[1]DARAAN
[2]Tioa-10338-10018 | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992, Mere
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[9]OCI No. 1586/64 4
[10]CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY uy
[11]Office of Current Intelligence
[13]4 June 1964
[15]CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
[17]SUBJECT: Cuban Subversion in Latin America
[18]. Since July 1963
[20]1. Cuban subversive efforts in Latin America
[21]are ‘continuing at a steady pace, despite recent
[22]major setbacks in such countries as Venezuela and
[23]Brazil, From July 1963 through December, when
[24]Havana evidently believed a "second Cuba" was likely
[25]in Venezuela, Cuban propaganda stressed.the inevi-
[26]tability of Castro-inspired revolutions in the ‘
[27]hemisphere. Since the first of this year, however,
[28]Cuban leaders have muted direct exhortations to vio-~
[29]lence and have emphasized other policy priorities.
[30]Nevertheless, the Cuban potential for subversion in
[31]Latin America remains high.
[33]2. In his speech of 26 July 1963, Castro re-
[34]captured much of the militant tone of his speeches
[35]in late 1962. He made it clear that he regards
[36]Cuba as the main source of inspiration and guidance
[37]for inevitable revolutions in the rest of Latin
[38]America, He claimed that what has been done in
[39]Cuba can take place "exactly the same way in many
[40]Latin American countries." The hemisphere's mili-
[41]tants, he said, must take advantage of conditions
[42]presently favoring revolution and "open the breach."
[43]On 28 September, Castro said that while "imperial-
[44]ists believe they can destroy the Cuban revolution,"
[45]the Cubans believe that before that could be acconm-
[46]plished "many other revolutions like ours will ap-
[48]. pear on the. continent." On 24 November, Che
[49]Guevara said the spreading of revolution in the
[50]hemisphere "is also our responsibility and it is
[51]part of our daily preoccupation."
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[61]3. What emerged from these and other Cuban
[62]pronouncements was the apparent conviction of
[63]Castro and his aides that further Communist revolu-
[64]tions in Latin America are inevitable, that Cuba
[65]can speed up the process, and that in Cuba's own
[66]interest it is urgent that revolutionary action be
[67]initiated wherever possible and as soon as pos-
[68]sible. It is logical to assume that despite recent
[69]official soft-pedaling of the issue, the basic
[70]Cuban viewpoint remains the same. Cuban leaders
[71]continue to believe that the very presence of their
[72]regime will inspire other Latin American revolu-
[73]tionaries to action, and undoubtedly will continue
[74]to give assistance to these efforts.
[76]4. Cuba's policy of revolution in the hemi-
[78]_ sphere has suffered severe defeats, however, since
[80]the 3-ton Cuban arms cache was discovered on a
[81]Venezuelan beach on 1 November 1963. For example,
[82]OAS action stemming from that discovery is pending;
[83]despite the Cuban-supported terrorist campaign,
[84]constitutional government in Venezuela was success-—
[85]fully transferred following President Leoni's dra-
[86]matic election victory last December; and the out~-
[87]breaks of violence in Panama last January failed to
[88]upset constitutional processes there. The April re-
[89]volt in which President Goulart of Brazil was over-
[90]thrown was also a severe defeat for Havana. These
[91]reverses may have produced a feeling in Havana that
[92]a breathing spell is mecessary. In addition, Castro
[93]may have peen cautsones to moderate his revolutionar
[95]year ‘has "Been "{osienated "the year of the economy."
[96]This and Cuba's all-out campaign to obtain needed
[97]commercial and industrial goods from West
[99]also may be factors prompting Havana to lessen its
[100]public expressions of support for revolution. More-
[101]over, Castro may believe that a soft-pedaled policy
[103]on revolution now may pay dividends after the US
[104]elections in November. He probably assumes that
[105]conditions for a US~Cuban modus vivendi--on his
[106]terms--will be more favorable then.
[108]5. Nevertherless, evidence presented in the
[109]accompanying country-by-country index shows that
[110]Cuba has continued since the first of the year to
[111]promote, finance, and otherwise support pro-Castro
[112]groups and individuals in Argentina, Brazil, (be-
[113]fore the April revolt), Chile, Panama, British
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[127]Guiana, and other countries. Indeed, on at least
[128]two recent occasions, Che Guevara was quoted as
[129]restating familiar Cuban views on revolution. In
[130]an interview published in an Italian newspaper in
[131]March, Guevara reiterated that the road to "national
[132]liberation" in Latin American must take a turn to
[133]violence. He emphasized that violence would be
[134]"necessary" in "almost all" Latin American countries,
[135]for "there is no other way." In an April interview
[136]in Algiers, Guevara said: "It is very, very, very,
[137]very, but very, hard to achieve liberation in Latin
[138]America by employing peaceful means."
[140]6. A number of reliable clandestine sources
[141]have provided information on the many facets of
[142]Cuba's subversive effort in Latin America, The most
[144]serio xm _ of subversion from Havana is its, txrain-
[145]Ing of other Latin Americans in the practical_arts_
[146]of guerrilla warfare. As_many as 1,500 received
[147]such training” in “1962. It is estimated that several
[148]hundreéd” GE iirico unre EE ere PPaSNS who
[150]traveled to Cuba in 1963 also received such train-
[151]ing. It has been learned that_"scholarship students"
[152]who go to Cuba ostensibly to study "agriculture" re-
[153]ceive “guerrilla warfare training. This instruction
[154]encompasses _ the use and management of communications
[155]equipment ; “the techniques of military - intelligence,
[156]including methods of establishing intelligence net-
[157]works to obtain information from peasants; training
[158]in a variety of weapons, including rifles and small
[159]arms, which aré“Yeadily available in most Latin
[160]American countries; training in explosives, and
[161]training in guerrilla _tactics, including instruc-~
[162]tion on how to” “S6perate “independently in the country-
[163]side for extended periods of time. A separate train-
[164]ing school reportedly trains Communist. youth 3 from
[165]other “Latin _American_ countries. The school's one-
[166]yédr course is divided between the study of Commu-
[167]nist theory and practical training in political
[168]agitation and subversive activities. Reports from
[169]returning trainees confirm that the Cubans are de-
[170]veloping extensive files on most Latin American
[171]countries on subjects pertinent” to “the” planning
[173]and development of further, subversive activity
[174]Detailéd-quéstionnaires submitted to GipmEsReemmry
[175]trainees requested comments on possible air drop
[176]zones, weather conditions, locations of military
[177]bases, competence of local authorities, border and
[178]frontier controls, and a long list of similar ques-
[179]tions, Ov casa designed to build up a body of basic
[180]knowledge oan srghepeAS
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[190]7. \GLatin Americans returning to their coun-
[191]tries after having received training in Cuba often
[192]take a round-about route to conceal the fact hat
[193]the have been | in Cuba . : aibete
[195]as weg: iteaes bic TED They then go through
[196]Europe to some other Latin American country, from
[197]which they enter their own, Cuba gives these
[198]travelers documents which show no indication that
[200]they had been in Cuba. Some guerrilla warfare
[202]trainees are chosen for intelligence assignments
[203]and are given Special training in clandestine cam-
[204]munications, which permits them to. maintain a con-
[205]‘tact with Cuba after they have returned home.
[207]8. In addition, Latin Americans who receive
[208]guerrilla warfare and other types of training in
[209]Cuba are encouraged, on their return home, to pass
[210]on what they have learned. Cuba-trained men are
[211]known to have been conducting g Such training in
[212]Costa-Rica; “Panama,” British Guiana, Peru, aid” élse-
[213]where, “thus, ‘the Castro-oriented revolutionary “ef-
[214]fort in Latin America has a potential for steady
[215]growth even if there should be a lessening in the
[216]actual training program in Cuba,
[218]9. Numerous reports have alleged that Cuba
[219]is supplying arms clandestinely to some Central
[220]and South American-based extremist groups. Only
[221]in the case of the arms cache discovered in Vene-
[222]zuela on 1 November, however, has there been in-
[223]controvertible proof of Cuban complicity in such
[224]efforts. A good deal of the undeniably extensive
[225]arms traffic which goes on in several areas of the
[226]hemisphere is basically a continuation of long-
[227]established patterns of arms smuggling between
[228]nationals of the countries involved. Cuba does
[229]possess over 100 fishing vessels and some cargo
[230]planes which are well-suited to gun-running or
[231]air drops, but we cannot confirm that they are used
[232]for this purpose. In addition, Cuban leaders have
[233]always stressed the importance of Latin American
[234]revolutionaries procuring their own weapons from
[235]local sources, Moreover, some financing from
[236]Havana undoubtedly is used to buy arms.
[238]10. Another important aspect of Havana's ef-~
[239]forts in Latin America is centered on supporting
[240]and guiding hemisphere front organizations. Havana
[241]has long sought to establish a new hemisphere-wide
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[253]labor organization which could serve as a platform
[254]for spreading pro-Castro propaganda among urban
[255]labor movements. The embryonic Single Center of
[256]Latin American Workers (CUTAL), which held its con-
[257]stituent congress in Brazil in January 1964, ends
[258]Havana's quest. This Brazilian congress was such
[260]a total failure, however, that it is doubtful if
[262]in the near future CUTAL will provide Havana with
[263]the type of organization it envisaged. Cuba's sup-
[264]port for the 9 March Second Latin American Youth
[265]Congress (LAYC) also was well established. This
[266]conference, too, ended in near-failure. Havana now
[267]is attempting to organize another hemisphere "soli-
[268]darity-with-Cuba" congress in Montreal, Canada in
[269]July. This proposed congress--which, however, is
[270]being officially discouraged by the Canadian govern-
[272]. ment--would be. modeled on a similar effort staged
[274]in Niteroi, Brazil in March 1963.
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[284]ANNEX
[286]Country-by-Country Rundown on Cuban Subversion
[288]‘1. Argentina
[290]Clandestine reporting for the past year con-
[291]firms that the Cubans are cooperating with small
[292]extremist Peronist groups in an attempt to estab-
[293]lish a coordinated subversSive effort in Argentina.
[294]Ext reme-le oti Peronists
[296]appears to be the principal Support agent of a
[297]group of Argentine terrorists and left-wing Peron-
[298]ists believed to be directed and supported *GyaRRnEe
[300]Last January, @igkes@g traveled to the provinces
[301]of Jujuy and Salta, near the Bolivian border where
[302]Argentine police discovered pro-Castro guerrilla
[303]camps in March, Some guerrillas who were arrested
[304]in that raid are known to have had guerrilla war-
[305]fare training in Cuba. Among the propaganda items
[306]found at these camps was a book written by Jorge
[307]Ricardo Masetti, who was in Cuba in 1963 as a
[308]director of Prensa Latina. He is thought to be
[309]"Commandante Sé@gundo™ and is probably in charge
[310]of the Small guerrilla bands discovered in north-
[311]ern Argentina in March and April. One of the FAL
[312]rifles found in the hands of the guerrillas pos-
[313]Sessed the same ‘specifications as those found in
[315]‘the 1” November ‘ Venezue. harms cache.
[317]2. Bolivia
[319]Cuban SubverSive activity in Bolivia has been
[320]centered on attempts to strengthen pro-Castro
[321]Sentiment among the followers of extremist Vice
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[333]President Juan Lechin, Through its embassy in La
[334]Paz, Cuba reportedly has given Lechin and his sup-
[335]porters some arms and money to aid his bitter strug-
[336]gle with President Paz Est
[338]believed it necessary to organize well-armed combat
[339]cadres from among various leftist-extremist groups.
[340]He said Havana was prepared to supply the required
[342]ile Bolivian tin m
[345]and material support to Lechin for his campaign
[346]to unseat President Paz in the 31 May presidential
[347]elections, Lechin was scheduled to meet with Cuban
[348]agents in early April to discuss his financial
[349]needs and to determine what he was prepared to of-
[350]fer in return for the proposed Cuban assistance,
[352]In addition, the Comittee of Anti-Imperialist
[353]Struggle, a pro-Castro Bolivian youth group which
[354]aspires to establish a terrorist organization on
[355]the model of the Venezuelan Armed Forces of Na-
[356]tional Liberation, was organized last year with
[357]the help of Mauro Garcia, then an officer of the
[358]Cuban embassy. Members of this group were caught
[359]in November 1963 attempting to plant bombs at the
[360]home of the commander of the Bolivian Air Force
[361]and near the residence of the US Ambassador.
[363]he Cuban government continues to regard Bolivia
[364]as a staging area from which to Sénd trained sub~
[365]versives into neighboring countires., It is pos-
[366]_siblé that some Cuban support for guerrillas in
[367]northern Argentina may have come across the border
[368]from near-by Bolivia. Bolivia also has. long heen
[369]a favorite transit area for terrorists returning
[370]to Peru after having received guerrilla warfare
[371]training in Cuba. In August 1963, a Bolivian Com-
[372]munist Party (PCB) member in north Bolivia led
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[384]police to an armS cache which was to be used to sup-
[386]port guerrilla operations in Peru, Bolivian authori-
[387]ties have uncovered and dispersed at least three pro-
[388]Castro guerrilla groups in this area in the past year,
[390]3. Brazil
[392]Before the overthrow of President Goulart, Cuba
[393]was engaged in an active subversive effort in Brazil
[394]providing funds, guerrilla training, and propaganda -
[395]Support to Communist and pro~Communist groups. Operat-
[396]ing primarily through its embassy in Rio de Janeiro,
[397]Havana collaborated closely with Francisco Juliao's
[398]Peasant Leagues in northeast Brazil and with Leonel
[399]Brizola, Goulart's violently anti-American brother-
[400]‘in-law. The former Cuban ambassador privately
[401]described Brizola as having the best prospects for
[402]starting a Castro-stule revolution in Brazil, The
[403]ambassador appeared to be favoring him over Juliao
[404]from late 1963 until the April overthrow,
[406]before the begin: ry —of Goulart's overthrow, Ha-
[407]vana sent money to Brazil in an effort to bolster
[409]the Brizola forces, Four—Cuban_—couriers reportedly
[410]took the money to Brazil
[412]Cuba also maintained a subStantial propaganda
[413]operation in Brazil, primarily through the local
[414]office of Prensa Latina. A Communist party member
[415]in the state of Bahia revealed, for example, that
[416]the local Communist newspaper was financed by Cuba,
[417]The number of Brazilian-Cuban Cultural Institues
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[431]had increased to the point where they covered all
[432]major cities; Rio alone had seven. Similar or-
[433]ganizations existed at the national level, such
[435]as the Society of Friends of Cuba and the National
[436]Committee Against Intervention in Cuba, Cuba also
[437]broadcast daily to Brazil in Portuguese.
[439]Brazil under Goulart also affordec Cuba an
[440]excellent base for promoting hemisphere-wide, pro-
[441]Cuban front groups. The constituent congress of
[442]the Single Center of Latin American Workers (CUTAL)--
[443]which is planned to replace the moribund Confedera-
[444]tion of Latin American Workers (CTAL)--was held in
[445]Brazilia in late January. The Brazilian delega-
[446]tion to the Cuban-supported Second Latin American
[447]Youth Congress (LAYC), held in Santiago, Chile on
[448]9 March, was headed by President Goulart's nephew,
[449]who brought a letter from the President warmly sup-
[450]porting the conference, Brazil was also used as
[451]a transit area for some Latin American Subversives
[452]returning to their countries after having received
[453]training in Cuba.
[455]In late April, the dissident Communist Party
[456]of Brazil (CPB), which follows a pro-Chinese line,
[457]was reported to have directed two Cuban-trained
[458]leaders to begin paramilitary operations in Sao
[459]Paulo and Goias. CPB members have been encouraged
[460]by their Cuban comrades--many have been trained in
[461]Cuba--but Havana is not known to have given them
[462]direct support. —~
[464]4. British Guiana
[466]The government of Premier Cheddi Jagan is openly
[467]pro-Castro. Thus, Cuban activities in british Guiana,
[469]“In contrast to subversive efforts elsewhere in the
[471]hemisphere, are designed to support rather than to
[472]bring down the existing regime,
[474]Clinton Adlum, the Cuban, trade represe j
[475]in Georgetown, is probably giving both political and
[476]economic advice to Jagan's People's Progressive Party
[478]PPP) >"tiiban ships call frequently at British Guiana
[480]ports to deliver food and fuels and to pick up rice.
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[496]Numerous unconfirmed reports have stated that these
[497]Ships also transport arms to British Guiana which
[498]allegedly are then shipped elsewhere in Latin America,
[500]The vehicle for British Guianese trade with Com-
[501]munis€ countrieS, as well as for Cuban funding of
[502]Jagan's regime and the PPP, is the Guyana Import Ex-
[503]port (GIMPRX). Havana ordered payment e@piedebe2o0o“onas
[505](GEBSE) ember, ostensibly
[506]for payment of goods, according to a usually reliable
[507]source, It is unclear, however, whether the money
[508]was ever actually paid. GIMPEX has loaned such funds
[509]in the past both to the government and to the PPP
[510]publishing house, Another source reports that the
[511]publishing house passes the funds to Janet Jagan
[512]for PPP salaries and expenses,
[514]=.
[516]Georgetown (ng
[517]trained terroristS are behind much of the sporadic
[518]violence which has occurred during the months-long
[519]Strike by the pro-Jagan sugar workers union; it is
[520]attempting to gain an official endorsement by the
[521]Guianese Sugar industry. A senior (gm official
[523]has told the US Consul General that Six or eight
[524]Cuban-trained youths provide the technical support
[525]for this group's growing terrorist efforts in George-
[526]town. Another source reports Some Guianese were
[527]recéiving guerrilla training in the interior of
[528]the country in November 1963, preSumably for the
[529]newly-formed Guyana Liberation Army..--——..
[531]5. Chile
[533]The Cuban effort in Chile concentrates on sup-
[534]port for the presidential campaign of Salvadore
[535]Allende, Allende is the candidate of the Communist-
[536]dominated Popular Revolutionary Action Front (FRAP),
[537]and he has a chance of being elected in the September
[538]presidential elections. Allende has vis ited Cuba,
[539]on SSveral occasions. his campaign manager was “in
[540]Havana in Januar While there, he was promised
[541]financial Support “tor Allende's campaign. A usually
[542]reliable Source reports that Che Guevara recently
[543]said: “Watch Chile, it will be the next Latin Ameri-
[544]can country to enter our camp."
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[559]would soon be leaving Cuba_ to return to.Chile. The
[560]SOUrCE SALA these Chileans had veceived “political
[561]training in Cuba and were returning with funds from
[562]the Cuban government for Allende's presidential
[563]campaign. Chilean police are reported to have identi-
[564]fied 400 Chileans who have visited Cuba over the
[566]past three years as "subverSives," but we have no
[567]evidence of any organized guerrilla training of
[568]Chilean _groups in Cuba.
[570]6. Colombia
[572]Cuba has” been providing . funds. £0. -subversiyes..
[573]in Colombia. § Since. 1960. . The pro-Castro, Worker-
[574]Student-beaSant Movement (MOEC), the United Front
[575]for Revolutionary Action (FUAR)--whose members are
[576]building up the newly activated National Liberation
[577]Front (FLN); and the recently organized National
[578]Liberation Movement have been the principal recip-
[579]ients of Cuban funds, A fairly reliable Source .
[580]veported: SEAS re: = e -
[581]BSYOHDIS to evaluate ‘the FLN and its prospects
[582]and to pass funds for further activity.
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[586]Cuba has established some contact with bandit
[587]gangs infesting — the Colombian | countryside, rmy
[588]tYoops who are fighting” “the “bandits have’ found
[589]Cuban propaganda in the possession of these bandits.
[590]Some bandit leaders may have had guerrilla training
[591]in Cuba, but Havana does not appear to have had
[592]substantial success so far in directing bandit
[593]activity tor political ends.
[595]The Communist Popular Vanguard Party (PVP)
[596]continues to send members for subverSive training
[597]in Cuba. Some of these militant returnees have
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[614]begun training small groups of party members, but
[615]they appear to have no immediate plans for anti-
[616]government action. Much of. the pro-Castro acti:
[617]vity in Costa R Rica appears to. ynave been directed.
[618]against neighboring Nicaragua. Cuba-trained
[619]révolitionaries based in Costa Rica have on oc-
[620]casion crossed into Nicaragua, The police in-
[621]Spector at a town in the Pacific banana zone re-
[622]ported in early February that two unidentified
[623]Cubans who traveled from Panama to Costa Rica at-
[624]tempted to stir up Costa Rican banana workers in
[625]support of Panamanian charges against the US.
[627]The Costa Rican Saciety for Friendship with
[628]PeopleS, a small Communist-front group désiétiied”
[629]to propagandize on behalf of the Cuban revolution
[630]and pro-Castro "revolutionary movements" in other
[631]Latin American countries, iS an important Havana
[632]asset _in San Jose. ——
[634]8. Dominican Republic
[636]The country's two militant pro-Communist or-
[637]ganizations, the 14th of June Political Group (APCJ)
[638]and the Dominican Popular Movement (MPD), are faith-
[639]ful supporters of Castro. Havana Radio quickly
[640]voiced support for last December's abortive APCJ
[641]guerrilla campaign, but we have no firm evidence
[642]of Cuban material support for this effort. The
[643]quick response from Radio Havana suggests, how-
[644]ever, the existence of a communications link with
[645]one or more pro-Castro organizations in the country.
[646]Quick response by Havana to unrest in the Dominican
[647]Republic also was reflected during the transit
[648]workers Strike in early May.
[650]One Dominican who has received guerrilla train-
[651]ing in Cuba organized the 14th of June Revolutionary
[652]Movement (MR 14J) earlier this year out of the old
[653]APCJ and MPD. The immediate aim of this new or-
[654]ganization is to promote urban terrorism. A ter-
[655]rorist captured by police in mid-March is said to
[656]have told police that this group is receiving arms
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[663]) 0: oRvanad hase ealeds prone wel litrained "Salvat
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[671]9. Ecuador
[673]Since the 11 July 1963 military coup, the
[674]Hcuadorean government's careful monitoring of
[675]anti-government activities has hampered Cuban ef-
[676]forts there, When the junta began to exile Com-
[677]munists and pro-Castro extremists las if :
[678]in Havana. ¢@ D )
[679]ease FEET S peck gold a clandestine Source—
[680]in late March that exiles in Cuba were receiving
[681]guerrilla warfare training before returning to
[682]Ecuador to initiate anti-government activities.
[684]Rafael Echeverria, leader of the hard-line faction
[685]of the Ecuadoxvean Communist Party (PCE), is re-
[686]portedly planning a trip to Havana in late May
[688]_ to confer with Castro. Echeverria expects to have
[690]laid the groundwork for guerrilla operations by
[691]then so that he can “prove his good faith" to the
[692]Cubans; he expects to be offered financial aid.
[694]Other clandeStine sources report Cuban aid
[695]has peen offered to supporters of former presi-
[696]dent Velasco Ibarra and that aid is being of-
[697]fered to followers of former president Arosemena.
[699]10, El Salvador
[700]There has been little evidence of direct Cuban-
[701]supported subversion in El Salvador during the
[702]past 10 months, The Castro government probably
[703]helps members of the Salvadoran Communist Party
[704](PCES) and its front groups to get to Cuba for
[705]guidance and training. Havana radio, heard
[706]clearly in El Salvador, provides a propaganda
[707]line which can be echoed in locally published
[708]nist publications.
[710]year and a half, not only in guerrilla warfare
[712]but in clandestine communications, Like many
[713]other Cuban agents, he is not actually working
[715]in Salvador but in a neighboring country, from
[716]which he deals with Salvadoran operations across
[717]the border on direct instructions from a Cuban
[719]oe
[721]ey. negvessraseh
[722]u pM
[723]eae gag SITE ra
[725]SN F PORZIGN DISSEM
[727]SECRET
[730]13-00000
[732]“SECRET
[733]NO FOREIGN DISSEM
[735]Se —
[736]1. Guatemala
[737]Cuba has been giving assistance and guidance
[738]to Guatemalan guerrilla and terrorist groups for
[739]over two years. While we have no firm evidence of
[740]substantial Cuban ass
[742]san J
[743]VI wTan, often used by Castro as an agent
[744]in Central America, saw Yon Sosa in October and is
[745]said to have urged him to work more closely with
[746]the Guatemalan Communists.
[748]Strong anti-Subversive measures by the Peralta
[749]Government have curtailed, but have by no means
[750]eliminated, the insurgency threat in Guatemala.
[752]The assassination on 11 April of a colonel with
[753]special antiguerrilla duties indicates the guer-
[754]rillas are still at large in the mountainous areas
[755]of the country. They maintain reliable communica~
[756]tions and contacts and have the capability to stage
[757]damaging raids on carefully chosen targets
[759]A ” least cs ‘Guatemalans are ‘known to have
[760]itraveled to Cuba in 1963, On the basis of clandes-—
[761]|tine reporting, it is estimated that another 50
[762]qtraveled secretly and that these received training
[763]Ain guerrilla tactics or ‘political indoctrination.
[765]Known Cuban activity in Haiti is limited to
[766]two daily propaganda broadcasts by Havana Radio.
[768]-9.
[770]NO FOREIGN DISSEM
[772]“SECRET
[774]13-00000 _
[775]| | “SECRET
[777]NO FOREIGN DISSEM
[779]A French-language transmission is aimed at the
[780]educated class and a broadcast in Creole is beamed
[781]to the masses. The speaker has been identified
[783]as Rene Depestre, a top-ranking Haitian Communist
[784]exile in Cuba. The content of Depestre's broad-
[785]casts is consistently pro-Cuban and anti-Duvalier.
[786]Some Haitians may have received guerrilla train-
[787]ing in Cuba, but we have no firm evidence that any
[788]Such trainees have returned to Haiti, The long-
[789]time presence of many hundreds of Haitian nationals
[790]in eastern Cuba provides Castro with material for
[791]Sizable infiltrations into Haiti if he should so
[793]desire. :
[794]7 a)
[796]Much of the pro-Castro activity in Honduras
[797]appears to be directed toward Support of similar
[798]activities in neighboring Nicaragua and Guatemala,
[799]The country's rugged terrain, the absence of an
[800]effective internal security force, and the presence
[801]| of long-established routes for smuggling into
[802]neighboring countries make Honduras well suited
[804]for such a role,
[806]13. Honduras
[809]Two recent clandestine sources report the
[810]Cuban government is dissatisfied with efforts of
[811]the Honduran Communist Party to establish an ef-
[812]fective guerrilla movement. Cuban leaders are
[813]said to favor the establishment of a new organiza—
[815]tion with no direct ties to orthodox Communist ;
[817]' groups, The Cubans are said to have selected ;
[818]“. Mario Sosa to organize the new movement, and to
[820]* begin making contacts with "liberal" leaders to tf
[821]“ investigate. their readiness for armed action
[823]- = t 2 2
[824]gains gnduras ' military
[826]TM
[830]NO FOREIGN DISSEM
[832]SECREF-
[834]13-00000
[836]-SECRET
[838]NO FOREIGN DISSEM
[839]14. Mexico
[841]The Castro regime has been careful in the past
[842]to avoid antagonizing the Mexican government, in
[843]-view of the importance to Cuba of maintaining its
[844]embassy and its civil air connections through Mexico.
[845]The Cubans continue to use their embassy in Mexico
[846]City as well as individual Mexican nationals and
[847]exiled Central American residents there to support
[848]subversive activities elsewhere in Central America.
[849]The activities of Mexican journalist Victor Rico
[850]Galan are a case in point.
[852],» however, ta.
[853]easant.. unrest..which
[855]of the peasant unre
[856]general at Tampico reported last May that the Cuban
[857]consul there was openly preaching revolution and
[858]distributing inflammatory propaganda and that he
[859]had stepped up the tempo of his activities consider-
[861]ably in recent months.
[863]Mexicans traveted=to-Cuba—in:1963 ;
[864]yaefrom January~through April~of
[866]15. Nicaragua
[868]Cuban subversive efforts aimed at Nicaragua
[869]have been channeled principally through the National
[870]Liberation Front (FLN), a Communist-dominated revo-
[871]lutionary organization. Most of this group's guer-
[872]rilla leaders were trained in Cuba in 1961-62, along
[873]with members of various other Nicaraguan revolu-
[874]tionary movements. Cuban aid to the FLN takes the
[875]form of financial support, training, and guidance,
[876]but details are lacking regarding its current size
[877]or effectiveness. In August 1963, the FLN launched
[878]an unsuccessful guerrilla foray into northern
[879]Nicaragua from Honduras which cost the small organ-
[880]ization some of its key personnel. Since then,
[881]the FLN has been the object of harassment by both
[882]Nicaraguan and Honduran security forces. It has
[883]shown no capability to make another move soon.
[887]NO FOREIGN DISSEM
[889]— rae
[891]13-00000
[895]“SECREF
[896]aa (0 FOREIGN DISSE
[898]16. Panama
[900]Pro-Castro and Communist elements moved quickly
[901]to exploit the January outbreaks of violence in
[902]Panama. For some four months preceding the 9-11
[903]January incidents, Havana had been increasing its
[904]pressure on its contacts in Panama to cooperate in
[905]starting revolutionary action. Revolutionary
[906]leaders of the Castro-supported Vanguard of the
[907]National Revolution (VAN) were urged as early as
[908]the threatened banana workers' strike in Ottober
[909]1963 to cooperate in initiating an anti-government
[910]campaign, Planning quickened after the early
[911]November visit of Victor Rico Galan and possibly
[912]other Castro agents. Some of the approximately
[913]100 Panamanians believed to have received training
[914]in Cuba were planning to give guerrilla warfare
[915]courses in December and again in May.
[917]Clandestine reporting also discloses Cuban
[918]efforts to influence the outcome of the 10 May
[919]1963 national elections. Havana is reliably re-
[920]ported to have provided some funds for campaign
[921]assistance to selected deputorial candidates of
[922]the Radical Action Party (PAR).
[924]22555 OF
[925]ett re ada." Sur of these were VAN
[926]members. Another group of recently-returned trainees
[927]was reliable, reported in early May to be seeking
[928]to establish a new revolutionary group in Panama
[929]and to launch revolutionary activities in the near
[930]future. —
[932]gato Cuba~in-1963. >)
[934]17. Paraguay
[936]Cuban subversive efforts directed against
[937]Paraguay continue to be confined to supporting and
[938]xiles based for the most part
[939]— ie y ) The Paraguayan Communist
[940]Party (PCP) and its paramilitary front group, the
[941]United Front for National Liberation (FULNA) are
[942]the most prominent recipients of Cuban aid and
[946]NO FOREIGN DISSEM
[948]- hod
[950]13-00000
[952]SECRET
[954]NO FOREIGN DISSEM
[956]attention, gbichsis-given:through-theCubanembassy .
[957]CGreiOngey: +. Some FULNA members have received
[958]guerrilla training in Cuba,
[960]: A once-weekly pro-Castro broadcast in the
[961]Guarani language has been heard in Paraguay since
[962]mid-November 1963. The PCP is said to be kéeping
[963]two Paraguayans in Cuba permanently to enable the
[964]program to continue to be broadcast in Guarani.
[966]SixeNarapiayatis traveled =to9Cibain19 63),
[967]However, probably more exiles in Uruguay traveled
[968]to Havana,
[970]18. Peru
[972]The primary recipient of Cuban assistance for
[973]armed revolution against the Belaunde government is
[974]the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), a
[975]militant pro-Castro organization composed of some
[976]1,000 members and 3,500 sympathizers.
[977]and 500 MIR members have received guerrilla, train-
[978]ing abroad, most of them in Cuba. Police raids in
[979]January and May probably upset the MIR's timetable
[980]for initiating anti-government action, but the move-
[981]ment is well-financed, well-armed, and well-organized.
[982]It has the potential for carrying out a subversive
[983]campaign Of considerable disruptiveness. Luis de
[984]la Puente, the leader of MIR, has visited Cuba on
[985]several occasions, and is on good terms with Castro.
[987]Cuba has assisted other pro-Castro groups of
[988]lesser importance, but such assistance has been
[989]limited to guerrilla training. One such group, the
[990]Army of National Liberation (ELN), organized by
[991]Peruvian extremist students in Havana, has isolated
[992]bands of guerrillas operating in remote areas of
[993]the country. The National Liberation Front (FLN)
[994]is openly pro-Castro, and has sent members to Cuba
[995]for subversive training. Principal FLN leader
[996]Salomon Bolo visited Cuba last September,
[998]Castro-inspired extremists have exploited re~-
[999]curring peasant unrest in Central Peru for the past
[1000]several months and they have been behind much of
[1001]the illegal peasant land incursions which have oc-
[1002]curred there.
[1006]NO FOREIGN DISSEM
[1010]13-00000
[1012]~SECREF
[1014]~~ NO FOREIGN DISSEM
[1016]re known. “tochave™
[1017]Taveled-to Cuba: -
[1019]19. Uruguay
[1021]We have no evidence of Cuban support for revo-
[1022]lutionary activity directed at subverting the
[1023]Uruguayan government. Uruguay's importance to
[1024]Havana lies in its value as a place where Cubans
[1025]and Cuban agents are relatively free to carry on
[1026]subversive contacts with dissidents from neighbor~
[1027]ing countries, particularly Argentines, Paraguayans,
[1028]and Brazilians. The Cubhan.embassy in Montevideo
[1029]has been particularly useful as a transit point for
[1030]air 6. Ciba of travelers’ ‘wishing to conceal
[1031]their ultimate destination. Uruguay also has been
[1032]useful to Cuba asa distribution point for. Cuban
[1033]propaganda for. neighboring | countries, Cuban propa-
[1035]_ ganda is widely disseminated in Uruguay as part of
[1036]a more subtle policy of building up Castroism among
[1038]Uruguayan leftists and intellectuals.
[1041]Plt AprLL “of CMES- VERT _ .
[1043]20. Venezuela
[1045]The current level of Cuban activity in Vene-
[1046]zuela is considered fairly low. International
[1047]reprecussions stemming fron the unprecedented dis-
[1048]covery of the huge Cuban arms cache in Venezuela
[1049]on 1 November 1963, the failure of the terrorist
[1050]campaign to disrupt the December national elections,
[1051]and the presently increased capabilities of the
[1052]Venezuelan military and security forces will prob-
[1053]ably dampen Cuban activities in Venezuela in the
[1054]short run, There is no reason to believe, however,
[1055]that these setbacks will alter Venezuela's high
[1056]priority on Cuba's target list for subversion.
[1057]Cuban support for the militantly pro-Castro Armed
[1058]Forces of National Liberation (FALN) doubtlessly
[1059]will continue, and may even increase.
[1061]_ The FALN gives signs of stepping up its activi-
[1062]ties, but on a lesser scale than at the end of 1963.
[1063]The decision in late April of the central committee
[1064]of the Communist party to continue using violence
[1068]NO FOREIGN DISSEM
[1069]-SECRETF
[1071]13-00000
[1073]activities.
[1075]SECRET
[1077]NO FOREIGN DISSEM
[1079]as a political instrument probably presages a gradual
[1080]increase of terrorist incidents, Riots in mid-May
[1081]led by Communist-dominated students took place in
[1082]Caracas, San Cristobal, and Merida. At the same
[1083]time, one successful student-led robbery of a post
[1084]office occurred, as well as an attempted robbery
[1086]of the university payroll. .
[1088]Robberies have been the FALN's favorite means
[1089]in the past to obtain money to finance its terrorist
[1093]NO FOREIGN DISSEM
[1094]ASECRET
[1096]13-00000
[1098]SECRET KNOWN TRAVEL OF LATIN AMERICANS TO AND FROM CUBA DURING 1963 SBGRETH
[1099]NATIONALITY Janvary February March April May June July August September October November December 1963
[1100]To From To From To From To From To From To From To From To From To From To From To From To From To From
[1101]ARGENTINA 18 27 47) 34 12 2t 13° «14 5712 4 5 6 0 4 0 37 0 4 9 5 3 ee | 222 126
[1102]BOLIVIA ] 7 4 3 3 5 é 0 2 5 3 2 14 0 5 3 21 5 q 7 2 1 7 ie) 69 = 48
[1103]BRAZIL Wo 22,0«413 9 6 18 7 10 5 1 é 25 0 0 24 121 0 2 162 0 0 0 O 219 242
[1104]BR. GUIANA 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 i 0 0 7 10 0 0 ] 0 oO 10 QO 26 255i
[1105]CHILE 31 44 26 = 20 13 42 20 8 9 #14 3 8 20 1 22. 47) (75 1 9 70 9 54 18 7 355 316
[1106]COLOMBIA 54. 39 7 12 3 9 23-0«5 7 15 3 7 29 1 6 14 17 1 8 #14 5 1 10 4 182 122
[1107]COSTA RICA 9 0 0 2 1 0 n 1 0 8 Q 3 12 0 0 8 0 5 0 1 4 ! 10 0 47 56
[1108]DOM, REPUBLIC 0 2 0 0 0 6 2 1 4 2 0 2 7 0 1 8 19 0 nN 0 0 0 3 3. 74 , 24
[1109]ECUADOR 20 0 20 5 10 1 31 1 24 1 4 6 2 0 0 2 7 0 3 4 4 0 ] 0 121 20
[1110]EL SALVADOR 7 2 0 0 0 ie) 5 4 0 0 0 4 4 1 1 0 3 0 6 0 0 1 0 0 26:12
[1111]GUATEMALA 30.18 0 5 15 0 2 0 i 0 0 0 6 0 3 0 2 0 3 0 1 0 i 0 64 23
[1112]HAITI 0 0 4 4 0 0 18 «18 0 0 a) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 i 0 2300 22
[1113]HONDURAS ib 12 20 0 i} ie) n 0 | 8 o oul o 0 0 8 0 ) 0 0 7 0. 0 0 50 39
[1114]JAMAICA 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 33 1 0 2 1 0 fe) 1 0 0 1 0 38 6
[1115]MEXICO , 10081 22 0 26 «38 3718 34 (54 14 42 65 28 34 «63 84 36 24 7 230027 49 72 512 530
[1116]NICARAGUA 4 7 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 5 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 i 1 0 0 ' 12 9
[1117]PANAMA 4 1 20 ie} 2 1 2 3 2 0 3 0 15 0 é 0 6 13 . 1 3 0 0 0 3 61 24
[1118]PARAGUAY 2 3 0 4 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 0 60 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 9
[1119]PERU 6 2 2 4 3 ] 5 8 5 3 3 3 4 0 2 9 1 2 0 0 1 2 1 2 33° (38
[1120]URUGUAY 19 «19 16 (14 8 8 8 0 5 12 9 0 7 15 10 16 = 56 6 3. 27 1 0 6 13 158 130
[1122]VENEZUELA 26 9 2 3 9 9 8 0 4 4 8 0 22 0 3°00 «9 i) MN 10 6 0 3 0 139° 35
[1124]MONTHLY TOTALS 354 296 212 150 124 149 223 88 163 144 73 103° «31947 104 214 58764 76 380 69 99 126 132 2430 1863
[1126]The peaks in Januery, July, and September reflect travel of delegations to the anniversaries of the overthrow of Batista and of the " 26 July movement, and to the internotionel
[1127]architects' congress in October. 640219 3
[1129]13-00000
[1131]KNOWN TRAVEL OF LATIN AMERICANS TO AND FROM CUBA = JANUARY 1964
[1133]JANUARY
[1134]FRO
[1139]jo)
[1140]4
[1143]He
[1144]4
[1145]K
[1147]PURPOSE OF TRIP TO CUBA
[1149]TO M
[1150]ARGENTINA | 9 | 3 [1 UNESCO delegate, 2 well-known Communists went to Cuba.
[1151]BOLIVIA 3 1 [1 attending preparatory meeting of the Latin American Commu-—
[1152]nist Youth Congress in Habana, 1 will attend a course at the
[1153]Cuban equivalent of Soviet Komsomol school,
[1155](BRAZIL
[1156]R. GUIANA
[1157]HILE
[1159]OLOMBIA
[1160]OSTA RICA 11
[1162]JAMAICA
[1163]PANAMA
[1164]PARAGUAY
[1165]RINIDAD
[1166]URUGUAY .
[1167]ENEZUELA
[1169]29 December 1963 - not previously reported -— unknown. _
[1171]Returning from Habana celebration 5th anniversary of Cuban
[1173]Revolution. ;
[1175]An additional 15 Colombian travellers to Cuba should be added
[1176]to the report for December 1963, which brings the total for
[1177]December to 25. It is estimated that 13 of the 25 went to
[1178]uba for the 1 celebrations,
[1180]13 |3 to Cuba to attend meeting at Habana at which Venezuelan
[1181]charge against Cuba was discussed. The remainder were sent to
[1182]Habana for 2 January celebration,
[1184]attended Architects Congress
[1185]children, 3 adults, went from Mexico,
[1187]fos) e
[1188]on wu a “1 olo cS CS be
[1190]re
[1192]1 wWlole lH ot ad on
[1193]oe a
[1194]fez
[1196]va I
[1198](or
[1199]p
[1200]to}
[1202]%)
[1204](0)
[1205]fad
[1206]et
[1207]th
[1209]Sits
[1211]STS
[1215]148 91
[1217]13-00000
[1219]KNOWN TRAVEL OF LATIN AMERICANS TO AND FROM CUBA — JANUARY 1964
[1221]ATIONALITY JANUARY PURPOSE OF TRIP TO CUBA
[1223]UNESCO: delegate, 2 well-known Communists went to Cuba.
[1225]ARGENTINA 1
[1226]BOLIVIA l attending preparatory meeting of the Latin American Commu-
[1227]- nist Youth Congress in Habana, 1 will attend a course at the
[1228]Cuban equivalent of Soviet Komsomol school,
[1229]BRAZIL nen
[1231]29 December 1963 ~ not previously reported -— unknown,
[1232]Returning from Habana celebration 5th anniversary of Cuban
[1233]Revolution.
[1235]An additional 15 Colombian travellers to Cuba should be added
[1236]to the report for December 1963, which brings the total for
[1237]December to 25, It is estimated that 13 of the 25 went to
[1238]Cuba for the ] January celebrations
[1240]13 13 to Cuba to attend meeting at Habana at. which Venezuelan
[1241]charge against Cuba was discussed, The remainder were sent to
[1242]Habana for 2 January celebration,
[1244]|i_attended Architects Congress C“‘“‘CSCOCOCC(*S
[1246]5 children, 3 adults, went from Mexico,
[1248]on
[1250]R, GUIANA
[1251]HILE
[1253]OLOMBIA
[1254]OSTA RICA 11
[1256]DOM. REP, |
[1257]ECUADOR
[1258]EL SALVADOR _|
[1259]GUATEMALA _|
[1260]HAITI
[1261]HONDURAS ___
[1262][JAMAICA |
[1263]MEXICO |
[1264]ICARAGUA
[1265]IPANAMA
[1266]PARAGUAY
[1267]PERU
[1268]SURINAM
[1269]RINIDAD
[1270]URUGUAY +
[1271]VENEZUELA |
[1273]I se bi
[1275]rv) e a
[1276]dfcleelaehefSelaifele| & =| Belo] ole
[1280]a) el to r te Hiwld
[1284]148 91
[1287]13-00000
[1289]KNOWN TRAVEL OF LATIN AMERICANS TO AND FROM CUBA - MARCH-APRIL 1964
[1291]NATIONALITY MARCH-APRIL PURPOSE OF TRIP TO CUBA
[1292]TO FROM
[1293]ARGENTINA 11 10 1- Going to Cuba is an Argentine Communist Party
[1295]leader in Buenos Aires Provinee. 1 - UNESCO
[1296]delegate. 1-Returning is employee of Cuban
[1297]Construction Ministry.
[1299]i
[1302]BOLIVIA 3~ Attending May Day Celebration.
[1303]BRAZIL
[1304]BR. GUIANA
[1305]CHILE 4- Labor leaders attending May Day Celebration. I6-
[1306]Returning are members of delegation from School
[1307]of Economy of University of Chile.
[1308]COLOMBIA [7 {0 |
[1309]COSTA RICA 1l~ En route to Eas ermany. 2- In attempt to
[1310]PF tT obtain release of Teodoro Picado Lara.
[1311]DOM. REP. 4- Returning from 26th July Celebration.
[1312]ECUADOR re ee
[1313]EL SALVADOR 3 PB Attending May Day Celebrations. 8-Returning
[1314]. from military training in Cuba.
[1315]| GUATEMALA [0 [0 | |
[1316]; HAITI Cn Soe
[1317]HONDURAS fof |
[1318]JAMAICA a a
[1319]MEXICO | 32 [| 24 | 3- Attending May Day Celebrations.
[1320]/ NICARAGUA | 2 | 1]
[1321]PANAMA | 2 { 14 f 3- Returnees members of Vanguard of National Action
[1322]PARAGUA a
[1323]PERU eo
[1324]SURINAN _f[O [ 01
[1325]TRINIDAD {0 | 0]
[1326]URUGUA [_14_f_i1 |
[1327]VENEZUELA $17 {| 0 |
[1329]po
[1330]NO
[1331]pent
[1333]TOTAL S$ 130