[1]187-10014-10109 | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
[3]JFK Assassination System Date: 7/8/2015
[4]Identification Form
[6]AGENCY ;
[7]RECORD NUMBER :
[9]RECORD SERIES :
[11]AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
[13]ORIGINATOR :
[14]FROM:
[15]TO:
[17]TITLE:
[19]DATE:
[20]PAGES:
[22]SUBJECTS :
[24]DOCUMENT TYPE :
[25]CLASSIFICATION :
[26]RESTRICTIONS :
[27]CURRENT STATUS :
[28]DATE OF LAST REVIEW :
[30]OPENING CRITERIA :
[32]COMMENTS :
[36]HW 50955 Docld: 324235497
[38]Agency Information
[40]SSCIA
[41]157-10014-10109
[43]MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITITEE
[45]07-M-15
[47]Document Information
[49]SSCIA
[51]06/25/1975
[52]19
[54]HARVEY, WILLIAM
[56]OPERATION MONGOOSE
[58]REPORT
[59]Declassified
[60]1B; 1C
[61]Redact
[62]03/08/2000
[64]CCBOX 418
[66]Page 1
[68]Date
[69]Page
[71]08/06/95_
[72]1
[74]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[75]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[77]AGENCY
[79]RECORD NUMBER
[80]RECORDS SERIES
[81]AGENCY FILE NUMBER
[83]AGENCY INFORMATION
[85]: SSCIA
[89]: MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTTEE
[92]ORIGINATOR
[93]FROM
[95]TO
[97]TITLE
[99]DATE
[101]PAGES
[102]SUBJECTS
[104]DOCUMENT TYPE
[105]CLASSIFICATION
[106]RESTRICTIONS
[107]CURRENT STATUS
[109]DATE OF LAST REVIEW
[110]OPENING CRITERIA
[111]COMMENTS
[113]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[115]SSCIA
[117]06/25/75
[118]19
[119]HARVEY, WILLIAM
[121]OPERATION MONGOOSE
[123]ZRRIFLE
[125]REPORT
[127]TOP SECRET
[129]REFERRED
[131]POSTPONED IN FULL -
[132]01/05/99
[134]o6 a0 86 68 Be oe oe
[136]CCBOX 418
[138]HW 50955 Docld:32423497
[140](R] ~ ITEM IS RESTRICTED
[142]Page 2
[144]ct
[146]ea
[149]AGENDA
[151]TWENTY-FOURTH MEETING OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE oN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
[153]10:00 A, M, ON JUNE 25, 1975 IN 457 RUSSELL BUILDING
[155]UNVENT] Di
[156]es
[160]Testimony by Mr. William Harvey
[162]ax
[164]HY 50955 Docld: 32423497 Page 4
[166]Biographical
[168]-Late January
[170]TOP SECRET
[172]WILLIAM HARVEY
[174]Short Chronology*
[176]i9ho-W7 - - Counterespionage work as FBI agent
[177]1947 | Joined CIA as head of Soviet Intelligence Branch
[178]1948 Deputy Assistant Director, Office of Special ©
[179]Operations (which became DDP)
[180]| 1952 Chief of Station, Berlin (Berlin Tunnel operation)
[181]| a ‘ ;
[182]\ 1959 Became Chief of Foreign Intelligence staff Division
[183]D (FI/D) which handles communications intelligence
[184]| and sensitive methods of obtaining it (e.g.,
[185]: surreptitious entries)
[186]1960
[187]August 16 DR. EDWARD GUNN (Office of Medical Services)
[188]receives box of Cuban cigars to be treated with
[189]lethal poison. (21)
[190]i
[191]t
[192]1961
[194]EDWARDS and O'CONNELL ask for development of
[196](approx.) | POISON PILLS. (2h)
[197]February BISSELL (DDP) asks HARVEY to establish an EXECUTIVE
[198]_ (approx. ) . ACTION capability under project ZRRIFLE. Harvey's
[200]notes are quoted as saying that Bissell said he
[201]had been "twice urged by the White House” to
[202]establish such a capability. (37) Harvey is
[203]priefed, probably by both BISSELL and EDWARDS, on
[204]the Phase I assassination plot run by Sheffield
[205]EDWARDS and James O'CONNELL (Office of Security)
[206]which involved criminal syndicate connections. (37)
[208]HARVEY uses agent QJWIN (recruited earlier by
[209]ARNOLD SILVER for use in an assassination operation
[210]against LUMUMBA) as the principle asset for ZRRIFLE.
[211](38)
[213]Edwards has the POISON PILLS tested. (25)
[215]* Page references in parentheses are from the 1967 Report of the Inspector
[216]General of the CIA.
[218]HW 50955 Docld:32423497 Page 5
[220]1961 (cont'd)
[222]_ Early Feb.
[223]Late Feb.
[225]March-Early April
[227]Mid-April
[229]November 15
[231]November 29
[232]1962
[233]February
[235]February 7
[237]' February 19
[239]April 8-9
[241]to April 14
[243]April 18-19
[245]HW 50955 Docld:32423497 Page 6
[247]TOP SECRET
[249]According to Dr, GUNN, HARVEY asked about the
[251]pills he tested. Gunn briefed Harvey, who told
[253]him to brief SIDNEY GOTTLIEB about techniques -
[254]but not targets. (27)
[256]Pills given to ROSELLI by O'CONNELL are passed
[258]_ to TRAFFICANTE, (27) ROSELLI reports to O'CONNELL
[259]that pills reached ORTA in Cuba. ORTA returns
[261]pills in couple weeks. (27)
[263]O'CONNELL.. gives, pills and money to ROSELLI who
[264]passes them to VARONA. (32)
[266]Bay of Pigs invasion fails; JFK appoints Taylor
[267]Committee. .
[269]Beginning of PHASE II: BISSELL instructs HARVEY to
[270]apply the ZRRIFLE assassination capability to ..
[271]Castro. (39) Harvey takes over the criminal syndicate
[272]contacts developed in Phase I. (39) HARVEY is told
[274]by HELMS that he is to take over the CIA Cuba
[276]task force. (39)
[278]MC CONE replaces Allen Dulles as DCI
[280]EDWARDS briefs HARVEY on Castro operation. (40)
[282]EDWARDS meets with FBI to ask them not to prosecute
[283]the Rowan wiretap case because of CIA concern. (60)
[285]HELMS (DDP nominee) authorizes HARVEY to handle
[286]ZRRIFLE project with unvouchered funds. (38) .
[288]HARVEY, ROSELLI, O'CONNELL, and perhaps MAHEU meet
[289]in New York to plan Phase II. (43) (Harvey disputes
[290]O'Connell's recollection that Maheu was there and
[291]knowledgeable of Phase II.) Both Edwards and
[292]Harvey check with HELMS before the meeting is ©
[293]arranged and HARVEY obtains Helm's approval not to
[294]brief MC CONE (41). Harvey thereafter begins
[295]regular reporting to Helms on. Phase II. (41)
[297]HARVEY, ROSELLI, and O'CONNELL meet in Miami. (46)
[299]Pills are delivered to Harvey in Washington. (46)
[302]April 21
[304]May 7
[306]May 14
[308]mess penetycegnnat oe wre secrarnes coun engorgement spmmtatan inten Smee te ee ae at intent ee te a
[310]June 21
[312]August 10
[314]August 13
[316]Late April
[318]1962 (cont'd)
[320]Throughout May —
[322]TOP SECRET
[324]HARVEY passes the pills to ROSELLI in Florida. (47)
[325]Roselli was to give the pills to Varona, who had an
[326]asset in Cuba with access to Castro's restaurant.
[328]At this point Roselli is using Tony VARONA and
[329]"MACEO" as contacts with Cuba rather than Trafficante.
[331]©. (47-8)
[333]HARVEY, with help of Ted SHACKLEY (Chief of JMWAVE
[334]station in Miami), loaded arms and equipment in a
[335]U-Haul truck which was left in a parking lot for
[336]Roselli, who delivered it to a Cuban contact. (49- 50)
[338]Intense contact between HARVEY and ROSELLI. Roselli
[339]reports that pills are in Cuba at the restaurant
[340]frequented by Castro awaiting the opportunity to
[341]use them. (50)
[343]EDWARDS and HOUSTON brief ATTORNEY GENERAL ROBERT F.
[344]KENNEDY on PHASE I of the assassination operation. (62a)*
[346]Edwards tells HARVEY of.the briefing of RFK. (65)
[347]Harvey says that he briefed HELMS about this and
[348]advised against briefing McCone (DCI) or Carter
[349](DDCI); Helms agreed. (65
[351]HARVEY is told by EDWARDS that the "tacit approval"
[352]of the DCI should be obtained if Roselli was to be
[353]used any further. (65) Harvey ‘told Edwards that _
[354]Roselli would not be used any more. (According to
[355]Edwards’ memorandum of 5/14/62.) (42)
[357]ROSELLI tells HARVEY that VARONA has sent three men
[359]to Cuba to recruit others for the pill plot. (51)
[361]Special Group (Augmented) meets on OPERATION MONGOOSE.
[362]HARVEY and MC CONE said that McNAMARA raised the
[364]subject of assassinations at this meeting in regard
[366]to new plans.
[368]General LANSDALE'S memorandum assigns to HARVEY the
[369]drafting of an outline of intelligence, political,
[370]economic, and paramilitary activities for the
[371]implementation of MONGOOSE. The task includes |
[372]planning for "splitting the regime, including liguida-
[373]tion of leaders".
[375]* RFK asks to be told before the CIA works with the Mafia again. (62a)
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[379]Page Tf
[382]“1962 (cont'a)
[384]oes ene MONON: ean GR eR Ae AON NI ttn mae ce
[386]HW 50955 Doocla
[388]August 14
[390]September
[392]October
[393]1963
[395]February
[397]June
[399]August 16
[401]22425497
[403]Page 6
[405]TOP SECRET
[407]_ HARVEY writes a memorandum to DDP HELMS saying
[409]that he advised Lansdale's aide FRANK HAND to
[411]excise the words "including liquidation of leaders”. |
[412]from the LANSDALE memo because of "the inadmissibility
[413]and stupidity of putting this type of comment in
[414]writing in such @ document"; Harvey also tells Helms
[415]that he has "careful notes" on MC NAMARA'S discussion
[416]of assassination at the Special Group meeting of
[417]August 10.
[419]Pills still in place; HARVEY learns that VARONA is
[420]ready to send another team to Cuba. (51)
[422]CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
[424]HARVEY and ROSELLI agree in Los Angeles to call off
[425]the operation, although not to break precipitously .
[426]with VARONA. (52)
[428]‘HARVEY and ROSELLI have last dinner in Washington
[430]and are observed by SAM PAPICH of the FBI, who has
[431]ROSELLI under intensive surveillance. Harvey asks
[432]Papich to let him know if HOOVER is going to call
[433]MC CONE. (53~4) Harvey briefs Helms and Helms
[435]agrees not to brief McCone unless it appears that
[436]McCone will receive a call from Hoover. (54):
[438]Spurred by a Chicago newspaper story of the same
[439]day, HELMS sends MC CONE the Edwards memo of 5/14/62 _
[440]of the RFK briefing. (69)
[443]Ma i daa Be
[445]A
[447]ba
[448],
[450]“HW 50955 BDocld: 32423497 Page 9
[452]v
[453]co
[455]ry
[456]FOLTB re 0 oe my cet ss urmnnee Ue at ORTON seb ery tS 8h ste
[458]SR cater lll ata. oat ate atime oA tae
[459]et .
[461]| INVENT ORIED:
[463]MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD: |
[465]SUBJECT: John Rosselli.” ee, BX nA
[467]1, In early April Mr. William Harvey asked me to arrange
[468]a contact with Subject. The meeting in New York City was’ arranged .
[469]for 9 April. I explained to Mr. Harvey that the undersigned would
[471]‘take no part in future operations proposed for Subject. -
[473]2. Inthe interim I have kept Mr. ‘Harvey fully informed | .
[474]reference to my briefing of The Attorney General on the former —
[476]project and cautioned him that I felt that any future projects of © ~ _ : | -
[477]' this nature should have the tacit a roval of the Director of ral ay ,
[478]Intelligence. a oe oo ;
[480]3 On this date Mr. Harvey called me and indicated that
[481]he was dropping any plans for the use of Subject for the future,
[483]She! Poe niet ds
[485]“ Director of Security ©
[488]i oo, ; — -
[489]Bo wed rh et ae rte Noe ee a
[491]OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
[492]WASHINGTON 25, D.C,
[494]| a OC 13 August 1962
[496]boos MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM HARVEY, CIA
[498]° i ROBERT HURWITCH, STATE. :
[499]CEN. BENJAMIN HARRIS, DEFENSE <————X_
[500]LON WILSON, USIA
[502]From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale Sh
[504]Subject: Alternate Course B
[508].In compliance with the desires and guidance expressed in the
[509]10 August policy meeting on Operation Mongoose, we will produce.
[510]an outline of an alternate Course B for submission, The CIA paper.
[511]“Operational Plan (Reduced Effor will be used as the starting
[512]basia.
[514]Since this 1s to be a bare outline, to permit further policy
[515]i ; guidance to be develoncc, I Lolicewe the paper need contain oaly
[516]i a statement of objectives acd a list of implementing activities.
[517]7 ‘The lst of activities will be undcoz the headings of: Intelligence,
[518]Political, Economic, FPaychciczical, Paramilitary, and Military. |
[520]Ve will hold an Ofevaticnunl Representatives work scssisn in
[521]7 my office, at 1400 nours, Teerdy, 14 August, to complete the
[522]7 outline paper for submics: Toc Ok you is to bring 5 copies of -
[523]completed assigned work 13 this wurk eessioa, to permit each of
[524]us to work from a full sel of Cruiis.
[528]Papers required fvors cacn of you for the Tuesday meeting:
[530]veical (eplittins the regime,
[531]wnomic (sabotage, limites
[532]any guerre estions for inclusioa
[534]_ . Harve Intollivones, Ts
[537]pO “ deception), and Paramiiivocy.
[538]. in other sections of the 20 cre
[540]Mr. Hurwitch: Sioto rol ol Sicectives, Political, ane
[541]Economic. Algo, any us. digas lar inclusion ia other sections
[542]of the paper.
[544]; . ‘ Demmeeeie see ae Sen
[546]i
[547]anal
[549]Aang Bee | . DOES HO? A.
[551]SE EMCEE En ga i a
[553]of 3S - hers : | ! SLING ane socunens con? 2ins
[554]og tert, L... a : Perera
[556]HY 50955 Docld: 32423497 Page 10 OG
[558]COL. :. Boke
[560]ox Di 62 Ha
[563]A MN RAE ae EOL GPT HN ae Eo
[565]HW 50955 Docld: 32423497 Page 11
[567]was brought up by Secretary McNamara at the meeting of the
[569]‘he agreed and that he had done so, . 7 ,
[571]~ ~~ ae ELS EX De
[573]4 . , }
[575]- aaa? = 22 i
[577]Sen ee | Pet earey xy © /15 en |
[579]Semeites ways i
[581]pee hie is Cy 7.
[582]CEQSEEVE 9 00 TER RS
[584]MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans)
[586]SUBJECT > Operation MONGOOSE
[588]1. Action, None. This memorandum is for your information,
[589]2. Reference is made to our conversation on 13 August 1962,
[590]concerning the memorandum of that date from General Lansdale,
[591]Attached is a copy of this memorandum, excised from which are
[592]four words in the second line of the penultimate paragraph on
[593]page 1. These four words were "including. liquidation of leaders. "
[595]3. The question of assassination, particularly of Fidel Castro,
[597]Special Group (Augmented) in Secretary Rusk's oifice on 10 August.
[598]It was the obvious consensus at that meeting, in answer toa
[599]comment by Mr. Ed Murrow, that this is not a subject which
[601]has been made a matter of official record, I took careful notes on
[602]the comments at this meeting on this point, and the Special Group
[603](Augmented) is not expecting any written comments or study on
[604]this point. :
[606]4. ‘Upon receipt of the attached memorandum, I called
[607]Lansdale's office and, in his absence, pointed out to Frank Hand -
[608]the inadmissibility and stupidity of putting this type of comment in
[609]writing in sucha document. I advised Frank Hand that, as far
[610]as CIA was concerned, we would write no document pertaining to
[611]this and would participate in no open meeting discussing it,
[612]I strongly urged Hand to recommend to Lansdale that he excise en ©
[613]the phrase in question from all copies of this memorandum, in-.
[614]cluding those disseminated to State, Defense, and USIA, Shortly
[615]thereafter, Lansdale called back and left the message that
[619]CEL AA its
[620]leeo eaves .
[621]Cts Gat u
[625]- ena
[626]¢ : er 4
[627]. ete
[628]ela Seled
[629]Cal Re iia a
[632]snc hie
[634]5. For your information also, in your absence and Since -
[635]the attached memorandum already had been distributed and in.
[636]' view of the possibility that this might come to the Director's —
[638]‘ . . . . - : -
[640]WILLIAM K. HARVEY
[642]_ Chief, Task Force W_
[643]| Attachment - ST
[644]i Memo fr Gen Lansdale dtd 13 Aug 62
[646]i .
[649]|
[650]| ;
[652]i
[654]po. :
[656]i.
[658]|
[660]H
[662]i
[664]HY 50955 DocTd:32423497 Page 12 -
[666]. attention, I informally briefed Walt Elder onthe above. a
[668]Neen
[670]SECRET 7 a 4
[672]; Project ZRRIFLE_
[674]l, Identification: The purpose of Project ZRRIFLE is to spot,
[675]develop, and use agent assets for Division D operations. ‘Agents will be
[676]spotted in several areas, ‘including the United States, but for operational
[677]security reasons will probably not be used in their countries of residence.
[678]Present developmental activity is being conducted in the WE and EE areas,
[679]but it is anticipated that this will be extended to other division areas. , The
[680]project will be operated against third-country installations and personnel.
[682]2. “Objectives: The objective of this project is the procurement of
[683]code and cipher materials, and information concerning such materials,
[685]in accordance with requirements levied on the Clandestine Services,
[686]primarily by the National Security Agency. Since these réquirements are
[687]subject to frequent revision, no listing of targets would be valid for the
[688]“duration of the project, Specific operations will be mounted on the basis of
[689]need and opportunity. The project will be conducted by Division D with
[690]assistance from area divisions and stations as needed. -
[692]3. Background : In response to the increasing requirements for the
[693]operational procurement of foreign code and cipher materials, Division D
[694]in 1960 began the spotting of agent assets as a developmental activity.
[695]During the same period requirements from NSA became more refined and in
[697]many respects more sensitive, Because most stations are not equipped to
[699]‘conduct this type of operation and because of the desirability of completely
[701]NATIONSL SECURITY INFORMATION _ . 2A 1818 dectesit emt tr
[702]Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to C ae D PT an exempilon schedu'e 5
[703]Criminal Sanctions. hu Automaticaily dec's
[705]HW 50955 Docld: 32423497 Page 13
[707]wevnrcl
[708]control over this entire effort, it was determined that Division D, which is
[709]in closest touch with NSA on procurement requirements, could best conduct the
[710]‘activity. The spotting activity has now advanced far enough to justify
[711]removing from the OOA category.
[712]4, Operational Assets: |
[713]a) Personnel: QIWIN is under’ written contract as a principal
[714]agent, with the primary task of spotting agent candidates. QIWIN was first
[715]contacted in 1958 through the Chief of the Luxembourg I.S. by the Chief of
[716]Station, Luxembourg, in connection with an illegal narcotics operation into
[717]the United States. For a period of a year and a half he was contacted
[718]sporadically by cos, Luxembourg, in behalf of the Bureau of Marcotics.
[720]Files of this Bureau reflect an excellent performance by QJWIN. In
[722]October 1960,
[724]“RECEIVED FROM
[726]win 24 1915
[730]HW 50955 Docld:32423497 Page 14
[732]CA
[733]Tis
[734]a>
[735]20
[739]|
[740]|
[741]QIWIN annual salary: : ; $ 7, 200 | - .
[742]Travel & ops expenses for QJWIN & —_
[743]other agents & agent condidates: 2,000 .
[744]Fees for services by and standby of agents |
[745]and agent candidates: . . 7 2,000
[746]Travel of staff employees engaged in
[748]Hire of safehouses, automobiles and other ;
[749]operational expenses:. © . . . 1, 000
[750]a $14, 700
[751]Pay for agents on completion of jobs? .
[752]1) Legal, ethical-morale, operational problems; political: non-attributability,
[753]2)) Our own experience (Bangkok) (and effect on DDP) and experiences with
[754]KGB (Crossup, Bandera groups, Khokhlov) - require most professional,
[755]proven operationally competent, ruthless, stable, CE-experienced ops
[756]officers (few available), ‘able to conduct patient search and with guts to
[757]: pull back if instinct or knowledge tells him he should, and w/known high
[758]regard for operational security, Assessments are all-important.
[759]3) Maximum security:
[760]a, Kubark only (e. Bes what does Siragusa now know? ); no approach
[761]to other Government agencies,
[762]b. Within dubark, one focal point for control, search, training
[764]case officering, etc, DDP authority in this focal point mandeREPEIVED FROM
[765]Qn 24 1975
[766]SECRET | Cla
[770]HY 50955 Docld: 324235497 Page 15
[772]SEGRET 7
[774]} ‘DCI officially advised?
[776]c, Max. security cable commo for innocuous cables only; no
[777]; restrictions on travel; possibility of one-man overseas (Europe) control
[778]base with own (non-Station) commo, “Word of mouth and no bashfulness
[780]re trips.
[782]d. No PA's (except for search) or intermediaries; rigid | case-.
[783]_ officering, from start to finish,
[784]e. No approach to officials of foreign governments,
[786]'f, No use of any agent who ever worked for a U.S. Government agency.
[787]Training by opposition would . .
[788]| . 7 g. Use of already tested assets {e.g., Manuel in the search,
[789]: h. Stand-by list of Rubarkers who can pass as foreigners.
[790]_ i, Pretext: Kutube/D search; this established (e.g., Rome).
[792]j. No discussions in Stations.
[794]k. No "team" until ready to go, if at all.
[795]4) Blackmail: .
[796]a. No American citizens or residents or people who ever obtained
[797]U.S. visa.
[798]b. No chain of connections: strictly person to person; singleton ops.
[799]c. No meeting any. candidate in house territory.
[800]d, Exclude organization criminals (e.g., Sicilians) those with record
[802]of arrests, those with instability of purpose as criminals. . a
[804], RECEIVED FROM
[806]aAN 24 1975
[808]SECRET GIA
[810]Linea nde mae ese meinen gama A mn
[812]HW 50955 Docld:324293497 Page 16
[814]SEOKEA
[816]e, Staffers -selection,
[818]5) Cover: planning should include provision for blaming Sovs or Czechs
[820]in case of blow.
[821]forged and backdated, Should look like a CE file.
[823]blackmail.
[824]8) Former resistance personnel a possibility,
[826]f 9) Use }ibady nobody who has ever dealt with criminals;
[828]to travel, wanted lists, etc.
[829]10) Possible use of staffers for the action, |
[831]ll) Silverthorne,
[833]Keeping of files,
[835]CRET
[839]S
[841]HY 50855 ‘Docld: 32423497 Page i7
[843]7) Testing of moninees essential: re following directions, security,
[845]6) Should have phoney 201 in RI to backstop this, all documents therein
[847]otherwise will not be aware of pitfalls or consider factors suchas freedom
[849]SECRET
[851]Freedom to travel
[853]. ; ; Khokhlov case.
[854]Legal, operational & ethical-morale problems.
[856]1) Maximu security & within Kubark only (e.g., how much doés Siragusa
[857]i ~ new know? ). imitation on number code clerks for enciph
[858]| deciphering. Guise of Louvide objection. Siglen not sefure enough.
[860]2) One focal point or search, control, training, ¢ se-officer & PA
[861]selection. Complete RDP authority in this foca//point mandatory, Overseas
[863]|
[865]{ one-man control base with own (non-Station) £ommo.,
[867]i
[869]3) Every operation to be rt idly case -offjeered; no silk-shirt PA's.
[870]4) Non-attributability: NoA itizens or American residents for
[871]direct action; possibly for approachAo foreign elements. No criminal who
[872]tainted by use by another Ameri agency, Use of case officers who can
[873]pass as foreigners -- and lim} ed offixial reference.
[875]5) No chain of connections permitting blackmail.
[877]6) Don't meet any selectér in house territoxy.
[879]i 7) Avoid discussion w/foreign officials until
[881]1 possibility of search
[882]through private citizens (e.g., QUWIN) has been wamined.
[884]8) Planning shoul include provision for blaming S viets (or Czechs)
[885]in case of blow. '/4 above essential.
[887]9) Exclude organization criminals, those with record of arrests, those
[889]who have engaged in several types of crime,
[891]i
[892]i
[894]RECEIVED F7
[895]IN 24 1975
[897]GIA
[899]ede mandennene Seite ones SIM BRED Bare NY
[901]SECRET
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[905]10) Corsicans rec
[907]ll) Former resistan
[909]13) All Kubark personnel
[910]14) Silverthorne & stable in
[911]15) What are limits on team
[912]ready to go,
[914]16) Danger of Standbys.
[916]ate vrei net nd Sot SORRY EOE atte tect nRh All te TE EC ONIN STAN eee mE
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[920]SECRET
[922]12) Period of testing, s rveillance, ete, for each
[924]volved should have
[926]or individuals
[928]SECRET
[930]mended. Sicilians could lead to/Mafia,
[932]personnel offer possibilitiey, (OSS archives, )
[934]‘selectee,
[936]ome CE experience.
[938]elected? No''team!" until
[940]oat
[942]SECRET
[944]Scd G- 25f a Exec Actions
[945]"The Magic Button"
[946]Narcotics Bureau
[948]"for a living!" RIS 201 cover
[950]Ae aS eh eRMImMRT a nee eget
[952]caution - Bankruptcy -- No star eyes -Jim A. Contradestinct from U-2
[953]Not a TSD problem —
[955]Apply brakes
[956]Last resort beyond last resort & a confession of weakness.
[958].-El Benefactor -- assumptions . ;
[959]Examples of 3 "wrong"
[961]Framework of Sid's job. _ Ledford
[962]Ehut R&D - memo.
[964]"Translating machines" - of E basic sounds project.
[965]pherious - (V with CB) .
[969]comment - Gear
[973]A
[975]: 26f. -- AS -- Fanforn - DCI Matter
[976]; . . _ No file _ .
[977]i ; . Never mentions word assassination,
[978]Select proper oern to run --
[980]1,
[982]2, Place a cover Max aso
[984]3, Security Rules B - WKH - AS-
[986]4, Guide leves ; Sid - Reserv.
[988]5. Last Resort - Brakes - ; Substitute - What next
[990]6. Noother agencies 4
[991]7, No projects or papers except per cover. Wie fy
[992]8. Principal agent ‘(Mankel) ? * oe of RECEWED FROM
[994]AF - Project draft LCH tested 1500 - from NB.°* _ a
[995]Mask spat rqm. stall AF project -,cler Dbieke | 2A 1975
[997]SECRET =si(‘itsé«CAA
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[1001]SECRET
[1003]9. Disposal -- ;
[1004]10. Targets who & where -- Must know before we can spot --
[1005]ll, Case officering :
[1007]12, Cover file - create to provide RIS or akbetobel it, - non Sov’
[1008]13. Note dangers of RIS counter action and monitor if they are
[1009]blamed -
[1010]Fd J list - Remember
[1012]RECEIVED FRI
[1014]ao 24 1975
[1016]CIA
[1018]peace mneen —* a
[1020]Cs
[1021]rr]
[1022]cD
[1023]mu
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