[1]A ARAAN
[2]1704-10333-10014 | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
[4]1
[5]ht On e
[7]Assassination Records Review Board
[8]600 E Street NW - 2nd Floor « Washington, DC 20530
[9]- (202) 724-0088 + Fax: (202) 724-0457
[11]A884
[12]0,
[13]4
[19]fey sor
[21]CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
[22]June9,1997 DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
[24]RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
[26]Stewart B. Aly | IN THIS DOCUMENT, nel James R. Moore, Jr., U.S.A.
[27]Associate Deputy General Counsel , Information Management Officer,
[28]Office of General Counsel DCSPER (DAPA-ZXD)_.
[29]Department of Defense ' 300 Army Pentagon, Room 2D749
[30]* 1600 Defense Pentagon Washington, DC 20310-0300
[32]Washington, DC 20301-1600
[33]Re: Proposal fora Multi-Agency Declassification Review of Joseph Califano’ 8 Amy .
[34]Papers under the JFK Act
[36]The Assassination Records Review Board would like to make arrangements with you to
[37]declassify six boxes of Army records from the files of Joseph Califano. The files date.
[38]principally from the period 1962-63, during which Mr. Califano served as Army General
[39]Counsel and as Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Army. The records had been
[40]deposited at the National Archives and Records Administration, where they were
[41]recently located. A description of the records, which primarily pertain to US. activities
[42]related to Cuba, is attached hereto. We have identified what appears to us to be
[44]equities of numerous military entities in the Califano papers as well as equities of the .
[45]Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department, the United States Information
[47]Agency, and others.
[48]Deadlines
[50]Due to the volume of the records, and the Review Boards current sunset date of
[51]September 30, 1997, it is important that we proceed expeditiously in our review of the
[52]records.’ We have slated the Califano papers for review by the Board at its August 5-6, 1997
[53]meeting. The Review Board staff is prepared to assist you in making arrangements fora
[54]prompt and efficient re review of the Califano papers.
[56]‘The Review Board is seeking from Congress a one-year, one-time extension to
[57]September 30, 1998. Congressman Dan Burton is sponsoring a bill to extend the life of
[58]the Review Board. ee nedule rameed belay PPowed extension, we may
[59]be able to revisit the schedule Proposed b below. -
[61]‘Boaro Memecne: John A. Tunheim, Chair » Henry F. Graff + Kermit L. Hall + William L. Joyce » Anna K. Nelson
[62]Execurve Oimecron: David G. Marwell ~
[65]13-00000
[67]- Messrs. Aly and Moore
[69]June 9, 1997
[70]Page2
[72]Preliminary Review of Califano Papers
[74]The Review Board staff has conducted an initial review of the records and has
[75]tentatively reached the following conclusions: first, the records are very similar in
[76]subject manner to many other records that already are a part of the JFK Collection;
[77]second, although the vast majority of the records technically remain classified, there is
[78]little remaining sensitivity due to the passage of time and to the release of much of the
[79]information in other contexts; and third, the Califano papers contain equities of
[81]_ Numerous military and non-military agencies, which, under the standard referral
[83]process, would be very difficult and time-consuming.” Thus, the logistical problem in
[84]the records is not the continued sensitivity of the records, but the number _
[85]of agencies that will need to review their own equities in the records. For this reason,
[86]and for the short time-line on which we are now operating, we believe that there is an
[87]urgent need to make acceptable arrangements for the review and referral of records.
[89]Proposal
[90]In order to expedite the process and make it more efficient, we would like to propose an
[92]" alternate arrangement for declassification of records that we previously have found
[94]effective. We suggest the holding of a multi-agency concurrent review of the Califano
[95]papers. We would like to schedule a single session at our offices, on or before July 23,
[96]1997, where all agencies with equities in the Califano papers be concurrently present for
[98]_ adeclassification review. At such a session, agencies would be able to review their own
[100]equities in the records, declassify them, and simply hand them across the table to other —
[101]‘agencies for their review. It has béen our own experience that sessions of this sort
[102]greatly simply the review process by giving agencies the opportunity to speak with
[104]each other and quickly to resolve questions.
[106]Because the Califano papers will need to be reviewed by the Board at its August 5-6
[108]" meeting, we believe that an arrangement such as is proposed above will provide all
[110]agencies with a full opportunity to identify their equities in the records and to make
[112]determinations regarding the need for continued classification. If the Army and the
[114]Ms. Toni Bowie, of the Army Declassification Activity, spent three days
[115]reviewing some of the records and making recommendations for referrals to other
[116]agencies both within and outside of the military. Although Ms. Bowie worked
[117]energetically for three days, it was our sense afterwards that, if we continue at the same
[118]pace, the agencies with equities will likely not be able to complete their reviews before
[119]the August deadline arrives.
[122]13-00000
[124]Messrs. Aly and Moore’
[125]June 9, 1997
[127] Page3
[129]Department of Defense are agreeable to such an arrangement, the Review Board will
[131]-take the responsibility for contacting all non-military agencies with equities in the
[132]; fecords while Army and DoD make arrangements for all appropriate military entities to
[134]be present.
[136], We are, of course, very willing to consider other ideas or suggestions that you might
[137]have. However, because the clock is ticking, it is important that we promptly develop a
[138]Poe arity trove and leclentty thal cqaltiee an Papers fo haven
[139]opportunity to review and declassify their equities.
[141]I look forward to discussing this issue with you.
[143]cc: Steven D. Tilley, NARA
[145]J. Barry Harrelson, CIA
[146]Nina Noring, State
[148]Richard S. Werksman, USIA
[149]William Leary, NSC
[151]‘Carol Keeley, FBI
[154]13-00000
[156]e.
[158]JOSEPH CALIFANO PAPERS (6 boxes)
[160]Identified by Steve Tilley at NARA, these 6 boxes of papers, almost exclusively from
[161]1962-63, were either generated by, or addressed to Joseph Califano, who at this time
[162]was Department of the Army General Counsel and Special Assistant to the Secretary of
[163]_ the Army. Most of the documents are short summaries of proposed policy positions, or
[164]letters of transmittal, with voluminous appendices attached. Each of the 6 boxes
[165]‘contains approximately 1500-2000 pages of material.
[167]Representative Topics:
[169](1)
[171]Q)
[174](4)
[175]6)
[176]©)
[178]14)
[180]ICCCA Ginterdepartmental Coordinating C Committee of Cuban Affairs—the
[181]“Cottrell Committee”) meetings on future U.S. policy toward Cuba. These
[182]- documents are generally background papers prepared prior to meetings,
[183]minutes of meetings, or follow-on discussion of action items assigned at
[184]meetings of the ICCCA.
[186]. Contingency plans for Cuban invasion by the US. military in the event of
[188]a Cuban uprising.
[189]Psychological warfare against Cuba.
[191]Diplomatic initiatives intended to increase isolation of Cuba:
[193]Biographies, and evaluations of Cuban exile leaders.
[195]Intelligence reports and estimates on reported events inside Cuba.
[197]Summaries of clandestine paramilitary actions taken against Cuba, and ~
[198]suggestions for possible future actions.
[200]Apparent Equities:
[202]Ninety-five per cent of the documents appear to have multiple-agency equities,
[203]usually 4 to 6 agencies per document. Based upon staff review, it is estimated
[204]that 80% of the documents have State equities, 60% Joint Staff or OSD, 60% NSC,
[205]60% CIA, 15% Army, Navy or Air Force, perhaps 10% DIA, and a small :
[206]percentage of USIA, Justice, Treasury and FBI.
[208]Horne e:\wp-docs\Califano.wpd
[212]13-00000
[214]- JOINT STAFF PAPERS (147 documents) _
[215]* Using broad topic guidelines provided previously by ARRB staff, the Joint Staff at the
[216]Pentagon has reviewed 40 boxes of records of Joint Chiefs Chairmen Lyman Lemnitzer,
[217]Maxwell Taylor, and Earle Wheeler for 1961-1964, as well as JCS central files for 1962”
[218]and 1963, and has flagged 147 documents which will enhance the historical
[220]understanding of the Kennedy administration, and which some scholars will believe
[221]may be relevant to the assassination. -
[223]Topics:
[225]. (1)  ICCCA (Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs)
[226]meetings regarding future U.S. policy toward Cuba.
[228](2) Special Group (5412 committee) meetings and decisions; and covert
[229]paramilitary operations against Cuba. ,
[231](3) . Cuban coup planning. ;
[232](4) Vietnam coup planning, and discussion of Diem and Nhu.
[233](5) OPLAN 34A (covert actions against North Vietnam). |
[234](6) US. military strength levels in Vietnam.
[236]Apparent Equities:
[238]Multiple agency equities appear to apply to virtually every document—-usually
[239]State, OSD and/or NSC. The Joint Staff has stated in writing that it is prepared
[240]to expeditiously process these documents for declassification in collaboration
[241]with agencies which have equities, and then accession the declassified
[242]documents to NARA. Currently the Joint Staff is awaiting guidance from ARRB
[243]staff on which of the tabbed folders we desire to have placed in the collection;
[244]upon receipt of that guidarice, they will commence declassification review.
[246]Home e: \wp-docs\Jointstaff. wpa
[249]13-00000
[251]Assassination Records Review Board
[252]600 E Street NW «+ 2nd Floor « Washington, DC 20530
[253](202) 724-0088 + Fax: (202) 724-0457
[255]s
[257]i «
[258]ns .
[259]Tew 90"
[261]Cc NS HE) OBJECTION TO
[262]June 9, 1997 cy SIFICACA ANO/OR
[263]; R OF Cid INFORMATION
[264]iN THIS DOCUMENT
[265]Stewart F. Aly . Mr. Edmund McBride. - --
[266]Associate Deputty General Counsel - Chief, Information Management
[267]Office of General Counsel Division.
[268]Department of Defense Joint Secretariat
[269]1600 Defense Pentagon Joint Staff ©
[270]Washington, DC 20301-1600 The Pentagon, Room 2B917
[272]Washington, DC 20318-0400
[274]Re: Proposal for a Multi-Agency Declassification Review of Selected Papers of JCS
[275]Chairmen Lemnitzer, Taylor.and Wheeler, and Selected JCS Central:Files: ::
[276]under the JEK Act .
[278]Gentlemen:
[280]The Assassination Records Review Board would like to make arrangements with you to
[281]; approximately 147 records previously flagged by the Joint Staff from both the
[282]JCS Central Files, and the papers of JCS Chairmen Lemnitzer, Taylor and Wheeler. The
[283]files date principally from the period 1961-64. The records were flagged during
[284]searches directed by Mr. Edmund McBride (Chief, Information Management Division, -
[286]- Joint Staff) at the request of the ARRB staff. With one exception, ARRB staff feels that .
[288]all records flagged by Mr. McBride's working group are relevant to the historical
[289]understanding or context of the assassination of President Kennedy. A description of
[290]the records, which primarily pertain to U.S. activities related to Cuba, or to Vietnam
[291]policy, is attached hereto. We have identified what appear to us to be equities of
[292]numerous military entities in these papers, cca Cel tthe intelligence
[293]Agency, the State Department, the National Security Council, and others.
[295]Deadlines
[297]_ Due to the volume of the records, and the Review Board’s current sunset date of
[299]September 30, 1997, it is important that we proceed expeditiously in our review of the
[301]- secords.’ We have slated these papers for review by the Board at its August 5-6, 1997 meeting.
[303]'The Review Board is seeking from Congress a one-year, one-time extension to _
[304]September 30, 1998. Congressman Dan Burton is sponsoring a bill to extend the life of
[306]‘ the Review Board. Should the Review Board receive the proposed extension, we may
[308]Board Memaeens: John R. Tunhsim, Chair « Henry F. Graff + Kermit L. Hall +» William L. Joyce « Anna K. Nelson
[309]Executive Dinecron: David G. Marwell
[312]13-00000
[314]Messrs. Aly and McBride
[315]June 9, 1997
[316]Page2
[318]The Review Board staff is prepared to assist you in making arrangements for a prompt
[319]and efficient review of these selected papers of Joint Chiefs Lemnitzer, Taylor, and
[320]Wheeler, and the Joint Staff Central Files.?
[322]__ Preliminary Review of Papers of JCS Chairmen and Joint Staff Central Files
[324]The Review Board staff has conducted an initial review of the records and has
[325]tentatively reached the following conclusions: first, the records are very similar in
[326]subject manner to many other records that already are a part of the JFK Collection,
[327]second, although the vast majority of the records technically remain classified, there is
[328]-little remaining sensitivity due to the passage of time and to the release of much of the
[329]information in other contexts; and third, these papers contain equities of numerous ; .
[331]military and non-military agencies, which, under the outa wee VIR,
[333]be very difficult and time-consuming. Thus, the logistical problem in declassifying the
[334]records is not the continued sensitivity of the records, but the number of agencies that
[335]will need to review their own equities in the records. For this reason, and for the short
[336]time-line on which we are now operating, we believe that there is an urgent need to
[337]make acceptable arrangements for the review and referral of records.
[339]Proposal
[341]In order to expedite the process and make it more efficient, we would like to propose an
[342]alternate arrangement for declassification of records that we previously have found
[343]effective. We suggest the holding of a multi-agency concurrent review of these papers
[344]of the three aforementioned JCS Chairmen and the JCS Central Files. We would like to
[345]schedule a single session at our offices, on or before July 23, 1997, where all agencies
[346]with equities in these JCS/Joint Staff papers be concurrently present for a
[347]declassification review. At such a session, agencies would be able to review their own
[349]be able to revisit the schedule proposed below.
[351]"The Joint Staff’s Initial Statement of Compliance to the Review Board, dated
[352]February 6, 1997, identified in detail the process by which these records were located
[353]namely, which files were searched, and who participated in the searches. Mr. Edmund
[354]McBride, Chief of the Joint Staff Information Management Division, indicated in this
[355]statement that the Joint Staff was standing by to expeditiously process these records for
[356]declassification in collaboration with other agencies when the ARRB was ready. ARRB
[357]staff has only recently completed its initial review of these records, which constitute
[358]selectively flagged folders within 40 boxes of JCS and Joint Staff records.
[360]13-00000
[362]Messrs. Aly and McBride
[363]June 9, 1997
[364]Page 3
[366]s
[368]equities in the records, declassify them, and simply hand them across the table to other
[369]agencies for their review. It has been our own experience that sessions of this sort
[370]greatly simply the review process by giving agencies the opportunity to speak with
[371]each other and quickly to resolve questions.
[373]Because these papers will need to be reviewed by the Board atts August 5-6 meeting,
[374]we believe that an arrangement such as is proposed above will provide all agencies ©
[375]with a full opportunity to identify their equities in the records and to make
[376]determinations regarding the need for continued classification. If the Joint Staff and the
[377]Department of Defense are agreeable to such an arrangement, the Review Board will
[378]take the responsibility for contacting all non-military agencies with equities in the
[379]records while the Joint Staff and DoD make arrangements for all appropriate military. -
[380]entities to be present.
[382]We are, of course, very willing to consider other ideas or suggestions that you might
[383]have. However, because the clock is ticking, it is important that we promptly develop a
[384]plan that will provide all agencies with equities in these Joint Staff/JCS papers to have
[385]an opportunity to review and declassify their equities.
[387]ing this issue with you.
[389]Attachment
[391]cc: Steven D. Tilley, NARA
[392]J. Barry Harrelson, CIA
[394]Nina Noring, State
[396]William Leary, NSC
[398]13-00000
[400]JOINT STAFF PAPERS (147 documents)
[401]Using broad topic guidelines provided reviously by ARRB staff, the Joint Staff at the
[402]Pentagon has reviewed 40 eet records of Joint Chiefs Chairinen tymesy Len,
[403]Maxwell Taylor, and Earle Wheeler for 1961-1964, as well as JCS central files for1962 *
[404]and 1963, and has flagged 147 documents which will enhance the historical ;
[405]understanding of the Kennedy administration, and which some scholars will believe
[406]may be relevant to the assassination.
[408]Topics:
[410](1) ICCCA (Iinterdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs)
[411]meetings regarding future US. policy toward Cuba.
[413](2) Special Group (5412 committee) meetings and decisions; and covert
[414]tary operations against Cuba. .
[416](3). Cubancoup planning. .
[417](4) ° Vietnam-coup planning, and discussion of Diem and Nhu.
[418](5) OPLAN 34A (covert actions against North Vietnam).
[419](6) U.S. military strength levels in Vietnam.
[420]Apparent Equities:
[422]documents to NARA. Currently the Joint Staff is awaiting guidance from ARRB
[423]staff on which of the tabbed folders we desire to have placed in the collection;
[424]upon receipt of that guidance, they will commence declassification review.
[426]Home e:\wp-docs\Jointstaff.wpd
[430]13-00000
[432]Assassination Records Review Board
[433]600 E Street NW + 2nd Floor » Washington, DC 20630
[434](202) 724-0088 » Fax: (202) 724-0457 '
[436]CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
[437]DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
[438]RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
[439]IN THIS DOCUMENT
[441]TO: Mr. J. Barry Harrelson, Central Intelligence Agency HRG
[442]FROM: — Doug Home, sentient toons
[443]SUBJECT: Declassification Session for Califano Papers and Joint Staft/JCS Records
[445]1. The joint declassification sessian mentioned in our letters to the Army (re: th Joseph
[446]Califano Papers) and to the Joint Secretariat (re: Selected Papers of JCS Chairmen
[447]Lemnitzer, Taylor, and Wheeler, and selected JCS Central Files) of June 9, 1997 is
[448]scheduled to take place during the four-day window Monday, July 21-Thursday, July
[449]24, inclusive. The first session will commence at 9-00 A.M. Monday moming, July 21, at
[450]the ARRB offices in room 207 of the Bicentennial Building, located at 600 E Street, NW
[452]- (at the corner of E Street NW and 6th Street).
[454]2 Our offices are located equidistant from the following three Metro stations:
[455]Archives /Navy Memorial (Yellow Line); Judiciary Square (Red Line); and Gallery Place
[456](Red Line). Parking Garages are located in the basement of the Bicentennial Building,
[457]and also across the street from us in the basement of the ARKP building, 1
[459]3. Please fax the names, SSNs, and clearance information for CIA attendees to Tracy
[460]’ Shycoff on our staff at fax number (202) 724-0457 prior to close-of-business on
[461]Wednesday, July 16, 1997. Please indicate on your visit request that the period of the
[462]visit is through the end of calendar year 1997, since it is anticipated that our efforts to
[463]expedite declassification of. these documents will take more than one sessionto
[466]4. Weloak fora to woking compel wit allofour parr nhs mers
[470]Boago Memssas; John R. Tunhaim, Chair « Henry F, Graff « Kermit L. Mall « Willlam L. Joyce ¢ Anna K. Nelson
[471]Executive Omecron: Dovid G, Marwoll
[474]13-00000
[478]J
[480]Confidential pve
[482]18 July 1997
[484]Memorandum For: David G Marwell
[485]Executive Director
[486]Assassination Records Review Board
[488]Subject: CIA Reviewers - Clearance Certifications
[490]1. The CIA review team for the joint declassification
[491]session for Califano Papers and Joint Staff/JCS records
[492]scheduled for July 21-24 is composed of the following
[493]individuals:
[497]Charles A. Briggs SSN (161-22-9115 /
[498]IC/DCI/CSI/HRG (262-227-9115 |
[499]Kathleen Puchnick SSN (161-26-1452 /
[500]IC/DCI/CSI/HRG Sd
[501]Richard D. Kovar SSN [194-22-0138 /
[502]IC/DCI/CSI/HRG ne
[503]C Bvléen M: Wukitch ) SSN [178-36-7636 /
[504]s/DO/IMS See
[505](Mary V. Amoia SSN [579-42-8195 /
[506]IC/DO/IMS wee
[507]William Perkins SSN (082-30-4664 ;
[508]IC/DO/IMS. So
[510]2. The Agency reviewers listed above have the
[511]appropriate clearances to review Joseph Califano's Army
[512]Papers and the selected JCS records and files. Official
[513]certification of the individuals' clearances will follow.
[514]If you have any questions concerning clearances in my
[516]absence, please contact (Barbara Standley, 703-613-1806)
[519]( -
[521]J. Barry Bakrelson-— -—.—-—--”
[522]Project Officer,
[523]CIA JFK Review
[525]CL BY: (611637/
[526]CL REASON: 1-5 (c)
[527]DECL ON: X1
[529]DRV FROM: COV 2-82
[531]PF
[533]bh bgpheag Confidential
[534](_-
[535]a
[539]13-00000
[541]108708/87 TUE 17:24 FAX 202 724 0457 ARRB ' ‘gjuor
[543]Assassination Records Review Board
[544]; 600 E Street NW « 2nd Floor « Washington, DC 20530
[545]ff 9 (202) 724-0088 + Fax: (202) 724-0457
[548]so"
[550]+ “Hl
[551]&,
[554]CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
[555]MEMORANDUM DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
[556]So RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
[557]Via F . ‘INTHIS DOCUMENT
[558]August 5, 1997
[560]To: Mr. J. Barry Harrelson, Central Intelligence Agency HG
[561]FROM: Doug Home, Assassination Records Review Board
[563]SUBJECT: Invitation to Next Declassification Session for Califano Papers and JCS
[565]. 1. Iam writing to notify you that the next working session for joint declassification
[566]review of subject records in accordance with the-standards of the JFK Act is scheduled
[567]for Tuesday, October 7 through Thursday, October 9, inclusive, in the ARRB conference
[568]room in our second floor offices at 600 E Street, N.W.
[570]2. Our goals for this second session are to complete joint review of the JCS papers, and
[571]to open up for review two more boxes in the Califano collection. This session will also
[572]allow selected agencies (which were not able to complete review of documents available
[573]at the first session) an opportunity to catch up.
[575]3. We see a need for representatives of the CIA to continue to attend these sessions
[576]until they are completed.
[578]4, Names and clearances need to be faxed to us only if the CIA attendees for this
[579]October session are different from those clearances passed to ARRB in July. Our point-
[580]of-contact and fax number far clearances is Tracy Shycoff, at (202) 724-0457.
[582]5. For planning purposes, following this October session, our plans are to host one
[583]session per month, of 2 to 3 days duration each time, until the declassification review of
[584]the selected JCS papers and the Califano collection is completed. Agencies which
[585]require more time are welcome to make individual appointments to review these
[586]documents in-between the monthly, group sessions.
[588]Soaap Mamanns: JoAn A, Tunheim, Chair « Henry F. Graff + Kermit L. Hall» William L. Joyce » Anna K. Nelson
[589]Exgcurve Dunsevon: David G. Marwell
[592]13-00000
[594]Assassination Records Review Board
[596](202) 724-0088 + Fax: (202) 724-0457
[597]CIA HAS NO OBJECTION 10
[598]DECLASSIFICATION ANDIOR
[600]NEWS RELEASE RELEASE OF CIAINFORMATION
[601]iN THIS DOCUMENT
[603]FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE CONTACT: EILEEN SULLIVAN
[604]NOVEMBER 18, 1997. (202) 724-0088, EXT. 253
[606]The Assassination Records Review Board, an independent federal agency overseeing
[607]the identification, review, and release of records related to the assassination of President
[608]John F. Kennedy, today released approximately 1,500 pages of previously classified
[609]military records from 1962-64 that relate to US. policy toward Cuba.
[611]; “These documents further expand the historical record by illustrating the United States
[612]. government's deep interest in developing a policy that would force Castro from power
[613]during the early 1960's,” said Dr. Anna Nelson, a member of the Review Board. “We
[614]now have a new window into the policy options toward Cuba that were being
[615]considered and debated at the highest levels of the military services.”
[617]The mandate of the Review Board is to make the record surrounding the assassination
[618]of President Kennedy as complete as possible. The Board has aggressively sought to
[619]uncover records on U.S. foreign policy that put the assassination into its historical
[620]context.
[622]The Review Board worked cooperatively with representatives from the Department of
[623]Defense (DOD) and the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) to
[624]locate records stored at NARA that met the definition of being “assassination related.”
[625]The documents are from the fil Pett,
[627]the Secretary of the Army, the files of rome els oO! of Staff Chairmen Lemnitzer, Taylor
[628]and Wheeler, and the central files of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
[630]The records have been transferred to NARA for inclusion in the JFK Collection, which is
[631]housed at the NARA facility in College Park, Maryland. These documents are now
[632]available to researchers.
[634]Copies of selected documents are available from the Assassination Records Review
[635]Board, 600 E Street, NW, Second Floor, 1 Washington, DC 20530; telephone number: (202)
[636]724-0088.
[638]~more-
[640]Boano Memsers: John A. Tunheim, Chair + Henry F. Graff « Kermit L. Hall « William L. Joyce « Anna K. Nelson
[641]Executive Dinecror: T. Jeramy Gunn + Deputy Dinecton: Thomas £. Samotuk
[643]600 E Street NW « 2nd Floor - Washington, DC 20530 : a
[645]13-00000
[647]The Assassination Records Review Board was 1s established by the JFK Act, which was
[648]signed into law by President George Bush. The five members of the Board were
[649]appointed by President Clinton, confirmed by the U.S. Senate, and swom in on April-
[651]‘11, 1994. The law gives the Review Board the mandate and the authority to identify,
[653]secure, and make available all records related to the assassination of President’
[654]Kennedy. It is the responsibility of the Board to determine which records are to be
[655]made public immediately and which ones will have postponed release dates.
[657]The Review Board consists of the following members:
[659]Honorable John R. Tunheim, Chair; U.S. District Court Judge, District of Minnesota.
[660]Dr. Henry F. Graff; Professor Emeritus of History at Coluinbia University.
[662]Dr. Kermit L. Hall; Dean, College of ‘Humanities, and Professor of History at The Ohio |
[663]State University. .
[665]Dr. William L. Joyce; Associate University Librarian for Rare Books and i Special
[666]Collections at Princeton University.
[668]_ Dr. Anna K. Nelson; Distinguished Adjunct Historian in Residence at The American
[670]University.
[675]13-00000
[677]Assassination Records Review Board
[678]600 E Street NW « 2nd Floor - Washington, DC 20530
[679](202) 724-0088 + Fax: (202) 724-0457
[681]NOVEMBER 18, 1997 ~ , ; (202) 724-0088, EXT. 253
[683]Attached are six selected documents from approximately 1,500 pages of military
[684]‘records that relate to U.S. policy toward Cuba from 1962-64. The records are being ‘-
[685]released today by the Assassination Records Review Board. Sections of the documents
[687]that may be of particular interest to the reader are e marked aby arrows in the margin on
[689]the right side of the relevant Pages. :
[691]List of Selected Documents
[692]1. Excerpts from 198-10004-10020
[693]Note: The Record Information Form (document cover sheet) for the compilation of
[695]documents in this group is dated 3/1/63, but the excerpted documents are from
[697]February 1962.
[698]“Possible Actions To Provoke, Harass, Or Disrupt Cuba”
[700]2. Excerpts from 202-10002-10104
[701]February 7, 1962, March 9, 1962, March 12, 1962, March 13, 1962, April 10, 1962
[704]3. Excerpts from 202- 10002- 10018.
[705]May 1, 1963
[706]“Courses of Action Related to Cuba"
[708]4. Excerpts from 198-10004-10011
[710]December 11, 1963 .
[712]Memo to Joseph Califano, General Counsel, Secretary of the Army - "Training of
[713]Cuban Refugees in Nicaragua".
[715]5. Excerpts from 202-10002-10010
[716]December 19, 1963
[717]- "Meeting with President on Cuba"
[719]Boanv Memsens: John A. Tunheim, Chair « Henry F. Graff » Kermit L. Hall « William L. Joyce + Anna K. Nelson
[720]Executive Director: 7. Jeremy Guan « Deeuty Dinector: Thomas €. Samoluk .
[723]13-00000
[727]_ 6.. Excerpts from 202-10002-10117
[728]January 31,1964
[729]“A Contingency Plan for a Coup in Cuba” ”
[732]13-00000 .
[734]oS - «es
[735]. . oo Cuba Selected Documents
[737]. #1 -
[739]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[740]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[742]AGENCY :. ARMY
[743]RECORD NUMBER : 198-10004-10020
[744]RECORDS SERIES : CALIFANO PAPERS
[745]AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
[747]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[748]MULTIPLE
[750]so ORIGINATOR :
[751]FROM :
[752]TO :
[753]TITLE :
[754]DATE : 03/01/63 . .
[755]PAGES : 135 \
[757]SUBJECTS : PLANNING AND POLICY, CUBA
[758]". POLICY OBJECTIVES, CUBA
[759]CONTINGENCY PLANNING, CUBA
[760]LATIN AMERICA SECURITY
[761]ACTIONS TO IMPEDE MOVEMENT OF SUBVERSIVES
[762]CARIBBEAN SURVEILLANCE ,
[763]U.S. MILITARY INTERVENTION, CUBA
[764]OPERATION MONGOOSE
[765]BLOCKADE OF CUBA
[767]DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[768]‘CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
[769]RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL
[770]CURRENT STATUS : OPEN
[771]TE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/07/97. :
[772]OPENING CRITERIA : . ,
[774]COMMENTS : Califano Papers, Box 6, Folder 7. Package of proposed -
[775]actions to be used against Cuba, including operations
[776]to apply pressure to the Cuban regime to oust Castro
[777]and potential reaction to US ‘involvement .
[780]13-00000
[782]he ene
[784]BO [po see
[786]: . Sess ko .
[787]POSSIBLE ACTIONS TO PROVOKE, HARRASS, OR DISRUPT
[789]_-CUBA-
[791]1. Operation SMASHER:
[793]a. Objective: The objective is to disrupt/disable military and_
[794]commercial communications facilities in Cuba, ’ ,
[796]b, Concept: This to be accomplished by the clandestine introduction of
[797]4 "special" vacuum tube into selected communications equipment. The tube,
[798]which is available, is virtually undetectable inasmuch as its effectiveness is
[799]due to the insertion of a chemical compound in the base of the tube. The
[800]chemical, when heated becomes a conductor, when cool a non-conductor,
[802]2. Qperation FREE RIDE: 9... re
[804]ae Objective: The objective is to create unrest and dissension amongst
[805]the Cuban people. : .
[807]b, Concept: This to be accomplished by airdropping valid Pan American
[808]‘or KLM One-way airline tickets good for Passage to Mexico City, Caracas,
[809]‘ete, (none to the U.S.). Tickets could be intermixed with other leaflets
[810]planned to be dropped. The number of tickets dropped could be increased,
[811]The validity of the tickets would have to be restricted to a time period,
[813]3. Operation TURN ABOUT:
[815]a. Objective: The objective is to create indications to Fidel Castro that
[816]his value to the revolutionary cause has diminished to the point where plans are *.
[817]being made for his "removal", . .
[821]b. Concept: This to be accomplished by the use of intelligence means the
[822]crecendo increasing until it culminates in Castro's discovery of the mechanism
[823]_ or hardware, m .
[825]Special Handling of this pacer is requested.
[827]Access should be limits to i 7h 1S requiring
[828]the information heroin in o:de: we-anrry out their
[829]official duties. - cna ee
[831]Reproduction cr this doc
[832]Or in pert is prehihg
[833]Pornisstoen or the issutne ez:
[835]ry This dosumont consists of —...__ pages.
[836]Copy # 4... of ___\S copys.
[838]Mh Se
[841]13-00000
[843]4, -Operation DEFECTOR:
[845]Objective: To induce elements or individuals of the Cuban military to
[846]defect with equipment.
[848]b. Concept: “This activity when properly planned and implemented has the
[849]effect of decreasing military capability. In a totalitarian system the immediate
[850]reaction is increased security accompanied by decreased activity. It also
[851]creates havoc in security and intelligence agencies. Could be accomplished -
[852]by intelligence means and promise of rewards. :
[854]5. Operation BREAK-UP: . oo
[856]. Objective: To clandestinely introduce ) corrosive materials to cause
[857]atreralt, vehicle or boat accidents. ; ..
[859]b. Concept: This activity, if possible: should be aimed primarily toward the = Be yt
[860]Soviet-provided aircraft. If properly accompHshed it would degrade confidence
[861]in the equipment, increase supply and maintenance problems and seriously
[862]affect combat capability.
[864]6. Operation COVER-UP:
[866].a Objective: The objective is to convince the Communist government of
[867]Cuba that Naval Forces ostensibly assigned to the MERCURY project is merely
[869]a cover.
[871]b. Concept: It should not be revealed as to what the cover is--this should
[872]- be left to conjecture. This could tie in with Operation 1 DIRTY TRICK.
[874]“9. Operation DIRTY "TRICK: :
[876]a. Objective: The objective is to provide : irrevocable proof that, should: a
[877]the MERCURY manned orbit flight fail, the fault lies with the Communists
[878]et al Cuba, :
[880]b. Concept: This to.-be accomplished by manufacturing various pieces of
[881]evidence which would prove electronic interference on the part of the. Cubans.
[883]8. Operation FULL-UP:
[884]a. Objective: The objective is to destroy confidence in fuel supplied by the
[886]Soviet Bloc by indicating it is contaminated,
[888]2
[893]13-00000
[897]2
[899]' bilities to create the impression that landings have been made on beaches
[901]b” Concept: This to be accomplished by introducing a known biological 7
[902]agent into jet fuel storage facilities, This agent flourishes in jet fuel and
[903]grows until it consumes all the space inside the tank.
[905]9. O eration PHANTOM:
[907]a. Objective: The objective is to convince the Castro Government that
[908]clandestine penetration and resupply of agents is being regularly conducted.
[910]b. Concept: This to be accomplished by use of BJ, UDT, AND JJ capa- setae
[912]and air drops have been made in other areas.
[914]10. Operation BINGO:
[915]. Objective: The objective is.to, erento. an incident which has, the Appearance ;
[917]‘of m an 1 attack on U.S, facilities (GMO) in Cuba, thus providing the excuse for
[918]- use of U.S, military might to overthrow the current government of Cuba.
[920]_b. Concept: This to be accomplished by the use of SNAKES outside the
[921]confines of the Guantanamo Base. .SNAKES simulate’an actual fire-fight and
[922]‘upon hearing such a sound it is-entirely feasible that the immediate reaction
[923]on G'Mo would be that the base is being attacked. This would, with proper
[924]preparation, be followed by a counterattack and with adequate planning the base
[925]at G'Mo could disgorge military force in sufficient number to sustain itself
[926]until other forces, which had been previously alerted, could attack in other .
[927]areas, It is envisaged that a schedule of operations similar to the following
[929]’ would overwhelm the Cuban military and cause its defeat:
[931](1) Simulated attack on Guantanamo.
[932](2) Word flashed to the President..
[933](3) President orders counterattack to include: .
[934](a) Immediate launch of alerted aircraft whose targets 2 are ‘Cuban airfields.
[935](b) Immediate launch of counterattack down strategic lines in communi- .
[936]cation in Cuba.
[937](c) Fleet force standing by on alert would make way toward pre-selected
[938]. targets /landing areas.
[939](d) Immediate embarkation of airborne troops previously alerted to
[940]pre-selected targets,
[941](e) Launch of additional combat aircraft to clear drop areas and
[942]further interdict lines of communication.
[943](£) Ships and aircraft would land/airdrop troops and secure airfields,
[944]road/rail terminals, etc.
[947]13-00000
[949]- (g) Resupply and replacement activities.
[951]Properly executed, the above could overthrow the Cuban Government in a
[952]matter of hours, providing the plan is implemented within the next six months.
[954]‘11, Operation GOOD TIMES:
[956]a. Objective: To disillusion: the Cuban population with Castro image by
[957]distribution of fake photographic material.
[959]BES:
[961]b. Concept: Prepare a desired photograph, such ag an obese Castro
[962]with two beauties in any situation desired, ostensibly within a room in the -
[963]Castro residence, lavishly furnished, and a table briming over with the most
[964]delectable Cuban food with an underlying caption (appropriately Cuban) such as _
[965]UMy ration is different.'' Make as many prints as desired on sterile paper and ,
[966]‘then distribute over the countrygide by air drops or agents. Thig should put
[967]even a Commie Dictator in the proper perspective ‘withthe Saderprivileged ”
[968]masses.
[970]= i
[972]cas Pr
[974]12. Operation HEAT IS ON:
[976]/ @e Objective: To create the impression with Castro Government that
[977]certain dyed-in-the-wool Red pilots are planning to defect, thus s causing a
[978]detrimental tightening of security.
[980]b. Concept: It is known that many Cuban refugee pilots are personally
[981]acquainted with many of the present CRAF pilots. Accordingly, by utilizing
[982]all sources available, determine by name those pilots considered to be dedicated
[983]Gastro Reds. Then by use of agents, communications, etc. inject into the
[984]Gastro intelligence system the fact that these pre-designated Reds are planning
[985]to defect for monetary and/or ideological reasons, Security crackdown should
[986]help destroy Castro image and also impose unacceptable restrictions on™
[987]routine training activities. :
[990]13-00000
[992]OPERATION: Invisible Bomb
[994]. OBJECTIVE:
[996]1. To create the impression that isolated bombings are taking place
[997]in Cuba thus maximizing harrassment and confysion of the Castro govern-
[1000]RERUNS
[1002]CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS:
[1004]. Be,
[1006]2. The Air Force can utilize the operational characteristica of F-101
[1007]. or other Century series aircraft to create the impression that anti-Castro
[1008]3 . opposition is continuing. The aircraft operational characteristic to be
[1009]. exploited is the "sonic-boom,"
[1011]seenaye ate
[1013].: ' The "gonic-boom" can ke. employed in. several different ways, such
[1014]as an individual boom at selected spots or a Continuous boom and performed |
[1015]at either high or low altitudes. It will cause not only apprehension but
[1016]varying degrees of malicious damage as well, i.e. break all the windows
[1018]on a street in Havana.
[1020]4, The "sonic-hoom" effect can be maximized by planning missions _
[1021]for execution during the early morning hours when the populace is sleeping.
[1022]The Cuban people are generally unfamiliar with this phenomenon, therefore
[1023]it is felt that the impact for a time would be most beneficial. :
[1025]5. The directional aspects of the sonic-boom" also make it feasible
[1026]for use in simulating U.S. Naval gun-fire in the immediate vicinity of the
[1027]Cuban land mass,
[1029]6. This operation is considered relatively safe and leaves no tangible
[1030]evidence. It can be planned and executed with a minimum of effort and
[1031]expense. :
[1033]Spocial Handling of this payor is requested.
[1034]Access sicila be limited to incividuels ‘requiring
[1035]the inforustion herein. in order to cerry cut their
[1036]official duties.
[1038]eproduction cf this document in whole
[1039]or in part is prohibited exsept with . ¢ _ sases-
[1040]peraission of the issuing office. This document consists of ~-H--- OTS
[1042]Auk b . @ Se Copy #,.-L_-. of --sA- mere
[1047]13-00000
[1051]Operation "HORN SWOGGLE"
[1052]Speration "HORN SWOGGLE!
[1053]Ob jective:
[1055]1, To crash or force down Cuban MIG aircraft with an all weather
[1056]intercept Capability by communications intrusion, ;
[1058]Concept of ‘Operations:
[1060]a _ 2. Closely monitor MIG air/ground communicatio
[1062]of determining frequency and terminology usage for p
[1063]operations. -
[1065]ns forthe purpose
[1066]ractice or real GCI -
[1068]3. By use of overr
[1069]solid weather conditions, -
[1070]Pilot issue instructions: which-tun MIG out of fuel.or-towa
[1071]Puerto Rico, Jamaica, a carrier, ete, ‘
[1073]Ye
[1075]Special Handling of this
[1076]Access shnuld ba lLisitad
[1077]the inforsntion hescin in <:
[1078]offdoini duties.
[1080]eproduction of this docvnent in vhole ’
[1082]or in part is srchibtted excent vith
[1084]permissioa of the issuing offices.
[1086]. . n220se
[1087]{This documont consists of -£---- Ped
[1089]Copy # _f__. of -mS_. copys.
[1091]ut 3
[1093]13-00000
[1095]e
[1097]. Operation TRUE BLUE
[1099]1. Qbjective: To degrade Castro and his government in the eyes of the
[1100](Cuban people by communications intrusion.
[1102]Concept of Operations:
[1104]Z By utilizing high powered transmitters in the vicinity of Cuba
[1105](Florida, Inagwa, Jamaica, aboard Naval ship) which have the capability of
[1106]overriding commercial Cuban radio and TV stations, periodically degrade
[1107]Castro and other government figures in the minds of the Cuban people.
[1109]te
[1111]“aad
[1115]3. The technique of communications. intrusion could be exploited by pre-
[1116]taping or live broadcasts of anti-communist and anti-Castro propaganda at
[1117]. station breaks, Castro speeches, etc. This idea envisions the use of a
[1118]i Cuban refugee to make such broadcasts and naturally would require close
[1119]| monitoring of stations to be worked. Any number of thoughts could be
[1120]injected such as:
[1122]a. "Cuba Si, Russia No."
[1123]b. Communism exploits the masses.
[1124]‘¢. Communism is ruthless totalitarianism.
[1125]d. Castro and henchment feast off the land while we are rationed.
[1126]e. Castro and his reign of terror.
[1127]f. Castro is a lunatic and should be put away.
[1128]g- Castro is the cause of all our troubles.
[1129]h. Rise up against the pig Castro, etc. etc.
[1131]4. If approved this operation could become a continuous project, perhaps
[1132]under control of USIA. .
[1134]Special Kanéling ef this paver is requested.
[1135]&ceess should be limited t>
[1136]the information herein in c:
[1137]official dutios. —
[1139]‘production of this dncument ts Yholg
[1140]rin part is prohibited o: with
[1141]pornission of the issuin.; offise. . this document cousiste of _ fe pages -
[1143]ap “OUT US ae
[1144]hot A Paar
[1147]4,
[1149]13-00000
[1150]THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ;
[1152]WASHINGTON 25,D.c. ~
[1154]2 February 1962
[1156]MEMORANDUM FOR Brigadier General Edward G, Lansdale, USAF,
[1157]Assistant to the Secretary of Defense .
[1159]Subject: Ideas in Support of ‘Project
[1161]The enclosed ideas are submitted for your consideration and
[1162]’ Possible use in furtherance of the objectives’ of the Cuba -
[1163]; Project. T think some of them have promise and should you
[1164]desire our group to develop any of them in more detail, we
[1166]Will do so.
[1167]H. CRAIG
[1169]Brigadier General SA
[1171]DOD Representativ .
[1173]Caribbean Survey Group
[1175]6 encls oS
[1177]1. Operation Smasher(2Pages) (Ts)
[1178]Operation True Blue(1Page) (rs) :
[1179]Operation "Horn Swoggle"(1Page Ts)
[1180]Operation "No Love Bost" (1Page). (7s)
[1181]Possible Actions to Provide, Harrass, or
[1182]disrupt (4Pages)( Ts)
[1184]- Operation Invisible Bomb: (1Page) (1s)
[1186]A UErwn
[1188]EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
[1189]REGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10
[1190]DOES NOT aPPLy
[1192]“SPECIAL THAHBLNG- esate _opi9 |
[1195]13-00000
[1201]Re
[1203]AE
[1207]Opération "NO LOVE LOST"
[1209]l. Objective: ‘To confuse and harrass Castro Cuban Pilots by use of
[1210]radio conversations. = =
[1212]2. Concept of Operations: Fly Cuban refugee pilot in sterile aircraft
[1214]in proximity of Cuba at periodic intervals while communication monitoring
[1215]Cuban air/ground frequencies utilized for airdrome control. Cuban refugee
[1216]pilot in sterile aircraft would personally know many of the pilots still flying
[1217]for Castro. Refugee pilot. would get into argument with Castro pilots over
[1218]radio thus distracting confusing, etc. Would be real trouble for Castro _
[1219]pilots in actual weather conditions. Argument could go, "I'll get you you .
[1220]Red son-of-a~gun, "and call by name if appropriate,
[1222]Spscial Hendling
[1223]Aesess shon.d ba
[1224]the inforuaticn herein in cz
[1225]efficial duties.
[1227]Recrowuct
[1229]This document consists cf - PRRs:
[1233]4
[1235]13-00000
[1237]. tik
[1239]seaakonta
[1241]e
[1243]I. Operation SMASHER.
[1244]1. Objective: Disrupt or disable military and commercial communications |
[1245]facilities in Cuba.
[1247]2. Technical Requirements:
[1249]. a. " Detailed ‘information on both commercial and military communi-
[1250]cations facilities and capabilities, to include inside and outside plant
[1251]construction, system networks, equipment details (i.e. circuitry, tubes, etc.)
[1252]location and type of repeator stations. This information.ia requiredto  _
[1253]construct a refined device. ,
[1255]b. A vacuum tube modified in such a manner as to cause a short
[1256]circuit. This is. possible by inducing silicon carbide (?) into the base of the
[1257]tube. When the tube becomes hot the silicon carbide liquifies and becomes
[1258]a conductor; whem the tube codls the matter returns to a solid non-conductive
[1259]state. Such a device (vacuum tube) is available.
[1261]3. Targets:
[1262]‘a. Cuban Telephone Company. The company provides local and long
[1264]' distance telephone service throughout Cuba and also international telephone
[1266]service.
[1268]b. Radio Corporation of Cuba Avenida Carlos, The company provides
[1269]radiotelephone service to American and European countries. It also provides
[1270]radiotelegraph service and includes leased teleprinter channels. In conjunc-
[1271]tion with AT&T the company inaugurated over-the-horizon microwave radio
[1272]service between Cuba and Florida in 1957. This latter made available two-way
[1273]TV channels.
[1275]c. Cuban American Telephone and Telegraph Company. Founded by
[1276]IT&T and AT&T, providing six (6) submarine cables linking Havana and Key
[1277]West. Facility operates in conjunction with microwave link.
[1279]d. Commercial Radio and Television Stations.
[1281]e. Military Radio and Land-line Facilities. These include point-to~
[1283]. point command and administrative systems, air/ground facilities, navigational
[1285]aids. Obviously certain commercial facilities provide service to the military
[1286]therefore disrupting or disabling commercial facilities will affect military
[1288]communications capabilities. Special Handling of this payer is requested.
[1289]Access should be lizited to individuals requiring
[1291]‘production of this. document in whole the information Lerein in order to carry out their
[1292]r in part is prohibited oxcopt with official duties.
[1293]peruission “of the issuing office.
[1295]"cS. Ht Yt
[1297]this document consists of -7—__
[1298]Ce TEL Copy # -L--. of Ll econ.
[1301]13-00000
[1307]_ 4 Concept of Operation:
[1309]a. The tube must be introduced clandestinely into appropriate
[1310]equipments, .. :
[1312]' b. Introduction can be accomplished through the use of known assets
[1313]either directly or by contact with an employee of a company who would have
[1314]access and who would receive Proper remuneration, .
[1317]13-00000
[1319]AGENCY
[1321]RECORD NUMBER
[1322]‘RECORDS SERIES
[1323]AGENCY FILE NUMBER
[1325]ORIGINATOR
[1327]se. FROM
[1328]TO
[1330]TITLE
[1332]DATE
[1334]Cuba Selected: Documents
[1335]. #2 ;
[1337]oe
[1339]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[1340]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[1342]AGENCY INFORMATION
[1344]Jcs :
[1345]202-10002-10104
[1346]acs FILES 1962
[1347]3360 (7 FEB 62)
[1348]DOCUMENT INFORMATION a
[1349]acs . .
[1350]NORTHWOODS
[1352]197
[1354]PAGES
[1355]SUBJECTS
[1357]DOCUMENT TYPE
[1359]CLASSIFICATION
[1360]RESTRICTIONS
[1361]CURRENT STATUS
[1363]‘TE OF LAST REVIEW
[1365]OPENING CRITERIA -
[1367]COMMENTS
[1369]U. S. MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CURA
[1370]CONTINGENCY PLANNING, CUBA
[1372]OPERATION MONGOOSE :
[1374]UPRISINGS IN CUBA _
[1376]COVERT OPERATIONS, CUBA
[1378]SOVIET BASE IN CUBA
[1380]CARIBBEAN SECURITY
[1382]PATROL POSTS
[1384]INVASION OF CUBA
[1386]JUSTIFICATION FOR-U: 8. MILITARY INTERVENTION
[1388]PAPER,. TEXTUAL DOCUMENT Stes
[1389]UNCLASSIFIED - |
[1391]1c ,
[1392]RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
[1393]10/07/97 .
[1395]: JCS Central Files 1962, Box 29. JCS Record Case, Code |
[1397]Name Northwoods, containing JCS Papers related to Jcs
[1399]recommendation to invade Cuba and pretexts to justify
[1400]US military intervention. : .
[1403]13-00000
[1405]. re
[1406]. - 1
[1407]° COPY WO,
[1408]w'JOS_1969/303 WWCLASSE SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION
[1409]February 1962
[1410]“ROEE BY THE SECRETARIES
[1411]: to the
[1412]JOINE CHIEFS OF sTAye «
[1413]on
[1414]' NorTHWOODS (8)
[1416]A report# on the above: subject is submitted for considera-
[1417]tion by the Joint Chiefs of State.
[1419]FP. J. BIOUIN
[1420]M. J. INGELIDO
[1421]Joint Secretariat
[1423]a :
[1424]* Not reprodin ed; on file in Joint Seoreteriat
[1426]EXCLUDED FROM Gb3
[1428]. CB 1969/303 214k
[1430]WACLASSIFD
[1433]13-00000
[1435]SPECIAL HANDLING
[1437]— | a
[1439]APPENDIX 1 TO ENCLOSURE A
[1440]“DRAFT
[1442]MEMGARSUM FOR BRIGADIER GENERAL E. G, LANSDALE,
[1443]Chief of Operabions, Guba Troject
[1445]" Subject: Cuba Projeot’
[1446]Reference: Memorandum from Your Office for
[1447]Mgpeciat Projést", dated 27 gan 62
[1448]7 As requested in referenced memorandum, the position of.
[1449]’ - the Department of Defense, with respect to the military stake
[1450]ane vole inthe removal of the Commnist regime in Cuba, has
[1451]been Gotormined bazed upon the following factors:
[1452]%. National Security Policy, determined by the SC during
[1453]_ vise outing of G May 2 .
[1454]bd. Current intelligence estimates cf the situation in
[1455]cuba.’
[1456]G. -Sperasions against the Castro regine will be covert,
[1457]at leaxs initially.
[1458]Gd. Time favors the Castro government.
[1459]2. The basis military implications of Castro's Communist
[1461]ave as follows:
[1463]governme:.': :
[1464]a. Zt exposes the Western Headaphere to an increasingly
[1465]serLous threat to its seourd ty. This increases our national
[1466]vulnexability and defense cose as forces are developed.
[1467]or shifted to meet this threat.
[1469]be ‘Tt provides the Soviet Union with the most effective
[1470]pase they have ever hed for spreading Communism throughout
[1471]the Western Hemisphere. This in turn greatly increases the
[1472]possibility that additional Latin American countries will
[1473]come under Communist control. Elimination of this base would
[1474]demonstrate to the other nations of the ‘world that the United
[1475]States will not tolerate such intrusions. Communist
[1477]control of additional countries would or could result in:
[1479]ae : Appendix 1 to
[1481]Enclosure A
[1486]13-00000
[1488]aecsee COU LEIVG WOT UH :
[1490].(1) Increased Communist capability: for WLS it
[1492]*. other nations of the Western Hemisphere.
[1494](2) Increased communist capability for spreading
[1495]Communism throughout Latin America.
[1497](3) The loss of existing and/or potential bases,
[1498]training areas, facilities and rights, as well as sources
[1499]of strategic materials necessary to our military
[1500]capability.
[1502](4) Ao increased threat to US usage and control
[1503]of the Panama Canal through subversion and sabotage..
[1505]3. The urgency of the requirement to remoye the Communist
[1506]government from Cuba is made apparent by Castro's constantly
[1507]Snereasing capabilities. for attacking other nations of the ..
[1508]Western Hemisphere and for spreading Communism throughout the
[1509]hemisphere: This sense of urgency is greatly increased if
[1510]courses of. action within the capability of the Communists
[1511]are considered: .
[1513]a. The Soviets could establish land, sea and/or air
[1515]‘bases in Cuba. °
[1517]‘b. The Soviets could provide Castro with a number of
[1518]ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads; or they could
[1519]"furnish the missiles and maintain joint control of the
[1520]’ ’ nuclear warheads.
[1522]4. In view of the factors set forth above, the Department of
[1523]Defense holds that the Communist regime in Cuba is incompatible
[1524]with the minimum security requirements of the Westero
[1525]Hemisphere, The Department of ‘Defense is prepared to overtly
[1526]support any popular movement inside Cuba to the extent of —
[1527]ousting the Communist regime and installing a government
[1528]acceptable to the United States. iile the possibility of
[1529]Communist Bloc reactions in areas other then in Cuba is
[1530]recognized,’ ge 1s belleved that this can be accomplished without
[1531]precipitating general war, and without serious effect on
[1532]world public opinion if the following conditions prevail:
[1534]| ne
[1537]13-00000
[1539]oa wage). SPEOIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
[1540]CEE DISTRIBUTION
[1542]ro If the impression is created that there is an urgent,
[1543]humanitarian requirement to restore order in Cuba and/or the
[1544]Uritod States is respording to an appeal for assistance fron
[1545]a government - representative of the Cuban people.
[1547]b. Z€ 4 48 announced incident to the overt military
[1548]action that the United States and/or members of the OAS are
[1549]moving into Cuba for the purpose of restoring order and holding:
[1550]free elections, and that they will immediately withdrew as soon?
[1551]as the new governnent atvises that they have the capability
[1553]to maintain order’ without further assistance from the OAS
[1554]nations.
[1556]i ®. if the military operation. is conducted as quickly
[1558]as peasivle and wath sufficient force co that thé Communist
[1560]‘Blos's ability to take effective counter-meaaures in support
[1561]or the Castro regine is reduced to a manimun. ;
[1563]@. or; 4f the Guban regime commits hostile acts against
[1564]VE forces or property. which would serve as an dneident upon
[1565]which to base overt US intervention. In this event, applicable.
[1566]pertione cf a, b, and c above apply. ; :
[1568]5. The Deayartment of Defense ia also prepared to covertly
[1569]provide support to CLA or State, or any US approved popular
[1571]movement inside Cuba, in terms of supplies, transportation,
[1572]personnel and bases.
[1574]ae Shien SAS BES A TLE ALOT PR RES a
[1576]URCLASSI
[1580]i
[1583]i
[1587]3 Appendix 1 to
[1588]. Enclosure A
[1590]SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
[1591]LINTTED DISTRIBUTION
[1595]q
[1598]13-00000
[1600]‘thinned,
[1602]a | rs
[1604]SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION -
[1606]NOTE BY THE SECRETARTES
[1607]aa . : to the
[1608]JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
[1610]on
[1612]A repert* on the above subject is submitted for consider-
[1613]ation by the Joint Chiefs of Starr.
[1615]ey . soni ntasainegy srnintans Bisa
[1616]SBA: 22 4 SEN POOR SILI ES Nitta Te ht MO Om in _ ue
[1618]F. J. BLOVIN
[1619]M.- J. INQELIDO
[1620]Joint Seorstariat
[1624]i
[1626]7
[1628]i .
[1630]a
[1632]. -
[1634]4
[1636]k
[1638]i
[1642]Not reproduced herewith; on file in Joint Secretariat
[1644]EXCLUDED Fo ops
[1645]e EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
[1646]. REGRADING; DOD DIRECTIVE -
[1647]5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY
[1649]SE
[1651]i
[1653]13-00000
[1655]THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
[1656]WASHINGTON 85, OG,
[1658]. Sudject: Justification for US Military Intervention
[1659]. . “in Cuba (38) Ao oe
[1661]* 1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the attached
[1662]Memorandum for the Chief ‘of Operations, Cuba Project, which
[1663]’ responds to a\request of that office for brief but precise
[1664]description of pretexts which would provide. Justification
[1665]' for US military intervention in Cuba.
[1667]_ 2. @he Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the ;
[1668]proposed memorandum be forwarded as a preliminary submission
[1669]suitable for planning purposes. It is assumed that there
[1670]will be similer submissions from other agencies and that
[1671]these inputs will be used as a basis for developing a
[1672]time-~phased plan. Individual projects can then be
[1673]considered on a case-by-case basis.
[1675]3. Further, it is assumed that a Bingle agency will be
[1676]given the primary responsibility for developing military
[1677]_. and para-military aspects of the basic plan, It is
[1678]. recommended that this responsibility. for both overt and
[1679]“ +govert military operations be assigned the Joint Chiefs of
[1681]For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
[1683]eps Re
[1685]L. Lb, LEMNITZER,
[1686]Chairman .
[1687]‘Joint’ Chiefs of st
[1689]1-Enclosure 0
[1690]Memo for Chief of operations, Cuba Project: EXCLUDED. FROM GDS
[1692]EXCLUDED FROM ANTOMATIC
[1693]RECRADLEG: DOD DIR 5200. 10
[1694]: DOES HOT APPLY
[1696]a
[1698]eof .
[1700]ose rcataapbaen tes Sane Ne ena SBR A Be
[1702]13-00000
[1704]takes cto
[1706]” . mundst goverament increases the probability that one or
[1708]| papsthie for tha Sino-Soviet Dies to establish mil
[1710]_ defense. costs as forces were developed or shifted to meet
[1711]the threat. - :
[1713]"they are provided with the opportunity to continue wv
[1715]MEMORANDUM FOR THR SRCHRTARY or DEFENBE -
[1716]Subseoti Guba
[1718], - . ‘ i
[1719]1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe’ that
[1721]problem sust be solved in the near future.
[1723]Bee ho prospect of early success in over
[1725]commnist- regime either es a re!
[1727]or extsrnal‘political, economic or
[1729]Accordingly believe that military:
[1732]United States will bé required to overthrow the Present
[1733]communist regime. .
[1735]2. ‘The United States cannot tolerate permment existence ~
[1736]of a communist goverment in the Western Hemisphere.
[1737]prasent regims in Cuba provides comauniam with a base of
[1738]operations for 6: ogpionags sabotage and subversion against
[1739]Latin America. ‘he stability of some governments in Latin
[1740]America is already threatened by the overt and covert aotions
[1741]of the Cuban government. Continued existence of this com -
[1743]more other nations in Latin America will become commmist
[1744]or commmnist dominated. ‘his will greatly increase the
[1745]problems currently facing the United States and the
[1747]tion of Amrican States. While considered bnlikely, it is
[1749]bases: in. Cuba cimilar to US installations around the too,
[1750]periphery. Zatablishment of such bases would increase US
[1752]3. Timo favors the Cuban regime ami the coumuniet | bloc.
[1754]their subversive efforts in Latin Amrica. Increas: seine
[1755]internal security measures by ‘police state methods decrease
[1757]EXCLUDED 7 FRow
[1758]|. au
[1762]13-00000
[1764]the possibiitty of internal uprisings within Cuba. ‘The
[1765]oteady: improvement in military defenses strengthens the. -
[1766]resistance vhich must be overcome in the event of US
[1767]military intervention an and could lengthen the time required
[1768]to secure control of the government anil the island. ‘The
[1769]contimuing indoctrination of the Cuban youth créates a
[1770]growing moleus for a communist underground after the
[1771]elimination of the present government. This creates a
[1772]problem for the future whion is } steadily increasing in.
[1776]magnitude."s_
[1777]- &, tha Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the United
[1778]States can undertake mili intervention in Cuba without
[1780]risk of gonsral var. ‘They also believe that the intervention
[1781]oan'be accomplished rapifily encugh ‘to minimize communist
[1782]opportunities for solicitation of UN action. Forces
[1783]available would assure rapid essential military control of
[1784]Cuba. Continued police action would be requized. :
[1786], 5. In view of the increasing military and subversive ;
[1787]_- threat to the United States and. the natidns of the Western
[1789]Hemisphere by communist regime in Cuba, the Joint
[1790]Chiefs of Staff ree that a national policy of early
[1791]mili tion in Cuba
[1794]States. They also recommend that such intervention ba
[1795]undertaken as goon as posaibie a and Lata ares ly, before the
[1796]release of National Guard and Reserve. forces presently
[1797]on active ‘duty. “ mae
[1798]. Por tha Joint Chiefs of Staff:
[1800]Doe
[1802]L. L. LEMNITZER
[1803]. . Chairman
[1804]~ Joint Chiefs of Staff
[1806]ET De, EON tin SORE ANAS LLL NIA OAD GAN ARID Bt NN SON EI LE Lael eng A
[1809]13-00000
[1811]“7 SES eee = Vn RULE TOE SEN
[1813]HLS)
[1815]REPORT BY THE DEPARTMENT OP DEFENSE AND
[1816]JOINT CHIEFS OF STARF URVEY GROSS ON THE
[1817]CARIBBEAN SURVEY GROUP
[1819]to the
[1820]JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
[1821]on
[1822]CUBA PROJECT (Tg)
[1824]The Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, has requested
[1825]that he be furnished the views of the Joint Chiefs of Stafr
[1826]on this matter by 13 Merch 1962,
[1830]RU LOSERTEB KES. By
[1832]excUDED FROM cps
[1834]a
[1836]os PRR nay
[1837]5
[1838]'
[1841]13-00000
[1843]: -_—we vEUnet: “2 OFLU
[1845]| TST)
[1847]. JUSTIFICATION FOR US MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA (18)
[1849]PNA DE
[1851]1. as requested” py chief of operations, Cuba Project;:‘4
[1852]Joint Chiefs of Staff are to indicate brief but precise
[1853]description of pretextywhich they consider would provid:
[1854]justification for Us military intervention 1n Cuba.
[1856]_ PACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM
[1858]2. It is ‘reoognized that any action which becomes pretext
[1860]for US military intervention in Cuba will lead to a political
[1862]decision whioh then would lead to military action.
[1864]3. Cognizande has been taken of a suggested scourge of
[1865]actiun proposed** by the US Navy relating ‘to generated
[1866]instances in’ the Guantanamo area.
[1868]ores gna hath ELE OR TILE AE sab
[1870]_ 4, Fox additional facts see Enclosure B.
[1872]DISCUSSION .
[1873].5. The suggested coursegof action appended to Enolosure A
[1874]are based on the premise that US military intervention will
[1875]¥ result from a period of heightened US-Cuban tensions which
[1876]t place the United States {n the position of suffering justit- eee
[1877]HI table “grievances. World opinion, and the United Nations
[1878]forum should be favorably,affected by developing the inter-
[1879]national image of the Cuban government as fash end irresponsible,
[1880]and as en alarming and unpredictable threat to the peace of
[1881]the Western Hemisphere. ;
[1883]6. While the foregoing premise oan be utilized at the
[1884]present time it will continue to hold good only as long as
[1886]there can be reasonable certainty that US military intervention
[1887]din Cuba would not directly involve the Soviet Union.
[1889]There is
[1891]* Memorandum for General Craig from Chief of goerations,’
[1892]Cuba Project,"‘subject: "Operation MONGOOSE", dated
[1894]5 March 1962, one file in General Craig's office.
[1895]“* Memorandumcfor the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, from
[1896]. Chief of Naval Operations, subject: "Inatances to
[1897]Provoke Military Actions in Cuba (TS)", dated 8 March 1962,
[1898]” on file in General Graig's office.
[1900]UNCLASSIFIED
[1902]BPS SeR ASRS AV rE
[1905]13-00000
[1907]eek ot Le SY RENE EE
[1909]* “ ¥! i puma,
[1910]sophie, Sat set tet SRE A NARLRLE NOLEN NTL LAOS:
[1912]SEER ET SPECT TANG NO EAR Ne
[1914]AUTUKN
[1915]as yet no bilateral mutual support agreement binding the USSR
[1916]to the defense of Cuba, Cuba has not yet become a member of the
[1917]vereaw Pact, nor have the Soviets established Soviet bases
[1918]in Cuba in the pattern of US bases in Western Burope. Therefore,
[1919]since time appears to be an important factor in resolution of
[1920]the Cuba problem, all projects are suggested within the time
[1921]frame of the next few months. :
[1923]oa CONCLUSION
[1924]---%, The suggested courses of action appended to Enclosure A
[1925]satisfactorily respond to the statement of the problem. However,
[1926]these suggestions-should be forwarded as a preliminary submission
[1927]suitable for planning purposes, and together with similar inputs
[1928]from other agencies, provide a basis for development of a single,
[1929]integrated ,- time~phased plan to focus all efforts on the
[1931]objective of justification for US military intervention in Cuba.
[1933]RECOMMENDATIONS
[1934]8. It is recommended that:
[1935]“+ a, Bnelosure A together with ite attachments should be
[1936]forwarded to the Secretary of Defense for approval and
[1937]transmittal to the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project...
[1939]_juwee-by This paper NOT be forwarded to commanders of unified
[1941]or specified commands.
[1943]ec. This paper NOT be forwarded to US gfficers assigned
[1944]to NATO activities.
[1946]a. This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, US
[1947]Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee.
[1949]“Wass
[1951]13-00000
[1953]some wees
[1955]anaes 10 seen na Imus)
[1957]PRETEXTS TO JUSTIFY US
[1959](Note: ‘The courses of action which follow are a preliminary
[1960]submission suitable only for planning purposes. ‘They are’
[1961]arranged néither chronologically nor in ascending order.
[1965]Together with similar inputs from other agencies, they are ‘
[1966]intended to provide a point of departure for the development M
[1967]of a single, integrated, time-phased plen, Suoh a plan would i
[1968]permit the evaluation of individual projeots within the context :
[1969]of oumlative, correlated actions designed to lead inexorably i
[1970]to the objective of adequate justification for US military 4
[1971]_ intervention in Guba). H
[1972]+ Since 1t would seem desirable to use legitimate i
[1974]provocation: as the basis for US military intervention in Cuba
[1976]a cover and deception plan, to include requisite preliminary
[1978]actions such as has been developed in response to Task 33 oc,
[1980]could be executed as an initial effort to provoke Cuban
[1982]reactions. Harassment plus deceptive actions to convince the
[1984]Cubans of imminent ‘invasion would be emphasized. Our military
[1985]posture throughout exeoution of the plan will allow a rapid |...
[1986]change from exercise té intervention if Cuban response justifies.
[1988]2.'A series of well coordinated incidents will be planned E
[1989]to take place in and around Guantanano ‘td give genuine
[1990]: . y
[1991]appearance of being done by hostile Cuban forces. a
[1993]+ Inoidents to establish a credible attack (not an
[1994]chronological order): ;
[1995](1) Start rumors (many). Use clandestine radio. £
[1997]3
[1999]'(2);1and friendly Cubans 4n uniform “over«the-fence"
[2000]to stage attack on base.
[2002](3) Capture Cuban (friendly) saboteurs inside the J # ‘
[2003]base. é
[2004](4) Start ricts near the base main gate (friendly :
[2005]Cubans). : , ; i
[2008]Annex to Appendix
[2009]7 to Enolosure A
[2011]“et SO
[2013]FAP--SEPAETcproLal. wasnisin marana
[2015]core
[2018]13-00000
[2022](5) Blow up ammnition inside the base; start fires.
[2023](6) Burn airoraft on air base (sabotage).
[2024](7) Lob mortar shells from outside of base into base.
[2026]Some “damage to installations.
[2028] (B) Capture assault teams approaching from the sea
[2029]or ‘vicinity of Guantanamo City.
[2030](9) Capture militia group which storms the base.
[2031](10) Sabotage ship in harbor; large fires -- napthalene.
[2032](11) Sink ship near harbor entrance. Conduct funerals
[2034]for mook-viotima (may be 1ieu of (20)). ,
[2036]b. United States would respond by executing offensive
[2037]operations to secure water and power supplies, destroying
[2038]artillery and mortar emplacements which ‘threaten the base.
[2040]0. Commence large scale United States military operations.
[2041]3. A “Remeniber the Maine" incident could be arranged in ©
[2043]several forms:
[2045]a. We could blow. up a US ship in Guantanamo Bay and
[2046]blame Cuba.
[2048]b. We-could blow up a drone (unmanned) vessel anywhere
[2050]in the Cuban waters. .We could arrange to cause syoh inoident- cee
[2052]in the vioinity of Havana or Santiago as a spectacular result
[2053]of ‘Cuban attack from the air or sea, or both. The presence
[2054]of Cuban planes ‘or ships merely invedfigating the intent of
[2055]the vessel could be fairly compelling evidence that the ship
[2056]was taken; ynder attack. ‘he nearness to Havana or Santiago
[2057]would add | credibility especially to those people that might
[2058]have heard the blast or have seen the fire. The US could
[2060]follow up with an air/sea rescue operation covered by US
[2061]fighters to “evacuate” remaining members of the non-existent
[2062]orew. Casualty liste in Us newspapers would cause a helpful
[2063]wave of national indignation,
[2064]4, we could develop a Commmist Cuban terror campaign in
[2066]the Miami area, in other Florida oities and even in Washington.
[2068]OLAS
[2070]Annex to Appendix
[2072]8 to Enolosure A
[2074]oe NADAS
[2076]tine ee
[2078]wegnaitre gene Coast fo ott
[2080]stent Vente
[2083]13-00000
[2085]The terror campaign could be wl ii BD see seeking
[2086]haven in the United States. We could sink a@ boatload of Cubans
[2087]enroute to Florida.(real or simulated). We could foster attempts "
[2089]on lives of Cuban refugees in the United States even to the
[2090]extent of wounding in instances to be widely publicized.
[2092]Exploding a few plastic bombs in carefully chosen spots, the
[2093]errest of Cuben agents and the release of prepared documents _ :
[2095]substantiating Cuban involvement also would be helpful in
[2096]projecting the idea of an irresponsible ‘goverment.
[2097]5. A "Quban-based, Castro-supported" filibuster could be
[2098]siminted against a neighboring Caribbean nation (in the vein
[2099]of the Mth of June invasion of the Dominican Republic), we
[2100]imow that Castro ip backing subversive efforts olandestinely*
[2102]against Halt4, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Nicaragua at
[2104]present and possible others. Thase efforts oan be magnified and
[2105]additional ones contrived for exposure. For example, advantage
[2106]can be taken of the sensitivity of the Dominican Air Force to
[2107]intrusions within thelr national air space, “Cuban” B-26 or
[2108]c-46 type atroraft could make cane-burning raids at.night, —
[2109]Soviet Bloo inowndiaries could be found. This svi Be Soupled |
[2110]with "Cuban" messages to the Communist underground in the
[2111]Dominican Republic and “Cuban" ahtpments ° of arms which would
[2112]be found, or intercepted, on the beach,'””
[2113]6. Use of MIG type aircraft by US pilots could provide
[2114]additional” ‘Provocation. Harasement of oivi2 air, attacks on .
[2115]_burface shipping and destruction of US military drone aircraft:
[2116]by MIG type planes would be useful as complementary actions. .
[2117]An P-86 properly painted would convince air passengers that they
[2118]saw a Cuban MIG, especially if the pilot of the transport were
[2119]to announce such fact. The primary drawback to this suggestion
[2120]appears to be the security risk inherent in obtaining or modify- .
[2121]ing an aircraft. However, reasonable copies of the MIG could ,
[2123]be produced from US resources in about three months,
[2125]Annex to Appendix :
[2126]9 . to Enclosure A §
[2128]UHGLESSHD
[2130]DNWWOLODET .anravas ween. ----
[2133]13-00000
[2134]soonest Rbit./ “NUOTONT
[2136]- '$-
[2138]7. Hijacking attempts against olvil Sir art surface oraft
[2139]should appeax to continue as harassing measures condoned by the
[2140]government of Cuba. Concurrently, genuine defections of Cuban
[2141]civil and military air and surface craft should be encouraged. _
[2143]8. It 4s possible to create an incident which will demonstrate
[2144]convinoingly that a Cuban airoraft haa attacked and shot dow
[2145]a chartered oivii airliner enroute from the United States to :
[2146]Jamaica, Guatemala, Panama or Venesuela. The destination would
[2147]ve ohosen only to cause the flight plan route to cross Guba,
[2149]The passengers could be a group of college students off on a
[2150]holiday or any grouping of persona with a common interest to
[2151]support chartering a non-soheduled flight.
[2152]"a. an afroraft at Rglin AFB would be painted and -
[2153]. numberelas an exact duplicate for a civil registered
[2154]airoraft belonging to a OIA proprietary organization in the
[2156]Miami area. At a designated time the duplicate would be
[2158]substituted for the actual olvi) alroreft and would be
[2160]loaded with the seleoted passengers, all boarded under
[2161]carefully prepared aliases, The actual registered
[2163]airoraft would be converted to a.drones "© © ~”
[2165]« Take off times of the drone airoraft and the actual
[2166]airoraft will be scheduled to allow a Foniezvous south of
[2167]Plorida. From the rendezvous point "the passenger-oarrying
[2168]advoraft will descend to minimum altdtude and go directly
[2169]into an ‘auxiliary £4014 at Eglin AFB where arrangements will
[2170]have been made to evacuate the passengers and return the
[2172]. aircraft to its original status, The drone airoraft
[2173]meanwhile will oontinue to fly the filed flight plan. When
[2174]over Guba. the drone will being transmitting on the inter-
[2176]. National distress frequency a "MAY DAY" message stating he
[2177]is under attack by Guban MIG aircraft. ‘The transmission
[2178]Will ‘be interrupted by destruction of the airoraft which will
[2179]be triggered by radio signal, ‘This will allow ICAO radio
[2181]tee Shag eA,
[2183]a nota Annex to Appendix
[2185]ULES ~~
[2187]FFP ABAD Eke DR EDilehd AR Ae ss 00m etc cce
[2190]13-00000
[2192]stations in the Western
[2195], Ne
[2197]11 the US what
[2199]has happened to the airoraft instead of the US trying to
[2201]"sell" the inoident. .
[2203]9. It ie poasible to oreate an inoident which will make 4t
[2204]appear that Communist Cuban MiGs have destroyed a USAF airoraft
[2205]over international waters in an unprovoked attack.
[2207]a. Approximately 4 or 5 F-101 aircraft: will be dispatched
[2208]in trail from Homestead AFB, Florida, to the vicinity of Cuba.
[2209]Their mission will be to reverse course and simulate fakir .
[2210]airoraft for an air defense exarcise in southern Florida, ‘ ‘
[2211]These aircraft would conduct variations of these flights at 2
[2212]frequent intervals. Grews would be briefed to remain at :
[2213]least 12 miles off the Cuban coast; however, they would be
[2214]required to carry Live ammunition ‘in the event that hostile
[2215]actions were taken by the Cuban MiGs.
[2217]b, On one such flight, a pre-briefed pilot would fly
[2219]tail-end Charley at considerable interval between airoraft.
[2220]While near tha Guban Island this pilot would broadcast that
[2222]he had been jumped by MIds and was going down. No other $
[2223]calls would be made; The pilot would then fly directly . i -
[2224]west at extremely low altitude and lafid at a secure base, an — i
[2225]Eglin auxiliary. ‘he atroraft would be met by the proper H
[2227]people, quickly stored and -given a rev tail number. The Le
[2228]Piliot who had performed the mission under an alias, would
[2229]resume bis proper identity and return to his normal Place
[2231]of business. ‘The pilot and aircraft would then have
[2232]disappeared.
[2234]EPPO RO WE Tee eet
[2236]a. At precisely the same time that the aircraft was
[2237]presumably shot down a submarine or small surface craft
[2239]would disburse F-12101 parts, parachute, etc., at approximately
[2240]25 to 20 miles off the OGuban coast and depart. The pilots
[2241]returning to Homestead would have a true story as far as
[2243]LTE AAAEREE LS.
[2247]they knew. Search ships and aireraft could be dispatched
[2248]and parts of atroraft found.
[2252]Annex Som Appendix
[2254]an Shae
[2259]13-00000
[2261]mccooren 2 WNCLASSiricz
[2263]PACTS BRARING ON THE PROBLEM
[2265]1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have previously atated*
[2266]that US unilateral military intervention in Cuba can be
[2267]undertaken in the event that the Cuban regime commits hostile
[2268]_aots, against US forces or property which would serve as an
[2269]incident upon’ which to base overt intervention.
[2271]2. The need for positive action in the event that current
[2272]covert efforts to foster an internal Cuban rebellion are
[2273]unsuccessful was indicated** by the Joint Chiefs of staff
[2274]on 7 March 1962, as follows:
[2276]" . . - determination that a credible internal
[2278]revolt is impossible of attainment during the next
[2280]9-10 months will require a decision by the United states
[2282]to develop a Cuban "provocation" as justification for
[2284]" positive US military action." ;
[2286]3. It is understood that the Department of State also is
[2287]preparing suggested courses of action to develop justification
[2288]for US military intervention in Cuba.
[2290]. fen. SC ELE Meee, + vob Miler Ses x
[2291]i ee a tesgnecen e+ cating 44 gtinasGupan ee ENMIPEOUNES IE TPEGINT CHEESE ALICE TLE ON ney
[2292]poboiplemsninn so nBeenitasy oc TON HORN ARTES
[2296]“¥- JOS 19897303 _
[2299]12 : Enclosure B
[2301]INGLISSFED
[2303]13-00000
[2306]Cuba Selected
[2307]_ :
[2309]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[2310]. IDENTIFICATION FORM
[2312]AGENCY INFORMATION
[2314]AGENCY : JCS :
[2315]RECORD NUMBER : 202-10002- -10018
[2317]RECORDS: SERIES : JCS CENTRAL FILE (1963
[2318]AGENCY FILE NUMBER : JCS 2304/189
[2320]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[2322]ORIGINATOR : JCS
[2323]’ FROM : J-5
[2324]: : TO : JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
[2326]TITLE : COURSES OF ACTION RELATED TO CURA (CASE IT)
[2327]DATE : 05/01/63 a
[2328]PAGES : 36 ; .,
[2329]SUBJECTS : POLICY, CUBA ;
[2331]REVOLT IN CUBA
[2333]COVERT OPERATIONS, CUBA
[2334]OPLAN 312
[2336]OPLAN 316
[2338]DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[2339]CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
[2340]_RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL
[2341]CURRENT STATUS : OPEN
[2342]CE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/23/97
[2343]OPENING CRITERIA :
[2345]COMMENTS : JCS Central Files 196
[2347]3, Box 4. Report to Joint Chiefs.
[2348]and Joint Staff disc
[2349]Cuba. .
[2351]ussing courses Of action toward
[2353]13-00000
[2355]Menthe. os
[2357]OMEN
[2362]13-00000
[2364]meets = a
[2365]‘COURSES OF acrid
[2367]4. Fo discussion, ‘se
[2369]Se Segre ce
[2371]EINEM NN! Fe tm nL: te
[2373]¥ Enclosure to JCS 23 176:
[2374]** Attachment to JCS 30/172
[2376]*** Attachment to JCS 2304/1168
[2378]a - . * .
[2379]JCS 2304/2189 -
[2380](Rev: 5/13/63)
[2383]13-00000
[2385]i
[2387]s
[2389]Ez
[2390]4
[2392]i
[2393]a
[2395]c Ind ; the viene: of me Joint —
[2396]chiefs , of Starr should be forwarded.
[2397]Committee ) for conaideratig
[2399]a:
[2400]* * Enclosuire’ to Jcs 1969/27
[2402]“EERO NSE NY ith nicl Rte Neuere
[2405]13-00000
[2409]Herntent
[2411]RET an 3
[2414]13-00000
[2420]13-00000
[2422]| Semis IN) FPP HOR
[2424]‘ - "| APPENDIX .
[2426]DISCUSSION
[2428]INTRODUCTION
[2429]1. Purnose. This report is in response to a request from
[2430]‘the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Start, to consider the desira-
[2431]bility ana requirements of a fomented revolt in Cuba. It
[2432]includes an examination of engineering an incident or a series
[2433]of incidents asa cause for invasion and consideration of
[2434]Pertinent comments received from CINCLANT, ©
[2435]+ Summary, Study of the desirability and the requirements
[2436]of a fomented revolt in Cuba and of the advantages of
[2437]enginepring an incident or a series of incidents rather than
[2438]trying to generate and coordinate action from inside involving
[2439]many Cubans of doubtful Teliability leads to the conclusions
[2440]that:
[2441]- It is unlikely that en effective Spontaneous revolt
[2442]will occur in the near future.
[2443]b. Any uprising without US overt. support is likely to
[2444]be short-lived because of the improved Cuban/Soviet -
[2445]military capabilities presently in Cuba and Castro's.
[2446]increasingly efficient internal security’ operations.
[2447]c. There appears to be little likelihood that the Castro
[2448]communist regime will risk a.direct provocation that
[2449]could be used as a pretext for US interverition.
[2450]- Unless the United States intervenes: militarily, the
[2451]Castro government will become more firmly entrenched and its
[2452]efforts and ability to spread international commnian will
[2453]increase.
[2454]+ The United States. should intervene. militarily in
[2455]Cuba and could (a) engineer provocative incidents ostensibly
[2459]y
[2460]3
[2461]2
[2462]3
[2463]3
[2464]‘3
[2467]semen, MIND
[2469](Rev. 5/13/63)
[2471]13-00000
[2473]Vee
[2475]perpetrated by the Castro regime to serve as the cause of
[2476]{nvasion or (b) foment a. revolt within Cuba which would
[2478]' eall for us military intervention,
[2480]: f. Engineered provocation Would provide greater ‘advantages
[2481]in control, timing, simplicity, and security than would a
[2482]fomented revolt. It would be most aarriciit to generate a
[2483]widespread effective revolt. However, the staging of @ local
[2485], uprising 48 a contrived incident ‘should not be precluded.
[2487]&. The United States should:
[2489](1) Initiate a Coordinated program to créate a pre-
[2490]text for US military intervention in cuba.
[2492](2) Im support of the above, undertake a flexibly
[2493]phased effort to build Cuban resistance potential, com-
[2494]menaing with the: intenstfication oe? intelligence collec-
[2495]tion and sabotage in Cuba, and the creation of a frame-
[2496]Work for guerrilla activity,
[2498](3) At a propitious time, launch appropriate military
[2499]action to remove the Castro communigt- government.
[2501]h. Implementation of the above would invoive many
[2502]agencies of the United States Government. It would appear
[2503]necessary that one governmental organization should. be
[2504]Given the primary responsibility for developing Buch a
[2505]national plan. The Joint Chiefs of ‘starr should participate
[2506]in the development of this national plan. :
[2508]i. The broad concepts herein and the views of the Joint
[2509]Chiefs of Staff should be forwarded to the Special Group
[2510](5412 Committee) for consideration under the provisions of
[2513], J. CINCLANT's concept for fomenting a revolt in Cuba
[2514]while containing much’ merit, should be re-examined both ©
[2515]for its timing and for the large-scale guerrilla activity
[2517]it envisages,
[2519]—SOR_SReRBT —SENSETEyE “2 Appendix
[2520]TOR-GRCREY —SENGTTEVE
[2522]Sy CAND
[2525]13-00000
[2527]. . . A Nes eee wo AWA
[2528]. . Ea .
[2530]“ease LAGI
[2532], b. Conduct physical and psychological military harassment oo
[2533]of the Cuban regime and covert and clandestine operations as
[2534]directed. ,
[2536]c. Undertake military action in Cuba in accordance with
[2537]contingency plans approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and.
[2538]directed by the President. The primary purpose of the US
[2539]military intervention would be to assure the overthrow of :
[2540]the Castro communist government and to assist in the establish.) § ,
[2542]’ ment of a new, non-communist government ‘acceptable to the
[2543]United states, .
[2544]+ The implementation of any of the suggested courses of
[2545]action. in this study would involve many agencies of the United
[2547]States Government. It would appear necessary, therefore, that
[2549]one single governmental. organization be given the primary
[2551]responsibility for developing a national plan.
[2552]21.. Beoause of the extensive military operations involved,
[2554]the Joint Chiefs of Staff should participate in the development
[2556]of this national plan. In addition, for a contrived revoit,
[2558]they should be assigned the specific résponsibility for develop-
[2559]ing the military and paramilitary aspects of the plan. This
[2560]would require the Joint Chiefs of Staff to seek a determination
[2561]under NSAM 57 when a revolt contrived by-the United States were ©
[2562]an operation large enough to warrant control of covert forces
[2564]by the Department of Defense and that CINCLANT be designated as
[2566]the DOD agent. In this connection, CINCLANT has developed a
[2568]specific concept for political and military action in Cuba,
[2570]CINCLANT CONCEPT
[2571]"22. The .CINCLANT concept provides for inciting a revolt in
[2572]; Cuba, fol owed by overt, large-scale US military operations.
[2573]The proposed timing of operations permits completion in 15-18
[2574].- months. Supporting operationa by CIA, State, and USIA wil
[2575]be required.
[2577]— sen secret a 2 12 LPCLASSIED Appendix
[2579]13-00000
[2581]23. Preliminary operations require the introduction by CIA
[2582]as soon ag practicable of assets into Cuba for the development
[2583]of Antelligence, ‘the organization by State of a Free Cuban
[2584]Government (FCG), the development of a propaganda plan by USIA, and
[2585]the devdlopment of a suitable cover plan. :
[2586]24. Actual operations would commence with the execution by
[2587]“ GINCLART of OPLAN 380-63 about 15 January 196%. This plan calls
[2588]for infiltrating of UW forces into Cuba for area assessment,
[2589]establishing guerrilia bases, developing military units,
[2590]establishing escape and evasion nets and conducting subversion. °
[2591]On about 15 June 1964, UW forces would be augmented and would
[2592]accelerate. subversive operations to create conditions favorable
[2593]for establishing a Free Cuban Government on Cuban soil and for
[2594]employment of conventional forces.
[2595]25. CINCLANT then proposed that on about 15 July mobilization
[2596]of forces for US conventional operations would begin. Execution of -
[2597]\CINCLANT, OPLAN 312 would commence on 26 July 1964 followed by
[2599]DeLay OPLAN’ 316, about 3 Auguot 19€4.-
[2600]26. Although the foregoing schedule is approximate, it should
[2602]be noted that the Free Cuban Government would be required to
[2603]exist at least for 18 days in the face of the Castro government's
[2604]/ excellent counterguerrilla ability. this time requirement appears
[2605]to be excessive, but it could be shortened. The criteria for
[2606]United States recognition of a new government could be met in
[2607]this period. The Free Cuban Government could claim it:
[2608], a. ‘Was in actual possession of the governmental machinery.
[2609]b. Mas administering it with general acceptance by the
[2610]popula‘tion; and,
[2612]Zante aR TEER REIR NN IRR NS ESIA 66 LOH rs NETIC NED Atte
[2614]¢. Was prepared to honor international obligations:
[2616]SSRN eS. 8 OSDIR
[2618](Rev. 5/12/83
[2620]13-00000
[2622]27. The ww forces required for CINCLANT OPLAN 380-63 are
[2623]approximately:
[2625](1) Headquarters, Joint - 6 Off 42 EM
[2626]Unconventional Warfare Task -
[2627]Forse, Atlantic’ (JUWIFA)
[2629]Se ce In te one
[2631](2) UW Operating Base - 36 ore 482 EM
[2632](3) Support Units - 15 off 331 —M
[2633](4) Special Forces an 1 Group Headquarter
[2634]2 Companies (reir.
[2636]. (5) Submarines . - 2
[2637](6) APD - 2
[2638](7) SEAL Teams . -~ ° a
[2639](8) Air Commandos - - 150 Personnel
[2640]. 20 Alreraft
[2641]. , Air Control Teams
[2642](9) CIA Forces - Internal and External
[2643]assets as required by
[2644]+ CINCLART.
[2646]28. CINCLANT does not have UW forces assigned at this time,
[2648], however, a nucleus JUWIFA staff is included within the CINCLANT
[2649]staff and has the capability for preparing UW plans for normal
[2650]contingencies. Planning or conducting UW operations of the
[2651]magnitude envisaged in CINCLANT's concept in this plan is beyond
[2652]current capabilities. :
[2654]29. At an appropriate time in preliminary operations the
[2656]- activation of the JUWIFA as a separate organization and the
[2657]assignment to it of full wartime headquarters couplement of
[2659]“48 officers, 56 enlisted men, and five civilians would be
[2660]required. Approval of any concept in principle or for
[2662]Planning purposes, however, would not necessitate the
[2664]13-00000
[2666]activation of a separate headquarters. in this case, OINCLANT
[2667]would re-evaluate his staff capabilities and submit appropriate
[2668]" Pecommendations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. ,
[2670]30. CINCLANT in a related outline concept’ recomended, con-~
[2671]cerning the use of Cuban nationals 4n UW ‘operations, that "As
[2672]‘practical, the Military Services should initially fom their
[2673]Cuban nationals into integral, all Cuban units ...". It 4s
[2674]considered that the oreation of a "Cuban Expeditionary Forée" “in
[2675]anticipation of its employment in the execution of OPLAN 316. is
[2676]a risk which cannot be justifed and should not be undertaken.
[2677]There appears to be no reason, however, why Cubans could not be
[2678]formed into small teams for use in UW activities. It is estimated
[2679]that from two to four hundred carefully selected Cubans could be
[2680]used in this role, It would be appropriate for the CIA in a
[2681]supporting role to select and train'the individuals forming them
[2683]into teams of appropriate size to be made available for Joint use
[2684]by CINCLANT or by CIA, as necessary. :
[2686]31. For other details of training Cuban nationals, 3ee
[2689]32. The force levels in CINCLANT OPLANS 312 and 316 are adequate
[2690]to cope with the improved Cuban military capability and the
[2691]presence of Soviet troops on the island. :
[2693]: 4
[2695]33. The experience of the JUWIFA during the Cuban crisis in
[2696]October 1962, indicates that the present military supply system
[2697]in the conus will be unable: immediately to provide equipment and
[2698]supplies an’ the required configuration for projected UW operations
[2699]in Cuba. The Army is currently studying prestockage of UW equip-
[2701]. ment and will submit proposals for approval and financing.
[2703]es
[2705]—2eR-SECREF - ~-SEROEEEVE
[2706](Rev. 5/13/63)
[2709]13-00000 -
[2711], ; aa. Oe .
[2713]; ; | ai
[2715]- - FOPTBROREY - senezeryy ll fy
[2717]3h The conceptual outline submitted by CINCLANT floes not.
[2718]Provide an exact plan in détail ‘for contriving a revolt in
[2720]Ouba. However, his general concept would provide ‘for:
[2722]a aR
[2724]"a. Incremental steps in replacing the present communist
[2725]dominated government of Cuba by infiltration, subversion,
[2726]unconventional warfare, limited conventional actions and
[2727]finally full-scale invasion in that order, if necessary,
[2729]b. The capability of U8 to withdraw ‘at any point. in the
[2730]Process if unfavorable international reactions or pressures
[2731]require it; or if the Cuban people themselves, in a successful
[2732]revolt, overthrow the present regiine and form a government
[2733]favorable to US interests,
[2735]ERS HORE ERNE ick
[2737]c. An ambiguous -atmosphere during the critical phases
[2738]in its development which would not present the Soviets with
[2739]a direct. confrontation of power until events would preclude
[2740]timely action on their Part to prevent our intended result
[2741]in Cuba. ,
[2743]4. Utilization of the OAS Forum ana support without being
[2744]dependent upon OAS approval or disapproval for the necessary
[2748]intermediate steps leading up to OAS recognition of a Cuban
[2749]Government in exile and the final, deci sive military action.
[2751]e. Maximum utilization of the Cuban refugee elements
[2752]in the US for political and military support without |
[2753]depending upon their effectiveness for the ultimate success
[2754]of the plan. ,
[2756]f. No waldeployment of US forees, affecting the over-all
[2757]US military posture, until the final decisive stages of
[2758]the plan are ready for execution, thus Feducing maldeployment
[2759]time. . .
[2761]&. The Most economical use of US resources to accomplish
[2762]the defeat of Castro communism. :
[2764]na A definite time scale of events culminating in the”
[2765]defeat of Castro's communist government and establishing
[2766]the groundwork for the installation of a-government compatible
[2767]with the aims of the OAS and friendly to the US by 1 October
[2768]1964." _
[2770]TOR.SECRRT - -ceustasee Ueld BNSIEIEY
[2773]13-00000
[2775]Cuba Selected Documents
[2777]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[2778]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[2779]AGENCY INFORMATION = 2 sss
[2780]AGENCY : ARMY
[2781]RECORD NUMBER : 198-10004-10011
[2782]RECORDS SERIES : CALIFANO PAPERS
[2783]AGENCY FILE NUMBER : .
[2784]DOCUMENT INFORMATION ,
[2785]‘ ORIGINATOR : ARMY
[2786]. FROM : R. D. ALBRO
[2787]TO : OFFICE, SECRETARY OF THE ARMY ;
[2788]TITLE : TRAINING OF CUBAN REFUGEES IN NICARAGUA
[2789]DATE: 12/11/63
[2791]SUBJECTS : ANTI-CASTRO CUBANS
[2792], ARTIME, MANUEL
[2793]CUBAN BRIGADE
[2794]‘KENNEDY, ROBERT
[2795]CUBAN EXILE TRAINING IN NICARAGUA —
[2796]DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[2797]CLASSIFICATION °: UNCLASSIFIED
[2798]RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL
[2799]CURRENT STATUS : OPEN
[2800]TE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/07/97
[2801]OPENING CRITERIA : - . Lo
[2802]COMMENTS : Califano Papers, Box 6, Folder 10. Memo regarding
[2804]training of Cubans in Nicaragua, recriutment efforts
[2805]of Manuel Artime, meeting between Artime and Robert
[2806]Kennedy, and Cubans in US Army . .
[2809]13-00000
[2811]ge Report #2870006563, 9 63, Subject:
[2812]Séeders visit Nicaragua "eros wart Nicaragua
[2814]ert #2870009363, 31 ect 63, Bubject: _.
[2815](0), from USARMA, Bicaragua
[2819]2. (8) Refaxense tn, Prepared at the request of Your office, advised
[2820]suery by UAANAS Mawigon within the bs Eabassy there, revealed no
[2822]on: thar Peaah, De McEhail,. 0-30613; YEA Ratived, the foe er
[2824]EN eorwny ‘iolved in the’ training of cance”
[2826]Bo
[2827]Duting the the USARMA, Managua called attention
[2828]{genes reports he hed furnished (réferencea 1b, and le above)
[2829]an press cousent on the visit of exiled Cuban refugee
[2830]nuel ARTIME Buesa, Dr. Carlos PRIO Secarras, Dr. Manuel
[2831]iA, De Pla, Dr. Laureano BGTISTA, Dr.
[2832]fo MAB SE » and Roberto RODRIGUEZ to
[2833]August he USARMA's comment on the
[2834]Speculation and runors
[2836]newspaper
[2837]fa conteming this visit was that he “does
[2839]Soy firm information or indicators that orces are
[2841]in Nicaragua. ™
[2843]OWAGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS:
[2844]HT AUTOMATEALLY DEcLaSsiFIER
[2845]BOD DIR szn0.10
[2848]13-00000
[2850]Colonel, @g ;
[2851]. Director of Foreign intelligence
[2853]Ske CHie, Sh 2ivep
[2854]gee iS $s
[2856]* BH 4b]
[2857]RVITE BEC are. ; $
[2858]tc Ela en - POWNGRADED Ariz YEs:: Ntenvs
[2859]WARNE NOTICE . 2 Wor AUTOMATICALLY OECtasSiFIE
[2861]“ .  BOD otR 5200.18
[2864]13-00000
[2866]AGENCY
[2868]RECORD NUMBER :
[2870]RECORDS SERIES
[2871]SENCY FILE NUMBER
[2873]ORIGINATOR :
[2875]FROM
[2876]TO
[2878]TITLE :
[2879]DATE :
[2881]‘ PAGES
[2882]SUBJECTS
[2884]DOCUMENT TYPE :
[2885]CLASSIFICATION :
[2886]RESTRICTIONS
[2887]CURRENT STATUS
[2889]E OF LAST REVIEW
[2890]IFENING CRITERIA
[2891]COMMENTS
[2893]Cuba Selected Documents
[2894]45
[2896]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM.
[2897]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[2899]Jcs
[2900]202-10002-10010
[2901]TAYLOR PAPERS
[2903]Jcs
[2904]EARLE G. WHEELER
[2906]MEETING WITH PRESIDE!
[2908]12/19/63
[2909]3 .
[2911]' AGENCY INFORMATION |
[2913]NT ON CUBA, 1100 HRS, 19 DEC 1963
[2915]POLICY AND PLANNING, CUBA
[2917]OPERATIONS, CUBA
[2919]PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[2921]UNCLASSIFIED
[2922]OPEN IN FULL
[2924]: OPEN
[2926]07/31/97
[2928]Wheeler, Box 193. Memorandum reporting meeting with
[2930]President on Cuba. 1 Document .
[2933]13-00000
[2935]“ACLUDED FROM 1HTOMATIC REGRADING
[2937]+fELIORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
[2939]SUBS
[2941]19 December 1963
[2943]2=CT: Meeting with President.on Cuba, 1100 hra, 19 Dec 1963
[2945]1. ‘The following persons were present at the meeting:
[2947]. White House: ........
[2949]States... ccescecscecs
[2951]« The President
[2953]Mz. McGeorge Bundy
[2955]Mr, Smith
[2956]-Mr. Thompson
[2957]Mr. Ball
[2958]Mr..Johnson ‘
[2959]Mtf.. Martin
[2960]Mr. Crimmins
[2961]x
[2963]Mr. Gilpatric
[2965]Mr. Vance
[2966]General Wheeler
[2967]General Carter
[2968]Mx. FitzGerald
[2969]Mr. Helms
[2971]Treacury:............ Mr. Dillen
[2975]2. My. FitzGerald briefed the Presiden
[2977]_ COvering the following areas:
[2979]Mr. Wilson
[2981]a. Collection of intelligence,
[2983]'b. Propaganda activities.
[2985]¢. Economic denial actions.
[2987]t on Agency operations
[2989]a. Exploitation of Cuban military disaffection.
[2991]e. Sabotage and harrassment activities.
[2993]f. Support of autonomous anti-Castro groups.
[2995]OOM BIR 5200.1. AS" > NOT APPLY
[2997]SENSITIVE
[3000]13-00000
[3002]- 3. a. The President was mést interested in economic denial
[3003]‘actions. Ele was informed that talks would be undextaken in the
[3004]‘unmediate future with representatives of the Canadian and Britich
[3005]governments relative to the supply of spare parts and critical materials |
[3006]by Canadian and British firms to Cuba. It waa stated that Spanish firms —
[3007]ave likewlse active in this area, a8 well as a number of essentially
[3008]ly sby-night firms located in a number of foreign countries. No
[3010]- " :putable Amexican firms are engaged in supplying Cuba and, in fact,
[3012]have bran helsful in preventing their foreign affiliates from engaging
[3014]in this craffic. Apparently, State regards the Canadian, the British
[3016]and the Spanish cfforte as being the real trouble spote. The President _
[3017]directed that State undertake talks, as appropriate, with the governmenta
[3018]vf firma concerned to dissuade them from this practice,
[3020]b. Under questioning, Mr. FitzGerald stated that exploitation
[3021]of Cuban military digaffectiod is a long term. undertaking. While there.
[3022]‘are disaffected Cuban military mén in important poste, they have not,
[3023]to date, made any contacts with cach other nor formed any sort of group,
[3024]iowever, Mr. FitzGerald considers that any succeasful operation to —
[3025]overthrow Castro emanating from within Cuba will have to be supported ©
[3026]by the Cuban military Lf it is to have any real likelihood of success.
[3028]ec. During the discussion on sabotage and harrassment, the
[3029]resident expressed his reluctance to undertake high risk actions at
[3030]this time for two reasons:
[3032]. (1) Current attempts to set OAS agreement to various
[3033]2stions directed against Cuba might be jeopardized; and
[3035](2) The Soviets seem to be watching closely the new
[3036]udministration's policies toward Cube, and it might influence unfavorably
[3037]the success of our efforts to achieve further reductions, in Soviet military
[3039]‘personne}l in Cuba.
[3041]4. Mr, Heims briefed on the significance of the arms cache
[3042]tiscovered in Venezuela. Mr. Martin briefed upon the activities of
[3043]e OAS. survey group now in Venezuela and the results, to dato, of
[3044]tueir survey, He stated that the group apparently had accepted that
[3045]the arms had been introduced for subversive purposes, but that the.
[3046]survey croup was asking of the Venezuclan government further informa-
[3047]tion recarding propaganda activities directed against the Vonezuelan
[3048]government, ctc. He does not expect that the commission will report
[3051]13-00000
[3053]—Z : . . ey ord ere
[3055]eect anette,
[3057]to the GAS prior to 10 January 1964, Inthe meantime, our effort
[3059]is devcted to ascer taining the maxiraurn that the OAS is prepared
[3061]to do as 2 result of the Venezuela affair. They are hopeful that the
[3062]CAS will support an increased surveillance system, He thinks it is
[3063]too easly to expect a complete break in cconomic.and travel relations
[3064]between GAS countries and Cuba.
[3066]_ 3. Phere was come discussion of further actions we might
[3067]take to increase pressures and harrassments at an appropriate time.
[3068]Amony other itemo raentioned were the offect of low level reconnaissance
[3069]flighto from time to tizne and the dboirability of executing auch flights
[3070]at intervals to maintain the viability of our ‘right’ to do so. While the
[3071]President did not express disapprobation, neither did he expresa ‘
[3072]=pproval. In fact, no reat decisions were taken at this mecting which
[3073]must be regarded, I think, as being an important orientation session. * _
[3075]Sigued = Berle G. Wheeler
[3076]EARLS G, WHEBLER
[3077]Gorcral, United States Army
[3078]Chief of Staff _
[3080]OFT To
[3082]airraan, JCS #!
[3084]a cone #5
[3088]cue ZF
[3090]Director Jt Staff (Atta: SACSA) #¢
[3092]Army General Counsel «7
[3094]os da & ot Bina
[3095]EF ota a rete
[3097]. Tote
[3098]OL, oy ae ied - 8
[3101]a]
[3104]13-00000
[3106]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[3107]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[3109]Cuba Selected Documents
[3110]#6
[3112]AGENCY
[3114]RECORD NUMBER
[3116]‘ RECORDS SERIES
[3118]AGENCY FILE NUMBER ;
[3120]AGENCY INFORMATION
[3122]: JCS
[3124]202-10002-10117
[3125]: JCS CENTRAL FILES 1963
[3126]JCSM-77-64
[3128]ORIGINATOR
[3130]TITLE
[3131]DATE
[3132]PAGES
[3133]SUBJECTS
[3135]DOCUMENT TYPE
[3137]CLASSIFICATION
[3139]RESTRICTIONS
[3141]CURRENT STATUS :
[3143]JATE OF LAST REVIEW :
[3145]OPENING CRITERIA :
[3146]COMMENTS
[3148]: A CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR
[3150]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[3152]: JCS
[3153]FROM :
[3154]TO :
[3156]JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
[3157]SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
[3159]01/31/64
[3160]58 . .
[3161]POLICY AND PLANNING, CUBA
[3162]COUP IN CUBA
[3164]CONTINGENCY PLANNING, CUBA
[3166]PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[3168]: UNCLASSIFIED
[3169]: OPEN IN FULL
[3171]OPEN
[3172]10/07/97
[3174]JCS Central Files 1963, Box 4.
[3176]regarding contingency plans in
[3177]Cuba. ;
[3179]A COUP IN CUBA
[3181]Memo for Chairman, JCS
[3183]the event of a coup in
[3186]13-00000
[3188]“Sa on ae
[3190]TALES ster
[3192].MEMOR ANDUM FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF, ATLANTIC
[3194]Subject: A Contingency Plan for a Coup in Cuba (s)
[3196]‘1. Transmitted herewith’ iga conceptual proposal, subject as above,
[3197]which has been developed jointly by the Department of State, the Depart-. .
[3198]ment of Defense, and the Central Intelligence Agency. .
[3200]2. This concept envisions a coup occurring in Cuba which may,
[3202]Supported by the United States, achieve US national objectives by the
[3204]- elimination of the. communist regime and establishment of a. Cuban
[3205]government acceptable to the United States. -
[3207]to support a coup in Cuba
[3208]the attachment hereto.
[3210]For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: .
[3211]y yt.
[3212]WS uopside
[3213]MMJ. INGELIDO
[3215]Brig Gen, USAF .
[3216]Secretary .
[3218]RSD
[3220]’ GROUP 1- . :
[3221]EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC —_
[3222]DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION
[3224]Attachment
[3226]TOP SECRET-SENSPIVE: OP secre PISENSTIVE
[3227]Copy 11 of 22 copies, each of } Page, Series A
[3229]te corty ont
[3230]NEWED
[3231]SYSTERAATICALLY pa 1989 ron
[3234]13-00000
[3236]ete Ne
[3237]‘DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
[3238]" WASHINGTON 28, D.c,
[3240]i oo i i nc f
[3241]Pot
[3243]= eg
[3245]e MEMORANDUM FOR HD :SHARMAN,: JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
[3247]wr SUBJECT: ~ A Contingéucy Plan for a Coup in Cuba: (s)
[3249]Reference:  JESM 809-63, Subject as above, dated October 21,
[3250]1963, To
[3252]#e
[3254]. Enclosed hexsiwith are Shree: copies. of the plan.on the above.
[3256]subject which has bei ppared Jointly ona restricted basis by
[3259]woos representaHves of i its. Of State arid. Defenae in coordina
[3260]i _ Hon wlth ithe: Centraltatetiin Hebey.: The’ which has bi
[3261]a revised to reflect génerally ‘ ewe Of the Joint Ghiefs of Staif
[3263]contained in referencé, ‘provides'a conceptual basis for US response _ tet
[3264]to a Cuban military coup and’has been approved by the Secretaries
[3266]of State:and Défenge:and. tiie Director, Gentral Intelligence Agency as
[3268]a basis.for: appropriate defailed Planting.” Mr. McGeorge Bundy has _
[3269]been advised. of the farégelng and xéquested to,inform the President.
[3271]In accordance with the: recommendations contained in paragraph.
[3273]8c, page 22 of the plan, it is requested that current CINCLANT plans
[3275]' be reyised.as necessary to reflect the. concept of military operations
[3276]described.in the plan and. that you advine.me when this has heen accom.
[3278]4 ‘plished,
[3279]In:abcoxdanceisdthigaiag pane 22.of the plan, .
[3281]! . répresentativea of the Central's telligence Agencyin cogrdination with
[3282]; representatives. of -the- Departments of Mtate: and-Defense will develop a
[3284]plan for the intraduction.of fhe. "Special Team": inta Cuba which will
[3285]. subsequently be circulated for-appropriate action.and further detailed
[3286]\ Planning by agencies concerned, .
[3289]: . °,** Appendix to Enclosure B to ~ - ; Quca
[3290]=... JCS 2304 /205~275 7 Dy Vance
[3292]Secretary\of the Army
[3294]. 7 EWED —
[3295]Pacloeure(5 eye) Byes QN 19-001 1988  — SERISTIVE—
[3297]As Stated CLASSIFICE EXCLUDED FROM AUTGHATIC REGRADING
[3299]Ae nied tore 0357 ULSI “ vm
[3302]13-00000
[3304]Neen eee wee
[3306]RU
[3308]1. Problem. To -provide planning guidance for US response to a coup in
[3310]A CONTINGENCY PLAN. FOR A COUP IN CUBA
[3312]Cuba in’order to assure that US intervention, if undertaken, results in
[3315]a
[3317]replacement of the Communist government with one acceptable to the United
[3318]States: ,
[3320]2. Ass ions,
[3321]a. The leaders of the coup may or may not be aware, Prom previous
[3322]contact with CIA, that if they agree to and appear capable of meeting
[3324]certain specified conditions (see paragraph 2.d. below), their revolt
[3326]will be supported by the US if a US “special team" (see paragraph 3.b.(1)
[3327]j below) confirms that the criteria for support have been adequately met. .
[3328]: Thus, the coup could be triggered in one of two ways: The leaders » in
[3329]| secure radio contact with CIA, implement their plan with US concurrence
[3330]‘ , and establish a Provisional Goverrment in full expectation of forthcoming
[3331]US support barring a complete and immediate crushing of the uprising; or, ©
[3332]less acceptably, the lesders, in the belief that they can meet probable
[3334]criteria for US support, initiate the coup without consulting with or
[3336]j : ; obtaining the concurrence of the US but establish a Provisional Govern-
[3338]| ment, hoping that the US will intervene.
[3340]b. If the US had prior knowledge of the coup, up to forty-eight NUE
[3341]hours would be ‘required after initiation of the action to introduce into
[3343]Cube and receive reports from a "special team" which would obtain in-
[3344]formation to assist in making a decision to support the insurgents; if the
[3346]US did not have prior knowledge, a longer time would be required. -
[3348]SYSTEMATICALLY REVI
[3349]This document contains 22 BY JCS ON _ NOTE 900 a
[3350]pages.
[3352]Copy No. __ of __ copies. . . . CLASSIFICATION CONTINUED
[3354]a > EE
[3356]nee, ase Ceatrol ZZE._O88 ¥ JE. ge
[3359]13-00000
[3361]em,
[3362]r
[3364]cus a - ve _ a WLS |
[3366](1) A pre-arranged call for help from a Provisional Government
[3368]set up by the insurrectionists (preferably to the OAS, although US action.
[3373]would mt await formal OAS approval), or
[3375]AR
[3377](2) A call for help from the insurrectionists after a coup had
[3378]started without prior US concurrence, if the us determined that the in-
[3379]surgents met generally the criteria for support, or
[3381]. (3) Intervention by local Soviet forces.
[3382]: d. A coup should meet the following criteria to be supportable,
[3383]i , recognizing that specific criteria will depend upon the ‘situation exist- ae
[3384]ent at the time: . 7
[3386](1). Have some power base in the Cuban army or militia in order .
[3387]to survive.
[3389](2) Be prepared to establish a Provisional Goverment, ‘however
[3390]rudimentary, with some sort of public claim to political viebility to
[3391]provide an adequate political basis for overt US action (not required if
[3392]Soviet troops were clearly fighting Cuban petricts).
[3394](3) Neutralize the top echelon of Cuban leadership.
[3396](4) Seize. and hold a significant piece of territory, preferably
[3397]including Flavana, long enough to permit the US plausibly to extend support
[3398]and some form of recognition to the Provisional Government .
[3400]e. Policy Considerations. For purposes of this paper, US policy af-
[3402]fecting US support to a revolt in Cuba is summarized below.
[3403](1) The US does not contemplate either a premeditated full scale
[3404]invasion of Cuba (except in the case of Soviet intervention or the re-
[3406]introduction of offensive weapons) or the contrivance of a provocation
[3408]- WRUSORED TOP HORE Fe
[3410]13-00000
[3414]. (2) By the seme token, it is not US policy to encourage un-
[3415]organized and uncoordinated mass uprisings since these would be too
[3416]easily crushed by indigenous Cuban military forces. ‘The likelihood of
[3417]any spontaneous uprising surviving long enough to receive adequate US
[3418]aid is small unless it is s part of, or followed immediately by, a
[3419]Planned and coordinated revolt led by a significant element of ‘the Cuban
[3420]military forces, :
[3422](3) Once a revolt begins, the involvenént, of Soviet forces,
[3423]either tactical formations or troops manning air defense installetions nf
[3424]would result in inmediate implementation of OPLANS 312 and 316. :
[3425]3. Sequence: of Operations. The concept of operations set forth in this
[3426]Paper is based on the following general sequence of events:
[3428], a. Upon receipt of word that the dissident leaders have agreed to
[3430]and appear capable of meeting the criteria for US support, approval
[3431]would be given to commence: the coup at the earliest practicable time.
[3432](In theevent that a coup were initiated without prior US Mnowledge,
[3434]the US would proceed as described below but introduction of the special
[3435]team into Cuba would probably be delayed and tts task of gathering in-
[3436]formation made more difficult. Consequently, it might not be possible
[3438]‘for the US to make a decision to support the coup in time to camit
[3440]forces needed to sustain it.)
[3441]db. Upon receiving word that a coup had been initiated, either on
[3442]& pre-arranged tasis with CIA or as a surprise to the US Government, the
[3443]US would:
[3444]3
[3446]WHLISHED TOP SECRET mm
[3448].
[3451]13-00000
[3453]2 RUS
[3455](1) Introduce into Cuba a "special team" to obtain information:
[3456]which would assist in making a decision to support the insurgents, This
[3458]tean, composed ‘of several persons representing DOD, State, and CIA,- would
[3460]ag meke contact with the coup leaders within twenty-four hours of the start
[3462]Pes (3
[3466]* of the coup if the US had prior knowledge of the plan, probably later if
[3467]not. The report ofthe findings should be received by CIA within twenty-
[3469]5 Ey
[3471]four hours after the team's arrival on the island but this might not be
[3473]possible without prior knowledge of the insurgents’ plans. In any event,
[3474]American
[3476]reliable reports from trained/ observers in Cuba would be of great value
[3478]to making a decision to intervene in order that the US would not commit
[3480]ce oe)
[3482]its prestige to the support of an uprising which might collapse prior to
[3483]the point at which US help has become effective enough to sustain and. .
[3484]i = "expand it. (The special.team, augmented as appropriate - by CINCLANT,
[3485]would remain in Cuba as a liaison element with the Provisional Govern-
[3486]ment if the US intervened and would be directed to report immediately
[3487]to CINCLANT for operational control at the time the decision was made
[3488]to intervene.) - _
[3489](2) Order forces needed to establish an air and sea blockade
[3490]of Cuba to take assigned stations in preparation for implementing the
[3491]blockade ; commence generating and positioning forces required for the
[3492]implementation of CINCLANT OPLANS 312° end 316.
[3493]c. A recommendation to intervene, based on a multiple source in-
[3494]telligence assessment including the special team's report, would be
[3495]. made to the President. This would be the critical. decision because,
[3497]once: made, certain actions would ensue inmedi ately and, henceforth,
[3499]4
[3501]WSR) “TOP SECRET mmm
[3503]13-00000
[3506]Uae
[3508]the US would be committed to the ultimate success of the coup. These ac-
[3510]' tions would include:
[3512](1) The assumption by CINCLANT of command of all military
[3514]and para-military operations in Cuba.
[3515](2) Prompt introduction of small groups of personnel::for the
[3517]purposes of intelligence, reconnaissance, communications and liaison
[3519]‘with the insurgents, and provision of unattributable logistic support
[3521]by eirdrop-or submarine. In the event that the us delayed public an-
[3523]‘“nouncement of the decision to support the coup, this assistance would
[3525]A be provided in such a manner as to minimize public Imowledge of active
[3526]. US involvement in Cuba. ‘
[3527]: (3) When authorized by the President, direct the special team
[3528]: to have the coup leaders proclaim a Provisional Government, if one has :
[3530]| , not already been established, and request US and OAS assistance in order
[3532]to provide justification for a blockade and consultation within the OAS.
[3534]As soon as the request for help is received, the President would announce
[3535]publicly that the US will isolate Cuba by means of an air and sea blockade
[3536]to become effective at (time, date). The justification for this unilateral,
[3537]interim action would be based on Paragraph 3 of Resolution 2 of the Punta
[3538]del Esta meeting of Foreign Ministers until such time as the COAS/0C es-
[3539]tablished a collective basis for the blockade, as well as to insure that
[3540]support for either side is not provided from external sources. Actually,
[3541]the announcement would be designed to immobilize the Cuban Navy and Air
[3543]Force, encourage indigenous support for the insurgents, and reinforce a
[3545]warning to the Soviet Union not to intervene. (See Paragraph J.a. below).
[3548]13-00000
[3552](CLASSIS
[3554](4) Complete positioning of forces for implementation of por-
[3556]tions or all of CINCLANT OPLAKS 312 and 316.
[3558]a. The US would have the option of replying to a formal ¢all for
[3559]help py either publicly announcing immediately ites intention to support
[3560]the Provisional Government and initiating overt military operations, or
[3562]responding by establishing a blockade without admitting other support
[3564]for the coup. In the latter case, the US would, between the time of the
[3566]Presidential announcement of the blockade and public ‘announcement of the
[3568]other forms of support, employ small groups of intelligence and recon-_
[3569]naissance units, thereby providing visible evidence, to, the insurgents
[3571]that support is forthcoming and yet providing a facade of non-téitervention
[3572]while the US consults with its allies to gain their political support.
[3574]At the same time, the US would be generating and positioning forces re-
[3575]_Quired for significant overt military operations. Upon publicly announc-
[3576]ing US intent to support the Provisional Government, the US would initiate
[3577]overt logistical and air support to the insurgents. There is a possibility
[3578]that this level of assistance and demonstrated US intent would be suffi-
[3579]cient to bring down the Castro. regime, if the coup carried with it a
[3580]significant element of the Cuban armed forces. . However, it is probable
[3582]that the US would have to introduce conventional forces incrementally as
[3584]required to sustain the uprising and should be prepared to and would im-
[3586]plement portions or all of CINCLANT OPLANS 312 and 316, as required.
[3587]4, Facts Bearing on the Problem.
[3589]a. The Situation in Cuba. The Government has an excellent surveii-
[3591]lance network, both internally and with respect tothe air and sea
[3593]6"
[3595]INELESSIE] FOP SECRET omen
[3598]13-00000
[3601]13-00000
[3603]» SECRET _SSECIAL HANDLING -MOFORH-
[3605]. ° OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
[3606]WASHINGTON 25, D.C.
[3608]13 MRACHSIOBDGLIECTION TO
[3609]DECLASSIFIGATION AND/OR
[3610]RELEASE GF Clé INFORMATION
[3612]MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF OPERATIONS, CUBA PROMEG#S DOCUMENT
[3614]Subject: Justification for US Military Intervention
[3615]; in Cuba (TS) —
[3617]1. Reference. is made to memorandum from Chief of Opera-
[3618]tions, Cuba Project, for General Craig, subject: "Operation
[3619]MONGOOSE", dated 5 March 1962, which requested brief but
[3620]precise description of pretexts which the Joint Chiefs of
[3621]Staff consider would provide justification for US military
[3622]intervention in Cuba.
[3624]2. The projects listed in the enclosure hereto are for-
[3625]warded: as a preliminary submission suitable for planning
[3626]purposes. It is assumed that there will be similar sub-
[3627]missions from other agencies and that these inputs will be
[3628]used as a basis for developing a time-phased plan. The
[3629]individual projects can. then be considered on a case-by-
[3630]case basis.
[3632]3. This plan, incorporating projects selected from the
[3633]attached suggestions or from other sources, should be
[3634]developed to focus ail efforts on a specific ultimate
[3635]objective which would provide adequate justification for
[3636]US military intervention. Such a plan would enable a
[3637]logical build-up of incidents to be combined with other
[3638]seemingly unrelated events to camouflage the ultimate
[3639]objective and create the necessary impression of Cuban
[3640]rashness and irresponsibility on a large scale, directed
[3641]at other countries as well as the United States. The plan
[3642]would also properly integrate and time phase the courses
[3643]of action to be pursued. The desired resultant from the
[3644]execution of this plan would be to place the United States
[3645]in the apparent position of suffering defensible grievances
[3646]from a rash and irresponsible government of Cuba and to
[3647]develop an international image of a Cuban threat to peace
[3648]in the Western Hemisphere. -
[3650]4, Time is an important factor in resolution of the
[3651]Cuban problem. Therefore, the. plan should be so time-
[3652]phased that projects would be operable within the next few
[3654]months. .
[3655]. ; EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
[3656]REGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10
[3657]DOES NOT APPLY _
[3659]DLING -OFORN-
[3661]BP _SECRET=SPECIAL HAN
[3665]oe - Jap-SECRET-OECIAL HANDLING “HOFORN- |
[3667]5. Inasmuch as the ultimate objective is overt military
[3668]intervention, it is recommeded that primary responsibility
[3669]for developing military and para-military aspects of the
[3670]plan for both overt and covert military operations be as-
[3671]signed the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
[3673]“A L Meg
[3674]4 : : Brig General, USA -
[3676]DOD/JCS Representative
[3677]Caribbean Survey Group
[3679]Enclosure
[3681]Pretexts to Justify
[3682]Military Intervention
[3683]in Cuba
[3685]end
[3687]WF -SECRET-SPEGHHE HANDLING -NOFORN-
[3690]13-00000
[3692]| Ti SPECIAL HANDLING: NOFORN
[3694]MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF OPERATIONS, CUBA PROJECT
[3695]Subject; -Justifieation for US miitary J Intervention
[3696]in Cuba (TS)
[3698]1. Reference is made to memorandum from Chief of Operations,
[3699]Cuba Project, for General craig, subject: "Operation MONGOOSE",
[3700]dated 5 March 1962, which requested brief but precise
[3701]description of pretexts which the Joint Chiefs of staff
[3702]consider would provide justification for US military inter-
[3703]vention in Cuba. .
[3705]2. The projects listed in the enclosure hereto are forwarded
[3706]a8 a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes.
[3708]It is aciumed that there will be similar submissions from
[3709]other agencies and that these inputs will be used-as a basis
[3710]for developing ‘a time-phased plan. The individual projects
[3711]ean then be considered on a case-by-case basis.
[3713]. 3. This plan, incorporating projects selected from the
[3715]attached suggestions, or from other sources, should be
[3716]‘developed to focus all efforts on a specific ultimate,
[3717]objective which would provide adequate justification for
[3719]us military Antervention. Such a plan would enable. a logioal
[3720]build-up of incidents to be combined with other seemingly
[3721]unrelated events to camouflage the ultimate objective and
[3722]oveate the necessary impression of Cuban rashness and
[3723]irresponsibility on a large scale, directed at other
[3724]countries as well-as the United States. ‘The plan would also
[3725]properly integrate and time phase the courses of action to
[3726]be pursued. ‘The desired resultant from the execution of
[3727]this plan would be to place the United States in the spparent
[3728]position of suffering defensible grievanoes from a rash and
[3729]irresponsible government of Cuba and to develop an inter- .
[3731]national image of a Cuban threat to peace in the Western
[3732]Hemisphere.
[3734]13-00000
[3736]TOP. SECRET“ SPECIAL Hf t - 7
[3738]4, Time is an important factor. in resolution’ of the Cuban
[3740]problem, Therefore, the plan should be so taime-phased that
[3741]’ projects would be operable within the next few months.
[3743]5. Inasmuch as the ultimate objective is overt military
[3744]intervention, it is. wecomnended that primary responsibility
[3745]for developing military and paramilitary aspects of the plan
[3747]' for both overt and’ covert military operations be assigned the
[3748]. Joint Chiefs of Steff.
[3750]Enclosure
[3752]Pretexte ¢o: Justify Military Intervention
[3753]- 4n Cuba
[3755]13-00000
[3757]"TOP SECRET SPEGHE =
[3759]PRETEXTS TO JUSTIFY US MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA
[3761](Note: ‘The courses of action which follow are a preliminary
[3762]submission suitable only for planning purposes. They are
[3763]arranged neither chronologically nor in ascending order.
[3764]Together with similar inputs from other agenoles, they are
[3765]intended to provide a point of departure for the development
[3766]of a single, integrated, time-phased plan. Such a plan would
[3767]permit the evaluation of individual projects within the context
[3768]of cumulative, correlated actions designed to lead inexorably
[3770]_ to the objective of adequate justification for US military
[3771]intervention in Cuba).
[3773]1. Since 1t would seem desirable to use legitimate.
[3774]provocation as the basis for Us military intervention in Cuba
[3775]a cover and deception plan, to include requisite preliminary
[3776]actions such as has been developed in response to Task 33 co,
[3777]could be executed as an initial effort to provoke Cuban
[3778]reactions, Harassment plus deceptive actions to convince the
[3780]yo Cubans of imminent invasion would be emphasized. our military
[3781]posture throughout execution of the plan will allow a@ rapid
[3782]change from exercise to intervention if Cuban response justifies.
[3784]2. A series of well coordinated Aneidents will be planned
[3785]‘to take place in and around Guantanamo to give genuine
[3786]appearance of being done by hostile Cuban forces.
[3788]a. Inoldents to establish a credible attack (not in
[3790]chronological order) :. ,
[3792](1) Staxt rumors (many), Use clandestine radio.
[3794](2) Land friendly Cubans in uniform “over-the-fence"
[3795]to stage attack on base.
[3797](3) Capture Cuban (friendly) saboteurs inside the
[3798]base. .
[3800](4) start riots near the base main gate (friendly
[3801]Cubans).
[3803]13-00000
[3805](5) Blow up ammunition inside the base; start fires.
[3806](6) Burn aircraft on air base (sabotage).
[3807](7) Lob mortar shells from outside of tase into base.
[3809]Some damage to installations.
[3811](8) Capture assault teams approaching from the sea
[3812]or vicinity of Guantanamo City.
[3813](9) Capture militia group which storms the base.
[3814](10) Sabotage ship in harbor; large fires -- napthalene.
[3815](11) Sink ship near harbor entrance. Conduot funerals
[3817]for mook-viotims (may be lieu of (10)).
[3819]b. United States would respond by executing offensive
[3820]operations to secure water and power supplies, destroying
[3821]artillery and mortar emplacements which threaten the base.
[3823]ce. Commence large scale United States military operations.
[3824]3. A "Remember the Maine” ineident could be arranged in
[3826]several forms: - : ;
[3828]a. We could blow up a us ship in Guantanamo Bay and
[3829]blame Cuba. .
[3831]b. We could blow up a drone (unmanned) vessel anywhere
[3832]in the Cuban waters. We could arrange to eausé such inoident
[3833]in the vicinity of Havana or santiago as a spectacular result
[3834]of Cuban attack from the air or sea, or both. The presence
[3835]of Cuban planes or ships merely investigating the intent of
[3836]the vessel could be fairly compelling evidence that the ship
[3838]“was taken under attack. The nearness. to Havana or Santiago
[3839]would add credibility especially to those people that might
[3840]have heard the blast or have seen the fire. The US could
[3841]follow up with an air/sea rescue operation covered by US
[3842]fighters to "evacuate" remaining members of the non-existent
[3843]orew. Casualty. lists in US ‘newspapers would cause a helpful
[3844]wave of national indignation. ; .
[3846]4, We could develop a Communist Cuban terror campaign in
[3847]the Miami area, in other Florida cities and even in Washington.
[3849]4
[3852]13-00000
[3854]The terror campaign could be pointed at Cuban refugees seeking
[3855]haven in the United States. We could sink a boatload of Cubans
[3857]enroute to Florida (real or simulated). We could foster attempts
[3858]on lives of Cuban refugees in the United States even to the
[3859]extent of wounding in instances to be widely publicized.
[3860]‘Exploding a few plastio bombs in carefully chosen spots, the
[3861]arrest of Cuban agents and the release of prepared ‘documents
[3862]substantiating Cuban involvement also would be helpful in
[3863]projecting the idea of an irresponsible government.
[3865]5. A “Ouban-besed, Castro-supported" filibuster could be
[3866]simulated against a neighboring Caribbean nation (in the vein
[3867]of the 1th of June invasion of the Dominican Republic). We
[3868]know that Castro 1s backing subversive efforts clandestinely
[3869]against Haiti, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Nicaragua at
[3871]present and possible others. These efforts can be magnified and
[3872]additional ones contrived for exposure. For example, advantage
[3873]oan be taken of the sensitivity of the Dominican Air Force to
[3874]intrusions within their national air space. "Cuban" B-26 or
[3875]C-46 type airoraft could make cane-burning raids at night.
[3876]‘Soviet Bloo incendiaries could be found. ‘This could be coupled
[3877]with "Cuban" messages to the Communist underground ain the
[3878]Dominican Repiblic and "Cuban" shipments of arms which would
[3880]be found, or intercepted, on the beach.
[3882]6. Use of MIG type aircraft by US pilots could provide
[3883]additional provocation. Harassment of civil air, attacks on
[3884]surface shipping and destruction of US military drone aircraft
[3885]by MIG type planes would be useful as complementary actions.
[3887]An F-86 properly painted would convince air passengers that they
[3888]saw a Cuban ure, especially if the pilot of the transport were
[3889]to announce such fact. The primary drawback to this suggestion
[3890]appears to be the seourity risk inherent in obtaining or modify-
[3891]ing an aircraft. However, -yeasonable copies of the MIG could
[3892]be produced from US resources in about three months.
[3894] at8F Fu Le
[3895]5 eae 1a. a
[3897]ior cones =SechhtewtNe Kora
[3899]13-00000
[3901]7. Hijacking attempts against civil air and surface oraft
[3902]should appear to continue as harassing measures condoned by the
[3903]goverrment of Cuba. Concurrently, gemuine defections of Cuban
[3905]civil and military air and surface oraft should be encouraged.
[3906]8. It is possible to create an incident whioh will demonstrate
[3907]convincingly that a Quban aircraft has attacked and shot down
[3908]a. chartered olvil airliner enroute from the ‘United States to
[3909]Jamaica, Guatemala, Panama or Venezuela, ‘he destination would
[3910]be ohosen only to cause the flight plan route to cross Cuba.
[3911]The passengers could be a group of college students off on a
[3912]holiday or any grouping of persona with a common interest to
[3913]support chartering a non-scheduled flight.
[3915]a. An aircraft at Eglin ARB would be painted and
[3916]numbered as an exact duplicate for a civil registered
[3917]aircraft belonging to a CIA proprietary organization in the
[3918]Miami, area. At a designated time the duplicate would be
[3919]substituted for the actual civil aircraft and would be
[3920]loaded with the seleated passengers, all boarded under
[3922]. carefully prepared aliases. ‘The actual registered
[3923]airoraft would be converted to a drone. _
[3925]b. Take off times of the drone aiveraft and the actual
[3926]airoraft will be scheduled to allow a rendezvous south of
[3927]Florida. From the rendezvous point the passenger-carrying
[3928]airoraft will descend to minimum altitude and go directly
[3929]4nto an auxiliary field at Eglin AFB where arrangements will
[3930]have been made to evacuate the passengers. and return the
[3931]airoraft to its original status. The drone airoraft
[3932]meanwhile will continue to fly the filed flight plan. When
[3933]over Cuba the drone will being tranemitting on the inter-
[3934]national distress frequency a "MAY DAY" message stating he
[3935]1s under attack by Cuban MIG aircraft. ‘The transmission
[3936]will be interrupted: by destruction of the airoraft which will
[3937]be triggered by radio signal.. This will allow ICAO radio
[3939]MESES VO ABS |
[3941]we tad een 2d
[3943]6 .
[3948]13-00000
[3950]stations 1n the Western Hemisphere to tell the US what
[3952]has happened to the aircraft instead of the US trying to .
[3954]"sell" the inoident. ;
[3956]9. It is possible to create an incident which will make it
[3957]appear that Comminist Cuban MIGs have destroyed a USAF airoraft
[3958]over international waters in an unprovoked attack.
[3960]a. Approximately 4 or 5 F-101 airoraft will be dispatched
[3961]4n trail from Homestead AFB, Florida, to the vicinity of cuba.
[3962]Theix mission will be to reverse course and simulate fakir
[3963]airoraft for an air defense exercise in southern Florida,
[3964]These airoraft would conduct variations of these flights at
[3965]frequent intervals. Crews would be briefed to remain at
[3966]least ‘12 miles off the Cuban coast; however, they would ‘be
[3967]required to carry live ammunition in the event that hostile
[3968]actions were taken by the Cuban MiGs. ,
[3970]b. On one suoh flight, a pre-briefed pilot would fly
[3971]teil-end Charley at considerable interval between etroraft.
[3972]While near the Cuban Island this pilot would broadcast that
[3974]Lo he had been jumped by MI@s and was going down. No other
[3975]calls would be made. The pilot would then fly directly
[3977]west at extremely low altitude and land at a seoure -base, an
[3979]Eglin auxiliary. The atroraft would be met by the proper
[3981]people, quickly stored and given a new tail number. ‘The
[3983]pilot who had performed the mission under an alias, would
[3984]resume his proper identity and return to his normal place
[3986]of business. The pilot and airoraft would then have
[3988]disappeared. — Lo
[3990]¢. At precisely the same time that the aircraft was'
[3991]presumably shot down a submarine or small surface craft:
[3992]would disburse F-101 parts, parachute, etec., at approximately
[3994]_ 15 to 20 miles off the Cuban coast and depart. The pilots
[3996]returning to Homestead would have a true story as far as
[3997]they knew. Search ships and aireraft eould be dispatched
[3998]and parts ef airoraft found.
[4001]13-00000
[4003]9 March 1962 ' "copy oF __copres
[4004]SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION
[4006]REPORT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND . .
[4007]JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF REPRESENTATIVE ON THE '
[4008]CARIBBEAN SURVEY GROUP
[4009]to the
[4010]‘JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
[4011]on
[4013]GUBA PROJECT (TS)
[4015]The Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, has requested
[4016]that he be furnished the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
[4017]on this matter by 13 Merch 1962.
[4019]13-00000
[4021]JUSTIFICATION FOR US MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA (TS)
[4023]THE PROBLEM
[4025]1. As requested* by Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, the
[4026]Joint Chiefs of Staff are to indicate brief but precise
[4027]description of pretexty which they consider would provide
[4028]Justification for US military intervention 1n Cuba.
[4030]; FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM
[4032]2. It is recognized that any action which becomes pretext
[4033]for US military intervention in Cuba will lead to a political
[4034]decision whioh then would lead to military action.
[4036]3. Cognizance has been taken of a suggested course of
[4038]activn proposed** by the US Navy relating to generated
[4039]instances in the Guantanamo area.
[4041]4, For additional facts see Enclosure B.
[4043]DISCUSSION .
[4045].5. The suggested coursegof action appended to Enclosure A
[4046]_ ave based on the premise that US military intervention will
[4047]result from a period of heightened US-Cuban tensions which
[4048]place the United States in the position of suffering justif- .
[4049]dable grievences. World opinion, and the United. Nations
[4050]forum should be favorably affected by developing the inter-
[4051]national image of the Cuban government as fash and irresponsible,
[4052]and as an alarming and unpredictable threat to the peace of
[4053]the Western Hemisphere.
[4055]6, While the foregoing premise oan be utilized at. the
[4056]present time it will continue to hold good only as long as
[4057]there can be reasonable certainty that US military intervention
[4058]in Guba would not directly involve the Soviet Union. There is
[4060]* Memorandum for General Craig from Chief of Operations,
[4061]Cuba Project, subject: "Operation MONGOOSE", dated
[4062]5 March 1962, on file in General Craig's office. —
[4064]*# Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, from
[4065]Chief of Naval Operations, subjeot: "Instances to .
[4066]Provoke Military Actions in Cuba (T3)", dated 8 March 1962,
[4067]on file in General Craig's office. —
[4069]2
[4071]TOP-“SEGRET=-SPECIAL-HANDLING —NOFORN-
[4074]13-00000
[4076]as yet no bilateral mutual support agreement binding the USSR
[4077]to the defense of Cuba, Cuba has not yet become a member of the
[4078]Warsaw Pact, nor have the Soviets established Soviet bases
[4079]in Cuba in the pattern of US bases in Western Europe. Therefore,
[4080]since time appears to be an important factor in resolution of
[4081]the Cuba problem, all projects are suggested within the time
[4082]frame of the next few months.
[4084]CONCLUSION ;
[4086]7. The suggested courses of action appended to Enclosure A
[4087]satisfactorily respond to the statement of the problem. However,
[4088]these suggestions~should be forwarded as a preliminary submission
[4089]suitable for planning purposes, and together with similar inputs
[4090]from other agencies, provide a basis for development of a single,
[4091]integrated, time-phased plan to focus all efforts on the —
[4092]objective of justification for US military intervention in Cuba.
[4094]RECOMMENDATIONS
[4095]8. It is recommended that:
[4096]a. Enclosure A together with its attachments should be
[4097]forwarded to the Secretary of Defense for approval and
[4098]transmittal to the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project.
[4099]b. This paper NOT be forwarded to commanders of unified
[4100]“or specified commands.
[4102]c. This paper NOT be forwarded to Us gfficers assigned
[4103]to NATO activities.
[4105]a. This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, US
[4106]Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee.
[4108]13-00000
[4109]DRAFT
[4110]MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
[4111]Subject: Justification for US Military Intervention —
[4112]in Cuba (13)
[4114]1. The Joint Chiefs of staff have considered the attached
[4115]Memorandum for the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, which
[4116]responds to a request* of that office for brief but precise
[4117]desoription of pretexts which would provide justification
[4118]for US military intervention in Cuba. .
[4120]2. The Joint Chiefa of Staff recommend that the proposed
[4121]memorandum be forwarded as a preliminary submission suitable
[4122]for planning purposes, It is assumed that there will be
[4123]similar submiseions from other agencies and that these inputs
[4124]will be used as a basis for developing a time-phased plan. ,
[4125]Individual projects can then be considered on a case-by-case
[4126]basis, 0 ee eee D ot :
[4128]C 3. Further, 1t is assumed that a single agency will be
[4130]: given the primary responsibility for developing military and
[4132]/ para-uilitery aspects of the basic plan. It is. recommended —
[4133]| ‘that this responsibility for both overt and covert, military
[4135]\ Operations be assigned the Joint chiefs of ptaff.
[4137]Ye
[4138]v
[4140]* Memorandum f or Gen Craig from Chief of Operations, Cuba
[4141]- Project, pubjeot, “Operation MONGOOSE", dated 5 March
[4142]1962, on file in Gen Oraig's office
[4144]4 Enolosure A
[4147]13-00000
[4149]MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF OFERATIONS, CUBA. PROJEOT
[4150]Subject: qustificetign for US Military Intervention
[4151]1. Reference is made to memorandum from Chief of. Operations,
[4152]Cuba Project, for General Craig, subject: "Operation MONGOOSE",
[4153]dated 5 Maroh 1962, which requested brief but precise
[4154]desoription of pretexts which the Joint Chiefs of Staff
[4155]consider would provide justification for US military inter-
[4156]vention in Cuba.
[4157]2. The projects listed in the enclosure hereto are forwarded
[4158]as 8 preliminary submiseion suitable for planning purposes.
[4159]It 18 assumed that there will be similar submissions fron
[4160]other agencies and that these inputs will be used as a basis
[4161]for developing a time-phased plan. The individual projects
[4162]can then be considered on a case-by-case basis. .. 9. = x */ >
[4163]. "3. This Plan, incorporating projects selected from the
[4164]attached suggestions, or from other sources, should be
[4165]developed to foous all efforts on a specific- ultimate
[4166]objective which would provide adequate justification for
[4167]US military intervention. Such a plan poyld enable a logical
[4168]build-up of incidents to be combined with other seemingly
[4169]unrelated events to camouflage the ultimate objective and
[4170]oreate the necessary impression of Cuban rashness and .
[4171]irresponsibility on a large scale, directed at other
[4172]countries as well as the United States. mhe”pian would also
[4173]properly integrate and time phase the courses of action to
[4174]be pursued. The desired resultant from the exeoution of
[4175]. this plan would be to place the United States in the apparent
[4176]position of suffering defensible grievances from a rash and
[4177]irresponsible government of Cuba and to develop an inter-
[4179]national image of a Cuban threat to peace in the Western
[4180]Hemisphere.
[4182]Appendix to
[4183]5 Enclosure A
[4185]13-00000
[4187]4, Time 4s en important factor in resolution of the Cuban
[4188]problem. ‘Therefore, the plan should be so time-phased that
[4189]projects would be operable within the next few months.
[4191]5. Inasmoh as the ultimate objective is overt military
[4192]intervention, it is recommended that primary responsibility x
[4193]for developing military and para-military aspects of the plan ne
[4195]cere Ad A
[4196]for. both overt. and covert ; military operations be assigned ‘the
[4198]Joint Chiefs, of Staff.
[4200]messes eee Som m eat
[4203]13-00000
[4205]ANNEX TO APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE A
[4206]" PRETEXTS TO JUSTIFY US MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA
[4208](Note: ‘The courses of action which follow are a preliminary . :
[4209]submission suitable only for planning purposes. They are :
[4210]arranged neither chronologically nor in. ascending order.
[4211]Together with similar inputs from other agencies, they are ,
[4212]intended to provide a point of departure for the development
[4213]of a single, integrated, time-phased plan. such a plan would
[4214]permit the evaluation of individual projects within the context
[4215]of cumlative, correlated actions designed to lead inexorably
[4216]to the objective of adequate justification for US military
[4218]. intervention in Cuba), © —
[4220]1. Since it would seem desirable to use legitimate
[4221]provocation as the basis for US military intervention in Cuba
[4222]a cover and deception plan, to inolude requisite preliminary
[4223]actions such as has been developed in response to Task 33 c,
[4224]could be executed as an initial effort to provoke Cuban
[4226]_ reactions. Harassment plus deceptive actions to convines the
[4227]. Cubans of imminent ‘Anvasion would be emphasized. Our military
[4228]posture throughout execution of the plan will allow a rapid -
[4229]change from exeroise to intervention if Cuban response justifies.
[4231]2.'A series of- well coordinated incidents will be planned
[4232]to take place in and around Guantanamo 'éd give genuine.
[4233]appearance of being done by hostile Cuban forces.
[4235]a. Incidents to establish a credible attack (not in
[4236]chronological order):
[4237](1) Start rumors (many). Use clandestine radio.
[4238](2) Land friendly Cubans in uniform "over-the-fence"
[4239]to stage attack on base.
[4240](3): Capture Cuban (friendly) saboteurs inside the
[4241]base. :
[4243](4) Start riots near the base main gate (friendly
[4244]Cubans).
[4247]13-00000
[4249](5) Blow up ammunition inside the base; start fires,
[4250](6) Burn aircraft on air base (sabotage).
[4251](7) Lob mortar shells from outside of base into base.
[4253]Some damage to installations. _ .
[4255](8) Capture assault teams approaching from the sea
[4256]or vicinity of Guantanamo City.
[4257](9) Capture miiitia group which storms the base.
[4258](10) Sabotage ship in harbor; large fires -~ napthalene.
[4259](11) Sink ship near harbor entrance. Conduct funerals
[4260]for mook-victims (may be lieu of (10)). -
[4262]b. United States would respond by executing offensive
[4263]operations to secure water and power supplies, destroying
[4264]artillery and mortar emplacements which threaten the base.
[4266]_ 6. Commence large scale United States military operations.
[4267]3. A "Remember the Maine" inoident could be arranged in
[4268]several forms:
[4270]&. We could blow up a US ship in Guantanamo Bay and
[4272]_ blame Cuba.. . .
[4273]. b. We could blow up a drone (unmanned) vessel anywhere
[4274]in the Cuban waters. We could arrange to cause such incident
[4275]in the vicinity of Havana or Santiago as a spectacular result
[4276]of Cuban attack from the air or sea, or both. ‘The presence
[4277]of Cuban plenes or ships merely investigating the intent of
[4278]the vessel could be fairly compelling evidence that the ship
[4279]_was taken under attack. fhe nearness to Havana or Santiago
[4280]would add credibility especially to those people that might
[4281]have heard the blast or have seen the fire. The US could
[4282]follow up with an air/sea. rescue operation covered by US
[4283]fighters to “evacuate” remaining members of the non-existent
[4284]orew. Casualty lists in US newspapers would cause a. helpful
[4285]wave of national indignation.
[4286]4, We could develop a Commmist Cuban terror campaign in
[4287]thie Miami area, in other’ Florida oities and even in Washington.
[4289]Annex to
[4290]8 to Enclosure A
[4292]“FOP-SEGREE= SPECIE HANDLING HOFER —
[4294]13-00000
[4296]. additional provocation.
[4298]‘(The terror campaign could be pointed at Cuban refugees seeking
[4299]haven in the United States. We could sink a boatload of Cubans
[4300]enroute to Florida (real or simulated), We could foster attempts
[4302]“on lives of Cuban refugees in the United States even to the
[4303]extent of wounding in instances to be widely publicized.
[4304]Exploding a few plastic bombs in carefully chosen spots; the
[4305]arrest of Ouban agents and the release of prepared documents
[4306]substantiating Cuban involvement also would be helpful in
[4307]projecting the idea of an irresponsible government.
[4309]5. A “Quban-based, Castro-supported” filibuster could be
[4310]simlated against a neighboring Caribbean nation (in the vein
[4311]of the 14th of June invasion of the Dominican Republic). we
[4312]kmow that Castro is backing subversive efforts colandestinely
[4313]against Haiti, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Nicaragua at
[4314]present and possible others. These efforts can be magnified and
[4315]additional ones contrived for exposure, For example, advantage
[4316]oan be taken of the sensitivity of the Dominican Air Force to
[4318]_ intrusions within their national air space. "Cuban" B-26 or
[4320]C-46 type airoraft could make cane-burning raids at. night.
[4321]Soviet Bloc incendiaries could be found. This could be coupled
[4322]with "Cuban" messages to the Communist underground in the
[4323]Dominican Republi¢ and "cuban" shipments of arms which would
[4324]be found, or intercepted, on the beach. e
[4326]6. Use of MIG type aircraft by US pilots could provide
[4327]Harassment of civil air, attacks on ~
[4328]surface shipping and destruction of US military drone aircraft
[4329]by MIG type planes would be useful as complementary actions.
[4330]An F-86 properly painted would convince air passengers that they
[4331]saw a Cuban MIG, especially if the pilot of the transport were
[4332]to announce such fact. The primary drawback to this suggestion
[4333]appears to be the security risk inherent in. obtaining or modify-
[4334]ing an airoraft, However, reasonable soples of the ura could
[4335]be produced from us resources in about three months.
[4337]Annex to Appendix
[4338]9 to Enclosure A
[4341]13-00000
[4343]7. Hijacking attempts against civil air and surface craft
[4344]should appear to continue as harassing measures condoned by the
[4345]goverrment of Cuba. Concurrently, genuine defections of Cuban
[4346]civil and military air and surface craft should be encouraged.
[4348]8. It 18 possible to create an incident which will demonstrate
[4349]convinoingly that a Cuban’ etroraft has attacked and shot down
[4350]a chartered civil airliner enroute from the United States to
[4351]. Jamaioa, Guatenals, Panama or Venezusla. The destination would
[4352]be chosen only to cause the flight plan route to cross Cuba.
[4353]The passengers could be a group of college students off on a
[4354]holiday or any grouping of persons with a common interest. to
[4355]support chartering « non-scheduled flight.
[4356]a. An afroraft at Eglin AFB would be painted and
[4357]numberalas an exact duplicate for a civil registered
[4358]aircraft belonging to a OIA proprietary organization in the .
[4359]Wiemi area. At a designated time the duplicate would be
[4360]substituted for the actual oivil aircraft and would be
[4361]loaded with the selected passengers, all boarded under
[4362]carefully prepared aliases. ‘The actual registered
[4363]stnenably woul be sonverved So & drones
[4364]. Take off times of the drone airoraft and the actual
[4365]-adroraft will be scheduled to allow a _Pendezvous south of
[4366]Florida. From the rendezvous point ‘she ‘passenger-carrying
[4367]airoraft will descend to minimum altitude and go directly
[4368]into an auxiliary field at Eglin AFB where arrangements will
[4369]have been made to evacuate the passengers and return the
[4370]aircraft to its original status. ‘The drone aircraft
[4371]meanwhile will continue to fly the filed flight plan. when
[4372]over Cuba the drone will being transmitting on the inter-
[4373]. natlonal distress frequenoy a "MAY pay" message stating he
[4374]is under attack by Cuban IG airoraft. The transmission
[4375]will be interrupted by destruction of the aireraft which will
[4376]be triggered by radio signal. This will allow ICAO radio
[4378]y Annex to Appendix
[4379]10. vo Enclosure A
[4381]TOP. 7
[4383]———————
[4385]13-00000
[4387]7
[4389]stations in the Western Hemisphere to tell the US what
[4390]has happened to the airoraft’ instead of the US trying to
[4391]"gell" the inoident. oo
[4392]9. It 4s possible to create an inoident which will make it
[4393]appear that Commmist Cuban MiGs have destroyed a USAF aircraft
[4394]over international waters in an unprovoked attack,
[4395]. Approximately 4 or 5 Pel0l airoraft: will be dispatched
[4396]in trail from Homestead AFB, Florida, to the vicinity of Cuba.
[4397]Their mission will be to reverse course and simulate fakir
[4398]airoraft for an air defense exercise in southern Florida. “
[4399]These aircraft would conduct variations of these flights at
[4400]frequent intervals. Crews would be briefed to remain at
[4401]least 12 miles off the Cuban coast; however, they would be
[4402]required to carry live ammunition in the event that hostile
[4403]actions were taken by the Ouban MiGs.
[4405]b. On one such flight, a pre-briefed pilot would fly
[4406]tail-end Charley at considerable interval between airoraft.
[4407]While near the Cuban Island this pilot would broadcast that
[4408]he had been jumped by MIGs and was going down. No other
[4409]calls would be made. ‘The pilot would then fly directly
[4410]west at extremely low altitude and land at a secure base, an
[4411]Eglin auxiliary. The aircraft would be met by the proper
[4412]people, quickly stored and given a yew tail mumber, The
[4413]Pilot who had performed the mission under an alias, would
[4414]resume his proper identity and return to his normal place
[4416]"of business. ‘he pilot and airoraft would then have
[4417]disappeared. ,
[4419]oc. At precisely the same time that the airoraft was
[4420]presumably shot down a submarine or small surface craft
[4421]would disburse F-101 parts, parachute, eto., at approximately
[4422]15 to 20 miles off the Cuban coast and depart. ‘The pilots
[4424]returning to Homestead would have a true story as far as
[4425]they lmew. Gearon ships end aireraft could be dispatched
[4426]and parts ef airoraft found.
[4428]Annex to
[4429]11 to Enclosure A
[4431]13-00000
[4435]».
[4437]ENCLOSURE B
[4438]FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM
[4440]- 1, The Joint Chiefs of Staff have previously stated*
[4441]that US unilateral militery intervention in Cuba canbe
[4442]undertaken in the event that the Cuban regine commits hostile
[4443]acts, against US forces or property which would serve as an
[4444]incident upon’ which to base overt intervention.
[4446]2, The need for positive action in the event that current
[4447]covert efforts to foster an internal Cuban rebellion are
[4448]‘unsuccessful was indlcated** by the Joint Chiefs of Staff
[4449]on 7 March 1962, as follows:
[4451]Ne we determination that a credible internal
[4453]revolt is impossible of attainment during the next
[4455]9-10 months will require a decision by the United States.
[4457]to develop a Cuban "provocation" as justification for
[4459]" positive US military action." |
[4460]. 3. It’ is understood that the Department of State also is
[4461]preparing suggested courses of action to develop ‘justification
[4462]for US military intervention in Cuba.
[4464]-
[4466]_ "* JES 19697303
[4469]12 . Enelosure B
[4472]13-00000
[4474]nee wy 3 ~ y 3 aye
[4475]'
[4476]TOP. SECRET . COPY NO. i
[4477]" JCS 1969/3021 SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION
[4478]12 March 1962
[4479]Page 216 .
[4481]NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES
[4482]: ‘to the
[4483]JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF .
[4484]on
[4486]NORTHWOODS (8)
[4488]& report* on the above subject is submitted for consider-
[4489]ation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. _
[4491]FP. J. BLOUIN
[4492]M, J. INGELIDO
[4493]Joint Secretariat
[4495]* Not reproduced herewith; on file in Joint Secretariat
[4497]EXCLUDED From
[4498]EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
[4499]REGRADING; DOD DIRECTIVE
[4500]5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY
[4502]‘TOP SECRET
[4504]JCS 1969/7321 . 8165
[4507]13-00000
[4510]13-00000
[4512]aN:
[4514]* DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY.
[4515]OPFICE OF THE SECRETARY
[4516]WASHINGTON, D.c.
[4519]13-00000
[4521]Wd, pS Sah a
[4522]affort to export subversion “datin Amavies, Great and fhewagh Cube, thore
[4523]is agteemont, at the least, that the program embodies grave potential
[4524]‘bana foe the Geisreliey athe Hancaphors, Boyead tia, thero ts alse
[4525]eeieenl ectmowtegrmans atta svrersian pohtne ix nota iw en,
[4527]' sources sf infection 80 wx much of Latin America for two decades 0 or more.
[4529]‘Fivally, thera ie evidence that the U. 5. appreciates these reilities, ac
[4530]sabtited in the depth of en-guing W. 8. progeeaas tn ail of Latin Amecica,
[4531]aimed at blunting the Communist subveratve thrusts inte the continent.
[4532]The question ercated by the President's underscoring of the problem is
[4533]whether or not our efforts in this area ava adequate o» an to ecops, as to
[4534]soordinatjon, and as to intensity. It to the vlew of the Committee that they
[4536]ere not. Purthae, it bs the vlew of Bie Gamunittns 7" wpe aimed solely ot,
[4537]” tonpeding the flow of wtadents end subversives to and toom Guba will aot, of
[4539]themeelves, greatly abate the problem. There mnst be companion efforts
[4541]. designed both to degrade the basic expability for Cubsnvbased subversion, as
[4542]well as efforts to develop a more effective ros{stance chpacity among the
[4543]Latin Amesican states. The sections to follow are designed with these two
[4546]13-00000
[4548]Pires, with reopect to praventing ths export of Communist subversion
[4550]by or through Caba, there is s summary of what we aze doing now, and what
[4551]we can do in the futuze. . ,
[4553]the Lmpect of Coonaaudet eubrersien there io o summary ef our current
[4554]programs and 6 listing of specific additional things which we ean do} in other
[4555]words, & trestment of the subversive question from two paints of view ~-
[4556]therapy 0 rogaede Cubes peepiylnais at regards Latin America at large .
[4558]L Programa Now ix Motion. ; &
[4559]The following exteting programs ate sll having same adverse afiect -
[4560]on the basic cayabllities of the Communiste to organine, train, teach, equip,
[4561]underwrite and export enbvezsive strength into Latin America trom Cuba:
[4562]&. Rocotnatesance and Surveillance activities, which unite to
[4563]| Frovide information and to represent a cantiauing dateivent to subversive
[4564]Q) Picket dhip patrol of the Windward Passage.
[4565]This action contributes te the rontriction of tlltett Cuban aon
[4566]trafic te Hail and Dominican Repubite azen.
[4567]. (2) Aircraft patrol fights cut of Guantanamo. a,
[4568]These Mighto, augmenting surface surveltiance, keep wateh for
[4569]amnsll cxait, Aabing and merchant ablyping opernsing in the Garthhewn owulh
[4570]of Cabs; and waters adjacent to and porth of Jematce.
[4572]13-00000
[4574](3) U.S, Military execution of epeoitie couster-mubversive tasks.
[4575]oe, i ; _ Tajo Invatvos action tahon tn eospanse to apectiie needs, as
[4576]” daitig the 1968 attoniphs to eabant wivebicteiastaw ae Gouval Ainaited ~
[4577]‘These were countered, and probably shorted, by the presente of U. 8, Navy
[4578]custoanete petsciing che ental enene of Soca Rien‘ the voquect of the
[4580]changes in Guban military capabitision, tose Aighte serve as & reminder of
[4581]U8, vighlanoe ond datermduntion, f
[4582](8) Gomsaunioatlons Intelligence,
[4584]All of the above are ovpported by and given a scnse.cf
[4585]diroution from the guest volume of material provided through the facilities
[4586]of the Communications Intdliigenes system.
[4588]be Propagands « Radio and Television.
[4590]" () tue Vetoe of Aankailon isnt conducts 4-8/3 kaure of short wave
[4591]broadcasts te Guba daily. These sstre, in some degreo, to expose to tha
[4592]Cuban people the subversive activities of the Castro regime.
[4594](2) Axmad Forces sadio and television bigadenste trum the Guantaname
[4595]Naval Base seek daily to combat the spread of Gommuntem by the orientation
[4598]13-00000
[4600]) fein i ite oven Bkophere organiaatons exhibites:
[4601]She pear f emits resi anor b herman stato,
[4603]cvs rem of Rava recs Hezoee
[4605]‘a deimas, si hany Ci ei ef eubrerson ator te wy
[4606]“@ Coreen ote tions Aid ot gating Hen tne nd ont of
[4608]Uh te clone at Sn aaivitien waleh colate to tha dank of agent
[4609]— "en wih. ol poupeanndes corre rectly to dieintah the |
[4610]$e aapont subvadeton thie Guha. It tp seencoary.
[4611]however, te coidamglite other actions which, ‘While tase divactly welated to.
[4613]enbvextion, sti} serve to wasken Cuba sad its Communist disteterelip,
[4614]- exud thine $0 elivntuate the problea af ite avurcs. It is for thie reascn that
[4615]see te praseated haxen « spectrom of eotions related dixectly to Cubs.
[4617]“feast ‘eo abo sy ‘ager, of the requirements of international ,
[4619]ted necessary that they be act forth in
[4621]13-00000
[4623]cooporative Latin American state of cucgected
[4625]2 EES
[4627]of the Gaban people by the Castzo
[4628]“ (4) Conduct airborne
[4631]13-00000
[4633]c. liteoubhy Physical ntattigense Gathering Rtforts.
[4634]a By venvattetiuabla mene e~ Cubana nod Sted comntry
[4636]res tnttng wound canted of eepertaton
[4637]@& Movement of Personnel,
[4640]Satin: American matan, coh t0 impede the movement of poston, into end
[4642]te he eden tint nendy tants, in conatderahie Guantity, are
[4644]Fequitad to condactd subversive training progvam, us} to speak af other
[4645]costly factors =« arms, demolitions, fenl, food, propaganda, etc. Specific
[4646]actions simed a¢ seducing the Cuban's resources will thus have a direct
[4647]effect upon theiy abtlity to putoun thelir program of euhvession, will cauge
[4648]Sheen. $> Come pee nn eas eshte Sa i give Oo» Deaciene pee
[4649]“prodyative. ldnaietes, oviny Action Wilih centetbatos to bnebllty, worent, -
[4650]apprehension and dlavensien bebwaen Rusolan.and Cuban will xeduae
[4651]conranpontingly both thely alillty and thelr oppartmity to ditve forward on
[4653]a program of edbrovatve tealnag and exycetaicn, ‘The following actions —
[4656]13-00000
[4658]“psnienas, eg dhl vonty of Cuba's atcaseay dnpeits These .
[4659]octiane shank emia fl the wey Soom dmvet Sonivuctian ie sabeind»
[4661]spenta, tear nacho tanmtacion; bind Jnpers)snnse Gu salty
[4662]tated to stand comtbuusily ab gh cost Level aad thus to-edasume oupplion
[4663]which could cthaweias be dedicated to. nubretutva training.
[4665](2) Diminish Cubes financial vesouxces.
[4667]‘@) Consider introduction. af counterfolt currency in
[4668]large quantities, $ distert the Cuban Aannetel posture, and to
[4669]19) vende angs tan eo de, r tai Neetween. and
[4671]13-00000
[4673]ry Programs maw ta beings
[4674]_ a emtaag hn yrogeen wes au newt proget U  tcesary
[4676]shots fi thirweh wd, taken all sagethin. they have cestalaly mit fortttied
[4677]sar allie $e thn polutstnce sebvertinn can be sald to be unter Sit consset.
[4678]* ‘Wo aitteany Mtr. ,
[4679]. Moited Mine milan devas are sow panictyiing in bees
[4681]ste anette smgtanig th ly of putsen te engne ad at .
[4682]dren wubvagalee ssttvtty. 2 thane, tha principal are: a
[4683]Q) Saunterineuegency, astlaeudwarsion sad physhntogical aperstions
[4684]trainiig through the sundium of military miasions and mobile training teams.
[4685](2) Provision of equipment and matestell on shoet notice for use
[4686]in the face of nubvervion o¢ subversive threats. |
[4687]Q) ‘The conduct af emergency truining programs tn mob and slot
[4689]{4} Provision of femal cuuntertneurgensy edneation for Latin
[4690]Amatican néfivase dnd galisted mon In Tilted States Servier gahoota and
[4691]" "{5) Proviaton of civée action tridning and ssststance.
[4692](s Anciiary miliary efferta ened at etengthening te ait
[4693]_ of Titta anita endian to Yontet eorepatans
[4694] @ Gated Oates pevsin of matnene ppt
[4696]assistance for Latin American novel gad ats units.
[4699]13-00000
[4701]@ Officer exchange programs.
[4702]ts) Language training for Latin American military students.
[4703]@ fornia Ars Ravy and Alr Foree Defense Contsrences.
[4705]‘The United Staten military te embarked on # program aimed at ms
[4706]the Latin American militesy aware of the realities of Gontmunism and
[4707]Gomsauntat eoversian. This includes
[4709]gy: ‘Fenuatation into Spon het yetatng of 80,000 ente of the
[4710]eerics of ten paraphlete entitied, “Demecracy versus Communism. "
[4711] @ evelopment of an aadio/visunl film strip based on she
[4712]"Demouracy versus Communism pamphtets for the illiterate Latin American
[4713]eni{eted men. One Hundred and eighty of these films and records have been
[4714]sent to CINGARIS for further distribution te the Latin American services.
[4716]42) Thivteenshundved copies af the USTA pamphlet "Tactices y
[4717]Pireativas Contr fa Fanse Gommusdote: sro bing pevoured for detetvtion
[4718]among the beds Assaylenn military,
[4720]&. Te PoliticosEconomic Effort (to he supplied by State).
[4721]e. The Propagenda Effort {to be ouppliod by USLA).
[4722]d. ‘The Intelligence and Non-ath sibutable Efforte(to be supplied by CLA).
[4723]An tn the ease of Sectiin It, the programe cutltaed below are within
[4724]oti . Howaver, as tiey exose the
[4726]13-00000
[4728]_ “whieh provides for slititeral exshaage af infutmation and sculillatere!
[4730]sarticipation tn an slesting aystexss anch cvvatey to he reapenatble for
[4732]system ond yootdn suite eshnnge of nteligngsbetwoce mbeertber
[4734]zations, ; he
[4735]@ Contiins tha tnprovemmnt of US commnnisations lu Letts
[4737]. America, nt high priority, to coutsthute to the effactivensss of the alerting.
[4739]oyster,
[4740]bh Multinations’ Guusterianus gency Farce.
[4741]Paper Sh aly of orang om OA Goerinegnny
[4743]subversion. Cutts 8 peopeatty sade ut de thos, would exhibit the selous :
[4744]determination af the awa te suppent vigorously an. sxtleubearaion program.
[4746]ce. Training aud Osientation. .
[4747]Provide tov a greaGy expanded cut-of-country training and
[4748]orfantation program fos kay segments of cach Lada American country's
[4751]13-00000
[4753]SD car danibeadainht hits Ai ertnieeth ete CPE REE gia te niente I tt Te
[4754]aoe re ’ Mo
[4756]a Eulisted and affieer military perscunel to be achoaled tn
[4757]Panama and/ex the United Stats, .
[4758]Soe Potiee psmspah tbe athoilnd ts Phin at te Rated nto,
[4759]@ Newspaper parsannel to be ucheched within the United States.
[4760]«) Nurses (mute snd fesnale} to bo traiand in the Salted Staten.
[4761](8) Civitan nshnaian tbe enka in tt itn ening
[4763]a wh hr fh pt sed ang vig tatleg pinged.
[4764]the United Sintee, ts aot fust to echanee the abill and efiftntion devel of thé
[4766]people tavolved but, even mora, te axpone the Latiua te UG taffeense, ¥e show
[4767]: oe a, .
[4768]them. eur country, to poxeunds them by close agcactatian that cus view ta
[4770]correct, and thus to effffen thats resalve to comber pulvorstan tn any Gorm.
[4771]4. Troup Information Program .
[4773]_ Rapand greatly tbo current Latin Amartoan trogp information
[4774]program in andes to edueste the Latin Ameniean sprvieansent (tod thais
[4775]stutinn enutecrpaien) we Sh ecbrenstre Gnu Bay Gee.
[4777]a. News and Pyopagands
[4779]@) Underwrite, as necessary, and condubt an tuformation
[4780]program within exch country tn Latin Amextos using those themed:
[4782]-(e) An exgapition of incte on tulvrarstve tenting, movement of
[4785]13-00000
[4787]{4} Facts on the decreess in living ctnodards within Cuba since
[4788]the rise of Castro.
[4790]fo) Paes on tennew sad sepeenston Se Goh.
[4792]- a: Develip i: Py eh a
[4794]Maicy Latin Atmasiean popees, oven the antlecommunist ones,
[4795]are infitreted by eameanstet agente ant mgay Of hnty calmmlite, pnout-
[4796]rendare end Unotypars ae hough with eqmenuntet minbey, Cleeulation
[4798]of tase payee ie ately tated Wy low petons and maderetiten by
[4800]tx news contr inset envey th tut th Lata wha Me the Amesica:
[4801]believes what he rade. | _ if
[4803]. 4
[4804]7
[4806](3) Mintelinits Auti-Communiet Mteratere .
[4807]Books snd pamphicts, ta lange uumobare, expasing the ‘woality
[4808]of communism abould he printid tn Spandub and Portuguese ond disteibuted
[4809]£ Tver tra fo be rte by
[4811]We shoot nonelarita nnd iteaden acetetionteysosy program tn
[4813]each country of Latin Aumgxica, dstving for 0 ronitatlg “Enteral Defense Plan"
[4815], for avery country and uxying Letin dmatioan countries to ask tor counter-
[4816]tnouxgency teafiing assistance, fox military, partmiiitary and police forces.
[4818]Beyond thie we shanld ate mpecifie exyisels wean developing civie action
[4820]13-00000
[4822]. @ Instigate and stage solocted tersoriat incidents in Latin
[4823]American countrios, designed to implicate Cuatro.
[4824]* (a) Avtange tor exchins of SotketeGunch pein bo bo “discovered”
[4825]in sclected Latin Amoristn countrias, ontanalidy axagghed i from Coba. |
[4826]TV. Sonclusion.
[4827]Mt 1s the bellef af the Camuttice that the setious outltied tn the
[4828]_ precoding sections sonspaise a acriae of stops which in some areas will stem
[4829]; ‘and th othons attach the pingram of Oxtnshened Yoni Spapratin tn Spin,
[4830]America. Kach individeal netion embodies seme element of usefsiness tn
[4831]itself, and any combination of sections may generate correspongingly favorable
[4832]regults. There i no profound sdlationshlp which demands the semblaiag of
[4833]siny epecitic cet of notions. | . .
[4834]It ln Fecammended, therefore, that an carly selection be mundo of those
[4835]ations Listed above whase execution fo compatihie with sntional obligations
[4836]wad dedications in other avons and which are within U,8, capabiifiine, and
[4837]_ th ay bo yuk eutey tte silet stnoe the longer thn snbrannirabtueneee
[4839]in thie Hemisphere ate permitted iy mature, the more dittinult will be thads
[4841]ultimate elimingtion, -
[4843]. And Saslly, revogsining the diverse nabaie af jha Geld Wer astéstibes
[4844]invelved, it is strongly recommended that a single point in the Government
[4845]be dentgated an aantgnd reepoctiity for eperviaing cancion of te
[4848]13-00000
[4850]Vee NBs Gua te
[4852]While we generally concur with the paper prepared by the
[4853]Department of State, we do not believe that the proposals contained
[4854]therein present a sufficiently wide spectrum of options or activities
[4856]to impede and stop Castro/Communist subversion in Latin America.
[4857]Specifically, we recommend the following additional actions:
[4859]q1) . Measures to attrit Cuban resources:
[4860]- 2) Purchase the defection of personnel,
[4861]aircraft, ships, . boats and other valuable items.
[4862](b) Conduct non-attributable actions against
[4863]petroleum resources, upon which much of Cuba's economy depends.
[4864]These actions -should extend all the way from direct destruction to
[4866]sabotage through chemical and bacterial contamination of carriers
[4868]' and storage,
[4870](c) By means of intelligence indications (aircraft
[4872]. flights, agents, clear radio transmission, beach jumpers) cause Cuban
[4874]military forces to stand continually at high alert level and thus.. to
[4876]consume supplies which could otherwise be dedicated to subversive
[4878]‘training.
[4880](d) Consider introduction of counterfeit currency
[4882]in large quantities, to distort the Cuban financial posture, dnd to
[4884]undermine confidence.
[4886]13-00000
[4888]‘ this financial investment
[4890](2) The designation of a single point in the Govern-
[4892]’ ment to be held responsible for supervising the execution of the total
[4894]program,
[4895](3) An intensified and broadened news and propaganda
[4897]program, including the following:
[4899](a) Underwrite, as necessary, and conduct
[4900]an-information program within each country in Latin America using
[4901]these themes: wont lee. meee nme .
[4903]1. An exposition of acts on subversive
[4904]training, movement of subversives and general subversive programs.
[4905]2. Objectives of the Communists within
[4906]each country. .
[4907]3. Communist methods of operation.
[4908]4, Facts on the decrease in living standards
[4909]within Cuba since the rise of Castro.
[4910]5.’ Facts on terror and repression in Cuba.
[4912](b) Develop a Pro-American Anti-Communist Press
[4914]“Many Latin American papers, even the anti-
[4915]communist ones, are infiltrated by communist agents and many of their
[4916]columnists, proof-readers and linotypers are bought with communist
[4917]money. Circulation of these papers is artificially inflated by low prices
[4918]and underwritten by communist funds. The United States must match
[4920]ews control in order to convey the truth
[4923]13-00000
[4925]adi.
[4931]the United States.
[4933]. education level of the people involved but, even more, to expose the
[4935]to the Latin who, like the American, believes what he reads:
[4936](c) Distribute Anti-Communist Literature
[4938]Books and pamphlets, in large numbers,
[4940]exposing the reality of communism should be printed in Spanish and
[4942]Portuguese and distributed through inexpensive commercial sale.
[4944](4) Greatly expanded training and orientation in the -
[4945]United States for key segments of each Latin American country's
[4946]population, such as: ; .
[4947](a) Enlisted as well as officer military personnel
[4948]to be schooled in Panama and/or the United States. > *
[4949](b) Police personnel to be schooled in Panama
[4950]or in the United States. ,
[4952](c) Newspaper personnel to be schooled within
[4954](4) Nurses (male and female).to be trained in the
[4955]Unifed States. 7
[4957](e) Civilian technicians to be trained in United
[4958]States training achools.
[4960]The thrust of such an expanded training program,
[4962]taking place in the United States, is not just to enhance-the skill and
[4964]Latins to US influence, to show them our country, fo persuade them by
[4966]13-00000
[4968]close association that our view is correct, and thus to stiffen their
[4970]resolve to combat subversion in any form.
[4973]{tin Stare enboilide grave potential tamrds for
[4974]——— Beyond Yikes, there i
[4976]“es exhibak ‘gn the depth of gimptne 0.2, programs in all —
[4977]of Latin Aniyioe, aimed at blunting the Commmnist subversive .
[4978]thrusts inty-the continent. :
[4979]The eugetion oreated by the President's undersvoring
[4980]of the padtilen 1s whether or not our efforts in this area
[4981]are adequate : ~~ a8 t6 Baope, ag te ooordination, ana ae te
[4982]intensity. .2b'ts the view. of thts Comittse that they are
[4983]nob. Furthain, A619 the viewof the Gamittes that steps 7
[4984]aimed soledy. Bt dnpeiting the Pee of stidents aid dubverstyey
[4985]¢o and oie wi. neti, of (iemmelvée,s greatiy anate the
[4986]problem. gére umatj de ctimpeuti efforts deatened both. te
[4987]degrade thi Ghote capability fay Cubsn-based subversion, as
[4988]jell ae otter te ‘deverep a wie -effeotive resistause
[4989]capacity auido the Latin saseripan states, The sections to
[4990]follow are designed with these tro requirements in mind,
[4991]First, ¥
[4993]nist subvermdbn by or through Pita, there 18 4 summary of
[4994]wat wo exe (aka now, nod wna we cen do in the future.
[4996]Lin respect to preventing the export of Comm- ©
[4999]13-00000
[5001]Seoerid, With respect to esuisting the Latin Aueyican
[5002]nations te weaist the impact 6f Coommist subversion, there —
[5003]io 8 sumixy of cur current programs and A listing of
[5004]specifies: editions. things which we om de) in other words,
[5005]B treatment @f the subversive question fron ¢we points of
[5007]view ~ therapy ap regerds Cubs peepiy lancta as regards Latin |
[5008]Amerioa et args. ;
[5010]TZ. Measures ts
[5012]whe felloning existing programs are ali having eous
[5013]edveres ethigh on thi hania abpibttitten of the Ogmmuriate
[5015]) Makes chip pehrgd of tho: Wanduase Pasunge.
[5016]his ection celytbubes to the restristien
[5018]ot Ftesn Given ope ehtrin Mate wat Deiter
[5019]4B) Assesede petrol adhe oot of coantenmn. _
[5020]i: Shene Plighte, mignenting aurface vurveiliance,
[5021]Keep: waten for mail? spite, fishing and merchants
[5022]sniping ‘epereting An the Onrthbean south of Oxbe,
[5023]and Waters tAgncent téan ana noveh of Jamaica.
[5026]13-00000
[5028]Tete dnvelves ection taken iu response to
[5029]specific necks, as tiring the 1962 sttampts to expert
[5030]Cuban vevolutiosartes te Central Aserica. These
[5031]were ooustered, and probably aborted, by the prevense
[5032]GF UA, lary Gostugers potveliing the constal areas
[5033]| OF Cente Rien ot the veqmet of the goverment of
[5034]_ text ooumtzy. :
[5036]: (4) Overtisgh. :
[5037]0 seocent staves $m Coban wiiitexy sqpubsistteny,
[5038]ese Flights serve'te s rounder of UAE. vigtinee
[5039]Bit Gobermtunittan,
[5041]| (5) Comamisatiqns Intelligate.
[5043]AI af the shove ere supported by ond strum
[5044]jevertas provid taeeup toe meeiitiaee of ta
[5045] Somemicntions Inbeltigense syaten.
[5046]Propaganda ~ Radi end Television.
[5048]. (1) the Votse of America nov conducts 2-3/5 boure
[5049]“(6f hort-ueve trontsante to Gia daly. ‘Shepe serve,
[5050]vin some degree, te expose to the Cuban people the
[5052](2) sued Feros radio ant televiaten tromfeants
[5053]fom the Gumatenmig Bevel Buse seek Gatty to combi
[5056]13-00000
[5058](1), Ziduination ef Cubs from Hemisphere organi-
[5059]witttens exhibits the penalty for conductive subversive
[5060]eativitty in her neighboring.states.
[5062](2) ¥.3.-Sovget talks regarding removal of Soviet
[5063]equibet forces from Guba are productive in thet they
[5064]cobtimme the pressure on the USSR end the Cubans, —
[5065]008 inep Ge mubjook. OF subversion vefore the wirlt.
[5067]Xp'is clear tint tebe ootivittes witah relate to
[5068]the dentaS of agent movenesis and the suppressiian of putge~
[5069]ganda enive Gtrectly to diminish the Commist capability
[5070]to export: subversion fzen Guba. Et 3s necessary, however,
[5071]bo contadpiate other actleiii itch, While less dtrectly
[5072]related bp wubversion, still serve to weaken Cube and tte
[5073]Comming itotatorshtp, and tims te oliminate the problen
[5074]at tts sgyrce. Xe 4s for this reason that there ts ;
[5075]presented herein 4: Gpestnm of sotions related directly
[5076]to Cuba, . ‘While tt ty alear that sous actions Iisted mny .
[5077]exceed the hortnens of feasthtlity, in terme ef sooye, viger,
[5078]or the retaiivenents of tutermtionsl rélations, 2t is never
[5079]theless fineidered necessmxy thay they be eet forth in thetr
[5080]_ sabtrety, $e onder that, the Brestdent may contenplate the
[5083]13-00000
[5085]te Iatratey Peclagtenltettons.
[5086]{42} Create probit Dor the Camtro vegime ond.
[5087]9) Sti sulvereive regain ty om intensified payeha-
[5088]hot! Angin effort euphintnine the hardships ont
[5089]i es » Gals eniiired ty the Conpentnos while
[5090]subvercivg tntnees axe given Jyrered trentemn
[5091](2) Yublieing the eosttast between Living eon
[5092]sto of Ct tte et ov of at
[5093]“{9) mason entetay the nomnt oF oA Uwesd-
[5094]gust time tattevet $9 Pula, and intenity exhests
[5095]LO “ge the daprotation 2 suffertig brought on the
[5097]OR A) centunt atebeien televiaten troatennts asm
[5098]44 the Gabon penne and Latin dmentoms stutenke tn ‘
[5100]lone on the matuie ‘abit seope of adbwenaive tainting
[5101]Gindusted in Cuba aid methods of exportation.
[5102]A. Movenant: of Perporae. oo
[5104]" Smengh miilktinbwial and Misterel political
[5105]poemomette with 2ahin snericon stater, eek to .
[5106]tipede the mpuinetit Sf persone into and out of Cuts,
[5107]_ {20 Co be cxymnted br Sento.)
[5111]ae. oi te eer ns
[5114]13-00000
[5116]6. Dininish the Hysical ant Esoncms Capability
[5117]of Castwo Cube to Train ani Expart Subvereives.
[5119]Te 1s evident that veaty fonts, in considerable _
[5120]quentity, are requived to conduct a subversive training
[5121]progr, not te apank bf pther costiy factors + army
[5122]demolttions, uci, food, progagunda, ete. Specific
[5123]actions aimed xt rederiig the Gubens' resourses will
[5124]tiem-have o divest effeit upon thety ability te pursua
[5125]thety uegtum of exiweysiion, wit! cow then to torn
[5127]to thety om tnternel payblime ahd will give the Raeions
[5128]vous 'ap to the wistem‘Or porting 2 yrogrem which te
[5131]13-00000
[5133]| (a) Atkrtt Catan senourean.
[5135]: (a) Furchasie the defection af persone, ete
[5137]“ qgafty ships, boats and ether valuable items,
[5139]_ (>) Coniuet aea-ettripatable actions agatnet
[5140]petwslens resources, upen which much of Cuba's
[5141]eoontny Cepeda. ‘these actions show extend ell
[5142]the uny from divest dertrustion te sabotage
[5144]” thvongh cheatin eat Sesturtel contamination of
[5145](e) ty aan oe tutettigmi tatieastone
[5147]cnuse Cuban ailttery fevees to stant continually
[5149]"eb @ high alert level und thas ‘te eonmens suppites
[5151]110). sate enna Semen tn teisentet to movers .
[5153]“ (3) Dintvich Cube finansial ressurees.
[5155]a Oe ee tn lavge
[5157]LO —_ eeamnk i, W'iarert the Satan finawatad prewe,
[5158]ae ant te nahi oak onde:
[5160]Stace the Bratton are anctttone = sesne Boater
[5163]13-00000
[5165]Sfp aepentsing tho Yegreas shdch are naw fn progress
[5166]it 42 nosensary 0 reflect that, extensive though they are,
[5167]many have net yet sccelevated to their full thrust ant, taken
[5168]all together, they have oertuinly sob fortified eur elltes to -
[5170]the point where suiversion can be gaid to be under full oembrel.
[5171]a. US Mtittany neterts. : , ;
[5173]. United States military forces are now partici ,
[5174]setting tn a tend saobion of miiksnay and exkos-eaitinay
[5175]fungiiens in Latin Anewlen, all of uhtch contribute to
[5176]etueigthening the abfiity of the ommtries to expase
[5177]tant put dem exbveredys eotivity. Te these, the
[5178]neteetved aves .
[5180]a
[5182]13-00000
[5184]- (2) couetxsursinay, exttnaitwession and 7ay~
[5185]chilogton) gperationy treining,’ thrown the medtan
[5186]of pilitery sitestons end mobile treining tomes.
[5188]AG) Yeoristen of eghigmant and materiel on chert
[5189]notice for wie tn the fies of subversion or subversive
[5190]tonnes. ,
[5192]GG) Ree conde 6 eerasney toeizing ogres ia
[5193]mob and viet contre, .
[5195]{8) Peoetaian of feted combertsmurgenay otuek-
[5196]tton for Latin dmertoan officers end enlisted men in
[5197]United States Seaview behets amt sondentes.
[5199]AS) Provision of efute action training and
[5200]assistance.
[5202]"(6) Amaitiney witttasy cerorte atued at streigthen-
[5203]ing the ability of Latin American countries to resist
[5205]Lo a (2) Satted Stétes provision of mintenence
[5207]vimeapert and Suctatanoe Say Latin American sare)
[5209](b) Berioer exetange yuesrem.
[5211]rs (a) Language fietning for Latin Auertcan
[5213]waiatary students, —
[5215]= Intecnatidont xy, mavy and Ate Farce
[5217]B. fe) Couperatins mapping operations.
[5219]“S0H) exedp sntormstiifins . .
[5221]: ‘The United Stptes military is embarked on a
[5222]pevgron aimed at making the Latin American military
[5223]mere of the retlittes-ef Comumisn ané Comuntst
[5224]eubterstion. This AneRinens
[5227]13-00000
[5229]. " (q)-Qvensistéen inte Spanish and printing of
[5230]'-$0,000 sets of the series of ten pamphlets
[5231]. entitled, » “Denoomiey versus Conmmisn”.
[5232]: (o): Devesynent of en antto/visun fim strip
[5233]_Mased on the "Denacecy vermus Ccmumian” Pamphlets
[5234]-/ Chechamived and elghty ef these films sat records
[5235]“tove been send bo WINERIES cur further distribution
[5236]i ae sats ada saraons
[5237], (oe) Mrdetecnsintired copies of the USEA pamphies
[5238]‘ eotdoes y Dovettien Contes Ia Yaron Sommnntsti"
[5239]“awe being pobourcdl ‘fer distritution anmg the
[5240]“ketth Amartcan nttitery.
[5241]b. te Roltoo-tombe Betas (to be euyplted Wy
[5242]"* State).
[5243]othe Foopaguata Eevert (to be mupited by WHA).
[5244]4.: the Intelligence gai Non-attributable Efforts
[5245]es ‘be sapped by OFA),
[5246]2. Bepgrenp Waton lay Be Znttinted.
[5247]fufn the case of Segtiim TI, the the programs outlined
[5248]bela are seithin ressanitte technical end pructiest soupetense.
[5249]However, 2 they ovtes the deuplete spectrum of actions, it~.
[5250]te vesleaaf that jer tiy'be foend smmttahte, on politions
[5251]or other gitupdss 7
[5252]2, Sarveiliances -
[5253]GS matched a GEBBiboan ane ant constel surveti
[5254]lugiee /peegvam witch WppYides fer mittisterel exchenge
[5255]of feforantion and milttlaterel pertisiyatton tn an
[5258]13-00000
[5260]43) Couttinn te taprorencat of US comooations
[5261]an Jatin America, ot high priedity, te contribute
[5262]tothe effectivences af the alerting systen.
[5264]b. Multinational Cousterinsumgency Force.
[5266]‘Bibtoxe the romsibitiity oF organizing en ORS
[5267]Counbérineurgemy Erigete for explaynent throughout
[5268]Latte ‘darter: to omiat the effects of subversion.
[5269]Such & proposst, mie #4 this time, would exhibit the
[5270]seriesis determination of the U.S, te support vigorously
[5271]an anti-cubversion program,
[5272]©, Spates and Orientation.
[5274]Provide for a greatly expented out-of-country
[5275]touting ant orientation peegrem for kay seguents of
[5276]each fintin American eoitey‘s population such ast
[5278]2) Bontsted and @fticer miittery persommel te de
[5279]' , sebijoled an Youu sntfar the United states. ,
[5280]42) Pontos persentidt to be soheeted tn Fanmes or
[5282]; (s) anti snctatom tn be irene 8 Ute
[5283]Shites teaming sotaaiis. .
[5285]{fe tot of shen pte tetnng eee,
[5286]taki pance ia the ntted Stebex,.ta not just te en.
[5287]hangg the skill ani edusmtion level of the people tuvebved
[5288]but, ‘even mows, to exping the Latins to US influence,
[5290]‘or ijow tien Gur veut, te yeanusde then Uy close -
[5291]congeinkton thet our view is correct, and thi to stiffen
[5292]thaty receive te oustat Sibresmten fm any fom.
[5295]13-00000
[5298]tmoclon ncroeam (cer strton enterprise)
[5299]to the sutwomatee dangly they fees.
[5303](2) Vademurtte, tig, mecemmmry, and comet an
[5305]{iferention yeoman nitintn each county sn Latin
[5307]Kiterton using these: §
[5309]3. (a) dn eayesitiim of feote on mivveretve totthm
[5311]ON ding, woirement of’ gubversives, and general sub-.
[5313]: (b) Gbjeotives of the Commuists within cach
[5315]a (o) Counintes metheda of eperatiag.
[5316](4)-Fects onthe decrease tn Ltving standards
[5317]. “ydtnin Guba since the Five of Cacteo. :
[5318]S (e) Pacts on turzor saa repression tn Cube.
[5319]“3qa) Develop & Prowimertean Jsh’-Comamist Press
[5320]Many Latin American papers, even the anti-
[5321]opmamist ones, axe infiltrated by commmist agente
[5322]and many of thetr colmamtists, proaf-readers and
[5323]Mnotypare sre bought with commaist money. Civcu-
[5324]Antton of these papiy te avtitieelty inflated by tow
[5326]United Stites must witeh this fiumcts} Saveetment in
[5327]swe control tn érder''to cowpey the tgnth to the ;
[5328]“Miftin who, If the Simertoan, Helteves what he ren .
[5331]13-00000
[5335], , Frevel conteels A b-
[5336]. Re Ue should strive for an O48 euberge on travel 7
[5337]|
[5338]i
[5340]g. agrove Our Combertusurgeney Programs .
[5341]“We should accelerate and brenden counberinuurgenay
[5342]progeigws in each ofuntay of Latin Amerton, detwing
[5343]for ; gealistia “tntermal Defense Plan” fay every ecustzy
[5344]ont usging Latin Anavioan camivies to ask for US cqunter-
[5347]13-00000
[5348]hl
[5351]13-00000
[5353]ceve-of Sidid-beset Cmmauist subversion tn latin Auavten,
[5354]Zeqh indtvidin? sotien enbodies some eletant of usefulness
[5355]in Atself, ‘and any seubination pf actions snelid/ generate
[5357]coppuspuntitiyly favorable semulte. Shere 19 no profound ver
[5359]lntLenship ‘which dusante the combining of any specific sot |
[5360]of satienss -
[5361]goomen, therefore, that en early selection
[5362]be made of those nations Lixted’ shove those exeoution ts
[5363]compatibig with nabional ¢ seat end dediostions in |
[5364]gli wad that they Ve gut qulokiy inte effect sinse
[5365]Longa) he subversive influences th the Hemisphere are ;
[5366]. ~~
[5367]- mnte 7 -
[5370]13-00000
[5372]7.
[5373]e
[5375]Subject:
[5377]Date:
[5379]A
[5380]| a | — | USAF __
[5381]vey OO NSC —
[5382]ONI HEDGES
[5383]OSD | a Se 7
[5385]_ Joint Staff
[5388]13-00000
[5390]IX.A.3.d+- General Pressures to Create a Contingency
[5392]In order to accomplish the overthrow or reorientation of the Cuban
[5393]regime without harming the United States image and vith minimm distortion
[5394]of bilateral US-USSR relationships, thare must be careful coordination and
[5395]phasing of our future actions and demeanor. There mist be a plan capable
[5397]‘. of getting us from where we are now to where ve vant to go, by gradually
[5398]increasing pressures until the objective is achieved. These pressures
[5399]should be designed to create opportunities ‘and contingent tuations
[5400]for further exploitation, along the way. | ee
[5401]The optimm orchestration of such # Cuban yrogram mist obviously be oO
[5402]developed as the future unfolds. But in onder to provide overall. guidiince
[5403]‘ee; within this Government, a plan tracing the mainstreams of effort is required.
[5404]This plan is divided into eight headings with a gradually increasing level
[5405]of effort described under each of these headings. The progress through
[5406]the various phases 1s visualized as taking place in « coordinated but not
[5407]a necessarily symmetrical manner. In other vords, we may be in the most
[5408]. vigorous phase of propaganda while not yet having reached the final. phase
[5409]a“ with regerd to subversion but nonetheless the decision to proceed to the
[5410]respective phase ‘in either category would t be coordinated ae .part of an
[5412]. overall govermmental orchestration.
[5413]A-program scenario capable of producing a decisive chanes or
[5414]oe exploitable contingency over an 18-month period follove.
[5415]US Posture - ~ Initially the US image should be that of ‘willingness
[5416]to ao all that is necessary to keep Cast=o's military threat nil end his
[5418]subversive threat to the Western Hemisphere at en acceptably low ie
[5419]It should be characterized as one during which the USG, .having been .
[5422]13-00000
[5423]7 . : | or ernie
[5424]st .
[5425]tle 0 extrenely reasonable despite Castro's intransigence, is waiting for signs
[5426]" of more favorable change in Cuba.
[5427]Later the US image showld change to one in which the US is being
[5428]"Led" by the majority of the OAS into OAS initiated and sponscred Tm
[5429]‘a . pressures against Cuba. These would consist of” measures less than those
[5430]certain to overthrow Castro but going beyond the earlier measures, in
[5431]’ . the expectation that resulting internal pressures might eliminate Castro
[5432]tial provide an occasion for decisive ection. Pressures would be applied
[5433]oe n, 4m such fashion ax to represent both a carzct to the Cuban people to get
[5434]rid of Castro regime end a stick toward the present regime. still later
[5435]the US stance should becom: publicly, "at last" to join the OAS mjority =~.
[5436]in seeking vigorous pressures ‘on the Castro”regime_without yet irrevocably
[5439]committing US prestige to decisive action. ; 2 oe
[5440]Finally, if and when the orchestration and circumstances have ,
[5442]brought the us position to such a point that decisive action is possible,
[5443]and if earlier pressures have not eliminated Castro or do not give nromise
[5444]eo of eliminating, “Stee decisive action might be considered. This need not
[5445]be an invasion by US forces and could be re-imposition of total blockade
[5446]or a disarming airstrike, dependent on the circumstances. .
[5447]OAS Action - --The USG will need to devote major attention to the
[5448]strengthening of the solidarity of the OAS as a source of regional
[5449]_ Opposition to the Castro regime. These efforts should go forward openly
[5451]. @long several lines, quite pert from the covert effort to organize the
[5452]majority on specific issues. This effort to achieve. solidarity should
[5453]consist of frequent briefings of the OAS nations through all appropriate
[5455]._’ channele, Consultative Meetings of Foreign Ministers of the OAS, efforte
[5457]to set up an OAS military organization ‘with occasional commitment of troops
[5460]13-00000
[5464]"for training, and all other feasible developments of regional themes, such
[5465]as intensive efforts to build up the counterinsurgency capabilities of the
[5466]region. -It is very necessary, in view of the general LA situation to
[5467]; contame all measures necessary to isolate Castro.
[5468]"| Initial OAS ection should be the enlargement of the bases for the
[5469]invocation of the Rio Treaty. | qhis broadening should be against the con-
[5470]timed presence of Soviet troops (unless negotiations with the USSR iniicste__
[5471]that this aspect should be deferred) and/or against Castro's continued
[5472]subversive activity. Concomitantly, the recent study of the. Special
[5473]Consultative Committee on Security should be given wide publicity and ,
[5474]the US should press for implementation of its recommendations. Do
[5475]‘The OAS, in the near future, probably after publication of the results
[5476]of the foregoing study and enlargement of the basis for invoking the Rio
[5477]Treaty to include subversion, should again formally warn Cuba against
[5479]promotion of any more subversive activities. ‘The OAS should formally
[5480]state that should Cuban subversive activities rise above some (unspecified)
[5481]level, a "new condition" would exist which would justify decisive action
[5482]_-— against Cuba. All episodes of subversion or sabotage which could be
[5483]attributed to Castro should be highly publicized. The majority OAS support
[5484]_ should be organized to neutralize the Brazilian co-existence thens. .
[5486]2’ Bitatered epprosches and economic quid pro qios should be used to win
[5487]Brazil to the U.S. view within OAS.
[5488]Still later, at an appropriate time, the OAS should make an official
[5489]finding, from its studies initiated earlier, that the Castro regime has
[5490]continued, despite warnings, to conduct aggressive and subversive actions
[5492]—_ in Latin America. A summary publication of subversive activities or
[5495]13-00000
[5497]See
[5501]vy oc O
[5504]. . t.
[5505]"white Paper should be promigated through ‘the OAS. Later a “new condition”
[5507]should be found formally to exist, following which the US would state
[5508]that the earlier US-USSR mods vivendi regarding’ Cuba. has ¢ come to an end.
[5509]Following the above, - an OAS vote should call for the remaining TA natidas—— ~~
[5510]to sever diplomatic relations with Cuba and for all menbers to restrict
[5511]their nationals from travel to ‘Cube. Castro should be officially labeled
[5512]as a major threat to the hemisphere and to the objective of the Alliance
[5513]for Progress, ;
[5514]The QAS might then declare that Castro's subversive activity constitutes
[5516]* warlike activity and proclaim @ prohibition against eny warlike activity
[5518]being conducted by Cuba within an ocean and lend area around the entire IA
[5519]continental and Caribbean area. Intervention of aircraft and ships
[5520]carrying arms, subversive egents, propaganda materials, ete. could be
[5522]orized, | ony > ' , a
[5524]Still leter at an appropriate time the OAS should vote, under the
[5525]Rio Pact, to punish Castro's aggression. This action could take the
[5526]form of a resolution for all wenbers to take such action including the
[5527]use of force es individually considered appropriate or to endorse any
[5528]specific decisive action to which the nenbers had agreed.
[5530]‘The USG should brief its Allies on the views of the OAS and warn that
[5531]the situation may get worse. Later, as 6 result of “OAB" insistence" the
[5532]Free World should be urged to extend or re-affirm trade exbargos to all
[5533]items except food stuffs, medicines, and medical supplies; to: apply shipping
[5535]; restrictions; NATO should be persuaded to include Cuba on the Vist of
[5537]countries to which shipment of COCOM ist (strategic) items is prohibited;
[5539]free world industrial nations should be dissuaded from shipping to Cuba
[5542]13-00000
[5544]-¢ . .
[5545]erucial spare parts and equipment which are not on the COCOM list.
[5547]' Union has no intention of removing any additional militery personnel,
[5549], fashion as to be clearly visible to the Cuban people; vhile avoiding
[5551]Eee
[5553]Still later the US should increase the vigor with which she seeks,’
[5554]through. briefings, ‘pressures, etc., to increase the effectiveness of all
[5555]economic measures and should seek to persuade all non-bloc nations to
[5556]limit their airline services-to Cuba and to withhold transit rights to
[5557]Soviet aircraft serving Cuba. At an eppropriate point in the orchestration,
[5558]food stuffs should be added to the prohibited trade list, vith US using ~---—__
[5561]its influence to extend this embargo throughout the Free World.
[5563]The ultimate extension of economic actions, would be the application
[5564]of @ blockade to Cuba. This could be © phased weapon consisting of a,
[5565]Dlockade on POL, with the prospect of total blockade to follow.
[5567]Surveillance over Cuba -~ Until it becomes apparent that the Soviet
[5569]aerial surveillance should be limited to appropriate high altitude
[5570]‘coverage with low level surveillance avoided oxceyt for thoroughly
[5571]suspicious indications.
[5573]Later, at a suitable point in the orchestration, occasional low
[5574]altitule surveillance of "suspicious" areas should be undertaken in such
[5576]AA. defenses. : -
[5577]sti21 later, sustebly timed, the United staton/oAs should initiate
[5578]very. frequent low altitude surveillance. This should be increased in
[5579]intensity to the point at which our aircraft vould literally seek out
[5580]AA defense sites in search of provocative acts or, in the absence or
[5581]Cuban reaction, to deflate Castro's image. — :
[5582]In any decisive action at the end of the road, surveillance should
[5584]be at saturation levels.
[5586]13-00000
[5588]ctese anemone
[5590]- Regions Surveillance ~- The OAS or the Caribbean nations should take
[5591]the initiative in organizing, as a part of a Caribbean security arrange-
[5592]went, a-curface ship and serial surveillance of the coastal and offshore
[5593]_waters of the Caribbean nations. These patrols should be progressively
[5594]moved out from the shores of the nations being protected into the Caribbean
[5595]approaches to Cuba, tying in with an OAS proclaimed zone in which movement
[5597]_ of subversive agents, materials, forces, or arms is prohibited. Toward the
[5599]. ” "end of the crescendo, they should operate close to the shores of Cube. °
[5601]"there should be increasing surveillance end control of land boundaries.
[5602]: There should be improved systematic exchange of intelligence on sub: verpive. .
[5604]/  estavity, wen
[5605]Propaganda -- There should be established sotsteny a redio station
[5607](Radio Free Cuba) » Probably in Florida, using covert fonds, with
[5609]regularly scheduled Cuban broadcasts available to all Cuben political
[5610]=~ @roups. Its content should be the middle cotvexse between VOA and
[5611]. Radio Swan. aa ;
[5612]Initially, through public statements, VOA, etc., maintain the
[5613]theme of the U.S. “watchful. wilting" for change in ‘the Castro regime.
[5614]a Maintain the currently enbanced VOL wave facility beamed G5 Uttar High-
[5615]5. °° ight positive results in Latin America of the Alliance for Progress. We a
[5616]_ should warn Cube unofficially through the suggested Radio Free Cuba of the
[5617]consequences of continued ‘subversion and of Castro's present track. Still
[5618]later, prior to any decisive action, if taken, this theme should go out
[5619]officially over VOA and in announcements of public officials.
[5620]Initiate and organize clandestine newspapers and leaflet operations.
[5622]Infiltrate Cuban exile publications. Play up, on all media, the threat
[5624]13-00000
[5626]‘of Castro to the regines of the Western Hemisphere and the objectives
[5628]of Alliance for Progress. Remind the Cuban people that Castro came to
[5629]power on-a pledge to provide political freedom. Remind them of the social
[5630]goals he held up while he destroyed that freedom. Contrast their present
[5631]economic chaos with those economic goals of land and housing reform. .
[5633]Remind them that he -preached nationalism while delivering their country
[5634]to the Soviet military occupation. Point out how each shift of goal vas
[5635]eecompanied by the destruction of earlier ones. Ask vhat Castro ‘has left
[5636]to offer. Conclude thet only the mitual fear of retribution among
[5637]huis elite remains to hold then in pover. Use slogans euch as " 64"
[5638]‘(Liberty in '6h), ete a
[5639]Still later initiate through public broadcast, training in the
[5640], rudiments of seditions activity.
[5641]St4ll later urge the many small yevolutionary-cells to make contact
[5645]with neighboring groups. Warn end threaten the Castro regime through
[5646]‘ all media; exhort the people to orgenize to-join enlerged resistance groups;
[5647]_ seek to build up resistance heroes. [ndeavor to deflate Castro through
[5648]__--—* these bewadcasts. Stress the freedom-of the Cuban people, post-Castro, to
[5649]- _choose their ow political and social structure.
[5650]Bo Subversion -- There should be’ an.initial ‘period of no increase in
[5651]~ subversive efforts by the U.8.4 until the bilateral phase of the Cuban
[5652]affair is completed and it is clear that the Soviet Union
[5653]no additional military personnel. _
[5654]° After that time minimal covert contacts should be established within
[5656]Cuba for the distribution of newspapers and leaflets. Minimal acts of
[5657]* - defiance and sabotage should be initiated.. For example, exhort groups
[5660]13-00000
[5662]Soe
[5664]ragyencaes
[5665]eerie)
[5667]* of 3 or 4 friends, without establishing external. rebel affiliation, to”
[5669]mane L'64, ete., on walls or. to cafit isolated acte of sabotage. The -
[5671]GS
[5673]. Purpose. would be to establish rebel connotation and to generate leadership.
[5675]This would lead to the establishment of rudimentary c&llular training
[5677]in seditious activity. Minimal supply of critical items shoulda be initiated
[5678]to subversive groups within Cuba on a case-by-case basis. Potential leaders .
[5679]should be identified. Contingency planning, covert and unilateral, should
[5680]continue. The number of Cuban exiles ‘teken into the United States Armed
[5681]Forces for training and formation of reserve units should be significantly
[5682]dncreased. A esmiler program for "freedom fighters for Cuba” should be
[5683]undertaken for volunteers from other LA nations. At a leter point in the
[5684]crescendo, departures from the Cuban armed forces in organized units should —
[5685]‘be encouraged. All covert effort should be exerted toward conrdinating
[5687]the cells, pockets, and groups ‘restating Castro, inside and outside Cuba.
[5688]Thig would bea transition period from sporadic acts in isolation into
[5689]organized subversion. Fuel and: food suppliés: chowla be sabotaged. An
[5691]"organized supply system should te put into effect vith large numbers of
[5693]fishing craft situated around the island to make both scheduled supply.
[5695]of deliveries and deliveries of opportunity. As various. groups are identi-
[5696]fied in revolt, they should be worked into the supply system. New LA end
[5697]Cuban fighters training outside.Cuba, should be introduced in the seme. way
[5699]into these organized movements within Cuba. There should be frequent.
[5701]ieaks of planed UB invasion and appropriate denials to frustrate the
[5702]suspicious Castro. Fleet and air "training" dembnstrations should be
[5703]scheduled off Cuba. At the ame time it should be made clear to rebel
[5705]leaders that an externally launched invasion is not to be expected until
[5707]@ revolution has come from within, with external logistic assistance.
[5710]13-00000
[5712]"Et" showla De emphasized to the rei.cl leaders that the U.S. does not expect
[5713]_ the clock to be turned back with regard to social conditions. |
[5714]" gtaa2 iater a complete orchestretion should be wover together,
[5716]coming to @ crescendo through the optimal exploitation of all the mn-
[5717]strearis discussed in the categories above. Propaganda should reach the
[5718]maximum denunciation of the regime, exhorting to revolt, holding up the
[5719]prospect of peace and a better life should the Cuban people join their
[5720]-Yesistance leaders. Subversion should be stepped up by introduction of
[5721]aul aveilable externally trained vesisterce fighters, provision of maximm
[5722]logistic cupport, ete. st the ep roprdct z : vime, if this resistance noyement
[5723]needs the essistance of external forces there should be an OAS structured
[5724]air strike, related to an appropriete Castro mis-step, to disarm Cuban .
[5726]offensive end defensive power and to destroy all POL storage. Thies atteck
[5728]should be coordinated with all-out sabote ze.
[5730]An invasion force should be kept in readiness for use, if re-
[5731]quired to save the resistance, once the all-out internal resistence
[5732]efforts has been initiated.
[5734]Criteria ~-- The pressures discussed in all categories above should
[5736]. be appropriately coordinated. The period of moderation should end after
[5737]one or two months when it fe apparent that no further Soviet nilitery
[5738]personnel are to be removed. Moderate pressures shoulda then commence,
[5739]lasting for a period of two to:three months, until some episode of
[5740]escalation by Castro or other appropriate event, makes further pressures
[5741]feasible. If such an event is not forthcoming, OAS major insistance should
[5742]lead to escalation of pressures. After enother skort period, egain pre-
[5743]ferable triggered by an approprinte Ccstro episode or alternatively vy a
[5745]. majority OAS vote’ still more vigorous pressures should be initiated.
[5748]13-00000
[5750]1.
[5752]; ° If Castro hes initiated a suitable -r-like act, such as firing
[5753]ve on surveillance aircraft, pressures should be escalated to the maximum
[5754]oh immediately rather than gradually. -_
[5757]13-00000
[5759]DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
[5760]OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS .
[5761]WASHINGTON 25, D.C. oe nercy acrer to
[5762]Op-613C/sg
[5763]Ser 000950P61
[5765]a MAR T1963
[5767]| ; oo Seen —oongraces to CONF upon removal of ‘enclosares
[5769]MEMO DUM FOR MR, J, A. CALIFANO, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO TH
[5770]_ SECRETARY OF THE ARNY —
[5772]Subj: Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee on Cuban
[5773]Affairs: Subcommittee on Cuban Subversion (U) .
[5775]Ref: (a) Your Memo No, 13 of 28 FEB 1963
[5777]Enol: (2) through (8) Proposed actions (18)
[5779]‘1. As requested by: reference (a), specific. and direct: ‘getions: md
[5780]designed to resolve problems of Cuban subversion are sub- .
[5781]mitted herewith as enclosures (1) through (8).
[5785]WF AWE poe
[5786]Pini Ha Da
[5790]|
[5792]EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING
[5793]- BOD DIB 620010 DOES MOT APPLY
[5795]: Reproduction of this decument fn zi
[5796]: or in part Is f-onbited
[5797]PAGE NO__1__oF__1_PAGES except with permissic. of the ;
[5799]copy NO._1._OF_10__cOPIES Wsultg eee or higher aut
[5802]13-00000
[5804]aon |
[5805]A,
[5807]Bt B.
[5809]28 G
[5810]' . . DD.
[5812]JE.
[5814]FPF,
[5816]| 6,
[5821]os,
[5823]pe we 7 I.
[5825]7 J.
[5827]K,
[5829]. PROPOSED ACTIONS WHICH MIGHT
[5830]sO BE-TAKEN UNILATERALLY BY THE US,
[5831], BILATERALLY, OR THROUGH THE OAS, TO
[5832]IMPEDE THE MOVEMENT OF SUBVERSIVE
[5833]TRAINEES TO AND FROM CUBA
[5835]Institute effective Procedures to insure that U.S, citizens
[5836]do not travel to and from Cuba (unflateral U.S. action).
[5838]Continue U.S. restriction against U.S, airline service
[5839]to Cuba. (This is important to avoid giving other air~ -
[5841]}. lines an excuse to reestablish air service) (unilateral
[5843]U.S. action). .
[5845]Thoroughly examine Latin American constitutions and laws .
[5847]to determine the legal. capability or impediment to.control
[5849]a travel “i their citizens to and from Cubs. (unilateral
[5850]oS. action), . :
[5852]Arrange ‘for adverse publicity on individuals who are . .
[5853]known to have undergone subversive training in Cuba (uni-
[5855]‘lateral U.S. action).
[5857]sSpread rumors of epidemics in Cuba Canilateral U.S. action).
[5858]Sabotege aircraft proceeding to and from Cuba (unilateral
[5859]U.S, action), ; .
[5861]Increase U.S. efforts to establish identity of all Latin
[5862]eeriosas travelling to and from Cuba (unilateral U.S.
[5863]‘action), . ; ; .
[5865]Encourage Latin American countries to pass new legislation,
[5866]or enforce existing legislation, restricting the travel
[5867]of their citizens to and from Cuba (unilateral U.S. action),
[5869]Persuade Latin American goveraments to prevent re-entry:
[5870]to their country of persons Suspected to have been :
[5871]trained in subversion in Cuba (unilateral U.S. action).
[5873]Persuade LA countries to tighten border security measures
[5874]by appropriate authority (unilateral U.S. action), Supply
[5875]equipment and POL for patrol and surveillance, See
[5876]enclosure (6), ; .
[5878]Cubana’s Britannia aircraft are in disrepair (2 or 3 of 5
[5879]are operational), Under existing agreements, Cuba must
[5880]ue : EXCLUTED FRO AUTOMATIC DAVRGRADING
[5882]Of this document in - . . . oon or S20 Does WOT APPLY,
[5884]= | hola or. in part is prohibited - oo i ;
[5885]“foo Bing offs or prt _Encosune (/) to cno Surjtena 000 £5 07%) Weel oe
[5889]thority. se
[5892]13-00000
[5894]seék Mexican concurrence in using new equipment (IL-18)
[5896]on the Havana—Mexico City route, We should persuade
[5898]Mexico to refuse the new aircraft on grounds of safety, :
[5899]facilities, or other reasons. We should also encourage = =
[5900]Great Britain or other sources to cut off spare parts
[5901](unilateral U.S, action),
[5903]L. Encourage hemd spheric countries to deny unscheduled
[5904]traffic stops: to Cubana airlines (unilateral U.S. action).
[5906]M. Persuade friendly governments in LA and elsewhere to.
[5907]harass ships and aircraft traveling to Cuba with admini- ~
[5908]strative delays (minute examination of air worthiness
[5909]setione customs, documents, ete. ) (unilateral U. 25e
[5910]action), .
[5912]N. Seek arrangement whereby other Latin ‘Amexican countries +. -- ..-
[5913]would cooperate with Mexican efforts to-deny travel their ,
[5914]nationals to and from Cuba via Mexico (see Mexico City
[5916]Tel 2221) (bilateral U. S. action).
[5919]13-00000
[5921]aie to predict { the. Suture, lt: LQ,
[5923]. The dlecussion of the factors conditioning U. a, polley ta
[5924]the realm of the clandestine and covert may ecem elementary and
[5925]somewhat philosophical; however, these factors provide the general
[5926]parameters within which future actions can be considered. Any.
[5927]attempt to determine the proportionate influence of any particular
[5929]“conditioner would be speculative,
[5930](2 MAJOR conperignuNG FACTORS
[5932], eu describes onal ce few of the elements which must bé considered
[5934]in the process of making valid and conclusive determinations:
[5936]TMS, a : a
[5937]It is moet dealrable to detazmine tha Ui 8.”
[5938]objective in precise terme. _ When the objective te clarified and
[5941]13-00000
[5943]understood, actions can be developed to achieve that oljeative. The
[5944]extent of the U. S. cormmitment; se. reflected by the determination
[5946]- of the objective, is an important factor in the determination of the
[5947]. commitment of U. 8, yeequrces and has great algnificance in the
[5949]“ander the situation currently sbtatning in Cuba probably envisages
[5951]: gn ultimate U. 8. Pooaeeeantn sures here can
[5953]F in advance of U. 8. policy, anid (4) devalop- .
[5957]some intriguing gimmickexy.
[5959]Obviously, thie dictoymination of U. 8, objectives is
[5960]beyond the realm of the clandestine and. covert and cannot be con-
[5962]. sidered in the context of Cubs atone. Serious judgments must be
[5964]made in relation to the broad world environment. Actions against
[5965]Cae ny be detrimental fo. o. alms by caning intensified socerity
[5967]7 7
[5968]A goad “rule of Cammnb” with reepect to clandestine
[5970]or covert nations te fat tha risks entailed are in direct proportion
[5971]ta thé necfalness of the operations.
[5973]cP Attest ibutlon ‘and Denisbiltty : ye
[5974]U. 8 Lenderitig will cbvays be concamed with
[5975]bra
[5978]13-00000
[5980]‘tatrative or security preceutions'o
[5981]ton itself) and reasqnabic safeguards to inraie tat the prost of
[5982]Lm 8. implication cannot ba developed, -
[5984]In this connettion there is a mandatery requirement ;
[5985]- for unanimity of dcalal ou‘the part of U. 5. officials. This unanimity
[5986]muist obtain despite the raagnitude, yecetotemens ov accuracy of the
[5987]-Cagt¥o/ Communist proph bie penssombeongert ty 8,
[5989]‘setire operations
[5991]shou peed oe ato 6 roto 8.
[5993]scat eon iy ciara senaluve postion e
[5994]the wu 8 is ina ‘ pmiere sensitive
[5996]cetngeavaban
[5998]SEEN og EMA NE REE ON AI, Neel ten tite
[6001]13-00000
[6003]OO Serre i Sa een Le a ee
[6005]greater credibility to the accusations of the Castro or Sino/Soviet
[6006]Bloc and alert our enemies to the possibility that the U. 5, may
[6007]tadartake- actions of a less conventional nature,
[6009]a “Vea, cake
[6011]. It may be desizable to undertake actions which
[6012]achieve Little press caverage (visibility or noise level), I¢ ig
[6013]difficult to determine with any accuracy beforehand the extent of
[6014]the publicity to be achieved. The Castro Regime generally can
[6015]-cantrol the timing and magnitude of public release. The world .
[6016]preas for the most part is not subject to WU. & control exgapt as”
[6017]‘the U. 8. may achieve success through counter -propagenda,
[6019]tnesenating’ or , iano canto mont acceptable;: A .°
[6021]atically increased nolae level may be acceptable when accomphiled
[6023]by significant (headline) overt items which serve to distract the -
[6024]attention of the sable. . of.
[6026]There is @ natural reluctance to undertake
[6027]clandestine or covert actlona which result in the death or serious
[6028]injury to innocent Cubans. Meaningful actions will certainly .
[6029]cause harm to certain elements, but eome of the destructive actions
[6030]which could be undertaken may be counterproductive in that they
[6031]strike at the wrong fargets. Unfortunately, it is difficult to achieve |
[6032]the desired degree of selectivity.in uncontrolled operations, imple- .
[6033]mmonted. ia secrecy,
[6035]aa - hy ereattoniot fobs” eLothing unit iadksl stingiagse
[6036]and the subotage of etorage or distribution facilities undoubtedly may
[6037]“hurt the sconomy but those committed to the Castro Regime may ;
[6038]suffer relatively little. Such actions may do little but weaken an
[6039]inane or apathetic populace while increasing the internal security |
[6040]me em.
[6043]13-00000
[6045]+ emma y *
[6048]. judgmé
[6049]many of the proposals for actions directed ageinst Cuba. When
[6050]. _ the judgments of various individuals differ, the resulting U. 8.
[6052]ti pauper mi icsane iy artardpe periennt-oryasen renee
[6054]mitment and subsequent disclosure would not be desirable since
[6056]“state which theoretically could be brought to its knees ine rela~
[6058]dvely short pesiod of time through the npplication of
[6059]weapons,
[6061]These could canject the. U. S. to adverse criticiam on moral
[6062]rounds oF cxtend the parameters of warfare to new dinyiaslons.
[6064]4; Besguttest ond Exile Politics: - °
[6066]‘The recruiting problem deserves consideration
[6068]in any paper considering clandestine and covert actions. Obviously,
[6070]the recrultment of a sole individual involves a system of screening |
[6072]which theoretically must not be compromised efther in the process
[6074]of sorting Or during the subsequent utilisation and post-atilisetion
[6075]Theéxe ie « marked tendency for Cubans to talk, to brag,
[6077]or to infer participation in secret operations. - Individuals personally ;
[6079]and scores of exile organtentions are quick to capitalize on the real
[6081]covert activities.. There is & constant flow of proposals for action
[6082]and requests for assictan¢e or officiel recognition. Some individuals
[6084]. and organizations merely dasire to publicise their affiliations with
[6085]Goverament.
[6087]some member of the U. 8.
[6089]5
[6091]13-00000
[6093]of the proposals for action submitted by individuals and groupe.
[6095]“ally can be sisasured in terme of thelr assimilation and ecoiiotn!
[6096]‘gatcens {n tha U;°8.: ‘Sapertence has shown that internal |
[6100]It is not feasible te investigate in details all .
[6102]are not datialed with a elngle robuil. but make their offers to ine
[6103]dividuals in CIA, the Departments of State, Defense and Justice
[6104]or with members.cf Congress, the press, and other nonegovgrne
[6105]montal individuels or agencies, A specific action or proposal -
[6106]may have had merit at one point, but from a security
[6108]the persistence of the propascr may have negated the potential
[6109]eer eeperccn Cond have compronaaed an otherwiee
[6111]groups, the most apparent solution which is suggested frequeitly ae
[6112]envisages the recruitment of Cubans who have no political affiiia
[6113]tions. While this may be pasaible, experience has: od. Shas
[6114]it is not probable. Those Cubans in the U. 8. who have absoe:
[6115]with U, S. parsonnel and those who speak English are generally |
[6116]marked. Those whose language capabilities and economic stature
[6117]combine to mit their social mobility are more likely to turn.to,
[6118]accept and become involved in the socfal, polltical or cultural
[6119]elolsters of Gubans inthe U.S.
[6121]There are additional political and psychological
[6122]problems in seeking recruits from among Cubans who have fled -
[6123]and generally desire to yemain united with familits and friends,
[6124]Their motivation to participate in activities against Castro gener
[6126]iets may resent external Guban lesderahip, As the exile eroupe | .
[6127]compete for political prestige and material support, ao do the ©
[6128]representatives of the internal reaistance groups.
[6130]The probleme of exiles attempting to detirniine =
[6132], the extent of U. s. commitment and associated secutity, im licat
[6134]are discussed eloewhere in this paper.
[6137]13-00000
[6139]ac ae
[6141]econ BM adaytindey caters oR pees te oy
[6142]ER RT
[6144]_Orviously, the suscnacted smevetion of walle S
[6145]Be cosa pervert stn plcanhrupebeinrr ar yinm eng
[6147]days. There is no standby reservoir of multlegarpose agents, The
[6149]operations themselves call for split second timing and are subject both
[6151]paticle, compromiee tf internal contacts, actions of anti+Castro
[6152]SFPD S.. or othey world evant).
[6154]Dog ing stone ee comme yn noon oo
[6155]a Mote oftective operations can be undertaken when
[6157]Lty to nla Le ceoutect dota” Troan ensued senile
[6159]tunity to plas in greatest detail, From a practical itis
[6161]extremely difficult to maintain individual or group motivation and aggres-
[6163]aiveness whan operations are delayed, aborted, canelied or subjected to -
[6165]continual modification.
[6169]3. ASSETS
[6171]In considering U. 8. asaects for covert and clandestine operations
[6172]ageinat Cave. Ane re ran” bristly in an historical context, the
[6173]situation whith faces the U. &.
[6175]. frie. Sartre's neous of pore, U. 6. edtuets tn the held
[6176]etlarts in Trove immediate problem areas of the world. At the time
[6177]Castro assemed central in Cube, there was much open controversy on the
[6178]quastion of Castro's subservience to communism, but generally it was
[6179]assumed that the change of government in Guba was in the Well-known
[6181]Latin tradition, Later, Noa eeetca. eee a eral ns arernment
[6182]was not. juat @ change in personalities, but a revol:
[6184]governmental system. At this point, cay tn 1966, plane ware developed
[6185]to asaist the people of Guba in overthrowing their government. This plan
[6188]13-00000
[6190]SPRL IE BEARER ITAL RS EUR SA ee ge
[6192]cullmtanted ta the abortive Bay of Pigs Operation in lato April 1961.
[6193]idente and potential sestotwace groupe to capoee teansehves act be
[6195]af this tacts ponders
[6197]; During toa six month period which followed the eents-of Apt
[6198]2961, ec Scnae rat ns position to copoce ieult farther £9 to any
[6200]7° pap arienrelpinipherin pores ety
[6201]the Cuban security osierations of oi eng ma soe of
[6203]ss ivenenysevealed at tof pele eaet fa he tree aren
[6204]Agente one Saald nat be spared for con-
[6206]e During
[6207]first nine months af 194%, the emphasis was placed on intelligenca
[6208]aaa ne
[6210]avea.
[6212]_ sigehone aadestacen fering the apring and ponsuce ef tha .
[6214]wet maa Gin of immed aer th mines ies osinse
[6216]‘The cole af the Department of Defence ti casdenting iid covert
[6217]areas has been the subject of much controversy both within the Depart-
[6218]ment of Defense and within the Central Intelliganes Agency. .
[6221]13-00000
[6223]1 engendered ees oe
[6225]on a dade
[6227]with come inborn §
[6230]13-00000
[6232]jn-the past, tue nilltsary has played an easeniiet role in threa
[6234]wee SE amen and materiel. From the flecal stand-
[6235]| paint, the Department tbe an previa Put epenar wt
[6236]- selatively great flexibility.
[6238]deepen raat Peonourene im manpower of the DeD (with miiltary
[6240]and Hnguistic ekilis, ovareeas experience, physical cone
[6242]aitioning and personal dedication and aggreasivendus) provides a
[6243]participation in clandestine and
[6246]13-00000
[6248]ca sis with tpned ene are aap onion ad etn
[6249]ton miggions. DoD stocks of arms, teed ehip fot savteh or eattee
[6251]There te a gendral mivenderstanding conzerning the use of
[6252]Army Special Forces units, Navy SEAL teams, Alz Force Jungle Jim
[6253]. .egententions or Marine Corps epecial units in covert‘and clandeitine -
[6254]. Operations. While it is entirely possible and feasible to convert
[6256]tion of a restetance in Cubs in support of a
[6257]ton thezve. . -
[6259]_ “it
[6261]It be encential to an understanding of the problem to.reallse
[6262]that since Late 1961, all U. S. intelligence estimates have indicated
[6263]that there ia little kelihoed of an internally sparked Cuban resistance
[6264]__ £9 bead any slgntGeanse. ‘Aedrding to GIA Gate Le ite possiblity
[6265]ef getting advance 1s
[6267]-of any uprising this information
[6268]ateo reaching officials ef the Castro Regime. It is also estimated that
[6269]theze in Uttie likelihood that any resistance groupe would be able to .
[6270]“hold out" In any organized form for more than a week or two. Castro
[6271]personally is quite aware of the potential of a guerrilla resistance and
[6273]rtionate foteas to ensure that
[6275]13-00000
[6277]Soe ee Oe a ec Oro ee Oe RD
[6279]There has been a lack of useful intelligence on Cuba. This
[6280]has caused the U. 5. oath 0. poutsupending lnek of gxaphacia.cn.
[6282]opr phereeeger of oonteat opacatianat inbottigenes are ctoded: The
[6283]’ petority for ale operational type e intelligence has been relegated
[6285]mo getiviion, Normally different methods of operation are employed
[6286]. t physical pexetionsl
[6288]"We ahaa ue peiaaca out that dhe tack of bablaghen
[6289]used as « crutch in not prescing for more clandestine operations
[6290]antions. This view can be justified, but no commander conimite
[6291]forces on the battlefield ever knows all he wants to know: hie
[6293]; ny. Somewhere in between lies the anewer. Therd must be on
[6295]‘This portion of the paper is designad to indicate in general
[6296]terms the latitude of clandastine and covert actions based upon past
[6297]srr eaty We. cation tn Gates creat, This abedd nos be where
[6299]- "Clandestine and covert activities prior te sind diiting the Bay
[6300]of Pige operstion can be characterised as bald and far reaching. The
[6302]fatare orientation of U. &, activity in this field is conditioned largely
[6303]by the failure of that operation. Clandestine and covert actions since
[6304]April 1961 can be summarized ac being cautious, intermittent, and low
[6305]level. The current attention directed towards “things Cuban" plates
[6306]even mote stringent fequizcenente on U. s. activities tn the clandestine
[6307]and covert envirénment.
[6310]13-00000
[6312]Following are examples of the types of activities which could
[6313]be undertaken. This is not an exhaustive list, wet te presgated to
[6314]: “x tlataets. the. types of aetiety which might be eansldared.’
[6315]a Interrogation of refugeas.
[6316]2) Ceunterintelligence in U. 5,
[6318](3) Legal travellers, |
[6319]eR ‘At. ‘clanayton taptigens agentes
[6320]- is) "pds end onvad eurvetllance..
[6322]6} 9 Commanicéitions surveillance. ?
[6324](7) ternal sources (wiaro Cutie sepres
[6325]‘sented officially or quasl-officielly or where refugees and
[6326]‘travellers can be reached).
[6328](8) Intelligence provided by third countries.
[6330](9) = Defectors (inside or outside Cuba). Itis —
[6332]: important to note that the security mechanism in Cuba renders
[6333]defectors relatively inaceensible. The
[6335], who might defect if there was eny reason to believe they could
[6336]leave Cuba. Those-who have sought asylum in other embasaics
[6337]in Havana have been yefused eait vices for auch prdlonged periods
[6338]that thefts information, when finally releasad, ts practically aseless,
[6340]— (0) Penetrations (inside or outatde Guba), Extreme
[6343]13-00000
[6345]Behe ta om se that tesco. legebes ames
[6347]Aan af el
[6349]@) Printed moeterial (mail, airdrop, or packed
[6350]. with other material destined for Cuba). Atrérop (s severely
[6351]“ Ygnited by Cubs's aly defence capability
[6353]milftary
[6354]nature, rumors and “plants" of information, ote,
[6358]; - (4) Inaide Cuba to instigate demonstrations,
[6359]establish a resistance net, or to take a particular action.
[6361]- : @). atnraal to instigati demonstrations against
[6362]eieewhere (educators, - fariete, labor leaders, women, yeuth, —
[6363]‘ ‘entertainers, religious and cultural groups, ste.) NOTE: Many
[6364]above-actions can can be aecomplished overtly.
[6365]4. Eeqnemie Actions .
[6366]a Sabotage af agricultares: power, industry,
[6367]internal or exiarial trans port, communteations, + adentadefretion,
[6369]. . t
[6370]u a al
[6373]13-00000
[6375]remaining
[6376]‘althongh wely minor, fy exitical to Cube and provides
[6377]the U. 5, with a incrative tatget.
[6379](3) «= Gounterfaiting. . Because Cube has oncextially
[6380]a barter market -and mass dlstefbution is is diffiecit, this may not
[6382]_ ‘znuat be conalared setters. a eelatively saaager..; i
[6383]* and shovt Hved getn,
[6385]©. Sabotage and Herrassing Actions
[6386]re
[6388]i) "astorage of teadare nomen, chess and
[6390]y installations. ‘Grconamic sabotage included tn para
[6391]graph d above).
[6392]. {2) Actions designed to withdraw people from
[6393]harvest or to overwork military elements, (To include actions
[6394]from tumors to mijor military oxerdises).
[6396]@) Radio of television intrusion or Jamming,
[6398]. Bribing, cmbsrraseings bachoasiling ascass~
[6399]_ Anathaiy cveneity and kidotping leaders —
[6400]8) Attack, seisure, eeateh or barrasement end
[6401]abotage of als and oncel ix trafic.
[6402]6} Attach, tninidation and harrassment of Cutan
[6403]Fepwescntatives abroad.
[6405]f.
[6407]13-00000
[6409]PAF est ra
[6410]SSR ee RE ge:
[6412]say of hen nat provecntins canbe devel ia provoese
[6413]tive acts.
[6415]2 ot .
[6416]A discussion of fature options should be related specifically —
[6417]te nea slot ed ahold conser etre indicated tn
[6419]ia ta
[6421]me, ‘ly be adviaclyss  tatiteg 6
[6422]actions sake alone in order to (a) demonstrate and
[6424]waned y
[6425]but-to the Cubans, the Latin Americana and many other new-born states,
[6426]Castes ta on ee “David" and the only Latin whe has oni pe
[6428]Au tha econaaie cltuntion in Guba becomes inoze intolerable,
[6430]_ the U. &. may expect greater dissensian and more manifestations of
[6431]outhranks of, }
[6433]extremely difficult for the U. 5. to support euch
[6434]destine or covert manner for more than a few days. Such eupport could
[6435]serve to alert Cubs to U. &. intentions.
[6438]13-00000
[6440]port vo vital to bis tenure and so necessaxy to prévent & Counter coup
[6441]from thove deriving strength from the heavy SineGoviet economic ;
[6442]ontantation sf the present segins.
[6444]Seite ae 8. emeenecl ca 200 aah artesian
[6445]targete in Cuba. Sach on action could serve to help Castro consolidate
[6446]internally and to aextously embarrass the U, 8; internatighslly.
[6448]8. . SUMMARY
[6450]' The U. 8. finds itself in an uncomfortable position of waiting
[6451]_ for the breaks in Gubs and not knowing precisely when or how the
[6452]breaks will occur, As time goes on the changes for en internally
[6453]- fnspived revolt become increasingly more remote, Barring a major
[6454]“political echism in. which major elements of the security forces are
[6455]eplit, there ia litte promise of an internally sparked revolt of cuf-
[6456]ficient magniteds to permit the U. S. to muster malitisteral representa-
[6457]wel. Hon af. euppest and intervene on behalf of this resistence. .
[6459]: Accoséiag t authoritative sources, the.U, 8. will recéive Mitte
[6460]or not advance notices of such en uprising and according to intelligence
[6461]eatimates there ie little likelihood of such an uprising curviving for
[6462]mere than a few days, Aled, it has been indicated that there is little
[6463]Ubelthood of such a resistance could gain control of radio station
[6465]request outside assistinge. {it is recognized, however, that this
[6466]probally wesld be one of he principle sis of any euch eston gree
[6469]13-00000
[6471]nomad 0 NA ELITE TEI ED SORA ANIIS ARID 0H enpete
[6474]wo. .
[6476]Go lug asthe SinosSovet los conimss to exbeidine Cuba,
[6477]situation
[6479]. Castro has cautiously avoided provocative actions of sufficient
[6480]magnitude to incur the wholesale wrath of the U, 8. oF to provide &
[6481]jaridical basis far overt intervéition. To Castwo's Uking, U.S. options
[6482]have been narrowed to U. S. instigated open conflict economic pressures
[6483]or t0-& timéeconsuming and # frestrating mltilatera epesack wilistog
[6484]the OAS mechantars, ao
[6486]befoveliand,
[6487]Salome in repent of nt vert money witb ted ly ove
[6488]deipoeal ot ths tim tn eaettalisn et at ite
[6490]- From the standpoint af the Cuban Regime, there appears to be
[6491]‘ Shetle Likelihood that any clandestine actions will be taken directly
[6492]against the U. S. However, the recent aircraft attacks or warnings
[6494]_ ageingt U. S. boate indicates the possibility of encontrofied action on
[6495]_ the part of individuals of the Castro Regime.
[6497]13-00000
[6501]ATLONL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
[6503]“(repared - for the Meating of ___» February 1963, 4 P.M.)
[6506]FROM: Coordinztor of Cuba Affairs oy
[6507]SUBJECT: Psychological Program in Support of U.S. Policy on Cuba
[6509]\ .
[6510]Objectives . . :
[6512]Tha basic program adopted by the Executive Committee on January
[6513]25, 1963 sets forth major objectives for our policy toward cuba. It als
[6514]commits us to "be prepared to increase the political, economic, psycho~
[6515]dogical and military pressures, as appropriate oppor tunities present :
[6516]themselves or ‘can be created," .
[6517]This memorandum outlines a program that will meet the paychologica:
[6519].
[6521]xequirements of our overall policy. -
[6523]Role of Psychological Ope yations
[6525]A successful psychological campaign cannot be viewed solely as a .
[6526]propaganda exercise or an informational program, It should cover action:
[6527]and statements--all thet is ‘said or done solely or primarily for paycho:
[6528]logical effect. This definition sets off psychological activities from
[6529]those actions undertaken primarily for their direct value--whether in tl
[6531]_ Elelds of intelligence, military, political, or economic action.
[6533]One of the tasks of psychological operations is to-exploi. other
[6534]a-vvities to maximum advantage, or to seek to minimize any nc :ative as:
[6536]pects of such activities, In designing and carrying out action program
[6538]directed at Gaba it sha} be the task of the Coordinator and his Group
[6540]LS GOS
[6542]ara
[6545]13-00000
[6547]to balance possibly conflicting interests and to determine which, in any
[6548]given circumstance, shall have priority.
[6549]Strategy and’ Tactics
[6550]we aust keep in mind constantly the relationship between what happens —
[6551]"in Cuba. and the overall struggle between ourselves and the Coamunis ts.
[6552]We should seek to insure that the Cuban situation will develop in a way
[6553]that will:
[6555]a) lead to the collapse or overthrow of the Castro regime;
[6557]. by demonstrate to the Cyban people and tothe world at large that
[6559]Communism ie not a solution for the problems of a developing
[6560]country; . .
[6562]ec). discredit ‘Castro ‘and his associates and their methods of opera-
[6563]tion throughout the Americas; .
[6565]d) insure that the burden imposed by Cuba on the Soviet Union and.
[6566]the satellites ‘adds substantially to the mounting evidence that
[6567]efforts to export communist revolution are unsuccessful and ex-
[6568]cassively costly. | .
[6570]Our focus should always be on the first of these objectives--the
[6571]end of the communist regime in Cuba. But pending achievement of tats,
[6572]wa’ cca rove toward the other objectives. And they, after all, are of
[6573]major importanca to our overall strategic purposes.
[6575]13-00000
[6577]a
[6581]Wa have the possibility of insuring that so long as Cuba remains
[6583]Communist it will serve as an open, bleeding wound that will weaken the
[6585]Communist cause generally, This strategic concept is one which the
[6586]Communists have tried to use against us.
[6587]Our tactical approach should be designed to fit this overall concept.
[6589]it calls for the utilization of every available weapon in our aresenai
[6591]_. and engagement, day-in and day~out, in a oulti-faceted struggle at all
[6593]levels. ; ;
[6594]Our initial ain should be to wéaken steadily the capability, con~
[6595]fidence and will of the enemy (inside and outside Cuba) and, correspond .
[6596]ingly, to ‘strengthen our sida. We need not, indeed ought not, stake every~
[6597]thing on one great effort. Nor should we concentrate on simply building —
[6598]up our forces and husbanding them "until the right time comas" for a final
[6599]showdown.,. 7 |
[6601]Instead, our effort should be directed toward achieving an unbroken
[6602]series of. small successes, encompassing gains on the part of anti-Castro
[6604]elements and failures on~the part of the regime ‘itself. Our aim should
[6606]. be that the end of each day'would see the position and prospects. of the
[6608]Castro regime and little worse than they had been at sunrise.
[6610]i”) factory breakdown because of a shortage of spare parts or sabotage, -
[6611]an inczease in absenteeisn, lengthened queues at the food stores, failure
[6613]to getia field planted--whether because of neglect or lack of seed, a.
[6615]FS Bae
[6618]13-00000
[6620]SeRSRSE
[6622]resort to terrorist methods egainst the populace, an unexplained fire, |
[6623]exeation of suspicion in a minor but key official, the sudden appearance
[6624]of antiregime slogans on walls, a " defection from the armad forcess-these
[6625]and similar things, whether major or minor, and over and over again on
[6626]a mounting scale, will have a cumulative impact, In the long mm, they
[6627]can be equivalent to a major victory.
[6629]The important thing is to keep-the pressure on, to never give the
[6630]‘regime a respite, to see that the series of small defeats and setbacks
[6632]ia unbroken and unendLige "our purpose is to create a sipuation in which
[6634]the regime and its supporters steadily lose hope and Heart, in which they
[6635]coma to “accept the certainty of eventual defeat,
[6637]Meanwhile, repercussions would be felt throughout the Communist
[6638]world. Assistance to tho regime would increasingly be regarded as a
[6639]"rat hole" operation. The “exemple of Cuba" would become the reverse of
[6640]7 - expectations; fidelismo would become a term of opprobrium,
[6642]* gm short, the goal is to bring about the elimination of the Castro
[6643]regime without resort to direct and massive foreé, We cannot rule our
[6644]the possibility that soma reliance on force may become necessary to. insu
[6645]finsl victory for anti-Castro forces. But the greater and more effec-
[6647]_tivs ie the effort herein outlined, the more we ere likely to insure thai
[6649]over Zorce requixements will te minimal, ©
[6651]See
[6653]13-00000
[6655]Specific programs to carry. out this kind of approach to the Ojban
[6656]probiem are submitted in Annexes A and B. : |
[6657]: 4 : f
[6659]fudiences and Targets
[6660]: . The psychological program should be directed at the following primary
[6662]audiences or target groups: ;
[6663]1) the Cuba people ° Our goal should be to encourage dissatisfaction
[6664]with the present. and hope for the future once Castroism is eli-
[6666]It should be made clear that the next chapter of Cuba's
[6668]i
[6670]i
[6672]i
[6674]miominated.
[6676]| But they should know that
[6679]‘history must be written by the Cubans.
[6681]‘Blak
[6683]| they will have friendly aupport from others. -
[6684]| 2). the Castro regime. Our goal should be to create dissension, doubi
[6685]\ Oo : : .
[6686]: and hopelessness inside the ruling clique.
[6687]| 3) Latin America. In ‘programs ‘directed at the peoples and govern-
[6688]34 ments of the hemisphere, our goal should be to weaken the influ- ~
[6689]|
[6691]I
[6692]i
[6695]ence of the Cuban regima and its propaganda, to encourage solid-
[6697]: arity within the OAS family, ‘to counter Cuban influence in key
[6698]groups (youth, labor, intellectuals), to encourage actions that
[6699]counteract Cuban programs of subversion and insurrection.
[6701]si 4) the Soviet Union and other Communist states. To picture Cuba
[6703]as a steady drein on already limited resources, to insure that i
[6705]is such a drain, to encourage the Soviets to limit and eventual]
[6707]- eliminate their involvemant in Cuba,
[6710]13-00000
[6712]5) Gther countries. To insure understanding of what is involved
[6713]ia the Cuban situation, to use Cuba to disprove that conmunism
[6714]provides useful answers to the needs of developing countries,
[6715]to expose. the continuing danger of communist efforts to export
[6717]‘ . ‘revolution, . , , ,
[6719]6) the Home Base. To provide the: American people and the Congress
[6720]with the full facts of the Cuban situation within: the limits of
[6721]legitimate security considerations,
[6725]The psychological program toward Cuba should utilize the full range
[6726]of che Gcvernment’s capabilities for action and information, These in-
[6727]| luda, emong others; a) public statements by the President and other
[6728], officials; , , — *
[6729]b) “{nformational assets ‘such as the public affairs anc
[6730]Congressional relations agencies of State,
[6731]Defense and other agencies; ,
[6732]‘¢) the Government's research and analysis facilities;
[6733]d) oversees information programs in all media,
[6734]especially the facilities of the U.S. Information
[6735]Agency; . .
[6736]e): the diplomatic mechanism for both formal end
[6737]“dnformal contacts;
[6739]£) capabilities for unattributed programs of Action
[6741]and information. ;
[6744]13-00000
[6746]Ae
[6748]Coordination arid Guidance
[6749]tn carrying out the kind of many-sided offensive described herein,
[6751]it will ba necessary to provide for coordinating various programs. We
[6753]5
[6755]" gust oe sure that what we do in one area reinforces what we do elsewhere,
[6757]It will be necessary to provide careful end regular policy guidance to
[6758]those responsible for action. This task is assigned to the Coordinator
[6759]for Cuban Affairs. He should establish the necessary machinery on an
[6760]inter~departmental basis.
[6762]. .
[6763]U.S. Posture toward Cuba : . ;
[6765]Tae picture we should seek to create fs one of a confident and de-
[6766]cisive United States moving forward in cooperation with its other ftitends,
[6767]dealing with the Cuben situation but not exclusively preoccupied with
[6768]Cestro, We should not appear to be in doubt or confusion, We should take
[6769]note of developments in Cuba promptly and react to them quickly, Our
[6770]answer to claima, charges or attacks should be swift. Our machinery must
[6771]be geared“ to permit answers to Castro ‘and his henchmen dmmedi ately and
[6773]effectively. If he makes a speech ‘tonight, our reply should be on the
[6775]airwaves tomorrow at the latest.
[6777]Cur approach should not be defensive. We should not confine ourselve
[6778]to cuswaring Castro’ but as much as possible force him onto the defensive.
[6779]We should insure that he is required to go tha answering, the explaining,
[6781]the disagreeing es much as possible.
[6783]Attachments: Annex A - Guidelines for Attributable Programs .
[6784]Annex B - Guidelines for Unattributable Programs;i8 i : 2253
[6786]as TAP Tae dn SS
[6789]13-00000
[6791]erases.
[6792]ZSREIX A
[6793]Guidelines for Attributable Programs
[6795]Ouyrrent Recuirements
[6797]1. There should 53 a statement, prefercbly by the President, ex- .
[6798]sleining overall U.S. policy teward tha Cuban question. It would provide
[6799]clarification of where we stand on Cuba and how we hope to see the future"
[6800]sevelop. It would provide the basis for statements, private and public,
[6801]for all other officials concerned. It would inform the Cubans how we re-
[6802]gard their future; ‘eet Latin Americans how we see tha problem and our
[6803]view of their role; underline’ to the Soviet bloc our determination to
[6804]oppose communism in this hemisphere; further clarify for our own peopje
[6805]the seriousness of the problem and our determination to support the cause .
[6806]of freedom in Cuba with all feasible means,
[6808]The Coordinator should arrange for preparation 0 of such a statement
[6809]and submit a draft. 6 the White House. ; ~ .
[6811]2. It is our policy to seek elimination, or at least material re-
[6812]Guction, of tha Soviet military presence in Cuba. Efforts now underway
[6814]. to achieve this end should be given a reasonable chance, If they fail
[6816]to produce the desired result within a reasonable time, we should be pre- .
[6817]pared to move forward along other lihes. The Coordinator should develop
[6818]& prozvam to mast this contingency. Meanwhile, the continuing presence
[6820]of Sovie= forces should be descrited as ‘an. exacerbating influence in
[6822]East-West relations and a symbol of forsign domination and control in Cuba. |
[6826]wees S00 Eran.
[6828]13-00000
[6830]_ 4. The Coordinator.should a:sange for up-to-date surveys of the
[6834]. 3. Clarificatioa of our position on “non-invasion" would be desira-
[6836]“pha. This could be covered in 1 above. It should be.clear that wa do not
[6837]xegazd invasion of Cuba by the United States as a desirable or useful |
[6838]coursa. But the possibility of such action in given circumstances cennot
[6839]bs eliminated, The door should be left open for any action that we and
[6840]our allies in the hemisphere may regard ag necessary in the future to
[6841]counter aggressive moves by the Cuban regime. , .
[6843]4. We need to have clearly in mind our. position regarding 4 possi-
[6845]_ bie internal revolt. This, too, could ba covered in 1 sbove. We should
[6846]evoid statements for the present which could reasonably be expected to
[6847]encouraze in open revolt, We should avoid for the present enything that
[6848]could be read as a firm pledge to coma to the eid of anyone who moves
[6850]| against Castro. We should make clesr, however, that we are prepared to
[6851]support and cooperate with any elements. who succeed in ending ‘communist
[6853]dominance in Cuba and who are committed to establishing in Cuba a free
[6855]and democratic government responsive to. the degtres of its own people.
[6857]5. We should exploit by available means all evidence of internal
[6858]discontent and opposition, Defections from the Cuban regime should be
[6860]exploited extensively and quickly as soon as security considerations are
[6862]mat.
[6868]13-00000
[6870]ae) progrens now underway in the psychological field;
[6871]b) U.S. capabilities in this field with a view to exposing any
[6872]obvious remediable gaps in our resources for conducting a signi~ .
[6873]Zicant psychological effort against Cuba;
[6874]- ¢) Castxo's propaganda machine--how does it work? how mich effort
[6875]_ goes into it? how can wa weaken id . .
[6876]d) major lines of the Cuban propaganda offensive--favorite themes»
[6877]techniques, principal targets, etc.; .
[6878]@) current position of Gastro and hig regime in Latin America--
[6879]main areas of influence, by country and by groups. ;
[6880]£) the past record on leaflet drops~~how effective, adventeges of
[6881]_plane vs, balloon drops, comparison of delivery by other means,
[6882]possibilities of such a program being used to ‘attack us in the
[6884]GN or among the Cuban people.
[6886]tnemes for Information Programs
[6887]Information media should exploit the following thames to the max- -
[6889]imum extent practicable. Hard data supporting these themes should be  ~
[6890]spotted on a day-to-day basis and used, Commentaries and discussions
[6892]shsvld be tzilored to take ‘full advantage of these attitudes.
[6894](20 Cabana audiences)
[6895]1. ‘Castroiem is doomed; it is on the slippery slope to oblivion.
[6897]5 =
[6900]13-00000
[6902]3.
[6904]4.
[6906]5.
[6910]Cuba is an unwilling i:strumeat of Soviet ‘policy, subject to
[6911]the whims and moads of a foreign power.
[6913]Moscow will use Cuba es it sees fit end for its own purposes,
[6914]giving help and withdrawing it to suit’ the Kremlin's desires.
[6915]Cestro has isolated his country from its traditional friends, a
[6916]from the hemisphere in which its roota of Bistorys culture,
[6917]religion, and well-being are. sunk.
[6919]Communism has failed to solve the problems. of Cuba--has lowered 7
[6921],
[6923]rather than raised its standard of ‘living.
[6925]r
[6927]The Cuban revolution has been perverted and betz‘ayed,
[6929]Ereedon, independence and diversity are the "wave of the future." -
[6930]Latin American audiences) .
[6932]Use the above as appropriate.
[6934]Cestro and the Russians are using Cuba as a base for subversion,
[6935]espionage and sabotage against neighboring states.
[6937]. Castroisn promises bicodshed, terror and economic stagnation.
[6939]The Hemisphere’ & most promising course is vigorous efforts to 2?
[6940]achieve the goals of the Alliance for Progress. . ‘
[6941]Soviet and Bloc audiences) — ;
[6943]The above as appropriete,
[6946]13-00000
[6948]2. Cuda rivresents a steady dcain on already limited Soviet and
[6949]bloe resources; every shipment to Cuba means things do not appear
[6950]on Soviet shelves, 7 ‘ | .
[6951]3. Cestro really supzorts the Chinese, not Moscow; he is using
[6952]a . “soviet help to promote Castroism not Moscow! s policy.
[6953]tr2 above lists do not: pretend to be exhaustive. They are but thea.
[6954]beginning of a catalog of themes we can exploit in our information and:
[6956]-propasenda offensive,
[6958]13-00000
[6960].
[6962]ABNSX B
[6964]It is the judgement of the Coordinator taat this annéx covering - ;
[6965]intelligence end covert actions should be submitted separately after the i
[6966]Executive Comaittea reaches a conclusion on, the overall psychological
[6968]‘ program and the attributable activities set forth in Annex A.
[6969]ry . * Hf
[6971]| |
[6972]at af : :
[6973]Ge ¢ t “" - . |
[6975]PR,
[6977]13-00000
[6979]DARE
[6983]E . Toy , . . . ;
[6984]DATE OF DOCUMENT [NUMOER OF COPIES [COPY NUMDERIS)
[6985]zeta || name |
[6987]LOCAL Ts CONTROL NUMBER (if eppficable) x iL , jo
[6988]al
[6990]S 00
[6993]MUMBER ANG DESCRIPTION OF INCLOSURES TO DOCUMENT (indicate addition and/or deletion of inclosurca with dates)
[6995]Annex A (5 pgs) and Annex B (1 pg)
[6997]: DISTRIBUTION DATA . GATE OF CISTRIGUTION
[6998]COPY WO. AODRESSEE (Print oF type) | copy wo. | ADDRESSEE {Print or type)
[7000]INTRA-OFFICE ROUTING DATA
[7002]FOR: ._ [action [_] information
[7005]e
[7007]v
[7008]a
[7009]5
[7010]a
[7011]5
[7012]a
[7014]S OF ALL PERSONS HAKOLING ATTACHEQ. DOCUMENT OR WHO HAVE BEEN INFORMED OF ITS CONTENT WILL BE LISTED BELOW
[7015][NAME Chin ore) om
[7017](92)
[7020]3
[7021]2
[7022]i
[7023]{THT
[7024]9
[7025]i
[7026]3
[7028]. REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM
[7029]CLASSIFIED INCLOSURES -
[7032]13-00000
[7034]SUBJECT: ‘Future Cuban Leadership
[7036]INTRODUCTION
[7038]Following is a proposal for the creation of an imaginary
[7040]Cuban leader. This proposal is presented primarily to fill gaps
[7041]existing in the present policy study. It will become obvious that
[7042]this proposal can be utilized int conjunction with current programs
[7043]as well as many of those programs proposed for the future. It
[7044]may be necessary to address this proposal or a similar proposal
[7045]separately and in advance of the policy study; however, in pe
[7046]event no pressing requirement exists, itis suggested that
[7048]_ proposal be considered in conjunction with the policy study end
[7049]handled on a closely held basis.
[7051]REASON FOR PROPOSAL
[7053]. Following are listed a number of indications that the leader-
[7054]ship question will be addressed in the near future:
[7056]a. With the termination of U.S. support to the Cuban
[7057]Revolutionary Council (CRC) a vacuum has been created. Various -
[7058]exile groups in the U.S. and elsewhere will be vying for recognition
[7059]and support in an attempt to fill this void.
[7061]b. There has. been constant pressure on the U.S,
[7063]_ and on other Latin American countries to recognize a government
[7065]in exile. This proposal could serve to lessen or eliminate much
[7066]of this political and psychological pressure.
[7068]¢. This proposal could serve to reduce the bickering
[7069]among exile groups and may serve to resolve some of the problems
[7070]of Cuban exile unification.
[7072]ass... EXCLUDED FROM
[7073]Gasitive DOD DIR 5200.
[7075]AUTOMATIC REGRADING
[7076]10 DOES NOT APPLY © -
[7078]13-00000
[7080]a. The proposal could emphasize the development of
[7081]a native "David" in opposition to Castro, the Cuban "Goliath." This
[7082]could serve the U.S. image by making Castro the "Goliath" rather
[7083]than the "David"' who opposes the "North American Giant. "
[7085]e. This proposal could serve to prevent the U.S, from
[7086]making premature commitments to a leader or a particular exile group
[7087]and could be used as a device to test exile response.
[7089]f. This proposal could retain for the U.S. the ability
[7090]to control future selections of leaders or groups (timing and political
[7091]ideologies). -
[7092]g. This proposal could permit the U.S. ona progres-
[7093]sive basis to influence the idealogies of the resistance and thus to
[7094]influence the platform of a future Cuban Government. ’
[7096]'h, The publicity aasociated with the prolonged existence
[7097]ofa resistance in Cuba can serve to delay the furtherance of. the de
[7098]facto recognition of the present Cuban Regime.
[7100]OBJECTIVE
[7102]. To create an imaginary leader or image of resistance in Cuba.
[7103]This image would serve as a focal point for resistance directed | against
[7104]Castro by Cubans or Latin Americans.
[7106]DEVELOPMENT
[7108]An imaginary name of a resistance leader could be developed
[7109]utilizing a popular name from Cuban history, a name associated with
[7110]resistance in Cuba or a newly devised:name. The name selected
[7112]‘should typify a person who is friendly to the Cuban people, is anti-
[7114]communist, is willing to fight against the Regime, and is little-but
[7115]tough, There is no requirement for a detailed staff study in order
[7117]Snsitivze
[7119]13-00000
[7121]. . te
[7122]> a
[7124]. ere $B? SERET sonsstsv0
[7125]¢ . .?
[7127]to determine this name. "The Little Bull," "The Little Worm,"
[7129]"The Friendly Worm," ''The Fighting Friend," "The Tough Peasant,"
[7130]or any such name which is acceptable and meaningful in Spanish
[7132]could suffice, Over a period of several months the name could be
[7133]too "“droppéd" or leaked through U.S. officialdom, in diplomatic channels,
[7134]in intelligence channels or within the Cuban exile community. Specific
[7135]acts against the Regime could be credited to this individual or mem-
[7136]bers of his group. Communications could be arranged between this
[7137]individual and his subordinates to be picked up either by Castro's
[7138]censors or by. radio intercept in Cuba or in the U.S. |
[7140]After a period of time, all unexplained incidents and actions
[7141]for which credit has not been seized by some other exile group would
[7142]automatically be ascribed to our imaginary friend. At some point in
[7143]time it could be leaked that the U.S. is, in fact, supporting this
[7144]imaginary person. Similarly, other Latin American countries may,
[7145]without inducement, publicly follow the U.S. pattern.
[7147]During the course of this operation it is quite possible that the -
[7148]Castro Regime could indicate that the activities of this individual were
[7149]terminated, that the individual was captured, that he was being pur-
[7150]sued, or that he was an imaginary faker or fraud. Such action would
[7151]only serve to further publicize the actions of the individual and so long
[7152]as resistance in general continued the fame of our "Cuban Kilroy"
[7154]’ would spread. Humorous antics could be credited to our imaginary
[7156]friend and rumors of his exploits of bravery (ala Zoro) could be
[7157]circulated. .
[7159]At some point in time it may be wise to indicate what this
[7160]individual stands for. (It will become obvious that he is opposed to
[7161]the Regime in Cuba.) It could be possible to indicate little-by-little
[7162]his political platform in very general terms -~ realizing that the
[7163]mistique and the "generalness" connected with his operation is, in
[7164]fact, the power behind the operation. Ultimately, Cubans and others
[7165]may demand that he proclaim his complete political views or even
[7166]that he present himself physically. Since this is not desirable,
[7168]3
[7170]13-00000
[7172]: arrangements could be made to have selected individuals meet
[7173]ok with his appointed representative. His instructions and words
[7174]“ could be relayed to the public by many means,
[7176]As his political platform becomes more apparent within
[7177]as . the exile groups, it may be possible to determine those willing to
[7178]a follow his leadership (to gain Cuban independence under his terms)
[7179]or those who are unwilling to accept his leadership. The lines of
[7180]controversy among exiles can.be drawn more clearly. Undesirable -
[7181]leaders and exile groups can be eliminated from the competition
[7182]through his disavowals. :
[7184]Eventually, a member of the resistance in Cuba may gain
[7185]sufficient stature to assume or to be given the title of this imaginary
[7186]leader. This, of course, will depend in large measure on individual
[7187]leadership ability and the ability to "fill the boots" of this anti-Castro
[7188]image. .
[7190]While this scheme is replete with gimmickery, ite imple-
[7191]mentation could be undertaken in a relatively short period of time.
[7192]Sensitivity of this scheme is such that the knowledge should be held
[7193]on the tightest basis and if implemented, those proposing should
[7194]not be informed. In the event the scheme is compromised, (unless
[7195]knowledge is widespread) there is little need for plausible deniability;
[7196]however, once used and compromised the scheme can hardly be .
[7197]reinstated. A major advantage is that this image can be created
[7198]over a long period of time or developed rapidly. without a political
[7199]ox economic commitment on the part of. the U.S. There may be a
[7200]point at which the U.S. could no longer disavow collaboration with
[7201]this imaginary person, This point,. however, is so distant that
[7202]during any point in the intervening period it would be possible for
[7203]the U.S, to disengage easily without suffering embarrassment or
[7204]loss of prestige.
[7209]13-00000
[7211]CONCLUSION -
[7213]Based on a consideration of factors indicated above, it
[7214]appears that the U.S. should immediately undertake to implement
[7215]this proposal, determining at 30 to 60 day future intervals what
[7217]‘additional action should be taken to improve, reduce, or change
[7219]the image during the subsequent 30 or 60 day period.
[7221]. Patchell
[7222]Lt Colonel, -USA
[7224]Spucrsgle Geta
[7227]13-00000
[7232]2] 7
[7234]awn,
[7236]From: Lt. Colonel Patchell
[7238]Subject: Poychological Operations Group
[7240]Following is a brief "run-down" of meeting on psychological
[7241]operations at State, 21 May 1962. The mectings are normally held
[7242]ench Monday at 1430, Attendees include: Bob Smith or Kermit Brown
[7243](USIA); Seymous Bolton (CIA); Colonel Wade Robert (DOD); ‘Harvey;
[7244]Summ (Cuba Deck Officer - State); Bob Hurwitch, Dick:Phillips (Public ‘
[7245]Affairs Advisor of Martin's Bureau of Inter-American Affairs - State)
[7246]and Leon Curtis (Bureau of Intelligence and Research - State).
[7250]Subjects discussed included: yg
[7251]: (1) Priorities of work « Cuba, Weatern Hamlaphore, U.S.
[7252]~ in that order.
[7253]—_ (2) Publication of document on conditions in Cuban Univer-
[7255]sities received from Cuban exile group (DRE) - CIA to check authenticity
[7256]and whether document is outdated. -
[7258](3) Radio SWAN - CIA studying proposed changes.
[7260](4) USIA reported three commentaries. pa out on Cuban
[7261]Independence Day. . ;
[7263](5) On the Axmstrong Circle Theater, USIA states this
[7264]"hung up" for $15,000 cost of translation. It was decided in meeting to
[7265]push on to get it translated - and in the meanwhile to get Miro Cardona's
[7266]apecch into wide circulation. ~
[7268]. (6) State suggested that speeches in Cuba (Rodrigues, Castro,
[7269]and others) within past week indicated moves away from collectivization
[7271]- to free enterprise and mentioned antipathy of people to idea and name of
[7272]cooperatives. USIA to push on this and to prepare releases on it.
[7274]EXCLUDED FROM ‘AUTOMATIC
[7275]_ REGRADING: DOD DIR 5200.10
[7276]DOES NOT APPLY
[7279]13-00000
[7281](7 CIA to declaseify the Soviet nickel contract with Cuba ,
[7282]which exposes Soviet colonialism + for wide distribution in Latin America
[7283]thrtugh Embssetes and USIA and for use by CIA in Cuba.
[7285]; . . (8). CLA wants more stuff in the vein of ridicule, satire,
[7286]mh ‘humor. =.t0 get away from invective and hit the regime: aod individuals -
[7287]‘low key atuff to develop ridicule.
[7289](9) CIA to find out from refugees what appeals best, what
[7290]they read, what they Listen to, etc.
[7292](10) USIA and GIA to play up the March USIA survey which
[7293]showe Castro's popularity in Latim America on the decline.
[7295](1)) On 26th of July, State suggested.cave be used to avoid
[7296]discussing 26th of July movement as Commy - to clearly differentiate
[7297]between original 26th of July movement and its prbiciples - and the be-
[7298]trayal. CIA requested State's guidance on policy and State's help on
[7299]providing material. State provided the attached and indicated that its use
[7300]4s within policy (Ihave noted some particularly hard hitting spiiff - « if used
[7301]properl
[7303](12) A number of important events and dates in June and July
[7304]were discussed to include Caribbean Games, ‘Peace Festival, Khrushchev
[7305]Rocket statement, and Castro's "Cordillera of the Andes” statement.
[7306]USIA and CIA to prepare information on these.
[7308]: (13) State asked CLA to prepare a catalogue of admission of
[7309]failures of the Castro Regime, a list of production promises, and a report
[7310]of bloc people in key positions, Ali were asked to bring ideas into next
[7311]week's meeting to. be used to exploit 26th of July to our advantage.
[7313](14) This office will be placed on distribution: ‘of minutes of
[7314]the meetings.
[7316]13-00000
[7318]22 ;
[7319]‘iS
[7321]OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
[7322]WASHINGTON 23, D.C.
[7324]1 June 1962
[7326]SENSIIE
[7328]os . MEMORANDU! M FOR GENERAL LANSDALE
[7330]From: Lt. Cal. Patchell
[7332]7 Subject: Psychological Operations Grgp.
[7334]Meeting held at 1430 hours on 28 May 62 with Mr. Hurwitch
[7335]and Mr. Simm of State, Bolton of CIA, Smith of USIA, and myself
[7336]attending. “Following } isa summary « of subjects, discus a:
[7338]: (1) CEA asked State to provide'a clarification of porsébalities
[7339]and groups to be supported - this came up in connection with a dis-
[7340]cussion of crc and newspaper stories on its change in laadprehip.
[7342](2) The Armstrong Ctrele Theater movie has ised okayed
[7343]for Spanish language publication and distribution.
[7345]. (3) On the "Eyewitness to History" program of 25 May 62 -
[7346]because of the type of movie - USIA to look at carefully and deter-
[7347]mine whether useful for replay (I will be invited to attend).
[7349](4) CIA using theme for farmers not to produce ~ okayed.
[7351](5) On declassification of Cuba - Soviet trade agreement ~
[7352]CIA has ‘been unable to obtain, bat should produce soon. ©
[7354](6) CIA GIA“guidance now being prepared for. payeh’ wae. £ to Met -
[7355]priorities as follows: -(a) Cuba, (b) Latin America; '(o} rest of world.
[7356]Draft copies will be brought to next meeting for informal review.
[7358](7) On the DRE publication White Book on University Probleme
[7359]in Cuba" - 2,000 copies each are being printed-in Chile in English,
[7360]French, and Spanish. CIA to take action to make available in summary
[7361]form for Latin newspapers and student publications. m ;
[7363](83) On the CRC publication “Guba Nueva" - presently going
[7365]only to exile commiunity. CIA ta look into getting it into Latin America
[7366]and Cuba - money appears té be no problem,
[7368]SENSILVE
[7370]Er are 7
[7373]13-00000
[7375](9) State suggested exploitation by USIA and CIA of items 7
[7376]appearing in the FBIS daily summary, (Housing end labor -- made
[7377]arrangemente 6 put us on distribution.)
[7379]vor :i(0) GIA brought up the. unhappy impact of Moscosp's:epeach
[7380]infotring that Cabs should be forgotten arid nip Mensee dat ea otk
[7382]the Alliance For Progress. State indicated that a correction was being
[7383]made to show that Moscoso was misquoted, :
[7385]ay State suggested that Castro's 11 April speech (which was
[7386]not released until May) had many exploitable points -- corruption =
[7387]failure to suggest unity - labor -- State sent to CIA for research people
[7388]to work on. ;
[7390]|” (2) tein ‘appeasiiig in Cubsin paper concerning people who
[7391]“transgrese the’ nora" being sent to training camp WSIA to'take. -
[7392]action,
[7394](13) CLA after looking at symbols etc. has about Gedided ‘that
[7395]the "worm" {a ‘preferable to the “fish” and that it haa beet popularised
[7396]by Castro and we should take advantage of it. Both CIA and USIA will
[7397]develop furthex the worm idea. Lt. Col. Patchell suggested relating
[7398]it to such expressions ae "the worm will turn" « if applicable in Cuba
[7399]and associating it will biblical quotations such as "Their worm shall
[7400]not die, and their fire shall not be quenched" -- Isa 6624 or “As a moth
[7401]doth by a garment, and a worm by the wood, 6o the sadness of a man
[7402]consumeth the heart" - Prov. 25.20. USIA to take action.
[7404]COMMENT:
[7406]- In the two: ‘previcus meetings I have developed sufficient rapport
[7407]so that I can Bow-get:actions taken without too.much: ‘question, Thies .
[7408]next meeting I propose to introduce a system ‘of suspense dates so that.
[7409]' the "we are looking into" or "we are considering" are replaced by —
[7410]"we will meet the suspense" ~- this may be difficult at first, but feel
[7411]it can be managed, .
[7414]13-00000 a | _ Ce ents matt
[7415]| ra)
[7417]OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
[7418]WASHINGTON 28, D. G.
[7420]6 June 1962
[7422]‘MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL LANSDALE -
[7423]From L&, Colonel Patchell
[7424]Subject: Paychological Operations Group
[7426]__ Meeting held 1430-1450 on 4 June 1962. Attended by Mr.
[7427]Hurwitch, Mr. Phillips, - Summ, and Mr, Curtis (State),
[7428]Mr. Bolton (CIA), Mr. Smith (USIA), and myself. Following is
[7429]& summery of discussion items: co
[7431](1) USIA will provide advance notice of TY programe
[7432]scheduled re Cuba. ,
[7435]Bo, (2) Free Cuban Group (DRE) has arranged for strong
[7436]‘; representation at African International Student Meeting in Canada
[7437]- 27-28 June. They will curface ¢oples of report on student conditions
[7438]“~~ je in Cuba. They asked for no advance publicity - then big follow up"
[7439]i = ~ State and CIA coordinating to include preparation of releases
[7440]i to U.S. prese, : .
[7442]i (3) CIA has looked at CRCta mailing liste for various types
[7443]A of info, to include the publication "Cuba Nueva, " They find lists
[7444]oo: most elaborate, .complete and well organized for each purpose,
[7446]as — [ . lose of rights by workers in Cuba, USIA provided exmple ciples of
[7447]. : their daily wire output and of weekly mail output for me to lock at in ;
[7448]’ ae greater detail, (I will report sepi rately on this.) , . ;
[7450]a ; (5) Much exploitable info in Castro's speech on housing ~-
[7451]7 corruption, unavailability etc. USIA and CIA to exploit. ;
[7453]ee . (6) CIA reported that the Latin American edition of Time
[7454]. A Magasine was in English -- that Time Magazine in spanish was @ :
[7455]& - Latin publication (Bogota) using same format, but not useful for purpose
[7456]- of exploiting Blas Roca story.
[7458]v
[7459]i:
[7461]Sesh
[7464]13-00000
[7466]. (1) Reports of hunger strikes etc. at Iele of Pines prison
[7467]to be played up by USIA. (Berne‘s cable 527).
[7469]wendy - (8), Copige of onrtoon books and other
[7470]_ “requested by Lt: *Gol.:Patchell.
[7472]: - (9) USIA requested to provide info on the public opinion
[7473]poll conducted and schedules for future polls.
[7475]Seymour Bolton privately asked me to inform you that subject to
[7476]any comment from you, he was using the approach on psy war that
[7477]the means of delivery would not be tied to attribution. Aone ke
[7478]might be more convenient to work completely through the CRC, he
[7480]believed that we‘should reserve flexibility by organizing the “pipelisies™ 7
[7481]_ and then putting ‘stuif in from CRC, . or other Cuban organizations, as © * -
[7483]well as tuff created by the U.5., with or without signatures or attri-
[7484]bution. He feele that such control would best insure that we Gent in
[7486]. just what wae needed and no more or no less. i
[7488]‘ y 4
[7490]at
[7493]13-00000
[7495]OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
[7496]WASHINGTON 25, D.C.
[7498]. 12 June 1962 ©
[7500]MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL LANSDALE “7(_
[7501]F HANSD
[7502]From: Lt. Col. Patchel {.\/
[7504]Subject: Psychological Operations Group
[7506]Meeting held 1430-1600 on 11 June 1962. _Attended by Mr. ,
[7507]Hurwitch, Mr. Summ, and Mr. Wells (substituting for Mr. Curtis
[7508]from R&I-State); Mr. Bolton (CIA); Mr. Smith (USIA); and Lt. Col.
[7509]Patchell. Following is a summary of discussion items.
[7511](1) CLA has translated and declassified Soviet-Cuban
[7513]. Trade Agreement and passed to Mr. Hurwitch for publication and
[7514]use. - . '
[7516]. ‘
[7519](2) Lt. Col. Patchell pointed out that the Cuban increase |
[7520]of delegates to 330 to Helsinki Eighth World Youth and Student Festival
[7521]"for reasons of an imperative nature" should be acted upon and full
[7522]use made of report on student conditions which will be surfaced at the
[7523]Canadian regional meeting. Bolton assured me that action was being
[7524]taken. NOTE: After the meeting Bolton said the same group of
[7525]people were working on both and that "extensive" work was being done
[7527]on Helsinki, I asked him to be sure it was on Cubans in Helsinki --
[7528]not just Helsinki,
[7530](3) USLA agreed to look at clippings on Cuba with view
[7532]4 to broader distribution in Latin America -- as requested by Lt. Col.
[7533]a Patchell. ; .
[7535]- (4) CIA will present a document next week on guidance. >
[7536]‘with respect to Cuba. wud wrt, Zo we 428 7
[7538](5) State (Mr. Summ) indicated a Cuban report indicated
[7539]: that Havana was going back to horse-drawn trolleys because of motor
[7540]transport shortages. Mr. Wells added that previously horse-drawn
[7542]transport was not permitted in Havana. All to look into this for possible
[7543]exploitation. .
[7545]EXCLUDED FROU AUTOMATIC \
[7546]REGRADING; DOD DIR 6200.10
[7547]DOES NOT APPLY =|
[7549]13-00000
[7551](6) Lt. Col. Patchell brought up comparison between
[7552]Hitler's speech after the wisuccessful Beer Hall Pustch and Castro's
[7553]"History Will Absolve Me Speech" following his abortive attempt.
[7554]CIA will look into this -- both for research and whether suitable for
[7555]propaganda purposes.
[7557](7) Since the title "Doctor" adds some respect to Castro's
[7558]name -- all agencies will push toward referring to him primarily as |
[7560]the Prime Minister or secondarily as Fidel Castro. < Wek accadins ‘i y.4.
[7562]t
[7566]f (8) A USIA report indicated that Cuba had increased its
[7567]radio propaganda output by 60% over the past few months. USIA .
[7568]stated that FBIS (Foreign Broadcast Information Service) has added
[7569]Cuba to the list of Bloc Countries, which -- subjects Cuba to periodic
[7570]research and analysis reports and broadcast trends. (See FBIS Report,
[7571]"Operational Developments in Foreign Broadcasting" Number 355,
[7572]dated 6 June 1962.) ‘
[7574](9) CLA reported additional people had been placed in
[7575]their research department to make content analyses on Cuba.
[7577](10) State has received two articles from New Delhi written.
[7578]by an Indian reporter who visited Cuba in the early months of 1959 and
[7579]recently revisited Cuba.. These reports are good for the before’ and
[7580]"after" content and will be publicized. State asked USIA to look for
[7581]others who visited in the early days of the Castro Regime -- who might
[7582]be encouraged on a selective basis to return and make a comparison.
[7584]s . .
[7585]auyOr® » +11) State indicated that Cuba had presented a series of
[7586]complaints against U.S. actions at Guantanamo and it looked as though |
[7587]Cuba was building up a case against the U.S, for future use in the U.N.
[7589]‘or world opinion medias. State has asked Navy to provide similar . Cs U!
[7590]information for use by State and will present information to the group Oy a *’,
[7591]*f i itation. Wh
[7593]or possible exploitation. . wre,
[7595]ms , (12) USIA unable to report on Miro Cardona'’s spéech in .
[7596]Costa Rica. CIA reported that it had been carried in papers in Costa
[7597]Rica and had been broadcast by the Voice of America and several Miami
[7598]Spanish language stations. : of
[7600]ote~rt
[7602]. (13) State suggested the next meeting be held’at USIA for HMeerD
[7603]the purpose of briefing the group on the functioning of USIA -- in ¢ rae a
[7604]handling a select number of items. ; ~~ Je
[7606]2 td a
[7608]13-00000
[7610]OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
[7611]WASHINGTON 23, D.C.
[7613]18 June 1962
[7615]From: 4. Gol. Patehell
[7617]Subject: Payehslogictl Operations Grow,
[7619]The meting held 1430-1600 on 18 June was attended by Me.
[7620]Hurwitch, Mx. ‘Bart. Welle, Mr. Gumm, and Mr. Phillipe (State), :
[7621]Mr. Boltan (CIA), Mr Dob Amish (TEIAD, and Lt. Col Patchell,
[7623]i ‘GIA dlvtciated coptes of a student booklet (Eaglish and
[7624]French versions attached). Thirty~-thousand copies were printed
[7626]by & Latin American student organization, : and prinstsfiy Zor Latin
[7627]audiences. The bodklets will be used.on tour.of Latins in Afri -
[7628]and were distributed throughout Latis America and at internstipnel
[7629]youth and student meetings in Quebec and Helsinki. Some copite
[7630]will be matfiled into Cuba.:
[7632](2.) GIA presented draft guidelines for overseas posts re
[7633]Cuba. The group made some minor changes. The guidelines are Pana aesey
[7634]Gers July. Fol USE
[7636]<3.) State will put out a slmatlar cleculat to tts porte, and UGIA
[7637]will consider doing:the same, .
[7639](4.) Howidap report of overects statiine on actions: ue
[7640]within 7 days after 26 July. They are to cable significant ‘actions
[7641]immediately.
[7643](S.). Hurwiteh distributed copies of a drat cable intended te
[7644]exploit Cardenas incident (copy attached).
[7646](6.) Lt. Col, Patchell asked full exploitation of Mexioaa
[7647]defector -- suggesting appearance before OAS Committee, . trip
[7648]. \
[7649]SPECTAL-HANBSLING This document contains pages.
[7650]: Gopy No... % of _ copies. septen_—
[7652]EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
[7653]REGRADING; DOD DIR: 6200,10
[7654]DOES HOT APPLY. .”'
[7657]13-00000
[7660]at
[7662]” WEBB. :
[7664]SUOBME -A0.3
[7666]Saturday evening and four times Sunday over VOA. -
[7668](7.) The Group was informed that Mr. Grant (St. Louie
[7669]PostDispatch), Tad Ssule, anda number of dther xewsmen
[7670]‘were attempting to get into Havana fax the 26 July celebration.
[7671]Depending on the individual situation, these people will be
[7673]__ (8.) State will obtain copies of seporte from the British, .
[7674]Italian, Weat.German and other Allied Embassies in Havana
[7676]for distribution to members of this group.
[7678]_ (95) CLA aaked to‘have Cuban Embasay representatives in
[7679]other Latin American states confronted, with. Castro promises
[7680]and agkedfor comment for publidation: +=. refusals and no com-
[7682]mente" to be publieized. ‘
[7683]: ) ‘Sth reported that Gardetiiie: fnctdent
[7685]-@l.). USIA provided film on Carpenter flight for use on -
[7686]at Guantanamo. . : i . wad
[7689]13-00000
[7691]WASHINGTON 238, D.C.
[7693]26 June 1962 .
[7695]“Feds” ars Gal : Putchell.
[7696]Subject: " Psychological Operations Group
[7698]Meeting held at 1430 on 25 June 1962 was attended by Mr. Hurwitch
[7699](State), Mr. Robert Follestad (substituting for Harvey Summ-State),
[7700]Bob Smith (USIA), John Tilton (substituting for Seymour Bolten-CIA),
[7701]and Lt. Gol. Patchell. Following. items Glecusced: -
[7703]a State to seek: anfi-Castro ; press clpeings ‘from other Latin
[7705]- American countries for replay.
[7707]b. USIA is distributing confidential memorandum, ‘/The Impact
[7708]of Castro on Mexican Public Opinion and Some Indications of Attitudes
[7709]Toward the U.S. and the USSR" (LA-3, Feb 62). This report, although
[7710]dated Feb 62, ie just now coming out - it reportedly shows a significant
[7711]decrease of Castro popularity in Mexico.
[7713]c. CIA was asked whether the reports of Cuban communist
[7714]interference with other Latin communist parties could be exploited.
[7716]d. Decided to direct propaganda into Cuba which is designed to
[7717]destroy the image of Cuban success throughout the hemisphere. Also to
[7718]direct propaganda designed te stress that Cuba is being “ased", by the USSR.
[7720]e. State pointed out. the value of President’s:trip to Mexico this |
[7721]week end to point up US-Mexico solidarity. (Noted that Hurwitch withdrew.
[7722]considerably from hie initial position - + Cuba not mentioned asa point of
[7723]solidarity).
[7725]£. CIA is tranolating Theodore Draper's book into Spanish for
[7727]" dissemination ao a paper-back in Latin America.
[7729]g. Decided to play back into Cuba administrative "goofs'' by
[7730]Cubans on transportation arrangements for youth of other Latin countries
[7732]. to celebrations. (Some left penniless and etranddd in Caribbean).
[7734]: _ ue oe t oe Be ee
[7735]SENSE . : ‘ EXCLUDED PROM AUTOMATIC
[7736]HEGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10
[7737]. DOES NOT APPLY
[7740]13-00000
[7742]_ SENORE
[7744]"ky The Cultural people in State are seized with problem of
[7745]Jamaican Games. I suggested other athletes for free Cuba or other
[7747]mss : personalities. +> That we should at least make an inventory to sce
[7748]o what'we have available. I¢ noted that Cubans are “out to win't oo
[7749]Rate What is now being aecomplaed ie not quod muvagh. ,
[7751]ero CIA working with Navy on s dclasotfteation of USSR-Cubs
[7752]Trade Agreement.
[7754]13-00000
[7756]OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
[7757]sO WASHINGTON 25, D.C.
[7759]3 July Oe pen
[7761]From: .Lt. Col. Patchell
[7763]SEB von or a
[7765]‘Subject: Psychological Operations Group
[7767]_Meeting held fram.1100.to. 1300.on 3 July-1962 with the
[7768]following in attendance: Bob Smith (WSIA), Seymour Bolten (CIA),
[7769]Bob-Hurwitch, Bob Fallestad, Al-Carter, and Bart Wells (State)
[7770]and Lt. Col. Patchell. Following are. highlights. of.discussion.
[7772]‘a. State is. providing. copies of report from: ‘Britiah
[7773]“Ambassador. to Cuba MARCHAND. Report.made after:absence $5 9
[7774]3.months from his post in Cuba. Compe ttrcaf) TA hw. y
[7776]Qocdtews
[7778]b, State has received letters explaining dothils of
[7779]Cardenas incident.- passed to CIA and USIA for action.
[7781]: c. CIA to obtain: more information on outbreak in ALCANO
[7782]which is being suppressed by:Cuba.
[7784]d, CIA provided copies. of study on. promises and failures
[7785]of Castro regime.- it has been.distributed to CIA stations overseas.
[7786]State and.USIA to look at-with view to providing copies. to international
[7787]organizations and State and USIA representatives overseas. Coy « at 6 ashade,
[7789]e. In-yiew of uncertainty expressed. in messages from.
[7790]‘Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and JAR about stability of
[7791]Cuban. economy and attempts ‘to collect.funds to assist Cuba - CIA
[7792]to play on theme of Cuba as poor inyestment.etc.. behind iron curtain.
[7794]£. Defector who was formerly, Cuban.economic attache in
[7795]Moscow being debriefed. - he was-held for 16. months -in Argentine
[7796]Embassy in Havana and for-thie reagon much of his information is
[7797]dated, CIA to expedite his. assessment.
[7799]- g. On Cuban economic defector from Mexico - still being
[7800]interrogated and assessed with view to looking at: his. ability to stand
[7802]- EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
[7803]REGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10
[7804]DOES NOT APPLY -
[7806]PSR
[7809]13-00000
[7811]up to cross~-examination under OAS, State stressed need to
[7813]+ expedite in order. to gain impact. CIA can provide no estimate
[7814]of time when assessment will. be completed. In Miami, his Press
[7815]‘conference indicated Gastro. control.of the Mexican provincial police.
[7817]-h.. On question-of intervention Mexican papers stating
[7819]this is Mexican victory on ‘Cuban issue - this is being replayed by
[7820]U.S. papers - leaves a poor.impression, State said this is-being
[7821]discussed with President and will.be covered by: Lincoln White at
[7822]‘Press. conference.today. CIA and USIA agreed that more should be
[7823]-done. - State could not answer. on ‘Cuban talks - unknown how deeply —
[7824]/Cuba was covered and. whether the question of diversion of U.S.
[7825]good or movement of people were discussed. ‘Any hint of Mexican
[7826]- victory will be ‘demoralizing to people in-Cuba.- ‘exile community -
[7827]and Latin America in general.
[7829]i, Following the meeting Mr. Hurwitch indicated that
[7830]State and CIA representatives would meet. with CAB officials con-
[7831]cerning.PAA flights to.Havana.
[7833]a
[7836]P
[7839]13-00000
[7841]be cok ate —
[7842]— HH
[7844]“UL July: 1962
[7846]MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL LANSDALE
[7847]. From: Lt. Col. Patchell
[7849]Subject: Psychological Operations Group
[7851]. Following is brief of meeting held from 1430-1530 on-9 July 62
[7852]with the following in attendance: Robert Hurwitch, Harvey Summ,
[7853], Juan Gurrell, and Al Carter (State), ‘Bob Smith (USIA), Jolin Tilton
[7854]” (CIA) and Lt. Col. Patchell. -
[7856]Swiss. article. A Swiss. publication has a very fine article in
[7857]detail on Cuba - by Swiss reporter who spent several months in
[7858]Cuba - USIA to replay. | ; . ? 7
[7860]Clipping service. ‘Good immediate reaction to clipping service
[7861]being provided. . —— -:
[7863]. 26th of July. Group.agreed to "jack up" machinery for informa -
[7864]tion on activities. and L. A. reaction to 26th of July. -
[7866]. GRC Political Platform. State provided members with copies
[7867]of a CRC political platform lattached) Little publicity has.been
[7868]‘attached to document. CIA will check to see if it is a document
[7869]for internal or external distribution. (Note: Following the meeting,
[7870]I asked Mr. Hurwitch:to.coneider this in connection with his guide-
[7871]lines paper, depending upon. its validity and usefuluers. He stated
[7872]he believed the two were in consonance, -but would check: )
[7874]Cuban Protests. “Discussion of Cuban protests. Believed that
[7875]the publication of. protests may be leading up to justification for
[7876]receipt of defensive weapons. (Note: This fits.in with Mr. Bill
[7877]Harvey's earlier remarks on the same general subject. ) State. is
[7878]responding to ‘protests. and queries in low key.
[7880]EXCLUDED, FROM AUTOMATIC |
[7881]REGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10
[7882]DOES HOT APPLY
[7884]This document containe___pagos.
[7885]Copy No. copies. Series___.
[7888]13-00000
[7890]Fed
[7892]British Newsman. Will meet with State representatives. at
[7893]1430 on ll July. Others invited: Thig individual was formerly
[7894]_ & Communist, :
[7896]' Chinese Opium Technicians. On report of Chinese techni-
[7897]cians to assist Cubans in opium ‘growing. Lt. Col. Patchellisug-
[7898]gested CIA get declassified and publicized as. quickly as possible.
[7900]Overall Evaluation. All to take a look at orientation of group -
[7901]its purpose, missions, methods of carrying out tasks to see what
[7903]changes are required for period starting 1 August 1962, or after
[7904]new NIE is published.
[7906]Note: From the time that I Joined the group on 21 May,. the
[7907]group's orientation has changed from a general Latin American
[7908]psychological operations g: ‘oup. to one focused on Cuba. My own
[7909]personal objective is now to get the output extended beyond Latin
[7910]America - into NATO, the uHcommitted areas, eastern Europe,
[7912]. . a 4
[7914]Japan, etc. ‘
[7916]2
[7918]ras . Visit of James B; Donovan” Following the meeting, Mr.
[7920]Hurwitch gave me the attached memorandum of conversation with
[7921]. Mr. Donovan. erence tae :
[7923]Copy tet Wr Nanas  ptyer