[1]DARAAN
[2]Iit04-10330-10778 | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
[4]al
[5]. ‘
[6]Ly .
[8]SECRET
[10]13 May 1998
[12]_ MEMORANDUMFOR: _ Executive Director .
[13]Assassination Records Review Board
[15]FROM: | -. J. Barry Harrelson
[16]: JFK Project Officer
[17]SUBJECT: CIA Proposal on Alias Documentation and
[18]Accommodation Addresses in Assassination -
[19]Records
[21]I. WU) Background and Recommendation
[23](C) Alias documentation includes materials carried on the person of any CIA
[24]otter 0 or foreign asset traveling and conducting business under a fictitious identity. .
[25]Aliases are widely used by CIA officers working under both official and non-official cover. :
[26]They are also used by those on TDY status traveling to or from Headquarters as well as
[27]between field stations. ,
[29]2. (S) This package contains five kinds of information relating to cover methods
[30]currently in use in connection with aliases:
[32]A) Foreign government forgeries (the Mexican and. Panamanian passports used by
[33]. David Morales under various aliases);
[35]B) US federal and state documents (social security cards, drivers licenses, and birth
[36]certificates);
[38]~ C) Business documents used with the prior agreement of the company, organization, or
[39]association they represent;
[41]D) Forged business documents;
[43]E) Accommodation addresses (“residences of record” for anyone working under alias).
[44]3. (S) Many of the specific forms of alias documentation represented in this
[46]package are identical to those used today by Agency officers and assets using aliases and
[48]operating under both official and non-official cover. Moreover, certain aspects of their
[50]use in support of non-official cover cause CIA particular concern in the event of
[51]disclosure:
[53]SECRET
[55]13-00000
[57]or SECRET
[59]e Use of non-official cover is expanding rapidly in response to changes in CIA targets ~
[60]following the collapse of the USSR.
[62]e The use by CIA of non-official cover and the details of how it is employed are less '
[63]well known than our use of official cover.
[65]© Some of our most uniquely valuable human intelligence comes from this method.
[67]© Non-official cover affords its user no diplomatic immunity. Since some of CIA’s most
[68]_ hostile targets necessitate the use of non-official cover, our officers and assets working
[69]against these targets run the risk of being arrested, imprisoned, or worse.
[71]4. (S) The likelihood of damage from disclosure of specific information. on alias
[72]documentation and accommodation addresses runs the gamut from “certain” to
[73]“unpredictable.” Based on past evidence, public release of references to the forged .
[74]Mexican and Panamanian passports would be virtually certain to draw a.reaction from
[75]those governments that would harm US diplomatic relations and deny CIA its use of a
[76]currently valuable tool. The probability of litigation from disclosure of business
[77]documents is also quite high.
[79]e The damage from release of 25--30 year-old addresses and specifics on seemingly
[80]innocuous pocket litter is less predictable. Nonetheless, it has broad implications for
[81]' both the current use of non-official cover and for the safety of individuals associated
[82]with these methods in the past, and therefore CIA can not afford to ignore it. To
[83]manage the risk, if denied the option of postponing the release, would require an
[84]extremely time consuming review of each piece of information on a case-by-case basis.
[86]5. _(U) None of the information being considered for release adds significantly to
[87]the historical record on the Kennedy assassination. The minimal added value from its
[88]release is small in comparison to the damage, both certain and potential, that would result.
[89]Since the cost-benefit ratio is so skewed, we recommend that release of specific
[91]information on alias documentation and accommodation addresses be postponed and that
[92]generic substitute language be used in its place.
[94]_ It. (OQ) Discussion of Potential Damage
[96]6 () Disclosure of information relating to the five categories discussed in
[97]paragraph 2 above can reasonably be expected to cause the following types of damage:
[99]a) Damage to diplomatic relations with Mexico and Panama;
[100]b) Litigation from private sector firms;
[102]c) Potential damage to a growing intelligence collection method;
[104]SECRET
[106]2
[108]13-00000
[110]a
[113]SECRET
[115]d) Potential physical danger to CIA officers and assets,
[117]e) Potential threats to CIA’s agreements with other US government entities.
[119]7. Category by category, the specific kinds of damage most likely to result from
[120]disclosure of the five types of information outlined in section 2 above are:
[122]=A) Foreign government forgeries.
[124](The Mexican and Panamanian passports carried by David Morales.)
[126]a) (S) Damage to US diplomatic relations with Mexico and Panama would
[127]' result from release of information on Morales’s passport documentation: In the past,
[129]CIA’s production and use of various countries’ passports, birth certificates, and other
[130]official documents have been done both with and without specific agreement from those
[131]countries. With respect to the documents in this package reflecting our use of Mexican
[132]passports, the latter was undoubtedly the case. Moreover, CIA still continues to provide
[133]its assets and officers with forged Mexican passports without the agreement of the
[134]Mexican government.
[136]e. The Mexican government has always been extremely sensitive to issues of national
[137]sovereignty and would almost certainly express official public resentment at CIA’s
[138]usurping of its unique authority by producing false passports and birth certificates of
[139]Mexican citizens.
[141](S) There-are concrete examples of past incidents involving disclosure which have
[142]resulted in strong censure and the threat of diplomatic action: In the aftermath of the
[143]Iranian takeover of the US Embassy in Tehran in 1978, among the papers the Iranians
[144]discovered were forged Belgian and West German identification documents including —
[146]“passports. Upon reading this in the Iranian media, Belgian intelligence officials summoned
[148].- our people and threatened that if all such documents were not destroyed immediately and
[149]the practice ended, there would be exceptionally dire consequences in the spheres of both
[151]_ ‘diplomatic relations and intelligence cooperation.
[153]e Besides the insult to its sovereignty, at least one additional strong factor in the Belgian
[154]government’s acrimonious represéntation was the desire to avoid any association
[155]with CIA, however spurious, of Belgian citizens living, working, or traveling
[156]abroad. ;
[158](S) The Germans also registered their ire in strong terms, noting that in using
[159]German passports outside the Warsaw Pact theater we had exceeded our negotiated right
[160]to reproduce their documentation for use by our officers. During this demarche, similar
[161]threats were made to end the liaison relationship with their intelligence service.
[163]SECRET
[165]3
[167]13-00000
[169]. . SECRET
[171]e Asaresult of such flaps, CIA has little recourse but to accede to direct demands that
[172]we cease using a given country’s documentation, which narrows our range of options
[173]for providing officers with operational aliases.
[175]= B) Federal and state documents
[176](Social security cards, FAA documentation, driver’s licenses, birth certificates)
[178]e) (C) Potential threat to CIA’s agreements with other US government entities.
[179]At present, sixteen states assist CIA in providing documentation for alias identities,
[180]including drivers licenses. There is an unwritten understanding with each that CIA will do
[181]all it can to protect the confidentiality of this agreement. Although the immediate damage
[182]from release of this would certainly be less severe than the harm done to US diplomatic
[183]relations from the release of information on passport forgery, these arrangements could be
[184]terminated if they receive too much publicity and State officials or politicians were publicly
[185]embarrassed.
[187]e Termination of any of such agreements would curtail CIA’s options for providing its
[188]officers with solid cover.
[190]7 =O) and D) Business documents.
[191](either forged or produced with prior negotiated agreement)
[193](Rotary club, record and book club membership, AAA, specific bank cards, travel club,
[194]Continental Insurance Co.)
[196]b) Litigation from private sector firms;
[197]_¢) Potential damage to a growing intelligence. collection method; and
[198]ad) Potential he sical danger to CIA officers and assets.’
[200]b) (O Litigation from private sector firms. The same probability of litigation
[201]applies to both forged documents and those produced with the permission of certain
[202]companies. Many of these firms conduct business abroad in a variety of political
[203]environments that range from friendly to hostile. For reasons relating to loss of revenue
[204]and physical threats to their employees and other assets, they cannot afford to have even |
[205]the public hint of an association with CIA, let alone official disclosure of this fact.
[207]© The likelihood of litigation from such disclosure would be high. C1A’s Office of
[208]General Counsel has on file a number of letters from private sector firms setting forth
[210]their right to take legal action in the event of the disclosure of their relationship with ©
[211]CIA.
[213]e. In the past, some firms have taken legal action against CIA for disclosure of an
[215]association that adversely affected their business.
[217]SECRET
[219]4
[221]13-00000
[223]*.
[225]a SECRET
[227]c) (S) Potential damage to a growing intelligence collection method. Firms
[228]which assist CIA by permitting the use of their documentation in support of non-official
[229]cover do so voluntarily and without remuneration. In addition, CIA generally requests
[230]that the companies sign secrecy agreements. ‘Therefore, the unilateral release by CIA of
[232]. information about this association would complicate future negotiations by creating the
[234]perception that we are an unreliable partner.
[236]e The official disclosure of one such secret arrangement, even at a 30-year remove, -
[237]would almost certainly be noted in the corporate board rooms of all firms that have an
[238]association with CIA.
[240](S) Release of information on private sector alias documentation would reduce
[242]' . CIA’s range of options for supporting its increasing use of non-official cover. .The
[243]’ magnitude of the threat this carries is unpredictable. Because of the versatility of non-
[245]official cover as well as its unique applicability to certain types of targets, CIA’s
[246]apprehensions about giving up information that could help adversaries are substantial.
[248]e Non-official cover is the most productive way to gather human intelligence on terrorist
[249]organizations, weapons proliferators, narcotics traffickers, members of international
[250]organized crime and money launderers, and countries with which we have no
[251]diplomatic relations. Almost all of our intelligence on weapons proliferation, for
[252]example, comes from NOC officers and assets.
[254]ad) (O Potential physical danger to CIA officers and assets. Adding to an
[256]adversary’s knowledge of specific forms of alias documentation used in non-official cover
[257]could help unmask CIA officers or assets by the profile of typical documentation CIA is
[258]known to carry. With the increased availability of sophisticated statistical analysis, the
[260]‘threat from “profiling” would increase exponentially as more information is released. This —
[262]is of particular concern when working against hostile targets such as terrorists and narco-
[263]traffickers.
[265]e Intelligence collection against targets like these requires a watertight alias
[266]documentation mechanism that allows our officers to operate as safely and freely as
[267]possible.
[269]= E) Accommodation addresses
[271]c) Potential damage’ to a growing intelligence collection method; and
[272]d) Potential physical danger to CIA officers and assets.
[274](C) Accommodation addresses were and stilt are used in support of a wide variety
[276]of covert operations involving both official and non-official cover. The potential damage
[278]SECRET
[280]5
[282]13-00000
[284]SECRET
[286]from disclosure of specific addresses relates both to present and past users as well as to
[287]those individuals who grant, or granted, CIA the right to use their addresses.
[289]The people who give us the right to use their addresses are in many cases not directly
[290]associated with CIA. They may be relatives of CLA employees or simply private
[291]citizens. Disclosure of addresses could complicate the search for individuals willing to
[293]assist CIA.
[295]The release of a specific accommodation address, even if it is no longer in use, could
[296]enable an adversary to make positive identifications of an entire series of aliases of
[298]individuals who used that address in support of their cover package.
[300]Conversely, an alias that is released can-be traced through local postal records toa
[301]corresponding accommodation address.
[303]It is possible to endanger those individuals, including foreign assets, known to have
[304]been associated with a given alias, even if the individual who bore the alias is no longer
[305]living.
[307]SECRET —