[1]157-10008-10150 | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
[3]JFK Assassinatic n System Date: 2/23/201
[4]Identification Form
[6]Agency Inforn ation
[8]AGENCY: SSCIA :
[9]RECORD NUMBER: = 157-10008-10150
[11]RECORD SERIES: MEMORANDUM
[13]AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
[15]ed
[16]Document Inf: rmation
[18]ORIGINATOR: SSCIA
[19]FROM: JOHNSON, LOCH
[20]TO: SENIOR STAFF
[22]TITLE: SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS R :TRIEVED FROM LBJ LIBRARY
[24]DATE: 07/21/1975
[25]PAGES: 14
[27]SUBJECTS :
[28]CASTRO
[29]COVERT ACTION AGAINST CL BA
[30]_  LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENTS
[31]DOCUMENT TYPE:. PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[32]CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified
[33]RESTRICTIONS :
[34]CURRENT STATUS:  Redact
[35]DATE OF LASTREVIEW: 05/11/1994 ~
[37]OPENING CRITERIA :
[39]COMMENTS : Box 393-1
[42]NW 47129) DocId:32203658 Page 1
[47]5. Memo from Chase to Bundy, 4 Decembi:r 1963.
[49]E39
[50]@ Plans for a meeting regarding Cuban policy. John Crimmins will
[51]present several options for discussion. including unleashing of Cuban.
[52]exiles and the intensification of the «overt program.
[54]6. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 2 December 1‘ 63.
[56]This memo is mainly important becaise it reveals who in the Admin-
[57]istration was dealing with Cuban policy. The list of people to attend
[58]the meeting on Cuba held this day inclided: Lyndon B. Johnson, Rusk, —
[60]Ed Martin, McNamara, McCone, Helms or les Fitzgerald, Don Wilson, Bundy,
[61]and Chase.
[63]|
[65]7. Memo, Bundy to Lyndon B. Johnson, 32 December 1963.
[67]For a press conference, Bundy recon mends the following language re-
[68]garding Cuba: "...say...that you expect to take every available means
[69]to stop and turn back the spread of Conmunism in this hemisphere."
[71]8. CIA Summary of Costs for Cuban Operations, FY 1960-1964, dated 15 ,
[72]December 1963.
[73]| peor
[74]This table reveals that the CIA spe nt[$106, 155,774 jon Cuban Opera- pe
[75]@ tions, almost 50 percent of which was spent-on paramilitary action c!
[77]£4847, 815,122); The total covert actior budget (psychological and para-
[78]military warfare) was approximately/$61,000,000|in this four-year period.
[80]ae Fa)
[83]9. Chase minutes on meeting with Lyndon B. Johnson, 27 December 1963.
[85]‘|
[87]——T-+
[89]1 :
[91]The meeting appears to be the first major briefing for the new Presi-
[92]dent on Cuba. Desmond Fitzgerald did most of the briefing, which in-
[93]cluded a detailed description of CIA assets in Cuba, proposed sabotage plans,
[94]and attempts by the CIA to stimulate an internal coup which would
[95]dislodge Castro. The CIA was aiding tw> exile groups in particular:
[96]one led by Manuel Artime, the other by ‘fanolo Ray. _Bundy recommends
[98]thatLyndon B. Johns pke "a more vigorous line /toward Cuba/ than
[99]we have in the past." 2.
[101]j , ew .
[103]5
[106]“B. Johngon, 9 January 1964.
[108]10. Memo, Bundy to L'
[113]- 7 :
[115]; Bundy recommends a Cabinet-level review of the whole principle of
[116]covert sabotage against Cuba. He notes that Rusk and McNamare do not
[117]support the program of sabotage, while ‘McCone and the CIA are for it,
[118]and so are most of the middle-level off tcers dealings with the Castro
[120]. problem.” Bundy concludes: "...in.your position, I would stop sabotage
[121]@ attacks on the ground that they are i111 sgal, ineffective, and damaging
[123]HET
[125]| 2
[127]hr]
[128]tf,
[132]y
[134]to our broader policy."
[136]ry yg Tees
[138]2 LNT ee Tae ate ett a a
[139]+ pocid: 39angss. “Page .2—~
[142]WH wie
[144]action up to or including invasion."
[146]18. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 21 April 1964.
[148]Notes that Alexis Johnson is in charg: of contingency planning for a coup
[149]in Cuba.
[151]19. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 14 May 1964. .
[153]This memo suggests that a primary goal of the Johnson Administration was
[154]"to keep the lid on Cuba" until after the November Presidential elections.
[155]Thus, the continued exile raids were view:d negative since they increased
[156]the noise level. The memo makes it clear that. the exile raids were becoming
[157]completely beyond U.S. control despite CL\ financial support to the groups.
[159]20. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 2 June 1964.
[161]Chase notes that Castro has executed -hree anti-Castro Cubans and jailed .
[162]two others as CIA agents. CIA admits hav ng a connection with the executed -
[163]Cubans "but that it is completely deniabl:."'
[165]21. Memo, Helms, DDP, to DCI, 10 June 1961. Subject: "Plans of Cuban
[166]Exiles to Assassinate Selected Cuban Gove nment Leaders"
[168]‘The CIA was made aware of certain plais to kill Castro. The Agency told
[169]the sources, according to Helms, that "th: United States Government would not,
[170]under any circumstances, condone the plamied actions."" Apparently on 2 March
[171]1964 a wealthy Cuban exile was approached with a Cosa Nostra offer to assassinate
[172]Castro for $150,000. The wealthy exile tuned down the offer. Similar offers
[173]were make to other Cuban exiles in early March. A leading figure in the
[174]negotiations was Byron Cameron, a shippin;'-businessmen from Ft. Lauderdale.
[175]An agreement was finally made to pay the.(‘ameron group $100,000 for killing
[176]Castro, plus .$2,500 for expenses. Julio ‘lobo Olavarria, a wealthy Cuban
[177]exile in New York was to pay much of the lioney, and did pay the $2,500 on
[178]25 April, Though Camerga! “group remaine:| anonymous, it was clear the Mafia
[179]was involved. Camerory @led that his contact was a police officer in the
[180]‘St. Louis (Mo:}-Vice pe
[182]22. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 15 June 1964. ‘ubject: "Assassination: of Castro."
[184]Referring to the above memo from DDP :o DCI, Chase notes that John
[185]Crimmins feels the matter should be discu: sed at a Special Group meeting.
[189]ee ir ar
[192]Site.
[193]"John's own inclination is that the U.S. Government cannot knowingly permit
[194]any criminal American involvement in this sort of thing, '' notes Chase,
[195]"and should go all out to stop the plot." In marginal notations, Bundy
[196]agrees with John and with the need to forvard the matter to the Special
[197]Group.
[199]23. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 16 June 1964, w.th attachment (Des FitzGerald's
[200]"A Reappraisal of Autonomous Operations'')
[202]FitzGerald makes a defense of the autonomous operations. Tom Mann and
[203]Chase disapprove of the operations, thoug for different reasons.
[205]24. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 18 June 1964.
[207]Chase warns that further U.S. support of the autonomous groups is more
[208]likely to lead to a U-2 shootdown and a Ciribbean crisis than the overthrow
[209]of the Castro regime. Chase continues to be worried about noice levels
[210]and the November election. This memo is ery mich like his 14 May memo
[211](see Item 19).
[213]25. Memo for the Record, Peter Jessup, 22 June 1964.
[215]In a reference to Helm's memo on assa;sination (see Item 21), it was
[216]pointed out in a 303 Committee meeting of 18 June that "these reports, in
[217]effect, put the United States Government on notice that failure to take
[218]preventive action could be construed as condonation. " The AG said Justice
[219]would look into the matter. ;
[221]26. Memo, McCone to Bundy, 19 August 1964.
[223]McCone summarizes the FBI investigation of Cuban exile plots against
[224]Castro as outlined in Helm's memo of 19 Jime (See Item 21). The Bureau
[225]interviewed many people allegedly invo ved, most of whom denied the existence
[226]a eau did not interv.ew Cameron, since he was out of
[227]the coimtry)}. <The most@uaeeresting findiig was that Lobo had in fact
[229]10 November 1961. Tay
[231]The election past, Chase et al. agrexd that "we can usefully do some
[233]wi POE ‘poctas ier
[235]fog
[237]-
[238]Pr
[239]he
[240]|
[241]t
[246]FitzGerald pishes: for re-institution of CIA-
[248]basic review work on Cfiifa."
[249]directed covert program.
[251]28. Memo, R.C. Bowman to Bundy, 12 Novembi:r 1964, with JCS attachment
[252]dated 30 October 1964. Subject: SQUARE J)ANCE.
[254]A contemptable proposal intiated by the Army ‘to usefgerin varterg)agains
[255]Cuban sugar and livestock. Bowman and Buidy agree that the White House should
[256]"remain aloof from formal consideration of ‘Square Dance' at this stage."
[258]I believe this plan for covert action lis «ven more shocking and unacceptable
[260]a
[261]than plans for assassination.) | b=
[262], ae
[264]Poe
[266]b
[268]ann Gee
[271]29. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 12 November 1964, and attachment (apparently
[272]© a Bundy memo for a meeting with LBJ on 7 April 1964).
[274]The Bundy memo syggests that LBJ approved various options "short of
[275]war to get rid of thé, Castro regime," including the possible contamination
[276]of sensitive Cuban intports (not food). The Chase memo indicates that a
[277]Fitzgerald operation was underway in November 1964 to ship contaminating
[278]elements into Cuba.
[280]7
[282]30. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 30 December 1964.
[283]The Artime group is out of control, though State, Defense and CIA
[285]t
[286](as well as Bundy) all agree that it would be unwise to try to interfere heh
[287]with him at this stage. pre
[289]31. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 5 January 1965.
[291]Chase reports a plan told to Crimmiis and the CIA about an Artime plot
[292]to stage a "palace coup" during which Castro and other top leaders would be
[294]"neutralized." - D-Day was to be March 13. This matter was to be discussed .-
[295]at an upcoming Special Group meeting on shether or not "to cut off Artime's ‘ai
[296]water." Chase notes: "CIA at this point is loath to make a hard evaluation - aa
[298]of the Artime/Cubela plot."
[300]rd 32. Memo to 303 Committee, unsigned, 18 January 1965, presumably a CIA
[301]document. :
[303]Discusses the virtues of continuing Underwater Demolition Teams against —
[304]ships in Cuban harbors. If such activities are disallowed, the CIA should E
[307]be authorized to reduce ite commitment i1 the paramilitary field. es
[308]Ew
[309]L
[310]33. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 8 February 1955. : ; Do
[311]“This memo indicates that not even Actime had his group in control. The '
[312]memo also discusses CIA covert activitie 3 Si British Guiana, such as pene-— P ae
[313]- t¥ating the: PPP and proping up the democ-atic trade unionism. be
[314]34. Memo, Murat Wi (INR) to Peter Jessup, White House staff, :
[315]23 February 1965. ie
[316]Recommends immediate termination of Artime support, ~ “js - ”
[318]35. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 2 March 1965 —
[319]Discussion of who is for maintainin; a covert capability against Cuba se
[320]Deel
[322]be opposed ("fish or cut bait"); State would not. Rusk's general attitude
[323]toward Cuba at this time was to keep the temperature low while sorting out
[324]the Vietnam problem. .
[326](presently on the shelf) and who is oppo:ed. Chase guessed that CIA would
[328]spe Dee ge Ree tah
[329]one ee gama ae geen EE
[330]va Te wen. oe wos
[332]are
[334]. ee
[335]3
[337]MI R7T29- Docld: 32203658 Page &~ *--
[340]36. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 4 March 1965.
[342], Chase recommend#phasing out suppoit to Artime. The CIA is consider-
[343]ing diluting pesticides sent to Cuba; tlis is similar to the kinds of tactics on
[344]mentioned in Items 28 and. 29 above and'i:re a manifestation of the moral bie:
[345]bankruptcy of U.S. palicy. Also some tilk here of backing a new exile es.
[346]group, RECE, though not much enthusiasm for the idea from anyone apparently. —_—
[348]Oddly, CIA wishes to drop its paramilit: ry capability, while DoD and State
[349]want the capability maintained.
[351]37. Memo, Grant Hilliker (State) to Burdy, 18 June 1965.
[353]This is a summary of U.S. policy tcward Cuba. The ultimate objective ate:
[354]is still to replace the Castro regime. The memo notes that "the paramilitary fee
[355]program involving ClA~controlled actions was set aside even before it really
[356]started." ;
[358]38. Memo, Bundy to LBJ, 26 June 1965.
[360]Adm. Raborn recommends reactivatior of a paramilitary effort against
[361]Cuba. Bundy, Tommy Thompson, Rusk, McNemara, and Cy Vance are against this :
[362]chiefly because of the concomitant international noise level. "Most of us," Bundy
[363]writes, "do not recommend visible violent actions against Cuba." Raborn's
[364]recommendations said nothing about assassination.
[366]@ 39. Memo, Rostow to LBJ, 30 May 1966.
[368]Rostow notifies the President that a CIA exfiltration mission ran into
[369]ambush and the agents were captured. Th2 President could expect "the noise a
[370]level of Castro's charges of ‘threatened Yankee aggression’ may go up."
[374]a
[376]a —_——
[377]40. Memo, Karamessines, DDP, to Rostow, 7 August 1967. z
[378]This memo is important because it lists the names of two or three Cubans #
[379]who worked on CIA missions. If they are in the U.S., it may be worthwhile 4
[381]talking to them about their activities.
[384]41, Meino, W.G. Bowdl
[386]Bt
[388]t Aeciee aitelhiee Bike, imate Raia Mad
[390]Rostow, 18 De:ember 1967.
[392]re
[394]a
[396]_ The new:CIA’ emph@ia on developiig contacts within Castro's inner
[397]circle. Dave Phillip® was to be in char:e of the new CIA Cuba-pzrogram.
[398]Bowdler advises that "we be alert to indications that Castro is looking for
[399]accommodation or his disillusioned lieut mants want to know where we stand
[400]if they move to dump him."
[403]4
[404]y
[408]aD
[410]eviews a gto ea ae,
[411]NW 47129 “‘Doold:322Q7658" Baye-7 ~~.