ukrainians took part in the Operation, 1 can recall none of
[18095]GRIBANOV's questions nor do I remember any of tae conversation
[18096]which took place at this meeting. When we were through, KOZLOV
[18097]and I left while PERFILYEV remained with GRIBANOV. Perhaps the
[18098]first time I was alone with GRIBANOV was in 1958 when I attended
[18099]a reception given by the Indian Embassy at the Sovetskaya Hotel
[18100]in Moscow. Usually [A.V.] SUNTSOV accompanied GRIBANOV on such
[18101]“occasions, butyhe was sick at the time. I don't know why SUNTSOV”
[18102]usually went with GRIBANOV, why I was selected to go, or what I
[18103]was supposed to do at the reception. I think GRIBANOV called the
[18104]Seventh Department and asked whom he could use, but I don't know
[18105]why he picked me. GRIBANOV told me that, at the reception, I was
[18106]to refer to him as Aleksey Mikhaylovich GORBUNOV. I was to
[18107]introduce myself as Yuriy Ivanovich and if anybody asked, would use
[18108]the last name NIKOLAYEV. Vera ANDREYEVA, who went with us, used
[18109]the name Vera Ivanova. After work, I went home to change ny
[18110]clothes and we went in GRIBANOV's car from the KGB to the Hotel
[18111]Sovetskaya. GRIBANOV sat in front with the driver and I sat in
[18112]back with Vera ANDREYEVA. I cannot say how many times I have seen
[18113]GRIBANOV altogether. From 1959 on 1 saw him more frequently.
[18114]Sometimes, GRIBANOV would call meetings of chiefs of secticns and
[18115]their deputies and I would take part in these, I had begun te
[18116]call GRIBANOV by his first name and patronymic in 1956, when I
[18117]was Deputy Chief of the First Section of the Seventh Department,
[18119]_ but at these meetings I called him “Comrade General." In 1959°-
[18121]'I’also went to GRIBANOV's office alone in connection with the.
[18122]FRIPPEL case and, sometime -between May and October 13959, tock
[18124]him a report that I had prepared concerning the use of. tourist
[18126]cover by foreign intelligence organizations.” — - . : .
[18128]23-24 February 1965 (from a protocol signed 26 February): —
[18129]*GRIBANOV was never. in my own office, my -home,, my parents home .-
[18130]OF my parent’s dacha, .My father never knew -him I was. never
[18132]j
[18135]a
[18138]. in. GREBANOV's. home or his: dacha.. ‘I’ was never in ‘any KGB opera-. -.*...
[18139]tional apartment: with: GRIBANOV. I never introduced any of my. j~"
[18142]sents to GRIBANOV. GRIBANOV knew about, agents
[18143]Meme. 2nd.'ARTUR' (FREPPEL), but. i. never scecifacaliy
[18144]discussed them with GRISANOV. ‘I aid discuss with SkIBANOV che
[18145]agent 'PRCKHOR' (PREISFREUND). On three occasions t have been
[18146]with GRIBANOV in social circumstances.* On all three occasions
[18147]TARABKIN was also present. After two of these occasions, we
[18148]had parties with yiris. I don't remember when tie firet tine
[18149]was, but tha last time was in Saptember or Ocrcker 1963. On
[18150]this occasion tuey called me at home late et nigst and agked me
[18151]to join them at the Prague Restaurant. - I arranged for female
[18152]companionship and this party lasted until early morning.* It.
[18153]was at this party that I gave GRIBANOV sone pilis T had fsr
[18154]hengovers. I nad brougnt a supply of thes2 bacx from Geneva in
[18155]1962. A few days after this party {GRIBANOY's secretary Ye.S.)
[18156]KIRPICKNIKOV came to my office with a note from GRIBANOV asking
[18157]me for some more of these pills. ‘this-is tne note I gava to my.
[18158]CIA case officers in 1964.*%* I have ridden in GRIBANOV‘s cars
[18159]perhaps four or five times, once when I went with him to an.
[18160]indien Embassy reception in 1958, perhaps two or three times to
[18161]moetings with SUSLOV and two or three times in connection with -
[18163]3 am
[18165]_the drinking parties with GRIBANOV and TARABRIN. GRIBANOV played
[18167]r
[18169]absolutely no part in my entry into tae KGB. <i chink he could not
[18171]have played any perscnal part in my assignrent to the #irse
[18173]Section, First Lepartzent, Second Chief Directorate in 1953 since
[18174]at that time GRIBANOY was Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Direc-
[18176]torate supervising the Second Lepartrent ana not the First De-
[18177]partment. I do not know who mace the decision to transfer me
[18178]from the First Department to the Seventh bepartment in 1955, but
[18180]I did net have any personal contact or conversatica with GRIBANOV
[18182]concerning this decision. I do act know if GRIBANOV played any
[18183]personal part in my appointment as Deputy Chiet cf Section in
[18185]the Seventh Cepartmenct in 1958. 2 da not remerber dust who was
[18186]responsible for my appointment to this position. 7 did ast per-
[18188]sonally @iscuss this appointment with GRIBANOV. GRIBANGV decided
[18190]at the end of 1959 that I would be appointed Deputy Chief of che
[18191]First Section, First Department, Second Chief Directorate, and
[18192]this appointment took place sometire in January 1969. OUBAS,
[18194]the Chief of the Seventh Department in 1959, told we that GRIBANOV
[18196]planned to appoint me to this pesition and that he had spoken to
[18197]GRIBANOV two or three times about it, but had been unable to get
[18199]. GRIBANOV to change his plans. I spoke to GRIBANOV myself abcut
[18201]‘this matter once or twice. GRIBANOV did not tell me who had
[18203]recommended me for this new position and did not tell me eny.
[18205]reason for my having been selected. GRIBANCV did tell me that my
[18206]appointment was a part of his personal plan to raise to more ~
[18208]senior positions a number of younger officers, including myself
[18210]and Aleksey SUNTSOV. The decision for me to return to the Seventh
[18211]Department in January 1952 was actually made in. about September or
[18212]Octcber 1961. GRIBANOV planned to appoint me Deputy Chief of the
[18214]First Department, but the new Chief of the First Department,
[18216]FEDOSEYEV, wanted KOVSHUK to take this position. Since I did not
[18218]See below for a more detailed version of this affair. .
[18220]#¢ When NOSENKO arrived in Geneva in 1964 he was carrying a note
[18221]- addressed: "Personal to NOSENKO, Yu.I." In translation the
[18222]- mote read in. full: "Yu.I., get me please some more tablets
[18224]like the one you gave me once.: {signed}: GRIBAXOV." ©
[18226]vt ata
[18229]‘own gents to "GRIBANOV..- .GRIBANOV knew: about agents
[18230]mee Bp and 'ARTUR' (FRIPPEL}, ‘put I never “specifically.
[18231]discussed them with GRIBANOV. I did discuss with GRIBANOV the
[18232]agent ‘FROKHOR' (PREISFREUND). On three occasions I have been
[18233]with GRISANOV in social circumstances... On all three occasions.
[18234]TARABRIN was also present. After two of these occasicns, we”
[18235]had parties with girls. I dén't remember when the first time
[18236]was, but the last time was in September or Octoter 1963. On
[18237]this occasion they called me at home late at. night and aeked me”
[18238]to join them-at..the Prague Restaurant. I arranged for female
[18239]companionship ara this party lasted until early morning,* It
[18240]was at this party that I gave GRIBANOV some pilis I had for
[18241]hangovers. I had brought a supply of these back from Geneva. in
[18242]1962, A few days after this party [CRIBANOY's secretary Ye.S.}- .
[18243]KIRPICHNIKOV came to my office with a note from GRIBANOV asking:
[18244]me for some more of thegye pills. -This is the note I gave to my
[18245]CIA case officers in 1964.**. Xr have ridden in GRIBANOV's cars
[18246]perhaps four or five times, once when I went with him to an
[18247]- Indian Embassy reception in 1958, perhaps two or three timés to
[18248]_meetings witn SUSLOV and two or three times in connection with
[18249]the drinking parties with GRIBANOV and TARABRIN. GRIEANOV played
[18250]absolutely no part ia my entry into the KGB. I think he could not
[18251]have played any personal part in ny assignment to the rirst
[18252]Section, First Department, Second Chief Directorate in 1953 since
[18253]at that time GRIBANOY was Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Direc-
[18254]torate supervising the Second bepartment and not the First De-
[18255]partment. I do not know who made the decision to transfer me
[18256]from the First Department to the Seventh Department in 1955, but
[18257]I did =ct have any personei contact or conversation with GRIBAXOV
[18258]concerning this decision. I do net know if GRIBANOV played any
[18259]personal part in ny appointment as Deputy Chief of Section in
[18260]the Seventh Department in 1958. I do not remember just who was
[18261]responsible for my appointment to this position. I did not per-
[18262]sonally discuss this appointment with GRIBANOV. GRIBANOV decided
[18263]at the end of 1959 that I would be appointed Deputy Chief of the
[18264]First Section, First Department, Seccnd Chief Directorate, and
[18265]this appointment took place sometime in January 1960. DUBAS,
[18267]the Chief of the Seventh Department in 1959, told me that GRIBANOV -
[18269]planned to appoint me to this position and that he had spoken to
[18270]GRIBANOV two or three times about it, but had been unable to get
[18271]GRIBANOV to change his plans. I spoke to GRIBANOV myself abcut
[18272]this matter once or twice. GRIBANOV did not tell me who had
[18274]. yecommended me for this new position and did not tell me any
[18275]reason for my having been selected. GRIBANOV did tell me that my
[18276]appointment was a part of his personal plan to raise to more
[18277]senior positions a number of younger officers, including myself
[18278]and Aleksey SUNTSOV. The decision for me ‘to return to the Seventh
[18279]Department in January 1962 was actually made in about. September or
[18280]- October 1961. GRIBANOV planned to appoint me Deputy Chief of the
[18281]First Department, but the new Chief of the First Department,
[18282]FEDOSEYEV, wanted KOVSHUK to take this position. Since I did not
[18284]* e below for a more detailed version’ of this affair.
[18286]#® When. NOSENKO. arrived in Geneva in 1964: he was carrying a. “note.
[18287]_ad@ressed: “Personal to NOSENKO, Yu.I."- In translation the
[18288]‘mote read in full: "Yu.I., get me please some more ‘tablets.
[18289]Tike. the one you gave. ‘me. once’. {signed} ‘GRIBANOV. ” :
[18291]fo ethevtahee tSecthaties wilt elated
[18293]alin ae etitiSnaniy Carn tad 8
[18295]| ARN Sern
[18298]'-on SHAKOV. BANNIKOV was concerned with the question of who would
[18300]my making this: second trip.”
[18302]want to be placed in this position by GRIBANOV's order against the
[18303]wishes of PFDOSEYEV, I went to GRIBANOV and requested that I be _
[18304]transferied Lack to the Seventh Department, in any position. I a at
[18305]had already spoken to CHELNOXOV, who Wa3z then Chief of the Seventh _ i
[18306]Departrent, about this matter, and he had suggested that I go to: oot : j
[18307]GRIBANOV and ask to be returned to the Seventh Departmert. GRIBANGV . : i
[18308]finally agreed that I should return to the Seventh Deoartment as. : :
[18309]Chief of the First Section with the understanding tnat I would be. .
[18310]appointed Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department 1s soon as this . e
[18311]position would be vacated by [3.A.] BALDIN. In July 1962 I was _ pO 4
[18312]appointed Deputy. Chief of the Seventh Department. Whis Gecision ; : ot 74
[18313]was made by CHELNOKOV and .GRIBANGV in accordance with the intention :
[18314]stated by GRIBANOV at the end of 1961 that I should be appointed
[18316]to this position as scon as possible. I had no further personal
[18318]di:cussions with GRIBANOV. about this appointment et this time. In
[18320]1963 CHELNOKOV [GRIBANOV's. Depucy, F.D.] BOBKGY, and GRISANOV
[18322]decided that I should be named First Deputy Chief of the Seventh”
[18324]Department. ‘they cid not ciscuss this with me beforehand and no
[18326]order was igsued about this appointment. I was sinply told that
[18328]oe a eg Rina dat ed le
[18330]- from that time I would be considered as First Deputy Chief of the
[18332]Department, At this time I was, in fact, the only Deputy Chief of
[18333]the Seventh Department, since KORCBOV did not come ts the Seventh
[18334]Department until about November cr December 1963. GRIBANOV did
[18335]net tell me his reasons for appointing me Leputy Chief of the
[18336]First Section, First Department in January 1960, for wanting to
[18337]appoint ma Deputy Chief of the First Department in late 1961, or
[18339]-for appointing me Section Chief and later Deputy Chief of the
[18341]Seventh Lepartment in 1962. He did not discuss with ma my personal
[18342]qualifications for each of these positions. GRIBANOV had nothing
[18343]at all to do with my assignment to Geneva in 1962. I thing that
[18344]the kharakteristika written about me for this trip was signed by
[18345]BOBKOV, Since he was tne Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Direc-
[18346]torate who supervised the Seventh Department. TI did not personally
[18347]discuss this trip with GRIBANOV before my departure from Moscow.
[18349]My candidacy for this assignment was supported Sy BANNIKOV, the
[18350]Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate who supervised the
[18351]work of the Eleventh Department which had the investigative file
[18353]go as case officer on this trip because SHAKOV, who was suspected
[18355]-Of possibly being a Western agent, was to be in the delegation.
[18357]There was no background or neighborhood investigation conducted
[18359]on me in connection with my being approved for this trip. My
[18360]assignment was approved by the Eleventh Department, by the Person-
[18361]nel Office of the Second-Chief Directorate, by the Central Personnel
[18362]Office of the KGB and by the Central Committee of-the CPSU. GRIEANOV
[18363]had absolutely nothing to do with my assignment to Geneva in 1964. i.
[18364]The kharakteristika on me for this trip was signed by BOBKOV. For |
[18365]the [964 trip no decision of approval of the Central Committee of ; i a
[18367]dan
[18369].the CPSU was required for me or for any of the other members of
[18371]the delegation who had been approved for the 1962 trip. KKLOBU-
[18373]', STOV, PANCHENKO, and KOVALENKO supported me for the assignment as”
[18374]@ personal favor to me. I-did not discuss my. 1964 trip to Geneva
[18376]with GRIBANOV prior to my departure. In fact, I was even afraid
[18377]that GRISANOV would find out that I was going and would object to
[18380]14-0000
[18383]23.1 Febru sary 1965 1965: NOSENKO cor d on. his: social ;
[18384]_* encounters with GRIBANOV:and- TAPABRLID he tetlovings which was’
[18385]“not included in the. protocol. -quoted above, is tater, from case
[18386]officer notes. .
[18388]Question: Teil me’ about’ thee gecasions when you were with GRIBANOV j
[18389]and TARABRIN. ‘ . of
[18391]NOSENKO: Three times--drinking in cafes. Twice afcerwards there
[18392]were girls. The most recent time was in September or
[18393]October 1963. I don't remember the first time.. In —
[18394]. 1963 I received a call from. TARABRIN at home. - Then © .
[18395]GRIBANOV got on the phone and told me to take his car a i
[18396]“and come join them at the Praga Restaurant. I didn't’ ~ te i
[18397]take his car. because I didn't want to call the duty-
[18398]officer. 1 took a cab and went to the Fraga, They
[18399]were sitting there and drinking in a private room. I
[18400]joined them. They were drinking channagne, but I took
[18401]cognac. TARABRIN suggested girls about. 1230 and GRIBANOV
[18402]made me go tc the office to get my notebook. I called
[18403]one girl I knew--her and her sister. When I got back
[18404]to the restaurant it was closed with only GRIBANOV and
[18405]TAPABRIN still there. We went to the giris' (apartment).
[18406]They weren't prostitutes exactly. I knew her before.
[18409]ce EE Tt tla cor,
[18411]Question: Is this why GRIBANOV called you to the restaurart (i.e.,
[18412]te provide girls)?
[18414]NOSENKO: I think so. It was the second time I had participated
[18415]a in this. This last time GRIBANOV told the girl his
[18416]name. The girl works in the Archives of the First Cnief
[18417]Directorate. At that time of night I wasn't able to
[18418]reach anyone else. Her name is Galina Mikhaylovna.
[18419]Her mother works in the Central Committee. I don't ; :
[18420]remember her last name. GRIBANOV was drinking and she .
[18421]toid him that she had quarreled with ZAYTSEV, the Chief
[18422]of the First Chief Directorate Archives. GRIBANOV
[18423]. told her that he would give her a job and told me to
[18424]i arrange for a job in the American Department of the
[18425]Second Chief Directorate for her. Galina's flat is in
[18426]the building inhabited by Central Committee workers on | .
[18427]Kutuzovskiy Prospekt. GRIBANOV's driver drove him
[18428]home at 0600 and he was in the office py 0830.
[18430]eather we
[18432]3 March 1965: Speaking of the damage his disclosures must
[18433]have Caused the KGB, NOSENKO said: "I believe they will punish i
[18434]people in the Second Chief Directorate [SCD]... Even GRIBANOV... |
[18435]. He was personally responsible, as head of the SCD, for pushing
[18436]_ ™e ahead.” | . soa
[18438]we hate
[18440]“Question: What sort of punishment? . ee
[18441]_ gE TOR
[18443]NOSENKO:; Even firing. _ =
[18445]Question: Do you think any others would be punished, or even
[18446]fired?
[18448]NOSENKO : Maybe. KOVALENKO, BOBKOV, and feople in the Eleventh
[18449]" Department. _ Many others», 00. ee : —
[18451]FEE neces temerity tne over msm
[18456]Later in the same session the interrogator. returned to this “subject:
[18457]The following is a transcript of the. discussion:.
[18459]Question:
[18461]' NOSENKO:
[18462]Question:
[18464]Question:
[18466]Question:
[18468]Question:
[18470]Question:
[18473]Question:
[18476]Question:
[18480]Question:
[18484]Question:
[18486]You said you trink GRIBANOV migkt be fired. Yet, there”
[18487]is nothing in the protocol you signed {see above] about
[18488]your relations with GRIBANOV which would ceem to make
[18489]him personally responsible for you. Is there something
[18490]€lse, something you haven't told me? ,
[18492]No.
[18494]Why then do you think GRIBANOV would be fired?
[18496](no answer) .
[18498](repeats)
[18500]Don't know.
[18502]Well, what is your opinion at least?
[18504]Nothing, nothing. Let's not discuss this.
[18506]Why not?
[18508]It's simply my opinicn, that's all. I don't know why.
[18509]Well, what is your cpinior:?
[18511]He was responsible for my becoming Deputy Chief of
[18512]Department.
[18514]But you had already gotten ahead before: you said he
[18515]didn't help you become Deputy Chief of Section in 1958.
[18517]Yes.
[18518]Did you ever hear any gossip about his help to you?
[18520]It was said in the SCD that he helped me become Chief
[18521]of Section and Deputy Chief of Department.
[18523]Why would BOBKOV be punished?
[18525]He was “my supervisor, and in ‘61 he was Secretary of
[18526]the KGB Party Organization.
[18528]would others in the Party Organization ‘be punished?. ee
[18534]Question:
[18536]. Would BANNIKOV be punished?
[18538]Yes, also in the Party Organization of the Seventh
[18539]Department and of the SCD. _ wee
[18541]~NOSENKO= .
[18543]No. He did nothing, just supported my | candidature for .
[18544]Geneva.
[18546]Question: .
[18548]Would KOVSHUK be punished? woe re aaa
[18551]. NOSENKO;
[18556]Question:
[18564]Question:
[18566]NOSENKO
[18568]Question:
[18570]NOSENKO
[18572]Question:
[18576]Question:
[18580]Question:
[18582]. 335.
[18584]Of course they would speak with KOVSHUK, GUK, GRYAZNOV, |
[18585]who talked to me.
[18587]‘How about the First Chief Lirectorate and the Seventh
[18591]No. I wasn't close to them, except GUX.
[18593]How about First Chief Directorate residencies abroad?
[18594](S.I.] GAVRICHEV might ke recalled from Geneva.
[18596]You must be withholding something about: your relation-
[18597]ship with GRIBANOV.
[18599]No, I was telling you | I visited his cffice. He told
[18600]me: ‘I found out you're drinking too much.’ I said
[18601]no, not especially. He said: ‘Stop this drinking
[18602]with KOVSHUK. It's not good for you.’
[18604]But this couldn't harm GRIBANOV's fesiticn now.
[18606]They would review my file, and find tnat it contained
[18607]the report about the woman in '54,* the fact that I
[18608]was turned down for assignment to Ethiopia, drinking,
[18609]scandals--GRIBANOV knew about this, but he approved
[18610]my appointment (to Deputy Chief of Cepartment) anyway.
[18612]Why did he promote you?
[18614]GRIBANOV thought I was a young, active guy. Six re-
[18615]cruitments--oh, they weren't much, but it sounds
[18616]great for the First Department, which was having no
[18617]success with Americans in the Embassy.
[18619]But why make you Deputy Chief of Department?
[18621]He thought I was a tough guy, good case cfficer. In
[18622]'59 I saw him often and was involved in a lot of
[18624]‘operations which were reported to him.
[18626]But it was not then, but in 1961, when he made you
[18627]Deputy Chief of Department.
[18629](shrugs)
[18631]who would officially approve a Deputy Chief of Depart~
[18634]4
[18635]3
[18636]i
[18637]3
[18638]i
[18642]Must be higher than a Department. Chief--bec. :se
[18644]GRIBANOV: signed. They could get him for his, especially
[18646]those who are, against GRIBANOV.
[18650]‘Well, IVANOV, who wanted to get promoted to _ Deputy.
[18654]Chief of Department. in 59-60. but didn't. ‘He was in an.
[18656]". dngpection group: of the Cotlegiumy checking the: Seventh .
[18658]Department...
[18659]_ . SresaET this is a reference: ‘to. ‘NOSENKO's contracting venereal
[18661]_ disease: (see Part Iv. C22.)
[18664]14-0000
[18666]Accordir.g to :
[18668]source
[18670]. Ao EE z FRERG
[18672]Cuestion: But GRIBANOV must have approved all the other Ceputy
[18673]~ te tf or:
[18675]Departrent. Chiefs, ¢
[18677]oo. “ould the sere happen
[18678]of them defecte i? So :
[18680]NGOSENKO : Well, if 21t was from the Second Bepirtnent, for ean
[18681]no, because GRIEANOV wasn't parsonally supervising it.
[18682]“yt woule be someone else's proposal. [7 my case it was
[18684]his own. ininistive. : .
[18686]Cuestion: Was anyone in the First Chiel Direccorate punished a3
[18687]a result of GOLITSYN's detection?
[18688]Ne, absolutely not.
[18690]2. Information fron £5
[18692]Ag indicated in Part III.I., a number of sources have reporte
[18693]that GRIBANOV and other KGB officers were discharged from tne KGS
[18694]in the wake of NOSENKO's Esta PS cs
[18696]Siro fitdeeak ‘ Rs eae au
[18697]15 KGB ofticers iad aiready been dismissed from the KGB kecause
[18698]of the defection, and that SRIBANOV and’ three of his Geputics wre.
[18699]ineluded in this number. One of the deputies wes named "BAMNIK"
[18700]{BANNIKGY). GRIBANOV's guilt was said to rest in the facts that,
[18701]as Chief of the Second Chief Directcrate, he had been ultimately
[18702]responsible for NOSENKO's flight; that NOSLNKO was his perscnal
[18703]friend ane protege; and that, therefore, he snould have been aware
[18704]Of NOSENKO’s intention to defect. ;
[18708]an
[18710]when HOSE : Leang Cconsia ion in the Soviet dele-
[18712]gatior. to go to Geneva, a summary statement cf NCSENKO's activities
[18714]and capabilities was prepared by employees of tac Secona Chief
[18715]Directorate and was sent to GRIBANOV... SR.g29 said he understood
[18716]this summary contained considerable ‘compromising’ information re-~
[18717]garding NOSENKO and, if acted on properly, would have removed
[18718]NOSENIO from future consideration ror the trip to Geneva.
[18720]Stated, however, that he understood fron conversations with other.
[18722]KGa employees, whom he could not recall specifically by name, that
[18723]GRIBAKOV read the summary material, ran a line through ail of it,
[18725]* tn addition, a western Ambaseadox with when GRIBANOV was in - me
[18727]“operational _ccntact—in-Moscew-has-—stated—that-GRIBANOV-disap—
[18729]another KGB handler. (He has also-indicated that GRIBANOV..
[18731]peared from .the scene sometime. in mid-1965 and. was. replaced by. -.
[18733]disappeared about the time of KHRUSHCHLV'S downfall in. Octeber —
[18734]1964.) ae . : we ee
[18737]oe Gee
[18739]don cen the summary, ‘Send hit to Cenevaw’. ae
[18740]wei 2 . the genezal feeling arong KGB iperscay 00 oe. |
[18741]nek thay CRIBANOY Was willing Lo overlook a lot of deficiencies —
[18742]about MCSENKO because of GRIBANOV's long-tiire ¢riendship with
[18743]NOSENHO's father." es ee
[18744]> secora me to sensitive :
[18745]DB ya CEE EY sire.
[18746]7 enh eh Hi
[18748]Ek? ¥ <n : a3, a rf, newts apes sent ae 3
[18749]ean WoV'a Cismigaay tock place inzediately after HOSENKO's
[18750]defaztion in February 1964 and-no leas than 50 other officers;
[18752]Lost of them from the Sucond Chief Ptrectorate and many of them
[18753]cicae frienda-cf GutBANov, had been fired subsequently. CiGeaee
[18754]Sar eeeibee prior to NOSENKO's defection, N
[18755]ta deputy to a Department Chief ia the Sacond Chief Direc-
[18756]torate but that he held only the rank of captdin in the KCB.
[18757]attributed NOSENKO's high position to the influence which
[18758]GRIBAROV exerted on his behalf. = : Sec ence
[18759]j rather than being fired, Major General "B; KR" (BANNIAGY)
[18760]had been appointed Acting Chief of the Second Chief Directorate in
[18761]GRIBANOV's stead.* i
[18763]eT EOS Sea
[18764]Giceetm after the defectica of NOSENKO, the Kel sonducted an ex-
[18765]tensive investigation:cf personac] in KSB Headquarters to find out
[18766]which KGB officers knew him, ‘One o. these questioned was TARASHIN,
[18767]who said he was ecquainted with NOSENKO, but that their relation-
[18768]ship was only casual and was limited to occasional official con-
[18769]tacts within the KGB. Subsequent investigation determined, however,”
[18770]that TAPABRIN and GRIBANGV were close friends socially and had
[18771]attended several parties which NOSENKO had arcanged and attended.
[18772]Girls provided by NOSENKO were at these parties.** As a result of
[18773]hie willful concealment of this information, TARABRIN, Like GRIBANOYV,
[18774]was discharged from the KGB and dismissed frem the Communist Party
[18776]of the Soviet Union. :
[18777]t
[18779]Nas [7a
[18783]j
[18784]i
[18787]4
[18789]i
[18791]os aRigy sR BANNIKOV was the Acting Chief of the © ‘
[18793]Second Chief Directorate. NOSENKO, as noted above, said that
[18794]BANNIKOV would not be punished as a result of his defection,
[18795]NOSENKO also said that it was BANNIKOV who sponsored NOSENKO's :
[18796]1964 trip to Geneva and that GRIBANOV had nothing to do with it 4
[18798]‘ or the 1962 trip. . ; f
[18802]**® These evide i @escribed by NCSENKO (see
[18803]above). wove at the time of . F
[18806]his_removal_trcm—tne
[18808]_ .— | promoted-to the position of Deputy Chicf of the newly established” ~ ~
[18810]Department of the KGB First Chief Directorate. NOSENKO said
[18811]that TARABRIN held this post until 1963, at which time he was 7
[18813]"Service Number Two" (counterintelligence) of the First Chief
[18815]Directorate.
[18818]o
[18820]‘e Sovict scientist with suspected: intelligenca connections |
[18822]I, Cenfire atios fr fron other § Sz eHEees ©
[18824]1, introduction
[18826]Since NOSENXD's defection several Soviet sevrets and
[18827]dofectors. have provided information Supporting . AHOSENKO's
[18828]clains of having nell certain positicns in the ob at. cer-
[18829]tain tines. FN * ; gar fig
[18831]CURR Soe ek
[18833]who was appreacied by Cla, Soviet caso officers for en
[18834]EMEP double asent (a NOSENKO lead) ,and the KGB cfficer
[18836]“hand ling Roberz Les JCIINSON (also a NUSENKD lead), a Sov-
[18838]det journalist who contacted the magazins Paris Nets h
[18840]with a proposal te write an article on NOSERKO, and two
[18841]defectors, Sere of these suurces hed se ppovted NOSENKG
[18842]directly by reporting that ne was a Second Chics Diroce
[18843]torate officer in the various positions he sax. he was, -
[18844]Others have offered indirect support by confirning HOSENKU'S
[18845]knowledge of particular pieces cf iatormation cr con-
[18846]firning the validity of +nfornat yon | which NOSENKO said he
[18847]lestned while in particular kKG3 jcts, As will be noted,
[18849]- the inform eticn froa one source sonatines contradicts
[18851]that learned from another or fron NOSENKO himself.
[18855]ae BED has corroborated NOSENKO's story indirectly
[18856]by acre vescriptions of the reporcussions of the defection :
[18857]within the Ko a frarticulacly, the firing of GRIRANOV) #RatREeo eR
[18858]Ee CRN TR PEER ATR RAL ang
[18859]by his staterents concerning tus Probab 1G mg ne t that ths
[18860]defection woul id have on KGS caper OR rae:
[18862]various tines 3 that NOSENKO is “nore valuaole than PEN-
[18863]KOVSKTY," that ne is wvastly more important than DERYABIN
[18864]or GOLITS YN," that th GB “will not be able tc. operate.
[18865]normal] for te veal ayy hat it is the “unanimous opinion”
[18866]© f . 7 - TAT AAT
[18868]ROSEN Could do tremendous harm to the KGB, ana
[18869]that this danage would be severo "for several years to
[18870]come", :
[18872]paihas also given indirect support to NOSENKO's
[18873]statement tnat he was Veput; Chief of sere U.S, Embassy. .
[18874]Section. ® SR eg & eye @' asia "chick". had. a
[18876]an tends
[18878]cone co tgbiane
[18880]mort ee
[18882]—aecess to de AL is ities against the U.S.Em-
[18883]bassy, and ee “Se Reieterhe loss suffered by the
[18885]KGB as a resulz a eeNRO's Knowledge of the mi¢rophones -
[18886]installed in the Embassy, (NOSENKO has said that this ine |
[18887]formation was available to hin only’ bec aut iadls was Deputy
[18891]reported that NOSENKO's. position as 2. “wohief™ an the. Second... --
[18892]Chief Directorate gave | him access to the: nemes and backgrounds
[18894]: 4 Rpsever Ts no tknosn To have sraveT™ ‘specifically
[18895]thar SOSENKO was .a senior ¢fticial in the Anerican Eabassy
[18896]Section. of the: American Department | in 1960 and: ADE
[18899]and to sens
[18901]operational, 1
[18903]7
[18904]se
[18906]a Abin. tH oe on,
[18907]was Jonn UPS, ne
[18909]Tha ay
[18911]a. : erecta retrunted in
[18913]ry 13€2 on homosexual grounds; this
[18914]s
[18916]Leningrad in: Jan alg
[18917]informaticn NOSENKO Said fe learned as Chief ot tne
[18918]American Tourist Sectjs:. of tla Tuuris gare
[18919]Further exacples of Ge S nis
[18921]way are revi
[18923]the KG NGOSENKO weckeda‘in the Second Directors
[18924]he once worked against personne] of the U.5. 238y
[18925]in Moscow; later he was assigneu to work against &.S. :
[18926]journalists in Moscow. During his last years with the KGa,
[18927]he.was assigned to the task of working against *merican and
[18930]14-0000
[18932]|
[18933]_ ee 2
[18934]Eurcp ean tourists: in. Mose i
[18935]Gr eRaw, was that of be: - {
[18936]udetrtment, Second.chief.v ees 1 4
[18937]® Gare SRD NOSENKO secured tris relay eSat ion”. Le ;
[18938] Bveese” of nelp he.receives- “21 GRIBANOV,
[18939]Chief of the, Second. Directord : through- oe i
[18940]out NOSENKO's caréer, GREGANOW ‘had’ “him and--. om ; '
[18941]suw that he was promoted..." - in
[18942]to NCSENKO!s: Ki igh
[18943]tae eee : st.
[18944]"it appeared quite coftain th ‘Of.7
[18945]-Lievtenna: Colonel. in the kob.” SN
[18946]Eh - reported havang lesrnedt KGB of-
[18948]i , ~ <s = : . 4
[18949]he feeis that NOSENKO has agtueliy deretted or whether Aa
[18950]feels that this might be a 'trick' by the KGB. He SS
[18951]replied that from his own knowledge — this matter, he is
[18952]convinced that NOSENKO's defection is net 2 ttrick! by the
[18953]KGB.". . Co bte ee
[18954]303 ee sénsitive source.. | ~
[18955]ae tho
[18956]aah
[18957]Gti OSENKA-
[18958]from various persons ae had never knean
[18959]‘NOSENKO ‘personally.: an irportant boss
[18960]inthe Kod. Ue said he did net know. dirsctcrate oF
[18961]department NOSENKO had been in. Ze 42 con-
[18962]tinued that when NCSENKO was a young catne vas in the
[18963]’ GRU Military Academy *** and‘then [was¥ sent to the TInfer- - ; - ;
[18964]macion Department. cf the. GRU for a short tire; in all,
[18965]- * Salt \
[18966]St s i eat 7. a !
[18967]Ble Sore: s . ein a: . . . : :
[18968]*@ Untii January 1965 NOSENKO maintaingd that he had pre- | _
[18969]_ gressed through the, KGB ranks in-n 1isequence, tTom ee : 4
[18970]— -  Jiéutenantto licutenant_coleneél 26 January-1965., == == 2
[18971]: however, he said that because oc - nistrative confusion ‘
[18972]and GRIRANOV's advice he had skipred’ the rank of majer and :
[18973]- -. ARad-moved directly, from captain to Rievtenant colonel in--- = => °° 7) + 7
[18975]~ never held ‘the rank of lieutenant colons) and was really
[18977]late 1963, In April 1966 NOSENKG told Cia that he had os a f
[18979]only a captain (see Part ViG.1.J.. =
[18981]piecemgrecseamngse dalam se opm a rpsent ste ae
[18983]bey
[18984]V
[18986]“aaa The Military-Viplematic Acadezy i the strategic intel- §-~ SR
[18987]_ ligence school of the GRU... Althouga..OSENKY said he. en
[18988]“o- attended various naval-type scheals- before joining. the. =
[18990]_ GRU, he insisted that he was never er
[18992]Soviet Navy. “H
[18993]_- attend. the. it
[18994]GRU Military Acaden
[18995]‘ courses that he-had
[18997]rolled: in a. fernal
[18998]iment..of the
[19000]intelligence course of any tra
[19004]feck
[19008]ain
[19012]perhaps a vear. . PN Sas oe es ROSE
[19013]been a very undiseip Ca person where ih lie GRE and tnot.
[19015]Suave been dascharged fron the ON, . , oo
[19016]however, tus labher. wae “Is & ry doflueitial person in”
[19017]he Ministry of Shipoualdiny, W ahtle to get NOoENKO trates
[19019]ferred to the EGB. i Tie wat che oprpion os bbe pere
[19020]‘ be
[19022]information about VOSETSXO that
[19024]very good." ile was
[19026]ae tate deat ub areata del Slee
[19028]sons from whom ie hese 5
[19029]_ NGSENKO nad given very. very inbormestion to the U.S. ‘
[19030]after his Cetcetion and that Qohad had great access
[19031]to FG information shich inc luce: , or CE covere- :
[19032]ave of puople in fooe vw. mieress ba Une ere! u og
[19033]pussies, ete. & “ esa 2 or the FS. be
[19034]assy bad feud we Mee Ed EE Ge Pott ON bead
[19036]vO. ho sourcid his knowledge Of © I
[19037]io an incident which eevmued about 1950, while NOSENKO Said
[19038]he was in the Pourist Departyent.*t
[19039]4
[19041]a
[19043]Wa indicatea ir Part V.E.3.p.. the final senteme is largely. _
[19045]but not entire? correct...
[19047]+*Sce Part V.F.8..
[19050]1400000
[19052]' $§, “FIRES
[19054]. | QPESERRCRTES: Wa tests sie Fase
[19055]at the time cf the defection, NOSENKO was rcoming +h Geneva
[19056]with Nikolay RESHETNYAK,: a representative of thw Inter-
[19057]national Organizations Branch of the Ukrainian Ministry
[19058]of Foreign Affairs, NESHETNYAK toldmEwer ere that NOSENKO
[19059]often left his quarters withcut saying where he was going,
[19060]but it was assumed that NOSENKO was “Intelligence” and had
[19061]gone mission.to acconmplish.**  C:SaiiRmi amy Ere r ess
[19063]erm RESHETNYAK had been interrcgate! uy th
[19065]PRS Bite ete
[19066]aaa ection with the NOSENKO- defection. HESHETAYAK also toid =253
[19068]G38 that he had attendod the Moscow. trial of NOSENAO, ~
[19070]held in absentia, at which NOSENKO was “found guilty of
[19072]treason and was sentenced to death. Sige pthought s. °
[19074]the KGB might go so far as to send somecne to the United
[19075]States -to locate and kill NOSENKO. Finally, he has -reported
[19077]_on the dismissa} of large numbers of KGB officer's, in-
[19079]cluding GRIBANOV and Yuriy GUK, and other repercussions
[19080]within the KGB of NOSENKO's detecticn (see Part 111.1.4.)
[19082]6. GAMKRELIDZE |
[19084]NOSENKO's service in the American Department was con-
[19085]fizacdin the fall of 1964. by the Soviet mathematician R.V,
[19086]GAMKRELIDZE.*** At that time an American scientist brovght. 5
[19087]up with GAMKRELIDZE the subject of the ABEL-PONERS exchango****
[19089]See rare oved oSe
[19091]a& = NOSBNKO identified RESHETNYAK as a Ukrainian Ministry of | ©
[19092]Foreign Affairs officer on the stafr of the Disarnament
[19093]Delegation, Asked on 24 January 1904 whether RESHETNYAK
[19094]might be suspicious of his absences for meetings with ClA,..
[19095]NOSENKO replied: "Ile thinks I'm KGS,..so of course there's
[19097]No problem if I come back late." Gay ey i
[19098]ported that RESHETNYAK had been dis.itssed.ircm the KGB as
[19100]a result of. the defection of NOSENKO. CIA has no other
[19101]- yeports of RESHETNYAK having served in the. KGa,
[19103]#e® GAMKRELIDZE is suspected of. having connections with Soviet
[19104]Intelligence because of his statements and actions, a5 :
[19105]we l as his unusual freede= of movenent, often alone, while oe
[19106]on visits to the United States. When approached by a CIA." * |. 17. |
[19107]representative with a recruitment proposal in 1964, GAM-. . : :
[19108]KRELIDZE declined but. added that he "welcomed the op-
[19110]portunity—to-meet-with-an-American Intelligence officerss:
[19111]Since this enabled him to compare the Soviet. Intelligance
[19112]officers he has met with their American counterparts," —
[19113]During this meeting, GAMKRELIDZE raised the subject of
[19114]NOSENKO again, describing. him as “obviously a traitor to
[19115]his country." : ae :
[19117]aee®The exchange of the KGB. Illegal Rudoif Ivanovich ABEL 4
[19118]for Francis Gary POWERS, the U-2 pilot, took place.in ss: Se
[19123]“' .NOSERKO.
[19125]. organization in 1961 for the MVD.. GOLITSYN said that in general,
[19127]“383.
[19129]and asked whether the Russian pecri¢ had been tole aba ite
[19131]“GAMKRELIDZE replied that they hed not boon held officialay ‘but
[19133]knew it had taken place since there + u
[19134]Moscow. As an example, he said t:
[19135]had heard about the NOSENKO defect
[19136]panding, GAMKRELIDZE stated that ¢:
[19137]the cofection “was very danagin ¢
[19138]NOSENKO was the Chief of the Amer:
[19139]identities of all Soviet agents an
[19141]iayrapeyvene™ ir
[19143]. Ws way” thac he
[19145]Doar zen Glaticance., Ee2-
[19146]“qraceyines indicated that
[19148]covet Inve liagence in thit
[19150]setion, and ne “new the
[19152]united States,"
[19154](7. GOLITSYN
[19156]The defector COLITSYN is tne cally source Of anformation cn
[19157]NOSENFO's KGB carver who Claims teh: wily acquainted
[19158]with him. GOLIYSYN. said that he . first time in
[19159]1953 when visiting the American nt_of the HGH Serand Chief
[19160]Directorate con business, and that ard 3 e with NOSSNYO on
[19162]; “in 1959, * This
[19164]Saw
[19166]first-hand information from GOLITS
[19168]sistent either internaliy or in vomparisen with that supplied ny
[19170]-ClA has no record that GOLTITSYN, pricr to the publicity
[19171]attending NOSENKO's defection, ever mentioned him by name or in
[19172]connection with the KGB Second Chieti Dircctorate, On 19 March
[19174]962, prior to NOSENKO's first contact with CIA, GOLI'TSYN was
[19175]shown NOSELKO's name among those of other Soviets in Geneva fo.
[19176]the Cisarmament Conference He farir nd bo comment, on it.
[19178]On 26 June 1962, after CIA's initial mectings with NOSENXKO
[19179]and because of the large overlap of NUSENKO's informetion ané
[19180]contacts with GOLITSYN's, one of the CLA case officers who. nad
[19181]met NOSENKO 1n Geneva met with GOLITSYN to cbtain his comments.
[19182]cn some of the NOSENKO material. GOLLTSY! was told thar CIA had
[19183]received in Switzerland an anonymous let.er which reported cer-
[19184]tain information from within the «5B; the CIA offic:al stated
[19185]to GOCLITSYN that the information so Closely overlappes Ais own
[19187]reporting, including promanent mention of COLITSYN's friends GUK,
[19189]KOVSHUK, ané CHUPANOV, that the péssibility of disinferwation .
[19190]was suspected, perhaps in relation to GULITSYN's cwn defaction.
[19191]Ten major items from NOSENKO were discussed with GOLITSYN, all
[19192]pertaining to Secend Chief Directorate operations,’ and a list
[19193]of 15 names was shown him, identified as names of Second Chief
[19194]Directorate personnel whom the letter writer had named Among
[19195]these names was (fnu) NCSENKO, and GOLITsYN indicated he had
[19196]previously reported on him; CIA records, however, shew that .
[19197]GOLITSYN had reported only on: one Aleksandr Fedoseyevich NOSENKO,.
[19198]who had been a KGB officer in Japan when -RASTVOROV defected to
[19199]the U.S. in 1954. GOLITSYN made ro further comments on these
[19200]names, except to say that one identified as KGB had left that
[19202]lacking the full details ‘necessary for an assessment, he could
[19203]say that there were serious signs of disinformation in what he __
[19205]had ‘Seen; he wanted to.seé the full information on the case.
[19206]Subsequently GOLITSYN made numerous demands for this informa-
[19207]tion,_complaining.to Attorney..General | Robert_KENNEDY—and-senior-
[19209]of ‘the ‘Second. Chief Directorate. working. against Amex,
[19211]_pertstinerion 2
[19213]“
[19214]|
[19216]4
[19217]oF
[19219]4
[19220]oak:
[19222]Le
[19225]heats
[19227]‘CIA officials” because his request nad net been granted.
[19229]On 10 February 1964: NOSENKO' s: defection from the: Soviet. ‘Disarma--
[19231]ment eet ton. in Geneva, Switzerland, \ including
[19233]s publicized, -
[19234]. Woen, GORE SN: hed he
[19236]. 1962. 2. ‘
[19237]to bt: “he thereupon stated: that he recalled -KOSENK
[19239]ome. ba’ ground: on the. case and. an indica
[19241]~ QP SECRET
[19245]wii Sth ‘
[19250]a a
[19252]reservations” about NOSENKO" 's° “bona fide . ‘Cver. the next se
[19254]- Other Embassy personnel or corr:
[19256]“with him-after work,-and Had“oncé entertained KASHCHEYEV af
[19258]cal.
[19259]months GOLITSYN was provided with macerial. from .the 1952 ‘and 1964
[19260]meetings with tIOSENKO in Switzerlami, ana at his request was sup-
[19261]plied wath all the available ‘biogrephic data to-assist him ins.)
[19262]analyzing the KG3 operation; On 29 June 1954; GOLITS Wi was inter-_
[19263]viewed in detail on the subject of NOSENKI. Ge conf ir eq NOSIN.
[19264]KO‘s identity as the son of the former Minizzer of Sh Liding
[19266]and said that he was a KGB officer who had worked in tne American
[19267]Department and the Tourist Department cf SBts Second Chiet
[19268]Directorace. He was shown a photograph of NCSENKO inot buried
[19270]in a photo spread, but singly) and he said that the ,hotograph |
[19271]depicted NOSEUKO, GOLITSYN sid he knew this because he Wed pere
[19272]sonally acquainted with KOSENKO, having met him two of three
[19274]‘tines an the U.S. Embassy Sex ctaon While tnere on -KGE Firs: Chief
[19276]Lirectorate business im 1953. He had clso seen NOSENKO cccasion-~
[19277]ally at work during 1358 and *959 and when GCLITSYN asked hin
[19278]whore he was working 1n 1969, .CSEsKG told him that he was in
[19280]the Tourist Separmment. Fineliy. GOLSTSm@ id, he and NOSEUKO
[19281]knew cre another through their ane friendshi ps with yu. Tr.
[19282]CUK, Via. CHURANOV, ana. Ye.G., KASHCHEYEV,* A. cording to GOLITSYN,
[19284]NOSENKO served in the U.S. Pion sy sect ior foom 1953 uncrl 1957
[19285]or 1958 end was specifically responsitle for KG cover2¢e of Aner-
[19286]ican military personnel «<n Mescew during the first year of this
[19288]period. For the remainder of his services in che U.S. Embassy
[19290]Section, until 1957 or 1959, GOLITSYN said. NOSENKO may have had
[19291]these.same responsibilities or ne may have been working against
[19292]vondéents. He was definitely in
[19293]the American Department during this entire period. In 1957 or
[19294]1958, NOSENKO transferred to the Tourist Department and wis a
[19295]seniors case officer there as of 1959.°* GOLINSYN was certain that
[19296]NOSENKO did not work in the American Department of the Second
[19297]Chief Directorate at any time during 1960. ‘This he said he xnew
[19298]because he hed visited the U.S. Embarsy Section on at least three
[19299]occasions during the early part of 1960 and again in about Decem-
[19300]ber 1960 (sxe, accually January 1961). *** COLITSYN sa:d that he
[19302]knew in detail who was in the section, and that he wouid nave
[19303]‘known if NOSENKO had been there, particularly if he were the
[19307]photograph and has consistently. denied ever seeing cr meet
[19308]ing him. After the Gefection, NCSENKO was asked what he knew
[19309]of GOLITSYN, He imnediatély gave a detailed account of
[19310]an incigent which GOLITSYN himself had previously reported
[19311]to CIA: GOLITSYN and KASHCHEYEV in 1951 or 1952 had written
[19312]a letter to the Central Committee of the Commaunist Party
[19313]proposing a reorganization and redirection of First Chief.
[19314]Directorate intelligence. activities: as a result of this
[19315]letter COLITSYN and KASHCHEYEV had been received by MALENKOV.
[19316]an@ STALIN, and their proposals were accepted. This was
[19317]NOSENKO's first mention of KASHCHEYEV, Dut he added at this
[19318]time that he was personally acquainted with chim, ‘had seen
[19319]him periodically at KGB Headouarters, sometimes: had a drink
[19321]ere ee
[19323]‘his dacha in-1953 of 1954. GOLITSYN. saw NOSENKO's reply to
[19324]his question prior to. making the above statement, and KOS2N.. .
[19326]i
[19327]i
[19328]i
[19329]j .
[19330]1
[19331]i
[19332]i
[19333]|
[19334]i
[19335]|
[19336]b
[19337]if
[19339]{rootnotes. continued on nent payee).
[19341]KO*s claims of friendships with. Yu.1. GUK and V/A. GEFRANCY
[19342]were included in the file GOLITSYN. studied.
[19345](Continuation of footnotes fron preceding pase.)
[19347]tn This ‘chronology differs fran an that. provided by NOSENKO and
[19348]described previously: - Az “ca rding to NOSENKO,-he served in
[19349]the American Department to mid-1955, in the Tourist Depart-
[19350]ment from 1955 until Januasy 1960, in the Americdn Depert-
[19351]ment during 1960 and 196i, ard again in the Tourist Depart~
[19352]nent from 1962 until nis: Sefer tion. NOSENKO's confirmed
[19353]19565 operg  EVRGI ahd his 1957 operations - .
[19354]against nd Gisella HARRYS tend to confirm ce .¢
[19355]|
[19356]|
[19358]y
[19360]2
[19362]his connecticn with tcurist operations in 1956 and 1957.
[19364]- *** GOLITSYN had spoken as early as December 1961 of these
[19365]visits to the U «8. Embassy Section.
[19367]****GOLITSYN had earlier reported that G. L. GRYAZNOV was acting
[19368]as the assistant of the chief cf section at this time. He
[19369]has never identified the Deputy Chief of the U.S. Snbassy
[19370]Section nor indicated that such a position was on the
[19371]table of organization.
[19375]pe lenlea pele eae
[19378]vapotog + B -
[19380]“NG
[19384]e micrcphones in the U:S.-Emd
[19385]from the tranucript ‘of her renarkd:
[19387]Question:
[19389]Question:
[19391]Questions:
[19393]. Question:
[19395]Question:
[19397]* V.G. SVIRIN was said by
[19399]said she. Snow that.. NOSENZD: nad ‘told the Ameries
[19403]pin Moscow, The following: ia
[19405]Do you know anything about NOSENKO, the” ‘one whe
[19406]defected an Geneva?
[19408]I Gidn't have any real information. I heard: ecma
[19409]gossip, and the gossip was that he ia the sen of
[19410]a general, that his mother is Jewish, and that hig
[19411]nother was always involved in send Dlackmarketing,
[19412]that his father had great concern ver the famtly,
[19413]This is, you know, idle talk. I don't really knacw--
[19414]it was just gossip.
[19416]Would you say that this idle talk wus among KG!
[19418]You know, 1 didn't kncw many EG people. . Ie wag
[19419]only Wr. SVIPIN,*
[19421]But he told you about this?
[19423]We didn't tell mea, he told Pe CRS ;
[19424]husband), ah--you know, they like to think they
[19425]are all-powerful, that this min of course will
[19426]be exterminated one cay. They always repeat it,
[19427]Well, somelcdy committed suicide. ‘The old de-
[19428]fector, that GUZENKO, [ think, Yese-l read in
[19429]the paper. ;
[19431]But what vere you saying about this Geneva NOSENKO? |
[19432]Nis mother is Jewish, his. tather was a general.
[19434]What was his father in?
[19436]I really den't know.
[19438]Were there others who suffered as a result of this?
[19439]I really don't know. .I never heard. I never knew
[19440]that defector. I never knew. He wasn't a KGB
[19441]person. - . . ;
[19443]I beg your pardon?
[19445]He wasn't a KGB person, NOSENKO.
[19447]officer under cover of the State Committee- for Science: and
[19448]Technology  (GKKNR) during the period of. her husband's em.
[19449]ployment (1960-1962) there and later head of a unit con- |
[19451]ducting—operations—against—th
[19452]a friendly association with § EN:
[19453]the date of. her defection. According to NOSE
[19455]6—U.$._Fuibassy~—He-maintained-—
[19456]: pand her husband to
[19457]KO, SVIRIN was
[19459]a@ KGB officer who’ participated in che PENKOVSKTY' tnvestigation
[19460](see. Part VI.D.7.b. ). ; -
[19463]Question: |
[19465]During a later debriefing by CIA,
[19467]‘the micro > aia age
[19469]visited the
[19470]mation that !
[19472]‘The fellow from Geneva?
[19474]No. He wasn't a KGR person.
[19476]No? What was he?
[19478]-He was 8 civilian, I think,
[19480]- You never heard anything about his family, his
[19482]friends?
[19483]No.
[19484]But you say he was not a Xud person?
[19486]I say I will tell you one thing: They don't have
[19487]much gossip on these things. It isi never safe.
[19488]So gossip isn't popular, tesides, ‘cach of then
[19489]have their own grudge, sort of department, and he
[19490]knows very little except gossip, very little gos-
[19491]Sip from outside, And so, For instance, maybe
[19493]Mr. SVIRIN wasn't in 3 position to know about
[19495]this person straight, so he repeated the tiny
[19496]scraps he heard.
[19498]And that was only that he had a Jewish mother and
[19499]a general fer 2 father, but nething about hin.
[19500]Everybody, was saying
[19502]Nothing... 1 don't Anow.,
[19504]“that he was detestable, when he ran away. Ile
[19506]tipped Americans... He tipped the Americans
[19507]about the microphones and things in the Embassy.
[19509]In the Embassy in Moscow?
[19510]In Moscow, yes.
[19511]But yet, he was not a KGB person?
[19513]But you know every Russian who is allowed to see
[19514]foreigners is. connected {in some way with the KGS].
[19515]You know, a KGB person is considered to be a person
[19516]who works at this place, as an oificer, and every-
[19517]body else involved is somehow related to the KGB
[19518]but not KGB persons themselves.
[19520]‘sourcing of this information. All of it except that concerning
[19521]Emh sth when he’
[19523]to the Soviets imc eke fact of the sicrophones to” Ue aa
[19525]authorities
[19527]TOP-SECRET
[19529]Paar Pan parereeaye
[19531]a
[19535]14-06000
[19537]e Offdcers
[19541]Soviet Journalisy KORG!
[19543]. In Getober ]Gtt, Yuli. MOREV, whe Sr oes a Soviet
[19544]journalist, offered to write ‘a stery on the life er the family of :
[19545]a "Soviet secret ascent" far the french aegetin 3 Match. *** :
[19547]- The stery was to cencern NOSENKO'S family and their Tife In Hos- : a4
[19549]» Pape
[19551]cow since NOSENKO's defection. A short bictstound statement en :
[19552]MN hO which KORQLEY haaded, Faris Match editers stated in part:
[19553]. "NCSENRLO, dbout 356-38, an of (Tour of the toviet Secret Police, o
[19554]“s organitation, defected to the USA without Lis fantiy about two i :
[19556]years ago and ashed for polities) asylum in the Ul5.; it was
[19558]# The JuINSON Le ai
[19559]Part-Vvien -
[19561]WAC provided information vi SR tsee Pert Vi.d
[19563]is ddseulsed in detail in
[19565]a: ave
[19568]ee Ce
[19570]e5.Ce)e Loe
[19571]eee’ Soe Part Lilt. for wore details concerning KONGLAV's ofler
[19572]te Paris: Match. an aa mo, on
[19574]cf
[19577]14-0000
[19579]eR oS arsine pregnriegth ot oe . rs tee .. ot care shh
[19582]P=
[19585]Security organs as NOSENKO occupied important positions in espion-
[19586]age and counterespionage departments and also was closely acquainted
[19587]with the country's leading ‘tamilies and homes."
[19589]granted to him. That was. the most serious defeat ul the Seviet
[19593]we re tee me tarde