[1][2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
[2]3/15/201
[4]JFK Assassination System Date:
[6]Identification Form
[8]Agency Information
[10]AGENCY: |
[11]RECORD NUMBER: — 124-10325-10318
[12]RECORD SERIES: HQ
[13]AGENCY FILENUMBER:  62-80750-4166 ;
[14]Document Information
[15]ORIGINATOR: = FBI
[16]FROM: BRENNAN
[17]TO: SULLIVAN
[18]TITLE:
[19]DATE: 09/11/1963
[20]PAGES: 12
[21]SUBJECTS :
[22]CIA LIAISON FILE
[23]DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[24]CLASSIFICATION: — Secret
[25]RESTRICTIONS:  1B;4
[26]CURRENT STATUS: — Redact
[27]DATE OF LASTREVIEW: — 12/29/1998
[29]OPENING CRITERIA :
[31]COMMENTS :
[34]HW 42333 DBocld:32313069 Page i
[36]FBI
[38]INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA
[40]INC MEMO, SUMMARY
[43]& ee Nas £5 . Ee 3 $3
[44]CY “  GENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SELi lly
[45]G
[47]9 4 oo 6S
[48]ee DIRECTOR'S MEETING WITH J. JMC CONE Ws
[50]. Ty hy ; a . .
[51]Although Mr . {McConey has tdi cated he will not be raising
[52]| 22v problems or issues, the Director may find the following of
[53]assistance: eAnAR TAN CONTALISER Os.
[55]STATUS OF RELATIONS WITH CIA
[57]To say that the two agencies work in complete harmony is
[58]not true. Conflicts of past years have had their influences. Fortu-
[59]nately we have been successful in establishing very effective work-
[60]ine relations with several key figures in the agéticy who have been
[62]ery cooperative and who are sincerely interested in getting the
[64]‘job done. Without this existing framework our relations with CIA.
[65]could degenerate into a chaotic state.
[67]With regard to differences with CIA, there were two
[68]situations during the past year which had a significant bearing
[69]on the relations between the two agencies. Approximately a year
[70]ago we learned that CIA had established contact with a Cuban exile
[71]who had come into the U.S. and who had confessed to the agency
[72]that he had been trained asa Cuban Intelligence Agent. CIA had
[73]this information for nearly a month before notifying the Bureau,
[74]We lodged very vigorous protest (re:{ Alwin Odio Tamayo The
[75]other event which led to a heated conflict arose from information
[76]which we disseminated to the President's Foréign Intelligence
[77]Advisory Board concerning Bureau's technical coverage of diplomatic
[78]establishments in this country. On May 15, 1963, McCone informed
[79]Mr. Belmont that a letter which the Bureau had sent to the afore-
[80]_ | mentioned Board should be retracted because the communication
[82]a
[84]included statements which incorrectly were attributed to him, the
[85]CIA Director. Mr. Belmont adamantly refused to retract the letter
[86]and after McCone asked for an apology, Mr. Belmont again made it
[87]clear that no apology was coming from him. The Bureau never
[88]retracted the letter because statements disseminated by us were
[90]“ predicated on information which had been given to us by two top
[91]CIA officials. The conflict was eventually resolved by McCone’
[92]writing a letter to the Board and admitting that two of his
[93]subordinates had erroneously briefed the Bureau on a particular
[94]matter.
[96]STATURE OF MC CONE IN THE PRESENT ADMINISTRATION
[97]McCone obviously enjoys acquiring and using power. He
[99]considers himself not only the head of a particular government
[100]agency but also “the Direcgor of Central Intelligence’ and in
[102]Wale. - | | er Liks —
[103]DECLASSIFY O¥ ZR (wie ba fb7o 0. _
[105]. SBpey
[106]) ENCLOSURE pana!
[108]a —
[110]| a $2333 Docld: 32313069 Page 2
[113]fiasco, we have not seen any evidence of high-grade intelligence
[114]being developed by CIA in Cuba since McCone became Director of
[115]the agency. To show impressive results, McCone must fall back on
[116]intelligence information developed through high-altitude photography
[117]and the use of other sophisticated technical equipment being used ,
[118]to photograph targets and to intercept communications. Much of
[119]this is, of course, being done in collaboration with other U. S.
[120]agencies such as the Air Force.
[122]FBI COOPERATION WITH CIA
[124]During the past year there have been numerous instances
[125]of excéllent cooperation rendered by the Bureau to CIA, Set forth
[126]are some outstanding examples:
[128]INFORMATION FROM SENSITIVE SOURCE SOLO
[130]We have furnished CIA information from our
[131]sensitive Communist Party source who has traveled
[132]to Russia and has been in contact with Soviet
[133]leaders. This information has been most valuable
[134]to CIA in following developments particularly the
[135]differences between Red China and Russia.
[137]TOPHAT
[139]Military Intelligence Service (GRU) has produced
[140]highly valuable information of use to CIA.
[142](ermal C9)
[144]This is a highly sensitive penetration of
[145]the/Czech Intelligence Service.} His information CSD
[146]has significantlyyassisted CIA”in. obtaining a
[147]current picture of the (Czech intelligence przantzas C5)
[150]| - Our sensitive penetration of the Soviet
[152]BUREAU FURNISHES CIA A VALUABLE SOURCE
[154]Our sensi tive(Czech source ,(Gimme, is Ost.
[155]scheduled to return tof Czechoslovakia. Arrange- C$ $3
[156]ments have been made to make him available to
[158]CIA.
[160]FEDORA
[161]Through this sensitive KGB penetration, we have
[162]furnished CIA leads pertaining to Soviet intelligence
[163]operations abroad. In addition, we have given the
[164]agency data pertaining to the organization and functions
[165]of KGB. . Se!
[166]- 3 - :
[168]wee
[170]eases EE
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[175]Oo  Q
[177]SOVIET MAIL DROPS OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES
[179]Through our investigations in this country,
[180]we have identified Soviet mail drops in other
[181]areas and we have given this valuable information
[182]to CIA,
[184]CIA APPROACHES OF THE SOVIET AND SATELLITE
[185]NALS IN THE L’ LATE
[187]Under agreed~to restrictions we have per=
[188]mitted CIA to contact Soviet and Satellite
[189]visitors in this country for the purpose of
[190]assessing their potential as sources when
[191]they return to their native countries,
[193]CUBAN.“SOURCES
[194]We have afforded CIA the opportunity to
[196]brief Bureau sources before such sources made
[197]trips to Cuba.
[199]SENSITIVE CUBAN ESPIONAGE OPERATIONS
[201]Both FBI and CIA have had access to
[202]intercepted radio communications being:
[203]utilized by Cuban Intelligence. The Bureau
[204]has been far ahead of CIA in identifying
[205]agents mentioned in the communications and
[206]has furnished pertinent information to CIA.
[208]TECHNICAL DATA TO CIA
[210]te The Bureau has been very successful in
[211]identifying Soviet and. Cuban secret writing
[212]techniques. We have made this knowledge
[213]available to CIA,
[215]CIA COOPERATION WITH BUREAU
[217]HW 42333
[219]TOPHAT
[221]CIA did an excellent job (ot servicing drops C6
[222]in Moscow\in this very sensitive case. This
[223]was done-~dt considerable risk and was productive
[224]for us.
[226]Bocld: 327313069 Page 4
[229]O ane
[231]4 a
[233]DOUBLE AGENTS FOR BUREAU
[235]where CIA operated Soviet double agents
[236]outside of the U.S. and then made these
[237]individuals available to the Bureau for
[238]use in the U.S. In this connection it is
[239]also noted that in our development of the
[240]sensiti sources, Fedora (KGB penetration)
[241]and (imag (penetration of
[243]Czech Intelligence (53
[244]sna(cimag CIA furnished va
[246]table assistance.
[247]VLADIMIR VLADIMIR ROMASHKIN CASE CASE
[249]‘Several weeks ago, CIA advised us that
[250]one of its employees had been contacted by
[251]the Soviets. With CIA's cooperation, we
[252]conducted investigation which led to the
[253]ouster of a Soviet official and very favor-
[254]able publicity for the Bureau.
[256]COVERAGE (IN_ MEXICO as
[258]Through surveillances and surreptitious
[259]entry, CIA produced valuable informationnin
[260]our investigation of/Franz Froehlich, a GRU Cs 5
[261]Agent \whom we since have doubled.
[263]/ There have been a number of instances
[265]AVAILABILITY OF DEFECTORS
[267]. CIA has been most cooperative in making
[268]defectors available to the Bureau for interviews.
[270]COOPERATION WITH LABORATORY
[272]From time to time CIA bas made certain
[273]documents and equipment available to the
[274]Bureau's Laboratory. For example, a few
[275]weeks ago CIA made available to our Laboratory,
[276]at no cost, a portable unit designed for making
[277]radiographs (X-rays) of papers recording such
[278]characteristics as watermarks, printing, etc.
[280]ASSISTANCE IN DEVELOPING A KEY CRIMINAL INFORMANT
[282]Through assistance afforded by CIA, we
[283]gained access to an individual who subsequently
[284]became a valuable informant in the labor rackets
[286]field (NY 3936-C). er aye
[287]oo . Sil “BET
[288]AG tee hes
[292]Geant
[294]-5 -
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[299]Oo O
[300](ZRancu activities C sl |
[302]Information provided by a sensitive CIA
[303]source has been very useful in following the
[304]activities of (French agents in the U. s.C$)
[306]| Posstsus TOPICS WHICH MC CONE MAY REFER TO
[307]--‘« JACK EDWARD DUNLAP
[309]who. supplied information to the Soviets and who
[310]committed suicide in July of this year. We
[311]recently received information from our sensitive
[312]source Tophat in Moscow confirming that Dunlap
[313]worked for the Soviets. Tophat's information
[314]was furnished to McCone last week. McCone is
[315]particularly concerned about the possibility
[316]that Dunlap may have furnished the Soviets
[317]information which led to the compromise of Oleg
[318]Penkovsky, a sensitive CIA source in Russia.
[320]| This is the National Security. Agency employee
[322]PERSONNEL SECURITY
[324]The Dunlap Case has been raising questions
[325]concerning the effectiveness of security within
[326]U.S. agencies. McCone anticipates that Congress
[327]eventually may initiate some inquiry and he
[328]already has been informed that the President's
[330]| serete: Intelligence Advisory Board is looking
[331]into the matter.:-Last week Mr. McCone asked
[332]Mr. Belmont for his views on personnel security.
[333]McCone, at that time, was briefed concerning
[334]our careful screening of applicants and our
[335]strong administrative controls including inspec-
[336]: tions. It was emphasized that the Bureau always
[337]resolved security problems in favor of the FBI
[338]rather than the individual involved. Mr. McCone
[339]was told that the key to the situation appeared
[340]|ts be tight screening and control procedures and
[341]the willingness to take prompt action.
[343]COVERAGE
[344]IN THE.
[346]e @
[348]up this matter before the President's Foreign
[350]| In the Spring of this year, McCone brought
[351]Intelligence Advisory. Board and he subsequently
[353]OF NON-SOVIET BLOC DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENTS
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[359]‘on
[361]CO Q
[363]had a discussion with Mr, Belmont. Essentially, te Md
[364]McCone is most interested in technical coverage
[366]-of individuals and installations of non-Soviet Bloc
[368]countries. He has left the impression that in
[369]his opinion such coverage could be expanded in
[370]the U.S. and thereby produce more intelligence
[372]‘and more sources. Our coverage in this field
[374]at the present time is quite extensive. With.
[376]regard to CIA, we have the understanding that \
[377]if the agency desires particular technical
[379]coverage, we will give each request the necessary
[380]consideration. :
[382]. (FRENCH \activitigs ( cs)
[384]In the early part of this year, we nitiated,
[385]extensive investigation of the alleged (Frenc
[386]agents in this country on the basis of data fur-
[387]nished to us by. a sensitive CIA source. This
[388]source has informed CIA that (De Gaulle)has (so
[389]embarked on an extensive espidnage program in
[391]the U.S. primarily designed cokhect scientific
[392]data which will enablefFrance)\to hasten its an
[393]development of a nucle TY capability. We have
[394]disseminated the results of our investigation
[396]to CIA and we are continuing the handling of
[397]numerous leads. The information developed by
[399]jus so far, has Bare, to disclose any evidence gs
[401]that. the(French are stealing any. classified
[402]secrets in the U.S.: The(#reneh|
[404]obtaining _yoluminous information available to
[405]the(French ‘through normal contacts between C eB)
[406]Frenchlofficials and their counterparts in the cs
[407]. Ss.
[409]appear to be
[411]- TOPHAT
[413]A CIA agent recently obtained the message
[414]which our sensitive source Tophat secreted in a
[415]drop{in Moscow.| The message included information C$}
[416]concerning Soviet activities in France, Germany
[417]and Austria. We have given this data to CIA, In
[418]addition, McCone was told that Tophat identified
[420]Dunlap as a Soviet agent. We have told CIA that
[422]Tophat may have loaded the drop as early as
[424]June, 1963, The delay in obtaining the communica
[425]tion prevented us from getting into the Dunlap
[426]Case well before the subject committed suicide.
[428]pe
[430]HW 42333 Docld:32313069 Page 7
[433]OO
[434]SEUREL
[436]CIA did not service the drop because our informant
[437]did not exhibit an agreed-to signal. He apparently
[438]did not use the signal in order to fully protect
[439]himself. On the other hand, CIA was unable to
[440]service the drop until August because State Depart-
[441]ment adamantly refused to give CIA clearance to
[442]conduct any activity in Moscow. .This position was
[443]taken by State because it felt that any operational
[444]activity might jeopardize the test ban talks. ("s"}
[446]ANATOLI GOLITZYN AKA ANATOLI KLIMOV
[448]This is the Soviet KGB defector who came to
[449]the U. 8. under CIA control, feuded with the agency,
[450]“left for England under British Intelligence ¢ontrol
[452]and very recently returned to the U.S. Since his
[453]return, he has met with the Attorney General and
[454]with McCone. He has been extremely critical of
[456]the U.S. position toward Russia. Although a prima
[457]donna, Golitzyn has been the source of extremely
[458]valuable information for all U.S. agencies including
[459]the Bureau. Since his return, he has indicated to
[461], the Attorney General and CIA that he will contact
[462]appropriate agencies when he sees fit. In the past,
[463]Golitzyn has asked to meet with the Director. The
[464]Director has made it very clear that he will not
[465]see Golitzyn. .
[467]MICHAL GOLENIEWSKI
[469]The subject is a former high-ranking official
[470]of the Polish Security Service who defected in
[471]January, 1961, and in recent weeks has been an
[472]embarrassing problem for CIA because of his many
[473]complaints. He has communicated with the President,
[474]the Attorney General and has been in contact with
[475]@ Congressman. He is slated to testify before the
[476]Senate Internal Security Sub-Committee in the near
[477]future. He has accused CIA of dishonesty and over~all
[478]failure to comply with his needs. We have had access
[479]to Goleniewski who has been a valuable source of
[480]information. However, we have been most careful not
[481]to become involved in the feud between him and CIA.
[482]We have cooperated to the extent of furnishing CIA
[483]any information received from Goleniewski which
[484]might be of assistance to the agency.
[486]ay a
[488]DEURE
[490]‘RE
[494]a
[498]HW 42333 Docld:32313069 Page 6
[501]For your information, McCone has found this
[502]Board to be a constant irritant. This Board was
[503]established several years ago by the Eisenhower
[504]administration then continued by President Kennedy.
[505]It is designed to periodically review foreign
[506]intelligence and counterintelligence activities.
[507]The present chairman of the committee is Clark
[508]Clifford and the staff director is J. Patrick Coyne.
[509]Apparently, McCone does not like a group such as
[510]this Board looking into his operations. There is
[511]some indication that his irritation arises from
[512]personal differences with Coyne.
[514]WENNERSTROM CASE
[516]Colonel Stig Wennerstrom, the Swedish Military
[517]Attache who, a few weeks ago, admitted to his govern-
[518]ment that he had been working for the Soviets.
[519]Wennerstrom was in the U. 8. from 1952 until 1957
[520]and was collaborating with the Russians while he
[521]was here. Recently, McCone indicated that a "damage
[522]report" should be prepared on this case and he
[523]expressed the opinion that this should be the
[524]responsibility of the Bureau. With regard to damage,
[525]he was referring to an evaluation of all information
[526]which Wennerstrom may have gained from the U. S&S.
[528]jWe have taken the position that we will not prepare
[529]such a damage report and if one is needed the work
[530]should be done by each interested agency.
[532]UNKNOWN SUBJECT; KGB AGENT KNOWN AS "SASHA"
[534]This is a Bureau investigation predicated on
[535]information furnished to us by Anatoli Golitzyn, the
[536]KGB defector who advised that CIA had been penetrated
[537]by KGB. We have been endeavoring to identify the .
[538]unknown Seviet agent. We do have a suspect,/John s.C$_)
[539]Barescu} who was born in Russia and who has been working
[540]for CIA for several years. McCone may not mention this
[541]matter but he is very much concerned about the situation.
[542]We have been keeping CIA advised of all pertinent
[544]- developments.
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