[1]Vie 104-10330-10 10330- 410083) "12025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
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[7]15 April 1997
[9]MEMORANDUM FOR: David G. Marwell
[10]; Executive Director
[11]Agsassination Records Review Board
[13]- SUBJECT: CIA Employees
[15](We request that thia memorandum be returned to CIA
[16]once the Review Board has completed its deliberations on the
[17]issues discussed below.)
[19]1.  (U) Iegye. The purpose of this memo is to relate
[20]CIA's concerns to the Review. Board regarding the release of
[21]the true names of CIA employees that appear in the JFK
[22]Collection and to present a proposal on how this problem
[23]might be addressed.
[25]I ctual fo] {e)
[27]2. (U) To date, approximately 600 true names of CIA
[28]employees have been identified in the JFK Collection. Some
[29]of these employees are important to the JFK story, and CIA
[31]‘will continue to work with the Review Board to release as
[32]many of these names as possible. Many names, however,
[33]appear only a few times in the entire JFK Collection and
[34]appear to add nothing to the historical record.
[36]3. (U) Under guidelines adopted by the Review Board
[37]on or about 20 March 1996, any names of CIA employees are
[38]presumptively released unless CIA provides specific evidence
[39]to the Review Board that harm to the national security or toa
[40]the employee would likely result from such release. Since
[41]these guidelines were adopted, it has become increasingly
[42]clear that the number of names at issue, and, in most cages,
[43]their tenuous connection to the JFK story, make this
[44]approach unworkable with regard to both CIA's obligation to
[46]CL BY: \ 2224130 J
[47]Cl: REASON: 1.5(c
[48]DECL ON: X1
[50]DRV FROM: HUM 4-82
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[57]Subject: CIA Employees
[59]protect national security information and the Review Board's
[60]duty to inform the public about the JFK assassination in a
[61]timely and accurate fashion. The task of locating and
[62]informing hundreds of former employees scattered all over
[63]the country and the world has’ been a formidable one. Some
[64]employees have contacted us to report their concerns about a
[65]"suspicious" letter purporting to be from CIA which they had
[66]received. It would not be surprising, therefore, if many
[67]former employees ignored the letter for similar reasons,
[68]even though they might have legitimate needs to protect
[69]their identities.
[71]4. (U) Contacting every named employee and collecting
[72]information on each of them to present to the Review Board
[73]will clearly take more time and effort than any of us had
[74]anticipated. This will have obvious ramifications for how
[75]and when the Review Board releases information to the :
[76]public. More importantly, the decision to publicly
[77]acknowledge employees who may have been living for over 30
[78]years under cover is a critical one that should be made not
[79]by default, but rather by careful planning and
[80]consideration.
[82]5. (U) Relevant to this discussion is the fact that
[83]the Review Board and CIA have recently agreed upon a policy
[84]for releasing true names of sources of intelligence
[85]information. It was agreed at that time that there would be
[86]a presumption of protecting source names; but in cases where
[87]a source was particularly important to the JFK story and
[88]there was no overriding national security interest, the name
[89]would-be released. Although the CIA recognizes that there
[90]are some sensitivities involved with: sources that do not
[91]apply to covert employees, there are also many legal and
[92]operational similarities, which are described herein, that
[93]justify similar treatment by the Review Board. As 1s
[94]further detailed in Section IV, CIA, therefore, proposes
[95]that the Review Board adopt a general policy of protecting
[96]employee names that appear in the Collection, with .
[97]exceptions for those individuals whom the Board believes are
[98]important to the JFK story.
[100]Le ratio
[102]6. (U) As both covert CIA employees and clandestine
[103]reporting assets are types of “human sources" of
[104]intelligence, many of the same laws apply. Although Section
[105]11 (a) of the JFK Act provides that, when the Act requires
[106]release of information, it takes precedence over all other
[107]lawe that would otherwise prohibit release, there are strong
[108]governmental national security interests in protecting the
[109]true names of CIA employees. CIA believes that it is
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[126]important for the Review Hoard to reconsider the laws which
[127]protect classified information, because they clearly reflect *
[128]a larger US Government policy to protect covert CIA
[130]employees from disclosure.
[132]7. (U0) By Executive order and statute, the President
[133]and Congress have made the Director of Central Intelligence
[134]responsible for protecting sources of intelligence. In hig
[135]Directive of 22 January 1946 that established the Central
[136]Intelligence Group, President Truman made the DCI
[137]responsible for protecting sources.- With the establishment
[138]of CIA, Congress also gave the DCI this responsibility. The
[139]National Security Act of 1947, Section 103(d) (3), codified
[140]at 50 USC §403(3) (c) (5), requires the DCI to protect
[141]intelligence sources from unauthorized disclosure. In
[142]addition, §403(3) (d)(2) requires the DCI to ensure that
[143]risks to the United States and those involved in the
[144]collection of intelligence through human sources are
[145]minimized.
[147]8. (U) Protecting the identity of individuals working
[148]for CIA, not only covertly but overtly as well, has been of
[149]particular concern to US lawmakers since the establishment
[150]of the Agency. For example, with Section 6 of the Central
[151]Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 50 USC §403g, Congress
[152]specifically exempted the CIA from the provisions of any law
[153]requiring the publication or disclosure of the organization,
[154]functions, names, titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel .
[155]employed by the Agency.
[157]a. (U) In 1980, Congress passed the Classified
[158]Information Procedures Act (CIPA) which sets out pretrial,
[159]trial, and appellate procedures for criminal cases involving
[160]or potentially. involving classified information. Working
[162]i with the Department of Justice and the courts, CIA has
[164]_guccessfully protected the names of CIA employees from
[165]public release even in criminal trials where there are
[166]heightened (i.e., constitutional) considerations favoring
[167]disclosure to the defendant of all government information
[168]relevant to the defense. CIPA allows for in camera ex parte
[169]hearings in.which the judge can rule on questions of
[170]admissibility and relevancy of classified information,
[172]_ including the identity of CIA employees who may have
[173]information pertaining to the defense, before it ia
[174]introduced either to the defendant, defense counsel, or in
[175]open court. In some cases involving CIA, the judge has
[176]ordered that CIA information be turned over to the defense,
[177]but only in some unclassified form such as in’a eummary. In
[178]other cases, judges have reviewed the classified information
[179]and ruled that the harm:to national security outweighs the
[181]3
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[189]Subject: CIA Employees
[191]defendant's legal rights to the information. In still other,
[192]cases, the defense was never notified that CIA even had
[193]information bearing on the case, ag the judge ruled that the
[194]mexe fact that CIA possessed this information was classified
[195]and outweighed any rights the defendant had. Moreover,
[197]under CIPA, the Attorney General has the authority to drop a
[198]prosecution in those cases where the risk to national
[199]security is too great.
[201]10. (UY) In 1982, Congress again acted to protect CIA
[203]employees’ by passing the Intelligence Identities Protection
[204]Act of 1982, 50 USC §421 that criminalizes the revelation of ~°
[206]; a covert employee or the identity of a source. This act
[208]subjects anyone who reveals information that identifies a
[209]“covert agent" to prosecution and provides up.to 10 years in
[210]prison and $50,000 in fines as punishment. This act
[211]specifically defines a “covert agent" as including “an
[212]officer or employee of an intelligence agency... .*
[214]11. (U) Most recently, President Clinton signed
[215]Executive Order 12958 on classified national security
[216]information that became effective in October 1995. Although
[217]it requires generally that agencies make greater
[218]declassification efforts than under the prior executive
[219]order, Executive Order 12958 affords human sources of
[220]intelligence information, which would include employees,
[221]extra protection from the declassification provisions.
[222]Under E.O. 12958, information that is over 25 years old and
[223]having historical value must be declassified within five
[224]years. However, information revealing the identity of a
[225]human source may continue to be protected.
[227]12. (U) The above federal laws show a long-standing
[228]practice by the US Government to protect CIA employees from
[229]disclosure to the public. In carrying out its statutory
[230]obligations, the Review Board should give serious weight to
[231]this policy and afford the protection of CIA. employees | a
[232]nigh priority. to a
[234]ZiL, Operational Considerations
[236]13. (U) For current CIA employees whose names may
[237]appear in the JFK Collection, the operational considerations
[238]for protecting their identity are similar to those for
[239]sources. Many of these employees have worked “under cover"
[240]for CIA. Cover is used to disassociate entire installations
[241]and offices from open linkage to intelligence activities, to
[242]enable intelligence personnel to enter and work effectively
[243]in foreign countries, to shield Agency employees and
[244]authorised clandestine activities from attention by hostile
[245]elements and from media exposure, to facilitate access to
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[255]Subject: CIA Employees
[257]certain individuals of intelligence interest, to prevent.
[258]embarrassment to host foreign governments, and to permit
[259]plausible denial of CIA's presence and activities in foreign
[260]countries.
[262]14.. (U) The ability to maintain one's cover is
[263]crucial to gathering intelligence. In either a "hostile" or
[264]“friendly“ country, should the local service become aware of
[265]who the CIA employees are, it would increase surveillance
[266]and make unilateral operations difficult if not impossible.
[267]In some countries, the local government tolerates the CIA
[268]presence and agrees to work with us as long as the local
[269]population ia not aware of the circumstances. Once it
[270]becomes known among the locals that certain US Government
[271]officials are actually CIA, pressure may be placed on the
[272]government to expel those Americans, disrupting liaison and
[273]diplomatic relationships. More importantly, covert
[274]employees and their families would face increased risk to
[275]their personal safety. Even in "friendly" countries, our
[276]employees could face some personal risks as well as risks to
[277]ongoing operations from extremists who may be living among
[278]an otherwise benign local population. In any of these
[279]cases, should a covert employee's cover be publicly
[280]compromised, that employee may have to be recalled from the
[281]field; and it could be difficult to place him elsewhere in
[282]an operationally and physically secure location. Thus,
[283]maintaining cover ig important to a case officer's
[284]effectiveness and to the continuation of a career with CIA.
[286]15. (S) Madntaining the confidentiality of cover is
[287]also important to cover providers. The Review Board will
[288]recall from prior briefings by the Agency that covert CIA
[289]employees, both in the United fvates and overseas, can work
[290]under "official" ay ate t), cover or "non-
[291]official" (e.g. (private compar - Disclosure of a
[292]covert employee wolld not only be official acknowledgment of
[293]the specific cover mechanism employed by CIA but would also
[294]negatively affect the governmental or business mission: of
[295]the cover provider, especially those who provide non-
[296]official cover. Acknowledgment of an employee who had been
[297]under non-official cover in a host country and possibly in
[298]other countries could have a negative impact on the
[300]der's business) interests and activitiea. It would also
[301]cast suspicion on that (provider's legitimat@ employees and
[302]their families. Further, exposure of cover providers could
[303]affect the recruitment and cooperation of such providers by
[304]the Agency and Intelligence Community.
[306]16. (S) Although the majority of names that appear in
[307]the Collection are retired CIA employees, the operational
[308]considerations in revealing their affiliation with CIA are
[310]- 5
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[319]Subject: CIA Employees
[321]not diminished. Similar to sources, many former employees ‘
[322]etill do not want their past affiliation with CIA revealed. —
[323]Perhaps their current friends, family, or employers are not
[324]aware of this past affiliation; and revelation of that fact
[325]could negatively affect personal and professional
[326]relationships. Some former employees still live overseas
[327]where a revelation of CIA affiliation poses risks to their
[328]personal safety. Other former employees travel overseas on
[329]business, where a revelation of a past CIA affiliation can
[330]threaten their business interests and personal safety.
[332]One example of an employee in this category is<Robert’:
[333]Fulton; whose name apparently appears only once in the
[334]Collection. (Fulton retired under (Department_of State? cover;
[335]he currently has a consultant business and frequently
[336]travels to(China: Release of his name would jeopardize not
[337]only his business but perhaps even his safety. A_similar ~
[338]example is Walter McCabe) who also retired under {State
[339]cover, He igs now working in(Russia\ and several/Eaat
[340](European! countries for a private firm. He does not want his
[341]name published, because it could be damaging to his current
[342]employer and his professional status.
[344]17. (8). Even if a former employee agrees to the
[345]revelation of his name in the JFK Collection, this might not
[346]be possible for other reasons. In some cases, officially
[347]acknowledging a covert employee could threaten ongoing
[348]operations on which that employee worked. Foreign nationals
[349]recruited by the employee and still providing information to
[350]the US Government would be at risk of exposure. Public
[351]acknowledgment could reveal the location of CIA stations
[352]where the employee worked throughout his career, including
[353]some not released by the Review Board. Any individuals who
[354]had substantial contact with a former employee overseas and
[355]may have believed they were legitimately providing
[356]information to a US corporate representative would be upset
[357]to learn they were, in fact, aiding the US Government.
[359]18. (U) Finally, the identification of case officers
[360]by their own service would have a chilling effect on
[361]prospective assets. Prospective assets would be unlikely to
[362]enter into a clandestine relationship with American
[363]intelligence if they believe that CIA does not protect even
[364]its own staff employees from public disclosure.
[366]iY. Proposal
[367]19. (U) In light of the foregoing, CIA believes it is
[368]important to work toward a general policy of protecting CIA
[369]employees identified in the JFK Collection, with exceptions
[371]made for those individuals who are important to the story of
[372]the assassination. The Agency proposes that in most cases a
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[384]te oe -
[386]' Subject: CIA Employees
[388]_ substitution: for the true name be used. If the Review Board
[389]is concerned about tracking particular employees throughout
[390]the records, a particular identifying substitution can be
[391]used for a particular employee.
[393]‘-
[395]° 20. (S) CIA believes that this approach will not
[396]undermine the Review Board's. obligations under the JFK Act.
[397]A review of the JFK Collection reveals that approximately 484
[398]‘of the 600 names appear only once in the entire Collection.
[399]In such cases, it is difficult to see how the individuals'
[400]identity can add anything of significance to the historical -
[401]record; yet there may be some security concerns still
[402]associated with these individuals. For example,(Arthur Hl
[404]retired under cover and is currently living in
[406]Europe. When the CIA notified him that his name appeared in
[407]the JFK Collection and was subject. to public release, he
[408]told CIA that he was opposed to having hig name released and
[410]- believed such a release could pose personal and security
[411]problems. Furthermore, he could not understand why his name
[412]even appeared in the Collection, since he had no
[413]recollection of being involved in anything related to the
[414]assassination.
[416]21. (8) With regard to the approximately 500 names
[417]that appear more than once in the Collection, the vast
[418]majority of these individuale played almost no role in the
[419]JER story. One example of this is former DO officer
[420]exander Brasko} His name appears approximately. 20-30
[421]times. in the Collection git ply because he signed off on name
[422]trace requests. Mr. ‘was a covert CIA employee and
[423]retired under cover. The public release of his name would
[424]provide the public with no additional significant
[425]information about JFK. (Tom: Flores) is another example of a
[426]covert CIA employee whose name appears in the Collection but
[427]has’ little or no connection to the JFK story. (Floreéeg
[428]retired under cover, is living in South America, and objects
[429]to the release of his name. Mr. recent letter to
[430]CIA igs also attached for your convenience.
[432]22. (8) The Agency, of course, recognizes that some
[433]namea may be particularly important to the JFK story
[434]regardless of how frequently or infrequently they appear in
[435]the Collection. One such example is former COS Mexico
[436]Winston Scott who CIA has acknowledged as a CIA employee.
[437]In such cases, the CIA will continue to work with the Review
[438]Board for an appropriate regolution. The CIA proposes that
[439]the Review Board and its staff identify those individuals
[441]' whom it believes are important to the JFK story and whose
[442]names should be released to the public. These names would
[443]carry a presumption of release unless specific evidence is
[444]provided to the Review ‘Board that harm would likely result
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[458]Subject: CIA Employees
[460]from euch release. The CIA will conduct the appropriate ,
[461]searches to determine whether release would pose national
[462]security concerns for the US Government or personal safety
[463]concerns for the individual. In this way, CIA and the Review
[464]Board can concentrate their efforts on individuals who are
[465]significant figures in the JFK story, expediting the review
[466]of the sequestered collection.
[468]23. (U) It is our hope that the CIA and the Review
[469]Board can agree on and work out a mutually acceptable policy
[470]. regarding the identity of CIA employees that will not
[471]- undermine the important principle of protecting those who:
[472]work covertly for the US Government. My staff and I are
[473]ready to discuss this matter with you at your convenience.
[475]se
[477]General Counsel
[479]Attachment
[483]SECRET
[485]13-0000
[487]ay
[489]"APR 1S '97 @5:@3PM USGOVERNMENT
[493]SECRET
[494]Subject: CIA Employees
[496]DCI/OGC/LD/ARECiprianD 76124 (10 Apr 97)
[498]O0GC-97-S50971
[500]Distribution:
[501]Original - Addressee
[502]Gc
[504]1 -.
[505]1 - Lit File - LDG00021
[506]1 - LCC Signer
[508]1 - RDC - FYI
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[512]OGC Registry
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[522]17 March 1997
[524]a idee
[526]Ms. Beth Mills ———
[528]Dear Ma, Mill, co, a _ SS |
[530]Your letter of 4 March was delivered to me on 10 March, and this reply will
[531]. be sent via the same channel. _
[532]L wigh to go on record as demanding that my name not be released in ANY
[533]| document disclosed concerning the Kennedy assassination.
[535]First, I shall describe my present circumstances; and thereafter I will address
[536]the legal points in the legislation, .
[538]I retired in 1974 fn a clandestine status, using a State Department oover,
[539]which has worked reasonably well since ther, I reside in Caracas, Venezuela. This
[540]city (and the entire country) is still populated with Communists and ex-Communists
[541]- who formed part of the ‘Marxiat.conspiracy to overthrow the democratically elected .
[542]‘Governments in the 19608 and 70s. Many of these persons are. now members of
[543]Congress and a few are in the President's Cabinet, During my service in Venezuela, |
[544]as COS, I maintained liaison with civilian and military officers, during which time I
[545]worked. with these ta overcome the guerilla offensive, and ‘to combat the
[546]Communist Party after it accepted "pacification." I left in 1972 and went to
[547]“Vietnam, from which I-returned to Venezuela as a private citizen. Because of my |
[548]‘wife's long employment and friendships, we are as closely connected with the 4
[549]j Jewish Community ¢ as two Christians can be.
[551]5 Given my somewhat exposed position as COS, my true affiliation was known
[553]|| to a number of important Venezuelan Government officials. In any event, soon after
[555]| my retum, I was informed by the Venezuelan Government that an important
[556]1 | Communist leader had learned of my return, and that “I was living in Urbanizacion
[558]| Miranda (a small and somewhat isolated Caracas suburb) and that I was training
[559]\Fight wing paramilitary personnel, " They were right about where I Hved, but /:
[561]SNE GREER wena
[563]soon a: OTN ye 5
[566]13-00000
[568]_ APR 15°97 @5:G4PM USGOVERNMENT
[570]sed Boy Scouts with right wing paramilitary personnel." I worked as a
[571]"| volunteer leader for the Boy Scouts of America and the Venezuelan Scout
[572]| Association from 1974 to about 1991,
[574]In any event, the Venezuelan Government was sufficiently concerned about °
[575]the matter, that it offered me a group of bodyguards. I turned down the offer, and
[576]‘asked them to provide me with an automatic pistol for my protection. I atill have
[577]that pistol.
[579]The country has changed somewhat since that time. There are still a number
[580]| of underground radical groups who resisted pacification, and try to foment violence
[581]wherever possible. Along the Colombian’ border they appear to be linked up with
[582]| the Colombian ELN and. FARC. In addition to these, the country has been.
[583]infiltrated by radical Moslem movements. A Cuban Embassy, with its usual
[584]collection of intelligence officers, is located in Caracas. Further Iran, Iraq and
[585]Lebanon also maintain diplomatic posts here, and probably support the Muslim
[586]extremists,
[588]Under present circumstances, my cover sr has prevented me from coming to the
[590]attention of these people. However, I feel vory strongly that ifmy name is released,
[592]I will again become a potential target for these and other persons who wish to
[594]| embarrass the United States. and/or adversely affect U.S./Venezuelan relationships.
[596]) I was recently decorated by the Venezuelan Président for my contributions to ) good
[597]Venezwelan/Americatt rélations.
[599]x‘
[601]Thave no intention of leaving Venezuela under any ciroumstatioes.
[603]Any connection I may ever have had with the investigation of President
[604]Kennedy's assassination, was highly peripheral. Any doouments which may be
[605]feleased, could include my job ttle (rather than my name) without reduoing’ the
[606]value of said documents.
[608]Since I will be quite dead in 25 years, I cannot object to my name being
[613]13-00000
[615]. maFR, 15, We. AS UAGLM USGOVERNMENT -_ . p,g:1314
[616]e
[618]released at that time.
[620]Although not mentioned as an option in your letter, I would like to be
[621]permitted to review the doouments containing my name which you are being obliged
[622]to release. When I retired, J gave up all links with fornier sources. One of these
[623]‘popped up in the New. York Times last week. Some others’ may still be alive, and in
[624]need of protection, although as‘I iecall, none had any useful data concerning the
[625]| assassination. If the sources are to be exposed, I feel very strongly that they are
[627]entitled to all the protection we can afford them. I will be in the Washington D.C,
[628]‘| area in November 1997, and would be willing to review these documents.
[630]In terms of the provisions y you cite for exceptions in your letter, (A) I consider
[631]| myself a person (Agent?) whose identity currently requires protection.
[633]The cover I am using, ‘provided by the State Department, is (B) an
[634]intelligence method whioh i is currently utilized.
[636]The public disclosure of my name as part of the assassination record (C.3)
[638]‘| could reasonably be. “expeoted to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal
[639]privacy, and that invasion i is so substantial that it outweighs the public interest. 1
[640]cannot resist: defining the public i interest in this matter aa “public morbid curiosity."
[642]! The publio disclosure’ of my name'as part of the assassination record (Cc. 4)
[644]. would probably contpromise the. existence of att. understanding of confidentiality
[646]currently requiring’ ‘proteotion’ between & governimerit agent ‘and a cooperating
[648]| individual or foreign government, and public disclosure would be so harmful that it
[650]outweighs the public’ interest. I was COS in Bolivia when the assassination
[652]occurred. I was in close touch with the Bolivian Government security chief at that
[654]time, and with the Minister of Interior, and we probably interchanged data on the
[656]. | murder, although they could provide nothing useful. Also, the Station was probably
[658]|. tasked to query all of our sources on the matter, again with negative results. The
[659]g revelation of my name and the identitles of Haison contacts and unilateral sources
[661]ve would not only imperil me, but would also embarrass the Bolivian Government, and
[663]a Bs
[665]g could endanger current activities of the Agency in that country. I do not recall
[666]| whether in my subsequent. assignment as Chief of the Cuban Task Force, any
[667]| mention of the assassination came up. However, if it did, revelation of my name
[668]| could not only imperil those agents of the time who survive, compromise our
[670]operational methods, but also, make 1 me a prime target ‘for the Cuban intelligence
[672]| service,
[674]_ None of the above should be construed as a waiver of my rights, or those of
[675]my heirs, to take legal action to prevent the release of my name and/or to collect
[676]damages, both civil and punitive, resulting from the release of my name. There
[677]exists an.implicit contract between me and the Ageticy dating from when I accepted
[679]‘the inconveniences of a clandestine retirement, The Agency undertook to provide a
[680]i LASTING cover for me. It should be noted that this implicit contract predates
[681]Public Law 102-526 by some 18 years. Naturally, I am going to inform my legal
[683]advisor of this entire matter. I suggest that you pull together a set of all documents
[685]“pertaining to my retirement, so.that-these can be made available for his review.
[687]I refrain from comment about a U.S. Congress that would pass such a bill,
[689]‘and a President who would fail to veto it. (You of course, are not te-blame.) The.
[690]_ New York Times and the Washington Post, will, of course, be drooling to get their
[692]hands on your papers. I don't envy you because this is an extremely complicated
[693]matter, Unfortunately, the release on a lot of non-pertinent information will go a
[694]long way to reveal the scope and role of the Agenoy in Latin America to any analyst
[696]h . who wants to review the material and piece it together. I believe that this role isnot =|
[697]@ significantly different today than it was when President Kennedy was murdered. +.
[698]: _V Only the targets and the gadgets have changed, ae
[700]Sincerely yours,
[702]Thomas J. Flores
[706]Paett 12 20 Dh USGUVERNIMEN | P 5Y- 14/14
[707]. ve Loe . e :