[1][104-10103-10097 | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
[3]. . i .
[5]AMTRUNK Operation - Interim Working Draft,
[6]Dated 14 February 1977,
[8]with Attachments —
[10]14-0000
[12]AMTRUNK Operation
[14]INTERIM WORKING DRAFT ; 14 February 1977
[16]1. It is possible that the AMTRUNK Operation might
[17]have been a political action operation run against the
[18]U.S.G./CIA. (See the separate memorandum on "Operations to
[19]Split the Castro Regime.")
[21]2. In late 1962 or early 1963, pressure was exerted on
[22]CIA by Higher Authority (State Department and the White House)
[23]to consider a proposal for an on-island operation to split
[24]the CASTRO regime. The proposal was presented to “ HURWITCH,
[25]the State Department Cuban Coordinator, by Tad S2ULC (AMCAPE-1)
[26]of the New York Times. On 6 February 1963, Albert C. DAVIES,
[27](Lt. Col. on military detail to WH/4 - Cuba) met with SZULC
[28]at SZULC's residence, to discuss the plan. SZULC referred to
[29]it as the "Leonardo Plan." While at first hesitant. SZULC
[30]finally revealed that Dr. Nestor MORENO (AMICE- 275 was one of
[31]its prime originators. SZULC said that he first thought of
[32]bringing the plan to the attention of President KENNEDY, as he
[33]had had a standing invitation, since November 1961, for direct
[34]contact with President KENNEDY, Attorney General KENNEDY, or
[35]Mr. McGeorge BUNDY, on matters concerning Cuba. He decided
[36]against that approach, however, and instead determined to use
[37]the Cuban Coordinating Group. SZULC later said that George
[38]VOLSKY (AMTRUNK-1) masterminded the plan, assisted by MORENO.
[39]It was agreed that CIA representatives would meet with SZULC
[41]and the two Leonardo planners, MORENO and VOLSKY, in Washington.
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[46]The follow-up meeting on 9 February (in a safehouse) was
[47]attended by HURWITCH, Tad SZULC, Jorge VOLSKY, Dr. Nestor
[48]MORENO, and David MORALES, Col. A. DAVIES and Alfonso RODRIGUEZ
[49]of the CIA.
[51]3. A 11 February 1963 memorandum from RODRIGUEZ to the
[52]Chief, SAS, expressed definite interest in the operation with
[53]certain recommendations which included having JMWAVE Station
[54]put its operational mechanism into gear to have the Cuban
[55]personnel of the operation (now called AMTRUNK) ready for
[56]infiltration by mid-March 1963. Following a review of the
[57]AMTRUNK Project, JMWAVE forwarded a lengthy dispatch to Head-
[58]quarters, dated 8 April 1963, which recommended that the
[59]operation be terminated soonest. Since it was a Headquarters
[60]originated operation, JMWAVE also requested Headquarters decision
[61]as to continuance or termination. A Headquarters cable to
[62]‘JMWAVE on 10 April 1963 concurred that the AMTRUNK operation
[63]should be terminated for a number of reasons, including the
[64]fact that CIA could not at that time be certain that hostile
[65]elements were unaware of the plan. A 17 April 1963 cable from
[66]Headquarters to JMWAVE Station advised that SZULC had informed
[67]“HURWITCH that JMWAVE had given VOLSKY responsibility to decide
[68]whether or not the operation was to continue. It seems that
[69]Headquarters had intended to use VOLSKY, with his concurrence,
[70]only as a funding channel for the AMTRUNK operation if the
[71]AMTRUNK principals were willing to proceed with the operation
[73]independently. In any case, for some reason, CIA continued to
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[78]support the operation. The two principals, MORENO (AMICE- 27)
[79]and Miguel A. DIAZ Isalgue (AMICE-14) claimed to have contact
[80]with high-level GOC officials. They completed four infiltration
[81]missions.to Cuba and were terminated in March 1964.
[83]4. Early phases of the operation resulted in the on-island
[84]recruitment of Ramon Tomas GUIN Diaz (AMTRUNK-10), Modesto
[85]Orlando OROZCO Basulto (AMTRUNK-9), and Carlos PEDRAZA Aguilar
[86](AMTRUNK-11). GUIN was arrested in February 1966. (CUBELA
[87]was arrested at the same time, separately.) OROZCO, after
[88]reportedly running scared, was exfiltrated and terminated in
[89]March 1964. He returned to Cuba in December 1964 on an indepen-
[90]dent exfiltration mission and apparently remained in Cuba.
[92]There is some speculation that he might have been G-2. His
[94]knowledge of the identity of internal AMTRUNK agents, caused
[96]a planned infiltration mission to be scrapped. PEDRAZA was
[98]arrested in December 1965, tried for alleged CIA activities
[99]and given a 30 year prison sentence. JMWAVE Station advised
[100]in March 1966 that four former AMTRUNK internal assets were
[101]arrested for counterrevolutionary activities during early 1966,
[102]in addition to CUBELA and GUIN, and that all of the principals
[103]of the AMTRUNK network active during 1963 and 1964 had been
[104]rolled up. The Cuban press reportedly identified DIAZ (AMICE-14)
[105]as the clandestine infiltree who recruited GUIN.
[107]COMMENT: It appears that the opposition might have
[108]succeeded in obtaining CIA financial and material support for
[109]an operation which ‘was controlled by the planners. They
[111]succeeded, it seems, in identifying, neutralizing, and exposing
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[116]on-island anti-Castro forces, and tying up CIA time, money,
[118]and manpower for an operation of their own creation. Following
[120]are some reasons which might have contributed to its failure:
[122]| a. The controversial nature of the principal
[123]‘initiators, Tad SZULC, Jorge VOLSKY and MORENO. The
[124]AMTRUNK operatives made it known that they were anti-U.S.G.
[125]and anti-CIA and accepted assistance only to accomplish
[126]their own purposes. They were not under CIA control.
[128]b. SZULC, although reportedly not directly involved
[129]in the operation, was kept fully informed of its activities
[130]by MORENO and perhaps others.
[132]c. SZULC's direct contact with the White House, if
[133]true, placed him ina position to pass U.S. policy infor-
[134]mation on Cuba: to the opposition. (There is a note by
[135]Richard Helms on a 23 September 1963 cover sheet requesting
[136]Alfonso RODRIGUEZ to maintain periodic contact with SZULC
[137]on Cuban matters at Presidential request going back many
[138]months.) .
[140]d. RABEL (AMLEO-3), who "defected" to the U.S. in
[141]1962, was: knowledgeable of on-island AMTRUNK targets.
[142]RABEL, following termination, returned to Cuba allegedly
[143]to bring out. his family, and never returned. There is
[144]a possibility that he was a CASTRO agent.
[146]e. CUBELA was knowledgeable of at least some of the
[147]AMTRUNK agents. GUIN (AMTRUNK-10) was a codefendant in
[148]the CUBELA trial. (Believe GUIN may have been given
[150]a stiffer sentence than CUBELA and may still be in prison.)
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[155]CUBELA was given a relatively light sentence, considering
[156]the magnitude of the crime. Immediately following
[157]ey! sentencing he functioned as a prison physician, and
[158]~ reportedly was driving a jeep unescorted, which is unusual
[159]treatment unless one is trusted by the regime. He report-
[160]edly is now practicing medicine as a private physician
[161]in Havana.
[162]f. The questionable activities and current where-
[163]abouts of AMTRUNK-9. We have learned of the other AMTRUNK
[164]‘agents who were wrapped up but we have been unable to
[165]determine precisely where AMTRUNK-9 is. There is some
[166]indication that he might have been G-2.
[167]| g. There was overlap with other operations: the
[169]AMLILAC's, placing CUBELA cache, etc.
[170]NOTE: Cables cited in this paper, and other selected papers
[171]from the AMTRUNK Project, are readily available in the
[173]LAD/JFK Task Force office for review if needed...
[175]LAD/JFK Task Force/Chris Hopkins:rp
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[180]14 February 1977
[181]MEMORANDUM
[183]SUBJECT: Tadeusz (Tad) Witold SZULC (AMCAPE-1)} (201-50539)
[185]1. SZULC was born on 25 July 1926 in Warsaw, Poland.
[186]He arrived in Brazil from Lisbon on 3 August 1940, and came
[187]to the U.S. in October 1947 under sponsorship of U.S. Ambassador
[188]John C. WILEY, the husband of his mother's sister. He became
[190]a correspondent for the New York Times (NYT) in 1953, and
[192]became a naturalized U.S. citizen in 1954 by a special
[193]Congressional bill.
[194]2. SZULC has been under suspicion as a hostile foreign
[196]agent since 1948 when the FBI reported (apparently from a
[198]WEDS source) that he was a Communist. He brought himself
[199]to the attention of CIA in August 1959 in Santiago, Chile by
[200]claiming (falsely) to be "cleared" and requesting contact with
[201]an Agency representative. This was the first of many such
[202]incidents in Latin America, and resulted in a warning to all
[203]Latin American Stations to beware of SZULC and his efforts to
[204]interview Agency personnel. It also resulted in continuing
[205]watch of his movements and activities because they represented
[206]a threat to the cover of Agency personnel. By 1960 his reputa-
[207]tion was so widespread that several different CIA officers
[208]called for an investigation that would clear up "once and for
[209]all"! his suspected connections with a hostile intelligence
[210]service. He was in frequent contact with Communist Party
[211]leaders and functionaries throughout Latin America, constantly
[213]sought out and elicited information from U.S. Embassy officers,
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[217]frequently mentioning the name of other CIA officers with
[218]whom he was acquainted.
[220]3. Although the suspicions have increased, and SZULC's
[221]anti-Agency activities have become much more serious and
[222]blatant in the 1970's, it has not been possible to clear up
[223]any of the suspicions about his motives or his possible
[224]connections with a foreign intelligence service. There have
[225]been numerous reviews of his files and the interest in his
[226]activities has extended from the case officer level to the DCI.
[227]In fact, it is not possible to come to any clear conclusion
[228]about this man, and the notes below are simply illustrative
[229]of the kinds of things that keep the suspicions alive. It
[230]is important to note that SZULC's activities can be explained
[231]by the combination of his personality, ambition, and the
[232]demands on an investigative reporter for the NYT. He is an
[233]aggressive, insensitive, and persistent journalist with the
[234]family connections (Ambassador Wiley) and ability to develop
[235]the kinds of contacts appropriate to a successful correspondent
[236]for a paper like the NYT.
[238]4, Nevertheless, there are elements throughout his
[239]entire career that are almost designed to arouse suspicion.
[241]For example, a BRIfiSH source in Rio de Janeiro (see Attachment A)
[242]reported that SZULC was "directed" by the Polish regime in
[244]Warsaw to seek employment in U.S. journalistic circles. This
[245]report runs like a thread throughout his file and is repeated
[247]and garbled in several versions over the years. The report
[250]14-0000
[252]y
[254]‘has never been adequately explained and was apparently never
[255]by the representative in
[257]Rio. This report and other questions that arose early in his
[259]reported in full to f6iiden
[261]career (his contacts with a cousin who was a Press Attache in
[262]the Polish Embassy in Rio) were, however, just the earliest
[263]elements that aroused suspicion.
[265]5S. Because he became so well-known to so many Agency
[266]officers, his name and reputation have become subject of
[267]discussion on many occasions. One senior operations officer
[268]stated in 1975 that a Soviet agent could not be more beneficial
[269]to the Soviets and the Communist cause than SZULC has been.
[270]Although he presented a generally anti-Communist view prior
[271]to quitting the NYT in 1972, it is noteworthy that he arranged
[272]extensive, favorable TV coverage of the Communist-dominated
[273]Ligas Campesinas in Northeast Brazil and that one of the most
[274]important anti-Castro operations, AMTRUNK, in which he was
[275]involved from the beginning, was disastrous for all participants.
[276]More indicative of his true beliefs, however, are the articles
[277]he has written since Watergate. They have become increasingly
[278]critical of the CIA and of the USG generally and have damaged
[279]U.S. image and prestige.
[281]6. The notes below are somewhat random examples of
[282]elements in SZULC's file that bring him under suspicion. As
[283]mentioned above, they in no way point to a firm conclusion.
[285]For further information on SZULC during the period 1963 - 1964,
[286]see the CI review prepared at Miami Station on Jorge VOLSKY
[288]in 1964.
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[292]scOneT
[294]a. The 1948 FBI report that SZULC was involved in
[295]supplying the Polish Legation in Rio with information
[296]from his personal contacts and from Ambassador John C.
[297]Wiley has been repeated in various versions throughout
[298]SZULC's file. The FBI has found similar allegations
[299]made by other sources who knew SZULC at that time. In
[300]addition, several sources have mentioned SZULC's relations
[301]with his cousin, Ignacy SACHS, who was the Press Attache
[302]in the Polish Embassy in 1947 and 1948, although there
[303]is no indication that SACHS had intelligence connections.
[305]b. SZULC's marriage to the daughter of the American
[306]manager of the English language newspaper in Rio de Janeiro,
[307]the Herald, lasted only until SZULC had permanent residence
[308]in the U.S. and appears to have been carried through for
[309]that purpose.
[311]c. By 1949 (SZULC was only 23) he had come to the
[313]attention of the Rido«S##tion) because of his dealings
[315]with the Polish Legation and because investigation revealed
[316]his father had some (apparently innocent) business dealings
[317]with Russians visiting Brazil from Mexico.
[319]d. In 1954, about a year after he was hired by the
[320]NYT, SZULC obtained a sensational story, by telephone,
[321]from a Communist leader in Guatemala. This launched his
[322]career with the NYT.
[324]e. In 1956 SZULC was investigating Brazilian nuclear
[325]policy for the NYT. Although a legitimate topic, it was
[327]somewhat unusual for him and the timing seems unusual
[329]for NYT interest.
[331]Fiat d
[334]ma
[335]na
[339]1400000
[341]SECRET .
[343]f. In 1959, on a trip to Santiago, Chile, SZULC
[344]claimed to be "cleared" and requested an interview
[345]with an Agency representative. This was the first of
[346]numerous such requests. In addition, it was in about
[347]1959 that he also began making a point of telling Agency
[348]personnel the names of other Agency officers he had
[349]identified.
[351]g. An article SZULC wrote on Cuba for the NYT in
[353]December 1959 was hailed as an antidote to the excessively
[355]. favorable reports of his colleague, Herbert MATTHEWS, but
[357]in fact his article was largely favorable to Fidel CASTRO
[358]and to CASTRO's plans for Cuba. It is only in comparison
[359]that
[361]with MATTHEWS blatantly pro-CASTRO articles / SZULC's
[363]piece/can — be considered balanced.
[365]h. By September 1960, SZULC was in the forefront of
[366]those advocating action against CASTRO. ({t was he who
[367]finally brought the Leonardo Plan to Washington in 1963.
[368]See AMTRUNK Operational paper).
[370]i. In April 1961, shortly after John F. KENNEDY was
[371]innaugurated, SZULC was transferred to Washington by the
[372]NYT. Although a reasonable transfer, it is noteworthy
[373]that in a very short time SZULC claimed that he had a
[374]standing invitation to go directly to the President, the
[375]Vice President, the Attorney General, McGeorge BUNDY
[377]and Robert HURWITCH on Cuban matters.
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[381]os a SECRET
[383]j. SZULC persistently sought a continuing contact
[384]with an Agency representative in Washington shortly after
[385]he arrived until it was granted in December 1962. The
[386]first contact was with Albert C. DAVIES (Lt. Col. on
[387]military detail to CIA - Cuba) , and was arranged at the
[388]behest of Colonel GROGAN, the Assistant to the Director,
[389]on SZULC's request. _ .
[391]k. ‘In early 1963, at President KENNEDY's urging, 7
[392]contact with SZULC was made into a formal relationship and
[393]was continued until October 1964. The meetings were used
[394]by SZULC to cross check his information from other sources,
[395]including various Cuban exiles and the Department of
[396]State. He became, by virtue of his contacts with the
[397]exile community and throughout Washington, one of the most
[398]knowledgeable people in the area of Cuban affairs, anti-
[399]CASTRO activities, and U.S. Government policy. (See CI
[400]study on Jorge VOLSKY for more information on this period.)
[402]1. The Agency officer, Alfonso RODRIGUEZ, who main-
[403]tained official contact with SZULC in 1963 and 1964 said
[404]in July 1964: |
[406]"The special friendship and mutual admiration
[407]society that has existed between Tad SZULC, Jorge
[409]VOLSKY, and Manuel RAY and the JURE is not something
[411]that is transparent or easily explained. This
[413]alliance may be something unholy and Machiavellian;
[415]I: just do not know, but I can find no evidence ‘to
[417]prove it."
[419]Liha
[420]seed
[422]14-0000
[424]m. Another officer, Seymour Young, wrote in 1965S:
[425]"After reading and re-reading this man's various
[426]files, I began to feel that this man in his position
[427]would be an ideal ‘agent of influence'. It was
[428]noted that he is always in a crisis area and usually
[429]in advance of the crisis and writes articles which
[430]are more concerned with the Communist successes."
[432]n. In about August 1965, SZULC was sent to Madrid
[433]as the NYT representative for Spain and Portugal. He
[434]stayed overseas until December 1968. He was present in
[435]Prague during the Soviet invasion of August 1968 and in
[436]December he was expelled, apparently for being too
[438]inquisitive. However, the West German Setvece has remained
[440]suspicious of the circumstances of SZULC's expulsion and
[441]the details have never been clarified. (It is interesting
[442]that SZULC wrote articles reflecting the official CZECH
[443]line concerning the defection of General Jan SEJNA who
[444]was in the Czech Intelligence service.)
[446]o. SZULC was reported by an FBI source to have gone
[447]horseback riding with Boris V. YAROCHEVSKIY, a suspect
[448]KGB officer, in Washington in June or July 1971. SZULC's
[449]file reflects no regular contact with Bloc diplomats.
[451]p. In 1972 and 1973 SZULC covered Watergate extensively
[452]and demonstrated an extreme bias against the CIA. By -
[453]July 1972, SZULC's inquiries of the Department of State
[455]and his articles had taken on a distinctly anti-US Govern-
[457]ment tone. His coverage of guerrilla and terrorist groups
[459]7
[461]OP ms ps
[463]BERNE |
[465]14-0000
[467]a 5 SEBRET
[469]was less sure than in earlier days and was frequently
[470]sensationalist and full of inaccuracies. (See, especially,
[471]article in NYT for 14 July 1972 on a terrorist Headquarters
[472]in Zurich and other wild statements.)
[474]q. Since 1974 SZULC's articles have been highly
[475]critical of the Agency and he has used the background |
[476]information he gathered in the 1960's to attack the Agency
[477]and to criticize its operations. .
[479]r. In May 1975 SZULC accused the Agency of rifling
[480]the files of U.S. Senators. This was only one of many
[481]irresponsible and false articles he wrote trying to dis-
[482]credit the Agency. One of the more spectacular efforts
[483]was a series in Esquire magazine, in which, among other
[484]things, he charged that the U.S. intelligence community
[485]had a hidden budget of $25 billion dollars and a network
[486]of 200,000 spies.
[488]s. In, Inside the Company: A CIA Diary, Philip AGEE
[489]credits SZULC's daughter, Nicole, for having "obtained
[490]vital research materials in New York and Washington, D.C."
[491]There is reason to believe, particularly in view of the
[492]extreme views Tad SZULC has manifested in the past two
[493]years, that he may have aided his daughter in her "research."
[494]SUMMATION oo
[495]The case against Tad SZULC as a foreign agent is weak.
[497]However, his most recent activities are entirely consonant with
[498]| the view that he has already served the Soviets well and can |
[500]8
[502]14-0000
[504]_ oS SEGRET
[506]end his career as an overt propagandist taking advantage of
[508]the current furor over the CIA to do the greatest possible
[512]i
[516]damage. The current paralysis of all anti-Communist action by
[517]the Agency attests to the effectiveness of AGEE, SZULC, the
[518]Soviets, et al. 3
[520]NOTE: (See attachment/from a highly sensitive source.
[521]Any use of the SECRET/SENSITIVE attachment requires C/CI
[522]approval.) The source reported that Nicole, while working
[523]with the DGI in Cuba to expose the Agency, said that except for
[524]her father, her whole family were "fascists."" She said that
[526]her father quit the NYT because of the restrictive editorial
[528]policy and he wished to write according to his beliefs.
[530]LAD/JFK Tas Force 1977/Marty.:
[532]2 Attachments, a/s
[534]Copy filed: 201-50539
[536]a
[537]SEGEEI