[1]198-10009-10099
[3]: | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESID
[5]ENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
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[25]DOCUMENT TYPE :
[26]CLASSIFICATION :
[27]RESTRICTIONS :
[28]CURRENT STATUS :
[29]DATE OF LAST REVIEW :
[31]OPENING CRITERIA :
[33]COMMENTS :
[35]Identification Form
[37]JFK Assassination System Date:
[39]6/24/20 1
[41]Agency Information
[43]ARMY
[44]198-10009-10099
[46]CALIFANO PAPERS
[48]Document Information
[50]MULTIPLE
[52]02/00/1963
[53]153
[55]CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
[57]SITUATION IN LATIN AMERICA
[59]PRESIDENT'S REPORT - SOVIET OFFENSIVE WEAPONS IN
[60]CUBA - 1962
[62]CUBAN SUBVERSION
[64]SOVIET MILITARY FORCES IN CUBA
[66]PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[67]Secret
[69]IB
[71]Redact
[73]07/15/1998
[75]Califano Papers, Box 1, Folder 9. Multiple papers re: classified/secret Congressional testimony
[76]concerning Cuban subversion in Latin America, Cuban military buildup, Soviet military weapons in
[78]Cuba, etc.
[80]FEK Kee ed
[82]Department of the Army EO 13528
[83]Bt eciassiy Ci Exclude ©! Exempt
[84]Authority.
[86][ Refer To : .
[87]Review Date L By. A
[91]HY 50955 Docld: 32424709
[93]22,
[95]Page 1
[97]. a)
[99]CLASSIFIED TESTIMONY - PART Il
[101]10.
[105]12.
[106]13.
[107]14..
[109]15.
[111]16,
[113]HY 50955 Docld: 32424709
[115]SUBJECT;
[117]Statement. by LtGen Joseph F. Carroll, DirDIA
[118]before the Cmte on Foreign Affairs, HR, WashDC
[120]’ Statement by the DirCIA ‘for use.of the staff of the
[122]Preparedness Investigating Subcmte of Senator
[123]Stennis .
[125]SecDef testimony before House Appropriations Cmte
[127].SecDef testimony before House Appropriations: Cmte
[129]SecDef testimony before House Appropriations Cmte
[131]SecNayv testimony before HASC
[133]Ltr to SecArmy from Mr. Martin, AsstSecState
[135]with attached statement by Mr. Martin before
[136]the Latin American Subcomte of HFAC on subject
[138]‘of communist subversion of the hemisphere
[140]SecDef testimony before SASC (Vol. I -A.M.)
[142]SecNav testimony before HASC
[144]‘Statement of SecDef accompanied by General Maxwell
[146]D. Taylor, ChJCs
[148]Excerpts of Navy testimony before HASC.
[150].SecDef testimony before SASC
[151].Excerpt of SecAirForce testimony before HASC
[152]-SecDef testimony before SASG (Cuba) |
[154].Statement by the DirCIA for use of the staff.of the
[156]Preparedness Investigating Subcmte of Senator
[158]‘Stennis (Cuban. Subversion in LA)
[160]‘Statement by Secretary of Defense to the Permanent
[161]Subcmte on Investigations of the Committee on -Govern-
[162]ment Operations - U.S. Senate
[164]Page 2?
[166]DATE:
[168]Undated
[170]7 Jan 63
[172]ll Feb 63
[174]‘12 Feb 63
[176]13 Feb 63.
[178]18 Feb 63
[180]19 Feb 63
[182]"19 Feb 63
[184]19 Feb 63
[186]20 Feb 63
[188]20 Feb 63
[190]21 Feb 63
[192]“21 Feb 63
[194]22 Feb 63
[196]26 Feb 63
[197](Transmittal
[199]Slip)
[201]13 March 63
[203]CLASSIFIED TESTIMONY: - PART II (Cont'd)
[205]NO, SUBJECT: DATE:
[207]17. Memo for Mr. Bromley Smith from Mr. McGiffert .& Mar 63
[208]Subj: Cuba -- with Items 3, 4,.5, 6, 8, 9, 10,
[209]11, .12, 13 and 14 included as attachments
[211]18. Study on Cuba as a Base for -------- prepared by Bob Undated
[212]Mandelstam and LtCol Patchell for use by Sec McNamara
[213]at Stennis Comm hearings, in the form of Memo to Sec/Def
[215]19, Memo for Mr, Robt A, Hurwitch, Subj: Missile Crisis 29 Mar 63
[216]Section of the President's Draft Rept to Congress on US
[217]Participation in the UN During 1963, fr Mr. Califano
[218]w/draft of President's message atchd
[220]_ Sub
[222]20. Interim Report by Preparedness Inves/Comm of the Comm  Undtd
[223]ef Armed Services US Senate, on the Cuban Military
[224]Buildup, OATSD(LA) Control # 5812(8) -
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[230]= AANSMITTAL SLIP |?" 267 rep 6(~
[233]; Mr. Califano for Secy. Vance
[234]ROOM NO. BUILDING
[235]3E985 Pentagon
[236]REMARKS:
[238]FROM:
[239]CIA - William A. Tidwell
[240]ROOM NO. BUILDING
[242]EXTENSION
[244]Codell. 6614
[245]FORM NO 7] 44 REPLACES FORM 36-8 GPO : 1957--O~439445 (Cr)
[246]tFEB 55 WHICH MAY BE USED.
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[252]286
[254]J
[255]u
[257]Gs
[259]STATEMENT BY THE DIRECTOR FOR USE OF THE
[260]STAFF OF THE PREPAREDNESS INVESTIGATING
[262]SUBCOMMITTEE OF SENATOR STENNIS
[264]OA, ASC Control Me Sy9__ noRET
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[269]25 February 1963
[270]CUBAN SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA
[272]I..- Introduction
[274]The public pronouncements of Cuban leaders, the
[275]daily record of events in Latin America, and reports
[276]from our intelligence, sources within Communist and
[277]other left-extremist elements throughout this hemis-
[278]phere all agree on one salient conclusion: that Fidel
[279]Castro is spurring and supporting the efforts of Com-~
[280]munists and other revolutionary elements to overthrow
[281]and seize control of the governments in Latin America.
[283]Even before the October missile crisis=--and with
[284]increasing rancor since then--Cuban leaders have been
[285]exhorting revolutionary movements to violence and
[286]terrorism, and supporting their activities. Cuban
[287]support takes" many different forms, but its main thrust
[288]is-in the. supply of the inspiration, the guidance, the
[289]training, and the communications and technical assist-
[290]ance that revolutionary groups in Latin America require.
[292]In essence, Castro tells revolutionaries from
[293]other Latin American countries: | "Come to Cuba; we _
[294]will pay your way, we will train you in underground
[295]organization techniques, in guerrilla warfare, in sab~
[296]otage and in terrorism. We will see to it that you
[297]get back to your homeland. Once you are there, we
[298]will keep in touch with you, give you propaganda sup~
[299]port, send you propaganda materials for your movement,
[300]training aids to expand your guerrilla forces, secret
[301]communications methods, and perhaps funds and special-
[302]ized demolition equipment. " Castro is not, as far as
[303]we know, promising these ‘other Latin Americans any Cu-
[304]ban weapons or Cuban personnel-~either leaders, ad-
[305]visers, or cadres. But he probably does tell them;
[306]"If you succeed in establishing something effective
[307]by way of a revolutionary movement in your homeland,
[308]if your guerrillas come down out of the hills and con-
[309]front regular armed forces, then we may consider more
[310]concrete forms of assistance."
[312]So far, it should be noted, none of the movements
[313]in South America has reached this. final stage=--and in —
[314]fact even Castro! 's Sierra Maestra guerrillas never had
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[322]to fight a pitched battle with regular military for-
[323]mations which might have required more advanced weap-
[324]ons than small arms, grenades, mines, and machineguns.
[325]In many ways, Cuba under Castro is the Latin version
[326]of the old Comintern, inciting, abetting, and sustain-
[327]ing revolution wherever it flourishes,
[329]We have occasional evidence of more concrete Cu-
[330]ban support. Cuban nationals, for example, took part
[331]in the La Oroya disorders in Peru in December. We
[332]know that some funds move, generally in cash by courier,
[333]from Cuba to the revolutionaries in other countries. We
[334]know that Cuba furnishes money to buy weapons, and that
[335]some guerrilla ferces in Peru, for instance, are equipped
[336]with Czech weapons which most probably came from Cuba.
[338]Venezuela is apparently number one on Cuba's pri-
[339]ority list for revolution. Fidel Castro said so to the
[340]recent meeting of Communist front organizations for
[341]Latin American women. Che Guevara and Blas Roca both
[342]emphasized the outlook for revolution in Venezuela in
[343]speeches in January. One of our established sources
[344]of proven reliability, high in the ranks of the Vene-
[345]zuelan Communist Party says the Central Committee
[346]agreed in January that a "peaceful solution to the pres-
[347]ent situation in Venezuela is out of the question."
[349]This same source reported that Communist guerrilla
[350]and terrorist operations in Venezuela were placed un-
[351]der a unified command in late 1962, which coordinates
[352]activities with the other militant extremist groups in
[353]Venezuela, The result has been the creation of the
[354]Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN). This or-
[355]ganization is currently trying to publicize its exist-
[356]ence by such acts as the hijacking of the freighter
[357]ANZOATEGUI, and by acts of sabotage and indiscriminate
[358]shootings. These were also designed to dissuade Pres-
[359]ident Betancourt from his trip to Washington. In this,
[360]of course, they failed.
[362]The violence in Venezuela should not be minimized,
[363]The sabotage is the work of experts, and is being done
[364]with advanced types of explosives. The shooting has
[365]reached the point in Caracas where it is not safe to go
[366]out at night in some sections of the capital. But it
[367]is the opinion both of our people and the embassy that
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[381]this level of activity is not the sort of thing that
[382]will bring down the government unless the president
[383]or other high officials are assassinated, The FALN
[384]has not reached a point where it stands up to the
[386]-armed forces, or seizes and holds government build-
[387]ings.
[389]We believe that Cuba has given guerrilla train-
[390]ing to more nationals from Venezuela than from any
[391]other country. Our estimate is that more than 200
[392]Venezuelans received such training in 1962. Many of
[393]these are engaged in terrorism in the cities, and
[394]others were rounded up and given long prison sentences
[395]when they committed themselves prematurely last spring
[396]in a countryside where the rural population strongly
[397]supports the Betancourt administration. One of our
[398]best penetrations of the Communist Party in Venezuela
[399]tells us that at present the unified command has less
[400]than 150 guerrillas in the field, in widely separated
[401]groups of 15 to 25 men each.
[403]II, The Cuban Plan
[405]For the past year Cuban spokesmen have been push-
[406]ing the line that Cuba provides the example for Latin
[407]American revolution, with the implication that nothing
[408]more than guidance needs to be exported. Castro ac-
[409]tually sounded the keynotes for Cuban subversion on
[410]July 26, 1960, when he said, "We promise to continue
[411]making Cuba the example that can convert the Cordillera
[412]of the Andes into the Sierra Maestra of the American
[413]continent.." In his speech on 15 January 1963 Castro
[414]said that if "Socialism" in Cuba had waited to over-
[415]turn Batista by peaceful means, Castro would still be
[416]in the Sierra Maestra., For the past three months,
[418]Che Guevara and Education Minister Armando Hart, both
[419]in public speeches and in remarks to visiting Com-
[420]munists which have been repeated to us, have been in-
[421]sisting that what they call "Socialism" can achieve
[422]power in Latin America only by force,
[424].The Cuban effort at present is far more serious
[425]than the hastily organized and ill-conceived raids that
[426]the bearded veterans of the Sierra Maestra led into
[427]such Central American countries as Panama, Haiti, Nic-
[428]aragua and the Dominican Republic during the first
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[438]eight or nine months Castro was in power. Today
[440]the Cuban effort is far more sophisticated, more
[441]covert, and more deadly. In its professional trade-
[442]‘craft, it shows guidance and training by experienced
[443]Communist advisers from the Soviet bloc, including
[444]veteran Spanish Communists.
[446]The ideas move fairly openly in a massive propa-
[447]ganda effort, The inflammatory broadcasts from Ha-
[448]vana and the work of Prensa Latina are matters of.
[449]public record, It may be worth noting that the postal
[450]and customs authorities in Panama are destroying on
[451]the average of 12 tons a month of Cuban propaganda
[452]coming into their land. Another 10 tons a month comes
[453]into Costa Rica; most of it is spotted either at the
[454]airport or in the post office and destroyed.
[456]. The know-how is not only imparted to the guerrilla
[457]trainees who come to Cuba, but is exported in the form
[458]of booklets. .There are thousands of copies of the
[459]texts on guerrilla warfare by Mao Tse-tung and by Che
[460]Guevara scattered over all of Latin America. Our agents
[461]‘have brought us, for example, a little pocket booklet,
[462]about two and a half by four inches, called "150 ques~
[463]tions on guerrilla warfare," written by a Spanish Civil
[464]War veteran, Alberto Bayo. This was printed in Cuba,
[466]) and turned up first in Peru. Another version, with
[467]100 questions and answers, based on Guevara's and Bayo’s
[468]books, has been written especially for Peruvian use and
[469]mimeographed in Peru. This is about 5.x 8, and in-
[470]cludes drawings on how to place demolition charges as
[471]well as charts for calculating the force of. various
[472]explosives. There is a Portuguese text of Guevara's
[473]book in Brazil, and a mimeographed abridgement of
[474]Bayo's 150 questions has been prepared by a terrorist-
[475]guerrilla organization in Colombia.
[477]All of these textbooks stress that the guerrilla
[478]must be self-sustaining. They not only tell him how
[479]to make Molotov cocktails, explosives, and incendiary
[480]preparations from materials that he can obtain easily
[481]and sometimes even openly at home.’ -They stress that
[482]his weapons, his equipment, and supplies should come
[483]from "the enemy"--that is, from the security forces
[484]in his homeland.
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[494]IIL. Training
[496]We estimate that: at least 1,000, and perhaps
[497]as many as 1,500 persons came to Cuba during 1962,
[498]from all the other Latin American countries with =
[499]the possible exception of Uruguay, to receive ideo-
[500]logical indoctrination. or guerrilla warfare train-
[501]ing or both. More have gone in 1963 despite the
[502]limited facilities for reaching Cuba at present.
[504]The largest contingents have come from Vene-
[505]zuela, Peru, Ecuador, Argentina, and Bolivia. Some
[506]of the courses are as short as four weeks, designed
[507]to let it appear that the trainees had merely at-
[508]tended some conference or celebration and done a
[509]little sightseeing. Other courses last as long as
[510]a year, and may include intensive training in such
[511]things as sabotage, espionage, and psychological
[512]warfare.
[514]We have devoted a great deal of effort to
[515]monitoring Latin American travel to Cuba at the
[516]main jump-off points such as Mexico and Curacao.
[517](Curacao has not been used since October, but KLM
[518]may soon resume flights.) The Cubans go to great
[519]lengths to conceal the fact that some of these
[520]trainees have ever been to Cuba, and how long they
[521]stayed, However, we know a great deal about this
[522]travel from our penetrations of the Communist par-
[523]ties, from controlled agents we have been able to
[524]maneuver into the training courses in Cuba, and
[525]from cooperative travel control authorities in
[526]Latin American countries, The Cuban Embassy in
[527]Mexico City gives the trainee a visa on a separate
[528]piece of paper, so that his passport, when he goes
[529]home, will only show that he has been in Mexico.
[530]We have a record, however, of those who fly on to
[531]Cuba, In other cases, particularly in the case of
[532]travel through Montevideo before the quarantine, ©
[533]the Cubans furnished passports under other names
[534]for travel by way of Curacao,
[536]We derive some of our figures from travel con-
[537]trol points, and another set from the information
[539]we receive from penetration agents of established
[540]reliability in the Communist parties. Some of the
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[550]Latin American governments are also able to maintain
[551]fairly accurate lists of their nationals known to
[552]have been in Cuba. We get a certain amount of cross-
[553]checking from lists of names furnished us by several
[554]of our agents who have undergone training, and in
[555]confessions of captured guerrillas who had been in
[556]Cuba. Thus in the case of Peru, for instance, we
[557]come up with a list of 235 names of individuals known
[558]to have made extended stays in Cuba in 1961 and 1962.
[559]We have to make allowance for some who did not re-
[560]ceive guerrilla training, and allowance in the op-
[561]posite direction for those whose names have escaped
[562]our surveillance. But we are guided in these adjust-
[563]ments by the cross-checking information mentioned
[564]above,
[566]Some of the trainees arrive, and many go home,
[567]by way of the Iron Curtain and Western Europe, using
[568]Soviet, Czech, or Cuban aircraft--and probably ships
[569]as well--for the trip between Cuba and the Bloc. This
[570]is another attempt to conceal their movements, and in
[571]some cases permits further indoctrination and train-
[572]ing in Bloc countries. ,
[574]Under the circumstances we consider that our
[575]estimate of 1,000 to 1,500 guerrilla warfare trainees
[576]in 1962 is reasonably accurate. We also believe that
[577]the scope and volume of this training is being stepped
[578]up, just as we know that it incresed in 1962 over 1961.
[580]The basic training covers cross-country movement.
[581]of guerrillas, firing, care of weapons, and general
[582]guerrilla tactics. One of our Brazilian agents took
[583]such a four-week course more than a year ago, under
[584]cover of going to Cuba for a convention. He returned
[585]to his Havana hotel every few days during the course
[586]to spread the word that he had been sightseeing. An
[587]Argentine trainee who took a longer course and then
[588]was sent home by way of Europe has given us a great
[589]deal of detail on the type of training. He reports
[590]that some of the trainees remain indefinitely. The
[591]Cubans sometimes refer to these men as their Interna-
[592]tional Brigade. Sometimes they are formed into na-
[593]tional units from a particular country, in effect
[594]forming a packaged cadre which can be returned to
[595]the homeland to'lead a "Liberation Army."
[597]-G-
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[605]A trainee whe recently returned to Peru after
[606]several months of training in Cuba, said that all
[607]his fellow trainees were asked to mark bridges and
[608]other similar demolition targets on detailed maps
[609]of Peru. They were also required to fill out :
[611].lengthy questionnaires on sabotage targets, possibil-
[612]ities for subversion of police, methods. for illegal
[613]entry and travel, suitable drop zones for air sup-
[614]ply, possible points of attack against police and
[615]military posts, and similar information necessary
[617]for directing subversion and insurrection.
[619]Numerous reports come to us indicating that in
[620]such countries as Colombia, Venezuela, and Peru,
[621]where there are indigenous guerrilla forces either
[622]in action or in being in the hills, there are Cu-
[623]bans among the bands acting as leaders, instructors
[624]or advisors for these forces. These reports are in-
[625]variably second-hand, and we have not been able to
[626]confirm any of them. In Some cases, it has turned
[627]out that a reference to "a Cuban" with the guerrillas
[628]referred to someone who has been trained in Cuba and
[629]was training others, rather than a Cuban national.
[630]However, we know positively that three Cuban nationals
[631]were involved in the strike violence at La Oroya,
[632]Peru, last December, which culminated in several
[633]million dollars worth of damage to the smelter of
[634]the American-owned Cerro de Pasco mining company.
[636]One of these Cubans has also been directing the armed
[637]invasions of big ranches in the Andean highlands by
[638]land-hungry Indians. Information of this nature con-
[639]tributed to the decision of the Peruvian junta to
[640]crack down on Communists in January. In Brazil, the
[641]complaint of guerrillas in training camps was that
[642]they had been recruited by a promise of Cuban in-
[643]structors, but found there were none, This came to
[644]light when the report of a Cuban intelligence agent,
[645]relaying their complaints to Havana, turned up in
[646]the wreckage of. the Varig airliner which crashed in
[647]Peru in November.
[649]IV. Weapons
[650]In general, the Cubans appear to be following
[652]the textbook for guerrillas in regard to provision
[653]of arms. We have strong evidence, from numerous
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[663]sources, that they are telling the guerrilla warfare
[664]students and their leaders to obtain their own weap-:
[665]ons at home.
[667]One of our agents who was in the original group
[668]of Brazilian trainees said he was trained exclusively
[669]in. the use and maintenance of the Garand M-1 rifle
[670]and M-3, Browning and Hotchkiss machineguns. His
[671]group was told that these were the weapons Brazilian
[672]guerrillas would be able to buy, steal, or capture
[673]from the security forces at home. Similarly, an Ar-
[674]gentine trainee, an agent, said their instructors
[675]told them Cuba would not be sending weapons because
[676]there was a plentiful source of supply for any de-
[677]termined guerrilla movement in its own homeland.
[678]Leaders of militant groups in Venezuela, Brazil, and
[680]-Peru who have gone to Cuba seeking assistance have
[681]been told by the Cuban leaders that Cuba is willing
[682]to furnish funds, training, and technical assistance.
[683]Reference to weapons is pointedly omitted. This is
[684]reported to us by our agents in these Same groups,
[686]mat .
[688]We have recently again checked with all of our
[689]stations in Latin America to review what evidence we
[690]have of military shipments|from Cuba. In Peru, radio
[691]transmitters were admittedly brought in from Cuba.
[692](In Venezuela so much radio equipment was stolen
[693]last fall that this was unnecessary} ) In 1962, Cuba
[694]furnished cash to buy weapons in Mexico to be smug-
[695]gled into Guatemala. In Peru, the guerrilla trainees
[696]who were rounded up in the: Huampani-Satipo incident
[697]last March had been issued kits containing a Czech
[698]rifle with a pistol grip, apparently of bloc origin.
[699]Otherwise, however, in case after case guerrilla
[700]hardware turned out to have been bought or stelen
[701]locally, or smuggled in from the adjoining country.
[702]We do:not have a single case where we are certain
[703]of the Cuban origin. of captured arms.
[705]This is not to say that we are positive weapons
[706]have not been Sént from Cuba. Latin America has a
[707]long tradition of smuggling, a long coastline, in-
[708]numerable isolated landing fields and drop zones,
[709]and inadequate security forces to control all such
[710]channels. A Venezuelan Communist leader has been
[711]telling guerrilla leaders |that. Cuba will soon send
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[719]. SECRET ®
[721]them mortars. It is always possible, of course, that’
[722]he is fabricating to build up the morale of his units,
[723]but we must also conclude that if he is indeed making
[724]this up, he risks inevitable disillusionment,
[726]In summary, we have evidence that in principle
[727]Cuba is not sending identifiable quantities of weapons
[728]to Latin American insurgents at present. But we have
[729]no reason to believe that they will not or cannot do
[730]so, when so doing serves their stated purpose of creat-
[731]ing uprisings in Latin American Countries. Needless
[732]to say, this is a matter that we consider of most ser-
[733]ious concern and we intensively trace every rumor that
[734]comes to us of the importation of arms from Cuba to
[735]Latin American countries,
[737]Vv. Funding
[739]Cuban financing of subversive operations in Latin
[740]America is easy to ascertain and hard to document, Our
[741]evidence shows that it is generally effected by couriers
[742]carrying cash. The following are a few examples of
[743]these operations,
[745]A Venezuelan politician, Fabricio Ojeda, returned
[746]from Cuba in March of 1962, and was seen by several
[747]witnesses to have large quantities of US currency
[748]stuffed in a false-bottomed compartment of his suit-
[749]case. There is no law against bringing currency into
[750]Venezuela, so that authorities could not even deter-
[751]mine how much he had brought in, Ojeda later was cap-
[752]tured, tried, and sentenced for guerrilla activity.
[754]A Nicaraguan exile, Julio Cesar Mayorga Porto-
[755]carrera, was flying from Mexico to Honduras in Sep-
[756]tember, 1961, when weather forced the plane to over-
[757]fly Honduras and land in Nicaragua. He was:.found to
[758]be carrying $3,600 in cash, which he admitted he was
[759]bringing from Cuba for Nicaraguan rebels in Honduras.
[761]Last March Ecuadorean troops raided a guerrilla
[762]training camp in the mountains west of Quito and ar-
[764]rested some 48 members of the Union of Revolutionary
[765]Ecuadorean Youth, The leaders of the group admitted
[769]SECRET
[771]HY 50955 Docld:32424709 Page 15
[775]having received guerrilla training in Cuba, together
[776]with funds to support their activities. One item
[777]of $44,000 was publicized in the press.
[779]A highly placed Guatemalan Communist who defected
[780]iast November has given us a specific account of :pro-
[781]cedures by which Cuba sent cash to Mexico to buy weap-
[782]ons which were then smuggled into Guatemala. We also
[783]have considerable evidence of involved bank transfers
[784]by. which Cuban money eventually reached Latin American
[785]front groups to pay for political and propaganda ac-
[786]tivity. In some countries where the. Cubans still have
[787]diplomatic missions, we have obtained photostats show-
[788]ing that Cuban diplomats paid for printing ef front-
[789]group propaganda.
[791]In January 1963 one of the first Brazilians to
[792]receive guerrilla warfare training in 1961 was picked
[793]up with a suitcase full of ammunition he was carrying
[794]to some of those same guerrilla training camps ex-
[795]posed when the Varig plane crashed in Peru. The man
[796]‘admitted that a woman attorney in Rio had given him
[797]the money to buy a large hacienda as a new guerrilla
[798]camp. We know that this woman is a cut-out in the
[799]communications between the pro-Commanist Peasant Leagues,
[800]which have run the camps, and the Cuban embassy.
[802]‘The principle that guerrillas must be self~sus-
[803]taining has obviously been applied to finances as well,
[804]Communist guerrillas have staged numerous bank rob-
[805]beries in Peru, Venezuela, and Argentina. .The most
[806]Spectacular hold-up was that of a bank in a Lima sub-
[807]urb last year which netted almost $100,000, From
[808]the participants, who have been caught, we know that
[809]the hold-up was carried out by a combination of guer-
[810]rillas and ordinary criminals, who divided the loot
[811]fifty-fifty. Some of the share of the common criminals
[812]has been recovered, but the Communist half is believed
[813]to have reached the sizeable guerrilla forces of Hugo
[814]Blanco in the Cuzco Valley. In February 1963 a bank
[816]. in an outlying Venezuelan town was robbed of $25,000
[817]by men wearing FALN armbands,
[819]VI. Cuban Propaganda Broadcasts
[821]International broadcasts by Cuban radio stations
[822]maintain a relatively constant propaganda level at all
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[832]times, with regularly scheduled and special broad-
[833]casts to specific countries as well as general trans-
[834]missions to all Latin America. The general theme
[836]of these broadcasts is that the "Cuban example” is
[837]awakening the "people" of Latin America to the op-
[838]portunity for revolutionary action against the "éor-
[839]rupt" regimes in power and against "Yankee imperialism"
[840]which allegedly supports them. Within the last two
[841]months there has been an increase in the aggressive-
[842]ness with which the broadcasts incite revolt.
[844]The official .Cuban international service called
[845]“Radio Havana Cuba is the chief radio propaganda out-
[846]Tet. More commonly known as Radio Havana, this sta-
[847]tion broadcasts weekly a total of I87 hours and 50
[848]minutes of propaganda in languages which include
[849]Spanish, English, French, Arabic, Portuguese, and
[850]Haitian Creole, to listeners in Europe, the Mediter-
[851]ranean area, and the Western Hemisphere.
[853]Radio Havana's. international service was in-
[854]augurated on May Day in 1961. It has grown rapidly
[855]since that time and is now Latin America's first in-
[856]ternational broadcaster in terms of program hours.
[857]Its time on the air is as follows, in hours per week
[859]Haitian Creole to Haiti - 7 hr
[860]Arabic to the Mediterranean area - 5 hr 15 min
[861]English to Europe ; - 9 hr 20 min
[862]English to the Western Hemis- - 17 hr 30 min
[864]French to Europe - 9 hr 20 min
[865]French to Canada - 3 hr 20 min
[866]French to Mediterranean - 3-hr 30 min
[867]Por tuguese to Brazil . _~ 7 br
[868]Spanish to Europe - 16 br 55 min
[869]Spanish to the Americas. a 108 hr 30 min
[871]-Ll-
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[879]In addition to the regularly scheduled” inter-
[880]national service, Radio Havana has been Known to -
[881]broadcast special programs in order to take advan-
[882]tage of unique political situations. When serious
[883]disorders broke out in the Dominican Republic in
[884]‘late 1961, for example, broadcasts emanating froma
[885]self- -styled “clandestine” station which said it was
[886]located inside the Dominican Republic demanded the
[887]overthrow of the Dominican government, The station
[888]went off after about a week, but not before direc-
[889]tion finder bearings and other technical clues in-
[890]dicated that it had been transmitting from Radio
[891]Havana's transmitting facilities in Cuba.
[893]Radio Havana states that it makes its facilities
[894]available to political groups from other Latin Ameri-
[895]can countries so they can beam programs to their home-
[896]lands. These programs, which have the evident intent |
[897]of encouraging subversion and inciting revolt, are
[898]presently beamed on regular weekly or twice a week
[899]schedule to Guatemala, Peru, and the Dominican Re-
[900]public. Similar programs were beamed to Nicaragua
[901]and Honduras until last September when they were
[902]replaced by a single program with wider targets now
[903]programmed nightly. These special programs are ex-
[904]emplified by the programs transmitted te the Domini-
[905]can Republic on 28 January. One was a "manifesto"
[906]by Dominican Communists (whe are based in Cuba) on
[907]the recent election of the “demagogic imperialist
[908]agent" Juan Bosch as President of the Dominican Re-
[909]public. Another was allegedly by a pro-Communist
[910]group of Dominicans in Cuba called the "National
[911]Liberation Movement." It appealed to Dominican
[913]‘university students to demonstrate against the Con-
[914]stituent Assembly meeting in Santo Domingo.
[916]There are also two special programs beamed to
[918]the United States. "Radio Free Dixie" is a one
[920]hour a week transmission in English aimed at US
[922]Negroes, The other program, "The Friendly Voice
[924]‘of Cuba," is somewhat more subtle and aimed at a
[925]' wider audience, Both programs can be heard well in
[927]Florida and also in many parts of southern United
[929]States.
[931]The technical facilities of Radio Havana are
[932]at a transmitter site at Bauta, some 23 miles
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[938]HW 50955 Docld:324274709 Page 16
[942]southwest of Havana, At present, no more than four
[943]shortwave transmitters are being used, but in the
[944]past as many as five have been observed on the air
[945]at the same time. These transmitters range in power
[947]- from 10 to 100 kilowatts, enabling Radio Havana to
[948]be heard all over the world. Programs are being
[949]sent from studios to the transmitter site by means —
[950]of microwave relays,
[952]‘VII. Rival Forces in Latin American Subversion
[954]Since the October crisis, Fidel Castro has ob-
[955]viously been trying to straddle the rift between Mos-
[956]cow and Peiping over global Communist strategy: It
[957]has been aptly put that Castro's heart is in Peiping
[958]but his stomach is in Moscow. This same split be-
[959]tween all-out militancy and a more cautious policy--
[960]call it coexistence or "two steps forward, one step
[961]back"--~is reflected on the extreme left in many Latin
[962]American countries, Thus Cuba at present not only
[963]Seeks to serve two masters, but to choose among rival
[964]servants in its Latin American subversion,
[966]Castro's views on what is good for socialism
[968]and revolution in Latin America are more in line with
[969]those of the Chinese Communists than the Soviets. |
[970]Only the Cuban and Venezuelan Communist parties are
[971]totally committed to terror and revolution, In spite
[972]of differences over tactics and timing between var-
[973]ious Communist groups, all intend eventually to de-
[974]liver the Latin American countries into the Commu-
[975]nists-socialist bloc. The so-called Soviet "conser-
[976]vative" view, as it is now espoused, is more intent
[977]on trying to achieve power by legal means if possible
[978]-and by subversion rather than by force.
[980]Direct Soviet interest in Latin America is clearly
[981]increasing. An excellent example of this was. the set-
[982]ting up early in 1962 of a Latin American Institute in
[983]the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. The avowed purpose
[984]‘of this institute is to raise the study of the prob-
[985]lems of Latin America, which in their own statements
[986]the Soviets claim they have neglected, to the highest
[987]possible level. Teaching of Spanish and Portuguese
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[993]BW 50955. DoclId: 32424702 Page 19
[999]languages is to be stressed in the institute and
[1000]throughout the school] system. A list of subjects
[1002]on which this institute intends to publish shows
[1004]that it is to be used to attack the Alliance for
[1005]Progress; it has already attacked the Alliance pro-
[1006]gram in Colombia--a showpiece of the Alliance. We
[1007]have been reliably informed that posters have been
[1008]placed in some Colombian universities referring to
[1009]the problems of the "national liberation and work~
[1010]ers' movements in Latin American countries" as top=
[1011]ics which will be studied by the institute. Re-
[1012]sults of these studies will be published in the
[1014]near, future in a magazine called America Latina,
[1015]intended especially for distribution in Latin: America.
[1016]A pamphlet, . apparently to be distributed by the in-
[1017]‘Stitute, and entitled Alianza para el. Progreso, will
[1018]in the words of its hera. Sy Winmask the economic ex=
[1019]pansion of. the. USA" in Latin America. The institute
[1020]also’ expects to enter into close. contact with leading
[1021]Latin American scientists and academicians, during
[1024]One of the most important Communist assets in
[1025]Latin America is a large number of Bloc diplomatic
[1026]and Cuban missions. These missions are used to fur-
[1027]ther..Communist subversive activities even in coun-
[1028]tries where there are no Bloc diplomatic missions.
[1030]The USSR, and in some cases some Satellites as well,
[1031]have diplomatic missions in Mexico, Brazil, _Argen=
[1032]tina, and Uruguay... ‘The USSR. maintains yelations |
[1033]with Bolivia, but has no resident mission there. Cuba
[1034]maintains embassies in Mexico, Brazil, Bolivia,
[1035]Uruguay, and Chile. ‘The’ Chinese Communists have no
[1036]diplomatic ties in Latin America except with Cuba.
[1037]That fact aloné would make Cuban missions important
[1038]to the Chinese. Only seven Latin American countries-~
[1039]Chile, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador,
[1041]. Guatemala, Paraguay, and Peru~-have no official ties
[1042]whatever with any bloc country.
[1044]Uruguay offers a good example of how the Com~
[1045]munists misuse diplomatic missions and the impor-
[1046]tance the Communists attach to them, We have found
[1047]that Communist. subversive activities -in Uruguay are
[1048]not now aimed at promoting revolutionary activity
[1049]against the government.: In this case even the Cu-
[1050]bans appear to be much more interested in retaining
[1051]the good, will of the. government. so that they can con-~
[1052]tinue to use ‘the country as a base of operations
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[1059]_  @ SECRET’ @
[1061]against Argentina, Paraguay, etc. Communist diplo-
[1062]matic missions, however, are active in supporting
[1063]local Communists and other pro-Castro groups to re- .
[1064]tain enough leverage within the country so as. to
[1065]prevent the anti-Castro groups from forcing a
[1066]break in relations. The badly split Uruguayan
[1067]government itself is anti-Communist, but is highly
[1068]tolerant of the activities of these missions. and
[1070]of the Uruguayan party itself. The USSR, most of
[1071]the Satellites, and Cuba all have diplomatic mis- |
[1072]sions in Montevideo--some 70 or so blec personnel.
[1073]In addition, couriers and travellers can go back
[1074]and forth between this city and the bloc countries
[1075]and Cuba at any time.
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[1083]. e SECRET @
[1085]ANNEX A - ARGENTINA
[1087]A participant has given us a detailed account
[1088]of a six-month guerrilla warfare training course
[1089]given to 50 Argentine extremists in Cuba from July
[1091]' to December 1962. Instruction included such sub-
[1092]jects as weapons and explosives, ballistics, com-
[1093]munications, construction of defenses, guerrilla
[1094]strategy and tactics, map reading, and closed and
[1095]open order drill. The trainees practiced with
[1096]Mauser and Garand rifles, Thompson submachineguns,
[1097]Brownings, bazookas, 81-millimeter mortars, and a
[1098]57-millimeter recoilless cannon. Part of the group
[1099]reached Cuba by way of Chile. Some of the men were
[1100]given two passports, one Cuban and one Ecuadorean,
[1101]and returned to Argentina by way of Prague.
[1103]Buenos Aires police in July 1962 announced that
[1104]they had raided a warehouse which had served as head-
[1105]quarters for terrorists working with both the Peron-
[1106]ists and Communists. According to the police, the
[1107]gang was engaged in smuggling Cuban propaganda into
[1108]Argentina and distributing it; facilitating travel
[1109]of Argentines to Cuba for guerrilla training; and
[1110]had carried out about 30 robberies to obtain funds,
[1111]weapons, and explosives.
[1113]A special. Cuban office in Montevideo, Uruguay,
[1114]_ provides false documentation for Argentines and
[1115]Paraguayans traveling to Cuba for guerrilla train-
[1116]ing.
[1120]so SECRET
[1122]HY 50955 Docld:32424709 Page 22
[1126]Morais, had a flat tire on 14 December. When a po-
[1127]lice patrol stopped to investigate, they found he
[1128]was:carrying a number of rifles. in his. car.
[1130]In the last’ week of January, another of the ori-.
[1131]ginal batch of trainees'in Cuba, Jeronimo Rodrigues
[1132]‘Lima, was arrested by national security police at an
[1133]airport. He was carrying-a suitcase full of ammuni-
[1134]tion for some of the camps which apparently are still
[1135]operating. - Jeronimo Rodriguées‘at first refused to
[1136]talk, but in less than 24 hours, disgusted, announced |
[1137]he would tell his whole story. So far, according to
[1138]the press, he has revéaled that a woman attorney ‘in.
[1139]Rio de Janeiro had furnished money with which he had
[1140]bought another farm to continue the Peasant League _
[1141]guerrilla operation. We know this woman works for
[1142]the Cuban Embassy. Rodrigues says the farm is in
[1143]his name, and that if he gets out of jail, he intends
[1144]‘to forget the Peasant League, move his family to the
[1145]farm, and work it.
[1147]=Qe
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[1153]—- = SECRET a
[1155]ANNEX B - BRAZIL
[1157]Documents found in a wrecked airliner in Peru now
[1158]have made public an obvious case of Cuban involvement’
[1159]in subversion directed against Brazil. These. are the
[1160]so-called VARIG documents recovered by Peruvian authori-
[1161]ties when an airliner carrying a Cuban commercial dele-—
[1162]gation crashed near Lima en route from Rio de Janeiro
[1163]on’ 27 November.
[1165]‘The documents, a letter and attachments from
[1166]"Gerardo" to “Petronio,” comprised a report from a Cu-
[1167]ban diplomat in Rio de Janeiro, writing under a cover
[1168]hame, to his superior in Havana. The letter made it
[1169]plain that Cuba had financed and supervised efforts by
[1170]‘Francisco Juliao, Brazilian Peasant League leader, to
[1171]set up guerrilla warfare training camps within the
[1172]framework of his pro-Communist peasant organization.
[1173]The report, which relays complaints of some of the
[1174]guerrillas recruited for these camps, makes it clear .
[1175]that the Peasant League guerrilla operation was plagued
[1176]by confusion and corruption, but leaves no doubt of Cu-
[1177]‘ban involvement, and names many Brazilians involved.
[1179]Purely fortuitously, a Brazilian customs police
[1180]official checking on possible clandestine landing fields
[1181]in the interior, ran across evidence of the training
[1182]camps and arranged to have some of them raided even be-
[1183]fore the Varig aircraft crashed. The raids turned up
[1184]no evidence pointing directly to Cuba, but the camps
[1185]happened to be precisely those described in the Gerardo-
[1186]Petronio correspondence, The Varig document provided
[1187]the evidence against Cuba, the two independent sources
[1188]matched their details perfectly, and it has become im-
[1189]possible for the. Communists and the. Peasant League to
[1190]obtain serious consideration for any claim that the docu-
[1191]ments might be forgeries. We in turn are sure of their
[1192]authenticity.
[1194]The Peasant League operation, which was staffed
[1195]by some of the first Brazilian Communists to take
[1196]guerrilla training in Cuba in June of 1961, continues
[1197]to provide evidence against Cuba, Although the ‘Cubans .
[1198]apparently have done their best to avoid all contact
[1199]with the ‘guerrilla organization since the exposé, Bra-
[1200]Zilian police continue to turn up further ramifications
[1201]of the operation, The second-in-command of the Peasant
[1202]League and head of the guerrilla organization, Clodomir
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[1208]@ SECRET a
[1210]ANNEX C - CHILE
[1212]On 28 October 1962, at the height of the mis-
[1213]sile crisis, a homemade bomb exploded during assembly
[1214]in a downtown Santiago apartment house. The Chilean
[1215]police who searched the apartment found four members
[1216]of the extremist Social Progressive Group (SPG), 6
[1217]cases of Cuban propaganda, 30 sticks of dynamite, 38
[1218]fuses, and one small bomb already assembled.
[1220]One of those arrested, an SPG leader, who had
[1221]his hand blown off, had earlier been photographed
[1222]with three Cuban diplomats. At least two of these,
[1224]_ Orlando Prendes Gutierrez and Raul Zayas Linares,
[1226]. have been reliably reported as Cuban intelligence of-
[1227]ficers. The Chilean police told the press that the |
[1228]group had planned bomb attacks on the US Embassy and
[1229]residence, US firms, and local public utilities, This
[1230]incident occurred two days after a clandestine Havana
[1231]broadcast urging Latin American Communists to attack
[1232]US property and installations wherever possible in ~
[1233]Latin America.
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[1239]; &B SECRET a3
[1241]ANNEX D ~- ECUADOR
[1243]Well-placed and reliable agents have reported
[1244]that the last Cuban chargé in Quito, Ecuador, had
[1245]given more than $40,000 to the Union of Revolution-
[1246]ary Ecuadorean Youth (URJE) for guerrilla warfare
[1247]training. .
[1249]More than 45 young Ecuadoreans, including
[1250]three girls, were rounded up by Ecuadorean para-
[1251]troopers last spring at a guerrilla training camp
[1252]at Santo Domingo de los Colorados, about 50 miles
[1253]west of Quito. Many of the trainees had been to
[1254]Cuba. The leaders of the group, Santiago Perez
[1255]Romoleroux, Jorge Rivadeneyra Altamirono, and Efrain
[1256]Alvarez Fiallos, had recently returned from extensive
[1257]guerrilla warfare training in Cuba.
[1259]When the Ecuadorean Communist Party last January
[1260]arranged for the expulsion of several URJE leaders in-
[1261]volved with the guerrilla operation in order to re-
[1262]store full Communist control, newspapers reported that
[1263]the expelled leaders had been accused by the Communists
[1264]of wasting Cuban funds.
[1266]Guillermo Layedra, Communist leader from Rio
[1267]Bamba, arrested on his return from Cuba in March 1962,
[1268]was reported to have photographs showing him under-
[1269]going guerrilla training in Cuba. Communist Miguel
[1270]Lechon, the only Indian on the party Central Committee
[1271]and president of the Ecuadorean Federation of Indians,
[1272]was arrested in 1962 for shooting a peasant. He showed
[1273]a Soviet pistol which he said had been given him by
[1274]Fidel Castro during a visit to Cuba, and has also
[1275]Shown. a key which he boasts is the ignition key for
[1276]a Cadillac Castro has promised to send him as soon
[1277]as he recruits 300 Indians for the Communist Party.
[1279]Reliable sources in Ecuador report that at
[1280]least 80 Ecuadoreans were in Cuba as of January for
[1281]guerrilla training. We have 30 of these trainees
[1282]listed by name.
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[1288]mr - @ ~~‘ SECRET Gg
[1290]ANNEX E -— PERU
[1292]The ruling military junta in Peru started in
[1293]February 1963 mass trials of more than 200 extremists,
[1294]including 63 Communist leaders. In a 68-page indict-
[1296]ment, the government charges that the extremists have
[1297]attacked police stations and banks, raised guerrilla
[1298]forces, incited peasant violence, and caused riots in
[1299].San. Marcos University. The evidence to be submitted
[1300]in the Lima trial alone runs to almost 700 single-—
[1301]spaced pages. .The security forces have given us no
[1302]“evidence of a Moscow-Havana master plan, but there is
[1303]'ample evidence of Cuban involvement.
[1305]The trials center on the activities of the Move-
[1306]ment of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), a roof-organiza-
[1307]tion for extremist militants founded by De La Puente
[1309]_ Uceda in 1961, De La Puente had just returned from
[1310]-Cuba and said he brought instructions to "organize the.
[1311]revolution in Peru with economic and technical help
[1312]from Fidel Castro." This phrase from the indictment
[1314]' conforms with reports our.agents received at the time
[1315]from close associates of De La Puente. He is one of
[1317]‘the top extremists who escaped the roundup launched
[1318]by the junta early.in January. We believe he is in
[1319]Cuba. We have a photograph, taken some time ago, .
[1321]- which shows De La Puente and two of his top Peruvian
[1322]associates with Fidel Castro in Havana.
[1324]Although the government did not move against
[1325]the Communists and other extremist groups with any.
[1326]great vigor, proof of Cuban involvement in subversion
[1327]goes back. at least as far as March 1962, Peruvian
[1328]police fooled a Cuban-trained agent in the mountains
[1329]into directing them to a guerrilla camp accessible
[1330]only by foot, near Satipo, and almost simultaneously
[1331]raided a house in the Lima suburb of Huampani from
[1332]which trainees were being sent to the camp. AS a re-
[1333]sult, they found complete guerrilla kits including
[1335]Czech-made rifles with a pistol grip, instructions for
[1336]dispatching and equipping the guerrilla candidates,
[1338]‘ and two radio transmitters brought in from. Cuba. The
[1339]custodian admitted he had used the radios to contact
[1340]a sister in Havana. Most of the men arrested in this
[1341]incident were released, but have been picked up again
[1342]in the January roundup and are to be included in the
[1343]mass trials.
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[1351]An agent who took guerrilla training in Cuba
[1352]last fall has provided a detailed account of his
[1353]training, lists of other trainees he could identify,
[1354]and in particular, a list of questions the Cubans
[1355]apparently gave to all the Peruvians. Possibly it
[1356]is a standard questionnaire for all guerrilla war-
[1357]fare trainees. The Peruvians were asked to pinpoint
[1358]possible sabotage targets such as bridges on a large
[1359]map. The Cuban instructors also wanted information
[1360]on all kinds of targets for sabotage, chances to
[1361]Subvert the police, possibilities for illegal entry
[1362]into and travel in Peru, the problems of Setting up
[1363]business firms to cover espionage and agent opera-
[1364]tions, and information on location of and access to
[1365]police and military installations.
[1367]Three major guerrilla groups, according to
[1368]good reports from our agents and from Peruvian po-
[1369]lice, appear to have reached agreement on 2 plan for
[1370]coordinated action. This may be one factor that per-
[1371]suaded the junta to move against the. extremists.
[1373]- The main guerrilla strength at present is a
[1374]force which local police in the Cuzco area estimate
[1375]to be as large as 2,000 men. This is the guerrilla
[1376]force led by Hugo Blanco, who is reported by Peru-
[1377]vian authorities to have received his guerrilla train-
[1378]ing in Argentina, If in fact he has 2,000 men, this
[1379]figure includes landless peasants and Indians,
[1380]largely untrained and unarmed; we have no reason to
[1381]believe that more than a small proportion are trained
[1382]and equipped guerrillas. The Indians, however, are
[1383]almost as deadly with rock slings as guerrillas are
[1384]with rifles. The junta has moved in some troops be-
[1385]cause the local police detachments have been unable
[1386]to withstand Blanco's raids. Interrogations and
[1387]agent reports have established that the guerrillas
[1388]are buying weapons stolen from or sold by the Bo-
[1389]livian military and smuggled across the frontier
[1390]into Peru. Some of the money is apparently the Com-
[1391]munist. share of the $100,000 Miraflores bank robbery.
[1393]AS One example of the activities of the co-
[1394]ordinated extremist forces, a lieutenant of the
[1395]Guardia Republicana, assisted by half a dozen guer-
[1396]villas dressed in Guardia uniforms, attacked the
[1397]village Guardia post in Jauja, 110 miles east of Lima,
[1398]and overwhelmed it. Arming another score of guerrillas
[1399]with the captured weapons, the gang then robbed three
[1400]local banks and retreated to the hills.
[1402]-2.
[1404]SECRET
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[1410]ANNEX F - VENEZUELA
[1412]. _ Venezuela is the top priority target for Cuban
[1413]Subversion. A campaign of terror is in full swing.
[1414]Castro, Che Guevarra, Blas Roca and other high-ranking
[1415]Cuban officials have, as recently as January 1963,
[1416]told various visiting Latin American Communists that
[1418]' Venezuela is the first goal of Castroism in Latin
[1419]America, Venezuela is receiving priority attention
[1420]from Castro, who has claimed that the Betancourt re~
[1421]gime will be toppled by guerrilla warfare methods, ©
[1423]It would appear from the meager evidence avail-
[1424]able in Venezuela, that the Venezuelan Communists
[1425]‘have been thoroughly briefed to hide or deny any Cuban
[1426]involvement in the present guerrilla-terroristic cam-
[1427]paign which is being waged in the country. The wave
[1428]of terror which has existed for months in Venezuela
[1429]has physically exhausted the handful of competent men
[1430]in the Venezuelan police system, which has little or
[1431]‘no time left over to track down evidence of Cuban in-
[1432]- volvement.
[1434]Support from Havana can be inferred, however,
[1435]if only from the expert character of. the sabotage
[1436]carried out. In mid-February, for instance, it was.
[1437]discovered that the Communists have begun to use
[1438]Shaped charges to sabotage vulnerable oil pipe lines.
[1440]- Earlier attempts had involved more conventional explo-
[1441]sives.
[1443]The paramilitary apparat of the Venezuelan Com-
[1444]munist Party, which is directly charged with the mis-
[1445]sion for continuing terrorism in the urban areas, has
[1446]been actively engaged in carrying out other major acts
[1447]of sabotage, such as burning down warehouses with ad-
[1448]vanced combustibles and dynamiting major bridges,
[1449]pipelines and pumping stations, All of these acts
[1450]_have been well planned and professionally executed,
[1451]There is circumstantial evidence that the Communist
[1452]sabotage of the Maracaibo oil fields last October and
[1453]November was in reply to an appeal from Radio Havana
[1454]to attack all American installations in Venezuela as
[1455]a reprisal for the quarantine of Cuba.
[1457]Last November a Venezuelan military court tried
[1458]139 guerrillas captured in the course of the Puerto
[1460]SECRET
[1462]NW 50955 Docld: 324274709 Page 29
[1464]~ @ SECRET (lb
[1466]Cabello revolt, and handed out heavy jail sentences,
[1467]Some of the defendants had previously been in Cuba.
[1468]One of them, Fabricio Ojeda, who had at one time
[1469]been photographed in Cuban uniform during Cuban arny
[1470]maneuvers, was known to have brought back a large
[1471]sum of US currency from Cuba, and had made several
[1472]trips there. He was also the recipient of large
[1473]quantities of Cuban Communist propaganda,
[1475]Venezuelan police early in January raided a
[1476]house registered in the name of a Venezuelan Com-
[1477]munist known to have made at least one trip to Cuba,
[1478]and discovered a radio transmitter capable of reach-
[1479]ing Cuba. Two Communists were subsequently arrested
[1480]attempting to enter the house. The armed forces
[1481]have also heard a voice radio, which appears to be
[1482]located on the grounds of the Central University in
[1483]Caracas, communicating with another station which they
[1484]believe to be in Cuba,
[1486]Late last fall a raid on the home of a leader
[1487]in Caracas of the pro-Communist Movement of the Revo-
[1488]lutionary Left turned up a sheet of instructions for
[1489]procedures in radio communication with Cuba. When
[1490]the man himself was arrested, police jfound a radio
[1491]transmitter being carried in the trunk of his car.
[1493]We have received reports from a reliable source
[1494]that Rafael Martinez, head of the Communist paramili-
[1495]tary apparat (PCV) in Venezuela, asked Castro last
[1496]September for assistance. Castro reportedly had prom-
[1497]ised to give the PCV mortars and other weapons. How-
[1498]ever, Castro is reported to have given Martinez
[1499]$50,000 instead, and offered to train| some of Martinez’
[1500]men in Cuba. Castro had explained that he was unable
[1501]to offer arms at that time because the USSR would not
[1502]permit him to do so. Last month (January 1963), it was
[1503]further reported that the wife of Martinez, Argelia
[1504]Laya de Martinez, received an additional sum of $6,000
[1505]to finance sabotage operations against North American
[1506]business installations in Venezuela. | Mrs. Martinez was
[1507]visiting in Cuba at the time that she| received these
[1508]funds,
[1512]SECRET
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[1518]Page 31
[1521]INVESTIGATION OF
[1522]THE PREPAREDNESS PRCGRAM
[1524]INTERIM REPORT BY
[1525]PREPAREDNESS INVESTIGATING
[1526]SUBCOMMITTEE
[1527]Of The
[1529]COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
[1530]UNITED STATES SENATE
[1532]Under The Authority Of
[1533]-S. Res. 75
[1534](88th Cong., lst Sess.)
[1535]| On
[1536]THE CUBAN MILITARY BUILDUP
[1538]5812 CF)
[1540]QATSD(LA) CONTROL NUMBER ~~~.
[1542]sECREI
[1544]HW 50955 DoclId:32424709 Page 32
[1546]TOT pe eet
[1548]as
[1550](A
[1552]ae a
[1553]SECRET
[1555]COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
[1557]Richard B. Russell, Georgia, Chairman
[1559]John Stennis, Mississippi Leverett Saltonstall, Massachusette
[1560]Harry Flood Byrd, Virginia Margeret Chase Smith, Maine
[1562]Stuart Symington, Missouri J. Glenn Beall, Maryland
[1564]Henry M. Jackson, Washington Barry Goldwater, Arizona
[1566]Sem J. Ervin, Jr., North Carolina Clifford P. Case, New Jersey
[1568]Strom Thurmond, South Carolina
[1569]Clair Engle, California
[1570]Howard W. Cannon, Nevada
[1571]Robert C. Byrd, West Virginia
[1572]Stephen M. Young, Ohio
[1573]Daniel K. Inouye, Hawaii
[1574]Harry L. Wingate, Jr. Chief Clerk
[1576]PREPAREDNESS INVESTIGATING SUBCOMMITTEE
[1578]John Stennis, Mississippi, Chairman
[1580]Stuart Symington, Missouri Leverett Saltonstall, Massachusetts
[1581]Henry M. Jackson,..Waghington Margaret Chase Smith, Maine
[1582]Strom Thurmond, Carolina Barry Goldwater, Arizona
[1584]James T., Kendell, Chief Counsel
[1586]SECRET
[1588]HW 50955 DoclId: 32424709 Page 33
[1590]HW 50955
[1592]ad SECRET ©
[1594]LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
[1596]U. S,. Senate,
[1597]Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee,
[1598]Committee on Armed Services,
[1599]May , 1963.
[1601]Honorable Richard B. Russell,
[1602]Chairman, Committee on Armed Services
[1603]U. &. Senate
[1605]My Dear Mr. Chairman:
[1607]There is transmitted herewith en interim report by the
[1608]Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, appointed under Senate
[1609]Resolution 75 of the 88th Congress, on the Cuban Military Buildup.
[1611]In its inquiry to this time the Subcommittee has received
[1612]testimony in executive session from the Director of Central Intelligence,
[1613]the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Chiefs of the
[1614]Army, Navy and Air Force intelligence sections. The interim report
[1615]transmitted herewith is addressed primarily to a review of military
[1616]developments and intelligence activities and operations in connection
[1617]with Cuba from early 1962 to the present insofar as the facts have
[1618]been developed and are now known to the Subcommittee.
[1620]The Subcommittee intends to pursue further its inquiry
[1621]into the Cuban situation and it is anticipated that one or more
[1622]subsequent reports on this subject will be issued in the future.
[1624]It is necessary that this interim report to the full
[1625]Committee on Armed Services be classified "Secret." However, the
[1626]Subcommittee is submitting the report for review for security
[1627]purposes and will have the report printed and released to the .
[1628]public when it has been so reviewed and the necessary security
[1629]matters have been deleted.
[1631]Respectfully,
[1633]JOHN STENNIS,
[1634]Chairman, Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee.
[1636]SECRET
[1638]Bocld:324274709 Page 34
[1642]CONTENTS
[1644]INTERIM REPORT ON CUBAN MILITARY BUILDUP
[1646]Page
[1647]I. Introductory Statement c.vccccerecscscccceveccevsnecesces 1
[1648]II. Summary of Major FIndingS .ccccccccerevececcauasesceseses 3
[1649]IItI. Situation Prior to Mid-July, LQ 2 se cecevevccnssseencens 7
[1650](aA) Cuban FPOPCOS sacccesesesossccesssososesersesoees 7
[1651](B) Intelligence Activities and Operations.....0.5. 8
[1652]‘IV. Situation’ From Mid-July to October 22, 1962... .ssseceeees 10
[1653](A) Buildup im Soviet Forces and Equipment,.....s05. 10
[1654]_ (B) Identification of Specific Weapons ..... -
[1655]and Equipmentssscssveseseoseseveecvaveresnees 1
[1656](1) SA=2 SATS oc vvenenesccvenccecnseseserens iz
[1657](2) Cruise: Missiles .csseccccresvcccavcecvaae il
[1658](3) MIG-21 Fighters sieseveccevecsscvvcceooss 12
[1659]{8} TL-28 (Beagle) Bombers..ssessssecccteses 12
[1660]5) Medium Range and Intermediate’... ...:..
[1661]Range Missiles, .. 000.00 0 ees ol®
[1662](C) Failure'to Identify Soviet Organized
[1663]1 . ‘Combat UDLts .ccccccccccaserseccceserereteeoes 13
[1664](D) “Alleged Photographic Gap..ssccccssenssesevanees 15
[1665](F} Transfer of U-2 Flights From CIA to SAC..seae0. 16
[1666]‘(F) Intelligence Activities and Operations ;
[1667]Generally scsserenssceceeecescsectinessccesees 17
[1668]V. Situation From October 22, 1962, to Time of |
[1669]Removal ‘of IL-28 Bomber scssvvsceesvessrencessreseeess el
[1670](A) Intelligence Activities and Operations |
[1671]Generally.svocveccerevcccecsuenecsasssessrsce al
[1672](B) Identification of Organized Soviet
[1673]‘Combat. Units ssccscncvcccccvcecceerersvesssses al
[1674](c) Removal of Missiles and IL-28 Bombers..eessees. 21
[1675]VI. Current Military Situation in CUA, cccconcerscvevssvnees ee
[1676]- , (A) Intelligence Activities and Operations
[1677]Generally.csccccteccccccerrecvessestenssteees Oe
[1678](B) Nature and Capabilities of Forces and
[1679]“Equipment Now in Cubficscssesesvevecovesveeees 23
[1680](1) Types and Numbers of WeaponS.cessserees 23
[1681](2) Strength ard Capabilities of Forces..., 26
[1682](3) Reports of Concealed Strategic
[1683]Weapons in. Cuba..cscrecseecsrevcecves 28
[1684](4) Withdrawal of Soviet Personnal....s...- 30
[1685]{c) Summary of Threat Arising From Soviet. _
[1686]Presence io CUBA cccccescvssuccesssssieernoes 31
[1687]_ (D) Prospect of Internal Revolt or Invasion....csss 32
[1688]VII, Concluding Statement, vescsrsecovessvessssccevenenscoooge 34
[1690]SECRET
[1692]HW 50955 DoclId:32424703 Page 35
[1695]INTERIM REPORT ON CUBAN MILITARY BUILDUP
[1696]I. INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
[1698]The dramatic eventa which occurred last October with respect to Cuba are
[1699]now history. Following photographic confirmation of the fact that strategic
[1700]and offensive weapons had, in fact, been introduced into Cuba end President
[1701]Kennedy's confrontation with Premier Khrushchev, such strategic and offensive
[1702]weapons were ostensibly withdrawn.
[1704]However, the public concern and debate about the Cuban situation hee not
[1705]subsided, There have been and are insistent reports that the Soviets still
[1706]maintain strategic missiles in Cuba which are concealed in caves and other
[1707]underground facilities and that Soviet troops are based in the island in
[1708]numbers far in excess of those accepted by our intelligence community. Reports
[1709]also abound with respect to the use of Cuba ag a base for subversive, agita-
[1710]tional and revolutionary activities directed at other Latin American countries.
[1712]The prevalence of these reports and allegations prompted the Preparedness
[1713]Investigating Subcommittee to launch an investigation inte the entire subject
[1714]matter in an effort to determine the facts. Although the investigation still
[1715]continues, the Subcommittee deems it appropriate to issue an interim report at
[1716]this time. This report will be limited to a review of military developments
[1717]and intelligence activities and operations in connection with Cuba from early
[1718]1962 to the current time insofar as the facts are now known to us. A discus-
[1719]sion of the use of Cuba as a base for subversive activities will be included
[1720]in a subsequent report. .
[1722]Broadly speaking, the term “intelligence commmity" includes the Central
[1723]Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the intelligence sections
[1724]of the Army, Navy and Air Force, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of
[1726]State, the National Security Agency, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the
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[1731]ep SECRET eo
[1733]- 2
[1735]Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is used in this report, howéver, ine
[1736]somewhat more’ ‘Limited sense; Where the term appears in this report it primarily
[1737]refers to and includes the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence
[1738]Agency, and the intelligence sections of the Army, Navy and Air Foree. Other
[1739]agencies are, of course, impliedly included in ‘our use of the term to the
[1740]extent that they particlpated in or contributed to any of the activities or
[1741]operations discussed,
[1743]Up to this time, the Subcommittee has received testimony in executive
[1744]bearings from Mr. John A. McCone, Director of Central Intelligence; Lt. Gen.
[1745]Joseph F, Carroll, Director of Defense Intelligence Agency; Major General
[1746]Alva R. Fitch, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U. S. Army; Rear
[1747]Admiral Vernon L, Lowrance, Director of Naval Intelligence; and Major General
[1748]Robert A. Breitweiser, Assistant Chief. of Staff for Intelligence, U. 5. Air
[1749]Force,
[1751]The Subcommittee has also received and has on file a number of written
[1752]reports from the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of State, the
[1753]Department of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We have
[1754]also considered reports issued by the Special Consultative Committee on Securit,
[1755]of the Council of the Organization of American States and the Cuban Revolution-
[1756]ery Council.
[1758]In addition, the Subcommittee staff has made an extensive investigation
[1759]and has thus far interviewed more than 70 witnesses who do not hold official
[1760]positions, including many Cuban refugees and exiles. Staff investigators spent
[1761]approximately 45 man days in the Miami area alone.
[1763]Information has‘also been received from individual Senators and Menbers
[1765]of the House of Representatives.
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[1771]eo SECRET Ee
[1775]This interim report is based primarily on the testimony received from
[1776]the intelligence chiefs who appeared before the Subconmittee. It does, however.
[1777]include some information from other sources.
[1779]Since our inquiry is not yet completed, this report does not contain any
[1780]overall or comprehensive conclusions and recommendations. Major findings, -:~
[1781]based on the testimony and evidence thus far received, relative to intelligence
[1782]activities during the military buildup have been incorporated, Our general
[1783]recommendation at this time is that an alert vigilance be maintained over all
[1785]activities taking place in Cuba.
[1787]II, SUMMARY OF MAJOR FINDINGS
[1789]1, While hindsight shows that the performance of the Central Intelli-
[1790]gence Agency and the military intelligence agencies can be criticized in some
[1791]areas, in other areas they performed creditably. Offensive weapons systems
[1792]were identified before becoming operational and their locations and performance
[1793]characteristics spelled out in @ limited period of time despite adverse weather
[1794]and an almost completely closed society.
[1796]2. Although photographic reconnaissance has limitations, it was this
[1797]capability which ultimately produced incontrovertible proof of the presence
[1798]of strategic missiles and offensive weapons in Cuba. Credit is due to those
[1799]involved in ‘this mission.
[1801]3, While a reasonably competent job was done in acquiring and collecting
[1802]intelligence information and data, in retrospect it appears that several
[1803]substantial errors were made by the intelligence agencies in the evaluation of
[1805]the information and data which was accumulated.
[1807]SECRET
[1809]HW 50955 DoclId: 32424709 Page 38
[1814]4h, Faulty evaluation and the predisposition of the intelligence com-
[1815]munity to the philosophical conviction that it would be incompatible with
[1816]Soviet policy to introduct strategic missiles into Cuba resulted in intelligence.
[1817]judgments and evaluations which later proved to be erroneous. Among these were.
[1819](a) It was not until after a confirming picture was obtained on
[1820]October 25th, 1962, that it was established by the intelligence community that
[1821]organized Soviet ground combat units were present in Cuba. At this time our
[1822]plans for a possible landing in Cuba were substantially complete and were neces-
[1823]sarily based upon the information that our forces would face only indigenous
[1824]Cuban defense forces.
[1826](>) The number of Soviet troops in Cuba was substantially under-
[1827]estimated throughout the crisis, On October 22nd, our intelligence people
[1828]estimated that there were §000 to 10,000 Soviets in Cuba. They now say that,
[1829]at the height of the buildup, there were at least 22,000 Soviet personnel on
[1830]the island.
[1832](ce) It was not until the photographic evidence was obtained on
[1833]October 1lith that the intelligence community concluded that strategic missiles
[1834]had been introduced into Cuba. In reaching their pre-October lth negative
[1835]judgment the intelligence analysts were strongly influenced by their judgment
[1836]as to Soviet policy and indications that strategic missiles were being installcc
[1837]were not given proper weight by the intelligence community. A contributing
[1838]factor to this was the tendency on the part of the intelligence people to
[1839]discredit and downgrade the reports of Cuban refugees and exiles.
[1841]5. The Subcommittee has uncovered no evidence to substantiate charges
[1843]and speculation about a photography "gap" having existed from September 5th to
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[1849]HW 50955
[1851]coe SECRET ge
[1853]- 5 =
[1854]October lth, The evidence before the Subcommittee leads to the conclusion
[1855]that such charges are unfounded.
[1857]6. The news reports of an alleged conflict between the Central Intelli-
[1858]gence Agency and Strategic Air Command with reference to the operation of U-2
[1859]high-altitude reconnaissance flights prior to October 1kth were also closely
[1860]inquired into and found to be without merit. No evidence was presented to
[1861]support the charge that the operation of the U-2 flights were transferred from
[1862]the Central Intelligence Agency to Strategic Air Command because of a deadlock
[1863]or friction between the agencies.
[1865]7. To aman the intelligence chiefs atated that it is their opinion
[1866]thet all strategic missiles and bombers have been removed from Cuba. However ,
[1867]they readily admit that, in terms of absolutes, it is quite possible that
[1868]offensive weapons remain on the island concealed in caves or otherwise. They
[1869]also admitted that absolute assurance on this question can come only from
[1870]penetrating and continuing on-site inspection by reliable observers and that,
[1871]based on skepticism, if nothing more, there is reason for grave concern.about
[1872]the matter.
[1874]8. There are literally thousands of caves and underground caverns in the
[1875]Island of Cuba and many of these are suitable for the storage and concealment
[1876]of strategic missiles and other offensive weapons. Refugee and exile reports
[1877]continue to insist that they are being so utilized. Military-connected activi-
[1878]ties have been noted with reference to @ number of them but it is the view of
[1879]the intelligence analysts that the military usage of the caves is for the
[1880]storage of those weapons which we know are now in Cuba and not for the storage
[1881]of offensive weapon systems. Admittedly, however, this view is based to a
[1883]substantial degree on the negative proposition that there is no hard evidence
[1885]SECRET
[1887]Bocld:324274709 Page 40
[1891]SECRET
[1893]confirming the presence of strategic missiles in Cuba at this time.
[1895]9. Even though the intelligence community believes that all have been
[1896]withdrawn, it is of the greatest urgency to detenmine whether or not strategic
[1897]missiles are now concealed in Cube. The criticality of this is illustrated by
[1898]the fact that, assuming maximum readiness at pre-selected sites, with all equip-
[1900]ment pre-lecated, the Soviet mobile medium range (1100 miles) missiles could
[1902]‘be made operational in a matter of hours.
[1903]10. The intelligence community estimated that approximately 5000 Soviet .
[1905]personnel were withdrawn from Cuba following the October confrontation, leaving,
[1906]according to intelligence sources, about 17,500 Soviets in Cuba. A net of hooc
[1907]to 5000 additional have been withdrawn since the first of the year, our intelii-
[1909]gence people say. However, because of what is described by intelligence as
[1910]"technical reasons,” the 17,500 intelligence estimate of those remaining is
[1912]unchanged at the writing of this report. At the least, this indicates to the
[1913]Subcommittee that there is a low level of confidence in the original estimate.
[1915]There is also some doubt in our minds as to the adequacy of the information as
[1916]to the number of Soviets newly arriving. All of the intelligence people agree
[1918]that there is no evidence that any of the combat ground troops associated with
[1919]the four mobile armored groups have been withdrawn.
[1921]12. Some other sources --primarily refugee and exile groups-- estimate
[1922]that as many as 40,000 Soviets are now in Cuba. Bearing in mind the lack of
[1923]hard evidence on the question and the substantial underestimation of last Fall,
[1924]we conclude that no one in official United States circles can tell, with any
[1925]real degree of confidence, how many Russians are now in Cuba and we are of the
[1926]opinion that the official 17,500 estimate is perhaps a minimum figure.
[1928]12. In any event, it is conceded that the combined Soviet and Cuban
[1929]forces now in the island are quite powerful defensively and could offer severe
[1931]opposition to any attack. They are admittedly capable of suppressing any
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[1941]internal rebellion or revolt mounted without external support, and it is clear
[1942]that an invasion from without, to have a fair chance of success, would require
[1943]large forces, extensive sea-borne landing efforts, and adequate air cover.
[1945]13. Based upon their judgment that all strategic missiles and offensive
[1946]weapons have been removed, the intelligence chiefs do not believe that the
[1947]Communist forces in Cuba now present a direct aggressive military threat to the
[1948]United States or Latin America. Strategic weapons may or may not be now in
[1949]Cuba. We can reach no conclusion on this because of the lack of conclusive
[1950]evidence.
[1952]14. The evidence is overwhelming that Castro is supporting, spurring,
[1953]aiding and abetting Communist revolutionary and subversive movements throughout
[1954]the Western Hemisphere and that such activities present a grave and ominous
[1956]threat to the peace and security of the Americas.
[1958]IIT, SITUATION PRIOR TO MID-JULY, 1962 = ‘
[1960]A. Cuban Forces
[1962]It was estimated by intelligence sources that et the beginning of 1962,
[1963]the Cuban ground forces consisted of a standing army of 75,000, a ready reserve
[1964]of 100,000, and a home guard of 100,000. Although the ground combat capability
[1965]of the Cuban forces had increased since the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion, it
[1966]was thought that, although the Cuban forces were of varying states of training,
[1967]they had the capability for effective ground operations at the battalion combat
[1968]team level. They were not thought to be organized for operations with units
[1969]larger than reinforced battalions and it was believed that they were maintained
[1971]primarily for the purpose of internal security operations and to repel any
[1973]attempted invasion. The intelligence community thought that approximately 500
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[1983]-6.
[1984]Soviet bloc advisory personnel were then in Cuba,
[1986]By the beginning of 1962, the Cuban Air Force had benefitted by the
[1987]acquisition of MIG aircraft and the return of a number of people trained in
[1988]bloc countries. It had some 40 MIG i's, 17's and 19's as well as about 40
[1989]propeller-driven aircraft of training, transport and utility types.
[1991]The Cuban Navy was small and of an essentially codstal patrol type.
[1992]Several of these craft in the sib-chaser and motor torpedo boat types had been
[1993]received from the Soviets. The crews on a number of these craft were mixed
[1994]Cuban and Soviet, indicating that the Cubans were still under training.
[1996]It was agreed by intelligence sources, however, that even prior to July,
[1997]1962, vast amounts of Soviet military equipment had been introduced into Cuba
[1998]for the use of the Cuban forces. As a result, it was believed that even then
[1999]the Cuban Army was one of the best equipped in all Latin America. The arms and
[2000]eguipment furnished the Cubans at this time consisted of a mixture of World
[2001]War II equipment and more modern weapons. There is a question as to whether
[2002]the amount of heavy and more complicated weapons introduced into Cuba at this
[2003]time was not more than ample to supply the needs of the Cuban forces as then ;
[2004]constituted.
[2006]B. Intelligence Activities and Operations
[2008]The intelligence activities with respect to Cuba prior to July, 1962,
[2009]consisted of reconnaissance overflights by U-2 aircraft, peripheral reconnais-
[2010]sance flights over international waters and the collection of reports from
[2011]refugees, exiles, and other human sources,
[2013]For sometime prior to 1962, U-2 aircraft operated by the Central Intelli-
[2015]gence Agency flew one mission a month at high altitudes over the Island of
[2017]Cuba itself for reconnaissance purposes. Commencing in early,1962, two flights
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[2023]ee SECRET ge
[2026]were flown each month, weather permitting, until September, 1962, when the
[2027]number of flights was increased.
[2029]Algo, even before 1962, regular electronic reconnaissance and photographic
[2030]flights were flown by the military on a regular basis over international waters
[2031]put not over the Island of Cuba itself.
[2033]In addition, during the same period, thousands of human source reports
[2034]were collected and assessed, Included in these reports were many which con-
[2035]tained allegations of missile-related activities and of the presence of Soviet
[2036]ground combat units in Cuba. However, although the reports were checked to the
[2037]greatest extent possible, the intelligence community obtained no confirmation
[2038]of such activities.
[2040]In recognition of the increasing importance of the Cuban problem, the
[2041]intelligence community in early 1962 intensified their intelligence activities
[2043]‘and stated a greater urgency in their collection requirements with respect to
[2044]Cuba. The routine one-a-month flight over Cuba was increased to two a month.
[2045]The intelligence community was alert to the implications of the communization
[2046]of Cuba, However, on the basis of the information collected and the assessment
[2047]of this information, the intelligence conclusion at this time was that the
[2048]activities were primarily defensively oriented. No Soviet combat units or
[2049]strategic weapons were discovered.
[2051]The intelligence community, although agreeing that the activities in Cuba
[2052]were then primarily directed towards defense, did conclude in early 1962 that
[2053]it might probably be expected that the TL-28 (Beagle) light bomber would be
[2055]supplied to Cuba by the Soviets in the future.
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[2064]IV. SITUATION FROM MID-JULY TO ocToBER 22, 1962
[2066]A. Buildup in Soviet Forces and Bijui pitent
[2068]In late July and early August, oui intelligence noted a significant
[2069]change in the situation ini Cuba. A sudden rise in military aid from the Soviet
[2070]Union became clearly evident, Ship arrivals, both dry cargo and passenger,
[2071]increased drastically. For example, for the first half of 1962, an average
[2072]of 15 Soviet dry cargo ships per month arrived in Cuba. The number jumped
[2073]to 37 in August. Only one Soviet passenger ship had arrived in Cuba during
[2074]the first five months of 1962. Four arrived in July and six in August.
[2076]While our intelligence people were aware from this and other informa-
[2077]tion that a major Soviet effort in Cuba was under way, its exact nature and
[2078]impact was not clear to the intelligence community.
[2080]During the July-August period, refugee reports of alleged missile
[2081]activity in Cuba increased significantly. These reports were checked out as
[2082]scrupulously as possible, but even though many of them included consistent
[2083]and similar descriptions of some form of missile activity, there was no confir-
[2084]metion of them.
[2086]At the same time, there were human source reports that some of the ships
[2087]were unloaded at night under rigid security with all non-Soviet personnel
[2088]being excluded from the dock areas. The practice of unloading at night in
[2089]small easily guarded ports, remote from large population centers, was known
[2090]to the intelligence community, although the alleged security conditions ashore
[2091]eould not be confirmed.
[2093]Human. source reports also alleged that the nature and character of
[2094]the arriving Soviet personnel had changed significantly. It was reported that
[2096]some of the arriving personnel during this period were primarily young, trim,
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[2107]physically fit, sun-tanned and disciplined, and that they formed in ranks of
[2109]fours on the docks and moved out in truck convoys. Refugee, exile, and
[2110]other human source reports suggested that, in cohtrast to the earlier artivals,
[2111]the new arrivals were Soviet combat troops. However, the intelligence com-
[2112]munity adhered to the view that they were military instructors, advisors, and
[2113]trainers, plus a number of civilian technicians and advisors associated with
[2114]improving the Cuban economy. The view was that they did not include signifi-
[2115]cant numbers of Soviet military personnel and that they were not organized
[2116]into combat units. As late as October 29, in an unclassified information
[2117]brochure published by the Defense Department entitled "Cuba," the Soviet 'per-
[2118]sonnel" in the island were estimated at 5,000.
[2120]B. Identification of Specific Weapons and Equipment
[2122]1. SA-2 Sites - About August 15, as a result of suspicions generated
[2123]by human source reports, the Department of Defense focused special attention
[2124]on suspected areas and requested that they be covered by the "next" high
[2125]altitude flight. As a result, the next such flight, flown on August 29, estab-
[2126]lished positive identification of SA-2 surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites at
[2127]two of the suspect locations and at six others in Western Cuba. Flights from
[2128]August 29 through October 7 discovered additional SA-2 sites. The SA-2 system
[2129]can engage targets at altitudes from about 3,000 to 80,000 feet and has a
[2130]slant range of about 25 miles.
[2132]2. Cruise Missiles - A coastal defense cruise missile installation
[2134]was identified shortly after the flight of August 29. Three additional
[2136]‘cruise missile sites were discovered by October 7. These are anti-shipping
[2138]missiles estimated to have a maximum range of about 40 miles. On August 29th
[2140]KOMAR class patrol boats with 2 missile ‘launchers each were identified in Cuba.
[2142]SECRET
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[2147]-j1e2-
[2149]3. MIG-21 Fighters - Although the Soviets had supplied the Cuban Air
[2150]Force with MIG-15, 17, and 19 aircraft prior to the Spring of 1962 » the pre-
[2151]sence of the modern supersonic MIG-21 fighter was first confirmed by a picture
[2152]obtained on September 5, 1962.
[2154]4, IL-28 (Beagle) Bombers - As early as the Spring of 1962, the intelli-
[2155]gence community was of the view that the Soviets might send the IL-28 (Beagle)
[2156]light bomber into Cuba. This apprehension was confirmed by a picture taken on
[2157]September 28 which was later evaluated as showing crates containing IL-28's
[2158]aboard a Cuba-bound ship. This evaluation was not made until October 9 and was
[2159]disseminated to the intelligence community on October 10.
[2161]5. Medium Range and Intermediate Range Missiles - As has already been
[2162]indicated, during all of this period there was a great volume of unconfirmed
[2163]reports and rumors from human sources about strategic misslle-related activity
[2164]in Cuba. None of these reports were confirmed prior to October 14, 1962. It
[2165]is evident that many of these reports in fact referred to the SA-2 missile,
[2166]which, although nowhere near the size of the strategic missiles later identi-
[2167]fied, still appears large to the untrained observer.
[2169]However, after mid-September some reports of missiles being introduced
[2170]into Cuba were suggestive enough of strategic or offensive weapons to arouse
[2171]the suspicions of intelligence analysts. This resulted in the conclusion--
[2172]apparently reached near the end of September, 1962--that there was a suspect
[2173]medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) site in Pinar del Rio Province. As a
[2174]result, photographic coverage of the suspect area was proposed and on October
[2175]14 a Strategic Air Command U-2 reconnaissance aircraft overflew the area and
[2176]emerged with hard photographic evidence of the San Cristobal medium-range
[2178]ballistic missile complex.
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[2185]~ 13 -
[2187]Photographic reconnaissance was unable to detect precisely how many
[2188]ballistic missiles were introduced into Cuba. Prior to the Soviet announce-
[2189]nent that 42 missiles would be withdrawn, our photographs had revealed evi-
[2190]dence of only 33. It could not be established, therefore, how many ballistic
[2191]missiles were, in fact, introduced into Cuba or how many the Soviets planned
[2192]to introduce.
[2194]Additional medium-range ballistic missile sites and intermediate-range
[2195]ballistic missile (IRBM) sites were located by high altitude reconniassance
[2196]missions flown after October 14, Six MRBM sites were located, all of which
[2197]had achieved a full operational capacity on October 28 when the dismantling
[2198]of the sites commenced. Three IRBM sites were located and it was anticipated
[2199]that a fourth would be established. None of the IRBM sites became operational
[2200]pefore being dismantled, it being the estimate that they would have become
[2201]operational by December 15.
[2203]The medium-range missile is estimated to have a range of about 1100
[2204]miles and the intermediate range missile is credited with a range of 2200 miles
[2206]C. Failure to Identify Soviet Organized Ground Combat Units
[2208]As has already been noted, notwithstanding some reports that many of
[2209]the Soviets arriving in Cuba after mid-July were military units, and notwith~-
[2210]standing the evidence of a drastically increased buildup in modern and sophis-
[2211]ticated ground weapons, the intelligence community did not identify the pre-
[2212]sence of Russian organized ground combat forces in Cuba until October 25
[2213]when new pictures obtained by low-level photography, coupled with a re-
[2214]analysis of previous photography, led to the conclusion that there were,
[2216]in fact, four organized, mobile, and powerful armored Soviet units in Cuba.
[2218]SECRET
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[2222]HW 50955
[2228]The aggregate strength of these units is now estimated by intelligence people
[2229]to be about 5,000 men.
[2231]In addition, it is agreed that the number of Soviet personnel in Cuba
[2232]was substantially underestimated by our intelligence. For example, on
[2233]October 22, 1962, the date that the President addressed the nation, the intelli
[2234]gence community estimated the Soviet personnel in Cuba to be 8 to 10 thousand.
[2235]The current intelligence evaluation is that at the height of the Soviet build-
[2236]up, there were in Cuba an aggregate of at least 22,000 Soviet troops. This
[2237]is, of course, a retroactive or reconstructed intelligence estimate, One
[2238]factor in.the underestimation of the number of Soviet personnel in Cuba in
[2239]October was the assumption that the arriving passenger ships were normally
[2240]loaded. It is obvious now that these ships were, in fact, troop loaded and
[2241]that the actual aggregate troop-carrying capacity of the arriving passenger
[2242]ships was in excess of 20,000. In addition, it is pelieved that additional
[2243]Soviet military personnel arrived in cargo ships. There is some reason to
[2244]doubt that even the 22,000 figure would account fully for all of the great
[2245]quantities of weapons and equipment introduced into Cuba since June, 1962.
[2247]The failure to identify the presence of organized Russian combat units
[2248]in Cuba and the underestimation of the number of Soviet personnel present
[2249]there merits special comment. At that time, that is, on October 22, our
[2250]plans for a possible landing of forces in Cuba, which were already substantial-
[2251]ly complete, were necessarily based upon the information that our invading
[2252]forces would be opposed only by indigenous Cuban troops. The fact of the matter
[2253]is that the native Cuban forces would have been reinforced by highly trained,
[2254]powerful, and mobile Soviet armored units possessed of tremendous striking
[2255]power. These facts were not transmitted to the responsible United States
[2256]commanders until several days subsequent to October 25,
[2258]SECRET
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[2264]- 15 -
[2265]In other words, the true order of battle of the enemy had not been ascer~
[2267]tained at the time of the completion of plans for possible landings of our for-
[2268]ces in Cuba. This omission could have resulted in our paying a much higher
[2269]price in casualties in the occupation of Cuba -than had been anticipated.
[2271]Equally important, since on October 22nd the President did not know of
[2272]the presence in Cuba of a substantial number of Soviet soldiers in heavily
[2273]armed organized ground combat units, he could not include this factor in his
[2274]actions vis-a-vis the Soviets and demand at that time their withdrawal from
[2275]the Western Hemisphere along with the strategic missiles,
[2277]D. Alleged Photographic Gap
[2279]There has been considerable public discussion about an alleged gap in
[2280]our photo, raphic reconnaissance over Cuba during the period from September 5
[2281]to Seeudaber 1. We have examined this question as thoroughly as possible and
[2282]have found the allegations with respect to it to be unfounded. The record of
[2283]the flights which were scheduled between August 29 and October 14 should be
[2284]sufficient to clear up the situation and these will be summarized here..
[2286]The flight of August 29, which has already been discussed, resulted
[2287]in the discovery of surface-to-air missile and cruise missile sites.
[2289]On September 5, a mission was flown which covered the central and
[2290]eastern portion of the island. Good coverage was obtained of the central por-
[2291]tion but weather conditions prevented any photographic returns with reference
[2292]to the eastern end of the island.
[2294]A flight was planned for September 10th but this‘ was not flown.
[2296]On September 17, a mission was flown but, because of weather conditions,
[2298]it was not wholly successful,
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[2306]~ 16 -
[2308]Adverse weather precluded further flights until September 26th. Flights
[2309]were flow on September 26, September 29, October 5 and October 7. These
[2310]flights completed the coverage of those areas of Cuba which had been spotlighte.
[2311]as requiring early attention.
[2313]Weather prevented any additional flights until October 14, On October
[2314]12, the Strategic Air Command was given responsibility for operating the U-2
[2315]high altitude reconnaissance missions over Cuba, and on October ik, it flew
[2316]the flight which gave the first hard evidence of the existence of strategic
[2317]missiles in Cuba.
[2319]E. Transfer of U-2 Flights from CIA to SAC
[2321]There have been numerous news reports alleging the existence of a con-
[2322]flict between the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Strategic Air Com-
[2323]mand (SAC) with reference to the operation of the U-2 high altitude flights.
[2324]These reports have contained allegations that a deadlock existed between CIA
[2325]and SAC and that this was resolved at the policy level by transferring the func
[2326]tion of flying the U-2 missions from CIA to SAC. It has also been alleged that
[2327]this is one of the reasons for the delay in locating the MRBM sites in Cuba.
[2329]These allegations have also been closely inquired into and have been
[2330]found to be without merit. There is no evidence whatsoever to suggest that any
[2331]conflict between CIA and SAC existed or that there was any delay in photograph?
[2332]coverage of the island because of the fact that the U-2 program was being
[2333]operated by CIA prior to October rhe
[2335]Likewise, there is no evidence whatsoever of any deadlock between the
[2336]two agencies or any conflict or dispute with respect to the question of by whor.
[2338]the flights should be flown.
[2340]SECRET
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[2345]SECRET
[2348]The Subcommittee inquired thoroughly into the reason for the transfer of
[2349]the U-2 operation from CIA to SAC. It is to be remembered that the SA-2 sites
[2350]in the San Cristobal area had been located on August 29th. The U-2 flight whici
[2351]was flow on October l4ith was programed to over-fly this area. In view of the
[2352]possibility that the flight might provoke hostile reactions from the SA-2's, it
[2353]was concluded that it would be more appropriate for the operation to be ecnduct.
[2354]ed by the military rather than by civilians. This decision was entirely reason-
[2355]able and proper.
[2357]It is a Pact, of course, that the first U-2 flight flown by SAC was the
[2358]one which resulted in obtaining a photograph of the MRBM site. This, without
[2359]explanation, originally gave the Subcommittee some concern, However, after
[2360]inquiring closely into the situation we are convinced that there is no signifi-
[2362]cance to it and that it was just a matter of timing and coincidence.
[2364]‘F. Intelligence Activities and Operations Generally
[2366]As has been indicated, the U-2 high altitude reconnaissance flights over
[2367]Cuba continued at the rate of two a month, weather permitting, until September.
[2368]The stepped-up schedule for September and early October has already been out-
[2369]lined. All of the U-2 flights prior to October bth were flown by the CIA.
[2371]After the mission which verified the existence of MRBMs in Cuba, there
[2372]Was @ concentrated effort to determinethe precise nature of the missile buildup
[2373]and the exact location, number, configuration and state of readiness of the mis
[2374]sile systems. Between October 14 and October 22, the Strategic Air Command fle:
[2375]a total of 17 high altitude sorties. Low altitude overflights were not initiat«
[2377]until October 23, the day following the President's message.
[2379]SECRET
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[2385]SECRET
[2386]- 18 -
[2388]During the same period, the peripheral reconnaissance flights over
[2389]international waters continued, as did the intensified collection efforts using
[2390]refugees, exiles, and other human sources.
[2392]In reviewing the intelligence activities with respect to Cuba, the Sub-
[2393]committee found areas in which criticism is justly due. In other areas, how-
[2394]ever, our intelligence did quite well. The MREMs were discovered while they
[2395]were in the process of being deployed. The IRBM sites were discovered ina
[2396]very early stage of construction. The IL-28 bombers were discovered while they
[2397]were still in their crates. The MIG-21's were discovered when only one had
[2398]been removed from the shipping container. All these weapon systems were iden-
[2399]tified, and their locations and performance characteristics spelled out before
[2400]they became operational in a very compressed and limited pericd of time despite
[2401]adverse weather conditions and the fact that we were penetrating an almost
[2402]completely closed society,
[2404]The SA-2 sites were discovered commencing August 29th, and were credited
[2405]by the intelligence community with becoming operational on a site-by-site basis
[2406]commencing in mid-September, It is certain that these air defense missiles
[2407]had attained an operational capability by October 27th. On that date a U-2
[2408]plane piloted by Major Rudolph Anderson, USAF, was shot down by an SA-2 and
[2409]Major Anderson was killed.
[2411]CIA and military intelligence, by use of their highly developed photo-
[2412]graphic capability, were able to give a unique performance in intelligence
[2413]operations. They ultimately piaced in the hands of the President, his advisors
[2414]and United States diplomatic representatives incontrovertible proof of the
[2415]presence of Soviet strategic missiles in Cuba in direct contravention of Soviet
[2416]government assurances. This visual proof unquestionably played a major part
[2417]in the united action of the Organization of American States and world accep-
[2419]tanve of the correctness of our position.
[2420]SECRET:
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[2424]SECRET
[2427]Photographic reconnaissance, however, does have limitations. It is only
[2428]a part of the total intelligence collection means, although a most important on
[2429]It did not reveal the presence of ballistic missiles in Cuba during the period
[2430]of at least a month between their introduction into the Island and their deploy.
[2431]ment on sites. The absence of photographic confirmation of human source and
[2432]other reports, therefore, does not of itself disprove the accuracy of the other
[2433]SOUrces »
[2435]The responsible agencies of the intelligence community appear to have
[2436]done a creditable job in gathering and collecting quantities of data and infor-
[2437]mation. The deficiency in the performance of the intelligence community appear:
[2438]to have been in the evaluation and assessment of the accumulated data. Moreove:
[2439]there seems to have been a disinclination on the part of the intelligence com-
[2440]munity to accept and believe the ominous portent of the information which had
[2441]been gathered.
[2443]In addition, the intelligence people apparently invariably adopted the
[2444]most optimistic estimate possible with respect to the information. available.
[2445]This is in sharp contrast to the customary military practice of emphasizing the
[2446]worst situation which might be established by the accummlation of evidence.
[2448]There also appeared to be a tendency on the part of the intelligence
[2449]people to discredit and downgrade refugee and exile reports: This was based on
[2450]the general lack of experience and training of the refugees and exiles as mili-.
[2451]tary observers, thelr frequent inclusion of items not reasonably credible
[2452]among those things which were within their power of observation as to time,
[2453]place and comprehension, and on the consideration of the obvious self-interest
[2455]of the Cuban sources.
[2456]SECRET
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[2461]~ 20 -
[2463]Finally, the intelligence community was of the opinion that the Soviets
[2464]would not introduce strategic missiles into Cuba because they believed that suc:
[2465]a development would be incompatible with Soviet policy as interpreted by them.
[2466]The error inherent in this estimate was clearly demonstrated by subsequent
[2467]events. The danger that such pre~conceptions will control the weighing of the
[2468]facts as events unfold is evident.
[2470]The influence of these and other factors resulted in several intelligenc:
[2471]judgments and estimates which, in the retrospect, proved to be erroneous. A
[2472]few of these will be mentioned.
[2474]The fact that the intelligence community did not accept the fact that
[2475]organized Soviet ground combat units were being introduced into Cuba, until pho-
[2476]tographic confirmation of this fact was obtained on October 25, and the related
[2477]fact that the number of Soviets in Cuba was substantially underestimated
[2478]throughout the entire crisis have already been discussed.
[2480]‘It has also been noted that the intelligence community did not estimate
[2481]that strategic missiles would be introduced into Cuba until photographic con-
[2482]firmation was obtained on October 1bth. It appears that, on this point, the
[2483]analysts were strongly influenced by their philosophical judgment that it
[2484]would be contrary to Soviet policy to introduce strategic missiles into Cuba.
[2485]In retrospect » it appears that the indicators to the contrary were not given
[2486]proper weight. Among other things the discovery of the surface-to-air missile:
[2487]complex in the San Cristobal area on August 29th could logically have led to
[2488]the assumption that they were being constructed to protect a strategic missile
[2489]installation since it was clear that these SA-2's were not being emplaced for
[2491]the purpose of protecting any existing or known military installation.
[2493]SECRET
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[2501]VY. SITUATION FROM OCTOBER 22, 1962, TO TIME OF REMOVAL OF IL-28 BOMBERS
[2503]Ae Intelligence Activities and Operations Generally
[2505]On the day following the President's statement, that is, on October 23,
[2506]1962, low altitude flights over Cuba were commenced and there was a concerted
[2507]effort to obtain detailed information poth about the entire island and selected
[2508]targets. .
[2510]During the period from October 22 to December 6 the Strategic Air Com-
[2511]mand flew a total of 82 high altitude sorties, and from October 23 through Nov-
[2512]ember 15, when the low level flights over the island were discontinued, the Air
[2513]Force and Navy flew a total of 162 low altitude sorties,
[2515]B. Identification of Organized Soviet Ground Conbat Units
[2517]As has already been mentioned, photographs obtained on October 25th pro-
[2518]vided the first confirmation of the presence of Soviet highly mobile armored
[2519]task groups in Cuba. The information obtained as a result was first distribute:
[2520]to the operational military commands on October 30th. Up to that time, it was
[2521]thought that the Soviet ground equipment arriving in Cuba was to be utilized
[2522]by the Cuban forces. .
[2524]C, Removal of Missiles and IL-28 Bonbers
[2526]To a man the intelligence chiefs believe that, following the October
[2527]crisis and quarantine, the Soviets removed from Cuba 42 medium range ballistic
[2528]nissiles and related equipment, intermediate range ballistic missile equipment,
[2529]and 42 IL-28 jet light bombers.
[2531]A comprehensive and concentrated serial reconnaissance and fleet obser
[2532]vation program endeavored to cover every aspect of the exodus of this equip-
[2533]ment. This program involved high and low altitude flights over Cuba, accom-
[2534]panied by intensive sea and aerial surveillance of the departing ships over
[2535]Cuba end Caribbean waters and continued surveillance across the Atlantic.
[2537]SECRET
[2539]HW 50955 DoclId:32424703 Page 56
[2544]The effort was directed at covering the dismantling and abandonment of
[2545]the missile sites, at covering the roads and highways leading from the sites
[2546]to the ports, and at covering the port areas to observe the material as it
[2547]arrived, was assembled on the docks and loaded aboard ships.
[2549]As stated, the intelligence community believes that all strategic mis-
[2550]siles and bombers which were in Cuba at the time of the quarantine were removed
[2551]by the USSR, However, they acknowledge the existence of continuing reports to
[2552]the contrary and freely concede that, in terms of absolutes, it is possible the
[2554]despite our surveillance program, we were misled and deceived.
[2556]VI. CURRENT MILITARY SITUATION IN CUBA
[2557]' ‘A. Intelligence Activities and Operations Generally
[2559]Since the withdrawal of the strategic missiles and the IL-28 bombers
[2560]the intelligence community has turned its primary attention to surveillance of
[2561]the situation as it now exists. High level U-2 photographic flights continue
[2562]on @ regular basis. Since the U-2 was shot down on October 27 there has been
[2563]no further attempt to interfere with our serial reconnaissance, The reason
[2564]for this one incldent amidst a pattern of acquiescence in the overflights re-
[2565]mains a matter for speculation. |
[2567]The collection efforts using the technical and the various human sources
[2568]available, such as refugees, exiles, and returned prisoners of the 111-fated
[2569]‘Bay of Pigs operations, and others is a continuing process. The close surveil-
[2570]lance of merchant shipping arriving and departing Cuba, by naval air and sur-
[2571]face ships continues, as does the peripheral surveillance by electronic recon-
[2572]naissance and photographic aircraft. There is additional surveillance of the
[2573]aircraft activity over and near Cuba, from bases and ships to the extent that
[2574]radar range permits.
[2576]SECRET
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[2580]SECRET
[2582]123 -
[2584]A particular focus of attention has been the prospect that Cuba might
[2585]become a base for Soviet submarine operations. There have been repeated ru-
[2586]mors and speculations that such is already the case. Much of this is related
[2587]to the Soviet assistance to Cuba in improving and expanding certain commercial
[2588]fishing facilities. The intelligence community, however, does not believe
[2589]that in fact Cuba is now, or has been, a base for Soviet submarines.
[2591]Admittedly, however, no spectacular operation is necessary to provide
[2592]temporary advance base type support to submarines, sufficient to greatly ex-
[2593]tend their time on station away from bloe nation ports, and to facilitate thei:
[2594]operations generally. Reasonably sheltered anchorages or ports with sufficieni
[2595]depth, ready supplies of diesel fuel, fresh water, food supplies, and relaxa-
[2596]tion facilities ashore for the crews greatly extend the time away from home
[2597]for any submarine. The presence of a few skilled technicians and a supply of
[2598]the high usage repair parts would additionally extend operational periods con-
[2599]siderably. The use of shore-~based long range communication systems end infor-
[2600]mation from surface and shore~based radio and radar nets would greatly facili-
[2601]tate Soviet submarine operations in the Caribbean as well as assist in attempt
[2602]to evade detection. |
[2604]B. Nature and Capabilities of Forces and Equipment Now in Cuba
[2606]1. Types and Numbers of Weapons - As previously mentioned, it was tes~
[2607]tified that the native Cuban forces are organized only at reinforced battalion
[2608]level with the effective modern weapons for such units, Including rifles, ma-
[2609]chine guns, light and heavy mortars and considerable field artillery. For an
[2610]organization of that type they have a rather large amount of mechanized
[2612]equipment, tanks, self-propelled artillery and armored personnel carriers.
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[2619]~ oh .
[2620]They also have available a considerable amount of anti-tank guns and light
[2621]antiaircraft guns suitable for use against low flying aircraft. How much of
[2622]the large numbers of additional crew-operated weapons of the types mentioned
[2623]above are now in Cuban hands is apparently not known or estimated,
[2625]The Soviet organization has a powerful modern array of weapons in plen-
[2626]tiful numbers. There are 24 SA-2 sites of 6 launchers each, in a tight knit
[2627]perimeter air defense of the entire Island of Cuba. These weapons are similar
[2628]to our NIKE-HERCULES and are very good indeed, Their fire control system is
[2629]also estimated as of a high order of effectiveness. They have brought in a
[2630]large amount of ammunition for these units. The SA-2 system which is quite
[2631]complex is manned by Soviet troops. It would take over a year of intensive
[2632]training, Including quite technical schooling, for the native Cuban troops to
[2633]replace the Soviets in the SA-2 system. Probably associated with the SA-2 sites
[2634]for low level air defense, as well as in local defense of other important sites,
[2635]are some of the large additional numbers of light antiaircraft guns brought in
[2636]by the Soviet Expeditionary Force. Whether any or all of these weapons are
[2637]manned by Soviets is apparently not known.
[2639]There are four cruise missile sites, with missiles of a range of about
[2640]30 to 40 miles from their ground launchers. The missiles are placed as part
[2641]of the coastal defense system of Cuba, which is the normal Soviet employment
[2642]of these weapons. They are manned by Soviet naval crews, As an added feature
[2643]of these missiles, there are at least one hundred fifty (150) of them in Cuba,
[2644]far more than could be logically associated with the known missile launching
[2645]sites. It may be speculated that the launchers for these missiles may have
[2646]been in some of the bloc shipping turned back by the October Quarantine and
[2648]thus failed to reach Cuba,
[2650]gE CRET
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[2654]© . SECRET ag
[2656]- 25 -
[2658]The Soviet naval contingent in Cuba also operates 12 KOMAR-type high-
[2659]speed patrol craft as part of the Cuban coastal defenses. These boats are
[2660]each equipped with a pair of cruise-type missiles. The missiles are estimated
[2661]to have a range of 10 to 15 miles. These boats are under Soviet control, but
[2662]Cubans are believed to have been observed aboard them. The KOMARS are appar-
[2663]ently the only Soviet naval craft introduced into Cuba as part of their expe-
[2664]dition.
[2666]The Soviet Army element of the Soviet expedition in Cuba is armed with
[2667]almost all of the weapons found in large Soviet troop formations. Many of
[2668]these weapons, of the type characteristic of elements of mechanized and motor~-
[2669]ized divisions, reinforced by artillery and other units, are known to be in
[2670]surprisingly large numbers, As mentioned before, the amounts, if any, handed
[2671]to the Cubans from the many hundreds of heavy weapons brought in by the ships
[2672]of the Soviet expedition, are not fully known. These weapons include heavy
[2673]tanks and medium tanks, to a total in Cuba, both in Soviet and Cuban hands, of
[2674]almost 400. There are several score self-propelled assault guns; over 200
[2675]57mm anti-tank guns; over 500 light, medium and heavy mortars; over 600 field
[2676]artillery pieces; around 400 antiaircraft guns, both 300 mm and 57 mm; almost
[2677]100 armored personnel carriers, a number of the truck-mounted multiple laun-
[2678]chers for the 130 mm rocket, all brought in over and above the numbers already
[2679]in Cuban hands. In addition, of course, quantities of various types of motor
[2680]vehicles, radio equipment and engineer equipment were also brought in.
[2682]To the above must be added two very modern Soviet Aruy tactical missiles
[2683]The first is the SNAPPER, a wire guided anti-tank missile similar to our SS-10
[2685]and SS-11. The second is the FROG, a rocket with a range of about 25 miles,
[2687]SECRET
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[2691]HY 50955
[2695]~ 206 -
[2696]which can be equipped with a nuclear warhead. It is similar to our HONEST
[2697]JOHN, .
[2699]According to our intelligence, the Soviet Air Force in Cuba has approxi -
[2700]mately 42 MIG-21's, one of their most modern high performance supersonic jet
[2701]fighters. They are equipped with infra-red seeking, homing missiles similar
[2702]to our SIDEWINDER. Associated with them is a net of radars and radios neces-
[2703]sary for their control and the integration of the entire air defense system,
[2704]SA-2 and fighter.
[2706]2. Strength and Capabilities of Forces
[2708]The estimate of the strength of the Cuban army remains at the same
[2709]level as before the crisis, that is, 75,000 in the regular Army, 100,00 in
[2710]the Militia and 100,000 in the form of a home guard.
[2712]The native Cuban Army capabilities are believed generally limited by
[2713]their orgenization. They are probably able, as before the crisis, to sup-
[2714]press an insurrection, depending upon the degree of support the insurgents
[2715]obtain from the people of Cuba, and the amount of effective outside help
[2717]given. It also has a limited degree of static defense ability against modern
[2719], highly organized and heavily supported forces such as those employed in United
[2721]States amphibious and air-borne landing operations. The lack of an organiza-~
[2722]tion which would permit coordinated operations by units larger than reinforced
[2723]pattalions indicates a low probability that any such combat would be of long
[2724]duration.
[2726]The Cuban Navy is estimated to number some 4000 to 5000 men and to
[2727]consist of 6 KRONSTADT patrol craft and a relatively small number of other
[2729]eoastal patrol craft. Although its previously slight capabilities have been
[2731]SECRET
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[2735]HW 50955
[2737]@ SECRET | @
[2739]- 27 -
[2740]somewhat enhanced by the provision of Soviet equipment and by training, it is
[2741]not believed to be very effective and is generally limited to coastal patrol
[2742]activities.
[2744]The Cuban Air Force consists of a Cuban manned jet fighter force of
[2745]about 70 MIG-15's, 17's, and 19's, about 14 World War II propeller fighters,
[2746]about 16 propeller-driven tactical bonibers , a considerable quantity of antiair-
[2747]eraft equipment, plus a limited number of trainers, transports, and helicopters
[2748]The modern MIG-21 jet fighters which are in Cuba are not believed to Imve been
[2749]turned over to the Cubans.
[2751]The effectiveness of the Cuban Air Force is not readily apparent. The
[2752]assortment of fighters for air defense have varying performance characteristics.
[2753]The effectiveness of its bomber force would probably be limited to. action
[2754]against insurgents in or invaders of Cuba who were not possessed of any real
[2755]alr cover or air defense capability.
[2757]The Soviet Expeditionary Force is still currently credited by the intel-
[2758]ligence community with a total strength of about 17,500. Of these, about 2000
[2759]are believed to be Soviet Navy, with about 1000 manning the cruise missile
[2760]sites, and the remainder in the KOMAR missile-bearing patrol boats, supporting
[2761]Cuban ships and headquarters, security and other miscellaneous assignments.
[2762]About 7800 Soviets are believed in the Air Force and Air Defense system, which
[2763]includes the personnel manning the SA-2 system. This leaves an estimated
[2764]7700 soldiers to man all the weapons and. equipment of the Soviet Army contin-
[2765]gent in Cuba. |
[2767]At this point it must be said that there is no really hard evidence of
[2768]the number of Soviets who are now in Cuba. While 17,500 is still the official
[2770]estimate of our intelligence people, despite the reported withdrawal of some
[2772]SECRET
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[2779]~ 2B -
[2781]4000 to 5000 since the first of the year, the level of confidence in its accu-
[2782]racy varies even within the intelligence community. Other sources present con-
[2783]siderably higher estimates ~-some ranging up to 40,000 and more. Bearing in
[2784]mind the substantial underestimation of last Oetober we can only conclude that
[2785]no one-- outside of Soviet and Cuban official circles -~knows how many Russian
[2786]troops are now there. The 17,500 estimate is perhaps a minimum figure.
[2788]In any event, it is believed that the Soviet expedition, combined with
[2789]the Cuban forces, as an entity, is quite powerful in a defensive sense. ‘The
[2790]air defense system is believed to be of a high order of effectiveness. The
[2791]coastal defense cruise missiles do not form a tight perimeter defense of the
[2792]Cuban shoreline, evidently because the quarantine turned back the necessary
[2793]launchers to complete an interlocking net similar to the SA-2 system. This
[2794]gap in the island defense may be partially covered by the KOMAR missile craft.
[2795]The Soviet Army units, trained in mobile aggressive armored warfare, if well
[2796]coordinated with the static defense ability of the Cuban native forces, could -
[2797]offer severe opposition to any attack, This opposition would be sufficient
[2798]to make it necessary to mount a large sea-borne landing effort along with any
[2799]desired air-borme effort in order to be sure of success, The public evidence
[2800]of the forces assembled during the October crisis indicate that the combina-
[2801]tion of Soviet and Cuban forces would require the bulk of the ready forces in
[2802]the United States and the Atlantic Ocean.
[2804]Based upon their judgment that all strategic missiles and offensive
[2805]weapon systems have been removed, the intelligence community does not believe
[2806]that Cuba now presents any major direct military threat to the United States
[2808]or Latin America in an offensive or aggressive sense. Strategic weapons may
[2810]SECRET
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[2814]oe @ SECRET ap
[2815]~ 29 -
[2816]or may not be now in Cuba. We can reach no conclusion on this because of lack
[2817]of conclusive evidence.
[2819]It is clear, however, that as a source of weapons and small bands of
[2820]provocateurs, saboteurs, agents of revolution and chaos it is a distinct and
[2821]present threat to all of the Latin American nations with shores on the Atlantic
[2822]Ocean and Caribbean Sea. It might be relatively difficult to engage in the |
[2823]smuggling of tanks, self-propelled guns, and heavy truck-towed artillery.
[2824]light mortars, machine guns, rifles, and the ammunition for these weapons,
[2825]grenades, explosives, radios and bribe money are an entirely different matter,
[2826]Gun running is an ancient art in Central and South America, well-practiced
[2827]and well-understood in many quarters. Modern facilities make Cuba, as a cen-
[2828]trally located base for such Communist operations, a present and grave menace
[2829]to the peace and security of the Western Hemisphere, The use of Cuba as a
[2830]pase for subversion will be discussed in more detail in a later report.
[2832]3. Reports of Concealed Strategic Weapons in Cuba
[2834]Reports from refugee, exile and other human sources insist that the
[2835]strategic missiles and bombers were not removed from Cuba but are concealed
[2836]in caves and otherwise. The intelligence community, although aware of these
[2837]reports, have been unable to confirm them and adhere to the position that all
[2838]strategic weapons are withdrawn.
[2840]It is fair to say, however, that this is a matter of great concern to
[2841]the intelligence community. Based on skepticism, if nothing else, there is
[2842]grave apprehension on this score. It is agreed that iron-clad assurance of
[2843]the complete absence of Soviet strategic missiles in Cuba can come only as a
[2845]result of thorough, penetrating on-site inspection by reliable observers. The
[2847]SECRET
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[2853]SECRET
[2854]- 30 -
[2855]current intelligence estimate that they are not present is based largely on
[2856]| the negative evidence that there is no affirmative proof to the contrary. This
[2857]of course, was precisely the status of the matter prior to last October 1k,
[2859]There is no doubt that there are literally thousands of caves and caverns
[2860]in Cuba and that it is feasible to use many of these for the storage and con-
[2861]cealment of strategic missiles and other offensive weapons. It isalso true
[2862]that military activity has been osserved in connection with these caves. Our
[2863]intelligence people are of the opinion that some of the caves are in fact
[2864]utilized for the storage of military items and equipment other than strategic
[2865]missiles, such as ammunition, explosives, etc.
[2867]The importance of making every effort to ascertain the truth with res-
[2868]pect to this matter cannot be over-emphasized. The criticality of it can best
[2869]be illustrated by the fact that the testimony established that, upon the assump-
[2870]tion that all missiles and associated equipment and the necessary personnel
[2871]were readily available near pre-selected sites in a state of complete readi-
[2872]ness, mobile medium range missiles could be made operational in a matter of
[2873]hours. Thus, if these missiles and their associated equipment remain in Cuba,
[2874]the danger is clear and obvious.
[2876]The possible installation of advance submarine bases in Cuba has already
[2877]been discussed.
[2879]4, Withdrawal of Soviet Personnel
[2881]Even though the intelligence community believes that a net 4000 to
[2882]5000 Soviet military personnel have been withdrawn from Cuba since: the first
[2883]of the year, because of what intelligence describes as "technical reasons"
[2884]the previous intelligence estimate of approximately 17,500 Soviets in Cuba
[2886]remains unchanged. At the very least this suggests to the Subcommittee that
[2888]SECRET
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[2892]SECRET
[2893]- 31 -
[2895]there is @ low level of confidence in the criginal estimate. There is also
[2896]some question in our minds as to the adequacy of the information as to the num-
[2897]ber of Soviets newly arriving. Admittedly, there could have been undetected
[2898]arrivals at smaller ports, where it is known that cargo ships have repeated
[2899]their prior practice of unloading at night under conditions of strict Soviet-
[2900]imposed security. Since night photographic methods were not employed, we
[2901]have little knowledge of what happened in these cases. In any event, as the
[2902]matter stands at the writing of this report, the intelligence community does
[2903]not believe it yet has sufficient concrete evidence to estimate any reduction
[2904]in overall Soviet military capability on the Island. There is no evidence
[2905]that any of the combat troops associated with the four armored groups have
[2906]been withdrawn. .
[2908]C, Summary of Threat Arising from Soviet Presence in Cuba
[2909]Our summary of the threat and potential threat which the Soviet presence
[2911]Taman presents to the Americas is as follows:
[2913]1. Cuba is an advanced Soviet base for subversive, revolutionary and
[2914]agitational activities in the Western Hemisphere and affords the opportunity
[2915]to export agents, funds, arms, ammunition and propaganda throughout Latin
[2916]America.
[2918]2. Assuming without deciding that all strategic weapons have been
[2919]withdrawn, there is the ever-present possibility of the stealthy re-introduc~
[2920]tion of strategic missiles and other offensive weapons, using the Soviet
[2921]forces still in Cuba as camouflage and security for the activity.
[2923]3. Cuba serves as an advance intelligence base for the USSR. .
[2925]4, "The potential exists to establish electronic warfare capabilities
[2927]based on Cuba.
[2929]“SECRET
[2931]HW 50955 DoclId: 32424709 Page 66
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[2935]SECRET
[2937]32 -
[2939]5. The vital Panama Canal could be the target for sneak raids originat~-
[2940]ing from Cuba.
[2942]6. Potentially, Cuba is a base from which the Soviets could interdict
[2943]our vital air and sea lanes. It can now be used for the air, sea, and elec-
[2944]tronic surveillance of our military activities in the Southeast United States
[2945]and the Caribbean.
[2947]7. Cuba's airfields could serve as recovery air bases for planes
[2948]launched against the United States from the Soviet Unidn.
[2950]8. Advanced Soviet submarine.:bases could be established in Cuban ports
[2951]with very little effort.
[2953]9. The continued presence of the Soviets in Cuba could require a furthe
[2954]reorientation of the U.S. air defenses.
[2956]10. Cuba provides a base for the training of agents from other Latin
[2957]American countries in subversive, revolutionary, agitational and sabotage
[2958]techniques. |
[2960]ll. The very presence of the Soviets in Cuba affects adversely our nation’:
[2961]image and prestige. Our friends abroad will understandably doubt our ability
[2963]to meet and defeat the forces of commmism thousands of miles across the ocean
[2964]if we prove unable to cope with the communist threat at our vexy doorstep.
[2966]A consideration of ali these matters serves to emphasize the gravity
[2967]of the threat to our national security which Cuba now represents.
[2969]D. Prospect of Internal Revolt or Invasion
[2971]The continued presence of the Soviet expedition in Cuba can now be seen
[2972]to be a most effective shield against either internal revolt by native insur-
[2974])
[2975]gents, or invasion by external forces from any source. The ringing of the
[2977]Bocld:324274709 Page 67
[2981]- 33 -
[2983]Island by the Soviet air defense and missile system, and the island-wide
[2984]evidence of impressive, powerful, armored Russian troop units, all apparently
[2985]immune from attack, has been and will be an increasing psychological damper
[2986]to the fires of revolt, We can only expect, under present circumstances,
[2987]that whatever capacity and will to resist communism may exist among the peo-
[2988]ple in Cuba, wlll wither and shrink. The communization of the younger ele-
[2989]ment creates simultaneously an increasingly militant coummist nation.
[2991]The withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Cuba would remove a primary
[2992]psychological prop of Castroism, and remove what is presently being used as
[2993]a physical shield against any overt effort to keep alive the fires of free-
[2994]dom in Cuba. As mentioned before, the ability of Castro's native Cuban forces
[2995]standing alone, to withstand any insurrection, depends upon the support the
[2996]Cuban people give to the insurgents, and the effective outside help given to
[2998]insurgent forces.
[3000]SECRE®
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[3004]"Ts @ . SECRET e
[3006]- 34 -
[3008]VII. CONCLUDING STATEMENT
[3010]Barring some development which is unforeseen at this time, the public
[3011]debate will probably continue as to whether missiles and other strategic
[3012]weapons are now based in Cuba and as to the number of Soviet troops being
[3013]maintained there. These things are certainly of undeniable importance. The
[3014]matter of basic and fundamental importance, however, and the source of the
[3015]real threat, is that international communism now has a firm foothold in this
[3016]hemisphere and that, if we permit it to do so, it is here to stay.
[3018]The Soviets are in Cuba primarily for the purpose of increasing and
[3019]spreading communism's influence and power in Latin America and we can be
[3020]sure that they will exploit their foothold to the greatest extent possible.
[3021]The paramount danger at this time is that the nations of this hemisphere may
[3022]be subverted one by one and be exploited, in turn, for subversive and revolu-
[3023]tionary activities. By this process of erosion our neighbors to the South may
[3024]fall nation by nation until the entire hemisphere is lost and the Communist
[3025]goal of isolating the United States has been attained.
[3027]Communism, of course, operates on a world-wide scale and its methods .
[3028]and techniques are always adapted to the environment in which it operates,
[3029]With this in mind, the value to the USSR of the occupation of Cuba is apparent.
[3030]The techniques of communist subversion may vary from simple infiltration to
[3031]violent intervention. Whatever its form, however, in Cuka ae elsewhere it is
[3032]conceived, developed and perfected by the leaders of world commimism for the
[3033]purpose of furthering their concept of world domination. Its aim and goal is
[3034]to destroy existing political, economic and social orders and to replace them
[3035]with new and dictatorial regimes which presuppose the complete physical and
[3037]moral control of subjugated peoples.
[3039]SECRET
[3041]BW O50955 Docld:32474703 Page 69
[3043]7" @ @ SECRET? is
[3045]~ 35 -
[3047]This aim and goal has already been ahcieved in Cuba. It will be abhieved
[3048]_ elsewhere in Latin America unless positive steps are taken to prevent it. We
[3049]_ must be prepared to take appropriate and positive action in our own national
[3050]ho ‘self-interest and in the interest of the collective security of the Western
[3051]Hemisphere,
[3052]The Communist domination and occupation of Cuba, and the resulting
[3053]menace to our security, requires and demands that the United States be ever
[3054]alert and vigilant to all of ite sinister implications. We must exercise
[3055]the greatest surveillance and watchfulness possible, and use all available
[3056]resources, for the purpose of ascertaining the true military situation in that
[3057]unhappy island and to insure that we will not again be deceived and surprised.
[3058]The entire Cuban problem, both military and political, should be accorded the
[3059]highest possible priority by our governmental officials to the end that
[3060]the evil threat which the Soviet occupation of Cuba represents will be
[3062]eliminated at an early date.
[3064]BW 50955 Docld:32474703 Page 70
[3066]. . Mrs Califano
[3068]: | Co) Corchel\
[3070]March 29, 1963
[3072]MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT A. HURWITCH, Department of State
[3074]SUBJECT: Miselle Crisis Section of the President's Draft Report
[3075]to Congress on US Participation in the UN During 1962
[3077]Purauant to dur telephone conversation, the attached draft
[3078]has been reviewed and the Department of Defense haa no objection
[3079]to it, subject to the following changes:
[3081]1, «=6©Page 3, Line &: Change nudiber "25" te a4,"
[3082]Reason: Accuracy, based on official Department of the Navy
[3083]records.
[3085]2. Page 3, Line 10: Change "12" to > LG" and "25"
[3086]to "24," Beason: Accuracy.
[3088]3. Page 34, Lines 14 and 15: Insert "10" before
[3089]word "November," "and observed" before "42," and "ballistic"
[3090]pefore “missiles, Reasga: Clarity and more accurate detail.
[3092]4, Page 37, Lines 13-15: Insert. “by December 6"
[3094]before “ite promise" and "42" before "1L-25," Eliminate
[3095]the sentence “and, by December 6, the US wae informed that
[3096]all bombers (42 in nuraber) had left," and substitute “their
[3097]removal being confirmed by aerial reconnaissance and by
[3099]. along-side:obeérvation at sea on the decks of the Soviet ships
[3100]carrying them back to the UDSR." Reason: Provide additional
[3101]positive detail, particularly with reference to the 1L.«28 remeval
[3102]being based upon confirmed observation and aot merely upon
[3103]information provided by the USER.
[3105]HY 50955 Docld:32424709 Page 71
[3108]. Page 43, Line 9: Insert “more vigilant and* bafora
[3109]“stronger. Reason: Streagthen prime poine that jacraased
[3110]awerenesa of Communist duplicity and potential threats
[3111]veguited from exisis, particularly im the OAS.
[3113]Joseph A, Califano, Je.
[3114]Special Agaistant to the
[3115]Secretary of the Army
[3117]HY 50955 Docld:32424709 Page 72
[3120]DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
[3122]DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
[3123]WASHINGTON 25, D.C.
[3125]28 March 1963
[3126]UL7,171/P-2 ,
[3128]SUBJECT: Missile Crisis Section of the President's Draft
[3129]Report to Congress on US’ Participation in the UN
[3130]During 1962
[3132]TO: General Counsel
[3133]Department of Defense
[3135]Intelligence content of subject draft has been reviewed and
[3136]the following comments are submitted:
[3138]1. Page 3,. line 8: Change number "25" to "24." Reason:
[3139]Accuracy, based on official Department of the Navy records.
[3141]2. Page 3, Line 10: Change "12" to "16" and "25" to "2i."
[3143]Reason: Accuracy.
[3145]3, Page. By. Lines 14 and “15: Insert "aor before word
[3147]"November" ai, Lines 1 before "2," and. "ballistic" before
[3149]"missiles." Reason: Clarity and more accurate detail,
[3151]4, Page 37, Lines 13 - 15 Insert "by December 6" before
[3152]Nits promise” and. "46" before hoy 28 Eliminate the sentence
[3153]"and, by December A the US was informed that all bombers (42 in
[3154]number) had left, and substitute “their removal being confirmed
[3155]by aerial reconnaissance and by along-side observation at sea on
[3156]the decks of the Soviet ships carrying them back to the USSR."
[3157]Reason: Provide additional positive detail, particularly with
[3158]reference to the IL-28 removal being based upon confirmed
[3160]observation and not merely upon information provided by the USSR.
[3162]5. Page He, Line 9: Insert "more vigilant and" before
[3163]"stronger. Reason: Strengthen prime point that increased
[3164]awareness of Communist duplicity and potential threats resulted
[3165]from crisis, particularly in the OAS,
[3167]HY 50955 Docld:32424709 Page 73
[3169]DEPARTMENT .OF DEFENSE
[3170]DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
[3171]WASHINGTON 25, D.C.
[3173]28 March 1963
[3175]Report o vConeress on US "partietpation in the UN
[3176]During 1962 _
[3178]LOe General Counsel
[3179]Department of Defense
[3181]Tntelly ence content of subject draft. ait Be reviewed and. _
[3182]owing comments. ave submitted:
[3184]» Be Change: nutiber “25" to "2h," Reason:
[3185]EES Department of the  Meny records.
[3187]Bo Pag
[3188]‘November a
[3189]“nissiles.
[3191]insert. "10" ‘before word
[3192]"HO." and "pal co" peffore
[3193]more accuPate: detail.
[3195]Reagon: larity and
[3196]Insert "by Decenber 6" before
[3197]sit el eabrate the Sentence
[3199]ily panblowlerty with
[3200]Pr a Lee - based upon confirmed
[3201]observation and not cerely. ‘upon information previded by the USSR.
[3203]9: Insert “mere vigilant and" before
[3204]trengthen ried eae that ancreased,
[3205]Ete: 1 +t
[3207]from. erisis,. particularly ain the OAS.
[3209]JOSEPH F, CARROLL
[3210]Bieutenant General, USAF
[3211]Director
[3213]HY 50955 Docld:32424709 Page 74
[3215]DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
[3216]OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
[3217]WASHINGTON 25, D.C.
[3219]March 27, 1963
[3223]de Se
[3225]MEMORANDUM FOR THE GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE Neer
[3226]: DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE Ww
[3228]_ Attached is a draft of the missile crisis section of the Presi-.
[3229]dent's Report to Congress on United States Participation.in the United
[3230]Nations during. 1962.
[3232]The Department of State has drafted this report and sent it to
[3233]me for Department’ eof Defense clearance. I. should appreciate it if
[3234]you would read the- report. and return it to me with any comments by
[3235]1200 hours ‘on March 29, 1963.
[3237]ny. A. Califano, Jr,
[3238]Special Assistant to. thé
[3239]Secrétary of the Army
[3241]Attachment
[3242]As Stated
[3246]Mr. Yarmolinsky
[3247]Mr. McGiffert
[3248]‘General Carroll (DIA)
[3250]HY 450955 Docld:32424709 Page 75
[3256]‘ut
[3259]OPTIONAL FORM RO. 10 .
[3262].“ 4JNITED STATES GOVERKNN ENT
[3263]te
[3266]. 7 FO
[3268]we
[3270]- FROM : RPA = William G, Bowdler™ ye
[3272]ve ‘SuBjECT: Defense Clearance of Missile Crisis Section of President's Report, -
[3273]. To Congress on US 5 Participation in UN During 1962,
[3277]; UNP, with RPA's cooperation, has prepared the attached draft chapter... _
[3278]‘on the missile crisis for the President's annual report to Congress on |
[3279]US participation in the. UN.
[3281]Mr. Monsma is handling clearance of the chapter within ARA. I have +
[3283]been asked to obtain Defense clearance. When I spoke to Mr. Knaur about °
[3285]- this last week, he touched base with Mr. Yarmolinsky and came back with ~
[3287]the reply that the most expeditious way to get DOD clearance is through.
[3289]. @CA channels, Could you please arrange for this te be done: as quickly . a
[3290]mo as Possible @ as the report is now overdue? | be 5 ot
[3292]“> ARA/RPA:WGBowdlers 3Jv
[3294]HY 50955 Docld:32424709 Page 76
[3296]March 27, 1963
[3298]MEMORANDUM FOR THE GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE
[3299]DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
[3301]Attached is a draft of the missile crisis section of the Presi-
[3302]dent's Repart to Congress on United States Participation in the United
[3303]Nations during 1962.
[3305]The Department of State has drafted this report and sent it to
[3306]me fer Department of Defense clearance. 1 should appreciate it if
[3307]you would read the report aad return it to me with any comments by
[3308]1206 hours on March 29, 1963.
[3310]Signed ~
[3311]Joseph A. Califano,Jr.
[3313]deceph A. Califano, Jr.
[3314]Special Agalatant to the
[3315]Secretary of the Army
[3317]Attathmest
[3318]Ag Btated
[3320]Os
[3322]Mr. Yarmelinshy
[3323]Mr. MeCitfere
[3324]General Garrall (DIA)
[3326]HY 50955 Docld:32424709 Page 77
[3328]7 ‘
[3330]Re
[3332]HW 50955 Docld: 32424709 Page 7a
[3334]te : oD
[3335]° | . @
[3337]sovisr OFFENSIVE YEAPOIS IN CUBS 4
[3339]DRAFT PRESTDESE'S. REEOR 1.962
[3341]“Soviet Buildup
[3343]on Oetobar 22, President Kennedy announsed to the nation and to the world
[3345]. the *seeret, swift and extraordinary buildup” by the Soviet Ynion of offensive
[3346]missiles in Cuba and the initial steps that the United States wes taking to
[3348]cope with this threat. Information on the buildup had been given to the
[3350]J 4 '
[3351]President the previous Tuesday morning (osteber 16} and, during the week that
[3352]followed, serveillance was stepped up, coufiruing avidence evaluated, a course
[3353]of aetion decided upon, friendly goverments notified and eonsulted, the
[3354]members and uachinery of the Organization of American Sta ates (OsAcS. > brought
[3355]7 into the picture, and Ageriean defenses in the Caribbean streng gthened and put
[3356]of the alert.
[3357]"The President revealed that 2 serious threat against the peace and
[3359]seeurit ¥ of the Americas | wag being vocretiy aounted by the Soviet [rion on
[3360].
[3361]7 the "imprisoned island" of Cuba. Sites for medium-rangs ballistic HLESILeS
[3362]“(oraus) -eapable of careying a , nuélear warhead i, 600 naubical niles had been
[3363]_ropidly and secretly installed and additional sites not vet connleted Wave
[3364]designed ‘for Inverediateurange ballistic nissiles (IRBHs} gapable of
[3366]travelling twee as far and thus posing a nuglear threat to rout of the Ea jor
[3367]cities of the Western Hemisphere. This ergent transformation of Cuba inte a
[3371]strategie base with muelear striking cepaclty const ed an expiics % threat
[3373]to the peace and security of ‘the Anorkeas in defianse of the
[3374]Treaty yy of Reciprocal hasistance (Rao Back) of 1947, "the traditions of this
[3375]nation and hemigphere, ®° and the CGhasier of the United Hations.
[3377]action con miradieted the repeated agsurances of Soylet spokesmen, both
[3379]{publicly and
[3382]. = e
[3385]e2Z2e2
[3386]publiciy and privately delivered, that the arms buildup in Cuba would retain
[3388]its original defensive character. Neither the United States nor ‘the world
[3390]" coummity, the President emphasized, could tolerate the deliberate esception
[3392]and offensive threat represented *y she clandestine Goploymant of strategic
[3393]nuclear HeEapons. .
[3395]fo meat this threat ‘the United States ves taking immediately the
[3396]following s steps: 4) to halt the buildup, a strict quarantine of all
[3397]offensive military. : whpmont under shipment to to Cube was being initiated and,
[3399]should ofgensive military preparations ontimioy "further action will be
[3401]“ gustified;" 2) ‘the Unive States declared that 14 would regard any nuclear
[3403]‘ missile Launched frou gube against the Western Hemisphere as an attack by
[3405]the Soviet Union, requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet
[3407]“Unions 3) Guantanamo was being reinforceds ‘&) the Couneil of the Organization. .
[3409]of fnerican States was being convened to appiy the Rio Treaty in support of.
[3410]hemispheric security; and 5) under the Charter of the United ations, the
[3412]United States wes requesting an enuergency meeting of tee Security couneil.
[3414]. Finally, the Pr resident called on Chairman Khrushchev "to halt and eliminate
[3416]this clandestine, reckless, and provocative threay to world peace and to -
[3418]stable relations between our two nations.”
[3420]. U.S. Chjective
[3422]This was a difftevlt and dangerous effort on which the United States
[3424]had set out, the President coneluded, wt the greatest danger of all would
[3425]be to do nothing.” On the military sides, steps ware taken to strengthen
[3427]defenses in the Caribbean and to put United States forces im a posture to
[3429]eyoly the quarantine. . The pepartuent of pefens se had order ed all tours of
[3430]cuty of We avy and Marine porgonnel extended until further notices the
[3432]/Guantanazo ‘naval
[3434]HY 50955 Docld:324274709 Page 79
[3436]oo _@
[3437]Guantanamo naval base defenses were strengthened; air power was built up in
[3438]the Southeastern portion of the United ‘States; and military deployment put
[3439]- 5.000 marines and 40 uevel vessels in the Caribbean, initially as part of a
[3441]training ekerclace Follows: cand resolution adopted by the Organ of Consultation
[3442]of the Comeil of the Organization of American States (deseribed below) the
[3443]President issued a proclamation establishing the quarantine of Guba as of
[3445]10 Ace on October 2h The Departuent of Defense ordered the interdiction
[3447]. of 25 Soviet nerchan vesaclls known to be headed for Guba ; At 8 AcHe on
[3449]October 25 ‘the first intereeption of a , Soviet shipg the ol tanker Bucharest, -
[3451]” tools place, and. the a was allowsd to proceed. ie of the 25 Soviet vessels
[3452]beading for. Cuba ' tuened around and no encounter with a contraband-carrying . wit
[3454]vereel occurred s durin the ae affair,’
[3456]_ and deception ace”
[3460]was conclusive. the second was to halt gurther shipments and bring about: ee
[3461]rapidly and effectively the ronoval. of the offensive weapons, under Uebe — os
[3463]supervision, before the guarantine could be lifted. The United States was
[3465]prepared to negotiate on modalities and to consider various ‘formulae but not =
[3466]to abandon this goal. | | - _
[3467]From the start, both the Organization of American states and the United
[3468]"Nations were involved. Resources and institutions of this hemisphere were
[3469]used to! underline its solidarity and determination, and to convince the Soviet
[3470]Union that elimination. of the offensive weapons Was a purpose to which the |
[3471]henigphers was solidly committed. From the start, Loo, & was clear that
[3472]- /the United Nations
[3474]HW 50955 DocId:32424709 Page 80
[3476]gg a
[3477]oka ,
[3478]the United Hatdons would have a crucial role. It was the forua in which the ~
[3479]evidence of Soviet godlt could be nost convincingly exposed to a world-wide
[3480]_ audience, world opinion mobiliz ad, ard the world vardict pronounced. It Was,
[3481]| also, a ready and efficient mechanism for diplomatic communis ations. The |
[3482]Duited Yatdons served as a site whers U.S and Soviet negotiators could
[3483]easily meet. The Secretary-General hineel? supplied an important, Link
[3484]between the parties particularly during the first, days when vension was
[3485]highest. Thirdly, al thougis Cuba prevented their exploynent, the United Nations Z
[3486]. proved itself willing and able to devise acceptable pechanisas for inspection
[3487]| . and vyorifieation of diszantling and renoval of the offensive weupons and for
[3488]safeguards against their reintrodustion. The United Hations was also prepared
[3489]“to carry out the necessary operational responsibilities: “Simul taneously with |
[3490], the President’s speech, therefore, the United States took diplozatic steps to
[3491]“© set in motion the political machinery of the 0.4.8. and the U.N.
[3492]QeAsSe Action
[3493]In Washington the U.S. Representative oa the Council of the Orgeni zation
[3494]of American States. (C.0.AcS-) sent 2 ‘note to the Acting Chairman requesting
[3495]the immediate eonvesation of. the Council as a Provisional Organ of Consultation
[3496]ynder Article 6 of the Tater-imerican freaty of Reciprocel Assistance (Rio treaty). :
[3497]fais article provides for imediate consultation on measures to be taken for the
[3498]. ¢ goson defenze and for the maintenance of peace and goourity of the Continent
[3499]yhen “the inplolability ef the integrity of the territory ow the sovereignty
[3500]cr political independence of any American states should be affeeted by an
[3501]aggression hich is not en armed attack or by an cxtrasconth zental conflicts
[3502]or hy any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of Azeriea.®
[3503][The O.AS-
[3505]RUE EE PE gop ae Pe ae better od
[3507]nore bs A Boag gs J Pattg s+ ae eR Ge BEES, por Pte.
[3509]50955 Dood: 32424709 ‘Page 81
[3511]. - 3 - | 2 .
[3512]fhe OAS. Couneil met on the morning of October 23. Secretary of state
[3514]Dean Rusk sitting as the D.S. Representative deseribed the nature: of the threat
[3515]to this hemisphere and the coun. .neesures which the United States considered
[3516]At essential for the inter-American systém to teke. He ‘stated thatthe Soviet —
[3517]intervention in this hemisphere with: major offensive weapons challenges as
[3518]never before the determination oF the Azericen Governments to earry, cut
[3519]enispheric commitments solemily assumed in inter-Azerican treaties and
[3521]resolut ons for the defense of the peace and security. of the nations of the
[3523]honiephere ‘heainst ‘extrd-continental aggression or intervention.® He proposed
[3525]: that under the Rio Treaty the Council, serving as Organ vof Consultation,
[3526]“without delay "eal for the immediate dismantling and withdrawal from Cuba
[3528]of all missiles ami other weapons of offensive capability and co. recomiond cos
[3530]that the member states of the Organisation of Amcrican States take the
[3532]necessary measures to ensure that Cuba doss uct continus to receive additional
[3533]‘offensive BEAPCNS ove and if necessary to prevent, the offensive capacity already
[3534]acquired by the castro rogixe fron being used to destroy the paace and security
[3536]- of the hezisphere.*
[3538]_ The Se erstary noted ‘that the United stat tes was oinn) tansously asking
[3539]the U.W. Seeurity Council to act in the natter. He observed: “fhe threat °
[3541]is to our hemisphere and we have primary responsibility and duty to act as
[3543]‘Ye ere now doing, as a hemisphere. Bub the threat originates from cutside
[3545]the henisphere awl it is appropriate that the extra-continental pover which
[3546]challenges our inter-American commitments oo. ba dealt with in the foram in
[3547]wsleh that power participates. It is therefore fitting in this case that the
[3549]SeourLty Council of the United Na ‘dons bs requested to eall upon this menber
[3550][to refrain
[3552]MW 50955 Docld:32494709 Page 682 -
[3554]1 seep ener Te oan cen TD
[3556]mee mene eee me nee Stee wage
[3558]strameemes oo etna nape ee
[3560]emer PTY eerie es
[3564]en tetera rtteom prea pattem en
[3566]“ - e @
[3568]=e Ge
[3569]to refrain fron nis aggressive actions agains st us and seek to emorse upon
[3570]him its decisions. Heanwhile, without avaliting the outeone of the United
[3571]Nations approach, ws must ensure that our hemisphere is sffectively
[3572]quarantined against any further addition to Soviet offensive nuclear military
[3573]pousr in owe midst.* . . .
[3575]. Follouing a general discussion of the danger confronting the heaisphere
[3576]the Council votad 19 to 6 (Bolivia abstained for lack of instracticas) to
[3577]“gonst itute itself provisionally as the Organ of Consultation {Cs OoAeS. 106 Ge ys
[3578]Thon, at the suggestion of the GoSe Representative, the organ of consultation
[3579]adjourned for several hours te permit | a pumber’ of del egations to songult their
[3580]governments and receive instruetions on the draft resolution presented by the:
[3582]tiaited States to deal with the thruat confronting the heal sphere.
[3583]| oe The Organ of Consultation reconvened that saze afternoon. Debate centered
[3584]on 2 the draft resolution. Ag each representative spoke, it becaze evident that
[3585]the nerican republics were solidly united im their determination to resist —
[3586]this’ “gost. ‘dangerous’ threat tothe peace and security of the hexispheres... he few
[3587]delegations wsre not in a position to vote affirmatively on certain provisions
[3588]of the resolution, attributable for the most part to dozestie constitutional .
[3589]- considerations, but when the regolution gs 2 whole was put to a vote, the support
[3590]was unanimous. In ona of tha historic decisions of the inter-Asarican systea
[3591]os the Organ of Consul tation: {1} called for “the immediate dismantling and
[3592]withdraval from Cuba of all missiles and other weapons with any offensive
[3593]canability,” and (2) recommended that “the mombor states, in accordance with
[3594]Articles 6 and 8 of the Inter-American Treaty of Resiprosal Asvistence, take
[3595]all meesures, individually and sollectively including the use of araad force;
[3596]. Junieh thoy
[3598]HW 450955 Docld: 32424709 Page 63
[3600]. “ © | . &
[3602]a Fo ; }
[3604]which they may deem nesessary to ensure that the Government of Cuba gannot
[3605]gontinue to receive from the Sino-Soviet powers military material and related
[3607]3
[3609]supplies which may threaten the peace’and security of the Continent and to
[3611]prevent the missiles in Cuba with offensive capability from ever beconing
[3613]an active threat to the peace and security of the Continent." The resolution
[3615]sige ae ote e reempeemne men
[3617]also expressed "the. hope that the Security Couneil will, in accordance with
[3619]the Resolution introduced by the United Sietes, dispatch United Nations
[3621]f
[3623]wes observer's to Cuba at the earJiest moment."
[3624]Following the meeting of the Council of the Organization of American
[3626]States/Organ of Consultation and pursuant te the recommendations contained
[3628]' in the second paragraph of the resolution edopted, President Kennedy issued
[3630]the Presidential Proclamation interdicting the delivery of offensive weapons
[3632]andassociated material to Cuba, to commence at 10:00 A.M. Eastern Standard
[3633]Time on Oatober 24. The proglamation stated that the Secretary of Defense
[3634]*shali take appropriate measures to prevent the delivery of srohitited
[3635]material to Cuba, enploying the Land, sea and air forces of the United States 7
[3636]in cooperation with any forces that may be made available by other jmerican
[3637]states." the ‘Secretary of Defense vas authorized to designate prohibited or
[3639]restricted zones and prescribed routes and declared that “any vessel, or craft
[3641]which may be proceeding toward Cuba may be intercepted ard may be direeted to
[3643]4
[3645]adentify itself, its cargo, equipment and stores and its ports of cai
[3647]ed
[3649].y to
[3650]stop, to Lie to, to submit to visit and search, or to progeed as divested."
[3651]Any vessel that refused to comply with diveetions wight be taken into
[3653]eustody. In earrying out the order forse was not to.be used except
[3655]an ease of failure or refusal to comply with directions or
[3657]/reguiations
[3659]Lait
[3660]24709
[3662]st"
[3663]Boold: 324
[3665]Page 84
[3667]. .
[3668]t : & o . L
[3670]=” 8 -
[3671]regulations after reasonable efforts had been made to communiéste with the
[3673]vessel or craft, or in self-defense.
[3675]In the days imnediately folloving, twalve other American republics offered
[3676]assistance in support of the quarantine ‘opsration: Argentina, Dosinican
[3677]Republic, Venezusia, Costa Rica, Coloxbia, Ecuador’, EL Salvador, Guatezala,
[3679]Raiti, Honduras, Panama, and Nicaragua. Several of these offers included naval
[3681]units, posing the problema of coordination of foreas. Consequently, on Hovenber 5s -_
[3683]the Co0.A.S2/0.C- recommended that the contributing mamber states take among
[3685]thenselves the technical reasures nacessary to establish an effielent and
[3687]“coordinated action. Pursvant to this recommendation, the governzsnts of Argentinas
[3688]the Dominican Republic and the United States on Noveaber 9 notified the .
[3689]CoboAeSo/OoCe of the establishment of an Inter-American Combined Quarantine
[3691]Fores into which they. vere integrating their respective naval units and placing
[3693]officers of the participating navies on the staff of the Commander of the _
[3695]. Combined: “Quarantine Force. —
[3697]Security Counedl. consideration
[3699]Simul tanepusly with the call for a meeting of the OoA.5- Councit, Ambas Ambassador
[3701]Ad}ad Stevensop in New York raquested the President of the Security Council ==
[3703]that month the Soviet Representative we to eall an urgent meeting of the Coueil
[3705]“te deal with the dangerous threat to the peace and security of the world caused
[3708]wy the secret pstablishnont in Cuba by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
[3710]of! “Launching bases and the ‘Anstallation of long-range ballistic missiles capable
[3712]of carrying thermonuclear ‘yarboads to wost of North and South juortea.® “the
[3714]United statesst he. wrote, mot has incontrovertible evidenes that the 0. S.3.R-
[3715]has been installing in cuba a whole series of facilities for Jeunching offensive
[3717]nuclear missiles and other offensive weapons and installing the weapons theasslve3.
[3718][the establishnent
[3723]' .
[3727]The ostablishsent of these bases, Ambassador Stevenson declared, “eonstitutes
[3728]a@ grave threat to the peace aud security of this henlsphere and of the whole
[3729]vorld,* It should be the purpose of Security Council action, he coneluded,
[3730]"to bring about the innediate diswantling and withdrawal of the Soviet
[3731]missiles and other offensive weapons in Cuba y under the supervision of United
[3732]Nations observers, to make it possible to lift the quarantine which 4s being
[3733]pat into effect." He also expressed the willingness of the United States to
[3735]confer with the Soviet Union "on measures to remove the existing threat to
[3737]7 the security of the Western Hemisphere and the peace of the world.®
[3739]_ |. Ambassador Stevenson transmitted a draft resolution hich ealied for the
[3740]- Amnodiate dismantling and withdrawal fron Cuba, of all missiles and other — |
[3741]offensive weepors, and hich authorized the sending to Guba of & Ucle observer
[3743]Corps, to ; assure. aed report on 2 compliance with the resolutione the resolution
[3745]called for an end to the U.S. quarantine of silitery shipsents to Cuba when
[3747]the above terns ware complied with and recomaanded that the United States |
[3749]and the U.3.S.R. "confer promptly on measures to remove tho existing threat.”
[3750]fhe Security Council held four mootings on October 235 2h, and 25. BY
[3752]_ the tins ‘the first mooting opened on the afternoon of Oetober 23, the Soviet
[3754]Union and Cuba hed introdueed two parallel letters to the President. of ths -
[3756]. Security Council making similar requests for an urgent meeting of the Couneil
[3758]in an attexpt to change the focus of the question. They contended that U.S.
[3759]countermeasures and “aggressive action® against Cubs consti tyted tho real,
[3761]threat +o peace in the Caribbean. Vader Rule 37 of the Comncil’s provisional
[3763]: vples of procedure, the ouben Representative was invited to perticipate in the
[3765]eiseussion of the uatter bsfore the Security Council.
[3766]/dsbassador
[3768]>. . ©
[3770]Ambassador Stevenson’s opening speech put the issue in the porspective
[3771]of Soviet post-war aggressive expansionisu. He traced the “vast plan of
[3772]plesemeal aggression" and “the basic drive to abolish the world of the
[3773]' Charter" which had characterized Soviet policy in the post-war years and’ which
[3774]had not been altered by the presont Soviet Government. Contrasting the
[3775]history of Soviet expansionisu and rejection of the priaeiples of the Charter |
[3776]with the United States record of loyal support for the Orgenization and “the
[3777]world of the Charter," Azbassador Stevenson rogretted that sone weabers ,
[3778]“secued to believe that the cold war is a private war petuoen wo. great, supar
[3780]: |. powers." "It is not a private atruggles* he insisted, "it is a : world evil
[3782]"war on a contest betueca the pluralistic world and the monolithic world en
[3784]contest between the world of the, charter’ ar the world of Communist conforaity.*
[3785]the castro rogino,® he pointed, out, thas aided and abatted an invasion of this
[3786]. “peakappore" and "hag given the Soviet Union a staging area in a this neaisphere”
[3788]. by inviting Yan extra-continontel, anti-dezocratic and cxpansionist pover into
[3789]the bosos ‘of the ‘American ‘fanily" ‘and by making itsal? "en accoaplice in the.
[3790]communist enterprise of world domination.” ‘The Soviet Union, he continued,
[3791]had secretly transforasd Cuba into a forsidable missile and strategie atrbasay
[3792]armed with the deadliest, nost Payareaching nmedern nuclear weapons, in an
[3793]attempt to put all the Averieas under a “nuclear gun” and to intensify the
[3794]"Soviet diplasacy of blackzail." The day of forbearance is past, he concluded.
[3795] 8Tf the United States and the other nations of ths western Hemispheres should
[3797]accept this Rei phase or aggression, ws would be delinquent in our obligations _
[3799]to world peaces" Be could not believe that the Soviet leadership had deluded
[3800]dtsal? into sugposing the United States lecked tho nerve and will to use its
[3801]pover, and ke voiced the nope that the Soviets would call en end “to this new.
[3802]. /phase of
[3804]HW 50955. DooTd:32474709° Page 67. _
[3806]rhe.
[3808]asia am se! ae Te step uitey Hake Pred ete Boat
[3809]HY 50955. Doold: 32424709" Page 66 — Tg
[3811]mat . ' : .
[3814]i : o Le :
[3815]phase of aggressicn.” He urged the Council to gall for the issediate withdraual
[3817]of Soviet missiles and other offensive weapons from Cuba.
[3819]Asbassador Stevenson then inforaad the Security Council, in in accordance - :
[3821]with Article 54 of the Charters that the Council of the 0.A.S. had adopted a
[3823]. resolution by 19 affirzative votes (as noted above) calling for the disaentling
[3825]and withdrawal of the offensive Weapons recommending that nexber states of the
[3826]Oo A.Ss take all measures to ensure that the threat was removed from the. .
[3827]continent, and expressing the hopo that the Security Council will “atspateh UcNe
[3829], observers to Cuba at the earliest moment.*
[3831]Aubassador Stevenson thus made three points before the Securliy Couneil
[3832]which defined the theses for the debate during the rest of the wack:
[3833](1) The Soviet astion in sending thousands of military technicians to .
[3835]its puppet in the Western Hemisphere, supplying jet borbers capable of delivering |
[3837]nuclear weapons, installing missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads and
[3838]preparing sites for additional missiles with a range of 2,200 miles, and doing
[3839]these ‘things through deceit and under tho cloak of secrecy, were in defiance
[3841]of the seeurity comsitments of the Organization of American States and in
[3843]. ylolation of the Charter of the United Nations, and contained a nanifest threat
[3845]- to this hewisphers and to the whole world.
[3847](2) ‘The action and policy of the United States in this matter were in
[3849]gonsonance with the U.N. Caarter and had the unanimous wacking of the
[3851], Organization of American States.
[3853](3) The Seeurkty Council should reuove the threat by calling, as the
[3855]yesolution proposed, for the imnediate dismantling and withdrawal froz Cuba
[3857]ge al), missiles. and alt offensive weapons; authorizing and requesting the
[3858]Sosrotary-Goneral to dispatch to Cuba a U.l. observer corps to agsure and
[3859][report in
[3861]Toop ote a ° 7
[3862]eae papi ip HTS fa te gett oof oul its aay a nerds
[3865]yo oO — @
[3867]report in coxspliance with this ‘resolution; calling for termination of the
[3868]‘quarantine upon U.N. certification of such ecmpliance; and urgently wecomending —
[3869]that the United States and ithe Soviet Uaion confer promptly om measures to
[3871]Pe Tp ere renner eet on arenes creat
[3873]remove the existing threat ‘to the security and the peace of the world end
[3874]report therein to the Seeurlty Councils - -
[3875]| Following Asbassador Stevenson's mresentation, the Cuban and Soviet
[3876]Representatives pads their initial Statenents. The Cuban Represoutative,
[3878]» Garcla-Inchaustegui, denounced the ravall "ploskede” ag an “act of war?
[3880]A ae TORS TIO eh v retnteerggyS ee newt
[3882]‘and declared that tho” cuban people bed ansvored the Sarned attack" with
[3883]. general mobilization. He asked the Council to eall for the immediate
[3884]“withdraval of all trocpsy ships and planes deployed on the approaches to
[3886]f
[3887]k
[3888]4
[3890]7
[3891]if
[3893]Cuban: ‘Shores, and for. the cogsation of all “interventionist” measures. TES:
[3894]Cuban, Representative also contended that the United States hed ne right to
[3895]ose for Atonantling and dicarnenent and that “logieally, UeHo observers skould
[3897]i . .
[3899]be sont ta ths U.So bases from which invéders and pirates energe to punish
[3900]and harass a small states? He insisted that Cuba ui) not acsept any kind
[3901]ad ‘observers in metters which fall within our domestic jurisdiction.
[3903]The’ Soviet Representative, Anbassador Zoring declared that the United =
[3904]states charges usre “a ‘glumsy attept to cover up egeressive actions” in Cubase .
[3905]He deseribed the U.S. quarantine es a "new and extrexely dangerces cet of
[3906]aggression” and as Sunda sgniged piracye* During this first encounter, while
[3907]avoiding direct reference to the prosence of Soviet missiles op boxbers in
[3909]Cuba, Asbassedor Zorin declared that accasxticas that the Soviet Union hed
[3910]"sot up offensive armazents in Cuba” vere false, and officially confiraed the
[3911]statement already nade by the Soviet Union in this connection, “that the Soviet
[3912]Coverazent hag not directed and is not directing to Guba any offensive armaments o"
[3914]Ee also recalled the statement of Soviet Hinister for Foreign Affairs
[3915]. _Hearet Grozyko
[3917]HW 50955 DoclId:32424709 Page 89
[3919]“AE, 50955 DocTd: 32424709 “Page. 90.00 6. ee
[3921]. ip
[3923]Audrad arcayto an the General Assezbly jest a month previously (Septenber 21, 1962)
[3924]that “ony sober-minded nau Imovs that Cuba is not ove building up her foress to
[3925]~ gueh a degree that she can pose a threat to the United States coo or cise a.
[3926]throat to any state of the Western Bealsphere.®
[3927]Anhbaseador Zoran gubaitted to the Security Council a statexent published
[3928]by the Soviet covernrent that day uhich addregsed a “serious warming to the .
[3929]Gaited States Goverazeat, to advise it that, im carrying owt the measures
[3930]emnounesd by President Kemnedy, it is Aeakshing on stself a heavy rosponmibility
[3931]: for the fate of the workds® declared that tho Soviet Government wi do
[3932]“everything in its pover to frustrate the aggressive desigas of 3.8.
[3933]imperialistic eircless” and appealed to all governzents and peoples to raise
[3934]their voices in protest against the “aggressive acts” of the Balted States and.
[3935]; strongly to conden such acts. He introduced 2 draft resolution conisening
[3936]the "actions of tho Goverment of the United States designed to violate the
[3937]Charter of the United Metions anc to intensify the threat of war.” Tks Soviet
[3938]resolution insisted that the United States “yepeal its decision on the coatrol, |
[3939]of ships of other states going touards tho ghores of Cuba,* and ealled spon
[3940]‘the United States, Guba, and 0.S.SRo to establish contacts and cuter inte
[3941]negotiations for the. purpose of norasiizing the situation and thareby Feaoving a -
[3942]the threat of war.”
[3943]At the request of the seereutstiv of Ghana the mecting wae adjourned
[3944]to the following morning so that representatives night consult with other
[3945]delegations outside the Council. , OO
[3946]sho Woxt Morning: Qetober 26 me
[3947]The nett nora » the Security Comell heard the nopreventative of
[3948]Yonesucle, Hro Sosa-Rodriguoz, associate the Latin Anerican nations with the.
[3949]action taken by the United States pursuest to the 0.A.Ss posolution, He noted ~
[3952].
[3954]wow Lb a
[3956]that "4% bas sen proved that the Soviet Union has set up iniCuba rocket bases
[3957]that might deliver meleer sissiles to about 1,000 miles distance, ana that,
[3958]anparently, it is at preseat sett ting up others for, roskots with @ range of up.
[3959]to 2,209 miles.” Thig had created on atmosphere of inscearity and concorn in
[3960]tho ecuntries of the American kenisphora vaich felt theaslves directly
[3962]' theostened by such Weapons. The weapons in Cuba, the Yenozuclan Representative
[3963]caphasized, vere no longer dofeasive but offensive, and “thoy are of a magnitude
[3965]_ that might be sufficlent to vipe gut any of the sscrioan republics and drog the. |
[3967]. world into the holocaust of fF . ° He deseribed the apprehension felt
[3969]2 cuban subversive activities, including the
[3971]throughout the continent :
[3972]“ introdection of agents, ‘propecenta, and weapons to equip guersilla forces in
[3973]fesriean republics, jubaseedor SosacRodrigusz recalled the yesolution adopted
[3974]by the Organization, oth ioarican States and declared that he vas sposking for the
[3975]- entire contineat in asking the Security Council to take measures to step nuclear
[3976]me oapons ‘from arriving te Cuba and to have the presently existing bases of
[3977]| nuclear ‘Foskets ia cuba ‘@iguantled. -
[3978]Sky Petrick Dean, Representative of the United Kingdom, noted that by 20
[3979]stroteh even of the Soviet imnginalioa could a nuclear mis sile with a range of
[3980](2,200 miles in Guba be called defensive, and roealled agsurencss on this point
[3981]by Foreign Minister Geonyno and Prosident Dortieos of Ceba at the Gameral
[3982]Ausexbly the previcus month. hile the Soviet Govermzent vere acting their
[3983]lie,” he stated, “the orders vere being given, plans qaid and preperations
[3984]boing made for the supply of missiles to Cuba. Who con possitty belicve in
[3985]' tho honesty of the Soviet Goverszent’s intentions in these eirewistances?®
[3986]The United Kingdea, he concluded, considered that the Ualted States acted
[3987]properly by eouing to the Security Council at the first possible mozonte Now
[3988]. the Security Couecll mst take imesdiate and urgent steps to restore confidence
[3989]/in the Western
[3991]HW'50955, DocId:32424709 Page 91
[3993]. oo _ @
[3994]2 15 =
[3996]in the Westers Hesisphere by having these offensive missiles dlssantled and
[3997]withdrawn. The United Kingdoz fully supported the U.S. resolution before tha
[3998]Council. .
[4000]fhe Representative of Rumania, Hre ‘palitea. supported the Soviet position.
[4001]fko Irish Foreign Minister, Hts Aiken, underlined world concern with tho
[4002]geouth of Soviet imtervention in Cubao He appreciated Cuban co aeera ‘with ats
[4003]national security, “out it ig a , Por ery feou that to a military puildep of the
[4004]kind whieh the Cubsn Goverment now eppesre to have exbarked upoa with the
[4005]massive assistarce of the Soviet Uakon.® He. sould not endersten! eywiay the
[4006]Soviet Union should have chosen this noasm to establish mew missile and pozker
[4007]/ bases on tho island of Cubar® the Foreign Minister believed he perceived sane
[4009]Feperrcie igromed in the U.S. statexont to the Security Comeil of October 22 whch |
[4011]declared ToS williagnass %29 confer with the Soviet Union on noeswres to
[4012]: renove the existing ‘threat to eoeurity of the Hsstern Henlsphere,” and in the
[4013]Sovist drat resoli¢ioa wich proposed thet the Yaited States, U.S.SRe and
[4014]Cuba eotablich contacts and enter into negotiations.
[4016]The Security Goanei peeonversd that evening, soze forty-cight hours
[4017]after Presidsat Kemedy°s bistorié specch. The naval quarantine had gone igto
[4019]effest at 10:69 AoMe that mornings deabors kmew that if a Soviet ship attexpted —
[4021]to run the queranting the result would be serious. ghey ziso kmewu that the
[4022] *Brpesident had indicated that tke quarsntine ls an imnodiate step" which
[4024]would be followed by further action? 1f the Soviet missiles were not ronovede
[4026]AY thig nesting ‘the Cowell heard statexouts by those mexkers who had not
[4027]yot spokeme France, China, Chile, United Arsh Republic, and Ghma.o In
[4028]‘ adddtica to expressions of support for the U.S». rosolutios by Franco and China,
[4029]the  Bightsgnte of the mesting ware the statexcat of Chile, the United arab
[4033]2 Se RR TT LM RR TEEN HOS APN a
[4035]Sear ee at Sa RA Ta ele a
[4037]= ete a agg enemy eres pen
[4039]/Republic-Ghana
[4041]HY 50955 Docld: 32424709. Page 92
[4043]+ 16 « 1
[4044]nepeblie-dhana "restraint vogolubic smo? and the first forsal imtecveation of
[4045]_ the Secretary-Genaral . Azbassedor Seydour, the Representative of Franco,
[4046]noted that “the eppearanca of foreign guelesyr missiles on Cuban soilo.-cannot
[4047]bo considered as other than a serious initiative ainzed at, eroating & Bey war
[4048]front in a regioa which up to nov has beoa freo from such threats.” He stated
[4049]that ths U.S. had denonstrated olearly that 4% is scoking a poacaful solution
[4050]in accordance, with the Charter of the Taited Nations and that the solution
[4051]_ proposed by the 8.8. ‘wag do trebil ia tho intorest of ‘tho countries coocerned
[4052]and “in order to ‘banish once and for alt the dangara with which world peace
[4053]ss threatened by tho regant dovelopseats in Gxba." Ankassador Lia, for the
[4054]! Republic of Chinas noted ‘that At was particularly disturbing to’ sea Cuba .
[4055]\peans? formed, so a result ‘of Sino-Soviet intervention, imto an arzed base for
[4056], cosminist ponstratioa ag ‘the juries, He declared that the measures initiated |
[4057]by the TUatted States designed to eal an iunodiate halt to the shipzeat of |
[4058]. blitary natorial to Cubs wera jusidtied and supported the U.S- draft :
[4059]resolution as 3 reasonable and peaceful, golutica. _
[4060]- Spesking for Chile, jebacvodar Schuuiteer extoracd the csowlty messares
[4061]ce tie veglonal systes and exprassed sarport for the U.S> arate resolutions
[4062]He weleoned the. gauthorization that the U.S. deaft % resoluticn gevo ta the
[4063]Secrotery-.donaral to dispatch an observer corps to Cuba. opafortenately," hs
[4064]said, “the Representative of Cuba yesterday rojeeted this iden. At such a .
[4065]decisive nonont as thie, vo balieve Cuba chould trust, tho methods of the United
[4066]eviews for putting out the flezeg of conflict and for ensuring PE2eS One
[4067]suck mothed could be to GAsure the United Hetions presence im a zone of |
[4068]conflict coos Wo make a fervent and heartfelt apneal, to Cuba to accept sach
[4069]a procedure.? .
[4070]{the United Arab —
[4072]HW 50955 Docld:32424709 Page 93
[4074]' @ . . ae
[4075]at .
[4077]ole) a]
[4079]LAI ORT
[4081]fhe United Arab Repeblic Represaatative, Bre Mahmoud Rind, declared that
[4083]“aneeeantmemem sonia er rte apeneninete zone
[4085]' bis ecuntry gamot coudone the milateral decision of the United States of
[4086]"_pearica to exorcise the quarantine” which ko characterized os costiary to
[4087]internaticasl lauiand Likely to imeresse world tension. He recalled that
[4088]’ Dre Dorticos had told the denaral, Assezbly thet the weapons cuba hed acquired
[4089]. Were "defensive. in natere” and eelled for enormaligation® of rolutions botuson
[4090]"Guba aed the United States, Ab the sano tine he reaffirmed U.ieRe policisg.
[4092]“against. the spread of ruclear wsapons. He wged ali parties to refrain from
[4094]lam peraggeageneenines qeepipanateringemnean ernie: teewnne mp emigteneie me RT AT
[4096]veasionaoggrevating action and called for gwegotiaticas. Tho Ghaxian
[4097]Representative, Re. Quaison-Saskey, took a sizilar position, stating that ke
[4098]. hed ao "incontrovertible: PROOF 0» 928 to the offensive charceter of milltery |
[4100]- developzents in Guba? and therefore could mot comdons the quarantine. He alse
[4102]eatded for yogotiations to resolve the crisis om the basis of “mateal respect
[4104]7 for soveretga Pights.®. Phe U.ARe«Ghans joint draft resolution requested the”
[4105]seeretary-Cencral Big promptly confer with the pertics directly concerned om
[4107]- “tmieaiate steps te bo taken to roxove the existing threat to world peace, and
[4108]to moxgelize the sit uption im the Caribheans" ead ealled on the parties
[4109]_ concernsd to comply forthwith with the resolution, to provide every assistance
[4110]to the Seerotary-Gemeral, and “to refrain moanuhile fren any action vhich may A
[4111]directly or oe indivestly further aggrave’ ate the siteation.® ho: forma proposed Jb
[4112]was thus Lintted toa general appeal for mediation by the SeorotaryGenarale (s.
[4114]: toe Baoblo invelvezant in inspsotion asd verification.
[4116]OS sank Ppopogal of Qatcbor ok
[4118]ht the close of the Ba-tiNZo the SeccotaryConeral revealed thet he had
[4119]. fi just addresset’
[4121]HW 50955 Docld:32424709 Page 94 : : - , j
[4122]i:
[4128]wo 18 «@ . . 1
[4130]yer eps
[4132]i
[4134]crc arm
[4136]just eddzcascd an argent appeal to President Kennedy and Chairasn Khrushchev
[4137]which proposed eho voluntary suspemoioz of all amas shipments to Cuba, and
[4138]also ths volumtary suspension of the qaawantine measures involving the searching
[4139]of shins borad for Cuba." Ghent believed that euch voluntary suspension for a
[4140]poried of tuo te thres weeks wowld groctly esse the altestion and give tine to |
[4141]the parties to “nest and discuss.® We offered te Snake uysclf available to
[4142]all parties for whatever services I may be able te perforn.”
[4144]In addition to this appeal to President Kennedy and Presiler Kurushchov,
[4145]the § Seeretaryefensral took tho ‘ceeasion of the Security Cowell meeting to
[4147]“ aavess an urgent spposl to tho President ont ester of Guba, dsclaring that
[4149]‘3%; ould also contribute grostly te the saze cad if the constructica and
[4150]devalopsent of wajor silitery facilities end installations in Gebe would be
[4151] sespended during the poried of zegotiations.” He then appealed to “the parties
[4152]) coxserncd” to eater into negotiations imedistely, Seven this night," |
[4153]irrespective of other prosedures, vith the firet subject to be discassed being ©
[4154]the °acdalities" to achieve his suggestions, Signifieast im U Tkant°s intervention
[4155]wore his offer to rake hineal? available to U.S- and Soviet negotiatars “for
[4156]vhatover services” he might perform ami the concrete suggestion for Sguspension®
[4157]of Soviet ares ghignents ami of the construction and cavelopscat of wajor
[4158]military iuotaliaticns in enchange for tho suspension of the ‘qearantine.
[4159]the maxt day, President Kennedy*s reply reninded the preyerrmareh
[4160]that the threat °uas created by the sserot intredusti.oy of offensive weapons.
[4161]tate Cuba, aud the answor Lies in the remeval <«f such HELPORSf fhe Prosident
[4162]4 that tho Seerotary.Coperel hedtesds certain suggestions ates invited
[4163]sci ierlm ioimery talks te dstersine whether satisfactory arrengerente cen be
[4165]—— aed ieadated that Cambassador Stevanson is ready 46 discuss proaptly
[4168]o@ 19%
[4170]these arrangenents with you." Proeniee Earushehev*s reply wellconed yu fhant’s |
[4172]initiative and characterized ‘the situation "as highly dangerous and calling ©
[4173]for the immediate intervention by the United Bations.”
[4175]When the Security Coaacii cocanvaned Shuveday afterncon for what proved
[4176]to bs the last formal mestiag on the Gubsn crisis, ‘hebassador Stevenson
[4177]weleezed both the course adopted oy the. Soviet Union the provicus day to
[4178]avoid dirset confrontations fia the 2020 of quarantine and the report that
[4180]Ere Knrachehor Rad agrecd to the proposals esvenced by the seezotarytonoral .
[4181],Hovarthaless, the situntion remained serious and ‘Asbassador Stevensom set the
[4182]“hone im hie opening voasrk by inv! iting the Council to address itself to the
[4184]7 realities of the situatica posed by the buildup of nuclear striking power
[4187]ja Cuba.®
[4189]Anbaseador Stevenson cautioned the Counsil not to forget that “us are
[4190]boro today’s efor one single reason: beeaase the Soviet Unien seeratly
[4192]introduced this mmacing offensive militery buildup into the island of Cuba .
[4194]while assuring the world that nothiag was further from its thougats.%
[4196]Already the Comamists hed attempted te dletort tho record by arguing that
[4198]£% was mot the Soviet Union which created this threat to peace by secretly —
[4200]installing these weapons in Cuba, “but thet it wes the United States which
[4202]' eronted this wisis by discovering and ruporting these installations. This
[4204]ag the Pirst vine, I sonfess,* the U.S. Representative contimeed, “thet I
[4205]| “Rave ever heard 4% said that the crieg is mot the burglary. ut the discovery
[4207]of the barglas ‘ 27 He note 2 that sono vepresentatives bao the Gomell say. Yat
[4209]they do mot imo whether the Soviet Usior has in fact ‘puilt ig Cuba
[4211]Sustallatdonas capable of firing maclear missiles ovar ranges fraa 1,000
[4213]2,600 wiles. if further dewbt remaized on this secre the United States would -
[4215]Ieeay
[4217]fiw prengenai enn one re rs
[4219]egg ee DE TLE TBE RL PEE IE PRE LAE I OE ATTY
[4221]|
[4222]E
[4225]neumeerner
[4228]|  &
[4229]2 2) o ; , oo?
[4230]| gladly exhibit photographie evidence to prove the truth of the charges.
[4231]- Oxe by one Aubassador Stevenson dexolished the arguments that Amzessador |
[4232]; Zovin had presented at the first Security Comeil meoting. As for the
[4233]“thirtyefive bases in foreign countries” waich the Soviet Represcatative had
[4234]mentioned, the fact was that there ware such missiles with the forces of
[4235]. only three of our allies << the Quited Kingdos, Italy, and Turkey: <= and that
[4236]. these were established by tha devisioa of Reads of Coverrmont in Deceabar 1957
[4237]Svhich vas s compelled to suthorize such arrangements by virtue of a priory
[4238]‘ Soviet decision to introduce its ov mlesiles eapeble of destroying the .
[4239]coantries of Western Europe.” why was it necessary for the Western Healsphore
[4240]nations to act with such apeed? The “speed and stealth” of the Sovict
[4241]offensive buildup in Cub desonstiated the preneditated attempt by the Sovict
[4242]| Union sto confvont this hemisphere with a fait aggamlie® If the United States
[4243]_ had not acted” prospthy and pad delayed’its comteraction, “the meclearization
[4244]© of Guba would have been quickly completed.” Ho stroosed that the United 7
[4245]7 : states had acted promptly to pet inte peouess “tho political machinery which
[4246]‘we pray will achieve a salution to this grave orisis.® ‘The one action in (| -
[4247]| the ‘Last feu days veich had strengthened the peace waa ‘the Goternination to
[4248]stop this further spread of weapons in this hesispheros qhe United States
[4249]was now ia ¢he security Counsil, Aebaseador Stevenson noted, because 1k
[4250]wished the machinery of the United Nations “to tae over to reduce those .
[4251]tensions and to interpose ite? to eliminate this aggressive threat to
[4252]peace and to ensure the renoval ‘frou this hemisphere of offensive nuclear
[4253]| wesvons and the corresponding lifting of the querantine.*
[4254]‘When Zorin again attempted to delude the Counell ebout the facts of
[4255]the Soviet offensive buildaip, a drazatic encounter occurred betucen
[4256]ST _ Stevenson and
[4258]HW 50955 Doold: 324274709 Page 937
[4260]HY 50955 Docld:32424709 Page 396
[4263]» 2 « a
[4265]“Stevenson and Zorin,g which exposed the trath beyond doubt.
[4266]STEVEESOW: | Wall, let me gay something to you, Hr. Axbassedors we do
[4267]| have the evidence. We have it, end it is clear and incontrovertible. And
[4268]let mo say somsthing elses Those wapons must be taken out of Cabs. |
[4269]| Next, let me say to you that, if I umderstood you, you said = with a
[4270]_ trespass on eredulity that exeels your best ~- that ou position had changed
[4271]since I spoke here the other day because af tho pressures ‘of world opinica
[4272]gad a najority of the United Bations.. Well, let no aay to Fou» sir: Toa
[4273]; are wrong agains “We have had 20 pressure from anyone whatsoever. ve Cane
[4274]: here today to indicate our willingness to cisouss U Thant’s proposals - ao BE
[4275]; . that is the only change that bas taken plase.
[4276]i But let He also say to you, sir, that there has been a changa. You, |
[4277], the Soviet Union, have sent these weapons to Cuba. You, the Soviet Union,
[4279]pave ‘upset ‘the balanog of ‘power in the world. You, the Soviet Union, have:
[4281]a ereated this, new! danger - ee not the United States...
[4283]Finally, Mr. torin, I remind you that the other day you did not deny
[4284]: the existence af these weapons. Instead, we heard that they had suddenly |
[4285]become defensive weapons. Bat today oe» again, if I heard you correctly a
[4287]"you ‘say that they do not exist, or that we have not proved they exist om and
[4289]- you say this with ansther fine flood of rhetorical seora. rel vighty sir,
[4291]let me ask you one sinple question: Do you, Ambassador Zorin, deny that
[4292]the U.S.S.R. has placed and is placing medium and internediate-range
[4293]missiles and sites in Cuba? Yes or no? Do mot wait for the interpretation.
[4295]Yes or no?
[4297]' ZORINs I am not in an American courtroom, sir, and therefore I do not
[4299]wish to answer a question that is put to me an the fashion in which a.
[4301]prosecutor puts questions. In due course, sir, you will have your reply. - .
[4305]ae preemie ae ne AC MON, 8S tar tere emer
[4308]See : : : .
[4309]aed . oO be :
[4310]" . . | a |
[4311]: Lo .
[4313]. 7 ee : , ‘ : .
[4314]"STEVENSON: You are in the courtrooa of world opinion right now, and
[4315]_ you can answer nyas” of "no®, You have dented that they exist -- ard I
[4316]want to know whether I have understood you correctly.
[4317]— ZORIN: Will you please continue your statenont, sir? You will have
[4319]your answer in due course.
[4321]se cece eres evened areneeine nena A) Me Speen Te menos gee
[4323]Inasmuch ag Zorin delayed his response, Stevenson proceeded to present
[4324]conclusive evidence of the existence of Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba.
[4326]This consisted of a display of enlarged aerial photographs and paps
[4328]pinpointing the details and Location in Cuba of Soviet bomber aireraft and of
[4329]Soviet. misgile basas, complete with launching sites and supporting equiprent,
[4331]tay short, all of the requirements to maintain, load, and fire these terrible
[4333]woapons." When Zorin’s reply again evaded the question of whether the Soviet
[4335]“ae cn canes nee amen ena npate Regn pen
[4337]Union had installed offensive missiles in Cuba, Stevenson challenged the
[4339]Soviet Union to ask the Cubans to permit a UN team to visit the sites he
[4341]had identified in order to authenticate the evidence. 7
[4342]{he proposal made by the United Arab Republic, and supported by Ghana,
[4343]%Q postpone further work ‘of the Council and to adjourn the meeting was
[4344]adopted without ob jection, in the light of the willingness of the U.S. and the
[4345]B,5.SoRe to consult with the Secretary-Gensral on his suggestions of the "
[4347]previous day. - The Security Couneil thus adjourned but remained “seized"
[4349]of the probley while the parties negotiated. The scene then shifted from the
[4350]fymal chauber of the Security | Counsil to the informal chanbers of the .
[4352]Sgorotary General.
[4354][Weekend Negotiations:
[4356]tb oneaelg Ade te
[4358]30404780" “Page ‘99 :
[4360]Pon hin weenie
[4361]“he su5% 7
[4364]a o¢ i
[4365]2 23 =
[4366]Weekend liogetiati ons Tae Kennady-Knrushchev tet lers
[4367]That weekend (October 26-28) there was an exchange of letters
[4369]between Moscow and Washington which transformed the nature of the Cuba
[4370]erisis. 0a Oetober 26, Khrushchev sent a letter to Preeident Rennedy.
[4372]making certain proposals on the ramoval of offensive weapons from Cuba.
[4373]“On Cetcber 27, another isttisr from Khrushchev, which was broadcast befors
[4374]- delivery, algo expressed willingness te withdraw the weapons but proposed
[4376]to 1ink the queation of Soviet offensive weapong ta Cuba te the unrelated .
[4378]: {veue of strategic weapons iz Turkey. the USSR would ragras te remove.
[4380]fron Cuba those. weane which ‘you regard & ap offensive msans We agree
[4382]to carry thia gut. and made a pledge da the United Nations. Your repre-
[4383]"sentative will nade a. declaration bed ‘the effect that the United States .
[4384]3 America, “On ptr part, considering the uneasiness and anxiety of the
[4385]fo Soviet State, wl remove ita gimilar meang from Turkey...After that
[4386]oe persons “sntrasted by the United Nations: Security Councit may check on
[4387]‘the « epot tho ‘fulfilment of the pledga made by either wide.” Of courze, » oe
[4388]he added, Bene suthorisation of tae Governmsate of Guba and of Turkey
[4389]. weuld be necensary for Gis eabry Late ‘those countries of thene agente. o
[4390]_ In addition, Karuehchey proposed that the United States and the USSR
[4391]give pledges against invasion of Uuba and turkey respectively: and eodem .
[4392]_ pramises to reyapect the sovereignty and ths inviolabi lity of the frontiers
[4393]of these countries.
[4394]- This tie-in of Turkey with Cuba was immediately rejacted. by the
[4395]tiited States. A statement issued by the kiite Howse that dey noted
[4396]that eoveral inconsistent and conflicting prepogale had been made by
[4398]the USSR in the past twenty-four hours, including the one just broadcast.
[4400]2 fhe proposal
[4402]HW 50955- Docld:32424709: Page 100
[4404]‘ cf .
[4406]~ 2 we
[4407], 4
[4409]“the propoxal involved the security of * nations ou wtedde the Western
[4410]“Hemisphers and.it-wag the Western Hemigphere nations alee that were
[4411]the subject of the threat which produced the crigis. ‘The position of
[4412]the United States, the statenent read, was that “ag an urgent ‘preliminary
[4413]* to consideration of any proposals work on the Cuban baa ses mast Zbop3
[4414]offensive weapons must be rendered inoperable; and further ehipment of |
[4415]offensive weapons to Cuba must cease ~- ali under effective international
[4416]= verificatica," As to propodals concerning the security of nations cabelas a
[4417]this hemisphere, the statement concluded, the United States and itg allie
[4418]had long taken the lead in seeking properly Inspected ars limitation,
[4419]Moy on both sides, These efforts cowld continue as soon ag the present seviét- .
[4420]- created threat was ended.
[4421]Te President Kennedy's letter to Chairman Khrushchev ef the same day
[4422]v4 (ooteber 27) replied to Khrushehev's letter of Getober 26.
[4423]. mae r read your letter," the President wrote, "the key elements of
[4424]your proposale which seem generally acceptable as I underatand them are .
[4425]as follows: ;
[4426]#2, “You would agrea to remove these weapons systems fron Cuba
[4427]_ under appropriate U. N. obs ervation and auperviedons’ and undertake,
[4428]with suitable safeguardd, to halt the further introduction of such
[4429]weapons systans dito Cuba. |
[4430]WZ, We, on our part; ‘would agree <= upon establishment of adequate
[4431]arraygeusnte through the United Nations to ensure the carrying oyt
[4432]and pontinuation of these comituents -- (a) to renave promptly
[4433]the quarantine measures now in effect, and (b} to give ageurance
[4434]against an invasion of Cuba, and I am ‘eoufident ‘thes other nations
[4435]of tbe Wester Hemtophore & ial be prepared ¢ to do iikewdea.
[4438]oF wi ma Spe
[4440]HW 50955. DocTa: 32424709. Page| ‘101
[4448]2 25 =
[4450]Agsuning work cvaned on offensive missile bageg in Cuba and all weapons
[4452]systema in Cuba capable of offensive use were rendered incpsrable, under.
[4454]| effective UN arvangemants, the President vas prepared to have representatives
[4455]in New York work out an arrangement in cooperation with the Se cretary-General
[4456]for a permanent solution akong the Lines suggested in Chairman Khrashchev’s
[4457]- 7 letter of October 26. *. . by .
[4458](On Sunday, October 28 == Chairman, Khruchchev broadcast the text of
[4459]. his reply in addition te earlier ineeructiong: vo dlecontinus: further. wrk
[4461]- on woapeng coustraction sites be the Soviet Goverament "has given .
[4463]8 new “order te alsnantle the arms vhieh you described ag offensive, and
[4464]- ro crate and return. them to the Soviet Union." The letter stated:
[4465]ae regard with respect, and truet the statement you mada in yeur
[4466]_ _ Jradeage of October 27, 1962, that there would bea no attack, no invasion -
[4467]do te of Ouba, and not only on the part of the Usited States, bet also on » the :
[4469]part. of other nationy of the: Western - Hemisphere, as. you gaid in your pang —
[4471]ae ‘then the motives which induced sas to vender sselstance of such
[4472]‘a kind te Cuba disappear. ; :
[4473]"Zt is for thi reason that we instrocted our officers <= thess means
[4474]ae I had alraady informed yeu earlier are in the hands. of the Soviet oe
[4475]a officers =~ to take appropriate measures to discontinue sonetruction of
[4476]. the aforementioned facilities, to dismantle then, and to raturn them to
[4477]the Soviet Union. As I had infermsd you an the letter of Octebar 27,
[4478]we are prepared to reach agreenont to enable Tnited Nations Representatives
[4479]te verify the dismantling of these means.
[4480]“Thus ia view of the ageurances you have given and eur instructions on
[4482]diemantling, there is every eoudition fey eliminating the present conflict."
[4484]/Chairnan
[4486]HY 50955 Docld: 32424709 Page 102,
[4488]fe,
[4490]Ae
[4492]zs 50953
[4494]we ve
[4497]Cx
[4498]t
[4500]. 4d
[4501]Chairman Khrugheney sent a copy of this message te U Thant "to enable
[4503]you to familiarize yourself with cur positica, which ve regard as exhaustive -
[4504]and which “whl help you to discharge your noble. funetiong.” At the sama
[4506]time, he informed the Thited States and the United Nations, that in connection
[4507]with the negotiations U0 Thant was conducting with representatives ef the USSR,
[4508]‘the United States, and ‘Cuba, the Soviet Government vas sunding First Deputy
[4509]Foreign Minister ¥. ¥. ‘Kuznetsov te Bow York to help U Thant in his noble
[4510]‘efforts aimed at eliminating the present dangerevs ci¢uation.® |
[4512]President Kennedy replied at once to the breadcest maseage of October 28 7
[4514]even before the official text reached him, and weleemed it as "an important
[4516]ah pees: eet
[4518]. , contribution to peace." The operative paragraph read:
[4520]“The distinguished efferte of Acting Secretary-General, 0 Tnant
[4521]. have greatly facilitated both our tavks. I conzider my letter to
[4522]_you of Ostober 27 and your reply ‘of today ae firm undertakings on
[4523]the part of both our governments which should be prenptly earriod
[4524]out. IX hege that the necessary measures can at. once be taken through
[4525]the United Nations as your masage gays, so that the United States
[4526]in % burn can. Texove the quarantine msagures now in affect. I have
[4527]. already nade arrangements to report all these matters te the
[4528]Organization of Ansricaa States, wiove mombera share a deep interest,
[4529]ina genuine peace in the Caribbean urea.“ 4 .
[4530]"Y agree with you,? the President cencluded, "hat we must devote :
[4531]urgent attention to the probiem of disarmament. oJ think we should
[4532]give priority te questions relating to the proliferation of nuclear 7
[4534]weapons, on earth and in cuter space,and to the great effort for a
[4536]. fnuglear test ban.
[4539]Docld: 324247 3 Pag
[4543]i,
[4544]nuclear test baz. Bat we ghould also work hard to see £f wider
[4546]meauures of disarmament éan be agreed and put inte operation at an
[4547]. early dats, the United States Govermasnt will be propered to discuss 7
[4548]these questions urgently, gad in a constructive spirit, at Geneva
[4549]er elsewhere."
[4550]A. U.S. statement iesued the sans day welcomed the Khrashchéy responge
[4552]and stated: We shall be in touch with the Secretary-General of the United .
[4554]| Natdons | with respect 4 to reciprocal measures to assure tha yoace: a the
[4556]“Caribbean area."
[4558]7 Weokend Fopotiati ons i Hew Yor
[4559]ee Meanthile steps contiaued in 3 New York to reach agreement on practical
[4561]means of avoiding confhict at ga and on arrangements to carry out the
[4563]Seoretary-Cenoral?s suggsation for stopping work on the offensive bases and -
[4565]prong further abipmenty ag conditions. of suspending ‘he quarantine.
[4566]The. initial, sm of the Sesvetary-Ceneral was to" avaid an incident: at
[4568]“pea. What concerned hiu most, he had written on Oeteber 25 to Chairmen |
[4570]. Khrushchev, waz that a confrontation at gon betwoen Soviet ships and Gn}ted:
[4572]States vessels rypuld destroy any possibility of the discusatons r have 4
[4574]suggested as a prelude toe negotiations on a peaceful 6e etlement.* He
[4576]therefore asked that Soviet ships already on their way to Cuba be inetructed
[4578]_ te stay away from the interception area for a limited time in order tte
[4579]“permit digeuesions of the modalities of a possible agreement.” fhe next
[4580]: day (October 26), the Secretary-Cenoral addressed a parallel Setter to
[4581]Progident Kennedy, ‘informing him of his approach te Chairman Khrushchev
[4582]and requesting that ninetrustd ont may be issued the United States’ vessels
[4584]ia the Caribbean $0. de overything posedbie to" avoid direct confrontation with
[4586]NW 50955 DocId:32424709" Page 104 : Cota {Soviet ships
[4588]TET NE Ne TENT OE ETE,
[4591]. @
[4592]= 2B |
[4595]Soviet ships in the next few days in order to minimize the ‘rigk of an
[4596]outward incident.” He expressed the further hope that such eouperation
[4597]. could be the prelude to a quick agreement in principle on the basis of...
[4598]uhich the quarantine msasures could be called off as goon as possible. |
[4599]Premier Nharughchey accepted the proposel and "ordered the magters of
[4600]Soviet voessls bound for Cuba...to stay out of the interception ' area, ag
[4601]you recommand.” President Kennedy weleoned u Thant °s efforts for a.
[4603]eaticfactery golutiea and stated that i? the Soviet. Qovermicnt acceptg
[4605]and abides by nie request that Soviet ahipe ‘already on thotr ey te Cuba
[4606]stay out of the. interception area ‘during the peried of prelininary discussions
[4607], o yon may be: ‘desured that this Goveranent will accept and abide by your |
[4608]" request thet our veszels in the Caribbean Yo everything possible to avoid
[4609]: “¢arect confrontation, saith Sovket chips in the next few days in- order to
[4610]3 -pinintig tho risk of any antoward incidents * at the gana time the Frevident
[4612]“underlined . that, this.we an matter of great urgency in view of the fect
[4614]that certain Soviet chips were. ‘otal proceeding touard Cuba and the |
[4615]interception area, .
[4617]- Sergening Shipments,
[4619]. Ags the Yhite House’ statement on October 2? made clear, the urgent
[4620]preliminary to the concideration of any proposals for a solution wae that
[4622]; wori on the Cuban baces stop, the offene! ive weapons be rendered inogarable, -
[4623]and further shigwent of veapene to Cuba mest ceage-<all under effective ; o
[4624]international verification, After that means must be found to get the .
[4625]missiles and other offensive weepens removed and their removal verified and
[4626]to inatitute adequate safocuards against their reilntraduction.
[4628] fTha immediate
[4630]HY 50955 Docld: 32424709 Page 105
[4632]at . 29 . —
[4633]7
[4634]“the tmodiate concern of the negotiators in New York, during the .
[4636]‘initial phase,’ Wee to work out a gyeten for incoming Shiprente to ensure
[4637]that no further affonsive weapons. were being introduced. The tN asked
[4639]the Intermational Comaittes of the Red Croae { (z0R6) to § gerve as its agent
[4640]in inepecting incoming vessels to make eure that ne more 5 Soviet weapons
[4641]were coming in to Cuba. Tho operation would be expected to continue for ;
[4643]. ‘about one month and would be entrusted te come thirty inspectors wnieh
[4645]| the ICRC vould undertake to recruit, Hr. Poul Ruegeer, former proaident
[4646]co of the TORC, arrived in Hew York early in Hovenber. tediseuss with the UN
[4647]whether and under what elreumstances the ICRC could widertake this task.
[4649]| in releases iseued in Geneva on Novexber 5 and November 13, the TCRC
[4650]‘pointed out that the organization could participate in the plan only with
[4652]. the formal agreenent of “the three parties concermed." The stateneat -
[4654]ro _ issued by the ICRC on November 13 explained that "evantual action by the
[4655]. TCRC- would be based on previowe congent being given by the three states.
[4657]: concemed* and the nethods of contre) ‘would have to be clarified in future .
[4658]discusalene. Premier Castro refused to give his eongent to the proposed
[4659]schexe, Before final arrangements eculd be made it WBS, in any event,
[4661] pealiged that the system envigaged would no leager be required and that
[4663]' the Taited States and other countries of the Western Hemisphere could rely
[4664]on other meang, including air surveillance, to guard against new shipments
[4665]of offensive weapons. | . . :
[4667]“Havana talks
[4669]The pain obatacle’ to pregregs on establishing the conditions for a.
[4671]eottlenent wag the attitude of the Cuban government. - On October 26 U Thant
[4673]_farote Prime wintetor
[4675]OLN eae getty He
[4678]| HW 50955 DocTd: 3342
[4680]IT Ae feet oe ccey
[4683]Se _ ry
[4684]: oo i ,
[4685]wrote Prime Minister Cagtro renewing bic appeal that he (Castre} direct that
[4686]_ ™the construction and development of major military facilities and
[4687]installations la Guba end especially installations desl gned ¢ $a launch
[4689]medium-range aad intermediate-range ballistic missiles, te suspended
[4691]sree, Creat inom capmnene ne oe PREG MINE ERE NER LEN ERE
[4693]during the poricd ef nagetietions which are now endervay.”
[4695]‘Dr. Castro's reply cane the next day and proved to be a hedged accept-
[4697]ance. He rejected "the preswytion of the thited States to determine what
[4699]action we are entitled ta take within our P country, what kind of arms we.
[4701]consider appropriate tor our datende,* Cuba wes prepared to accopt ‘tthe
[4703]. compromises that “you, request as afforte in favor of peace 3 provided that — c
[4704]1 Bt the sama tn, enile negotiations ave in progress, the United States
[4706]coveranent desiats from threats and ageresaive actions against Cuba,
[4708]sg renee
[4710]_ including naval vleckade of the country." Read Literally, De, Cagtre wag -
[4711]| saying that he would consider the suspension only at the price of ending :
[4713]the quarantine. At the same time » bis letter contained another note:
[4715]nadqmeg neon err errr a
[4717]8, Should you consider At weofel to the cause of peace, our government
[4718]“would be glad te receive Fou in our country ag Sesretary-General of the - rn:
[4719]United Nations, with a: view to direet digcussions on the present. erisia." _ . - of
[4721]u Thant réplied eho next day noting that Castro was | prepared to accept.
[4723]the suggestion he nad made provided the Uaited states Government “desints :
[4725]rom threats. against Cuba including the naval Blockade" while negotiations ~
[4727]wore in progress. ‘Ho accepted the invitation to wieit Cuba carly in the
[4729]coming week ==. ond to "oving a fow. aides vith Re to leave some of them behind . _ |
[4730]to continue our - eonmen etfert to ards 2 scetud solution of the problen.” |
[4731]Po focititate his task ‘the United Staves had agreed to ‘guspand its naval
[4733]quarantine and ‘eoriel survei lence during. ‘the  Seoretary-Censvall'e visit to. oS
[4735]_fBavana.
[4737]HW 50955 DocId:32494709 Page 107
[4739]~ Fle
[4741]et vue : ,
[4743]Havana, At thts point » the United Rationg was working on tHe ascumption :
[4745]that the vieit to Cuba would be concerned vith yorking out molalities of
[4747]Uo. ebcervation and inspection and "reciprocal measures + aseure the
[4749]pozce in the Caribbean."
[4751]fhe issue was further clouded by Castro’s netatensnt ‘of conditions"
[4753]- §esusd in Havana on Octeber 28. "The guarantecs of waich President Komedy
[4755]gpsaks against the. invasion of Cuba will not exist without the elinination | ,
[4757]also of the naval blockade ;" he declared, "and adoption; - auong others, of
[4761]1.
[4765]End of the economic blockade and mall measures of commercial
[4767]and economic pressure" exercised by the Uaited States against
[4769]Cuba
[4771]End of wall subversive activities and the organization or support
[4772]of imvasionss
[4774]End of npdrate attacks" frou bases in the United States and
[4775]Puerte Rico; |
[4777]End of "violationa of air and naval specs by the ‘United States;
[4778]United States withdrawal from the naval bage at Guantanamo and its |
[4780]return to Cuba.
[4782]Thie statenent of conditions wag ¢learly unacceptable and adunbrated
[4784]. 4tg intrans}gent . position that the Cuban authorities would take during the .
[4786]Ravana talks. JU Thant and a party of nineteen, including Brigadier Ganeral
[4788]Rilkhye and a email mili¢ary staff, flew to Havana on Oeteber 30 and held
[4790]“telke with Guban leaders that day and the next to arrange for U.N.
[4792]; eupervicion of removal of the offensive weapons and to digguss the other
[4794]acdalities for: carrying out the Kenmedy-Rurushclov agreement of October. 27-28.
[4796]/artiroiign store a
[4798]HW S095S” Docta:3249e%09 . Page Tbs? (OP 0 Povo eee ot pe
[4800]pee te sna RE TEI IE TT I TA CE
[4802]; 2326, -
[4803]Although general agreensnt was reached that the United Nations showld
[4804]participate in cottlemont of the Cuban crisis and the talks vere characterized
[4805]. ag "fruitful," the Cuban awthorities balked at all preposals for U.N.
[4807]inepeetion of weapons removal and safeguards against their reintroduction.
[4809]a snliea mtemeesepmie on raion ome nL SRR Epa ias Ae sete mtn wut
[4811]“Premier Castro reiterated the five demands he had made in his October 28
[4812]gtatement. These demands were ebviouely beyond ‘the scope of the,
[4813]Sacretary-General’s purpove ih negotiating with the Cubang, and no agreeuent
[4814]was reached. . |
[4815]es The Secretarg-Ceneral and his party retumed te © Hew York “tng next day,
[4816]uhere, it was understeod; alka betwson the Secretery-Gsneral and Cuban
[4817](Peproventatives + would contines, Premier Castre, hovever, did state that he
[4818]would not interfere with. the Soviet removal of the migelles. The missiles
[4819]8re. Snot ours, he gad in a radie spsech om Novexber 1 in which he
[4820]: 7 “reported on his talks with J Jhant, but he rajected any form of intéraational
[4821]dnepecticn on the withdraval ef Soviet waapone. He specifically turned
[4822]down a proposal that ‘the: Intemations? Committees of the Red Croas ¢ rere)
[4823]‘carry out the inapestion task, He also rejected other forms: of tN tnepect.gn.
[4824]On Friday, Noveaber 2, Soviet Firet Deputy Premier Anastal I, Mikoyan
[4825]arrived in New York ca his way to Havana and issued a . statement cupporting
[4826]Premier Castro's demands ard warmly endorsing the Cuban regina,
[4827] Survyolllance and Dismantling Continued . .
[4828]| When U Thant lef Hevana without a mutually satisfactory formula,
[4829]| President .Kennedy ordered resumption of the quarantine on shipping to.
[4830]Cuba and authorized reg gwaption of cloge serial surveillance of ‘the iglend
[4831]to dstermine unether diamantling of Sovict ndseile basses was proceeding
[4833]ag reported by Soviet officials. On the evening of Nevember 2, the
[4835]/President reported
[4837]HW 50955 Docld:32424709 Page 109
[4839]asa ii ana
[4841]AWW 50955 Docld:32424709 | Page 110
[4843]eo 33
[4845]President. reported in a short gelevision and radio breedcast that the
[4846]"Soviet missile bages ars being disnantled, the missil ag are being
[4848]‘ erated and the fixed installations at the sites are peing destroyed." The
[4849]Preeident said the information was based on acriel photographs and added .
[4851]that the Urited States intended to follow closely the completion of this ,
[4853]work through various means, fueluding aerial surveillance, until Ran equally
[4854]satisfactory international meang of verification is effected." ‘He also
[4855]gaid that while the quarantine remained in effect, hs was ‘hopeful that
[4856]adequate procedures could be developed for: international inspection of
[4858]Cuba~bound ‘eargess.. Fhe Taternationsl Gommittce of the Red Cross could be
[4860]i "en appropriate agent" for carrying out tls inspection.
[4862]mony Hew Yorke Nogotiabions:  Yord fication end T2685
[4864]“Weanuanile 2 talke proceeded in New York between Anbassador Stevenson
[4865]and Be, John J. MeCloy for the Taited States and Deruty Foreign Minister _
[4866]‘Rusnoteoy, for the Soviet Union. Apart from working owt the details of”
[4867]“the schoms for ORC. inspection of laceming shi puents (deseribed above) hace
[4869]negotiators gpent the next three weeks in considering suo main iseves.
[4871]: Until November 12 the contral concern ef the negotiators wag to make sure.
[4873]| thet the offensive missile gystem had left Cuba and te work out a satige
[4874]factory aysten for verification that diemandling and renoval had in fact -
[4875]taken place. Associated with thie was ths problea of longer-term safe~
[4876]guards ageinst the reintroduction er offensive WOSPSES Fron Rovember’ w
[4877]to Hove mber 20 the focus of negotiation shifted to the problen of removal
[4878]of the Sevist TL-26 bombers from Cuba. .
[4879]| On vorificatioa, ae vag clear that what the President had terusd .
[4881]Pan equally satiefactory international usens of verification" required an
[4883]adequate | Gi ‘eye stom ‘of ‘fnepsction to make sure: that: the offensive wsapOns - a
[4885]t
[4887]fnad in fact
[4890]‘ Lo
[4891]- | a
[4893]had in fact. been renoved, te guard against hiding, and to > provertt
[4894]reintroduction of sus h weapons. Various Schenss were ‘considered -
[4895]and the USSR made clear its willingness 3 teh have oY verification take place.
[4896]Castro ademantly refused to accept any form of verification in Cuba by the
[4898]UN or under ite auspices for removel of the weapons. US negotiators
[4900]peer ne renee a Oe ET MIRAE A a RBar ep mmEE
[4902]contimied te maka 1t clear to the Soviet negotlaters thet US aerial
[4903]surveillance vould continue so loug as there was no adequate UH syaten of
[4904]inspection, When it became elear that Castro would not give nis consent
[4906]te UN ingpection or verification of shipments frem his ports, the negotiators
[4908]tumed to ‘devising a systen for GS inspection < at sea of outgoing ships
[4910]carrying the diexantled miseiles. The 05 ‘pavel vessels would coma “alongeide"
[4911]departing Seviet vess els wnieh wowld be loaded in such a way as te enable .
[4912]“the US vessels to see and count the missiles and associated equipment. Rapid
[4913]prognges was mede in dismantling 2 and toading the rissiles and by November
[4914]' the US had counted 2 departing missiles by this procedure, Falling UW .
[4915]verification and safeguards, the BS continusd its oun “system of surveillance - Ss
[4916]under the” existing OAS vegolution to meke sure that offensive weapons a
[4917]were nob reintroduced. . - 7
[4918]On Hovenber 12, with the missiles removed, the US negotiators
[4919]--teok up again the question of the venoval of: TL-283 and made it clear
[4920]that the United States could not consider Lifting the quarantine anti
[4921]the bembera wera withdrawn. The Soviets claimed they had fulfilled their
[4922]part of the bergein by dismantling and removing the nisalige and were
[4923]sging for Lifting of. the quarantine and a U.S. non~irivagion pledge, -
[4924]. Tre oS posi Lea was that the bombers ware defined ag offensive
[4926]weapons in the Presidential Proclamation of. Octeber r 23 and that they, Cee Bad wee
[4928]pore included 20
[4933]_ were included. ag. such im the Kennedy-Khrue noker exchange of Octover 2728.
[4935]The United States made it clear that 1t could uct consider lifting the
[4937]quarantine wmtil the Sovists agreed to remove the Ti-28s within a short time.
[4939]Partisl Settlement: Nowexber 20 :
[4940]on November’ 20, Br. Castro informed U Thant that if the Soviets wtehed
[4941]to remove the beubors he would not object. That day an agreenent was reached
[4943]betwoen Kennedy and Khrushchev under which the Th-28e would oe withdraw, .
[4945]a, & U Thant was notified the game day by anbacoader Stevenven . ead Deputy Foreign
[4947]Minister. Kueneteovs ‘Soviet agreement we renove the panbers payed the way
[4951]‘for the Lifting of the: quarontiti. The partial s settlement had | taken just .
[4953]At nis pres 5 conference that evening, President Kennedy snnounced
[4955]‘shat he hed that day been informed by Chairman Karushcher that all of the
[4957]| meet bombers in Guba, would be withdrawn in shirty days 3, and that these
[4958]38 Co a. erved and counted aa they departed. “iesmuch ag this
[4959]goes a tong way sowerds reducing the ‘danger wWiieh faced tht hemisphere .
[4960]four weeks ago," the Fresidsnt announced , af have this afterncon instructed
[4961]the Secretary ef Defense to Lift our naval quarentine." The Presidant |
[4962]then recalled the egresnont he had reached with Chairman Khrushchev
[4963]October Z7-26, “ineluding the stipulation that once the Soviet leader had
[4964]complied with all his pledges > Hea woud remove our naval quarenvine. and —
[4965]give assurance against invagion of Cuba." Bridence to date indicated that
[4966]‘ali known offencive missile sites had beon diswantled, he stated, and sea
[4967]inspection by the navy had confirmed thet the missiles had teen withdrawn.
[4968]Bui, ke warned, Hiepor riant part 2" of the agrsemont "remain to be carried
[4970]out. The Cuban Government has net yet permitted the United Nations to
[4972]\ frerify whether all Ys Bene
[4974]HY 50955 Docld: 32424709 Page 112
[4976]peek a SRD PPR es CRA auth ise ts pote A a in Sa
[4978]a * , | e
[4979]. | @
[4981]ag
[4985]verify whether all offeneive weapons have been remered, and no lasting
[4987]Le appear gee oe mre Ma he eee EN
[4988]aires re
[4990]safeguards have yet been established against the future introduction of
[4992]offensive weapons back inte Cuba.* the United States, therefore, had no
[4993]choice but to pursue ite owa means of checking on military activities in
[4994]Cuba. ‘fhe United Stetes, he gaid, will continues ite efforts to achieve . |
[4995]tadequate international arrangemate for the task of ingpection and . or
[4996]verification ‘of Cube." Later, in reply tc a question, he defined adequate ; (
[4998]safeguards a3 "an inspection which would provide Us with agsarances that
[5000]there are not in the igland weapong capabis of offensive action ‘againet
[5002]United States or neighboring countries and that they wil not be reintroduced, "
[5004]Regarding guarantess against invasion, the President gtated that these ;
[5005]were contingent on adequate verification and vafeguards for the future. oa
[5007]a “AS for our part, 4f all effensive weapons are removed from
[5009]Cuba and hope out of the Hemigphers in the future, wider |
[5010]adequate verification and safeguards, and if. ‘Cuba is not used _
[5012]for the export of aggressive Commins. 2% gurposea, ¢here will be
[5013]peace in” the Caribbean. And, as r agta in ‘Septexber, We shell -
[5015]noither fnttiat 2. Ror permit aggression in tds hemisphere."
[5017]The United Seat vee he stressed, would not abandon the political,
[5019]economic,’ aga other efforts to hald subversion from Guba nor its purpoge |
[5021]and hogs | Rae & the Cuba people shell soma day be fulldy | free. That thesg |
[5023]policies
[5025]sig very different from any Intent to Jauneh a military invasion
[5026]of? the ieland.”
[5028]Tater-Amorican quarentins Porce fomnine ated: Gpstatione
[5032]Following the. Lifting of the quarentire, the three governments whose.
[5034]- foaval units hed
[5036]set Pe Ray eye wee nateita tags Nowe eetin? fof tee ae boa
[5037]ria 50955 ‘Page. ne en Cn ace poe de oe
[5040]oe
[5043]naval unite tad paréiedpated in tho intersAmsricsn coabined quarantine
[5044]force w= i.e. Argentina, Dominican Republic, and the United Statas --
[5045]notified the €.0.A.5./0.C. on Wovenbor 30 that the operetions of the
[5046]quarantine force had been termineted. Uurley thie pseried, it had not been
[5047]necessary to take up the offers of airport and seaport facilities and
[5048]other types of assistance made by ether henigpherie determinatien and
[5049]solidarity,
[5051]Ag the negotiations botween the United States and the Soviet Trion
[5052]in New York progressed, the United States kept the o.0.8.8./0.0. fully a
[5053]informed of devélopients.. “the C.0.8.8./0.C. in the meantime withheld
[5054]aking any further action with regard to the crisis until these talks werg
[5056]‘complet ed.
[5058]Continued. Negotistions —
[5060]The Soviet Government carried oub it3 promize to withdraw the rin28
[5062]poubors, and, by December &, the tated States wae informed that all benbers
[5064](he ‘dn ‘nunber) hed left. No progress, hoijever, wad made duping the rest
[5065]of the month in achieving the radsquate ingemational arrangersnts fer the
[5067]tack of ingpection and. werification in Cuba" that the President had
[5069]- mantigned on November 20, and which were part of the original understanding.
[5071]Dsputy Promisr Mikeyan''s three-hour conversations with ths Pregident on
[5072]Novenber 29 and with the Secretary of State on November 30, did act advance
[5073]the final golution. The question was turned over again to the delegations
[5074]in Hew York. |
[5076]By mid-December several important loose ends still remained, . No,
[5078]fadequate,
[5080]HY 30955 Docld: 32424709 Page 114
[5082]a gteeticrmecnre n mereretanee a ry
[5084]2
[5086]§ Ther near etre ener nene gem
[5088]to ptt a ene anne pe I en Fem ecm tet
[5090]Ba
[5092]Ae
[5094]ry oo h a £ :
[5095]adequate, U.N,-superviesd arrangements fer verification of removal of
[5097]7
[5098]|
[5099]f
[5101]offensive weapons and safeguards ageins} their reintroduction had been . ‘|
[5102]achieved, the U. S$. agsurance against invasion or suppor eting an inwasion of
[5103]t
[5104]k
[5105]Cuba was dependent on adequate safeguards that offensive weapons “were hot i
[5107]present or reintroduced into Cute and thet Cuba refrained from aggressive’ i
[5108]j
[5109]i
[5111]acts against the Weetern Hemlephers.
[5113]Soviet Troops _ . — , - ; ; :
[5114]The withdrawal, of Soriet personnel from Cuba vag algo a natter of
[5116]deep concern to ths United States, As the President stated at his
[5118]press conference ef November 20, the U.S. had been informed that Soviet
[5120]combat unite and other Sovies mits wore assoclated with the protection
[5123]ef effensive weapons systems and would alee be withdrawn in dus course.
[5125]the U.S. position was that removal of the offengive weepons systems made the
[5126]! pesaenee ef Seriet traops to defend euch + pons ne longer necessary. | ie
[5127]7 “Efforts be secure their removal continued inte 1963,
[5128]Security. Council Consideration Coneluded
[5129]fhe formula for tenninating Security Council consideration of the
[5131]Cuban crisis vas finally agreed between the governments of the United
[5133]States and the Soviet Union on January 7, 1963. Tt represented a standstill
[5134]‘yather than a final settlement. The tuo governments agreed to send a
[5135]joint letter to the Secretary-General which he, in turn, transmitted to
[5136]the Security Council for information of its members, The text of the .
[5137]letter read:
[5138]| "On behalf’ of the covernmente ef tha United States and the
[5139]Soviet Union, we desira te express to you our appreciation for
[5141]_ your efforts in assisting our governments te avert the serious
[5142]threat te the peace uhich recently arose in the Caribbean area.
[5144]pprrneeeenee gre tmecene: yong meme remaster, gears neengemeentp nn saeco ly ete
[5146]"yhile at has not bsen possible for cur governments to
[5148]/resolve all the -
[5150]HY 50955 Docld: 32424709 Page 115
[5152]— .* ]
[5155]resolve al} the problems that have arigen in eonnection with this
[5156]affair, they believe that, in view of the degree of understanding»
[5157]reached between them on the settlement of the crisis and the
[5158]extent of progress in the implementation of this understanding, it
[5159]is not receagary for this item to occupy further the attenticn A
[5160]of the Security Council at this tine,
[5162]one manera pone nerccemea ate aime eR,
[5164]"The Govermments of the Urited States of America and of the
[5165]Soviet Union express the hope thet the actions taken to avert the ae
[5166]_¢breat of war in commection with this erisis will lead toward the i
[5167]adjustment of other differences between them end the general :
[5168]- easing of tengions that could cause a further threat of war. ® ,
[5170]The sama day (January 7, 1963), the Permanent Representative ef Cuba,
[5171]Carlos M.. Lechuga, addressed a letter to the Secretary-General, which he
[5172]requested ba ¢rarionitied to Uaited Nations mambors, sxpreesing 2 dissenting
[5174]view on the conclusion of the affair, Cuba, the letver declared, "does
[5176]_ snob consider as effgetive any agreenont other then one which would include’
[5178]consideration of five points or measures, wich ag minimum guarantees to
[5180]peace in the Caribbean, our Prim Hinieter Fidel Castro stresses in his
[5181]‘declaration of 26 Ogteber, 1962...00 .
[5182]As the Security Council concluded ite consideration of the Cuban
[5183]iten, the situation remained as follewss
[5185]4. ‘The Soviet Union had withdram ite offensive missiles,
[5187]ena en ME Ee Merete Men gees cape amma pamenrongentecmtetin, to certs at
[5189]°° 4¢8 bombers, and soms of its military personnel. ‘The United
[5191]States and participating American Republics had lifted the
[5192]-querentina, ~ | . , ;
[5194]2, The Cubans had refused to accept eu site inepection and
[5196]post-removal verification or te agree on a system of sentinuing ~~ [
[5197]safeguards against relntroduction of offensive weapons under _
[5199]United Nations auapices.
[5200]3, In the abgence of adequate insyection and safeguards, the . ood
[5201]United States continued other metheds of surveillance of military ..
[5203]. oo  factivities in _
[5204]HY 50955 Docld:32434709 Page 116
[5206]ee 7 ot 4, @ : i
[5208]oe KO »
[5210]estivitdes in Cuba in the intereste af hemispheric security.
[5212]hk, The continued presence of Soviet military personnel in
[5214]Cuba constituted an unacceptable interventisn of foreign
[5216]military power in the Western Hemisphers. Efforts contdnuad
[5218]with the USSR to chtain their removal og agread,
[5220]5S. The United States continued tc be sericusly conserned about
[5221]‘Guban subversive efferts directed against other American Republics.
[5223]6. The United States position with regard te assurance against
[5225]Aneasiion Fomained that stated by the Pres ident on ‘November 20, as J 4
[5227]duthined above, | _ i:
[5229]Vo With he contlusion of the Now York telke and the Joint GS-TS5R :
[5231]-Istter teminating Security Council congideration of the matter,
[5232]responsibility: of further action remained with the OAS Organ of
[5234]' - Consultation in its hemispheric context,
[5236]| Con: Lemente ne of Bila
[5238]“Gonehusion: ary Role
[5240]aberal, Rap pnais and UN Diplomac
[5244]the Cuban affair denorstrated the utility and possibilities for inte
[5246]action of the varicue dipleratic and military inetrumente available to the
[5248]' United States in a cris vi. Orchestration of bilaterial diplomacy, regional,
[5250]arrangements, and the United Natione syatem marked the handling of the
[5252]erisis throughout. Im particular, the Cuba affair represented a unique
[5254]demonstration of coordination hetween a regional system and the world
[5256]organization, with diplomatic action being taken in the 0,A.5. and the
[5258]Usited Nations, deyending on the task to be perfermed and the governments
[5260]ai
[5262]directly involved, The 0.4.5. systen successfully met the test of
[5264]a am ae a
[5266] fworkability by
[5268]oe ene eee mere
[5270]HW 50955 Docla:32424709 Page 117
[5272]workability. by denonstrating comiusively, the solidarity and determination
[5273]of the American Republics when their gecurity is endangered. The rapid,
[5274]dscisive action taken by the American Republics under the Rio Treaty
[5275]etrengthened the hand of the Usited States in making ats sass before world
[5276]opinion, in dealing in the Security Council with the crisis, and in
[5278]nogetiating with the Soviets.
[5280]4
[5281]'
[5283]“The United Nations played a thres-feld role: as a forum for exposing _
[5284]Soviet duplicity and for anlisting diplomatic suppert of the United Staten
[5285]position; as an instrument for international consultation and as a site for
[5286]negotiations and, ag an institution willing and abla, on shert notice,
[5287]to provide inepection and verification servi cag.
[5289](2) The United States provided an waparalleled forum for presenting
[5290]the facts of the Soviet offensive buildup directly to repregentatives of
[5292]109 nations and through communications media directly to world public
[5294]opinion. Ambaeaador Stevenscn’s gpaeches of Octcber 23 and 25 in the
[5295]Security Council, together with the photographs and explanations vO
[5296]delegations both inside and eutsida the chamber, prevented incontrevertibie °
[5297]evidence in a dramatic and effeetive manner and thus helped in convincing
[5299]the world of ths facte. Yn addition, the Waited Nations provided a
[5301]forum in ehich the American Republics cowld impress on the world and
[5303]on the Secretary-Gensrel their solidarity on thig issue.
[5305](2) the Secretary-Gensval provided an effective point ef contact,
[5306]notably in the tease days at the outast ef the erisis and valuable
[5307]suggestions for avoiding cirsct eonfrontation, The Secretery-General’s  .—
[5308]intervention on the cecond day of Security Couneil debate, in which i
[5309]he called for suspension of arn shipments and of construction and
[5310]development of military inetallationg im exchange for suspension of
[5312]i
[5314]sd 5O98S Saw TA 90424909 Page ALG 4 oyu wk ea tee ya yee, cee A EHO, QUATANEINE snip oncners,
[5317]a
[5319]bq we, & a, = &
[5321]the quarantine led te the formula under whieh Seviet ships! stayed away
[5322]- fren the interseption area and on that condition the United States agreed |
[5323]_ to do everything poasibls to avoid diract confrontation. Khrushchev gave
[5324]unprecedented agreement te tha idea of U.N. inspection and verification |
[5326]of arms removal on the spot. And, the United Nations proved that it was
[5328]4
[5329]1
[5331]ready and capable of organiaing a corps of observers and a eystem of
[5332]inspection in rapid order. -
[5333]"Both the United Katiens and. the Organization ef American States proved
[5335]their utility. and vigor <= and anerged atxonger from the erdgal,
[5337]as
[5339]‘HW 50955 Docld:32424709 Page 119
[5341]‘SECRET - wap WITH srAceyeTS
[5343]OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
[5344]WASHINGTON 25, D.C.
[5346]a iia
[5348]March 6, 1963
[5350]MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BROMLEY SMITH
[5352]SUBJECT: ‘Cuba
[5354]Ae & follow-up to my rnemorandum to you on February 15,
[5355]£963, lam attaching excerpts containing references to Cuba in.
[5356]tactimeny given by the Degartmuent of Defense te congressional
[5357]committees. They continue from the latast dete of each coransitice |
[5358]excerpt you now have, and include excerpts from the Senate Armed
[5360]” Services Gommittee trauseYipts.
[5362]Not ali testimeany has heen eercencd for Cuba references
[5363]inasmuch ae all trangerigte are got available. ‘Thus the House
[5364]Armed Services Gommmittee has been covered up to Fabruary 21,
[5365]the DOD Subcommittee of the Neuse Appropriations Committee to.
[5366]®ebruarcy 13, and the Senate Armed Services Commities to
[5367]February 22. The DOD Subcommittee of the Genate Appropriations
[5368]Gommittee hag not yet begun ite heavings.
[5370]| . Aa transezipis become available, I will send the raquested
[5371]items to you.
[5373]“SIGNED
[5375]"David HE. MeGiffert
[5376]. Agvlatant to the Sacretary
[5377](Legialative Affaira)
[5379]U Attachments
[5380]HASC Transcript excerpte
[5381]; Dad So, HApgone Transcripts excerote
[5382]4 £A6C Tranocript excerpts
[5384]SERY » | SECR FT WHEN WITH ATTACHMENTS
[5386]ce:(S/Attachments included) -
[5387]Mr. McNaughton, GC Myr. Lennartson, PA
[5388]Mg. Yarmolinsky, Spec Asst. “Mg. Califano, OSA <————““«
[5389]Mr. McGiffert, ATSD(LA)
[5391]HY 50955 Docld: 32424709 Page 1270
[5393]HW 50955 Docld: 32424709 Page 121
[5395]STATEMENT BY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
[5396]‘y ROBERT S.°.McNAMARA‘TO.THE PERMANENT
[5397]SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE
[5398]COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS - 13 March 1963
[5399]U. S, SENATE
[5401]Mr. Chairman, I am grateful to this Committee for having granted
[5402]my request of 9 March that I be afforded the opportunity to present my
[5403]views on the development of the TFX concept and on the selection of
[5404]General Dynamics Corporation aS prime contractor for this versatile new
[5405]addition to our Defense arsenal.
[5407]My decision in November 1962 to select General Dynamics over the
[5408]Boeing Company, as the better of two qualified competitors, was based
[5409]on the judgment that the General Dynamics design would result in an air-
[5410]plane less expensive to produce, maintain, and operate, and more depend-
[5411]able both in training missions and in actual combat.
[5413]The General Dynamics-Grumman team was successful because, in
[5415]aay judgment, and in the judgment of the Secretaries of the Navy and the
[5416]Air Force, their proposal gave the most valid promise of. obtaining a
[5417]single airplane that can meet Navy and Air Force requirements with:
[5418]- The least expensive, time-consuming research and
[5419]development effort before production.
[5420]- The least reliance upon unknown process and materials.
[5421]- The earliest delivery to our fighting forces.
[5423]- The highest level of experience in building fighter-type
[5425]aircraft.
[5427]HW 50955 Doclad: 32424709 Page 122
[5429]ily i)
[5431]- The greatest use of proven design techniques and
[5433]methods.
[5435]° - The most understanding of the requirements and
[5436]difficulties in developing, testing, tooling, and
[5437]producing a fighter~type aircraft.
[5439]When the General Dynamics and Boeing proposals were first
[5440]identified in the early stages of the competition in December-January 1961 --
[5441]1962 as the two significantly better proposals among those submitted by
[5442]six competing companies, neither proposal was found to be acceptable
[5443]without substantial changes. Differing opinions were expressed as to
[5444]whether a single contractor, Boeing, should be selected at the outset, or
[5445]whether the competition between General Dynamics and Boeing should be
[5446]continued in order to meet the military requirements.
[5448]Competition was continued over the period from January to the Fall
[5449]of 1962. In November 1962, the Fourth Evaluation Report, prepared by
[5450]the evaluation officers of the Navy and the Air Force, concluded:
[5452]"(1) Both contractors have the capability to successfully
[5453]design and produce this weapon system.
[5455]"(2) Both designs are acceptable as initial development
[5456]design configurations to the using Agencies involved ~- TAC and the
[5457]Navy.
[5459]'(3) Both designs will require further design refinement,
[5461]and changes can be expected during the development period.
[5463]HY 50955 Docld: 32424709 Page 123
[5465]HY 50955
[5469]'(4) When fully developed, the operational tactical aircraft
[5470]will markedly improve the capability of the Tactical Air Command in
[5471]carrying out its assigned missions, especially in limited war.
[5473](5) Similarly, the Navy version, when fully developed,
[5474]and when configured with the new long range air-to-air missile, will
[5475]markedly improve existing fleet air defense capability. "'
[5477]The Report itself did not express a preference for either proposal,
[5479]and indicated there was little to choose between the proposals. Both
[5481]‘proposals were certified by General LeMay and Admiral Anderson to
[5483]meet military requirements. My examination of the facts, in consultation
[5484]with my advisers, convinced me that, as compared with the Boeing pro-
[5485]posal, the General Dynamics proposal was substantially closer to a single
[5486]design, requiring only relatively minor modifications to adapt it to the
[5487]differing requirements of the Navy and the Air Force, and that it embodied
[5488]amore realistic approach to the cost problem. Accordingly, I decided to
[5489]select General Dynamics as the development contractor, since I concluded
[5490]that it was best qualified to design the most effective airplane that could
[5491]be produced at the least cost, in the least time, to meet our military
[5492]requirements. It should be unnecessary to add that no other considera-
[5493]tions entered into my judgment, but I wish to make that statement a part
[5494]of the record,
[5496]When I took office in January 1961, President Kennedy instructed
[5498]me to:
[5500]Docld: 324274709 Page 124
[5504]1. Develop the force structure necessary to our military
[5505]requirements without regard to arbitrary budget ceilings.
[5507]2. Procure and operate this force at the lowest possible
[5508]cost.
[5509]Following this guidance, we have made substantial increases in
[5511]both our nuclear and non-nuclear forces. The additions to our nuclear
[5512]forces have been designed both to strengthen our strategic retaliatory
[5513]forces:and to. increase théir flexibility by shifting the emphasis to those
[5514]weapon systems which have the best chance of riding out any kind of
[5515]nuclear surprise attack.
[5517]At the same time, we have substantially expanded our non-
[5518]nuclear forces -- ground, sea, and air -- so that we can cope with the
[5519]many and varied threats confronting us around the world. To insure
[5520]that our non-nuclear forces are properly equipped and supplied, pro-
[5521]curement of weapons, equipment, and ammunition has been vastly in-
[5522]creased, °
[5524]Concur rently with these increases in.our fighting strength we have
[5525]attacked the problem of costs on a wide variety of fronts. Because of
[5526]the great technical complexity of modern-day weapons, their lengthy
[5527]period of development, their tremendous combat power and their
[5528]enormous cost, sound choices of a limited number of major weapon
[5529]systems in relation to military tasks and missions have become the key
[5531]decisions around which much else of the Defense program revolves.
[5533]4
[5535]HW 50955 Docld:32424709 Page 125
[5539]In the past, the actual costs of major weapon systems have com-
[5540]monly increased from 300 to 500 percent over the costs estimated when
[5541]the program started, and in some instances more, Some of the reasons
[5542]for such overruns have been:
[5544]1, We have insisted that weapon systems meet pefform-
[5545]ance standards that go far beyond essential military requirements.
[5547]2. We have accepted unrealistically optimistic cost
[5548]estimates at the beginning of a program, only to find costs multiplied
[5549]many times during the program.
[5551]3. We have not sufficiently defined at the outset what
[5552]it is we are asking our contractors to develop. Here we have discovered
[5553]that it is frequently helpful to work with more than one contractor in
[5554]what we call a "program definition phase" before a development contract
[5555]is awarded,
[5557]4, We have too often employed inadequate and
[5558]unsatisfactory procedures to select major contractors, putting in-
[5559]sufficient weight on. .seagoned.experience in:theidesign and :prodiiction
[5560]of similar weapons. .
[5562]5. We have relied too much on cost-plus-contracts and
[5563]other contracting procedures which do not provide incentives to reduce
[5565]cost.
[5567]f
[5568]HY 50955 Docld: 32424709 Page 126
[5571]Within the Department of Defense, we have taken a number of steps to
[5572]attack these problems. A formal five-year cost reduction program has been.
[5573]launched, which should produce savings of at least $3. billion per year by the
[5574]end of fiscal year 1965. It has already produced savings that should amount
[5575]to $1.4 billion per year. We are shifting from cost-plus-fixed-fee to fixed
[5576]price and incentive contracts. We are studying ways to improve program
[5577]definition and cost estimates, using the resources of such non-péofit organiza-
[5578]. tions as the Logistics Management Institute as well as in-house resources.
[5579]At my request the problem of how we select. contractors. has been under
[5580]_ study for several months by a subcommittee of the recently established Defense
[5581]Industry Advisory Council, which represents a cross-section of America's
[5583]business and industrial leaders. Both the Council and we are convinced that our
[5585]current source selection procedures can be improved.
[5587]One way to reduce costs (and to increase reliability) is to insist that
[5588]weapon systems be developed that can be used by more than one Service, where
[5589]this can be accomplished without degradation of essential military requirements.
[5590]The advantages of one weapon ‘system over two are obvious. They result in
[5591]substantial savings not only in the development, test and production stages, but
[5592]throughout the life of the system in terms of logistic! support, ‘midinterrance,
[5593]training programs, and operations,
[5595]The. disadvantages of operating many different weapons systems can be
[5597]observed in the Navy and in the Air Force today. The Navy currently has a
[5599]HY 50955 Docla: 324274709 Page i237
[5601]e ®
[5602]rate of aircraft out of operation for lack of parts which is altogether too high.
[5603]The Air Force is maintaining a better operational rate but at a cost of excessive
[5604]spare parts ‘inventories. With the present rapid rate of technological change,
[5605]the Air Force has acquired a $2.2 billion inventory of spare parts that are already
[5606]obsolete and practically worthless.
[5608]When I became Secretary of Defense, I learned that the Air Force was
[5609]developing plans for a tactical fighter that would ultimately replace the F-105,
[5610]At the time, the Navy was designing a second tactical fighter to replace the
[5611]F4H in its fleet air defense role. These two planes would have many common
[5612]missions and require many similar operational capabilities, After consultation
[5614]with my military and civilian advisors, and independent study, I became con-
[5615]vinced that one tactical fighter could be developed that would meet both the
[5616]Navy and Air Force requirements, Accordingly, I directed that the Air Force
[5617]reorient its program, with Navy participation, to achieve the goal of a common
[5618]tactical fighter.
[5620]The concept of a major multi-Service weapon system is new.
[5621]I would be less than candid with you if I did not admit that the majority
[5623]of experts in the Nawy and Air Force said it couldn't be done, As late
[5625]HY 50955 Docld:32424709 Page 126
[5627]as the 22nd of August 1961, after the Navy and the Air ‘Force had been
[5628]working together for almost 8 months, it was reported to me by both
[5629]Services that development of a single TX aireratt to fulfill stated
[5630]requirements of both Services was not technically feasible.
[5632]While this attitude, based ori years of going separate ways,
[5633]was understandable, ‘Idid not consider it was a realistic approach,
[5634]considering the versatility and. capabilities that could be built into a
[5635]modern aircraft because of-advances in technology. ‘Iwas also
[5636]convinced that, if we could achieve’ a single tactical fighter, we would
[5637]save at least one billion ‘dollars, . in development, production, maintenance
[5638]and operating costa. In short, after study and review, I believed: that .
[5639]the development of a single aircraft of genuine tactical utility to both
[5640]Services in the projected time frame was technically feasible and
[5641]economically desirable, I directed that we continue to work toward
[5642]this objective. “Because this decision was peculiarly my own, I kept
[5644]myself fully advised of the development of the (FX as it progressed
[5646]over the succeeding 14 months.
[5648]HW 50955 Docld:32424709 Page 129
[5650]Since I consider it essential to a thorough understanding of
[5651]the. matter before you, I would like at this point to recount for you
[5652]in some detail the sequence of events which led up to the decision.
[5653]On 1 September 1961, I directed the Air Force to seek to develop ~
[5654]a single aircratt for. both the Air For ce. tactical mission and the .
[5655]Navy fleet air defense mission. ; From the outset; the emphasis :
[5656]was on development ofa weapons system that provided minimum .
[5657]divergence between the Navy-and.Air Force versions. My specific
[5658]guideline in this regard was! "Changes ‘to the air Force tactical a
[5660]' version of the basic aircraft to achieve the Navy mission shall |
[5661]be held to a minimum, " ‘This is a recurring theme throughout thei: -
[5662]procurement actions which followed. ee
[5664]Requests for proposals from aircraft manufacturers were |.
[5666]issued in October, 1961, and proposals ‘were submitted by six-firms a
[5668]two months thereafter. © — . |
[5670]A Source Selection Board was organized with members
[5671]appointed by the. Navy-and the Air Force, ‘and they’ we re instructed
[5672]to work jointly in evaluating the proposals, under the non-voting
[5674]chairmanship of the Commander of the Air Force Ae ronautical
[5676]Systems Division.
[5678]HW 50955 Docld:32424709 Page 130.
[5680]To assist the Source $élection Board, an Evaluation Group was -
[5681]established, consisting of approximately 235 Navy and Air Force
[5682]officers, advisors and consultants, divided into teams to make the
[5683]detailed analyses and to evaluate each of the proposals in the: areas
[5684]of technical design, operational effectiveness, logistics, management a
[5685]strength, production efficiency, and suitability for use on aircraft
[5686]carriers. | |
[5688]The findings of the Evaluation Group were submitted to the ‘Source
[5689]Selection Board. The Board's recommendations were reviewed by
[5690]appropriate commands within the: Navy'and the Air Force, ‘as well as ;
[5691]by the Air Council, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and the Chief a
[5692]of Naval Operations >» and finally, by the Secretaries of the Navy and ;
[5693]Air Force who made their recommendations to me. o ue
[5695]Of the six proposals conside red in December and January, those of
[5696]Boeing Company and Gene val Dynamics Corporation were determined by
[5697]the Evaluation Group to-be significantly bette r. : But it was recognized
[5698]that each of these designs would require substantial changes before it.
[5699]would be acceptable. | Although the Boeing design was given. the higher
[5700]rating in ope rational capability, ‘and General Dynamics was | given the.
[5701]higher rating in the technical area,. the Evaluat jon Group recom-
[5702]mended that study contracts -be awarded to both Boeing-and General
[5704]Dynamics, in order to modify their designs to meet the military
[5706]requirements. For éxample, Boeing's proposal had offered the General
[5707]10
[5709]HW 50955 Doclad: 32424709 Page 131
[5711]Electric engine which was found to be unacceptable, The senior
[5712]Navy member of the Evaluation Group stated that none of the designs
[5713]was acceptable without very substantial change.
[5715]A different view was expressed by the Source Selection Board
[5716]which recornmended that further work to achieve a satisfactory
[5717]design be conducted exclusively with Boeing. It recognized that
[5718]substantial changes had to be made to the Boeing design: a different engine
[5719]was required, the means of stowing missiles was unsatisfactory, the
[5720]radar equipment required revision, and feasibility of substituting
[5721]capsules for ejection seats had to be explored, The Source Selection
[5722]Board proposed that a letter contract be issued to Boeing for the
[5723]limited purpose of refining a design specification which would be
[5724]acceptable to the Navy and the Air Force. The Board's recommenda-
[5725]tion was concurred in by the Tactical Air Command, the Air Force
[5726]Logistics Command and the Navy Bureau of Weapons. The Air Force
[5727]Systems Command, however, which would have the over-all responsi-
[5728]bility for development of the aircraft, | recommended against the selection
[5729]of Boeing, and proposed the award of study contracts to both Boeing and
[5731]General Dynamics, as suggedted by the Evaluation Group.
[5735]HW 50955 Docld:32424709 Page 132
[5737]The Air Force Council, chaired by the Deputy Chief of Air Staff for
[5738]Operations, in the absence of the Vice Chief of Staff, with the concurrence
[5739]of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Air, also supported the Evalua-
[5740]tion Group, and recommended that study contracts be issued to-both companies
[5741]for continued competition for another 60 to 90 days. The Council recognized
[5742]that neither the Boeing nor the General Dynamics proposal, as submitted, 7
[5743]would meet the established military requirements. The Council felt that by
[5744]extending the compatition for an additional period “time and dollars are thereby
[5745]more apt to be saved than lost in the long run. " It considered that competition
[5746]should produce realistic cost estimates, further ‘as surance of the validity |
[5747]of the eventual choice, and, in all probability, an earlier final design. .
[5749]Agreeing with the Air Council's proposal, the Secretaries of the
[5750]Navy and Air Force recommended to ‘me that study eoatracts be. awarded.
[5751]to both Boeing and General Dynamics. They pointed out that: :
[5753]a. The proposals of these two companies were markedly
[5754]superior to the others and offered the best chance of being brought up
[5755]to stated Service requirements. | | |
[5756]b. The Services were unanimous in rejecting the General
[5758]Electric engine (on which ‘the Boeing design had been-based) because of
[5759]the low probability of its development in the time required, ‘since not
[5761]even a prototype existed at the time.
[5763]12
[5765]HW 50955 Docld:32424709 Page 133
[5767]c. The extension would permit the fuller use of the two designs
[5768]and provide the incentive for sharper competition from business and design
[5769]standpoints.
[5771]I approved the recommendations of the-Secretaries of the Navy and
[5772]Air Force, raising particular questions about the realism of the Boeing cost
[5773]estimates :
[5775]The two. companies submitted new proposals on April 2,, 1962,. and
[5776]the second evaluation was conducted in April and\May. The Evaluation
[5777]_Group.concluded that both contractors had done an excellent job in correct-
[5778]ing identified deficiencies, but neither design was acceptable to the Navy > .
[5779]from the standpoint of suitability for use on aircraft carriers and ability
[5780]to remain on station for adequate: periods of time.
[5782]-The diffe rence of opinion between the Navy and the Air Force emerged
[5783]more fully in the deliberations of the Source Selection Board, and overt:
[5784]shadowed consideration of the relative merits of the two companies, since
[5785]the Navy member of the Board took the position that neither the Boeing nor
[5786]the General.Dynamics design was acceptable to the Navy, and the endorse-
[5787]ments transmitted to the Chief of Naval Operations, and. by him to-the
[5788]Secretary of the Navy, recommended in. effect abandonment of the effort to
[5789]-achieve a. joint fighter. It is clear also that the Air:Force members of the
[5791]Source Selection Board preferred the Boeing: submission. The qualified,
[5793]13
[5795]HW 50955 Docld: 32424709 Page 134
[5797]os 8
[5798]concurrence of the Navy member must be viewed in the light of the
[5799]over-all Navy recommendation. As a matter of fact,. Admiral Anderson
[5800]stated in writing that he had ''no indication that Navy requirements can
[5801]indeed be met.'' Therefore, he. was of the opinion that it was premature
[5802]to state a firm recommendation at that time that Boeing be unequivocally
[5803]selected,"
[5805]The Secretaries of the Navy and Air Force advised me that, in
[5806]view of the joint nature of the program and the continued nonacceptance by
[5807]the Navy of either design (principally because of high gross weight and
[5808]wing loadings), the Source Selection Board had been directed to examine
[5809]courses of action which would correct deficiencies as specified by the
[5810]Navy. Minimum design changes were to be analyzed and the resulting
[5811]divergence between the Navy and the Air Force versions of the aircraft,
[5812]resulting from the elimination of those deficiencies, were to be determined.
[5813]Three weeks were suggested to accomplish the task. I concurred, emphasiz-
[5814]ing that acceptable Navy and Air Force versions were not to be created by
[5815]reducing the degree of commonality so far as to lose the savings inherent
[5816]ina joint program. |
[5818]At the end of the three-week period, both companies submitted proposals
[5819]which contained very substantial changes from previous designs. The Navy
[5820]member of the Source Selection Board remained unconvinced that either of
[5822]the new proposals met the Navy's requirements, The Board also noted that
[5824]14
[5826]HY 50955 Docld: 32424709 Page 135
[5828]the degree of divergence between the Navy and the Air Force versions
[5829]that would be. necessary to meet Navy specifications had not been
[5830]determined in the time available. Nevertheless, the Board recom-
[5831]mended, and the Air Council, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and
[5832]the Chief of Naval Ope rations proposed that a single contractor, Boeing,
[5833]should be selected at that point to undertake a continuing "design .
[5834]definition" phase. The expressed neéd for the continuation of the
[5835]definition process pointed up the fact that the purposes for which the
[5836]third evaluation were held had not been satisfied.
[5838]Following the second and third evaluations of the TFX, it
[5839]appeared to me not only that neither contractor was meeting Navy require -
[5840]ments, but also that my primary goal was not accepted or not fully under-
[5841]stood by the contractors or the Source Selection Board. That goal was to.
[5842]develop, if at all possible, one plane to meet the ‘needs of both the Navy.
[5843]and the Air Force.
[5845]Therefore, the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of the Air
[5846]Force directed that work be continued to establish detailed designs, from _
[5847]which they could better assess the probability of developing the respective
[5848]versions into an effective weapon system acceptable to both the Navy and .
[5849]the Air Force. They also directed that the obvious disparity between the
[5850]contractors’ cost proposals and the Air Force standards be reconciled.
[5852]' Lastly, they restated my intent to reduce. cost by maximizing similarities
[5853]15
[5855]HY 50955 Docld: 32424709 Page 136
[5857]in the Navy and Air Force versions, and by use.of common equipments
[5858]and structures,
[5860]To avoid any doubt as to the objective, I asked Deputy Secretary
[5861]of Defense Gilpatric to write to Boeing and General Dynamics explaining
[5862]fully my position, and asking both of them to rework their proposals in
[5863]accordance with our requirements. That letter of July 13, 1962,.
[5864]explicitly established three conditions that had to be met before any
[5865]contract would be awarded. These. were: | |
[5867]"l, Satisfaction of both Navy and Air:-Force that a significant
[5868]improvement to their tactical air capabilities is represented by the
[5869]winning design,
[5871]"2. Minimum dive rgence from a common design compatible
[5872]with the separate missions of the Air Force and Navy to protect the
[5873]inherent savings of a joint program.
[5875]"3, Demonstrably credible understanding of costs both for
[5876]development and procurement of the complete: TFX ‘weapon ‘system,,.which
[5877]costs must be acceptable in view of the capability added to our military
[5878]strength by the weapon system," |
[5880]These three conditions are vital. They are the yardsticks I used
[5881]in judging and weighing the two proposals | -- Boeing and General Dynamics.
[5882]They were constantly in my mind as I reviewed the Fourth Evaluation
[5883]Report. Rather than ignoring its advice, I relied heavily on its
[5884]comments and conclusions.
[5886]16
[5888]HY 50955 Docld: 32424709 Page i137
[5890]i | @
[5892]The two companies submitted their new proposals in September
[5893]1962, These proposals were reviewed by the Evaluation Group and the
[5894]Source Selection Board, which made its report on November 2.
[5896]At the risk of repetition, I want to read to you again the general
[5897]conclusions of the Evaluation Group which were restated verbatim by
[5898]theAir Council, with the concurrence of Admiral Anderson,. Chief of
[5899]Naval Operations, and General LeMay, Chief of Staff of the Air Force:
[5901]"(1) Both contractors have the capability to successfully
[5902]design and produce this weapon system,
[5904]'(2) Both designs are acceptable as initial development
[5905]design configurations to the using Agencies involved -- TAC and the Navy.
[5907]"(3) Both designs will require further design refinement,
[5908]and changes can be expected during the development period.
[5910]“(ay When fully developed, the operational tactical aircraft
[5911]will markedly improve the. capability of the Tactical Air Command in
[5912]carrying out its assigned missions, especially in limited war.
[5914]"(5) Similarly, the Navy version, when fully developed, and -
[5915]-when configured with the new long range air-to-air missile, will. markedly
[5916]improve existing fleet air defense capability.'' ‘
[5918]The Fourth Evaluation Report did not choose as between the contractors.
[5919]When I reviewed the report, I could see. why. The question was a very close one.
[5921]': In. the technical area, the Report evaluated the General Dynamics design
[5922]as having ''a better structural design, a simpler fuel system, a slight edge
[5924]in the flight control area and better proposed programs in the Personnel
[5926]17
[5927]HW 50955 Docld:32424709 Page 138
[5931]Subsystem and Aerospace Ground Equipment areas. The General Dynamics
[5932]design had an edge in supersonic dash capability and supersonic maneuvera-~
[5933]bility at altitude. It has a low radar cross section and an integrated
[5935]penetration aids system, For deceleration,. it uses dive brakes in ‘the
[5937]air and brakes on the ground, providing a conventional but limited
[5938]deceleration capability. The Boeing design has the edge in fe rry capability,
[5939]conventional-weapon carriagé;. loiter capability, and in landing perform-
[5940]ance, It has the advantage in low-altitude -maneuve ring capability. For
[5941]deceleration it uses a thrust reverser which offers an excellent
[5942]deceleration capability, but will require additional development effort."
[5944]In the operational area, the Boeing proposal received the higher
[5945]score, but the Report stressed that either design was considered acceptable
[5946]from the users' viewpoint.
[5948]In the "Production, Management and Cost'! area, General Dynamics
[5949]was rated higher than Boeing. ‘In ngcheduling, 4 General Dynamics ‘presented
[5950]the better program. It was ‘somewhat more detailed and better time phased,
[5952]In the "Logistics" area, which includes the functional elements of
[5953]maintenance, supply, transportation and procurement, the Boeing proposal
[5954]received a slightly higher rating over-all. |
[5956]It was clear that beth designs met the first condition prescribed in
[5957]Mr. Gilpatric's letter of July 13, i.e., satisfaction of both Navy and Air
[5958]‘Force that the designs represented significant improvement to their
[5959]tactical air capabilities. With this state of the record, the ‘degree to which
[5960]‘the two designs met the other two cardinal conditions became crucial. - You-
[5962]will recall that those two conditions were; (1) minimum divergence from a
[5964]18
[5966]HW 50955 Docld: 32424709 Page 139
[5969]common design; and (2) demonstrably credible understanding of costs.
[5970]It should be emphasized that the se two conditions would understandably loom
[5971]less important in the eyes of the Source Sele ction Board than operational
[5972]capability. These are conditions more properly the conce rn of those
[5973]charged by law with the over-all direction of our defense effort. They are
[5974]equally a part of my.determination of what is in the national ‘inte rest.
[5975]~ When I reviewed the Fourth Evaluation Report from the standpoint
[5976]of minimum dive rgence from a common de sign, Twas immediately struck
[5977]by the difference in approach adopted by the two contractors. | The Report
[5979]found. that General Dynamics proposed an airframe design that has a very
[5981]high degree of identical structure for’ the Navy and Air Force versions. .
[5982]On the other hand, the. Report estimated that in the two Boeing versions less
[5983]than half of the structural components of the wing, fuselage and tail were
[5984]the same. In fact the. Evaluation Group concluded that Boeing is, in effect, .
[5985]proposing two diffe rent airplanes froma structures point of view. | ‘The
[5986]same differences in approach were apparent in the larger number of
[5987]identical parts in the General Dynamics design. --a particularly crucial
[5988]point, since there are strong incentives in the course of the development
[5989]process to retain identity ‘of parts, while, on the other hand, small
[5990]divergences in the early stages tend to grow.as development proceeds.
[5992]In short, Boeing simply did not meet the fundamental requirement of
[5993]minimum divergence from a common design. No amount of peripheral
[5995]technical argument should be permitted to obscure this central and crucial fact.
[5999]HY 50955 Doclad: 32424709 Page 140
[6001]S a
[6003]It has been suggested by several of your committee staff in their role
[6004]as witnesses before the committee that much ado about nothing has been made
[6005]about the so-called issue of commonality. It has been suggested to you that
[6006]the only reason for common structures or common parts is so that money could
[6007]be saved by use of common tooling. Such a conclusion overlooks the basic pur-
[6008]pose of attempting to get one airplane instead of two, Two airplanes increase
[6009]costs at every stage beginning with development itself.
[6011]As the Fourth Evaluation Report stated, the design approach adopted by
[6012]Boeing would "require separate documentation, (drawings; loads, stress, flutter,
[6013]and fatigue. analyses; etc.); separate static, dynamic and fatigue test programs;
[6014]and more extensive developmental flight testing for the USAF and Navy versions,"
[6016]Separate production lines or unique production operations would be required
[6017]earlier in the production process, Supply and logistics problems become compli-
[6018]cated. It is evident that the less the divergence, the greater the savings in the
[6019]logistics drea.
[6021]These future savings are not susceptible of precise measurement, involving
[6022]as they do such factors as training, supply processes, future usage rates,
[6023]common technical manuals, and the. like.
[6025]If I had approved what was essentially two different airplanes, the prospects
[6026]of saving one billion dollar s would have evaporated. The issue of minimum diver-.
[6028]gence is fundamental. ‘The effort to attain the highest possible degree of commonality.
[6030]19
[6032]HW 50955 Docld:32474709 Page 141
[6035]lies at the heart of the entire TFX endeavor. My instructions on this point
[6036]were clear and consistent.
[6038]Another aspect of the Fourth Evaluation Report struck me as I reviewed
[6039]the report and consulted with my technical advisors, including Dr. Charyk,
[6040]who was then Under Secretary of the Air Force, and Dr. Brown, the Direc-
[6041]tor of Defense Research and Engineering. On the basis of my studies, dis-
[6042]cussions with my advisers, and my experience over the years in judging
[6043]development and production programs, it became clear to me that the
[6044]General Dynamics proposal was generally more straightforward in approach
[6045]than that of Boeing, although the General Dynamics design was fully “acceptable,
[6046]There were aspects of the Boeing proposal which, on their face, complicated
[6047]the development of the aircraft. Three problems in particular stood out in
[6048]my mind.
[6050]The first problem was Boeing's proposed use of engine thrust reversers
[6051]for in-flight deceleration, as well as for reducing ground roll after landing
[6052]touch down. ‘Te date, engine thrust reversers have never been used in flight
[6053]on operational fighter aircraft, nor have they ever been employed on super-
[6054]sonic aircraft. The only operational experience has been on subsonic commer-
[6055]cial jet transports and cargottype aircraft in which the engines are mounted on
[6056]outboard pylons underneath the wings. The Air Force does have one fighter
[6057]aircraft in which a research and development type installation has been made.
[6059]This is a single engine aircraft with the exhaust on the airplane centerline
[6061]20
[6063]HY 50955 Docla: 324274709 Page 142
[6065]a ®
[6066]and aft of the tail surfaces, The Boeing design uses two engines nestled
[6067]in the fuselage with their nozzles exhausting hot gases directiy alongside
[6068]the horizontal and vertical control surfaces. ‘The full effect of this hot
[6069]gas efflux is unknown. Assurance that longitudinal and directional stability
[6070]was not impaired could not be obtained without extensive flight tests, in
[6071]addition to considerable developmental wind tunnel testing. Since flight
[6072]testing cannot occur until late in the development phase, the Boeing design
[6073]would impose an added degree of risk in terms of meeting an early opera-
[6074]tional date for the TFX,
[6076]In addition, the Boeing thrust reverser feature, as the Fourth Evalua-
[6077]tion Report observed, adds considerably to the complexity and to the
[6078]development task associated with the engine. The full impact of this
[6079]problem could not be completely assessed because Boeing did not collaborate
[6080]in detail with the engine contractor, Pratt and Whitney, on its proposed thrust
[6081]reverser design and development.
[6083]Speed brakes, as proposed by General Dynamics, are historically
[6084]proven and. offer a more straight forward approach to meeting the stated
[6085]military requirement. Since speed brakes will, in themselves, exceed the
[6086]military requirement, the greater development risk of thrust reversers must
[6088]be weighed against their possible advantages, I want to point out that in
[6090]selecting the General Dynamics proposal we retain the option to apply
[6092]21
[6094]HY 50955 Docld: 32424709 Page 143
[6096]@ 8
[6097]thrust reversers to the aircraft design, but we have the flexibility: to under-
[6098]take this development on an exploratory basis concurrent with the overall
[6099]program, and terminable at will if costs should exceed anticipated benefits.
[6101]The second area in which Boeing's approach seemed likely to produce
[6102]more complicated development problems was its proposed power plant-instii-
[6104]_ lation with top~mounted inlets, The Fourth Evaluation Report commented that
[6105]| Boeing's location of the inlets on top of the fuselage, in combination with the
[6106]Boeing subsonic diffuser design, results in significant distortion of the air
[6107]flow at the engine face under most conditions, and prohibitive distortion during
[6108]high angle of attack operation. The Report noted that the effect of this
[6109]distortion on engine operation is virtually impossible to predict accurately,
[6110]and it can only be determined by actual testing of the engine in flight under
[6111]the distortion conditions delivered by the induction system.
[6113]In contrast, General Dynamics chose a conventional "straight through"
[6114]installation and inlet design which the Evaluation Group considered to be a
[6115]good selection for the TFX aircraft -- one which should give the best
[6116]trade-off in terms of performance, complexity and operational problems.
[6118]The top-mounted inlet does minimize the problem of foreign object
[6119]damage during ground operations, but there is no reason to believe that
[6120]the more conventional General Dynamics solution for this problem will not
[6122]be effective, and it avoids all of the other uncertainties of the Boeing approach.
[6124]22
[6126]HW 50955 Docld: 32424709 Page 144
[6130]The third area in which the Boeing approach involved greater
[6131]development risks was its extensive use of titanium in its wing carry-
[6132]through structure. We have had some experience in the use of titanium
[6133]in other Department of Defense weapon systems but mainly in heat’: ous
[6134]resistant applications and where high streés levels in thick plates are not
[6135]involved. The Fourth Evaluation Report observed that data concerning the
[6136]fatigue design properties of titanium, in the thickness Boeing proposed to use
[6137]in the wing carry-through structure, is very limited, and that this raises
[6138]the question of the advisability of using such thickness. The Report
[6139]further commented that the effect of temperature on structural details,
[6140]especially in the aluminum-to-titanium splice, can be expected to be
[6141]quite pronounced in producing metal fatigue, and the Report concluded
[6142]the Boeing fatigue test program showed lack of realism. In fact, Colonel
[6143]Gayle, the TFX System Project Officer, sent a letter to the competing
[6144]companies pointing out that, in the judgment of the Aeronautical Systems
[6145]Division, it was net advisable to use titanium in fittings which are subject
[6146]to heavy load, nor in heavy section areas because of a lack of data relating
[6147]to such use. If Boeing's proposed use of titanium did not work out and
[6148]heavier steel had to be used to replace the lighter metal, I realized that
[6149]not only would the operational capabilities of the Boeing plane suffer, but
[6150]additional costs would be incurred. : |
[6152]In contrast, the General Dynamics design solved the problem of wing
[6154]leading by the ingenious but simple expedient of providing a bolt-on extra
[6155]wing extension for the Navy version of the aircraft, instead of employing
[6156]relatively unusual applications.of an exotic metal.
[6158]23
[6160]HY 50955 Docla: 324274709 Page 145
[6162]These three examples point up for me a basic difference between the
[6164]everall philosophies underlying the two proposals. I should emphasize that
[6165]this difference in philosophy was not peculiar to the fourth phase of the
[6166]cempetition. Boeing had from the very beginning consistently chosen
[6168]more technically risky trade-offs in an effort to achieve operational
[6169]features which exceeded the required performance characteristics. This
[6171]approach was first exemplified in Boeing's choice of the undeveloped
[6173]General Electric engine for its initial submission.
[6175]‘Mr. Chairman, I do not mean to say that the Boeing approach posed
[6176]insuperable obstacles. On the contrary, I assumed that the problems
[6177]associated with the use of titanium, the use of thrust reversers in super-
[6179]_ sonic flight, and the high inlet ducts in the propulsion system are all
[6180]susceptible of solution. But my judgment, ‘reinforced by the Fourth
[6181]Evaluation Report, clearly indicated that these proposals would, in fact,
[6182]complicate the development problems, and would require a significantly
[6183]greater development effort te be expanded by Boeing in their solution.
[6185]But, significantly, Boeing proposed a development effort less than
[6186]that proposed by General Dynamics, and this in spite of the greater
[6187]complexity of the Boeing aircraft design, the greater divergence between
[6188]the Navy and the Air Force versions of the Boeing aircraft, and the lesser
[6189]experience which they possess in building high-density supersonic fighter
[6190]aircraft. hia anomaly caused me to examine other cost aspects of the
[6192]Boeing proposal.
[6194]24
[6196]HY 50955 Docld: 32424709 Page 146
[6198]I discovered additional evidence of unrealistic. cost estimates in the
[6199]Boeing proposal. In the judgment of the Evaluation Group, Boeing was
[6200]overly optimistic in its estimate of production tooling and was dangerously
[6201]low in estimating the manufacturing hours for both the development and
[6202]production phases. It appeared to me that Boeing simply did not appreciate
[6204]the complexities.of developing the TFX,. This is understandable because
[6206]a
[6208]Boeing's paSt experience in aircraft development and preduction has been
[6209]with bombers and transport aircraft -- experience which is largely inapplicable
[6211]to TFX estimating.
[6212]I therefore concluded that as to the third cardinal condition -- .
[6214]demonstrably credible understanding of costs ~- Boeing's proposal was
[6215]deficient. |
[6216]The Evaluation Team cost estimators recognized this fact. They
[6217]. attempted to correct for it by raising Boeing's costs to a level which in
[6218]their judgment was more accurate, They also made adjustments for the
[6219]General Dynamics cost estimates, which were considered deficient, but
[6221]not nearly so much so as Boeing's.
[6223]The Air Force estimators applied experience and other statistical
[6224]factors to the two proposals in an effort to arrive at ultimate costs. The
[6225]application of such factors is well suited to correction of an intentionally
[6227]low proposal, Where, however, the low proposal is the result of a. lack
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[6233]of appreciation of the complexity of a problem, the adjusted figures are
[6234]subject to substantial errors,
[6236]Expressed another way, the cost estimators of the Evaluation Group
[6237]‘could only assume an equal understanding of the problem by both Boeing
[6238]and General Dynamics, and then correct the two cost proposals more or
[6239]less mechanically. But the predictable result of the lack of appreciation
[6240]of the scope of a problem is delay and increased costs, the extent of which
[6241]is essentially unpredictable, and therefore not susceptible to analysis by
[6242]the application of statistical factors.
[6244]The question has been raised as to why costs are important when
[6245]both contractors were proposing fixed-price incentive contracts, There
[6246]are several reasons,
[6248]In a development. contract for a complex new weapon system like the
[6250]TFX, there inevitably will be engineering change orders. The cost of
[6252]change orders.is borne by the government. Consequently, when two pro-
[6253]posals both meet military requirements as did Boeing's and General
[6255]Dynamics', the proposal which seems likely to involve less change, with
[6256]consequent delays and increased costs, is to be preferred,
[6258]Aside from the maiter of cost over-runs induced by multiplicity of
[6259]change orders, there are other reasons why credibility of costs must be
[6261]carefully evaluated in a fixed-price incentive contract.
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[6267]| It is true that any costs over the contract ceiling are at the expense of .
[6268]the contractor and not the government, Nonetheless, if after several years
[6269]of effort it appeared that a contractor's costs were going to. be far in excess
[6270]of the ceiling, say, by several hundred million dollars, the contractor would
[6271]be.in very serious financial difficulty. He would then be motivated to take
[6272]every possible cost saving alternative, These alternatives could have a
[6273]serious adverse impact on the continuity and quality of the development.
[6275]In short, while incentive contracts are generally important to force
[6277]efficient management and obtain good estimating, where the dollar expendi-
[6279]‘ture is exceedingly large, as in the case of the TFX, it is imperative that
[6281]we make our own judgment of cost estimates. This is the only way
[6283]we can insure that a contractor, through optimism or misunderstanding, has
[6284]not imposed a ceiling on himself that could lead to serious degradation of
[6285]the development. This result would hurt the Department of Defense as well
[6286]as the contractor. —
[6288]Further, the proposed contract covered only the research and
[6290]development phase of the TFX program. A multi-billion dollar production
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[6296]@ a
[6297]program is to follow. There is no future price commitment for this pro-
[6298]duction program, In the event of very large over-runs on the research
[6299]and development contracts,. the price of uthe production program, which
[6300]for all practical purposes would be committed to the development con-
[6301]“ttactor, would probably be affected.
[6302]When we talk about the TEX program, we are talking National Defense.
[6303]This aircraft is to be an. important element in our militar y force; it must
[6304]: be'ope rational in proper quantities in the time span scheduled, The more
[6305]straightforward design of General Dynamics, an airframe contractor well
[6306]versed in the design, development, and production of supersonic fighters,
[6307]and assisted by Grumman, an outstanding designe Y, developer, and pro-
[6308]ducer of Navy carrier-based aircraft, offered a more dependable answer
[6309]to our needs,
[6310]Ihave detailed at some length the reasons underlying my judgment
[6311]‘that the General Dynamics proposal offered the better possibility of ob-
[6312]taining a satisfactory aircraft.on the desired time schedule and within
[6313]the dollars programmed,
[6314]Having studied the TFX question over many months, I met with Deputy
[6318]Secretary Gilpatric, Secretary Korth, and Secretary Zuckert early in
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[6325]November 1962, I found that their own views, arrived at independently,
[6326]coincided with mine. After several discussions we concluded:
[6328]First, that all the evidence showed that the TFX concept was a valid
[6329]concept that would markedly improve existing military capabilities of
[6330]the Navy and Air Force. We therefore decided.to move ahead with the
[6331]development of the TFX aircraft.
[6333]Second, our best judgment of the many facters involved let us to
[6334]the tentative conclusion that General Dynamics should receive the award.
[6335]Although I considered our judgment to be soundly supported on the broad
[6336]bases I have outlined, I agreed that Mr. Zuckert was to review the facts
[6338]again before we arrived at a final decision,
[6339]¢Having verified to our satisfaction our judgments, we.decided to
[6340]award the TFX development contract to General Dynamics.
[6341]There remains one more important aspect of this case which I
[6342]believe should be thoroughly understood, Fundamentally, we are
[6343]dealing with a question of judgment. Granted there are specific
[6345]technical facts and calculations involved; in the final analysis, judgment
[6347]is what is at issue.
[6348]In this case we are faced with a situation in which judgments are
[6349]pyramided upon judgments. First, we have the judgments of the competing
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[6356]contractors that an aircraft of particular design can be built at a given cost
[6357]within a specific time-frame. Next, we have the judgments of the Evaluation
[6358]Group regarding feasibility, and the degree to which the designs would or
[6359]. would not satisfy the stated requirements. Then the Source Selection Board,
[6360]using factors weighted by judgment, made a recommendation which appeared
[6361]to place greater emphasis on potential bonus factors in certain operational
[6362]areas, rather than on dependability of development and predictability of.
[6363]costs, This recommendation, understandably; was seconded by the Navy
[6364]-and Air Staffs, since these.officers are most vitally interested in obtaining
[6365]the ultimate in performance in individual weapons systems. On occasion,
[6366]this desire leads to the establishment of characteristics for weapons
[6367]systems which cannot be met within the time or funds available, and it
[6368]has frequently resulted in lowering operational effectiveness.
[6370]There is only one way I know to. minimize the compounding of error
[6371]that can occur through this pyramiding of judgment, and that way is to apply
[6372]the judgment of the decision-maker not only to the final recommendation,
[6373]but also to the underlying recommendations and facts. This I did to the
[6374]best of my ability. In doing so, I found it necessary to balance the promises
[6375]held out by competing contractors, against the hopes and aspirations of
[6376]military officers, and the limiting realities of economics and technology.
[6378]That I attach great importance to the principle of free competition
[6380]- is, I believe, demonstrated by my insistence that competition continue
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[6386]@ e
[6387]through the program definition phase of the TFX project. That I attach
[6388]great importance to the fulfillment of established military requirements
[6389]is, I believe, demonstrated by my refusal to terminate the program |
[6390]definition phase until I was satisfied that the. military requirements -of
[6391]both the Navy and Air Force had been met, That I attach great importance
[6392]to the recognition of economic and technological limiting conditions is,
[6393]I believe, demonstrated by my selection of General Dynamics as the
[6394]contractor that most clearly recognized the effects of these limitations
[6395].on the task to be achieved..-
[6396]-I do not feel that this is a case which presents a-civilian--military
[6397]conflict but rather one of placing emphasis ‘where it must be placed.
[6398]In the final analysis, judgments differed. In reaching my decision, I
[6399]considered the recommendations of my various military and civilian
[6400]‘advisors as well as-other available evidence, but I had the final
[6401]respon sibility. The basic judgments on my part which determined my
[6402]decision were:
[6403]- Both the General Dynamics and the Boeing designs
[6404]met stated military requirements and. would provide
[6405]significant improvements in combat capabilities of
[6406]_the Navy and the Air Force.
[6407]- The General Dynamics proposal resulted in
[6408]minimum divergence from a common design
[6409]compatible with the separate mission of the Navy
[6411]and Air Force, thus insuring the substantial savings
[6412]Sr
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[6416]6  g
[6417]and increased dependability inherent in.a joint
[6418]‘program.
[6419]_- The General Dynamics proposal reflected a more
[6420]realistic undérstanding of costs.
[6422]As Secretary of Defense my responsibilities were clear; the
[6424]decision was mine.
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