[1]Tie 104-10337-1 10337-10014)
[3]a
[5]| 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
[6][e)
[8]Lear ub. a eae ee ee hb EWSAL
[10]24 November, 1998
[12]Memo for the Record
[13]Subject: JFK Records Review - Lessons Learned
[15]The CIA's JFK Collection is made up primarily of
[16]records pulled together for the Warren Commission, House
[17]Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) and the -
[18]Assassinations Records Review Board (ARRB). It contains a
[19]significant amount of duplication and non-JFK related
[20]material. The current index is flawed and contains gaps.
[21]Release standards were liberal; basically only source
[22]identities and information, names of agents, employees under
[23]cover, Agency locations and foreign liaison activities were
[24]redacted. There is no evidence in the Collection to indicate
[25]that the Warren Commission conclusions were wrong.
[27]I. The JFK Act - --
[29]Mandated review and declassification projects can be
[30]two-edged swords. The JFK Act forced the Agency to review
[31]records that should have been opened years ago. The legal
[32]requirement to presume release,. backed up by an independent
[33]review, resulted in the opening of documents that clearly
[34]would not have been released under other programs. However,
[35]the Act and the Review Board created by the Act imposed un-
[36]realistic deadlines, inflexible standards and procedures
[37]which created a major drain on all Agency review resources
[38]and had an over-all negative effect on the Agency’ 's release»
[39]program.
[41]Unrealistic Deadlines: The release dates set by the
[42]Act did not take into account the start-up time and costs
[43](searches, inventorying and indexing) of a project of this
[44]magnitude, nor the time it would then take for a page-by-
[45]page review and- sanitization of classified documents. _ For
[46]example, initial indexing of the collection was done on a
[47]crash basis using overtime employees and resulted ina
[48]flawed database. The revising, re-indexing and updating of
[49]that database took several thousand man-hours and continues
[50]today.
[52]Mandated Procedures: NARA's and ARRB's interpretation
[53]of the law created a time-consuming, labor-intensive review
[54]process that meant an inordinate amount of time was spent by
[55]both the Agency and Board staff on issues which were
[56]marginal to the story and to processing decisions by the
[57]Board. For example:
[59]a. Under the JFK Act every piece of paper in the
[60]collection was considered a “unique” assassination record.
[61]The result is a staggering amount of chaff and duplication.
[63]13-00000
[69]For example, one cable was files and processed 58 times in
[70]the collection.
[72]b. The ARRB required that all sanitized documents be
[73]reviewed by the Board and that each postponement (deletion)
[74]be acted on individually. Even after the Board changed
[75]procedures and accepted staff recommendations instead of
[76]reviewing each document, the detailed tracking, recording
[77]and coding of every deletion within each document required
[79]_processing resources well beyond what would be considered
[81]reasonable for such a project. A most sanitized documents
[82]contained multiple deletions (one contained more than 1600
[83]deletions and many over 100).
[85]Inflexible Standards: The level of evidence required
[86]by the Board to postpone what was generally considered
[87]protectable information was extremely high and usually
[88]required docmentation of “current harm”. Defenses based on
[89]general principles such as official cover or sources ‘and
[90]methods were not acceptable. This required the Agency to
[91]dedicate significant resources to prepare evidence to
[92]support recommended postponements. Again, much time was
[93]spent on issues that were marginal to the JFK story. For
[94]example, several major evidence packages involving several
[95]offices and presentations by senior agency officers and
[96]officials were needed to secure Board agreement to protect
[97]Agency physical locations and names of employees and other
[98]persons not related to the JFK story.
[100]Three times during the six years of the project, including
[101]most of this past year, the JFK review effectively shut down
[102]all other aspects of the Historical Review Program and had
[103]to borrow additional resources from other offices and review
[104]projects to meet deadlines. The JFK review will continue to
[105]require a significant portion of HRP's resources through
[106]FY99.
[108]II. The Process
[110]There are a number of basic lessons from the JFK review
[111]that are applicable to other historical/systematic’ review
[114]* We need reviewers with broad Agency experience, which
[115]can be either managerial or substantive.
[117]* We need to establish early on what information is
[118]already in the public domain and address the issue of
[119]“official release” in the context of each project.
[121]* Develop a strategy/policy with the IROs concerning the
[122]release of information. Be smart about it; do not accept
[123]stonewalling by them on relevant information that can -be
[125]13-00000
[127]_in the last month of the project.
[129]released. At the same time, avoid confrontations with them
[130]on marginal or non-relevant information. ~
[132]* On-site Directorate reviewers are the most effective
[133]way to handle the internal coordination requirements of a
[134]large project. Without the DO's JFK team on site it would
[135]have been impossible to complete the JFK project.
[137]* Develop guidelines and processes for coordinating Third
[138]Agency documents; include other agencies in discussions; do
[139]not drop documents into the black hole of other agencies'
[140]FOIA offices without this advance discussion.
[142]* Maintain written,up-to-date, project-specific
[143]declassification guidelines. This is no small task. A
[144]“declassification guide” must be flexible; no guide can
[145]anticipate all the issues which will arise in.a review.
[146]After six years, we were still revising the JFK guidelines
[148]* In establishing deadlines, allow sufficient time to do
[149]a thorough, professional job as required by the project
[150]activities (see Unrealistic Deadlines above) .
[152]* Ensure we have adequate support people for routine
[153]processing tasks; declassification involves both tough
[154]substantive analysis--and a lot of routine processing.
[156]* _I£ ‘possible, inventory /index all materials before the
[157]review and processing begins. Experienced indexers are a
[158]must. Identification of duplicate documents should be a key -
[159]part of any inventory or index.
[161]III The Requests © .
[163](being drafted)
[165]Attachment I. [incomplete draft attached]
[167]Description of the JFK Collection
[169]Attachment II. {being drafted]
[171][statistical summary of collection including size and status
[172]of documents (RIFs, SANs, DIFs, NBR, etc.)]
[174]13-00000
[176]DRAFT yes
[177]BISU
[179]12 December, 1998
[180]Memo for the Record
[181]Subject: JFK Records Review Project and Lessons Learned
[183]The CIA's JFK Collection is made up primarily of
[185]records pulled together for the Warren Commission, House
[187]Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) and the
[188]Assassinations Records Review Board (ARRB). It contains a
[189]significant amount of duplication and non-JFK related
[190]material. The current index is flawed and contains gaps.
[191]Release standards were liberal; basically only source
[192]identities and information, names of agents, employees under
[193]cover, Agency locations and foreign liaison activities were
[194]redacted. There is no evidence in the Collection to indicate
[195]that the Warren Commission conclusions were wrong.
[197]I. Background (1992-1995)
[199]The setting up of the Historical Review Program by DCI
[200]Gates in early 1992 coincided with growing interest in
[201]Congress to require federal agencies to declassify records
[202]related to the assassination of President Kennedy. DCI Gates
[203]decided to start declassification process before Congress
[204]passed legislation:
[206]* testified before Congress on 12 May 1992. about CIA*s
[207]new openness policy and announced the declassification
[208]of the first folder of Oswald's 201 (also known as the
[209]pre-assassination file).
[211]* six boxes of the Oswald's 201 were reviewed and
[212]transferred to NARA by Oct. 1992.
[214]‘The John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection
[215]Act of 1992 (JFK Act) was signed 26 October 1992:
[217]* it called for Presidential-appointed Assassination
[218]Records Review- Board composed of non-government
[219]individuals;
[221]* established “a presumption of immediate disclosure”
[223]for records relating to the assassination.
[225]For first two years of its existence, the Historical
[226]Review Program focused primarily on the review of JFK
[227]assassination records:
[229]13-00000
[231]* there were two major releases of Agency records (August
[232]1993 and August 1994)of approximately 227,000 pages;
[234]* joint HRG/DO teams reviewed additional assassination
[235]related collections at National Archives (Warren
[236]Commission), the SSCI (Church Committee and the Ford
[237]Presidential Library (Rockefellow:- Commission) plus
[238]numerous referrals from other federal agencies (FBI,
[239]State, Army, etc.).
[241]Due to delays in the appointment of its members and the
[242]time required to hire and clear a staff, the ARRB did not
[243]actually begin reviewing documents until May 1995. It became
[244]clear in immediately that the ARRB would require the release
[245]of far more information than the Agency had released in the
[246]1992-94 review. In mid-1995 HRG began a re-review of the
[247]previously released sanitized documents:
[249]* approximately 80% of the 227, 000 pages release in
[250]1993-94 contained deletions
[252]* resources were taken from other projects and added
[253]to JFK project to meet Board's monthly deadlines.
[255]II. The JFK Act and the ARRB
[257]Mandated review and declassification projects can be
[258]two-edged swords. The JFK Act forced the Agency to review
[259]records that should have been opened years ago. The legal
[260]requirement to presume release, backed up by an independent
[261]review, resulted in the opening of documents that clearly
[262]would not have been released under other programs. However,
[263]the Act and the Review Board created by the Act imposed un-
[264]realistic deadlines, inflexible standards and procedures
[265]which created a major drain on all Agency review resources
[266]and had an over-all negative effect on the Agency's release
[267]program.
[269]Unrealistic Deadlines: The release dates set by the
[270]Act did not take into account the start-up time and costs
[271](searches, inventorying and indexing) of a project of this
[272]magnitude, nor the time it would then take for a page-by-
[273]page review and sanitization of classified documents. For
[274]example, initial indexing of the collection was done ona
[276]crash basis using overtime employees and resulted in a
[278]flawed database. The revising, re-indexing and updating of
[279]that database took several thousand man-hours and continues
[280]today.
[282]Mandated Procedures: NARA's and ARRB's interpretation
[284]‘of the law created a time-consuming, labor-intensive review
[286]process that meant an inordinate amount of time was spent by
[288]13-00000
[290]both the Agency and Board staff on issues which were
[291]marginal to the story and to processing decisions by the
[292]Board. For example:
[294]a. Under the JFK Act every piece of paper in the
[295]collection was considered a “unique” assassination record.
[296]The result is a staggering amount of chaff and duplication.
[297]For example, one cable was files and processed 58 times in
[298]the collection.
[300]b. The ARRB required that all sanitized documents be
[301]reviewed by the Board and that each postponement (deletion)
[302]be acted on individually. Even after the Board changed
[303]procedures and accepted staff recommendations instead of
[304]reviewing each document, the detailed tracking, recording
[305]and coding of every deletion within each document required
[306]processing resources well beyond what would be considered
[308]‘reasonable for such a project. A most sanitized documents
[310]contained multiple deletions (one contained more than 1600
[311]deletions and many over 100).
[313]. Inflexible Standards: The level of evidence required
[314]by the Board to postpone what was generally considered
[315]protectable information was extremely high and usually
[316]required documentation of “current harm”. Defenses based on
[317]general principles such as official cover or sources and —
[318]methods were not acceptable. This required the Agency to
[319]dedicate significant resources to prepare evidence to
[320]support recommended postponements. Again, much time was
[321]spent on issues that were marginal to the JFK story. For
[322]example, several major evidence packages involving several
[323]offices and presentations by senior agency officers and
[324]officials were needed to secure. Board agreement to protect
[325]Agency physical locations and names of employees and other
[326]persons not related to the JFK story.
[328]Three times during the six years of the project, including
[329]most of this past year, the JFK review effectively shut down
[330]all other aspects of the Historical Review Program and had
[331]to borrow additional resources from other offices and review
[332]projects to meet deadlines. The JFK review will continue to
[333]require a significant portion of HRP's resources through
[334]FY99.
[336]III. The Process and Lessons Learned
[338]There are a number of basic lessons from the JFK review
[339]that are applicable to other historical/systematic review
[340]projects:
[342]* We need reviewers with broad Agency experience, which.
[343]can be either managerial or substantive.
[345]13-00000
[347]ry
[349]* We need to establish early on what information is
[350]already in the public domain and address the issue of
[351]“official release” in the context of each project.
[353]* Develop a strategy/policy with the IROs concerning the
[354]release of information. Be smart about it; do not accept
[355]stonewalling by them on relevant information that can be
[356]released. At the same time, avoid confrontations with them
[357]on marginal or non-relevant information.
[359]* . On-site Directorate reviewers are the most effective
[360]way to handle the internal coordination requirements of a
[361]large project. Without the DO's JFK team on site it would
[362]have been impossible to complete the JFK project.
[364]* Develop guidelines and processes for coordinating Third
[365]Agency documents; include other agencies in discussions; do
[366]not drop documents into the black hole of other agencies’
[367]FOIA offices without this advance discussion.
[369]* Maintain written, up-to-date, project-specific
[370]declassification guidelines. This is no small task. A
[371]“declassification guide” must be flexible; no guide can
[372]anticipate all the issues which will arise in a review.
[373]After six years, we were still revising the JFK guidelines
[374]in the last month of the project.
[376]* In establishing deadlines, allow sufficient time to do
[378]a thorough, professional job as required by the project
[380]activities (see Unrealistic Deadlines above) .
[382]* Ensure we have adequate support people for routine
[384]processing tasks; declassification involves both tough
[386]substantive analysis--and a lot of routine processing.
[388]* If possible, inventory/index all materials before the
[390]review and processing begins. Experienced indexers are a
[392]must. Identification of duplicate documents should be a key
[394]part of any inventory or index.
[396]IV ARRB Requests for Additional Information and Records
[397](see attached draft)
[399]Attachment I. Description of the JFK Collection
[401]Attachment II. [being drafted-will be available 17 Dec a.m.]
[403][statistical summary of collection including size and status
[404]of documents (RIFs, SANs, DIFs, NBR, etc.)]
[406]13-00000
[408]va WG _ Arp
[409]: leg. doc”
[411]DRAFT: Section 27f, ARRB Requests for Additional
[412]Information and Records
[414]1. Unlike most declassification projects, the Agency’s
[415]involvement in the JFK Project was governed by the dictates
[416]of a Federal statute, the JFK Act, and the powers it vested
[417]in the Board it established -- the Assassination Records
[418]Review Board (ARRB). In particular, under Section 7, the
[419]Act armed the ARRB with the authority to dig for records and
[420]information, specifically:
[422]-+- (1) The Review Board shall have the authority .
[423]to act in a manner prescribed under this Act, in-
[424]cluding ‘authority to --
[428](C) (ii) direct a Government office to make
[429]available to the Review Board, and if necessary
[430]investigate the facts surrounding, additional
[431]information, records, or testimony from
[432]individuals, which the Review Board has reason
[433]to believe is required to fulfill its functions
[434]and responsibilities;
[438](F) hold hearings, administer oaths, and subpoena
[439]. witnesses. and documents. ;
[440]This substantial authority provided the“ARRB and its staff
[441]with almost unlimited access to Agency records and
[442]personnel. It also was the basis for a number of specific
[443]requests from the Board to the Agency for additional
[444]information, document searches and explanatory papers. HRP
[445]designated this ARRB activity, “Special Requests.” During
[446]its existence the ARRB sent to the Agency fifty-three
[447]special requests, CIA 1-16 and CIA-IR 1-37.
[448]2. Categories of Requests:
[450]“te
[452]13-00000
[454]Bey
[456]2
[458]Although each request had unique characterigtics,
[459]all began as a request by the Board or an ARRB staff mémber
[460]on behalf of the board for information. The requests fell
[461]generally into five broad categories as follows:
[463]a. Requests for access to basic information which
[464]would help the board understand the CIA, its organizational
[465]structure and how it operated around the time of the
[467].assassination which included: Requests for organizational
[469]charts, briefings, mission statements, etc.; review of over
[470]__._ histories of CIA offices and projects; a review of the
[471]so-called “Breckinridge files;" and, a search for an IG
[472]index of Oswald reports.
[474]b. Requests about methodologies which included: How
[475]cable traffic was handled at HQ during the relevant time
[476]period; the existence and use of the inter-agency source
[477]registry; and, the assignment and use of alias's pseudonyms,
[478]crypts, etc. ,
[480]c. Requests for subject specific matters which
[481]included: The Mexico City Station annual reports; the
[482]existence of DRE monthly reports; Oswald’s pre assassination
[483]files; and, a search for any documents or information
[484]detailing the Agency’s involvement in transporting and
[486]processing the Zapruder film. .
[488]d. Requests for project specific information and
[490]‘files, which included:-Requests for information and files on
[492]AMWORLD, QKENCHANT, an index to the HTLINGUAL materials, and
[493]the Mexico City electronic surveillance tapes.
[495]e. Requests for individual specific information
[496]and files, which included both CIA and CIA associated
[497]individuals and non-CIA individuals: Information on
[498]individuals with JMWORLD; detailed information on Sylvia
[499]Duran; a determination of the identify of a particular
[500]“George Bush;” and, the files on William Pawley.
[502]to
[504]13-00000
[506]* e
[508]at od a
[509]a
[511]3. How a Request was Worked Following receipt of a
[513]request and HRP tasking the responsible Agency component (s)
[514]to conduct a search, the materials found were first reviewed
[515]by HRP staff members before access was provided to the ARRB
[516]staff. ARRB staff then reviewed the documents and materials
[517]and identified those which it believed were relevant to
[518]their inquiry and these materials were placed in the normal
[519]queue to be reviewed and processed for release. However,
[520]the mere identification of materials did not equate to
[521]automatic release. Rather, if particularly sensitive
[522]information was involvéd, negotiations took place and, on
[523]occasion, a written statement about the materials was
[524]provided for release vice the actual document (s) .
[526]Ly. The Agency’s written responses to each request -
[528]either’ a letter or memoranda - included, of course, the fact
[530]the materials designated were to be processed for release
[531]according to then current guidelines. The ARRB staff then
[532]wrote its own version of the request, search, and response.
[534]Both of these are a part of the public record on this |
[536]project.
[538]Se. Lessons learned: A number of things surfaced as
[539]HRP worked to complete these requests which required
[540]considerable explanation, negotiation, and resolution.
[542]a. First among these was the fact there existed an
[543]outside Board which asked for informatidn and carefully
[544]monitored the responses (a very powerful external Board with
[545]subpoena authority), without doubt caused documents and
[546]information to be found and made available that would not
[547]have been provided to an internal declassification project.
[549]b. Second, for any large project such as JFK to be
[550]successful, there is an absolute requirement that each
[551]directorate and independent office identify two responsible
[552]persons -- a senior Management official who-can ensure that
[554]deadlines (particularly deadlines established by an external
[556]13-00000
[558]authority) are met; and, a senior focal point officex; who
[559]has the substantive knowledge and background to both” locate
[560]all relevant material and make decisions on its sensitivity.
[562]c. Third, the individuals identified and appointed
[563]in sub-paragraph “b” next above must be fully versed in the
[564]guidelines which pertain to each specific project. ‘They
[565]cannot rely on FOIA or other guidelines as to the depth of
[566]their searches or the conditions governing release/
[568]redaction/denial of materials.
[570]13-00000
[572]ATTACHMENT #1
[573]CIA’S JFK ASSASSINATION RECORD COLLECTION
[575]Oswald Files
[577]Pre-assassination “201” file ~approximately 40 documents that existed at the time of
[579]the assassination. Released in 1992 with minimal deletions.
[581]DO 201 File (Approximately 26,000 pages): Agency's primary file for documents dealing
[583]with the assassination or mentioning Oswald; the file is still active. Contains pre-
[584]assassination documents; materials collected after the assassination and during the
[585]Warren Commission investigation; Mexico City files, Garrison investigation materials
[586]plus other documents related to the assassination or Oswald received over the years. A
[587]microfilm copy of file, as it existed in 1978, was sequestered by the House Select
[588]Committee on Assassination (HSCA). ;
[590]The DO's original (record copy) 201 was transferred to HRG in early 1992; a
[591]declassified version was released in August 1993; it was re-released with fewer
[592]deletions in 1996 under the authority of the ARRB . Additional documents, filed into the
[593]201 after the its transfer to HRG, were released in September 1998.
[595]Office of Security File (2041 pages): Contained key Oswald documents, FBI
[596]investigative reports, newspaper clippings. This file, primarily duplicative of the 201,
[597]was reviewed by the HSCA, but a copy was not sequestered with the rest of the
[598]Agency’s “JFK” collection. The file surfaced as a result of an ARRB request in 1997. A
[599]declassified version of the file was releasedin 1998.
[601]DCD “A" File (41 pages): A microfilm copy of this Oswald file was in the sequestered
[602]collection.. The ARRB requested that the original file by reviewed for release.
[604]Marina Oswald's 201 file. A copy of this file from the sequestered microfilm collection
[605]was reviewed and released in 1994. The ARRB requested that the original fi file be
[606]reviewed for release by September 1999.
[608]The ARRB directed that the classified originals of all documents from the Oswald files
[609]be transferred to NARA for secure storage. These documents were transferred to
[610]NARA in October 1998.
[612]The Sequestered Collection
[614]At the end of its investigation, the HSCA directed that all materials (files,
[615]documents, memos, notes, tapes, etc.) collected or prepared in response to its
[616]investigation be sequestered. This included files made available for review, but not
[617]reviewed by the HSCA staff.
[619]JFK boxes 1-63 (hardcopy): These boxes are the core of the Agency’s JFK collection.
[620]They are the working files/materials of the HSCA staff and reflects the wide range of
[621]issues pursued by the Committee. In addition to Agency documents, they include
[623]13-00000
[625]approximately 30,000 pages of notes, letters and memos created by the HSCA or its
[626]Staff. The boxes are a combination of files on subjects and persons of interest to HSCA
[627]including documents prepared by the Agency as a result of the investigation, eight
[628]boxes of security files and Mexico City cable chrono files. The boxes contain a
[629]significant amount of duplication (most of the Oswald 201 documents appear multiple
[630]times in this part of the collection). A declassified version was released in August 1993,
[631]then re-released under ARRB in 1997. ‘
[633]JFK Microfilm (72 reels): These reels are copies of Agency files that were made
[634]available to HSCA staff. Although the HSCA interest usually focused on a small portion
[635]of a file, the Committee sequestered the complete file. The microfilm includes
[636]approximately 25 reels of 201 files, 6 reels of Office of Personnel files, 14 reels of
[637]Anti/Castro - Cuban exile material, extensive files on Nosenko and operational and
[638]production files from Mexico City. The microfilm also contains copies of all the Oswald
[639]files except for the security file.
[641]DCI Morning Meeting Minutes
[643]This file contain 442 excerpts from the minutes of the DCI’s Morning Meetings
[644]that refer to JFK assassination and related issues and investigations. The initial search
[646]for the minutes was in response to an FOIA. The material was turned over to HRG in
[648]1993 for review and inclusion into the Collection.
[650]Russ Holmes’ Working Files (19 boxes)
[652]Russ Holmes was a DO officer initially assigned to work on JFK assassination
[653]records in the mid-70s. He was one of the Agency’s liaison officers with the HSCA
[654]during its investigation and subsequently became custodian of HSCA sequestered
[655]collection. He continued in this role until 1992.
[657]As the focal point for JFK related requests, Russ Holmes created a JFK
[658]reference file know as the “Ancillary Collection” (13 boxes). The contents are primarily
[659]duplicative (approximately 80%) of material found in Oswald's 201 and in the
[660]sequestered collection, but organized by subjects and requests. The collection contains
[661]some non-related material reflecting Holmes’ involvement in other FOIA, etc. requests.
[662]There were an additional six boxes of unorganized reference material and files from his
[663]office transferred to HRG when he retired. These 19 boxes became know as the “Russ
[664]Holmes Working Files” and were declared assassination records as a collection by the
[665]ARRB. Non-duplicative records from this collection were released in September 1998.
[666]The duplicative material is currently being reviewed and will be transferred to NARA in
[667]early January 1999.
[669]LA Division JFK Task Force Files
[670]The survey undertaken in response to Executive Order HEHE located seven
[672]boxes of DO Latin American Division continuing JFK Task Force files and related Cuban
[673]material. The ARRB staff reviewed the boxes; the non-duplicative JFK Task Force
[675]13-00000
[677]documents and selected documents from the Cuban material were designated as
[678]assassination records. 1637 pages from these boxes were transferred to NARA in
[679]October 1998.
[681]New assassination Records -- “M” [Miscellaneous] Series
[683]The ARRB submitted 53 numbered “Requests for Additional Information and
[684]Records” (CIA-# and CIA-IR-# series) plus many informal requests on individuals and
[685]subjects in their search for additional assassination records. Theses requests
[686]generated several 100 additional assassination records including 185 audio tapes from
[687]the Mexico City telephone taps. Additional material related to the JFK Act including DO
[688]cables to the field and working files of the HRP project officer were declared
[689]assassination records in the final actions of the Board. Over 4500 pages and 17 tapes
[690]have been reviewed and prepared for transfer to NARA. The remaining records and
[691]tapes are scheduled for completion by September 1999,.
[693]13-00000
[694]oO CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
[695]RELEASE IN FULL
[696]2000
[698]JFK Assassination Records Collection Act
[700]Five year Effort; Estimated 100 person years expended
[701]Extraordinary Authorities/ Access/ “non Precedent Setting Releases”
[702]Processed over 14,000 CIA documents upon which the Board took
[703]direct action.
[705]Transferred to the National Archives over 100,000 redacted pages for
[706]the JFK Collection.
[708]Prepared a Declaration of Compliance with the Act, with a detailed
[709]accounting of CIA actions in response to the Board’s requests.
[710]Negotiated a detailed Memorandum of Agreement among CIA, the
[711]JFK Board and the National Archives regarding the disposition and
[712]processing of all documents resulting from the five year review.
[713]“The Review Board considered the CIA’s compliance with the JFK
[714]Act....to be one of [the Board’s] highest priorities.” It is particularly
[715]significant that the board fully accepted the Agency’s Declaration of
[716]Compliance and reported favorably on the Agency’s activities in
[717]response to the Board.
[719]During FY 1998, compliance with the legal requirements of the JFK Act
[720]absorbed the preponderant portion of HRP resources. HRP completed necessary
[721]coordination with the JFK Assassination Records Review Board on behalf of the
[722]Agency, an ongoing process since FY 1994. HRP provided a central Agency
[723]focus for a process which:
[725]Coordinated with Board Staff on relevancy and classification on Toughly
[726]250,000 pages (many duplicates) :
[728]Processed over 14,000 CIA documents upon which the Board took direct action.
[730]Transferred to the National Archives over 100,000 redacted pages for the JFK
[731]Collection.
[733]Prepared CIA’s Declaration of Compliance with the Act, a detailed accounting
[734]of CIA actions in response to the Boards requests.
[736]Negotiated a detailed Memorandum of Agreement among CIA, the JFK Board
[737]and the National Archives regarding the disposition and processing of all
[738]documents resulting from the five year review.
[740]The Board’s report of 30 September 1998 states that “The Review Board
[741]considered the CIA’s compliance with the JFK Act....to be one of [the Board’s]
[742]highest priorities.” It is particularly significant that the board fully accepted the
[743]Agency’s Declaration of Compliance and reported favorably on the Agency’ s
[744]activities in response to the Board.
[746]13-00000
[748]JFK Act -- Process
[750]Scope/Deadlines/Decisions defined by law and outside Board.
[751]Focal Point (HRP) Serves Primarily as: (1) Moderator _
[752]between Board and Components, (2) Bookkeeper, (3)
[753]Consistency Keeper.
[755]Everything reviewed by Focal Point (HRP) and the appropriate
[756]component (Often many times). ;
[758]Components often take strong initial position but recede in
[759]face of strong arguments.
[761]Senior Agency Managers unaware of intricacies of the Process
[762]unless problems come up.
[764]Exceptions: Issues Taken to Board by senior management:
[765]Cover, Employee Names, Facilities Stations.
[767]Without making a value judgment on the merits of the JFK Act, it is possible to
[768]characterize the process which the Act dictated for CIA.
[770]The scope/deadlines and decisons were defined in the law and by the
[771]Assassination Records Review Board, an outside body. Over the course of the
[772]history of this effort (5 years), CIA, as did other agencies, developed (and
[773]redeveloped) processes and responses to the Board. For the most part the
[774]detailed work by the Staff was at a level which did not involve senior managers
[775]unless a major problem arose.
[777]When problems did arise, Senior Agency officials were asked to make
[778]presentations to the Board and, in all cases, consensus was achieved. No issues
[779]from CIA had to be appealed to the President, the formal procedure in the Act
[780]for resolving differences between Agencies and the Board.
[782]13-00000
[784]JFK Lessons Learned
[786]¢ Statutory Mandates are Not Efficient
[787]— Requirements to deciassify All drives out focus on important -
[788]— Standards for Declassification are Invariably Different
[789]— Projects of equal merit without a statute are orphaned .
[790]¢ Structure and Planning
[791]— Good Communications with Oversight Body
[792]~- Expertise in Subject matter and Information Management
[793]— Strategy, Concepts and Policy known and Understood:
[794]© Guidelines (flexible),
[795]¢ Deadlines (reasonable),
[796]¢ Responsibilities
[797]~ Understanding of Final Product Desired:
[798]* Media, Databases, indexes, etc.
[799]© Support of Senior Management
[801]® Our experience is that statutory mandates such as the JFK Act are very inefficient. The specific
[802]requirements of the act, including Board administrative decisions, required us to :
[803]* Address all possibly related documents, no matter how insignificant.
[804]* Engage in lengthy negotiation processes over an almost endless number of documents.
[805]* Establish databases for management of the documents and workflow
[806]¢ Treat documents in ways different from all other release programs. stat did A peat Su wth. sft
[808]* Postpone plans for systematic declassification on other programs forsake vrissine legal
[809]mandate.
[810]* Our expectation is that there will be more of such mandates, including the recently enacted Nazi
[811]War Crimes Disclosure Act. Similar proposals are under consideration for human rights violations in
[812]central america. What we have learned from our JFK experience is that:
[814]* We need to remain in very close coordination with the Oversight body to assure that we are
[815]not going down the wrong street and will have to repeat efforts.
[817]* We have found that annuitants “who know the territory” can be extremely valuable as a
[818]resource for finding and understanding the senstitivity of material.
[820]* We know that we have to organize within the Agency and to gain agreement early on with
[821]regard to strategies for managing the effort, including agreement on what the final product is to
[822]be and how we are to get there.
[824]* We also need to keep senior management attention on what we are doing so that they are not
[825]surprised at the end, which not only causes delays in an orderly process but can lead to
[826]significant misunderstandings between senior participants.
[828]¢ We are trying to apply these lessons learned to our planning for the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure
[829]Act. ;
[831]700000
[833]OIM 99-0281
[834]29 October 1999
[836]MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Information Review Group, OIM
[838]FROM: Charles A. Briggs
[839]JFK Declassification Project, OIM
[841]SUBJECT: _ The JFK Declassification Experience
[843]1. My assumption in preparing the attached is that
[844]I was asked because: a) for seven-plus years I've been.
[845]involved in the project; and b) my past Agency assign-
[846]ments, including being the first DO Information Review
[847]Officer, gave me the opportunity to see declassification
[848]from many vantage points: from a legalistic directorate-
[849]oriented, either-or standpoint (taking full advantage of
[850]allowed exemptions), to a "corporate" Agency-wide strategy
[851]to foster credibility while protecting secrets that should
[852]remain secret. My comments and conclusions reflect that
[853]experience and do not necessarily reflect the views of HRP
[854]management.
[856]2. Historically, the Deputy Directors have not
[857]paid much attention to information management - unless
[858]there's a problem. Then the approach has been: what went
[859]wrong; who's to blame; how can we ensure that this doesn't
[860]happen again; what lessons have we learned? What this JFK
[862]_ experience reiterates is the need for a proactive, not just
[864]reactive, flexible strategy, with corporate Agency direction
[865]through the Deputies to their Information Review Officers.
[866]And the IROs, who, in essence, determine credibility and
[867]resource impact, should be supergrades, with experience
[869]in at least two directorates. Because information release
[870]has become a major management issue, the Executive Director
[871]is the obvious officer to ensure consistent and informed
[872]implementation of release policy.
[874]AIUO When Separated CL BY: 0611637 / f
[875]from Attachments CL REASON: 1.5 (d)
[876]: DECL ON: x5
[878]DRV FRM: LIA 2-82
[880]13-00000
[884]SUBJECT: THE JFK DECLASSIFICATION EXPERIENCE
[886]3. Considerable skepticism in the public, the media,
[887]and, unfortunately, the Congress results from the in-house
[888]conclusion that denial is justifiable in the absence of
[889]“official acknowledgment" of Executive Branch information,
[890]even though such information is already in the public
[891]domain, from senior Agency officials' publications,
[892]Congressional investigations, books by former Cabinet-level
[893]NSC members, even Presidents. This inflexible legal
[894]strategy may win the battle and lose the war. Lawsuits are
[895]a lot more expensive than negotiation.
[897]4. The Agency Task Force that in 1992 considered
[898]some of the aspects of DCI Gates' “openness" philosophy
[899]did not have the benefit of the JFK experience. I suggest
[900]that a senior-level panel be established to consider an_
[901]objective look at the need for continued classification
[902]of generic versus specific sources and methods information,
[903]particularly that already in the public domain and when
[904]dealing with matters of high public or historic interest.
[905]HR 70-14, referring as it does in paragraph e.(4) to
[906]"Guidelines for Declassification” in Executive Order 12356,
[907]does not promote the tactical approach which is suggested
[908]in the Comments section on page eight of the attached.
[910](Setpete AB ee?
[913]13-00000
[915]_SECRET™
[916]SUBJECT: THE JFK DECLASSIFICATION EXPERIENCE
[918]DA/OIM/IRG/SCD/CABriggs:bkh/31835 (29 Oct 99)
[919]s:/oim/fo/jim/hrp/jfk/C.B. JFK Declass Exp.doc
[921]Distribution:
[922]Original - Addressee, w/atts
[923]1 - C/IRG/SCD, w/atts
[924]IRG/SCD/HRO, w/atts (Harrelson)
[925]SCD Chrono, w/atts
[926]- SCD Subj, w/atts
[928]1
[929]1
[930]1
[932]13-00000
[934]OIM 99-0282
[935]29 October 1999
[937]MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Information Review Group, OIM
[939]FROM: Charles A. Briggs
[940]JFK Declassification Project, OIM
[942]SUBJECT: The JFK Declassification Experience
[944]1. (AIUO) BACKGROUND: The impact of the JFK
[945]declassification law on Agency resources and information
[946]release decisions was dramatic and to the DO, traumatic. ~The
[947]resource trauma stemmed from the unanticipated number of years
[948]required to complete the project. In a memorandum for the DCI
[949]dated 11 June 1993, the then-Director of the Center for the
[950]Study of Intelligence outlined a plan for implementing the
[951]“openness philosophy” espoused by both DCIs Gates and Woolsey
[952]through a series of “Cold War Declassification” projects. He
[953]noted that priority, by virtue of a Congressionally-mandated
[954]‘deadline of 22 August 1993, had been given to declassification
[955]of the JFK collection; however, he said, “with the end of the ©
[956]JFK activity in sight,” resources could be applied to the
[957]other projects. Six years later {actually seven since the
[958]project got underway), we are almost finished.
[960]2. (AIUO) The substantive, versus administrative,
[961]trauma stemmed from the fact that the JFK Act superseded
[962]all other existing laws, including FOIA, the Privacy Act,
[963]the DCI’s authorities, as well as Executive Orders and -
[964]Regulations.! The Act presumed release. It did allow for
[965]appeal but only to the President from the DCI. It allowed
[967]“postponements” but only if clear and convincing evidence
[968]was presented for each requested postponement and that
[969]release would demonstrably impair the national security.
[970]The net effect was the release of names, crypts, pseudos,
[971]methods, station locations (within specified dates), file
[972]identifier numbers, and tradecraft generally, which are
[973]protectable under the other laws - and which the Agency had
[975]1 See OGC-92-5325, 14 Dec 92 and OGC-94-52916, 19 Sep 94 (Attachment B)
[977]AIUO When Separated CL BY: (0611637/
[978]from Attachments . CL REASON:  1.5(d)
[979]DECL ON: x5
[981]DRV FRM: LIA 2-82
[983]13-00000
[985]SUBJECT: The JFK Declassification Experience
[987]learned to live-with (See Appendix A for the Assassination
[988]Records Review Board (ARRB) “Standards For Review” and “Key
[989]Distinctions Between Those Under FOIA, Executive Order 12356
[990]and the JFK Act,” with examples).
[992]3. (U) Finally, a Presidentially-appointed
[993]assassination review board (the ARRB) had the final say
[994]both on postponement and on relevance, subject only toa
[995]successful DCI appeal to the President. Although a few
[996]appeals were considered, particularly in the early period,
[997]none was made.
[999]4. (U) The JFK-Act called for each agency to review
[1000]and transfer its relevant material to NARA by 22 August 1993.
[1001]Thus, a.significant set of materials was transferred from
[1002]CIA to NARA in 1993, reflecting CIA’s then-current judgment
[1003]on the redactions permitted. Subsequent Board reviews and
[1004]ARRB staff inquiries resulted in the addition of material to
[1005]that original set of documents, as well as adjustments to the
[1006]original set, to reflect Board actions - generally to release
[1007]more information. Although many documents have been adjusted
[1008]or added to the collection, requiring substantive HRG and DO
[1009]reviews as well as administrative actions, the net number of
[1010]pages in CIA’s JFK Collection at NARA is about 260,000.
[1012]SIZE AND NATURE OF THE COLLECTION
[1014]5. (U) The material requiring line-by-line review
[1015]included 17 boxes called the Oswald 201 File; 64 boxes called
[1016]the “Segregated Collection” File, containing those documents
[1017]made.available to the House SubCommittee on Assassinations
[1018](HSCA) during its 1978 investigation; 23 boxes of HSCA
[1019]referrals - staff notes in longhand and type, draft sections
[1020]of the HSCA final report, correspondence on HSCA letterhead,
[1021]trip reports - anything referred to us by the National
[1022]Archives (NARA) for review of possible Agency equities;
[1024]19 boxes called “The Holmes Collection” - a reference
[1025]collection used by the then-DO focal point for FOIA and other
[1027].JFK queries, Russell Holmes; Presidential libraries material,
[1029]Church Committee and Rockefeller Commission testimonies,
[1030]National Security Council papers, PFIAB Minutes and other
[1031]Community papers made available through the ARRB staff; and
[1032]13 boxes called “Miscellaneous,” including follow-on
[1033]questions from the ARRB, a previously overlooked Latin
[1034]American Division working file, DCI calendars, some DI/OCI
[1036]2 .
[1038]_SEcKET
[1040]13-00000
[1042]SUBJECT: The JFK Declassification Experience
[1044]“Dailies.” Box 64 of the “Segregated Collection” consisted
[1045]of 72 reels of microfilm of complete files from which the
[1046]material reviewed by the HSCA staffers was drawn: CIA staff
[1047]personnel and security files; a duplicate Oswald 201 file;
[1048]26 reels of 201 files on Cubans, Russians, and Americans
[1049]linked with Oswald, the JFK assassination, and the several
[1050]investigations; DO project history files, and so on.
[1052]6. (AIUO) Included were printed text, almost illegible
[1053]Thermofax, photographs, computer listings, typed 3X5 cards,
[1054]buckslips, routing sheets, handwritten scraps - every
[1055]imaginable form of documentation, with a tremendous amount
[1056]of duplication, in one instance, 54 copies of a Mexico City
[1057]cable. Every one of these pieces of paper had to be handied
[1058]according to NARA instructions, as a unique document for
[1059]inclusion in the NARA collection for public access and with
[1060]an Identification Aid for research assistance and retrieval.
[1061]Among other things, the collection reflected little attention
[1062]to procedures propounded by NARA itself for Records
[1063]Management, including destruction of duplicate copies.
[1065]7. (AIUO) The pressure to meet an initial Congress-
[1066]ionally-mandated release date of 22 August, 1993 with the
[1067]NARA~-required Research Identification Forms, resulted in a
[1068]crash effort at indexing done, mainly, by individuals on
[1069]loan from the directorates on an overtime basis and generally
[1070]unfamiliar with the collection and the subject matter. Thus,
[1071]a major factor in inconsistent redacting of multiple copies
[1072]of the same document in different boxes was a function of the
[1073]quality of the indexing and the effort of the reviewers to
[1074]cope, with constantly changing guidelines. Inadvertent
[1075]release was inevitable.
[1077]THE REVIEW PROCESS
[1079]8. (AIUO) The majority of the reviewers were
[1080]independent contractors with many years of experience,
[1081]in some cases senior management experience in at least two
[1082]directorates. Two HRG reviewers had been Information Review
[1083]Officers themselves as supergrades, one in the DO, the other
[1084]in the DA. After the HRG review with suggestions for release
[1085]in full or with rédactions, the documents went to a DO review
[1086]team. The DO agreement or disagreement was reflected on each
[1087]document, and the package was returned for a senior-level HRP
[1088]review prior to forwarding to the ARRB.
[1090]13-00000
[1092]SECRET
[1094]SUBJECT: The JFK Declassification Experience
[1096]9. (AIUO) As complicated and frustrating as the
[1097]process was, it wouldn’t have worked at all without the on-
[1098]site presence of the DO team with their link to DO/IMS and
[1099]the area divisions in Headquarters. Not surprisingly, the
[1100]DO Headquarters tended to use the familiar FOIA standards,
[1101]under which much more information could be withheld than was
[1102]defendable under the JFK law. A major part of the JFK story
[1103]was Oswald’s trip to Mexico City; it took several months for
[1104]the DO to agree to allow acknowledgment of the existence of
[1105]a station in Mexico City and many more months to release the
[1106]name, pseudo, and tenure of the chief of station -
[1107]information, except for the pseudo, long since in the public
[1108]domain. — _
[1110]10. (AIUO) Another long time debate concerned
[1111]acknowledgment of teltap and photo surveillance by the.
[1112]Mexico City Station on the Soviet and Cuban embassies and
[1113]consulates - both discussed in open literature but disguised
[1114]as unidentified sensitive source materials in the Warren
[1115]Commission report, along with a cropped photo and transcripts
[1116]of telephone conversations that came to the station from
[1117]somewhere. One issue, for a long time, was acknowledging
[1118]that the teltaps were station activities. The ARRB insisted
[1119]on nearly total release of Mexico City Station traffic,
[1120]history, personnel, and project approvals because Oswald’s
[1121]trip to Mexico City remained one of the most controversial
[1122]conspiracy theory aspects of the JFK story. Proof of
[1123]Oswald’s presence there, of his contact with the Soviet
[1124]and Cuban embassies and consulates, and the reasons
[1125]therefore, of the station’s unfamiliarity with him prior
[1126]to the assassination became evident through release of the
[1127]detailed information on the teltap and photo operations.
[1129]11. (AIUO) After the ARRB staff received the Agency
[1130]reviewed material, discussion of the validity of the
[1131]deletions (the “postponements”) occurred. In the early
[1132]stages there was a tendency for the Agency Information Review
[1133]Officers in the directorates to deny rather than release, to
[1134]test using FOIA standards until challenged, then back off.
[1136]In a couple of instances, assertions were made that the
[1137]information that the ARRB said should be released was so
[1138]sensitive that an appeal to the President would be made - but
[1139]it wasn’t. The net result of the deny-until-pushed approach
[1140]was an absence of credibility, leading the ARRB to include
[1141]the following statement in its Final Report to the President
[1142]on 30 September 1998:
[1144]CRET
[1146]13-00000
[1148]_ SECRET
[1149]SUBJECT: The JFK Declassification Experience
[1151]“A small number of CIA staff officers, almost
[1153]exclusively in the Directorate of Operations,
[1155]unnecessarily impeded the process and damaged
[1157]the Agency’s interests by resisting compromise
[1158]with all-or-nothing positions.”
[1160]12. (AIUO) As time passed and both Agency and ARRB
[1161]staffers became better educated in attempting the balance
[1162]between the public interest and the legitimate need for
[1163]secrecy, credibility improved, the ARRB members delegated
[1164]the negotiation process to the staff. Previously; every
[1165]postponed word, phrase, or paragraph had to the approved _
[1166]by the Board. Toward the end, only remaining disagreements
[1167]were passed by the staff to the Board.
[1169]THE ISSUE OF RELEVANCE
[1171]13. (AIUO) The ARRB, under the law, determined
[1172]relevance of file material - the Agency could not do so
[1173]although it could and did, eventually quite successfully,
[1174]negotiate. Because of the impact of the Oliver Stone movie
[1175]“JFK,” reflecting a 70-80% public view that the Warren
[1176]Commission conclusion that Oswald acted on his own was wrong,
[1177]the ARRB pursued all the major conspiracy theories. Thus,
[1178]Agency files on the USSR’s handling of American defectors,
[1179]entry and departure controls on foreigners, alien employment
[1180]and marriage with Soviet citizens, and, particularly, KGB
[1181]interest in Oswald, and Nosenko’s claim to have reviewed
[1182]Oswald’s KGB file in Moscow were declared relevant - as_was
[1183]the whole Nosenko bona fides issue. Agency contact with the
[1184]Mafia to arrange for Castro’s assassination, not known to the
[1186]. Warren Commission, were obviously relevant and, by extension,
[1187]assassination as an Agency activity was considered relevant -
[1188]hence, all such testimony before the Church Committee had to
[1189]be reviewed. Of particular interest was the plot against
[1190]Lumumba because of the involvement of the former Chief of the
[1191]Technical Services Division, which division was also involved
[1192]in the Castro assassination planning.
[1194]14. (U) The major conspiracy theory of interest
[1195]to the Board concerned Cubans: either alleged Castro
[1196]involvement because of his awareness of plotting against
[1197]himself or Cuban exiles, furious with JFK for the Bay of Pigs
[1198]failure. Thus, all files on Agency support to the many Cuban
[1200]5
[1202]_SECRET
[1204]13-00000
[1206]a
[1208]_-SECGRET
[1210]SUBJECT: The JFK Declassification Experience
[1212]exile groups and CIA involvement in Project MONGOOSE were
[1213]declared relevant. Hundreds of JMWAVE cables, Mexico City
[1214]Station documents, and Cuban names, and many with their
[1215]crypts, were released.
[1217]15. (U) Those records that the Board concluded
[1218]“truly had no apparent relevance to the assassination”
[1219]were designated “not believed relevant” (NBR). Cooperative
[1220]negotiation resulted in about 50,000 pages being declared
[1221]NBR.
[1223]INADVERTENT RELEASES/FOREIGN LIAISON CONCERNS
[1225]16. (AIUO) As noted above, inadvertent releases were
[1226]inevitable. The contributing factors included: guidelines
[1227]that changed almost continuously as negotiations with the
[1228]ARRB reduced the claims of current sensitivity; inaccurate
[1229]and incomplete records on the cover status of retirees; an
[1230]initial tendency, consistent with FOIA practices, to deny
[1231]crypts but to release true names- the crypt implying an
[1232]Agency relationship- if the text did not imply same. (Later:
[1233]duplicate copies plus mosaic pattern analysis made linkage of
[1234]some crypts and true name quite easy.); and a surge of
[1235]inexperienced reviewers loaned during the closing days to
[1236]meet the agreed NARA deadline for the remaining files.
[1238]17. (S) The inadvertent releases of former employees
[1239]names resulted in a few individual complaints but no known
[1240]foreign government or liaison service complaints. Four
[1241]foreign governments opposed release of their information.
[1242]when queried, but no inadvertent releases were involved.
[1244](See Appendix C.) The worst slip appears to have been the
[1245]name of a former NOC, living abroad, who, upon being
[1246]informed, demanded and received compensation for the
[1247]violation of his confidential relationship with CIA and the
[1248]FBI. The other outraged former employee, also living abroad,
[1249]threatened to contact the President if it became known in his
[1250]adopted country that he had been CIA. His true name, ona
[1251]great many documents, is the only redaction; he was of
[1253]' considerable interest to the Board as a key player in the
[1255]HSCA investigation because he was the Mexico Branch chief
[1256]and was initially appointed by the DDO to be the focal point
[1257]for JFK assassination information and briefings. The HSCA
[1258]allowed him to testify in alias, and the ARRB allowed the
[1259]substitution of his alias wherever his true name appeared;
[1260]however, the Board ruled that his true name should be
[1262]6
[1264]SECRET
[1266]13-00000
[1268]__SEGRET——
[1270]SUBJECT: The JFK Declassification Experience
[1272]released in May 2001 or on his death if before that date.
[1273]Given the volume of the documents in which his name appeared,
[1274]there were inadvertent releases of his true name.
[1276]IMPACT OF THE JFK RELEASES ON FUTURE DECLASSIFICATION
[1277]PROGRAMS
[1279]18. (AIUO) Whether the JFK Act is, or should be
[1280]considered, precedent-establishing has been argued since
[1281]its passage. It addresses a unique, highly emotional event,
[1282]of obvious interest to the public; and it should serve as a
[1283]catalyst for future declassification policy discussion. But
[1284]it should not be considered to have set a legal precedent...
[1285]What should result is what the ARRB directed in the case
[1286]of exact duplicate documents: that they all be handled.
[1287]consistently, with the same, or no, redactions. Other
[1288]documents concerning the same or a similar event, not exact
[1289]duplicates but relevant to the issue, and not subject to the
[1290]tight legal demands of the JFK legislation, could be reviewed
[1291]in accordance with the exemptions allowed under the FOIA or
[1292]the Executive Order. However, the basic factor in deciding
[1293]on release or denial should not be the avoidance of
[1295]embarrassment through inconsistent or inadvertent release.
[1297]It should be the current need for protection of sources and
[1298]methods.
[1300]19. (U) The JFK experience did demonstrate that a
[1302]traditional generic sources and methods denial is not always
[1304]necessary, defendable, or smart. Instead of being negatively
[1305]reactive, it may well be tactically smarter to be proactive
[1306]to better ensure protection of important secrets. More on.
[1307]that below.
[1309]20. (AIUO) LESSONS LEARNED:
[1311]e Don’t cut costs on indexing. Use experienced indexers.
[1312]Aim for indexing all materials before review and
[1313]processing begins. A key focus should-be identification
[1314]of duplicate documents.
[1316]e Use retirees with broad Agency experience under staff
[1317]supervision. Because the most common release problems
[1318]usually involve DO material, seriously consider an on
[1319]site-DO team.
[1321]13-00000
[1323]_SEGRET
[1325]SUBJECT: The JFK Declassification Experience
[1327]e Develop and keep updating written guidelines, including
[1328]those for coordinating third-agency documents ,
[1330]® Establish early what is already in the public domain. .
[1331]Take a fresh look at the “official release” philosophy,
[1332]particularly as concerns former DCIs, Cabinet Officers,
[1333]Presidents, and Congressional investigations.
[1335]e Develop better information on the cover status of retired
[1336]employees.
[1338]e Avoid confrontation -on marginal or non-relevant
[1339]information. Avoid stonewalling on relevant information.
[1341]e Because the Information Review Officers are the key
[1342]implementers of information release policy, ensure that
[1343]the guidance given them by their Deputy Directors has .
[1344]Agency corporate equity.
[1346]21. (AIUO) COMMENTS: Information Management,
[1347]Information Warfare, Information Handling, Information
[1348]Declassification: at least three of these terms have
[1349]elicited groans from senior Agency management and a
[1350]preference to have someone else, some staffer, deal with
[1351]the subject, keeping the boss out of trouble and minimally
[1352]informed. But inflexible insistence on continued
[1353]classification of dated information, particularly that
[1354]known to the public, ignorance of what has already been
[1355]declassified and released, and counterproductive stonewalling
[1356]- these factors have caused trouble and will cause more
[1357]trouble as the “Information Age” matures.
[1359]22. (C) In 1976, then DDI Ed Proctor wrote to the DCI,
[1360]citing “the need to rationalize the classification process.”
[1361]A 1977 memorandum for the Agency’s Executive Committee by two
[1362]of the current HRG contract reviewers urged the development
[1363]of an O/DDCI level (the Executive Director position having
[1364]been abolished) policy review of flap potential in
[1365]information release and a computer-supported index to
[1366]released documents. At various times in the 1970s,
[1367]consideration was given to establishing a fifth Directorate
[1368]of Information Handling. After a good bit of internal
[1369]agonizing, DCI Gates in April 1992 signed off on HR 70-14
[1371]_to make “significant historical information available without
[1373]13-00000
[1375]a
[1377]SUBJECT: The JFK Declassification Experience
[1379]damage to national security.” Subsequently, a central
[1380]Management focal point was established in the Office of
[1381]Information Management and a system that addresses part of
[1382]the indexing goal and, with its mandatory declassification
[1383]“metrics” (millions of pages of released documents),
[1384]modulates some of the outside criticism alleging that CIA
[1385]is reneging on “openness.”
[1387]23.. (AIUO) What is missing is a Year 2000 look at
[1388]secrecy. When the FOIA law was passed and the Agency was
[1389]traumatized by receipt of 150 public requests a day for
[1390]information, we were able to make case law in the courts and
[1391]protect sensitive sources and methods by non-arbitrary and
[1392]non-capricious use of allowed exemptions. It is obvious
[1393]today that a more forward-thinking strategy than the “no
[1394]comment” of the 1950s and the “answer the question only as
[1395]asked” of the 1970s is needed - the JFK experience
[1396]demonstrated both the counterproductive result of an all-or-
[1397]nothing defense and that credibility and compromise can he
[1398]gained without current sensitivity loss. And the fact that
[1399]Chairman Porter Goss has joined with Senator Moynihan in
[1400]proposing the existence of an outside group on the model of
[1401]the JFK Assassination Review Board as arbiter in the
[1402]government declassification arena is a very clear signal.
[1404]24. (AIUO) In my view (and as was the case, briefly,
[1405]in the past), this extremely complicated, frustrating, and
[1406]ubiquitous topic requires the personal attention of the
[1407]Executive Director with “corporate” Agency focused guidance
[1408]to the Deputies for their personal attention and policy.
[1410]' guidance to the IROs. And because the IROs, as the
[1412]implementors of their Deputies' policies, determine the
[1413]credibility and resource impact levels, they should be
[1414]supergrades and experienced in at least two directorates.
[1416]25. (AIUO) The eventual development of a credible
[1417]association with the JFK ARRB was a function of: (1) the
[1418]patience and diplomacy of the HRP/JFK Project Officer,
[1420]Barry Harrelson and (2) the presence, on site, of the DO
[1421]team, without whom this exercise could not have been
[1422]completed. Ironically, as is so often the case when an
[1423]individual or group is between a rock and a hard place,
[1425]as the DO team was between the DO desk officers, the DO/IRO,
[1426]and the HRP reviewers, there were allegations of their having
[1428]SECRET
[1430]13-00000
[1432]74
[1434]SUBJECT: The JFK Déclassification Experience
[1436]been co-opted. Both the DO team and HRG were seen, at times,
[1437]as “the enemy.” That kind of in-house idiocy needed instant
[1438]quashing.
[1440]26. (AIUO) CONCLUSIONS: The JFK Project cost far
[1441]too much, took far too long, produced no information to
[1442]change the conclusion that Oswald acted alone. But it did
[1443]make available to the public previously withheld operational
[1444]material to negate what DCI Gates had called the most
[1445]heinous of the conspiracy theories: that CIA was involved
[1446]in the assassination of the President of the United States.
[1447]The resource impact was a function of: the unique
[1448]requirements of the law; the crash nature of the initial
[1449]release; the National Archives decision that every duplicate
[1450]must be reviewed and indexed as a unique document; less than
[1451]satisfactory indexing, contributing to inadvertent releases
[1452]and time wasted in checking for consistency in the handling
[1453]of duplicates; problems in determining the cover status of
[1454]retired employees; and stonewalling.
[1456]27. (AIUO) Although there was inconsistency and
[1457]inadvertent release and some resultant retiree anger, we
[1458]know of no significant national security breech. Previously
[1459]withheld information from the Church Committee hearings and
[1460]from the Presidential libraries declared relevant by the ARRB
[1461]will be titillating and may stimulate FOIA requests, but the
[1462]variance from FOIA rules was not a legal justification for
[1463]withholding under the JFK law.
[1465]28. (U) If this experience leads to a serious
[1466]objective look at the theory and practice of secrecy in
[1467]this changed world, perhaps the cost will have been worth it.
[1469]Charles A. 4. Brigg — }
[1471]Attachments:
[1472]A. Excerpt from Final Report
[1473]of the ARRB (Standards)
[1474]B. OGC Memorandum
[1475]C. Foreign Government Information
[1477]10
[1479]13-00000
[1481]a
[1483]SUBJECT: The JFK Declassification Experience
[1485]DA/OIM/IRG/SCD/CABriggs:bkh/31835 (29 Oct 99)
[1486]s:/oim/fo/jim/hrp/jfk/C.B. Memo The JFK Declass Exp.doc
[1488]Distribution:
[1489]Original ~ Addressee, w/atts -
[1490]1 - C/IRG/SCD, w/atts
[1491]1 - IRG/SCD/HRO, w/atts (Harrelson)
[1492]1 - SCD Chrono, w/atts
[1493]1 - SCD Subj, w/atts
[1495]11
[1497]SECRET
[1499]13-00000 |
[1502]FINAL REPORT OF THE A
[1504]closure-oriented than President Reagan's
[1506]order. The current Executive Order applies to
[1507]all Executive branch records and, unlike the
[1508]JFK Act, requires agencies to engage in a sys-
[1509]tematic declassification of all records more
[1510]than 25 years old. The Executive Order gives
[1511]agencies five years—until April 2000—to
[1512]declassify all classified information that is (1)
[1513]more than 25 years old, and (2) is of perma-
[1514]nent historical value unless the “agency
[1515]head” determines that release of the informa-
[1516]tion would cause one of the nine enumerated
[1517]harms. The Executive Order provides for
[1518]continuing protection for sources and meth-
[1519]ods where disclosure would damage the
[1520]national security. [t also protects, inter alia,
[1521]information that involves diplomatic rela-
[1522]tions, U.S. cryptologic systems, war plans
[1523]that are still in effect, and protection of the
[1524]President.
[1526]The JFK Act guidelines.
[1527]’ that governed the disclo-
[1528]sure of records relating to
[1529]the assassination of Pres-
[1530]ident Kennedy were
[1531]detailed in section 6 of
[1532]the JFK Act.’ The JFK Act
[1534]- allowed the Review Board to postpone the
[1536]release of assassination records only where
[1537]the agencies provided clear and convincing
[1538]evidence that one of five enumerated harms
[1539]would occur if the Review Board released
[1540]the record and that the harm outweighed
[1541]the public interest in disclosure: The statute
[1542]allowed protection of intelligence agents
[1543]and intelligence sources and methods if the
[1544]agency could show that the agent, source,
[1545]or method currently required protection.
[1546]The statute further allowed the Board to
[1547]protect the identity of living persons who
[1548]provided confidential information to the
[1549]government if the agency could show that
[1550]disclosure of the person’s identity would
[1551]pose a substantial risk of harm to the per-
[1552]son. The JFK Act allowed the Review Board
[1553]to postpone release of information if release
[1554]would constitute an unwarranted invasion
[1555]of personal privacy or if release would com-
[1556]promise the existence of an understanding
[1557]of confidentiality between a government
[1558]agent and a cooperating individual or for-
[1559]eign government. Finally, the JFK Act
[1560]allowed the Review Board to protect cur-
[1561]rent information concerning protection of
[1562]government officials.
[1564]2. Key Distinctions Between Standards
[1565]of Release Under the FOIA, the Execu-
[1566]tive Order, and the JFK Act
[1568]In considering whether the JFK Act was nec-
[1569]essary to guarantee public access to assassi-
[1570]nation records, Congress evaluated the effec-
[1571]tiveness of both the FOIA and the
[1572]then-current Executive Order 12356. Both the
[1573]House and the Senate concluded that the
[1574]FOIA and the Executive Order, as adminis-
[1575]tered by the executive branch, had failed to
[1576]guarantee adequate public disclosure of
[1577]assassination records.
[1579]At the time that the JFK Act became law, the
[1580]largest collections of records concerning the
[1581]assassination were under the control of the
[1582]FBI, the CIA, and the Congressional Commit-
[1583]tees who investigated the assassination. The
[1584]FOIA provides special protections for each of
[1585]these entities, and thus could not serve as the
[1586]mechanism for maximum disclosure of
[1587]assassination records. First, the FOIA
[1588]exempts CIA operational files from disclo-
[1589]sure.” Second, the FOIA provides broad-
[1590]based protection for law enforcement files
[1591]and therefore allows the FBI to protect a sub-
[1592]stantial amount of its information from dis-
[1593]closure." Third, the FOIA does not apply to
[1594]unpublished Congressional records.” Con-
[1595]gress found that the FOIA did not require
[1596]adequate disclosure in those records that it
[1597]did cover. Thus, Congress believed that the
[1598]FOIA was not a satisfactory mechanism for
[1599]guaranteeing disclosure of assassination
[1600]records.”
[1602]President Clinton did not sign Executive ae
[1603]Order 12958 until April 17, 1995—over two “fs
[1604]years after Congress passed the JFK Act.
[1605]Clearly, the terms of the Executive Order
[1606]applied to most assassination records since
[1607]they were of permanent historical value and
[1608]were over 25 years old. Even if President
[1609]Clinton’s Executive Order had been in effect
[1610]prior to 1992, it could not have achieved the
[1611]maximum disclosure accomplished by the
[1612]JFK Act. The problem with the Executive:
[1613]Order is that it allowed “agency heads” to”
[1614]make the decision to exempt records from®
[1615]automatic declassification provided that the
[1616]“agency head” expected that disclosure ©!
[1617]the records would result in one of the nin
[1618]enumerated categories of harm. As many sec
[1619]tions of this Report explain, the Review-
[1622]Board found that “agency heads” tended to
[1623]be quite reluctant to release their agencies’
[1624]secrets. The Executive Order, while well-
[1625]intentioned, failed to provide for any inde-
[1626]pendent review of “agency heads” decisions
[1627]on declassification. Thus, although the Exec-
[1628]utive Order's standards for declassification
[1629]appeared to be disclosure-oriented, the Exec-
[1630]utive Order failed to hold agency heads
[1631]accountable for their decisionmaking.
[1633]The JFK Act did require agencies to account
[1634]for their decisions. To ensure such account-
[1635]ability, Congress included four essential pro-
[1636]visions in the JFK Act: first, the JFK Act pre-
[1637]sumed that assassination records may be
[1639]released; second, the JFK Act stated that an
[1641]agency could rebut the presumption of dis-
[1642]closure only by proving, with clear and con-
[1643]vincing evidence, that disclosure would result
[1644]in harm and that the expected harm would
[1646]outweigh any public benefit in the disclo- |
[1648]sure; third, the JFK Act created an independent
[1649]agency—the Review Board—whose mandate
[1650]was to ensure that agencies respected the
[1651]presumption of disclosure and honestly pre-
[1652]sented clear and convincing evidence of the
[1653]need to protect information; and fourth, the
[1654]JFK Act required agencies to provide the
[1655]Review Board with access to government
[1656]records, even when those records would not
[1657]become part of the JFK Collection. Without
[1658]these accountability provisions, the JFK Act
[1659]would not have accomplished its objective of
[1660]maximum release of assassination records to
[1661]the public. So, while the FOIA and the Exec-
[1662]utive Order each expressed the goal of
[1663]obtaining maximum disclosure, the JFK Act
[1664]ensured that the goal would be met. The two
[1665]accountability provisions that relate directly
[1666]to the Section 6 grounds for postponement—
[1667]the presumption of release and the standard
[1668]of proof—are discussed in detail below. The
[1669]third provision discussed below is the
[1670]Review Board's obligation to balance the
[1671]weight of the evidence in favor of postpone-
[1672]ment against the public interest in release.
[1674]a. JFK Act presumes disclosure of
[1675]assassination records.
[1677]The most pertinent language of the JFK Act
[1678]was the standard for release of information.
[1679]According to the statute, “all Government
[1680]records concerning the assassination of Pres-
[1681]ident John F. Kennedy should carry a pre-
[1683]43
[1685]sumption of immediate disclosure.” The statute
[1686]further declared that “only in the rarest cases is
[1687]there any legitimate need for continued protection
[1688]of such records."
[1690]b. JFK Act requires agencies to provide clear
[1691]and convincing evidence.
[1693]If agencies wished to withhold information
[1694]in a document, the JFK Act required the
[1695]agency to submit clear and convincing evi-
[1696]dence that the informa-
[1697]tion fell within one of the
[1698]narrow postponement
[1699]criteria.
[1701]Congress selected the
[1702]clear and convincing evi-
[1703]dence standard because
[1704]“less exacting standards,
[1705]such as substantial evi-
[1706]dence or a preponder-
[1707]ance of the evidence,
[1708]were not consistent with }
[1709]the legislation’s stated goal” of prompt and
[1710]full release.” The legislative history of the
[1712]JFK Act emphasized the statutory require- .
[1714]ment that agencies provide clear and con-
[1715]vincing evidence.
[1717]There is no justification for perpetual
[1718]secrecy for any class of records. Nor can
[1719]the withholding of any individual
[1720]record be justified on the basis of gen-
[1721]eral confidentiality concerns applicable
[1722]to an entire class. Every record must be
[1723]judged on its own merits, and every
[1724]record will ultimately be made available -
[1725]for public disclosure."
[1727]When agencies did present to the Review
[1728]Board evidence of harm that would result
[1729]from disclosure, it had to consist of more
[1730]than speculation.
[1732]The [Review] Board cannot postpone
[1733]release because it might cause some con-
[1734]ceivable or speculative harm to national
[1735]security. Rather in a democracy the
[1736]demonstrable harm from disclosure must
[1737]be weighed against the benefits of
[1738]release of the information to the public.”
[1740]The Review Board’s application of the clear
[1741]and convincing evidence standard is covered
[1742]in more detail in Section B of this chapter.
[1744]Serre.
[1746]13-00000
[1748]Section B includes a discussion of the “Rule
[1750]of Reason” that the Review Board ultimately
[1751]adopted with regard to receiving evidence
[1752]from the agencies.
[1754]c. JFK Act requires the Review Board to
[1755]balance evidence for postponement against
[1756]public interest in release.
[1758]Assuming that agencies did provide clear
[1759]and convincing evidence that information
[1760]should be protected from disclosure, the
[1761]terms of section 6 required that information
[1762]not be postponed unless the threat of harm
[1763]outweighs the public interest in disclosure.
[1764]As used in the JFK. Act, “public interest”
[1765]means “the compelling interest in the prompt
[1766]public disclosure of assassination records for
[1768]historical and governmental purposes and.
[1770]for the purpose of fully informing the Amer-
[1771]ican people about the history surrounding
[1772]the assassination of President John F.
[1773]Kennedy.”” The Review Board interpreted
[1774]the balancing requirement to mean that agen-
[1775]cies had to provide the Review Board with
[1776]clear and convincing evidence of the threat of
[1777]harm that would result from disclosure.
[1778]However, to the extent that the JFK Act left
[1779]room for discretion in evaluating the histori-
[1780]cal significance, or public interest, of particu-
[1781]lar assassination records, it was the Review
[1782]Board—not the agency that originated the
[1783]document—that was to exercise this discre-
[1784]tion. The burden was on the agencies to make
[1785]the case for postponement, not to judge the
[1787]level of public interest in a particular docu-
[1789]ment. The JFK Act established the Review
[1790]Board as a panel of independent citizens with
[1791]expertise as historians and archivists pre-
[1792]cisely in order to secure public confidence in
[1793]such determinations.”
[1795]d. Segregability and substitute language.
[1797]When the Review Board determined that the
[1798]risk of harm did outweigh the public interest
[1800]. in disclosure, it then had to take two addi-
[1802]tional steps: (1) ensure that the agency
[1803]redacted the least amount of information
[1804]possible to avoid the stated harm, or “segre-
[1805]gate” the postponed information, and (2)
[1806]provide substitute language to take the place
[1807]of the redaction.
[1809]"FINAL REPORT OF THE ASSASSINATION RECORDS REVIEW BOARD
[1811]3. Federal Agency Record Groups and
[1812]the Standards Applied to Them.
[1814]The JFK Act defines “assassination records”
[1815]to include records related to the assassination
[1816]of President Kennedy that were “created or
[1817]made available for use by, obtained by, or
[1818]otherwise came into the possession of” the
[1819]following groups: the Warren Commission,
[1820]the four congressional committees that inves-
[1821]tigated the assassination, any office of the
[1822]federal government, and any state or local
[1823]law enforcement office that assisted in a fed-
[1824]eral investigation of the assassination.”
[1826]When it passed the JFK Act, Congress
[1827]intended for the JFK Collection to include the
[1828]record groups that it identified in section
[1829]3(2), but it also intended for the Review
[1830]Board to consider carefully the scope of the
[1831]term “assassination record” and to issue an
[1832]interpretive regulation defining this crucial
[1833]term.” The Act requires government agencies
[1834]to identify, organize, and process those assas-
[1835]sination records that are defined as assassi-
[1836]nation records in section 3(2). Chapter 6 of
[1837]this report explains. how the Review Board
[1839]‘interpreted its responsibility to define and
[1841]seek out “additional records and informa-
[1842]tion.” Set forth below is a description of some
[1843]of the core government holdings on the
[1844]assassination which were released under the
[1845]standards of the Review Board.
[1847]a, lhe FBI's “core and related” files.
[1849]The FBI's “core and related” files consist of
[1850]those records that the FBI gathered in
[1851]response to:FOIA requests that it received in
[1852]the 1970s for'records relating to the assassi-
[1853]nation of President Kennedy. The “core” files
[1854]include the FBI files on Lee. Harvey Oswald
[1855]and Jack Ruby, as Well as the FBI’s Warren
[1856]Commission files andghe e JFK assassination
[1857]investigation file. The’“related” files include
[1858]FBI files on Lee ‘Harvey Oswald’s wife
[1859]Marina and mother Marguerite, Oswald's
[1861]friend George DeMohrenschildt, and the
[1862]Oswalds’ Dallas friends Ruth ‘and Michael
[1863]Paine. The FBI began its processing of the -
[1864]core and related files in 1993. Theg Review
[1865]Boaid applied strict standards to its review of
[1866]postponements in the core and related files.
[1869]b. CIA's Lee Harvey Oswald “201” file.
[1871]CIA opens a 201 file on an individual when it
[1872]has an “operational interest” in that person.
[1873]The CIA opened its 201 file on Lee Harvey
[1874]Oswald in December 1960 when it received a
[1875]request from the Department of State on
[1876]defectors. After President Kennedy’s assassi-
[1877]nation, the Oswald 201 file served asa depos-
[1878]itory for records CIA gathered and created
[1879]during CIA’s wide-ranging investigation of
[1880]the assassination. Thus, the file provides the
[1881]most complete record of the CIA’s inquiry in
[1882]the months and years immediately following
[1883]the assassination.
[1885]c, The FBI's “House Select Committee on
[1886]“Assassinations"(HSCA) Subject Files.
[1888]During the. HSCA’s tenure, the Committee
[1889]made a number of requests to the FBI for
[1890]records that the Committee believed might
[1891]be relevant to their investigation of the
[1892]Kennedy assassination. In response to the
[1893]HSCA's requests, the FBI made available to
[1894]the HSCA staff approximately 200,000 pages
[1895]of FBI files. The FBI began its processing of
[1896]the “HSCA Subject” files in 1993, The Review
[1897]Board applied its “Segregated Collection”
[1898]guidelines (explained below) to the HSCA
[1899]subject files.
[1901]d. The CIA's “Segregated Collection” files.
[1903]HSCA investigators gained access to CIA
[1904]files. Upon completion of the HSCA’s work,
[1905]the CIA kept separate the files that it had
[1906]made available to the HSCA and retained
[1907]them as a segregated collection. This collec-
[1908]tion is divided into two parts: paper records
[1909]and microfilm. CIA made 63 boxes of paper
[1910]records available to the HSCA staff. The
[1911]paper records consist, in many cases, of par-
[1912]ticular records that CIA culled from various
[1913]files. The 64th box of the CIA’s segregated
[1914]collection contains 72 reels of microfilm and
[1915]represents the entire set of files from which
[1916]records were made available to the HSCA.
[1917]Thus, in many cases, the microfilmed files
[1918]contain material well beyond the scope of the
[1919]HSCA investigation and may, for example,
[1921]- cover an agent's entire career when only a
[1922]small portion of it intersected with the assas-
[1923]sination story.
[1925]CHAPTER 5: THE STANDARDS FOR REVIEW: REVIEW BOARD
[1927]“COMMON Law”
[1929]e. FBI records on the congressional commit-
[1930]__ tees that investigated the assassination.
[1932]The JFK Act defined “assassination record”
[1933]to include records relating to the Kennedy
[1934]assassination that were used by the congres-
[1935]sional committees who investigated events
[1936]surrounding the assassination.*
[1938]Before President Clinton appointed the
[1939]Review Board, the FBI collected and began to
[1940]process its administrative files relating to its
[1941]involvement with each of these committees.
[1942]In large part, the records contained in the
[1943]Bureau’s administrative files related to topics
[1944]other than the Kennedy assassination. To the
[1945]extent that the Review Board found records
[1946]in these files that concerned topics other than
[1947]the Kennedy assassination, it designated the
[1948]records not believed relevant (or “NBR” as-
[1949]that acronym is defined infra) and removed
[1950]them from further consideration. .
[1952]f. Requests for Additional Information.
[1954]Congress included in the JFK Act a provision
[1955]that allowed the Review Board to obtain
[1956]additional information and records béyond
[1957]those that were reviewed by previous inves-
[1958]tigations. Chapter 6 of this report explains
[1959]the requests that the Review Board made and
[1960]the assassination records designated as a
[1961]result of those requests.
[1963]B. DECLASSIFICATION STANDARDS
[1965]The Review Board's primary purpose, as out-
[1966]lined in section 7(b) of the JFK Act, was to
[1967]determine whether an agency’s request for
[1968]postponement of disclosure of an assassina-
[1969]tion record met the criteria for postponement
[1970]set forth in section 6. Section 6 consisted of an
[1971]introductory clause, which established the
[1972]“clear and convincing evidence” standard,
[1973]and five subsections that set forth the criteria
[1974]under which the Review Board could agree
[1975]to postpone public disclosure of assassina-
[1976]tion-related information.
[1978]1. Standard of Proof: Clear and
[1979]Convincing Evidence
[1981]Text of Section 6
[1983]Disclosure of assassination records or par-
[1984]ticular information in assassination records
[1986]13-00000
[1988]to the public may be postponed subject to the
[1989]limitations of this-Act if [agencies provide]
[1990]clear and convincing evidence that [the
[1992]- harm from disclosure outweighs the public
[1993]interest in release.]
[1995]a. Review Board guidelines. For each recom-
[1996]mended postponement, the JFK Act requires
[1997]an agency to submit “clear and convincing
[1998]evidence” that one of the specified grounds
[1999]for postponement exists.* The Review Board
[2000]required agencies to submit specific facts in
[2001]support of each postponement, according to
[2002]the Review Board’s guidelines for each post-
[2003]ponement type.
[2005]b. Commentary. Although the agencies
[2007]argued that the clear and convincing evi-
[2008]dence standard could be
[2009]satisfied -by a general
[2010]explanation of those
[2011]agencies’ positions in
[2012]support of postpone-
[2013]ments, the Review Board
[2015]- determined that the clear
[2016]and convincing evidence
[2017]requirement was a docu-
[2018]ment-specific one. Thus,
[2019]the Board required agen-
[2020]cies to present evidence
[2021]that was tailored to indi-
[2022]vidual postponements
[2023]within individual docu-
[2024]ments.
[2026]The JFK Act clearly
[2028]vide clear and convinc-
[2029]ing evidence in support
[2030]of their postponements,
[2031]but it did not establish a
[2032]mechanism for when and
[2033]how such evidence should be presented. The
[2034]legislative history provides a clue as to Con-
[2035]gress’ intent: “[T]o the extent possible, con-
[2036]sultation with the government offices creates
[2037]an understanding on each side as to the basis
[2038]and reasons for their respective recommen-
[2039]dations and determinations.”* The Review
[2040]Board did consult with government offices to
[2041]determine fair, efficient, and reasonable pro-
[2042]cedures for presenting evidence.
[2044]The Review Board began its review of assas-
[2045]sination records by considering pre- assassi-
[2046]nation records on Lee Harvey Oswald. In an
[2048]required agencies to pro-_
[2050]attempt to arrive at consistent decisions, the
[2051]Board asked the staff to present the records
[2052]on an issue-by-issue basis. For example, with
[2053]FBI records, the Review Board first sched-
[2054]uled a group of FBI records for review and
[2055]notified the FBI of the meeting date at which
[2056]it intended to vote on the records. The
[2057]Review Board invited the FBI to present its
[2058]evidence. Second, the FBI requested that it be
[2059]allowed to brief the members of the Review
[2060]Board. At the briefing, the FBI presented its
[2061]position to the Board—both in an oral pre-
[2063]sentation and in a “position paper.” The FBI's _.
[2065]“position papers” summarized the FBI's gen-
[2066]eral policy preferences for continued classifi-
[2067]cation of certain categories of information.
[2068]Third, the Review Board staff researched
[2069]existing law on each of the FBI's “positions”
[2070]and determined that the arguments that the
[2071]FBI put forth in support of its JFK Act post-
[2072]ponements, were essentially the same argu-
[2073]ments that the FBI offers to courts for FOIA
[2074]cases. Of course, in legislating the declassifi-
[2075]cation standards of the JFK Act, Congress
[2076]intended for the JFK Act standards—and not
[2077]the FOIA standards—to apply. Aware of con-
[2078]gressional intent, the Review Board rejected
[2079]the FBI's general policy preferences on the
[2080]basis that the arguments did not constitute
[2082]the clear and convincing evidence necessary’
[2084]to support a request for a postponement
[2085]under section 6. The FBI did appeal the
[2086]Review Board’s decisions to the President,
[2087]but the Review Board’s document-specific
[2088]interpretation of the clear and convincing
[2089]evidence standard ultimately prevailed
[2090]when the vote was withdrawn.
[2092]i, “Rule of Reason.” Of course, some assassi-
[2093]nation records are of greater interest than
[2094]others. With regard to records that had a
[2095]close nexus to the assassination, the Review
[2096]Board strictly applied the law. For example,
[2097]the Review Board voted to release in full
[2098]nearly all of the information in the FBI’s pre-
[2099]assassination Lee Harvey Oswald file and the
[2100]bulk of the information in the HSCA’s report
[2101]on CIA activities in Mexico City—the
[2102]“Lopez” report—because of the high public
[2103]interest in that material. With regard to the
[2104]FBI files, the FBI believed that its arguments
[2105]were compelling enough to merit appeals to
[2106]the President on nearly all of the Review
[2107]Board’s decisions on the pre-assassination
[2108]Lee Harvey Oswald records. The FBI, the
[2109]Review Board, the White House Counsel's
[2113]13-00000
[2115]Office, and ultimately the Department of
[2116]State spent a substantial amount of time
[2117]resolving the issues that arose in the appeal
[2118]process, and for those important records that
[2119]were at issue, the Review Board considered
[2120]its time well-spent. The Review Board simi-
[2121]larly dealt with other key records and spent
[2122]as much time as was necessary to deliberate
[2123]and decide upon those records.
[2125]The postponement-by-postponement review
[2126]at each early Review Board meeting proved
[2127]to be a slow and careful process. The post-
[2128]ponement-by-postponement review proved
[2129]to be a necessary educational process for the
[2130]Board members. The Board members were a
[2131]group of five citizens who were selected not
[2132]for their familiarity with the subject of the
[2133]assassination, but for their professional com-
[2134]petence in history and law. Thus, through
[2135]reviewing individual documents at its early
[2136]meetings, the Board essentially educated
[2137]itself about the assassination.
[2139]While the Review Board did need time to edu-
[2140]cate itself and to develop its policies, the
[2141]Board’s pace eventually increased. In an effort
[2142]to streamline its work, the Review Board con-
[2143]sulted with federal agencies such as the CIA
[2144]and FBI to work out an approach for review of
[2145]tecords that would allow the Review Board to
[2146]make informed decisions, but not require
[2147]agencies to spend hundreds of hours locating
[2148]evidence for and providing briefings on each
[2149]postponement within an assassination record.
[2151]The first step to developing a reasonable
[2152]approach was for the Review Board to for-
[2153]mulate general rules for sustaining and
[2154]denying postponements. The Review Board’s
[2155]“guidance” to its staff and the agencies
[2156]became a body of rules—a Review Board
[2157]“common law.” Once the Review Board noti-
[2158]fied an agency of its approach on a particular
[2159]type of postponement, the agency learned to
[2160]present only those facts that the Review
[2161]Board would need to make a decision. For
[2162]example, with regard to FBI informants, the
[2163]Review Board notified the FBI of what it con-
[2164]sidered to be the relevant factors in its deci-
[2165]sionmaking. In other words, it defined for the
[2166]Bureau what it considered to be “clear and
[2167]convincing” evidence. Then, the Review
[2168]Board worked with the FBI to create a one-
[2169]page form titled an “Informant Postpone-
[2170]ment Evidence Form” that the FBI could use
[2172]CHAPTER 5: THE STANDARDS FOR'REVIEV
[2174]to provide evidence on an informant. (See
[2175]illustration.) The form allowed the FBI to
[2176]simply fill in the answers to a series of ques-
[2177]tions about the informant in question, which
[2178]in turn allowed the Review Board to focus on
[2179]those facts that it deemed to be dispositive in
[2180]a particular document. This approach had
[2181]the added benefit of providing consistency to
[2182]the Review Board’s decisionmaking.
[2184]A large number of records that the JFK Act
[2185]defined as “assassination records” proved to
[2186]be of very low public interest. The JFK Act
[2187]required the Review Board to process all
[2188]records that were “made available” to the
[2189]Warren Commission and the Congressional
[2190]Committees that investigated the assassina-
[2191]tion, whether or not the records were used by
[2192]the Commission or the committees. Many of
[2194]‘ these records, while interesting from a histo-
[2196]rian’'s perspective, are not closely related to
[2197]the assassination. For those documents that
[2198]were of little or no public interest, the Review
[2199]Board modified its standards in the two ways
[2200]described below.
[2202]A. “NBR” Guidelines: Records that Review
[2203]Board judged were “not believed relevant” to the
[2204]assassination. For those records that truly had
[2205]no apparent relevance to the assassination,
[2206]the Review Board designated the records
[2207]“not believed relevant” (NBR). The “NBR”
[2208]Guidelines allowed the Review Board to
[2209]remove irrelevant records from further con-
[2210]sideration. Records that the Review Board
[2211]designated “NBR” were virtually the only
[2212]groups of records that the Review Board
[2213]agreed to postpone in full. Thus, the Review
[2214]Board was always extremely reluctant to des-
[2215]ignate records “NBR” and rarely did so.
[2217]B. Segregated Collection Guidelines. For those
[2218]records that were not immediately relevant,
[2219]but shed at least some light on issues that the
[2220]congressional committees that investigated
[2221]the assassination explored as potentially rele-
[2222]vant to the assassination, the Review Board
[2223]created the “Segregated Collection Guide-
[2224]lines.” The segregated collections records,
[2225]although marginally relevant, were not
[2226]appropriate for “NBR” designation, as the
[2227]“NBR” Guidelines would have resulted in
[2228]withholding records in full. Instead, the
[2229]Board passed the “Segregated Collection”
[2230]Guidelines, which ensured that the Review
[2231]Board staff would review every page of the
[2234]marginally relevant records, but would not
[2235]require agencies to present the same amount
[2236]of evidence in support of postponements.
[2237]The regulations that the Review Board
[2238]adopted on November 13, 1996, define “Seg-
[2239]regated Collections” to include the following:
[2240](1) FBI records that were requested by the
[2241]HSCA in conjunction with its investigation
[2242]into the assassination of President Kennedy,
[2243]the Church Committee in conjunction with
[2244]its inquiry into issues relating to the Kennedy
[2245]assassination, and the Pike Committee and
[2246]Rockefeller Commission that investigated
[2247]issues related to the assassination; (2) CIA
[2248]records including the CIA’s segregated col-
[2249]lection of 63 boxes as well as one box of
[2250]microfilm records (box 64) and several boxes
[2251]of CIA staff “working files.” The Review
[2252]Board adopted revised guidelines on April
[2253]23, 1997 in an attempt to streamline the
[2254]review process of postponements in the seg-
[2255]regated collections, and ensure a page-by-
[2256]page review of all documents in the segre-
[2257]gated collections. The guidelines state,
[2258]“,..even with the assumption that our oper-
[2259]ations may: be extended through Fiscal Year
[2260]1998, the Review Board cannot hope to com-
[2261]plete review of postponements in the Segre-
[2262]gated Collections under the current method
[2263]of review.” Where the Review Board’s stan-
[2264]dards differed between core files and segre-
[2265]gated collection files, the guidelines set forth
[2266]below note the distinction.
[2268]Thus, throughout. its tenure, the Review
[2269]Board sought to be vigorous in applying the
[2270]law, but, in order to complete its work, found
[2271]it necessary to employ a “rule of reason.”
[2273]2. Intelligence Agents
[2274]Text of Section 6(1)(A)
[2276]... Clear and convincing evidence that the
[2278]threat to the military defense, intelligence
[2280]operations, or conduct of foreign relations of
[2281]the United States posed by the public disclo-
[2283]sure of the assassination record is of such
[2285]gravity that it outweighs the public interest, .
[2286]and such public disclosure would reveal—
[2288](A) an intelligence agent whose identity
[2289]currently requires protection...
[2291]SASSINATION REcoRDS REVIEW BOARD
[2293]aR
[2295]a. CIA officers.
[2297]i. Review Board guidelines. The Review
[2298]Board usually protected the names of CIA
[2299]officers who are still active or who retired
[2300]under cover and are now living in potentially
[2301]risky circumstances. The Review Board usu-
[2302]ally released names of deceased CIA officers
[2303]and the names of CIA officers whose connec-
[2304]tion to the CLA was public knowledge. When
[2305]the Review Board postponed names, it usu-
[2306]ally substituted the phrase, “CIA Employee.”
[2308]li, Commentary. Names of numerous CIA
[2309]officers appeared in the CIA's assassination
[2310]records. The Review Board and the CIA had
[2311]to confront the challenge presented by the
[2312]statute, which requires name-specific evi-
[2313]dence, but gathering such evidence proved to
[2314]be time-consuming and burdensome for the
[2315]CIA and the names of CIA officers in the
[2316]records were not always relevant to the
[2317]assassination. The statute, of course, states
[2318]that the only way that the Review Board
[2319]could protect names of intelligence agents
[2320]was if the CIA provided clear and convincing
[2321]evidence that the CIA officer’s identity “cur-
[2322]rently” required protection.
[2324]The CIA initially believed that the solution to
[2325]the above-referenced challenge was for the
[2326]Review Board to agree with CIA that the
[2327]names of all CIA officers within the JFK Col-
[2328]lection should be postponed until the year
[2329]2017. The CIA supported its request for blan-
[2330]ket postponements with two arguments: first,
[2331]since many CIA employees are “under
[2332]cover,” CIA argued that its intelligence gath-
[2333]ering capability depended on employees
[2334]maintaining cover, and, second, even though
[2335]the majority of CIA officer names in the Col-
[2336]lection are names of retired CIA employees,
[2337]CIA is bound by a confidentiality agreement
[2338]to protect the relationship. Many of these for-
[2339]mer employees objected to release of their
[2340]former Agency affiliation, complaining that it
[2341]violates this agreement and suggesting that
[2342]such release might jeopardize business rela-
[2343]tionships or threaten personal safety.
[2345]Mindful of the JFK Act’s requirement that
[2346]agencies provide name-specific evidence, the
[2347]Review Board would not agree to CIA's
[2348]request for blanket postponements of CIA
[2349]names. Instead, the Review Board requested
[2350]CIA to provide evidence for each name.
[2352]PRE isi: Tse Ea ee
[2354]Dees a 3: RR ES ts Se
[2356]13-00000
[2358]CHAPTER'S: THE STANDARDS:
[2360]The CIA, however, was reluctant to produce
[2361]name-specific evidence and, on occasion,
[2362]CIA fatled to furnish evidence when it
[2363]promised to do so. CIA’s initial refusal to
[2364]supply evidence on, individual names was
[2365]met, not with the wholesale release of names
[2366]by the Board, but with a firm insistence that
[2367]the Agency meet the requirements of the Act.
[2368]The Review Board released the names of a
[2369]few individuals who were of central impor-
[2370]tance to the assassination story early in the
[2371]process, but gave the Agency a number of
[2372]additional opportunities to provide specific
[2373]evidence on other names.
[2375]For example, in December 1995, the Review
[2376]Board designated one day of their meeting
[2377]“name day,” and invited CIA to provide evi-
[2378]dence for names the Review Board had
[2380]encountered in CIA records during the previ-.
[2382]ous six to seven months. On that day, CIA
[2383]again requested the Review Board to sustain
[2384]the postponement of all CIA names. The
[2385]Review Board did not want to jeopardize the
[2386]personal safety of individuals and gave CIA
[2387]more time to provide evidence. The Board set
[2389]ather “name days” iri May 1996 and May.
[2391]1997. As deadlines for submission of evi-
[2392]dence approached, CIA agreed to release
[2393]some names, but in most cases, continued to
[2394]offer less than satisfactory evidence on those
[2395]they wished to protect. Gradually, the CIA
[2396]did begin to provide supporting evidence of
[2397]the postponement of individual names.
[2399]By May 1996, the Review Board had decided
[2400]what evidence would meet the clear and con-
[2401]vincing evidence standard. If the CIA pro-
[2402]vided evidence that the individual retired
[2403]under cover or abroad, or evidence that the
[2404]individual objected to the release of his or her
[2405]name when contacted (CIA agreed to attempt
[2406]to contact former employees), the Review
[2407]Board would protect the CIA officer’s name.
[2408]Moreover, where the CIA specifically identi-
[2409]fied an ongoing operation in which the indi-
[2410]vidual was involved or CIA could demon-
[2411]strate that the person was still active with
[2412]CIA, the Review Board would protect the
[2413]name. Because the JFK Act. required the
[2414]Review Board to balance the potential harm
[2415]from disclosure against the public interest in
[2416]release, there were cases in which the Review
[2417]Board determined that, even though the CIA
[2418]had provided the required evidence, the
[2419]Review Board believed ‘that the individual
[2421]was of sufficiently high public interest that it
[2422]would require the CIA to provide additional
[2423]evidence before it would consider protecting
[2424]the name. In these cases, the Review Board
[2425]asked CIA to provide information on the
[2426]employee’s current status, his or her location,
[2427]and the nature of the work he or she did for
[2428]the CIA.
[2430]The Review Board determined that names
[2431]were of high public interest when the CIA
[2432]officer at issue had a substantive connection
[2433]to the assassination story or where the CIA
[2434]officer’s name appeared in CIA’s Oswald 201
[2435]file. By July 1997, the Review Board had
[2436]determined that where CIA officer names did
[2437]not fit within one of the “high public inter-
[2438]est” categories, it would require CIA to pro-
[2439]vide significantly less evidence in support of
[2440]its requests for postponement. Given the
[2441]large number of CIA officer names in the CIA
[2442]records, the Review Board determined that it
[2443]had to adopt the practical high public inter-
[2444]est/low public interest approach, particu-
[2445]larly since it had limited time and resources
[2446]available to complete its own review of CIA
[2447]records. The Review Board would have pre-
[2448]ferred to review each name at the same high
[2449]level of scrutiny that it used to review names
[2450]of high public interest. Nevertheless, the
[2451]Board’s approach compelled the CIA to
[2452]release many more names than it would have
[2453]desired.
[2455]b. “John Scelso” (pseudonym).
[2457]i. Review Board guidelines. The Review
[2458]Board protected the true name of the individ-
[2459]ual known by the pseudonym of John Scelso
[2460]until May 1, 2001 or three.months after the
[2461]decease of the individual, whichever comes
[2462]first.
[2464]ii. Commentary. The CIA employee who
[2465]was head of CIA's division “Western Hemi-
[2466]sphere 3” during the period immediately
[2467]after the assassination of President Kennedy
[2468]testified before the HSCA and the Church
[2469]Committee under the “throw-away” alias
[2470]John Scelso. His true name appears on hun-
[2471]dreds of documents in the JFK collection,
[2472]many of which were the product of the
[2473]Agency’‘s extensive post-assassination inves-
[2474]tigation that spanned the globe. In reviewing
[2475]this particular name, the Review Board's
[2476]desire to satisfy the public’s interest in release
[2479]13-Q0000
[2481]STEERS" oon Freer
[2482]out 1 C/CUSIG ° fone A 7
[2483]or 3 5367 | ”
[2485]clashed with the CIA's strong evidence in
[2486]support of postponement. Initially, the Board
[2487]was inclined to release Scelso’s true name, but
[2488]the Agency argued convincingly against
[2489]release. CIA provided evidence on the current
[2490]status of the individual, shared correspon-
[2491]dence sent by him, and even arranged an
[2492]interview between him and a Review Board
[2493]staff member. As an interim step, the Review
[2494]Board inserted his prior alias “Scelso” as sub-
[2495]stitute language. (See illustration.) Then, at its
[2496]May 1996 meeting, Board members deter-
[2497]mined to release “Scelso’s” true name in five
[2498]years or upon his death.
[2500]CLASSIFIED MESSAGE -
[2502]Qo ox
[2504]ONE 1 23 NOY 63 oO HE Ch en HO.
[2506]TR ' MEXICO CITY
[2507]FROM: DIRECTOR
[2509]Diaso-s-4 |
[2511]Stir
[2513]cones C1 /st : ; '
[2514]nro scl, Ofect, oop, wwe() Cifors, cific 2, F1,°SR'7, WH 7,
[2516]IMMEDIATE MEXI INFO
[2518]A HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGR! 9.4886 _
[2519]REF: MEXI 6453 (IN 36017)K RELEASE ie NITIZED ,
[2520]1. DMPORTANT You REVIEW ALU LIENVOY TAPES AND
[2521]Transcntpre|smice 27 SEPTEMBER TO LOCATE ALL MATERIAL
[2522]POSSIBLY PERTINENT TO SUBJECT REF.
[2523]2. DISPATCH SOONEST BY SPECIAL COURIER, STAFFER If
[2524]NECESSARY,| FULL TRANSCRIPTS AND ORIGINAL TAPES IF
[2525]AVAILABLEJALL PERTINENT MATERIAL.
[2527]3. [ev ORIGINAL TAPES avawaniz? | THM PEW
[2528]wr 16 APR SHB
[2530]END OF MESSAGE
[2531]CS Comment: *Reported that om | October 63, an American male who said
[2532]his uame was Lee Oswald was at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City,
[2534]vocenert Nant AVS4}  - A0l-2F7 aus
[2536]fos FOIA Review od APR 1676 ~ROO-S=F Tr
[2537]a3 Nves
[2539]vu Seng .
[2543]Qtieatinc offices . TALS carne
[2544]. OFFices:
[2546]pow
[2548]REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE {§ PROHIBITED. Cooy He
[2550]c. Information that identifies CIA officers.
[2552]i. Review Board guidelines. For specific
[2553]information that, if released, would reveal
[2554]the identity of an individual CIA officer that
[2555]the Board had voted to protect, the Review
[2556]Board protected the information.
[2558]ii. Commentary. Whenever the Review
[2559]Board voted to protect the identity of an indi-
[2560]vidual throughout federal agency assassina-
[2561]tion records, it had to be realistic enough to
[2562]realize that some information about individu-
[2563]als is so specific that release of the information
[2564]would reveal the individual's identity. Exam-
[2565]ples of specific identifying information include
[2567]home addresses, birth dates, job titles, names .
[2569]of family members, and other less obvious, but
[2570]equally revealing pieces of information.
[2572]d. Names of National Security Agency
[2573]employees.
[2575]i. Review Board guidelines. The Review
[2576]Board protected the names of all National
[2577]Security Agency employees that it encoun-
[2578]tered. The Review Board would have consid-
[2579]ered releasing names of National Security
[2580]Agency employees if it determined that a par-
[2581]ticular name was extremely relevant to the
[2582]assassination.
[2584]ii. Commentary. Due to the nature of NSA
[2585]information, few NSA employee names
[2586]appeared in NSA’s assassination records.
[2587]Even though the Review Board did not often
[2588]encounter NSA employee names, it did have
[2590]to vote on those names that it did confront..
[2592]NSA’s policy of not releasing the names of its
[2593]employees conflicted with section 6(1)(A) of
[2594]the JFK Act that presumed release of such
[2595]information unless NSA could prove that
[2596]individual NSA employee names required
[2597]protection. NSA argued that the release of any
[2598]names, other than those of publicly acknowl-
[2599]edged senior officials, jeopardized the poten-
[2600]tial security of U.S. cryptographic systems
[2601]and those individuals. As it did with the
[2602]names of other intelligence agents and offi-
[2603]cers, the Review Board considered the names
[2604]of NSA officers on a document-by-document
[2605]basis. Given the nature of NSA information,
[2606]the Review Board members agreed that none
[2607]of the few names which appear in the docu-
[2608]ments, and for which NSA requested protec-
[2609]tion, was of high enough public interest or
[2610]central to an understanding of the assassina-
[2611]tion story. Thus, it protected the names.
[2613]3. Intelligence Sources and Methods,
[2614]and Other Matters Relating to the
[2615]National Security of the United States
[2617]x
[2619]Text of Section 6(1)(B) and (C)
[2622]CHAPTER 5
[2624]__. clear and convincing evidence-that the
[2625]threat to the military defense, intelligence
[2626]operations, or conduct of foreign relations of
[2627]the United States posed by the public disclo-
[2628]sure of the assassination record is of such
[2629]gravity that it outweighs the public interest,
[2630]and such public disclosure would reveal—
[2632](B) an intelligence source or method which
[2633]is currently utilized, or reasonably expected
[2634]to be utilized, by the United States Govern-
[2635]ment and which has not been officially dis-
[2636]closed, the disclosure of which would inter-
[2637]fere with the conduct of intelligence
[2638]‘activities; or
[2640](C) any other matter currently relating to
[2641]the military defense, intelligence operations
[2642]or conduct of foreign relations of the United
[2643]States, the disclosure of which would
[2644]demonstrably impair the national security of
[2645]the United States;
[2647]a. CIA sources.
[2649]i. Review Board guidelines. The Review
[2650]Board handled CIA sources, assets, infor-
[2651]mants, and specific identifying information
[2652]under standards similar to the Board’s deci-
[2653]sions for CIA officers. Where the Review
[2654]Board believed names held a high level of
[2655]public interest, either because the name was
[2656]central to the story or because assassination
[2657]researchers expressed interest in the name,
[2658]the Review Board subjected them to close
[2659]‘scrutiny. The Board generally protected the
[2660]identity of foreign nationals unless they were
[2661]of high public interest and then the Review
[2662]Board required CIA to provide specific evi-
[2663]dence in support of its claimed postpone-
[2665]ments. The Review Board protected domestic.
[2667]sources, assets and informants where CIA
[2668]demonstrated that release would jeopardize
[2669]ongoing operations or harm individuals. If
[2670]CIA did not provide evidence of one of the
[2671]two above-referenced harms, the Review
[2672]Board released the name at issue. In addition,
[2673]where the public already knew the names of
[2674]individuals who were connected to the CIA,
[2675]especially if the government had previously
[2676]released the information, the Review Board
[2677]released the information.
[2679]ll. Commentary. The Review Board
[2680]addressed the issue of whether to postpone or
[2681]release source names at the same time that it
[2683]considered CIA employee names, and
[2684]encountered the same problems as it had in
[2685]the review of CIA employee names. As with
[2686]CIA employee names, CIA was reluctant to
[2687]provide name-specific evidence to the Review
[2688]Board, opting instead to offer general princi-
[2689]ples supporting CIA’s request that the Review
[2690]Board redact all names.
[2692]The Review Board ulti-
[2693]mately decided to protect
[2694]the names of sources,
[2695]assets, and informants in
[2696]cases where the identity
[2697]of the: source is of
[2698]reduced public interest
[2699]because CIA sources live
[2700]in countries other than
[2701]the U.S. and were more
[2702]likely to face harm if the
[2703]Board disclosed . their
[2704]relationship with CIA. In
[2705]those records where the
[2706]source’s identity was of
[2707]possible public interest
[2708]in relation to the assassi-
[2709]nation story or was
[2710]important to understand-
[2711]ing information related to
[2712]the assassination, the
[2713]Review Board required the CIA to provide
[2714]additional evidence to support-the protection
[2715]of the source's identity.
[2717]When the Review Board postponed release of
[2718]source names, it did so for ten years except in
[2719]cases where a foreign government might
[2720]accuse the source of committing treason for
[2721]assisting the CIA. In those cases, the Review
[2722]Board protected the source’s name and iden-
[2723]tifying information until 2017.
[2725]b. CIA pseudonyms.
[2727]i. Review Board guidelines. With only a
[2728]few exceptions, the Review Board released
[2729]the pseudonyms of individuals. In some
[2730]instances, the Review Board used pseudo-
[2731]nyms as substitute language for the individ-
[2732]ual’s true name.
[2734]ii. Commentary. Very early in the review
[2735]process, the Review Board determined that,
[2736]since pseudonyms were a sort of “throw
[2737]away” identity for individuals who were
[2738]under cover, the Review Board could release
[2741].the pseudonym without harming the indi-
[2742]vidual. The CIA did not object to the Review
[2743]Board's policy to release pseudonyms. The
[2744]CIA did identify several pseudonyms that it
[2745]believed to be particularly sensitive, and
[2746]demonstrated to the Review Board with clear
[2747]and convincing evidence that release of those
[2748]pseudonyms would do irreparable harm.
[2750]c. CIA crypts.
[2752]i. Review Board guidelines. The Review
[2753]Board released some CIA “crypts”—code
[2754]words for operations and individuals. The
[2755]Review Board also generally released CIA
[2756]“digraphs”—the first two letters of a crypt
[2757]that link a particular crypt to a particular
[2758]location. CIA often created crypts to refer to
[2759]other U.S. government agencies; for example,
[2760]the FBI was “ODENVY.” The Review Board
[2761]made a blanket decision to release all U.S.
[2762]government crypts. The Review Board nearly
[2763]always released CIA crypts where those
[2764]crypts denoted operations or individuals
[2765]relating to Mexico City or Cuba. (The
[2766]digraph for Mexico City was “LI,” and for
[2767]Cuba, it was “AM.”) For all other crypts, the
[2768]Review Board protected the digraph and
[2769]released the remainder of the crypt. The
[2770]Review Board established a few exceptions,
[2771]and where exceptions applied, the Board
[2772]required CIA to provide crypt-specific evi-
[2773]dence of the need to protect.
[2775]ti. Commentary. The Review Board had
[2776]to determine whether it believed that release
[2777]of CIA crypts would harm CIA operations
[2778]and individuals. Section 6(1)(B) and (C) of
[2779]the JFK Act provided the standard for post-
[2780]ponement of CIA crypts. The Review Board
[2781]required the CIA to provide crypt-specific
[2782]clear and convincing evidence that CIA cur-
[2783]rently used, or expected to use the crypt and
[2784]that CIA had not previously released the
[2785]crypt. Thus, in order to convince the Review
[2786]Board to sustain postponements, the Board
[2787]required CIA to research each crypt to deter-
[2788]mine whether CIA still used the individual or
[2789]the operation and provide that evidence to
[2790]the Review Board.
[2792]As it did with CIA agent names, CIA initially _
[2794]requested the Review Board to sustain post-
[2795]ponements of all CIA crypts—even
[2796]“ODENVY”—the CIA's old crypt for the FBI
[2797]that CIA had already released in other CIA
[2799]\SSINATION RECORDS R
[2801]records. CIA argued that its use of crypts was
[2802]an operational method that should remain
[2803]secret, even though CIA had replaced most of
[2804]the crypts at issue years earlier. CIA believed
[2805]that if the Review Board released the crypts,
[2806]researchers would be able to piece together
[2807]the records and determine the identity of
[2808]operations and individuals. CIA further
[2809]argued that the burden of locating evidence
[2810]on each crypt was too heavy.
[2812]The Review Board, conversely, believed that
[2813]CIA conceived crypts as a code to hide the
[2814]identity of an operation or an individual, and
[2815]so the Review Board could release the crypts
[2816]and not compromise the operation or the
[2817]individual. As with CIA agent names, the
[2818]Review Board allowed the CIA ample time to
[2819]locate evidence on each crypt. Finally, the
[2820]Review Board released a group of CIA crypts
[2821]from Mexico City with the “LI” digraph. CIA
[2822]eventually agreed to release its crypts and
[2824]digraphs in assassination records, and the:
[2826]Review Board eventually agreed to protect
[2827]certain sensitive crypts.
[2829]The Review Board recognized that it could
[2830]not conduct a crypt-by-crypt review for
[2831]every CIA record that it encountered. CIA
[2832]records contain hundreds of thousands of
[2833]crypts. Given the need to finish its work, the
[2834]Review Board decided that, for all crypts
[2835]except the “LL” “AM,” and “OD” series
[2836]crypts, it would agree to postpone the loca-
[2837]tion-specific digraph and release the actual
[2838]crypts. Thus, the Review Board released most
[2839]crypts in the collection and the most relevant
[2840]digraphs. The Review Board did make three
[2841]exceptions to its general rule: it protected the
[2842]digraph in non-core files when (a) the crypt
[2843]appeared next to a true name that had been
[2844]released, (b) when the crypt appeared next to
[2845]specific identifying information, and (c)
[2846]when CIA provided clear and convincing
[2847]evidence that the Review Board should pro-
[2848]tect the digraph.
[2850]d. CIA sluglines.
[2852]1, Review Board guidelines. “Sluglines” are
[2853]CIA routing indicators, consisting of two or
[2854]more crypts, that appear above the text in
[2855]CIA cables. (See illustration.) The Review
[2856]Board released CIA sluglines according to the
[2857]same criteria it applied to crypts and
[2858]digraphs.
[2862]Bee
[2864]awn
[2866]ee ye
[2868]Seen a
[2870]CHAPTER 5: THE STANDARDS FOR REVIEW: REVIEW BOARD “COMMON Law”
[2872]ii. Commentary. The Review Board
[2873]rleased CIA sluglines because the Agency
[2874]r offered the Review Board any evidence
[2875]to explain why the Board should not release
[2876]them. An example of a CIA slugline is
[2877]“RYBAT GPFLOOR.” “RYBAT” is a CIA
[2878]that meant “secret,” and GPFLOOR
[2879]was the crypt that CIA gave Lee Harvey
[2880]Oswald during its post-assassination investi-
[2881]gation. CIA initially asked the Review Board
[2882]to postpone the CIA slugline even where CIA
[2883]had released the individual crypts that made
[2884]up the slugline elsewhere. For example, in
[2885]the case of “RYBAT GPFLOOR,” the CIA
[2886]agreed to release the crypt “RYBAT” in two
[2887]places elsewhere in the document at issue,
[2888]and the CIA agreed to release the crypt
[2889](;3PFLOOR when it appeared in the text. CIA
[2890]told the Review Board that it could not, how-
[2891]ever, release the slugline “RYBAT
[2892]GPFLOOR.” CIA offered no substantive
[2893]arguments to support its request for post-
[2894]ponement of the slugline. Given the statute’s
[2895]demand that CIA provide clear and convinc-
[2896]ing evidence in support of its requests for
[2897]postponement, the Review Board voted to
[2898]1elcase CIA sluglines.
[2904]« CLA surveillance methods.
[2906]i. Review Board guidelines. The Review
[2907]Board generally released CIA surveillance
[2908]methods, the details of their implementation,
[2909]and the product produced by them where the
[2910]Review Board believed the methods were rel-
[2911]cvant to the assassination. The Review Board
[2912]sustained postponements of CIA surveillance
[2913]methods where CIA provided convincing
[2914]evidence that the method still merited pro-
[2915]tection. Where the Review Board sustained
[2916]the CIA’s requests for postponement of sur-
[2917]veillance methods, it substituted the lan-
[2918]Kulage “surveillance method,” “operational
[2919]details,” or “sensitive operation.”
[2921]ii. Commentary. As with all its sources
[2922]and methods, CIA initially requested the
[2923]Review Board to postpone all of its surveil-
[2924]lance methods since, CIA argued, CIA cur-
[2925]rently conducts surveillance operations. The
[2926]Review Board, on the other hand, believed
[2927]that it was not a secret that CIA currently
[2928]conducts surveillance operations. Moreover,
[2929]the Review Board did not believe that its
[2930]Votes to release CIA surveillance methods in
[2931]Mexico City in 1963 would jeopardize cur-
[2933]53
[2935]rent CIA surveillance operations. Finally, the
[2936]Review Board recognized that certain CIA
[2937]surveillance operations in Mexico City in
[2938]1963 were already well-known to the public
[2939]because the U.S. government had disclosed
[2940]details about those operations. CJA surveil-
[2941]lance, particularly telephone taps and photo
[2942]operations, was a major element in the story
[2943]of Oswald’s 1963 trip to Mexico City. (See
[2944]illustration.)
[2946]The Board, therefore, concluded that the pub-
[2947]lic interest in disclosure far outweighed any
[2948]risk to national security and directed release
[2949]of the information. However, in records that
[2950]CIA proved did contain information about
[2951]current operations, the Review Board voted
[2952]to postpone the information.
[2954]CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
[2955]Dare: 29 NOV 63
[2958]“DUP OF
[2959]cee. 230-650
[2962]1s FEEL ERTKYROID 3 SHOULD CO MEXT SVEN THOUCH ALVARADO FAY BE
[2963]IM WEXICAR HANDS. ASSUNE HE CAN BE USED AS CONSULTANT AT LEAST,
[2965]IMMEDIATE NEXT NANA
[2966]Shogtine G
[2967]RYBAT CPFLOOR
[2968]REF MANA 4617
[2971]THAT ME WILL RNOW WHETHER KE CAH ARD SUOULD CONTACT MEXICAN AUTHORITIES,
[2972]AND THAT NEXT WILL CLEAR ANY ACTIVE USE WE MAXE OF HIN VITH THE
[2973]ODEWY REP. ODOWY HERE KNOWS HE IS COMING TO HEXI TO KELP.
[2975]Qe AT 1850 WASHINGTON TIME, WHICH IS ABOUT 16350 YOUR TINE, WE HAVE
[2977]mania
[2980]Com pe EE
[2982]WO FURTHER HEVS OR REQUESTS.
[2983]ON THE WIRE ON SHORT NOTICE.
[2985]f CIA installations.
[2987]i. Review Board guidelines. The Review
[2988]Board used date “windows” within which it
[2989]released the locations of CIA installations
[2990]where the location was relevant to the assas-
[2991]sination. Specifically, the Review Board
[2992]released the location of CIA installations
[2993]relating to Mexico City during the time
[2994]period 1960-1969. Likewise, the Review
[2996]13-00000
[2998]Record reviewed unilaterally by CIA In 1992,
[3000]BYISH UWL © see:
[3004]Hoch bas ben qhite 2 about the de: ter (y tae
[3005]station) Ing ending Ge fia entle regocs tin ren one
[3006]nave Lee OSWALD. xs TE cased Sg Weve RILALE bask 8
[3007]qe of RUE oa ee 2 af Ge Soviet tat of ftze: 2
[3009]sap majum t and unnseate rd aad indicates wae
[3011]SU*UECT: Petey tn sendane the fi 6 cable stout
[3014]- a :
[3017]i
[3018]1
[3019]# Mane trate euie Rat, beon Tequet cad ea the bes ts
[3020]we neha siear wee Bs cet Taga cae a fan tat
[3021]Sea: cite. ———— 7
[3024]“iene Gray a, pegeees % ste'ntsberse “apieae, (Sabla oF
[3026]SoRETED PS RETR 162?
[3027]ofan SADT GEM
[3029]SEAOUEIIS te
[3031]Board generally released the location of all
[3032]CIA installations that were relevant to the
[3033]assassination during the time period
[3034]between the date of the assassination—
[3035]November 22, 1963—and the date that the
[3036]Warren Commission issued its report in Sep-
[3037]tember 1964. Finally, the Review Board gen-
[3038]erally released the location of all CIA installa-
[3039]tions that appeared in Oswald's 201 file
[3040]during the time period January 1, 1961
[3041]through October 1, 1964. The Review Board
[3042]did grant CIA a few exceptions to its general
[3043]rule, and except for the specific time win-
[3044]dows described above, the Review Board
[3045]protected all information that identified CIA
[3047]installation locations.
[3049]The Review Board created substitute lan-
[3050]guage for its postponement of CIA installa-
[3051]tions to enable researchers to track a particu-
[3052]lar CIA installation through the JFK
[3053]collection without revealing the city or coun-
[3054]try in which it is located. To accomplish this,
[3056]Same record after Review Board action in 1995.
[3060]SESET: “ele tn womdicg the fire Calde aloes
[3062]has boon wciie alow
[3063]kes ersten) y He altar Ge igre ges Ce nt Mexico
[3064]eet Bstines ce vr art ot tue havtts cae rears Seat ath
[3065]= io ay
[3066]"Ee Ra Citar a atiad Wtndicete eat Bevo
[3068]Morea Ly as isn trey crs for
[3069]ava Teen pieced cp on a aotciags
[3071]Py v9 prole tly
[3072]renee Land posed 44 ction ca WE wext work
[3074]ait the caver.
[3075]bt of cher tine, eee date we tn ule Sneha es
[3076]bo er Ar do near es a) ward
[3078]same trace Cortd have bee
[3079]¢ riage but at cen! ne pean hte thet
[3080]tation, axted the Bodograt i L covnege Re ise the
[3081]ifcew em ronler. tas aha pore of
[3082]pee rere Ere ry proieee “y te et, ot ds Bel rd ae
[3084]the Review Board divided the world into five
[3085]regions: Western Hemisphere, Western
[3086]Europe, Northern Europe, East Asia/ Pacific,
[3087]and Africa/ Near East/ South Asia. Then the
[3088]Board added a number to refer to each differ-
[3089]ent location in the region. Thus, “CIA Instal-
[3090]lation in Western Hemisphere 1” serves as a
[3091]place holder for a particular installation in all
[3092]CIA assassination records.
[3094]ii. Commentary. Initially, the Review
[3095]Board released CIA installation locations in
[3096]CIA documents relevant to Oswald’s visit to
[3097]Mexico City. CIA did not raise significant
[3098]objections to the Review Board's release of its
[3099]installations in these records.
[3101]When the Review Board began to vote to
[3102]release the location of additional CIA instal-
[3103]lation locations, the CIA did object, but did
[3104]not offer evidence of the harm to national
[3105]security that it believed would result from
[3106]disclosure of the information. The CIA
[3109]1 3-00000
[3111]threatened to appeal to the President to over-
[3112]turn the Review Board’s votes, but the
[3113]Review Board's position was that the JFK Act
[3114]required release of information where CIA
[3115]did not provide convincing evidence to sup-
[3116]port their postponements. The Review Board
[3117]allowed the CIA ample time to gather and
[3118]present its evidence to support its requests
[3120]for postponements as both the CIA and the -
[3122]Review Board hoped to avoid a CIA appeal
[3123]to the President.
[3125]Ultimately, the CIA determined that it would
[3126]trust Review Board members with the infor-
[3127]mation that the Review Board required to
[3128]postpone the release of :the location of a
[3129]small number of CIA installations. In an
[3130]effort to balance high public interest in the
[3132]location of CIA installations and the need to.
[3134]protect certain installations, the Review
[3135]Board decided to establish date “windows”
[3136]within which it would release CIA installa-
[3137]tion locations.
[3139]The CIA never appealed a Review Board vote
[3141]to the President.
[3142]g. CIA prefixes (cable, dispatch, field report).
[3144]i. Review Board guidelines. CIA cable, dis-
[3145]patch, and field report “prefixes” are identi-
[3147]fiers that CIA uses on its communications to -
[3149]indicate the installation that generates a par-
[3150]ticular message. Where the Review Board
[3151]had voted to release the location of a particu-
[3152]lar CIA installation, the Review Board also
[3153]voted to release CIA cable, dispatch, and
[3154]field report prefixes that the installation gen-
[3155]erated. Likewise, the Review Board protected
[3156]cable, dispatch, and field report prefixes
[3158]_ where it voted to protect the location of the
[3159]CIA installation.
[3161]The Review Board replaced the prefixes that
[3162]it protected with substitute language similar
[3163]to that used for CIA installations. An exam-
[3164]ple of substitute language for CIA prefixes is:
[3165]“Cable Prefix for CIA Installation in Western
[3166]Hemisphere 1.”
[3168]li. Commentary. Once the Review Board
[3169]voted to release the location of a particular
[3170]CIA installation, the Review Board and CIA
[3171]did not disagree that the Board should release
[3172]cable, dispatch and field report prefixes.
[3176]h. CIA job titles.
[3178]i. Review Board guidelines. The Review
[3179]Board voted to release CIA employees’ job
[3180]titles except when the Board’s disclosure of
[3181]the title might reveal the identity of an indi-
[3182]vidual or CIA installation requiring protec-
[3183]tion.
[3185]li. Commentary. Although the Review
[3186]Board did not believe that it should vote to
[3187]protect CIA job titles, standing alone, it some-
[3188]times voted to protect titles if they revealed
[3189]other information that the Review Board had
[3190]voted to protect.
[3192]i. CIA file numbers.
[3194]i. Review Board guidelines. CLA organizes
[3195]many of its files by country and assigns
[3196]“country identifiers” within particular file
[3197]numbers. The Review Board released nearly
[3198]all CIA file numbers that referred to Mexico
[3199]City. The Review Board protected the “coun-
[3200]try identifiers” in CIA file numbers for all
[3201]other countries with the exception of country
[3202]identifiers “15” and “19.” The Review Board
[3203]generally released all CIA “201” or “person-
[3204]ality” file numbers where the files related to
[3205]the assassination.
[3207]ii. Commentary. The CIA rarely objected
[3208]to the Review Board’s release of its file num-
[3209]bers.
[3211]j. CIA domestic facilities.
[3213]i. Review Board guidelines. The Review
[3214]Board released references to domestic CIA
[3215]facilities where the CIA has previously offi-
[3216]cially disclosed the existence of the facility.
[3217]The Review Board did not release informa-
[3218]tion that would reveal the location of domes-
[3219]tic CIA facilities where the CIA provided evi-
[3220]dence that the facility was still in use.
[3222]ii. Commentary. The Review Board rarely
[3223]encountered the issue of whether to release
[3224]the location of CIA domestic facilities in
[3225]assassination records, as CIA officially
[3226]acknowledges most of its domestic facilities.
[3227]When the Review Board did vote to postpone
[3228]the location of CIA domestic facilities, it
[3229]required the CIA to provide extensive evi-
[3230]dence as to why the CIA had to keep the loca-
[3231]tion of those facilities secret.
[3234]k. CIA official cover..
[3236]i. Review Board guidelines. CIA “official
[3237]cover” is a means by which a CIA officer can
[3238]operate overseas in the guise of an employee
[3239]of another government agency. In congres-
[3240]sional documents, the Review Board released
[3241]general information about official cover but
[3242]protected specific details. With regard to exec-
[3243]utive branch documents, the CIA convinced the
[3244]Review Board that, while Congress might
[3245]reveal information about official cover, the
[3246]executive branch does not generally reveal
[3247]information about official cover because to
[3248]do so would damage the national security.
[3249]Thus, the Review Board sustained CIA’s
[3250]postponements regarding official cover in
[3251]executive branch documents unless the U.S.
[3252]government had previously officially dis-
[3253]closed the information at issue.
[3255]The Review Board inserted the phrase “offi-
[3256]cial cover” as substitute language when it
[3257]postponed such information.
[3259]ii. Commentary. The Review Board ini-
[3260]tially considered the issue of official cover to
[3261]be an “open secret” that was well-known to
[3262]the public. Thus, they were loathe to withhold
[3263]such obvious information. The CIA, however,
[3264]supported its strong objections in briefings
[3265]and negotiations with the Board, and eventu-
[3266]ally convinced the Review Board that the
[3267]harm in releasing information about official
[3268]cover outweighed any additional information
[3269]that assassination researchers might gain from
[3270]knowing details about official cover.
[3272]1. Alias documentation.
[3274]i. Review Board guidelines. CLA employ-
[3275]ees and agents use aliases and the CIA cre-
[3276]ates documentation to support its employ-
[3277]ees’ and agents’ aliases. The Review Board
[3278]released information that revealed that CIA
[3279]employees and agents used aliases. The
[3280]Board protected specific details about how
[3281]CIA documents particular aliases.
[3283]ii. Commentary. The CIA argued that it
[3284]currently uses alias documentation and that
[3285]aliases are vital to CIA’s performance of its
[3286]intelligence operations. The CIA also argued
[3288]. that the Review Board's release of specific
[3289]information about alias documentation
[3290]would not be useful to assassination
[3292]researchers. The Review Board members
[3293]accepted CIA's arguments, primarily because
[3294]they agreed that the public interest in the
[3295]specific details about alias documentation
[3296]was low’ The Review Board determined that
[3297]it did not want the CIA to spend a large
[3298]amount of time gathering evidence in sup-
[3299]port of postponements that were of low pub-
[3300]lic interest and, thus, it did not require the
[3301]CIA to provide evidence in support of every
[3302]postponement relating to alias documenta-
[3303]tion.
[3305]m. Foreign intelligence cooperation.
[3306]i. Review Board guidelines. The Review
[3307]Board postponed references to foreign intelli-
[3309]gence cooperation with the CIA.
[3311]ii. Commentary. The Review Beard vigor-
[3312]ously debated the issue of foreign intelli-
[3314]"gence cooperation with the CIA and,
[3316]demanded extensive evidence and multiple
[3317]briefings from the CIA on the subject.
[3318]Though in some instances Board members
[3319]judged that the information might add to the
[3320]historical understanding of the assassination,
[3321]the Review Board, with some dissent, deter-
[3322]mined that the evidence to postpone the
[3323]information outweighed this potential value.
[3325]n. Human sources in FBI foreign
[3326]counterintelligence (assets).
[3328]i, Review Board guidelines. The Review
[3329]Board evaluated the need to postpone the
[3330]identity of human sources in foreign counter-
[3331]intelligence operations on a-case-by-case
[3332]basis. Where the human source was a foreign
[3333]national, the Review Board generally agreed
[3334]to protect the individual's identity unless the
[3335]individual’s connection with the FBI was
[3336]already known to the foreign government at
[3337]issue. Where the human source was a United
[3338]States citizen interacting with foreign govern-
[3339]ment officials, the Review Board sometimes
[3340]released the identity of the individual if the
[3341]public interest in the name of the asset was.
[3342]high. Where the human source was a United
[3343]States citizen interacting with other United
[3344]States citizens, the Review Board tended to
[3345]evaluate the release of the source’s name
[3346]more like other domestic informants.
[3348]ii. Commentary. In its position paper, the
[3349]FBI defined “intelligence source” as “any
[3352]’ CHAPTER 5:
[3354]individual who has provided or is currently
[3355]providing information pertaining to national
[3356]security matters, the disclosure of which
[3357]could reasonably be expected to result in
[3358]damage to the FBI's intelligence and counter-
[3359]intelligence-gathering capabilities.”
[3361]The FBI offered the following arguments in
[3362]support of its request to keep intelligence
[3363]sources’ identities secret: (1) Review Board
[3364]disclosure of intelligence sources would harm
[3365]the FBI's ability to develop and maintain new
[3366]and existing sources, because sources would
[3367]reasonably . believe that the government
[3368]would reveal their identities, and (2) disclo-
[3369]sure of intelligence sources may subject the
[3370]sources, their friends, and their families to
[3371]physical harm, ridicule, or ostracism.
[3373]The Review Board’s interpretation of the
[3374]“clear and convincing” evidence. standard
[3375]required it to reject the FBI’s general policy
[3376]arguments, and instead required the FBI to
[3377]present asset-specific evidence that explained
[3378]ihe particular harm that the FBI expected the
[3379]asset to face if the Review Board voted to dis-
[3380]close his or her identity. As a general rule, the
[3381]Keview Board usually protected the identities
[3382]of foreign nationals who could be prosecuted
[3383]in their home countries for espionage. Like-
[3384]wisc, where the asset was a United States cit-
[3385]izen interacting with foreign government offi-
[3386]cials, the Review Board considered whether
[3387]the individual was in a position of trust with
[3388]the foreign government: and whether he or
[3389]she might be in danger if the Review Board
[3390]disclosed his or her relationship with the FBI.
[3391]Unlike the above-referenced scenarios, the
[3392]source who was a United States citizen interact-
[3393]ing with other United States citizens was gener-
[3394]ally evaluated according to the Board's
[3395]domestic informant standards.
[3397]0. FBI foreign counterintelligence activities.
[3399]i. Review Board guidelines. As a general’
[3401]rule, the Review Board believed that most
[3402]Aspects of the FBI's foreign counterintelli-
[3403]Kence activities against Communist Bloc
[3404]countries during the cold war period were
[3405]well-known, were of high public interest,
[3406]and were not eligible for postponement pur-
[3407]suant to § 6(1)(B)-(C) of the JFK Act.
[3409]i. Commentary and overview of foreign
[3410]counterintelligence appeals. The FBI's assassi-
[3412]_dence on the foreign
[3414]nation records contain information that
[3415]reveal many of the FBI's foreign counterintel-
[3416]ligence activities during the cold war period.
[3417]Beginning in late 1995, the Review Board
[3418]considered how it could release as much
[3419]information as possible in the records with-
[3420]out jeopardizing operations that still require
[3421]protection.
[3423]In spring 1996, the
[3424]Review Board considered
[3425]and voted on a group of
[3426]FBI records relating to the
[3427]FBI's foreign counterin-
[3428]telligence activities. In
[3429]response to the Review
[3430]Board’s requests for evi-
[3432]counterintelligence
[3433]records, the FBI had pro-
[3434]vided its “position paper”
[3435]on foreign counterintelli-
[3436]gence activities. In its
[3437]paper, the FBI defined
[3438]“intelligence activities” as
[3439]“intelligence gathering action or techniques
[3440]utilized by the FBI against a targeted individ-
[3441]ual or organization that has been determined
[3442]to be of national security interest.” The FBI's
[3443]primary argument in support of its request for
[3444]continued secrecy of intelligence activities
[3445]was that disclosure of specific information
[3446]describing intelligence activities would reveal
[3447]to hostile entities the FBI’s targets and priori-
[3448]ties, thereby allowing hostile entities to
[3449]develop countermeasures.
[3451]Sections 6(1)(B) and (C) of the JFK Act pro-
[3452]vided the standard for postponement. ‘In
[3453]addition, the JFK Act's legislative history
[3454]instructed the Review Board to consider a
[3455]variety of factors related to the need to post-
[3456]pone disclosure of intelligence sources and
[3457]methods, including the age of the record,
[3458]whether the use of a particular source or
[3459]method is already well-known by the public,
[3460]whether the source or method is inherently
[3461]secret, or whether the information collected
[3462]was secret.”
[3464]The Review Board considered the FBI’s evi-
[3465]dence and weighed it against public interest
[3466]in the records. After careful consideration,
[3467]the Review Board decided to release some
[3468]foreign counterintelligence information. The
[3469]Board’s primary reason for releasing such
[3472]13-00000
[3474]records was its belief that the FBI‘s evidence
[3475]did not enumerate specific harms that would
[3476]result from disclosure.
[3478]A. The FBI's May 1996 Appeals to the
[3479]President. On May 10 and 28, 1996, the FBI
[3480]appealed to the President to overturn the
[3481]Board‘s vote on 17 records relating to the
[3482]FBI’s surveillance of officials and establish-
[3483]ments of four Communist countries—the
[3484]Soviet Union, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, and
[3485]Poland—during the 1960s. The FBI's overar-
[3486]ching arguments were that disclosure of the
[3488]information would reveal sensitive sources
[3490]and methods that would compromise the
[3491]national security of the United States, and
[3492]that disclosure of the targets of the surveil-
[3493]lance—the four Communist countries—
[3494]would harm the foreign relations of the
[3495]United States.
[3497]The FBI sought to postpone five types of
[3498]source and method capabilities: tracing of
[3499]funds, physical surveillance (lookout logs),
[3500]mail cover, electronic surveillance, and type-
[3501]writer and fingerprint identification. The
[3502]Review Board’s response briefs to the Presi-
[3503]dent dealt with each source or method in
[3504]turn. Specific details regarding the appeal of
[3505]each issue are discussed below.
[3507]In response to the FBI‘s overarching argu-
[3508]ment that disclosure of the information
[3509]would reveal sensitive sources and methods
[3510]and compromise the national security, the
[3511]Review Board responded that if the national
[3512]security would be harmed by release of this
[3513]information, the harm would have already
[3514]occurred, since the FBI had already released
[3515]both the identities of the target countries and
[3516]the sources and methods that the FBI used in
[3517]its operations.
[3519]In response to the FBI's arguments that dis-
[3520]closure of the targets of the surveillance
[3521]would harm the foreign relations of the United
[3522]States, the Review Board responded in three
[3523]parts. First, the information that the FBI
[3524]sought to protect is widely available in the
[3525]public domain, from both official govern-
[3526]ment sources and secondary sources, so if
[3527]foreign relations are harmed by disclosure of
[3528]the information, then the harm has already
[3529]occurred, Second, the FBI simply did not
[3530]prove its argument that it may have violated
[3531]international law or “diplomatic standards”
[3533]by employing the sources or methods at issue
[3534]since the FBI did not cite the laws or treaties
[3535]to which it referred and the Review Board
[3536]could not locate any laws or treaties that
[3537]were in effect at the time that the records
[3538]were created. Third, despite the FBI's asser-
[3539]tion to the contrary, the Review Board had
[3540]evidence that other governments do acknowl-
[3541]edge that, in past years, they conducted for-
[3542]eign counterintelligence operations against
[3543]other countries.
[3545]The Review Board believed that the FBI had
[3546]not provided evidence of a “significant,
[3547]demonstrable harm” to current foreign rela-
[3548]tions or intelligence work. Thus, the Board
[3549]asked the President to deny the FBI's requests
[3550]for postponement. The White House did not
[3551]expressly rule on the appeals. Instead, after
[3552]several meetings involving representatives
[3553]from the Review Board, the FBI, and the White
[3554]House, the White House directed the FBI to
[3555]provide the Review Board with specific evi-
[3556]dence in support of its postponements. The
[3557]White House requested the Review Board to
[3558]reconsider the Bureau’s specific evidence. The
[3559]FBI, in turn, withdrew the first two of its
[3560]pending appeals, including some records in
[3561]which the Review Board voted to release
[3562]information obtained from a technical source.
[3564]B. Post-appeal decisionmaking. After fur-
[3565]ther negotiations, the Review Board and the
[3566]FBI agreed to release most information
[3567]regarding its .foreign counterintelligence
[3568]activities against Communist Bloc countries
[3569]as “consent releases.” In those few cases
[3570]where the Bureau believed that foreign coun-
[3571]terintelligence activity against Communist
[3572]Bloe countries still required protection, the
[3573]Bureau submitted for the Board’s determina-
[3574]tion postponement-specific evidence.
[3576]To the extent that the information in the FBI's
[3577]proposed redaction did not meaningfully
[3578]contribute to the understanding of the assas-
[3579]sination, the Review Board allowed the FBI
[3580]to postpone direct discussions of foreign
[3581]counterintelligence activities against non-
[3582]Communist Bloc countries. With regard to
[3583]the FBI’s “segregated collections,” the
[3584]Review Board stated in its segreated collec-
[3585]tion guidelines,
[3587]It is presumed that the FBI will, at least
[3588]partially, carry over its post-appeal stan-
[3591]13-00000 |
[3594]13-00000
[3596]a
[3597]t
[3599]OGC-92-53256
[3600]14 December 1992
[3602]MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Historical Review Group
[3604]VIA: W. George James
[3605]Associate Gene unsel
[3606]Litigation Divisigh, OGC
[3608]FROM: Robert J. Eatinger, Jr.
[3609]Assistant General Counsel
[3610]Litigation Division, OGC
[3612]SUBJECT: Declassification Guidelines Established by the
[3613]President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records
[3614]Collection Act of 1992
[3616]1. The enactment of the President John F. Kennedy
[3617]Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 ("the Act") has
[3618]created declassification guidelines that are to some extent
[3619]different from the Historical Review Program guidelines
[3620]established by the Director of Central Intelligence. In the
[3621]continuing review of material related to the assassination of
[3622]President Kennedy, the guidelines established by the Act must be
[3623]used.
[3625]2. The Act's most fundamental changes are the burden it
[3626]creates on agencies to justify continued classification of
[3627]information, and a requirement that agencies balance the national
[3628]security concerns against the public interest. Under the Act,
[3629]information must be declassified unless a showing is made by
[3630]clear and convincing evidence that release of the information
[3631]would demonstrably impair the national security.
[3633]3. The Act's guidelines for declassification are found in
[3634]its Section 6 and are as follows:
[3636]‘Sec 6. GROUND FOR POSTPONEMENT OF PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF
[3637]RECORDS. ;
[3639]Disclosure of assassination records or particular
[3640]information in assassination records to the public may be
[3641]postponed subject to the limitations of this Act if there is
[3642]clear and convincing evidence that--
[3644](1) the threat to the military defense,
[3645]intelligence operations, or conduct of foreign
[3646]relations of the United States posed by the public
[3647]‘disclosure of the assassination is of such gravity that
[3649]13-00000.
[3651]it outweighs the public interest, and such public
[3652]disclosure would reveal --
[3654](A) an intelligence agent whose identity
[3655]currently requires protection;
[3657](B) an intelligence source or method which
[3658]is currently utilized, by the United States
[3659]Government and which has not been officially
[3660]disclosed, the disclosure of which would interfere
[3661]with the conduct of intelligence activities; or
[3663](C) Any other matter currently relating to
[3664]the military defense, intelligence operations or
[3665]conduct of foreign relations of the United States,
[3666]the disclosure of which would demonstrably impair
[3667]the national security of the United States;
[3669](2) the public disclosure of the assassination
[3670]record would reveal the name or identity of a living
[3671]person who provided confidential information to the
[3672]United States and would pose a substantial risk to that
[3673]person; “—
[3675](3) the public disclosure of the assassination
[3676]record could reasonably be expected to constitute-an
[3677]unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that
[3678]invasion of privacy is so substantial that it outweighs
[3679]the public interest;
[3681](4) the public disclosure of the assassination
[3682]record would compromise the existence of an
[3683]understanding of confidentiality currently requiring
[3684]protection between a Government agent and a cooperating
[3685]individual or a foreign government, and public
[3686]disclosure would be so harmful that it outweighs the
[3687]public interest; or
[3689](5) the public disclosure of the assassination
[3690]record would reveal a security or protective procedure
[3691]currently utilized, or reasonably expected to be
[3692]utilized, by the Secret service or another Government
[3693]agency responsible for protecting Government officials,
[3694]and public disclosure would be so harmful that it-
[3695]outweighs the public interest.
[3697]4. The Act therefore superseded the guidelines established
[3698]for the Historical Review Program to the extent the Historical
[3699]Review Group (HRG) is processing information related to the
[3700]assassination of President Kennedy. The specific changes are as
[3701]follows.
[3703]a. The most basic change is that you must apply a
[3704]balancing test before maintaining the classification of any
[3705]information. You must balance continued classification
[3706]against the public interest in the information. Therefore,
[3707]the greater light disclosure of the information would shed
[3708]on the assassination of the President, or on the
[3710]2
[3712]13-00000
[3714]t
[3715].
[3717]government's investigation into that assassination, the more
[3718]serious must be the need to continue to withhold the
[3719]information for classification to be maintained.
[3721]b. HR 70-14.e(2) states the reviewers of information
[3722]advocating continued classification of information will bear
[3723]the burden identifying any damage that disclosure could
[3724]reasonably be expected to cause to the national security.
[3725]The Act defines that burden as one of "clear and convincing
[3726]evidence." Further, the Act changes "reasonably could be
[3727]expected to cause" to "demonstrably." Therefore, unless a
[3728]showing is made by clear and convincing evidence that
[3729]release of the information would demonstrably impair the
[3730]national security, the information must be declassified.
[3732]c. HR 70-14.e(4) addresses the standards for
[3733]maintaining the classification of foreign government
[3734]information, the identity of a foreign source, and
[3735]intelligence sources and methods. It notes that Executive
[3736]Order 12,356 presumes that this information is classified.
[3737]Under the Act, with respect to these categories of -
[3738]classified information found with records related to the
[3739]assassination of President Kennedy, you must still find
[3740]demonstrable damage by clear and convincing evidence
[3741]regardless of the presumption in the Executive Order.
[3742]Further, with respect to intelligence sources and methods,
[3743]the Act requires that they--
[3745](1) be either currently utilized or reasonably
[3746]expected to be utilized by the U.S. Government; and
[3748](2) that they not have been officially disclosed;
[3749]and
[3751](3) that their disclosure would interfere with the
[3752]conduct of intelligence activities. ;
[3753]All of these factors must be met by a showing of clear and
[3754]convincing evidence.
[3756]d. HR 70-14.e(4) also discusses CIA personnel and
[3757]organizational information. The Act only permits the
[3758]continued withholding of the identity of an "intelligence
[3759]agent" if, by clear and convincing evidence, it can be shown
[3760]the person's identity requires protection. Further, the Act
[3761]does not permit the withholding of organizational
[3762]information unless, by clear and convincing evidence, it can
[3763]be shown the disclosure of the organizational data would
[3764]demonstrably impair the national security.
[3766]e. HR 70-14.e(7) states that the HRG will determine
[3767]whether information warrants continued protection pursuant
[3768]to statutory or other requirements. The Act supersedes all
[3769]other statutory authority for withholding information except
[3771]3
[3773]13-00000
[3775]for a provision of the Internal Revenue Code dealing with
[3776]tax return information. This means the Act takes precedence
[3777]over 50 U.S.C. § 403(d) (3) and § 403g, as well as the
[3778]Privacy Act, when determining whether to release records
[3779]related to the assassination of President Kennedy. The Act
[3780]also makes no provision for protecting information on the
[3781]basis of executive privilege, such as deliberative process
[3782]and attorney-client communications.
[3784]5. Certain categories of information may fall into more
[3785]than one of the grounds set forth in Section 6 of the Act. We
[3786]recommend that you review all of the grounds when determining
[3787]whether to release or withhold specific information. For
[3788]example, a human intelligence source may fall into grounds (1) (A)
[3789]("intelligence agent"), (1)(B) ("intelligence source"), (2)
[3790]("living person who provided confidential information to the
[3791]United States"), and/or (4) ("understanding of confidentiality
[3792]currently requiring protection between a Government agent and a
[3793]cooperating individual"). At this point, we do not know how the
[3794]Assassination Records Review Board will interpret each of these
[3795]grounds. Therefore, if you determine the standards of the Act
[3796]are met to permit withholding of certain information, you should
[3797]assert as many grounds as may arguably apply as authority for
[3798]that withholding.
[3800]6. Although the Act severely limits what information may be
[3801]withheld from disclosure, it may be possible to protect
[3802]information not expressly covered by the Act. However, such
[3803]information may be withheld only with the personal authorization
[3804]of the President. When the President signed the Act, he issued a
[3805]statement that included the following:
[3807]My authority to protect [executive branch
[3808]Geliberations, law enforcement information of the
[3809]executive branch, and national security information]
[3810]comes from the Constitution and cannot be limited by
[3811]statute. Although only the most extraordinary
[3812]circumstances would require postponement of the
[3813]disclosure of documents for reasons other than those
[3814]recognized in the bill, I cannot abdicate my
[3815]constitutional responsibility to take such action when
[3816]necessary. :
[3818]7. The Act provides individuals the ability under ‘the
[3819]Administrative Procedures Act to challenge in court final
[3820]decisions of the Assassination Records Board. We can expect,
[3821]then, court challenges to the Board's decisions to uphold any of
[3822]our determinations that certain information meets the criteria
[3823]for postponement of release. Additionally, as you know, there
[3824]are FOIA litigations for this same material. Plaintiff's counsel
[3825]has indicated in court pleadings and orally that he wants the
[3826]court to review our redactions not under FOIA standards, but
[3827]under the standards of the Act. Thus, you should apply the Act's
[3828]standards knowing your judgments may be questioned by the Board,
[3830]4
[3832]13-00000
[3834]subsequent court challenges to the Board's action, and the FOIA
[3835]cases. ,
[3837]8. If you have any questions concerning the application of
[3838]the Act to your review of the assassination records, please cail
[3839]me on secure extension 76105.
[3842]13-00000
[3844]DCI/OGC/RJE:ig 76105/ 15 Dec 1992
[3845]OGC-92-53256
[3847]Distribution:
[3849]- Addressee
[3851]- DO/IRO
[3853]- DI/IRO
[3855]- DS&T/TRO
[3857]- DA/IRO
[3859]- DCI/IRO ‘
[3862]ERR
[3864]- DPH
[3866]- Lit file
[3868]- EC
[3870]- WGI
[3872]- RJE Soft file
[3873]- OGC Chrono
[3875]- RJE Signer
[3877]a a
[3878]1
[3880]13-00000
[3882]-,.
[3886]ASENCY- INTERNAL USE ONLY
[3887]PRIVILESED ATTORNEY WORK PROCUCT
[3891]OGC-94-52916
[3892]19 September 1994
[3894]MEMORANDUM FOR: David P. Holmes
[3895]Deputy General Counsel
[3897]FROM: Robert J. Eatinger. Jr.
[3898]Assistant General Counsel
[3899]Litigation Division, OGC
[3901]SUBGECT: DCI Sources and Methods Authority With Respect
[3902]to JFK Assassination Records
[3904]1. Per your request, I have attached a copy of the
[3905]President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of
[3906]1992 {ARCA), Pub. L. 102-526, 106 Stat. 3443-3458, reprinted-at
[3907]44 U.S.C. § 2107 note. For ycur convenience, I have highlighted
[3908]the pertinent provisions that will aid in reszronding to an
[3909]inquiry regarding the statute's effect on the DCI's statutory
[3910]authority to protect intelligence sources and methceds.
[3912]2. The clear language and intent of the law is to supersede
[3913]statuces that prohibit disclesure of information, except for some
[3914]irrelevant subject areas, such_as tax records. The statute
[3915]provides that "it shall take precedence over any other law
[3916](except section 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code), judicial
[3917]decision construing such law, or common law doctrine that would
[3918]otherwise prohibit" the disclosure of information subject to the
[3919]Act. ARCA § 11(a). This language, taken with the provisions
[3920]discussed below which limit the intelligence sources and methods
[3921]that may be protected and set a strict procedural scheme by which
[3922]information is to be reviewed under the ARCA, effectively
[3923]supersedes the DCI's National Security Act authority with respect
[3924]to incelligence sources and methods information subject to the
[3925]ARCA.
[3927]3. Section 6 of the ARCA provides the grounds for which the
[3928]release of information may be "postponed." The statute
[3929]contemplates that all information will eventually be released.
[3930]Indeed, it specifies that all information will be made available
[3931]to the public no later than 25 years after the. passage of the
[3932]ARCA (which occurred in October 1992) unless the president
[3933]certifies that continued postponement is necessary. ARCA
[3934]§ 4(g) (2) (D). With respect to intelligence-related information,
[3935]ARCA allows postponement if:
[3937]"(1) the threat to ... intelligence operations ... is
[3938]of such gravity that it outweighs the public interest, and
[3939]such public disclosure would reveal--
[3941]PRIVILEGED ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
[3942]AGENCY- INTERNAL USE ONLY
[3944]I
[3946]13-00600 |
[3947]wha AGENCY- INTERNAL USE ONLY
[3948]PRIVILEGED ATTORNEY WORK PRODUC
[3950]SUBJECT: DCI Sources and Methods Authority With Respect to JFK
[3951]Assassination Records
[3953](A) an intelligence agent whose identity currently
[3954]requires protection;
[3956](B) an intelligence source or method which is
[3957]currently utilized, or reasonably expected to be
[3958]utilized, by the United States Government and which has
[3959]not_been officially disclosed, the disclosure of which
[3960]would interfere with the cenduct of intelligence
[3961]activities; or
[3963](C) any other matter currently relating to ...
[3964]intelligence operations ... the disclosure of which
[3966]would demonstrably impair the national security of the
[3967]United States.*
[3972]ARCA § 6(1) (Emphasis added.)
[3974]4. The originating agency is ts make the first review to
[3975]identify information that meets the standards for postponement.
[3976]ARCA § 4(c)(2)(D) (i). For CIA, this effort is being undertaken
[3977]by the Historical Review Group, in consultation with the
[3978]Directorate of Operations and other appropriaze Agency
[3979]components. Information the originating agencies identify for
[3980]postponement must be transmitted to the Review Board. ARCA
[3981]§ 4(c)(2)(E). The Review Board "shall consider and render
[3982]decisions on a determination by a Government office to seek to
[3983]postpone the disclosure of assassination recczrds." ARCA §
[3985]7(i) (1). Specifically, the “Review Soard shail consider and
[3986]render decisions on ... whether an assassination record or
[3987]particular information in a record qualifies for postponement of
[3988]disclosure under the Act." ARCA § 7(i) (2) (B).
[3990]: S. If the Review Board determines to orser the disclosure
[3991]of information that the originating agency feit met the criteria
[3992]for postponement, it "shall notify the head cf the originating
[3993]body of its determination and publish a copy of the determination
[3994]in the Federal Register within 14 days after the determination is
[3995]made." ARCA § 9(c){4) (A). If the information contained in an
[3996]assassination record is “obtained or developed solely within the
[3997]executive branch, the President shall have the sole and
[3998]nondelegable authority to require the disclosure or postponement
[3999]of ... the information under the standards set forth in
[4000]Section 6." ARCA § 9(d){1) (emphasis added). The President's
[4001]decision must be certified to the Review Board within 30 days of
[4002]the Review Boards determination. Id. Records postponed by the
[4003]-President must be re-reviewed every S years. ARCA § 9(d) (2).
[4005]‘2
[4007]PRIVILEGED ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
[4008]AGENCY- INTERNAL USE ONLY
[4010]13-00000
[4011]Se AGENCY- INTERNAL USE ONLY
[4012]PRIVILEGED ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
[4014]SUBJECT: DCI Sources and Methods Authority With Respect to JFK
[4015]Assassination Records
[4017]6. I would be happy to discuss this further if you so
[4018]desire. You might also want to contact John Pereira (x30373)
[4019]since he has met with some or all of the Review Board members.
[4021]Attachment
[4023]3
[4025]PRIVILEGED ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
[4026]AGENCY- INTERNAL USE ONLY
[4028]13-00000
[4030]we
[4032]SUBJECT: DCI Sources and Methods Authority w/Respect
[4033]to JFK Assassination Records
[4035]OGC-94-52916
[4037]DCLI/OGC/RJEatinger:76195 (19 Sept 94)
[4039]Original - Addressee .w/attach) ihand celivered)
[4040]- OGC Registry (wfattace)
[4042]- Lit File
[4044]- RBB (OGC/Iz5D)
[4046]- C/HRG (J.Pereira-404 Ames)
[4048]RJE - Soft File (w/attach)
[4050]- RJE - Signer
[4052]- PDP
[4054]- KK -fyi
[4056]- PAS-fyi
[4058]ed a ee od
[4059]'
[4062]’ .
[4064]Tat ace the
[4069]13-00000
[4071]4
[4073]Attachment C
[4075]Friday, October 29, 1999
[4077]Foreign Government Information Contained in JFK Collection
[4078]CIA’s JFK Collection includes Foreign Government Information (FGI) in a number of forms:
[4080]First, some CIA documents in the collection contained FGI but, by general agreement with the
[4081]Assassination Records Review Board, the source could be protected by redaction even when CIA and
[4082]the Board agreed that substantive information could be released.
[4084]Second, documents were provided by foreign governments in the aftermath of the assassination in response
[4085]to réquests from the US Government for information about the assassination or individuals whose
[4086]names may have been associated with it. Such documents subsequently became a part of CIA’s
[4087]“sequestered collection” and thus were automatically designated by the JFK Board as “Assassination
[4088]Records,” subject to declassification review. A number of such documents were released in full in the
[4089]early years of the project (1992-1994), with the concurrence of the DO/IRO, but OIM has no _
[4090]documentation regarding coordination with liaison.
[4092]Third, in a number of documented cases, the DO consulted with liaison services regarding documents that
[4093]were clearly identifiable as from a liaison service, and handling of both the substance and the sources
[4094]was discussed with the liaison services and their views obtained. In all such documented cases, the
[4095]BOARD agreed to protect the foreign government source and, as appropriate, to postpone the release
[4096]of redacted portions or entire documents until the year 2017, reflecting the language of the JFK Act.
[4098]The information below reflects those instances of coordination with liaison services that are
[4099]reflected in OIM records:
[4101]Australian———_
[4103]1. (S) A 1968 letter from Charles C. F. Spry, on Australian Security Intelligence Organisation
[4104]letterhead, to DCI Richard Helms objected to the proposed release of a Warren Commission document in
[4105]which reference is made to the ‘Australian security service.’ [The Warren Commission document (CD #97)
[4106]was a memorandum to Mr. J. Lee Rankin from DDP Helms dated 22 May 1964 reporting an anonymous
[4107]caller -- who described himself as a Polish chauffeur for the Soviet Embassy in Canberra -- to the US
[4108]Embassy there. That memo was sanitized to delete the “Australian security service.’] The Board did not
[4109]accept the Agency’s initial action to “deny in full” Sir Spry’s letter and the Board’s acceptance of
[4110]substitute text provided only additional time to pursue the possibility of full release. Consultations between
[4111]and among EA/PAMSI, OGC, and others and queries to the Australian desk, and, in turn, the Station and
[4112]the Australian Government brought an acceptable compromise. ASIO authorized the release of a redacted
[4113]and retyped version of Sir Spry’s letter that did not reveal Sir Spry as the writer and that did not reveal an
[4114]ASIO/CIA relationship, and ASIO further stated “this . . . should not be seen as setting any precedent in
[4115]releasing ASIO documents.” The Board postponed release of the original until 2017.
[4117]2. (S) Helms’ response to Sir Spry and two related CIA documents were released in sanitized
[4118]form that protected the liaison relationship. The release of the redacted portions are postponed until 2017.
[4120]3. (S) Cables exchanged between Headquarters and Canberra over the issue in-Item-l were —
[4121]«declared assassination records, but.release-of thé cables was postponed until 2017.
[4123]SECRET
[4126]X5
[4129]13-00000
[4131]British
[4133]1. (S) The BOARD wanted to release the 1963 British Security Service’s (BSS) interview of the
[4134]spouse of a West-East defector (Sloboda). The BSS advised the Station that release would be a violation of
[4135]privacy rights in the UK. The BOARD agreed that the document was “not intrinsic to assassination story”
[4136]and that the document could be postponed until 2017.
[4138]2. (S) Another British document in the collection provided information that as of 1982
[4139]“KOSTIKOV . . . was posted in Beirut in 1978 . . . and may still be there.” (The author EPSTEIN in
[4140]Legend claims KOSTIKOV was Lee Harvey Oswald’s KGB case officer in Mexico City.) The British desk
[4141]accepted the release of the one pertinent paragraph (one of five paragraphs in the document), and the Board
[4142]agreed to postpone until 2017 the release of all other text and source originating information.
[4144]an
[4146]3. (S) The BOARD leamed of the existence of a British document that the CIA possessed from the
[4147]BOARD’s examination of FBI files. One member of the BOARD reviewed the entire document and
[4148]declared one portion of the document as relevant to the JFK assassination. The four-page section of the
[4149]document regarding KGB Active Measures was released in full and further noted that it was from a foreign
[4150]government that specifically requested not to be identified.
[4152]Mitchell) is in the collection. As consultations with the Canadian desk were underway, the BOARD
[4153]determined the document as not believed relevant and postponed its release until 2017.
[4155]Dutch
[4157]; (S) The BOARD wanted to release two attachments (teltap transcripts) to a dispatch from the
[4158]Dutch Station. The matter was coordinated with the Dutch desk, the Dutch Station, and the Director
[4159]General of the Dutch National Security Service. As a result, translation substitutions provide the
[4160]information from intercepted conversations on the topics of “Mr. Lee (sic)” and Richard Gibson, but
[4161]redactions obscure the source of the transcripts, according to guidelines in.a letter from the service. Release
[4162]of the redacted portions is postponed until 2017.
[4166]Canadian
[4167]: (S) A report received through Canadian liaison channels on West-East defectors (Martin and
[4169]SECKET
[4171]LIA 2-82
[4172]X5