[1]oe
[3]1 ADANN a 4 . so. . ~ . * cot
[4]104-10069-10185 : [2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992),
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[12]0 ISP A | ani | a ae | : FROCESENG ‘
[13]‘ ee ey . re ow — 7
[15]| Chief, Task Force W (ee femes ess
[16]Tao 8 > Gay GERLFED .
[18]i
[22]Chief of Station, JMMWAVE
[24]Agreed Activities ree many
[26]REFERENCE: DIR-14742 jw --- i
[28]i
[29]i
[30]1. INTRODUCTION, As a follow up to reference, Haj. Watlington |
[31]arrived in Miami on 6 June 1962. After Maj. Watlington had an op- l
[32]portunity to discuss the local situation with Lt. Col. Carlos Causes ‘|
[33]‘the local ACSI representative, arrangerents were made for a lengthy i
[35]., session on the subject of Agreed Activities. It was agreed that
[36]this discussion would take place at 1000 hours on 7 June 1962 at a H
[37]JENMAVE safehouse facility. This meeting subsequently took place as |
[38]t]
[39]|
[40]|
[41]i
[43]crepe tatty A ETE LTA ALLTEL GCE TERI EI A
[45]RTT te ee ee
[47]_ scheduled and was participated in by Lt. Col. Causes, Maj. Watlington,
[48]Dudley R. JENTONS, Charles B..WIESINGER and Andrew K. REUTEMAN.
[49]The specific points which were outlined in this discussion are
[50]covered in the following paragraph.
[52]2. DISCUSSIONS. In the course of the 7 June 1962, conversations
[53]with ACSI representatives the following topics worthy of recording
[54]were discussed.
[56]y
[57]en emettanneenvecrercenrerner art
[59]0.
[61]a. Opa Locha Refugee Referral Procedures. ha).
[62]Jatlington made the point that in accordance with the |
[63]agrecrents which had been reached between ACSI and :
[64]KUBARK, local procedures were to be agreed upon in |
[65]order that ACSI might obtain refugee referrals fron
[66]Gpa Locka which could be used as a basis upon which to
[67]mount OB collection operations, Maj. Watlington under—
[68]scored the point that ACSI had no interest or charter
[69]to run other than OB collection operations. At the
[70]sane time if any of their operations produced intelli-
[71]gence on subject matter other than OB, this intelligence
[72]would be reported via existing ACSI reports chansels.
[73]REUTEMIAN indicated that JLAVAVE,acknowledged the validity |
[74]of ACSI's mission in the OB field, and we were therefore
[75]_. wAlling £9 42 merate fully in this regard. On the other
[76]_-Y pamared BeLliéved that it was essential that certain
[80]Suga optEh on
[82]TSG get. li: fy ee — ve ~)o =?
[83]faa pCa OPT “yy a , ersten ne -
[84]Som. WA Fold. = ° : tS oOeV _ .| 7
[86]. astribution: -
[88]3 - Chief, TFW
[90]MELIKRAATIRG FLE SL
[92]rare oas
[94]i - “of e
[96]mo a _ Co ackground Use Only E
[97]Oo ae = “ Oo Net Repreduce 2732 ;
[99]AGE SERGE a
[100]_7 5 BONTINUATION O8.° SREPATCH EMMAGOL ARO seyMebIA
[101]UFGA-4322
[103]| J OW picpareH
[105]ocofeguards bo built into any Opa Locka rqferral inorder
[106]that we could minimize the possibilities for duplication
[107]‘of effort and/or wire crosging. This concept was readily
[108]aceopted by Haj. Watlington, It did not, however, strike
[109]a totally responsive chord in Lt. Col. Causes. This was
[110]noted but in order to proceed with preliminary arrange-
[111]nents, REUTENAN put forth the proposal that ACSI register
[112]a list of ‘igent requirements with Opa Locka and that this
[113]‘Vast could then be used as a basis upon which refugee
[114]screenings could be conducted. It was suggested that Col.
[115]Kail would be the logical point of reference in Opa Locka f.
[116]through which the referral system could be managed. In |
[117]“this connection it was pointed out that once Col. Kail 2
[118]identified an individual whom he considered to ‘be pri- —~
[119]marily of ACSI interest, he could arrange for this indt-
[120]vidual to be referred to Lt. Col, Causes’ covert unit.
[121]At the same time Col. “ail would make arrangements to pass
[122], to KUBARK representatives at Opa Locka and to Station
[123]JMWAVE a copy of the Opa Locka debriefing of the individual
[124]who had been referred to ACSI. Upon receipt of this in- ;
[125]formation KUBARK representatives at Opa Locka and at
[126]Station JMWAVE would review the referral. If this review
[127]revealed that the individual was not of operational
[128]‘oan interest to JMWAVE and his primary access was not in fields
[129]Y other than OB, no objections would be expressed relative
[130]to ACSI retention and full exploitation of the body. Maj.
[131]Watlington expressed satisfaction with this proposal and
[132]“gtated that he would be prepared to discuss it further
[133]once he had an opportunity to personally review the func-
[134]tioning of the Opa Locka center. *
[135]an 4, Eel AgB eR Re woe by auctharUs. Agency Tew 6)
[136]t OY b. Antonio *CUESTA Valie. “Lorn 13 dune 1926. Lt.Col.
[137],{" Causes asked if wo could clarify the current status of
[138]« our relationship with Cuesta. As this name did not ring
[139]y a bell with any of the JHWAVE representatives, Lt. Col.
[140]Causes was asked for further details. This produced the
[141]ptatement that ACSI was interested in CucSta ‘and wanted
[142]to uso him in an infiltration cperaticn. ACSI had allegedly
[143]previously traced Cuesta with Station vliVAVE and had re-
[144]ceived the reply that’ KUBARK had been in touch with the
[145]individual but had terminated nim because he was unreliable.
[146]' in view of this response Lt,. Col. Causes wanted to know
[147]whether we would recommend the reuse of Cucsta by ACSI.
[148]We responded to this by stating that we would review our
[149]files and would forward a written reply to Lt. Col. Causes
[150]within tho noxt few days.
[152]pa :
[154]wa Mb f- PR GERD FR Re vidi by anctles WS shyeney Jom O!.
[156]cLaggificaTion
[158]BECRET
[160]eee OG AERTS ON REE ATR EEN EAM LEE ST OE TN CH ERIPST TE PISS PF AE
[163]STE
[165]22
[167]2 a ese mon pena, pete
[168]SMe Dn gee ey Poe
[172]ce. baureano *BATXYSTA Palla. Born 1 May 1935. ..Lt.
[173]Col, Causes asked i¥%We Stil retained an operational
[174]interest in Batistal If we did not ’ACSEY was interested-
[175]in using this individual in an infiltration operation and-
[176]a3 a resuit wanted JHVAVE'’s opinion as to Batista's
[177]eapability and reliability. We advised Lt. Col. Causes
[178]that we would check our files and would forward a written
[179]reply relative to Batista within a matter of a few days.
[181]Re ABUSE FR Re Woe 2 OTA REY §, cise ity Tene Ef
[182]a“ “: ad. Antonio *ORDONEZ Hernandez. Eorn 24 August 1918,
[183]Lt. Col, Causes asked if Wa Ware currently in touch with
[184]Ordonez. Ag this name rang a bell with RBUTEMAN we remy
[185]eponded by stating that7~Subject vas of interést to ual In
[186]this connection we indicated we were{willing to reexaning]s:,
[187]Our relationship with Ordeiez7in order to detérmine his ~ 4
[188]full potential or Capability, and if his capability was :
[189]‘greater in the OF field than in fialds which were of interest_-
[191]to us, we would certainly consider/ relinquishing our interest] aw |
[194]_ 3 rr Ce +3
[196]i
[199]° on ~~ oe
[201]SECRET. UFGA-4322 —
[203]Neen ee UE
[205]Lt. Col. Causes stated that he felt that ho had
[206]established his equity in Ordonez through the name
[207]trace procedure. Despite this, he had found that
[208]Ordonez had disappeared from circulation; and, there-
[209]fore, he assumed that we were debriefing this man.
[211]e. Third Country Diplomats. REUTEMAN asked the
[212]ACSI representatives whether they were currently in
[213]touch with any third country Giplomats. aj. Watlington
[214]stated thatKACSI had previously tried to harness they
[216]€apabilities of the_Spanish, Uruguayan and Canddian §
[217]diplomatic pouches ./ Coordination of these activities
[218]With KUBARK had resulted in ACSI's being denied the use
[219]of these facilities, As a result Maj. Watlington stated
[220]that at tho present time ACSI was not in touch with any
[221]third i Bieta, On the other hand, ACSI was
[223]idterested in pursuing the third country diplomatic
[225]channel ds a means of establishing communications with
[227]inside dssets. At this point Lt. Col. Causes stated
[229]that he was very disappointed at KUBARK's refusal to
[231]allow him to use the facilities of the{Spanish, Uruguayan’2 y
[232]or Canadian pouches}} ft was indicated that KUBARK under- —
[234]stood I”. Col. Catises' reaction; however, the KUBARK
[236]position was based on sound security principles and
[238]could not be altered. The additional explanations which
[240]were made relative to the security implications which
[242]were inherent in the use of third country diplomats and
[244]how misuse could affect long standing government to
[246]government or service to service agreements between
[248]ODYGKE and free world countries did not make any impact
[250]on Lt. Gol. Causes. This gentleman was predisposed to
[252]interpret KUBARA's refusal to ailow him to use certain
[253]diplomatic pouch -hanneis as a clear indication that
[255]Geof KUBANKS “primary responsibilities in the Hiand
[257]area was to restrict and inhibit ACSI operational activity.
[258]Gnce this attitude was identified no further attempts were
[259]made to persuade Lt. Coli. Causes that our actions had
[261]been taken in the best interests of‘ the intelligence
[262]community.
[266]£. Maritime tagiltwatien of ACSE Agents. A dis-
[267]cussion of thode Gupport services which KWEAIK might
[268]render to ACSY operations revealed that Lt. Col. Causes
[269]was still interested in having JMWAVE infiltrate two of
[270]his egents into PBRUMEN, Xn this connection the point
[271]was mado by ACSI that under optimum circumstances they
[272]would prefer that JMVAVE assume responsibility. for tho
[273]agents in. the lizami area and then deliver them through a
[274]Gecure mechanism to liavana. ff this were not possible
[275]ACSY would reluctantly accept infiltratibn of their agents
[276]into arly point in PBRUMEN, L¢e. Col. Causes was toid in
[277]very precise terns that JLWAVE would not undertake to
[278]infiltrate any of his agents into Havana. On the other
[279]hand, we would consider any proposal for the infiitration
[281]Gegernens EPAPER TES at ges OT
[285]of selected agents to a beach area in PBRUHEN, The point
[286]was rade that in this connection Lt. Col. Causes had to
[287]understand that our maritime capabilities were limited
[288]and we were currently committed to the full exploitation
[289]of these assets for at ieast six weeks in advance. As a
[290]result any operational plan which he might subnit to us
[291]should be keyed to the agsumption that approximately siz
[292]to eight ‘weeks would paGs before we could realistically
[293]consider the servicing of his request. Lt. Col. Causes
[295]agreed to project his operational plans within this Yrane
[296]of reference. .
[298]e.
[301]RTITUATION OF
[302]“DISPATCH”
[304]“GLAGDIFICATION = * Posarcts GYMOL AKD FeRanER
[306]|
[308]SECRET UFGA-4322
[310]. Ge Documentation. A discussion of the documentation —
[311]problem réiative to agent infiltrations revealed that at
[313]* the ponent - ACSI aid not have any.documentation problems
[314]which they felt warranted discussion at this session,
[316]. h. ' Coordinatioa Forms. The discussion of opsra~
[317]tiopal coordination revealed that ACSI was willing for
[318]JLWAVE to coordinate locally those operational. proposals
[319]which might be received from.Lt. Col. Causes. Once this
[320]coordination was effected and if there were disagreement,
[321]then the operation could be reforred to the Washington ;
[322]headquarters of both ACSI and JMWAVE, Maj. Watlington . >
[323]stated that the forms for effecting coordination in ac- .
[324]cordance with procedures which had been agreed upon at
[325]Washington would be sent to both JMWAVE and the ACSI unit
[326]in Miami in the near future. In view of this Maj. .
[327]Watlington suggested that we -not initiate the coordination
[328]mechanism until these forms were on hand circa 1 July 1962.
[330]ee et a
[331]Po Bes
[333]comes
[334]ate
[338]ntetets
[339]pest
[341]i. W/T Assets. The discussion of the use of W/T
[342]facilities in terms of PBRUMEN operations revealed that
[343]the Miami ACSI unit did not have any W/T assets in
[344]PBRYMEN at this time. On the other hand, Lt. Col. Causes
[345]was’ interested in establishing W/T assets in PBRUMEN. In . +]
[346]view of Ghis he asked if JMWAVE would continue to assess,
[347]polygraph and train those individuals that ACSI thought
[348]wore suitable W/T candidates, It was indicated that we
[349]were certainly prepared to review all appropriate cases
[350]and would render whatever support was required. This then
[351]resulted in a discussion of whether JMWAVE would be willing
[352]to monitor ACSI W/T transmissions from PBRUMEN in those
[353]instances where the W/T operator had not been assessed,
[354]polygraphed or trained by KUBARK. We indicated that we
[355]would be glad to moniter,such transmissions if we were
[356]told in advance of the date, time and frequencies on which
[357]the broadcasts were to be made. This then led to a dis-~-
[358]cussion of whether JMWAVE would be willing to transmit
[359]C/V messages for ACSY agents. Here again, we stated that
[360]we would favorably concider any requests for C/V trans-
[361]missions providing that we knew the content of the message,
[362]the identity of the agent who was to receive it, and the
[364]« agent's location and equipment which he might be using.
[365]Lt. Col. Causes stated that in view of this discussion we
[366]could anticipate that he would be levying requirements on
[367]us in the near future for support in the W/T field,
[369]7
[370]'
[372]7
[373]4
[376]Hy
[377]'
[380]TIL BONE TO" AMO Tg NGOS SE TRA eh er eee
[382]j. Secret Writing. A discussion of 3/W teéhniques
[383]revealed that TY a réquest for the issuance of S/W were
[384]recolived from their Hianil representative it would be re-
[385]viewed, and if ACSY approved the operation KUBARK would
[386]be asked to issue a system. If JMWAVE agreed via local
[387]coordination that the operation in question required the
[388]use of B/W, then this recommendation would be cabled to
[389]our Washington Headquarters where coordination would be
[390]effected with ACSY. Once this was accomplished, KUBARK
[391]Washingtgen would cable to JHWAVE the number of the system
[392]which was\to be issued. JMWAVE would then issue the
[393]system to the ACSI representative in Miami.
[395]ye
[398]3. COHMENT, At the conclusi6a of the above discussion arrange-
[399]nents were made for lunch, but Lt. Col, Causes chose not to partici-
[400]pate in the luncheon session. During -the luncheon conversation
[401]Haj. Watlington indicated that he did not believe that Lt. Col.
[403]. Causes would cooperate within the spirit of the DCID's. As a result
[404]he asked that JMWAVE be extremely patient with ACSI until such time -
[405]as Lt. Col. Causes retired and could be replaced. Maj. Watlington
[407]t cn
[413]Wty ais
[417]TGGpininanaMON 6 GP
[419]BicAveN a SECRET. UFGA-4322
[421]indicated that the retirement was scheduled to take place. at the
[422]end cf September 1962, At the end of the luncheon session ar-
[423]rangonents wero made for JENTONS to take Maj. Watlington on a ~
[424]tour of Gpa Locka. Based on this tour additional discussions
[425]wore to be held with Maj. Watlingzon.particularly in regard to
[426]the development of proceduves for referral of agents to ACSI
[427]from the Opa Locka flew.
[429]4. OPA LOCKA, Maj. Watlington and JENTONS subsequently Hoe
[430]went out to the interrogation center at Opa Locka. Here they —_—
[431]had an interview with Col. Kail, “the tenor of which was, on the fo
[432]part of Maj. Watlington, to assure himself that the ACSI repre-
[433]sentative, Francasi, was having adequate access to operational 7
[434]leads. Col. Kail said that operational leads were shared ac- . Hot
[436], cording to their abilities between the KUBARK representative and fo:
[437]the, ACSI man. However, there were occasional difficulties in
[438]assuring that the men best qualified received the body in question.
[439]Yn addition, he said KUBARK occasionally pulled a man out of the boo:
[440]Center without his completing the full treatment which precluded —_
[441]the ACSI representative's getting his hands on someone who might x
[442]be well qualified for their operations. Maj. Watlington believed
[443]that assurance that the ACSI representative got a fair deal .
[444]night be achieved through a more complete briefing of Col. ‘a
[445]Trudencio Ulibarri, who is in charge of the preliminary screening
[446]so that he would more fully understand what was needed. JENTONS I -
[447]said that this would be a very good idea, but that it would be
[448]better if it were a dual briefing with a KUBARK representative
[449]belng present as well. Maj. Watlington said that he would ask
[450]his headquarters for permission to have such a briefing given.
[451]Col, Kail expressed his opinion that the assignment of JENTONS ;
[452]to formal liaison with the ACSI representatives would do much to ho:
[453]eliwinate present difficulties and all present echoed this pious HF
[454]thought. fo:
[458]5. AGREEMENT, When JENTONS turned Maj. Watlington over to sag
[459]Lt. Col, Causes after the meeting at Opa Locka, the two ACSI
[460]representatives said that they believed that, for the time being,
[461]it would be better to continue the system as at present, pending
[462]JENTONS' permanent arrival at the beginning of July 1962. As. Lt.
[463]Col, Causes is obviously skeptical about the outcome, this was
[464]agreed to as a stopgap measure,
[466]END OF DISPATCH
[468]oe
[471]“5
[472]be,