[1]176-10036-10098 | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
[3]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[4]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[5]AGENCY : NARA
[6]RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10098
[7]RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
[8]AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
[9]ORIGINATOR : CIA
[10]FROM :
[11]TO:
[12]- TITLE : Central Intelligence Agency Information Report
[14]PAGES #3
[15]SUBJECTS :
[16]DOCUMENT TYPE :
[17]CLASSIFICATION :
[18]RESTRICTIONS : ,
[19]CURRENT STATUS : i
[20]DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
[21]OPENING CRITERIA :
[22]"COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 197: Vietnam, 4/63-5/63. Box 2
[24]?4an A VORA “08 AO BEES
[25]INFURMATION REPOKT
[27]CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE-AGENCY
[29]~ This material contains Information affecting the National Defense of: the United States within tha meaning of tho- Eipionage Laws, Title (8, US.C Secs.
[30]: 793 and m4, the ftrensmission or revelation of which la any menser to en unautherized perton is prohibited by law, : mo, :
[32]. CONFIDENTIAL ICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
[34](eaen Ped NO FOREGH Hse
[36]COUNTRY SOUTH: VIETNAM REFORT NO. TOCS- FT, 672
[38]TELEGRAM.
[40]SUBJECT PLANS FOR A. COUP. DETAT. 1N.-CENTRAL "DATE DISTR, «1G way 1963
[41]VAETNAM BY THE REFORMED _¥N@oD _
[42]PRECEDENCE 9 ROYTINE
[44]DATE OF REFERENCES , IN Waar
[45]INFO. EARLY. “MAY: 1963 ., ML PG1 -
[47]OAT HED. VLETNAMy-SALGON (13 may, 1963)
[49]aoe FIELD REPORTNO. Fvs &
[50]; “THis is UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE. DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE,
[52]SOURCE A VIETNAMESE NEWSPAPERMAN (¢) WITH, EXTENSIVE CONTACTS IN PRESS AND POLITICAL CIRCLES, :
[54]APPRAISALS {7.18 PROBABLY TRUE. THAT THE VNQDD 1S BEING REFORMEGS ITS CAPAGILITHES
[56]IN CENTRAL VIETNAM ‘CANNOT. BE. JUDGED. a
[58]1. SHORTLY AFTER THE 8 MAY 1963 INCIDENT IM HUES NGLIVEN VAN
[60]Luc RECEIVED A PLAN FOR A cour DIETAT IN CENTRAL -WAETNAH "FROM THE .
[61]CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CENTRAL VIETNAM ‘THOAT XAC PHON'. TRAQ te ce i
[62](TXPT). (SOURCE COMMENT. 5 TXPT DOES NOT TRANSLATE. MEANINGFULLY .
[63]INTO ENGLISH, THOAT HAS THE CONNOTATION OF GOINGS our. IN MIND AND . s
[64]SPIRIT XAC. MEANS BODY, 1.Es, PHYSICALLY} PHONG TRAO MEANS MOVEMENT
[66]THUS, THE MOVEMENT OF MIND,. SPIRIT, AND BODY Mage BE ONE TRANSLATIONS
[67]A BETTER ONE WOULD BE VN@DD.) - THE TXPT HAS Bein DEVELOPING SINC E
[69]LETN. quoc my DANG ‘(VNQDD$ VIETNAMESE NA ATIONAL 137 FAR
[70]7 1958 FROM ‘THE. ie SBARTICU RLY? THOSE BEMIS IN SERPRAL vi eTNaM,
[72]CLASSIFICATION al ie
[74]bal Ka ‘ORsOLETa PREVIOUS EDITIONS pes : pt
[76]Sartives t NU OU197& 10k
[78]CLASSIFICATION— DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
[80]QONFIDENTIAL mn FOREEN DSSEN | rocssioener
[82]THE VNQDD STRONGHOLD. THE TXPT, ALTHOUGH COMPOSED ENTIRELY OF FORMER
[83]VNQDD MEMBERS, WAS ESTABLISHED ESSENTIALLY AS A BUDDHIST ASSOCIATION
[84]“AND HAS BEEN LEGALLY ENGAGED IN CIVIC AND SOCIAL ACTIVITIES SINCE
[85]ITS FORMATION. CLANDEST INE POLITICAL ORGANIZAT ICH NAS PROCEEDED
[86]FOR THE PURPOSE OF DEVELOPING NEW, YOUNGER LEADERS, AND OF DENYING
[87]THE OLDER PASSIVE TENETS OF BUDDHISM AS WELL AS YHL OLDER LEADERS
[88]OF THE VNQDD , THE ULTIMATE INTENT BING A REVITALI ZED REVOLUT {ONARY
[89]SPIRIT. (FIELD COMMENT. LUC 1S THE FATHER AND ACCOMPLICE OF NGUYEN
[90]VAN CU, ( ONE OF THE Two “PILOTS HU SOMBER Lye ot STENT ERE ALALE
[91]ON 27 FEBRUARY 1962.) |
[93]2. THE TXPT CENTRAL COMMITTEE REMIND DED LUC THAT THE ORGAN I-
[94]‘ZATION WAS IN A POSITION TO HANDLE A COUP ACTION IM CENTRAL + ETNAM
[95]. EFFECTIVELY, POINTING ouT THAT THOSE MILITARY UNITS NOT coatRoLLeD
[96]., COULD BE NEUTRALIZED AND THAT THE AIR BASE AT DA NANG COULD BE
[97]"CONTROLLED THROUGH THE AIR FORCE. THE COMMITTEE STATED THAT, AFTER
[98]is.) THE ANT|-BUDDH|ST ACTIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT, THE PEOPLE WERE READY
[99]| FOR AN UPRISING. BY TAKING NGO DINH CAN AND ARCHBISHOP NGO DINH
[100]THUC INTO CUSTODY AND BY GAINING MILITARY CONTROL OVER THUA THIER
[101]_ AND QUANG"NAM PROVINCES, SUCCESS COULD BE ASSURED IN CENTRAL VIETNAM,
[102]THIS WOULD PLACE THE TXPT IN A POSITION OF USING PRESIDENT DIEM!S
[103]|. TACTICS OF NEGOTIATIONS AGAINST HIM, 1.E., HAVING GAINED CONTROL
[105]OVER “CENTRAL VETETNAM . THEY. WOULD OFFER TO NEGOTIATE WITH DIEM
[107].CLASSIFICATION— DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
[109]comea, Pic cee
[115]“CLASSIFICATION= DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
[117]COWROENTAL B® FOREIGN DISSEM
[119]TDCcS~3/547,672
[121]AND , AT. THE: ‘SAME TIME, THEY WOULD BE MOUNTING A COUP AGAINST THE
[122]REGIME IN-SAIGON, WHICH WOULD TAKE PLACE NO LATER THAN THREE DAYS
[123]AFTER THE ONE IN CENTRAL VIETNAM, |
[124]3. Luc SENT A TRUSTED” FOLLOWER , ONE VIET > TO’ SAIGON TO DISCUSS
[125]THE PLAN WITH AN OPPOSITIONIST SYMPATHIZER AND GET HIS VIEWPOINT.
[126]VIET WAS ADVISED TO TELL LUC THAT ANY SUCH ACTION WAS PRECIPITATE
[127]AND DANGEROUS. ALTHOUGH IT WAS PROBABLY TRUE THAT THE FORMER VNQDD
[128]"MEMBERS -IN.CENTRAL VIETNAM HAD THE POWER CLAIMED, A CouP THERE,
[129]WITHOUT SIMULTANEOUS ACTION IN SAIGON, WOULD LEAVE A VACUUM WHICH
[130]THE VIET CONG (vc) COULD IMMEDI ATELY USE TO THEIR Own ADVANTAGE.
[131]¥C REACTION PROBABLY WOULD TAKE THE FORM OF GAINING CONTROL OF ALL
[132]AREAS: NOT EFFECTIVELY CONTROLLED BY THE COUP GROUP, WITH THE:
[134]ULTIMATE “POSSIBILITY OF PARTITIONING CENTRAL VIETNAM, OF BEING IN A
[136]POS1T1ON TO FORM A REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT, AND FINALLY, OF BEING
[137]ABLE TO CALL FOR NEGOTIATIONS - ‘THEMSELVES. ACCORDING TO VIET, THIS
[138]FOLLOWED LuC'S THINKING, PARTICULARLY BECAUSE HIS FOLLOWERS WERE NoT
[139]INA POSITION’ 70 ACT IN THE SOUTHERN PART OF THE COUNTRY. VIET
[140]THOUGHT THAT ‘LUC WOULD INSTRUCT THE TXPT CENTRAL COMMITTEE IN.
[141]CENTRAL VIETNAM TO TAKE NO ACTION AT THIS TIME, AND THAT LUC'S
[142]ADVICE WOULD BE ACCEPTED.
[144]ly, FIELD DISSEM., STATE ARMY NAVY. AIR USMACV USOM MAAG USIS
[145]j
[146]CINCPAC PACFLT PACAF ARPAC 9TH FIELD STATJON PND ALR. DIVISION
[148]CLASSIFICATION— DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
[150]NO FOREIGN DISSER
[152]A4QNf1 Naanta.saraca-n -