[1]oe -“RETURNTO CIA
[2]a a Background Use Only
[3]Do Not Reproduce
[5]a 1a@february 1977
[6]MEMORANDUM | '
[7]SUBJECT: Nestor Antonio MORENO Lopez (AMICE-27) (201-312091)
[9]1. MORENO was born on 25 August 1921 in Havana, Cuba.
[10]His: father was a Cuban Senator (1940-44) and the Cuban Minister
[11]of Public Works (1944). MORENO became a lawyer and continued
[12]to live in comfortable circumstances. He became involved in
[13]the arti-BATISTA movement, apparently in the late 1950's, and
[14]ultimately in the 26th of July Movement. After the revolution,
[15]one of his clients was Camilo CIENFUEGOS. In Miami after
[16]defection, he was associated with the JURE.
[18]2. MORENO's specific activities in the anti-BATISTA
[20]movement were not reported and apparently were unexceptional.
[22]- A point worth noting about his activities before defection is
[24]his acquaintance with Tad SZULC, at least by 1959, and with
[25]Jorge VOLSKY. MORENO's background as a lawyer did not prepare
[27]him for active revolutionary involvement. When he defected in
[29]' April 1961, therefore, he associated with anti-CASTRO exiles,
[31]particularly VOLSKY, but did not become actively involved.
[32]He was assessed in 1963 as being unfriendly to CIA.
[34]3. About February 1963 MORENO. and Enrique- CAYADO Ribera
[35]‘reportedly collaborated in the formulation of an operational
[36]plan to overthrow the Castro government. They discussed it
[37]with Jorge VOLSKY, who then passed it to Tad SZULC. VOLSKY
[38]and SZULC apparently conspired to have the plan presented to
[39]the "political authorities" (Robert HURWITCH and the KENNEDY
[41]Administration) in Washington in order to by-pass the dis-
[44]see tent sine seninwteteemannee 6 es
[48]J ‘Stbiy
[50]trusted "operational authorities" (the CIA). (VOLSKY
[51]originally took full credit for the pian, called "Leonardo
[52]Plan," which eventually became known as the AMTRUNK Operation.)
[54]4. The Leonardo Plan was well thought-out and caught the
[55]fancy of the KENNEDY Administration. HURWITCH bought it to
[56]the CIA with the blessings of the Department of State. Thus,
[57]from the very beginning, SZULC, VOLSKY, and MORENO, each of
[58]whom had outside interests. to some degree in conflict with
[59]AMTRUNK, were involved in AMTRUNK policy and planning meetings.
[60]Moreover, all three were to some degree antipathetic to the
[61]Agency for various reasons and were difficult or impossible
[62]to control.
[64]5. MORENO's indiscretions were a serious problem that
[65]limited his effectiveness as a direct participant in the AMTRUNK
[67]Operation by arousing the concern of other participants. While
[69]the Station attempted to cut out VOLSKY and SZULC after, the
[71]initial policy discussions in Washington, VOLSKY always remained
[72]involved to some degree and kept SZULC fully informed. Under
[73]the circumstances, the censure of MORENO for talking to SZULC
[74]was just an attempt to plug one of many leaks. The fact is
[76]that MORENO, SZULC, and VOLSKY believed they had an inside
[78]track in Washington because of their contacts there and all
[79]three disliked following Agency instructions that conflicted
[80]with their own diverse interests. However, because JMWAVE
[81]Station and AMICE-14 (Miguel A. DIAZ Isalgue) objected to
[82]MORENO's continued involvement in the AMTRUNK Operation after
[84]learning of his free talk with SZULC and others, the Station
[86]oS ScGRET ey.
[88]terminated MORENO's involvement sin the sensitive aspects
[89]of AMTRUNK in November 1963. | |
[91]6. Since MORENO was one of the original authors of
[92]_ AMTRUNK and already disliked the Agency, one can imagine his
[93]feelings at that juncture. He sulked, refused at first to
[94]take a position on the Rebel Army Radio Program, and caused
[95]problems in general. By January 1964 MORENO was actually
[96]interferring in the AMTRUNK Operation (by giving demoralizing,
[97]conflicting information to AMTRUNK-9, for example) and
[98]attempting to debrief returnees on behalf of VOLSKY and SZULC.
[99]MORENO was fired, therefore, by RABEL on Station instructions,
[100]from the Rebel Army Radio Program in February 1964 and termin-
[101]ated by the Station as of 5 March. .
[103]7. Shortly after his termination, MORENO, using VOLSKY
[104]as an intermediary, approached Mr. G. Harvey SUMM with a
[105]proposal similar to the Leonardo Plan. The COS met with SUMM
[106]on 1 April 1964 and advised him how to put off MORENO.
[108]8. In August or September 1964, MORENO left Miami and
[109]took a position as a Spanish-language professor in South
[110]Carolina.
[112]CONCLUSION:
[114]MORENO. apparently’ was a sincere anti-CASTRO revolutionary,
[115]but his dislike for and distrust of the Agency, which was
[116]undoubtedly stimulated by SZULC and VOLKSY, made his involve-
[117]ment in AMTRUNK a lia&bility to the security of the operation.
[119]It appears that MORENO, like many Cubans of the upper middle
[122]Tal
[125].
[128]Aer
[129]peed
[131]cl
[133]class, had little sense of security. It is obvious that he
[135]trusted SZULC and VOLSKY far beyond what normal prudence
[137]would dictate. He probably was not a CASTRO agent, but he
[138]did help leak operational details and general plans to
[140]people who helped to spread the information more widely and
[142]who, themselves, were not trustworthy.
[144]oo |
[145]LAD/JFK Tas Force 1977(Marty Miller}: rp
[147]Copy filed: 201+312091