[1]177-10002-10105 | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
[3]JFK Assassination System’ _ Date: 3/6/2018
[4]Identification Form
[5]Agency Information
[6]AGENCY: LBJ
[7]RECORD NUMBER: _ 177-10002-10105
[8]RECORD SERIES: NSF, CF, USSR, VOL. 21, BOX 226
[9]AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
[10]Document Information
[11]ORIGINATOR: CIA
[12]FROM:
[13]TO:
[14]TITLE: SPECIAL REPORT--WEEKLY REVIEW
[15]DATE: 09/13/1968 is
[16]PAGES: 11
[17]SUBJECTS :
[18]INTELLIGENCE REPORT
[19]DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[20]CLASSIFICATION: Top-Secret
[21]RESTRICTIONS: Consulted;-Mandatory Review Material
[22]CURRENT STATUS: — Redact
[23]DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 07/06/1994
[24]OPENING CRITERIA :
[25]COMMENTS: DOC. #57
[29]TOP SECRET
[31](Security Classification)
[33]CONTROL NO, SC. so. OO78togB 1B)
[35]OF
[37]REMARKS:
[39]FROM: NAME. ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO.
[41]COMINT
[43]Channels
[45]Access to this document will be restricted to
[46]those approved for the following specific activities:
[49]NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
[50]Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
[52]TOP SECRET
[54](Security Classification)
[60]Top Secret
[62]No Foreign Dissene
[64]DIRECTORATE OF ;
[65]INTELLIGENCE ;
[67]The Developing Soviet Submarine Force
[69]Special Report
[71]WEEKLY REVIEW
[73]Top Secret
[76]a
[78]13 September 1968
[80]Handle via Comint Channels SC No.00787/68B
[82]oof,
[84]os,
[86]TOP SECRET
[88]SPECIAL REPORTS are supplements to the Current Intelli-
[89]gence Weeklies issued by the Office of Current Intelligence.
[90]The Special Reports are published separately to permit more
[91]comprehensive treatment of a subject. They are prepared by
[92]the Office of Current Intelligence, the Office of Economic Re-
[93]search, the Office of Strategic Research, and the Directorate of
[95]_, Science and Technology: Special Reports are coordinated as
[97]appropriate among the Directorates of CIA but, except for the
[98]normal substantive ‘exchange with other agencies at the working
[100]‘level, have not ‘been: coordinated outside CIA- unless specifically
[102]indicated.
[103]WARNING
[105]The SPECIAL REPORT contains classified information affect-
[106]ing the national security of the United States within the mean-
[107]ing of the espionage laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794,
[108]and 798,
[110]THIS DOCUMENT MUST BE KEPT IN COMMUNICATIONS
[111]INTELLIGENCE CHANNELS AT ALL TIMES
[113]The SPECIAL REPORT is to be seen only by US personnel es-
[114]pecially indoctrinated and authorized to receive COMMUNICA-
[115]TIONS INTELLIGENCE information; its security must be
[116]maintained in accordance with COMMUNICATIONS INTELLI-
[117]GENCE REGULATIONS.
[119]No action is to be taken on:any COMMUNICATIONS INTEL-
[120]LIGENCE which may be contained herein, regardless of the ad-
[121]vantages to be gained, unless such action is first approved by the -
[122]Director of Central Intelligence.
[124]DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
[126]The SPECIAL REPORT MUST NOT BE RELEASED TO FOR-
[127]EIGN GOVERNMENTS and must be handled within the frame-
[129]work of specific dissemination control provisions-of DCID 1/7.
[131]GaRoup 1
[132]Exeluded from automatic
[133]downgreding and
[134]declassificotion
[136]TOP SECRET
[138]C C
[139]'  - TOP SECRET TRINE
[141]No Foreign Dissem
[143]THE DEVELOPING SOVIET SUBMARINE FORCE
[145]The Soviet naval leadership, commanding the .
[146]world’s largest submarine fleet, is undertaking a pro-
[147]gram to increase the operational capabilities of the
[148]force. Four new classes of submarines—three tor-
[149]pedo-attack classes and a new Polaris-type missile-
[150]firing submarine—are in production, and several older
[151]classes are being improved and reconditioned. In ad-
[152]dition, since the early 1960s the range, number, and
[153]duration of open ocean patrols by Soviet submarines
[154]have been generally increasing.
[156]| TOP SECRET TRINE
[157]. Pagel. SPECIAL REPORT 13 Sep 68
[160]TOP SECRET TRINE
[162]No Foreign Dissem
[164]Fleet Modernization
[166]The new Polaris-type sub-
[167]marine--designated the Y-class--
[168]carries 16 SS-N-6 ballistic mis-
[169]siles with ranges ofsome 1,500
[170]miles. These 425-foot-long sub-
[171]marines. are currently being built
[172]at Severodvinsk in the Soviet
[173]Northern Fleet area. The first
[174]units should be operational soon
[175]and 40 or more could be in serv-
[176]ice by the mid-1970s,
[178]‘Two new classes of nuclear-
[179]powered attack submarines are
[180]also being built--one at Lenin-
[181]grad shipyard and the other at
[182]Gorkiy. At least one of these
[183]classes probably was specifically
[184]designed to engage enemy subma-
[185]rines. A third class of attack
[186]submarine is under construction
[187]in the Soviet Far East; its means
[188]of propulsion is not yet known. -
[190]In addition to these new con-
[191]struction programs, the Soviets
[192]are. reconditioning many of their
[193]Older classes of submarines.
[194]There are no indications that
[195]the Soviets intend to introduce
[196]a new class of cruise-missile
[197]submarine, however, and con-
[198]-struction of these submarines
[199]is apparently ending as the
[200]Soviets approach their desired
[201]force level for these anticar-
[202]rier units. :
[204]Operational Implications
[206]Strategic targets in the
[207]middle of the US are beyond
[208]reach of the 650-mile SS-N-5
[210]carried on the older ballistic-
[211]missile submarines, but are
[212]within range of the SS-N-6
[213]carried on the Y-class. By
[215]the mid-1970s, Soviet ballis-
[216]tic-missile submarines may
[217]present a strategic threat com-
[218]parable to that of the US Polaris
[219]fleet and be able to operate with
[220]less risk of detection than
[221]earlier classes of Soviet mis-
[222]sile submarines.
[224]The introduction of the new
[225]classes of attack submarines
[226]suggests that the Soviets are
[227]attempting to come to grips
[228]with the Polaris threat. The
[229]Soviets apparently are counting
[230]on their submarines to help
[231]blunt that threat by attempting
[232]to destroy Polaris submarines
[233]before they can launch their
[234]missiles.
[236]Soviet ballistic-missile
[237]submarines frequently patrol
[238]within range of US Polaris
[239]bases and could destroy a num-
[240]ber of Polaris submarines by
[241]attacking these bases. The
[242]new Soviet attack submarines
[243]may be able to locate and de-
[244]stroy a few Polaris submarines
[245]in confined waters through which
[246]those submarines frequently
[247]must pass, such as the Irish
[248]Sea or the Sicilian Straits.
[249]Combined operations with new
[250]Soviet surface ships, such as
[251]the Moskva-class helicopter car-
[252]riers and Kresta~ and Kashin-
[253]class guided-missile ships,
[254]will provide some antisubmarine
[255]capability in the ocean approaches
[257]TOP SECRET TRINE
[259]Page 2
[261]SPECIAL REPORT
[263]13 Sep 68
[266]C C
[267]TOP SECRET.TRINE
[269]The Soviet Submarine Force
[271]o in
[274]x aS ¥
[276]= g Cy a
[278]Nuclear-powered
[280]Ballistic missile 9 (t] 0 1
[282]Cruise missile 16 0 0 17
[284]Attack 14 0 0 4
[285]Diese!-powered
[287]Ballistic missile 18 1 1 8
[289]Cruise missite 11 3 5 6
[291]Attack 91 64 32 65
[293]© Fleet Headquarters
[295], BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES
[297]Y-CLASS
[299]Nuclear powered :
[300]Carries 18 SS-N-6 missiles in hull
[301]425 feet long
[303]Now being deployed
[305]H-CLASS
[307]Nuclear powered
[309]Carries three SS-N-4 or SS-N-5missiles in sail
[310]380 feet.long
[312]9 in service
[314]G-CLASS
[316]Diesel powered
[318]Carries three SS-N-4 or SS-N-5 missiles in sail
[319]320 feet long
[321]22 in service
[323]Z-CONVERSION CLASS
[325]Diesel powered
[327]Carries two SS-N-4 missiles in sail
[328]295 feet long
[330]6 in service
[332]SECRET
[333]NO FOREIGN DISSEM
[337]TOP SECRET TRINE
[340]C
[342]C
[344]TOP. SECRET TRINE
[346]No Foreign Dissem
[348]CLASSES OF SOVIET SUBMARINES
[350]Nuclear Powered Diesel Powered
[352]Ballistic Missile Y. Ballistic Missile G
[353]H 2 Conversion
[354]Cruise Missile E-7 Cruise Missile J
[355]E-11 W Conversion
[356]Attack N Attack F
[357]Vv Zz
[358]Cc R
[359]One New Class ‘’B”’ Ww
[360]SECRET
[362]NO FOREIGN DISSEM
[363]" RELEASABLE TO UK AND CANADA
[365]91870 8-68 CIA
[366]to the USSR and in the Mediter-
[367]ranean,
[369]Deployment Patterns
[371]Soviet submarines are as-
[372]signed to each of the four
[373]fleets--Northern, Pacific, Bal-
[374]tic, and Black Sea. Because
[375]of the restricted exits from
[376]the Baltic and Black Seas, how-
[377]ever, most of the missile-
[378]equipped units and all of the
[379]nuclear-powered units are based
[380]in ice-free ports of the Kola
[381]Peninsula (Northern Fleet) and
[382]in the Pacific Fleet.
[384]The Soviets are apparently
[385]trying to reduce the dispropor-
[386]tion between the two major
[387]fleets--the Northern and the
[388]Pacific. Although the North-
[389]ern Fleet still holds the favored
[390]position, several nuclear sub-
[391]marines have been transferred
[392]under the polar ice to the Pa-
[393]cific and a number of modern
[394]diesel units have joined the
[396]Northern Sea Route convoy in
[397]past summers.
[399]The Baltic Fleet is re-
[400]sponsible for protecting Soviet
[401]coastal waters and for furnish-
[402]ing diesel submarines for pa-
[403]trols off the US Polaris base
[404]at Holy Loch. Moscow has also
[405]begun sending Baltic Fleet sub-
[406]marines to the Mediterranean to
[407]take some of the strain off the
[408]Northern Fleet, which has been
[409]furnishing most of the units
[410]operating there. There are no
[411]nuclear submarines in the Bal-
[412]tic, and the few cruise-missile
[413]units there operate in coastal
[414]waters,
[416]The Montreux Convention
[417]of 1936 places severe limita-
[418]tions on the passage of Soviet
[419]submarines through the Turkish
[420]Straits. Black Sea - based
[421]submarines can pass into the
[422]Mediterranean only if they are
[423]headed for another fleet area
[424]for repairs. For this reason,
[425]only older diesel units are
[426]based in the Black Sea. Once
[427]in the Mediterranean, however,
[428]these units operate there for
[429]about 60 days on their way to
[430]and from Baltic shipyards.
[432]Patrol Activity
[434]Most of the increase in
[435]the level of Soviet submarine
[436]operations during the past year
[437]is attributable to the station-
[438]ing of a force of six to ten
[439]submarines--mostly diesel attack
[440]units--in the Mediterranean since
[442]TOP SECRET TRINE
[444]Page 4
[446]SPECIAL REPORT 13 Sep 68
[449]oo
[452]TOP SECRET TRINE
[454]No Foreign Dissem
[456]June 1967; at least one nuclear
[457]unit is usually included in
[459]the force. There was an over-
[460]all increase of nearly 20 per-
[461]cent in the number of Soviet
[462]submarine patrols beyond local
[463]fleet operating areas in 1967,
[464]but if the trend noted so far
[465]this year continues, fewer sub-
[466]marines will deploy in 1968,
[467]Patrols this year have been of
[468]longer duration, however,
[469]thereby resulting in more sub-
[470]marine time at sea.
[472]Soviet
[473]Submarine Deployments
[474]1965-1968
[475]Total 116.
[476]“Total 102
[478]1965"
[480]NORTH Loa BALTIC
[482]Number of deployed units, not including routine interfleet transfers or fleet exercise participants.
[484]91946 9-6B CIA
[486]No confirmed patrols by
[487]H-class ballistic-missile units
[488]have been noted since late 1966,
[489]and there have beenperiods dur-
[490]ing the past year when no Soviet
[491]ballistic-missile submarines
[492]have been on patrol in either
[493]the Atlantic or Pacific. The
[494]G-class is the only such sub-
[495]marine now being used for mid-
[496]ocean patrols,
[498]Conversion and overhaul
[499]of first-generation ballistic-
[501]Total 138
[503]Total 114
[505]PACIFIC
[507]TOP SECRET TRINE
[509]NO FOREIGN DISSEM
[510]RELEASABLE TO UK AND CANADA
[512]TOP SECRET TRINE
[514]Page 5
[516]SPECIAL REPORT 13 Sep 68
[519]C
[521]TOP SECRET TRINE
[523].No Foreign Dissem
[525]missile submarines and the re-
[526]assignment of their crews to
[528]new Y-class units have probably
[529]been at least partly responsible
[530]for the decline in ballistic-
[531]missile submarine activity. In
[532]addition, the loss of a G-class
[533]submarine in the Pacific in mid-
[534]March apparently resulted in a
[535]three-month standdown in patrols
[536]by these units. That incident
[537]probably caused the Soviets to
[538]implement new safety measures.
[540]Moreover, as the Soviets prepare ~
[542]to deploy new Y-class submarines,
[543]they may be reassessing the
[544]military value of sending their
[545]diesel-powered units into the
[546]mid-Atlantic and mid-Pacific
[547]patrol areas,
[549]Until mid-1967, E-class
[550]cruise-missile submarines con-
[551]ducted regular patrols in the
[552]Atlantic. Since June 1967,
[553]patrol activity in the Atlantic
[554]has diminished; however, a
[555]series of single E-class units
[556]has been almost continuously
[557]present in the Mediterranean.
[558]Some of the submarines on re-
[559]cent patrols have also engaged
[560]in other activities such as
[561]hydroacoustic research and
[562]support of naval training ma-
[563]neuvers. J-class diesel-powered
[564]cruise-missile submarines ap-
[565]parently have been used primarily
[566]for peripheral defense. in
[567]late 1966, the first of these
[568]units to venture into the
[569]Mediterranean broke down and
[570]limped back to its base in the
[571]Northern Fleet. Some of the
[573]being retired from service.
[575]older W-class units are equipped
[576]to launch cruise missiles, but
[577]these, too, operate only near
[578]Soviet shores and probably are
[580]Recent patrols by diesel
[581]attack submarines in the Medi-
[582]terranean have been extended
[583]to as long as six months through
[584]the use of Arab and Yugoslav
[585]ports for upkeep, reprovision-
[586]ing, and crew recreation. Pre-
[587]vious patrols by Soviet sub-
[588]marines in the Mediterranean
[589]had lasted less than two months.
[591]Last year, a submarine
[592]support group operated for nearly
[593]six months off the west coast
[594]of Africa in a program to study
[595]the feasibility of submarine
[596]operations from a floating base.
[597]The group consisted of a sub-
[598]marine tender and a missile
[599]supply ship, and was assisted
[600]briefly by a survey vessel and
[601]two intelligence collection
[602]ships. Several other ships
[603]provided logistic support. Four
[604]submarines participated in the
[605]group's operations. One of
[606]these--a nuclear-powered unit--
[607]was away from home waters for
[608]more than six months.
[610]Once the new ballistic-mis-
[611]sile submarines go on patrol,
[612]the Soviets may make greater
[613]use of such floating support bases
[614]on the high seas. Floating base
[615]ships would be vulnerable in
[617]TOP SECRET TRINE
[619]Page 6
[621]SPECIAL REPORT
[623]13 Sep 68
[625](TOP SECRET TRINE™
[627]Soviet
[628]*, Submarine-Launched
[629]a Missiles
[632]( 1500 nm range
[634](Cavers al\US!
[636]TOP SECRET TRINE
[638]US OPERATIONAL WARHEAD
[639]DESIGNATION 10C RANGE WEIGHT REMARKS
[641]CRUISE SS-N-3 1961 250 NM 1,000- Carried by E-\ and E-Il-
[642]MISSILE 2,000 Ibs. class nuclear submarines
[643]and by J-class diesel units.
[644]A few W-class didsel torpedo
[645]attack submarines were modified
[646]to carry this missile. Surface
[647]launched.
[649]BALLISTIC §S-N-4 1960 300 NM About Carried by most G-class
[650]MISSILES 2,200 Ibs diesel submarines and by
[651]some H-class nuclear units.
[652]A few Z-class diese! torpedo
[653]attack submarines were
[654]modified to carry this missile.
[655]Surface launched.
[657]SS-N-5 1963 650 NM 1,600- Carried by most H-class
[658]2,400 Ibs nuclear submarines and by
[659]some G-class diesel units.
[660]Underwater launched.
[662]SS-N-6 Probably 1,500 NM 700- Probably intended for the
[663]1968 1,700 Ibs new Y-class nuclear sub-
[664]SECRET marines. These 16-tube
[665]NO FOREIGN .« Polaris-type units first
[666]DISSEM went into service in
[667]mid-1968.
[669]TOP SECRET TRINE
[672]TOP SECRET TRINE
[674]No Foreign Dissem
[676]wartime, but ballistic-missile
[677]submarines operating from such
[678]‘bases south of the Azores, for
[679]example, could remain on-station
[680]off the US coast longer ‘than
[681]could units deployed from the
[682]Kola area. Cruise-missile and
[683]attack submarines would also
[684]profit from mid-ocean bases,
[685]reducing the number of. long
[686]transits to and from patrol
[687]areas.
[689]The USSR recently has
[690]achieved several technological
[691]advances in submarine support.
[692]New and more powerful radio
[693]transmitters serving submarines
[694]on distant patrols are now in
[696]operation in the USSR. A navi-
[697]gation satellite system cur-
[698]rently being tested may permit
[699]Soviet submarines to determine
[700]their positions with greater
[701]accuracy even inthe most un-
[702]favorable weather and sea con-
[703]ditions. Hydroacoustic re-
[704]search ships have conducted
[705]surveys in the past few years
[707]in areas of the Atlantic and
[708]Pacific where the Soviets might
[709]hope to detect Polaris subma-
[710]rines and in the Canary Island
[711]Basin and Philippine Sea where
[712]they may intehd to operate their
[713]own submarines. (TOPSECRET TRINE
[714]NO FOREIGN DISSEM EXCEPT UK AND
[715]CANADA)
[717]TOP SECRET TRINE
[719]Page 8
[721]SPECIAL REPORT
[723]13 Sep 68
[729]JFK Assassination System
[730]Identification Form
[732]Agency Information
[734]AGENCY:  LBJ
[735]RECORD NUMBER: _ 177-10002-10105
[736]RECORD SERIES: NSF, CF, USSR, VOL. 21, BOX 226
[737]i}
[738]AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
[739]Document Information
[740]ORIGINATOR: CIA
[741]FROM:
[742]TO:
[743]TITLE: SPECIAL REPORT--WEEKLY REVIEW
[744]DATE: 09/13/1968
[745]PAGES: i
[746]SUBJECTS :
[747]INTELLIGENCE REPORT
[748]DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[750]CLASSIFICATION :
[751]RESTRICTIONS :
[752]CURRENT STATUS :
[753]DATE OF LAST REVIEW :
[755]OPENING CRITERIA :
[757]COMMENTS :
[759]Top Secret ;
[760]Consulted;:Mandatory Review Material
[761]Redact -
[763]07/06/1994
[765]DOC. #57
[767]Date:
[769]3/6/2018