[1]198-10005-10018 | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
[3]AGENCY :
[4]RECORD NUMBER :
[6]RECORD SERIES :
[8]AGENCY FILE NUMBER:
[10]ORIGINATOR :
[11]FROM:
[12]TO:
[14]TITLE :
[16]DATE:
[17]PAGES:
[19]SUBJECTS :
[21]DOCUMENT TYPE:
[22]CLASSIFICATION :
[23]RESTRICTIONS :
[24]CURRENT STATUS :
[25]DATE OF LAST REVIEW :
[27]OPENING CRITERIA :
[29]COMMENTS :
[33]HY 50955 Docld: 32423736
[35]JFK Assassination System Date: 6/24/201
[37]Identification Form
[39]Agency Information
[41]ARMY
[45]CALIFANO PAPERS
[47]Document Information
[49]MULTIPLE
[51]00/00/0000
[52]123
[54]ARMS SMUGGLING, CUBA
[55]LATIN AMERICA SECURITY
[56]CUBAN SPONSORED SUBVERSION
[58]PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[59]Secret
[61]4
[63]Redact
[65]10/07/1997
[67]Califano Papers, Box 6, Folder 30. Assorted documents related to Cuban material support of
[68]Communist subversives in Latin America.
[70]~JFE Khecort or ee
[72]* Department of the Army EO 13526
[73]SDeclassity “I Exclude “ Exempt
[75]Authority,
[77]I Refer To _. ef ,
[78]Review Dates/ £2) 2019 By
[80]Page 1
[82]Page 2
[84]324239736
[86]HY 40955 Daocld
[88]Sa eo re
[90]ta, With the arrival of large quantities of Soviet Ble
[92]dina 2 ADSL, Cue
[94]i Recovered 21. 0,0. erns im the hands of the pomdlace
[96]_ -@evernnent ptodke which emild be chipped ta aiwersive aroups
[97], in other coumiwies.. Tdentigiention of these arms with Cuba woul
[99]te 4 tists coubedne thve Shows: a) we reports alledsing orm
[100]eunigel: crea aad by aoans of food meicuets shinged to
[101]es whieh indtectes thet a Cuber armas
[102]pandl, lé aot of Cuban origing and (3) Teo
[103]ant amine & Cuban erdemal, purportedly being used to
[104]snveviek of fawtk Anerien,
[106]te
[108]oo;
[110]HW 50955 Docld: 32423736 Page 3
[113]SECRET
[115]Guiaos tee without founietion end the second iten which
[116]ea the soport contained in the Life Maguzine avtdels
[118]SECRET
[120]]
[122]a oe - moe oe . eee ek -: : ee a ee
[124]HW 50955 Docld: 32423736 Page 4
[126]Docld: 3274273736 Page 45
[128]50955
[132]_ . CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ©
[135]bo ad material contains infarmation affecting fhe Notional Defente of the United States within the meaning of- “the Espronage ews, ‘Tate 18, USS Secs.
[136]3 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorited person it, prohibited by Jew. .
[138]p,m e GLASSIFIGATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
[139]CHES getC-O-N-F-1-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
[140]ye CONTROLLED DISSEM
[142]COUNTRY CuBA/LAT IN AMERICA
[144]REPORT NO. TOCS DaL3/653, 152
[146]_ SUBJECT POSSIBLE. _CONCEALMENT. OF WEAPONS ‘DATE DISTR. 6 FEBRUARY 1963
[147]FOR. “SHIPMENT TO LATIN AMERICA. _
[150]DATE OF LATE 1962 REFERENCES in. 62553
[151]INFO. . aa 35871 eg
[152]PLACE & UNITED STATES (4 FEBRUARY 1963) Cg an .
[154]- DATE ACO. . oe . .
[155]APPRAISAL FIELD REPORT NO,
[157]THIS is UNEVALUATED-RIFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
[158]U.S. OWNER Cc) F A MARINA, FROM A FORMER CUBAN AIR FORCE OFFICER,
[159]FROM THE BROTHER OF AN ‘EMPLOYEE OF A CANNERY IN SAN CRISTOBAL.
[161]SOURCE
[163]— 1. .IN LATE 1962 A DAY-SHIFT EMPLOYEE AT. A_CANNERY IN’ SAN
[165]Ferner ag mme
[167]IN NYLON AND <> BEDDED IR SURERDEDCOCONU? IK J A_CAN WHICH HAD SAD TELE
[172]“UNUSUALLY HEAVY. (FIELD COMMENT: IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER THE
[173]CAN HAD GONE THROUGH THE CANNING PROCESS AND HAD BEEN SEALED.)
[174]‘AS A RESULT OF HIS DISCOVERY THE WORKER WAS ALMOST FIRED. ONE.
[175]OF THE MILITIA GUARDS AT THE CANNERY SAID THAT AMMUNITION AND
[176]AMERICAN COUNTRIES. A SPECIAL NIGHT SHIFT WORKS AT THE PLANT.
[177]= 2. cere’ ‘COMMENT: “aN UNTESTED SOURCE REPORTED IN EARLY ~
[179]OCTOBER 1962 ‘THAT IN JULY 1962 A STORY, IAS GURCULATING ISM.
[181]GROUP t
[183]downgrading ond
[185]declasuifcanon
[187]” “ CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS.
[188]C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T~I-A=L
[189]» “CONTROLLED DISSEM
[191]FORM 1 Kb OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
[192]i pT
[194]HW 50955 Docld: 32423736 Page 6
[196]EE ee de
[198]. O_O
[200], LT tee CLASSIFICATION ~- DISSEMINATION CONTROLS ot * , wet ve
[202]on Pe a IN
[204]reba. “-C+0-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L. ... . ,. . [TDCS DB 3/888, 152 35871
[205]. oe CONTROLLED DISSEM cL . 7:
[207]| | ) o 7 .
[208]V ’ .
[209]. “ANDRES, ANI ISLAND POS POSSESSION OF. “conompra, THAT A PISTOL ‘HAD
[210]BEEN. FOUND_ EARLIER CONCEALED, INSIDE A A FROZEN ¢ CHICKEN. WHICH
[211]HAD E BEEN 1 PART OF A. SHIPMENT 1 RECEIVED FROM CUBA. Do ,
[213]7 | 3. FELD DISSEM: _CINCARIB, CINCLANT.
[215]oo sp wane”
[217]CLASSIFICATION —< DISSEMINATION CONTROLS ~ _ tee . 4 -
[219]“CONTROLLED DISSEM ©... a 7
[222]f .
[223]one cman alta Ay capiyt nmmaane saemmprenetne ana
[225]HW 50955 Docld: 32423736 Page 7
[227]SECRET
[228]WO FOR... wISSEM
[229]An atua cache of maeponi end ammmition sevently discovered at the
[230]Idgas Camponesas guetrilis training center in tha iiterter of the
[231]Bresilion étate of Goias is believed by US Eibassy and OAS officers te
[232]be of Brazilien vathor than Cuban arms, despite a Brecilien newspaper
[233]Suggestion that they vere Cuben, ‘There were ales Gigsevered about 125
[235]goples of Commimist publications ineluding Che Gueverats wellmown
[237]treatise on “Guerrilla Verfere". ‘The trainitig center was described aa
[238]organized sccording to that book. A confidential report on the discoveries
[239]edded that “neribers of the center wank to be the Bregilien equivalent
[241]of those vho fought in the Siere Meestra and se bring the hard Chinase-
[242]Cubsa type evolution to Brasil.” Same 90 to 95 peveons in the locality
[244]| axa reported menibersé of or aympathetic te the ligas Camponedas activities,
[245]bo but only @ of the 24 for whom verrants wore issued have yet been teken
[247]| inte eustedy. (Am im, Rio de Janeiro 1122, 10 Decexber, CONFIDENTIAL,
[248]and CIA, Brasilia, IN 33026, 11 Decenber, SUCKED NOFORN)
[250]SECRET
[252]NO FOREIGN DISSEM
[254]HW 50955 Docld: 32423736 Page 68
[257]_ CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Ey p of 9 leer.
[259]Thar Material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within ‘the 4 fe of the De Lave Tie
[260]1, HD, Soo TD and 74 © transmission or revelation of Which in eny manner.to an unauthorised percon is proaibited by dbw,
[262]0 S-E-C-R-E-T VAAN
[263]NO FOREIGN, DISSEM os - Ott \
[265]verte nema Cc RT Se Le ee at aaa
[267]coun Cuba/USSR/Latin merioa “REPORT NO.” eua/aso/aee
[269]suect . 1. Use of Soviet Fishing Boats DATE DISTR. 11 Décember 1962
[271]to Transport . Arms to: Latin 3
[272]America ° "NO. PAGES Od.
[273]2. Belgian Arms * Dealer in Habana ,
[274]a | REFERENCES * RD ~W-2107
[275]{Paras. 1 & 2: October 1962; - , ae
[276]‘[Para. 3; August 1962 me “RD~ACQ=01258
[278]aras, 1, 2: France, Paris; _
[279]Para. 3; Spain, Madrid — _ 38937
[280]Paras. 1, 2; 23 ae 1962; fre. REPORT NO.
[282]- THIS 1S UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT = THMATVE
[284]Paras. 1 & 2: ~-An. official French service: ‘Para. 3: CC 1167,
[285]Cuban refugee (F), a former employee of the Cuban diplomatié
[286]. 0. service, who visited Santiago de Cuba in August” 1962,
[288]' - Appraisal of Content 3." —
[290]“Soviet fishing. boats, “wnder cover of ‘fishing Atlantic waters, .
[291]“.-are transporting contraband arms to Latin American countries. *,°
[292]‘, The boats are met. outside the territorial waters of those
[294]' countries, and arms are transferred in small quantities.
[296]' On board the Soviet boats are only Soviets and a very few
[298]Cubans or other Latin Americans who talk with those who
[299]- pick up the arms. The arms being delivered are of American
[300]_ manufacture, including those obtained during the Batista
[301]‘. regime and those.taken during the Playa Giron invasion. The
[303]Soviet fishing boats also carry. propaganda, and pamphiets
[304]-- containing, military instructions, the same type of material
[306]' being .sent by diplomatic pouch from Mexico.
[308]A Belgian in Habana: who: says he represents, a Belgian ‘firm, -
[310]": of arms for payment in dollars, The Belgian has made a
[311]°- Similar offer of .sale of arms to a representative of an
[312]’. anti-Castro group in Habana. _ vo
[314]2 In August 1962 a fisherman in. - Santiago de Cuba said that
[316]“on several occasions he had been forced by the Government
[318]to use his boat for transporting. small groups of men, in
[319]civilian clothes, and supplies of arms. He also knew of
[321]“ other fishermen who had been forced to do the same. The men
[323]- and arms were carried to small islands or transferred to other
[324]- boats at sea. Such trips sometimes lasted as long. as four or
[325]' five days, The fisherman did not know the purpose or final
[326]destination of ‘the men and arms. i
[329]NO FOREIGN DISSEM
[331]awageading and
[332]declostihcation
[334]RY 50955 Docld: 32423736 Page 9
[336]- has offered the Cuban Government any type and nationality fo
[338]coer |
[340]SECRET XN ae FOREIGN DISSEM
[342]CIA INFORMATION REPORT €S-3/532,138.
[343]“COUNTRY: CUBA _ 26 December 1962
[345]7 SUBJECT: IDENTIFICATION OF CUBAN VESSELS ALLEGEDLY PREPARED 0 INVADE A
[346]: CARIBBEAN COUNTRY ; ,
[348]bo DATE OF INFO: 28 NOVEMBER 1962
[350]|. SOURCE: TRAVELING SALESMAN (F)
[352]"APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: '3
[354]- HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: _ . ACCORDING TO TDCS-3/530,589, DATED 6 DECEMBER 1962, AS
[356]OF MID-NOVEMBER TWO CUBAN SHIPS LOADED WITH PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT WERE SKBX
[357]"SAID TO BE PREPARED FOR AN INVASION OF HAITI, SOURCE SAID HE WOULD PROVIDE THE
[358]_NAMES OF THE SHIPS AND THEIR DEPARTURE DATE,
[360]_ THE FRUCUBA AND THE FUNDADOR, CUBAN-FLAG VESSELS, WERE DOCKED AT THE ARSENAL
[362]Rocks IN CASABLANCA (HABANA) | IN LATE | NOVEMBER. THESE XEKS VESSELS WERE SCHEDULED
[363]a
[364]10 PARTICIPATE IN AN INVASION 6 OF SOME CARIBBEAN COUNTRY,
[366]<>, SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM
[368]HY 50955 Docld:32423736 Page 10
[370]SINE ENTS
[372]SOnERTIL we |
[374]1 gat
[375]fi OFA
[377]wok
[379]UG OMPIDEETIAL
[381]CUDA -
[383]| Sipe of war satarteh for ts + 39 damasy 2962
[384].. §moxhos (3) ee wot
[385]7 cr
[387]oa tacly donsexy 3962 Hone
[388]_. Rabsnay cf2T January 62. Loe gag
[389]: Ot — Bug
[391]eee ce ia deb2 |
[393]f ‘2s. Gource reports on atvonal or stoc chilling of wor ‘pateriel at Casehlonga, &
[394]ohana District, northeast shore of Bebana 3 Bayy Hebana Province ;
[396], DOW AGAA DED aa 32 YEANS
[398]lo Rerauey bocLacsnstep *
[399]“pen DIR $2020
[401]9 SON FIDE Tab
[403]AF VARA ae
[405]HY 50955 Docld:32423736 Page 11
[407]Be Source bas head vais materiel in targeted for am invasion of So8th inoricae = :
[410]Venezuela Uncovers Communist Arms’ UCacne-——. a
[411]en mn EL EF .
[413]HW 50955 Doctd:
[415]The Venezuelan Government —- in a raid on a small
[416]Village near Caracas on 5 January --, uncovered a
[418]large cache of arms and equipment which it claims
[419]belonged to the pro-Castro Armed Forces of National
[420]Liberation, reputed to be emerging as a para-
[422]military arm of the Venezuelan Communist Party,
[423]several tons of explosives and large quantities
[425]of hand bombs, arms, and ammunition were seized ss well
[426]&s a nearby clandestine Communist radio
[428]transmitter. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
[430]SOURCE: TDCS 533,071 (S/NFD); FBIS (0U0); PRESS
[432]|
[433]20 Jan 63 ' DEA Intelligence Bulletin Page 9 7
[435](REVERSE BLANK)
[437]SECRET—NO FOREIGN DISSEM
[439]TT sere imipt ee perrgie rnin ny oe nate Fence meagre oe eae
[441]32423736 Page 12
[443]C
[445]HW 50955 Docld: 32423736 Page 13
[447]12 Feb 63 "All the information avaliable to Ker Majesty's Government
[448]and to the British euthorities in British Gulena indicates that there is
[449]no truth whatever in the contimuing reports thet arms are belng shipped
[450]| to the colony from Cubs. Similar stories have appesred from time to tine
[451]| in the pest, birt upon examination all have been found to be without
[452]foundation.” .
[454](British Eubssuy in US to Reuters, AP end UPI),
[456]J
[457]Sud
[459]HW 50955 Docld: 32423736 Page 14
[464]Open) GENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
[466]oy a matecial contains informeti ‘on effecting the Nati ‘onel Defente of
[467]“a
[469]the Unis tat NSKsGe a Pie ta, U.S.G Seas.
[470]end. 794, the transmission of revelation at which in any. manner to s United States withia the mosni aaa 29e bews, A ‘
[472]2
[473]|
[474]aa uaa uthors zed persen is prohibited fi, as
[476]s
[477]E
[479]CON FIDENTIAL ° icon DISSEMINATION CON
[481]Ee he Hog Ie \
[482](When Filled da mai SSE.
[484]) Honpuras-/-cosTaTR Fea ts CUBA "REPORT NO, _ TOSS, aaa, 035
[485]“SUBJECT PLANS TO. LAND. ARMS, FROM. GUBA.. IN, HONDURAS 7
[487]: DATE OF 9 JANUARY 1963 Ape :
[488]2 INFO, »
[491]feu PRECEDENCE =» ROUTINE. - ma
[492]st . gt ? gt fee
[493]aie . . . ‘ . . yA if
[495]U REFERENCES”, IN, 50531 “ee
[496]. ao be . its a
[498]PLACE & - NICARAGUA, -MANAGUA .(15. JANUARY-1963)-> re Beye
[499]: DATE ACO, , vibe
[500]. aoe
[502]f APPRAISAL: 3 : -_FigLD ReroRT NO, UNM=729
[503]THis Is UNEVALUATED INFORMATION, SOURCE GRADINGS ARE
[505]counter NICAL wire
[507]"> pate piste. 16 SARUARY 1963 _ yr
[509]DEFINITIVE, APPRAISA OF CONTENT: IS.TENTATIVE,
[511]: A NICARAGUAN. JOURNALIST. (¢) ‘FROM. A Nioansevet Gi \ 4N: : SAN vOsES. FROM is
[512]“CESAR AUGOSTO. MIRLAREAL, CABEZAS im
[514]Se BEL E 7 eae AREA =
[516]1. ON’ 9 UANUARY 1963 CESAR AUGUSTO VILLAREAL caBezis, A NIEARAGUAR
[517]REVOLUTIONARY LIVING IN ‘SAN, Ose, SAID “THAT HE WAS AWAITING. INSTRUC.
[519]$00 RCE
[521]a
[523]St TONS, TO GO TO PUERTO. CORTES, HONDURAS TO RECEIVE A ‘SHIPMENT OF ARMS _
[524]WHICH WILL COME- ‘FROM CUBA on THE "CORK _c", A MERCHANT VESSEL OF. LUNKNOBN
[526]REGISTRY. HE SAID THAT THE: INSTRUCTIONS: TOGO TO PUERTO CORTES: wn
[527]FROM CUBA THROUGH DR. “EMILIO ORTEGA TAPIAS
[529]“2s THE. "CORK. cH WILL: UNLOAD THE ARMS AT: CAYO COCHINO WHERE THEY
[531]“y Wet ‘BE, RECEIVED BY, GRIFFIN, (ENU) WHO LIVES » IN PUERTO CORTES. | ”
[532]. GRIFFIN WILL, DELIVER, “THE, ARMS, To. VILLAREAL, AT. PUERTO. CORTES.
[533]vere Be. THE. ARMS WiLL, BE: TAKEN, FROM. PUERTO. coRTES TO. PUEBLO NUEVO,
[535]woe HE
[537]CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS:'
[539]it FU at eee ee
[543]Sire rT
[544]Ty °
[546]71
[550]BW 50955 - ‘pockasozanava
[552]ATL
[554]Bage 17.0.)
[556]|
[558]i | Ce At ~ SI RERTON = TETOATTTOR CONTROLS
[559]| JCORMDENTIL 59 pepeieat UISSEE
[561]= OCS 3/538, 035
[562]ER ad Bicoeal | .
[564]“NICARAGUA BY “VILLAREAL, “JUL to VELASQUEZ VELEZ,
[566]AND ‘DRy. HERNAN | SILVA.
[567]ARGUELLO- WHERE, ‘THEY Witt BE TURNED ‘OVER TO DR.. EMILIO
[569]Ok, € SOURCE COMMENT:
[570]‘KNOWN.
[572]"FLORES - [SBREGON,.
[573]“THE DATE OF ARRIVAL, OF THE "Conk cn 1s UN.
[575]CARLOS’ FONSECA AMADOR, NICARAGUAN COMMUNIST GUERRILLA LEADER
[577]|: IN HONDURAS, HAS RECEIVED ARMS FROM CUBA BY THE SAME: SYSTEM, |
[578]FELD DISsEM: STATE: ARMY, CINCARIB CINCLANT.,
[580]ACTIONS, ACSI,
[581]“-TNFO. + DCSOP"
[582]DA INS» 82
[584]“NAVY, AF, JCS; 0sD.
[586]CLASSIFICATION -— DISSEMINATION CONTROLS a
[588]; : fen f SS ee
[590]HW 50955 Docld: 32423736 Page 18
[592]CENTRAL INTE:
[593]asa of the United States within the meeni ing of the Expr
[595]This material contains information <° jecting die ary ete
[596]793 and 794, the transmission of reve.stion of Whi eats! anner ia an unauthorued person is prohibited by le a
[597]x.
[600]vonage Laws, Title? |
[602]CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
[604](63 FES 9 AL at
[606](When Filled inj
[608]VENS 7UELA
[610]REPORT NO. ToCs-3/536, 942
[612]AAD- ” ‘ .
[613]DATE DISTR. 9 FearuARY 1963
[615]pc: SLE SHIPMENT OF rene FROM CUBA AND |
[616]powam TO WESTERN VENEZUELA.
[618]i
[619]i
[621]PRECEDENCE ROUTINE
[623]i re-auary 1963 REFERENCES IN 64876
[624]bs VEN CO UJELA, MARACAIBO (1 FEBRUARY 1963) os . oe
[625]DALE ACG. : .
[627][PEPRAISAL 2 FIELD REPORT NO. “Hvc~2651
[628]THIS 1S 3 UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT 1S TENTATIVE:
[629]SURCE 4S MEMBER (C) OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF VENEZUELA IN MARACAIBO.
[630]Ne |
[631]Rae)
[632]NE
[634]y 1. PEDRO MATOS, WHO TOGETHER WITH THREE MEMBER REGIONAL COMMAND
[636]Aur ‘N.
[637]Ne |
[638]RT!DO COMUNISTA DE VENEZUELA (PCV, COMMUN | ST PARTY
[640]“EOMMITTSS OF THE PA
[641]OF VENEZUELA) _ IN THE STATE OF ZULIA IS RESPONSIBLE FOR PCV ARMS MATTERS ~
[643]SAID RECENTLY THAT THE PAR CA te Is. AWAITING A A SHIPMENT OF
[645]END THAT STATE,
[646]_ ARMS FROM. CUBA AND PANAMA BUT THAT THE EXACT DATE OF ARRIVAL iS STILL
[648]RE KNOWN
[650]co
[652]-QURCE COMMENT : ALTHOUGH THE LOCATIONS OF “ARMS A
[654]SINKMOWY
[655]IT 1S POSSIBLE THAT THE
[657]SQNLY ro mafOS AND THE REGIONAL COMMAND COMMITTEE,
[658]x AROUND LA CONCEPC iON AND” LA PAZ; “TOWNS APPROXIMATELY SOUTHWEST
[660]BND. WEST, RESPECTIVELY» ‘OF MARACAIBO CITY IN THE DISTRICT OF MARACAIBO,
[662]SITES). (F LELD COMMENT : ACCORDING TO SOURCE, THE REGIONAL
[664]GROUP
[666]” oc
[667]: ; CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
[669]-. is-a0)
[671]HY 50955 Docld:32423736 Page 19
[673]a
[676]u
[680]N
[682]La
[684]AW
[686]Hn
[687]gina
[688]MS
[689]id
[690]he
[692](2, FIELD DISSEM:STATE ARMY NAVY AiR CINCLANT CINCARIB.
[695]a ee SSL EE ee : oo —
[697]Z
[698]Qo CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS 1 .
[699]sero Tt , ,
[700]CORE |
[702]wm Filled In)
[704]iYTEE OF THE PCV IN THE STATE OF ZULIA HAD BEEN DISSOLVED AS OF EARLY
[706]‘63 AND A THREE MEMBER REGIONAL COMMAND COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED).
[708]DOF MESSAGE
[709]CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
[711]50955 Docld: 324233736 Page 20
[714]4. pEPARTI: SENT OF THE AIR FORCE
[715]STAFF MESSAGE DIVISION -.
[716]_ INCOMING MESSAGE "RETRANSMITTED 70: SAC, TAC,
[717] GONAD, AFSC, MATS
[718](per req Mr Ke
[719]25rop62 d oleh a: :
[721]A/D a2 NAVE-2, CMC“): es: fe)
[723]OSD/SDLU-1;-STATE-79 CIA-11,_NSA-T -
[725] XPD-3, «ISI-2,, 22) (112) (Risd. by
[726]Mr Kerp-CIN-4o8e 62).
[730]1127 USAF FAG Ft BELVOIR v/s
[732]INFO CIARC ALBROOK AFB CZ
[733]USAIRAS GUATEMALA BRAZIL VENEZUELA aa
[735]BT |
[736]CON FIDE NT 1 AL XX CITE CHARLI
[738]E "DASH NINE -$@D “HARRIS: Pant
[739]ITED. MEXICO ve us
[741]MILITARY REP OF EURHPEAN WESTERN NATION ACGRED
[742]ING. RECD INFO FROM: To DIFFERENT.SOURGES,
[744]D DEPARTED BITHER SANTIAGO. DE, CUBA
[745]IVE MINUTES: NORTH. SEVEN FIVE.
[746]ONE ‘ONE. TO. ONE. SEVEN
[747]“NORTHEAST, BRAZIL
[749]EPORTED Two TWO FEB HAV
[750]HAT. CUBAN SHIPLOAD OF ARMS KA
[751]OR BAHIA DE NIPE TWO XERO DEGREE FOUR F
[752]XERO unNuTES yest DURING VEEK OF,
[754]"HEADED FOR BRITISH GUIANA OR’
[756]BLE CONF IR PARA ‘SOP DASH THREE =
[758]ALLE
[760]ADIN
[762]F 50955, Dovti:32423736. page 21 ay
[764]SECRET ..
[766]The British cousul in Santiago de Cubs has informed Washington
[767]and the Governor of British Guiene that two alleged US citizens,
[768]Join ALivem Johnson, aged 53, and his wife Margene’. Frances Jotncon,
[769]were leaving Ciba on 3] December on the Cuban vessel, BANTA Dm TARA
[770]destined for deorgetow, Bricish Guiana, On board with then were 17
[773]nsme, ingluding two lsree wod erates understood to ba
[774]“viwy gimiler to those recently unloaded from a Soviet Union ship
[776]in Sentiegs de dubs." Tho Britieh congul notes the unlikelihe
[778]L of
[779]US elidaens" leaving Cuba in this manner, and the resulting doubt aa to
[780]their veal ldentities and intentions. (Uritish Porsign Office te
[781]Washington, No. S759, 31 Decetber, 1962 (SuoREr))
[783]SECRET
[785]WH 50955 Docld: 324233736 Page 22
[788]‘ eM
[790]CENTRAL NTHLUGENGE 3 AGENCY
[794]‘ COUNTRY. Cuba/British cutene. 7 _  REPORT.NO. = 0O= K-3,210,108
[796]~ SUBJECT | Shipment of ; Weapons to. British Guiena DATE DISTR. . @L Feb 62.
[798]. / o _- €D/00 Case = 2 2/08616/65
[800]DATE OF _ Se . , Case -
[801]DATE OF aes a960. oe |  Gase 62 78/rwu/DOM 61/cx.
[802]{PLACE& . wags Dec 1962» .
[804]DATE ACQ._ OT m
[806]. Me This material contains. information affecting the National. Defense of the United States within. the meaning of the Espionage, Laws, Title ee
[808]i U.S.C. Secs: 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to on unevihorized | person is. prohibited by low. _ won
[810]C-O-RAP-I-D-BN-T- eleAcL_.
[812]- REFERENCES a oe
[814]THIS 1S UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
[816]"Cuban national, A 12 88% 576, who arrived in the US on 3 Feb 1962.
[817]: Source is an electrical engineer and advisor to undergrour groups in Cuba.
[819]- [This report was developed by an Army representative assigned to the office io
[820]of preparation. ]
[822]x was advised by a Cuban merchant marine officer that the Cuban freighter, 7
[823]“"Bohia ade Nipe" left Cuba for British ‘Guiana on 22 Dec 1961 with a cargo
[825]. shipment of weapons. ‘The. boxes containing this equipment, were stored —
[827]in the bottom of the ship's hold and covered with nattresses and canvas.
[829]a8 cargo of sugar bags win misced on. top of the ‘weapons.
[831]50955 Docld: 32423736 Page by 7 7 ci ee ae :
[833]“280G. mca | Department of State = 7 02 | 47.
[835]eos piconet ;
[836]"Tp cnaaa 10. _
[838]uname oFFICAL USE” - mA ae ..
[839]| | practi a, a Fee & 10 6 A
[840]2 Ota AREION: snatveaey Qx0nGenO%s 286 7 oe
[841]; = so - : oo - UNCLASS! FIED MESSAGE REFERR
[842]me a cae . «TO THIS MESSAGE BY CiTE rem b
[843]WILL BE DESIGNATED : EFTO
[844]che Feb 8 ‘edition of LIFE contains story on. Cuba with follexing
[846]- a eremmrrn oe
[847]caption under ‘Bhoto of  Ruigedan freighter: - .
[849]But refugecs: aboard’ the ‘sha ploy Lykes said two bts pat out fron
[851]: Mariel | (Cuba) 6 only last: week with holds loiided with weapons: sent by
[853]Castro to British Guiana. UNQUOTE &
[857]" Woula a appreciate any: r avaslable @ comport,
[859]ve nates
[860]a
[861]t
[862]om
[864]“ACTION: “STATE (ARMY :ACSI) 0...
[865]OSA, JCs::
[867]a. N 827722.
[869]Felegraphle wansmissloa and
[870]+ | classification approved bye
[872]*. . REPRODUCTION FROM This:
[873]"  EGPY IS PROHIBITED
[874]_ UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED",
[876]LIMITED OWFTATAT. TAR | |
[878]‘HW 50955 Docld: 32493736 Page 24
[882]54
[883]Action
[884]EUR
[886]oy Info
[888]G
[889]. SAL
[890]~ ARA
[891]P
[892]USIA
[893]SCA
[894]NSC
[895]INR
[896]CIA
[897]~ NS
[898]OSD
[900]NAVY
[901]AIR
[903]\.
[905]‘HW 50955
[907]INCOMING TELEGRAM = Department of State’
[911]3 ~Gontral: 4682 /
[912](05 ‘Rec'd: February 7, 1963
[913]. 953. 12:57 PM
[914]FROM: Georgetown - ’
[919]TO: Secretary of State
[921]NO: 245, February 7, NOON
[923]Reference: Department's 286 February 6.
[925]Neither harbor master nor shipping companies” have. any
[926]knowledge Cuban ships en route Georgetown. Guiana Import-
[927]Export agents for sales rice Cuba, states it is always
[928]notified as soon as rice ships leave Cuba so that necessary
[929]arrangements at RMB wharf can be made, It denies having
[930]received any notice recently. Governor also reports
[931]negative results his inquiries. ; _—
[932]CONGEN has had numerous inquiries AP story mentioned TOUSI
[933]18. Appreciate any clarification (not for release to press)
[934]Department can give. ne
[936]MELBY
[938]TEK/18°
[940]REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS.
[941]CONFIDENTIAL ———. PROHIBITED UNLESS “UNCLASSIFIED”
[943]Docld: 327473736 Page 25
[946]“FBIS 84 OFFICIAL USE ONLY
[947]" PARIS AFP IN’ ENGLISH TO THE FAR EAST 1965 7 FEB 63 E
[949]- €EXCERPT) GEOR >GETOWN--BRITISH GUIANA IN 4 STATE OF NEAR PANIC.
[950]TODAY AFTER. NEWSPAPERS AND RADIO STATIONS PUT OUT A
[952]WASHINGTON NEWSPAPER REPORT THAT CUBA WAS SENDING TWO SHIPS
[954]FULL OF SOVIET ARMS/TO THIS COUNTRY. PREMIER CHEDDI JAGAN CALLED
[956]THE REPORT FROM THE WASHINGTON EVENING STAR FANTASTIC AND UNFOUNDED.
[958]<A SPOKESMAN IN THE. HOME AFFAIRS. MINISTRY SAID. THE: GOVERNMENT
[960]- EXPECTED NO" ARMS, FROM THE. SOVIET. UNTON OR CUBA.
[962]“7 FEB 749? FG/OP | Co N. rn ee
[964]‘HW 490955 Doold: 32423736 Page 26
[966]‘OUTEO
[968]ING TELEGRAM Department of State Ly
[970]e"GE TO : : 3 s
[971]at - | ‘CONFIDENTIAL tA f e
[972]9 | fc
[973]“2 Orie ACTION:  AmConGen GEORCETOW! 293 os
[974]. EUR . 8
[975]J defo: x, _ cee
[976]“8s | | oe ae
[977]SR UrTel 2h5 = _
[978]oe intelligence a
[979]% ‘Sp Washington inpesiieotion agencies have no information to contin
[980]o JE
[981]SAL alleged munitions shipments from Cuba to Georgetown. a
[982]AR : . / oO
[983]STR” Story originated with caption current edition Life Magazine to
[984]_P effect two Russian ships carrying munitions from Mariel, Cuba to BG.
[985]USTA ,
[986]> SCA O'Leary of Washington Evening Star apparently seized on Life story
[987]. INR * wee . ~ ee aoe _ im . aoe 7 .
[988]pra as-basis Evening Star article. Unlikely any responsible US official
[989]NSA ~ confirm: ‘story as O'Leary alleged in article. x
[991]Drafted bys
[993]Iv repeat if Department is asked ty press » we plan Say we have
[995]no information but are making inquiries.
[997]Telagraphic transmission and
[999]SUR: BNA: RJTepper: 14a : 2/8/03 ctassification approved by: Bun iA - kX. Y“ordon Knox
[1000]Clearances: . j 2 oo.
[1001]INR - Mr. Packman 7 mm/s - Mr. Simmons. . hoe. “BRAcceod pace
[1002]- ~ “BUR/P Mr. McGowan a Ts ~ ye, COA = Mr. Polles a
[1003]Ce, ee REPRODUCTION FROM THIS \
[1004]Oe ae PROHIBITED ae
[1005]CCONPEDENTEAL, 4 ee UNLESS “UNCLASSIFIED”, 1
[1007]HY 50955 Docld:32423736 Page 27
[1009]i
[1011]NTELLIGENCE AGENCY
[1013]aterial contains information affecting the Nationa! Defense
[1014]S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of whic
[1016]CENTRAL |
[1018]of the United Stores within the meaning of the Espionage Lows, Title
[1019]h in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
[1021]O~O-N-P-T-D-E-N-P-T-A-L
[1023]2 \ 4 .
[1025]os o . iy : .
[1026]COUNTRY: British Guiana/Cuba REPORT NO. © OO— B--3, 247, 34d q
[1027], . a as
[1028]. 11 Jan 63 rari oF 4
[1030]SUBJECT = dagan'’s Political-Rconomie Viewpoints
[1031]; propriation of Foreign Proverties Lin
[1032]to Foreign Aid/Futility of Jagants 5-
[1034]Plan/Psoples Progressive Party Infiltration
[1036]t
[1037]of United Front, Arus. Saugeling irom Cuba fw REFERENCES i
[1038]Filariasis Diseas@ Conon in Gui Fala ; i
[1039]DATE OF Country. ; : . i
[1040]INFO. Taru Oct 62 (
[1041]PLACE & - ‘
[1042]DATEACQ. British Guiane/Taen Ort 62
[1044]THIS is UNEVALUATED INFORMATION *
[1046]OURCE: “US national, executive in a US aluainua company 4
[1048]' Source bas frequently treveled to and within British Guiena in connection |
[1049]» wita geologicel surveys for his company. He nes known dagen for about
[1050]| wine years, aud on ais latest trip ned several conversations with Jagan.
[1052]" On tue basis of any conversations wita Chedid Jagan (isostly concerning
[1053]‘possible iavestiuents by wy coucany in Britisa Guiana), I an convinced
[1054]tnat he is not « Communist. Ia fact, dagen oes not know what re is.
[1055]He is siuply Looking for anytulug uew thas il bels to pull up ais.
[1056]people quickly. In this context be sees Soviet and Chinese Communisn
[1057]as the two principal Twentieth Century econouic experiuents ~-/ eat as
[1061]~ Se0n0uie experiments be is willing to try then.
[1063]. to talking with ue, Jegan has wade clear that he is not a “Castro Type.” .
[1065]‘He wants hélp from anybody. Tie one thing ict might in the futare
[1066]seriously winder nis getting econoxte aid fron the USSR is that he
[1068]. Gevands that aid be without strings.
[1070]dagan would hesitate to do anysoing (such as confiscating foreign pro-
[1071]perties in an ettampt to inereese revennes ) which would ofiend the US
[1072]or the UN for fear of ruining any fubare chances of obtaining US or UN
[1073]aid. Jagan is of course quite conscious that se is still under tas UK
[1074]_and that it is therefore wmiconstitutiorsl for aim to expropriate anything.
[1075]After British Guiana achieves independence, Ilan confident Jagan would
[1076]not expropriate. anything if he is getting aid trom the US or the UN --
[1077]_, that is, until the money is spent. If at any point (after independence )
[1078], Jagan is receiving no such aid and DAS no prospects of receiving suca
[1079]-aid, then anything could happen. I would, however, temper this sowewhat
[1080]uepressing estimate of Jagan by commenting thet in 1953 when he entered
[1081]_ office, ne was something of a wild-syed fanatic without direetion, ;
[1082]Since then he has matured considerably, © 2) - eat
[1084]' Bota Jagan and ais Trade Miaister » Frank Hibbard, nave told we that
[1086]The PPP capability for increasing the industrial wealth of Britisna
[1088]“Guiana is hopeless. Jagan indiserluinately wants dil kinds of factories.
[1090]His “Five Year Plan" is no.plan at all. fa his eagerness to do souething (\y .
[1092]. for British Guiana, dagan thinks he ought’ to build any kind of factory \ °
[1094]~ that the country does not have. Whenever he thinks of something, he \
[1095]just tells a subordinate to add it to ‘tne Plan. But there is no one in NN
[1097]the Jagan government who has done or can do the marketing reeeareh, etc., \ .
[1099].whish 1s necessary for any such investment. Oy
[1101]f Excluded from automatic
[1102]downgrading and“
[1103]- Coclassifcation
[1105]GROUP f } ry
[1107]ROIS
[1109]HY 50955 Docld:32423736 Page 26
[1111]C-O0-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
[1114]00~B-3, 247, 3lb
[1116]§.- In the last elections Jagan ordered some of his (Indian) Peoples
[1117]Oh Progressive Party (PPP) supporters to join the United Front Party
[1118]< (uP) in order to impress the world in general and the US in particular
[1119]iz _ 4 + democracy in British Guiana was working. By virtue of the fact |
[1120]thet the UFP mewbership was “growing,” it was “obvious” that Jagan
[1121]was not a dictator. I was told this by two Indian Gulanese who were
[1123]working for Jagan.
[1127]I vas in British Guiana for about 12 months on my latest trip.
[1128]Since much of this time was devoted to geological surveying in the
[1129]hinterland, I was accompanied by an Indian Guianese doctor. A well-
[1130]educated man of the upper-middle class, he told me that armg were
[1131]; } being smuggled into the country from Cuba. He aid not go into any
[1133]: detail on the subject, but he did mention that his sons, who were ;
[1134]is,mewbers of the Progressive Youth Organization (PYO) frequently brought
[1135]xms into their home, kept them for a while, and then.disposed of them.
[1136]ti The doctor was so much concerned -- and pessimistic -- about the _
[1137]» Situation that he emigrated from the country shortly after I departed.
[1139]6.
[1141]Te. Malaria isnot a factor now. Even well into the interior there. is
[1142]Ope than 1 percent incidence. But anywhere away from the coast
[1143]filariasis presents a problem. At first I did not believe it when my
[1144]Indian Guianese doctor said that mosquito bites incurred in the day- .
[1145]-time were harmless but mosquito blies at night would infect with
[1146]: f{lariasis. After several months in the back country I believed him.
[1147]“The disease seems to affect women more than men, causing women's legs
[1148]“to swell. But the disease's affect on men's sexual organs was not
[1149]‘exactly encouraging.~ T. never-did understand why, but my doctor said -
[1150]“that to be effective in detecting the disease a-blood test must be
[1151]~made at night (preferably between 11 p.m. and 1 asta), and analyzed
[1152]; “quickly. If filariasis is treated promptly, a man's sexual. prowess
[1153]--s,@an be saved.:,.We found’ that the disease is very common throughout
[1154]‘the’ country. a era - oe
[1156]CO _ os QeQ-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-ASL en Soak,
[1157]oe CONTROTIED_DISSEM_.. NO DISSEM ABROAD +)» NO_FOREIGN DISSEM
[1159]HW 50955 Docld: 32423736 Page 29
[1161]CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
[1163]One material contains. information offecting the National. Defense of the United States within the meaning ‘of the Espionage ‘Laws, Title
[1164]18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelatio
[1166]in of which. in -any manner to on unauthorized, person is. prohibited by low. .
[1168]y
[1170]ce C-0-PAT-D-SAio-EaAcd
[1172].00- K-3,210, 102
[1173]DATE DISTR... 21 Feb 62
[1175]COUNTRY cuva/Britien 6 Guiana u
[1179]SUBJECT ~~ Salmment of Weapons % to British Guiana
[1181]NO. PAGES One |
[1183], REFERENCES
[1185]Ce _ eD/oo case ce 22/05676/¢5
[1186]el Dec 1962: oe . os @ 3566 78/Iww/DoM bi/ox
[1187]/PLACE & --3 Dec 1962 |
[1189]DATE ACQ._
[1191]THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION a .
[1192]source: | Cuban. national, A 12 88% 576, who arrived in the US on 3 Feb 1962.
[1194]Source. is an electrical engineer and advisor, to undergrouril groups in Cuba.
[1196]a [This report was: Aeveloped by. an Arny representative assigned to the office
[1197]on - of preparation.} . -
[1199]x was advised by a Cuban merchant marine officer that the Cuban freighter,
[1200]De "Bohia de Ripe" left Cuba for British Guiena on 22 Dec 1961 witha cargo.
[1202]shiment of weelpons. The boxes containing this equipment were stored . - a
[1204]in the bottom of the ship’ s hold and. covered with mattresses and canvas. .
[1206]io . A cargo of. sugar > bage ‘wes placed on. : top of ‘the. weapons. _
[1208]ile as
[1212]‘HW 50955 Docld: 32493736 Page 30
[1214]_ SNOLELVOTNNNWOD
[1216]a
[1217]HW 50955 Docld:32423736 Page 31
[1219]HW 50955 Docld:32423736 Page 32
[1221]ahdy of @ devolution in Beardly howwver, the Brazilian toverment
[1223]hee nt tales wale Hote of the dotumiat..
[1225]cECRET
[1227]‘HW 50955 Docld:32493736 Page 33
[1230]ft em
[1232]‘ OFT
[1234]4
[1235]HY 50955 Daocld: 3274239736
[1237]Page 34
[1240]‘HW 50955 Docld: 32493736
[1242]Page 35
[1244]EE TRE AEP ESE RET
[1246]SECRET
[1248]SECRET
[1250]SSIS a EP EE
[1253]CONFIDENTIAL
[1255]DAL
[1256]genteel Stan” Radio cransttting Station, 7 50 donuary 1962”
[1257]| Sancho Boyeras Aaports Habana. Proviso, (2° 4
[1258]bof.
[1260]we ‘120 Sasary 1962 ~ Sons
[1261]“Rancho Boyares, Jan 6 tas
[1263]a8 BE6/3ToSR oe EE ee
[1264]Ze Subsiource sorerts ahat the &
[1266]vernaent of Cubs had planned to ineuarete a
[1267]Genin padie tranemitting station ob
[1268]Fated
[1270]in & the Rancho Boyeres Airport, south ef
[1271]ona Clg, on the 19t ta or 20th of damary 19 See =
[1273]news 26 Tho puspoze off the station waa to be concanieation betweon cubs cad
[1274]geclzalpes, Horetarasy ¢ os the 9677. Sreinsneye
[1276]. Bos SFORADED At tz baer AIG
[1277]TSTESV AL BOF AU De
[1278]HAT GAULY DELASSISTED
[1280]oe DoD TER 5200010,
[1284]#50955. Docld; 32423736 .P,
[1286]4 C, ao CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
[1292]ATION REP
[1294]aA IWAN
[1296]This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title
[1297]- 18, U.S.C, Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to ar. unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
[1300]NO FOREIGN DISSEM
[1301]COUNTRY .: Dominican Republic/Cuba , REPORT NO. CS.3/535, 788
[1302]“SUBJECT... Clandestine Radio Receiving DATE DISTR. 1 February 1963
[1303]oe Station in Santo Domingo . ;
[1304]a NO. PAGES 1
[1305]‘ REFERENCES RD
[1307]DATE OF © 22 January 1963
[1308]_ INFO.
[1310]PLACE & Dominican Republic, Santo Domingo
[1311]DATE ACQ. 22 January 1963 | FIELD REPORT NO. HDC-~553
[1312]THIS 18 UNEVALUATED INFORMATION, SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT iS TENTATIVE,
[1314]-_ SOURCE: Foreign businessman (B) with good contacts in Dominican
[1316]political circles. Appraisal of Content: 3.
[1318]One of.the under-cover receiving stations for radio messages
[1319]from Habana is believed to be in a house at Calle .Espaillat 56:
[1321]repair shop there.
[1323]"Headquarters Comment. Johnson (fnu} is probably identifiable -
[1324]with the Johnson (fnu) reported by another source as a Com-
[1325]munist member of the. Agrupacion.Politica.Catorce de Junio.
[1326]{APCJ - 14th of June Political Group). See CS~3/511,814,.of
[1327]24 May 1962. Also see CS-3/528,287, of 14 November 1962, from
[1328]an official British service, which reports -on a clandestine
[1329]group of pro-Castro Dominicans who are in radio contact with
[1330]‘Habana from a repair shop in Santo Domingo...
[1332]The house is occupied by Johnson (fnu), who has an electrician' s
[1334]‘HW 50955 Docld:32493736 Page 37
[1336]yo aie Tz a
[1339]HW 50955 DBocld:32423736
[1341]Page 36
[1344]20 thet sone efforte
[1346]VIA gtetion in Rio de Janeiro hes repor
[1347]may be mide to put pressure on President Gowlart te wieliély take some
[1348]Rote of the Cuban intervention in Brasil's internal affairs, allegedly
[1350]shown by sone 16 pages of Spanish-language documents found in the
[1352]Verig plane exach which carried a Guben delegation to thetr deaths da
[1353]Novauber. The docun
[1355]ante are conaidered by o Brazilian gouree who nade
[1356]then available to the CIA wtetion to be “explosive, since they prove .
[1358]the Cubans are eponsoring reveluvion in Brazil." Parepbrassa of those
[1359]domuments have apped
[1360]President Gouls
[1362]ed in thé Lime preas) but i4 46. unt
[1364]ely that
[1365]et wil. give ony support to publigiizing then. (cra,
[1366]Rio de Janeiro, IN 43586, @ January, SECRET MOYORN)
[1368]SECRET
[1369]NO FOREIGN DISSEM
[1371]Ww 50955 Docld: 324233736 Page 39
[1374]Prt ne ee ee
[1376]ww 50955 Docld: 32742735736
[1378]Page 40
[1381]DRE INE OR MAI TION Rie SPORT
[1383]if, U.S.C.
[1385]COUNTRY
[1387]i SUBJECT
[1389]DATE OF
[1390]oS INFO.
[1392]' PLACE &
[1393]DATE ACG.
[1395]CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
[1397]‘his material contains informstion affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title
[1399]Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which In any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
[1401]S.-B-C~R-E-T
[1402]NO FORE(GN DISSEM
[1406]Pacaguay/Cuba REPORT NO. CS -3/536.454
[1407]Paraguayan Travelers to and DATE DISTR. 7 February 1963
[1408]‘From Cuba | ;
[1410]NO. PAGES 2
[1412]REFERENCES RD
[1414]December 1962 - 20 January 1963
[1415]Paraguay, Asuncion
[1416](24 January: 1963) FIELD REPORT NO. HYA-833
[1417]THIS iS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
[1419]SOURCE
[1421]web a eet shonin ee een a one ek ews
[1423]oe Ge
[1425]on
[1427]Paraguayan security officer (B) from a member of She Paraguaya7
[1429]Communist Party (C). Appraisal _of Content: 2,
[1431]On about 20 January 1963 Cantero, a leader of the Partide
[1432]Comunista Paraguayo (PCP ~ Paraguayan Communist Parity) in
[1433]Paraguay,1 met with five rural leaders of the PCP from ;
[1434]areas of Villarrica, Concepcion, Piribebuy, Tebycuarymi, an
[1435]Guarambare. These leaders received political instructic
[1436]from the PCP for their trip to Cuba, where they will receive
[1437]military and political training in rural organizaticn.
[1439]Lopez (fnu)2 is the leader from Piribebuy, and Ignacio Accasta3
[1440]is the leader from Tebycuarymi.
[1442]Federico Tatter, a retired ensign in the Paraguayan Navy.
[1443]eniered Paraguay from Cuba in the firs: half of December to-
[1444]assume military direction of the Frente Unido de Liberacian
[1445]Nacional (FULNA « United Front for Natienal Liberation).
[1447]Anibal Garcete4.a% ceturned to Paraguay. from Cuba tc organize
[1448]| the sugar-cane workers. Garcete is a PCP member masquerading
[1449]“as a member of the Colorado Party.
[1451]i. Field Comment. Cantero is the PCP pseudonym of a persona
[1452]whose True name is unknown.
[1454]Source Comments
[1456]“4, Lopez was born about 1937.
[1458]3. Acosta is a cousin of Wigberto Acosta, a long-time
[1459]member of the PCP. ; oO ‘
[1461]innate iad,
[1463]HY 50955 Docld:32423736 Page 41
[1466]- CS-3/5236, 454
[1468]. WAS reported in June 1960
[1469]ive in the labor dispute in
[1470]4e the sugar cane worker's
[1472]as mentioned in confidential
[1473]jich time he was an officer in
[1474]r Cane Workers.
[1476]ww 50955 Docld: 324233736 Page 42
[1479]SECRET NO Fone .SEM
[1481]On 4 Deceuber Brasilien Prestdent Goulars telephoned General Alves,
[1482]tera in Rlo de Janeiro and
[1484]comender of the Piret Army with headquas
[1485]the highest renking extmone leftist 4a the Brastlien amed foreda,’ He
[1486]toll Alyes to choowe four or five junior officers of his. abeolute con-
[1487]fidenes to escort certain people who were arriving from Cuba vle Bolivia,
[1488]Joulart paid the people were coming with “mich auteriel." (OTA, Sao
[1489]Paulo, IN 30353, 6 December, SEORER mOROR)
[1491]SECRET
[1492]NO FOREIGN DISSEM
[1494]‘HW 50955 Docld:32493736 Page 43
[1497]SECRET wo rozees Uireeyy
[1499]Hight Doniniean pro-kstro leadera vere shoard the Czech airlines
[1500]flight to Guba which transited Shannon Aleport on 14 Decenber, sceording
[1501]-to en official Irish service, The Danial wis dneinded Maximo Lopes
[1503]Tomas Pansonio Eriekeon, and Gustave Ricert, leadera of the
[1505]outlawed Deminiten Populex Movemint (MPD), oné of the moot ective pro-
[1506]Commmist groups in the Dowiniean Republic. The eight. Deninioans were
[1507]among the ten who vére deported from the Dominican Republic to France
[1508]eetiier thi year, Another sourea reported last Novenher that. the Cuban
[1509]eabnatador’ in Paris had a meeting with the ten Dosinican deportes to
[1510]iistuse helping then travel to Cuba without passports, {CTA Dublia,
[1511]"HCH 3/551, 991, 21 Decesber, SECREL/NO FORELGY Disem)
[1513]SECRET
[1515]|
[1517]NO FOREIGN DISSED
[1519]HY 50955 Docld:32423736 Page 44
[1521]Promiex Castro is te deliver the closing speech at the Congress
[1522]of Women 6f the Americas on 15 damuery tn Havanese. Hevana Radio
[1523]ammounéed thet the congress, achedpled to begin 11 Jeouary, will be —
[1524]attended by more than 200 delegetes from Latin America, the U. @.,
[1525]and Cenada, a8 well as by guects from many other nin-American countries.
[1526]akia, North Rores,
[1528]Delagations from Communist Ching, Albania, Gzechoslo
[1529]ahd North Vietnam arrived in Havana on 9 Jenuery. (FSIS 03 and 51,
[1531]HY 50955 Docld: 32423736 Page 45
[1534]HW 50955 Docld:32493736 Page 46
[1536]siege ndasions im the U.8.p (2) A report chet
[1538]age & sient te the uts)e ena, (8) Repox
[1539]ettemst +o Bebotage @ bridge tm Venewucla.
[1541]Ls ined be the Meracadbo: secbe te
[1543]HY 50955 Docld:32423736 Page 47
[1546]WW 50955 Docld:32493736 Page 48
[1548]SECRET NOCEOREIGN DISSEM.
[1550]#m, éxpart Cuban electrical technician in the Borjite sugar mi1i
[1551]has told q former cloke mogociate who 16 now a Fegular clandestine
[1552]“souree thet Cubs Le training personnel in the techniquesie? using
[1554]plosives price to ending them to the United States on sabotage missions.
[1555]Et is. tubended ;
[1557]‘waged, aod the dabotage will bé 80 arranged that in acme eases 1% vill.
[1558]be teken to be merely aeetdenta, ‘the electrical techadeian addsd that
[1559]there 16 5 impge Commniist espionage ring operating with a fing in the
[1560]United States serosa the berder, with several plane already wider way.
[1561](CTA ppp I 29527, & December, SEOREY ROTOR) —
[1563]. that such persong wih go in the galee ef antiath
[1567]NO FOREIGN DISSEN
[1569]HY 50955 Docld:32423736 Page 49
[1572]SR SRST EB TEE er
[1574]‘BECREN, =, -ameignt DISSEM
[1576]A Yontnicen exita in Cuba repos
[1577]about wid-becenber that Dominican
[1578]Tominicen Republic to sdbotage the eane fields there. (CIA, Panam
[1579]City, IH 46599, 11 January, SECREP NOFORE)
[1581]‘SECREL, un AogiGN DISSEM
[1583]HY 50955 Docld:32423736 Page 50
[1585]told @ source whe vas there
[1586]Commnieta ars Leaving Cube for the.
[1589]MING TELEGRAM Department of State
[1591]Agehd 82. 6 25 45 CONFIDENTIAL
[1592]a - Control: 1171
[1593]Action ce Rec'd: NOVEMBER 3, I 1962
[1594]RA a | 11:29 P.M,
[1595]FROM: CARACAS
[1597]Info
[1599]Ss TO: Secretary of State
[1601]SP “NO: -548, NOVEMBER 3, 9 P.M.
[1603]/ SAL |
[1605]; ane)
[1607]OR NLACT |
[1609]Bop. DEPARTMENT PASS CINCARIB, CINCLANT
[1611]_ INR core tGN MINISTER FALCON BRICENO INFORMS “ME HE WILL ARRIVE
[1612]WASHINGTON SUNDAY NIGHT TO MAKE SPECIAL SPEECH IN OAS/OC
[1613]MONDAY RE CUBAN SITUATION UNDERSCORING CUBAN. INSPIRED
[1614]SUBVERSION AND SABOTAGE AGAINST VENEZUELA.
[1616]HE WILL PRESENT | NTERCEPTED. _CABLE..TO-VENEZUELAN STUDENTS
[1617]AND OTHER EVJ-DENCE..WHI-CHHE.HOPES OBTAIN FROM !NTERIOR
[1618]MINISTRY HE ASKS -1F DEPARTMENT CAN ROV).DE HIM. ‘SUNDAY
[1620]AT VENEZUELAN EMBASSY. WITH..TRANSCRILET
[1621]— STATEMENT AFTER. MARACAIBO. S, SABOTAGE. IN WHICH PRESS CLAIMS .
[1623]RAUL TOOK CUBAN CREDIT FOR INCIDENT, . en
[1627]SUGGEST DEPARTMENT MAKE, THIS AND ALL OTHER USEFUL FBIS
[1628]| NTERCEPTS AS WELL OTHER EVIDENCE AVAILABLE TO HIM.
[1630]_FALCON?S ARRIVAL NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON WILL BE AVAiLABLE
[1631]’ VENEZUELAN’ EMBASSY THERE. PLEASE EXTEND COURTESIES.
[1632]HE PLANS STAY US ABOUT EIGHT DAYS.
[1634]"STEWART
[1635]SMD:
[1637]NOTE: PASSED TO CINCARIB, CINCLANT i //be.
[1638]i MESSRS. MOSKOWITZ, BOVWDLER AND ALLEN (ARA) NOTIFIED
[1639]ee «12: i A. Mas 11/4/62 -TEM,
[1641]_ REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY 1S
[1642]CONF | DENT! AL PROHIBITED UNLESS “UNCLASSIFIED”
[1644]HY 50955 Docld:32423736 Page 51
[1646]CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
[1648]ASD i eats
[1649]THs ‘material contains iments aliectin
[1650]74 and 774, ‘tha transmission of revelation of which in any manner to an unauthon ited person is prohibited by LE
[1652]rdso 7
[1653]EG) &
[1655]CLASSIFICATION —- DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
[1658]. “ : he. Bowen hes acer
[1659](When Filled In) . i . ah. AOE De BoEN
[1661]VENEZUELA
[1663]"REPORTNO. TOCS -3/537,176
[1664]CONTINUATION OF COMMUNIST TERRORIST DATE DISTR, . 13 FEBRUARY 1963
[1665]ACTIVITIES ,
[1666]PRECEDENCE PRIORITY
[1667]8 ano 12 resruary 1963 - So REFERENCES IN 67419
[1668]VENEZUELA, CARACAS (13 FEBRUARY 1963)
[1670]2 Hve 2655
[1672]FIELD REPORT NO.
[1674]PARA 12 FORMER POLICE OFFICIAL (C) WITH CONTACTS IN THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE
[1675]NATIONAL GUARDS ‘PARA 2: U.S. BUSINESSMAN (B) WITH EXCELLENT CONTACTS IN THE
[1676]VENEZUELAN MILITARY. _ So
[1678]. ON THE. "EVENING OF 8 FEB 63 NAT 1 ONAL GUARD SOLDIERS WHO WERE PRO-
[1680]. ENTRANCE TO-TUNNEL NUMBER 1. WHO WERE ATTEMPTING, TO DESTROY. TURNPIKE
[1681]_ BRIDGE NUMBER" 1. FIRE: WAS EXCHANGED FOR ABOUT THIRTY, MINUTES, BETWEEN:
[1683]none oa
[1685]a POUNDS OF. DYNAMITE: “WAS FOUND BELOW THE privae. “
[1687]2, “TWO CAR LOADS: OF. GUERILLAS ATTACKED THE. WA HYONAL GUARD HEADQUARTERS
[1689]PENINSULA, AND LAKE MARACA NBO,” STATE OF ZULIA, IN WESTERN VENEZUELA,
[1691]ON 12 FEB. ABOUT 198 SHOTS, WERE EXCHANGED BUT ALL THE - QUERILLAS ESCAPED.
[1693]7 co aK OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. ;
[1694]i. Fal tate ie eevee en LOREAL =
[1696]HY 50955 Docld:32423736 Page 52
[1698]q the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 16, U.S.C Sect.
[1701]Ce-tectine THE CARACAS-LA GUAIRA TURNPIKE SURPRISED A GROUP OF MEN AT THE |
[1703]- THE SOLDIERS: AND: THE MEN IN THE TUNNEL AND LATER, A ‘BOK CONTAINING ABOUT 5
[1705]“h
[1707]oat. DABAJURO, A PIPE LINE OUTPOST BETWEEN AMUAY,, IN THE PARAGUANA et
[1709]2h]
[1710]|
[1711]‘|
[1714]CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
[1715]Siumemey es we , +
[1717]|SECRET | en _per . |!
[1719](When Filled In}
[1721](FIELD: COMMENT + TERROR | ST ACTIVITIES HAVE BEEN INCREAS ING IN oe
[1723]2 penta, SEVERAL MEMBERS OF THE FUERZAS ARMADAS DE LIBERACION
[1725]NAC TONAL (FALN, ARMED. FORCES OF NATIONAL LIBERATION) TOOK TEMPORARY
[1727]_- POSSESION | OF. THE OFF ICE OF THE PREFECT IN THE TOWN OF SAN DIEGO DE |
[1728]LOS ALTOS, ABOUT. 26 MILES FROM CARACAS, ON 4 FEB. THEY TIED UP THE
[1729]POLICEMEN: ON: GUARD, STOLE A FEW RIFLES, AND PAINTED. THE WALLS WITH ANTI=
[1731]. GOVERNMENT, SLOGANS. ‘ON 5 FEB AN ATTACK WAS MADE ON THE HOME OF COLONEL — |
[1732]JOSE. ANTONIO. GONZALEZ, “COMMANDER OF THE. ‘MILITARY TRIBUNAL, LOCATED .
[1733]iN A WELL-TO- “DO RESIDENTIAL AREA OF CARACAS. THIS WAS FOLLOWED BY MNoTHER
[1734]“ATTACK ON 12 FEB WHICH RESULTED IN THE GOVERNMENT ESTABL1SHING ROAD |
[1735]‘Clocks: AND SENDING. TROOPS “AND POLICE INTO THE AREA, ON THE
[1737]-- MORNING OF 3 FEB. AN ARMED ATTACK WAS MADE ON THE AMERICAN (PORTION -
[1738]GARBLED WILL Fwo) “WHERE. OFFICES WERE SET ON. FIRE ‘AND “EQUI PMENT DESTROYED pe!
[1740]— AND ON THE NIGHT OF 9 FEB. ‘SEARS WAREHOUSE IN ANTIMANO WAS COMPLETELY
[1741]DESTROYED BY ‘MEMBERS OF THE ALN, THREE BRIOGES ON THE -PAN AMERICAN
[1743]| HIGHWAY, BARQUISIMETO AREA, STATE OF LARA, WERE ‘DAMAGED BY BOMBS... a
[1744]ON 12 FEB: AND AN ATTEMPT, WAS MADE ON: THAT DAY To BLOW UP A CREORE® GE. LINE, |
[1746]IN CATIA LA. MAG, FEDERAL DISTRICT, BUT ONLY ONE SMALL BOMB EXPLORED.
[1747]CAUSING MINOR DAMAGES) .
[1749]—s FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY. NAVY, AiR CINCLANT CINCARIB.
[1751]* 5. HEADQUARTERS: COMMENT ¢ MISSING | ‘PORT LON. WELL BE DISSEMINATED: ONLY AF. iT MATER ALLY
[1752]AFFECTS THE SENSE ‘OF THIS REPORT. aan , Lo.
[1756]- e) { .
[1757]- "SLASSIFIGATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS .
[1759]4 AVY, AF, JCS, OSD
[1761]HY 50955 Docld: 32423736 Page 53
[1763]Ww 50955 Docla
[1767]Page 54
[1770]Extremist And Police Activities In Venezuela
[1772]“-Venezuelaihas been afflicted over the past several
[1774]_months with a rash of Castro-Communist terrorist actions.
[1775]“Many incidents, involving shootings and robberies, are:
[1776]connected with the Movement of the Revolutionary Left, 4 -
[1777]‘the Venezuelan Communist Party, and the Armed Forces ,”..
[1778]“of National Liberation -- the Castro-Communist group
[1779]-eredited with the destruction at the Maracaibo oil ,
[1780]fields during the Cuban crisis. These activities are
[1781]“probably designed to discredit and weaken the Betan-~-
[1782]“court Government.
[1784]The police have demonstrated considerable proficiency
[1786]-in preventing major outbreaks and in acting rapidly
[1788]to arrest terrorists. They have rounded up extremists
[1789]“responsible for the holdup and looting of a printing ..-
[1790]: supply warehouse and the burning of the Dupont paint
[1791]warehouse and have captured the Communist leader of.
[1792]guerrilla bands operating in: the Falcon area of .
[1793]“northwestern Venezuela. °°) 0 7S
[1794](CONFIDENTIAL) 2 vee mennesiees
[1796]HY 50955 Docld:32423736 Page 55
[1800]Ni
[1802]COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION
[1803]FOR LATIN AMERICA
[1805]|
[1807]Page 56
[1809]324239736
[1811]50955 Docld
[1813]J
[1816]Tnformetion on the Communist apparatus for Letin America and ite
[1818]relationship with Cuba and the Sino Soviet Bloc de lergely derived from
[1819]highly classified intelligence which is provided separately, From the
[1820]reports tonteined in thie section, it may be ceneluded that the organine-
[1821]tional Links vary fyom country to country depending upan,
[1823]amine other
[1824]factors, the legel atatus of the Coumuniet party, whether diplometie
[1825]fepresentation 16 located in a eaumtry, the relative atrength of Comaundat
[1826]alliences with other leftist or opposition parties, and the character of
[1827]ourrent goverment leadership in theae countries, Next atteched ie an
[1828]uncliuseified report prépered in Orteber for release ug « White Payer.
[1829]Although thie paner wae not relensed due to the elacile erisie, it repre-
[1830]sents en agreed summary (State, DOD, CIA and USIA) of the Communiot
[1831]apperstue in Latin America. The report containd wriefs on Commmies
[1832]activities in each of the Latin Auerican sountries,
[1834]The reports vary with respect to the country pHiority for Castiro/
[1835]Commmist ection in latin America. Braid, Venesuele, ond Britien Guiena
[1836]are wontioued most fréquentiy es the Likely priority tergete, There are
[1837]also conflidting veperte on the relative independence of Castre fron the
[1839]Soviet Union and indicstions thet the publicized Sino Boviet disegreecents |
[1841]ae reflected in local Comminiet orgenizetione throughout Letin America.
[1843]TAB Suban Relationships and Polistes Toward Latin American
[1845]Tals tab eantelne relevant exeerpts from the drart NIB
[1846]nov under preparation. (USIB is meeting on this ites and
[1848]HY 50955 Docld:32423736 Page 57
[1851]SRST PS TT IE Se
[1853]the most current egreed positions will be made avaliable
[1854]to you in the event there is any dignificent change.) Alec
[1855]included et this tab are « number of significant reports
[1857]indieating the probable orlentation of Castro/Commmist actions
[1858]directed toverd Letin America. ‘The last item at this tab |
[1859]aumatizes the vneuccessful armd Ineuraions of 1959 (Panem, |
[1860]Wicaragua, and Dominicen Republic), |
[1862]TAB 2 Goviet Activities and Conflicts
[1864]Thies teb contains a number of items indicating posaible Guban+
[1865]Soviet conflicté as reflected in Ietin America, The last two
[1866]items reflect the concern attached to the possible establich-
[1867]ment of a Soviet fishing port in Cuba,
[1869]TAB 3 Situstion in letin America
[1871]This tab contains a number of current situation and pertinent
[1872]background reports on verious Latin American countries in the |
[1874]folleving order: Central America, Panama end Mexico} Bolivia; . ; |
[1878]Brazil (4)) Colombias Costa Rica; Ecuador} Heitt; Mexico: Panama s
[1879]Peru (4); and Venezuela (3). |
[1881]“B-
[1883]HY 50955 Docld:32423736 Page 58
[1885]—_) 4 October 1962:
[1887]terial support i¢ being given
[1888]oe ‘Chart. @uch dscistance ts
[1890]ae 0 Gibe's example,
[1892]ae eves ely stated ;
[1894]te Rect, however,
[1896]pee: in every ven of the ‘19 other Tetin
[1897]vegi s beoone a ay etbeattes instrument
[1899]state 4 2 fon and eset eup
[1900]groups has besa 2a in ve)
[1902]; 1 - : effort 4 deupetatic
[1903]polities. “institutions in latin , Amaricae
[1905]2, Cuban subversion has beaome more subtle Stace 19995 when e Cutan
[1906]x "vasion fovees" left Cuba: for abortive | sid “om on the "governments.
[1907]ME» gua, and Haiti. ‘Row Cuban _ gubversive efforts generally fall
[1908]in three eatagorien:
[1910]Be
[1912]a. bomimed. at Iatin. Auerics, by Cuban
[1913]nH printed meterisl and
[1914]awa” agency, ands
[1916]given oubvercive groups in
[1918]38 Feel 1 Castro announced on O duke 2 1961 that his government would
[1919]000 scholarships to "poor students” from other Latin Auerican
[1921]acuniy £ Prey axt school tei and LOO scholarships to students from
[1923]other i cnerlen of the worlds. Hundreds of young latin Americans have been
[1925]4 a. St imation. In addition to whatever foal :
[1927]twoining ‘they receive in Subs, miny of them recelve training in | 4tis.
[1928]arfere ond other techniques of wevolution,
[1930]be Cubon refuges vho have arrived recently in the United Bistes have
[1931]tad Le information om the troining programs offered to some of
[1933]HW 50955 Docld:32493736 Page 59
[1936]@.  Gne refugee, a deserter fron Castro's aruy, reported. from
[1937]personel Imoyledge that in late 1961 there were a number of students fron
[1938]Kouador, Argentina, Guatemala, end-Braci1 Living is a Her :
[1939]iho rogularly abtended Glagses ii Merzisn-leninion, aropag techniques,
[1940]and other subjects te prepare them for active yevolublonary roles in their
[1941]homelands, He reported that. these mle studeite who were betueen 16 end 20
[1942]peers Of age were Gont as part OF theiy training to the Minas éel, Frio
[1943]‘ : 2 BKC + During this phase of thele training they
[1944]Javigation in the use of emall. erms and hiked to the top of
[1945]iuptain, Pleo Ty »» iu. the Sterna, Maestra, the locale of
[1946], warfare against the Batista Aiotetanshp
[1948]y_ learned Label
[1950]us trading of students from other Iatin American countries
[1951]sy Oriente, The trainges receive instruction in
[1953]LLitary % villa verfare, subversion, sebotage, propaganda, and
[1955]Comaniat ide Ther x ‘efugee da not Imow how many Latdn Americana were
[1957]involved, wat beloved the duration of each course was about Sight weeks, after
[1959]which another group veplesed the tne that had been training.
[1961]3s Mush of the travel of latin American studetite to Cuba for training
[1962]end indoctrination ia handled by the Tnatdituto Cubano. de Amistad con los
[1963]Pushios (TOAP ~ Cuban Institute for Prtendship. with Peoples).
[1965]6; ide is. aise e w&jar talwore point for latin Americans traveling to
[1966]aid from the Stao-Sevlet ble, Over 400 Lex wicca returned fron last
[1967]July's Coumuniet-dporicored, Youth Festival re Wensine sbourd. @ Soviet padssenser
[1968]vessel with the Looeman Cuban delegation. Whey dieenberked in Havens and
[1969]stayed. ix Cue tame Works bef re Some (of them began returning to their home
[1971]8, b . x Pempining In Cubs. fox dome tine,
[1973]a1. Wwowleaste by Giban vedio atatléns madntadn BS
[1974]meende. Level at all times, with regular
[1975]eg mtries ao well a6 genevel. trangmiesLone
[1976]” he general thems of @11 these Drosdeneta is
[1977]fn exemple’ Gl id Guekening the “people” of Iatin America to
[1978]n Op tu nity for revolutionary action against. the “eorruptcregimes in
[1980]se and against "Yankee rialism" which allegedly supports then,
[1982]8. There are regular programs beamed by Havens radic to Stesrague,
[1983]the ey minLoan n convent Guatema By. wey. | he They ‘
[1985]specifi a are apparently dixected end produced with the
[1986]mee o exiles trem the countries concerned resident in Guba.
[1988]HW 50955 Docld:32493736 Page 60
[1991]Be The program to the Dominican Republic, for instance, is annouseed
[1992]- a the program of the Dominican Liberation Movement (MLD), and the program
[1993]. 38 eptitied Patria Libre. At predent, Radio Havana beams the 20 iante
[1994]' Patria Libre program to the Dominican Republic on Thursdays and Saturdays.
[1996]dust prier to the progrom, the Radio Havana aniouncer explaiie that the,
[1997]atation is meking ite facilities aveileble te the MLD for its program.
[1998]There are gomg areat in the Dominican Remiblic where, due to the sbsente
[1999]of local redio etations, the Caben broaddasts are the only ones heard.
[2000]Lest July, the subversive content. of these broadcasts to the Deminican
[2001]Republic led the Dominiean government to protest to the Organization of
[2002]Sierieen States.
[2004]18. ‘he content of such broadcasts is exemplified in the stated goals
[2005]* of #bhé "Volee of Revolutionary Nicaragua," the programa which ie regulerly
[2006]beamed by Redio Havane to Wiceragua. On 31 fAuguet thia program celebrated
[2007]its first anniversary by repeating ita original statement of its purposes:
[2009]"The Volee of Revolutionary Nicaragua hee set iteels the goal
[2011]of contributing to pointing ‘owt the real way to Nicarague’s
[2012]liberation fvtm tha dominion of Yankes duiperdeldan and the
[2013]Somoze tyrenny. Ekections (scheduled for next February to
[2014]choose President Semoza's successor) with the Somozes in power,
[2015]and under the State Department's economic and political control
[2016]of Wicerawue, will be a fares. Without. « & prior revolutionary
[2017]overthrow of the Scmoza. tyremiy there can be no free elections
[2018]in Wiewragua nor ean a popular govermiont be ¢eteblished. This
[2019]progrem will be et the service of the revolutionerien and
[2020]egeinet the eleetioneers...The Voice of Revolutionary Nicaragua
[2021]will defend the Cuben revolution because it is an important
[2022]part of the Letin American people's liberating revolution.”
[2024]il. Guban propeganda io also disseminated threugh the offices of
[2026]“Pressa Latine, the Cuban-eubsidiaed international ew agency” whith
[2028]has close wor! working relation with TASS, the New China News Agency, ad other
[2029]propagands medie for the Gino-Seviet bloc.
[2031]32. Cuban printed material ia ctrevlated throug the herve;
[2032]Che Guevara's book on guerrille warfare has received wide distribution.
[2033]Periodically, the Mexican government, most recently last August, hag been
[2034]obliged to confiscate large quantities of propangtinda meterials from Latin
[2035]Americans paseing through that country enroute from Cuba te their homelanda.
[2037]igs Cuben covert aupport. for Cemmmmdst or pro-Cotmuniet groupes in
[2038]other Latin American seuntries is provided in a muubér of ways. In the five
[2039]Latin American countries where Ciben diploemitic migaions are still resident
[2040](Mexica, Brazil, Uruguey, Chile, and Bolivia), these misaions have often
[2041]been the channel. fhe Cuban enbessy in Mexico ig known to have provided
[2043]HW 50955 Docld:32493736 Page 61
[2046]“peek gna!
[2048]frequent eseietance to extlee from Guateskia, Nlearagua, and other Central
[2049]Amerieean countries living in Mexieo. In. other instences, assistance is
[2050]provided through travelers coming from Cube end through Prenga Letina —
[2051]represeutetives.
[2053]o
[2055]i4. The assievance is voudbly finenciel. ‘The Cuban’ appear to have
[2056]been eareful einee 1959 to avoid being caught in a bletent act of subversion
[2057]pe used to justify concerted inter-Awericén action. inancial
[2058]sesiatance is often dust ag useful aml much lege rieky than actual weapons
[2059]deliveries. In « number of Anerican countries, emel), arms end other weapons
[2060]eré available for @ price. Unserupulous or cirelegs arms dealers in thé US
[2061]heve also eontributed to the arma traffic from which pro-Castre groups have
[2062]benefitted, directly or indirectly.
[2064]. 25. Aa the following country-by-country rundowa indicates, Cuban support
[2065]for subversive activity hes affected in varying degrees every one of the 19
[2066]other Let dn Amer isan countrtes.
[2068]a. Apgentinat Ernesto "Che" Guevara, en Argentine by birth,
[2069]han vetalnedlite deep Interest in Argentina's political affairs. On 25 May,
[2070]the Argentine national holiday, he eddreased the group of Argentine citizens
[2071]vesident iu Cuba and told them thet he hoped that next year they would be
[2072]eélebreting in Argentine under “the flag ef gocielign." At enother point
[2073]in. this address he gaid: “Our revolution is one which needs to expand ite
[2074]ideas...and other people sre helping us. Let the other peoples of the hemisphere
[2075]get engry and take up arms or seize power and ald us am this task which is
[2076]the teek of the satire hemlephers and of hunenity.”
[2078]the éxgentine comamity in Cuba isst. April organized the
[2080]"Cubsn-Argentine Friendship Ingtitute” with headquarters in Ravens. One
[2081]of the leaders is dahn Williem Cooke, who was for 4 time chief of former
[2082]Argentine dictator Peron's political machine in Argentina. Cecke continues
[2083]active in that faction of the Peronista party which seeks concerted action
[2084]with the Argentine Commuiets. Cooke malataing regular contact with sympathizers
[2085]inside and outside Argentina through travelers and through his wife,
[2086]Alieia Eguren de Cooke, a résident of Montevideo, Uruguay, who apparently
[2087]has resular meine of eomunieation with individuals in Argentina. Argentine
[2088]eitizsens bave been recruited through this channel to go to Cube for tr ;
[2089]There are also strong indiestions that terrorist activities by Argentine
[2090]Peronists aml Commniets havé been eneouraged end perhaps eusieted through.
[2091]this channel.
[2093]Fria Prior to the diplomatic break between Argentina and Cuba -
[2094]iast February, the Guban exbassy in Buenos Alves provided financial esaietence
[2095]te antl «government groupe there. An’ Argentine jownalist whe hee contacts in
[2096]the Commmniat party there reported lest Decexber, for inetence, thet the
[2097]Argentine Commuist party had reeelved the sum of 50,000 pesos from the
[2098]Cuban exbasuy as & contribution to the railway workers whe were then on
[2099]Strike in the provines of Cordoba.
[2101]HW 50955 Docld:32493736 Page 62
[2104]Though the @uben embassy is no donger in Buenos Aires, Cuban
[2105]clandestine assistence to Argentine Peronist-Commmist groups continues, On
[2106]19 July of this year the federal police in Buenos Adres reported the un-
[2107]earthing of 4 center of Commniat and Peronlet eetivities in the capital,
[2109]Two Buenos Aires policeman were shot and killed at a surburben warehouse in
[2110]June. Tnveatigetionus revealed that a quantity of explosives snd propapanda
[2111]were stored in the warehouse. The trail led to the arrest of ona Jose
[2112]Maria Aponte, a journalist and known Peronist activist, and oue Mario
[2113]Magsl, owner of the firm which owed the warehouse. It wes revealed that
[2114]Masei hed been maintaining contact. with Cuban Commusists, with John Williem
[2115]Cooke, and with an unidentified women agseciated with the Cuban exbassy in
[2116]Uruguay who was probably Alicia Bguren de Cooke referred to above. According
[2117]to the Argentine police investigation, some 150 Argentine citigens had been
[2118]sent from Argentina to Cuba (through Uruguay and Mexico) for training in
[2119]guerrills warfare. On their rebun to Argentina, these men were to be used
[2120]-in planned activities in the provinces of Farmosa, Tucuman, Salte, and the
[2121]wooded Gress of eastern Argentina. A number of other individuals were appre-
[2122]hended by the Argentine police in connection with the subversive activity
[2123]revealed in these investigations.
[2125]be Bolivia: Bolivia has been the recipient of special Cuben
[2126]attentions. The number of Bolivians receiving "seholarships" in Cube this
[2127]year--between 130 and 150-- appesra dispropertionately high. Tha Bolivian
[2128]government felt obliged to véguest the departure of Cuban Ambassador Tabares
[2129]in 1960 and of Cuban Charge Gerela Trians in 1961 for blatent iatervention,
[2130]in internal Bolivian affairva, ingluding support for Bolivien Comimiste and
[2131]attempts to incite extreme leftist members of the governing BNR party to leava
[2132]the party. In June 1961, the Bolivisn government published e series of
[2133]dccumente linking the Cuban exbassy with a Commmist conapiracy to seize
[2134]control of the government. One of these documents, a ateatewent by en arrested
[2135]Bolivian egitater who had been in close comtact with the Cuban exbassy,
[2136]gave the nemes of a number of Bolivians whe hed received financial support
[2137]from the Cuban embassy. This evidence vas used to justify the request for
[2138]the Cuban charge‘e recall.
[2140]The present. Cuban charge in Bolivia, Ramon Aja, hes also been
[2141]active though perhaps a bit more discreet than hie predeaeasors. He has
[2142]been particularly energette in cultiveting relations with Bolivlen campesines.
[2143]The peasant union in the Clize Valley of Bolivia has been reported te be the
[2144]recipient. of Cuban financial assistance.
[2146]e. Brazii: During the pasttwo years the Castro regime hes
[2147]developed increasingly close ties with Frencieco Julise, self-proclaimed
[2148]Marxist and leader of the Peegent Leagues in the troubled northeast region
[2149]of Brazil. Juliao, whose wife and children are resident in Cube, has
[2150]traveled there on several ctcasions; and a number of his esscetetes and rank «
[2151]and-file members of the Leagues have gone ta Cube for agricultural
[2152]training which i@ undoubtedly heavily lerded with ideological indoctrination.
[2153]Transportation direct from northeast Brazil to Cubs. has been provided by
[2154]Bubana airlines on at least one occasion. Cireumatantial evidence strongly
[2155]suggests thet Juliso has received financiel asaistence for his movement from
[2156]the Cuban government. Bracilian Commmist leaders heve privately stated, in
[2158]HW 50955 Docld:32493736 Page 63
[2161]feet, that Juliao's Peasant Leagues have received not only money but alao
[2163]shipments of emall arms from Cube. ‘hese Brazilian Communist leaders also
[2164]said thet the reason Juliano sent bis family to Cuba was his fear that they
[2165]might be endengered in the civil war he expecta to erupt shortly in Brasil:
[2167]The Cuban government has also during the pest year cultivated
[2168]particularly close relations with leaders of the disaident Commmist Party
[2169]of Brezii (CPB). One of the CPB leaders who heé visited Cubs lest May
[2170]told a friend of a long converestion he hed had with Fidel Castro in late
[2171]Mey.. Cactro expressed identity of feeling with the dissident Brazdiien
[2172]Communists end criticized the regular Commmist party for its failure "to
[2173]take a strong revolutionary line" in accordance with the decision of the
[2174]22nd party congress of the Costmnist party of the Soviet Union. Castre
[2175]approved the insurrectionary policy of the CPB and urged the leadsrs to
[2176]organize guerrills activities and start the revolutionary movement in Brazil
[2177]“as soon 68 possible." Castro advised them that government reprisals against
[2178]revolutionary action in Brazil would serve only :to increase populer dis-
[2179]content in Brezii and swell the ranks of the revolutionaries. He advised
[2181]CPB leaders to give special emphasie to securing agvwide a base a8 possible — ~
[2183]enong agricultural workers and the inhabitants of rurel ereas.
[2184]The Cuban enbussy in Rio de Jenetro, like Cuban embassies
[2186]elsewhere in Latin
[2187]pro~Commmist elements. Last May leaks to the Brazilian press reported dis=
[2188]cussions in the Brasilien cabinet on the subversive activities being directed
[2189]by Cuben enbessador Joagiin Hernandez Armas. The Navy and Army Ministers are
[2190]reported te have expressed particular concern over Hernandes' setivities.
[2192]d. Chilé: Senator Salvador Allende, leader of Chile's
[2193]Commmist~dominated populer front and a leading presidential aspirant, hes.
[2194]made at least two trips to Cubs.
[2196]The Cuban exbessy in Santiago is the source of propaganda
[2197]support fer pro-Commamiet groups, mostiy these aseceiated with Allende, who
[2198]are intent on coming to power in Chile through elections or revolution.
[2200]Orlende Prendes, cultural attache of the Cuban eubagsy, is known te be supers... -:
[2202]vising the printing of Cuban propaganda on a clandestine printing press in
[2203]the home of Julie Bocenegra, who alse prints propagenda for the Chiiean
[2204]Communist party. This activity has been going on for some time. As long
[2205]ago as Aggust, 1961, Chileen officials investigating political agitation
[2206]énd resulting unrest in the Salamanca area learned that after a visit to the
[2207]area by a Cuban diplomat thé previous month, pro«Cuben propaganda was being
[2208]distrivuted in the araa, and Commmists and pro-Commnists there vere soying
[2209]“The mountains of Selemanca are going to be the Chilean Sterra Maestra."
[2211]__ Last March, when Cuban Minigter of Education Armando Hart
[2212]went to Chile for en international conference he took with him several sacks
[2213]of prepagands.
[2215]_ @+ Colombia: The United Front for Revolutionary Action (FUAR),
[2216]ergenized early this year by Colonbian extremists, ig believed to have
[2217]received financial assistance from Cuba to promote its objective of ereating
[2218]® guerrilla movement aimed at the overthrow of the government. A Coloubien
[2220]6
[2222]HW 50955 Docld:32493736 Page 64
[2224]America, has been a source of assistante to Commnist and
[2227]citizen who has contacta among PUAR menbere reported last June that Fidel
[2229]“Castro bad just given the group $15,000 and promised further financial
[2231]aid semi-annually. Gloria Gaitan de Valencia, the wife of a FUAR leader
[2232]and the deughter of the Colombian leader Gaitan whose assassination in
[2233]19h8 sparked the digaatrous Bogota rioting, 1s a long-time personal friend
[2234]of Fidel Castvo. He hes vieited Cuba frequently end probably returns to -
[2235]Colombia with specific advice snd assletance from the Cuben government.
[2236]The FUAR has aueceeded in drawing menbers from the extremist wing of the
[2237]regular Colenbien Commmist party who are dissetiefied with that party's
[2238]reluctance to engage in ipen yevolutionary action.
[2240]%. Costa Ricat The small Costa Ricen Comumist party, the
[2241]Popular Vanguard party (PVP), is charged by the Cuban government with the.
[2242]selection of young men to be traivéd di Guba. Riboberte Carmons and Jose
[2243]Murille, PVP menbers, left Costa Rica lest June for tilinine under this
[2244]program, end PYP leaders had plans for organizing guerrilla treining prograns
[2245]in Costa Ries under the direction of the Costa Ricans who had received training
[2246]in Cuba. os
[2248]; &- The Dominican Republic: The provisional Council of State,
[2249]which is preparing the country for ifs firet free elections this Decexber
[2250]in more than 30 years, has been a major target for Cuben aubversion. A
[2251]eadre of Dominican Communists. is headquartered in Cuba, end elandestine con-
[2252]tect is probably mainteined with sympathizers ineide the Donindcan Republic.
[2253]Broadcasts to the Bowiuiean Republic from Cuba have helped incite the
[2254]frequent riote in Bante Domingo. The feet that broadcasts from Cuba have on
[2255]occasion réferred to very recent events in the Dominican Republic strongly
[2256]suggests the presence of clandestine rddio contacts between the tvo courxtries.
[2258]h. Ecusdor: ‘The Commnist party of Eeusdor has formed the
[2259]nucleus of 4 smell guerrilla organization. This greup was drewn largely from
[2261]| the pro-Castre Revolutionary Union of Heuaderean Youth (URJE), which was
[2263]involved in a two-day battle with government forces lest April. ‘the leader
[2264]ef the April affair, a6 well es several other Ecuadereand involved ia sub
[2265]versive activities, haa received guerrilla training in Cuba. A URJE leader
[2266]told a friend last June that this organization hag eo far in 1962 recaived
[2267]$22,000 in financial ald from the Cuban government.
[2269]Memel Araujo Hidalgo, pro-Comimunist former Beusdorean Minister
[2270]of Interior who has visited Cuba and who recently traveled in Commnist .
[2271]China, appearé to be working with the URJE. He is reported to have received
[2273]& considerable amount of money from the Cuban govermment for his efforts,
[2275]according te a private statement by the URJE Leader.
[2277]_ 4. El Saivador: On 1 Merch 1961, the Salvadoren government
[2278]broke relations with the Castro regime after it hed received evidence of _
[2279]conversation between the Cuban ¢harge, Roberto Lessalle, and leading Salvadoran
[2280]Commaniste in which Leséele urged inereased revolutionary activity.
[2282]_§+ Guatemala: On 5 March 1962, a Cuben arrived in Mexico with a
[2283]message for a leader then in Mexico of the Guatemalan Cormuni at -infinenced
[2285]HW 50955 Docld:32423736 Page 65
[2288]13 Novenber group, which hed recently engaged in querrilia aebivity. in
[2289]Guetemala. The Cuban gave hin $4,000 which be said was the first instell-
[2290]ment of a total of $10,000 to be used to establish a new guerrilia front
[2292]in Guatembla. On 8 March, Castro’s emiasary geve the Guetemalens the balanne
[2293]ef the $10,000 and told one of the 13 Novenber leaders that the decision ta
[2294]provide then with the money was taken by Fidel Castro personally. Castro,
[2296]he eadd, had sent inetructions thet the group did not have to account, for how
[2297]the money was spent, thet no strings were ettached, and that he hopes they
[2298]ere successful so he can provide them with additional, assistance.. Leter the
[2299]Cuban exiseary met with Leaders in Mexico of the orthedox Guatemalen
[2300]Communist party. These Guatemalan Commniste hed apparently complained that
[2301]the Cuban money wae not. going te them. They wore told that. Castre wanted
[2303]the money te go to the 19 November group because this group hed demonstrated
[2304]ite capacity to fight the Guatemalan government, © eepacity which the
[2305]Guatemalan Commuiists had not shown. The Cuben sada: "It is not a matter
[2306]of atéeding arcund with Arab fatelien waiting for events to take place---
[2308]Ve should act efficiently gc as to precipitate the death of imporlalim.
[2309]Because of this we are ready to help anyone vho may decide te struggle against
[2310]imperialisn anywhere.”
[2312]Cuban propaganda medio have sought through publicising the
[2313]activities of the 13 Hoverber group to increase its prestige and chances for
[2314]success: A Prenga Latina reporter published an alleged interview with
[2315]13 Hoverber Leader Yon Sosa.
[2317]k. Helti: A cadre of Haitian Comamists led by Rene Depestre is
[2318]resident in Cuba, am end many thousands of Haitian citizens living in eastern
[2319]Cuba are now being subjected to Comamict regimentation and indectrination.
[2321]3. Hondwrag: Prior to the breek in Cuben-Honduraa diplomatic
[2322]yélations in April 1961, Cuben personnel under the cover of consuler and
[2323]aiplomatic offices engaged in proselyting in the north coast region of
[2324]Honduras: Hondyreas now is the target of a gartiowlarly vicious regular radio
[2325]program beamed especially to Hondurad by Reto Havana, Many Hondurens are
[2327]4n Cuba under the - "atholarghiy” program.
[2329]it Mext ot The Cuban embassy in Mexteo City, the consulate in
[2330]Merida, end the "(iban-Mexican Cultural Center” in Merida have ell g¢ —
[2331]engaged in propeganda activities designed te snecurege the pro~commist cause
[2332]in Mexteo, perticularly the Commnict-infiwuenced Natiogal Liheration Move«
[2333]ent (neta). Former Cuban avbagsador in Mexioo Portucnde im reported by people
[2334]in close comtact with MLN tesders to have concluded an agreement whereby
[2335]fone of the money sent by Havana te cover the expense of the embassy is ear-
[2336]parked as a contribution to the MLN. Mexieon officials were disturbed et the
[2337]participation of Cuban exbessy officiala in inciting the anti-US demon-
[2338]@brations by Mexican students in July and August 1960. Mexican euthoritics
[2339]heve periodically impoundsd quantities of Cuban propaganda being sent through
[2340]Mexico to other Latin American countries. The moet important aspect. of
[2341]Mexico in Cubon propaganda and subversive operations in Latin Aweriea le ite
[2342]use by the Cubans ap a ‘way station or jumping off place between Cuba iteeir
[2343]and the reat of Latin Americé.
[2345]HW 50955 Docld:32423736 Page 66
[2348]ne Nicaragua: A esdre of Wiecaraguen Commmiste 1s based in
[2350]Cuba. Contect between them and pro-Castro Micaragudns in Niearagua and in
[2351]exile in other countries of the Caribbean area is matwtetned at leaat on a
[2352]sporadic basis. A matber of Nicaraguans perlodically have traveled to Cuba,
[2353]and some have received training there in guexrille teetics. Reliable reports
[2354]indicate that some of these Cuba-treained Micaraguana have been among the
[2355]small guerrilla tands that have infiltrated Nicaragua acroas the largely un-
[2356]guarded Hondruen border: The Elearaguan government is the target of a
[2357]regularly broadcast Radio Havana program to Nicaragua which is announced as
[2358]the program of “free Nicaraguan."
[2360]©. Panam: Cuban finaneial assistante is believed to be
[2361]channeled to the pro-Commmist National Action Vanguard (VAN) 4n Panama. One
[2362]of the VAN leaders, Deputy Thelma King, is o frequent traveler to Cuba and
[2363]claims to be a personal friend of Fidel Castro.
[2365]; cagusy: Peraguayen exifes in Uruguay and Brezil have
[2366]received Cuban financial asgistance. Four nenbers of the United Front fer
[2367]National Liberation (FULNA), e Commmist Paraguayan éxile group in Uruguay,
[2368]vecelve the equivalent. of $230 monthly each from the Cuben exbassy in
[2369]Uruguay to finance clandestine pro-Castro. aetivities in Uruguay, according
[2370]to & Paraguayan exile in Uruguay whe ia in close touch with FPULNA.
[2372]q “Peru: Abt least eleht Peruvians traveled to Cuba by wey of
[2373]Mexico last June to receive training and indectrination in that country.
[2374]Other Peruvian Commmists or pré-Commmiats have long been in Cuba and a
[2375]regularly broedeast Redio Havana program te beamed to Peru.
[2377]z. Uruguay: The Cuban exbassy in Montevideo hag been. engaged
[2378]in promoting pro-Castro propaganda. In January 1961 the Uruguayan govern-
[2379]ment was obliged te declare the Cuben ambassader persona non grata for
[2380]intervening in intermal Uruguayen affairs.
[2382]; 8 Venezuela: The Castro regime hag been extremely vitriolic
[2383]in its propaganda blests agsinst the Betaneourt administration in Venezuela.
[2384]Cuban assistance has been channeled to members of the militant oppesition
[2385]Leftist Revolutionary Movement (MIR), which 16 attempting to develop a
[2386]guerrilla movement in Venezuela with the eid of tts ally, the regular Vene-
[2387]guelan Commmist party. While there is Little evidence to indicate direct
[2388]Cuban involvement in this Communist effort, a significant number of the lead-
[2389]ing figures involved, including Fabricio Ojeda, ara kuowa to heve traveled
[2391]to Cube, where they provebly received financial and other assistance in
[2392]addition to official encouragement and propaganda support for their activities,
[2394]HW 50955 Docld:32423736 Page 67
[2397]. .
[2398]1
[2399]it
[2400]4
[2402]i
[2403]Ha
[2404]i
[2405]4
[2406]Pa
[2408]D
[2410]: i
[2413]i wp
[2414]i m
[2419]N
[2420]} a
[2421]' s
[2423]i re)
[2424]iH a
[2425]i a)
[2426]i
[2427]os
[2428]6
[2429]th
[2430]| =
[2431]| rr
[2432]| =
[2435]SEGRE!
[2436]EXCERPT FROM DRAFT NIE 85-63, 4 FEBRUARY 1963
[2438]Policies Toward Latin America
[2440]42, Here Castro has more capability for independent
[2441]action than in any other fleld except the internal politica of Cuba,
[2442]Gastre is deeply committed to a policy of armed insurrection
[2444]throughout Latin America. Because of his own experience he has
[2446]"a deep-seated belief that only through insurrection can revolution
[2448]be promoted in Latin America. Further, he apparently believes that
[2449]@ successful revolution in another Latin American country would give
[2450]great impetus to the revolutionary movement and would also conseli-
[2451]date his own regime in Cuba. In trying te foment insurrections, he
[2452]apparently does not believe it crucial that he cannot now give direct
[2453]military assistance to them, nor does he seer te consider it impor -
[2454]tant whether he has or has not Soviet support. Fo# the Soviets,
[2455]however, such an inflexible approach smacks of the Chinese position
[2456]and causes great problems in dealing with other Latin American
[2457]Communists. Most important, however, it is probable that the
[2458]Soviets believe such a posture will damage Soviet prospects for
[2459]penetration of Latin America and inevitably bring about a confronta-
[2461]ton with the US.
[2463]WW 50955 Docld:32423736 Page 69
[2466]. SECRET
[2468]EXCERPT FROM DRAFT NIE 85-63, 4 FEBRUARY 1963
[2469]16. Cuban overseas military capabilities remain severely
[2471]limited by lack of the requisite air or sea lift. The Cubans could
[2472]probably not undertake an overseas operation on a seale larger than
[2473]one battalion. For political ag well as military reasons, the Castro
[2474]regime is most unlikely to undertake military operations of this nature.
[2475]It would prefer to concentrate on rendering clandestine support te
[2477]local insurgents.
[2479]HW 50955 Docld:32493736 Page 70
[2482]- SEURET
[2484]EXCERPT FROM DRAFT NIB 85-63, 4 FEBRUARY 1963
[2486]3L. The decline of bie prestige has at least for the moment
[2487]reduced Castro's capability for subverting popular groups and
[2489]moving thera inte action against their own governments and
[2491]against US interests., Local fidelistas have encountered greater difficulty
[2492]in mobilizing mass support for anti-government strikes and demonstrations
[2494]on other than local fasuea.
[2496]HY 50955 Docld:32423736 Page 71
[2500]EXCERPT FROM DRAFT NIE 8563, 4 FEBRUARY 1963
[2502]32. Nonetheless, Castro contiques his appeal fer vevolution in
[2504]Latin America on the Guban model. Those Latin Americans who are
[2505]cormmiltted to violent revolution continue to look to Castro for help,
[2506]particularly from his training program in Cuba and hie large-scale
[2507]dissemination of printed and broadeast propaganda. Communi st
[2509]agitators are concentrating their efforts increasingly in rural areas,
[2511]as they have done in Peru recently, In addition, there has been an
[2512]increase in sabotage and other violence perpetrated by extremists,
[2514]of the sort not requiring the participation of large popular groups, yet
[2515]designed to provoke drastic countermeasuraa by governments and to
[2516]increase popular anti-government sentiment, These widespread
[2518]activities have demonstrated that the ability of local Communista to engage
[2519]in terrorist and subversive activities and their willingness to accept Cuban
[2520]“and Soviet support do not dpend upon Castros prestige or upon their
[2522]_
[2524]opinion of his doctrines and policies,
[2526]HW 50955 Docld:32423736 Page 72
[2529]SR Sa a TET EE
[2531]Che Guevera's mother, who lives tn Argentina, told a clandestine
[2532]roe in mid-December thet during her recent visit to Guba her son
[2534]told hex thet Cuban leaders now feel they will heve to rely more ond
[2535]mnist penstration in South
[2537]more on theiy ovh efforte to promote Con
[2539]Ameriea, Guerrillas will be used on o lavgd seale atter they pave
[2541]received training in Cuba, Guevara caid, Be explained to bie mother thet
[2542]thic te necessary since both he and Castro feel. Khrushchev “let them
[2544]_ Gown" end hes mo further interest in epreading Comamien in South Anerion.
[2546]Guevers addad that he and Castve belleve they and the Chinese ere
[2547]better Commmists than Karushchey, (CIA Db/P Buenos Adren, 19 December,
[2549]sant)
[2551]Comment: This reyort. is consietent with reeent publie speeches by
[2553]Guevere which have emplasiged the important role of Guba with redpect
[2555]to the “antd-impertelia
[2557]% revolution” in Ietin Ameriea, (SHRED)
[2559]HW 50955 Docld:32423736 Page 73
[2562]seCRe NO FOREION DISSEM,
[2564]CIA Report 21 Dec 62 Rome
[2566]Translation of report deted 6 Dec 62 from Italien Embassy Havana to
[2567]Foreign Ministry in Rome. "As I noted in my 9 November report is is
[2568]difficult for Castro to remain calm. Wherefore the revolutionary regine
[2569]will continue with all means at ite disposition to disseminate mbversive
[2570]propaganda in the whole continent, a¢ demonstrated by the fact that all the
[2571]gtates of Latin Amertea (including Mexies) are tekiug strong measurés
[2572]ageinst the dissemination of this propagends. But it is doubtful that
[2573]today Castro cen do much wore and snot /soetttubes &@ real menece to the
[2574]security of other countries, if only because he lacks the necessary funds,
[2575]I tend to share the opinion of the Ambassador to Brasil thet the Cuban
[2576]leaders are trying to concentrate all their subversive efforta in one
[2577]country, and thet they heve selected Vendsuela for varleus reasons, in-
[2578]eluding the old 111 feeling between Castro and Betancourt. E note in
[2579]passing thet, ateording to whet was told me by the aforeumtioned
[2581]Ambassador, Guring the recent meeting of the OAS the Venesuelan representative
[2583]accused the Cubang of promoting the recent ettempte in his country but, when
[2584]eeked to furnish proof, he wae uneble te do so.”
[2586]SECRET (SOFORN) (CONTROLLED DISSEMINATION)
[2588]HW 50955 Docld:32493736 Page 74
[2591]SECREL
[2593]A polative of a leading Communist ia Cuba (whe has greviewsly
[2594]given reliable alivendée informetion of 4 conte) oxpressed
[2596]enmtiries which will masquerade ae “national revolutions” go as to
[2597]iigete the actuention of Cuban conplicity, Im fact, however, these
[2598]revalutions will be dissected frou Cubs through revolutionaries fron
[2600]ed. io Cubs, (CIA po/p IN Léy2r7,
[2602]oument: Thin polite wp whet is probably the most effective
[2603]mean’ of Cuben subversion in Latin America - the training of hundreds.
[2604]ané perhaps thousands ef Latin Americans in Guba, (SECRET)
[2606]- SECREE
[2608]n
[2610]HW 50955 Docld:32493736 Page 75
[2613]| ee. > CREIGN DISSE
[2615]f
[2617]fhe recent apate of public addresses ‘by leadive Cubea offietals
[2618]on the gubjech. of Jnsurverticr
[2620]in other Latin Amerdean countries refieets
[2621]& mOre agressive shance than prior te the “missile erisis” ond euguests
[2622]that a decision to step up Cuban support for subversive gripe in other
[2623]letin dmerless cowtried my be uider discussion within the inner sivele
[2624]of Cuban. leaders.
[2626]Che Guevara and Ducation Minleter Armano Mart heve been in the
[2627]forefront sives late November in publicly expressing the view thet the
[2629]wily food to the “Ditberetion” of ‘the Latin Auertean peo,
[2630]inmurrection, Fidel
[2632]e8 16 the road of
[2634]Castro's earlier public line hed been to deny the.
[2635]necessity for Cuba to “export” ite revolatlany Ciba te "exem example” was
[2637]gugticlent, This line 26 given only perfunctory attention in thé recent
[2639]r Guevera and Hert epgachen. ‘The Line aes ing in these epedches anveare
[2641]vetedn aivcumstences
[2642]tated eoslitions could come to power by peaceful. méans. The
[2643]whole toner of the recent speeches suggeats that Cubs intends to provida
[2645]every astietence within ite mane te l
[2647]attention given in the Cuban press to develomments
[2648]weeks strongly duggeste more than acadenle intevest in sevelopuente there.
[2649]Canadian Avhasteder Etdd, |
[2651]ane) revolution” spparent. in @ 21 November ax
[2652]echmented that Cuban leader
[2653]ation of the withdrawal
[2655]ech by Armando Hert,
[2656]6 may be ettenpting to counter “the mumlli+
[2657]of the Rusgian misailes" by me
[2659]‘Lng senewed aftorta .
[2660]te aa revolutionary fires in neighboring countries.” (Conment ont |
[2662]HY 50955 Docld:32423736 Page 76
[2665]SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM
[2667]SUPPLEMENT
[2668]THE CASTRO THREAT TO LATIN AMERICA . .
[2670]Despite diminished prestige, especially among government
[2671]leaders, Castro retains great influence over politically
[2672]‘unsophisticated Latin Americans. He is also supported by
[2673]Western Hemisphere Communist parties and the vast majority
[2674]of extreme leftists. Castro's main appeal lies in his claim
[2675]to be the leader of a successful revolution against "Yankee
[2676]imperialism" and in the support he is ready to provide
[2677]subversive activities throughout Latin America. :
[2679]The degree to which Cuba is involved in, current
[2680]hemisphere unrest is not clear. Antigovernment nationals and
[2681]Communists of various Latin American countries, however,
[2682]have made frequent visits to Cuba to receive pro-Castro
[2683]indoctrination and propaganda. During 1962, 1,000 to l, 500
[2684]are believed to have received intensive education ‘and training
[2685]in sabotage and ‘guerrilla warfare. Significant representation
[2686]has been noted from Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru,
[2687]Bolivia, Paraguay, and Nicaragua. There is no definite
[2688]C “ proof that Cuba is now exporting arms to any dissident groups,
[2689]. _ but propaganda materials, explosives, and financial. support are
[2690]reliably reported to have been furnished.
[2692]Cuban leaders have also called with increasing frequency
[2693]for cpen rebellion as the "only road" to liberation for the
[2694]Americas; they have been especially vociferous since the first
[2695]of the year. Leading officials, such as Castro, Blas Roca,
[2696]Che Guevara, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, and Juan Marinello are
[2697]among those calling for revolutionary violence. The ,
[2698]"Betancourt tyranny" in Venezuela has been designated a
[2699]primary target, but Peru and Chile apparently also have high
[2700]priority. * The use of the Prensa Latina organization and
[2701]the agent network already in existence makes it virtually
[2702]sure that Havana will intensify its clandestine activities...
[2704]Latin American governments are generally now more alert to
[2705]Castro's threat. _ Inadequate security forces and widespread
[2706]poverty throughout the area, however, make it almost certain
[2707]that Cuban-supported: insurgency will have an.effect out of.
[2708]proportion to the number of people involved.
[2710](SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM) ;
[2712]8 Feb 63 pIA Intelligence Bulletin Page (1)
[2714]SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM
[2716]Ea “oi aan
[2718]HW 50955 Docld:32493736 Page 77
[2722]a ST
[2724]fee erat git Hemline te oh tate neon
[2726]BW 50955
[2728]SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM
[2730]Cuban Developments
[2732]Following Fidel Castro's call for revolution in
[2734]Latin America in his 2 January speech, other Cuban
[2735]- Che Guevara
[2737]speakers are emphasizing the same theme
[2739]told a group of Central American delegates in Havana
[2741]recently that they must prepare for simultaneous
[2743]revolutions in all Central American countries and pointed
[2744]to Venezuela and Chile as major targets for revolution.
[2746]Long-time Communist leader Blas Roca, on 23 January,
[2748]praised Venezuelan Communists for their recent
[2749]acts of sabotage and pledged continued Cuban
[2751]support for the struggle of the people against the
[2753]Betancourt "tyranny." Venezuela has long been a
[2754]major Castro-Communist target, and Blas Roca's
[2756]remarks imply Cuban support for the present upsurge
[2758]of Communist activity there.
[2760]ue oe wee ob
[2762]28 Jan 68 . DIA Intelligence Bulletin Page
[2763](REVERSE BLANK) .
[2764]SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM ©
[2766]2
[2768]cnn Si ri een a eS A a
[2770]Docld: 327473736 Page 75
[2772]2. Armed incursions.
[2774]Me scouer had the Reveluitionary Government of Cuba taken pover
[2775]than it lemebed a pregram for exporting ite revolution to other countries
[2776]in the Hemisphere, particularly in the Caribbean area. The memories of
[2777]the invasions and attempted invasions of Panama, of Nicaragua, and of
[2778]the Dominican Republic; following clesely upon one enother in the spring
[2779]end summer of 1959 are obill fresh. Support of Cuban officials for
[2780]military expeditions againat the Governments of these countries,. although
[2781]vehemently denied, has béen esteblighed beyond reasonable doubt. With
[2782]thé invasion of the Dominican Republic came the r¢alization among the
[2783]American Reptblics thet guternational tensions. in the Caribbean axes,
[2784]to which Cube. had significantly contrivuted, hed risen to the extent that
[2785]a Meeting of Consultation of Minteters of Foreign Affaire of the American
[2786]States was necessary.
[2788]The Investigating Committee appointed by the Council of the OAS,
[2789]aéting provisiowally aa Orgen of Congvltation under the Inter-American
[2790]Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, in the Panama cage in June, 1959 con
[2791]cluded “that the Republic of Panania was the victim of an invasion,
[2792]organized ebroad, that sailed from « Cuben port and was composed almost
[2793]entirely of foreigners". The Committee report stated that the Chairman
[2794]of the Committee was able to confimm thet 82 of 84 imprisoned invaders
[2796]HY 50955 Docld:32423736 Page 79
[2799]were Cubans. Further, the Government af Panema, prior to the departure
[2801]of the invasion group from Cuba informed the Cuban Government of reports
[2802]about this impending event, invoking the 1928 Hebann Convention on the
[2803]Duties and Rights of States dn the Event of Civil Strife. ‘the Cuban
[2804]Foreign Minister in turn assured Paneme. thet the Guben Government would
[2805]teke the necessary preventive measures.
[2807]_ 4% connection with several of the invasions or attempted invasions
[2808]of Nicaragua from Covta Riea énd Hondures‘in ume, 1959, end the
[2809]individusls organizing them, docunettery and other types of evidence
[2810]which came to light demonstrated Cuben officials support in the form of
[2811]arn and finencial contributions. .
[2813]a Official Cuban complicity in the invasion of the Dominican Remiblic
[2814]in the seme mouth was clear. The expedition was organized, trained, ana
[2815]equipped in Cuba with the undoubted assistance of Cuban officials. An
[2816]officer on eetive duty with the Cuban Revel Army was ode of the expedi-
[2817]tion's leaders. The Cuban favy escorted the three landing craft used
[2818]by the invading force on thelr voyage to the Dominican Republic.
[2820]Even during the Fifth Meeting of Congultation in Santiago, Chile,
[2821]® report was reeeived of the invesion of Haiti on August 13, 1959 by a
[2822]group of armed men coming from Cuba. The Heitlen Government after the
[2823]Santiago meeting expressed ite fears of furth
[2825]© daveeion attempts. Fb
[2826]charged that the Aygust 13 invasion from Cuba wes @ violation of the
[2828]i928 Habana Convention on Duties and Rights of States in the Event of
[2829]Givil Strife. The sesistance of Cuban officials, ducluding the Cuban,
[2831](2)
[2833]HY 50955 Docld:32423736 Page 60
[2836]eras aa a Sa Sra eae
[2837] SEAEnEIemece: ea
[2838]PRETO S a  RREE
[2840]Ambassador to Haiti end his five wilitery attaches, in the attempt to
[2841]overthrow the Heitien Goverment was denounced by that Government, he
[2842]Cuben Government, though edmitiing that the invasion was leunched in
[2843]Cube and all but ene of the participants were Cubans, convendently dis-
[2844]avowed the sets of the Cuban citizens involved.
[2846]a”
[2848](3)
[2850]HY 50955 Docld:32423736 Page 61
[2853]HY 50955 Docld: 32423736 Page 62
[2855]SECRET
[2857]EXCERPT FROM DRAFT NIE 85-63, 4 FEBRUARY 1963
[2859]33. There have been indications of disapproval of Gastro«a
[2860]policies on the part of those Latin American Communist parties
[2861]whith are committed ta a more gradual and legs violent approach to
[2862]revolution. Castro has shown himgelf willing te collaborate with any
[2863]group, Cormmuniat or not, willing to resort to vielence and in so doing
[2864]to clreumvent some of the regular Communist parties. Some of the
[2865]latter resent euch tactics and have appealed to the Soviets against
[2866]Castro, It seem@ likely that the question of relations with other
[2867]Lgntin Aweuticen Communist parties, as well as the question of tactics,
[2868]is likely to hamper Communist revolutionary efforts in Latin America
[2870]and cause strains in Soviet-Cuban relations.
[2872]HY 50955 Docld:32423736 Page 63
[2877]SECRET
[2879]EXCERPT FROM DRAFT NIE 65.63, 4 FEBRUARY 1963
[2881]49. ... Among much of the revolutionary left, discussion hag
[2882]tended to shift to the need for indigenous, nationalist revolutions, and
[2883]away frem internationalism and alliance with Moscow-oriented
[2885]Communists and fideli atas.
[2887]SECRET
[2889]AW 50955) Docld:32423736 Page 64
[2892]p
[2894]- REGRET.
[2896]Panamanian Comamist Party (POP) leader Riperte Thomas? recent
[2897]trip to Cube was evidently am effort to persuade Castro to mupport the
[2898]POP rather than the mere activist Panamanion pre-Commnist vate group.
[2899]When he returned to Penas on 14 December, Thome reportedly said that
[2900]Jorge Turner, who also went to Havens in September and has not returned,
[2901]weinet the POP in Cute.
[2902]Bowever,. the Cubans claim to heve told VAI lenders they must cooperate
[2904]5
[2906]aud other VAN lebders are a¢1Ll campadenitp
[2908]with the PEP to get. Castro support.
[2909]t seems consistentiy to favor the VAN with
[2911]jal trips. The Cubens mey distrust the POP's poor
[2912]ovganivetion and bélieve VAN charges that the PUP te infiltrated. However,
[2913]the VAN da a tether unsteble sroup and the Cubans ave probably trying te
[2915]keep on good tems with both, Thomwed oaid be received no militery trading
[2917]but wes taugit a Pow things like how to dlememtle a mehine gun.
[2919]‘Theumes commented that no pertiqular
[2921]group deemed te be tn command.
[2922]iu Cuba, resulting In auch dleorder that it was « wonder the revolution
[2924]head survived, He believes the ORT ts merely a mechanion,
[2926]Mexico would not igaue Thotes o vids, 60 he rétuened to Penama vie
[2928]Prague where he talked with Czech Commmist officials and may have
[2930]pleaded the POP case against VAN with thee. (CIA Ponema Clty p0s.3/
[2932]531,754, 20 Dee, SECRET) —
[2934]NW 50955) Docld: 32473736 Page 65
[2936]2MATION REPORTED:
[2938]F}
[2939]CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
[2941]C This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espronage Laws, Title 18, UGC Se
[2942]> » 722 and. 384. the transmissizeurer,revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is orohibiied by law. wee
[2944]rn re a CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
[2945]ane a * , vi
[2946]we Le S EC R E i
[2948](When Pili? Inj .
[2950]COUNTRY | VENEZUELA «EAST GERMANY REPORT NO. TDCS-3/537} 107
[2952]SUSJECT = VENEZUELAN ATTENDANCE AT THE DATE DISTR, 12 FEBRUARY 19
[2953]a ' .° EAST GERMAN COMMUNIST PART a
[2954]oe Hs PRECEDENCE ROUTINE
[2956]| DATE OF ; REFERENCES IN 4 6562
[2957]' INcO, JANUARY 1963
[2959]PLACER . pas
[2960]1 DATEACO. VENEZUELA, cARacas (7 &-7 FEBRUARY 1963) .
[2961]“4 APPRAISAL. 2 - FIELD REPORTNO. ave 2652
[2965]i
[2966]4
[2968]THIS is UNEVALUATED ix TIGN. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT {S$ TEN
[2969]SOURCE PARA Uf . A MEMBER: (8) OF THE COMMUNIST. PARTY OF VENEZUELA, FROM A FELLO
[2971]_ | MEMBER WHO WORKS [N THE NATIONAL PARTY OFFICES.
[2972]-PARA 21. A mMemBeR (8) OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY. OF VENEZUELA, FROM POMPEYO
[2974]JESUS
[2976]WOMEN'S AFFAIRS OF THE PCY,
[2978]“AND OLGA | LUZARDO FYNOL, SECRETARY OF
[2980]WERE TwO OF THE DELEGATES OF THE PCV TO THE EAST GERMAN COMMUN | S.7
[2982]ARTY [CONGRESS HELD DURING JAN 63. THEY RETURNED TO VE NEZUELA WITH A
[2984]LENGTHY DOCUMENT WHICH CLEARLY DISCUSSES THE IDEOLOGICAL
[2986]DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE COMMUNIST PARTIES OF CHINA AND THE USSR,
[2987]THIS DOCUMENT 1S BEING CIRCULATED AMONG SOME MEMBERS OF THE PCV.
[2989]“2 “POMPEYO MARQUEZ, MEMBER OF THE NATIONAL SECRETARIAT OF THE PCV,
[2991]E VENEZUELAN “AND CUBAN DELEGATIONS AT THE EAST
[2993]ON. 1 FEB SAID THAT
[2995]GROUP t
[2996]Excluded from avtomath
[2997]downgrading ond
[2998]deciaawiccnon
[3000]CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
[3002]“SECRET
[3004]HY 50955 Docld:32423736 Page 66
[3006]LASSIFICATIO
[3008]“GERMAN ‘COMMUNIST PARTY CONGRESS TOOK A NEUTRAL POSITION REGARDING THE
[3009]; DIFFE RENCES BETWEEN. CHINA AND THE USSR WHEREAS THE OTHER LATIN AMERICAN
[3010]| COMMUNIST PARTY. REPRESENTATIVES STRONGLY SUPPORTED THE POSIT! ON OF
[3011]| as THE USSR, REPRESENTATIVES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNIST. PART! AT THE
[3013]tos | CONGRESS CAUTIONED- THAT EXTREME CARE SHOULD BE TAKEN BY THE PCV IN usINe
[3014]|| QUERRILLA FORCES. 7
[3016]ye 7 3. FIELD DISSEM: “STATE ARMY NAVY. AIR CRNCLANT CINCARIB.
[3018]Por -
[3020]ACTION: . ACSI, NAVY,-AF,JCS, 08D. 8
[3021]INFO: DCSOP,DtAPe
[3022]DA IN. 16376)
[3024]HY 50955 Docld:32423736 Page 67
[3026]SECRET—NO FOREIGN DISSE M
[3028]Cuban Anniversary Celebrations (See pictures following)
[3030]The Cuban Armed Forces parade in Havana yesterday
[3031]included infantry, naval, artillery, armor, and air
[3032]formations. The most significant display was that
[3033]of SA-2 missiles and possible cruise missiles. .
[3034]Ground units included 15 companies of the 2d Western
[3035]Army, units of the National Militia, and other
[3036]infantry onits in a "new parade step" resembling the
[3037]goose step. The artillery unit had antitank guns, heavy
[3038]artillery, multiple rocket launchers an@ AA artillery.
[3039]Three battalions of medium tanks, heavy tanks and
[3040]assault guns, along with the surface-to-air and possible
[3041]. Cruise missiles made up the final unit of the parade.
[3043]The air formations included helicopters, propeller-
[3044]type training planes, and MIG-15's, 19's and 21's.
[3046]Scviet participation in the parade has not been established,
[3047]although Soviets and Czechs may have piloted some of
[3048]the aircraft.
[3050]Premier Castro's spsech following the parade brought
[3051]no surpbrisés aside from its unusual brevity. He
[3052]made an effort to indicate Cuban control of the air
[3053]defense system, including the SA-2's, and, ina
[3054]probable reference to US reconnaissance flights, said
[3055]there could be an incident "at any time".
[3056]Castro reiterated the five demands he first made
[3057]after the announcement that the Soviets would
[3058]withdraw offensive missiles from Cuba. He
[3059]inciuced his usual anti-US statements and slurs at
[3060]President Kennedy and made a low-keyed appeal for
[3061]"osity" within the Communist Bloc.] H He called for
[3063]ge some
[3065]é revolution in Latin America, with special en
[3066]Rea
[3068]a on Venezuela, and cited Cuba's "historic task
[3070]i. _of-serving as an example" for that revolution
[3071]“In the USSR, Cuban and Soviet spokesmen lauded Cuban-
[3072]Russian friendship and unity, and the Soviet
[3073]spokesman, Suslov, pledged that his country would
[3074]"never leave Revolutionary Cube alone in distress.
[3076](CONFIDENTIAL)
[3077]SOURCE: VARIOUS
[3079]3 dan 63 DIA intelligence Bullet in Page 1
[3081]SECRET—-NO FOREIGN DISSEM
[3083]BULLE SORE 2 a ete oe
[3085]it
[3086]ol bag
[3088]HY 50955 Docld:32423736 Page 66
[3090]a
[3092]SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM
[3094]ra
[3096]reportedly continues, the threat cof retaliatory action from forces
[3097]rallying around deposed Air Force Chief Lemus has apparently
[3098]diminished, and the majority of the armed forces still supports
[3099]President Ydigoras. The President's intention with regard to:
[3100]leftist ex-—President Arevalo, who plans to return and seek the
[3101]presidency in next December's elections, is an unsettling factor.
[3102]The armed forces universally oppose Arevalo. Some factions want
[3103]to replace Ydigoras with a Civilian-military junta and call new
[3104]elections before Arevalo becomes eligible to run in March, Should
[3105]Arevalo return, the military will probably move to prevent his
[3106]candidacy and the coming months may be critical, —
[3108]Honduran President Villeda Moraies, although not a strong
[3109]leader, is expected to complete his term. The ruling Liberal
[3110]Party will probably retain the Presidency in the October elections,
[3111]and maneuvering for the nomination has begun. Rodas Alvarado,
[3112]President of the Congress and one of the three leading contenders,
[3113]has used his position to build up strength, but the armed forces
[3114]regard nim as the least desirable and.a developing anti-Rodas
[3115]coalition may prevent his nomination. Either of the three leading
[3116]candidates would probably follow the present government's policies,
[3117]including its relatively soft Communist stand. The Communists,
[3118]while not yet a direct threat, are steadily increasing their
[3119]influence in the labor field and are exploiting the country's
[3120]Gisconraging political, economic, and social conditions.
[3122]El salvador, faced with a serious Communist threat about
[3123]two years ago, continues to show political and economic progress, .
[3124]but there are clouds on the horizon. President Rivera, who
[3125]assumed control last summer in a full return to constitutional
[3126]government, still has widespread Support and military backing.
[3127]The government is moving ahead with its reform program, but
[3128]there is some resistance to the proposed new income taxes.
[3129]Communist activities have been curbed, but the Communists still
[3130]retain a subversive capability particularly among labor anda
[3131]student groups. There is concern over the likely election of a
[3132]pro-Communist as rector of the university, a center of sub-
[3133]version and intrigue.
[3135]Costa Rica continues to be one of the most democratic and
[3136]politically stable-countries in Latin America but there are
[3137]reverberations sf unrest stenming from the deteriorating economic
[3138]Situation. The ruling National Liberation Party, which was
[3139]returned to power in last year's election in a bitterly contested
[3140]but peeceful election, represents the liberal left, although it
[3141]inciudes a number of moderates such as President Orlich and some
[3142]members of his cabinet. The Communist Party is small ana illegal
[3143]bus well organized ana effectively led. It recently instigated
[3144]disorders in the banana zone and, while not an immediate threat,
[3145]has Long-range potential sheuld economic conditions worsen,
[3147]I
[3149]7 28 Jan 63 - DXA Intelligence Bulletin _ Page (2)
[3151](REVERSE BLANK)
[3152]SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM
[3154]HY 50955 Docld:32423736 Page 69
[3156]uses}
[3158]° - SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM
[3160]Penama is relatively quiet. Although Panama has failed to
[3161]receive any commitment for 4 Long-sought yenegotiation of the
[3162]Canal Zone treaty, continuing talks on areas of disagreement and
[3163]some concessions have eased tensions and softened violent anti-US
[3164]propaganda. Public emotion may again be aroused, however, py the
[3166]recent petition, filed by 4 Communist Lawyer, requesting the Supreme
[3168]Court to declare the treaty unconstitutional. President Chiari
[3169]has also indicated he expects to press for increased compensation
[3170]during the forthcoming talks. On the internal scene, President
[3171]Chiari has failed to provide a strong administration. Corruption
[3172]continues; the cabinet is @ivided by conflicting loyalties and
[3173]ambitions; badly needed reforms have not yet been adopted; and
[3174]the chronically depressed economy remains stagnant.
[3176]fhe stability which has marked the 30-year dominance of
[3177]Mexico's Party of Revolutionary Institutions (PRI) is gradually
[3178]peing eroded, Extreme right and left factions of the PRI are
[3179]‘yyine for domination. In attempting to placate poth, President
[3180]Lopez Mateos has adopted inconsistent and vacillating policies,
[3181]‘pleasing neither group. Forces outside the PRI also pose an
[3182]increasing threat -- particularly the recently formed Tudependent
[3183]Peasant Central (CCI) with which leftist ex-President Cardenas is
[3184]associated. The CCI, organized to exploit unrest among the land-
[3185]less peasants, may also attempt to challenge the PRI politically.
[3186]To undercut the CCI, the government plans to complete the land
[3187]distribution program by the end of Lopez Mateos' term late next
[3189]year. ithough this may alleviate discontent in the agrarian
[3191]sector, yising population and mounting unemployment will continue
[3192]to be major problems. ~
[3193](SECRET )
[3195]28 Jan 63 DIA Intelligence Bulletin Page (3)
[3196]. (REVERSE BLANK)
[3198]SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM
[3200]HW 50955 Docld:32423736 Page 90
[3202]Construction of the fishing port im the Bay of Havana, whose
[3204]snnouncement a a Soviet undertaking caused so mich concern last fall,
[3205]will be dlreeted by a team of Soviet techuioiens and Cuban engineera
[3206]and will start in February ~ eccovding to a Havana radio announcement.
[3207]The port ie te be completed by the end of 1963 and is to cost 12 millicn
[3208]poses, vhich vill be met by loan from the Seviet Union, te be amortiecd
[3209]over 1O yeers, The port ia expected to serve 130 vessela of the Soviet
[3210]fishing fleet and from 24 to 30 of the Cuben fleet, It will have
[3211]installations euch as freezer plants for 10,000 toms of fish, factories.
[3212]for processing ses products, machinery for making no lees than 56 tons
[3213]of ice a day, a floating deck to repair ships of up to 2,500 tons, and
[3214]well-equipped repair shops. ‘The emouncement emphasized that the port is
[3215]to be operated by and will be the “absolute property of the Cuban state."
[3216]Tt has @leo been announced that Poland has now formileted plans for
[3217]wudlding the shipyard enviaaged in the port of Meriél, The ingtallation
[3218]WALL be mariaged by Cuban technicians vho are presently receiving training
[3219]in Polish shipyards on the Baltic, Ship construction will reportedly
[3220]resoh a level of 70,000 tons per yoar, (RBIS 98, 17 January, end Daily
[3221]Report, 16 Jemary, OFFICIAL USE ONLY)
[3223]HY 50955 Docld:32423736 Page 91
[3226]manentc
[3227]today the
[3228]USSR Eur
[3229]torpe ado bi arin
[3230]supplied . chins as. having Ot
[3231]' fishing industry‘: as well as presen
[3232]_problem, He asked whether t
[3233]~. information on these
[3235]built "Ei shing base"
[3237]Per
[3239]_concerned « over, cep
[3241]ac
[3242]es
[3244]rn
[3246]in Cube,
[3248]Ta view of reports
[3249]ection on dscidine 2 ang oliciz
[3250]waters in order { to avoid incident
[3252]ee mE
[3255]potential
[3256]Ovential |
[3258]us could provide”
[3259]ships which would operate from Sovietce
[3263]ep Ak tPinesr 4
[3264]fet bree .
[3265]amare ES Bin realy HeUbato
[3266]K, 2
[3269]© Ministry told Embassy
[3270]s it had received: that
[3271]Shing -v sels, but also
[3272]S. He foresaw Souler.
[3273]verse ie effect on _Jamaican
[3274]possible security
[3275]more detailed -
[3277]urge. Cabinet to te
[3279]PRES OREE ysee
[3281]of L
[3282]Soviets and ‘Cubans,
[3284]He is cons idezing ‘recommending to Cabinet. that, Jamaica claim
[3286]ferritor ial _ Waters of _Six-and-six x miles,
[3288]claing ‘three-mile limit,”
[3290]Although Gog obviously counting on
[3291]ment,
[3292]ovimerily ‘by desire to speed
[3293]to view Jamaican approach ag
[3294]|. technical leve e} beginning .to
[3295]Cuban _problen..
[3296]ACTION: STATE (ARMY ACSI)
[3297]INFO;  BCSOP, _OSA,. MGS, “USDEL
[3298]‘ EN: 16465:
[3299]1 SMD: CT -
[3301]4
[3303]COMP IDENT LAL
[3305]receipt Us military equip-.
[3307]seems unlikely that ‘this expression GOJ concern motivated
[3308]up delivery,
[3309]healthsome indication GOJ et
[3310]appreciate. wami fications of
[3312]Embassy. ‘inclined
[3314]TADB . - DOHERTY.
[3316]REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS
[3317]PROMIBITED UNLESS “UNCLASSIFIED”
[3319]Jamaica now apparently
[3321]HW §0955 Docld: 324233736 Page 92
[3324]BW 50955 Dorcld: 32423736
[3326]Page $3
[3329]* | SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM
[3331]THE SITUATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA, PANAMA, AND MEXICO
[3332]Central America is relatively stable. Preparations are a
[3333]under way for President Kennedy's scheduled meeting with the Chiefs
[3334]of State of these countries at San Jose, Costa Rica, on 18 and 19
[3335]: . March. Tensions are rising, however, in those countries having
[3336]: ‘ ‘.elections scheduled this year; Mexico's political stability is
[3337]threatened;. and the Cuban subversive potential remains a problem
[3338]throughout the area.
[3340]During the forthcoming meeting, an attempt will be made to
[3341]center discussions on areas of common interest. Economic integra-
[3342]tion of the Central American region -- one of the major objectives
[3343]of the Alliance for Progress Program ~- will undoubtedly be em-
[3344]‘phasized. Central America, which has been moving toward greater
[3345]political unity, has begun to take steps toward economic integra-
[3347]‘tion, and presently envisages the creation of a Common Market by
[3348]1965. The Cuban subversive threat is also likely to be given top
[3349]priority. All of the Central American countries regard this as
[3350]one of the major problems and are seeking ways to meet it.
[3352]On 8 February, Nicaraguans are scheduled to cast ballots for
[3353]the first time in nearly 30 years for a Presidential candidate
[3354]who is not a member of the Somoza family. Rene Schick -- the
[3355]government's Liberal Party (PLN) candidate and hand-picked by the
[3356]Somozas -- is expected to win easily, however. Effective oppo-
[3357]sition to Schick collapsed when the major opposition party --
[3358]Traditionalist Conservative (PCT)-- boycotted the elections
[3359]because the government refused to permit OAS supervision. The
[3360]only opponent is Diego Manuel Chamorro Bolanos, a last-minute
[3361]candidate of the splinter Nicaraguan Conservative Party (PCN),
[3362]whose entry into the race seems to have been engineered by the
[3363]government to provide a semblance of opposition. Castro-
[3364]Communist.elements, militant conservatives and others may ‘attempt
[3365]to create disorders before or during the elections, but the
[3366]Nicaraguan National Guard is believed capable of. controlling
[3367]any troubles short of .a general uprising or wel 1-coordinated
[3368]rebel invasion -- neither of which seems likely.
[3370]Oo.
[3372]Anti-Somoza Nicaraguans have alleged fraudulent registra-
[3373]' tions and may attempt to challenge the elections. Although
[3374]Schick may not turn out to be a Somoza ‘puppet , opposition
[3375]suspicions will be reinforced with the likely retention of
[3376]Generali Anastasio Somoza as Director of the National Guard.
[3378]Repercussions in Guatemala from the recent abortive Air
[3379]Foree revolt have not been too serious. Although ‘plotting
[3381]ie 28 Jan 63 “DIA Int telligence Bulletin a Page (1)
[3382]- (REVERSE BLANK) . ,
[3383]SECRET-NO PORE EIGN Di ISSEM
[3385]“h
[3387]NW 450955 Docld:32423736 Page 94
[3389]e ‘ Ms at : e i e 5 a :
[3391]‘ Ss. ME a va 1
[3392]50955 Bocld:3 3796 Page 95 bs ° . OE
[3394]a an | i . ° ’
[3397]Campesino ‘Strike. Scheduled in Bolivia’
[3399]A planned Campesino (peasant) strike in Bolivia today .
[3401]could iead to violence if it. occurs. The Government
[3402]reportedly plens to block all entrances into La Paz
[3403]and campesinos loyal to the government are assembling
[3404]and arming to counter the strikers who are led by
[3405]pro-Communist Torribio Salas, A government spokesman
[3406]claims that ‘the Cuben and Czechoslovak Embassies are
[3408]financing the strike and that the Cubans are training |
[3410]campesino militia in other areas as well.
[3412]President Pag has reportedly said he wili do every-
[3413]thing to prevent the strike but will call on loyal
[3414]campesinos for aid if he fails. If armed conflict
[3415]develops between the two groups of campesinos,
[3417]the Armed Forces would probably be forced to step in,
[3418]President Pag might also have to take action sfainst
[3419]trouble makers like Salas, something he has tried to
[3420]avoid,
[3422](CONFIDENTIAL)
[3424]SOURCE: ARMA LA PAZ CX-11 (C)
[3426]28 Jan 63 DIA (igeelli gence Bulletin | Page
[3428](REVERSE B
[3430]SECRET-NO FORE! TCR DISSEM
[3432]an i Oe a
[3434]HY 50955 Dacld: 327423736
[3436]Page $7
[3438]/N
[3440]_—___. SECHIEAL pisseit
[3441]Three top WEkien Communist Party offiediala, including tude
[3442]Carlos Prestes, are teported Leaving for Cuba vie Prague prior to
[3443]15 Jenuary to dlsouss certain political problems with the Cuban.
[3444]im activities in the different Latin
[3446]Commuiiets vesponsible for pro-Cul
[3448]Awerlean eountrics, Before leaving they planed to be briefed by 2
[3450]Bregilian Communist Party méxber whe hes just returned from « viait to
[3451]perty leaders in Uruguay, Argenting, Chile, Peru, and Bolivie to get their
[3452]opinions shows holding the “Latina Awertoon Congress in Support of Cubs,”
[3453]now rescheduled for Maxéh, dn Rio or Sac Paulo, (CIA, Rie de Janeiro,
[3455]TN 42868, 31 Beoexbor, SHCrEr noroRN)
[3457]HY 50955 Docld:32423736 Page 96
[3460]SEGRE, =H FOREIGN DISSENT
[3462]The Wational Executive Commission of Brasil's orthodex Commmist
[3463]Party (P0B) reported;
[3464]perty position im relation te Franaisco Julies, Bredilian Peadent-League
[3466]alae
[3468]planned to meet on f January ta discuss the
[3470]leader who hes been cloder to Bragil's diseldent herd-Ling Conmmmist
[3471]Party than to ite orthodox group (CPB), The POB leaders planned to
[3472]eonciders the possibility of sending a high-level party delegation to
[3473]Cube to confer with Fidel Cagtro, not. only to improve relations but
[3475]to protest a maport that Cuttvel is supporting duldeo. (CIA Seo Pauls,
[3477]THeS.35 3904, 9 Jenusry, SECREP)
[3479]Comment: Cuba has for sew time had a divisive influence on
[3480]Bragiiian Communist affeiee. The diasident Commniet Party formed in
[3481]late 1951 hes ~ dike duliao ~ favored & nore revolutionary Lind and has
[3483]apparently received considerably mere support from Cuba than bas. the
[3484]orthodsx party. Anothex' indlestion of the divisive influence of Cube
[3486]wt that Frencisco Leives Otero, POR leader responsible for
[3488]matters pertaining to Cuba, attecked party mibservience to the Grou
[3489]a national POR conference on 29 November, Lefvas maintained that the
[3490]PCE showld digeuss the Sine-Soviet dispute with complete independence,
[3492]rather then waintein silenced on it as it had been doing, (SECRET)
[3494]CN DISSENT
[3496]HY 50955 Docld:32423736 Page 99
[3499]“rah eaten ea cy
[3501]This matesist contains informotion effecting thd Netions! Defensa of the United States within the “meaning of the Eipionage ‘Laws, Tue ta, Us.c- Soce. * at
[3502]793 and 795. the transmission or ravalation of which in any manner fo en una uihon zed persona is prohibited by, law, __ !
[3504]SECRET
[3506]i (Wren Pulled In}
[3510]J]. COUNTRY vexico/arazin | a REPORT NO, TORS =3/537,107
[3512]SUEJECT CLOSE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VICENTE LOMBARDO’
[3513]TOLEDANO AND PRESIDENT MATEOS$ -REASONS. FOR |
[3514]LOMBARDO'S TRIP TO BRAZIL
[3516]oe. ah t
[3517]ATE ngTR, - TH Feeruary 1963
[3518]tt my . ay ;
[3519]4 .
[3521]PRECEDENCE ROUTINE
[3523]_ DATE OF REFERENCES IN mn
[3524]INEC, (12 FEBRUARY 1963 we : . : 67594
[3525]-. PLACE &
[3526]DATE ACO, MEXICO, MEXICO CITY (12 FEERUARY 1963) By
[3527]APPRAISAL 2 FIELD REPORT NO. HMM ~ 7016
[3529]rris is UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SCURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE,
[3530]SOURCE a PERSON (2) IN CLOSE PERSONAL CONTACT WITH LOMBARDO», a4
[3532]t
[3533]4
[3534]i
[3536]ai
[3538]4
[3539]a
[3542]“4
[3544]“|
[3545]4
[3546]4
[3547]3
[3549]4
[3551]le “ON 12. FEBRUARY VICENTE LOMBARDO: TOLEDANO, SECRETARY GENERAL
[3553]BERT 0 ROMERO PEREZ, PRIVATE SECRETARY OF, ADOL FO
[3555]CONFERRED WITH HU
[3556]Lopez MATEOS, PRESIDENT. OF MEXICO. LOMBARDO TOLD ROMERO HE WANTED |
[3557]“THE PR RESIDENT TO KNOW: ABOUT ‘HIS TRIP TO BRAZIL AND WHY HE WAS”
[3558]GOING. HE ASKED ROMERO TO TELL LOPEZ MATEOS THAT HE WOULD LE EAVE
[3559]AND EXPECTED TO BE
[3561]~Lowtact HIM ON HIS RETURN FROM BRAZIL IN ORDER TO ARRANGE A PRIVATE
[3563]MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT. LOMBARDO SAID HE HAD SEVERAL THINGS
[3565]GROUP I
[3566]Excluded from automate
[3567]downgrading ead
[3568]declanification
[3570]CLASSIFICATION ~~ DISSEMINA
[3572]cl Ei Re
[3573]at TUE EIOl
[3575]a ORMATION
[3577]TION CONTROLS
[3579]REP ORT
[3581]GERRY
[3583]. 4
[3584]ku! Yb i
[3586]FORM Th " OBSOLETE PREVE US EDITIONS. ee . 3 . 45-20)
[3588]HY 50955 Docld: 32423736 Page 100
[3590]SET TSS RSS SO
[3592]. . x u
[3593]QO . : _ +) “CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS.” i so rn ne ie
[3595]RPA! - ;
[3596]SECRET of A OISSEM wes -3/537, 187
[3598]SE
[3599](When Filled In}
[3601]2 TO DISCUSS WITH LOPEZ MATEOS.,
[3603]By! LOMBARDO GAVE ROMERO THE FOLLOWING REASONS FOR HIS TRIP TO
[3605]' BRAZIL. HE SAID THAT A GROUP OF BRAZILIAN PERSONALITIES AND
[3607]INTELLECTUALS HAD CONVOKED A CONGRESS WHICH IS SCHEDULED TO SE HELD —
[3608]/ IN RIO DE JANEIRO IN MARCH 1963. HE SAID THE TWO PRINCIPAL AIMS
[3609]“OF THE CONGRESS ARE: | | -
[3610]“7A TO CREATE AN ORGANIZATION IN DEFENSE OF CUBA,
[3611]BL To EXAMINE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS EXISTING IN LATIN
[3612]AMERICAN COUNTRIES:. IN ORDER TO PROMOTE THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC |
[3614]DEVELOPMENT OF - LATIN AMERICA, 7
[3615]S03. LOMBARDO. SAID THAT SOMETHING WENT WRONG IN BRAZIL BECAUSE,
[3617]APART. FROM THE COMMITTEE WHICH CONVOKED THE CONGRESS, A SECOND
[3619]SEPARATE COMMIT TTEE HAD SPRUNG UP WHOSE AIMS ARE. THE SAME, AND
[3621]THAT A ‘SORT OF RIVALRY HAS DEVELOPED BETWEEN THE TWO GRCUPS.
[3623]LOMBARDO SAID THE RESULT WAS "THAT MY COMRADES IN EUROPE HAVE
[3625]ASKED ME TOGO TO BRAZIL TO INTERVENE: N, THE MATTER, To TRY TO ORGANIZE
[3627]A SING Le UNITED COMMITTEE, AND MAKE DEFINITE PREPARAT LONS_ FOR THE
[3629](OLDING OF* THE CONGRESS. IN ORDER TO ENSURE. ITS SUCCESS." _ LOMBARDO
[3631]ID "THE COMRADES: IN EUROPE” SHOULD HAVE SENT AN ARGENT INE, A CHILEAN;
[3633]URUGUAYAN, OR SOMEONE NEARER BRAZIL, BUT THEY INSISTED ON SENDING
[3635]LIM BECAUSE HE HAS EXPERIENCE, “AND THEY ARE CONVINCED THAT HE GAN
[3636]STRAIGHTEN THINGS OUT: SATISFACTORILY.
[3637]pe
[3639]T &
[3641]LOMBARDO oe ROMER 0 THAT IF THE CONGRESS 1S HELD IN. MARCH AS
[3643]HY 50955 Docld: 32423736 Page i101
[3648]fons ee no ~ a 7 4
[3649]7 i
[3650]oe ;
[3651]: t
[3652]H Me
[3653]a °
[3655]wh i
[3658]' |SECRE
[3660](When Filled
[3662]| 1083/5375 181
[3664]‘ SCHEDULED, HE WILL NOT ATTEND IT. HE SAID "THE PRIMA DONNAS" |
[3665]"| AND ORNAMENTAL FIGURES WILL TAKE OVER THEN, AND | AM NOT ONE OF :
[3666]THOSE. " ROM 4ERO REMARKED THAT LOMBARDO IS A MAN OF WORK, LOMBARDO ‘ P
[3667]SAID, "I GO TO ORGANIZE SO THE CONGRESS WILL NOT FAIL, THAT 1S MY i
[3668]MISSION, NOTHING MORE, AFTER THAT ANY ONE FROM MEXICO CAN TTEND. " I
[3669]5. (FIELD COMMENT. LOMBARDO'S PLAN TO LEAVE MEXICO ON 13 FEBRUARY | ;
[3671]FOR PANAMA AND RIO DE JANEIRO HAS ALREADY BEEN REPORTED. ) ;
[3673]6, FIELD DISSEM:STATE ARMY NAVY AIR FBI I&NS CINCARIB.
[3675]me b
[3677]. a
[3678]‘ is
[3679]i 5
[3681]t &
[3683]i Fg
[3684]a io
[3686]t ’
[3688]ACTION: ACSi, NAW, AF, JCS, CSD
[3690](NFO. .s 8CSOP
[3691]‘DA EN 17084 |
[3693]hoe Be END OF MESSAGE
[3695]‘CLASSIFICATION — - et MINATION CONTROLS
[3697]RCE
[3698]Sen \
[3700]HW 50955 Docld:32493736 Page i102
[3702]DEPARTMENT GF STATE
[3704]GRAM
[3706]: HANDLING INDICAT
[3708]j
[3709]as
[3711]‘| ne o
[3714]—_ i
[3716]Hi P38) a
[3718]4 a
[3719]KER om Fas
[3721]FROM, ot Amcongen, SAO. PAULO | “DATE: . February 65 1963
[3723]FAR
[3726]|suaecr . Sample survey of worker sentiment . shows receptivity
[3727]>. toward communism; ‘S80 Paulo business leaders re>
[3728]REE + ported by one observer as generally unconcerned over ee
[3729]ee Communist danger. os os as
[3731]7 Two straws in. the wind ‘that have come » recently to my atten: ro
[3733]j tion indicate the existence of an unhealthy attitude toward communism . ae
[3734]on the part of at least some segments of So Paulo! s working and’ -
[3735]—i managerial classes. - Further indications in support of or in refutation.
[3736]of the se signs will be submitted as they are noted,
[3738]PS ‘On January 31, L was visited by the two top Z American ex-
[3739]' ecutives of a- Brazilian subsidiary of a large American corporation. §
[3740]| They said. that their firm, following a practice instituted some years ~
[3741]} ago.of. periodically sampling worker sentiment in their plants, had
[3742]i; just finished a small survey conducted very informally by trusted ©
[3743]| Brazilian employees among 55 or 60 of their semi-skilled workers |
[3744]to discover how the latter would feel about the establishment in Brazil ;
[3745]| of a communist system of government. The result of this survey was 9.7
[3746]_} 30 shockingly different fromm that of earlier pulse-taking that these :
[3747]| executives thought the Consulate General should know about it. Eighty °
[3748]' percent of the workers. approached had indicated that while they did not -
[3749]_ {| pretend to know: much about communism, they. thought they would be =
[3750]-t bettet off under a communist regime than they-are at present. Among.”
[3751]: the reasons most commonly given were that things were sO badin ..
[3752]i Brazil that any change would be for the fEsyyxand that communism
[3753]i would put an end: to the rascality (malandragem) which is so prevalent.’ -:
[3754]The other twenty percent thought that communism would be ‘bad for the.
[3756]country,
[3757]LEN Names withhele at their “request.
[3759]OFFICIAL USE ONLY
[3761]OUIeR(S ang Uiassiiication Pps
[3763]HY 50955 Docld: 32423736 Page 103
[3765]ESE Dee Flo.
[3766]_ OFFICIAL USE ONLY =
[3767]-2-. _
[3769]‘The company executives attributed the pro- ~communist
[3770]“sentiment. ‘as revealed, mainly to the economic difficulties ex-
[3771]perienced’ by, low~income families as a result of the rampant,
[3772]inflation. | They said their. labor relations were good, that while |
[3773]their pay scales were not as high as those in some other industries,»
[3774]‘some popular fringe benefits were provided, and that to the best of |
[3775]' their. knowledge there had been no communist agitators at work
[3776]among their x employees. : ;
[3778]- Not ‘long before this visit I was lunching one day at the
[3779]Y Jockey Club with Sr. Paulo Ayres Filho, a Brazilian banker-and
[3780]“pharmaceutical manufacturer who is the spark-plug of IPES
[3782]'. (Instituto de Pesquisas Economicas e Sociais), the principal demo-=
[3783]cratic action group in the local business world. Looking around him *-
[3784]at the other tables, occupied by a good many well-known figures ‘of ©
[3785]_ sdo Paulo's conservative upper classes, Sr. Ayres said to me, | _
[3786]“Apart from the two.of us, there isn't a man in this dining room who.”
[3787]“is seriously concerned over the communist danger in Brazil. = °°
[3789]No. conclusions, ‘obviously, should be drawn fromsuch | |
[3790]slender: ‘indications: _It has been my observation, however, that :
[3791]; “most Brazilians either believe that a communist take- ~over would
[3792]be impossible, in Brazil, or. believe that even if it occurred, it.
[3793]a would take. a. relatively mild form. with which they could live. The a
[3794]'“-Brazilian's’ boasted calm, which is genuine and in most circumstances-
[3795]‘a vir tues, could in the. Present, state of: affairs be the cause of his undoing.
[3797]‘Daniel Me. “Braddock ’
[3798]C ns L General “
[3800]FFICIAL USE ONLY.
[3802]HY 50955 Docld: 32423736 Page i104
[3804]eee -
[3806]SHG 18 mcanl TON” IA a
[3807]rae : _ CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
[3809]This material containa infoxmation affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title
[3810]18, U.S.0, Secs, 793 and 704, the tranamission or rovelotion of Which in any manner to on unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
[3812]S-E-C-R-E-T
[3813], NO FOREIGN DISSEM
[3815]'-- country, Colombia/Cuba «=. | REPORT NO. CS -3/536,069
[3816]1 SUBJECT Cuban Support of Guerrillas DATE DISTR, | 4 February 1963
[3817]in Colombia ,
[3818]NO. PAGES 1
[3819]REFERENCES RD
[3820]. DATE OF October 1962
[3821]a INFO. —
[3822]“2. PLACE & Germany, Munich
[3823]a DATE ACQ. (14 December 1962) FIELD REPORT NO.
[3824]} THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
[3825]4 "SOURCE: An official German service, from "a fairly reliable source
[3827]‘with contacts in Buenos Aires." Appraisal of Content: 6.
[3829]1. Maximo Gruber, a major in the Cuban Army and one of the
[3830]leaders of the G-2 section, has been appointed technical leader
[3831]of the Communist guerrillas in Sumapaz, Colombia. 1 Gruber,
[3833]a Polish Jew, was formerly a commiSsar in Spain. His wife
[3834]is European. His son Maximo is a graduate of the Lenin
[3835]Institute in Moscow. On his frequent trips to Bolivia,
[3836]Uruguay, and Cuba he carries a Bolivian diplomatic pass-
[3837]port identifying him as "traveling inspector of the
[3838]Bolivian Foreign Ministry."
[3840]2. Gruber is being assisted in his tasks in Colombia by
[3841]Jaime Guerra, also known as Captain Veneno. One.of his
[3842]liaisom officers to the Communist Party.of Colombia is
[3843]Blanca Diaz y Collazo, a lawyer and former member of the _
[3844]‘Cuban Embassy in Bogota, who was trained in Prague in 1952. . wl
[3846]oy, Headquarters Comment. ‘An official British service
[3847]“reported in April 1961 that Maximo Grobart, nationality |.
[3848]unknown, waS training guerrillas in the Sumapaz area;
[3849]Grobart, who claimed to be of Hungarian origin, had a
[3850]‘Cuban passport in the name of, Jose Blanco and might
[3851]-have had other passports of different nationalities.
[3855]Abaca ann setinaaitnt a Bie cade avnbrow adatoms duu lav dad af tle cnedaiwaudase shaadi
[3859]I
[3861]i
[3863]HY 50955 Docld: 32423736 Page 105
[3865]EN Rtg ones
[3867]Wi FSP a ce BE fE TBS A reer ENTE conn Bm is MTR gp PV ENG
[3868]LIMMIMEKOUNE = BEG) eB NUTCCR RIM. AST GHNI
[3870]CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
[3872]contains information affecting the National ‘Defense of thé United States within the
[3873]cs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an
[3875]. This ‘material
[3876]18, U.S.C. Se
[3878]meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title
[3879]unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
[3881]__SeH-CoReE-T _
[3884]COUNTRY Costa Rica/Cuba REPORT NO. CS -3/534,724
[3886]SUBJECT Departure of Costa Rican Communist to DATE DISTR.
[3888]22 January 1963
[3889]Live in Cuba
[3891]NO. PAGES i
[3893]REFERENCES RD
[3895]DATE OF November 1962
[3896]INFO. . .
[3897]DATE ACQ, (23 Nowertee eyo FIELD REPORT NO. HRS-3006
[3899]; SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
[3901]source: Costa Rican (B) with good contacts in Costa Rican Comn
[3902]: circles. Appraisal of Content: 2,
[3905]unist Party
[3907]Carlos Guillen Fernandez, Costa Rican Communist who was formerly very
[3909]active in the Sociedad de Amigos de la Revolucion Cubana (Society of
[3911]Friends of the Cuban Revolution), left Costa Rica on WwW November, on his
[3912]' way to Cuba, where he planned to remain indefinitely and to work.
[3914]ra
[3916]a
[3918]HY 50955 Docld: 32423736 Page 106
[3920]Sant EB inabats ae erate
[3922]nee tana deat han abba tee ute
[3924]j
[3925]7
[3926]4
[3927]i,
[3929]u
[3930]4
[3932]4
[3934]TESA cisinisb ka bitecoant samen
[3936]Few inw Hasan
[3938]“REPORT itNFORMAT
[3940]‘CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
[3942]10
[3944]s
[3946]N
[3948]‘This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title
[3949]18, U.8.0, Secs..793 and 704, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person 1s prohibited by law.
[3951]7
[3953]C-O-N-F-1I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
[3955]COUNTRY Ecuador/Cuba/Latin America / REPORT NO.” CS=3/535,791 . -
[3956]SUBJECT Request by Cuban Diplomat in DATE DISTR. 1 February 1963
[3957]. Chile to Member of the - ST -
[3958]Revolutionary Union of Ecuadorean NO. PAGES |. lL
[3959]Youth for Information on Leftist Ce
[3960]Activity in Ecuador REFERENCES © RD -W-2107
[3961]DATE OF ae OS .
[3962]"INFO. Mid-January 1963 ‘
[3963]PLACE &
[3965]- DATE AC@, Ecuador, Guayaquil (22 January 1963) FIELD REPORT NO, HEG-2108
[3966]THIS 1S UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
[3967]souRCcE:; Member (C) of the Revolutionary Union of ‘Ecuadorean Youth. —
[3968]Appraisal of Content: 3. Se — .
[3970]Cc “" Alfredo Vera Arrata, a member of the National Executive Council |
[3972]’ of the. Revolutionary Union of Ecuadorean Youth (URJE) until his
[3974]‘- ‘expulsion from URJE during its National: Convention held in early -
[3976]-.- January 1963, has received a letter from Pedro Martinez Pirez, .
[3977]First Secretary of the Cuban Embassy in Santiago, Chile, in ;
[3978]‘whiéh he asks” Véra™to“send”a person to Chile to inform him on
[3979]current leftist activity ‘un Ecuador. Vera plans to send
[3981]- Jaime Galarza Zavala, also expelled from URJE, if funds can. be-:
[3983]', raised for the tri a oe °
[3985]a
[3987]_-Field-Commen
[3989]activities\in Chile, Peru,*and Ecuador. 0.
[3990]. - a een cease ont sans BETES a . : a a : a
[3992]. Martinez is in charge of Cuban subversive |
[3994]HY 50955 Docld: 32423736 Page i107
[3997]ne Lich 7 "Siwmme'ts " @ENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
[3999]his material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 1a, USC Secs. *
[4000]a and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in ony monner to an unawthorued person it prohibited by law
[4002]—_ CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS mat
[4003]SECRET _GGNTROULED DISSER ur. Rowen bee 9088
[4004](When Filled inj Z
[4006]“COUNTRY CUBA HAITI REPORT NO. TDCSDB-3/653, 274
[4008]“SUBJECT. PLANNED MILITARY COUP TO OVERTHROW™™ ?<0~0=~. «DATE piste... 14.
[4009]Pa PRESIDENT DUVALIER OF HAITI ; _
[4011]JARY 1963
[4012]_. PRECEDENCE ‘ROUTINE
[4014]“DATE OF
[4016]: REFERENCES IN 4
[4018]> INFO. & resruary 1963 67457
[4019]“PLACE & |
[4021]~ DATE ACQ.-UNITED STATES (28 vanuary, 8 resruary 1963)
[4023]APPRAISAL FIELD REPORT NO,
[4025]me THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE, APPRAISAL OF CONTENT 18 TENTATIVE, aa
[4027]a SOURCE AN OFFICER (B) OF ‘NEWS. DISTRIBUTING MEDIA; -FROM A COLLEAGUE: OF EUSEBIO MUJAL BARNIOL. |!
[4029]Die -PAUL E. MAGLOIRE, FORMER HAITIAN PRESIDENT, 1S PLANNING] Fey
[4030]‘TO OVERTHROW PRESIDENT FRANCOIS DUVALI ER OF HAITI IN A MILITARY | FMRa—
[4032]COUP.» MAGLOIRE CLAIMS. TO HAVE THE BACKING OF THE HAITIAN ARMY,
[4033]THE DATE OF THE couP |S EXPECTED TO SE SET AT A SECRET MEETING
[4035]© WILL BE HELD IN NEW YORK ON 2 FEBRUARY.
[4037]2, MAGLOIRE EXPECTS TO RECEIVE FINANCIAL SUPPORT AND MANPOME
[4038]oo FROM C CERTAIN CUBANS IN EXILE, “ANTONIO RODRIGUEZ Y ECHAZABAL,
[4039]a FORMER CUBAN AMBASSADOR TO HAITI, 1S LINING@UP. CUBAN EXILE SUPPO!
[4040]eo RODRIGUEZ HOPES THAT IF THE CUBANS PLAY A PROMINENT’ ROLE, THEY
[4042]CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
[4044]| “SECRET CONTROLLED DISSER
[4045]: TZ
[4047]TREASURY FBS T&NS REPC INCLANT
[4049]GROUP t
[4051]FQRM K. 7 ssc Bauviovs 38 EDITIONS.
[4055]Nw 50955 Docld: 32423736 Page 106
[4057]SERSSTPICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS 2. 00 UO
[4059], SECRET. ___ GONTROLLED DISSEN
[4061]- MIGHT BE G GIVEN A BASE: ROM WHICH TO OPERATE ACTIVELY AGAINST CASTRO
[4063]aN THE, FUTURE. (SOURCE COMMENT: RODRIGUEZ HAD BEEN A DELEGATE OF THE
[4064]BL 26) JULY MOVEMENT IN: PUERTO" PRINCIPE UNTIL JANUARY 1959 WHEN HE WAS
[4065]: NAMED ) AMBASSADOR TO HAITE BY FADEL CASTRO RUZ.
[4067]ee we IN LATE 1959.
[4068]RODRIGUEZ MANAGED TO. ESCAPE ASSASSINATION), | Soak
[4070]3 EUSEBIO MUJAL. BARN OL OF THE CONF EDERAC 1 ON DE TRABAJADORES DE,
[4071]CUBA eN EXILIO (CTCE- ~CONFEDERATION OF CUBAN WORKERS iN EX1LE) |
[4072]is ASSISTING: RODRIGUEZ, A RELATIVE,
[4074]“EELD ) DISSEMs STATE, einetant, CINCARIB.
[4076]ACTION: ACSI, NAVY, “AF, JCS, OS
[4077][NFO°: -DCSOP-
[4078]DA IN 17056
[4080]“END OF MESSAGE
[4082]- CLASSIFICATION = , DISSEMINATION CONTROLS ©
[4084]ic rane Sane aS
[4086]HY 50955 Docld: 32423736 Page 109
[4091]HY 409545
[4093]information
[4095]fleeting
[4096]Diet
[4098]by
[4100]1? DECEMBER 196
[4102]DAN Etre
[4104]PANS
[4106]BY TE oymawe we.
[4107]fo. THE CUBA mires
[4108]PAR OURRTN anne
[4110]the Notional
[4111]of reveletion of which
[4113]eit tee
[4114]mae
[4116]an DIssim
[4118]O PROPOSE To ES7,
[4120]we}
[4122]OS OF MILITARY ‘SHIPS. THRO
[4124]UCH THE PANAMA caxar,
[4126]THOMAS Wy
[4128]GSslense of the United o¢
[4129]in any mosagr ig
[4131]CLASSIFICATION TE
[4133]Docld: 32423736
[4135]Page 112
[4137]Sao Verse
[4139]teen
[4140]re rr
[4141]OISSEMI
[4143]ca
[4145]3D TO
[4147]vies With 2
[4150]ATION CONT
[4152]“+ NEP WOULD REQUIRE TWO MEN,
[4154]megain
[4155]a
[4157]1g Of the Espionage
[4158]filted Se tase
[4160]RUA G
[4161]LaOMAS
[4163]Laws,
[4165]Tae 4
[4167]6,
[4169]OLS . —
[4171]i
[4172]n
[4175]So ce Sma?
[4177]+. spam tatnesinnenrrenpt naman ma
[4179]: . : - mo rtes : _ ;
[4181]ca me roe tine a7 4 SS AR aERRPIESE oye PTE I
[4183](EN) OF THE FD 1 BER EU ee ne
[4185]“|
[4186]mie 7 OT eT ES _ |
[4187]THAT HE EAD COMiLA- |
[4188]. |
[4190]ETARY OF ORCANT
[4194]~ weeny
[4195]boiate n 7
[4196]rat, GEGRETARY+CENERAL OF Th
[4197]ON AG DLA A
[4198]ots mee oT ULD USE me
[4199]SAVING TONG AS THE POP COULD USE THE I
[4200]LT oem a 7 :
[4202]SSED FULLY av
[4204]seat 00
[4206]A SNAMA
[4208]WER ZURICH
[4210]VER
[4212]MOUS! E ‘EUROPEAN 1
[4214]eat wo
[4215]NAVY, « Eaeme'e sy ome
[4217]END OF MESSAGE
[4221]HW 50955 Dacld:32493736 Page 113
[4223]nears
[4225]~~ “a = 3 5 Ss “= | i 5 y j -
[4226]IRMATION REPORT. RAM | /
[4227]CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ve
[4229]basons eed 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauihoried person is srohibited by fw.
[4231]a £50 Tritt material conteing inforrnation affecting the Nations! Defansa of the United State: within She meaning of the E:pronege text, Tithe (8, US. Secs.
[4232]i
[4233]s
[4235]Y CONTROLS :
[4236](When Filled in; |
[4238]REPORT NO. TDCS. =3/537,185
[4240]J. DECISION OF GUARDIA CIVIL JUDGE TO RELEASE DATE DISTR, 4 reeRUARY: 1963
[4241]COMMUNISTS a, ,
[4242]2, COMMUNIST LEGAL ADVISER- IN -GUARDIA CIVIL - PRECEDENCE ROUT INE
[4244]REFERENCES in 67565
[4246]WE ACO, Peru, Lima {12 FEBRUARY 1963)
[4247]. . . ae
[4248]PRAISAL 2 FIELD REPORT NO, HPL 2756 ;
[4249]THIS is UNEVALUATED INFORMATION, SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT iS TENTAT
[4250]COMPETENT AMERICAN OBSERVER (B). yo a
[4252]de MAJOR GUILLERMO HINOSTROZA, WHO WAS NAMED AS THE GUARDIA CIVIL
[4254]JUDGE TO. TAKE THE STATEMENTS OF THE COMMUNISTS ACCUSED OF
[4255]PLOTTING SUBVERSION, DECIDED ON 12 FEBRUARY 63 THAT HE COULD NOT ASSUME:
[4256]RESPONSIBILITY FOR BRINGING THE COMMUNISTS TO 7atal.. HE INTENDS TO
[4258]ELEA
[4259]ELE:
[4261]THEM ON 1
[4263]{ FEBRUARY IN THE ABSENCE OF A DECISION BY THE
[4265]Soh,
[4267]avers tie JUNTA (FIELD COMMENT: THE PRESS REPORTED HiNOSTRO zAs
[4268]APPOINTMENT AS AD HOC JUDGE OR MAGISTRATE FOR THE SECOND POLICE
[4269]JUDICIAL ZONE IN THE ARRAIGNMENT PROCESS. IT ALSO REPORTED THAT
[4270]SOLONEL ENRIQUE DIEZ CANSECO WAS THE GUARDIA CIVIL LEGAL ADVISOR
[4271]f] THE CASE.
[4273]ACCORDING TO A USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE. WITH GOOD
[4275]cROUP I
[4276]Excluded from automanc
[4277]downgrading ond
[4278]declowFicahon
[4280]Knee cane iON -— DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
[4282]“BA EM
[4284]staTe/ine | o1a [army/acsi| NAVY | A
[4286]TK OBSOLETE PREVIOUS. EDITIONS. ; Cal (15-20) 2
[4288]HY 50955 Docld: 32423736 Page 114
[4290]SECRET
[4292]. (When Filled In}
[4294]CONTACTS AMONG COMMUNIST PARTY LEADERS, THE PARTY iS PLEASED
[4295]HAT Ofe2 CANSE co iN THE CASE BECAUSE HE WAS A COMMUNIST SYMPATHIZER
[4297]WHO CONTRIBUTED TO THE, PARTY IN THE NI NETEEN FORTIES. PARTY.
[4299]RECO RDS FURN [SHED BY. THE POLICE IN 1958 SHOW ACTUALLY THAT HE WAS
[4301]Neewtlne ade etter eta ta ea alata ere Band Tee vy
[4303]A PARTY MEMBER). .
[4304]2. NAVY CAPTAIN ENRIQUE CARBONNEL, CHIEF OF THE SERVICIO DE
[4305]|NTELLIGENCIA NACIONAL, PLANNED TO DISCUSS THE SITUATION WITH
[4306]THE PRESIDENT OF THE. JUNTA. AND URGE HIM TO PREVENT THE. RELEASE
[4307]oF THE COMMUNISTS... JAVIER CAMPOS MONTOYA, CHIEF OF THE STATE
[4308]| SECURITY DIVISION, OF THE POLICIA DE~ INVESTIGACIONES DEL PERU, INSISTS
[4309]| THAT THE. GOVERNMENT HAS AMPLE EVIDENCE, INCLUDING SOME CONFESSLONS,
[4310]ON WHICH! TO CONVICT THE COMMUNISTS. CAMPOS EXPRESSED D!SAPPOINTMENT
[4311]UAT THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE JUDGE, WHOM HE DESCRIBES AS WEAK, ~
[4312]BUT HE HAS SOME HOPE THAT THE JUNTA WILL OVERRIDE THE DECISION.
[4313]ig FIELD DiSSEM:STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCARIB, a
[4315]ACTION: ACSI, NAVY, AF, JCS, OSD
[4316]{NEO BESO:
[4317]DA IN 17081
[4319]END OF MESSAGE
[4321]CLASSIFICA
[4323]SECRET | GE
[4325]N— DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
[4327]HY 50955 Docld: 324235736 Page 115
[4329]yelieble end qudeitent couree, acme the Leaders of the 17 Decembe
[4330]ike violanse ot the US-omed Cexro ap Poses mine da i Quoya, Pave.
[4332]af verchiand in the Peruvian hig! a ty Andoen Tnitenis,
[4334]indigne wore sald te hewe plamed te synelnonis
[4336]mogaigh vith the violenée ageinet Cuawe de Psono. Me duck Anettante
[4338]hove been reported yet. (SEGREE)
[4340]2 GiJer now seiaure
[4342]HY 50955 Docld: 32423736 Page 116
[4344]bas alea been active dn promoting the seleurc
[4347]Peruvian
[4349]Communist Elements Coordinating Their Activities
[4351]Orthodox Communists in Peru are apparently putting
[4352]aside their differences and moving toward closer
[4353]co-operation with the extremist Trotskyist faction,”
[4354]believed to be leading the recent outbreak of
[4355]disorders. The groups are reportedly ce-ordinating
[4357]‘previously random plans to carry out extensive
[4359]Gestruction of industrial and agriculteural
[4360]installations and to provoke uprisings. Cubans and
[4361]other Latin American nationals as well as Havana
[4362]and Moscow-trained Peruvians are said to be
[4363]instrumental in this latest development.
[4365]Members of the Peruvian junta have expressed
[4366]serious concern over the internal situation
[4368]and hinted that they favor strong action. Although
[4369]constitutional guaranises have been: suspended-in a
[4370]fourth department ,and several Army units have been
[4371]moved into the areas of disorders, the junta has
[4372]taken no further action. It has requested riot
[4373]control equipment from the US and says it is
[4375]Yeady to embark on an anti-Communist program upon
[4376]assurance that the equipment is forthcoming.
[4377](SECRET)
[4379]SOURCE: EMB LIMA 612 and 613 (S); ATRA LIMA C-1 (Cc)
[4381]gan 63 DIA Intelligence Bulletin Page
[4383]ee (REVERSE BLANK)
[4384]SECRET—NO FOREIGN DISSEM
[4388]8
[4390]KW 50955 Docld: 32423736 Page 1i7
[4393]SECRET—-NO FOREIGN DISSEM
[4395]Peruvian Junta Makes Firm Anti-Communist Move
[4397]Continued Communist—incited disorders and an alleged
[4399]Havana~Moscow plan to take over the government >
[4401]prompted the military junta to suspend constitutional
[4402]guarantees in Peru and institute a nationwide state ‘
[4403]'of siége early on 5 January. Military commanders
[4404]assumed political control in their respective zones, :
[4405]and a reported 800 Communist Party leaders and pro- :
[4406]Communist subversives have been arrested. The :
[4407]Lima headquarters of several Communist and
[4408]Communist-front organizations, as well as their
[4409]publications, have been closed.
[4411]According to the Communist plan, subversive activity t
[4412]was to have been intensified between 15 and 20
[4413]January in all parts of Peru, with assaults on i
[4414]banking and commercial institutions, military |
[4415]garrisons, vital communications facilities, and i
[4416]universities. A clandestine radio station operating |
[4417]on the Bolivian border allegedly was to direct '
[4418]and co-ordinate this activity.
[4420]O -The junta has regarded members of the leftist but
[4421]non-Commmist American Popular Revolutionary '
[4422]Alliance (APRA) a greater danger than the
[4423]Communists and originally tended to blame them
[4424]for the disorders. There is no proof that APRA . ;
[4425]has been involved in anything but legititmate :
[4426]strike activity. Suspension of constitutional
[4427]guarantees would enable the junta to strike at
[4428]“APRA to discredit and weaken it before the scheduled
[4429]elections next June. (SECRET)
[4433]‘SOURCET BME LIMA 622 (S), 623 (LOU) and 624 (U)
[4435]a ; .
[4436]7 Jan 63 DIA Intelligence Bulletin Page 11
[4437]- (REVERSE BLANK )
[4439]SECRET — NO FORE! GN DISSEM
[4441]eo ee oo ce Te . Plo eee ” . woo
[4443]HW 50955 Docld: 32423736 Page 116
[4445]oo
[4446]A
[4447].
[4449]€R
[4450](Ae
[4451](o
[4453]=—=NO FOREIGN DISSEM
[4455]SUPPLEMENT
[4457]THE VENEZUELAN SITUATION
[4459]Y
[4461]A number of high-ranking Cuban leaders since the first of
[4462]the year have publicly called for revolution,in other Latin
[4463]American countries, with Venezuela singled out as a country
[4464]with top priority.
[4466]Coinciding with these appeais have been reports that the
[4467]Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV) planned to step up terrorist
[4468]activity to discredit President Betancourt before his US
[4469]visit. The recent incidence of terrorism, which has included
[4470]attacks on the US Chamber of Commerce office building and the
[4471]burning of Sears, Roebuck warehouses, is apparently part
[4472]of this campaign.
[4474]Involved in the current terrorism is the Armed Forces of
[4475]National Liberation (FAIN). The PALN, although purporting to
[4476]represent all of the opposition, includes some prominent
[4477]Communists and is emerging as a paramilitary force of the PCV
[4478]with its main strength in the Caracas area.
[4480]Guerrilla bands also operate in western Venezuela, but
[4482]there is no firm evidence that their activity is coordinated
[4484]with that in the Caracas area. Venezuelan army units, with
[4485]air support, have been used in a recent campaign against
[4486]these guerrillas.
[4488]The armed forces are generally capable of maintaining
[4489]internal security and of defending the nation's borders
[4490]against neighboring countries. The vast majority supports
[4491]conustitutionality and is leyal to the Betancourt government.
[4492]The armed forces would not ‘hesitate, however, to take over the
[4493]government in order to maintain order or to forestall a
[4494]Communist uprising. The armed forces were earlier greatly
[4495]frustrated over the government's inaction against Communist-—
[4496]instigated disorders. Betancourt's recent willingness to
[4497]take more vigorous action, however, coupled with the strong
[4498]support given the US during the Cuban crisis, has’ overcome
[4499]much of this dissatisfaction, and armed forces' support of
[4500]the government is greater now than it was six months ago.
[4502]The officer corps is generally free of Communist
[4503]penetration, although there has been some infiltration in the
[4504]Marine corps, two or three battalions having been involved
[4505]in leftist-led revolts during the spring of 1962. ~
[4506](SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
[4508]13 Feb 63 DIA Intelligence Bulletin Page (1)
[4509](REVERSE BLANK).
[4511]SECRET—~NO FOREIGN DISSEM
[4514]HY 50955 Docld: 32423736 Page 119
[4516]a Ces
[4518]SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM
[4520]C Extremist And Police Activities In Venezuela
[4521]Veneznela has been afflicted over the past several
[4522]_months with a rash of Castro-Communist terrorist actions.
[4523]Many incidents, involving shootings and robberies, are
[4524]connected with the Movement of the Revolutionary Left,*
[4525]the Venezuelan Communist Party, and the Armed Forces
[4526]of National Liberation -- the Castro-Communist group
[4527]ro, credited with the destruction at the Maracaibo oil
[4528]fields during the Cuban crisis. These activities are
[4529]probably designed to discredit and weaken the Bétan-
[4530]court Government.
[4532]i The police have demonstrated considerable proficiency
[4534]: in preventing major outbreaks and in acting rapidly
[4535]to arrest terrorists. They have rounded up extremists
[4536]responsible for the holdup and looting of a printing
[4538]- supply warehouse and the burning of the Dupont paint
[4539]warehouse and have captured the Communist leader of
[4540]guerrilla bands operating in the Falcon. area of
[4542]H northwestern Venezuela. (CONFIDENTIAL)
[4544]’ SOURCE: VARIOUS
[4547]HY 50955 Docld: 32423736 Page 1270
[4549]io
[4550]ie 50955 Docld: 32
[4552]ee eR i
[4554]SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM  ,
[4556]Venezuelan Communists Plan to Yucrease Violence
[4557]ES
[4559]As part of its terrorist campaign, the Venezuelan
[4560]Communist Party reportedly plans to mark the fourth
[4561]anniversary of Betanccurt's presidency on 13: February
[4562]by guerrilla bombings in the Caracas area. Other
[4563]Communists are to see to it that the capital is
[4564]flooded with propaganda that day. According to un-
[4565]confirmed reports, Venezuelan authorities have
[4567]charged the Castro government with ordering the recent
[4569]terrorism in both Venezuela and Colombia under an
[4570]extensive plan to create collective panic and insecurity
[4571]in both countries. Colombian military authorities’
[4573]have reportedly erawn up a plan to prevent terrorism
[4575]in Colombia's cities. :
[4577](SECRET) ~
[4579]SOURCE: TDCS 3/537,117 (S); FBIS (U)
[4581]——— eerie etn re EE tt be Ste a err
[4583]433736 Page 171
[4587]By 4
[4590]|
[4593]Leites/Mandelstam/DRAFT/14 Mar 63/fre os |
[4594]; . OO on. |
[4596]SUBJECT:  Alternetive US Public Posture on Subversion in Latin America
[4598]a. Although our public’ posture on subversion in Latin Anerlea may . oo nce
[4600]be 400 firmly esteblished for instant end radical revision, the following - i
[4602]‘enalysis is offered on the assummtion that sowe change in emphasis is
[4604]both possible and desirable, now or et soue time in the future.
[4606]‘2. Given the existence of a Commnisé sta zte, of.elther mnjor per- ; i
[4608]suasion, what is the likelthood that if will en. age in subversion toward —~,
[4610]ne eignboring states?
[4612]ay Potal. ALL experience of the pest forty years demonstrates | 4a
[4614]“that @ Communist state emanates subversion as the sun emanatés heat. a : 5
[4615]b, But let us be clear that two kinds of subversion ere involved:
[4617](1) Hardwere-centered - that is, fumds, guns, tools of _ bE
[4619]sabotage.
[4621]. (2) Egalitarian end libertarian idesils.
[4623]3, How mich does this fact of inevitable subversion raise the prob-
[4625]“epi ity cf Commnism spreading to target countries? |
[4627]" Subversion is never a a suffieléat condition - - vend frequently | - a pS
[4629]“not @ ne cessary ones : Aes
[4631]lr ‘Subversion is | really dangerous: to a 2 target Btate, there
[4633]Po 8 $a pes bE sonething seriously yrong in that atete, | (Prance's "Wasser:
[4635]Fellecy” of 1956; France embarked on the Suez adventure on the assumption |
[4637]ie in Algeria would magical ly
[4639]= - ‘thet if Wasser vere disposed of, the t+
[4640]\ .
[4641]diser Sean, ‘Although the game was not pleyed cut, few would dispute the
[4643]coriclusion thet France's assumption was wrong; or, for that matter,
[4645]Seem _QmARnn oO SENRTDTVE,
[4647]HW 50955 Docld: 32493736 Page i122
[4649]that France would have been in an even deeper worass if her military
[4651].
[4653]forces hed nanaged with the British to cemmy Cairo.)
[4656]AY How feasivle is it to control subversion at the source without
[4660]destroying the Commpniist State?
[4661]Usually st is infeasible to do so or the costs are prohibitive.
[4662]For instance, the costs of a protracted tight quarantine which
[4664]‘gould prevent the export bot’ of nerdvere-ortented en and idéa subversion,
[4666]oe
[4668]would be very high, even if the activity were aceepted by Cuba and the...
[4669]Soviet Union, This would mean inspecting every vessel, searching every
[4670]traveler, -forcing planes down for inspection, ete. We submit (a) that
[4671]“ideas would still be exported end (») that by so doing we would mesnify
[4672]the importance of Cuba beyond imagination, Te would becomes a kind of
[4673].. forbidden trait. ‘The analogy with prohibition in this country comes to
[4674]“mind, This course involves ean increment of prestige and lure to Cuba
[4676], . ‘vnten would be Likely “to outweigh the doubtless desirable diminution, in
[4677]- the expert of trained. Subversives and associated haravere, ‘Furthermore >
[4678]~ given the success of such an effore by the obvious Soviet ‘counter would be
[4679]: to use other: channels voick we. could not surveil without tWajor Rast-
[4681]; o West conzrontation. “the Cuben. su ubversion exp port orgmization might well
[4683]“move, to Hoscow, Progue endfor even Péiping, Therefore, to take & public
[4685]. “stance opponed: to cuban subversion srbthows having, resolyed on invasion
[4687]ds to be committed to a policy bound tc demonstrate US Impotence.
[4689]5. If we want to control eubversion at the source by déestroving
[4690]the Commnist State » Cuba, hov useful ls 16 for us publicly to emphasize
[4692] hardware-centered, subversion ss the reason?
[4694]to
[4696]‘SNCRED - SHISTUIVE”
[4699]HY 50955 Docld: 32423736 Page 123
[4706]Be For mony people outside of the US, even the export of
[4708]>. gubversion by foreé and sabotage also involves ideas and dedication, _
[4710]eS weil ad funds, arms, end other eouipment, (We, for example, are
[4711]not ashened of the Bay of Pigs expedition except that it failed.) 9
[4712]b, Usually attitudes toward viclent subversion depend on
[4714]ebtitudes toward thetarget, (Bxemcle: acts against Jimines, Trujillo .
[4716]aid not offend US/ wost of Latin Ax serten/ 1 most of the world; the paral-—
[4718]“Jel todey: Somoza, Ydigoras, Stroesser); We run the danger of felling
[4719]na into the USSR projection of the US as the "world gendarme." Subversion
[4721]“directed against the Dutch govermzent would outrage not only all Americans,
[4723]“'put also all non-Comnmist Europ ites legitimacy ts total, . But the
[4725]same can not be said for most Lt Yhe difference La decisive
[4727]and perhaps ‘sonetimes neglected.
[4729]d, We in the US tend %o Look at subve: reion in Letin America
[4730]fron the point-of-view of hardware. Bub a great deal of ‘she subversion
[4731]tn Latin norton is or at deast Sppears as iden-centered, not hardware-
[4733]conte ee The export of “armed sagresst "by, dedicated revolutionaries
[4735]: ds only a é port. of the ‘process, Another paz dart, watch is sat ‘Least as impor-
[4737]: tant, and probably more 80,. is the export ¢ of ‘propaganda, This, he ver,
[4739]to much ‘of the world, ‘tetudine Letined mores outside of ‘the oligerchies,
[4740]will appeer as an export of idens and ideals (perheps wrong, bub never-
[4741]7 theless 4deas). Our approach, then, tends to pass rather than meet the
[4743]SB | ot
[4745](BoP SECRET ~ BENSTTIVE
[4747]_@, Most people generally recognize thet when violent subversion -
[4750]i
[4751]p.
[4752]i
[4754]i
[4756]4
[4758]HY 50955 Docld: 32423736 Page 1274
[4761]SECHET -
[4763]“lating viewpoints, We are very close to putting ourselvee into the
[4765]- position of “the Tsarist gendarmes who tried to use brute foree against
[4766]the power: of idens. The tre ap is that we may seem thereby to be acknow~
[4767]edging thé decline and duminent fall of our own ideas.
[4769]cry . One consequence e of thie line of reasoning would be that,
[4770]Lf we ever find it necessary to invede Cubs, we‘ should do “$0 in stop
[4771]7 the firing squads," “to guarantee free elections," -~ but not to’ save
[4773]_Bonoza
[4775]6 ‘How feasible is it for us to comtrol both-kinds of subversion .
[4777]at. the ‘tanget rather then at ‘the source?
[4779]fully controlled subver sion except in t the dubious case of S. Vietnor
[4780]Even tn the: difficult ease of Greece » we succeeded aa a - combine tion of
[4782]military ond economic measured.
[4784]vig the problems» rather it is often practicable and also often the mos’
[4785]sirable way a ~ 2 Ce 7 ak :
[4786]’ Suppose ‘that. we decided to invade cuba to control Subversion
[4788]sen the result (Comes eases):
[4790]2, That ve. “vestored, the st eo agte Castro. |
[4792]be: . Theat ‘for. seesons of expedicney we try to maintain Castro's
[4793]yeforus” -+ 1.a., what many ‘Letinoes) ‘would régerd as "socialism."
[4794]e, That ve gave the Cuban peovle an chvious free choice, no
[4796](— —_ matter whet ensued. -
[4798]nism in the Western Hemisphere
[4800]How would the prospects for Cav
[4802]a
[4804]“ye affected? -
[4806]7
[4808]So AS _ semen  seonrderipersrst
[4810]Be is often feasible. This is how we have in fact succesé~ | a
[4812]2’, The point is not that this is always a fensible wey of hand-
[4814]m
[4815]HY 50955 Docld:32423736 Page 125
[4817]Casé Bs There would be strong popular Latin American support,
[4818]et
[4820]“.. $ome governmental outrage , but the prospects for Commmism would be
[4822]diminished,
[4824]Case C: Paradoxically, the reault would depend on what ensued,
[4826]because most Latin Americans do not trust~the, US: (and particularly would
[4829]be skeptical of "roe elections" if US seldiers were present }:~
[4831]oo * goNeLsTONS 2 | .
[4833]2, Conditions in most parte of Latin America ere such that sub-
[4835]‘version (oxen or > Bloo or - poth) is really dang Zerous,
[4837]2, Since this is 80, the US ‘ublic posture should not recomize
[4839]Mats; and. we should abstain frou public pronouncezents that subversion
[4841]is conceivably a casus belli,
[4842]4, The point-of-view Bet forth in this paper, insofar as it can
[4844]be made opefative, may tend to bring & fundamental eLignnent between the
[4846]“US publi ¢ posture and LA opinion,
[4848]ood, the us course . of ac tion towards ‘any Ll country has to veign the
[4849]catvant ages and dtendventoses, , in any Ge ven case at any given tine 7 or
[4851]gubversion eontrol () at gource or ()-2 at +! point of. impect.
[4853]5. Te satus principles. ‘vould apply af another comamist-oriented
[4855]goverment 1 were to: “eone to power tn any part of latin ‘America,
[4857]TOP s sucker - _ SINSTTIVE BO aa
[4859]Cese As Boomerang - we would almost certainly enhance the — : arn
[4861]‘prospects for Comumisn, Bg ea
[4863]Si
[4866]HY 50955 Docld: 32423736 Page 1276
[4868]a