[1]DARAAN
[2]1f04-10301-10004 « [2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |:
[4]on
[7]. » TOP SECRET
[9]CIA Internal Use Only
[10]Access Controlled by.
[12]CIA History Staff
[14]TS#795052
[15]Copy 1 of 2
[17]OFFICIAL HISTORY
[18]OF THE
[19]BAY OF PIGS OPERATION
[21]Vocume III
[23]EvotutTion oF CIA's
[24]Anti-Castro PoLicieés,
[26]1959-January 1961.
[27](pages 1-203)
[29]TOP SECRET
[30]TS#795052 |
[31]DCI-8
[32]December. 1979
[34]Copy 1 of 2
[36]PERMANENT HISTORICAL DOCUMENT
[37]DO NOT DESTROY
[41]TOP SECRET
[42]CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
[44]“OFFICIAL HISTORY
[45]OF THE
[46]BAY OF PIGS OPERATION
[48]DCI-8
[49], Volume III
[50]EVOLUTION OF CIA'S
[52]-ANTI-CASTRO POLICIES,
[54]- 1959-JANUARY 1961 _
[56]‘December 1979
[58]' Jack B. Pfeiffer
[60]\ TOP SECRET
[62]13-00000
[64]TOP SECRET
[66]Foreword
[68]This is the third volume of the Official History
[69]of the Bay of Pigs Operation and it focuses on the
[70]problems of establishing a policy for the United
[71]‘States. Government as Fidel Castro and his cohorts
[72]came to power in-Cuba.* The policy decided on by the
[73]US Government in March 1960 called for the displace-
[74]ment of Fidel Castro, and it was by no means a uni-
[75]lateral decision promoted by the Central Intelligence
[76]Agency -- although it is demonstrable that the Agency
[77]was far more perceptive. than the policy making bodies
[78]-in recognizing the threat to the Western Hemisphere
[79]posed by Castro's communist affiliation. Because the
[80]policy makers feared censure by the United Nations
[81]and/or. the Organization of American States, the myth
[82]of “plausible deniability" was the caveat that deter-
[83]mined the CIA would be the principal implementing arm for -
[85]the anti-Castro effort. From inception to termination,
[87]* The preceding volumes were:
[88]I - Air Operations
[89]II - Participation in. the Conduct of Foreign
[91]Policy.
[95]\\ OO ; _ TOP SECRET
[97]13-00000
[99]TOP SECRET
[101]"deniability" would be the albatross around the necks
[102]of Agency planners; and from D-Day minus 2, aCe
[103]15 April 1961). it became the strangling cord insuring
[104]the failure of the effort at the Bay of Pigs.
[106]This: volume describes the Agency' s organization
[107]designed to accomplish the assigned task; and it
[109]records the interaction between the Agency and other
[111]government components (State and the military in
[113]particular), between the Agency and the White House,
[114]and among various CIA components as the program
[115]evolved. The relationships were sometimes less than
[117]harmonious. Particular attention is focused on the
[119]roles played by both President Eisenhower who author-
[121]ized the anti-Castro program and Vice President Nixon
[123]'who has been charged ‘time and again -- unjustifiably
[125]as the record reveals -- with being the mastermind
[126]behind the operation.
[127]Emphasis also is focused on the drastic change
[129]in the concept of the operation between the spring
[131]' and fall of 1960. From April's plans for the infil-
[133]tration into Cuba of small teams of Agency trained
[135]specialists in communications, sabotage, and para-
[137]military operations to provide training and guidance
[141]TOP SECRET
[144]13-00000
[146]TOP SECRET
[148]to anti-Castro dissidents, November's plans called for
[149]an amphibious landing with armor and combat air support
[150]to establish a lodgement on Cuba soil from which a
[151]provisional government (approved /and apdtsttes’ by CIA)
[152]could issue its clarion calls for US, UN, or OAS inter-
[153]vention.
[155]Encompassed in this volume are the: records of
[156]the policy level.meetings which considered such items
[157]as funding the operation, possible use of US personnel
[158]in combat roles, the use of US bases for training or
[159]for operations, types of direct action programs (e.g.,
[160]propaganda drops vs sabotage), and the host of other
[162]- problems related to Castro's overthrow. It also makes
[164]. clear that various US corporate interests played an
[165]active (sometimes overactive) role in support of the
[166]anti-Castro efforts of the Government.
[168]This volume also examines official records in
[169]light of the allegations of the Senate Select Commit-
[170]tee's investigations that the assassination plans being
[171]developed by the Mafia were a fundamental part of the
[173]official US Government program to overthrow Fidel
[175]a hae
[176]wot
[177]aa | Castro. There is no basis in fact for this chadbe. .
[179]-Vo-
[181]TOP SECRET
[183]13-00000
[185]TOP SECRET
[187]Finally, the reader of this volume should gain.
[189]“7 some insights to the character of various of the
[190]principal actors -- Agency and non-Agency -- who were
[191]involved most closely with the Government's anti-Castro -
[192]policy during the period from its inception through
[193]the close of the Eisenhower administration. Not all
[194]of these impressions are flattering; but the author,
[195]‘who was in no way associated with the operation or
[197]. the Directorate of Plans (now Operations) , hopes that
[198]the presentation of. the evidence has been as free from
[200]- bias as possible. |
[202]Again the author wishes to acknowledge the valu-.
[203]able contributions of the other two members of the CIA
[204]History Staff, Mrs. Eulalie Hammond and Mrs. Sharon
[205]Bond, ° to the completion of this volume. Without their
[206]unfailing willingness to perform either the ‘substantive
[207]research or the grimly. mechanical tasks required in
[208]preparing a volume such as this, the task could have
[209]been interminable.
[211]For any errors of. fact or questionable interpreta-
[213]‘tions, the. author alone is responsible.
[215]-vi- '
[217]TOP SECRET.
[219]13-00000
[221]TOP SECRET
[222]Volume III
[223]Contents
[226]Part I. Background . . . . ....+4 646s
[228]A. Watching from the Sidelines
[230]B. Castro Takes Over .... .
[231]Part II Castro Must Go ......42...
[233]A. Organizing for Covert Action
[235]B. Forging the Tool ......
[237]Cc. Cooperation and Challenge .
[239]D. Personnel and Training .. .
[240]Part III Changing Concepts .......
[241]Part IV Presidential Resurgence ....
[242]‘Part V Direct Action Programs .....
[244]A. Propaganda.........
[246]B. Sabotage and other Exercises
[247]Part VI Mr. Nixon's Role . .......°
[248]Part VII The Question of Assassinations .
[249]Part VIII ‘Conclusions ..........
[251]Appendixes ©
[253]A. Memorandum for the Director of Central
[254]Intelligence from J. C. King, 11 Dec 59
[256]- vii -
[258]TOP SECRET
[260]Page
[264]17
[265]32
[266]32
[267]80
[269]104
[271]126
[273]143
[275]165
[277]204
[279]204
[280]233
[282]241
[283]277
[285]290
[287]296
[289]13-00000
[291]TOP SECRET
[293]Page
[295]B. A Program of: Covert Action Against
[296]the Castro Regime, 16 Mar 60 ..... - s .300
[298]C. CNO Correspondence with Department of State
[299]and NSC:
[301]1) Letter for Allen Dulles from
[302]' Arleigh Burke, 17 Mar 60 OO
[303]TS (DD/P 0-1436) .........-.- #311
[304]2) Letter for Gordon Gray from To
[305]Arleigh Burke, 16 Mar 60 ...... 313
[306]' 3). Memorandum for the Special
[307]Assistant to the President
[308]for National Security Affairs
[309]from Haydn Williams, 16 Mar 60,
[310]sub: US Policy toward Cuba .... 318
[312].D.. Memorandum for Assistant Deputy Director
[313](Plans) - Action from,J. D. Esterline,
[314]2 May 60, sub: - Liaison with US
[315]Agencies on JMARC Activities . .... . . 332
[317]E. Attack on Petroleum Refinery at. -,
[318]Santiago de Cuba, 13-14 March 1961... ..335
[320]F. Richard M. Nixon's Memorandum on Meeting
[321]with Fidel Castro, 19 April 1959 | oe e © « 337
[323]G. Memorandum for DCI {for Briefing Vice
[324]President Nixon], 29 Feb 60, sub:
[325]What We Are Doing in Cuba ........ 344
[327]Source References
[329]Part I . Background ee ee ee ee ee B47
[331]Part II '. Castro Must.Go .-. ..... . . +. 352
[333]Part III ‘Changing Concepts .:.... . . . 366
[335]Part IV Presidential Resurgence ... .. . 369
[336]- viii -
[338]TOP SECRET
[340]13-00000
[342]Part V
[344]Part VI |
[346]Part. VII
[348]Part VIII
[350]TOP SECRET
[352]Direct Action Programs
[353]Mr. Nixon's Role
[354]Assassination Coe ee
[356]Conclusions ....
[358]- ix -
[360]TOP SECRET
[362]Page
[363]374
[364]- 382
[365]386.
[367]388
[369]13-00000
[371]TOP SECRET
[373]THE BAY OF PIGS OPERATION |
[375]Volume III Evolution of CIA's
[376]Anti-Castro Policies,
[377]1950 = January 1961”
[378]Part I
[379]Background
[380]A. Watching from the Sidelines
[381]Fidel CASTRO RUZ was identified in one of the
[382]earliest reports in Agency files as "one of the young,
[383]“student leaders’ in Cuba, who manages to get himself
[384]involved in many things that do not ‘concern him." 1/
[385]Beginning in 1948, the activities of Fidel Castro came
[386]to be of increasing concern to the Central Intelligence
[387]_ Agency and to the United States Government (USG). By
[388]early 1960 the USG officially adopted a covert action
[389]program designed to remove the Castro government from
[390]control. of the island of Cuba. The policy of the USG
[391]was to be carried out by the Central Intelligence Agency
[392]and would culminate in the operations at the Bahia de
[393]Cochinos from 17-19 April 1962.
[394]Beginning in 1998 and continuing even after the.
[396]United States had formulated its official policy of
[398]TOP SECRET
[400]13-00000
[402]TOP SECRET
[404]removing Castro from the leadership of the Cuban
[405]Government, the principal questions faced by CIA's
[406]Western Hemisphere Division, by the Department of
[408]State, and by other concerned principals in the United
[410]States were: What is Fidel Castro? By whom is he
[412]controlled? What does he represent? Is he, or is he
[413]not, a Communist? The nature of the Agency's interest
[414]in answers to these questions is reflected in various
[415]of the records for the period beginning in the mid-
[416]1950's when it appeared that the Agency depended in
[417]considerable part on the reporting from the American
[418]Embassy offices in Havana.
[420]‘Commenting on a report entitled "“Antidemocratic
[421]Antecedents and Activities of Fidel Castro" prepared
[422]by President Batista's Military Intelligence Service
[423](SIM) -- apparently in response. to a request from the
[424]Burd de Represién a las Activadades Communistas (BRAC) *
[425]-- to the Counselor of the American Embassy (Amembassy)
[426]in Havana, Lincoln Vinton Chapin, told the CIA repre-
[428]sentative among other things, that:
[430]* Bureau for the Repression of Communist Activities.
[432]TOP SECRET
[434]13-00000
[436]TOP SECRET
[438]The SIM report is nothing more than
[439]a summary of allegations and accusations
[440]made. against Fidel Castro during the
[441]period 1948-1950. This summary has
[442]apparently been slanted in an effort to
[443]make Castro a "Rojo," but the result
[444]is a rather poor one. 2/
[446]The Department of State reporter refuted, ona
[448]paragraph by paragraph basis, all of the allegations
[450]which indicated that Castro had been tied in with
[451]Communists, ‘or Communist sympathizers, ever since
[452]his university days; and in forwarding the report to
[453]Chief, Western Hemisphere Division, the COS Havana
[454]indicated ‘that he was furnishing the information be-
[455]cause of renewed interest: by the State Department in
[456]Fidel Castro. 3/
[458]| The tenor of State reporting continued in a.
[459]similar vein well into 1957. Charges that Castro
[460]was a Communist could not be substantiated, but State
[461]did note that in his student days, he "was involved
[462]in gangster-type activities." 47 Havana Embassy
[463]reporting also reflected another of ‘the problems: of
[464]continuing concern to the US Intelligence Community --
[465]would Castro have sufficient force to oust Batista,
[467]and were his basic feelings toward the US friendly. 5/
[469]TOP SECRET
[471]13-00000
[473]TOP SECRET
[475]In the mid-1950's, Havana Station ran seven
[476]approved FI projects, most of which were aimed at
[477]the Cuban ‘Communist Party, the PSP (Partido Socialista
[478]Popular). Agency funds also were used to support
[479]the efforts of an anti-Communist organization engaged
[480]principally in propaganda activities. 6/
[481]Lyman Kirkpatrick, CIA's Inspector General,
[482]apparently accompanied US Ambassador Gardner and
[483]his, party toa meeting with President Fulgencio
[484]; Batista in the summer of 1956, a meeting which prompted
[485]the Cuban President to write to the DCI, Allen Dulles,
[486]in praise of the meeting.* 7/ In fact, ‘Agency support
[487]for the peaceful transfer of power from Batista to a
[488]democratically elected successor and amnesty for Castro
[489]and his followers, as well as other anti-Batista dis-
[490]sidents, was proposed in a memorandum from the Inspector
[492]General in November 1957. 8/
[494]‘* David R. McLean, a former member of the IG‘'s In-
[495]spection Staff, attached a cryptic note to the copy.
[496]of Dulles' letter of response to: Batista, which he,
[497](McLean) included in the file of miscellaneous docu-
[498]ments on the Bay of Pigs, which were inherited by the
[499]present author. McLean suggested that Kirkpatrick
[500]helped organize BRAC, but the present author has not
[501]confirmed this story. .
[503]TOP SECRET
[505]13-00000
[507]TOP SECRET
[509]In view of subsequent developments, one inter-
[510]esting suggestion made by the Inspector General in
[511]November 1957 was the following:
[513]On the island of Cuba, probably only
[514]a US citizen, in some way known to be
[515]connected with the US Government and
[516]"assumed" to be backed by Washington,
[518]' would. have the ability to act as inter-
[519]mediary between the various opposition
[520]groups in the Batista Government and
[521]work out a possible “cease fire." This
[522]would have to be done covertly, and any
[524]_ results achieved either not ever publicly
[525]announced or certainly not advertised.
[526]until after the election. Any public
[527]attempt to bring peace would be fore-
[528]doomed to failure by each side probably
[529]indicating exorbitant demands and. then
[530]being unable to withdraw from its
[531]announced position.* 9/
[533]Although it may have had no relation to the
[535]’ Kirkpatrick memorandum, on 25 November 1957, less
[536]than a week following the Kirkpatrick memorandum,
[537]William Wieland of the Department of State notified
[538]Adolf Rerle, one of the country's leading experts on
[539]Latin American Affairs and a former member of the
[540]* It is. interesting to speculate whether at this
[541]time Kirkpatrick was thinking of William D. Pawley, .
[542]former US. Ambassador to Brazil and Peru and an
[543]American businessman who operated significant enter-
[544]prises in Cuba,.to negotiate with Batista. Within
[545]a year's time, Pawley, who also stood-high in the
[547]ranks of the Republic Party contributors, was desig-
[548]-nated to undertake such a mission to Cuba.
[550]TOP SECRET
[552]1,3-00000
[554]TOP SECRET
[556]State Department, that he was enroute to Cuba, ac-
[557]cording to Berle, “to see whether anything can be
[558]done to bring the Cuban revolt to any kind of an
[559]orderly conclusion." 10/
[560]. Berle, with remarkable prescience, noted:
[561]It is rough going, anti-intervention is
[563]all right up toa point.. But we are re-
[565]sponsible for keeping order in. the hemis-
[567]phere quite aside from the proprieties, and
[569].a rather bolder policy in that regard.
[571]seems indicated. il/
[573]By early 1958, the Agency had become sufficiently
[574]concerned about the pro-Communist orientation of
[575]Castro's government, and particularly the pro-Castro
[576]proclivities of his two principal deputies, Ernesto
[577]Che Guevara and Raul Castro Ruz, Fidel's brother, that
[578]penetration of the Partido Socialista Popular was a
[579]priority concern of the field. At least two agents
[580]were successfully placed in psp ranks, and. in March
[581]1958, one Agency officer managed to join the Castro
[582]forces in the mountains for a period of two weeks and
[583]to observe their tactics in combat. In June 1958,
[584]Robert D. Wiecha, COB, Santiago de Cuba, got himself
[585]"captured" by Raul Castro's forces in order to be
[587]able to assist 29 US sailors and marines and 15 US
[589]TOP SECRET
[591]13-00000
[593]TOP SECRET
[595]businessmen who had been kidnapped by Raul Castro.
[596]In both instances, the Agency representatives returned
[597]unharmed; and both reported ‘on the "radical" and anti-_.
[599]American nature of the Castro movement. According
[601]to one source, Wiecha found "definite communist over-
[603]tones" among’ the Raul Castro forces.* 12/ .
[604]Additional documentation of the pro-communist
[606]nature of the Castro organization was reported with
[608]great frequency during 1958 from contacts the Santiago
[610]de Cuba Base had in Oriente Province. Whether Castro's
[611]contingent: was communist oriented or not, others such
[612]as Adolf Berle and his.friends (both in-and out of
[613]State. Department), continued to reflect their concern
[614]about the possible ways to combat ‘the growing strength
[615]of the Castro movement in Cuba. 13/ Berle was most
[616]hopeful that the Castro situation could be remedied
[618]by cooperation among Latin American liberals working
[620]in conjunction with some of the more enlightened Cubans
[621]who haa broken with Castro (for example, Felipe Pazos
[623]and Pepin Bosch) with additional support from the OAS
[625]* The historian for WH Division provided the figures
[627]on US captives shown here, but Hugh Thomas indicates
[629]19 US businessmen and 27 servicemen were captured.
[631]TOP SECRET
[633]13-00000
[635]TOP SECRET
[637]-- and only minor participation from the US Department
[638]of State. 14/.
[640]At atime when the Agency's fears about the
[642]Castro movement were increasing, a rather different |
[643]proposal was put forward by the Chief of the Para-
[644]military Division, Political and Psychological Staff,
[646]of the Clandestine Service. Rather than trying to
[648]‘whip Castro, Alfred Cox suggested that perhaps the
[649]wisest move for the Agency would be to join Castro.
[651]It waS apparent, according to Cox, that since Batista
[652]was on the way out, we should now try to remedy Castro's
[654]hostile attitude toward the United States because of
[658]our efforts to prop up Batista. To accomplish this,
[659]Cox suggested that:
[661]A practical way to protect United
[662]States interests in this matter would
[663]be to make secret contact with Castro,
[664]assure him of the United States sympa-
[665]thy with some of his objectives, and
[666]to offer him support. The individual
[667]chosen to. make the contact should be
[669]of such background that it is clear
[670]~ that he speaks with the authority of
[672]the United States Government.
[674]Obviously, the support must be given
[675]covertly so as not to endanger United
[676]States relations with Batista. The most
[677]effective means of help to Castro would
[678]be ‘arms and ammunition. Air dropping of
[680]- TOP SECRET
[682]13-00000
[684]TOP SECRET
[686]oe
[688].this equipment might be dangerous from
[689]the security aspect. Allowing a ship-
[690]load of equipment manned by a Cuban
[691]crew to evade our Coast Guard would
[692]probably be.a better method. The most
[693]secure means of help would be giving
[695]the money to Castro, who could then
[696]purchase his own arms. A combination
[697]of arms and money. would probably be
[699]best.* 15/
[701]By late fall of 1958, when it became apparent.
[702]that the Batista regime in Cuba was about to go under,
[703]the Agency in conjunction with the Department of State
[704]supported a plan to have Batista bow out more or less
[706]gracefully and to have the government of the country
[708]taken over, not by the Presidential candidate who had
[710]been elected in the rigged election, but by a junta
[712]pending subsequent free, democratic elections. When
[714].* Not all Agency reporting out of the Cuban area was
[716]biased against.Castro. One. report in the fall of 1958
[717]indicated that Castro definitely was not a Communist,
[719]citing as a reason for this: "Ninety-five percent of
[721]his followers are good Catholics. Three Catholic
[723]‘priests have joined Fidel Castro and his forces in
[725]the Sierra Maestra, and one has joined Raul Castro
[727]and his troops in the Sierra Cristal. The rebel forces
[728]under the Castros, therefore, have four chaplains,
[730]while the entire Cuban Army does not have a single
[731]chaplain.. (Source comment: The United States should
[732]not be taken in by President Fulgencio Batista's attempt
[734]-to label the revolutionary movement as Communist in-
[736]spired, dominated, or influenced.)" 16/
[738]The source for this evaluation of Castro was, as
[739]one might surmise, a Catholic priest. —
[741]TOP SECRET
[743]13-00000
[745]TOP SECRET
[747]traveling to Miami with William Snow, an Assistant
[748]“Secretary of State, and Henry Holland, formerly a
[749]Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Col. J. C. King,
[750]Chief, Western Hemisphere Division, met with William
[751]D. Pawley on 18-19 November 1958 to discuss a plan
[752]which would have Pawley travel to Cuba to meet with
[753]Batista in an attempt to convince him to bow out
[754]gracefully. Pawley was a long-time acquaintance and
[755]friend of Batista from the days when Pawley had been
[756]running the Cubana Airline. “
[758]In return for Batista's support for a friendly
[759]military junta -- nominally to be responsible for his
[760]ouster -- the representatives of the Department of
[761]State and the Agency agreed that Batista should be
[762]provided safety for himself, his friends, and his
[763]close cronies, particularly those whose lives would
[764]be endangered should there ever be a truly violent
[765]overthrow of the government. Batista also was to be
[766]provided protection for his personal assets in Cuba.
[767]Various individuals were identified as possible candi-
[769]. dates. for the junta, and,’ according to King, the
[771]objective was. that various of these members would have -
[773]TOP SECRET
[775]13-00000
[777]TOP SECRET
[779]sufficient political strength to weaken Castro's sup~
[780]port.
[782]Following the meeting in Miami, Pawley did
[783]undertake the mission to see Batista in Cuba. Arriv-
[784]ing on 8 December in Havana he had a series of pre-
[785]liminary meetings with the Cuban Foreign Minister,
[786]who strongly supported the proposals that Pawley
[787]indicated that he was going to make. Unfortunately,
[788]however, the Foreign Minister told Pawley that it was —
[789]unlikely that: Batista would accept the proposals.
[791]The meeting between Pawley and Batista actually took
[792]place on 11 December 1958 when, according to the re-
[793]port from Havana station: .
[794]Pawley. met with Batista for two hours
[795]this evening. Laid his plan before ©
[796]Batista without pulling any punches.
[797]. B{atista] took it calmly.’ He agreed with
[799]much of Pawley's analysis of situation,
[801]but said he could not take the junta
[803]way out. 17/ so ;
[805]Batista made no promises, and went. through the .
[806]reasons why he couldn't possibly give up the office --
[807]for fear of being called a coward and traitor; that
[809]there would be a blood bath; and that he had both
[811]moral and constitutional obligations. COS Havana
[814]TOP. SECRET
[818]TOP SECRET
[820]noted Pawley's evaluation of the meeting as follows:
[822]Batista will not accept plan, and will
[823]make every effort turn government over to
[824]Rivera Aguero [the Batista candidate who
[825]had been named Presidential successor in
[826]a rigged election]. However, unfavorable
[827]developments may produce change of attitude
[828]on part of Bfatista]. 18/
[830]Following Pawley's visit with Batista, the situ-
[831]ation in Cuba deteriorated rapidly and the policies of
[832]the US Government regarding Cuba were ambivalent. A
[833]representative of the Archbishop of. Havana, Father Bez
[834]Chebebe, approached the American Consul in Santiago to
[835]float some proposals for resolving the differences be-
[836]tween the two countries. The priest emphasized that
[837]although a Castro take over was inevitable:
[839]Both Fidel Castro and US interests -
[841]had important stake in sugar crop and
[843]both undoubtedly wish resolve problems
[845]caused by present situation. Also said
[847]that there were matters now mostly minor
[849]on both.sides which have been sources
[851]mutual irritation and misunderstanding
[853]and that these should be eliminated
[855]soonest, so that they would not grow
[857]to affect: future relations, which Father
[859]considers inevitable. 19/
[861]In addition, the representative of the Archbishop of
[862]Havana indicated to the Amconsul that:
[863]He though[t] US Government could
[864]profitably send person of confidence,
[868]TOP SECRET
[870]13-00000
[872]TOP SECRET >
[874]not necessarily an official, to discuss
[876]mutual problems as discreetly as possi-
[878]ble with Fidel. Implied that such would
[880]be well received. 20/
[882]Despite the fact that the communist proclivities
[883]of Fidel Castro and his cohorts had been clearly stated
[885]by Agency personnel in Cuba, on 18 December 1958, COS
[887]Havana cabled Headquarters strongly supporting. the
[889]position that the Archbishop of Havana's representative
[890]had proposed to the American Consulate, saying:
[892]Havana: Station feels proposal merits
[893]serious State/CIA consideration. Opera-
[894]tion this nature could pay big ;future
[895]dividends if fully qualified person could
[896]be found for job and dispatched quickly.
[897]Regardless how. we may feel about Castro-
[898]and his movement, both will be important
[899]political forces for a long time to ‘come.
[900]Perhaps candidate could be found through
[901]National Catholic Welfare Organization. 21/
[903]At about the same. time this, ‘proposal was being
[904]put forward, WH Division had asked the Paramilitary
[905]Division (PMD) to establish 'a small contingency task
[906]force, capable of making air drops into Cuba. Two
[907]representatives of PMD, Lucious L. Rucker and William
[909]G. Redel were sent to Havana -- Rucker to locate and
[911]“survey possible drop zones and Redel to get himself
[913]into position to see if he could locate dissidents who
[914]- 13-
[916]TOP SECRET
[918]13-00000
[920]TOP SECRET
[922]were both anti-Castro and anti-Batista. What WH hoped
[924]to accomplish, presumably, was that they could organize
[926]these anti-Batista and anti-Castro dissidents and get
[927]them armed in time so that they could prevent Castro
[928]from taking over the government if Batista should |
[929]suddenly resign or decide to flee the country. 22/
[930]On 31 December 1958, Paramilitary Division reported
[931]to WH Division that a Helio Courier was already in
[932]place in Key West with a backup Helio in Washington;
[933]a sterile C-54 had been requested from Europe; and
[935]the Office of Logistics would have an arms load
[937]* Yigged for a drop by 2 January 1959. 23/
[939]It was not until the last week of December 1958
[940]that President Eisenhower became actively involved in
[941]discussions and decisions affecting US policy toward
[942]Cuba. “His interest was precipitated by a 23 December
[943]1958 Memorandum on Cuba which had been prepared by
[944]the Acting Secretary of State and sent to Eisenhower's
[945]National Security Adviser, Gordon Gray, who discussed
[947]the memorandum with Eisenhower and the DCI on 26 Decem-
[949]‘ber. The President apparently indicated that he had
[951]not been fully aware of the positions of State and CIA
[953]- 14. -
[955]TOP SECRET
[957]13-00000
[959]TOP SECRET
[961]“regarding Castro, and he suggested that meetings of
[963]the Special Group under NSC 5412/2 should be held on
[965]a weekly basis, with Cuba to be a regular subject
[967]‘for discussion.
[969]Gordon Gray and Allen Dulles had some differences
[970]of opinion concerning the advisability of reading other
[971]individuals into the act. Gray suggested that the |
[972]President's Board of Consultants (later the President's
[973]Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board) be made party to
[974]the discussions,. but Dulles rather strongly suggested
[975]that there was a significant difference between the
[976]discussions which were intended for the Special Group
[977]5412 on Covert Operations, and PFIAB responsibilities
[978]for general problems related to foreign intelligence.
[979]Dulles made ‘the specific point that if the Board of
[980]Consultants was going to get involved in the details ©
[982]of planned covert operations, they were then in a
[984]position of reviewing US foreign policy. The discus-
[986]sion also seems to have verged on the right of Congress
[987]to. attempt to oversee covert operations -- a point
[989]about which Eisenhower expressed himself very strongly,
[991]‘noting that such action by Congress would be an in-
[993]fringement of his prerogative as Commander-in-Chief. 24/
[996]TOP SECRET
[998]13-00000
[1000]TOP SECRET
[1002]At 3:40 on the afternoon of 31 December 1958,
[1003]there was another high level meeting attended by
[1004]Messrs. Herter, Murphy, and Rubottom, Department of
[1005]State; Irwin, Department of Defense; Admiral Burke,
[1006]the CNO; General Cabell, DDCI; and Gordon Gray at
[1007]which the Cuban situation was again discussed. Even.
[1008]as the meeting was in progress, Batista was preparing
[1009]to flee Cuba; and possible US action, including direct
[1010]intervention by US Marines, was among the topics that
[1011]were discussed. There also was some suggestion that
[1012]the US take the responsibility for naming members to
[1013]a junta to succeed Batista, rather than permitting
[1014]Fidel Castro and his followers to take over the Cuban
[1015]Government. 25/
[1017]With some benefit of hindsight, Eisenhower re-
[1018]called this period in the following manner:
[1020]. During the rush of these last events
[1022]in the final days of 1958, the Central
[1024]Intelligence Agency suggested for the
[1026]first time that a Castro victory might
[1028]not be in the best interests of the United
[1030]States. (Earlier reports which I had re-
[1032]ceived of Castro's possible Communism were
[1034]Suspect because they originated with
[1036]people who favored Batista.)
[1038]“Communists and other extreme radicals
[1040]appear to have ‘penetrated the Castro move-+
[1041]ment,“ Allen Dulles said. “If Castro
[1043]- 16 -
[1045]TOP SECRET
[1049]TOP SECRET
[1051]takes over, they will probably participate
[1052]in the government." When I heard this
[1053]estimate, I was provoked that such a con-
[1054]‘clusion had not been given earlier.
[1055]At another point,. the ex-President wrote: ©
[1056]Though our intelligence experts backed
[1057]and filled for a number of months, events
[1058]were gradually driving them to the conclu-
[1059]sion that with the coming of Castro, Com-
[1060]munism had penetrated this hemisphere. 26/
[1062]B. Castro Takes Over :
[1063]During the first few weeks of 1959 following
[1065]Castro's take over, there was a flurry of activity
[1067]as Havana Station attempted to keep track of the
[1069]- changes in government. “The Station seemed assured
[1071]that it was cognizant of all of Castro's movements ,.
[1072]especially on the developing military capabilities.
[1073]In fact, when the US Army suggested that the Station
[1074]provide support for the Army's covert collection of
[1075]‘military intelligence under -commercial cover in Havana,
[1076]COS took strong exception to the proposals, emphasizing
[1077]the Station's own capabilities in this area. COS was
[1078]overruled by Headquarters, however, and General Cabell
[1079]assured the Assistant Chief of Staff. for Intelligence
[1082]of the Army that while he was aware that Havana had
[1086]TOP SECRET
[1088]13-00000
[1090]TOP SECRET
[1092]objected to the Army's proposals, the COS nonetheless
[1093]had been “instructed" to coopérate.* 27/
[1095]In these early weeks of 1959, US representatives
[1096]in. Havana were predicting that Castro would have a
[1097]difficult time holding his government together, and
[1098]among other things, one report emphasized the proba-
[1099]bility that Castro would soon find that he would have
[1100]to get along with the United States. 29/ The most ,
[1101]likely threat to relations with the United States
[1102]was the existence of the naval base at Guantanamo
[1103]Bay, but neither CIA nor State Department representa-
[1104]tives saw any threat to this installation, and this
[1106]belief was supported in early March 1959 by a Special
[1108]‘National Intelligence Estimate that, at most, Castro
[1110]“sooner or later {is] likely to ask for major increases.
[1112]* An interesting side note. to the discussions at this
[1113]time was that the Army Attache apparently had planned
[1114]to use a negro Lt. Col. who was on -TDY in Havana to do
[1115]a study of -the new Castro Army. In a memorandum -to
[1116]the Chief} Western Hemisphere Division, and to the
[1117]Chief, Foreign Intelligence Staff, Al Cox, Chief,
[1118]Paramilitary Division reported -- without ever using
[1119]the term “black" --. that General Erskine (Army Special
[1120]Forces) believed that‘a “color bar“ did exist in the
[1121]Caribbean area and that a better choice than Lt. Col.
[1122]Reuben Horner, the black officer in question, could
[1124]be made. 28/
[1126]- 18 -
[1128]TOP SECRET
[1130]13-00000 -
[1132]TOP SECRET
[1136]in the nominal rent now paid for the Guantanamo Base,
[1137]revision of employment practices which appeared to
[1138]discriminate against Cuban workers, and perhaps other
[1139]changes," 30/
[1140]In the early spring of 1959, as Castro made
[1141]known that he was planning to visit the United States,
[1142]COS Havana revealed ambiguous feelings about the im-
[1143]portance of the Castro trip. He noted for Headquarters
[1144]information that: |
[1145]Washington visit can make or break
[1146]Castro. Unless he gets a strong helping
[1147]‘hand from the United States, many serious
[1148]observers feel his. regime will collapse
[1149]within a matter of months. 31/
[1150]Pointing to the serious economic difficulties of the
[1151]new Cuban Government, cos Havana indicated that
[1152]castro’ s popularity was very low among the middle and
[1153]upper classes, but at the same time he emphasized that
[1154]Castro was "the idol of the masses." 32/ COS Havana‘
[1155]did an excellent. job of predicting how Castro would
[1156]act when he arrived in the United States, suggesting
[1157]that Castro would probably make his pitch, not to. the
[1159]heads of the ‘State Department. and to the press, but
[1161]‘that he would appeal to the workers, the farmers, the
[1163]- 19 +
[1165]TOP SECRET
[1167]13-00000
[1169]TOP SECRET
[1171]students, and the masses in America to support his
[1173]revolution. .COS emphasized that ‘Headquarters should
[1175]‘make no mistake that the Castro Government, while not
[1177]openly avowed Communist, was heavily infiltrated with
[1178]Communists and had taken no stand in opposition to
[1179]Communist positions, and, moreover, there was little
[1180]question about who would eventually control the Cuban
[1181]Government. cos did suggest that Headquarters give
[1182]serious consideration to planting embarrassing ques-
[1183]tions with reporters ‘to stick to Castro while he was
[1184]in the US. 33/0 Both the Department of State and COS
[1185]Havana were in general agreement about the results of
[1186]the Castro. visit. COS Havana summarized one of his
[1187]dispatches as follows:
[1189]' It would be unwise to assume from the
[1191]minor indications to date that Fidel has
[1193]undergone a serious change of heart as a
[1195]result of his visit to the United States. 34/
[1197]In a memorandum to Gordon Gray, President Eisen-
[1198]hower's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs,
[1199]Robert Murphy, Deputy Undersecretary of State noted .
[1200]that: |
[1202]Despite Castro's apparent simplicity,
[1204]sincerity, and eagerness to reassure the
[1205]United States public, there is little
[1207]- 20 -
[1209]TOP SECRET
[1211]13-00000
[1213]TOP SECRET
[1215]probability that Castro had altered the
[1216]essentially radical course of his revolu-
[1217]tion. -From his experience here, he has
[1218]gained a valuable knowledge of American
[1219]. public reaction which may make him a more
[1220]difficult man to.deal.with on his return
[1221]to Cuba. It would be a serious mistake
[1222]to underestimate this man. ‘With all his
[1223]appearance of naiveté, unsophistication,
[1224]-and ignorance. on many matters, he is clearly
[1225]a strong personality and a born leader of
[1226]great personal courage and conviction.
[1227]While we certainly know him better than
[1228]before, Castro remains an enigma; and we
[1229]should await his decisions on specific
[1230]matters before assuming a more optimistic
[1231]view than heretofore about the possibility
[1232]of developing a constuctive relationship -
[1233]with him and his government. 35/
[1235]With the benefit of hindsight, it seems that in
[1236]this period shortly following Castro's visit to the
[1237]United States the COS Havana may have misjudged a
[1238]significant development which surfaced almost imme-
[1240]diately after Castro's return to Cuba. Remarking on
[1242]‘an apparent rash of anti-Communist statements appear-
[1244]ing in the Cuban press, one dispatch speculated that:
[1246]These demonstrations obviously welcome,
[1247]but possibly most significant aspect is
[1248]demonstration once again, enormous power
[1249]Castro, who with few words. made anti-
[1250]Communism popular position. By same
[1251]token he could reverse trend at. any time,
[1252]and skeptics speculating that current
[1253]stand is sop intended to make it more
[1254]difficult for U.S. interests to protest
[1255]effectively against stringent agrarian
[1256]reform law. 36/
[1260]TOP SECRET
[1262]13-00000
[1264]TOP SECRET
[1266]A follow-up dispatch within two days of that
[1267]cited above provided a more accurate insight as to
[1268]the depth of the struggle which was,in fact, being
[1269]waged within Cuba between the pro- and the anti-
[1270]Communist factions. Reporting on comments made by
[1271]the Executive Secretary of the Partido Socialista
[1272]Popular (PsP) with reference to. the confusion among
[1273]party members regarding statements that Castro had
[1274]made while he was in the United States, Anibal Escalante
[1275]laid it on the line that there was a struggle between
[1276]the left and the right; and he emphasized that the
[1277]- conservative element was trying to take advantage of
[1278]‘remarks which Castro had been forced to make while in
[1279]the United States. According to the source reporting
[1280]on Escalante's talk, Vice-President Nixon had told
[1281]Castro that unless he broke his alliance with the
[1282]Communists, the United States would cut off economic
[1283]aid to Cuba; and this threat had struck Castro as so
[1284]serious that he made some unwise statements. The
[1285]source, however, noted that the liberal forces of the
[1286]26 July movement in the Directorio Revolucionario (the
[1288]DR), were in control of the revolution, and that the
[1290]~ 22 -
[1292]TOP SECRET
[1294]13-00000
[1296]TOP SECRET
[1298]duty of the PSP was to work toward unity and overcome
[1299]the counterrevolutionaries. 37/ |
[1301]‘In a Special NIE of 30 June 1959 on The Situation
[1302]in the Cartbbean through 1959, the intelligence com-
[1303]munity again indicated that the internal situation in
[1304]Cuba had not been decided. “The SNIE commented:
[1306]The Communists probably do not now.
[1308]control Castro, but they are ina posi-
[1310]tion to exert influence in his regime, —
[1312]and to carry on further organizational
[1314]work. 38/
[1316]Through the summer aad into. the early fall of
[1317]1959, the degree of Castro's commitment to Communism
[1318]continued to be a major subject. of discussion within
[1319]the intelligence community; and in the weekly reporting
[1320]that was begun by COS Havana in early June, this topic
[1321]continually occurred. ‘In August 1959, when the Deputy
[1323]Chief of Western Hemisphere Division, Rudolph Gomez,
[1325]assisted ‘Leo Churn in the preparation of an “Urgent
[1329]Report on Cuba" for distribution to members of the
[1331]Research Institute of America, Castro's Communist
[1333]association was prominently featured. At this time,
[1335]> and reflecting the views’ of both Western Hemisphere
[1337]Division and the Department of State with whom Gomez
[1339]. had coordinated the paper, Fidel Castro was not
[1343]TOP SECRET
[1345]13-00000 .
[1347]TOP SECRET
[1349]‘considered to be a Communist. His brother Raul Castro,
[1350]however, was clearly identified as a hard-core Com-
[1351]munist.* 39/— |
[1353]The internal problem to which Anibal Escalante
[1354]had referred in mid-summer came to a head in mid-
[1355]October 1959 when Hubert Matos, a military Leader in
[1356]Camaguey Province and formerly a strong supporter of
[1357]Castro, broke with Fidel over the increasing number
[1358]of leadership positions which were being turned over
[1359]to members of the Communist oriented PSP rather than
[1360]to members of the 26 July Movement . Matos resigned
[1361]as military leader of Camaguey on 19 October 1959 and
[1362]was arrested ‘on 20 October. During the months prior
[1363]to his trial in December 1959, when he was found guilty
[1364]of treason and sentenced to 20 years imprisonment, a
[1368]* In view of the trend of recent. years, it is inter-
[1369]esting to note that the Chuxn report found reason to
[1370]be somewhat critical of the Senate Internal Security
[1371]Committee (Sén. Eastland's Committee) for getting in-
[1372]volved in matters which were principally of concern
[1373]to’ the intelligence community. In this case, the
[1374]Senate Committee was criticized specifically for
[1375]taking Diaz Lanz, the head of Castro's Air Force who
[1376]‘'had defected, and questioning him before turning him
[1377]over to the intelligence agencies for initial inter-
[1378]rogation.
[1380]- 24 -
[1382]TOP SECRET
[1384]13-00000
[1386]TOP SECRET
[1388]number of others who had been prominent anti-Batistianos
[1389]also broke with Castro. Among these were Faustino
[1390]Perez, Minister for Recovery of Illegally Acquired
[1392]| Property; Rufo Lépez-Fresquet, Minister of Finance;
[1393]Manuel Ray, Minister of Public Works; and Felipe Pazos,
[1394]head of the National Bank who was removed by Castro
[1396]and replaced by Che Guevera, whose expertise was in
[1397]revolution not in banking. As Theodore Draper has
[1398]said, this was the second civil war for Castro. 40/
[1400]Coincidental to the internal squabble that led
[1402]to Matos's resignation, the Deputy Chief of WH Division,
[1403]Rudy Gomez, was in Havana (15-18 October 1959) promot- -
[1404]ing. an increase in Station efforts to penetrate the
[1405]PSP. In the course of this tour, the qualifications
[1407]of the best of the agents who might conduct this pene-
[1408]tration were reviewed with COS Havana and Station
[1409]personnel. Gomez also pointed out that the anti-Com-
[1410]munist efforts in Havana should not be limited to
[1412]those who were FI or PP designees, but everyone in
[1414]the Station was urged to take advantage of opportunities
[1415]to push into the Partido Socialista Popular.” In re-
[1417]porting on his visit with COS Havana, Gomez noted that ~
[1419]-~ 25 -
[1421]TOP SECRET
[1423]13-00000
[1425]TOP SECRET
[1427]the Ambassador and other members of the American
[1428]Embassy in Havana also were very much interested in
[1429]the program being advanced; and, in fact, asked Gomez
[1430]if CIA could “send a qualified Communist ‘expert to
[1431]Havana to indoctrinate appropriate Embassy officers
[1432]on Communist doctrines, particularly on their modus
[1433]operandi and how Communists working under ‘cover: could
[1434]be recognized." Upon his return Gomez received J. Cc.
[1435]King's approval to comply with this request.* 41/
[1436]‘Even as Gomez was promising State's representa-—
[1437]tives in Havana assistance in understanding Communist
[1438]activities, J. C. King, Chief of Western Hemisphere
[1439]Division, was going forward to the Director of Central
[1440]Intelligence with a memorandum complaining about the
[1441]Department of State's failure to provide CIA with a
[1442]policy action paper on Cuba -- a paper which, accord-
[1443]ing to King, had been promised as early as May 1959,
[1444]yet had not been received by the end of October. Nor
[1446]was there any indication when such paper might be
[1448]* It would appear from this request that both the DDP
[1449]and State were remiss in the training of their overseas |
[1450]personnel. That the Station had to request Headquarters
[1451]for support on such an issue is difficult to imagine.
[1453]- 26 -
[1455]TOP SECRET
[1457]13-00000
[1459]TOP SECRET
[1461]expected, despite numerous meetings with Department
[1462]representatives. King also was particularly critical
[1464]of the fact that Ambassador Bonsal had been called to
[1465]Washington on two occasions, but in neither instance
[1467]had he called on. the Agency for consultation -—- this
[1468]despite the fact that there had been indications from
[1470]the Department that such consultations were to be held. 42/
[1472]The ambivalence regarding Castrce's relation to
[1474]the Communist Party was illustrated by the Deputy
[1476]Director of Central Intelligence on 5 November 1959
[1478]in testifying at the hearings of’ the Judiciary SubCom-
[1479]mittee which was investigating the “Communist Threat |
[1480]to the US through the Caribbean." In response to the
[1481]question of whether Fidel was a Communist, General C.
[1482]P. Cabell stated:
[1484]Our information shows that the Cuban
[1485]Communists do not consider him a Communist
[1486]Party member or even a pro-Communist. On
[1488]N the other hand, they are delighted with the
[1489]nature of his government, which was.allowed
[1490]the Communists opportunity -- free opportun-
[1491]ity -- to organize, to propagandize, and
[1492]to infiltrate. We know the Communists
[1493]consider Castro a representative of the
[1494]bourgeoise ... Our conclusion, therefore,
[1495]is that Fidel Castro is not a Communist,
[1496]however, he certainly is not anti-Communist. 43/
[1498]In an attempt to resolve, at least part of the
[1500]dilemma a Related Mission Directive was approved on
[1501]7 270-
[1503]TOP SECRET
[1505]13-00000
[1507]TOP SECRET
[1509]6 November 1959 and “would remain in effect until
[1510]further notice." The RMD stated in part as follows:
[1512]For the moment, CIA operations should
[1514]be carried out on the assumption that the
[1515]revolutionary government is basically non-
[1516]Communist, with legitimate reform goals
[1517]that. deserve US respect and support. Cov-
[1518]ert operations should support overt efforts
[1519]to arrive at a rapprochement with the pres--.
[1520]ent government and to eliminate the con-
[1522]: _ ditions described above without resorting
[1523]to forceful means.
[1525]‘If it should be established that the
[1526]Cuban government is. Communist-led or Com-
[1527]munist-dominated, or if that government
[1528]cannot be swayed from adopting measures
[1529]which intentionally or unintentionally
[1530]accomplish Communist objectives, the
[1531]question of direct attacks against Castro
[1532]will be re-examined. In planning for such
[1533]a contingency, each existing or new asset
[1534]should be evaluated in terms of possible
[1535]future utility from a paramilitary point
[1536]of view, nor will the development or re-
[1537]cruitment of assets be precluded merely
[1538]because they lack a paramilitary capa-
[1539]bility. Under no circumstances would any
[1541]"asset be apprised of this -contingency
[1542]planning. In fact.any disposition to
[1543]undertake violent action should. be promptly
[1544]and emphatically discouraged pending a
[1545]change in policy at the policy-making
[1546]level. -44/
[1548]Even as the RMD was being dispatched to the
[1549]field, another and more significant program was being
[1550]evolved in Headquarters. On 11 December 1959, J. C.
[1552]King, Chief, WH Division prepared a themorandum for the
[1554]- 28 -
[1556]TOP SECRET
[1558]13-00000
[1560]TOP SECRET
[1562]Director of Central Intelligence, through the Deputy
[1563]Director of Plans, forwarding a program having as its
[1564]specific objective “The overthrow of Castro within
[1565]one year, and his replacement by a junta friendly to
[1566]the United States which will call for elections 6
[1567]months after assumption of office." To achieve this
[1568]objective, Chief, WH/D put forward a program, to in-
[1569]clude among other items the following: |
[1571]1. Clandestine radio attacks on Cuba,
[1572]from liberal Caribbean countries.
[1574]2. Intrusion operations against Castro's
[1575]{TV and radio, to be mounted from within Cuba.
[1577]3. Formation of pro-US opposition groups
[1578]to establish by force a controlled area
[1579]within Cuba.
[1581]Colonel King then went on to suggest that:
[1583]Thorough consideration be given to the
[1584]elimination of Fidel Castro. None of those
[1585]close to Fidel, such as his brother Raul
[1586]or his companion Che Guevarra [ste], have
[1587]the same mesmeric appeal to the masses.
[1588]Many informed people believe that the
[1589]disappearance of Fidel would greatly ac-
[1590]celerate the fall of the present govern-
[1592]‘ ment.* 4S/
[1594]* The reader's attention is drawn to Appendix A (see
[1596]page 296) which reproduces the original 11 December
[1598]1959 J. C. King memorandum to the DCI. In light of
[1600]subsequent investigations, hearings, and publicity
[1602]regarding the Agency's complicity in assassination
[1603](footnote continued on following page)
[1605]- 29 -
[1607]TOP SECRET
[1609]13-00000
[1611]TOP SECRET
[1613]As 1959 drew to a close, a final Special National
[1614]Intelligence Estimate, "The Situation in the Caribbean
[1615]through 1960," indicated that Castro was in to stay,
[1616]despite internal difficulties. The SNIE saw no serious.
[1617]threat to Castro's continued rule, and it pointed out’
[1618]that if there was direct US intervention, "Most Cubans
[1619]including the military, would react violently." 46/ .
[1621]| AS 1960 began, General Cabell, the Deputy Direc-
[1623]tor of Central Intelligence, held a joint briefing
[1625]plots aimed at Fidel Castro and others, pages 2 and 3
[1626]of Appendix A show two significant corrections in Allen
[1627]Dulles's own handwriting to the text submitted by Col.
[1628]King. In paragraph 3d, the phrase “thorough consider-
[1629]ation. be given ‘to the elimination of Fidel Castro"
[1630]carries Dulles's pencilled correction making the text
[1631]read “removal from Cuba" rather than "elimination."
[1633]At a later point in the same paragraph the
[1635]original text said “many informed people believe that
[1637]. the disappearance of Fidel would greatly :accelerate
[1639]the fall of the present government". Mr. Dulles has
[1640]substituted the word “removal" for the word “disappear-
[1641]ance." These significant changes in the text on the
[1642]‘original copy of King's memorandum -- which the author
[1643]has recovered ~- support the contention that the author.
[1644]has made in the Foreword to this Volume that the com-
[1646]_. ponent (WH/4) officially charged with the conduct of
[1647]the Agency's anti-Castro program was. neither charged
[1648]with nor responsible for programs designed to assas-
[1649]sinate Castro in the course of the Bay of Pigs Opera-
[1650]tion. Colonel King's. memorandum of 11 December 1959,
[1651]with the pencilled corrections noted above, was con-
[1652]curred in by Richard M.: Bissell and approved by Allen
[1653]W. Dulles on 12 December 1959.
[1655]- 30 -
[1657]TOP SECRET
[1659]13-00000
[1661]_ TOP SECRET
[1663](8 January 1960) on Cuba for the Department of State
[1664]and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He reviewed the in-
[1665]creasing hold that the Communist idealogy and those
[1666]affiliated with the Communist Party were exerting
[1668]the Castro government. At this time, the DDCI also
[1669]discussed the need for increased covert and semi-
[1670]covert programs aimed at Castro -- psychological war-
[1672]fare, political action, economic action, and para-
[1674]‘military action, all of which had been conducted in:
[1676]_ some degree during the past year. 47/ This 8 January
[1678]1960 briefing can be used to denote the beginning of
[1680]the serious anti-Castro programs by Central Intelli-
[1682]_gence Agency which would culminate at the Bay of Pigs.
[1684]- 31 -
[1686]TOP SECRET -
[1688]13-00000
[1690]TOP SECRET
[1692]Part II
[1694]Castro Must Go . ‘
[1696]A. Organizing for Covert Action (January-March 1960)
[1698]The first mention of a formal Agency structure
[1699]to’ deal with the matter of Fidel Castro was noted by
[1700]Colonel L. K. White, then Deputy Director for Support,
[1701]in reporting on the DCI's morning meeting of 8 January
[1702]1960. White's diary noted:
[1704]There was considerable discussion of
[1706]the situation in Cuba, and. the Director
[1708]requested Dick Bissell:to organize a
[1710]special task force to insure that we were
[1712]attacking this situation from all possible
[1714]angles. 1/ ,
[1716]The instruction was taken to heart, for on 18 Jan-
[1717]uary 1960 the WH Division:organized Branch 4 (WH/4) as
[1718]an expandable task force to run the ‘proposed Cuban Op-
[1719]erations. The initial Table of Organization totaled
[1721]. . _ \
[1722]40 persons, with 18 at Headquarters, 20 at Havana Station,
[1723]and 2 at Santiago: Base. 2/
[1724]Named to head the new Branch in Western Hemisphere
[1726]Division, was Jacob D. Esterline, recently returned COS,
[1728]Caracas, Venezuela, and formerly one of the principals
[1730]~ 32 -
[1732]TOP SECRET
[1736]TOP SECRET
[1738]in Project PBSUCCESS, the operation which had resulted
[1739]in the overthrow of the Communist-dominated government
[1741]of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954. Esterline was
[1743]. the choice of J. C. King, Chief, WH Division; and to
[1745]the best of Esterline's recollection, toward the end
[1746]of his two year tour in Venezuela he had been queried.
[1747]by King about remaining in Venezuela or coming back
[1748]to Headquarters to work on the Cuban problem. It was
[1749]shortly after his return to the States in. January of
[1750]1960 that Esterline became Chief, WH/4. 3/
[1752]| In addition to his participation in the Guatemalan
[1753]episode and his extensive guerrilla warfare experience _
[1754]in World War II with the Oss, Esterline thinks that .
[1755]he got the job because J. C. King "had pretty much
[1757]confidence in my judgment. "* 4/ The relationship
[1759]- between Esterline and J. C. King, Chief, WH Division
[1761]and the relationship between. King and Richard Bissell,
[1764]Deputy Director for Plans (DDP) during the course of
[1766]* The author had heard that Esterline had been directly
[1767]selected by the DDP, Richard Bissell, to be the head of
[1768]WH/4. Bissell made no mention of this, and it is con-
[1769]trary to the story noted above, as told by Esterline.
[1771]- 33 -
[1773]TOP SECRET
[1775]13-00000
[1777]TOP. SECRET
[1779]the Bay of Pigs Operation has been the subject of
[1780]considerable speculation ever since the close out of
[1781]the invasion. It seems appropriate that some atten-
[1782]tion’ should be devoted to this subject before going
[1783]further into detail about the evolution of the covert
[1784]plans to oust Castro. One source close to the DDP
[1785]at the time.of the anti-Castro activity stated flatly:
[1786]A task force was formed under Bissell,
[1788]excluding J. C. King, Chief, WH/D, from
[1790]having in fact any control whatsoever
[1792]over the activity. 5/
[1793]‘The WH/D history states:
[1795]There was an informal but understood
[1797]short cut in the chain of command; basic
[1799]decisions were made at the DDP; DCI, or
[1801]Presidential level. Although some of
[1803]the key personnel were detailed from WH
[1805]Division, the Cuban Headquarter's unit
[1807]was in another building; and no one pre-
[1809]tended that J. C. King was running the
[1811]show. Jacob D. Esterline ... was the
[1813]Chief of the Cuban Unit, during the
[1815]build-up and invasion attempt and took
[1817]his orders from the DDP. 6/
[1819]" Walter Elder, formerly Special Assistant to Allen
[1820]Dulles at the time of the Bay of Pigs Operation has
[1821]indicated that there was a deliberate attempt to keep
[1822]King on the. outer edges of the anti-Castro activity;
[1823]but according to Elder, Col. King always knew what
[1825]was going on and was thoroughly involved in the Bay of
[1827]aT
[1830]- 34 -
[1832]TOP SECRET
[1834]13-00000
[1836]TOP SECRET
[1838]Pigs activity from its inception until its conclu-
[1839]sion.* 7/.
[1841]Esterline himself declined to comment for the
[1842]record on this particular speculation, but indicated
[1844]that he was not sure what J..C. King was up to at all
[1846]' times. It is clear, however, that Esterline was in
[1848]very close contact with Col. King throughout the
[1849]course of the Bay of Pigs Operation.**
[1851]Additional insights concerning J. C. King's
[1852]role in Bay of Pigs Operation have been provided by
[1853]Richard D. Drain, who was Chief of Operations for-WH/4,
[1854]and by Richard Bissell, the DDP. Drain has stated:
[1856]J. C. King never was told, I think for
[1857]. understandable reasons, to what extent he
[1859]+. Elder. suggested to the author that “they" wanted
[1861]King out of the operation because of his strong Re-
[1863]publican affiliations. "They" were never identified,
[1864]but King was well acquainted with highly placed figures
[1866]and. contributors to the Republican Party.
[1868]** This will become most apparent in the subsequent
[1869]discussion of the relationships between WH/4 and
[1870]William D. Pawley. During the author's initial conver-
[1871]sation with Esterline about the Bay of Pigs, Esterline
[1872]did state, in a manner similar to Elder,’ that J.C.
[1873]King was..out of the mainstream of the anti-Castro
[1874]effort, because he had known Republican Party
[1875]affiliations. 8/ There was no elaboration indicating
[1876]the impact of such affiliations on King's role, and
[1877]there is nothing in the record to support this allega—
[1878]tion.
[1880]7 35 -
[1882]TOP SECRET
[1884]13-00000
[1886]TOP SECRET
[1888]was in it, to what extent he was not in
[1889]it. Therefore, from time to time, he ~
[1890]would protrude ... sometimes, saying that
[1891]he was sorry to protrude; and then he.
[1892]would retract; and then he would be in;
[1894]and then he would be out ... that's as
[1896]a person. Then again, his Deputy, Ray
[1897]Herbert, would call and say "I just. don't
[1899]. understand Cable 18963 IN from Guatemala
[1900]_today. Would you come over and explain
[1902]to me what that's all about;" and I would
[1903]step out of the maelstrom of JMATE ...
[1904]they were just working flat out ... and
[1905]go over. There would be the old WH types
[1906]Going their thing in the old WH way.
[1908]- Maybe two cables a week from the stations,
[1910]and quite leisurely ... I think what had
[1911]happened.to J. C. King was that he had
[1912]stayed overlong in.the same job; and he
[1913]was "Mr. WH," by Gawd. With the excep-
[1914]tion of first Guatemala and then Cuba,
[1916]there was very little that ever happened
[1918]in Latin America which got to be,. given
[1919]our other worldwide responsibilities in
[1920]the DDP, a very front priority matter;
[1921]and consequently, at Staff meetings, for
[1922]example, they would go around and talk’
[1923]about the Soviet Union and China and ©
[1924]Europe and even Africa. Then, if there
[1925]was any time left, J. C. King would have
[1926]his time at. bat and report: some relatively
[1927]minor thing... Except in the case of
[1928]Guatemala there was, as everybody knows
[1929]now, a very substantial paramilitary
[1930]operation which was run by Richard M.
[1931]Bissell in his capacity as Special As-
[1932]sistant to the Director for Planning and
[1934]“Coordination.
[1936]I think that one of the many reasons
[1937]--- and I never was able to get much in
[1938]the way of history on Guatemala as an aid
[1940], to the study of the Cuban operation ...
[1941]‘while the latter was in process ... was
[1943]- 36 -
[1945]TOP SECRET
[1947]13-00000
[1949]TOP SECRET
[1951]that this had never set very well with
[1952]Jd. C. King. He was divested of the
[1953]Guatemalan experience, and particularly
[1954]when it turned out to be a success ...
[1955]PBSUCCESS was a success, through dumb
[1956]luck more than anything else. J.C. ...-
[1957]‘couldn't take-any of the bows for it.
[1958]All right, that rankled, I am sure. - Now
[1959]this one comes along, and rather than ex-
[1960]pand WH/4, or whatever. the hell it was,
[1961]and leave this JMATE Project within that
[1962].Branch, and build up that Branch -- oh,
[1963]no. Once again the same man, Dick Bissell
[1964]“-- now, however, DDP instead of SAPC --
[1965]becomes the case officer for the thing;
[1966]and his assistant, Tracy Barnes, is all
[1967]over him. One of J. C. King's few very
[1968]good men, Jacob D. Esterline, is pulled
[1969]aside and made Chief of the project -..
[1970]The old man had a great deal of amour
[1971]propre, J. C. King did. He was very vain.
[1972]He had all of the area expertise that one
[1973]would like to see in a Division Chief,
[1974]but he had been at it an awful long time.
[1975]It was a very incestuous Division. In
[1976]terms of the rotation, it was solely
[1977]within WH. There were very few people
[1978]in WH who had served outside of the |
[1979]“Western Hemisphere, except in Washington.
[1980]They were a tight-knit little group, and
[1981]here now, for the second time running, one
[1982]of their big chances to shine -- there
[1983]was a lot of money and all that kind of
[1984]stuff -- again had been taken away ...
[1985]and it was ... it was tough. 9/
[1987]Where Drain implied that J. C. King was cut com-
[1988]pletely out of WH/4 activities and operations, Mr.
[1989]Bissell had indicated that the situation was somewhat
[1991]different. In the course of an oral interview, the
[1993]- 37 -
[1995]TOP SECRET
[1997]13-00000
[1999]TOP SECRET
[2001]former DDP responded to questions concerning J. C.
[2002]King in the following manner:
[2003]Question: I.would like to clarify at
[2005]this point J. C. King's relationship .
[2006]to the Bay of Pigs project. I have
[2008]heard it:on both sides -- that he was
[2009]involved and that he was deliberately
[2010]end~run.
[2012]Mr. Bissell: There.is no doubt in my
[2013]mind that that was the case. I was
[2014]going to say that both of the things
[2015]that you have heard have an element of
[2016]truth in them. There was a deliberate
[2017]decision fairly early in the game --
[2018]I doubt if it was as early as March
[2019]'[1960. In fact,] I am pretty sure
[2020]that it wasn't, [but] I am reasonably
[2021]sure that the decision I speak of was
[2022]made by some such date as June [1960]
[2023]-- {that] Esterline would take charge
[2024]of this. Project and Esterline would
[2025]have direct access to. mé. He would.
[2026]not be under. the usual requirement of
[2027]all the cases going through J. C. King.
[2028]Now, as the scope of the scale of this
[2029]operation increased, and with the passage
[2030]-.of time, Esterline's direct channel to
[2031]me came to be more exercised; and there
[2032]was frequent interchange between Ester-
[2033]‘line and myself that didn't go through
[2034]J. C. King in the gense of a command
[2035]channel. On the other hand, J. C. ‘
[2036]was brought into all the consultations |
[2037]and was fully informed from the very
[2038]beginning about this operation. His
[2039]advice was sought and given, and I
[2040]_usually found it very good and followed
[2041]it. I remember no specific case where
[2042]either J. C. King's specific advice or
[2043]general attitude toward the operation
[2044]was inconsistent with, or in conflict
[2045]with my own.
[2047]- 38 _
[2049]TOP SECRET
[2051]13-00000
[2053]TOP SECRET
[2055]Question: Why did you make this decision
[2056]‘with regard to Jake, coming directly to
[2057]you and not going through King? Was it
[2058]just a-matter of great efficiency, or
[2059]what precipitated that?
[2061]Mr. Bisséll:. I think it was in part on
[2062]-the model of the Guatemalan operation,
[2063]and in part, I think, a feeling, probably
[2064]‘on-my Own part -- in some degree perhaps
[2065]on the part of Allen Dulles -- that J.
[2066]C. was not effective enough to handle ‘*
[2067]this kind of very fast moving, quite
[2068]large scale, quite complex, paramilitary
[2069]operation.
[2071]_ Question: Do you recall any instances ;
[2072]where there was a serious conflict be-
[2073]tween what Jake wanted to do and what
[2074]J. C. King thought should be done?
[2076]Mr. Bissell: I don't remember many, if
[2077]- any, and I believe that the relation-
[2078]ships between Jake and J. C. were pretty
[2079]good throughout. 10/
[2081]Certainly the’ written record bears out Bissell's.
[2083]_ contention that King was fully informed and that the
[2084]‘relationship between King and Esterline was, if not
[2086]love, at least mutually respectful.*
[2088]ay
[2090]* The only point of contention between King and Ester-
[2091]line that surfaced in the records concerned the degree
[2092]to which William Pawley should be involved in affairs
[2093]related to the organization of the Cuban exiles. At
[2094]one point, Jake suggested to the DDP that all contact
[2096]with Pawley be cut.off, but in sending Esterline's
[2098]memorandum through channels, J. C. King noted that he
[2099]was against cutting Pawley completely off from contact
[2100]with WH/4.: In fact, Pawley was ‘in continuous contact
[2101]-- even though in disagreement -- with both Jake and
[2102]King until: the close out of the operation.
[2104]~ 39 -
[2106]TOP SECRET
[2108]13-00000
[2110]TOP SECRET
[2112]Another of the questions which must be addressed
[2114]in setting the stage of the Bay of Pigs operation is
[2116]_.the failure of Richard Helms -- at. that time Chief of
[2118]Operations (COPS) for the DDP: -- to become more than
[2120]marginally involved in the Cuban project. Oral inter-
[2121]views again provided the best explanations, and, con-
[2122]sequently, are entered into this record in rather full-
[2123]detail. Dick Drain, who became COPS/WH/4, made the
[2124]following comments:
[2126]Helms was COPS [Chief of Operations].
[2127]Either on his own volition, which I sus-
[2128]pect or on order -~ which I doubt -- Dick
[2129]Helms completely divorced himself from this
[2130]thing. I.mean absolutely! The one time
[2131]that I heard. from. Helms during this entire
[2133]_ project was ... I am sitting down there in
[2134]my chair, as COPS of the project, ona
[2135]Monday, having spent the entire goddamned
[2136]weekend working with the guy who is now
[2137]the head. of MI-6 -- Maurice Oldfield,
[2138]who was then the MI-6 resident in Washing-
[2139]ton -- trying to get an airplane and some
[2140]Cubans. out of Montego Bay before the
[2141]Brits in Jamaica came back from their
[2142]long. weekend ... I am sitting there con-
[2143]gratulating myself that the plane is out,
[2144]and the Cubans are out, and the British
[2145]are back, and it hasn't hit the fan, and
[2146]I get a telephone call from Dick Helms's
[2147]long time secretary, "Mr. Helms would
[2148]like to speak to you." Well, fine ...
[2149]well, the whole thing on his part was so.
[2150]-.. to me ... incredibly apologetic ....
[2152]‘three times he said to me in different
[2153]parts of the conversation ... "As you know,
[2154]I have nothing to do with this project."
[2155]What he did have to do with, ever since
[2157]- 40 ~
[2159]> TOP SECRET
[2161]13-00000
[2163]TOP SECRET
[2165]the Francis Gary Powers thing, he had
[2166]been a member of an inter-Agency com-
[2167]mittee that met with periodic regularity
[2168]to discuss air matters of any sensitivity.
[2169]I guess he'd had enough to do with this |
[2170]project so that somebody [who] had [been]
[2171]reading the cable traffic told him ...
[2172]"Well, those nuts down in Quarters Eye
[2173]seem to have lost an airplane this week-
[2174]end." He was going to the regular com-
[2175]mittee meeting that afternoon, so he had _
[2176]to ask me the details ... very apologetic-
[2177]ally. The third time that he said, "You
[2178]know I have nothing to do with this
[2179]project," I said, "Well Mr. Helms, I don't
[2180]want to be: fatuous about this, but I wish
[2181]to Christ that you did have because we
[2182]could use your expertise." He said,
[2183]“Hahaha ... yes, well thank you very much,"
[2184]and that was the end of that. He avoided
[2185]the thing like the plague. One of the
[2186]reasons may have been that, of course,
[2187]life went on; and if Bissell was getting
[2189]‘increasingly immersed in this one thing,
[2191]somebody had to watch the whole worldwide
[2192]store ... which of course Helms was damned
[2193]good at. A less attractive suggestion is
[2195]_ that Helms figured that there was a high
[2197]likelihood that this thing would screw up,
[2198]and he didn't want to have the tar baby
[2199]around him. I don't know. 11/ ,
[2201]Bissell, in responding: to the question about.
[2203]Helms' role during the course of the Bay of Pigs, com-
[2205]mented as follows:
[2207]I think that he [Helms] saw most. all
[2208]of the cable traffic and I think he was
[2209]pretty well informed as to what was going
[2210]on, very well informed; but he was really
[2211]out of the line of command on this opera-
[2212]tion. There was something of a tacit
[2213]agreement between us, that he would be
[2214]devoting himself to a lot of the other on
[2216]- 41 -'
[2218]TOP SECRET
[2220]13-00000
[2222]' TOP SECRET
[2224]going, business of the DDP office, be-
[2225]cause this was taking a great deal of
[2226]my time. .
[2228]Question: This was a tacit agreement,
[2230]“this wasn't a session in which you
[2231]and Helms ...
[2233]Bissell: Let me say this was probably
[2235]not that explicit. I would make an
[2236]observation here, and I don't want
[2238]you to infer anything really beyond
[2239]what it says, it was not particularly
[2240]easy -- I did not find it particular-
[2241]ly easy -- to discuss things clearly
[2242]and derive a clear understanding with
[2243]Dick [Helms] about the division of
[2244]labor between us when he was my Deputy. |
[2245]I don't imply by this any sense of
[2246]conflict or rivalry, but he would go
[2247]ahead and handle certain kinds of
[2248]matters, and I would go ahead and
[2249]handle certain kinds of matters.
[2251]‘We saw one another, of course, ‘all the
[2252]time. Quite often I would consult him
[2253]-about something that I was handling.
[2255]I think rather less often he would con-
[2256]sult me. I don't mean to imply however
[2257]in that any kind of concealment from me
[2258]-- I' never had that feeling at all --
[2259]but it really was our habit during the,
[2260]whole time that we were in those posi-
[2261]tions that the division of labor between
[2262]us was more tacit than explicit. 12/
[2264]Simultaneously with the decision to create a
[2266]separate Branch in WH Division to handle the anti-
[2268]' Castro activity discussions were begun by both the
[2270]Special Group 5412 and on an inter-agency basis as
[2271]to the nature of the anti-Castro effort. Among the
[2273]many questions raised early in the game was whether
[2275]- 42 -
[2276]TOP SECRET
[2278]13-00000.
[2280]TOP SECRET
[2282]the US program should be overt or covert, with the
[2283]overt implications being the ultimate application
[2285]of US military force. to oust Castro. DCI Dulles
[2286]emphasized that contingency planning should be under-
[2288]taken by the Special Group, without necessarily in-
[2290]‘volving either the President or the National Security
[2292]Council.
[2294]The Department of State was concerned that if
[2295]Fidel Castro were deposed, perhaps his successors, Che
[2296]Guevara and Raul Castro, would be even worse than
[2297]Fidel. As reported in subsequent congressional reve-
[2298]lations, concerning CIA's role in assassination plots,
[2299]it was during the Special Group Meeting of 13 January
[2301]1960 that the Director of Central Intelligence "“empha-
[2303]sized that we do not have in mind a quick elimination
[2305]of Castro, but rather. actions designed to enable re-
[2306]sponsible opposition leaders to get a foothold." 13/
[2308]At this same Special Group Meeting, President
[2309]Eisenhower's National Security Adviser, Gordon Gray,
[2310]predicted with uncanny accuracy the situation which
[2311]would ultimately develop as one of the key weaknesses
[2312]in the whole concept of the Bay of Pigs Operation.
[2314]According to the report on the Special Group Meeting:
[2315]- 43 -
[2317]TOP SECRET
[2319]13-00000
[2321]TOP SECRET
[2323]Mr. Gray commented that a problem
[2325]would be posed for administration offi-
[2327]cials if a decision should be taken to
[2329]change our attitude toward Castro, as
[2331]outlined earlier in the meeting. He
[2333]acknowledged that any such decision
[2335]‘must. be kept highly secret, but he
[2337]foresaw difficulties which would arise,
[2339]for example, during testimony by the
[2341]Secretaries of Defense and Treasury”
[2343]before Congress, at public gatherings,
[2345]etc., if they should have to give an
[2347]impression that. the US was not doing ; -
[2349]anything about Cuba. 14/
[2351]This in.fact, was the “damned if I do, damned if
[2352]I don't" position in which Richard Nixon found himself
[2353]in the Fall of 1960 and thé position in which the United
[2354]States found itself with reference to both the United
[2355]Nations ‘and the Organization of the American States
[2356]throughout the course of the Bay of Pigs operation as
[2357]the myth of “plausible deniability" overruled common
[2358]sense, Following the initial Special Group meeting,
[2359]there was a flurry of activity séeking some solid
[2360]proposals; and in a CIA meeting of 21 January 1960,
[2361]C. Tracy Barnes (the Assistant DDP for Action), J. C.
[2362]King, Jake Esterline, and Dick Helms among others,
[2363]discussed a whole series of issues which would he
[2364]basic to the program from this time forward: identi-
[2366]fication of the principal Cuban leaders: -- Ramon Barquin,
[2368]Justo Carrillo, and Miro Cardona (who would eventually
[2369]- 4y -
[2371]TOP SECRET
[2373]13-00000
[2375]TOP SECRET
[2377]head up the principal anti-Castro organization sup-
[2379]ported by the Agency) were mentioned; radio propaganda
[2381]operating out of either Third country or US areas
[2383]was raised; the training program for both communica~
[2385]tors and for PM trainers at Fort Randolph in the
[2386]zone was discussed; and the possible acquisition
[2388]aircraft for support operations and the question
[2390]US business as a cover for the operations ‘of the
[2392]groups in the United States were all discussed.
[2394]Canal
[2395]of
[2397]of -
[2398]exile
[2400]The
[2402]possible involvement of US businesses to put overt.
[2404]pressure. on the US government for the possible imposi-
[2406]tion of economic sanctions and as a covert means
[2408]of
[2410]raising money for the support of Cuban exile organiza-
[2412]tions. also surfaced. This initial meeting also recog-
[2414]nized the problem of trying to gain the support of
[2416]the more liberal Latin American Governments (e.g.,
[2418]_that of Betancourt in Venezuela). 15/
[2420]Al Cox, one of the senior officers in paramilitary
[2422]note:
[2424]Stringent security precautions were a
[2426]placed on JMARC, including the exclusion
[2427]of the PP Staff and other Agency compo-
[2428]nents from all cable and dispatch traffic
[2429]and from access to correspondence between
[2431]- 45 -
[2433]TOP SECRET
[2435]operations was in attendance, and he would subsequently
[2437]13-00000
[2439]TOP SECRET
[2441]the project and the office of the DDP
[2443]+». In point of fact, such restrictive
[2444]measures were somewhat meaningless inso-
[2445]far.as keeping awareness of the project's
[2446]activities away from PP/PMG. The A/DDP/P
[2447]granted permission to PP/C/PMG to read the
[2448]daily project traffic, (with Esterline's
[2449]knowledge and permission). Esterline
[2450]personally knew the majority of the PP/PMG
[2451]senior officers, and in no time he had
[2452]drafted six or seven of these, including
[2453]the Deputy Chief, PMG, for assignment to
[2454]JMARC ... This, of course, was valuable
[2455]as’ a built-in penetration of JMARC in
[2457]the best FI and CI tradition.* 16/
[2459]‘Early in February of 1960, Allen Dulles was
[2460]briefed in general terms on the planning that was
[2464]being initiated by WH. Division, and at the same time
[2466]J. C. King told the Director "that the Branch concept
[2468]was used [in establishing WH/4] rather than the term
[2469]Task Force for greater security and to simplify chan-
[2470]nels of command." The Director subsequently explained
[2471]to the Special Group. (3 February 1960) some of the
[2472]activities that were being undertaken, noting that
[2474]within the next week or two, the Group would receive
[2476]* The crypt for the WH/4 anti-Castro operation was
[2477]initially’ JMARC. Following compromise of this crypt,
[2478]the project became JMATE (sometime in the period be-
[2479]tween 6-13 December 1960) Throughout this volume
[2480]the project will be identified as JMATE, except in
[2481]direct quotations.
[2483]-~ 46 -
[2484]TOP SECRET
[2486]13-00000
[2488]‘TOP SECRET
[2490]‘a paper outlining the Agency's thoughts on the programs,
[2492]‘which had been initiated .against the Castro Govern-
[2495]The proposals of which the DCI had spoken were
[2496]discussed in a.DDP review session on ll February 1960
[2498]which was attended by Tracy Barnes, Jake Esterline,
[2500]Al Cox, Dave Phillips, and Jim Flannery. The focus
[2502]was on sabotage of the Cuban sugar industry,** propa-
[2503]ganda broadcasts, and funding. Noting that WH Division
[2504]had roughly $50,000 available for immediate use, it .
[2505]was speculated that the "ultimate magnitude" of the
[2506]anti-Castro effort might reach 3 million dollars =-—
[2508]an estimate that would, in effect, be some 40 million
[2509]short of the eventual cost. It was stated, however,
[2510]that funds would easily be obtainable from the Agency
[2512]reserve to meet any shortages. At this planning ses-
[2514]- sion, the training program for the PM cadre at Fort
[2516]‘Randolph in Panama was given minor attention; and
[2518]* In addition to the Special Group, which included
[2519]a DOD. representative, WH/4 worked directly with other
[2520]representatives of DOD regarding current developments
[2521]and the possible coordination of activities vis-a-vis
[2522]Cuba. 18/-
[2524]** "The big sugar sack?"
[2526]- 47 -
[2528]TOP SECRET
[2530]13-00000
[2532]TOP SECRET
[2534]here, too, the seéds were planted by Tracy Barnes
[2536]for an attitudinal survey of “Cuban society" which
[2538]could have (and. should have) caused CIA planners to
[2540]re-think the whole anti-Castro effort.* 19/
[2541]A very similar briefing, with somewhat more
[2542]emphasis on possible paramilitary action, was given
[2544]to a high level group from DOD on 12 February 1960; .
[2546]_and the agenda for the 17 February 1960. meeting of
[2548]the Special Group, again emphasized that the Castro
[2549]Government was dependent on sugar revenues for, both
[2550]continuation of popular domestic and hemispheric
[2551]subversion programs. ** 20/ It was further suggested
[2552]to the. Special Group that dissidents within Cuba
[2553]might. also be stimulated .to sabotage, with the ulti-
[2554]mate result leading to Castro's ouster. 21/ The
[2555]recommendation that the DCI made to the Special
[2557]Group was as follows:
[2559]* This refers to the Lloyd Free Report, which is
[2560]discussed: subsequently in this Volume, see pp. 222-226.
[2562]** The DOD representatives who were briefed were the
[2563]Deputy Secretary, Mr. Douglas; Mr. John Irwin, Assis~
[2565]tant Secretary of Defense for International Security
[2566]Affairs; General Erskine; and General Lansdale.
[2568]- 4g -
[2570]TOP SECRET
[2572]13-00000
[2574]TOP SECRET
[2576]That CIA be authorized to initiate
[2577]operational planning, including covert
[2579]spotting and assessment of potential
[2581]agents, for. eventual sabotage of both
[2583]‘Cuban and American-owned sugar mills.
[2585]Should this course of action prove. feas—
[2587]ible and desirable, the operation would
[2589]be designed to deny Castro as much as
[2591]possible of the revenues anticipated
[2593]from the 1960 sugar crop. 22/
[2595]Interestingly enough, although the briefing for
[2596]DOD had placed considerable emphasis on paramilitary -
[2597]planning, apparently no mention of the subject was
[2598]made to the Special Group.
[2600]On 17 February 1960 when Allen Dulles presented
[2601]the sugar sabotage plan to the Special Group, he em-
[2602]phasized that he was not asking for permission to
[2603]engage in action, only that he was looking for a
[2604]Special Group approval. Mr. Irwin (Assistant Secre-
[2605]tary of Defense for International Security Affairs)
[2607]' noted that he and the Deputy Secretary of Defense,
[2608]Mr... Douglas were all for the plan; and the Group agreed
[2609]to present the plan to the Secretary of State and to
[2610]Gordon Gray so that the latter could get the Presi-
[2611]dent's. reaction.
[2613]President Eisenhower was less than enthusiastic
[2614]about the sugar sabotage plan, reportedly doubting
[2616]that the loss of sugar revenues would impact on
[2617]- 49--
[2619]‘TOP SECRET
[2621]13-00000
[2623]TOP SECRET
[2625]Castro's ability to continue to finance subversive
[2626]activities in other Latin America areas. President
[2627]Eisenhower also objected to the focus on economic
[2628]sabotage, and he would not agree to the plan to
[2630]identify assets specifically for sabotage operations
[2632]against the sugar industry. Eisenhower was willing
[2634]to support a program to identify assets for the sugar -
[2636]industry " and other things as well ... including -
[2637]even possibly things that might be drastic." In
[2638]addition to identifying assets on a broad basis, the
[2639]President also requested that a comprehensive covert
[2640]action program be prepared by Mr. Dulles. This, it
[2641]was suggested, should go to the Special Group; and
[2642]if they approved the plans, then the President wanted
[2643]to discuss them. In any event, action on the PM pro-
[2645]gram would be delayed until Eisenhower returned from |
[2647]his upcoming Latin American visit and gave his
[2649]specific approval.* 23/ |
[2651]* The Minutes of the Special Group Meeting of 17 Feb-
[2652]ruary 1960 also noted that
[2654]. Mr.:Joseph Scott of State also reported
[2655]later that Mr. Herter had made exactly the
[2656]same point.
[2657]This appears to have been one of the few instances
[2658]where Department of State representatives indicated
[2659]support for possible direct action programs rather
[2660]than political solutions to the Cuban problem.
[2662]~ 50 -
[2664]TOP SECRET
[2666]13-00000,
[2668]TOP SECRET
[2670]Despite the rather positive doubts that the
[2671]President had about the sugar sabotage activity, J..
[2672]Cc. King charged ahead almost immediately following
[2673]the Special Group Meeting of 17 February 1960. On.
[2674]18 February, King and Milo Perkins had a detailed
[2675]discussion concerning the disruptive effects which |
[2676]might result from interference with the. Cuban sugar
[2677]operation. Perkins was planning meetings with Am~
[2679]bassador Hill and Thomas ("Tommy the Cork") Corcoran,
[2681]and King brought to Perkins's attention that Corcoran
[2683]had been willing and able to provide valuable assist-
[2685]ance to the Agency in the past. Later in the month,
[2687]‘Col. King met with Thomas Mann, the. Assistant Secre-
[2689]tary for Economic Affairs (subsequently Assistant
[2691]. Secretary for American Republic Affairs) who reportedly
[2693]was in favor of both reduced sugar quotas and direct
[2694]sabotage of Cuban sugar mills. According to King,
[2695]Secretary Mann also would support both cut backs in
[2697]us oil companies deliveries to Cuba. and actions which
[2698]might cut back on us tourist trade with the island. 24/
[2700]Col. King also consulted with former Ambassador
[2702]‘William Pawley, whom he asked to make arrangements
[2704]for the publication of Diario de la Marina in Miami,
[2706]- 51 -
[2707]TOP SECRET
[2709]13-00000
[2711]TOP SECRET
[2713]and also “to raise at least a portion of the money,
[2714]which would be needed for this operation." In addi-
[2715]tion to Pawley, King also contacted Henry Holland in
[2717]New York City, suggesting that Holland raise money,
[2718]through Cuban exile Justo Carrillo, to help pay for
[2719]the propaganda efforts of New York radio station WRUL.
[2720]King agreed that Holland could tell prospective donors
[2721]that the “money was going to be used on behalf of
[2722]non-Batista groups who were going to make a serious
[2723]effort to remove Fidel Castro." 25/
[2725]In addition to J. c. King's high level con-
[2726]tacts, Jake Esterline and -Mr. Dulles had a meeting
[2727]with Abbott Washburn, Deputy Director of the US In-
[2728]formation Agency who had requested a briefing on the
[2729]current state of activities in.Cuba -- Washburn was
[2731]concerned lest there be a conflict of interests be-
[2732]tween USIA and the CIA's ongoing effort in the area.
[2733]Washburn presented ‘the Agency with a copy of some
[2734]proposals which the State Department had approved
[2735]for implementation by USIA in Cuba. USIA's pitch
[2737]. would be that the long-standing friendship between
[2738]Cuba and the United States was being endangered by
[2740]the infiltration of Communists and Communist ideology
[2742]~ 52 -
[2744]TOP SECRET
[2746]13-00000
[2748]~TOP SECRET
[2750]into Cuba -- at the same time not denying that the
[2751]US was sympathetic to the need for a change in Cuba.
[2753]The Director and Mr. Esterline agreed that it would
[2755]_be advisable for Mr. Washburn, who-was planning to
[2757]visit Cuba, to meet Jim Noel, COS Havana, and out-
[2758]line the USIA program for Mr. Noel's benefit.* 26/
[2759]As the propaganda activities were being pushed
[2760]forward, as plans were being made for training Cuban
[2761]exiles, and as the possibilities of sabotage, PM
[2762]action, and other measures against Castro were being
[2763]contemplated,-a cautionary memorandum apparently was
[2765]drafted by one of the individuals most closely con-
[2767]. cerned with the potential anti-Castro operations.
[2769]The memorandum, undated and unsigned, reviewed the
[2771]anti-Arbenz operation in Guatemala in light of what
[2773]I
[2775]was being planned for Project JMATE: It noted some
[2777]of the similarities or differences with respect to
[2779]“the removal of Jacobo Arbenz in contrast to the pos-
[2781]sibilities of removing Fidel Castro; and in light of
[2783]the ultimate tragedy at the Bay of Pigs, some of. the
[2785]* One result of the meeting with Washburn was a de-
[2786]cision to turn over a planned USIA: anti-Castro car-.
[2787]toon effort to CIA.
[2789]- 53 -.
[2791]TOP SECRET
[2793]13-00000
[2795]TOP SECRET
[2797]key points made in this memorandum are worth repeat-
[2798]ing -- even though it is not known who read the piece.
[2799]Among other things, for example, the author of the
[2801]memorandum stressed "the unique coincidence of favor-
[2803]able factors" with reference to Guatemala and suggested
[2805]that it was unlikely that any of these would operate
[2806]with reference to Project JMATE. ; :
[2807]It was noted that the Guatemalan leadership was
[2809]“unusually inept"; that: “Communist support for Arbenz
[2811]came from the local Communist Party, which was immature,
[2813]badly led, and generally weak"; and, that “we had. un-
[2814]believable luck." 27/ The memorandum also noted that
[2815]there were a number of circumstances which would not
[2816]recur during the course of the anti-Castro activity.
[2818]Specifically pointing out that where Arbenz was a
[2820]. weak leader, Cas‘tro was obviously a strong leader;
[2822]that Castillo Armas was a Guatemalan leader of high
[2823]character and standing, but no one of similar stature
[2824]had surfaced in Cuba to oppose Castro; and that in
[2825]Guatemala Arbenz had made no changes in the armed
[2826]forces of Guatemala, and when the crisis came, he
[2827]could not depend on his army. Castro, on the other
[2829]hand had eliminated the Batista influence, and filled
[2833]TOP SECRET
[2837]‘TOP. SECRET
[2839]the key military positions with his own followers
[2841]and "introduced a system of intense ideological in-
[2843]' doctrination." Furthermore, the unknown author pointed
[2845]out that while Moscow.'s interest in Guatemala was
[2846]compartatively mild -- the Soviet Ambassador to Mexico
[2847]City was the nearest Soviet official available to the .
[2848]Arbenz Government -- in Cuba, the heavy economic and
[2849]propaganda support from both Moscow and Peiping were
[2850]a matter of record. 28/ |
[2852]The memorandum closed by pointing to three areas
[2853]where the writer claimed that tactical -- not strategic
[2854]-~ errors were being made. It stated that the blunt
[2855]propaganda attacks on Castro were forging all anti-US
[2856]elements in Cuba into a united front and US efforts
[2857]should be attempting to drive a wedge between Castro,
[2858]as a victim of international Communism, and the Com-
[2859]munists both Cuban and foreign. Secondly, it was
[2860]pointed out that the propaganda broadcast out of US
[2861]commercial radio stations, even if the time were
[2862]legitimately being purchased by Cuban exile groups,
[2864]would be a "kiss of death" for anyone: who tried to
[2866]‘deny US intervention in Cuban affairs. In part re-
[2868]lated to the propaganda activities, the planned use
[2870]/ - 55 -
[2872]TOP SECRET
[2874]13-00000
[2876]TOP SECRET
[2878]of US business groups as a cover for the Agency's
[2880]support of the Cuban opposition, particularly the
[2882]use of US business as a funding mechanism, was also
[2884]hazardous in the eyes of the author of the memorandum
[2886]under study. If the author was correct in assuming
[2888]that this cover would not withstand careful scrutiny,
[2890]it would mean that the anti-American contingents would.
[2892]have additional ammunition to use against the US.
[2894]The memorandum suggested that many of these risks
[2896]could be eliminated if propaganda activities were
[2898]moved to Third countries and if fund raising activi-
[2900]ties were run out of Latin America or Western Europe. 29/ -
[2901]Based on the language, the familiarity with the
[2903]Guatemaia activity and the nature of the. critique,
[2905]it is probable that Tracy Barnes wrote the memorandum
[2907]in question. The mémorandum may have been prompted
[2909]in part by the increasing attention which the OCB and /
[2911]the Cabinet had been giving to fire bomb attacks on
[2913]the Cuban cane fields by light aircraft flying out
[2915]of the United States. The Agency fully supported Gen-
[2917]eral Quesada's effort.to put an end to such flights.* 30/
[2919]* Quesada was Director of the Federal Aviation Agency. °
[2921]- 56 -
[2922]TOP SECRET
[2926]~TOP SECRET
[2928]From 2 March 1960, when the Director briefed
[2929]Vice President Nixon on Agency activities in Cuba
[2930]and. the state of Cuban affairs, until 17 March 1960,
[2931]when President Eisenhower formally approved the cov-
[2932]ert anti-Castro plan, CIA personnel most closely
[2933]involved in: the anti~Castro effort. were fully immersed
[2934]in the efforts to define -- and refine -- a US policy -
[2935]which would be acceptable to President Eisenhower.
[2937]In the course of this two week period, they were en-
[2938]gaged in efforts to satisfy the 5412 Group, the National
[2939]Security Council, and themselves that they had developed
[2940]‘a viable program which would lead: to the downfall and
[2941]‘ouster of Fidel Castro and his principal. cohorts, Che
[2943]Guevara and Raul Castro, and the elmimination of
[2945]Communism from the island of Cuba and, in effect,
[2947]from the Western Hemisphere.
[2949]During this period of evolution of national .
[2951]policy, WH/4 held its first official meeting asa ‘
[2952]. branch on 9 March 1960. J. C. King and Jake Esterline
[2954]were in charge of the meeting and outlined the general
[2956]nature of the programs that were going to be put into
[2958]operation (propaganda activity, PM training, commo
[2960]. training) and they emphasized the need for cooperation
[2962]“- 5ST =
[2964]TOP SECRET
[2966]13-00000
[2968]TOP SECRET
[2970]and support from all of the offices that were repre-
[2971]sented at. the. meeting, including, among others, the
[2972]Office of Training, the Office of Communications,
[2974]the Comptroller's Office, the DDS, DPD, the PP Staff,
[2975]Personnel (particularly the Military Personnel Divi-
[2976]sion), and the Office of Security. At this initial
[2977]meeting, Jake Esterline mentioned that Bob Reynolds,
[2978]Deputy Chief, WH/4, Dave Phillips, Propaganda Officer,
[2979]Phil Toomey, Political and. Psychological. Stategist,
[2980]Bob Wedbee, the Economist, and Ed Stanulus, his Plans
[2981]and Ops Officer, would be the principals who would
[2983]be in contact with other Agency elements which would: -
[2984]be called on for support. In addition, Esterline also
[2985]noted that liaison channels would be established with
[2986]other elements of the US Government, particularly with
[2988]the Office of Special Operations of the Department
[2990]_of Defense. 31/
[2992]It was during the period between 8-17 -March 1960
[2993]that the previously mentioned covert anti-Castro pro-
[2994]gram which Allen Dulles had agreed (on 17 February
[2995]1960) to provide to the Special Group evolved. Among
[2996]those in the Agency having a direct hand in preparing
[2998]a suitable paper for the Director's presentation, were
[2999]- 58 _
[3001]TOP SECRET
[3005]TOP SECRET
[3007]C. Tracy Barnes, Richard Bissell, Dick Helms, Jake
[3009]Esterline, J. C. King, and Tom Parrott, among others.
[3010]Those who figured most prominently among the Special
[3011]Group representatives at this time were Livingston
[3013]Merchant, Department of State; John Irwin, Assistant
[3015]Secretary -for International Security Affairs, Depart-—
[3017]- ment of Defense; Admiral Burke, Chief, Naval Opera- -
[3019]tions; and Gordon Gray, the President's National
[3020]Security Adviser. Other than the more than a dozen’
[3021]memorandums and drafts and other papers related to
[3022]the development of the policy paper, perhaps a note
[3024]from Richard Helms to C. Tracy Barnes on 8 March 1960
[3026]best illustrates the seriousness with which the Agency
[3028]approached the task of writing a paper for the Direc-.
[3030]tor.. Mr. Helms's note to Mr. Barnes read as follows:
[3034]Tom Parrott gave me for security late
[3035]this afternoon the attached paper for the
[3036]5412 Group outlining the proposed covert
[3037]action program against Fidel Castro.
[3038]After reading it, I asked Tom to. defer
[3039]consideration of. Cuba until next week
[3040]since I feel that: this document needs re-
[3041]drafting whether it is used by the Direc-
[3042]tor for an oral briefing or handed to the
[3043]designated representatives for their en-
[3044]lightenment.
[3046]x
[3048]I think you will agree with me that
[3049]the paper is poorly drafted and needs
[3050]considerable pointing up in various
[3052]- 59 -
[3054]TOP SECRET
[3056]13-00000
[3058]TOP SECRET
[3060]places. I do not disagree with the listed
[3061]recommendations in paragraph 6, but I do
[3062]feel that the backup material in paragraphs
[3063]2 and 3 needs recasting. For example, the
[3064]reference to a “short-wave radio station
[3065]patterned after Radio Free Europe", is no
[3066]way, in my opinion, to describe what we
[3067]have’ in mind. Also the paragraph on covert
[3068]economic action is not sufficiently precise
[3069]and raises more questions than it answers.
[3070]There are other points, but there is no
[3072]" sense in belaboring them in this note to
[3073]you. -
[3075]May I ask that you take this matter in
[3076]hand and advise WH how to put it in suit-
[3077]able shape for use by the Director with
[3078]the 5412 Group next week. 32/
[3080]In the paper to which Mr. Helms referred the
[3081]problem facing the US was stated rather simply as
[3082]follows:
[3084]To replace the present Government of
[3085]Cuba, headed by Fidel Castro, with one
[3086]that will be acceptable to the United
[3087]States; and to cause this change to occur
[3088]in such a manner that anti-US repercussions
[3089]are not induced in Latin America. 33/
[3091]- Throughout the discussion of the Agency's role
[3092]in the anti-Castro activity, there was a tremendous
[3093]concern that there be no “anti-US repercussions,"
[3094]not only in Latin America per se, but particularly
[3095]among the Latin American representatives in the Or-
[3097]ganization of American States and in the United Nations.
[3099]The constant quest for plausible deniability would
[3101]- 60 -
[3103]TOP SECRET
[3105]13-00000 i, _ PO ,
[3107]TOP SECRET
[3109]become the holiest of grails -- constantly, and ‘un-
[3110]successfully, to be sought throughout the course of
[3111]the operation by Agency planners.
[3113]The proposed paper for the Special Group (the
[3114]paper which Mr. Helms found somewhat lacking) empha-
[3115]sized those areas highlighted in previous Special
[3117]Group sessions -- anti-Castro propaganda, disrup-' _
[3118]tions of the Cuban economy, including large scale
[3119]Sabotage operations, and the development of instructor
[3120]cadres to provide both communications and PM training
[3121]cadres to resistance groups already extant in Cuba.
[3122]Interesting, too, is the fact that at this. early
[3123]stage of US planning mention was made of the offer
[3124]‘from the Guatemalan Government of a training site
[3125]for the PM cadres, or “action groups" as they were
[3126]called. A financial annex included in the proposals
[3127]for the Special Group indicated the need for $900,000
[3128]for the remainder of FY 1960 and $1.6 million for
[3130]FY 1961.* 34/
[3132]* Apparently Mr. Helms failed to read the financial
[3134]annex carefully enough, for the estimated requirement
[3135]for fiscal. 1961 which is shown as $1.6 million, was.
[3136]either a typographical error, or a mistake in addition
[3137]-- the sum of the parts shown for FY '61 is $1.7 million.
[3138]It also was noted that for the remainder of FY '60,
[3140]the Agency reserve funds would have to be drawn on to
[3141]meet these “non-program requirements."
[3143]- 61 -
[3144]TOP SECRET
[3146]13-00000
[3148]TOP SECRET
[3150]. As the paper was being prepared for Special
[3151]Group consideration, J. Cc. King, Chief, Western
[3152]Hemisphere Division had forwarded a memorandum for
[3153]the Director of Central Intelligence, providing him
[3154]with additional information for use during the Special
[3155]Group discussions; and the transmittal to the DCI
[3156]recorded that this paper had been used to brief Mr.
[3157]Nixon on 2 March 1960. King's memorandum covered
[3158]much the same ground as the paper which went to the
[3160]Special Group, but contained considerably more de-
[3162]‘tail about the activities of the Castro Government
[3164]which were directly aimed at overthrowing the legiti-
[3165]mate. governments and replacing them with Communist
[3166]oriented governments. Col. King's paper also re-
[3168]vealed that both Guatemala and Nicaragua -- the only
[3170],two governments in Latin America which were to throw
[3172]their full support behind the Agency's anti-Castro
[3174]activity -- had made offers at this time for both
[3176]radio time for anti-Castro broadcasts and, also, for
[3177]training facilities for anti-Castro groups which the
[3178]Agency might wish to sponsor. 35/
[3180]Despite President Eisenhower's previous objec-
[3182]tions to the over-emphasis on plans to sabotage Cuba's
[3184]- 62 —-
[3186]TOP SECRET
[3188]13-00000
[3190]TOP SECRET
[3192]sugar industry, King's paper did reflect considerable
[3193]emphasis on disruption of that economic sector.
[3194]Another. item which Col. King saw fit to include in
[3195]his memorandum was the following: |
[3197]; We have available, a drug, which, if
[3199]placed in Castro's food, would make him
[3201]behave in such an irrational manner that
[3203]a public appearance could have very damag-
[3205]ing results to him.* 36/
[3207]Even as the Special Group was planning its ses-
[3208]sions on the anti-Castro program, so, too, was the
[3209]‘National Security Council being geared up for discus-
[3210]sions of the same situation. Again, there wads great
[3211]concern over the question of possible loss of prestige
[3212]should the US act independently of the international _
[3213]organizations. There also was interest in protecting
[3214]US business and in the protection of US lives, and
[3216]‘the question of viability of the Guantanamo Base was .
[3217]of considerable concern to the President's National ~
[3218]' Security adviser, Gordon Gray. The policy that Gray
[3219]was advised to recommend to the National Security
[3220]' Council regarding US bases stated:
[3222]_. Take action as necessary, including
[3223]military action, to insure the continued
[3225]_* For comments on this subject see Part VII of this 7
[3226]volume.
[3228]- 63 -
[3230]TOP SECRET
[3232]13-00000
[3234]TOP SECRET
[3236]availability to the United States of
[3237]bases and base rights in Latin America
[3238]that are considered vital to “the secur-
[3239]ity of the United States. 37/ ©
[3241]An additional aspect of the basic national secur-
[3242]ity policy for Latin America which Gordon Gray was
[3243]being encouraged’ to promote with the National Security
[3244]Council on 10 March 1960 recommended that:
[3246]In the event of an imminent or actual
[3247]Communist seizure of control from within,
[3248]take all feasible measure[s] to thwart it,
[3249]including military action if finally re-
[3250]quired and appropriate to cope with the
[3251]situation.* 38/ .
[3253]Following Gordon Gray's briefing of the National
[3254]Security Council on 10 March 1960, President. Eisenhower
[3255]approved the following rather innocuous actions:
[3257]-1, Every effort should be made to in-
[3258]‘fluence the other members of the Organiza-
[3259]tion of American States to recognize the
[3260]dangers involved in the Cuban situation.
[3261]and support action with respect to them.
[3263]* Mr. Gray also was advised to play both sides of the
[3264]street for with reference to the disruptive efforts of
[3265]non-Communist groups, the position he was being urged
[3266]to promote was the following:
[3268]The United States should be prepared, if
[3269]required to protect US interests, to take
[3270]similar actions against subversion or armed
[3271]rebellion by non-Communist elements hostile
[3272]‘to US interests.
[3274]- 64 -
[3276]TOP. SECRET
[3278]13-00000
[3280]TOP SECRET
[3282]2. The responsible Departments and
[3283]Agencies should keep current plans to
[3284]déal promptly with likely contingencies
[3285]which might develop with. respect to Cuba,
[3286]especially those involving the safety of
[3287]US citizens in the Guantanamo Base.
[3289]-3. The developments: with regard to
[3290]the situation in Cuba should be reviewed
[3291]by the’ Council’ each meeting, for the
[3292]immediate future. 39/
[3294]Subsequent to the NSC meeting of 10 March 1960, -
[3296]‘Gordon Gray informed the President that the Special
[3298]Group had set aside a 2-hour session on 14 March “to
[3299]discuss the whole range of assets and possibilities
[3301]in Cuba." 40/ Prior to the 14 March meeting, Messrs..
[3302]Bissell and King received a somewhat strange memorandum
[3303]from Allen W. Dulles offering “some suggestions as to
[3304]possible added 'starters' for our Cuban paper; use
[3305]your own judgment as to adding them." 41/ Among these
[3306]starters was Dulles's suggestion that the International
[3308]Transport Union somehow be induced to refuse to load
[3310]“dangerous" munitions intended for Cuba and then Dulles
[3312]made the following rather unusual suggestion: *
[3314]* In addition to the International Transport Union,
[3315]Dulles also suggested that an attempt be made to in-
[3316]duce Cuban laborers to resist unloading explosives
[3317]that were sent to Cuba, but as he himself pointed out,
[3318]Castro probably would use the Cuban Army should the
[3319]dockworkers refuse to do the unloading.
[3321]- 65 -
[3323]TOP SECRET
[3325]13-00000
[3327]TOP SECRET
[3329]Stress point that while the dynamism
[3331]is running out of the Marxist-Leninist
[3333]revolution in Russia, it still remains
[3335]in China. This explains ChiCom special
[3337]‘interest in supporting the Cuban revolu-
[3339]tion and expanding it, with the ultimate
[3341]aim of facilitating mass emigration -of
[3343]Chinese to the Latin American continent
[3345]to meet their over-population problem.
[3347](This may be premature, but there may be
[3349]something to it.} 42/
[3351]As promised by Gordon Gray, the Special Group
[3352]Meeting of 14 March 1960 focused exclusively on the
[3353]Cuban problem, and Mr. Dulles presented the members
[3354]with the paper entitled "General Covert Action Plan
[3355]for Cuba." Much of the ground was already familiar
[3356]to the participants, but the memorandum of the meet-
[3357]ing reflects a number of items worth review. Even
[3358]though Dulles's paper Placed heavy emphasis on the
[3359]propaganda needs, even greater emphasis was urged
[3360]for covert and overt propaganda activities, not only
[3361]through WRUL, the commercial broadcasting operation,
[3362]but also through the efforts of USIA's programs for
[3363]Latin America -- programs which apparently had been
[3364]sharply curtailed in the recent past. The question
[3365]of location for the Agency's covert broadcasting
[3367]activity was again raised and discussed, the question
[3369]being whether it should be somewhere in the Florida
[3371]- 66 -
[3373]TOP SECRET
[3375]13-00000 -
[3377]TOP SECRET
[3379]Keys, in some Caribbean country, or elsewhere.
[3381]Somewhat more attention was focused.on the para-
[3382]military plans during this discussion than had occurred
[3383]before, and Mr. Gray was particularly concerned by the
[3384]Agency estimate that: "it appears no large scale para-
[3385]military effort (other than wholly overt) will be
[3386]feasible in less than 8 months"; and he wondered if  .
[3387]a crash program was feasible to speed up the training
[3388]program. 4&3/ The questions of economic sanctions, OAS
[3390]and individual Latin American country involvement, the
[3392]‘choice of the proper Cuban exiles to represent the
[3394]government in. exile, and the question of a budget --
[3395]the $900,000 for fiscal 1960 and the $1.6-1.7 million
[3396]for 1961 were also the subjects of discussion.
[3398]One additional subject of disucssion at this
[3399]Special Group meeting as recorded by Col. J. C. King
[3400]was:
[3402]_ What would be the effect on the Cuban
[3404]scene ‘if Fidel and Raul Castro and Che
[3406]Guevarra[sie] should disappear simultan-
[3408]eously. 44/
[3410]In the reported context of the discussion it is not
[3412]believed that the term "disappear" was a euphemism for
[3414]assassination, but rather referred to the ouster of
[3416]-= 67 -
[3418]TOP SECRET
[3420]13-00000
[3422]TOP SECRET
[3424]Castro's government from political power. The para-
[3425]graph which had raised the question then continued:
[3427]Admiral Burke said that the only orga-
[3428]nized group within Cuba today were[sie] the
[3429]Communists, and there was therefore the
[3430]danger that they might move into control.
[3431]Mr. Dulles felt that this might not be
[3432]disadvantageous because it would facilitate
[3433]a multilateral action by OAS. Colonel King
[3434]said that there were few leaders capable
[3435]of taking over so far identified. One pos-—
[3436]sibility was Nunez Jiminez, the head of the
[3437]Agricultural Reform Program. No other
[3438]names were widely enough known to be men-
[3441]Other discussion, notwithstanding, the focus of
[3442]Mr. Dulles's recommendations on 14 March 1960 was that
[3443]the Central Intelligence Agency should be authorized
[3444]to take a number of steps which were specifically re-
[3445]lated to the development of the guerrilla capacity of
[3446]‘the anti-Castro groups, both within and without Cuba...
[3447]The Agency should be responsible for broadening its
[3449]contacts with such groups and attempting to unify
[3453]* ‘This comment and one made five days earlier (9 March
[3454]1960) by J. C. King that “unless Fidel and Raul Castro
[3455]and Che Guevara could be eliminated in one package --
[3456]which is highly unlikely -- this operation can be a
[3458]long drawn-out affair and the present government will
[3459]only be overthrown by the use of force" were discussed
[3460](pp. 93, 114-116) in SSC report on Alleged Assassination
[3461]Plots Involving Foreign Léaders, and it is apparent from
[3462]the recollections of the participants in the meetings
[3463]that assassination was not the issue in these two
[3464]instances.
[3466]- 68 -
[3468]TOP SECRET
[3470]13-00000
[3472]TOP SECRET
[3474]them to direct their efforts against Castro. The DCI
[3475]proposed that CIA should take the lead in assisting
[3477]these groups to develop friendships among various of
[3479]_ the Latin American Governments which were skeptical
[3481]of Castro and that the Agency should be responsible
[3482]for identifying and training -- in facilities in the
[3483]United States or elsewhere -- those who would be the
[3484]leaders of the Cuban guerrilla warfare groups. At the
[3485]conclusion. of the 14 March meeting, it was agreed
[3487]that the Agency would revise the paper on the basis
[3489]of the discussions and plan to present it to President
[3490]Eisenhower later in the week. 45/
[3492]As part of the effort to improve the paper on
[3493]the proposed anti-Castro operations, the Agency pre-
[3494]pared additional backup material which could be cranked
[3495]into the version which would eventually go to the
[3496]President. On 14 and 15 March, the records reveal
[3497]copies of two drafts of such a paper, one of which
[3498]was labeled as "revised version, done by [C. Tracy]
[3499]Barnes ,. evening 14 Mar," which went into moré detail
[3500]on both the political opposition to Castro and on the
[3501]propaganda activities that were being mounted against
[3503]Castro. These papers also noted that paramilitary
[3505]- 69 -
[3507]TOP SECRET
[3509]13-00000
[3511]TOP SECRET
[3513]' activity would “take the longest to become a usable
[3514]asset." 46/ The most important difference between
[3515]these papers and the covert action plan presented
[3516]by Dulles was that the Financial Annex showed a sharp,
[3517]upward increase in the anticipated costs for FY ‘61
[3519](-- from $1.6-1.7 million to $3.5 million -- with the
[3520]heaviest increment coming in terms of the proposed
[3521]paramilitary operation. The sum for PM operations
[3522]was revised from an estimated $500,000 in Duliles's
[3523]14 March presentation to a total of $1.3 million for
[3524]that same year.
[3526]From the time Allen Dulles enunciated the covert
[3527]action plan (14 March) until President Eisenhower ap-~
[3528]proved it (17 March), there was an interesting bit of
[3529]bi-play between the National Security Council and the
[3530]Special Group 5412. One of the principal concerns of
[3531]the National Security Council was the proper US re-
[3532]sponse should the Cubans try to intervene or inter-
[3533]fere with operations of the Naval base at Guantanamo
[3534]Bay, including a possible takeover of the Base. On
[3535]16 March 1960, after Gordon Gray had been fully apprised
[3536]of the proposed plan for covert action submitted by |
[3538]Allen Dulles, Gray was the recipient of a briefing
[3540]- 70 -
[3542]TOP SECRET
[3544]13-00000
[3546]TOP. SECRET
[3548]note from a member of his own Staff, Samuel E. Belk,
[3549]for the planned National Security Council meeting
[3550]of 17-March which again focused exclusively on the
[3551]situation at Guantanamo Bay. It appears as though
[3552]Mr. Belk, even though ‘he was a member of the NSC
[3553]Staff was completely in the dark as to the planning
[3554]that had already been undertaken with regard to
[3555]Castro's ouster. At a time when the President had
[3556]already indicated that proposals for economic action
[3557]or direct. sabotage of the Cuban sugar industry were
[3558]less than what he desired, Mr. Belk, for whatever
[3559]reason, suggested again that with the new sugar
[3560]legislation, perhaps Castro could be straightened
[3561]out. In addition, Belk suggested a plan which was
[3562]“unconventional and radical" -- having President
[3563]Eisenhower send a message directly to Castro. telling
[3564]him that’ he was concerned over the deterioration of ©
[3565]relations between the two countries and suggesting
[3566]that Castro have private conversations with an emissary
[3567]whom the President would personally designate.
[3569]Staffer Belk believed that this was a “can't
[3570]lose" situation for the US. If Castro refused to
[3572]meet with Eisenhower's representative, then he would
[3576]TOP SECRET
[3578]13-00000
[3580]TOP SECRET |
[3582]be condemned throughout Latin America. The US on the
[3583]other hand would receive the blessings of the OAS and
[3584]the UN for its efforts. If Castro did agree to meet
[3585]with the President's representative, then relations
[3586]between the US: and Cuba probably would be improved. 47/
[3587]Mr. Belk' s suggestions apparently never went beyond
[3589]Mr. Gray.
[3591]At 1430 hours on 17 March 1960, Mr. Dulles pre-
[3592]sented his covert action plan to a combined meeting
[3593]of the National ‘Security Council and the principals
[3594]of the Special Group. In attendance with the Presi-
[3595]dent were Vice President Nixon, Secretary Herter, Mr.
[3597]Merchant, Mr. Rubottom, Secretary of Treasury Ander-
[3598]son, Secretary Irwin, Admiral Burke, Richard Bissell,
[3599]Colonel King, Gordon Gray, Major John Eisenhower, and
[3600]General A. J. Goodpaster. Based on General Goodpaster's
[3601]report on the meeting:
[3603]The President said that he knows of no
[3605]better plan for dealing with this situa-
[3607]tion. The great problem is leakage and
[3609]breach of security. Everyone must be pre-
[3611]pared to swear that he has not heard of
[3613]it. .He said we should limit American
[3615]contacts. with the groups involved to. two
[3617]or three people, getting Cubans to do
[3619]most of what’ must be done ... He under-
[3621]‘stood that the effort will be to under-
[3622]mine Castro's position and prestige ...
[3624]—- 72 -
[3626]TOP SECRET
[3628]13-00000
[3630]TOP SECRET
[3632]The President told Mr. Dulles he thought
[3633]he [Dulles] should go ahead with the plan
[3634]and the operations. He and the other
[3635]agencies involved should take account of
[3636]all likely Cuban reactions and prepare the
[3637]actions that we'would take in response to
[3638]these .,. The President said he would
[3639]like some groundwork laid with the OAS to
[3640]let the Latin American countries know that
[3642]‘if the Cubans were to start to attack our
[3643]people in Cuba we’ would be obliged to take
[3646]The President said that at the next
[3648]meeting, he would want to know what is
[3650]the sequence of events by which we see _.
[3652]the situation developing -- specifically
[3654]what actions are we to take. He said
[3656]our hand should not show in anything
[3658]that is done. In the meantime State
[3660]should be working on what we can do in
[3662]and out of the OAS ... Essentially,
[3664]the job is to get the OAS to support
[3666]us. 48/ . .
[3668]During the course of this meeting, Secretary of
[3669]the Treasury Anderson exhibited great concern over the
[3670]welfare of the US firms which had investments in Cuba;
[3671]and he was pushing for US intervention to protect
[3672]these private property rights. The President, how-
[3673]ever, cut him rather short on this. Vice President
[3674]Nixon, too, indicated some concern with the American
[3675]business interests in.Cuba; and suggested that steps
[3676]might be taken to cut off the flow of new capital in-
[3678]vestment by US firms in Cuba, terminating private
[3680]- 73-
[3682]TOP SECRET
[3684]13-00000
[3686]TOP SECRET
[3688]businesses already there, and reducing American tour-
[3690]ism.* 49/
[3692]President Eisenhower's approval of the 17 March
[3693]1960. covert action program against the Castro regime
[3694]thus set US ‘policy. Briefly restated, the four major
[3696]courses of action called for the formation of an anti-
[3698]-Communist exile political opposition located outside
[3700]of Cuba which would be the focal point for all of the
[3701]anti-Castro elements, provision for a powerful propa-
[3702]ganda offensive against the island, perfection of a
[3703]covert intelligence-in-action network organization
[3704]within Cuba, and the development of a paramilitary
[3705]force outside Cuba, with the necessary logistical
[3707]support for covert military operations on the island.**
[3709]* ‘Col. King prepared a memorandum on the same meeting,
[3710]but, strangely enough, failed tq include a list of the
[3711]participants. The fact that the President, Vice Presi-
[3712]dent, and Secretary of State were in attendance could
[3713]not be known from King's memo alone. 50/ Not in attend-
[3714]ance’ at. this meeting was Jake Esterline, Chief, WH/4.
[3715]This was one of numerous instances where higher level
[3716]personnel ~- in this instance, the DCI, Col. King, and
[3717]Bissell -- were the principals in a meeting at which
[3718]Esterline would seem to have been an equally legitimate
[3719]participant.
[3721]** Even as President Eisenhower was approving the anti-
[3722]Castro effort a Special National Intelligence Estimate
[3723]was in process and would state that Castro was not
[3724]"demonstrably under the domination or control of the
[3725]international Communist, movement." . {(SNIE 85-60,
[3727]22 March 1960, p. 3. S.)
[3729]- 74 -
[3730]TOP SECRET
[3732]13-00000
[3734]TOP SECRET
[3736]It is particularly important in light of changes which
[3737]were subsequently made in the covert action plan to
[3738]note the language of the approved policy with reference.
[3739]to’ the paramilitary operation:
[3741]Initially, a cadre of leaders will be
[3742]recruited after careful screening and
[3743]trained as paramilitary instructors. In
[3744]a second phase, a number of paramilitary
[3745]cadres will be trained at secure locations -
[3746]outside of the US so as to be available for
[3747]immediate deployment into Cuba to organize,
[3748]train, and lead resistance forces recruited
[3749]there, both before and after the establish-
[3750]ment of one or more active centers of resis-
[3751]tance. ,
[3753]At no point in this Presidentially-approved plan
[3754]for covert action by the Agency is there any hint of
[3755]invasion. The paramilitary activity was clearly to
[3756]be in the context of guerrilla warfare with leader-
[3757]ship and training to the dissident activities inside
[3758]Cuba being provided by Cubans trained by United States
[3760]technicians.* Finally, with reference to the approved
[3762]* Colonel Jack Hawkins (USMC) who was Chief, WH/4/PM
[3763]correctly noted in his memorandum: for record of PM
[3764]operations for Project JMATE that:
[3766]The only approved, written policy
[3767]governing paramilitary action against
[3768]Cuba is contained in paragraph 2d of
[3769]the Policy Paper approved by the Presi-
[3770]dent on 17 March 1960." (Emphasis added
[3771]by author.) 51/ ‘
[3773]- 75 -
[3775]TOP SECRET
[3777]13-00000
[3779]TOP SECRET
[3781]plan, the overall budget for the remainder of FY '60,
[3782]and FY '61 of $4.4 million was approved with the
[3783]caveat that should there be cost overruns, ‘these could
[3784]be drawn up from the Agency's reserve for contingen-
[3788]* A copy of the approved Program of Covert Action
[3789]Against the Castro Regime is given as Appendix B..
[3790](Appendix B, page 300). The reader is also
[3791]urged to examine Appendix C, a set of correspondence
[3792]between the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Arleigh
[3793]Burke, and Livingston Merchant, the Undersecretary of
[3794]State for Political Affairs. (Appendix C ,
[3795]page 311.) Admiral Burke apparently had become ex-
[3796]tremely agitated about the rise of Castro to power
[3798]in Cuba; and on 26 February of 1960, he had forwarded
[3799]a paper on US action in Cuba, to both Secretary Merchant
[3800]and also to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
[3801]International Security Affairs, Irwin, in which the
[3802]Navy's senior officer took it upon himself to examine
[3803]the various options available to the United States to
[3804]reassert itself in the Western Hemisphere vis-a-vis
[3806]‘the growth of Communist power represented by Castro.
[3808]Admiral Burke outlined a series of options that were
[3809]available to the United States, such as multilateral
[3810]action through the OAS, unilateral overt action by
[3811]the US, or covert unilateral action by the US.»
[3813]Leaning heavily on both the Monroe Doctrine and
[3814]Article 5 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal
[3815]Assistance (the Rio de Janeiro Treaty of. 1947) Burke
[3816]made a series of recommendations covering the same
[3818]ground -- propaganda, organization of the anti-Castro
[3819]exiles who were in the US, or direct US military inter-
[3820]vention -- which had already been considered at high
[3822]levels and were already familiar to both Secretaries
[3824]. Merchant.and Irwin. On 10 March 1960, Merchant replied
[3826]to Burke's memorandum noting "a marked degree of simi-
[3827]larity in the suggestions of the Navy and of our people
[3828]here concerning: the need to reverse the trend in Cuba —
[3830]and the methods which are best calculated to achieve
[3832](footnote continued on following page)
[3833]~ 76 -
[3835]TOP SECRET
[3837]13-00000
[3839]TOP SECRET
[3841]With reference to his action of 17 March 1960,
[3843]President Eisenhower subsequently wrote:
[3845]this result." Merchant then went on to review the
[3846]bidding that had already been done, particularly in
[3847]the Special Group, on the question of how to handle
[3849]_ Castro, emphasizing, of course, that State was very
[3850]much concerned that precipitate action against Castro's
[3852]government would work, if not immediately, certainly
[3853]in the long run, to the detriment of the United States,
[3854]particularly in its relations to the other governments
[3855]of Latin America.
[3857]Whether the. response did not satisfy Admiral
[3858]Burke or whether he sincerely believed that the Navy,
[3859]more than any other US Agency, should be principally
[3860]responsible for setting US policy toward Cuba is not
[3861]known. In any event, on. 16 March 1960, he forwarded
[3862]another set of proposals for US action in Cuba to both
[3863]Gordon Gray,. the Special Assistant to the President
[3864]for National Security Affairs, and to Allen W. Dulles.
[3865]Burke's: comments on the transmittal sheets to these ;
[3866]two individuals are interesting. To National Security
[3867]Adviser Gray he wrote:
[3869]‘Dear Gordon: Enclosed is my copy of a
[3870]memorandum on U.S. Action in Cuba which
[3871]may be of interest to you. Sincerely yours,
[3872]Arleigh Burke...
[3874]To the Director of Central Intelligence he wrote:
[3876]Dear Allen: Enclosed is a memorandum
[3877]my Staff prepared containing some sugges-—
[3878]tions which might be useful to you in your
[3879]work. Naturally, I do not agree with
[3880]‘quite all the comments contained in the
[3881]memorandum but I know that you will for-
[3883]give the impatient young lad for his de-
[3884]sire to make sure no opportunity is left
[3885]uncovered. Warm regards. Sincerely,
[3886]_Arleigh Burke.
[3888]Why one.of the recipients was cautioned about "the im-
[3889]patient: young lad" and the other was not is something
[3890](footnote continued on following page)
[3894]TOP SECRET
[3896]13-00000
[3898]TOP SECRET
[3900]On March. 17, 1960, less than two weeks
[3901]after my return from Puerto Rico, I
[3902]ordered the Central Intelligence Agency
[3903]to begin to organize the training of
[3904]Cuban exiles, mainly in Guatemala, against
[3905]the possible future day when they might
[3906]return to their homeland... More specific
[3907]planning was not possible because the
[3908]Cubans. living in exile had made no move
[3909]to select from among. their numbers, a
[3911]of a mystery. Certainly the proposals by one J. E.
[3912]Pond, Jr., reflect at least, Pond's youth and immatur-
[3913]ity. For among other things in his memorandum, Mr.
[3915]* Pond suggested that the Navy: “Accept Mr. Merchant's
[3917]offer in his letter of March 10 to Admiral Burke of
[3918]a complete briefing of State Department activities —
[3919]vis-a-vis the Cuban situation in an effort to prod
[3920]State to move faster." Or, with reference. to action
[3921]that the State Department should take, he suggested:
[3923]"Brief all individuals and groups of U.S. nationals
[3924]‘going to Latin America on the Kommunist [ste] threat
[3926]in Cuba for further dissemination to host country
[3927]personnel." Two items which had not appeared in other
[3928]of the papers related to the evolution of US policy
[3930]to oust Castro which were introduced by Mr. Pond,
[3932]were that the IADB (Inter-American Defense Board)
[3934]' become involved in the anti-Castro effort -- an exceed-
[3936]ingly naive suggestion considering that the members
[3938]‘of this group were far from unariimous in condemning
[3940]the Castro Revolution. And the second unique contri-
[3942]bution of this paper which Admiral Burke saw fit to
[3944]forward to two very senior members of the Executive
[3945]Branch, was the spelling throughout the: paper of
[3946]Communist with a "K". These last proposals that Ad-
[3947]miral Burke had forwarded to the Director of Central
[3948]Intelligence ended up in the files of Chief, Western
[3949]Hemisphere Division. The memorandum having been sent
[3950]down from Mr. Bissell's office, with the following
[3951]notation to Col. King:
[3953]Admiral Burke. sent this over to the
[3954]Director on the afternoon of 17 March,
[3955]and the latter handed [it] to me. I do
[3956]not believe it requires a reply,. but
[3957]pass it to you for any value it may
[3958]have.
[3960]- 78 -
[3961]TOP SECRET
[3963]13-00000
[3965]TOP SECRET
[3967]leader whom we could recognize. as the
[3968]head of a government in exile.¥* 52/
[3970]* In preparing this comment, the former President ap-
[3971]parently had to call-on his own memory, on the memory
[3972]of. Gen. Goodpaster, and the memory of Gordon Gray.
[3973]Based on his own recollections Eisenhower said that
[3974]neither his own nor Goodpaster's records contained
[3975]anything about the 17 March 1960 meeting. Similarly,
[3976]Gordon Gray wrote to Eisenhower: .
[3978]_ You may recall that not .so very. long
[3979]after I became your Special Assistant, in
[3980]a meeting you had with Allen Dulles and
[3982].me you gave instructions that activities
[3983]of the so-called "Special Group" should
[3984]not be recorded. in.any place except the
[3985]files of the Director of the Central In-
[3986]telligence Agency. You did not ‘wish that
[3987]there be other copies. It’ was for this
[3988]‘reason that I did not seek a copy of. the
[3989]-* March 17th paper for my files, nor did I
[3990]_ make notes at that meeting.
[3992]Subsequent: to March 17th, I began to
[3993]make memoranda of every meeting on that
[3994]particular subject. because I hada hunch .
[3995]that. someday these might be important, and
[3996]I intended to put them in your hands at the
[3997]appropriate time,- understanding, of course,
[3998]‘that you might wish to have them destroyed.
[3999]Incidentally, there were no carbons or
[4001]‘ other copies made of these memoranda. By
[4002]not making copies, and by planning to put
[4003]the documents in your own hands for .what-
[4004]‘ever, disposition you wished to make of
[4005]them, I sort of rationalized my violation
[4006]of your instructions about not making such
[4007]memoranda. I hope I neednot assure you
[4008]that it was not my practice to violate
[4009]your instructions and this is the only
[4010]instance of ‘such that I can recall, 53/
[4012]- 79 +
[4014]TOP SECRET
[4016]13-00000
[4018]TOP SECRET
[4020]-B. . Forging the Tool
[4022]Following President Eisenhower's approval of
[4023]the anti-Castro program which had evolved from the
[4024]numerous discussions, meetings, and briefings pre-
[4025]viously mentioned, the Agency's leadership then faced
[4026]the problem of acting directly to implement the anti-
[4027]Castro program. Problems which had been discussed
[4028]philosophically prior to this time now had to be put
[4029]to the test of practicality. Among the problems of
[4030]principal importance during the period from March to
[4031]September 1960 were the following:
[4033]The establishment of ‘the leadership of WH/4 and
[4034]the acquisition of pexsonnel for WH/4 5
[4036]Extensive coordination between Agency representa—
[4037]tives and representatives of other US Government
[4038]Agencies and, at the same time, a “high level of intra-
[4039]Agency coordination. | .
[4041]. The initiation of a paramilitary training program
[4042]for those Cubans who would be directly involved in help-
[4043]ing to dispose of the Castro Government:
[4045]Attempting to. establish project parameters and
[4046]to.give proper consideration to possible changes in
[4048]the concept of the program as time passed;
[4050]- 80 -
[4052]TOP SECRET
[4054]13-00000
[4056]TOP SECRET
[4058]And, finally, to retain the credibility and
[4059]viability of the operation despite numerous wild
[4060]haired proposals that were being put forward at vari-
[4061]ous ‘times ‘during the months under study -~- proposals
[4062]which never should have been offered let alone given
[4063]any serious consideration. —
[4065]As previously noted, WH/4s was established by. .
[4066]Col. King in January of 1960; however, it was not
[4068]until 24 March 1960 that Mr. Bissell apparently of-
[4070]ficially got around to approving the new Branch, for
[4072]‘in a memorandum for the Deputy Director for. Support
[4074](DDS), it was noted:
[4076]The SSA-DDS has advised of the DDP's
[4077]approval of the creation of a new opera-
[4078]tional Branch, the abolishment of an
[4079]existing Section, and the creation of a
[4080]-new Section within the WH Division Head-
[4081]quarters Staffing complement. ,
[4082]The 15 new positions required by the Branch would be
[4083]more than offset by the decrease in the. DDP complement.
[4085]The same memorandum indicated that the Wage and
[4087]Salary Division of the Office of Personnel had approved
[4088]the various grades that had been proposed and then the
[4090]memorandum went on to. state:
[4092]The approval limits the usage of the
[4093]requested positions to the duration of the
[4095]- 81 -
[4097]TOP SECRET
[4099]13-00000
[4101]TOP SECRET
[4103]Cuban crisis; after which all the positions
[4104]in ‘the new Branch and Section will be re-
[4105]viewed for reclassification purposes. 54/
[4107]The question of financing and budget for project
[4108]JMATE had already caused concern among those responsible
[4109]for the formulation of the anti-Castro policy, and soon
[4110]after the President's approval of the project, the
[4111]question of budget and finance surfaced. By 24 March |
[4113]' 1960, the Deputy Director for Support noted that:
[4114]“Jack Earman advised me that the Director had approved
[4115]of the paper calling for the release of $900,000 from
[4116]the reserve for Project JMARC." 55/ Indeed the Director
[4117]had signed such a paper calling for the $900,000 as
[4118]"an unprogrammed requirement for which other funds
[4119]are not available." 56/
[4121]In his memo to the Comptroller concerning the
[4122]release of funds from the Agency reserve, the Director
[4123]was also careful to point out that it would be the
[4124]responsiblity of Chief, WH Division to certify that
[4125]the funds had been expended as specified for the
[4126]project; that additionally, the DDP or his designee
[4127]would have to approve each certification; that the —
[4128]only Headquarters file on the budget for the project
[4130]would be maintained by WH/Division; and that the
[4132]~ 82 -
[4134]TOP SECRET
[4136]13-00000
[4138]TOP SECRET
[4140]file would be complete as to the purpose of the expend-
[4142]iture, the date, those who were involved as payees,
[4143]and any other details; and finally that access to
[4145]this financial file would be “limited to persons
[4147]_specifically authorized by the Deputy Director (Plans) ."* 57/
[4149]In the. first meeting following the Presidential
[4150]approval. of the anti-Castro. program, Jake Esterline
[4151]callea the members of WH/4 together to announce that
[4152]the program had been given the crypt of JMARC; and he -
[4153]further pointed out that 1 May 1960 was the target
[4154]date for. the beginning of training at Fort Randoiph
[4155]in Panama. (This. date was predicated on the assump-
[4156]tion of a satisfactory report from the Inspection, Team —
[4157]which was to travel to Fort Randolph on 27 March.)
[4158]Medical. and security officers were to be assigned to
[4159]the training base and the communications Link was to
[4161]x
[4163]be established with Headquarters. In this early
[4165]* Unlike some suggestions that had been forwarded by
[4166]the WH/4 Finance Officer, Michael King, the Director's
[4167]Memorandum placed budgetary responsibility with the
[4169]_ DDP and Chief, WH. Division. Chief, WH/4 was not even
[4171]included on the routing. for the Director's Memorandum.
[4172]The WH/4 Financial Officer, on the other hand, had
[4173]suggested that certain of the responsibilities for
[4174]approval: of funding be given to the project Chief,
[4176]or the Chief, WH/Division. 58/
[4178]- 83 -
[4180]TOP SECRET |
[4182]13-00000
[4184]TOP SECRET
[4186]meeting, Esterline emphasized that training at the
[4187]Fort Randolph and Fort Sherman areas of Panama was
[4188]going to be extremely limited; and since there would
[4189]be no training areas in the United States; third
[4190]country training activities would need to be estab-
[4191]lished. He emphasized again that secrecy was of
[4192]paramount importance if the operation was to succeed, .
[4193]and stressed that the establishment of a Government-
[4194]in-exile was a key point to making the planned opera-
[4195]tion credible. Esterline further indicated that such
[4196]a government hopefully could be announced by the early
[4197]part of April and that the Headquarters for such a
[4198]government could be located either in Puerto Rico or
[4199]Costa Rica.
[4201]Esterline also made an appeal for personnel to
[4202]staff both the Panama training activity and Base Two,
[4203]the Coral Gables Headquarters which later would be
[4204]known as JMWAVE. one interesting point made at this
[4205]first meeting was that:
[4207]Mr. [Scudder] Georgia reported that
[4209]the DDS Offices concerned had nominated
[4211]nearly all of the personnel required by
[4213]1 and 15 April respectively. Action was
[4215]being taken to make all these available
[4217]at once.... [and] it was agreed that DDS .
[4218]representatives would meet once a week
[4220]- 84 ~—
[4222]TOP SECRET
[4224]13-00000
[4226]‘the fact of Agency involvement in this covert opera-
[4228]TOP SECRET
[4230]to review activities, determine the status
[4231]of commitments, and prepare a brief re-
[4232]port for Chief, Branch 4. 59/
[4234]In another Branch meeting soon after the one
[4236]just ‘mentioned, Esterline reemphasized, as he and
[4238]others would do throughout the course of the operation,
[4239]the’ need for security practices designed to protect
[4240]tion. He also indicated the considerable degree of
[4241]cooperation which already was being required from
[4242]other services. Dave Phillips provided a specific.
[4243]example of this, emphasizing that without the close
[4244]cooperation of the United States Navy, it would have
[4246]been difficult to transport the two radio transmitters
[4248]which were going to be installed on ‘Swan Island.
[4250]-Moreover, Phillips reported that a crew of Seabees
[4252]would be responsible for constructing the facilities
[4253]to house the transmitters and the quarters for’ per-
[4255]sonnel who would conduct the propaganda effort from
[4257]. Swan Island. Because the activities then’ established
[4259]on Swan Island were under the control of the Federal
[4260]Aviation Administration, om _ Tracy Barnes (the A/DDP/A)
[4261]was to meet with the Director of FAA, Gen. Elwood
[4262]Quesada, to clear with him the problems that were
[4264]- 85 -
[4266]TOP SECRET
[4268]13-00000
[4270]TOP SECRET
[4272]involved in establishing this Agency activity on the
[4273]island. 60/ Coordination also had to be effected
[4274]with the United States Coast Guard in order that
[4275]-there be no interference with maritime activities;
[4276]and the Immigration and Naturalization Service was
[4277]alerted to the need to facilitate the entry of Cuban
[4278]defectors. 61/ .
[4280]As attempts were being made to establish the
[4281]parameters for the operations against Castro, a most
[4282]prescient memorandum was directed to Chief, WH/4
[4283]from Paul Oberst, Chief, Covert Action, WH Division.
[4284]Oberst apparently had been associated with PBSUCCESS,
[4285]the project which resulted in the ouster of the Arbenz
[4286]Government in Guatemala in 1954; and recalling some
[4287]of the “pitfalls and counter-productive aspects" of
[4288]that particular operation, Oberst wrote as follows:
[4290]I have the impression that our basic
[4292]JMARC plan commits us to a rather firm
[4294]timetable. In my judgment, we should
[4296]have great flexibility in deciding the
[4298]appropriate time for kicking off any
[4300]paramilitary operations. Before such
[4301]operations are initiated, we should have
[4303]firm evidence that our propaganda and
[4305]political action operations have irrev-
[4307]ocably undermined Castro's prestige,
[4309]both in Cuba and abroad. We should not
[4311]initiate paramilitary actions until we
[4312]are convinced that they will not enable
[4314]- 86'°-
[4316]TOP SECRET
[4318]13-00000
[4320]TOP SECRET
[4322]Castro to recuperate lost prestige and
[4323]rally local and foreign sympathy and sup-
[4324]port. .Generally speaking, current area
[4325]attitudes toward the Castro regime are
[4326]satisfactory from our [CIA] point of view.
[4327]However, this could change radically and
[4328]rapidly, if there are any premature para-—
[4329]military actions. When the time comes
[4330]for paramilitary activity, we should make
[4331]every effort to conceal any invasion
[4332]actions. To avoid or minimize Castro's
[4333]counter propaganda, the paramilitary
[4334]operations must appear to be an internal : -
[4335]uprising by'dissident elements within
[4336]Cuba. This, of course, would require
[4337]clandestine infiltration of personnel
[4339]and. arms before the hostitlities begin.
[4341]In my opinion, Castro will inevitably
[4342]charge the US with responsibility for
[4343]JMARC operations, and many Latin Americans
[4344]and other foreign observers will be in-
[4345]clined to accept such charges with or
[4346]without supporting evidence. Therefore,
[4347]what we need is a massive diversionary
[4348]effort that will either obscure the fact
[4349]of our involvement or make our involvement
[4350]palatable. This diversionary tactic might
[4351]be accomplished by exploiting unanimous
[4352]Latin American revulsion toward the Trujillo
[4353]regime ... If it became known, or strongly
[4354]suspected, that we were supporting opera-
[4355]tions to bring about a transition to demo-
[4356]cratic.government in the Dominican Republic,
[4357]the waters would be suitably muddied, and
[4358]a climate prepared for the Cuban effort.* 62/
[4360]* Debatable though Oberst's philosophy regarding the
[4361]Dominican Republic might be, serious attention to his
[4362]initial comments regarding paramilitary activities
[4363]against Castro might have halted -~ or at least seriously
[4364]altered -- the operations which would ultimately con-
[4365]Clude at the Bahia de Cochinos.. As with other of the
[4366]cautionary and restrained: proposals which would be put
[4367]forth prior to launching the invasion, little heed
[4368](footnote continued on following page)
[4370]- 87 _
[4371]TOP SECRET
[4373]13-00000
[4375]TOP SECRET
[4377]In mid-April of 1960 WH/4 made the first presen-
[4378]tation for the DCI since the basic program had been
[4379]approved by President Eisenhower in mid-March. In
[4380]attendance in addition to the DCI were: Gen. Cabell,
[4381]Mr. Helms (C/OPS), Herman Horton (CI Staff), and C.
[4382]Tracy Barnes, Mr. Bissell's Deputy. This high level
[4383]group was informed that broadcasting activity from -
[4384]Swan Island was scheduled to begin on 17 May 1960 and
[4385]that very special operations. were being carried out
[4386]in order to provide stories for propaganda use. Ac-
[4388]cording to Dave Phillips who made the presentation
[4390]apparently was paid to Mr. Oberst's proposals.
[4392]About the same time that Oberst's memorandum
[4393]was going forward, the DDP was calling for WH/4 to
[4394]prepare daily progress reports as one way of eliminat-
[4395]ing the need for crash-type responses or actions.
[4397]In discussing the contents of such reports, it was
[4399]indicated that: ,
[4400]The Progress Report should generally
[4402]not exceed one page in length, and that
[4404]we should not hesitate to include it in
[4406]items which were not favorable to our
[4408]progress, in other words, setbacks or
[4410]handicaps. which we might have encountered. 63/
[4412]Also, by way of keeping informed about develop-~
[4413]ments related to the operation, Chief WH/4 instituted
[4414]a series of weekly meetings with the operational ele-
[4415]ments of the DDP "for the purpose of insuring opera-
[4416]tional coordination similar to that achieved by the
[4417]meeting of support elements every Tuesday morning." 64/
[4419]- 88 -
[4421]TOP. SECRET
[4423]13-00000
[4425]TOP SECRET
[4427]on propaganda, excellent results were being obtained.
[4428]The reports on the evolution of the government in
[4429]exile and the buildup of the stay-behind network and
[4430]on paramilitary activity indicated that much work
[4431]still remained to be done to get these activities
[4433]off the ground: Further, it was pointed out to the
[4435]‘DCI and the DDCI that budget estimates were rapidly
[4437]escalating, principally because:
[4439]Direct costs of nonexpendable equipment
[4440][were] being charged against the project
[4441]which, in fact, was the major cause of the
[4442]project's over-obligation. It was the.
[4443]opinion of ‘all concerned that such property
[4444]should be held on a Memorandum Receipt
[4446]- basis without cost to the project, and
[4447]that. charges, if any, should be reflected
[4448]as direct costs only if property was found
[4449]unserviceable or was not returned to com-
[4450]munications stock supply after the project
[4451]is terminated. The DCI was advised that
[4453]- this matter would be discussed with the
[4454]Comptroller for resolution. 65/
[4456]Most important ‘in’ connection with this briefing,
[4457]was the DCI's comment that:
[4458]With respect to personnel needs, he
[4459]: assured all, no matter whether personnel
[4460]were overseas or in the US, he would
[4461]arrange to obtain personnel required in
[4462]‘support of JMARC. 66/
[4463]The meaning of Chief/WH/4's comments to the DCI,
[4465]was made quite clear within a few days when Admendment
[4467]No. 1 to the project was submitted to the Director
[4469]- g9 -
[4471]TOP SECRET
[4473]13-00000
[4475]TOP SECRET
[4477]for approval. The amendment concerned the need for
[4478]more money and pointed out that:
[4479]Not only has the initial $900,000
[4481]already been expended, but it is cur-
[4483]rently estimated that an additional
[4485]$1.0 million is immediately required to
[4487]carry-the activity. through 30 June 1960
[4489]--. Note is also made ... of possible
[4491]. contingencies amounting to an additional
[4493]$1.4 million for which no funds are re-
[4495]quested ‘at this: time. 67/
[4497]In addition to an early updating for the DCI,
[4498]WH/4 also. undertook to educate the Joint Chiefs of
[4499]Staff on the Cuban problem very soon after the Eisen-
[4500]hower approval of the anti-Castro program. On 8 April
[4501]1960, General: Cabell headed a CIA delegation including
[4502]Mr. Bissell, Col. King, and Jake Esterline which
[4503]briefed a very high level group of Department of
[4504]Defense representatives in the JCS conference room
[4505]at the Pentagon.* General Cabell made only introduc-
[4507]tory remarks, and the bulk of the briefing was con-.
[4509]ducted by Mr. Bissell with some assistance from
[4511]* Included among the Defense participants were Thomas
[4512]Gates, Secretary of Defense; Gen. Twining, Chairman, ©
[4513]oCS; Gen. Shoup, Commandant U.S. Marines; Admiral
[4514]Burke; CNO; General Erskine, Chief, Special Ops, U.S.
[4515]Army;. Gen. White, COS/USAF; and Gen. Woolnough, repre-
[4516]senting Cos/army . 68/
[4518]_ 90 -
[4520]TOP SECRET
[4522]13-00000
[4524]TOP SECRET
[4526]oS. c. King. Apparently Jake Esterline, the man who
[4527]had the monkey on his back as project chief sat
[4528]quietly by. |
[4529]The Suggestion which had been made by Paul
[4530]Oberst that the "waters be muddied" by making it
[4531]appear that the US was backing the anti-Trujillo
[4532]forces in the Dominican Republic was not introduced
[4533]during the course of this briefing of the JCS, even
[4534]though the Dominican Republic was included as a part
[4535]of the overall briefing. What did emerge with refer-
[4536]oe | ence to the Dominican Republic was a concensus that
[4537]_ if Trujillo were ousted, there was a strong possibility
[4538]that Castro might move into the Dominican Republic |
[4539]where he probably would be received as a conquering
[4540]hero.
[4542]_ in the course of the discussion which followed
[4543]the briefing, Admiral Burke emerged as the principal
[4544]“hawk, * indicating his willingness to move fleet units
[4545]into the Port au Prince, Haiti area because the sug-_
[4546]gestion had been made that. if Castro went into the
[4547]‘Dominican Republic it would only be a few days time
[4548]before ‘he also would be welcomed into Haiti. In ad-
[4550]dition, Burke made it quite clear that should the
[4552]-=- 91 -
[4554]TOP SECRET |
[4556]13-00000
[4558]TOP SECRET
[4560]Cuban government launch an attack on Guantanamo, the
[4561]Navy was prepared to defend that base. In Burke's
[4563]opinion, the Navy had adequate force available to do
[4565]that.* 69/.
[4567]Whether a direct result of this briefing of
[4569]the JCs or. not, there was’ a noticeable improvement .
[4570]in WH/4"s relations with the military services be-
[4571]fore the end of April 1960. On 19 April, for example,
[4572]$150,000 was to be funneled from the CIA's Director |
[4573]of Logistics to the Comptroller, US Army, ostensibly
[4574]as a working fund for the 2750th Maintenance Unit,
[4575]Fort Randolph, Canal Zone. This money, Of course,
[4577]was to be used for necessary construction, renovation,
[4579]procurement of material, and hire of native labor as
[4581]necessary to improve Fort Randolph as a training site
[4582]for the PM insturctor cadre. 71/-
[4583]Before the end of April 1960, the Joint Chiefs
[4587]of Staff had approved, in principle, the Agency's
[4589]ee This briefing for the senior personnel in the Depart-
[4591]ment of Defense, would have taken. place in any event;
[4592]but it may have been prompted by the reluctance of the
[4593]designated DOD liaison officer with WH/4, Capt. Burns
[4594]Spore (USN), to do much more than listen to WH/4' s re-
[4595]quests for the assignment of DOD personnel to the
[4596]project and for real estate for use in the. training
[4597]program until. he received a green light from the
[4598]SecDef. 70/
[4600]- 92 -
[4602]TOP SECRET ©
[4604]13-00000
[4606]TOP SECRET
[4608]request for overflight photo coverage of the islands
[4610]offshore of Cuba. The decision on this matter was
[4612]taken up, not only with the Air Force, but also with
[4613]J. Lampton Berry of the Department of State.* Al-
[4614]though the ‘authorization and plan for these overflights,
[4615]presumably by the U-2, antedated the shootdown of
[4616]Francis Gary Power's U~2 in the Soviet Union, it was
[4617]recorded that:
[4619]Ambassador Berry had called to say
[4621]that the Department ... had approved the
[4623]mission, but insisted that extremely
[4625]tight security be exercised throughout
[4627]and that Col. Benson (USAF/Operations)
[4629]inform Ambassador Berry before each
[4631]sortie so that the Department would be
[4633]properly prepared to respond to any
[4635]emergency. 72/
[4636]The first flight, incidentally, ‘was tentatively sched-
[4637]uled for the weekend of 30 April ~ 1 May of 1960.**
[4639]In April of 1960, in addition to working with
[4641]the Army, the Agency representatives also began to
[4643]work with the Covert Limited Warfare Committee of
[4645]* Berry was a Career Minister and former Ambassador
[4646]Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary. (AE&P) to Ceylon who
[4647]was at this time. assigned to the Bureau of Intelligence
[4648]and Research. .
[4650]++ Powers was shot down over the USSR on 1 May 1960.
[4652]: - 93 -
[4654]TOP SECRET _
[4656]13-00000
[4658]TOP SECRET
[4660]the Office of Special Operations, Department of De-
[4661]fense. One of the particular problems of concern in
[4662]this relationship was that of covert sea transporta-
[4664]tion which might be necessary to lift anti-Castro
[4666]forces back to the. island of. Cuba. Even though all
[4668], the planning about which there is a record at this
[4670]time concerned only cadres for guerrilla warfare
[4672]training and the infiltration of communications ex-
[4674]perts, on 25 April 1960, Savilion Chapman of DDP's
[4676]Maritime Branch met with a Captain Thomas (USN) and
[4677]a Col. Anderson’ (USMC) who were members of the DOD/CIA
[4678]Covert Limited Warfare Stockpiling Committee, and
[4679]discussed among other interesting subjects:
[4680]The acquisition from the Navy of two
[4681]Landing Ship~Tanks (LST) and four Air-
[4682]Sea Rescue Craft (AVR), the training of
[4683]the Cuban crews for these vessels, and
[4684]. the means; of covert transfer of the
[4685]vessels from the Navy to the Agency.* 73/
[4686]In addition to the requested overhead reconnis-
[4688]sance of the Cuban coastline. by the Air Force, the
[4690]-* It is rather strange that at this early date in
[4691]_ April 1960 discussions were being held concerning
[4693]the acquisition of LST's. There had been no discus-
[4695]‘sions concerning the movement of a large body of Cuban
[4696]troops back into their homeland; and, consequently,
[4698]the discussion re LST's seems highly out of place.
[4700]- 94 -
[4702]TOP. SECRET
[4704]13-00000
[4706]TOP SECRET _
[4708]Maritime Branch representatives also discussed beach
[4709]gradient problems with the Marine Corps and repre-
[4710]sentatives of the Navy's Hydrographic Office. It
[4711]was ascertained that much work neéded to be. done in
[4712]order to upgrade information suitable for pianning
[4714]the use of LST's for beaching and landing of troops
[4716]-and vehicles. 74/
[4718]In the weeks immediately following Eisenhower's
[4719]announcement of the anti-Castro policy, the Department
[4721]of State seemed to be operating in a world.of. its own
[4723]-~ making elaborate plans for Cuban briefings and the
[4725]flow of information on Cuba's internal developments.
[4726]On 25 March, for example, Roy Rubottom, Assistant
[4727]Secretary of State for American Republic Affairs,
[4728]was the originator of an elaborate memorandum which
[4729]provided a check list .of current. operations and ten
[4730]categories of activity related to developments in.
[4731]Cuba. From the tenor of the paper itself, it seems
[4732]as though Rubottom was ignorant of the Cuban issues
[4733]before the Special Group, of the discussions among
[4734]CIA, State, and Department of Defense, and of the
[4735]President's approved plan for covert action. Nor
[4737]was there any evident awareness of the various overt
[4739]- 95 +
[4741]TOP SECRET
[4743]13-00000
[4745]- TOP SECRET
[4747]programs with reference to the Cuban problem. 75/
[4748]About this same time, Allen Dulles made known to
[4749]‘the Special Group his displeasure that the Depart-
[4750]ment failed to consult with the Agency prior to
[4751]announcing the reappointment of Philip Bonsal as US
[4752]Ambassador to Cuba. 16/
[4753]The Rubottom plan apparently had some. impact,
[4754]for by the end of April 1960, Gordon Gray was calling
[4755]on Douglas Dillon, the Undersecretary of State, to
[4756]find someone in the Department -- Dillon himself --
[4757]‘to be “constantly seized of the Cuban problem and
[4758]who would take steps. to assure that all of the activ-
[4759]. ities of various groups were in harness and that all
[4760]needed decisions were made when needed. "* 77/ Mr.
[4761]Gray also specified some of the problems which would
[4762]face a Chief of Staff on the Cuban activity, noting:
[4763][Livingston Merchant] has set up two
[4764]groups, one under the chairmanship of
[4765]Mr. Mallory. In addition, there is the
[4766]Special Group, of which Livie is a mem-
[4768]ber, and in his absence Ray Hare sits.
[4769]Further, there is a special activity
[4771]* This, of.course, apparently ignores or disregards
[4772]the creation of WH/4 and the responsibilities desig-
[4773]nated to the Agency by Gray's boss, President Eisen-
[4774]hower.
[4776]- 96 -
[4778]TOP SECRET
[4780]13-00000
[4782]TOP SECRET
[4784]proceeding under the chairmanship of Bob
[4785]Anderson, with which you may or may not
[4786]be familiar. Allen Dulles has a particu-
[4787]lar liaison with Bob in this matter.
[4789]The Defense Department, of course, has
[4790]many interests. 78/
[4792]‘The suggestion that Undersecretary Douglas Dillon be
[4794]made Chief of Staff responsible for coordinating the
[4796]programs with reference to Cuba did not sit well with-
[4798]: . / .
[4799]the Agency; and after the matter had been surfaced at
[4801]‘,
[4803]a meeting of the Special Group on 28 April, Chief,
[4805]., WH/4 prepared a memorandum stating in part with
[4807]reference to Dillon:
[4808]The Agency would not look with favor on
[4810]this arrangement. Mr. Barnes and the
[4812]-Director, therefore, plan to go over to
[4814]State on Monday afternoon [2 May 1960]
[4816]-and head off this new development. Mr.
[4818]Barnes believes that a short paper setting
[4820]forth what we are already doing in the
[4822]fields. of coordination and liaison should
[4824]be adequate to support their point of
[4826]view. 79/ ;
[4828]Whether resistance to the suggestion that Dillon
[4829]become Chief of' Staff for the nation's anti-Castro
[4830]program was in itself distasteful to the Agency or
[4831]whether it was simply opposition to the idea that State
[4832]should take over the direction of a program which
[4833]would basically be carried out by the Agency is not
[4835]revéaled -in the records... Presumably both elements
[4837]- 97 -
[4838]TOP SECRET
[4840]13-00000
[4842]TOP SECRET
[4844]entered into the picture. In any event, Gordon Gray
[4845]seemed cavalier in disregarding the creation of WH/4
[4846]and the liaison arrangements which had already been
[4847]made. (See Appendix D.)* But whatever the explana-
[4848]tion, Mr. Dillon did not become Chief of Staff for
[4849]the nation's Cuban program.
[4851]Although it was not. included on the list of
[4853]‘Agencies with which CIA maintained liaison and con-
[4855]tacts at this time, mention should be made of the
[4856]CIA-FBI contacts concerning Cuba. Technically the
[4857]FBI was prohibited. from engaging in intelligence
[4859]operations overseas, but in mid-June 1960, Chief,
[4861]‘WH/4 revealed that the FBI reportedly had. plans for
[4863]installing a stay-behind network ~-- using Mexicans
[4865]and Cubans -- to be activated in case diplomatic
[4866]relations between the US and Cuba were broken. Chief,
[4867]WH/4 suggested that the CI Staff get in touch with
[4869]the FBI Liaison Officer, Sam Papich and ask for an
[4870]explanation of the Bureau's’ plan. 80/ About the
[4872]same time that Chief WH/4 was evincing concern about
[4874]FBI activities in Cuba, Chief, WH Division noted in
[4875]* Appendix D, page 332.
[4877]- 98 -
[4879]TOP SECRET
[4881]13-00000
[4883]TOP SECRET
[4885]a memorandum for the Acting Director of Central In-
[4886]telligence that: .
[4887]A thorough investigation has been made
[4889]of the relations between the Havana Station
[4891]and. the Havana Office of the Federal Bureau.
[4893]‘of Investigation. It has been concluded
[4895]that the operations of the FBI have neither
[4897]interferred with nor conflicted with the
[4899]Station's operations. 81/
[4901]Col’... King's memo also stated the Bureau's long-
[4902]time contacts in the Cuban area were a benefit to
[4903]both the Bureau and to the Station pointing out that
[4904]-€requently the Station was called on to participate
[4905]in, or actually undertake, the debriefing of various
[4906]individuals who had come into the FBI offices to volun-
[4907]teer information. On oceasion, the Bureau had even
[4909]_ turned over specific operations to the Station.
[4911]Chief, WH Division went even further when,
[4912]during the course of one of the weekly interdepart-
[4913]mental meetings in State, it was suggested by Mr.
[4915]Gray and Mr. Mallory that the FBI was exceeding its
[4916]jurisdiction, and that perhaps this should be brought
[4917]before the NSC for consideration. Col. King reported
[4918]that he remained non-committal at this time, but did
[4919]point out that he thought the jurisdictional issue
[4921]should be “soft-pedaled." He did say, however, that
[4923]~ 99 -
[4925]TOP SECRET
[4927]13-00000
[4929]TOP SECRET
[4931]the memorandum he had prepared on this subject was
[4932]being held in the files should questions about this
[4934]- particular Bureau activity ever be raised. King
[4935]also recommended that the Agency not take the initia-
[4936]tive in raising the question. 82/
[4938]Neither Col. King, nor anyone else involved in
[4939]the anti-Castro operation ever registered a formal
[4940]protest against the FBI's activities in the Havana
[4941]area. By mid-summer 1960, the relationship became
[4942]even closer, particularly as the Agency expanded
[4943]activities. at the Forward Operations Base, JMASH
[4944](later JMWAVE) in Miami. ‘In one report concerning
[4945]the number of the. Cuban exiles in the Miami area who
[4946]were under suspicion of -- or were -- working for
[4947]Castro, or who were trying desperately to get sup-
[4948]port from one or another US Agency, an FBI agent
[4949]made a rather interesting forecast to the CIA repre-
[4950]sentative with whom he was exchanging information.
[4951]According to the report from Miami, an FBI agent
[4953]| told me that his personal opinion was
[4955]that it. would be virtually impossible, if
[4957]not completely impossible, to bring about
[4959]the overthrow of the Castro regime using
[4961]Cuban exiles. He thought the only solu-
[4963]tion to the problem, and the one that
[4964]stood the best chance of success, was to
[4966]~ 100 -
[4967]TOP SECRET
[4971]TOP SECRET
[4973]go in with the US Marines. He admitted
[4974]_that this was only his personal opinion,
[4975]but he felt that in view of his experience
[4976]and contact with the Cuban exiles, he had
[4977]a good point. I could not help agree
[4978]with him. 83/
[4980]Agent George Davis apparently was extremely
[4982]interested in full cooperation with the Agency, quick-
[4984]ly accepting the Agency representative's proposal
[4986]that they visit the FBI offices once or twice each
[4987]week to compare notes; and the CIA field’ representa-
[4988]tive, in turn, agreed to pass on to Mr. Davis in the
[4989]FBI any information which the Agency might acquire
[4990]pertaining to FBI interests. *
[4992]* The Forward Operations Base (FOB) opened in May
[4993]1960 in Coral Gables, Florida, and it was the second
[4995]FOB that had been established since the formation of
[4996]WH Division -- the initial base having been set up
[4998]during the anti-Arbenz operation in Guatemala in 1953-
[5000]1954. In general, the Miami FOB paralleled the organ-
[5001]ization of Headquarters with FI, CI, CA, Support, and
[5002]PM units. FOB reported directly to the Chief,. WH
[5003]Division, not to Jake Esterline, Chief, WH/4. Ini-
[5004]tially the satellite communications center for relaying
[5005]commo between Headquartérs and the field -- including
[5006]facilities in thé Florida Keys concerning the maritime
[5007]operations --.was established; and ultimately the commo
[5008]link would connect Headquarters with the operations in
[5009]Guatemala and Nicaragua. The cover firm for the base, |
[5010]was Clarence A. DePew & Sons, a notional cover:: for
[5012]an organization engaged in Classified research.
[5014]A series of some 32 reports has been prepared on ~
[5015]the FOB, and the reports are available through the
[5016]Records Management Officer of WH Division. These
[5018](footnote continued on following page)
[5020]- 101 -
[5021]TOP SECRET
[5023]13-00000
[5025]TOP SECRET
[5027]In addition to its concern with the interests
[5028]of other government agencies in the Cuban problem,
[5029]in mid-summer of 1960 the Agency also was required
[5030]to provide intelligence briefings for the Presidential
[5031]and Vice-Presidential candidates of the major politi-
[5032]cal parties. ‘While the intelligence briefings were
[5033]scheduled to consider. the world situation, consider-
[5034]able emphasis was being given to both Cuba and the
[5035]Dominican Republic. In preparation for Mr. Dulles’
[5036]briefing of the Democratic nominee, John F. Kennedy,
[5037]on 23 July 1960, WH/4 prepared a detailed Cuban brief-
[5038]ing paper touching on the principal aspects of the
[5039]exile organization, the propaganda plan, penetration
[5040]of Cuba by personnel from communist countries (includ~
[5041]ing the Soviet Union, Red China, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia,
[5042]and East Germany), and the play that Castro was making
[5043]in the Latin American world for pro-communist sympa-—
[5045]thizers. In addition, emphasis also was given to the
[5047]reports deal basically with the period between 1962
[5048]and 1968; and while there is some feeling that the
[5049]story of the Bay of. Pigs operation should go into
[5050]extensive detail on the initial operations of the
[5051]FOB, this author has chosen not to do so, focusing
[5052]instead on only those broad aspects of the problem
[5053]relating to the Miami Base. 84/
[5055]-. 102 -
[5057]TOP SECRET .
[5059]13-00000
[5061]TOP SECRET
[5063]planned program for paramilitary training and opera-—
[5065]tions under the aegis of CIA. “Insofar as can be
[5067]determined, however, there is no indication that in
[5068]“his pre-election briefing of the Democratic Presidential
[5070]candidates that Mr. Dulles went into any specifics
[5072]on the Agency's anti-Castro pians. 85/
[5074]As‘mentioned previously, one of the continuing .
[5075]problems requiring coordination within the Executive
[5076]Branch was the increasing budget demands for Project
[5077]JMATE. From an estimate of some $2.5 million of
[5078]‘budgeted and reserve funds, which had been made avail-
[5079]able for the program by mid-August of 1960, Mr. Bissell.
[5080]appeared ata special Group meeting, requesting that
[5081]“an additional $10.75 million be released from reserve
[5082]funds to meet the ever-increasing needs, particularly
[5083]for the paramilitary and propaganda programs. The
[5084]decision of the Special Group following Mr. Bissell's
[5085]appeal was that: .
[5087]| This matter should be laid before the
[5089].appropriate higher authorities and a
[5091]presentation would be arranged hopefully
[5093]within the next ten days. This was be-
[5095]lieved to be wise, not because any. actions
[5097]involving major political risks were to
[5099]be taken in the near future, but because
[5101]the Agency would soon become committed _
[5102]to various substantial expenditures which
[5104]- 103 -
[5106]TOP SECRET
[5108]13-00000
[5110]TOP SECRET
[5112]should not be undertaken without a reason-
[5113]able assurance that the operation was to
[5114]go forward. 86/
[5115]On 22-23 August of 1960, after discussions with Mr.
[5116]Stans and Mr. Macy, the Agency was notified that the
[5118]requested $10 million for FY 61 would be made avail-
[5120]_able from the Agency Reserve for Contingencies.* 87/
[5122]Cc. Cooperation and Challenge
[5124]As already mentioned, immediately following
[5125]the Eisenhower decision to promote the anti-Castro
[5126]program, there was a considerable degree of coopera-
[5127]tion between CIA ‘and other of the concerned Agencies
[5129]-- the Department of Defense, the Department of State, .
[5131]the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Immigration and
[5133]Naturalization Service, and others. As WH/4 continued
[5135]to expand and develop the various programs -- propa-
[5139]ganda, covert.action, staybehind networks, and para-
[5140]military operations -- there were ever increasing
[5142]contacts between CIA and the representatives of other
[5144]* One explanation for the sharply increasing demand
[5145]for reserve funds may lie in the fact that materiel
[5146]was being written off upon issue, rather than upon
[5147]consumption -- an aspect of the operation that was
[5148]explained to the author by William E. Eisemann,
[5149]formerly Chief, Support WH/4. 88/
[5151]- 104 -
[5153]TOP SECRET
[5155]13-00000 .
[5157]TOP SECRET
[5159]government agencies. Perhaps the best way to describe
[5160]the period from the summer of 1960 until the early
[5162]fall was as a period of cooperation and challenge.
[5164]' Cooperation because the needs of the Agency represented
[5166]National Policy. Challenge to most if not all of
[5168]CIA's proposals -- proposals which concerned the
[5170]nature of the propaganda effort, the size and make-up :
[5172]. of the exile military force which was being organized,
[5174]the location of training sites, the types of technical
[5175]materiel (including. aircraft) being requested, and,
[5176]most important by the end of this period, the specific
[5180]nature of the military operation which was to be
[5182]mounted against Fidel Castro.
[5184]By early June 1960, the program for paramilitary
[5186]training of Cuban exiles was jumped from some 60 to
[5188]500 or more trainees -- even. though the actual train
[5190]‘ing of the: initial instructor cadre at Fort Randolph
[5192]in Panama had not yet begun and the FRD was only in
[5194]. i . :
[5195]the initial stages of negotiation for PM and commo
[5196]“training facilities in Guatemala. It was anticipated
[5198]‘that the increased number of PM trainees would be
[5200]recruited out of the Miami area, from other Latin
[5202]American countries where Cubans had taken up residence,
[5204]- 105 -
[5206]TOP SECRET
[5208]13-00000
[5210]TOP SECRET
[5212]and from others who might be recruited inside Cuba.
[5213]The emphasis on the PM training at this time was to
[5214]be on weapons, demolitions, sabotage, and guerrilla
[5216]warfare tactics; and the weapons familiarization was
[5218]to be with the M-1 carbine, the Garand and Spring-
[5220]field rifles, the Thompson sub-machine gun, and the
[5222]-45 Colt automatic pistol. This, of course, was the
[5224]weapons mix in the Agency's stockpile of standard
[5225]arms packs. 89/
[5227]It must be presumed that the call for increases
[5228]in the number of PM trainees was related to the con-
[5229]tinued importation of Soviet weapons and’ technicians
[5230]and the increasing strength of the Communist Party
[5231]in Cuba. An NIE written in mid-June 1960 on “The
[5232]Situation in Cuba," for example noted that the Castro’
[5233]regime was “deeply and increasingly influenced by Conm-
[5234]munists .. no longer any prospect of democratic govern-
[5235]ment under his [Fidel Castro's] regime." As was past
[5237]estimates, this particular NIE was unable to answer
[5239]the question of whether Castro himself was a Communist.
[5241]The NIE also mentioned that no strong opposition
[5242]leader to the Castro regime had emerged, nor did the
[5244]opposition at that time “pose a serious threat to
[5246]- 106 -
[5248]TOP SECRET
[5250]13-00000
[5252]TOP SECRET.
[5254]the regime." One weakness touched on by the National
[5255]Estimate concerned the Castro militia which was char-
[5256]acterized as "only partially armed, and for the most
[5257]part poorly trained ... [and] appears to have little,
[5258]if any, effectiveness as an organized combat force.
[5259]in conventional operations." For either of the fore-
[5260]going reasons, perhaps, an increase in the number. of
[5261]PM personnel might (a) assist in bringing a strong
[5262]dissident leader to the fore, or (b) develop the
[5263]capability to overcome the Castro militia. 90/
[5265]The question of an increased number of PM
[5266]trainees surfaced in a late August briefing for Presi-
[5267]dent Eisenhower, Secretaries Gates, Dillon, and Ander-—
[5268]son, and Generals Persons, Lemnitzer, and Goodpaster
[5269]by the DCI and Mr. Bissell. After President Eisenhower's
[5270]National Security Adviser, Gordon Gray, summarized
[5271]developments since the March announcement of the anti-
[5272]Castro program, Mr. Dulles provided some specifics
[5273]concerning the organization of the FRD and its prin-
[5274]cipals, noting that the Headquarters for the FRD had
[5275]been established in Mexico City, in lieu of the invi-
[5276]tation of. President Ydigoras of Guatemala to permit
[5278]the FRD to operate’ from his country. “Mr. Dulles
[5280]- 107 -
[5282]TOP SECRET
[5284]13-00000
[5286]TOP SECRET
[5288].
[5290]noted that at this time, it was particularly important
[5291]that the US presence in Guatemala not be revealed.’
[5292]When the discussion turned to the PM forces, the De-
[5293]partment of Defense representative, Mr. Gates, made
[5295]it quite clear that he was concerned about the pos-
[5297]sibility of US military personnel being involved
[5299]directly in the military operations inside Cuba.
[5301]Mr. Bissell responded that US military personnel in
[5302]third countries would be used only as instructors --
[5303]not as cadre leaders for either an invasion ora
[5304]guerrilla warfare effort.
[5306]Bissell did stress, however, that there was
[5307]need for a standby force, .preferably of non-Americans,
[5308]with. special training in guerrilla warfare to pro-
[5309]vide a leadership complement to the Cubans when “push"
[5310]came to’ "shove," a recommeridation that provoked some
[5311]differences of opinion during the course of this
[5312]briefing for the President when it was suggested
[5314]that US officers might be required to direct these
[5316]forces. Mr. Dulles proposed withholding this dis-
[5318]cussion until the Agency and the JCS could talk the
[5319]matter over. Mr. Gray seemed to be determined that
[5321]the issue of the force level and make-up be resolved
[5323]- 108 -
[5325]TOP SECRET
[5327]13-00000
[5329]TOP SECRET
[5331]at this particular time. According to his own report
[5332]_ Of his position at this meeting,
[5334]Mr. Gray pointed out that it would be
[5335]unwise to mount any kind of an operation
[5336]without the determination to see it
[5337]through and that. an abortive effort would
[5338]be worse than-no effort at all. He there-
[5339]fore thought that if this backup force
[5341]“was essential to ultimate success, full
[5342]consideration should be given to it at
[5343]this stage in the planning. Mr. Dulles
[5344]again urged that a decision on this be
[5345]deferred.* 91/
[5347]In support of Mr. Gray and in some contradiction
[5348]to Mr. Bissell's view that perhaps the Cuban PM force
[5349]would be able to carry off the effort without any out-
[5350]side help, the President was reported to have indicated
[5351]that _ .
[5353]He would go along so long as the Joint
[5354]Chiefs, Defense, State, and CIA think we.
[5355]have a good chance of being successful. —
[5356]He wouldn't care much about this kind of
[5357]. cost [the $10 million increase noted |
[5358]: earlier]; indeed, he said he would de-
[5359].. fend this kind of action against all
[5360], comers and that if we could be sure of
[5361]freeing the Cubans from this incubus, —
[5362]$25 million might be a small price to pay.
[5364]* In light. of today's relations between the United
[5365]States and other of the major world powers with. the
[5366]third countries, Gordon Gray displayed -- in the
[5367]‘summer of 1960 -- a degree. of foresight with which .
[5368]he has never been properly credited. For he noted
[5369]at that time that if the US failed to deal firmly
[5370]with Cuba, there was an obvious danger that other
[5371]. small nations would be encouraged to undertake harass~
[5372]ments of the major powers. 92/
[5374]-109 -
[5376]TOP SECRET
[5378]13-00000
[5380]TOP SECRET
[5382]The President concluded the meeting, by
[5383]saying that he would like to urge caution
[5385]with respect to the danger of making false
[5387]moves, with the result of starting some-
[5389]thing before we were ready for it.* 93/
[5391]One of the most persistent problems which was
[5392]to Surface. by: early fall of 1960 concerned the need
[5393]for the anti-Castro operation itself, and the bulk
[5394]of the questioning came from the Department of State, .
[5395]principally from Thomas Mann, who soon was to become
[5396]the Assistant Secretary of State for American Repub-
[5398]lic Affairs. Mann already had been involved in some
[5400]of the prior discussions concerning the anti-Castro
[5402]‘activity in his capacity as Assistant Secretary for
[5404]* ‘In his temorandum of a meeting with the President
[5405]on 17 August 1960, Gordon Gray noted that in discuss-
[5406]ing the CIA meeting planned for 18 August, that in
[5407]addition to Messrs. Dulles.and Bissell, a third CIA
[5408]officer might possibly be in attendance; and he also
[5410]noted that the Vicé-President had been invited to at-
[5412]tend the briefing. According to Gray's record, how-
[5413]ever, neither the Vice-President nor the third CIA
[5415]representative were in attendance at the briefing of
[5417]18 August. The attendance of the Director and Mr.
[5418]Bissell, but with no CIA representative from WH/4,
[5420]was further: illustration of Jake Esterline's criticism
[5421]that at too many high level ‘briefings, CIA's repre-
[5422]sentatives were individuals who, high ranks notwith-
[5423]standing, were the furthest from the operation -- yet
[5424]they were responsible’ for informing the nation's policy-
[5425]makers about the details of the anti-Castro program. g4/
[5427]It is also interesting to note that this off-the-
[5429]record meeting which was arranged by Gordon Gray lasted
[5431]only 23 minutes, and this included at least a short
[5432]time for a brief discussion related to Francis Gary -
[5433]Powers. 95/
[5435]- 110 -
[5436]TOP SECRET
[5438]13-00000
[5440]TOP SECRET
[5442]Economic Affairs. In early September of 1960, Chief,
[5444]WH/4 learned from a member of the Department of State
[5445]that Mr. Mann was going to ask for a restudy of the
[5446]basic concept of IMATE, or, if he did not ask for
[5448]that re-evaluation, he would ask for immediate review
[5449]and rescheduling of the timetable for the IMATE oper-
[5450]ation. At this time and in view of the lack of prog~ -
[5452]ress both in developing any great cohesion within
[5454]the FRD in organizing the dissidents within Cuba,
[5455]_the questions seemed in order. The reaction of Chief,
[5456]WH/4 however, was that an attempt should be made to
[5458]blunt Mr. Mann's efforts, noting for example:
[5460]_ The degree to which we are already com-
[5461]mitted in JMARC would pose a monumental
[5462]security. problem alone if we were suddenly
[5463]instructed to cease and désist from further
[5464]activity.,. As of this moment, they. have
[5465]well in excess of 200 people .engaged in
[5466]air, ground, and communications ‘training
[5467]in Guatemala. Additionally, our across-
[5468]the-board propaganda activities are being:
[5469]stepped up daily. A drastic rescheduling
[5470]Of either activity, therefore, could bring
[5471]about serious repercussions. 96/ ,
[5473]The precise nature of these "serious repercus-
[5474]sions" was not spelled out. As time passed, however,
[5475]it would be charged that the cessation of the Agency-
[5477]sponsored training activities would loose a flood of
[5479]- lll -
[5481]TOP SECRET
[5483]13-00000
[5485]TOP SECRET
[5487]Cubans back into the exile community; and they would
[5488]charge that the United States feared to undertake the
[5489]task of ousting Fidel jCastro. This, in turn, would
[5490]mean that the US would lose face in the eyes of the
[5491]Democratic Latin American republics. Jake Esterline
[5492]speculated that Mann did not believe that the, Cubans
[5493]were willing to support an insurrection against Castro.
[5494]A suggestion which was made to counter the possible
[5495]Mann proposals was that:
[5497]To strengthen our position, therefore,
[5499]we are bending every effort to get at
[5501]least one supply: airdrop into the target
[5503]country, prior to the Assistant Secretary's
[5505]return to the United States ... Success-~
[5507]ful action in this area should weigh
[5509]heavily on Assistant Secretary Mann's
[5511]alleged new attitude. 97/
[5513]Just how one ~- or even more -~ successful air
[5514]drops would in any way influence Mann's opinion about
[5515]the receptiveness of the Cuban population to a pos-
[5516]sible insurrection effort was not explained. ‘That
[5517]there were dissidents on the island was unquestioned,
[5519]the problem was the degree of strength and effective-
[5521]ness that they might be able to demonstrate. *
[5523]* Fortunately for the continuation of Project JMATE,
[5525]. the hurry-up air drop to which Jake Esterline referred |
[5527]did not set the criteria for the continuation or dis-
[5529]‘solution of the project. This air drop was a complete
[5531](footnote continued on following page)
[5532]~ 112 -
[5534]TOP SECRET
[5536]13-00000
[5538]TOP SECRET
[5540]Mr. Mann would continue to raise questions con-
[5541]cerning the feasibility of discontinuing the training
[5542]in Guatemala, and ,in on-going meetings with Agency
[5543]representatives including the DCI, the DDP, Chief, WH,
[5545]as well as Chief, WH/4 and others, Mann continued to:
[5546]raise questions about the effect on Project JMATE
[5547]should all the American trainers and Cuban trainees
[5548]be pulled out of Guatemala immediately. Mann also
[5549]questioned the exact timing for Project JMATE. As
[5550]he raised such questions, the Assistant Secretary for
[5551]Latin American Affairs was informed by CIA that they
[5552]would much prefer that the training of the Cuban
[5553]exiles take place in US bases, both for purposes of
[5554]security and for efficiency. But they also pointed
[5555]out that it had been the decision for the Special
[5556]Group and the “highest levels" that such training
[5557]should take place in third countries, rather than in
[5558]the US. Mann persisted, however, suggesting that
[5559]the question of maintaining the training base in
[5561]-and total. bust, the supplies being dropped to the
[5562]guerrillas fell into the hands of Castro's forces;
[5563]and the aircraft itself made a forced landing in
[5564]Mexico and was not recovered. See Volume I of this
[5565]history, Air: Operations.
[5567]- 113 -
[5569]TOP SECRET
[5571]13-00000
[5573]TOP SECRET
[5575]Guatemala or removing it to the US should be raised
[5576]again with the Special Group. The Agency's repre-
[5577]sentatives agreed to this suggestion “with the strict-
[5578]est proviso that no move from Guatemala could or
[5579]should be made until adequate staging facilities in
[5580]the Zone of the Interior have been prepared." 98/
[5582]Tracy Barnes put the question of moving the
[5583]base from Guatemala to the Zone of the Interior in
[5584]a somewhat different context than had been suggested
[5585]by Esterline and J.C. King. Barnes recommended con-
[5586]sideration be given, among other items, to:
[5588]The fact that a move from the present
[5590]training sites to the US should not be
[5592]made too hurriedly and the importance of
[5594]avoiding a decision at a later date that
[5596]the training in the US is a bar to opera-
[5598]tional use. I realize that this latter
[5600]point would be a complete contradiction
[5602]of the present theory but, after all,
[5604]there is an intervening election; and
[5606]political views can shift so that every-
[5608]thing possible should be done to avoid
[5610]our getting ourselves into the box where
[5612]we move to the.US for one reason and then
[5614]find that the US move is used against us
[5616]to prevent or limit ultimate operations.* 100/
[5618]One additional point which was made’ by Jake
[5620]Esterline and J. C. King in their conversations with.
[5621]Source reference No. 99 not used.
[5623]- 114 -.
[5625]TOP SECRET
[5627]13-00000 .
[5629]TOP SECRET
[5631]Secretary Mann was that the sudden pullout of the
[5632]training program in Guatemala might very well lead
[5633]to the overthrow of President Ydigoras by the pro-
[5634]communist elements which were already in evidence
[5635]in opposition to the Ydigoras regime. It was indi-
[5636]cated that should the troop training be moved from
[5637]Guatemala to the United States, 300 Guatemalan troops .
[5638]would be trained as a special security force for the
[5639]Guatemalan government. 101/
[5641]During these discussions in the late fall of
[5642]1960, Mann also raised the issue of. economic sanctions
[5643]which had been touched on in the early spring. At
[5644]this time however, the Agency's representatives be-
[5645]lieved that Mann was talking in terms of a one to
[5646]three year quarantine period, in an attempt to dis-
[5647]rupt the Cuban economy -- a quarantine, however,
[5648]which would not interfere with the flow of goods from
[5649]the Communist countries. This was a point of some
[5650]contention between State and CIA, with the Agency
[5651]people convinced that the Soviet Union would make up
[5652]any deficiencies that tended to impede seriously the
[5653]economy of Castro's Cuba. 102/
[5655]In. the context of a possible move of the train-
[5657]-ing facilities to the United States, Chief, WH prepared
[5659]- 115 -
[5661]TOP SECRET
[5663]13-00000
[5665]TOP SECRET
[5667]a memorandum for the DDP indicating that the need
[5669]for training bases to be located in the southern
[5670]part of the United States. should include an infantry
[5671]training base capable of handling 3,000 men with
[5672]range facilities, tactical training areas, an air-
[5673]field for training air and ground crews in the utili-
[5674]zation of B-26, C-46 and C-54 aircraft, aerial gunnery.
[5675]and bomb range facilities, and maritime training and
[5676]staging facilities. It was suggested that the air-
[5677]field logistical base should be located in southern
[5678]Florida, and permission to use Ramey Air Force Base
[5679]in Puerto Rico to stage black over-flights’-to Cuba
[5680]should be obtained. The maritime facilities would
[5682]‘be located on Vieques Island, ‘Puerto Rico and also
[5684]‘in southern Florida.
[5686]. In a meeting with the Special Group, the Deputy
[5687]Director for Central Intelligence put forth the pro-
[5688]posals concerning the movement of training bases to
[5689]the United States; and although he was supported by
[5690]the Department. of Defense representatives -- Mr.
[5691]Douglas and Gen. Lansdale -- Livingston Merchant of
[5693]the Department of State, normally one of the hard
[5695]liners of the Department, seemed to have ambivalent
[5697]- 116 -
[5699]TOP SECRET
[5701]13-00000
[5703]( : TOP SECRET
[5705]feelings at this time about the training program.
[5706]Possibly Merchant was succumbing to Mann's arguments
[5708]suggesting that the time for military action was so
[5710]far down the line that US efforts should be concen-
[5711]trated on @conomic sanctions at this time. 103/
[5712]Adolf A. Berle, who would become one ‘of the Kennedy
[5714]administration'sprincipal advisers on Latin America, -
[5716]also Seemed to be swayed by Tom Mann's argument in
[5718]favor of economic sanctions, Berle suggesting that
[5720]the embargo be expanded to include the shipment of
[5721]arms and ammunition both ‘to Cuba and from Cuba to
[5722]other parts of Latin America. 104/
[5724]Although it has been indicated that the Depart-
[5725]ment of Defense would apparently support the Agency
[5726]in its. request for the. establishment of training .
[5728]facilities in the continental United States, DOD did
[5730]- balk at the use of military personnel in third country |
[5732]areas in support of Project JMATE. Although Deputy
[5733]Secretary of Defense James H. Douglas began to ques-
[5735]tion whether his department had actually been committed
[5737]to support CIA's anti-Castro effort, it seems clear
[5739]that policy approval for the use of Department of
[5741]Defense personnel in Project JMATE had been established
[5743]- 117 =
[5745]TOP SECRET
[5747]13-00000
[5749]TOP SECRET
[5751]with the approval of the President's comprehensive
[5752]program of covert action against Fidel Castro in
[5753]March 1960. 105/
[5754]| The difficulties encountered with the Department
[5756]of Defense .concerning the assignment of Special Force
[5757]trainers from the US Army to the Guatemalan training
[5758]bases has already been spelled out in considerable
[5759]detail in another volume, but even as the Department
[5760]of Defense was taking a negative attitude toward the
[5761]possible use of DOD personnel in either training or
[5762]combat activities, the Agency was proposing the re-
[5764]" eruitment of either American or foreign volunteers
[5765]to serve as combat troops for Project JMATE. The
[5766]Bureau of American Republic Affairs of Department
[5767]of State, however, put the quietus on the plan for
[5768]obtaining foreign volunteers; but J. Foster Collins,
[5769]the Chief of the Covert Action Staff, suggested to
[5770]the Deputy Director for Plans that possibly he (the
[5771]DDP) could convince Livingston Merchant of the need
[5772]to re-examine the Department of State policy. *
[5774]* The problem of the Special Force trainers is dis-
[5775]cusséd in Volume II of this history, Participation
[5777]in the Conduct of Foreign Policy.
[5779]- 118 -
[5781]TOP SECRET
[5783]13-00000
[5785]TOP SECRET
[5787]_ Collins was particularly enthusiastic about the pros-
[5789]spects for recruiting Germans, Greeks, and Turks to
[5791]serve as volunteers; but in the end, State's view
[5793]‘prevailed, and there were no contingents of either
[5795]American or foreign volunteers. 106/
[5796]During the period of buildup and organization
[5797]of WH/4 for the JMATE effort against Castro, the ~
[5799]Agency encountered some problems with the US Navy,
[5801]but none of these were as serious as the difficulties
[5803]encountered with the Department of Defense per se,
[5804]the Air Force, or ‘the United, States Army. The exist-
[5805]ence of the United States Naval Base at Guantanamo
[5806]Bay in Cuba presented an unusual situation in view
[5808]of the planning that was taking place. Apparently, —
[5809]however, there was no disagreement between the Agency
[5811]and the Navy that prohibited Guantanamo from being
[5813]- used. to mount anti-Castro activities or from being
[5815]used as a safe haven area for‘ those who might have
[5817]. been detected engaging in sabotage, propaganda, or
[5819]other anti-Castro activities. The purpose of such
[5820]restrictions, of course, was to prevent the Cubans
[5821]from claiming violations of the legal and binding
[5823]international agreement between the Unitéd States
[5825]- 119 -
[5827]TOP SECRET
[5829]13-00000
[5831]TOP.SECRET
[5833]‘and the Government of Cuba over the lease of Guantanamo
[5834]Bay. So serious was this issue in fact, that the .
[5835]Agency agreed |
[5837]_ that. all Cubans participating in over-
[5839]flights of Cuba would be told that Guan-
[5841]tanamo Naval Base was not to be used as
[5843]a safe haven, and that if they landed
[5845]there, they would be turned over to the
[5847]Cuban authorities. 107/
[5849]The - Guantanamo Base also presented a major aif
[5850]ficulty for the Department of State. Evidence of this
[5851]surfaced in early October ‘of 1960 when it was reported
[5852]that during a meeting of the State Working Group on
[5853]Cuba a suggestion was put forward that the US try to.
[5854]“influence Latin American nations to approve US reten-
[5855]tion of the base. One proposal had been made that
[5856]this: be done through the Inter-American Defense Board
[5857](TaD8) , where a resolution apparently was “about to be
[5858]introduced asking for a definition of the relations
[5859]between Cuba and. the USSR, with. the expectation that
[5861]\ .
[5862]this might force Cuba's resignation from membership
[5863]-on the. IADB. According to Col. John F. Mallard, the
[5864]Agency's. liaison officer with the State Working Group:
[5866]In addition, State desires that the
[5867]IADB, make some statement on the impor-
[5868]tance of Guantanamo Bay to Latin. American
[5869]hemisphere: defense. This statement would,
[5870]in effect,. give Latin American approval
[5871]to U.S.. retention of this base. 108/
[5873]- 120 -.
[5875]TOP SECRET
[5877]13-00000
[5879]TOP SECRET
[5881]This frame of reference concerning Guantanamo
[5882]Bay led the Executive Officer of WH/4, Ed Stanulis,
[5883]to prepare an extremely sharp memorandum for Chief,
[5884]Western Hemisphere Division raising some questions
[5885]which are as pertinent to CIA today as they were
[5886]when they were. raised in 1960. Stanulis wrote as
[5887]follows: 7
[5889]I realize that this Agency is an
[5890]implementing. arm of the Executive Branch
[5891]and has no right or privilege in the area
[5892]of formulation of U.S. national policy.
[5894]- I believe that within this framework we.
[5895]who aré part of this’ Agency are permitted
[5896]to comment on certain.State Department —
[5897]or other Executive Department propositions
[5898]that appear, on the basis of our own
[5899]personal observations and experience, to
[5901]be counter-productive to the best interest
[5902]of the United States. I am convinced
[5903]that the course of action, described in
[5904]paragraph 1 [that the U.S. use the IADB
[5905]to win Latin American support for the
[5906]U.S. retention of Guantanamo] is in fact
[5907]within this category.
[5909]It is high time that the U.S. take an
[5910]understandable public position in matters
[5911]of international agreement, compact, con- |
[5912]tract, and treaty. The rights of the U.S. .
[5913]to the Guantanamo Bay area have been clear-
[5914]ly and.legally described in several docu-
[5915]ments which bear the signatures of the
[5916]then reigning and cognizant governments
[5917]of the United States and Cuba, respectively.
[5918]Certainly the assistance of any single or
[5919]plural Latin American national:entity (ies)
[5920]seems to me to be indicative of an admitted
[5921]weakness on the part of the United States
[5923]- 121 -
[5925]TOP SECRET
[5927]13-00000
[5929]TOP SECRET
[5931]and its conviction of its legal inter-
[5932]national rights.
[5934]I suggest that this Agency make known
[5935]to the State Department its feelings in
[5936]this matter, as described above (if ad-
[5937]dressees agree). I realize that consider-
[5938]able discussion could be waged in terms
[5939]of legally and/or logically presenting
[5940]our’case. This memorandum is not intended
[5941]to meet these requirements.
[5943]One observation that might be included
[5944]is the fact that the current Chief of
[5945]Naval Operations, Admiral Arleigh Burke,
[5946]has on at least two occasions in U.S. mass
[5947]_INedia of sizable: circulation stated that
[5948]the United States would not tolerate any
[5949]invasion. of Guantanamo or hostile abroga-
[5950]tion of our treaty arrangements to the base.
[5951]yo I believe it is significant to note that
[5952]no responsible member of the Executive
[5953]Branch (including. the President of the
[5954]United.States) has contradicted his state-
[5955]ments. On the basis’ of this evidence, it
[5956]would appear to me that the official overt
[5957]position of the United States is crystal
[5958]clear and we need not at this time place.
[5959]ourselves in a position of indebtedness
[5960]or vulnerability with any other Latin
[5961]American nation in terms of the Guantan-
[5962]amo issue. 109/
[5964]By early November 1960 Secretary of State,
[5965]Christian Herter, had decided that the matter of
[5966]Guantanamo needed to be discussed at a higher level;
[5967]and, consequently, he introduced the subject on the
[5968]agenda for the National Security Council meeting of.
[5969]7 November 1960. The Secretary emphasized the need
[5971]for coordination of military and political planning
[5973]- 122 -
[5974]TOP SECRET.
[5976]13-00000 .
[5978]TOP SECRET
[5980]Xu
[5982]in case of an attack on the naval base. Herter
[5983]indicated two extreme possibilities: one, that in
[5985]case of an attack, the United States respond with
[5987]only sufficient military force to protect the base
[5989]13
[5991]itself; and another, that the United States decide
[5992]that an attack on the base was in fact an act of war
[5994]and apply ‘such military power as necessary. Herter
[5996]also suggested, of course, that there would be possi-
[5998]ble responses between the two extremes, with activities.
[6000]in the OAS or the UN possibly having some bearing on
[6002]the US response -- the sort of contention that undoubt-
[6004]edly must have raised the hackles on Mr. Stanulis
[6006]again. The Secretary of State did specify, however,
[6007]that the US response to an attack on Guantanamo would
[6009]be the result of a decision made by the President of
[6011]the United States.
[6013]As will be pointed out subsequently, the Cubans
[6014]would make charges: about Guantanamo being the center
[6015]for anti-Castro activities, and there would be a few
[6016]instances where anti-Castro Cubans were able to find
[6017]refuge within the confines of the base. Overall,
[6019]however, there was a surprising degree of neutrality
[6021].with respect to the naval installation during the
[6023]course of the Bay of Pigs operation.
[6025]-° 123 -
[6027]TOP. SECRET
[6029]13-00000
[6031]TOP SECRET
[6033]It is also important to mention at this time
[6034]the Agency's relations with the Commander in Chief,
[6035]CINCLANT, Admiral Dennison. Before the end of October
[6036]1960, the Admiral had made it clear to the Agency's
[6037]representatives that he believed it impossible for
[6039]him to conduct the affairs of the Atlantic Fleet in
[6041]_ the Cuban area properly until he received further -
[6043]information. -- specific information -- about the
[6044]Agency's planned operations against Castro. When
[6045]this report on Dennison was brought to the attention
[6046]of the Chief of the Agency War Plans Staff, F. P.
[6047]Holcomb, Holcomb assured the Admiral that any request
[6048]for information which he cared to lay on the Agency
[6049]would be promptly answered. By this time, Dennison
[6051]indicated that he had already been in touch with
[6053]General Lemnitzer, Chairman of the JCS, and the
[6055]expectation was that such briefing on Cuban affairs
[6057]by CIA was being laid on. .
[6059]| Holcomb, quite truthfully, indicated that
[6061]neither he nor the Agency's liaison officer to CINCLANT,
[6062]Commander Ray E. Millard, were privy to the planned
[6063]operations of WH/4. Once having assured the Admiral
[6065]of the willingness of CIA to cooperate and provide
[6067]-~ 124 -
[6069]TOP SECRET
[6071]13-00000 ; “
[6073]TOP SECRET
[6075]-him with the necessary information, Holcomb then
[6076]noted: “
[6078]It was the impression of the CIA
[6079]officers present that Admiral Dennison is
[6080]a cooperative officer and favorably and
[6081]objectively inclined towards CIA, and
[6082]that if his needs can be met, he will
[6083]undoubtedly follow a positive and helpful
[6084]course. 111/
[6085]On 2 November 1960, Richard Bissell, Jacob Ester-
[6086]line,, and Colonel Jack Hawkins traveled to Norfolk to
[6087]Admiral Dennison's headquarters. The CIA representa—
[6088]tives received a general briefing by the Navy on con-
[6089]tingency plans for Hispaniola and Cuba, and in return,
[6090]they briefed the Navy on Project JMATE. Mr. Bissell
[6091]gave an overview of the CIA operation, Esterline dis-
[6092]cussed the political and propaganda aspects, and
[6093]Hawkins talked about the PM program, including the
[6094]plan for a 1,500-man invasion force to seize a lodge-
[6095]ment on the island of Cuba. Hawkins emphasized that
[6097]this last objective could not be met until March or
[6099]April of 1961.¥* 112/
[6101]* In a telecon with the author.of this history on
[6102]15 May 1978, Admiral Dennison indicated that it was
[6103]extremely late in the course of the Bay of Pigs oper-
[6104]ation before he received any briefing from CIA on the
[6105]anti-Castro operation. He made it sound, in fact,
[6106]. aS. though he was not briefed until shortly before the
[6107](footnote. continued on following page)
[6109]-~ 125 -
[6111]TOP SECRET
[6113]13-00000
[6115]TOP SECRET
[6117]D. Personnel and Training |
[6119]From the time of the official approval of the
[6120]anti-Castro policy by President Eisenhower until the
[6121]collapse of the effort at the Bay of Pigs the question
[6122]of personnel and personnel Management for Project
[6123]IMATE was of constant concern. Even though the
[6124]Director of Central Intelligence “emphasized the
[6125]significance of the Project, by saying that he would
[6126]recall Agency personnel from any station in the world
[6127]if the individual's abilities were required for the
[6128]successful achievement of JMATE objectives," some of
[6129]those who were closest to the personnel problem be-
[6130]lieved that DCI Dulles failed completely to keep that
[6131]promise. 113/ Jake Esterline, Chief, WH/4 has re-
[6132]marked as follows:
[6134]It was obvious that as the operation
[6136]began to increase in size that the Divi-
[6138]sions didn't have the personnel, the
[6140].senior personnel; to staff out the organ-
[6142]ization; or if they did have them, they
[6143]‘weren't about to release them from the —
[6145]LSD (Landing Ship Dock) which was to carry the landing
[6146]craft to the area of the Bahia de Cochinos was ready
[6148]-to load at the naval base at Vieques for the invasion.
[6150]As the text above confirms, however, the Admiral was
[6151]read into the act relatively early in the game and
[6152]should have had plenty of time to make preparations
[6153]for the activities of April 1961.
[6155]- 126 -
[6157]TOP SECRET
[6159]13-00000
[6161]-TOP SECRET
[6163]things they were doing, because they were
[6164]considered indispensable, which was probably
[6165]correct. It was on that basis, I think,
[6166]that when people like Dick Drain came
[6167]‘back home from -- in Dick's case, I think
[6168]he came in from Greece -- where he had a
[6169]pretty good record -~ but he was not re-
[6170]turning to Headguarters to go into an
[6171]assignment, and Dick Bissell put him in
[6172]the operation with us. Gerry Droller had
[6173]been around Headquarters for a long time,
[6174]had been quite a bit of a replacement
[6175]problem. He was very bright, he was a
[6176]German specialist, had a pretty good
[6177]political background; and Gerry and Howard
[6178]Hunt, for whatever reason, were sort of
[6179]-selected, not by us, but they were told
[6180]“they were going to be the people who
[6181]would handle the political aspects of
[6183]the operation. 114/
[6185]Esterline also noted that the shortage of compe-
[6186]tent, personnel became particularly critical when the
[6187]operational concepts began to change and to expand.
[6189]He claimed that when serious problems came up none of
[6191]the GS-18 case officers were available to make deci-
[6193]-sions. 115/.- 7" *
[6195]Bill Eisemann, Chief/Support/WH/4, was more
[6196]specific in his criticism of the personnel management
[6197]for Project JMATE. After emphasizing that Colonel
[6198]L. K. White, the Deputy Director for Support (DDS),
[6200]did insure that the support elements got the best
[6202]people for Project JMATE, “he [White], directed all
[6204]Support office heads that if there was a need for any
[6206]- 127 -
[6208]TOP SECRET
[6210]13-00000
[6212]. TOP SECRET
[6214]senior officer or any position to be filled that they
[6215]would £111 it without any hesitation whatsoever." 116/
[6216]But, in contrast, Eisemann pointed out:
[6218]I can't say that was true on the opera-
[6219]tional side of the shop. A Contingency.
[6220]Task Force, a program developed by the >
[6221]Clandestine Services, was designed to
[6222]make available Agency personnel who could
[6223]be pulled out of any position that they
[6224]were assigned to and moved into any urgent,.
[6226]_high priority type of project. JMATE
[6227].Project, was a high priority project; and
[6228]the Contingency Task Force concept, in my
[6229]opinion, failed at that point because the
[6230]Clandestine Services did not provide the
[6232]- top quality people we needed for: the posi-
[6234]tion to be filled. After JMATE Project ...
[6235]the Contingency Task Force was completely
[6236]abolished. ._ Many people in the Agency were
[6237]designated from the Support and the Opera-
[6238]tional side to fill various positions as
[6239]they would come up, but it didn't work from
[6240]the Clandestine Services side. We had real
[6241]' problems, trying to get qualified ... top
[6242]qualified people ... to do those jobs. In
[6243]my opinion, the Contingency Task Force was
[6244]a failure. It was set up and designed so
[6245]that.qualified personnel would be completely
[6246]immunized and processed and ready to go with
[6247]passports at any given time. But you
[6248]couldn't get. the people you wanted -- I'm
[6249]talking about qualified key professionals
[6250]in:the Clandestine Services -- because the
[6251]Division heads in the Clandestine Services
[6252]would not release those people. 117/
[6254]Dick Drain, who became Chief of Operations for
[6255]Project JMATE was among the severest of the critics
[6256]with reference to the personnel assigned to Project
[6258]JMATE. Pointing to his own case; Drain stated:
[6260]- 128 -
[6262]TOP SECRET
[6264]13-00000
[6266]TOP SECRET
[6268]I don't mean to be unduly immodest, but
[6270]really, I didn't have any qualifications
[6272]for this [WH/4] except that I was there
[6274]and unemployed -- had no Spanish language
[6275]whatsoever, and my entire exposure had been
[6276]punching cows in Arizona in 1940. That
[6277]doesn't: really bring you up much on Latin
[6278]America and latinos, and any of that ...
[6280]I had never been on an amphibious operation,
[6281]and if that was characteristic of my quali-
[6282]fications, it really characterized the whole
[6283]damned operation ... about which, it seemed
[6284]to me, there was a good deal of well-meaning
[6285]hypocrisy. Allen Dulles, always meaning
[6286]what he said, would say repeatedly, “now,
[6288]I want the very best people assigned to
[6289]this project ... there is nothing more
[6290]important that we are doing than this; and
[6291]I want directed assignments ... I want
[6292]people pulled out of tours overseas if
[6293]necessary, this thing must be manned."
[6294]Everybody would solemnly nod and, then,
[6295]much like the case of Vietnam ... humans
[6296]being humans ,.. we would tend to get. the
[6297]people that the area Division Chiefs ‘found
[6299]. "excess" -- which normally meant “found
[6301]insufficient." With many notable exceptions,
[6302]we did not get the very best people avail-
[6303]able. 118/
[6305]Although Drain levelled his broadside at all of
[6307]the Divisions in the DDP, he was most critical of the
[6309]Western Hemisphere Division:
[6311]More of this staffing would have come
[6313]from WH if there had been more competent
[6315]people within WH. WH suffered, in my
[6316]opinion, from a surfeit of ex-FBI officers
[6317]who had been picked up at the time that
[6319]-the Agency took over from the Bureau in
[6321]Latin America ... but there were damned
[6323]’ few of them that had any particular ex-
[6325]perience ... One of the main things
[6326]that plagued me was that I could never
[6328]- 129 -
[6329]TOP SECRET
[6331]13-00000
[6333]TOP SECRET
[6335]figure. out, because nobody ever made it
[6337]clear, where the hell the project stood
[6338]vis-a-vis WH ... J.C. King never was
[6339]told, I think for understandable reasons,
[6340]to what extent he was in it, and to what
[6341]extent he was not in it. 119/
[6343]As with other of the principals who were involved
[6345]in the WH/4 effort, Drain was extremely complimentary
[6346]of the Support element assigned to WH/4, stating as
[6348]follows:
[6350]This is a little ironic, because with
[6351]Bissell as the DDP, you would have thought
[6352]that if the directed assignment thing
[6353]worked anywhere, it should have worked
[6354]within the DDP. It worked less well there
[6356]_than’it did within the DDS. Red White,
[6358]soldierly-like he was, took absolutely
[6359]sincerely, what the Director said, when
[6360]he said "I want the very best people
[6361]assigned to this." So we got Mike King
[6363]to run the finance, not some stumblebum
[6365]with garters on his sleeve ... the best
[6366]finance officer they had. Our logistics
[6367]support and Bill Eisemann, they were really
[6368]hand picked by Red White ... The DDS or
[6369]the DDA, whatever they called it then,
[6370]deserved very high marks for being uniquely
[6371]the people to put their back into it.
[6373]The DDI really wasn't. asked; and that
[6375]was too bad, because we could have used, ‘
[6376]it seéms to me, some input from the DDI.
[6377]Our own intelligence report structure
[6379]was not bad. The Chief, FI was a nice
[6381]- old guy, Whedbee; and we had some reports
[6382]officers who were quite competent in the
[6384]DDP sense; but the thing was so compart-
[6385]mented from the DDI, in any event, that
[6386]the idea of drawing down on DDI talent .
[6387]to get in on this, was. not well received.
[6388]I had suggested it because I had been
[6390]- 130 -
[6392]TOP SECRET
[6394]13-00000
[6396]TOP SECRET
[6398]in the DDI and I knew where the talent
[6399]was. For example,. on just such a mundane,
[6400]but important thing, as topography and
[6401]geography and beach stuff ... Christ, I
[6402]well knew from the time that I worked for
[6403]Lofty Becker ... that there was in old
[6404]ORR ... in the geographic thing ... Jim
[6405][Brammell], ... Otto Guthe ... I mean,
[6407]_ they would have been glad to supply
[6408]people ... and we didn't ask. So you
[6409]can't say: that DDI didn't provide, unless
[6410]you understand that they didn't provide
[6411]because they really weren't asked.* 120/
[6413]Although the Agency's own personnel assignments
[6414]have been criticized, the assignment of two of the key
[6415]military personnel involved in the JMARC operation
[6416]proved to be quite successful. Col. Jack Hawkins,
[6417]United States Marine Corps, and Lt. Col. Frank Egan,
[6418]United States army, were in charge of the overall PM
[6419]activity (Hawkins) and the PM training (Egan) for the
[6420]Cuban. exile brigade. Hawkins, who was serving on the
[6422]Staff of the Marine School:at Quantico, Virginia at
[6424]* Drain's suggestion that.the DDI was left completely
[6425]in the cold during the Bay of Pigs operation overstates
[6426]the case... As early as January 1959 there is evidence
[6427]that Mr. Helms agreed to cut the DDI in on “useful
[6428]intelligence to which it would be well for the DD/I to
[6429]have access" from State cable traffic on Cuba being
[6430]carried over CIA channels. A "massive" study of
[6432]Cuban telecommunications facilities prepared by ORR
[6433]in the fall of 1960 led Mr. Bissell to send a memo
[6435]of commendation for :the Communications. Branch through
[6436]the DDI. Obviously the DDI knew something was a-
[6437]foot. 120a/_- ;
[6439]- 131 -
[6440]TOP SECRET
[6442]13-00000
[6444]TOP SECRET
[6446]_the time that he was assigned to Project JMARC, had
[6448]taken part in the battles of Bataan and Corregidor;
[6449]had been taken prisoner with the fall of Corregidor;
[6451]and escaped from the Japanese prisoner of war camp
[6453]at Davao, Mindanao; and joined the Philippine guerrilla
[6455]forces, leading raiding parties and harassing attacks
[6456]against the Japanese army in the Philippines. After
[6457]seven months of such activity, he was evacuated by
[6458]submarine from the Philippines in November 1943 and
[6459]was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for these
[6460]actions. After returning.to the United States for
[6461]additional training, in November 1944 Hawkins again
[6462]returned to the Pacific area where he was an assistant
[6463]operations officer taking part in the assault ‘and
[6464]capture of Okinawa. For this service, he received a
[6465]Bronze Star Medal. During the Korean conflict, he
[6467]was Commanding Officer of the lst Battalion, lst
[6469]‘Marines; and he led the Battalion in combat ‘during
[6471]the Inchon landing and in subsequent operations in
[6472]Korea. For his participation in the Inchon-Seoul op-
[6473]eration, Hawkins had received the Silver star Medal
[6474]for heroism. From March 1956 to the summer of 1959
[6476]when he entered the Naval War College, Hawkins had
[6478]- 132 -
[6480]TOP SECRET
[6482]13-00000 .
[6484]TOP SECRET
[6486]served as liaison officer with the Amphibious Forces
[6487]Atlantic in Norfolk, Virginia -- a pertinent assign-
[6488]ment for his transfer to Project JMARC.
[6490]Lt. Col. Egan's military record showed a well-
[6491]trained infantry officer who -haa served overseas in
[6492]the European Theater during the course of World War
[6494]rf
[6495]II; an infantry officer including an infantry train-
[6497].ing officer in much of the period following World
[6499]War II; and a staff officer in the Special Warfare
[6500]Division of the United States Army in 1958, serving |
[6501]with the Director of Plans, in Washington from 1958
[6503]to 1960. Immediately prior to his assignment to
[6504]Project JMATE, Colonel Egan had been on: the Operations -
[6505]and Training Staff of a Joint Support Group, head-
[6506]quartered in’ Washington. Egan EOD'd with Project JMATE,
[6508]27 June 1960, and Hawkins on 29 August of 1960. 121/
[6510]Both officers received high marks from Mr. Bissell
[6512]and Jake Esterline, and, particularly from Dick Drain,
[6513]who stated:
[6515]I thought they [Hawkins and Egan] were
[6516]first rate ... I mean first rate, not com-
[6517]pared with the jaded World War II memory,
[6518]but first rate in terms of officers then
[6519]serving in the armed forces of the United
[6520]States. The Hawkins selection was an
[6521]excellent one. I don't myself, know how
[6523]- 133 -
[6525]-TOP SECRET
[6527]13-00000
[6529]‘TOP SECRET
[6531]one could have found a better man. People
[6533]have said ... “Well, the son of a bitch
[6534]just worked out in the Philippines as a
[6535]stay behind ... what did he know?" He
[6537]knew a lot. He had written a book on
[6538]guerrillas. He was sharp, he was smart,
[6539]and honest, and not overly ambitious. I
[6541]am sure that he saw this as a way to further
[6542]-Ahis career, of course. Military men, I
[6543]‘think, tend to maximize that more than
[6544]Agency people. But that was not his:
[6545]motivation -- or his primary motivation.
[6547]He had around him some really first rate
[6548]help.... not very high ranking ... but ©
[6549].we didn't need an awful lot of high ranking
[6550]‘... we needed some hard workers. Frank
[6551]Egan, who went down to do the training,
[6553]was the man that I. would have picked. He
[6554]was probably the most disputable of the
[6555]bunch because he was pretty volatile. He
[6556]has been condemned for leading the Cuban
[6557]manpower to believe that they were going
[6559]to get more support than he had any right
[6560]to let them know about. Well, I wasn't
[6561]there, but I know damned well that if I
[6563]had been, I would have been priming up
[6565]the ‘Brigade to do this tough job, not by
[6566]‘counseling them as to the difficulty of
[6568]ait ... at least, exclusively ... or, giving
[6569]them lectures about now you will really
[6570]have to do this on your own, because you
[6571]are not going to get one iota of assistance
[6572]from the armed forces. You don't normally
[6573]train a group to conduct an operation. of
[6574]this sort by.playing on cheir fears. If,
[6575]down there at the end of the line -- first
[6576]in Guatemala and then in Nicaragua -- Egan
[6577]led them to believe that they were going
[6578]to get them more help than he had any right
[6579]to let them know, well, I can understand
[6581]l why that would have happened.* 122/
[6583]* With reference to Colonel Hawkins, Jake Esterline
[6584]has noted: : _
[6585](footnote continued on following page)
[6587]- 134 -
[6588]TOP SECRET
[6590]13-00000
[6592]TOP SECRET
[6594](
[6595]By way of illustrating some of the problems
[6597]encountered in acquiring adequate personnel for the
[6598]JMATE operation, on the very day that President
[6599]Eisenhower was approving the anti-Castro program, a
[6600]memorandum was being sent to the Deputy Director for
[6601]Plans from the Chief, Western Hemisphere Division
[6602]noting that two individuals assigned to the Office
[6604]of Training were ‘urgently needed for service in WH/4.
[6605]Colonel King reported to the DDP that although Colonel
[6606]Matt Baird, Director of Training, was agreeable to
[6607]the release of the two individuals to serve as PM
[6609]trainers, Baird insisted that the men could not be
[6611]I guess that it is only fair to say
[6612]that that assignment [Project JMARC] cost
[6613]him his general's star, and a good many
[6614]other things in terms of his record. 123/
[6616]The author of this history attempted to arrange
[6617]oral history interviews with Colonels Hawkins and Egan,
[6618]but in neither. case would the individuals consent to
[6619]such interview. In addition, the author also asked
[6620]each man if he would be willing to respond to a series
[6621]of written questions, and neither would agree to this.
[6622]It was made quite clear to the author that both indi-
[6623]viduals harbored considerable résentment about their
[6624]relationships and association with the Agency at the
[6625]time of the Bay of Pigs. In a similar manner,. Col.
[6626]John F. Mallard, United States Marine Corps who was
[6627]Liaison Officer between the Agency and the Depart-
[6628]ment of Défense, at the time of the Bay of Pigs, also
[6629]rejected the author's request for either an oral inter-
[6630]view or a response to written questions.
[6632]- 135 -
[6633]TOP SECRET :
[6635]13-00000
[6637]_ TOP SECRET
[6639]released until suitable replacements could be found
[6641]to take over their tasks in the Office of Training.
[6643]' King, therefore, appealed to the Deputy Director for
[6645]Plans for their immediate release. 124/
[6647]Not only did the Clandestine Service encounter
[6648]difficulty in obtaining personnel from within its own
[6649]units to serve in WH/4, it also appeared to draw blanks
[6650]in terms of Cubans willing to volunteer for the strug-
[6651]gle against Castro. In response to a November 1959
[6652]memorandum to all WH field. stations and bases asking
[6653]that they supply the names of Cubans who would be
[6655]willing to work as agents against the Castro Govern-
[6657]‘ment, WH/4/FI reported the results of its search,
[6659]stating that as of June 1960:
[6661]Many of the Agents who were proposed
[6662]by other WH Stations for use ‘in Cuba were
[6663]either found unacceptable, or did not want
[6664]to accept such an assignment.’ Other sta-
[6665]tions were unable to come up with any
[6666]assets who might gain access to the de-
[6667]sired targets in Cuba. 125/
[6669]The problem which Col. Baird had raised back in
[6670]March concerning replacement for personnel who might
[6672]be assigned to Project. WH/4 was not actually resolved
[6674]until June of 1960 when:
[6676]Colonel White announced that DDS per-
[6677]sonnel on full time detail to JMARC
[6679]- 136 -
[6681]TOP SECRET
[6683]13-00000
[6685]TOP SECRET
[6687]would be transferred to the project Table
[6688]of Organization, effective the beginning
[6689]of the first pay period in July 1960.
[6690]Employees on detail to the project from
[6691]the Clandestine Services offices will not
[6692]be transferred since DDP. considers them
[6693]temporary assignments with the personnel
[6694]returning to their, parent office when the
[6695]project is completed. Colonel White
[6696]pointed out, that although DDS personnel
[6697]would be transferred to the project, there-
[6698]by relieving slots in the various DDS ele-
[6699]ments, each office head should keep in
[6700]mind that his employees will be returning
[6701]‘to him, and he should plan accordingly. 126/
[6702]Colonel White's comments are quite understandable
[6703]in view of the fact that of 104 personnel’ on duty with
[6704]JMATE on 7-8 June 1960, only 32 were Clandestine Serv-
[6705]ices careerists; and excepting a few with DDI career
[6706]designations, the bulk of the personnel were Support :
[6707]careerists. By 14 June 1960, Colonel King was appeal-
[6708]ing to the DDP for an increment which would bring
[6709]total JMATE personnel to 234, including 131 employees
[6710]“who were to be in the field. Apparently, however,
[6711]the Deputy Director for Plans approved a:total ceiling
[6712]of only 158 staff personnel by the end of June 1960;
[6713]and.in August of 1960, Chief, WH Division forwarded
[6714]a revised staffing. guide, calling for a total of 274
[6715]positions and requesting that “as soon after 15 August
[6717]as is possible, a total of 40 additional staff: personnel"
[6719]- 137 -
[6721]TOP SECRET
[6723]13-00000
[6725]TOP SECRET
[6727]be added to the 158 who were then on duty --. making
[6728]a new total of 198.
[6730]. Although Mr. Bissell approved the recommended
[6731]increment, he nonetheless wrote a memorandum to C.
[6732]Tracy Barnes, the ADDP/A, suggesting that Barnes and
[6733]Dick Helms (surprisingly) take a close look at the
[6734]JMATE staffing pattern to see if there were areas of
[6735]auplication, particularly between the field bases and
[6736]Headquarters. ‘The DDP suggested that in the areas
[6737]of FI and PM there might be slots in either the For-
[6738]ward Operations Base in Miami or in JMOARSMAN -- the
[6739]Panama Training Site -- where possibly the. staffs
[6740]could be transferred during slack’ periods to conduct
[6741]similar operations in other parts of the JMATE opera~
[6745]* Lest the reader be confused by the term “Forward
[6746]Operations Base," this was the JMWAVE activity in the
[6747]Miami area, which continued to operate subsequent to
[6748]the Bay of Pigs. At the same time that the Bay of
[6750]- Pigs operation was. getting under way, there was con-
[6751]siderable emphasis from various individuals in Head-
[6752]quarters for establishment of a "Forward Command Post,"
[6753]which also might be located in the Miami.area, possibly
[6754]in the communications complex. Some even suggested
[6755]the possibility of establishing a sub-command post
[6756]in a third country. In any event, no Forward Command
[6757]Post was established. 128/
[6759]- 138 -
[6761]TOP SECRET
[6763]13-00000
[6765]TOP SECRET
[6767]By early November 1960, as the concept of the
[6768]operation was shifting from one of guerrilla warfare
[6769]and infiltration to invasion, the staffing pattern
[6770]for WH/4 was again increased. Mr. Bissell authorizing
[6771]a total of 308 positions. Even as he signed the
[6772]approval, however, Mr. Bissell noted his reservations,
[6774]_ Saying: . |
[6776]‘I have signed this request to indicate
[6777]my approval, but ‘do. so with a good deal of.
[6778]concern. I realize that this is a very
[6779]major and top priority activity and I also
[6780]realize that the senior officers engaged
[6781]in it continue to be heavily overworked.
[6782]On the other hand, I am fearful that the
[6783]addition of large numbers of personnel will
[6784]not in fact reduce the load on those indi-
[6785]viduals who are most overworked, but may
[6786]instead create additional burdens of
[6787]Management without contributing signifi-
[6788]cantly to the success of the underlying
[6789]activities. I am concerned also that we
[6790]may be simply running out of suitable
[6791]people in the Agency in cértain categories.
[6792]Accordingly, I urge you to re-examine even
[6793]the double-starred positions in the staff-
[6794]ing guide submitted with your request to
[6795]see whether they are all in fact of a high
[6797]' order of essentiality.* 129/
[6799]* Much of the staffing problem, of course, traces
[6801]back to the failure of the DDP to insure early on that
[6802]‘only the best people ’be assigned to the WH/4 project.
[6804]As. early as August of 1960, it had been indicated
[6806]that the DDP might be leaning toward the use of
[6808]directed assignments, but nothing ever came of this. 130/
[6810]-— 139 -
[6812]TOP SECRET
[6814]13-00000
[6816]TOP SECRET
[6818]Even before. Mr. Bissell's memorandum of early
[6819]November 1960, indicating the possibility that experts
[6820]in certain areas might-no longer be available from
[6821]within the Agency, proposals had gone forward request-
[6822]ing permission for the use of American contract person-
[6823]nel in the maritime operations. Unlike the brouhaha
[6825]that was precipitated by the early suggestions for the
[6827]use of American volunteers from the ground forces,
[6829]the authorization for the use of US contracts in mari-
[6830]time activities apparently was granted without much
[6831]debate. The statement of the. requirements for the ‘
[6832]use of the US contracts indicated that US citizens
[6833]would be put under contract to act not only as trainers
[6835]for the crews of LCI's, LCU's, LCVP's, and SK's, but
[6837]- also, that they would serve in key positions
[6839]as LCI captains, LCI diesel engineers, and
[6840]. LCU ¢oxwains during training and operations,
[6841]where qualified Cubans cannot be obtained.
[6842]This would require their entering Cuban
[6843]coastal waters and, on occasions, touching
[6844]on Cuban beaches, when operations so re-
[6845]quire.
[6847]It is essential for operations that
[6848]these key positions be held by qualified
[6849]and dependable men. At this time, it is
[6850]not expected that Cuban trainees qualified
[6851]for such positions or possessing the
[6852]necessary aptitude and character to permit
[6853]successful training will be found. If.
[6855]- 140 -
[6857]TOP SECRET
[6861]TOP SECRET
[6863]they are located, the use of U.S. contract
[6865]’ personnel. will correspondingly be cut down.
[6866]Staff personnel will assist in the training
[6867]of all crews but will not be used in opera-
[6870]Not only were such contract employees authorized,
[6871]but by early November 1960 a cable from Headquarters
[6872]to the Forward Operations Base noted: .
[6874]In view degree risk involved rendezvous-.
[6876]type mission request Case Officer advise
[6878]‘all Maritime contract personnel bonus this .
[6880]type mission be hereafter $100.00. Bonus
[6882]for Cuban territory beach landings or
[6884]caching would remain $500.00. 132/
[6886]By the early fall of 1960, the question of rota-
[6888]_ tion of staff personnel for Project JMATE had become a
[6890]serious matter. Many of those who had initially joined
[6891]the project had come in on 90-day rotation periods,
[6892]and in a cable to Headquarters, Ernie Sparks, the
[6893]overall Liaison Officer for Project JMATE for COS
[6894]Guatemala, requested that Headquarters approve a ro-
[6895]tational’ plan since:
[6896]Most personnel adjusted family and
[6898]business problems to period they told
[6900]they be absent and fact they. on duty
[6902]seven days a week as well as being con-
[6904]fined. to training areas which lack
[6906]‘recréation facilities. 133/
[6908]Bill Eisemann, who was Chief of Support for WH/4,
[6909]was particularly critical of the 90-day TDY assignments,
[6911]saying:
[6913]-~ 141 -.
[6915]TOP SECRET
[6917]13-00000
[6919]TOP SECRET
[6921]They [the DDP] would bring a man in,
[6923]and then another man would come in to
[6924]replace him. It was really a tremendous
[6925]task to keep up with. it, because a lot of
[6926]these people had. personal problems. In
[6927]‘some cases they would cable and request
[6928]release from their assignment for personal
[6929]reasons. We attempted to satisfy most of
[6930]these requests. Herb Juul was the assigned
[6931]Personnel. Officer within the project. He
[6932]had to constantly keep a check on the loca-
[6933]‘tion of our personnel, and when their time
[6934]was up for replacement, he would then visit
[6935]with the Clandestine Services, and also the
[6936]Support components, and give them a list-
[6937]ing of the names of potential TDY returnees.
[6938]The Support components and Clandestine
[6939]Services'then provided names of people who
[6940]would be replacements. That was a hell of
[6941]a task, now, believe me. When you have a
[6942]full time project running 15 months or more,
[6943]you have people returning on a 90 day basis,
[6944]and constantly being replaced ... you can't
[6945]expect the greatest efficiency in opera-
[6947]' tions. 134/ |
[6949]= 142 -
[6951]TOP SECRET
[6953]13-00000 -
[6955]TOP SECRET
[6957]Part III
[6959]Changing Concepts
[6961]It has already been pointed out that the’ initial
[6962]planning for paramilitary operations against Castro |
[6963]was to be based on extremely small units. Two or
[6964]three man units, including a communicator, would be
[6966]‘trained and infiltrated (or dropped) into Cuba to work
[6967]with a dissident group. ‘one trainer would be the
[6968]adviser for the types of guerrilla warfare activities
[6969]which the anti-Castro dissidents might undertake safely
[6970]and reasonably securely. There had been some signs
[6971]of dissatisfaction with this particular type of program
[6972]prior to the summer of 1960. By the late summer of
[6973]1960 and through the fall there was to be a complete
[6974]and radical shift in the concept of the paramilitary
[6976]_operations® in which the forces backed by CIA should
[6977]engage. In late August-September, there were some
[6978]clues that changes in the nature of operations were
[6979]being contemplated. During the last week of August
[6980]and in the initial week of September 1960, Savilion
[6981]Chapman claimed that he and a Col. Evans, Acting
[6983]Chief, PMG/DDP, were "briefed by WH/4 planners on the
[6985]- 143 -
[6987]TOP SECRET
[6989]13-00000
[6991]TOP SECRET
[6993]approximate number of troops, tanks, and vehicles
[6995]for which sea transport would be required." “In that
[6996]same period Lt. Col. Frank Egan and Commander Norman
[6997]Imler of the WH/4-'staff reported they asked the Mari-
[6998]time Branch to draft a memo to the DDP giving infor-
[6999]mation on the foreign cargo vessels that would be
[7000]required for troop transport, including their owner-
[7001]ship, their costs, and on the methods of their acquisi-
[7004]Inasmuch as Egan had been requested for the proj-
[7005]ect to become the trainer for the PM forces, it was |
[7006]apparent that some changes were contemplated. The
[7007]reference to the use of vessels for the transport of
[7008]tanks would indicate that something beyond hit-and-run
[7009]exercises were being contemplated. Before mid-October,
[7010]Lt. Col. Egan and a representative of the Logistics
[7011]Branch of WH/4 had spelled out some additional details
[7013]for the Maritime Branch of Special Operations. At
[7015]that time, according to Mr. Chapman's report, WH/4
[7017]was talking about deck loading of 3 LCV's, with 5
[7019]armored tanks, 5 2-1/2 ton trucks, one caterpillar
[7020]dozer, and two gasoline tank trucks -- hardly type
[7021]of equipment which would be required for 2-3 man guer-
[7023]villa teams. 2/
[7025]= 144 -
[7027]oe “TOP SECRET
[7029]13-00000
[7031]TOP SECRET
[7033]By the first week in November 1960, it had be-
[7034]come clear to the most senior planners of the anti-
[7035]Castro effort _- Jake Esterline, J. Cc. King, Tracy
[7036]Barnes, and Richard Bissell -- that decisions were
[7037]going to have to be made about all aspects of the .
[7038]paramilitary program. The basic question being
[7039]whether a paramilitary program under CIA aegis “should
[7040]be launched at Castro, or whether, at this time, such
[7041]a program should become a joint operation between the
[7042]Department of Defense and the Agency. In the dis-
[7043]cussion among Agency personnel, in the discussions
[7044]between Agency: personnel and representatives of the
[7045]Special Group, and “in. discussions within the meetings
[7047]of the Special Group, the whole gammut of options
[7049]was being explored. Barnes, apparently deferring to
[7051]Bissell, suggested that rather than small team activi-
[7052]ties something on the order of 10-20 man teams be
[7054]formed and tried out. Barnes was very emphatic that
[7056]‘what was needed at this time, was a willingness to:
[7058]run some risks --. including the risk of defeat. Barnes
[7059]was critical of the Special Group, pointing out that
[7060]the apparent belief of the Group was that every opera-
[7062]tion had to succeed; .and that if ‘there were “losses,
[7063]- 145 -
[7065]TOP SECRET
[7067]13-00000
[7069]TOP SECRET
[7071]failures, or mishaps," the Special Group seemed to
[7072]‘want to. cancel everything. This was contrary, com-
[7073]pletely, to Barnes' concept of operational activity.
[7074]What both Barnes and Bissell supported in terms of
[7075]the smaller team activity were that:
[7076]The implementation of such teams would
[7077]indicate whether the dissident elements
[7079]“in Cuba were likely to rally around such
[7081]groups, once it had been established that
[7083]such groups could provide guidance and
[7085]supply for the anti-Castro activities.
[7087]These teams also would provide a test
[7089]‘of the Castro forces. Could Castro's
[7091]militia or his army contain the guerrilla
[7093]forces, if such forces were led by cadres
[7095]trained by the Agency? Or would the Castro
[7096]resistance crumble in the face of effective
[7098]dissident elements? 3/
[7100]Even as this discussion was going on, it became:
[7101]‘clear that the small team concept was going to go by
[7102]the board; and when the Agency tried to jump the op-
[7103]tion to a 3,000 man force for making a lodgment in
[7105]. Cuba in the conventional manner (e.g., amphibious
[7107]- 146 -
[7109]TOP SECRET
[7111]13-00000
[7113]TOP SECRET
[7115]assault), the plan was rejected by the Special Group
[7116]ina meeting of -3 November 1960. The Department of
[7117]Defense supported the Agency, but State objected
[7118]and suggested that perhaps the point where covert
[7119]7 intervention was possible had passed. Gordon Gray
[7120]even went so far as to raise the possibility of a
[7121]fake attack on Guantanamo as a means of justifying
[7122]overt us intervention. It was at this same meeting
[7123]that Mr.. Livingston Merchant of the Department of
[7124]State raised the question of whether plans were being
[7125]made to assassinate Fidel Castro, Raul Castro, and
[7126]Che Guevara -- at which point General Cabell, the
[7127]Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency,
[7128]pointed out that such activities as assassination
[7129]were extremely difficult to manage and that the CIA
[7130]had no, capability for such an operation. 4/
[7131]Even as the size of the Cuban exile force was.
[7132]being debated, Headquarters cabled to Guatemala
[7133](4 November 1960) that the small team concept had
[7134]gone by the board and that planning should begin for
[7135]_ training a ‘conventional amphibious assault force of
[7136]at least 1,500 infantrymen. Outlines sent to the
[7138]infantry training base in Guatemala. (JMTRAV), emphasized
[7140]= 147 -
[7142]TOP SECRET
[7144]13-00000
[7146]TOP SECRET
[7148]the need to instill an esprit de corps among the
[7149]trainees. To do this JMTRAV was urged to provide
[7150]for unit separation, competition in the military arts,
[7152]and specific identities for the individual units
[7154]“through the use of scarfs,. caps, or some other de-
[7156]vice. This new training program was to be instigated
[7157]in November 1960 and to be completed by the end of
[7158]January 1961. 5/ . .
[7160]Even as the discussions over the changing con-
[7161]cept were going on, the Director of Central Intelli-
[7162]gence and the Deputy Director for Plans were scheduled
[7163]to brief President-elect John F. Kennedy on 18 Novem-
[7164]ber. 6/ The concept to be presented to the President
[7166]was that a force of 600 men would be landed by. LST on
[7168]Cuban shores and that these men would move inland to
[7170]create “a safe area ina mountain fastness. These
[7171]men, with possibly another 600 man unit in another
[7172]area, and those who‘ joined them from within, would
[7173]be resupplied by air drop." 7/ In addition, there
[7174]would be new recruits in the pipeline to provide sup>
[7175]port for those who had landed. An airstrip in Nica-
[7176]ragua would be used to support air operations, and
[7178]it was intimated that the US and possibly allied
[7182]TOP SECRET
[7184]13-00000
[7186]TOP SECRET
[7188]governments would recognize that the force lodged in
[7189]Cuba and its nominal leadership was the Provisional
[7190]Government of Cuba. 8/
[7192]One strange and contradictory note which appeared
[7193]during WH/4's staff meeting on 15 November to plan
[7194]the briefing for the DDP prior to his participation
[7195]with the DCI in briefing the President elect was the
[7196]following item stating:
[7198]Our [CIA's] original. concept is now
[7199]seen to be unachievable in the face of
[7200]the controls Castro has instituted.
[7201]“There will not be the internal unrest
[7203]earlier believed possible, nor will the
[7205]defenses permit the type strike first
[7207]planned. Our second concept (1,500-
[7209]3,000 man force to secure a beach with
[7211]airstrip) is also. .now seen to be unachiev-
[7213]able, except as a joint Agency/DOD action.
[7215]Our Guatemala experience demonstrates we
[7217]cannot staff nor otherwise timely create
[7219]the base and lift needed. 9/
[7221]How, if in mid-November 1960 the concept of the
[7222]1,500-3,000 man force to secure a beachhead with an
[7224]‘airstrip was envisioned by the senior. personnel in
[7225]WH/4 as “unachievable" except as a joint CIA/DOD ef-
[7227]fort, did it become "achievable" in March 1961 with
[7228]only 1,200 men and as an Agency operation? What was
[7230]being denied in confidence in mid-November 1960 be-
[7232]came the fact of the Zapata Plan and the Bay of Pigs
[7234]= 149 -
[7236]TOP SECRET
[7238]13-00000
[7240]TOP SECRET
[7242]Operation in March 1961. Certainly there was no
[7243]lessening in the controls that Castro had instituted,
[7245]nor in the efficiency of the military forces and
[7247]militia that he had at his command by April 1961.+#
[7249]One of the principal problems posed by. Project
[7250]JMATE -- both before and after the concept changed
[7251]in November 1961 -- was whether the training activity
[7252]at JMTRAV and JMADD in Guatemala should be, or could
[7253]be, continued without reflection upon the position
[7254]of the United States Government. Thomas Mann of the
[7255]State Department became increasingly concerned about
[7256]this situation; and the discussions within the Special
[7257]Group and among the concerned Agencies during the
[7258]period from the middle of November until the end of
[7259]the year, focused very frequently on this question.
[7260]Considering the continuingly favorable reception to
[7262]Agency activities from Ydigoras Fuentes, Guatemala's
[7264]* During interviews with the author of this history,
[7265]Messrs. Bissell, Esterline, and Drain had only slight
[7266]remembrance of the details of these meetings of 15-16
[7267]November 1960 when they ruled out what.would be, in
[7268]effect, the invasion plan implemented in April 1961
[7270]at Playa Giron -- and at that time it was minus the
[7271]joint support of the Department of Defense: This
[7273]point was completely overlooked by both ‘the Inspector
[7274]General and the Taylor Committee post mortems on the
[7275]Bay. of Pigs.
[7277]- 150 -
[7279]TOP SECRET
[7281]o
[7283]Oe
[7285]13-00000
[7287]TOP SECRET |
[7289]President, State's concern that the training "places.
[7291]too much strain on the government of Guatemala" appear
[7293]unrealistic. The Department's real concerns were
[7295]with potential criticism from the OAS and the UN.
[7297]‘Certainly Ydigoras was ‘not interested in the removal
[7299]of those military units which could most. effectively
[7301].
[7303]_guarantee his continued reign as President of Guatemala
[7305]-- the Cubans in training for both air and ground
[7307]_ activities.* 10/
[7309]. Even as the Special Group was trying to determine
[7310]whether or not the forces in training in Guatemala
[7312]should be removed, the Agency proceeded apace with
[7314]‘plans for the staffing necessary to put a 600-man
[7316]strike force in training. Chief, WH/4 Personnel
[7318]estimated that in addition to 14 staffers, there
[7320]would be a requirement for 146 military personnel if
[7322]such training were to succeed. Well prior to the
[7324]-officially agreed-to change in concept, Chief, WH/4
[7326]had anticipated a significant increase in funding
[7328]* The internal situation,in Guatemala vis a vis the
[7329]training operations is discussed in detail in Volume
[7331]II of the Official History of the Bay of Pigs Opera-
[7333]tion, Participation in the Conduct of Foreign Policy.
[7335]- 151 -
[7337]TOP SECRET
[7339]13-00000
[7341]TOP SECRET
[7343]for JMARC requesting of the DDP that: .
[7345]With your approval, in the interim
[7346]period [as new budget estimates were
[7347]being prepared], project funds will be
[7348]used as required to meet operational
[7349]necessity without strict adherence to
[7350]the preliminary estimates of last June
[7351](1960] .* 10a/
[7353]Although Mr. Bissell approved the request, he made
[7354]this interesting comment:
[7356]What is disturbing is that the overrun
[7357]reported. in your memorandum seems to have
[7359]. eccurred long before you could be feeling
[7361]‘any effect of the {planned expansion] in
[7363][PM] plans. 10b/
[7365]Contrary to suggestions that the President of
[7366]Guatemala was concerned about the Cuban training ac-
[7367]tivity, a cable of 22 November 1960 to the Director
[7368]from Guatemala indicated that the ground training
[7370]' base was undergoing a major reorganization because
[7371]permission for the establishment of a tactical train-
[7372]ing area at another of the fineas (estates) controlled
[7374]‘by Roberto Alejos -- this one near San Jose -- was
[7375]being undertaken. Inasmuch as Alejos was Ydigoras's
[7377]right hand man and conducted the liaison with the
[7379]“> WH/4 representatives for the establishment and operation
[7381]* The increased budget being suggested: was on the order
[7382]of $42 million compared to $3 million being discussed
[7383]in June.
[7385]- 152 -
[7386]TOP SECRET
[7388]13-00000
[7390]TOP SECRET
[7392]of the Guatemalan training bases, the contradiction.
[7394]in positions between State and the Agency was obvious. 11/
[7395]As the Special Group discussions were going on,
[7397]Jake Esterline, Chief, WH/4 was in Guatemala taking’
[7399]a first-hand look at the air and ground training bases.
[7401]As noted in another volume, Esterline went strongly
[7403]on record in support of the Office of Logistics en-
[7405]gineer who had been responsible for the reconstruc-
[7407]tion of the airstrip at Retalhuleu. Jake noted that
[7409]even though there had been a sizable cost overrun,
[7411]the task had been performed on time under the most
[7413]adverse weather conditions; and, consequently, sug-
[7415]gestions from Headquarters that there had been gross
[7417]inefficiency were unwarranted and unfounded.* Ester-
[7419]line's review of the situation at JMTRAV, the ground
[7421]training base, indicated that the situation there was
[7423]considerably more difficult than what he had encountered
[7425]at the air training base. He noted, for example, that
[7427]there was a severe lack of qualified senior trainers,
[7429]stating:
[7431]* For details.‘on construction of the airfield at
[7432]Retalhuleu, see Office of Logistics, Engineering Staff,
[7433]RECD, Agency Engineering Activity, 1947-1966, Vol. I,
[7434]63-67; Vol. II, 132-193. DDS/HS OL-11, Feb 72. Ss.
[7436]- 153 -
[7437]TOP SECRET
[7439]13-00000
[7441]TOP SECRET
[7443]. While a few of these men [from the
[7444]Domestic Operations Base in.Miami] impress
[7445]me as being good. types,. for the most. part
[7446]I found them to be too immature and lack-
[7447]ing in experience to qualify for the job
[7448]at hand. In any event, they are not in
[7449]my judgment worth the $1,000 per month
[7450]which we have to pay them. I would like
[7451]most of them to be GS-4, 5, and 6 students
[7452]that [sic] we trained at Fort Benning in
[7453]1951-52. Under’no circumstances would I
[7454]consider putting these people into Cuba
[7455]with the Cubans.
[7457]In closing his report on the visit to Guatemala,
[7459]Esterline presented the following critical observations
[7460]of the situation as he saw it. Reflecting on the
[7462]mission and on the resources available, he wrote:
[7464]I also reviewed the problem in the
[7465]light of the many gaps in policy approval
[7466]for. JMARC,. all of which complicate project
[7467]planning. By the time I arrived back at
[7468]Headquarters, I had fairly well convinced
[7469]myself that it is unrealistic for the
[7471]_project or the Agency to try to "go it
[7473]alone" in opening up another major base
[7474]in a third country to train from 1,500 to
[7475]3,000 Cubans for a major invasion effort.
[7476]I discussed my thinking with Col. Hawkins
[7477]at length, and found that-he shared my
[7478]view. As a result of this discussion, we
[7479]re-evaluated our capability and presented
[7480]you [the DDP] with the recommendation that
[7481]we limit ourselves to preparing a force
[7482]of 600 maximum to be used in the manner
[7483]we outlined to you on 16 November. I
[7484]still feel this recommendation is quite
[7485]valid given the limitation on real estate
[7487]‘that we are presently working under. If
[7489]it turns out that we can acquire policy
[7490]approval for the real estate in the interior,
[7492]- 154 -
[7494]TOP SECRET
[7496]13-00000
[7498]TOP SECRET
[7500]I would then agree that, with limited
[7502]additional help from DOD, we could train
[7504]a maximum of 1,200 and commit them along
[7506]the line outlined during the.16 November
[7508]meeting. Even our present scope of op-
[7510]erations, however, continues to be en-'
[7512]dangered by the gambit that Mr. Mann and
[7514]Mr. Merchant are engaged with in the
[7516][State] “Working Group." I cannot empha-
[7518]size this too strongly: if we are re-
[7520]quired to.evacuate Guatemala for reasons
[7522]of high policy or because of the situation,
[7524]the project will be seriously damaged unless
[7526]we have immediately available real estate
[7528]where these people can be put to work. 13/.
[7530]Some relief would be provided for the ground
[7531]training: program with the opening up of Alejos finea
[7532]near San Jose, but the adequacy of the training facil-
[7533]ities for the ground forces would continue to plague
[7534]JMARC through the course of the project. - Moreover,
[7535]even though the discussions concerning plausible
[7536]deniability reached near fever pitch during the. dis-
[7537]cussions. of November 1960, at no point did the.
[7538]Special Grotip of presidential consultants ever step
[7542]' forward with a firm recommendation that the United
[7543]States assume responsibility and so admit. The most
[7544]persistent advocate of this position: was Thomas Mann,
[7545]of the Department of State, and why his proposals
[7547]were never pushed more seriously is one of the unresolved
[7548]t . . .
[7550]-~ 155 -
[7552]TOP SECRET
[7554]13-00000
[7556]TOP SECRET
[7558]questions concerning the Bay of Pigs Operation.*
[7559]Esterline's visit to the bases in Guatemala
[7560]was almost immediately reflected in the correspondence
[7561]between the field and Headquarters, with specific
[7562]emphasis being placed on the assignment to the ground
[7563]training base, JMTRAV, of senior training officers.
[7564]Similarly it was stressed that there was a priority
[7565]need to secure Special Force trainers from. the Army,
[7566]on an ASAP basis. Requirements for materiel jumped,
[7567]particularly in the number of personal weapons which
[7568]would be required for added numbers of troops in
[7569]training. With the acquisition of the additional
[7570]training. site in Guatemala from Roberto Alejos, re-
[7571]quests immediately came forward for trucks and jeeps
[7572]to transport troops to these training areas. The.
[7573]* There also is evidence that at least one of the
[7574]principal Agency planners, C. Tracy Barnes, contrib-
[7575]uted to the November confusion. At one point, when
[7576]serious consideration was being given to the possi-
[7577]bility of increasing significantly the training activ-
[7578]ity that might be done in Nicaragua, Barnes introduced
[7579]what amounted to moral objections to the association
[7580]-- or to strengthening the association -- with the
[7581]Somoza Government. Barnes emphasized that this would
[7582]go down hard with the more liberal elements in Latin
[7583]America. 14/ This argument, of course, was very much
[7585]in line with the position being advanced by the Depart’
[7586]ment of State -- Thomas Mann excepted.
[7590]TOP SECRET
[7592]13-00000
[7594]TOP SECRET
[7596]field was aware that the increasing number of trainees
[7598]would create problems, but at the same time, there
[7600]. were indications that the trainers were hopeful that
[7602]the infiltration teams that had been developed could
[7604]be held intact. 15/
[7606]Just as there was confusion within the Headquarters
[7608]‘area over the nature of the program, so, too, was:con-
[7609]cern reflected in the field's messages to Headquarters.
[7611]“A cable of 28 November 1960 from COS Guatemala to
[7613]Headquarters requested:
[7614]Recent cable traffic suggests. major
[7616]changes in near future and COS feels it
[7618]would be of great assistance to have
[7620]complete story to assist in dealing with
[7622]Alejos and Ydigoras. 16/
[7624]Even as COS Guatemala was requesting information,
[7625]the situation in Washington remained in a state of
[7626]flux. On 29 November, Col. King made a specific at-
[7627]tempt to obtain positive guidance through the office
[7628]of the Deputy Director for Plans. Chief, WH/D, out-
[7629]lined his understanding of the paramilitary planning
[7630]as follows:
[7632](a) On or about 1 February 1961, land by
[7634]amphibious means a guerrilla force of about
[7636]600. trained Cubans to establish a perimeter
[7638]defense and resistance center in a selected
[7639]-area of Cuba.
[7641]- 157 -
[7643]TOP SECRET
[7645]13-00000
[7647]TOP SECRET
[7649](b). Continue present operations of in-
[7650]filtrating small paramilitary teams to
[7651]organize, train, and lead resistance
[7652]forces and report intelligence informa-
[7653]‘tion. |
[7655](c) Follow up this effort by providing
[7657]‘ air logistical support to the 600-man
[7658]guerrilla force in Cuba and all additional
[7659]guerrilla elements who join to collaborate
[7660]with this force. 17/
[7662]Having outlined his understanding of the planning,
[7663]Col.. King then went on: - ,
[7665]‘The following major questions must now
[7666]be resolved by the Special Group or referred
[7667]_ to the President for decision before pro-
[7668]ceeding further to implement the paramili-
[7669]tary aspect of this program as described
[7670]above:
[7672]a. Does either the Department of
[7673]State or the Department of Defense view
[7674]the proposed paramilitary concept as
[7676]_ not in consonance with policy or for
[7677]any other reason open to question? If
[7678]so, why and what alternatives are pro-
[7679]posed; what course of action is ap-
[7680]proved? .
[7682]b. If there is agreement as to the
[7683]paramilitary concept,. then is there
[7684]agreement that training shall ‘continue
[7685]in Guatemala?
[7687]c. If continuance in Guatemala is
[7688]disapproved, will DOD air-lift the.
[7689]present trainees at once from Guatemala
[7690]to Saipan for training and provide
[7691]‘similar air-lift for up to 300 additional
[7693]"men as they are recruited? . The entire
[7694]group would later be returned toa stag-
[7695]ing area in Nicaragua for the amphibious
[7696]operation.
[7698]- 158 -
[7700]TOP SECRET
[7702]13-00000
[7704]TOP SECRET
[7706](da) Will the DOD also provide the
[7707]following:
[7709](1) Thirty-eight Special Force
[7710]officers and enlisted men to be used
[7711]as instructors in Guatemala or in
[7712]Saipan, or both.
[7714](2) One reactivated LST.
[7716](3) Supplementation of logistic
[7718]' resupply air-lift to resistance after
[7719]1 February. (As detailed an estimate.
[7720]as can be made will be forwarded to
[7721]DOD if the paramilitary concept is
[7722]approved. ) 18/
[7724]Col. King then closed this memorandum to Mr.
[7725]Bissell by noting that if the paramilitary concept
[7726]was approved, certain policy approvals would be re-
[7728]' quired. These were listed as follows:
[7730]a. To use one Florida base, .such: as _
[7731]Opalocka, for air supply missions in sup-
[7732]port of guerrilla forces in the ‘target
[7733]country.
[7735]“b. °To use a small number of American’
[7736]civilian contract personnel in air and |
[7737]‘maritime operations. (No such personnel
[7738]are to be used in ground operations.)
[7740]c. To mount air strikes against Cuban
[7741]air and other military targets. 19/
[7743]. Whatever else can be said, it is clear that by
[7744]the end of November 1960, the original concept of the
[7745]Agency's anti-Castro effort as one focussing on the
[7747]‘use of small teams infiltrating Cuba and working with
[7749]- 159 -
[7751]TOP SECRET
[7753]13-00000 |
[7755]TOP SECRET
[7757]the dissident elements located within the country had
[7759]' gone by the board. What was now to be undertaken was
[7761]an amphibious assault in strength -- the strength as
[7763]yet to be determined -- with the concomitant require-—
[7765]ment for heavy ‘air support for resupply and possibly
[7766]for military support as well. Indicative of the con-
[7767]fusion which surrounded this period when the concept
[7768]was changing were Jake Esterline's remarks shortly
[7769]following the collapse of the Bay of Pigs when he
[7770]testified before the Taylor Committee. It appears
[7772]as though Esterline had been informed -- incorrectly
[7773]as it turned out -- that in his testimony of 1 May
[7774]1961 Lt. Col. Frank Egan had indicated to the commit-
[7776]tee that the strike force concept has been in being
[7778]‘since his EOD in June 1960.*
[7780]In rebutting what he thought Egan's testimony
[7782]had been, Esterline reported:
[7784]My recollection is that Lt. Col: Egan \
[7785]came to us about June 1960 and that he
[7787]* Egan had actually testified. that following the
[7788]Guatemalan revolt he had been sent down to organize
[7789]the brigade, and he stated that the number of Cuban
[7790]trainees had been on the order of 420 on 20 November
[7791]1960 and had risen to nearly 600 by the first week
[7792]of December. 20/
[7794]- 160 -
[7796]TOP SECRET
[7798]13-00000
[7800]TOP SECRET
[7802]arrived with certain ideas which he carried
[7803]from the Pentagon on how best to tackle the
[7804]Cuban problem. This, however, did not con-
[7806]“stitute JMATE policy. I am sure you [Col.
[7808]Jack Hawkins] -- or more particularly, mem-
[7810]_bers of your staff -- will find that we had
[7811]‘no approved philosophy of the operation
[7813]within the Project until well in[to] Sep-
[7814]tember. The training program which Rocky
[7815]Farnsworth conducted in Panama was directed
[7816]solely toward training an instructor cadre .
[7817]in small unit or “guerrilla type" opera-
[7818]tions. This cadre, when it arrived in
[7819]Guatemala, in. addition to working on build-
[7820]ing the camp with Carl Jenkins, continued
[7821]to train the first recruits in the same
[7822]kind of training they had received.
[7824]Another example of my positivenéss
[7825]that we were not, at Project level, think-
[7826]ing of the strike operation is the first
[7827]conversation that we held in my office in
[7828]Barton Hall when I referred to the fact
[7829]that the PM staff had been talking about
[7831]. the development of a strike operation, but
[7833]that I, myself, was not convinced of it at
[7834]the time and that I preferred to put small
[7835]teams into existing units at the appropri-
[7836]ate time. As I recall, you [Col. Jack
[7837]Hawkins] had an open mind at that point;
[7838]although without positive study of Cuba
[7839]you leaned to the concept I outlined... It
[7840]was at a. somewhat later date, therefore
[7841](probably before the first of October),
[7842]that we talked .again,and you [Col. Jack
[7844]Hawkins] stated your conviction that Castro
[7846]could not be overthrown without a major
[7847]or catalytic effort being made against
[7848]him. After deliberation, I came to the
[7849]same ‘conclusion, and we then began to
[7850]think.in terms of expanding the force
[7852]to the strength of a reinforced battalion,
[7853]more or less.
[7855]The foregoing is important only be-
[7857]' cause General Taylor is going into very
[7859]- 161 -
[7861]TOP SECRET
[7863]13-00000
[7865]TOP SECRET
[7867]fine points in his analysis: of government
[7868]policy. It is incumbent upon us, there-
[7869]fore, to get the record straight in this
[7870]manner, and, although Lt. Col. Egan may
[7871]have had in his own mind the idea of a
[7872]strike opération -- and I believe he came
[7873]to us with some idea on hitting the Isle
[7874]of Pines -- this nevertheless was not
[7875]approved Project or Agency policy until
[7876]quite a few months later. In point of
[7877]fact, as I look back over that period, I
[7878]am sure during that period I found myself
[7879]drifting along, devoting myself merely to
[7880]creating basic capabilities in a variety
[7881]of fields. without any clear-cut idea of
[7882]what national policy would permit us to
[7883]do.* 21/
[7885]Richard Bissell who was the Deputy Director for
[7887]Plans at the time of the Bay of Pigs operation has a
[7889]* In a discussion with the author of this history in
[7890]the fall of 1975, Esterline introduced another thought
[7892]‘about the change in concept to wit:
[7894]That the small team concept had been planned to
[7895]be put into operation early in November of 1960, and
[7896]Esterline seems to believe that this would have been
[7897]feasible. ‘dowever, the Presidential election of that
[7898]year made the Eisenhower administration extremely
[7899]cautious about anything: that might have an impact on
[7900]the outcome of the election; and, consequently, such
[7901]delays as were incurred gave added time for the build-
[7902]up of Castro's internal forces. By the time that the
[7903]election was over, it had become apparent. that the
[7904]small team concept was no longer viable. Esterline,
[7905]in fact, suggested that the emphasis for the buildup
[7906]in the brigade forces came from the White House. But
[7908]even though Gordon Gray -- in various meetings of the
[7909]Special Group during the period from November to the
[7910]end of the Eisenhower administration -- did support
[7912]the idea of increasing the size of the force, there
[7913]is no evidence to indicate that pressure to do this
[7914]came from the White House. 22/
[7916]- r62 -
[7918]TOP SECRET .
[7920]13-00000 -
[7922]TOP SECRET
[7924]rather more positive recollection of the change in
[7925]concept, having noted:
[7927]That.decision as to the character of |
[7928]the operation was rather gradually modi-
[7929]fied during the late autumn [of 1960],
[7930]and it's very difficult, even for someone
[7931]who.was close to those developments, to
[7932]put a finger on the exact moment when a
[7933]clear decision was made, or the circum-
[7934]stances, or, really, the people who niade
[7935]it. It was a decision rather forced by
[7938]When discussing the situation in October of 1975,
[7939]however, Bissell volunteered the following observations
[7940]about the change in concept for the operation. He said:
[7942]One of the clearest impressions I have
[7943]of the whole planning period and of this
[7944]change in concept was that by November
[7945]({1960] ... and I don't think Esterline
[7946]bought this view either as completely or
[7947]as soon as I did ... I [also] remember
[7948]the feeling that I was well ahead of
[7949]King ... in my ‘belief that we had to place
[7950]nearly exclusive reliance for the initial
[7951]phase on whatever force it was possible
[7952]to land.. So, I also remember very clearly
[7954]-~ and I think as early as November -- where
[7955]I think there were probably under 500 people
[7956]'in the brigade in training -- I remember
[7958]repeatedly saying to Hawkins and Esterline
[7959]that if we are really going to have to
[7960]place this heavy reliance on a landing
[7961]force, this is an all together prepos-
[7962]_terously inadequate number ... I remember
[7963]being told that people did not see how it
[7964]would be. feasible to get up to the size I
[7965]was talking about in the time period; but
[7966]secondly ... I have a ‘clear recollection
[7967]that he [Jack Hawkins} had a lesser sense.
[7969]- 163 -
[7971]TOP SECRET
[7973]13-00000
[7975]TOP SECRET
[7977]of urgency at that point about a buildup
[7978]in numbers than I did. .I felt that I
[7980]‘was consistently .urging upon Hawkins the
[7982]necessity of a larger buildup than the
[7983]plans then contemplated, and I. also re-
[7984]member, at. a later stage in a somewhat
[7985]similar fashion, urging upon Beerli, the
[7986]necessity of a significantly larger air
[7987]arm than his plans contemplated ....I
[7988]think that Hawkins likewise felt that he
[7989]had to rely on what the recruiting
[7990]mechanism would turn up, which wasn't
[7991]really his direct operation, and that |
[7992]he wasn't at all sure that he could get
[7993]the sort of numbers that I was talking
[7994]about.. But I do remember an awareness
[7995]of what seemed to me to be the inadequacy
[7997]-of our resources in the light of an altered
[7999]concept of the operation. 24/
[8001]= 164 -
[8003]TOP SECRET
[8005]13-00000
[8007]TOP SECRET
[8009]Part IV:
[8011]. Presidential Resurgence
[8013]The previous section of this volume has examined
[8014]the activities that occurred during the period from
[8015]the early fall through November of 1960, with the
[8016]shift away from what was to be exclusively a guerrilla
[8017]warfare type operation to a new concept emphasizing
[8018]amphibious invasion. During this period most of the
[8019]discussion and the decisions, aside from those within
[8020]CIA, were at the level of the special Group. The
[8022]principals involved from the Department of State were
[8024]at the Under Secretary/Assistant Secretary level at
[8026]the highest, and at the Agency, both the Director of
[8028]Central Intelligence and the Deputy Director for Plans
[8029]were involved. On 29. November 1960 the level of in-
[8030]volvement of the US Government escalated sharply with
[8031]the sudden resurgence of interest on the part of
[8032]President Dwight David Eisenhower. In contrast to
[8034]the period from July 1960 through the Presidential
[8036]election of early November -- when, as noted earlier,
[8038]_ there was, at most, minimal attention to the develop-
[8040]ing anti~Castro program at the White House level --
[8042]- 165 -
[8043]TOP SECRET
[8045]13-00000
[8047]TOP SECRET
[8049]suddenly the President emerged as one of the principal
[8050]decision makers in the period prior to the take-over
[8051]by the Kennedy administration.
[8053]- When asked for an explanation of this sudden
[8054]resurgence, Jake Esterline, then Chief, WH/4 stated:
[8056]I.can't explain it ... but I will say.
[8057]this, it probably had a political basis.
[8058]They [the Republican administration]
[8059]realized that they had lost, and they
[8060]realized that they were going to have to
[8061]brief a new administration along with the
[8062]British on the things that had been going
[8063]on. I suspect that they didn't want to
[8064]‘brief on something that would emerge that
[8065]they hadn‘t been giving anything other
[8067]-than their full support. I am guessing,
[8068]but I would think that was a pretty good
[8069]guess. 1/
[8071]on 29 November of 1960, the President had a meet=
[8073]; ing which included Messrs. Dillon and Merchant of State;
[8075]Gates and Douglas of Defense; Gray and Goodpaster of
[8076]his own Staff; and Dulles and Bissell of CIA. In his
[8077]report on the session with the President, Mr: Bissell,
[8078]the DDP mentioned among other things the following two
[8079]points of particular interest:
[8080]The President made it clear he wanted
[8082]all done that could be done with all
[8084]possible urgency and nothing less on the
[8086]part of any department, ... and the Presi-
[8088]dent led a discussion as to how best. to
[8090]organize the total US effort against the
[8091]target. There was some feeling that an
[8093]~ 166 -
[8095]TOP SECRET
[8097]13-00000
[8099]TOP SECRET
[8101]overall coordinating executive might be
[8102]desirable, but it was left that the
[8103]Director would make Mr. Barnes available
[8104]to work closely with a State Department
[8105]- officer to be designated. It was also
[8107]-felt desirable to use Mr. Pawley's
[8108]services, initially in connection with
[8110]' Argentina's possible covert assistance. 2/
[8112]The points of view attributed to the President
[8113]at this time by Mr. Bissell reflect very. closely the
[8114]position of William D. Pawley who had met with the
[8115]President immediately prior to the President's ses-
[8116]sion with State, DOD, and the Agency's representatives.
[8117]According to Livingston Merchant, who had a long
[8118]session with Mr. Pawley.on the day prior to Pawley's
[8119]meeting with President Eisenhower:
[8121]Mr. Pawley said. that two things are
[8122]necessary, and I inferred that these would
[8123]constitute his [{Pawley's] principal recom-
[8125]_ mendations to the President.
[8127](Ll) The President should appoint a
[8128]single experienced individual (he said he
[8129]was personally qualified and would be
[8130]available for the job if asked) to. conduct
[8132]the entire covert operation. In this con-
[8133]nection, he cited the role which he had
[8134]played in the Guatemala case.
[8136](2) We should recruit several thousand
[8137]good young Cubans in Florida and give them
[8138]basic training. This could be done in five
[8139]or six weeks, rather than months, according
[8140]to him. He was extremely impatient at the
[8141]thought of moving any Cubans who may now be
[8142]in Central America, expressing himself
[8144]- 167 -
[8146]TOP SECRET
[8148]13-00000
[8150]TOP SECRET
[8152]forcefully as being sure their host would
[8153]object.
[8155]-I asked if he was proposing overt in-
[8156]tervention by US armed forces. He said
[8157]absolutely not. The essence of his plan
[8158]would be to land in Cuba, presumably in
[8159]the next month or two, a force of 600
[8160]trained Cubans, following up this land-
[8161]ing with additional Cuban elements and
[8162]then installing a government in the bridge-
[8163]head which would call on us for financial
[8164]and logistics support. He mentioned a
[8165]number of names which were unfamiliar to
[8166]me of Cubans who he said are politically
[8167]unblemished in Cuba, neither pinks nor
[8168]reactionary rightists.* 3/
[8170]On 30 November 1960, a Special Group meeting was
[8172]held at which time Gordon Gray:
[8174]*. Considering that discussions within the Agency and
[8175]within the Special Group had only recently arrived at
[8176]the figure of 600 men for an invasion brigade, plus
[8177]the fact that this brigade would establish a bridge-
[8178]head from which a provisional government opposed to
[8179]Castro might be announced, .one might speculate on the
[8180]source of Pawley's information. Jake Esterline has
[8181]tended to denigrate the role played by Pawley during
[8182]the course of the Bay of Pigs operation; but, nonethe-
[8183]less, throughout the course of the operation Jake was
[8184]charged with maintaining close liaison with Pawley.
[8185]JMATE records indicate not only the numerous. face-to-
[8186]face meetings between Pawley and Esterline during the
[8187]course of the operation, but also reflect an amazing
[8188]number of telephone conversations between the two
[8189]during the life of the operation. In terms of the
[8190]operatiorial plan per se, Esterline appeared to be
[8191]most cagy in handling this subject during the dis-
[8192]cussions with Pawley. The recorded conversations
[8193]focus on the potential leadership for the FRD -~ with
[8194]Pawley's "best" leadership choices usually being far
[8195]to the right.
[8197]- 168 '-
[8199]TOP SECRET
[8201]13-00000
[8203]TOP SECRET
[8205]Solicited the Group's assistance in -
[8206]arriving. at a concensus [{ste] of views
[8207]_as..to what exactly had been decided as a
[8208]result of the. high level meeting [the
[8209]meeting with the President] of the day
[8211]before. 4/ a
[8213]According to the memorandum on the meeting,
[8214]there was agreement that the US would deny its partic-
[8216]ipation in any training activities in Guatemala, that
[8218]. there would:continue to be a prohibition on the train-
[8219]ing of Cubans in the United States, and that evacua-
[8221]tion plans. should be kept in readiness in case the
[8223]Cubans in training in Guatemala had to be evacuated
[8224]-- the plan to evacuate was not clear as to whether
[8225]the Cubans would be taken into Florida as ordinary
[8227]refugees or whether ‘the evacuation would call for
[8229]‘transporting the troops to our Saipan training base.
[8231]“The problem that apparently created the greatest
[8232]difficulty at this Special Group meeting was the Presi-
[8234]dent's suggestion that a single individual should be
[8236]placed in charge of. the: anti-Castro program. The
[8238]Special Group decided that there should be two indi-.
[8240]viduals with principal responsibilities -- one to
[8242]handle the overt and the other to handle the covert
[8243]activities. After reviewing a list of potential
[8245]candidates: |
[8247]- 169 -
[8248]TOP SECRET
[8250]13-00000
[8252]TOP SECRET
[8254]It was finally decided that, taking all
[8255]things into consideration, including the
[8256]aspect of quick availability, Ambassador |
[8257]Willauer would probably be the best choice.
[8258]On the CIA side, Mr. Dulles nominated Mr.
[8259]Barnes. It was recognized that these
[8260]nominees would have to be checked’ with
[8261]Mr. Gray's associates. 5/
[8262]When Mr. Mann suggested that Ambassador Willauer
[8263]‘might also assume responsibility for contacts with the
[8264]FRD, Mr. Dulles rejected this out of hand, emphasizing
[8265]that this liaison must be done covertly, and that it
[8266]- must be done by. the Agency. There apparently was
[8267]unanimous agreement that Mr. Pawley not be given any
[8268]official status with the US Government, but no one
[8269]objected to Pawley's plans to visit Argentine Presi-
[8270]dent Frondizi in his capacity as a private US citizen. 33/
[8271]Following the President's suggestion of 29 Novem-
[8272]ber, Acting Secretary of State Douglas Dillon forwarded
[8273]a memorandum for President Eisenhower on 2 December
[8274]1960 recommending that, because of the differences
[8275].
[8276]in responsibilities, two senior officials, rather
[8277]than one, be charged with managing the anti-Castro
[8278]‘program. Dillon suggested that Ambassador Whiting
[8279]Willauer be named as a Special Deputy to Assistant
[8281]Secretary for American Republic Affairs, Thomas Mann,
[8283]to.act as the officer responsible for the US Government's
[8285]. - 170 -
[8286]TOP SECRET .
[8288]13-00000
[8290]TOP SECRET .
[8292]overt position vis-a-vis Cuba, and with the responsi-.
[8293]bility of coordinating the covert activities of the
[8294]Agency into that US position. On the covert side
[8295]Dillon followed the DCL's suggestion that, C. Tracy
[8297]Barnes should be appointed "to devote full time to
[8299]the direction of the Agency's program with: respect
[8301]to Cuba, and to concert! with Amb. Willauer." 6/
[8302]Dillon's memorandum then went on to recommend
[8303]that the members of the Special Group -- Dulles,
[8304]Gray, Douglas, and Merchant -- should continue to
[8305]exercise general supervision over the covert opera-
[8307]tion and to provide the Agency with general guidance
[8309]in the operation, and -- now at the tag end of the
[8310]Eisenhower administration -~ went on to say that the
[8312]Group
[8314]should continue and intensify its general
[8315]supervision of the covert-operation ...
[8316]{and] maintain close and regular liaison
[8317]with Secretary Anderson of Treasury or
[8318]‘his designated representative ... [and]
[8319]should meet, together with the member's
[8320]individual principals, with you from
[8322]time to time as it deemed necessary or as
[8323]you desire. 7/
[8325]In response to this recommendation, the Presi-
[8326]dent wrote:
[8327]I approve of the suggestions regarding
[8328]the reorganization of the government's
[8330]- 171 -
[8332]TOP SECRET
[8334]13-00000
[8336]TOP SECRET
[8338]program with respect to that country
[8339]{(Cuba], except that I think Mr. Willauer
[8340]should have a position directly subordi-
[8341]nate to the Secretary of State for so
[8342]long as Cuba remains a critical problem
[8343]in our foreign relations. There should
[8344]be no doubt as to the authority of the
[8345]Special Assistant to the State Department
[8346](Mr. Willauer) to. subordinate covert and
[8347]overt activities, nor as to his responsi-
[8348]bility for conveying policy guidance to
[8349]the operating agencies. In their broad
[8350]outline, these policies will, of course,
[8351]be subject to the approval of higher
[8352]authority. 8/
[8354]An interesting aspect of the Eisenhower memoran-
[8356]dum is that he elevated the position to be assigned
[8358]to Mr. Willauer from that of being a Special Deputy
[8360]to Assistant Secretary Mann, the Assistant Secretary
[8362]for American Republic Affairs, to that of being direct-
[8364]ly subordinate to the Secretary of State. When Thomas
[8366]A. Parrott who acted as secretary for the Special
[8368]Group meeting. transmitted a copy ‘of the draft of puiies' popes
[8371]menorati it to racy Barnes, Parrott had been made
[8373]aware of the possibility that Eisenhower was in favor
[8375]of raising the position of Willaver. In an aside
[8377]to Barnes in his transmittal note, Parrott indicated
[8379]that even if Eisenhower did want Willauer made
[8381]directly responsible to the Secretary of State, in
[8383]fact: “He (Willauer] will be instructed that he
[8385]- 172 -
[8387]TOP SECRET
[8389]13-00000
[8391]TOP SECRET
[8393]darn well works for Mann anyway, regardless of the
[8394]title."* 9/
[8396]Even as the negotiations just mentioned were
[8398]“underway, by early. December 1960 the Agency's posi-
[8400]tion on the nature of the PM action decidedly hardened.
[8401]On 8 December at a meeting of the Special Group,
[8402]Colonels Hawkins and Egan proposed a military program |
[8404]which combined the use of infiltrated small paramili-
[8406]tary teams as a test to see if. the dissident elements
[8408]would rally round and, also recommend a training
[8410]program for a force of 600- -750 men possessing extremely
[8411]heavy fire power for amphibious assault. Prior to
[8413]an amphibious invasion, however, it was agreed that
[8414]there would be sorties into Cuban air space but the
[8415]precise nature and number of these was disputable,
[8416]ranging from possibly 100 a month for a three month
[8417]period beginning on 15 January 1961 -- and including
[8418]some B-26 sorties to bomb and strafe military targets
[8420]-- to an undefined minimum of sorties for a three
[8422]week period to’ soften up the opposition. |
[8424]* The Agency apparently thought that it had a pretty
[8425]good handle on Willauer because of his long. term associ-
[8427]ation as Executive Vice- President, President, and Vice-
[8428]Chairman of the Board of Civil Air Transport (CAT).
[8430]vo ; ~ 173 -
[8432]TOP SECRET
[8434]13-00000
[8436]TOP SECRET ©
[8438]in the course of these discussions of grouna
[8439]and air operations there were some interesting contra-
[8440]dications among Agency spokesmen aS to what was needed
[8441]or what was wanted. Tracy Barnes seemed to have a
[8442]great deal more to say than was warranted by his
[8443]knowledge and apparent understanding of the planned
[8444]action. In one discussion with Secretary Douglas,
[8445]when Barnes was pushing for the use of an increased
[8446]number of troops, he stated that the number of anti-
[8447]Castro dissidents who might rally round the invaders
[8448]would be no different if the size of the invading force
[8449]were 600 men or 3,000 men. A rationale such as that
[8450]and Barnes's comment to Gen. Lansdale when he for-
[8451]warded one proposal --
[8452]Please recognize that this proposal is
[8453]a draft and is off the top of the head.
[8454]without any detailed knowledge of possible
[8455]applicable regs and procedures -~
[8456]help make understandable the consternation within the
[8457]ranks of the Department of Defense concerning the
[8458]Agency's understanding of which end was up.* 10/
[8459]+ There was also an ongoing discussion during this time
[8460]_ period regarding the assignment of US Army Special Force
[8461]trainers to the Guatemala bases. This is discussed in
[8463]detail in Volume II.of this history, Participation in
[8464]the Conduct of Foretgn Poltey.
[8466]- 174 -
[8468]TOP SECRET
[8470]13-00000
[8472]TOP SECRET
[8474]In one of the longer and more detailed papers
[8475]being prepared toward the close of the Eisenhower
[8476]_ administration, the State Department drafted the polit-
[8477]ical action recommendations and suggested collective
[8478]action through the Organization of American States
[8479]to effect the ouster of Castro. Failing in that,
[8480]State then outlined a unilateral political action
[8481]program for the United States. The paramilitary and
[8482]covert action segments of this paper were prepared
[8483]by the CIA. Neither the State nor the CIA paper
[8484]introduced ideas that had not been thoroughly dis-_
[8485]cussed. These recommendations were made just as if
[8486]the Secretary of State, the Special Group, and the
[8487]President had approved, or would approve, the courses
[8488]of action that were being outlined. This. being the
[8489]case, it was: suggested that the concurrence of the
[8490]president-elect should be sought for the proposed
[8491]program. In the best of all possible worlds one
[8492]could hardly find fault with this optimistic approach
[8493]-~- in the pragmatic world it is difficult to under~-
[8494]stand that anyone would go on record with the expec-
[8496]tation that such recommendations might be followed
[8498]- 175 -
[8500]TOP SECRET
[8502]t
[8504]13-00000
[8506]- TOP SECRET
[8508]across changing political and administrative lines.* 11/
[8509]With WH/4 in the throes of revising the anti-
[8511]Castro program on the basis of the increased efficiency
[8513]‘of the Castro military forces, an SNIE, Prospects for
[8515]the Castro Regime, was issued, belaboring the obvious
[8516]-~- that Castro was firmly in control of Cuba. The
[8517]SNIE also proceeded to make the following observation
[8518]about Castro's military forces:
[8520]The militia's overall combat efficiency
[8522]is low; many units are still on a part |
[8523]-time training basis.. However, there appears
[8524]to be emerging a nucleus of well organized,
[8525]well equipped, and well ‘trained units loyal
[8526]to Castro and strongly Communist~influenced;
[8527]we believe that within the next 12. months
[8528]or so, these units will develop into a
[8529]reasonably effective security force. 13/
[8531]The estimate continued, noting that the Cuban Army
[8532]was still disrupted and “combat effectiveness of the
[8533]Air Force is virtually:nil." 9/ . The concept for
[8534]Project IMATE, however, had shifted from small unit
[8538]guerrilla warfare to invasion because of evidence of
[8540]* President Eisenhower wrote that on 6 December 1960,
[8542]“Senator Kennedy“ came to the White House for a brief-
[8543]ing and that among the subjects. discussed was Cuba,
[8545]this being one of-the first three items that Kennedy
[8546]wished to talk about and that: "He [JFK] had previous-.
[8547]ly been briefed by Allen Dulles a number of times and
[8549]had some familiarity with the details." 12/
[8551]- 176 -
[8553]TOP SECRET
[8555]13-00000
[8557]TOP SECRET
[8559]increased: efficiency of Castro's forces and it would
[8560]appear that the operators and the estimators were
[8561]not making evaluations from the same intelligence
[8562]information.
[8564]Despite his promotion early in the month, it
[8565]was not until 23 December 1960 that Ambassador Willauer
[8566]called a meeting with the Agency's principals to ex-
[8567]plain both his role and some of the problems that he
[8568]anticipated the President wanted him to handle. Ap-
[8569]parently it was an inauspicious beginning, for accord-
[8570]ing to a memorandum of the meeting: .
[8572]Mr. Willauer stated that his role, as
[8574]explained to him by Secretary Herter, was
[8576]to be that of the chairman and major
[8578]shareholder of a corporate board with Mr.
[8580]Tracy Barnes, the executive director for
[8582]operations and minority shareholder. Col.
[8584]King asked for clarification on this point,
[8586]noting that Mr. Esterline is the director
[8588]for operations for CIA with the chain of
[8590]command going from the Director to Bissell
[8592]to Col. King to Mr. Esterline. Mr. Barnes
[8594]is a coordinator with, the other interested
[8596]agencies. Mr. Willauer agreed that this
[8598]was the case, noting that he had used the
[8600]term operations in the looser sense of
[8602]overall coordination. 14/
[8604]Once having had the pecking order set straight, |
[8605]Ambassador Willauer then proceeded to a discussion
[8607]of various problem areas, indicating his very strong
[8609]bias in favor of Agency ‘positions as opposed to
[8611]- 177 -
[8613]TOP SECRET
[8615]13-00000
[8617]TOP SECRET
[8619]positions being taken by the Department of State.
[8621]For example, Willauer noted that there was a. strong
[8622]aversion to attempts to set a firm date for D-Day,
[8624]with the opponents basing their arguments on the
[8626]fact that the oas would be sure to get in on the act
[8627]and, moreover, that military planning should be deferred
[8629]until it could be determined if the economic sanctions
[8631]would work to Castro's disadvantage. On the question
[8633]of economic ‘sanctions Willauer pointed out: to the
[8635]people in State that since the Soviet Union was so
[8637]- strongly committed to support the Castro government,
[8639]economic sanctions would have little or no impact on
[8640]Castro's position. Willauer also argued that there
[8641]was going to be revolutionary activity in Cuba,
[8642]whether the US had a hand in it or not; and he empha-
[8644]sized that, in any event, the US would be blamed for
[8646]it.
[8648]Both Jake Esterline and Col. Jack Hawkins pointed
[8649]out that another reason for firming up the D-Day date
[8650]concerned the logistics of the troop movement ; and .
[8651]both urged as early a date as possible because of
[8653]the already mentioned improvement in the military
[8655]capability, equipment, and training of Castro's
[8657]- 178 -
[8659]TOP SECRET
[8661]13-00000
[8663]TOP SECRET
[8665]forces. Esterline also emphasized that most of the
[8666]arguments urging delay: of PM planning, particularly
[8667]concexn re the OAS, had been debated with State for
[8668]months, and the time had come for direct action.
[8669]The WH/4 representatives also stressed that the
[8670]period of training for many of the Cubans had been
[8671]extended and re~extended, and that to hold them be-
[8672]yond 1 March 1961 increased the problem of maintain-
[8673]ing high morale among the troops. Esterline took
[8674]the position that the Cubans the Agency was training
[8675]knew that the US had the force to throw Castro out
[8676]any time that it ‘so desired, but the months and months
[8677]of.training was indicative, to them at least, that
[8678]the US was not really interested in the welfare of
[8679]the anti-Castro Cubans. |
[8680]During the 23 December 1960 meeting, Willauer's
[8681]expertise and familiarity with air operations led
[8682]-him to ask almost immediately “why the project is
[8684]‘so thin in the air'." Willauer was told that the
[8685]rules of the game were that only Cuban air crews
[8687]could be used, and this was the reason for the Agency's
[8689]efforts to obtain permission to use contract American
[8691]- 179 -
[8693]TOP SECRET
[8695]13-00000
[8697]crews for both:
[8699]tions were the
[8700]Concerning the
[8702]for three days
[8704]TOP SECRET
[8706]resupply. and combat.* The air opera-
[8707]subject of considerable discussion.
[8708]possibility of launching air strikes
[8710]before the invading force landed,
[8712]Willauer objected, pointing out that this would give
[8714]the OAS ample time to get involved in the act. Wil-
[8716]lauer then raised the question of whether all of the
[8718]tactical bombing could be done on D-Day. The answer
[8720]to that from Col. Hawkins was
[8722]no," but Hawkins said
[8724]that it could be done on D-2, if permission were given
[8726]for dawn airstrikes to take out Castro's air force
[8728]and military targets, with additional sorties during
[8730]the course of D-1 and follow-up raids on D-Day prior
[8732]to the landings. Moreover, Hawkins pointed out that
[8734]. if an attempt were made to withhold the airstrikes
[8736]until D-Day, the Castro. air force would have an op-
[8738]portunity to attack the ships which would be. carrying
[8740]the invasion troops. «
[8742]In a similar manner, a strong case was made for
[8744]the use of the
[8746]Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua air base to
[8748]* Hawkins wanted “pilots who can work over key targets
[8749]without tearing up installations we will later need."
[8751]- 180 -
[8753]TOP SECRET
[8755]13-00000
[8757]TOP SECRET
[8759]launch strikes against Cuba. Apparently there was
[8761]some discussion of limiting use of this base to only
[8763]two or three days -- at least some of the State De-
[8764]partment people pushed this idea -- but WH/4 pointed
[8765]out that it was inconceivable in view of the nature
[8767]of the planned air operations, that the air support
[8769]‘operation could be in and out of Nicaragua in this
[8771]period. It was pointed out to Willauer that efforts
[8772]had been made to get permission to use US bases, or
[8773]other closer bases to Cuba than Nicaragua, but with-
[8774]out success. Willauer, himself was positive that no
[8775]US bases would be made available for the strike
[8776]against Castro. .
[8778]One other interesting aspect of this initial -
[8779]meeting with Willauer, concerned the transition be-
[8780]tween the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations.
[8782]Willauer stressed that the ground rule at. the Depart-
[8784]‘ment of State was that the Kennedy people could not
[8786]be sought out to discuss specific problems unless
[8787]they initiated requests for information, and it was
[8790]. That the only practical way to get de-
[8792]cisions.on the project before 20 January
[8793]would be to have the Director [the DCI],
[8795]-~ 181 -
[8797]TOP SECRET
[8799]13-00000
[8801]TOP SECRET
[8803]whose position re the new administration
[8805]is different than Mr. Herter's, to go to
[8807]Mr. Kennedy in person and seek to get him
[8809]committed. It would be very difficult
[8811]for State people to’try to approach Mr.
[8813]Kennedy via Mr. Rusk and Mr. Bowles. 15/
[8815]During the 21 December 1960 meeting of the
[8816]Special Group, Allen Dulles briefed the attendees on
[8817]a meeting that he had participated in the previous:
[8818]day in New York, with a group of American business-
[8819]men. The meeting had been called by Henry Holland,
[8820]who was one of the principal fund: raisers for the
[8821]FRD, and in attendance at this meeting were the Vice
[8822]President for Latin America of Standard Oil of New
[8823]Jersey, the Chairman of the Cuban-American Sugar
[8824]Company, the President of the American Sugar Domino
[8826]Refining Company , the President of the American &
[8828]Foreign Power. Company, the Chairman of the Freeport
[8830]Sulphur Company, and representatives from Texaco,
[8831]International Telephone and. Telegraph, and other
[8832]American companies with business interests in Cuba.
[8833]The tenor of the conversation was that it was time
[8834]for the US to get off of dead center and take some
[8835]direct action against Castro.
[8837]Suggestions were made. to sabotage the sugar .
[8839]crop -- the question being whether to burn the cane
[8841]- 182 -
[8842]TOP SECRET
[8844]13-00000
[8846]TOP SECRET
[8848]fields or ruin the refineries; to interrupt the
[8849]electric power supply; and to put an embargo on food,.
[8850]drugs, and spare parts for machinery. Dulles opposed
[8851]the embargo. on food and @rugs, but the feeling of
[8853]the business group was that it was time to get tough
[8855]and, hopefully, the blame for an embargo would be
[8857]laid on Castro. Another interesting suggestion volun-
[8859]teered was that the US Navy should blow up a ship in
[8861]Levisa Bay in order to force the shutdown of the
[8863]nickel plant at Nicaro which formerly had been owned
[8865]and operated by the US Government. 16/ In his usual
[8866]cautious manner, Gordon Gray suggested that the
[8867]Special Group not authorize any action until he had
[8868]cleared the matter with his "associate." |
[8870]This group of businessmen also indicated that
[8872]‘they were going to undertake the publication of
[8874]specific papers on issues and programs related to
[8877]the post-Castro Cuba, which would be designed to
[8879]-help us policy planners. Mr; Dulles, of course,
[8881]emphasized that policy. planning was not his respon-
[8883]sibility; this was the responsibility of the Depart-
[8885]ment of State. He did comment that “what he was
[8887]interested in was getting rid of Castro as quickly
[8889]- 183 -
[8891]TOP SECRET
[8893]13-00000
[8895]TOP SECRET:
[8897]as possible and in this field he had direct responsi-
[8898]bility and would welcome any ideas or suggestions on
[8899]how this might be achieved." 17/
[8901]The high-level business group which Dulles met
[8902]with. was also extremely concerned about the possible
[8904]orientation of any anti-Castro government in exile,
[8906]particularly that it should not be left-oriented.
[8908]Michael Haider, Standard of Jersey's Vice President
[8910]‘for Latin America, for example, forwarded a.memorandum
[8912]to Col. J. Cc. King in early January 1961 identifying
[8913]as members of an extreme leftist group which had
[8914]formed in Miami to oppose Castro, Manolo Ray, Aureliano
[8915]Sanchez Arango, Rufo Lépez Fresquet, and Dr. Raul
[8916]Chibas among others. Mr. Haider worried that unless
[8917]more positive steps were taken to force ‘the conserva-
[8918]tive Cuban exiles into a cohesive organization, that
[8919]any post-Castro government would automatically be in
[8920]the hands of the leftists. * 18/
[8922]In addition to strong positive suggestions from
[8923]US businessmen, Brigadier General Lansdale, Office of
[8924]* Haider was consistent at any rate -- "leftists"
[8926]with Fidel or “Fidelistas sin Fidel" were held to be
[8927]equally bad for US business interests.
[8929]- 184 -
[8931]_ TOP SECRET
[8933]13-00000
[8935]TOP SECRET
[8937]Special Operations, Office of the Secretary of Defense,
[8938]also had some suggestions which he made. to Mr. Bissell
[8939]about the conduct of the Agency's anti-Castro program.
[8940]For whatever reason, in late December 1960 Lansdale
[8942]forwarded to Bissell a number of suggestions which
[8944]. had been presented to him by an Army reservist who
[8946]had put in two weeks of active duty with OSO at Lans-
[8947]dale's direction researching Cuban political objectives.
[8948]Inasmuch as the Agency had devoted many months to
[8950]the study of this subject, ‘and all other aspects of
[8952]‘the anti-Castro effort, it appears a rather gratuitous
[8954]insult that Lansdale would have forwarded this kind
[8956]of paper to Bissell. 19/ What response, if any,
[8958]‘Bissell made to this memorandum is not known.
[8960]The Special Group held its last meeting of 1960
[8962]-on 29 December, and there were, in addition to the
[8964]standing problem of the use of US air bases to sup-
[8965]port the operation against Cuba, the questions of
[8967]the use of a Nicaraguan air base, the political organ-
[8968]ization of the Cuban exiles, and considerable discus—
[8969]sion about the possibility of initiating action against
[8970]Trujillo in the Dominican Republic. “Te was emphasized
[8972]that Mr. Pawley was strongly in favor of intervention
[8974]~ 185 -
[8976]TOP SECRET |
[8978]13-00000
[8980]TOP SECRET
[8982]in the Dominican Republic, even suggesting that an
[8983]overt operation against Trujillo be mounted concur-
[8984]rently. with ‘the Cuban operation. The members (of the
[8985]Special Group, however, were unwilling to buy this
[8986]particular plan of action; but they did | Support Mr.
[8987]Bissell’ s. ‘proposals for some limited covert action
[8988]operations aimed at the Trujillo. regime.
[8990]James: H. Douglas, Deputy Secretary of Defense
[8992]questioned the feasibility of “expanding the initial
[8994]beachhead into a full-scale takeover of the Cuban
[8996]Government"; but Mr. Bissell. pointed out that such
[8997]a project was unrealistic unless "One or all of the
[8998]following situations develops: (a) overt support,
[8999](b) a major revolutionary uprising, (c) massive. use
[9000]of air support." 20/° The Group was apparently in
[9002]agreement that the Agency should make every effort
[9004]to insure that no abortive small-scale insurrections
[9006]be attempted to overthrow Castro. 21/
[9008]In view of the fact that the US would break ©
[9009]diplomatic relations with Cuba. on 3 January 1961,
[9010]the minutes of the Special Group meeting of 29 Decem-
[9011]ber 1960 present an interesting historical problem.
[9013]In summarizing Livingston Merchant's report of his
[9015]- 186 -
[9017]TOP SECRET
[9019]13-00000 ; J
[9021]TOP SECRET
[9023]meeting with President Eisenhower, on 28 December,
[9024]the minutes of the Special Group Meeting of 29 De-
[9025]‘cember read as follows:
[9027]The latter [President Eisenhower] made
[9028]two points: (a) it would be desirable to
[9029]obtain the cooperation and support of indi-
[9030]vidual Latin American Governments, (b) it
[9031]would be desirable, if possible, for. US to
[9032]break relations with Cuba, in concert with
[9033]other countries some time before January
[9036]In contrast to the suggestion that the US break
[9037]realtions with Cuba, prior to the inauguration of
[9038]Kennedy, General Goodpaster's record of the Merchant-
[9039]Eisenhower meeting of 28 December reported that:
[9041]He, [President Eisenhower] thought,
[9042]however, that [Presidents] Frondizi,
[9043]Prado, and others should take diplomatic
[9044]initiative to get Latin American countries
[9045]to take a position that they would like
[9046]to remove Castro from power, but, lacking
[9047]the means to do so, would like the US to
[9048]take the lead. The President said it was
[9049]Clear to him that Latin Americans must be
[9050]brought to see the necessity of action.
[9051]He was inclined to think that it might
[9052]be time to recognize the anti-Castro
[9053]front as the Cuban Government. He added
[9054]that he would like to see a definite
[9055]move taken in this matter before January
[9056]20th, and said that the State Department
[9057]should be thinking of some definite
[9058]action that could be brought about be-
[9059]fore that time. 23/
[9061]"Thinking of some definite action" differs consider-
[9062]‘ably from the suggestion that the President thought
[9063]- 187 -
[9065]TOP SECRET —
[9067]13-00000
[9069]TOP SECRET
[9071]it would be "desirable" to break relations with Cuba
[9072]prior to 20 January of 1961.
[9074]At the Special Group meeting of 29 December 1960,
[9075]it also was suggested by Mr. Merchant that the Group's
[9076]membership for discussions on Cuba be expanded to in-
[9077]clude Ambassador Willauer, Assistant Secretary Thomas
[9078]Mann, and Cc. Tracy Barnes. 24/ As already has been
[9079]noted, in his retrospective view of the Bay of Pigs
[9080]operation Jake Esterline was quite forceful in his
[9081]opinion that the Agency's representatives at such
[9082]high level meetings should have been someone like
[9083]either himself or Col. Jack Hawkins who were the most
[9084]knowledgeable about the status of the operation and,
[9085]indeed, the whole operational plan.*
[9087]* It is the considered opinion of the author of this
[9089].  . history that Esterline had a valid criticism. A re-
[9090]view of the records of the Bay of Pigs Operation, indi-
[9091]cates that one of the most voluminous correspondents
[9092]was C. Tracy Barnes, that a great deal of the written N
[9093]material is repititious ad nauseam, and that Barnes
[9094]belabored issues which were common knowledge to the
[9095]principals in WH/4. Illustrative of this, for example,
[9096]was a 28 December 1960 memorandum which Barnes wrote |
[9097]to Jake Esterline. It began as follows: “It has been
[9098]a little while since we have had an internal DDP hoe
[9099]down on your project. In the meantime, a number of
[9100]important points have been raised." 25/
[9102]The memorandum then proceeded to run through all
[9104]of the issues which, by this time, were common knowledge
[9105](footnote continued on following. page)
[9107]- 188 -
[9109]TOP SECRET
[9111]13-00000
[9113]TOP SECRET
[9115]On 2 January 1961 Fidel Castro notified the
[9117]United States Government that it would. have to cut
[9119]its Embassy staff in Havana to eleven persons. On
[9121]3 January 1961, President Eisenhower held a meeting
[9123]at the White House to discuss the Cuban situation.
[9125]In addition to the President, and the Secretaries .
[9127]of State, Defense, and Treasury, the participants
[9128]“included the members of the Special Group, plus
[9129]General Goodpaster, Mr. Bissell, Thomas Mann, and
[9130]Tracy Barnes. “Among principal questions, of course,
[9131]were if and when the United States should break off
[9132]a@iplomatic relations with Cuba; and after some initial
[9133]hesitation, before the day was over the United States
[9134]did break relations officially with the Cuban Govern-
[9135]ment. *¥ |
[9137]to those who were even marginally involved in planning
[9139]the anti-Castro operation and contributed nothing in
[9140]‘particular to understanding of any of them.
[9142]- Similarly, Barnes' memorandum for the DCL in prep-
[9143]aration for a 3 January policy meeting, rehashed the
[9144]same information that Barnes had presented to Chief,
[9145]WH/4, just a few days before. 26/ Barnes appears to
[9146]have suffered a severe case of verbal diarrhea.
[9148]* Before the firm decision was made to break diplomatic
[9149]relations, there was great concern within the Agency
[9150]that the COS, a communicator, and a PM officer, and
[9151]‘possibly a fourth individual be retained as members of
[9152]the Staff. 21/
[9154]- 189 -
[9156]TOP SECRET
[9158]13-00000
[9160]TOP SECRET
[9162]The other subject of conversation was whether
[9164]there now was cause or reason for direct US inter-
[9166]vention in Cuba, and the decision was that no such
[9168]action should be taken unless the Cuban Government
[9169]took aggressive action against US citizens in Cuba
[9170]or damaged official US property (e.g., Guantanamo) .
[9172]In the course of the discussion about the status of
[9174]Agency planning for anti~-Castro activities, the
[9176]question was raised about increasing the number of
[9178]trainees. This was ruled out pending the suitability
[9179]of training sites to handle additional numbers.
[9180]Training sites in the US still were denied, in part,
[9181]again, because of the fear of compromising the US
[9182]position in the Organization of American States or
[9183]in the United. Nations. |
[9185]The high level White. House meeting also agreed
[9186]that it would be useful to brief members of the new
[9188]administration, particularly the Secretary of State,
[9190]“but “no definite schedule was agreed upon but the
[9192]concensus {sic} of the meeting was that appropriate
[9193]briefings should be considered for the near future." 28/
[9194]In the few days following the 3 January decision |
[9196]to break relations with the Castro Government, the
[9198]- 190 -
[9200]TOP SECRET (© ok
[9202]13-00000
[9204]TOP SECRET
[9206]Agency retained control of US communications out of
[9208]‘Havana -- the Ambassador deciding that he preferred
[9210]to relieve the female Department of State communica-
[9211]tions officer and retain the services of her male
[9212]counterpart from the Agency. During this hectic
[9213]period, the communications officer was instructed
[9214]to pack up as much gear as possible and destroy that
[9215]which remained. Even if all the gear were not destroyed,
[9216]CIA's Director of Communications indicated "there
[9217]would not be any extreme compromise." In any event,
[9218]however, the last message from Havana Station -- on
[9219]7 January 1961 at 16382 -- stated
[9220]This last msg from HAVA Station. All
[9221]files and crypto material destroyed ...
[9222]on evening 6 Jan [1961] Swiss amb placed
[9223]"Carta de Proteccion" notices on emb doors
[9224]minimizing possibility takeover of bldg
[9225]by GOC.* 29/
[9226]' Even as the ‘debate over the breaking of diplomatic
[9227]relations was taking place within the Eisenhower ad-
[9228]ministration, Col. Jack Hawkins addressed a memorandum
[9230]to Jake Esterline, Chief, WH/4 which provided an ex-
[9232]cellent summary of the policy decisions which needed
[9234]* Authorization for complete shutdown. had been set
[9235]for 03002 on'7 January 1961. 30/
[9237]- 191 -
[9239]TOP SECRET
[9241]13-00000
[9243]TOP SECRET
[9245]to be made if strike operations were to be conducted
[9246]against the Castro government. In the course of his
[9247]eight page memorandum, Hawkins reiterated the need
[9249]for resolution of the problem that had particularly
[9251]‘bothered the Special Group -- that.was whether the
[9253]Kennedy administration was interested in following
[9254]through on the plans that had been made. Assuming
[9255]that the Kennedy administration did intend to follow
[9256]through on the program which had been initiated,
[9257]Hawkins suggested that considering the rapid build
[9259]up-of Castro's military forces the strike operations
[9261]be conducted not later than 1 March 1961. The ques-
[9263]tion of air strikes was basic to Hawkins's planning
[9264]-- on this he was quite firm. In discussing the
[9265]general question of air operations Hawkins said:
[9267]It is axiomatic in amphibious operations
[9268]that control of air and sea in ‘the objec-—:
[9269]tive area is absolutely required. The
[9270]Cuban Air Force and naval vessels capable
[9271]of opposing our landing must be knocked
[9272]out or neutralized before our amphibious
[9273]shipping makes its final run in to the
[9274]beach. If this is not done, we will be
[9275]courting disaster.
[9277]Then, by specific recommendations, Hawkins urged
[9278]the following:
[9279]1. That the air preparation commence
[9280]not later than dawn on D minus 1 Day.
[9282]- 192.-
[9284]TOP SECRET
[9286]13-00000
[9288]TOP SECRET
[9290]2. That any move, to curtail the number
[9291]_ of aircraft to be employed from those
[9292]available be firmly resisted.
[9294]3. That the operation be abandoned if
[9295]policy does not. provide for use of adequate
[9296]‘tactical air support.
[9298]In order to insure the success of both the air
[9300]strike and the air drop operations which would pro-
[9302]' vide the logistical support for. the troops holding
[9304]the lodgment on Cuban soil, Hawkins urged, as he had
[9305]in the past, authorization for the use of contract
[9306]American pilots, the use of the airfield at Puerto
[9307]Cabezas as an advance strike base, and the use of air
[9308]bases in. the United states for the launching of
[9309]logistical flight operations .* 3l1/
[9311]'. Much the same ground indicated in Hawkins memo-
[9312]randum was rehashed in preparing Mr. Barnes and the
[9314]DCI for a Special Group meeting of 5 January 1961.
[9316]* .There'is no indication that Hawkins ever changed
[9317]his, attitude about the need for the. introduction of
[9319]some ‘us pilots into both the-strike and logstics
[9321]air operations, even though his much quoted cable of
[9322]13 April 1961 from Puerto Cabezas repeated the high
[9324]_ praise. for the B-26 pilots. who were about to under-
[9326]take the D-2 air strike. See Volume I of the Official
[9327]History of the. Bay of Pigs Operation, Air Operations,
[9328]Part III, A for discussion of the Hawkins cable in
[9329]the context of the air operations.
[9331]- 193 _
[9333]- TOP SECRET
[9335]13-00000
[9337]TOP SECRET
[9339]Somewhat more. emphasis than Hawkins had given to it.
[9340]was placed: on the political organization and the
[9341]needs for structuring the exile political group to
[9342]conform accurately to the sentiments of those Cubans
[9343]who did oppose Castro. Otherwise, much of the same
[9344]focus was to be given to the questions regarding air
[9345]bases, the -size of the invasion force, and the number
[9346]of trainees who could be accommodated in the’ camps,
[9347]and other of the problems that had already been dis-
[9349]cussed time and time again. 32/ Similarly, in dis-
[9351]cussions prior to the 12 January 1961 meeting of
[9353]the Special Group, much of this same ground continued
[9354]to be replowed without any positive resolution by
[9355]the Special Group members. 33/ . |
[9357]During the course of the frequent sessions of
[9358]the Special Group in the final weeks of the Eisenhower
[9359]administration, the Director of Central Intelligence
[9361]also was required to make a presentation before the
[9363]CIA Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee
[9365]on 6 January of 1961. Among other things, the record
[9366]of this meeting stated as follows: .
[9367]Mr. Dulles then gave a fairly detailed
[9369]picture of CIA action with respect to Cuba,
[9370]mentioning the two-pronged program of
[9372]- 194 -
[9374]TOP SECRET
[9376]13-00000
[9378]TOP SECRET
[9380]propaganda including radio and publica-
[9381]tions and the paramilitary effort. Again
[9382]he pointed out that this is an expensive
[9383]program running to approximately $28
[9384]million. Mr. Dulles discussed the radio
[9385]effort and paramilitary effort in some
[9386]detail, indicating the numbers of Cubans
[9387]being trained and the supply efforts and
[9388]the bases. 34/
[9390]Because of the subsequent charges which would
[9391]be made by historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. and
[9392]others writing on the Bay of Pigs, it is important
[9393]to emphasize that among other CIA personnel attend-
[9394]ing this briefing was Robert Amory, Jr., the Deputy
[9395]Director for Intelligence, who, according to Schlesinger
[9396]and some of the later “experts, " was supposed to be
[9397]in almost total ignorance of any planning for an
[9399]operation such as took place at the Bay of Pigs.*
[9401]* Other Agency personnel in attendance at this brief-
[9402]ing were General Cabell, DDCI; Colonel L. K. White,
[9403]Deputy Director for Support; Richard Helms, Chief of
[9404]Operations for DDP; Emmett Echols, Director of Personnel,
[9405]and John Warner, Legislative Counsel. It also should
[9407]be noted that Mr. William A. Tidwell, Jr. of Amory's
[9408]office was appointed in January 1961 to be Chief of
[9410]the Office of Operations in Miami. 35/ Organizationally
[9411]at this time, the Office of Operations was under the
[9412]Deputy Director for Intelligence. In view of -the
[9413]efforts being made in the Miami area to recruit Cubans
[9414]for training in the exile Brigade, it is inconceivable
[9415]that Tidwell and the Deputy Director for Intelligence |
[9416]were not fully aware of the plans that were being made
[9417]to unseat Castro until after the invasion had collapsed
[9418]at Playa Giron..
[9420]- 195 -
[9422]TOP SECRET
[9424]13-00000
[9426]TOP SECRET
[9428]On 10 January 1961, President Eisenhower got
[9429]involved in a meeting concerning the planned opera-
[9430]tions against Castro. On that day the New York Times
[9431]broke a story about the training of the Cuban troops .
[9432]in Guatemala. As the ex-President himself wrote:
[9434]On the morning of January 10 [1961],
[9436]the New York Times carried an article,
[9438]with a map, describing . the training of
[9440]anti-Castro- forces in Guatemala ... It
[9442]told most of the story. I decided that
[9444]we should say nothing at all about this>
[9446]article... Believing that my. successor
[9448]‘might want’ some day:to assist the refugee
[9450]‘forces to move into*Cuba, I considered
[9452]that we were limited in what we could
[9454]say about them. 36/ ,
[9456]Whether a meeting had been planned prior to the
[9457]appearance of the New York Times article is not known,
[9458]but the Senate Foreign Relations Committee did call
[9460]on the administration to send a representative up to
[9461]the Hill on 12 January 1961, in order to provide fur-
[9462]ther explanation of the Times article. Of the two
[9463]‘candidates being considered to appear before the Senate,
[9464]' Thomas Mann, Assistant Secretary of State for American
[9465]Republic Affairs, or DCI Dulles, it was decided to
[9466]send Mr. Dulles to appear before the Senate Committee.
[9467]However, President. Eisenhower
[9468]raised certain questions as to the right
[9469]of a Committee to ask questions on foreign
[9471]oo - 196 -
[9473]TOP SECRET
[9475]13-00000
[9477]TOP SECRET
[9479]policy affecting the security of the
[9480]United States. He [Eisenhower] commented
[9481]that when this is demanded as a right you
[9482].are “sunk," and wondered how much right
[9484]'. have they got, inasmuch as the Constitu-
[9485]tion says that it is the responsibility
[9486]of the Chief Executive. 37/ _
[9488]The culmination of the Special Group discussions,
[9490]which had taken place with increasing frequency between
[9492]‘ mid-November 1960 and mid- ~January 1961, was the report
[9494]of the Joint Planning Committee issued by Willauer on
[9496]18 January 1961. The conclusions were predictable --
[9498]there were decisions that needed to be made, but these
[9500]could not be made until the new administration became
[9501]fully aware of the extent of the anti-Castro programs
[9502]that had been evolving. As Willauer himself said in
[9503]his final memo: .
[9505]In the absence of these decisions, or
[9506]at least most of them, there is a grave .
[9507]danger that the December 6 plan (updated)
[9508]may have to be abandoned, -as an effective
[9509]means of overthrowing Castro without more
[9510]overt support, and that the only practical
[9511]course of action for the physical overthrow
[9512]of Castro, will be either: (1) open U.S.
[9513]war with Cuba, or (2) a.seven-month overt
[9514]training by the.U.S. on United States soil
[9515]of a Cuban-Latin American invasion force,
[9516]which will be planned to strike with at
[9517]least overt U.S. logistical support.* 38/
[9519]* Willauer probably meant to refer to the 8 December
[9521]1960 plan. See pp. 173 ff.
[9523]- 197 -
[9525]TOP SECRET
[9527]13-00000
[9529]TOP SECRET
[9531]Perhaps best illustrative of the merry-go-round
[9532]which the Special Group had been riding for at least
[9533]two months was Willauer's closing statement:
[9535]In our discussions we weighed without
[9536]coming to a conclusion the advantages of
[9537]a rapid, effective action by direct war
[9538]in terms of getting matters over with
[9539]without a long buildup of world opinion
[9540]vs. the inevitability of such a build up
[9541]under any seven month program. 38/
[9543]Having reviewed the meetings during the last
[9544]few weeks of the Eisenhower administration, it is
[9545]interesting to review the comments of some of those
[9547]- who were principally involved, as they looked back
[9548]on that period. One of the most. immediate responses
[9549]was found in Fidel Castro's virtuoso performance for
[9550]the Cuban television audience on 23 April 1961 when
[9552]‘he explained the invasion to them. Among other things,
[9553]Castro claimed: an
[9555]-That on certain occasions, we have also
[9556]been in. danger of direct aggression. This
[9557]danger always has been lurking about us
[9558]and.at certain times has gathered consider-
[9559]able support in the minds of ‘leading circles
[9560]of the United States. One of those moments
[9561]when this type of direct aggression was
[9562]very near was at the end of December [1960]
[9563]and the beginning of [January 1961], and
[9564]that is to say, during the last days of the
[9565]Eisenhower administration. 40/.
[9569]- 198 -
[9571]TOP SECRET
[9573]13-00000.
[9575]TOP SECRET
[9577]So concerned was Castro at this time that he put his
[9579]armed forces in. a state of alert for a two week period,
[9580]_ covering the transitfon from the Eisenhower to the
[9581]Kennedy administration. 41/
[9583]The other. principal protagonist at this time,.
[9584]remembered it ina somewhat different manner. The
[9585]former us President wrote of this period in the fol-
[9586]lowing manner :
[9588]. . Covert training of exiles for any pos-
[9589]j sible future operations against Castro
[9590]: - was going forward. Units were growing
[9591]L, steadily in strength and efficiency
[9592]' against the time when actual tactical
[9593]} planning could. be undertaken. In Decem-
[9594]ber [1960], I suggested to the State
[9595]Department that the time might be pro-
[9596]pitious for organizing a "front" against
[9597]Castro among the refugees, with ‘the.
[9598]United States recognizing the leader
[9599]and his associates as the legal govern-
[9600]ment of Cuba, with the priviso, however,
[9601]‘that the exiles themselves would volun-
[9602]tarily select from their own number an
[9603]acceptable “head of government." I
[9604]added that if they could do so at once,
[9605]I'd like to see recognition accorded
[9606]i promptly -- if possible, before January
[9608]So, to the incoming administration,
[9609]we left units of Cuban refugees busily
[9610]training and preparing hopefully for a
[9611]{ ; return to their native land. Because
[9612]: they had as yet been unable to find the
[9613]leader they wanted -- a national leader
[9614]to be both anti-Castro and ‘anti-Batista
[9615]~- it was impossible to make specific
[9617]. " - -~ 199 -—
[9619]: TOP SECRET
[9621]13-00000
[9623]TOP SECRET
[9625]plans for a military invasion, However,
[9627]their hatred of Castro, their patriotism,
[9628]and their readiness to sacrifice for the
[9630]restoration and freedom in Cuba could not
[9631]be doubted. 42/
[9633]In the statement just quoted, Eisenhower's empha-
[9635]sis was on the fact. that during his administration
[9637]all that took place was a training program -- that
[9638]there was no specific plan for the invasion of Cuba.
[9639]This was re-emphasized in an interview that he held
[9640]on 10 September 1965 when he said: “There was no
[9642]tactical or operational plan even discussed" when he
[9644]turned the presidency over to John F.. Kennedy. 43/
[9646]According to this same interview:
[9648]_ The retiring President stressed that
[9649]there, had been no decision as to how the
[9650]' Cuban forces would be used, if-at all.
[9651]Eisenhower had made no commitments that
[9652]might bind the new President in dealing
[9653]with the Castro problem. In fact, the
[9654]armed. refugee group was still so small
[9655]and relatively unprepared that. it could ©
[9656]easily have been disbanded if the incom-
[9657]ing administration considered its exis-
[9658]tence unnecessary. |
[9660]And, more specifically,
[9662]- Eisenhower felt that Kennedy shared his
[9663]judgment that the new administration need
[9664]not rush a decision regarding the Cubans.
[9665]“At no time did I put béfore anybody any-:
[9666]thing: that could be called a plan (to invade
[9667]Cuba)," declares the former President. He
[9668]emphasizes that there was “no mandate, no
[9670]- 200 -
[9672]TOP SECRET
[9674]13-00000
[9676]TOP SECRET
[9678]commitment by me, or by anyone in my admin-
[9680]istration,” and he doubts that Kennedy felt
[9682]“he was frozen to any position by me." 44/
[9684]Gordon Gray, President Eisenhower's National
[9685]Security Adviser, also supported his former boss when
[9686]queried about the Eisenhower role in the Bay of Pigs
[9687]activity, stressing that the emphasis during Eisen-—
[9688]hower's administration was on training the Cuban ex-
[9689]iles and providing then with equipment. Like the
[9690]former President, Gray, too, said that there was "no
[9691]military plan". 7
[9693]The definition of a military plan, however,
[9695]seems to have focused on an actual site for the land-
[9697]ing; and in this sense, Gray certainly was telling
[9699]' the truth because no such choice had been made at the
[9701]time that’ Eisenhower left office. In his own words,
[9702]Gray stated:
[9704]There wasn't any military plan formu-
[9705]* lated by the time the Eisenhower admini-
[9706]- stration went out. Of course, the Presi-
[9707]dent was fully aware of and conversant
[9708]with the decision to train and arm indi-
[9709]viduals. And the concept was one that
[9710]was sort of changing in the Eisenhower
[9711]Administration. First we were thinking
[9712]in terms of the old infiltration of small
[9713]groups. Then they were thinking of the
[9714]possibility of landing of people, unit
[9715]sized groups. And no decisions had been
[9716]' reached at that time. It was only that
[9718]-- 201 -
[9720]TOP SECRET
[9722]13-00000
[9724]TOP SECRET
[9726]there was’training. That was clearly
[9728]authorized, and it was clearly contemplated
[9730]that there would be or could be a military
[9732]action. But it simply was not true that
[9734]Kennedy inherited a plan that he couldn't
[9736]change. As a matter of fact, the planning
[9738]that was done in his administration was
[9740]changed. The Bay of Pigs was not the first
[9742]landing point. That was changed. But none
[9744]of that, no planning process in the Eisen-
[9746]hower administration had got to the point
[9748]of discussing what would be the landing
[9750]point. 45/ : mo
[9752]What both Gray and Eisenhower conveniently. ig-
[9753]nored, as has been pointed out in the preceding dis-
[9754]cussion, was the major change that was made in the
[9755]concept in November of 1960. What was to have been
[9756]an infiltration of numerous small teams of communi-
[9757]cators and PM trainers became an amphibious invasion
[9758]plan calling for a major enlargement of the exile
[9759]Brigade and an air operations plan which would be
[9760]critical to both the Brigade's landing and its ability
[9761]to be sustained once ashore in. Cuba. What was yet
[9763]. ‘
[9764]undecided as Eisenhower was succeeded by Kennedy were
[9765]the issues which. the Special Group had argued through-
[9766]out the weeks from mid-November into January -- the
[9767]number of troops that should be. or could be trained,
[9768])
[9770]the facilities that would be available for training
[9772]sites (possibly in third countries or in the United
[9774]- 202. -
[9776]TOP SECRET
[9778]13-00000
[9780]TOP SECRET
[9782]States), the possible commitment of the United States
[9783]personnel (as "volunteers" or contracts), and possible
[9785]overt US intervention to remove Fidel Castro.* 46/
[9790]* Despite the availability of documentary records
[9791]and autobiographical information about President
[9792]Eisenhower's role in the anti-Castro program, it is
[9793]interesting to the historian that the subject of the
[9794]Bay of Pigs apparently was banned as a topic in oral
[9795]history interviews conducted with Eisenhower and.
[9796]various of his senior subordinates who were close to
[9797]the operation. Included among this group, in addition
[9798]to. Eisenhower himself, were James H. Douglas, Jr.
[9799](DOD), Thomas Mann (State), Gen. David Shoup (USMC),
[9800]Thomas S. Gates, Jr. (DOD), and Livingston Merchant
[9801](State) . . .
[9803]~ 203 -
[9805]TOP SECRET
[9807]13-00000
[9809]TOP SECRET
[9811]CIA Internal Use Only
[9812]Access Controlled by
[9814]CIA Htstory Staff
[9816]— -TS#795052 .
[9817]Copy l of 2
[9819]OFFICIAL HISTORY
[9820]OF THE
[9821]BAY OF PIGS OPERATION
[9823]‘VOLUME ITI
[9824]Evotutton oF CIA's
[9825]Aur1-CastRo POLICIES; |
[9827]1951-January 1961
[9828](pages 204-388)
[9830]TOP. SECRET.
[9831]TS#795052
[9832]DCI-8
[9833]“December 1979
[9834]Copy 1 of 2°
[9836]PERMANENT HISTORICAL DOCUMENT
[9837]DO NOT DESTROY
[9839]13-00000 ; -
[9841]TOP SECRET
[9843]Volume Tit
[9844]Contents
[9846](pp. 204-388)
[9848]Page
[9849]Part V——- Direct Action Programs ...... . 204
[9850]A. Propaganda eZ
[9852]B. Sabotage and other Exercises . + 233
[9853]Part VI Mr. Nixon's Role. ......... 242
[9854]Part VII The Question of Assassinations . . . 277
[9856]Part VIII Conclusions .........4.4.4.. 290
[9858]Appendixes
[9860]A. Memorandum for the Director of Central
[9861]Intelligence from J. C. King, 11 Dec 59 . 296.
[9863]B. A Program of Covert Action Against
[9864]the Castro Regime, 16 Mar 60 ....-. . . 300
[9866]_C. CNO Correspondence with Department of State
[9867]and NSC: ;
[9869]1) Letter for Allen Dulles from
[9870]-Arleigh Burke, 17 Mar 60
[9872]TS (DD/P 0-1436) ...... +... #311
[9873]2) Letter for Gordon Gray from. ;
[9874]Arleigh Burke, 16 Mar 60... .. - 313
[9876]3) Memorandum for the Special
[9877]Assistant to the President:
[9878]for National Security Affairs
[9879]from Haydn Williams, 16 Mar 60, |
[9880]sub: US Policy toward Cuba ... . 318
[9882]TOP SECRET
[9884]13-00000
[9886]TOP SECRET
[9888]Page
[9890]D. Memorandum for Assistant Deputy Director
[9891](Plans) - Action from J. D. Esterline,
[9892]2 May .60, sub: Liaision with US
[9893]Agencies on JMARC Activities ...... . 332
[9895]E. Attack on Petroleum Refinery at
[9896]Santiago de Cuba, 13-14 March 1961 . . . . 335
[9898]F. Richard M. Nixon's Memorandum on Meeting
[9899]with Fidel Castro, 19 April 1959...... 337
[9901] G. Memorandum for DCI [for Briefing Vice
[9903]President Nixon], 29 Feb 60, sub:
[9904]_ What We Are Doing in Cuba ......'. . 344
[9908]Source References
[9909]Part I Background... - - +--+ +--+ ++ + 347
[9910]Part II Castro.Must Go .......... . 352
[9912]Part III . Changing Concepts .... Le - « 366.
[9914]Part IV Presidential Resurgence Dee ee 369
[9915]Part V Direct Action Programs eee ee ee) 6374
[9916]Part VI Mr. Nixon's Role . Loe we .o - 382
[9917]Part VII Assassination .......... + 386
[9919]Part VIII Conclusions ............. 388
[9921]TOP SECRET
[9923]13-00000
[9925]t
[9926]TOP SECRET
[9928]Part V
[9930]Direct Action Programs
[9932]A. Propaganda
[9934]The desire of WH Division to undertake the propa-
[9935]-ganda operation against the government of Fidel Castro,
[9936]antedated the formation of Branch 4 in the Division by
[9937]more than two months; for on 27 October 1959 in a Memo~
[9938]‘yandum to the Director of Central Intelligence, J. C.
[9939]King proposed:
[9941]That CIA undertake clandestine propa-
[9943]ganda. operations targeted at Cuba. These
[9945]operations would employ primarily: radio
[9947]broadcasts and other means of propaganda,
[9949]and at informing the Cuban masses of the
[9951]truth. 1/
[9953]Col. King's memorandum pointed out that repre-
[9954]sentatives of various of the Cuban opposition gxoups
[9955]organized in the United States had requested Agency
[9957]_ assistance to. set up propaganda operations directed
[9958]against the. Cuban mainland, and, in addition, he also
[9959]indicated that he and the Director of Communications,
[9961]Gen. McClelland, had his people studying the best,
[9963]methods for carrying out such propaganda broadcasts.
[9965]- 204 -
[9967]TOP SECRET
[9969]13-00000. .
[9971]TOP SECRET
[9973]King's initial memorandum. contained no information
[9974]about potential locations of transmitters, personnel
[9975]security, inter-agency coordination or costs.
[9977]Almost ‘immediately following the ‘memorandum from
[9979]col. King to the Director, the > subject of propaganda
[9981]directed against the Castro government | was introduced
[9983]to discussions in the Special Group. Following the
[9984]first such meeting at which the subject came up seri-
[9985]ously, the DCI requested that WH Division provide
[9987]“
[9989]more specifics on such matters as requirements for
[9991]real estate, recommendations for someone to be in
[9993]charge of the propaganda operations, the equipment
[9995]that would be required, and how the broadcasting might
[9997]be controlled. By mid-November, following additional
[9998]discussions both within the Agency and by the Special
[9999]Group, WH Division proposed that the broadcasts origi-
[10000]nate from the Yucatan Peninsula under the guidance
[10002]of Manuel Benitez, and “from Costa Rica under the Monte
[10003]Cristi Group, headed by Col. Ramon Barquin. ‘The pre-
[10004]sumption was that the Yucatan operation would be self-
[10005]sufficient, but that the Costa Rican operation. would
[10006]be CIA funded, supported, and directly under Agency
[10008]control. ' The estimated costs that were mentioned in
[10010]--205 -
[10012]TOP SECRET
[10014]13-00000
[10016]TOP SECRET
[10018]mid-November 1959 were roughly $80,000 each for the
[10019]operations in Costa Rica and Yucatan, plus an addi-
[10020]tional $12,000 for intrusion broadcasts which would
[10021]originate within Cuba. 2/
[10023]Before the end of November, the plans to utilize
[10024]the Yucatan peninsula had been abandoned because it
[10025]was feared that the President of Mexico would not.
[10026]give his approval for such an activity; and by the
[10027]early part of December, President Figueres of Costa
[10028]Rica had made it clear that he: dia not want the propa-
[10029]ganda operation to be set up in Costa Rica. Conse="
[10030]quently, there was considerable discussion about the
[10031]‘possibility of getting permission from President
[10032]Betancourt of Venezuela to agree to permit. the broad-
[10033]casts from his country. Some members of the Special
[10034]Group also suggested the possibility that the anti-
[10035]Castro broadcasts might be originated from other of
[10036]the Latin American countries, a project which Mr.
[10037]Dulles discouraged because of the lack of suitable
[10038]‘broadcast facilities that would be available in coun-.
[10039]tries outside of the immediate Caribbean area. Some-
[10040]where along the line C. Tracy Barnes, the ADDP/A and
[10042]Mr. Bissell's right hand man, came up with the
[10044]= 206 -
[10046]TOP SECRET
[10048]13-00000
[10050]TOP SECRET
[10052]suggestion that broadcasts against Castro could be
[10053]originated from continental United States. How Barnes
[10054]came by this proposal is not known, for no such
[10055]activity was ever given the slightest sanction. 3/
[10057]By early February of 1960, however, an equivo-
[10058]cal agreement apparently had been reached with Presi-
[10059]dent Betancourt, for a memorandum from WH Division
[10060]indicated that:
[10062]One pilot [anti-Castro] tape has been
[10064]made and has been played, for the benefit
[10066]of President Betancourt Of Venezuela. He
[10068]has agreed not to interfere if we initiate
[10070]broadcasts from available transmitters in
[10072]‘Venezuela. 4/7.
[10074]Even though thought had been given to the establish-
[10075]ment of a special transmitting facility for the Frente
[10076]Revolucionario Democratico (FRD), or whoever would
[10078]run the ° ahti-Castro ‘broadcasts, Betancourt had made
[10080]it clear that he would not permit the establishment
[10082](of special new. transmitting facilities in. his country.
[10084]On or: “about 17 March 1960, the same date that
[10086]President Eisenhower approved the formal anti-Castro
[10088]program for the US Government, JMATE had prepared its
[10090]propaganda program which, after outlining: various
[10092]‘phases of the activity, stated:
[10094]~ 207 -
[10096]TOP SECRET
[10098]13-00000
[10100]TOP SECRET
[10102]It is planned to concentrate all capa-
[10103]bilities available to the U.S. Government
[10104]on the [Cuban] target. In addition, it
[10105]will be necessary for CIA to create such
[10106]unilateral, FRD, and third country opera-
[10107]tions as may be feasible and useful. All
[10108]‘facets of psychological operations will
[10109]be exploited through mass media means,
[10110]including: radio, television, motion
[10111]pictures, press.and publications, books,
[10112]leaflets, posters, handbills, and rumors.
[10113]The major emphasis will be placed on gray
[10114]materials. Liaison will be conducted as
[10115]necessary with other U.S. Government
[10116]agencies. Black operations will be care-
[10117]fully coordinated within CIA prior to im-
[10118]plementation. All direct dealings with
[10119]members of the FRD willbe under unofficial
[10120]cover. 5/ ‘
[10122]The outline of the propaganda program made it
[10123]clear that funding of the propaganda operation was
[10124]going to be a major problem, and it was also clear
[10125]that CIA was going to be responsible for a consider-
[10126]able portion of this. But even as the propaganda
[10127]program was being formulated, Col. J. C. King was in
[10128]New York working with Henry Holland to approach a
[10129]number of American businessmen whose companies had
[10130]interests in Cuba . Their objective was to raise funds
[10131]to support the FRD propaganda operations which might
[10132]be operated through Station WRUL in New York, a sta-:
[10133]tion that was directed by Mr. Walter Lemon who worked
[10135]closely, with the CIA. Lemon, in fact, was ready to
[10137]- 208 -
[10139]TOP SECRET
[10141]13-00000
[10143]TOP. SECRET
[10145]mount radio program operations almost immediately
[10146]pending receipt of material and guidance from the
[10147]Agency.* 6/ _
[10149]With reference to King's approach to Mr. John
[10150]Loeb, of Loeb, Rhodes & Company, the businessman
[10151]stated that he would contribute his personal funds
[10152]to the anti-Castro propaganda effort; and. in addition, |
[10153]he would approach the directors or heads of other
[10155]companies that were also involved in Cuba -- individ-
[10156]we
[10158]‘uals whom he thought were well enough off to make
[10159]‘personal’ contributions. With reference to contribu-
[10161]tions of this nature:
[10163]It was decided that personal contri-
[10164]butions were most advisable because they
[10165]. would ‘not require action and approval by
[10166]' Boards of Directors, and therefore could
[10167]be most easily concealed. . The sum dis-
[10168]' cussed was $50,000. 7/
[10170]The plan for private funding of WRUL was in
[10172]trouble from the start. As early as April 1960, Chief
[10174]# Among those that Col. King met with on 15 March
[10176]. 1960, were Mr. John Loeb of Loeb, Rhodes & Company,
[10178]Mr. Lapham of Banker's Trust Company,. and the president
[10180]of the Freeport Sulphur Company, Mr. Wright.
[10182]** Other companies, including American and Foreign
[10183]Power Co. and: the Freeport Sulphur Co., made donations
[10185]in the company names and the Agency notified the Com-
[10187]missioner of Internal Revenue about the donations so
[10188]that they could be treated as corporate tax deductions.
[10190]- 209 -
[10191]TOP SECRET
[10193]Ta/
[10195]13-00000
[10197]TOP SECRET
[10199]WH/4 had requested Chief, .WHD's permission to obligate
[10200]JMATE funds for support of the station; but Chief,
[10202]WHD refused, indicating that private money would be
[10203]available. In October 1960 a similar proposal. was
[10204]made and rejected for the same reasons. By: December
[10205]1960, however, payment from JMATE funds was authorized
[10206]because private funds were unavailable. 7b/
[10208]In terms of the broadcast facilities that were
[10210]to be established under the propaganda program, CIA
[10212]was to create and control both short and medium wave
[10214]shipborne radio broadcasting operations, and to investi-
[10215]gate the feasibility of an airborne radio transmitter
[10216]capable of black broadcasts into Cuba:* Aside from
[10218]the broadcast operations, there were a number of ad-
[10219]ditional programs calling for printing facilities for
[10221]the production of propaganda materials and secure .
[10223]‘* Whe airborne medium wave transmitter apparently
[10225]was ruled out early in the planning stages because
[10227]it was “a terribly expensive operation." Based on
[10228]DPD's. estimates, Phillips figured that three flights
[10229]per week to six selected Cuban cities -- among others,
[10230]Havana, Santiago and Cienfuegos -- over a two month
[10232]. period would show operating costs in excess of $83,000,
[10234]plus an additional $0,000 for transmitting equipment
[10235]on a C-54, and a cost of ($250, 000 if the C-54 were
[10236]lost. 7c/
[10238]-~ 210 -
[10240]TOP SECRET
[10242]13-00000
[10244]TOP SECRET
[10246]editorial offices so. that..the propaganda materials
[10247]could be prepared. 8/
[10249]It was shortly after the formulation of the
[10250]propaganda program that David A. Phillips became
[10251]Chief of the WH/4 Propaganda Activity. Phillips
[10252]had done propaganda work for the Agency at the time
[10253]of the Guatemalan activity, but subsequently retired |
[10254]and had been in private business in Havana. Accord-
[10255]ing to his own: story, he had intended to stay in
[10256]private business; but in the course of Castro's rise
[10257]to power, he was. recontacted by Agency personnel and
[10258]persuaded to take on the. job of running the Agency' s
[10259]propaganda campaign against Castro.*
[10261]According to one interviewer: _
[10263]In the Guatemalan campaign, Phillips
[10264]had worked with a handful of completely
[10265]controlled Latin American propaganda
[10266]writers, and had been able to‘develop a
[10267]single credible propaganda line. Now,
[10268]however, he had to work under Washington
[10269]orders, to offer radio broadcasting time
[10271]to all’ the major and competing Cuban
[10272]exile groups. Much of the Phillips'
[10274]* For Phillips' own story. of his employment and his
[10275]re-employment by the Agency, see his book The Night
[10277]Watch (New York: Atheneum, 1977).
[10279]- 211 -
[10281]TOP SECRET
[10283]13-00000
[10285]TOP SECRET
[10287]effort went into overcoming the idea that
[10288]CIA financed radio programs should become
[10290]a forum for the varying views of rival
[10291]exile splinter factions. Phillips was
[10292]principally in Washington ... [but] there
[10293]were frequent trips to Miami and New York,
[10294]and Phillips himself coordinated CIA covert
[10295]broadcasting with Henry Loomis, Director
[10296]of USIA's Voice of America. 9/
[10298]All indications are that Phillips had an excellent
[10299]staff which was highly motivated and certainly extremely
[10300]busy during the course of the Bay of Pigs Operation.*
[10301]The key point in Dave Phillips's propaganda opera-
[10302]tion was to be the 50,000 watt radio transmitter located
[10303]_on the larger of the two Swan Islands -- this so called
[10304]“larger" island being roughly 1 3/4 miles long by 1 1/4
[10305]miles wide. US possessions, the Swan Islands are located
[10306]roughly 100 miles NE of Honduras in the Caribbean Sea.
[10307]Already located on the island was a Federal Aviation radio
[10308]beacon, and a Department of Commerce weather station. In
[10309]April 1960,\the cover story.which was devised for the
[10310]* Among those who worked in Phillips's Political and
[10311]Psychological Section in WH/4, were William Kent, John
[10312]Isaminger, Phillip A. Toomey, Earnest I.Harrison, Paul
[10313]Oberst, and Michael J. Maney. 10/ Illustrative of the
[10314]desire to placate the various exile factions was the
[10315]proposal by the Forward Operations Base to give the
[10316]spokesmen of the factions air time on WRUL on a rotating
[10317]basis to present the position of the particular group.
[10318]FOB was to assume responsibility for WRUL programming
[10319]on 1 December 1960, and was of the opinion that such
[10321]programming would “have desired effect on creating
[10322]semblance [of] united anti Castro opposition." 10a/
[10324]~ 212 -
[10326]TOP SECRET
[10328]13-00000
[10330]TOP SECRET
[10332]operation of the two radio transmitters (one 50,000
[10333]watts. and the other 7,500 watts) was that the Navy
[10334]was going to purchase scientific signal time from the
[10336]Gibralter Steamship Company, an Agency proprietary,
[10338]- which was nominally the operator of a commercial
[10340]radio station then being established.
[10342]The loading of the transmitters, the unloading,
[10343]the construction of the facilities to house the trans-
[10344]mitters, and the installation of the transmitters
[10345]was done by the Navy Seabees under the direction of
[10346]Alfred Cromartie of CIA's Office of Logistics. James
[10347]Burwell, a logisitcs officer who was thoroughly in-
[10348]volved in the JMATE operation, reported that the con-
[10349]struction activity at Swan Island required the move-—
[10350]ment of 180,000 pounds of equipment from the Washing-
[10351]ton Depot, aboard Agency trucks for delivery to Norfolk
[10353]and the reloading aboard two LST's. In addition to
[10355]“locating the transmitters and constructing the facili-
[10357]ties for housing the transmitters, a crude landing
[10358]field also was cleared. The total time involved was
[10359]approximately 20 days, and the cost was something under
[10361]$225,000.
[10363]- 213 -
[10365]TOP SECRET
[10367]13-00000
[10369]TOP SECRET
[10371]The first test signals from Swan Island were
[10372]sent on 17 May 1960, and from that time until the
[10373]close out of the Bay of Pigs Operation, the station
[10374]was one of the two or three. principal voices. aimed
[10375]at Castro's government. 11/ Shortly after the initi-
[10376]ation of the broadcast from Swan, a true tempest in
[10378]teapot was brewed over the question of whether or not
[10380]‘export licences were going to be required for goods
[10382]moving from the mainland to support operations at
[10384]Swan Island.. Involved in this brouhaha were the
[10386]Department of Commerce, . the US Customs Service, and
[10388]numerous Agency components -- Cover Staff, Commercial
[10390]Division, the Office of Logistics, and the Office of
[10392]Security. Bill Bisemann,, WH/4's Chief of Support,
[10394]had his hands full! Comnion sense ultimately prevailed
[10396]and the question of export licences was dropped. 12/
[10397]‘Even before Swan went into operation, there
[10399]was some question within the government as to whether
[10401]the CIA or the United States Information Agency should
[10403]be principally responsible for propaganda broadcasts
[10405]directed at Cuba. Within a few weeks following the
[10407]' beginning of operations at Swan, this question was
[10409]resolved in a meeting in Senator Mundt's office which
[10411]- 214 -
[10413]TOP SECRET
[10415]13-00000
[10417]TOP SECRET
[10419]. included representatives from the Agency, ‘Mr. Abbot
[10420]Washburn, the Director of the United States Informa-
[10421]_ tion Agency, and various of Mr. Washburn' s senior
[10422]people. The meeting made clear that the Agency was
[10423]‘doing medium wave broadcasting directly into Cuba.
[10424]‘Although it was ‘not specified at the meeting in
[10425]Mundt's office, CIA also was supporting station WRUL,
[10426]which had made a direct application on its own initia-
[10427]tive for funding such broadcasts ~~ even though the
[10428]Agency was behind such broadcasting and such. financ-
[10429]ing. ay
[10430]The Navy, however, got goosey about the cover |
[10431]story which was being presented. pespite a strong
[10432]effort on the part of senior Agency representatives
[10433]to convince Rear Admiral S. B. Frankel -- who was
[10434]designated as the Chief representative of the Office
[10435]' of Naval Intelligence by Admiral Fauste, then Director
[10436]of ONI -- the Navy declined further involvement in
[10438]supporting the cover story.* The hassle with the
[10440]* The thrust of the Agency's 27 April 1960 briefing
[10441]for Adm. Frankel was that.the USN was already so heavily
[10442]involved in the project that it. would do them more harm
[10443]than. good to withdraw. Information on this meeting
[10444]with the Navy and other information pertaining to the
[10445]development’ of the Swan Island facility is contained in’
[10446]the sources listed under Reference 14/.
[10448]-215 -
[10449]TOP SECRET
[10451]13-00000
[10453]TOP SECRET:
[10455]Navy was successfully resolved when the Agency found
[10457]that. through its own resources it would be able to
[10459]‘provide for resupply of all of the Island's needs,
[10461]including transportation of personnel between JMWAVE
[10463]in Florida and Swan Island without undue difficulty.
[10464]The problem of security of the island -- particu-
[10466]larly the fear that perhaps Castro would send saboteurs
[10468]to the island -- was never put to any real test. In
[10470]fact, what might have been the only serious security
[10472]incident was most successfully resolved by Robert
[10474]‘Overjord, the Security Officer for the island and
[10476]the Députy Chief of Base. The incident took place
[10477]in July 1960 when a group of 14 Honduran students
[10478]landed to assert a claim to sovereignty of the Swan —
[10479]Islands by the Republic of Honduras, and it was re-
[10480]ported as follows:
[10482]A potentially. dangerous situation was
[10483]averted by the tactful handling of the
[10484]‘group by Mr..Overjord who persuaded them
[10485]‘to leave their armament of 13 pistols and
[10486]three submachine guns aboard their boat
[10487]and conducted them on a tour of the island.
[10488]The group leader indicated that he wanted
[10489]to take a census of the population, and.
[10490]‘was furnished with pertinent information,
[10491]with no divulgénce of Agency interest in
[10492]Radio Swan or its personnel, Upon comple-
[10493]tion of the census, the group was permitted
[10494]to raise the Honduran flag, was given lunch
[10496]- 216 -
[10498]TOP SECRET
[10500]13-00000 .
[10502]TOP SECRET
[10504]and refreshments, and: ‘departed shortly
[10506]thereafter. The: good judgment and dis-
[10508]cretion of Mr. Overjord are felt to be
[10509]. directly responsible for avoidance of
[10511]what could have been a serious incident
[10513]involving loss of lives, or injury to.
[10515]Agency and other island personnel.* 15/
[10517]The question of the exact nature of the broad-
[10518]casts from Swan was the subject of much discussion,
[10519]both prior to the opening of the station and subse-
[10520]quent to its first broadcast. The Deputy Director
[10521]of Central Intelligence, for example, called Jake
[10522]Esterline, Chief, Project JMATE to report on conver-
[10523]sation that he (General Cabell) had with "a person
[10524]of considerable importance who. was very familiar
[10525]with Cuba," concerning the nature of the propaganda .
[10526]which should be aimed at the Cuban population. Cabell
[10527]stated that according to this important person, if
[10528]tapes of Castro's radio broadcasts could be acquired
[10530]and then patched together for rebroadcasting to the.
[10532]Cuban population for hours on end, the effect would
[10534]be “to bore the people horribly with Castro, but would
[10536]* The island. was manned by 24 people, all but nine
[10537]of whom were CIA personnel. ‘The nine were unwitting
[10538]technicians of the Philco Corporation.
[10540]- 217 -
[10542]TOP SECRET
[10544]13-00000
[10546]TOP SECRET
[10548]also pointedly reveal the. inconsistencies of his
[10549]statements." Following receipt of this call from
[10551]the Deputy Director, Esterline passed the word on to
[10552]Dave Phillips with the comment that he thought perhaps
[10553]such broadcasts might be used as filler during the
[10554]intervals when Swan was not doing its regular broad-
[10555]casts.* 16/ | .
[10557]By early August 1960, however, the official
[10558]policy for the Swan propaganda broadcasts aimed at
[10559]Cuba, was: to be “the Revolution Betrayed." This
[10560]theme was formalized by the Department of State; and
[10561]at the direction of the Secretary of State, copies of
[10562]a 105 page document addressed to this theme were pre-
[10563]sented to members of the National security Council,
[10564]to members of the Inter-Americah ‘Peace Committee, and
[10566]to US Embassies in the Latin American countries.
[10568]* COS Havana forwarded another suggestion for a pos-
[10569]sible propaganda attack on Castro based on a May 1960
[10570]issue of Confidential magazine, which apparently car-
[10571]ried an article called “An American Mother's: Terrifying
[10572]Story -- Fidel Castro Raped my Teenage Daughter." It
[10573]was COS Havana‘s ‘suggestion that wide publicity be
[10574]given to this article in the Spanish language, pre-
[10575]sumably including broadcasts from Radio Swan. 17/
[10576]Available records do not indicate whether this sug-
[10577]gestion was adopted.
[10579]~ 218 -
[10581]TOP SECRET
[10583]13-00000
[10585]TOP SECRET
[10587]‘Instructions were that the Embassies could furnish
[10589]copies-of the document to the foreign ministers and
[10591]to other high officials in their respective countries.
[10593]Additionally, the NATO Council also received.a copy
[10594]of this document; and it was the hope of the Depart-
[10595]ment of State that the document would have some im-
[10596]pact on the upcoming meeting of the foreign ministers
[10597]of the Western Hemisphere countries, which was to be-
[10598]gin 16 August 1960 in San Jose, Costa Rica. According
[10600]to one interview of WH/4's propaganda chief, Dave
[10602]. Phillips, the theme of the Revolution Betrayed
[10604]Hammered across the idea that Castro
[10605]had. double-crossed the Cuban people by
[10606]abandoning the programs and promises »
[10607]that originally won him support: None
[10608]of CIA's propaganda, spoken or printed,
[10609]ever urged the populace to rise up against
[10610]Castro. This appeal, suicidal before the
[10611]invasion, would be used when, and if, a
[10612]Provisional Government obtained a lodge-
[10613]ment on the island. 18/-
[10615]According to Phillips's interviewer:
[10617]Friendly third country diplomats in
[10618]Havana monitored CIA's principal broad-
[10619]casts and confirmed that the signals were
[10620]loud and clear. To verify its audience
[10621]the Swan Island radio offered simple gifts
[10622](ball point pens were a favorite). to any
[10623]listener who would write to the station.
[10624]Considering the police controls inside
[10625]Cuba, listeners' letters were an act of
[10626]defiance to the regime. There was a
[10628]- 219 -
[10630]TOP SECRET
[10632]13-00000
[10634]TOP SECRET
[10636]a flood of letters including, during
[10637]freak radio propagation periods, re-
[10638]quests for..ball point pens from New
[10639]Zealand.* 19/
[10641]Another evidence of the success of the Swan broadcasts
[10643]_was related to the Director of Central Intelligence by
[10645]Col. King, Chief, WH Division, who pointed out that WH
[10646]had a copy of a letter from a Cuban listener who, in
[10647]the form of a letter bitterly attacking Swan, made it
[10648]clear that the Swan broadcasts were coming in loud and
[10649]clear. 21/ ™.
[10651]- Before the end of the summer of 1960, Swan was
[10652]on the air on both short-wave and medium-wave for a
[10653]total of 10 hours a day, in addition to which they
[10654]also began to utilize programs that had been prepared
[10655]by the FRD. One: problem which would plague Radio Swan
[10656]-~ as well as other elements of Project JMARC -- was
[10657]the shortage of Spanish language capability. Among
[10658]* %It appears that perhaps baseball cards also were
[10659]going to be offered as an inducement to get listeners
[10660]to indicate that they had picked up Swan's broadcast. -
[10661]A propaganda note from WH/4 for 9 August 1960, for
[10662]example, reported: "M[aney] spoke to Ken Harris,
[10663]Special Acquisitions. He has contacted a company
[10664]making baseball cards who claim ‘this most unusual
[10666]order ever received.' Will get cards, but curious
[10667]what was wrong with bubble gum." 20/
[10669]- 220 -
[10671]TOP SECRET
[10673]13-00000 -
[10675]TOP SECRET
[10677]other evidence of the need to have someone with Spanish
[10678]language capability immediately available at Radio
[10679]Swan, were the following: A machine-run of Agency
[10680]employees failed to surface anyone with sufficient
[10681]Spanish language to undertake an announcer's job;
[10682]inability to exploit the fatal shooting of a Venezue-
[10683]lan child by a pro-Castro goon, could not be turned
[10685]to US advantage; and by mid-November 1960 WH Division
[10686]was requesting that a requirement be laid on to the
[10688]Department of Defense for a serviceman with native
[10690]_ fluency in Spanish who could be used as an announcer
[10692]at Radio Swan.*
[10694]* In the instance of the death of the Venezuelan
[10695]child, the pro-Castro Cuban press was able to get the
[10696]story out before it could be broadcast from Radio Swan.
[10697]The pro-Castro press claimed that the death had been .
[10698]caused by a counter-revolutionary. (Sources for the
[10699]foregoing discussion related to the lack of Spanish -
[10700]language capability are listed in reference 22/.)
[10702]‘The lack of Spanish language capability was felt
[10703]throughout the project, not only in the propaganda ef-
[10704]fort. As late as January 1961, for example, the train-
[10705]ing facility in the Canal Zone was pushing Headquarters
[10706]for the services for a two week period of an Air Force
[10707]sergeant who was fluent in Spanish. The training base
[10708]wanted the sergeant to assist in briefing and debrief-
[10709]ing an infiltration team. The request was denied, how-
[10710]ever, because there was a greater need for the man's
[10711]services as an instructor at the air training base in
[10712]Guatemala.. 22a/ In another instance, a request from
[10713]COB Miami for promotion of a clerical from GS-4 to
[10714]GS-5 was based on the fact that “her services as a
[10716]' translator have been of the greatest importance to the
[10718]Base since her arrival." 22b/
[10719]- 221 -
[10720]TOP SECRET
[10722]13-00000
[10724]TOP SECRET
[10726]Despite the handicap imposed by the lack of
[10727]Spanish language capability at the Station, Radio
[10728]Swan was the most effective of the propaganda activi-
[10729]ties supported by the agency; and with Station WRUL,
[10730]New York, these Agency-sponsored radio broadcasts
[10731]were the most effective means of providing the general
[10732]Cuban population with anti-Castro ammunition. Addi-
[10733]tionally radio propaganda -- via both short and medium
[10734]wave transmitters -- was: to play an important role
[10736]. immediately following the landing of the anti-Castro
[10737]forces on Cuban soil. 23/ .
[10739]Aside from radio broadcasts, other media activi-
[10740]ties in which WH/4 PP engaged were the. hewspaper Avance
[10741]in Exile and the magazine Bohemta Libre. Both of these
[10743]“were published in Miami by the exile groups, and at
[10744]one time Bohemia Libre was reputedly the most widely
[10745]circulated Spanish language. weekly in the world. Al-
[10746]though barred in Cuba, selected items from both publi-
[10748]. cations -were broadcast by Swan or WRUL. 23a/
[10750]One of the strangest of all activities in which
[10751]WH/4 PP. engaged was a public opinion survey conducted
[10753]“by the Lloyd Free organization to assess the attitudes
[10755]of the Cuban people toward the Castro regime. If WH/4's
[10757]- 222 -
[10759]TOP SECRET
[10761]13-00000
[10763]‘TOP SECRET
[10765]planners expected that the survey would show a strong
[10766]core of internal opposition to the Castro government,
[10767]they were to be sadly disappointed. Working with "a
[10768]competent ‘Cuban research organization" Free's report
[10769]was based on a series of a thousand interviews with a
[10770]cross section of the urban population of Cuba “both in”
[10771]Havana and in other cities, towns, and villages through-
[10772]out the island." Among the findings of the Free survey,
[10773]the following comments were included in the summary
[10774]report of mid-August of 1960:"
[10776]The great majority of Cubans surveyed
[10777]felt that both they personally and their
[10778]“country were very much better off than
[10780]during the days of Batista. fhe prevail-
[10781]tng mood was one of hope and optimism.
[10783]Attesting the apparently genuine en-
[10784]thusiasm of the great majority for the
[10785]‘Revolution, the Castro Government and its
[10786]program were the replies when the sample
[10787]was asked about the worst aspects of life
[10788]in Cuba today. Despite the fact that *
[10789]this question was designed to illicit un-
[10790]favorable comments, a very sizable major-
[10791]tty named.as the worst aspects of the
[10792]present situation items which implied
[10793]sympathy or support for the present regime.
[10794]At the top of the list (mentioned by one-
[10795]third of all respondents) was regret or
[10797]- apprehension over the fact that there is
[10798]opposition to the Revolution and to the
[10799]Revolutionary regime; jand] that there
[10800]are misguided counter-revolutionaries and
[10801]reactionaries.
[10803]- 223 -
[10805]TOP SECRET
[10807]13-00000
[10809]re
[10811]TOP SECRET
[10813]Even in describing the worst aspects
[10814]of the present situation, only 30% of all
[10815]respondents mentioned items which could
[10816]be construed as.criticisms, explicit or
[10817]implicit, of the Castro regime. Only a
[10818]few such subjects received significant
[10819]mention, with each being referred to by
[10820]only a small minority of total respondents:
[10821]e.g. the danger of or’ trend toward Com-
[10822]munism (7%); criticism of the Revolution's
[10823]program (7%); economic. difficulties (7%);
[10824]unemployment (6%); confusion and disorgan-
[10825]ization (5%).
[10827]In view of the overwhelming popularity
[10829]of the Revolutionary program, it is patently
[10831]‘clear that ertticisms of Castro's program,
[10833]as such, will fall very “largely on barren,
[10835]tf not counter- productive ground.
[10836]The only positive statements that appeared in the Free
[10837]report, insofar as the objectives of WH/4 were con-
[10838]cerned, were to the effect that successful attack on
[10839]the Castro Government should be made in terms of the
[10840]inability of the government to meet the projects it
[10841]had outlined because of "the unwise and unrealistic
[10842]means it is employing in the execution of its program";
[10844]. ON
[10846]and “the Revolution and its program are being perverted
[10848]through the insidious influence of the Communists."*
[10849]* The information concerning the Free report, is
[10851]contained in source reference 24/.
[10854]TOP SECRET
[10856]13-00000
[10858]TOP SECRET
[10860]. It is interesting to record the reaction within
[10861]the Agency to the Free report:
[10863]. C/JMARC lamented the fact that the
[10864]Lloyd Free report evidently has gotten
[10865]‘into: the. hands of the Cuban Government
[10866]and will probably be. used with devastating
[10867]effect at some point during the meeting
[10868][the upcoming OAS Conference scheduled
[10869]for San Jose, Costa Rica]. He told ADDP/A
[10871]‘that he felt the Department of State. would
[10872]have to. be prepared to sacrifice Mr. Free's.
[10873]report on the proverbial “alter of gold."
[10874]The point was made strongly to ADDP/A
[10875]that the Free report, in fact, is not at
[10876]all valid other than for a. limited
[10877]"sample" of the City of, Habana. ADDP/A
[10878]agreed, but said he didnot think ‘State
[10879]should be made aware of the fact CIA
[10880]actually paid for the report. He further
[10881]indicated that he was still endeavoring ~
[10882]to find out how the report -- copy of which
[10883]CIA never receivéd in full -- got out. of
[10884]control. * 25/
[10886]The substance of the Free Report appeared in the
[10887]New York Times and also in a Peter Edson column which
[10888]was reported to be syndicated in 600 newspapers. In
[10889]passing this information on to the DDP, Chief, WH/4
[10891]suggested that “the survey, in the opinion of WH/4
[10893]* Chief, WH/4 apparently misread the significance
[10894]of the Free report: because, as the report points out,
[10895]‘the most’'serious ‘opposition was, in fact, in. the
[10896]Havana area, which included the heaviest sampling of
[10897]opposition ‘sentiment.
[10899]- 225 -
[10901]TOP SECRET
[10903]13-00000
[10905]TOP SECRET
[10907]Prop, will be used in Cuban propaganda" --. something
[10909]of an understatement!* 26/ _
[10911]* Logic would seem-to indicate that if WH/4's princi-
[10912]pals could not subscribe to the results of Free survey' s
[10913]that WH/4/PP might have been tasked to. make a serious
[10914]study of the impact which Castro's propaganda and his
[10915]achievements were having on the will of the Cuban public
[10916]to. resist outside interference. In an interview with
[10917]the author of this history, Dave Phillips stated that
[10918]Enno Hobbing had provided the editorial guidance for
[10919]WH/4's propaganda efforts; but that to his (Phillips' s)
[10920]knowledge, no study: ever was conducted of the Castro
[10921]propaganda effort. In retrospect, Phillips indicated
[10922]that this probably was an oversight. 27/
[10924]On the subject of surveys of. questionable value
[10925]during the Bay. of Pigs Operation, mention should be
[10926]made of a contract JMATE negotiated with Klein and
[10927]Saks
[10929]to initiate a survey of Cuba's present
[10930](May 1960]. economic position that will
[10931]also contain an outline of proposals that
[10932]would sound [ste] as a platform for a suc-
[10933]cessor government to the Castro regime.
[10934]The cost, which will be borne by JMARC,
[10935]will be about $20,000. This is merely the
[10936]first phase of the projected comprehensive
[10937]economic program.
[10939]Why, with CIA's in-house economic talent (in the
[10940]Economic Research Area of the Office of Research and
[10941]Reports) and the surfeit of government economists fa-
[10942]miliar with Latin America, WH/4 thought it necessary
[10943]to negotiate’ an. outside contract for a study such as
[10944]indicated is truly incomprehensible! That the Klein
[10945]and Saks contract was not. blocked at the DDP or DCI
[10946]level is equally: incomprehensible. The. company's
[10947]‘“Preliminary Outline of Economic and Financial Govern-
[10948]ment Platform to Serve the Interests of the People of
[10949]Cuba and to be Compatible with the Interest of the
[10950]Hemisphere and ‘the Free’ World of Which Cuba is a Part"
[10951]-- which was presented in typescript -- was 15 pages
[10952]of platitudes about the best of all possible worlds. 28/
[10954]- 226: -
[10956]TOP SECRET |
[10958]13-00000
[10960]TOP SECRET
[10962]WH/4 PP also became involved in the propaganda
[10963]activity that was intended to offset the planned
[10964]visit of Nikita Khrushchev to Cuba in the summer of
[10965]1960. In an Eyes Only memorandum to the Director of
[10966]Central Intelligence, Col. J. C. King informed Allen
[10967]Dulles that it had been learned that Khrushchev had ©
[10968]accepted an invitation from the Government of Cuba
[10969]to visit that country. Working with Havana Station,
[10970]a two-pronged program was being developed with the
[10971]intention of either forcing the cancellation of the
[10972]trip or indicating the opposition of the Cuban people
[10973]to Communism. Havana Station was to be responsible |
[10974]for organizing church opposition to the visit, and
[10976]' WH/4 and other elements of WH Division would be re-
[10977]sponsible for instigating rumors throughout Latin
[10978]America that an assassination attempt would be made
[10979]on Khrushchev's life if he appeared in Cuba.
[10981]. One of the WH/4's contacts suggested that leaf-
[10982]lets should be prepared depicting the crucifix upside
[10983]down, to signify the Soviet treatment of religion,
[10984]and that. these leaflets should be distributed widely |
[10985]through Cuba. 29/ There is no indication that this
[10987]particular leaflet was ever devised, but in at least
[10989]- 227 -
[10991]TOP SECRET
[10993]13-00000
[10995]TOP SECRET
[10997]one instance, the Hammer and Sickle was used to form
[10998]the ‘'T‘' in the word fraidor..on a sticker that was
[11000]being prepared for propaganda use. 30/ In anticipa-
[11002]' tion of the possible visit, 10,000 stickers of an
[11004]anti-Khrushchev, ‘anti-Soviet nature were forwarded |
[11006]from Headquarters to Havana Station. The legend
[11008]on one of these was "Ciba, Yes; Russia, No; Khrushchev,
[11010]w
[11012]No; and a second item showed a prisoner behind bars
[11013]formed by the stripes of the Cuban flag with the words
[11014]Sin Palabras .-- “Without words."* 33/_
[11016]Despite these advanced preparations, no oppor-
[11017]tunity was presented to utilize the propaganda stickers.*+
[11018]Although both Castro and Khrushchev were in attendance:
[11019]at the 15th General Assembly of the United Nations in
[11020]New York, 19-28 September 1960, and even though Castro
[11021]flew out of New York in an Aeroflot jet, the Khrushchev
[11023]visit did not materialize at this time. ***
[11025]* See following two pages for copies.
[11027]** ‘More’ detailed information on propaganda leaflets
[11028]and the dissemination of such materials by air drop is
[11029]given in Volume I of this history, Atr Operations.
[11031]*** Khrushchev flew from New York directly to Moscow
[11033]‘at the close of the UN session. On 22 October 1960 in
[11035]the course of an interview in Moscow with a Cuban
[11036]journalist Khrushchev did state that he wanted to visit
[11037]Cuba and its people as soon as possible. 3la/
[11039]- 228 -
[11041]TOP SECRET
[11043]13-00000
[11045]TOP SECRET
[11047]If not particularly successful in projects other
[11048]than Radio Swan, WH/4/PP cannot be charged with lack
[11049]of imagination. Among other projects, it was proposed
[11050]that the Office of Medical Services’ psychiatric study
[11051]of Fidel Castro be surfaced because the profile was
[11052]not particularly flattering to the Cuban leader; and
[11053]the Castro image also would have suffered if a dis-
[11054]orienting drug could have been placed in Castro's .
[11055]food. These proposals were similar in intent to
[11056]others aimed at the Castro "image" as revealed in the
[11057]Senate Select Committee investigation of. CIA plots
[11058]against ‘the Cuban leader.
[11060]In light of a rumor that had been picked up to
[11061]the effect that the Cubans reportedly were painting
[11062]some of their British Sea Fury aircraft with the
[11063]American flag ~- said planes to be used in a provoca-
[11064]tion action to discredit the United States -- WH/4
[11065]investigated the possibility of doctoring some photos
[11066]of the Sea Furies with the flag being painted on in
[11068]order to forestall any such: provocations by the Cubans.
[11070]. Unfortunately, however, the Agency art shop pointed
[11072]out that it would be technically infeasible to attempt
[11074]to make such fake photos. “With the idea in mind of a
[11076]- 229 -
[11078]TOP SECRET
[11080]13-00000
[11082]~ TOP SECRET
[11084]propaganda campaign aimed at terrorizing Castro's
[11086]militia (and apparently at ‘the request of Col. Jack
[11088]-Hawkins, Chief, WH/4/PM), WH/4/PP gave some thought
[11090]to preparing a purported secret order to Castro's
[11091]militia to establish an "elite suicide squad" which
[11092]would fight on even after the defeat of the other
[11093]troops. The gentleman who would later become infamous
[11094]in connection with the Watergate activity, E. Howard
[11095]Hunt, and Dave Phillips assessed the possibility of
[11096]sending a white painted “Flight of truth" airplane
[11097]on a trip to several of the Latin American countries,
[11098]bringing -- in a “Billy Graham type operation" -- the
[11099]message of Castro's betrayal of the Cuban Revolution.
[11101]But this esoteric plan, too, never got beyond the
[11103]/ planning stage. 32/
[11105]None of the foregoing proposals however, were
[11106]in the same league with the propaganda plan that came
[11108]to be known as “the Dripping Cuban." The WH/4 Propa-
[11110]ganda Notes for 19 August 1960 stated:
[11112]P({hillips] dispatched cable on Special
[11113]Operation to HAVA. (Cuban jumping ship in
[11114]Bosphorous) . .33/
[11116]In fact, the cable that Dave Phillips had orig-
[11118]inated was addressed not only to Havana, but also to
[11120]- 230 -
[11122]TOP SECRET
[11124]13-00000
[11126]TOP SECRET
[11128]Istanbul, Ankara, and to the Forward Operations Base
[11129]in Miami. Remembering that Dave Phillips himself
[11130]was something of an actor, as well as a newspaperman,
[11131]it is believed worthwhile to repeat this cable in its
[11132]entirety. The cable read as follows:
[11134]1. FYI: HOS IS CONSIDERING THE FOLLOW-
[11135]ING OPERATION: SHORTLY AFTER A RUSSIAN
[11136]BOAT HOMEWARD. BOUND FROM CUBA PASSES THROUGH
[11137]BOSPHOROUS A DRIPPING CUBAN CLIMBS ASHORE
[11138]IN TURKEY. HE CLAIMS TO BE POLITICAL
[11139]PRISONER ARRESTED BY CUBANS IN HAVANA BUT
[11140]SENT TO RUSSIA FOR IMPRISONMENT. CUBAN
[11141]SUBJECT WILL CONTACT LOCAL LATIN AMERICAN
[11142]CONSULS AND ISTANBUL PRESS FOR EXPLOITATION,
[11143]THEN RETURN LATIN’ AMERICA. AFTER BRIEF
[11144]BUT DRAMATIC EXPOSURE TO PRESS AN "ATTEMPT"
[11145]WILL BE MADE ON SUBJECT'S LIFE. FOR THIS
[11146]REASON HE WILL GO UNDERGROUND SO "THEY"
[11147]WILL NOT LIQUIDATE HIM.
[11149]2. FOR HAVA: REQUEST STATION RECRUIT
[11150]SUBJECT. OBVIOUSLY HE MUST .BE SUPERB
[11151]ACTOR WHO CAN CONVINCINGLY MAINTAIN ROLE
[11152]IN SPITE OF SKILLFUL PROBING BY DUBIOUS
[11153]NEWSMEN. HE MUST HAVE MEMORY CAPABLE. OF
[11154]RETAINING THOUSANDS OF "DETAILS" ABOUT HIS
[11155]ARREST AND FORCED JOURNEY. HE MUST BE
[11156]KNOWN IN HAVANA SO AS TO BE MISSED WHEN
[11157]HE IS “ARRESTED." AN ARTICULATE STUDENT
[11158]TYPE WOULD BE DESIRABLE. SWIMMING ABILITY
[11159]DESIRABLE BUT NOT ESSENTIAL.
[11161].3. SUGGEST THAT IN RECRUITMENT, STATION
[11162]STATE THERE GOOD REASON TO BELIEVE CUBAN
[11163]PRISONERS REALLY ARE BEING SENT RUSSIA,
[11165]BUT THAT THIS CANNOT BE PROVED. THUS SUB-
[11166]JECT'S PARTICIPATION IN THIS PLAY-ACTING
[11167]WILL BE JUSTIFIABLE DRAMATIZATION OF
[11168]SOVIET. CONTROL IN CUBA. STATION ALSO
[11169]AUTHORIZED PROMISE FINANCIAL BACKING, LATER
[11171]- 231 -
[11173]TOP SECRET
[11175]13-00000
[11177]TOP SECRET
[11179]RETURN TO CUBA WITH FIGHTING GROUP, PER-
[11180]MISSION WEEKEND © WITH ALL THE WORKS IN
[11181]PARIS, ETC.
[11183]4. “IN RECRUITMENT,. IT SHOULD BE
[11184]STRESSED TO SUBJECT THAT SUCCESS THIS
[11185]OPERATION AND STATUS HIS POSITION IN
[11186]INTERNATIONAL LIMELIGHT DEPENDS ENTIRELY
[11187]ON SECURITY. HIS FAMILY AND FRIENDS MUST .
[11188]REALLY BELIEVE HE HAS BEEN ARRESTED (AND
[11189]STATION MUST ASSIST IN SPREADING WORD OF
[11191]\ HIS ARREST FOR SPECIFIC OFFENSE SO THAT
[11192]FACTS WILL JIBE IN SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGA-
[11193]TIONS. ).
[11195]-5. ADVISE SOONEST WHEN YOUR MAN IS
[11196]SELECTED. HIS BRIEFING WILL BE IN PBPRIME.
[11197]_ HOPE HE:MAY BE RECRUITED IN TIME EXFILTRATE
[11198]AMPAN BOAT DEPARTING HAVA END OF THIS MONTH.
[11200]6. FOR ANKA, ISTA: APPRECIATE YOUR
[11201]CABLED ASSESSMENT POSSIBLE EXTENT .COOP-
[11202]ERATION LOCAL SERVICE AND NEWSPAPER ASSETS.
[11203]SUGGEST HOWEVER NOT (REPEAT NOT) CONTACT
[11204]NON-KUBARKERS UNTIL HEADQUARTERS CAN FOR-
[11205]WARD OPERATIONAL PLAN. 34/
[11207]A memorandum on the outgoing cable quoted above
[11209]went to Chief, .WH/4 from Rudy Gomez, the Deputy Chief
[11211]x
[11213]of WH Division on 24 August 1960. Gomez's memorandum
[11214]' read as follows: ,
[11216]The DCI, General Cabell, and Mr. Helms
[11217]discussed this cable on 24 August [1960]
[11218]and concluded that since Fidel Castro is
[11219]definitely identifying himself. more and
[11220]more with the Russians, it is not worth
[11221]the candle to launch an operation such
[11222]as that one proposed in subject cable.
[11224]Mr. Helms said that we may discreetly try
[11225]to find a body for’ this operation, provid-
[11226]ing we ‘play it very carefully and do not
[11228]- 232 -
[11230]TOP SECRET
[11232]13-00000
[11234]TOP SECRET
[11236]let the body in on what we definitely
[11237]have in mind; also, that any further
[11238]cables which go out on this proposed
[11239]operation are to be signed off by him.
[11241]Examined in retrospect, it would appear that Mr. Helms
[11243]had good reason to be nervous about the proposal!* 35/
[11245]B. Sabotage and other Exercises**
[11246]Where WH/4/PP was successful in putting Radio
[11248]Swan into operation. and in supporting Station WRUL in
[11250]* This proposal provided another of the very few in-
[11251]' stances where Mr. Helms' name surfaced in relation to
[11252]a Bay of Pigs related problem.
[11254]** Because so many of the sabotage activities of the
[11255]Cuban dissidents were uncoordinated, uncontrolled, and
[11256]did nothing to impede the extension of Castro's control
[11257]or lessén his support, the author has tried only to
[11258]illustrate something of the scope of those sabotage
[11259]operations: over which the WH or WH/4 could exercise a
[11260]degree of control. In responding to the Taylor Com-
[11261]mittee's requést for an assessment of the effectiveness
[11262]of its sabotage program, the best that WHD could say was:
[11264]There are numerous acts of sabotage re-
[11265]ported from all provinces of Cuba. ‘These
[11266]acts included the burning of cane fields,
[11267]damaging of power and communication lines
[11268]and sugar mills, burning of schools and
[11269]commercial buildings and damaging of petro-
[11270]leum and sugar refinery [ste]. It is ex-
[11271]tremely difficult to verify just what
[11272]sabotage damage were [sic] the result of
[11273]our team's [ste] activities; however, they
[11274]have claimed the burning of cane fields,
[11276]_the firing of commercial stores, [high]
[11277]tension lines, and the damage to the oil
[11278]refinery at Santiago de Cuba was the re-
[11279]sult of a raider operation by one of our
[11280](footnote continued on following page).
[11282]~ 233 -
[11284]TOP SECRET
[11286]13-00000
[11288]TOP SECRET
[11290]its broadcasts into Cuba, Project JMATE could claim
[11291]no similarly successful or continuing program of
[11292]sabotage and disruption. In fact, one of the earliest
[11293]and most thoroughly discussed sabotage programs against
[11294]Cuba -- disruption of the Cuban petroleum industry --
[11295]was a complete and total bust. Being suggested even
[11296]before President Eisenhower's authorization of the
[11297]anti-Castro program, attempts to sabotage and inter-
[11298]fere with the operation of Cuba's petroleum refineries
[11299]continued until well into the middle 60's -- with at
[11300]least one of the sabotage "experts" displaying the
[11301]same notable lack of success, but excess of foolish-
[11302]ness, that characterized his. activities during Project —
[11304]external action groups. In addition,
[11306]we feel that a great deal of the. other
[11308]sabotage were [ste] the results [sic]
[11310]of the demolitions we supplied to the
[11312]various teams and other action groups
[11314]in Cuba with which we were in contact.
[11316]Approximately 10-15,000 lbs. of the
[11318]over 100,000 lbs. of material [ste] .
[11320]placed in the hands of internal assets
[11322]were demolitions supplies for sabotage
[11324]action. 35a/ —
[11325]The attack on the Santiago refinery was led by Rip
[11326]Robertson, but his exciting cable about the action
[11327]greatly overemphasized the damage; and the plant op-
[11329]erations were quickly restored to normal. At the
[11330]time, however, the DCI reported it to the Special
[11332]‘Group (Chester Bowles, Roswell Gilpatrick, and
[11334]McGeorge Bundy) as a "successful" operation. 35b/
[11335]Robertson's cable is shown as Appendix E (p. 335).
[11337]= 234 -
[11338]TOP SECRET
[11340]13-00000 -
[11342]TOP SECRET
[11344]JMATE. It is a story worth recording here, because
[11345]of. the extremely close and. continuing relationship
[11346]between one of the major US.oil companies operating
[11347]a refinery in Cuba, Standard Oil Company of New
[11348]Jersey (SONJ), and WH Division.
[11350]As early as 9 March ‘1960, the minutes ofa
[11351]Special Group meeting reflect conversations that
[11352]both Allen Dulles and Gordon Gray had concerning the
[11353]problems being faced by the major petroleum companies
[11354]operating in Cuba -- SONJ, Texaco, and Shell -- and
[11355]particularly the need for “discreet means of inter-
[11356]company: consultation" in order to avoid possible
[11357]anti-trust prosecution. In a discussion of planned
[11359]para-military operations against Cuba, it was report-
[11361]ed that on 14 July 1960, Chief, Western Hemisphere
[11363]Division was approached “by the Standard Oil Company. .
[11365]4
[11367]‘He {(Chief, WH/D] indicated that it appeared that
[11369]Standard will be willing to: cooperate, perhaps even
[11370]carry the ball, on certain selected [sabotage] targets.
[11372]DD/P gave authority | to push this contact immediately."* 36/
[11374]* Paramilitary Operation Plan I, indicated that among
[11375]the specific sabotage targets to be considered for at-
[11376]tack in the period between 1 and 30 September 1960,
[11377]were petroleum targets. 37/
[11381]~ 235 -
[11383]TOP SECRET.
[11385]13-00000
[11387]TOP SECRET
[11389]By August of 1960, WH/D had approved a program of
[11390]“subtle sabotage paying off, without resorting to
[11391]the more risky and sensational type of sabotage."
[11392]Unfortunately, however, there was a communications
[11393]gap between the operations people and the intelli-
[11394]gence analysts most familiar with. the world petroleum
[11395]industry and a number of demonstrably unworkable --
[11396]though subtle -- sabotage efforts came to naught.*
[11397]The Cuban petroleum industry also was looked
[11398]to as an. économic-political target as well as a
[11399]sabotage target. When the US refineries operating
[11400]in Cuba refused Castro's order to process Soviet
[11401]crude oil, WH/4 began to think in terms of disrupting
[11402]the flow of this crude to Cuba by pressuring Onassis
[11403]and other independent shipping operators to refuse
[11405]to carry the Soviet oil. It was predicted that such
[11407]* The Agency's real petroleum expertise and knowledge-
[11408]ability --~ both technically and economically -- ona
[11409]worldwide basis was in the Fuels and Power Branch
[11410](later the Fuel's Branch) of the Office of Research
[11411]and Reports (later the Office of Economic Research) .
[11412]Aside from the constant irritation of having to work
[11413]half in*the dark in response to WH/D or WH/4, ORR/F&P
[11414]was constantly having to correct errors, to make
[11415]apologies, or mend fences with the major US petroleum
[11416]companies as a result of the lack of coordination be-
[11417]tween DDP and DDI components.
[11419]-— 236 -
[11421]TOP SECRET
[11423]13-00000
[11425]TOP SECRET
[11427]a plan would force the USSR (then facing a shortage
[11428]of tanker bottoms in the world market) to. transport
[11429]its ow crude to Cuba and. to "provide technicians
[11431]and make modifications in existing refineries to
[11433]process their crude." This, in turn, was supposed
[11435]to alienate Venezuela and Mexico, normally among
[11436]Cuba's crude suppliers .* 39/,
[11438]In addition to ‘petroleum refineries as targets
[11439]for sabotage, plans: were also, made to disrupt the
[11441]Cuban microwave system. unlike the plans: to disrupt
[11443]the Cuban petroleum industry -- which would directly
[11445]. involve properties of the international. oil companies
[11447]~~ the sabotage program for the. microwave networks,
[11448]as late as February of 1961, specifically stated that
[11449]attacks should be limited to the Cuban operated net
[11450]with “hands ‘off RCA‘and Dumont systems, which are to
[11452]remain intact:for later consideration.":40/ Also
[11454]* In fact, the Cuban refinery technicians themselves
[11455]did an excellent job of adapting the plants to the
[11457]‘use of Soviet crude. The former manager of the
[11458]' Standard Oil refinery commented to this effect after
[11460]reviewing thé all source intelligence materials avail-
[11461]able on the plant. He was pleased -—- at least in
[11462]one sense -- to note that Standard's training program
[11464]“has apparently been quite successful!
[11466]- 237 -
[11468]TOP SECRET
[11470]13-00000
[11472]TOP SECRET
[11474]prohibited were attacks under Agency sponsorship on
[11476]Soviet and Soviet-bloc targets located in Cuba. J. C.
[11477]King protested that attacks on Soviet and Soviet-bloc
[11478]targets by resistance forces not controlled by the
[11479]Agency were far less efficient than such attacks
[11480]would be if they were mounted through Agency efforts. 41/
[11481]In addition to planning for sabotage, WH Divi-
[11482]sion's anti-Castro activity also included extensive
[11483]plans for the formation of goon squads throughout
[11484]much of Latin America in an attempt to counter the
[11485]pro-Castro elements of the various nations. This
[11486]goon squad program also was of considerable interest
[11488]to the Deputy Director for Plans, Mr. Bissell. Be-
[11490]. cause of its. areawide nature, the activities of the
[11492]goon squads were run out of WH/D rather than out of
[11493]WH/4. Among the operations which WH claimed credit ‘
[11494]for were the following: The disruption in Mexico
[11496]City of about 400 Castro sympathizers gathered to
[11497]celebrate the 26th of July movement through the use
[11499]of stink bombs set off in the ‘meeting place; in Lima,
[11500]Peru a counter demonstration against some 200 Castro
[11501]sympathizers also gathered to. celebrate the 26th of
[11503]July movement; and in San Jose, Costa Rica, "A meeting
[11505]- 238 -
[11507]TOP SECRET
[11509]13-00000
[11511]TOP SECRET
[11513]of the Amigos de Cuba was broken up by an agent at
[11514]the Station, who sprayed the. two principal speakers,
[11515]prominent Costa Rican leftists with ‘Who, Me?'."* 42/
[11517]Among other assets which Chief, WH/D chose to
[11518]mention in the same context with the goon squads were
[11519]the Secretary to the President of one Latin American
[11520]country: .
[11522]Who can promote action of any of the
[11523]National Security Forces.
[11525]In another country, an.
[11527]Agency member integrated. into the
[11529]' Public Safety Program serving as an
[11531]Advisor to the President on Security
[11532]matters is in a position to’ recommend
[11533]police action to the President.** 43/
[11535]In what may have been a ploy intended principally
[11537]to obtain a vessel for use in infil-exfil operations,
[11539]* “Who, Me?" was an obnoxious scent.
[11541]** In light of subsequent investigations of CIA Activ-
[11542]ities by the Senate Select Committee in the mid 1970's,
[11543]it is interesting that the reference to the “Action
[11544]Squads" described above also included with reference
[11546]to the Dominican Republic an agent:
[11548]_ In contact with a group of dissidents
[11549]capable of violent action, including assas-
[11550]sination. This group has killed a number
[11551]of: agents of the Servicio de Inteligencia
[11552]Militar (SIM), Dominican Secret Police. 45/
[11554]- 239 -
[11556]TOP SECRET
[11558]13-00000
[11560]TOP SECRET
[11562]rather than in direct action programs against Cuba,
[11563]representatives of the Special Projects Group, Counter-
[11564]intelligence made a pitch to Chief, JMATE to acquire
[11565]a vessel which.-- for its acquisition, operational |
[11566]maintenance, crew, including incentive bonus would
[11567]run roughly $200,000 for a 6-month period ~- could
[11568]also be used in deception operations against Castro.
[11569]In responding to this suggestion from the Special
[11570]Projects Group, Col. Jack Hawkins quickly put the
[11571]quietus on this request, noting that it was doubtful
[11572]that the Cubans had either enough sophisticated radar
[11573]or commo gear so that they would react to “the false
[11574]radar presentation, deceptive communications traffic,
[11575]noise makers ,, signals, smoke, explosions, etc." Con-
[11576]sequently Hawkins concluded:
[11577]In view of the high cost involved,
[11578]and the other factors mentioned above,
[11579]I do not concur in the acquisition of
[11581]this craft for deception purposes as
[11582]proposed in the reference. 46/
[11584]~ 240 -
[11586]TOP SECRET
[11588]13-00000
[11590]TOP SECRET
[11592]Part VI
[11594]- Mr. Nixon's Role
[11596]Like so many other aspects of the Bay of Pigs
[11597]story a great deal’has been said about the role that
[11598]Richard. M. Nixon played in the operation during the
[11599]course of his Vice Presidency, but woefully: little
[11600]solid evidence has ever appeared to verify either
[11601]the pros or cons on the subject. Because of the
[11602]continuing vepetition of many of these stories, a
[11603]careful search was undertaken of the voluminous CIA
[11604]records of the operation in order to recover those
[11605]items pertaining to Nixon' S participation directly
[11606]or inditectly -- through his aides, assistants, or
[11607]correspondence -- in the Bay of Pigs operation.
[11609]During the course of his unofficial visit to
[11611]the United States in the spring of 1959, Fidel Castro
[11613]accepted the invitation of the Vice President of the
[11615]United States to meet with Mx. Nixon in his official
[11616]office in the Capitol for: an informal discussion.
[11617]Nixon has stated that the meeting was arranged at the
[11619]request of the Secretary of State Herter, who suggested
[11621]- 241 -
[11623]TOP SECRET
[11625]13-00000
[11627]TOP SECRET
[11629]that. the administration might profit if one of its
[11630]leaders could gain additional inside information about
[11631]what made Castro tick.
[11633]Nixon has said that he had a 3 1/2 hour meeting
[11634]with Castro on 19 April 1959 and that as a result of
[11635]the meeting, he prepared a 4-page secret memorandum
[11636]‘and sent copies to Président Eisenhower, Secretary
[11637]Herter and to Allen Dulles.* 1/ In part at least,
[11639]Mr. Nixon's version of the meeting with Castro was
[11641]made public as early as November 1964 in an article
[11643]he wrote for the Reader's Digest, and - these views
[11645]were repeated in somewhat more detail in his recent
[11646]memoirs, RN. The thrust of the meeting was that Nixon
[11647]was emphasizing the need for castro to establish a
[11648]democratic form of government as he (Nixon) understood
[11650]it, with Castro on the other hand emphasizing that the
[11652]* In his Reader's Digest article of November 1964 Nixon
[11653]indicated that copies of the memorandum went to the
[11654]three individuals as noted in the text above, however,
[11655]in his recent Memoirs, RN, Nixon states that a copy
[11657]also went to John Foster Dulles. John Foster Dulles
[11659]was technically Secretary of State until 22 April 1959,
[11660]on which. date he was succeeded by Christian Herter.
[11662]At the time of the meeting between Nixon and Castro,
[11663]however, Mr. Herter had been acting in Mr. Dulles'
[11664]place. Dulles‘'s death occurred 24 May 1959.
[11666]- 242 -
[11668]TOP SECRET
[11670]13-00000
[11672]TOP SECRET
[11674]type of government he believed in was that which was |
[11675]expressed most vocally by the people. Nixon's most
[11676]widely known remark about Castro as a result of that
[11677]meeting was his statement that: "Castro is incredibly
[11678]naive about communism, or is under communist discipline."
[11679]Reportedly Castro was not particularly enchanted with
[11681]the meeting either, for according to a member of his
[11683]“party when Castro. emerged from the meeting he “was”
[11685]angry. He swore and added, ‘This man has spent the
[11686]whole time scolding me'."* 2s
[11688]Subsequent to his meeting with Castro in April
[11689]of 1959, Agency records do not reflect any particular
[11690]interest on the part of the Vice President in Cuban
[11691]activities until the end of January 1960. On 27 Janu-
[11692]ary, and again on 23 February, Col. J. C. King, Chief,
[11693]Western Hemi sphere Division, briefed Gen. Robert Cushman,
[11695]Mr. Nixon's Aide, at the Vice President's Office...
[11697]“Cushman. made it. clear that the Vice President was
[11699]* It was only after making a direct request to Mr.
[11701]Nixon that a copy of the memorandum was obtained.
[11703]No copies were found in the files of. CIA, State, or
[11705]the Eisenhower Library. The copy obtained was from
[11707]Mr. Nixon's personal files. The memorandun was, in
[11709]fact, classified CONFIDENTIAL rather than SECRET.
[11711]A copy of the memorandum is attached as. Appendix F . 2a/
[11713]- 243 -
[11715]TOP SECRET
[11717]13-00000
[11719]TOP SECRET
[11723]interested in supporting anti-Castro groups both within
[11724]and outside of Cuba, including goon squads or other
[11725]direct action groups to match against the pro-Castro
[11726]groups in Cuba.
[11728]‘Among the other subjects discussed with General
[11729]Cushman on 23 February 1960 were propaganda attacks on
[11730]the Castro government and the possibilities of economic
[11731]sanctions similar to those which had been suggested
[11732]by former Assistant Secretary of State Henry Holland,
[11735]whose views on the need for economic sanctions had
[11737]‘not only been discussed with Agency representatives,
[11739]but also had been forwarded to the Vice President's
[11740]office.
[11742]Another facet of the Agency's anti-Castro ef-
[11743]forts which were of some interest to the Vice-Presi-
[11744]dent were CIA's relations with the Department of State,
[11745]which obviously was not one of the Vice President's
[11746]favorite organizations; but Col. King made it quite
[11747]clear that all of CIA's actions were undertaken only
[11748]after policy’ approval. 3/ After it was pointed out
[11749]to Gen. ‘Cushman that the Department. of State's knowl-
[11750]edgeability about Agency operations was ona strict
[11752]"need-to-know" basis, even for the Ambassador in Cuba,
[11754]- 244 -
[11756]TOP SECRET
[11758]13-00000
[11760]TOP SECRET
[11762]Cushman then showed Col. King some derogatory informa-
[11763]tion that the FBI had provided the Vice President
[11764]about both Ambassador Bonsal and William Wieland of
[11765]the Bureau of American Republic Affairs. Col. King's
[11766]memorandum provided no details about the nature of
[11767]this information, but the probability is that both
[11768]were accussed of being too tolerant of Castro and
[11769]communists. 4/
[11771]During one of these meetings in the early part
[11772]of 1960, Gen. Cushman- noted that the Vice President
[11773]had suggested that possibly the Agency would want to
[11775]consult with, or acquire the services of, Col. Edward
[11777]Lansdale, a member of Gen. Erskine's Special Operations:
[11779]Staff in the Department of Defense. Lansdale's activ-
[11780]ities in helping to quell the Huk rebellion in the
[11781]Philippines, apparently were well known to Nixon. 5/
[11782]On 2 March 1960, the Director of Central Intel-
[11783]ligence gave Vice President Nixon a detailed briefing
[11785]on "What We are Doing in Cuba:" The 7-page briefing
[11787]‘paper which had been given to the Director provided
[11789]information on Castro's pro-communist proclivities,
[11791]on the whole range of the anti-Castro propaganda ef-
[11793]fort which was being supported by Agency financing,
[11795]- 245 -
[11797]TOP SECRET
[11799]13-00000
[11801]TOP SECRET
[11803]‘and went into. details concerning attempts to rally
[11804]anti-Castro support, not only in the other Latin Ameri-
[11805]can nations, but in the Near and Far East and in Africa.
[11806]Details were given on the preparations being made for
[11807]resistance activities including the acquisition of
[11808]training bases in third countries, and both Ydigoras
[11809]Fuentes, President of Guatemala, and President Luis |
[11810]‘Somoza of Nicaragua were noted as having made offers
[11811]of support for this country's anti~Castro activities.
[11812]Plans for economic warfare against Castro were
[11813]also outlined for the Vice President. Delaying de-
[11814]liveries of necessary spare parts for the sugar indus-
[11815]try, tightening credit by oil companies to restrict
[11816]delivery of the essential petroleum products, and
[11817]possible restriction in ‘sugar quotas were mentioned
[11818]as under study. One other. item which was mentioned
[11819]in this briefing for Vice President Nixon was the
[11820]fact that the Agency had "a drug, which if placed in
[11821]Castro's food, would make him behave in such an irra-
[11822]tional manner that a public appearance could have very
[11823]damaging results to him." 6/ It’ should be emphasized
[11824]that at the date of this briefing (2 March 1960), the
[11826]United States did not yet. have an official anti-Castro
[11828]- 246 -
[11830]TOP SECRET
[11832]13-00000
[11834]TOP SECRET
[11836]policy -- that would not come until 17 March of 1960.
[11839]/ .
[11841]Subsequent to that announced policy, the author has
[11842]found no other references: to drugs or other types of
[11843]attack. which were being considered upon Castro's
[11844]person, or the persons of any of the other Cuban
[11845]leaders, as a part of the Agency's official program. *
[11846]There is some question as to whether it was the.
[11847]Director of Central Intelligence himself, or whether
[11848]it was Mr. Bissell, or, perhaps, whether it was Col.
[11849]King who actually briefed the Vice President on
[11850]2 March 1960. A stamp on the copy of the original
[11851]Memorandum for the Director reads: “Noted by DCI
[11852]28 March 1960." This copy was sent to the DCI through
[11853]the DDP and carries Mr. Bissell's initials. The car-
[11854]bon of the memorandum does not’ show this stamp and
[11855]the presumption is that it was the Director who did
[11859]the briefing. A third version of the memorandum is
[11861]_-eren—ae ‘N
[11863]* See Part VII of this Volume of the History of the
[11864]Bay of Pigs Operation for clarification of the defini-~
[11865]tion of the Agency's official: policy regarding the
[11866]anti-Castro program, as contrasted to the unofficial
[11867]program. The author assumes that regardless of reader's
[11868]biases regarding the former Vice President, that the
[11869]fact that he heard about this drug in the course of a
[11870]briefing will not be construed to.make him a member of
[11871]a conspiracy to assassinate Castro and other of the
[11872]Cuban leaders.
[11874]- 247 -
[11876]TOP SECRET
[11878]13-00000
[11880]TOP SECRET
[11882]dated 8 March 1960 and was revised to read:
[11883]For the Director's use at the NSC 5412
[11884]Representatives Meeting which will. con-
[11885]sider the Cuban covert action program
[11886]paper. (This paper was used for Mr. Nixon’ S
[11887]briefing.)
[11888]This would seem to imply that perhaps the DCI did in
[11889]_ fact do the briefing. While the briefer may: not be
[11890]: positively identified, there is no question however,
[11891]‘that the Vice President did receive a detailed brief-
[11892]ing on the Agency's plan for action against Castro
[11893]prior to the time of Eisenhower's formal proclamation. *
[11894]In addition to the meeting of 2 March when Mr.
[11895]Nixon was briefed on the Agency's concerns about Cuba,
[11896]the Vice President was also a participant in the
[11897]10. March 1960 meeting of the ‘National Security Council
[11898]when President Eisenhower emphasized that Cuba was a
[11899]danger, that he wanted contingency plans drawn up, and
[11900]that he wanted Cuba to be a subject for review at all
[11902]future National Security Council Meetings. Mr. Nixon
[11904]attended the 17 March 1960 conference when the President
[11906]* See Appendix G for copies of the first page of each
[11907]of the three memorandums on the briefing of the Vice
[11908]President on 2 March 1960. (For Appendix G see p. 344).
[11910]- 248 -
[11912]TOP SECRET
[11914]13-00000
[11916]TOP SECRET
[11918]“ gave a formal "go" to the Covert Action Plan of the
[11919]Agency which had been agreed to by the 5412 Group.
[11920]Mr. Nixon's only reported comments during this meet-
[11921]ing concerned the cutting off of new capital to Cuba,
[11922]the pulling out of private american firms, and the
[11923]possibilities of reducing tourism to stop the flow
[11924]of American dollars into Cuba. 7/
[11925]Perhaps one.of the reasons why Vice President
[11926]Nixon has been attributed with playing a major role
[11927]in the Bay of Pigs activity has to do with the re-_
[11928]lationship between Nixon's office and Mr. William D.
[11929]Pawley, former US Ambassador to Peru and Brazil and
[11930]a us businessman with extensive investments in Cuba
[11931]and interests in various other parts of Latin America.
[11932]Pawley also was a principal contributor to the Repub-
[11933]lican party, particularly to Mr. Nixon's cause. Ap-
[11934]parently hopeful of an appointment as Assistant Secre-_
[11935]tary of State for Latin American affairs -< assuming
[11936]a Republican party victory in the 1960 presidential
[11937]election -- Pawley was a widely known conservative.
[11938]In the spring of 1960, shortly following Presi-
[11939]dent Eisenhower's decision to promote the anti-Castro .
[11941]program, Pawley's contacts with the Agency (particularly
[11943]- 249 -
[11945]TOP SECRET
[11947]13-00000
[11949]TOP SECRET
[11951]with WHD) and with Nixon's office became increasingly
[11952]frequent and apparently quite close. On 21 March 1960,
[11953]four days after formal approval of the anti-Castro
[11954]program, Jake Esterline met with Pawley to plan a
[11955]meeting to be held in Pawley's Miami residence which
[11956]would include the DCI, col. King, Gen. Cushman, and
[11957]Walter J. Donnelly, Vice President of United States |
[11958]Steel and former ambassador to Venezuela as well as
[11960]Mr. Pawley. Of the session with Pawley, Chief, WH/4
[11962]t,
[11964]wrote:.
[11966]Details and the agenda were not dis-
[11967]cussed other than to say the principal
[11968]emphasis would be on reviewing what work
[11969]could be done throughout the hemisphere
[11970]and public opinion on the pending opera-
[11971]tion against Castro. Mr. Pawley was told
[11972]that the time had arrived for careful coor-
[11973]dination of all activities; that permission
[11974]had been granted for an all-out operation;
[11975]a government in exile will be formed post.
[11976]haste; that the acceptable non-Batista .
[11977]groups will be put into contact. with each
[11978]other almost immediately; and that Mr.
[11979]Pawley's contact, Rubio Padilla, will
[11980]figure prominently in this effort ... It
[11982]. was carefully explained to Mr. Pawley that.
[11983]any action involving exiles now should be
[11984]most carefully coordinated with Chief,
[11985]WHD and Chief, Branch'4 to avoid any flaps.* 8/
[11987]* Esterline also mentioned in his memorandum that
[11988]Pawley had provided some information on the Dominican
[11989]Republic which he asked Esterline not to pass beyond
[11990]CIA until’ he, Pawley, had the opportunity to give the
[11991]information directly to Vice President Nixon. .
[11993]- 250 -
[11995]TOP SECRET
[11997]13-00000
[11999]TOP SECRET
[12001]The meeting mentioned in the foregoing para-
[12002]graph was convened in Pawley's Miami residence on
[12003]‘1 April 1960, and the Agency's representatives briefed,
[12004]among other things, on the problems being faced by
[12005]_ the Cubans in exile who. were trying to form a govern-
[12006]ment. There was considerable discussion as to who
[12007]should be the nominal leaders of this government in
[12008]exile, with Pawley pushing in particular for Dr. Rubio
[12009]Padilla and the agency's representatives suggesting
[12010]Dr. Antonio Varona. For the benefit of the Vice
[12011]President's representative, it was stressed that none—
[12012]of the Latin American countries seemed particularly
[12013]anxious to provide a-base of operations’ for the
[12014]government in exile. The group was informed by the
[12015]Director of Central Intelligence and by Col. King
[12016]that, in addition to US Government financing, arrange-
[12017]ments were being made to have private confidential
[12018]sources help defray the costs of the Cuban government
[12019]in exile. Col. King pointed out’ that over and above
[12020]a bond issue | |
[12021]’ which will be floated in the name of the
[12022]government in exile with Mr. Pawley's
[12023]help, that donations are being made by
[12025]private citizens and corporations. He
[12026]indicated that confidential arrangements
[12028]- 251 -
[12030]TOP SECRET
[12032]13-00000
[12034]TOP SECRET ©
[12036]‘have. already been .made with the Bureau
[12037]of Internal Revenue ‘to permit individuals
[12038]Or corporate entities making donations to
[12039]claim these donations as contributions to
[12040]' the US Government for‘tax purposes. He
[12041]cautioned that this arrangement was being
[12042]‘limited to a very small group. 9/
[12044]The question also was raised about the relation~
[12046]ship of the anti-Castro program to the Organization of
[12048]American States. Mr. Pawley suggested that rather than
[12050]lean toward the OAS, better use should be made of the
[12052]US Military Mission in the Latin American countries,
[12053]especially having them pass the word on about the dangers
[12055]of the Castro Government to one and all in the Western
[12057]Hemisphere. Other items of importance that were dis-
[12058]cussed by the group were the planned propaganda program
[12059]and “the present pathetic effort on the part of the
[12061]Catholic Church to face up to the Communist plot in.
[12063]Cuba."
[12065]This meeting demonstrated that from the very
[12067]_ outset of the formalization of a US anti-Castro policy *
[12069]Mr. Nixon was being fully informed of the plans that
[12071]were underway to accomplish the US objectives, and
[12073]that certain private American citizens were closely
[12075]involved in the planning. Within a very short time
[12077]after the April meeting at Pawleys residence, however,
[12079]- 252..-
[12081]- TOP SECRET’
[12083]13-00000
[12085]TOP SECRET
[12087]senior Agency personnel + notably C. Tracy Barnes,
[12088]the ADDP/A -- began to question the Agency's rela-
[12089]tionship with Mr. William Pawley, particularly as
[12090] pawley's support for Rubio Padilla was apparently
[12091]intended to establish a group of. Pawley supported
[12092]Cubans in exile in opposition to the FRD, the Agency's
[12093]supported exile group. Barnes's concern was that .
[12094]if the US continued to support the extremely conserv-
[12095]ative element represented by Rawley's group, it
[12096]would be charged that any anti-Castro action under-
[12097]taken by the us would be “on the basis of protecting
[12098]economic royalists." | .
[12099]| What Barnes stressed to Mr. Bissell, the DDP,
[12100]was the need for the US to decide whether or not it
[12101]wished to be charged with supporting reactionary
[12102]movements in Latin America, not only in Cuba, but
[12103]in the rest of the Central’ American and Caribbean.
[12105]areas as well. ‘Once having made up its own mind,
[12106]Barnes suggested that CIA's’ position be worked out
[12107]with State “and thereafter take it to Mr. Nixon,
[12108]giving him at that time, a thorough and complete
[12110]briefing so that there can be no doubt: in his mind
[12112]- 253 -
[12114]TOP SECRET
[12116]13-00000
[12118]TOP SECRET
[12120]as to where we stand, and what we propose to do."* 10/
[12121]“When Rubio Padilla and the FRD failed to get
[12122]together, Pawley informed Chief, Western Hemisphere
[12123]Division that he was withdrawing from support of the
[12124]Agency's anti-Castro operation; and Pawley told col.
[12125]King that he intended to make his views regarding the
[12126]FRD known to Vice President Nixon. In addition,
[12127]Pawley also had a meeting with President Eisenhower
[12129]on 12 or 13 May 1960 at which time he stated his
[12130]opinions with regard to the Dominican Republic and
[12131]probably with reference to Cuba. In view of Pawley's
[12132]‘recalcitrance to continue to work on the funding of
[12133]the FRD, the DDP, ADDP/A, Chief WH/D, Chief WH/4 and
[12135]. others, discussed the pros and cons of cutting off
[12137]the communications channel between Pawley and the
[12138]Rubio groups into Cuba -- a channel which was pro- |
[12139]vided by the Agency's communications facility.
[12141]Chief, WH Division got the group to agree that
[12142]the communications channel should be continued because
[12143]* Mr. Barnes's thoughts probably were transmitted to
[12144]Director Dulles for in a meeting of the Special Group
[12146]on 19 May 1960,-the DCI categorized the Cubans sup-
[12147]ported by Pawley as “unreconstructed reactionaries." 10a/
[12149]- 254 -
[12151]TOP SECRET
[12153]13-00000 -
[12155]TOP SECRET
[12157]it did provide a window to the activities of the Pawley
[12158]group. Moreover, the Pawley group had a duplicate
[12160]channel into Cuba and would not necessarily have been
[12162]_ restricted by denial of the Agency channel. A restric-—
[12164]tion was placed on the transmittal of communications
[12166]which would be prejudicial to CIA operations in Cuba;
[12168]but it was agreed that Pawley should be advised of
[12170]the cancellation of such messages by Chief, Western
[12171]Hemisphere Division. The monitoring of such cable
[12172]traffic, however, was to be the responsibility of
[12173]Chief, WH/4, Jake Esterline.
[12175]Because of Pawley's close ties to the Eisenhower
[12176]administration, the Deputy Director for Plans agreed
[12177]that the discussion regarding Pawley should ‘be brought
[12179]to the attention of the Director of Central Intelli-
[12181]gence and that Mr. Dulles should be urged to bring
[12183]this matter before both President Eisenhower and Vice
[12185]President Nixon. 11/ By the first week of June 1960,
[12186]however, Jake. Esterline apparently had reached the
[12187]end of his tether, for in a Memorandum to the DDP,
[12188]he wrote:
[12190]It is our firm conviction, based on
[12192]months of discussion, that Mr. Pawley's
[12193]views on the Cuban situation are highly
[12195]- 255 -
[12197]TOP SECRET
[12199]13-00000
[12201]TOP SECRET
[12203]personal and rigid. These views in our
[12204]opinion are inimical to the best interest
[12205]of the United States. Mr. Pawley has re-
[12206]fused to budge from his position and has —
[12207]continued. to seek official endorsement of
[12208]his views at the high levels of the govern-
[12209]ment. The flagrant disregard for security
[12210]reflected in Havana cable 4820 dated
[12211]4 June 1960 requires Chief, JMARC to
[12212]recommend that all contact with the Rubio-
[12213]Pawley group be immediately and finally
[12214]severed. If such action is not taken,
[12215]no guarantee can be made for the security
[12216]of the JMARC operation. In point of fact,
[12217]the information in the foregoing message
[12218]indicates that security already has been
[12219]damaged severely. 12/ |
[12221]:,
[12223]Among other things, the Havana cable which had
[12225]aroused Chief, WH/4 stated that the following infor-
[12227]mation was being circulated in anti-Castro circles in
[12229]US Government now backing Rubio group
[12230]and no other group. Group has entre to
[12231]Veep. For a time Pawley was - having
[12232]trouble with an Agency or Agencies who
[12233]wanted [to] back another junta, but after
[12234]Pawley offered. [to] withdraw completely,
[12235]he was talked out of doing so, and given
[12236]assurance his group only would be backed,
[12237]{and this] resulted resignation person
[12238]backing other group. 13/
[12240]Headquarters prepared a priority cable ‘to be
[12242]sent to both Havana and to the Forward Operations
[12243]Base, which had also picked up the disinformation
[12245]being spread by the anti-FRD group. The text of the
[12247]- 256 -
[12249]TOP SECRET
[12251]13-00000
[12253]TOP SECRET
[12255]cable read in part as follows:
[12257]You have been authoritatively advised
[12258]that US Government is not (repeat not)
[12259]backing Rubio group.and that it has no
[12260]intention of ever doing so. It complete
[12261]fabrication that Pawley was given US
[12262]Government assurance that only his group
[12263]would be backed. No resignations of any
[12264]kind occurred, nor are any foreseen.
[12265]Mention Veep in such context and on this
[12266]particular level sheer foolhardiness and
[12267]can only reflect most adversely on those
[12268]Cubans who guilty misrepresentation of
[12269]facts and severest indiscretions. 14/
[12271]The cable apparently wag never forwarded to
[12272]either Havana or to Miami, presumably because of op- -
[12273]position from Col. J. C. King who had noted and ini-
[12274]tialed on his ‘copy of the Memorandum from Jake Ester-~
[12276]line recommending that all contact with the Rubio-
[12278]’ Pawley group be “immediately and finally severed"
[12280]the following: "I do not concur with severing of
[12282]all contacts."* 15/
[12284]* As will be noted subsequently, whether it was
[12285]political expediency or conviction that Pawley could
[12286]“actually do some good, the relationship among Pawley,
[12287]Chief, WH Division, and Chief, WH/4 continued through-
[12288]out the course of the Bay of Pigs Operation. If any~
[12289]thing in fact, the relationship between Pawley and
[12290]Jake Esterline appears to have become mutually sup-
[12291]portive, particularly as the operation drew to its
[12292]unsuccessful conclusion. ,
[12294]- 257 -
[12296]TOP SECRET »
[12298]13-00000 -
[12300]TOP SECRET
[12302]On 20 June 1960 at the request of General
[12303]Cushman, Jake Esterline joined him for. lunch, the
[12304]purpose being to provide the General with sufficient
[12305]information on the state of the anti-Castro program
[12307]so that he could bring the Vice President up to date
[12309]from the time of the Miami meeting that had taken
[12311]place at William Pawley's house.* Among the points
[12312]covered were the developments related to the organ-
[12313]ization of the FRD and the, fact that Mr.° William
[12315]Pawley's candidate, Senor ‘Rubio, had decided not to
[12316]join the Frente. According to Esterline's memorandum:
[12317]‘Dr. Rubio's failure to join the Frente,
[12318]however, has not held up progress in form-
[12319]ing the junta, and/or the other important
[12320]aspects of the operation.
[12321]General Cushman was told that the Frente's headquarters
[12322]were to be established in Mexico, and it was on this
[12323]occasion that Esterline introduced General Cushman to
[12325]E. Howard Hunt, who was going to move to Mexico with
[12327]the Frente.**
[12329]* The meeting of 21 March 1960.
[12331]** Insofar as can be determined, this probably was
[12332]the first occasion on which Richard Nixon heard. the
[12333]name of E. Howard Hunt.
[12335]- 258 -
[12337]TOP SECRET
[12339]13-00000
[12341]TOP SECRET
[12343]‘Chief, WH/4 also touched on the programs that
[12344]were being beamed out of Swan Island, on the prepara-
[12345]tion being made for training paramilitary types, base
[12346]communications, planned paramilitary activities, the
[12347]choice of a Third Country's staging area, and that the
[12348]operation was still scheduled to begin during the
[12349]month of November 1960. Gen. Cushman noted that the
[12350]Vice President requested this information in order to
[12351]prepare for an upcoming NSC meeting at which he would
[12352]be a senior official. The vice President's aide also
[12353]asked if there were any particular problems with re-
[12354]lation to the operation that. Chief, WH/4 wished to.
[12355]have brought to the attention of the Vice President.
[12356]Esterline reported that the only problems that had
[12357]occurred concerned political differences among the
[12358]exiles, but that for the moment all factions seemed
[12359]to be quiescent. Chief, WH/4 also indicated to Gen.
[12360]Cushman “that much had yet to be done vis-a-vis other
[12361]‘countries in the hemisphere to ensure that JMARC
[12362]would have adequate support at the eleventh hour."* 16/
[12364]On 22 June 1960, General Cabell ~~ Acting DCI
[12365]at the time -~ briefed a special meeting of the National
[12367]Security Council on the Cuban situation. The Vice
[12369]* Except for Guatemala and Nicaragua, such support
[12370]would never be forthcoming. ;
[12372]- 259 -
[12373]TOP SECRET
[12375]13-00000
[12377]TOP SECRET
[12379]oO President presided and the meeting was attended by
[12380]the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Treasury, the
[12381]Director of the Office of Civil & Defense Mobiliza-
[12382]tion, the Acting Attorney General, a representative
[12383]_ of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and,
[12384]among others, Messrs. Bissell, King, Esterline, and
[12385]McMahan of the Central Intelligence Agency.* 17/
[12386]A great deal of the briefing was devoted to the
[12387]FRD and its leadership ~- their policies, their back-
[12388]ground, and the internal difficulties and bickering.
[12389]The propaganda picture also was discussed, with partic-
[12390]ular emphasis again on radio broadcasts from Swan
[12391]Island. Gen. Cabell stated that the paramilitary
[12392]plan was to develop a force of 500 men who would be
[12393]divided into 25 20-man teams. The teams would go
[12394]into Cuba to organize and to train indigenous dissident ,
[12395]groups. Cabell emphasized that the implementation
[12397]of the paramilitary program depended on the existence
[12399]* Knight McMahan was on the Staff of the Deputy
[12400]Director for Intelligence -- that component of the
[12401]Central Intelligence Agency which, according to some
[12402]of the “authorities" on the Bay of Pigs, was presum-
[12403]ably uninformed and unaware of the Agency's anti-
[12404]Castro program. .
[12406]- 260 -
[12408]TOP SECRET
[12410]13-00000
[12412]TOP SECRET
[12414]‘of viable dissident forces which “have not emerged
[12415]in strength."
[12417]The ADCI also mentioned the plans to create an
[12418]anti-Castro air force, but his comments about this
[12419]air force (even at this time) were very much in error.
[12420]According to General Cabell:
[12422]Some trained Cuban fliers are currently
[12423]available and we hope soon to have access
[12425]to additional numbers. "Sterile" aircraft
[12427]for their use have been mothballed by the
[12429]Department of Defense and earmarked for
[12431]CIA use. These craft can be made ‘available
[12433]in a matter of hours. 18/
[12435]As reported in an earlier volume of this history, nei-
[12436]ther the aircraft nor trained Cuban pilots would be
[12437]available for missions against Castro's Cuba until
[12438]late in the fall of 1960.*
[12440]In the NSC briefing, Cabell also made some inter-
[12441]esting comments about the resistance that might be
[12442]encountered in an attempt to oust Castro, emphasizing
[12443]that intelligence reports had indicated that Cuba >
[12444]Might organize “a ‘foreign legion' comprised of highly
[12445]trained: regular military personnel, drawn from Com-
[12447]munist nations, mainly the eastern satellites. Should
[12449]this eventuality occur it would seriously affect the
[12451]* See Volume I of the Official History of the Bay of
[12452]Pigs Operation, Air Operations.
[12454]- 261 -
[12456]TOP SECRET
[12458]13-00000
[12460]TOP SECRET
[12462]‘probable success of any purely clandestine paramili-
[12463]tary operations." Cabell then introduced a suggestion
[12464]which would be heard right up to the time that the
[12465]invasion fleet was being boardea -- that “volunteers"
[12466]be acquired for the anti-Castro forces, such volunteers
[12467]to be drawn from US Special Forces.* 18a/ | |
[12468]As the presiding officer at the special National
[12469]Security Council meeting, Vice President Nixon raised
[12470]a number of questions with the Department of State
[12471]representatives concerning support that the Organiza-
[12472]tion of American States would likely give to this
[12473]country's anti-Castro efforts; and he also posed a_
[12474]series of questions concerning the economic pressures
[12475]that the United States might put on Cuba. The. ques-
[12476]‘tions concerned sugar, oil, and tariffs in particular;
[12477]and the Vice President urged that "strong, positive
[12478]action [be taken] to avoid becoming labeled “Uncle
[12480]Sucker." 19/— ‘
[12482]* Wo such volunteers were permitted in the case of
[12484]the ground forces, but in the last two days of the
[12486]Bay of Pigs Operation such volunteers were accepted
[12488]for combat. air operations. See Volume I of this
[12489]“History, Atr Operations.
[12491]- 262 -
[12493]TOP SECRET
[12495]13-00000
[12497]TOP SECRET
[12499]On 1 July 1960, Jake Esterline received an inter-
[12500]esting telephone call from General Cushman, contain-
[12501]ing two messages from the Vice President. First, Mr.
[12502]Nixon was interested to know if there were any obsta-..
[12503]-cles that the Agency was encountering vis-a-vis other
[12504]agencies in support of JMATE; and if there were, the
[12505]Vice President indicated that he personally would
[12506]help to resolve such problems. The second request
[12508]was a bit more sticky. Gen. Cushman said
[12510]that the Vice President™has commissioned
[12512]him to. keep Mr. William Pawley happy and,
[12514]in connection with-this, he has also been
[12516]instructed to keep Mr. Pawley briefed on
[12518]how things are moving. General Cushman
[12520]said he realized that this is much against
[12522]our desire, as concerns Mr. Pawley, but
[12524]the fact remains that he [Pawley] is.a
[12526]“big fat political cat" and, as such, the
[12528]Vice President cannot completely - ignore
[12529]him. 20/ .
[12531]Esterline allowed that he understood the General's
[12532]problem and. suggested that with a few hours advance
[12533]warning the Agency would provide the Vice President,
[12534]or the General, with such briefing materials as nec-
[12535]essary for any given meeting with Mr. Pawley -~- after
[12536]first clearing the paper with the appropriate agency
[12537]officials and within the security regulations that
[12539]applied to Mr. Pawley. Esterline indicated in his
[12541]- 263 -
[12543]“TOP SECRET
[12545]13-00000
[12547]TOP SECRET
[12549]‘memorandum that he. immediately informed the Deputy
[12551]Director for Plans, and the Assistant Deputy Director
[12552]for Plans, Mr. Bissell and Mr. Barnes, respectively,
[12553]about the call from General Cushman.*
[12557]Jake Esterline apparently took the Vice Presi-
[12559]dent's offer to help CIA with difficulties it might
[12561]‘have with other agencies to heart. In a memorandum
[12563]from C. Tracy Barnes, concerning a.more effective
[12565]commercial cover for Radio Swan, it appears, from:
[12567]Barnes's response, that Esterline must have suggested
[12569]that the services of Vice President Nixon be engaged
[12571]to resolve a difficulty between the Agency and the
[12573]_ FCC over the use of commercial advertising to make
[12575]* The following interesting comments also appeared
[12576]in Esterline's memorandum on the conversation with
[12577]General Cushman:
[12578]This information {regarding Cushman's
[12579]telephone call] could not be given to Col.
[12580]King, as he had just departed on a three-~-
[12581]day trip.. This memorandum will be avail-
[12582]able -to Col. King, however, upon his re-
[12583]turn. Wednesday, 6 July. ;
[12585]Contrary to the opinions of ‘many who have. sug-
[12586]gested that Col. J. C. King was read out of the anti-
[12587]Castro operation, this memorandum would indicate that,
[12588]in fact, extreme care was being taken to make sure
[12589]that J. C. King was read into the act.
[12591]- 264 -.
[12593]TOP SECRET
[12595]13-00000
[12597]TOP SECRET
[12599]Swan appear more legitimate. Barnes, however, took
[12600]exception and recommended that the US Government
[12601]should consider overt sponsorship of the Swan broad-
[12602]casts.* 21/
[12604]It was also in July 1960 that Vice President
[12605]Nixon's office, principally through the person of
[12606]General Cushman, first indicated an interest in the
[12607]activities of one Mario Garcia Kohly Antiga. Garcia
[12608]was a Cuban exile who claimed to have extensive back-
[12610]. %,
[12611]ing both within the Cuban community in Miami and
[12613]‘among dissidents inside Cuba. At one point he claimed
[12615]that he could raise a force of 2,000 men in the Miami
[12616]area and 10,000 men inside of Cuba -- if he were given
[12617]proper financial support for training and equipping
[12619]these men. Garcia's name first came before the Agency
[12621]in mid-June 1960 following a meeting he had with a
[12623]Cuban exile who was an Agency contact. During this
[12625]* Whether the FCC was chastened by Mr. Nixon or whether
[12626]a determination was made concerning the increased use
[12628]of commercial advertising for Radio Swan is left in
[12629]doubt. But Barnes's suggestion of official, USG par-
[12630]ticipation in Swan was rejected. A note from Ester-
[12631]line on the official routing slip from Barnes for-
[12633]‘warding this memorandum read: “I believe Mr. Bissell
[12635]reversed this position?" To this query King noted
[12636]“Yes" on the buck slip.
[12638]- 265 -
[12640]TOP SECRET
[12642]13-00000
[12644]TOP SECRET
[12646]initial meeting Garcia claimed that he had large
[12647]stores of military equipment in Spain, that he had
[12648]additional promises of assistance from General Franco,
[12650]and that he had contacts in the White House who had
[12652]given him the "go ahead" for an invasion of Cuba!
[12654]Word of Garcia apparently got to the FBI, to
[12655]General Cabell, and apparently to the Office of Vice
[12656]President Nixon. In any event, on 9 July 1960 Jake
[12657]Esterline met with Mr. Marshall Diggs, a Washington |
[12660]lawyer and Garcia's sponsor, where he was told of
[12662]Garcia's grandiose plans to overthrow Castro. In a
[12664]follow-up meeting in Diggs's office on 11 July, Mr.
[12665]Phillip Toomey, WH/4/Prop met with Garcia, Cameron
[12666]Pulley, and two reputed underwater demolitions ex--
[12667]perts. Garcia went into his act about how his force
[12668]could overthrow the Castro Government, assuming that
[12669]he could get some financial assistance for training
[12670]and equipping the troops. Mr. Pulley proceeded to
[12671]tell Mr. Toomey that Garcia's project was part of a
[12672]program that was being promoted by former Senator
[12673]Owen Brewster ‘for the entire Caribbean area -- appar-
[12674]ently a program designed tu eliminate all the bad
[12676]guys. Following another meeting on 13 July and after
[12678]~ 266 -
[12680]TOP SECRET
[12682]13-00000
[12684]TOP SECRET
[12686]listening to Garcia denounce the FRD leaders as
[12687]Communists -- as well as. being unimpressed by his
[12688]credentials -~- on 15 July 1960, Marshall Diggs was
[12689]informed that the Agency had no interest in support-
[12690]ing Mr. Garcia. On 20 July 1960, Chief, JMATE met
[12691]with General Cushman to tell him that a full study
[12692]had been made of the representatives of Seffor Garcia;
[12693]and as a result, the DCI probably would get in touch
[12694]with Mr. Diggs and/or Senator Brewster and explain to
[12695]them "the wisdom of their desi'sting from pushing Garcia
[12696]as an outstanding Cuban military leader."
[12698]The subject dragged on, however; and at one
[12699]point Mr. Pulley, who with Mr. Diggs and ex-Senator
[12700]Brewster, was a strong supporter of Mr. Nixon, indi-
[12701]cated that the administration's policies with regard
[12702]to Cuba might hurt the Vice President in’the upcoming
[12704]election. Moreover Pulley also is reported to have.
[12705]indicated that a congressional investigation. of the
[12706]anti-Castro plan was possible. The Director of Cen-
[12707]tral Intelligence was advised on 26 September that
[12708]because of Garcia’ s threats to expose everything he
[12709]had learned ‘about possible Agency involvement in the
[12711]anti-Castro effort, including the Cuban exile
[12713]~ 267 -
[12715]TOP SECRET
[12717]13-00000
[12719]TOP SECRET
[12721]organization in the United States, that the time had
[12722]come for Diggs and Pulley to be asked “to forego
[12723]their efforts on behalf of Mario Garcia Kohly Antiga."
[12724]This recommendation was approved by General c. P.
[12725]Cabell on 13 October 1960.* 22/
[12727]Insofar as the available records show, the con-
[12729]tacts between Vice President Nixon's office, and the
[12731]* More nonsense from Mario Garcia Kohly Antiga would
[12732]surface again in the summer of 1961 following Castro's
[12733]offer to free the Bay of Pigs” ‘prisoners in return for
[12734]US tractors when Garcia bounced up with another pro-
[12736]posal for the planned escape of the prisoners -- pro-
[12737]viding, of course, that he be given a bundle of bucks.
[12739]In fact, the hand of Garcia reached from beyond
[12740]the grave to touch on the BOP operation. On 2 August
[12741]1976, almost a year after Garcia's death, the Washing-
[12742]ton Star carried a.UPI dispatch saying that Rep. Thomas
[12743]N. Downing (D., Va.) had affidavits claiming that:
[12745]In return for support of the invasion
[12746]{of Cuba] from Mario G. Kohly, a popular
[12747]right-wing leader who was exiled from
[12748]Cuba, then Vice President ‘Nixon agreed
[12749]in October 1960.to order the CIA to
[12750]arrest the leftist leaders and turn
[12752]them over to-Kohly for "elimination"
[12753]after Premier Fidel Castro was thrown
[12754]out of office. |
[12756]The affidavits reportedly came from a former CIA con-
[12757]tract agent and Mario G. Kohly, Jr., son of the would-be
[12758]invasion leader. These materials were supposed. to have
[12759]some bearing on House of Representatives's investigation
[12760]of the assassination of President Kennedy; but there is —
[12761]no indication that they were given any credence. 23/
[12763]- 268 -
[12765]TOP SECRET
[12767]13-00000
[12769]TOP SECRET
[12770]Central Intelligence Agency -- except for the Garcia
[12771]case -- for all practical purposes ended by August
[12773]1960.*
[12775]The only other significant involvement between
[12776]the Vice President and the Central Intelligence Agency,
[12777]prior to the change of administration on 20 January
[12778]1961, concerned a briefing of the Democratic candidates
[12779]for President and Vice President of the United States,
[12780]prior to the 1960 election. | On 23 July 1960, follow-
[12782]ing the Democratic convention, Allen Dulles briefed
[12784]Sen.. John Kennedy, and on 28 July Senator Lyndon
[12786]‘Johnson. In his memorandum to President Eisenhower,
[12788]who had directed that Dulles give these briefings,
[12789]the DCI reported that in the two hour period for each
[12790]briefing he had covered US relations with the Soviet
[12792]Union, developments in the Berlin situation, in the
[12794]* Whether this reflects the concentration of the Vice
[12795]President's activities on the upcoming November elec- —
[12796]tion, whether the principal contacts came to be main-
[12797]tained between Col. J. C. King and Nixon's office --
[12798]with the consequent reference memoranda being included
[12799]in J. C. King's files, which have disappeared from the
[12800]sight of God and man -- or whether, in fact, this is
[12801]an accurate reflection of the limited contacts, the
[12802]author cannot confirm. His inclination is to believe
[12803]that the contacts probably were as limited as described -
[12804]above. , . -
[12806]- 269 -
[12808]TOP SECRET
[12810]13-00000
[12812]TOP SECRET
[12814]Congo, and in Cuba. Kennedy was briefed again on
[12816]19 September 1960, and again the briefing touched
[12818]_. on relations with the Soviet Union and on the trouble
[12820]spots in the world, including Cuba. The White House
[12821]was informed of this briefing prior to the event; and
[12822]subsequent to the briefing of Kennedy, Mr. Dulles
[12823]reported on the meeting to both Jerry Morgan of the
[12824]White House Staff and also to Brigadier Genéral Andrew
[12825]Goodpaster, Staff Secretary to the President. 24/
[12826]; a
[12827]The exact nature of the briefings that Dulles
[12828]gave to Kennedy on Cuba is of particular historical
[12829]importance in terms of the election of 1960. In the
[12830]last of the famous TV debates between candidates Nixon ~
[12831]and Kennedy, Mr. Kennedy, in the course of condemning
[12832]the Castro regime and suggesting that the United States
[12833]take stronger action against Castro, made the statement
[12834]that:
[12835]We must attempt to strengthen the non-
[12836]Batista democratic anti-Castro forces in
[12837]exile, and in Cuba itself, who offer
[12838]eventual hope of overthrowing Castro. Thus
[12839]far, these fighters for freedom have had
[12840]virtually no support from our Government. 25/
[12842]Based on his knowledge and interest in supporting
[12844]the anti-Castro program that had been authorized by
[12846]- 270 -
[12848]TOP SECRET
[12850]13-00000
[12852]TOP SECRET
[12854]President Eisenhower in March 1960, Nixon was put in
[12855]a Catch-22 situation; for as he said:
[12857]President Eisenhower had instructed
[12858]Allen Dulles, head of the CIA, to brief
[12859]the Democratic candidate on all opera-
[12860]tions, including Top Secret operations.
[12862]I knew that Kennedy had already received
[12863]two briefings from Dulles. I immediately
[12864]had a member of my staff call the White
[12865]House on the security line to ask if
[12866]these briefings covered Cuba. A member
[12867]of the White House Staff indicated they
[12868]had. (Several months after the election,
[12869]Allen: Dulles was to state that his: brief-
[12870]ing of Kennedy ‘had included Cuba but not
[12871]the training program fof, Cuban exiles.)
[12872]At the time of the debate, however, and
[12873]after checking with the White House, I
[12874]had to proceed with the assumption that
[12875]Kennedy had been briefed on the secret
[12876]program.
[12878]I was faced with the heads-he-wins,
[12880]tails-I-lose proposition. If in the TV
[12882]. debate I were to reveal the existence of
[12883]the training program and point out that I
[12884]had been one of its strongest advocates, I
[12885]would pull the rug out from under Kennedy's
[12886]position. But if I did so, the project
[12887]would be doomed, and also the lives of the
[12888]brave men, both inside and outside of Cuba,
[12889]who were receiving training and assistance.
[12891]I had only one choice: to protect the
[12892]security of the program, I had to oppose
[12893]Kennedy on his position of advocating that
[12894]the United States openly aid anti-Castro
[12895]forces inside and outside Cuba. 26/
[12897]It is interesting to observe that Nixon became
[12899]more philosophical about the impact of the final TV
[12901]- 271 -
[12903]TOP SECRET
[12907]TOP SECRET
[12909]debate with regard to the outcome of the 1960 elec-
[12910]tion as time passed. In 1964 he would write "Most
[12911]observers agree that our positions on the Cuban
[12913]issue could well have been the decisive factor [in
[12915]‘the’ outcome of the election]." But in his recent
[12917]memoirs he expressed doubt that any single factor
[12918]in such a close election could really have changed
[12919]the outcome. * 27/ |
[12921]Following the TV debate+in which Kennedy had
[12922]raised the issue of assistance for Cuba, Nixon quickly
[12923]lashed back at Kennedy. The result of the introduc-
[12925]tion of the Cuban issue into the late stages of the
[12927]* In an interesting conversation with Fawn M. Brodie
[12928]who is writing a Nixon biography, the author of this
[12929]history, in response to Brodie's concern about the
[12930]fact that Nixon knowingly lied to the American public,
[12931]emphasized that plausible deniability was of real con-
[12932]cern at the time. of the TV debate. He also emphasized
[12933]the Catch-22 aspect of the situation as explained by
[12934]Nixon. The author also suggested to Mrs. Brodie that
[12935]it seemed equally valid to infer that perhaps Kennedy
[12936]had been leaked detailed information about the anti-
[12937]Castro program and that he used this device to put
[12938]Nixon in a corner during the TV debate. Arthur Schles-
[12939]inger, of course, claimed that the Kennedy comments
[12941]“ “were no more than a rhetorical flourish. Neither
[12943]Kennedy nor his staff knew about the secret Cuban Army
[12944]in Guatemala." 28/
[12946]~ 272 -
[12948]TOP SECRET
[12952]TOP SECRET
[12954]election campaign, struck sensitive nerves within
[12955]the Agency; and on 26 October 1960, General Cabell
[12956]met with Gordon Gray, President Eisenhower's National
[12957]Security Adviser, indicating that the discussion and
[12958]debate about Cuban issues were touching on
[12960]areas which, in the end, might be damaging to the
[12961]nation's interest. On 27 October at the Special
[12962]Group meeting, Mr. Gray reported that he had talked
[12963]to “certain Nixon people in the White House" in an
[12964]attempt to enlist their support to bring such dis- -
[12965]cussions to an end. 29/
[12967]It was not until.18 November 1960 that Presi-
[12968]dent-elect John F. Kennedy was fully briefed by Direc-
[12969]tor of Central Intelligence, Allen Dulles, and the
[12970]Deputy Director for Plans, Richard Bissell, on the
[12971]extent of the anti-Castro activities being planned
[12972]by the United States Government. 30/ Mr. Nixon's
[12973]misconception of the extent of the briefing that
[12974]Kennedy had received in the pre-election period was
[12975]not finally clarified however, until 20 March 1962
[12976]when Allen Dulles addressed a memorandum to John A.
[12977]McCone, his successor as Director of Central Intelli-
[12979]gence, stating as follows:
[12980]'- 273 -
[12982]TOP SECRET
[12984]13-00000 .
[12986]TOP SECRET
[12988]I have read the portions of Mr.
[12989]Nixon's book with regard to the intel-
[12990]ligence briefings which he understood
[12991]Senator Kennedy had been given by me
[12992]with respect to Cuba during the campaign.
[12993]I have also seen the White House state-
[12994]ment issued today on this subject.
[12996]There has been here, I believe, an
[12997]honest misunderstanding. This was
[12998]probably due to the nature of the mes-—
[12999].Sage Mr. Nixon writes he received as to
[13000]these briefings. The Cuban situation
[13001]was, of course, dealt with in the .
[13002]briefings I gave to Senator: Kennedy.
[13003]The last briefing I gave him was over a
[13004]month before the debate,in which the
[13005]issue arose. ,
[13007]My briefings were intelligence brief-
[13009]ings on the world situation. They did
[13011]not cover our own Government's plans or
[13013]programs for action -- overt or covert. 31/
[13014]As previously noted, however, by 1964, if not earlier,
[13015]Mr. Nixon had accepted the fact that he had made an
[13016]error in assuming that Kennedy. had received a more
[13017]detailed briefing than in fact he truly had.
[13019]By way of concluding this segment on Richard
[13021]x
[13023]Nixon's involvement in the Bay of Pigs activity, it
[13025]should be clear that by no stretch of the imagination
[13027]was Nixon "the architect of the Bay of Pigs."* 32/
[13029]* A statement made to DCI Stansfield Turner by Fawn
[13030]Brodie who attributed it to Tom Braden, an old CIA man,
[13031]in.a TV documentary on the CIA made by the Canadian
[13032]Broadcasting Corporation. .
[13034]~ 274 -
[13035]TOP SECRET
[13037]13-00000 .
[13039]TOP SECRET
[13041]It is equally clear that Mr. Nixon, principally
[13042]through his aide, General Robert E. Cushman, Jr.,
[13043]was fully read into the plans that were being
[13044]developed by the Central Intelligence Agency for
[13045]the ouster of Fidel Castro. This interest was
[13046]especially strong in the period from the winter of
[13047]1960 through the late summer of 1960. It also
[13048]should be apparent to the reader that while some
[13049]of the Vice President's interést -- particularly
[13050]in his insistence on placating William Pawley,
[13051]especially in giving undue attention to Pawley's
[13052]concerns that the Agency-sponsored Cuban~exile
[13053]organization was being taken over by the pro-Com-
[13054]munist groups -- was politically motivated, his
[13055]basic concern was the fear of the establishment
[13056]of a communist government in the Western Hemis-
[13057]phere. Certainly his constant interest and offers
[13058]to provide help for the Agency in its relations
[13060]to other branches of the US Government fall into
[13061]the latter, rather than the former, category. The
[13063]unanswerable question, of course, is whether Cuban
[13065]Communism would play such a large role in international
[13067]- 275 -
[13069]TOP SECRET
[13071]13-00000
[13073]TOP SECRET
[13075]affairs in 1979, particularly in the third world
[13076]countries, if Richard Nixon had been elected Presi-
[13078]dent in 1960.* |
[13082]* Indicative of the more forceful role that Nixon
[13083]would have had the US play was the comment that he
[13084]reportedly made to William Pawley several weeks be-
[13085]fore the 1960 election, when Nixon indicated that he
[13086]favored breaking relations. with Cuba -- at that time |
[13087]-- recognizing a Government-in-exile, and then assist-
[13088]ing that: Government in its efforts to oust Castro. .33/
[13090]_- 276 -
[13092]TOP SECRET
[13094]13-00000
[13096]TOP SECRET
[13098]Part VII
[13100]The Question of Assassinations
[13102]In his testimony before the Senate Select Com-
[13103]mittee to Study Governmental Operations, Intelligence
[13104]Activities, Richard M. Bissell, formerly CIA's Deputy
[13105]Director for Plans, testified fully and completely
[13106]to the role that he, Sheffield Edwards, and William
[13107]Harvey played in negotiations with Robert Maheu and
[13108]Mafia figures John Rosselli and Momo Salvatore Giancana
[13109]on plans for the assassination of Fidel Castro. In
[13110]addition to the. individuals just named, it also appears.
[13111]highly probable that Allen Dulles, the Director of
[13112]Central Intelligence (ana possibly both Presidents
[13114]Eisenhower and Kennedy) was aware that Castro was an
[13115]assassination. target. Unfortunately the Senate Com--
[13116]mittee Report -and the media. coverage of the investi-
[13117]gation of the Central Intelligence Agency's partici-
[13118]pation in assassination plots made it appear that the
[13119]Mafia involvement was a fundamental paxt of the Agency's
[13120]response to President Eisenhower's March 1960 authori-
[13121]zation for CIA to be principally responsible for the
[13123]ouster of Fidel Castro. In fact, the activities of
[13125]~ 277 -
[13127]TOP SECRET
[13129]13-00000
[13131]TOP SECRET
[13133]Messrs. Bissell, Edwards, and Harvey, with Maheu and
[13135]the Mafia remained strictly compartmented and isolated
[13136]from the officially authorized Project JMARC -- the
[13137]Project which came to be known as the Bay of Pigs
[13138]operation. Bissell himself stated:
[13140]I don't remember. I have no recollec-
[13141]tion that [there was] any specific other
[13142]plot against Castro during this period
[13143]when the Bay of Pigs operation was in
[13144]preparation. I do remember my own feel-
[13145]ing that the Mafia plot had a very modest
[13146]chance for success, and that it was not
[13147]something to be depended*.on in any way.
[13149]I don't remember others. 1/
[13151]Bissell also told the author of this history that:
[13153]Shef [Col. Sheffield Edwards, Director,
[13154]Office of Security] would occasionally let
[13155]me know what was going on [vis-a-vis the
[13156]Mafia]. In effect, he and his immediate
[13157]subordinate were case officers for that
[13158]activity; and I don't think anybody else
[13159]{was] involved. I think probably Tracy
[13160][Barnés] may have known about it, but I
[13161]don't think anybody else involved with the
[13162]Bay of Pigs operation knew anything about
[13163]it, whatever. My recollection is that it
[13164]never went to the Special Group, and that
[13165]is the view of [McGeorge] Bundy.* 2/
[13167]* Interestingly enough, at the same time that Col.
[13168]‘Edwards was concerned about the elimination of Castro,
[13170]CIA's Deputy Director for Support, Col. L. K. White,
[13172]noted:
[13174]. Shef Edwards and I met with General
[13175]Cabell and Jack Earman [on 22 March 1961]
[13176]to point out to them that we were not
[13177](footnote continued on following page)
[13179]- 278 -
[13181]TOP SECRET
[13183]13-00000
[13185]TOP SECRET
[13187]Jacob D. Esterline, who was Chief, WH/4, the
[13188]component of Western Hemisphere Division specifically
[13189]created to run the anti-Castro project, disclaimed
[13190]either responsibility or knowledgeability about the
[13191]Mafia connection.* 4/ Richard D. Drain, who became
[13193]Chief of Operations for WH/4 was more voluble on the
[13194]‘subject of the assassination attempts which were re-
[13195]ported by the Senate Select Committee . In an inter-
[13196]view which touched, among other things on the planned
[13197]assassination of Castro by the Mafia-types Drain com-
[13199]_ mented:
[13201]furnishing. the Director the personal
[13202]protection which. we should be furnish-
[13203]ing in these critical times, particu-
[13204]larly with regard to the dangers inherent
[13205]in the Cuban situation. General Cabell
[13206]agreed to talk with the Director about
[13207]this, and to try to obtain his approval
[13208]to increasé Mr. Tighe's force to six
[13209]people. 3/ —
[13211]* Esterline claimed that on one occasion as Chief,
[13212]WH/4 he refused. to grant Col. J. C. King, Chief, WH
[13213]Division, a blank check when King refused to tell
[13214]Jake the purpose for which the check was intended.
[13215]Esterline reported that King nonetheless got a FAN
[13216]number from the Office of Finance and that the money
[13217]was used to pay the Mafia-types. It was subsequent
[13218]to the Bay of Pigs operation when he found owt about
[13219]this, and Esterline told the author of this history
[13220]that he expressed his strong opposition to the fund-
[13221]ing of such activities to J. C. King. 5/
[13223]- 279 -
[13225]TOP SECRET
[13227]13-00000
[13229]TOP SECRET
[13231]I've been giving you lessons here about
[13232][how] a COPS should know a little about
[13233]everything ... Well, I promise you, until
[13234]it. came out in 1975, this allegation, at
[13235]least, that Shef Edwards and Mr. Maheu
[13236]were working with the Mafia to assassinate
[13237]Castro, concurrent. with the Bay of Pigs
[13238]Operation, that is the first time I ever
[13239]heard about it. Ever! ... My thought, when
[13240]I saw this, was Jesus Christ, I must have
[13241]been a little over-compartmented, because
[13242]we had spent a considerable amount of
[13243]nervous energy figuring out how are we
[13244]going to get a shot at the old son-of-a-
[13245]bitch concurrent with the landing. If
[13246]anybody with whom I participated in
[13247]planning for that ... something that we
[13248]never had figured out how to do, because
[13249]so many of our agents went down just prior
[13250]to the invasion. If anybody that was in-
[13251]volved in that ever spoke a word about any
[13252]other exercise going on to get Castro, I
[13253]never heard it; and-my initial reaction
[13254]when all this came out, during this last
[13255]year was ... well ... why did they give
[13256]me the idiot treatment? . Then it occurred
[13257]to me that maybe there was very good reason
[13258]for me not to know. You don't need to
[13259]know ... compartmentation ... even from
[13260]COPS is not unheard of ...
[13262]Well, mind: you, I am not saying what
[13263]I've just said in any kind of pique; and
[13264]I certainly don't want to leave you -- or
[13265]this tape recorder -- with the impression
[13266]that had I known about this, I would have
[13267]been opposed... I must say, I don't think
[13268]I would have enjoyed the instrument very
[13269]much -- whereas we put out an awful lot
[13270]of bullshit to the Cubans about the res-
[13271]toration of democracy and all that. Those
[13272]Cubans, that were working with us were not,
[13273]I submit, working for the re-establishment
[13275]of the Mafia as a controlling factor in
[13277]Havana. I had a helluva lot rather, in
[13279]- 280 -
[13281]TOP SECRET
[13283]13-00000
[13285]TOP SECRET
[13287]contemplating the assassination of Castro,
[13288]contemplated in the way that we were con-
[13289]templating it -- that is, can we get a
[13290]‘Rip Robertson close to him? Can we get
[13292]a really hairy Cuban -- I. mean a gutsy
[13293]Cuban -- to be infiltrated with this one
[13294]thing in mind? We surveyed all of our
[13295]agent material to see who could take a
[13296]shot at him, but the assassination of
[13297]that charismatic guy, coincidental -with
[13298]the invasion, would have been a highly
[13299]desirable thing. Whether the instrument
[13300]to be picked should have included the.
[13301]Mafia, I think I might have questioned at
[13302]the time. It was part of my job ... to
[13303]ask, “Now wait a minute ... What are we
[13304]doing here? ....If this comes out ...
[13305]what will we look like?™. Not only to our-
[13306]selves, which is important, but'to the
[13307]Cubans." 6/
[13309]In light of Drain's comments about the desira-
[13310]bility of having the good guys in the white hats elim- -
[13311]inate Castro, rather than the Mafia guys in the black
[13312]hats, a specific attempt was made to see what the
[13313]official records revealed about such plans. Although
[13315]XN
[13317]far from satisfactory or complete, there is evidence
[13319]4
[13321]to indicate that the white-hatted guys would have had
[13323]no objection -~- as reported by Mr. Drain -- if a suc-
[13325]cessful assassination attempt could have been made.
[13327]Contrary to General Cabell's reported put down of
[13329]Assistant Secretary of State Livingston Merchant for
[13331]' Merchant's query about the possibilities of taking
[13333]- 281 -
[13335]TOP SECRET
[13337]13-00000
[13339]TOP-SECRET
[13341]“direct positive action" against the Castro brothers
[13342]and Che Guevara, WH/4 : records reveal interest, and
[13343]possibly Limited, direct participation, in a number
[13344]of such activities. *
[13346]~ For the most part, however, the various pieces
[13347]of evidence that seemed ‘to implicate WH/4 in assas-
[13348]sination plots against Castro or other of the Cuban
[13349]leaders. proved to be cold trails. The peripatetic
[13350]Howard Hunt claimed, even prior to the Senate inves-
[13351]tigations, that after a visit to Havana in the spring
[13352]of 1960, he prepared a report recommending among other
[13353]things that the Agency should:
[13355]Assassinate Castro before or coincident
[13356]with the invasion (a task. for Cuban patri-
[13357]ots) ... Barnes and Bissell read my report
[13358]--. and said it would weigh in the final
[13359]planning ... So far as I have been able
[13360]to determine no coherent plan was ever
[13361]developed within CIA to assassinate
[13364]* As the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence,
[13365]Cabell. pointed out to Mr. Merchant that such action
[13366]was highly dangerous both in conception and execution,
[13367]and, further, he indicated that it was beyond the
[13368]Agency's capability. 7/ The Senate Select Committee
[13369]chased its tail at some length over the interpretation
[13370]of the ‘term “direct positive action," as used by
[13371]Merchant. Only someone (even a Senator) who consist-
[13372]ently engaged and in omphaloskepsis would have a ;
[13373]problem understanding the meaning to ‘be anything other
[13374]‘than assassination.
[13376]- 282 -
[13378]TOP SECRET
[13380]13-00000
[13382]TOP SECRET
[13384]Castro, but it was the heart's desire of
[13385]many exile groups.* 8/
[13387]In another instance, it appeared possible that an
[13388]agent named Rivero, a Cuban exile, might have been in
[13389]training to make an assassination attempt because it was
[13390]reported that he
[13392]was taken to the Warrington [ste], Virginia
[13393]firing range. where he was checked out in
[13394]the use of the Special .38 Airweight semi-
[13395]hammerless pistol; British Welrod pistol,
[13396]single shot, a 9mm parabellum with silencer;
[13397]carbine with folding stock; and a 7.65mm
[13398]British Welrod with silencer. He is to be
[13399]also checked out this week in the use of a
[13400]sporting rifle with telescopic lens attach-
[13401]ment. oo, ;
[13403]It was revealed subsequently that upon his reinfiltration
[13404]into Havana, Rivero had two principal sabotage missions --
[13405]one against the Esso; refinery and the other aimed at the
[13406]Havana Electric Company. 9/
[13408]In mid-July 1960, theré reportedly was an internal ©
[13409]Cuban attempt on Castro's life, an attempt in which neither
[13410]WH/4 nor the Mafia played a part. A cable from Santiago
[13412]N
[13414]de: Cuba reported:.
[13416]* Hunt alleged that when he asked Barnes about the status
[13417]of his recommendation he was told that it was “in the hands
[13418]of a special group." Jake Esterline and Jim Flannery
[13419](Executive Officer of the DDP at the time of the Bay of
[13420]Pigs) both disclaimed knowledge of any memorandum prepared
[13421]by Hunt. A search of WH/4 records failed to surface any
[13422]such report.
[13424]- 283 -
[13426]TOP SECRET
[13428]13-00000
[13430]TOP SECRET
[13432]‘On 15 July 1960, the Cuban Government un-
[13433]covered a plot to kill Prime Minister Fidel
[13434]Castro Ruz on 26 July 1960 during his visit
[13435]to Mina del Frio, an army camp in the Sierra
[13436]Maestra mountains, between Bayamo and Manza-
[13437]nillo in Oriente Province. Three captains
[13438]‘and approximately 100 soldiers had been ar-
[13439]rested and more arrests are expected. 10/
[13441]In addition to Richard Bissell and Dick Drain, Jake
[13443]Esterline the Chief of Project JMATE was also very emphatic
[13445]. in denying that assassination of Castro or the Cuban lead-
[13447]ers waS a part of the JMATE Program. In response to a
[13448]question of whether various of the special arms that were
[13449]being forwarded to the PM training sites were intended for
[13451]use against the Cuban leadership, Esterline responded:
[13453]No, I think it [silenced weapons in par-
[13454]ticular] is for hit and run operations, where
[13455]they could do their maximum damage and get
[13456]out without necessarily alerting people ...
[13458]I know of no -- within JMARC as I knew it --
[13460]I know of no attempt, no plans that were made
[13461]to assassinate. As a matter of fact, the
[13462]constant battle with Cubans during those
[13464]years ‘was to tell them that we weren't
[13466]going to get involved in any assassination,
[13467]that if there was going to be an overthrow,
[13469]it was going to be, obviously, a bloody op-
[13470]eration; but no Cubans were going to be ©
[13472]Sent in there, to "make an assassination attempt."
[13473]It was. going to be a ground-roots revolution.* 11/
[13475]Some contradictory evidence, however, indicates
[13477]that WH/4, if not principally responsible, was certainly
[13479]* It is known that at least one assassination plot
[13480]against Castro and his advisers -- an attack by four men
[13481]using US rifle-grenades -~ was proposed by anti-Castro
[13482]Cubans to COS Havana, but the COS gave the originator of
[13483]the plan “no encouragement whatsoever." lla/
[13485]os 284 -
[13486]TOP SECRET
[13488]13-00000
[13490]TOP SECRET
[13492]aware of some sort of planned assassination activity.
[13493]One of the principals of WH/4 recorded that on 24 Feb-
[13494]ruary 1961 he:
[13496]_ Asked Ed [Stanulis], Dave P{hillips],
[13498]{Ed] Hinkle, [Bob] Moore, and Jake [Ester-
[13500]‘Line] why not proceed with Operation
[13502]“AMHINT to set up a program of assassina-
[13506]Although the author of that remark was Chief of
[13507]Operations for Project JMATE, he was unaware, as re-
[13508]ported earlier in this chapter, of the Mafia connection;
[13510]el
[13511]but he had indicated that one of his hopes was that
[13512]the invasion might lead to the death of Castro.* In
[13513]response to a specific question about the AMHINT pro-
[13514]gram, all he could say was: -
[13515]I said that I was not failing to give
[13517]some attention to the business of assas-+
[13519]sination. Now, here on the 24th of Feb-'
[13521]ruary, when I asked Ed, Dave Phillips,
[13523]Hinkle, Moore, and Jake “why not proceed
[13525]with Operation AMHINT to set up a program
[13527]of assassination," either none of those
[13529]bastards knew anything about Sheffield
[13531]Edwards and Maheu in the Mafia ... or
[13533]some of them did, and didn't see fit to
[13535]say “Drain, take your AMHINT and stuff
[13536]- it. We've got this thing pretty well
[13538]* See pp. 279-281.
[13540]~ 285 -.
[13542]- TOP SECRET
[13544]13-00000
[13546]TOP SECRET.
[13548]‘covered." What I would love now [is] to
[13549]see an outline of AMHINT.* 13/
[13551]_ A few days after the reference to the AMHINT assas—
[13552]sination program, WH/4 Propaganda Notes contained the
[13553]following statement: “I [saminger] phoned following line
[13554]to Wilkinson from Swan: ... attempted assassination of
[13555]Guevara"; and Chief.Operations WH/4 made a cryptic note:
[13556]“CI and D watch Gueverra [ste] assassination attempt." 15/
[13557]When asked about the possibility that WH/4 was directly in-
[13558]volved in an attempt to assassinate Che Guevara, the former
[13559]Chief of Operations for the prBject wrote: |
[13561]My only memory of this is that we did not
[13562]plan a Che assassination, but must have gotten
[13563]intelligence that an attempt on him had been
[13564]tried, planned, discovered or speculated
[13565]on. 16/ . .
[13567]If one can assume that the statement "Ci and D watch
[13568]Gueverra [sic] assassination attempt" translates as "Counter-
[13570]Intelligence and Division D watch Guevara assassination
[13572].* The author of this history has unsuccessfully tried to
[13573]track down this particular project. AMHINT was related
[13574]to the work of the Directorio: Revolucionario Estudiantil
[13575](DRE), an anti-Castro organization inside Cuba. The only
[13576]evidence that has been found which might have been related
[13577]to an assassination attempt concerned an AMHINT request
[13578]of 14 January 1961 for “Silenciadores Rifles de marilla
[13579]telescopica." (A request for rifles with silencers and
[13580]telescopic sights.) This might have had to do with a DRE
[13581]plan to assassinate the Soviet Ambassador to Cuba rather
[13582]than a plan to kill Castro. When the FOB in Miami heard -
[13583]about the plan against the Soviet official they “immedi-°
[13584]' ately sent ... [word] to AMHINT-1 forbidding planned
[13586]‘atentado' [assassination] ." 14/
[13587]. — )
[13589]- 286 -
[13590]TOP SECRET
[13592]13-00000
[13594]TOP SECRET
[13596]attempt" then the comment from Chief of Operations appears
[13598]eminently sensible, for Counter-Intelligence and Division
[13599]D (which was responsible for intercept traffic) would be
[13600]the two most likely sources to pick up information should
[13601]an attempt be made on Guevara's life -- particularly since
[13602]such an item probably would not be reported overtly in the
[13603]Cuban press or radio. -
[13604]. One ‘final item which was surfaced during the course
[13605]of research concerning the possibility that WH/4 had >
[13606]actually included an assassination program as part of its
[13608]operational planning concerns a carbon copy identified
[13610]only as "Must Go List." The single sheet of unknown prov-
[13612]enance lists and identifies in the following order eleven —
[13616]Che Guevara - Minister of Industries
[13618]Raul Castro Ruz —- Chief of Cuban Armed
[13619]Forces, and wife, Vilma Espin de Castro
[13621]Blas Roca - International Communist leader
[13622]and Secretary General of Communist Party
[13624]Ramiro Valdez Menendez - Minister of
[13626]; Interior (G-2) :
[13628]Carlos Olivares - Deputy Foreign Minister
[13630]Carlos ‘Raphael Rodriguez - Communist leader,
[13631]editor of newspaper HOY
[13633]Lazaro Pena - Communist leader - labor
[13634]movement
[13636]Abelardo Colome. - Deputy in G-2
[13638]Captain Rogélio Acevedo - Chief of Militia
[13640]Anibal Escalante ~ Communist leader
[13642]Armendo Hart Davalos - Minister of Education,
[13643]and wife, Haydee Santamaria de Hart
[13645]Pencilled in on the bottom of the paper is a note:
[13646]"List forwarded E. L. by C/WH/4 in Nov [1960]."* When
[13647]* A copy of the list follows p. 287. The list should
[13648]read Armando, rather. than gpmende Hart.
[13650]TOP “SECRET
[13652]13-00000
[13654]TOP SECRET
[13656]asked if he could identify the "Must Go List" the
[13657]former Chief of WH/4 stated: ~
[13659]Weil, I know all these people ... Some
[13660]of them I know personally, like Armando
[13661]Hart ... I entertained Hart in my home a
[13662]number of times ... the miserable bastard.
[13663]I have never seen that list in my life,
[13664]but this is the whole top gang at that
[13665]time. Now many of them were later elimi-
[13666]nated from the power structure by Castro,
[13667]and by Raul Castro ... They got rid of
[13668]Olivares, and Roca was pushed aside ...
[13669]Armando Hart was also half nuts at this
[13670]point, and he still is. I guess he is
[13671]still fairly prominent,,but he is not
[13672]really in the power structure. Abelardo
[13673]Colome ~-- I don't even know who he is.
[13675]I wish to help you, but I don't know. 17/
[13677]The former Chief of Operations for WH/4, in re-
[13678]sponse to the question of whether the "Must Go List"
[13679]meant anything to him, replied as follows:
[13681]No! Huh! “List forwarded E. L. by
[13682]Chief WH/4" ... Eddie Lansdale ... E. L.
[13683]would be Eddie Lansdale. Chief, WH/4
[13684]was Jacob D. Esterline. In November, I
[13685]was. there ... No “Big Daddy.“ Well,
[13686]whether this "Must Go“ is in terms of
[13687]the assassination, or in terms ... [of]
[13688]nobody, none of these people must be
[13689]allowed to have a role in the new govern-
[13691]ment. I guess “Must Go" came to pass
[13692]eventually in the case of number one on |
[13693]this list, Che Guevara. Raul ... I myself,
[13694]contemplating the future government, thought
[13695]it might be interesting to try to keep
[13696]Raul in, with Fidel out. Capture what
[13697]magic there was in the name of Castro,
[13698]but do it with that little homosexual,
[13699]instead of with Fidel, the real man. I
[13701]- 288 -
[13702]TOP SECRET |
[13704]13-00000
[13706]TOP SECRET
[13708]don't even know the rest of these guys --
[13709]_ Hart, Escalante, etc. 18/
[13711]By way of summarizing, it would appear that CIA's
[13712]official anti-Castro program as reflected in Project
[13713]JMATE did not include assassination as an integral
[13714]part of its operational planning, but would not have
[13715]been averse to eliminating Castro or other of the.
[13716]Cuban leaders if the opportunity had been afforded.
[13717]Based on records, however, WH/4's principals were in
[13718]no way privy to, or participants in, the Mafia assas-
[13720]ination planning at the time of the Bay of Pigs.
[13722]- 289 -
[13724]TOP SECRET
[13726]13-00000
[13728]TOP SECRET
[13730]Part VIIL .
[13732]_ Conclusions
[13734]This volume has traced the history of the CIA's
[13735]official anti-Castro program from its inception in
[13736]1959 through the end of the Eisenhower administration
[13737]in January of 1961. It emphasized that in the initial
[13738]period when Castro's revolution was taking place, the
[13739]Agency, reflecting the policies of the US Government,
[13740]was caught betwixt and between -- to move with Castro
[13741]or to move against Castro. Shortly following his take-
[13742]over, it became cleax that Castro had little or no in-—
[13743]tention -- nor apparently concern -- for establishing
[13744]cordial relations with the “Colossus of the North."
[13746]Instead, he turned to the Soviet Union and its allies
[13748]x
[13750]for military, technical, and economic assistance. It
[13751]- became clear that a new philosophy was being intro-.
[13752]duced into the Caribbean basin and‘that this philosophy
[13753]was directly contrary to the interests of the United
[13754]States Government and to the governments of many of
[13755]the Latin American nations, whether democratically
[13757]governed or governed by dictatorships of the right.
[13759]- 290 -
[13761]TOP SECRET
[13763]13-00000
[13765]TOP SECRET
[13767]As Castro's threats -became more serious, and
[13769]as increasing pressures were put on legitimate eco-
[13770]nomic interests’ of the United States in Cuba, pressures
[13771]within the United States Government led to a decision
[13773]that Castro must go. . With great concern about the
[13775]impact any overt, anti-Castro activities by the
[13777]United States Government would have on the United -
[13778]Nations and on the Organization of American States,
[13780]it was decided that a covert plan of action would be
[13781]adopted. This was the officially sanctioned program
[13782]approved by President Eisenhower on 17 March of 1960.
[13783]It broadly outlined the political, economic, propaganda,
[13784]and paramilitary programs which would be implemented
[13786]in an attempt to oust Fidel Castro. CIA was j}to be
[13788]the principal action agent for the bulk of the program.
[13790]Once the official US position was announced,
[13792]CIA made organizational plans to carry out the policy.
[13793]A separate Task’ Force within the Western Hemisphere
[13794]Division was established under the leadership of Jacob
[13795]D. Esterline, on whose shoulder Col. J. C. King, Chief,
[13796]. Western Hemisphere Division perched and peered. Initial
[13797]concepts of the Central Intelligence Agency called
[13799]for a propaganda program to be run out of a radio
[13801]- 291 -.
[13802]TOP SECRET
[13804]13-00000
[13806]TOP SECRET
[13808]station based on Swan Island and by Agency financed
[13809]radio operations out of Station WRUL in New York City.
[13810]Strong support was to be provided for anti-Castro
[13811]publications launched in the area of Miami. Para-
[13812]military programs initially called for the training
[13813]of cadres of communicators and paramilitary instructors
[13814]who would go into Cuba and provide leadership and .
[13815]training for the numerous dissident elements that
[13816]reportedly were ready to move against Castro.
[13819]‘as the summer of 1960
[13821]Unfortunately, however,
[13822]drew to a close, it became apparent that Castro's
[13823]military strength and training programs were sharply ..
[13824]improving.and that the initial plan to infiltrate
[13825]small teams to organize the dissidents no longer was
[13826]feasible. Consequently, the concept changed to one
[13827]of.a landing in force, the acquisition ofa defensible
[13829]base in Cuba from which a Provisional Government might
[13831]call for assistance from the United States Government
[13832]if the invaders themselves could not arouse sufficient
[13833]support to force the overthrow of Castro.
[13835]This volume emphasized that following his decision
[13837]in March 1960 that there should be an anti-Castro pro-
[13839]gram, President Eisenhower remained quiescent on the
[13841]= 292 -
[13843]! a TOP SECRET
[13845]13-00000
[13847]TOP SECRET
[13849]question of developments of the anti-Castro program
[13850]until late in the fall, following the election of 1960
[13851]and the defeat of Mr. Nixon. At that tiime Mr. Eisen-
[13852]hower reinjected himself into the program and stimulated
[13853]action to the point where some of CIA's planners hoped
[13854]that -- in addition to the propaganda program which was
[13856]already underway -~ paramilitary operations might be
[13858]‘initiated. Apparently this was feared by Castro,
[13860]too, for in his famous TV broadcast on the Bay of Pigs
[13861]he said: ,
[13863]. When our country was in danger of
[13864]direct aggression and mobilized itself,
[13865]it waited for the [Kennedy] presidential
[13866]inauguration thinking that this man
[13867][Kennedy] would do something different,
[13868]because all in all, we didn't understand
[13869]why a man who assumed the administration
[13870]of the United States would want to bear
[13871]the guilt of someone else's mistakes.* l/
[13873]This was not to be, however, for aside from considerable
[13874]emphasis on the propaganda activity, there was only
[13876]limited support for sabotage activities prior to the
[13878]* Raul Roa, Castro's Foreign Minister charged that
[13880]-.in the Eisenhower administration Vice President Nixon
[13882]and General C. P. Cabell, ADCI, were two of the most
[13883]vigorous proponents of direct action, with Cabell
[13884]proposing air and naval protection for the invasion
[13885]and, if necessary, use of US marines to hold the
[13886]beachhead. 2/ ;
[13888]- 293 -
[13890]TOP SECRET
[13892]13-00000
[13894]TOP SECRET
[13896]end of Eisenhower's administration. There was con-
[13897]siderable concern over the necessary formalities of
[13898]diplomacy in order that the United States not be in-
[13899]volved in investigations by either the UN or the OAS
[13900]for its anti-Castro program.
[13902]Because it has been so widely publicized that
[13903]ex-Vice President Richard Nixon was one of the prin-
[13904]cipals in planning the Bay of Pigs Operation, this
[13905]volume has attempted to put the role that Nixon
[13907]played into the proper context®. It was the role of
[13909]an interested senior officer in the Executive Branch, |
[13911]and by no stretch of the imagination could Nixon's
[13912]role be construed to have had a major impact on the
[13913]development of operational planning by the Central
[13914]Intelligence Agency in its anti-Castro effort.
[13916]. Similarly, because of the sensationalism which
[13917]surrounded the Senate Select Committee's report on
[13918]Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders,
[13919]including Fidel Castro and the implications that the Mafia
[13920]plot was a part of the authorized planning for the Bay.
[13922]of Pigs Operation, thorough examination of the evidence
[13924]was undertaken to determine if this allegation was sup-
[13926]‘portable. It was not. ‘The Mafia operation was run
[13928]- 294 -
[13930]TOP SECRET
[13932]13-00000
[13934]TOP SECRET
[13936]aside from, apart from, and independent of the formal
[13937]anti-Castro program which was undertaken by CIA. At
[13938]most, four or five senior officials -- Allen Dulles,
[13939]Richard Bissell, Shef Edwards, Bill Harvey, and pos-
[13940]sibly, Tracy Barnes -- probably were knowledgeable
[13941]about the Mafia connection and Mr. Maheu.
[13943]In terms of Project JMATE itself, the .few bits
[13947]of information which indicate the possibility of as-
[13948]sassination attempts against the Cuban leadership also
[13949]fail to demonstrate any respongibility for their ini-~
[13950]tiation on the part of WH/4. ‘If anything, the evidence
[13951]would indicate. that WH/4's position was one of watchful
[13952]waiting and wishful thinking that dissident Cubans
[13953]would themselves eliminate the Castros and Che Guevara.
[13955]‘The possibility, of course, that Agency-supplied weapons
[13956]might be involved in such an attempt ‘cannot be ruled
[13957]out. 3/ |
[13959]Obviously it would be foolish to contend that
[13961]those principally responsible for developing CIA's
[13963]' anti-Castro program would have objectéd to the assas-
[13964]sination of Fidel Castro. On the other hand, this |
[13965]was not one of the basic concepts nor intentions of |
[13967]the official program of the Central Intelligence Agency.:
[13969]= 295 -
[13971]TOP SECRET
[13973]k
[13975]13-00000
[13977]Appendix A
[13979]Memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence
[13981]from J. C. King, 11 Dec 59
[13983]13-00000
[13985]wees EY sry . 4 NTERN? : . , a nrivsos en
[13986]Ci uNcassiniep 2 tsp iy — OF conripgniian. (secrete,
[13988]ve tN pec —- resale
[13989]RWUTING AND RECORD SHEET
[13993]Pa eh nretet na sant ete
[13998]DATE |
[13999]ee . _ UL Desemier 2959
[14001]TO: (omen <ssignation, 26m number, ond
[14003]j Suilding)
[14005]COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from when
[14006]fo whom. raw a fine across column ‘after each comment.)
[14008]: purer veer
[14009]de eam atte A pe bans. ded shen AE | Rehan Oy AO a Anche ARN ct ANA aN | nen DARI oli to an EAs itl mle ti Ad A AARON BRO ae Carman 0 sae amen amma aemmemmmcsencattetanaiene! dbo the ate
[14010]. s
[14013]: 01 TE
[14014]—_- a
[14018]- |
[14020]a
[14022]£70 Use paw er. ieee ~ {NTERMAL nit
[14023]se DL amass” TO] SECRET a CONF IDF AU ti INTE “OMY: a URC. ASSIFIED
[14025]13-00000
[14027]Li Becentomer 1
[14029]KA)
[14030]WH
[14031]re
[14033]i
[14035]TEMORANLO #OR: Director of Central Intelits
[14037]VIA: Deywty Director (Plans)
[14038]GUBSECT: Cuben Problems.
[14040]This menorsadun = requests aporoval by the Diracttor oc? the xeccruen-
[14041]C2tions cowtatned in paragraph 3.
[14043]-
[14045]i. Nstimate of the Situation.
[14047]a. A Getatorshin of the far LePt ls nov astablisnmad. Tt
[14048]is’ not only unfriendly to the United Stctea in oral eriticisa, but
[14050]has ta: sen acticn against Aneris an properties, both industrial and
[14051]agricultural, which, ii perubtbted to stead, will encmurage siailac
[14053]acti ons azainst U.S. noldiags in other Latin American countriss.
[14056]b. Wedo and must expect 3 wajor increase in the scale nd
[14058]effectiraness of Cuban aid and parti elpation in revolutionary .
[14059]achiors against other countries o? Latin A wnerica now Crisndly to
[14060]the United States. Tn addition to Vaose hat ‘have already been
[14061]tergets - Micarsima, Paneme, the Damwitican Resubliic ond Haiti,
[14062]recon’ Entei cgence indicates 2 Girect interest by Cestre in ..
[14064]Coloweia and P. . Betancourt's positior in Venemele would he
[14065]gravely weakened by Caatro succeshas, and 1% is believed crly a
[14066]quaustion of tine before an allience would be eatadLi shed betreen
[14067]the poverful Commmist Party of Venemtela and the Castros. —
[14069]Ce Rapid naticralization of the banks 3 industisy and commerce
[14070]is reportedly contemplated. If this occurs, the stials group in
[14071]control vill have 2t its disposition several hndred willion dollars
[14072]froa the sale of the sugar crop early is 1960. Part of these 2nnds
[14073]may ba sed to further their revolutiorery onjactives against other
[14075]nounbrle 28 sof the Caribbean and South América. ;
[14077]a
[14079]ad. Castro naa lost the sw aggort or the wover class acd most of
[14081]nijale class, | Tie » prebai) ¥ still bas a sufficient following fron
[14084]the nasuas to maintain control util Yurther iproads can be mada in
[14085]Bis vomilar support t ead the uppoaition nots effectively unifisd.
[14087]& _Propagsnda sekion toa reduce nis f follovicz, wails easential,
[14088]in ies212 will probably rot be eongh to dislodge Win. His eusroacking
[14090]strane isola on Cuba will be broken only oy violent netion.
[14092]£. it is ay versonsl coinion taet if Castro is sucesss2ul in
[14093]consciidating his position and remaining in power for two mors years,
[14097]13-00000
[14100]fiomtss aver uwsswaption oY office.
[14102]lusting damage may occur to the United States' alrsudy weskenad
[14103]position of leadership in Latin Americs.
[14105]&. U.S. Objective.
[14106]= overtharoy of Castro within cre year, and his repiscerent dy a
[14108]friendy to the United States which will call tor elections six
[14110]Prd
[14115]cries
[14118]a
[14120]& Clandestine radio attacks trom Caribrean countries ov
[14122]Aiberal group, working closely with us and ‘using Cuban netionels for
[14124]broadcasting.
[14126]Dd. nerusioa overations agsinst Castro's {V7 and radio, to
[14127]be mounted from within Cuba
[14129]c. She encouragement of proJ-S. cpposition gromps, exc}uding
[14130]Bytiste anl Mesferrer supporters, to establisn by fords 2 contreiied
[14131]area within Cuda. This would have the following advantages:
[14133](1) It wousd cermit che establismmeat of a radio stetion,
[14134]long yave, woich would reach wll of tha acations in Cuba.
[14136]Since it would be on Cuban soil, the problans o2. Joint
[14138]tions with other covatries would be elimina tad.
[14140](2} A controlled area would ve a walltying point for
[14141]the growing opoosition to Cautro in the same senner that tt
[14142]25th of July movement in the hills of Oriente became the
[14144]vallying point of ueny who turned against Batista.
[14146](3) ret would be a mesns of t2 esting the strength a nd. Libre
[14147]or th» opposition, and separating the men trom the boys. ,
[14149](4) The reportedly Large fe Pregemented 2 ecents of the
[14150]constitutional Cuben Aray would neve a > lace | to go.
[14152](5) A sizeable guerrilla moverenat within Cuda would
[14153]eurtall Castro's plans for revoictionary action against
[14154]cthar countries. : ..
[14155]. iy et amelie
[14156]ad. Whorough consideration 2 elimination tor Pidel
[14157]Castro. Hone of those chase to Tidal, w such as his brother Rent
[14159]298
[14161]13-00000
[14163]er his cameenion Che Guevarra, haye the se
[14164]tne masses. Many informed people believe ah tna diss
[14165]of Side would greatly accelerate the 2sli oF the presect Govermrent.
[14167]hyo. King
[14168]. Cnie?, Jestexa) Tenisoners Division
[14170]the
[14171]para
[14173]Directer ox Genter moaliigence
[14175]. 2 a Weise fie
[14176]Tete ao
[14178]7
[14180]£.
[14182]299
[14184]13-00000
[14186]Appendix B
[14187]‘A Program of Covert Action
[14188]Against the Castro Regime
[14190]16 Mar 60
[14192]13-00000
[14194]t.
[14196]i
[14198]a .
[14199]oe 7 -
[14201]FVES ORLY
[14203]SECRET
[14205]This document is our basic policy
[14206]paper. It was approved by the
[14207]President at a meeting in the
[14209]White House on 17 March 1960.
[14212]rms Fattt im)
[14213]Pues Pi y
[14214]gad rn Vita
[14215]QCARIT
[14216]Nyabtal
[14218]Stee ete A me ata mee a core
[14220]13-00000
[14222]16 March 1960.
[14224]A PROGRAM OF COVERT ACTION AGAINST THE CASTRO REGIME |
[14226]l. Objective: The purpose of the program outlined herein is to bring.
[14227]about the’ replacement of the Castro regime with one more devoted to the true
[14228]interests of the Cuban people and more acceptable to the U.S. in such a manner
[14229]as to avoid any appearance of U.S. intervention. Essentially the method of
[14230]accomplishing this end will be to.induce, support, and so far as possible direct
[14231]action, both inside and outside of Cuba, by selected groups of Cubans of a sort
[14232]that they might be expected to and could undertake on their own initiative. | —
[14233]Since a crisis inevitably entailing drastic action in or toward Cuba could be
[14234]provoked by circumstances beyond controi of the U.S. before the covert action
[14235]program has accomplished its objective, every effort will be made to carry it
[14236]out in such a way as progressively to improve the capability of the U. S. to
[14237]act in a-crisis.
[14239]2. Summary Outline: The program contemplates four major courses of
[14240]action:
[14242]a. The first requirement is the creation of a responsible, appealing
[14243]. and unified Cuban opposition to the Castro regime, publicly declared
[14244]as such and therefore necessarily located outside of Cuba. It is hoped
[14245]that within one month a political entity can be formed in the shape or
[14246]a council or junta, through the merger of three acceptable opposition
[14247]groups with which the Central Intelligence Agency is already in contact.
[14249]The council will be encouraged to adopt as its slogan "Restore the
[14251]Eyes Gay
[14252]ies Vall 301 |
[14253]eranrt
[14255]SS A SRS SAE SR A EL Oo
[14257]13-00000
[14259]> NBS OMY
[14260]SECRET
[14262]Revolution", to develop a political position consistent with that slogan,
[14263]and to address itself to the Cuban people as an attractive political
[14264]alternative to Castro. This vocal opposition will: serve as a magnet
[14265]for the loyalties of the Cubans; in actuality conduct and direct various
[14266]opposition activities; and provide cover for other compartmented CrIA
[14267]controlled operations. (Tab A)
[14269]b. So that the opposition may be heard and Castro's basis of
[14270]popular support undermined, it is necessary to develop the means ‘for
[14271]mass commiunication to the Cuban people so that a powerful propaganda
[14272]offensive can be initiated in the name of the declared opposition.
[14274]The major tool proposed to be used for this purpose is a long and short
[14276]wave gray. broadcasting facility, probably to be located on Swan Island.
[14278]‘The target date for its completion is two months. This will be supple-
[14280]mented by broadcasting from U.S. commercial facilities paid for by
[14281]private Cuban groups and by the clandestine distribution of written
[14282]material inside the country. (Tab B)
[14284]c. Work is already in progress in the creation of a covert
[14285]intelligence and action organization within Cuba which will be respon-
[14286]sive to the orders and directions of the “exile opposition. Such a,
[14287]network must have effective communication ard be selectively manned,
[14289]to minimize the risk of penetration. An effective organization caa
[14291]probably be created within 60 days. Its role will be to provide hard
[14293]YEO avy 302
[14294]Eves GAL =
[14295]oranrs
[14297]deeete me ne eect ene encanta RE ASO Ee A RE SS RENN fauna en gH &
[14299]13-00000
[14301]‘the Island. Initially’a cadre of leaders will be recruited after care-
[14303]ful screening and trained as paramilitary instructors. Ina second
[14305]mN
[14307]intelligence, to arrange for the illegal infiltration and exfiltration
[14308]of individuals, ‘to assist in the internal distribution of illegal
[14309]propaganda, and to plan and organize for the defection of key individuals |
[14310]and groups as directed.
[14311]| d. Preparations. have already been made for the development of
[14312]an adequate paramilitary force outside of Cuba, together with mechanisms
[14314]for the necessary logistic support of covert military operations on
[14316]phase a number of paramilitary cadres will be trained at secure locations
[14317]outside of the U.S. ‘so as to be available for immediate deployment into
[14318]Cuba to organize, train and lead resistance forces recruited there both
[14319]before and after the establishment of one or more active centers of
[14320]resistance. The creation of this capability will require a minimum of
[14321]six months and probably closer to eight. “In the meanwhile, a limited
[14322]air capability for resupply and tor infiltration and exfiltration already
[14323]exists under CIA control and can be rather easily expanded if and when
[14324]the situation requires. Within two months it is hoped to parallel this.
[14325]with a.small air resupply capability under deep cover as a commercial
[14326]operation in another country.
[14328]3. Leadershio: It is important to avoid distracting and deévisive rivalry
[14330]among the outstanding Cuban opposition leaders for the senior role in the
[14333]13-00000
[14335]EYES QULY °
[14336]SERED
[14338]opposition. Accordingly, every effort wili be made.to have an eminent,
[14339]non-ambitious, politically uncontentious chairman selected. The emergence
[14340]of a successor to Castro should follow careful assessment of the various
[14341]personalities active in the opposition to identify the one who can attract,
[14342]control, and lead the several forces.. As the possibility of an overthrow of
[14343]_ Castro becomes. more imminent, the senior leader must be selected, U.S.
[14344]support focused upon him, and his build up undertaken,
[14346]4, Cover: All actions undertaken by CIA in support and on behalf of
[14348]1
[14350]‘the opposition council will, of course, be explained as activities of that entity
[14351]{insofar as the actions become publicly lmown at all). . The CIA will, nowever,
[14352]_ have to nave direct contacts with a certain number of Cubans and, to protect
[14353]these, will make use of a carefully screened group of U.S. businessmen with
[14354]a stated interest in Cuban affairs.and-desire to support the opposition, They
[14355]will act as a funding mechanism and channel for guidance and support to the
[14357]irectorate of the opposition under controlled conditions. CLA personnel will
[14358]be documented as representatives of this group. In order to strengthen the
[14359]cover it is hoped that substantial funds can be raised from private sources to
[14360]| Swpport the opposition. $100, 000 has already been pledged from U.S. sources.
[14361]At an appropriate time 2 bond issue will be floated by the council (as an
[14362]obligation on a future Cuban government) to raise an additional $2, 906, 000.
[14364]5, Budget: Itis anticipated that approximately $4,400,006 of CLA funds
[14366]wil be vequired for the above program, On the assumption that it wiil not .
[14368]CVlO ANI
[14369]RIES BNL. so,
[14371]“Ooranrs.
[14373]13-00000
[14375]pasty
[14376]SECRET
[14378]reach its culmination earlier than 6 to 8 months from now, the estimated
[14379]requirements for FY-1960 funds is $900, 000 with the balance of $3, 500, 000
[14380]‘required in FY-1961. | The distribution of costs between fiscal years could,
[14381]of course, be greatly altered by policy decisions or unforeseen contingencies
[14382]which compelled accelerated paramilitary operations. (Tab C) |
[14384]6. Recommendations: That the Central Intelligence Agency be authorized
[14385]to undertake the above outlined program and to withdraw the funds required for
[14386]this purpose as set forth in paragraph 5. from the Agency's Reserve for
[14388]contingencies.
[14390]ay
[14391]ra
[14393]13-00000
[14395]) : Aa0
[14400]ts Yd
[14401]Cr
[14405]T
[14407]ma
[14408]oo
[14409]se]
[14410]re
[14412]THE POLITICAL OPPOSITION
[14414].l. CIA is already in close touch with three reputable opposition groups
[14415](the Montecristi, Autentico Party and the National Democratic Front). These
[14416]_all meet the fundamental criteria conditional to accepiance, i.e. -they are
[14417]for the revolution as originally conceived --many being former 26th of July
[14418]members--and are not identified with either Batista or Trujillo, They are
[14419]- anti-Castro because of his failure to live up to the original 26th of July
[14420]platform and his apparent willingness to sell out to Communist domination
[14421]and possible ultimate enslavement. - These groups, therefore, fit perfectly
[14422]the planned opposition slogan of "Restore the Revolution". foes
[14423]| 2. An opposition Council or Junta will be formed within 30 days from
[14424]representatives of these groups augmented possibly by ‘representatives of
[14425]. other groups. ‘It is probably premature to have a fixed platform for the Council
[14426]“but the Caracas Manifesto of 20 July 1958 contains a number of exploitable
[14427]points. Two of the CIA group leaders were signers of the Manifesto. The
[14428]following points are suggested as a few possibilities:
[14429]a. The Castro regime is the new dictatorship of Cuba subject
[14430]‘to strong Sino-Soviet influence.
[14431]|
[14432]b, Cuba is entitled to an honest, democratic government based
[14434]on free elections. There is no hope of this as long as Castro throttles
[14436]. t
[14437]the rights of legitimate political parties and the freedom of expression.
[14441]EVES ONLY
[14442]SECRET
[14443]set
[14445]c. Arealistic agrarian reform program providing for individual
[14447]ownership of the land must be put into effect.
[14449]d. Individual freedoms must be restored and collectivism in
[14450]commerce and education must be eliminated.
[14451]e. Sino -Soviet influence in the affairs of Cuba must be eliminated.
[14452]A special research group of Cubans with American support is planned to refine
[14453]and expand these planks and to produce propaganda materials based on the above
[14455]platform for use by and on behalf of the opposition Council.
[14457]™.
[14459]13-00000
[14461]i:
[14463]™, ™; Tab B
[14465]. PROPAGANDA
[14467]re Articulation and transmission of opposition views has already begun.
[14468]. Private opposition broadcasts (i.e. purchase of commercial time by private
[14469]individuals) have occurred in Miami (mediurn wave) and arrangements have
[14470]been made with Station WRUL for additional broadcasts from Massachusetts
[14471](short wave) and Florida (broadcast band), Presidents Betancourt and Ydigoras
[14472]‘have also agreed to the use of commercial stations for short wave broadcasts
[14473]from Caracas and Guatemala City. CIA has furnished support to these efforts
[14474]through encouragement, negotiating help and providing some broadcast
[14475]material,
[14477]2. As the m2jor voice of the opposition, it is proposed to establish at
[14478]least one “gray" U. S. -controlled station, This will probably be on Swan Island
[14479]and will employ both high frequency and broadcast band equipment of substantial
[14480]power. The preparation of scripts will be done in the U.S. and these wu be
[14481]transmitted electronically to the site for broadcasting. After some experience
[14482]and as the overation progresses, it may be desirable to supplement the Swan
[14484]Island station with at least one other to ensure fully adequate cove rage of all
[14485]parts of Cuba, most especially the Havana region. Such an additional facility
[14486]might be installed on a U.S. base in the Bahamas or temporary use might be
[14487]made of a shipborne station if it is desired to avoid "gray" broadcasting from
[14489]- Florida.
[14493]13-00000.
[14495]. - ~ s , , ~\
[14496]EYES CMLY “
[14497]SECRET
[14499]3. Newspapers are also being supported and further support is planned
[14500]for the future. Avance, @ leading Cuban daily {Zayas' paper), has been
[14501]confiscated as has =1 Mundo, another Cuban daily. Diario dela Marina,
[14502]one of the bemisphere's outstanding conservative dailies published in Havana,
[14503]is having difficulty and may have to close soon. Arrangements have already
[14504]been made to print Avance weekly in the U.S. for introduction into Cuba
[14505]‘clandestinely and mailing throughout the hemisphere on a regular basis. As
[14506]other leading newspapers are expropriated, publication of "exile" editions
[14507]will be considered. ; . ™%,
[14509]4, Inside Cuba, a ClA-controled action group is producing and distributing
[14510]anti-Castro and anti-Communist publications regularly, CJA is in contact with
[14511]groups outside Cuba who will be assisted in producing similar materials for
[14512]clandestine introduction into Cuba.
[14514]5. Two prominent Cubans are on lecture tours in Latin America. They
[14515]will be followed by others of equal calibre. The mission of these men will be
[14517]_ to gain hemisphere support for the opposition to Castro. Controlled Western
[14518]Hemisphere assets (press,. radio, television) will support this mission as
[14519]will selected American journalists who will be briefed prior to Latin American
[14521]travel.
[14523]13-00000.
[14525]. Z - r > ER any y ; “Tab Cc
[14527]FINANCIAL ANNEX -
[14529]I. Political Action oO , ' FY-1960 : FY-1961
[14530]Support of Opposition Elements ;
[14531]and other Group Activities 150, 000 800, 000
[14532]I. ‘Propaganda
[14533]Radio Operations and Programming
[14534](including establishment of trans -
[14535]mitters)- ; - 400, 000 . 700, 000
[14537]Press and Publications — m, 100, 000 500, 000
[14539]fi, Paramilitary
[14541]In-Exfiltration Maritime and Air
[14543]Support Material and Training 200, 000 1, 300, 000°
[14544]IV. Intelligence Collection 50, 000 200, 000
[14545]Totals , * 900, 000 3,500, 000
[14547]‘X
[14549]*These figures are based on the assumption that major action will not
[14550]occur until FY-1961. Uf by reason of policy decisions or other contingencies
[14551]over which the Agency cannot exercise control, the action program should be
[14553]accelerated, additional funds will be required.
[14557]13-00000
[14559]Appendix C-1
[14561]CNO Correspondence with Department of State
[14562]and NSC:*.
[14563]1) Letter for Allen. Dulles
[14565]from Arleigh Burke,
[14566]17 Mar 60
[14568]13-00000
[14570]“J UNCLASSIFIED Ld see "Gy
[14571]. ROUTING AMD GEC:
[14573]SUBJECT: (Optional)
[14575]Ltr from Admnirai Sueks - . ;
[14577]‘DD/P . So oe
[14580]DATE
[14582]TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
[14583]ustdieg) INIT13i5 4 t wron,
[14585]1, Admiirat Burke sent this
[14586]over to the Director on the
[14587]aiterngon of 17 March and tha
[14588]latter handed to me. Ido nat
[14589]Delieve it requires a reoly
[14590]but pass it to yau for any
[14591]value it may have.
[14593]pod fe
[14595]: 4 “RM Bjr.
[14596]Wath, 42 ABj
[14598]5. i.
[14599]t : . i
[14600]bles A iic CB | Sos
[14602]joanne nnn InTIRSIDEEENIE HY SunenERanER eres
[14606]n : i
[14608]i
[14610]3.
[14612]Eo
[14613]Fr a i
[14614]fy “4 -
[14615]WH Obes Feb
[14618]; .
[14619]QFRICER S 2 COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
[14620]‘Draw @ Hine vcror column alter each comment.)
[14623]13-00000
[14625]CO Okt
[14627]17 March 19690
[14628]PERSONAL - TOP SECRET
[14630]Dear Allen:
[14631]: . . : \.
[14633]Enclosed is a memorandum my staff pre-
[14634]pared containing some suggestions which might be
[14635]‘useful to you in your work. Naturally, I do not
[14636]agree with quite all the comments contained in the
[14637]memorandum, but I know-that you will forgive
[14638]the impatient young lad for his desire to make sure
[14639]no opportunity is left uncovered.
[14641]Warm recards.
[14643]n
[14645]Sincerely,
[14646]The Honor able
[14648]iliyt BURKE |
[14649]Allen Dulles
[14651]Director of Central Intelligence
[14653]Enclosure
[14655]312
[14657]13-00000
[14659]Appendix C-2
[14660]CNO Correspondence with Department of State
[14661]and NSC:
[14663]2) Letter for Gordon Gray from
[14664]Arleigh Burke, 16 Mar 60
[14666]Ww
[14668]Ww
[14670]13-00000
[14672]Dear Gordon:
[14674]Encloseé is a convy of 2
[14675]momoranduma on U.S. -action in
[14676]Cuba which may be of interest
[14677]to you. ,
[14679]Sin cerely yours,
[14681]bh.
[14683]ARLEIGH BURKE
[14685]The Honorabie
[14687]Gordon Gray
[14689]Special Ascistant to.the President
[14690]for National Security Affairs
[14692]The White House ,
[14694]Enclosure
[14696]314
[14698]13-00000
[14700]very out : : . - . Op4Ao3D/ivr
[14701]os ae a : L6 Ve: 950
[14702]rl 9
[14703]Lieu.
[14704]“sy. fons
[14705]‘4 yO ot
[14708]eA
[14709]ie)
[14711]1, ‘Whe recomacndciiens comiained in the wper on "U.S. Actions in Cuba" were
[14712]oMied oripinally to provide the brozd outline for a carefully laic out
[14713]Pe for causim, the Castro reise to be replaced by a friendly povernment .
[14715]Jt was interded that “tate would lo ically control and coordina nie allapects
[14716]provide the guidance as.to the specific actions uired of the other
[14718]teents of the government, The paper was not suterereted in this manner
[14720]wee Nio received it and the search appears row to be for specific actions
[14721]which can be wed.to accomplisn the end desired
[14723]9
[14726]my
[14730]et
[14731]a
[14733]2 The tol loins are offered as possible s pecific actions which can be taken
[14735]in stvport of ow position on Cuba — You wmifht desire to have 00 inject
[14736]these jiccs ints the KOC scétine, 16 Zarch,
[14738]a. Tach - Chairman, or the Chief of the U.S. Nelretion, attempt to have
[14740]@ Gcleyation other than U.S. introduce 4 motion for the board to consider the
[14741]gap in henispheric cefense resulting from the Cuban oituetion or for the
[14743]Board to rocommend th wat tk ne OAS study the influence of Kommunisn in Cuba...
[14745]asseroial ~ Oil companies aro not being paid by Cuba, State could
[14746]oil coz zpanies to point out to the governments who produce the
[14747]ets. an tieir cconomies of the loss of the Cuban uarket.
[14749]Ce Schocls and “ar Colleces ~ ‘The Services could include in courses for
[14750]foreizn officers the cfiect on hemisphere defense of the establishner it of a
[14751]Soumnist Gictatorship in Cuba,
[14753]‘a. Commercial ~ Do iatin Anericans. hold stock in the expropriated properties
[14754]in Guba? If SO, State could regucst the companies concerned to include in
[14755]‘their dividend maiiangs, information pointing out the effect on the companies
[14756]_e@arninis andthe stock holders' cividends of expropriation of property without
[14757]conpens sation and, for the oil companies, » non-payment for oil celivered,
[14759]e. State in conjunction with CIA, pudlish a weekly or bi-xeekly: letter
[14760]Gocanenting the ctions: of the Castro Covernment for the previous period.
[14761]Incliced would be:
[14763]ag o: hun
[14765]re ) Lous norights.
[14766](2) Kormenist tronds ané actions,
[14767](3) Dictator
[14769]tato isl and undemocratic act tions.
[14771]315
[14773]Soave 2 nt? Leanies = Pa:e 1 of 3 copies
[14777]13-00000
[14779]sloxntie posts.
[14780]an. AGr Force for surther distribution to units or
[14781]atin ccericans,
[14783]st
[14785]Castro repiso.
[14786]for the U.S. position.
[14788]te,
[14790]Alert Latin Avericans as to the sommunist agpocts,.
[14792]ané Gistribute speech material su
[14793]adc tresses, Ha terial snoulc cover
[14795]forwards tie aspects of present Cuban tovernment,
[14796]throat of Xomnunisn in Cunha to henispheric cefense.
[14797]Gre
[14799]ne cietatorial. aspects of the Cuban reine. on
[14801]the Cuban regise's actions against the basic numan rights,
[14802]the strategic impor tunce of tre Cuantanemo Naval base.
[14803]ire) 7
[14805]Oued tH
[14806]Ne er ae et
[14808]The logic of the firmness of the treaties by which we hold |
[14809]Cuantanano aré the forsal comiitnent of the Castro regine on taking power
[14810]to honor Cuba's international cozm:.itments,
[14812](
[14813](
[14815]3
[14817]Distribute this saterial to the Services and to their Leazues and
[14818]Aéssociaticns for raxinuz use in oublic ssecctics.
[14820]Ce. 28GB - have Uersral Skaer, as Director of the Staff, IéDB, inject
[14821]into the month wly intéllijzence briefinss at the IADB inforzation on the latest
[14822]Soviet Bloc actions and the pro:ress of International Komsunism in Cuba.
[14824]h, State, in conjunction with CU: and the Service intelligence arencies
[14825]hold special briefings oce cach month on the general situztion in Cuba with
[14826]specia 1 emphasis on the Kozmunistic aspects for the following:
[14828](1) U.S. officials of the OAS and UN. ’
[14830](2) U.S. person anel of the Staff of the IALB.
[14832](3) ors 15. personnel in Washington having duties involving
[14833]close contact with 4atin ieevioans.
[14835]iw]
[14836]ro,
[14837]i
[14838]Q
[14839]1 a
[14841]| ol
[14842]¢.
[14843]$e
[14845]i, All Services provice spscial briefings on a one-tine basis alone “ne
[14846]dine of nm, above ior officers and enlisted nersomicl of units proceeding t
[14847]Caribsean or South Averican ports
[14849]J. Navy endcaver to have a good resorter or author prepare a story con=
[14850]taining the lewy's vicows on Cuantanazo for publication in 3 national magazine
[14851]With “ide circulation in Latin Averica,.
[14853]7 tac
[14854]TOP SrCx
[14858]316 7
[14860]13-00000
[14862]we
[14864]wee
[14867]auii Sut. teed
[14869]. ecept °.
[14871]rw Merchant's ofier in his lett
[14872]serho us & conplete briefir
[14874]letter of\-aren 10
[14875]of State » wartzer: wt. activitics
[14876]situstion in an effort to prod State to nove Taster.
[14878]S and, croups of
[14879]‘reat in Cub.
[14881]U.S. Nations:
[14882]sa Yor Furt!
[14884]als goin, to
[14885]wr dissoningtion to
[14887]F
[14889]Vory. respectfully,
[14891]J.B, POUD, Jk.
[14893]317
[14895]ace 3 of 3 pares
[14897]TOP SenRTe
[14899]13-00000
[14901]: _ Appendix C~3
[14904]_CNO Correspondence with Department of State
[14905]and NSC:
[14907]3) Memorandum for the Special
[14908]. Assistant to the President
[14909].for National Security Affairs
[14910]from. Haydn Williams, 16 Mar 60,
[14911]sub: US. Policy toward Cuba
[14913]13-00000
[14915]ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
[14916]WASHINGTON 25, D.C,
[14918]whe 16 1960
[14920]INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
[14922]MEMORANDUM “FOR THE SPECLAL (SSISTALS TO THE PRESIDENT
[14923]: POR NATIONAL SECURITY AP? AIRS
[14925]SUBJECT: _ ‘U.S. Policy toward Cuba
[14927]Esclosed 1s en exchance of letters on tha above
[14929]“gubject betusen Admiral Burke and Under Sceretary Marchent, both .
[14931]of whom have suthorized that I malls the correspondence available
[14932]to you for whatever help it may be in connection with the dis-
[14934]cussion of this subject at tho Council nesting this coming
[14936]Thursday . ;
[14937]| Vo se for )
[14939], me) assistant Secretary
[14940]2 Excls
[14942]8
[14944]318
[14946]a,
[14948]13-00000
[14950]SECRET
[14952]27 USS tenn
[14954]LO FPwe we
[14956]Deor Arleighs
[14958]XY vas cosh intercoted fn your psroonal letter of Februcry 25,
[14959]1960, on Cvba exd ths Caribtessn eituation, {a vaich 1 noted a norked
[14960]desres of stallarity in the suggestions of the Navy ond of cur poople
[14961]hess cencerning the eecd to reverne tha trond tn Cea ead ths eathods
[14962]vaich ara best calculated to echicve this result.
[14964]As you ore écubtleso avare from ths bricfing ch Dick Retottea
[14965]rad I gave ths Joint Chlefs of Steff oa Jenucry J,. “1960, es ot of tha
[14966]eources of action swygasted In tte sored es kocdsd ®Roccemsndations
[14967]for U. S. Actions In Cuba,™ “rich you trancaltted with yoer letter,
[14968]wore initioted seas tics ago and ere constently being {ntensiffed. To
[14969]recapitulate, cer om thinking oa ths Cruden aftentica aa it relates
[14970]to Cocomlea cad cor nn cecurity interests bao beca 79 follovas
[14972]” The racic eijectiva of Iutersaticnal Cccaunfsm-- -
[14973]in the” lexcdfate Keturc--fo tha consolldatica of a radical,
[14974]rat i-Acoricen Revolution fricadly to the USSR In Cra nad the
[14976]- utill{ention of Cuda.as a bass to proncte slnilne revoluticcaory
[14977]coveronts In thes Cartbbsan. The cinfmsa epdestive of the
[14978]Comxvaigts, if they oro unable toe cealew omugoing, is
[14979]to aeio the United Stctes my as high price co peosible for
[14980]thz aliaination of the undspirable features of the Cehon
[14981]Revolution. In particular, the Cosmmists stent to gin by
[14982]proveling us into arsed intervention, or otherviss tating
[14983]interventionist actions fm violation of cur comafte=sts fa
[14984]a ezensr which could be cada to appros os if tho Uaited States
[14986]reacted ths ezx3 Way on the Soviota did in Hungary ond other
[14987]eatallites.
[14989]b. Unless
[14991]Adalfral ArleicaA Berks,
[14992]Chief of Haval Operatic,
[14993] Departzcat of the Havy.
[14995]SECRET
[14997]NREE) rile COPY _ 319 a J 1240 vile |
[14999]13-00000
[15001]princinle thet eoaittica to Coatete polfsics
[15003]Scher
[15007]>. Unloso we vere indefinitely to occupy Cuba nilitorily,
[15008]hs only solut{ca to ths Cubsn problea {is necessarily the
[15010]‘eccagents of a Cudoa lenderahip willing to end caopcble of
[15012]ecvesaiag ths countsy olong lass ecceptable to the Cedan
[15013]gsople end along Linco consistent vith bosie U.S. policy ,
[15014]tAth meapent to Letin Anerica. This will teus tics. On the
[15015]exg hae, fC fa Covottul thet ary Cider Govenm=nt rich re~
[15016]exited fren U.S. cored eg other overt intesvertien could
[15018]leag ovrvive cut withdratal. Or the other, dcopite car om
[15019]long=dtendiag edogivings comcrning Coatso, it fo en inescep
[15020]Cole Fatt teat hs cme fnto gover with overeheleing cuppect
[15022]sok ealy fn Creda bet elocctere In the hoaicphsr, scoluding .
[15023]§a thio Cutcy. Although that ovpport hos lonely evcporate’
[15024]ta the Urited Stateo~-ond, to a lesser extent, in coapeasible
[15025]Ofraics 4m the othes Latia Accricsn Republi faz—Cestso end,
[15026]sortieultriy, his sofoma poogrea ctiil enjay very con fidszable-
[15027]arose fn his coutey. Cxbmo, oven tose dloilicsicacd with
[15029]Oe aed
[15031]Costco, Fave yet to find cn alterrative lectsrchfp rhagch thay
[15033]Belficve told esteslly cory cut tha refara cmowres tAlca
[15035]Polio opinion sth1l dcomis. Gppsaitioa clencrto tainted
[15036]Tith colich=atfon with the Extlate gogins ose stél2 political
[15037]toncdeptoble end covid not osteblich a ctable gavegnocat.
[15038]Grcostdon groups that might be aveeztabla to Crborms are
[15039]begfentng to organise cove effectively but, ct best, ft will
[15041]Be contho befesa thay ore ready for vigcco ction.
[15043]GO. Tha pricecy ebsective of U. S$. polley cheuld be the
[15044]cseolesetioa of the orcatica af cn effective, potriotic aovo-
[15045]cont fifendly to the United States within Ccta and cong
[15046]Cha eles to counter Cubsio curvent toon’, The Livot Cesk
[15047]fs to coguze, froegest cs wa ota eble to do op, u Glicate fn
[15049]waile to egpose Cestco policies taich hsly the Coacexats ext
[15050]vtameias good U.S..Oban roleticns. Ca ths poolitiva aids,
[15051]vo chouid exi age teksng sotions orl etking otetencnts tick
[15052]tesid caccugngs cuth elecents to exgeics care offectively
[15054]end to expect cor euppost end COlicbosctica fn thsfic offerte
[15055]tO acticvus political ac4 coonmais poogicas fos Ccta hy tetzirg
[15057]® iffereat road than the sroad Cxebm sesicsio. At the
[15059]SS beisfins, we gave ca iileation of th covert cotivities
[15060]crfomray torr this end, cs toll a cn Iadiccttion of ths
[15062]ove? a ycar to idextify end exeaa to pxbhfa epiaica
[15063]ost ths henfophers the Cemmeuist espects of tho Coton pocbica,
[15064]€5 ths nog-tive site, cag polfeiecs ave cdc by the
[15066]{3
[15069]13-00000
[15071]SECRET
[15077]{neresse fairly zooidly Lf & Ao clear to Crbens thet Cectro
[15078]Kicsely ig ceapensible for political ond ecocenic dateriora
[15079]t1en ef the country. Hower, the consolidatsea of tho:
[15080]caposttion will be slowed doa ff Cestro cm Scsescd by
[15082]eelf fa Seether ccavinting the Cuban ceogie Unt tha Uaited
[15083]Stctea has aggseroive écaigns on tha Cetin n-ticn ca a hole
[15084]Od thas the United Stateo motaor then Costsots policies is
[15085]teopeasible for Cebata difficultics, Ye 25%, thorcfore, -
[15086]exosofoc the grostcest eare tant we do aot umedcccthy
[15087]tecasfommn ths developing disontiafeaticn of tas Cclon poople
[15088]with Cestco into a sight botesm ths United Stated ed Gta,
[15089]‘foe 29 eslferespcsting Croan could thea afford to cesport wa
[15090]against his eva couctsy.
[15093]fo O53 ondfar com cecaccio cation by the United Stotca fa
[15094]doferss: of ite rigkta acy play cn Acpoticnt role at the
[15095]Trepee tina, wo crust ast ict these posalbilizics come 3
[15096]© lose sigh? ef the critical fect thet mo soluticn will be
[15098].posoSdle until em cltemetéve lenieranip is rectly to move in.
[15100]2% ths cppliortios of collective oF unlicteral prccoercs
[15101]Mould Balsg the Contre Government down before ea cosepteble
[15102]Leotoechtip fo gecty to tets over, tis poctobihitio eye efvil
[15103]wor of 0 tetemcver by evca cose Conmmistia elemcto. Bithor
[15104]would beirg us oleser to comed intesvention. Tau, vile vo
[15105]ems going chec4 fn the process of influcnsing the hos Ancri~
[15107]ma RepSilcs to ace the Coomalst and other expats of the
[15109]Cyan sitextion a9 we Co ext preparing the ground for pooginic .
[15110]istes-Acorlom censidecetion of. the Coten predlen, wo Sntend
[15111]ts cemtrol the tintag of aay such meting fmofes 29 petDie
[15112]% ecoinside with tae dovalepmsct of sm alterentiva lowisre
[15113]cafip. xt fa eles the irtentica of ths Scniniotact ica to
[15114]rropoas to ths Congrees thes ths President ba given dfecro.
[15115]GScnary muthority to elter sygar quotes In ths exticcal
[15116]fatecost end ws hove develesed ond ars sxthirg feta afoot
[15117]ection plen to ehtain the release of tha hits Sot
[15118]fron sextola ether cereale comitemts vhleh beo$e eur
[15120]G ity to take actlon. ia tha escacate fficld tom this could
[15121]cottituts to Cofcgansdiag ovr Interest ec te the cocticn
[15123]. ef Caxtitions fewsahls to o lotorchlp exposed te Exstie ts
[15125]poileles, .
[15126]Vote
[15128]321.
[15132]! gcccist te atl thess eattccs, a ecot Espouten® olecast f5 tics.
[15133]ize th noodet gor Ceding to scatice eked ths dctoricrahtcn of thete
[15134]molitisel cad ccencaia 13%0 $a cua ts Costrola axceteco, Ansludirg his
[15136]-  Cannsothens wht Intesantionsl Cocoméica. Tics is nected Lor ea Altern
[15137]Rive lesdisoh4a to esesps ead to commiss cifestively foe action, Tim
[15138]t3 alco reedod furthes to omoties Latin Acoricen cpinica te th Gagera
[15139]of ia oitustica oni fot Lotta Amicon Gcvocmmate te oo arom
[15140]reco to the point of view thot the Cxora citeation $9 a matter of
[15141]commen conecrm, not just a U.S.-Cootse qeooeel, Ue mrs vaing all
[15142]eveilodle restlivics to atks this tic2 o3 clost ca puasibie, DA cer
[15143]experiome Sa other dixficult situcticzs fn the Hear Enst end Cexisal
[15144]Snctica indfoate that foicdiata semiita cre not ty bo expected, Kitt
[15145]tine, we ara gsfiag to hove, vo hellove, to axertige restraint frou
[15146]cxing setiors valek, while tafisating our am great sense of Ccomccen
[15147]Ga usyendy, vould esteally retard the process ef Ghange vhich ve of]
[15148]desire, | Oo
[15150]I chovlé point ect also thet, rakle estion in the O23 et ths right
[15151]tine my bo dacircbls a3 e means of exouraging ta alternative Cutea
[15152]icadavehip, wa would prebchiy here-do contend vith Seviets In the
[15153]Vakted Betiens. Yt to cloost certain thot tas Ceouns will try to |
[15154]exicipate or counter exy U. I. approach to the O4S by going dircatly
[15155]to tha Gaited Hations, Furthecoere, ecturl "forcenent netien® hy
[15156]tho G&S would predobly be beougit up before the Gaited Hatieno unéor
[15157]aetials 53 of the (2 Charter even Lf ve angqued tat any sction teken
[15158]hy ths GS corstituted ealy *recosmendstiens" to governments. Thic
[15159]veinferacs our wlew that action In the OiS—-uhich cen be taken uextor
[15160]fAe Caster by coavoking a acting ef Fortign Htatstare, ss vell 03
[15161]exfer the Rio Treaty ani the Caraess Renoluticnmchould prieertly be
[15162]vicved a9 2 mses of otrengthening Cuben copositien to Cestzols
[15163]pollofes at the right acorst sathsr then 29 6 coos of quarvatining
[15164]Cia cad walting to see what boppens. Te would ot present bs sone
[15165]. - tant difffoult to bring a case against. Cuta undes the Careees Reoslin
[15167]thon since the Intest Spectol National Intelligence Retiente-—which
[15168]ws have asked te be sevicwste-dres not Lind the Coban Geovermncat te
[15169]be omumlst-donimted at prevent. TL our orm Potéeate ses wot
[15170]yet Chotactinte the case, ft would be diffionlt in a shert ties ts
[15171]pormanis less wall-indered cgovetrments that the Politics! snoti¢e.
[15172]tleas? ef Cr>a are unter Intematioml Commmiot ccatsol
[15173]Gata lea, ;
[15175]AS yuu ete Exare, cor basie asticacl policy (oon sont
[15176]CSowd intesvasticn as 2 loot reser’ to bs pee <a ro con eset
[15177]thea all elge failo. Uo veuld bo gt selucter: to oohe es esate
[15178]im OU recommendation to the Prestde:t util Sioa MY ben a
[15179]seccensble sharse fcr alk othe eskision to te toctct,
[15181]Thartt.-yes
[15182]° eg
[15184]322
[15186]13-00000
[15188]he
[15190]iecnk you again for ocr nding ce a cory of your occemoaten. Aa ys
[15191]kasy, the To is “bespirg ths Cwon problen miss constent ocrutizz,
[15193]having dicosoad (& fa com detall at its Jowasy U, escting cad mata
[15195]ids coraing., At the Lhest of tne eectings, the Scuretary of State
[15196]seviived ths sollcy toverd Cuta Uiteh hed been eppcoved by ths Preaidest, ©
[15197]ead the concensus of this ssonligts nceting tao thet this polfcy fs”
[15199]ecsentieity correct. Yo maticipate te?, at Mature ceotings of tho ESC,
[15201]tisge will be further dfacussleas caacerning Cuba te deteraing tisthos
[15202]thece should be o rociffcetion of policy tears that country, Ia view
[15204]| ef the fest that tedcyls EX nacting indicated cavtiausd egzcecont ca
[15206]the validity og thea poiley dliccugsed In Jonucey, ft wuld empcar
[15207]wrtesessary Co develop now policy documsntction ct thts ties, capootolly
[15209]‘cs the prepocais in your Easy execcendca cloacly patalis] policics. vdick
[15211]era alswady untamay. Should you, e¢ your coliecgess on ths Jofnt Chiefs, -
[15212]acSirc.o furtiss _peiering ca cur ettions and epecaticonal plans to corzy
[15213]GA ths policy, I chad ba gore: thea glzd te exregeo it.
[15215]Dinceraly,
[15217]...s LSwingoten %. Raertheact
[15218]Uaéer Leoretacy for Political Affairs
[15221]13-00000
[15223]26 FEB 1969
[15225]I em bscomine incres
[15226]ltions in tke Caribbean. Tsu
[15228]eke,
[15230]s
[15231]s
[15232]presen. Sz
[15234]Sincly censerncd over cctericra
[15236]ting con=
[15238]cepecisily concerned over tre
[15240]itustion in Ceba, in whose security the Xevy io dircetly
[15241]interested oy reason of island's stretezic location with
[15243]et.
[15244]pt)
[15246]roeniaa Tansl, the loczt
[15248]Hoysl ivsee Cuba eypon:
[15250]untcr the Cosination of imbernz
[15252]conbinee wicheeled end a es.nurist
[15253]besone = roclity,
[15255]oes Stetcs vould fe prosontcd.
[15257]state in Cuba world serve ts a. pase of
[15259]. Spread of covsnaiistic influence in the
[15261]as its ain the
[15265]ated or 85
[15266]& direct threat to koe 3 sco
[15268]Sie ipan
[15269]Adcitica
[15271]Sicnal Cesmuni
[15273]pene.
[15274]we,
[15276]. Because of ny concern, I <2 tsking the lib
[15278]southern United States =
[15280]end
[15282]tion there of the Guan
[15283]to be in the process of fat
[15286]ins
[15290]ity. of tro tint bod
[15291]communist contro] led
[15292]Soervtions for the further
[15293]Vestern _tenisphere having
[15294]Aascletion of the United States from Latin Americas
[15296]exty of sending you
[15298]the attsched paper a9 indicative of current Heavy thintcins in this
[15299]mebttor, — naaely trai positive auction to revérse the present tread
[15301]should be initistcd to the er
[15303]Action teken new in tha case of Cuba will] a
[15305]mi that the ca:
[15307]coucunist threat is clisi-
[15308]etavle, ir tondly goverment es stoblis ned in Cubase
[15309]aiso facilitate ard proce
[15311]vide 2 fousation for exy sintler actions which may be necessary to
[15312]prevent the sprezd of comunisn in Latin America end to stabilize
[15314]other srecs where anrest is Sppesring «
[15316]am also sending a ‘copy of this letter ari the enclosure to
[15319]Sincerely,
[15320]AZLZISH BURKS
[15321]The Honoredie Livingston 7 > ber hank
[15323]Enclosures Paper on } U.S. Acticn ia Cup2
[15324]Copy to: Mrs Je Be Ircin I, (osn/tsz) w/fenclesire
[15325]f
[15328]a 324
[15330]13-00000
[15332]lh. Ghe Castro Uiewsent in Guba is a vehicic by which iaternational cow:unisa
[15333]opomcrs to Se a fosthold.in the ucstern Hosischere., Lf tie present
[15335]: 2211 soon be too late for tie United Siates to sten ,
[15336]> Sovict dneursion ints this henisphere, This situation, in its many i
[15337]rauLlfiections, proesonts an imsediate threat to the security of tix United
[15341]Slates ard to tint of ovr important nctzhbors in North and South Azerica,
[15343]oNMIMA
[15345]2. what action can be taken to prevent the cotablichzent of a comsuaist (<7
[15346]State in Cube aad to restore a stable, friencly ,overnzent?
[15348]LACKEEOTD
[15351]Ps ws _ . . : nae . Pn: -
[15352]9, “She wu. oS. has nyver renconee? the Youree Ooctrine. This was reeffirced
[15354]by Ceerctary of Stato Dulles in his addrass to the Kation on July 12, 1954,
[15355]Ga internaticnel Comconisz in Custecnela. In thet address, wr. Dulles
[15356]stated;
[15360]rs intcrnatiorcsl coizmmism has teen probing kere
[15362]stin:; places in tho Auertcas, It finally chose
[15364]Guatenzla as a spot which it coxld turn into an official base
[15365]fron ywnich to breed subversion which would extend to other
[15366]Axericen Repunlics.”
[15368]“Sor several yoe
[15369]one there for re
[15371]ford
[15374]‘ "Tis intrusion of Soviet cespotism was, of course, a direct
[15376]- challern:e to our Monroe Doctrine, the first and most funda-
[15378]mental of our forei,n policies,“
[15380]iss united States is bound by treaties which comait it to seek scttle-
[15381]ment of henispharic-disputes by neaceful means, bat which also provice for
[15382]action in the event of aggression cither from outside the hemisphere or
[15383]within, Article 5 of the Inter-Acerican Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance,
[15384]Sijned at iio de Janeiro, 1947, requires each contracting party to send
[15385]to the Security Council of the UN complete inforaation "concerning the
[15386]activities uncertaken ... for the purpose of saintaining Inter—Amrican
[15388]pecce and security."
[15390]Article 6 of this treaty states:
[15392]"If the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the
[15394]ignty or political indevendence of any Arerican State sto.ll
[15395]ec Ly an amression which is not an gesed attack ... or
[15397]h
[15399]hor Pact or citvation that night endancer the xeace of
[15400]f:icrica, the Yrgun of Consultation shall xect in.ediately in
[15403]13-00000
[15405]mote
[15406]4 Rake a
[15407]Qt
[15409]order to avroc of .., the measures chich stoule be taken for the
[15410]corsen Cefcnse asc for tle mainteiasce of the peace a: secarity
[15411]2 tte Contiacnt,"
[15413]. fhe Ycclaration a do opted by the Tents Iater-sécerican Conference at
[15415]Caracas, Voucaucla, ch. 1954, states:
[15417]th -
[15419]WOhet the Coziratioa or control of the political institution
[15421]of any @zcricaa State by the faternati mal corsumist movement,
[15422]extendis: to this hemisphere the vcliticel syste=x of an extra-
[15423]continental raver, wouls constitute a threat t o tze sovereignty
[15425]anc political indepontence of the Avsriccn States, endangering
[15427]the peace of Avcrica, and woule call for the ceeting of consultation
[15428]to consider the adoption of approprizte action ia accordance with
[15429]existing treaties."
[15431]a 5
[15433]fhe 26th of July tovenant succeeded in cicpleciny Batista on 1 Jan 1959.
[15434]Since that tine the Czstro rezice has followed ‘sncreasingly tre classic
[15435]stroteny for establishing a coz.unk ; stzte, the concnunist time table is
[15437]ielinceted im Acerican cubossy Tavana Picpstcn «0, 903 dated 29 Lecexber
[15438]1956. ‘the rothless elisination ef the opposition, ssuspiion of dictatorial
[15439]mowerc, Suspension of elections, the "Late Averica" campaign, the studicd
[15440]breaistomm of ihe cconesy and confiscztion of preverty, the initiation of
[15441]rolatio:s ami trade with the Soviet inion, ite forbidding: oF anti-communist
[15442]activity and the brealwowmn and reconstitution of the Arecd Services and
[15443]police cre ali % ypicst cor. coum st mareuvers,
[15445]the rafority of the Cubans are not yet cosuitted to the acceptance of
[15446]conzunism nor are they avare of the trend of the Revolution in this direction.
[15447]The lencr classes, horever, continue to five full support to Castro and the
[15448]Revolution,
[15450]It has not yet been vroved that Castro hinsely is a cosmmist, Hovever,
[15451]Sore of his srincipal dcouties as well as other leacers are believed to te
[15452]co:ununists, Ia my case, individvals susceptitle to comcuaist influence are
[15453]. Occupyire key positions in the .overmcent as «¢11 as in ali isportant organ-
[15454]salions an¢ trece unions. Two develoments ere noticeable, Comsunists
[15455]are bei::, appointed oxcaly and are. heins elected (in trade unions) to wy
[15456]‘positions, ‘iddcn communists in ihe 26th of July Hoverent ara taking
[15457]positions in sseming oosposition to the open communists,
[15459]At present the Cuban Aried forces are.
[15461]Gisorgenized arai apparently capable
[15462]only of guerrilla warfare, Intellizence resorts indicate that the Sovict
[15464]Bloc may be suoclying technicians to assist in training: the new forces anc
[15465]supzlying ars to the now governuent. There is no present indication thet
[15467]tie £511 of the Castro Goveracent is iminent. If it should fall, hovever
[15469]the governzent would roct protaoly emerge 25 a conmmist povernment because
[15473]Page 2
[15475]376
[15477]13-00000
[15479]bo. CHL?
[15481]OD, .95 a. bean eib.inated and thers appear to ie no leaders of
[15482]stater nud when anti-Castro/eatiCosuumist peoples coulé rally.
[15483]Show’ Cast ooo agcassinated, sot action Wile: would provaaly
[15484]reselt would ge tne safety of f ericans in Cura, Finally, in the
[15486]worst ¢ Roilit, of Cirost  peeort for Cuba by tho Sovict
[15487]alec, ihe extent of an opin xutual sceurity egreecont, caunot te
[15489]Giere
[15491]4. ‘Source bosic courses
[15493]4, Lultiliteral sci aon. - thrown she UAE. -
[15495]B. ‘ivilateral wert Action bythe vu. S.
[15497]; it
[15499]Unilateral éction + by the gS.
[15502]AML sursidiary cetiows, such as economic pressure and wore) suae ton,
[15504]wilh accist in achicviny the objective Should also be taken in. addition
[15506]Taree ga
[15508]TAH LE
[15509]“CS aio. + bdine Ulare
[15511]The machinery exists in the daclerstion and smecsonts of ‘the usS
[15513]for the U.S. to rewuest convocation of the Organ of Conszliz! ion of the
[15515]Gis With subsequent investigation of the government in Cuba, anc, if
[15516]aparoval of tro menaber states is obtained, intcrvern.ion to prevent a _
[15518]Conusenist takc~over.
[15520](1) fevanta, Fer}
[15522]» (a) Tt woulc be in consonance wi ith our nationzl policy and
[15523]our treaty comcitcents under the OAS.
[15524]. ‘
[15525](b) It. woul strenrthen the JAS and would reassur ure te Free
[15526]“orld and the Latin Acerican States of U.S. weliingncee to live up to
[15527]comdtnents. .
[15529](2) bisadvanrases:
[15531]_ |. (a) Uncertainty of support for Os action by oth ner Latin
[15532]Acerican States,
[15534](b) Lelay in 045 action could result in a Comzumist controlled
[15535]front covernzent being a "fait accompli" in Cube.
[15537](ec) Could result in the entire proble= endizg in the Security
[15539]Page 3
[15543]13-00000
[15545].Y ass
[15547]Coweti of the Un where tre povict unioa
[15549]B
[15550]fe
[15551]4
[15552]oO
[15553]fag
[15555]e
[15557]OCH TOM a cl S ‘2
[15559]the U.S. has tie eapebl lity to ceize Cuba by direct: nilitary
[15560]wctien, anc after a comolidation perisd, cause the establishrcat of a
[15562]as
[15564]=.
[15566]viendly, nom-comsnnist ovement.
[15568](a) It would be in consonance with the tonroe Doctrine,
[15569]“wnich is st ee 5, policy with respect to the Sestern Uemisphere,
[15570]ané world solve the problex. .
[15571](b) It would serve notice to the sorle that the U.S. will
[15572]t ablishrent of a commumist or communist "front" rezgin
[15574](c) It wold re-omphacise to the world thet the U.S. will not
[15575]hesitate to acct when ite security i6 itestake.
[15577](d). Ié woulé dispel any illusions by the world at lerze tiat
[15578]the U.S. is unmiDis;,, anu vucble to act ao catter what the provocation.
[15579]Iv sould also procably stop the “baiting of the 0.5." in which soxe ainor
[15580]powers throuchout the vorld indulce.
[15582](2) Uisadverta‘es:
[15584](a) It wovld violate owr GAS comitacnts to seek settlezent
[15585]by peaceful means.
[15587](b) It wuld lead to charges of aggression against the U.S.,
[15588]both in the OAS and in the United lations, with the resulting possivility
[15589]of UF and C15 action azainst ise 3. S. ;
[15591](c) It would prove tint the U.S. is not willing to abide by
[15592]its treaties if §. S. intorests dictate othersise,
[15594](d) It conkd isolate tho U.S. fron the other Anerican States,
[15595](e) Tt would violste the principle of non-intervention,
[15597]% ACTION UF Pie US.
[15599]The U.S. wuld ‘assist rebel groups covertly to. overthrom the
[15601]i
[15602]ct and rewestablisa o friencly gevernournt, Concurrently,
[15603]‘take all possible acasures to alert al fricadly nations and the. -
[15604]5, yeople and branches of the U.S. covernzens to ike danger of the threat
[15606]Page 4
[15608]328
[15610]inester ta dicevedit Cube and bring ¢ rld opinion to tre side of ine U.S,
[15612]{aj} So S..akid not be charged with aguression,
[15614](z) TL carrise out successfully, bree Vorlé acd Latin Anerican
[15615]opinion wouls Lo faverablc iv tue 4. S.
[15616]{2} Yisaévanta, 253 .
[15617]{2} here is no certainty of success, ‘
[15618](&) She effort cist well cone too latc,
[15619]Ta cons ring the above courses of action, the basi
[15622]cannot and must not pomsit within the
[15623]vomisiker: t este Aat of Bay Covernss: at Cconinated oy the
[15624]Tatecaatious : Gun. Gnerefore, ii other courses of
[15625]4
[15627]_ ection Fail, tue Geo. 4 au the face of adverse world opiation,
[15630]2
[15631]Cy «4
[15632]a
[15634]er
[15636]nt OCCUrxrsce,
[15638]Until tae Sitwtion resenes the stare. where direct enileteral ection
[15639]by the U.S, is tis only ccancg 2cft, it apgcars thet a combination of those
[15640]rarts of courses of ccticn A ard C which heve a fair Chesce of success
[15641]should be followed ia srder to utilize the prim: advaniage givea uncer A,
[15642]i.e., the cocscration anc ,osd will of thse other Averican States,
[15644]COOL SICS
[15646]5. The follow! im, conclusions ore reacikod:;
[15648]a. The cstablisicecnt of a.coma nemist governsent , or a “front"™ goverment
[15649]followias cowmmist precepts, ia Cuba would be a dizoct threat to the -
[15650]scecurity of the 3, 5. ans ele ender: eer hedispheric security.
[15652]bE The U.S. sh ald initia te
[15655]positive actio on to @lininate the threat
[15656]before a Om amdst or “froa" yo
[15658]vernaint in Cuca is a "fait accomli."
[15659]ce, Althonh the revolution still has iss support of the aasses, the
[15660]resultin, :overucest ia Cuda is following the path of Aer ne
[15662]connanics,. Althewt th ey are bs tote yet aware of the tread tuvard conmmunisn,
[15663]Castro has the personal ioyaity of the asses,
[15665]dq, accricaa holcin s are being coafiscated, - auericas lives ray te
[15666]encangeréed if stable, responsible goverascal is not ensured,
[15668]e. The wonros Soctrine is siill basic U.S. policy with respect to the
[15669]Sestern venisphero,
[15671]Page 5 ae -
[15673]SECKE ?
[15675]t
[15677]13-00000
[15679]. tee
[15682]- rHececure exisis saior tie Ueccluretion of Caracas t
[15683]ay the oo ueaincst a Tomsunist threat to fomispueric security.
[15685]we The i. 5, showld proceed. te cocuent the exteat of infiltration of
[15686]gsvzunist2 inin key positions in Cuba and the extont of extra—lestern
[15687]woieriers commurist sunport of the present Cubana regire,
[15689]hk. Tre Vl. should initiste a canmainn to asprise 211 U, S. agencies,
[15690]the 2, 5S. public, and the other Arerican States of the threat in order to
[15691]gain Sucsort Yor any Luture action that czy be taken,
[15693]~ - a wore . ee sya a val 3
[15694]i, Tne UW. 5. shevld sovertly snpnort the Cuban opecesition.
[15696]a. tne H. 5., aftor having gatocd the reanired suprort, should vresont
[15697]sic ense before the O° in arder that goint action oy the uembers of tie
[15698]ois say br taken to elininete the com unist inrest awl establish a friendly,
[15699]staklc Tovercent in Cuna, sO
[15701]Kk. The U. S., as a lest resert, shovic iake unilateral nilitary action
[15703]to elisinete the threst, :
[15705]Ese
[15708]6, To accurmlish the above, the followin: plen of action is recomended:
[15710]a Tmnediately Gccurent the commerist tize teble ‘anc the comaunist
[15711]take-over in Cuba,
[15712]b. Use all rosourees and cedia te wake the U.S. and the other Anerican
[15713]States aware of the threat, The following should be utilized to accomplish
[15716](1) Intellilerce briefings of:
[15718](a) U.S. Sovernrent officials.
[15719]Ab) Hewspaper represent atives and editors.
[15721]{c) U.S. businesszen operating abroad and soinr abroad.
[15725]et
[15726]el
[15728]hé ILPB nezbers and latin Americana Ciplormatic persomel
[15729]and military attaches,
[15731](ec) The Catholic Church (possibly throug the Ap postolic Pelerate).
[15733]sO (f) Church groups operating in Latin Aserica.
[15735](g) Latin Aucrican officials visiting the U.S. aad ¥. S..
[15737]Paze 6
[15738]330
[15740]ns ‘a sr dte
[15742]ORAS
[15744]13-00000
[15746]ry
[15747]i
[15749]2) ueriemtation of radio breadeasis and mvs regorts, bota rorern=
[15751]wet wo orivats,
[15755](2) She ci. SO. infernstion Sarvice.
[15757]fy AML country tess.
[15759]ce. Covertly sigsort . : : et aae groon trusted
[15762]7
[15763]wiseasS £5 S37,
[15765]te
[15767]evacuate 2, G, Netionale
[15768]ere they are endangered,
[15770]s tee Pons
[15771]d, Zs perres
[15777]should the
[15779]" at ef swe Pan ees.
[15781]‘ys ane ioree to safspuard and
[15783]wot
[15785]situation deteriorate to the point ©
[15787]CG. On Sunsort Is baen galed, ust, in conjuacti mowith other
[15788]meicers of ths 23, convecniisa of the Org.n of Co asalt ation of the as
[15789]cam€er the Pars:s of the Declarct ton re) t
[15791].
[15793](1) See: %83 action to call on Cuta to nace hersell wer 0:5
[15794]ausak ices "in orcer to sreserw the reveiution for the people auc prevent
[15795]sommaisct take-over,* and;
[15797]. {2) Sect WA acbiou-to ictervene by force > in the event the ebove
[15798]d 7
[15802]oint group is Zor:ed to acconpiic the alove, keep
[15803], force the Latin Arerican |
[15804]9 the Kenisphere and to counter
[15806]Fa
[15807]G
[15808]e
[15809]e
[15810]B
[15811]a
[15812]Qa
[15813]Ar f
[15814]6A
[15815]c
[15816]My
[15818]io]
[15820]HM) gu
[15822]ae |
[15824]x fo
[15825]ay
[15827]a a
[15828]h
[15829]i
[15831]2 hat
[15832]ss
[15834]re
[15835]cf
[15836]iv)
[15838]accusations af Ee S. . ie erialicn,
[15840]e.in the event tims does aot permit coxplction of ths above, or as a
[15841]last | resort, be prepared to take unilateral ailitary action to establish
[15842]a non-commants t gove rn-x: 2% in Cuba,
[15844]Pasta?
[15846]my . . Aas
[15848]13-00000
[15850]Appendix D
[15851]a
[15852]Memorandum. for Assistant Deputy Director (Plans) -
[15854]Action from J. D. Esterline, 2 May 60
[15857]13-00000
[15859]EYES ONLY
[15861]SECRET
[15862]\ _
[15863]COPY
[15864]2 May 1960
[15865]MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Deputy Director (Plans) - Action
[15866]SUBJECT : Liaison with United States" Agencies on JMARC Activities
[15868]1. This memorandum contains information for the Assistant Deputy Director
[15869](Plans) - ‘Action.
[15871]2. The attached chart on liaison with other agencies of the United States'
[15872]- Government on JMARC activities is restricted to those contacts that are made
[15873]on a regular basis, such as the weekly policy meeting with the Department of
[15874]State, and to offices which, we must’ contagt ‘quite frequently to solicit their
[15875]support, such as the Immigration and Naturalization Service.
[15877]3. As you know, infrequent contacts are made at various other levels of
[15878]the Executive Branch including:
[15880]‘a. Brigadier General Cushman, Vice President Nixon's military
[15881]assistant. :
[15883]b. NSC 5412 Representatives.
[15885]'. ¢. Certain United States' Senators and Representatives, particularly
[15886]' Senator George Smathers of Florida.
[15888]4. In the early stages of JMARC we had-almost daily contact with Rear
[15889]Admiral S$. B. Renkin, USN, who was the action officer on the movement of two
[15890]radio transmitters and construction of the broadcasting facility on Swan Island.
[15892]5. Through Raymond Millard (Mallard?], the Agency is in close touch with
[15893]CINCLANT at Norfolk. Robert Reynolds, Deputy Chief, WH/4, has briefed selected
[15894]senior officers on JMARC 4. Mr. Reynolds is the designated CIA alternate for
[15896]the CINCLANT force under provisions of the Contingency Operations Plan for
[15897]Cuba..
[15899]J. D. ESTERLINE
[15900]Chief, WH/4
[15902]Attachment:
[15903]Chart mentioned in paragraph 2:
[15905]ao . SECRET’
[15907]EYES ONLY 339
[15909]13-00000, . “
[15911]SECRET
[15913]| . EYES ONLY | . COPY
[15914]OFFICE | ; NATURE OF DISCUSSION . . CIA REPRESENTATIVE FREQUENCY
[15915]STATE DEPARTMENT
[15916]Office Inter-American Affairs (ARA) “Policy Col. J. C.. King _ Weekly
[15917](Mr. Rubottom) . ; ,
[15918]Cuba Working Group (State, USIA) ~~ Overt Programs ; Robert Whedbee Daily
[15919](Chaired by Ambassador Mallory) ; oe _
[15920]Consular & Security Affairs Passports for Aliens — Me. Pennington (08) As required
[15921](Mr. John Haynes) , ; :
[15922]Office of Intelligence & Research "Talent" Matters - | _. E, A. Stanulis — As required
[15923](Ambassador J. Lampton Berry) ‘ ‘
[15924]. : By - - .
[15925]Inter~departmental Defector Committee Cuban "Defectors" Robert Whedbee As required
[15926]© Latin America. Task Force Program Coordination Paul E. Oberst Weekly
[15927]Ww (Chaired by John Hill (ARA) ; ,
[15928]DEFENSE DEPARTMENT
[15929]Office of Special Operations Defense Support /—E, A, Stanulis . As. required
[15930](Capt. Burns B. Spore, USN) - Robert Young (CC)
[15931]Office of Special Operations ; Briefing J. D. Esterline Weekly
[15932]- (Capt. Burns B. Spore, USN) ; _
[15933]Collateral Support Section, . Cover Robert Young (CC) As Required
[15934]Office of Naval Intelligence ,
[15935](Cdr. Frank Day, USN)
[15936]Operations Branch, Collection Cover - Robert Young (CC) As required
[15937]Division, ACSI (Army) | ,
[15938](Col. Stewart McKinney)
[15939]. SECRET ;
[15940]Continued
[15942]EYES ONLY
[15944]13-00000
[15946]‘ COPY
[15947]SECRET .
[15948]. SO . - EYES ONLY
[15949]| OFFICE | NATURE OF DISCUSSION © CIA REPRESENTATIVE FREQUENCY
[15950]UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY ~ |
[15951]Director, Voice of America _ Coordination . | “David A. Phillips weekly.
[15952](Henry Loomis) ; , :
[15953]IMMIGRATION. AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE -
[15954]Office of the Director Us S. Entry of Cubans - Mr. Pennington (0S) As required
[15956](Mr, Hennessey)
[15958]o
[15960]HEE
[15962]SECRET
[15964]EYES ONLY
[15966]13-00000
[15968]Appendix E
[15970]Attack on Petroleum Refinery at
[15971]Santiago de Cuba
[15973]13-14 March 1961
[15975]13-00000
[15977]PRIM t MAR 7% 09202 61
[15979]Aes ee
[15981]BELL 15 | af
[15988]-
[15990]A as '
[15991]Do/r, COP, ADDP/A, WH 3, OC GH Bei «rE Y | - OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE
[15992]IN| 3307 i
[15994]"1M@ BELL KOLA WAVE
[15996]SFOULOW. 3 RECEIVED: FRQM BARBAR:. . 47 1466982. NRA 1¥sseez
[15998]May netted
[16000]MSGUMAGER KO. CroItK
[16001]RED I300E5R MARCH Es
[16003]APT HS xe
[16005]of
[16007]NO . cc VER ba
[16009]Ete? i
[16010]eae SLA
[16012]t
[16016]Sans
[16018]Se a
[16020]a fsct Beets
[16023]13-00000
[16025]_ Chagsizize .eashex F;
[16026]ay ed
[16028]y
[16030]ANCE AT
[16031]1 Be CALISRES AUD PO MILIMETER ENGAGED US PLUS PLENTY SHALL
[16035]vAT AIT DUT RESTARTED IN FEW MINUTES, AT HAPSOR ENTR
[16037]wees,
[16039]when ene “tle aa seer ee sae eens fee eee _. *
[16041]ee a
[16043]£10 ON STRONG SEARCHLIGHT. LEFT SEARCHLIGHT POLRTING a _
[16044]OWN INTO. WATER AND SILENCED 20 MILLIME
[16046]Sh Lond
[16047]ad
[16049]‘ETER BUT. 51S FOLLOWEO  -
[16052]13-00000
[16054]Appendix F
[16058]Richard M. Nixon's Memorandum —
[16060]on Meeting with Fidel Castro,
[16062]19 April 1959
[16064]13-00000
[16066]RICHARD NIXON
[16068]LA CASA PACIFICA
[16069]SAN CLEMENTE, CALIFORNIA
[16071]July 27, 1979
[16073]JZ. a. 0 ~
[16074]I am enclosing b-AX summary
[16076]of. my conversation with -.Fidel Castro
[16077]‘in 1959, as. you requested in your
[16078]letter of July 19th.
[16080]With best wishes,
[16082]Sincerely,
[16084]Dr. Jack B. Pfeiffer
[16085]CIA Historian ‘
[16086]Washington, D.C. 20505
[16088]enclosure, 4 pages”
[16090]13-00000
[16092]COPY _ COPY COPY
[16094]CONFIDENTIAL
[16096]April 19, 1959
[16098]Summary of conversation between The Vice President and
[16099]Fidel Castro: ;
[16101]When Castro. arrived for the conference he seemed
[16102]somewhat nervous and tense. He apparently felt that he had
[16103]not done. as well on “Meet. the Press“ as he had hoped. He
[16104]was particularly concerned about whether he might have irri-
[16105]tated Senator Smathers for the comments he made with regard
[16106]to him. I reassured him at the beginning of the conversa-—
[16107]tion that "Meet the Press" was one of. the most difficult pro-
[16108]grams a public official could.go on and that he had done ex-
[16109]tremely well -- particularly having in mind the fact that he
[16111]“had the courage to go-on in EngLish rather than to speak
[16113]through a translator.
[16115]The subjects we discussed ‘were no different from
[16116]those on which he had made public statements on several
[16117]other occasions. A brief summary, however, might be of in-
[16118]terest, particularly in view of the comments I made with re-
[16119]gare to the positions he took. .
[16121]I suggested at the outset that while I understood some
[16122]reasonable time might elapse before it would be feasible to
[16123]have elections it would nevertheless be much better from his
[16124]viewpoint if he were not to state so categorically that it
[16125]would be as long as four years before elections would be held.
[16127]I urged him to state his position as being in favor of having
[16129]-elections at the earliest possible date and that four years
[16130]. wotld be the maximum amount of-time that would elapse before
[16132]elections were scheduled. He went into considerable detail
[16133]as he had in public with regard to the reasons for not holid-
[16134]ing elections, emphasizing particularly that "the people did
[16135]not want elections because the elections in the past had pro-
[16136]duced bad government."
[16138]He used the same argument that he was simply reflect-
[16139]ing the will of the people in justifying the executions of war
[16140]criminals andhis overruling the acquittal of Batista's avia-
[16141]tors. In fact he seemed to be obsessed with the idea that
[16142]it was his responsibility to carry out the will of the people
[16144]COPY . COPY . COPY
[16148]13-00000
[16150]COPY copy COPY
[16153]whatever it might appear to be at a particular time. It
[16154]was also apparent that as far as his visit to the United
[16155]States was concerned his primary interest was "not to get
[16157]' a change in the sugar quota or to get a government loan
[16158]but to win support for his policies from American public
[16159]opinion."
[16161]It was this almost slavish subservience to prevail-
[16162]ing majority opinion -- the voice of the mob -- rather than
[16163]his naive attitude toward Communism and his obvious lack of
[16165]} understanding of even the most elementary economic principles
[16166]which concerned me most in evaluating what kind of a leader
[16167]he might eventually turn out to be. : That is the reason why
[16168]I spent as much time as I could trying to emphasize that he
[16169]had the great gift of leadership, but that it was the respon-
[16170]sibility of a leader not always.to follow public opinion
[16171]but to help to direct it in the proper channels -- not to
[16172]give the people what they think they want at a time of emo-
[16173]tional stress but to make them want what they ought to have.
[16174]I pointed at that it might be very possible that the people
[16175]of Cuba were completely disillusioned as far as elections
[16176]and representative government were concerned but that this
[16177]placed an even greater responsibility on him to see that”
[16178]elections were held at the very earliest date, and thereby
[16179]‘to restore the faith of the people in democratic processes.
[16180]Otherwise, the inevitable result would be the same dictator-
[16181]ship against which he and his followers had fought so gal-
[16182]lantly. I-.used the same argument with regard to freedom of
[16183]the press, the right to a fair trial before an impartial
[16184]court, judge and jury, and ‘on other issues which came up
[16185]during the course of the conversation. In every instance he
[16187]justified his departure from democratic principles on the
[16189]‘ ground that he was following the will of the people. I, in
[16190]my turn, tried to impress upon him the fact that while we be-
[16191]lieve in majority rule that even a majority can be tyrannous and
[16192]that there are certain individual rights which a majority
[16193]‘should never have the power to destroy.
[16195]I frankly doubt that I made too much impression
[16196]upon him butte did listen and appeared to be somewhat recep-
[16197]tive. I tried to cast my appeal to him primarily in terms
[16198]of how this place in history would be affected by the courage
[16199]and statesmanship he displayed at this time. I emphasized that
[16200]the easy thing tod was to follow the mob, but that the right -
[16202]COPY — COPY COPY
[16204]339
[16206]13-00000
[16208]COPY “Copy COPY
[16211]thing in the long-run would be better for the people and,
[16213]-of course, better for him as well. As I have already in-
[16214]dicatedle was incredibly naive with regard to the Communist
[16215]threat md ppeared to have no fear whatever that the Commu-
[16216]nists might eventually come to power in Cuba. He said that
[16218]' during the course of the revolution there had been occasions
[16219]when the Communists overplayed their hand and “my people put them
[16220]in their place." He implied that this would be the situation
[16221]in the future in the event that the Communists tried to come
[16222]to power. As a matter of fact, in his attitude toward Com-
[16223]‘munism, both nternally and from an international standpoint,
[16224]he sounded almost éxactly like Sukarno had sounded to me
[16225]when I visited Indonesia in 1953, In our discussions of
[16226]Communism I again tried to cast the arguments in terms of
[16227]his own self-interest and to point out that the revolution
[16228]which he had led might be turned against him and the Cuban
[16229]people unless he kept control ofthe situation and made sure
[16230]that the Communists did not get into the positions of power
[16232]. and influence. On this score I feel I made very little im-
[16233]pression, if any.
[16235]Speaking to him from a personal standpoint I urged
[16237]him at the earliest possible moment to bring good strong -
[16238]men. into his government and to delegate responsibilities to
[16239]‘them in the economic and other areas where he presently was
[16240]making many decisions. I tried to point out that unless he
[16241]did thishe would have a workload which would be so great that
[16242]he could not provide the leadership and the vision that the
[16243]Cuban people needed for the great issues, I put as much em-
[16244]phasis as possible on the need for him to delegate responsi-
[16245]bility, but again whether I got across was doubtful.
[16247]It was apparent that while he paid lip service to
[16248]such institutions as freedom of speech, press and religion
[16249]his primary concern was with developing programs for economic
[16250]progress. He said over and over that a man who worked in
[16251]the sugar cane fields for three months a year and starved
[16252]the rest of the year wanted a job, something to eat, a house
[16253]and some clothing and didn't care a whit about whether he had
[16254]freedom along with it. I of course tried to emphasize that
[16255]here again as a leader of his people, he should try to de-
[16256]velop support for policies which could assure economic pro-
[16257]gress with freedom rather than without it.
[16259]COPY COPY COPY
[16263]13-00000
[16265]COPY . “COPY COPY
[16268]He indicated that it was very foolish for the
[16269]United Sates to furnish arms to Cuba or any other Carib-
[16271]‘bean country. He said “anybody knows that our countries
[16273]are not going to be able to play any part in the defense
[16274]of this hemisphere in the event a world war breaks out,
[16275]The arms governments get in this hemisphere are only used
[16277]‘to suppress people as Batista used his arms to fight the
[16279]revolution. It would be far better if the money that you
[16280]give to Latin American countries for arms be provided for
[16281]capital investment." I will have to admit that as far as
[16282]his basic argument was concerned here I found little that I
[16283]could disagree with!
[16285]We had a rather extended discussion of. how Cuba could.
[16286]get the investment capital it needed for economic progress.
[16287]He insisted that what Cuba primarily needed and what he
[16288]wanted was’ not private capital but government capital. He
[16289]gave me some rather confused arguments as to why plants that
[16290]were licensed and/or owned and operated by the government
[16291]would serve the best interests of Cuba better than privately
[16292]owned enterprises. I told him quite bluntly that his best
[16293]hope as far as the United States was concerned was not in
[16294]getting more government capital but in attracting private:
[16295]capital. I explained that government capital was limited be-
[16297]‘cause of themany demands upon it and the budget problems we:
[16298]- presently confronted. I pointed out that private capital on
[16300]the other hand was expansible and that he would be serving
[16301]the interests of Cuba far better by adopting policies which
[16302]would attract it, I pointed out that there was competition
[16303]for capital throughout the Americas and the world and that
[16305]it would not go to.a country where there was any considerable
[16306]fear that policies might be adopted which would discriminate
[16307]against private enterprise. At this point he, at considerable
[16308]length, tried to explain why he had said and done some of
[16310]the things which had appeared to be anti-private enterprise up
[16311]to this time. Here again on this point I doubt if I made too
[16312]much of an impression.
[16314]He explained his agrarian reform program in consider-
[16315]able detail justifying it primarily on the. ground that Cuba
[16316]needed more people who were able to buy the goods protuded
[16317]within the country and that it would’make no sense to pro-
[16318]duce more in factories unless the amount of money in the hands
[16320]_of consumers was increased.
[16322]‘COPY COPY — COPY
[16324]13-00000
[16326]‘COPY COPY Copy
[16329]He rather bitterly assailed the United States press
[16330]for what he called their unfair reporting of the revolution
[16331]after he came to power. I, of course, tried to explain
[16332]that speaking from some personal experience, it was neces-
[16333]sary to expect and to learn to take criticism both fair and
[16334]unfair. I would not be surprised if his sensitivity with
[16336]riticism) regard to @Bkxsism might eventually lead him to take some
[16337]. - rather drastic steps toward curtailing freedom of the press
[16338]in the future.
[16340]He also spoke rather frankly about what he felt was
[16341]avery disturbing attitude on the part of the American press
[16342]and the American people generally. His argument went along
[16343]this line: “yours is a great country -- the richest, the
[16345]greatest, the most powerful in the world. Your people, there-
[16346]fore, should be proud and confident and happy. But every-
[16347]place I go you seem to be afraid -- afraid of Communisn,
[16348]‘afraid that if Cuba has land reform it will grow a little
[16349]rice and the market for your rice will be reduced — afraid
[16350]that if Latin America becomes more industrialized American
[16351]factories will not he able to sell as much abroad as they
[16352]have previously. You in America should not be talking so
[16353]much about your fear of what the Communists may do in Cuba
[16354]or in some other country in Latin America, Asia or Africa -—-
[16355]you should be talking more about your own strength and the
[16356]reasons why your system is superior to Communism or any
[16357]other kind of dictatorship."
[16359]; In my turn of course I tried to explain that we wel-
[16360]. comed. the industrialization and development of Latin America,
[16362]that one of our best customers was Canada, for example,
[16363]which was highly industrialized and that as economic conditions
[16365]improved in any country this was not only good for that coun-
[16366]try but good for us as well. TI also tried to put our atti-
[16367]tude toward Communism in context by pointing out that Commu-
[16368]nism was something more than just an idea but that its agents
[16369]were dangerously effective in their ability to grasp power
[16370]and to set updictatorships. I also emphasized, however,
[16371]that we realized that being against Communism was not enough
[16372]-- that it was even more important that we make it by our
[16373]actions, by what we say and what we do abroad that we con-
[16374]vince people every place that we want to help them achieve
[16375]economic progress in a climate of freedom.
[16377]COPY COPY _ . COPY
[16379]R42
[16381]13-00000
[16383]COPY COPY . COPY
[16386]_ Several other subjects were discussed but none
[16387]that I: think are worthmting at this point. Significantly
[16388]enough, he did not raise any questions about the sugar
[16389]quota nor did he engage in any specific discussions with |
[16390]regard toeconomic assistance. His primary concern seemed
[16391]to be to convince me that he was sincere, that he was not a
[16393]_ Communist and that his policies had the support of the great
[16395]Majority of the Cuban people.
[16397]My: own appraisal of him as a man is somewhat mixed.
[16398]The one fact we can be sure of ts that he has those inde-
[16399]finable qualities which make him a leader of men. Whatever
[16400]we may think of him he is going to be a great factor in the
[16402]' development of Cuba and’ “very possibly in Latin American
[16404]affairs. generally._ He seems: to be sincere, He is either
[16405]incredibly naive about Communism or under Communist discip-
[16406]line -- my guess is the former, and as I have already im-
[16407]plied his ideas as to how to run a government or an economy
[16408]are less developed | than those of almost any world figure I
[16409]have met in fifty countries.
[16411]But because he has the power to lead to which I have
[16412]referred, welave no dcioice but at least to try to orient him
[16413]in the right direction.
[16415]COPY . COPY COPY
[16417]“RHR
[16419]13-00000
[16421]Appendix G.
[16422]-
[16423]Memorandum for DCI
[16425]{for Briefing Vice President Nixon],
[16427]29 Feb 60.
[16429]13-00000
[16431]taken or planned against Cuba are:
[16433]t. ep3ry | q. pent
[16434]| py nebo
[16436]29 February 1960
[16437]MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
[16438]VIA: Deputy Director (Plans)
[16440]SUBJECT: What we are doing in Cuba.
[16442]1. This memorandum is for information only, and is for the Director's
[16444]‘use at meeting with the Vice President on 2 March 1960.
[16446]2. Intelligence
[16447]Some highlights of recent intelligence which justify the actions being
[16448]- Rapid build-up of events waich snateate slide toward Commmnist orbit
[16450]' and intensified efforts implement internal programs ‘towards esteblishnent
[16451]Communist dictatorship. Public feeling emong middle and upper class
[16452]Cubans and students has reached new nigh on Comminist : issue and numenous
[16453]station contacts: ‘ranging from left to right have declared that situation
[16454]cannot be tolerated, and that they are. now convinced Communists control
[16456]"Guba. :
[16457]b. The Chief of Cuban intelligence activities in Mexico is on a trip
[16459]. through Central America to initiate activities for the establishment of
[16460]a pro-Castro revolutionary. movement in each country aimed at: the. over-
[16461]throw of existing government. Cuban Embassies serve as cover.
[16462]@. Considerable intelligence has been received of Cuban attempts to
[16463]establish an operational relationship with guerrilla groups in Colombia
[16464]with ult imate goal of overthrowing the Colombian government.
[16465]da. French intelligence reports "Che" Guevara is talking of including
[16467]Martinique and Guadeloupe in a Caribbean Federation headed by him.
[16469]344 >
[16471]13-00000
[16473]— 29 February 1960
[16474]NENORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
[16475]VIA: Deputy Director (Plans)
[16476]SUBJECT: . What we ave doing in Cuba.
[16478]1. Thia memorentm is for information only, end is for the Director's
[16479]use ab meting with the Vice President on 2 March 1960.
[16481]2. Intelligence
[16483]“Soo highlights of recent intelligence which justify the sctions being
[16484]taken or planned against Cuba are:
[16486]fg. Rapid bulla-up of events which indicate elids toward Commniat orkit
[16488]end intensified efforts implement internal progrems towards esteblishuent
[16489]vines Comintst dictatorship. Public feeling snong miQale and upper: clasa
[16491]Cubeas ana studenta has reached new high on Commmist issue snd mmercus
[16493]station contacts ranging free left to right have declared that situation —
[16495]coonot be tolerated, end that they are now convinced Commnisate control
[16497]Cube. 7 |
[16499]b. The Chief of Cuben intelligence ectivities in Hexico is on a trip
[16501]through Central Azerica to initiate ectivities for the entablishment of
[16503]a pro-Castro revolutionary movesent in each countay aimed st the over
[16505]throw of existing goverment, Cuben Exbessies serve as cover.
[16507]c. Considertble intelligence has been recetvea of Cuben attenpta to
[16509]eatablish en operational relationship with guerrilla groups in Colombia
[16511]vith ultimate goal of overthrowing the Colesbian government.
[16513]- @. French intelligence reporta "Che" Guevara is talicing of including
[16514]Martinique and Cusdeloupe in a Caribbean Federation headed by him. ©
[16516]345
[16518]13-00000
[16520]8 March 1960
[16522]MEMORANDUM FCR: Director of Central Intelligence
[16523]VIA: Deputy Director (7lans)
[16525]‘SUBJECT: What we are doing in Cuba. —
[16527]1. This ‘nemorandum is. for information only, and is for the Director's
[16528]use at the RSC 5412 Representatives Heeting waich will consider the Cuba |
[16529]covert action program paper. - (This paper was used for Mr. Nixon's briefing. )
[16531]2 Intelligence
[16532]Some hignlishts of recent. intelligence which justify tha actions being
[16533]taken or plenned against Cuba are:
[16535]Be Rapid build-up of events. which indicate slide toward Communist orbit
[16537]i
[16539]and intensified efforts Implenent internal programs towards establishment
[16540]‘Conmunist dictatorship. Public feeling anong middle and uopsr clasa
[16541]Cubans and students’ hes reached new high on Communist issue and numerous
[16542]stztion contacts ranging from left to right ave declared that situation
[16543]cannot bo tolerated, and that they are now convinced Communists control
[16544]Cuba. |
[16545]. be The Chict of Guban intelligence actAvit ies in Mexico is ‘ona trip a
[16547]Pa
[16548]through, Central America to initiate activities for the establishment of 7
[16550]Fj
[16554]@ pro-Castro revol: tionary. movenent in exch country aimed at the over
[16555]throw of existing government. Cuban Embavaies serve as cover.
[16556]&- Consideraole intellizence has been received of Cuban attempts to
[16558]- estabiish an operational relationship with guerrilla ‘groups in Colombia
[16559]with ultimate goal of overt: vowing the Colombian government.
[16560]d. French intelligence. reports "hs" Guevara is talking ot including
[16562]Hartiniqua: and Guadelouge tn a Caribbean Fedsration headed by him.
[16565]13-00000.
[16569]TOP SECRET
[16571]Source References*
[16573]Volume III
[16575]Part I
[16576]- Background
[16578]A. Watching from the Sidelines
[16580]State, Amembassy Havana: Memo from V. Lansing .
[16581]Collins, 17 Nov 48, sub: Fidel Castro Ruz. C.
[16583]Memo for Chief, WHD from COS Havana, 20 Dec 55,
[16584]sub: Fidel Castro Ruz. S. (HKH-A-2261)
[16586]Ibid. -
[16588]State, Memo for Mr. Braddock from [Army?]. Attache,
[16589]14 Oct 57, sub: Fidel Castro Ruz. (Memo No. 185.)
[16590]Ss. ; .
[16592]State, Memo from Vinton Chapin, 19 Jun 57, sub:
[16593]Biographic Information Concerning Fidel Castro
[16594]_ Ruz. (Memo No. 869). C.
[16596]David R. McLean, Western Hemisphere Division,
[16597]1946-65, Vol. I, 191-192 (DDO/HP 324, 2 Dec 73).
[16598]3.
[16600]Letter to General His Excellency Fulgencio Batista
[16601]y Zavdivar from Allen W. Dulles, 7 Jul 56. (ER~-8-
[16602]4007/a) . .
[16604]Memo ino addressee) from Lyman B. Kirkpatick,
[16606]* 19 Nov 57, sub: How to Bring P2ace in Cuba. S.
[16608]Ibid.
[16609]Beatrice B. Berle and Travis B. Jacobs (eds),
[16611]Navigating the Rapids, 1918- 1971, (N.Y., 1973),
[16612]p- 681. U.- .
[16614]Unless otherwise specified. all sources are SECRET.
[16616]Copies or notes of all sources cited are filed under
[16617]HS/CSG 2632. .
[16619]- 347 -
[16621]TOP SECRET
[16623]13-00000
[16625]TOP SECRET
[16627]12. MR [no author], 27 Jan 61, sub: WHD Reporting
[16628]on the Cuban Revolution and the Rise of Fidel
[16629]Castro to Power, p. 6. 5S.
[16631]McLean, Western Hemisphere Division, op. ctt.,
[16632]I, 213-216. 8S.
[16634]Hugh Thomas, Cuba, The Pursuit of Freedom (N.Y.
[16635]1971), pp. 1000-1001. U.
[16637]13. Berle and Jacobs, op. cit., pp. 685-686.
[16638]Following CS reports (S):
[16640]3,345,281, 13 Feb 58
[16641]3,345,282, 13 Feb 58
[16642]3,347,126, 4 Mar 58
[16643]3,351,466, 15 Apr-68
[16644]3,354,755, 12° May 58
[16645]3,367,468, 21 Aug 58
[16646]3,373,470, 10 Oct 58
[16648]‘qa. . Berle and Jacobs, op. eit., pp. 685-686.
[16650]15. Memo for Chief, PP Staff from Alfred T. Cox,
[16651]25 Aug 58, sub: US Course of Action in Cuba. S&S.
[16653]16. DCS 3/376, 032, 30 Oct 58, sub: Fidel Castro
[16654]. Ruz and Forces Strongly Catholic, Non-Communist.
[16655]Ss. ;
[16657]17. MR from J. C. King, 20 Nov 58, sub: Cuba - Dis-
[16658]cussion of. Pawley Proposal. S.
[16660]Cables to Director from Havana: 9 D--~- 5° - ™™tr™ —
[16661]0661 (IN 35522); 11 Dec 58, HAVA 006
[16662]Ss.
[16664]oe f Gf
[16665]18. Cable to Director from Havana, 11 De
[16666]0668 (IN 36486). S. |
[16668]19. State, Incoming Telegram from Amconsul Santiago
[16669]; de Cuba, No. 341, 15 Dec 58. S.
[16671]20. Ibid.
[16673]- 348 -
[16675]TOP SECRET
[16677]13-00000 |
[16679]21.
[16681]22.
[16682]23.
[16684]“24,
[16686]25.
[16688]26.
[16690]27.
[16692]TOP SECRET
[16694]Cable to Director from COS Havana, 18 Dec 58,
[16696]HAVA 0704 (CHECK NO. 453). S.
[16698]Alfred T. Cox, Paramilitary Activities at.the Staff
[16699]Level, 15 Sep 55 - 31 Dee 61, II, 374-375 (CSHP 183,
[16700]Mar 70) . Ss.
[16702]Memo. for Bob Dahlgren from Alfred T. Cox and Col.
[16703]C. H. Heinlen, 31 Dec 58, sub: Support Arrange-
[16704]ments. S. :
[16706]Memo for the President from Acting Secretary [of
[16707]State], 23 Dec 58, sub: Cuba. TS: [no number].
[16708](Dwight D. Eisenhower Library: Gordon Gray Records,
[16709]1952-61, “Cuba" folder, Box 27(?).) .
[16711](Minutes of] Special Group Meeting on Cuba [from:
[16712]Thomas A. Parrott?], 7 Jah 59. S.
[16714][Minutes of] Special Group Meeting on Cuba [from
[16715]Thomas.A. Parrott?], 7 Jan 59. S.
[16717]Handwritten notes on Department of State Meeting
[16718]on Cuba [by Gordon: Gray?], 31 Dec 59. (Dwight D.
[16720]‘Eisenhower Library: Gordon Gray Records, “Cuba"
[16722]folder, Box 27.) .U._
[16724]-. Dwight D. Eisénhower, Waging Peace (N.Y., 1965),
[16725]. pp. 521, 524. UL
[16727]B. Castro Takes Over
[16729]Cable to Havana from Director, 9 Jan 59, DIR 07542
[16730](OUT 60805). S.
[16732]Cable to Director from Havana, 15 Jan 59, HAVA 0900
[16734](IN 47617). S:
[16736]Memo for Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
[16737](Army) from C. P. Cabell, 6 Feb 59,: sub: Proposed
[16738]US Army . Operation’ Against the.New Cuban Armed
[16739]Forces. (ER 11-409a.) 5S.
[16741]- 349 -
[16743]TOP SECRET
[16745]13-00000
[16747]28.
[16749]29.
[16751]30.
[16753]31.
[16755]32.
[16757]33.
[16759]34,
[16761]35.
[16763]- 36.
[16765]37.
[16767]38.
[16769]39.
[16771]TOP SECRET >
[16773]Memo for Chief WHD from Alfred T. Cox, 30 Jan 59,
[16774]sub: Research Project on Castro Movement. S.
[16776]Cable to Director from Havana, 3 Feb 59, MSGNR
[16777]0984 (CKNR 747). S. ,
[16779]Memo for Mr. Braddock from [Army] Attache, 16 Feb
[16780]59, sub: Situation Report, Memo No. 412. S&S.
[16782]Board of National Estimates, Threats to the
[16783]Stability of the U.S. Military Facilities Posi-
[16784]tion in the Caribbean Area and Brazil, SNIE 100-
[16785]3-59, 10 Mar 59, p. 1. S.
[16787]Cable to Director from Havana, 9 Apr 59, MSGNR
[16788]1191 (CKNR 004). S.-
[16790]Ibid.
[16792]Ibid., 13 Apr 59, MSGNR 2000 (CKNR 017); 15 Apr 59,
[16793]MSGNR 2016 (CKNR 039). S.-
[16795]Dispatch to Director from Havana, 15 May 59, HAVA |
[16796]2161. S.
[16798]“Memo for Gordon Gray from Robert Murphy, 1 May 59,
[16800]sub: Forwarding Tentative Evaluation of Castro
[16801]Visit. C.
[16803]“Dispatch to Director from cos Havana, 26 May 59,
[16805]HAVA 2197.
[16807]HKH-1964, 4 Jun 59, sub: Comments of Cuban Com-
[16808]munist Leader on Castro's Trip to US. C.
[16810]Theodore: Draper, Castro's Revolution (N.Y. 1962),
[16812]pp. 48-57. U.
[16814]Board of National Estimates, The Situation in the
[16815]Caribbean through 1959, SNIE 80-59, 30 Jun 59. S.
[16817]Memo ‘for DCI from Rudolph Gomez, 4 Aug 59, sub:
[16818]Mr. Leo Cherne. 6S.
[16820]- 350 =
[16823]TOP SECRET
[16825]13-00000 .
[16827]40.
[16828]41.
[16830]42.
[16832]~ 43.
[16834]44.
[16836]as.
[16838]46.
[16840]47.
[16842]TOP SECRET
[16844]Dispatches: To Director from Havana, 5.Jun 59,
[16845]HAVA 2233, 5 Jun 59; To COS Havana from DIR,
[16846]9 Jun 59, DIR 30041. Ss.
[16848]Draper, op. ett., pp. 61-62, 65-69.
[16849]Thomas, op. ctt., pp. 1234-1271.
[16851]Memo for Col. King from Rudolph E. Gomez, 26 Oct
[16852]59, sub: Visit of Mr. R. E. Gomez to Havana,
[16853]Cuba, 15-18 Oct 59. S.
[16855]Memo for DCI from J. C. King, 27 Oct 59, sub:
[16856]Discussions between the Department and Chief,
[16857]WHD on Cuba. S.
[16859]US Senate, 86th Congress, lst Session, Judiciary
[16860]Sub-Committee Hearings on’ “Communist Threat to
[16861]the US through the Caribbean," Part III Testimony
[16863]‘of Gen. C. P. Cabell, pp. 162-163. U..
[16865]Dispatch for COS Habana and COB Santiago de Cuba
[16866]from Chief, WHD, 18 Dec 59, sub: RMD -- Cuba,
[16867]HKBW[?] 3214. TS (No number). os ;
[16869]Memo for DCI from J. C. King, 11 Dec 59, sub:
[16870]Cuban Problems. S&S. (DD/P 4-9871.)
[16872]Board of National Estimates, The Situation in the
[16873]Caribbean through 1960, SNIE 80/1-~-59, 29 Dec 59,
[16874]pp. 1, 4, 7, 13. 5S. a ;
[16876]Office Memo to Doris from Pauline, 11 Jan 60, .
[16878]‘sub: General Cabell's Briefing qf JCS-State,
[16880]8 Jan 60. S. ;
[16882]- 351 -
[16884]TOP SECRET
[16886]13-00000
[16888]10.
[16890]Ll.
[16892]by
[16894]TOP SECRET
[16896]Source References’:
[16898]Part II
[16900]Castro Must Go
[16902]A. Organizing for Covert Action, Jan-Mar 60
[16904]L. K. White, Diary Wotes, 8 Jan 60. S.
[16906]CIA Inspector General's Survey of the Bay of Pigs
[16907]Operation, Oct 61, p. 5. TS 173040. (Hereinafter
[16908]cited as I. G. Survey.)
[16910]Oral History Interview: Jacob D. Esterline by
[16912]‘Jack B. Pfeiffer, 10-11 Nov 75, Tape 1, p. 2.*
[16914]Ibid., pp. 3-4.°
[16916]Memo for James E. Flannery, 12 Dec 73, sub: Review
[16917]of [{E. Howard] Hunt's Book [Give Us This Day]. S.
[16919]David R. McLean, Western Hemisphere Division, 1946-
[16920]1965, II, 242-243. (DDO HP 324, Dec 73.). S.
[16922]Conversation between Walter Elder and Jack B.
[16923]Pfeiffer, 14 Jun 74. U. ce
[16925]MR from Jack B. Pfeiffer, 3 Oct 73, sub: Brief
[16926]Conversation with Jake Esterline. C.
[16928]Oral History Ihterview: Richard Drain by Jack B.
[16930]Pfeiffer, 8 Jan 76, Tape 1, pp. 6-8.
[16932]Oral History Interview: Richard Bissell by Jack
[16933]B. Pfeiffer, 17 Oct 75, Tape 1, pp. 2-3.
[16935]Drain-Pfeiffer OH Interview, op. cit., Tape l,
[16936]pp. 15-16.
[16938]This and all other Oral History Interviews conducted
[16939]Jack B. Pfeiffer are UNCLASSIFIED.
[16941]- 352 -
[16943]TOP SECRET
[16945]13-00000 -
[16947]TOP SECRET
[16949]12. Oral History Interview: Richard Bissell by Jack
[16950]B. Pfeiffer, 17.0ct 75, Tape 1, pp. 5-6.
[16952]Proposed ‘Agenda [for the] Special Group Meeting,
[16953]12 Jan 60. S.
[16955]13. MR [from Thomas A. Parrott], 13 Jan 60, sub:
[16956]' Minutes ‘of Special Group Meeting, 13 Jan 60. S.
[16958]US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activi-
[16959]ties, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign
[16960]Leaders,:20 Nov 75, p. 93. (94th Congress, Ist
[16961]Session, Report No. 94-465.) U. (Hereinafter SSC.)
[16963]14. MR [from Thomas A. Parrott], 13 Jan 60, oP. ett.
[16965]15. Memo for DDP from C. Tragy Barnes, 21 Jan 60, sub:
[16966]; Cuba. Ss.
[16968]16. Alfrea T. Cox, Paramtlitary Ground Activities at
[16969]the Staff Level, 15 Sep 55 - 31 Dee 61, II, 384-
[16970]- _ 385 (DDO HP 183, Mar 60). S&S.
[16972]17. MR from J. D. Esterline, 2 Feb 60, sub: Meeting
[16973]with the DCI. S. :
[16975]{MR from Thomas A. Parrott] 3 Feb 60, sub: Minutes
[16976]of Special Group Meeting - Cuba. 5S. .
[16978]18. MR from J.-C. King, 26 Jun 60, sub: Meeting with
[16979]DOD: representative on Cuba.- S.
[16981]MR from E. Scott, 3 Feb 60, sub: Meeting, 3 Feb
[16982]vo [60], 0900 hours - 1015 hours. S. ;
[16984]Memo for the DDS from Bruce Cheever, 4 Feb 60,
[16985]sub: Request for Special Allowance for CIA Rep-
[16986]resentative. to CINCLANT. S.
[16988]19. [MR from Jim Flannery?], 11 Feb 60, sub: A/DDP/P
[16989]Review of Status of Plans for Cuban Operations. S.
[16991]MR from J. D. Esterline, 12 Feb 60, sub: Briefing .
[16992]of Deputy Secretary of Defense on Cuba. S.
[16994]- 353 -
[16996]TOP SECRET —
[16998]13-00000
[17000]‘20.
[17002]21.
[17004]22.
[17006]23.
[17008]24.
[17010]25.
[17012]26.
[17014]27.
[17016]28.
[17018]29.
[17020]30.
[17022]31.
[17024]TOP SECRET
[17026]Memo to.Designated Representatives Under NSC ©
[17027]5412/2 [from Thomas A. Parrott?] [15-16 Feb 60?],
[17028]sub: Covert Action Operations Against Fidel ‘
[17030]. Castro. S.-
[17032]Memo to Designated Representatives under NSC 5412/2
[17033]{15-16 Feb 60?], op. ett.
[17035]Ibid.
[17037]{MR from Thomas A. Parrott?] Minutes of Spectal
[17038]Group Meeting - Cuba, 17 Feb 60. S.
[17040]Memo of Meeting with the President [on 17 Feb 60]
[17041]from Gordon Gray, 19 Feb 60. TS 189337-1.
[17043]MR from J. D. Esterline, 18 Feb 60, sub: Conversa-
[17045]tion with J: C. King, 110@ hours, 18 Feb 60. §&.
[17047]MR from J. C. King, 25 Feb 60, sub: Meeting with
[17048]Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, Mr. Thomas
[17049]Mann on Cuba. S.
[17051]MR from J. D. Esterline, 18 Feb 60, sub: Conversa-
[17052]tion with J. C. King, 1100 hours, 18 Feb 60. S.
[17054]MR from J. D. .Esterline, 19 Feb 60, sub: Meeting
[17055]with the DCI on Cuba. S.
[17057]Memorandum [no author, no date, presumed written
[17058]between 24-25 Feb 60], sub: Covert Action Against
[17059]Cuba. S&. ;
[17061]‘Ibid.
[17063]Ibid.
[17065]Minutes of OCB Meetings: 2 Mar 60;'9 Mar 60. S.
[17066](Dwight.D. Eisenhower Library Files of the Office
[17067]of the Special Assistant for National Security
[17068]Affairs, Gordon Gray (A67-64), Box 67.)
[17070]MR [from E. A. Stanulis?], 9 Mar 60, sub: First
[17071]Meeting of Branch. 4 Task Force. S.
[17073]- 354 -
[17075]TOP SECRET
[17077]13-00000
[17079]TOP SECRET
[17081]32. Note to Mr. Barnes from Richard Helms, 8 Mar 60,
[17082]sub: [Revision of 8 Mar 60. paper for 5412 Group].
[17083]S. | :
[17085]33. [Memo] to Designated Representatives Under NSC
[17086]5412/2 [from T: A. Parrott, 8 Mar 60], sub:
[17087]Covert: Action. Operations Against Fidel. Castro.
[17088]S. ;
[17090]‘34... Ibid.
[17092]35. Memo for DCI from J. C. King, 8 Mar 60, sub:
[17093]' What We Are Doing in Cuba. S.
[17095]36. Ibid.
[17097]‘37. Memo for Mr. [Gordon] Gray from-Samuel E. Belk,
[17098].. 9 Mar 60; sub: . Cuba. (TS 189337-2). (Dwight
[17099]D. Eisenhower Library. -ChLean-Up Files, Box 6
[17100][Cuba] -)
[17102]- Briefing Note for NSC Meeting of 19 Mar 60, from
[17103]S. E. Belk, 9 Mar 60, sub: Cuba. S. (Dwight
[17104]D. Eisenhower Library. Clean-Up Files, Box 6
[17105][Cuba] .) .
[17107]38. Memo for Mr. Gray from Samuel E. Belk, 9 Mar 60,
[17108]op. ett. ,
[17110]39. Memo for the NSC from James S. Lay, Jr., 15 Mar 60,
[17111]sub: .U. S. Policy Toward Cuba... TS (no number).
[17112]. (Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. Gordon Gray .
[17113]Records, 1952-61, “Cuba". Box [27?].)
[17115]40. .Memo of Meeting with the President on 12 Mar 60
[17116]from Gordon Gray. TS (no number). (Dwight D.
[17117]Eisenhower Library. Clean-Up Files, Box 7,'1960,
[17119]- Meetings with the President. Vol. I.)
[17121]41. Memo for Mr. Bissell. and Col. J. C. King, from
[17122]‘Allen W. Dulles, 14 Mar 60, sub: = ["Starters"
[17123]for Our Cuban Paper]. S.
[17125]42. Ibid.
[17127]- 355 -
[17129]- TOP. SECRET
[17131]13-00000
[17133]43.
[17135]ay,
[17137]45.
[17139]46.
[17141]47.
[17143]48.
[17145]49.
[17147].50.
[17149]51.
[17151]52.
[17153]53.
[17155]TOP SECRET
[17157]MR from J. C. King, 15 Mar 60, sub: Special Group
[17158]Meeting, 14 Mar 60. 5S. ; ;
[17160]Memo to Designated Representatives Under NSC 5412/2
[17161](14 Mar 60], sub: Covert Action Operations Against
[17162]Fidel Castro. S. . ;
[17164]MR from J.-C. King, 15 -Mar 60, sub: Special Group
[17165]Meeting, 14 Mar 60. S.
[17167]Ibid.
[17169]Two draft papers on the Clandestine Service's .
[17170]anti-Castro efforts, 14 and 15 Mar 60. {15 Mar,
[17171]6 pp. plus Financial Annex; 14 Mar 60, 5 pp.,
[17172]no Financial Annex.)  S.
[17174]Memo for Mr. [Gordon] Gray from S. E. Belk, 16 Mar
[17175]60, sub: Cuba (Briefing Note for NSC Mtg 17 Mar
[17176]60). S.
[17178]Memo of Confererice with the President, 2:30 p.m.,
[17179]17 Mar 60 from A. J. Goodpaster, 18 Mar 60. TS
[17180](no number). (Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, White
[17181]House Office, Clean-Up Files, Gordon Gray, et al,
[17182]1953- 61, Box 40[{?].)
[17184]Ibid. —
[17186]{Memo from] J. C. King, 21 Mar 60, sub: Policy
[17187]Meeting on General Covert Action Plan for Cuba,
[17188]17 Mar 60. §S. -
[17190]MR from Col. Jack Hawkins, 5 May 61,.sub: Record
[17191]of Paramilitary Action Against the Castro Govern-
[17192]ment of Cuba (CSHP 105). S.
[17194]Eisenhower, Dwight D., Waging Peace (New York,
[17195]1965), p. 533. U.
[17197]Letter to William Colby from Gordon Gray, 3 Dec
[17198]74, sub: ‘Letter to Dr. Don Wilson. (ER 74-6355/4).
[17199]U. . .
[17201]~ 356 -
[17203]TOP SECRET
[17205]13-00000 -
[17207]TOP SECRET
[17209]B. Forging the Tool
[17210]54. Memo-for DDS from John E. O'Gara, 24 Mar 60, sub:
[17211]‘Establishment of a New Branch and Section within
[17212]Headquarters WH Division. S&S.
[17213]55. L. K. White, Diary Notes, 24 Mar 60. S.
[17215]56. Memo for Comptroller, CIA from Allen W. Dulles,
[17216]24 Mar 60, sub: Project JMARC. S.
[17218]57. Ibid.
[17220]58. Memo for J.-D. Esterline from M. J. King, 18 Mar
[17221]60, sub: Branch 4. Financial Support. S.
[17223]Memo for Ed Stanulis from,Mike King, 22 Mar 60,
[17224]sub: Per Diem for Domestic Base. S.
[17226]59. MR - No. 2 [no author], 25 Mar 60, sub: _JMARC.
[17227]Ss.
[17229]60. MR - No. 3 [no author], 31 Mar 60. S.
[17230]61. Ibid.
[17232]Savilion H. Chapman, The Cuban Invasion: Maritime
[17233]Aspects, 1961, p. 7. {(CSHP-.86, Nov 66.) S.
[17235]62. Memo for Chief, WH/4 from P. E. Oberst, 31 Mar 60,
[17236]_ sub: JMARC ~- Timing and Tactics. S.
[17238]63. Memo for Chief, WH/4 from R[obert] Reynolds,
[17239]4 Apr 60, sub: Daily Progress Reports. S. ‘
[17241]64. Memo for DDP from J. D. Esterline, 15 Apr 60,
[17242]sub: JMARC Daily Progress Report for 14 Apr 60.
[17243]S. ;
[17245]65. MR from Eleanor, 27 Apr 60, sub: DCI Briefing
[17246][by] WH/4, 14 Apr 60: S.
[17248]66. Ibid.-
[17250]- 357 -
[17252]TOP SECRET
[17254]13-00000 .
[17256]67.
[17258]68.
[17260]69.
[17262]70.
[17264]71.
[17266]72.
[17268]73.
[17270]74.
[17272]75.
[17274]. 76.
[17276]77.
[17278]78.
[17280]TOP SECRET
[17282]Memo for DCI from J. C. King, 26 Apr 60, sub:
[17283]Project JMARC, Amendment No. 1. S.
[17285]MR from Jacob D. Esterline, 8 Apr 60, sub:
[17286]Briefing of the JCS on Cuba and the Dominican
[17287]Republic. S..
[17289]Memo for DCI from J. C. King, 6 Apr 60, sub:
[17290]Briefing of JCS on Operations in Cuba. S.
[17292]MR from Jacob D. Esterline, 8 Apr 60, sub:
[17293]Briefing of JCS on Cuba and the Dominican
[17294]Republic. S.
[17296]MR from E. A. Stanulis, 10 Mar 60, sub: Meeting
[17297]with Capt. Burns Spore, USN. S&S.
[17299]Memo for Director of Logigtics from William E.
[17300]Eisemann, 19 Apr 60, sub: ° Funding of JMARC-3.
[17302]Memo of Conversation from E. A. Stanulis, 27 Apr
[17304]°60, sub: Aerial Coverage of Cuba and the Off-
[17306]Shore Islands. S._
[17307]Chapman, fhe Cuban Invasion, op. cit., p. 8.
[17308]Ibid., pp. 8-9.
[17310]Memo for the Secretary [of State] from R. R.
[17311]Rubottom, Jr., 25 Mar 60, sub: Coordination of
[17313]Activities Relating to Cuba.. C. (Dwight D-~.
[17315]Eisenhower Library, Gordon Gray, Records 1952-61,
[17316]Box 29, Folder: “Cuba".):
[17318]‘Minutes of Special Group Meeting of 23 Mar 60
[17320]from T. A. Parrott, 24 Mar 60. S.
[17322]Memo for Honorable Douglas Dillon from Gordon
[17323]“Gray, 29 Apr 60, sub: Personal and Confidential.
[17325]U. (Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. ‘Gordon Gray
[17326]Records, 1952-61, Box 27, Folder: "“Cuba“.)
[17328]Ibid. |
[17330]- 358 -
[17332]TOP, SECRET
[17334]13-00000
[17336]79.
[17338]80.
[17340]81.
[17342]82.
[17343]83.
[17345]84.
[17347]85.
[17349]TOP SECRET
[17351]Minutes, of Special Group Meeting of 28 Apr 60
[17352]from T. A. _ Parrott {29 Apr 60?]. Ss.
[17354]Memo for E. Stanulis from J.D. Esterline, 30 Apr
[17355]60, sub: Review of Coordination with other
[17356]Agencies. S.
[17358]Memo for Chief, JMARC/CI from Jacob D. Esterline,
[17359]14 Jun 60, sub: Bureau Stay-Behind Activity. - S.
[17361]Memo for Acting Director of Central Intelligence
[17362]from J. C. King, 23 Jun 60, sub: Operational
[17363]Activities of the FBI in Cuba. S.
[17365]MR from J. C. King, 30 Jun 60, sub: FBI Intelli-
[17366]gence Operations in Cuba and Mexico. S.
[17368]Dispatch to Chief WHD frow. COB JMASH, 30 Aug 60,
[17369]sub: Forwarding of Memorandum (UFGA-113) . Ss.
[17371]Official Routing Slip for Bill Byrne from Don
[17372][Ewing], 6 Mar 69, sub: [Review of papers on
[17373]JMWAVEJ. S. :
[17375]Memo for the President through the Secretary of
[17377]State from Allen W. Dulles, 9 Jul 60, sub: [Brief-
[17378]ing of Presidential Candidates] -[ER-62-1750]. Ss.
[17380]Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Clean-Up Files
[17382](Gordon Gray, et al), Box 64, Actions by the
[17383]“President, Miscellaneous Action Notes, 18 Jul 60,
[17384]“Telegrams to Sen. John F. Kennedy and Sen.
[17386]Lyndon B. Johnson.“ U.
[17388]Memo for Mr. C. T. Barnes from John H. Dyer,
[17389]20 Jul 60, sub: Briefing Material. C.
[17391]Memo for Mr. C. T.-Barnes from E. A. Stanulis,
[17392]21 Jul 60, sub: Cuban | Briefing Paper. S.
[17394]Memo for the President from Allen W. Dulles, —
[17395]3 Aug 60, sub: (Briefing of JFK, 23 Jul 60,
[17396]and LBJ, 28 Jul 60). ER-60-6067. S.
[17398]~ 359 -
[17400]TOP SECRET
[17402]13-00000
[17404]‘TOP SECRET
[17406]* 86. [Minutes of] Special Group Meeting [from T. A.
[17407]Parrott], 11 Aug 60. S.
[17409]“Memo for DCI from J. C. King, 12 Jul 60, sub:
[17410]Project JMARC, Amendment No. 2. S.
[17412]Memo for George H. Reingruber (P) from J. C.
[17413]King, 19 Jul 60, sub: Instructions for the
[17414]Obligation and Expenditure of JMARC Funds. S.-~
[17416]Memo for the DCI, from J. C. King, 19 Aug 60,
[17417]sub: .JMARC, Amendment No. 3. Ss.
[17419]87. [Memo for] Mr. Bissell from T. A. ‘p{arrott],
[17420]23 Aug 60, sub: [Release of $10 million from
[17421]the Agency Reserve for Project JMARC]. Ss.
[17423]88. Oral History Interview: William E. Eisemann by
[17424]Jack B. Pfeiffer, 14 Nov 75, Tape 3,, pp. 33-34.
[17426]C. Cooperation and Challenge
[17428]89. Cables to: MASH and RAND from Director, 6 Jun 60,
[17429]DIR 33225 (OUT 82950); MASH from Director, 22 Jul
[17430]60, DIR 41283 (OUT 99274); OARSMAN, GUATEMALA,
[17431]PANAMA, 4 Aug 60, DIR 43756 (out 54882). Ss.
[17433]90. NIE. g5- 2-60, The Situation in Cuba, 14 Jun 60,
[17434]pp. 1, 5-6. -S/NOFOR .
[17436]91. Memo of Meeting with the President on 18 Aug 60
[17437]from Gordon Gray, 22 Aug 60. TS 208101. (Dwight
[17438]'D. Eisenhower Library, White House Office, Project
[17439]cxeans Ue Records of Gordon Gray, et al, 1953-1961,
[17440]Box 40.).
[17442]92. Special Group Papers, 15 Apr 60 - 31 Dec 62,
[17443]Vol. I, 30 Jun 60. 6S.
[17445]93. Memo of Meeting with the President on 18 Aug 60,
[17446]op. ett.
[17448]- 360 -
[17450]TOP SECRET
[17452]13-00000
[17454]94.
[17456]95.
[17458]96.
[17460]“97.
[17462]98.
[17464]99.
[17466]100.
[17468]101.
[17470]102.
[17472]TOP SECRET
[17474]Memo of Meeting with the President, 17 Apr 60
[17476]_ from Gordon Gray. (Dwight D. Eisenhower Library,
[17478]White House Office, Project “Clean-Up Records of
[17480]- Gordon Gray et al, 1953-61," Box 7, 1960 Meetings
[17482]with the President, Vol. II, 22 Aug 60. TS
[17483](no number).
[17485]The President's. Appointments, 1960 (Dwight D. Eisen-
[17486]hower Library, A 70-29/1.) U.
[17488]Memo for DDP from J. D. Esterline, 7 Sep 60, sub:
[17489]Attitude of Asst. Secretary of State for Latin
[17491]America, ‘Thomas Mann, on JMARC . Ss.
[17493]Ibid.
[17495]MR from Jacob D. Esterline, 24 Oct 60, sub: Re-
[17496]view of Cuban Situation fgr Asst. Sec. State for
[17497]L. Aes Thomas Mann. S&S.
[17499]Memo for DCI from J. C. King, 21 Oct 60, sub:
[17500]Observation on Briefing of Asst. Sec. State, Thomas
[17501]Mann, re JMARC/Guatemala Operations on 20 Oct 60.
[17502]S. : .
[17504]MR from Jacob D. Esterline, 24 Oct 60, sub: Meet-
[17505]ing with DCI and Asst. SecState for L.A., Thomas
[17506]Mann, on Cuba. S.
[17508]Not used.
[17510]Memo. for DDP/EMB from C. Tracy Barnes, 31 Oct 60,
[17512]sub: Attached Paper for Special Group.
[17514]MR. ftom Jacob D. Esterline, 24 Oct 60, sub: ‘
[17515]Meeting with DCI and SecState for L.A., Thomas
[17516]Mann, on Cuba... S.
[17518]MR from Jacob D. Esterline, 24 Oct 60, sub: Review
[17519]of Cuban Situation for Asst. SecState for L. A.,
[17520]Thomas Mann. S. . .
[17522]Memo: for DCI from J. C. King, 21 Oct 60, sub:
[17523]Observations on Briefing of Asst. SecState,
[17525]Thomas Mann, re JMARC/Guatemala Operation on
[17526]20 Oct 60. Si. .
[17528]- 361 -
[17530]TOP SECRET
[17532]13-00000
[17534]103.
[17536]104.
[17538]“105.
[17540]106.
[17542]107.
[17543]108.
[17545]109.
[17549]111.
[17551]112.
[17553]TOP SECRET
[17555]Memo for DDP from J..C. King, 26 Oct 60, sub:
[17556]JMARC U. S. Base Requirements... S.
[17558]MR from Jacob D. Esterline, 3 Nov 60, sub:
[17559]Meeting’ with DDCI. Ss.
[17561]MR from J. C. King, 7 Nov 60, sub: Dinner with
[17562]Adolf A. Berle, Jr.
[17564]MR from J. D. Esterline, 10 Sep 60, sub: Meeting
[17565]with James A. Douglas, "9 Sep 60. S.
[17567]Memo for Chief, WH/4 from E. A. Stanulis, 12 Sep
[17568]60, sub: Policy Approval for the Use of DOD
[17569]Personnel in Project JMARC. S.
[17571]Memo for DDP from J. Foster Collins, 15 Sep 60,
[17572]sub: Foreign Volunteerswfor JMARC. .,
[17574]Memo for Chief, WH Division from Alfred T. Cox,
[17575]12 Oct 60, sub: Recruitment of American Volun-
[17576]teers. Ss.
[17578]Memo for DDP from Jacob D. Esterline, 20 Sep 60,
[17579]sub: JMARC Progress Report for 12-16 Sep 60. S&S.
[17581]Memo for Chief, WHD .from E. A. Stanulis, 5 Oct 60,
[17582]sub: Guantanamo Bay. S..
[17584]- Ibid.
[17586]Briefing Note for NSC Mtg, 7 Nov 60 from CAH
[17587]{Christian A. Herter], 4 Nov 60, sub: U. S.
[17588]Policy Toward China. S.
[17590]Memo for DCI from F: P. Holcomb, 28 Oct 60, sub:
[17591]Concern Expressed by Admiral Dennison, CINCLANT.
[17593]MR from J. Hawkins, 2 Nov 60, sub: Briefing this
[17594]date. at HQ CIC Atlantic and Supreme. Commander,
[17595]Atlantic on Project JMARC. SS. .
[17597]- 362 -
[17599]TOP SECRET
[17601]13-00000
[17603]TOP SECRET
[17605]D. Personnel and Training
[17607]“113. Memo for DDP from Jacob.D. Esterline, 14 Apr 60,
[17608]sub: JMARC Daily Progress Report. S. ;
[17610]114. Esterline-Pfeiffer OH Interview, op. cit., Tape l,
[17611]pp. 3-4.
[17613]115. MR from Jack “B. Pfeiffer, 26 Oct 73, sub: Brief
[17614]conversation with Jake Esterline. ic
[17616]116. Eisemann-Pfeiffer OH Interview, op. cit., Tape l,
[17617]: p. 2.
[17619]117. . Tbid., Tape 1, pp. 2-3.
[17621]118. Drain- Pfeiffer OH Interview, op. ett., Tape l,
[17622]Pe 5.)
[17624]119. Ibid., Tape 1, pp. 6-7.
[17625]'120. Ibid., Tape i, pp. 9-10.
[17627]120a. Memo for Executive Officer, ‘DCI from. ‘Richard Helms,
[17628]19 Jan 50, sub: Dissemination of Intelligence to
[17629]DD/I. (ER 11-552). S.
[17630]David Coffin, Development of Ecnomic Intelligence
[17631]in the Office of Research and Reports, 1950-1967,
[17632]II, 44-45. (DDI/OER 2, Oct 74.) s.
[17634]-121. Military biographic sheets on Hawkins and Egan.
[17635]U.
[17637]JMARC Daily Progress Reports, 27 Jan and 29 Aug 60.
[17638]Ss.
[17640]122. Drain-Pfeiffer OH Interview, op. eit., Tape 1,
[17643]123. ‘Esterline-Pfeiffer OH Interview, op. ectt., Tape l,
[17644]/- p. S. .
[17646]- 363 -
[17648]TOP SECRET
[17650]13-00000
[17652]TOP SECRET
[17654]124. Memo for DDP from J. C. King, 17 Mar 60, sub:
[17655]: Personnel Assignments to Branch 4, WH Division.
[17656]sS.
[17658]125. WH Field Memo. No. 12-60 to Chief: All WH Field
[17660]Stations and Bases, from Oliver G. Galbond (P)
[17661]19 Feb 60, sub: -Agent Candidates for Possible
[17662]Use in Cuba. S. ,
[17664]Book Dispatch No. 1881 to All WH Field Stations
[17665]and Bases from Chief, WHD,. 22 Apr 60, sub: Re-.
[17666]cruitment of Cuban Nationals. S&S. .
[17668]R and R to WH/FI from WH/4/FI, 12 Sep 60 forward-,
[17669]ing FI activity reports for.months of Mar through.
[17670]‘Aug 60. S.
[17672]126. DDS Chrono Files: Minutes of DDS Staff Meetings,
[17673]20 Apr, 18 May, and 29 June 60. S.
[17675]127. Memo for DDP from Jacob D. Esterline, 9 Jun 60,
[17676]sub: JMARC Progress Report for 7 and 8 Jun 60.
[17677]Ss. ; ;
[17679]Memo for DDP from J. C. King, 14 Jun 60, sub:
[17680]Staffing Guide for JMARC. S&S.
[17682]Memo for DDP from J. C. King, 9 Aug 60, sub:
[17683]Personnel Requirements for WH/4 - JMARC. S.
[17685]Memo. for A/DDP/A from Richard M. Bissell, Jr.,
[17686]'25 Aug 60, sub: .Personnel Requirements for
[17687]WH/4.° (DDP-O-4402.) 5S.
[17689]. (128. MR from John F.’ Mallard, 6 Sep 60, sub: Meeting
[17690]with Mr. Tracy Barnes. S.
[17692]129. Memo for Chief, WH/4 from.Richard M. Bissell, Jr.,
[17693]5 Nov 60, sub: Personnel Requirements for WH/4-
[17694]JMARC. (DDP-0-5858.) S. ;
[17696]130, JMARC Daily Progress Reports - Support, 19 Aug 60.
[17697]S.
[17699]~ 364 -
[17701]TOP SECRET
[17703]13-00000
[17705]131.
[17707]132.
[17709]133.
[17711]134.
[17713]4
[17715]TOP SECRET
[17717]Memo for DDP from J. C. King, 19 Oct 60, sub:
[17719]“Use of US Contract Personnel for JMARC Maritime
[17721]Operations. S.
[17723]Cable to JMASH:from Director, 9 Nov 60, DIR 10738
[17724](ouT 90611). S.-
[17726]Cable to Director from MADD, 1 Nov'60, MADD 8452.
[17727](IN 36407). S.
[17729]Eisemann-Pfeiffer OH Interview, op. ett., Tape l,
[17730]p. 7.
[17732]it
[17734]- 365 -
[17736]TOP SECRET
[17738]13-00000
[17740]TOP SECRET
[17742]Source References
[17744]Part III
[17745]' Changing Concepts
[17747]1. Savilion H. Chapman, The Cuban Invasion -- Maritime
[17748]Aspects, 1961, pp. 11-12. (CSHP 86, Nov 66.) S.
[17750]2. Ibid., p. 13.
[17752]3. Memo for Chief, WH/4 from Richard M. Bissell, Jr.,
[17753]2 Nov.60, sub: [Memorandum on Project JMARC]. S.
[17755]' Memo for DDP/EMB from Frangis W. Barkley, 2 Nov: 60,
[17756]sub: WH/4 Paper. for SubmiSsion to Special Group on
[17757]3 Nov 60. S. ;
[17759]4. MR from Jacob D. Esterline, 3 Nov 60, sub: Meeting
[17760]with DDCI. Ss.
[17762]Minutes of Special Group Meeting [from T. A. Parrott],
[17763]3 Nov 60. S. -
[17765]5. Cable ‘to Guat. from Director, &4& Nov 60, DIR 09972
[17766](OUT 88974). ;
[17768]Cable to Director from MADD, 5 Nov 60, MADD 0487
[17769](IN 38552)... S. .
[17771]Memo for Chief, TRAV from Jack Hawkins, 7 Nov 60,
[17772]sub: Organization and Training of Strike Force. S.-
[17774]6. Memo for C/CA from WH/4, 15 Nov 60, sub: Draft
[17775]Cuban Operational Briefing {for] PresidentrElect. S.
[17777]MR from Jack Hawkins, 2 Nov 60, sub: Briefing this
[17778]date at Hq. CIC Atlantic and Supreme Allied Com-
[17779]‘mander, Atlantic. Ss.
[17781]MR from Richard D. Drain, 16 Nov 60, sub: JMARC
[17782]' Meeting with’DDP. S.
[17784]- 366 -
[17786]_ TOP SECRET
[17788]13-00000
[17790]10a.
[17794]li.
[17796]_ 12.
[17798]13.
[17799]14.
[17801]15.
[17803]16.
[17805]TOP SECRET
[17807]MR from Richard D. Drain, 16 Nov 60, sub: JMARC
[17809]Meeting with DDP. 6S.
[17811]Ibid.
[17812]Ibid.
[17814]Memo for General Maxwell Taylor from Allen W. Dulles,
[17815]1 Jun 61, sub: [Briefing of President- Elect, John
[17816]F. Kennedy, 18 Nov 60]. Ss.
[17818]Memo for DDP from C. Tracy Barnes, 18 Nov 69, sub:
[17819]Points re Cuba from Discussion at Special Group Meet-
[17820]ing, Saturday, 19 Nov 60. S.
[17822]Minutes of Special Group Meetings [from T. A. Parrott],
[17823]16 Nov, 19 Nov, and 23 Nov, 60. S.
[17825]Memo for DDP from J. C. King, 26 Oct 60, sub: JMARC
[17826]Budget. {DD/P. .0-5866). 5S. :
[17828]Memo for Chief, WHD from Richard M. Bissell, Jr.,
[17829]7 Nov 60, sub: JMARC Budget. - (DD/P 0-5866). S.
[17831]Memo for Chief, WH/4 Support from Herbert B. Juul,
[17832]22 Nov 60, sub: Staffing Requirements for 600 Man
[17833]Strike Force Training.
[17835]Cable to Director from Guatemala, 22 Nov 60, GUAT
[17836]584 (IN 46427). S. |
[17838]Memo for DDP from Jacob D. Esterline, 23 Nov 60,
[17840]sub: Major Problems Confronting. Operation JMARC. S&S.
[17841]. . N
[17843]Ibid.
[17845]Memo for DDP from Cc. Tracy Barnes, 18 Nov 60, op. eit.
[17847]Cables to Director from JMTRAV: 23 Nov 60, .TRAV 0141
[17848](IN 46775); 25 Now 60, TRAV 0148 (IN 47383). .S.
[17850]Cable to Director from Guatemala, 28 Nov 60, GUAT
[17851]605 (IN 48628). 5S. L
[17853]- 367 -
[17855]“TOP SECRET
[17857]13-00000
[17859]18.
[17861]19.
[17863]20.
[17865]21.
[17867]22.
[17869]23.
[17871]24,
[17873]TOP SECRET
[17875]Memo .for DDP from J. C. King, 29 Nov 60, sub: Para-
[17876]military Policy re Cuba. 5S.
[17878]Ibid.
[17879]Ibid.
[17881]Taylor Committee Reports, MR's of PM Study Group
[17882]Meetings, 7th Meeting, 1 May 1961, p. 3. S. .
[17884]Memo for Chief, WH/4 PM from Jacob D. Esterline, |
[17885]2 May 61, sub: Straightening Out Dates of Strike
[17886]Force Concept for the Taylor Committee. S.
[17888]Oral History Interview: Jacob D. Esterline by
[17889]Jack B. Pfeiffer, 10-11 Nov 75, Tape 3, p. 39.
[17891]Oral History Interview for the John F. Kennedy
[17892]Library: Richard Bissell by Joseph E. O'Connor,
[17894]25 Apr 67, pp. 3-4. U.
[17896]Oral History Interview: Richard M. Bissell, Jr.
[17897]by Jack B. Pfeiffer, 17 Oct 75.
[17899]ps!
[17901]- 368 -
[17903]TOP SECRET
[17905]13-00000
[17907]TOP SECRET
[17909]Source References
[17911]‘Part IV
[17912]Presidential Resurgence
[17914]1. Oral History Interview: Jacob D. Esterline by
[17915]Jack B. Pfeiffer, 10-11 Nov 75, Tape 1, pp. 13-14.
[17917]2. MR from Richara@’D. Drain, 29 Nov 60, sub: JMARC.
[17918]Meeting with DDP. S.
[17920]3. Memo of Conversation with William D. Pawley from
[17921]_ Livingston, T. Merchant, 28 Nov 60. S.
[17923]4. Minutes of Special Group Méeting [from Thomas A.
[17924]Parrott], 30 Nov 60. s.
[17926]Ibid.
[17928]2: a. - Lbid., E Pec:iéo.Ts
[17930]6. -Memo for [Allen W. Dulles] from Livingston T.
[17931]Merchant, 10 -Dec 60, sub: Proposal to the President
[17932]and President's Reply. TS (no number).
[17934]7. Ibid.
[17935]8. Ibid.
[17936]9, CAE aera a per’ Ae OPEL A Poem (pel ente | Doe bc, Aul--
[17938]leenabede a peeps,
[17939]Jo, Vernke § Spread hey, nals] prove Theme, A bee], SDVee Go, S.
[17940]Memo for DDP/EMB from Jacob D. Esterline, 6 Dec 60,
[17941]sub: Four JMARC Problems for 8 December Meeting of
[17942]Special Group. S. : ;
[17944]Memo for Gen. Lansdale. from-C. Tracy Barnes, 7 Dec 60,
[17945]sub: [Problems for Special Group Meeting of 8 Dec 60].
[17947]Memo for DCI from C. Tracy Barnes, 7 Dec 60, sub:
[17948]. Special Group Meeting, 8 Dec 60. S.
[17950]~ 369 -
[17952]TOP SECRET
[17954]13-00000
[17956]ll.
[17958]12.
[17960]13.
[17962]14.
[17964]15.
[17966]16.
[17968]17.
[17970]18.
[17972]19.
[17973]20.
[17974]21.
[17976]22.
[17978]TOP SECRET
[17980]_MR from Thomas A. Parrott, 8 Dec 60, sub: Minutes
[17982]of Special Group Meeting, 8 Dec 60. S.
[17984]Memo for Tracy Barnes from Joseph W. Scott, 8 Dec
[17985]60, sub: [A Suggested Program for Cuba]. TS (no
[17986]number). —
[17988]‘ Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace (New York, 1965),
[17990]pp- 603, 712. “Ue
[17992]SNIE 85-3-60, 8 Dec 60, Prospects for the Castro
[17993]Regime. S/NOFORN.
[17995]MR from Michael F. Taylor, 23 Dec 60, sub: Meeting
[17996]with Ambassador Wilhauer [ste]. Ss.
[17997]Ibid,
[18001]Minutes of Special Group Meeting {from Thomas A.
[18002]Parrott], 22 Dec 60. S.
[18004]MR from R. E. Whedbee, 22 Dec 60, sub: Meeting
[18005]arranged by Henry Holland, 21 Dec 60.
[18007]Minutes of Special Group Meeting {from Thomas A.
[18008]Parrott],'22 Dec 60. S..
[18010]MR from R. E. Whedbee, 22 Dec 60, sub: “Meeting
[18011]arranged by Henry Holland,, 21 Dec 60.
[18013]{Memo] for Attention of Col. J. C. King from Mike
[18014]Haider, rec'd 10 Jan 61, sub: [Anti-Castro Leftists].
[18015]U . . . . .
[18017]Memo for Mr. Richard Bissell from BG Lansdale,
[18018]28 Dec 60, sub: Cuba. S.
[18020]Minutes of Special Group Meeting {from Thomas A.
[18021]Parrott], 29 Dec 60. 5S.
[18023]Ibid.
[18025]Ibid.
[18027]- 370 -
[18029]TOP SECRET.
[18031]13-00000
[18033]23.
[18035]24.
[18037]25.
[18039]26.
[18041]27.
[18043]28.
[18045]29.
[18047]30.
[18049]31.
[18051]32.
[18053]33.
[18055]TOP SECRET
[18057]Memo of Conference with the President, 29 Dec 60,
[18058]from A. .J. Goodpaster, 6 Jan 61. S. (Dwight D.
[18059]Eisenhower tibrary, DDE Clean-Up Files, Box 51 -
[18060]Cuba.)
[18062]Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 29 Dec 60,
[18064]Op. ett.
[18066]Memo for Chief, WH/4 from C. Tracy Barnes, 28 Dec 60,
[18068]“sub: [Cuba]. S.
[18070]Memo for DCI from C. Tracy Barnes, 2 Jan 61, sub:
[18072]_ Material for Policy Meeting on Cuba, 3 Jan 61. S.
[18074]Memo for Mr. Frank Devine from J. D. Esterline,
[18076]3 Jan 61, sub: Personnel for US Embassy in Havana.
[18077]Ss. :
[18079]Cable to Havana from. BELL, 3 Jan 61, BELL 0174
[18081](OUT 5669). 5S. ;
[18083]MR from C. Tracy Barnes,‘'3 Jan 61, sub: Outline
[18084]of 3 Jan 1961 [White House] Meeting. S.
[18086]L. K. White, Diary Notes, 3 Jan 61. Ss.
[18088]Cable to BELL from Havana, 7 Jan 61, HAVA 7405
[18089](IN 1184). Ss.
[18091]Cable to Havana from Director, 7 Jan 61, DIR 19746
[18093](OUT 60701). S. ‘
[18095]Memo for Chief, WH/4 from J. Hawkins, 4 Jan 61,
[18097]sub: Policy Decisions Required for Conduct of
[18098]Strike Operations Against ‘Government of Cuba. S.
[18100]MR from R. D. Drain, 4 Jan 1960 [ste], sub:
[18101]Meeting with A/DDP/A. Ss.
[18103]Memo for DCI from C. Tracy Barnes, 5 Jan 61, sub:
[18104]Material for the 5 Jan Special Group Meeting. S.
[18106]Memo for. ADDP/A from J. D. Esterline, 9 Jan 61,
[18107]sub: Material for the 12 Jan [61] Special Group
[18108]Meeting. S. :
[18110]- 371 -
[18112]TOP SECRET |
[18114]13-00000
[18116]34.
[18118]35.
[18120]36.
[18122]37..
[18124]38.
[18126]‘39.
[18128]40.
[18130]41.
[18131]42.
[18133]43.
[18135]AG,
[18137]45.
[18139]‘TOP SECRET
[18141]Minutes of Special Group Meeting [from Thomas A.
[18142]Parrott, 12 Jan 61]. S.
[18144]MR from John S. Warner, 9 Jan 61, sub: DCI Appear-
[18145]ance before. CIA Subcommittee on House Appropriations
[18146]Committee, 6 Jan 61. (TS 174817).
[18148]Daily Progress ‘Reports, WH/4/Support: June 1960 -
[18149]March 1961: ‘28 Déc 60, . 30 Dec 60, 3 Jan 61. S.
[18151]_ Eisenhower, Waging Peace, op. ett., p. 614. U.
[18153]MR from J. C. King, 1L Jan 61, sub: Meeting to
[18154]Discuss Proposed Release to the Press re NWYf Story
[18155]of 10 Jan 61- on _ Training of Guerrillas in Guatemala.
[18156]Ss.
[18158]Memo for Under Secretary Merchant. from Ambassador
[18159]Willauer, 18 Jan 61, sub: The Suggested Program
[18161]for Cuba Contained in the Memorandum to You dated
[18163]6 Dec 60. S.
[18165]Minutes of Special Group Meeting [from Thomas A.
[18166]Parrott], 19 Jan 61. S.
[18168]Memo for Under Secretary Merchant from Ambassador
[18169]Willauer,.18 Jan 61, op. cit.
[18171]Playa Giron: Derrota. det Imperitaltsmo (Habana:
[18172]Ediciones R, 1961), I, 405... U.
[18174]Ibid., 436.
[18176]Eisenhower, Waging Peace, op. ctt., pp. 613-614.
[18177]Newsday, 10 sep 65, p. 50. U: |
[18179]Ibid., pp. 50-51. |
[18181]Interview with Gordon Gray by Paul D. Hopper,
[18183]19 Jul 67, Columbia University Oral History Project,
[18185]Part 7, pp. 274- -277. U. (Dwight D. Eisenhower
[18186]Library copy.)
[18188]- 372 -
[18190]- TOP SECRET |
[18192]13-00000
[18194]TOP SECRET
[18196]46. The following Oral History Interview filed in the
[18197]; Dwight D. Eisenhower Library:
[18199]OH~14 Dwight D. Eisenhower, 28 Jul 64.
[18201]OH-57 | Thomas C. Mann, 23 Feb 68.
[18203]OH-117 Livingston Merchant -- Part I, 4 May 67;
[18204]: Part 2, 13 May 68. : :
[18205]OH-183 Thomas S. Gates, Jr., 3 Aug 67.
[18207]OH~206 Gen. David M. Shoup, 29 Aug 72.
[18209]OH-288 James H. Douglas, 23 Oct. 72.
[18211]- 373 -
[18213]_ TOP SECRET
[18215]13-00000
[18217]~ TOP SECRET
[18219]Source References
[18221]Part V
[18222]Direct Action Programs
[18224]_A. Propaganda
[18226]1. Memo for DCI from J. C. King, 27 Oct 59, sub:
[18227]Propaganda Operations in _the Caribbean.
[18229]2. Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 28 Oct 59 [from
[18230]T. A. Parrott).
[18232]Memo for A/DDP/A from Sherman Hoar, 29 Oct 59, sub:
[18233]DCI Comments on Cuban Proposal.
[18235]Memo for DCI from J.C. King, 3 Nov 59, sub: Opera- .
[18236]tion Against the Regime of Fidel Castro. ;
[18238]Memo for: Acting Chief, WHD from Richard M. Bissell,
[18239]Jr., 16 Nov 59, sub: Anti-Castro Broadcast Opera-
[18240]tions.
[18242]Memo for DCI from R. E. Gomez , 17 Nov 59, sub:
[18243]Anti-Castro Broadcast Operations.
[18245]3. Minutes of Special Group Meetings {from T. A. Parrott]:
[18246]18 Nov 59; 9 Dec 59.
[18248]Memo for. Chief, WHD from C. Tracy Barnes, 20 Jan 60,
[18249]sub: Cuba (DD/P-0-308).
[18251]4. Memo for DCI from J. C. King, 2 Feb 60, sub: Report.
[18252]on WHD Plans and Activities Concerning Cuba, etc.
[18254]5. _JMARC Propaganda Program [Maxch 1960]. Ss.’
[18256]6. MR‘'s from J. €. King, 15 Mar 60, sub: [Meetings
[18257]with Messrs. Lemon, Loeb, Lapham, and Wright].
[18259]7. Ibid.
[18261]~ 374 -
[18263]TOP SECRET
[18265]13-00000
[18267]Ja.
[18269]Tb.
[18271]7c.
[18273]~ TOP SECRET
[18275]MR from J. C. King; 9 May 60, sub: Freeport Sulphur
[18276]Co. Contribution to Support of Anti-Castro Radio
[18277]Program.
[18279]Memo for Mr. Lawrence R. Houston from J. C. King,
[18280]9 May 60, sub: Freeport Sulphur Co.
[18282]MR from J. C. King, 9 Aug 60, sub: Contribution
[18283]to Cuban Broadcasting Program.
[18285]; Ltr to Hon. Dana Latham, Commissioner of Internal
[18286]“Revenue, 10 Aug 60 from John S. Warner. ;
[18288]Memo for Col. King from R. E. Gomez, 19 Aug 60,
[18289]sub: Telecon with Henry Holland, 19 Aug 60.
[18291]Memo for ‘Chief, WHD from q. D. Esterline, 25 Oct 60,
[18292]sub: WRUL Radio Effort. —
[18294]Cable to Director from MASH, 19 Nov 60, MASH 1744
[18295](IN 45083).
[18297]Cable to JMASH from Director, 23 Nov 60, DIR 13132 |
[18298](OUT 95725). - Se
[18300]‘Request for Payment of Confidential Funds to JMARC/
[18302]Finance from D. Phillips, 21 Nov 60.
[18304]Memo for JMARC/Finance from C/WH/4/Prop, 23 Nov 60,
[18305]sub: WRUL Monthly Payments.
[18309]Cable to JMWAVE. from BELL, 27 Dec 60, BELL 0022
[18310](OUT 5074). °
[18312]Memo for Chief, WHD from David A. Phillips, 25 Jan
[18313]61, sub: Approval for Continuing Payments from JMATE
[18314]Funds for WRUL Radio Program.
[18316]Memo for Chief, Ops Branch, DPD/DDP from Chester H.
[18317]Vincent, .29 Apr 60, sub: JMARC Progress Report
[18319](DPD 3505-60).
[18321]Memo for DPD/AS from.D. A. Phillips, 25 May 60, sub:
[18322]Medium Wave Broadcasts from Aircraft (DPD-4426-60).
[18324]~ 375 -
[18326]TOP SECRET
[18328]13-00000
[18330]10."
[18332]10a.
[18333]ll.
[18335]12.
[18337]13.
[18339]TOP SECRET
[18341]Memo for DDP from D. A. Phillips, 27 Jun 60, sub:
[18342]Estimates for Aircraft Broadcasts to Cuba.
[18344]JMARC Propaganda program, op. cit.
[18346]MR from David’ R. McLean, 27 Jul 72, sub: Interview
[18347]with David A. Phillips.
[18349]Ibid.
[18351]Cable for Director from JMASH, 22 Nov 60, MASH 1805.
[18352](IN 46419). -
[18354]Memo for C. T. Barnes from E. A. Stanulis, 21 Jul 61,
[18355]sub: Cuban Briefing Papers.
[18357][Memo for] Mrs. Geraldine S. DePuy, Director,
[18358]Operations Division and John P. Hebrew, Director,
[18359]Investigation Staff, Bureau ‘of Foreign Commerce,
[18360]Dept. of Commerce from R..W. Lindsay, Intelligence
[18361]Division, Investigation Staff, Bureau of Foreign’
[18362]Commerce, Dept. of Commerce, 20 May 60, sub: Swan
[18363]Islands (FC-2040; 2-37).
[18365]Ltr. for Harold W. Reeves, Collector of Customs,
[18366]Tampa, Fla. from Geraldine S. DePuy, 25 May 60,
[18368]‘FC-2650-FLB.
[18370]Memo for Chief, WH/4 from Chief, WH/4 Support,
[18371]27 May 60, sub: Shipment of Supplies and Equip-
[18372]ment to Swan. Island.
[18374]MR from [R. S. Kraus?], 27 May 60, sub: JMHOPE.
[18375]MR from David A.-Phillips, 27 Jun 60, sub: Briefing
[18377]of Senator Mundt on CIA Radio Operations against
[18378]Cuba. .
[18380]- . Minutes of Special: Group Meeting [from T. A.
[18382]14.
[18384]Parrott], 12 May 60.
[18386]Memo for Chief, WHD from William E. Eisemann,
[18387]27 Jun 60, sub: Administrative Plan for the
[18388]JMARC/4 Phase of Project JMARC.
[18390]- 376 -.
[18392]TOP SECRET
[18394]13-00000
[18396]TOP SECRET
[18398]Phillips, David A., fhe Night Wateh (New. York:
[18399]Atheneum, 1977), pp. 90-91. U.
[18401]MR from Richard R. Bennett, 22 Apr 60, sub:
[18402]Proposed Implementation Plan for Cover Plan for
[18403]' JMARC/4.
[18405]"Memo for DDP from Jacob D. Esterline, 25 Apr 60,
[18406]; ‘sub: JMARC ‘Daily Progress Report 22, 23, 24,
[18407]ye 28 Apr 60.
[18409]R and R Sheet for E. Stanulis from David A. Phillips,
[18410]_.5 May 60, sub: Annex A, Operational Plan for JMARC/4 .
[18412]Memo. of Conversation from E. A. Stanulis, 28 Apr 60,
[18413]_sub: Cover for JMARC. ,
[18415]‘Burwell, James, Logisttes*.Support for Operations
[18416]in Cuba, March 1960-October 1961, DDS/HS OL-7,
[18417]Apr 71.
[18419]15. - [Memo from} WH/Security for Cuban History [May 61],
[18420]~ sub: ' [Security ‘of Swan Island] .
[18422]16. Memo for Mr. David Phillips from J. D. Esterline,
[18423]29 Mar 60, sub: Random Notes of 29 Mar [60] which
[18424]Require Attention.
[18426]17. Cable to Director from Havana, 30 Mar 60, MSGNR
[18427]3940 (CKNR 208).
[18429]Cable to Havana from Director, 9 Mar 60, MSGNR .
[18430]18435 (CKNR 098).
[18432]‘18. MR from David R. McLean, 27 Jul 72, sub: Inter-
[18433]view with David A. Phillips.
[18435]Memos for the NSC from James S. Lay, Jr., sub:
[18436]U.S. Policy Toward Cuba: 20 Jul and 5 Aug 60.
[18438]oUO. (Dwight D. Eisenhower Library: Gray, Gordon:
[18439]Records, 1952-61, Box 27, , Folder “Cuba - ")
[18441][Dept. of State, ARAI, Progress Report on Cuba,
[18442]22 Jul 60. Cc. (Dwight D. Eisenhower Library:
[18444]Gray, Gordon: Records, 1952-61, Box 27, Folder
[18445]“Cuba. "y) ;
[18447]- 377 -
[18449]TOP SECRET Se
[18451]13-00000
[18453]19.
[18455]20.
[18457]2r.
[18459]22.
[18461]22a.
[18463]' 22b.
[18465]23.
[18467]23a.
[18469]24.
[18471]TOP SECRET
[18473]MR from David R. McLean, 27 Jul 72, op. eit.
[18474]WH/4 Prop Notes for 9 Aug 60.
[18476]Memo for DCI from J. C. King, 1 Sep 60, sub:
[18477]Radio Swan.
[18479]Memo for DCI from J. C. King, 2 Aug 60, sub:
[18480]Radio Swan. (DD/P 0-4013).
[18482]Memo for DDP from Jacob D. Esterline, 30 Aug 60,
[18483]sub: JMARC Progress Report for 25-29 August 1960.
[18485]WH/4 Prop Notes for 23 Sep 60.
[18487]Memo for DDP from Jacob D. Esterline, 27 Sep 60,
[18488]sub: JMARC Progress Report for 23-26 Sep 60.
[18490]_ —.
[18492]Memo for Mobilization and Military Personnel Divi-
[18493]Sion from J. C. King, 19 Nov 60, sub: Request for
[18494]Personnel from Department of Defense.
[18496]Cables. to BELL from RAND: 7 Jan 61, RAND 0172
[18497](IN 1158); 10 Jan 61, RAND 0179 (1360). —
[18499]Dispatch to Chief, WHD from COB, JMWAVE, 20 Mar 61,
[18501]sub: Request for Promotion/Fitness Report.
[18503]{Memo from] c. T. Barnes, 15 Mar 61, sub: Propaganda
[18505]Effort.
[18507]x
[18509]MR from David.R. McLean, 27 Jul 72, op. cit.
[18511]Memo for DDP from Jacob D. Esterline, 6 May 60,
[18512]sub: JMARC Progress Report, 28 Apr-5 May 60.
[18514]WH/4/Prop Notes for .20 Oct 60, 21 Oct 60.
[18516]MR from Jacob D. Esterline, 13 Aug 60, sub:
[18517]Conversation with ADDP/A.
[18519]Free, Lloyd A., "A Summary Report on Attitudes
[18520]of the Cuban People toward the Castro Regime"
[18522]' [August 1960]. (ER 60-5982).
[18524]-. 378 °-
[18526]TOP SECRET
[18528]13-00000 -
[18530]TOP SECRET
[18532]25. MR from Jacob D. Esterline, 13 Aug 60; op. cit.
[18534]26. Memo for DDP from Jacob D. Esterline, -12 Aug 60,
[18535]sub: JMARC Progress Report for 10 and 11 Aug 60.
[18537]27. Interview of David A. Phillips by Jack B. Pfeiffer,
[18538]11 Mar 75.
[18540]28. Memo for DDP from Jacob D. Esterline, 24 May 60,
[18541]sub: JMARC Progress Report for 12-19 May 60.
[18543]Klein and Saks,.. “Preliminary Outline of Economic
[18544]and Financial Government Platform, etc," 17 Jun 60.
[18545]U.
[18547]29. Memo for DCI from J. C. King, 5 Jul 60, sub:
[18548]Operational Exploitation of Khrushchev Visit to
[18549]Cuba. (ER 60- ~5254)". ™
[18550]WH/4 Prop Notes for 5 July 1960, 6 Jul 60..
[18552]30. Memo for. DDP from Jacob D. Esterline, 23 Aug 60,
[18553]- sub: JMARC Progress: Report for 19-22 Aug 60.
[18555]31. Memo for DDP from Jacob D. Esterline, 13 Sep 60,
[18556]' sub: JMARC Progress Report for 8 and 9 Sep 60.
[18558]3la. Information on Khrushchev destinations from John
[18559]Zabotto, OCR/USSR Div/Pol-Mil Br., 23 Aug 78. U.
[18561]32. Memo for DDP from Jacob D. Esterline, 9 Aug 60,
[18562]‘sub: . JMARC Progress Report for 8 Aug 60. ©
[18564]WH/4 Prop Notes for: 21 Oct 60; 1, 2, and 1 Nov
[18565]60; and 1 Dec 60.
[18567]Memo for DCI from J: C. King, 29 Feb 60, sub: What
[18568]We Are Doing in Cuba. ; ,
[18570]Cable to JMASH from Director, 2 Dec 60, DIR 14634
[18571](OUT 98992).
[18573]Senate Select Committee, Alleged Assassination Plots
[18574]Involing Foreign Leaders (94th Cong, lst Sess, Rpt
[18575]No. 94-465), 20 Nov 75, p. 72. U. .
[18577]- 379 -
[18579]TOP SECRET
[18581]13-00000
[18583]33.
[18585]34.
[18587]35.
[18589]35a.
[18591]35b.
[18593]36.
[18595]37.
[18597]38.
[18599]39.
[18601]TOP SECRET
[18603]WH/4 Prop Notes for 19 Aug 60, 22 Aug 60.
[18605]Cable to Havana, Istanbul, Ankara, JMASH from
[18606]Director, 19 Aug 60, DIR 46287 (OUT 60198).
[18608]Memo for Chief, WH/4 from R. E. Gomez, 24 Aug 60,
[18609]sub: Outgoing Cable to Havana, Istanbul, Ankara,
[18610]and MASH, OUT 60198 of 19 Aug 60.
[18612]B. Sabotage and Other Exercises
[18614][Information Requested for Green Study], Job 63-289,
[18615]Box 1, Folder 9.
[18617]‘MR {from T.A. Parrott], 16 Mar 61, sub: ‘special
[18618]Group Meeting - Cuba.
[18620]MR [from Thomas A. Parrott], 9 Mar 60, sub: Minutes
[18621]of Special Group Meeting, 9 Mar 60.. .
[18623]Ibid., Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 14 Jul 60.
[18625]MR from J. D. Esterline, 15 Jul 60, sub: Paramilitary
[18627]‘Meeting with DDP.
[18629]Transmittal Slip to Chief, WH/D from [Chief] WH/4/PM,
[18630]21 Jul 60, ‘sub: Paramilitary Op Plan 1.
[18632]Routing and Record Sheet to WH/FI from WH/4/FI,
[18633]12 Sep 60,.sub: Monthly Reports of FI Activity,
[18635]March-August 1960 (See Aug 60).
[18637]MR from [WH/4/PM?] 30 Nov 60, sub: Operation to
[18638]Subtle Sabotage Oil and Kerosene in Storage [in
[18639]Cuba]j. ‘
[18641]Cable to BELL from WAVE, 31 Jan 61, WAVE 3322
[18642](IN 3361). |
[18644]Cable to Paris from Director, 23 Jun 60, DIR 36353
[18645](OUT 89214).
[18647]- 380 -
[18649]TOP SECRET
[18651]13-00000 . c
[18653]TOP SECRET
[18655]40. MR [from J. C. King?], 29 Nov 60, sub: Sabotage
[18656]' [of] Cuban Television Services. TS (no number).
[18658], Cable to .JMWAVE from BELL, 24 Feb 61, BELL 1924
[18659]. ‘ (OUT 9992).
[18661]Cable to. JMWAVE. from Director, 24 Feb 61, BELL 1929
[18662](ouT 5001). ©
[18664]41. Memo for DDP from J. C. King, 1 Nov 60, sub:
[18665]' Request for Approval for Sabotage attacks against
[18666]Soviet and Soviet Bloc Targets in Cuba.
[18668]42: Memo for DDP from J. Cc. King, 18 Nov 60, sub:
[18669]* Development of Action Squads by WHD.
[18671]Memo for Chief, WHD from Richard M. Bissell, Jr.,
[18672]10 Nov 60, sub: Goon Squads. ;
[18674]43. Memo for DDP from J. C..King, 18 Nov 60, op. cit.
[18676]44, Memo for Chief, JMARC from John D. Corbett, 12 Sep 60,
[18677]° sub: Approval of Special Operations.
[18679]Memo for Chief, WH/4 from J. Hawkins, 14 Sep 60,
[18680]sub: - Special Operations.
[18682]-~ 38] -
[18684]TOP SECRET
[18686]13-00000
[18688]2a.
[18690]. TOP SECRET
[18692]Source References
[18694]_ Part VI
[18695]Mr. Nixon's Role in the BOP Operation
[18697]Richard M. Nixon, “Cuba, Castro,. and John F. Kennedy,"
[18698]Reader's Digest, Nov 64, pp. 283-286. U. .
[18700]‘Richard M. Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of: Richard Nixon
[18702](N.¥., 1978), pp. 202-203. U.
[18704]Theodore Draper, Castro's Revolution (N. Y., 1962),
[18706]pp. 62-63. U.
[18708]Nixon, "Cuba, Castro, and John F. Kennedy," op. ctt.
[18711]Nixon, RW, op: ett., p. 202.
[18713]Rufo Lopez-Fresquet,,” My Fourteen Months with Castro
[18714](Cleveland, 1966), p. 107. U.
[18716]MR from Jack B. Pfeiffer, 18 Jul 79, sub: Telecon
[18717]with Bob Zunzer re writing letter to Richard Nixon.
[18718]U.
[18720]Letter to Richard M. Nixon from Jack B. Pfeiffer,
[18721]19 Jul 79. U.
[18723]Memo for Jim Pittman from Jack B. Pfeiffer, 5 Mar 79,
[18724]sub: Memo of Meeting with Fidel Castro on 19 Apr 59
[18726](ER 79-7295). U.
[18728]MR's from J..C. King: 27 Jan 60, sub: Meeting in
[18729]Vice President's Office on Cuba; 27 Jan 60, Meeting
[18730]with Mr. Henry Holland on Cuba; 25 Feb 60, sub:
[18731]Meeting with General Cushman, Aide to the Vice
[18732]President.
[18734]Ibid., 25 Feb 60.
[18736]Ibid., 27 Jan 60.
[18738]- 382 -
[18740]TOP SECRET
[18742]13-00000
[18743]TOP SECRET
[18745]6. .Memo for DCI from J. C. King, 29. Feb 60, sub: What
[18746]We Are Doing in Cuba.
[18748]7. Minutes of the 436th Meeting of the NSC [from Gordon
[18749]Gray], 10-Mar 60. (Dwight D. Eisenhower Library:
[18750]Gordon Gray, Box 79-NSC, Minutes and Agenda 1960. -)
[18751]TS (no number).
[18753]Memo: of Conference with the President [on] 17 Mar
[18754]60 from A. J. Goodpaster, 18 Mar 60. TS (no number) .
[18756]8. MR from J. D. Esterline, 30 Mar 60, sub: Contact
[18757]- with Mr. William Pawley in Miami, 21 Mar 60.
[18759]“an,
[18761]9. MR from J. D. Esterline, 8 Apr 60, sub: Review of
[18762]the. Cuban. Operation and Examination of Possibilities
[18763]for Hemispheric Support for Liberal Governments
[18764](DDP 0-1956).°
[18766]10. Memo for. DDP from C. Tracy Barnes, 17 May 60, sub:
[18767]‘ ; : Project JMARC. a
[18769]10a. [Minutes of] special Group Meetings - Cuba. [from
[18770]Thomas A. Parrott], 19 May 60.
[18772]11. MR from Jacob D. Esterline, 20 May 70, sub: Review
[18773]of Swan Island Operation and [William D. Pawley's]
[18774]‘Apparent Unilateral Decision to Work with Cuban
[18775]Exiles Independent of CIA.
[18777]12: Memo for DDP from Jacob D. Esterline, 7 Jun 60,
[18778]sub: Rubio-Pawley Group.
[18780]13. cables to. Director: from Havana, 4 Jun 60, HAVA
[18781]4820 (IN 48003); from MASH, 9 Jun 60, MASH 0041
[18782](IN 49533).
[18784]14. Official Routing Slip to C/WHD from Gerard Droller
[18785]{4 Jun 60].
[18787]a
[18789]15. Memo to DDP from Jacob D. Esterline, 7 Jun 60, sub:
[18790]Rubio-Pawley Group.
[18792]-16. MR from Jacob D. Esterline, 11 Jul 60, sub: Lunch
[18793]{on 20 Jun 60] with General Cushman, Vice-Presidential
[18794]Aide.
[18796]- 383 -.
[18798]TOP SECRET
[18800]13-00000
[18802]17.
[18804]18.
[18806]18a.
[18808]19.
[18810]20.
[18812]21.
[18814]22.
[18816]23.
[18818]TOP SECRET
[18820]{Minutes of] Special Meeting of the NSC on 22 Jun
[18821]60 [from' James S. Lay, Jr.]. (Dwight D. Eisenhower
[18822]Library: Gordon Gray: Records, 1952-61, "Cuba"
[18823]folder.) TS (no number).
[18825]Routing and Record Sheet. for Chief, WHD from Chief,
[18827]WH/4, 21 Jun 60, sub: Copy of NSC Briefing Paper
[18828]sent General Cabell on 20 June.
[18830]Ibid.
[18832]Memo for Assistant to the President for. National
[18833]Security Affairs from Jacob D. Esterline, 25 Jun 60,
[18834]sub: Notes on Policy Discussion which Followed the
[18835]CIA Briefing of the NSC on Cuba, 22 Jun 60.
[18837]Memo for Mr. Jacob D. Esterline from James S. Lay,
[18838]Jr., 29 Jun 60, sub: Esterline memo of 25 Jun 60.
[18840][Notes on Policy Discussion at Special NSC Meeting
[18841]of 22 Jun 60). .
[18843]MR from Jacob D. Esterline, 1 Jul 60, sub: Tele-
[18844]phone Conversation with General Cushman.
[18846]Memo for Chief, WH/4 from C. Tracy Barnes, 7 Jul 60,
[18847]sub: Swan Island Broadcasts.
[18849]Memo for DCI from Rudolph E. Gomez, 26 Sep 60, sub:
[18850]Mario Garcia Kohly Antiga. (ER 60-7645).
[18852]Memo for DCI from J. C. King, 18 Jul 60, sub:
[18853]Contacts with Mario Garcia Kohly .
[18855]MR from. J. D. Esterline, 20 Jul 60, sub: Briefing
[18856]of General Cushman. oo .
[18858]_WH/4 Prop Notes Jun 60 - Jul 61: 18, 19, 20, 21,
[18860]26, 29 Jul; 1 Aug; and 11, 17 Oct 60.
[18862]MR's from. Robert W. Andrews, 23 and 26 Sep and 4 Oct.
[18863]0, sub: William Jackson Powell.
[18865]. ta
[18866]Memo for Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor. from Allen W. Dulles,
[18867]17 Jun 61, sub: Marshall Diggs Proposals on Behalf
[18868]of Garcia Kohly. ,
[18870]- 384 -
[18872]- TOP SECRET
[18874]13-00000
[18876]TOP SECRET
[18878]. Washington Star, 2 Aug 76. U.z
[18880]24. Memo for the President from Allen W. Dulles, 3 Aug 60,
[18881]{sub:. Intelligence Briefing for Democratic’ Candidates,
[18882]July 1960]. (ER 60-6067). U.
[18884]Memo for the Record from Allen W. Dulles, 21 Sep 60,
[18885]‘{sub: Briefing of Sen. John F: Kennedy on 19 Sep 60].
[18887]25. New York Times, 21 Oct 60. U.
[18889]7 26. Nixon, "Cuba, Castro, and John F. Kennedy , " op. cit.,
[18890]pp. 286-288. U.
[18892]Nixon, RN, op. ctt., pp. 220-221. U.
[18893]27. Nixon, “Cuba, Castro, and John F. Kennedy," op. cit.,
[18896]Nixon, RN, op. cit., p. 221.
[18898]28.. MR from Jack: B. Pfeiffer, 1 Mar 78, sub: Meeting .
[18899]with Mrs. Fawn M. Brodie. U. |
[18901]Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr., A Thousand Days (New .
[18902]York, 1965), p. 225. U.
[18904]29. New York Times,- 23 Oct 60. U.
[18906]MR from Thomas A. Parrott, 27 Oct 60, sub: State-
[18907]ments by Presidential Candidates.
[18909]30. Schlesinger, -op. eit., p. 164. U.
[18911]Memo. for C/CA from WH/4, 15 Nov 60, sub: Draft
[18912]Cuban Operational Briefing: President Elect.
[18914]31. Memo for the Honorable John A. McCone from Allen
[18915]W. Dulles; 20 Mar 62, sub: [Intelligence Briefing
[18916]of President-elect Kennedy] . - U. .
[18918]32. Letter to Admiral Stansfield. Turner from Fawn M.
[18919]Brodie, 4 Jan 78. U.
[18921]33. .MR [from WH/4], 15 Nov 60, sub: [Transcript of
[18923]Tape of] Telephone Conversation between C/JMARC
[18924]and William D. Pawley on 14 Nov 60.
[18926]- 385 -
[18928]TOP SECRET
[18930]13-00000
[18932]10.
[18934]ll.
[18936]lla.
[18938]TOP SECRET
[18940]Source References
[18942]Part VII
[18943]Assassination
[18945]Oral History Interview: Richard M. Bisssell, Jr.
[18946]by Jack B. Pfeiffer, 17 Oct 75, Tape 2, p. 18.
[18948]Ibid., p. 17.
[18950]LK. White, Diary Notes, 22 Mar 61.
[18952]Oral History Interview: Jacob D. Esterline by
[18953]- Jack. B. Pfeiffer, 10-11 Nov 75. (Untaped conver-
[18954]_ sation.)
[18956]Ibid.
[18958]Oral History Interview: . Richard D. Drain by Jack B..
[18959]Pfeiffer, 8 Jan 76, Pemaeiy: pp. 19-21.
[18961]MR [from Thomas A. Parrott], 3 Nov 60, sub: Minutes
[18962]of Special Group Meeting, 3 Nov 60.
[18964]Hunt, Howard, Give Us This Day (New Rochelle, N.Y.,
[18965]Arlington House, 1973), pp. 38-39. U.
[18967]Daily Log - [WH/4] PM Section, 18 Jul 60; 14 Oct 60.
[18969](No author], Key to Map of Potential Paramilitary
[18970]Assets, [no date, but ‘after 6 Aug 60].
[18972]Cable to Director from SACU [Santiago, Cuba], 18 Jul
[18973]60, MSGNR 609 (CKNR 170).
[18975]Esterline-Pfeiffer OH Interview, er a 3) Sd
[18976]pp. 16-17. ,
[18978]Cable for Director from Havana, 9 Dec 60, HAVA 7133
[18979](IN 14488). — , -
[18981]- 386 -
[18983]TOP SECRET
[18986]13-00000
[18988]TOP. SECRET
[18990]12.° Richard D. Drain, Personal Notes.
[18992]13. ‘prain-Pfeiffer. OH Interview, op. ett., Tape 3,
[18993]p. 60.
[18995]14. Job 63-605/58, Folders 1, 2, 3: AMHINT-Operations, .
[18996]19-132-16/1-3. ;
[18998]Cable to BELL from IMHAVE, 24 Feb 61, WAVE 3931
[18999]“€IN 0915).
[19001]15. WH/4 Prop Notes for 27 Feb 61, 28 Feb 61.
[19002]Richard ‘OD. Drain, Personal Notes, 28 Feb 61.
[19004]16. Letter to Jack B. Pfeiffer from R[ichard] D. D[rain],
[19005]24 Jan 76. ;
[19007]Letter to Richard D. Drain from Jack B. Pfeiffer,
[19008]' 22 Jan 76. ,
[19010]17. Esterline- Pfeiffer OH Interview, op. eit., Tape 1,
[19011]“pp. 15-16.
[19013]“Must Go List"
[19015]18. Drain-Pfeiffer OH Interview, op. ett., Tape 1,
[19018]oe - 387 -
[19020]TOP SECRET
[19022]13-00000
[19024]TOP SECRET
[19026]_ Source References
[19028]Part VIII
[19030]Conclusions
[19032]Playa Giron: Derrota del Impertalismo (Habana:
[19034]Ediciones R, 1961), I, 436. U. -
[19036]Maurice Halperin, The Rise and Decline of Fidel
[19037]Castro (Berkley, 1972), p. 89. U.
[19039]Playa Giron: Derrota, op. cit., III, 387. U.
[19041]Oral History Interview: Richard D. Drain by Jack
[19043]_B. Pfeiffer,.8 Jan 76, Tape 1, p.
[19045]- 388 -
[19047]TOP SECRET