[1]D-DD ne mee
[2]Thod-10330-10026)” {2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 2 wi
[3]. > . - SECRET po/o (“we
[5]~ 1 Soe 1995
[7]MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, JFK Assassination Records Review Board
[9]FROM: David Cohen
[10]Deputy Diractor for Oparations
[12]SUBJECT: Release of JFK Documents
[14]4. I understand the JPK AARB is presently congidering the
[15]release of documents which would identify CIA stations to the
[16]public. I am opposed in general to revealing the locations of
[17]our atations and would prefer instead to substitute the station
[18]name with a regional designation, e.g. European Station vice
[19]Brussels. I would be willing, however, to open certain stations
[20]during a specific window of time if they are substantively
[21]relevant to the assassination investigation and provided that the
[22]documents in question are sanitized! to (£0 conceal the permanent
[24]| presence of the station? (Ss) ~
[26]a .
[28]fn 2. In all but a handful of instances, public acknowledgment
[29]of a station would be a political embarrassment to the host
[30]government and would threaten ongoing aenaitive operations and
[31]liaison relationships. In a few instances, tha damage probably
[32]would be minimal or not at all as long as the presence appears to
[33]be temporary. I have surveyed the involved components and
[34]determined the damage to national security which would follow
[35]such release. (S)
[37]3. I strongly urge that you not allow the information
[38]regarding the Congo and Senegal to be released. The Congo is now
[39]Zaire and the station in the 60's would have been in
[41]._ Leopoldville, now Kinshasa where we are currently located. our
[42]current relationship with the Zaireans is not a full-blown
[43]liaison type, but more of a limited relationship with certain
[44]individuals from the services. In the past, we have had close
[46]CL BY {0695930 |
[47]CL REASONS 1.5  (C)
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[59]SUBJECT: Release of JFK Documents
[61]EE ee eT te ng ea nro,
[63]' velationships with the Zaireana because of our naed for their
[64]cooperation in assisting with a Presidentially-mandated program
[65]and will need to improve our relationship over the next several
[66]months to accomplish our goals in that part of the world. We
[67]also continue to have a Station in Dakar, Senegal. We have
[68]_liaigeon there and would not want to jeopardize it. In dealing
[69]with developmental contacts, there have been recent instances
[70]where potential assets have voiced concern about our Agency's
[71]ability to keep its relationships clandestine. To expose our
[72]station there would further hamper developmental relationships
[73]and eventual recruitments. (8) ; \
[75]4, Within the context of our European presence, I have the
[76]following comments:
[78]_ Brussels - Public acknowledgment would force the
[79]government and liaison service to pay closer attention to
[80]Station operations and therefore present a threat to ongoing
[81]sensitive operations. (S)
[83]Helsinki - A neutral country. Public acknowledgment
[84]of a CIA atation would embarrass the government and liaison;
[85]thereby inhibiting the close and productive liaison
[86]relationships we now. enjoy as well as presenting a threat to
[87]ongoing sensitive operations. (8S)
[89]Paris - No additional damage. (8)
[91]Bonn - No specific damage. (5)
[93]Berlin - No specific damage. (8)
[95]Luxembourg ~ Public acknowledgmant would embarrasa the
[96]government and inhibit liaiaon cooperation; thus endangering
[97]ongoing operations. (5S) ,
[99]The Hague - Public acknowledgment would draw questions
[101]from the press and create political problema for the
[102]government and liaison. This would endanger the
[108]13-00000
[110]a
[114]\ Shove our" during the Cold War will necagsarily raise quastions
[115]XS
[117]awe owe wwe Tey
[119]° SECRET
[121]SUBJECT: Release of JFK Documents
[123]————n _ a
[125]Oslo - Public acknowledgment would draw questions from
[127](~ the press and threaten very productive and very sensitive
[129]ongoing joint operations. (S)
[131]Madrid - Public acknowledgment would draw prase
[132]attention and embarrassing questions for the government and
[133]liaison service. This would further damage an already
[134]dalicate liaison relationship which is vital to us for
[135]counterterrorism operations. (5S)
[137]. Stockholm - A neutral country. Public acknowledgment
[138]would be politically embarrassing for the government and
[139]liaison services. This would likely endanger any
[140]continuation of joint operations. (S)
[142]Geneva ~ A neutral country. Public acknowledgment
[143]would create political problems for the government and
[144]liaigon service and force greater attention to our
[145]operations. This would create an intensive
[146]counterintelligence atmosphere for our operations; likely to
[147]cause a decrease in our operations. (8)
[149]London - No specific damage. ($8)
[150]Ottawa - No specific damage. (8)
[152]5. Our Eastern European stations pose a unique problem when
[153]we considar public exposure. Prague Station is recovering from
[154]operating for almost fifty years in an undeclared statue. During
[155]the laat three years we have managed, with much effort, to begin
[156]the establishment of good working relations with the host
[157]government and internal/external servicea. As a result, tha
[158]station has recently begun some very sensitive and high-level
[159]bilateral operations. These obviously depend upon the good will
[160]of the host service. The Czech citizenry came of age in an
[161]atmosphere in which distrust of intelligence services in general,
[162]and the CIA in particular, was thoroughly ingrained. That
[163]distrust lingers in the public's mind even today. Exposure of
[164]our station's. previously undisclosed presence and operational
[166]bout our activities then, and almost certainly lead to further
[169]Se
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[179]4
[180]‘inquiry about our present relationship. It is doubtful tha \
[182]t our
[183]relationship, and certainly our very sensitive operations, could
[184];| withstand the resulting public debate. The existence of Prague
[185]Station, past and present, cannot be surfaced at this tima
[186]without serious damage to national security. (S)
[188]6. Public acknowledgment of our stations in Managua,
[189]Ban Jose, Panama City, San Salvador, Santo Domingo, Buenos Aires,
[190]Lima, Santiago, and Montevideo would not further damage our
[191]operational capabilities in a specific sense. Overall, any
[192]release of information about a clandestine service breeds |
[193]distrust in professionalism and will put future operations at
[194]risk. (8)
[196]7. We receive significant national collection systems |
[197]support from Australia which affects national system collection
[198]efforts against Tier IA targets throughout Asia. We would | My
[199]| jeopardize this by releasing the presence of our station to the
[201]| ‘ public. Tokyo is a special case in that there is continuing
[202]disagreement regarding our station. We should not complicate the
[203]current "Spy Mania" atmosphere in Tokyo. There have been two
[204]incidents regarding our presence in Japan during the present
[205]year. Any further disclosure would exacerbate the tension and
[206]create an untenable operational atmosphere for our station and
[207]personnal. (8)
[209]8. Public acknowledgmant of a station in India would be a
[210]problem for the U.S. Government. U.S. and India foreign |
[211]relations are always delicate; the Indian Government is very ,
[212]sensitive to parceived slights to its national sovereignty, and
[213]public acknowledgment of a atation would prove embarrassing to
[214]the Indian Government which in turn could aak that the station be
[215]closed. If the station were closed or significantly downsized,
[216]it would affect a larga number of important intelliganca
[217]collection operations. (8)
[219]9. Public acknowledgment of a station in Tunisia would be
[220]a problem for Tunisia vis-a-vis its Libyan neighbor. Libya and
[221]Tunisia share a border which means the Tunisian Government must
[222]act with gome prudence regarding its relations with Libya. The .
[223]Libyan Government would almost certainly respond very negatively .
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[236].
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[242]SUBJECT: Release of JFK Documents
[244]ceil ae
[246]to a public acknowledgment of a station in Tunisia and might well
[247]engage in harassment/sabotage/terrorist actions in Tunisia to
[248]show its displeasure. If the Tunisian Government should aak that
[249]our station be closed, the U.S. Government would lose a
[250]capability to collect on Libya, north African stability, and
[251]Islamic extremiam. (8)
[253]10. Public acknowledgment of a station in Morocco would be a
[255]problem for Morocco via-a-vis its Islamic fundamentalist
[257]“population. Morocco, like so many countries with a majority
[258]Muslim population, hag a growing Islamic fundamentalist problem,
[259]and Islamic fundamentalists are frequently opposed to the U.S. in
[260]general and the Agency in particular. Public acknowledgment of a
[261]station in Morocco could cause its Islamic fundamentalist
[262]‘population to react negatively and demand that our station be
[263]closed. If the station were closed, the U.8. Government would
[264]lose intelligence on the western Bahara conflict, north African
[265]stability and Islamic extremism. (5)
[267]11. In those instances where I have indicated damage to
[269]. operational capability and national security, I would feel
[271]compelled to seek a reversal of any decision to make a public
[272]acknowledgment. In those cases where I indicate "no specific or
[273]additional damage", I am prepared to accept your decision yet I
[274]muat call your attention to the general damage done to us by any
[275]disclosure of operational presence. Our operational capabilities
[276]are in direct proportion to the confidence placed in our ability
[278]to protect source identities and operational metheda. Disclosure
[280]to the public of our presence weakens this confidence. (S)
[282]L
[283]wal Wy
[284]fe David Cohan
[286]. __ To
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