[1]DARAAN
[2]\q04-10400-10341 | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
[4]I ‘FORM 30200
[5]i ToT) MEG2/76 ;
[7]a CABLE | sec pIssEm By. ve _ : ” 35 . TOTAL COPIES |
[8]: . ODUCTICN ay OTHER Tr
[10]SECRET! — , IMBUING orvice ta PROHIBIT
[12]'* (PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIEO
[14]ADVANGE COPY IESUED ED : E A a
[15]: ACTION UNIT Lo. , . . . sp
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[22]~ 1 6 6475 . “ETAB36 . es i —_ EN 795558
[24]_ToR1 519028 4M % | oS LOND 68796").
[26]| et GR g 7 Fous JAN 76 STAFF
[27]ITE LONDON 68796 ~
[29]“10% DIRECTUR, —
[30]Se
[31]CRYBAT PLKMBALL
[32]“NELSON FROM MEYER
[34]none ROGER “CHANNEL 9548
[36]Eaeen WITH DEREK TONKIN FOR BRIEFINGS ON SERIES: OF SUBJECTS OF e
[37]“INTEREST: To HIM” AND “SELECT COMMITTEE. THEY ARE THE: DIVISION OF.
[39]= LABOR BETWEEN hin SECURITY AND THE SECRET SERVICE AND’ Bs INTEL-
[41]"LL GENCE AND GOUNTERINTEL UI GENCE, HE GOES ON TO REQUEST BRIEFINGS
[43]“ON THE ORGANIZATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR COVERT OPERATIONS AND POLIT=
[45]NICAL CONTROL ‘OF POLITICAL OPERATIONS WITH THE FOREIGN OFFICE, IN NE
[46]ADDITION HE. “WANTS BRIEFINGS ON INTELLIGENCE BUDGET ALLOCATION AND
[47]| GOORDINATION AND SYSTEM FOR APPROVAL OF MAJOR INTELLIGENCE PROJECTS,
[49]| SENATOR HART ALSO WANTS A BRIEFING ON THE OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT
[50]| AND HOM IT WORKS,
[52]i, TONKIN HAS BEEN CONTACTED BY EMBASSY OFFICER AND TONKIN HAS
[54]secRET Nt Recowed.
[56]13-00000
[58]flR GS Cpe
[60]a
[62]af
[64]| . . x . wo
[65]| 7-71 MEG, 2/75 ee Af he oe, SoG oe ( :
[66]I
[68]’ GABLE SEC OISSEM BY. ___PER _ TOTAL COPIES : RUN BY’ «|
[70]REPRODUCTION BY OTHER TH
[71]-_ ISSUING OFFICE IS PRONIBIT:
[72]PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED, ee es
[74]ACTION UNIT
[76]ACTION #
[78]T 604753. EL AB36. PAGE 02-02. SS~*~*~*«**N S98
[80]TORI4519022 JAN 76° =~ *—s LOND 68796
[82], ADVISED. THAT BRITS. WILL, DO THEIR BEST TO PROVIDE INFORMATION, SENATOR
[83]“MART. WANTS BUT THAT ‘SOME OF THE INFORMATION COULD NOT BE MADE
[84]AVAILABLE, HE IS PROPOSING A JOINT MEETING WITH SIR LEONARD
[86]- HOOPER AND RICHARD SYKES FOR GENERAL DISCUSSIONS ON. THE INTELLIGENCE
[88]COMMUNITY AND WITH WR, ROBERT ARMSTRONG AT THE HOME OFFICE ON THE
[89]"|. WORKINGS OF THE OFFICIAL SECRETS. ACT. THERE WILL BE CHANGES IN
[90]“THE SCHEDULE AND EMBASSY WILL BE ADVISED. BY MR. TONKIN AT A LATER
[91]DATE, _ a
[92]THERE 1S NO ‘anptcaTtoN IN THE DEPARTMENT TRAFFIC THAT CIA
[93]“HAS BEEN INFORMED ‘BUT WE PRESUME THAT OFFICIALS OF THE AGENCY HAVE
[94]“OR WILL BE CONTACTED BY SENATOR HART OF HIS STAFF ON THE MATTER,
[95]ay NG FILES: €2> IMPDET.
[99]13-00000
[100]_ TTR MFG: 2778)
[102]- CABLE SEC DISSEM'BY.
[106]Saas PAGE Oi
[108]“y 602263 : Boe
[109]ns __raniseosat wan 16 |
[111] gecRet scant aN 70 STAFF ae
[112]| OTE CANBERRA 24083 ee ee Moy
[113]YE DIRECTORS. ac a ae A
[114]“year. TAPPER PLHHCONGA CODEL ADD ABBO a woe a
[115]roe UPON ARRIVAL OF. THE CODEL ON THE EVENING OF THE
[116]“aatH GEORGE CARY CONTACTED: cos. No. ARRANGED. FOR: STATION:
[117]BRIEFING Ar. 630/237. THE ‘CONTRY. TEAM BRIBE ING WAS sevenu.
[118]= FOR 0930), CARY. ‘MENTIONED ‘HAT THE INTEL: wes: HAD BEEN. |
[119]GIVEN MTATL END" TABATHENT. At PReVioUs: STOPSs AND CONGRESSMAN
[120]-aDDABaD HAD. INDI ATED THAT HE WANTED TO Be ‘SURE AND REMEDY
[121]THAT ON’ THE CANBERRA STOPOVER.. | co
[122]2 CONGRESSMEN ADDABRO,. ROBINSON. ‘AND EDWARDS, ACCOMPANIED
[123]: BY “STAFFERS. SNODGRASS, PRESTON AND GEORGE CARY “ARRIVED: AT HE. |
[124]-. EBASSY AT 8830, WITH CUNNEELY PRESENT, COS GAVE THEN DETAILED
[125]BRIEFING AS OUTLINED BY: HEADQUARTERS, DISCUSSION COVERED THE
[126]NAKE*UP OF THE STATION AND GASES, OUR PRIMARY OBJECTIVES IN
[128]CAUBTRAL TAD THE. OVERALL MANAGEMENT SCHEME useD BY HOS IN MANAGES _
[129]MENT OF STATION AND ITS ACTIVITIES, OUR USE OF LIAISON,
[130]“STRESSING OUR USE OF THEM TO. SUPPLEMENT OUR LIMITED RESOURCES»
[131]OUR INTELLIGENCE CYCLE FROM VALIDATION OF REQUIREMENTS 10
[132]6 E CR e Tt
[134]13-00000
[136]7-71 MFG. 2/75
[138]_. NORA COMES |
[139]SECRET
[141]CALE SHE: DHE BRR
[143]REPROPUGT ON BY OTHER THAN _
[144]ISSUING TION BY gree Tuas :
[146]PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED.
[148]Ale Aly OP
[149]ACTION UNIT
[151]“7 682263. E1Ad22 0 PAGE 82 - ———y 794546
[152]| oe Tans soaves JAN: 76 _— : CNBR 91033
[154]| -pRODUCTION. OF. INTELLIGENCE) “SPECIFIC. verards 0 OF HOW WE ‘ACCOMP a
[155]Li SH OUR OPS TASKI NG# SPOTTING) ASSESSMENT, DIRECT CONTACT .
[156]WITH TARGETS. AND ‘USE oF LIATSON = STATION BUDGET, ETC,» ACTUAL
[157]“EXAMPLES. WERE ‘USED “WHENEVER POSSIBLE To MKE THE POINTS” |
[159]| FOR ‘EXAMPLE, THE. ‘PDWHI2 CASE WAS USED TO SHOW HOW THE STATION
[161]7 FOCUSES ON AN INDIVIDUALS PRIMARY TARGET, IT WAS A LIvety
[162]SESSIONS WITH CONGRESSMAN ROBINSON AND SNODGRASS *- THE "LIVE.
[164]WIRES! OF THE GROUP. QUESTIONS WERE OF A ROUTINE NATURE
[165]PRIMARILY. RELATED TO. INC IDENT AL OPS DETAILS. FOR EXAMPLE,
[166]“CONGRESSMAN ROBINSON NOTED THAT. HE: FELT I RATHER EASY To. IDENTIFY
[167]| THE SENIOR AGENCY OFFICERS: oF A MISSION BECAUSE OF THE WAY THEY
[168]HAPPEN TO. BE ANTERFAGED ADMENI STRATI VELY WITHIN AN EMBASSY
[170]cos RESPONSE WAS. THAT. ‘such TS OFTEN TRUE. BUT THAT STATIONS AND
[172]HOS. MAM GENENT, ARE Focusine. oN. THT SPECIFIC PROBLEM, AND: THAT THE
[174]—WELOH I INCIDENT HAS CERTAINLY ACCELERATED OUR EFFORTS. IN THAT Oo
[175]REGARD, oe fe
[177]fo Be AGL BUT: a FEW “MINUTES OF. THE ENTIRE HOUR. Was
[179]> Pent IN DISCUSSING “STATION: Ps. GEORGE CARY CERTIFIED.
[181]THAT THE GROUP ‘was w WETTING AND. A FEW ‘QUESTIONS AND.
[183]ISSUES Wi WERE ADDRESSED. ON, JHE SPECIAL s ‘AND t suBvect,.
[184]SECR ET
[187]13-00000
[189]“3 ACTION #
[191]<a TSTVMPG, 2/780 es
[192]re ;
[194]TOTAL Cortes | = wo RUIN BY ; a
[195]| ee & paopucrion bY OTHER 3H.
[197]CABLE SEC DISSEM.BY___) PER
[200]". RERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED
[202]ACTION UNIT
[204]~y 602265 BtAdae re PAGE as ~ oe TW 795K oo
[205]ors _ToRasoosze JAN 1 a OR 24038 ;
[207]7 “swouoRass ws. THE: FOCAL POINT. oF: Twat “exchuige, ND. ar
[208]7 1s REPORTED IN. SEP ARATE CROLE (Cc ANGERRA nae Se) -
[209]“SND GRASS ABGUEST STATION WAD. “ARRANGED. 7 SPECIAL MEETING mo
[210]WITH A-SELECT. GROUP OF Gos “OFFICIALS: ‘THE DETAIES OF THs _
[211]“MEBTING ‘AND AN ADDITIONAL: ONE. “EARLIER IN T THE: AFTERNOON oF |
[212]THE 13TH WITH DEFENSE. ARE, ‘ai 80 DETAILED IN CANBERRA aieae, ow
[213]BECAUSE oF SOME RATHER UNUSUAL ‘DEVELOPMENTS AN FHOBE |
[214]MEGTINGS) ‘SuOGEST. 05 A ND C/EA/OME REVIEW ‘REFERENCED
[215]CABLED. THE: CABLE WAS a VEN RESTRICTED WANDL ING BY erATION moe
[216]| BECAUSE OF THE SENSITIVITY. OF ITS CONTENT, — | |
[217]oe 4, THE MEBTING LASTED. THE FULL HOUR. AND: THE CONGRENS= oe
[218]MEN INDICATED THAT THEY WERE WELL “SATISFIED. WITH WH AT HAD
[219]BEEN CONVERED: COS: STRESSED THAT WE. WERE AVAILABLE TO -
[220]CONTINUE. ON THE: SUBJECT AFTER THE FORMAL AGENDA OF THE Day
[221]was. COMPLETED, BUT THEY. INDICATED THE SUBJECT HAD BEEN.
[222]. ADEQUATELY COVERED. THERE WAS No FURTHER STATION CONTACT
[223]WITH THE CONGRESSMEN DURING THEIR VST. THE STAFFERS
[224]DEP ARTED ON THEIR "VIS ITH. IN. THE EMBASSY CONVA IR ON Sc HEDULE,
[225]AND WILL RETURN DIRECT at SYDNEY BY CONVAIR ON THE 14TH;
[226]. ARRLVING. AT ABOUT 2300. BR. IMPDE T. —_ |
[229]13-00000
[231]ts “eee
[232]__ TOTAL COPIES SO_ _f ‘RUN BY ED
[234]L REPRODUCTION BY OTHER T
[235]SECRE tT ISSUING OFFICE 1S PROHIBI
[237]! : CABLE.SEC DISSEM BY PER
[239]PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED __
[241]ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED. | 0 BY
[242]ACTION UNIT
[244]. ONZ-
[246](7 595025 «EL A412
[248]IN 791659.
[250]CNBR 21007
[252]SECRET 122¢492 JAN 75 STAFF |
[253]CITE CANBERRA 24087. OO ee
[254]TO! JAKARTA INFO DIRECTOR, =. |
[255]RYBAT PLMHCONGA CODEL RANDALL AND ADDAgBO
[256]REFS! ‘Ae JAKARTA 35606 (79763)
[258]B. JAKARTA 35661 (1790 §79_)
[259]CANBERRA STATION MUCH APPRECIATES ADVANCED. REPORTING
[260]“ON GODELS. WAS HELPFUL WITH THE RANDALL GROUP, AND AM SURE
[261]WILL BE VALUABLE WITH ADDABBO GROUP AS WELL, REGARDS, €2 IMPDET,
[263]aha ; , SECRET
[265]13-00000
[267]| FORM 302007
[269]Je MEG, 2/76
[271]= | Sep I> Le -= lf a
[272]i”) CABLE Sec DISSEM BY_ TOTAL COP RUN BY. 7 ; !
[273]a opin SEI : REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA:
[275]S EcRET ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITEI
[277]. PERSON/UNIT NotIFIED
[279]|
[281]- 7 393616 . EL AG2]4 PAGE ee ; — in 791004
[282]7 Oo . -  -TORM4 211412 JAN 76 SKRT. 35674
[283]SE Cr E T 12693592 WN 76 STAFF - A. - ee 7 oe :
[284]CIlTe JAKARTA 35674 oo . | . - | |
[286]TO! DIRECTON,
[288]RYSAT. PLYMCUNGA CODEL ADDABBO
[290]REF: JAKARTA 95 664 ( 4905)
[292]1, AT RECEPTION aT HOME OF CHARGE NIGHT OF. it JANUARY,
[293]— - REPRESENTATIVE ADDABBO MADE POINT OF TELLING COS THAT: STATION |
[295]BRIEFING AS PER REF WAS "DAMN GOOD" AND THAT HE APPRECIATED THE
[297]FR AN K ANS WE RS Ty THE DELEGATIONS QUESTIONS. .
[299]2, MR. SNODGRASS ALS@ VOLUNTERRED THAT THE BRIEF ING-HAD 7
[301]IMPACTED FAVORABLY ON THE DELEGATION AND THAT THEY WERE “SURPRISED
[302]“ano PLEASED TO GET SUCH STRAIGHTFORWARD ANSWERS. TO THEIR QUESTIONS.
[303]ie 4DDEL THAT WHAT OFTEN GAVE HIM TROUBLE WAS STATEMENTS BY a 4
[305]AGENCY UFFICERS THAT THEY HAD GEEN PURSUING SOVIET OFFICIALS FOR. a
[307]TEN YEARS GR MGRE AND HAD NOT YeT RECRUITED ONE. HE. ALLUDED TO
[309]THIS AS THE BUREAUCRATS DREAM, BEING PERPETUALLY. PAID FOR SEEKING
[310]THe HOLY GRAIL WITHOUT “EVER FINDING IT, . COS ‘POINTED, oUt TO MRi
[312]— SNULGRASS That SOVIETS WERE BEING RECRUITED AND THAT THE WORK
[314]|
[315]‘|
[316]|
[318]OF UNE STATION WHICH NIGHT NOT RESULT IN. RECRUTTNENT KOULD BE.
[320]THE VERY Basis ON WHICH ANOTHER STATION Is ABLE. TO MAKE’ A SUCCESSFUL,
[323]13-00000
[325]2271. MFG, .2/76
[327]PER . TOTAL COPIES RUN BY.
[329]REPRODUCTION BY OTHER TH.
[331]_ |." CABLE SEC DISBEM BY
[332]ae ISSUING OFFICE iS PROHIBITS
[334]| |e PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED_:
[336]ACTION a
[337]7.593616  EAG24 FoGE B2 TN 7948040
[338]- TORI{Z44442 JAN 76 _okRT $5674
[340]“RECRUITMENT APPROACH, IN COST EFFECTIVENESS TERMS, aLso. POINTED -
[341]QUT THAT THe RECRUITMENT @F A SINGLE SOVIET. COULD AND DOES RESULT’ - =-
[342]IN & MORE ACCURATE APPRAISAL OF THE SOVIET THREAT AND THUS A HORE |
[343]REL 1ST Ic “ALLOCATION OF FUNDS TU MEET IT, MR SND GRASS ADMITTED |
[344]THAT THIS WAS SO BUT ADDED HIS UPINION THAT MORE RATHER THAN. Less.
[345]CONGRESSIONAL CONTACT: WETH CIA FIELD PERSONNEL AS IN JAKARTA
[346]WOULD BE A PLUS FOR THE AGENCY AND GIVE THE CONGRESS A BETTER
[347]FEEL FOR OUX ENDEAVORS AND PROBLEMS,
[348]5, NR CAREY ALSO SAID THAT ON THE BASIS OF HIS “TALKS WITH
[349]MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION IT APPEARED THAT THE BRIEFING HAD oN
[350]DOWN WELL AND THAT THEY FELT They WERE BEING GIVEN AN AGCURATE
[351]ANU INTEREST ING INSIGHT.
[352]4, THUS IT SEEMS THAT STATION DID GET THROUGH’ TO THE DELEGATION
[353]DESPITE THE INITIAL IMPRESSION THAT THEY WERE GENERALLY: LETHARGIC
[354]ABOUT IT,
[355]5. NEW SUBVECT! DOES HE ADOUARTERS HAVE ANY SPECIFIC
[357]INSTRUGT [ONS Fur HANDLING OF CGOLEL 016687, 2», IMPDET.
[359]-* ee SECRET
[361]13-00000
[363]Jo FORM 3020b sO
[364]- FeFUEMPG. 2775
[366]GABLE SEC'DISSEM a ae ow,
[368]_ PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED
[370]a
[372]co OD ucrion gy ovHkA “THA
[373]ae _JeBUING orrice 18. PROHIBITS:
[375]" ACTION-UNIT «| Se
[377]1 7 ACTION #
[379]- ann 7 ; _ : _Naaaze538 uy 760° CNBR 24088
[380]og SEC RE 1 1122202 JAN 76 STAFF
[381]cite CANBERRA 21000, 7 Cee ee
[382]= TO, : IMMEDIATE WELLINGTON, INFO: ‘DIRECTOR. a
[383]“RYBAT PLMHCONGA: CONGRESSMAN MILFORD .
[384]REFE “WELLINGTON 1037/1 PP IS 2 van .
[385]on ‘CONGRESSHAN. MILFORD. DESIRES: REFERENCED MEETING at ge00
[386]anos WILL ‘EXPECT “CONTACT FOR DETAILS UPON, HIS ARRIVAL.
[387]oa HE 1s VERY EASY TO TALK 10 “AND aM “SURE YOU: WILL, ENJOY
[388]THE. MEETING, HE. MET. HERE WITH HEADS: oF LIATsON. SERVICES, asouT ro
[389]245 mINUTES WITH. EACHY HIS. PRINCIPAL QUESTIONS ARE wEaat THEY
[390]THINK: OF THE CURRENT.. INVESTIGATIONS, WHAT ‘Impact HAVE THEY HAD
[391]ome FOREBIGN INTEL RELATIONS, ETC.
[392]| HE HAS A: MINOR HEARING PROBLEM) so sHouuD ARRANGE To
[393]- Have HIM SEATED. AS CLOSE AS POSSIBLE 10 BRIGADIER GILBERT.
[394]: ae ‘BEST REGARDS. E2, IMPDET.
[396]—SeGRET
[401]13-00000
[403]; ADYAN OPY 18
[404]aetion unit [71
[406]SEBS
[408]f section #
[410]"FORM 30200:
[411]"7674 MFG, 2776
[413]CABLE Bec DIdeEM eS Ma :
[415]S P 2/1) Q. “TOTAL cries. 26 le
[417]RUN ay a = :
[418]a ‘Ruproplicrion BY Y Orhan Tha
[421]— ot ; ¢ ormise. 18: PROM IBITEI
[424]_Tomeas2sis@ JAN 76 NBR ata
[425]og SEC R E T 1123058 JAN 5 STAFF.
[426]> rte: CANBERRA 21901
[427]yo PRIORITY DIRECTOR. o |
[428]- RyBAT PLMHCONGA. RTBUSHEL (DUCKETT)
[429]“SUBJECT MILFORD: VISIT | Oo
[430]rare cos. SPENT ABOUT EIGHT HOURS WITH CONGRESSMAN WILFORD |
[431]oN 10 SANUARY > AND. BELIEVE HE WENT AWAY. TOTALLY SATISFIED THAT
[433]HE HAD ACCOMPLISHED. HIS: ‘OBJECTIVES HERE. WE MET WITH
[435]SQUASH DIRECTOR GENERAL» D/UIO” AND ‘SOTERN/44,, -EACH: For agouT 45
[436]MINUTES “AND. ALL: MEETINGS. WENT WELL. ALso WORKED THE MEETING IN
[437]WUTH. THE NASA REP AND THAT ‘ALSO APPEARED TO Go WELL, AS. DID THE
[438]MEETING. ON THE SPECIAL S AND 7 SUBJECT. _ 7
[439]2, INCIDENTAL CONVERSATIONS. HELD WITH WILSON AND DICKINSON;
[440]DEALING. WITH TERRORISM QUESTION. | ENTIRE DELEGATION. WAS VERY
[441]FRIENDLY AND A PLEASURE TO DEAL WITHA (JACK. MAURY 'S. PRESENCE
[442]WAS AN ASSET... . . ae
[444]3. DETAILED SUMMARY. oF DAY'S ACTIVITY BEING FORWARDED
[445]“THIS DATE. E2 IMPDET,
[447]ee SECRET
[449]cents need Stearns en's tse ett Amal dati Rimi ale Ale om. age 6 thane ir cla ae alte
[451]13-00000
[453]va { . FORM 30200 ;
[454]* FA
[456]: 7-7 1MFG, 2/75 . .
[457]i
[459]| ; a
[461]i CABLE Sec DISSEM of oa oh (12st TOTAL COPIES — 2. RUN BY
[462]_ REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA
[463]. SECRET . ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE!
[464]PERSON, UNIT NOTIFIED : . a ~F
[465]. ; : . “oT J ae wl ale
[467]PAGE @ "TN 790579
[469]ETA799
[471]TORS1112132 JAN 76 JKRT 356614
[473]SE CRE T 1199372 JAN 76 STAFF
[475]CITE. JAKARTA 35661. Se -
[477]TO: DIRECTOR INFO IMMEDIATE CANBERRA, SYDNEY.
[479]NIACT CANBERRA |
[481]RYBAT PLMHCONGA cope ADDABBO
[483]1, COS SR1EFED REPS ADDABBO, EDWARDS AND ROBINSON AND
[485]MESSERS PRESTON, SNODGRASS AND CARY ON 12 JAN IN COS OFFICE,
[487]ONE HOUR SESSION WAS BASICALLY QUESTION AND ANSWER PERIOD
[489]CONCERNING TARGETS» OVERALL BUDGET, FIELD PORTION OF BUDGET,
[491]ALLOCATION OF costs TO COMMUNIST. TARGETS. VS INTERNAL TARGETS.
[493]RELATIONSHIP WITH LIAISON, ASSESSMENT OF GOVT, STABILITY AND
[495]INSURGENCY POTENTIAL, MEANS OF ACQUISITION OF SECRET NF oRMa ION»
[496]MOST IMPORTANT REPORTING OVER PAST YEAR, AMOUNT OF COVER WORK
[498]PERFORMED BY OFFICIALLY COVERED OFFICERS, MALAYSIAN iNSURGENCY,
[500]INDONESIAN REASONS FOR NOT PROVIDING BASES» DIA ROLE iN INDONESIA,
[502]AND CONSTRAINTS OF COS SPENDING, .
[504]2. QUESTIONS WERE NOT PERSUED WITH MUCH VIGOR-AND GROUP
[506]SEEMED NOT TOO DIFFIWSLT TO SATISFY. EXCEPTION WAS. SNODGRASS,
[508]A YOUNG AGGRESSIVE STAFFER WHO OBVIOUSLY WANTED TO DELVE
[510]IN MORE DETAIL BUT WAS RESTRAINED BY TIME LIMITATIONS (THE “,
[512]SECRET
[514]13-00000
[516]FORM 30200
[517]7-71 MEG, 2775
[519]‘CABLE SEC DISSEM BY. TOTAL OTAL COPIES | RUN BY
[521]. ; _REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA:
[522]S E C R E T ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITEL
[523]PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIEO. -
[525]ACTION #
[527]PACE O2=g2— IN- 79579
[529]TOR!111013z2 JAN 76 . JKRT 35661
[531]“CONGRESSMEN WERE HUNGRY AND WANTED TO GET OFF TO LUNCH).
[532]3, THE DELEGATION IS QUITE DIFFERENT FROM CODEL RANDALL,
[533]‘NONE HAD THE INTENSITY OR INTEREST OF REP MILFORD OR THE TOUGH
[534]POLIVIUAL PERCEPTION.OF REFS WILSON/DICKENSON, NR, GARY WAS GUITE
[535]“HELPFUL IN ORGANIZING THE GROUP AND PROVIDING CLUES TO THESR
[536]‘OUTLOOK, | | ae |
[537]4, OVERALL, BELIEVE DELEGATION WAS SATISFIED THOUGH THEY.
[538]PROBABLY DO NOT CONSIDER THIS AN IMPORTANT PART. OF THEIR TRIP.
[539]E2, IMPDET.
[541]13-00000
[543]7-71 MFG. 2/75?
[545]CABLE SEC DISSEM BY peRQOU™ Tora cortes IO— Run ey : . :
[546]: . REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN -
[547]. ; : SECRET . . ISSUING OFFICE 1S PROKIBITED --
[548]PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED . . :
[549]D
[551]PAGE @1-01 | IN 789314 :
[553]oe ee . , : |
[555]~  TORSG91229Z JAN 76 | “CNBR 20992 :
[559]“SEC.RE T a9ce3sz- JAN 76 STAFF.
[560]Ite CANBERRA 20992
[561]To: WELLINGTON INFO. ‘pIRECTOR.
[562]. RYSAT. PLMHCONGE CONGRESSMAN MILFORD
[563]REF KELL INGTON 15857, 79752)
[564]1, CoS. WIL TAKE: MATTER UP WITH CONGRESSMAN MILFORD ASAP . .
[565]ARRIVAL CANBERRA AND ADVISE, — oo . re
[567]20. REGARDS. E2, ‘IMPDET.
[569]SECRET On
[572]13-00000
[574]- OUTGOING | ‘ESSAGE
[576]SECRET.
[578]- MESSAGE HANOLING INDICATOR . . OATE-Time enour - cre MESSAGE MEFERENCE NUMBER
[580]STAFF “+ G88385Z "DIRECTOR: 289926 a2
[581]CONF: oaé INFO: FILE Der Zovtous 5 / 4 coves DISSEM BY:
[582]} “O nerumro PER SOP
[583]“eter ayy Le,
[584]. : . a] memes # V2. .
[585]TOs PRIORITY JAKARTA INFO CANBERRA. WELLINGTON. v Oe
[586]~RYBAT PLNHCONGA Y a BN
[587]R FE JAKARTA asbo0 ‘JIN 2e7s7ael. we | _—_
[588]A. be. STATION APPEARS: TO HAVE. HANDLED VISIT OF ‘CONGRESSMAN
[590]7 HILFORD IN FINE: FASHIEON. REF. wILL BE HELPFUL. IN FOLLoU- uP
[591]“DIScUSSTONS HERE-¥ 7
[592]| 2. PARAGRAPH NINE. “REFERENCE GIVES US SOME PROBLENS.
[593]“oavroUsLYs EVEN FHACT THAT HE WAS BRIEFED BY CIA STATION CHIEF
[594]; (FE Pagers heos-
[595]“IN JAKARTA SENSITIVE SINCE, THAT FACT,WILL CAUSE US EMBARRASSMENT
[596]ITH INDONESIAN LIAISON, AND: WITH INDONESIAN. GOVERNMENT PLUS
[597]: CALLING, UNWANTED ATTENTION T0 STATION. FURTHER, STATION ACTIVITIES
[598]AIN INTERNAL OPS FIELD AND FOCUS ON’ “ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION
[599]Ww INDONESIA WILL IF PUBLISHED, CAUSE. US DAMAGE. IN INDONESIA.
[600]ANOTHER PROBLEN IS THAT WE HAVE. PLEDGED. TO LIAISON THAT WE WILL
[601]“PROTECT: 0 OUR: RELATIONSHIP WITH THEN. NEETING WITH YOGA, IF.
[602]" PUBLISHED» WILL BE INTERPRETED BY YOGA AS A BREACH OF FAITH.¥.
[603]3. THEREFORE REQUEST STATION FORWARD "NON- CLASSIFIED"
[605]: VERSION OF BRIEFING AND’ Yooa nEETING BY CABLES ~ HEADQUARTERS
[606]_ DATE: Soe .
[607]ORIG:
[608]_ UNIT:
[609]Ext?
[611]_ RELEASING OFFICER _S0oROmATHNG oricens ap cones
[614]ere E "Ar 1 Abie ev OTHER THAN HE ISSUING OFFICE ts ; PRONIBITED. E 2 DET -
[615]7 a CL BY: 058923
[617]13-00000
[619]ONF. O- A ee ee ee |)
[621]: - CLASSIFICATION, :
[623]ces - SIGNAL CENTER Use ONLY, ue aoe
[624]age con J) Uae te toe.” wee
[626]SEC RE: T
[628]STAFF “= ee _ DIRECTOR:
[630]MESSAGE HANDLING IHOATOR So _ BATa-TMegRoUr cre : i MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
[632]~ 0 wow pIssem BY:
[633]-D doen , .
[635]784 q26 O ncrunvto | PER
[639]‘CONF: =. > ~—sINFO: - FE
[641]WILL HANDLE HERE WITH CONGRESSHAN ELFORD So. THAT: STATION
[642]OPERATIONS INCLUDING LIATSON EQUITIES ARE PROTECTED. a
[644]We FOR CANBERRA, WELLINGTON: IF CONGRESSMAN MELFORD MAKES -
[646]_ REQUEST FOR: UNCLASSIFIED VERSIONS OF MEETING -AND BRIEFINGS WITHS 7
[648]BY STATION AND. LIAISON STATION. SHOULD AGREE FORWARD 70 HEADQUARTERS.
[650]. AND. WE UIE HANDLE, IN SIMILAR: FASHION. AS. VAKARTA MATERIAL - ER. IMPDET. oo
[652]oLe MR. WHITE {DRAFT}
[654]Se SAZ/DDO MR» WALLER: {TEL ECOORD}
[657]»  DCEA™b . Co - .
[659]4 94373. a eo a
[661]WILLTAL, F. NELSON DDO) — THEODORE &» SAACK CSA CEA
[663]RELEASING OFFICER © . . COORDINATING OFricEns ©
[665]CLASSIFICATION cyt Jn BROdUCriON . JTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE 1s PROHIBIT. —E 2° IMPDET™ |
[666]SEC RE tO oo a , ‘CL BY: 953443
[668]13-00000
[669]|
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[673]: caste see seem av Y7 rer
[675]PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED
[677]REPRODUCTION ay ornun THA
[678]. 1BSUING OPFicE- 13. PROWIDITEE
[680]"fare PRECEDENGE
[682]ACTION UNIT
[684]4 “ACTION.# - DLO pe XO 710" ae Dc
[686]Pie rs an \ IN 7e7635
[688]fey
[691]ts TOR: 10805592 JAN 76° JKRT. 35606
[692]_ _ oe = WS
[693]SE CRE T. 0603522 JAN 16 STAFF ; Ww
[694]| » LOS Nal
[695]CITE JAKARTA 356 06. . oo . me yl |
[696]T03 DIRECTOR INFO. TWMEDIATE CANBERRA ROUTINE WELLINGTON,
[698]RYBAT PLMHCONGA
[699]REF? JAKARTA 235600 (0767873).
[700]i, CONGRESSMEN WILSON AND. DICKINSON BRIEF ED “AT COS RESIDENCE 7
[701]NIGHT 7 JANUARY FOLLOWING A RECEPTION AT CHARGE'S RESIDENCE. THEIR
[702]INTERESTS LAY PRIMARILY IN GENERAL INTELLIGENCE APPRECIATION OF SITUA=
[703]TION IN INDONESIA, PARTICULARLY STABILITY OF GOVERNMENT. ann ROLE OF
[704]INDONESIAN MILITARY. THEY ASKED NO QUESTIONS “CONCERNING ORGANI~
[705]ZATION, TARGETS, PERSONNEL OR BUDGET OF STATION, THEY WERE OPENLY
[706]CRITICAL UF YOGA BRIEFING, WHICH THEY HAD ATTENDED: EARLIER IN
[707]“THE DAY AS PER REF, AND FELT THAT YOGA HAD BEEN EVASIVE AND
[708]| GENERALLY UNRESPONSIVE. THEY ASKED COS TO SUM UP WHAT YOGA HAD
[709]SAID, GOS'S ANSWER WAS THAT YOGA HAD APPEALED FOR MILITARY
[710]ASSISTANCE BUT HAD STRESSED THAT THIS WAS ONLY ONE ELEMENT OF
[711]THe TOTAL INDONESIAN’ "NATIONAL RESILIENCE" PLAN, WHICH INCLUDED
[712]ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AS. A DEFENSE AGAINST. COMMUNIST
[713]ENCROACHMENT, THE CUNGRESSMEN AGREED THAT THIS WAS THE BASIC
[714]MESSAGE, SAID THAT IT COULD HAVE BEEN CONVEYED IN FIVE MINUTES |
[715]| | SECRET
[717]13-00000
[719]"771 MFG. 2/76
[721]“TOTAL COPIES . RUN BY 7
[723]SECRET
[725]CABLE SEC DISSEM BY_ PER : ed
[726]. _ REPRODUCTION BY OTHER Tt
[727]* ISSUING OFFICE 16 PROHIBIT
[729]PERGON/UNIT NOTIFIED.
[731]| ACTION UNIT
[733]ACTION #
[735]| 504762 ElASSi PAGE @2. — IN 787635 |
[737]TOR?e05592 JAN.76 =.  SKRT «35686
[739]“RATHER THAN ONE HOUR PLUS, | | _
[740]2. THE THO WERE ALSO INTERESTED IN TERRORIST ACTIVITY AND
[742]“WHAT WAS BEING DONE ABOUT IT IN INDONESIA THEY APPEARED HIGHLY
[743]INTERESTED HEN CoS REPORTED THAT THE STATION HAD PENETRATED WHAT
[744]APPEAREL Tu BE AN ACTIVE TERRORIST GROUP WHICH APPARENTLY HAD
[745]- [CONNECTIONS WITH THE JAPANESE RED ARMY, NEITHER HAD EVER HEARD
[746]“OF THE JRA AND WERE INTERESTED IN & SHORT BRIEFING ON IT, BOTH
[747]wane MENTION OF INDONESIA'S CO*SPONSORSHIP OF THE U.N. RESOLUTION
[748]"(CONDEMNING UsSs MILITARY BASES IN GUAM, ONE OF THE MEMBERS OF THE
[749]DELE GA TION 1s REPRESENTATIVE ANTON IO WONPAT, wi 1S THE REPRESEN- -
[750]TATIVE FROM GUAM, THEY SAID MR, WONPAT HAD AGREED FOR THE SAKE
[751]oF DIPLUMACY NOT TO BRING. UP THIS MATTER DURING THE’ VESIT, Bur
[752]“THAT HE HAD CONFESSED TO SOME DIFFICULTY IN CONTAINING HIMSELF
[753]“IN THIS MATTER,  COS.REPLIED THAT AS A PERSONAL OPINION HE SOMEWHAT .
[754]REGRETTED THAT NR, WONPAT DID NOT EXPRESS HIMSELF ON: THIS ISSUE
[756]_ SINCE WE HAD TAKEN SOME PAINS TU LET OUR INDO NESTAN COUNTERPARTS
[758]KNOW THAT We WERE NOT HAPPY.aT THIS. GRATUITOUS REBUFF IT WAS
[760]> ALSO POINTED OUT THAT STATION. HAD MADE SURE THIS ISSUE WAS BROUGHT - LA |
[761]TO THE ATTENTION OF PRES IDENT SUHARTO, | WHO HAD’ REACTED By INSTRUCTING .
[763]THE INDONESIAN’ UyN. DELEGATION TO SEEK. INSTRUCTIONS FROM JAKARTA os
[765]|
[766]SEC R E T on Oe oe | :
[769]13-00000
[771]| DT MPG, 2/76 et, : - _ oC
[773]‘. “CABLE BEC DISSEM BY. __PER UTOTAL COPIES | RUN-BY © ‘
[774]tenes tier ; a oo |” REPRODUCTION By OFMER THA
[775]“IGSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITEE
[777]'. BERGON/UNIT NOTIFIED.
[779]a8, Ary F
[780]ACTION UNIT
[784]T 594762 EIAS51.. Pace @3.=S*=*~<“CS*~sé‘“‘S*S:*S*C*WNSC BOS
[786]TARE 6B 95592 JAN | % 0 . JKRT 35606 ;
[788]BEFORE ACTING ON ANY SUCH Is SUE ahins WE also NOTED THAT.
[789]“PRESIDENT. SUHARTO. HAD BEEN DEEPLY UPSET AT THE INDONESIAN UN.
[790]. DELEGATION VOTE 8N THIS ISSUE. AND HAD. MADE HIS DISPLEAS SURE KNOWN
[791]TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE, .
[792]3, “DURING THE COURSE OF THE YOGA BRIEFING, SEVERAL OF THE
[793]CONGRESSMEN HAD RAISED THE ‘ISSUE OF PUBLIG STUTEMENTS OF” PRESIDENT
[794]Mangos AND "THE KING OF THAILAND" DEM AND IN G THE REMOVAL OF U. Ss.
[795]MILITARY BASES: ‘FROM THEIR COUNTRIES. YOGA HAD RESPONDED. THAT
[796]THESE STATEMENTS WERE FOR DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONSUMPTION AND. pip
[797]NOT REPRESENT THE TRUE POLITICAL BELIEFS OF THE THAT AND PHILIPPINE .
[798]LEADERSHIP, “AS. YOGA PUT 17, THESE WERE POLITICAL STATEMENTS AND
[799]) NOT STATEMENTS OF POLICY, BOTH CONGRESSMEN FELT THAT THIS ANSWER
[800]REPRESENTED HIGH DEGREE OF POLITICAL NAIVETE SINCE SUCH PUBLIC
[801]STATEMENTS WERE HEADLINED IN THE U.S, AND NATURALLY AFFECTED.
[803]CONGRESS, CONGRESSMAN WILSON COMMENTED THAT IT WAS EXTREMELY
[804]DIFFICULT TU FIGHT FOR MILITARY. ASSISTANCE FOR THESE COUNTRIES ©
[805]WHEN THEY WERE TELLING THE WORLD THAT THEY DIDN'T WANT IT, HE |
[806]ADDED THAT THAT GOES FOR THE GUAM RESOLUTION ALSO, HE ASKED FOR
[807]CoS'S RECOMMENDATIONS ON WHE THER TO KEEP QUIET ON. THIS OR LET
[809]_ HIS FEELINGS BE KNOWN s. cs SUGGESTED THAT HE MIGHT WISH TO.
[810]7 . SECRET
[812]13-00000
[814]_7+7) MFG, 2/78
[816]CABLE SEC DISSEM BY__ PER | ___TOTAL COPIES 2 RUN BY
[818]S ECR ET
[820]REPRODUCTION BY OTHER shan!
[821]ISSUING OFFICE 16 PROHIBITED | |
[823]PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED __
[825]ADVA E COP SSUE = : Z .
[827]ACTION UNIT .
[829]. !
[830]1
[832]i
[834]i
[836]ACTION #
[838]T 584762 EIASS1 = © PAGE 04 _ ~ IN 787635
[839]TOR$@8O5592 JAN 76 _  SKRT 35606
[841]DISCUSS THIS WITH THE CHARGE, BUT OFFERED AS A PERSONAL OPINION
[842]THAT 17 WOULD DO NO HARM AND MIGHT DO SOME VERY REAL GOOD TOR |
[843]CONGRESSMEN TO LET THEIR FEELINGS BE KNOWN ON THIS SUBJECT. =
[844]COS ADDED THAT HE HAD FREQUENTLY TOLD HIS INDONESIAN COUNTERPARTS
[845]THAT 17 DID NO GOOD FOR ASIAN LEADERS TO SAY PRIVATELY THAT THEY.
[846]“DIDN'T REALLY MEAN WHAT THEY DID SAY puBLIcLY SINCE, THE PUBLIC
[847]STATEMENTS WERE ON THE RECORD AND THE PRIVATE “ONES WERE NOT.
[848]4, THESE GENTLEMEN ARE HARD BITTEN, PROFESSIONAL POLITICIANS.
[849]GENERALLY THEY APPEARED TO FAVOR A CONTINUING ROLE FOR THE UsSy
[850]IN ASIAN AFFAIRS, INCLUDING CONTINUING MILITARY ASSISTANCE. THEY
[851]ARE, HOW EV ER, DEEPLY SUSPICIOUS OF ASIAN LEADERS, THEIR WILL AND
[852]ABILITY TO SURVIVE AGAINST DETERMINED COMMUNIST ‘SUBVERSION: AND.
[853]THEIR PERSONAL INTEGRITY, CONGRESSMAN WILSON RECOUNTED THAT HE.
[854]HAD BEEN PRESENT WHEN SUKARNO ADDRESSED A JOINT SESSION OF THE
[855]| CONGRESS AND WAS HAILED AS A GREAT NATIONALIST LEADER. HE ADDED,
[856]MLOGK AT WHAT THAT (EXPLETIVE DELETED). DID TO UsI" “THEY EXPRESSED
[857]VERY LITTLE GF THEIR UPINIONS CONCERNING. THE AGENCY, ALTHOUGH -
[858](BOTH SEEMED To ATTEMPT TO ELICIT STATEMENTS FROM COS CRITICAL
[859]OF MR, HELMS. IN THIS, OF COURSE: THEY. WERE UNSUCCESSFUL. BOTH
[860]EXPRESSED ADMIRATION FOR THE “CONDOR “OF MR, COLBY ».
[861]| gee RET
[864]13-00000
[866]|
[867]| TTY MPG, 2/78 soe S os ee
[869]REPRODUCTION ey.
[871]“2% TOTAL copies : “> RUN BY-
[872]ISSUING OFFice 18 paonverre
[874]‘CABLE SEC DISSEM BY____-_PER
[876]_ PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED
[878]- ADVANCE COP
[879]|” ACTION UNIT
[882]1 $84762- EIAS51 PAGE 05-05 =  .  ..——sN 787635 |
[883]poe cS ToR 19605592 JAN 76 7 SkRT 35606
[885]5 GENERALLY IT APPEARED THEY WERE SATISFIED WITH THEIR
[886]CONVERSATION WITH COS» ALTHOUGH GENERALLY DISAPPOINTED WITH THE .
[887]RESULTS OF THEIR VIS IT UP To THAT TIME, SINCE THEY’ SAID’ THEY. WAD-
[888]NOT FOUND OUT MUCH FRUM THE INDONESIANS THAT THEY DIDN'T KNOW
[889]“BEFORE. STRONGLY ENDORSE HEADGUARTERS ADVICE To TREAT WITH THESE
[890]GENTLEMEN SEPARATLEY FROM CONGRESSMAN MILFORD» WHOSE INTERESTS
[891]SEEM QUITE DIFFERENT 7 FRoW THEIRS', £2, IMPDET. |
[893]- *Advised of contact with Congressmen. Milford, Wilson and Dickinson to arrange .
[894]briefings, and forwarded a report of the separate 3 hour briefing of Milford on’ |
[896]7 January.
[898]. SECRET
[900]13-00000
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[903]{ rURM SUZUD |
[905]I * I5d7 MFG, 12/76
[906]le
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[914]'  PERGON/UNIT NOTIFIED
[916]AeTION UNIT Ly
[917]Cleary
[919]_ ACTION #
[922]“= 7b84283  EIAQ0S PAGE OL IN 787573
[923]ee ; _TuRt@80007z2 JAN 760 KT 35600 |
[925]/- §.8 € RE T 0709442 JAN 76 STAFF
[926]CITE JAKARTA 35600 ©
[927]To: DIRECTOR INFO CANSERRA, WELLINGTON,
[928]RYSAT PLMHCONGA | |
[929]REF: A, DIRECTOR 788143
[930]gg, DIRECTOR 788139
[931]C+ DIRECTOR 768390
[932]‘D. DIRECTOR 785722
[933]4, MADE CONTACT WITH CONGRESSMAN MILFoRD SuoRtiy AFTER HIS
[934]_ ARRIVAL AND ARRANGED To BRIEF HIM ON MORNING 7 JANUARY, ALSO
[935]| CONTACTED JONGRESSMEN WILSON AND D/ RKINSON AND LATER MR, TED
[936]LUNGER, AND WILL: BRIEF WILSON AND DICKINSON NIGHT 7 JANUARY,
[937]| 2, MILFORD BRIEFING COMPR/SED THREE FULL HOURS AND GENERALLY
[938]FOLLOWED FORMAT OUTLIVED REF. THIS WAS LIBERALLY INTERSPERSED
[939]WITH THEORETICAL EXAMPLES WHICH WEREVERE CLOSE TO ACTUAL CASES,
[940], 3, MILFORD WAS SERTURS, ATTENTIVE AND (NTERESTED LISTENER,
[941]| HE WAS PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN CHECKS AND BALANCES, COMMAND
[942]-AND CONTROL» FISCAL ACCOUNTABILITY.» AND SECURITY ANU MORALE oF
[943]STATION PERSONNEL, HE DID NOT ASK NUMBERS oF STATION: PERSONNEL,
[944]OVERALL QUDGET, OR OTHER SENSITIVE DETAIL. WE WAS VERY INTERESTED
[946]13-00000
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[951]; ‘SECRET oo, esuine orrice 1s paontbrraa ,
[952]J
[954]CABLE SEC DISSEM BY. __ PER
[956]PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED
[958]T 584283 ELAB94 PAGE a2 . IN 787573
[960]ToRI 802072 JAN 76  JKRT 35608
[962]IN STATION'S LIAISON PROGRAM AND AN EVALUATION OF THE STABILITY
[963]-- AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE INDONEWIAN GOVERNMENT, -HIS ATTITUDE |
[964]WAS POSITIVE THROUGHOUT AND HE INDICATED THAT HE HAD HIGH. en
[965]ADMIRATION FOR THE AGENCY AND BELLVED THAT NEGATIVE CONGRESSIONAL.
[966]ATTITUDES WERE LARGELY BASED ON IGNORANCE, HE SAID ALSO THAT THE
[967]CONGRESS SO FAR HAD BEEN LUOKING AT THE AGENCY'S "OLD CATS" AND
[968]‘THAT EVEN SOME OF THE "RAVING LIBERALS" WOULD TAKE ANOTHER VIEW
[969]OF THE AGENCY IF THEY ‘TOOK THE TIME TO INFORM THEMSELVES OF THE
[970]MANY POSITIVE CONTRIBUTIONS MADE BY THE AGENCY, AND PARTICULARLY
[971]‘BY THE poo. HE ‘ALSO EVIDENCED CONSIDERABLE | NTEREST IN ECONOMIC.
[972]INTELLIGENCE, SAYING THAT HE FELT THIS To BE AN IMPORTANT MISSION.
[973]OF THE AGENCY AND NEEDED TO BE EMPHASIZED MORE. cos. OUTLINED 4
[974]FEW STATION ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN THIS FIELD THAT SEEMED TO PLEASE
[975]HIM. — : : . re - |
[976]PAGHSE IMMA TA-SEODL-S EO REF BF
[977]eo oe _
[978]& OFF THE RECORD» CONGRESSMAN MILFORD ‘galD HE HAD IN MIND.
[979]PREPARING A MINORITY REPORT AND SPONSORING A BILL WHEREBY A
[980]SINGLE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON AGENCY OVERSIGHT WOULD BE FORMED, THIS
[981]COMMITTEE WOULD HAVE MEMBERSHIP FROM THE ARMED SERVICES, FOREIGN 7
[982]RELATIONS, APPROPRIATIONS, TREASURY, SCIENCE AND TECHNOL OR, AND
[983]” . , pakinces . | |
[985], SECRET. )_.
[989]13-00000
[992][ee eeeeee wos. _"
[993]| 7671 MEG. 2/76 ° _ foe a oa i
[994]' ae . t : : . 4
[996]CABie sec DISSEM BY “PER! us TOTAL COPIES - RUN BY
[998]: oe _ + .REPRODUCTION BY Grin Tha
[999]SECRET : | oe ISSUING OFFICE ts PROHIBIYe
[1001]" PRREON/UNIT NOTIFIED
[1003]: ACTION UNIT”
[1005]ACTION #
[1007]T 584283 EIA94 “PAGE BS _ | IN 787573 °
[1009]TORIGSOGB7Z JAN 76 7 SKRT 35600-
[1011]THE PRESENT SELECT COMMITTEE. UNLIKE OTHER COMMITTEES OF .
[1012]CONGRESS; ITS MEETINGS WOULD ALWAYS BE CLOSED AND ONLY OPEN AS
[1014]A SPECIFIC VARIATION FROMTHE NORM AND WITH THE APPRUVAL OF THE
[1016]; 7 ; 40s - |
[1017]SREAKER @F THE HOUSE, ALSO» UNLIKE OTHBS COMMITTEES, COMMITTEE
[1018]DOCUMENTS WOULD NOT 8 ACCESSIBLE EXCEPT oN A STRICT BIGOTED
[1020]7 courstD Nowr GB
[1022]€ BASIS AND MCHD NRLNYE DECLASSIFIED WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE
[1024]: . THE
[1025]MAJORITY GF THE COMMITTEE, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE CONNITTEE AND 6a
[1026]“SPEAKER GF THE HOUSE. HESADMITTED THAT THIS BILL MIGHT HAVE
[1028]: . CE : : . ;
[1029]SOME ROUGH GOING IN THE P@@SENT CONGRESS, WE POOH=POOHED THE IDEA
[1031]. 44 KO
[1032]OF A JOINT COMMITTEE SAEENG THAT IT WOULD HAVEMAO LEGISLATION
[1034]wrtaeie AND WOULD THUS SIMPLY BE ANOTHER Dos BITING, AT OUR HEELS,
[1035]: . . CONGRESSMAN MILFORD AskeD FOR COS! VIEWS ON THIS |
[1036]| “LEGISLATION AS WELL AS ANY RECOMMENDATIONS WHICH GOS WOULD CARE
[1037]| TO MAKE @N GR OFF THE RECORD. COS MERELY COMMENTED THAT
[1039]CONGRESSMAN MILFORD!S PLANNED LEGISLATION SEEMED EXCELLENT AND
[1041]NOTED THAT THE AGENCY WAS NOT ATTEMPTING To AVOID RESPONSIBLE
[1042]OVERSIGHT BY THE CONGRES, BUT ADDED THAT A SECRET SERVICE MUST
[1044]WAVE Sve SECRETS, AND WITHOUT THIS ESSENTIAL ELENENT We WOULD
[1046]BE OUT OF BUSINESS, CoS OFFERED NO RECOMMENDOFRANS ON THE BASIS
[1048]THAT THE REQUEST WAS UNEXPECTED AND DID NOT GIVE HIM SUFFICIENT
[1050]SECRET
[1052]13-00000
[1054]Th MFG. 2/76
[1056]CABLE SEC DISSEM BY TOTAL COPIES RUN BY . : a
[1057]REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN
[1059]SECRET (SGUING OFFICE is PROHISITED
[1061]PERGON/UNIT NOTIFIED : ; _
[1063]ACTION UNIT
[1065]ACTION #.
[1067]1 584283 ° E1A894 PAGE 4 . a IN 787573
[1069]TOR: @8G0B7Z JAN 76 © JKRT. 35600
[1071]TIME TO THINK THROUGH A RESPONSIBLE RECOMMENDATION,
[1072]6. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD ALSO’ INQUIRED ABOLT THE EFFECT OF
[1074]THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT ON STATUN AGTIVITEES. COS
[1076]POINTED BUT CERTAIN OBVIOUS SECURITY AND BUREAUCRATIC DIFFICULTIES»
[1077]‘BUT pID N@T ELABORATE,
[1079]Fe - FOLLOWING STATION BRIEFING, cos ACCOMPANIED CONGRESSMAN
[1081]MILDORD. TOGETHER WITH. CPARGE RIVES AND THE ENTIRHDELEGATION, TO
[1083]A MEETING WITH GENERAL YOGA IN THE LATTER'S OFFICE. IN THE COURSE
[1084]OF THIS MEETING CONGRESSMAN MILFORD ASKED GENEXAL YOGA IFWYOGA ——
[1085]FELT HE WAS RECEIVING ADEQUATE INTELLIGENCE ASSISTANCE FROM
[1087]UsSs INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES AND IF HE HAD-ANY CRITICISM OF U.Ss
[1089]INTELLIGENCE INTERFERENCE IN. INDONESIAN AFFAIRS, GENERAL YOGA
[1090]REPLIED THAT ALTHOUGH HE FELT THE NEED To DEVELOP BAKIN SOMEWHAT
[1091]FURTHER, THE PRESENT ORGANIZATION AND CAPABILITIES OF BAKIN ARE
[1092]CLOSE TO SUFFICIENT, IN.CERTAIN CASES It 15 POSSIBLE TO COOPERATE
[1093]“WITH FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES» BUT THIS WAS ALWAYS DONE WITHOUT
[1095]INVOLVEMENT IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS IN EITHER SIDE. YOGA CONTINUED
[1097]THAT BAKIN AND CIA COOPERATIE IN CASES OF MUTUAL INTEREST, SUCH
[1098]AS THE SOVIETS, THIS 1S A LIMITED COOPERATION DIRECTED TO
[1100]A SPECIF3G GOAL, YOGA ADMITTED ALSO THAT HE HAD OTHER LIAISON:
[1101]a SECR Er
[1103]: . 4
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[1132]_ REPRODUCTION: BY oTHaR tial
[1134]; “CABLE SEC DISSEM BY.
[1135]: . ISSUING onricu w PROHIBITED
[1137]' PERBON/UNIT NOTIFIED_
[1139]i . -
[1140]i ACTION UNIT
[1144]T peaz83 TABS PAGE 25 _ EN 787573 |
[1145]ae 7 TORIQBOO07Z JAN 76 UKRT 35690
[1146]bo YY - | Po -
[1148]_ RELATIONSHIPS ETH THE: ‘BRU TISH, THE. AUSTRALIANS, THE JALANESEs
[1149]| WEST GERMANS, aD ALL OF THE ASEAN NATIONS, HE SAID SPECIFICALLY
[1150]THAT HIS RELATIONSHIPS WITH AIA WERE EXCELLENT. HE DID NOT ADDRESS.
[1151]HIMSELF TO ANY INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL - AFFAIRS. a
[1153]8. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD HAS AN ACTIVE, VIVACIOUS WIFE NAMED
[1154]MARY WHO WASWELL TAgEN CARE OF BY EMBASSY ESCORT FSO EMILY PERREAULT,
[1155]SHE EVIDENCED INTEREST IN THE CASINOS, SAILING SHIPS AND SHOPPING
[1156]FOR NATIVE HANDICRAFTS, CONGRESSMAN MILFORD IS AN AVID PHOTOGRAPHER
[1157]AND ASKED TO BE TAKEN ON A MINI®TOUR OF THE CITY FOR THIS PURPOSE, .
[1158]HE WEARS A HEARING AID AND IS SLIGHTLY HARD OF HEARING, AND IT
[1159]Is wert SPEAK DISTINCTLY AND DIRECTLY AT HIM. |
[1160]9, MILFORD Asko For A NON*CLASSIFIED VERSION OF STATION,
[1161]BRIEFING AND OF MEBTING WITH oc To Be SENT TYABENGY AND PSsED_
[1162]ON TO HIMs THIS WILL BE A LITTLE DIFFICULT BUT HE INSISTED 1T
[1163]HAVE NO CLASSIFICATION SINCE IT WOULD Go INTO THE OFFICIAL RECORD,
[1164]wIke PREPARE AND FORWARD SOONEST,
[1166]10, GVERALL pELIVE. THIS WAS A PLUSe MILDORD EXPRESSED |
[1168]COMPLETE SATISFACTION WITH HIS BRIEF ING AND AGAIN REPEATED
[1170]THAT IF @THERS OF THE CONGRESS WOULD ONLY INFORM THEMSELVES. THEY TOO
[1171]WORLD BE IMPRESSED,
[1172]SECRET
[1174]13-00000 |
[1178]7-71 MEG, 2/78
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[1184]CABLE SEC DIdSEM BY Cs
[1185]REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN |
[1186]SECRE T. : . . ISSUING OFFICE ia PROHIBITED —
[1188]PERBON/UNIT NOTIFIED.
[1190]ACTION UNIT
[1192]ACTION #
[1194]T 598283 EIA894 PAGE B6=06 IN 787573:
[1196]TOR 10800072 JAN 76_ a JKRT 35600 |
[1198]7
[1200]wit WILL REZORT ecaRATELY ON WILSON/DICKINSON BRIEFING
[1201]~~ wen, iT Is COMPLETED LATER TONIGHT, E2, IMPDET,
[1203]ae oo) SECRET
[1205]13-00000
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[1218]ACTION UNIT
[1220]PAGE Oin0, IN 767586.
[1222]7 ToRia72i2va JAN. 76. os CNBR 20980.
[1223]S& c RET. 0721002 JAN 16 ‘STAFF a a
[1225]CITE CANBERRA 20960.
[1227]“Tor DIREGTOR, ~ |
[1229]_RYBAT PLMNCONGA CONGRESSMAN MILFORD -
[1231]EFL DIRECTOR 787585 |
[1233]a ty APPOINTMENTS WITH LIAISON HAVE BEEN TENTATIVELY”
[1234]ARRANGED. CONG, MILFORD WILL MEET WITH ‘SOTERN REP
[1235]reat SOTERNI44, D/10 AND SQUASH/D=G. _
[1237]COS’ AND BONHAM DISCUSSIONS TENTATIVELY set FOR:
[1238]0830-1090, “ANTICIPATE: APPROXIMATE 30 MINUTES WEETING WITH
[1239]EACH LIAISON. OFFICER, $0 SHOULD. BE COMPLETED IN aNeLE Tae :
[1240]FOR’ ‘WILFORD TO REJOIN ‘GROUP FOR AFTERNOON. AQTIVITHES, -C AN
[1242]“EXTEND DURATION. oF NEGTINGS. IF we | DESIRES. Ea, JWPDET,. |
[1245]13-00000
[1246]{ 7e7V MEG. 2770
[1248]CARLE GEC DISGEM BY a, .
[1249]oe _ REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN
[1250]ISSUING OFFICE 15 PROHIBITED
[1252]PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED
[1254]7 STAFF fe
[1256]ADVANGE COP BSUED LOTTED z : : ;
[1258]ACTION UNIT 1 RP. FILE... VR. “De Macview STAFF 7 2 el :
[1260]N Fr Sc) es Ld
[1262]LEAS \) poo ©S/RE zafoe\ Mode BL ep CS
[1265]TF 584270  ELABB2 PAG| = J “IN 787572
[1266]roRteeagetz JAN 76 a WELL 15837
[1268]S Ec RE T 0702402 JAN 76 STAFF a vlS.
[1269]CITE WELLINGTON (15837 |
[1270]To! CANBERRA INFO DIRECTOR,
[1272]RYBAT PLMHCONGA CONGRESSMAN MILFORD
[1274]REFS: As DIRECTOR 787959
[1276]B, “DIRECTOR 787555
[1277]PLS ADVISE CONGRESSMAN MILFORD THAT cos WELLENGTON CAN ARRANGE
[1278]45 JANUARY 0802 HOURS BREAKFAST MEETING WITH Nz SECURITY INTELLI
[1279]"GENCE SERVICE DIRECTOR, BRIGADIER H, E. GILBERT, AT CONGRESSMAN
[1280]"MILF ORD!'S HOTEL. ALTHOUGH EMBASSY WELLINGTON BRIEFINGS ON UPERATION
[1281]DEEPFREEZE SCHEDULED FOR MORNING OF 15 JAN. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD MAY
[1282]PREFER TO MEET WITH COS AND GRIGADIER GILBERT. AMBASSADOR SELDEN
[1283]GONCURS WITH THIS ARRANGEMENT, TRANSPORTATION TO AIRPORT FOR
[1285]FLIGHT TO MT. COOK: WILL BE AVAILABLE IMMEDIATELY: AFTER MEETING WITH
[1286]GILBERT. PLS “ADVISE CONGRESSMAN MILFORD!S PREFERENCE So COS CAN .
[1288]CONFIRM ABOVE ARRANGEMENT WITH BRIGADIER GILBERT, .  E21MPDET
[1290]cee SECRET
[1292]13-00000
[1294]7 Tem se ett em Oe eee
[1296]“OUTGOIN _. MESSAGE.
[1298]. - sionaL CentER Use onty , /0 = f
[1299]: aca * cor. ACR Too oe ~ id i
[1300]onF oO ag oF O° 0 Oo. |
[1301]SECRET. | SO | | Pe
[1302]. MESRAGE HANDLING INDICATOR _ pater .TIME GROUP : ome . 7 oo MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER -
[1303]STAFF a Ove3uaz DIRECTOR ST  PAPASA
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[1308]CONF: ila INFO: “FILE wes, REVIEW STAFF, )
[1309](900, CoM F, S/
[1311]; roofoo | fee
[1312]Tor JAKARTA CANBERRA WELLIN TON y
[1316]~RYBAT. PLITHCONGA CONGRESSMAN MELFORD yoo
[1317]REFS DIRECTOR 787555 |x| a
[1318]"CONGRESSMAN MILFORD DOES ‘DESTRE MEETINGS. WITH SENTOR LIATSON
[1319]“OFFICIALS REQUEST STATION'S PROCEED TO SCHEDULE MEETINGS WITH
[1320]7 LIAISON. £2. InPDET- A oe
[1322]_ ¥TRANSMITTED CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S SCHEDULE. .
[1324]~ 2 CEA/PMI
[1326]DATE: 2 JAN’ 26
[1327]“ORIG! Bed. HOUSTON |
[1328]UNIT: DCEA
[1330]EATS 923. |
[1332]| STHEODORE G. SHA oo _ BILL: ‘J. HOUSTON CEA -
[1333]. RELEASING OFFICER . eo - COORDINATING orricens. : : “AUTHENTICATING Orricen ot
[1334]- _ELASSIFICATION 7 : . “REPRODUCTION BY OTHER “THAN. THE. ISSUING OFFICE 1s PROHIBITED” E
[1336]BO hte eee SOILS yp Op ae
[1338]13-00000
[1340]. : _ z 7 siovnk Cemiun via énty 0 >
[1341]on oo Uo 1
[1342]CLABEIICATION : mn . : -
[1343]SECRET 9. .00 . °) a ‘
[1344]MESSAGE HANDUNG INDICATOR oo. a dave-rime gaouP . : _ _—
[1345]STAFF /J 0. OBB120Z. DIRECTOR oe
[1347]~ RYBAT PLMHCONGAY
[1348]“REFS: A- DIRECTOR 2as7ze {NOT ‘NEEDED TOKYOR “lel
[1350]SECRET © re CL BY:
[1352]_ OUTGOIN” | -MESSAGE
[1354]com D/OLC, wo: mu Der /Review SH, D Lesher : “i. fate
[1356]Pooper, 5 oleas neruan ro PER eert
[1357]Orne + of
[1359]TO: JAKARTA CANBERRA; WELLINGTON INFO TOKYO. y oe
[1361]. B- DIRECTOR’ SELES {NOT NEEDED TOKYO} lesly
[1362]be BASED 3 JANUARY DISCUSSION WITH CONGRESSMAN MELFORD» HE
[1363]EXPECTS MEETINGS WITH ACTION ADDEES AS FOLLOWS # sy ~
[1365]JAKARTA - MORNING ? JANUARY -
[1367]CANBERRA - 10 JANUARY.
[1369]WELLINGTON ~ EVENING 14 JANUARY ¥-
[1371]2. AT 3 JANUARY MEETING: MILFORD REAFFIRMED HE, AS MEMBER HOUSE
[1372]SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE (PIKE COMMITTEE}, HAS BEEN MOST |
[1373]INTERESTED IN OUTCOME OF COMMITTEE'S INVESTIGATIONS AND IS. CONCERNED |
[1375]. ABOUT DIRECTION IN WHICH COMMITTEE HEARINGS HAVE GONE. FYI4 ONLY
[1377]MILFORD PLANS FILE SEPARATE VIEWS OR MINORITY REPORT WHEN COMMITTEE
[1378]DRAUS UP ITS RECOMMENDATIONS. HE HAS VISITED H@S ON A NUMBER OF |
[1379]OCCASIONS AND HAS BEEN BRIEFED BY VARIOUS AGENCY OFFICIALS’ HE’
[1381]RECENTLY VISITED SEOUL WHERE HE SPENT DAY IN COS HOSPITAL ROOM JUST
[1383]TALKING. MILFORD ANXIOUS SOAK UP AS MUCH KNOWLEDGE AGENCY ACTIVITIES
[1384]DATE: . _ .
[1386]ORIG:
[1387]UNIT:
[1388]EXT:
[1389]+ .
[1390]RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS sO AUTHENTICATING OPmcER .
[1391]CLASSIFICATION : REPRODUCTION ‘BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE Is PROHIBITED E 2  IMPDET
[1392]‘sangs
[1395]13-00000
[1397]OU TGOING: MESSAGE |
[1399]SIGNAL center use omy °°
[1401]ee aon Ce en se pet
[1402]OMF..O- OF 0 GO. Oo. 0 OF
[1403]CLasaiMcation. . . 7 code - ” : Te
[1404]SECRET.- a OR
[1405]a ‘waesaan HANNO INDICATOR - coe : OaTa-Timm GROUP : : MESSAGE REFERENCE HUMBER.” :
[1406]| STAFF Sr "DIRECTOR ns
[1407]a a - O woex DISSEM BY:
[1409]-) CONF: «= NRO: FILE.
[1411]288 39 Be :
[1413]AS POSSIBLE. TO ASSIST HIM WRITE INORITY’ REPORT. ACCORDENGLYS HE.
[1414]“WANTS MEET OUR FOREIGN. LIAISON COUNTERPARTS TO GET FEEL FOR INPORTANCE
[1415]THIS SOURCE AND NEED PROTECT IT FROM PUBLIC. DISCLOSURES. “RECOGNIZE.
[1417]SHORT NOTECEs’ BUT REQUEST ACTION ADDEES TAKE: “SPECIAL EFFORT ARRANGE
[1418]LIAISON CONTACTS. 4
[1419]| 3. FOR UAKARTAR PLS HANDLE MILFORD AND. UELSON/DICKINSON. coN= |
[1420]7 TACTS SEPARATELY. AND AVOID OBVIOUS. SITUATION oF SINGLING MILFORD our Ck
[1421]OR SPECIAL. TREATMENT. ne oO “Mr ‘Lew Bout
[1422]Ws FOR CANBERRA. MILFORD. DOES EXPECT MEETAAND DISCUSS. HIS.
[1423](Bon H4m'5) a
[1424]Aertvary UITH AR. = BONHAR IN CANBERRA. HE wILL. DEVOTE Day. oF
[1425]“M0 JANUARY TO STATION "AND NASAL. REQUEST STATION. COORDINATE wrth nif
[1426]REP WHO PLANS: TAKE: MILFORD VISIT FACILITY at TIPENBILO. oF SOs oa
[1427]—suesest STATION. ARRANGE HAVE: RSs MILFORD ‘TOUR NEARBY 2006. IF ANY
[1428]CONFLICT SCHEDULING. wITH NASA® MELFORD SAYS HE WANTS, ‘AGENCY 10 TAKE
[1429]“PRIORITY. eg: oe - 7 oe _
[1430]Bs FOR WELLINGTON: ‘MILFORD UNDERSTANDS. AIS. stay "WELLINGTON |
[1431]SHORT AND. WILLING DEVOTE. EVENING TO STATION. ee
[1432]oe be FOR ToKvo: ToKyo “rs RESTaSTOP a AND. RELFORD EXPECTS 4 No -
[1434]a cos Lo os oe
[1436]_ ORIG:
[1438]“UNITE
[1439]ORT
[1441]- RELEASING orricar : . . | COORDINATING ovricens
[1443]_ REPRODUC 1! 5 TH N THE ISSUING OFFICE 1s. Pre “SITED
[1445]a :
[1446]. cuisnipicanion’
[1449]13-00000
[1451]; | Sg OUTGOIL | _ MESSAGE
[1453]OnF.o - “po - 0 a ee ee
[1455]_ CLADSIFICATION
[1457]: . SIGNAL CENTER Use ONLY _ : QL,
[1458]7 aaa’ cor " aep . Tos nD Ls ‘MAO
[1460]SECRET. | , | ae
[1461]Lf _mtsoacn HANDLING INDICATOR oo - : > . DaTE-Tiug erour cre ; S co, (mussage CarERENCe wuMoER
[1462]OSTAFF DIRECTOR rr
[1463]_ Bree _ 0 trom bisseM BY:
[1464]_ CONF: - INFO: FILE vo "o. tio ete: wa,
[1465]- - we 788 nt “0 “jiaruien $0" ‘PER
[1466]. ‘g “peaks S a #
[1467]“ CONTACT, y no :
[1469]on REQUEST ACTION ADDEES. COORDINATE. STATION PLANS uItH EnBassy.. a
[1470]SCHEDULING. FOR GROUP. 10 GIVE. AILFORD OPPORTUNITY ‘NEET SENTOR FOREIGN. ies
[1471]GOVERNHENT OFFICIALS IF CONFLICT CAN BE. AVOIDED. MILFORD HAS STRESS=
[1472]EDs HOUEVER; AGENCY. BUSINESS HAS PRIORITY. . Has, HAS PROVIDED WILFORD |
[1473]NAMES. COS'S IN JAKARTA, CANBERRA. AND WELLINGTON. REQUEST STATIONSS
[1475]CONTACT MILFORD. AS SOON AFTER ARRIVAL AS POSSIBLE SO. WILFORD CAN PLAN
[1476]NON-AGENCY PART OF SCHEDULE: SUGGEST STATIONHOFFICER - ASSIST mes.
[1477]‘NILFORD SINCE SHE NAY NOT uISH TO TAG ALONG: UTTH LARGER GROUP “wITHoUT
[1479]HER HUSBAND. E2 IMPDET. A
[1481]GAVE DETAILS ON CONGRESSMAN. MILFORD® s TRIP.
[1483]*# CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S REVISED SCHEDULE.
[1485]DEP. “DIR/DDSAT - ft DUCKETT CRAFT
[1487](OLC - Re CHIN. CDRAFTF,
[1488]pave: 3 JANUARY 7B . _ ae
[1489]onic: R-» CHIN: oN
[1490]cunt: “OLC . 7 .,
[1492]| Peovens G. SHACKLEY, CEA BILLY Houston. pcea
[1493]RELEASING COMCER COORDINATING OFFICERS + AUTHENTICATING OFMcER
[1494]" CLASSIFICATION _ REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED £ 2°  IMPDET
[1496]SEO RE Te oe Ob By: 958088 |
[1498]13-00000
[1500]* ‘CABLE SEC DISSEM BY, Y ‘3 __*_PER RUN BY
[1502]PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED,
[1504]REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN
[1505]ISSUING OFFICE 1S PROHIBITED
[1507]7 572090 + ElA@e2 PAGE O4 — IN 782959
[1508]= TORI@208402 JAN 76 — MKRT 35549.
[1509]SECRET 0207562 JAN 76 STAFF
[1510]CITE JAKARTA 35549 (SHIMA ACTING)
[1511]701 . DIRBETOR.
[1513]~ RYBAT PLMWCONGA: CONGRESSMAN
[1514]REFS! Aq DIRECTOR 767555
[1515]Bs ‘DIRECTOR 785722
[1516]1, CHARGE MIKE RIVES HAS BEEN ADVISED CONGRESSMAN MILs
[1517]“FORDIs REQUEST FOR STATION BRIEF ING PER REF A, WELL ARRANGE
[1518]@RIEFING AFTER CONGRESSMAN'S ARRIVAL, | |
[1519](5 @y, OM 2 JANUARY HAFAWN/4, TELEPHONED STATION TO SAY
[1520]iat cas HAS BEEN RECEIVED BY BAKIN FROM HACLAUSE/1, WE
[1521]PROPOSED MEETINGS: WITH MINISTRY OF DEFENSEs MINISTRY oF
[1522]FOREIGN AFFAIRS» INDONESIAN PARLIAMENT AND CALL ON PRESIDENT
[1523]“SUHARTO, HE ALSO PROPOSED THAT GENERAL MURDANI“@RIEF THE
[1524]“GROUP ON GENERAL SECURITY SITUATION, GAKIN HAS SENT CABLE
[1525]TO MURDANE. TO RETURN TO JAKARTA EARLY NEXT WEEK To os
[1527]re
[1529]PARTICIPATE TN. BRIEFINGS, . BRIEFING oF CONGRESSMEN ‘AND
[1530]THEIR STAEF. MEMBERS SGHEDULED. To: BE HELD AT BAKIN HQ@S ON ;
[1531]7 JANUARY4 CONGRESSMAN MILFORD WILL PARTICIPATE IN THIS
[1533]SRIEFINGs STATION ARRANGED BAKIN. BRIEFINGS BASED ON INSTRUCTIONS
[1534]F Rom CuARGE,
[1536](€ 2 Imerer sSecRET
[1539]13-00000
[1541]oe ne
[1543]OMF O°. oo. a ee
[1545]. “wmaeige HANOLING OICATOR __ - to. BATE Time sROUP: an tre
[1549]_ MENTIONED DIRECTOR 778824. Wo . ar
[1551]OUTGOING MESSAGE
[1553]. ., " SIGNAL CENTEA UBE ONLY Cn -
[1554]aoe. a ee ee . a)
[1556]_ CLassinicATION oe
[1558]SECRET
[1559]STAFF. _ . Joon ‘3123382 . DIRECTOR
[1561]- 7 DIAS Diouc. ”
[1562]TO: PRIORITY JAKARTA CANBERRA, WELLINGTON. v
[1564]“RYBAT PLHCONGA CONGRESSMAN. ILFORD. we
[1566]. REF? DIRECTOR 7as722 Ish 7
[1568]CONGRESSMAN NILFORD REVISED SCHEDULE: ¥ |
[1569]op asa _ -.. 4a00 8 JAN “FOR BALI. a |
[1570]ETD BAL eaten JAN: FOR “CANBERRA ¥ vo
[1571]ETA CANBERRA os vena cg GANS BO a
[1572]ETAVELLINGTON© = aS35 “a gAN. ¥ *
[1573]ETD WELLINGTON 28 wooo 48 JAN FOR nt. cooK y oe
[1574]-ETD MT. COOK yuan 4s JAN I FOR CHRIST CHURCH y
[1576]| ETA. CHRIST. cHURCH > spo. 438 JAN
[1578]2 OF 6 Fe a
[1579]ETD CHRIST CHURCH: 2230 dt JAN. FOR HAWAII. ye
[1581]NOTES . THIS. SEPARATE TRIP. TO THAT (OF ‘SNODGRASS PRESTON CARY
[1583]e. .
[1585]2. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD HAD PREVIOUSLY REQUESTED HEETING WITH
[1586]COS: JAKARTA. 10 JANUARY», cos, CANBERRA 13 JANUARY AND WITH COSs,
[1588]UELLINGTON, 35 JANUARY... REVISED SCHEDULE, vite ALTER HIS’ DESIRES
[1589]THIS CASE. MEETING UITH AEH ON 3 JANUARY AND WILL. FORWARD NEW
[1591]' DATE:
[1593]ORIG:
[1595]_ UNIT: er ee
[1596]er ee
[1598]RELEZASING OFFICEN COORDINATING orricars : : uy + AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
[1600]cLasaircaTion . REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED — 2 _ IMPDET
[1602]13-00000
[1604]_ OUTGOING - ‘MESSAGE FS NS ES]
[1605]————————
[1606]a sraNAL eran UaE ONLY _ ; . ) 0 eR ) ER
[1607]OMF oo | o ee ee ee Be .
[1608]SECRET... i
[1609]7 MEOAGE RaMOLINa moncATOR ~ . " eavurumm nous © ome wasseae marenienca wiumeR
[1610]oe SO DIRECTOR . OS
[1611]CONF: INFO: FILE . Pe of a mSSEM BY:
[1612]; | (Tess (0 nerumra PER
[1613]OD wens - .
[1615]SCHEDULE FOR NEETINGS wrth cost AT THAT TENE: ¥ 7
[1616]| | FOLLOWING ARE. RESULTS CEA AND OLC cM» ROBERT. CHINE a
[1617]paereve OF. ‘CONGRESSMAN MILFORD wa DECEMBER 14975: ¥ _ |
[1618]_ "NINETEEN DECENBER MEETING LAID ON IN ORDER THAT.
[1619]- “qepnesentatzve ‘MILFORD COULD: BE GIVEN A BRIEFING IN OVERVIEW
[1620]TERNS ON WHAT THE cIA STATIONS IN AUSTRALIA. NEW ZEALAND AND
[1621]~ EHDONESIA WERE DOING IN. TERMS OF OPERATIONAL PROGRAMS. ye |
[1622]| Be  AUSTRALTA® THERE: WAS CIA PRESENCE IN CANBERRAy
[1623]“HELBOURNE AND SYDNEY. “THIS REPRESENTATION ‘CONSISTED OF ABOUT |
[1624]SIX OFFICERS CHARGED WITH BASIC NISSION OF PURSUMING. SOVIET.
[1625]© CHINESE AND. EAST: EUROPEAN TARGETS AVAILABLE. iN AUSTRALIA» at
[1626]_ WAS “STRESSED-THAT. THESE DENIED. AREA. TARGETS: WERE PURSUED “0TH
[1627]“UNTLATERALLY AND. IN. JOINT OPERATIONS WITH THE: AUSTRALIAN -
[1628]LIAISON. SERVICE + THERE WERE 53 SOVIETS IN AUSTRALIA, bb cutser
[1629]a HUNGARTANS 22 CZECHS J BULGARIANS. 59. YUGOSLAVS+ a RUMANTANS: |
[1630]AND 47 NORTH KOREAN STUDENTS. IT WAS STRESSED: THROUGHOUT
[1631]"BRIEFING. THAT PRIMARY. ‘OBUECTIVE IN BOTH’ UNILATERAL AND JOINT
[1632]OPERATIONS. WAS THE: RECRULTHENT. OF SOVIETS. CHINESE OR EAST
[1634]DATE:
[1635]_ ORIG:
[1636]_  UNTTs
[1637]EXT -
[1639].
[1641]" BELeABING OFFICER’, a LSS OGROINATING OFFICERS , wa AUTHENTICATING GnmceR ”
[1643]CLASSIFICATION : “REPRODUCTY,. _ BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE is: PROM ofTED .
[1644]SECRET, paniae werent aeenees mE 2 WMPDET
[1646]“BY: Mitetd te
[1648]13-00000
[1650]Pa
[1652]a ‘OUTGOING MESSAGE EE TF =]
[1653]— . Sct ene cl
[1654]fe i BIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY “| - ce staf _
[1655]De : AGE coi". acp me Toa _ - , MRO a | SO _ . es pao oF eniese _
[1656]. maasAg8 HANDLING INDICATOR o a - DATE-TiME GROUF ., esta ° , ; (-) + itagAGn REFERENCE NUMBER :
[1657]| . - : DIRECTOR .
[1658]ao, ne () won °° ~DISSEM BY: :
[1659]CONF: ©. INFO: FILE QO wom
[1660]_ , ee 78058 = oO mevuied 76. PER 7
[1662]oo pe sus’
[1664]EUROPEAN TARGETS AS IN- PLACE. AGENTS Ho wouL WORK. (FOR US NOT “ONLY,
[1665]“IN AUSTRALIA. BUT UPON. THEIR, RETURN a THEIR COUNTRY OF ORIGIN. 7 ALSO.
[1667]STRESSED CIA's RINTEREST IN OBTAINING NATIONAL ‘LEVEL INTELLIGENCE Fron
[1669]. RECRUITED. PENETRATIONS ‘OF THE ‘SOVIETs CHINESE OR, EAST. EUROPEAN |
[1670]_ PRESENCE IN’ AUSTRALIA. ‘HE. was. INFORMED. OF. our DESIRE To RUN.
[1671]‘COUNTERINTELLTGENCE ‘OPERATIONS. OR ARRANGE: THE DEFECTION OF KNOULEDGE~ o:
[1673]ABLE SOURCES: OUR - INTEREST IN BUILDING. uP PERSONNEL INDICES On:
[1675]THOSE . INDIVIDUALS: ‘FROM TARGET COUNTRIES WHO WERE IN. AUSTRALIA put
[1677]WHO. WERE NOT. RECRUITABLE IN THE CURRENT. CONTEXT. OF. THEIR, ecuivaee
[1679]. SHIPS uri THEIR, OuIN GOVERNMENT ALSO. WAS DISCUSSED- IT WAS. UNDER=
[1680]" scoreD THAT. THE INDIVIDUAL ‘WHO NOT RECRUITABLE TODAY. NIGHT BE oo
[1681].  RECRUITABLE IN FUTURE IF WE CAN, LEARN TO. ‘UNDERSTAND WHAT MOTIVATES
[1682]THE TARGET AND. WHAT MAKES THEN TICK AS HUMAN: BEINGS. THE. ‘BRIEFING
[1683]OF, REPRESENTATIVE: MILFORD ON: AUSTRALIA ALSO. TOUCHED LIGHTLY ON THE |
[1684]| BROAD ASPECTS oF ‘CIA'S. LIAISON WITH ASIO: ASTS “AND JIO. ¥
[1686]ce NEU © ‘ZEALAND: HE WAS ADVISED. THAT: CIA HAD THREE ©
[1687]PEOPLE IN. WELLINGTON WHO WERE FOCUSED ON RUNNING JOINT OPERATIONS
[1689]WITH THE NEW ZEALAND INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. AGAINST THE* SOVIET: PRC
[1692]' ORIG:
[1694]UNIT: ne t
[1695]EXT: - _ , “ a :
[1697]ARLEASING OFFICER . . ‘ ! a coonomanna OFFICERS . . AUTHENTICATING orrican
[1699]“ guassuncaTion REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED iz 2. __ IMPDET
[1700]/ SECRET ; : ; AG RAL
[1702]13-00000
[1704]oe “OUTGOING MESSAG “C7 ooo
[1705]7 Ee x-—EE
[1706]" SIGNAL CENTER UsE OnLy 3 Ds A
[1708]g
[1709]4
[1711]aap o oo: oo Oo” Ft] @ - ney
[1715]SECRET. . . . - _ .
[1716]: " MSEAGE HANOLING INDICATOR oo = oo “ OATE-Tima GROUP - * om : Meosage Rarenence HUMOER ‘
[1717]: . =. _ DIRECTOR :
[1719]. ee oe 7 . : 0 woe °° ‘DISSEM By:
[1720]CONF: oo . “INFO: FILE o 7 a he ng neo ° -
[1721]7 , 7 o SSS" ~  --O » neruns ro > PER
[1723]0 ees i #
[1725]AND EAST EUROPEAN: PRESENCE IN NEW ZEALAND. HE was GIVEN RUNDOUN |
[1726]| ON. NUMBERS: OF: SOVIETS, CHINESE AND EAST EUROPEAN ‘WHO. WERE CURRENTLY.
[1728]IN. NEU ZEALAND: THE SCOPE oF OUR, OPERATIONAL PROGRAMS UAS ALSO
[1730]DISCUSSED IN, TERMS SIMILAR. TO. WHAT VAS OUTLINED. IN PARA 38 ON
[1731]AUSTRALIA. u oe , |
[1732]De INDONESIA? OCIA. MAINTAINED A. PRESENCE IN JAKARTA s ;
[1733]MEDAN. AND SURABAYA. | CIA HAD. APPROXIMATELY 26 PEOPLE IN. INDONESIA + -
[1734]"THESE. FIGURES” WERE ‘COMPARED: AGAINST THE SOVIET INTELLIGENCE PRESENCE
[1735]IN INDONESIA. A DISCUSSION. OF THE PRC TARGET AS SEEN FROM PER-
[1736]SPECTIVE | OF INDONESIA..FOCUSED oN LEGAL TRAVEL OPERATIONS AGAINST -
[1737]CHINA AS WELL AS SCREENING’ OF INTERCEPTED NAIL FROM CHINA TO -
[1738]“INDONESIA. . THERE. WAS, ALSO BRIEF DISCUSSION OF NORTH KOREAN “AND.
[1739]"VIETNAMESE 1 TARGETS ‘IN. INDONESIA: THE. BRIEFING ALSO FOCUSED. on
[1740]-sINDONESIA AS AN-INTELLIGENCE TARGET JIN TERMS: OF HOST COUNTRY |
[1741]ACTIVITIES: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS» INTERNATIONAL TERRORTSN. AnD
[1742]NARCOTICS TARAFFIC INTO “AND: our. OF INDONESIA. A BRIEF COMMENT
[1743]WAS. ALSO MADE ON TOPIC OF CIA LIAISON vITH BAKIN: THE: roovesran
[1745]INTERNAL” AND. EXTERNAL, INTELLIGENCE ‘SERVICE. “THE: TOTALITY OF
[1747]- DATE: _ wo - : _ oho
[1748]“ORIG: Me re mo , .
[1749]UNIT:
[1751]| RELEASING ormcan Soy oa ‘ ae COORDINATING OFFICERS. © tgs poo Autuenmcarina: orncen
[1753]clasemcarion "OO REPRODUCTIoN BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE 8 PROHIBITED E2- iMPDET
[1755]SE C R & T.. cee we . : Pye Pag el pea L
[1757]13-00000
[1759]: a OUTGOING MESSAGE
[1761]: . SIONAL CENTER UZ ONLY , ce
[1762]Aon. coi: ace, “foo. “pa |. MRO
[1764]_GLASUICATION |
[1766], : | nehion navi wiseaton ps _ .: meine oe whe ean’ on oan a ae waouads nevinarc vinimila sila EA
[1767]rr “DIRECTOR. ni
[1768]conF: oo “INFO: * FILE : i : DISsEM aye 7
[1770]oO: ries. oe
[1772]| ” statron* s EFFORTS. IN INDONESIA was: DESCRIBED IN ‘BROAD MANAGEMENT oe
[1773]TERNS AND. SOME. EXAMPLES WERE CITED OF TYPES oF INTELLIGENCE OBTAINED .
[1774]| FROM. CTA. ACTIVITIES: IN INDONESTA. CEA ALSO. FOCUSED BRIEFLYD ON OUR a
[1775]© ABILITY 70 use ‘AGENTS: OF INFLUENCE 0 PURSUE U.S, FOREIGN POLICY a
[1776]_ INTERESTS IN INDONESIA. " oe Serra _
[1777]Ee. COMMENT: "REPRESENTATIVE ILFORD. TOOK ‘NOTE OF. ‘ABOVE
[1778]" wRiCFINGS+ ASKED LIMITED NUMBER OF. QUESTIONS ON THE TYPES OF
[1779]INTELLIGENCE THAT WAS PRODUCED BY THE: VARTOUS STATIONS AND. INDICATED.
[1780]THAT BRIEFINGS ‘HAD. COVERED ALL OF. THE: ISSUES THAT He HAD. WANTED TO.
[1784]“DISCUSS. we
[1785]Fe. REPRESENTATIVE MELFORD ) EXPRESSED GREAT DEAL OF
[1786]INTEREST IN. THE. INTELLIGENCE PROCESS. “AND. ASKED THAT IF aT ALL POSSI-
[1787]BLE. PARTICULARLY: IN. AUSTRALIA, HE WOULD LIKE. 10 “MEET ‘WITH MEMBERS
[1788]OF AUSTRALIAN. LIAISON SERVICES. "REPRESENTATIVE, NILFORD MADE POINT
[1789]“THAT SUCH MEETINGS. wouLD BE USEFUL TO HIN IN CONTEXT OF HIS PIKE.
[1790]COMMITTEE DUTIES. BECAUSE HE COULD THEN COMMENT ON, LIAISON SERVICES*
[1791]REACTIONS TO CURRENT CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES INTO CIA. REPRESENTATIVE |
[1793]MILFORD. was ADVISED THAT IATTEMPTS wouLD BE. ADE: TO ARRANGE MEETINGS.
[1795]. DATE: Le cot. nt oy
[1797]t _ OR: ; ; se,
[1799]4 . UNIT: : co re |
[1800]EXT: . -
[1802]RaLaasing ormicen oe vo ‘COORDINATING OFFICERS | : Aumenmcaind ormcen -
[1803]: eC R E T REPRODUCTION BY OTHER, THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2. IMPDET a
[1804]OS EN Ee oe ee aye S89
[1806]13-00000
[1808]“OUTGOING, MESSAGE : :
[1809]; . . _svawat cen uae ony oo ; i
[1810]: one 0 o oOo 20 gn o" oO
[1811]SECRET. . — . a _
[1812]HESBAOE HAWOLING NOIEATOR , we OATE-TIME OUP ; Con ent - [1 messactnaranancamsesan *
[1813]Ae . DIRECTOR oo
[1814]ae . a ae ; — - + DO mvex DISSEM BY: .
[1815]a CONF: oe - INFO: FILE . oe a oe OD womoex - ,
[1816]. o , : , : O. iprnes : #. :
[1817]PARTICULARLY IN AUSTRALIA4. WITH ONE OR: TWO ‘SENTOR LIATSON PERSON-
[1818]-ALITIES. ye
[1820]- 7 4 REGARDING. REFERENCE PARA THREE: Fa “SINCE CONGRESSMAN
[1821]MELFORD. SPECIFICALLY WISHES ‘DEAL WITH LIAISON SERVICES ATTITUDES.
[1822]IN. ‘HIS. MINORITY REPORT >. HAVE. NO OBJECTION GENERAL DESCRIPTION
[1823]OF OUR: DEALINGS. WITH LIAISON, SERVICES- STATIONS CAN ALSO. ARRANGE .
[1824]"GETING WITH SENIOR. LIAISON. “OFFICIALS: oN. DISCREET BASIS IF.
[1826], CONGRESSMAN ILFoRD REQUESTS~ Eas I INPDET. ae |
[1828]“e aavE beens ON 1 cinéeessnan MILFORD vat :
[1830]4
[1831]4 ’
[1832]“ome: BeHOUSTON = SST LH ca
[1833]UNIT: DCEA ~ - SA/DDO 10,4,
[1834]em 9373,  EAZPIT fe SL
[1835]EA cos! a er “HOUSTON DCEA |
[1837]. _ COORDINATING: OFFICERS 7 oe ~ AUTHENTICATING OFrncen.
[1839]a : "REPRODUCTION BY. OTHER THAN THE ISSUING. OFFICE | 1s 5 PROMIBITE
[1841]“ = 2 IMPDET
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[1849].
[1851]. OUTGOING MESSAGE | :
[1853]SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY
[1854]AGE cor ace. “toa - wre aR ber
[1856]OMF oO a 0 o = -0 0 “0
[1858]CLASSIFICATION
[1860]Pace or PAGES
[1862]SECRET a iene
[1864]MESSAGE HANOLING INDICATOR DATE-TIME GROUP . . cre ° MESSAGE REFERENCE NUYEER
[1866]STAFF GY2LNSZ DIRECTOR rs7ze ag
[1867]’ CONF: fas 2 INFO: FILE (.)C] [Review STA FF, slér, oe DISSEM BY:
[1868]| (000, :sA/Xo, £09]00
[1870]RETURN TO | “PER SOP
[1871]. Ol OLC<y Pres # | / a.
[1872]TO: PRIORITY CANBERRA JAKARTA, WELLINGTON.
[1874]oO oco
[1876]RYBAT PLHHCONGA yo : 7
[1877]REFS: A. CANBERRA 208bb Irn o7esuos| {RELAYING JAKARTA 4 ‘WELLINGTON |
[1879]B. DIRECTOR 784159 [xx | {RELAYING JAKARTA UELLINGTON}. yo oo
[1880]: LAr a oe AMAA fos . o . AS
[1881]Le aie MEMBERS OF HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE." —
[1883]ACCOMPANIED BY WIVES, WILL BE MAKING TRIP TO JAKARTA. CANBERRA |
[1884]SYDNEY. AND UELLINGTON., GROUP BILL USE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE:
[1886]; AIRCRAFT. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE WILL BE MAKING ARRANGEMENTS FOR.
[1887]TRIP. THEREFORE y NO NEED FOR STATION TO MAKE HOTEL OR RELATED
[1889]TRANSPORTATION ARRANGEMENTS ; ‘TWO REPRESENTATIVES, PRICE AND
[1890]= & only yhet aol,
[1891]WILSON, ARE MEMBERS oF, THE. SUB-COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE W
[1892]ARE GOive-e AT TALS TUE MOVE f= RAS f2 SLATIOSIEY WV
[1893]OF ABOVE HAVE ASKED TO MEET WITH STATIONS. TBorkAPERERECUES PED
[1894]Chick Covuvsel at Comumeliee sully leat ed Awe: pravelliny
[1895]| BY. HEADQUARTERS >TO" NEETU GROUP CONTACTEAN~BEIAD ETHROUGH
[1896]wet da S¥ OWE AV OEY PECTS FO PRY Kaa TACT you I fe =
[1897]GOMMET TEES TAFE ASSIS TANT” SLATINSHEK™ UHO> TRAVELLING-UITH. GROUPS 4
[1898]INTEREST DGVE LOPS, _
[1899]2. HOWEVER. CONGRESSMAN DALE MILFORD {DEMOCRAT TEXAS} WHO:
[1901]IS A MEMBER OF THE PIKE COMMITTEE {HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
[1902]| INTELLIGENCE? WILL ACCOMPANY* THIS GROUP AND DOES DESIRE BRIEFINGS -
[1903]CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S WIFE WILL TRAVEL WITH HIN. CONGRESSMAN
[1905]24 DEC 75. —
[1906]B.J-HOUSTON.
[1908]RELEASING OFFICER . COORDINATING orricens. ; AUTHENTICATING orncen : e
[1909]CLASSIFICATION _ REPRODUCTION, BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED £ 2 IMPDET
[1910]Ss E ¢ RE T ; cL BY: 058913
[1912]13-00000
[1914]“OMNF GO a g Gg 68 a}
[1916]“OUTGOING MESSAGE
[1919]7
[1921]SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY .
[1922]AGE cor ACP TOS Tree AO
[1924]"of
[1926]3
[1927]a
[1929]a
[1930]tu
[1932]CLASSIFICATION
[1934]SECRET
[1935]MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: . DATE-TIME GROUP , cma MESSAGE HEFERENCE NUMZER
[1936]ce Doe DIRECTOR | .
[1937]cone: " Weo: Fe . © OD, meee DISSEM BY:
[1938], mo , , *.. . GF no woex . .
[1939]_ A oS 22 0 sorerunn to _PER
[1940]O wenes x
[1942]MILFORD’ S INTEREST AS STATED ‘BY HIM WILL BE IN SEEING HOU THE . a
[1943]INTELLIGENCE PROCESS WORKS FROM THE GROUND UP. HE WANTS TO ACQUIRE
[1945]BACKGROUND KNOWLEDGE ON THIS PROCESS SO THAT WHEN THE FINAL”.
[1946]* COMMITTEE REPORT IS MADE HE CAN USE HIS INFLUENCE TO SEE THAT ‘It
[1947]IS A ‘BALANCED. ONE. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD DOES NOT LIKE FORMAL
[1948]“BRIEFINGS AND DOES NOT WANT CHARTS. yo
[1950]3. “SINCE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE IS VERY INTERESTED
[1952]“tw COMMAND AND CONTROL ‘ASPECTS OF HOW THE AGENCY FUNCTIONS 4 IT
[1954]IS. LIKELY. THAT ‘CONGRESSMAN MILFORD WILL FOCUS ON, THIS ASPECT
[1956]OF STATION ACTIVITIES DURING HIS VISIT.
[1958]A- MANAGEMENT BY OBJECTIVES: STATIONS PROBABLY CAN
[1960]‘DEAL WITH THE CONGRESSMAN'S DESIRE TO UNDERSTAND THE INTELLIGENCE |
[1961]PROCESS FROM THE GROUND UP BY BRIEFING HIM ON HOw MANAGEMENT BY
[1963]OBJECTIVES FUNCTIONS - STATION CAN OUTLINE OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE 7
[1964]PROCESS I. Evy HOW STATION RECEIVES OD FROM HEADQUARTERS AND COMMENTS
[1965]ON IT. ONCE AGREEMENT REACHED ON OD DIALOGUE FOLLOWS ‘ON AG'S
[1967]‘WHICH RELATE TO SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES. THINK IT WOULD BE USEFUL
[1969]| _ TO FOCUS ON KEY OBJECTIVES IN GENERAL AND THEN NARROW" DISCUSSION
[1971]_DATE: -
[1972]ORIG:
[1973]“UNIT: |
[1975]EXT: © -
[1977]RELEASING orricen . . COORDINATING Orriceas ‘ : AUTHENTICATING OPFICER
[1978]CLASSIFICATION REPROF’CTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2. IMPDET
[1979]SECRET re SO CL BY: 058913
[1981]13-00000
[1983]_ OUTGOING MESSAGE
[1985]s
[1986]2 Bit
[1988]Oz-scoa |
[1990]SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY . : . _. : :
[1991]AGE cor ACP toa Re MROD . oc . OF
[1993]oiF o o§. gO Oo .0 oO a
[1995]CLASSIFICATION
[1997]MESSAGE HANDUNG INDICATOR OATE-TIME GROUP . . cia MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMaER
[1999]. "DIRECTOR: . tes
[2000]~ conr: . , INFO: FILE : . - me 7 . , . Joe : INDEX - “DISSEM BY:
[2003]NO INDEX
[2007]" perunn 10 PER _
[2008]abate
[2009]“DOWN TO AG! S OF SPECIFIC INTEREST. “TTS PHASE OF. BRIEFING “SHOULD |
[2010]INCLUDE COMMENTARY ON FUNDING OF FAN" Sa ETC. a ;
[2011]: B: AGENT ACQUISITION: STATION, couLD THEN ‘OUTLINE, How sneer
[2012]| STUDIES OF. KEY. INTELLIGENCE REPOSITORIES ARE. CONDUCTED POTENTZAL, Bee
[2013]TARGETS FOR RECRUITMENT IDENTIFIED" AND: HOW ‘SPOTTING, ASSESSHENT
[2014]AND RECRUITMENT PROCESS UNFOLDS. IN DISCUSSION OF RECRUITMENT |
[2015]PHASE OF OPERATIONS 5 THERE SHOULD BE EXAHINATION OF (NAME TRACE.
[2016]‘AND POA PROCESS. yo
[2018]AVTHEMTILATED
[2020]2 Ge S AGENT. AUTHENTICATION: ‘DIALOGUE. WITH: CONGRESSIAN ‘SHOULD: poe
[2021]- ALSO OUTLINE HOU AGENT ‘hablone ze ONCE RECRUITED. STRESS SHOULD my
[2023]BE PLACED ON CONTINUING ASPECTS OF AUTHENTICATION SECURITY OF
[2024]MEETINGS. ETC-¥ | | ne
[2025]D. POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION: ACQUISITION OF"
[2027]INTELLIGENCE FROM IN-PLACE AGENT. TURNING IT INTO INTEL DISSEN-.
[2028]INATION REQUIREMENTS SYSTENs AND REPORTS EVALUATION CYCLE, SHOULD.
[2029]ALSO RE REVIEWED. GAR BUBRERRT aepanngeona BRORCO-RENDEOOARES ane
[2031]near weet ne
[2033]5.
[2034]NISHKEXERDSUDGUESTEREACATONEENS EE ETS aiid CusReOMRRATuGuanSaeed” |
[2035]BReseorght Jenseneancconeosncenstunondnsesssorncansencnesoocsi]
[2037]DATE:
[2039]UNIT:
[2044]RELEASING ormcan : COORDINATING Orricars . . ; _ AuTHENncarina orricen
[2045]CLASSIFICATION REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET
[2046]SECRET ee CL BY: 058933
[2048]13-00000
[2050]“OMF o 0 O@ 8 8 @
[2052]OUTGOING MESSAGE
[2054]Qz-«con"
[2056]SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY :
[2057]age “cor ACP toa TRE MRO oct
[2059]“CLASSIFICATION
[2061]3S E'C-R E T . :
[2062]. | | DIRECTOR |
[2063], rs _ . - 0 woes DISSEM BY:
[2064]CONF: WFO: FILE Ooms .
[2065]_ , _ ; ES? < mo 0 RETURN TO _PER
[2066]0 1p FES. #
[2068]FOR CANBERRA AND. WELLINGTON: ' SHOULD MAKE POINT THAT COLLECTION
[2070]ON INTERNAL TARGET Is By PRODUCT ACQUIRED THROUGH ELICITATION | -:
[2071]. FROM LIAISON, FOREIGNERS AND AMERICANS. {FYI: OBJECTIVE Kk.
[2073]~ HAS BEEN. DROPPED FROM CANBERRA, OD AND THEREFORE SHOULD NOT BE
[2074]"ADDRESSED IN THIS BRIEFING-}— THRUST oF PROGRAM TS RECRUITNENT
[2075]"OF SOVS. AND CHINESE USING. LIAISON AS
[2077]_ DATE:
[2079]ORIG:
[2080]UNIT:
[2081]EXT:
[2082]. RELEASING ormcen ° ° COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER —
[2083]CLASsWIcATION, ; REPRODU™TION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PPTHIGITED = E 2 IMPDET
[2085]a ., . CL BY:
[2087]13-00000
[2091]“OUTGOING MESSAGE
[2093]Gzeacoz '
[2095]SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY . .
[2096]AGE. eon: ace. . tes | TRE mao ' Ott
[2098]OnF oO OF GG GO GG a a4
[2100]CLASSIFICATION -
[2102]“SECRET : -
[2104]MESSAGE }.ANDLING INDICATOR. DATE-TIME GROUP cima . , MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMGER .
[2105]DIRECTOR - a ae
[2106]: ; , - O woes’ °. DISSEMBY: 3.
[2107]_ CONF: | _ INFO: -FILE 722 2. —D nomoee | Co
[2108], - ; 0897 “Doneemre PER
[2109]. O- ries _ #
[2111]EXTENSION OF. CIAy FOR, COLLECTION OF INFO ON PRC AND USSR. ' POINT -
[2113]OUT DO NOT RECRUIT: AUSTRALIANS OR NEU “ZEALANDERS ‘WITHOUT SPECIFIC
[2115]APPROVAL OF GOVTS CONCERNED - Ye
[2117]E. OPERATIONAL, REPORTING SYSTEM: | STARTING UBT RECRUTTHENT
[2119](OF AGENTs STATION. ‘SHOULD OUTLINE TYPES OF REPORTING REQUIRED” By.
[2120]AGENCY FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL PURPOSES I. Ee PRA PART: I “AND a
[2122]CONTACT REPORTS. INTEL REPORTS» PERIODIC ASSET REPORTS. PERIODIC .
[2123]PROGRESS REPORTS, OPACTS AND. FIELD ‘PERFORMANCE REPORTS: ON LATTER» |
[2124]STRESS SHOULD BE PLACED on, FEED BACK FROM ‘MID~ YEAR’ AND FY. “RevEeus:
[2126]. WITH DDO. FY BUDGET CYCLE SHOULD ALSO BE “TOUCHED ON. _
[2128]oF. CASE HISTORY: IT ESSENTIAL WE NOT ‘IDENTIFY “ANY ACTIVE. .
[2129]SOURCES OR LIAISON SERVICES BY° TRUE NANE TO CONGRESSMAN MILFORD: ae
[2130]IN VIEW OF THIS uISH POINT OUT H@S HAS FOUND IT USEFUL TO. DRAU ;
[2132]ON CASE HISTORY.SCENARIO TO UNDERSCORE ALL POINTS PREVIOUSLY .
[2134]MADE IN BRIEFING. IN SUCH CASE HISTORY ONLY IDENTITY OF AGENT. fe
[2135]AND POSSIBLE TARGET HAS BEEN ALTERED . FOR SOURCE PROTECTION. THIS
[2136]APPROACH HAS WORKED EFFECTIVELY FOR Has AND ASSUME IT WILL BE
[2138]USEFUL TECHNIQUE FOR STATIONS - a
[2139]DATE:
[2141]“ORIG:
[2143]UNIT:
[2144]EXT:
[2146]nELEASING orricen . COORDINATING orricers . AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
[2147]CLASSIFICATION : REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET
[2148]SEC RET a 7 ce, oa _ ' CL BY: gSaq13 -
[2150]13-00000
[2152].
[2154]ONF @F: rt) oO aq .o a gag
[2156]wae bt.
[2158]“OUTGOING MESSAGE .
[2160]Ar=4c0a 7
[2162]SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY ;
[2163]AGa . €or ae won wre MRO ocr
[2165]CLASSIFICATION
[2167]SECRET
[2169]MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR . DATE-TIME GROUP . cre . MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER -
[2171]DIRECTOR
[2173]ne Pe we _ 785722 ;
[2175]1NOEX | - DISSEM BY:
[2177]NG INDEX
[2181]RETURN TO : PER
[2183]. , . a Pees: , #
[2184]4. “WHERE APPLICABLE {SUCH AS UAKARTAE BRIEFING SHOULD ALSO
[2186]DEAL SPECIFICALLY wITH STATION COORDINATION ROLE UNDER DCIDS FOR
[2188]| CLANDESTINE MILITARY AND INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION OPERATIONS. vo
[2190]SS. “FOR CANBERRA AND WELLINGTON: IT PROBABLY WOULD ALSO BE.
[2192]"USEFUL TO PROVIDE CONGRESSMAN MILFORD .- wITH ANALYSIS OF THE RECENT
[2194]ELECTION: DEVELOPMENTS IN AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND. HE WOULD ALSO Fs
[2195]BE. INTERESTED IN STATION" Ss ESTIMATE: OF HOW NEW GOVERNMENTS - vILL
[2197]CONDUCT FOREIGN POLICIES» VIS-A-VIS UNITED: STATES -¥ |
[2198]ob. FOR JAKARTA: IN ADDITION TO STABILITY OF SUHARTO
[2200]+ rectne THE CONGRESSMAN MIGHT APPRECIATE A REVIEW OF THE PORTUGUESE |
[2204]TIMOR SITUATION AND HOw THAT WILL INFLUENCE THE STABILITY OF
[2205]THE, REGION: i"
[2207]Pe THIS VISIT IS SEPARATE FROM TRIP OF PRESTON, SNODGRASS 4.
[2209]CALLOWAY AND CARY DISCUSSED IN DIRECTOR 778574.
[2211]Be CONGRESSMAN MILFORD TS NOT A MEMBER OF THE HOUSE ARMED
[2212]SERVICES COMMITTEE - y
[2213]4 “SEPARATE CABLE FOLLOUS TO CANBERRA ON SENSITIVE ASPECTS
[2215]oF VISIT. geo auanascn ITINERARY AS FOLLOWS: ? - ..
[2217]| ORIG:
[2218]UNIT: |
[2219]RELEASING orrican COORDINATING OFFICERS ; . . AUTHENTICATING OFFICER —
[2220]qusrearen ‘REPROD! ‘ON BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS! ISITED «= g 2 IMPDET
[2222]RET
[2223]s 7 CL BY: 958913
[2225]13-00000
[2227]_ OUTGOING MESSAGE
[2229]Oz-ncoz
[2231]SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY
[2232]AG&.- cor ace Toa. vee. MRO. i ec
[2234]OMF 0 aq a o ac oOo 4
[2236]CLASSIFICATION
[2238]returnto PER
[2240]3S E.C RET '
[2241]MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DATE-TIME GROUP . cre MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER ~
[2242]a . . ee DIRECTOR
[2243]; CONF: | “INFO: FILE ~ oe ; . woex —--: DISSEM BY:
[2244]. 7 , - oO : ; . ; - PES72Z!Y NO INDEX |
[2246]Oo aoa
[2250]JAKARTA b JAN, ETD 4 JAN >
[2251]CANBERRA 9 JAN 4 ETD Uh JAN ¥
[2252]SYDNEY 1% JAN+ ETD 24 JAN ¥ . |
[2253]WELLINGTON 24 JAN, ETD Wb JAN Ea. IMPDET «A
[2254]"x INQUIRY CONCERNING CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION.
[2255]"x HOS CONTACT UETH D- MILFORD ON TRIP TO AUSTRALIA.
[2257]_ _ oe ppser /oEL-7 ee
[2258]as _ . eee
[2260]SA/DDO
[2263]DATE: 24 DEC 75
[2265]ORIG: 8. J-HOUSTON
[2267]UNIT: ACEA .
[2269]Gt 41373 | a
[2270]We ha
[2271]_ DAVID BLEE. 4/006 BILL fe HOUS uL/n
[2273]RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS ON, ACE A cca
[2275]CLASSIFICATION REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE Is PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET
[2276]SECRET - oo . CL BY: 954913
[2279]i Bib 7AM, 3020 Ob .
[2281]“cuore due ciesem ev PPo'ren CS =<
[2283]PERGON/UNIT NOTIFIZD__
[2285][REPRODUCTION BY: OTHER vt
[2288]: “ACTION UNIT: = — ENG
[2289]poo  BPT FILE
[2291]: oe TE i eS es
[2293]| ACTION ® - Heo.
[2295]| _ 7 494891. EIA755 PAGE #1 | TN 7eaae4
[2297]Tors 2005032 Nov 75. sss SOU, .25948-
[2298]SEC RE T 2603482 NOV 75° STAFF
[2299]tte SEOUL 25948 |
[2300]TO1 DIRECTOR. —
[2301]RYBAT PLMHCONGA
[2302]REF: SEOUL 25761 (73 bere)
[2303]1s FOLLOWING: LETTER WAS PREPARED BY GENERAL RICHARD Ge
[2305]STILWELL» COMMANDER=IN-CHIEF, UNITED NATIONS COMMAND. AND
[2306]FORWARDED TO DOD CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON FOR REVIEW AND PASSAGE TO
[2307]CONGRESSMAN MILFORD, THE LETTER WAS PREPARED IN RESPONSE TO
[2308]CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S REQUEST To BOTH GENERAL STILWELL AND LT.
[2309]“GENERAL JAMES HOLLINGSWORTH» COMMANDER, I CORPS» CAMP RED cLouDs
[2310]FOR LETTERS SIMILAR TO HIS REQUEST OF AMBASSADOR SNEIDER,
[2311]GENERAL HOLLINGSWORTH PREPARED A LETTER WHICH was REWORKED INTO
[2312]THE FOLLOWING LETTER WHICH WAS SENT BY GENERAL STILWELL AS
[2313]REFLECTING BOTH GENERAL HOLLINGSWORTH'S AND HIS OWN VIEWS, THE
[2314]LETTER WAS FORWARDED TO WASHINGTON AS AN SSO BACK CHANNEL MESSAGE
[2315]AND HAS SINCE BEEN CLEARED BY DOD FOR RELEASE TO CONGRESSMAN
[2316]MILFORD, THE TEXT OF THIS LETTER WAS GIVEN TO cos BY GENERAL
[2317]7 HOLLINGSWORTH.
[2318]: 2. QUOTE " DEAR MR. MILFORD:
[2319]| —— SECRET
[2321]13-00000 |
[2323]FORM 30206
[2324]7-70 MEG, 2/76
[2326]RUN BY
[2328]CABLE SEC DISSEM BY PER. TOTAL COPIES
[2330]ae a “SECRET '- | ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITS).
[2331]PERGON/UNIT NOTIFIED - - - - : — 7 : : .
[2332]ne, Se a STAFF . 7
[2333]ADVAN OF BS D/SLOTTED : BY. A Z . ; . .
[2334]ACTION, UNIT an oo , , . py 4
[2335]RF. FILE. ° VR.” So ,
[2338]7 494891 ELA755 or IN 754484
[2339]: “TORI280501Z NOV 75 © ~—.-~—s SEOU. 25948
[2341]GENERAL HOLLINGSWORTH AND I WERE EXTREMELY PLEASED At THE INTEREST
[2342]YOU SHOWED IN THE PROBLEMS WE FACE HERE IN KOREA, 1AM ONLY. SORRY
[2343]“THAT OUR SCHEDULES DID NOT PERMIT US TO EXPLORE THE CHALLENGES WE
[2344]FACE HERE AND OUR CAPABILITIES TO DEAL WITH THEM IN GREATER. DETAIL.
[2345]THIS LETTER INCORPORATES BOTH GENERAL HOLLINGSWORTH!S AND MY.
[2346]‘VIEWS, |
[2347]AS FIELD COMMANDERS, WE ARE DEEPLY INVOLVED IN THE AREA OF
[2348]INTELLIGENCE © -AND FOR GOOD REASONS. A COMMANDER HAS A FUNDAMENTAL
[2349]INTEREST IN PROTECTING HIS COMMAND AND ASSURING THAT. SHOULD
[2350]HOSTILITIES OCCUR, HIS COMBAT RECOURSES ARE EMPLOYED IN THE nost .
[2351]EFFECTIVE MANNER POSSIBLE,
[2352]ORGANIZATIONALLY, THE. us INTELLIGENCE SETUP IN KOREA . 1S VIABLE, a
[2353]THE RESIDENT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE. AGENCIES,
[2354]I Eas CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIAD, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
[2355](DIA), AND NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY (NSA) WORK EFFECTIVELY IN |
[2356]CONCERT WITH OUR” INTELLIGENCE STAFFS AND THOSE COLLECTION ELEMENTS.
[2357]WHICH ARE UNDER OUR CONTROL TO PROVIDE AN INTEGRATED: AND
[2358]| BFFICIENT FLOW oF. INTELLIGENCE, WE HAVE BEEN MOST IMPRESSED: WITH. (THE.
[2359]"DEDICATION AND. PROFESSIONALISM OF. THE INTELLIGENCE, OFFICERS. ASSIGNED.
[2360]TO THOSE NAT LONAL AGENCIES: AND He HAVE EQUALLY HIGH. RESPECT FOR our.
[2361]oy Ss Ec RET | ye
[2363]|) REPRODUCTION: BY OTHER THA.
[2365]13-00000
[2367]casie bec BIGSEM BY eR TOTAL COPIES "RUN BY
[2369]_PEREON/UNIT NOTIFIED__
[2370]ACTION UNIT:
[2372][ACTION #
[2374]FORM. 3020b |
[2375]me ura 278
[2377]SECRET
[2379]7.494691 © BLA755 _ PAGE @3 . IN 754484
[2381]| TOR 2605042 NOV. 75 __Se00 25948
[2383]OWN ‘PEOPLE. THIS TEAM 1S RESPONSIVE AND GIVES US A GREAT DEAL
[2385]OF QUALITY INTELLIGENCE.
[2387]LIKE ALL COMMANDERS, HOWEVER, WE ARE NOT FULLY SATISFIED WITH ALL:
[2388]ASPECTS “OF THE. INTELLIGENCE. EFFORT. THE PRIMARY. NEED 1S, FOR.
[2390]RELIABLE WARNING INTELLIGENCE, BECAUSE OF OUR PROXIMITY ‘TO THE.
[2391]ENEMY'S AIRFIELDS, AND THE FACT THAT MANY OF OUR TROOPS LIVE WITHIN
[2392]THE RANGE FANS OF HIS: EMPLACED WEAPONS SYSTEMS» WE MUST CONSTANTLY Be
[2393]ALERT FOR THOSE ANOMALIES IN HIS BEHAVIOR WHICH WOULD. TIP. US. OFF
[2395]TO IMPENDING ATTACK. UNFORTUNATELY, RECAUSE OF HIS. READINESS “AND
[2397]THE FORWARD DISPOSITION OF HIS FORCES, INCLUDING FORWARD POSITIONING
[2399]OF SUPPLIES, WE DO Not HAVE A HIGH DEGREE OF ASSURANCE: THAT WE.
[2401]WILL HAVE MUCH WARNING. WHILE WE MIGHT HAVE DAYS OR WEEKS» IT TS
[2403]MORE PROBABLE THAT NE WOULD HAVE ONLY HOURS. TO PARTIALLY OFFSET THISs
[2405]US AND ROK FORCES MAINTAIN A HIGH DEGREE OF ALERT, PREPARED TO
[2407]QUICKLY ENGAGE THE FORCES oF THE NORTH SHOULD THEY INITIATE
[2409]AN ATTACK. CONCURRENTLY, WE AND THE NATIONAL LEVEL INTELLIGENCE
[2411]COMMUNITY ARE SEEKING WAYS TO IMPROVE OUR SYSTEMS AND METHODOLOGIES
[2413]TO INCREASE OUR ASSURANCE OF TIMELY WARNING.
[2415]NATIONALLY MANAGED COLLECTION PROGRAMS GIVE us INVALUABLE |
[2417]INTELLIGENCE ON THE DISPOSITIONS OF THE POTENTIAL ENEMY, YET WE
[2418]SECRET. | |
[2421]13-00000
[2423]FORM 3020D
[2424]7-71 MFG. 2/76
[2426]‘CABLE SEC DISGEM BY__- __PER : TOTAL COPIES ° RUN BY pane Sennen
[2427]on REPRODUCTION. BY OTHER THA!
[2428]_ ISSUING OFFICE-IS PROHIBITEE:
[2430]_ PERGON/UNIT NOTIFIED
[2432]" ACTION UNIT.
[2434]ACTION #
[2436]—~? 494091  EIA75s PAGE p4 75
[2438]Ton 2605012 Nov 75 _se0U 25948
[2440]STILL HAVE SIGNIFICANT GAPS IN OUR HOLDINGS ON THE: “AGTUAL |
[2441]LOCATIONS. AND IDENTITIES OF HIS UNITS, HIS COMMAND AND. CONTROL a
[2443]| STRUCTURE AND HIS WAR PLANS, IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT WHILE: THE,
[2444]EXCELLENT TECHNICAL COLLECTION PROGRAMS IN PHOTOGRAPHY AND. ELECTRONIC
[2445]ireeicrne Ey CouPeLy A GREAT DEAL OF INFORMATION ON: THE. ENEMY 'S.
[2446]CAPABILITIES, WE ARE STILL LACKING INTELLIGENCE ON HIS INTENTIONS,
[2447]UNFORTUNATELY» INTELLIGENCE ON WHAT HE IS THINKING AND PLANNING
[2448]WOULD COME LARGELY FROM HUMAN SOURCES, AND GIVEN THE-CLOSED
[2449]NATURE OF HIS SOCIETY AND HIS STRICT AND EFFECTIVE SECURITY.
[2450]MEASURES, IT IS VERY DIFFICULT TO COLLECT THIS KIND OF
[2451]INFORMATION, | oe
[2453]THE PREPONDERANCE oF REQUIREMENTS FoR HUMAN SOURCE “CLANDESTINE”
[2454]INTELLIGENCE FALL WITHIN THE PROPER PURVIEW OF THE CENTRAL
[2455]INTELLIGENCE AGENCY: AND. THAT AGENCY I UNIQUELY QUALIFIED ©
[2457]TO PERFORM THIS VITAL FUNCTION, AT THE SAME TIME, THERE IS. 4 NEED
[2459]FOR A CAREFULLY MANAGED). LIMITED MILITARY EFFORT TO FOCUS ow.
[2461]STRICTLY MILITARY REQUIREMENTS. A PRIMARY MILITARY TARGET OF THIS
[2462]“NATURE 18 THE TUNNEL NETWORK THAT THE NORTH HAS BEEN DETECTED |
[2464]_ CONSTRUCTING UNDER THE DMz, THIS 1S ‘A LABOR INTENSIVE EFFORT, AND:
[2465]EXPLOITATION OF CLANDESTINE. TECHNIQUES WOULD BELA ‘MEANS oF .
[2469]oo SECRET
[2472]13-00000
[2474]| "TOTAL COPIES *
[2476]ACTION UNIT
[2478]acTiON r OO
[2479]7494891. ETA755 PAGE 05 So WN 754484
[2480]| Tontzoasoi2 NOV 7 : —_ = se0U 25948
[2482]DIscoveRING THE TUNNELS BEFORE THEY ARE USED ‘AGAINST us.
[2484]IN THE AREA OF ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE WE HAVE REQUESTED A HIGH,
[2485]“ALTITUDE PLATFORN TO BE OPERATED OVER THE SOUTH KOREAN LAND ‘MASS
[2487]TO GIVE US A DEEPER AND MORE EFFECTIVE LOOK INTO THE ENEMY'S
[2489]ELECTRONIC ENVIRONMENT. THE REQUESTEN SYSTEM INCLUDES A DOWN LINK
[2490]CAPABILITY WHICH WOULD GIVE US A NEAR REAL TIME READ OUT OF DATA.
[2492]COLLECTED. OUR PROPUSAL HAS RECEIVED STRONG SUPPORT FROM DIA AND
[2493]NSA. WE ALSO HAVE HIGH INTEREST IN INSURING THAT WE WILL HAVE DOWN
[2495]LINK ACCESS TO NATIONALLY MANAGED OVERHEAD PHOTOGRAPHY SYSTEMS,
[2496]WHICH ARE NOT YET OPERATIONAL. — | |
[2498]WE ARE AWARE OF THE COSTS INVOLVED IN FIELDING MODERN COLLECTION
[2500]SYSTEMS AND THE UPGRADING OF CURRENT ONES, NONETHELESS, GENERAL |
[2501]HOLLINGSWORTH AND I SHARE THE VIEW THAT, GIVEN OUR MISSION AND OUR
[2502]PROXIMITY TO POTENTIAL BELLIGERENT, WE MUST HAVE THE BEST.
[2504]INTELLIGENCE AVAILABLE. I AM SURE THAT YOUR TRIP TO KOREA GAVE
[2506]YOU A FEEL FOR THE SENSE OF URGENCY THAT WE LIVE WITH HERE,
[2508]AND WE HOPE THAT YOU WILL BE ABLE To PROVIDE YOUR COLLEAGUES |
[2510]IN THE CONGRESS WITH A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF OUR POSITION. AND HELP
[2511]TO INSURE THAT OUR FORCES CONTINUE TO GET THE KIND OF SUPPORT |
[2512]NEEDED TO DO THE JOB TO WHICH WE ARE DEDICATED,
[2514]SECRET
[2516]13-00000
[2518].
[2520]FORM 3020
[2521]7-71 MPG, 2/75
[2523]PER wo TOTAL COPIES : RUN BY —
[2525]SECRET
[2527]CABLE SEC DISSEM BY__
[2529]: REPRODUCTION, ny: OTHER THA:
[2530]. _ BSSUING. ‘Orrick 1a PROMIBITE!
[2531]. PERBON/UNIT ‘NOTIFIED
[2533]. 7 [starr 7 ~
[2535]. FILE
[2536]zy SS
[2538]ReTION # - ” - : — 2) - ‘6 =
[2540]T 494894 EL A755 “PAGE 96-06 . “IN 754484
[2541]TOR? 2805912 NOV 75 SEOU. 25948
[2543]SINCERELY YOURS, "UNQUOTE:
[2544]E2, IMPDET.
[2546]ee Jat SECRET © !
[2548]13-00000
[2550]“CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 4 PER SR MW2 a
[2552]TOTAL COPIES
[2554]‘ REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ~
[2555]. ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED:
[2556]PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED : — -
[2558]ADVANGE COPY 15:
[2559]ACTION UNIT
[2561]SUED‘SLOTTED
[2563]T 4489 ;
[2565]EI AQ8O
[2567]PAGE B1-o1
[2569]"IN. 756898
[2570]TOR34093492Z NOV 75
[2572]SEOU 25761
[2574]SECRET 1003222 NOV 75 STAFF
[2575]CITE SEOUL 25764
[2577]TO DIRECTOR.
[2578]RYBAT PLMHCONGA
[2580]REF: SEOUL 25732 Gs 73a 037) ;
[2582]FOLLOWING 1S TEXT OF STATE 264362 (ROGER CHANNEL)
[2583]-AB-NOVEMBER 1975% QUOTE SuBECTs LETTER TO CONGRESSMAN
[2584]MILFORD. | REFS SEOUL e531 1. LETTER HAS BEEN FORWARDED
[2586]TO MILFORD aS RECOMMENDED, ONLY CHANGE IN TEXT PROPOSED
[2588]PARA 5 REFTER WAS DELETION OF FINAL SENTENCE. QW ING TO
[2590]SENSITIVITY OF REF ERENCE To "CLANDESTINE OPERATION"
[2592]IN: LETTER -
[2593]7 LIKELY TO B EC OME PART OF ‘PUBLIC RECORD. UNQUOTES . coe
[2594]. Ss ; sn
[2595]2 .
[2596]| =p
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[2602]SECRET
[2604]13-00000
[2610]FORM auzv0 . . ? ; a] \
[2611]7671 MFG. 2/76 ! , j i
[2612]|
[2614]CABLE SEC DISsEM ev A _Totac copies — ! RUN BY i
[2615]REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA|
[2617]SECRE ECRET ISSUING OFFICE 1S PROMIMITES:
[2619]PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED.
[2621]ADVAN OP D/ SLOTTED STAF AR ii beta
[2622]ACTION UNIT
[2623]Ss)
[2624]ACTION #
[2625]T 424247. G1A337. [PAGE O14 — "TH 726294
[2626]TORI3103452 06775 SEU 25687
[2627]. : . fe . . ran 1 .
[2628]SECRET 3103142 OCT 75 STAFF engine t
[2629]= Lq LC GkLL
[2630]CITE SEOUL 25687 AAAS
[2632]TO: DIRECTOR. a eet ip
[2633]RYBAT PLMHCONGA a
[2634]REF: SEOUL 25649 7A4591) * a
[2636]1. REGRET DELAY. IN REPORTING FOLLOWUP DISCUSSION
[2638]L190 he
[2640]WITH CONGRESSMAN MILFORD. HE MET WITH COS FOR APPROXIMATERY
[2641]ONE HOUR MORNING OF 28 OCTOBER PRIOR TO DEPARTURE, pcos =
[2642]BROUGHT THE CONGRESSMAN TO COS RESIDENCE AND THEN EXCUSED
[2643]HIMSELF TO MEET WITH CONGRESSMAN LUCIEN NED@l (SEOUL 25657).
[2644]2. AS IT TURNED OUT NOTHING OF PARTICULAR SIGNIFICANCE
[2645]DEVELOPED AT THIS MEETING. °R SPROVIDED BOTH AN OPPORTUNITY
[2646]‘TO REVIEW VARIOUS POINTS DISCUSSED IN THE PREVIOUS SESSION
[2647]WITH COS EMPHASIZING THE AGZFCY COMMAND AND CONTROL
[2648]PROCEDURES FOR FOREIGN OPERATIONS PLUS THE MANAGEMENT BY
[2649]OBJECTIVE AND COST EFFECTIVENESS REVIEW PROCEDURES.
[2650]3, COS PERMITTED THE CONGRESSMAN To READ A STERILIZED
[2651]_ COPY OF SEOUL 25388 Less THE FINAL PARAGRAPH AND THEN -
[2652]DISCUSSED HIS PROPOSAL To TRY To DEVELOP A MINORITY
[2653]REPORT AROUND THIS TYPE’ vad $e 2 23 5 Fee REVIEW
[2654]S ECRE T
[2656]ean OO ec NETTIE See
[2658]13-00000
[2660]|| FORM 3020b LO co .
[2661]TeV MEG. 2/75 ; : Lo
[2663]TOTAL COPIES : RUN BY
[2665]CABLE SEC DISSEM BY___ PER wo .
[2667]es ~ —— _ . _ REPRODUCTION BY OTHE THA
[2668]; - _ | . SECRET ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE!
[2670]PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED a : ne :
[2672]. t 424247_ ETA337 PAGE 02-02. , IN 728294
[2673]Ho ng 88452 OCT 75 _ SEoU 25687
[2675]| STUDY AND EXPLAINED WHY DID NoT BELIEVE THIS WAS FEASIBLE.
[2676]THE CONGRESSMAN CONCURRED BUT RESTATED HiS DESIRE TO NOW
[2677]FOLLOW UP HIS KOREA INQUIRIES AT THE WASHINGTON LEVEL AND
[2678]SOMEHOW INCORPORATE VARIOUS ASPECTS INTO HIS REPORT. HE cx. -
[2679]REINTERATED HIS STRONG DESIRE TO MEET WITH GENERAL WALTERS
[2680]COMMENDED MR, SHACKLEY TO THE CONGRESSMAN FOR SPECIFIC. 7
[2681]DISCUSSIONS ON-THIS AREA.
[2683]4, THE CONGRESSMAN WAS QUITE PLEASED AND APPRECIATIVE
[2685]| OF THE DISCUSSIONS HERE AND WOULD LIKE TO BE HELPFUL.
[2687]E2, IJMPDET,.
[2688]CS COMMENT:*COS forwards a resume of points covered during more than
[2690]six hours of off the record discussions with Congressman Dale Milford (Dr Texas) _
[2692]| HIS PROBLEM REMAINS ONE OF FOCUS AND STAFF ASSISTANCE,
[2693]; on 25 October 1975.
[2695]i Bows S¥cD
[2697]| ( _ SECRET
[2700]13-00000
[2702][ Z ‘4.
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[2705]2 _ Lo | (3
[2706]CABLE Sec S16sEM oii ___rer : x A- af Run py
[2710]REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA!
[2711]IGBUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITEE
[2713]7 c Bar pm eCED: DENG
[2715]PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED.
[2717]| ACTION UNIT
[2719]GAS || pJeas pne b/see_csee(sa/abo\
[2720]7 414529 E1AGa7 = "PAGE OF TN 72459
[2722]TORI2804402 OCT 75 — SEOU 25649
[2724]SECRET 2003008 oct 75 STAFF
[2725]CITE SEOUL 25649 SECTION 4 OF 4 a “by. y
[2727]TO! DIRECTOR,
[2729]RYBAT PL MHCONGA
[2730]REF! A, SEOUL 23646 "72, saa)
[2731]Be DIRECTOR 759641
[2732]“FOLLOWING is A RESUME OF POINTS COVERED DURING
[2733]“MORE THAN SIX HOURS OF OFF THE RECORD DISCUSSIONS
[2734]WITH CONGRESSMAN DALE MILFORD (D=TEXAS) ON 25 OCTOBER 1975,
[2735]BECAUSE OF FEVER COS HAD NOT BEEN RELEASED FROM HOSPITAL AND
[2736]DISCUSSIONS WERE THEREFURE HELD AT THE HOSPITAL SITTING
[2737]ROOM, | |
[2738]1, CONGRESSMAN MILFORD OPENED THE DISCUSSION
[2739]| BY REITERATING CONCERNS SURFACED THE PREVIOUS AFTERNOON,
[2740]IN ADDITION TO HSS REFERENT A ASSESSMENT, HE STATED
[2741]THAT HE BELIEVED THAT THE FIRST PHASE OF THE COMMITTEE
[2742]REPORT WILL STATE THAT:
[2743]Ay DUPLICATION OF INTEL MISSIONS RESULTED IN
[2745]MULTICHANNEL FORWARDING OF INFORMATION,
[2746]B. BUREAUCRATIC INEFFICIENCY RESULTED IN DELAYS
[2747]| SECRET
[2749]13-00000
[2752]| «
[2753]|
[2755]PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED__-
[2756]ACTION UNIT
[2758]ACTION #
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[2762]T 444520 ELAge7” - PAGE 2
[2763]| | | Fons 2896003 oct 75
[2765]IN | FORWARDING OF INTELLIGENCE,
[2767]Ce. NEW LEGISLATION ‘AND NEW PERMANENT, PREFERABLE
[2769]JOINT OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE ARE REQUIRED,
[2771]2, THE CONGRESSMAN STATED THAT THE COMMITTEE
[2772]INQUIRIES ARE POLITICAL IN NATURE AND IN WIS OPINION
[2773]THERE IS NO PRETENSE OF OBVECTIVITY. TIME FACTORS ©
[2774]DID NoT PERMIT HIM OR OTHER MEMBERS To PERSONALLY
[2775]OR SERIOUSLY ADDRESS. THE QUESTIONS INVOLVED SO
[2776]THAT FOR PRACTICAL PURPOSES, MOST MEMBERS WERE "PRISONERS
[2777]OF THE COMMITTEE STAFF", HE HAS NOT BEEN HAPPY WITH
[2778]THIS SITUATION AND HAD INITIALLY PROPOSED THAT EACH
[2779]COMMITTEE MEMBER BE PERMITTED TO PERSONALLY SELECT
[2780]ONE STAFF MEMBER FOR ASSIGNMENT TO THE COMMITTEE,
[2782]HE HAD LINED UP A TOTAL OF SIX MEMBERS TO BACK THIS
[2784]APPROACH, WHEN THE CHAIRMAN AGREED TO LET HIM SELECT
[2785]ONE STAFF MEMBER IF HE IN TURN WOULD DROP HIS SPONSORSHIP
[2787]; OF THIS PROPOSAL. HE AGREED» BUT SAID THAT HE HAD AS
[2789]YET BEEN UNABLE TO IDENTIFY AN APPROPRIATE CANDIDATE.
[2791]“HE DISMISSED THE CURRENT COMMITTEE STAFF AS STARRY-EYED.
[2793]LIBERALS OUT TO MAKE A NAME FOR THEMSELVES, ; HE [S
[2794]. S$ ECRET
[2796]REPRODUCTION BY OTMEZR THAN
[2797]ISSUING OFFICE [6 PROHIBITED
[2799]“IN 724594
[2801]—SEQU 25649
[2804]13-00000
[2806]L.
[2807]'
[2808]t.
[2809]I
[2810]i
[2812]|
[2814]ee TOTAL COPIES '. RUN BY
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[2817]an : REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAI
[2818]ISSUING OFFICE IS PROMIDITEE
[2820]PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED.
[2822]ACTION UNIT
[2824]ACTION
[2826]7 414520. EAs? PAGE OS IN 724591
[2827]| TOR12804402 OCT 75 - SEou 25649
[2829]“OROTIVELY SEEKING A CANDIDATE FoR EMPLOYMENT aS HIS
[2830]STAFF ASSISTANT ON THE COMMITTEE, BUT DID NOT APPEAR
[2831]SANGUINE THAT HE WOULD CoME UP WITH THE: RIGHT MAN,
[2833]3s. COS NOTED THAT DIRECTOR cOLaY WOULD BE |
[2834]THOROUGHLY DELIGHTED WITH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A
[2835]JOINT CONGRESS 10NAL OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE SINCE HE
[2836]WAS NOW O@LIGED TO REPORT TO SIX SEPARATE COMMITTEES,
[2837]CoS EVIDENCED SOME SKEPTICISM THAT A JOINT OVERSIGHT
[2838]COMMITTEE WOULD BE ESTABLISHED, THE CONGRESSMAN WAS
[2839]NOT OPTIMISTIC IN THE SHORT TERM BUT BELIEVED THAT
[2840]A JOINT COMMITTEE WILL EVENTUALLY BE ESTABLISHED,
[2841]HE SAID THAT RIGHT NOW THE AGENCY IS ESSENTIALLY IN
[2842]“AN UNDERDOG POSITION AND 1S GOOD COPY, HOWEVER»
[2843]OVER THE LONGER TERM, INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP
[2844]SCORES NO POINTS WITH THE FOLKS BACK IN HOMETOWN USA SO
[2845]THAT IN TIME CONGRESSMEN WILL NAMEUVER TO AVOID THE
[2846]ASSIGNMENT. | |
[2848]4, THE REAL PROBLEM AS HE SEES. IT IS TO FORM A
[2850]COMMITTEE THAT WOULD HAVE CREDIBILITY IN THE EYES oF
[2851]THE HOUSE AND HAVE PROCEDURES THAT WOULD PERMIT EFFECTIVE
[2853]| SECRET |
[2855]13-00000
[2857]L.
[2858]| .
[2859]|
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[2863]_ ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED
[2867]ACTION UNIT
[2869]ACTION #
[2871]7 414520 ElAe@7. PAGE 04 | IN 724594
[2873]oo 7 _ TOR 2606402 gcT 73  SEQU 25649
[2875]OVERSIGHT FUNCTION TO BE EXERCISED AND IN A SECURE |
[2876]| MANNER, - THE CONGRESSHAN 1S PUSHING A PROPOSAL THAT.
[2877]THE HOUSE. COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP BE COMPOSED OF ONE
[2878]MEMBER NOMINATED FROM THE ARMED FORCES COMMITTEE, |
[2880]ONE FROM THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, ONE APPOINTED -
[2881](BY THE SPEAKER, WITH THE REMAINDER OF THE COMMITTEE
[2882]To BE NOMINATED BY THE SPEAKER WITH CONCURRENCE BY
[2884]THE HOUSE MEMBERS, — |
[2886]5, THE PRESENT HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE (HSC) IS
[2888]TO BE PHASED OUT AS OF 31 JANUARY, THE CONGRESSMAN
[2889]| WAS OF TWO MINDS AS TO WETHER THE COMMITTEE'S LIFE
[2890]| SHOULD BE EXTENDED, IF TERMINATED ON SCHEDULE, THE
[2891]SPOTLIGHT WOULD FADE AWAY BUT THE RESULT WOULD BE
[2892]| VARIOUS RECOMMENDATIONS FOR "GAD" LEGISLATION, IF
[2893]| GONTINUED, THE POLITICALLY INSPTRED MANIPULATION OF
[2894]THE COMMITTEE WILL CONTINUE SEEKING SENSATIONAL
[2895]HEADLINES, HE SAID THAT HE FRANKLY DID NoT KNOW
[2896]WHICH WAS WORSE, |
[2898]6, THE CONGRESSMAN'S STATED INTENT» WHICH HE
[2899]SHARES WITH CONGRESSMAN DAVID C. TREEN IS TO FILE
[2900]. . SECRET
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[2917]YT 414520 ElA827. - PAGE @5 a, IN 724591. ~
[2918]| TOR! 2604402 OCT 75° SEOU 25649
[2920]A DISSENTING MINORITY REPORT FOCUSING IN A POSITIVE
[2921]MANNER ON THE CONTEMPORARY SITUATION RATHER THAN.
[2922]THE HISTORICAL ISSUES THAT THE COMMITTEE HAS FOCUSED
[2923]IN A NON® OBVECTIVE MANNER, HOWEVER, SINCE DECEMBER
[2924]oS FOR PRACTICAL PURPOSES NOT A WORKING MONTH) THIS:
[2925]“GIVES’HIM ONLY THIRTY DAYS TO PUT TOGETHER A REPORT,
[2926]SINCE HE IS A MEMBER OF THREE HOUSE COMMITTEES AND
[2927]CHARMAN OF UNE SUB-COMMITTEE WITH NOT EVEN ONE STAFF
[2928]ASSISTANT ON THE SELECT COMMITTEE HE IS FINDING IT.
[2929]AL Mo ST IMPOSSIBLE To DEVELOP A MINORITY REPORT.
[2930]HE TURNED ASIDE THE SUGGESTION THAT FAVORABLE WITNESSES
[2931]BE CALLED AS IMPRACTICAL, HE SAID.» FOR EXAMPLE, THAT
[2932]| IF HE ASKED GENERAL WALTERS OR PRESTIGIOUS AND |
[2933]| KNOWLEDGEABLE PERSONALITIES WITH INTELLIGENCE BACKGROUNDS
[2934]T0 APPEAR» THEY WOULD NOT BE PERMITTED TO MAKE AN OBUECTIVE
[2935]; AND BALANCED PRESENTATION, THE COMMITTEE'S LINE OF
[2936]QUESTIONING WOULD BE CONFINED TO THEIR KNOWLEDGE OF THE
[2937]"DEAD CATS" OF TEN TO FIFTEEN YEARS AGO, HE ALSO FORESAW
[2938]i NO POSSIBILITY OF MODIFYING THE MAJORITY VIEWS OR THE
[2939]| MAJORITY REPORT, HE WAS CLEARLY CONCERNED THAT SAM ADAMS!
[2940]| SECRET
[2942]13-00000
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[2954]+ PBABON/UNIT NOTIFIED - srr : nn an = .
[2956]| ACTION UNIT
[2958]ACTION #
[2960]7 414520 ElAG27. PAGE 26-BG oO IN 724591
[2962]TORI2804402 OCT 75 — SEOU 25649"
[2963]ALLEGATIONS ARE BEING ACCEPTED AS FACT WITHOUT REBUTTAL
[2964]PERMITTED, HE WAS PUSHING FOR REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF ALL
[2965]INDIVIDUALS CITED BY ADAMS BUT WAS UNCERTAIN WHETHER HE
[2966]“GOULD OBTAIN COMMITTEE AGREEMENT, IF NOT» HE INTENDED To
[2967]EMPHASIZE THIS PO{NT IN THE PROPOSED MINORITY REPORT,
[2968]7, THE CONGRESSMAN IS TENTATIVELY: CONSIDERING A
[2969]MINORITY REPORT THE THRUST OF WHICH WOULD BE THAT HE
[2971]oo SECRET
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[2983]. : : REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAI
[2984]ISSUING OFFICE is ‘PROHIBITSD
[2986]PRERGON/UNIT NOTIFIED,
[2988]“AGTION UNIT.
[2991]T 414531. ElAgsB PAGE | IN 724594
[2992]| ToRI2e05022 OCT 75 — SEQU 25649
[2994]ge Cc RET zedsaoe uct 75 STAFF
[2996]CITE SEOUL 25649 SECTION 2 0F 4
[2997]To! DIRECTOR,
[2999]RYBAT PLMHCONGA .
[3001]HAD TAKEN A CURRENT LOOK AT THE INTEL COMMUNITY IN A
[3002]CRITICAL AREA (KOREA) AND FOUND IT ALIVE AND WELL:
[3003]AND HAD FOLLOWED THE INTEL FLOW THROUGH THE CYCLE
[3004]MALL THE WAY TO THE FORTY COMMITTEE", HE STATED
[3005]THAT WHAT HE NEEDED WAS SOME "VEHICLE" TO TIE THIS
[3006]ALL TOGETHER FOR PURPOSES OF HIS REPORT. COS NOTED
[3007]THAT USIB IN WASHINGTON HAS RECENTLY COMPLETED A.
[3008]COMPREHENSIVE ALBEIT HIGHLY CLASSIFIED REVIEW AND
[3009]ASSESSMENT OF THE KOREAN TARGET IN A EFFORT To
[3010]IDENTIFY ANY PROBLEM AREAS AND TO TAKE PROPER
[3011]REMEDIAL ACTIONS, COS NOTED THAT HAVING ONLY
[3012]RECENTLY ARRIVED HERE HE HAD OF COURSE UNDERTAKEN
[3013]A THOROUGH IN@COUNTRY REVIEW IN ORDER To ASSURE
[3014]HIMSELF OF THE ADEQUACY OF OUR IN=COUNTRY PROGRAMS,
[3015]THE CONGRESSMAN SEIZED ON THESE REVIEWS AS THE POSSIBLE
[3016]BASIS OF HIS REPORT, HOWEVER, HE WANTED TO DEAL
[3018]| SECRET
[3020]13-00000
[3022]f
[3023]i
[3024]i
[3026]‘ PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED,
[3028]0. 444532
[3030]CABLE SEC DISSEM BY. _ PER - _. TOTAL COPIES . RUN BY
[3032]ACTION UNIT
[3034]ACTION #
[3036]Elaese
[3037]J TOR12805022 OCT 75
[3039]“WITH "UNCLASSIFIED ASPECTS" OF THE REVIEW. (HOW
[3041]ONE RECONCILES THIS CANNOT BE SUGGESTED FROM THIS
[3042]VANTAGE POINT, IT MERELY EMPHASIZES THE LACK OF
[3043]FOCUS. AND THE CONGRESSMAN S DESIRE TO DO SOMETHING
[3044]CONSTRUCTIVE, But HIS INABILITY TO FIND A’*HANDLE".)
[3045]8, THE CONGRESSMAN COMMENTED THAT THE SECURITY OF
[3046]CLASSIFIED MATERIAL IN THE COMMITTEE'S HANDS IS A
[3048]“MAJOR PROBLEM, THE HSC RULES STATE CLASSIFIED
[3050]MATERIAL MUST NOT BE RELEASED UT THESE RESTRICTIONS
[3051]DIRECTLY CONTRAVENE HOUSE REGULATIONS ON THIS POINT
[3053]AND WOULD NOT BE SUSTAINED IF CHALLENGED, HOWEVER,
[3055]SINCE THE HARRINGTON EPISODE HE DOUBTED THAT THE
[3057]-WSC'S SPECIAL RULE WOULD BE CHALLGNGED (ACCORDING TO
[3059]THE CURRENT HOUSE RULES ANY MEMBER CAN ASK FOR A
[3060]COMPLETE TRANSCRIPT OF ANY CLOSED COMMITTEE HEARING
[3061]AND USE IT ALMOST WITH IMPUNITY),
[3063]9, COS WAS PREPARED TO PROCEED ON THE BASIS OF
[3064]REFERENT B GUIDANCE IF WE SENSED THAT THE CONGRESSMAN
[3065]WOULD BE RECPTIVE TO THIS LINE OF PRESENTATION, |
[3066]GIVEN THE UNORTHODOX MANNER IN WHICH THIS HAD
[3068]SECRET
[3070]REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAI
[3071]_ISSUING OFFICE 1S PROHIBITED
[3073]SEOQU 25649
[3075]13-00000
[3077],
[3078]_
[3079]|
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[3083]PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIEO_
[3084]ACTION UNIT
[3085]ACTION #
[3087]T. 414531
[3089]“per TOTAL COPIES RUN BY
[3091]E]AGSS.
[3092]_— TOR! 2805022 OCT 75
[3094]“DEVELOPED, AND UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES IT WAS BELIEVED
[3095]BEST TO GIVE THE CONGRESSMAN THE OPPORTUNITY To CHART
[3097]THE COURSE. IN SO-DOING IT BECAME ABUNDANTLY CLEAR
[3098]THAT HIS INTEREST LAY IN THE AGENCY'S ROLE VIS-AeVIS THE
[3100]INTEL COMMUNITY IN THE FIELD, HE WANTED TO KNOW HOW
[3102]COORDINATION AND CONTROL WAS EXERCISED IN THE FIELD.
[3103]COS EXPLAINED THE CHIEF OF STATION'S RESPONSIBILITY
[3104]AND AUTHORITY IN THE COORDINATION OF CLANDESTINE
[3105]COLLECTION PORGRAMS. IN DISCUSSING COORDINATION OF
[3106]MILITARY COLLECTION AGENCIES CoS IN DUE COURSE
[3107]SUGGESTED THAT MILITARY REPRESENTATIONS MIGHT
[3108]PROFITABLY BE INVITED TO JOIN IN THE DISCUSSION.
[3109]TELEPHONE CALLS BROUGHT THE 8TH ARMY Jes CAPTAIN ALBERT
[3110]My HUNT» THE DEPUTY J©2 COLONEL ARTHUR W, LONG AND
[3111]THE SENIOR NSA REPRESENTATIVE MR, DELMAR C. LANG INTO
[3112]THE DISCUSSION, THE COMMAND AND COORDINATION CHANVELS
[3113]WERE OUTLINED, AND THE STATION'S ROE WAS ENDORSED BY
[3114]THE MILITARY REPS TO ALMOST AN EMBARRASSING DEGREE.
[3115]COS EXPLAINED THE DCID'S, AND IN THIS INSTANCE
[3116]DCID 5/1, EXPLAINED HOW THE FIELD CLEARANCE,
[3117]SECRET
[3119]REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA?
[3120](GBUING OFFICE 18 PROHIBITED
[3122]_ Qo . f,
[3123]| PAGE BR - IN 72459
[3125]SEQU 25649
[3127]13-00000
[3129]" CAGLE SEC OleeEM BY. PER : : _TOTAL COPIES RUN BY , ‘
[3130]: a . aa , : REPRODUCTION BY OTMER THA:
[3131]ISBUING OFFICE 18 PRONIBITES
[3133]PERGON/UNIT NOTIFIED
[3135]ACTION #
[3137]“7 414531 G1A8Se =SS*«C«i GEC “IN 7245997
[3139]ToR12805022 OCT 75 SEOY 25649
[3141]REGISTRATION, APPROVAL AND IF NECESSARY, RECLAIMOR
[3142]PROCESS WORKS AND SUGGESTED THAT THE CONGRESSMAN
[3143]OBTAIN COPIES OF THE DCIDIS UPON HIS RETURN TO
[3144]WASHINGTON. NOT SURPRISING, THE CONGRESSMAN HAD
[3145]NEVER HEARD OF THE DCID'S, HE NOTED THE SUGGESTION
[3146]AND WILL IN ALL PROBABILITY FOLLON UP UPON HIS
[3147]" RETURN, ce
[3148]40, THE CONGRESSMAN WAS CONCERNED THAT THERE
[3149]WAS A DUPLICATION OF EFFORT AND INTENTLY QUESTIONED
[3150]“THE MULTICHANNEL NATURE 0F REPORTING WHEN ONLY ONE
[3151]DICISION COULD GE TAKEN. COL, LONG» THE DEPUTY.
[3152]Je2, WAS PARTICULARLY ELOQUENT IN DEFENSE OF
[3153]MULTIPLE REPORTING CHANNELS» POINTING QUT THE
[3154]SPEED AND ASSURANCE OF COVERAGE WHEN SUCH WERE
[3155]EMPLOYED, HE ADDED THAT PLACING A UNIFYING LAYER
[3157]i OF BUREAUCRACY ON TOP WOULD TEND: TO DELAY THE
[3158]MORE RAPID TRANSMISSIUN OF INTELLIGENCES TO STIFLE
[3159]DISSENTING VIEWSs AND To GREATE A MONSTROUS SIZED
[3160]SUPER*AGENCY WHICH MIGHT PROVE LESS SUSCEPTIBLE
[3162]TO CONTROL AND REVIEW, THE CONGRESSMAN WAS PARTICULARLY
[3163]| SECRET
[3167]13-00000
[3168]i:
[3171]|
[3172]i
[3174]1
[3176]PER: : “TOTAL COPIES . RUN BY
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[3179], REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAI
[3180]ISSUING OPFICE 1S PROHIBITED
[3182]PERGON/UNIT NOTIFIED___._-
[3183]ACTION UNIT
[3185]ACTION #
[3187]T 4145314. E1A838.. PAGE DS IN 72459¢
[3189]: TOR 2805022 OCT 75  SEQU 25649
[3191]STRUCK WITH THIS LATER POINT WHICH HE CONSIDERED
[3193]A PARTICULARLY PERSUASIVE ARGUMENT FOR MULTICHANNEL
[3194]REPORTING, HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE EVEN ‘MOR E PERSUASIVE
[3195]“ON HIS "WILD=EYED" LIBERAL PEERS,
[3197]41, GOS’ REVIEWED IN DETAIL AND ESTABLISHNENT OF
[3198]NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER SYSTEM AS A DEVELOPMENT
[3199]WITHIN THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS AND DEVELOPED BY THE
[3200]DCL TO FURTHER REFINE. THE COMMUNITY EVALUATION
[3201]SYSTEM AS WELL AS TO-ENSURE EVEN MORE EFFECTIVE
[3202]COORDINATION AND UNDERSTANDING WITHIN THE COMMUNITY,
[3203]IT WAS NOTED THAT THE NIO FOR NORTH ASIA AND THE |
[3204]PACIFIC, MRS, EVELYN COLBERT, IS A SENIOR CAREER
[3205]STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICER, WHILE COL. LONG'S PREVIOUS
[3207]| ASSIGNMENT HAD BEEN AS THE DEPUTY NIO FOR LATIN
[3209]AMERICA, IT WAS EXPLAINED THAT THE SYSTEM PERMITS
[3211]| THE DCI TO ESTABLISH AN ORDER OF NATIONAL PRIORITIES
[3213]AND TO EXAMINE THE PRODUCT OF AN ENTIRE MISSION, AN
[3215]IN TELL IGENCE SERVICE, OR A SERVICE COMPONENT TO SEE
[3217]| HOW WELL IT IS ADDRESSING THE KEY INTELLIGENCE .
[3218]QUESTIONS, THE EVALUATIONS OF THE NIO SYSTEM REPRESENTS
[3220]SECRET
[3222]13-00000
[3223]|
[3225]| GABLE GEC DisekM ay PER __TOTAL COPIES RUN BY 2
[3226]Sn . . ‘ : REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAI
[3227]ISSUING OPFICE Ie PRONIBITES
[3229]PERGON/UNIT NOTIFIED.
[3231]ACTION UNIT
[3233]ACTION # .
[3235]y 414531 ElAa3a PAGE BO-BG
[3237]TORI 2605022 OCT 75 2S 25 EKG
[3239]MAJOR ADDITIONAL. STEP IN MANAGEMENT OF THE COMMUNITY,
[3240]COS ALSO NOTED THAT PERHAPS AN EVEN MORE IMPORTANT 7
[3241]STEP TAKEN BY THE DCI IN EFFECTING COMMUNITY CONTROL
[3242]WAS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF INTER AGENCY RESOURCES
[3243]ALLOCATION COMMITTEE (IRAC) WHICH PERMITS THE DCI
[3244]. To MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE BUDGETS oF THE
[3245]“RESPECTIVE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES, THE CONGRESSMAN
[3246]MAS QUICK TO PERCEIVE THE USEFULNESS OF IRAC.
[3247]‘42, COS REVIEWED THE AGENCY SYSTEM OF
[3248]MANAGEMENT BY OBWECTIVE AND THE FIELD INTEL
[3249]PROCESS IN SOME DETAIL NOTING THE AUTOMATIC
[3250]SIMULTANEOUS RELEASE TO CUSTOMERS IN WASHINGTON.
[3251]AS WELL AS THE FIELD, LOCAL CoORDINATION WAS
[3252]EXPLAINED AND THE ABSOLUTE INTEGRITY OF STATION'S
[3253]/ REPORTING WAS STRESSED, COS STATED THAT HE WAS
[3254]UNAWARE OF A SINGLE INCIDENT DURING HIS CAREER
[3255]IN WHICH AN AMBASSADOR OR GENERAL OR ANY OFFICER.
[3256]HaD PREVENTED THE DISSEMINATION OF A SINGLE. REPORT
[3257]| -FOR POLITICAL OR OTHER REASONS, LOCALLY, cos
[3259]oo. SECRET
[3261]13-00000
[3263]CABLE S&C DISSEM BY__ PER TOTAL COPIES RUN BY
[3265]: REPRODUCTION SY OTHER THAI
[3266]1eSUING orricg is PROMIBITED
[3268]PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED...
[3270]“ACTION UNIT
[3272]oe
[3273]i ACTION #
[3275]"} 414508 ElAS;S PAGE WL , IN 724504—
[3276]ee TOR(2804232 OCT 75 SEOU 25649
[3278]“S$ ECRE T 2e03eg2 OCT. 75 STAFF
[3279]CITE SEOUL 25649 SECTION 3 0F 4
[3280]TO! DIRECTOR,
[3281]RYBAT PLMHCONGA
[3282]NOTED: THAT WE DO NoT PRECLUDE REQUESTING THE
[3283]AMBASSADOR’ S OR THE. CINCUNC'S OR ANY OTHER SPECIALIST
[3284]OPINION OR COMMENTS IN THOSE INSTANCES WHERE: THE SUBJECT
[3285]MATTER IS OF A NATURE THAT THEIR COMMENTS WOULD. PLACE
[3286]THE INFORMATION IN CONTEXT AND THEREBY MATERTALLY
[3287]ADD TO THE VALUE OF THE REPORT, IT WAS NOTED THAT
[3288]SUCH COMMENTS ARE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED AS SUCH IN THE
[3289]REPORT AND SUCH REVIEW IS NOT PERMITTED TO DELAY
[3290]| LTS TIMELY DISSEMINATION, E.Gy, THE OFFICE OF THE
[3291]CINCUNG IS PERMITTED 24 HOURS IN WHICH TO
[3292]COMMENT ON CERTAIN MILITARY REPORTS IF THE SUBVECT
[3293]MATTER IS OF A MILITARY NATURE AND THE TIMELINESS
[3295]| Of THE INFORMATION IS NOT AFFECTED BY A 24-HOUR DELAY,
[3297]COS EMPHASIZED THAT NO ONE REPEAT NO ONE IN THE FIELD
[3299]CAN PRECLUDE A CHIEF OF STATION FROM EXERCISING HIS
[3301]RESPONSIBILITY AND PREROGATIVE TO DISSEMINATE SUCH
[3302]SECRET
[3304]13-00000
[3307]p
[3309]| GABLE BEC BIGHEM BY... PER eee __TOTAL COPIES — . __ RUN BY
[3311]" PERGON/UNIT NOTIFIED,
[3312]ACTION UNIT
[3314]ACTION #
[3316]SE&CRET
[3318]T 444508 ElAea5 PAGE “
[3320]REPRODUCTION By OTHER THAN
[3321]\asuiNne OPMICE 18 PROHIBITED
[3323]TORI 2804232 OCT 75
[3325]INTELLIGENCE AS HE, IN HIS CONSIDERED JUDGMENT,
[3326]CONSIDERS WORTHY OF DISSEMINATION INTO THE NATIONAL
[3327]LEVEL SYSTEM, .
[3329]43, THE costs sesroustin AND AUTHORITY FOR
[3331]“COORDINATION OF MILITARY CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS WERE
[3333]ALSO REVIEWED IN DETAIL IN THE PRESENCE OF THE DEPUTY
[3334]J=2, COLONEL LONG» WHILE DEFENDING THE SERVICES
[3335]SEPARATE NEED FOR A COLLECTION CAPABILITY » STRONGLY
[3337]ENDORSED THE NEED FOR THE COORDINATION PROCESS UNDER
[3338]DCID 5/2, |
[3340]14, THE CONGRESSMAN NOTED THAT ONE PROBLEM THAT
[3341]HAD BEEN BROUGHT TO THE COMMITTEE'S ATTENTION AND
[3342]WHICH HAD SURFACED DURING THE TET OFFENSIVE WAS THAT
[3343]FOUR DIFFERENT INTEL ORGANIZATIONS HAD BEEN USING THE
[3344]SAME SOURCE IN VIETNAM, COS NOTED THAT IF TRUE
[3345]THE INCIDENT WAS THE EXCEPTION NOT THE RULE AND
[3346]EXPLAINED THE ROLE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE INTER AGENCY
[3347]SOURCE REGISTRY AND HOW IT SERVES THE NEEDS OF THE
[3348]ENTIRE COMMUNITY, THE PROBLEM OF FABRICATION WAS
[3350]DISCUSSED AND THE COMMUNITY'S USE OF BURN NOTICES
[3352]SECRET
[3354]SEQU 25649 |
[3356]13-00000
[3358]CABLE 8&¢ ‘DISEEM BY ____PER . TOTAL COPIES RUN BY
[3359], REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAI
[3360]ISBUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITZO
[3362]; PERGON/UNIT NOTIFIED.
[3364]” ACTION UNIT
[3366]| es / | Y,
[3367]7444508 ELAB15 = PAGE BS - IN 72 45-64~
[3369]| | °° ToRSeeg423z2 ocT 750 i(“Sstt*«S E25
[3371]“To IDENTIFY AND NEUTRALIZE SUCH PEOPLE WAS EXPLAINED,
[3372]“45, ALTHOUGH.COS HAD PREVIOUSLY BRIEFED THE
[3373]CONGRESSMAN PRIOR TO HIS ARRIVAL, SUSLAK DELMAR LANG
[3375]BRIEFED THE CONGRESSMAN ON THE STATUS OF COMINT
[3376]COVERAGE OF THE NORTH KOREAN TARGET. HE ALSO.
[3377]STRESSED THE DESIRABILITY AND COST EFFECTIVENESS
[3379]OF THE PROPOSED Us2R DEPLOYMENT, PROPOSED MARKHAM
[3381]AND SWAMP COVERAGE AND ADDING A DF CAPABILITY TO THE
[3382]AUTOMATED VHF/HF ADVENTURER COLLECTION SITES, LANG
[3383]ALSO MADE A STRONG PITCH FOR THE COST EFFECTIVENESS
[3384]OF THE THIRD PARTY PROGRAM, AND THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL
[3386]FUNDING OF DSA, THE KOREAN COUNTERPART ORGANIZATION,
[3388]/ THE CONGRESSMAN AT THIS POINT INTERJECTED THAT HE
[3390]SAW NO REASON FOR THE SEPARATION OF NSA AND CIA, COS
[3392]ADDRESSED TO THIS AND THE NSA REPRESENTATIVE LATER
[3394]/ «STATED HIS VIEWS WHICH WERE GENERALLY IN ACCORD.
[3396]COS EXPLAINED NSA TASKING RESPONSIG{LITY AND
[3398]FIRST AND THIRD PARTY PROGRAMS NOTING THAT ON THE
[3400]SURFACE HE COULD NOT PERCEIVE ANY ADVANTAGES THAT
[3402]WOULD ACCRUE TO THE GOVERNMENT IN TERMS OF GREATER.
[3404]“SECRET |
[3406]13-00000
[3408]GAGLE SEC DIG@EM BY ___ PER _ _ TOTAL COPIES RUN BY - .
[3409]oo ; : REPRODUCTION SY OTHER THA!
[3410]IGGUING OFFICE 18 PROHIMITEE
[3412]i PERGON/UNIT NOTIFIED __
[3414]ACTION UNIT
[3416]ACTION ¥
[3418]7 414508 EYAei5 PAGE BS ) TN 72 4a
[3420]TORI2Ze04232 OCT 75 ==—i(‘(‘(‘é‘ié«S OOO
[3422]| EFFICIENCY OF COST EFFECTIVENESS BY COMBINING THE
[3423]_ TWO ORGANIZATIONS, INDEED THE UNIQUE. NATURE OF NSA
[3424]RESPONSIGILITIES WHICH ARE HIGHLY TECHNICAL AND SOMEWHAT
[3425]ESOTERIC ARGUED AGAINST FUNCTIONAL MERGER OF THE TWO
[3426]ORGANIZATIONS, IT WAS NOTED THAT THE RESULTANT: SPAN
[3427]OF MANAGEMENT CONTROL COULD IN FACT RESULT IN A LESS
[3428]“COST EFFECTIVE OPERATION, BOTH COS AND MR. LANG NOTED
[3429]THAT PRESENT PROCEDURES PRECLUDE UNDESIRED DURLICATIVE
[3430]TASKING AND ENSURED MAXIMUM EFFECTIVE CoMMUNITY EXPLOITATION
[3431]IRRESPECTIVE OF WHICH “AGENCY HAD THE LOCAL COMINT |
[3432]RESPONSIBILITY, MR. LANG COMMENTED THAT HE HAD WORKED
[3433]CLOSELY WITH CIA IN SEVERAL COUNTRIES, AND SAW NEITHER
[3434]MAJOR PROBLEMS NOR ANY ADVANTAGES THAT WOULD NECESSARILY
[3435]ACCRUE IF THE AGENCIES WERE COMBINED. |
[3436]16, DCOS BRIEFED THE AMBASSADOR ON THE EVENING
[3437]‘OF 25 OCTOBER ON THE NATURE OF THE CONGRESS MAN'S
[3438]INTERESTS AND THE SUBSTANCE OF THE DAY'S
[3439]: DISCUSSIONS. THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT HE WOULD BE
[3440]HAPPY TO DISCUSS THESE CONCERNS WITH THE CONGRESSMAN
[3441]“ON SUNDAY OR MONDAY, THE. AMBASSADOR SAW CONGRESSMAN
[3442]SECRET
[3444]13-00000,
[3446]. to _ i
[3447]GABLE BRC DIOSEM BY. .PER TOTAL COPIES i,
[3448]« . . : REPRODUCTION BY OTMAR TNAI
[3450]$ E . C R . — T . taSUING OFFICE 18 PROMIBITED
[3452]PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED
[3454]ACTION UNIT:
[3456]" ACTION # . |
[3458]t 414508 ELAG15 PAGE BA > OIN 72456
[3460]| _. = J TORI2894232 OCT 75. | SEOY 25649
[3462]|
[3464]MILFORD THAT NIGHT AT DINNER AND INVITED HIM TO THE
[3465]RESIDENCE AT 1402 HOURS ON THE 26TH, “THE CONGRESSMAN
[3466]LATER STATED THAT THE DISCUSSIONS WERE QUITE HELPFUL
[3467]AND THE AMBASSADOR AGREED To FORWARD A LETTER ON THE
[3468]EFFECTIVENESS OF LOCAL INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT WHI CH
[3469]WOULD BE OF ASSISTANCE TO HIS PROPOSED MINORITY REPORT.
[3470]17, IN A STATION@ARRANGED ONE HOUR MEETING WITH
[3471]LT. GEN. HOLLINGSWORTH ON 26 OCTOBER IN WHICH DcOS
[3472]PARTICIPATED» THE CONGRESSMAN RESTATED THE NATURE. OF
[3473]HIS CONCERNS IN SEEKING POSITIVE CONTRIBUTIONS TO
[3474]; A MINORITY REPORT, HE THEN ASKED GEN. HOLLINGSWORTH
[3475]| WHAT INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT HE NEEDED AS A FIELD ARMY
[3476]| COMMANDER AND HOW HE WOULD CHARACTERIZE THE SUPPORT
[3477]HE WAS CURRENTLY OBTAINING FROM THE INTELLIGENCE
[3478]COMMUNITY, HOLLINGSWORTH RESPONDED WITH A CRUSTY
[3479]BUT IMPASSIONED LECTURE ON THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL
[3480]CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT TO CIA AND NSAy, HOLLINGSWORTH
[3482]we
[3484]TOLD THE CONGRESSMAN THAT HE NEEDED MORE TACTICAL
[3486]INTELLIGENCE AND HE NEEDED IT IN A TIMELY FASHION,
[3487]| WHICH WAS EXACTLY WHAT HE HAD RECENTLY TOLD SECRETARY
[3488]: , SECRET
[3490]13-00000
[3492]i
[3493]|
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[3496]' CABLE eee DIGBEM BY _, Per were peewee OTA CORNED eens RUN BY .
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[3501]| a -
[3502]ACTION # - 2 ee |
[3503]- F 444508 EI AG25 : PAGE (e- : IN 72458
[3504]| TORI 2804232 OCT 75 | SEQU 25649
[3506]" SCHLESINGER WHO HAD ‘POSED THE SAME QUESTION, . THE
[3507]GENERAL STATED THAT HE WANTED MORE NORTH KOREAN TACTICAL,
[3508]“PHOTO, AND EVEN ECONOMIC COVERAGE AND HE DEPENDED ON
[3509]NSA AND CIA TO GET IT FOR HIM, HE: COMPLETELY
[3510]DISCOUNTED US. MILITARY. INTELLIGENCE EFFORTS SAYING
[3511]THE ARMY Dip NOT PUT HIGH CALIBER MEN INTO INTELLIGENCE
[3512]AND DID NOT DEVELOP. INTELLIGENCE PROFESSIONALS.
[3513]HE NOTED THAT HIS SPECTAL ‘FORCES COMMANDER HAD JUST
[3514]BEEN TRANSFERRED TO DIA IN AN INTELLIGENCE ASSIGNMENT,
[3515]HE SAID HE WAS A GOOD SPECIAL FORCES COMMANDER BUT. |
[3516]NO INTEL OFFICER, WHEREAS HIS FORMER G-2 HAD BEEN
[3517]REASSIGNED TO HONOLULU IN A PERSONNEL SLOT, AND THEN
[3518]THE ARMY HAD BEEN UNABLE TO PROVIDE A QUAL IF IED
[3519]COLONEL AS A REPLACEMENT, HE SAID THAT IN CONTRAST
[3520]C1A AND NSA HAVE CAREER PROFESSIONALS WITH WHOM THE
[3521]FIELD COMMANDER CAN WORK, AS HE FORMERLY DID IN
[3522]VIETNAM AND AS HE IS NOW DOING IN KOREA, HOLLINGSWORTH
[3523]ALSO ADDED KUDOS FOR STATION MILITARY REPORTING
[3524]‘NOTING THAT KOREA IS A MILITARY@ORTENTED SOCIETY
[3526]oo. SECRET
[3528]13-00000
[3530]. ony
[3532]PER . TOTAL COPIES _.-. AUN BY
[3534]SECRET
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[3537]- : ; REPRODUCTION DY OTHER THAI
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[3540] PRABON/UNIT NOTIFIED
[3542]ACTION UNIT.
[3544]ACTION #
[3546]7 4452 ElAeig—S*«*AGE CS : TW 2 585
[3547]bo ee _ TOR42804272 OCT 75 SEOU 25649.
[3549]| $B CRE T 2803002 UCT 75 STAFF
[3550]CITE SEOUL 25649 FINAL SECTION “OF 4
[3551]To! DIRECTOR,
[3552]RYBAT PLMHCONGA
[3553]AND THAT HE. HAD. FOUND OUR MELE TARY /POLITICAL
[3554]REPORTING QUITE HELPFUL, THE GENERAL DECLINED
[3555]TO BE SPECIFIC AS TO THE NATURE OF ADDITIONAL
[3556]TECHNICAL SUPPORT HE REQUIRED BECAUSE OF |
[3557]UNCERTAINTY REGARDING ITS SECURITY CLASSIFICATION,
[3558]‘BUT HE VOLUNTEERED 10 PUT HIS REQUIREMENTS AND
[3559]COMMENTS IN A LETTER TO THE CONGRESSMAN WHICH HE
[3560]WOULD FORWARD VIA STATION CHANNELS AND "THEN LET
[3561]| THE PEOPLE BACK HOME WORK OUT THE CLASSIFICATION
[3562]| PROBLEM") CONGRESSMAN SAID THAT WOULD BE MOST
[3563]HELPFUL AND WOULD REPRESENT A REAL CONTRIBUTION
[3564]TO HIS REPORT,
[3565]18, IN A SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION WITH DCOS,
[3567]THE CONGRESSMAN REQUESTED THE ASSISTANCE OF THE
[3568]DDC] BY NAME IN DRAFTING HIS MINORITY REPORT AS
[3569]| WELL AS IN REVIEWING THE USI8 STUDY ON KOREA
[3571]| “SECRET
[3573]13-00000
[3574]L,
[3576]PER ‘TOTAL COPIES - RUN BY
[3578]SECRET
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[3582]REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN
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[3587]ACTION UNIT |
[3589]ACTION #
[3591]De 50 ,
[3592]T 414542 E1A819- PAGE WR IN 724585
[3594]TOR12804272 OCT 75  SEou 25649
[3596]REQUIREMENTS, HE STATED THAT HE PROPOSED TO BASE
[3597]HIS REPORT ON THE USIZ AND COS REVIEWS OF THE KOREAN
[3598]PROBLEM AND TO INCLUDE EXTRACTS OF THE LETTERS FRON
[3599]_THE AMBASSADOR AND GENERAL HOLLINGSWORTH. ALTHOUGH
[3600]“STILL UNCERTAIN AS 10 METHODOLOGY, HIS INTENT IS
[3601]TO DEVELOP A PUSITIVE REPORT REFLECTING THE HIGH |
[3602]DEGREE OF LOCAL COOPERATION THAT HE HAS PERSONALLY
[3603]“OBSERVED BUT STRESSED THAT THE REPORT MUST BE
[3604]UNCLASSIFIED BECAUSE THE REPORT MUST BE DESIGNED
[3605]FOR PRESENTATION ON THE HOUSE FLOOR, HE BELIEVED
[3606]THE DDCI WOULD BE OF PARTICULAR ASSISTANCE IN PULLING
[3607]| TOGETHER A REPORT OF THIS NATURE,
[3608]: 19, THE CONGRESSMAN STATED THAT HE AND REPRESENTATIVE
[3609]| DAVID G, TREEN WERE IN THE VANGUARD ON THE NEED FOR A
[3610]NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE EFFORT AND THEY HAVE THE. SUPPORT
[3611]| OF REPRESENTATIVES MCCLARY AND JOHNSON ON THE COMMITTEE.
[3612]| -HE SAID THE BIPARTISAN NATURE OF THIS MINORITY, ALBEIT
[3613]THREE REPUBLICANS TO ONE DEMOCRAT, WOULD ASSIST ITS
[3614]ACCEPTANCE, HE ALSO STATED THAT HE MUST NOW MOVE
[3615]RAPIDLY TO RECRUIT HIS OWN STAFF ASSISTANT ON THE
[3616]SECRET
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[3644]| COMMITTEE STAFF,
[3646]2. ADDITION DISCUSSION IS SCHEDULED WITH
[3647]CONGRESSMAN MILFORD FOR 28 OCTOBER, WILL ADVISE,
[3648]2, IMPDET, | _
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[3670]“Ls HS AUARE OF AND HANDLING RHF CASE. NO NEED FORUARD = |
[3671]WALKER LETTER AND OTHER THAN POUCHING COPIES OF MEMOS. No FURTHER
[3673]STATION ACTION NECESSARY AT THIS TIME.: PLS ADVISE BY CABLE IF ANY
[3675]’ FURTHER INFO THIS MATTER CONES TO STATION ATTENTION. 4” = :
[3676]2. FILE: DEFER. €2 -IMPDET. do | la Be, |
[3677]| | fae - ‘
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[3680]LA COMMENT: REQUEST Has GUTDANICE ON’ 1972 CASE OF mart. INTERCEPTS
[3681]INADVERTENTLY ‘SENT TO. PANAMA.
[3684]on
[3686]SA/DDO - NORM SHEPANEK {TELECOORD?
[3688]28 OCT ?S
[3690]DATE: ~~ BARBARA GRAHAM? EN Ep?
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[3693]oor ZCAM
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[3722]REF: DIRECTOR 7S 7273 7 | 7
[3723]oh EFFECTIVE INMEDIATELY ALL CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO IDENTITY
[3725]MUST BEAR THE SENSITIVITY -INDICATOR RYBAT AND: THE. CRYPTONYM 1 AuDaRORoaa
[3727]PLMHCONGA. ye a | | on
[3728]2. .FOR UNUSUALLY SENSITIVE CASES; CHIEFS OF STATION MAY AT.
[3730]THEIR DISCRETION | USE THE DIVISIONS {PLNPTACT? PRIVACY CHANNEL- 4
[3732]a: ALL INFORMATION RELATING TO IDENTITY MUST REPEAT nUST BE
[3734]SENT TO HAS VIA “CABLE REPEAT CABLE. . £2. IMPDET-d
[3735]CEA/OEM: R-E. RUSSELL {IN DRAFT}
[3738]DATE: ay OCTOBER ° L975
[3739]ORIG: CEA/ESEC
[3740]UNIT: S.M. LABAR
[3742]Ext; 4709 °
[3743]THE 2gR Lhe» vo CEA
[3745]ORE 6 Orr CER COORDINATING OFFICERS . . AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
[3746]cuss CATION REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET
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[3759]_ SYDNEY .
[3761]* QUTGOING MESSAGE
[3763]ace cor - ace Too Tre uno Soci
[3765]-0OMF oO Oo @ oO. o..a O°.
[3767]‘| CLASSIFICATION
[3769]SECRET . ano
[3770]STAFF . PNET DIRECTOR
[3772]000, dv2f00
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[3778]-RYBAT ADMIN. PLNHCONGA y.
[3780]REF? DIRECTOR7S FEYe e
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[3796]NEDANs NEL BOURNE »
[3798]REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING CFFICE IS PROHIBITED
[3800]PAGE _ OF ° PAGES —~
[3802]‘Le
[3804]+ MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
[3806]7594843 a
[3807]O  woex DISSEM BY, |
[3808]G no INDE x ,
[3810]o returnto PER- Sop
[3813]SURABAYAs a
[3815]CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION OF. THE AGENCY.
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[3819]oe SS gay yDOr MR. PECHOUS {TELECOORDI.
[3820]_ RATES 24 OCTOBER L475. ye
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[3822]UNIT: Sit. LABAR
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[3861]REFY” Ae SEOUL 25645 JIN vena} os
[3862]oe Be SEOUL 25646 IN 7aanaal ¥ | |
[3863]“4. JIN VIEW OF CONGRESSMAN. MILFORD* S INTENTION AS EXPRESSED IN
[3864]"REF A TO SPEND: ONE IF NOT SEVERAL DAYS IN DISCUSSION OF FIELD STATION
[3865]“ACTIVETIESs BELIEVE SEOUL STATION SHOULD APPROACH THIS. TASK WITH
[3866]FOLLOWING DATA IN MIND? ¥
[3867]“As BACKGROUND... HOUSE COMMITTEE IN ITS ENTIRETY IS”
[3869]Sete
[3871]KEENLY INTERESTED IN “COMMAND AND CONTROL ASPECTS OF HOw cra
[3872]FUNCTIONS. IT MOST LIKELY CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S WILL BE |||
[3873]“POCUSED PRIMARILY ON COMMAND AND CONTROL ASPECTS oF FIELD a
[3874]STATION ACTIVITIES DURING HIS VISIT TO SEOUL. ¥ ,
[3875]B. “MANAGEMENT BY OBJECTIVE. BELIEVE MUCH OF WHAT |
[3876]CONGRESSMAN MILFORD CALLS "START OF THE INTELLIGENCE :
[3877]COLLECTION PROCESS IN THE FIELD" CAN BE DEALT WITH IF_
[3878]STATION STARTS ITS BRIEFING WITH PRESENTATION ON HOW
[3879]MANAGEMENT, BY OBJECTIVE FUNCTIONS. SUGGEST STATION OUTLINE
[3880]DATE: BY OCT 7S. |
[3882]ORIG? TESHACKLEY 2 DCM
[3883]UNIT: C/EA
[3885]EXT: yygQ . . . o
[3886]. RELEASING OFFICER , COORQINATING OFFICERS AuTHennicaTina OFFICER
[3887]curssinicarion v1, REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE 1S PROHIBITED £ 2 “IMPDET
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[3894], ORIG:
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[3906]oF OF oO OO bp OO OF. eo
[3907]SECRET _—
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[3909]| STAFF a DIRECTOR: _
[3910]— : . INDEX — DISSEM BY:
[3912]retunnto PER
[3914]a IP FILES # ,
[3915]OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE PROCESS I. Ee, STATION RECEIVES oD
[3917]FROM H@S AND COMMENTS ON IT. ONCE AGREEMENT REACHED ON OD
[3918]DIALOGUE FOLLOWS ON AGS WHICH RELATE TO SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES.
[3919]THINK IT WOULD. BE USEFUL. IN KOREAN CONTEXT TO FOCUS ON
[3921]Jon “5
[3922]KEY OBJECTIVE IN GENERAL AND THEN NARROU DISCUSSION DOUN oP
[3924]TO AG=H OR AG-?. THIS PHASE OF BRIEFING SHOULD INCLUDE
[3926]COMMENTARY ON. FUNDING ‘BY FAN'S, ETC. ry
[3928]Ce AGENT ACQUISITION. WITH Focus OF BRIEFING BEING
[3930]ON AG~ 4. OR AG~ is STATION. CouLD THEN OUTLINE HOU TARGET -
[3932]ARE 0 ge
[3933]STUDIES OF KEY. INTELLIGENCE REPOSITORIES ES CONDUCTED,
[3935]POTENTIAL TARGETS FOR. RECRUITMENT IDENTIFIED AND HOU SPOTTING: —
[3937]ASSESSMENT AND RECRUITHENT PROCESS. UNFOLDS. IN ‘DISCUSSION
[3939]OF RECRUITMENT PHASE OF OPERATIONS, THERE ‘SHOULD BE EXANI- *
[3941]NATION OF ‘NAME TRACE. AND POA PROCESS. 2
[3943]De AGENT. AUTHENTICATION... DIALOGUE UITH CONGRESSMAN
[3945]SHOULD. ALSO OUTLINE. Holl AGENT AUTHENTICATED ONCE RECRUITED.
[3947]|” STRESS SHOULD BE PLACED ON CONTINUING ASPECTS OF. AUTHENTI-
[3949]7 CATION» SECURITY OF. “MEETINGS + ETC. 4
[3951]DATE::. .
[3953]UNIT: | ;
[3955]. é ; * RELEASING-OFMICER SO “ oO ; ‘COORDINATING OFFICERS oo. "AUTHENTICATING Orricer
[3956]" SLASSIFICATICN , . REPROL | SION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE As DHIBITED fF. 2 ‘IMPDET
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[3961]4; SINTELLIGENCE. FROM IN- PLACE. AGENT. TURNING IT INTO INTEL. a 2 o oh
[3962]“EE ee
[3964]"OUTGOING | | MESSAGE .
[3966]Oz-4con
[3968]: “SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY | _—
[3969]cor . ACR Tos yee ||. * MRO oc:
[3971]oe : Se oo DIRECTOR : _ oo coe. .
[3972]ne ee , 0 woex. .. DISSEM BY:
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[3974]we mie teh) fod
[3975]. a ‘ip eues a
[3977]E- POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION. - ACQUISETZON OF .
[3979]| DISSENINATION, REQUIREMENTS SYSTEN+ AND REPORTS EVALUATION =
[3981]SECRET
[3983]CYCLE SHOULD ALSO BE REVIEUED. ¥ a
[3984]7 Fe OPERATIONAL REPORTING SYSTEM. STARTING. WITH RE-
[3986]“CRUITMENT OF AGENT, STATION SHOULD OUTLINE TYPES OF REPORTING
[3987]“REQUIRED BY AGENCY. FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL PURPOSES: T-E-4
[3989]PR@ PART I AND 23 CONTACT REPORTS, INTEL REPORTS. PERIODIC
[3991]ASSET REPORTS. PERIODIC PROGRESS REPORTS» OPACTS AND FIELD
[3992]PERFORMANCE REPORTS. ON LATTER» STRESS SHOULD BE PLACED a
[3993]oN ‘Reatess> FROM MID-YEAR AND FY REVIEWS UITH DDO. FY 7 of
[3994]BUDGET CYCLE SHOULD ALSO BE TOUCHED ON. ¥
[3996]-G. CASE HISTORY. IT ESSENTIAL UE NOT IDENTIFY ANY
[3997]ACTIVE SOURCES BY TRUE NAME TO CONGRESSMAN MILFORD. IN VIEW.
[3998]OF THIS WISH POINT OUT Has HAS FOUND IT USEFUL TO DRAW
[4000]ON CASE HISTORY SCENARIO TO UNDERSCORE ALL POINTS PREVIOUSLY
[4001]MADE IN BRIEFING. IN SUCH CASE-HISTOQRY ONLY IDENTITY OF
[4002]AGENT AND POSSIBLE TARGET HAS BEEN ALTERED FOR SOURCE
[4004]DATE:
[4005]ORIG:
[4006]UNIT:
[4007]EXT: | . ,
[4008]RELEASING OFFICER ‘ COORDINATING OFF CERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER .
[4009]CLASSIFICATION © REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED £ 2 IMPDET
[4011]Ch BY? uaa |
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[4026]CLASSIFICATION
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[4029]STAFF oo «DIRECTOR .
[4031]INGER ~ OISSEM BY:
[4032]NO INDEX
[4034]reruanvo PER
[4036]o | - INFO: FILE - : _ 784 ed |
[4038]PROTECTION. THIS APPROACH HAS WORKED EFFECTIVELY FOR Hes.
[4040]oS aoa
[4042]- AND ASSUME IT UILL BE USEFUL TECHNTQUE FOR SEOUL. ¥
[4043]2. BRIEFING SHOULD ALSO ZERO IN ON STATION'S COORDINATION ROLE
[4044]UNDER DCID'S FOR CLANDESTINE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION OPS.
[4045]ALSO THINK IT UOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE PART OF. BRIEFING CONCENTRATE _
[4046]ON IMMINENCE OF HOSTILITIES INDICATORS WHICH NOW BEING WORKED ON BY .
[4047]“AMERICAN INTEL COMMUNITY IN CONSULTATION WITH ROK'S.- THIS NIGHT _
[4048]. WELL SHOW COMPLEXITY OF ISSUES. INVOLVED-IN MEASURING INTEL SUCCESS
[4049]OR FAILURES. Yo | , eo
[4050]3. HOS HAS HAD LIMITED EXPOSURE To CONGRESSMAN MILFORD. THUS:
[4051]“UNABLE TO SHED ANY LIGHT. ON question POSED IN REF B PARA 2. BASIC
[4052]GUIDELINE FOR THIS BRIEFING NUST BE FULL CANDOR. WHILE SIMULTANEOUSLY -
[4053]_PROTEGTENG SOURCES AND METHODS. ¥ | —_ | :
[4054]WE PLEASE USE ABOVE’ “IuprcaroRs ON FUTURE, TRAFFIC ‘DEALING WITH
[4055]- werius OR TRAVELS “OF CONGRESSTONAL NEMBERS: WHO. INVOLVED IN IWVESTE“
[4056]- GATION OF INTEL COMMUNITY. -£= ay IMPDET. ad
[4058]DATE: ay oT 75 : ISH
[4059]ORIG: TESHACKLEY: DCM C/REVIEW | SEAS : BS
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[4076]— . _ REPRODUCTION BY OYMER THAN
[4077]I. 8 E R & tT TOQUING OFFICE [8 PROMINITED
[4079]BUN LINED NUPEIP URED.
[4083]“ANCE COPY IWSURL. SLOTTEO | swe AT. a 4
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[4090]TON # ol 9)
[4092]PAGE 01
[4094]T 408492 ETA9BA | IN. 722803
[4095]| TORI24@6502 OCT 75 «5 (ss SE BU 25645
[4097]SECRET 2406202 OCT 75 STAFF
[4098]CITE SEOUL 25645
[4099]‘TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR,
[4100]WLAST DIRECTOR
[4101]RYBAT CODEL
[4102]REF: A, DIRECTOR 750492
[4103]_ Bs DIRECTOR 758427.
[4104]1. GODEL MURPHY ARRIVED SEOUL EVENING 23. pcroaer
[4105]AT ROKG INVITATION, DUE HOSPLTALIZATION of COS, DcOS .
[4106]CONTACTED ‘CONGRESSMAN MILFORD AND OFFERED SEPARATE
[4107]BRIEFING IF DESIRED, IN GRIEF CONVERSATION AFTER
[4108]COUNTRY TEAM BRIEFING ON MORNING OF 24 acToBER IN.
[4109]WHICH DCOS PARTICIPATED, REPRESENTATIVE MILFORD REITERATED
[4110]POINTS COVERED IN REFERENT A MESSAGE AND STATED HE KAD.
[4111]BEEN CHARGED BY HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN TO MAKE A
[4112]DETAILED STUDY. OF THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS IN THE: FIELD,
[4113]HE ADDED THAT HE WOULD Like ‘TO BREAK OFF FROM DELEGATION
[4114]SCHEDULE AS OF 0980 OCTOBER 25 TO COMMENCE DISCUSSIONS.
[4115]WHILE PARAMETERS OF HI a INTERESTS NOT FULLY COVERED TN
[4116]INITIAL CONVERSATION» HE ANTICIPATES DEVoTinG onea/F NOT
[4117]SECRET.
[4120]13-00000
[4122]ADE SEA Disney ron . wena, OTAL Cons: . 7 NUN DN vos .
[4124]; - , , . eo . “REPRODUCTION BY OTRAA THAN
[4125]: . . S E c R E 7 IW3SUING OFFICE 1S PRONIDITED
[4126]ve REIN UNEP NOPEDIER — Cee eat ae ween . :
[4128]LARVANGA COPY ISSUED/SLOTIED a
[4129]DAC TION UNIT :
[4131]1) RF. FILE | -
[4132]REL. FIRE
[4133]‘action PPP -
[4134]7 498492 ErAg5a "PAGE 2-02, O,SS™”*~S:*CSCSC*WN SBS
[4136]ee ToR12606502 ocT 75 (SSO SOM
[4137]_ SEVERAL DAYS TO DISCUSSION OF FIELD STATION ACTIVITIES.
[4138]. 2, REP, LUCIEN NEDZI WAS ALSO CONTACTED WITH OFFER
[4139]OF STATION BRIEFING WHICH WAS REYEIVED IN FRIENDLY FASHION. -
[4140]REP. NEDZI EXPRESSED ‘APPRECIATION AND. SAID THAT HE WOULD BE. IN TOUCH
[4141]LATER. DURING THEIR FIVE DAY Stay. .
[4142]3, COS MAY BE RELEASED FROM HOSPITAL MORNING OF 25 OCTOBER,
[4143]WHETHER HE 18 OR NOT, Cos PREPARED TO TALK WITH REP, MILFORD GITHER |"
[4144]AT HOSPITAL OR AT RESIDENCE WHERE HE WILL NEED 8 CONF INED FOR
[4145]‘ONE WEEK RECUPERATION, THIS, OFFER BEING CONVEYED TO CONGRESSMAN, -
[4146]AND IF AGREEABLE To HIM, ARRANGEMENTS WILL BE MADE FOR
[4147]HIM TO MEET DIRECTLY WITH COS, - | oe
[4148]| 4, WOULD APPRECIATE SPECIFIC GUIDANCE BY 9809 LOCAL 25
[4149]| STOBER AS REP. MILFORD!S INTERESTS OBVIOUSLY EXTEND TO DETAILED
[4151]PROCEDURES AND REQUIREMENTS BEYOND NORMAL SCOPE OF FIELD BRIEFINGS,
[4153]| 62 tMPDET | (
[4155]oN
[4157]| YS \
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[4171]SECRET | SC —- :
[4172]| STAFF — aRaRyAZ «OC DERECTOR © 258926 .
[4174]. "Os nvex DISSEM BY: 1
[4175]CONF: INFO: FILE St wo moe
[4176]Yr. 2 PY Kevee) ” a a
[4178]. . > RETURN TO
[4179]PLDs 2vefoe ,
[4180]a
[4182]TO: TEHRAN. BEIRUT. AMMAN, CAIRO
[4184]a meee # (12.
[4185]MTABAD » NEW DELHIy JIDDA. uv
[4187]ADMIN ¥ ee 7 |
[4188]Lb. ALL SIGNIFICANT CABLE TRAFFIC RELATING TO THE CURRENT.
[4190]CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION OF CIA SHOULD CARRY IDEN SLUG-Y
[4192]| 2. IN CASES OF UNUSUAL SENSITIVITY ADDRESSEES MAY USE
[4194]PLARGYLE RATHER THAN IDEN SLUG. IN-SUCH INSTANCES. NE DIVISION |
[4196]WILL ASSURE THAT “APPROPRIATE HAS COMPONENTS ARE APPRISED OF
[4198]PERTINENT PORTIONS*OF THOSE MESSAGES. £2 IMPDET.d
[4200]ty
[4202]DATE: 23 OCTOBER 1975
[4203]ONS: SAMUEL H- RICKARD
[4204]UMT: NE/SCOPS
[4206]EXT: R-15b2 - _ A.
[4207]. \ Ly Veen Hl Obban de
[4209]C/NE yn am . NE/COPS
[4211]RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICEIT
[4213]CLADE TICATION “REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET
[4214]SECRET Be , CL BY:Q5b382
[4216]13-00000
[4218]OUTGOING MESSAGE
[4221]Oz~4~cos
[4223]SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY . :
[4224]ace. cor ACP Too wee MAO" . Der . PAGE OF PAGES
[4226]omF O -Q. GQ as. a a 0 So hoo
[4227]SECRET | oo
[4229]MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR - - . DATE-TIME GROUP cre . . MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER. .
[4230]STAFF. e3174,Z DIRECTOR . - 295g
[4232], CONF: . INFO: © FILE adi, /Repien S77 yy Ose no moex
[4233]~ 2 : ; : y Y a 0 RETURN TO SS .
[4234]BO PLY , 7 BD -
[4236]0 Ww FILES # I ! 2
[4238]TO: TEHRAN. BEIRUT, AMMAN, CATRO® ISLAMABAD. NEU DELHI, JIDDA- y
[4240]ADMIN Yo re
[4241]REF: DIRECTOR J3O¥TQAb)
[4242]IDEN: PLMHCONGA €2 IMPDET-d
[4244]i
[4246]DATE: 33 OCTOBER 24575
[4247]ORIG? SAMUEL H. RICKARD
[4248]UNIT: NE/COPS
[4249]EXT: R-4Sb2 | / A
[4250]2 . / m
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[4287]bs HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE PLANS HOLD HEARINGS ON DESTRY
[4288]“PROJECT 29 OCTOBER. REQUEST MR. OZGA PLAN. REVIEY PLOEFINE HATERTAL
[4289]ANTH CHIEF sure ON 27 OCTOSER AND ARRANGE BE HEADQUARTERS NOT
[4291]LATER, THAN AFTERNOON 28 OCTOBER. ¥ |
[4292](2. PLEASE USE ABOVE SLUG FOR FUTURE SIGNIFICANT TRAFFIC
[4293]RELATED TO THE CURRENT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS. "IN CASES
[4294]OF UNUSUAL SENSITIVITY. YOU MAY USE PLKNBALL SLUG FOR SUCH TRAFFIC .
[4295]“AT YOUR DISCRETION. £2. TMPDET.d | | a
[4297]21 OCTOBER 14975 -
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[4328]MANY THANKS FOR YOUR REPORTING ON VISIT ‘ida “DAVID sss >
[4330]PLEASE USE ABOVE SLUG FOR. FUTURE SIGNIFICANT
[4332]RELATED
[4333]TO THE. CURRENT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS. IN CASES OF
[4334]UNUSUAL SENSITIVITY YOU MAY USE PLKMBALL SLUG FOR SUCH TRAFFIC
[4335]AT YOUR DISCRETION. Ee IMPDET «dl
[4337]“DATE: 51 OCTOBER 75
[4339]ORIG:
[4340]unit, PHILIP F- FENDIG
[4342]DC/EU a oo
[4344]ca a : —.. DCAEUR
[4345]RELEAGING OPFICER . coonoinaring OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING opricen 7
[4346]cLassinicarion REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED £ 2 {MPDET.
[4348]SECRET a a CL BY: guage
[4350]13-00000
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[4356]Po °
[4357]- a “DEPUTY ‘DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS
[4359]ROUTING SHEET |
[4361]ACTION “INFO DATE INITIALS
[4363]* [ST GNATURE
[4365]A FORM use fPREVIioUS — vt zo — —— Oe re
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[4375]eo G7 OCT 1975
[4379]fe
[4381]MEMORANDUM FOR: DDO Division and Staff Chieis: s
[4383]SUBJECT : The Director's Greeting Card List
[4385]1. It is requested that-you provide recommendations as to whom
[4386]the Director should send holiday greetings. Please submit vour list
[4387]to the SA/ADDO in Room 7E22 by the close of business 1 November 1975.
[4389]2. Your list should be prepared on a very selected basis. You
[4390]may include the names of chiefs of foreign security and intelligence
[4391]services and the names of non-intelligence personnel abroad who are
[4392]of special interest or significance to the Agency mission. In most
[4393]cases, these names should be those of persons whom the Director has
[4394]met here or abroad.
[4396]_ 3. After the Director has reviewed the lists of recommended
[4398]names, the greeting cards will be prepared and sent to the appropriate
[4399]Division or Staff for pouching or mailing.
[4402]f - j i /
[4404]ed (ie CW ee Aa ae
[4407]SA/ADDO
[4409]Distribution: .
[4411]C/AF . C/SE
[4413]‘C/EA % C/CCS
[4415]C/EUR ; u C/CI
[4417]C/DCD - “y C/OPS
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[4421]C/FR — , C/SS
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[4438]ee en et fe eee eee eee a
[4440]MEMORANDUM FOR: DDO Division and Staff Chiefs
[4442]SUBJECT : DDCI's Greeting Card List
[4444]Addressees are requested to prepare a Christmas card list
[4445]for the DDCI. It should include, where security permits, al!
[4446]significant contacts hosted by him at Headquarters or visited in
[4447]the field. Please submit your list to the SA/ADDO by close of
[4448]business 10.November 1975.
[4450]he TES UE Cb in Pan
[4451]Peter enbush
[4452]SA/ADDO
[4453]Distribution:
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[4455]C/EA C/CCS
[4456]C/EUR C/CI
[4457]C/DCD C/OPS
[4458]. C/DIVD C/PS
[4459]C/FR C/SS
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[4477]_
[4480]i
[4481]H
[4482]Hl
[4484]H.
[4486]FROM: -
[4488]Philip Be “ Fendig
[4491]* EXTENSION’ -
[4493]| DATE. 8 Oo
[4495]“TO (Officer dqsignti, room “number, ond’
[4496]‘building} yok .
[4498]DATES *
[4500]. ‘| orricer’s” |"
[4501]- a  ANITIALS
[4502]-| receives | FoRwaRsed | =
[4504]NO
[4506]( /OMMENTS “(Number each corment to show from whom.
[4507]wl om. - Draw a if
[4509]foss 5 column after, each: -cmrnent}
[4511]FORM
[4514]4] 0 eal a “SECRET
[4516]a CONF ENTIAL
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[4532]; SEC .R E T od. .  _,HSSUING OFFICE 18 PROHIBITED
[4534]ERGON/UNIT NOTIFIED oe fone _ a
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[4542]T 389706 E1A620 —- PAGE @200 TN 726429
[4543]| TOR11619312 ocr 75 ____Lonp 66194
[4544]SEC RE T 1616502 OCT 75 STAFF. | Seed ag as
[4545]CITE LONDON 66194 rer Cee. SG: oe -
[4546]. . . 7 a , eo Wo .
[4547]Tor DIRECTOR, = rs E Bar selesee
[4548]RYBAT PLKMBALL © Z a + on maa
[4550]REF A, DIRECTOR 752556
[4551]B, DIRECTOR 754586 .
[4552]1, AT DAVID AARON'S REQUEST, COS BRIEFED HIM. FOR AN | HOUR AND
[4553]FIFTEEN MINUTES ON THE AFTERNOON OF 16 OcT, IN RESPONSE To
[4554]HIS QUESTIONS, COS BRIEFED HIM IN GENERAL TERMS ON THE STRUCTURE
[4555]OF THE BRITISH INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND: THE FUNCTIONING oF
[4556]THE JIC. COS ALSO DESCRIBED.» WITHOUT OPERATIONAL DETAIL» THE
[4557]INTERFACE WITH THE BRITISH AND THE FUNCTIONS OF THE STATION
[4558]AND OUR RELATIONSSHIPS WIH THE VARIOUS COMPONENTS. OF THE ..
[4559]EMBASSY. AARON DID NOT ASK FOR FINANCIAL DETAILS OR PERSONNEL
[4560]FIGURES. 7 oo
[4561]2. IN & WIDE RANGING DISCUSSION AFTER THIS BRIEFING»
[4562]AARON PURSUED THE FOLLOWING MAIN LINES OF QUESTIONING#
[4563]A, HE ASKED IF A RECRUITMENT ATTEMPT COORDINATED
[4564]WITH THE BRITISH WOULD BE CLEARED WITH THE AMBASSADOR, COS
[4565]REPLIED THAT THIS COULD BE A MATTER OF JUDGMENT, BUT CERTAINLY
[4566]| SECRET > . 7
[4569]13-00000
[4571]' " CABLE SEC DISSEM BY Pen .. TOTAL COPIES . RUN BY
[4573]-PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED
[4574]-. ACTION UNIT
[4576]ACTION # - ment me -
[4578]- REPRODUCTION |
[4579]SECRET a, _ 1aBUING OFFICE
[4581]“oo T 389706 ary : PAGE 2S / IN 72641
[4583]So ToR14 619342 ocr 75) - LOND 664
[4585]ten THERE WAS ANY POLITICAL RISK OR 2 SENSITIVITY HE WOULD
[4587]“os PROBABLY ALERT THE: AMBASSADOR, COS POINTED OUT THE FACT OF
[4588]“COORDINATION WITH THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES REDUCED THE RISK
[4589]CONSIDERABLY |
[4591]B, HE ASKED IF A LARGE SCALE ACTION TYPE PROGRAN COORDINAATED ©
[4593]WITH THE BRITISH SUCH AS MIGHT BE INVOLVED IN PORTUGAL WOULD GE -
[4595]CLEARED WITH THE AMBASSADOR, AFTER HE HAD REPHRASED THE QUESTION |
[4597]aL) LEAVE OUT ANY MENTION OF PORTUGAL» COS STATED THAT HE WOULD
[4598]7 SEEK AUTHORITY. ‘FROM WASHINGTON TO INFORM THE AMBASSADOR OF ANY SUCR
[4600]SITUATION,
[4601]8, HE ASKED IF. cos WOULD APPROACH THE FOREIGN OFFICE
[4603]DIRECTLY OR® “THROUGH GNGRAPH IN ORDER TO COORDINATE SUCH A
[4605]PROGRAM, COS REPLED THAT NORMALLY HE WOULD Go DIRECTLY TO
[4607]GNGRAPH AND ° THAT THEY WOULD INSURE | COORDINATION WITH THE FOREIGN a
[4608]OFFICE.
[4610]‘De. HE ASKED iF GNGRAPH HAD TO CLEAR BOTH INTELLIGENCE
[4612]| - eOLLECTEON: AND ACTION OPERATIONS WITH THE FOREIGN OFFICE AND THD
[4613]U.K. - AMBASSADOR IN THE FIELD « COS REPLIED THAT ACTION
[4615]OPERATIONS HAD TO BE CLEARED WITH THE FOREIGN OFFICE, QUT THAT
[4617]‘HE IS.NOT SURE AS TO HOW MUCH COORDINATION WAS REGUIRED GN
[4619]SECRET.
[4621]13-00000
[4623]vacate 2m Ch. taco O
[4624]CABLIGEC DIBBEM AY 000 PER he WOTAL Combs RUN AN
[4625]| “SECRET o -  1GSUING OFFICE 18 PRONIBITSO
[4626] PERGON/UNIT NOTIFIED ee ; Leone aor . !
[4627]ADYAN(
[4629]9
[4630]ACTION UNIT
[4632]FACTION #
[4634]ey at
[4636]7 3a9706- «CO EIAG2M- PAGE, 3s een LO ee
[4638]REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN
[4640]—tonsueigise gor ys. uta" ste |
[4642]“COLLECTION OPERATION, AARON WILL’ UNDOUBTEDLY PURSUE. THIS.
[4643]POINT IN HIS MEETING THIS AFTERNOON WITH: SYKES AND HOOPER
[4644]AND WE WILL REPORT ANY PLAYBACK WE GET. HE ASKED WHETHER
[4646]IN COS'S JUDGMENT IT WOULD BE AN IMPROVEMENT. ON: PRESENT
[4648]PROCEDURES FOR THE STATE DEPARTMENT TO REQUIRE PRIOR CLEARANCE
[4650]WITH OUR AMBASSADORS OF ALL INTELLIGENCE AND ACTION OPERATIONS,
[4651]COS REPLIED THAT IF ALL THE AMBASSADORS WERE AS, ABLE AND AS
[4652]INFORMED AS THIS ONE AND SOME OTHERS HE HAD KNOWN) THAT THIS
[4653]MIGHT WORK, THE PROBLEM WAS THAT MANY AMBASSADORS. HAD NO
[4654]KNOWLEDGE OR ACQUAINTANCE WITH THE INTELLIGENCE FIELD AND NO
[4655]BASIS FOR MAKING INFORMED JUDGMENTS, AND THE RESULT, THEREFORG,
[4656]OF SUCH A RULE MIGHT BE TO SERIOUSLY INHIBIT. AND® PREVENT MANY |
[4657]OPERATIONS THAT SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN.
[4659]E, IN ANSWER TO ANOTHER QUESTION, cos CONFIRMED THAT BOTH”
[4661]‘THE AMBASSADOR AND THE BRITISH WERE PERIODICALLY BRIEFED ON”
[4663]THE STATUS OF ANY COVERT ACTION OPERATIONS TAKING PLACE IN
[4664]THE U.K, a | | | | _ oo
[4665]3, AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE DISCUSSIONS, COS TRIED..10. MAKG _
[4666]THE FOLLOWING POINTS! SO os a
[4667]Ae THE BRITISH WERE SERIOUSLY CONCERNED GY THE LEAKS AND -
[4668]SECRET. |
[4671]13-00000
[4673]' CABLE SEC DIegEM By_"_ “PER Zs TOTAL COPIES : RUN BY -
[4675]a | nana sonee ss
[4676]| PaRGON/UNIT NOTIFIED
[4677]ACTION UNIT
[4678]ge
[4679]‘ACTION 9
[4680]—  T389786- ETAB2B PAGE. 04 . | a “TN 716149
[4681]pe a Tomaso ocr 7s LOND e635
[4682]~ continuina’ pusticrry IN WASHINGTON, ©THE’ PAD BEEN REASSURED:
[4683](7s BY-US THAT WE WOULD PROTECT THE LIAISON RELATIONSHIP AND THE
[4684]~ . > “pRopuer, AND=To: DATE THERE HAD BEEN NO DIMINUTION ; a
[4685]~~ OF THRE INTELLIGENCE THEY WERE PRPARED TO GIVE uss AARON SAID
[4686]- WE WouLD ALSO REASSURE SYKES AND HOOPER ON THIS POINT AS FAR AS
[4687]THE SENATE COMMITTEE-18 CONCERNED. a
[4688]~ By «COS POINTED OUT BRITISH INTELLIGENCE ENJOYED AN ENVIABLE
[4689]| DEGREE OF PROTECTION AS A RESULT OF THE OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT,
[4690]THE ABSENCE OF PARLIAMENTARY INVESTIGATIONS AND THE VERY
[4691]iw > EPFECTIVE COVER PROVIDED BY THE FOREIGN OFFICE FOR GNGRAPH
[4692]REPRESENTATIVES SERVCING OVERSEAS. COS TOLD AARON THAT ONE
[4693]a “OF THE USEFUL THINGS THE SENATE COMMITTEE MIGHT DO WOULD
[4694]\ BE TO CALL FOR NEW LEGISLATION THAT MIGHT OFFER SOME
[4695]a © PROTECTION SIMILAR TO THE KIND THAT THE BRITISH ENJOY,
[4696]aaron SAID THAT THE COMMITTEE WAS IN FACT LOOKING INTO THIS
[4697]> PROBLEM, oes _ we
[4698]gy 60s REVIEWED THE PUBLIC EVIDENCE AVAILABLE aS To \ ya" 2,
[4699]~ “WHAT PHIL AGEE HAS BEEN’ UP TO AND POINTED GUT THE KIND oF ike"
[4700]s ‘DAMAGE THAT GAN BE DONE IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY EFFECTIVE |
[4701]SANCTIONS, : COS DUCKED A QUESTION FROM AARON AS TO HOW MUCr a
[4703]SECRET
[4706]13-00000
[4708]ae 2
[4710]- cape sec Qisemm en . . __ TOTAL COPIES “RUN BY |
[4711]. oy es ot . 2 ee
[4712]PERBON/UNITNOTIFIEO | os
[4714]\_ AOVANGE COPY JOBUNOHROTINO.000 0000 my ap
[4715]ACTION UNIT. ons -— ~~ -
[4716]re ' RF, FUE. VR.
[4720]. REPRODUCTION BY OTH
[4721]'" ISSUING OFFICE IB PRO
[4723]ACTION ? , staal enaneieeetinent cnatlinmeeentl iaheheneminl
[4725]_ Faerie EIAG20 PAGE OB 088 IN 746129,
[4726]| TOR's619942 067 we a _Lono 06494
[4728]COVERAGE. ON. AGEE” JAGUAR. Was: ‘PROVIDING FoR us.
[4730]44 IN CONCLUSION, COS STATED THAT WE HAD ‘evIDENCE. THAT.
[4731]THE CONTINUING. PUBLICITY IN.WASHINGTON IS BEGINNING To AFFECT
[4732]UR ABILITY TO RECRUIT AND MAINTAIN OUR AGENTS, » AARON REPLIED
[4734]THAT IF SECSTATE KISSINGER HAD BEEN WILLING TO PROVIDE THE.
[4736]- CHURCH COMMITTEE WITH THE INFORMATION THEY REQUESTED THE
[4737]HEARINGS WOULD HAVE BEEN OVER IN SEPTEMBER, - HE SPECULATED
[4738]THAT THE WAY THINGS WERE NOW GOING, “THE CHURCH COMMITTEE |
[4739]WOULD FINISH UP NEXT FEGRUARY, THE ENTIRE MEETING WAS CARRIED
[4740]OUT IN A COURTEOUS TONE AND NO CONFRONTATIONS OCCURRED, &2 -IMPDET
[4742]ae | _ : Ss GCRET
[4744]13-00000
[4746]aac RL BAAR as ata De an ot
[4748]17 0cr73
[4749]<4
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[4751]“—s
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[4754]3
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[4756]a
[4757]S4GNATURE DATE dq
[4758]: 3
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[4761]z USE PREVEOUS Tae)
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[4765]13-00000
[4767]Po FORM
[4769]LO AZ
[4771]_* DEPUTY DIRECTOR ‘FOR OPERATIONS
[4773]‘ROUTING SHEET |
[4775]ACTION: |. INFO DATE
[4777]“) REMARKS : °
[4779]C=
[4781]BIG,
[4783]1 10er75
[4785]3671
[4787]EDITIONS
[4789]USE PREVIOUS - (40) {
[4791]| CITE BONK 43
[4792]JO: PRIORITY
[4793]RVEAT
[4797]AARON. HAD.
[4798]COLONEL OLIVER
[4800]“AUESTIONS
[4801]HE WAMTE
[4803]page a ceri
[4805]RIRECTOR
[4807]DIRECTOR
[4809]We. DAMID:
[4810]HIEBERT AND
[4811]LUNCH WITH HI BEER:
[4813]cE AFFAIRS:
[4814]EXTENT COD
[4816]eee ee NNN OEE ne Py
[4818]O
[4821]“AARON OF ENATE: -EL ot br
[4822]“TEUT INGER FOR Twa HOUR
[4823]MT MEW YY
[4825]«nove pie m ne L TARY.
[4827]S1EF i NB:
[4829]LN
[4831]SES ADE ERT"
[4833]CT. 1 OF. “MILITARY veo.
[4834]< OL LEC “TIOM IM REE ‘ENT “EARS
[4835]THAT. THERE, HAD, BEEN Mo. FLARS-
[4837]CALE: AND
[4839]re een teen tee
[4842]BAGESE EBON. 4Sa87 2 EO RET . *7 8" @ A
[4843]CONTROL IN FIELD. WE -OFLNED THIS IS TO SOME EXTENT DIRECTION IN
[4845]WHICH COORDINATION. HAS TRENDED OVER THE. YEARS BUT LOCAL COMMANDERS
[4846]PROBABLY FEEL. HIS CONTROL: UNDERMINED THEREBY. 0.0" i oo
[4848]- 4.0 TURHINS TO°EEHERALD OPS. ‘HF. SARROM ‘SAID HE RECALLED fs
[4849]FROM WASHIMETOR ERIEF TMG THAT... GERMAH STATION HAD SIZEABLE AL. LOoT-
[4850]MENT FOR OFFIC ‘ER ENGAGED. IN? PUL ITICAL * COVERT ACTION ON REGIONAL
[4851]Ene =. WE EX ‘PLAINED. THAT. MONIES Tht THES PRO. Se T ALMOST LES = ;
[4853]CLUSIVELY FOR SALARY > “ART ‘EX TEN:
[4855]HOT MENTIONED BY AANED AND HOT |
[4856]PURPOS ESS _TH EEMET THs SATI
[4858]a HE ASKED HL INBER:. ‘QUES TIONS: ABOUT. “FANE fe
[4859]ALONE LINE THAT THESE OULD - PERHAF tE
[4860]DIPLOMATIC C ONTAC A A =
[4862]TAND The. CONTAC Tiss “WHICH: co LD AS OLD.
[4863]POR “REASON STHAT, THE’. WERE.”
[4864](IFS ° COULD HOT. BE TRA ai id
[4865]: F: WE: MENT TONED © ]
[4866]‘OPERATIONS Al TUALL
[4867]‘OUTLINE OF “HIL
[4869]OLR “TNE ICHMPAT BLE SURGE
[4871]HERAL, bERMAP ANT THAT THs
[4873]EAR “LED
[4874]MAIO, ENBHRRASSMENT
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[4883]“ : ~ .
[4884]PASE 3 °RONN 443s Ve To ee,
[4885]7. MRe AARON FS En” SEOUT EXTENT Wie KEPT AMEASS
[4886]ON OUR ACTIVITIES IN WEST GERMAN FIELD. OWE REPLIED .
[4887]SAW VIRTUALLY ALL REPORTING AND. THEREEORE KMEN WHERE - . oo
[4888]LOCATED BUT THAT AS RULE WE DID HOT CLEAR WITTH HIM ON “INDIVIDUAL
[4889]CONTACTS» MAKING. REFERENCE TO "SOURCES AND METHODS WESTON OF
[4890]OWR REGULATION AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS. POINTED nur “THAT ERICH .
[4891]SE TREATED SEPARATELY BLT THAT. ADOR AND EMBASSY “CON—
[4892]SULATES HAWE NOT HAD INTEREST. If TEVELOPMENTAL CONTAET WITH
[4893]YOUNBER POLITICAL, FIGURE = OUT 1De: BONN BREA “OM OTHER HAND
[4894]CKEARLY G@uUuITE. CONEE ] ORE “MINTS
[4895]BENERALLY |
[4897]HE
[4899]25 SEPT Pepe ed
[4900]THAT FOR: til
[4903]ANSWERED: CANDIZLY.
[4904]iNge q ff :
[4906]YO AWRILABLEs - 6
[4907]; - THAN HOG COVER.
[4909]: ‘RE "RERS SONS: WE. WOULD PUT CEPI CER TH
[4910]-PLATHED MOC : . USED. FOF :
[4911]GHEE GERMANY: 7 2
[4912]-FOR INS TANCES WHERE IT PROVIDED BETTER A
[4914]2 HRTHER : “ES SAMPLES ME BENT TOME D- AAD RECE T
[4916]CHIMES ES
[4917]DROPPED
[4919]“MOT IDENTIFY. Ar
[4921]ED TIBINS “WATCH OF ‘WHAT: ane
[4924]MEO WITHIN stations >
[4925]{SUMED THE MAJOR, PART OF HIS og"
[4928]13-00000
[4931]LAELE SEC Bisset! Bt cane rn ene ee ne
[4933]noon “ION BY OTMER TH
[4934]tinl 1. 4 SF ICH 18 PROMIBDIT
[4936]PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED i co aa
[4938]7 3097258 Elseea. PAGE 24 | IN 716124. —
[4939]TOR!1619372 OCT 75 BONN 43389
[4940]SECRET 1626552 OCT 75 STAFF JL a
[4941]CITE BONN 43369 | My p47
[4942]Se, tf . : \ i? a7 ep!
[4943](TO PRIORITY DIRECTOR, / ra
[4944]RYBAT . foe a,
[4946]REF BONN 43381076059 ) a,
[4948]1, AMBASSADOR BRIEFED COS AFTERNOON 16 OCT ON HIS HOUR AND
[4949]ONESHALF SESSION WITH MR, AARON ON 15 OCT, DISCUSSION COVERED ~
[4950]THREE MAIN TOPICS: (A) RISKS AND NEED FOR "FANCY POLITICAL
[4951]SOURCES" IN BONN} (B) COVERT ACTION OPERATIONS AND (C) DEGREE
[4952]TO WHICK AMBASSADOR COGNIZANT OF STATION ACTIVITIES,
[4954]2. ON POINT OMA. AMBASSADOR STATED THAT MOST STATION
[4955]POLITICAL SOURCES WERE OF LONGeSTANDING AND COMMENCED IN THE
[4957]EARLY POSTWAR/OCCUPATION ERA, THEY WERE BASED ON PERSONAL’
[4958]| FRIENDSHIPS AND UNIQUE CHARACTER OF THE EARLY POSTWAR YEARS
[4959]AND WERE IN HIS BELIEF LIKELY TO PROVE IRREPLACEABLE...
[4960]. THAT 1S, AMBASSADOR OPINED THAT SIMILAR CLOSE ASSOCIATIONS
[4961]i COULD NoT BE ESTABLISHED BY STATION IN TODAY'S POLITICAL
[4962]CLIMATE AND IMPLIED THAT HE EXPECTED COVERAGE To GRADUALLY ©
[4964]WITHER AWAY, BECAUSE OF THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE RELATIONS
[4965]SHIPS, AMBASSADOR BELIEVED RISK WAS VERY LOW AND STATED THAT.
[4967]SECRET
[4969]13-00000
[4971]~-1 MEG, 2/76
[4973]“ h BLE
[4975]a
[4977]7 389723 EL A645 . PAGE G2 . IN 746426
[4978]a TOR14649372 OCT 75 SONN 43385
[4980]TH COVERAGE PROVIDED BY THESE SOURCES WAS OF DEFINITE VAL
[4981]Si NC HE INFORMATION WAS NOT OBTAINED BY OFFICIAL EMBASSY
[4983]CONTACTS Debt,
[4985]REGARDING. PARA eBay. ‘AMBASSADOR CONFIRMED To AARON
[4986]THAT. AT WAS HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT STATION WAS NO LONGER
[4987]INVOLVED IN LARGE*SCALE. COVERT ACTION OPERATIONS AND THAT HE
[4988]ASSUMED EXPLANATION PER PARA 4 REF WAS IN ACCORD WITH FACTS,
[4989]COS ‘EMPHATICALLY ASSURED THE. AMBASSADOR THAT THERE WERE NO
[4990]COVERT ACTION FUNDING OPERATIONS BEING UNDERTAKEN BY THE
[4992]STATION» AND THAT WE HAD BEEN MYSTIFIED BY MR. AARON'S
[4993]REFERENCE TO THE LARGE BUDGET FOR SUCH ACTIVITIES BUT HAD
[4994]CONCLUDED THAT IT MUST APPLY TO SALARY AND EXPENSES OF
[4995]HERZFAN2 WITH WHICH AARON SEEMED TO AGREE,
[4997]4, WITH RESPECT TO THE AMBASSADOR'S KNOWLEDGE OF SPECIFICS
[4999]“OF STATION ACTIVITY, THE AMBASSADOR STATED FIRST THAT HE OF
[5000]COURSE "HAD A PRETTY GOOD IDEA" ABOUT THE IDENTITY OF SOME
[5001]OF OUR SOURCES BUT HAD NOT BEEN SPECIFICALLY ADVISED OF THE
[5002]IDENTITIES OF ANY oF- THEM, HE FOUND THE SITUATIEN ACCEPTABLE.
[5003]HOWEVER, FIRST BECAUSE HE HAD BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH COS PER-
[5004]Nabaentel FOR THE LAST TWENTY YEARS AND HAD CONFIDENCE THAT
[5006]| i" SECRET
[5008]Sonee rar arenas tes mapa e— et Ge IR pn Et te ce eee erates
[5010]13-00000 -
[5011]an . ‘ ° { ' . . - i .
[5012]PER TOTAL COPIES RUN BY ~
[5014]me : "REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THI
[5015]SECRE T. : + 4 +. MSSUING OFFICE 16 PROHIDITE
[5017]zLE SEC DOISSEM BY
[5019]‘ BERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED
[5021]ADVANGE CO
[5022]ACTION UNIT
[5026]1 389723. EI A6A5 PAGE 03 : _ IN 716124
[5028]TOR11619372 OCT 75 BONN 43389
[5030]COS WOULD ADVISE HIM OF ANYTHING HE OUGHT TO KNOW. LOOKING
[5031]BACK ON THE RECORD OF THE PAST TWENTY-FIVE YEARS, THE .
[5032]AMBASSADOR SAID HE CONCLUDES THAT IN FACT THE AMBASSADORS IN.
[5033]BONN HAD BEEN KEPT APPROPRIATELY ADVISED AND THE ABSENCE OF
[5034]FLAPS WOULD SUBS TANT JATE THE JUDGMENT EXERCISED BY THE RE= |
[5035]SPECTIVE STATION CHIEFS OVER THE YEARS.
[5036]| 5, MR, AARON DISCUSSED AT SOME LENGTH WITH THE AMBASSADOR
[5037]THE FEASIBILITY OF CHARGING THE AMBASSADOR WITH GREATER DIRECT
[5038]RESPONSIBILITY FOR SUPERVISION OF THE CLANDESTINE EFFORT, |
[5039]_ AMBASSADOR STATED THAT IF IT WERE :SSIGNED TO WIM AS A MISSION
[5040]a& WOULD MANIFESTLY HAVE TO DISCHARGE IT AND WOULD AS HE SAW’ tT
[5041]aaUSaBlLY Neel A STAFF OF aT LEAST TWO COMPETENT OFFICERS TO.
[5042]TARRY OUT THE PRACTICAL STAFF WORK ON HIS BEHALF. MR AARON THEN
[5043]| A ISED THE QUESTION OF THE GRITISH SYSTEM ABOUT WHICH THE AMBASSA=
[5044]DOR MADE THE PERTINENT OBSERVATION THAT IT WAS A QUESTION FOR THE
[5045]70VERNNENT TO DECIDE. IF IT WAS DECIDED TO SUBORDINATE CLAN>
[5047]DESTt(ug TELL IGENCE OPESaTIANS <8 THE FIELD DIRECTLY TO THE
[5048]PEa0c8: Tay APPROPRIATE 57 \.SEMENT COULD AND WOULD BE MADE.
[5049]THE 2-2. 220 isd LaF 7 ytv- Tu2 T4BRESSTON BY MR. AARON THAT. AT
[5051]LEAST Pr NUMRER OF 2 Fs Ui: E SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ARE
[5053]13-00000
[5055]REPRODUCTION EY CTHEL ve.
[5056]ISSUING OFFICE IL PRoR.LI
[5058]PAGE 24-04 IN 716124
[5060]BOA S.
[5061]= TORI4619372 OCT 75 BONN 43389
[5062]Lome. ae Mee, : a
[5064]GIVING SERIOUS CONSIDERATION: 70 THE BRITISH SYSTEM -AS-A MEANS OF
[5065]INVESTING AMBASSADORS WITH. DIRECT AUTHORITY OVER CLANDESTINE
[5067]INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, -G2:1MPDET. = oy weeny
[5070]1 #. ¥
[5071]“
[5074]13-00000
[5076]foe Loe
[5077]me ; yore
[5078]FIle “
[5079]TSEESEC. ETABSE
[5080]ToRPA615442 OCT 75 Sohme 2366
[5081]iE 2 P Et Lengege OCT 75 starr BRocomedd Aisseminh nos
[5082]IITE ste « 43369 “B blot Ce Hei Linen
[5083]To: DIRE ECT OR. . . : ——
[5084]RYBAT PLKMSALL a “ _—
[5085]ky AARON MADE FOLLOWING COMMENTS AT LUNCHEON 15 UCTOSER,
[5086]SAID -= WAS STAFF EMPLOYEE UF SENATOR MONSDALE AND: WAS ‘HEAD OF
[5087]CELECT COMMITTEE TASK FORCE FORMERLY CALLED WHITE HOUSE TASK
[5088]RCE BUT RENAMED COMMAND AND CONTROL TASK FORCE, MRe AARON SAID
[5089]~E FELT COMMITTEE WOULD CONCLUDE ITS WORK IN FEBRUARY AS CURRENTLY
[5090]SCKEDULED, | |
[5092]2. AARON SAID IT HIS OPINION THAT AS CONCERNED WRONGDOINGS
[5093]CIA'S RECORD WAS PROBABLY BETTER THAN SOME OF THE OTHER INDEPENDENT
[5094]GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, HE MENTIONED THE SECURITIES AND EXCRANGE
[5095]COMMISSION IN THIS CONTEXT, HE SAID IF WE FELT THAT CIA HAVING
[5096]_ DIFFICULT TIME WITH CHURCH COMMITTEE WE SHOULD WAIT AND SEE WMAT
[5097]HAPPENS TO FB] WHO WERE "GDING TO HAVE THEIR CLOCKS CLEANED."
[5098]SAID FBI HAD GONE 58 YEARS WITHOUT REVISION AND VAST AMOUNT OF
[5099]KRONGDOING HAD RESULTED FROM THIS SITUATION,
[5100]3. ALSO OF INTEREST, COLONEL SMITH, DEPUTY TO DCSI USAREUR
[5101]GENERAL DILLARD, WHO WAS PRESENT DURING AARON'S SESSIONS WITH ARMY
[5102]«SE GRET
[5104]13-00000
[5106]cf - oo
[5108]jgL@ SEC DISSEM BY PER : TOTAL COPIES RUN BS
[5109]H . - . REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN —
[5110]SECRE T. ISSUING OFFICE 1S PROHIBITED
[5112]IRSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ~
[5113]Hi
[5115]“7 388903  E1A896 PAGE 02-02 IN 715761
[5117]TOR31615142 OCT 75 “BONN 43369
[5119]COMPONENTS, INFORMED US 15 OCTOBER THAT HIS IMPRESSION BASED ON
[5120]» TALKS WITH MR, AARON» LATTER WOULD LIKE SEE CIA TAKE QVER POSITIVE
[5121]COLLECTION ELEMENT OF THE 65TH. MIG, MR. AARON MADE SIMILAR
[5123]COMMENTS TO US» AS WE REPORTING SEPARATELY, 2 IMPDET.
[5125]13-00000
[5129]\“
[5133]teva copies (3 7 22
[5135]ECRET . |
[5137]~~ t 389706 "EAD PAGE @4 . IN 716119
[5139]T0R31619342 OCT 75 LONE 66:96
[5140]SEC RE T 1616502 °0CT 75 STAFF Ap we
[5142]CITE LONDON 66194 es 7
[5144]C bo
[5146]Tos DIRECTOR. *
[5148]RYBAT PLKMBALL 2 | | | =
[5149]- a | we ;
[5151]’ REF A, DIRECTOR 752556
[5153]B. DIRECTOR 754586
[5155]1, AT DAVID AARON'S REQUEST, COS BRIEFED HIN FOR AN HOUR AND
[5156]FIFTEEN MINUTES ON THE AFTERNOON OF 16 OCT, IN RESPONSE TO
[5157]MIS QUESTIONS, COS BRIEFED HIM IN GENERAL TERMS ON THE STRUCTURE
[5158]OF THE BRITISH INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND THE FUNCTIONING oF
[5159]THE JIC. COS ALSO DESCRIBED.» WITHOUT OPERATIONAL DETAIL» THE
[5160]INTERFACE WITH THE BRITISH AND THE FUNCTIONS OF THE STATION
[5161]AND OUR RELATIONSSHIPS WIH THE VARIOUS COMPONENTS OF THE
[5162]EMBASSY. AARON DID NOT ASK FOR FINANCIAL DETAILS OR PERSONNEL
[5163]FIGURES, |
[5165]2, IN A WIDE RANGING DISCUSSION AFTER THIS BRIEFING.
[5166]AARON PURSUED THE FOLLOWING MAIN LINES OF QUESTIONING!
[5168]A, HE ASKED IF A RECRUITMENT ATTEMPT COORDINATED
[5169]WITH THE BRITISH WOULD BE CLEARED WITH THE AMBASSADOR, COS
[5170]REPLIED THAT THIS COULD BE A MATTER OF JUDGMENT, BUT CERTAINLY
[5172]SECRET . : .
[5174]13-00000
[5176]“> 389706 Eleeze FAGE Be IN 716249
[5177]TOR:2629342 OCT 75 LOND 66194
[5179]BESER
[5181]E WAS ANY POLITICAL RISK OR SENSITIVITY HE WOULD
[5183]= Te
[5185]La
[5187]Wt
[5190]PROBABLY ALERT THE AMBASSADOR, COS POINTED OUT THE FACT OF
[5191]COORDINATION WITK THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES REDUCED THE RISK
[5192]- CONSIDERABLYs _
[5193]. B, HE ASKED IF A LARGE SCALE ACTION TYPE PROGRAM COORDINATED
[5194]WITH THE BRITISH SUCK AS MIGHT BE INVOLVED IN PORTUGAL WOULD BE
[5195]~ CLEARED WITH THE AMEASSADOR, AFTER HE HAD REPHRASED THE QUESTION
[5197]TD LEAVE OUT ANY MENTION OF PORTUGAL, COS STATED THAT HE WOULD
[5199]SEEK AUTHORITY FROM WASHINGTON TO INFORM THE AMBASSADOR OF ANY SUCH
[5200]~ SITUATION, | |
[5202]C, HE ASKED IF COS WOULD APFROACH THE FOREIGN OFFICE
[5204]~ DIRECTLY OR THROUGH GNGRAPH IN ORDER TO COORDINATE SUCH A
[5205]~ PROGRAM. COS REPLED THAT NORMALLY HE WOULD GO DIRECTLY TO
[5206]GNGRAPH AND THAT THEY WOULD INSURE COORDINATION WITH THE FORGIGN
[5208]~ OFFICE. | oe .
[5210]~ , D. HE ASKED JF GNGRAPH HAD TO CLEAR BoTH INTELLIGENCE
[5212]| COLLECTION AND ACTION OPERATIONS WITH THE FOREIGN OFFICE AND THE
[5213]~ U.K, AMBASSADOR IN THE FIELD » COS REPLIED THAT ACTION.
[5215]. OPERATIONS HAD TO BE CLEARED WITH THE FOREIGN OFFICE, BUT THAT
[5217]HE IS NOT SURE AS TO HOw MUCH COORDINATION WAS REQUIRED“ON
[5218]SECRET —
[5220]13-00000
[5222]“
[5224]TOAR COPIES AL. ay
[5226]wn PER L _. . . :
[5227]_ i _ |. MEPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA
[5228]; : , ; SECRET 1@SUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITEI
[5230]. PURBON/UNIT NOTIFIBOL : = = . . .
[5232]_~ DISbEM BY.
[5233], | - | -|STAFF.
[5234]— AQVANS COP SSUEO/SLOTTED 8 AT_
[5236]ACTION UNIT ar KLE. vr. _ 7 De
[5238]; — [2 ee
[5240]~ ACTION # a _
[5241]7 389706  ELA620 PAGE 03 : — IN 716149
[5242]T0R81619342 OCT 750 ti«w “LOND 66194
[5244]COLLECTION OPERATION: AARON WILL UNDOUBTEDLY PURSUE THIS
[5245]POINT IN HIS MEETING THIS AFTERNOON WITH SYKES AND HOOPER
[5246]AND WE WILL REPORT ANY PLAYBACK WE GET. HE ASKED WHETHER
[5247]IN CGS'S JUDGMENT IT WOULD BE AN IMPROVEMENT ON PRESENT
[5248]PROCEDURES FOR THE STATE DEPARTMENT TO REQUIRE PRIOR CLEARANCE
[5249]WITH OUR AMBASSADORS OF ALL INTELLIGENCE AND ACTION OPERATIONS.
[5250]COS REPLIED THAT IF ALL THE AMBASSADORS WERE AS ABLE AND AS
[5251]INFORMED AS THIS ONE AND SOME OTHERS HE HAD KNOWN» THAT THIS
[5252]MIGHT WORK, THE PROBLEM WAS THAT MANY AMBASSADORS HAD NO -
[5253]KNOWLEDGE OR ACQUAINTANCE WIIH THE INTELLIGENCE FIELD AND NO
[5254]BASIS FOR MAKING INFORMED JUDGMENTS, AND THE RESULT,’ THEREFORG,
[5255]aF SUCH A RULE MIGHT BE TO SERIOUSLY INHIBIT AND PREVENT. MANY
[5256]OPERATIONS THAT SHOULD 3E UNDERTAKEN .
[5258]E, iN ANSWER TO ANOTHER QUESTION, COS CONFIRMED THAT BOTW
[5259]THE AMBASSADOR AND THE QRITISH wERE PERIODICALLY BRIEFED ON
[5260]THE STATUS OF ANY COVERT ACTION OPERATIONS TAKING PLACE IN
[5265]“HE CONCLUSION GF 742 DISCUSSIONS» COS TRIED TO MAK&
[5267]“OR END TISM WES Lic llvsl? CINGERNED BY THE LEAKS AND
[5272]13-00000
[5274]o -
[5279]ISBUG Ne ‘arr toe ia
[5281]ISTAPE
[5283]"IN 746229
[5284]~ .  TR11619342 OCT 75 * LanD 663s
[5288]CONTINUING PUBLICITY IN. WASHINGTON, THE PAD BEEN REASSURED
[5290]PRODUCT, AND TO DATE THERE AD. BEEN NO. DIMENUTION. Se
[5291]- OF THHE INTELLIGENCE THEY: WERE. PRPARED TO. GIVE US, AARON SAID
[5295]E WOULD ALSO REASSURE SYKES ‘AND HOOPER ON THIS POINT AS FAR AS
[5296]THE SENATE COMMITTEE IS CONCERNED,
[5298]~ @, COS POINTED OUT BRITISH INTELLIGENCE ENJOYED AN ENVIABLE
[5300]DEGREE OF PROTECTION AS A RESULT OF THE OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT»
[5302]THE ABSENCE OF PARLIAMENTARY INVESTIGATIONS AND THE VERY
[5304]- EFFECTIVE COVER PROVIDED BY.THE FOREIGN OFFICE FOR GNGRAPH
[5305]REPRESENTATIVES SERVCING OVERSEAS. COS TOLD AARON THAT ONE
[5307]~ OF THE USEFUL THINGS THE SENATE COMMITTEE MIGHT DO WOULD
[5308]- BE TO CALL FOR NEW LEGISLATION THAT MIGHT OF FER SOME
[5310]PROTECTION SIMILAR TO THE KIND THAT THE BRITISH ENJOY,
[5311]~ AARON SAID THAT THE. COMMITTEE WAS IN FACT LOOKING INTO THIS
[5312]. PROBLEM, a LE,
[5314]C, COS REVIEWED THE PUBLIC EVIDENCE AVAILABLE AS TO
[5316]~ WHAT PHIL AGEE HAS BEEN UP TO AND POINTED OUT THE KIND OF
[5317]~ DAMAGE THAT CAN BE DONE IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY EFFECTIVE
[5319]SANCTIONS, COS DUCKED ‘A QUESTION “FROM AARON. as TO HOW MUCH
[5320]SECRET. .
[5322]fa
[5324]13-00000
[5326]TOTAL COPIES Ri oy ;
[5327]: . REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THJ
[5328]SECRET | - ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE
[5330]ACTION UNIT
[5333]“7389706 = E1A20 PAGE 05-05 IN 716119
[5334]7 | T0R12619342 OCT 75. «= (ité‘é‘«*CND
[5336]~ COVERAGE ON AGEE JAGUAR WAS PROVIDING FOR US.
[5337]4, IN CONCLUSION, COS STATED THAT WE HAD EVIDENCE THAT
[5338]THE CONTINUING PUBLICITY IN WASHINGTON IS BEGINNING TO AFFECT
[5339]QUR ABILITY TO RECRUIT AND MAINTAIN OUR AGENTS, AARON REPLIED
[5340]THAT IF SECSTATE KISSINGER HAD BEEN WILLING To PROVIDE .THE
[5341]CHURCH COMMITTEE WITH THE INFORMATION THEY REQUESTED THE
[5342]“HEARINGS WOULD HAVE BEEN OVER IN SEPTEMBER, HE SPECULATED
[5343]THAT THE WAY THINGS WERE NOW GOING, THE CHURCH COMMITTEE
[5344]“| WOULD FINISH UP NEXT FESRUARY, THE ENTIRE MEETING WAS CARRIED
[5345](QUT IN A COURTEOUS TONE AND NO CONFRONTATIONS OCCURRED, &2 IMPDET
[5347]13-00000 oo, . . ~ ae
[5348]sO, oO — G@.PLe 7S Jo SZ -
[5350]Review Staff: , 75/3149/a
[5351]Date 6 October 1975 |
[5352]| _ we
[5353]at es _ met
[5354]TO : CIA Task Force
[5355]‘FROM =: The Review Staff, Walter Bilder
[5356]SUBJECT : SSC/HSC Request . .
[5357]_RECEIVED: Date 3 October Time 1905
[5359]etter requests an orientation briefing ~
[5360]for-D o is travelling again, this time to
[5361]Swit 3 West Germany , and the United Kingdom.”
[5363]o
[5365]4
[5367]. _ Comments:  neitng Sch.
[5368]- ee -_ oe (9PS, TE. v2 end I oo
[5369]. aad 5 ny ae “a . oe oe
[5370]. a ~y ¢ ” 4 ; Action info
[5373]13-00000
[5375]ot . : . 1
[5376]+s FRANK CHURCH, FOAMG, CHAIRMAN . _
[5377]JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMA,
[5378]PHIL? A, HANT, MICH. HOWARD H. BAKER, JA., TEN,
[5379]WALTER ff, MONDALE, MINN, BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ,
[5380]WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY. CHAPLES MCC. MATHIAS, JA, MD.
[5382]ponent wonoan ne RICHARD 5: SCHNEIER. FAG “Miriled Blots Denate
[5384]WILLUAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
[5385]FREDERICK A. ©. SCHWAST, JM., CHIZF COUNSEL, . .
[5386]CURTIS R, SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSS1, SELECT COMMITTEE TO
[5387]STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS witH
[5388]RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
[5389](pursuant to 5. RES. 2, 54TH CONGRERS)
[5391]WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510
[5393]October 5, 1975
[5395].
[5397]Mr. Seymour Bolten: - .
[5398]Assistant to the Director - .
[5399]’ Room 6D0120° _ _
[5400]Central Intelligence Agency . :
[5401]Langley, Virginia .
[5403]7 Dear Mr. Bolten:
[5405]oe This letter is ‘to request an orientation briefing ‘for _
[5406].a visit to'the Federal Republic: of Germany which a member of .
[5408]the Select Committee staff, David Aaron, has been asked to.
[5409]take ‘this month. °
[5411]Although plans are not yet precise, it is expected “hat
[5412]_ he will be in Geneva Sunday, October -12;.in the Federal
[5413]Republic of Germany October 13- ~153 and in London October 16
[5414]“and 17. : .
[5415]: The priniaxy purpose of this ‘travel is to discuss State-.
[5416]CIA and military intelligence relations in the field with
[5417]_the Aubassadors, Embassy Station officers and military com- ..
[5418]. wmanders....As appropriate, past Agency programs may also be
[5419]‘reviewed. In Geneva, Mr. Aaron plans to interview Ambassador
[5420]- U. Alexis: Johnson on the broad issue of the role of the co
[5421]7 Department of State in the control of intelligence « activities. . ot
[5423]_Stacerely,
[5425]s
[5426]; Willian G. Miller
[5428]copy to. Mr. Hyland, ‘State Department
[5430]Sh H! 50 Lt 129
[5432]‘ ; _ REVIEW STAFF -
[5434]of
[5436]WALTER D, ested Ky. CMARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JF., MO,
[5439]ees wo
[5440]> Ls FRANN 4 LM, IDAHO, cy AN
[5441]. . oof * JOHN G, TqWwEA] TEXAS, Vict, MAN
[5442]FWLIP A, HART, wd HOWARD H, DAKER, JR., TENN.
[5443]{ ALTER FF, MONDALE, BARAY GOLDWATER, aniz.
[5445]RODEAT MORGAN, thc. RICHARD $. SCHWEIKER, PAs . 7? ts oS f Be {
[5446]Gawy HART, COLO. Mrutled Diales Henale
[5447]VILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
[5448]* FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL. SELECT COMMITTEE TO
[5449]|. SMOTNE, s
[5450]7 vans eee Mansy rt IMORREY CONDE STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
[5452]RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
[5453](PURSUANT Yo S. RES. 7, ETH CONGRESS)
[5455]WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510
[5457]October 3,,.1975 ; REVIEW starr
[5459]Mr. William G. ‘yland - oe
[5461]Director - - : ’
[5462]"Bureau of Intelligence and Research -
[5464]Department of State .
[5466]Washington, D. Cc. » 20520
[5468]_ Dear Mr. Hyland:
[5470]This letter is to request an orientation briefing
[5471]for a visit to the Federal Republic of Germany which a
[5472]‘member of tne Select Committee staff, David Aaron, has
[5473]heen. asked to make this month.
[5475]; ‘Although the plans’ are not yet precise, it is expected
[5476]that he will be in Geneva Sunday, October 12; in the Federal
[5477]. Republic’ of Germany October 13-15; and in London October
[5478]16 and 17.. .
[5480]The primary’ purpose of this ‘travel is to discuss State-
[5481]‘CIA and military intelligence relations in the field with
[5482]_ the Ambassadors, Embassy Station officers and military com-
[5483]‘manders. As appropriate, past Agency programs may ‘also be
[5484]_xeviewed.. In Geneva, Mr. Aaron plans to interview Ambassador |
[5485]U. Alexis Johnson on the broad issue of, the role of the
[5486]Department of State in the control of intelligence activities.
[5488]“sincerely,
[5490]‘William G. Miller 9 ~
[5492]copy to Mr. Bolten, CIA
[5497]13-00000
[5499][OT rer mei Sg Te
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[5503]wee ee pee
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[5512]chassisieD ©] (tEAM 00 conp senriat =] seerer
[5514]__. ROUTING AND RECORD:
[5516]‘SHEET
[5518]| SUBJECT: (Optional). .
[5520]* EXTENSION
[5522]OFFICER'S
[5523]INITIALS:
[5525]‘COMMENTS | {Number "each comment to >show from :whom f
[5527]f TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
[5528]: . : fo whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.) “| >.
[5530]| building) _
[5532]ct
[5534]SS G1O“aSe" C) seceet — C]-conrioentialC] ERAS onciaseitien
[5537]13-00000,
[5539]wal —— e ‘ . . ' . : . . i 7
[5540]So -_ & . . . . an
[5542]\ REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN
[5543]| : 185) NG OFFICE 1S PROHIGITED
[5545]"_s@EE SEC DISSEM BY
[5547]” RSENFUNIT NOTIFIED
[5549]HRITE CO”, FSVEDISLOTTED
[5550]“a. | QF. Fe”
[5552]oe Nt cee ee
[5553]‘Hop a
[5555]“Ty 333576 ELADZ2 "PAGE 01 IN 695650
[5557]ToRI2420292 SEP 75. MONT 21403
[5558]| 419452 SE |
[5559]“SECRET 2419452 SEP 75 STAFF yz. | - . ee
[5560]CITE MONTEVIDEO 21405 SECTION 2 OF 20 oe A /
[5562]“TO IMMEDIATE BUENOS AIRES INF 0 DIRECTOR,
[5563]NaCT BUENOS AYRES
[5564]RYBAT PLVWCADET
[5565]1, COS HAD TWO*HOUR SESSION WITH TRUEHART AND AARON LATE-
[5566]MORNING 24 ‘SEPTEMBER, GENERAL IMPRESSION 1S THAT BOTH WERE
[5567]BUSINESS-LIKE) QUESTIONS WERE INCISIVE AND DESIGNED TO ASCERTAIN
[5568]HOW A STATION FUNCTIONS IN AN EMBASSY, PARTICULARLY VIS-A-VIS
[5569]THE AMBASSADOR, RATHER THAN HOW MONTEVIDEO STATION 1S FUNCTIONING
[5570]“IN URUGUAY, HENCE MANY QUESTIONS WERE HIGHLY HYPOTHETICAL, MOST
[5571]IMPORTANT IMPRESSION WAS THAT FORMER AMBASSADOR TRUEHART (WHOM S
[5572]COS HAD MET IN NIGERIA YEARS AGO) FEELS THAT AN AMBASSADOR
[5573]“SHOULD BE FAR MORE. KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT ALL REPEAT ALL STATION
[5574]OPERATIONS IN ORDER TO JUDGE POSSIBLE "FLAP POTENTIAL".
[5575]2s COS DID NOT SKGW OD TO VISITORS SINCE THEY DID NOT ASK
[5576]TO READ IT BUT INSTEAD READ PORTIONS OF IT TO THEM AND DISCUSSED
[5577]IT WITH THE Ns
[5578]3, THEY ASKED INITIALLY WHAT THE ANB4SSADORS INJUNCT [ONS
[5579]WERE WITH RESPECT TO PROHIBITED OP ERAT IONE, cos SAID
[5580](SECRE T
[5582]13-00000,
[5584]SBLE BEC DIGGEM BY
[5586]‘ASONJUNIT NOTIFIED _
[5588]a 2P
[5589]*TION UNIT
[5591].
[5593]PER 7 + TOTAL COPIES i - RUN ;
[5594]_ [| REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN
[5596]7 oo. | --- SEC m7 E | ae ; || MIBUING OFFICE ts PROHIBITED
[5598]was
[5600]TORI2420292 SEP 75 _ 4 MONT 21403
[5602]“yMBASSADOR DOES “NOT, ‘WANT “COVERT OPERATIONS OF A POLICTICAL NATURE
[5604]PRIOR TO INITIATION OF AN OPERATION. WHAT KIND OF AGENTS
[5606]iN® “URUGUAY WITHOUT “HIS PRIOR APPROVAL (NOR DOES HE WANT US TO.
[5607]noUNT "ELECTRONIC" OPERATIONS. WITHOUT APPROVAL. COS OPINED THIS
[5608]LATTER INJUNCTION MEANT UNILATERAL EFFORTS, AARON ASKED IF WE
[5609]WAD oW=8OING PRESS PLACEMENT MEDIA OPERATIONS, COS SAID WE.
[5610]DID HAVE. SOME BUT THESE WERE OF ROUTINE NATURE. AARON PURSUED
[5611]MATTER, | “ASKED. IF AMBASSADOR WAS FULL Y AWARE OF THIS TO WHICH
[5612]cos “RESPONDED THAT HE PRE SUMED $0, COS ADDED ‘HE HAD NOT
[5613]SPECIFICALLY COVERED’ “THIS POINT WITH THE AMBASSADOR SINCE.
[5615]eos ARRIVAL HE RE ‘LESS. THAN ONE MONTH ACOs
[5617]ay “BOTH AARON AND TRUEHART QUESTIONED AT LENGTH WHAT KIND
[5618]OF THINGS WE COORDINATE WITH THE AMBASSADOR AND IN WHAT DEPTH
[5620]WOULD HE IDENTIFY BY NAME TO THE “AMBASSADOR? COS SAID HE
[5621]WOULD BE INCLINED TO REVEAL TO THE AMBASSADOR THE NAME OF
[5622]ANY, SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL WITH WHOM THE AMBASSADOR WAS
[5623]DEALING OFFICIALLY AND INTIMATELY, BUT THIS WOULD IN LARGE
[5624]PART DEPEND ON THE AMBASSADORS WISHES HIMSELF. WOULD WE
[5625]INFORM THGSROLITICAL SECTION CHIEF OF THE IDENTITY OF ONE OF
[5626]QUR AGENTS WHOM THE POLITICAL OFFICER WAS-TRYING TO, DEVELOP?
[5627]a SECRET
[5629]13-00009
[5631]ABLE SKC Disarm AY PAR | ‘ o VOTAL Corin: cence ee een AVE ;
[5632]an : : : : | REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN
[5633]; oes | (GBUING OFFICE 18 PROHIBITED
[5634]MHBON/UNIT NOTIFIED ee ee Cee AS E Cc R & an pete eee = a comer ees
[5636]WWVANCE. COPY “SUED SLOTTED.
[5638]‘CTION UNIT a
[5639]; RF FILE .
[5641]\CTION # po
[5643]T 333576 = EL.Ag22 PAGE 03 - IN 695652
[5645]Sree nen ae Toni 242292 SEP 75°00 MONT. 24.403
[5647]cos ANSHERED WE WOULD FIRST INSTRUCT THE AGENT. HOW ro HANDLE
[5648]MIS ‘OVERT CONTAGT BUT, DEPENDING UPON RELATIONS, MIGHT ALSO
[5649]Discuss. THE MATTER FRANKLY WITH POLITICAL OFFICER. WHAT ABOUT
[5650]DEFENSE ATTACHE? ANSWERS THE SAME, .
[5652]5, THIS LED TO. DISCUSSION OF INTER@AGENCY SOURCE REGISTER,
[5654]HAVING wust FINISHED WITH DEFENSE ATTACHE, AMBASSADOR TRUEHART
[5655]SAID. ‘DEFATT INDICATED HE HAD MANY SOURCES REGISTERED AND
[5657]THEREF ORE WE WERE PROSCR IBED FROM RECUITING THEM. COS POINTED
[5659]ouT SOURCE REGISTER 1s FOR COVERT AGENTS ONLY AND SINCE DEFATT
[5661]HERE 1S PROCSCRIBED FROM RUNNING COVERT AGENTS, NONE OF HIS
[5663]SOURCES ARE IN INTER*AGENCY SURCE REGISTER, COS ADDED THAT
[5665]MANY DEFENSE ATTACHES MISCONSTRUE THEIR REGISTERING OF THEIR 4
[5666]“AGENTS IN PENTAGON SERIES AS SYNONOMOUS WITH REGISTRATION IN
[5668]THE INTERAGENCY SOURCE REGISTER, |
[5670]6, TRUEHART ASKED IF WE EXERTED "REAL CONTROL” OVER DEA'S
[5672]OPERATIONS AS REQUIRED BY DCID. CoS SAID THAT ON THE CONTRARY
[5674]WE EXERTED NO CONTROL OVER DEA NOR ARE WE UNDER INSTRUCTIONS TO
[5676]TRY To DO So WE DO COORDINATE CLOSELY, REGISTER THEIR SOURCES, |
[5677]PROVIDE TRACES AND ASSITANCE, ENCOURAGE LIAISON TO COOPERATE FULLY
[5679]WITH THEM, ETC. IN ADDITION, WHEN A DEA OPERATIN IS _
[5680]SECRET
[5682]13-00000
[5686]TABLE SEC DIGSEM BY |. _PER ye TOTAL copies Ry!
[5688]ae ! © mEpRoBUCTION BY OTHER THar
[5689]I a SE COR € Tt . | > | ; ; isauina orrice ts PRONIBITED
[5691]a rine)
[5693]*ERRON/UNIT NOTIFIED
[5697]WOVANCK.COPY HepURD-eLOTIED 6, YL ATO
[5698]CHOON UNI T .
[5702]¥ 335576 ElAagee2 - PAGE 64 IN 6956528
[5704]TOR!2420292 SEP 75 MONT 21403
[5706]BEING MOUNTED TO UNDERTAKE A-DRUG BUY WE ARE REQUIRED To KNOW
[5707]ENOUGH ABOUT THE CASE IN ADVANCE TO ADVISE THE AMBASSADOR
[5708]AS. TO THE POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS INVOLVED, IF THERE ARE ANY.
[5710]7, TRUENART ASKED TO WHAT EXTENT WE WORK WITH LIAISON ON
[5711]THE OSOVIET TARGET AND WHETHER WE HAVE TELTAPS, HB WAS ADVISED
[5712]“LIAISON SHARES WITH US THE PRODUCT OF THEIR TELTAPS AND THAT
[5713]“LIAISON 1S PREPARED TO MOUNT JOINT OPERATIONS WITH US AGAINST
[5714]SOVIET TARGET,» THAT WE ARE NOW INTENDING To ‘APPROACH THIS
[5715]MATTER WITH LIAISON IN A MORE PLANNED WAY. AARON ASKED
[5716]HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION WOULD WE ADVISE AMBASSADOR IN ADVANCE
[5718]OF MOUNTING JOINT OPERATION WITH LIAISON TO 8UG RESIDENCEE OF
[5719]A SOVIET OFFICIAL, WE SAID PROBALBLY NOT SINCE THERE WOULD BE
[5720]NO FLAP POTENTIAL, AARON WANTED To PURSUE THIS BUT STRANGELY
[5721]ENOUGH. TRUEHART AGREED FULLY AND EXPLAINED THAT IF SOME ELEMENT
[5722]"WENT AWRY THE LIAISON SERVICE WOULD BE THERE TO SET IT RIGHT,
[5724]8, AARON. AND TRUEHART SPENT CONSIDERABLE TIME ANALYZING OD
[5726]NON@COMMUNIST WORLD COVERT ACTION OBJECTIVE K-2 INVOLVING AGENTS
[5727]OF INFLUENCEM, THIS PARAGRAPH WAS READ SEVERAL TIMES TO THEM ON
[5728]THETR REQUEXT, THEY..WANTED TO KNOW HOW LONG THE AGENT OF INFLUENCE
[5729]PROGRAM HAD BEEN IN EXISTENCE, IN LATIN AMERICA (ANSWER? TWO OR
[5731]SECRET .
[5733]13-00000 ,
[5735]AE Boe reoe ee gle
[5737]LBLE SEC DISSEM BY PER TOTAL COPIES. Run
[5739]REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN
[5740]ISSUING OFFICE 1S PROHIBITED
[5742]ZRSON/UNIT NOTIFIEO
[5744]_RF ~—FILE .
[5746]“7 355576 ELAD22. "PAGE 05. | IN 695650
[5748]Ton re “ToR12420292 SEP 75: ore meee MONT 24493 |
[5750]THREE YEARS IN ITS PRESENT FORM THOUGH WE HAVE. “BEEN ‘DOING THIS
[5751]RIND OF 7 THING FOR “YEARS, 7 WE STRESSED THAT THIS: PARAGRAPH IN.
[5752]Two. PLAGES CONTAINED. THE PHRASE "SUBJECT To POLIcy APPROVAL"
[5754]WH ICH MEANT THE AMBASSADOR AND: HASHING TON, WHILE THEY UNDERSOT OOD
[5755]THIS, POINT THEY. WANTED TO. KNOW IF WE WOULD COORDINATE: IN ‘ADVANCE
[5756]WITH THE AMBASSADOR OR THE -DEF ENSE ATTACHE ON THE RECRUITMENT OF
[5757]SENIOR | “URUGUAYAN. GENERAL AS A POSSIBLE AGENT ‘OF INFLUENCE’:
[5758]ANSWER | No, Do WE HAVE ANy RECRUITED AGENTS oF _INFLUENCE IN
[5759]URUGUAY, ANSWER} NO, ARE HE WORKING ON THIS? ANSWER: YES,
[5761]THEN AARON ASKED IF Ir WAS TRUE THAT AT THE PRESENT TIME
[5763]WE DID NOT HAVE THE CAPABILITY THROUGH COVERT AGENTS OF
[5764]INFLUENCE TO COUNTER SOVIET INITIATIVE WHICH PRESUMABLY «
[5766]“coud THREATEN PRIORI TY UsSe INTERESTS IN URUGUAY. ANSWER:
[5767]TRUE AT THE PRESENT TIME} WE PROBABLY WOULD HAVE TO RURN TO
[5768]OTHER AGENTS POSSIBLY INCLUDING LIAISON SHOULD 17 BE NECESSARY
[5769]IN THE NEAR FUTURE: PRIOR TO OUR ACQUISITION OF AGENTS OF
[5770]INFLUENCE, AARON ASKED WHY THAT PARAGRAPH IN OD SPOKE OF
[5771]MAINTAINING THE CAPABILITY 0 COUNTER SOVIET INITIATIVES THAT
[5772]THREATEN THE STABILITY DF URUGUAY SINCE THERE IS LITTLE UsSe
[5773]COMMERCIAL INTEREST IN URUGUAY, HE ANSEWEREED THAT URUGUAY IS
[5775]SECRET
[5777]13-00000 .
[5778]Misi 2/7B .
[5780]_— Le
[5781]= t
[5782]|
[5784]WOLKE RE! OINBEM BY 2 TKR OFA Opin RUN Le |
[5786]a
[5788]“RBON/UNIT NOTIFIHO
[5790]ANCE *.
[5791]FTION UNIT
[5793]erin
[5794]7 333576 PAGE D6-Bh | . "IN 695650
[5795]tI 2420292 SEP 75 MONT 24493
[5797]CLEARLY IN THE WESTERN CAMP, VOETES ANT I*COMMUNIST IN
[5798]__. FNTERNATIONAL FORUM AND IS CONSIDERED A FIRIEND OF THE U.S,
[5800]AKRON ASKED IF SIMILARPROVISIONS WERE WRITTEN INTO THE OD'S OF
[5801]bTHER STATIONS-IN LATIN AMERICAs I.E TO COUNTER SOVIET |
[5802]INITIATIVES THAT THREATEN INTERNAL STABILITY. WE SAID WE DID NOT
[5804]“KNGW, CONTINUING DISEUSS TONS: ON THE MILITARY, TRUEHART
[5805]PoSED HYPOTHETICAL CASE ABOUT RECRUITMENT FOR FI PURPOSES OF —
[5806]AVPRIVATE SECRETARY TO A MINISTER, WOULD WE COORDINATE THIS —
[5808]“ - ay
[5811][| REPROOUCTION BY OTHER THAN
[5812](ISSUING OFFICE IS PROMIBITED
[5815]13-00000
[5817]CABLE SEC DISSEM BY "PER WW TOTAL COPIES 3 BY . ,
[5818]. oe : : REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THi
[5820]pemuonsuntrnorifie oo a : s E C “R E Y. no 7 . he ISSUING OFFICE. 16 PROHIBITS
[5822]ACTION # cD es en
[5824]T 333589 EL AQ34 | PAGE GES TN 695658
[5825]TOR: 2420342 SEP 75 Mont . 21.403
[5826]S EC RET 2419452 SEPT 75 STAFF
[5827]CITE MONTEVIDEO 21403 FINAL SECTION OF 2
[5828]101 IMMEDIATE BUENOS AIRES INFO DIRECTOR,
[5830]NIACT BUENOS AIRES | —
[5831]RECRUITMENT IN ADVANCE WITH THE AMBASSADOR, ANSWER? NO,
[5832]TRUEWART THEN POSTULATED CASE WHERE RECRUITED SECRETARY
[5833]CONFESSES 10 MINISTER THAT SHE HAD BEEN FURNISHING US WITH
[5834]COPIES OF THE MINISTERS CLASSIFIED CORRESPONDENCE. WOULD
[5835]THIS NOT HAVE FLAP POTENTIAL HE ASKED? ANSWER? YES,
[5836]TRUEHART THEN MUSED THAT AMBASSADOR SHOULD HAVE THE RIGHT .
[5837]TO KNOW PRIOR TO OUR RECRUITMENT OF THE SECRETARY. HE DID.
[5838]NOT SEEM SATISFIED WITH THE EXPLANATION THAT WE ARE THE
[5839]OPERATIONAL PROFESSIONALS WHO WOULD JUDGE THE RISK PRIOR TO
[5840]RECRUITMENT AND WOULD BE MONITORING THE CASE THROUGHOUT. NE
[5841]PRESUME, THEREFORE, BY EXTRAPOLATION TRUEHART WOULD WANT THE
[5843]_ AMBASSADOR TO GE THE SUPER-CASE OFFICER MONITORING ALL OUR
[5844]OPERATIONS FOR POSSIBLE FLAP POTENTIAL,
[5846]9, SOME OF THE EASIER QUESTIONS WERE ALLOCATION OF MAN
[5847]POWER (ABQxL TWO OFFICERS NOW ON SOVIET/BLOC TARGET» HOPE
[5848]PUSH THIS TO THREE WHILE REMAINING OFFICERS COVER OTHER
[5850]| SECRET
[5852]13-00000 .
[5854]. ton
[5856]WBLK BEC DISHEM BY) | | LPRRO TOTAL copies: . 7 RUi _
[5858]AMBON UNL! NOTIFIED a [ § E c R E a i | |
[5859]o-.- 1.
[5861]JYANCE.COPY ¢¥aVED. SLOTTEO. .
[5862]STION UNIT
[5864]REPRODUCTION SY OTHER THAN
[5865](seUING OPFICE IG PROMIBITED
[5867]CTION #
[5869]1 333589 = ELAD34 PAGE BE | IN 695658
[5871]opJECTIVES), “HOW Is OVER*ALL, BUDGET ARRIVED AT (DIALOGUE
[5872]WITH HEADOUARTERS, SYSTEM STILL IN FLUX) AND IS BUDGET
[5873]BoVIDED BY OBJECTIVES (YES) WITH SUBORDINATE LINE ITEMS, CALLED
[5874]WHAT (PROJECT ACTIVITIES), WAS THERE ANY FLEXIGILITY DURING
[5875]THE COURSE OF THE FISCAL YEAR? ANSWER? SOME WITHIN PROJECT
[5877]| ACTIVITIES AND OBJECTIVES BUT NOT BETWEEN OBJECTIVES WITHOUT
[5878]HEADQUARTERS APPROVAL, Do WE HAVE A REGULAR PROGRAM OF
[5879]BRIEF ING REGULAR EMBASSY OFFICERS ON OUR ACTIVITIES SO THEY
[5880]UNDER STAND BETTER? ANSWER NOT IN ANY FORMAL SENSE, AARON
[5881]IMPLIED THIS MIGHT BE DONE BETTER AT THE WASHINGTON LEVEL.
[5883]40, IN DISCUSSIONS ON TERRORISM AND NARCOTICS, WE POINTED
[5884]OUR MOST OF OUR TARGETS ARE IN BUENOS AIRES. COULD HE _
[5885]RUN AGENTS FROM HERE AGAINST THOSE TARGETS IN ARGENTINA? -
[5886]ANSWER? YES, BUT ONLY IF COORDINATED WITH AND APPROVED BY
[5887]HOS AND BUENOS AIRES STATION. .CONCERNING MANPOWER, WE SAID
[5888]WE “ARE AT PRESENT UNDERTAKING A REVIEW OF BOTH TERRORIST AND
[5889]NARCOTICS TARGET TO DECIDE THE EXTENT OF THE PROBLEM AND THEN
[5890]THE HANPOWER REQUIRED SO THESE EFFORTS ARE IN A STATE OF FLUX,
[5891]WE SAID We WERE UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT BUENOS AIRES MAY NOT) .
[5892]HAVE NARCOTICS IN ITS 0D BUT THAT THEY HAVE A VERY FULL PLATE
[5894]SECRE 1
[5896]13-00000,,
[5898]Te, . —. . . : . ' a - . : 4
[5899]' eur sec bisuem by — an __- TOTAL CoPIes sR | , .
[5900]7 . . REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN
[5901]| Ss E C. Rg E T | : | ISSUING OFFICE is PROHIBITED
[5902]RSON/UNIT NOTIFIED
[5903]“y 355589. ET AG34.. PAGE . IN 695658
[5904]SOLE 2 7 og
[5905]TORI2420342 SEP 75 MONT 21403
[5906]oF 0 OTHER THINGS 10 Dd,
[5907]: Ad IN RESPONSE TO “QUESTION ON Nocs WE ADVISED WE -H
[5908]—— NONE. aN URUGUAY, £2) IMPDET, a
[5910]Be ~ woe
[5911].
[5912]. ty
[5913]*. . _ SECRET
[5915]13-00000
[5917]” REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN
[5919]« t
[5920]Cape sec piss a eee * z )
[5921]. . ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED
[5923]PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED
[5925]ACTION ©
[5927]ELAG42. PAGE 81 TN 694147
[5929]T 329488
[5931]_—10n12815282 SEP 750 BRL 2472s.
[5932]. } | | 7 : oe o-
[5933]SECRE T 2314092 “SEP 75 STAFF Ea, a - -_ I- or
[5935]CITE BRASILIA 24723. SECTION 1 OF 2
[5936]Tol. IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, NONTEVI DEO ROUTING BUENOS AIRES,
[5937]RYBAT PLVWCADET a | .
[5939]d+ HAD TWO HOUR SESS1ON WITH AARON AND TRUEHEART | wa :
[5940]AFTERNOON 22 SEPT, TRUBHEART AWAY PART OF TIME TO TALK TO. .
[5941]OTHERS IN EMBASSY AS AARON WAS CONCENTRATING ON STATION'S
[5942]“ACTIVITIES.
[5943]2, QUESTIONS RAN ALONG LINES OF THOSE INDICATED IN
[5944]DIRECTOR 744266, PLUS QUITE A FEW EXTRAS, FOL 1S HIGHLIGHT
[5945]OF FIVE AND ONE*HALF HOURS OF DISCUSSIONS HELD STAURDAY AND. MONDAY.
[5946]3. AARON MosT INTEREST ED IN HOW STATION RAN ITS a
[5947]OPERATIONS=+E,G, LINE OF COMMAND FROM HOS AND STATION'S
[5948]RELATIONSHIP WITH BASES, HE WENT OVER OD MINUTELY, THEN:
[5949]PERUSED EXAMPLES OF TELENOTE REQUIREMENTS SENT FROM
[5950]STATION TO BASES INCLUDING SUCH AS HBBS 933. A NUMBER OF
[5951]QUESTIONS WERE RAISED ON HOW CONTROL WAS EXERCISED OVER
[5953].
[5955]OUR OPERATIONS, BASICALLY, HE WAS TOLD THAT ALL oR ie
[5957]ACTIVITIES#@SENTERED AROUND THE 0D, OUR PROJECTS,
[5958]FUNDS, AND MANPOWER ALLOCATION WERE DESIGNED TO MEET 7.
[5959]| secret = ih. eth
[5962]13-00000
[5964]“CABLE GUC DISSEM BY.
[5966]REPROGUCTION BY OTHER THAN
[5968]1
[5969]4
[5971]pen, -_TOTAL COPIES : oY | os
[5972]' IGBUING OPMCE Is PROMIBITED
[5974]PERGON/UNIT NOTIPIEO.
[5977]T 329088 + ElAeaO CS PAGE Be TIN 69
[5978]ToR 2315232 SEP 75. | Steere
[5980]THE PRIORITY REQUIREMENTS AS ENUNCUTA TED IN THE 0D. PERIODIC
[5981]REPORTS WERE SUBMITTED TO HOS To APPRISE THEM OF WHAT WE
[5982]HOPED TO DO WITH REFERENCE TO QUR OD PRIORITIES, AND tuts WAS _
[5983]FOLLOWED BY REPORTS ON WHAT HAD ACTUALLY BEEN: AcCOMPLISED AGALST: _
[5984]THESE PRIORITIES, A "REPORT Carp" SYSTEM EXISTED WHEREIN « oe
[5985]WE WERE GRADED ON THE WORK DONE, - AARON WAS’ INTERESTED IN :
[5987]HOW A CASE OFFICER (THIS IS THE TERM HE USED) WORKING ON .
[5988]THE HARD TARGETS WAS GRADED RELATIVE TO ONE WHOSE
[5989]TARGETS WERE LESS HARD, AND WHETHER LACK OF ULTIMATE success
[5991](RECRUITMENT OF A SOV, FOR EXAMPLE) WAS HELD AGAINST THE c/0.
[5992]THE EXPLANATION WAS THAT THE RECRUITMENT OF SOMEONE IN- THE
[5993]HARD TARGET AREAS WAS THE ULTIMATE TEST, AND FAILURE TO RECRUIT RS
[5994]RECEIVED A ZERO SCORE, HOWEVER, IF THE C/0 WORKING ON THE
[5995]HARD TARGET HAD BEEN IMAGINATIVE, HAD GOTTEN A NUMBER OF
[5996]ACCESS AGENTS, HAD MANAGED TO HAVE DIRECT CONTACT WITH ONE
[5997]OR MORE TARGET PERSONALITIES» AND ALL IN ALL DID HIS
[5998]HOMEWORK, WORKED HARD» WAS AGGRESSIVE» BUT WAS. NOT | .
[5999]SUCCESSFUL BECAUSE THE TARGET WAS IN FACT NOT RECRUITABLE, |
[6000]HE WAS GIVEN A GOOD.GRADE, AARON MUSED WHETHER LACK ne
[6001]‘SUCCESS IN RECRUITING A HARD TARET INDIVIDUAL, EVER HELD” oo
[6003]s BECRET
[6006]13-00000
[6008]“CABLE SEC DIEGEM BY__ PeR’_. TOTAL Copies Ro ay.
[6010]i | REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAI
[6011]: ISSUING OFFICE 16 PROHIBITED
[6013]PERGON/UNIT NOTIFIED
[6015]eo ae . _ . . : . : . a
[6016]tere Me . mo, . , 2 a ig . natal
[6018]ACTION UNIT
[6020]ACTION .
[6022]7 329488 ElAG4Q 7 PAGE 83 be IN 694247 |
[6024]| TORI2315232 SEP Be BAIL, 24728
[6026]UP A C/O'S PROMOTION, AND HE WaS TOLD THAT IN ouR EXPERIENCE
[6027]THIS WAS NOT So, SO. LONG aS THE OTHER ELEMENTS THAT
[6028]EARMARK A GOOD C/O. WERE PRESENT, _
[6030]_ 4 THE NOC PROGRAM HAD A CERTAIN FASCINATION FOR 0TH
[6031]AARON AND TUREHEART,’ THEY WERE NOT INQUIS ITIVE ABOUT NAMES
[6032]OR COVER COMPANIES» BUT Dip WANT TO KNOW THE REASON FOR NOCS
[6033](SECURITY FOR HIGHLY SENSITIVE AGENTS, STAYBEHIND IN CASE
[6034]THE STATION HAD TO BE ABANDONED), WHE THER CUTOUTS WERE USED IN-
[6036]“ GONTACTING NocS (NOs DIRECT INSIDE C/O CONTACT UNDER
[6038]SCRUPULOURS SECURITY CONDITIONS), WHETHER THEY WERE WORTH
[6039]THE MONEY OUTLAY (YES, IF PRODUCTIVE AGENTS WERE GIVEN
[6041]THEM AND NOCS WERE SUFFICIENTLY EXPERIENCED AND ADEPT IN.
[6042]GETTING THE MAXIMUM FROM THE AGENTS BEING HANDLED). —-
[6044]5, AARON WAS MOST SPECIFIC IN QUERYING ABOUT THE
[6046]PERCENTAGE OF TIME SPENT BY STATION IN ACCOMPLISHMENT OF
[6047]INDIVIDUAL OBJECTIVES. HE WANTED TO KNOW HOW A cO/O SPENT HyS DAY,
[6048]THE PROCESS HE WENT THROUGH IN CONTACTING AN AGENT, HOW DID’
[6049]WE ENSURE THAT C/0S DID NOT TRY TO RECRUIT THE SAME
[6050]INDIVIDUAL deCONT.ACT REPORTS) AND TRACE REQUESTS ALLOWED ADEQUATE
[6051]CONTROL), WITH REFERENCE TO CI, HOW MUCH TIME WAS.
[6053]SECRET
[6055]13-00000
[6059]- CABLE BEC DIggEM BY _.
[6061]; REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THar
[6062]Lee 190UING OFFIca 13 PRONIZITED
[6063]PERBON/UNIT NOTIFIRO__... ; 7
[6065]_ “ACTION #
[6068]| -19R32315232 SEP 75 ween TUE
[6070]DEVOTED | TO THIS AND HOW DID WE MANGAGE IT (PENETRATION OF
[6071]. ‘Vrarson AND JOINT EFFORT WITH LYATSO Ne TEL ET APS)
[6072]ISURVETLLANCE » ET-C,**AGAINST HARD TARGETS), DISCUSSIONS oN.
[6073]COVERT ‘ACTION TOOK UP CONSIDERABLE TIME, “DESPITE QS - fo
[6074]‘gnifer ING ON THIS: ‘SUBJECT, AARON WANTED TO KNOW THE ~~
[6075]‘DIFFERENCE BET KEEN A MEDIA OP AND A COVERT POL ACTION OP,
[6076]‘HUGH STRESS WAS. “PLACED ON WHETHER WE HAD ANY PLUMBING FOR
[6077] IPOLETICAL ACTION OPS SHOULD WE BE REQUESTED To GET INTO _
[6078]SPRATSACTIVETY, LT WAS, EXPLAINED THAT WE HAVE ‘NOT SEEN iN |
[6079]66k ACTION -IN BRAZIL FOR YEARS, THAT WE HAD NO. PLUMBING AS |
[6080]SUCH, AND THAT IF A REQUEST WAS TO BE MADE FoR SUCH ACTION,
[6081]“THE STATION WOULD LIKELY NEED To START FROM POINT ZERO
[6082]PAGES BRAG Het B23 6” . 7
[6083]UNLESS SOME OF THE AGENTS NOW AVAILABLE WERE USABLE, IT WAS
[6084]“EXPLAINED THAT WE DID HAVE A SMALL MEDIA CAPABILITY AS WELL as
[6085]AN AGENT OF INFLUENCE PROGRAM BUT THAT THESE IN NO WAY
[6086]RESEMBLED THE KIND OF COVERT POLITICAL ACTION OF THE ~— *.
[6087]CHILEAN VARIETY, | ost ye
[6088]6, AAR HAD A FASCINATION FOR TRADESCRAFT, WANTED’ To: a
[6089]“KNDM HOW LONG CoS ‘HAD BEEN IN THE BUSINESS AND appRoxinatety |
[6090]wht . sy 7 Ss E c R ET a
[6093]13-00000
[6096]re ene
[6098]. CABLE SEC DIsszM BY___- PER___ TOTAL COPIES _ . wf ay oo :
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[6100]. ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED
[6102]PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED.
[6103]rn .
[6105].— ARYAN OP
[6106]ACTION UNIT +
[6108]ACTION 6
[6110]1 320488 = E1Ag4O PAGE OS t~*~<CSstsi‘is~™sSCSN AS AZ
[6111]| a | TOR: 2315232 sep 75 ae 24723
[6113]HOW MUCH TIME IN TOTAL 0S SPENT IN TRAINING: y ceouLDNtt
[6114]HAZARD A GUESS AS TO HOW MUCH TIME SPENT IN’ TRAINING BUT.
[6115]SAID. THAT THERE WAS A LONG COURSE ON ENTERING AGENCY », THAT
[6117]OVER THE YARS THERE WAS TRAINING COVERING ‘AOVARIE TY OF
[6119]~ guavects INCLUDING SECRET WRITING, CLANDESTINE® PHOTOGRAPHY»
[6120]COMMUNISM, MANAGEMENT: INCLUDING THE STUDY OF GRIDS, REPORTS
[6121]WRITING, ETC. MENTION WAS MADE oF MEDeCAREER ‘COURSE, .
[6122]PLUS SENIOUR SEMINARS AVAILABLE TO OFFIERS, PLUS “ATTENDANCE
[6123]AT SAFF COLLEGES SUCH AS THAT PROVIDED BY STATE, ARMY, ETCs)
[6124](AARON WAS FASCINATED WITH THE REPORTS WRITING COURSE. AND
[6125]ASKED FOR PARTICULARS, )- |
[6127]9,° ON INTERAGENCY RELATIONSHIPS, BOTH AARON AND
[6128]TUREHAEART WERE INTERESTED IN HOW INTEL REPORTS WERE’
[6129]DISTRIBUTED WITHIN THE EMBASSY, WHETHER cOB HAD AUTHORITY
[6130]TO SEND AN INTEL REPORT DIRECTLY TO HQS WITH INFO TO
[6131]STATION (YES) ON MATTERS WHICH WERE PECULIAR To THE LOCAL
[6132]‘SCENE BUT THOSE IMPINGING ON BROADER GOB MATTERS WERE. FIRST
[6133]SENT TO BRASILIA FOR ADDITIONS, MODIFICATIONS, ETC, PRIOR TO
[6134]ONWARD TRASSMHISSION,) THEY WERE TOLD THAT THE AMBASSADOR
[6135]SEES ALL REPORTS, THAT OTHER SECTIONS OF THE EMBASSY arp SEE
[6136]SECRET
[6138]13-00000
[6140]PER TOTAL copies | kL py foe :
[6141]7 . debe. REPRODUCTION SY OTHER THA
[6142]SECRET. |
[6143]: . . '
[6145]GABLE ‘SEC -DISGEM BY.
[6147]; “ISSUING OFFICE IS PRONIBITE!
[6148]~PERGON/UNIT NOTIFIED, . ; :
[6150]AL? Ply VE
[6151]‘ACTION UNIT®
[6153]‘ACTION “#
[6155]T EI AB 4D EN 6941 47
[6157]BRIL. 24723 -
[6159]PAGE 06-6
[6160]TOR12345232 SEP 75°
[6164]THOSE. REPORTS WHICH WERE PERTINENT To THEM, INTEL ON MAJOR
[6165]MTEMS* SUCH. AS. THOSE WHICH HAD: A BEARING ON. GOB POLICIES
[6166]WAS*AeVIS THE Us SeeWaS SHOWN TO: THE AMBASSADOR PRIOR TO
[6167]SUBMISSION» STATION MADE IT A PRACTIVE TO CHECK INTEL
[6168]QUT. WITH CONCERNED SECTIONS WITHIN THE EMBASSY PRIOR To
[6169]ARANSMISSLON LF. THIS WAS CONSIDERED NECESSARY AND BENEFICIAL
[6170]BY! THE STATION, THERE ARE OCCASIONS WHEREIN THE STATION IS
[6171]REQUIRED TO'LIMIT A REPORT TO THE AMBASSADOR ONLY WHEN
[6172]SENSITVE: INFO AND/OR A SENSITIVE SOURCE IS INVOLVED...
[6173]“THIS HAD NOT HAPPED IN THE COS'S SHORT. TENURE IN. :
[6176]13-00000
[6178]— : 4 |
[6179]cheater sic bissen BY. ot PER eens Lome TOTAL COPIES RU. 2¥ i ot - a .
[6181]. So a : . ; . eo : | ‘REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN
[6183]“§ ECRET 2 | 8 PROHIBITED
[6185]TT Le tte nn en
[6187]PERVON UNIT NOTIFIED 2 noc eo
[6189]a F 329420 IN 694107
[6191]TOR: 12315082 SEP 75 _ | BRIL: 24728,
[6193]“EL A971
[6195]gE RET 2314092 SEPT 15 STAFF |
[6196]. cite ‘BRASILIA 24723 FINAL. SECTION “OF THO
[6197]POS TMMEDTATE DIRECTOR, ‘MONTEVIDEO ROUTINE. auENds AIRES.
[6199]BRASILIA, “SUT IN PANAMA FOR EXAMPLE» senvan REPORTS
[6200]CONSIDERED HIGHLY SENSITIVE WERE OFTEN LImtTeD TO THE.
[6201]AMBASSADOR, THE CINSCO, AND THE GOVERNOR OF THE CANAL
[6202]S§NE/ OR TO THE AMBASSADOR ONLY, SECURITY WAS: THE
[6203]GARD INA FACTOR “IN SUCH LIMITING OF DISTRIBUTION. | |
[6204](8, AARON WANTED TO.KNOW WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF ONE OF >
[6205]THE STATION'S AGENTS WAS BEING SEEN BY A MEMBER OF THE |
[6206]POLITICAL SECTION*=WOULD WE DISCUSS IT WITH THE POLITICAL
[6207]OFFICER? (FIRST STEP WOULD BE TO TALK To THE AGENT ON THE
[6208]PROBLEMS THAT WOULD BE ENCOUNTERED BY SUCH ACTION ON HIS _
[6209]PART, THAT THIS NORMALLY DID SUFFICE IF IN FACT HE WAS A
[6210]CONTROLLED AGENT. IF HIS ACCESS WAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY
[6211](SENSITIVE, HE WOULD BE ALLOWED TO SEE THE POLITICAL OFFICER
[6212]SO LONG AS HE REMEMBERED WHO HE WORKED FOR AND ACTED
[6213]ACCORDINGE), |
[6214]9, AS TO. KEEPING THE AMBASSADOR APPRISED ON POSITIVE
[6215]SECRET
[6217]13-00000
[6219]- “CABLE SEC DISSEM AY PER __TOTAL COPIES Ry... BY
[6221]- - REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA
[6222]a | ISSUING OFFICE Is PROMIBITEE
[6223]PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED a ;
[6225]ACTION UNIT’
[6227]ACTION ¢
[6229]——¥-329420  EYAg71~
[6231]‘TORS2345082 SEP 75 _BRIL 24723
[6233]COLLECTION ‘OPERATIONS, THIS WAS DONE AS A MATTER oF COURSE
[6234]“put WITHOUT SPECIFIC DETAILS UNLESS THE AMBASSADOR WAS “IN
[6235]FACT..SEEING AN AGENT OF OURS REGULARLY AS PART oF HIS AMBASSADOR
[6236]“TAL -DUTIES.
[6238]2 A) THE LIAISON SERVICES WITH WHOM WE WERE IN TOUCH WERE
[6240]“NAMED, INCLUDING OUR JOINT EFFORTS AT TELTAPS, PLUS OUR
[6242]UNILATERAL PENETRATION EFFORTS FOR CI AND POSITIVE INTEL
[6243]Ais BOTH AARON AND TRUEHEART WERE SHOWN THE K1Qs AND THE
[6245]CLALS AND TAILORED ‘REQUIREMENTS THAT WERE SENT PERIODICALLY.
[6247]THEY BOTH REMARKED THAT THE AGENCY HAS A MORE |
[6249]SOPHISTICATED SYSTEM FOR GETTING REQUIREMENTS: to THE FIELD THAN:
[6250]SAY. STATE,
[6252]42, VERY LITTLE WAS ASKED ABOUT SPORLON ACTIVITIES IN R10
[6254]EXCEPT THAT THEY BOTH WERE UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT NSA
[6255]WAS RUNNING THE SHOW. THEY DID ASK ABOUT CUSTOMER REACTION
[6256]TO THE SPORLON PRODUCTS (AMBASSADOR CRIMMINS 1S AN AVID
[6257]CUSTOMER AND WE WERE OF THE OPINION THAT AGENCIES IN
[6258]WASHINGTON CONCERNED WITH THE INTERCEPT PROGRAM WERE
[6259]HAPPY WITmRTHE RESULTS.) .
[6261]- 43, ON HEARING THAT COS HAD BEEN IN PANAMA, QUESTIONS
[6262]. SECRET
[6264]13-00000
[6266]“CABLE SZC DISSEM BY__- PER - TOTAL COPIES
[6268]B REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN
[6269];| , ESSUING OFFICE IS PRONIDITED
[6271]PERSON /UNIT NOTIFIED.
[6273]ACTION UNIT
[6275]_ ACTION #
[6277]1
[6279]i}
[6281]JIN
[6283]41F
[6287]1329420 = ET A974 | .
[6288]TOR:2315082 SEP 75 si(‘(st*«~S; C#ROE ROIS
[6290]WERE RAISED ON AGREED. ACTIVITIES, THEY WERE BoTH
[6292]SURPRISED To FIND OUT THAT THE STATION IN PANAMA HAD TO
[6293]AUTHORIZE ALL CLANDESTINE COLLECTION ACTIVITIES ENGAGED . IN By
[6294]US. ELEMENTS IN THE AREA, INCLUDING GETTING PROJECT INFO
[6296](MUCH LIKE THAT REQUIRED IN THE AGENCY WHICH GAVE NAMES: OF
[6297]AGENTS TO BE RECRUITED, RATE OF PAY, METHOD OF CONTACT,
[6299]ETC, . |
[6301]14, aes EVINCED GREAT INTEREST IN THE COVER
[6302]PROVIDED BY THE EMBASSY, HE WAS TOLD THAT COVER COULD
[6303]BE IMPROVED UPON, THAT WE DID HAVE A SMALL NUMBER OF
[6304]OFFICERS WHO WERE ACTUALLY ASSIGNED TO OTHER SECTIONS,
[6306]THAT THEY GAVE ALMOST SOPERGENT OF THEIR TIME ON THE ACTUAL
[6307]WORK OF THAT SECTION, THEN SPENT THE REST aF THA WORK
[6309]DAY PLUS A LARGE DOSE ON NIGHTWORK ON OUR WORK FOR WHICH
[6311]THEY RECEIVED NO OVERTIME BUT DID THIS OUT OF HIGH MOTIVATION
[6312]“AND THE DESIRE TO GET AT OUR OBJECTIVES, ——
[6314]15, AARON KNEW OF THE OLD oP AND 0S0 SEPARATIONS OF THE
[6315]PaST AND PROBED ABOUT HOW THE FINAL AMALGAMATION AFFECTED
[6316]MOST PEOPLE. (NOTHING TRAUMATIC, OPC AND 080 OFFICERS HAD
[6317]A COMMON DENOMINATOR IN BASIC TRADECRAFT AND OTHER
[6319]SECRET
[6321]13-00000
[6325]Camue ssc pisesm av". pan : Tovaucopies Wools A
[6326]Te _ SECRET |: |:,  WOUING OPFICR 18 PROMIBITED
[6327]“PERGON/UNIT NOTIFIED |... . —-- — :
[6328]aevow wT TS ge pug vm) TT
[6329]ee eee [2] ee Ld
[6330]SNF , a , [a ) ar
[6331]. | Oo} ; . . : Oo ee - , a
[6332]T 329429 ELAQ74 7 PAGE (oq) SEN 694485
[6333]. _Torng3i506 SEP 75. (SC BRL 24723
[6335]“TRAINING. A GOOD OPC TYPE COULD. DO. EQUALLY coop WORK IN. a
[6336]THE 0SO FIELD» AND VICE VERSA.) oo
[6337]16. ABOVE ARE ONLY THE HIGHLIGHTS OF THE DISCUSSION.
[6339]AARON IS IN CHARGE, HE ASKED MOST OF THE QUESTIONS, AND.
[6341]TOOK COPIOUS NOTES. BOTH AARON AND TRUEHEART WERE 7
[6342]“ESSENTIALLY LOW-KEY BUT THE QUESTIONS WERE SHARP» PROBING,
[6343]AND AARON ESPECIALLY HAS A QUIETLY INCISIVE WAY OF GETTING.
[6345]AT THINGS, TIS DIFFICULT ‘To TELL WHETHER. THE THO: ARE.
[6346]FAVORABLY DISPOSED TOWARD THE AGENCY OR NOT. CERTAINLY
[6348](NO ANIMOSITY WAS SHOWN, BUT NEITHER WAS THERE ANY SHOW: oF
[6349]GREAT LOVE FOR THE AGENCY. AN OBJECTIVE APPROACH (QD) THE
[6350]MATTER AT HAND APPEARS TO BE AN APT DESCRIPTION OF HOM THEY,
[6351]WORKED, ;
[6353]17, AARON AND TRUEHEART WERE CARED FoR sy wie eheuesy
[6354]WHILE IN BRASILIA BUT ON SATURDAY IN RIO AARON SEEMED To
[6355]HAVE BEEN LEFT ALONE BY THE CONGEN. COB AND COS TOOK
[6356]AARON OUT TO DINNER AFTER THE BRIEFING SESSION AND HE
[6357]SEEMED TO. ENJOY AND APPRECIATE’ THE CHURRASCO. MONTEVIDEO
[6358]AND BUENOS AIRES MIGHT WISH TO KEEP IN MIND THAT AARON |
[6359]48 INTERESTED IN TRYING THE BETTER KNOWN LOCAL FOODS, 18
[6361], ‘Ss ECRET
[6363]Gy mo  , . .
[6364]* 7d . a : . Sf Lae :
[6366]13-00000
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[6370]. : ; ! REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN
[6371]. SO Ss & c R & T . _ ASBUING OFFICR 18 PROHIBITEO
[6373]PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED
[6375]__ABVANCE COP -LSBUED. BLOTIED._
[6376]ACTION UNIT
[6378]ACTION #
[6380]IN 6942
[6382]T 329420
[6384]ELA971
[6386]__ ToR:2315082 SEP 75 BRIL 24723
[6387]OA WINE LOVER AND WANTS TO SAMPLE THE BEST oF Me ae
[6389]PRODUCT. - —
[6391]18. AT DINNER ON SATURDAY NIGHT» AARON was ASKED BY
[6393]THE COS WHAT HE THOUGHT NIGHT HAPPEN To THE AGENCY. HE
[6395]OPINED THAT THE DDO MIGHT BE SPLIT OFF FROM THE MAIN BODY oF
[6397]THE AGENCY, AND PUT UNDER AN EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MADE UP OF
[6399]‘MEMBERS FROM STATE AND OTHER AGENCIES: IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH
[6401]MORE CONTROL OVER ITS ACTIVITIES. E2, IMPDET.
[6403]- . SECRET
[6405]13-00000
[6408]oe Ww eR Bn
[6409]“Camteeec oissmm By pee oe re
[6411]_ .. : , — " REPRODUCTION. BY OTHER THs
[6412]. ISSUING OFFICE 18 PROHIBITE
[6414]PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED
[6416]awe copy tes Lol orto cht _— d=. at [an Z = 7 _[st4FODE -EDENCE
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[6419]—— YB on
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[6423]Foo ener ce epee tat ee eee
[6424]t oo
[6426]a SECRET 2915472 ‘SEP 75 STAFF.
[6428]CITE. BUENOS. AIRES: 3459
[6430]tor IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO wonTeVIDED, BRASILIAS m0 OE JANEIRO”
[6432]oRYBAT PLVWCADET a | re Seen
[6433]REF BUENOS AIRES 34541 (x Gatacs pe a
[6435]‘de VISITORS MET WITH AMBASSADOR HILL FOR ONE HOUR AND A AHALF
[6437]“EVENING 27 SEP AT HIS ‘RESIDENCE “AND THEN WENT DIRECTLY. to AIRPORT,
[6438]AFTER INTRODUCING VISITORS To AMB® cos WITHDREW AND. WAITED. IN’ “ANOTHER:
[6439]ROOM, (UPON. DEPARTING COS HEARD ANB ASK VISITORS FOR THEER:
[6440]CREDENTIALS.) AMB LATER TOLD COS HE SUGaESTED TO visitors, ‘THAT COS
[6442]Be PRESENT DURING. DISCUSSION BuT THEY PRBFERRED TO TALK: WITH HIM.
[6443]PRIVATELY, COS WAS CALLED INe HOWEVER, YO PARTICIPATE iN LAST: FEW. .
[6445]MINUTES OF DISCUSSION, IN COS PRESENCE, MR. AARON ASKED. ANE
[6446]WHETHER HE“THOUGH HE SHOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO SEE ALL INFORMATION:
[6447]PRODUCED WITHIN HIS MISSION, TO WHICH AMB REPLIED AFFIRMATIVELY,. ;
[6448]_ AARON THEN ASKED AM WHETHER HE IN FACT SAW ALL INFO, AMB REPLIED
[6449]“HE DID NOT KNOW, BUT HAD CONFIDENCE IN COs IN THIS REGARD, AARON
[6450]THEN ASKED COS WHETHER HE WAS AUTHORIZED to SHOW AMB ALL STATION
[6451]REPORTING, . ANSWER! OPERATIONGL REPORTING {DENTIFYING AGENTS OR
[6452]"CLANDESTINE METHODS: oF OPERAT]ON COULD NoT BE SHOWN TO ANB WITHOUT
[6453]| . SECRET .
[6456]B.,
[6458]be
[6460]¥ .
[6468]13-00000
[6470]i vapLe Skt. DigsEM ey. eePBR TOTAL copies, RUN BY ;
[6472]boo. ee Gl oo REPRODUCTION: ‘BY OTHER THAI
[6474]i ; -. 8) € C. R E T ; . oo: HSUING: ‘OFFICE 16, PROMIBITEE
[6475]. PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED oe : ee ee
[6478]ACTION UNIT
[6480]ACTION #
[6483]ee as _ToR 2936272 SEP 75 ; coos BUEN ""S45t9 Lo
[6485]HOS APPROVAL, OTHER INFO couLD BE SHOWN at “DESCRETION. OF cos,
[6487]° SUBY OF ROGERS LETTER RE SHOWING INTEL REPORTS 0 ANB. PRIOR TO
[6488]“DISSEMINATION WAS THEN RAISED BY.ANB, ANB SAID WE TOOK POSITION THIS -
[6489]“WAS POLICY MATTER WHICH HAD to BE SOLVED IN. WASHINGTON AND HAD SO. =
[6490]TINFORMED ROGERS, (COS SAW DRAFT OF LETTER To ROGERS TO. THis eFFecr, a
[6491]“AT CONCLUSION OF MEETING AMB. HANDED COS A NEWS ITEM “HAVANA
[6493]NERIDIANG 80 IN SPANISH 1-45 JUL 75 PP 5q4, ARTICLE BY CARLOS: mARLA
[6495]GUTIERREZ ENTITLED AMERICAN AMBASSADOR HILL SEEN AS.CIA“AGENT IN
[6496]ARGENTINA) AND ASKED THAT ARTICLE 8E SHOKN TO VISITORS IN CAR, “aa
[6497]_TRUBHEART READ ARTICLE AND. COMMENTED SOMETHING TO. EFFECT THAT.
[6498]ARTICLE DID NOT SEEM TO HIM TO BE ANYTHING To BE VERY CONCERNED
[6500]ABOUT. MR, ‘AARON DID NOT READ IT, POUCHING COPYs AMA, SUBSE
[6501]| QUENTLY TOLD COS ARTICLE HAD BEEN GIVEN TO HIM IN WASHINGTON BY
[6502]| “DEPUTY ASSISTANT RYAN.) .
[6504]2, ON WAY TO ALRPORT AFTER MEETING WITH AMBs TRUEHEART
[6505]MENTIONED ANB'S REQUEST TO SEE THEIR CREDENTIALS, SINCE THEY HAD
[6506]NONE» THEY SHOWED THEIR PASSPORTS. (AMB LATER TOLD COS HE HAD
[6507]| ASKED To SEE CREDENTIALS SINCE HE WANTED To SEE FOR HIMSELF EXACTLY
[6508]WHAT THE LIMITS OF THEIR AUTHORITY WERE.) (CoS INFERRED THAT
[6510]VISITORS WERE TAKEN ABACK By AMB''S REQUEST BUT NEETING WITH AMB |
[6511]re oan SECRET
[6514]13-00000
[6515]i wt ee ne es Be
[6516]+ : me . ae + aa oe Pe - - ;
[6518]| GABLE SEC-DISSEM BY__
[6519]“an _
[6521]. REPRODUCTION. mY oTHER THs
[6522]rssuina OFFICE is PROHIBITE
[6524]-  PERSON/UNIT. NOTIFIED ~~
[6526]ACTION UNIT
[6532]ToRiass6272, SEP 75° BUEN sis
[6534]was: NONETHELESS HARMONIOUS, cane LATER. CONFIRMED Tats. IMPRESSION, y
[6535]- Ba AMB TELEPHONED cos: MORNING 28 SEP. AND GAVE. ‘HIGHLIGHTS OF aie
[6536]DISCUSSION. WITH VISITORS. FULLER ACCOUNT GtVEN IN WIS. OFF Ice EARLY.
[6537]‘MORNING 29 SEP, “AMB CHARACTERIZED. VISITORS AS AINTELLTOENT. AND. Se
[6538]BUSINESSLIKE, AMB HAD: IMPRESSION THEY. SATISFIED. WITH visit, 10 BUENOS -
[6539]AIRES AND WITH C COOPERATION THEY RECEIVED FROM. EVERYONE. HE
[6540]. SPECULATED ‘THAT THEIR REPORT. WOULD BE RET TEN IN “MANNER WHICH SERVES. |
[6541]INTERESTS oF CHURCH COMMITTEE. AMB SAID HE TOLD VISITORS HE ‘SATISFIED.
[6542]WITH SKHERALD OPERATION IN ARGENTINA. ONLY AREA: WHERE ‘WE. HAD A
[6543]—QUARREL WITH BKHERALD ‘TS THAT OF COMMUNI CATIONS: ANB ‘BELIEVES STATE
[6544]‘DEPT SHOULD CONTROL ITs OWN COMMUNICATIONS HE HAS: NO OBUECTION. TO
[6545]BKHERALD # HAVING ITS OWN COMMO, ALSO. REGARDING HIS. KNOWLEDGE ‘OF
[6546]SKHERALD ACTIVITY, AMB SAID HE TOLD VISTTORS THAT BECAUSE oF
[6547]TERRORIST PROBLEM HE DID NOT WANT TO KNOW. “ABOUT aKWERALD ACTIVITIES
[6548]IN DETAIL AND TRUSTS COS TO TELL HIM WHATEVER HE NEEDS TO KNOW,
[6549]_ VISITORS SHOWED GREAT INTEREST IN THIS VIEWPOINT, AMB SAID HE HAD
[6551]HAD A PROBLEM WITH ONLY ONE STATION CHIEF HHO NOW DECEASED, WIN
[6552]SCOTT, AND WITH ONE FORMER DIRECTOR, RICHARD HELMS. AMB EXPLAINED
[6553]THAT. BEFORE HE WENT TO SPAIN AS AMB, DIRECTOR HELMS. HAD TOLD HIM
[6554]“SIXTY PERCENT oF “MADRID STATION'S EFFORTS: HERE ‘DIRECTED AGAINST —
[6556]§ gE CRE tT
[6558]bids ef oalis ela i iad eesoanhivckne wisading ik BR ow nt LARA Fan
[6561]13-00000
[6563]_ CABLE S&C DIGREM BY_
[6565]PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIEO=
[6567]ACTION # .
[6569]“AGTION UNIT -
[6571]"per : TOTAL COPIES _ __RUN BY °
[6573]: ° ore : - REPRODUCTION av ‘OTHER. Tha
[6574]wt | s 12 Cc. AR & T° i. Se, \SSUING OFFICE 18 PROMIBITE!
[6576]PILE
[6578]y 344592 elavsa “PAGE 4. SSOSS~C~C~CS*S*S«SN 99D
[6580]‘euiiimabmisews a
[6582]TOR12936272 SEP 75 aa . BUEN. 34519
[6584]CUBANS. ONLY LATER pip AME FIND. ouT. ‘BY chance agouT SPORCON:
[6586]~ BFFORT. DIRECTED AGAINST NORTH AFRICA, ANB SAID. MRe HELMS: AWARE OF
[6587]HIS SENTIMENTS AS IS. GENERAL WALTERS, EVIDENTLY ON BASIS: oF COMMENT.
[6588]BY VISITORS, ANB TOLD cos. THAT AMB CRIMMINS: HAD. ‘BEEN CRITICAL OF
[6589]BKWERALD, BUT DID NOT: ELABORATE.
[6590]4. CURIOUSLY» AARON ASKED peas! SECRETARY FOR DATE EVENING |
[6591]26 SEP. ‘ALTHOUGH: a “TURNED: OUT BE PRIMARILY SOCIAL EVENT AND HE
[6592]‘bib NOT ATTEMPT eLIcIT INFORMATION FROM SECRETARY, ‘AARON: DID MAKE co
[6593]FOLLOWING COMMENTS OF INTEREST! | : a
[6594]y (A) HE SAID HE-HAD BEGUN TRIP WITH CERTAIN AMOUNT ANTS
[6595]BKHERALD BIAS BUT THIS HAD BEEN, MUTED SOMEWHAT. BY FAVORABLE |
[6596]IMPRESSIONS’ HE HAD OBTAINED oF VARIOUS SKHERALD OFFICERS. IN THE
[6597]FIELD WITH WHOM HE HAD SPOKEN.
[6598]| (B) HE SAID HE THOUGH BUENOS AIRES" EMBASSY POLITICAL:
[6599]SECTION WAS "JEALOUS" OF BKHERALD. | . |
[6600]0) HE IMPLIED HIS EGO HAD BEEN BRUISED ON TRIP BECAUSE
[6601]PEOPLE FREQUENTLY ASSUMED AMBASSADOR TRUEHEART, NOT HEs WAS SENIOR ©
[6602]OFFICER, HE SAID HE NEXT PLANS TRIPS TO. EUROPE AND ELSEWHERE,
[6603]HEADQUARTERS, THEREFORE, MIGHT. WISH ALERT. FUTURE ‘STATIONS HE WILL
[6604]VIsiT OF PECKING ORDER. | —
[6605]wo . fo se CRET
[6608]13-00000
[6610]REPRODUCTION BY OTHER TH)
[6612]CABLE GEC DISSEM BY___"_ PER) ___TOTAL COPIES AUN BY
[6613]IGSUING OFPICE is PROHWIBITE
[6615]PRRSON/UNIT NOTIFIED.
[6617]oe “/ABWANGE Gor SBE.’ ALOT IRR be septa we .
[6618]“  AGTION NIT
[6620]° AGTION . er
[6622]F sae “EIA7SG.~~*~“‘“‘i‘é AE: MS!COC~™*S*~*SCS*~™SC*WNS CO
[6624]_Teanenisa7# 8 SEP 75 ss _-_ wu 34519
[6625]Ba visitors “DeaRTED ‘BUENOS AIRES a7 SEP AT 230 ‘HOURS: oN
[6626]SCHEDULE, 7 : | . .
[6627]; be - AMB SAID: HE HAD A soon ‘TELEPHONE CONVERSATION. with Re. RICHARD .
[6628]_ SAMPSON. IN WASHINGTON, “MENTIONING ESSENTIALLY. SAME POINTS ‘REPORTED a
[6629]‘DIRECTOR 744995, 7
[6630]My NO FILE. E2. IMPDET.
[6631]acer) Comment: xAaron and ‘Trucheart!s 26. September conversations with, cos”
[6632]_ and. DCOS, |. ; ;
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[6642]“48 . ‘ wad ha
[6643]_ -CABLE SEC DISSEM sv, _PER_2yr..
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[6647]PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ___~
[6649]~ aa 337339 Eiavoe IN 697014
[6651]“PAGE D1
[6653]TOR12523372 SEP. 75 =<“ (BUEN. 34503
[6655]oh S BOR eT 2522342 SEP 75 STAFF.
[6656]_ GITE BUENOS AIRES 34503 SECTION a 2 | |
[6657]To IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO. wonrevi0eo» BRASILIAs + RIO DE JANETROs:
[6658]5 RYBAT. PLVWCADET coe
[6659]REF DIRECTOR 745626.
[6660]1, COS AND DCOS HELD TWO*HOUR- DISCUSSION: WITH. AMBASSADOR”
[6661]. WILLIAM TRUEHEART AND MR. DAVID AARON MORNING 25 SEP AND THEN
[6662]ATTENDED LUNCHEON AT WHICH CHARGE D'AFFAIRES JOSEPH MONTLLOR,
[6663]EMBASSY POLITICAL COUNSELOR WAYNE SMITH, AND FBI REP ROBERT
[6664]on SCHERRER ALSO PRESENT. EARLIER IN MORNING TTHE TWO VISITORS MET
[6665] BRIVATELY WITH CHARGE MONTLLOR AND IN AFTERNOON TRUEHEART TALKED
[6666]| PRIVATELY WITH SMITH, (ARRON, ‘BECAME ILL AND REMAINED IN HOTEL.)
[6667]\~ COS AND DCOS ALSO HAD DINNER ALONE: WITH VISITORS EVENING 24 SEP,
[6668]| 24 AARON CLEARLY IN CHARGE, (AT LUNCHEON TRUEHEART
[6669]: EXPLAINED THAT AARON IS HEAD OF THE COORDINATION AND CONTROL
[6670]- | WORKING GROUP, ONE OF FOUR WORKING GROUPS OF CHURCH COMMITTEE,
[6671]AND TRUEHEART IS SERVING AS CONSULTANT.) AARON ASKED MOST OF
[6673]or :
[6675]QUESTIONS. BY NATURE AND TONE*OF SOME OF AARON'S QUESTIONS AND
[6677]iw COMMENTS, WE SUSPECT THAT HE HAD PREFORMED NOTIONS WHICH ANTI-=
[6678]BKHERALD, (E.G.» ATTITUDE TOWARD SOVIET PROGRAM DISCUSSED BELOW.)
[6680]SECRET
[6682]13-00000
[6684]CABLE BEC DIBSEM AY | | rER ay ce waviness _TOTAL cons a KUN BY
[6685]. § E C R E T REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA:
[6687]1@BUING OFFICE IS PROHISITE:
[6689]ACTION #
[6691]~F 3S7339 ET A706 ——paAGE B2. IN 697814
[6693]TOR!2523372 SEP 75 - BUEN 34593
[6695]3 IN pI SCUSSING BKHEARALD APPROACH TO SOVIET TARGET, AARON
[6696]ASKED IF IT REALLY MADE SENSE. TRY RECRUIT SOVIET IN "OUT OF WAY
[6697]“PLACES” WHERE SOVIET, EVEN IF RECRUITED, WOULD NOT LIKELY HAVE ACCESS
[6698](TO INFORMATION OF VALUE TO USG, WE EXPLAINED THAT OUR INTERESTS NOT
[6699]| PRIMARILY IN LOCAL SOVIET ACTIVITIES BUT IN INTERNAL SOVIET MATTERS,
[6700]POINTED OUT ‘ACCESS SOVIETS HAVE TO THIS INFO ‘EVEN WHILE ABROAD, SAID
[6701]SOME. SOVIETS RECRUITED ABROAD SELECTED FoR INTERNAL HANDLING» ALSO
[6702]POINTED OUT Cl VALUE OF CERTAIN TYPES INFO PROVIDED BY RECRUITED RIS
[6703]“OFFICERS, NONE OF THIS SEEMED IMPRESS AARON, WHO CONTINUED QUESTION
[6704]VALUE OF BKHERALD SOVIET OPS IN MANY (BUT UNDEFINED) AREAS, SAID HE
[6705]HAD WORKED IN WHITE HOUSE WHERE HE SAW ALL INTEL, FOUND IT HARD
[6706]JUSTIFY BKHERALD SOVIET PROGRAM INPUT ON BASIS INTEL PRODUCTION, WE
[6707]ARGUED THIS IS ONE PROGRAM WHERE LARGE AMOUNT CASE OFFICER TIME
[6708]REQUIRED ON WORLD=WIDE BASIS IN ORDER ACQUIRE THE FEW g00D SOURCES
[6709]WHO CAN BE PICKED UP AND WHO ARE PICKED UP, TRUGHEART ASKED FOR
[6710]EXAMPLES» AND WE REFERRED. THEM TO HOS FoR DETAILS, -TRUEHEART SAID
[6711]IT HIS IMPRESSION THAT BKHERALD NOW IN A SSOVIET PHASEN, WHEREAS IN
[6712]EARLIER YEARS IT HAD BEEN IN COVERT ACTION. OR OTHER PHASES, WE SAID
[6713]‘SOVIETS HAVE ALWAYS BEEN MAJOR TARGETs AND OUR APPROACH: TO THEM HAS .
[6715]«BEEN REFINED OVER THE YEARS:
[6718]13-00000
[6720]| CABLE ORG OLUBEM @Y 0 PUR, cence nee = ee GTAL . COPIES Beco everewe May BY
[6722]PEABON/UNIT NOTED oo te Le
[6723]. -ABMANGE.GO
[6724]ACTION UNIT
[6726]~ “ACTION Ld
[6730]: | - REPRODUCTION ny orhur -"
[6731]§ & c Rr E Tt ; . - ' 1GSUING OFFICE t® PROHIBITS
[6735]_ Tonuasass7e SEP 75) | _ BUEN 34503
[6736]4 KEEN INTEREST WAS SHOWN IN STATION RELATIONS WITH
[6737]AMBASSADOR AND DEGREE TO WHICH STATION. ‘ALLOWED AMBASSADOR EXERCISE
[6738]CONTROL. OVER PR AT LEAST. HAVE KNOWLEDGE OF, ITS OPERATIONS,
[6739]SPECIFICALLY: DEGREE To: WHICH WE- WOULD” COORDINATE RECRUITMENT
[6740]“PROPOSAL OF. GOVT OFFICIAL PRIOR TO MAKING PITCH, ANSWERI ANB
[6741]WOULD BE INFORMED IF UNUSUAL. SENSITIVITY: OR HIGH. RISK INVOLVED»
[6742]WHICH HAS NoT BEEN THE CASE HERE. THUS FAR, ASKED WHO DETERMINES
[6743]IF AMB SHOULD BE INFORMED, “ANSHER 1 CoS, ASKED WHETHER AMB HAD
[6744]PLACED CERTAIN POTENTIAL RECRUITMENT TARGETS OFF LIMITS. ANSWERS
[6745]HE HaD NOT. THEN ASKED WHETHER, IF SUCH INJUCTION EXISTED, WE
[6746]WOULD ADHERE TO IT oR TRY TO CIRCUMVENT IT, ANSWER? WE WOULD
[6747]ADHERE To IT, ASKED WHE THER AMB SATISFIED WITH WORK OF STATION
[6748]AND ITS MISSION, ANSWER! WE BELIEVE-S0, BUT DEFER To AMB (WHO-
[6749]WILL RETURN BUENOS AIRES MORNING 26 SEP AND WILL TALK WITH TRUE
[6750]HEART, ) | |
[6751](5, BOTH WANTED KNOW HOW STATIONS'S REPORTING REQUIREMENTS ON
[6752]LOCAL POLITICAL SCENE WERE GENERATED (1,E,, PRIMARILY BY HS OR
[6753]THROUGH DISCUSSION WITH AMB AND OTHER EMBASSY OFFICERS). IT CLEAR
[6754]THAT THRUST OF QUESTION WAS To DETERMINE DEGREE TO WHICH STATION
[6755]COOPERATED/COORDINATED WITH AMB AND OTHER SENIOR EMBASSY OFFICERS,
[6756]| SECRET. |
[6758]13-00000
[6760]CAGLE BEC DiseEM AY | PER.
[6762]PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED. __ een
[6764]ADVANCE COP
[6765]ACTION UNIT
[6767]TOTAL COPIES cca, - UN BY
[6769].
[6770]; N
[6771]ACTION # F
[6772]Oo .
[6773]7337339 EIA7B6 - PAGE 04 | ) IN 697014"
[6774]. . . _ ;
[6775]TOR12523372 SEP 75 BUEN 34593
[6777]ANSWER! WE RECEIVED REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FROM Has ON CONTINUING.
[6779]“BASIS, AND THESE FORM GOOD DEAL BuT.. NOT ALL OF GUIDANCE WE FOLLOW
[6781]ON INTERNAL TARGET, WE ASSURED VISITORS WE TAKE INTO ACCOUNT REPORT}
[6782]ING FROM OTHER EMBASSY COMPONENTS AND THEIR NEEDS, “VISITORS PROBED
[6783]DEEPLY INTO MANNER IN WHICH STATION COORDINATES ITS REPORTING AND
[6784]FORUMS THROUGH WHICH IT RECEIVES THIS GUIDANCE. WE MENTIONED TWICE
[6785]WEEKLY POLITICAL MEETING PLUS COUNTRY TEAM MEETING AND FREQUENT .
[6786]INFORMAL CHATS WITH AMB AND OTHER OFFICERS, WE ALSO. POINTED TO OUR
[6787]PROCESS OF SHOWING REPORTS: PRIOR TO- DISSEMINATION: TO Po” SECTION
[6788]AND OTHER INTERESTED COMPONENTS, REGARDING VOLUME oF REPORTS, We
[6789]SAID AVERAGE IS OVER 20 PER MONTH, REGARDING DISTRIBUTION OF Has
[6791]DISSEMINATED REPORTS, WE SAID AMB RECEIVES ALL REPORTS AND, EXCEPT
[6793]FOR EXTREMELY SENSITIVE ITEMS (WHICH ARE RARE), OTHER INTERESTED
[6795]OFFICERS DO ALSO, \
[6797]6, IN, RESPONSE. THEIR: QUERIES: WE ACKNOWLEDGED PRODUCTIVE
[6798]LIAISON RELATIONSHIP. WITH LOCAL INTEL SERVICE (WHICH NOT IDENTIFIED
[6799]BY NAME) BUT DID NOT GO INTO DETAIL» SAID COS AND DCOS ONLY STATION
[6802]OFFICERS DEKZARED TO LIAISON. ASKED WHETHER WE IN TOUCH WITH
[6804]BRITISH INTEL REP, ANSWER! . YES#, BuT THIS NOT SUBSTANTIVE RELATION=
[6806]SHIP, THEY WANTED KNOW HOW WE HAD MET HIM. AND WE SAID RELATION-
[6807]— SECRET
[6809]REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA:
[6810]SECRET ISSUING OFFICE [8S PROHIBITED
[6813]13-00000
[6815]i: CABLE SEC DISSEM BY______|_PER TOTAL COPIES __-N BY , ;
[6816]. ; ; " ; REPRODUCTION BY OTHER TI
[6817]ISSUING OFFICE 18 PROHIBN
[6821]AD OSS :! a
[6822]ACTION UNIT F
[6824]ACTION #
[6826]| Tas "EIA706— PAGE OS st~<—s~<“Sts«:*«~CS*«*SiN DG
[6827]y OS - toRt2523372 sep 75 BUEN 34503
[6828]|.” SHIP HAS EXISTED FOR YEARS, AND contact 18 PASSED. FROM ONE PERSON
[6830]70 ANOTHER, ' ASKED WHETHER THERE SDECE. REP IN BUENOS AIRES, ANSWER’
[6832]| WE NOT. AWARE OF ANY, NO MENTION MADE OF "ANY OTHER LIATSON CONTACTS |
[6833]v AND SUBJECT. OF LOCAL POLICE NOTSRATSED, a :
[6834]| 7. SUBYECT OF NOCS NOT RAISED. | .
[6835]m 8, ASKED WHETHER WE HAD ANY COVERT ACTION PROGRAMS, ANSWER?
[6836]- NONE OTHER THAN A FEW CONTACTS UNDER ‘AGENT OF INFLUENCE PROGRAM, WE
[6837]- STRESSED INFO COLLECTION ROLE OF THESE AGENTS AND CONTINGENCY NATURE
[6838]ve OF CONTACT IN COVERT ACTION CONTEST. - ASKED WHETHER WE RECRUITING
[6839]ie NEW AGENTS, ANSWER! WE CONSTANTLY sTRI‘E To UPGRADE CALIBER OF
[6840]OUR REPORTING SOURCES AND THEREFORE ARE RECRUITING NEW ONES AND AT
[6841]sane Tome WEEDING OUR LESS PRODUCTIVE ONES, WE EXPLAINED HOW ACCESS
[6842]i. OF GIVEN AGENT CAN CHANGE FROM ONE TIME Td ANOTHER DUE TO CHANGES
[6843]| IN. POLITICAL SCENE,
[6844]— 9, FEW QUESTIONS ASKED REGARDING STATION STAFFING, WE
[6845]ine EXPLAINED IN RESPONSE QUESTING WHETHER STAFF ING ADEQUATE THAT STATION
[6846]! CUT BY OVER 32 PERCENT OVER LAST 18 MONTHS-OR SO» INCLUDING CASE
[6847]~ OFFICERS & WE ADMITTED THIS RESULTED IN CUTTING OF SOME LESS
[6848]Ie | IMPORTANT CONTACTS BUT NO LET UP IN EFFORTS AGAINST HARD TARGETS,
[6849]. WE EXPLAINED FUNCTIONS OF EACH CASE OFFICER AND STRESSED TEAM ~~
[6851]SECRET
[6854]13-00000
[6856]CABLE BEC DIGMEM- DY PER TOTAL COPIES oe ee tUN BY 8
[6857]REPRODUCTION SY OTHER THA:
[6858]SECRET ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE: .
[6860]FRRSON/UNIT NOTIFIED
[6862]~~ ABVANGE COPY If
[6863]ACTION UNIT . . .
[6865]ACTION #
[6867]7 337339 ETA706.  +~+~+~PAGE O6-06. IN 697044
[6869]‘TOR!2523372 SEP 75 BUEN 34593
[6871]CONCEPT IN WORKING AGAINST HARD TARGETS. oD OBJECTIVES AND.
[6872]PRIORITIES. WERE IDENTIFIED BY OD TNSELF Not PROVIDED, oe |
[6874]Seana
[6877]13-00000
[6881]‘ > , . oo - wo
[6882]Ji a . '
[6883]: i TOTAL COPIES vc cite a A MY:
[6884]IGBUING OFFICE 18 PROHIBITE
[6886]: .
[6887]CABLE SEG HNEBEM BY BER. se ca pe nye tonne eee we a ; . Co .
[6888]‘ ; oy : : REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THE
[6890]~ pRBON/UNIT NOTIFIED. ot
[6891]_ ACTION UNIT
[6893]ACTION #
[6895]SECRET
[6897]TE S70 ETC R oO PAGE—Ot~ — _ IN 697 0am |
[6899]TORI2523012 SEP 75 BUEN 34503
[6901]SECRET 2522342 SEP 74 STAFF
[6902]CITE BUENOS: AIRES 34503 FINAL SECTION OF 2
[6903]‘TO! IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO MONTEVIDEO, BRASILIAy RIO DE JANEIRO.
[6904]CRYBAT PLVWCADET | | oO
[6905]10, CONSIDERABLE INTEREST SHOWN IN SUBJECT OF TERRORISM, WE
[6906]DESCRIBED TWO PRINCIPAL TERRORIST GROUPS ( MONTONEROS AND ERP) AND
[6907]STRESSED DIFFICULTIES OF PENETRATING THESE GROUPS, AARON SAID THAT
[6908]CHARGE DI AFFAIRES HAD MENTIONED. TO HIM THE CASE OF SOURCE FROM
[6909]“ANOTHER AREA WHO“HAD PROVIDED COVERAGE IN THIS AREA, (AMB AWARE
[6910]Gf COVERAGE BY PUTENNIS-3 FROM TINE OF HIS FIRST VISIT AND HAD
[6911]MENTIONED IT TO MONTLLOR, ) WE EXPLAINED HOM SOURCE SUCH AS THIS’
[6912]CAN ESTABLISH GOOD CONTACTS AT HIGHER LEVEL AND PROVIDE GOOD INFO,
[6913]WE STRESSED THAT OUR INTEREST WAS IN COLLECTING INFO BEARING ON
[6914]SECURITY OF UsS. PERSONNEL AND PROPERTY. AARON ASKED WHETHER WE
[6915]WOULD PROVIDE To LIAISON INFO FROM OUR AGENT WHICH WOULD ENABLE
[6916]THEM TO CAPTURE TERRORISTS DURING MEETING WITH OUR AGENT, ANSWER:
[6917]NO» FOR SEVERSL (OBVIOUS) REASONS, WHICH WE SPELLED OUT.
[6918]14. EVENING’ 25 SEP AARON APPEARED TO HAVE RECOVERED FROM
[6919]"ILLNESS, WENT SHOPPING WITH TRUEHEART, BECAUSE BUENOS - AIRES
[6920]STORES WILL BE CLOSED 26 SEPT AND BECAUSE AARON NOT LEAVING
[6921]SECRET |
[6923]13-00000
[6925]CABLE BEC DISSEM BY____ PER name TOTAL COPIES —___RUN BY “4
[6927]. : REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA™
[6929]SE ¢ R ET ISSUING OFFICE (8 PROHIBITEC!
[6931]PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ;
[6932]OTTED
[6934]ACTION UNIT
[6936]ACTION #
[6938]O8-O*F |
[6939]PAGE @emez— IN 69700@
[6941]—TORS2523012 SEP 75 BUEN 34583
[6943]> Vas
[6945]UNTIL NIGHT 26 SEP AND TRUEHEART NIGHT 27 SEP, WE ANTICIPATE WE ©
[6946]WILL HAVE FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH THEM, THESE WILL BE COVERED |
[6947]IN NEXT CABLE. a
[6949]| 42, WISH THANK INFO ADDEES FOR THEIR PROMPT AND USEFUL WRAP-UPS,
[6950]B2 IMP DET |
[6952]SECRET
[6955]13-00000
[6957]CABLE SEC DISGEM BY. TOTAL COPIES RUN 4
[6958]2 REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN |:
[6959]S SEC C Rg & tT: | ISSUING OFFICE t@ PROMIETTED
[6961]PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED
[6963]PAGE @1-81 IN 699862
[6965]TORI2919572 SEP 75 BRL 24777
[6967]A
[6969]7 345467. EJASoA
[6971]S$ EC RET 2919252 SEPT 75 STAFF
[6972]CITE BRASILIA 24777
[6973]TO1 BUENOS AIRES INFO DIRECTOR,
[6974]_ RYBAT PLYWCADET a ; oo
[6975]REF! BUENOS Ines seis 995-04)
[6976]- REF PARA 3 SENTENCE "EVIDENTLY ON BASIS OF COMMENT
[6977]“BY VISITORS, AMBASSADOR TOLD COS THAT AMBASSADOR CRIMMINS .  — ..
[6978]HAD BEEN CRITICAL OF SKHERALD, BUT DID NOT ELABORATE.” Oo
[6979]“ORY Ty AMBASSADOR CRIMMINS ON HOME LEAVE AND RICHARD JOHNSON.
[6980]—DEMy WAS CHARGE AT TIME OF AARON'S AND TRUEHEART#S VISIT TO
[6981]" GRASILIA, IN THE SHORT TIME COS HAS BEEN IN BRASILIA,
[6982]CRIMMINS HAS BEEN MORE THAN COOPERATIVE AND APPEARED 0.
[6983]"BE MORE APPRECIATIVE OF BKHERALD'S EFFORTS THAN MOST STATE.
[6984]OFFICERS, WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF YOU COULD GET
[6985]ELABORATION ON HILL'S REMARKS ON LOW KEY BASIS, 2, IMP DET.
[6987]es — (SECRET ©.
[6989]13-00000
[6991]t
[6992]: 7 G L oe _o a oo
[6993]’ ‘CABLE SEC OISSEM BY__ Oo per’_& : QO, ToTaLcories ~ _ UN BY . be, .
[6994]! - hos : REPRODUCTION BY Orhkn HAN
[6995]ISSUING | OFFICE 1s PROMIBITED
[6997]_. PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED,
[6999]LD. te
[7001](GSD s.orteD
[7003]AGTION UNIT - . = a
[7005]; - MRE. FILE. VR. Ono
[7007]“Nit A2 —— —— —— —
[7008]i Geo F ) . _ ; ; ; re ee oe
[7011]- ACTION # -
[7013]PAGE a4 Ol Ni
[7015]1 sa0e88 Elna
[7016]- a : _oniass8208 SEP 5
[7018]ge ec R'E 1 “e314008 SEP 75. ‘TAFE, ey
[7019]2 “CrTe BRASILIA. 24723. SEC TION. 1 OF 2 Se
[7020](ot. THNEDIATE DIRECTOR, MONTEVIDEO ROUTINE BUENOS AIRES,”
[7021]| RYBAT PLVWCADET .
[7022]1. HAD Two HOUR SESSION. WITH AARON AND. TRUEHEART
[7023]“AFTERNOON: 22. SEPT, -TRUBHEART AWAY PART. OF TIME TO TALK TO’
[7025]_ OTHERS IN ENBASSY as AARON. WAS CONCENTRATING ON STATIONS
[7026]oe ACTIVITIES.
[7028]25. QUESTIONS RAN ALONG LINES OF. THOSE tiprcaTeD in
[7029]ae DIRECTOR 744266, PLUS quite A FEW EXTRAS. FOL Is HIGHLIGHT |
[7030]oF ‘FIVE AND ONE*HALF HOURS. oF DISCUSSIONS HELD STAURDAY “AND WoNDAY, =
[7031]| “3. AARON MOST. INTEREST ED IN HOW STATION RAN ITS ; :
[7032]' OPERATIONS <<, G, LINE oF COMMAND FROM HOS: AND STATION'S
[7034]RELATIONSHIP WITH BASES, WE WENT OVER OD MINUTELY, THEN:
[7035]“PERUSED EXAMPLES OF TELENOTE REQUIREMENTS SENT FROM
[7037]STATION TO BASES INCLUDING SUCH AS HaBS eas, NUMBER oF
[7039]QUESTIONS WERE RAISED ON HOW CONTROL WAS: EXERCISED OVER
[7041]| OUR OPERATIONS, BASICALLY, HE WAS TOLD THAT ALL
[7042]-_ ACTIVITIES CENTERED. AROUND THE 0D, OUR PROUECTS,
[7043]FUNDS » AND MANPOWER ALLOCATION WERE DESIGNED: to Mee
[7045]& E c R & tT
[7048]13-00000
[7050]CABLE SEC DIGSEM BY PER : TOTAL COPlES RUN BY
[7052]PERGON/UNIT NOTIPIRQ . s ECRET
[7053]ACTION UNIT
[7055]ACTION #
[7057]7 329468. ELADAD PAGE O2
[7059]ToRuesigasé SEP: 75
[7060]“THE PRIORITY REQUIREMENTS AS. ENUNCULA TED IN THe oD, PERIODIC.
[7061]“RePoRTs WERE. ‘SUBMITTED To Has To APP RISE THEN oF F wha WE
[7063]WE WERE GR ADED ON THE WORK DONE, AARON WAS: a wtenéefa
[7065]HOW A case OFFICER (THIS 1s THE TERM HE USED) WORKING. ON, i
[7066]THE HAR D TARGETS WAS GRADED RELATIVE TO ONE: WHOSE”
[7068]TARGETS WERE LESS HARD». AND WHETHER Lack OF ULTIMATE ‘success. o
[7069]CRECRULTHENT. OF A SOVe “FOR EXAMPLE) WAS HELD AGAINST THE C04
[7070]THE EXPLANATION. WAS THAT. THE RECRUITMENT OF SOMEONE IN The -
[7072]HARD TARGET AREAS WAS THE™ ULTIMATE TEST, AND FAILURE To RECRUIT a _
[7073]RECEIVED. ‘A ZERO SCORE, HOWEVER, IF THE c/o worKine ON. THe |
[7074]HARD TARGET Had BEEN IMAGINATIVE HAD GOTTEN A. NUNBER OF
[7075]"ACCESS AGENTS, HAD MANAGED TO HAVE DIRECT CONTACT| WI AO Ne :
[7076]OR MORE TARGET PERSONALITIES, CAND. ALL: IN ALL, DID als ae _
[7077]HOMEWORK» WORKED HARD» WAS. AGGRESSIVE, Bur WAS NOT)
[7079]SUCCESSFUL BECAUSE THE TARGET. Was IN FACT NOT. ‘RECRUITA
[7080]HE WAS GIVEN. A GOOD. GRADE, AARON. MUSED WHETHER. Lach
[7081]‘success IN: RECRUITING A HARD. TARET INDIVIDUAL EVER.
[7084]13-00000
[7086]Ba . es co Loo
[7088]; CABLE SEC DISSEM BY__- PER _____TOTAL COPIES : __RUN BY. —
[7089]oo : : Tee : REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA
[7091]; esuina b OFFICE 18 PROHISITE
[7093]PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED.
[7095]ACTION UNIT.
[7097]ACTION #
[7099]7 PAGE BS
[7101]7 329488 ELAgag, 2
[7103], ToR1 2325252 L SEP 18 __
[7105]Pk co's “PROMOTION, AND He Was TOLD THAT IN. our EXPERIENCE
[7106]THIS ‘WAS NOT SO» SO. LONG AS. THE OTHER. cLENE ) ,
[7107]EARMARK ‘ soo0 C/O WERE PRESENT, - |
[7109]oo 4, “THE Noe PROGRAM HAD A CERTAIN FASCINATION. FOR otk
[7110]AARON “AND STUREWEART, THEY WERE ‘NOT INQUISIT IVE ABOUT NAMES |
[7112]oR covER COMPANIES. BUT. ‘DID WANT TO KNOW. THE REASON FoR ‘Nacs
[7113]= ASECURITY FOR HIGHLY SENSITIVE, AGENTS, STAYSEHIND Ww ‘CASE .
[7114]oo TWE STATION, HAD 7D BE. ABANDONED)» WHETHER cuTouTs WERE: “USED m
[7115]CONTACTING NOcS (NOs DIRECT INSIDE vo CONTACT UNDER -
[7116]SCRUPULOURS SECURITY SONDITIONS), WHETHER THEY. WERE WORTH
[7117]| “THE MONEY OUTLAY (YES, IF PRODUCTIVE: AGENTS. WERE GIVEN |
[7118]‘THEM AND NOCS WERE SUFFICLENTLY EXPERIENCED AND ADEPT - IN
[7119]GETTING THE MAXIMUM FROM THE AGENTS. BEING HANDLED) «
[7120]5, AARON WAS MOST SPECIFIC IN QUERYING ABOUT THE
[7121]— . PERCENTAGE OF TIME SPENT BY STATION IN ACCOMPLISHMENT OF”
[7122]INDIVIDUAL OBJECTIVES. HE WANTED TO KNOW HOW .A cov0 SPENT as. DAY,
[7124]THE PROCESS HE WENT THROUGH IN CONTACTING AN AGENT, HOW Dr’
[7125]WE ENSURE THAT C/0S ‘DID NOT TRY TO. RECRUIT THE SAME
[7127]“INDIVIDUAL (CONTACT REPORTS) AND TRACE REQUESTS ALLOWED. ADEQUATE,
[7128]CONTROL), WITH REFERENCE TO C1, HOW MUCH TIME WAS
[7129]SECRET |
[7131]per
[7133]13-00000
[7135]GABLE SEC DISSEM BY ___ PER. __TOTAL COPIES RUN 8Y
[7137]; Co ‘nuenooucriOn SY OTHRA TH
[7138]SECRET . crrice tn PaoMiaiTaS
[7140]PERGON/UNIT NOTIFIED
[7142]ACTION UNIT
[7143]“ACTION #
[7145]7 32osee  ElAQaD PAGE 04
[7146]ToRI2315232 seP 75 7 ante 24723.
[7148]DEVOTED TO THIS AND HOW DID WE MANGAGE It (PENETRATION oF. po
[7149]“LLATSON AND JOINT EF FORT WITH LTA SON oT BL ET APS», . -
[7150]SURVEILLANCE» ETC, “+ AGAINST HARD. TARGETS) ‘pIscusst oN, e
[7151]‘COVERT ACTION. T00K uP CONSIDERABLE. TIME, “pesPite Has.
[7152]GRIEFING ON THIS SUBJECT, AARON WANTED TO KNOW THE oo |
[7153]DIFF ERENGE SETHEEN A MEDIA-OP AND-A COVERT POL ACTION: Re
[7154]MUCH. STRESS. WAS PLACED ON WHETHER, WE HAD ANY. PLUMBING : FOR -
[7155]POLITICAL ACTION OPS ‘SHOULD WE BE REQUESTED TO GET NTO .
[7156]“THAT ACTIVITY, IT WAS: EXPLAINED THAT WE HAVE NOT BEEN Ww ne
[7157]Pol ACTION IN BRAZIL FOR YEARS, THAT WE HAD No PLUMBING as
[7158]‘SUCH, AND THAT IF A REQUEST WAS TO BE “MADE | F N SUCH ACTION» |
[7159]THE STATION WOULD LIKELY NEED. To START FROM POINT ZERO not
[7160]PAGE E-BRISHETI BAI2EE EE .
[7161]UNLESS SOME OF. THE AGENTS” NOK watiane USABLE, IT WAS 2
[7162]| EXPLAINED THAT WE DID HAVE A SMALL MEDIA CAPABILITY AS WELL 8
[7163]AN AGENT. OF INFLUENCE PROGRAM BUT THAT THESE IN No WAY .
[7165]‘RESEMBLED THE KIND OF COVERT POLITICAL ACTION OF THE ©
[7166]CHILEAN VARIETY, — . a |
[7168]ba “RARON: HAD A FASCINATION FOR. TRADESCRAFT) WANT
[7169]KNOW HOw: Gong CoS HAD: BEEN INTHE BUSINESS. AND APPR
[7171]13-00000
[7173]oe a : a Cops
[7174]CABLE GEC DISSEM BY ‘per TOTAL COPIES : RUN‘BY -
[7176]REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA
[7177]: issuina OFFICE, Le OM IBITEE
[7179]: PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED
[7181]' ) AGTION UNIT
[7183]ACTION #
[7185], PAGE rice
[7187]329488. «= El agde
[7189]Tons 2535282 SEP. a
[7191]over THE YARS THERE WAS TRAINING covenina a
[7192]| SUBVECTS. INCLUDING SECRET WRITING, CLANDESTEA
[7193]COMMUNISM, MANAGEMENT: INCLUDING THE STUDY. ti é
[7194]WRITING, ETC, MENTION WAS MADE OF MID@CAREER COURSE,
[7195]"+ PLUS SENIOUR SEMINARS. AVAILABLE TO OFFIERS, PLUS ATTENDANCE
[7196]AT SAFF COLLEGES SUCH AS THAT PROVIDED BY STATE, ARMY, etc.)
[7197]“(AARON WAS FASCINATED WITH THE REPORTS. RITING: COURSE: AND
[7198]ASKED FOR PARTICULARS, ):
[7200]74° ON INTERAGENCY RELATIONSHIPS, BOTH AARON AND
[7201]TUREHAEART WERE INTERESTED | IN HOW INTEL REPORTS WERE oe
[7202]DISTRIBUTED WITHIN THE EMBASSY WHETHER cos HAD. AUTHORITY
[7203]TO SEND AN INTEL REPORT DIRECTLY TO HOS WITH INFO to
[7204]i. STATION (YESs ON.MATTERS WHICH WERE PECUL TAR To THE LOCAL
[7205]| SCENE BUT THOSE IMPINGING ON: “BROADER GOB MATTERS WERE, FIRST
[7206]SENT TO BRASILIA. FOR ADDITIONS, MODIFICATIONS, ETC, PRIOR TO
[7208]ONWARD TRANSMISSION.) THEY WERE TOLD THAT THE AMBAS! _ |
[7209]SEES ALL REPORTS, THAT OTHER SECTIONS OF THE Embassy BID SEE
[7210]SECRET oe
[7213]13-00000
[7215]PER . TOTAL COPIES RUN BY
[7217]CABLE SEC DISSEM BY,
[7219]; ncrnoouencn sv orman THAN .
[7220]S & C R E T : - WOSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED -
[7222]PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED.
[7223]ACTION UNIT
[7225]ACTION # | | ——— — — i
[7227]1329488) EIAC4D PAGE eT IN 694147
[7228]- ToRIasi5232 SEP 75 - BRIL. 24723- |
[7230]THOSE REPORTS WHICH WERE PERTINENT To THEM. “INTEL ow ‘WAJOR :
[7232]“TTEMSeSUCH AS THOSE WHICH HAD A BEARING ON GOB POLICIES =
[7233]VIS*AeVIS THE Us SecWas SHOWN TO THE. AMBASSADOR PRIOR TO. _
[7234]SUBMISSIONS STATION. WADE IT A PRACT IVE TO CHECK INTEL .
[7235]out WITH. CONCERNED SECTIONS WITHIN THE ‘EMBASSY PRIOR. To
[7236]TRANSMISSION IF THIS WAS” CONSIDERED NECESSARY AND BENEFICIAL
[7237]BY THE STATION, THERE: ‘ARE’ OCCASIONS WHEREIN THE STATION IS
[7238]REQUIRED TO LIMIT. A. REPORT 10 THE AnB ASS ADOR “ONLY, WHEN —
[7240]SENS ITVE INFO. ‘AND/OR a SENSITIVE SOURCE 1s woLveD.
[7241]wis HAD OT HAPPED W THE “c08's sont TENURE IN -
[7244]13-00000
[7246]- . {
[7248]CABLE SEC DISSEM By. PER TOTAL copies
[7250]. seo RE T-
[7252]‘REPRODUCTION. BY OTHER THAN
[7253] WEBUING OFFICE 16 PROHIBITED
[7255]PERSON: unit NOTIFIED.
[7257]“T 329420 EIAQ71
[7259]“TOR 1251508 Laer  BRIL. 24723.
[7260]SECRET. ‘2314092 SEPT 75 STAFF |
[7261]CITE. BRASILIA. 24723. FINAL ‘SECTION ‘OF THO. rs _
[7262]7 Or IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, wonrevipEd ROUTIN NOS AIRES,
[7263]“ RYBAT PLVWCADET | . . . a . 7 a
[7264]BRASILIA, But IN PANAMA FOR EXAMPLE, cert N-RERORTS |
[7265]: CONS IDERED: HIGHLY. SENSITIVE WERE OFTEN “LimifeD t9 THE
[7266]AMBASSADOR, THE CINSCO, AND THE “GOVERNOR oF THE CANAL
[7267]ZONE» OR TO THE AMBASSADOR ONLY, “SECURITY was THE oo
[7268]CARDINAL FACTOR IN SUCH LEMITING: OF DISTREGUTION,
[7269]8. AARON WANTED TO KNOW WHAT. WOULD HAPPEN IF ONE oF
[7270]“THE STATION'S AGENTS WAS BEING SEEN BY A MEMBER. OF THE
[7271]POLITICAL SECTION*-WOULD WE DISCUSS IT WITH THE POLITIGAL
[7272]| OFFICER? (FIRST STEP WOULD BE TO TALK To THE AGENT ON THE
[7273]| PROBLEMS THAT WOULD SE ENCOUNTERED BY SUCH ACTION ON His
[7274]i PART, THAT THIS NORMALLY DID SUFFICE IF IN FACT HE WAS A”
[7275]| CONTROLLED AGENT, IF HIS ACCESS WAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY
[7276]SENSITIVE, HE WOULD BE ALLOWED TO SEE THE POLITICAL OFFICER
[7277]| SO LONG AS HE REMEMBERED WHO. HE WORKED FOR AND “ACTED ©
[7279]| ACCORDINGLY).
[7281]9, AS TO. KEEPING THE AMBASSADOR APPRISED ON POSITIVE —
[7282]SECRET ne
[7284]fo ete St teem Tt
[7286]13-00000
[7288]CABLE SEC DISSEM BY __ PER=: : TOTAL COPIES RUN BY
[7290]UCTION. ay ovnen THAN
[7293]_ sesuING armen s PROMIBITED
[7294]PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED .
[7296]ACTION UNIT
[7298]remeatannentinatoaieal Aci
[7299]ACTION # .
[7301]T 329420
[7303]. ) EIAS74
[7305]toR:2315082 SEP Wo “eRIL ge7as
[7307]“COLLECTION. “OPERATIONS, THIS Was DONE AS A AT TER OF course
[7308]BUT WITHOUT SPECIFIC DETAILS UNLESS THE AMBASSADOR WAS IN.
[7310]oF HIS Aibussaoone
[7312]‘FACT SEEING AN AGENT OF OURS REGULARLY. AS PA t
[7313]TAL DUTIES, Ee oo a
[7314]10, THE LIAISON SERVICES. WITH WHOM. WE WERE IN: TOUGH Were
[7315]NAMED): INCLUDING OUR JOINT EFFORTS AT TELTAPS. Plus OUR
[7316]UNILATERAL PENETRATION EFFORTS FOR Cl AND POSITIVE INTEL & .
[7317]an BOTH AARON AND TRUEHEART WERE SHOWN THE K10s AND THE a
[7318]CIRLS AND TAILORED REQUIREMENTS THAT WERE ‘SENT PERIODICALLY. oe
[7319]THEY: BOTH REMARKED THAT THE AGENCY HAS A. MORE: oa ee
[7320]| SOPHISTICATED SYSTEM FoR GETTING REQUIREMENTS, TO THE. Frevo THAN a
[7321]SAY, STATE,
[7322]42. VERY LITTLE. (WAS ASKED ABOUT SPORLON ACTIVITIES. IN RIO.
[7324]‘EXCEPT THAT THEY BOTH WERE UNDER THE IMPRESSION, THAT NSA 7
[7325]"WAS RUNNING THE SHOW. THEY DID ASK ABOUT CUSTOMER REACTION
[7326]TO. THE SPORLON PRODUCTS. (AMBASSADOR ‘CRIMMINS Ts AN AVID.
[7327]CUSTOMER AND WE WERE OF THE OPINION. THAT AGENCIES. IN |
[7328]WASHINGTON CONCERNED wrt THE INTERCEPT PROGRAM WERE g
[7330]HAPPY WITH THE RESULTS, »
[7332]©4300 ON HEARING THAT cos. aD BEEN IN Pana, QUEST#ONS
[7333]oe s € 6 RET
[7335]13-00000
[7337]: - : 1 . . an on _ oo _
[7338]'. GABLE SEC DIssEM BY___ PER- a TOTAL COPIES RL By.
[7340]SECRET
[7342]REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAP
[7343]1SSUING OFFice Is PROHIBITED
[7345]i PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED __
[7347]-spbvance copy tsgursvenorran oe . - = . — STAFF. Boo
[7348]r ACTION UNIT oe a ~ ons) —
[7349]ne '] RF. FILE. © VR. ; : Loe ; 1 ee)
[7351]; po —— Br
[7352]ACTION # F . op
[7354]_tor: 2345082 SEP ce escent oii 24723
[7356]WERE RAISED ON AGREED acTIVITIES. THEY’ WERE BOTH
[7358]‘SURPRISED To FIND out. THAT THE. ‘STATION IN PANAMA AD to
[7359]‘AUTHORIZE ALL, CLANDESTINE COLLECTION ACTIVITIES ENGAGED IW ey
[7360]UsSs ‘ELEMENTS: IN THE AREAs INCLUDING ‘GETTING PRovecT INFO
[7361]MUCH LIKE THAT REQUIRED: IN. THE. AGENCY WHICH GAVE NAMES” OF
[7363]F CONTACT,
[7365]AGENTS TO. BE. “RECRUITED, RATE OF PAY, weraoD ¢
[7366]ETC. . |
[7367]14, oe EVINCED. “GREAT INTEREST IN THE cavER
[7368]PROVIDED By THE: EMBASSY, HE WAS TOLD THAT. COVER coup”
[7369]| BE IMPROVED UPON, THAT WE DID HAVE A SMALL NUMBER OF.
[7370]“OFFICERS WHO WERE ACTUALLY ASSIGNED TO “OTHER. ‘SECTIONS,
[7371]| THAT THEY GAVE ALMOST SOPERCENT OF THEIR TINE on THE ACTUAL
[7372]WORK OF THAT SECTION, THEN SPENT THE REST oF THR WORK
[7373]DAY PLUS A’LARGE DOSE ON NIGHTWORK ON OUR WORK FOR WHICH
[7374]| THEY RECEIVED NO OVERTINE BUT DID THIS OuT OF HIGH MOTIVATION»
[7375]AND THE DESIRE TO GET AT OUR DBJECTIVES,
[7377]15. AARON KNEW oF THE OLD OPC AND 0S0 SEPARATIONS oF THE
[7378]. PAST AND PROBED ABOUT HOW THE FINAL AMALGAMATION AFFECTED
[7379]MOST PEOPLE. (NOTHING TRAUMATIC, OPC AND 0S0- OFFICERS: HAD
[7380]A COMMON DENOMINATOR IN BASIC. TRADECRAFT AND. ‘OTHER . 7
[7382]SECRET
[7385]13-00000
[7387]" CABLE ORC DIWBEM BY___._ per - perenne TOTAL COPIES RUN BY os ”
[7388]. - SECRET lindas Seana raan .
[7390]eure sarorts re STAFF eC
[7391]aGvAL BPY JOPWEO/ SLOTTED ——a SPs] Pl nae
[7392]_ ACTION UNIT ‘| me. FE. VA. ; ; _ . 0 ee ee
[7394]Teron \F a _ Na |
[7395]“T 32002e E1KO7a a PAGE [Oa] a BEY
[7397]oR: 2315082 SEP 75. Ce _ -oRiL 24728
[7399]~ TRAINING. | A ‘e000 OPC. TYPE ‘cbuiD. DO EQUALLY: ‘e000 WORK: IN |
[7400]THE 080 FIELD, AND VICE VERSA.) _ | _
[7401]16. ABOVE ARE ONLY THE HIGHLIGHTS oF. “THE. DISCUSSION,
[7402]1ONS,- AND. asad
[7403]| TOOK coP Tous NOTES. BOTH AARON AND TRUEHEART WERE . ames
[7405]AARON Is IN CHARGE, HE ASKED MOST. OF THE que
[7407]_ ESSENTIALLY LOW-KEY BUT THE QUESTIONS WERE SHARP y ROB Ive,
[7408]AND AARON ‘ESPECIALLY HAS a QUIETLY INGIST : GETTING:
[7409]an THINGS. ITts DIFFICULT TO. TELL WHETHER
[7410]FAVORABLY DISPOSED TOWARD THE AGENCY OR NG
[7412]NO ANIMOSITY WAS SHOWN, BUT NEITHER WAS. THORE. ANY SHOW!OF
[7413]GREAT LOVE FOR. THE AGENCY, AN OBJECTIVE ‘aseroack AY THE:
[7415]MATTER AT HAND APPEARS TO BE aN APT DescAteTION. OF HOW THEY .
[7417]“WORKED. : oe a |
[7418]417, AARON sn reuignsy enc ‘eaten rien
[7419]WHILE: IN: BRASILIA BuT ON: SATURDAY IN RIO AARON SEEMED To.
[7420]"HAVE BEEN LEFT ALONE BY THE CONGEN, “COB AND COS TOOK -
[7421]AARON out To DINNER AFTER THE BRIEF ING SESSION AND He”
[7422]SEEMED TO. Envoy AND.. APPRECTATE THE. CHURRASCO. MONTEVIDEO.
[7423]| AND. BUENOS. AIRES MIGHT WISH TO KEEP IN MIND. THAT AARON -
[7425]1S INTERESTED IN TRYING THE BETTER KNOWN, Local: Foon
[7426]: 8 EcR E r
[7428]13-00000
[7430]: . CABLE SEC DISSEM BY__” PER 0 TOTAL Copies -_____RU. cr Lo
[7431]oe. | > RRPROBUETION BY OTHER THAN
[7432]: . os | Ss E c R E JT. : . | JSRUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED
[7433]i PRRSON/UNIT NOTIFIED, a ed enews ce wpmecen : .
[7435]i . : : j
[7437]\, ADVANCE GOPY (S8UBD/ALQTIEO. 8
[7438]; ACTION UNIT : :
[7440]| erm met cere
[7441]ACTION #
[7443]|. ORS
[7445]‘7 329420 E1A971-
[7447]TOR:2315082 SEP 75. BRL RATQS
[7449]| AWINE LOVER AND. WANTS TO SAMPLE THE BEST.OF-THE LOCAL
[7450]PRODUCT. a
[7452]18. AT DINNER ON SATURDAY. NIGHT» AARON WAS ASKED BY
[7453]THE COS WHAT HE THOUGHT MIGHT HAPPEN TO THE AGENCY. HE
[7454]OPINED THAT THE DDO MIGHT BE SPLIT OFF FROM THE MAIN Boby OF
[7456]THE © “AGENCY, “AND PUT UNDER AN EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MADE UP OF
[7458]MEMBERS FROM STATE. AND. OTHER AGENCIES: IN ORDER: TO ESTABLISH
[7460]MORE CONTROL. OVER ‘ITS ACTIVITIES. ° Ba TmeD hoo
[7462]-- CS SECRET
[7465]13-00000
[7467]| SECRET
[7469]20 August 1975
[7471]MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, LA Division
[7473]SUBJECT : Transmittal of SSC Memo Announcing
[7474]the Intention of SSC Staffers: ‘to
[7475]Visit Latin America
[7477]ae 1. Attached is a xerox of a letter from the
[7478]_ SSC Staff Director ‘(Review Staff 75-2399) describing
[7479]travel plans to Latin America on the part of SSC
[7480]Staffers. This is for your information. You will
[7481]be alerted when this. becomes firm and an itinerary
[7482]is established.
[7484]2. Atso attached is an agreed upon. memo giving
[7485]guidelines of such trips. Supplementing this should
[7486]be a briefing of the travelling of SSC Staffers
[7487]before they go and a notification of the stations
[7488]involved as-to what the guidelines are.
[7490]John H. Waller
[7492]| SA/DDO
[7493]Attachment
[7494]As stated above
[7495]Distribution:
[7496]i Orig & 1 - Addressee w/att
[7497]! 2 - SA/DDO
[7498]E2 IMPDET
[7500]CL BY 055636
[7502]SECRET
[7504]13-00000
[7506]- SUBJECT: Guidelines for Members of the Select Committee and’
[7507]-— Their Staffs While Traveling Abroad
[7509]. There have been already and there will continue to be ‘nesbers -
[7510]of the Senate Select Committee (880) who, wish to travel abroad ‘and 7 _ : 7
[7511], talk to Ue Ss. enbassy and ‘intelligence personnel. It is essential |
[7512]that we agree on guidelines to avoid ‘serious diplomatic and security
[7514]problens. The following ‘specific guidelines are applicable. -
[7516]one o MRS 1 AND STARE OF THE ssc SHOULD NoT PUBLICLY APPEAR 10 BE
[7518]Pe ‘ABROAD. FOR THE PURPOSE OF. INVESTIGATING U. s. INTELLIGENCE ;
[7520]-agratiattons. —
[7522]Most of these. ‘Snstellations, 3 including all. CIA stations abroad,
[7524]for example, . ‘are: “under sone form of cover, . or are , maintaining a ow a
[7525]piofile. Certainly all have and need varying ; degrees of protection :
[7526]from exposure. At one extreme, are U. s. intelligence activities
[7528]: bent the- -iron ncartain. 1 These clearly need maxon protection,
[7530]e The mere visit of ssc representatives could be noted’ as evidence -
[7532]of U. 's. intelligence presence within the country. ‘Even in those
[7533]“countries where u. S. intelligence efforts enjoy the chielding and
[7535]- . ‘other benefits Elowing from close liaison with the ‘host government,
[7537]oo ‘care is required to avoid ‘the ‘potentially grave political repercussions
[7539]Ges/y -
[7541]13-00000
[7543]that could result ‘to U.S. and host country. activities from exposure
[7544]4 Be of such ‘Liaison. Many countries that wish to cooperate with the
[7545]| United States in: in intelligence endeavors simply cannot afford public -
[7546]exposure of ‘such relationships. “To help waintain the discreet:
[7547]: _ nature of the visit, it would be preferable if some reason other
[7548]| than SSC business could be given to explain any visits by SSC members
[7549]~ a : . and ‘staff. | x deliberate ‘contact should be made with ‘the. local press,
[7551]7 _ROr. should comments, on ssc. matters ; be supplied if’ ‘investigating
[7553]ay ns officers are contacted vy the press. “Local press publicity pertaining
[7554]to, an ssc investigation abroad would in almost all cases be _
[7555]: “atstastefot, to the host government.
[7557]fe In sum, “except in the case: of especially sensitive areas, discreet
[7559]‘afrengenents cr be. made for S8C visits to, certain U. .S. intelligence
[7561]Vactivities overseas on.a case by case basis, - and with | senior officers
[7563]within the covering embassies. Such visits are contingent upon the
[7564]“ssc nenber not publicly declaring. himself to be on SSC business
[7565]a at the time of. the, visit ox upon his return, and his -proceeding
[7567]- ‘on a basis satisfactory ¢ to’ the Ambassador.
[7568]THE AMBASSADOR AT THE EMBASSY VISITED WILL | BE IN" CHARGE OF ‘THE
[7569]we All arrangements. and contacts will be made by him, and because of his
[7571], knowledge of local situations, his advice will be binding. :
[7574]13-00000
[7576]TIX. FIELD DISCUSSIONS WITH U.S. INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL SHOULD BE
[7577]“CONDUCTED ONLY IN GENERAL TERMS.
[7578]It is more fitting that ‘Washington be the place where operational
[7579]. ‘details « are conveyed to the ssc. Field intelligence elements will
[7581]‘only discuss operations in general terms~-operational priorities,
[7583]the kinds of operations conducted, the operational environment,
[7585]. coe ; relationships with the Embassy and defense attaches, etc. ; Jn all . :
[7587]7 cases, ‘such ‘discussions wild ‘only be ‘conducted in’ “physical
[7589]ves.
[7591]"surroundings which meet appropriate security standards. . .
[7593]Menbers and staff, of the SSC alee refrain from asking to
[7595]‘see. ‘texts of or "general notes on intelligence agreements | between
[7596]“ the U. 8. and the host government. These ‘are usually considered
[7598]: : by the host, ‘government as extremely sensitive, politically and .
[7600]ar ‘operationally, and cannot be divulged without ‘the consent of the
[7602]“host. government. —
[7604]Mmors AND. STAFF OF | THE $SC WILL NOT INTERVIEW AGENT
[7606]ae PERSONNEL.
[7608]a Foreign agent: personnel frequently are ‘under hostile or local service
[7610]i a ot “eerutiny. For. them to be placed in touch with SSC members would be
[7612]° gi ‘to run an ‘unacceptable risk. Moreover, - serious damage would be
[7614]done to- agent morale and motivation if their identity were to be.
[7616]“revealed to Members or staff of the SSC..
[7618]13-00000
[7620]* Vv.
[7622]MEMBERS OF HOST COUNTRY INTELLIGENCE OR SECURITY SERVICES —
[7624]WILL BE CONTACTED ONLY IN EXCEPTIONAL CASES.
[7626]Many foreign intelligence services will find contact with the SSC.
[7627]politically difficult and will avoid it. They further regard: that
[7629]their relationships with U. S. intelligence activities > the.
[7631]. ‘Snformation they pass, ‘and the cooperation. ‘extended. are all. most
[7633]7 * “penaittve ma matters. : “Regardless what assurances are > given then,
[7635]2 ‘they would ‘find tte atericate and awkward to discuss these. matters — .
[7636]oowith m nenbers or "staff of ‘the ‘SSC. The very fact that such matters
[7638]: were under investigation could well cause the host Service to -
[7640]. "reassess the desirability of a ‘relationship with v. 8. intelligence
[7642]activities. . 7
[7644]or
[7646]Jnusezis AND STAFF OF ‘THE ssc SHOULD NOT VISIT FOREIGN
[7647]we TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE INSTALLATIONS .
[7649]"In those countries. in which we operate joint technical collection .
[7651]: ve sites, ‘the host would be firmly opposed to access by U.S.
[7653]oe Congréssional representatives, especially where there is s public
[7655], - knowledge of the Congressional investigating interests. ‘If such
[7657]ae va visit ‘is considered essential, a special réquest must be
[7659]~ megotiated with the host: country in advance.
[7661]13-00000
[7663]f
[7664]on
[7669]ye,
[7670]t
[7672]i
[7674]"VIX. AN ORIENTATION BRIEFING WILL BE PROVIDED ALL MEMBERS AND
[7676]~ ‘STAFE, PRIOR TO DEPARTURE.
[7677]; This briefing will be conducted. by the DCI and other representatives: .
[7678]‘of the Intelligence Community (cra, NSA, DIA, State, ete.), 2 as
[7680]appropriate. ‘The purpose of this briefing is to familiarize the on
[7682]- visitor’ with the types of activities conducted | at each Jocatiin, :
[7684]a the restraints which dite imposed upon v. s. activities ; in each case |
[7686]: and the. considerations which preclude | the discussion of
[7688]_ operational details, « names and terms in an overseas” _envixonnent a
[7690]Meubers ‘and state of the ssc should bear in. mind at : alt times that
[7691]; “they and ‘their activities are matters of ‘great interest to opposition
[7692]IntelLigence Services, as well as to the press. Committee and staff
[7694]- members, particularly those who are publicly prominent, can. hardly _
[7696]ne travel, Snconspiciously ‘and will be easily recognized. _
[7699]13-00000
[7701]eHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN . ~
[7702]ae TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
[7704]HOWANO H. BAKER, JR., TENN,
[7705]~% “MIND. BARRY GOLOWATER, ARIZ.
[7707]Ee metre Nn ited Btates Senate ae
[7709]WILLIAM G, MILLER, STAPF DIRECTOR
[7710]FREDERICK A. ©. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL, SELECT COMMITTEE TO
[7712]CURTIS Re BMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL ” STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
[7713]RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
[7715](runsuanr To 5. RES. 21, 96TH CONGRESS)
[7716]f WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510
[7718]August 12, 1975
[7720]Mr. Seymour Bolten ;
[7721]Assistant to the Director. fe .
[7722]Room 6D0120. | Me ;
[7723]Central Intelligence Agency a (Nea
[7724]Langley, Virginia - , ae
[7726]Dear Mr. Bojten:
[7728].. \ This letter is to confirm an oral request by Committee staff
[7729]for an orientation briefing for a visit to South America which two
[7730]members of the staff, David Aaron and William Trueheart, have been
[7731]asked. to make next month.
[7733]Although plans are not yet firm, it is expected that they will
[7734]be free to travel during the second and third weeks of September.
[7735]It is proposed that they visit Brasilia, Rio de Janeiro, and
[7737]_ Montevideo, If time permits, they might also visit another con-~
[7738]; sular post in Brazil L and/or Buenos Aires. . 8 so
[7740]‘The primary purpose of this travel is to discuss “State-CIA
[7741]relations in the field with Embassy and Station officers. As ap-.
[7742]propriate, past Agency programs may also be reviewed.
[7744]' Messrs. Aaron and Trueheart are not expected to consult with
[7745]officials of the host government and, so far as the Committee is oo
[7746]concerned, the latter need not be informed of the visit. ‘
[7748]Sincerely yours,
[7750]William G. Miller
[7752]copy to Mr. Hyland, State Department
[7755]13-00000
[7757]oe VUICYO NG MEQOAUE Lb
[7759]|
[7761]a: oO SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY
[7762]- aaa con ace roa i bei : . : an Pacu OF PAGES
[7764]OMF O o- oO QQ o o a eo 8
[7765]CLASSIFICATION © ° . : . + 7 . _ . CO , a. oo. oo. _. j
[7766]SECRET Sos TS |
[7768]|
[7770]1 MMLSSAGE HANOUNG INDICATOR . . OaTe-rima arour ’ ona . MEBSAGE REFERENCE wumean |
[7772]“STAFF _ Gaagyqz | SIRECTOR i aayyag <
[7773]@.. , . ‘ . a ° i, 0 INDER DISSEM BY!
[7774]CONF; EUR Ss INFO: FILE sled SSS ABS Oj OC 0 nomoer i
[7776]|
[7777]|
[7779]axes: Psfeq -- Barre PER
[7781]fo Dem |
[7782]TO: PRIORITY LONDON. ~~ —_ ne | |
[7784]"REF? STATE 13737, 30 JUNE A975 ¥ 0 re pee
[7785]on, "SHENATOR TOWER MEMBER OF SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
[7787]r ASC AND VICE CHAIRMAN OF SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE {SSC} INVESTIGAT-
[7789]\ , ING CIAy IS TRAVELING IN. EUROPE IN HIS ASC CAPACITY BY U.S. ATRI
[7791]1 FORCE JET AND wER"AIR FORCE ESCORT. STATE HAS ADVISED THAT SENATOR
[7793]o TOWER WILL BE IN LONDON 3-7 JULY WHERE HE WILL CALL ON MINISTER!
[7795]oT HEALEY ON 4 JULY AND. CINCUSNAVEUR ER. on 1 Tory, + Oe
[7797]| | 2. ALTHOUGH TRAVELING ON ASC BUSINESS, SENATOR TOWER MAY TAKE |
[7798]IR THE OPPORTUNITY TO LOOK INTO CIA AND BOTHER U.S. INTEL SERVICE | . |
[7799]| ACTIVITY IN U-K- IF HE REQUESTS “A GENERAL BRIEFING, STABTION i. !
[7800]SHOULD BE COOPERATIVE AND FORTHCOMING .IN PROVIDING HIN WITH ‘ONE. |
[7801]YOU MAY COVER THRUST OF OUR GENERAL INTEL EXCHANGE WITH THE BRITISH
[7802]|" BUT SEE NO NEED TO TOUCH ON ANY JOINT OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY. STATIONS |
[7803]| SHOULD NOT OFFER ARRANGE CONTACT BETWEEN SENATOR. TOWER AND BRITISH i
[7805]SERVICE CONTACTS.¥. . a : -
[7807]Pa 3. FOR BACKGROUND GUIDANCE. IN THE. EVENT SSC BUSINESS ARISES: |
[7808]H@S IS CURRENTLY WORKING WITH THE SSC TO ECMSSTABLISH GUIDLINES FOR
[7810]DATE:
[7811]ORIG: |
[7812]UNIT:
[7814]EAT:
[7816]RLeAS IG GARICEAR LUTHENTECATING GEE 7
[7818]REPROOUL TT. wit FeAl. ol gia lycrs
[7820]13-00000
[7822]ITS DEALINGS WITH ITS MEMBERS AND THEIR STAFFS- ALTHOUGH NOT 1
[7824]oo
[7826]_.
[7829]p ABR PIV ES ha mp eee ent
[7830]{ | ne wf ———
[7831]. ad 7 . ee ~ ~~
[7832]BIGNAL CENTEM BLD ONLY Og - ree
[7833]ae co: acr KEL hare wo : per m, a7 Pe.
[7834]One Ll G 0 & 6b -G Go -. L é
[7836]CLA LU ICATION
[7838]SECRET
[7840]MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR .* DATE-TIME GROUP cre MESSAGHO REFZRENCE NUMBER
[7842]: 8] netuento PER
[7844]"STAFF : oo.) DIRECTOR ee
[7845]CONF: INFO: FILE TIO : a an nex _ DISSEM BYE.
[7847]| . See eee eee
[7849]o PILES #
[7851]FINAL H@S BELIEVES IT IS MORE APPROPRIATE THAT WASHINGTON BE |;
[7853]THE PLACE WHERE OPERATIONAL DETAILS OF CIA ACTIVITY BE CONVEYED: .
[7855]TO THE SSC. FIELD ELEMENTS SHOULD ONLY DISCUSS THEIR OFS: AND |
[7857]ACTIVITIES IN GENERAL .TERMS. I-E-1 OPERATIONAL PRIORITIES. TYPES
[7859]OF OPERATIONS. PARTICULAR PROBLEMS AS EVOLVE FROM THE LOCAL OPERA-
[7861]TIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE EMBASSY AND LOCALI:
[7863]MILITARY SERVICES. . IN ALL CASES DISCUSSIONS WILL MEET APPROPRIATE
[7865]SECURITY STANDARDS IN TERMS OF PHYSICAL’ SURROUNDINGS.. H@S IS |
[7867]ASKING THE SSC TO REFRAIN FROM ASKING TO SEE THE TEBXTS OF OR
[7869]GENERAL NOTES ON INTELLIGENCE “AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE U.S- AND HOST
[7871]GOVERNMENTS SINCE THESE ARE CONSIDERED BY THE. HOST, GOVERNMENTS | i
[7872]wt _
[7873]AS EXTREMELY SENSITEE, POLITICALLY AND OPERATIONALLY, AND CANNOT
[7875]BE DIVULGED WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE HOST GOVERNMENT. Ee IMPDET-d
[7877]|:
[7878]|
[7880]baTE: 2 JULY 4975
[7881]ORIG: GEORGE B- HOLMES
[7883]EXT: 44 . .
[7885]SA/DDO - WALLER [MSvASTANCE.
[7886]OLC - MILLER 7, Cra) -
[7888]eke io BC. COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
[7890]CLARSINICATION "REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS'PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET |
[7891]SSEERETO 8. poe Cb BY! g3 2891
[7893]i nee,
[7895]13-00000
[7897]1G Te
[7898]one ob : sg G | 3
[7899]s E o e = : ' DATE -Time GROUP ewe MESSAGE REFERENCE HUMBER
[7900]STAFF _ G4175b2 DIRECTOR 713701
[7901]CONF: Fe) 3 INFO: FILE, stfad, Z CZ, a7 Wy f 2 4 en OISsEM eM,
[7902]ps/Eb 2 De Jo a 0 rerumnro §=PER
[7903]sSA/ddo 125, PS/PE enn #
[7905]TO: IMMEDIATE BONN: MUNICH. ¥
[7907]ANAcT Bonn Wuwiok.
[7910]| —_—_—— , 0 ws _
[7911]REF: MUNICH 30382 [IN &G2LS5E7| ¥
[7913]1. AS YOU AWARE. IN ADDITION TO BEING A MEMBER OF THE SENATE
[7914]ARNED SERVICES COMMITTEE {ASCH SENATOR TOWER IS VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE
[7915]“SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE {SSC} INVESTIGATING CIA. SENATOR TOUER IS
[7916]TRAVELLING TO EUROPE IN HIS ASC CAPACITY BY U.S. AIR FORCE JET AND
[7917]WITH AIR FORCE ESCORT. ‘WE HAVE NOT DETERMINED HIS DETAILED ITINERARY
[7918]BUT WILL ADVISE YOU AS APPROPRIATE WHEN WE DO. ¥
[7920]2. ALTHOUGH TRAVELLING ON ASC BUSINESS SENATOR TOWER MAY WELL
[7922]a
[7924]TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY TO LOOK INTO CIA AND OTHER U.S. INTEL SERVICE
[7925]ACTIVITY IN THE FRG- SHOULD HE DO SO. THIS ASPECT OF HIS VISIT
[7926]SHOULD NOT BE PUBLICIZED. BUT. IF HE REQUESTS A GENERAL BRIEFING,
[7927]THE STATION SHOULD BE COOPERATIVE AND FORTHCOMING IN PROVIDING HIM
[7928]WITH ONE. YOU MAY COVER THRUST OF . OUR GENERAL LIAISON EXCHANGE. . .
[7929]WITH THE BND. OMETTING THE DETAILS INVOLVED WITH OUR INTEL EXCHANGE
[7930]AND JOINT OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY: THE STATION SHOULD NOT OFFER TO
[7931]ARRANGE CONTACT BETWEEN SENATOR TOWER AND ITS FRG LIAISON CONTACTS.
[7933]DATE:
[7938]EXT: . . . . . . .
[7940]RELEASING OFFICER - COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
[7942]CLASSIFICATION REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ([SSUING OFFICE 1S PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET
[7943]SECRET .. coe os ee CL BY:
[7945]13-00000
[7947]Pay
[7948](
[7949](
[7950](
[7951]te
[7952]a
[7953]q.
[7954]i.
[7956]+ SIGNAL CENTER USE wnLY
[7957]omF O- O QO. QO.
[7958]SECRET a
[7959]MEBSAGE MANDLING INDICATOR : . DATE Tie GROUP . ore . MESBAGE RAPERENCE NUMGER
[7960]STAFF oe DIRECTOR
[7961]. _ ~ ; , O wcex —-—«dDISSEM BY:
[7962]_ “CONF: , INFO: FILE . DO nomex: =
[7963]WS ad OD sumiro PER
[7964]b “penas #
[7966]THE COS WILL PROBABLY WISH TO MAKE HINSELF AVAILABLE TO PARTICIPATE
[7967]IN ANY BRIEFING SENATOR TOWER MAY REQUEST. ¥ oo,
[7969]3. FOR BACKGROUND GUIDANCE», EVENT SSC BUSINESS. ARISES: HaS IS
[7970]CURRENTLY WORKING WITH THE SSC TO ESTABLISH GUIDELINES FOR ITS
[7971]DEALINGS WITH ITS MENBERS AND THEIR STAFFS. ‘ALTHOUGH NOT FINAL H@S
[7973]“BELIEVES IT IS MORE APPROPRIATE THAT ‘WASHINGTON BE THE PLACE WHERE
[7975]OPERATIONAL DETAILS OF CIA ACTIVITY BE CONVEYED TO THE SSC. FIELD
[7976]ELEMENTS SHOULD ONLY DISCUSS THEIR OPS AND ACTIVITIES: IN GENERAL
[7977]TERMS + I.Eea OPERATIONAL PRIORITIES, TYPES, OF OPERATIONS. PARTICULAR
[7978]PROBLEMS AS EVOLVE FRON THE LOCAL OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND
[7979]RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE EMBASSY {CONSULATE} AND LOCAL MILITARY
[7980]SERVICES. IN ALL CASES DISCUSSIONS WILL NEET APPROPRIATE SECURITY
[7981]STANDARDS IN TERMS OF PHYSICAL SURROUNDINGS . HaS IS ASKING THE SSC
[7982]TO REFRAIN FROM ASKING TO SEE THE TEXTS OF OR GENERAL NOTES ON
[7983]INTELLIGENCE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE. U-S. AND HOST GOVERNMENTS SINCE
[7984]THESE ARE CONSIDERED BY THE HOST GOVERNMENTS AS EXTREMELY SENSITIVE.
[7985]POLITICALLY AND OPERATIONALLY AND CANNOT BE DIVULGED WITHOUT THE
[7987]CONSENT OF THE Oe GOVERNMENT. E2 IMPDET.d
[7989]DATE: 1, JULY Rane
[7992]i
[7994]uNIT: E/G/CIL AA Oo ee Niue Me ;
[7996]EXT: } y5ea2 i SA {obo tuealler 7
[7998]TT eveas. No a] ¢: set
[8000]Hag GTPVe iS #ROMGITTS
[8002]SLASSIFICATION PU AQULAITIOO. Thou ay tbe ig rs
[8004]SEC 2
[8007]13-00000 co
[8008]Lp UNCLASSIFIED USE ONLY _ C] CONFIDENTIAL [-] SECRET
[8010]7 t "ROUTING AND RECORD SHEL :
[8012]SUBJECT: (Optional)
[8014]C/SS/CAG 3D0004
[8016]TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
[8017]building)
[8019]COMMENTS {Number eoch comment to show from whom
[8020]fo whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
[8022]OFFICER'S
[8023]INITIALS.
[8025]By
[8027]ONY Abba we,
[8029]'" Mr. John Waller Peer.
[8030]} the em fe ir
[8031]Breet | ia “ wee
[8033]SA/ DDO 2B1415
[8035]Mr. Seymour Bolten
[8036]Review Staff 6 D 0120
[8038]rom GTQ HB” [] SECRET © [[] CONFIDENTIAL [] WITRIAL” ~—(] UNCLASSIFIED
[8040]ore Sen: a
[8042]28 July 1975
[8043]_ MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Seymour Bolten
[8044]Review Staff
[8045]VIA: = —__~-s Mr..: John Waller
[8046]co, Special Assistant to the DDO
[8048]SUBJECT: Summary of Covert Action Operations Targeted at
[8049]Right-Wing Governments
[8051]1. Pursuant to your request, forwarded as attachment A is a paper
[8052]providing examples of covert action operations targeted at right-wing
[8053]governments, which is responsive to a question £ from the Senate Select
[8054]Committee.
[8056]2. All of the cases in the attached summary are considered sensitive
[8057]by the area divisions and some are considered extremely sensitive up to
[8058]today. In many ways public disclosure of some of these operations could
[8059]impact more severely on our foreign policy interest than the dther dis-
[8060]closures on our foreign involvements. For example, a disclosure of our ~
[8061]past operations in Spain could possibly adversely affect the military
[8062]base negotiations now underway. With this problem in mind, we have
[8063]broken the operations into two categories: Category I are those oper-
[8064]ations about which full committee could be briefed, if necessary, and
[8065]Category II are those operations considered extremely sensitive about
[8066]which the committee Chairman and Co-Chairman might be briefed, if abso-
[8067]lutely necessary.
[8069]3. In addition to the attachment A summary, we also approve the use
[8070](with the full committee) of the case summary on our operations to assist
[8071]the survival of the Betancourt government in Venezuela, which was pro-
[8072]vided to you directly by LA Division.
[8074]L 4. Obviously, we would prefer to forego providing this information
[8075]to the committee. However, should it be necessary to do so, we would
[8077], appreciate being advised promptly regarding the time and circumstances
[8078]of any use of this material outside of the Agency.
[8080]E2 IMPDET
[8081]CL BY 055377
[8083]SEGHET
[8084]SEASTHYE
[8086]13-00000
[8088]5
[8090]SECRET
[8091]SENSITIVE
[8093]a weed
[8094]See
[8096]5. We are also providing you as attachments B, C and D copies
[8097]of memoranda from EUR, AF and EA Divisions which provides additional
[8098]background on division attitudes and caveats concerning the provision
[8100]of this material to the Select Conmittee.
[8101]Gewti/ lot
[8103]- conatd Purcell
[8104]. Chief, Covert Action Group
[8105]Services Staff
[8107]Attachments, a/s
[8109]SECRET.
[8110]2
[8111]SENSE
[8113]13-00000
[8115]lutely necessary.
[8117]7 . 28 July 1975
[8118]MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Seymour Bolten
[8119]oO a Review Staff
[8120]VIA: = —™—«SMMr. John Waller
[8121]'- Special Assistant to the DDO
[8122]SUBJECT: Summary of Covert Action Operations Targeted at
[8124]Right-Wing Governments
[8126]1. Pursuant to your request, forwarded as attachment A is a paper
[8127]providing examples of covert action operations targeted at right-wing
[8128]governments, which is: responsive to a question from the Senate Select
[8129]Committee.
[8131]. 2. All of the cases in the attached summary are considered sensitive
[8132]by the area divisions and some are considered extremely sensitive up to
[8133]today. In many ways public disclosure of some of these operations could
[8134]impact more severely on our foreign policy interest than the.other dis-
[8135]closures on our foreign involvements. For example, a disclosure of our.
[8136]past operations in Spain could possibly adversely affect the military.
[8137]base negotiations now underway. With this problem in mind, we have
[8138]broken the operations into two categories: Category I are those oper ;
[8139]ations about which full committee could be briefed, if necessary, an
[8140]Category II are those operations considered extremely sensitive about |
[8141]which the. committee Chairman and Co- Chairman a might | be briefed, if abso-
[8143]3. In addition to ‘the ‘attachment A sumary , we also approve the. use
[8144](with the full committee) of the case summary on our operations to assist
[8145]the survival of the Betancourt government in Venezuela, which was pro-
[8146]vided: to you directly by LA Division.
[8148]4. Obviously, we would prefer to forego providing this information
[8149]to the committee. However, should it: be necessary to do so, we would
[8150]appreciate being advised promptly regarding the time and circumstances
[8151]of any use of this material outside of the Agency.
[8153]E2 IMPDET
[8154]CL BY 055377
[8157]13-00000
[8160]\ “
[8162]5. We are also providing you as attachments B, C and D copies
[8164]. of memoranda from EUR, AF and EA Divisions which provides additional
[8166]background on division attitudes and caveats concerning the provision
[8167]of this material to the Select Committee.
[8169]y
[8171]/s/ Donald J. Purcell
[8173]Donald J. Purcell
[8174]Chief, Covert Action Group
[8175]re _ Services Staff
[8177]‘Attachments, a/s
[8179]pan WOES de
[8180]Aawdesd Au fa
[8183]13-00000
[8184]po mc Mbit : - cha
[8186]Oe SENS STEVE oF _ | [A
[8187]|
[8189]CATEGORY I:
[8191]. 1. ETHIOPIA: A project for covert support of the Ethiopian labor
[8192]movement was first approved for FY 1965. The purpose of the support
[8194]; was to encourage the development of the labor movement as a democratic
[8195]i. + force and as one of the few mass representative organizations in Ethiopia.
[8196]Lo The project was terminated at the end of FY 1973. The total approved.
[8197]budget for this project from its inception in CY 1964 to its termination
[8198]in CY 1973 was $291,006. Covert support to the Ethiopian labor movement
[8199]was approved by the Special Group on 22 August 1967, on 25 March 1970,
[8200]on 26 May 1971, and on 8 May 1972.
[8202]2. SOUTH VIETNAM: From 1955 to 1975, a series of projects was F
[8203]begun designed to build up grass social institutions as a means of
[8204]strengthening the democratic foundations of the country. One of the i
[8206]‘most long-lasting of these was aimed at supporting the soundly dem- t
[8207]cratic labor movement through the provision of guidance and funds to |
[8208]facilitate its growth among the workers and rural village peasants and ‘
[8209]tenant farmers. L
[8211]3. GUATEMALA: In 1972-73, the Guatemala City Station with access
[8212]to the government succeeded in dissuading the President from military
[8213]‘action against Belize. .
[8215]4. HAITI: As early as 1963, the Special Grow discussed ways and
[8216]means of influencing the Duvalier * dictatorship. In 1967, a modest pro- 7
[8217]ject was approved for the support of Haitian exile radio broadcasts for -F
[8218]the purpose of offsetting "the inflammatory propaganda broadcasts to ,
[8219]Haiti from Radio Habana."
[8221]5. DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: In 1963, CIA was directly involved in the
[8223]successful efforts to prevent the return to the Dominican Republic of
[8225]So General Elias Wessin y Wessin and forestall his leadership of a right-'
[8226]wing coup designed to prevent the holding of free elections.
[8228]6. GERMANY: From 1948 to 1960, CIA exploited an asset in a neo-
[8229]Nazi political movement both as a source of intelligence concerning its ~
[8231]plans and actions and as a means of covertly sabotaging the movement.
[8232]and its European counterparts. —
[8234]SECRET
[8235]SENSITIVE
[8237]13-00000
[8239]CATEGORY II
[8241]- SECRET
[8242]SENSITIVE
[8244]1. SOUTH AFRICA: In 1959, after consultation with the Special
[8245]Group, the DCT approved an overall expenditure of $165,000 to a leading
[8246]South African political figure designed to encourage the creation of a.
[8247]new political party. This party was established in 1960. The objective
[8248]was to influence the liberalization of the South African Government by
[8249]having a legally constituted party in opposition to apartheid. The
[8251]activity was terminated in 1962.
[8253]2. SOUTH AFRICA: A project ‘was initiated in 1962 to encourage
[8255]. the development of a multiracial trade union organization which opposed .
[8257]apartheid. It was funded through a European philanthropic organization.
[8258]State Department approval was received in June 1963. A total. of $311,705
[8259]was spent on this activity. The project was terminated in 1968. ~
[8261]3. KOREA: In 1963, the Special Group: approved a-covert action .
[8262]project designed to encourage "emerging civilian government" vis-a-vis
[8263]the military leadership following President Rhee's resignation and in
[8264]anticipation of forthcoming elections; it proposed to support a group. —s_,
[8265]of National. Assembly members. ;
[8267]-4, KOREA: The Special Group approved in 1967 a project designed
[8268]to support a private, rural self-help organization to encourage more
[8269]participation by rural farmers in local and national politics to increase
[8270]their influence on the Government of the Republic of Korea; it involved
[8271]the creation of agricultural training centers in rural villages, a news-
[8273]letter and student rural services. It was terminated in 1970 as a project, —
[8275]but the movement has been continued under the auspices of the government.
[8277]5. ARGENTINA: Between 1950 and 1955, efforts of the CIA were ©
[8278]directed at countering Peron's program to obtain wide support in Latin
[8279]America for his Movement of Latin American Trade Unionists (ATLAS) which
[8280]was designed as one element of his campaign to expand his influence in ~
[8281]the area.. Partially as the result of CIA's efforts, the movement never
[8282]caught on and it was abandoned with Peron's ouster from power.
[8284]6. BRAZIL: From the early 1960's through the ouster of Goulart
[8285]and the assumption of power by the conservative Brazilian military, to
[8286]1972, CIA supported a rural cooperative movement in the impoverished
[8287]Northeast. This support was provided in spite of strong opposition to
[8288]the movement first by the Goulart government and then by Brazilian .
[8289]military authorities in that area and in spite of the effect particularly
[8290]after 1974 on liaison and diplomatic relations if this support by the USG
[8291]were discovered. The project was terminated in 1972.
[8293]13-00000 ,
[8295]et
[8299]| | SERSTINE, 4
[8301]7. NICARAGUA: ‘During the period 1962 to 1966, ‘CIA participated
[8302]in efforts to interdict moves by General Somoza to purchase arms for
[8303]military actions against his neighbors.
[8305]— 8. SPAIN: In 1963, the Special Group approved : a program to train
[8306]15-20 Spanish democratic labor leaders a year outside of Spain to build’
[8307]an effective cadre of Spanish labor leadership. In 1966, the Special
[8308]Group approved a modest program designed to strengthen the Christian
[8309]Democratic movement in Spain through supportive efforts with youth,
[8310]political and labor elements.
[8314]Seer ET
[8316]SOMITE E
[8318]a 7
[8320]13-00000
[8322]eS,
[8325],
[8326]e
[8330]22 JUL 1975
[8332]MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr: John Waller
[8334]Special Assistant to DDO
[8336]SUBJECT: "Summary of Covert Action Operations
[8338]‘Against Right- Wing Governments
[8340]_ REFERENCE: _ 'SS/CAG Memorandum of 18 July 1975,
[8342]Same Subject.
[8344]-” We have reviewed referent memorandum and have the
[8345]following comments on those paragraphs which concern ©
[8347]. Buropean Division.
[8349]13. GERMANY. While this case is somewhat
[8351]‘bizarre and does not represent a productive operation,
[8352]- we pose no objection to its being presented to the
[8354]any
[8356]Senate Select. Committee.
[8358]- 14. SPAIN. We have no objection to. the
[8360]‘presentation of these prograns to the Senate Select
[8362]Committee for review although we share concern expressed
[8363]by SS/CAG that.a leak of this information would be detri-
[8364]mental to the base negotiations,
[8366]etgena/eisnies We Wells
[8368]William W. Wells
[8369]‘Chief, European Division
[8371]DDO/DC/E/NW :MFBue11: tj (22 July 78),
[8373]_ Distribution:
[8374]Orig. §& 1 - Addressee
[8375]; 1 - SS/CAG
[8376]1 ~ C/EUR
[8377]1 - DC/E/NW
[8378]1 - E/G
[8379]1 - E/IB
[8380]‘2 IMPDET
[8382]CL BY 061414
[8384]SECRET
[8386]a
[8388]13-00000
[8390]2 SEORETISERSTINE
[8392]25 JUL 1975
[8394]MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Covert Action Group, Services Staff
[8396]SUBJECT : Covert Action Operations Against Right
[8398]Wing Regimes
[8400]1. Attached are revisions of the descriptions of the
[8401]three covert action operations in Africa, cited in your
[8402]memorandum to Mr. John Waller dated 18 July 1975.
[8404]2. In the case of Ethiopia, we understand from your
[8405]discussions with Mr. Clifton Strathern that the labor project
[8406]has not been eliminated from your list but that ‘the Director
[8407]will request that. discussion of it be limited to the Chairman
[8409]’ and Vice-Chairman only of the Senate Select Committee. The
[8411]Director should be informed of the potentially embarrassing
[8412]procedural errors in the presentation and review of this
[8413]project before the 303 Committee, and the risks of exposure
[8415]to two former assets. who have been jailed by the new Ethiopian
[8416]regime. ;
[8418]3. The Ethiopian labor program was undertaken
[8419]without 303 Committee knowledge or approval. Subsequently,
[8420]the project was presented to the 303 Committee on 22 August
[8421]1967 and Mr. Wait Rostow, then Chairman of the Security Council,
[8423]_ asked why it had not been brought before the Committee before.
[8425]He was told that for projects costing $20,000 or less, it had
[8426]been the DCI's discretion to determine if a given project was
[8427]sufficiently politically sensitive to warrant bringing it
[8428]before the committee. Mr. Rostow directed that the 303
[8429]Committee should examine all political action projects.
[8431]Nevertheless, the project was not submitted to the Committee
[8432]for review in 1968, 1969 or 1973.
[8434]4, In addition to these procedural errors, the arrest
[8435]in 1974 and continued detention of two Ethiopian labor leaders
[8436]who are former assets under this project, and accusations in
[8438]E2 IMPDET
[8440]CL BY 009904.
[8442]SECRET SENSITIVE
[8446]ace eat alas titled re chgpe Camere
[8447]Se eres ag
[8449]Cd
[8451]a
[8452]Lats
[8454]13-00000 3
[8456]i . ; no . oe, ?
[8458]Sey SEITE
[8460]the Ethiopian press that the trade union organization received
[8461]support from the U.S. Government, make any disclosure of CIA
[8462]interest in the labor organization potentially dangerous to
[8463]our former assets. Neither of the former assets was arrested
[8464]because of his CIA connections, and neither of the two assets
[8466]_nor the labor organization have been accused of CIA involvement.
[8467]An admission now of CIA support to Ethiopian labor. or to the.
[8468]two Ethiopian labor leaders in jail could be a sentence of
[8469]death for them. .,
[8471]5. In the case. of South Africa, CIA support to a leading
[8472]‘South African political figure to encourage the creation of a
[8473]; new political party remains a very sensitive matter. The
[8474]- ee principal agent is still a leading and respected spokesman ;
[8475]for the opposition party in South Africa and is a leading member |
[8476]of the South African parliament. Exposure of the. operation
[8477]could lead to his identification which would be extremely.
[8478]damaging to him, to the opposition party and to our govern-
[8479]‘ment's relations in South Africa. For these reasons, we believe |.
[8480]it would be desirable for the DCI to limit discussion of this
[8481]operation to the Chairman ‘and Vice-Chairman of the Select.
[8482]Committee only. .
[8483]6. The European philanthropic organization which was used.
[8484]to fund the development of a multiracial trade union organiza-
[8485]tion in. South Africa was the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES),
[8486]located in Germany. The South African labor officials and
[8487]organizations which received funds from FES were not aware
[8488]that the actual origin of the funds was the United States —
[8489]Government and presumably do not now know of U.S. Government
[8490]or CIA involvement. Aside from exposing a U.S. Government
[8491]involvement where none is known to have existed, FES was used —
[8492]to support a number. of other covert action operations in Africa
[8493]i and elsewhere and exposure of the foundation would have
[8494]ramifications other than in South Africa. The Director should
[8495]be briefed on FES and its range of activities on behalf of CIA
[8496]if he has not already been informed.
[8500]Deputy Chief, Africa Division
[8504]Attachments:
[8505]P As Stated Above
[8507]a - SECRET /SENSITIVE
[8509]13-00000
[8511]‘21 JUL 1975
[8512]MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr, John Waller
[8513]Special Assistant to the DDO
[8514]SUBJECT ; : Covert Action Operations Against .
[8515]Right Wing Governments
[8516]REFERENCE |. .: Chief, SS/CAG Memorandum, dated
[8518]18 July 1975:
[8519]Subject: "Summary of Covert Action
[8520]Operations Against Right Wing Governments"
[8522]_ 1. EA Division is concerned about Reference and its possible
[8523]use in briefing the Senate Select Committee. Specifically, our. concern
[8524]centers on describing the EA operations contained in the attachment to
[8525]Reference as ''were mounted against" "right wing governments",
[8527]None of the EA operations -- DNSCOOP, DNSPROUT (both of which
[8529]took place in Korea) and TUMIX (which took place in Vietnam) --
[8531]were or should be so described as being mounted against the government —
[8532]then in power. In fact, just the opposite is true. All of these
[8533]operations, while covert in the sense that the U.S. Government hand
[8535]was never disclosed, were primarily designed to broaden the base of
[8537]the governments in power and enhance its stayability by providing ©
[8538]advice and support to "grass root elements" in an attempt to get these
[8539]elements to function as a more cohesive organization in seeking
[8541]-participation in the governmental process,
[8543]2. While all of the operations have been terminated, the
[8544]DNSCOOP operation is perhaps the most sensitive of the three, in that
[8545]it represented an initial effort by the Agency to establish contact with
[8546]opposition elements in South Korea. As noted above, the purpose of
[8547]this contact.was not to overthrow the ruling government but rather to
[8548]assist the opposition in establishing itself as a more viable force in its
[8549]effort to establish a two-party system in South Korea. The Agency today
[8551]E2 IMPDET
[8552]CL BY 014848
[8554]SECRET
[8556]13-00000
[8560]SECRET
[8562]maintains contact with the major opposition leaders in South Korea
[8564]and this contact is well known to and approved by the U.S. Ambassador
[8565]in Korea as well as the Assistant Secretary for East Asia and Pacific
[8566]Affairs, Department of State.
[8568]3. We see no real value to be gained if any of these operations
[8569]were to be raised with the Senate Select. Committee.
[8571]ce: DC/Operations Staff
[8572]C/SS/CAG ,
[8574]ooo —— i a
[8575]oy \. Hae t~.
[8576]\ \ N Ser ues + Nee: VN
[8578]“’RSbert DY Brown, irs —
[8579]Acting Chief, East Asia Division
[8583]SECRET
[8585]13-00000 _
[8589]; a peed AL
[8591]SUBJECT: Guidelines for Members of the Select
[8592]Committee and Their Staffs While
[8593]Traveling Abroad
[8595]‘There have been already and there will continue to
[8596]be members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) who
[8597]wish to travel abroad and be in conversation with our
[8598]Stations. It is important that we agree on guidelines
[8599]to avoid serious security problems from arising. The
[8600]following specific guidelines are considered important:
[8602]-- Members of the SSC and members of its staff
[8603]should not publicly appear to be abroad for
[8604]purposes of investigating CIA installations.
[8605]CIA Stations abroad, all of which are under
[8606]some form of cover, have and need varying
[8607]degrees of protection from exposure. At
[8608]one extreme are Stations behind the iron
[8609]curtain or in other particularly sensitive
[8610]areas which need maximum protection. At
[8611]the other extreme are Stations which enjoy
[8612]close liaison with the host government and
[8613]are thus less sensitive. In the first case,
[8615]! Stations existing under strict cover conditions
[8616]in sensitive environments, the very presence of
[8617]_ SSC members could be highly provocative by
[8618]flaunting the fact of CIA's presence. But
[8620]i even in countries in which we enjoy a good
[8622]i liaison with the host country's security
[8623]service, there remains a need to be discreet.
[8624]Many countries whose services want to ‘be
[8625]cooperative with CIA cannot afford public or
[8626]parliamentary exposure of the relationship.
[8627]Local press publicity pertaining to an SSC
[8628]investigation abroad would in almost all
[8630]cases be distastefull to a host government.
[8632]SECRET,
[8634]13-00000 _
[8636]6
[8638]E35
[8639]rod
[8640]ore
[8641]werd,
[8642]Fy
[8645]In sum, except in the case of very sensitive
[8646]areas, discreet arrangements can be arranged
[8648]for SSC visits to CIA's overseas stations and
[8649]with senior officers within the covering Embassy
[8650]provided the SSC member does not publicly declare
[8651]himself to be on SSC business and maintains his
[8652]Station contacts on a discreet basis.
[8654]Members of the SSC and their staff should not
[8655]questyon Station personnel on specific operational
[8656]etail. It 1s more fitting that Washington be the
[8657]place where operational details are conveyed to
[8658]the SSC. It is at Headquarters where the guide-
[8659]lines are best understood, where the most complete
[8660]and authentic records are kept (many Stations
[8661]finding themselves in dangerous crisis situations,
[8662]have periodically destroyed their files). There
[8663]is no reason, however, that Station Chiefs should
[8664]not discuss operations in general terms -- opera-
[8665]tional priorities, the kinds of operations, the
[8666]operational environment, relationships with the
[8667]Embassy, the service attaches, etc.
[8669]Members of the SSC and their staff should not
[8670]interview agent personnel. Foreign agent
[8671]personnel frequently are under hostile or
[8672]local service scrutiny. For them to be placed
[8673]in touch with SSC members would be to run an
[8674]unacceptable risk. Moreover, serious damage
[8675]could be done to agent morale and motivation
[8676]if they were to think their role had been
[8677]revealed to members of Congress.
[8679]Members of the SSC and their staff should not
[8681]in most cases be in contact with members 0
[8683]host country’s intelligence or security services.
[8684]Many services will rind contact with the SSC
[8685]politically difficult and will avoid it. They
[8686]further regard that their relationships with CIA,
[8688]the information they pass us and the sort of
[8689]cooperation extended as a most sensitive matter.
[8691]SECRET
[8693]13-00000 _
[8695]No matter what assurances are given then,
[8696]they would find it difficult and awkward to
[8697]discuss these matters with the SSC or its
[8698]staff, and the very fact that such matters
[8699]i were under investigation could well cause
[8700]them to reassess the desirability of a
[8701]relationship with CIA or other U.S.
[8702]intelligence agencies. Exceptions can
[8703]perhaps be made in special cases.
[8705]. -- Members of the SSC and their staff should
[8706]not visit foreign technical intelligence
[8707]installations. Again there may be exceptions
[8708]to this which can be arranged, but in most
[8709]countries in which we operate joint technical
[8710]collection sites, the host service would be
[8711]opposed to access by Congressional representatives.
[8713]SECRET
[8715]13-00000
[8717]s . hor un
[8718]CABLE bet UIGSSEM EY fo eb TOTAL COPIES RUN BS
[8720]SECRET 3041282 JUN 75 STAFF
[8722]4
[8725]7
[8727]PERSON ‘UNIT NOTIFIED
[8729]ne RC RET. no — REpRoBUETION wy OT 5
[8731]T 126005 ETAL65 PAGE Od IN 620730
[8733]TORI3Q15012 JUN 75 LOND 628897
[8735]CITE LONDON 628897
[8739]TO: DIRECTOR,
[8741]RYBAT
[8742]REF DIRECTOR 712872
[8744]1, IN MEETING WITH COS ON 32 JUNE» AMBASSADOR TOLD COS .
[8745]THAT HE HAD LUNCH WITH SENATOR MONDALE ON 28 JUNE AND ENGAGED
[8746]IN BRIEF GENERAL DISCUSSJON OF INVESTIGATION OF BKHERALD BY
[8747]SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE, AMBASSADOR FOUND SENATOR MONDALE
[8748]ENTIRELY REASONABLE IN HIS APPRUACH AND FULLY AWARE OF OILFFICULTY
[8749]OF JUDGING EVENTS AND DECISIONS OF EARLY 1968'S BY STANDARDS
[8751]ier 1975,
[8753]i
[8755]2, AMBASSADOR REPORTED THAT SENATOR MONDALE STATED THAT
[8756]HE HAD MADE SOME EFFURT TO CONTACT BRITISH ON JUNE 28 WITHOUT
[8757]SUCCESS, IN LIGHT OF REF, COS DID NOT ATTEMPT TO CONTACT
[8758]SENATOR MONDALE ON 26 JUNE, IN CONVERSATION WITH COS ON 3@ JUNE,
[8760]RICHARD SYKES, CHAIRMAN, JIC. REPORTED THAT BRITISH EMBASSY
[8762]IN WASHINGTON LAST WEEK FORWARDED REQUEST FROM SENATOR MONDALE
[8764]TO MEET WITH BRITISH ON 3a JUNE, SINCE SYKES HAD TO BE IN
[8766]PARIS ON 28 JUNE AND HOOPER HAD NOT YET RETURNED FROM HIS ASIAN
[8767]SECRET
[8769]13-00000
[8771]PAGE BEC DIMEM PS PEF TOTAL COFtEr RUM EY
[8772]oe : REPRODUCTION BY OTHER T
[8773]SECRE 7 ; 1SBUING OFFICE Is PROMIEN
[8775]Pr HSON/UNIT NOTIFIED wee ee ed ee
[8777]_ ACTION *
[8779]T 126005 ElALOS PAGE We~be "IN 620738
[8780]TORI3013012 YUN 75 _ “LOND 628897
[8782]TRIP) Usk; EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON WAS ASKED TO 2NFORM MONDALE
[8783]THAT THEY WOULD NOT BE AVAILABLE AT THAT TIME, THIS IS FOR
[8784]YOUR BACKGROUND IN EVENT SENATOR RAISES THE POINT WITH HGS,
[8786]b2 IMPDET,
[8788]13-00000
[8790]CMABLi vi Libsett BS
[8791]REPRODUCTION BY GTHER Tr
[8792]ISSUING OFFICE IS PRC HIEIT
[8796]| = lel ef 3.
[8798]. T 122509 EJABLS PAGE @2 IN 619528
[8799]: TORI2Z716522 JUN 75 «BONN 42004
[8801]SE C RE T 2712172 JUN 75 STAFF
[8802]CITE BONN 44004
[8803]TO: DIRECTOR,
[8804]RYBAT
[8805]FROM GRAVER
[8806]REF DIRECTOR 708791
[8808]1e IT WILL GREATLY FACILITATE PLANNING SCHEDULE FOR SENATOR .
[8809]MONDALE IF A MORE SPECIFIC ITINERARY GAN BE OBTAINED TOGETHER
[8810]WITH SOME. INDICATION UF HOW MUCH TIME THE SENATOR PLANS TO MAKE
[8811]AVAILABLE TO US DURING HIS BONN VISITs IN VIEW OF THE UNUSUAL
[8812]CIRCUMSTANCE IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC THAT GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES ARE
[8813]NOT CENTRALLY LOCATED IN ONE PLAGE, PLUS THE SPECIAL NATURE OF
[8814]BERLIN» 1 AM GIVING THOUGHT TO HAVING CHIEFS OF BASE BERLIN AND
[8815]MUNICH PARTICIPATE BUT AS OF PRESENT TIME WE UNCERTAIN EVEN WHAT
[8816]DAY SENATOR WILL ACTUALLY BE IN BONN,
[8818]2, WE ALSO PERPLEXED BY PARA 6 REF RE“ SIMILAR INDEPENDENT
[8819]CONTACT WITH THE BND" SINCE, AS HOS AWARE, THE BND JS LOCATED
[8820]IN MUNICH, WE ARE EQUALLY PUZZLED BY THE COMMENT IN PARA 7
[8821]ABOUT "SEEING THE WESTPORT FACILITY! WHICH SEEMS TO SUGGEST
[8822]RESURGENCE OF LONGSTANDING MISCONCEPTION THAT WESTPORT IS A
[8824]| SECRET ~
[8826]13-00000
[8828]CABLE SEC LISSEM BY Pir TOTAL COPIES RUN BY
[8830]REPRODUCTION BY OTHER TH
[8832]$ é C R —E Tt ISSUING OFFICE 1S PROHIBIT
[8834]PERSON/ UNIT NOTIFIED
[8836]| |__ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTES _
[8838]ACTION UNIT | |
[8840]Ply RF. FILE .
[8841]IN
[8842]F
[8843]fe)
[8845]ACTION #
[8847]T 121989 ETA815 PAGE d2eve IN 619528
[8849]TORt2746512 JUN 75 BONN 41¢03
[8851]PHYSICAL FACILITY HOUSING AND PROCESSING DEFECTORS, THERE
[8852]. IS NO WESTPORT FACILITY AS SUCH, JUST A FEW SAFE APARTMENTS
[8853]JN FRANKFURT» AND J PLAN TQ @RIEF THE SENATOR ON WESTPORT
[8854]ACTIVITIES aS PART OF THE BONN PRESENTATION, IF THE SENATOR
[8855]PLANS TO VISIT ANY OTHER LUCATION IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC IN
[8856]ADDITION TU BONN WE URGENTLY REQUEST EARLY ADVICE THEREOF,
[8857]$, ASSUME SENATOR HAS BEEN BRIEFED IN GENERAL TERMS AT LEAST
[8858]ON AGENCY PROCEDURES FOR TRACING AND CLEARING OPERATIONAL SOURCES,
[8859]REPORTING ON THEIR ACTIVITIES» AND AGENCY FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING
[8860]PROCEDURES» KUT WOULD PLAN USE THESE PROCEDURES AS FRAMEWORK
[8861]IN DESCRIBING EXERCISE OF CONTROL AND SUPERVISION IN THE FIELD,
[8862]IN ADDITION TO PROVIDING GENERALIZED DESCRIPTION OF MAYOR AREAS
[8863]OF STATION OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY. . .
[8864]4, WILL GREATLY APPRECIATE ETA UF SENATOR AND PARTY BONN
[8865]| ‘AS SOON AS THIS. CAN POSSIBLY BE PROCURED, G2 IMPDET,
[8867]ce “SECRET.
[8869]13-00000
[8871]i
[8872]. fal
[8874]F-7Y MEG. 22s aan ra
[8877]TOTAL COPIES x _ { RUN B+
[8878]\ REPRODUCTION BY OTHER 1
[8880]| S E C R E T | (SBUING OFFICE IS PROHIBI
[8881]PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED
[8883]scasort upuroimome YC POMS A rrr PRECEDENT
[8885]in OK O18 ca
[8886]SARL Teco Gora Aeseas pt
[8889]CABLE SEC DISSEM BY _ = PER
[8891]Aaviow 6 5 Ao be sy CS
[8892]7 120565 EJAB92 PAGE 21 | N 6494 09
[8893]TORI27441192 JUN 75 a LOND 62823
[8894]SECRET 2734122 JUN 75 STAFF ‘
[8895]CITE LONDON 62623 /
[8897]RNIN ect lo . of . ee ee
[8898]TO! IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, : A, a
[8899]os, rn
[8901]RYBAT
[8902]REF A, DIRECTOR 708794
[8903]B, STATE 146723 DTD 21 vune (WE*
[8904]D> 6, STATE 150884 DTD 26 wune (HO-™
[8905]/ 24.) We NOTE CHANGES IN SENATOR MONDALE TRIP.
[8907]2, REFS 8 & C INDICATE MONDALE ARRIVING =eRexeSEn 28 JUNE
[8908]DEPARTING. 297H, TRAVELLING NORWAY THEN RETURNING TO WASHINGTON
[8909]VIA LONDON ON 7 JULY. NO MENTION OF OTHER MEMBERS OF PARTY
[8910]EXCEPT MRS, MONDALE, REALIZE INFO MAY BE COVER FOR TRIP, BUT
[8911]WOULD LIKE CLARIFICATION, DOES SENATOR EXPECT BRIEFINGS
[8912]"LONDON ON 28TH VICE 30 JUNE AND 4 JULY?”
[8914]«3, PLS ADVISE, €2 IMPDET
[8916]Se NO RECORD IN CASLE SECRETASIAT
[8918]“= , SECRET
[8920]13-00000
[8922]° OUTGOINS i LZ SSAGE
[8923]SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY
[8924]ace col acre 0G YRE MRO oct
[8926]onF oO oO OQ D o a 0
[8928]CLASSITICATION
[8930]Oz-+coz
[8932]SECRET
[8934]MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DATE-TimE GROUP . , om |
[8936]STAFF 2522252 DIRECTOR " | -—s @AL 7b
[8938]MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
[8940]or
[8943]conr:(! live (s INFO: FILE Cl IIA bles rH DO moex DISSEM BY: ¢~
[8944]© PPV I | Hie Pps A Ono wnoex ‘
[8945]a ee O ncrunvto PER
[8946]~ 9 CG 2, Do wenes # 4
[8947]TO: LONDON-Y- : . ee (PA | |
[8950]REFS: A- LONDON b2701 IIN 616087] -
[8952]B- LONDON b2b15 JIN b13590] ¥
[8953]AS YET WE HAVE NOT HEARD FURTHER ON THE MONDALE VISIT
[8954]NOR HAS EUR DIVISION HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO BRIEF ANY OF THE
[8956]Tt)
[8958]MENBERS OF THE CODEL- IN ANSUER TO YOUR SPECIFIC QUESTIONS,
[8960]( WE HAVE ALREADY FORWARDED TO LONDON BY SEPARATE CHANNEL THE CLEAR-
[8961]ANCE STATUS OF THE PARTY. WE HAVE QUERIED ABOUT THE SENATOR'S ~_
[8962]KNOWLEDGE OF THE AGEE CASE. BUT KNOW OF NO’ SPECIAL BRIEFING GIVEN
[8963]HIM. WE PRESUME HE HAS READ THE NEWSPAPERS. SHOULD THE SUBJECT .
[8964]ARISE. WE ARE PREPARED TO ANSWER HIS QUESTIONS FORTHRIGHTLY.
[8966]RATHER THAN DISCUSSING SPECIFIC COVERT ACTION PROJECTS AND DIVULGING
[8967]SOURCE NAMES. YOU SHOULD COVER THE GENERAL IDEAS BEHIND COVERT
[8968]ACTION ACTIVITIES, THE PURPOSES FOR WHICH THEY WERE DEVELOPED _
[8969]AND WHY THEY WERE TERMINATED. E24 INPDET «A
[8971]o
[8973], DATE: 2S JUNE 1975S so :
[8974]ORIG: WILLIAM W. WELLS , :
[8975]UNIT: C/EUR _ ijl
[8976]EXT: 1412 Sd
[8978]WILLIAM We WELLS, - JOHN WALLER. SA/DDO
[8980]RELEASING OFFICER . . . COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
[8981]CLASSIFICATION | REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET
[8982]| : , oN CL BY:
[8985]13-00000
[8987]L771 MFG, 2/75 | : : _ j
[8988]j . fi
[8990]“
[8992]CABLE SEC DISSEM of vn TOTAL COPIES _ RUN ‘Ry
[8993]SECRET.
[8995]PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED. ;
[8997]DYAN D/SLOTTED T
[8999]RODUCTION BY OTHER THAN
[9000]UING OPFICE IS PROKIBITED
[9002]IN 616067
[9004]7 112809 ELAsse | PAGE O14
[9005]. TO RI24416222 YUN 75 LOND 62704
[9007]S EC RE T 2444512 JUN 75 STAFF
[9009]CITE LONDON 62702 wo
[9011]TOs DIRECTOR,
[9013]RYBAT | | . 9 ne
[9015]REF A, DIRECTOR 708794 w
[9016]>. B, LONDON 62615 ¢ ¥13590) = ~
[9017]A 1, [RE PARA 5 REF Ay RICHARD SYKES» CHAIRMAN, JIC, |
[9019]INFORMED COS AT LUNCH 24 JUNE ‘THAT AS RESULT OF REQUEST FROM
[9021]SENATOR MONDALE VIA MURRAY SIMONS+ SYKES AND SIR LEONARD
[9022]C HOOPER ARE TENTATIVELY PLANNING TO MEET WITH SENATOR MON DALE. .
[9023]ON 1 JULY TO DISCUSS BOTH HOW POLICY CONTRO-IS EXERCISED OVER
[9024]BRITISH INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND HOW BRITISH OFFICIAL -
[9025]“SECRETS ACT WORKS,
[9026]2, SYKES MADE IT-CLEAR THAT HE AND HOOPER WERE THE .
[9027]ONLY ONES AUTHORIZED TO DEAL WITH SENATOR MONDALE AND THAT
[9028]“SENATOR MONDALE WILL NOT BE MEETING WITH GNGRAPH OR JAGUAR
[9029]REPS, . 7
[9030]3, WOULD APPRECIATE REPLY To GUIDANCE REQUEST IN REF a.
[9032]E2. IMPDET
[9034]ee . . BU ROR ET
[9036]13-00000
[9038]Review Staff: 75/1009
[9040]24 June 1975 -
[9042]' MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
[9044]SUBJECT : Senator Gary Hart's Request to Talk
[9045]. to QUWIN While Traveling in Europe
[9047]This is for your information concerning Senator Gary
[9048]Hart's request to talk to a former agent while the senator
[9050]-is traveling in Europe.
[9052]The agent is QUWIN. . He was first approached in 1958
[9053]through the head of the Luxembourg intelligence service.
[9054]At first he was used mainly to spot potential agents in
[9055]various European countries. Later he became the major |
[9056]asset under ZRRIFLE. In this capacity he made.a brief
[9058]..visit to the Congo, but took no actions. -
[9060]- On the weekend of 7 June 1975, members of the Senate
[9061]Select Committee staff spent many hours at Headquarters
[9062]reading files, including QJWIN and ZRRIFLE, among others.
[9063]QJWIN's true name contract is in the file which they read.
[9064]So is a street and post office address as of 1964, the
[9065]time when we ended our contract with this agent. We have
[9067]not contacted him since.
[9069]We have heard that David ‘Aaron of the ‘Senate Select
[9070]Committee staff telephoned QJWIN. This report remains |
[9072]unconfirmed. We have protested to Bill. Miller. eck
[9074]It is difficult to imagine how a U.S.- “senator could
[9076]“talk to a former agent without arousing the interest of
[9078]the local intelligence service (probably Luxembourg) and
[9080]‘of. the host government who might wonder about the propriety
[9081]of investigations being conducted on their territory and
[9083], involving one of their citizens.
[9085]“In any ‘event, an approach of this nature “would be
[9087]of i interest to the Department of State, and the senator
[9089]might wish to consult with the Department before proceeding.
[9090]4
[9091]Me, Flee
[9092]Walter: Elder. - a —
[9094]| (E2 IMPDET
[9096]| SECRET.
[9099]13-00000
[9101]SECRET —
[9103]Talking Points For Use With Senator Gary Hart On His s Proposed
[9105]Contact With Qi WYN
[9107]Senatorial contact with a former CIA agent would run the
[9108]risk of his exposure to his local government and the press.
[9110]. Because of his former activities and relationships he
[9112]might be subjected to reprisals from abroad, possible
[9113]prosecution for espionage at home from his local govern-
[9115]-ment and harassment from the media.
[9117]‘Active as well as former CIA agents abroad would have
[9118]-further cause to believe that the American intelligence
[9120]service is incapable of protecting its informants from dis-
[9121]closure. Contacting an agent. under the insecure conditions
[9122]involved would violate the Agency's promise to this former
[9124]informant to protect the confidentiality of the relationship. ~
[9126]Foreign intelligence services with which the CIA is in
[9128]‘ liaison would find this approach highly unprofessional
[9130]and risky. It is bound to raise further questions about
[9131]the dangers of continued confidential cooperation with»
[9132]the CIA. ;
[9134]It is possible that the local government involved might
[9136]'. lodge a formal protest to the-US mission protesting the —
[9137]-unusual procedure of a Senate investigating committee .—
[9138]‘interrogating its nationals in violation of its sovereignty |
[9140]without requesting formal permission.
[9142]6/24/75
[9144]SECRET.
[9146]he nen tell
[9149]13-00000
[9151]20 June 1975
[9153]MEMORANDUM FOR; Director of Central Intelligence -
[9155]This is for your information concerning Senator Gary |
[9156]Hart's request to talk to a former agent ¢ of ours while
[9157]traveling in Europe.
[9159]You should know that we “have -been told that the
[9160]Senate Select Committee staff has already been in touch.
[9162]with this agent by telephone. We do not know how they — oo
[9163]learned his true name or his whereabouts. We have already
[9165]advised David Aaron of the Senate Select Committee staff
[9166]of a potential problem.araa in connection with such a
[9167]proposed. meeating.. The agent in. question is, of ‘course, |.
[9169]' a subject of interest to. the local intelligence service
[9170]and we doubt that the host government or the intelligence
[9172]Review Staff: 75/868
[9174]service would agree. that a United States senator, especially a
[9176]a member of the Senate Select Committee, may appropriately
[9177]conduct -guch. investigations | within its territory without .
[9178]clearance ‘to do. SO. :
[9180]‘In any event, an ‘approach o£ this ‘nature would be’ .
[9182]of interest and indeed. of concern to the Department of
[9184]State and the senator. night. be well advised to consult,
[9186]. with then. before. proceeding. -
[9188]For your information, the agent referred to is
[9191]Walter Elder |
[9193]a ae
[9194]oe
[9196]7
[9198]een Me DDT BBs 007789
[9199]oreo re 2 IMPDBP
[9201]oo and we » have not been in touch with him since “aoe - 7
[9203]13-00000
[9205]i Vo 3
[9206]MEMORANDUM FOR: DC / ~ a a
[9208]Ting pre
[9210]| wee unt ene
[9212]ard Untlanded
[9213]4. Lana —tRt | gaghs
[9215]FORM NO. idl REPLACES FORM . (47
[9216]UG 54 3 wich MAY. BE usep. : . oo so
[9218]13-00000
[9220]C a ¢ PRa PssED DOD
[9221]SE CAGES SHOWN.
[9223]| a | | WERE, pp ena S
[9227]BRACKETS, |
[9229]‘SUBJECT: GUIDELINES FOR MEMBERS OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE AND |
[9231]‘THEIR STAFFS WHILE TRAVELING ABROAD
[9233]There have been already and there will continue to be members ae
[9235]| ef the Senate Select Committee (SSC) who wish to travel abroad and -
[9237]talk to U. s. enbassy and “intelligence personnel. ‘It is essential
[9239]' that we agree on guidelines to avoid serious diplomatic and security.
[9241]problems. The following specific guidelines are 2 applicable.
[9243]I. MEMBERS AND. STAFF OF THE SSC SHOULD NOT PUBLICLY APPEAR TO BE ,
[9244]| ABROAD FOR THE PURPOSE OF INVESTIGATING U.S. INTELLIGENCE . |
[9245]INSTALLATIONS. | —
[9246]Most of these installations, including all CIA stations ‘abroad,
[9247]‘for example, are under some form of cover, or are naintaining
[9248]a low profile. ‘Certainly all have and ‘need varying degrees of
[9249]protection from exposure. At one extreme axe U.S. intelligence
[9250]activities behind the iron curtain. These clearly need maximum 7
[9251]protection. Ther nere visit of ‘SSC representatives could be .
[9252]noted as evidence of U.S. _ intelligence presence within the
[9253]country. Even in those countries where U. S. intelligence :
[9254]efforts enjoy the shielding and other benefits flowing from
[9255]close Liaison with the host government, care is ‘required | to -
[9257]avoid the potentially grave political repercussions ‘that |
[9259]2 Ture — Jodest- Vevs7on | shear pavatiny :
[9263]13-00000
[9265]; could result to U.S. and host country activities from exposure
[9266]of such 1istson. f Severax foreign governments or entities thereof -
[9267]now willing to cooperate privately with the U.S. in intelligence
[9268]‘agreement s-exchanges naintain strong/neutral or anti-U.S. foreign
[9269]policies; continuation of such agreenents-exchanges is. therefore
[9270]‘dependent upon avoidance of their public disclosure. ‘In many we
[9271]cases termination of such agreements would result in ‘the loss
[9272]“of -unique strategic intelligence, and alternate collection -
[9273]methods are - either not available or are prohibitively expensive.
[9274]‘To help maintain the discreet nature of, the visit, it would be
[9275]preferable if some reason other than ssc business could be _
[9276]given to explain any visits by SSC menbers and staff. No
[9277]Po , “> deliberate contact should be made with the local press; nor
[9278]should comments on SSC matters be supplied if investigating
[9279]officers are contacted by the press. Local press publicity _
[9280]_pertaining to an SSC investigation abroad would in almost all .
[9281]cases be distasteful to the host government.
[9282]“In sum, except in the case of especially sensitive areas,
[9283]discreet arrangements can be made for SSC visits to certain U.S.
[9285]intelligence activities overseas on a case by case basis, and with
[9287]senior officers within the covering embassies. Such visits are
[9288]- contingent upon the -SSC member not publicly declaring himself
[9289]to be on SSC business at the time of the visit or upon his
[9291]‘return, and his proceeding on a basis satisfactory to the Ambassador.
[9293]13-00000
[9295]to. oF
[9297]II, ‘THE AMBASSADOR AT THE EMBASSY VISITED WILL BE IN CHARGE -
[9298]OF THE VISIT...
[9299]All arrangements and contacts will be made by him, and because
[9301]of his knowledge of local situations, his advice will be binding.
[9303]of L. FIELD DISCUSSIONS 1 WITH Uv. 3. INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL, | SHOULD BE
[9304]: ay Va - CONDUCTED ONLY IN GENERAL TERMS. | 7 . |
[9305]a oe It is more fitting that Washington be the place where operational -.
[9306]' details are conveyed to the 58C. Field intelligence elements) a
[9307] yild only discuss operations in general terms—operational
[9308]priorities, the kinds of operations conducted, . the operational :
[9309]ho. . , : ‘environment, relationships with the Embassy and defense attaches, 7
[9310]‘ete. In all cases, such discussions will only be conducted in
[9311]physical surroundings which meet appropriate security standards. :
[9312]Members and staff of the ssc should refrain from asking to. =
[9313]- see texts of or general notes on ‘intelligence agreements between
[9314]_ the U.S. and the host government. These are usually considered _
[9315]by the host government as extremely sensitive, politically and ©.
[9317]operationally, and cannot be divulged without ‘the consent of |
[9319]the host government.
[9320]IV. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC WILL NOT INTERVIEW AGENT PERSONNEL.
[9321]Foreign agent personnel frequently are under hostile or local
[9323]service scrutiny. For them to be placed in touch with Ssc - members
[9325]13-00000
[9327]Vv. .
[9329]LS.
[9331]sould be to run an unacceptable risk. ‘Moreover, serious
[9333]damage would be done to agent norale and motivation if their
[9335]identity were . to be revealed: to Members or staff of the ssc,
[9337]MEMBERS OF HOST COUNTRY INTELLIGENCE OR SECURITY SERVICES
[9339]WILL B IN EXCEPTION ..
[9341]_ Many foreign intelligence services will find contact with the:
[9342].. SSC politically difficult and will avoid it. They further regard
[9344]- that their relationships with Uv. S. intelligence activities, the ©
[9346]information they pass, and the cooperation extended are all most
[9348]sensitive matters. Regardless what assurances are given . then, _
[9349]they would find it difficult and avikivard to discuss these matters
[9350]with members or staff of the SSC. The very fact: that. such matters
[9352]were under investigation could well cause the host service to
[9354]“reassess the desirability of a relationship with U.S. intelligence |
[9356]VI.
[9358]activities.
[9360]MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC SHOULD NOT VISIT FOREIGN TECHNICAL |
[9361]INTELLIGENCE INSTALLATIONS .
[9363]In those countries in which we operate joint technical collection
[9365]‘ sites, the host would be firmly opposed to access by U.S.
[9367]Congressional representatives, especially where there is public
[9369]knowledge of the Congressional investigating interests. If such
[9371]13-00000
[9373]-- a visit is considered essential, a special request must ‘be
[9375]negotiated with the’ host country in advance.
[9377]Senate Select Committee principals and staff should --
[9379]_ understand the distinction between U.S. intelligence .
[9381]installations abroad and joint U.S.-foreign intelligence
[9383]. installations or foreign intelligence installations supported
[9385]"by the U.S. intelligence community. Access to the former
[9387]| Vit.
[9389]is at the discretion of the U.S. Ambassador; access to the
[9391]‘latter two is at the discretion of the foreign government
[9392]_ involved. J a
[9394]AN. ORIENTATION BRIEFING WILL BE PROVIDED ALL MEMBERS: AND: STAFF,
[9395]PRIOR TO- DEPARTURE.
[9396]‘This briefing will be » conducted by the DCI and other representar.
[9398]tives of the Intelligence Community (CIA, NSA, DIA, State, etc.),-
[9400]as appropriate. ‘The purpose of this briefing is to familiarize
[9402]the visitor with the types of activities conducted at each
[9404]- | location, the restraints which are imposed upon U.S. activities
[9406]in each case and the considerations which preclude the discussion .
[9408]‘of operational details, names and terms in an overseas environment.
[9410]Members and staff of the SSC should bear “in mind at all tines that.
[9412]they and their. activities are matters of great interest to opposition
[9414]intélligence services, as well as to the press. Committee and staff
[9416]members, particularly those who are publicly prominent, can hardly
[9418]travel inconspiciously and will be easily recognized.
[9420]13-00000
[9422]_ Pel avers - oe ; wt. _ . Loo, : ; |
[9423]J 721 MEQ. 2/78. re ae 8 oe es oo ;
[9424]' ‘Ca@;e anc o1ssem ov.24 per
[9426]“ PERGON/UNIT NOTIFIED
[9428]REPRODUCTION @Y OTHER THA;
[9429]ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHUNITRI!
[9431]ACTION UNIT
[9433]ACTION #
[9435]Y i05767—ETAaes IN 613590"
[9436]| | _Tenvaniyetz MUN 75 LOND 62615
[9438]ne ee EE
[9440]8 E. . R &T 2047482 JUN. % stare ed
[9441]are: ‘LONDON. e2is a |
[9443]Tor DIRECTOR), -
[9445]~ REF A, DIRECTOR 707518
[9447]By DIRECTOR 708793 oo
[9448]“44 THANK YOU FOR ADVICE REGARDING SENATOR HONDALEYS
[9449]PROPOSED VISIT) AND. AMBASSADOR “AND! MINISTER HAVE ‘BOTH BEEN
[9450]ALERTED, | a oo -
[9451]| 2. IN RESPONSE. 10 PARA 6 REF Ay cos: PLANS TO. BRIEF SENATOR
[9452]| MONDALE ON STRUCTURE OF THE BRITISH INTELLIGENCE. COMMUNI Ty a |
[9453]AND “THE NATURE OF. our INTERFACE WITH 17 WITH PARTICULAR STRESS =
[9454]“ON THE GROUND RULES. GOVERNING “OUR RELATIONSHIP. os wee, ALSO. ue oe
[9455]“COVER THE STATION'S ORGANIZATION, PRIORITIES, AND THE GENERAL |
[9456]| KINDS OF “OPERATIONS BEING RUN, 7 Would: 86 WELPFUL 10 HAVE co od
[9457]“ANSWERS TOA NUMBER OF SPECIFIC QUESTIONS THAT OCCUR TO'USs
[9459]“Ay. WHAT CLEARANCES. DO: SENATOR MONDALE AND WIS THO. STAFF
[9460]. av : co:
[9461]ASSISTANTS covet a TO WHAT. EXTENT HAS. THE. SENATOR BEEN INFORMED
[9463]|
[9465]ABOUT AGEE CASE, ~ AND IN WHAT De TALL. SHOULD THIS, CASE. BE ‘COVERED oo |
[9467]WITH HIM AND His THO. “ASSIS TANCTS 7 to WHAT. ‘EXTENT. ‘SHOULD
[9469]$ EC: R & T To wer,
[9471]13-00000
[9473]~ DeP-MEG. 2776.”
[9475]wer oo TOTAL COPIES RUN BY
[9477]SECRET.
[9479]CA@LE SEC DISSEM BY .
[9480]: : REPRODUCTION BY OTHER -
[9481]. ISSUING OFFICE Is PROHIB
[9483]mo PERGON/UNIT NOTIFIED
[9484]_ - AN os
[9485]ACTION UNIT
[9487]"ACTION F
[9491]TORI 2ag9rt uN 75 Lan 62635.
[9493]~gpeciFic 6 CA PROJECTS. BE DESCRIBED, “ASSUME THERE 18 NOT. QBVECT IONS
[9494]10 POINTING ‘OUT THE DANAGE DONE BY LEAKAGE IN WASHINGTON TO.
[9495]“TOWANKBIT, AS A WAY OF. DRAMATIZING THE NEED FOR ‘SECURITY IN THE 2
[9496]COURSE OF THE SENATE [NVESTIGATION, Dy IF. THE STATION |
[9497]1s TO BE RESPONSBIGLE: FOR THE SENATOR'S HOTEL AND TRAVEL ARRANGEMENTS, |
[9498]WE WOULD. APPRECIATE, BEING. So. INFORMED, BQ IMPDET. |
[9500]as
[9502]é Ae 17 amy ee) p-
[9503]Ly HW Y Lo 1S
[9504]CO |
[9508]13-00000
[9510]“= QUTGOING,~MESSAGE
[9512]SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY ode
[9513]AGE cor” ACP +T0G Tre MRO
[9515]omF o ogo o§ O oOo %O a PO, 7
[9516], s E C R E T o. OUP : cre MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
[9517]STAFF 1837332 TRECTOR 208? h
[9518], os 0 woex DISSEM BY:
[9519]CONF: clo Rio inro: File cl, P lav, , O20 ho oO, OD womoex
[9520]c[Peleca, elo. Lx , ‘®) ‘cs 0 nerurnto PER
[9521]8}
[9523]cla] le? 2 ’ 1 FES >
[9524]TO: LONDON. VIENNA. SONN., PARIS INFO OSLO. HELSINKI. ¥ av
[9527]RYBATY | a |
[9528]we ae
[9530]REF: DIRECTOR 207518 {NOT NEEDED OSLO. HELSINKI} 4
[9532]L. {REF CONCERNED VISIT OF SENATOR MONDALE TO EUROPE IN EARLY
[9533]JULY ON SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE INVESTIGATION ACTIVITIES-} ¥
[9535]2. SENATOR MONDALE'S ITINERARY IS NOT YET FIRM. NOW APPEARS
[9536]HE WILL ARRIVE LONDON ON 30 JUNE FOR TWO-DAY STAY THEN PROCEED
[9537]OSLO AND HELSINKI FOR VISITS NOT CONNECTED WITH SENATE SELECT
[9538]COMMITTEE ACTIVITIES. CURRENT PLANS BRING HIM TO VIENNA 7 JULY FOR
[9539]TWO-DAY STAY THEN TO PARIS {4 DAY? AND BONN £2 DAYS}. NO DECISION
[9541]Ree Cee TRO
[9543]YET AS TO WHICH CITY WILL BE VISITED ESSER VIENNA.
[9545]3- MR. DAVID AARON ADVISES THAT SENATOR WISHES THE DISCUSSIONS.
[9546]TO BE GENERIC IN NATURE. HE WANTS TO KNOW THE STATIONS’ PRIORITIES
[9547]AND THE GENERAL KINDS OF OPERATIONS BEING RUN. BUT HE IS NOT SEEKING
[9549]_ SPECIFICS. ¥
[9551]Y.. MR.» AARON STATES THERE WILL BE No PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT
[9552]OF SELECT COMMITTEE CONNECTIONS, AND IT IS NOT YET CLEAR WHETHER
[9554]“THE SENATOR'S PARTY WILL BE TRAVELING BY AIR FORCE OR COMMERCIAL
[9556]DATE:
[9557]ORIG:
[9558]UNIT:
[9559]EXT:
[9561]RELEASING OFFICER . ° COOROINATING OFFICERS . , . AUTHENTICATING orricen
[9562]CLassinicaTion REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED = E 2 IMPDET
[9563]_ CL BY:
[9565]“ALAALL
[9567]a.
[9569]13-00000
[9570]re OQULGUING VWIKDDAGE
[9572]i _—
[9574].
[9575]4 SIGNAL CENTER USE on,
[9578]onF O O G .@ G° BB:
[9580]CLASSIFICATION
[9582]SECRET .
[9583]MESSAGE HANOUNG INDICATOR OATE-TIME GROUP _ coe . MESSAGE neranence NUMBER
[9584]STAFF — So , : DIRECTOR ,
[9586]CONF: INFO: FILE DO no moss :
[9587]Ao anh, Dame ren
[9588]i] IP FILES. #
[9589]7 AIRCRAFT-¥
[9591]i 5+ FOR LONDON. MR. AARON HAS BEEN IN TOUCH WITH MURRAY
[9592]SYMONDS BUT NOT THROUGH CIA ARRANGENENT-- SENATOR MONDALE HAS
[9593]ASKED FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE FOREIGN OFFICE {AND PROBABLY MI-b}
[9594]_ ON THE BRITISH OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT AND HOU THE BRITISH COMMAND
[9595]SS AND, CONTROL AUTHORITIES RUN WITHIN THE BRITISH SERVICE. WE ARE
[9596]NOT ASKED FOR ANY ASSISTANCE IN THIS AFFAIR.¥
[9597]b- FOR BONN. SENATOR MONDALE PLANS A SIMILAR INDEPENDENT
[9599]GERMAY ENBASSY AD THE BD xf)
[9600]CONTACT WITH THE te
[9602]7. IN A GENERAL REVIEW OF THE TRIP, MR- AARON SAID THAT IN
[9603]VIENNA THE SENATOR WOULD WISH TO DISCUSS EAST/UEST RELATIONS AND
[9604]HOW THESE AFFECT THE OPERATIONAL PICTURE IN THAT CITY- IN BONN
[9605]THE SENATOR WILL WISH TO LOOK INTO. COUNTRY TEAM RELATIONS AND
[9607]MAY ALSO BE INTERESTED IN SEEING THE WESTPORT FACILITY- IN PARIS
[9608]THE SENATOR WILL EXPECT TO REVIEW THE STATION'S VARIED PROGRAM. ¥
[9609]es B. WE NOTED THE SENATOR'S INVESTIGATION MAY STILL BE SUBJECT.
[9611]TO HIGHER LEVEL EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT DIRECTION OF WHICH WE HAVE NOT
[9613]YET BEEN INFORMED. £2, IMPDET.dA ~ oT
[9614]. pate: 17 JUNE 1975. Pe ——
[9615]orIG: WILLIAM W. WELLS  E- -H. KNOCHE Libesevs
[9616]UNIT: C/EUR ih.
[9617]EXT: 101
[9619]fy, - Ww. “2
[9620]UICLIAM W- WELLS4 C/EUR sous’ Oa SALZDDO
[9621]CLASSIFICATION REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE 1S promisiTeD — 2 IMPDET
[9623]‘ cL BY:
[9624]cor fe PF tT ; ;
[9626]13-00000
[9628]ee SECRET
[9630]MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
[9632]DATE AND- PLACE: 17 June 1975 1000 - 1100
[9633]Room 2E-45
[9635]SUBJECT: Conversation by Mr. John Waller, SA/DDO with
[9636]Mr. David Aaron, member of Senator Mondale's
[9637]staff, with Regard to the Senator's Proposed
[9638]Trip to Europe
[9640]1. According to Mr. Aaron the Senator and Mr. Aaron's itinerary,
[9641]while not yet fixed, will be along the following lines:
[9643]a. 30 June - 1 July: London
[9644]b. Monday, 7 June: Vienna, for one day
[9646]c. Paris and Bonn. Although the order has not yet been
[9647]determined, the Bonn stop would be two days and the
[9648]Paris stop, one day.
[9650]In the period between London and Vienna, the party intends to visit
[9651]Oslo and Helsinki.. The purpose of this part of the trip, however,
[9652]has nothing to do with the SSC and the party does not want or need
[9653]Station contact.
[9655]2. Mr. Aaron agrees that in discussions with Stations, the
[9656]party should not get into specific operational cases. They want to
[9657]discuss "more generic" subjects: operational priorities, relations
[9658]with the Embassy, problems, scope of liaison, operating conditions,
[9659]—t etc. Their basic interests are related to “command and control".
[9660]It had occurred to Aaron that Vienna would be a good example of a \
[9661]Station which concentrates on "East - West" operations (read third
[9662]country, Sov and Sov Bloc operations}. He recognized London was a
[9663]liaison station. Mondale, however, was anxious to talk to Cord Meyer. |
[9665]E2 IMPDET
[9667]SECRET | . Et By 085636
[9669]13-00000
[9671]a  SERRET
[9673]Paris, he felt, would provide some understanding of "third world"
[9674]operations. Bonn, he felt, would be a good example of the inter-
[9675]relations of a CIA Station with the Military and the Foreign Service.
[9677]3. Mr. Aaron stated that he had already sought out Mr. Simon
[9678]of the British Embassy, requesting that contacts be arranged in
[9679]London with the appropriate Foreign Office or Intelligence Offices
[9680]in order to discuss the British experiences in "command and control”.
[9681]Aaron is also interested in how the British Official Secrets Act
[9682]works. He had heard that it was proving inadequate. Mr. Aaron
[9683]stated that Simon had not been enthusiastic about the idea but
[9684]promised to look into it. Aaron felt that it had been better to
[9685]work directly with Simon, whom he claimed to know,than to involve
[9686]the Agency's go-between.
[9688]4. Mr. Aaron intended to make a similar approach to the German
[9689]Embassy. : ;
[9691]5. Mr. Waller commented that such approaches to foreign
[9692]- governments would make our liaison services uneasy and could
[9693]adversely affect their willingness to cooperate. To this reason,
[9694]we did not favor involving foreign governments -- at whatever
[9695]level or wherever in the bureaucracy. Moreover, contacts with -
[9696]foreign governments increased the likelihood that the true purpose
[9697]of the Senator's trip could leak to the press. Mr. Waller mentioned
[9698]that he would want to bring this to the attention of others.
[9700]6. Mr. Aaron agreed that the Senator, through press conferences
[9701]or otherwise, would not make public the fact that his trip was
[9702]connected with Select Committee investigations.
[9704]7. Mr. Aaron said that he and the Senator were in touch with
[9705]Mr. Hyland of the State Department with regard to this trip. He
[9706]also sugges ted that they might get in touch with military intelligence
[9707]services in Washington and in the field. He made specific reference
[9708]to "Naval Intelligence".
[9710]8. Mr. Aaron stressed the fact that the itinerary was still
[9711]tentative and subject to change.
[9713]SEGRET
[9715]13-00000
[9717]oe SECRET
[9721]9. At one point, Mr. Aaron asked if CIA had any aircraft
[9722]in Europe which could be put at Senator Mondale's disposal.
[9723]Mr. Waller replied negatively.
[9725]10. Mr. Aaron felt that it was unlikely that Mr. Bader
[9726]would be a member of the Senator's party.
[9728]Distribution:
[9729]1 - Mr. Knoche
[9730]1 - Mr. Wells
[9731]1 - Miss Page
[9732]1 - Mr. Leader
[9734]SECRET
[9736]13-00000
[9738]i
[9739]i
[9740]|
[9741]i
[9743]CABLE SEC DISSEM avd PER TOTAL cored — i
[9744]PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED__ : Pam
[9745]-E COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED py é/
[9746]. ACTION unit
[9747]ruz. ve Wan S50.
[9749]Ogun | .
[9751]action # | Ole Se. “lor <= —
[9753]T 892461 E1A462 PAGE 21
[9755]TORS1699212 JUN 75
[9757]SEC RE T 1668532 JUN 75 STAFF
[9759]CITE VIENNA 26877
[9760]TOs DIRECTOR.
[9761]RyYBAT
[9763]REF’ DIRECTOR 797518
[9765]IN 696574
[9766]VIEN 26877
[9768]Nye
[9770]1e ALTHOUGH WE WOULD GENERALLY PLAN BRIEF SENATOR MONDALE
[9772]ON STATIONS POSITION WITHIN EMBASSY, PRIMARY TARGETS...
[9774]ORGANJZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND DEPLOYMENT FOR OPERATIONS, CAN OF
[9776]COURSE ADJUST TO SUIT HIS REQUIREMENTS, WHICH HOPEFULLY WILL
[9778]COME INTO CLEARER FOCUS AFTER HOS BRIEFING MENTIONED PARA 8 REF,
[9780]3. NO FILE, E2 IMPDET.
[9782]SECRET
[9784]2. IF POSSIBLE, WOULD APPRECIATE CONFIRMATION THAT STAFF
[9785]AIDE, MR, WILLIAM BADER (PARA 2 REF) IS IDENTICAL WITH PERSON OF |
[9786]SAEM NAME WHO WAS FORD FOUNDATION REPRESENTAT:VE IN PARIS LATE
[9787]SIXTIES AND AT THAT TIME WAS NAVAL RESERVE LIEUTENNANT COMMANDER,
[9789]13-00000
[9793]TOE PRIORITY LONDONs VIENNA, BONN PARIS. 7
[9795]-RYBAT 4 yo oe mos | - ne
[9797]“suasects THE vISIT OF SENATOR MONDALE OF MINNESOTA TO EUROPE
[9799]70 EXAMINE, ‘AGENCY, COMMAND AND. CONTROL IN THE FIELD- " SENATO
[9801]“GATING CIA ACTIVITIES. MR. “WILLIAM BADER: A SECOND STAFF MEMBER.
[9802]; HAY ALSO ACCOMPANY THE SENATOR. ¥ |
[9804]wUILUVIIN NWIRDDIAUE
[9806]aa We Cs a
[9807]Pt anu ua om 8 aE es
[9808]OMF o “Oo OG Oo oO G oo. a oy
[9809]. cuassmcarion ce, 7 . . 3l- ;
[9810]SECRET - nar
[9811]4 SRA 0 MANOLINS INGIeATOR . . _ DATE-Timg GROUP < org Loe MEBBAGH REFAREHCE NUMOER - . .
[9812]STAFF oo, L4Lb51Z Dy ECTOR a a 707524
[9814]D weez - DISSEM BY: 28
[9815]CONF: a/mgi G INFO: FILE bez, ‘Diez, bao, esheF, OAL, o mo wean
[9817]_ ofPlan, poole, tlalo ' “efoPs, eleswha rerumre . PER
[9819]CfASIEER, - . A vey S Le
[9821]| AT THE END OF THE: MONTH. = ee oe
[9822]— THE SENATORIAL PARTY. WISHES. To VISIT CIA FIELD STATIONS:
[9824]MONDALE. WILL WISH | TO TALK. 70 You } ABOUT. How STATIONS OPERATE AND
[9825]THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE STATION AND THE: EMBASSY. PRESUMABLY
[9827]: THE “SENATOR WILL ALSO UISH TO EXAMINE OUR O8 COUNTRY TEAM RELATIONS. so
[9829]2. SENATOR NONDALE ‘WILL BE TRAVELING WITH HIS PERSONAL
[9830]AIDE. MR. “DAVID AARON, WHO IS THE DIRECTOR OF THE TASK FORCE .
[9831]ON COMMAND. AND CONTROL OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE INVESTI~
[9833]~REequesl. OF ages
[9834]3. HEADQUARTERS WILL “SUGCESPHTO SENATOR MONDALE THAT HE USE
[9836]OTHER REASONS: THAN THE ‘SENATE. SELECT COMMITTEE INVESTIGATION FOR - |
[9837]ET :
[9839]HiS TRAVEL: IN HIS. DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PRESS: WE DO NOT KNOW, -
[9840]A. ,
[9842]HOWEVER, IF HE WILL AGREE-¥ |. . ee eT
[9843]“pare: |
[9847]UNIT:
[9849]EXT:
[9851]. puceanina OFFICER : . coonoinanina ornicans : aurmerncanns OPPcan .
[9853]cussemearon «= REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED £ 2 — IMPDET
[9855]SECRET , oe | oe, CL BY: 93,2866
[9857]13-00000
[9860]ho : . * mavaLcentin uae onty . . .
[9861]vee aon | cot ach TO Tee mg et j
[9862]OMF- O 0 GO 90° °0 0. Oe. -
[9863]- . Safina Fueldunbrwnbaron . : - 7 . naré-rmaenour. oo . 7 oO ore _ 7 MESSAGE REFERENCE UMBER 7 -
[9869]NO iNONX
[9871]nao.
[9873]‘aerunnto PER
[9875]You: ‘SHOULD ADVISE THE “AMBASSADOR OF: THE SENATOR'S” me
[9877]INTENTIONS To VISIT HIS MISSION AND. THE PURPOSE OF THE vISIT~ _ .
[9878]LEASE. ASK THE AMBASSADOR “To RESTRICT: HIS. ‘CORRESPONDENCE TO. “WASHINGTON .~
[9880]BouT THIS TRIP TO, EITHER CIA. CHANNELS oR THE ROGER. CHANNEL - ad
[9882]© LATER: RESTRICTIONS MAY BE FORTHCOMING. DEPENDING ON ‘HOU. SENATOR
[9883]7 MONDALE DECIDES TO HANDLE HIS PUBLIC STATEMENTS. -
[9884]oe 5. THE CODEL' S TENTATIVE ITINERARY IS AS FOLLOWS: DEPART
[9886]30 JUNE VIA COMMERCTAL AIRCRAFT > ARRIVING | LONDON L SULYs 2 aULy -
[9888]“WIENNAS 3-4 JULY ~ - BONN’ 5-6 “guLy. - “PARIS 33 28 JULY - “LONDONS”
[9890]a) SULY = RETURN, TO THE U. si
[9892]che. REQUEST EACH COs ADVISE: HEADQUARTERS OF HIS P PLANS FOR
[9894]BRIEFING. EvSENATOR. ¥ oo As
[9895]| FOR BONN... SUGGEST you ‘CONSTDER A VISIT 10 UESTPORT. vo
[9897]te
[9898]be HEADQUARTERS WILL OFFER A BRIEFING TO SENATOR MONDALE
[9900]ano HIS PARTY AT HEADQUARTERS PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE. E2, IMPDETA
[9901]“Gf MoRE specific qui Dance ON oPgestione! discussions 7d
[9902]Fallow. / EB +Hs KNOCHE 5
[9904]_ BATE: 13 “JUNE 1975
[9905]ORG: HTLLTAM We hes
[9906]ill C/EUR
[9908]RALSASING OFMcER .
[9910]I
[9912]COORDINATING OFFICERS : a a AUTHENTICATING LJ
[9914]chagsincanion REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHISITED £ 2 IMPDET
[9915]. . . « . .
[9916]: , ; - CL BY:
[9920]DL@Sebeh .
[9922]13-00000
[9924]C-
[9927]a
[9929]SUBJECT: Guidelines for Members of the Select
[9930]Committee and Their Staffs While
[9931]Traveling Abroad
[9933]There have been already and there will continue to
[9934]be members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) who
[9935]wish to travel abroad and be in conversation with our
[9936]Stations. It is important that we agree on guidelines
[9937]to avoid serious security problems from arising. The
[9938]following specific guidelines are considered important:
[9940]-- Members of the SSC and members of its staff
[9942]should not publicly appear to be abroad for
[9943]urposes of investigating CIA installations.
[9945]CIA Stations abroad, all of which are under
[9946]some form of cover, have and need varying
[9947]degrees of protection from exposure. At
[9948]one extreme are Stations behind the iron
[9949]curtain or in other particularly sensitive
[9950]areas which need maximum protection. At
[9951]the other extreme are Stations which enjoy
[9952]close liaison with the host government and
[9953]are thus less sensitive... In the first case,
[9954]Stations existing under strict cover conditions
[9955]in sensitive environments, the very presence of
[9956]SSC members could be highly provocative by
[9957]flaunting the fact of CIA's presence. But
[9958]even in countries in which we enjoy a good
[9959]liaison with the host country's security
[9960]service, there remains a need to be discreet.
[9961]Many countries whose services want to be
[9962]cooperative with CIA cannot afford public or
[9963]parliamentary exposure of the relationship.
[9964]Local press publicity pertaining to an SSC
[9965]investigation abroad would in almost all
[9966]cases be distastefull to a host government.
[9968]SEORET
[9970]13-00000
[9974]In sum, except in the case of very’ sensitive
[9976]areas, discreet arrangements can be arranged
[9978]for SSC visits to CIA's overseas stations and
[9979]with senior officers within the covering Embassy
[9980]provided the SSC member does not publicly declare
[9981]himself to be on SSC business and maintains his
[9982]Station contacts on a discreet basis. .
[9984]Members of the SSC and their staff should not
[9985]uestion Station personnel on Specific operational
[9986]detail. It is more fitting that Washington be the
[9987]place where operational details are conveyed to
[9988]the SSC. It is at Headquarters where the guide-
[9989]lines are best understood, where the most complete
[9990]and authentic records are kept (many Stations
[9991]finding themselves in dangerous crisis situations,
[9992]have periodically destroyed their files}. There
[9993]is no reason, however, that Station Chiefs should
[9994]not discuss operations in general terms -- opera-
[9995]tional priorities, the kinds of operations, the
[9996]operational environment, relationships with the
[9997]Embassy, the service attaches, etc.
[9999]Members of the SSC and their staff should not
[10000]interview agent personnel. Foreign agent
[10001]personnel frequently are under hostile or
[10002]local service scrutiny. For them to be placed
[10003]in touch with SSC members would be to run an
[10004]unacceptable risk. Moreover, serious damage
[10005]could be done to agent morale and motivation
[10006]if they were to think their role had been
[10007]revealed to members of Congress.
[10009]Members of the SSC and their staff should not
[10011]in most cases be in contact with members of
[10013]host country's sntetiigence or security services.
[10014]any services will find contact with tne SSC
[10016]politically difficult and will avoid it. They
[10017]further regard that their relationships with CIA,
[10019]the information they pass us and the sort of
[10020]cooperation extended as a most sensitive matter.
[10022]SECRET
[10024]13-00000
[10025]ee | BEURE
[10027]No matter what assurances are given them,
[10028]they would find it difficult and awkward to
[10029]discuss these matters with the SSC or its
[10030]: staff, and the very fact that such matters
[10031]! were under investigation could well cause
[10032]them to reassess the desirability of a
[10033]relationship with CIA or other U.S.
[10034]intelligence agencies. Exceptions can
[10035]: perhaps be made in special cases.
[10037]-- Members of the SSC and their staff should
[10038]not visit foreign technical intelligence
[10039]installations. Again there may be exceptions
[10040]to this which can be arranged, but in most
[10041]countries in which we operate joint technical
[10042]collection sites, the host service would be
[10043]opposed to access by Congressional representatives.
[10045]rome
[10046]Stowe
[10048]13-00000
[10052]SUBJECT: Guidelines for Members of the Select
[10053]Committee and Their Staffs While
[10054]Traveling Abroad
[10056]There have been already and there will continue to
[10057]be members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) who
[10058]Wish to travel abroad and be in conversation with our
[10059]Stations. It is important that we agree on guidelines
[10060]to avoid serious security problems from arising. The
[10061]following specific guidelines are considered important:
[10063]-- Members of the SSC and members of its staff
[10064]should not publicly appear to be abroad for
[10065]purposes of investigating CIA installations.
[10066]CIA Stations abroad, all of which are under
[10068]some form of cover, have and need varying
[10069]degrees of protection from exposure. At
[10070]one extreme are Stations behind the iron
[10071]curtain or in other particularly sensitive
[10072]areas which need maximum protection. At
[10073]the other extreme are Stations which enjoy
[10074]close liaison with the host government and
[10075]are thus less sensitive. In the first case,
[10076]Stations existing under strict cover conditions
[10077]in sensitive environments, the very presence of
[10078]SSC members could be highly provocative by
[10079]flaunting the fact of CIA's presence. But
[10080]even in countries in which we enjoy a good
[10081]liaison with the host country's security
[10082]service, there remains a need to be discreet.
[10083]Many countries whose services want to be
[10084]cooperative with CIA cannot afford public or
[10085]parliamentary exposure of the relationship.
[10086]Local press publicity pertaining to an SSC
[10087]investigation abroad would in almost all
[10088]cases be distastefull to a host government.
[10090]13-00000
[10092]|
[10093]t
[10095]ee eee i ineee n
[10097]In sum, except in the case of very sensitive
[10098]areas, discreet arrangements can be arranged
[10100]for SSC visits to CIA's overseas stations and
[10101]with senior officers within the covering Embassy
[10102]provided the SSC member does not publicly declare
[10103]himself to be on SSC business and maintains his
[10104]Station contacts on a discreet basis.
[10106]Members of the SSC and their staff should not
[10107]quest yon Station personnel on specific operational
[10108]etail. It 1s more fitting that Washington be the
[10109]place where operational details are conveyed to
[10110]the SSC. It is at Headquarters where the guide-
[10111]lines are best understood, where the most complete
[10112]and authentic records are kept (many Stations
[10113]finding themselves in dangerous crisis situations,
[10114]have periodically destroyed their files). There
[10115]is no reason, however, that Station Chiefs should
[10116]not discuss operations in general terms -- opera-
[10117]tional priorities, the kinds of operations, the
[10118]operational environment, relationships with the
[10119]Embassy, the service attaches, etc.
[10121]Members of the SSC and their staff should not
[10122]interview agent personnel. Foreign agent
[10123]personnel frequently are under hostile or
[10124]local service scrutiny. For them to be placed
[10125]in touch with SSC members would be to run an
[10126]unacceptable risk. Moreover, serious damage
[10127]could be done to agent morale and motivation
[10128]if. they were to think their role had been
[10129]revealed to members of Congress.
[10131]Members of the SSC and their staff should not
[10133]in most cases be in contact with members of
[10135]host country's intelligence or security services.
[10136]Many services will Find contact with the SSC
[10137]politically difficult and will avoid it. They
[10138]further regard that their relationships with CIA,
[10140]the information they pass us and the sort of -
[10141]cooperation extended as a most sensitive matter.
[10143]13-00000
[10145]No matter what assurances are given them,
[10147]they would find it difficult and awkward to
[10149]discuss these matters with the SSC or its
[10151]staff, and the very fact that such matters
[10152]were under investigation could well cause
[10153]them to reassess the desirability of a
[10154]relationship with CIA or other U.S.
[10155]intelligence agencies. Exceptions can
[10156]perhaps be made in special cases.
[10158]-- Members of the SSC and their staff should
[10159]not visit foreign technical intelligence
[10160]installations. Again there may be exceptions
[10161]to this which can be arranged, but in most
[10162]countries in which we operate joint technical
[10163]collection sites, the host service would be
[10164]opposed.to access by Congressional representatives.
[10166]13-00000
[10170]“ ce : 7 a - —_ _ . slabs
[10172]SUBJECT:. Guidelines for Members. of the Select Committee and
[10173]Their Staffs While Traveling Abroad © e
[10175]There have been already and there will continue to be: members
[10177]‘of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) wha wish to travel. abroad and’
[10179].
[10181]talk to U.S. embassy. and Antelligence personnel... It is essential that
[10183]we agree On. guidelines: to avoid s serious. diplomatic and security. problems.
[10185]‘The following. specific guldelines a are applicable: :
[10187]I. MEMBERS AND'STAF F OF THE. ssc. SHOULD PUBLICLY APPEAR :
[10188]ro BE ABROAD FOR SOME: PURPOSE OTHER THAN. THE °
[10189]“INVESTIGATION OF U. S. INTELLIGENCE INSTALLATIONS,
[10193]‘Most of these. installations, including all CIA stations abroad, for
[10195]~ "sc example} a are under, some. form of cover, or are maintaining a low
[10197]Profile. . Certainly 3 all have and need.varying degrees of. protection .
[10199]from exposure vat. one extreme are U.S. intelligence activities.
[10201]behind the iron - cctatn. These « clearly need maximum protection.
[10202]The ‘mere visit of SSC. representatives. could be noted as evidence
[10204], of U.S: intelligence presence within the country. - Even in those
[10205]countries where U.S. intelligence efforts enjoy the shielding and
[10206]other beriefits flowing from close liaison with the host government,
[10208]care.is required to avoid the potentially grave political repercussions
[10210]13-00000
[10214]“ae
[10216]that could result to U.S.. and host country activities from exposure
[10218]of such liaison. Many countries that wish to cooperate with the
[10220]' United States in intelligence endeavors simply cannot afford public _
[10222]exposure of such relationships. Some reason other than $ SSC business
[10223]should be given to > explain any visits by SSG members and staff to
[10224]help maintain ihe discreet nature of the visit. No deliberate: contact
[10225]should. be made with the: tocal press, ‘nor should comments. on 1 SSC
[10226]matters be. supplied if: investigating officers are: contacted by y the :
[10227]presa. Local press publicity pertaining to.an ssc investigation abrond.
[10228]would in almost all cases be distasteful to the host government, ‘ : 7 |
[10229]; In sum, ‘except in. the. case-of especially sensitive areas, discreet
[10231]arrangements can be made for SSC visits to certain U.S. intelligence :
[10233]activities overseas ‘on a case. by.case basis, and with senior officers
[10235]within the covering embassies. Such visits are contingent upon the’
[10236]ssc nlember 1 not. “Publicly. declaring: himself to be on ssc. business.
[10238]at the | time of the visit or upon his return, an and his procéeding ona
[10240]7 basis satisfactory to the Ambassador:
[10242]THE AMBASSADOR AT THE EMBASSY VISITED WILL BE IN CHARGE
[10244]OF THE VISIT.
[10246]All arrangements and contacts. will be made by him, and because of his
[10248]_ knowledge of local situations, his advice will be binding.
[10250]13-00000
[10252]Mm. FLELD DISCUSSIONS WITH U.S, INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL
[10253]SHOULD BE CONDUCTED ONLY IN GENERAL TERMS. :
[10254]It is more fitting that Washington be the place where operational
[10255]; details are conveyed to the SSC. Field intelligence elements will.
[10256]only discuss operations in general terms _ operational priorities, .
[10257]the kinds of operations conducted, the operational environment,
[10258]relationships with the Embassy and. defense attaches, etc. ‘In all
[10259]cases, such discussions will only. be conducted.in physical surroundings.”
[10260]which meet appropriate security standards. |
[10261]Members and statt of the SSC should refrain from asking to
[10262]‘see texts of, or general notes on intelligence agreements between the
[10263]U.S.. and the host government. These are usually considered by the
[10264]host government as extremely sensitive, politically and operationally,
[10266]and cannot be divulged without the consent of the: host government. -
[10268]IV.. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC WILL NOT INTERVIEW AGENT
[10270]PERSONNEL,
[10272]! _ . Foreign agent personnel frequently are under hostile or local service
[10274]° scrutiny. For them to be placed ‘in touch with SSC members would be
[10276]13-00000
[10278]to run an unacceptable risk. Moreover, serious damage. would be
[10279]done to agent morale and-motivation if their identity were to. be -
[10281]revealed to Members or staff of the SSC. _ . -
[10283]Vv. MEMBERS OF HOST COUNTRY INTELLIGENCE OR SECURITY. 2 |
[10284]. SERVICES W WILL BE.CONTACTED ONLY my EXCEPTIONAL CASES: 3
[10285]Many foreign intelligence » services. s will, find contact with the ssc
[10286]7 politically difficult and. will avoid : it.. “They further regard that their -
[10287]relationships with U. s. intelligence activities, the information. they. -
[10288]pase, and the cooperation extended are all most sensitive matters! ~
[10289]‘Regardless. what assurances are given them, they: would find it -
[10291]; difficult and awkward to discuss these matters with members or
[10293]staff of the ssc. 7 ‘The: very fact that such matters were
[10295]‘the host: ‘service to: reassess: s the , desirability of 2 a. fe
[10297]relationship with U.S S.. ‘intelligence activities. i
[10299][EMBERS AND'STAFF OF THE SSC SHOULD NOT VISIT FOREIGN
[10301]TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE INSTALLATIONS.
[10303]* In those countries in which we operate joint. technical collection sites,
[10304]the host would be firmly opposed to access by U.S. Congressional .
[10305]repre sentatives, especially where there is public knowledge of the
[10307]Congressional investigating interests. If such a visit is considered
[10309]13-00000
[10311]Sd
[10313]essential,.a special request must be negotiated with the host country
[10315]. in advance.
[10317]-. VIL AN. ORIENTATION BRIEF ING, WILL BE PROVIDED. ALL MEMBERS
[10319]' AND STAFF, PRIOR. TO DEPARTURE,
[10321]This briefing will be conducted by the. DCL: and other representatives -
[10322]of the Intelligence: Community (CIA: NSA. DIA, State, etc. }y as cate
[10324]appropriate. ‘The purpose of this briefing is to familiarize the _
[10326]visitor with the. types of ‘aétivities conducted -at each location, the
[10327]_ restraints which are imposed upon U.S. activities in each case and ,
[10329]‘the considerations which preclude the discussion of operational details,
[10331]names and terms in an overseas environment..
[10333]“Members and staff: of the ssc. should bear j in mind at all times that
[10335]: they. and their activities: are ‘matters af: great interest to opposition
[10337]intelligence services, as well as to the-press. “Committee and staff. o .
[10338]members, particularly those who are publicly prominent, can hardly
[10340]travel inconspiciously and. will be easily recognized.
[10342]13-00000
[10344]|
[10345]| «
[10347]i
[10349]wae a
[10353]SUBJECT: Guidelines for Members of the Select
[10354]Committee and Their Staffs While
[10355]Traveling Abroad
[10357]There have been already and there will continue to
[10358]be members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) who
[10359]wish to travel abroad and be in conversation with our
[10360]Stations. It is important that we agree on guidelines
[10361]to avoid serious security problems from arising. The
[10362]following specific guidelines are considered important :
[10364]-- Members of the SSC and members of its staff
[10365]should not publicl ear to be abroad for
[10366]urposes of investi ath CIA installations.
[10368]CIA Stations abroad, all of which are under
[10369]some form of cover, have and need varying
[10370]degrees of protection from exposure. At
[10371]one extreme are Stations behind the iron
[10372]curtain or in other particularly sensitive
[10373]areas which need maximum protection. At
[10374]the other extreme are Stations which enjoy
[10375]close liaison with the host government and
[10376]are thus less sensitive. In the first case,
[10377]Stations existing under strict cover conditions
[10378]in sensitive environments, the very presence of
[10379]SSC members could be highly provocative by
[10380]flaunting the fact of CIA's presence. But >
[10381]even in countries in which we enjoy a good
[10382]liaison with the host country's security
[10383]service, there remains a need to be discreet.
[10384]Many countries whose services want to be
[10385]cooperative with CIA cannot afford public or
[10386]parliamentary exposure of the relationship.
[10387]Local press publicity pertaining to an SSC
[10388]investigation abroad would in almost all
[10389]cases be distastefull to a host government.
[10391]SECRET
[10393]13-00000
[10395]|
[10397]In sum, except in the case of very sensitive
[10398]areas, discreet arrangements can be arranged
[10400]for SSC visits to CIA's overseas stations and
[10401]with senior officers within the covering Embassy
[10402]provided the SSC member does not publicly declare
[10403]himself to be on SSC business and maintains his
[10404]Station contacts on a discreet basis.
[10406]Members of the SSC and their staff should not
[10408]uestion Station personnel on specific operational
[10409]detail. It 1s more fitting that Washington be the
[10410]place where operational details are conveyed to
[10411]the SSC. It is at Headquarters where the guide-
[10412]lines are best understood, where the most complete
[10413]and authentic records are kept (many Stations
[10415]finding themselves in dangerous crisis situations,
[10416]have periodically destroyed their files). There
[10418]‘is no reason, however, that Station Chiefs. should
[10420]not discuss operations in general terms -- opera-
[10421]tional priorities, the kinds of operations, the
[10422]operational environment, relationships with the
[10423]Embassy, the service attaches, etc.
[10425]Members of the SSC and their staff should not
[10426]interview agent personnel. Foreign agent
[10427]personnel frequently are under hostile or
[10428]local service scrutiny. For them to be placed
[10429]in touch with SSC members would be to run an
[10430]unacceptable risk. Moreover, serious damage
[10431]could be done to agent morale and motivation
[10432]if they were to think their role had been
[10433]revealed to members of Congress.
[10435]Members of the SSC and their staff should not
[10437]in most cases be in contact with members of
[10439]host country's intelligence or security services.
[10440]Many services will Tint contact with the ssc
[10441]politically difficult and will avoid it. They
[10442]further regard that their relationships with CIA,
[10444]the information they pass us and the sort of
[10445]cooperation extended as a most sensitive matter.
[10447]SEGRET
[10449]13-00000
[10451]2
[10452]m
[10453]re
[10454]“4
[10458]|
[10459]| wow Par *
[10460]t
[10463]No matter what assurances are given then,
[10464]they would find it difficult and awkward to
[10465]discuss these matters with the SSC or its
[10466]staff, and the very fact that such matters
[10467]were under investigation could well cause
[10468]them to reassess the desirability of a
[10469]relationship with CIA or other U.S.
[10470]intelligence agencies. Exceptions can
[10471]perhaps be made in special cases.
[10473]-- Members of the SSC and their staff should
[10474]not visit foreign technical intelligence
[10475]installations. Again there may be exceptions
[10476]to this which can be arranged, but in most
[10477]countries in which we operate .joint technical
[10478]collection sites, the host service would be
[10479]opposed to access by Congressional representatives.
[10481]SECRET