[1]DARAAN
[2]Iitod-10307-10006 ' | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
[4]Byes bee
[8]Sear. iJ
[10]CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE INTELLIGENCE. COMMUNITY'S REVIEW OF INTELLIGENCE vo,
[11]' ACTIVITIES RELATING TO THE CUBAN ARMS BUILD-UP
[13]1h APRIL THROUGH 14 OCTOBER 1962
[15]Task Force W
[16]- Foreign
[17]Intelligence _.
[18]Branch ,
[21]13-00000
[23]a :
[25]x
[26]3
[29]III. WHAT TARGETS WAS THE AGENCY ABLE TO COVER AND WITH WHAT
[30]FREQUENCY AND CONTINUITY? _
[32]The following remarks apply to agent coverage only, that is,
[33]coverage by means of individuals on the island of Cuba, or elsewhere
[34]in the world. Audio devices or telephone taps on Cuban installations
[35]abroad or Cubans living abroad have produced intelligence which has
[36]served operational ends, in other words, information which has pro-
[37]vided critical data used in the spotting, assessment and recruit-
[38]ment of agents. Due to the standard security measures taken in
[39]“arena most official installations, these technical operations have been
[41]able to provide only a limited amount of positive intelligence. In
[43]general, agents have produced information essentially in accordance
[44]with their known access at the time of recruitment. Responsibility
[45]for many of the agents dealt with during the present .reporting period.
[46]was simply assumed by TFW from past efforts against Cuba. In many
[47]instances, these agents had been recruited strictly on an “availa-
[48]bility" basis, and indeed had no particular access. A major effort —
[49]was made at the inception of TFiW to winnow out those persons who
[50]could make no contribution and to redirect those who could. This
[51]process of redirection, which was conducted via time consuming and
[52]generally inefficient S/W channels, resulted in the conversion of ;
[53]a number of heretofore unusable agents into sound, pertinent report-
[54]ing sources. Though, in most instances, TFW operations officers
[56]had never had personal contact with these agents, they succeeded .
[58]in inducing many of them to spot, develop and recruit sub-agents.
[59]This technique succeeded, despite the obstacles involved in
[61]vetting candidates and advising agents via S/W means. In regard
[63]to the recruitment of new agent assets during the reporting period, _
[64]_[FW was able to be guided by specific, priority needs. Accordingly,
[65]the many new assets acquired were chosen because of specific access
[66]‘to target personalities or institutions. The assigned targets and
[67]extent of coverage are indicated below. ,
[69]A. Military
[71]During the reporting period, in the latter half, the Agency's
[72]major effort to obtain intelligence from agent sources, centered
[73]on Cuban military affairs. The reporting obtained covered matters
[74]‘ranging from military policy to detailed OB. Almost every agent
[75]contributed to this effort, with the consequence that the coverage
[76]‘of military matters was wide-spread and continuous. Despite the
[77]fact that 95% of this information was provided via S/W (much of it
[78]‘fron totally untrained sub-sources who had no military experience),
[79]such was the detail and volume of the data, that our agents were
[80]able to give us highly significant information on troop and materiel'
[81]movements, location and nature of military sites, etc. The follow-
[82]ing agents served as the major sources of military ifformation
[83]‘during the reporting period:
[86]13-00000
[90]Se STOO hese SR
[91]es
[93]of
[95]1. Cuban (insurance) executive, who had a large and diversified
[97]-net, provided intelligence in late June 1962 which specifically
[99]anticipated the massive Soviet military build-up which ultimately -.....
[100]took place in Cuba. Throughout the build-up itself this agent a
[101]provided an almost continuous stream of OB intelligence on ‘missile;
[102]maritime and air phases of the build-up. He provided the initial
[103]reporting on delivery of TL-28's to the island.
[105]2. <A relative of a former Cuban president whose government |
[107]. connections provided him on several occasions with information on
[109]attitudes of various military factions toward Castro and the
[110]Soviets.’ Agent also provided some detailed missile OB.
[112]G.8. Atized w o established contact with a resistance
[113]ohie? | in Pinar del Rio)during July 1962, provided, in the course _
[114]of sevéral reports}9an inventory of Soviet installations throughout
[115]the province. The maintenance of communication with this agent was
[116]extremely arduous in virtue of his most exposed position.
[118]4. A Havana surgeon) who took special horseback trips to cover
[120]the Soviet installation at Torrens Reformatory.
[122]5. A former lawyer, resident of Santiago provided information
[123]on Cuban armymhitse laying along roads in Santiago area, as well as .
[124]on Soviet troops and materiel movements.
[126]6. <A western diplomat who provided photographs of Soviet~ Ee,
[127]occupied hotels in Havana, Soviet troop and materiel movements in ute
[128]the Havana area. ‘
[130]7. <A Cubana official who provided comprehensive data on state
[131]readiness of Cubana air materiel.
[133]8. A merchant in Camaguey who had provided general observa
[134]tional reporting on military activities in his area. .
[136]9. A former wife of a Cuba Airlines pilot. who has contacts
[137]among Cuban Airline pilots from whom she obtained some air OB.
[139]10. A shipping clerk at Cardenas harbor reported sporadically
[140]on activities at the port.
[142]ll. OA construction company employee at Guantanamo Naval Base
[144]“reported on Cuban OB in the. environs of the base.
[146]12. <A public accountant in Havana who is the leader of a
[147]counter-revolutionary group, reported military information acquired
[148]through his group contacts.
[150]13. A Havana bartender who reported considerable quantities
[151]of OB data obtained from his large circle of varied acquaintances
[152]in Havana area,
[154]14, A retired railroad official reported data on raat shipments.
[156]SR
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[160]SIG STO aed
[162]in Havana where kh certain airijpe) is one of his clients. a
[164]16. A pineapple) firm manager in Pinar del Rio recruited:
[166]in July 19 reported on military developments in his area.
[168]17. A Cuban employee of a foreign embassy recruited in July -
[169]1962 in Havana reported some OB information which was obtained
[170]through casual contacts. lo
[172]18. A customs inspector t Jose Marti Airport) in Havana
[173]was.the source of good reporting on Sov/Bloc cargo shipments to
[174]Havana, including military cargos.
[176]19. <A physician in Havana who reported on military movements,
[178]20. <A Cuban Airlines official, with limited access, reported —
[179]Air OB. ;
[181]21. -<A foreign intelligence service staff officer in Havana
[183]15. A nore & ce Havana reported on Rancho Boyeros Airport
[184]|
[186]|
[188]| reported military OB,
[190]22. A second foreign intelligence service staff officer in .
[191]Havana reported military OB. ;
[193]23. A number of maritime assets who have reported on Sov/Bloc
[194]military cargo deliveries to Cuba.
[196]@ ; b. Political. Throughout the reporting period, the Agency was
[197]able to produce Intelligence on Cuban political affairs at the |
[198]| ministerial lovel and above. This intelligence was derived
[199]essentially from sources who had but limited access to persons of
[200]| high rank or in key positions. This type of access placed a premium
[201]on Agent elictation skills and the ability to distinguish between
[202]: rumor and fact, plus an aptitude for remaining afloat in dangerous
[203]waters. The most significant political information was provided — ,
[204]by the following agents: 8
[206]1. An official Gn the Ministry of Economics )who, (in the
[207]capacity of advisor to Ernesto GUEVARA) was able to giean informa-
[208]tion on Cuban political affairs. :
[210]2. A relative of a former Cuban president who through this
[211]connection and his own social position is able to maintain contact
[212]with high-level officials in Cuba. & on
[214]o
[216]3. A Cuban doctor Who gives médical treatment to Cuban
[217]officials and)who is reporting limited intelligence, by direction,
[218]until he is able to develop direct access to. important high-level
[219]VLLL LAL Ss
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[223]8
[225]on ae 4. A cultural attache of a West European Embassy in Havana who
[227]. picks up information from other diplomats and from Cuban contacts on
[228]political matters. A sub-agent of this asset has also been a source: _
[229]of medium-level political information.
[231]5. A West European Ambassador in Cuba who provides political
[232]information he obtains from foreign and Cuban contacts.
[233]‘ oe | - ae
[234]6. A/fCuban Ambassador in Western Burope) who has been reporting
[235]with utmo: detail and frequency on high-le¥Vel political matters of
[236]an i which he is aware.
[238]7.. The Ambassador to Cuba of & Latin American country who reports
[239]‘political intelligence*obtained through his Cuban and foreign contacts..
[241]8. <A former protege @f Raul CASTRO) who retains contacts with
[242]government leaders and who is a new asset developing his reporting |
[243]capabilities on political matters, — io
[245]9. The Ambassador in Cuba of @ North African country who has
[246]provided high-level political information. os
[247]; 10)
[249]10. A: Cuban . awyer in Santiago whose brother-in-law, (a high- __
[250]ranking official) provided intelligence on GOC/Soviet relations. —
[252]2412, A staff officer of a foreign intelligence service assigned
[253]po a to a cover position)in a Havana Embassy who has produced some
[254]political intelligence responsive to our requirements.
[256]12. A Cuban manager of an intervened U.S. company who has .
[257]relatives in the PSP and in the government. To date, his reporting
[259]has covered general political developments. é.
[260]ob
[262]Q | librarian and teacher who is a relative of a (former justice)
[263]levees of the “Gini Supreme Court) and who has high-level government contacts,
[264]This agent has been reporting political. personality data and some .
[265]political information. |. 6
[269]14, A-@uban Ambassador in Western Europe) who hi has reported political
[270]information to which he has access. © :
[272]15. In addition, there are a number of agent penetrations in
[273]Cuban diplomatic establishments overseas who provide a variety of
[274]miscellaneous political information concerning Cuban activities in the
[275]areas concerned. ; . ;
[277]4 iia
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[283]wee,
[285]Jo. c. Economic. The Agency was able to produce a continuous am
[286]of intelligence from Agent sources on the Cuban sugar, o11 and anount.
[287]portation industries, much of which was in the form-of statistical
[288]summaries. In a number of instances, this intelligence was pro.
[289]vided by agents who had direct access to this information by virtue .
[290]of their jobs.. We also have been able to get continued reporting
[291]on general economic conditions and foreign trade. Among the nost ,
[292]significant agents reporting economic information were: .
[294]1. A Cuban (insurance) salesman, previously noted, who
[295]through his extensive coxtacts and sub-agents has been. able to
[296]provide information on sugar production, (insura e)affairs and
[297]the Cuban banking system. %
[299]ee of 08 — .
[300]-@, An off{cial of the Ministry of E cconomy),( a close associate |
[301]‘of Che GUEVARA , who has proVided useful economié intelligence. ,
[303]3. A-relative of a former Cuban president, previously noted, —
[304]who has provided detailed import-export figures; detailed documentary
[305]reports on petroleum,
[307]“4, @ high-level official of Cubana Airlines who reportedly
[308]provided high-level information on Cubana Airlines, particularly
[309]' financial and materiel affairs. 7
[311]pharmaceutical )firm who travels to Cuba where he has good contacts
[313]0
[314]5. A resigent of Mexico and (director of an Italian-controlled _
[315]in the Minist
[317]of Industry, who has reported economic information,
[319]6. A Dutch businessman who has access to Cuban economic
[320]officials and who has provided useful economic information,
[322]U. Ss. trained Cuban engineer who provided detailed reports .
[323]on(petroleun) industry.
[325]d. Sociological and General Conditions. The Agency has
[326]- provided a st teady and relatively heavy flow of intelligence - :
[327]covering such matters as the state of resistance activities, mood |
[328]of the populace, Living conditions, etc., from agents in nearly
[329]every Cuban province. A survey of agents reporting this type .
[330]of information has not been completed, because almost all of our
[331]agents have reported on this low priority topic from time to time,
[333]4. Within the Terms of the Agency's Mission, What Target '
[334]Was It Unable to Cover and Why? re _
[336]R. Paragraph 3 above sets forth in general the degree to oe 4
[337]which the major Cuban targets were covered during the reporting:
[339]Zh). | 7 a Oo
[340]m a ee wt
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[346]clearly defined and assiduously pursued by TIW. The. immense
[347]pressure of time must continuously be borne in mind if the attack .
[348]on the Cuban problem is to be granted its. full perspective. Even
[349]before TYW assumed responsibility for collection against Cuba, —.
[350]it was clear that intelligence on Soviet, Satellite and Chinese.
[352]’ Communist Cuban policy and maneuvers | would be formulated and
[353]planned at.the highest level in the respective governments.
[354]Equally clear was the fact that the clandestine search for in~ —
[355]sights into the Cuban policies of these governments would enjoy
[356]only as much success as the clandestine search for any. intelligence |
[357]regarding any policies of these governments. Time restrictions
[358]alone ruled out the hope that adequate coverage of these key
[359]denied area targets could be achieved. As a consequence, every ~
[360]facet of the TFW collection program was geared to the search for.
[361]top priority Cuban intelligence; from sources in the free world
[362]and on the island every agent or agent candidate was evaluated in .
[363]terms of his access to such intelligence. Translated into
[364]espionage terms, this meant that every agent or candidate was
[365]examined sharply to determine whether and how he could help
[366]penetrate the GOC, the Cuban armed forces or the managerial and
[367]policy levels of the Cuban economy. Below is an account of the
[368]success of this effort; it will be seen that most major target.
[369]areas were under direct, specific assault.
[371]“om . period, The key military, political and economic targets were
[372]|
[374]~ | by Potatical,
[376]1. Cuban Communist sects late May a clos relative .
[378]and confidant (of the Chief of the Cuban Communist Party) was
[379]singled out and developed by a Cuban principle agent. he
[380]candidate provided highly valuable information throughout the
[381]summer of 1962. -Though the information was obtained indirectly
[382]by the agent it was but a portion of what he could produce. Thus
[383]the ultimate aim of the operation was to effect the candidate's
[384]direct recruitment, The drive toward this goal continues, and..
[385]though we are optimistic that the 6 months effort thus far in- |
[386]vested will result in the direct recruitment of a high-level
[388]* 29 Communist Party )member, it would be inaccurate to say that as of:
[390]he close of the reporting period, the (Party had been penetrated
[392]ata ‘Significant level. 24
[394]2. GOC Ruling Circle,
[396](a) .In May 1962 TFW spotted a Cuban legal”
[397]traveller whose brother-in-law has been a member of the GOC™
[398]from its inception. The agent was recruited under specific
[399]instructions.to attempt to induce his relative to report on GOC
[400]policy matters. Though TFW had only 12 hours with the agent
[402]Cen
[406]a wi
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[411]a
[413]before dispatching him to Cuba, he has attempted to carry out 7
[415]his instructions. By October he had succeeded in eliciting
[416]significant information from the target, and was confident his “4%;
[417]full recruitment was simply a matter of time, One inhibiting
[419]feature affecting the pace of this operation is the fact that
[421]the agent lives in Santiago while his relative, the target, is
[423]a resident of Havana. Unquestion: bly the full recruitment of |.
[425]the target could help fili an important gap in our reporting —
[427]on GOC activities.
[429]So (b) In June 1962 TFW obtained a lead to a
[430]person very closely related to Fidel CASTRO. Throughout the
[431]summer extensive but necessarily circumspent negotiations were
[432]conducted to bring this person to Mexico where full recruitment,
[434]training and briefing would be possible. The negotiations , ‘
[435]culminated in success, The agent was met and trained by Agency I
[436]personnel in September and early October and dispatched to Cuba yt
[437]on 15 October with the specific mission of reporting on the aw
[439]thoughts, plans and activities of the CASTROS and otner leading \\
[441]' GOC figures. Since the target, prior to recruitment did not 3
[443]possess the kind of political awareness which would have led him _
[444]systematically to observe those GOC personalities to whom he
[446]had matural access, the Agency was denied any prime political
[447]intelligence from this source during the reporting period.
[449]-(c) Throughout the summer 1962, TFW
[450]received various reports, the tenor of which were that Ernesto
[451]‘Che! GUEVARA would like to defect from Cuba. Each report proved,
[452]upon closer inquiry, to be groundless, until we learned in late
[453]September that a Mexican industrialist had claimed GUEVARA had
[454]asked him in 1961 for assistance in leaving Cuba. Though many
[455]of the facets of this disclosure tallied with other known data, .
[456]exploitation of this exceedingly important lead was hamstrung by
[457]the inability to aline a qualified agency officer with the widely:
[458]travelling Mexican. This lead illustrates well the frustrations.
[459]involved in pursuing high-level targets within a rigid time
[460]framework, and with a limited number of available personnel.
[462]It also illustrated the need to persist, when the target is of
[463]sufficient importance, in the follow up of "far-out" leads,
[465]-3. Military
[467](a). In late July TFW recruited a Cuban _ .
[469]legal traveller expressly because @f-his close relationship with .
[471]a member (of the Cuban General Staf 2° Once again only a few hours \
[472]was available in which to train the agent. Nevertheless, during
[473]August, September and October the agent persisted in his efforts
[475]13-00000
[477]| Qa ~ ce
[479]13-00000
[481]4 . ve ee
[483]C oe
[485]-to develop the target and was able to provide significant OB -
[486]at the same time. Neither this, nor the other efforts to
[487]penetrate the Cuban military at high-level, however, had met
[488]with full success by the end of the reports period.
[490]of (b) The Cuban lawyer recruited ‘in May 1962.
[491]‘(see paragraph above) developed a second target in September,
[492]_a former member(of the Cuban General Staff)now awaiting reassigne
[493]ment, The agent was instructed to recruit and train this |. ,
[494]military Officer in 5/W. At the end of the reporting period
[495]oo it was not possible to determine the success of this potentially:
[496]“ean excellent operational development.
[498]' (€e) Included in this discussion is the
[499]partially successful recruitment of a Cuban army engineer who |
[500]is stationod in Santiago. The agent cited in (2b above) has —
[501]been in contact with this target, a captain, since July 1962,
[502]but has not succeeded in completing the full recruitment. He
[503]has obtained OB from the captain, but we feel the operation
[504]; will not have reached its full potential until the captain has
[505]| been trained in S/W and is reporting directly to us. .
[507](dad) Since mid-August the Agency has been
[508]pursuing a lead to the G-3 of the Cuban Army. The basis of this
[509]pursuit was fitted together from innumerable reports, and finally
[510]centered, in early October, on a plan to try to effect the recruit~
[512]3g ‘ment using a letter from a former army and prison comrade, By”
[513]cut-off date, the developmental activity had reached the point
[514]where the only remaining matter was to deliver the letter into
[515]the hands of the Officer.
[517]3. Economic. The Agency has striven to identify key
[518]figures in the Cuban 6conomy and to develop ag$Sess to them as ;
[519]rapidly as possible, wherever the opportunity has arisen. Oil,
[520]Nickle and Sugar Industries have been assigned to us having the |
[522]' highest priority.
[524](a) ‘Petroleum:© TW recruited and sent to.
[526]Cuba in January a-.yound\U. rained engineer. In Way) it eported
[527]he had obtained a position in the (Institute of Petroleun Too .
[528]lowly himself to be of major value, we have steadily guided him 24 =|
[529]in an enterprise aimed at recruitment of the(chieg of the petroleum)
[530]industry. The families of the two man had bée@n close friends.
[531]‘The effort involves many imponderables and must be carried out via.
[533]S/W. Still, the major aim is deemed worthy of the investment,
[534]Meanwhile the agent has been able to provide intelligence of
[535]increasing value. .
[537]13-00000
[539].. . (b) Nickle Industry: The seat of this
[540]important industry unfortunately Is in two small towns in Oriente
[541]province. Lightly populated areas which are of strategic importance
[542]always pose rugged operational obstacles. The nickle towns are
[543]no exception. Numerous well-meaning persons in the U.S. have
[544]attempted to help us obtain access to this critical target. Yet
[545]not until late September was the Agency able to turn up (by. |
[546]virtue of a Now Orleans recruitment) a source of viable leads
[547]to key personnel. By cut~off date, however, we had not been able
[548]to bring any lead to function. Most promising is a lead to the
[549](technical supervisor of the Nickle complex.
[553]{c) Sugar: Two former high-level penetrations
[554]of the Sugar Industry. defected to the U.S. soon after the inception
[555]of TFW. Throughout the summer it was not possible to identify :
[556]a suitable candidate to replace them. A New York source in early
[557]October succeeded in placing us in touch with the (chief sugaro re
[558]technician)in Cuba. This “operation should be full. productive
[560]by Christi s 1962, —
[562]2Iry res Se
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[567]La
[569]To illustrate the results of this opecational data, we have
[570]recently been preparing the recruitment in place or defection of
[571]one of the principal officers of the Cuban Foreign Service in
[572]Europe. We have been able to develop the proposals through an
[574]already defected diplomat and the effectiveness of his approach
[576]and a reading on the diplomats reactions can be provided to us
[577]independently by three other agents in close contact with him as
[579]well as through a technical surveillance operation.
[581]G. Liaison
[583]r¢] .
[585]The most fruitfu  \4aison relative to the Cuban target has
[586]been conducted with Guropean)and a few of the(Latin American)/¢ ~
[587]services. Specifically, tn llowing ;services,have veen [tne most
[588]cooperative, and helpful:, ritish ‘Outch) Tench, , (Spanis by,
[590]Italian) Greek, ) Norweziaiys (Deatak) (rede German (Mor; can) @rg ntinian)
[591]ruguay 1€ (Canda any and(‘Chi tean):
[593]sorte of thene services are working closely with the Task Force
[594]both in Washington and Miami, cutting corners on procedure,
[596]. protocol and actually exceeding their own official instructions.
[598]This has been particularly true after the announcement of. the
[599]President on 22 October 1982. The degree of this effort is se
[600]remarkable and runs. all the way from full cooperation to an
[602]‘outstanding exertion of personal conmitment, resourcefulness, and
[604]imagination to find ways to help our effort.
[606]To cite only’ a few of the current||FI operations developed,
[607]through liaison services, the Gpanis sepvice has,given us(4 24
[608]resident agents, (including\2 diplomats)%4 The (French) service has
[609]provided us with one (resident di Loma, yho communicates: directly
[610]with us (by W/T)24 Thdl Manish and Mutchy)iSérvices, have given us
[611]control of eo tdae assets calling at Cuban rts), and they have |
[612]also participated in join perations using (legal travellers) 24 —
[613]In addition to mounting,operations against Cuba, several (European) (0
[614]services have provided(secure diplomatic courier )services for the
[615]transmittal of our owhagents' communications) and for the infil-— 24
[616]tration of S/W and W/T and. other materials )to our agents inside
[617]Cuba. Services in bigtundand Gotland) fava. been particularly
[618]helpuf] in the devélopment of an operation to deny Cuba @ccess) 24
[619]to a (urgently needed solvent for petroleum product date
[620]it appears that efforts to make this roduct mod e) to
[622]_ the Cubans has been successful,
[624]{O-
[625]In general, the West European) services have been cooperative
[627]installations in their own territory.\|ofatin American)services,
[628]have been most helpful in developing operations against Cuban |,
[629]targets in, their own countries, apparently because of the (Latini0
[630]Americans')increasing concern with the threat. of Cuban subversion
[631]on their territory. .
[633]in assisting us to mount operations against Cuba ican)eervic
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[643]oe
[645]_ V. | SIGNIFICANT CHANGES, EITHER POSITIVE OR NEGATIVE, IN
[646]‘THE AGENCY'S COVERAGE CAPABILITY, WHICH TOOX PLACE DURING THE
[648]PERIOD.
[650]The initial, significant change effected by the Agency to
[651]increase and improve its Cuban intelligence coverage capability
[652]was to establish a Cuban Task Force at Headquarters and to
[653]staff it with experienced intelligence officers. These officers
[654]‘were selected from other operating Divisions within the Agency.
[655]Many of them spoke Spanish and all of them have had extensive
[656]experience in various intelligence assignments both at Headquarters
[657]and in the Field. This newly created Task Force was charged with
[658]the responsibility to direct, advise, support, and/or coordinate
[659]‘all phases of the Agency's intelligence operations directed
[660]‘against Cuba. a :
[662]At the same time, the Task Force Field Station in Miami was
[664]strengthened considerably with increased numbers of experienced
[665]staff officers and facilities for mounting intelligence operations
[666]against the Cuban target. This concentration of experienced
[667]personnel into the Cuban Task Force, both at Headquarters and at
[668]the Miami Field Station, was a positive and significant effort to
[669]increase the Agency's intelligence coverage capability in order
[670]to satisfactorily fulfill the priority requirements and tasks
[671]which had been levied on the Agency as a result of the Communist. -
[672]takeover in Cuba. . . .
[676]To further improve our -coverace—capability,: the Agency comnunica~
[677]tions office set up a special facility in Miami to (intercept
[678]electronically internal communications) within Cuba, These (inter-24
[679]‘cepted communications )are processed in Miami and then forwarded
[680]directly to Headquarters, Miami Field Station,(and to NSA for ection *4
[681]and/or further dissemination) The (wsi disseminates to the other
[682]members of the intelligence comnunity"the information that has been
[683]intercepted and processed by this special Agency communication _
[684]facility. This facility cooperates and coordinates its operations. -
[685]closely with(NSAland is used 6y NSA) to assist in the (interception) ZY
[686]of (internal communications) in Cuba. *% - ma _
[688]In addition to setting up within the Agency an organization
[689]whose primary mission is concerned with all phases of intelligence
[690]operations directed against Cuba, all other operating Divisions
[691]within the Agency wére directed to give top priority attention to
[692]the development of intelligence operations against Cuba. This. has
[693]resulted in the diversion of certain assets who had the requisite’
[694]access to Cuban targets as well as the experience or capability.
[696]13-00000
[698]The response of the various Agency components, both by Head-
[699]quarters Desks and by the Field Stations, has been most satis-
[700]factory and has aided the Task Force considerably in the perform-.
[701]ance of its assigned mission. Within the Task Force, selected’ -
[702]officers have been designated to assist, advise, and coordinate .
[703]on all phases of Cuban intelligence operations with the various
[704]geographic division desks. This arrangement has provided for a
[705]continued, increased coverage capability of the Cuban target by
[706]insuring a regular review of. current, developmental, and planned —
[707]intelligence operations of all available Agency intelligence
[708]assets which could be directed against Cuba.
[710]The above points are ones that reflect significant changes
[712]which have taken place during this period. In addition, it
[714]should be pointed out that there has been an intensification
[716]and concentration: of all operational techniques applicable to
[718]the particular type and character of the Cuban target. . There
[720]has been a substantial increase in the recruitment and training.
[722]of agent assets. There has been an extensive increase in the
[723]establishment and use of clandestine communications methods and
[724]channels. The use of SW, one way voice radio, and WT as. methods
[726]of communicating with agents inside Cuba has been greatly expandéd.
[727]And ‘singe certain (Western Nationg“stil1 maintain Embassies in -
[728]Havana, €ourier)channels for the delivery @f letters and packages)24 —
[729]by the(diplomatic pouch have. been developed and are being usad'
[731]_. extensively.:4The above points are discussed elsewhere in this |
[733]_ paper but they are mentioned here briefly in the context of being
[734]closely related to significant changes in the Agency's intelligence
[735]capability. ,
[739]13-00000
[741]VI. WHAT SUPPORT FOR COLLECTION FACILITIES-WAS REQUIRED
[743]" FROM OTHER AGENCIES? HOW WAS IT SECURED FROM THEM? WAS IT TIMELY -
[744]_AND EFFECTIVE? WHAT, IF ANYTHING, WAS LACKING?
[746]The conduct of intelligence collection operations often
[747]has depended on timely and effective support from other U.S. governe
[748]ment agencies. Several government agencies provided support to
[749]intelligence operations directed against the Cuban target on both a
[750]regular and a standby basis. In fact, each and every request for
[751]policy approved support was granted and carried out rapidly and
[752]effectively. For example, the Department of State has expedited the
[753]issuance of visas on selected cases at our request as well as granting
[754]visa waivers to individuals of operational interest to the Agency.
[755]In addition, Foreign Service personnel interview, debrief, and attempt
[757]‘to establish the bona-fides of potential intelligence assets who
[759]voluntarily contact a U.S. Embassy or Consulate. This. is often done
[760]alone and some times in collaboration with an agency officer prior
[761]to introducing the agency officer for further development and ex-
[762]ploitation as the case may require. These types of support are
[763]provided regularly by the Department of State and contribute consid~
[764]erably to the effectiveness of many complex intelligence operations.
[766]Another U.S. government agency which has given invaluable
[767]support to the Agency's intelligence collection operations is the. FBI.
[768]The FBI has provided biographic data, investigative reports, and
[769]operational leads to individuals of known or potential operational '
[770]interest. This support has been maintained on a regular and continuing
[771]basis. Close liaison relations between the FBI and this agency are
[772]maintained at Headquarters and at various Field Stations. This close
[773]liaison has resulted-in a better understanding of the needs and
[775]. requirements of each Agency in the successful accomplishments of :
[777]their separate responsibilities as well as providing a rapid channel
[778]for providing support and assistance when requested.
[780]- The U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service has facil
[781]itated the entry into the U.S. of persons of operational interest —
[782]to the Agency; and has provided guidance and support for cases which
[783]involve unusual alien residence and/or naturalization proceedings.
[784]Liaison with the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service is
[785]particularly close and harmonious at the Miami Field installation.
[786]where the bulk of the cases involving persons of operational interest
[787]to us originates.
[789]Reports provided on a regular basis by the National Security |
[790]Agency have been a source of operational leads which have been followed
[792]13-00000
[794]Sih)
[796]ant
[798]up sor’ the development of collection assets. The disseminations by
[799]the(N.S. ASalso serve as an effective means of checking selected
[800]information and rep ey that has been provided by other sources of
[801]information. Th 4) also collaborates in theydissemination of _.
[802]certain information een the CIA (communication facility) in Miami, an.
[803]Agency,unit engaged in the (electro nic interception and processing ¢ of
[804]Cuban (I (internal Communications) _ 24 24
[806]Liaison with the aforementioned U. S. government agencies
[807]is maintained . on «x continuing and regular basis both at the Headquarters
[808]level in Washington, D.C. and. at appropriate field installations by
[809]designated Agency components. It has been our pleasurable experience
[810]that these agencies, in addition to others such as the Department of
[811]Agriculture where specific operations required guidance in their par~
[812]ticular fields of competence, have provided timely, effective, and |
[813]professional support and guidance, in support of policy approved
[815]_intelligence collection operations as required in the national interest.
[817]Without such support, the task of.intelligence collection would have
[819]been in many instances much more. difficult and, in many cases, impossible
[821]i a , nee ; Of
[825]z . - een : - So
[826]nn ner a aes sete as .
[828]VII. AGENT SUMMARIES
[830]The scope and nature of the Agency's Foreign Intelli-
[832]gence operations is most clearly seen in the character, personal
[833]ambition and caprice of the human material present, namely the
[834]agents involved. The following sketches of the individual agents | -
[835]_ engaged in these operations have been compiled in recognition of
[837]the vital ingredient which these human beings bring to an apprecia-
[839]tion of the Agency's FI operations. It will be noted that a
[840]‘majority of the agents work, or have been worked, out of Miami,
[842]‘the city which has been the center of anti-Castro Cubans, the
[844]major pool of potential agents, since 1959.
[846]Other gfeorraphical areas are represented in mathematical
[847]sequence, in fact according to the number of Cuban exiles in
[848]residence at a given place. This same mathematical order applies
[849]with reference to the jobs these agents hold. Thus, if a Cuban
[851]- fas a function, the performance of which is important in sustain-
[852]ing the island, hence important to the Cuban Regime, the Agency
[853]‘has sought the services of this man as its agent.>,For this reason,
[854]several agents are in the employ of the (airlines \and of (merchant zl
[855]i. ‘marine shipping\businesses. So too, with diplomacy. Every foreign
[856]| “diplomat now acéredited to the Regime in Havana has been examined
[857]|
[858]j
[860]by the Agency asa prospective agent. Forty percent of these diplo-~
[861]mats were approached. Of this number about one half took our bait
[862]-and have accepted assignments which range from marginal involvement
[863]in "intelligence" (e.g., using their diplomatic immunity to. carry
[864]our materials), to active participation in our operations.
[866]Finally, one type of Cuban who played an influential, 3
[867]though limited, role during the past six months was the defector
[868]; (who is not mentioned elsewhere in this paper). The defector is
[869]; the official who for one reason or another cannot remain in or be
[870]! persuaded to:remain in place and report on his job. Owing to the
[871]nature of this particular person, it is difficult to draw hard
[872]‘lines between those who genuinely reject their Government and those
[873]who merely quit in self-interest, but during the past six months,
[874]i the Agency tapped in on the defections of aLout ten Cubans of
[875]| _ eonsequence, prvfiting from their information in all cases and
[876]| _ from their psychological exploitation when circumstance would permit, .