[1]177-10001-10445) | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
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[33]HY 50955 Docld: 32283348
[35]JFK Assassination System Date: 8/26/201
[36]Identification Form
[38]Agency Information
[40]LBJ
[41]177-1000 1-10445
[43]NSF, JOHN MCCONE MEMORANDA, MTGS. 6 JAN. 64-2 APR. 64, BOX I
[45]Document Information
[47]CIA
[48]MCCONE, JOHN
[50]02/21/1964
[51]2
[53]NEED SUBJECT ASSIGNED
[55]MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
[56]Secret
[58]Withhold
[60]DOC. #12
[61]Q
[63]Page i
[65]ges OY
[67]20 February 1964
[68]MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
[70]SUBJECT: Meeting with the President - 20 February 1964 ~- Alone
[72]_ .. Ladvised the President of my willingness to go with him and to meet
[73]early in the day with General Eisenhower if he thought this would be
[74]constructive. He said he felt General Eisenhower might feel he was being
[75]high-pressured and that he intended merely to advise him of the plan to
[76]| surface the OXCART and exchange formalities. He would then tell him hé
[77]was ordering me to go out and brief him in the next week or two andI _
[78]should make my own arrangements.
[80]2. Ltold the President we had a very sensitive effective operation
[81]working in Mexico City jointly with President Mateos which involved
[82]telephone surveillance and was being done in a most careful manner with
[83]his knowledge and with the assistance of a few of his trusted officials.
[84]This had resulted in a very intimate relationship between our station chief,
[85]Mr. Win Scott and the President. Ambassador Mann knew of this from
[86]Scott, as did certain selected people in State Department. However
[87]President Mateos did not know of Mann's knowledge of the operation and
[88]locked upon the operation as an intimate arrangement between himself and
[89]the CIA station. I mentioned that Mateos had been best man at Win Scott's
[90]recent wedding. I said the President should not mention this but I wanted
[91]him to know about it if it was raised by President Mateos.
[93]3. Ltold President Johnson that we continued our inte rrogation of
[94]Nosenke; our counterintelligence people were inclined to feel he was a
[95]plant but had not made up their minds. President said he thought he was
[96]probably legitimate and would give us some good information. I said I
[97]hoped this was true ~ that we certainly were taking advantage of everything
[98]that he did give us; that we were working closely with the FBI, however we
[99]could only conclude at the moment that the Soviet's performance and
[100]action were so different from any other defector case that our suspicions
[101]had been aroused. The President asked to be kept informed.
[103]4. The President then raised the question of Spain, sugge sting I
[104]might return to Spain to talk again to Franco. He said he was in a very
[105]difficult situation because of announcement of the cut-off of aid to
[106]Britain, France and Yugoslavia which he did not know about until he read it
[107]in the paper, and that he was be side himself because he wanted to give aid
[108]of $31 million to Spain but had the greatest difficulty in the justification.
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[113]ty | | SECRET-EVES ONLY
[115]f
[117]I teld the President it was my impression from information gained from
[119]| clandestine sources that Franco had made some moves to curtail trade
[121]{ with Cuba after my visit with him but that the Spanish companies were
[123]y endeavoring to circumvent his orders by various surreptitious methoda.
[124]‘The President asked that I study the matter carefully and speak to him
[126]about it next week.
[127]ACTION: I have asked Mr. O'Ryan to contact Noel
[128]and lam asking Mr. Ball to contact Ambassador Woodweird to
[129]determine whether the Spanish had taken any actions which they
[130]have announced or might communicate to us which would indicate
[131]an intention of their part to curtail or restrict shipping or trade
[132]with Cuba.
[133]5. The President then said he wanted to do everything possible to
[134]get me out of the cloak and dagger business. That he was tired of
[135]-a situation that had been built up that every time my name or CIA's name
[136]was mentioned, it was associated with a dirty trick. He asked if our
[137]economic studies had stood up and I said yes, they had, and that they were
[138]reconfirmed and supported by an exhaustive article in TIME Magazine.
[139]The President seemed pleased at this, expressed satisfaction in CIA's
[140]operations but was most emphatic in his feelings that we should get away
[141]from the cloak and dagger image and expressed a determination to bring
[143]this about by statements he would make from time to time.
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