[1]DARAAN -
[2]104-10330-10070 | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |’
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[8]Central Intelligence Agency
[10]13 December 1996
[12]MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director
[13]Assassination Records Review Board
[15]SUBJECT: (U) Identity of Human Sources
[17](We request that this memorandum be returned to CIA
[18]once the Review Board has completed its deliberations on the
[19]issues discussed below. )}
[21]1. (U) ‘Issue. The purpose of this memorandum is to
[22]relate CIA’s concerns to the Review Board regarding the
[23]release of the true names of human sources of intelligence
[24]which appear in the JFK Collection and to present a proposal
[25]on how this problem could be addressed.
[27]I. Factual Background
[29]2. (U) In general, CIA “sources” are foreign
[30]nationals, recruited and living in a foreign country, who
[31]provide information to the U.S. Government under a promise
[32]of confidentiality. Their act of passing information to the
[33]U.S. is generally against the national interest of their own
[34]country and would be considered espionage, which is a
[35]capital offense in most countries. Just as in this country
[36]when a spy is caught, should a CIA source be discovered, it
[37]would be “headline news,” even 30 years after the fact. The
[38]Review Board will recall that when. former National Security
[39]Agency employee Robert Lipka was arrested approximately a
[40]year ago for espionage he allegedly committed 30 years
[41]earlier, this received a lot of attention in the United
[42]States. Lipka is currently awaiting trial in the U.S. for
[43]his alleged espionage activities.
[45]3. (U) This month, the Review Board will be
[46]considering approximately 50-60 true names of human sources
[47]for release. These particular sources range from encrypted
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[63]assets to one-time contacts. It is our understanding that
[64]additional source names appear throughout the JFK Collection
[65]and will be reviewed in the future. It is important,
[66]therefore, that the Review Board and CIA agree on a
[67]consistent method of dealing with source names appearing in
[68]the JFK Collection at this time so as not to impede the
[69]future review of documents.
[71]4. (C) The Review Board has recently developed a
[72]policy for releasing the true names of covert CIA employees.
[73]Although there are many similarities between covert
[74]employees and sources, there is an important difference that
[75]should be reflected in the way the Review Board looks at
[76]this issue. With CIA covert employees who are mentioned in
[77]this collection, it has been possible in some instances to
[78]go to them and seek their permission to reveal their names.
[79]Some of these former employees have even been made available
[80]for interviews and depositions. With most sources, it is
[81]not possible to do this. First, CIA has dropped contact
[82]with some of these sources and may not be able to locate
[83]them. Attempting to find these individuals would create
[84]some risk of creating suspicions that they were or are
[85]associated with this Agency or the U.S. Government. If CIA
[86]were unable to locate a particular source, there would still
[87]be some risk in releasing his name. Just because CIA cannot
[88]locate him, does not mean that he is not alive and well-
[89]known in his own community. Even if we were able to locate
[90]a source without risk to his safety, it is probable that he
[91]would not want to be visited by the CIA again after so many
[92]years. More than likely, sources do not now want their past
[93]association revealed when they have undoubtedly moved on in
[94]their lives to do other things. Some may be in political or
[95]private enterprise positions where CIA affiliation would
[96]damage them professionally and/or harm them and their
[97]families personally.
[99]5. (U) Another important distinction that needs to be
[100]taken into account is the difference between CIA and Federal
[101]Bureau of Investigation (FBI). “sources.” Perhaps the most
[102]significant difference is that many FBI sources provide
[103]information with the understanding that the information and
[104]the source will be publicly revealed. FBI sources are often
[105]used in criminal prosecutions as witnesses. CIA, on the
[106]other hand, promises secrecy and confidentiality to its
[107]sources. CIA sources rarely appear at public trials. In
[108]fact, not only is the identity of CIA sources protected from
[109]public acknowledgment, but also it is closely held within
[110]the Agency itself. Another difference is the fact that a
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[121]foreign national cooperating with CIA is usually committing
[122]a unique violation. of his own country’s laws-—espionage. If
[123]one gets caught committing espionage, the punishment in many
[124]countries is for a capital offense. On the other hand, a
[125]foreigner who cooperates with the FBI is not usually
[127]_ committing espionage. Cooperation may be with the full
[129]knowledge of his government--such as cooperation in a
[130]criminal investigation. Therefore, the risks for
[131]cooperation with the FBI are not usually as great as
[132]cooperation with CIA. In addition, the FBI has greater
[133]means for protecting individuals who provide information to
[134]it, for example, the witness protection program, which CIA
[135]does not: have. .
[137]It. Legal Considerations
[138]6. (U) Although Section 1i(a) of the JFK Act provides
[140]‘that when the Act requires release of information, it takes
[142]precedence over all other laws that would otherwise prohibit
[143]the true names of sources. CIA believes that it is
[144]important for the Review Board to consider the laws, which
[145]have been growing and developing over the years, to protect
[146]Classified information because they clearly reflect a larger
[147]U.S. Government policy to protect intelligence sources.
[149]7. (U) By Executive Ordér (E.0.)and statute, the
[150]President and Congress have made the Director of Central
[151]Intelligence (DCI) » responsible for protecting intelligence
[152]sources. In his Directive of 22 January 1946 which
[153]established the Central Intelligence Group, President ‘Truman
[154]made the DCI responsible for protecting sources. With the
[155]establishment of the CIA, Congress. also gave the DCI this
[156]responsibility. The National Security Act of 1947, Section
[157]103(d) (3), codified at 50 U.S.C. §403(3)(c)(5), requires the
[158]DCI to protect intelligence sources from unauthorized
[159]disclosure. In addition, §403(3)(d)(2) requires the DCI to
[160]ensure that risks to the United States and those involved in
[161]the collection of. intelligence ‘through human sources are
[162]minimized.
[164]8. (U) Protecting the identity of individuals working
[165]with or for CIA has been of particular concern to U.S.
[166]lawmakers since the establishment of the Agency. For
[167]example, with Section 6 of the Central Intelligence Act of
[168]1949, 50 U.S.C. 1949 §403g, Congress specifically exempted
[169]the CIA from the provisions of any law requiring the
[170]publication or disclosure of the organization, functions,
[171]names, titles, salaries or numbers of personnel employed by
[172]the Agency. Although the purpose of this law is to protect
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[183]employees of the CIA, and not assets or contacts, it
[184]indicates Congress’ intent from early on to protect those
[185]working covertly for the U.S. Government.
[187]9. (U) .In 1980, Congress passed the Classified
[188]Information Procedures Act (CIPA) which sets out pretrial,
[189]trial, and appellate procedures for criminal cases involving
[190]or potentially involving classified information. Working
[191]with the Department of Justice and the courts, CIA has
[192]successfully protected intelligence sources from public
[193]release even in criminal trials where there are heightened
[194](i.e., constitutional) considerations favoring disclosure to
[195]the defendant of all government information relevant to the
[196]defense. CIPA allows for in camera ex parte hearings in
[197]which the judge can rule on questions of admissibility and
[198]relevancy of classified information, including the identity
[199]of human sources who may have information pertaining to the
[200]defense, before it is introduced either to the defendant or
[201]defense counsel, or in open court. In some cases involving
[202]CIA, the judge has ordered that CIA information be turned
[203]over to the defense, but only in some unclassified form such
[204]as in a summary. In other cases, judges have reviewed the
[205]classified information and ruled that the harm to national
[206]security outweighs the defendant's legal rights to the
[207]information. In still other cases, the defense was never
[208]notified that CIA even had information bearing on the case
[209]as the judge ruled that the mere fact that CIA possessed
[210]this information was classified and outweighed any rights
[211]the defendant had. Moreover, under CIPA, the Attorney
[212]General has the authority to drop a prosecution in those
[213]cases where the risk to national security is too great.
[215]10 (U) In 1982, Congress acted to protect human
[216]intelligence sources by passing the Intelligence Identities
[217]Protection Act of 1982, 50 U.S.C. §421 which criminalizes
[218]the revelation of a source’s identity. This Act subjects
[219]anyone who reveals information that identifies a covert
[220]agent to prosecution with up to 10 years in prison and
[221]$50,000 in fines. A covert agent includes: (a) a U.S.
[222]citizen whose intelligence relationship with the U.S.
[223]Government is classified and is acting abroad as an agent,
[224]informant or source of operational assistance to an
[225]intelligence agency; and (b) an individual, other than a
[226]U.S. citizen whose past or present intelligence relationship
[227]to the U.S. is classified information and who is a present
[228]or former agent or informant of, or is of operational
[229]assistance to, an intelligence agency.
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[242]11. (U) These statutes are just a few examples of a
[243]larger government policy to protect human sources from
[244]public disclosure. There has also developed over the years
[245]a significant amount of.case law which further implements
[246]this policy. For example, in Sims v. CIA, 10 S.Ct. 1981
[247](1985), the Supreme Court held that pursuant to the National
[249].Security Act, the DCI had the authority to protect from
[251]release to Freedom of Information Act requesters the
[252]identities of individuals conducting research on projects
[253]financed by CIA. The Supreme Court further stated that the
[254]DCI’s authority to protect sources was broad, and was not
[255]limited to only those individuals who were guaranteed
[256]confidentiality.
[258]12. (U) Most recently, President Clinton signed an
[259]Executive Order on classified national security information
[260]which came into effect in October 1995. Although it.
[261]requires that agencies make greater declassification efforts
[262]than the prior Executive Order, Executive Order 12958
[263]affords human sources extra protection from its
[264]declassification provisions. Under E.0. 12958, information
[265]that is over 25 years old and has historical value must be
[266]declassified within five years. However, information
[267]revealing the identity of a human source may continue to be
[268]protected. —
[270]13. (U) The above federal statutes and case law show
[271]a long-standing practice of protecting human sources who
[272]provide intelligence information to the U.S. Government. In
[273]carrying out its statutory obligations, the Review Board
[274]should give serious weight to this policy and afford the
[275]protection of human sources the highest priority.
[277]rrr. Operational Considerations
[279]14. (U) As the Review Board is well aware, in order
[280]for CIA officers to effectively collect intelligence around
[281]the world, they cannot acknowledge publicly that they work
[282]for CIA and, conversely, CIA cannot acknowledge a particular
[283]individual's affiliation with it. This is true even more so
[284]with sources. In addition to the risk to a source’s
[285]personal safety, discovery of a CIA source would also reveal
[286]any operations he was conducting and CIA case officers with
[287]whom he was meeting or might even cast suspicion on the
[289]1
[291](U) The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. §552 is another
[292]example of a federal statute that allows for the protection of human
[293]sources. Although the FOIA generally mandates release of government
[294]documents, exemption b(3) allows for withholding from release
[295]information that is exempted from disclosure by statute. The National
[296]Security Act has been held by the Supreme Court to be such a withholding
[297]statute. Sims v. CIA, 105 S.Ct. 1981 (1985).
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[308]affiliation of innocent family and friends. This is no less
[309]true with a source.who no longer works for the Agency. A
[310]source’s prior affiliation with CIA is normally still
[311]classified in order to protect him, his former contacts at
[312]CIA, the CIA facilities at which he may have been meeting
[313]with case officers, the cover mechanisms employed to protect
[314]his affiliation with CIA, and the operations which he
[315]conducted.
[317]15.. (U) The public disclosure of an individual's
[318]affiliation with CIA could and, in fact, has threatened the
[319]safety and lives of not only the source, but also their
[320]families, colleagues, officials of foreign governments and
[321]other foreign nationals with whom they have had contact.
[322]The Review Board will certainly recall the Proenza case
[323](since this was released by the Board in August 1995) in
[325]- which a number of Cuban officials were falsely believed to
[327]be CIA agents. They were arrested, convicted and spent
[328]years in prison for their alleged treasonous activities and
[329]their professional and personal lives were ruined. The
[330]threat of violence to those who are in fact associated with
[331]CIA is even more real. These individuals live and work in
[332]foreign countries, many of which have a local population
[333]hostile to the United States and especially CIA. If one
[334]should doubt the risks that those affiliated with CIA face, |
[335]one only has to recall that, in.1992, two CIA employees were
[336]murdered while waiting to turn into CIA Headquarters in
[337]Virginia. If this type of attack is possible right at the
[338]CIA’s front gate, it is not hard to imagine the personal
[339]risks that those working with the CIA abroad face. Clearly,
[340]the risk is that much greater for those who are sources:
[342]for example, as a result of Aldrich Ames’ disclosures to
[343]the KGB, 10 Soviets who were covert assets of. the CIA were
[344]executed. oo
[346]16. (U) Incidents such as these clearly demonstrate
[347]that 'the policy of protecting association with the CIA is an
[348]important one. Individuals associated with CIA have been
[349]and will continue to be subjected to threats, reprisals and
[350]physical injuries from.foreign intelligence services,
[351]terrorist groups, and other persons or organizations hostile
[352]to CIA or the U.S. Government. Individuals choose to
[353]undertake these risks for many different reasons, but it is
[355]‘with the condition that the CIA will protect their
[357]cooperation with the U.S. Government.
[358]Iv. Proposal
[359]17. (U) In light of the foregoing, CIA believes it is
[361]important to work toward a general policy of protecting CIA
[362]sources in the JFK Collection. The Agency proposes that in
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[372]most cases a substitution for the true name be used. In
[373]prior releases of these same documents, the Review Board
[374]agreed to redact the true name and substitute “source.” If
[375]the Review Board is concerned about tracking particular
[376]sources throughout the records, a particular identifying
[377]substitution can be used for an individual source throughout
[378](for example, “Mexican source 1%).
[380]18. (S) Among the names that are currently being
[381]considered for release by the Review Board, the following
[382]are some that the CIA proposes be treated in this manner:
[384]¢ True name of LIRING/3, an encrypted asset of the
[385]CIAf and “unilatéral penetration of the Cuban °
[386]“Embassy. His wife also worked at_the Embassy and
[387]“he was was apparently suspected as being CIA though it
[388]was never proven. LIRING/3 at some point
[389]disappeared and we have no way of knowing what his
[391]current situation is.
[393]e True name of ERTHYROID/3,! the unilateral ~
[395]pe penetration < ‘of the Nicaraguan Service. The Review
[396]“Board will recall that it has already “been fully
[397]briefed on ERTHYROID/3 and had agreed to the
[399]; protection of the> fact“that he was a unilateral)
[400](source. | OAR ee A ae
[402]*;/Anthony Cc. M. Devere (1041001210022) \was fis] a
[404]{member of the British Service.’ As such, he was
[405][is] a liaison source. This raises concerns about
[406]protection of our /liaison relationships.
[408]__Moreover, __Mr.({Devere’ s ‘identity constitutes
[410]\, “foreign. government information”\.which, as the
[411]Board has already been informed, ° he CIA does not
[412]have the authority to release. pee ee
[414]i9. (8) Another type of name that similarly should be *
[415]protected from release is the new. identity provided toa
[416]Gefector. Although defectors do“ not face some. ‘of. the _
[417]dangers that “assets” overseas ‘face, they are: still given
[418]new identities for their’ protection because’ there’ is some °
[419]risk to their personal safety even in the U.S. “For example,
[420]in this collection the identity of Golitsyn appears in
[421]documents being reviewed this month.* Since the time of his
[422]Gefection, Golitsyn has utilized successive identities,
[423]because they have been unofficially disclosed, that have not
[425]AS) Golitsyn’s identity had to be changed again. However, there is a
[426]risk that revealing this former identity could lead to the
[427]identification of Golitsyn’s current identity.
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[441]been officially released and that are closely held within
[442]the Agency. This is done for his own protection and that of
[443]his family even though they live in the United States. CIA
[444]cannot, at this time, agree to the official release of
[445]Golitsyn’s assumed new identities or for that matter of any
[446]defectors that appear to date in the collection.
[448]20. (S) CIA has noted that in some cases a source is
[449]identified by only a first name or a code name. Where CIA
[450]has been unable to identify any information about that
[451]individual or there is no other source revealing information
[452]that has been revealed in the JFK Collection, it would be
[453]possible to release that name. For example, in a few
[454]documents, the name “Tota” appears. To date, CIA has been
[455]unable to determine who this person is and there does not
[456]appear to be any further source revealing information in the
[457]collection. It is probably that “Tota” is just a code name
[458]or a street name known to his colleagues. As “Tota” isa
[459]common name, such a release would not threaten the
[460]particular individual or his family, and as the person can
[461]not be identified it would not seriously undermine the U.S.
[462]Government policy to protect intelligence sources.
[464]21. (U) The Agency recognizes that some names may be
[465]particularly important to the JFK story. In such cases, the
[466]CIA is willing to work with the Review Board to come to the
[467]appropriate resolution. CIA proposes that it conduct a
[468]record search for information on that individual. It may be
[469]that in these cases, if the person is deceased and has no
[470]living family, that the Review Board and the CIA can agree
[471]that the value of revealing the true name outweighs the need
[472]to protect that source from disclosure.
[474]22. (U) It is our hope that the CIA and the Review
[475]Board can work out a mutually agreeable policy regarding the
[476]identity of human sources that will not undermine -the
[477]important policy of protecting those who work covertly for.
[478]the U.S. Government. As usual, my staff and I are available
[479]to discuss this matter with you.
[482]Chief, Historical Review Group
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[492]DCI/CSI/J.Pereira: apd/x31805 (13 Dec 96)
[493]G: /CSIFO/SHARED/Pereira.doc
[495]Distribution:
[496]Original - Addressee
[497]- CSI/HRP Chrono
[498]- D/CSI
[499]- C/CSI/HRG
[500]- Barry Harrrelson, CSI/HRP
[501]-| Linda Cipiriani}) occ
[503]Le mene
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