[1]176-10037-10494) | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
[3]t
[5]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[6]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[7]. . AGENCY : NARA
[8]RECORD NUMBER : 176-10037-10494
[9]RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
[10]AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ,
[11]ORIGINATOR : CIA
[12]FROM :
[13]TO:
[14]TITLE : Information Report Re: Strategic Hamlets
[15]DATE : 2/20/1962 , .
[16]PAGES : 5
[17]SUBJECTS :
[18]DOCUMENT TYPE :
[19]CLASSIFICATION :
[20]RESTRICTIONS :
[21]CURRENT STATUS :
[22]DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
[23]OPENING CRITERIA :
[24]COMMENTS : NSF: Countries: Vietnam, General, 2/62, Box 195. Box 8.
[26]r
[28]. .
[29]This materlal “contalns - inforrnation cttecting tho : Naitenal | ‘Detome ‘of .the United States within. the meaning of the Espionage Lows, Title 18, pic Seca. us
[30]I. . 793 and. 794, the frensmision ow = of. which: ls ony: manner ta- an: unauthorized -person:is prohibited be lai | Rilo J G: .
[32]ZOUNTRY = ry VIET Ee — Sn 2, :REPORTNO. . TOCS -3/502,553
[34]UBJECT - | BERATEGIC HAMLETS ae wo pate Distr. 20 FEBRUARY 1962 aa r
[35]te Se ~ PRECEDENCE ROUTINE a AL e.
[36]DATEOR . MID-FEBRUARY 1962 ee TELD NO. FVS-7075 -IN 3 ii
[38]NFO. - Lo
[40]PLACER. VIETNAM, SAIGON (14. FEBRUARY 1962) - PETA OR @ DES OY
[41]DATEACQ. =I rr Is PROBABLY RUB THAT NEU'S VIEWS ARE AS EXPRESSED, AND THAT LUONG
[44]_ THIS 1S UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL C OF CONTENT is TENTATIVE.
[46]SOURCE - eT aon OP) EE PRS. 1-3 FROM NGO DIN NEU, AND PARA. 4 FROM
[47]: : BUI VAN LUONG. =
[49]oo 1... NGO DINE wav, PROTHER An POLITICAL "ADVISOR OF PRESIDENT NGO DINE ‘DIEM,
[50]‘STATED ON ab FEBRUARY 1962 THAT THE STRATEGIC BALERS “PROGRAM WOULD. BE. MORE |
[51]""SRAN A MEIKOD OF AFFORDING DEFENSE FOR ‘THE POPULATION. OF VIETNAM; It WOULD, BE A
[53]“ne ‘STRATEGY FR TE TEVELOPMET oF VIETNAM. “HE STATED THAT A COMMON COMPLAINT
[55]“Sa Voom WAS Tit wNERESS OF 70S CADRES, WHO FALLED TO TURN TH GOVERIWEND'sS
[57]: * REVOLOTETONARY, PROGRAK To RRALITY. HE STATED, HOWEVER, ‘THAT THE COMPLAINT wis
[58]o “ont PARMEALLY RUE, AS, THE OTHER ASPECT. HAD EEN THE INABILITY OF THE CADRE 10
[59]oe “OPERATE IN THE CONDITION OF INSECURITY IN JHE COUNTRYSIDE. IT WAS NECESSARY
[61]© pone cosine Yo 60 CROAT TH SUHCASICN THAT TEE CADRE COULD HE PLACED
[63]it AREA OF HIS. WORK AND, AFFORHED THE: NECESSARY PROTECTION AND FACILITIES -
[65]ren si vor, _ THE ‘STRATEGIC HAMLETS" PROGRAM WOULD! PROVIIE BOTH OF THESE. _
[67]. ot woo . . . J CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS ; a
[68]a 2 _ CeO PLDRED-T beh | ly... ° NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL .
[70]EUEGR
[72]Rae EEG as
[74]C-ONAFAT-DBNAD-ToAcL _ eee corer CONTROL ¢
[76]* CLASSIFICATION - "BISTEMINATION CONTROLS
[78]lad -3/502, 553
[80]com THE PROGRAM AS-PLAIOIED BY NEU ‘HAD THREE MAIN. ELEMENTS WHICH WOULD MAKE
[82]TP. PARTICULARLY APPROPRIATE FOR. yoRmin. ;
[83]ran IT was ‘FIRST OF ALL TRADITIONAL, , RESTING UPON THE BASIC UNIT OF
[85]: _VIBTNAMESE SOCIETY. US IT CAPITALIZED UPON THE INGRAINED HABITS OF THR”
[86]a “POPULATION... oe, ee .
[87]Be THE SECOND ASPECT WAS THAT IT WOULD AFFORD THE MEANS TO MODERNIZE
[88]: _ VIETNAMESE ‘IFS. BU STATED THAT I? WAS. LESS: A PROBLEM OF RAISING THE STANDARD
[89]- OF LIVING THAN OF CHANGING THE MOTE OF LIVING. HS SAID THAT IF ATTENTION WAS.
[90]" GIVEN TO INSERTING NEW MOIES OF LIFE INTO THE ORDINARY PEASANTS EXISTENCE, iT
[92]- WOULD INEVITABLY BRING SUBSTANTIAL CHANGES IN HIS ORIENTATION - NHU COMPARED
[94]- 3B RESULT OF TEE ‘INEBRTTON oF SMALL AUTOMOBILES, WASHING MACHINES, BIC. “Into
[96]* “LIFE. OF THE EUROPEAN WORKING CLASS WHICH HE CLAIMED HAD DISRUPTED COMMUNIST *
[98]; "INFLUBNCE OVER THIS CLASS. AS A RESULT, NEY SAID, MOST EUROPEAN COMMUNIST
[100]~"“PARTTES OPPOSED MODERNIZATION. HE STATED THAT THE ASIAN COMMUNIST PARTIES
[102]| - WERE LESS INTELLIGENT aN TER APPROACH, "AS THEY ADVOCATED. .MODERNIZATION OF
[103]“ASIAN LIFE, WITHOUT ‘REALIZING “THAT “TT WOULD INEVITABLY REDUCE THEIR OWN ORGAN-
[104]“TZATTONAL,. POWER.. “Na ‘onAteD THAT A STUDY OF STEPS APPROPRLATE POR VIETNAM Aton
[105]_ as Lae. SHOULD HE-MADE“AND A CONSCIOUS EFFORT ‘TEVOTED 10 INSERTING THESE ‘NEW
[106]“yous. OF LIFE INTO VIETNAM. - AS. AN “EXAMPLE ? “HE CITED ‘THE’ ‘EFFECT: OF DISTRIBUTING .
[107]" BICYCLES WITH MacRoKoroRS, THUS MAKING ‘THE PEASANT MOBILE AND CHANGING HIS MODE
[108]OF LE. = STRATEGIC. mut, iB REITERATED, ‘WOULD: AFFORD "THE NECESSARY
[109]_-FROTBGHLON sip gociiaae BASE PR. BUCH A MODERNIZATION PROGHAM. a
[111]et
[113]mene ; cca ‘DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
[114]0-0-N-PAI-D-E-NT-I-A-L. tess. ‘NoRORN/CONTENUED CONTROL
[117]“CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION Contacts
[119]CAGoneP EDT A ~NOFoRU/CommtitanD CONTROL
[121]Ce TE ‘TED ELEMENT, NEU SAID, WOULD 2B DEMOCRATIZATION.
[123]| XEFINED YAS HE APPLICAOTON. OF AF AID ORDER O RURAL LIFE. HE STATED ‘THAT
[124], (At PRESEN? THE PEASANTS WERE EXPOSED. 0 ILLEGALITY BY ‘THE VIBINAMESE: COMMUNISTS
[126]. AND BY GOVERNMENT OF ‘VOBINAM (cv) ‘ELEMENTS, BOTH MILITARY AND CIVIL. THIS WAS
[127]os IN PART A RESULT. OF TE DISPERSION OF THE POPULATION AND ITS INABILITY TO ASSUME :
[129]"SERS OWN GOVERNANCE - AS AN INDUCEMENT TO FORM A STRATEGIC HAMLET, NHU SAID THE
[131]| POPULATION. SHOULD BE ASSURED EKO THE MANGE NOULD SE GUARAED THE FULL
[133]ae APPLICATION OF LAW BY TIS OWN AUTHORITIES, THUS MOVING IT TOWARD A SYSTEM OF
[135]“DEMOCRATIZATION APPROPRIATE TO THE COMMUNITY. HOWEVER, If WOULD HAVE LITTLE OR ,
[136]_ ‘NOTHING 10 Do WITH CHANGES OF THE GOVERNMENT IN SAIGON. NEU STATED: THAT HE HAD
[137]: . BROUGH our IN A RECENT TALK TO GVN OFFICIALS THAT ONE COULD CHANGE THE.
[139]GOVERNMENT. IN SAIGON 35 TIMES WITH NO EFFECT UPON THE REAL SITUATION IN THE
[141]aa * COUNTRYSIIE; BUT SHAT ‘THE APPLICATION OF THE STRATEGIC HAMLETS' SYSTEM WOULD —
[143]/_ DSFINITELY AFFECT ‘THE DEMOCRATIZATION ‘OF THE COUNTRYSIDE IN A WAY WHICH TOUCHED
[145]= THE POPULATION ITSELF. THE STRATEGIC. EAMLED WOULD ALSO, ACCORDING TO NHU, _ AFFORD. .
[147]wt BASIS "FOR ‘THE BUILDING or INGTTTUTIONS In VISTNAM TO GIVE ADDITIONAL STABILITY,
[149]aoe Gey COOPERATIVES, | MEDICAL SERVICES, EDUCATION, ‘WOMENS' MOVEMENTS, YOUTH:
[151]a te 3. NaU STATED THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED THE STRATEGIC HAMLETS' CONCEPTS" WITH
[153]- at GROUP OF GOVERMENT OFFICIALS RECENTLY, ‘AND HAD MADE ONE VERY STRONG ADDITIONAL
[155]‘POINT TO ‘THEM, , (ramp COMMEND. -¥VS- 7034, TDCs- 3/501,110 GAVE AN: ACCOUNT, FROM
[157]. = Pm ata ome, oP ME'S RBURES AD OHE YESTTNG. ) HE STATED THAT HE
[159]"CLASSIFICATION - DissEMINATION CONTROLS
[161]- GOAN SP-TADBNDATSASL a _BOPCRN/CONTINURD, CONTROL. a
[164]"CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
[166]| Qe0-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L ©. NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL :
[168]ce WAS AWARE THAT ‘THERE WAS MUCH, DISCONTENT ANONG THE VARIOUS LEVELS OF THE
[169]. Govenmanr, warce, HE SAID, STEMMED FROM THE COVERNMENT'S APPROACH ‘70 ‘THE JOB. |
[170]aw LOCAL OFFICIAL WHO FACED ‘A PROBLEM MADE A REQUEST 10 HIS NEXT HIGHER “AU-
[171]a _“THORITY FOR ASSISTANCE AND WAS DISCONTENTED IF THE ASSISTANGE WAS INADEQUATE.
[172]|” SHE NEXT LEVEL REQUESTED ‘THE CHIEF OF PROVINCE, HO REQUESTED ASSISTANCE FROM |
[173]a THE > MINISTRY, . ‘AND HAD THE SAME REACTION. ‘THE MINISTER MADE THE REQUEST OF TH
[174]"PRESIDENT AND WAS DISCONTENTED At INADEQUATE SUPPORT. THEORETICALLY, aE -
[175]| _ PRESIDENT ‘SHOULD MAKE. REQUESTS OF THE AMERICANS AND BE ‘DISCONTENTED WITH THE |
[176]‘AMERICANS FOR LACK OF ADEQUATE SUPPORT. NEU STATED THAT THE ENTIRE PROCESS WAS
[177]oe INFANTILE, AND A CHILDISH WAY OF DEPENDENCE ‘UPON A SUPERIOR TO SOLVE ONE'S
[178]PROBLEMS. HE STATED-TRAT IT WAS NECESSARY [0 IEVELOP A MATURITY IN THE .
[179]yee PEOPLE SO ‘THAT HEY WOULD TAKS THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR SOLVING THEIR
[180]om PROBLEMS, UTILIZING SUCH ASSISTANCE AS WAS GIVEN ‘THEM, BUT Nor ATTEMPTING
[182]Riven SHIFT RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SOLUTION OF THE ‘PROBLEM. HE STATED THAT THE
[183]7 ‘STRATEGIC ‘HAMLET WAS THE way TO INTRODUCE ‘THE PROCESS OF BEGINNING MATURITY,
[184]86 HE "TETNAMESE ‘PROPLE AND THE GOVERNMENT. "NEU SAID’ ‘THAT THE OFFICIALS WERE.
[186]~~ MUCH ‘AMUSED At THE TESCRIFITON oF ‘THE DISCONTENT AND FOUND MUCH VALIDITY. IN HIS
[188]; STATEMENT OF HOW 70 ‘OVERCOME IT. i SAID, HOWEVER, THAT IT WAS: NECESSARY TO |
[190]“KEEP ‘REFEATING THE 1ESSON, AS OTH WISE THE OLD HABITS OF DEPENDENCE UPON
[191]o POWERS "ABOVE. woul RETURN AND aE WHOLE VICIOUS cxclE: OF DISCONTENT WOULD START _
[193]AGAIN. -
[195]woes
[197]~SUSSIFICATION = DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
[198]<-CLOAN-P-L-DSENAEACL 7 -NOFORN/CONTENURD CONTROL .
[201], CIASIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
[203]Ce O-NP ADELA me HOR /CORELHUED CONTROL Toes -3/502, 553
[205]ky iENISTER. oF. INTERIOR BUL VAN | Bo0NG, IN A SEPARATE CONVERSATION on 13
[206]~ HEBRUARY, STATED THAT NHU. HAD argu ‘TNSTRUCTIONS ‘THAT THE STRATEGIC HAMLETS" :
[207]“PROGRAM BE CONDUCIED UNTER THE FULL COMIROL OF THE NEW. INTERMINISTERZAL ,
[209]“‘eamisston. HE ‘saTD ‘THAT NEU HAD SPECIFICALLY STATED THAT THE GOVERNMENT DID
[210]NO? WISH A"REFETITION OF THE ERRORS MADE IN THE INITLATION OF THE AGROVILLE
[211]. “PROGRAM. NEU EMPHASIZED D THE NECESSITY OF EXPLAINING TO THE POPULATION WHAT
[212]| TT WAS BEING ASKED 70 DO AND OF FOLLOWING VERY STRICT RULES, “FOR INSTANCE, _—
[213]ag THE POPULATION BE ASKED TO ASSIST ONLY IN ITS OWN LOCALITY AND NOT BE
[214]* REQUIRED TO WORK ON DISTANT AREAS. “HE ALSO STATED THAT THE PROVINCE CHIEFS
[215]WER INSTRUCTED NOT TO LAUNCH OFF IN: ALL ‘DIRECTIONS, CREATING STRATEGIC HAMLETS
[216]LS ACCORDING TO THEIR OWN IDEAS, BUT 0 FOLLOW THE FROGRAM AND PATTERN 10 BE
[217]‘ESTABLISHED, BY THE STRATEGIC HAMLETS ' COMMITTEE. |
[218]5s FIBLD DISSEA: STATE “ARMY NAVY AIR MAAG AID .CINCPAC PACFLT .
[220]LON
[222]* ARPAC. ‘PACAP.
[224]END OF MESSAGE -
[226]. CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
[228]©. QeQ-NGRsIpD-B-NAT-I-A-L 0 _ _NOFORN/CONEINUED CONTROL