[1]14-00000
[3]104-10107-10183 | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
[5]( f
[7]SC-022.64-53
[9]‘Sucmery of Initial Missions
[10]perloa from 20 June to 10 July 1956 the Soviet Bloc air defenss”. _
[11]subjected ‘to eight penetrations of an unprecedented nature, seven >
[12]thin a period of only eight deys. It must be remerdered that
[13]5 the only basis of judging the performance of the Soviet
[15]Lite
[17]Ls important because it is clea = »recerial that |
[19]ry defeuss bust ness is conducted over JanéTines “and thus. nok
[20], conclusions may be drawn. from
[22]} these ere indicated as follows: :
[24]i. In spite of the fact that these missions came as 2 surprise,
[25]mone of them went undetected. ‘This is clear evidence that their
[26]r2car coverage extends above 72, ,C00! feat.
[28]~ 236
[31]14-0000
[33]5C-02164-58
[35]2. By 5 July 1956, the fourth fist %, the USSR was aware
[37]of the purpose of the missions and were taking counter action.
[38]Cne positive action was the standdow of civil flights while the
[40]p
[41]mission aircraft was over the USSR, and a second action which is
[42]b2lieved related is the moving of MIG-19 aircraft imto Eest
[43]trmaay and Poland on.7 July 1956. Also HIG-19's were moved
[44]inte Hungary at ahout this time. -
[45]erformance of the Soviet sysvem on the 5 July mission,
[46]indeed curious. While the action evident fraw Comm?
[47]ar an explanation which appears to fit the known Pacts
[48]fered as follows: As a result of the previous missions » the
[49]ts bad concluded the essential facts concerning the nissions,
[50]+, that they were for reconnaissance, that they flew zbove<65,000™~
[51]et, and that a penetration as deep as Moscow wes possible. They.
[52]obadly surmised that the 3 July mission wes headeé for Moscow when
[53]track appeared on a northeasterly heading. “The toss of the * |
[54]Brget whéi it entered Sovies territory wes provably deliberate and) )*
[55].the red herring" track returning to the west was either a dodge |‘
[56]/Or e-convenience to avoid broadcasting a track for ell the system ,
[57]'td ses that-a_/ "hostile or intruder" wes eoning over Moscow with no
[58]means available to.stop it. This idea is supported by the use.
[59]@ raid number assigned in the region just beyond the point
[61]ve the track had been "lost". In adai tion, the treck was not yo
[62]2oeled “hostile or intruder" when it ves broadcast after it
[63]pessed beyond Moscow. THe. reporting .o? the track when it did |
[64]Rar Was only by Moscow and it has been suggested that other oo \
[65]tions had been instructed not to broadeast the track. ‘Further, + may.
[66]¥ =ay nov be @ coincidence that the height broadcast was almost _ [
[67]cxectly half of the true altitude of the mission aircraft, but-en
[68]the text missions, four.days later, the altitude reporting was ..--- &
[69]\_Sonsisteatly above"50,000 feet. . CS ae
[71]CEI hy be OD be pe
[72]Q uit
[76]al
[79]("oy oe
[82]re
[84]Q
[85]a)
[87]ty a
[88]Gi
[89]QO
[91]y
[95]Qu
[97]a fty
[100]d ty
[102]q
[103].
[108]9 July 1956, in addition to the evident recogition of
[109]ight of the mission flights, tracking was better and
[110]he performance of the werning system was nuch improved.
[112]9+ “he next day, 10 July 1956, ‘the Soviet air defense warning }
[113]SYStSG closed a 3000 mile track with only tyo short periods of . ~
[114]*usion or track loss. Altitude reporting vas over 60,000 feat
[115]2 one plot passed 68,800 which was only 100 feet off target.
[117]6. The first cight missions proved that the air defense warning
[118]systen is deployed in dopth. (This was evident fran both the ‘continuity |
[119]OF treck and most foreéefilly fron the ELD date collected. Some 163: ~
[120]Va cepts of Soviet Bloc radars operating in the 3000 ne/s band were
[121]o asd by project ELIUT as follows: TOXEN-1331, WHIFT-37, GAGE-26,
[122]2 -37, Otner 30. These numbers cennot be equated to tn-
[124]a?)
[125]rb
[128]> Fg
[130]adar sets since the same redar nay be intercepted more than
[131]+ TOKEN sites were Located, including 213 new sites. Some
[133]a1 TOKEN signals were identified out aveileble information
[134]determination of location so that $+ must be con-
[135]ese signals inelude both known and new sites. Because
[136]imitetion of ELINT to the 3000 ne/s band and the Soviet ; !
[137]collocating radars on different frequencies the total
[139]of radars may be expected to be 2t.least double the numbar . to
[140]Ss. , . 7
[142]i
[146]fay 2)
[149] O
[151]ai
[153]Oo fu
[154]cr RS
[155]try
[156]tL
[157]i
[158]+H
[159]Q er
[161]R
[162]ct
[163]F
[165]ty pb by
[166]0
[169](3)
[173]|
[177]ch ty
[179]- 2h ne
[181]TOP SECRET — EIDER—CHESS
[184]on
[185]_ presente oF 1.
[188]SC-02164-58
[190]3
[192]S}
[193]-
[195]. 3102 and track loss seemed to be related to the >
[196]ar Ba TH BURDETS OF Tignters alt tnaovgn the saturation point
[197]azterminsd because of insufficient date.
[199]has not bd
[201]8. The question of radars for height finding, ‘the | capabilities
[202]of TOXEN in this role, the introduction oe ROCK CAKES end later
[203]acvelormients are discussed in enother section. It is believed,
[205]however, that these missions were & catalyst in the imbroduction
[207]cf ROCK CAKEs.
[209]- 25 -
[211]TOP SECRET — EIDER— CHESS