[1]Vie 104-10303-1 10303-10007; | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
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[18]1 June 1973
[20]MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. William E. Colby
[22]SUBJECT: - Special Activities
[24]L. Following our recent conversation, I have
[25]searched my memory and Mr. McCone's files for examples.
[26]of activities which to hostile observers or to someone
[27]without complete knowledge and with a special kind of
[28]motivation could be interpreted as examples of activities
[29]exceeding CIA's charter.
[31]2. First, as we discussed, on 7 March 1962,
[32]DCI McCone, under pressure from Attorney General Robert
[33]F. Kennedy, agreed to tap the telephones of columnists
[34]Robert S. Allen and Paul Scott in an effort to identify
[35]their sources for classified information which was appear -
[36]ing in their columns. Because the primary source appeared
[37]to be in the Department of Defense, McCone ordered me
[38]personally to brief General Joe Carroll, Director of DIA,
[39]orally, which I did. I understand more complete information
[40]on this operation is available from the Director of Security.
[41]I, personally, managed to avoid gaining any knowledge of
[42]what precise actions were taken, what information was gained,
[43]what was done with it, and when the operation was terminated.
[45]3. As a result of a developing relationship with
[46]Pirti-ippe-de-¥osjeii, the SDECE representative in Washington,
[47]and also as a result of certain information conveyed by
[49]¢ Anatole Golitsen, James Angleton, with the approval of
[50]Dick Helms, agreed to mount a counterespionage operation
[51]against the French. Embassy in Washington. This involved
[52]breaking and entering and the removal of documents from
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[67]the French Consulate. On 18 June 1962, DCI McCone and
[68]Helms briefed Secretary of State Rusk generally on the
[69]operation without going into operational details. Later
[70]on the same day, President John F. Kennedy was briefed. —
[71]Actual breaking and entering occurred somewhat later, and
[72]on 15 April 1963, DCI McCone met with President Kennedy
[73]alone and briefed the President on the details of this
[74]new phase of the operation. On the same day, the Attorney
[75]General was briefed and he agreed that he would not
[76]mention it to the FBI unless the FBI themselves raised
[78]it with him. On 3 February 1964, DCI McCone met alone
[79]with President Lyndon B. Johnson and briefed him on the
[80]operation. On 4 February McGeorge Bundy was briefed.
[82]On 6 February 1964 in a briefing of Secretary of State
[83]Rusk on the results of the operation, Rusk expressed
[84]reservations about the propriety of such an operation.
[86]He raised this same concern in subsequent conversations
[87]with McCone on 17 April 1964, 28 May 1964, and 14 June
[88]1964. On 12 September 1964 Rusk continued to express
[90]‘grave reservations and repeatedly suggested that the
[92]French be informed directly that we knew about their
[93]espionage operations in the United States and ask them
[94]to desist. In a meeting on 28 May 1964 Rusk expressed
[96]‘these reservations in the presence of DCI McCone and
[98]President John.-F.. Kennedy-**.Secretary of Defense McNamara
[99]was also present, and there is no record that he had_
[100]previously been made aware of this operation.
[102]4. Although certain activities never got beyond
[103]the planning stage, there are, I believe, three examples
[104]of such planning which could be subject to misinterpretation.
[105]One involved chemical warfare operations against the rice
[106]crops in both Cuba and North Vietnam. A second involved
[107]a paramilitary strike against the Chi-Com nuclear instal-
[108]lations. Outside the United States Government, General
[109]Eisenhower was briefed on such planning. A third, which
[110]assumes a new Significance today, involved a proposal by
[111]Angleton and Helms for a greatly increased intelligence
[112]collection effort against foreign installations in this
[113]country. This planning also involved a scheme for selected
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[130]exposure of KGB activities and counteractions against the
[131]Soviet intelligence service. The reasons are still unclear
[132]to me as to why the FBI chose to brief the PFIAB to the
[133]effect that CIA was planning to wiretap extensively and
[134]indiscriminately in this country, to greatly increase
[136]the Agency representation in the Moscow Embassy, and
[137]generally to use KGB-type tactics, also extensively and
[138]indiscriminately. This led to a heated exchange between
[139]DCI McCone and Mr. Belmont of the FBI, one such meeting
[140]taking place in the presence of the Attorney General.
[142]It is clear that the FBI was opposed to any such proposal
[143]then, as now, and the plan never went forward.
[145]5. During the period when Des FitzGerald was in
[146]charge of the Cuban Task Force, DCI McCone‘s office
[147]learned, quite by accident, that FitzGerald had secured
[148]the cooperation of several prominent US business firms
[149]in denying economic items to Cuba. There was no question |
[150]but that the businessmen were glad to cooperate, but know-
[151]ledge of this operation had to be rather widespread. —
[153]6. On 17 April 1964, Mr. Robert B. Anderson came
[154]to DCI McCone on behalf of American business interests,
[155]offering to insert some $300,000 to try to secure a
[156]favorable result in the elections in Panama. Shortly
[157]after this approach, Mr. Clyde Weed of Anaconda Copper
[158]Company made a similar proposal to McCone in connection
[159]with elections in Chile. On 12 May 1964 at a meeting of
[160]the 303 Committee, it. was decided that the offers of
[161]American business could not be accepted, it being neither
[162]a secure way nor an honorable way of doing such business.
[163]This declaration of policy at this time bears on the recent
[164]ITT hearings, but I am not surprised that McCone has
[165]forgotten that he helped to set the precedent of refusing
[166]to accept such collaboration between the Agency's operations
[167]and private business. :
[169]7. At the direction of Attorney General Robert
[170]Kennedy and with the explicit approval of President Kennedy,
[171]McCone injected the Agency, and particularly Cord Meyer,
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[197]into the US labor situation, and particularly to try .
[198]to ameliorate the quarrel between George Meany and |
[199]Walter Reuther. Cord Meyer steered a very skillful
[201]. course in this connection, but the Agency could. be
[203]vulnerable to charges that we went behind Meany's back,
[204]or were somehow consorting with Reuther against Meany's
[205]wishes.
[207]8. There are three examples of using Agency
[208]funds which I know to be controversial. One was the
[209]expenditure of money under Project MOSES in securing
[210]the release of Cuban Brigade prisoners. Details of
[211]this gperation are best known to Larry Houston, Mike
[212]Miskoysky, Georgg@M@acManus, and James Smith. Second,
[214]-as you well know, when Lou Conein received his summons
[215]' to report to the Joint General Staff Headquarters on
[217]1 November 1963 a large amount of cash went with him.
[218]My impression is that the accounting for this and its
[219]use has never been very frank or complete. Third, at
[220]one of the early Special Group meetings attended by
[221]McCone he took strong exception to proposals to spend
[222]Agency funds to improve the economic viability of West
[223]Berlin, and for an investment program in Mali. His
[224]general position was that such expenditures were not
[225]within the Agency's charter, and that he would allow
[226]such spending only on the direct personal request of
[227]the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense, or
[228]the White House.
[230]9. I raise these issues of funding because I
[231]remember the Agency's being severely criticized by the
[232]House Appropriations Subcommittee for having spent $3,000
[233]for stamps in connection with a program to buy tractors
[234]to secure the release of prisoners from Cuba.
[236]10. Under the heading of old business, I know that
[237]any one who has worked in the Director's office has worried.
[238]about the fact that conversations within the offices and
[239]over the telephones were transcribed. During McCone's .
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[265]‘tenure, there were microphones in his regular office,
[267]his inner office, his dining room, his office in East
[268]Building, and his study at his residence on White Haven
[269]Street. I do not know who would. be willing to raise such
[270]an issue, but knowledge of such operations tends to
[271]spread, and certainly the Agency is vulnerable on this
[272]score. .
[274]11. Also under the heading of old business, [I
[275]well remember the hue and cry raised, especially by Carl .
[276]Kaysen in the White House, when the Agency injected a
[277]contaminating agent in Cuban sugar bound for the Soviet .
[278]Union. Shortly after the Cuban missile crisis, there was
[279]a disposition in Washington to reexamine the Bay of Pigs,
[280]and the fact that several Alabama National Air Guard
[281]officers lost their lives in the Bay of Pigs was surfaced
[282]with surprisingly little excitement at the time.
[284]12. During my stint on the 7th floor there was
[285]a special arrangement with the Office of Communications
[286]whereby. the Director's office gained access. to non-CIA
[287]traffic. This surfaced briefly at one point shortly after
[288]Admiral Rayborn became DCI. He had visited the Signal
[289]Center and removed a copy of a telegram from the Embassy
[290]in the Dominican Republic for Under Secretary George Ball,
[291]Eyes Only. He returned to his office and proceeded to
[292]discuss this telegram with George Ball who was naturally
[293]quite curious as to how Rayborn knew about it, and also as
[294]to how Rayborn had it in his possession before Ball did.
[295]Ben Read in the Secretary of State's office and I spent
[296]several weeks putting this one to rest.
[298]13. Finally, DCI McCone, as you and I well know,
[299]operated on a very lofty plane, and I think certain of
[300]his activities could be misunderstood. One example was
[301]his decision in July of 1964. to have Aristotle Onassis and
[302]Maria Callas flown from Rome to Athens on Air Force KC 135.
[303]Their arrival in Athens in this airplane attracted the
[304]attention of the local press and in due course Mr. John
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[321]Hightower, Chief of the Associated Press Bureau for
[323]Washington, came to see me to ask about the propriety
[324]of this action. .
[326]14. The use of Fairways Corporation aircraft
[327]has been remarkably secure, but DCI McCone himself
[328]forgot about the cover arrangement and became quite
[329]exercised when he saw Candidate Goldwater land in the
[330]San Francisco airport for the Republican National Con-
[331]vention in 1964 aboard the Grumman Gulf Stream with
[332]the highly visible tail number N 8 E. This was, I
[333]explained to him carefully, a perfectly legitimate
[334]charter, but he didn‘ t like it.
[336]15. McCone dealt quite extensively with newsmen
[338]in Washington. In fact, they gave him a gift and a
[339]luncheon when he left Washington, which is perhaps
[340]indicative of the press's relations with him. However,
[341]in the case of the Ross and Wise book, The Invisible
[342]Government, he did try to bring pressure on the publisher
[343]and the authors to change things. They did not change
[345]a comma, and I doubt that this old saw willever sing
[346]again.
[348]° 16.. Finally, and this will reflect my Middle
[349]Western Protestant upbringing, McCone‘s dealings witb .
[350]the Vatican, including Pope John XXIII and Pope Paul
[352]VI, would and could raise eyebrows in certain quarters.
[354]17. The above listing is uneven, but I have a
[355]- sinking feeling that discipline has broken down, and that
[356]' allegations from any quarter which cast these things in .
[357]the wrong light would receive great publicity and attention,
[358]and no. amount of denial would ever set the record straight.
[359]If. 1 may be of any assistance in tracking down further
[360]details, I am of course at your disposal, but I would point
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[382]out that I was very much in the position of the
[383]enlisted man who knew that the commissioned officers
[384]were aware of these activities and better able to
[385]judge their propriety and possible impact or misinter-
[386]pretation.
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