[1]157-10014-10081
[3]2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
[5]Date
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[8]08/04/95
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[13]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[14]IDENTIFICATION FORM
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[18]AGENCY
[20]RECORD NUMBER
[21]RECORDS SERIES
[22]AGENCY FILE NUMBER
[24]ee ew a a ee a a ee ee ee RE EE ERE RRR RR SS
[26]ORIGINATOR
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[31]TITLE
[33]DATE
[35]PAGES
[36]SUBJECTS
[38]DOCUMENT TYPE
[39]CLASSIFICATION
[40]RESTRICTIONS
[41]CURRENT STATUS
[43]DATE OF LAST REVIEW
[44]OPENING CRITERIA
[45]COMMENTS
[47]oe 0a ce 26 26 aa oF
[49]ee es 26 80
[51]AGENCY INFORMATION
[53]SSCIA .
[54]157-10014-10081
[55]HEARINGS
[57]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[59]SSCIA
[61]GOODWIN, RICHARD
[63]07/10/75
[65]61
[66]ASSASSINATION, TRUJILLO
[67]DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
[69]CIA
[71]EISENHOWER, DWIGHT
[73]TRANSCRIPT
[74]UNCLASSIFIED
[76]OPEN IN FULL
[78]RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
[79]05/12/98
[81]Box 3
[83]ee i a a ee a a a ee ee em eS ma a em mw ea a SS
[85]HY 50955
[87]- ITEM IS RESTRICTED
[89]Docld: 32423469 Page 1
[91]ag SETA
[95]Te peppiie TGR iirsce
[96]hie ents : said
[98]‘Unaue
[100]we
[102]The 2
[106]feve,
[107]STO, -
[108]an
[110]Report cf Proceedings >
[114]Hearing held before
[116]Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental
[118]Operations with Respect te Tatelligeance Activities
[120]sere
[121]Thuraday, July 10, 1975
[122]Washington, D.C.
[125](Stenotype Tape and Wasts turned over
[127]to the Comntceeg for destruction)
[129]WARD & PAUL
[131]410 FIRST STREET, 8. KE.
[132]WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003
[134]{208) 844-6000
[136]TOP SECRET
[139]it
[141]POR IDENTIFICATION
[143]BEY
[144]eS
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[173]TESTIMONY OF
[174]EXHIBIT
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[207]410 Pest Street, $.€_ vravengion, D.C, 2000)
[209]EXECUTIVE SESSION
[211]Thursday, July 10, 1975
[213]United States Senate,
[215]Select Committee to Study Governmental
[216]Oparations with Respect to
[217]Governmental Activities,
[219]Washington, 0. C.
[221]The Committes met, pursuant to notice, at $:02 o'clock
[222]pem. in Room S-128, The Capitol, the Honorable Frank Church
[223](Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
[225]Present: Senators Church (prasiding), Hart of Michigan,
[226]Mondale, Huddleston, Hart of Colorado, Tower, Baker and
[227]Schweiker.
[229]Also present: William Miller, Staff Director; Frederick
[230]A. O. Schwarz, Jr., Chief Counsel; Curtis R. Smothers, Minority
[231]Counsel; Charles Kirbow, Charles Lombard, Michael J. Madigan,
[232]David Aaron, Joe Dennin, Elizabeth Culbreth and Patrick Shea.
[234]Professional Staff Membars.
[236]TOP SECRET
[239]F7JANANNAT R79.
[241]BIG Foret Str9t. $ E_ wasnemrgton. B.C. 20002
[243]The Chairman, We will come back into order.
[245]Mr. Goodwin, would you please take the oath?
[247]Do you swear that all the testimony you ara about to give
[248]in this Proceéding will be the truth, the whole truth, and
[249]nothing but the truth, so help you God?
[251]Mr. Goodwin. I do.
[253]The Chairman. I am given to understand that there has
[254]been some problem in connection ‘vith your appearance here today
[255]and that there are soma notes that you have that you feel you
[256]need for purposes of your testimony which you have not brought
[257]with you. Is that the cage?
[259]Mr. Goodwin. Yes, I think they miqht he helpful. Thay
[260]have been in storage for Several years and fY just had no access
[261]to them. I have to go get them out of the storage. They wera
[262]notes -- my files and averything have been in storage for
[263]Several years. I've had no access to tham. And they consist
[264]of the files that 1 brought from the White House with me.
[266]The Chairman. Have you been interviewed by members of the
[267]staff and shown certain documents that the staffé believes will
[268]be pertinent to your tastimony?
[270]Mr. Goodwin. I have been shown documents connected with
[271]the Dominican Republic and the assassination of Trujillo today.
[273]The Chairman. And do you bellave that you are prepared
[275]today to give us testimony ralating to Mr, Trujillo or do you
[277]TOP SECRET
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[287]|
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[293]at
[295]you need to oF oughe to Faview those notes befora
[297]tenants
[299]5 . you give any testimony?
[301]y Mr. Goodwin. Well, I'm ef course fully prepared to testiry
[303]§ : to the best of my recollection to any matter, and I think |
[305]: | probably in the case of the Dominican Republie, the documents |
[307]a ; 6 : have been adequate. I think there’s a good chance that goina |
[309]x i 9 | through the files may very well add something to my recollection
[310]a | g || of Cuba and Castro.
[312]M4 | 9 | The Chairman, Well I will have this suqgeation to make.
[314]u 10 We will take your testimony on the Trujillo matter today, and |
[316]11 | then «= how long will it take you to qet your files and review
[318]41330
[320]|
[322]12 | them and coma hack fully prepared to give us your testimony on:
[324]13] the other issues?
[326]WARS & Paw,
[328]14 Mr. Goodwin. ell, 1¢ will take a day or two, ft is
[332]i?
[333]ag
[334]Yi
[338]25) Posaible X will not be able to gat access to them until Monday
[340]76000
[342]i
[343]|
[344]16 i morning. It's kind of like trying to get to Pocatello
[346]17 | 4n@ find them in a warehouse, because I'm up in Rumford, Maine.
[348]18 But I am sure that it would not take more than a day or two.
[349]19 The Chairman. So that if the Comnittes were to give you |
[351]20 that opportunity, would you than get those files, review then, |
[354]TENSE SAE SIUM
[356]2) || 4nd respond to the request by the Committee that you appear the}
[358]first of next week to testify?
[360]22
[362]Mr. Goodwin. If that is your wish, certainly,
[364]The Chairman. Wa are most anxious to complete the record
[366]410 Fars Street, $.£., Wemnengion, D.C. 20008
[368]and your testimony is necessary, and it would certainly
[370]TOP SECRET
[373]He Ae Ns
[374]adconodate' our, fn
[378]owe
[380]Mr. Goodwin, f
[382]The Chateman.” ai rtones
[384]. 4 With that understanding then, Mr. Schwarz, are you
[385]i
[386]aan 8 prepared to proceed with the questioning on Trujillo?
[387]oon 6 Mr. Schwarg, I'm sorry Mr. Goodwin that we didn't have
[388]M , 9 a chance to get togather. f thought we were going to have a
[389]8 | chance to do that on Tuesday, and I have not had a chance to
[390]7 9 Speak to you but I do know some of the material, and Perhaps
[391] o% 10 || ¥e can work on the material.
[392]é ll Refore we do g0, could you state your full name and you:
[393]oi 12 address please? ,
[396]c 8
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[419]Washington, B.C.
[421]|
[422]4 Mr. Schwarz. And as a macter of course, we teil all of i
[424]5 | our witnesses what they no doubt know, that they have their '
[426]6 | right to counsel, and you know that, and if you want to stop i
[428]9 to obtain counsel, you know that you can do that?
[429]8 Mr. Goodwin. f already have too many lawyers.
[431]bas | 9 Mr. Schwarz. And you know what your constitutional
[433]m 10 || rights are?
[435]_ 11 Mr. Goodwin. Hopefully.
[436]wi 12 Mr. Schwarz. Now, what connection did you have with the
[437]Oc; 13 || Dominican Republic in the winter and eapring of 1961?
[438]- . 14 Mr. Goodwin. I came inte the White House ag Assistant |
[439]ce 15 | Special Counsel to the President, having worked on Latin
[440]< 16 | American affairs policy statements in the preceeding campaign. |
[441]-*= 17 || I became involved in Latin America. And from that period until! :
[442]ia i| % left to go to the State Department, I was involved on a |
[443]§ 9 | datay basis with President Kennedy and his activities’in Latin
[444]8 20 || Amarica which included what was happening in the Dominican
[445]I . pi] Republic in terms that I drafted contingency plans, I prepare:
[446]: ge || cables that want to Mr. Dearborn focussing on the areas that
[447]I pz) you are interested in, and I waa with him every day on somethin:
[448]eG é . connected with Latin America.
[449]3
[451]Me. Schwarz. Without your turning to the documentary j
[452]' i
[453]|
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[456]TOP SECRET
[458]material, would you recount for the Committee your understand Jn:
[459]of what the United States government policy toward the Dominic
[460]Republic was in the winter and spring of ‘61 and what actions
[461]were taken to implement that policy.
[463]Mr. Goodwin. Well, that policy was a continuation of th-
[464]policy established by Pragident Eisenhower when he, in
[465]accordance with the vote of the OAS, voted to sever -- decide
[466]to sever diplomatic and commercial relations with the Dominican .
[468]Republic and the sithation whith you know arose was precipitated
[470]by the attempted assassination of Prasident fetancourt by the
[472]A
[474]President of the Dominican Republic.
[479]yannn®
[481]So that from that point on when we cama in, the feeling
[482]wags, firat of all, of course that Trujillo was evan more
[483]at odds with the philosophy of the Alliance for Proqregs tha:
[484]had been and beyond that, having cut off diplomatic and other
[485]relations, that Trujillo's time: dh office was probably,
[486]numbered. The principal support of the regime in that decade
[487]which was often in great domestic difficulty had been tha
[488]concept of Amarican support, it strengthened Trujillo agains:
[489]his opposition.
[491]At that point our policy became one of trying to anticlru:
[492]at least, the fall of trujilio. Of course the Castro thing
[493]wags Very much in everybody's mind and the principal concern «!
[495]the President, the ons thing he didn't want was for Trujillo
[497]@2O Ferse Street, $.0.. Vrewumgpon, O.C. 20003
[499]to go and a Communist leadar to come in. - So I think the policy
[501]TOP SECRET
[503]i
[506]Pern Ean gare
[508]was to keep up our eaconemia ané diplomatic prassure to hope
[510]that when Trujillo went, howaver he went, whether violently or
[512]Peacefully or died a natural death that the succession would
[514]be a moderate, democratic group friendly to the interests of |
[516]the United States in the Caribbean and therefore try to keap in
[517]touch with and halp out and keep communications open with |
[518]the potential successor groups, and it wag very hard to
[520]pinpoint.
[522]Hr. Schwarg. What stepa did you take during the period
[523]of tima you were involved, or prior therate, if you know
[524]about it, in order to assist one or more of the dissident
[525]groups?
[527]Mr. Goodwin. Well, we did all sorts -- everything from
[528]policy statements, the usé of USIA, the ude of economic
[529]Pressure, to maintain our network of contacts with exile
[531]groups principally'in New York and elsewhere. A certain number
[533]pannnesiayq
[535]of limited covert operations, some transfer of arms. Dearborn
[537]of course was one of tha principals, his principal instruction
[539]aap rennennerstpvornen yetmnr me
[541]19 || was to try to keep all channels of communication open, he was
[543]20 zealous in thia because ha disliked Trujillo intensely himself
[545]2) and felt that he ought to be allied with these other groups.
[547]|
[548]22 And ¥ read through the sort of overall Planning papers, and I |
[550]t
[551]k
[552]i
[555]think they fairly reflact that range of operations.
[557]None of them wera terribly effactive.
[559]410 Fest Street, $.E.. Wowmegton, 0.6. 20003
[561]Mr. Schwarz. In connection with the transfer of arma,
[563]TOP SECRET
[565]See E MP pre ee
[569]eee 5 yoUEDS SEED REISU IM DHE ATM: a Berane + Petias
[571]Ce ara EY Gee EO ATEN GCSON A rer
[572]ae SCT RE ecRET
[574]|
[575]1 | what, to your understanding, was the time at which authorization!
[576]j 2 || was provided to transfer arms?
[577]j 4 Mr. Goodwin. January 12, 1960, under President Fisenhower .;
[578]4 Mr. Schwarz. And that was at 4 meating of the Special ‘
[579]5 Group? :
[580]6 Mr. Goodwin. Well, 1 don't know because they didn't let !
[582]7 || me in that week, but there was an NSC action memorandum of |
[583]j
[585]8 | some kind which just set forth the authorization. I don't really
[586]* 9 | know the procedure.
[587]. 10 Mr. Schwarz. When were the arms passed?
[588]=: 11 ‘Mr. Goodwin. I don’t’ know. [I became aware of the transfer
[590]i7 | effort to kill Trujillo, the smaller guns were to be given as
[592]18 | Dearborn told me later in conversation after tha assassination
[594]rd
[595]~ 3 .
[597]“4 12] of arms. The transfer I think you're thinking of is the
[599]c: 13 i transfer of a couple of carbines and .39 pistols. After the |
[601]fo 14 | transfer had been made,: 1 the message of communication that
[602]c 15 |} came to us from the Dominican Republic along with the request
[603]i
[604]< i
[605]16 | for the transfer of machine guns which were to be used in an i
[606]* |
[607]i
[608]j
[609]4
[610]i
[612]19 | because theses people felt their own lives were in danger,
[613]20 | especially if they embarked on anything ‘as risky as trying to
[614]fi || kill Trujillo, and thay wanted some self-defense weapons, and
[616]22 | they were given to them for self-defense and then they made a
[618]24 | request that they wanted weapons to try an assassination, thev
[620]24 || wanted a machine gun.
[622]AIG Faet Steoet. 4 | Brahmo, B.C. 20008
[624]25 Assassinating Trujillo, of course, a lot of People had
[626]TOP SECRET
[629]on
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[634]ous,
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[636]re
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[662]risky business.
[664]ere
[666]ETOP: SECRET Sr
[668]tried and most of tham, they were all dead.
[670]try with a .38,
[674]It was a very
[676]Tte's not the kind of thing they would want to
[678]And f think also, I mean nobody, I think -- aa I say, we
[680]Mr. Schwarz.
[682]Mr. Goodwin.
[684]in convarsation.
[685]have known at one time how ha qot them.
[687]Mr. Schwarz. Did you know [ei
[689]fthe diplomatic pouch
[691]Mr. Goodwin.
[693]Mr. Schwarz.
[695]far as you know?
[697]Mr. Goodwin.
[699]| had no particular anticipation that this or any other group
[700]6 | would be successful in somathing that nobody had been able to
[702]do for thirty years, but at any rate, those were the backstops.
[704]Did you know how the arma were passed into
[706]the Dominican Republic, as opposed to passed to the dissidents?
[708]No, I only know what Dearborn later told ma
[710]I only have this fifteen year old mamory
[712]2 | on my part that he qave tham to them in the consulate.
[715]guns in the Dominican Republic. ‘a4
[717]I may
[719]There were a lot of
[721]that arms were passed through}
[723]I did not know that, but 1 wouldn't be
[725]surprised, weapons of that size.
[727]Now again, when were the arms passed, as
[729]Wall I don't know. Y don't have the exact --
[731]the message is in here. I think it waa after President
[733]Kennedy took office.
[735]My knowladgs of it was on the basin of the massage --
[737]The Chairman.
[739]Ia thers someone that can halp Mr.
[741]TOP SECRET
[743]Goodwin
[746]Ne aR ORY Bing
[748]ECRET
[750]“oe 10
[751]@ with the documents? |
[752]H 2 Mr. Schwara. Let'a mark that as Goodwin Exhibit No. 1,
[753]j 3 || a document consisting -~ dated May 13, 1961 and headed t
[755]4 Subject, CIA Covert Activities, Dominican Republic, stating: ¢
[756]$ “Attached is the spacial briefing paper of CIA covert activities
[757]6 || directed against the Dominican Republic which is requested by
[758]7 || Me. Richard Goodwin at the White House,* and attaching a
[759]8 Several page document with that heading and that date.
[760]-. 9 Mr. Goodwin. This is the paper that they sent me and
[762]10] that's where, I guess, I found out about it,
[764]% 3
[766]_. 2l (Tha document referred
[767]ai 12 to was marked Goodwin |
[768]e H
[769]@.; 13 Exhibit No. 2 for |
[771]< 14 identification.)
[773]fod 15
[775]< 16 | |
[776]” |
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[781]TOP SECRET
[784]3 3 4
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[800]Mr. Schwarz. Now that indicates, does it not, that the
[801]weapons were passed sometime after late January, you can tell
[802]that?
[804]Me. Goodwin. Yeah.
[806]Mr. Schwarz. All right.
[808]You can tell that by looking at the heading 2 which
[809]indicates when the requast for the passage of the arms was
[810]made. . ,
[812]Mr. Goodwin, Yas, it says in late January. Of course
[813]they weran‘'t authdrized until the 12th.
[815]Mr. Schwarz. But they were passed, in any event, after
[816]the Kennady Administration took office.
[818]4r. Goodwin. Yes.
[820]Mr. Schwarz. Now you told President Johnson, Vice
[821]President Johnson,-- we will mark this Goodwin Exhibit 2,
[823]4 Memorandum which, Senators, is at Tab H, the book which is
[824]marked book 2 of 2 and dated June 1, 1961,
[825](The document referred to
[826]was marked Goodwin
[827]Exhibit No. 2 for
[829]idantification.}
[831]TOP SECRET
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[853]Me. Schware. Would you read into the record, Mr. Goodwin,
[855]this 18 a memorandum for the files dated June 1, 1961, subject
[856]Report of Point Raised at meeting with Vice President.
[858]Would you read into the record the second paragraph?
[860]Mr. Gocdwin. “At one point during tha meeting, the Vice
[861]Prusident asked about the three carbines which the Agency had
[862]turned over to tha dissidents, specifically asked about the
[863]date of dalivery. Mr. Goodwin made a statement to the effact
[864]that this was done under the previous Administration, 1.@.,
[865]prior to January 20, 1961, pursuant to a decision of the
[866]Special Group.”
[868]Can you tell me if this his mamo I'm reading? t’'d like
[869]to know,
[871]Me. Schwarz. Well, there are some initials at the bottom
[872]of the page, do they help you decide whosa memo it is?
[874]Me. Dennine. f believe we wera told by Secretary of State
[875]Rusk that it’s Under Secretary of State Johnson. That's what
[876]the U stands for.
[878]Mr. Schwarz. Did you make that statement, Mr. Goodwin?
[880]Mr. Goodwin. I don't remember making it. It is an
[881]inaccurate statement, and there was a clear record that it
[882]would be inaccurate in documents that I had already seen.
[884]I thought that I wouldn't have made it. If had no purpose in
[885]making it. And this is --
[887]The Chairman. What is the inaccuracy of this?
[889]TOP SECRET
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[915]it) Sea
[917]Mr. Goodwin. The delivery ‘of the arms wag not made prior
[918]‘to January 20th. The authorization, Senator, was prior to
[919]January 20th.
[921]Senator Schwaiker. Was when, ag&in? Was what date?
[923]Mr. Goodwin. The authorization was the 12th of January.
[925]Sanator Schweiker. What year?
[926]Mr. Goodwin. 1961.
[928]Senator Schweiker. And delivery was when?
[930]j
[932]Mr. Schware. Somatime subsequent to Jahuary 24th. |
[933]Mr. Goodwin. Wall, now that I look at this, all it says |
[935]was late January. H
[936]The Chairman. This 4s June ist, this is dated June lat,
[938]and you are reported to have said, "At one point during the
[940]meating the Vice President asked about the three carbines
[942]which tha Agency had turned over to the dissidents and
[944]specifically asked ahout the date of delivery. Mr. Goodwin
[946]made the statement to tha effect that this was done under
[948]the pravious Administration, i.e., prior to January 25th,
[950]1961, pursuant to a decision of the Special Group.” ro
[951]Actually the delivery took place after January 20th 1961.
[953]Mr. Goodwin. Well that was my first impression on reading |
[955]that, but I notice that all it says was late January, Senator,
[956]so I suppose the 20th or the 19th in somebody's mind could he
[957]late January. I mean, ft don't really remamber.
[959]Mr, Schwarz. Bue Mr. Goodwin, you know, independant of
[961]TOP SECRET
[963]the document which we marked ag Exhibit 1, tn fact the arms
[964]ware delivered after January 20th.
[966]Mr. Goodwin. I may have known. All I ~~ my first
[967]knowledge was this decument, the timetable that I requested
[969]which simply informed me that the delivery of carbines had hbaen
[971]da ce Someta ete ete te
[973]made in late January. If don't know any more than that. |
[974]Mr. Schwarz. All right. |
[975]Mr. Goodwin. Thie im my source of knowledge. Y may have
[976]learned more subsequent to it if Dearborn pinpointed it.
[977]Mr, Schwarz. In addition with dealing with Dearborn, were
[978]you dealing with anybody from the CIA on this?
[979]H Mr. Goodwin. Well, they were always at the maetingr.
[980]: Mr. Schwarz. Who do you remamber from the CIA?
[981], Mr. Goodwin. Tracy Barnes -~ I can't be sure who ail was
[982]there. At the meeting with the Vice President, I'm sure some-
[983]body like Bissell, at least, would have been there. But I'm
[984]gure you must have a list. |
[985]Mr. Schwarz. tlow I would like you to tastify in answer to }
[987]a series of questions aa to what you ware or ware not told.
[988]Now, Were you told that the arms which had been delivered |
[990]| had been delivered to persons who said at timer that they |
[992]wanted to use them for personal defense, but who said more
[994]often that they wanted to use them for assassination pursoses?
[996]Mr. Goodwin. I was given to underatand and told
[998]ALO © mit Street, GE, WEA en, OC. 20003
[1000]specifically and it's reflected in the documents, that they
[1002]TOP SECRET
[1005]SSeereaeteerecee
[1007]Carvings aaa
[1008]ry SH Eee Rad
[1009], Met sete fy ih
[1011]. 18
[1013]wanted -- in order to carry out an assassination, they thought
[1014]they needed transfer of additional weapons, of submachine guns.
[1015]tI don't remember any indication that anyone thought that @
[1016]carbine or & .38 was adequate to mount an affore of that kind
[1017]against Trujillo. Rut they, of course, were interested in
[1018]assassinating Trujillo, involved ag they were in a very life
[1019]and death struggle, their families were being slaughtered -- B
[1020]8 Me. Schwarz. Tha record demonstrates that the Agency was a
[1021]9 informed in April, prior to the memorandum that want to you 4
[1022]10 | which we marked as Exhibit 1, that the dissidents intended to
[1024]11 || undertake the assassination effort and to do so within the °° a
[1026]. Pa
[1028]LP Hi means that they eventually actually did, by blockading the ¥
[1029]hz } road and shooting Mr. Trujillo as he was visiting his mistress. fe
[1030]c 14 || And that they intended to do it whether or not they received a
[1031]Cc 15 the machine guns, but they would like the machine guns; fuse ‘
[1032]< 16 to help. q
[1034]7 Now, ware you informed by the Agency oF by anyone else .
[1035]1s |! that the dissidents intended to accomplish the sasassination :
[1036]§ 19 with the small arms whether of not they got the machines?
[1037]é 2 Mr. Goodwin. I was informed that both this and other
[1038]i “) groups intended and wanted to assassinate Trujillo. We got
[1039]: ap | reports of assassinations about to occur almost avery two oF |
[1040]: } ee three weeks in the White House. There {8 6 long gap between
[1041]: ea} wanting to kill Trujillo and being able to do it, and -< hut i
[1042]° Dt, | at all times, continually, up inte May, there was the very
[1044]TOP SECRET
[1046]2 3 43
[1048]y7anan
[1050]AID Fost Sire, $ £ . warengton, OC FOCOE
[1054]insistent request for additional arms that would make the
[1056]eS ood
[1057]cS
[1061]race
[1063]plot feasible and at the specific request of President Kennedy,
[1064]those arms were denied and -<
[1066]Mr. Schwarz. I'm going to come to that. I want to know
[1067]what you wera informed about the intentions of the dissidents.
[1068]You didn't answer my quustion. You said you were fraquently
[1069]informed about assassination plots all over the world, but
[1070]specifically with respect to the Dominican Republic, were you
[1071]of were you not informad that the Aqency had been told by the
[1072]diseidents that they intended to accomplish the assassination
[1073]of Fidel Castro -- excuse me, of Trujillo -- whether or not
[1074]they received the machine qunsa?
[1076]Mr. Goodwin. I was told that afterwards by Dearborn. If
[1077]wasn't told that particularly at the time, although that
[1078]wouldn't surprise me if they said that. Sy the Agency, you
[1079]maan Dearborn, or --
[1081]Mr. Schwarz. I mean the Central Intelligence Agency.
[1083]Mr. Goodwin. They communicated directly with the Agency
[1085]in this instance?
[1086]Me. Schwarz. Thare wera Aqency people in the Republic.
[1088]Did you know there ware Agency psople in the Republic?
[1090]Mr. Schwarz. In and out?
[1091]Mr. Goodwin. They ran soma guns in at one time, as 1
[1093]Femember, and they also were engaged in the collection of
[1095]TOP SECRET
[1097]|
[1098]|
[1099]Mr. Goodwin. I knew thay were in and out.
[1104]Tee
[1107]oh ee
[1109]See
[1111]WARD & PLE
[1113]ORO Feet Greet. $f, teaumengton, O.C. 20003
[1115]oe
[1117]a
[1119]16
[1121]17
[1123]le
[1125]19
[1127]|
[1129]Mre
[1131]Schwarz.
[1133]et BD Fy eit, rs
[1134]a Ke)
[1136]intelligence about dissident qroups.
[1140]Was it your impression that Dearborn was
[1142]in charge of the pominican Republic, or the Agency personnel
[1144]was in charge of the pominiean Republic?
[1146]Mr. Goodwin.
[1148]My impression at the time was that the
[1150]instructions given to Dearborn ware carried out, and all
[1152]inetructions from the Pre
[1154]Mr.
[1156]Schwarg.
[1158]aident went to Dearborn.
[1160]Apart from dnatructions from the President.
[1162]was it your impression that the Aqency was in charge of the
[1164]Dominican Republic or t
[1166]Dominican Republic.
[1168]Mr.
[1170]Goodwin.
[1172]My impression wa
[1174]of the Nominican Republic, subject
[1176]from Washington.’
[1178]The Chairman.
[1180]Mr.
[1182]Goodwin.
[1184]relations.
[1186]hat Dearborn was in charge of the
[1188]to very close supervision
[1190]Dearborn was the -~
[1192]He was the Consul. We had no formal
[1194]The Chairman. fe was the Consul?
[1196]Mr.
[1198]Goodwin.
[1200]Right.
[1202]Wasn't that true?
[1204]Mr.
[1206]Schwarz.
[1208]The paper recor
[1210]that the Agency, at least from the
[1212]that they were in charge.
[1214]Mr.
[1216]sunt all of our massages &
[1218]TOP SECRET
[1220]Goodwin.
[1222]d makes it look quite hikely
[1224]ir point of view, thought
[1226]They should have told the Presidant. Wa
[1228]o Nearborn.
[1230]s that Nearborn was in charag
[1233]11
[1234]3
[1235]: 12
[1236]a
[1238]8 t
[1240]8
[1241]14
[1242]15
[1243]16
[1244]17
[1245]1&
[1247]rv)
[1248]ry
[1249]i ec
[1250]bog:
[1252]* 24
[1253]H
[1254]a ae
[1255]t
[1257]bd 24
[1259]Mr. Schwarz. What was your understanding of the
[1260]location of the machine guns that the dissidents wanted?
[1262]Mr. Goodwin. I don't remember, but it's in hera somewhere
[1264](Pause) |
[1266]in the paper. |
[1267]Mr. Schwarz. Well, let me cut through the question. |
[1268]t
[1269]|
[1272]Mr. Goodwin. I know now.
[1273]Mr. Schwarz. Did you know about it?
[1274]Mr. Goodwin. No:-. £ knew, when the issue arose in May
[1276]that we had -- we had brought in machine guns, but the pracisa
[1278]|
[1279]|
[1280]|
[1281]|
[1282]mathod by which they were brought in I never asked about. |
[1284]The Chairman. I am having & Little difficulty following. |
[1286]We began with your heing told that it was the policy of
[1287]the previous Administration to ancourage dissident groups and |
[1289]do whatever possible to isolate or to undermine and bring down
[1291]the Trujillo regime. Then, following the Inauguration of
[1293]nid you know that the machine quns were aent to the
[1294]Dominican Republic fERFoudt tha diplomat tepouen?| L
[1296]President Kennedy, certain weapons are passed to these
[1298]| dissidents in the Dominican Republic for the purpose of
[1300]| assassinating -- of their use in the assassinating President
[1302]ry
[1305]| Now when did you learn that. weapons had been in fact
[1307]Trujillo.
[1309]President Kennedy had been inaugurated. When did you first
[1311]TOP SECRET
[1313]H
[1314]|
[1315]|
[1316]H
[1317]i
[1318]|
[1321]passad to dissident groups, that obviously had occurred after |
[1327]4
[1330]eovemaoa
[1332]matere
[1333]es ae
[1335]learn?
[1337]{ 2 Mr. Goodwin. On the Lith of May when we requested from
[1338]j 3 the White House a briefing paper on all covert activities in
[1340]4 the Dominican Republic, that had been conducted in the
[1342]5 || Dominican Republic.
[1344]17 in January to certain dissident qroups for the purpose of
[1346]assassinating Trujillo, what did you do?
[1348]6 Mr. Schwarz. Now that briefing paper was requested from |
[1349]vd | whom?
[1350]8 Mr. Goodwin. Well, it would have been requested by me for
[1351]oe 9 the President. ‘
[1352]10 f Mr. Schwarz. From the CIA?
[1354]_ 11 Mr. Goodwin. From the CIA.
[1355], ;
[1356]Ra iP The Chairman; From the CIA, and that briefing paper has
[1358]@-: 12 | been identified for the record? i"
[1359]c ,
[1360]c 14 Mr. Goodwin. That is correct. 3
[1361]Cc 15 The Chairman. All right. a
[1362]< 16 When you found out that these weapons had been transferred | :
[1363]~ E
[1365]18 | |
[1366]§ x9 | Was it than your understanding that this was Prasident '
[1367]i |
[1368]3
[1369]‘ en | Kennedy's policy?
[1370]: 2 | Mr. Goodwin. Na.
[1371]z F ;
[1372]22 | the Chairman. Then what did you do when you received |
[1373]a * '
[1374]i 24 | that information? |
[1375]j .
[1376]g
[1379]| Mr. Goodwin. If I may go back for a moment, Senator,
[1381]© 24
[1383]TOP SECRET
[1385]and that is the briefing paper involved a very clear distinction
[1388]DAB Poss
[1390]Re TSR EU
[1391], ds
[1393]dee
[1394]yt
[1396]ri us
[1397]between these weapons which were to be used for purposes of
[1398]2 || personal type side~arms, the salf-defense attendant to any
[1400]3 project and the desire for assassination weapona which would |
[1401]4 have consisted of machine guns.
[1402]6 Our response to thia briefing paper was immediately to
[1403]6 try to review our entire policy toward the Dominican Republic
[1404]7 || and prepare, which we did over the next couple of weeks, \
[1406]8 instructions to the Consul about the nature of future’ relations |
[1408]with dissidents, because the President felt that things
[1411]o
[1413]t
[1415]10 || might be getting out of hand, with what was happening in the |
[1417]oe 11 Dominican Republic.
[1418]a 2 So we did prepare that paper. The President had, as I
[1419]@.: jz | said, two great concerns. He didn't want anybody trying to
[1420]a! 14 push Trujillo over unless he knew what was going to happen
[1421]= 15 || next. because he would much rather have Trujillo in there than |
[1422]< 16 | 4 Communist’. leader. And secondly, that the United States |
[1423]s 17 | not be associated with any kind of violent overthrow. And in
[1424]ja | the telegram that wags -=° | |
[1425]i 9 | The Chairman. All right. ——
[1426]5 20 Now whan the President told you that those were his
[1427]i 2, | two concerns, what action was then. taken to implement the
[1428]: oD, | President's policy?
[1429]} 24 ur. Goodwin. The action that was then taken was to taka |
[1430]: ea and set aside the original instructions from the State
[1431], 26 Department and at the Prasident's instructions, I typed up the :.
[1432]| ,
[1434]TOP SECRET
[1436]telegram which is here in my handwriting, which wag to go and
[1438]did go, slightly revised to --
[1439]Mr. Schwarz. Ail right. Let me mark the one in your
[1440]hand as Exhibit 3.
[1441](The document referred to
[1442]was marked as Goodwin
[1443]Exhibleé No. 3-A for
[1445]identification.)
[1447]WARD & PAVE
[1449]“
[1450]Ww
[1451]rs
[1452]f
[1456]3
[1457]s
[1459]Bit © eeed Srreet, oF
[1461]TOP SECRET
[1464]1 Mr. Schwars. Well, let's mark them, Mr. Goodwin -~ you
[1465]2 | xnow how to do this as wall as I do. Make them 3-A, 3-B and
[1466]3 3-C.
[1468]4a Mr. Goodwin. In which f personally added in the courses
[1470]6 | ef rewriting --
[1472]6 The Chairman. Can you identify in the Senators’ hooks
[1474]7 | where these documents appear?
[1476]8 Mr. Schwarz. Where is 3A?
[1477]= 9 Mr. Goodwin. This is 233 at the bottom.
[1478]I 16 (Pause)
[1479]i o
[1480]Li This xerox of my raw, parsonally typewritten draft appears
[1482]vi 12 |} on page 237. That's my very bad typing and handwriting.
[1483]o- : 13 And then paqe 256 is the final. And the same page, 242,
[1484]8
[1485]c 14 || page 237 and 242.
[1486]Cc 16 The Chairman. Is 242 the final version of the message
[1488]ty
[1490]16 || that went out?
[1492]17 Mr. Goodwin. Yes.
[1494]The Chairman. This is for Dearborn from State?
[1496]18 |
[1498]i 19 | Mr. Goodwin. That's correct.
[1500]° 2u the Chairman. And by whom was the messages signed? i
[1502]} g} Mr. Goodwin. Probably the Secretary, I guass, but they
[1504]: ay |) are both my drafts. 1! received a draft from the State Depart- |
[1506]gt l ment, discussed it with the President, and at his instruction
[1508]ee : 24 || prepared this redraft. I never would have overridden tha State
[1509]25
[1511]|
[1513]Dupartment on my OWN, and adding to it two major points aside |
[1514]i
[1518]TOP SECRET
[1521]o
[1522]aa 4
[1524]769
[1526]B50 Fons Steere. SE. tr asvrereton, D.C. 20003
[1528]oe
[1530]a
[1534]a
[1538]the second one was
[1539]3 |) must not run the risk of U.8. association with political
[1541]from rewording it.
[1543]to gay in the final version, "However, we
[1545]assassinations, since the United States as a matter of general
[1546]policy cannot condone assassinations. This last principle is
[1548]overriding and most prevail in doubtful eituations.*
[1550]23
[1551]The firet one is on a different matter, and
[1554]a much stronger statement of that than occurs in the State |
[1556]Department draft, and it finishes again with -- 4¢ says,
[1558]| That was inserted at the inetruction of the President,
[1561]“Clearly, at the present time We are unabie to transfer arms |
[1562]to dissidents. Wa feel that the transfer of arms would serve
[1565]very little purpose."
[1567](The document referred to |
[1569]was marked Goodwin
[1572]| Exhibit No, 3-8 for
[1574]|
[1575]idantification.) |
[1576]t
[1578]TOP SECRET
[1580]weep e Pau,
[1582]210 6 ota Steer, $F, Heeemyton, OC. POO)
[1584]The Chairman. Now you saw this telegram and approved
[1585]before it was sant by State?
[1587]Mr. Goodwin. I wrote it.
[1589]The Chairman. But you said that tha State Departmant
[1590]changed the language.
[1592]Mr. Goodwin. No. They had prepared an original draft.
[1593]which I changed and redrafted. Now that i# here too, including
[1595]a note from them saying that I wasn't satisfied with their
[1597]draft.
[1599]The Chairman. So this was your own message, then, that
[1601]Mr. Goodwin. It was prepared at the specific instruction
[1603]1
[1604]you balieved accurately reflected President Kennedy's policy? |
[1605]i
[1608]of the President. It was shown to him before transmission.
[1610]The Chairman. Tt was shown to the President?
[1612]Mr. Goodwin. Oh, yes.
[1614]The Chairman. Very well.
[1616]Then, reading the first paragraph, “The President has now
[1617]approved contingency plans discussad during your stay here ;
[1618]with one major exception. You are not to requast a pre-
[1619]signed request for help from Nominican dissident groups."
[1621]Mr. Goodwin. I can explain that, Senator.
[1623]There was a proposal made in the State Papartmant version '
[1624]has baen discussed that the dissident groups, that in case!
[1626]managed to take over the governmant and there was some
[1628]of fighting that they should request halp from Venazuela,
[1630]TOP SECRET
[1633]Columbia, a few of our allies an@é therefore we ought to prepare
[1634]them in advance for such & request. The President thought that
[1635]putting such a4 document in their hands would amount to @
[1636]declaration of war and wanted it struck.
[1638]The Chairman. All right.
[1640]Than the second paragraph, "We consider it essential that
[1641]you continue to work" -- wall, before we go on with the second
[1642]paragraph, in the first paragraph you 84y, “rhe President has
[1643]now approved contingency plans discussed during your stay here
[1645]10 with one major axception.*
[1646]Now, what were those contingency plans that had been
[1648]12 discussed?
[1650]Bi Mr. Goodwin. Thay have tham here, I believe. I think --
[1652]wARe & FAL
[1654]contingency plans, it discusses here. “tha paramount interest
[1656]i
[1657]1 of the United States ie to assure that Castro-Communist
[1659]14 this is a very thick document, whare you have a series of
[1660]5
[1661]6
[1663]\ elements not take over.” It says Trujillo is weak, and then it,
[1664]a is an analysis of the dissidents and their intention, the
[1665]19 weakness of the Prujillo regime, and it goes into the covert
[1666]ou | activities. which, I think probably ~~ is that your principal
[1667]“y | interest at this tims?
[1668]| o The Chairman. Yes.
[1669]Mr. Goodwin. There's an Appendix that gets forth all the
[1671]og || covert activities. Recommendation A of the United States,
[1673]B10 8 ost Srrset, SE, Wearmonaton. Oc 20003
[1675]not initiate the overthrow of Trujillo, that we inform prod.S.
[1677]TOP SECRET
[1679]25
[1682]26
[1684]Aissidenta that if they succeed on their ow and form an
[1685]acceptable government we will be giad to come in and help then
[1686]and then the rest talks about here; ways of recognizing -~
[1688]The Chairman. There is nothing in that contingency
[1690]4
[1691]5 ‘plan that contemplated the assassination of Trujillo himself?
[1692]6 Mr. Goodwin. It contemplated only the possibility that
[1693]” he might be assassinated, not that we would assassinate him.
[1694]tape Sb 8 The Chairman. But if he were “assassinated, it would have
[1695]a 9 prasumably been the result of an action by a dissident’ group
[1696]er 10 |} €° overthrow his regime?
[1697]r Mr. Goodwin. Yes.
[1698]~. 1]
[1699]wr 12 The Chairman. All right.
[1700]|
[1702]Moving to Paragraph 2 in your message ~~ the President's
[1704]n
[1707]13
[1708]c 14 message to Mr. Dearborn, “We consider it essential that you
[1709]i 18 continue to work to strengthen pro-U.S. sentiment among disai-~
[1710]ss 16 dent groups. Your work along this line has been invaluable.
[1711]~ 17 | However, wa must not run the risk of U.S. association with
[1712]16 political assassination, since the U.S., as a matter of general
[1713]3 19 policy cannot condone assassination. This last principle is
[1714]3 24 overriding and must prevail in doubtful situations.”
[1715]2} | How that language, it has been suggested by some mambers
[1716]i op i of the Committee that your concern here had to do with avoldina
[1717]* ,
[1718]' at any relationship that might lead to a disclosure that the
[1719]© 4 24 United States had indeed an interest in or was somehow involved
[1720]. 25 | in a plot to assassinate Trujillo. Because you say, “nowaver
[1721]|
[1723]TOP SECRET
[1725]|
[1726]|
[1727]i
[1728]|
[1730]i
[1734]art SnD
[1735]a “a
[1739]1 || we must not run the risk of U.S. association with political
[1741]g | assassination, gince the U.S. as a matter of general policy
[1742]z cannot condone assassination. This last principle ia over-
[1743]I riding and must prevail in doubtful situations.*
[1744]Now don't those words at least convey or lend themselves iS
[1746]to the interpretation that your primary concarn was that the
[1748]Mr. Goodwin. Well, I don't believe so, Senator, because
[1750]|
[1751]7 United States should not qet caught?
[1752]8
[1753]= 9 1 think, to ma, the plain meaning of the words and as 1
[1754]- 10 understood it was that we must not run the risk of U.S.
[1755]ba
[1756]. i association with political assassination. That means not
[1757]vi WP be associated with the process of political assassination in
[1759]eo: ¢ ist any form.
[1760]ci ay
[1761]| Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman?
[1762]ce 14
[1763]c 1b In that same vein, if % could interrupt for just a second,
[1764]<< 16 ds it true -- and would Counsel prompt me -- that the guns had
[1765]ia
[1766]already been dispatched?
[1768]Mr. Schwarz. Certain guns.
[1770]j 10! ‘Senator Baker. T'm not talking ahout how many, Fritz.
[1772]3 ve | Guns had been dispatched.
[1774]al Mr. Schwarz. Mut this talegram refuses the passage of
[1776]ann .
[1778]: ve | four machine guns.
[1780]} on! Senator Baker. I'm not going to argue with you. I am
[1781]] i vs just saying that guns had been dispatchad,
[1783]; Senator Schweiker. What's the date of this teleqram?
[1785]TOP SECRET
[1787]“
[1790]ct
[1791]c
[1792]c
[1796]WARD & FAVE
[1798]ENO Fort Sereet. $C... Warhongton, O.C, 7000)
[1800].
[1802]if 8 FORRES, anes | de Lianieg
[1804]a SAR 5. ,
[1805]TOP SECRET
[1807]Senator Baker. This was just before the assassination,
[1809]two days before the assasaination.
[1811]Mr. Smothers. Carbines and pistols had been dispatched.
[1813]Machine guns were in the country but had not been turned over
[1815]to the dissidents.
[1817]Senator Raker. And now, in retrospect, we're not quite
[1818]gure -~ or there's no indication that the quns were actually
[1819]used in thse assassination, although they may have been in the
[1820]back swat. Ta that about the way it atacka up?
[1822]The Chairman. And the dissidents had requested machine
[1823]guns.
[1825]Senator Baker. And the witness, or another witness, has
[1826]said wa thought the signals for assassination afforts for
[1827]machine guns, when in fact it would appear that they went ahead
[1828]with the material in hand.
[1830]Mr. Goodwin. I believe they had additional guns of their
[1831]own. You wouldn't try it with a .38.
[1833]Senator Tower. I think the type of guns is important,
[1834]because carbines or pistols wouldn't be used in an assassinatio:
[1835]against &@ heavily armed <-
[1837]Mr. Goodwin. Trujillo travelled with bodyguards ina
[1838]heavily armed car.
[1840]Also, if I might add, Senator --
[1842]The Chairman. Just to understand what you hava said,
[1844]as the author of this instruction and having conferred about
[1846]TOP SECRET
[1849]3
[1854]be
[1855]" ,
[1858]ry
[1860]ry
[1866]cs
[1867]C..
[1869]c
[1872]i
[1874]APO Feat Street, & EE. Mrasmingron, B.C. 20009
[1876]it and having ahown it to President Kennedy, are you teatifying
[1877]that it was your understanding that the meaning of that
[1878]sentence -- that that sentence was intended to convey to Mr.
[1880]Dearborn 4 prohibition against involving the United States
[1882]i in an assassination attempt on tha life of Mr. Trujillo?
[1884]Mr. Goodwin. Absolutely. And in my firat draft, I did it
[1885]in terms of disclosure and changed that, struck that phrase
[1886]about disclosure in order to make the point, and always at the
[1887]President's instruction, to make absolutely clear to the Consul:
[1888]because I used‘ the vary word disclosure, you can see here, and
[1889]I crossed it out, in my handwriting.
[1891]Mr. Schwarz. Could you read into the record how you
[1892]changed it?
[1894]Mr. Goodwin. Well, {t's not very qramnatical, it's
[1895]embarrassing. Also, on the xerox -- I can't raad the hand-
[1896]writing on the xerox.
[1898]“Nowever we also must not™ -- something -- “permit any
[1899]danger of disclosing any U.S. association with political
[1900]assassination or intervention in the fominican Republic,”
[1901]it says or intervention. All that was atruck.
[1903]Senator Baker. That sounds ilkse exactly what the Chairman.
[1904]asked you. It sounds like it might be interpreted as, please
[1905]don't get caught.
[1907]Mr. Goodwin. Absolutely, which is why fT changed it,
[1909]Sgnator, to read “Howsver, we must not run risks of U.58.
[1911]TOP SECRET
[1914]; Zé
[1916]: 12
[1917]oo:
[1918]é 1
[1919]ct 3
[1920]c. 14
[1921]& 15
[1923]16
[1925]as
[1927]18
[1928]$ ag
[1930]u
[1932]3
[1934]: 20
[1938]H z)
[1942]. 2x
[1946]a 22
[1951]association with political asgassination gince the U.8., as a
[1952]matter of general policy, cannot condone assassination.”
[1953]Senator Baker. I've got to say, and I don't mean it te
[1955]be critical of this witness, but on first reading of this
[1957]document, which was some time ago, it sounded a lot to ma like
[1959]the Mission Impossible opening when they say, if you get caught
[1961]the Secretary will disavow any knowledge of this undertaking.
[1963]Mr. Goodwin. I wasn't familiar with the program at this
[1964]time.
[1966]Senator Baker. Nor waa I, at that time.
[1968]I need reassurance, and I think the record doas, that the
[1969]coincidance of that this cable, this wirs, going out, gay two
[1970]days before the assassination, ‘ after quns in fact had been
[1971]dispatched, although not the guns they requested, and under
[1972]the circumstances it might lend itself to that interpretation.
[1974]This witness says i¢ does not. There {s no avidence to
[1975]the contrary that I'm aware of, and I don't know that we need
[1976]to pursue the issue any further.
[1978]Mr. Goodwin. If I may, Sanator --
[1980]Senator Bakar. And it also, as Smothers points out, that
[1981]there was another communication saying destroy anything you'va
[1983]got, all those communications except this cabla.
[1985]t
[1986]Mr. Aaron. ‘That is standard practices. That is the standan!
[1988]practice for covert operations.
[1990]Mr. Goodwin. My response, Senator, is that the carbines
[1992]TOP SECRET
[1995]ia
[1996]|
[1997]i
[1998]|
[2001]ore
[2004]and pistols were transferred in late January, 1960, subsequent
[2005]to an authorization of January 12th, prior to Kennedy's taking
[2006]offica. I'm not sure of the date of the transfer. 1 haven't
[2007]geen any indication of tha date of that transfer. I do know
[2008]that the President was not aware of any transfer of guns,
[2009]because he told ma he was not aware of it, until we finally
[2010]requested a review a couple of months, a few months later, of
[2011]our complete covert operations in the Dominican Republic, at
[2012]Which point we became aware that this transfer had occurred.
[2013]r etill don't know tha date of that transfer.
[2015]And then 4¢ was the basis of that briefing paper, which
[2016]obviously the Dominican Republic was not tha first matter on
[2018]President Kennedy's agenda when he came into offica, on the
[2020]BARD ® PAL
[2022]basis of that briefing paper, he reviewed our policy and sant.
[2023]this telegram.
[2024]The Chairman. And was the purpose of the telegram to call
[2025]off any further involvement by the United States government in
[2026]i an assassination attempt against Mr. Trujillo. |
[2027]Mr. Goodwin. The purpose was to make sure the United |
[2028]States was not involved in any assassination. The purpose was to
[2029]slow down that kind of over-zealousness. The Presidant was
[2031]not that.anxious to see@ Trujillo thrown out.
[2033]Mr. Goodwin. Well, t'm sorry.
[2035]ALD F erst Gaveet, BE. teauronaton. OC. 20001
[2037]|
[2039]t
[2041]Senator Tower. That doasn't totally answer the question. |
[2044]|
[2046]The Chairman. Well, you see, we know, from your testimony,
[2048]TOP SECRET
[2051]that you had been advised in May that certain weapons had bean
[2052]transferred to certain dissident groups who at least had
[2053]expressed an interest in assassinating Trujillo.
[2055]Mr. Goodwin. Correct.
[2057]Tha Chairman. So there was 4 connection, the connection
[2058]being that the American government, through the CIA, furnished
[2059]weapons to a group that had communicated ite interest, if not
[2060]its intention, to assassinate Trujillo.
[2062]So then you send this message, and I'm asking you if the
[2063]Massage was meant to call this off, this involvement. What
[2064]axactly was meant? You weren't saying recover those arms.
[2066]Mr. Goodwin. No, I wasn't. No.
[2069]i
[2070]The Chairman. But at the same time, you ware saying, don’
[2072]transfer the machine guns, Were you not?
[2076]Mr. Goodwin. That's right. I think the President -- what
[2077]we were saying is --
[2078]The Chairman. What exactly were you saying?
[2079]Mr. Goodwins We were saving that we didn’t want to do
[2080]i anything that would involve us further, the United States
[2082]| further, in any effort to assassinate Trujillo.
[2084]Mr. Goodwin. Because we were not for assassination.
[2086]Senator Raker. The distinction is --
[2088]Seunator Tower. Well, it saya hare in number J}, it says,
[2090]420 © art Greet, SE, trahinsion, B.C. 20002
[2092]i
[2093]: | The Chairman. 1 ses. I saa.
[2096]| continue to inform dissident slements of U.S. support of their
[2098]TOP SECRET
[2101]A AMA A
[2102]WARD b PAVE
[2104]4
[2106]7
[2108]410 Fase Gireet, SE. Wangan, O €. 7000)
[2110]33
[2112]position. So what, again the interpretation that can be drawn
[2113]from this ia that we don't want to be involved, but go ahead
[2114]and have the other guys on, because their position would be to
[2115]assassinate Trujillo, so what you are in effect doing is: sayina,
[2116]let's don't be involved in it but let's indicate our support
[2117]for what they are doing.
[2119]Mr. Goodwin. We were indicating our suppert for what they .
[2120]were doing on the basis of the estimate in the contingency
[2121]paper that Trujillo's days were numbered and whoever took office
[2125]we wanted to be our man, that ia corract. And so wa were going |
[2127]to support and try to retain’ relations and say we would support,
[2129]| which is not a difficult thing to do, aa you know, any droup
[2131]that might take offica and be moderate and pro-tnited States.
[2133]| that was all we wore interested in, was having a pro-American
[2135]government.
[2137]Senator Schweiker. Wall, there are two other references
[2138]here, Mr. Goodwin. Paragraph 3, “In case of assassination or
[2139]overthrow” -~- obviously you still had a reference thare, whether
[2140]initiated by a pro-U.S. group or not, was still part of the
[2141]planning, and then back on page 3 you say, "In actual fact, we
[2142]feel the transfer of arms would serva very little purpose and
[2143]exposa tha United States to great danger of ultimate disclosure —
[2144]in participation in an easassination attempt," and that is
[2145]scratched out, and says “assassination attempt,” meaning that
[2147]thers was ‘== to me -- some other plan afoot to assassinate
[2149]TOP SECRET
[2152]since the ultimate would still be disclosed if you gave this.
[2154]So what interpretation? I mean, thie is rift here with
[2156]assassination propositions, and the fact that you have “ultimate
[2157]disclosure,” fear of ultimate disclosure of participation,
[2158]Mauant that cortainly there was something already afoot, that
[2159]ultimately would be disclosed if you went ahead with this
[2160]pass through.
[2162]Mr. Goodwin. I think what we were saying is if we did,
[2163]it would be found out ultimately, which means not right away,.
[2164]but later. In the case of assassination or overthrow, there
[2165]ware many groups, a continual flew of groups, of information,
[2167]i that there were various groups planning to assassinate
[2169]Trujillo.
[2171]WARD & PHL
[2173]Senator Schweiker. Wall, if that's what it meant, then
[2174]why did you delete it?
[2176]Mr. Goodwin. Well, I think --
[2178]Senator Schweiker. If that was your interpretation, why
[2179]in fact did you delete those four words, “ultimate disclosure
[2180]; of participation?”
[2182]Mr. Goodwin. Could you tell ma what page you're reading
[2184]from?
[2186]Senator Schweiker. Page 3.
[2188]The very words that you interpret one way ware in fact
[2190]deleted, which shows to mu that you maant them another way, or
[2191]4
[2193]ALO Cornet Sree AT | Marrengten, OC. PORS9
[2195]they wouldn't have been dateted, and you substitute two words
[2197]TOP SECRET
[2203]ai
[2207]7 4%
[2209]RARD & PAVE
[2211]810 8 wet Steoer SE, Mavkongiom, OF € 7000}
[2213]Mr. Goodwin. Well, I mean --
[2214]Senator Schweiker. So that you disquise that.
[2215]Mr. Goodwin. Well, the words were deleted because they
[2217]were words that were going to give exactly the impression you
[2219]were afraid of being found out and what we didn’t want wag any
[2220]association with the assassination attempts, so the reference
[2221]to disclosure was struck and thea words association were
[2222]inserted.
[2224]Senator Schweiker. Mut you still call off -- you still
[2225]left the language, in actual fact we feel the transfer of arms
[2226]would serve very little purpose and expose the United States
[2227]to great danger of association with assasaination attempts.
[2228]That still makes the point that you want to make, but you had
[2229]other language, that says “ultimate Aisclosure of participation
[2231]which impliss to ma you were concerned about other things you
[2233]are talking about. By talking about ultimate disclosure, ws |
[2235]|
[2237]|
[2238]|
[2239]|
[2241]were doing and things that had already been programmed and ar
[2242]operation that you Were 458 much concerned about those baind --
[2243]or you wouldn't have changed the language to atill gay the sane,
[2244]thing with that one distinction ahout somathinn else being
[2245]afoot. 1 don't --
[2247]Mr, Goodwin. Well, T changed it, T believe, Senator -- | |
[2249]mean it's hard to bea hald responsible for languace that was |
[2251]rajectad because it was inaccurate. The problem was not one
[2253]TOP SECRET
[2256]4
[2259]by DOE AP
[2261]y
[2263]of disclosure, the problem was wa did not want to be associated
[2264]with assassination. That's why I struck it out.
[2266]Sanator Schwaiker. You changed the language, but the first
[2267]part of it remained exactly the same. In fact, wa feal the
[2268]transfer of arms would serve very little purpose and axpose
[2269]the United States. So while you changed the language, you had
[2270]the same condition there that you were not qoing to supply thos
[2271]arma.
[2273]Mr. Goodwin. We weren't, that's correct. We were not --
[2275]Sanator Schweiker. Mut why were you not concerned about
[2276]the othar language, becauge ~-
[2278]Mr. Goodwin. Because the implication of the other lanquane
[2280]| was that, well, wa were worried about being found out, whan in
[2282]2
[2283]2
[2284]a
[2285]ry
[2287]6
[2289]4
[2290]6
[2292]fact what the policy was was that we did not want to be
[2294]involved. So I struck the implication.
[2296]H
[2297]|
[2298]|
[2300]Mr. Smothers. Mr. Goodwin, why wags the communication of
[2303]¢.
[2304]ont
[2305]Cc
[2306][on
[2307]2
[2310]| our withdrawing to Dearborn? The only way Dearborn could have '
[2311]been any closer to this plot would have been to bacome one of
[2312]the dissident group. They told him evervthing thay did, down
[2314]+ to and including when the car was coming down the road. And
[2316]we knew that, didn't we?
[2318]Mr. Goodwin. Well, I haven't seen any communications to
[2319]us that said that. I would not have -- I mean, one of his
[2321]| dnetructions was to keep in very close contact with these
[2323]AAD Carat Geet, $1. Rowrmgtion, OC. 70007
[2325]i dissident groups. I wouldn't ba surprised if they dropped hy
[2327]TOP SECRET
[2330]WED ® PALE
[2332]ALO Ceres Stoeet. 4. Waerenqion, OC, 10003
[2334]and if they told him everything they ware planning to do. Rut
[2335]it's a long jump between saying you're going out and wail
[2336]Trujillo and pulling it off, as many people tried.
[2338]But I was not aware, as ft can remember, that he had any
[2339]kind of detailed information.
[2341]Mr. Smothers. His massages back to CIA, in fact, convey
[2342]thosu datails, don’t they?
[2344]Mr. Goodwin. Not that I saw after this, when these ~~
[2345]none of tham that --~
[2347]Mr. Schwarz. Well, did you know or did you not know that
[2348]the dissidenta intended to use tha small arma, carbines and
[2350]pistols, and other materials they had themselves, but intended
[2352]to use the weepons we had supplied to assassinate Trujillo in
[2354]precisely the way ha was, in fact, assassinated? Did you know
[2355]that befora you wrote the telagram, or not?
[2357]Mr. Goodwin. No, because what I’m rasponding to is 4
[2358]request that says we can’t do it unless wa have the machina
[2359]guns, and that's to be used for the assassination. Wa area
[2360]saying, don't give them machina quns.
[2362]Later on they said to Dearborn, fF mean he did tall me
[2363]that afterwards, I don't know when they told him, well, wa'll
[2364]do it, whether or not we get tha machina guns. T mean, that
[2365]might also just bravado, or an effort to bluff us into saying,
[2366]well, you might as wull giva it to them anyway since they're
[2368]going to do it. Tf don't know why anyone would take on
[2370]TOP SECRET
[2373]Trujillo with a .38. f wouldn't have thought that, if I thought
[2374]about it.
[2375]President Kannedy went to Paria a week or two later. When
[2376]the assassination actually occurred, we were all taken by
[2378]surprise, so that Nearborn had detailed knowledge of when it
[2380]1
[2381]was going to occur, we didn't. The Vice President ~~ he called
[2382]an emergency masting with the Vice President, a telegram was sent
[2384]to Paris, and then the assassination ended up getting announce?!
[2386]by Pierre Salinger.
[2388]11 | make it absolutely clear we're not getting involved in
[2390]10 But this instruction, the Prasident told me he wanted to
[2391]|
[2393]u
[2394]12 | assassinations.
[2396]|
[2398]1o 4 Senator Mondale. Mr. Goodwin, the racord shows -~ I think
[2402]BARD & PAVE
[2404]va | you'va testified to this -- that toward the end of the Zisenhowe
[2406]nna 4
[2408]16) Administration, they decided to supply arms eo this dissident
[2410]|
[2412]16 | group and assist in the assassination of Mr. frujillo. Then,
[2414]|
[2416]17 | as thase documents show, at some point very near to the time
[2420]7
[2422]" that Mr. Trujillo was actually assassinated, a telegram was
[2423]t sent to our Consul saying, we don't want to be associated with
[2424]i this.
[2425]Why didn't wa also say stop it, tall thase people not
[2426]to procesd further, in light of the fact that they may have
[2427]thought, because of previous history, that their efforts to
[2429]z4 | assassinate Trujillo had our biessing? In other words, thare
[2431]BLE eens Greet, BE. Teacnengron, D.C. 20003
[2433]ah | is still a piece missing, in my opinion, that should have
[2435]TOP SECRET
[2438]WMA ERS
[2440]WASD & Pau
[2442]4
[2444]Cc
[2445]Cc
[2447]7 4
[2449]430 Fartt Stomet, 8 . Wavhengiam, OC. POOCE
[2451]suggested -=
[2452]2 Senator Tower. Well, the next line says, "Continue to
[2453]3 j| inform dissidents of U.S, support for their position.”
[2454]4 i Senator Mondale. In other words, if I ware one of those
[2455]5 | dissidents and I qot that from tha United States pursuant to
[2456]6 | this earlier agreaament, I would feel ancouraged to believe that
[2457]? | T had the support of the United States in killing Trujillo, ana|
[2458]8 | that wo weren't exactly neutral in that, at least, our govern-
[2459]9 ment wag not really neutral, that it encouraged them.
[2460]10 Tt fa true that they didn't get the machine guns, and it
[2461]is true, apparently that what you understood was that they
[2462]2) Wanted the machine guns for assasaination and they wanted the
[2463]4 Other weapons for personal defanse, but there was still, it
[2464]| would seem to me, reason for tham to beliava that they had our
[2465]Bupport.
[2466]Why didn't we say or communicate to tham we want you to
[2467]stop and we don't want this man assassinated, and we want you
[2469]to know that we will have nothing to do with it?
[2471]Why wasn't that final -- I just want to make one more
[2473]There was a similar talegram sent just before Diem was
[2475]assassinated -- now these are entirely different matters, and
[2476]yt appreciate that -- but it always seems to me that if we're
[2477]I
[2478]| worrled about human life, if wa're worried about correcting 4
[2480]policy that may have set a possible assassination in motion,
[2482]TOP SECRET
[2485]Smee
[2487]to
[2489]the way to really disassociate it is to @ay atop, and that is
[2490]really what I don't understand.
[2491]Mr. Goodwin. Wall, lat me say, Senator, first of all,
[2492]that the question of assassination now is paramount in people's
[2493]| minds. There ‘is no doubt that we hoped that frujillo would. he
[2494]| overthrown, Not only was their no doubt, but there was a
[2495]unanimous vote of the Organization of American States that it
[2497]be ostracized and sanctions imposed with the hopa that it
[2501]might happen. And that occurred aver before wa took office and
[2503]we were in full agraament with it.
[2505]There are papers hare which talk about the avent of a coup
[2507]on)
[2509]; of how you're going to get Trujillo some money to get him out
[2511]Now
[2512]Cc
[2513]Lond
[2514]Cc
[2515]Cc
[2516]La
[2519]of the country. Assassination waa always a possibility, but
[2521]WARD & PAUL
[2523], & coup d'etat, a revolution or a civil war of some kind, a whole
[2524]range of possibilities. And we did, in fact, believe that
[2525]Trujillo was going to be ovarthrown one way or another and
[2526]not necessarily, or even in paramount in our minds, by assassi-
[2528]| nation because -- in fact, 1¢ would sesm at that time to he tha
[2530]” most difficult thing of all to do. He was heavily guarded and
[2532]: protected, ordinarily. Thay knew morse about fit than we did.
[2534]. And whan that happened, which we favored that happened,
[2536]becausa wa falt that the eatablishment of a democratic raqime
[2538]‘in the Dominican Republic was gomething not only baneficial to.
[2540]the United States and to our policies. I mean, when we'ra
[2542]ALO Borate Srsoet 3.0 . Meareneenn, OC 20003
[2544]h
[2545]i talking about Trujillo he was not -- I mean, about human life,
[2546]t
[2548]TOP SECRET
[2551]7ANnAADN
[2553]2
[2554]4
[2556]WAS & Pave
[2558]SIR C wat Seems ST. Hemungion, 9.0. 2000)
[2560]i history that we may be supporting the overthrow,- including
[2562]the business?
[2564]the man wae not only a Pascist, but he was @ murderer. He used
[2565]to have @ freezer room in the back of his house where he would
[2566]take people and show tham the bodies of enemies.
[2568]But in any event, that's none of our concern, but our real
[2569]concern was that this was regarded as an inevitability and we
[2570]wanted to be associated with the new government.
[2572]Senator Mondule. If understand, but the arqument is made
[2573]with respect to that last telaqram that it was a fig leaf
[2575]teleqram deaigned to cover our tracks should assassination occur
[2577]' @nd you arque, and I think Persuasively, that you intended much
[2579]mora than that, you intended to make it Clear that we wers not
[2581]nd Supporting the assassination, that machine guns were not going
[2583]If that was our intent, and I take it that 1¢ was, why
[2585]we didn‘t wa go one step further and say please communicate to
[2587]|
[2588]|
[2589]to be used. |
[2591]. = these dissidents who have @Very reason to believe from past
[2593]assassination, that we oppose the assassination of Mr. Trujillo.
[2595]Wouldn't that make it very clear then that we were out of
[2597]Mr. Goodwin. I don't know. It would have made it, I
[2599]* BUPpOss, Claarer to them. On the other hand, I think, it's
[2600]74 their country, and they could deal with Trujillo as they wanted
[2601]+ to. Tt was not going to be us that dealt with him in.this
[2603]4 : fashion.
[2605]TOP SECRET
[2608]Senator Mondale. Yeah, but sea, if we were completely
[2609]neutral I'd agree with that. If they wanted to assassinate
[2610]Trujillo that's their buainass. I agree with it, that's none
[2611]of our business.
[2613]But I think we were already implicated. It's sort of like
[2614]being in a criminal conspiracy and then pulling out the day
[2616]before the job is done and not talling anyhody. It seems to
[2617]ma you should say, boys, I'm out and I don’t want you to do it.
[2619]The Chairman. I"ve changed my mind.
[2621]Senator Mondale. That's why I don't understand.
[2623]Senator Baker. It's sort of like the situation that’s
[2625]been described to uz where peopla ware beyond control and you
[2627]RARE & PAWL
[2629]couldn't communicate with them after the forces had heen set
[2631]in motion.
[2634]c
[2635]Cc
[2636]Cc
[2637]e
[2639]Mr. Goodwin. Well, may I tell you, — don't know that ther
[2641]4
[2643]aver was any statement that those guna that were authorized on
[2645]7
[2647]January 12th, either in the authorization or subsequant, for
[2648], | the purposes of assassination or otherwise.
[2649]Mr. Schwarz. Well,.there’ were :scores of those;
[2650]i and whether they reached you.or not 4s a4 separate and important
[2651]question, but thera are four or five axamples of communication
[2652]| to the Agency, and I think passad on to the State Department,
[2653]" and that those guns were to be used for an assaasination effort
[2655]‘whether or not the machine guns were obtained.
[2657]B10 6 wet Severs, SE. ewNerane D.C. 200048
[2659]Senator Mondale. Well, you sae, that could be important.
[2661]|
[2663]TOP SECRET
[2666]Gen alroadeont’ tev Urea rice sey a re
[2667]COREG RU RA Lee 3 de teenie
[2671]43
[2673]1 | because if your understanding was as you have just described
[2674]2 || then the telegram makes more genge. But if in fact we were
[2675]3 || implicated, as I understood earlier in assassination attempts --
[2676]The Chairman. Fritz, look at the way Dearborn is. I
[2677]think it's vary important to understand this matter, to look
[2678]at the way Dearborn apparently understood the instruction. He
[2679]was the one to whom it was given, and he wires back, having
[2680]received the inatruction, the following -- now this is at Tah
[2681]J, book 2 of 2, the second J.
[2682]It saya -- first of ail, do you have that, Mr. Goodwin?
[2684]Mr. Goodwin. Yes, I do.
[2686]2
[2687]3
[2689]The Chairman. It says: “One, I believe we can hold pro-Unite™
[2690]States dissidents, although with soma grumbling on the basis
[2691]set forth." Now you're not likely to hold them if you tall
[2692]tham you're no longer connected with their scheme and Mr.
[2694]Dearborn had not been instructed to tell them that.
[2696]peana®
[2698]“two, following our observations for Department and CAS
[2699]considerations, A) if attempt is made by United States’ friends
[2700]| to assassinate Trujillo, there will be accusations aqainst us
[2701]' and the best we can do is sae there ia no proof."
[2703]Senator Raker. To see thera is no proof.
[2704]The Chairman. "The greatest danger point ia Thomas Stockar’
[2705]He was given a small number of arms by dissident agents to hold
[2707]| several days and has told several persons disaidants obtained
[2709]B10 9 wat Yreet, SE. Remmnaten OC POOOE
[2711]thease items from Consulate. Stockard told me saying, I have
[2713]|
[2714]|
[2715]|
[2716]|
[2717]\.
[2718]|
[2719]|
[2720]|
[2721]|
[2723]TOP SECRET
[2726]Sn
[2727]“TOP SECRET
[2729]informed him this cannot be true or 1 would know and when he
[2731]requested ma supply arms through him for dissidents, T told
[2733]Beene (Arte TOP) 344-4008
[2735]him it was impossible. He ‘is greater danger because of
[2736]personal ambitearment against CAS, a matter of which CAS head-
[2737]| quarters is fully informed.”
[2738]| Than he goes on to say that *gince local CAS is now to
[2739]engage mainly in intelligence collection and reporting,
[2740]recommend urgent transfer from the Dominican Republic of three
[2741]9 CIA officers. If simnering assassination plot should materiziie
[2742]an they would be in danger and might ba picked up for trujillo-
[2743]11 | evee questioning. This ie easily avoidable by quick transfer
[2744]|
[2746]Py now. Thase three have enqaged in fully authorized activity
[2748]which, if uncovered, could put the United States in bad public
[2750]AND & POE
[2752]naan
[2754]position. There is still considerable job in counterespionage
[2756]n
[2758]and the collection and reporting and need to follow GODR,
[2760]4
[2762]foster Laftist activities.”
[2764]7
[2766]Now there’s a vote On.
[2768]1 read this because it suggests that Mr. Dearborn got a
[2769]4 different message than the one you say you intanded to send.
[2771](A brief recess was taken.)
[2773]The Chairman. Let's go back on the record.
[2775]Mr. Goodwin. Well, that paraqraph, to ma, Senator,
[2777]410 Corer Street eT. wotinetnn. o.6 20003
[2779]instructions, or at least in specifics, seems to be clear.
[2781]He says that he has informed them that he cannot supply arms
[2785]|
[2787]|
[2793]i
[2795]i
[2797]\ |
[2798]’ paraqraph A -- I am not sure whether his interpretation of |
[2800]TOP SECRET |
[2803]tr.
[2804]tv.
[2808]a
[2809]e:
[2810]a
[2811]ct
[2814][on
[2816]ton
[2818]Cc
[2822]7
[2824]B10 Forst Stemet, S.C Warmenainn, OC $000)
[2826]7
[2829]na he of fHg HERR MURARHIE HEE me:
[2831]Seen parE CIAL LAS"
[2833]TOP'S
[2835]to the dissideanta, and that is what is what Kennedy, of course,
[2836]had said in the telegram. And the request had been to know
[2837]wheather or not he could supply arms.
[2839]So that I see from that point of view, I am not sure,
[2840]quite clear, in what way ha misinterpreted the telegram.
[2842]The Chairman. Well, let's go down -- I don't think he
[2843]has misinterpreted his instructions not to supply more arms.
[2844]That's clear enough. Rut if you go down to B == are you with
[2845]Ma now?
[2847]Mr. Goodwin. Yas.
[2849]The Chairman. “Since local CAS" <= I guass that should
[2850]be chief of Station -- “Since local Chief of Station, then” --
[2851]and that would be CIA Chief of Station -- “Since local Chief
[2852]of Station is now to eangaqe mainly in intelligence collection
[2853]and reporting, I recommend urgent transfer from Dominican
[2855]Rapublic of three CIA officers. If simharing assassination plot
[2857]| should materialize” -- now that in itself, if I may digress a
[2859]moment, suggests that in Dearborn's opinion aasassination might
[2861]i be imminent. For he says “If simmering assassination plot
[2863]should materialize, they would be in danger and might be picked
[2865]up for Trujillo-typse quastioning. This is easily avoidable by
[2866]i quick transfer now." -- again the indication of his feeling
[2867]‘ that an assassination might ba imminent, otharwise, why transfar:
[2869]‘tham. “These three have engaged in fully authorized activities
[2871]|
[2872]i
[2873]which, if uncovared, could put the United Status in bad public
[2875]TOP SECRET
[2878]prone (ares 707) s4s-600@ ©” {51
[2880]RAND & PAE
[2882]ALG Foret Btoeed, SE, Mrs einn. DBE 200ns
[2884]position."
[2886]Now: © would read those words as meaning that Mr. Dearborn
[2887]anticipated at least the real possibility of assasaination
[2888]attempts in the immediate future and that he was recommend ina
[2889]that those CIA officers that had been connacted with having
[2890]supplied weapons should be taken out of the Dominican Republic
[2891]right away.
[2893]Mr. Goodwin. Well, Tf would agree with a good part of nat.
[2894]Senator, although 1 think that there wets assassination plots :
[2896]simmering in the Pominican Republic and now, and of course this
[2898]in fact took place. And I think he was concernad that the
[2902]up the Americans and find out not simply about the transfer of
[2903]guns but the whole range of covert activities that they had
[2904]been engaged in, torture them and perhaps kill then.
[2906]And he thought the safest thing to do, with this thing in
[2908]t
[2910]1
[2912]|
[2914]assassination would he unsuccesaful, that Trujillo would pick :
[2915]'
[2917]the air, was to get them out of the country. There was nothing.
[2919]I think, in the telegram that was sant to him that danies the
[2920]possibility that Trujillo might be assassinated or that there
[2921]might be an attempted assassination, which is the purport of
[2922]Dyarborn's, because if the assassination wan successful, thera
[2923]was no need to get the CIA out.
[2925]The Chairman. . But there 4s somathing more, really. If
[2926]the possibility of assassination was a long continuing thing,
[2928]always on the mind of Naarhorn, why doas he raspond to this
[2930]TOP SECRET
[2933]2 Mr. Goodwin. Well I think obviously these people had
[2935]3 | relayed to him that thay're going to try to make the attempt
[2937]3 | anyway, with or without the machine guns. Ile thought the attemp
[2938]H
[2940]4 might be abortive, and if so, he thoudht that all Americans or
[2942]1 {| instruction by saying, get these men out now?
[2943]t
[2944]|
[2945]'
[2947]|
[2948]people that worked for him or with him would be in dangar.
[2950]The Chairman. Then -you would have to aqres with ma, |
[2951]wouldn't you, that in his opinion, Dearborn's opinion, he had
[2954]| evidence that suggested to him that an assassination attempt
[2955]was imminent.
[2956]Mr. Goodwin. 2 think that's clear. Yer, T think it was.
[2957]The Chairman. And ha took this sufficiently serious to
[2959]recommend getting the threa CIA aqents out without further
[2961]WARS & Fae
[2963]delay?
[2964]Mr. Goodwin. f think that’s right. That's absolutely
[2966]ltrua, because I think he believed that there was a serious
[2968]76%
[2970]attempt in the offing, as'indeed there was, and he was absolute!)
[2972], tight and he was doing his job well. |
[2973]I would like to say, if I might go back, that in terms of
[2974]| the telegram, is that I gat in the office with President |
[2975]t Kennedy who instructed me to draft a telegram to say that he
[2976], | wanted nothing to do with political assassinations, which ft
[2978]did, so it's not a matter of interpretation, bacause he cannot
[2980]testify to that matter, 80 it's not a quastion of reading the
[2982]£10 @ mest Seeaet SE. Harhington, OC. 20002
[2984]text so much as deciding whether or net t'm telling the truth
[2986]TOP SECRET
[2991]about that instruction.
[2992]Mr. Schwarz. Assuming that you are telling the truth --
[2993]Mr. Goodwin. Thank you.
[2994]Mr. Schwarz. We hava to explore whether somathing went
[2995]| wrong in the communication procass. and I want to put some
[2996]information in front of you and then see if you can help us
[2997]| explain what, if anything, want wrong.
[2998]Would you show him Exhibit 2-A.
[2999]Now Exhibit 2-A ia a cable dated March 20th from the Agency
[3000]10 | in the nominican Republic to the Aqancy {n Washington. And
[3002]1) |} reading -in Paragraph 3, it describes the way in which «= it
[3004]@,
[3006]BARD ® PAUE
[3008].t deseribes a plot.
[3009]4
[3011]. i
[3012]4 five M-3's or comparable machine guns and 1599 rounds
[3013]i .
[3014]ammunition for personal defense in event fire fight. Will use
[3016]In Paragraph 4, it says the following: °To do, thay need
[3018]Anan
[3020]quiet waapons for basic job." Now the basic job is apparently
[3021](
[3023]{ the assassination.
[3024]aT
[3026]| told in the briefing on covert action by the CIA that the
[3029]Row again, wate you told -~- now, in Exhibit 1, you were |
[3031]|
[3033]| carbines and the pistols had been passed for personal defense
[3034]" weapons and not to do the basic job, as this telegram indicates.
[3035]vet Mr. Goodwin. That's correct. That's what it says. |
[3036]Me. Schwarz. . Right. I understand that. |
[3038]Now, what I am trying to understand is, in telling you that
[3040]BUD Pant Geewet, BE. Hasnmatem. OC. S005
[3042]i the weapons had been passed for parsonal dafense purposes, do
[3046]TOP SECRET
[3049]you think that is consistent, © is candid, in light of the
[3050]fact that the Agency had been told that other weapons ware
[3052]going to be used for the basic job, that is the assassination.
[3054]Set
[3056]Mr. Goodwin. Well, thera are several communications
[3058]om
[3059]2,
[3061]beat:
[3063]cS
[3066]regarding the weapon details of the plan and they are obviously
[3068]4
[3070]iF
[3074]inconsistent.
[3076]Daas tose
[3077]rite ot
[3078]aD
[3080]Mr. Schwarz. Thay are.
[3082]8
[3087]Mr. Goodwin. The telegrams say it, but on the other hand, ;
[3088]a carbine or pistol 4s hardly a quiet weapon. I mean, I would
[3089]regard that as saying IT am going to strangle him. And if
[3091]you're going to have a fire Cight with machine quns, IT mean
[3093]in other words, it swama to ma that somebody is interpretting
[3095]what they say, or they might have had five or six different
[3099]WARS @ CHE
[3101]plans.
[3102]The request that came to the White Housa, finally, was
[3104]i very specific, and this is too, that additional weapons are
[3106]io
[3108]Cc
[3109]c
[3110]a
[3113]needed in order to carry out an assassination plot. f mean,
[3114]i however you read this, thsy do say they need additional weapons
[3115]to carry off an assassination. And that is what the President
[3116]i
[3117]tat that point had in mind on May 13th, around May 13th, about
[3118]the original transfer, which was not pursuant to any policy that,
[3120]{he had wstablished or any directions that he had given, immediately
[3122]‘ said, you know, make it clear to Dearborn that we're not getting
[3124]ALO Fert Srreet. $C. Mra wtiengtor, OC. 20003
[3126]| involved in assassinations. Thay can do what thay want, but
[3128]we are not going to get involved. |
[3130]TOP SECRET
[3133]fe
[3134]BS
[3136]Ag
[3139]Sang
[3141]erenon
[3145]VY
[3147]WARD B ORUR
[3149]BIOS eat Srreet, SE wahingian, OC COCO}
[3151]Senator Mondale. In othar words, the Presidant was
[3152]advised by you that there was an assassination plot in which we
[3153]were implicated and he told you that we don't want any part of
[3154]it and you are to send a message on his authority saying that,
[3155]and that is what you thought you had dona?
[3157]Nr. Goodwin. Tf would phrase it a little bit differently,
[3158]Senator, which is to say 1t would say there were people who
[3159]wanted to assassinate Trujillo to whom we had given some guns
[3160]and hia response was probably like, ycu mean some idiot gave
[3162]them guns? 1 said, yes. He said -- this {fs a paraphrase <-
[3164]you know, if you knew Senator Kennedy, or Prasident Kennedy,
[3166]. 1 maan, ha said, well, let’s make it clear. And if you compars .
[3167]i my draft with the State Department draft, I was overridina, as
[3168]r they point out, bacduse their draft says, we're trying to cet
[3169]this message through but we're blocked by Mr. Goodwin and have
[3170], to send his message instead. They would rather blame ma, of
[3172]‘ course, than the President.
[3174]It is clear that the stress is changed to make it clear
[3176]that the President wants nothing to do and cannot condons
[3178]assassination. {ft does not say cannot condone baling caught at
[3180]‘assassination, it says cannot condone assassination. And! did’
[3182]“ ¢hat bacauss he told ma to do that.
[3184]The Chairman. And you have characterized the Kannedy
[3186]. policy a8 ona of getting the sovernmant no further involve?
[3188]because there had been a past involvemant? tle knew that ane
[3190]TOP SECRET
[3195]fa)
[3197]Prepne [Aree 202) 444-4009
[3201]A1D Tange Srewes, $E . Harmenston, Oc FOOOD
[3203]z
[3205]a
[3207]ge
[3211]ne
[3212]ane
[3214]4,
[3215]Bee
[3217]TA RN SCE ee
[3219]OP SECRET
[3221]you knew that, to the extent that weapons had been furnished
[3222]dissident groups who had expressed an interest in assassinating
[3224]Trujillo. And your intention here in sending this telegram
[3226]1 Was to convey to Mr. Dearborn that the Kannedy Administration
[3228]wanted no furthsr involvement in this -~
[3229]Mr. Goodwin. That's right. We found -- the Prasident
[3231]found out on May 13th that pursuant to the authorization that
[3233]' pracesdad his coming into office that a couple of carbines and
[3235]pistols had been transferred in order to mount 4 major assault
[3237]on @ governmant that had lasted for thirty ysars, and it seemed
[3239]y at that point like «4 formidable threat to Trujillo.
[3241]le wanted to make it absolutely clear whan he found out
[3243]i ¢hat anybody who wantad to assassinata Trujillo in the Nominican
[3245]; Republic that they were going to do it on their own, the
[3247]i no more Weapons and -this is why he said wa do not want to
[3249]. condone assasSination oF be associated with it. And that’s why
[3250]i
[3252]i
[3253]United States would have nothing to do with it and we give out |
[3254]t
[3255]'
[3257]" t wrote the telegram that I drafted that's in my handwriting.
[3259]Senator Towar. Well, may T ask you, then, what you
[3261]-dnterpratted the meaning of tha first sentence in number 3,
[3263]“continua te inform dissident elementa of U.S. support for
[3265]|, their position?”
[3267]'
[3270]4
[3273]H
[3275]|
[3277]|
[3278]Me. Goodwin. They were ~~ their position was that, what {
[3280]they regarded as that Trujillo should be overthrown and raplacet
[3282]|
[3284]by a moderate govarnmant. Wa supported that position, as did \
[3285]i]
[3287](
[3289]TOP SECRET
[3292]Bam a save
[3294]210 Past See AE | Waneneton, 8 2000)
[3296]the other mambers of the Organization of American States, and
[3297]a
[3298]| ve wanted to make it very clear that we did support that
[3300]| position, and we wished tham well in their efforts to establish
[3303]y that position and if they did we would recoqnize their govern-
[3305]‘ment and sand them assistance, which we did.
[3306]As a matter of fact, we took much qreater efforta to
[3307]| got rid of Ramfes Trujillo in the six months that followed the
[3308]assassination than anything that preceaded it, ineluding brinaing
[3309], the American fleet practically into the harbor at Cuidad
[3310].Trujille at the direction of tha Secratary of Defense. Instead
[3311]of carbines and pistols, wa brought in destroyers, aircraft |
[3313]carriers and Marine battalions so that thay would know what
[3315]the consequences might be if they didn't get out when they cot
[3317]" out.
[3319]If I might make one more point, Senator, if I may, is that
[3320]‘the countries of South America are full of quns sent thare
[3321]| by the American government to be used to kill thousands of
[3322]' people over the last several decades, and with the lcne
[3324]“exception of both revolutionaries from underneath and armiss
[3326]go: from on top -- of courses you'rs well-acquainted with that --
[3328]sent knowing that they would be used to kill people in internal
[3330]zy i struggles. The only distinction in this case is that Trujillo
[3331]ei ‘happened to be the head of State, which is a practical
[3333]; | dtatinetton, but you’ could hardly make a moral one.
[3335]Sanator Baker. Mr. Chairman, could t aak a quastion in
[3336]TOP SECRET
[3341]WAGED & PAE
[3343]BE, Waahenetnn, OC FOOOR
[3345]410 © ret Seeowt,
[3348]each Bee ey + pa _
[3349]LR oe Bee fee eee etree - ie eee Fs
[3351]eo SHER eu nmmaran: rReeanes rena os
[3352]PASREUTOB, SECRET irre”
[3353]ves po eg
[3354]that respect?
[3356]The Chairman. Well, I am not sure I agree with that,
[3357]although that is a philosophical argument.
[3359]Senator Raker. Are you talling us, Mr. Goodwin, that
[3360]assassination, not of heads of stata, but assassination of
[3361]lesser figuras was a common, ordinary occurrance in South
[3362]America at the beheat of America or with American support?
[3364]Mr. Goodwin. No, L am talking about that we supply arms
[3365]toe revolutionary groups or to armed groupe which we did in
[3366]say Dolivia, or sometimes to the government itself, or in Chile
[3368]we gave assistance of various kinds to dissident groups with
[3370]| the knowledge that our assistance would he used in internal
[3372]atruggies.
[3374]i don't have to use the word assassinations.
[3376]Senator Baker. Sut how about for internal struggles, then,
[3377]as opposed to assassination?
[3379]Mr. Goodwin. Well, this is an internal struqgle in the
[3380]Dominican Republic.
[3382]The Chairman. I think you recognize the distinction,
[3384]because it is well-defined in our criminal laws. There is
[3386]a difference between first deqras murder and manslauqhter.
[3388]t
[3389]| Theres is supposed to connote 4 certain differance in moral
[3391]+ connotations, and undertaking delibarate action that is
[3393]k
[3394]targetted against a particular parson with the intantion of
[3396]i murdering that person ia normally reqardad under our crimina)
[3398]TOP SECRET
[3403]BIO F ort Seo FE Mawnan. OC. 20003
[3405]i |!
[3411]laws as the most reprehensible kind of homicide and therefore
[3412]definted as murder'in the first degree. Soa there mast ba some
[3413]gradation there.
[3415]Mr. Goodwin. Wall, there are gradations, althouch I do
[3416]think that many of the activities against, say, someone like
[3417]Allende or others are equally tarqetted in Latin American
[3418]countries and not just general conflict or the killing of
[3419]particular &=- Mexicans, ‘of'course, traditionally go out and
[3420]shoot down leaders of new guerrilla groups or insurqents, but
[3421]not necessarily with our guns.
[3423]The Chairman. But in any avent you're not testifying hare
[3425]'
[3426]to your certain knowledge the United States government partictpas
[3428]'
[3429]ted in an assassination attempt or asaisting in an assassina-
[3430]|
[3433]Mr. Goodwin. No, I don't have any deep knowledge of that
[3434]' subject, what was the natural end consequence of our acte.
[3435]In any eVent, I do want to return to this.
[3437]This was -- clearly President Kennedy was much closer to
[3442]y | yours.
[3444]| Nr. Schwarz. After the Trujillo assassination took, place,
[3446]|
[3448]_ | President Kennedy was in Paris and as one of the documents we
[3450], | looked at indicates, there was a meeting at which Vice President
[3451]a :
[3453]Johnson was interasted in finding out what had happened and you
[3455]| had a teview of this, and discussed in that review that the
[3457]weapons had bean passed, the small arms and the machine guna |
[3459]TOP SECRET
[3462]ORE EG ee ek Sa : Pees
[3465]ee He ‘i anes pega RS i mess ig! ae
[3466]bes a *" wy wae ie ie oo . » |
[3467]o 1 hadn‘t been passed and the assassination occurred. |
[3468]g
[3469]H 2 Now, after that review, were any Steps taken to make, a8
[3470]} 3 & matter of more general, govarnmental policy, the policy which
[3471]4 is expressed in the telegram you drafted at Prasident Kennedy ‘+
[3473]instruction?
[3475]Mr. Goodwin. Not to my knowledge.
[3477](A brief recess was taken.)
[3479]The Chairman, Do you have any more questiona?
[3481]Mr,
[3483]Schwarz. I don’t hava any more quastions.
[3485]The
[3487]Chairman. Do you have any other matters that you
[3489]can tell us about the Trujillo assassination for our enliqhten-
[3493]RABD & PAVE
[3495]nt Mr. Goodwin. On tha assassination?
[3496]i
[3498]The Chairman.
[3500]On the assassination.
[3501]yo Mr. Goodwin. I don't think so, but let me read through
[3502]all of this, and when I come back the next time, I might have
[3503]something else, if I can find anything else in there -- I do
[3505]think this is pretty complete.
[3507]; yes The Chairman. We will expect to hear you again gsarly next
[3509]; pos | Weeks on the Cuban phase of your testimony,
[3511]i wa Mr. Goodwin. And Ruvalliar.
[3513]: be | The Chairman, Me. Dennin, thay've bean ur all niqhe,
[3515]i oy woutd lika to ask two quastions. |
[3517]@ i Pa Mr. Dannin. Well, whan you said thera were no more |
[3519]. 24, | quentions, I just ralsad thy possibility and you discussad it |
[3520]'
[3521]H
[3523]TOP SECRET
[3525]a
[3528]Wao @ Fave
[3530]ion
[3533]Cc.
[3534]c
[3536]Pret (Pema 2025 946-4008
[3538]410 Fert Sreoee, $.6., ravseneron. 0.0. 20003
[3540]about meetings held after the assassination back in Washington
[3541]when Mr. Dearborn came back as well as those meetings held
[3542]after the assassination befors ha came back, at which the
[3543]whole matter was discussed, initially with Vics President
[3544]Johnson presiding and ultimately, the last ons, with President
[3545]Kannedy.
[3547]Mr. Goodwin. That's riqht. We had, of course, a serias
[3548]of emergencies. Wa had an emergency mesting, and cabled the
[3549]Prasident who was in Paris, and the first matter on our mind
[3550]was how to keep Ramfes Trujillo, who wan the son of Trujillo,
[3551]from taking over, and we didn't know whare he was, at first,
[3553]it took us awhile to find out that he was in Paris, which at
[3555]least {ndicated, Senator, that if they were planning it, it
[3557]: wasn't done in a very comprehensive fashion, and we found ha
[3559]was in Paris and we wanted to stop him from returning, to
[3561]detain him, but it was too late. Ry the time wa found out, he
[3563]| had already chartered an Air France jet and was on his way to
[3565]Cuidad Trujillo, and I believe’ thare was some affort mada to
[3566]bluff him off by sending messages to ths plane in flight,
[3567]diverting it to somy American airport, but he didn't do that.
[3568]and he landad and took over. And I think the principal aim of
[3570]our policy from that point on was how to get him and his uncle,
[3572]’ Hector -- and I forget tha othar fellow's name ~- out of there
[3573]“$0 that the kind of moderats governmant that we wanted could
[3575]| be installed.
[3577]TOP SECRET
[3580]various inducements like ha could taka his money out, it was
[3582]discussed that if ha would leave peaceably, but what finally
[3584]Prgee (Aree 202) 34646008
[3586]happened was when McNamara moved tha fleet in over the horizon
[3588]And John Martin was sent down to talk to him and to make |
[3589]|
[3590]i
[3591]i
[3593]j and an Air Force Ganeral bombed the palace, that was the and,
[3594]ha got on his boat and left.
[3595]The Chairman. Air Force Gauneral?
[3596]Mr. Goodwin. A Dominican Air Foreea General.
[3597]tle decided that was an easier target than the Amertcan
[3598]flost.
[3599]The Chairman. Was tha bombing done at our inatruction?
[3600]Mr, Goodwin. No, I don't buliave so. Tf was trying to
[3602]Temembur that, but I don't balieVa ‘it was. As T remember,
[3604]RARO & POE
[3606]it was quite a surprise to us that this fallow had takan the
[3607]initiative. The moving of the fleat was intendad as sort of
[3608]a threat that if they didn't gst out we might come in and get
[3609]them. Thera was no, however, no, at that point, no country
[3610]| attempted to do that, just to scara them, And the fleet was
[3611]actually chesred in the Dominican Republic, a very rare
[3612]occasion.
[3614]But this Air Force General did, and then he tried to make
[3616]. Parriagen OC 2000)
[3618]| himself dictator and two of his own officers arrwestad him. They
[3619]ali hed been trained in American military achools.
[3621]Mr. Schwarz. To complete the record on the response to
[3623]BLOF was Seow SE
[3625]the teleqram We had Nearborn'a raaction. «© Wa will read into
[3627]TOP SECRET
[3630]ra SERS geen eC
[3631]SOs pe et to
[3633]SUR THinaioripes i stn
[3634]Som Mace eat eg TAR:
[3636]STL MTR ela
[3637]SMUT ae
[3639]the record the cable back from the CIA Chief of Station in
[3640]response to tha telegram ‘Mr. Goodwin drafted.
[3642]Assume -- reference BB, that's the telegram, “Final word
[3643]on present policy in which KUBARK" == that's CIA -- “work here
[3644]must be based. Para 2 and Para 5, that’ raference, are for
[3645]practical purposes retraat from previous policy. Howaver,
[3647]| Headquarters aware extent to which ODYOKE" that is, the United
[3649]States ~-“already associated with PER -- that ian the
[3650]assassination of Trujillo. -- "if we are to at least try ‘cover
[3651]up tracks' KUBARK parsonnel directly involved tn cen
[3652]preparations must be withdrawn now.”
[3654]I don't know if that marita comment or not. [t just
[3656]happens to be how it was interpratted by CIA.
[3658]WARD & PHU
[3660]Mr. Goodwin. I think it‘'a accurate and it also raflects |
[3662]Dearborn's own disappointment that --
[3664]|
[3666]Mr. Schwarz. CIA.
[3668]Mr. Goodwin. CIA's disappointment, which is understandable.
[3670]The Chairman. Any further quastions?
[3672]Senator Tower?
[3674]Mr. Smothers?
[3676]Mr. Smothars. Mr. Chairman, ft'd rather wait t11] the return
[3677]H of the witness,
[3679]The Chairman. Yas.
[3681]810 Forwt Grreet. 3 €,. Wasmogion, OC 70007
[3683]Let's make certain that Mr. Goodwin has an opnortunity to
[3685]meet with the staff ao that the pertinent documents that will
[3688]up in connection with our interrogation on Castro will be
[3689]reviewed. Wa're not interested in any kind of entrapment. We
[3690]want you to be fully aware of whatever documantation we have
[3691]go you can help eniighten us of your understanding of the
[3692]policy at the time.
[3694]Me. Goodwin. And whatever I bring I can give to you and a
[3695]then duplicate it.
[3697]Mr, Schwarz. Well, shall we plan, for safety, on the
[3698]ataff seeing you on Wednesday morning and having your testimony
[3699]Wednesday afternoon, or could you be here by Tuesday?
[3701]Mr. Goodwin. Well, since I'm going to Rumford, Maine and
[3703]getting tha thinga out, I think it will be safer Wednesday,
[3705]5
[3707]that's not too inconvenient.
[3709]RAS & PAUL
[3711]a)
[3713]The Chairman. Wednesday?
[3715]A
[3717]ALL right. Thank you very much.
[3718](whereupon,. at 6135 o'clock p.m., the hearing was recessed,
[3720]to reconvene at .8:30 o'clock a.m., Priday, July ll, 1975.)
[3722]Bt Earns Street, SE _ Wawmogien, 0.0. 2000)
[3724]TOP SECRET