[1]178-10004-10087, 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
[2]° JTK Assassination Svstcm Datt: SIZ 77201
[4]Identification Form
[6]Agency Information
[8]AGENCY: WILDEROTTE
[9]RECORD NUMBER: — 178-10004-10087 .
[11]RECORD SERIES: ASSASSINATION-RELATED MATERIALS
[13]AGENCY FILENUMBER: ASSASSINATION-RELATED MATERIALS (3)
[15]Document Information
[17]ORIGINATOR: CIA
[18]FROM: CARL, OFFICE OF THE DD/S&T
[19]TO: BUCHEN, PHILIP
[21]TITLE : [Restricted]
[23]DATE: 07/10/1975
[24]PAGES : 17
[26]SUBJECTS :
[27]CIA
[28]ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES
[29]CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS
[31]DOCUMENT TYPE: REPORT
[32]CLASSIFICATION: — Secret
[33]* RESTRICTIONS: = Consulted
[34]CURRENT STATUS: = Withhold
[35]DATE OF LASTREVIEW: — 08/06/1993
[37]OPENING CRITERIA :
[39]COMMENTS : Transmittal memo and 15-page report.
[42]7
[46]v9.1 . .
[47]HY 50955 Doecld:32112749 Page 1
[49]od 10 July 1975
[50]DATE: __ a
[52]Office of the DD/SeT
[54]TO: Mr , Phillip Buchen
[55]178-10004-10087
[57]SUBJECT: Attached Report
[59]. REMARKS:
[61]Phil:
[63]I stressed objectivity and tried to assure
[64]that no persons who were potentially a’ party
[65]to the activities in question had any
[66]opportunity to destroy information or material
[68]which might be related,
[70]My Associate Deputy Director, Dr, Sayre Stevens,
[71]was the prime investigator with technical
[73]advice from *Dr..«'-FomNevison, an MD with an
[74]outstanding research background but hired by
[76]Photocopy
[77]from
[78]Gerald R. Ford Library
[81]Be GG ct aio oe sancerctcotopenaretionneyaae gba
[82]BES APSE ond AKC Suna Sverre weshcetmarioatrie fn
[84]HW 50955 Docld: 32112749 Page 2?
[86]CIA only a couple of years ago and could not
[87]possibly have had any prior knowledge or
[88]involvement. Additionally, I used personnel
[89]from my own staff to assure that compilation of
[90]inventory, etc. was done in presence of people
[91]representing me, who again could have had
[93]no prior involvement.
[95]As I noted earlier, we are continuing our
[96]investigation internally as well as jointly
[97]with DOD. We will keep you informed.
[99]Photocopy
[100]from
[101]Gerald R. Ford Library
[103]HY 50955 Docld:32112749 Page 3
[105]SENSITIVE . SEBRE}
[107]SUMMARY REPORT ON CIA INVESTIGATION OF MKNAOMI
[109]Project Discovery.
[111]The initial identification of the relationship between the CIA and the
[112]Army Biological Laboratory at Fort Detrick as a possible questionable activity
[113]requiring further investigation occurred in late April of this year. It
[114]resulted from information provided by a CIA officer not directly associated
[115]with the project in response to. the repetitive appeals of the DCI that all
[116]past activities which might now be considered questionable be brought to the
[117]attention of Agency management. .As a result of the information provided by him
[118]and by two other officers identified as having some awareness of the project,
[119]it became clear that further investigation of the matter was in order. The
[120]three identified the project at.Fort. Detrick as having involved the/development
[121]of BW and possibly CW agents and associated dissemination systems that were
[123]suitable for clandestine use against human targets. They moreover identified letha
[125]Concern about’ these assertions was heightened because the A/DDS&T had noted.
[127]agents as among those involved in the project.
[129]in a recent review of the 1963 IG Survey of the Technical Services Division (TSD)
[130]that approximately $90,000 in that current fiscal year was spent at |Fort Detrick
[132]"for the maintenance of a BW capability". This statement appeared so important
[134]that a quick check was made to determine its significance. In response to
[135]questions about the activity, the cognizant officer in TSD -- now the Office of -
[136]Technical Service (OTS) -- reported that a small effort had been carried on at
[137]Fort Detrick, but that it related to the development of incapacitants and BW/CW
[138]E2 IMP DET CL 26895
[140]Photocopy
[141]‘ from
[142]Gerald R. Ford Liteary
[144]HW 50955 Docld:32112749 Page 4
[146]De ALA ntl ean e otN te
[149]Photocopy
[150]from ;
[151]Gerald R. Ford Library
[153]detection and did not carry the serious implications of the IG's report. It had
[155]in any event been terminated some years ago. The A/DDS&T was satisfied with this
[157]response. When new and more disturbing information about the nature of the Fort
[159]Detrick activity emerged, however, the words of the IG Survey tended to give it
[161]credibility. Thus, late in April 1975 a search was begun for any records or other
[163]information available on the project. Difficulties were immediately encountered
[164]because the project cryptonym could not be identified. The search for records
[166]of fund transfers to Fort Detrick did ultimately produce information in that
[168]regard, however, and checks by the Office of Security on one of the individuals -
[170]identified as having been involved in Fort Detrick activities did provide the
[172]MKNAOMI cryptonym. This enabled OTS to recall the proper files from Recards
[174]Center; two MKNAOMI files were retrieved.. Some additional information was also.
[176]produced from the Office of Logistics files. This collection of material largely
[178]confirmed the nature of the project as reported by the informants and identified
[179]q a number of people involved in the activity. Additional cause for concern _
[180]resulted from the association of several of these people with specific. assassinatic
[181]plans as revealed in the IG's report on that activity.
[183]A major concern after the discovery of the records involved the disposition
[184]of a stockpile of BW agents and toxins maintained by Fort Detrick for possible
[185]Agency use. It was not known whether or not these materials had been destroyed
[186]along with the Army's BW stockpiles in response to Presidential Directives of
[187]November 1969 and February 1970. An unsigned memo raising the question of the
[188]disposition of Agency materials maintained by Fort Detrick posed the option
[189]of having it stored in a commercial laboratory. It was the impression of those
[190]in OTS who were familiar with the -project that the material had in fact been
[191]destroyed but no records confirming it could be found. In an attempt to find
[193]such confirmation, laboratory storage facilities in OTS were searched and in the
[195]y)
[197]HW 50955 Docld: 32112749 Page 5
[199]course of that search about 11 grams of shellfish toxin and 6 mg of cobra venom
[200]~~ but none of the other materials -- were discovered.
[202]Subsequent to the decision in late April that a full investigation of the
[204]Ft. Detrick project was needed, all information uncovered was passed to the OCI,
[206]wee
[208]handling Intelligence Community investigation matters. In June, Senator Church
[209]was informed by Rod Hills of the White House that a sensitive activity was under
[211]investigation.
[213]Sources of Information.
[215]This summary report on the activity is based upon an investigation utilizing:
[216](1) the files and documents uncovered as a result of the initial search which are
[217]limited and contain only a small? number of Agency-originated documents; (2) the
[218]material found in OTS storage which includes the shellfish toxin and several].
[219]pieces of delivery hardware; (3) interviews voluntarily given by current Agency
[220]employees who had some knowledge of the project and by a number of retired
[221]employees indicated by the records as having been more deeply involved at stages
[222]of particular interest. (Included in the latter category are
[223]Tom Karamessines, Cornelius Roosevelt, RayxTreichler, and Nathan Gordon); (4).
[224]information contained in the iG‘s Report on assassination Pianning and (5)
[225]information developed by a DOD investigation initiated as a result of conversa-
[226]tions with the White House about the matter; this information was only recently
[228]received and has not been widely incorporated in this report, however.
[230]Special Operations Division of Fort Detrick.
[232]The Agency association with Fort Detrick involved the Special Operations
[233]Division (SOD) of that facility. This Division was apparently responsible for
[235]3
[237]2228 RE Photocopy
[238]SEEN Py from
[239]° Gerald R. Ford Library
[241]HY 50955 Docld:32112749 Page 6
[243]we)
[245]sp
[246]pare
[250]mel
[252]developing special applications for BW agents and toxins. The principal customer
[253]of its activities appears to have been the U.S. Army Special Forces. Its concern
[254]vas both with the development of suitable agents and delivery mechanisms for
[255]Special use in paramilitary situations. These applications clearly included
[256]one-on-one Situations in which clandestine delivery was a concern. Both standard
[257]BW agents and biologically derived toxins were investigated by the Division.
[258]Discussions with former Fort Detrick employees indicates that SOD was first
[259]established as a distinct, highly secure activity within Fort Detrick in about
[260]1948, though no records. going back that far have been found. The Division was
[262]_abotished in 1970 or 1971 as the Fort Detrick operation was terminated.
[264]CIA Relationships with SOD.
[265]The CIA relationship with SOD was formally established in May 1952 through
[267]a memorandum of agreement with the Army Chief Chemical Officer for the performance
[269]| of certain research and development in the laboratory facilities of the Special
[270]Operations Division of the Army Biological Laboratory at Fort Detrick. The animus
[271]for establishing this relationship seems to have been a belief in OTS that the
[272]special capabilities of the Fort Detrick group and its access to biological
[273]materials of all sorts provided the Agency with expertise and capabilities which
[274]were appropriate to its function and not otherwise available.. Discussions
[275]indicate that the perception of the requirement for such capabilities was tied to.
[277]. earlier: OSS experience. Initial funding was at the $200,000 a year level which
[278]grew to a high point in FY 1958 of $390,000 and then dwindled to $75,000 a year:
[279]in the late 1960's. Though there appear to be some gaps in available funding
[281]records, total Agency funding in the period from FY 1953 through FY 1970 is
[283]GEESE, Pty
[284]wide Het from
[285]Gerald R. Ford Library
[287]HY 50955 Docld:32112749 Page 7
[289]farsa]
[291]estimated to have been somewhat more than $3 million. These funds were
[292]apparently used to generally augment the level of effort undertaken by SOD.
[293]Agency requirements for specific R&D were not levied in any programmatic way,
[294]but rather the Agency identified particular work being done by SOD as part of its
[295]program supporting the Army Special Forces as being of interest and then levied
[296]requirements for the customizing of such developments for Agency use. Through
[297]the course of years, Agency objectives in the project became better defined.
[298]Thus a project approval memo of 1967 identifies the four functional categories
[299]of project activity:
[301]a. Maintenance of a stockpile of incapacitating and lethal ©
[303]agents in readiness for operational use;
[305]b. Maintenance, assessment and evaluation of a designated
[307]balance of biological and chemical disseminating systems for
[309]operational readiness;
[311]c. Adaptation and testing of a non-discernible microbloinoculator
[313](a dart device suitable for the clandestine and imperceptible
[315]inoculation with BW/CW agents) to determine compatibility with
[317]various materials and to assure that the microbioinoculator
[319]cannot be identified structurally or easily detected upon a
[321]detailed autopsy; and
[323]d. Provide technical support and consultation on request to meet
[325]ad hoc requirements related to offensive and defensive BW/CW.
[326]In the later years the activities dwindled to the point of simply maintaining
[327]a stockpile of agents and delivery systems for possible Agency use.
[329]5
[331]. hi
[332]SEG0ET o
[333]Gerald R. Ford Library
[335]HY 50955 Docld:32112749 Page 6
[337]SECRET
[339]Project Management within CIA.
[341]From its outset the project was characterized by a compartmentation that
[342]was extreme even by CIA standards. Only two or three Agency officers at any
[343]given time were cleared for access to Fort Detrick activities. This work was
[344]managed first within the Biology Branch and later in the Chemistry Branch of
[345]TSD. Because of the sensitivity of the activity, queries by operations officers
[346]as to the availability of materials and delivery systems of the type being
[347]developed at Fort Detrick were automatically turned away by TSD unless initial
[348]approval for contact had been given by the Deputy Director for.Plans. Even
[349]when this was the case, the Chief of TSD often referred the operations-officer
[350]directly to one of the cleared officers dealing with Fort Detrick and was never
[351]informed as to the nature of the discussions. ~ This method of procedure has’ been
[352]confirmed both through interviews and by the IG report on assassination planning.
[353]No written records were kept. . Though some CIA-originated documents have been
[354]found in the project files, it is clear that only a very limited documentation
[355]of activities took place. No records on such things as material control, receipt,
[356]delivery, destruction, etc. can be found. No documents relating to any possible
[357]operational use of the material have been found. The files as they exist are quite
[358]different from those normally maintained in the course of a typical CIA R&D
[359]project. As noted above, funding to the project was provided simply on the basis
[360]of augmenting the level of effort established by Army funding. There appears
[361]to have been no relation of funding to specific tasking, nor cam any strict
[362]accounting of funds on the basis of effort expended in the Agency's behalf be
[363]found. Project officers with whom discussions were held stated that the funding
[364]was simply provided to maintain the availability to the Agency of the capabilities
[366]6
[368]ee Photocopy
[369]SED BE i fom
[370]Geraid R. Ford Library
[372]HW 50955 Docld: 32112749 Page 9
[374]| EEE
[376]of SOD. Finally, there is little evidence of much specific program definition
[378]on the part of the Agency. Though occasional specific requests for material
[380]or for investigations relating to the solution of a hypothetically posed
[381]operational problem can be found, the Agency with one or two exceptions through
[382]the years appears to have ridden on a program generated internally by SOD largely
[383]on the basis of Special Forces requirements. There are one or two exceptions
[385]which will be discussed below.
[387]Activities of Peculiar CIA Interest.
[389]Though discussions with people associated with the project reflect an
[390]overriding interest in incapacitants, particularly in later years, available
[391]records make it clear that CIA interests included maintaining a stockpile of
[392]lethal materials and delivery systems. The evidence indicates that the Agency
[393]relied upon the use of specific BW agents and toxins being investigated as a
[394]normal part of the Army's BN program. However, directions were given to
[395]investigate such matters as agent stability over varying periods of time, the
[396]Suitability of specific agents for preparation in dry form, the development of
[397]dart coatings, and the preparation of materials in a form suitable for dusting of
[398]clothes, pillows, etc.
[400]Primary Agency interest seemed to. relate to the development of dissemination
[401]equipment to be used with a standard set of agents kept on the shelf. A number of
[402]such dissemination ‘devices appear to be peculiarly suited for the type of clandesti
[403]use one might associate with Agency operations. Some of these were included among
[404]hardware stored for the Agency at Edgewood Arsenal subsequent to the closure of
[406]SOD: attache cases rigged to disseminate an agent into the air, a cigarette
[408]7
[409]Sebnky
[410]Photocopy
[411]from
[412]Geraid R. Ford Library
[414]HW 50955 Docld:32112749 Page 10
[416]case rigged to disseminate an agent when lighted, a fountain pen dart launcher,
[418]“an engine head bolt designed to release an agent when heated, a fluorescent
[419]light starter to activate the light and then release an agent, etc. Available
[420]records do not indicate whether or not all these were developed specifically for
[421]the CIA, though. the DOD investigation has identified the head bolt device as
[422]falling into such a category. The easy association of this equipment with
[423]specific Agency requirements because of its nature is apt to be misleading,
[424]however. At a meeting in June 1952, at the very outset of the Agency's associa-
[425]tion with SOD when CIA representatives stated they-as yet had no specific re-
[426]quirements, a list of SOD priorities for work on dissemination devices was
[427]provided. This dissemination list included such things as cigarettes, chewing
[428]gum, cigarette lighters, wrist watches, fountain pens, rings, etc. Presumably
[429]work on these devices was already underway in response: to Army Special Forces
[430]requirements. Nevertheless, the Agency clearly showed an interest in such devices
[431]and levied requirements for the special preparation of some. .
[433]One- development peculiarly associated. with the CIA was the “microbioinoculator
[434]which was an extremely small dart device which could be fired through clothing to
[435]penetrate the skin so as to inoculate him with an agent. of some sort without the
[436]target's perception of being hit. An added fillip to this development was the
[437]requirement that no indications of the use of such a device be discernable in
[438]the course of autopsy. A large amount of Agency attention was given to the
[439]problem of incapacitating guard dogs. Much of the equipment delivered to. the
[440]Agency and some of the testing undertaken by it involved a dart delivery system
[442]carrying dog incapacitants, and an antidote used subsequently to restore the dog
[444]8
[445]SebEET “Photocopy
[446]from
[448]Geraid R. Ford Library
[450]HW 50955 Doeld:32112749 Page 11
[452]to normal activity. Though most of the dart launchers used in these develop-
[453]ments were developed for the Army, the Agency did request the development of a
[454]smal] hand-held dart launcher for its peculiar needs.
[456]Clearly a lot of work was done on human incapacitation. OTS apparently
[457]received continuing requests for safe, effective and rapidly acting, incapacitat-
[458]ing devices. Much work was done in trying to use the dart system for such
[459]purposes, but real success was never actually achieved. Since larger amounts
[460]of appropriate agent are required to incapacitate a human than to kin] him, no
[461]scheme was developed for introducing sufficient amounts. through the use of darts.
[462]Attempts were made to solve this problem increasing the area of the darts
[463]available for coating and for making a dart which would dissolve in tissue
[464]which could thereby introduce more material into the system. Work on this pro-
[465]ject was underway when the association with SOD ended and Edgewood Arsenal
[466]endeavored to complete the project using unexpended Fort Detrick funds. Success
[467]Was not achieved, however. One reason for the preoccupation of those involved in
[468]the project with the incapacitant problem may well. have been the substantially
[469]greater difficulty of solving it when compared to developing lethal mechanisms.
[471]Substantial work was also done for the Agency in the development of spoilants
[472]for. agricultural products, biological materials for the ‘contamination of petroleum
[473]stores, and agents for use in the destruction of electronics, optical systems,
[474]structural materials, etc. At times in the history of the project, requirements
[476]for such materials as these were apparently very high on the Agency's list.
[478]ey an a Photocopy
[479]Sebhe : ton
[481]Gerald R. Ford Library
[483]HW 50955 Docld:32112749 Page 12
[485]SEGRET
[486]Shellfish Toxin.
[488]By the late 1960's, a stockpile of some 15 to 20 different BN agents and
[489]toxins was maintained on a regular basis by SOD for possible Agency use. The
[490]supply included such agents as food poisons, infectious viruses, lethal botulinum
[491]toxin, paralytic shellfish toxin, snake (krait) venon, Microsporeum gypseum which
[492]produces severe skin disease, etc. Varying amounts of these materials ranging
[493]from 100 grams to 100 milligrams were maintained.
[495]As noted above, with the Presidential Order requiring the destruction of
[496]Army BW and toxin stockpiles, the question was raised as to the disposition of
[497]Agency materials. Though specific accounting for each agent on the list: is not
[498]on hand, DOD indicates that, with the likely exception of. the shellfish toxin,
[499]all of these materials were in fact destroyed by SOD personnel.
[501]The shellfish. toxin -- along with 8 milligrams of cobra venom -- was found
[502]by David Boston, currently Chief of the Chemistry Branch, in Vault B10. in the
[503]basement of South Building which houses OTS. This vault is a lightly used
[504]laboratory area and historically associated with the Biology and Chemistry
[506]“Branches of OTS. It has been regularly used for the storage of dangerous materials
[507]of various types. In past years, the combination to the vault had been available .
[508]only to the Chief and Deputy Chief of the Chemistry Branch and their secretary.
[509]More recently, the combination had been given to other members of the Chemistry
[511]_ Branch as well. With the discovery of the material on 20 May, however, the
[512]combination was changed and is now available only to the Chief of the Chemistry
[513]Branch, his secretary, and OTS security officers. Qn 13 June the vault was put
[515]under 24-hour guard.
[517]Photocopy
[518]IRE 3, 6E> es Th
[520]Re Ee) from
[521]a Geraid R. Ford Library
[523]HW 50955 Docld:32112749 Page 13
[525]SECRET
[527]The freezer in which the toxin was found is located under one of the.
[528]work benches in the laboratory. The Fort Detrick material was the only thing
[529]in the freezer and was in two one-gallon cans along with several smaller con-
[530]tainers. There were no labels on the gallon cans, but on top of each was a
[531]folded piece of paper with pertinent information about the contents. This
[532]information provided the types and amounts of material and the date on which
[533]it was put into storage. The shellfish toxin was, according to this information,
[534]put into the freezer in February 1970, and the cobra venom, in February 1961.
[536]The shellfish toxin was packaged in several different forms including two
[537]individual doses in tablet form. .
[539]The discovery of the material was a result of repeated attempts by Boston
[540]to determine what disposition had been made of Agency BY materials held by Fort
[541]Detrick. In making one more check on this, he called Nate Gordon, a former Chief
[542]of the Chemistry Branch, who retired in September 1972, and asked him if- he knew
[543]what the disposition had been. Gordon stated that he thought that perhaps some
[544]of the shellfish toxin might not have been destroyed and was in storage in OTS.
[545]In following up on this lead, Boston found the material in the freezer.
[547]Though hard to understand, such material could in fact be stored for so long
[548]without anyone being aware of it. The laboratory is no longer used for the type
[549]of work for which it was originally built and had become a disordered storage
[550]facility. There have been no requirements for use of the freezer in the inter- °
[551]vening years and. it is indeed possible that no. occasion arose to. investigate the
[553]contents of the freezer. There have been no reported functioning difficulties
[555]with the freezer during this entire period.
[557]1
[559]Photocopy
[560]from
[561]Gerald R. Ford Litrary
[563]HY 50955 Docld:32112749 Page 14
[565]After finding the shelifish toxin in the vault, a complete inventory was
[566]taken. A large number of dangerous chemicals or drugs of various types were
[567]found. These materials relate to a number of past programs of TSD, including
[568]the drug project, the development of harassment materials for crowd control or
[569]meeting disruption, crop contamination programs, etc. Small amounts of several
[570]other Jethal preparations were found. Two of these are known to have been
[571]obtained by the Agency for testing at Fort Detrick. Nothing is known about three.
[572]others. Aiso found were a number of L-Pills issued to agents, and formerly to U-2
[573]pilots, for suicide purposes in the event of capture.
[575]Boston contended that he had no recollection of the shellfish toxin having
[576]been obtained from Fort Detrick and stored in the laboratory. On 30 June, dis-
[577]cussions were held with Dr. Gordon in an interview at which Boston was also presen
[578]Gordon stated that the toxin had in fact been called back from Fort Detrick and
[579]stored in the laboratory on the basis of his own decision which resulted from -
[580]conversations with Boston. It was their belief that the cost and difficulty of
[581]isolating the shellfish toxin were so great that it simply made no sense to have
[582]it destroyed. Apparently no one, including the Chief of TSD, was told of this
[583]decision or the fact that the material had been delivered by Fort Detrick. As
[584]Gordon recalled, this took place prior to -his being told by the Chief of TSD to
[585]inform Fort Detrick that destruction of the material on the inventory list should
[586]take place. Boston who was present during this discussion took.no issue with
[587]Gordon's account. Neither could recall precisely how the material was delivered
[588]to OTS, but the DOD investigation indicates that it was delivered to Boston by
[590]someone from Fort Detrick.
[592]Photocopy
[594]Rp. from
[595]SEGRE: Gerald R. Ford Library
[597]HW 50955 Docld:32112749 Page 15
[599]Gordon was certain that the shellfish toxin in storage in OTS is the same
[600]toxin as that listed on the inventory. There is, however, a discrepancy between
[601]the amount in storage as calculated from the labels and the amount shown on the
[602]inventory. Since the material in storage is in several different forms and
[603]complete reliance is placed upon labeling, however, no real discrepancy may
[604]actually exist.
[606]Discussions with Karamessines have established that he and Helms were
[607]aware of the disposition question and that a clear decision had been made that
[608]the Agency stockpile should be destroyed by the Army and that, im accordance with
[609]Presidential Directives, the CIA should get completely out of the BW business.
[611]The explanation given by Gordon as to how the shellfish toxin came to be
[612]in Agency storage is fully consistent with other available information. He
[613]stated that the material was always handled with extreme care. Undoubtedly it
[614]was simply transferred from one freezer to another and in his view was continually
[615]under adequate control. He is certain that nothing was done with it subsequent
[616]to its delivery and prior to his departure from the Agency in 1972. Boston has
[617]given assurance that it was untouched subsequent to that.
[619]After the discovery of the material, OTS was told to investigate ways in
[620]which they could safely dispose of it with full documentation. Edgewood Arsenal.
[621]was contacted and arrangements were made to deliver the material to Edgewood for
[622]disposal on 11 June 1975. The disposal was to be witnessed by a representative
[623]from the IG's office. On the day prior to the scheduled delivery, these arrange-
[624]ments were cancelled, however, because the DD/S&T wished to consider further
[625]ways of insuring that the destruction of the material could not be later
[627]13
[629]SEGRET “on
[631]Gerald R. Ford Library
[633]HY 50955 Docld:32112749 Page 16
[635]SECRET
[636]misinterpreted. Upon informing Edgewood Arsenal of this decision, Boston
[637]was told that while Edgewood would dispose of chemical material for the CIA,
[638]it would not do so in the case of biological materials since that was not con-
[639]sistent with the mission of the arsenal. No further efforts toward the disposal
[641]of the material have taken place, and it remains under guard in the OTS vault.
[643]Operational Uses of MKNAOMI Material.
[645]There is no record associating the project with actual operations. Dis-
[646]cussions with those involved in the project indicate that hand-launchers with
[647]darts loaded with: dog incapacitant may have been delivered for use in .
[648]S.E. Asia. They also indicate that some of the material or cropsspoilants may
[649]have been employed. While no direct connections to assassination planning have
[650]been found, there are some disturbing similarities between the agents being
[651]investigated at Fort Detrick and some of the reported schemes for incapacitating
[652]or assassinating Castro. For example, botulinum pills were reportedly provided
[653]in February 1961 and again in April 1962 for use against Castro. Such pills”
[654]were made for the Agency at Fort Detrick and the record shows the delivery of
[655]some in the same time period as the 1962 attempt. Another scheme in 1960 -
[656]involved the treatment of cigars with botulinum toxin; the comparable treatment
[657]of cigarettes is reported in MKNAOMI files. Consideration was given to the
[658]' administration of shellfish toxin with a pin device in late 1960. Both the
[659]toxin and pin delivery devices were developed at Fort Detrick. The diving
[660]suit scheme in 1963 involved dusting the inside of the suit with a fungus
[661]which would produce madura foot, a serious, non-spécific, skin disease. Work
[663]14
[665]Segre] Photocopy
[667]from
[668]Gerald R. Ford Litrary
[670]HW 50955 Docld:32112749 Page i7
[672]on fungal agents generally compatible with such an approach was underway at Fort
[673]Detrick shortly before this scheme was hatched and the agent was prepared at
[674]Agency direction in a form suitable for application to clothing, pillow cases,
[675]and so on. Tuberculosis germs with which the breathing apparatus of the suit were
[676]to be contaminated were available at Fort Detrick though not included in Agency
[677]stocks. Finally, the general presence of BW agents or toxins in all of these
[678]plans suggests the strong influence of work carried on at Fort Detrick.
[679]_ None of the interviews. undertaken in the course of this investigation provide
[680]information about specific.support to operations which may have involved
[681]assassination. Roosevelt, who.was Chief of TSD from 1960-1962, believed that
[682]discussions involving assassination took place but claimed to know few of the
[683]details and was skeptical as to. the seriousness of such discussions. Treichler,
[684]Chief of the Biology Branch during this period, denied ever having received
[685]requests for such support or providing it, but these assertions appear incompatible
[686]with information he earlier provided to the IG's office during: its investigation
[687]of assassination attempts. ‘Treichler may constitute a connection. between the
[688]MKNAOMT project and the assassination plots involving Castro. “He was the officer
[689]responsible for MKNAOMI during this period. The records show his giving direction
[690]in specific terms to the preparation of materials at Fort Detrick matching those
[691]mentioned in the assassination schemes. Finally, the IG's report indicates that
[692]he delivered such material to other elements of the Agency. Beyond the Castro”
[693]"schemes, no suggestion can be found that-any of these materials or devices was
[695]ever considered for use for lethal purposes.
[697]Photocopy
[699]from
[700]SEERET Gerald R. Ford Library
[702]HW 50955 Docld:32112749 Page 18