[1]187-10002-10152| = | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
[3]oe Date:10/05/93
[4]Page:1
[5]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[6]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[8]AGENCY INFORMATION
[10]AGENCY : SSCIA
[11]RECORD NUMBER : 157-10002~10152
[13]RECORDS SERIES :
[14]INTERVIEW SUMMARY
[16]AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
[18]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[19]ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
[21]TO: .
[23]TITLE :
[24]INTERVIEW WITH SAM PAPICH
[26]DATE : 05/29/75
[28]PAGES : 21
[29]SUBJECTS :
[30]PAPICH
[31]FBI
[32]CIA
[33]OSWALD, LEE HARVEY
[34]CUBA
[35]CASTRO
[37]DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[38]CLASSIFICATION : T
[39]RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
[40]CURRENT STATUS : P
[41]DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/30/93
[43]OPENING CRITERIA :
[44]COMMENTS :
[46]Box 256
[47]Folder 4
[49][R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED
[51]HY 450955 Docld: 322781992 Page i
[53][TERVICH WD MEETING SUTARY
[54]SECRET
[56]INTERVIEW WITH: Sam Papich
[58]ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
[59]HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
[61]VATE~TIMELOCATION: Ma 2 1975; a.m.; Carroll Arms
[63]PRESENT: morning: John ELLIFF, Mike Epstein, John Bayly
[65]afternoon: John ELLIFF, Burt Wides, John Bayly
[67]WAS OR SHOULD BE DIGESTED:
[69]FOLLOW UP REQUIRED: poe Y. Vins
[71]MATERIAL SUBMITTED BY INTERVIEWEE(S) :
[73]seam BY FBIJEK cAna=
[74]| ON SIs ley 92 _
[75]__AT RELEASE in eu,
[77]~ RELEASE jy PART
[78]C) TOTAL pew
[80]EXECUTIVE SESSION: YES __jio
[82]2 BY: SAG SLB) ude
[84]4
[87]3 (Ord).
[88]PY OT KOM
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[98]FILE:
[100]Papich began with a brief summary of his experi-
[101]ence in the FBI. During World War II and there-
[102]after he ran certain operations in Latin America.
[103]In 1945-47, he ran counterintelligence operations
[104]in Brazil against the Communist Party of Brazil
[106]and bloc intelligence agents. In 1952 he became
[107]FBI liaison with CIA charged with coordinating
[109]and planning, including the development of sources
[110]He also had special assignments overseas for Hoover
[112]Papich presented the following overview of the
[113]issues. He has a high respect and regard for the
[114]Soviet intelligence service, its efficiency, andg@
[115]effectiveness. He must be shown that their
[116]philosophy has changed since 1970. c
[117]of the U. 8. i i oa
[118]KGB and GRU is very limited. In 195g
[119]the U. S. intelligence community_ ‘
[120]lieved was good information oy, @t@
[122]er neW defectors
[123]Bowing that the
[124]ed "they've taken
[126]and new operations succeed®t
[127]few years". There
[129]premises were false.
[130]us to the cleaners in the las
[131]is no estimate of how many Soviet illegals are in
[133]the United States. The old view was that illegals
[134]would aim at middle-class government and business ed
[135]positions. It has been discovered that they take 2
[136]jobs like dishwasher to develop an employment a
[137]background. There is no knowledge of Soviet =<
[138]objectives. Illegals may do nothing for years so 2
[139]they can be tapped for the future. There may be brag
[140]100, 500, or 5,000 of them. Some were sent in as 25
[141]early as the 20's and 30's. They are the Rudolph u =
[142]Abel-type. His network was never identified.
[143]Therefore, Papich is clearly unhappy with U. S. ly
[144]KL
[146]results in identifying Soviet operations in the
[147]United States.
[149]Papich stated that he played a controversial
[150]"devil's advocate" role between the FBI and the
[152]CIA. He did not confer with Attorney General
[153]Mitchell after Helms called his name to Mitchell'
[154]attention. Papich assumes Heims wanted Mitchell
[156]to get a review of the history of PBI-CIA relations.
[157]Papich would not have gone to Mitchell without
[158]‘checking with-other FBI officials.
[160]PARA TeTIAN TY
[162]Pye
[164]Page 3
[166]ASE IN FULL
[168]Cl RELE
[170]A REL
[172]PART Cex taba )
[174]“1 TOTAL DENIAL
[176]EASE IN
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[184]To understand decisions in 1966 or 1970 it is
[185]necessary to g0 pack to World war If, according
[187]to Papich. President Roosevelt got the FBI into
[189]the foreign intelligence field in World War It.
[190]Overnight the FBI had to generate the capability
[192]to move into Latin America against the German
[193]espionage operation which ineluded business covers,
[194]radio networks, and influence in Latin American
[195]governments. The FBI had no precedent or guidance.
[196]Assistant FBI Director Hugh Klegs conferred with
[197]the British in London for assistance. FBI agents
[198]went into Latin America first under business covers,
[199]then in the embassies, which was thin cover. The
[200]legal attaches established official liaison wight
[201]Local authorities. The FBI's role was prime@@t
[202]counterinteliigence but some positive ipo
[203]was gathered about the stability of g
[204]FBL agents learned on the job. Mog
[205]headquarters was ridiculous until %
[206]were reported back. Cos
[208]The OSS ran operations # Oe
[210]as Latin America. Donovaiia He ran undercover
[211]operations in the United sfites. see the book
[213]by Donald Downs. OSS had a very close relation-
[214]ship with MI 5 and MI 6. The British also ran
[215]operations in the United States in 1939-41. No
[216]one knows how many. They saw the FBI as neophytes
[217]knowing little about the business. The British
[218]developed closer relations to OSS than to FBI.
[220]At first, Donovan and Hoover were friendly but
[221]Hoover received complaints of OSS operations in
[223]the Un ted State Sang One XAMpP Le ; the OSS bugging. IB :
[224]ace Spanien peep) Other complaints came from (S (Fst)
[225]Latin America. eatetion between Hoover and
[227]Donovan is important background for Hoover's view
[229]of the CIA. Donovan would recruit persons regard-
[231]less of their packground if he thought they had
[233]the capability to penetrate the access: The OSS
[235]use of Communists tshook the hell" out of Hoover,
[237]as aid OSS discussions in Moscow of cooperation
[239]with the NKVD. Hoover would never work with
[241]Communists. Hoover saw CIA roots in oss. Papich
[243]stressed that oss had some great people, extremely
[245]capable and dedicated, but oss had an element that
[247]Hoover would never buy.
[249]- a SECRET
[251]INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY Page 3 of </
[253]In 1943-45, the government began looking toward
[254]a worldwide intelligence system. The alternatives
[255]were the military, OSS, State, and FBI. FDR
[256]allegedly assured Hoover that he would be respon-
[257]sible for setting up the post-war system. Papich
[258]never saw any documents showing that Hoover wanted
[259]this job. The Latin American operation was
[260]successful but Hoover never understood or had a
[261]feel for the problems. He felt insecure. He never
[262]traveled outside the U. S., and only saw things
[263]from Washington, D. C.
[265]Under President Truman, Hoover did not have a
[266]"warm" relationship with the President. When the
[267]Central Intelligence group was formed and the 1947
[268]Act drafted, Hoover's attitute was mistrust and
[269]lack of confidence in the group creating CIA.
[270]were a different type of people, not law-=g
[271]oriented. Ivy League students of forag
[272]did not speak Hoover's Tanguage. ~<
[274]Papich states it was a "ble egies Hoover did
[275]not get the job. Hoover "Wis fomfortable" when
[276]confronted with worldwidqgie stg. ~ He did not under~
[277]stand relationships and opeMRtions abroad. In the
[278]U. S., for instance, if Hoover had a problem with
[280]a police chief, he just cut off relations. He
[281]couldn't do that with foreign police. A foreign
[282]intelligence service cannot operate like a domestic
[283]intelligence agency.
[285]In 1952, when Papich became FBI-CIA liaison, rela-
[286]tionships between the agencies were a mess. Beedle
[287]Smith was CIA director. There were many flaps
[288]between FBI and CIA over CIA political and psycho-
[289]logical warfare, especially regarding the funding
[290]of labor groups, student groups, and political
[291]parties. At the time of the 1947 Act, these tech-
[292]niques of "covert action" were the subject of
[293]‘tremendously heated battles between CIA and State.
[294]There were fewer flaps in the counterintelligence
[295]field.
[297]In the field of political and psychological warfare
[298]operations, the CIA didn't want stereotyped people.
[299]The CIA was not disciplined and ignored jurisdictional
[300]agreements. It would contact a U. S. newsman about a
[302]_ | SRE
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[310]e SEGRE!
[312]possible assignment, the newsman would contact
[313]the FBI to ask what was going on, this would go
[314]to Hoover, who would raise hell with the CIA
[315]director. But Beedle Smith was tough.  Communi-
[316]cation between the FBI and CIA was almost non-
[317]existent by 1952.
[319]Papich had no CIA counterpart since the CIA is
[321]so compartmented. He had contacts at all levels,
[322]exchanging ideas for operations. He would push
[323]CIA ideas in the FBI. Flaps would come up. He
[324]would stamp them out and say "get on with the job".
[325]The FBI was easier to control since it was ceng
[326]tralized. Papich's relations with Hoover EN
[328]go up and down. He frequently asked to gage
[329]field -- and sometimes Hoover consider
[330]him there. But by the 1950's, most
[331]foreign intelligence talent had dig
[333]No formal consideration was
[334]to limiting its role to “¢é
[335]probably thought it shouldg@ep tag
[337]expressed a desire to give his intelligence
[338]job. Nobody, including Tolson, knew Hoover's
[339]reasons for doing what he did. He had his own
[340]conversations and contacts in the White House,
[341]Congress, and his personal sources. He knew what
[342]he was doing and had "a nose and ear for the
[343]political climate in Washington”. This was true
[344]for "risky" operations.
[346]Papich believes it would be disastrous to give
[347]both foreign and domestic intelligence duties to
[348]a CIA. While there would be advantages in
[349]coordinating fragmented sources, it is a risk to
[350]liberty, like a national police.
[352]Papich did not recall any significant plan to
[353]improve coordination in 1958 when FBI joined USIB.
[354]FBI was part of the USIB predecessor group.
[356]The CIA would suggest joint fleld operations but
[357]Hoover would rarely buy it. This was like his
[359]reluctance to join any operation with any other
[360]agencies. He thought the FBI should always have
[362]control, a commanding role. For example, Allan
[363]Dulles discussed gaan United Nations \ ian Hoover. (S } Gs
[365]SECRET
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[372]~E)
[374]when fon: een en a Hoover objected
[375]to the plan, Dulles dropped it. Another example:
[376]Angelton might be disturbed about our lagk,of_
[377]information about KGB operations out athe eN3)
[378]He would discuss with Papich how to pene erator
[379]KGB.
[381]Friction would develop in "the gray area" of posi-
[382]tive intelligence. For example, a top foreign
[383]“official came to the United States for medical
[384]treatment. The CIA knew he was coming to the U. S.
[385].and wanted to know his relationship with Communists
[386]and wanted intelligence on the instability in the
[387]country. The CIA wants him surveilled to find out
[388]his contacts, what he's saying, and a wiretap or
[389]bug. The FBI would not do this since he was not
[390]an intelligence agent and not within FBI Jurisd
[391]tion. The CIA would be upset. There were s
[392]cases like this, one involving }la=Boliviangs
[393]Over the years, Papich sold Hoover on
[394]but it was always a gray area. The
[395]tion never worked with the FBI g@%
[397]In summary, the sources of Fy™
[398](1) the OSS experience, (2) Oy Scal and psychological
[399]warfare by CIA, and (3) the CIA desire for positive
[400]intelligence gathering in the U. 8.
[402]There was no major issue regarding CIA's desire to
[403]develop "€ptendst-in the U.S. Papich recalls no
[404]more than three to six instances of disagreement.
[405]The FBI never helped the CIA create an organization
[406]for deep cover. It never needed FBI help because
[407]it moved on its own. The CIA Office of Security
[408]advised Papich that they had a relationship with
[410]the National Student Association. This never gave
[411]the FBI a problem.
[413]The Katzenbach report would not give the FBI prob-
[414]lems but many good CIA contacts overseas went down
[415]the drain when contacts through student groups were
[416]curtailed. Papich believes that if these contacts
[418], HY 50955 Docld:32281992 Page 7
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[422]had not been eliminated in 1967 the intelligence
[423]community could have dealt with the New Left
[424]dater. The CIA would have had assets to assess
[425]the issues. Such questions involved New Left
[426]travels overseas and relationships with foreign
[427]agents. ;
[429]The FBI and CIA did discuss developing a cover
[431]in the U. S. to get intafMeWiaymeltravelers gainea(S) G» IR
[432]very little. The immediate prop em was the pr
[434]posal for a joint approach. When Papich was there,
[436]it got no further than discussion. If the CIA did
[438]set up cover in the U. S., the FBI provided no
[440]support. However, if the CIA desired to use a
[442]company it would ask for a check of FBI files. os
[444]Papich is not aware of any political organiz S
[446]created by the CIA, although it may have
[447]in the 50's or 60's. There was discuss}
[448]FBI about creating its own group aimed,
[449]and discussion of whether or not to, nee TA™
[450]know about it. There had to be cod wae with
[451]CIA. Papich does not know if ply soreate
[452]organizations were implementeg®
[453]have been at Hoover's level
[455]Mie Gecision would
[457]PBI informant travel overse@Q wads limited mainly
[459]to CPUSA members. The FBI wofild not tell CIA
[461]about informant trips to Moscow or Paris before-
[462]hand. The reason was that the CIA would have
[463]notified its field agencies that the informant's
[464]life should be protected. Instead, the FBI informed
[465]the CIA of the results upon the informant's return.
[467]The FBI liaison section was made up of six or seven
[468]agents. Papich and Bill Creager handled the CIA.
[469]Creager dealt specifically with USIB, the Security
[470]Committee, the Interagency Defector Committee, and
[471]the Office of Security. Papichn and Creager backed
[472]each other up in their respective areas. There
[473]were several liaison agents at the Pentagon. The
[474]liaison at State was Oren Bartlett. The other
[476]liaison agents were not so deeply involved in in-
[477]elligence operations as was Papich. FBI liaison
[478]at NSA was Bil] M Te although Papich was also | 7 aon. >)
[480]involved wit hiiMShg)
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[488]Regarding FBI service and support to other agencies,
[489]Hoover was "goddamned careful". He was sensitive
[491]to any "risks" and thus any request for FBI support
[492]had to be established firmly. Hoover never
[493]responded “let them do it" within the United
[495]States. Hoover did not give other agencies any
[496]blessing or approval for question dome \
[497]activities such as the case of vn iatetdet festa)
[498]mentioned above. >
[500]In both the FBI and the CIA, Papich stimulated
[501]interest in covering and recruiting people in
[503]the United States, for example \gem J ysketaceh
[504]The CIA wanted to use its sourcdes™es"
[505]foreign officials in the United States
[506]officials went home. These officials, éfe
[507]spies, therefore, when the CIA asked
[508]recruit them, Hoover said no. Thig¢t
[509]ups and downs, depending on the
[510]times Papich did convince Hooy
[511]recruit a foreign official jgp¥
[513]rather than the DoW
[514]Hoover was back-sto
[515]to the Attorney G . SNK ee Gk: ScONe | eve er
[516]ncaa ylesreatoover sometimes refused. ee
[517]based his. evaluatign on the feasibility of the (S)
[519]operation. Neither\@ysi§\nor State had their own
[520]capabilities and there“Was no formal discussion
[521]of their developing it. Papich tgessed that
[523]Hoover treated State, CIA, and@i@fleach differently CSG
[525]There were flaps in the 1950's when the CIA
[526]recruited without clearing with the FBI. The CIA uw
[527]Migeeamckino more than five or six se)
[529]times. Papich™ sked by FBI officials whether
[531]the CIA ever went to the Attorney General directly
[533]oie S uthority. Papich says this may have @y
[534]per not to his knowledge. Few Attorneys
[536]General would have stuck their neck out. It was a
[538]possibility with McCone and Robert Kennedy, where
[540]UNE, Le meme ceaeh was unusually close. Papich = OY)
[542]Mieould only have happened once or
[544]et
[546]ce ” BI would have detected it most of
[547]the time. If it was done it would be through CIA
[549]INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY
[551]Office of Security, although that office had an
[552]excellent relationship with FBI. Allan Dulles
[553]would not have condoned it since he had great
[554]respect for the FBI. Papich believes the same
[555]is true of McCone and Helms, Papich also con-
[556]cedes the possibility of entries by the CIA,
[557]citing the Andependent operation conducted regard
[558]jonmpe woover opposed goi
[559]eT in a, Joint
[561]wo &. < .
[563]S
[565]United States. CIA tried t
[566]the 50's FBI involvement
[567]some thought anew FBI qa mar would be needed
[568]for it. The FBI as conStygrs
[569]trained personnel or cagé Ss ity to develop foreign
[570]targets. The CIA had this capability. Papich
[572]& proposed that FBI permit CIA to recruit in the
[573]United States. CIA would advise FBI of its interest
[574]in a target, the purposes of the contact, and any
[575]results. If the FBI had no interest in the target,
[576]that is, an interest in a KGB contact for example,
[577]it would OK the CIA contact. FBI required that
[578]CIA furnish it any information relevant to its
[579]needs, that is regarding KGB contacts (the New Left
[580]was handled separately from the memorandum of under-
[581]standing procedures). re]
[583]Alan Belmont headed the FBI Intelligence Division
[584]before Sullivan. A capable administrator, he
[585]operated behind the scene, stayed out of politics,
[586]had good rapport with agents, and was able to
[587]handle Hoover. When Belmont retired, the FBI: “lost
[588]a rudder". This was a crucial point in FBI history,
[589]with Hoover getting old. Belmont stressed to his
[590]subordinates the need to develop a strong case for
[591]any proposal going to Hoover. Once that case was
[592]ready, Belmont would push it hard, but Papich and
[593]Belmont did disagree on such matters as counter-
[594]intelligence operations against the KGB.
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[598]INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY
[600]Regarding the CIA and domestic dissidents, in
[602]the 50's the CIA's general attitude was not to
[603]investigate or surveil Americans overseas. FBI-
[604]CIA communications rarely involved U. S. citizen
[605]targets unless they clearly involved a KGB agent.
[606]In the 1960's, Papich recalls two early incidents
[607]of FBI requests for CIA coverage overseas. One
[608]was the Republic of New Africa, a black group
[610]with contacts with Communists and foreign radicals
[611](note by Elliff -- the individual was Robert
[612]Williams?). The second was Stokely Carmichael, who
[613]traveled around the world. The FBI asked the CIA
[614]for coverage of Carmichael's contacts overseas
[616]but there were no results since the‘CIA had no
[617]capability. In retrospect, Papich thinks his
[618]importance was exaggerated.
[620]Papich does not recall any case or interest of the
[621]CIA regarding Dr. King. The FBI levied no requests
[622]on the CIA regarding Dr. King. Papich recall ge
[623]the PBI thought a black Communist Party m vo
[624]contacts with King. The assumption w
[625]CPUSA was supported and financed py i
[626]This influenced the FBI's vie ‘ Sblem.
[627]There was no way the CIA jg@Wvs
[629]the CIA had no penetra Ce he “Communist Party
[630]in Russia. The CIA hadWge@Wiss on the CPUSA links
[631]to the Soviet Union. ,@% But little or no effort
[632]abroad into developing information on this. It
[634]was not a CIA priority. CIA was satisfied with FBI
[635]coverage of the Communist Party. If the KGB was
[636]using it for espionage or influence, the FBI would
[637]uncover it. The FBI would inform CIA of CPUSA
[638]activities. Regarding CPUSA, FBI determined that
[639]there was Soviet financial support into the 1960's
[640]The FBI attitude as early as the 50's was that the
[641]CIA did not have the capability to discover CPUSA
[642]links to the Soviet Union. There were no leads for
[643]the CIA to explore in France, Czechoslovakia, etc.
[644]If a Communist Party member went to Rome or London,
[645]then FBI would ask CIA coverage, but the CIA gave
[646]it low priority and produced little. This led to
[647]FBI dissatisfaction with CIA, so FBI went through
[648]its legal attaches, who would contact foreign
[649]security services. Normally, the CIA was informed
[650]but sometimes the CIA was not notified if the FBI
[651]called it "an internal security” matter. Papich
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[663]stresses that this is a problem. What is the dif-
[664]ference between "internal security" and "counter-
[665]intelligence" and "positive intelligence"? FBI
[666]would use these distinctions as an excuse not to
[667]notify CIA.
[669]Regarding the legal attaches, Papich was in Rio
[671]de Janerio after World War II. The FBI had moved
[672]out when the CIA moved in, but Hoover wanted to
[673]have someone there anyway. Papich stayed a year
[674]but wanted out since he disliked doing only
[675]liaison work with local police and CIA. The legal
[676]attaches were never operations and dealt with
[678]foreign security pq and inal police. A [ (
[679]major exception wasgiiichaler) [eri ; u) FRI
[681]acquiescence, the FBI was operational.
[682]"age was through sources going back ¢
[683]and may still exist. The ¢t Be ty
[684]and CPUSA officials a ;
[685]ing fugitives. The FP
[687]There were six or sevewi\legal attache offices
[688]from the 1950's until Papich left in 1970. Papich
[689]feels that if the FBI has legal attaches they should
[690]be closely coordinated with the CIA so that their
[691]assets and sources do not duplicate the CIA. A
[692]FBI man abroad can be useful to the intelligence
[693]community through his liaison with local police.
[694]6.9 Ehemcounterintelligence field of a RB a
[695]} SO Snould be by the CIA. Coverage ofS) (Fal)
[696]“a ber should be joint FBI-CIA. There
[697]never has been such coordination. The legal
[699]attache should be involved in operations through
[701]his liaison contacts.
[703]Papich gave the following example: the CIA and i)
[704]Reve french DST fnave good liaison for co reranter &) Ne (perce
[705](< a it
[707]igence coverage. If a jointheGeASrrench [coverage
[708]target is coming to the U. > the FBT legal int
[709]attache should be involvedttaim Eranice |to prepare (S) (> (sta)
[710]for the transfer of coverage to FBI in the U.S.
[711]Papich sees the implications of this for the need
[712]to have a single counterintelligence agency. There
[713]would be advantages of centralization, communication,
[714]and security.
[716]AW 50955 Docld:32261992 Page 12 SEORET: DR
[718]INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY page /L of XY
[720]When the legal attache asks a foreign intelligence
[721]service for coverage of an FBI target, it asks for
[722]any information rather than specifying the data.
[723]This is because foreign services may be penetrated
[724]by the KGB.
[726]Papich knew nothing about the tap on Joseph Krafft
[727]in France or the "17 wiretaps".
[729]through the roof. Hoover
[730]these investigations 9
[731]would be a top offic =
[732]For example, under P#® pt Kennedy the FBI did
[733]identify a top source ST leaks, gave the informa-
[734]tion to Kennedy, and nothing was done. The secu-
[735]rity committee was created to deal with leaks.
[736]Bach agency would handle its own, although the
[737]President could still order the FBI to enter the
[738]case.
[740]Z would be done.
[742]Papich did not recall anything about Anna
[743]Chennault, but he did recall that during the
[744]Korean War there was a request of a top American
[745]citizen regarding those negotiations. Papich
[746]says he talked them out of it.
[748]Regarding the CIA investigations of U.S. citizens,
[749]Papich recalls beginning to request CIA coverage
[750]of New Left travel abroad about 1967. He does not
[751]recall an FBI interest as early as 1965, at the
[752]time of the Hoover meeting at the White House on
[753]antiwar protests.
[755]Papich did not know of the 1967 White House request
[756]to CIA nor did he know when Ober's unit was set up.
[757]He had no discussion with Ober on setting up his
[759]unit but he did know of its existence after it was
[760]established. The FBI was asking CIA about particular
[761]group leaders. The Bureau wanted to know if there
[762]was foreign money or guidance to antiwar leaders.
[763]These requests were directed to Ober (Papich did not
[765]know CIA project codewords). There WO CIA Oe yn
[767]bil Benet op-/(oaUy (FB!)
[768]Comees fche CIA's attitude toward this new issue®
[770]similar to the old assumpt tons about the CPUSA.
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[776]: mb | on SEER
[778]The accepted view at CIA was that it was impor-
[779]tant to determine if there was foreign support or
[780]sabotage training. After 1967, FBI-CIA contacts
[781]on this topic developed rapidly. There were few
[782]really valuable CIA results nor was much obtained
[783]through the FBI, the legal attaches, or informants
[784]going abroad. ;
[786]Papich referred to the climate of préss commentary,
[787]assassinations, allegations of sabotage plans, and
[788]bombings. There was "a potential for panic within
[790]the intelligence community" since no one had the
[791]coverage they thought they needed. Travel of U.S.
[792]antiwar leaders to Communist nations seemed impor-
[793]tant, although sometimes after inquiry the individuals
[794]were found not to be important. Therefore, time was
[795]spent on targets who should not have been targets
[797]but this was a new task.
[799]Hoover did not understand the issue. He thought
[801]New Left CPUSA links were most important. Papich
[802]never thought the CPUSA responsible for development
[803]of the New Left or SDS. CPUSA did try to use the
[804]New Left. Hoover assumed the Soviets controlled \
[805]CPUSA day to day. Some of his assumptions had
[807]been proved wrong. In World War II days, yes,
[809]the Soviets used CPUSA for recruitment. In the
[811]late 40's and 50's, the Soviets changed their
[812]policy, no longer using CPUSA for this purpose.
[813]Hoover was never convinced of tnis change. Papich
[814]recognized the possibility that there might be a
[815]reversal of Soviet policy regarding CPUSA but
[816]Papich's top concern has always been KGB penetra-
[817]tion of CIA, FBI, NSA, etc., as well as the question
[818]of how good the double agents are.
[820]Regarding the theory of KGB aims) for using U.S.
[821]dissidents, the main problem was lack of knowledge.
[822]In the 40's and 50's, the FBI was confident of its
[823]knowledge of CPUSA and could assess its use to
[824]influence U. S. politics, but in tne late 50's
[826]the Bureau's coverage of new grouscs was tremendously
[827]weak. The FBI recognized this. The CIA stressed
[828]it also for three reasons: (1) the increase in FBI
[829]requests for CIA information, (2) the White House
[830]requests, and (3) CIA officials cwn concern about
[831]inadequate coverage. The conciusicn was that
[832]intelligence regarding people who went abroad was
[833]inadequate. ,
[835]HW 50955 Docid: 32261992 Page 14
[837]INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY
[839]Papich had no personal involvement with White
[840]House requests. There was discussion both in the
[841]FBI and between CIA and FBI on expanding coverage
[842]and development of sources. For example, does
[843]CIA have anybody who can have an entree into SDS?
[844]The Katzenbach report had'limited the CIA to
[845]foreign sources or to U. S. students recruited
[846]abroad. Papich dealt mainly with Ober on this,
[847]but also with Angleton and Tom Karamenses (DDP).
[848]Papich believes anything Ober said and did
[849]reflected CIA policy from the top. The operation
[850]grew like Topsy. CIA compartmented it ver a Se
[851]tightly and Ober was very security conscigt¥s
[852]the FBI, W. C. Sullivan was concerned
[853]by the assassinations, riots, and he
[854]put on the pressure to find out @
[855]He pressed Papich to Pressurgm
[857]convinced and Belmont was anced that Oswald
[858]acted alone. No one k@ ered the question
[860]of what Oswald did in the Soviet Union. Did he
[862]get any guidance? Why did they permit him to
[863]leave? Papich had frequent discussions with
[865]Dulles and the CIA regarding the Warren Commission
[866]aithough he thinks the formal FBI liaison was Jim
[867]Malloy. The question as to whether Oswald was a
[869]U. S. intelligence asset never arose. Critics at
[870]the time said the FBI should have surveilled
[871]Oswald. Papich recalls discussions of a plan to
[872]have a CIA or FBI man defect to Moscow but no such
[873]plan was ever implemented to his knowledge. It was
[874]not worth the risk. He does not know whether the
[875]CIA did it. He stresses that the FBI was not likely
[876]to use "nuts".
[878]Regarding the Riha incident, Papich says this was
[879]not the reason for his retirement. Instead, there
[880]were problems with Hoover on operations and policy:
[881]decisions. Pap iS} an aggressive stand
[883]on coverage off (Ss
[885]Regard 's proposal on expanded FBI cover-
[886]age offs elPapich stated that others in the « )
[887]CIA infIuenced McCone to press for more coverage.
[889]MeCone was aggressive. Papich pusned it too.
[890]This was the time of the Cuban missile crisis.
[892]“HW 50955 Docld:32281992 Page 15
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[898]INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY Page Mkt 2
[899]. Seite
[901]Hoover would agree to expand on certain issues
[903]but proposals for major new operations went to
[905]PFTAB for support. Clifford was chairman. Papich
[906]doesn't know what Hoover said to Clifford, but the
[907]answer on the proposal was negative. The proposal
[908]involved more extensive and sophisticated elec-~
[910]tronic surveillance. This was at the time of dis-
[911]covery of microphones in the U. S. Embassy in S
[912]Moscow, as well as an increase in the numb ergy
[913]KGB attempts to recruit U. S. citizens
[914]does not think COINTELPRO was deve long
[915]alternative to this. e-
[917]; Oia influence
[918]CIA attitudes toward the me wtalA saw the FBI as
[919]not being "a clandestine gageWry". CIA's view was
[920]that FBI had to reject CIA™broposals as illegal.
[921]When Papich lectured to CIA recruits he attempted
[922]to orient CIA to the FBI's limits. On the other
[923]hand, FBI did not understand CIA functions abroad.
[925]Returning to the Riha incident, Papich stressed
[926]that he clashed with Hoover every year and that
[927]their relationship had declined steadily after
[928]1966. By fall of '69, he saw his value as nil.
[930]In December '69, he decided to retire the follow-
[931]ing.spring. In February 1970, while winding up
[933]his normal business, the Riha incident arose.
[934]Professor Riha disappeared from the university.
[935]There was faculty and press interest in Boulder,
[936]Colorado, and a Congressional inquiry came to FBI.
[937]But FBI opened no case or investigation. In March
[938]of 1970 the president of the University of Colorado
[939]came to a CIA man in domestic contact service in
[940]Boulder to inquire about the disappearance. The
[941]CIA man called two friends in the Denver FBI office.
[942]FBI agent agreed to contact Denver police and dis-
[943]covered that marital problems had led to the dis-
[944]appearance. CIA man told the university president
[945]what he learned from "reliable government sources".
[946]The president told the press. The local district
[947]attorney called the president and asked his source.
[948]The president went back to his CIA source. The CIA
[949]source then promptly contacted the CIA officer in
[950]Denver, who contacted the Denver FBI SAC. The CIA
[952]officer suggested that he and the SAC go to the 4
[953]district attorney to say that the original source Loos
[954]was local police, but the SAC rejected the idea and (A.
[956]HY 50955 Docld:322781992 Page 16 &
[958]INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY Page “Sof <7
[960]FILE:
[962]wanted to know the identity of the FBI agent
[964]who gave the information. The CIA officer
[965]refused and there was a bitter clash. (Things
[966]like this had happened in the past. FBI field
[967]agents had contacted Papich and Papich had always
[968]told them to get on with the job.) The SAC sent
[969]a teletype to Hoover. Hoover said to Papich, go
[970]to Helms and get the identity of the FBI sourge.
[971]Helms called in the CIA man, who refused tg a
[972]identify him. Helms sent Hoover a let
[973]this and said he was "taking the oe
[974]trative action". Hoover noted o "dis-
[975]continue liaison with CIA".
[977]Papich then wrote a long
[978]Hoover instead of his Bf prief resignation
[980]note. He strongly apn mo Hoover to reconsider
[981]and keep communications oWen. He also raised
[982]serious questions concerning Hoover's past decisions.
[983]Hoover was not happy. Papich says there had been
[984]dozens of incidents like this before. He did not
[985]eonfer with anyone in the FBI about his letter.
[987]W. C. Sullivan was angry with Papich for stirring
[988]things up. (Papich says if it is OK with the FBI
[989]it's OK with him for the Committee to get the
[991]letter, although he considers it personal to Hoover.
[992]The letter reviews FBI-CIA relations.)
[994]esignation to
[996]Regarding the 1966 cutbacks, Papich-thinks it
[997]started with the Long Committee hearings on the
[998]Internal Revenue Service. After the Kennedy
[999]general Clark. and especially under ee cisctr
[1001]W. C. Sullivan saw Angleton and CIA directors at
[1002]USIB meetings. Papich would discuss FBI-CIA
[1003]11 Papich ase the need
[1005]HW 50955 DoclId: 322619392 Page if : pany
[1009]Regarding the CIA and cal police, the only thing
[1010]Papich recalls is discussion of the CIA's relation-
[1011]ship with New York City police. The purpose was
[1012]not operations, but protection of CIA New York
[1013]facilities. He was also aware of relationships
[1014]between Washington, D. C., and suburban police for
[1015]protection of CIA facilities and personnel. He
[1017]‘knew that some CIA employees joined questionable
[1019]groups and that the CIA was concerned about its
[1020]personnel associating with radicals and protesters.
[1021]The CIA Office of Security informed the FBI in
[1022]1967-1970 that it had developed from two to six
[1023]sources to assess involvement of CIA personnel in
[1024]protest groups. The information provided to the
[1025]FBI from these sources about such groups was "crap".
[1026]Papich was not involved in any meetings with CIA
[1027]sources. He is not aware of any CIA activity re-
[1028]garding Women's Strike for Peace, nor was he aware
[1029]of any CIA intelligence operations for the purpose
[1030]of protecting CIA from violent demonstrations.
[1032]CIA should have relied on FBI.
[1034]Bill Creager was succeeded as liaison with Office
[1035]of Security by Fred Cassidy. They provided memo-
[1036]randa to the FBI Intelligence Division on all trans-
[1037]actions with CIA. Creager kept Papich advised,
[1038]especially of the potential for flaps and for
[1039]successful operations. Papich believes Office of
[1040]Security was restricted both in number of personnel
[1041]and by CIA rules. It could claim a need to protect
[1042]its own facilities and personnel but it didn't
[1044]have significant capability. If it did, it would
[1045]have been detected by the FBI.
[1047]Regarding the Dominican Republic in 1965, Papich
[1048]recalls the fear of another Cuba by the President
[1049]and the National Security Council. Johnson may
[1050]have asked the FBI for help. An FBI agent from
[1051]the office in San Juan, Puerto Rico, and possibly
[1052]from Mexico City, were sent to the Dominican
[1053]Republic. This was done with CIA approval and the
[1054]joint effort was successful. There were no flaps.
[1055]The FBI agent had sources all over Central America
[1056]going back to World War II. Other FBI activities
[1057]in the Caribbean grew out of the FBI's role in
[1058]Havana beforé Castro, Jamaica, Miami, and San Juan.
[1059]In all these areas the FBI's capability was based
[1061]HW 50955 Docld:32761992 Page 16
[1063]CAD
[1065]on personal relationships going back to World
[1066]War II. In the late 1960's, the FBI went into
[1067]El Salvador and Papich thought this was a waste
[1068]of FBI manpower.
[1070]Regarding Cubans in Miami, there were many flaps
[1071]with CIA. For example, CIA would attempt to
[1072]recruit an exile for an operation in Cuba, the
[1073]exile would ask the FBI about it, and Hoover would
[1074]get mad. The FBI would not be informed about CIA
[1075]cover companies screening exiles. The FBI investi-
[1076]gated one cover company until it discovered the
[1077]CIA cover. CIA tried to recruit FBI sources with-
[1078]out checking out FBI. Papich is sure CIA "must
[1079]have" used agents to cover local Miami Cubans.
[1081]But FBI had excellent coverage and would protest
[1082]when CIA took an interest in somebody FBI was
[1083]investigating. There would be general protests
[1085]to CIA to stay out of counterintelligence. Some
[1086]problems were resolved locally with the FBI agent
[1087]in charge. There was minimum FBI contact with
[1089]CIA operations. Some names involved here are (S)
[1091]Emreddy.:Frohbosé, Meceased; Bill Harvey; and a
[1093]tzgerald.
[1095]Regarding CIA counterintelligence against Cubans
[1097]in New York, Papich said the policy was no
[1098]counterintelligence by CIA. He has no recollection
[1099]of CIA implication in anti-Castro Cuban illegal
[1100]activities, but Papich admits he would have learned
[1101]only if there was a flap.
[1103]Regarding CIA Domestic Operations Division, Papich
[1105]formulated the 1966 agreement to ease FBI relation-
[1107]ships. The problem, as noted earlier, was CIA
[1109]Pee £9 ies Neato foreign officials in the U. S$
[1111]2 Hoover finally, reluctantly, S)
[1112]966 understanding. Papich warned
[1114]CIA that if there were continuing flaps, Hoover
[1116]would withdraw his agreement and "it would be my
[1118]putt". There were flaps from 1966 to 1970 where
[1120]Domestic Operations Division attempted to recruit
[1122]and failed to advise FBI. If CIA was interested
[1124]in a Soviet bloc intelligence service recruitment,
[1126]FBI said no. If either Domestic Operations Division
[1128]or the counterintelligence staff was interested in
[1130]“any Soviet in the U. S., they touched base with FBI.
[1132]But they felt that if FBI had allowed them to
[1133]recruit they could have succeeded.
[1135]HW 50955 Docld:32231992 Page 19
[1137](<14))
[1139](<1)
[1142]INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY Page J of </
[1144]Regarding postal intercept, CIA came “up “with the
[1146]proposition, said they had entree, and desired it
[1148]for positive intelligence. CIA did all the cra S) (
[1149]ae Fat)
[1151]gave FBI the products where FBI nat stops” on
[1152]persons of interest and also where other informa-
[1153]tion might be of interest to FBI. It provided
[1155]some leads to intelligence agents. Papich recalls .
[1156]a brief mail intercept. int early 1950's on the
[1157]West Coast regardin 08 «Ne was stopped @)
[1158]anew postmaster arrived. Papich stated that the
[1160]New York operation was of greater >a nee relat
[1162]Papich recalls meetings with CIA andjalenlne . aie =
[1163]. fine coverage. ae not much worthwhile agmesnyiee
[1164]Q)® ere wad PCOMENT Jin the Miami area [Rone | on
[1165]& itoring. The FBI would get leads for gs spect.
[1166](0 |RMICIAS “Division D.weresthe, cOMINT. people,
[1167]ts HE ieee eee aa sat
[1168]eth recalls no other “aread thor pang |t n the U. iS)
[1170]Regarding CIA Domestic Contact ete FBI would
[1171]get positive intelligence reports, for example,
[1172]on an alien coming to the United States. The FBI
[1173]was interested in his training in Russia as a
[1174]possible source regarding Soviet intelligence
[1175]activities. The CIA Domestic Contact Service would
[1176]provide reports to FBI headquarters or the field
[1178]on antiwar, Black Power, and protest groups. They
[1179]got the information from faculty and students regard-
[1180]ing future riots.
[1182]The Domestic Contact Service programs and priorities
[1183]were set by the intelligence community, for.
[1184]example, gather whatever they can about missiles.
[1186]. The FBI would not task DCS. If DCS went into opera-
[1187]tions, FBI itself was upset. But DCS had good
[1188]officers who would note potential for counter-
[1189]intelligence use. There was no increase in DCS
[1190]traffic regarding dissidents in 1967 to 1969.
[1192]The creation of DCS in 1947 worried Hoover, who
[1193]feared an internal security role. It was set up
[1195]by NSCID. Until the 1960's, there was no contact
[1196]between FBI and the DCS at the rieid level. The
[1197]procedure developed that if DCS wanted to interview
[1199]AW 450955 DBocld: 32261992 Page 20
[1201]ol.
[1203]an alien, a form was submitted by FBI. “Ctr then
[1204]got FBI data on the alien and FBI had notice so
[1205]it could protect any operation.
[1207]Regarding possible spies in foreign intelligence
[1208]agencies, if the FBI discovers any it evaluates
[1210]the potential for a double agent or the possibility
[1211]of recruitment. FBI usually goes to the agency and
[1212]tells them the situation to prevent access to
[1213]sensitive information. Also, the agency can give
[1214]FBI assistance. The CIA Office of Security is
[1215]"paranoid" on this subject. It is very concerned
[1216]if there is a report on a CIA employee associating
[1217]with bloc nationals. Before telling the FBI, it
[1218]would do as much as it could on its own so there
[1219]would be something to discuss. In one case the
[1221]CIA was absolutely convinced an employee was a spy,
[1222]predicated on its analysts’ conclusions from a
[1223]photograph. FBI refused to move on the basis of
[1224]this alone. There were other cases where FBI and
[1225]CIA had different evaluations of evidence. It
[1226]depended on what CIA gave FBI. CIA was "jumpier"
[1227]than FBI.
[1229]If CIA did any electronic surveillance of its own
[1230]employees, it never checked with FBI. The same was
[1231]true for physical surveillance of its own employees.
[1232]If the FBI had known, it would have raised hell,
[1234]but it never came to FBI attention and there was
[1236]no policy discussion of the subject. If the CIA
[1237]wanted to do something with its own assets with
[1238]Attorney General or White House approval, it would
[1239]not check with FBI. But it would coordinate with
[1240]FBI if it saw a risk that FBI would discover.
[1242]Papich recalls no CIA surveillance of newsmen.
[1243]Papich adds his view that every newsman assigned
[1244]to Moscow is useful to the KGB. A newman who may
[1245]have been recruited by KGB in Moscow may become a
[1246]target in the U. 8.
[1248]Papich did not recall any problem of CIA activity
[1249]"tainting" a criminal case. CIA would make sources
[1250]oe available for criminal prosecutions.
[1252]HW 50955 Docld: 32281992 Page 21 ’ 2 iz
[1254]Regarding CIA Far East Division, Papich recalls
[1255]proposals for developing cover in the U. 8S. for
[1256]going overseas. Ober advised Papich of the develop-
[1257]ment of sources in the U. S. to cover overseas
[1258]targets. -Papich would write a memo on the situa-
[1259]tion and provide any relevant FBI information. He
[1260]also discussed with Ober giving FBI assets to CIA
[1261]if they travel overseas. Papich stresses that FBI
[1262]sources are sent overseas. He encouraged working
[1263]through CIA but never got very far. Papich gives
[1264]the example of an FBI source who went to Italy and
[1265]reported back through CTIA.
[1267]Ober asked FBI to use its sources to gather
[1268]information on policy guidance, funding, and train-
[1269]ing of U. S. dissidents overseas. There was a large
[1270]volume of communication covering names like
[1271]Carmichael and leaders in domestic groups.
[1273]FBI told CIA that if there was ever an investiga-
[1274]tion regarding a possible U. S. crime, CIA must
[1275]recognize the evidentiary rules. If there were
[1276]prosecutions (very few), it was never necessary to
[1277]disclose CIA data. CIA sources were not ina
[1278]position to testify. Papich does not recall ask-
[1279]ing CIA if information sent to FBI from CIA might
[1280]have originated with electronic surveillance over-
[1281]seas.
[1285]If Ober gave FBI information regarding domestic
[1286]matters, FBI would ask for everything CIA knew
[1288]about the sources. CIA memos would be very brief.
[1289]Papich would insist on identification of the
[1290]sources, since the FBI might want to use it. FBI
[1291]did get access to sources, sometimes working through
[1292]a CIA intermediary if source would not talk to FBI.
[1294]Papich recalls di og creation of "notional" ( ;
[1295]ina’ aud Russie. Als prosran(S) | ~ FR
[1297]groups targeted a Lh a
[1299]was not implemented before he left in 1970 It
[1300]could have been explored in the FBI Intelligence
[1301]Division but they would have come to Papich if
[1302]CIA was needed. Papich discussed with Far East
[1303]Division in CIA.
[1305]Regarding the several million dollar fund transfer.
[1307]to FBI, Papich recalls this was an effort of the
[1308]@ entire intelligence community, including the White
[1310]; a
[1311]HW 50955 Docild: 32261992 Page 22 . aA
[1315]ence where ~ TSD provided documents to FBI and
[1316]he has no knowledge of any COINTELPRO-type use of
[1317]CIA alias documentation or other document forging.
[1318]If this had been done, it would have had to go
[1319]through Papich.
[1321]Papich knew nothing about Vesco.
[1323]On Ober memos to ERI, £apich recalls a code b
[1324]designat icgig aedaly [PauT m@he purpose was 2o(S) ) re)
[1326]that when ? kK to CIA from FBI
[1328]it could be sent directly to Ober. The counter-
[1329]intelligence staff had an office to log communica-
[1330]tions. The determination as to what FBI informa-
[1331]tion would go to Ober was first based on Ober's
[1332]request for specifics.and second based on FBI
[1333]criteria which considered whether there would be
[1334]any possible CIA results. FBI would alert Ober
[1335]regarding an individual and ask for any informa-
[1336]tion generally about his overseas activity.
[1338]Papich does not recall any CIA breaking and enter-
[1339]ing operations in the 1960's
[1341]Regarding CIA security research staff, Papich
[1342]recalled that it concentrated on developing counter-
[1343]intelligence equipment. It also was "an Angleton-
[1344]type" operation, doing research on penetration of
[1345]the CIA. It also analyzed and evaluated the
[1346]exposure to the agency of OSS personnel who might
[1347]have been Communists or have had World War II
[1348]Communist contacts. For example, in Germany until
[1349]the mid-50's, CIA was vulnerable to recruitment
[1351]by Communist intelligence. CIA brought in brilliant
[1352]minds who might still have strong identification
[1353]with their home countries in eastern and middle
[1354]Europe.
[1356]Finally, Papich and Creager felt that “the guts of
[1357]liaison" was with DDP on counterintelligence, not
[1358]on their internal security problems. With Office
[1359]of Security there was a small number of investiga-
[1360]tions overlapping FBI.
[1362]HY 50955 Docld:322819932 Page 23 : ; t