[1]157-10014-10089 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
[3]Date : 08/06/95
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[6]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[7]IDENTIFICATION ‘FORM
[9]AGENCY
[11]RECORD NUMBER
[12]RECORDS SERIES
[13]AGENCY FILE NUMBER
[15]SSCIA
[16]157-10014-10089
[17]HEARINGS
[18]11-H-08
[20]ORIGINATOR -
[22]FROM
[24]TO
[26]TITLE
[27]DATE
[28]PAGES
[29]SUBJECTS
[31]DOCUMENT TYPE
[32]CLASSIFICATION
[33]RESTRICTIONS
[34]CURRENT STATUS
[36]DATE OF LAST REVIEW
[37]OPENING CRITERIA
[38]COMMENTS
[40]aa ae 00 00 0s ce oe
[42]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[44]SSCIA
[45]TWEEDY, BRONSON
[47]10/09/75
[48]92
[49]CIA
[51]ASSASSINATION, LUMUMBA, PATRICE
[53]TRANSCRIPT
[54]UNCLASSIFIED
[56]1A, 1B, 1¢
[58]RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
[59]09/25/98
[63][R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED
[65]HW 50955 DocId:32423477 Page 1
[68]Co)
[69]ty
[70]3
[72]N
[74]Report of Proceedings
[76]mar: a)
[77]wi Ef
[79]Hearing held before
[81]Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental
[83]Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities
[85]Thursday, October 9, 1975
[87]Washington, D.C.
[89](Stenotype Tape and Waste turns ¢
[91]Wer
[92]to the Committee for destruct:. =
[94]WARD & PAUL
[96]410 FIRST STREET, S. F.
[97]WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003
[99](202) 544-6000 ©
[101]TOP SECRET
[104]WARGO ® PAUL
[106]EXHIBIT
[108]No.
[110]No.
[112]No.
[114]No.
[116]No.
[118]; NO.
[120]i No.
[122]No.
[124]No.
[125]| No.
[127]| No.
[129]a NO.
[131]EXHIBITS
[133]FOR IDENTIFICATION
[134]3
[135]1
[136]2A
[137]32
[138]35
[139]39
[140]Al
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[146]63.
[149]Pd
[150]2
[153]e
[154]c
[157]z
[159]EXECUTIVE: SESSION
[161]Thursday, October 10, 1975
[163]United States Senate,
[164]Salect Committee to Study Governmental
[165]Operations With Respect to
[166]Intelligence Activities,
[167]Washington, ND. Cc.
[168]The Committees mot, pursuant to notica, at 11:25 o'clock
[170]a.m. ir Room 407, The Capitol, thea Honorable Richard Schweiker
[172]’ prasiding.
[173]u
[175]Prasent: Senator Schweiker (prasiding),
[177]Also present: Frederick Raron and Rhett Dawson, Profes-
[179]’ sional Staff Members.
[181]TOP SECRET
[184]PROCEEDING
[186]Senator Schweiker. Would..you’ raise your right hand?
[188]Prone {Aree 207) 344-4008
[190]DO you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to
[191]| give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth,
[192]so halp you God?
[194]Mr. Tweedy. I do.
[196]Senator Schweiker. It has been nice meating you.
[198]Mr. Tweedy. Thank you very much.
[200](Whereupon, Senator Schweiker left the hearing room.)
[202](Discussion off the record.)
[203]Mr. Baron. Mr. Tweedy, you have just receivad the oath
[204]from Senator Schweiker, who has now laft tha room, and you are
[206]‘under no obligation to continue to testify in his absanca, but
[208]4
[209]2
[213]a
[214]a
[215]t
[217]g
[219]‘ obviously the Committes would appraciate it graatly if you
[220]would continue to testify.
[221]Are you willing to continue to testify in the Senator's
[222]absence?
[223]Mr. Tweedy. I plan to testify fully.
[224]Mr. Baron. You are willing to tustify to tha truth as hsv?
[225]as you can do it?
[226]Mr. Tweedy. I will indeed.
[227]Ar. Baron. Are you aware that vou have the riqht to
[228]counsel?
[229]Mr. Tweedy.
[231]‘ir. Saron. You ars appearing here voluntarily without
[233]TOP SECRET
[236]s
[237]2
[239]s
[240]a
[241]o
[244]z
[246]we
[250]Wasran at:
[252]ne
[254]ALO Haast Stee
[256]“ questions at any point if you wish to conault with counsel?
[258]counsel?
[259]Mr. Tweedy. I am.
[261]Mr. Baron. Ara you also awara that you may cease answering
[263]Mr. Tweedy. I am.
[265]Mr. Baron. Finally, are: you aware that all of your Consti-
[267]tutional rights are intact, including your Fifth Amandment
[269]rights to remain silent?
[271]Mr. Tweedy. I am,
[272]Mr. Baron. All riqht, then.
[274]Let us proceed to reviaw a set of documents which were not
[276]“available to us in your first examination. The attempt here
[277]- today is not to go over a lot of old ground that we covered
[278]in your first examination but to focus our concerns on a few
[280]i main evants in the alleged story of an assassination plot
[282]‘ against Lumumba, and to refresh your recollection by review of
[284]these documants.
[286]Let me introduce as Fxhibit 1 a cable from Allen Dulles
[287]to the Leopoldville Station, marked for Robert. Guthman on
[288]October 26th, 1960.
[290](The document referred
[291]to was marked Tweady
[292]Fxhibit No. 1 for
[294]identification.)
[296]TOP SECRET
[308]o
[310]2
[313]et.
[315]TESTIMONY OF BRONSON TWEEDY
[316]Mr. Baron. We discussed this cable in your previous
[317]appearance, did we not?
[318]Mr. Tweedy. August 26th.
[319]May I correct the date? It da August 26th.
[320]Baron. Certainly.
[321]Tweedy. It is rather important.
[322]Baron. It is August 26th,
[323]Tweady. Yes, we did indeed Giscues it the last time.
[325]Baron. After you took another look at this cable
[327]this morning before we went On the record, you made a remark to
[328]‘+ the effect that this cable was a source of euthority as far aa
[330]| you were concerned at the time.
[332]Is that your impression now?
[333]Mr. Twaedy. Yes.
[335]Let me just add to that a bit. Tha cable per se I did not
[337]"! remamber, but £t is perfectly obvious the cable is tha authorit-.
[339]” When I first talked to Mr. Bissell about this, he certainly
[341]implied the only reason the subjact was being raised is because
[342]it had been of national policy laval concern. I do not thin
[343]it could be more clear-cut than that. This was hasically, this
[344]was the formal axpression of that bv the Diractor himself.
[346]T Cannot remember which came first, did I ses this cable
[347]first, or did IT talk to Mr. 3isgal} first. I suspect that }
[349]talked to Mr. Hissell first. It must have been absolutely i:
[351]TOP SECRET
[354]Sy asaanme ty
[355]SR ait
[357]the same tima pariod.
[359]This merely confirmed what I think I probably heard from
[360]u Mr. Bissell first.
[362]Mr. Baron. In this discussion with Mr. Bissell, you are
[363]| referring to the subject of getting access to Lumumba for the
[364]| purpose of assassination.
[366]Mr. Tweedy. I think it probably came up in the sense that
[367]the thrust 6f the American position was that thera was no
[368]solution in the Congo without the fall from powar of Mr. Lumumba,
[369]and no maasure should be overlooked to achiava this -- constitu-
[371]tional. ravolutionary and indused, axecutive action, if you want
[372]to call it that.
[374]Mr. Baron. Meaning assassination?
[380]a
[381]o
[382]e
[384]s
[386]Mr. Tweedy. Yes.
[388]But none of these possiblsa measures were excluded, and the
[389]main point was that averybody aqreed that tumumba. had to qo or
[390]We Were in for very serious trouble in the Congo.
[392]Mr. Aaron. You wera referring a moment ago in discussina
[393]this cable from Alle: Dulles to the Fact. that when you first
[394]discussed the possibility ef assassinating Lumumha as one Means
[395]of removirg him from power with Richard Bissell, Bissall rafsrre}
[396]to this cabls.
[398]Mr. Tweedy. No, I would hava saan this cable whan it went
[400]out. tT am afraid you cannot pin me down on this, beceuss I!
[402]Cannot remember the sequence of events. Tt would hava hean 4
[404]TOP SECRET
[407]mone [Aree 207) 344-4008
[409]4
[410]2
[411]4
[412]a
[415]c
[416]e
[418]t
[420]|
[421]i
[423]perfectly natural follow-up to my discussion with Bissell. It
[424]is conceivable that this went out bafore I talked to Bissall,
[425]do not exclude that, but the two were totally in tandem.
[427]Mr. Baron. Having taken a look at all of the documents
[429]that ws are about to introduce into the record today, befora
[431]i We begin taking your testimony on the record, are you ‘abla to
[433]Pinpoint with any more precision your initial discussion with
[434]Mr. Bissell of the prospect of assassinating Lumumba?
[436]Mr. Tweedy. Pinpoint it in terme of time?
[438]Mr. Baron. Yas.
[440]Tweedy. No, not in terms of time. I can only assum --
[441]Baron. Th would have takan place shortly hefora this
[442]Allan Dulles cable?
[444]Mr. Tweedy. Either shortly befors, or shortly aftar,
[445]because the next seriss of cablas obviously qet the show, as
[446]it ware, on the road.
[448]May I comment just ganerally on those cables as a group?
[449]Theres are ro surprises in them as far as I am concerned, in
[450]terms of dutail. Much of it, even to this dav, I still do not
[451]remember.
[453]One aspect emerges very clearly for ms, that wa wers very
[454]careful about examining this on ths possihilities of doirad
[455]anything against Lumumba. Pasically, this wholes nariod was a
[456]Series Of exchanges with the filald who wers seaking, as vou car
[458]See from that cable traffic, various maasures that might narfor-
[460]TOP SECRET
[463]or achieve the goal, including, indded assassination, but not ,
[465]Means which appeared secure, particularly means which kept the
[467]| by any means limited to- that, that we were in trouble finding
[468]i
[470]“U.S. hand hidden. It is the to and from, and the atmosphere
[472]: of it which is vary familiar to ma) the details of it, much of
[474]i te eVan on reading them, is rather unfamiliar to me. I found
[476]| no surprines in it.
[478]. Mr. Baron. Having refreshed your recollaction by reviewina
[480]|
[482]| these cables, can you add any graater specificity to the record
[483]about the substance of your conversations with Richard Biassel!
[484]on the possibility of assassinating Lumumba? .
[486]Mr. Twasdy. I think what wa usad to do, as [ remember it.
[488]when it came to tha technical axchanga with the Station on one
[490]s
[493]a
[494]e
[495]oO
[496]t
[498]t
[500]asset varsus another, the possible security weakness of this
[501]man versus the possible strengths of another, 5issel] left this
[502]lergely to me. I do not mean to sav that we did not from time
[503]to time review it. He did not dabate with me on whether(white }
[504](lami was somebody who was worth dealing with or not, because
[506]‘he had Nelqian connections, for sxample.
[508]Mr. Haron. You are savinad he woule heave laft the operations!
[509]details to you?
[511]Mr. Twesdy. The oparaticnal details of trying to come ur
[512]with some solution that lookud as if itt made Senss, and had a
[513]promise of success. JF do sot racall that we would discuss this
[515]type of a cable in detail. As you can ses, he ralaased quits
[517]TOP SECRET
[520]Prone | Av as 707) 344-6008
[522]4 number of tham, because he wanted to remain familiar with
[524]tham.
[525](Discussion off the‘ record.)
[526]Mr. Daron. Back on the record on thin subject.
[528].
[530]Mr. Tweedy. No, I do not have any further recollection of
[532]i datailed discussions with Bissell on this. On the other hand,
[534]\ it was perfectly clear that he remained actively intereated in
[535]it. Tam sure that he was the one that had the idea of Justin
[537]‘ O'Dounell, for example, I think he undoubtedly came up with
[539]that idea. As you recall, I had forgotten uatirealy that Justin
[541]" O'Dornell had over played a role in thin. I am sure when he
[543]fixed on O'Donnell the possibility tct essist the Tie” of Statice
[545]‘he must have discussed this with him. I can almost say I
[547]remember it, but hardly.
[549]Mr. Baron. Do you have any recollection of what Rissell
[551]“gaid to you in the series of discussions on the prospect of
[553]assassinating Lumumba about the level at which tha exploration
[554]of this prospect had beer authorized?
[556]Mr. Tweedy. No. That is the aspect I was never clear on
[557]exCept that it was parfactly clear to me that he was quite
[558]co.fide.t that this was -- T am now talking about the elimination
[559]of Lumumba by whatever means. T am rot talking necessarily
[560]about assassination: I want to ba quite clear on thet.
[562]I was quite clear in my mind that the policy levals of
[564]Washington were agreed that Lumumba must qo. T cannot go any
[566]TOP SECRET
[569]Py
[572].
[574]Q
[577]s
[579]further than that. I cannot say, for example, that Bissell
[581]said I think as an Agency we should consider assassination on
[583]thia or that this had basen discussed with the policy levels
[584]of government. I do not know, and it was never made clear to
[586]Me.nor:does this cable make clear, but it was perfectly clear
[588]that Mr. Dulles felt quite quiet in his mind about discussing
[590]i any of these aspects with the State Department or the Ambassador.
[592]Mr. Baron. Off tha record.
[593](Whereupon, a brief racess was taken.)
[594]Mr. Baron... We are back on the record now.
[596]When we stopped, we ware discussing your account of your
[598]( Meetinas with Richard Bissell where the subject of assassinatiny
[600]; Lumumba had arisen among other maans that had been considered
[602]in disposing of Lumumba, Did Richard Bissell aver indicate
[604]| directly or indirectly to you that he had the authority of the
[605]7 President of the United States for moving forward with an
[607]‘ operation which might include assassinating Lumumba?
[609]‘Mr. Tweedy. Let me make it quite clear, he certainly
[610]never mantioned the Presidant at all.
[611]Mr. Baron. Ry nama?
[613]Mr. Tweedy. Sy nemse, or aven by anv indication. It was
[615]Merely my impression reinforced, cartainly, aithar befors or
[617]after, of this cable of Allan Dulles that this was a nolicy
[619]- level decision, but the extant to which the FExacutive had
[621]» assassination discussed with him at all, I cannot comment on.
[623]TOP SECRET
[626]4
[631]a
[632]c
[637]It is perfectly obvious that tha Agency felt that it had
[638]the support of tha. Executiva in afforts to eliminate Lumumba.
[640]It was at least my impression throughout this whole period that
[642]“if it aver came down to the point where somebody said, I think
[644]Wwe can do it, and wa decided upon the means, that someone would
[646]| have said, well, bafore we do, obviously thare has to be final
[648]approval. I would not have known where the final approval
[650]| would have come from. I would not expect that. my corresporidance
[651]“with the Chief of Station in Laopoldville would result in the
[653]“assassination of Mr. Lumumba without further refarance.
[655]Mr. Baron. You Were under the imprassion that whatever
[657]steps you Were involved in toward sliminating Lumumba, as you
[659]* put it, were fully authorized at the highest leval of the
[661]- GOVernment?
[663]Mr. Tweedy. Yas, I was.
[665]Mr. Baron. That would include tha Prasidant?
[667]Mr. Tweedy. I do not really think I can answer that
[668]question, Mr. Baron. Wher. somabony at my lavel, fairly senior
[669]though it was, receives clear-cut assurances that the policy
[670]leval wants something done, it is varv difficul+* for him to
[671]judge whether the Presidant per ss has hean in contact with the
[672]Agency or that he has done this through his National Security
[673]Advisor, the Secretary of States, Or whoever. There could he
[674]ho way that. I could judga that.
[676]I think i would be quite misleading if I were to try to
[678]TOP SECRET
[681]warn a rau
[683]read into it either then or now.
[684]Mr. Baron. Whatever imprassion you had of the axtent of
[685]the authority for. the staps that you were taking to aliminate
[687]Lumumba was derived from your conversations with Richard
[691]Mr. Tweedy. And the cable.
[692]Mr. Baron. And the cable by Allen Dulles.
[694]\ Mr. Tweedy. Which marely indicated to me that the Agencv
[696]waa confident that it had its policy guidance and was thus
[698]; acting accordingly.
[700]Mr. Raron. Batween this cable on Auqdust 26th which
[701]Allen Dulles dispatched to tha Congo and tha cahle we will now
[702]mark Exhibit 2, which is a cable from yourself to Leopoldvilla
[703]On Septembar 19th, marked Fyes Only, Guthman from .Jadwin--
[705](The document. refarred
[706]to was marked Tweedy
[707]Exhibit No. 2 for
[709]identification.)
[711]TOP SECRET
[714]Py
[716]a
[718]e
[719]o
[722]t
[724]Mr. Baron. Were there any other mMeatings that you recall
[726]| between yourself and Richard Bissell where he asked you to
[728]move beyond the exploratory stage to the implementation staqe
[730]“in assaasinating Lumumba?
[732]Mr. Tweedy. I do not know at all. 1 just do not racall
[733]that ever occurred.
[735]Mg. Baron. Let us turn, then, to this cable.
[737]Thia cable indicates --
[739]Mr. Tweedy. This is the one on the 19th?
[741]Mr. Baron. Yes.
[743](Discussion off the racord.)
[745]Mr. Baron. Back on the record.
[747]This cable bagins with your indication to tha Chief of
[749]Station that someone was proceading shortly to the Congo who
[751]i: would announce himself as Sid from-Paris.
[753]First of all, to backtrack, Guthman, in this cable, is
[754]the Chief of Station, is that right?
[755]Mr. Tweedy. Correct.
[756]‘Mr. Baro. Who we agread would be raferred to as the
[757]Chief of Stetion or by hin alias, Hadqmena, and Jadwin is --
[758]Mr. TWeedy. My pseudonym.
[759]Baro:. Nid you hava a first nane in the pseudonvm?
[760]Twasady. Thomas Kk.
[761]Raro:.. Who was Sid from Paris?
[763]Twuedy. TI was trving to think. The idantitv is Sid
[765]TOP SECRET
[768]WARD w Pau
[770]FG 200er8
[772]Brown. Sid Brown as a name means nothing to me.
[773]Mr. Baron. If I reprasent to you that wa have had testimony
[774]Sidney Gott ; By that thia identity stood for himself, does
[775]refresh your recollection?
[776]Mr. Tweedy. It would not surprise me. It was my assumption
[777]that it probably was, but I could not Fraecall, so I find -- in
[778]other words, your explanation, I think, is what I would havea
[780]expected..
[782]Mr. Baron. Do you have any independent recollection of
[784]tee oe ,
[785]' dispatching ‘Sidney Gottlieb on a miseion to tha Congo?
[787]Mr. Tweedy. I hava the most unclear recollection that 1
[789]. TINT ee
[790]- discussed with Mr. Bissell Sidney Sottias” 8 goina *o the
[791]Siiney Gotti izh"s
[793]; Congo. I hava no recollactions of any Conversations IT had
[797]“with Mr.’ Goek iubj himself, although I am quite convinced I had
[798]a RE
[800]them.
[802]In other words, it is inconceivable to mg that he would hav-
[803]gona to the Congo without seeing me. I cannot: recall the
[804]substance of our discussions, although I assume, and I imaqi:s
[805]Mr. Bissell must have shared in this, we discussed what it was
[806]411 about, the operational preblems involved, so that he, in
[807]turn, could be somewhat sansibls ahout what his own support in:
[808]rule ah tnis miant be.
[810]Whee I say this, it is a reaso.ahble assumption but it is
[811]not direct recollection.
[813]Mr. Baron. “Dons this cable indicate to you that you did
[815]‘TOP SECRET
[821].
[823]a
[824]*]
[825]e
[827]g
[829]dispatch ‘S{aney*Gottiteb™ to the Congo on a highly sensitive
[830]mission?
[831]Mr. Twaedy. It does indeed.
[833]When you say I dispatched him, I would say it would be
[835]1
[836]more accurate to say that Mr. Bissell and I dispatched him. I
[838]am sure the authority for him going would have come from he
[840]‘rather than me, but we arranged the details.
[842]Mr. Baron. Your comment about ‘the fact that the authority
[844]“ would have flowed from Mr. Bissell diracty is borne out, is it
[846]| not, by Mr. Bissell's initials on this cable?
[848]Mr. Tweedy. Yes, axactly.
[850]Mr. Baron. Was that a fairly unusual practice, to have
[851]both the DDP and the Chief of the Africa Division sign a
[854]Mr. Tweedy. Quite common. Throughout the organization
[856]ion matters of aither particular sensitivity or so important that
[858]the DDP wished to be constantly informed about correspondence
[859]on 4 Subject, the Chief of the Division would originate and
[860]send out cables and have it aetually signed off by the DOP.
[861]That was yuite a common practices in the Agency. .
[863]Mr. Baron. Do you have a racollection, having seen this
[864]documart, of the fact that you get up 4 special channel using
[865]the YOPROP sensitivity indicator?
[867]e
[869]Mr. Tweady. T did not recall ¥OPROP, but I recall special
[871]channels.
[873]TOP SECRET
[876]Mr. Baron. This. would have restricted all traffic from
[877]yoursalf to Chief of Station, ia that. correct?
[879]Mr. Twaedy. Yas. My Deputy would also have access to it
[880]“dn my absence.
[881]Mr. Baron. That would be Glen Fields?
[883]Tweedy. Yas.
[885]Baron. Would Richard Bissell have access to it?
[887]Twasdy. Indead he would.
[889]Baron. Allen Pulles also?
[891]Mr. Twasdy. Certainly if he wanted, absolutely.
[893]Mr. Baron. Why was a anecial communications channel set
[895]- J up in this cable?
[897]Mr. Tweedy. Because of tha sensitivity of the subject.
[899]5
[900].
[901]N
[903].
[907]This, again, was a frequent procedure in the Agancy on sensitive
[908]|. matters. If One was about to mount a seansitive operation, cne
[909]-of the first things normalivy done was to set up special
[911]communications procedures so the dissemination of the messages
[913]could be restricted to what wes raquirad.
[915]Mr. Baron. In this case, the aspecially sensitive subiect t-
[916]which you Were restricting communications access was the elini-
[917]nation of Lumumba by one means or another?
[919]Mr. Tweedy. That. is correct.
[921]“ir. Baron. What was the assidnmant rhacfStaney Motelieny
[922]was to explain to the Chief of Station wher he arrived in the
[924]Couyo?
[926]TOP SECRET
[929]WARD & PAUL
[931]Mr. Twaedy. That, I do not recall. I can only assume
[933]it wae nat Aarne aererrermmnn—e
[934]' that Sidney Gottliubtwould have discussed with the Chief of
[937]| Station instruments which TSD might have which could be of
[939]assistance in an assassination attempt. I assumed he discussed
[940]his inventory, whatever it miqht be, and the two presumably were
[942]1 trying to coma to some conclusions as to what might have the
[944]: bast chance or the most practical chance of being used.
[946]‘ This is my assumption. I think in this early stage, that
[947]] .
[949]. would have been the purpose of the exercise.
[951]. a
[953]Mr. Baron. Let me represent to you tha testimony of Sidney”
[954]Gottiiebyapout two conversations that he had at Headquarters
[955]bafore he undartook the mission to the Congo in Ssapteambar of
[956]1960.
[958]First, when ‘or. Gotti Tab) looked at this cable and some
[959]subsequent. cables which we witl discuss today, he said thes
[960]cables applied to himself. He confirmed the fact that he took
[961]a trip to the Congo and arrived on Sentember 24th as is indicated
[962]by a subsequent cabla, and: left on October Sth, as is indicated
[963]by another cable.
[965]Ee said before he left the Coneo -- T an sorrv,
[966]before he left for the Congo -- he had ¢ convaraation with you
[967]and Glen Flelds in which you instructed him to take a lathe}
[968]material to the Conge and give it to tha Chie? of Station
[970]with instructions to assassinate Lumumba if it were possible
[972]and to instruct the Chis’ of Station in tha technical means hy
[974]TOP SECRET
[977]which this lethal material could be administered through
[978]Lumumba's food or toothpaste or something that he would ingest.
[979]Mr. QDEETTEE; also tastified that in that conversation you
[980]| indicated to him that thease instructions were being given at
[981]Richard Sissell‘s authority.
[982]Did that conversation take place?
[983](Discussion off the racord.)
[984]Mr. Twaady. His testimony does not basically refresh my
[985]| memory. Tha only aspect of it which I would find unrealistic is
[986]that he had an instruction from ma to tall tha Chiaf of Station
[987]“to use this material and qo ahead and assansinate Lumumba, as
[989]it, i. effsct, that igs all the authority that was necessary.
[991]To be frank, that does not make Sansa. Tha rast of it is
[995]‘ perfectly feasible. 1 do not recall it in tha detail, but 1
[997]. am not going to deny wha tQSidj said. I think his racollectior
[999]- f ehat I told him, in effect, to go to the Chief of Station anc
[1000]‘ gort of gat the show on the road and use the poison and
[1001]assassinate Lumumba without any furthar ceremony {is just not f!.-
[1002]way it would have happened.
[1003]Mr. Raror. Why is that?
[1004]Mr. Tweady. For tha simple reason that under ne ecireumstencs
[1005]would that instruction hava been given by me without reference.
[1006]to higher authority up through the chain of command.
[1007]Mr. Baron. When you say reference to hicher authority,
[1009]what do you mean?
[1011]TOP SECRET
[1014]WARD & PAUL
[1016]Mr. Tweedy. My higher authority in the first instance
[1017]would be Mr. Bissell.
[1019]Mr. Baron. Gottlies} did testify --
[1021]Mr. Tweedy. I understand. |
[1023]Mr. Baron. -- that you referred in your conversation with
[1025]him to the fact that you had authority from Mr. Bissell for the
[1027]| assignment you were giving to Gottlieh,
[1029]Mr. Tweedy. The only thing that Mr .{G6tt ri ab would disagree
[1030]on is that thare would be no furthar reference, which hia
[1031]statement implies from Laeopoldville before thay took any action
[1033]on this matter, in other words, take the final action on this
[1035]". matter, and that was navar a matter, to the bast of my recollec-
[1036]| tion, that was saver delegated by Mr. Bissell. In other words,
[1038]' Mr. Bissell never said, look, you have the picture, qo ahead
[1040]and do it in your own good time without any further referance
[1042]“ tO me or anybody else, nor is the tenor of this correspondence
[1044]“ae I read it that way at all.
[1046]4r. Baron. No you recall if Mr. Bissell ever want as far
[1047]as telling you that if an opportunity arose to carry off the
[1048]assassination of Lumumba in a situation where it would hs
[1049]practically impossible to confirm, that there was authority
[1050]for proceeding with the assassination with Headquarters, that
[1051]the Chief of Station would be, under those circumstances,
[1052]authorized to procead to assassinate Lumumba ?
[1054]Mr. Tweedv. No, I do not.
[1056]TOP SECRET
[1059]‘Mr. Baron. Do you have a recollection about that one way
[1060]| or the other? |
[1061]Mr. Tweedy. I do not recall that he ever put it to ma
[1062]«this way.
[1064]Mr. Baron. Let us then break down your statement about this
[1066]poe tee
[1067]meeting with (Dr. Gottlieb) into component parts.
[1069]You agree now, having heard ‘Dr. Gottlieb‘s, testimony, that
[1070]: 1t 1g true that you had asked {Dr. Gottlieb} to go to the Congo?
[1071]1 = . ’
[1073]Mr. Tweady. Indeed, as I assumed I had, yes.
[1075]sae od
[1077]Mr. Baron. It is also trua that you knew that Dr! Gott lier
[1078]was to carry a lethal material to the Chiaf of Station in the
[1079]Congo?
[1081]Mr. Tweedy. If he says so, T do not disaqrea with him.
[1083]wand & Pau
[1085]I do not frankly recall thet at this noint, but fT an parfeactly
[1086]wadded to accapt what he says.
[1088]Mr. Baron. Assuming, for the momant, that you would have
[1089]required the Chisf of Station to check back with Headquartars
[1090]before he carriad out an assassination mission, would it be
[1091]true that vou assigned fro Gort italy the task of instructina
[1092]the Chief of Station to assassinete Lumumha on that basis?
[1094]Mr. Tweedy. Gr, Sottligs vas the head of the Technical
[1095]Services Division, or whatever it was called in those days.
[1097]‘4r. Baron. Let me jump in for @&@ moment.
[1099]At this point, for about a yaar ania half, he was the
[1101]Science Advisor to Mr. Bissell, and he moved to Tachnical
[1103]TOP SECRET
[1106]Services shortly thereafter.
[1108]Mr. Tweedy. The way you put it to me was that I instructed
[1110]Prone (Aree 207) 344-6000
[1112]Covel tebrto aesassinate Lumumba. The answer to that is, I am
[1114]‘sure I newer instructed Gottlieb; to assassinate Lumumba. This
[1116]ia the way you put it to me.
[1118]Mr. Baron. Let. ma correct that.
[1120]What I maant to say was, would you have asked FTSETE
[1121]to convay the instruction to the Chief of Station that he wes
[1122]to assassinate Lumumba if he found a way to do it and if he
[1124]| contirnled it with Headquarters?
[1125]“rt. qwaedy. My answer to that is almost cartainly not.
[1127]‘ That would have bean covared in other correspondance, which |
[1129]think is demonstrated by thase cables, to tha Chief of Station
[1131]WARD & PAUL
[1133]_ direct jfrom me with authority of Mr. Bissell. I would not have
[1134]used, neither would ‘ir. Bissell, Mr. {Gott: as the channel
[1136]for thi's instruction.
[1138]Mr, Baron. Dr. Gott by has also testified that, aside
[1140]from carrying the materials to the Chief of Station and
[1142]instructing in their use and giving him an instruction about «4
[1143]mission to essassina-e Lumumba, thet he had one further role
[1145]the Congo: he was to sarve as a technical advisor to the
[1146]Chisf of Stetion on the feasibility of using these biolesical
[1147]substances to carry off the oparation.
[1149]nut it, Gottlishj was to satay down there for
[1152]of the operational plan that the Chief of Station might come
[1154]| up with.
[1156]i | Mr. Tweedy. This seems quite reasonable to me. Presumably!
[1157]a ,
[1159], with his technical knowledge of the nature of these materials
[1161]|
[1163]|
[1164]i he would be in a position to either comment on or advise the
[1165]|
[1167]‘ Chief of Station as ha attempted to put together some kind of
[1168]| operation. That makas good sense to me.
[1169]He would require, basically, a technical advisor.
[1170]Mr. Baron. gDr>~GottViabualso testified that the materials
[1171]; he took with him were of a fairly short life. Their toxicity
[1172]1 | would wane within a matter of wasks.
[1173]Given that bit of information to refresh your recollectic:,
[1174]" dows that make it more likely that Gottliahy was there, to aid
[1175]‘the Chief of Stetion in actually carrying off tha administration
[1176]"of these drugs, &S opposed to qiving him qaeneral instructions
[1177]"in the use of such lethal substances?
[1179]Mr. Tweedy. I do not know really that T can commant on
[1180]thet. If the materials would deteriorate fast, tha use of ther,
[1181]if possible, [ woule@ stress the latter, would necessarily have
[1182]to he exoeditied, but the overwhelming concern of Headquarters
[1183]and the field, aqain, demonstrated in this corruspondeance was
[1184]our concera that this thing could ba done at all, that it be
[1185]done right, sscurely, aud that the U.S. hand should ha
[1186]concealed.
[1188]If this ware at odds with the life of thease materials,
[1190]TOP SECRET
[1193]think that would have just been too bad. But I think it is
[1195]perfectly clear that we would not have expedited anything at
[1197]‘ the risk of doing it unprofessionally.
[1199]Mr. Baror. At the point that GotElfap lett for the Congo
[1200]) after talking with you, would he have been enpowerad ‘to convey
[1201]i to the Chief of Station that an assassination of Lumumba could
[1202]be carried off if he could meet the criteria you just laid out,
[1203]concealment of tha U.S. hand and use of these materials befors
[1204]i ¢thedr potency waned?
[1206]Mr. Tweedy. My answer to that would be he would he in no
[1207]position to do anything more with the Chief of Station if thev
[1208]reached that point in planning, that as of tha last time hs
[1209]. was at Ileadquarters that there would probably ba an approval
[1210]from Washington.
[1212]Mr. Baron. You would axpect, then, the Chief of Station
[1213]* would have bsen expected to reconfirm with Headquarters the
[1214]fact that he had a go-ahead?
[1216]Mr. Tweedy. It would never have occurred to me othsrwise.
[1218]Mr. haron. It would ba your testimony that, although you
[1219]do not specifically recall your conversa*ion with SErsoee li
[1220]you would have made that clear to Bev orev ebs
[1222]Mr. Tweedy. I would have thoudht so, yas, hut 7 could sot
[1223]comment any further.
[1225]Mr. Daron. The reason for that is you do not recall the
[1227]conversation?
[1229]TOP SECRET
[1232]Mr. Tweedy. Not only that; Drv Gottlieb) was as familiar
[1234]y
[1236]| es I was with (a) the sensitivity of this particular project
[1238]‘and what was involved and tha way that. the Agency did its
[1240]Prone | Aree 207) $46-6008
[1242]’ business, which was things of this kind were not dealt with on
[1244]“ sort of an offhand basis.
[1246]Mr, Dawson. What is offhand?
[1250]Mr. Tweady. The fact that the field and Or “Gottl feb; were
[1251]» given something in the nature of a blank check as to how they
[1252]» would go about it and when, without further reference to
[1253]Neadquarters.
[1254]Mr. Dawson. If we are to tia this to the cables, then,
[1255]1s there somathing in thea cables predatina Hotei iah's visit to
[1256]the Congo which would lead you to believe that it had previousl~
[1260]a "beet. authorized by some words in thosa cables?
[1261]Mr. Tweedy. What, Mr. Dawson, had previously bean
[1264]Mr. Dawsen. The authorization of the assassination effor~,
[1265]the elimination of Lumumba.
[1267]Mr. Tweady. Only in the most general terms. No oparetio:.
[1268]had been put forward by the field. In our husiness, thase
[1269]things were done by operational planning, at which voint one
[1270]came up with an operation that was aqreed upon hy tha Station
[1271]and by Headquarters, and this, then, would have beer either
[1272]implemented Or not, according to the sav-so from Headquarters.
[1274]‘Mr. Dawson. That kind of operattonal Planning is
[1276]TOP SECRET
[1279]after Mr. Gottliebj arrives in the Congo, is that correct?
[1281]Mr. Tweedy. This, in affect, is that (Indicating). You
[1282]can tell by the Chief of Station, there is no further
[1283]' reference to Mr. Gottlieb, aa I recall.
[1284]Mr. Baron. In this cable traffic?
[1285]Mr. Tweedy. In this cable traffic, was looking at all
[1286]|| sorts of ways and means of eliminating Lumumba , not rastricted
[1287], to assassination, which coincides exactly with my recollaction
[1288]. of the: period betwean when the subject was first broached to the
[1289]Station and that rathar indafinablea pariod whan, in effect, it
[1290]“was all over, which, I suppose, basically {a the disappearance
[1291]of Lumumba.
[1292]I think all of this traffic supports my contantion thet
[1293]under the instructions he was given, the Chief of Station in
[1294]" Leopoldville set about exploring all allays and found none
[1295]“crystal clear. There were problems with all of them. Some
[1296]looked more promising than others. Individuals who miqht be
[1297]used obviously looked more promising than others. Some were
[1298]discussed and discarded. We commented on some. And so it
[1299]Wait.
[1300]Mr. Maron. I think that we should proceed in a moment
[1301]to go through these cables with a clos+ eya, ons by one.
[1302]One further point inQor..cottlisb!s} tastimony, to be fair
[1303]to nim, he said he was under the impression that it was qenere]
[1305]Agency procedure that in a mission like this one the Chie’ c!
[1307]TOP SECRET
[1310]AARD & PAUL
[1312]25
[1314]Station probably would check back with Headquarters, that any
[1317]| prudent Chiaf of Station would check back to raconfirm his
[1320]authorityto go ahead with an assassination oparation, but, DE
[1321]Gate febjaaia in his conversation with you he was not told
[1322], that ha should convey to the Chief of Station the requirement
[1323]‘ that ha should check back with Headquarters before he proceeded
[1324]“with the assassination of Lumumha.
[1325]Mr. Twaady. I cannot comment on his statements, beacause
[1326]I cannot recall what I said to him, It cartainly is perfectly -
[1327]conceivable to me that J could have had this conversation with
[1328]him and not mantioned this, that this would be covered in al}
[1329]the basic corraspondence that I was having with tha Chief of
[1330]Station.
[1331]Mr. Harou. So ther it is possibl+# ~-- or {s it nmrobable
[1332]‘that in your instructions to Sidney cottitebjahout his mission
[1333]to the Congo you might nct have explicitly mentioned tha
[1334]requirement that the Chief of Station return to Headquarters
[1335]to recunfirm his authority to move ahead with th» assassination.
[1336]Mr. Tweedy. It is, I suppose, possible. T am not going
[1337]to gay it is nct pessible. T am merely savings thet that is
[1338]Lot the way we did business, and on the wiele, Sidney Sottlia
[1339]would be as familiar with that as IT would -- nerheps not és >
[1340]familier with it, becauBe he was on the technical side where I
[1342]was cr th: operational sids and used te thie chain of comma?
[1344]thina and the relationship batwaean ths Division and Station
[1346]‘TOP SECRET
[1349]Chiefs in the field,to a greater extent than ir. Gott feb) would.
[1350]The last thing I am doing is impugning his veracity and
[1351]his testimony.
[1352]Mr. Baron. When you say it is not the way wa do business,
[1353]you meant to say it was your understanding in general Agency
[1354]I practice that the Chief of Station in a situation like this
[1355]i would be expected to chack back with Headquarters?
[1357]Mr. Tweedy. When a Chief of Station was given the authority
[1359]" to carry out something entirely on his own initiative, that
[1360]‘was inada quite clear -- I'm not talking about this case, I mean
[1361]' Ganurally -- this was made quits clear.
[1363]Mr. Baro.w. When you ware talking about tha fact that
[1367]“this was not thu way that we generelly did business,” you wer-
[1368]not referring to the fact that vou would have made it absolutes!"
[1370]‘Si
[1372]explicit in any conversation with Cavey ‘not tl lab or anyhody
[1373]like him who was undertaking a sansitiva mission that the Chis‘
[1374]of Station would be expected to chack back?
[1376]Mr. Tweedy. If I had not mantionad this to Sianay Getty:
[1378]end he said I did not, I am perfactly prenarad to balieve hin,
[1380]it would be because it never occurred to me thet the Chie’ oF
[1382]wee ORG
[1384]Station would act in any other wav. That is it.
[1386]Wastonate
[1388]Mr. Dawson. Of course, Nr. Hludqeman also tastifiad thet
[1390]it never would have occured to him to have carried this out
[1392]st Steet SE
[1394]withovt having checked back, an? he did so, of ccurse: the
[1398]cables will show that verv clearly, What we ara trying to focus
[1400]TOP SECRET
[1403]Prone [Ares 202) 344-6008
[1405]WARD & PAVE
[1407]on is exactly what Mr. Gottliab*convayed to Mr. Hedgeman,
[1408]which, of course, you could not testify to.
[1410]Mr. Tweedy. I could not.
[1412]Mr. Baron. Or what you said to him.
[1414]Mr. Tweedy. I think it ia quite possible that I did not
[1416]i gay to’Mr. Gottlieb, Sid}. for Heaven's sake, do not have the
[1417]. § 4
[1419]’ Chief of Station go off assassinating this fellow without
[1420], Feferring back to Headquarters. It would never hava occurred
[1422]" ta me to do that. It would have bean, in my view, superfluous.
[1424]Mr. Dawson. You ars, of course, aware that Mr. iWiedqarar.
[1426]"was aware of this practica in the Agency?
[1428]Mr. Tweedy. Certainly.
[1429]Mr. Dawson. You had sean that happen. He had only beer
[1431]Station Chief for a short time; in spite of that, he was still
[1433]|| aware of Agency practice?
[1435]Mr. Tweedy. T think that it would be perfectly true to
[1436]say that any clandestins services officer who had reached a
[1437]cartain seniority L field axperience whether he was Chisf o£
[1438]Station or not, he! would have sucked this in with his mother's
[1439]milk. We ware, if I may say so, a very disciplined ordanizatin
[1440]in that reaard.
[1442]‘Mtr. Dawson. Specifically as to Mr. Hedqeman, that woul?
[1443]apply to him also?
[1445]Mr. Tweedy. It would indeed.
[1447]Mr. Baron. Let us procesd then to 4 documant ws will mer?
[1449]TOP SECRET
[1452]7) Prone [Aree 202) 544-4000
[1454].
[1457]ry
[1459]coy
[1460].
[1462]3
[1464]Exhibit 3, which is a cable from Bronson Tweedy. to the Chief
[1465]of Station for his eyes only on September 22, 1960.
[1466](The document referred
[1467]to was marked Tweedy
[1468]Exhibit No. 3 for
[1470]identification.)
[1472]TOP SECRET
[1475]ay
[1477]“ Ped ¥
[1480]“TOP'SECRET
[1482]Mr. Tweedy. This is mostly discussion o+ ome aha
[1484]Mr. Baron. The man you referred to wasn at this time an
[1486]Prone (Aree 207) $44-40090
[1488]agunt that was in contact with the Chief of Station?
[1490]Mr. Tweedy. I remamber him very well. I could not possibly
[1491]remember his nama. I remember him vary wall; I met him later.
[1493]Mr. Baron. lle proved to be a highly effective agant for
[1494]the Station?
[1496]Mr. Tweedy. Ha was a very good intalliqanca agent, an
[1497]excellant intelligence agent, for the simnle reason that ha
[1498]was able to make contact with groups and madia in the Congo
[1499]which was very difficult for non-Africansk to reach. 'te was, for
[1500]¢ year or two, 4 first-class intelliqence source basically:
[1501]not an action source, but é@n intslliqance source.
[1503]Mr. Barer. When you read the sentence that is at the
[1504]beginning of paragraph 3 on tha first page where it says:
[1505]“Concur this possibility worth watching, but. 4€ decided support.
[1506]cor Ugrnor objectives. Relieve essential such be provided
[1507]through third national channal with PRPRIMNF role completely
[1508]concealed.”
[1510]What are you referring to there?
[1512]My. TWeedy. Iam not gur2a; 1 do not ramenber.
[1514]recall what the incoming cable said.
[1517]am obviously seying i) ebornres Va aE 1 ouess,
[1519]wife who was, at least had been,
[1521]Gus: } think what I was saying is, if we wanted to use
[1522]TOP SECRET.
[1525]Scnotrok directly in an assassination attempt, that I would
[1527]not dismiss it out of hand.
[1529]Prone (Aree 707} 544-4000
[1531]Mr. Baron. You would be concerned about its ‘security?
[1533]Mr. Tweedy. Absolutely.
[1535]Mr. Baron. You then would say the phrase "¥GPROP objec-
[1536]| tives would refer to an assassination attempt?
[1537]| Mr. Tweedy. Yas.
[1539]Mr. Baren. That the assassination, discussion of an
[1541]assassination attempt, was being restricted to the YOPROP
[1545]ir. Twaedy. Yes.
[1547]Mr. Baron. On tha last page of this documant --
[1549]WARD & PAUL
[1551]Mr. Tweedy. Tha only thing that worries ma about this
[1552]** conclusion of mine is this, the more I read it, 2-B is anothar
[1553]“ paragraph, which may not have had anything to do with (Sahstnay
[1555]** at all and I do not fael, at least I cannot recollect, why
[1557]Ty |
[1558]aan any rane would almost certainly hava included the (gore
[1559]: if coe vere involved in this. Thus, I am inclined to
[1562]feel T am talking about. somebody else and not 1G
[1564]Mr. Baron. Io will represent 9 vou in other cable traffic,
[1565]TIT believe, which we will review as we rocsed here, thers was
[1566]discussion of the usa of ano't.~
[1568]Mr. Tweady. This’ vee probably the case. T do not think
[1570]this refers Ea Bo here I do not think refers to
[1572]ee I cannot recall --
[1574]TOP SECRET
[1577]WARD B® PAI
[1579]20001
[1581]J Wasne tar Oo
[1583]AIG Baty: Street, SE
[1585]Mr. Baron. Who?
[1587]a :
[1588]YQPROP objectives would still refer ‘to exploring possibilities
[1590]> to an assassination attempt?
[1592]Mr. Tweedy. Yas.
[1594]Mr. Baron. This may refer to exploring it with a
[1597]| different agent?
[1599]Mr. Tweedy. Yes.
[1601]Mr. Raron. On the last page, paragraph 3, it tells the
[1603]_ Chief of Station: "Not intended you construe above comment.s
[1605]‘as basically negative. You and colleagua understand wa cannot
[1607]read over your shoulder as you plan and agsness opvortunitias.
[1609]Our primary coicern must be concealment PRPRIME role unless
[1611]outstanding opportunity emerges which makes calculated risk
[1612]first class bet. Rwady entertain any serious proposals you
[1613]make based our high regard hoth your professional judaments.”
[1615]What are you referring to in that paraqraph? What massaqe
[1616]ate you convaying to the Chief of Station?
[1618]Mr. Tweedy. Well, I think if you read the cahle you will
[1619]notice that we have found difficulty with a number of his
[1620]proposals. These were expvloratoryv nroposals. T wanted --
[1622]Mr. Baron. For carrying off an assassination mission?
[1624]Mr. Tweedy. You keep coming off with an assassination
[1625]mission as if this was always just around the corner. What I
[1626]am saying is, we are in a Period hare quite commor in our
[1628]business of vary intensive operational planning and axploratior..
[1630]TOP SECRET
[1633]All sorts of things were coming up from the field. I had
[1635]commented on it hare; in the end, I say, do not be discourage
[1637]i because you do not see the probable channal wa will usa. I
[1639]" assume the colleague was Sid Gottlieb, because I guess he was
[1640]i atill there.
[1641]Mr. Baron. The first time he had not arrived, but you had
[1642]already cabled that his arrival was imminent?
[1643]Mr. Tweedy. I assume that that is the colleaque. I do
[1644]; not think he would have talked to anybody else on it. That is
[1645]| all it means.
[1646]It is, if you like, a techniqua of management.
[1648]Mr. Baron. Moving on to a documant that we will mark
[1650]WARD & PAUL
[1652]i. Exhibit 4, the next cable, is from Allen W. Bullaes of Saptember
[1653]1s 4, 1960 and your pseudonym is also listed as one of tha senders
[1654]of the cable to the Chiaf of Station.
[1655](Tha document refarred
[1656]to was marked Tweedy
[1657]‘Exhibit No. 4 for
[1659]idantification.)
[1661]TOP SECRET
[1666]TOP SECRET
[1668]Mr. Baron. In this cable, in the firat paragraph, it says:
[1670]“We wish give every possihla support in elim{nating Lumumba
[1672]Prone {Aree 2027) $44-4000
[1674]| from any possibility resuming governmental position or if ha fails
[1675]“in Leop* -- maaning Leopoldville -- “setting himself in Stanley-
[1676]| ville Or alsewhere °
[1678]Firat, for the racord, any time your pseudonym “Jadwin" or
[1679], your name “Tweady" appears in the upper lefthand corner of a
[1680]‘cable Or your signature appears on the bottom, you dispatched
[1681]y that cable? Is that not riqht?
[1683]-Toam raferring gunerally to the cable traffic.
[1685]Mr. Tweedy. What it maans ia thia,. Te could maan severe!
[1687]thinas, but I parsonally dictated the cahle and diapatchad it
[1689]without further referance, or for some reason I constructed the
[1691]WARD & PAUL
[1693]5
[1694]. Cable and had it released by a higher authority, either Mr.
[1696]* Bissall or Mr. Dulles. Although thosa were not the only alter-
[1697]i natives, if my name was on it, I was connected with it in ona
[1698]form or another.
[1699]I would guess that I dictated the cable and that ‘tr. Dulles «-
[1700]and I do not have any idea how this cams about -- Mr. Nulles
[1701]wanted to Sse it, and Mr. Hissell suqqeaste? that it ao out
[1702]from Mr. Dulles and myself, I just do not know. . What this
[1703]Meais is, Dullas and Tweedy were totally aware of the cahle.
[1704]Mr. Haron. Meturaing than to the santsnca I citad from
[1706]the Cable where vou and Dulles were talking about divine evere
[1708]porsible support i: elimtnati.a Lumumba, what meassaqe --
[1710]TOP SECRET
[1713]RET” ws oe
[1715]Mr. Tweedy. *Eliminating Lumumba from any Possibility
[1716]a resuming governmental position.” This, if I may say so, raverts
[1717]: to the original instruction from Mr. Dulles which was that the
[1718]U.S. position was that. Mr. Lumumba must be ramoved from a
[1719]i Poaition of authority in the Congo and that assassination was
[1720]not by any means the Only way by which thia might be accomplished.
[1721]Thia, I think, Merely reiterates that it is not a -- being
[1722]: a ¢QpRop Cable does not refer Specifically to assassination.
[1723]Mr. Baron. Would this cable, in using the phrase "elimina-
[1724]Hl ting Lumumba" in this context contemplate ensassination as
[1725]at least ona of the possible Means that midh+ be used?
[1726]Mr. Twaady. Tam afraid if 7 mey S&éy $0 you are putting
[1728]words in my mouth. This is exactly what it says. He has two
[1732]Messagas now from Mr. Dulles. The first One, I think, wag
[1733]‘perfectly clear. Sincy then he has had massaqdes from Mr,
[1735]Dulles’ subordinates liks myself. This meraly makes it clear
[1736]egain that Neadquarters wishes to "give avery possible support
[1737]in eliminating Lumumba from any possibility resuming govarnmen*’<:)
[1738]position" and I cannot Sé#y More than thet, and T think to sav
[1739]that this strasses 4assessi.etion wou)? Ds quits untrue. Rut the
[1740]Chief of Stetion in Leopoeldaville was already under instruction
[1741]to be consitering this as ons of the vossibilitiss.
[1743]Mr, Buron. Assassisetion?
[1745]Mr. ‘Tweedy. This doses not chands that.
[1747]Mr. Haro... T think thet is Fine.
[1749]TOP SECRET
[1752]WARD & Pa
[1754]| The interesting aspect of that sentence for me is the
[1755]rest of the sentence where it makes {¢ clear that not only is
[1756]there a concern about Lumumba being able to resume his position
[1759]; dn Leopoldville, but anywhere else, and it would seam that
[1760]NW
[1762]|
[1763]| assassination would at least have to be One of very faw means
[1765]i
[1766]| that could insure that fact that Lumumba would not resume a
[1768]i position of power anywhere.
[1769]Mr. Tweedy. I do not think I can comment any further.
[1770]Mr. Baron. Lat us introduce as Exhibit 5 a cable
[1771]' dispatched from the Chief of Station on September 27th, 1969
[1772]for your syaes Only, and this cable beqins with a referance to
[1773]{OFT GOtET i 3by
[1774]ae |
[1775]Tt says he was contacted 26 September. “We on same wavn
[1776]length." Ther it continues, “Hance balisva most rapid actior
[1777]consistent with security indicated,”
[1779]The next paragraph says, “fRasis 2 talks considering
[1780]possibilitias:” -- there follows a list of nossibilities from
[1781]A to G and paragraph 3 on th: hottom of paqe 2? says, "Plan
[1782]Proceed on basis prioritiss as listad ahove, unlass instructed
[1783]to co:trary."
[1785](The document refarrad
[1786]to was marked Twaedy
[1787]Exhihit No. 8 for
[1789]idantification.)
[1791]TOP SECRET
[1794]Mr. Baron. Does that indicate to you that on the list of.
[1796]priorities, priority A would have bean considered by the Chief
[1798]| of Station to be his top priority?
[1800]Mr. Tweedy. Can you read, by the way, paragraph 2:
[1801]2 talks considering possibilities" of dispatching
[1802]to Stanleyville and taking refuge -- that would be refuge, would
[1803]| it not? . of
[1804]Mr. Baron. Yes. “Recall [ESERIES ron Stanlayville” --
[1805]Mr. Tweedy. -- “and have him take refuge with Big
[1806]'* Brother” --
[1807]Mr. Baron. -- "Would thus act as ‘inside man to brush up
[1808]datails to razor edga. Also would provide info on food anct
[1810]agricultural problem. Guthman recalling /SaNgeronrs| to Leop.”
[1813]When Dr. Gottlieb; looked at this cable, he testified that
[1815]WARD & PAL.
[1817]this cable indicated that he arrived in the Congo on the 26th
[1818]lof September. He had two talks with the Chief of Station where
[1819]* they discussed various operational possibilities of getting ric
[1820]of Lumumba. The letter A represented their ton priority pla.
[1821]Would you agree with thet interpretation of tha cable?
[1822]Me. Tweedy. T would think so.
[1823]Mr. Baron. Would you --
[1824]Mr. Tweedy. When he says: “Plan proceed on basis prior:
[1825]ities as listed above” this again is no* what he was qoing *c
[1826]do at the conclusion of this without further reference carr’:
[1828]out arn assassination. Ne says, What we see isifin
[1830]TOP SECRET
[1833]Prone (Asae 202} 344-4000
[1835]WARO & PAUL
[1837]| best answer to our problem.
[1839]Mr. Beron. Does he not indicate in this cable though
[1841]! that he would proceed to implement these plans unless he were
[1843]instructed to the contrary? In other words, this very cable
[1845]2
[1847]i might constitute his requast for a confirmation.
[1849]Mr. Twaedy. I disagree. I think these various possibili-
[1851]’ ties still need further exploration is what he was suggesting
[1853], to Headquarters. he concentrate onthat.ia the best possible use
[1857]“
[1858]+ of Sfhotretitehion this including further operational inteliigance
[1860]On the situation which might lraad to an adreemant that. we woul
[1861]use this man, and then all these Othars, but it doas not-in anv
[1862]Sense, as far aga I am concerned, it is not in anv sanse the
[1863]Chief of Station saying, if A looks terribly aood T shall just
[1864]go ahead and finish the job without further reference. Not at
[1865]all.
[1867]Mr, Baron. I do not understand how you.can read the phras-
[1868]“unless instructed to the contrary” in that. way.
[1870]Mr. Twaudy. Because there are other possibilities here.
[1871]l am sorry, but I am afraid lookina at it fifteen years later -
[1872]in the subject that you are andaged in, TI think you would loak
[1873]at it entirely differantly than 1 would, working on a day-to-day
[1874]matter with the Chief of Station. There is absolutely nothina
[1876]in this cable which seys that thay heave ths answer te
[1878]Naro:z.. Does peragraph A indicate thas OBResanaag) ¥o8
[1880]TOP SECRET —s_—sit
[1883]Want a PAUL
[1885]take refuge with Big Brother, Meaning move into
[1887]Mr.’ Twaady. I think probably this would be -- I am trying
[1889]| entourage?
[1890]|
[1893]“to think how this was.
[1895]06
[1896]Was this possibly retegary
[1898]Mr. Baron. I do. not know the operational detaila.
[1900]Mr. Tweedy. Hie did have some access to Lumumba's entour-
[1902]{ages which was the reason we were so interested.
[1904]Mr. Baron. Would you assume that thia cable is suggesting
[1906]t vt
[1907]| that (§ Ss) be recalled to Leonoldvills so that he might
[1909]. career ae anaes
[1910]- move into 4Lumumba's entourage?
[1911]: Od
[1912]Mr. Twaady. Absolutely.
[1913]Mr. Baron. Whare it says he “would thus act as insides mete
[1915]‘to brush up details to razor edge," would you assume that. refars
[1916]to exploring the means by which Lumumba might be poisonad?
[1918]ur. Tweedy. I think that is quite # possibility. 1 cannc:
[1919]specifically say yus. I suspect he was our best potential source
[1920]for operational intelligence, if you Like, on this.
[1922]Than hs says "Also would provide info on food and agricni-
[1923]tural problems.” I have a vaque recollection at thin point the!
[1924]he was raporting rather importantly On aspects of food anc
[1925]agriculture which wes a major nolitical factor within tha Cor.
[1926]then. I cannot put it any more clearly than that.
[1928]Ithink it is that this woul? ba a byproduct of this, th.«'
[1930]we woul] aat more good ranorting on the subieact.
[1932]TOP SECRET
[1935]Mr. Baron. You would read that sentence literally instead
[1936]of an oblique reference to getting access to Lumumba's food hy
[1937]which he might be poisoned?
[1939]Mr. Tweedy. I would read it much more literally than that.
[1941]Mr. Baron. Let us turn then to Exhibit 6, which is a
[1942]cable from the Chief of Station on September 30th to Jadwin,
[1944]| which ia yourself --
[1946]8 (The document referred
[1948]lt Exhibit No. 6 for
[1950]identification.)
[1952]|
[1953]9 | to was marked Tweady
[1955]ill
[1957]WAR & eA
[1959]TOP SECRET
[1962]Mr. Baron. in which the Chief of Station says: “No
[1964]really airtight op possible with assets now available. Must
[1966]Prone (Aree 2707) 344-6008
[1968]chooses batween cancelling op or accepting calculated risks
[1969]ef varying degrees."
[1972]EEE ee assat available. View necessity act
[1973]immadiately, if -at all, urge Headquarters authorize exploratory
[1974]conversations to datermine it| a Rehwilling take role as
[1975]active agent or cut-out this op.”
[1977]Firat, would you read the sentence or the phrase “view
[1979]’ necessity act immediately, {f at all” to refer to the fact
[1981]- Sena : .
[1982]that at this point “ottlieb had informed tha Chia’ of Station
[1984]i
[1986]that ths lethal material was of 4 Limited life?
[1988]Mr. Tweedy. I cannot really commant on that. That is
[1992]ecurtainly a perfectly reasonable explanation for that remark,
[1994]: but as I do not know exactly where Lumumba sat on that particu-
[1995]lar moment when this cabla waa sent, it miqht hava something
[1996]to do with his availability or somathine elae, I just do not.
[1998]know.
[2000]Certeimuly your first point is 4 possibility. Tt aquali
[2002]makeS Cleer, of course, thet althouch EMO Oke s] Ne! Daan 2ss
[2003]in an operational intelligence support role, he at this point
[2005]het never been cut in on plans. Of course, Chie’ of Station
[2007]did not knew whether he would be willing te qo atong with thas:
[2009]“tr. Haron. The Chief of Station here ia considering
[2011]TOP SECRET
[2014]approach to | SENosEsar? first on a hypothetical basis --
[2016]I
[2017]| Mr. Tweedy. Yes.
[2018]'
[2019]|
[2021]OY
[2022]Mr. Baron. It is clear here, is it not, that | SERSeaO ee}
[2024]" is baing viewed as a potential assassination asset?
[2025]u
[2027]mone [Aree 202) $44-4008
[2029]Mr. Tweedy. Indeed.
[2031]Mr. Baron. Let us introduce as Exhibit 7 a cable on 30
[2032]| September 1960 signed by Glen Fields to the Chief of Station,
[2033]\ again in the {oPROP channel,
[2034]| (The document referred
[2035]to was marked Twaedy
[2037]Fxhtihit No, 7 for
[2039]idanti*ication.)
[2041]TOP SECRET
[2044]WARD a rau
[2046]oe" te ae
[2048]SECRET
[2050]“TOP
[2052]Mr. Baron. Prasumably, it is responding to the cable that
[2054]We just looked at, and in this Cable, Glen Fields says, "You
[2056]4
[2057]are. authorized have exploratory talks wien EET co
[2059]assas6 his attitude toward possible active agent or cut-out
[2060]role.”
[2062]Would you assume that Glen Fields consulted you before
[2064]Bending this authorization to the Chief of Station?
[2066]Mr. Tweedy. Not necassarily. f might have been out of
[2068]. town that day. As you will notice, all he says is, “You.are
[2069]i authorized have exploratory talks" -and “Agree with you initia}
[2071]}; Aiscussions shoulda ba on hypothetical basis.” And, of
[2073]course, at that point, we would expact a raport from tha field
[2075], On how it want. He wag taking it one Step further. He micht
[2076]“not have cleared that with ma if I were away. He might also
[2078]- have perhaps cleared it with Mr. Bissell,
[2080]Mr. Baron. As your Deputy, it would have been perfectly
[2082]: Proper in your eyas for Glen Fields to have issued this cable
[2084]without consulting you?
[2086]‘ir. Tweedy. Certainly. Tt is quite possible, too, ther
[2087]he eVen told “Mr. tissal] what he was plarnnirea to do. T Cannot
[2088]tell you Specifically. This is all thyt this cable authorizes.
[2089]I find it antirsly within his delequted rasponsibilitias.
[2091]Mr. Maron. Would it have bea Standard srocedura for
[2092]Glew Plelds, in your absence, to M4ution to Richard Sissel! «he
[2094]fact that such authorization to be sant to the Chiaf of Statio.:
[2096]TOP SECRET
[2099]on an exceptional and sensitive mission like this one?
[2101]Mr. Tweedy. Would you say that again?
[2103]Prone (Ares 202) $44-4000
[2105]Mr. Baron. Would it have bean standard procedure for
[2107]’ Flelds to check with Rissall in your absence before he sent such
[2109]i a cable? |
[2111]Mr. Tweady. No. Field's understanding of his authorities
[2112]; and his relationships with tha DDP on such matters were exactl
[2113]‘ the same as mine. We would have sean eye to aye with him.
[2114]If I had sant the cabla, undoubtedly I would have lat
[2115]‘Mr. Bissell know that I was planning to carry this thing thet
[2116]much clossr. Ths reason for thet {s that wa wera qatting clos-
[2118]to informing a third party the+ this was in the wind. Therefor-.
[2120]WARD BPA
[2122]bufore wa actually took this step, IT think something like
[2123]this,a third party baind{Snomegnn
[2124]Mr. Baron. As Exhibit 8, wa will introduce a cabl@ on
[2125]‘October 7th, 1969, from the Chiat of Statin to Jadwin, which
[2126]is yourself.
[2127](The document raferre?
[2128]to was marked Twaady
[2129]Exhibit No. 9 for
[2131]identification.)
[2133]TOP SECRET
[2136]1
[2138]Mr. Baron. This cable begins with a reference to sidney}
[2139]; GOttlieh, and he: : "Departed Leop for PBPRIME 5 |October, view
[2140]expiration data his materials. However, laft cartain items of
[2141]° continuing usefulnass. Guthman plans continue try implement
[2143]Do you have any independent recollection of receiving
[2145]7 | this cable?
[2147]& Mr. Tweedy. You know, it's terribly hard when you see
[2149]9 something that clearly occurred, and to me I read, it's
[2150]|
[2152]'  , terribly hard at this stage. to say, of course I remember. It a1}
[2153]reads parfectly familiar to me now.. To say quite specifically
[2154]T recall receiving the cable will perhans qo a little heyond
[2156]my memory.
[2158]WARD @ aU,
[2160]Mr. Baron. Based upon having read thia cable at that
[2161]time, which you assume you did, is that corruct?
[2163]Mr. Tweedy. Absolutely.
[2165]Mr. Baron. You would have known that Gitaey Gottlien® had
[2166]laft the Congo on October Sth and that the Chief of Station
[2168]Planned to co.tinue to try to implemant the operation. |
[2170]Mr. Tweady. Which msans that he would continues his
[2172]axploratory onerationel work to see if he could coma to some
[2174]ware
[2178]dr. Beron. You would read thet santeance still to apniy
[2180]BLO Hast Sermon, SE
[2182]to an exoloratory phase, a phasa in which the Chief of Static:.
[2184]Was exploring the feasibility of assassinating Lumumba as
[2186]TOP SECRET
[2189]Prone (Ares 207) 5444000
[2191]opposed to moving to implementing?
[2192]Mr. Twwedy. Absolutely. Under no circumstances anything
[2193]else.
[2195]Mr. Dawson. Based upon this Exhibit and the previous one
[2197]“than, Mr. Tweedy, is it your opinion that in this case no agent
[2199]f was ever asked to assassinate Lumumba?
[2201]“Mr. Tweedy. Yes, indead. That also coincides with my
[2202]best recollection which is not. all that damn good. It is
[2203]parfactly obvious that | GREE wee naver raquested to
[2204]assassinate Lumumba, and I have no recollection of anybody
[2206]having besn asked to do this.
[2208]Mr. Dawson. Whether the discussion was hypothetical, «as
[2210]e
[2211]outlined in the pravious sxhibit.
[2213]Mr. Tweedy. Yes.
[2215]fir. Dawson. Why is it obvious that Frenoreerotra
[2217]asked to assassinete Lumumba in light of the santence in this
[2219]OF
[2220]fiffeywas never
[2222]cable that reads, “Although did not pick up ball," -- reaferrins
[2223]to the fact that /Gehotinot did not necessarily pick up the
[2224]bell on assassinating Lumumba in his conversation with the Chie’
[2225]of Station, the Chief of Stetion nevertheless believad “he
[2226]Prepared take any role necessary within limits security acce
[2227]plish objective.”
[2228]Does thet not indicate Or TE wag at least view!
[2230]a8 S$OMcO.e VhO WAS prenared to undertake an assassination “i:
[2232]if he should he tasked with it?
[2234]TOP SECRET
[2237]Mr. Tweedy. I did not say he was not. This at that time
[2238]. a
[2239]is the Chiaf of Station's best assessment of what theyscnoceas
[2240]reaction would be if tha thing was formally put to him so
[2241]bluntly that ha understood ontirely what it was all about.
[2242]i do not recall, I do not believe any of this residual traffic
[2243]indicates that it aver got so far that we did that, and I think,
[2244]t
[2245]my own belief is it is a 50-50 proposition on nether ERE)
[2246]would agree to do it. I think probably in “limits security
[2248]accomplish objective" is probably the controlling factor.
[2250]Cannot really racall anymora.
[2252]‘Nr. Dawson. Off tha record.
[2254](Discussion off the record.)
[2256]Mr. Baron. Back on the record.
[2258]This report on October 7th by the Chief of Station refers
[2259], back to the exploratory conversations that he mentioned he
[2260]was --
[2262]Mr. Twaedy. Implied to by Fields.
[2264]Mr. Baron. -- authorized by Fields in the pravious cabic
[2266]of the 30th.
[2267]Mr. Tweedy. Richt.
[2269]Mr. Heron. As Fxhibit 9, we will introduce a cable siqne.'
[2271]Bas
[2272]Tweedy to the Chisf of Station in the yoOrRor channal,.
[2274](The document referred
[2276]ALO bas Some SE
[2278]to waa marksd Tweedy
[2280]Exhibit ‘lo. 9 for
[2282]TOP SECRET
[2287]os
[2291]10
[2293]1
[2295]WAGED & PAUL
[2298]yo [i
[2299]ad ji
[2300]4
[2302]17
[2303]1 Pa
[2304]z .
[2305]é . at
[2306],
[2308]4
[2310]z ar
[2311]i
[2312]2
[2313]3
[2314]u
[2316]TOP SECRET
[2319]WARD & OAR
[2321]Mr. Baron. It bagins, "Had good discussion your colleague
[2323]7 October. Comments follow:" ‘
[2325]am
[2326]"A. Be ‘assured did not expact YOPROP " objectives
[2328]‘ be reached in short period and understand current situation
[2330]« fully warranted return your colleague.”
[2332]And then it continues to discuss the fact that you were
[2334]i considering dispatching a third country national operator and
[2336]{a senior casa officer from the CIA who would "run thia op and
[2338]; Outeide agent full time under your direction.”
[2340]Doas this cable refer to tha fact that you debriefed
[2342]' Sidnay Gottlieb?
[2346]‘Mr. Tweedy. Loam sure it doas. That is what it must be,
[2348]Mr. Baron. The first paragraph is meant to indicate that
[2350]ithe Chief of Station should not feel that Headquarters would
[2352]be disappointed in the fact that ha did not pull off an
[2354]‘ assassination mission in such a short period of tima?
[2356]Mr. Tweedy. I want to be careful to how I reply to that.
[2358]All 1 was saying to a vary professional collaaque was that we
[2359]hed no illusio::s about the fact that tha plenninad operation
[2361]of this would be very difficult, at bast, and would taka time
[2362]and thoroughly agree with the fact that prospects, immadiate
[2366]prospects, wera such that there was no alternative for Sicnarg
[2370]Gottlieb to raturn. That is all I was saying.
[2372]But to say what T was trving to exprass to him was the
[2374]TOP SECRET
[2377]WARD & PAUL
[2379]49
[2380]fact that we were not overly disappointed that Lumumba was not.
[2381]assasainated at this point is just not the level of intercourse
[2383]} that I had with a very professional Chief of Station. That is
[2385]i
[2387]tall.
[2388]|
[2389]|
[2391]Mr. Baron. Doas not the paragraph A here indicate that
[2393]| the objective of the mission that was discussed dn the YQPROP
[2394]. ~
[2397]|
[2398]I we a
[2400]« fact that qGottliLebyhad gone to the Congo with materials that
[2401]|
[2403]| were Only going to ba lethal for a short pariod of time?
[2405]channe] was to assassinate Lumumba in view or in light of the
[2407]Mr. Tweedy. That is what it says.
[2408]Mr. Baron. In other words, what I am trying to explore
[2410]‘with you is your characterization of thia entire Stage of the
[2412]‘ S operation as one of planning and exploration when we know that
[2414], pn en . .
[2415]Gottlieb took materialm to the Congo which would only be lsthel
[2417]for a short period of timu and presumably was prapared to move.
[2418]' from exploration to implamentation?
[2420]Mr. Tweedy. If, as a result of tha Station focusing on
[2421]the problem for the first time, as a result of Haadquartars’
[2422]request, they had come up with 4 plan that they thoudht was
[2423]exceadingly solid and which Headquarters approved, it is not
[2424]surprising, perhaps, that we wanted the matzrials there to tar=
[2425]advantage of such, if you likes, an unlikely avent. But this
[2426]would not chande tha normal sequence of svents, which would b+
[2427]that the Station would axplora, kaen Headduartears informec,
[2429]Headquarters woul) commant, it would than be a cresando of
[2431]TOP SECRET
[2434]agreement or no agreement at all resulting from either a final’
[2435]request for approval or either approval or no approval. This
[2436]would not have changed.
[2438]Mr. Baron.
[2439]the Congo with him that had such a short period of lethality,
[2440]ware you not contemplating at that time that the operation
[2441]might wall move from the exploration phase to the implementation
[2443]nn,
[2445]phase just as soon as Gottlieb jand Hedgeman determined that it
[2446]was feasible?
[2448]Mr. Tweedy. I think IF would put it quite differently.
[2450]vu T think that I would say that we would have been remiss in not
[2452]- being in a position to wxploit, if wa reached the point where
[2454]+ we all agreed that the thing was possible.
[2456]If they had merely gone over and said we think wa can ‘to
[2457]te, by why do you not send the stuff from Headquarters, that
[2458]- i would have been sort of nonsense, if you follow me.
[2460]Mr. Baron. You would have expected the Chief of
[2461]Station to cable back for confirmation, but i* was cartainly
[2462]within your contemplation at the time that when Gott liad went
[2463]to the Congo, wher the Chief of Station cabled for confirme-
[2464]tion, you woul’) probably give him a go ahea:’ to assassinate
[2465]Lumumba?
[2467]Mr. Tweedy. .I did not say that at all.
[2469]Mr. Baro... Tf the operation wers feasible?
[2471]Mr. Tweedy. 1 did not. say that at all. It would not have
[2473]TOP SECRET
[2476]Prone [Aree 207) 346-4000
[2478]WAR &® PAUL
[2480]- OC 2OOu6
[2482]1 been my say-so. I do not know what the policy levels of my
[2484], Agency, who in turn would have been reflected in the policy
[2486]levels of the government, would have dona if it had come to the
[2488]Point where somebody said, wa can do it, do you want us to do
[2489]“it.
[2491]Mr. Baron. You would’ have referrad that to Bissell?
[2493]Mr. Tweedy. Yes.
[2495]Mr. Baron. He would have referred it?
[2497]Mr. Tweedy. He would have referrad it according to his
[2499]“lights. That was not my business. We was his own level of
[2501]authority. He was as aware of his authority as I was at my
[2502]leval. T only assume that this would haves been discussed at
[2503]the highast level, certainly at the Agancy. T assume that the
[2504]decision would have had to have bean made hy Allen Oulles and
[2505]who else he wished to consult in Washington.
[2507]These are pure assumotions on my part. Under no circum-
[2508]Stances would I have given the go ahead.
[2510]Mr. Dawson. That is interesting.
[2512]Mr. Baron. I just have one more question on this line.
[2513]I realize we are going very closely over this qround. We woul!
[2514]not be dcing it if it weren't important in trying to qet you to
[2515]clarify for the record exactly what shade of maaning you wast
[2516]to attach here.
[2518]Would it ba fair te say that wher you dispatched
[2520]to the Cornao you expected to hear back --
[2522]TOP SECRET
[2525]Mr. Tweedy. I expected this would result in a dialogue
[2526]between the Station and ourselves as to what might be feasible.
[2528]Mr. Baron. You were hoping?
[2530]Mr. Tweedy. Gottliebjassisting the Chief of Station in
[2531]his explorations.
[2533]Mr. Baron. In view of tha entire policy of the Agency at
[2535]that time, as indicated in the cables of Dullas and the cables
[2536]from yourself and Bissell to the Congo, you were hoping that
[2538]| GoverLeb} and the Chief of Station would find a feasible means
[2541]of carrying out an acsassination mission and then inform you of
[2543]jy 1% that.
[2545]| Mr. Tweedy. I am not going to commant on the hope. I do
[2547]:y ‘| not know what my frame of mind was on that.
[2549]The purpose of the exercise was to sea whether this was
[2551]+s il possible. One thing was clear, that I was the instrument of
[2555]. policy in carrying out the exploratjian which was antirely 4
[2556]_ professional Matter. If the exploration had reached a point
[2557]where we felt that we could submit to higher authority a plan
[2558]which wa thought made some sensa, at that point hiahar authorit~
[2559]would have to taka the ball and run with it and let us know
[2560]what they concludad.
[2561]Mr. Baron. By higher authority here, you mean any
[2562]authority highar than yourself?
[2563]Mr. Twaady. It would start with me in my chain of comman.
[2565]Lt would not be concernad with the Mational Security Advisor
[2567]TOP SECRET
[2570]warn a rau
[2572]to the President or anybody else, I was perfectly clear in my
[2573]mind because of what had occurred and the way that these matters
[2575]had been broachad to the fleld by Mr. Dulles, that the thing
[2577]i was in the national arena and was just not in the Agency's
[2579]arena.
[2581]What Mr. Dulles would have done and what he felt his
[2582]authorities ware from higher authority I cannot tell you.
[2584]Mr. Dawson. That would havea been @ matter that would havs
[2585]bean between Mr. Bissell and Mr. Dulles, in that correct?
[2587]Mr. Tweedy. In the first instance, {it would have been
[2588]betwaen Mr. Dulles and the outside world, tha Fxacutive.
[2590]Mr. Dawsor.. Tha chain of comman! would have bean, you
[2591]would have talked to Bissell, you would not have been expacts'
[2592]or would have asked what Mr. Dulles’ view wera?
[2594]Mr. Tweedy. Mind you, We Weru also an Aqency that was
[2596]very flexible. Tt am not saying “Yr. Nulles might not have talked
[2598]to me about this, that was bacause Mr. Pissell was not
[2600]immsadiatealy available, or somathing of this kind.
[2602]Wheat I am saving is at the working level, the oparatione:
[2603]level, the Divisionel and tha Stetion lavel, we had come up
[2604]with « plan which mad» profassional sense to us which we felt
[2605]sound sanoudh so that we would praesent it to our masters, we
[2606]would have dons so and the resultant instruction te the fiel'
[2607]would heve dapemled on their reaction as far as | was concerse
[2609]within the Aqancy. As far as “Ar. Dulles was concernsad, } caninc"
[2611]TOP SECRET
[2614]is
[2615].
[2616]s
[2618]you.
[2620]In other words, tha degreaa to which he thought he would
[2622]Prone [Mee 2027} $44-4000
[2624]have to refer furthar to Washington on, I have no idea.
[2625]Mr. Baron. It was your job to find a feasible way to carry
[2626]F out an assassination; it was the job of Rissall and those above
[2627]him to decide whether to go ahead, as far as you ware concerned?
[2628]Mr. Tweedy. As far as I was concernad, that is the way it
[2629]sterted.
[2630]Mr. Dawson. You have no independent or specific recollec-
[2631]' tion that you ever went to Mr. Bissell and said, wa do not hevs
[2632]‘a shot at this, or we do, and wa could do it this way, and hin
[2633]saying one thing or another? You hava no recollection aither
[2636]Mr. Tweedy. Mr. Bissell read the same traffic 1 did.
[2638])
[2639]Mr. Dawson. I did not know that.
[2641]Mr. Tweedy. He read these cables. Whan I say he raad
[2642]every single one of them word for word -- all I can say is ha
[2643]had full access to these cables and anything he had not read oc:
[2644]had anv reason to bslicve he had not read, I would have kept bin
[2645]GQouerelly briefed on thse progress of tha planning. “lIaturelly,
[2646]he would have been interested. He woule not haves followed it
[2648]: .
[2650]in detail.
[2652]Mr. Dawson. Would My. Dulles have hal any access to thes
[2654]Not routinely. I think he would have expect sl
[2656]TOP SECRET
[2659]WARD & PAUL
[2661]Mr. Bissell to keep him orally informed on a thing like this.
[2663]He did not want any more paper floating around in those days.
[2664]Mr. Dulles was in evan another building. Now, We were all down
[2665]at the Reflecting Pool at that point, were we not, and Mr.
[2667]Dulles was on E Street. It doasn't make any difference. The
[2669]th Cbs
[2670]| number of papers on this XQPROP thing would have been restricted
[2672]j to the absolute minimum. I do not think Mr. Dulles would hava
[2673]! expadted to be bothered with the operational detaile, What he
[2674]‘would have expected from Mr. Bissell was progress on plannina
[2676]the alimination of Lumumba by whatever maana.
[2678]Mr. Dawson. Was the routine way that that information
[2679]would have besn given to Mr. Mulles -- for instance, what I'm
[2680]thinking was, were there staff meatings at which you attended
[2681]with Mr. Bissell in Mr. Dulles’ praseaace concerning what was
[2682]happening ganerally on a routine quarterly or weakly basis?
[2684]Mr. Tweedy. Mr. Bissell would have sean Mr. Dulles by a:
[2685]large svery day.
[2687]Mr. Tawsou. They would not. review mretings on a weakly or
[2690]Mr. TWeedv. He hat his own sta‘’f maoting avery morning,
[2691]Mr. Oulles did. These were attended by his Daputyv Directors, o°
[2692]which ‘ir. Bissell was one.
[2694]L used to See Mr. Bissell -- he had a staff meating once
[2695]a week which all Chisfs of Division attendad. “Nothing like
[2697]this would be discussed at those. had my own private mautiseds
[2699]TOP SECRET
[2702]WARD © Pau
[2704]with him on these matters whenever it Seemed nacessary by one
[2706]or the other of us.
[2708]Mr. Baron. Returning to the cable of October 7th, 1969,
[2710]i .
[2711]which you sent to the Chief of Station, the reference toa
[2713]senior case officer who might be dispatched to the Congo, is that
[2714]a reference to the fact:that Bissell was considering dispatching
[2715]Justin O'Donnell?
[2717]Mr. Tweedy. No other candidate, no other. I assume that
[2719]' te who it is.
[2721]Mr. Baron. O'Donnell's account that he was asked by
[2722]Bissell to go to the Congo to carry off the assassination of
[2723]Lumumba would fit here?
[2725]Mr. Tweedy. Sure.
[2727]Mr. Baron. The third country national refarrsd to in this
[2729]» cable and in other cables as someone you are considering
[2731]dispatching to the Congo to halp with the operation, would that
[2733]‘be QJWIN or WIROGUR?
[2735]Mr. Twuedy. As I told you before, definitely not WDROGUF.
[2736]Presumably this other fellow, whose identity and what ha wes is
[2737]very, very unclear to Me.
[2739]Mr. Baron. The agent that was rua by Phy;
[2741]Mr. Tweedy. Yas. This would have beer the man that would
[2742]have worked with Justin 9'Mounell if it had all happaned.
[2744]‘xr. Baron. That was QJWIN. I will ranrasenut to you that
[2746]QJWIN was the agent who was supervised by Justin O'Ponnell.
[2748]TOP SECRET
[2753]Mr. Tweedy. We read that that time, which is my only
[2755]i recollection of it. That is the person I am sure.
[2757]! Mr. Baron. Let me correct mysalf here.
[2759]I will ruprasent to you that. QUWIN was the agent that was
[2760]: recruited by Tho lass iverg and sent vy ENR *> the Congo for
[2761]| usa by O'Donnell and perhaps by the Chief of Station.
[2762]Is that consistent with your recollection?
[2763]Mr. Tweely. No, it is not consistent with my recollection.
[2764]It is cartainly consistant with what I read the last time I saw
[2765]! you, which I have no reason to dispute. IT just cannot remamber
[2766]the bliqhter at all.
[2767]Mr. Baron. As Exhibit 10, let us introduce a cable of
[2768]October 15th, 1960, which is not sent in the ¥Yoprop channel.
[2769]It is marked nronr ie cat in the space whars sensitivity
[2770]dudicators are usually placed.
[2771](The document referred
[2772]to was marked Tweedy
[2773]Exhibit No. 10 for
[2775]identification.)
[2780]Mr. Baron. This cable requests the views of the Chief of
[2782]: Station on suggastions A, B and C for various covert operations.
[2783]. ve
[2784]In paragraph C, there is a reference toffEROAK.
[2786]Mr. Tweedy, we have received the representation from the
[2788]“ CIA that that was a cryptonym used to refer to Lumumba.
[2790]Is that consistent with your intereptation of the cable?
[2792]Mr. Baron. It is indeed.
[2794]Mr. Tweedy. This paragraph C says in part: “Only direct
[2796]| action we can now stand behind is to support immobolizing or
[2798]Oe .
[2800]: arresting EBROAK, dasirable as more definitiva action night he.
[2802]* Any action taken would havea to be antiraly Congolese.”
[2804]Now, you signed this cable, but it was sot sant in the
[2805]special senaitivity channel) that dealt with Gottllab's mission
[2806]to the Congé*
[2808]Before we discuss this cable, let us also introduce into
[2809]the record as Fxhibit 11 another cable which you siqned on
[2810]october 15, 1960 which was sent in the YOPROP channel to the
[2811]Chief of Station.
[2813](The documant referred tc
[2814]was marked Twealy Fxhibit
[2816]So. ll for inentiticetic:.
[2818]TOP SECRET
[2821]Mr. Baron. This contains the following language: “You
[2822]2 | will note from cable through normal channel currently being
[2824]any
[2826]3 i transmitted" then it continues “on YQPROP suggestions. You
[2827]\ .
[2829]i
[2831], wild Propet receive more along these lines aa stumbling
[2832]i bloc [fiaoax represents increasingly apparent all studying
[2834]| Congo situation closely and his disposition spontaneously
[2836]Mr. Tweedy. I think by that, I think it is perfectly God-
[2838]| Pecones number ona consideration.”
[2839]I
[2840]i
[2842]| awful English.
[2844]Mr. Baron. The cabla continues --
[2846]Mr. Twaedy. Obviously that means that everyone one talked
[2847]‘to said thare is no solution to the Congo as long as Lumumba
[2849]‘ stays in a position of powar or influance there. That is whet
[2851]WARD @ PAu
[2853], that Means.
[2854]Mr. Baron. The cable'continues: "“Raisa above so you not
[2855]* confused by any apparent duplication. This channel remains
[2856]for specific purpose you discussed with cclleague and also
[2857]remains highest priority."
[2859]Now, dows this pair of cables indicate that at this point
[2861]Oc 2000"
[2863]despite the indication in the first cable that we lookad at thet
[2864]“direct action would be limited to entirely Congolase action"
[2865]the actual position of yourself and others at Headquarters
[2867]involved in this onearatio: was that exploration of an assassinrc-
[2869]210 Porst Street, § fo Wathingtinn
[2871]tion mission remained tha highest priority for tha Chief of
[2873]gi Station?
[2875]TOP SECRET
[2878]WARD @ PAUL
[2880]410 Feat Street. > fF, Warmington, 1 20003
[2882]ERTIES TE
[2885]Mr. Tweedy. I think thet is accurate.
[2886]We had come to the end of the road, at least- temporarily
[2887]on the YQPROP aspect and for the tima being we were in no
[2889]position to approve anything but: what was discussed in the
[2890]0?
[2892]NQPLAP’ cable. Nonetheless, as long as the threat to the Congo
[2894]from Lumumba existed, there remained a high priority to search
[2895]for maans to take care of the YQPROP Planning aspects.
[2897]Mr. Baron. When the cable refers to the specific purpose
[2898]you discussed with colleague --
[2900]Mr. Tweedy. This is assassination with (Gottlieb; I am
[2902]gure.
[2904]Mr. Baron. It than says: This purpose remains highest
[2906]| | priority. Would that not indicate to the Chief of Station
[2908]+ i that he should proceed to find a way that Lumumba could be
[2910]assassinated?
[2912]Mr. Tweedy. What this would mean to the Chief of Station
[2914]‘was that he should retain exploration of possible means of
[2915]' assassinating Lumumba as highest priority. He should continues
[2917]“to suek means to do this, not to do it.
[2919]Mr. Baron. Again, you are maintaining you have just made
[2921]yourself claar, as far as you W4re concarnsd, you were still
[2923]“asking him to explore and not implemant at this point?
[2925]Mr. Tweedy. Nothing alss but.
[2927]Mr. Baron. Who would have had accass to or received
[2929]‘distribution of the first cabl» we looked at which travelled i:
[2931]TOP SECRET
[2934]WARD & Pau
[2936]S10 Farss Street, 5 ©. Wrasrengton, OC. 20003
[2938]Mr. Tweedy. It would have basn restricted, but not as
[2939]restricted as the other.
[2941]Mr. Baron. Would somebody at the Embassy conceivably
[2942]| have been cut in on cable traffic in the channel that dealt with,
[2943](are operations?
[2945]Mr. Tweedy. Could be, certainly. —__ oy
[2947]Mr.. Baron. In other words, the purpose of sending -a
[2949]. #econd cable on the same day which dealt with action against
[2951]Lumumba was: what?
[2953]Mr. Tweedy. The simple reason I think -- I say I think,
[2955]| because I cannot tell you so -- as I said a few minutes ago,
[2957], obviously you'd come tamporarily to the and of the line on
[2958]YOPROP, Measures taken to shore upf{; ETT position in ths
[2960]|| congo, {#abutul would have served to support the general objactive,
[2962]I ot containing Lumumba by whatever means. It is all part of the
[2964], same purpose. —
[2965]Once again referring to the original cable from Mr. Pullas
[2966]which said all means, in effect, ani I think the reason I'm
[2967]putting this in tha open channel, the onen channal is still --
[2968]Mr. Baron. Simply tha ordinary channel usad batween
[2969]yourself --
[2970]Mr. Tweedy. Still a restricted channel. RIBAT is a
[2971]restricted thing, in any evant. This could have bean discussed
[2973]with the Ambassador or the Embassy, if any aspect of it seemed
[2975]TOP SECRET
[2978]WARD &@ Pau
[2980]2 Wasnengtian 16. 20001
[2982]410 Fey Street,
[2984]the Congo to handls the
[2986]e@ppropriate by the Chief of Station.
[2988]Mr. Baron. by contrast, the YQPROP cable would only have
[2989]been sean by the Chief of Station?
[2991]Mr. Tweedy. Tha Fmbassy would not have been shown this
[2993]cable anyway. Wea do not show the traffic to the Embassy; we
[2994]discussed it. 02
[2996]Mr. Baron. It would have been propr for the fiipiar cable
[2997]to be conveyed in some manner?
[2999]Mr. Tweedy. ‘To ba discussed.
[3001]Mr. Baron. Between the Chief of Station and perhaps the
[3002]Ambassador?
[3004]Mr. Tweedy. Discussed; only orally.
[3006]Mr. Baron. By contrast, the YOPROP cable clearly would
[3007]have been restricted to the Chiaf of Station?
[3009]Mr. Tweedy. I have no reason to believe that the YOPROP
[3011]business was discussed with the’ Ambassador, I do not
[3013]beliuve it was, although Mr. Dulles, in his original cable, sai?
[3015]"he could, if he wanted to.
[3017]Mr. Baron. Let us introduce as the final exhibit for
[3019]| the moment Exhibit 12, a cable of October 17, 1960 going to
[3021]* Jadwin from the Chief of Station.
[3023]In this cable, the Chief of Station 1s responding to your
[3025]* suqgestion that a senior cass officer might be dispatched to
[3027]Tdprop Operation. He says it is an
[3029]excellent idea. Is that a fair interpratation?
[3031]TOP SECRET
[3034]Mr. Tweedy. Yes.
[3035](The document referred
[3036]to was marked Tweedy
[3037]Exhibit No. 12 for
[3039]identification.)
[3041].
[3042]ry
[3043]a
[3044]i+)
[3045]r
[3047]g
[3049]TOP SECRET
[3052]Prone [Av ee 202) 34446008
[3054]Mr. Baron. The Chief of Station then makes a suggestion
[3055]j tn the fourth paragraph for equipment that might be provided if
[3056]I such a casa officer ware to be sent. He ssays, "If case officer
[3057]J
[3058]‘|
[3059]ti
[3061]sent, recommend Headquarters pouch soonest high powered foreign
[3063]| make rifle with telescopic sight and silencer. Hunting good
[3065]| here when lights right. However as hunting rifles now forbidden.
[3067]jj would keep rifle in office pending opening of hunting season.”
[3068]Would you take that to be a racommendation by the Chief
[3070]“of Station, if a case officer was sent to the Congo to concen-
[3072]Oke
[3073]“strate on tha YQPROP operation, he should be provided with the
[3075]: kind of Weapon that would be suited for a aniper shot at
[3076]Lumumba ?
[3077]Mr. Tweedy. Yes. Not necessarily to be fired by the
[3078]case officer, obviously not, but at least used in the operatio.:.
[3079]Mr. Baron. This reference to the hunting season can be
[3080]’ taken as a reference obliquely to the fact that Lumumba was in
[3081]UN custody and that there would not be, in affect, "open
[3082]Season” or. him until he showed his face outside of UN custor’y.
[3083]Would that be a fair interpretation?
[3084]Mr. Tweedy. I would not have interpreted it quite the
[3085]Bame way. 1 would have interpreted it this way, which was if
[3086]it, as a rasult of Ileadquartarg suggestion that a rifle bs
[3087]providad to the Station, the Station would coms up with an
[3088]Operational plan involving the uss of the rif€te which Headaue: t-r5%
[3090]would approve, and that thus, in affact, tha opsaration was o:
[3092]TOP SECRET
[3095]Prone (Aree 202) $44-4000
[3097]by a rifle,that would be the opening of the hunting season.
[3099]In other words, the Point where they knew, how it could be used
[3101]\ and Headquarters had approved its use.
[3103]Mr. Baron. I have one othar genaral quastion before wa
[3105]i tak break t £ G "s
[3106]ea eak, and that is, returning to sianey ottiieb!
[3107]! account of his conversation with Richard Bissell about -making
[3109]‘| Preparations for carrying off an assassination against an
[3110]i aot EY
[3112]) African foreign leader if it were required, Gottlieb said in
[3113]i ies
[3115]that context that he had higher authority for such an operation.
[3117]" Gottlieb. also said that he clearly interprated Bissell to maar:
[3118]that Bissell had Presidential authority for such an operation?
[3119]Did you have any knowledga of such a conversation between
[3120]dottlieh ‘and Bissell from any source?
[3122]Mr. Tweedy. I do not recall that Gottliab‘and I avar
[3123]discussed highar authority and approval. 1 do not say that it
[3124]did not occur. re Gottlie’, said that he had this impression
[3125]in talking to Bissell, I cannot say no, but I cannot comment
[3126]on it further.
[3128]Mr. Baron. For the moment, we have no further questions
[3130]and we will take a break now and pick un eqein befora the full
[3132]Committes and Executive Session this afturroon.
[3134]Thank you very much for your patience in qoing through these
[3136]documants ona by ona. It has been extranaly heloful to us.
[3138](Whereupon, at 1:40 p.m. the heeringa concluded.)
[3140]TOP SECRET
[3143]stipe Retetenre #4 ons
[3144]AR SES Ae 282)
[3145]e LEOPOLD FILLE
[3150]—_— a a RS
[3154]* W7887
[3155]NPRIOAITY
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[3160]oF THE CONGO WITH DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES FOR VILE PRESTIGE Ue fr:
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[3162]CONSEQUENTLY ‘VE CONCLUDE THAT HIS REMOVAL MUST BE AN URGENT
[3163]AND PRDAE OBJECTIVE AND THAT UNDX2 SXISTING CONDITIONS T7US
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[3167]LZ0P 0772 AND LZOP N74S AND DLR 46115 INCLUDING SVEN MOEE AUGRL.SIe
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[3209]'P TO A TOTAL C¥ 9100, 000 YO CARRY OVT ANY CRASH PROGRAMS CF
[3211]vost OPPORTUNITY TO CONot us nin. AVVO”
[3213]3. TO THS SXTINT THAT AMBASSADOR MAY DOISiR= TO 3a CONSULSED,
[3214]OU SHOULD 623% iis GONCUARZNCE. LF IN ANT PAATICULAR CASE Hi
[3215]O83 MOT WISH TO BZ CONSULT2D YOU CAN ACT ON YOUR OWN AUTHORITY
[3216]T PRALLT RIETERRAL HERE.
[3217]he deta MAM YSIAGS AS CLAN UMA ANU APPKUY.Y AT LUM PENT
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[3221]ar 2q704)3
[3222](i nt
[3223]res(cul 35
[3224]CABLE SECASTARLIAT: LAMIT MISTuinuTion
[3225]. M2, HELMS.
[3227]aid
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[3240]mEPRCOUC TION AY OTHER THAN THE SSUINO CHPICE 1S PRCrUAITIO.
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[3244]« 19 September 1960
[3246]'2 § LEOFOLDVILLE
[3250]CON far
[3252]ar
[3253]ROUTINE /* pee
[3256]tad
[3258]PhiONTY
[3260]mA FaUenows
[3264]“O08  DoP. She 2
[3268]Aprhan “Tana 77
[3269]OPERATIO*aL
[3273]“
[3277]is (PRITY) LEOP into Crt Ga
[3280]EYES ONLY GUTHMAN FROM JADWIN
[3282]RYBAT YOPRUP
[3283]Mw
[3284]l. IDEN PROCEEDING BRAZZAVILLE SHORTLY AND SHOULD ARRIVE
[3285]APPROX 27 SEPT. HE WILL MAKE HIS WAY LEOP SOONEST THEREAFTER — Nie
[3286]CALL YOU AT CFFICE ON ARRIVAL. WILL ANNOUNCE HIMSELF AS “SID Fic.
[3287]err - BRIEF COVER DISCUSSION WILL THEN BE HELD LN WHICH "SIN"
[3288]SUGGESTS MEETING YOU-AT OFFICE AND YOUQGVILEL RESPOND by aAriyi re
[3289]AND SETTING THE TIME. HOWEVER THE ACTUAL MEETING wtb. TAKE PLA:
[3290]ONE HOUR EARLIER THAN TIME MENTIONED IN THIS CONVERS a rIAN AND IN
[3291]FRONT MAIN ENTRANCE NEW STANLEY HOTEL. "SID" WILL CARRY UNROL LL}
[3292]COPY OF "PARIS MATCH" IN LEFT HAND.
[3293]2 IT URGENT YOU SHOULD SEE IDEN SOONEST FOSSiBLE AFTER He
[3294]PHONES YOU. HE WILL FULLY LOENTLIFY HIMSELF AND EXPLAIN HLS A:
[3296]MENT TO YOU. HOWEVER HIS ETA NOT FIRM AND You SHOULD NOT BE
[3298]CONCERNED BY SOME DELAY.
[3300]CONEDIMATING OF FTChag
[3302]@ GCthaabin dg ovrricea SECRET _| AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
[3303]REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE 1S PROHIBITEC.
[3306]ehoury
[3308]Dot oe
[3309]OPERATIONAL
[3310]IMMEDIATE
[3312]mT VEE Tae Thee
[3313]Into Cn 2:2
[3314]PAGE TWO
[3316]3. ACKNOWLEDGE ABOVE SOONEST, WITH ANY REVISIONS YOU
[3317]WISH MAKE IN ABOVE PROCEDURES. CONTINUE USE YQPROP INDICATOR
[3318]ALL. TRAFFIC THIS OP, WHICH YOU INSTRUCTED HOLD ENTIRELY TO
[3319]YOURSELF.
[3321]END OF MESSAGE
[3323]bel _ ccd,
[3324]DD/ COCEDIMATING OFPICTES Clar &
[3325]CEbdabing oerices SECRET AUTAEMTICATING OPFICES
[3327]@ REPROOUCTION.| BY OTHER THT ISSUING OFFICE.18 PROHIBITED. Copy °.
[3329]rated -
[3331].
[3333]: Tay se ier LS
[3334]oD Oe eEweed y 455:
[3335]te) CJAR
[3337]‘ 27445 .
[3338]te 19 September 1960
[3340]r LEOPOLDVILELE
[3342]we CLRECTOR
[3343]he CfAF prineity
[3344]ae hoe, sfe 2 | Orteationay feet :
[3346]tM MEDIATE
[3348]Po) fy, rors 4G
[3349]Ye fre
[3350]/ Jé ‘ Wyhegs be
[3352]CHE Gm 0) Eee
[3354]{PRITY) LEOP
[3356]regse a
[3357]RYBAT YQFROP
[3359]RE DIA Jiye4 jour GIYY SF
[3361]IDEN SIDNEY BRAUN.
[3363]END CF MESSAGE
[3367]DD/P
[3368]eerssasing orricts SECRET avintnt
[3370]ern neem eee eS Dee a ee Em ew RRM TE
[3373]a Se cee
[3374]C/AF
[3375]1 22 Sa ptcmber 1Sh3
[3378]wae VIKEC TDA
[3380]PRiery
[3383]+ meee “Great Fantane
[3385](PRITY) LEOp cre ove
[3386]“T23 ONLY GUTHWAAN
[3387]RYMAT rdyxop
[3388]RE LEOP 0025 (iN 18989)
[3389]af VERY WELCOME,
[3390]A. RE 2A. CONCUR MAXIMUM use |&E TORE OR COLL. Kh
[3391]S SL. MUS1 RERMALN UNWITTING FOR TIME BEING ALTNOUGH Pil urh
[3392]You “WiLL BE i 4% MORT ACTIVE ROLE.
[3394]HAS APPARENTLY MAINTAINED SPLENDED COVER, MUST RE
[3395]BEA MINATION HIS BACKGROUND WILL REVEAL HE RESID
[3396](imams ONE LES ON RaERUME]RASSPORT AND voz Raxco mmm ;
[3397]RZ 2%. CONCUR THIS PCSSIBILITY WO2TH WATCHING BUT iF
[3398]DECLDED SUPPORT FOR TOPROP OBJZCTIVES, BELILVE ESSENTIAL. 51
[3400]3E PACYIC : (Gin TU3BD NATIONAL CHANNEL WITH PORQUE WOOL:
[3402]COMPI.LTZLY CONCRAL=D, ‘A IMACRIE FOU CONCUR OUR DELIEY SUBJECTS
[3403]. ny
[3404]SSOGuVUAITT LiZ=Ly 324 POOR AND LEAKS WOULD ALMOST CERKTALNLY
[3406]Se owen za WHS
[3408]a
[3410]aviwM Atte ea OPPICL OS
[3412]coo
[3413]CT
[3419]TONS,
[3421]NEO
[3423]PAGL TWO
[3425]TCRIGITHAN WE, DUT TRACES INDICATE AE ECT AN GINS: PRS Conncvie
[3427]TUVS OUR COMMENTS ALONG LINES B ABOVE.
[3429]5 9. RA 2D. UNDX2STAND STATION HAS HAD REASONS QUEST
[3432]Bate LAM R2EPCRTING RELLABILITY AND WE MUST ASSUM = (YEREUNS
[3434]CONN=:CTIONS COMMENTS AS AROV m.
[3436]t EB. Ke 2h. FROM TRACES HERE ASSUME SUAIECT MAY Ae cree $f’
[3438]ARM SUPPORTEA \YUSU. NOTEZ PREVIOUS CZECH COMNECTIONS.
[3440]iG YOUR FURTHER EXPLORATION CNA CA Ah
[3442]PSA ES PED ANT POSSIDLZ CNA SOLUTION. YSUS SHOULL
[3444]Wow |
[3446]t
[3448]PROVIDE MAAIMUM CREDIFILS
[3450]UBIEC1 LYOP oco? Luc ELLY ih
[3451]MCS T RISKY VEHIC
[3456]‘VERESTEL TOUR CONTINUIAG...
[3458]RAB
[3459]COOEDINATING OPFFicery fist
[3461]~~ SZCREiT ] AUTNEMTICaATINGO OFritet
[3464]Tt me IRED
[3466]i
[3468]@oxc- . H
[3470]dy
[3475]aAmAyey
[3477]s
[3479]a
[3481]t
[3486]jo RAS
[3487]is $
[3494]4 {¢ OPERATIONAL Poitiais oy
[3495]. Li TMMEOIATE
[3496]bt -——-- =.
[3498]| UIE fay,
[3499]ee 2
[3501]Inryo PAGE THREE 7 Cite Gia wees %
[3502]assseanean(Ghorres AS GENUINE THIRD NATIONAL ASSET ON GhOUND 2 Ch.
[3503]WHATEVER ROLE THIS OP YOU MIGHT CONSIDER 300M. SOMEWHAT COlGi nt §
[3504]YOUR RECANT RIEPOAT HE MISUNDERSTOOD OR DISOSTYED INSTRUC TIO.
[3506]HUT ND APPARENT INCREASING ACCEMSE TO Sik
[3507]MILLizu CLF spear} JAGEASST. Wit ARE CONSIDESAING A TURD NATICNA!.
[3508]EUS UUT CORPZETAA VALLAX LE HERE WHO MIGHT FILL DILL AND WILL Aleve ;
[3509]SHORTLY.
[3510]NOT INTINDED YOU CONSTRUE ASOVE COMMENTS AS DASITCALILY
[3511]ZOU AND COLLEAGUE UNDERSTAND WE CANMOT READ OVE ‘5
[3512]AM Aa
[3513]MUST DE CONCZALMWUENT PBPRIME AOLE, UNLIGS OUIEBTANVING Urruis::
[3514]IME2GA3 WHICH MANES CALCULATED EIST FISST CLASS SET. READ
[3515]ENTEATAIN ANY SXRIOUS PROFOSALS TOU MAILE SASED OUR INGN At
[3516]ZOTH YOU PR PF ESSIOWAL JUVGGIAAINO.
[3517]if i por MESSAGE
[3518]v gis
[3520]/ rhipeedy we
[3522]m/AY / : CEORSCMMATING OF Ftcsen welt
[3523]9 DELTAS Am Grercae pm T ’ AITOAMU CATING OFFICT?
[3524]ny | n ' .
[3526]er enero
[3527]AEVOARIUATINUARY PAV TUA RS VEIT ELON NF EIR (OC PO HIOITEY,
[3534]PROKY
[3536]OPERATIONAL | ae
[3537]MET IALE
[3538]t CT TZ
[3540]morgane
[3541]| er Rere Ee)
[3543]26 Tanenw
[3545]cole Ore
[3549]02521
[3551]FV RCM ASCHAM AND JADWIN
[3553]RE: LEOP 0002 (LN 173384) *
[3555]1, APPRECIATE EXCELLENT REPORTING YOUR REFERENCY
[3557]AND COMMENDE RAVEHIS ALERT ROLE. WE AWloH GIVE EVE Y
[3559]POSURLE SUPSORT MUS GMATING LUMUMBA FROM ALY POSSLEILI OY
[3561]“Nee . my
[3563]HESUMING GOVERNMENTAL POSITION OR HE FAILS OI LEOP.
[3565]SETTING HIMSELF IN SFANLEYVILLE OR ELSEWHERE.
[3567]é. WHILE FULLY AWARE OF NEFARIOUS PLOTTING Gitans,
[3568]GUINEA, UAL. TO ANSTORE LUMUMBA, GREATLY DISTURBED AT
[3569]REFERENCE TO MCROCTO AND PARTICULARLY TUNISIA AS MEMSE? -
[3570]YOU SUGULOT ANY ACTION WE CAN PROM.
[3572]mae
[3575]OQCACID OR TAKE OTHERWISE TO HWELP DETACH THEM FROM LUMUAINA
[3577]“yy
[3579]conesimatina opyi1eres
[3582]» LECPO LINVILLE
[3584]. 4
[3589]. «6
[3590]FRicale '
[3592]t
[3594]ane ad
[3595]rab ate |
[3601](N&O
[3602]DISTURBED AT PUSSIBILITY THATS?
[3603]CONTAOL OF WIS FORCES DUE POSSIBLE HIGHER PAY DEING OF FEREL
[3604]SOURCES HOSTILE TO US AS SUGGESTED PARA 4 TOUR REF FERENCE.
[3605]SITUATION IM ORDER AND CAN ANYTHING FUHTHER DE DONE
[3607]ABOUT THIS THROUGH UN OR COVERTLY THROUGH},
[3609]4, AGREE POSITICN CUTLRIED LAST SENTENC? REPRE RENCz
[3613]Duce WE ASSUME is FULLY ENDORSED BY AMBASIAUURK,
[3615]5. AT YOUR DISCRETION, SHARE THIS MESSAGE WITH
[3616])
[3618]AMBASSADOR.
[3619]ENO CF MESSAGE
[3621]CIS COMMENT: EHiOERO. Ee ayl 2) reported of. 23 Settember that Pierce
[3622]Matcts, Gabriel Yormae, and Antnine Giznenga of the PSA were mounting
[3624]a coup agauinet Mobutu and the Council of Cormmmissiunecs
[3626]roe
[3628]1 .
[3629]Wo ste 24 1005
[3631].* say f
[3632]SAA
[3633]‘my rStrs MATIN mr rirees
[3635]e@ . acl n a
[3636]Gbtsasingd ovricer yy | SECRET i ae ai CATIB
[3638]* REPROCUCT BY Ores Trane decd ISSUING Sr FICE iG FROHICLTS
[3641]rronyas
[3642]bbatavel
[3644]Seen er 1915
[3646]C lA 'N 18Qfa
[3647]LECP 4226
[3649]rn 2>5 Cote
[3651]abrnin
[3652]ry eM) Aw pe raNTAcT «oa PHAAS way ns CAYe YlAne
[3653]CLAM IM CONTACT 5 SALUBAS Wo LE SAYS ANXIOUS
[3655]PRIORITY
[3657]Laven BOF PROGRAM IF PROPER INSTRUMENTS AVAILABLE.
[3658]c HECTOR GEORGES MASS!IANGA RECENTLY TOLD UUACID OFF ISLE
[3662]SMOVCOUTHMAN HE TN CONTACT SMALL GROUP CNA TROCPS WO WOULD
[3663]SARTISIEP ATE CF RECEIVE FINANCIAL ENCOURAGEMENT. GUTRAAN WI THEE
[3664]Med ARAANGEO HAVE ODACIO GFFILEX Ini eoouce MASS LANGA
[3666]THIS COULS BE PUSH THROUGH ANOTHER
[3668]nia WM TOLO BETTELMEIM ME IN act
[3670]wes rN Gee UF ty IRASAVLES, Lie
[3671]“0 GF COMMISSIONERS, BOLIKANGO AND CAPTAIN, asecol Rhye an
[3673]4 TM CONTACT GELS! Nt, FRE ke o OR OTHER GROLPS WILLING TRALI
[3675]ALO Alta VES TROOPS LOCATED. K LTONA AREA. SAIO HIS GROUP WANTS
[3677]. ?
[3678]Meow THEM LEOP IN ABOUT & DAYS TO TRY TAKE OVER CITY. PLAN NOT
[3680]GLE ANO GOUST KASAVUGU AGREES. BUT MIGHT Get CAPTAIN
[3682]FOALIE
[3683]INVULYED REF OP, O78 - .
[3684]G.. SLIGHT chance(potree MIGHT TRY THROULn SUBLET
[3686]LEoP C209. CIN: “or
[3687]3. “PLAY PROCEED:
[3689]N-BASIS-PRIORITIES AS LISTED ABOVE, UNLESS
[3691]INSTRUCTED. bicy ‘CONTRARY
[3694]“PRIORITY
[3698]SLED. 2b
[3700]procreerao
[3704]PUNT ONS
[3709]Cept 24 . REC'G CALE SEE1.
[3711]fo an PRIORITY
[3713]re 22 \9I5 po
[3714]C Lh ‘ | In 1E565
[3715]. ae
[3717]“tO cE coP gach
[3719]yy a Q1hby (OUT 74465)
[3720]\, INFN PL© CONTACTED 25 SEPTEMBER. wE CN SAM WAVE
[3722]Ply MAGT VAP IO AT TION CONSISTENT WITH SECURITY INDICATED,
[3724][SERING POSSIBILITIRS:
[3726]WOULD THUS ACT AL aS | Co CMAN, TO Ritimae
[3727]Mam are ey
[3729]ALSO WOULD PROVIDE INFO OM Fong AnD
[3730]SUL TURAL zm. GUTHMAN RECALL Chie a] 10 LEUP.
[3731]é. Syeuect LEGP 9981 TIN 16685 —) SAID HE PLANNED ACT
[3733]Witt" © DAYS. CATE PASSED AND “NO ACTION BUT ITF PRICE RIGHT Mich:
[3735]GOT STW ON ROAD.
[3736]WHO UNWITTING GUTHHAN POLITICAL
[3738]COMTACT VISITED STATION. 26. SERTENCER, EXPRESSED VitwW NEED TAC
[3740]IMMEOTATE ACTIGH, © SAI" HAS: Me S Malt SOUAD weio WANT INTER VE
[3742]ACHIEVE POSITIVE SETTLEMENT.
[3744]NEED CUT-OUT SUCH AS RouTont REALIZE PREFERACLE. USE THIRD NAT ten ob
[3747]DIRECTOR
[3750]C/ar {CR HIS, af Chy NOTIFIED 1940 20 SEP)
[3752]Oop, .3/C 2 . CPERATIONAL IMEDIATE
[3753]IN 20057
[3754]Dia = it Leo?
[3755]EYES CNLY JACWIN FRCM GUTHMAN ee
[3756]RYBAT YOPROP SEP 22 1915
[3757], CIA
[3759]REF: DIR £3994 (OUT 74837 7”
[3761]1. NO REALLY AIRTIGHT OP POSSIBLE WITH ASSETS NOW AVAIL:
[3762]MUST CHOOSE BETWEEN CANCELING OP OR ACCEPTING CALCULATED 1545
[3763]GF VARYING DEGREES.
[3765]2. PE PARA 1 REF: WE BELIEVE f§ci
[3766]AVAILABLE. vitw NECESSITY ACT IMMEDIATELY,
[3767]AUTHORIZE €*PLCRATORY CONVERSATIONS TO CETCRM IBC
[3768]WILLING TAKE ROLE AS ACTIVE AGENT OR CUT-OUT THIS OP. (WOULD
[3769]APPSCACH CH HYPOTHETICAL BASIS. ANO NOT REVEAL PLANS). IF HE
[3770]APPEARS WILLING ACCEPT ROLE, WE BELIEVE IT NECESSARY REVEAL
[3771]CBSECTIVE OF TO HIM IN ORDER OOTAIN FULL nail HIS POTENTIAL.
[3772]ALTMOUGH TOO EARLY SEE SPECIFIC COTAILS | Se
[3774]" BELIEVE RISK MINIMIZED iF HE: LEAVES AREA BEFORE EFFECTS OP ARE
[3775], _ 2)
[3777]_ APPARENT. ss fae 0%
[3778]3. FEAR MIGHT HAVE OVERSTATED Possi8iL 1 TY Qfhor ie 7
[3782]PARTICIPATIGC’. BELIEVE, HE UNSUITED ROLE AT PRESENT TIME, VIEW
[3784]POSSIBILITY MAY ALSO a REPORTING ad
[3786]'
[3793]LEOPCLOVILLE
[3795]‘ C/aF (CR HOSE, AF Civ NOTIFIED igo 20 SEP)
[3797]@ cop,.s/C 2 .
[3799]CPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE
[3801]IN 2005]
[3802]oR who a crt LEOP P25."
[3804]EYES CNLY JACWIN FRCM GUTHMAN Ke rats
[3805]RYBAT YOFROP SiP 22. 1915
[3807]; ) | CIA
[3808]REF: DIR £3994 (OUT 74837 )
[3810]1. NO REALLY AIRTIGHT OP POSSIBLE WITH ASSETS NOW AVAIL) LE
[3811]MUST CHOOSE SE TWEEN CANCELING OP OR ACCEPTING CALCULATED RIS<S =m
[3812]GF VAHYING DEGREES.
[3814]2. Af PARA 1 REF: WE BELIEVE QM cco: asses
[3815]AVAILABLE. vtiw NECESSITY ACT IMMEDIATELY, TF AT ALL, URGE HS
[3816]AUTHORIZE E*PLCRATORY CONVERSATIONS TO CETERMing if QQ
[3817]WILLING TAKE ROLE AS ACTIVE AGENT OR CUT-OUT THIS OP. (WOULD
[3819]APPOOACH CH HYPOTHETICAL BASIS. AND NOT REVEAL PLANS). IF HE
[3820]APPEARS WILLING ACCEPT ROLE, WE BELIEVE IT NECESSARY REVEAL
[3822]CBSECTIVE OF TO HIM IN ORDER OBTAIN FULL VALUE HIS POTENTIAL.
[3824]ALTHOUGH TOO EARLY SEE SPECIFIC COTAILS GMB Paks is ce,
[3825]| ;
[3826]BELIEVE RISK MINIMIZED IF HE:LEAVES AREA BEFORE EFFECTS OP Ane
[3828]. - _— es os
[3830]_ APPARENT,
[3831]3... FEAR MIGHT “HAVE “OyERSTATED. POSSIBILITY gee YILE
[3832]PARTICIPATICY, BELIEVE, HE UNSUITED ROLE AT: PRESENT TIME, VIEW
[3834]POSSIBILITY MAY ALSO BE REPORTING a
[3836]|
[3839]OPERATIONAL IMMUULATI
[3841]IN 2203) /
[3842]LECP 5442
[3844]“WNwO Catt
[3846]4, NEW POSSIBILITY EXISTS VIEW 29 SEPTEM3ER GUTHMAN
[3848]r
[3849](Gisce 1 TALKS. AL THOUGH [BE ISLE 1 PREVIOUSLY FAVORED SUBUECT
[3850]REF OP, NOW BELIEVES HISS>ANGOLAN GROUP WOULU BE SUPPRESSED 11!
[3852]CONGO ANDO REPLACED 8Y GUINEAN SUPPORTED GROUP IF SUBU’ECT EVER
[3854]REGAINS ASCENUANCY. EXPRESSED VIEW NEED TAKE IMMEDIATE ACTIC?.
[3855]THEREFORE PRCPOSE cxPcone [EI Sus 1 THINKING SOCNEST TO SEE tu
[3856]TAR =E WItLLites GO AND CETERMINE HIS ASSETS. assem no QR Psu: 5
[3858]“MOOT ING POSITIVE, COLES HOS CONSIDER HIM BE TRUE THIRD COUikt
[3860]U2
[3861]NATIONAL FROM POINT VIEW SECURITY OF 07? 1FGQLISLE ) REACTS
[3863]FAVCRABLE, SCLIEVE THIS OF FERS MEANS ACHIEVE OUJECTIVE EARLY
[3864]PAR wi Th (GenononaE IN SO.FAR AS ACCESS ANO SECURITY CONCERNE::
[3865]5. RE PARA IF REF: -AS OF NOW DO NOT HAVE CNOUGH INFO
[3866]EVALUATE POTENTIAL OF CNA. ~
[3867]5. view IMMINENT [(Genunev ai AND [GA SLE powCETINGS, of.
[3868]QUEST HCS REPLY OPIM VIA EQUERRY LINK. |
[3869]_ END OF MESSAGE
[3877]or" (/
[3879]CPLRATIONAL
[3881]i IAM E DIATE
[3883]ace v2 Wh
[3884]Gi
[3885]. Cité or
[3887]Py |
[3888]QYES GAY CUTMA CS COMENT:® URGED HOS AUTHORIZE CxPLURATE
[3890]TALKS TO DETERMINE IF SCHOTROFFE WwiLuli
[3892]ia
[3893]RYLAT YORE?
[3894]- * ROLE AS ACTIVE AGENT CR CUT-OUT.
[3896]RE LLOP fee2 (10 20887)
[3898]1.) VOU ARE AUT:GRIZED HAVE EXPLORATORY TALKS arerenerc TO ASSESs
[3900]HIS ATTiTLCE TOWARD PCGSIBLE ACTIVE AGENT OR CUT-OUT ROLE. AGREE witht yOu
[3902]INITEAL DISCUSS ICAS TrCOULD BE Ctl HYPOTHETICAL BASIS. O
[3903]Cc. UT UKE APPL FROA HERE THAT OF POSSIBILITIES AVAILSL Gar SR \
[3904]ot TE
[3906]@*". wi STILL HAYS SOME WORRY ALCUT PSPRIME STAY TOGETIGR WITH CLESTIC.
[3908]O wif hl. GCOLVER WE WILL WEIGH VERY CAREFULLY YOUR INITIAL ACSESDENT bis
[3910]ATZITUL AS VELL AS ANY SPECIFIC APPROACHES THAT BAY DERGE. LE WOULD GE Te.
[3912]A'S STATUS Gu) SITUATION WOULE ALLO FOR MODERATE HASTE.
[3913]3. 1 AGSEICE MORE DETAILS WE ARE RELUCTANT cexsiogn (Ry tste Ge.
[3915]WACREAS nf HAS ELEN LOG TIME CONTACT ARD IN HIS SPECIFIC FIELD IE 1S tN
[3916]HOST RESPECTS AN ALENT WE WOULD STILL HAVE BASIC CUESTIONS AS TO CONTROL AD
[3917]SECURITY. wo 00 AGREE YOU SHOULD. EXPLORE HIS i WITH QUESTIGHS HORE
[3918]COLIQUE THAN TIREST. vF YOU FEEL WE ARE VRONG a OS ASEESSEMT or
[3919]ADVISE AFTER NEXT TALKS WITH Hot,” -,
[3920]POL APPRECIATE revze YOUR FFFFAAGHK TO rROoLEis, | Gud of MEME.
[3922]/-COUTOTHUATING OPetceas.
[3924](SEE Fi Cite 0 > 7
[3925]oe a if, - gee Caitee eT | O41 sagtmauricatino oericer
[3927]ae OTHER THAN. Wee ISSUING OFFICE 1S PROMS, | ats a
[3930]OIFECTOR
[3932]LEGPOLE. .ce
[3933]c/a RECO Cache SECT,
[3934]oo/P, s/c 2 PRICAQITY
[3936]tN 2447)
[3938]PRITY DIR ve
[3940]EYES ONLY UGADWIN FROM GUTHMAN®
[3941]r
[3943]RY2AT YOPRUP
[3945]PEF: OR a5 (QUT 757900 ) ee
[3947]1. icem Ore g1hb3Z (out 78S.
[3948]5 OCT, VIEW CxXPIRATION CATE HIS MATERIALS.
[3949]TTEMS OF CONTINUINS USEFULKESS. GUTHYAN PLANS
[3951]IM“_LEMOENT OP.
[3953]1
[3955]2. Com CTEO LAPLORATORY CONVERSATION WIT guepcepmcmecmmmeraig. ©
[3957]PEF. AFTER EXPLORING ALL POSSIBILITIES, ere ES TES
[3959]SOLUTION RECOMENDED BY HOS. ALTHOUGH DIO 'i2T PICr UP ALL,
[3963]BELIEVE HE PREPARED TAKE ANY ROLE NECESSARY WITHIN LIMITS S
[3965]ACCOPPLISH OBJECTIVE.
[3967]3. IF HOS BELIEVES PRP RIME STAY OR LOCATICA
[3968]WIFE PERMANENT BAR HIS PARTICIPATION, WISH STRESS NECESSITY
[3969]PPOVIDE STATION WITH QUALIFIED THIRD COUNTRY HATICNAL.  PECRUL INET
[3970]SUCH ASSET LOCALLY NOT FEASIBLE VIEW SECURITY FROLGLM aND LIVI TCU
[3971]PUM2ER POTENTIAL ASSETS, OMLY OTHER POSSIPLE ASSET HERD IS
[3973]1. 'GurtH4an DOUBTS + CAPABLE SUCH ACTION, ALSO |
[3976]ry Quays
[3978]LOEP To
[3980]40ViSe.
[3982]r
[3983]at
[3985]mn
[3990]END CF MESSAGE
[3992]Hi Bre
[3994]"5 © WAENT: PL YLS ONLY APPEARS TO GE IMPROPERLY USTG. IN 3P
[3995]Pf aSl ADVISE “HE FILLO TO COMPLY WITH RESULATION 90--”.
[3997]ee ATM EIED GUTPAAN TO HAVE EXPLORATORY TAL ry ai th
[3998]7) SESS IS AT TETUDL TOWARD POSSIBLC ACTIVE AGENT We soe ROL
[4000]fag
[4003]4
[4006]~LCPOLDVILLE
[4011]Prioety
[4013]fart e eater eT)
[4015]Ima Ale
[4017]oe
[4018]{7RITT) LEOr Ree crt om NA
[4022]RYRAT YOPROP
[4024]HYXS UNLY GUTHMAN
[4025]SOODUCOK
[4027]HAD GOOD DISCUSSION TOUR COLLEAGUE 7 OCT. COMMENTS
[4029]FOLLOY
[4030]De ASSURED DID NOT EXPECT forRor ONsEOTIVES Be
[4031]EOD AND UNDERSTAND CURILENT SiITUAG LU 8
[4033]ROACadES WA SHORT
[4034]FULLY WAARANTEU BETURN YOUR COLLMAGUE.
[4036]CE
[4038]Bw OR BORE ACTIVE HOLE,
[4039]C. MZANWHILE WE CONSIDEURG DISPATCIUNG FPiURD MATIC
[4040]OPXTAATOR YHOO, WHEN HE ARRIVES, SHOULD THEN DUN ASSESGED iy
[4042]CU OVXR PVAIOD TO SEE WHETHER WE MIGHT PLAT ACTIVE OK
[4044]rama rmwating OF FICHE
[4046]Qivirssine orricie SECRET
[4048]VERDE STA BY OTHE THAN THR ISSN ESI 1 MR NEP, op ee ee
[4049]a . a en yo Posty: “e . TO Eras Gl .
[4055]baicgersaae -
[4056]BEGET My.
[4057]sep 2 195
[4059]eos
[4061]PAGL TAO
[4063]+ OT OLE ON FULL TIME BASIS. le TUU CONULUUS ti:
[4065]EEF Clea:
[4067]SUITABLE AND BEARING IN MIND HEAVY EXTRA LOAD THIS VLACK
[4069]UN TOU, W OULD EXPECT DISPATCH TDY SENIOR CAS? OFFICER KU
[4071]TRIDE AGENT FULL TIME CNDFK (TOUK LIRECTICN.
[4073]iid ANT CASE THIRD NATIONAL WOULD NOT Hi NETTING PRIGR vlorn re
[4075]POs Vn ANU WOULD CS TENSIBLY ph UCHR G Le PERFORM
[4077]GrnMAL OFS MOLE. WILT. ADVISE Pee eEesSs om Tis Luan.
[4079]MEN DIONED AKRAIVAL YOUR PARC AME More ¢
[4081]Ler erersesten sn
[4082]LUANDA WEEMEND. WARMLY sux PCAT THIS -no ANT C1 Hea SPOKMT
[4084]LEAVE YOU CAN SCROUNGE. DONOT WAIT TILL YOU TOO TIRED Ta
[4086]SEN=SIIT FACH IT.
[4088]imp OF MESEACE
[4090]a
[4092]coy
[4094]f
[4095]/ Awtek,,
[4096]Lf ATS J ovsresrine opricgna
[4098]SIatAse am OPPs EE { Sj . DECEZT AGIAEMMCATIMG OFFICHT
[4099]Nn re NS |S
[4100]PEPROCUCTION BY OTHER THAN IHD ISSUING OFPICE 13 SSCHIBTTO
[4102]irre INC ce srernbseerersih hare
[4104]TERE uted =e Slee i A
[4107]15 Octohed 1944
[4112]arenentee2
[4114]6 CPER ST yeeag
[4116]| ' | L tea whOIATS
[4118]LAT
[4120]RE AL V.ZCP Ici (IN 25261)
[4121]3B. LEGP cict UN 25967)
[4122]Cc. LEOP 0672 (IN 23052)
[4124]WOULD APPRICIATE YOUR VIEWS FOLLOWING:
[4126]A. FURMA pe
[4128]YPRALTORIAN GUAKD BY GIVLNG EXTHA TAT
[4130]PERHAPS 25-50 PERCENT MORE THAN NOW BEING RECZIVED TO CORFS
[4132]ce MN UP TO 206. DO ROT FEEL THAT BATLOAA-
[4133]ART
[4135]HCOL GROUP CAN BE USED FOR THIS. RAISE QUESTION WhHiels
[4137]sc
[4138]LOYALTT IN
[4140]LISTED MEN COULD BE SO HELD FOR LONG. SUGGEST THis
[4142]Z57 HANDLED BY GIYING FUNDS rofiipLar 4 YOR HIM TO GIVE TO
[4145]FTE PURPORT THIS TO USE(QF Lat 4 TO KEEP (BS) SPINE STA Stir
[4147]ENO.
[4152]3. AMMUNITICM: WHAT RESZAVES AMMUNITION 1ODE HELD UM
[4154]PRB CON TAL VOULD BE RICUIRED. ASSUME 10,000 ROUNES FOX
[4156]SMALL AMMLS MIGHT Sur PICE. wh MOULD REQUIRE INYO CALIBRE ANL
[4159]val
[4162]wi FAGE TWO cist Oe
[4163]TYVE WEAPCIS INVOLYED. PCSSIYLE METHODS DELIVIRNY ARS FOR
[4165]& Sx PLANE TO TRANSPORT FROM ADJACINT TERRITORY, Cl PESSIDLY
[4167]FROM MATADI BY PLANE OR TRUCK. ALTZIANATIYZ WOULD 3E GIVE
[4168]cal. vagy
[4169]MCNEY wr rE TS TO GIVE TOfjapiy LAT 7 FCR HIM TO PURCILASE
[4171]np AMD HAND ovon Tolapgigenyae, 0 |
[4173]mK
[4174]r ) c BBe -IN VIEW OUR DISTRUST SUBJECT ALF A exeLoufGh Lu.
[4176]KNOWLEDGE CF AND ACCESS (TO FETICHEURSTO SETZAsUNE
[4177]cHzt EAs pRoax SPIRITUAL SUPPORT MICHT B33, SERIOUS
[4179]BLOW TO HM. ONLT DIRECT ACTION WE CAN NCW CTAKS 2z27IND is Ta
[4181]SUPPORT iMMOBILIZING OR aanzsTin PBA. DESIRABLE AS MORSE
[4183]wee INLTTY E (ACTION MIGHT Ba. AMY ACTION TALS NOULYD AAV E TOS es
[4185]eee we
[4187]ZNTiRZLY CONCOLISE. HOWEVER, WE WOULD HRELCOME YOUR VIEWS #OCK
[4188]OUR 2EVIZTW CN ANY WAY THLS COULD PCSSISLT Se ACCOMPLIS:E:.:
[4190]\ ZND OF MESSACZ
[4192]5 Tt 7
[4194]AF — shed , Cave atiM@ OFFictes
[4195]v . : —_———___———---,
[4199]RIP ECAAK. DOM A OTe? DAM Det ISSUING Abece 3 PROHIPITED,
[4202]Glas
[4204]1S Dctoner 194Y
[4206]ce
[4208]Liao ca Vl dg
[4210]Ou
[4212]_
[4217]- ee
[4218](PRITT) Lior
[4221]RYBAT YOPROP
[4222]ad
[4224]Cate Gat
[4226]ZYES ONLY GUTHMAN
[4227]GH NORMAL CHAVINEL
[4229]YOU WILL NOTE FROM CABLE THROU
[4231]Fur
[4232]DBR PARA ON EPROP TYPE SUGGESTIC!
[4233]7
[4235]CURBINTLY DELING TAAKSMITTS
[4236]fOU WILE PROBABLY WECEIVE MORE ALONG THESE LINZS AS STUMBi.i?.
[4237]KFMTS INCH ZASINGL YT APPARENT ALLL ATUDTING ©
[4239]3SLCORM tS Os
[4241]ONE CUNSIDEHA TION. YOR EXAMPLE WE HAD SOME AFRICAN TALKS VE:
[4243]; Mey H1S WEEK AMD BE CONGO THEY CAMA UP WiTH Tt
[4245]TMOLNG ANT
[4247]= 50 YOU NOT CORT US:.D ut AKY APPARENT DU
[4249]CIFIC PUNPOSS TOU DiSce
[4251]SAND ALSO REMAINS HIGHEST PRIORITY. ih LAIR CHIOR, 2
[4253]RFACTICN TO POSSIBLE DIRZCTED ASSIGNMENT SENIOR CASE:
[4256]'
[4257]a)
[4258]women. -4
[4260]bevsatiece |
[4262]poe eee eh
[4264]\s' . . A .
[4267]er
[4269]eyp 2 VS Ch ona p>
[4271]Gi
[4273].
[4275]PAGE TS CIE O1n
[4277]ere)
[4279]SOONE5ST TO CONCZMNYTIUALE ENTLRELY THIS ASPECT. WE STILL WORK''4,
[4281]ON THLRD NATIONAL MENTIONZD THAT REF, DUT WONDER WHITHER Y° U
[4283]THINK EARLY ARAQAIVAL CASE OFFICER WOULD MAKE GENSE. SEEMS 1h
[4285]aA dawn geen pms ee owen reste pee ee as pease wane
[4286]BVOWD OTMIN COMMIT Tas T TOO HEAVY T GiVS NECrssnaY VNU.
[4288]YQFPROK. ADVIA®,
[4290]oe
[4292]()
[4293]COMMANDO TIRE GROUP FOR aupucTionfytoax, AVTHER VIA ASSZ.UL
[4295]are .
[4297]HAV 2 iidsCuUsse S00 DSLAM WITH BET TRLHUIM with POSSIST LS 1
[4299]OM HOUSE UP CLLEF FROM BIVER OR, MORE PROBABLY, PROM
[4301]OPTS ANOTHER DAEAKOUT INTO TOWN AS RECENSILY. PICKED G)'
[4303]aN
[4304]or GiEeNy RONA TACOPS MIGHT ALSO 2E CONSIDEREL. REQUEST LUC"
[4306]rrtrs.
[4307]ATT oS
[4309]EM OF MESSAGE
[4311]pam artiwy Deerceesn
[4314].SIPLCTOR
[4315]LEOPOLOVILLE
[4317]Cyar
[4319]O1R
[4321]EYES CNLY CATASIN FRO SUT PMAN
[4323]RYBAT YAPRCP
[4324]Boe: A. GIR gthas2 (CUT 783%)
[4328]“
[4331]1. | TeMGR AS NOT OREN AELE PENETRATC ENTOURAGE
[4333]'
[4334]ml esA MOT Roe te SELE PeUVIOC Cen fs
[4336]el ge es PAO ey AL yluM4enT COMIOR CASE OFF hoe SHANG TE
[4337]CPS CATELLENT GDEAL AL THOUIH MAINTATHING PRIGRITY INTEREL SY
[4338]CP, anel CEVCTE Sel y LIMITEO AMOUNT TIVE, WIEW MULTIPLE TPS
[4339]COMMITMENTS. cE UAT ION WILL BE EVEN MORE COMPLICATED WHEN ptiAT:
[4341]“GCES ELIZ 19 CCTCBER. IF CA E OFFICER AVAILAELE, GUTHMAN OSL
[4343]CAS
[4344]DEVOTE AS MUCH TIME AS POSSIELE TO ASSISTING AND OFRECTING fis
[4346]EFFORTS.
[4347]3. LERIWSLY OOUST POZSIBILITY ASSAULT HOUSE, VIEW STC. ..
[4348]CONCUR WP FEASIBLE IF SUBJECT GOES OUT INTO TOnN QUT ViEW CNA
[4349]" VATCHING HOUSE, DOVOT HE WILL TRY THIS. 1 NEAR FUTURE. CELI:
[4350]POSSIBLE TO MOUNT CAT4ANDO, PER REF 2, BUT ASSUME HSS WOULT) ‘WANT
[4352]7 mo
[4353]~ THIS COME BY THIRD HAT IONALASSET.
[4354]LOLS CASE OFFICE SUNT, RECUHFEND HGS POUCH SOONEST bIoH
[4358][eo secne to.
[4362]he
[4363]PAGE 2 wp 2% 1915 PRIORITi
[4364]CLA IN 2593;
[4365]. LEC gl.
[4367]CITE
[4369]POWERED FOREIGN MAKE RIFLE WITH TELESCOPIC SIGHT AND SILENCER
[4370]HUNTING GOCD HERE WHEN LIGHTS RIGHT. HOWEVER AS HUNTING RIFLI
[4371]NOW FORBIDOEN, WOULD KZEP RIFLE IN OFFICE PENDING OPENING OF
[4372]HUNTING SEASCN,
[4374]ENO OF MESSAGE
[4376]C/3 CO4ENT: "SL QESTED ETA VIEWS RE POSSIBILITY USE COMMANDO TYFL ChOUW Ie:
[4378]ABAXTION (SUeJ).