[1]I\f04-10306-10020, [2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 | 4
[2]* * te a . . - ot | lhens Gs youn wT
[3]wo Lo. . Tinteage Q have takrn ko | at howe,
[8]SECRET
[9]. 30 October 1962
[10]URGENT
[12]MEMORANDUM FOR: General Marshall S. Carter
[14]At the Executive Committee meeting this morning, the President
[15]directed as follows:
[17]1, CIA do everything possible to insure no refugee or
[18]emigre provocative actions against Cuba are undertaken with or
[19]without our knowledge during the next several days. The Miami
[20]station and the MONGOOSE Task Force should be alerted to exercize
[21]every precaution to see that no unauthorized attempts are made..
[22]This should be done without discussion or disclosure to the refugee groups.
[24]2. CIA should attempt to estop Alpha 66 actions during the
[25]next several days. The President was informed by DCI we have no
[26]contact with or control over Alpha 66. DCI was instructed to attempt
[27]through every resource available to influence Alpha 66 to stand down
[28]operations during the next several days.
[30]3. The activities of Operation MONGOOSE are to be stopped
[31]during the next several days and therefore all prior approvals for
[32]sabotage, infiltrations, guerrilla activities, caching of arms are to be
[33]temporarily suspended. The direction of Operation MONGOOSE will be
[34]reconsidered after current negotiations are completed. ,
[36]NOTE: After the meeting McCone, Bundy and the AG
[37]discussed the approved plan of sabotaging Cuban ships
[39]or shipping (Item 2-B of Lansdale's memorandum of 10/26)
[41]and it was the opinion of Bundy, DCI and the AG that these
[43]operations should be suspended for the next seyeral days.
[44]NOTE: General Lansdale was informed by DCI by grey
[45]phone of 1, 2 and 3 above - 10/30 at 11:00 A.M.
[47]4, The President requested that all the principals who are
[48]attending Executive Committee meetings and those in the Departments
[49]who were in intimate contact with the Committee's procedures and
[51]. decisions not contact anyone of the Press for the next several days.
[53]Press contacts are to be made by Salinger and Sylvester and a
[55]representative of State. Any necessary Press contacts by CIA, and
[57]these must be kept at a very minimum, perhaps should be made by Col. Grogan.
[58](This was not mentioned in the Executive Committee meeting.)
[61]13-00000
[63]SECRET.
[65]30 October 1962
[67]URGENT
[69]MEMORANDUM FOR: General Marshall 8. Carter
[71]At the Executive Committse meeting this morning, the President
[72]directed as follows:
[74]1. CIA de everything possible to insure ne refugee or
[75]emigre provocative actions against Cuba are undertaken with or
[76]withoat our knowledge during the next several days. The Miami
[77]station and the MONGOOSE Task Forea should be alerted to exercize
[78]every precaution to see that no unauthorized attempts are made.
[79]This should be done without discussion or disclosure to the refugee groups.
[81]2. GIA should attempt to estep Alpha 66 actions during the
[82]next several days. The President was taformed by DCI we have zo
[83]contact with or control over Alpha 66. DCI was instructed to attempt
[84]through every resource available to influence Aipha 66 to stand down
[85]operations during the next several days.
[87]3, The activities of Operation MONGOOSE are to be stopped
[89]. daring the next several days and therefore all prior approvals for
[91]sabotage, infiltrations, guerrilla activities, caching of arms are to be
[92]temporarily suspended. The direction of Operation MONGOOSE will be |
[93]reconsidered after current negotiations are completed.
[94]NOTE: After the meeting MeCone, Bundy and the AG
[95]discussed the approved plan of sabotaging Cuban ships
[96]or shipping (item 2-B of Lansdale's memorandum of 10/26)
[97]ané it was the opinion ef Bundy, DCI and the AG that these
[98]operations should be suspended for the next several days.
[99]MOTE: General Lansdale wae informed by DCI by grey
[100]phone of 1, 2 and 3 above - 10/30 at 11:00 A.M,
[102]4. ‘The President requested that all the prineipats who are
[104]decisions not contact anyene of the Press for the next several days.
[106]Press contacts are to be made by Salinger and Sylvester and a
[107]representative of State. Any neceseary Frese contacta by CIA, and
[109]these must be kept at a very minimum, perhaps chould be made by Col. Grogan.
[110](This was not mentioned in the Executive Committee meeting.) _
[114]SECRET,
[116]we
[119]| ‘The above has been communicated te you by telephone. This .
[120]ne / memorandum serves to confirm decisions which require implementa-
[121]wa tion by you. |
[123]JOHN A. MeCONE
[124]Director
[126]JAM/mfb
[127]lee - DCI chrono
[129]i 1ee)- DCI $5 file
[134]a foe =
[136]ee SECRET
[138]'
[140]The above has been communicated to you by telephone, This
[141]memorandum serves to confirm decisions which require implementa-
[143]tion by you.
[145]JGHN A. McCONE
[146]Director
[149]1 3-00090
[151]ocreyes only
[153]ar ee ink
[155]we
[157]November 14, 1962
[158]MEMORANDUM FOR: General Carter, DDCI
[160]Attached is a copy of a memorandum for my file outlining
[161]policy decision in connection with the Cuban prisoner transaction.
[162]In your absence this memorandum was discussed with Megsrs,
[163]Helms, Houston, Miskovasky and McManus, and upon receiving
[165]- final approval from higher authority at 1:45, Mr. Houston was
[166]instructed by me to initiate appropriate actions.’
[168]It ie exceedingly important that great care be exercised ~
[169]; to minimize the publicity and to emphasize humanitarian interest
[170]or the part of the United States Government in securing the release
[171]of the prisoners. Both the President and the Attorney General are
[172]- anxious that the explanations giventhe Cuban Families Committee
[173]‘be handled with great care. I agree with this and urge that extreme
[174]caution be taken to avoid attribution or CLA implication in this matter.
[176]SIGNED:
[178]John A. McCone
[179]Director
[181]Attachment
[183]JAM:at
[184]1 cc - DCI Chrono
[185]utce - DCI Memoranda
[186]1 cc - Memo for the Record _..
[188]Lo Oil
[191]13-00000
[193]14 November 1962
[195]MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
[196]CONCERNING THE NEGOTIATION FOR THE RELEASE OF THE CUBAN
[197]PRISONERS.
[199]The meeting took place at the residence of the Attorney
[200]General at 10:30 a.m., on A Thureday, November 14, at the DCI's
[202]request.
[204]- MeCone explained that he had had dinner the evening before
[205]with Mr, Edward Foley (former Under Secretary of the Treasury,
[206]legal representative and a Director of the Drug Industry. Association).
[208]Mr. Foley had questioned DC] concerning the negotiations ,
[209]for release of Cuban prisoners in exchange for some 50 million |
[210]dollars in druge, and stated that Mr. Donovan had been in touch with
[211]members of the industry (presumably Pfizer and Merck) in the past
[212]few days, that indications were that the transaction was to be worked
[213]out promptly, and the subject would undoubtedly be discussed st
[214]length at the Industry's Board of Trustees meeting in New York on
[215]November 16th.
[217]Mr. Foley stated that the Industry had no clear understanding
[218]of the Government's position, most particularly in view of Cuban
[220]develepments of the last three weeks.
[222]Alter explaining to Foley the background of the transaction
[224]" -Tteld him that Mr. Donovan had been told to do absolutely nothing
[226]in this matter and expressed great surprise that the subject was a
[227]topic of current discussion among members of the Industry.
[229]In the meeting with the Attorney General I. expressed. grave
[230]concern over the situation, poin: GIA hac, 20;million |. .
[231]dollars on covert deposit in the Bank [ot Ca adajend that swo. Letters _
[233]. of Credit pea pose issued by the Baik, one in the amoun joomnitiion | Q
[235]dollars to/Pfidex, ‘and one for \eVenimillion dollars to[M yaaa As!
[236]long as this money was on deposit and: ‘the letters outetanding. “there >
[237]was a. danger of publicity emanating from either Donovan or the drug
[238]industry, or both. Despite the fact that'no official government
[240]13-00000
[242]Bil
[243]ay
[244]i
[246]SECRET-EVES Guill
[248]connection had ever been admitted, publicity would implicate the
[250]’ Administration and CIA in the negotiation because of recent press
[252]stories (most particularly the Herald Tribune articles). identifying
[253]Administration and CIA activities and citing the exact amount of
[255]17 million! dollars as representing the Government. cost of the drugs.
[257]I pointed out that certain elements of competition between the members
[258]of the drug industry | made it almost a certainty that "leaks" would
[259]come.from industry sources as long ae the letter of credit were —
[260]outstanding, regardless of Mr. Donovan's denials.
[262]Furthermore, consummation of the transaction seemed
[263]totally unrealistic in view of current difficulties with Castro and if
[264]an article appeared indicating we were still pursuing this transaction,
[265]the American public and a great many othera would be confused and
[266]disenchanted,
[268]For the above reasons, and feeling that damaging publicity
[269]undoubtedly would appear, I strongly recommended that we arrange
[270]for the bank to. withdraw the. Letters of Credit, and for the withdrawal
[272]/ of a substantial part of ‘the. money from the (Bank [of Cehaaiay: Also
[274]advise Mr. Donovan that the pursuit of this effort must await a better
[275]climate although our interest remained constant. I urged that
[276]action be commenced today.
[278]The Attorney General, after some discussion involving an
[279]exploration of possible alternatives, agreed with the course of
[281]action.
[283]We agreed that we should carefully explain to the Families
[285]| Committee and possibly te Miro Cardona that we were in no way
[287]abandoning our intention to secure the release of the prisoners but
[288]were forced because of circumstances beyond our control to set the
[289]negotiation aside pending further developmente on other Amportent
[290]problems involving ¢ our Guben relationship.
[292]- MeCone discussed the above with Mr. Bundy who personally
[293]approved the action and, in turn, received approval from higher
[294]authority. The latter. was communicated to the DCI by telephone
[295]at 45 p.m
[297]‘Copy to General Carter wi
[298]covering memo - JOHN A. McCONE .
[300]Director
[302]Le Eee
[304]TRUM 7