[1]124-10276-10400 | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
[3]a ;
[4]OgTIONAL FORM NO, 10 4 5010-108 .
[5]t AY 1962 EDITION .
[6]GSA GEN, REG. NO, 27-
[7]. : : Assoc. Dir.
[9]; UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 6s Dep. AD Adm. —
[11]ok SECRETASCOPEL1 - Mr. J. B. Adams oe
[12], Memorandum & 1 - Mr, W. R. Wannall — Adnis.
[14]1- Mr. W. Cregar Comp. Syst,
[16]2
[18]. Ext. Affairs
[19]Sir, We R. Wannaliweelel DATE: 7/15/75 fee
[20]. 1.- Mr. F. S. Putman Ment.
[21]J U q E : 5 (ns, eflgn ,
[22]om — ; Sits 1 -Mr. W. A. Branigan md&tetyAre
[23]FROM +B. 8. partnansp SIN 1 - Mr. L. Fl Schwartz tsteoter
[24]: Ar Dn, Danton connate ho Br H.R. DNAliier Pe Ea
[25]/ ™ . . le Tbe ae
[26]SUREOMAENSTUDY 75 0 HITWIN 1s UN" LiSSEFIED ETCE"T Teining
[27]ES SET OLE Tolophone Rm, —
[29]Hr. W. R. Wannall, dated 6/26/75, captioned "Senstudy 45s
[31]: OtrectorsSec'y
[32]Reference is made to memorandum W. O. Cregar to DE scr
[33](ea h
[36]. x J
[37]SYNOPSIS: | Len mex db, =e
[39]The purpose of this memorandum is to summarize nity yy
[41](s) information in FBI files concerning [Israeli intelligence col- Ls)
[43]lection capabilities|in the United States, James J. Anyleton,
[44]former Chief, Countérintelligence Operations, Central Intelligence,»
[45]Agency (CIA), advised the FBI on 5/26/75 that he appeared before,
[46]the Senate Seléct Committee (SSC) and in response to questions?
[47]advised SSC_he only had secondhand and fragmentary information /.. .-
[48]concerning (Israeli capabilities to conduct intelligence collec ion)
[49]in the United States, including {nuclear information) He advised
[50]the SSC that questions concerning this matter might more properly
[51]2 be directed to the FBI. (Sensitive technical source coverage by
[52]"| the FBI of the &smacines SSyeaVyers mpOn=EDEeaeesr between
[53]February, 1969, and October, 1972, developed information showing
[54]that Angleton, during this period in his official capacity at
[55]CIA, had frequent personal liaison contacts with the ERVASSS
[56]isERe 1, Israeli Intelligence Service (IIS) representatives 1
[57]the exchange of extremely sensitive information, Currently the
[58]|FBI has no pending investigation involving Israeli intelligence
[59]collection capabilities in the United States. The most current
[60]information in FBI files concernins this matter involved the’
[61]investigation based on CIA information dated 11/14/68 concerning
[62]the establishment at the Embassy of Israel, Washington, D. C,, of
[63]an Israeli: technical intelligence network, Also under investi-
[64]sation durinz this period at New York City was an IIS attempt to.
[65]penetrate United Nations and official Arab estabtishents mel the
[67]use of live sources, FBI files 3 uiet cay ota dd ti
[68]periodically have operated in the Uist &y staf Loita Bees ia
[72]Lane.
[73]FIED BYSA 2ALM Jie
[74]SSIFY ON: 2X4:
[76]Si
[77]DECLAS
[81]i O,
[83]{-
[84]Le
[86]1 - [65-5870 (IIS) 6) PECag CONTINUED i (Ss)
[87]* : a ta
[88]MRL:med ‘- DETAILS - - | PAGE 2
[89]» * (9) | | sone aa “e
[91]a4 a.
[93]6 W228 ROUTE IN ENVELOPE oi
[96]sucner (Scori) (S)
[98]Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
[99]Re: Senstudy 75
[101]ACTION:
[103]None. For information.
[105]re 7 ono | p
[106]Pa’ |
[109]SECRET/ cori](¢)
[111]- la -
[114]| ; - secret Score \(s\
[116]Memorandum to Mr, W. R, Wannall
[117]Re: Senstudy 75
[119]DETAILS:
[121]According to referenced memorandum, James Angleton,
[122]former Chief, Counterintelligence Operations, CIA, advised the
[123]FBI on 6/26/75 that he had recently testified under oath without
[125]_ counsel before three Senators and staff members of the Senate
[126]~ Select Committee (SSC). He was questioned concerning his knowl- is)
[127]edge of {Israeli capabilities to conduct.intelligence collection)
[128]in the United States, including (nuclear information, Angleton
[129]stated he avoided any direct answers, advising that any knowledge
[130]he might have would be secondhand and fragmentary. He informed
[131]the SSC that questions concerning this matter might more properly
[132]be directed to the FBI,
[134]Senstive technical source coverage by the FBI of the era
[135]Embassy of Israel, Washington, D. C., between February, 1969, and aM
[136]October, 1972, determined that Angleton, in his official capacity
[137]at CIA, had frequent personal liaison contacts with Israeli
[138]Intelligence Service (IIS) representatives at the Embassy of
[139]Israel, Washington, D. C., involving the exchange of extremely
[140]sensitive information, This special relationship was confirmed
[141]by Angleton and other CIA officials during a meeting with an FBI
[142]representative on 4/3/69. At this meeting CIA representatives
[143]stated that this liaison with IIS_was known by the White House
[144]and the U, 8, State Department. (S) | JERK OY)
[146]At the present time the FBI has no pending investigation
[147]- involving Israeli intelligence collection capabilities in the
[148]United States, Cs) L
[150]The most current information in FBI files concerning
[151]this matter involved the investigation based on CIA information
[152]dated 11/14/68 concerning the establishment at the Embassy of
[153]Israel, Washington, D. C., of an Israeli technical intellicence
[154]network directed by Avraham Hermoni, Scientific Counselor. Hermoni,
[155]prior to his assignment as Scientific Counselor in Washington,
[157]we D. C., was involved in the Israeli nuclear weapons program. The
[158]activities and contacts of Hermoni and colleagues at the Embassy
[159]were investigated through 1972, The investigations of these
[160]individuals were discontinued as no specific information was.
[161]developed to indicate that they had acted unlawfully or outside
[163]the scope of their official duties, (§) ore ()(8)
[164]CONTINUED - OVER
[165]SECRET /SCOPE
[166]$)
[171]foe e oe
[172]secrEt/Scors](S) -
[174]Memorandum to Mr, W. R. Wannall
[175]Re: Senstudy 75
[177](
[179]During the period of these investigations it was
[180]determined that Embassy of Israel officials recruited U. &.
[181]scientists for employment in Israel, and extensive liaison was
[182]established with individuals within U. 8. scientific, political,
[183]academic and industrial communities. As an example, Hermoni
[184]developed close contact with Dr. Zalman Mordecai Shapiro, Director
[185]of Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corporation, Apollo,
[186]Pennsylvania, a firm which processes uranium 235 for nuclear
[187]reactors, (§
[189]. The basis of the discontinuation of the sensitive 1.
[190]technical source coverage on the Israeli Embassy in 1972 was 5 RKC
[191]aU, S. State Department directive. (5)
[193]During this period it was also determined that the
[194]IIS was attempting to penetrate the United Nations (UN) and
[195]Arab diplomatic establishments in New York.City, An informant
[196]of the New York Office, who previously engaged in intelligence
[197]activities in the Middle East for the Israelis between 1955 and
[198]1960 while working at the UN, was recontacted by Israeli intel-
[199]ligence in August, 1968, while visiting Israel. This informant
[200]had access at the UN to extremely sensitive information from the
[201]office of the Secretary General, Israeli intelligence had
[202]directed him to obtain and furnish, through a mail drop in
[203]Belgium, interoffice communications between the Secretary General
[204]of the UN and his undersecretaries, and information regarding
[205]the Middle East, particularly relating to Arab matters, (s)
[207]In May, 1968, another informant of the New York Office,
[208]who previously resided in the Middle East and was active in the
[209]Egyptian intelligence service, addressed a personal letter to
[210]General Dayan of Israel in which he expressed his opinion the
[211]Israelis should force the Egyptians to surrender and sign a peace
[212]treaty. Informant was subsequently contacted in New York City by
[213]an Israeli intelligence agent who furnished his name as "Michael"
[214]who showed informant a copy of his letter to Dayan, "Michael"
[215]subsequently “recruited" informant and furnished him a mail drop
[216]in Italy, "Michael" instructed informant to obtain employment at
[217]an Arab diplomatic establishment in New York City in order to (S
[219]CONTINUED - OVER
[221]secrEt/Score ](g)
[223]-o -
[227]oO SECRET SCoPE] (S)_
[229]Memorandum to Mr, W. R. Wannall
[230]Re: Senstudy, 75.
[232]furnish Israeli intelligence information on Arab moves in the
[233]Middle East crisis. During a meet in October, 1969,. "Michael"
[234]was surveilled to the Israeli Consulate where he met Paul Koren,
[235]IIS representative, The informant subsequently received
[236]instructions that in the event of an emergency he should call
[238]a specific telephone number and ask for "Paul." This telephone
[239]number was identified as being a private line located at the
[240]Israeli Consulate. (§
[242]Neither of the above-described operations is currently
[243]active at New York. (§
[245]Korem, during his assignment at the Israeli Consulate
[246]in New York, initiated liaison contact with the New York Office
[247]of the FBI. ©)
[249]FBIHQ currently has liaison with Menachem Navoth, IIS
[250]representative at the Embassy of Israel, Washington, D, C,
[251]During July, 1956, through December, 1956, while attending
[252]American University, Washington, D, C., and employed part time
[253]as a guard at the Embassy of Israel, Navoth was engaged in intel-
[254]ligence activities in the United States, Navoth met with an FBI
[255]double agent who was an employee of the U. S. State Department
[256]on several occasions and paid the double agent,$250.00 for
[257]cooperating with the Israelis, Gs)
[259]New York currently has liaison with the Israeli Consulate |S)
[261]FBI files also reflect that IIS representatives have
[262]periodically conducted operations in the United States similar
[264]to those described herein since 1948, (S)
[266]snoret (Score / |
[267]ene,