[1]2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
[3]Date : 08/06/95
[4]Page : 1
[6]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[7]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[9]AGENCY INFORMATION
[11]AGENCY : SSCIA .
[12]RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10067
[13]RECORDS SERIES : HEARINGS
[14]AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 09-H-08
[16]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[18]ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
[19]FROM : TWEEDY, BRONSON
[20]TO :
[21]TITLE ;
[22]DATE : 09/09/75
[23]PAGES : 76
[24]SUBJECTS : CONGO
[26]ASSASSINATION, LUMUMBA
[28]OPENING CRITERIA
[29]COMMENTS
[31]CIA
[32]DOCUMENT TYPE : TRANSCRIPT
[33]CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
[34]RESTRICTIONS : 1A
[35]CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
[36]DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/25/98 ;
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[41]HW 50955 Docld:3242735455 Page 1
[43]The Wuitea States &
[45]Report of Proceedings
[47]Hearing held before
[49]Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental
[51]Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities
[53]Tuesday, September 9, 1975
[55]Washington, D.C. 7
[57](Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over
[58]to the Committee for destruction)
[60]WARD & PAUL
[61]410 FIRST STREET, 8. E.
[62]WASHINGTON, D. C, 20003
[64](202} 844-6000
[66]SECRET
[68]: dey “
[69]ubject
[72]Prone {Aree 202) 344.
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[86]z
[90]4 Washrsgtan, Pes
[92]lewet, SE
[94]TESTIMONY OF
[96]Bronson Tweedy
[98]NUMBER
[99]Tweedy
[100]Tweedy
[101]Tweedy
[102]Tweedy
[103]Tweedy
[104]Tweedy
[106]Tweedy
[108]{The above exhibits were retained by counsel.)
[110]Exhibit
[111]Exhibit
[112]Exhibit
[113]Exhibit
[114]Exhibit
[115]Exhibit
[117]Exhibit
[119]EXHIBITS
[121]TOP SECRET
[124]V
[126]a mre an ern tae ta ear omence rnin Mie LETTE TS come en tienen salted i, REE TE
[128]thomas/nash
[130]o
[132]EXECUTIVE SESSION
[134]Tuesday, September 9, 1975
[136]Prone {Area 207} $444000
[138]United States Senate,
[139]Select Committee to Study Governmental
[140]Operations with respect to
[141]Intelligence Activities,
[142]Washington, D. C.
[143]The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:15 p.m.,
[144]in Room 443, Russell Office Building, Senator Walter F.
[145]Mondale presiding.
[147]Present: Senator Mondale (presiding).
[149]ra
[150]2
[152]6
[154]i?
[155]a
[159]Also present: Rhett Dawson and Frederick Baron,
[161]Professional Staff Members.
[165]1 eam
[167]MUP Fergt NteWet Sb
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[183]z
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[197]Uap RGER TUTOR
[201]Senator Mondale. Bo you swear the testimony you are
[202]about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
[203]but the truth, so help you God?
[205]Mr. Tweedy. I do.
[207]Mr.Baron. Mr. Tweedy, are you aware that you have
[208]the right to counsel here today?
[210]Mr. Tweedy. I am.
[212]Mr. Baron. And are you appearing voluntarily here
[213]today without counsel?
[215]Mr. Tweedy. I am.
[217]{At this point, the hearing was removed to Room 608,
[218]Carroll Arms Hotel.)
[220]tir. Baron. Are you also aware that all of your
[221]Constitutional rights are intact before the Committee, includ-
[222]ing your Fifth Amendment rights?
[224]Mr. Tweedy. I am.
[226]Mr. Baron. Mr. Tweedy, are you aware that you have
[227]the right to cease answering questions at any time and
[228]consult with an attorney? .
[230]Me. Tweedy. Yes. TI gather that was implicit in what
[231]you said in the Senator's office.
[233]Mr. Baron. lt was.
[235]Now, that we are no longer in the Senator's presence
[237]YT would like to make it clear to you that you are under no
[239]obligation to continue testifying, although the Committee
[241]TOP SECRET
[244]would obviously appreciate it if you would.
[245]Are you willing to do so?
[246]Mr. Tweedy. I have no intention of not cooperating.
[248]Mr. Baron. And you are willing to continue to testify
[250]Prane (Aree 202) 444-4000
[252]to the truth as best you can?
[254]Mr. Tweedy. Indeed I will.
[256]Mr. Baron, Perhaps we should hegin by putting on the
[257]record a bit of your background in Agency activities leading
[258]to the point at which you assumed the position as Chief of
[259]the African Division.
[261]TESTIMONY OF BRONSON TWERDY
[262]Ne. Tweedy. TI came aborad the Agency in the first of
[264]May, 1947 and after training was sent to Switzerland. t
[266]“
[267]2
[269]e
[271]o
[274]g
[276]returned in 1950 and did a series of desk jobs in what was
[277]as the Central European Division, I quess, and went through
[280]a number of different assignments at that time, until May
[282]3 1S-]} i
[283]of 1953 when I went out as Chief of Station co iuemamoaaat
[285]T was there until the middle of 1956 and returned very
[286]Age . oo
[287]briefly to the States, went to [@ERUoa]R Deputy Chief of
[289]Station there. I took over as Chief of Station there in
[291]4
[293]middle of 1998 ‘and was then replaced by Frank Wisner, in
[294]15 -{
[295]EGRET R earty in October 1959, and I took over the
[297]Mar gtaaee,
[299]African Nivision T should think somewhere around between the
[301]ay
[303]15th and 18th of November 1959.
[305]That brings me up to date.
[307]ALD DK Stones,
[309]TOP SECRET
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[328]MAL Steet *
[330]Mr. Baron. And how long did you serve as Chie fof
[331]the African Division? .
[333]Mr. Tweedy. Until September of '63.
[335]Mr. Baron. In that position did you consult frequent
[336]with people in policy-making positions at the State Department?
[338]- Mr. Tweedy. Well, as I was explaining to you as we
[339]were strolling around, the simple answer to that is yes.
[340]These consultations would take many, many different forms.
[342]On the Congo, for example, the State Napartment
[343]obviously was just as involved as practically the rest of the
[344]U.S. Government and they had a Congolese task force. I
[345]would attend their meetings or a representative of mine would
[346]attend their meetings. They took place almost daily,
[347]sometimes I guess even more than once daily.
[349]Mr. Baron. During what period of time?
[351]Mr. Tweedy. oh, Lord, from the time the Congo thin;
[352]really hotted up, and I am talking then particularly under the
[353]Kennedy Administration, when Mennen Williams organized the
[354]task force and Wayne Fredericks was his deputy; those mect-
[355]ings were State's meatinas, they weren't CIA meetings, they
[356]weren't meetings primarily to discuss the CIA policy, but
[357]we had to be there to maintain, to keep abreast of what the
[358]policy was.
[360]Mr. Raron. If we could focus our attention on the
[362]period between the independence of the Congo in June of '60
[364]and the announce pea ES SR CRET: Lumumba in February of
[367]Mr. Tweedy. WAs that the month of his death?
[368]Mr. Baron. The month the death was announced.
[370]As you know, there is a lot of mystery surrounding his
[372]Prone [Area 207) 344-6600
[374]death and the probable cause of his death, AS far as the U.N
[375]investigation was concerned it was January 17 or perhaps
[376]January 18, 1961.
[378]Mr. Tweedy. Yes.
[380]Mr. Baron. What was the nature of your contact with
[381]the State Department during that period of time?
[383]Mr. Tweedy. My recollection of thia is far less
[384]Congo and far more general, as I was mentioning to you as
[385]we strolled, and particularly my talks with Jim Penfield,
[387]whom Joe Satterswate was dedicated.
[389]3
[391]a
[392]4
[393]a
[394]_«
[395]“
[398]Joe Satterswate, who was Assistant Secretary for
[399]African Affairs, and Penfield and I were colleagues in Vienna
[400]together. He had the minister. Rut we did a great deal cf
[401]talking together about CIA deployment in Africa. I was
[402]forming a division both at home and abroad and I had a lot
[403]of things to negotiate with him {aba
[404]ste? msraand he naturally had his views on a jot of the thim:
[405]we wanted to da, and we spent a qreat deal of time arguina
[407]these things out, making arrancements and so on and so forth.
[409]St.
[411]To be frank with you, I have far less recollection abe
[413]seer,
[415]intimate policy talks on places like the Congo with that
[417]BIG Faye ne
[419]particular qroup than 1 did after 19-what, the beginning
[421]TOP SECRET
[424]Emane {Ares 202) $04-4000
[426]2
[428]“
[429]ay
[430]e
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[436]the Kennedy Administration.
[438]Mr. Baron. It was during the Kennedy Administration
[439]that the large scale paramilitary operations in the Congo were
[440]qeared up.
[442]Mr. Tweedy. All that happened then, absolutely.
[444]Mr. Raron. Do' you remember: discussions with Livingstone
[445]Merchant in the State Department before the turn of Adminis-
[448]Mr. Tweedy. I knew Livingstone Merchant but specific
[449]discussions with him | really do not recall, no. Later on
[450]Lt remember having a4 couple of meetings along with Mr. Rusk.
[452]mr. Baron. Nid any of those Meetings concern Lumumba?
[454]Mr. Tweedy. “Mo, Mr ak, T think they exclusively
[455]concerned Portuguese Africa.
[457]Mr. Baron. No you remember having any meetings alone
[458]with Herter, Secretary Herter, about Lumumha?
[460]Mr. Tweedy. T am not sure T have had a meeting with
[461]Herter.
[463]tir. Waron. Did you have any meetings with Secretary
[464]Herter or Douglas Dillon or Livinastone Verchant?
[466]Mr. ‘Pwinedy. Never met Mr. Pilon.
[468]“tr. Baron. About Congolese affaires?
[470]tur, Tweedy. Newer get Nr. Dillon and f do wot recall
[471]having met with Livinastone Merchant on the Conga. T may
[473]have dane so but J really don't recall, T had very Little
[476]Prone {Aras 767) 344-4000
[478]z
[480]4
[481].
[482]e
[483]z
[487]professional contact with Mr. Merchant, I knew him mostly
[488]slightly socially. .
[490]Mr. Baron. When you met regularly with mr. Satterswate
[491]or Mr. Penfield did you discuss Lumumba with them?
[493]Mr. Tweedy. I am sure we discussed Lumumba in the
[494]sense of which would be all the time, assessing the situa-
[495]tion, assessing where Lumumba was heading, where the Congo
[496]was heading. I did this with, you know, almost all of the
[497]African situations, individual African country situations.
[499]We would spend a great deal of time, their pointa of
[500]view, our point of view, cur perspective, their perspective,
[501]but never as an action matter that I can recall,
[503]Mr. Baron. Was the assassination of Patrice Lumumba
[504]ever contemplated or raised in those meetings?
[506]Mr. Tweedy. Never.
[508]Mr. Baron. Did you meet regularly in this period
[509]between Congolese independence and the announced death of
[510]Lumumba with people at the NSC level or people in the White
[511]House?
[513]Mr. Tweedy. I don't recall so at all. For example,
[514]President Eisenhower had an African representative the same
[516]N
[517]way President Kennedy later had, then I can't recall who he
[518]was. President Kennedy had two. The first name escapes
[520]me. He later went on down to South Africa as Ambassador
[522]and one that I saw most of for a considerable period of
[524]TOP SECRET
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[529]7]
[530]3
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[543]time was Carl Kazen, recently retired head of the School of
[544]Advanced Studies in Princeton.
[546]Mr. Baron. During the Eisenhower Administration did
[547]you have direct contact with Gordon Gray or Andrew Goodpaster
[548]with reference to Congolese affairs.
[550]You are shaking your head and we have to put it on
[551]the record,
[553]Mr. Tweedy. I am alsmot convinced that the answer is
[554]no. I am just thinking. I know Gordon Gray quite well. 1
[555]don't recall ever having: policy discussions with him at all,
[556]nor General Goodpaster. I think the answer is certainly no.
[558]Mr. Baron. You mentioned to me earlier that you had
[559]attended only two National Security Council meetings in your
[560]memory and that those two meetings were both long after the
[561]death of Lumumba, is that correct?
[563]Mr. Tweedy. I can only imagine that they must have
[564]because this was well into the Kennedy Administration.
[565]wouldn't be able to put any dates on it now.
[567]Mr. Baron. It was during the directorship of John
[568]MeCone at CIA?
[570]Mr. Tweedy. Yes, that is without question. And
[571]McBundy was at the meetings. Yes, it must have been
[572]well after the death of Lumumba, maybe even the following
[573]year.
[575]Mr. Baron. During the latter part of the Eisenhower
[577]TOP SECRET _
[580]Prone (Ares 207) $44-4000
[582]3
[586]a
[587]7
[589]t
[591]Administration when events in Congo were heatingup, after
[592]Congolese independence, what was the general atmosphere in
[593]the Stata Department and at the CIA in relation to Lumumba,
[594]the general attitude toward Lumumba?
[596]Mr. Tweedy. Well, I think you would have to start by
[597]saying what was the general assessment of the situation in
[598]the Congo. Lumumba was really sort of the last thing you
[599]came down to.
[601]The worry in WAshington about the situation in the
[602]Congo was that here was the largest geographical expression
[603]in Africa that thretened to go up in smoke, up because the
[604]Kremlin was about to march in and take it over, not because
[605]it was about to break up tribally and do all the things that
[606]those African countries in their early years were at least
[607]vulnerable to. The only trouble with the Congo was if it
[608]happened there the side effects would have been infinitely
[609]greater than, of course, if it had happened anywhere else.
[611]Mr. Baron. What would those side effects have been?
[613]Mr. Tweedy. All one culd do was assess those, but it
[614]would have set a precedent, for example, the neighboring
[615]country by which great store was set by the West was Nigeria
[616]and if the same infection crossed that border one was afraid
[617]that this would go up in smoke and that in effect there
[619]was a possibility of the continent disintegrating before it
[621]really had had a chance to get under way under its own aegis.
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[647]This was the concern.
[649]Mr. Baron, Were these political sida effects only
[651]that were being taken into account or were thera also
[652]fears for Americah business interests in the Congo that
[653]were part of the side effects?
[655]Mr. Tweedy. Insofar ag my assessmenta were concerned,
[657]and those of the Agency and any conversations I can recall
[659]with the State Department, American business was just not a
[661]great factor.
[663]If you want to talk about business, the big factor, of
[665]course, was Katanga and eventually when Tachombe threatened to
[667]succeed reauiting in tha great dinvalvamuane ef both the its amt
[669]the U.S. in the Congo affair, the fear there was that 1? you
[671]put together the Congo without Katanga it was like construct-
[672]ing a Cadillac and purposely omitting the gas station.
[674]Mr. Baron. That is because Kutanga is the home of
[675]most of the natural resources that are in the Congo.
[677]Mr. Tweedy. That is the only thing that keeps that
[678]country going.
[680]Now, I don't say there weren't a lot of economic con-
[681]siderations in back of that but these were political
[682]economic concerns much more than anything parochial, but is
[683]whatwas going to happen to U.S. business was not a factor inso-’
[684]far as I recall.
[686]Mr. Baron. So the primary concern was for political
[688]TOP SECRET
[692]Stability in Africa.
[693]Mr. Tweedy. Yes, political stability in Africa. In
[694]4 quick phrase you put your foot right on that.
[696]Mr. Dawson. During the summer of 1960 you mentioned
[698]Prans (Ares 207) $44-4000
[700]@arlier that in the time frame you did not think the
[701]Kremlin was ready to march in there, as that was a fear with
[702]you but --
[704]Mr. Tweedy. I don't mean to Bay this was nothing that
[705]anybody was worred about but it was not the primary concern,
[707]Mr. Dawson. But there was significant Soviet interest
[708]in infiltrating and taking advantago of the situation in the
[709]Congo?
[711]Mr. Tweedy. I think £t would be much more accurate
[713]to say it was our assumption, we were not privy to Soviet
[715]4
[716]2
[718]6
[720]i]
[721]ry
[725]intentions with respect to Africa, which r Suspect in those
[726]days like a great many other things about African culture
[727]round the globe were {11 informed at that point, and un-
[729]doubtedly seeking their own policies in Africa just the way this
[731]country was. It was obviously a worry.
[732]Mr. Baron... Was it also Our assumption {f the Soviets
[734]moved into the Congo they would move on the side of Lumumba?
[735]Me. Tweedy. Oh, yes, I think there would have bean
[737]little doube in our minds that that would have been the case,
[739]Mr. Baron. And is it also true that the qeneral perception
[741]at the Agency and in the State Department was that Lumumba
[743]TOP SECRET
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[770]posed the threat in the Congo beyond the mére threat of
[771]political instability because of his closeness to the Soviets
[772]or his willingness to accept aid from the Soviets?
[774]Mr. Tweedy. It made the cheese mora binding but I
[775]don't think we had any information indicating there was
[776]any close umbilicus between the Soviets and Lumumba but it
[777]was potentially there.
[779]Mr. Baron. And that potential --
[781]Mr. Tweedy. Thia increased one's nervousness about the
[783]situation.
[785]Mr. Baron. In your capacity as Chief of the African
[786]Division to whom did you report and from whom did you receive
[787]orders?
[789]Mr. Tweedy. Well, the normal chain of command was
[790]through DDD, Dick Bissell and --
[792]Mr. Baron. Would you meet regularly with Richard
[793]Bissell during this period of time?
[795]Mr. Tweedy. Regularly would be a big word. Not
[796]necessarily that often. We might talk on the phone. To
[797]say that I saw him all the time, how often I don't know. It
[798]would go in fits and starts, undoubtedly but --
[800]Mr. Baron. In formulating actions to be taken in the
[801]Congo, would you consult with Bissell before you undertook
[803]any major operation.
[805]Mr. Tweedy. Well, depending on what you mean by
[807]TOP SECRET
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[825]major operation, Major operation per se, iff you are not
[826]talking about just intelligence operations, call for in-
[827]structions and formalization either inside the Agency or out-
[828]side.
[830]Mr. Baron. So any major covert action would be
[831]formulated in consultation not only with Bissell but with the
[832]DCI, Allen Dulles at that time, and probably higher levels
[834]than that,
[836]Mr. Tweedy. I suppose the DCI, if Bissell felt that
[837]'
[838]was necessary, and, of course, he used to talk to the
[839]DCI without my being present, and undoubtedly certain instruc-
[840]tions I would receive from time to time undoubtedly stem from
[841]conversations that Bissell would have had with the DCI and
[842]funnelled down to me.
[844]I didn't always know who talked to whom before I re-
[845]ceived instructions.
[847]Mr. Baron. So if you received an instruction from
[848]Richard Bissell as DDP you would proceed to implement that
[849]instruction on the assumption it was fully authorized above
[850]the level of DDP?
[852]Mr. Tweedy. I think I would proceed with it on the
[853]basis that he was authorized to give me instructions
[854]and it was up to him to bloody well know what he was empowered
[856]to tell me to do.
[858]XY couldn't run his affairs for him to that
[860]TOP SECRET
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[879]by and large I reckon the Agency worked and that was the way
[880]it was set up to work and that is the way it worked, but to
[881]say every time Bissell talked to me he always talked to
[882]Allen Dulles first 1 would think is nonsense.
[884]Mr, Baron. You didn't consider it your duty to question
[885]Bissell about the source of authority for some covert: action
[886]he was asking you to undertake?
[888]Mr. Tweedy. I would have never hesitated to do if
[889]I felt that it was necagssary to do so.
[891]TI can't recall having done so. He and I used to have
[892]disagreements philosophically on Operations. We were very
[893]good friends and I never had any hesitation about telling him
[894]when I thought he didn't make any sense but --
[896]Mr. Dawson. Could you describe that philosophical
[897]difference, or is it describable?
[899]Mr. Tweedy. Well it varied a lot. 1 think Dick was
[900]by and large inclined to feel that almost anything was
[901]possible, you know, in the Clandestine service, if they put
[902]their minds to it, and my view was this wasn't the case.
[904]Mr. Dawson. Thank you.
[906]Mr. Baron. Did you ever discuss the question of
[907]assasgainating Lumumba with Richard Bissell?
[909]Mr. Tweedy. Yes, this was the way the whole thing
[910]came up in the first instance. Iocan't remember how it came
[912]up except undoubtedly we had a conversation,
[914]TOP SECRET
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[931]Mr. Baron. Do you recall when {t came up?
[933]Mr. Tweédy. No, I don't. ft obviously must have
[934]come up, I assume, what, the fall of 1960. But I have no
[935]way of putting a date to it.
[937]Mr. Baron. And what was said during that discussion or
[938]perhaps I should backtrack first and ask whether this was one
[939]discussion or a series of discussions?
[941]Mr. Tweedy. Oh, we must have discuased it more than
[942]once, I think it came up in the sense that Dick would have
[943]said we probably better be thinking about whether it might
[944]ever be necessary or desirable to get rid of Lumumba, in which
[945]case we presumably should be in position to assess whether we
[946]could do it or not successfully.
[948]Mr. Baron. Do it, meaning carry off an assassination?
[950]Mr. Tweedy. Yes, but it was never discussed with him
[951]in any other sense but a planning exercise, but a planning
[952]exercise which, in other words, never were we instructed
[953]to do anything of this kind. “We were instructed to ask whether
[954]such a thing would be feasible and to have the Chief of
[955]Station he thinking along those lines as well.
[957]Mr. Baron. So, in effect you were asked to move
[958]ahead at least as far as developing the capability to
[959]carry of an assassination if an order should be given?
[961]Mr. Tweedy. Well, or to examine the potential for
[963]doing that.
[965]TOP SECRET
[968]rene (Area 202} 544-4000
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[981]TOP SECRET:
[983]Mr. Dawson. I know that you have indicated you
[984]won't be able to put a precise date to this conversation
[985]with Bissell or conversations with Bissell, but maybe we can
[986]narrow it down a little bit.
[988]Would you assume that it would be after the proclama-
[989]tion of the Congolese independence on June 30, 1960?
[991]Mr. Tweedy. Oh, yes.
[993]Mr. Dawson. Would you assume it would be before
[994]Lumumba's being put into U.N. protective custody on
[995]Septemberl5, 19607
[997]Mr. Tweedy. I think it must have been, yes.
[998]didn't realize he had gone into custody that early.
[1000]Mr. Baron. So then it would be sometime during the
[1001]summer or early fall of ‘60?
[1003]Mr, Tweedy. What happened to Lumumba after that?
[1005]Mr. Baron. He was in protective custody at the United
[1006]Nations force from mid-September until late November and
[1007]it was in Late November that he left to go traveling
[1008]towards Stanleyville and he was captured by Mobutu's troops
[1009]at thac point in very early December and from early December
[1010]until mid-January he was in the custody of the Congolese in
[1011]prison and then it was in mid-January 1961 that he was
[1012]flown from a prison in Tysville to Katanga where his death
[1013]was announced shortly thereafter.
[1015]Mr. Tweedy. That I recall. I have got to assume it
[1017]TOP SECRET
[1020]Prone (Aree 207) 544-4000
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[1036]PEON eee Qtemee
[1038]waa sometime after September 15th. I don't know.
[1040]Mr. Baron. When you aay “after"™ --
[1042]Mr. Tweedy. After you put September 15 the day he
[1043]came under, The only thing is X have no recollection that
[1044]it would have happened as early as, say, early August or
[1045]early September,
[1047]Mr. Baron. It was in August or ®arly September that
[1048]Lumumba was Premier of the Congo?
[1050]Mr. Tweedy. Yes.
[1052]Mr. Baron. And there was obviously a atruggle for power
[1053]between Lumumba and Kasavubu going on. .
[1055]Mr. Dawson. I guess the crucial question,
[1057]Mr. Tweedy. You have really got me at this point.
[1059]Mr. Dawson. It would be whether or not you would have
[1060]considered the plan had he been in U.N. protective custody.
[1061]If you assume that would be the case, then I don't think
[1062]any More precision in the date would neceasarily be productive.
[1064]Mr. Treedy. My whole recollection of the thing would
[1065]be that only purpose of the exercise would have been te have
[1066]a plan when he was in nobody's custody.
[1068]Mr. Baron. That would have been before --
[1070]Mr. Tweedy. That is the only thing that makes sense
[1071]to me, September, because --
[1073]Mr. Baron. Well, I will go on.
[1075]In a moment I will show you some cable traffic that
[1077]TOP SECRET
[1080]went back and forth between headquarters and the Congo after
[1081]he was in U.N. custody to see if that refreshes your recollec-
[1083]tion about the general attitude with regard to Lumumba at
[1085]that time.
[1087]Mone {Area 207) 344-4000
[1089]Mr. Tweedy. Yes.
[1090]Mr. Baron. But, you are saying now, that it would
[1091]only make sense to you that --
[1093]Mr. Tweedy. In retrospect nothing makes sense to me
[1095]Mr. Baron. -- that this initial consideration of the
[1096]feasibility of the assassination of Lumumba between Bissell
[1097]and yourself?
[1099]Mr. Tweedy. I should have thought that would have
[1101]been during the period when he was in effect in power. 1
[1104]2
[1105]4
[1110]o
[1115]should have thought, but the record may prove me wrong.
[1117]Mr. Baron. Did you have any discussion with Bissell
[1118]where he indicated that his own consideration of the assassina-
[1119]tion of Lumumba had moved beyond the realm of possibility to
[1121]_ an actual plan that he was prepared to carry out or taking
[1122]steps to carry out.
[1124]Mr. Tweedy. . I cannot recall a conversation with
[1125]Bissell wherein effect he said, let's move from A to Bore
[1126]to D or something like this. I do not recall that. My
[1127]recollection of the whole interval when this was under con-
[1129]sideration was that it was a planning interval and at no point
[1131]TOP SECRET |
[1134]Prone [Ares 707) 444-6000
[1137]a
[1139]z
[1143]can I recall that I even felt it was imminent that somebody
[1144]would say go, (a) we never came up with a plan that was
[1145]go~able. or anything really very close to it. It was
[1146]always my assumption that at the time anything like this should
[1147]occur there would have been some kind of real focus on the
[1148]problem at probably a very considerable policy level within
[1149]the Agency at which somebody would have said something
[1150]more about it and it never occurred to me I would get a call
[1151]or Bissell would ask me to come down to his office and say
[1152]go to it.
[1154]Nor were we ever in position where he said that I would
[1155]merely implement plan so-and-so. We never got that far,
[1157]Mr. Baron. You didn’t have any action plans for
[1159]assassination of Lumumba that you had prepared or were aware
[1161]Mr. Tweedy. No. Planning, yes, but nothing that ever
[1162]got anywhere.
[1164]Mr. Baron. What kind of planning was -done?
[1166]Mr. Tweedy. It was mostly the kind of thing where one
[1167]asked the Chief of Station to keep in mind what sort of
[1168]accers one might ever have had to Lumumpa tor whatever purpose.
[1169]Yt was this kind of thing, as best {I recollect.
[1171]Mi. Baron. Did you send cables raising the question of
[1172]gaining access to Lumumba for the purpose of assassinating
[1174]him?
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[1195]SLD Pages
[1197]Mr. Tweedy, I suspect that was the first cable that
[1199]ever went out. In other words, the first cable that ever
[1201]went out to Larry Hedgman. He must have realized, he would
[1203]have been perfectly clear on his end, the way one's minds were ;
[1204]running even though it was purely a-contéhgency.
[1206]Mr. Baron, I am sorry. I don't think I understood
[1208]You say the first cable that went out.
[1210]Mr. Tweedy. That was the first way that Hedgman was
[1211]ever advised that there was any thinking of that kind in
[1212]Washington, was via our cable. Iam sure he wasn't back in
[1213]the States over anything of this kind.
[1215]Mr. Baron. Today you distinctly remember a cable sent?
[1217]Mr. Tweedy. I think I remember that much more distincte-
[1218]ly than anything I remember in the last few minutes that it
[1219]was & cable which asked him to be thinking of that.
[1221]Mr. Baron. That was pursuant to your conversation
[1222]with Mr. Bissell?
[1224]Mr. Tweedy. That was,
[1226]Mr. Baron. Did you send that cable or Mr. Bissell
[1230]send that cable.
[1232]Mr. Tweedy. It probably would have been a cable 1
[1234]wouldhave written and Probably released by him,
[1235]Mr. Baron. Do you know what was in that cable?
[1237]Tweedy. God knows,I don't.
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[1252]Mr. Baron, “Or the effect of the language in the cable?
[1254]Mr. Tweedy. The effect of the language in the cable
[1255]would be to get Hedgman to be thinking along these lines.
[1257]Mr. Dawson. Would you describe the purpose?
[1259]Mr. Tweedy. It would have been the aventuality that we
[1260]might wish to get rid of Mr. Lumumba personally.
[1262]Mr. Dawson, I@ that language you think might have
[1263]been used or that is how you think it might have been done?
[1265]Mr. Tweedy. I couldn't even start to reproduce the
[1266]cable,
[1268]Mr. Baron.- Did you send a number of auch cables to
[1269]the Chief of Station?
[1271]Mr. Tweedy. I imagine there were a few over a -period
[1272]of time. It was not an intansive correspondence as I
[1273]remember it.
[1275]Mr, Baron. It wouldn't be thenormal practice to
[1276]have an intensive correspondence on such a sensitive subject,
[1277]would it?
[1279]Mr, Tweedy. I don't know. It is the only time I ever
[1280]had one but I have had very sensitive subjects,operationally
[1281]sensitive nubjects that I have dealt with in extensive
[1282]cables over a very long period of time, but nothing of this
[1283]nature whatsoever,
[1285]Mr. Baron. Were these cables from headquarters to
[1287]the Chief of Station in Leopoldville sent in a specially
[1289]TOP SECRET
[1292]Prone (Area 207) $44-6000
[1295]2
[1297]6
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[1300]e
[1304]restricted channel?
[1305]Mr. Tweedy. Yes, all sensitive cables are sent in
[1306]various types of restricted channels I am gure you aware.
[1307]Mr. Baron. This channel even more tightly held and
[1308]closely restricted than the normal cable traffic that would
[1309]flow to the Chief of Station?
[1311]Mr. Tweedy. That would be a very fair statement,
[1313]Mr. Baron. Do you know whether the cable included in-
[1314]structions to destroy it after reading it?
[1316]Mr. Tweedy. That wouldn't have been normal.
[1318]Mr. Baron. Would you assume that on a subject like this
[1319]such an instruction would have been given?
[1321]Mr. Tweedy. It would really be up to the Chief of
[1322]Station, I think. It would be up to the Chief of Station
[1323]what was in the cable and the degree to which he felt he
[1324]needed to maintain a record for quick reference Purposes in
[1325]the future,
[1327]But, he was pexfectly capable of keeping a file
[1328]which would be accessable only to him and the station and
[1329]if he was sure of his own security within the station I don't
[1330]think this would have been a problem for him,but to answer your
[1331]guestion I don't know what Hedgman himself did.
[1333]Mr. Baron. What kind of response did you receive from
[1335]Hedgman or from the Chief of Station in Leopoldville?
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[1356]TOP SECRET
[1358]Mr. Tweedy. _ It was a serious answer. I can't do
[1359]better than that. It was a serious answer. It wasn’t argu-
[1360]mentative, I guess it started to diacuss, not the pros and
[1361]cons of policy,at least I don't recall it did, but “what it
[1362]was that he might be able to do. It was a disciplined reply
[1363]to an instruction from headquarters.
[1365]Mr. Baron. Did he mention any specific means that
[1366]he had of gaining access to Lumumba?
[1368]Mr. Tweedy. I don't recall now. I don't recall. I
[1369]think ha said it was certainly not beyond the question that
[1370]moans cauld either be developed or might arise but I certainly
[1371]do not recall that he came up with any very specific ideas in
[1372]the first instance. On that I am afraid I am terribly hedgy.
[1374]Mr. Baron. At the time that you were requesting the
[1375]Chief of Station to report back on means of gaining access
[1376]to Lumumba for the purpose of eliminating him, was this
[1377]access made any more explicit in terms of the kind of |
[1378]personal access that would be ‘needed?
[1380]Mr. Tweedy. Y am sure that must have been covered
[1381]at some point,i.e., in perhaps a series of types of accesses.
[1383]Mr. Baron. Would this be access to shoot him or would
[1384]this be access to his personal food or drink or toiletries?
[1386]Mr. Tweedy. I suppose all those types of things might
[1387]have been considered.
[1389]Mr. Baron. But this was not access in the sense of --
[1391]TOP SECRET.
[1394]rore [Ares 207} 544-4000
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[1403]2
[1405]Wasting
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[1409]YOP SECRET
[1410]finding a way to sneak inside the U.N. guard to simply
[1411]snatch Lumumba from custody,thia was Clearly access to assassin-
[1412]ate him, is that correct?
[1414]Mr. Tweedy. That would certainiy be my recollection.
[1415]Kidnapping was never a factor that I recall at all or even
[1416]considered,at least I don't remember it.
[1418]Mr. Baron, In your discussions with Richard Bissell
[1419]about the prospect of assassinating Lumumba, did he mention to
[1420]you that he had had similar discusaions with Justin O'Donnell
[1422]Mr. Tweedy. I was reminded of uatin o'Donnell’a
[1423]role in all this. As you may recall, when I talked to you
[1424]and Mr. Wides, and until you reminded me I had forgotten
[1425]that qiustin"o"Donrely played any role whatsoever and now
[1426]that it has been brought to my recollection I recall it.
[1428]I recall it almost in detail.
[1430]I remember being told that he had expressed reservations
[1431]or disagreement or refusal to participate to Bissell and I
[1432]think my response to you was if he said that 1 would believe
[1433]him but 1 didn’t recall it.
[1435]Mr. Baron. Did Richard Bissell ever indicate to you
[1437]Lae
[1439]that he had asked<Justin O'Donnell te go to the Congo to
[1441]assassinate Lumumba?
[1442]Mr. Tweedy. Well, he must have indeed have told me
[1443]that he was going to ask O'Donnel lato go to the Congo to
[1444]vw “
[1448]examine the thing on the ground, but I don't recall him ever
[1450]TOP SECRET.
[1453]Prove {Aras 202} 444-4000
[1458]a
[1461]e
[1465]Se eee en cee car FEE Seer  e CRETE MEN Aare dines ene Ai
[1467]saying, I am going to send O'Doniiell sto the Congo to knock
[1468]off Lumumba, not in those words.
[1470]Mr. Baron, When you say examine the thing on the ground
[1471]you mean he would send 0'Donnell to the Congo to take a
[1472]first-hand look at the meana?
[1474]Mr. Tweedy. Yee, conceivably I suppose this all’
[1475]might have resulted ina climax there but at least my recollec-
[1476]tion certainly was never that he told me that I am sending
[1477]@'DeRneLL, to the Congo to knock off Lumumba in those words
[1478]but that he, I am sure the Philosophy was that if anything
[1479]was done you would want to keep it as separate from the
[1481]station as possible and thus a man from the outaide,
[1483]It was Bissell's idea that O'Connell might be the man.
[1485]sepa per: .
[1487]Mr. Baron. The man from outside?
[1488]Mr. Tweedy. Outside the station.
[1489]Baron, The CIA station in the Congo?
[1490]Tweedy. Right.
[1491]Baron. That such a man would be necessary to
[1492]out an assassination operation if one were to be mounted?
[1493]Mr. Tweedy. That if one was mounted it would
[1494]obviously be desirable to do it under auspices which would
[1495]protect the security of the station or involvement of the
[1496]station.
[1497]That I am sure was the philosophy behind it.
[1499]Mr. Baron. But it is your recollection that QuBonRer
[1501]TOP SECRET. --
[1504]was sent to the Congo to assess the possibility for
[1505]assassinating Lumumba rather: than to mount some sort of kid-
[1507]napping plan to draw Lumumba out from the U.N. guard and put
[1509]Bmore three 7202) 344-4000
[1511]him in the hands of Cangolese authorities?
[1513]Mr. Tweedy. That is certainly my recollection but I
[1514]would not want to put too high a value on it. I
[1515]just don't recall kidnapping as a factor ia all.
[1517]Mr. Baron. Did Richard Bussell ever mention to you that
[1518]lethal biological agents had been developed in the CIA
[1519]laboratories for possible use in the Congo to assassinate Lumum-
[1520]ba? Or they were available for such usa?
[1522]Mr. Tweedy. I think that it would be closer that TSD
[1524]probably had the capahility or had the agent or whatever ic
[1526]i)
[1528]N
[1530]a
[1531]a
[1533]'
[1535]was. When I say agent I mean chemical agent. I suspect I
[1537]heard that, yes.
[1539]-
[1540]cea apace
[1542]Mr. Baron. Would this have been under [sianey. Gotelié
[1544]ian
[1546]auspices or direction in TSD?
[1547]Mr. Tweedy. If he was Chief of TSD at the time it would
[1548]have been. I don't recall. Was he? I think he was.
[1550]Mr. Baron. . Did Richard Bissell ever indicate to you
[1551]. ove 4a,
[1553]directly that (Sidney Gottliehiwas involved in developing
[1557]poisons that might be used for assassination?
[1559]Pareto 7
[1561]Mr. Tweedy. don't recall that at all,
[1563]Mr. Baron. In your discussions with Bissell, about
[1565]0 Farag Stewart 6 8
[1567]the feasibility of an assassination operation, did poisons
[1569]TOP SECRET -
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[1576].
[1578]t
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[1583]come up 48 one means that was being considered and which
[1584]the Chief of Station should axplore?
[1586]Mr. Tweedy. Iam sure it must have. After all,
[1587]there are not many ways of doing it. Shoot a man, poison
[1588]him, of course you could,-I suppose, atab him or something
[1589]like that. But basically you are talking about a contingency
[1590]plan which I assume has the best possibility of protecting the
[1591]involvement of the U.S. Government and if you want to do it
[1592]in a manner which would be as distant, if that is the right
[1593]word, as posaible, I think poison would then stand high on the
[1594]list of possibilities.
[1596]Mr. Baron. Did the Chief of Station ever make a
[1597]response to you via cable which indicated that he was ex-
[1598]ploring means of gaining access to Lumumba for the possible
[1599]use of poisoning -- purpose of poisoning him. 2
[1601]Mr. Tweedy. I am sure he must have done that. I
[1602]don’t recall specifically, but that éeffect is what he was
[1603]charged to do in the first inatance, examine the possibilicics.
[1605]I would be very surprised if Hedgman didn’t come back
[1606]and in effect comment on this but the nature of his comments
[1607]I really don't recall.
[1609]Mr. Dawson. When you and Bissell had your conversa-
[1610]tions, whatever time it was, concerning this matter, did he
[1611]mention to you that he had approval or direction from highest
[1613]authority to undertake.to assassinate Lumumba?
[1615]TOP SECRET
[1618]TOP SECRET
[1620]Mr. Tweedy. I don't recall that, no. I guess I was under
[1621]the impression when he talked to me that -~ I don't know
[1623]whether this is fair or not <- I honestly don't know what
[1625]Prone {Ares 202} $44-6008
[1627]my impression was at the time whether this was something that
[1628]Bissell had in effect aucked out of his own thumb as a
[1629]contingency plan which he then raised with higher authority, and
[1630]because it was contingency planning I don't think at that
[1631]stage I was particularly concerned. But to anawer the
[1632]question I just don't know.
[1634]Mr. Dawson, You stated earlier you knew Gordon
[1635]Gray very well.
[1637]Mr. Tweedy. I didn’t say that. I have known Gordon
[1638]Gray far better since than I did then, I knew Gordon Gray
[1640]very slightly indeed then, and I am not sure 1 ever had a --
[1642]5
[1644]a
[1645]4
[1646]2
[1649]gk
[1651]while he was in office -- that I ever had a personal conversa-~
[1652]tion with him. I have seen a lot of him since he was on the
[1653]President's Board.
[1655]Mr. Dawson. That answers my question,
[1657]Mr. Baron. Richard Bissell never made a representation
[1658]to you one way or the other as to whether he had approval from
[1659]any authority higher than DDP for this consideration of
[1660]assassginating Lumumba?
[1662]Mr. Tweedy. No, I do not recall so.
[1664]Mr. Baron. Did Richard Bissell ever indicate to you
[1666]that he was directly in contact with the Chief of Station in
[1668]TOP SECRET
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[1675].
[1677]8
[1679]B
[1681]Sanat
[1683]Sh Peas ote ted
[1685]S10 6 osat Steno,
[1687]Leopoldville or that he had:means of dealing directly with
[1688]the Chief of Station in Leopoldville without going through
[1689]you?
[1691]Mr. Tweedy. He always said that any DDP, of course,
[1692]that has the capability, and right, it was never my impressio
[1693]that he was using it and going around me, no. But that he
[1694]did, but he might have done it, I wouldn't gainsay it, he
[1695]certainly had the right and capability to go into it.
[1697]Mr. Dawson. Can wa go into how the right was able to be
[1698]exercised?
[1700]Mr. Tweedy. All he had to do was send a cable. He
[1701]could establish hia own channel to Leopoidville with his own
[1702]set of slugs which would exclude the Chief of African Division,
[1703]He has the right to do that.
[1705]Mr. Baron, It would not be improper for a DDP to send
[1706]a cable or messenger to the Chief of Station in another
[1707]country?
[1709]Mr. Tweedy. I wouldn't comment on the appropriateness.
[1710]He obviously had the authority. My relationships with
[1711]Bissell were such that I do not believe it.
[1713]I never had the impression that he ever had any inten-
[1714]tion or desire to go around me on matters of this kind.
[1716]Mr. Dawson, Who else other than the DDP or DCI
[1718]would have such authority?
[1720]Mr. Tweedy. I don't know.
[1722]TOP SECRET
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[1741]SOL Wawmington, foe
[1743]410 Fast Stree,
[1745]Mr. Baron, Would the President?
[1747]Mr. Tweedy. Yes, but he would Probably have to come
[1748]to the Agency to find out how to do it. f imagine the Presi-
[1749]dent could send &personal representative, I am damn sure he
[1750]would}.have no way of knowing how to send a cable out there.
[1752]He would make a muck of it if he did.
[1754]Mr. Baron, Did you learn at any point that lethal bio-
[1755]logical substances were actually in the custody of the Chief
[1756]of Station in Congo?
[1758]Mr. Tweedy. This was mentioned when I talked to you and
[1759]Mr. Widea and my 4newer was that I don’t recall it, but that
[1760]it was perfectly possible for them to be sent there.
[1762]Mr. Baron. How would they have been sent?
[1764]Mr. Tweedy. They could have been sent one or two ways,
[1766]they would have been sent through the pouch with the
[1768]opened only by the Chief of Station or somebody coming out
[1769]by hand of officer or hand of somebody either way it could be
[1770]done.
[1772]Mr. Baron, Do you have any knowledge of a meesenger
[1773]from CIA headquarters having to go to the Congo to provide
[1774]the Chief of Station in the Congo with instructions to carry
[1775]out the assassination of Lumumba ,if possible, and also pro-
[1776]vide him with the tools to carry out such an assassination,
[1778]namely, poisonsand medical equipment for administering them?
[1780]TOP SECRET
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[1800]TIO Fsest Stemes,
[1802]Mr. Tweedy. No, I do not.
[1804]Mr, Baron, Let me represent to you that we have
[1805]testimony from the Chief of Station in the Congo at that
[1806]point that he had received a cable from headquarters saying that
[1807]& megsenger would arrive in the Congo and would be
[1808]someone that he would recognize and thig messenger would give
[1809]him instructions that he was to carry out,
[1811]Did you ever know of such a cable being. sent to the
[1812]Congo?
[1814]Mr. Tweedy. I should be very surprised if I didn't,
[1815]but I certainly have m recollection of it-whatsoever.
[1817]Mr. Baron. And the Chief of Station further testified
[1819]that shortly after receiving such a cable he received & viait
[1821]: Hy
[1822]trom Signe: RAG who arrived in _ heopoldville and
[1824]made himself known to the Chief of Station, the Chief of
[1825]: - “cheradt’,
[1826]Station said that he immediately recognized GOestany,as an
[1828]officer of the Agency, and as the messenger that this
[1829]cable referred to.
[1831]Subsequently, the Chief of Station said he had meetings
[1833]mae ard a -
[1835]seb? in his apartment in Leopoldville where a7
[1837]5 ~ NN
[1838]fom bee ats. |
[1840]GOEE ey save him instructions that he aaid came from the
[1842]headquarters to carry out the assassination of Lumumba and
[1843]also, according to the Chief of Station, gave
[1845]him lethal biological substances and medical equipment with
[1847]which to administer them.
[1849]TOP SECRET
[1852]Prine (Arad 202} 546-4000
[1855]ry
[1856]-@
[1860]FY
[1862]a Wastungren 26
[1864]IO faye Atel ee
[1866]Were you aware of that chain of events?
[1867]Mr. Tweedy. That sounds far more definitive than any-
[1869]thing I have any recollection of at all. - ee
[1872]Aa
[1873]If I understand what you said was, Gottilerwould have
[1874]a aes
[1875]left instructions with the Chief of Station which would have
[1877]empowered the Chief of Station at the conclusion of their
[1878]conversations, to go out and assassinate Lumumba, without any
[1879]further recourse or reference to headquarters?
[1881]Mr. Baron. That is --
[1883]Mr. Tweedy. If that is the case I don't believe it.
[1885]Mr. Baron. That is the essence of the testimony that
[1886]the Chief of Station although he did say that he was not anxious
[1887]to carry out an assassination mission. He didn'it think it was
[1888]practical or wise and he probably would have gone back
[1889]to headquarters to consult with them if he thought he
[1890]was in a position to move immediately to carry out the assass-
[1891]ination plan, but it was his opinion that the policy decision
[1892]had been made and that he had authority to move ahead
[1893]aithough he doubted ~-
[1895]Mr. Tweedy. My recollection doesn't go anywhere near
[1896]that far. _ .
[1898]Mr. Dawson, He checked that authority by] immediately
[1899]cabling back to headquarters saying,this guy has made himself
[1901]available to me as well as he has delivered something and
[1903]has told me that he had the approval of the highest authority
[1905]TOP SECRET
[1908]in the land to order me to do what he so ordered, which got
[1909]another cable back through the specially slugged cable saying
[1911]yes, what he told you is correct.
[1913]Prana {Brag 202} 344-6000
[1915]Mr. Tweedy. E don't recall that, which surprises
[1916]me, because once again I would be very surprised, I wouldn't
[1917]have been privy to those.
[1919]Mr. Baron. If a request such as the plan Mr. Dawson
[1920]outlined had been sent from the Congo to headquarters and it
[1921]were in more narrow cryptic terms, for instance, if 4t had
[1922]said aimply I have seen your messenger and received instruc-
[1923]tions and request confirmation that I am to carry them out,
[1924]would that refresh your recollection as to whether you had
[1925]seen such a cable?
[1927]Mr. Tweedy. I can't be at all sure it will refresh
[1929]oi
[1931]a
[1932]rs
[1935]2
[1939]my recollection but if you and Hedgman say that such a cable
[1940]was sent, I am not going to gainsay it.
[1941]Mr. Baron. Would that be the manner in which
[1942]confirmation for such a sensitive operation would be requested?
[1943]Mr. Tweedy. I don't know because I never saw one be-
[1944]fore or since but it sounds highly reasonable to me. This
[1945]is the way, this would be the way I should have thought-uany
[1947]two sensible people would confer on sensitive matters when
[1949]a Wanhergton, 2
[1951]each knew that the other knew exactly what he was talking
[1952]about and, of course, you don’t have to use unnecessary words
[1954]but beyond the likelihood of this I can't say that de whet
[1956]210 Sua Street wt
[1958]TOP SECRET
[1961]Mr. Dawson, This leaves us with one or two alter=
[1962]natives,either the Chief of Station who has appeared and
[1964]testified although not necessarily reluctantly, but certainly
[1966]Prone {Ares 202) $44-4000
[1968]reluctantly as to substance of his testimony, is not telling
[1969]us the truth, or he is telling us the truth and you were: not
[1970]privy to what was going on.
[1972]Mr. Tweedy. Or I literally don't recall it. This is my
[1973]problem. I will tell you quite frankly with these things --
[1975]Mr. Dawson. It 1s 15 years ago.
[1977]Mr. Tweedy. I really am having trouble with this.
[1978]had to be reminded of so many things about the things that
[1979]T recall the most vividly about all my African experiences
[1981]were basically the things I was basically concerned with all
[1984]«“
[1985]rs
[1987]o
[1989]1 €
[1990]2
[1992]the time which was putting this division together and the
[1993]rest of it.
[1995]When it comes to operational detail I start getting
[1996]fuzzy and you would have thought with something like thinking
[1998]about Mr. Lumumba in these terms, that I would have gone to
[2000]bed and got up thinking about Lumumba, I can assure you this
[2002]Senge
[2004]wasn't the case.
[2005]I spent days in a row not even giving Lumumba one
[2007]single bloody thought. This is my problem.
[2009]LPeamingtin, fe
[2011]ut
[2013]Mr. Dawson, Let's try to jog your memory on this.
[2015]Do you recall any time during that period of any dis-
[2016]Tate “1 .
[2017]biwhatsoever as a courier?
[2019]ALO Barat Atewet
[2022]Prené {Area 202) 544-6000
[2024]2
[2025]‘2
[2027]a
[2028]a
[2029]fe)
[2030]t
[2031]4
[2034]Mr. Daweon. All right.
[2036]Mr. Tweedy. But if he went as a courier, I will bet
[2037]I knew it, but I don't recall it.
[2039]Mr. Baron. Having heard this satory, would it be your
[2040]assumption it is moreilikely to be true than not?
[2042]Mr. Tweedy. Well, I put it purely this way.
[2044]Mr. Baron. Iam asking you for your expert opinion
[2045]here as someone experienced.
[2047]Mr. Tweedy. Expert opinion.
[2049]Mr. Dawson. You had been the person responsible for
[2050]promoting this Chief of Station or at least appointing him
[2051]Chief of Station, I assume?
[2053]Mr. Tweedy. That in actual fact isn't true. His
[2054]appointment was already in the works when I came aboard and
[2055]I had met Hedgman in London on his previous assignment which,
[2056]if I remember correctly, was in Brussels and he came to Lon-
[2057]don to discuss an operational matter with me which had
[2058]nothing whatsoever to do with that and we had a very good
[2059]discussion. It was only, I think, when I got back to
[2060]headquarters as it were, took up the reins after the division
[2061]that I learned that he had been appointed Chief of Station
[2062]in the Congo, a decision with which I took absolutely no
[2064]exception whatsoever, but as a number of assignments may
[2066]made before I came thay had to be they couldn't wait for
[2068]TOP SECRET .
[2071]Prone {Ares 207} 544-6900
[2073]4
[2076]a
[2077]e
[2078]o
[2079]z
[2081]g
[2085]LWastumaun 06
[2087]se
[2089]AUD Brent Steees,
[2091]ph md
[2092]TOP SECRET
[2093]to get tha word.
[2095]Mr. Dawson. Have you ever had any occasion to doubt
[2096]his veracity or integrity?
[2098]Mr. Tweedy. I have not.
[2100]I think when I say yes to your basic queation, it would
[2101]be that I would trust hia memory and I certainly trust his
[2102]integrity.
[2104]Mr. Baron. We don’t question it.
[2106]Mr. Tweedy. All of this happened pretty much the way
[2107]you gave it to me.
[2109]Mr. Baron. That would be your --
[2111]Mr. Tweady. The aspect of it I find very difficult to
[2112]believe it that at any time headquarters said on receipt of
[2113]these instructions, go ahead and do it. This I find very
[2114]difficult to -- I do not recall and I find difficult to believe
[2115]and I believe implicitly the reaction he gave you which was,
[2116]reaction, that if he found it not feasible he sure as
[2117]hell would have referred again to headquarters before he did
[2118]it.
[2120]Mr. Baron. Why did you find it difficult to believe
[2121]such an instruction would have been given?
[2123]Mr. Tweedy. That way I would have said in auch a
[2124]matter of this kind, headquarters would have wanted to have a-
[2126]last word up to the last minute.
[2128]abe tte
[2130]Not one of these things that GorelicByruns off to the
[2131]TOP SECRET
[2134]-
[2135]2
[2137].
[2138]e
[2139]c
[2142]z
[2146]4
[2150]310 feat Sreeee
[2152]Prene (hte 202} 5444000
[2154]Congo and by the time he has found Hedgman, given his inatruc-
[2155]tions and all of which could have been four or five or six
[2156]days later and Hedgman in turn had found a way to do it
[2158]even then set about his leisure to do te or without further
[2160]reference to headquarters that is not the way my organization
[2162]has ever run operations.
[2165]Mr. Baron. Was it likely at all that (i ogterrss
[2166]would have gone off on his own with these poisons to the
[2167]Congo to deliver them to the Chief of Station?
[2169]Mr. Tweedy. I should have said quite impossible.
[2171]Mr. Baron. Without an instruction from the DDP at
[2173]least?
[2175]Mr. Tweedy. That is quite impossible.
[2177]a set g
[2178]. , cher rf
[2180]Mr. Baron. Would <pr Gottliebfhave proceeded to the
[2182]Congo in the way the organization normally worked if the
[2183]DCI had tasked him directly with such a mission?
[2184]Mr. Tweedy. I am afraid 1 don't quite understand.
[2185], Soho saw
[2186]Mr. Baron. If the DCI had given
[2187]instruction to go to the Congo and deliver poisons to the
[2188]Chief of Station would he have done it without consulting
[2189]with the DDP?
[2190]Mr. Tweedy. I suppose so.
[2191]But I don't believe it. I don't believe it ever happened.
[2193]To answer your question, I suppose if anybody got a
[2195]personal private instruction from the DCI, and was ‘inatructed
[2197]TOP SECRET
[2200]to proceed without reference to anybody else he would pre-
[2201]sumably go ahead and do so.
[2203]Mr. Baron. But, because the feasibility of this
[2205]mone (Area 207) $44-4000
[2207]assassination of Lumumba had been Giscussed, this was not such'
[2208]a tightly held subject that the DDP would have been circum-
[2209]vented?
[2211]Mr. Tweedy. DDP as far as I was concerned was the
[2212]person with whom the division first discussed the matter on-
[2213]tirely. I don't recall ever having discussed it with Allen
[2214]Dulles. Y am sure when I say I am sure I assume Bissell dis-
[2215]cussed it with Allen Dulles but, this was never a matter
[2216]which was between the DCI's office and the Leopoldville
[2217]station insofar as 1 was aware, and to this day I don't
[2219]believe it ever was.
[2221]4
[2222]3
[2224]a
[2226]a
[2227]8
[2229]5
[2231]Mr. Baron. Just to clarify something we talked about
[2232]earlier when I think we were jumbling two questions together,
[2233]it is your expert opinion, expert in the sense of your knowl-
[2234]edge of the Agency, and your opinion as a participant at that
[2236]time that the testimony, the ‘basic testimony we have received
[2237]Oeohrvete
[2239]about poisons being delivered to the Congo by {Sr. teliebywith
[2241]N
[2243]instructions to use them in the assassination of Lumumba,
[2245]wo.
[2247]if possible, would be true testimony?
[2249]2 aun
[2251]i
[2252]Mr. Tweedy. Only way I can answer that question, Mr.
[2254]Baron, is to say I see not the glightest reason and do not
[2256]believe that you would have been lied to on this point.
[2258]SLO Barat Gerees nF
[2260]TOP SECRET.
[2263]TOP SECRET 39
[2264]But, there is nothing in my experience with the Agency
[2266]which would really bear on that point whatsoever.
[2268]Mr. Baron. Did you travel to the Congo shortly
[2270]tereane (Area 207) $44:8000
[2272]before the independence of the Congo was declared?
[2274]Mr. Tweedy. That was my first visit to the Congo as I
[2275]recall, it was two weeks before independence. I made a
[2276]long trip through Sub-Saharan Africa which culminated in
[2277]a drive from Kampala to Sambura and I flaw from Sambura, I
[2278]guess, to Albertville and from Albertville to Leopoldville
[2279]and that is thefirst time I ever saw Leopoldville.
[2281]Mr. Dawson. De you know whether Mr. Hedgman was
[2283]at that time?
[2285]Mr. Tweedy. Mr. Hedqman I am almost sure was
[2287]not. His predecessor was there. He had many children, I
[2289]3
[2291]s
[2292]e
[2293]z
[2295]z
[2297]can't remember his name.
[2299]Mr. Baron. And you left the Congo before
[2300]independence was declared.
[2302]Mr. Tweedy. Yes, I was only. there for, 1 suppose f
[2303]was there for four or five days and I thought I was going to
[2304]end my whole tour there and whole trip there but eventually
[2305]I had to go up to the Ivory Coast to settle an unexpected
[2307]problem,
[2309]Latter fos
[2311]Mr. Baron. For the record would you agree with me
[2312]that independence was declared about June 30, 1960?
[2314]Mr. Tweedy. Yes.
[2316]TOP SECRET
[2320]iets SAS
[2322]TOP SECRET
[2324]40
[2326]Mr. Baron. Did you make another trip during which
[2328]07) 344-6000
[2330]you visited the Congo at some point before the death of
[2332]- Lumumba?
[2334]Irane {Aree
[2336]Mr. Tweedy. Yes, well, it is this one that I regurgi-
[2337]tated finally which must have been as near as the early
[2338]part of December and which had started with a visit to Rome
[2339]in the latter part of November, followed by a trip to Nairobi
[2340]followed by a brief visit to South Africa, then I think Congo,
[2341]then briefly Brazzaville and home via Europe.
[2343]Mr. Baron. And this meeting in November ‘60 in
[2344]Rome was a meeting of Aftican --
[2346]Mr. Tweedy. South - Northern African Station Chiefs.
[2348]june Tibgirely and these would have been chicfs of stations of
[2350]Mr. Baron, And the Congo?
[2352]Mr. Tweedy. No.
[2354]Mr. Baron. So the Congo Chief of Station would not
[2355]normally have been --
[2357]Mr. Tweedy. If he came up he must have come up to see
[2358]“Bissell.
[2360]Mr. Baron. Richard Bissell was traveling with you on
[2362]Tweedy. No.
[2363]Baron. -- tour to Rome and Nairobi?
[2365]Tweedy. He called the meetings. The whole purpose
[2367]os
[2369]TOP SECRET@
[2372]‘TOP SECRET
[2374]41
[2376]of the exercise was that he wanted to meet a large number of
[2378]our new Chiefs of Stations in Africa and rather than make a trip
[2380]around Africa, which he hardly hud time, he used a device
[2382]Panne {Area 207) $44-6006
[2384]which we often used, which is to hold regional meetings at
[2386]a central point to which these people could have ready access
[2387]and, therefore, it was easy for people on the north Mediter-
[2388]ranean littoral or South Mediterranean littoral to proceed to
[2389]Rome, and the same way it was easy for East African Station
[2390]Chiefs to preceed to Nairobi, and he had the meetings there,
[2391]each one two or three days, I suppose.
[2393]Mr. Baron. Did the Chief of Station in the Congo
[2395]attend the meeting in Rome?
[2397]Mr. Tweedy. I am sure he would not. In other words,
[2399]3
[2401]6
[2403]z
[2407]if he saw Rissell he would have merely come to Rome and have
[2408]seen him, but he would have had no reason whatsoever, in
[2409]fact it would have been ridiculous for Bissell to invite a
[2410]man who didn't belong in the North African meetings and merely
[2411]raised the question whether Iledgman was there.
[2413]Mr. Baron. What region in the CIA organization chart
[2414]would the Chief of Station in the Congo belong to?
[2416]Mr. Tweedy. We change amound there. We had in
[2417]those days, we had the North African branch, we had the
[2419]ESC Nirican branch, we had af then African branch, which
[2422]included SguthAFrich @Rhodessa, probably syoReuquese Africas
[2423]. Re: : ~~ Senso baa Or eel
[2425]maybe the Congo in those days. Later on the Congo was sort
[2427]TIO Vaear Gere
[2429]TOP SECRET
[2432]Prone [Ares 707) 544-4000
[2437]z
[2438]“
[2439]z
[2441]TOP SECRET
[2443]of Sui Generis but in that early time I suspect it
[2444]fell down in Southern Africa but I am not absolutely sure.
[2445]It might have fallen just in French-speaking West Africa.
[2446]We always had aChirenchyWest” Africa, an ENGTIS AE Tepeakingy
[2448]a2 aati te F
[2450]queat trAfrica.
[2451]Socata ane
[2453]Mr. Baron. We have received testimony from the Chief
[2454]of Station in the Congo at that point that he did came to
[2455]Rome to meet with Richard Bissell and he belives that he also
[2456]met with yourself and Mr. Karamessines at Mr. Karamessines'
[2457]house.
[2459]Mr. Tweedy. I doubt if he saw Mr. Karamessines. Tt
[2460]would only be because Mr. Karamesaines was host as Chief of
[2461]Station in Rome. But I am sure he was not discussing any
[2462]policy problems with Mr. Karamessines who had absolutely no
[2463]jurisdiction over them in those days whateoever.
[2465]Mr. Baron. That was his testimony, but it was incidental,
[2466]but if, as he has testified, that he met with Mr. Bissell and
[2467]yourself, you wouldn't dispute that testimony?
[2469]Mr, Tweedy. Absolutely not.
[2471]Mr. Baron. And that would be due to the intensity of
[2472]activity in che Congo at this point and the intensity of
[2473]concern over that activity?
[2475]Mr. Tweedy. Absolutely. It was obviously becoming more
[2477]and more of a commitment of both the U.S. Government and
[2479]thus the agency. I think leaving Lumumba entirely aside this
[2481]TOP SECRET
[2484]Yee Sella: a
[2486]. i
[2487]waa the main reason that I am sure I went to the Congo |
[2488]at that point was the fact that it obviously was going to become
[2490]a major personnel drain, if you like, on the Division
[2492]Panne {Ares 202) 3444000
[2494]and a major commitment both at headquarters and in the
[2495]field, thus it was important I sort of look the thing over.
[2497]Mr. Baron. Having refreshed your recollection about
[2498]this meeting between the Chief of Station and Mr. Bissell and
[2499]yourself in Rome, do you recall what was discussed when you
[2500]were together?
[2502]Mr. Tweedy. I can only assume that some of the things
[2503]that we discussed by cable traffic were dinacussed.
[2505]The other thing I am sure must have been discussed was
[2506]what I would call the general assessment of the Congolese
[2508]situation and what the station might be required to do, thus
[2511]ry
[2513]z
[2515]g
[2517]the sort of support headquarters was going to have to give
[2518]the Station.
[2519]Mr. Baron. Was there any discussion of the assassination
[2520]of Lumumba or the prospect of ~-
[2521]Mx. Tweedy. I would be immensely surprised if it
[2522]wasn't discussed but I don't recal! in what context it was
[2523]discussed. In fact, I don't believe it wasn’t discussed.
[2524]It was after all on the agenda, as it were, at least I
[2525]assume it was, at that point.
[2526]Mr. Baron. The prospect of assassinating Lumumba con-
[2528]tinued to be on the agenda of the Agency until the point that
[2530]TOP SECRET
[2533]TOP SECRET
[2534]Lumumba was actually dead?
[2536]Mr. Tweedy. I don’t recall. You probably are much more
[2538]knowledgeable on that than I am. I don’t recall when in
[2540]Panne [Araa 207) 5444000
[2542]effect we no longer considered it or it no longer was a
[2543]factor. I just don't remember.
[2545]Mr. Baron. But, just now you were assuming that that
[2546]would have the case?
[2548]Mr. Tweedy. If it was still on, it wags atill on
[2549]the agenda, inevitably we must have discussed it. If it was
[2550]off the agenda then no, but I honestly don't remember.
[2552]Mr. Baron. Let me show you now some cable traffic
[2553]between the agency and Leopoldville which consists of a
[2554]series of cables that begins shortly before Lumumba was placed
[2556]into U.N. custody, then continues after he was placed in U.N.
[2559]3
[2561]6
[2564]8
[2566]s
[2568]custody.
[2570]In an attempt to refresh your recollection about the
[2571]attitude at the Agency toward Lumumba after he was in U.N.
[2572]custody --
[2574]Mr. Tweedy. Okay.
[2576]Mr. Baron. -- the first cable which we will mark Tweedy
[2577]Exhibit 1 is dated August 26, 1960, from Leopoldville to the
[2578]Director.
[2580](The document referred to was
[2581]marked Tweedy Exhibit No. 1 for
[2583]identification. }
[2585]TOP SECRET
[2588]Mr. Tweedy. That is the way all cables were addressed.
[2589]see he sent one specifically to DCI.
[2591]Mr. Baron. Off the record.
[2593]trans [Aloe 207) 484-6000
[2595](Discussion off the record.)
[2597]Mr. Baron. Onthe record.
[2599]Let's turn back now.
[2601]I believe while we were off the record and axamining this
[2602]cable closely you corrected me, Mr. Tweedy, on the fact that
[2603]this cable was not sent from Leopoldville to the Director but
[2604]rather it was sent from headquarters to Leopoldville; is
[2605]that correct?
[2607]Mr. Tweedy. Correct.
[2609]Mr. Baron. And it appears to you from the designation
[2611]"Allen W. Dulles", at the top of the telegram, that this was
[2616]2
[2618]“
[2619]z
[2621]a personal message signed off by the DCI himself to the Chief
[2622]of Station.
[2624]Mr. Tweedy. Correct. As I said, he might not have
[2625]drafted it but it certainly would have been his sign off.
[2627]Mr. Baron. And let me direct your attention to
[2628]the portion of the cable that says in high quarters here it is
[2629]the clear-cut conclusion that if LLL continues to hold high
[2630]office the inevitable result will at best be chaos and at
[2631]worst pave the way to a Communist takeover of the Congo with
[2632]disastrous conseyuences for the prestige of the U.N. and for
[2634]the interests of the Free World generally.
[2636]TOP SECRET
[2639]Brace thraa 202} 944-6000
[2641]WAHO & PAUL
[2645]BLA Cage Neto
[2647]1G
[2651]TOP SECRET
[2653]Consequently we conclude that his removal must be an
[2655]urgent and prime objective and that under existing condit::
[2656]this should be a high priority of our covert action.
[2658]Now, do you believe that LLL refers to Lumumba?
[2660]Mr. Tweedy. I do.
[2662]Mr. Baron. And why would three L'a have been used in
[2663]the cable?
[2665]Mr. Tweedy. I don't know.
[2667]Mr. Baron. Would that be a standard way of making sure
[2668]that at least one of the L's was clear in transmission?
[2670]Mr. Tweedy. I honestly don't know.
[2672]Now, that isn't the normal way to do dt at all. 1
[2673]honestly don't know how. His name was Patrice.
[2675]Mr. Baron. But it is nonetheless your opinion that
[2676]LLL does refer to Lumumba?
[2678]Mr. Tweedy. I do indeed.
[2680]Mr. Baron. Does this accord with your general sense
[2681]of the policy toward Lumumba at that time at the Agency anc
[2682]State Department? . |
[2684]Mr. Tweedy. Ft accords much more with my recollect!
[2685]of our attitude toward the potentially disastrous situatic
[2686]the Congo than it does on he personally, but he obvious!+
[2687]W&s aiwayS in the bacxground,
[2689]Mr. Baron. Where the cable says we conclude that his
[2691]removal must be an urgent and prime objectiva and that under
[2693]TOP SECRET
[2696]Panne tarts 207) 244-4008
[2698]RWAHO R PAUL
[2700]Ww
[2704]ye
[2706]exiating conditions this should be a high priority of out
[2708]covert action, close quotes, ~~ is that consistent with the
[2709]policy towards Lumumba as you recall it? ,
[2711]In other words,that Lumumba's removal was a prime objec-.
[2712]tive of the covert actions of the Agency.
[2714]Mr. Tweedy. We would have givan our eye teeth to have
[2715]Lumumba not the head of the Congolese state, certainly I would
[2716]agree with that.
[2718]Mr. Baron. As Exhibit 2, let's turn to a cable dated
[2719]September 16, 19606.
[2721](The document referred to was
[2723]marked Tweedy Exhibit No. 2
[2725]for identification.)
[2727]50955
[2729]Prone (Aves 707} 3446-4008
[2731]WARD @ Pau
[2733]we
[2734]os
[2736]ee A GOR Pee aay
[2737]TOP SECRET
[2739]Mr. Baron. This containa references to the fact that
[2741]48
[2743]“the station ws flooded with reports re outcome Mobutu coup",
[2744]And the cable goes on to discuss the fact that U.N.
[2745]troops had interferred with Congolese troops and prevented
[2746]them from arresting Lumumba.
[2747]Now, this cable was sent to the CIA headquarters :
[2749]from Leopoldville one day after Lumumba sought protective
[2751]custody from the United Nations and two days after the Mobutu
[2752]coup where Mobutu took over the government.
[2754]In the cable as it has been sanitized by the Agency
[2755]it now reads:
[2757]“Station advised two moderate Congolese politician
[2758]try work with key Congolese contact in effort eliminate
[2759]Lumumba. Fear U.N. protection will give Lumumba opportunity
[2760]toe organize counterattack. Only solution is remove him
[2761]from scene soonest".
[2763]WAs that the attitude of the Agency at this point,
[2764]as far as you understood it, that the fact that Lumumba
[2765]was in U.N. protective custody did not eliminate him as a
[2766]threat in the Congo?
[2768]Mr. Tweedy. I don’t really recall but I think the
[2769]chances are that we feared that U.N. protective custody
[2770]might very well result in his early release or his ability sti:
[2771]to control matters. I should think that is very probabie.
[2773]Mr. Baron. And that is the reason why there would be
[2775]TOP SECRET
[2780]to
[2782]ty
[2784]ro)
[2785]cr
[2787]Oo
[2791]250 bay Gteeet St
[2793]HY 50955
[2795]Geer ato
[2796]aM, SF
[2798]TOP SECRET
[2800]this fear of counterattack organized by Lumumba while he was
[2804]protected by the U.N. ==
[2805]Mr. Tweedy. © Yes, that is probably true.
[2806]Mr. Baron. As Exhibit 3 let's turn to a cable dated
[2807]September 20, 1960, which ia sent -- off the record. ¢
[2808](The document referred to was
[2809]marked Tweedy Exhibit 3 for
[2810]identification.}
[2812](Discussion off the record.)
[2814]TOP SECRET
[2817]Prone (Aras 2027) 548-4003
[2819]a
[2821]Te:
[2823]WAM R Pay
[2825]be
[2827]SOOS
[2829]PEO Berge Sreeet SF) Wansemarin,
[2831]HW 50955. De
[2833]TOP SECRET oa!
[2835]Mr. Baron. Back on the record,
[2837]Although the top of this cable does not indicate where
[2838]the cable was sent to and from, because we don't have the
[2839]cover sheet for the cable, you have indicated to me by looking
[2841]at the designations that this cable must have been sent from
[2842]Leopoldville to headquarters, is that correct, Mr. Tweedy?
[2844]Mr. Tweedy. That is correct.
[2846]Mr. Baron. Let me direct your attention to Paragraph
[2847]7 which saya:
[2849]“Station checking recurring reports of Kasavubu Lumumba
[2850]reconcilation. Kasavubu denies Bolikango failed deny
[2851]possibility of Lumumba entering new government, possibly
[2852]as vice Premier. Believe some substance to rumor but will
[2853]do best prevent if Lumumba allowed even minor role he most apt
[2854]come out on top".
[2856]Does that indicate to you that the Chief of Station
[2857]in the Congo at this point continued to be extremely concerned
[2858]that Lumumba should net be allowed even a-minor role in the
[2859]government of the Congo?
[2861]Mr. Tweedy. That is what it says.
[2863]Mr. Baron. Next, as Exhibit 4, we have a cable dated
[2865]January 19, 1961.
[2867]{The document referred to waa
[2868]marked Tweedy Exhibit No. 4
[2870]for identification. }
[2872]TOP SECRET
[2875]1 Mr. Baron. This was sent from the Congo to -- '
[2876]i
[2878]Mr. Tweedy. Sent from Elizabethville to Leopoldville infa
[2880]headquarters, information headquarters.
[2882]|
[2884]i i
[2887]4 f Mr. Baron. 80 that headquarters. would have received :
[2888]5 a copy of this cable sent by the base chief in Blizabethville ,
[2889]6 | to the Station Chief in Leopolaville?
[2890]t
[2891]2 i Mr. Tweedy. Right.
[2892]b Mr. Baron. And paragraph 1 of thie cable Bays:
[2893]9 "Thanks for Patrice. If wa had known he was coming
[2894]1 | wa would have baked a snake".
[2895]Do you have an independent recollection of this
[2896]. cable?
[2897]) i vat Mr. Tweedy. Yes, of course I do, for the simple reason
[2898]: ie of that phrase, which ia another way of saying, a lighthearted
[2899]1s ; way of saying, on the part of Elizabethville Lumumba arrived
[2900]1é : in Kutanga and he had no idea he was coming.
[2901]. Mr. Baron, . So this cable does not indicate that there
[2902]: was any connection between the CIA and. Lumumba's eventual death,
[2903]the actual causes of his death in Kutanga?
[2904]: Mr. Tweedy. Will you say that again? {[ am not quite
[2905]: ‘sure I understood that.
[2906]: - Mr. Baron. Does that cable indicate in any way that :
[2909]- ; the CI was knowledgeable ef the actual causes of Lumumba's
[2911]death at the point when it occurred?
[2913]; i
[2915]i
[2917]+ ‘ 4,
[2918]3
[2919], 2
[2921]TOP SECRET _
[2923]In other words, that they were connected to the people
[2926]Prone (Aree 202) 344-6008
[2929]9
[2931]16
[2933]WAR & PAUL
[2934]i
[2936]OP TC ry it acs
[2937]Oo
[2939]46
[2941]TOP SECRET
[2943]who caused his death?
[2945]Mr. Tweedy. I must say I have a hard time following the
[2946]queation. Thia means that Lumumba arrived under the Congo-
[2947]lese auspices in Kutanga and that Elizabethville, the base at
[2948]Elizabethville didn't know he was coming, our base, didn't
[2949]know very much, didn’t presumably know very much about what
[2950]eccurred, and reported very briefly on what they had heard.
[2952]Mr. Baron. Let me put the question in context.
[2954]On January 17, Lumumba had been flown to Kutanga?
[2956]Mr. Tweedy. Yes.
[2958]Mr. Baron. And later United Nations investigations coz
[2959]cluded that. it was the 17th or perhaps the 18th that Lumumba
[2960]was actually killed in Kutanga.
[2962]I was asking you before whether thia cable would indi-
[2963]cate that the United States would have been involved in
[2964]bringing about the death of Lumumba?
[2966]Mr. Tweedy. I would have thought that it merely in-
[2967]dicates that thia part of the Agency, d.a., Elizabethville
[2968]had no idea he was coming, knew nothing about his fate
[2969]except these few phrases that he put down here and would imp:
[2970]although it certainly doesn't say so, that he was adding a
[2971]little information to what was perhaps an enormously ignoran:
[2972]Leopoldville which, of course, is the fact of the matter.
[2974]We didn't know how all this was occurring and were not able
[2976]to follow the event except after the event.
[2978]TOP SECRET
[2980]TOP SECRET so}
[2982]Mr. Baron. Was the CIA connected in any way to the
[2984]events that immediately led to Lumumba's death?
[2986]'
[2987]| Mr. Tweedy. None whatsoever.
[2988]|
[2989]i}
[2991]Prene {heres 202} 3444000
[2993]Mr. Baron. CIA was not involved in a plot to fly
[2994]i . Re
[2995]u Lumumba from his previous place of imprisonment in Tyaville a
[2996]i ¢
[2997]| out to Kutanga where the authorities were known to be so q
[2998]a
[3000], hostile to him that he would probably meet his death there? fi
[3002]iH Mc. Tweedy. The fate of Lumumba in the end was purely
[3003]| an African avent. : C
[3005]q Mr. Baron, At what point did you learn of Lumumba's
[3007]he
[3009]death? ‘ -
[3010]‘Mr. Tweedy. I suspect probably about the time that the
[3012]world did. No one had a beat on this.
[3014]WAPD & Pau
[3015]n
[3017]Mr. Baron. You had no advanced warning that Mobutu in-
[3019]tended to fly Lumumba to Katanga?
[3020]Mr. Tweedy. Not that I recall, and I am aure the cable
[3021]traffic would reflect it if I had. ; :
[3023]Mr. Baron. Mr. Tweedy, do ‘you recall an asset who was -
[3025]gent from Europe, where he had been recruited by aap OS
[3026]§ Bava
[3028]Mr. Tweedy. I think Iwas reminded of this when I talked
[3030]to the Congo in the fall cf 1960?
[3032]to you and Mr. Wides a couple or so months ago. q
[3033]eo Mr. Baron. This would be an asset who went by the
[3035]ie  ) t cryptonym of QJWIN.
[3037]Mr. Tweedy. So I was reminded then, which was a cryptonym
[3039]St Fares
[3041]TOP SECRET
[3043]5
[3045]"HW 50955:
[3048]WARD &® Pau
[3050]Prone (Aras 202) $64-6000
[3058]o
[3060]|
[3062]I
[3064]“
[3066]le?
[3068]t . na
[3069]first, by relating to you the testimony of SUBCUMPO' Donnell
[3071]I didn't remember at all, whereas I do remember quite a number
[3073]of cryptonyms- when reminded of them.
[3075]Mr. Baron. Aside from the cryptonym, do you recall Os
[3076]there was an asset who had been recruited by aenaes| in |
[3077]Europe and who was sent to the Congo to perform some mission ,
[3079]in November and December of 1960?
[3081]Mr. Tweedy. I was generally reminded of it by that
[3082]conversation with you and Mr. Wides but I will confess that
[3083]my recollection doesn't go any further than that. i
[3085]But unlike some of the things If have jbeen reminded
[3087]of, I think recalled that asset of fATnolaps lig had been
[3088]involved. That is just as about 48 deep as my recollection
[3089]goes. .
[3091]Mr. Baron. Let me see if I can refresh your recollection.
[3093]i
[3095]who said that he did make use of QUWIN in the Congo as
[3097]a kind of “alter ego” of his, a general operative of .-his.
[3098]Does that remind you at all of the nature of the
[3100]mission that QJWIN had in the Congo?
[3102]_Mr. Tweedy. No, it doesn't.
[3104]Mr. Baron. Have you heard the phrase executive ac-
[3107]Mr. Tweedy. In the newspapers.
[3109]Mr. Baron. During your tenure as a CIA official you
[3111]never heard the phrase executive action discussed as part of
[3113]TOP SECRET. 4
[3116]Prone (Aree 207) $44-46600
[3118]Vc
[3120]ro me
[3122]WAND & FAL
[3124]005
[3126]Oe
[3128]ALO Fad Steet SE. Brastiengton,
[3130]HF 599: cs
[3132]TOP SECRE
[3134]a CIA program or plan.
[3136]55
[3138]Mr. Tweedy. No. Only in bureaucratic Washington
[3139]terma of executive action.
[3141]Mr. Baron. Meaning administrative action?
[3143]Mr. Tweedy. Yes.
[3145]Mr. Baron. Were you aware of any project at CIA to
[3146]develop the capability of carrying off an assassination of
[3147]a foreign leader, if required?
[3149]. Mr. Tweedy. Will you repeat that?
[3151]Mr. Baron. Were you aware that the CIA had a project
[3152]which operated under the cryptonym ZRRIFLE to develop the mea:
[3153]pardon me, to develop the capability of carrying out assassin-
[3154]ations if required? ;
[3156]Mr. Tweedy. You mean just generically?
[3158]Mr. Baron. Yes.
[3160]Mr. Tweedy. No.
[3162]Mr. Baron. Aside from the discussions that you had
[3163]with Richard Bissell about the feasibility of assassinating
[3164]Lumumba, did you participate in any other discussions at the
[3165]Agency about assassination capabilities?
[3167]Mr. Tweedy. Never.
[3169]Mr. Baron. Did you bring anyone else connected with
[3171]the Agency into the discussion of the feasibility of
[3173]assassinating Lumumba, other than the Chief of Station in
[3175]Congo?
[3177]TOP SECRET
[3179]brane (Aree 202} 344-6600
[3181]WARD & PAUL
[3183]Roahiegter ma 290s
[3185]F210 Fst Stree $F
[3187]Pal
[3191]10 |
[3193]1
[3195]we
[3198]TOP SECRET
[3200]Mr .Tweedy. The only other person who was aware of it
[3202]56
[3204]was my deputy.
[3206]Mr. Baron. That would be?
[3208]Mr, Tweedy. Glenn Fields. He was aware of it in that
[3209]sense.
[3211]Mr. Baron. Did he take any action in realtion to that
[3212]plan or consideration?
[3214]Mr. Tweedy. No; just he was in matters of this kind he
[3215]would have been my alterego but he was aware of it, that is
[3216]all.
[3218]Mr. Baron. Do you know William Harvey?
[3220]Mr. Tweedy. Sure, I know Bill Harvey well. Haven't
[3221]seen him in @ long while.
[3223]Mr. Baron. And were you aware that William Harvey
[3225]was in contact with#frnedas Wivartto develop the standby
[3227]capability for carrying out assassinations?
[3228]Mr. Tweedy. I don’t know anything about it whatsoever.
[3229]Mr. Baron. Did you at any point talk with William
[3230]Harvey about any CIA activity in the Congo?
[3231]Mr. Tweedy. Not that I remember.
[3232]Mr. Baron. Let me show you a document now that we will
[3233]Mark Fxehibit 5.
[3234](The document referred to was
[3235]marked Tweedy Exhibit No. 5 for
[3237]identification.)
[3239]° a
[3240]TOP SECRET i
[3243]ib Sah y
[3245]TOP § | |
[3246]& } Mr. baron! This is a dispatch from the Chief of }
[3247]§ 2 | KUTUBE/D, which I believe is ated |
[3248]3 ‘A Mr. Tweedy. That is staff D.
[3249]} 4 ! Mr. Baron. In‘ the Foreign Intelligence Diviaion, is
[3250]that correct?
[3252]Mr. Tweedy. Yes.
[3255]9 | Mr. Baron. Written to the Chief of Station in)‘uke
[3257]and Chief of Station in Luxemburg through Chief AP and
[3259]Division?
[3261]& |
[3263]9 I Chief WE.
[3265]ic Would Chief AF have been yourself, Chief of the African
[3266]} .
[3267]li
[3269]Mr. Tweedy. What is the date?
[3270]Mr. BAron. The date is November 2, 1960.
[3272]Mr. Tweedy. I would have been.
[3274]WARD B® PAUL
[3276]Mr. Baron. And William Harvey would hve been Chief of
[3277]_ KU2B0?
[3278]Mr. Tweedy. I suppose he was then. He certainly was
[3279]Chief of Staff D, in which case ‘he could have, that is
[3280]what he would have been then.
[3282]Mr. Baron. Mr. Tweedy, while we have been off the
[3286]record you have had a chance to review this document and
[3288]sara, FC
[3290]teri me some things about it I would like to repeat on the
[3292]raw
[3294]record.
[3296]First of all, on this copy of the document there is
[3298]TIO Beet Stemer. $F
[3301]typed the words Danuel M. Preaskand, under the space for
[3303]| - TOP SECRET
[3305]ee thee ba en tite
[3307]WAND & PRUE
[3313]VE mnie
[3317]Prone [Area P02} 9446-8006
[3319]o>
[3321]be
[3323]TOP SECRET
[3325]officer'a aignature, and you said to me a moment ago that
[3327]you are almost 100 percent sure that that is the pseudonym
[3328]of William Harvey, is that right?
[3330]Mr. Tweedy. Yes.
[3332]Mr. Baron. And you were just pointing to --
[3334]Mr. Tweedy. Chief of ID. You told me he was Chief
[3335]of ID at the.time. He certainly was Chief of ID. You told
[3336]me he was Chief of ID than, I put those two together
[3337]and say I am pretty sure my recollection is Pressland was
[3338]Harvey, I can't gwear to it, but I am virtually sure.
[3340]Mr. Baron. And do you have any independent recollec-
[3341]tion of the subject matter that fa discussed in this document?
[3343]Mr. Tweedy. None at all. It doesn't ring a bell
[3344]at all.
[3346]Mr. Baron. Even after reviewing the document
[3347]do you have any recollection of what QJWIN's mission in the
[3348]Congo would be, would have been?
[3350]Mr. Tweedy. No.
[3352]Mr. Baron. You said that such a memo --
[3354]Mr. Tweedy. You told me he was going out there to
[3355]work with O'Dénnell and whoh. O'Donnell Went out there I
[3356]guess he was going to look into a number of things for
[3357]headquarters and the Station pertaining to Congolese matters.
[3359]When I say I guess I am in effect asking you because I don't
[3361]3
[3363]recollect by any emeans what the full auspices of O'Donnell 's "5
[3365]TOP SECRET
[3369]Tere Orpen Sm
[3372]Prone {Area 202} 544-4000
[3374]WARD & PAUL
[3380]@oydSiinel2.
[3382]|
[3383]visit to the Congo were and you said that Mr. QUWIN
[3384]was going out as sort of his caddy, if you like, he was going |
[3385]to work for him and act as his general assistant.
[3387]Mr. Baron. That was the way ‘Mr._0!Donnell.described
[3389]it, although in this lengthy memo which apparently precedes
[3390]the dispatch of QJWIN to the Congo there is no mention of [Mr “Y i
[3392]ate
[3394]Mr. Tweedy. This I don't think necessarily hae anything
[3395]to do with o!pennell! s mission whatsoever. This, I think, is ,
[3396]generic mission, seams to indicate that he is going to
[3398]muck around with Corsicans. I don’t recall Corsicans, I
[3400]know Oysoinet} in the Congo at all.
[3402]Mr. Baron. Would this kind of dispatch have been
[3403]written by the Chief of Staff D without consultation with the
[3404]Chief of the African Division?
[3406]Mr. Tweedy. He did consult, that is to say, he wrote.
[3407]the dispatch. I haven't read the whole thing but I gather
[3408]from this -- you see there is also a reference here. I don't
[3409]know what the reference is about. But I gather that Dakar is
[3410]brought into this activity because they wanted to act ina
[3411]support capacity to this headquarters activity.
[3413]Mr. Baron. You don't have any recollection of a mission
[3414]in Dakar Senegal about this time that headquarters was con-~
[3415]cerned “with?
[3417]Mr. Tweedy. No, I surely don't. On the contrary.
[3419]TOP SECRET
[3421]TOP SECRET si‘ st
[3423]Mr. Baron. Would it have been proper for the Chief of
[3425]Staff D to arrange an operation in the Congo directly without
[3426]going through the African Division although keeeping the
[3428]African Chief informed?
[3430]Prone {ree 207) $44-46008
[3431]rd
[3433]i
[3434]t
[3435]P i Mr. Tweedy. Well, the two are mutually exclusive.
[3436]|
[3437]6 You can't have one without the othar. To answer your first
[3438]a question, it would be quite improper and wouldn't have occurred
[3440]6 “ that the Chief of Staff D was operating in an African Station i
[3441]f
[3442]1
[3443]9 | without the African Division being informed. This, however, H
[3444]ro |
[3446]makes it amply clear that that was not the case, the African
[3447]t Division was informed. In what depth in terms of terma of
[3448]headquarters purposes I don't know but it would have been
[3450]sufficient for Harvey to have done what he did and coordinate
[3452]WAND & PAUL
[3454]this with the Division and if the Division had perceived
[3455]any objection or saw any problems they would have raised it
[3456]before the dispatch went out.
[3458]Also I noticed Dakar is also invited to find problems
[3459]with this, if it did, and say so. -
[3461]Mr. Baron. What kind of missions generally would
[3463]Staff D have been carrying out in Africa at this time?
[3467]Mr. Tweedy. Well, you know what the role of
[3469]Staff D was.
[3471]Parmer at fhe
[3473]Mr. Baron. This would be obtaining codes by surrepti-
[3475]tious entry.
[3477]Mr. Tweedy. This is in effect the obtaining of signals
[3479]DVO Voeye Streets
[3481]TOP SECRET ee
[3483]HW 50959
[3486]Prone tives 207) 344-6000
[3488]WAM mM FAL
[3492]tet
[3494]BID Faye Ne ees
[3496]Bien = GENE
[3497]TOP SECRET
[3499]1 | intelligence by whatever means, yes, absolutely.
[3501]Mr. Baron, Would it be surprising to you that QUWIN might.
[3503]ss)
[3505]have been used in some manner in connection with an assasasina-
[3507]tion plot against Lumumba and have been directed or supervised
[3509]‘|
[3510]5 by William Harvey without your knowledge? ;
[3511]6 | Mr. Tweedy. It would have surprised me exceedingly and
[3512]” t would today. To put it differently, I am sure it didn’t occur.
[3513]8 h Mr. Baron. After reading this memo, you told me a4
[3514]9 | moment ago that you thought this might indicate that QJWIN
[3515]1G | was being recruited for ZRRIFLE activities.
[3516]: : Mr. Tweedy. Well, you mentioned ZRRIFLE, which frankly
[3517]I hadn‘t heard before. Thie sounds as if he was going to
[3518]is have some kind of generic assignment. I merely put those
[3519]Ls two together but I know nothing about it at all.
[3521]Mr. Baron. The dispatch says, “In view of the extreme
[3523]|
[3524]i
[3525]sensitivity of the objective for which we want him to perform
[3526]his task, he was not told precisely what we want him to do.”
[3528]De you have any knowledge of what it was precisely that
[3529]QUWIN was asked to do?
[3531]Mr. Tweedy. I do not.
[3533]Mr. Baron. Then, on page 3 of the dispatch it says:
[3535]“The operation we have in mind is too sensitive
[3537]to risk blowing it in this phase and the search for assets
[3539]must be conducted with truly" -- which is underscored --
[3541]“minimum risk”.
[3543]TOP SECRET.
[3545]Prone (Ares 207) $46-4009
[3548]3
[3549]4
[3550]a
[3551]a
[3552]e
[3553]a
[3554]a
[3556]TOP SECRET
[3558]What would these assets have been used for, what was
[3559]the search for assets all about?
[3561]Mr. Tweedy. I juat do not know.
[3563]Mr. Baron. Let's turn now to a document .that we will
[3564]mark Exhibit 6, dated January 11, 1961, which is a maemo
[3565]for the PN Division from William K. Harvey, Chief of FI
[3566]Division 0.
[3568]In thie memo I will direct your attention to the
[3569]sentence that says in that cable COS Luxemburg was told
[3570]to TA/A all QJWIN expenses to headquarters since QUWIN waa
[3571]being used for FI/D purposes."
[3573]Do you know what FID purposes QJWIN was being used
[3575]Mr. Tweedy. I don't know.
[3577]Mr. Baron. The memo goes on to say that:
[3579]“QJWIN was sent on this trip for a specifically sensi-~
[3580]tive operational purpose which has been completed”.
[3582]Were you informed by William Harvey that QUWIN's
[3583]mission was completed?
[3585]Mr. Tweedy. I don't recall that at all and don't recall
[3586]any aspect of the mission or its completion.
[3588]Mr. Baron, Okay.
[3590]Did you know of an asset of the Chief of Station in the
[3591]Congo known as WIROGUE, who was sent to the Congo after re-
[3593]ceiving plastic surgery so that he wouldn't be recognized by
[3595]TOP SECRET
[3598]Prone (Ares 202) 544-4000
[3600]3
[3604]c
[3609]TOP SECRET
[3611]his fellow Europeans who might be traveling through the
[3612]Congo?
[3614]Mr. Tweedy. I do recollect that and you brought it
[3615]to my attention, when you and Mr. Wides and I discussed this
[3616]& couple of months ago. I do remember the cryptonym and
[3617]remember generally the circumstances in which he was sent as
[3618]& sort of general purpose agent to the Congo with the thought
[3619]if we got involved in paramilitary activity he would be heipful
[3620]and he was recruited on that rather general basis, and when you
[3621]discussed with me a later alarming exchange of cables which
[3622]indicated that he landed running and made some rather irrespon-
[3623]sible remarks and we commented on them to the station.
[3625]My best recollection is that in the long haul he stayed
[3626]on in the Congo and I think became, I believe he became a
[3627]somewhat useful intelligence source, but Hedgman would
[3628]have a much better recollection of that. But I do remember
[3629]quite well his dispatch. He had been seen by two or three
[3630]members of my Division, including my-deputy. I don't
[3631]recall that I ever met him unless I met him in the Congo.
[3632]If I did I just don't remember, But I remember he was assessed,
[3633]as it were, recruited in the United States and dispatched on
[3634]a general purpose mission.
[3636]Mr. Baron. So, he would be viewed as one of the major
[3637]assets that Hedgman had in the Congo at that point?
[3639]Mr. Tweedy. How major I don‘t know. He was an
[3641]TOP SECRET |
[3644]TOP SECRET
[3645]} t asget. Only time would have told how major it would have
[3647]. . been. He was thought qualified to perform one of a variety
[3649]; of things in the Congo by Hedgman.
[3651]Panne thro 202} 544-4000
[3653]Mr. Baron. Would one of those thinga for which he was
[3655]qualified have bean an assassination mission against Lumumba?
[3657](oa
[3659]‘ Mr. Tweedy. As I told you previously, told you and Mr.
[3661]6
[3663]a Wides previously, absolutely not, for the simple reason he was
[3664]‘ basically dispatched, asseased and dealt with by the balance
[3665]9 i of the Diviaion, not by me personally, Glenn Fields person-
[3667]ally, and he was in effect a station as set mounted by the
[3668]Division.
[3670]The Division knew nothing about the balance of this
[3671]thing.
[3673]Mr. Baron. You are saying that Division personnel out-
[3675]wart @ eat
[3677]side of yourself and Glenn Fields would not have known -~
[3678]Mr. Tweedy. To my knowledge.
[3679]Mr. Baron . -~- would not have known that the assassina-
[3681]tion of Lumumba was being considered?
[3683]cece bee bbs Al dah ata ab ICD mae 0d
[3685]Mr. Tweedy. Considered at all, that is correct.
[3686]Mr. Baron. And --
[3688]Mr. Tweedy. 1f they did learn of it I never knew
[3692]that they learned of it and certainly never learned of it
[3693]through me or Fields.
[3695]Mr. Baron. The fact that you left the recruitment and
[3697]training of this asset to other people in the Division than
[3699]TOP SECRET
[3701]J
[3703]Snare [Ares 2Q27} $44-4000
[3705]7
[3707]mA Pau
[3711]woe
[3713]TOP SECRET
[3714]yourself and Fields would indicate to you that he wasn't
[3715]being considered at that point for an assassination mission?
[3717]Mr. Tweedy. Iwill put it differently. As far as
[3718]I know he was never considered for an assasaination mission
[3719]at ali.
[3721]He thought he was presumably being sent ouf for deeds
[3722]of daring in the PM “ield and began to talk rather lusty when
[3723]he arrived, but I think he was soon put straight.
[3725]Mr. Baron. PM is paramilitary operations?
[3727]Mr. Tweedy. Yes.
[3729]Mr. Baron. Let me show you a document we will mark
[3730]Exhibit 7, dated December 17, 1960, which is # cable to
[3731]the headquarters, marked to Director fromueopoldville dealing
[3732]with WIROGUE on an approach. he made to agent QJWIN.
[3734](The document referred to was
[3735]marked Tweedy Exhibit No. 7
[3737]for identification.) -
[3739]TOP SECRET
[3741]bane {hres 207) $444000
[3744]4
[3745]ry
[3748]a
[3749]8
[3751]TOP SECRET
[3753]Mr. Tweedy. Yes, I know that. This is the one we dis-
[3755]66
[3757]cussed two montha ago and this happens all the time.
[3759]Mr. Baron. We are referring specifically to QIWIN's
[3760]report that"WIROGUE had offered him $300 per month to par-
[3761]ticipate in intel net and be member" .--1 am sorry -- “member
[3762]‘execution squad'*,
[3764]Mr. Tweedy. Yes; I remember all of this aa a result
[3765]of your having previously brought it to my attention and I
[3766]recall it, it was a typical example of an agent or as#et
[3768]full of piss and vinegar exceeding his brinf and he was
[3770]_certainly put back on the track very early on.
[3772]But in this business do not confuse axecution Bquad
[3773]with anything to do with the assassination of Lumumba or any-
[3774]thing else. It had nothing to do with that.
[3776]Mr. Baron. You are saying even though you would
[3777]assume that Mr. Hedgman's testimony about poisons coming to
[3778]the Congo and instructions to carry out an assassination
[3779]coming to the Congo was true, the approach that WIROGUE made
[3780]to QUWIN was probably not a part of that mission.
[3782]Mr. Tweedy. it was quite specifically not a part of
[3783]that miasion. There was a chapter of accidents. You have
[3784]seen it happen, I have seen it happen, a thousand times be-
[3785]fore, two people who are periphically involved in the same
[3786]thing and run into each. er and one smelis something on the
[3788]other.
[3790]TOP SECRET
[3793]Prema (ewe 9021 444-6000
[3795]TOP SECRET
[3797]Mr. Baron. Again, why are you ge sure that this would
[3799]67
[3801]not have been connected in any way to the assassination
[3802]mission?
[3804]Mr. Tweedy. I thought I made that clear because
[3805]this man went out up to a point through what I would call
[3806]the open channel, it was developed by the Division, giving
[3807]training by the Division and was sent out. This had nothing
[3808]to do whatsoever with the other thing and wouldn't have been
[3809]handled that way.
[3811]Mr. Baron. Could he have been instructed by Mr.
[3812]Hedgman, after he got to the Congo, that he was to undertake
[3813]recruitment of assets for participation in an assassination
[3814]mission as part of his general duties in the Congo?
[3816]Mr. Tweedy. It is purely a speculative question. He
[3817]could have been but Hedgman would also have been required
[3818]and would have told headquarters what he was doing with him.
[3819]That was not the purpose for his being sent. The purpose for
[3820]which he was sent out was unspecific at the time, generally
[3821]in the PM field.
[3823]Mr. Baron. Bid this report create a flap at headquarters
[3824]at the time when the cable was sent?
[3826]Mr. Tweedy. No, not at all.
[3828]Mr. Baron. It would have been considered a fairly
[3830]Mr. Tweedy. Jt is not.
[3832]TOP SECRET
[3835]TOP SECRET
[3837]Mr. Baron. -- example of free wheeling by an operative?
[3839]68
[3841]Mr. Tweedy. It ig the sort of thing that can happen.
[3843]What you want to do is put a stop to it. But no great problem.
[3845]© (Atee 202) 944-4060
[3847]The problem must have lasted 30 minutes.
[3849]Pees
[3851]Mr. Baron. Have you ever discussed events in the Congo
[3852]RR ede ‘
[3855]with Sidney _GottllLeb?:
[3857]Mr. Tweedy. Have I ever discussed events in the
[3859]ease teen:
[3861]Congo with {Sidney Gottiten?
[3863]i ' whee
[3864]I can only assume I must have seen Sidv during this
[3866]period, during this period, but I don't recall any discussions.
[3867]; wo gem
[3869]In fact, if there had been any discussions with Sidney-Gottey-
[3872]. Yr seyon the Congo it would have been at that time,
[3873]Mr. Baron. Why would that be so?
[3876]Mr. Tweedy. Otherwise Sidney Cottlieb would have had
[3880]ex
[3881]3
[3883]t
[3887]no interest in the Congo.
[3889]Mr. Baron. So you'mean if there had been any dis-
[3890]cussions between yourself and Sidney Gort liee it probably
[3891]would have --
[3893]Mr. Tweedy. It would have surrounded these events.
[3895]Mr. Baron. The development of lethal biological sub-
[3896]stances in his laboratory? ;
[3898]Mr. Tweedy. Yes, sir. Not necessarily that, because
[3899]1 think that would have been Siarey7saevHieb "Fp business as
[3901]what he developed in his laboratory. My only interest pre-
[3903]sumably would have been was there anything in his inventory
[3905]TOP SECRET
[3908]Prine ‘Brea 207} 2A-SO0
[3910]TOP SECRET
[3912]that could possibly be used if we ever wanted to use something.
[3913]Mr. Baron. You might have had at least an exploratory
[3914]conversation with him on that subject?
[3915]Mr. Tweedy. I would be surprised if. I didn't.
[3916]Or perhaps Bussell had a conversation with him and then 1
[3917]followed it up, something like that. I would suspect that
[3919]probably the first conversation would undoubtely have been
[3922]/ pater ao. .
[3923]held between Dick Bissell and§sidney Ggttiieby but this is mercly -
[3925]_
[3927]what I would suspect was the way it occurred.
[3929]I don't say that that is the way it occurred. fut
[3930]¢“aehe seu .
[3932]than that no conversation with iSidney Gottlieb on the Con-
[3933]cad
[3935]all.
[3937]Mr. Baron. T am at the end of my questions on specific
[3938]facts concerning the Congo during this period of time leadina
[3939]dp to Lumumba's death which, as you know, is the narrow
[3940]subject of our inquiry right now, and first of all I want
[3941]to say that I appreciate tremendously and know ‘that the
[3942]Committee is appreciative and grateful for your testimony
[3943]here today. It is a difficult subject. It is only one
[3944]narrow aspect of what the Committee is undertaking, and un-
[3945]pleasant, but unnecessary aspect to assemble.
[3947]1 wonder if you have any facts that you would like to ant
[3949]to the record that you think are necessary to put our dis-
[3951]cussion today into context? i
[3952]J
[3954]Mr. Tweedy. I think the strongest. .recollection about
[3956]TOP SECRET
[3959]TOP SECRET
[3961]my period as Chief of the African Division and the Congo --
[3962]let's leave the balance of Africa out -- and U.N. and U.S.
[3964]involvement in the Congolese matter, that I have never seen
[3966]1608 (Bee 207) 5444000
[3968]an element of the Agency so totally involved in a matter which
[3972]clearly had the highest policy approval. I am not talking
[3973]about Lumumba, I am talking about the Congo.
[3975]Mr. Baron. There was an extreme sense of urgency at
[3976]that time?
[3978]Mr. Tweedy. Not only an extreme sense of urgency, .
[3979]the U.S. was supporting the U.N., the Agency was supporting
[3980]the U.S. Government, the U.S. Government requests. “What the
[3981]Agency was doing was very closely coordinated appropriately
[3982]with any organs of government that need to be covered, mostly
[3983]State, the White House. I must say the Fxecutive Department
[3984]was very much working as a team during these days. AGain for-
[3985]get Lumumba. I am now talking the whole Congo action. And
[3986]I never felt that anything we were doing was wandering off in-
[3987]to left field or that I didn’t know the way the White Mouse was
[3988]thinking about things, or the State Department was thinking
[3989]about things, and the National Security was thinking about
[3990]things, and 1 have no reason to believe they ever felt that tne
[3991]didn't know how CIA was thinking about things. Tt was an extras
[3992]ordinarily close thina.
[3994]I remember Mennen Williams trying to forma
[3996]Congo club. When LI retired from the African Division I was
[3998]TOP SECRET
[4001]TOP SECRET
[4003]given a little thing for a watch chain, if I had one,
[4005]which would be a member of the Congo Club, and it was rather
[4007]* 1 Ares 297} $44.6000
[4009]typical of the way the government worked on this thing and I
[4010]personally felt excellent advised that the U.S. was absolutely
[4011]right to support the U.N. on this. I think it could have been
[4012]& total disaster if Kutanga had been allowed to succeed,
[4014]and although Mobutu was acting like an ass now, that is
[4016]Africa for you, but on the whole that country has done pretty
[4017]well and I consider we had a considerable role in giving it
[4019]a chance to move the way it has.
[4021]There are going to be ups and downs with the things
[4022]but that ds the way it is. I feel very stronaly about it.
[4024]Does that somewhat answer your queation,
[4025]does that help?
[4027]Mr. Baron.] simply wanted to give you a chance.
[4029]Mr. Tweedy. 1 felt that very strongly and no other assiqn-
[4030]ment that. I have ever had was this kind of government team
[4031]and cooperation ever teally required. because we weren't
[4032]engaged or I wasn't engaged in that kind of activity.
[4034]Mr. Baron. 1s this government team efforts that you are
[4035]talking about one that was primarily put together to carry
[4036]out the paramilitary activities in the Congo in the
[4037]latter part of the 60's, ‘62, ‘63.
[4039]Mr. Tweedy. It was put together to preside over what-
[4041]ever activity the United States Government felt it needed
[4043]TOP SECRET |
[4046]tm trae 207) 4Ah-4000
[4048]Em,
[4051].
[4052]e
[4054]t
[4056]TOP SECRET
[4058]to be engaged in in the Congo. This included such things as
[4059]purely policy questions of what the Ambasaddor to the U.N.
[4060]might say to the Secretary General of tha U.N.or what the
[4061]President might want to Bay conceivably I suppose to the
[4062]Chief of the Belgium state on such matters. Everything
[4063]certainly didn't just involve what CIA waa going to be
[4064]involved in. It was the whole policy ball of wax with res-
[4065]pect to the Congo which obviously had many ganglia and which
[4066]the CIA part and paramilitary activity was just a bit.
[4068]Mr. Baron. Did this high dagree of organization and
[4069]intensity of concern begin sometime after the death of Lumumba
[4070]or had it gotten rolling?
[4072]Mr. Tweedy. I think --
[4074]Mr. Baron. After the Congolese independence?
[4076]Mr. Tweedy. I think the U.S. Government waa thoroughly
[4077]seized with the intimate problem and danger of a disintegrating
[4078]Congo that started in the earliest days of independence
[4079]and continued and, of course, when the Tachombe-Kutanga
[4080]thing became a fact of life, which is basically why the U.N.
[4081]was there, then, of course, that was it.
[4083]Tn other words, I would say that U.S. involvement, U.S.
[4084]concern, merely moved with the events, as anybody could read
[4085]them in the press just continued and continued, but one thin:
[4086]was perfectly clear, was that the U.S, was quite determined
[4090]to see this thing through. Nothing had been clearer than
[4092]TOP SECRET
[4095]Orr e hems 707) $84 4000
[4098]a
[4099]“
[4102]t
[4104]TOP SECRET 73
[4106]the way President Kennedy presided over those two meetings.
[4107]He was annoyed by the Congo and irritated by it and he was
[4108]worried that he had to spend so much bloody time on it, but
[4109]he was damn well determined to see the thing through and he
[4110]waa continually goosing his staff to do just that , but
[4112]in support of the U.N. We weren't going to do it all by
[4113]ourselves. It couldn't have been clearer,
[4115]Mr. Baron. All right, as I mentioned before, the
[4116]Committee is interested in your wisdom on policy-making and
[4117]analysis in the intelligence community yenerally and there may
[4118]be other members of the Committee staff that would ike to call
[4119]upon you to testify on other subjects because of your long
[4120]experience in Agency activities.
[4122]But I want to thank you now for your complete coopera-
[4123]tion and the tremendous amount of information that you have
[4124]provided on this one subject that has been very helpful?
[4126]Mr. Tweedy. Thank you, Mr. Baron. I can assure you any-
[4127]thing I can do to help the Committee in other areas I
[4128]will be glad to do it and if I dun't think 1 can help be-
[4129]Cause I don’t think I know enough about the subject I wilh ius
[4130]Say 80, Gtherwine 0 am not afraid tc. put in, two Dits in.
[4132]Mr. Baron. As far a8 your two bits goes, we would
[4133]be interested in your two bits worth on pOricy recommendations
[4134]in general, institutional, critique or suggestions for change
[4136]or any kind of recommendations that you would care to make,
[4138]TOP SECRET
[4141]mene {Aree 202) 584-4000
[4143]z
[4147]3
[4148]ry
[4150]t
[4152]and we will take that up at some point in the future. But
[4154]4
[4156]you have obviously had a good deal of experience at the policy :
[4157]level in the Agency and wa like to take advantage of that.
[4159]That is all, thank you.
[4161]Mr. Tweedy. All right, than you very much.
[4163](Whereupon, at 3:55 p.m., the hearing was concluded.)