[1]178-10004-10053 | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
[2]_* JFK Assassination System Date: 8/2 a
[3]~ ; Identification Form
[4]Agency Information
[5]AGENCY: ROCKCOM
[6]RECORD NUMBER: _ 178-10004-10053
[7]RECORD SERIES: ASSASSINATION FILE
[8]AGENCY FILENUMBER: MISC. ROCKEFELLER COM. AND CIA FILES (3)
[9]Document Information
[10]ORIGINATOR: CIA
[11]FROM:
[12]TO:
[13]TITLE: DCI PRESENTATION TO THE PFIAB, 7 DECEMBER 1962
[14]DATE: 12/10/1962
[15]PAGES: 3
[16]SUBJECTS :
[17]ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES
[18]PFIAB
[19]OPERATION MONGOOSE
[20]MC CONE, JOHN
[21]CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS
[22]DOCUMENT TYPE: MEMORANDUM
[23]CLASSIFICATION : Top Secret
[24]RESTRICTIONS: 1B; 1C
[25]CURRENT STATUS: — Redact
[26]DATE OF LAST REVIEW: — 08/03/1993
[27]OPENING CRITERIA :
[28]COMMENTS :
[30]TGP SECRET | (EELAY ted pein
[32]178-10004-10053
[33]10 December 1962
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[42]MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD. oo, canoe
[44]SUBJECT: DCI Presentation to the President's Foreign intelligence
[45]Advisory Board, 7 December 1962
[47]1. After concluding the discussion on Cuba, the Director told the
[48]Board that he wanted to report on the status of OXCART. He noted that we
[49]were on schedule with the aircraft, and that five would be completed by the
[50]end of December. He said that one had reached MACH 2.16 at 60, 000 feet.
[51]Thére had been some trouble with the 5-58 engines, but all problems were |
[53]soluble. He said the progress on the aircraft was running ahead of that on
[55]‘the engines, and noted that we had had'75 hours in the air with 18 hours on
[57]the J-58 engine. “He said he had been in direct contact with Mr. Horner to
[58]insure that the project was receiving top priority. ‘Dr. Killian asked sf Pratt
[59]and Whitney had their fir st team in and the DCI said yes, but one of the
[60]problems was that Hamilton Standard didn't have access to everything in
[61]Pratt and Whitney unless Horner paved the way. |
[63]2. Dr. Baker asked if there had been a a solution to the fuel pump
[64]problem and the DCI commented t that he believed a solution was being reached.
[65]Dr. Killian noted that Bendix was working | on an alternative fuel pump. The ©
[67]DCI concluded by saying that while the radar cross section was not as small
[69]4.
[71]as we had hoped for, it was being worked on. a Do
[72]Photocopy OS rt rn aney nee :
[73]PGP SCEREP toftes:
[75]from
[76]Gerald R. Ford Library
[79]PUP URUNLS ere NL
[80]Vee eet ed ae eee dl Mo
[82]° _ 3. Mr. McCone then turned to the budget and noted that some
[83]difficulties had arisen in this connection and in the over all field of coordina-
[84]tion. He reminded the Board that they had wanted him to ‘review the budgets
[85]of the whole intelligence community, and noted that the military intelligence
[86]budget was 90% of the over all effort. | He said that he had discussed this with
[87]Secretary McNamara. Dr.’ Killian reiterated that he thought the DCI should |
[88]review the whole intelligence budget.. The DCT noted that intelligence in .
[90]Defense was going through a transitional period with the development of DIA
[91]and other changes. General Doolittle expressed surprise that CIA was only
[93]10% of the intelligence budget. The DCI pointed out that Defense was spending
[94]935844, 000, 000 on intelligence and CIA only $363; 000, 000. ~ This was an.
[95]increase from $2, 250, 000, 000 ia the past, but Defense had put all reconnais-
[96]sance of the Navy and Air Force into its intelligence budget. He said he did
[98]not believe this was correct, ‘and thought it should be deleted. |
[100]_ 4, . Turning to the CIA budget, the Director said he had instructed the
[101]Agency to keep at the level of last year--this was about:$50} 000,000 less than
[102]what had been asked for by the various departments. He said he thought the _
[103]Agency had worked hard to keep the budget down, and noted that there had to
[104]be additional funds for operations against Cuba. There was an increase in
[105]NPIC, and as a result the budget was $425,000; 000 versus $405, 000, 000,
[107]. The Bureau of the Budget had cut this to $381, 000, 000 and taken $20, 000, 0900
[109]for Cuban operations to charge to the Reserve. The DCI said he found this
[111]unacceptable, and thought the contingency should be pure. At this point
[113]Pry GP SE
[115]from
[116]Gerald R. Ford Library
[119]Mr. Clifford said he had run across the phrase, MONGOOSE, on several |
[120]occasions, and asked what this involved. The DCI then explained briefly the
[121]MONGOOSE project and how it was setup. He said that after his discussion
[122]with the President and Attorney General last fall, it had been decided to
[123]7 utilize all resources to unseat Castro. He went on to mention “some of. the
[124]activities of the project. Mr. McCone then said he did not favor continuing
[125]. sabotage and guerilla operations. He noted that he was very disturbed about.
[126]the future and felt that there might be a confrontation within the r next few days,
[127]and that the Russians 5 might light up the SAM's. He said he had no way of
[128]explaining why the SAM sites were being left there. Dr. ‘Langer asked if it
[129]might n¢ not be for fear of an invasion; the Director said he did not think so
[133]because our miliiary forces could eliminate the SAM sites without much
[135]trouble. - a _ Fs _ a
[136]5, Mr. McCone then said he wanted to discuss the NRO agreement.
[138]He said that it had not worked, and the Director of NRO feels that he must
[140]: have fiscal control over CIA projects and review programs progressively
[142]week by week and month by month. The DCI said this was wrong because the
[144]appropriation was to CIA and was approved by a different committee of
[146]Congress. to whom we were responsible. He noted that CLA could handle the
[148]project more clandestinely, He had discussed this. matter with the Secretary
[150]of Defense but had reached no agreement. Defense is withholding
[152]$140, 000, 000 and asking CIA to fill out certain forms before they will advance
[154]the money. The Director said that such a.decision cannot be made retro- *
[157]2 Ne OO oe Oe
[158]1 Qi WECTICG } Met eed ee and Coad Salt
[160]Photocopy
[161]from
[162]Gerald R. Ford Library