[1]187-10014-10227, | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
[3]JFK Assassination System Date: TIT/2015
[4]Identification Form
[6]Agency Information
[8]AGENCY: SSCIA
[9]RECORD NUMBER: — 157-10014-10227
[10]RECORD SERIES: MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE
[11]AGENCY FILENUMBER:  07-M-132
[12]Document Information
[13]ORIGINATOR: = SSCIA
[14]FROM: DAWSON, R.
[16]TITLE: DIEM
[17]DATE: 06/00/1975
[18]PAGES: 157
[19]SUBJECTS :
[20]CIA
[21]COLBY, WILLIAM
[22]VIETNAM
[23]KENNEDY, JOHN
[24]DIEM, ASSASSINATION
[25]DOCUMENT TYPE: SUMMARY
[26]CLASSIFICATION: — Declassified
[27]RESTRICTIONS: = 1B;1C
[28]CURRENT STATUS: ~~ Redact
[29]DATE OF LASTREVIEW: — 05/05/2000
[30]OPENING CRITERIA :
[31]COMMENTS: CC Box 133
[35]HW 50955 Docld: 32423615 Page 1
[38]Date : 08/08/95
[39]Page : 1
[40]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[42]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[44]AGENCY INFORMATION
[46]AGENCY : SSCIA
[47]RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10227 .
[48]RECORDS SERIES : MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE
[49]AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-M~-132 ;
[51]ORIGINATOR
[52]FROM
[54]TO
[56]TITLE
[57]DATE
[59]PAGES
[60]SUBJECTS
[62]DOCUMENT TYPE
[63]CLASSIFICATION
[64]RESTRICTIONS
[65].CURRENT STATUS
[66]DATE OF LAST REVIEW
[67]' OPENING CRITERIA
[68]COMMENTS
[70]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[72]SSCIA
[73]DAWSON, R.
[75]DIEM
[76]06/00/75
[78]157
[80]VIETNAM
[82]DIEM, ASSASSINATION
[83]COLBY, WILLIAM
[85]CIA
[87]KENNEDY, JOHN
[89]SUMMARY
[90]TOP SECRET
[91]REFERRED
[92]POSTPONED IN FULL
[93]01/20/99
[95]c¢C Box 133
[97][R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED
[99]HW 50955 Doocld:327493615 Page 2
[101]es NNER te Sey ee MI at Oe,
[105]\an 0955 Docld:32423615 Page 3
[109]z
[110]a
[116]CATEGORIES:
[118]BicCone Naw
[120]Coloy Hillsman
[122]Xennedy, Jonn F. Tung ea
[123]icNamarra Diem io wg
[124]Lodge *
[125]Act - ay “ a
[126]ket OCCURRENC®: Im a Presidential meeting on Vietnam with the CIA Sarticipants
[128]Seing MeCGone and Colby the record by Colby reflects that McNamarra pointed out that
[129]aLodge has little contact with Diem and has not been out of Saigon. Mr. MecCone commented
[131]hat he believed that we should move cautiusly, that. we should talk seriously to Diem
[132]gand that Lodge should be urged to visit the countryside to obtain a more realistic
[133]aview of the effects of suspending aid. Mr. McCone also suggested that another approach
[134]wbe made toNhu ito seek his cooperation ina departure. The President asked whether we
[136]had carefully studied the detail effects of cuts in aid. (as proposed in a paper prepared
[137]by Hillsman). It was evident that the effects had not been studies. The President
[139]asked DOD and CIA to analyze the Hillsman paper. He also asked that a telegram be sent
[141]to Lodge asking him to try to reduce the press leakage from Saigon and to establish some
[142]real contact with Diem. Any current plans for aid negotiation should be stalled, and the
[143]Presiden jou. ch-as—the——
[144]instance involving CIA payment to Col Tung last week. , :
[146]IG Report 1967 (CIA 21-22
[147]PILE: epo 967 (CIA), p.
[149]DATE: Dawson
[150]6/27/15
[153]KENNEDY, JOHN F.
[154]KENNEDY, ROBERT F'.
[155]MC CONE, JOHN
[157]DIEM
[159]DATES:
[161]CATEGORIES:
[163]5 Oct. 1963
[165]Feq Ploeg coeos AH
[167]OCCURRENCE: On or about October 5, 1963 when thé telegram of October 5 and 6 were sent
[169]to Saigon, MC CONE was called over by PRESIDENT KENNEDY and met privately with PRESIDENT
[171]@ KENNEDY and the Attorney General, ROBERT F. KENNEDY, and took the position that the CIA
[173]“should take a hands off position as far as the assassination of DIEM was concerned. MC CONE
[175]m felt that the President agreed with my position, despite the fact that he had preat reser-
[177]& Vations. concerning DIEM and his conduct. I urged him to try to bring all the pressure we
[179]® could on DIEM to change his ways, to encourage more support throughout the country. My pre-
[181]“cise words to the President, and I remember them very clearly, was that Mr. President, if I
[183]_ was manager of a baseball team, I had one pitcher, I'd keep him in the box whether he was a
[184]good pitcher or not. By that I was saying that, if DIEM was removed we would have not one
[185]coup, but we would have a succession of coups and political disorder in Vietnam, and it might
[186]last. several years as indeed it did. So it was for that reason that I felt there would be
[188]SOURCE: STAPF:
[189]-Hearings, SSCI, Friday, June 6, 1975, McCone, Vol. 1, 2 of
[190]FILE: pp. 62-32
[192]a ee A eS SY cee EE SS Ae Se et ee ch ee seed are eh ne et te me nin ind eee ood
[194]R. DAWSON
[196]DATE:
[197]— 29 June 1975
[199]PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES:
[200]Card 2 of 2
[202]OCCURRENCE: more stability if DIEM could be persuaded to change his ways than remove him
[203]and hope that some group of generals could run the country better."
[205]SOURCE:
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[303]eeeeiemam os tree tee ee ——___- : _
[304]PERSONS/ENTITIES: — paprpy, 256 pares: | CATEGORIES:
[306]RICHARDSON ‘TAYLOR LODGE =< {29 Aug. 1963 DLE ears ae. =
[307]SPERA HARKINS ] 4 AR e
[308]CONEIN TRUEHEART / i
[310]AY oe
[312]MINH WEEDS, Gen. Richard ¢. CARD 1 of.
[313]a Chief of Staff, MAC
[316]On August 29, 1963, the following report was listed within the Saigon Station's chronology
[317]of August 1963 coup activities as follows: —
[318]Sea ed Sep eceeveres
[320]"At. O745 hours, RICHARDSON, SPERA and CONEIN, latter two of whom were scheduled to contact
[321]GENERALS MINH and KHIEM at 0815 same morning, were shown a message from GENERAL TAYLOR to
[322]GENERAL HARKINS stating aspects of Vietnam situation being reviewed at WHITE HOUSE and com-
[323]menting that second thoughts were beginning in Washington. Faced with this information and
[324]a» Given strictly limited time factors, RICHARDSON decided that the meeting with GENERALS MINH
[326]and KHIEM should not be postponed but that contacting officers would make this meeting a
[327]fact-finding mission without encouraging or discouraging GENERAL MINH,
[329]abeqd GTSESPEe PID0ad Gsceos AN
[331]"When SPERA and CONEIN returned from their meeting with KHIEM and MINH, (con't. )
[333]- SOURCE: I.G STAPF;
[335]- REPORT 1967, Part C., p. 12 Dawson
[337]FILE:
[339]DATE: 28.6.75
[341]SESS a ee ace ce ae ee ee ee eo te a
[345]CATEGORIES:
[349]we proceeded to TRUEHEART's office to make our report. The AMBASSADOR came in and RICHARDSON
[350]advised him of our meeting with GENERAL WEEDE, of TAYLOR's cable, and of the decisions which
[351]RICHARDSON had made as a result of the TAYLOR cable. LODGE was angry and expressed the view
[352]that. RICHARDSON's decision had destroyed the possibilities of carrying, out a coup. RICHARDSON
[353]expressed a firm dissenting opinion." (12)
[355]SOURCE: | STEP:
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[466]PERSONS / i)
[468]. DATES;
[469]RICHARDSON, John DIEM 25 August 1963
[470]LODGE, Henry Cabot CIA
[471]TRUEHARY, William
[472]HARKINS
[474]do theip Dest to carry out
[475]Successor Pegimes ." (7-8)
[477]Aneto;
[480]IG, REPORT 3
[482]967, Dp. 7-8
[483]Part c
[485]1
[486]32423615 Page 1
[488]WW 50955 DocId
[490]mae |
[491]. PERSO NS/ENTITIES: ; DATES: | CATEGORIES:
[492]HARRIMAN, Averell KENNEDY, John F. ~ ,
[494]HILSMAN, Romer ~° TAYLOR, Maxwell
[496]McCONE, John (Mil. ass't to
[498]MeNAMARA, Robert Pres. )
[500]RUSK, Dean GILPATRIC, Roswell
[501]OCCURRENCE:
[503]The I.G. REPORT of 1967 (CIA) contains. the following. description of the events of August 25,
[504]1963, from a book by MARGUERITE HIGGINS: "The crucial act, with its overtones of Greek
[505]traredy, opened with a cable. It was dispatched to Saigon late in the evening of August 24,
[506]1963, a date made more sipnificant because it was a Saturday. .Washington usually- empties on
[507]sunmer weekends or lapses into a somnolent mood as officials desperately seek relaxation.
[509]"The telegram contained spectacular new instructions for the U.S. EMBASSY in SAIGON.
[510]It was drawn up at a meeting called by Under-secretary of State AVERELL HARRIMAN and ROGER
[511]HILSMAN, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs and head of the Vietnam task
[512]foree. The President's senior advisers were, for the most part, out of town. CITA DIRECTOR
[513]JOHN MecCONE was in California. DEFENSE SECRETARY ROBERT MCNAMARA was on vacation. (con't)
[515]SOURCE: STAFF? Dawson
[517]LG.
[519]REPORT 1967, pp. 5-6
[521], Fier C DATE: 28.6.75
[523]PERSONS/ENTIT IEG: : DATES: i CATEGORIES: _ .
[524](cont) hash fay
[525]HELMS, Richard ; fuby Siet ah
[526]DIEM RPE Met nk
[527]NHU (CARD 2 of 4) a
[529]OCCURRENCE:
[530]SECRETARY OF STATE DEAN RUSK was attending a baseball mame in New York. PRESIDENT KENNEDY
[531]was at Hyannis Port. GENERAL TAYLOR says he knew nothing of the meeting until it was over
[532]and the telegram long on its way. ;
[534]"| the cable proved historic. For the first time it gave the signal to
[535]‘unleash! the Vietnamese nilitary, flashed a green light for the coup against DIEM of which
[536]the generals had been talking for so many years. e
[538]"|. the cable of August 24 was a radical revision of the previous philosophy
[539]of one war at a time. It-envisaged the generals' making war on their own Rovernment , and
[540]with the implicit blessing of the United States.
[542]"the substance of the cable was that the U.S. EMBASSY was to make an effort (con't.)
[544]A
[546]HW 50955 Docild:324293615 Page 12
[548]PERSQNS/ENTITLES: DATES: | ; CATEGORIES: s
[552]Mp
[553](CARD 3 of WY)" H
[557]so persuade DIEM to fire his brother, release the Buddhist rebels, end press censorship, and
[558]cestore other democratic liberties suspended under martial law. And if, as the cable antici-
[559]sated, DIEM would not. do these things, then the EMBASSY was to contact the VIETNAMESE GENERALS
[560]and tell them that the United States would no longer stand in the way of a revolt.
[562]it
[564]_» » the controversial August 24 cable was dispatched from Washington Saturday
[565]2vening after being cryptically summarized to PRESIDENT KENNEDY at the summer White House at
[566]jyannis Port.
[568]"The ACTING SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, ROSWELL GILPATRIC . . . had the cable described
[569]0 him over the telephone. MR. GILPATRIC says he was frankly surprised that such an (con't. )
[573]DATES: CATEGORIES:
[576]Sb be
[577]a AY , wal d ah &4 pt .
[578]eek ae a,
[580]OCCURRENCE:
[581]unportant set of instructions should be rushed out on a weekend But he did
[582]Ss é * not feel that h
[583]ought to vete the telegram since . . . it had the ‘approval of the PRESIDENT, ' .
[585]. "In MeCONE's absence, the cable was described
[586]WEPUTY DIRECTOR of the CIA, who also did not feel dispo
[587]che PRESIDENT. (5-6)
[589]» again cryptically, to RICHARD HELMS ,
[590]sed to veto something ‘approved by
[592]CARD 4 of 4
[594]AW 50955 Docld:32423615 Page i3
[598]LODGE, Henry Cabot (Amb. to SVN)
[599]NHU °
[601]DIEM
[603]pepe. 243
[605]DATES: CATEGORIES:
[607]24 August 1963
[609]OCCURRENCE:
[611]In. a State telegram to Saigon (DEPTEL 243), on August 24, 1963, '% oll oe abe’ %
[612]"The DEPARTMENT informs the AMBASSADOR that the U.S. Government cannot tolerate a situation
[613]in which power lies in NHU's hands. If DIEM is unwilling to rid himself of NHU, then DIEM
[614]himself may have to go. ‘The AMBASSADOR is authorized: (1) to inform the GVN that actions
[615]apainst BUDDHISTS must be redressed; (2) to tell key military leaders that: the USG cannot
[616]support a DIEM rewime that includes the NHU's and that "we will give them direct support
[618]in any interim period of breakdown central government mechanism; (3) to make statements in
[619]Saigon removing the military taint on the pagoda raids." —
[621]"The telegram includes the following statement: "The AMBASSADOR and COUNTRY TEAM should
[622]urgently examine all possible alternative leadership and make detailed plans as to how (eon't.)
[624]SOURCE? 1G. REPORT 1967, Part C, pp. 4-5 STAFF: Dawson
[627]FILE:
[631]OCCURRENCE? “(con't from card 1)
[632]we Might bring about. DIEM's replacement if this should become necessary. You will under~
[633]stand that we cannot from Washington give you detailed instructions as to how this opera—
[635]tion should proceed, but you will also know we will back you to the hilt on actions you take
[636]to achieve our ebjectives.'" (4-5)
[638]CARD 2 of 2
[640]AW 50955 Docld:32493615 Page i4
[643]Thich Tri fuang
[644]Diem
[646]DATES: CATEGORIES:
[647]Aug. 21, 1963 | Diem _Y
[651]Higgins states that the Xa Loi pagoda, based on her oWn miybriences, was more a political
[654]command post than a holy place. It was the headquarter ‘from which the militant i
[655]Thich Tri Quang and others had run their political way against the Diem regime.
[656]According to Higgins, Thich Tri Quang told an Austrian journalist by the name of
[657]Denis Warner early in August that he hoped in the process "they would kill one or two
[658]of us."
[659]Higgins goes on to note that the State Department regarded the actions against a dozen
[660]pagodas a betrayal of Diem's promise to reconciliate the Buddhists. (Page 181)
[662]SOURCE: Qur Vietnam Nightmare by Marguerite Higgins, STAFF: Dawson
[663]Harper and Rowe
[665]PILE: DATE: July 3, 1975
[667]PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: | CATEGORIES:
[668][GENERAL T TON THAT DINH, MILITARY 4 4
[670]GOVERNOR OF SAIGON, COMMANDER 3RD 21 August 1963! DIEM
[672]CORPS
[674]CONEIN Lode, Henry C-
[675]NGO DINH NHU
[677]____ AMBASSADORS NOLTING
[678]OCCURRENCE: "On the night oF the elst of August. GENERAL TON THAT DINH, as military gov-
[679]ernor of Saigon and Commander of the 3rd Corns, has established a curfew. If I recall
[681]correctly, the curfew was to start about 7:00 or 8:00 o'clock at night. Anybody seen afte:
[683]that time would be -- shot. And that night, elements -- later on, we didn't know at that
[684]time, later on proving to be elements of the special forces, which was praetorian guard of'
[685]NGO DINH NHU and the police dressed in military uniforms attacked the pagodas in Saigon.
[686]What was very bad about this, Ambassador NOLTING had already been relieved and Ambassador
[687]LODGE was on his way to take over". -p. 21
[689]SOURCE:
[691]Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein R. DAWSON
[693]AW 50955 Docld:32423615 Page i5
[697]DATES: [ CATEGORIES:
[699]‘Milting, Ambassador
[700]Lodge, Ambassador
[701]Diem .
[703]Thich Tri Quang
[705]Aug. 21, 1963 | Diem a
[707]OCCURRENCE:
[709]Higgins claims that
[710]five days after the departure of Ambassador Milting from Saigon, and a week before Henry
[712]».the taids by the Vietnamese Army and the pagodas took place
[713]Cabot Lodge was expected to arrive on his first tour of duty in Viet Nam.” Higgins goes
[714]on to explain that Diem claimed that the reason that the raids were performed at this
[715]time was because: "It had become clear that Thich Tri Quang of Buddhist was that no
[716]intention of coming to any agreement with the government, irrespective of how many
[717]consessions were made. Since the raids would create an anti-Diem Ta Pesan explosion,
[718]it would be a pansto the United States if they took at e when the new
[719]Ambassador wad“? so ae ea of Vietnam. For the same ne wedges ete was taken not |
[720]to inform the United States of the pagoda plans. ; Swas that Washington
[721]could be blamed for something about whiig (page 183)
[724]SOURCE:
[726]DATE:
[727]FILE:
[728]PERSONS/ENTLULES t 7 | pares: CATEGORIES:
[729]CONEIN, CEA officer (Saigon) . , t
[730]DON, General 8/21/63 Diem
[732]Non August 21, 1963, at a meeting between CONEIN" [an officer ae the Sore? _
[733]Saigon station) and General DON, the latter asked for US ®. government
[735]assurances of support aasusances—of-support for moves against the DIEM
[736]regime." (3)
[738]1967 I.G. Report, Part C, p3. . RD
[741]AW 50955 Docld:32423615 Page 16
[745]GENERAL. DON
[747]ANBASSADOR NOLTING July 1963
[749]CONEIN
[751]OCCURRENCE: On July I, 1963, CONETN received a message from DON, Commander of I Corps
[752]“at the time, to meet with him in the Caravelle Hotel for a public "meeting and the hotel
[754]was jammed packed. CONEIN states. that:
[756]"Tt was at that time on the 4th of July that I
[758]nad the first indication that something serious was being comtemplated, when: GENERAL DON t«
[759]me that if the Buddhist situation does not get settled, that the military are planning. a
[760]ported this fact, and I believe it was around the 8th or Sth of July, that more indi-
[762]cations.... p. 20.
[764]SOURCE:
[766]Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein
[767]FILE:
[769]ee ee me ee re a ee eres Se ee ee eect ce et rh an
[771]PERSONS/ENTIP IES:
[773]EN. DUONG VAN MINH
[774]EN. TRAN VAN DON
[775]AJ, GEN. LE VAN KIM
[776]EN, TRAN THIEN KHIEM
[778]DAES:
[780]LO yrs ceeuneed Als
[781]Sh, L1G%,
[782]ait +: re t oop
[783]Alempt wees
[784]vcckel furl
[785]a pastnin Gos»
[787]; Gap t
[789]ibavdenid oa mS
[790]idee ron (borat
[792]OCCURRENCE? “he mitiet CORSA ChE Sie
[794]eee the teeta) cau
[796]STAPF :
[798]R. DAWSON
[799]DATE:
[801]30 June 1975
[803]a an a el em i eee Se ee i a ne
[807]STAPF :
[809]“p fa (hed, SOURCE: Hearings, $.S.C.1., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, }————" Dawson
[811]pase a i o.
[813]BYTE
[815]e
[817]gars; 6/30/75
[819]AW 50955 DociId:32423615 Page if
[821]7 » DATES:
[822]prea ye Spy ey ws AA Baa
[824]ore PERSON S/HNT J ta KS . 7/63
[826]GEN. MINE
[828]NGO DINH WHU
[830]“OC CURRENCIES
[832]_ ees ee : ~“TSTAR ER: Davson
[833]Hearings, S.S.C.2,, 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one,
[835]page ten. DATE: 6/30/75
[836]BILE:
[838]“SOURCE?
[841]aS EO
[843]Diem
[845]OCCURRENCE:
[847]In SNIE, 53-2-63, on 10 July "the Situation in South Vietnam" the
[848]following quotation appeared: "if —— as is likely -- Diem fails to
[850]carry out truly and promptly the commitment he has made to the Buddhists,
[851]disorders will probably flare again and the chances of coup or assassina-—
[852]tion attempts against. him become even better. . . We do not think .
[853]the €ommunists would necessarily profit if he were overthrown by some
[854]combination of his non Onmunist opponents. A non—lommunist Successor
[855]regime might be initially less effective against the Viet Cong, but,
[856]given continued Support. from the U. S., could provide reasonably effec-
[858]tive leadership for the Government and the war effort." (1-2) ~
[859]SOURCE:
[861]1967 TT. Rennnt nant anda?
[863]HW S0955 Docid: 32423615 Page 16
[865]CATEGORIES:
[867]PERSONS/ENTITIES : _ DATES
[870]: a | ee
[871]DIEM . || May 6, 1963 | DIEM Va .
[872]‘HICH TRI QUANG . | ;
[873]OCCURRENCE? Diem on May 6, 1963 revived a regulation banning the public display of any
[875]religious flag--either the Buddhist or Catholic-- having any precedence over the National
[876]Vietnamese flag in public places or in public view. Higgins does not doubt that the
[877]Vietnamese government's decision to revive these flag regulations on May 6, 1963 made —
[878]possible the Hue tragedy. Ironically, action by Diem has been generally viewed as anti-
[879]Buddhist. His May 6 circular had been provoked a few days earlier in Da Nang by the
[880]excessive use by Catholics of the flag of the vatican with the Nationa! Vietnamese flag
[881]on view being sometimes tattered and torn and few in number.
[883]SOURCIS: Our Viet Nam Nightmare, Higgins, Harper and Row,} STAPF:
[884]“T9565 Dawson, R.
[885]FILE: DATE: July 2, 1975
[887]CONEIN
[889]MADAME, NHU
[890]OCCURRENCE:
[892]CONEIN stated that the catalyst that brought down the DIEM regime was their
[893]antagonism of the Buddhists. He explained that 80% of the Vietnamese people claimed to be
[894]Buddhists. And that DIEM led a Catholic regime and that this drove people, particularly in.
[895]light of MADAME NHU's statements to the effect that she'd like to furnish Some mustard at
[897]a bonzes barbecue, or something to that effect. This made people want to identify themselve:
[899]against. the regime and so they would go back to the pagodas. CONEIN did not know whether or
[900]not poss became the principal reason for the United States wanting to get rid of the regime.
[901]pp. 42-44. .
[903]SOURCE?
[905]Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein
[906]PILE:
[908]R. DAWSON
[910]Taster F WATS:
[912]AW 50955 Docld:32423615 Page 19
[914]PERSONS /ENTTTIES : DATES : CATEGORIES:
[915]TRUEHEART, WILLIAM » | June 1963 DIEM v~
[917]MECKLIN, JOHN (Dir. USIA)
[919]NOLTING, AMBASSADOR
[921]Cad (fr
[923]OCCURRENCE! Mecklin stated that the American position following the incident at Hue
[924]was to "urge Diem to repair all Buddhist grievances forthwith, to accept responsibilit
[925]for the May 8 killings, and to indemnify the victims and apologize, perhaps by visiting
[926]Hue himself to do so." (Ambassador Nolting was on a Meditterranean vaction at the time.)
[928]. "According to Mecklin, William Trueheart, the Charge d'Affaires, applied on orders from
[929]Washington, ‘direct,relentless, tablehammering pressure on Diem such as the United States
[930]had seldom before attempted with a sovereign friendly government..,' In despair Trueheart ~
[931]in June resorted to a formal warning to Diem that if he continued repressive measures
[932](police effort to prevent and disperse illegal demonstrations), t niged States would
[933]be forced to disassociate itself publicly from such actions , .as* n we, did two months
[934]later. The warning waS a momentous step. It amount edntOy :
[936]OUNCES Our Viet Nam Nightmare, Higgins, Harper Bate omar Dawson, R.
[937]Row, 1965 ; pare, July 2, 1975
[938]FILE: - i
[940]CATEGORIES :
[942]PERSONS /ENTIPIES: DATES :
[943]|
[945]OUCURRIAICH {continuation)
[946]the United States. Public disassociation could have disasterous results, encouraging the
[947]Buddhists, heartening the Viet Cong, strengthening the regimes foreign critics...
[948]perhaps even stimulating the Vietnamese Army to try another coup"™' (100)
[950]el A
[951]Ty %
[952]ee .
[954]i
[956]SOURCE > Our Viet Nam Niehtware, Higgins, Harper and Row} STAPF:
[958]TATE
[960]HW 50955 Docild:324293615 Page 20
[962]PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES:
[963]CONEIN "Summer 1963" | DIEM ~~
[965]NHU, NGO DINH
[967]MADAME, NHU
[969]CAN, NGO DINH
[971]OCCURRENCE: coNEIN stated that the attacks in May In Hue followed up by
[972]on the pagodas in Saigon consolidated the three or four different sects of oe ei betea
[973]by making them become a political entity which they had never been pelo ts ae stat
[974]that it had become obvious to people in the State Department, USAIB and JSP aon Sem
[975]as persons within the CIA and the country team generally, that the true power aa ae er
[976]ment at that time was not DIEM but rather NHU and CAN, as well as MADAME ee e ° ser
[977]the womens’ solidarity movement. DIEM was felt te be out of touch with reality an eis
[978]ting the true facts as everything was being channeled through his brother, NHU. pp.
[982]SOURCE: START:
[983]Hearings, SSCI,.June 20, 1975, Conein DATE: 7 R. DAWSON |
[984]Se duly 1, 1975
[985]PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES:
[986]CONEIN DIEM a
[988]"middle May .
[990]196 3"
[992]OCCURRENCE? CONEIN said that the DIEM
[993]eould not understand their deing so. He
[994]chance to get out of it and Bet out of it
[995]the 8th of May incident. in HUE by meeting
[996]people who were killed. when the military attacked the pagodas in Hue.
[998]been done, I think that 1d have 6 bet 3 tae on
[999]3 at we wou ve been much better off....This was a tumin int
[1000]the political situation...." pp. 41~42 & Pe of
[1002]government started the Buddhist antagonism but
[1003]gave his personal opinion as that "they had a
[1004]very gracefully within the first two weeks after
[1005]the demands of paying off the families of those
[1007]SOURCE:
[1009]TAFE:
[1011]Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein
[1013]mrrm.
[1015]R. DAWSON
[1017]HW 50955 Docld:32423615 Page 21
[1019]PERSONS /ENLTIP IES : DATES t CATEGORIES :
[1021]DIEM / | May 8, 1963 | DIEM ~~
[1022]MAJOR GEN. TRAN VAN DON (sp. ?)
[1024]i
[1025])
[1026]1
[1027]i
[1032]OTT TRE PONT OTS «
[1033]OCCURRENCE: "Immediately after May 8, President Diem ordered a formal investigation
[1034]of the Nue affairs. For this purpose he appointed a 3-man technical commission led by
[1035]Major General Tran Van Don, the acting head of the army (General Don was considered a
[1036]man of integrity by the Americans.)' The commission also included the Surgeon General
[1037]of the Vietnamese Army and its Chief of Ordinance. After extensive interrogation of
[1038]witnesses General Don's mission cited plastic charges as the cause of ¢ ape deaths on
[1039]May 8.
[1041]“At the time, nonetheless, Diem' S > regime claimed that plasticepgh
[1043]a
[1044]d the deaths was
[1045]widely ridiculed.
[1047]“Unfortunately, no American officials were witness “toh ng intidence. The American con-
[1049]—— had son the He of | town put be BViet ita saves gi sbelicyesthe overnnent . 55 gi iprts to place
[1051]ade ze ry nA
[1052]Oar Viet Naan tne Higgins, Harper and ovarre Dawson, R.
[1053]Row, 1965 parE: July 2, 1975
[1054]FILE i
[1055]PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: | CATEGORIES *
[1057]THICH TRI QUANG
[1058]NGUTEN VAN BANG (Prevince Chief)
[1059]MAJOR DANG SY (ASST. PROV, CHIEF)
[1061]May 8, 1963 | DIEM
[1063]OCCURRENCE: ‘A
[1065]a Nguyen, Van Bang later at the trial of Major Dang sy said that "While we
[1066]were inside, two loud explosions ‘suddenly reverberated on the veranda. Then came the
[1067]sounds of broken glass, gunshots, and- exploding hand grenades.'"" In the confusion Major
[1068]Dang Sy heard the explosions also and in attempting to signal what he feared may be a
[1069]Viet Cong attack fired three shots in the air. Unfortunately this was the prearranged
[1070]signal authorizing his troops to use grenades to disperse the crowds. At least 15 of
[1071]these grenades were throw and the explosions caused at least 8 dead at the radio station.
[1072](95) This statement though, appears to be in conflict with later medical evidence coming
[1073]from the Interior Minister which ‘found that none of the bodies of the dead had metal
[1074]splinters in their organs, but rather the weapons expert said that the bombs were probably
[1075]made of plastic and that "plastic is the arm of the Viet Cong guerilla." (95-96)
[1077]SOURCE . ‘ STAPF
[1079]Our Viet Nam Nightmare, Higgins,
[1081]Harper and Row, | Dawson, R.
[1082]1965 | | pn:
[1083]FILE: ; DATE: July 2, 1975
[1085]HW 50955 Docld:32423615 Page 22
[1087]PERSONS/ENTITIES: | DATES: z
[1088]THICH TRE QUANG “1 May 8, 1963 | DIEM /
[1089]NCUYEN VAN BANG (Province Chief) ° |
[1090]MAJOR DANG SY (Asst. Province Chief) H
[1092]OCCURRENCE: According to Higgins on May 8, 1963-on the, ' ddhist birthday Thich Tri
[1093]Quang, in the middle of a religious ceremony, began to give a vitriolic anti-government
[1094]speech on the subject of the non-existent ban on Buddhist flags. About 8 pm Thich Tri
[1095]Quang arrived at the radio station carrying in his hands a tape recording which he then
[1096]made the demand upon the director of the station to play. He was refused. © Thich Tri
[1097]Quang proceeded to encourage an already active angry crowd which in the middle of this
[1098]oration began to shout and press forward. The director of the station called up Nguyen
[1099]Van Bang who soon arrived and attempted to appease Thich Tri Quang, but the latter would
[1100]not listen. Nguyen Van Bang then asked for armored cars in hopes that this would
[1101]fighten the crowd and prevent any violence to the radio station. Major Dang Sy
[1102]then arrived with some armored cars and got some general orders to disperse the crowd.
[1103]Police arrived and attempted to turn fire hoses on the crowd. (93-94) :
[1105]SOURCE: Our Viet Nan Nightmare, Higgins, Harper and Row,} SANE:
[1106]1905 : Dawson, R.
[1108]FILE: DATE: July 2, 1975
[1110]CATEGORIES:
[1112]Diem ~~
[1114]PERSONS /ENTITIES :
[1116]Trich Tri Quang
[1117]Diem
[1119]OCCURRENCE: "No evidence can be adduced showing that before the Hue incident of
[1120]May 8, 1963, there was a religious issue in Vietnam. If there had been, assuredly
[1121]the critics of Diem's leadership would have trumpeted it to the world. Complaints of
[1122]alleged religious repression made by Thich Tri Quant. and his. accomplices in a campaign
[1123]of letters to the United Nations and prominent foreigners, had begun, but they represented
[1124]no more than the early activity of determined propagandists.
[1126]‘Most hostile criticism toward Diem centered not on what he did but on his methods and
[1127]techniques of governing."
[1129]AACE ee wae: wee ee Ey . a.
[1131]RW 50955 Docld:32423615 Page 23
[1133]PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES:
[1134]Colby Teo, Uiewh Can 1O/G5 Dien
[1135]Conan
[1136]“lay
[1138]OCCURRENCE:
[1140]Colby explained that a couple of weeks before the assassination the thought
[1141]of assassination was not aimed at Dien but at Slut and Can, Dien's two
[1142]rotuers who were considered the evil influence of the sovernnent. "The
[1143]2a of removing Nhu £rom Vietnam was one that was discussed in great detail
[1144]ind a great deal of pressure was put on Diem to send fis brother out of
[1145]the country." At one point To nade a steeestion that perhaps I could con-
[1146]vince him of the desirability of leavine the country for the bencfit of :
[1147]iis own, of the country itself, That fT could so over areal areue hin intofs e)
[1148]Mhat think is the separable thing from the Actual decision to shoot Dien,
[1149]Po think the decision to shoot Dien Was a conscience decision taken by the
[1151]renerals which ‘c cae as a very new deve lepmert hiring the coup, but let's
[1153]face
[1155]if Soe a ie af 4-
[1156]SOURCE: wovenmowe Pages '
[1157], Jawson
[1158]earines, SSCT, June 20, 1975, Colby DATE:
[1159]FILE: 7/1/75
[1163]DU CATEGORIES:
[1164]11/2/63 f = Dien
[1166]ni, Heo Dinh
[1170]OCCURRENCE:
[1171]mein stated that at no point in the climatic days leading up to the assassina-
[1172]on was there a discussion of the killing of Dien. Further, there had never
[1173]‘en any discussion at any time about Diem himself being killed by anybodk.
[1175]i fact, the generals and many people wanted Diew tea be around but they could
[1176]‘t stand Hhu and Madawe Nhu, Diem's wife. Page 64-66.
[1178]SOURCE: ° TARR?
[1179]uo Hearings, SSC, Conein, June 20, 1975 Dawson
[1181]32423615 Page 24
[1183]AW 50955 Docla
[1185]PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: ' CATEGORIES:
[1187]COLBY, WILLIAM ,
[1189]MINH, GENERAL , 1 November 1963} DIEM J
[1190]NHUNG
[1192]CONETN | ;
[1194]Nhu.
[1195]OCCURRENCE? COLBY stated that "Apparentiy the decision by several of the generals, the
[1196]ones that were present, that he (DIEM) would be executed when they got him. They sent an
[1197]officer, a stall armored unit to pick him up after they found out where he was down in the
[1198]other part of town. He and his brother were put: in an armored personnel carrier with an
[1199]officer, a young Vietnamese wno was an aide to GENERAL MINH, head of the coup group, and
[1200]they went into the armored personnel carrier and when the carrier arrived back at head-
[1201]quarters, the two were dead and had been shot several times. .That officer, incidentally,
[1202]and a rather bizarre aspect of this, was himself apparently/ when this junta of generals
[1203]was overthrown about two months later. Somebody took that.oceasion to shoot him."
[1205]po. 16-19.
[1207]SOURCE: yo uohe STAMPS R, DAWSON
[1209]Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby, pp. 18-19
[1211]ATE:
[1213]FILE: ae 29 June 1975
[1215]PERSONS/ENTIVIES: DATES : CATEGORIES:
[1216]: | CATEGORIES
[1217]DIEM | May 7, 1963 | pray A
[1219]THICH TRI QUANG
[1223]OCCURRENCE?
[1224]OO The Diem circular to ban all religious flags reached’Hue on May 7, 1963.
[1225]Since the city was already bedecked with flags the Vietnamese Minister,of Interior,
[1227]Vui Van Long, arriving in Hue on‘the same date as the circular arrivéd “to the Bud-
[1228]dhist leaders and explained that the flag regulation would not ¥é ‘enforced. "The leaders
[1229]of the monks were very pleased,"'said Minister Long. "they Liste ed*to me and told me
[1230]that I had given complete satisfaction to their desires ‘Quane was present during this
[1231]exchange and joined in expressing satisfaction with the rangement not to enforce
[1232]the regulation. Some police in Hue did take down flags before the Province Chief could
[1233]reverse the order to enforce the regulation. But the precipitating factor, according
[1234]to lliggins was that Kuang sent aifew monks around to tell the people to haul down the
[1235]flags, even though he knew this was no longer required, thanks to the Interior Ministers
[1237]actions. "The monks were told to te]1 the population that this was being done as a
[1238]SOURCE: Pesala ot Dens oder aid Buddhist Aig: OF) STAPF 3
[1239]R.
[1241]“Our Viet Nan Nichtmare, Higgins, Harper and Row, , Dawson,
[1243]1965 |
[1244]PILE: pDATE: July 2, 1975
[1246]HW 50955 Docld:32423615 Page 25
[1251]Kahn H ;
[1253]In responge to. % guestion as to whether McCone was aware of a suggestion to assassinate
[1255]Mr. Diem and" “®had sent a telegram jn conjunet lo ‘that suggestion, MéCone testified
[1256]that he did not think it. was Mr. Diem#"° CASAS that "there was a prog 2sal, one
[1258]of a number of proposals, in connection with the difficult political situation that -
[1259]existed in. South Vietnam, to dispose by assassination’ Mr. Nhu and. General Kanh.... —
[1261]when that was brought to my attention I ordered a telegram sent out to stand that down"
[1263](4) McCone testified that "The situation in Vietnam was unlike other situations.We
[1265]were really at war there. My opposition was more on the basi s of considered judgement
[1266]that the action recommended by the station wouldn't in final an alysis solve any
[1268]problem..", (5).
[1270]TAFE s
[1272]Gordon Rhea
[1274]DATE? 6/27/75
[1276]HW 50955 Docld:32423615 Page 26
[1278]HW 50955 DoclId: 32423615 Page 27
[1280]PEKSONS/ENTIPIES : DATES: CATEGORIES:
[1281]TEAR BDLLES Mar 16, 1960 MONGOOSE ;
[1282]SPECIAL GROUP
[1283]DIEM 1~
[1287]6 the Special Group Meeting there was discussion of stepped up plans
[1288]to ere e bane radio at Guentameo Bay to expand the stations listening audience. 4
[1289]VIETNAM Mr. DULLES Referred to the worsening security situation in South Vietnam... an
[1290]commented that. this appears to be_a situation where S. F, training might be in onaer-
[1291]DULLES asked whether it would be "politically feasible for Col. LANSDALE to visit the u
[1292]area to assess the situation on the spot." DULLES also discussed briefly "the possibil y
[1293]of assisting the South Vietnam government to mount guerrila operationsin. the north.
[1295]STAFF:
[1296]KELLEY
[1297]DATE:
[1298]6/27/75
[1300]ad ff Ef hoy
[1302]t Pap hey gate
[1304]fe fed v ae Brn
[1305]el Eee on
[1307]bY
[1309]Minutes of Special Group eating, March’ 16, 1960.
[1310]a oe
[1311], SETy fe
[1313]ay
[1315]DATES:
[1318]FERSONS/ENTITIES
[1322]Lansdale May 12, 1960 Diem ~
[1323]Dulles Special Group
[1324]Hare
[1326]Irwin
[1328]OCCURRENCE;
[1330]On May 12, 1960
[1331]from President Diem for General Lansdale to visit Viet Nam. Mr.
[1332]"that he assumed that the way in which Diem would like to use
[1333]Lansdale would not be acceptable to the U. S., but that some adjustments
[1334]could no doubt be made, Mr. Dulles said that “Lansdale could be counted
[1335]On to carry out whatever instructions he had in a manner least calculated
[1337]» the Special Group discussed the subject of the invitation
[1339]Hare said
[1340]General
[1342]to upset Diem." 4
[1344]STAFF: Bob Kelley
[1346]DATE: June 29, 1975
[1347]FILE:
[1349]HW 450955 Docld:32423615 Page 23
[1351]2 SROONS/ENTIVIES: DATES: i
[1353]STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM |
[1355]NGO. BINH NHU 1962 " DIEM /
[1356]MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR-GOVERNMENT |
[1357]OF VIETNAM, COLBY, HARKINS
[1358]WESTMORELAND, GENERAL .
[1359]OCCURRENCE: CONEIN stated that: "In 1962 COLBY assigned him to work with the MINISTER ¢
[1360]THE INTERIOR OF THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM to be responsible for liaison between CIA and th
[1361]MINISTER on a program called THE STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM. The idea for this program was
[1362]that of NHU, the President's brother and counsellor, which was to establish security with:
[1363]hamlets and villages in order S3"the people could deny access of food and taxes to the
[1364]VIET CONG. In this position, CONEIN was able to travel quite extensively under the auspic
[1365]of the MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR, and to talk to the unit commanders down to and including
[1366]small sections.” ». 17. CONEIN. "This was done with the permission of GENERAL. HARKINS ar
[1367]it was knowm to GENERAL WESTMORELAND when WESTMORELAND took over." p. 18.
[1369]CATEGORIES:
[1371]SOURCE: STAFY:
[1373]Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein <., R. DAWSON
[1375]TILE: DATE: :
[1376]Pil. DATE? 39 June 1975
[1377]PK | PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORTES:
[1378]Maxwell Taylor Special Group Aug -
[1379]27 Sept 62 - Mooncoosr™ente
[1380]Diem)
[1382]OCCURRENCES , ~~ ee
[1383]laylor states that the Special Group and the Sencial Group Augmented considered a proposal by
[1384]SIA for covert activities designed to harass the Democratic REpublic of Vietnam. This had
[1385]seen prepared in response to a request by the Sec.'s of State and Nefense.
[1387]-aylor added that the Special Group aéked that a more detailed operation plan be prepared.
[1389](t was agreed that Defense make certain equipment and personnel available to CIA in support
[1391]of this program. An elint flight designed to identify the North Vietnamese radar order of
[1392]rattle, so as to permit planning over flight routes was authorized. This will be Flown out
[1394]of Saigon , using the specially equipped aircraft available on Taiwan, but with the Chinese
[1396]vir rorce markings removed, and employing Chinese Nationalists,.piléts documented South Vietnam-
[1397]sé citizens. e ¥
[1401]SOURCE? . ~~ } BOS STR RTT -
[1402]——~—=" Maxwell Taylor! saméfiarandum SARE pay
[1404]Sept 27, 1862." Gp : Oy
[1405]FTLE: ee name 6/20/76
[1407]HW 50955 Docla:324273615 Page 29
[1409]OCCURRENCE: CONEIN stated: "In February of 1962, two air foree pilots, Vietnamese Air
[1411]“CONELE
[1413]February 1962
[1415]PERSONG/ENPTTTES : | CATEGORIES:
[1416]t
[1417]r
[1419]Force pilots, attacked the presidential palace of NGO DINH DIEM. ‘This was not the first
[1420]indication there was something wrong, because if you will recall, in November of 1960, th
[1421]was another attempted coup. At that time, in February, I was asked if I would go to the
[1423]different military leaders which I knew and had known in the past, to find out what was Sh
[1425]political pressure, what was the temperature, was there really some dissidence within the
[1426]military ranks, was there really a basis for an uprising against NGO DINH DIEM? I was un-
[1427]able, at this time, to determine this fact. ‘here was an isolated dissidence within the
[1428]military structure. ‘his was reported In February and March of 1962." pp, 16-17.
[1430]SOURCE: “ee Sea
[1432]Hearings, SSCT, June 20, 1975, Conetri R. DAWSON
[1433]VA DATE:
[1435]FILE: be 30 June 1975
[1437]HW 50955 Docld:32423615 Page 30
[1439]IG/ENTITIES: . DATES t | CAREGOH INS :
[1441]February 1962 | DIEM 4
[1443]|
[1445]6CCURRENCE: GONEIN stated: "In February of 1962, two air force pilots, Vietnamese Air
[1447]Force pilots, attacked the presidential palace of NGO DINH DIEM. This was not the first
[1448]indication there was something. wrong, because if you will recall, in November of 1960, th
[1449]was another attempted coup. At that tine, in February, I was asked if I would go to the
[1451]different military leaders which I mew and had known in the past, to find out what was iver
[1453]political pressure, what was the temperature, was there really some dissidence within the
[1454]military ranks, was there really a basis for an uprising against NGO DINH DIEM? I was un-
[1455]able, at this time, to determine this fact. ‘There was an isolated dissidence within the
[1456]military structure. ‘This was reported in February and March of 1962." pp. 16-17.
[1458]“PSTAPR:
[1460]SOURCE: _
[1461]Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Coneiri R. DAWSON
[1464]FILE 30 June 1975
[1466]ee wre tee ee wee, ree ee merce eee AG he eG eke ce ee ee ce a eee Ae eg nf
[1468]HW 50955 Docla:32423615 Page 31
[1470]Page 32
[1472]32423615
[1474]HY 50955 Docld
[1476]PERSONS/ENTLTIFS : | DATES: | Raa:
[1477]iE oo 1963 DIEM
[1479]OCCURRENCE: "Most manifestations of political oppostion," wrote Henderson, "were
[1480]vigorously suppressed. Civil liberties remained an unfulfilled ideal. Elections were
[1481]far from free and many of the devices used to stimulate popular support for the regime
[1482]bore the the familiar stamp of modern totalitarian practice. No doubt these moves could
[1483]be justified, at least to some extent, in terms of the overwhelming problems confronting
[1484]Diem during his first few years in office and also the inexperience of Free Viet Nam's
[1485]people with the forms and substance of democracy, but...Diem had still to prove that his
[1486]professed devotion to the democratic cause represented anything more than a facade to
[1487]disguise increasingly plain reality of stern dictatorship." (164-165) .¢
[1490]toe us oe Our Viet Nam Nightmare, Higgins, Harper: STARE: Dawson, R
[1491]OW, : ’ *
[1492]J > : 4B. DATE: July 2, 1975
[1497]PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES:
[1498]NGO DINH CAN 1963 - | prem //
[1499]MINISTER OF INTERIOR
[1501]COnein . |
[1503]“OCCURRENCE :
[1505]SL CONEIN stated that: "On May 7, 1963,....."The MINISTER OF INTERIOR, myself <
[1506]his entourage flew to Hue in central Vietnam. While in Hue, it was on my aireraft that I:
[1507]assigned to me for that day --: while in Hue, they had a very large meting of different
[1508]military authorities and at that time I did not realize what was going on. They had met w
[1509]the President's brother, NGO DINH CAN who was considered the war lord, in a way, and some
[1510]decisions were made, of wich I was not aware of (sic). We returned quite late the night °
[1511]the 7th; though I wanted to stay, the MINISTER OF ‘THE-INTERIOR told me it. would be impossi:
[1512]T wanted to see the celebration of the birthday of Budda. I wanted to see burnt boats. wit’
[1513]she candles lit going down the perfumed river, but it was not to be. The next day there we:
[1514]an attack by the military forces on the Buddhists. At that time, the Buddhists as an ent?"
[1515]was not a political foree and therefore thought of being, and when the attack on the Budd
[1516]came about, this was, in my estimation, one of the turning points in what was happening 1
[1518]SOURCE: . STAPF:
[1519]R. DAWSON
[1521]te
[1522]Hearines, SSCI, June 20, 1975 | Coried a
[1524]HW 50955 Docld:324273615 Page 33
[1526]PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: | CATEGORIES:
[1527]; I
[1529]LODGE, leary CABOT 1963 | DEIM~
[1531]CONEIN
[1533]CCURRENCE: .
[1534]oeeuiee "4.1 worked for Ambassador LODGE. I reported to Ambassador LODGE and I re-
[1535]ceived my instructions from Ambassador LODCE. They were cable instructions, he had a very
[1536]good habit of not reading something. He would fold a piece of paper and what pertained tc
[1537]you for instructions, he would let you read that and that alone so that you didn't know wh
[1538]was sending it or where it came from. He just read that and he said those are the instruc.
[1539]tions, do you understand them? Yes, sir; allright, we'll carry them out." p. 23
[1541]SOURCE: ES
[1542]Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein R. DAWSON
[1544]PILE: | pam:
[1546]20 June 1975
[1549]CONEIN
[1551]DATES: | CATEGORIES:
[1552]1963 DIEMY- SSS
[1554]) . : ( fp fe
[1556]CIC) clacte A Met ‘
[1557]OCCURRENCE: "I had never, and even right up to the very end, I had never been asked for any
[1558]resources whatsoever to help or to aid in the elimination of any individual." p. 25
[1560]SOURCE: STAFF:
[1561]Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein R. DAWSON
[1562]FILE: . DATE:
[1564]Tune 30 FQ76
[1566]HW 50955 Docld:32493615 Page 34
[1569]Dawson
[1571]National Security Council a
[1572]State Dent
[1574]DATES: | CATEGORIES:
[1576]1963 Diem
[1578]OCCURRENCE :
[1579]Colby stated that the policy of the chain of const wanted a determination
[1580]whether it be by the Security Council or by other authority is made to carry
[1581]out that policy is normally transferred from the National Security Council
[1582]to the ambassador. "The ambassador is the President's representative and
[1584]has overall authority of all agencies in that country, and therefore, an
[1585]important question like this (the Diem ceup} would be passed to the ambassador
[1586]tohandle. "Now, the other axencies in town would be informed of the policy
[1587]directive tha t We macht have additional communication as to the details as
[1589]to how to implement them, which in this case (the Diem coup) were done through
[1590]directive to our Station Chief to make sure he operated very directly and im-
[1591]mediately under the control of the ambassador." Pare 35.
[1593]STAPF:
[1595]Hearings, SSCT, June 20, 1975, Colby
[1597]Dawson
[1598]4
[1599]PILE: | pam TAIT
[1600]PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATE DATES: | CATEGORIES:
[1601]Special Vorces : 1965 i Rien /
[1602]Colby
[1604]OCCURRENCE:
[1606]Colby stated that "the Special For€es first arrived in Vietnane worhing for
[1607]CTA in this country prosraum of developines villages for their own defense.
[1608]"hen Tt gat to be as T remember 750 of them the question arose as to whether
[1609]they should be transferred out of CLA into military control, and this was
[1610]done during T9603; military took over responsibility for that program and
[1612]j 7 - fb pMe “ys ‘ 7¢
[1613]LTowill have some more words to say about that at another time." Page 26-29.
[1615]SOURCE:
[1617]Hearings, SSCI, June 20,1975, Colby j AAwsSon
[1619]HW 50955 Docld:324273615 Page 35
[1621]PERSONS/ENTITIES! |
[1622]BUNDY, MC GEORGE 4 ‘TAYLOR, MAXWELL
[1623]BALL, GEORGE
[1625]FORRESTAL, MICHAEL
[1627]HILLSMAN, ROGER; AMBASSADOR NOLTING
[1629]MC CONE, JOHN, MC NAMARA, ROBERT
[1632]P
[1634]ER Fence oe
[1636]GEAR Eee COLBY stated that the persons typically in attendance in the conference
[1637]yoom or situation room to discuss matters in Vietnam during 1963, MESSRS. BUNDY, BALL,
[1638]FORRESTAL, HILLSMAN, MC CONE, MC NAMARA GILPATRIC, TAYLOR. p. 70 COLBY also stated that
[1639]generally the Attorney General was generally not in attendance. If the meeting was to be
[1640]with the President, then it would have been in the Cabinet room and then the Attorney
[1641]General would have been there. op. 70-71, ‘The chairman of the meetings downstairs which |
[1642]President never attended would have been Me. BUNDY. pp. 71-72 Mr. HARRIMAN would come soi
[1643]times, COLBY recalled, and Vice President JOHNSON would always attend the ones upstairs in
[1644]the Cabinet roon, but did not take a particularly active part. pp. 72 Ambassador NOLTING.
[1645]when he returned, after his replacement in Vietnam tock a very active role opposing action:
[1646]against President DIEM to the extent that he was invited to participate. And ‘his advice we
[1647]not accepted. p. 73
[1649]“SOURCE: STARE: R. DAWSON
[1650]Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby OATS
[1651]Lind
[1652]FILE: 1 July 1975
[1653]PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES! CATEGORIES:
[1655]Sunmer’ and
[1656]Fall 1963
[1658]CONEIN
[1660]DIEM a
[1662]OCCURRENCE: "There were (sic) not one coup plan. There were several.
[1663]facing the people that were making assessments of this was which one had the most likely
[1665]chance of succeeding? We were at the point of no return. There was no ehance of going back.
[1667]because there was going to be a coup. ‘The best thing to do was to monitor arid keep the U.S.
[1668]government advised of who the principal players were, what their intentions were then and in
[1669]the future. It was an impossible situation, and also during this tine, it was getting down
[1671]to the critical. element. In October, the generals had to have assurances that I was spealcin:
[1673]for the Ambassador. Several attempts were made to get these assurances, and it was practi-
[1674]cally impossible because of the security around the generals, who were already suspect...."
[1675]ps 28 : — o 6 Ces
[1677]The problem that wa:
[1679]HW 50955 Docla:324273615 Page 36
[1682]Diem Sumer 1963 Diem \/
[1684]SECUR RENCE
[1686]-.»-Diem was not conforming. to Western standards of democracy. And this
[1687]was really the heart of the case against him. Implicit in their criticism was the assunp-—
[1688]tion that Occidental style democracy was, in fact, the answer to Oriental Vietnam's problems .
[1689]It was an assumtion with which Ngo Dinh "Diem disagreed on both practical. and philosophical
[1691]grounds."
[1694]~~~ “Our Vietnam Nightmare", Marguerite Higgins, ———" Dawson
[1695]Harper & Row, 1965, p. 165
[1696]FILE: DATE: July 2, 1975
[1697]PERSONS/ENTITIES : DATES: CATEGORIES:
[1699]Thich Tri. Quang Summer, 1963 Diem va
[1701]McNanara
[1703]Diem
[1705]OCCURRENCE:  Card=I==
[1707]Higgins states in her book that, "Washington generated pressure on Diem for concilia~
[1708]tion was based on the assumption that Thich Tri Quang's grievances concerning flags and
[1709]such were what motivated his Budist protest movement. But it was evident that what Thich
[1710]Tri Quang. wanted was a pretext to see. His objective was not a solution, but nonethe-
[1711]less than Diem's head.
[1713]“Perhaps Diem might have had a better image in the United States if he had personnally
[1714]shown immediate public concern for the victims of the Hue tragedy. He then instantly
[1715]oxder generous indemnification of the families who suffered losses, but this was never
[1717]publicized. Perhaps he was too ' , So inwardly assured of his innocence was
[1718]Diem that he did not of going through the croubee of . Pee, it. He,weuld certainly
[1719](Continued-or-Card2) fac preesed Maaisos Ave. be, Sof fig Embassy, hi °
[1721]jul suca straitiy would Scarce; 4 By, Se
[1722]SOURCE: Our Vietnam Nightmare by Marguerite Higgins, \ Aue
[1723]Harper and Rowe J
[1725]| DATE: July 3, 1975
[1727]mrrn.
[1729]AW 50955 Docld:324273615 Page 37
[1731]PERSONS/ENTIETIES : | DALES + CAL EUUR ite:
[1733]CEN, HYUH SS 7/63 DIEM ~
[1735]SOURCE: ; STAFF:
[1737]“= " Hearings, $.S.C.1.; 6/20/75 , Conein, Exhibit one, Dawson
[1738]page ten.
[1740]PILE: pars: 6/30/75
[1742]Ch
[1744]DIEM ~~
[1746]GEN,
[1747]GEN. NGUYEN ICHANIL
[1748]GEN, TON THAT DINH
[1749]GEN. DON
[1751]OCCURRENCE:
[1753]SOURCE: mane ,
[1754]mo Hearings, $.8.C.1., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, | ~~ "~ Dawson
[1755]page LO. wo, DATE:
[1759]32423615 Page 38
[1761]AW 50955 DocId
[1763]PERSONS SENET
[1765]DATES: . CATEGOR:
[1767]OCCURRENCE:
[1768]CONTINUED ON ANOTHER CARD:
[1770]a ~ “STAPPT
[1771]Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, ~~ Dawson —
[1772]page ten. DATE; 6/30/75
[1773]BILE:
[1774]- PERSONS/ENTITIES: CATEGORIES:
[1776]OCCURRENCE:
[1778]FOANTTINEER PD OND
[1779]CONTINUED FROM FIRST CARD:
[1781]SOURCE: TAFF: .
[1782]~~~" Hearings, S.S.C.I,,' 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, STAPy: Dawson
[1783]page il.
[1784]“RILE: | PE:
[1785]6/30/75
[1787]‘32473615 Page 39
[1789]HW 50955 Docld
[1791]LOD Nee edad nad fd i or
[1793]“SOURCE: . ; STARE
[1794]w=" Hearings, S.S.C.1., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one , —————" Dawson
[1796]Page ll. DATE: 6/30/75
[1798]PTI:
[1802]PERSONS/ENTITINS t
[1804]Becet
[1806]. abe ve:
[1807]ead che
[1808]a
[1810]4
[1812]SOURCE: “Hearings; S.S.c. “Tv; 6/20/75, Conein , EXHIBIT one, SAK
[1813]. page LO-l1ll. Dawson
[1817]32423615 Page 40.
[1819]HW 50955 Docld
[1822]NGO DINE NHU |
[1823]CONEIN July 11, 1963 |
[1825]OCCURRENCE: CONEIN states that:
[1826]staff meeting and shocked them by telling them that he mew of some coup planning going on
[1827]the generals. This scared tne generals and other officers, needless to say, that NGO DIN
[1828]NHU would be completely aware that there was some dissidence in the ranks." p. 20-21.
[1830]SOURCE: STAFF: 2 DANSON
[1831]Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein
[1832]FILE: DATE; 30 dune 19%5
[1833]PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES; CATEGORIES:
[1834]Krulik, Major General Vietor H. Diem
[1836]Kennedy, John F.
[1837]Mendenhall, Joseph, State
[1838]National Security Council
[1840]OCCURRENCE:
[1841]Higgins notes that Kennedy dispatched Krulik and Mendenhall to Viet Nam to make a tour of
[1842]the country to determine the effect of the Buddhist crisis on the war against. the Viet
[1843]Cong. Returning to Washington, Krulik and Mendenhall each gave a different report on the
[1844]effect. Higgins notes that Kennedy asked wryly, "Have you two fellows been in the same
[1845]country?" Higgins goes on to note that this was indeed indicative of the American reac-
[1846]tion to Vietnam generally. Krulik, Higgins points out, visited the theatre of war by go-
[1847]ing to all core areas as well as six divisional and some twenty-five regimental and bat-
[1848]talion headquarters. But Mendenhall saw the theatre of the political intrigue, i.e.,
[1850]Hue in Saigon. These latter two areas was the only Viet Nam that Americans knew during
[1851]that time, and it was the slightly Effett, volital society ey eb ey haven of Viet
[1852]Nam's chronicall eritical and bickering intellectu
[1854]” 6 ig CaN
[1856]SOURCE: joins, STAFF? pawson
[1858]DATE « ya Ro anne
[1860]Our Vietnam Nightmare by Marguerite |
[1862]Harper and Rowe
[1864]"On July 11, 1963, NHU called the generals together for
[1866]AW 50955 Docld:32473615 Page 41
[1869]Niu, NGO DIN
[1871]CATEGORIES:
[1873]DIEM /
[1877]CONEIN ‘ . August 1963
[1879]OCCURRENCE: The coup ...."aborted, because, one, they did not have necessary forces.
[1881]Im talking about the coup plotters, did not have the necessary forces to combat those
[1882]loyal to the DIEM government, namely elements of the Marines , elements of the Rangers ,
[1883]presidential guard, and other units, and especially the Special Forces, which were the bes
[1884]armed trocps available. Also, they announced in the press that the CIA was paying to have
[1885]a coup. This was a very shrewd and calculating move on any man on the quality NGO DINH NE
[1886]who was a shrewd politician and also master of psychological warfare." pp. 22-23
[1888]SOURCE: . : STAFF: R. DAWSON
[1889]Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein DATE: 20 June 1975
[1892]PERSONS/ENTITIES: | DATES: -
[1894]PERSONS /EN| 5 CATEGORIES:
[1895]VIBTNAMESE SPECIAL FORCES | | 2
[1896]COLBY August 1963 ‘ | DIEM
[1898]— arta a]
[1899]_ -
[1901]OCCURRENCE: COLBY stated that. "TS part Of the Pressure Oi Che BOVERTENE-In-Che AOE
[1902]period, in response to the fact that these SPECIAL FORCES with Vietnamese military and wit:
[1903]Vietnamese police had conducted the raid on pagodas, CIA was directed to suspend its assis:
[1904]ance to the SPECIAL FORCES. We did not suspend our assistance to the police or to the
[1905]military who were involved in that, but. CIA is an easy thing to tum off, turn on and off.
[1906]The other programs are much more difficult to turn on and off, In a simple way, I think t}
[1907]has had a certain influence in what they did. I lmow it resulted in the transfer of sever:
[1908]units outside of Saigon when we said we would continue to support them." p. 78-79
[1910]| Ae
[1912]“SOURCE : STAFF:
[1914]: ‘ R. DAWSON
[1915]Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby
[1917]PILE: . j Date 1 July 1975
[1919]AW 50955 Docld:32423615 Page 42
[1921]pLeaene totW dd be Lait DALES Ss ; CATEGOK Liss:
[1922]; |
[1924]eMADAME NHU .
[1926]SCONEIN August 1963 | DIEM .
[1928]in.
[1930]on
[1933]CCURRENCE: "Just before August 21, 1963, there were periods the
[1935]CONEIN states that: I
[1936]Mponzes burned themselves and that there had been local press releases made by MADAME NHU
[1937]mthat were sometimes not too well received by the Americans, and also antagonized the popul:
[1941]EP aheq CTICZPEE
[1943]SOURCE: STAPF:
[1945]Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein { R. DAWSON
[1947]PILE: | | pare: 31 June 1975
[1948]PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: _ CATEGORIES:
[1949]COMMODITY IMPORT PROG:
[1950]DIEM RAN August 1963
[1952]COLBY, WILLIAM
[1954]SEP RE i]
[1955]NGO DINH NHU » CONEIN wy Pek ae |
[1957]QOCUHRENCE: OOLBY stated that the United States sought to put pressure on President DIEM
[1958]and the government, particularly to remove NCO DINH NHU from the country, to bring about cer-
[1959]tain changes of policy in August of 1963 that was thought necessary to improve the perfor-
[1960]mance of the government of South Vietnam. Among these were the suspension of Public Law
[1961]480 aid the suspension of the commodity import.program. And also through various contacts
[1962]with dissident generals, the United States was requested whether it would-stand aside if
[1963]the generals ran their own coup, and they were given the response in general terms that,
[1964]"Yes, we would stand aside, and yes, we would continue the aid program if a successor gov-
[1965]ernment took over and looked reasonably able to carry on the war.’ This can only be read as
[1966]a green light to the generals. This message was passed through a CIA officer, but his cre-
[1967]ditentials were checked by the generals receiving this kind of a message, with the Ambassador
[1969]and with the Chief of the Military Aid group in Saigon so, that there was no question
[1971]SOURCE: about what U.S. policy was, nor that the CI”. office
[1972]was speaking for the Ambassador with his knowledge
[1974]FILE; Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby, pp. 10-12
[1976]d consent." R. DAWSON
[1978]DATE: 29 June 1975
[1981]o DIEM
[1983]® COLBY, WILLTAM August 1963 prem ”
[1985]7 LODGE. Henry Cabot
[1987]OCCURRIs ae A
[1988]OCCURRENCE? COLBY testified that during August, 1973 between the change of ambassadors
[1990]a from NOLTING to LODGE, that the government of South Vietnam took that period and raided
[1991]ss Buddists pagadas and essentially sought to surpress the Buddihist dissidence. COLBY stated
[1992]N that DIEM went out and supressed this kind of active dissidence, justifying. it in his mind
[1994]a and publicly as not accepting this kind of dissidence during a wartime situation, which that
[1995]wx country was faced with. COLBY claimed that this suppression only served to adversely affect
[1996]- DIEM's image here in. the United States and intensify the feeling of dissent within. the educa-
[1998]ted class in Saigon and in the cities, weakened himself, rather than strengthen himself.
[2000]PE afie
[2002]SOURCE: .
[2003]Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby, pp. &9
[2005]R. DAWSON
[2006]BILE:
[2008]29 June 1975
[2009]PRRSOUG/ENT TUT ES ¢ PATIOS: | a :
[2010]DIEM | Aug. 7, 1963 } DIEM
[2011]NOLTING, AMBASSADOR ” !
[2012]RICHARDSON, JOHN :
[2013]OCCURRENCE: Higgins asked Diem ‘in an interview on August 7, 1963 whether Diem thought
[2015]the United States was plotting against him. Diem replied: ''I do not think Ambassador
[2016]Nolting is plotting against me. I do not think Richardson /of the CIA/ is plotting
[2017]against me. I know there are American officials who are preparing the way in the event
[2018]the decision is taken to try and get rid of me. I cannot forsee the future. And I
[2020]cannot believe that America would turn against an ally under attack, engaged in a struggle
[2021]for its very existence. But some people are crazy--and the world is crazy. Still,
[2023]Miss Higgins, I hope that your government will take a realistic look at these young
[2024]generals plotting to take my place. How much maturity or political understanding do
[2026]they have--of their own country, let alone the world?" (169)
[2028]SOURCE:
[2030]Our Viet Nam Nightmare, Higgins, Harper and ine Dawson, R.
[2032]Qe
[2035]CATEGORIES:
[2038]“YE, LODGE, AMBASSADOR | Aug. 7, 1963 | DIEM
[2040]|  Camd bd2
[2042]During an interview by Higgins with DIEM on August 7, 1963 "...Diem
[2043]sent an aide for document, which:I later deduced to be a memorandum of a recent con-
[2044]versation with an American official."
[2046]a. eyes
[2049]"Your ambassador, '' Diem resumed, "comes and tells me that it enhances my
[2050]posture of the liberal image to permit demonstrations in the street by the Buddhists
[2051]and the political opposition...1 cannot seem to convinvce the embassy that this is Viet
[2052]Nam--not the United States of America. We have had good reason to ban street demoristra-
[2053]tions in the middle of a war, and the reason is that the Viet Cong. verywhere...what
[2054]would happen if the Viet Cong should infiltrate the demonstratienghe Saigon, toss
[2055]a bomb, kills dozens of persons, ‘including some American pre a -would ‘liberal
[2056]opinion’ say of me then? ‘Would they believe my govezmienh Ty said that the Viet
[2057]Cong were responsible for the killings because only the 3Us mmunists could profit from
[2059]GP aHegq CIILTPEE:PIPOCad Cos6Os AH
[2061]SSURCE! Our Viet Nam Nightmare
[2063]STAFF:
[2064]Dawson, R.
[2066], Higgins, Harper and Row,
[2068]1965
[2069]FILE DATE: July 2, 1975
[2070]PERSONS/ENTICIES: DATES: | CATEGORIES:
[2072]CARD TWO Cad 2 fz
[2073]GCCURRENCE: (continuation) :
[2074]such an event? Consider what happened at Hue. These plastic bombs were throw by the
[2075]Viet Cong...but.whom did the Americans blame? They blamed me--the President of Viet
[2076]Nam-- and the Vietnamese Army. Would they be any more charitable nexje“tame? This is
[2077]not child's play; | am not inventing Viet Cong terror. Yet when 1 yotosprotect the
[2078]people of this country--including the Americans--by good police wor
[2079]the streets, I am accused of persecuting the Buddhists!" (67a :
[2081]SOURCE + ; : | STAFF:
[2082]~ Our Viet Nam Nightmare, Higgins, Harper and Row, Dawson, R.
[2084]1965 i
[2085]PTL: ; DAVE: July 2, 1975
[2087]OF ahead CTIEZPEE: ploogd
[2089]CG60c AH
[2091]PERSONS/ENTITIES /fiq1eing, Amb. DATES: CATEGORIES:
[2093]_ Affair, Saigon Embassy]
[2095]‘Hile tan, Roger, Assistant Secretary of St te]
[2096][frueheart, William] /Mechlin, Director, YSIA 3/ie lez
[2097]eter Hen
[2099]t
[2101]CARD 1 OCCURRENCE: Higgins points out that on August 14, 1963, Hilsman, in a voice of America ©
[2102]broadcast, declared that the Buddhist crisis was “beginning to affect the war effort."
[2103]Higgins decided to check this story with the Saigon Embassy in approached Milting, who
[2104]was at that time in conference with Trueheart and Mechlin. Milting told Higgins that
[2105]“Qur report shows that the Buddhist crisis is not having any impact at all--though,
[2106]of course, it could ££ riots become severe enough to necessitate diverting frontline
[2107]troups.”
[2109]"We have made a special check," the Ambassador continued, " of the rumor that Bud-
[2110]dhist and Catholics are eating apart an Army messes. Nothing to it. I don't know what
[2111]Hilsman based this statement on. But he isn't basing it on anything that went out of
[2112]his Embassy, the military mission, or the CIA." Mechlin guested to Milting that
[2113]perhaps he should not publicly deny Hilsman's co mentree Hdlsman was, after all,
[2114]Milting’s boss." Higgins, returning to News ries enoeg thereafter, called Hilsman
[2116](Continued on Card 2) AA a)
[2118]SOURCE: Our Vietnam Nightmare by Marg¥erite Higgins,
[2120]Harper and Rowe
[2122]STAFF: Dawson
[2124]DATE:. july 3, 1975
[2126]DATES:
[2130]CCURRENCE? cara 2
[2131]to find out what was the basis for his breadcast. Hilsman conceded that in fact he had
[2132]based his account upon the reports in the New York Times and other press dispatches out :
[2134]of Saigon. (page 2@& 124-125). Hee Ys
[2137]Po
[2141]FILE: loaner:
[2145]CATEGORIES:
[2147]Diem 14 August 1963
[2149]OCCURRENCE:
[2151]In the @urrent Thtelligence Mbmorandum (OCI 2339/63): "Voup Runors in
[2152]. South Vietnam” the following quotation appeared: ". . . the coup reports yt
[2153]and rumors which have aris sen Since the Buddhist crisis seem to reflect
[2154]some serious coup plotting s,we have no firm evidence of advaneal planning
[2155]by any group to attempt to overthrow the regime . . ." (2).
[2157]ha
[2159]=)
[2160]on
[2161]Lé.)
[2162]J
[2163]o
[2165]Ls)
[2167]4
[2170]i)
[2171]4
[2172]ha
[2173]fad
[2174]om
[2175]-
[2176]in
[2177]A!
[2178]i
[2180]o
[2182]Hm
[2183]ua]
[2185]DATES?
[2187]PERSONS/ENTITIES: CATEGORIES
[2188]DIEM 8/21/63 Diem“
[2189]Ball, Undersecretary of State
[2190]Helms, Richard
[2191]Colby, Wm.
[2193]OCCURRENCE:
[2195]On 21. August 1963, South Vietnamese troops and police attacked the occupied
[2197]Buddhist pagodas throughout: the country. DIEM imposed nationwide martial
[2198]law, At apresidential meeting on Vietnam on this same date, the participants
[2199]from the CIA, including the DCI, DDP, and Chief of Far Eastern Division, it
[2200]was pointed out that on notes taken by the Chief of the Far Eastern Division
[2201]that “on the matter of possible alternate leadership in Vietnam, it was
[2202]pointed out that there was no indication that DIBM was not in full eontrol."
[2203](2)
[2205]wt]
[2207]SOURCE:
[2208]1967 L.G. Report, Part C RD
[2210]PILE: DATE:
[2211]Cage
[2213]6/28/75
[2215]PERSONS/ENTITIES: |
[2216]wae 4 “ , :
[2218]DIEM
[2220]ma 21 August 1963, the eurrent in
[2221]tim ae in South Vietnam Stated that "adqai
[2222]ie evidence cn rane eon guiment have been received,
[2223]situates dangerous in (3) action, the Buddhist issue e
[2225]tional reports of plot-
[2227]While there is no
[2228]ontinues to make the
[2230]PDE GEES PEEL
[2234]21 August 1963
[2236]LM DIEM
[2238]CONEIN
[2239]DINH
[2240]NGO DINH NHU, .GENERAL DON
[2242]See RR ENCE? touring the period between 21 August and the lifting of marshall law on 16
[2243]September, GENERAL DINH actually considered himself the hero of Vietnam and the savior of
[2244]the DIEM regime. DINH, on approximately 31 August had the audacity to inform both President.
[2245]DIEM and counsellor NHU that. he was thelr savior and requested a ministerial post for himsel!
[2246]NHU's reaction was. to order him to Dalat for a rest." During this period of time, DINH
[2247]realized that he had been played for a dupe by DIEM. ‘The generals would recognize this fact
[2248]and GENERAL DON started playing on DINH's vanity by telling him that he was a real hero and
[2249]that, above all, should have beén thanked by DIEM and NHU for saving the government.
[2252]SOURCE: - STAFF:
[2254]Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975 , Exhibit 1, Conein R. DAWSON
[2256]ETT | vente.
[2259]Diem
[2261]DATES: | _/ CATEGORIES :
[2262]August 21, 196 Diem
[2263]f
[2265]OCCURRENCE: (peed—t
[2266]Higgins characterizes the raids enxXakei on the XaLoi and= on
[2267]August 21, 1963, as the turning point in American policy cowa d°Viet Nam. She states
[2268]that this crystalizes the feelings of a powerful action inside the Kennedy Administration
[2269]that Diem had to be opposed.
[2270]" raised stories from Saigon scene that had all the inventiveness of an
[2271]Oriental lan Fleming. Soldiers in battle dress were wearing gasmasks “stormed” into
[2272]shortly after midnight. A . of bells, a blood-curdling
[2274]scream shattered the spirits serenity. One eye witness professed to see
[2275]two monks thrown twenty feet from a balcony. Extravagant rumors about the number of
[2276]death and wounded spread like a wild malignancy.
[2278]“When the United Nations in Viet Nam investigated the rumors in of
[2280]SOURCE: Our Vietnam Nightmare by Marguerite Higgins
[2281]Harper and Rowe
[2282]The snyes tisatovs fathead at (ensth . why had See, | DATE: suly 2, 1975
[2283]FILE! preseut darn fee eutue aftas tq los and elsewlays. (g0-&
[2285]Se ee ee a a ee a ee ES a ee an Ae, ON NE SE SR HO SN Ec A EN N,N eS
[2287]6F 26Pg_ CLOLEPEEPIICT GeoeOos AH
[2289]STAFF! pawson
[2291]" PERSONS /ENTI I'PIES:
[2293]DATES: CATEGORIES:
[2295]8/21/63
[2297]DIEM
[2298]Ball, Undersecretary of State
[2299]Helms, Richard
[2301]Colby, Win.
[2302]OCCURRENCE:
[2304]On 21 August 1963, South Vietnamese troops and police attacked the occupied:
[2305]Buddhist pagodas. throughout the country. DIEM imposed nationwide martial
[2306]law. At apresidential meeting on Vietnam on this same date, the participants
[2307]from the CIA, including.the DCI, DDP, and Chief of Far Eastern Division, it
[2308]was pointed out that on notes taken by the Chief of the Far Eastern Division
[2309]that. "on the matter of possible alternate leadership in Vietnam, it was
[2310]pointed out that there was no indication that DIEM was not in full control."
[2311](2)
[2314]‘ fog ot bier.
[2316]SOURCE:
[2318]1967 I.G. Report, Part C RD
[2320]FILE: ¢ DATE:
[2321]Cage
[2323]6/28/75
[2325]og sheg CTSEZFZETPIO0G GcaOoc BH
[2327]PERSONS/ENTELIES : l DALES: CATEGORIES :
[2329]21 AUG. thru
[2330]16 SEPT.
[2332]OCCURRENCE:
[2334]Hearings, $.8.C.1., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, STARE? Dawson
[2335]page 12.
[2337]PILE: gape. 6/30/75
[2339]PERG OS JEN
[2341]GENERAL DINH
[2343]OCCURRENCE F
[2345]STAPEY pawson
[2347]“SOURCES
[2348]. Hearings, &.8.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, — ;
[2349]page 12. : DATE? 6/30/75
[2351]PILE:
[2353]PERSONS/ENTLIITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES:
[2354]a
[2355]HILLSMAN , Roger (Assistant
[2356]Secretary of State for Par
[2357]Eastern Affairs)
[2358]CIA
[2361]8/22/63
[2363]ai ie
[2364]On August 22, 1963, in a CIA cable to Saigon (DIR 53334), ete ‘followin Ap,
[2365]message appeared: "Ref dept. telegram in process. Reftel (which Hqs. ~ .
[2366]not yet seen) states basic line to be taken and directs that it be pushed
[2367]at all levels. Hilf{sman requested Hqs. send companion telegram to station
[2368]pointing out this is one technique to bring about surfacing of where and
[2369]who. real power is. Pressing this line could maximize possibility of obtain-
[2370]ing US@. objective. Even if it does not succeed, it can substantially
[2371]assist in identification of alternate or successor leadership with necessary
[2372]drive, abilities and ambition, to incorporate in our overall contingency
[2373]planning and serve as focus of build-up program. Hqs. will comment BB Le
[2375]STAPF:
[2376]RD
[2378]Tg eheq GTOESFEE'PIO0CG GSc60S AH
[2380]SOURCE:
[2381]1967 I.G. Report, Part C
[2382]PILE:
[2384]Cage DATE? 6/28/75
[2387]HILLSMAN, Roger (Assistant
[2388]Secretary of State for Far
[2389]Eastern Affairs)
[2391]CIA
[2393]OCCURRENCE:
[2395]8/22/63
[2397]CARD #2
[2399]further detail after seeing message, if necessary, but passes above at
[2400]Hilvsman's request." (3)
[2401]2
[2403]STAFF:
[2405]RD
[2406]6/28/75
[2408]ee ee ee ne ee ae ee a ee eR i RE A ES ER, A RF ee Sm, ee
[2410]DATE:
[2413]fn EY Lee dk cL Lan DA'LIGS ¢
[2414]RICHARDSON, John (CIA station 8/22/63
[2415]chief in Saigon) :
[2416]Saigon Embassy pe
[2417]DIEM
[2418]OCCURRENC
[2420]EB:
[2422]On August 22, 1963, in a CIA cable from Saigon (SATG 0208) Chief of
[2423]-station RICHARDSON forwarded his personal views concerning alternate
[2424]leadership: ". . . Recent events have made us feel that hope for civilian
[2425]government to replace DIEM administration is unrealistic. The solution
[2427]seems even more improbable than ever béfore. Would appear that we should
[2428]have either DIEM or military junta... . View time factor have net coordinated
[2430]poe neesans with embassy but we have exchanged views fully on subject mat~
[2431]er. — .
[2436]CATEGORIES:
[2439]THILLSMAN, ROGER
[2440]LODGE, HENRY CABOT
[2441]CONEIN
[2443]i
[2445]32 or 23 August! DIEM ™
[2447]OCCURRENCE: LODGE arrived on 22 or 23 August. When he arrived he found that Saigon was +
[2449]arme i tn j con the pagodas, there had been many con-
[2450]med camp. “During this period of these attacks ion : en ma 7
[2451]tacts made by a lot of people to anybody who would listen 10 ee Gitte aoe orale gone
[2453]j doing away with the existing regime, I had talked wi ifferent. g 5 2
[2454]rapa oy Aue —- I don't recall if it was the 23rd or 2lith, we received a cable wnleh |
[2455]later neen known as the famous ROGER HILLSMAN cable which practically gave us the go-ahead
[2456]that this type of thing could not continue." pp. 21-22
[2458]SOURCE:
[2460]1 \
[2461]Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein R. DAWSON
[2463]DAME _
[2465]PERSONS /ENTITIES: DATES: | CATEGORIES:
[2466]CONEIN 23 August 1963 | DIEMY
[2469]"There was a lot of talk of coups. We met with generals on different occastc
[2470]I met with them, other peeple had also. We had mt with colonels and junior or ricer. te
[2471]we anticipated that there would be some type of action taken in the latter part of August.
[2474]€G ahegq GCLIESFEEPLOCd GeeOos AW
[2476]SOURCE: STAFF:
[2477]i } . WSON
[2478]Hearings, SSCL, dune 20, 1975, Conein ! R. DA
[2479]FILE: DATE: 30 June 1975
[2480]PENSONS/ENTIELES : DATES: CATEGORIES:
[2482]HARRIMAN, W. Averrel (Undersecretart
[2483]ef State for Political Affairs)
[2484]HELMS (Deputy Director for Plans,
[2485]RUSK, Dean (Secretary of State)
[2487]OCCURRENCE:
[2489]Diem
[2491]8/24/63
[2495]ati‘? i.
[2497]On August 24, 1963, in a telephone call from HARRIMAN to HELMS attoacdi elke
[2499]hours, HARRIMAN outlined to HELMS the substance of what eventually turned
[2500]out to be Deptel 243 to Saigon. In notes recorded by HELMS, in response to
[2501]HELMS' query, "HARRIMAN confirmed that the thrust of the telegram contained
[2502]an implicit. pullout of American forces and Support if the Nhus' were not
[2503]ousted. HARRIMAN said the message had been cleared "with Hyannisportl with
[2504]the Secretary of State and with Mr. GILPATRICK. (4) ’
[2506]of Defense)
[2508]SOURCE:
[2510]1967 I.G. Report, part C,p.4 RD
[2511]FIL® ¢.
[2513]Cage
[2515]6/28/75
[2518]HILSMAN, Roger (Ass't. Sec.State for
[2519]Far Fastern Arf -- FE)
[2520]LODGE, Henry Cabot (Amb. to SVN) —
[2522]DA'TES: | CATEGORIES:
[2524]25 August 1963 ;
[2528]On August 25, 1963, in a cable from HILSMAN to LODGE (personal), sent via CIA channels
[2529](DIR 63854), there appeared the following message:
[2531]"State cable sent separately represents agonizing at highest levels. Course outlined is
[2532]dangerous but all agree that delaying clear cut US stand is even more dangerous. It won't
[2533]be easy for you, but be assured we will back you all the way." (5)
[2535]FG HPT CLOEZEZEPIOCT GceOoc AH
[2537]SOURCE? T.G. REPORT 1967, p. 5
[2538]TAer C
[2539]FILE: DATE: 38.6.75
[2540]PERSONS/ENTITLES : DATES: | CRPRGORTES:
[2541]cm 25 Aug, 1963 | Vv
[2542]LODGE, Henry Cabot ' DIEM
[2543]7
[2545]eee il ae 1 i Pages We a
[2547]In a CIA cable to Saigon (DIR 63855), of August 25, 1963, the following iressage appeared:
[2549]"FYT CIA not cons sulted re cable being sent separately, which however cleared. at. highest
[2550]levels. In circumstances believe CIA must fully accept directives of policy makers and seek
[2551]ways accomplish objectives they seek. While have not seen exact. text, understand it invites
[2552]LODGE final judgment. . . . Danger in present course of action appears to be throwing away
[2553]bird in hand before we adequately identified birds in bush, or songs they may sing. ‘Thus
[2554]sugeest a real search for courses of action which might retain options in our hands at same
[2555]time as takine, positive stand rather than waiting for situation to clarify (at which point we
[2556]probably unable to affect it.) This boils down to seeking some middle ground for at least
[2557]interim period... . (7)
[2559]STAPF: Dawson
[2561]BERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES:
[2562]‘“GHARDSON, Saigon Chief of Station 25 August 1963 | DIEM’
[2564]WH, General (SVN)
[2567]RA, CIA officer in Saigon
[2568]a
[2570]ee . ovat te y, | i re “
[2571]ium CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG 0291), the following message appears on August 25, 1963:
[2572]hat
[2574]i 5 > SNERS ted an immediate meeting with
[2575]AQIEP OF STATION RICHARDSON reports that GENERAL KHANH reques i
[2577]we (an officer of the CIA Saigon Station}. At the meeting KHANH requested assurances that
[2578]U.S. Government would support the VIETNAMESE ARMY if it should move against the D.
[2580]eal." C7)
[2582]Br
[2583]Lt
[2584]=]
[2585]a
[2587]SOURCE: I.g. REPORT 1967, p. 7 STAFF: Dawson
[2589]fier C.
[2590]FILE: DATE: 28.6.75
[2591]PLHGUNS/ENT LT LES: DATES: } CATEGORIES:
[2592]CIA 26 August 1963 | DIEM +
[2594]TAD ORM TF
[2596]OCCURRENCE: MW inte
[2598]Jn August 26, 1963, in a CIA document entitled "ONE Starr Memorandum, No. 60-63 Internal ONE
[2599]Vorking Paper, CIA Distribution Only," the following statement appears:
[2600]a NE :
[2602]"On balance, we believe the best hope for the preservation of US interests and attainment
[2604]of US objectives in South Vietnam lies in the possibility of a coup d'etat by anti-Conmunist
[2605]rationalists with sufficient military support to obviate prolonged civil war. Such a group
[2606]nicht not prove able to salvage the situation and, indeed, might eventually prove no better
[2607]‘han the present repiime. Such a development would, however, enable the US and anti-Communist
[2609]rationalist elements to make a fresh start unencumbered and unhampered by political errors of
[2610]vast years, months, and weeks. ‘Tn such a fresh start, we believe, lies the only viable hope
[2611]“or the attainment of US interests and objectives in South Vietnam." (8)
[2614]|
[2616]y PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES:
[2617]GIELMS, Richard LODGE, Henry Cabo DIEM i/
[2618]CARTER, Gen. Marshall KENNEDY, John F. | 26 Aupust 1963
[2619]SHU CIA
[2620]TEM DEPTEL 243
[2622]BELT, ADM. Harry D. (CINCPAC)
[2625]on
[2627]Mn Aucust 26, 1963, HELMS' record. of a Presidential Meeting on Vietnam, is below. The other
[2628]SLA participant was GENERAL MARSHALL CARTER, DDCI.
[2630]=.)
[2632]gthe question was raised as to whether there had been such a significant change in the Vietnam
[2633]gsituation that 1t really appeared desirable to dump the NHU's and possibly DITM himself. Prin-
[2634]‘pal points discussed were: ADMIRAL FELT's concern over the dangers inherent in the current
[2635]WS action in South Vietnam; the faet that LODGE had not seen DIEM to discuss the future role
[2636]of the NHU's; the meaning of the phrase ‘give direct support to military commanders’ in DEPTEL
[2637]243; the question of succession; and what would happen if the action taken over the weekend
[2638]failed. ‘The PRESIDENT asked for another session on August. 27 with participants to present
[2639]biographic data on key SVN personalities and a contingency plan for the succession." (8-9)
[2641]SOURCE: J.G¢, REPORT 1967, Part C, pp. 8-9 STAFF? Dawson
[2643]DATE: 8.6.
[2644]FILE: . ©
[2648]CTA
[2650]RICHARDSO KHTED
[2651]CONETN NY? John MINH
[2654]WN said he
[2657]PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: _ CATEGORIES:
[2658]KENNEDY, John EF, HARKINS (MAC/V)
[2659]HELMS (DD/P) CIA 27 Aug. 1963
[2660]COLBY,; Wilitam DEPTEL 243
[2662]LODGE, Henry Cabot wy
[2664]hav SO td wok OB
[2666]OCCURRENCE: “
[2667]On August 27, 1963, there was a Presidential Meeting on Vietnam. ‘The record was taken by
[2668]HELMS or by COLBY for the CIA, and the other CIA participants were CARTER and HELMS:
[2670]"The PRESIDENT stated that a coup should not be attempted unless it would be successful and
[2671]asked whether we could turn back at this point. The PRESIDENT asked that the judpment of
[2672]LODGE and HARKINS be sought on the prospects for victory or defeat of a coup. A cable was
[2673]drafted asking if they still agreed with their coneurrences to DEPTEL 243." (9-10)
[2675]£6 shed CTIEZPZE:PIO0d So605 AH
[2677]Dawson
[2679]SOURCE: SEARE:
[2681]I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C, po. 9-10
[2683]DATE: 28.6.75
[2685]et DALES +
[2687]ott t .
[2688]“ppyy. OL CATEGORIES:
[2689]DEPLIEL 243 DEPTEL 256 SATEGORTES :
[2690]eT Aug. 1963 | = DTEM
[2692]KENNEDY, John F.
[2694]LODGE, Henry Cabot
[2696]HARKINS, John (Commander , MAC/V)
[2697]OCCURRENCE:
[2699]In a State telegram to Saigon (DEPTEL, 256), on August 27 196
[2702]BI
[2705]3, the following message appeared:
[2707]appraisal of present prospects,
[2708]of developing situation, presently favor
[2710]to give you all possible su
[2711]BiVe you a ; poort in best availabl
[2712]that developing evidence makes it wise to modify." “(40). Sut no
[2714]-I.G, REPORT 1967, Part C, p. Lo
[2716]FILE:
[2719]PEN OUNS ZENE LES t z ae
[2720]; a Lise
[2721]GEN » DINE | G k
[2722]S {
[2723]GOUNSELLER NHO
[2725]OCCURRENCE:
[2727]b tely 3 audacity oO ir orm both President
[2728]> 2 1 Y oe \
[2729]yin On @pprox i mate y August nad the ° :
[2730]: an OUNnSse er Nhu that he Was their savior an requeste a Ministeria
[2731]Die d ¢ S } im d ted t i
[2732]post for himself.
[2736]Se OT. GIONS. pomee a hibit one,
[2737]anne (20/75, Conein, Bx
[2738]“SOURCHS? Hearings, 5.8.C.1., 6/20/75 ;
[2740]—— pages 12-13.
[2742]DATES 6/30/75
[2744]LL UNS/ENT UY riggs
[2745]XICHARDSON, John
[2747]Ciba
[2749]na CIA cable from By
[2751]-+++Unless the
[2755]i
[2758]Coe RE Zt a hata be
[2759]gon (SATG 0363) that:
[2761]&enerals are neutralized before
[2762]» We believe they will act and that they have 4 Rood
[2763]-«.We all understand that the effort must Suceeed and that
[2764]done on our part must be done..." (10)
[2766]whatever needs to
[2768]I.G. REPORT 1967, Part Cy, p. 10
[2771]BZ LRLKSONS/ENTIVIES:
[2772]et
[2774]. DATES: °S:
[2776]gic EXLCUTIVE Covear rte — _ CATEGORIES:
[2777]IELMS, Richard fo
[2779]SMARKINS 29 Aur. 1963 bm“
[2781]CIA
[2783]SXENNEDY, John F,
[2787]At a NATIONAL SECURTTY COUNCIL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE i i
[2788]gith @ record taken by DD/P HELMS, shows that EE necting on Vieteam on MEUs 29, 1983,
[2791]4#The consénsus was that HARKINS sh i
[2792]f should confirm to the gfenerals that th
[2794]vetter tte nae eeereee the views of the US gevernment. There Was anreonert eee
[2795]on was. needed on what ¢ ene . i : ing to do .
[2796]ge was inilitariiy Pee he generals were in fact planning to do and whether
[2798]At ivi
[2799]@RESTDENTIAL approval.” (42) telegram giving the sense of the meeting was drafted for
[2801](Other CIA participants were not identified.) (12)
[2805]DATES:
[2806]KENNEDY, JOHN F. BUNDY, McGeorge | “
[2807]RUSK, Dean NSC Exec. Com. 28 Aug. 1963 | DIEM!
[2808]McNAMARA, Robert LODGE, Henry CaboPB
[2809]TAYLOR, Maxwell HARKINS, John
[2813]On August 28, 1963, the PRESIDENT met privately with RUSK, McNAMARA, TAYLOR, and
[2814]BUNDY. He reported to the rest of the NSC EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE merely that three telegrams ;
[2815]were being sent to Saigon: a personal message to LODGE from the PRESIDENT, a general. message
[2816]from the DEPARTMENT to the AMBASSADOR, and a telegram from TAYLOR to HARKINS. (11)
[2818](This is refleeted in notes taken by HELMS (DD/P) of the NATIONAL SECURTTY COUNCIL. EXECUTIVE
[2819]COMMITTEE meeting on Vietnam. Other CIA participants are not identified.) (41) .
[2821]SOURCE: L.G. REPORT 1967, Part C., p. 11 STAFF: Dawson
[2823]FILE: DATE:  28.6.75
[2825]es LOS BySie DATES: CATEGORIES:
[2826]Wey et DATES CATEGORIES
[2828]%) INSON, Lyndon B. MeHAMARA 30 tug. 1963 | DrEM
[2830]SEIMS BUNDY
[2832]CARTER
[2834]AOLBY
[2836]2 OCCURRENGE: : wie Bory eG PUSS
[2837]GH August 30, 1963, there was a VICE PRESIDENTIAL meeting on Vietnam, with HELMS, CARTER,
[2838]aid COLBY participating. The record is provided by C/FE COLBY which shows that:
[2840]Ko
[2844]"BUSK referred to recent cable traffie and said that he was not even sure whom we were dealing
[2845]ath or what they were planning. McNAMARA pointed out that there was some question whether
[2846]tHe generals ever did have a plan. BUNDY said he had re-read the earlier traffic and noted
[2847]-mat they never said they did. GEN. CARTER Said he believed that the general's coup. was not
[2848]lakely at this Stage and that in another week we will be approximately where we were before
[2849]‘Re attack on the Buddhist temples. BUNDY Supsested we consider additional contingencies
[2850]fore the GROUP. and whether the assumption that NWU is impossible: is well founded." (13)
[2854]iG. REPORT 1967, Part C., p. 13 STAFF
[2856]* Dawson
[2858]FILE: DATE: 28.6.75°
[2859]nr a a ono np ea yt ema, ft ems eee ces me ve
[2862]JOHNSON, Lyndon B. TIARKINS
[2864]DATES: CATEGORIES:
[2866]COLBY CARTER 31 Aug. 1963 DIEM
[2867]RUSK HELMS
[2869]MCNAMARA
[2871]LODGE
[2873]OCCURRENCE:
[2875]At a VICE PRESIDENTIAL meeting on Vietnam, on August. 31, 1963, a record by C/FE COLBY reflects
[2876]that:
[2878]"RUSK sugzested we look at precisely what in the Vietnam situation made us spenk a a coup
[2879]and what. might be done to improve conditions in Vietnam. McNAMARA RRS RUG dine tes
[2880]quirement was reestablishment of communication between LODGE. and HARKT. 7 aos ree oon
[2881]that a telegram be prepared for Saigon making suggestions as to what we mig
[2883]to do." (14)
[2885]DDCI CARTER and DD/P HELMS. also participated. )
[2887]: STAFF: Dawson
[2888]SOURCES 1G. REPORT 1967, Part C, p. WA
[2890]CATEGORIES:
[2891]DIEM
[2895]DATES: |
[2896]31 Aug. 1963
[2898]BOCCURRENCE: 4 Se fogs
[2900]oe * oF . ee oe
[2901]myAugust 31, 1963, in the Saigon Station's chronology of August 1963 coup activities,
[2902]Oflowing report appears:
[2904]ho
[2906]vd OE
[2910]GENERAL HARKINS was authorized to meet with KHIEM to mive KHIEM assurances of USG backing.
[2911]H@EM showed a reluctance to talk and surgested that HARKINS meet with GENERAL MINH. KHTEM
[2912]oqymented that MINI had called off the planning and was working, on other methods which KHTEM
[2913]qBld not describe. KHIPM further stated that the fenerals were not ready as they did not have
[2914]w®urh forees under their control. “ HARKINS decided not to sive KHIEM assurances which he had
[2915]28n eae to impart. LODGE approved HARKINS' decision on 31 August after HARKINS re-
[2916]orted." (13
[2918]SOURCE? T.G. REPORT 1967, Part C., p. 13 STAFF: Dawson
[2920]FILE: DATE: 28,6.75
[2921]PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES:
[2922]| Fall 1965 bien ~
[2923]State Department heCoane :
[2925]Defense Pepartment
[2926]OCCURRENCE:
[2927]Colby stated that the "...in this situation we were haviny almost daily
[2929]meetings with senior officials in the CIA, State Department, Defense Ne-
[2930]partment and so forth, in the basement of the White House and thore was
[2932]no aucstion that this was national policy and hammered out. ...at these
[2933]meetings, these were the meetings at which Mr. McCone and I argued very
[2934]strongly .that we should not move against the Diem government we should
[2936]continue “to work with it." Pare 36 T
[2939]PERSONS/ENTIVPIES : DATES: | CATEGORIES:
[2940]CONEIN Fall 1963 | prem eo
[2942]CCURRENCE: 1 |
[2943]a CONEIN stated that: there was dissidence within the coup group, the people who
[2944]were going to pull the coup and one general didn't like the other general. ‘The best way I
[2945]can describe it, if you had three Vietnamese generals sitting and talking to you, one genera!
[2946]would talk, walk. out of the room to go to the "john", two would tell you, don't trust that
[2947]one’, and finally the one who had out-waited the other two, there would be one left, and he
[2948]would say, don't trust those two. p. 31
[2950]zo ahead GToeZPZE:PLooed sceos AN
[2952]SOURCE: STAFF:
[2953]Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein R. DAWSON
[2954]FILE: DATE:
[2955]July 1, 1975
[2956]ERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: | CATEGORIES:
[2958]COLEY {
[2959]Fall 1963. DIEM /
[2961]LODGE, HENRY CABOT |
[2962]NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL i
[2964]SER as PRR ART ish i
[2965]HCCURRLNCE? ‘conpy stated that "I would say that the embassy's position, the political
[2966]section and the ambassador, was much more sympathetic to the preposition that the war coul:
[2967]not successfully be conducted with President DIEM still in power without a major change in
[2968]his style of operation. However, there is an additional factor, .this which was the public
[2969]pressure on the policy levels of our government in Washington, and the United States, and.
[2970]think this public pressure was felt particular by the people in the NATIONAL SECURITY COUN’
[2971]and by the people in the STATE DEPARTMENT." p. 61
[2973]“SOURCE : R. DAWSON
[2975]w
[2976]br
[2979]COLBY
[2981]DIEM 4
[2983]Generel HAR Kms Fall 1963
[2985]a
[2989]Lo)
[2991]RLODGE , H.C +
[2993]BNSC
[2997]Bo
[2999], ted
[3001]BOCCURRENCE: Mp, COLBY“that: "The Defense Department was almost totally in a position th:
[3003]Fthe wars in the countryside, that the countryside seems to be going along reasonably well,
[3004]that this (DIEM’s continuance in office) is an wroan problem, urban political problem whic:
[3006]pshould not interfere with the main things going on. This was true of the Secretary and
[3008]€coneral HARKINS out there and the Joint Chiefs here and so forth". p. 62
[3013]SOURCE: STAFF? oR, Dawson
[3015]Fail 1963 DIEM
[3017]Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby DATE
[3018]aye 1 July lL
[3019]FILE: | y 19%
[3020]PERSONG/ENTITIRG + DATES? CATEGORIES:
[3022]NHU ' /
[3025]LODGE, #1-¢:
[3026]COLBY
[3028]OCCURRENCE: (COLBY stated in response to a question as to whether there was any serious
[3029]attempt to persuade DIEM to leave office voluntarily that: "There had certainly been. dis-
[3030]cussions to have NHU leave Vietnam at various times". But, “there was almost no direct
[3031]contact between our ambassador LODGE and President DIEM, very little contact.” P. 66
[3034]ZPERSONS/ENTIGIES: DATES: — | CATEGORIES:
[3035]a COLBY or ne
[3036]: Fall 1963. | DIEM
[3038]in ~ .
[3042]NSC ‘ | |
[3043]S spare popanmene .
[3045]“BCCUARE “NCE? COLBY stated that the public pressure that was brought upon or was felt by
[3047]«the NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL and by the people in the STATE DEPARTWENT was "one of distas:
[3048]2 for President. DIEM." p. 61
[3050]F9 aHeq GTaoePee: BI
[3052]SOURCE: ~ : P STAPF: Rg, DAWSON
[3054]j
[3055]Hearings , SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby | ame
[3056]PILE: jeanne 1 July 1975
[3058][ots naetateieenr terse tineaclnenetaenticentnnatienetieediemeaienseieanbetetaem teed cs teen teemtneaia needa tune’ dentametamrtanataeeciemimmtonrtramiom iets ean ee
[3060]PERGONS/ENTITIES : DATES + CATEGORIES :
[3061]COLBY Fall 1963 DIEM
[3063]PRESIDENT KENNEDY
[3064]GENERAL KRULAK
[3066]MR. MENDELHAY
[3067]“OCCURRENCE: coLBY stated that: ‘tine’ most dramatic way in which this was posed, this has
[3069]been described publicly a number of times, was that at one tim, particularly with the
[3070]frustrating period the President (Kennedy) faced with these two strong positions, he sent
[3071]two officers, one a General Krulak, who was an assistant to Secretary McNamara and a Mr.
[3072]Mendelhay, who had formerly been the political counsellor in Saigon, to Saigon for about
[3073]five days to make an assessment on the spot and they cate back to the camera room, and one
[3074]sat on ore end of the room and one sat on the other and General Krulak first said he had b.
[3075]to 20 provinces and talked to 20 provinces and 20 military chiefs and all that sort of thir
[3076]and the war business (was) going on basically and there were some problems, but the thing
[3077]was that they seemed to have a strategy and they seemed to be moving along on it, then
[3078]. Mendelhay said he went to three cities and talked to lots of civil servants and political
[3079]people, and all the rest of it and there was a general feeling that the cause hopeless be~
[3080]cause there was so much distaste for President DIEM and so much opposition, and the genera:
[3081]feeling that the war could not be won. And the President, of course, Idoked at them and
[3082]SOURCE Sad, Tf you Tass tethas” yo hb Tha Sane country ? fing die | STAPF:
[3083]Hearings . Answer 13 they cid,
[3084]caranb®? SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby yy os at ta bleonct R. DAWSON
[3086]TATT We Pe ee tag TRAM «
[3089]x PERSONS /EN TILES ¢
[3091]DATES + CAPEGOR LIES ¢
[3092](Boh, Tonthat
[3093]5D.
[3095]wn.
[3097]Wa, Neo Dink
[3098]e
[3100]9 OCCURRENCE:
[3101]i
[3103]Mancin stated that Diem and Nhu did not understand Dinh's role as a double
[3104]@ent. Dien or Nhu had planned to have a Bravo T and a Bravo TT that Diem
[3106]G Hina would have their ewn conn and so down to Vowstan as if they were
[3107]Soapdine and there would immediately be » counter-coup to bring Diem--all
[3108]Wstieated by Nhu back to power hy popular acclamation. So on November 1
[3110]te lop.m. in the afternoon when troons were moving it was assumed by Dien
[3112]Bd Nhu that this was part of Diem's nlan to have a cownter-cemp. Pace 66-66.
[3114]ilearings, SSC, Conein, June 20, 1975 STAPP?
[3116]SOURCE: Q Rawson
[3117]|
[3119]PILE DATE? 7/1/75
[3123]CONEIN
[3124]DINH
[3125]GENERAL DON
[3127]September 1963 DIEM a
[3129]HUAN, Commanding Officer, Military
[3130]OCCUR
[3132]re
[3133]o>
[3135]Se . DON promised DINH that he would personnaly speak to the President on DINH's
[3136]behalf and that he would ask that DINH be granted the Ministry of Interior, while he, DON,
[3137]would ask for the Ministry of National Defense. MDINH believed that DON had his personal
[3138]interest. at heart and DON did in fact make such an appeal to the President to enlarge his
[3139]povernment, but made the proposal in such a way that it would have been impossible for DIEM
[3140]or NHU to accept. Deadlines were given. DINH was informed that the President would give hii
[3141]the ministerial post. After the deadlines had passed and DINH had not received what he tho-
[3142]ught was his proper recognition, GENERAL DON and other officers including HUAN continued to
[3143]lend sympathy to DINH.while DINH was still waiting for his ministerial post. p. 13
[3145]Xe,
[3147]SOURCE:
[3149]Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Exhibit 1, Conein
[3150]Trina 2h Taquq7e
[3152]CATEGORIES :
[3154]DIEM JS
[3158]CENERAD | MINH .
[3160]BER September 1963 |
[3162]LODGE, tleant CABOT
[3164]DON, GENERAL
[3165]EIN
[3167]OCCURRENCE: "During the month of September, there was stilt nore talk of coups, and af th
[3169]a y i
[3171]ne, the n of September, I nad been told by Ambassador GE
[3173]eae tee only. “That T was to convey any messages. I had conveyed messages to eG Mt
[3175]on two occasions, GENERAL KHIEM on one oecasion. T had met with GENERAL EN and ot
[3177]en another occasion. On several occasions, I had mt with GENERAL DON and other ary
[3179]leaders." p. 23
[3181]DATES:
[3183]|
[3185]rood Se605
[3187]99 abed ST9eePree:
[3189]SOURCE;
[3190]Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein
[3191]FILE:
[3193]pe ee ee ee ar a ae ee cS ee ae came enc i ee -
[3196]PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES |
[3197]RICHARDSON, John ——
[3198]DIEM r
[3199]NU 2 Sept. 1963
[3200]CIA
[3201]ZOL. TUNG
[3203]OCCURRENCE 3 on September 2, 1963, u
[3204]In a CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG 0523) ,/the I.G. REPORT provides the following sunmary:
[3206]R. DAWSON
[3207]DATE:
[3209]if
[3211]20 June 1975
[3213]"RICHARDSON cabled a damage assessment. He concluded that DIFM and the NHU's are fully aware
[3214]that the USG encouraged the GENERALS to attempt a coup and that CIA was the instrumentality of
[3215]this encouragement, He judged there was an even possibility that all major programs could
[3216]xo forward as in the past. He listed as a major dilemma the Stations future relationships with
[3217]COL. TUNG. He noted his dissatisfaction with TUNG as a SVN liaison vehicle through which to
[3218]conduct PM programs, but noted that the GVN had offered no alternative. Unless we. were willing
[3219]to discontinue our NVN, Laos border, and cross-border programs, we must continue to work with
[3220]TUNG. {NOTE: PM programs = paramilitary programs) ;
[3222]"The Times: of Vietnam published charges that the CIA was plotting and finaricine a cour:
[3223]and was giving asylum to the chief anti-DIFM Buddhist leader. The story was picked up and widely
[3224]alaved by the New York Daily News , the Chicago Tribune, Baltimore Sun, and other prominent
[3226]SOURCE: newspapers. STAFF:
[3228]Dawson
[3230]Ho AIH Ao
[3232]Zien SUNS/ENTLY LES:
[3233]KENNEDY, John F. DIEM
[3234]HELMS NHU
[3235]CAaLBY BUNDY
[3237]” MADAME NHU
[3239]DATES : CATEGORIES:
[3241]_ 6 Sept. 1963
[3243]"RUSK stressed the Immediate need for direct contact. between LODGE and DIEM. BUNDY pointed out
[3244]the necessity of advising LODGE not to have a real show-down with DIEM over NHU at this forth-
[3245]ggming meeting, as one of LODGE's cables indicated he was headed very much in this direction.
[3246]WSK agreed to do this. The PRESIDENT agreed with the desirability of silencing MALAME NHU but
[3247]expressed some doubt that NHU's participation was as fatal as STATI seemed to say it was. RUSK
[3248]Gmmented that the COUNIRY TEAM had stated its feeling that NHU must. go, to which the PRESIDENT
[3249]replied that they may have been operating under directives received from here." (16)
[3251]I.G. REPORT 1967, STAFF:
[3253]SOURGE: Part C, p. 16 Dawson
[3256]BV LNKSUNS/EN PI LES + DATES : CATEGORIES:
[3258]EWNEDY, John F. DIEM VY
[3259]FEMS NHU _ 6 Sept. 1963: DIEM
[3261]ChBY BUNDY
[3263]USK "MADAME, NHU en ng peng
[3265]BOCCURRENCE: : Tiny? Ab
[3267]tha PRESIDENTIAL meeting on Vietnam, on September 6, 1963, HELMS 4nd COLBY provide the fol-
[3268]Owing summary : ,
[3272]en
[3274]Fesk stressed the immediate need for direct contact between LODGE and DIEM. BUNDY pointed out
[3275]He necessity of advising LODGE not to have a real show-down with DIEM over NHU at this forth-
[3276]qping, meeting, as one of LODGE's cables indicated he was headed very much in this direction.
[3277]UBK agreed fo do this. The PRESIDENT agreed with the desirability of silencing MADAME NHU but
[3278]xbressed some doubt: that NHU's participation was as fatal as STATE seemed to say it was. RUSK
[3279]dymented that the COUNTRY TEAM had stated its feeling that NHU must. go, to which the PRESIDENT
[3280]‘eplied that they may have been operating under directives received from here." (16)
[3282]STAFF:
[3284]SOURCE? I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C, p. 16 Dawson
[3285]PILE: DATE: 98. 6.75
[3288]Special. Forees CIA payments
[3290]CIA 8 Sept. 1963 a
[3292]Tung, Col. te os DAM fe oe
[3294]pell, DAvid Pp bp 8 r
[3295]7 -
[3298]On 8 Septemer 1963 wire services in prominent newspapers carried a story that the
[3299]Special Forces troops who raided the pagodas on the 21 August were still being |
[3300]paid secretly by CIA. This story was: attributed tO a highly reliable source in oo
[3301]Washington and gave details of support to Col. Tung in the amount: of $3 2000, 000
[3302]annually, and of payment of $250,000 on 3 September. ‘The ssory was datelined in
[3303]Washington and in Manila. David Bell warned in a television interview that the
[3304]U.S. Congress might cut pack aid to Vietnam unless: the Diam government changed
[3306]its policy.
[3308]STAPF: —,
[3310]. _— ~ ; Dawson
[3311]IG Report 1967 (CIA) , p. 17 DATE:
[3313]SOURCE:
[3316]69 afeg cT9EZPaE PlacG GG605 BAH
[3318]Kr ylgkP BRSONS/ENTITIES : DATES: CATEGORIES:
[3319]Ccoviesk, Victor Gen.,|Mendenhall,Jos. A.} 10 Sept. 1963
[3321]Counterinsurgency Specialist UN Adviso
[3323]Joint Chiefs of Staff__ Bureau Fap Eastern DIEM
[3325]Rusk, Dean Sec. of State . ffairs |
[3327]MeCone,.loha DCT a ee
[3328]“PSO ED RRENCE: Richardson ,John
[3330]At a Presidential meeting on Vietnam with Carter and Colby in attendance, the
[3332]following Sore by Colby is provided of the meeting of September 10, 1963.
[3334]General Graetaak reported his findings in Vietnam. His conclusions were that the
[3336]war was going ahead at an impressive pace and that the Vietcong war could be won
[3338]if current U.S, military and socological programs are continued. Mendenhall, the
[3340]State representative who acconpanied €releck, expressed the view that there was
[3342]complete breakdown of the Siagon clvilian government in the security situations in
[3344]the. provinces had deteriorated. The President asked where the two gentlemen had been
[3346]insame country. Rusk suggested that the focus be on what happened in July and August
[3348]that reversed the optimistic judgments in May and June. Mr. MeCone talked from a
[3349]t he {ved Richardson recommen sainst any cut in aid.
[3351]SOURCE: STAPF:
[3352]IG Report 1967 (CIA), p. 19 Dawson
[3353]FILE: DATE:
[3354]6/27/75
[3356]Diem .
[3357]Richardson, Chief of Station CIA Siagon DIEM
[3359]10 Sept 1963
[3362]On 10 September 1963 in a cable from the CIA station in Siagon (SAIGO760) to
[3364]Washington, the following quotation appears: "Am inclined to feel general officers
[3365]will seek evolutionary accomodation with Diem, (if he permits them to do sa)
[3366]unless overall situation clearly deteriorates, there — : ,
[3367]is breakdown of civil © ‘order or of governmental machinery,or unless war effort
[3368]begins to fo backward seriously (despite damages suffered since 8 May and 21 August
[3369]am inclined to believe we should be able to resume successful prosecution of war
[3370]ain military and civil sections) do not align myself with the view that USG should
[3372]suspend aid ".
[3374]SOURCE? STAFF?
[3376]IG Report 1967 (CIA), p. 19 , Dawson
[3378]On: 10 Septenber 1963, in an interview by Huntley and Bri ey. Hl t taere de,
[3379]the charge that the GIA makes its own pol ley. ey ; rinkley. the President denied
[3381]Of ahead GT9eTPee PIOOM CoeOs AH
[3383]PRRSONS/ENTITINS: DATES: CATEGORIE
[3385]Kennedy , John F. President
[3386]CIA . 10 Sept. 1963 DIEM
[3387]OCCURRENCE: as a —— tne
[3391]IG Report. 1967 (CIA), p. 19 .
[3392]FILE: 2 DATE: Dawson
[3393]i ; 6/27/75
[3394]PRRSOWS/ENTITTES | DATES? CATEGORIES +.
[3395]Bandy , —_
[3396]Colby
[3397]HeCone DIEM
[3399]MeHamarra
[3400]Kormedy, President fa an
[3401]. ep ee oaks eee ners vee . je eae . + i
[3402]OCCURRENCE: At a National Security Council executive meeting on Vietnam,
[3403]Carter and Colby participating for the CIA, Colby provided the following record: Bundy
[3404]stressed the need to unify U.S. government posture, to coordinate press guidance and to
[3405]eontrol outgoing messages to Saigon. - He emphasized the importance of following the
[3406]President's guidance on this delicate problem, in spite of intensly differing views of
[3407]what should be done and how, the risk, minimum objectives, and facts. McNamarra stated
[3408]that his position was virouously against throwing out this government without secing
[3409]an alterpative and that none eppeared to exist. Mr. MeCone commented that the problem
[3410]was not so much the existance of an alternative as to how to put one inte power. Bundy
[3411]summarized the President's position as one in which we must express our reservations
[3412]as to mistakes and iisdeeds of Diem but not be a position where we can not deal with
[3414]him further - .
[3416]SOURCE’ : : | STAFF:
[3417]+ Dawson
[3419]10 Sept. 1963) 425, !
[3420]Pf
[3422]we
[3424]Z PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: : CATEGORIES:
[3425]®ichardson, John
[3426]Heede, General
[3428]TIA Station Siagon 11 Sept 1963 . DIEM
[3429]5
[3430]A OCCURRENCE? “34 @ September 11, 1963 CIA cable from Saigon (SALGO797) Richardson
[3432]weported that the country team attempted to agree on a six page summary cable to answer
[3433]™ cable frow the department requesting views. ‘The team was unable to agree even on the
[3434]Nirst. three pages of the sunmary. Weedrand Richardson dissented on the basis of the
[3435]Sraft summary was. too sweeping and too negative including definitively about the country
[3436]%n an inadequate basis of data. He said: "In some ways we seem to have reached the
[3437]moint in the official American community, where if you think we can win with the present
[3438]Government, you are simply not running in the right direction with the majority."
[3440]ia)
[3442]Té
[3444]SOURCE: “STAFF!
[3445]IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 20 Dawson
[3446]FILES . DATE: 6/27/75
[3447]PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES ¢ CATEGORIES:
[3448]MceCone “Lodge re
[3449]Colby Nou :
[3450]Rusk 11 Sept 1963 DIEM
[3452]Bundy
[3454]OCCURRENCE: In a September 11, 1963 meeting of the National SEeurity Council
[3455]Executive Conmittee meeting on Vietnam, the record taken by Colby (with MeCone also
[3457]being present for the CIA) te following appears: "Rusk. said he believed that we were
[3458]not likely to achieve an independent Vietnam unless we could eliminte Nhu, at the same
[3459]time he was not willing to say that Diem should go, he aaw no alternative. Rusk commented
[3460]that we should work with Lodge on Diem to take over the real. leadership’ and become the
[3461]real President. McCone suggested also the desirability of negotiating with Diem. Bundy
[3462]read off a CIA suggestion for a process of negotiating with Nhu. -
[3464]SOU RC STARE?
[3465]“IG Report 1967 (CIA), p.
[3467]FILE: > pap ; Pawson
[3469]PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES = CATEGORIES:
[3471]dge, Ambassador Henry Cabot ,
[3472]11 Sept 1963
[3473]DIEM
[3475]jToegd ssegs AL
[3477]5 ~ OCCURRENCE : 7
[3478]fn a state telegram from Saigon (SAIGK78) Lodge provided the following ref lection on
[3479]Bhe situation: "My best estimate of the current situation in Vietnam is (a) that
[3481]ft is worsening rapidly; (b) the time has arrived for the U. S. to use what effective
[3482]Sanctions it has to bring about the fall of the existing goverment and the installation
[3483]@f another; and (c) that intensive study should be given. by the best brains of the
[3484]government to all the details, procedures and variants in conncection with suspension
[3485]Of aid.”
[3487]i
[3489]“al
[3490]ha
[3491]SOURCE: STAPF:
[3492]IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 2h Dawson
[3493]PILE: DATE:
[3494]6/27/15
[3497]Coloy Hiddsman
[3498]Kennedy, John F. Tung ;
[3499]MeNamarra Diem ll Sept 63 °
[3501]Lodge
[3503]OCCURRENCE: tn a Presidential meeting on Vietnam with the CIA participants
[3504]being MeCone and Colby the record by Colby reflects that McNemarra pointed. out that
[3505]Todgo has little corttact with Diem and has not been out of Saigon. Mr. McCone conmentod
[3506]that he believed that we should, move ‘cautiosly, that we should talk seriously to Diem
[3507]and that lodge should be urged to visit the countryside to obtain a more realistic
[3509]view of the effects of suspending aid. Mr. MeCone also suggested that. another approach
[3510]be made: toNijutto seek his cooperation ina departure. The President asked whether we
[3511]had carefully studied the detail effects of cuts in aid. (as proposed in a paper prepared
[3512]by Hillsman). It was evident that the effects had not been studies. The President
[3513]asked POD and CIA to analyze the Hilisiman paper. He also asked that a telegram be sent
[3514]to Lodge asking him to try to reduce the press leakage from Saigon and to establish some
[3515]peal contact. with Diem. Any current plans for aid negotiation should be stalled, and the
[3516]prestdepOUN ROUTE be WELT UTonned OF any ”steps "taker ty vats contpyTER RECT Se
[3517]fuatanna teaotwine CTA navment to Col Tung last week. .
[3520]UOSME\]
[3526]ZousSTTTaquy pesewep ATALenes Sey ‘fKressooou aTTUM NUN U9TM UOoTyeTOOSse asoTO JeTUo
[3528]ITauy Taey osTe feu, ‘“seposed ety UT spfer. sy} ao padeyypque are jyeqs sty Jo
[3530]SIaquau Jsyjo TTB ysouye yey 4Anq guyZar quesard aug doy q1oddns qno [Te sdoaey Aoussy
[3532]aousSTTTaquT Teryuag ayy Jo JeTyO aq Feud peyejs WeISAOqTeH *€g6T taqueqdag GT UO
[3535]4
[3537]t
[3538]pd
[3540]. i
[3541]oe Ue yy t
[3543]A Waid ‘ ‘
[3544]€96T ~34deg ST Tod “uuor Sau0goy
[3547]ERR Tol ta Tld
[3548]NOSMVd ze *d S(¥ID) L96T yxodey DI
[3550]ian]
[3552]a Ayaougne s,o8poy &
[3553]UTUVTA SEM STy4 PTO sem pue uo suTYse OF Tescdoid e yons apeu Jopessequy pey parnbuy &
[3554]I ‘saouemsse *s'n eqetadoidde yyym uopqoe dnoo ATaea sqeyMWTys 04 qduaqye of Suog a
[3555]“Usp pauoTquan ay *ATEYTT TU AS 04 YOwordde ayy Bupyeu uyTM ABAoW BuyS7eyo BupsrapTsuod A
[3556]S]T aopessequiy suy,, sqareuenzy\hod ugEM uoTssnostp eB Jo souBysqns oy qaodar sty %
[3557]go yred se papnTour sy *ueugeyA UT UOTIENATS eYyy JO SMOTA STUY peqiodar uosTeg payrsyTA #
[3558]OUM UeUTTeYs UCTUPISUN (O6QONTVS) E96T atequeydeg ET uo uosyTeg wory eTqeo yIO eB ur f
[3559]————_____ cs
[3560]_ TAONTYH NOOO i
[3561]=]
[3565]a " goqeg Aqua ‘eBpoT in
[3566]Ward €g6t ades ET NOT SWETTLIM Sgreqend a
[3569]?SHTNODALVO } 9 ?Sulvd 1 SATLLIGNA/SNOSHAd :
[3572]C605 BH
[3575]Faiberstan, David, an
[3576]wecCone, Jehn, DCL 15 Sept. 1963
[3578]agen Station
[3580]a
[3582]Cf
[3584]OCCURRENCE:
[3586]i
[3588]ePee- PL
[3590]1 15 September 1963, Halberstarn stated that the chief of the Central Intelligence
[3591]eoncy favors all out support for the present regime but that almost all other members
[3592]of his staff are embittered over the raids in the pagodas. They also feel their
[3593]Bhief close association with Nhu while necessary, has severely damaged intelligence
[3595]Wathering.
[3596]“J
[3597]tee.
[3598]SOURCE : eee ST AF i: nme,
[3599]' TG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 2 Dawson
[3600]“P v7 )p 3 DATE:
[3604]Richardson, John
[3605]Diem
[3607]DATES :
[3609]CATEGORIES:
[3611]DIEM
[3615]16 Sept 1963
[3616]- OCCURRENCE: re
[3617]In a CIA cable from Saigon (SAIGO922) of 16 September 1963 Richardson replied to
[3618]Washington's requestfor his judgment on the desirability and feasibility of certain
[3619]ideas, as Washington was then in the course of constructing an agreed plan. He :
[3620]cabled: "We must go on trying to win the war with current administration for as long —
[3621]as it persists in power (we should not attempt publicly to achieve objectives with .
[3622]respect to GVN with probability of attainment is virtually nil) we cannot covertly
[3623]tinker with or engineer coup unless general situation is reasonably perpitious
[3624]and if we are unable to establish necessary working contact with Vietnamese leaders
[3625]willing and able to do the job with necessary means. (Agree we should carefully
[3626]explore and perhaps carefully experiment with graduated measures designed to pressure /
[3627]Diem, within context of persuading. him to take steps needed. These measures. would be i
[3628]more effeftive if they are limited to practical and acheivable objectives.)" :
[3630]SOURCE: par ?
[3631]IG Report: 1967 (CIA) p. 2h i
[3634]n
[3636]GL a6eg GI9LSEEE*PIIOG GG6é0c AH
[3638]PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES:
[3639]Richardson, John a
[3640]Diem .
[3642]16 Sept 1963 DIEM
[3644]OCCURRENCE:
[3645]In a CIA cable from Saigon (SAIGO922) of 16 September 1963 Richardson replied to
[3646]Washington's requestfor his judgment on the desirability and feasibility of certain
[3647]ideas, as Washington was then in the course of constructing an agreed plan. He
[3648]cabled: "We must go on trying to win the war with current administration for as long
[3649]as it persists in power (we should not attempt publicly to achieve objectives with
[3650]respect to GVN with probability of attainment is virtually nil) we cannot covertly
[3651]tinker with or engineer coup unless general situation is reasonably perpitious
[3652]and if we are unable to establish necessary working contact with Vietnamese leaders
[3653]willing and able to do the job with necessary means. (Agree we should carefully
[3654]explore and perhaps carefully experiment. with graduated measures designed to pressure’
[3655]Diem, within context of persuading him to take steps needed. These measures. would be
[3656]more effeftive if they are limited to practical and acheivable objectives. )"
[3658]"SOURCE: ' a
[3659]IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 24 a
[3661]CVT /9TE
[3665]. CATEGORIES:
[3666]Smith, David.R.
[3668]DATES:
[3670]CIA Acting Chief after 5 Oct 196 “
[3671]Richardson, John Lodge ; Sept 17, 1963 paEM
[3672]Dunn, Mike
[3676]OCCURRENCE: TT : TOADS
[3678]in 2 memoranda for the record prepared by Helms on September17i4 1963. he“Peporte 4 Loa
[3680](Mik sonnel with me) reports that Lodge wanted to get rid of Mr. John Richardson
[3681]e had told Conein that Lodge was 'to get rid of Richardson’. (On one
[3683]occasion Dunn asked Conein, 'do_you think that. Da
[3684]: . i . Dave. Smith can run the
[3685]a temporary period while a new station chief is being sent out here?! qarions *or
[3687]SOURCE: STAFF:
[3688]IG Report. 1967 (CIA) p. 24 Dawson
[3689]PILES DATE:
[3691]6/27/75
[3695]4
[3698]a
[3700]94 98g CI9CePZE Plocd ceeos BH
[3702]PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES:
[3704]Smith, David R.
[3706]CIA Acting Chief after 5 Oct 1963 Sept 17, 1963 DIEM
[3707]Richardson, John Lodge ;
[3709]Dunn, Mike Saigon Station
[3711]- OCCURRENCE: 7 Ta
[3713]In a memoranda for the record prepared by Helms on September.17;. 1963, he reported
[3714]"Smith (discuss with me) reports that Lodge wanted to get rid of Mr. John Richardson
[3715](Mike Dunn) had told Conein that lodge was 'to get rid of Richardson'. (On one
[3716]occasion Dunn asked Conein, 'do you think that Dave Smith can. run the stations for
[3718]a temporary period while a new station chief is being sent out here?! ™
[3720]SOURCE: a STAPF:
[3721]IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 24 Dawson
[3722]FILE DATE:
[3723]G/27/75
[3724]PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES:
[3726]Lansdale, Major General Rusk, Dean
[3727]McCone, John
[3729]Lodge, Henry Cabot
[3731]Richardson, John
[3733]OCCURRENCE:
[3735]Sept 19, 1963 DIEM
[3737]in a personal letter from MeCone to Lodge it was stated that: "I was told by Dean Rusk
[3738]that you proposed thet Gen. Lansdale(replace Richardson as Chief of Station). JI wish
[3739]to emphasize the agency will reorient the Saigon station any practical way to meet. your
[3740]desires. Personnel, including the ‘station chief can be replaced ... Lansdale would
[3741]not be acceptable to the organization or to me personally... if the decision is to
[3742]abandon all hope of working with the regime then Richardson probably should be replaced
[3743]We have no current intelligence nor resulting estimate in hand which could lead
[3744]us to conclude that the present regime can be disposed of, or that there exists a
[3745]replacement regime which would be better. This is not however to say that a coup may
[3746]occur even before you receive this letter....."
[3748]SOURCE:
[3749].IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 25
[3751]ETT He
[3753]Dawson 1
[3755]BL She CIIESPSEPIOOG SGE0S AW
[3757]PERGOUS/ENUTT LES: DAVES: CATEGORIES?
[3759]Tadve, Hoary Cabot
[3760]Kennedy, John. F. Sept. 19, 1963
[3762]On September 19, 1963 in a state telegram from Saigon (544) Lodge stuted to the President
[3763]that "I agree that no good opportunity for action to remove the present government In
[3765]the immediate future is apparent and that we should, therefore, do whatever we can as
[3766]an interim measure pending. such eventuality. Frankly, I see no opportunity at all. for :
[3771]IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 24-25
[3772]6/25/75
[3775]Lansdale, Major General Rusk, Dean
[3776]MeCone, John Saivon STatdon Sept 19, 1963 DIEM
[3777]Lodge, Henry Cabot boots or a eB :
[3778]Richardson, John ; ee ee oe :
[3782]In a personal letter from McCone to Ledge it was stated that: "I was told by Dean Rusk
[3783]that you proposed that Gen. Lansdale(replace Richardson as Chief of Station). I wish
[3784]to emphasize the agency will reorient the Saigon station any practical way to meet your
[3785]desires. Personnel, including the station chief can be replaced ... Lansdale would
[3787]not be acceptable to the organization or to me personally... if the decision is to
[3788]abandon all hope of working with the regime then Richardson probably should be replaced
[3789]wae We have no current intelligence nor resulting estimate in hand which could Jead |
[3790]“us to conclude that the present regime can be disposed of, or that there exists a
[3791]replacement regime which would be better. ‘This is not however to say that a coup may
[3792]occur even before you receive this letter....." :
[3794]—— OURS an Starr;
[3796]IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 25 Dawson
[3798]_ PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES + CATEGUR Ib?
[3800]MeCone
[3801]CTA Subcommittee on House Armed Services
[3802]Sept. 23, 196
[3804]On September 23, 1963, the iicCone briefed the CIA Subcommittee of House Armed Services.
[3805]He told them that the agency was urging a slow cautious approach to the problem of
[3806]ousting the Diem regime and that there appeared to be no replacement for the then
[3808]current regime that was capable of running the government.
[3810]Qf shea GI9LSPEE*PIOOG GG60S AH
[3812]SOURCE: STAFF?
[3813]IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 25 Dawson
[3814]FILE: DATE:
[3815]6/25/75
[3817]DATES:
[3820]NHU _ TT
[3821]DINH October 1963 DIEM we
[3823]COLONEL TUNG
[3825]CONEIN
[3826]CCURRENCE: DINH's desire to become a Minister was greater than his allegiance to rres ent
[3828]DIEM. He became the actual key to the success of the coup. His facile, and at times
[3829]brilliant mind, was used to the peneral's advantage in that GENERAL DINH convineed President
[3830]DIEM that he, General DINH, along with COLONEL TUNG, should be given blanket orders. to be
[3831]a counter-coup force. ~DINH also convinced TUNG to move four of his principal airborne com-
[3832]e of Saigon on 29 and 30 October, so that these troops
[3834]panies on a bootless operation outsid
[3835]would not be present on 1 November. DINH is the Minister of Security in the provisional
[3837]government. p. 13
[3839]“SOURCE: : STAFF:
[3840][Se DAWSON ;
[3842]Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Exhibit 1, Conein |
[3843]Wer DATE:
[3845]PERSONS/ENTITIFS: DATES: CATEGORIES:
[3846]CONEIN October 1963 DIEM <<
[3848]OCCURRENCE CONEIN stated that he looked upon his job as conveying o S ane
[3849]bassador to the people that were planning the coup and to monitor those people who were
[3850]planning the coup, and to get as much information so that our government would not be caught
[3851]with their pants down. He did agree not to thwart the coup and in fact, to supply economic
[3852]and military assistance if the coup succeeded, but did not conceive his objective the en-
[3853]couragerent or the promotion of the coup, nor did he ever discuss the possibility of dis-
[3854]couraging the coup. CONEIN stated that if the United States had now shown any interest or
[3855]remained neutral in opposing DIEM, there would have been a coup anyway. pp. 38-41
[3857]6£ abhed CLIESETEPIOCG Coos AH
[3859]SOURCE: STAPT:
[3861]Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein R. DAWSON
[3865]FILE: ~~ duly 1, 1975
[3867]PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES:
[3868]DINH
[3870]MINH Early October DIEM ou —
[3872]DON 1963
[3874]COLONEL CO, Dinh's Deputy
[3876]OCCURRENCE? Woon the ministerial post for DINH did not materialize by early October, the
[3877]coup principals realized that they had DINH actively thinking against the regime. It is
[3878]evident from statements during the series of meetings with GENERAL DON and GENERAL MINH dur-
[3879]ing the month of October that they still did not trust DINH, but felt they had compromised
[3881]him sufficiently with his troops, and, if necessary to eliminate DINH if he showed any sign
[3882]of compromising the generals. DINH was surrounded by officers who surveilled him 24 hours a
[3884]day including. CO, his deputy. p. 13
[3886]. STARE :
[3887]SOURCE: R. DAWSON
[3891]CATEGORIES:
[3892]CONEIN
[3895]COLBY, WILLIAM October, 196
[3897]OCCURRENCE: coLBY stated that "The CIA officer (CONBIN) received a call on October 30
[3898](1963) to come over and join the general staff and come to the meeting and essentially
[3900]sat with them as they continued the operation from thereon. They didn't move to the de-
[3901]cision to run the coup and he sat in the headquarters during most of the time. He went home
[3902]at one point, etc."
[3906]Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby, pp. 11-12 =" _R, DAWSON
[3908]FILE: at 29 June 1975 —
[3910]ne ae i a eS ee ee co a ee Oe eS RN ee ee OR SY ce ny sp Fer: nS Sen Sn es endo ‘ee sin i.e ere cm, es ey ape es mw eno end one ee ae
[3912]~— PERSONS /ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES:
[3913]. Oct. 2, 1963
[3915]Conein - ; P
[3917]Gen. Don - . BIEN
[3919]Gen. Duong Van Minh
[3920]Gen. Ton That Dinh
[3921]Neo Dinh Nhu
[3923]an i Gcé0o AH
[3925]|
[3926]|
[3927]I
[3929]tl
[3930]8 OCCURRENCE =
[3932]a
[3934]ar
[3936]ch.
[3940]i=.)
[3944]a
[3947]Raga
[3951]i
[3953]CONTINUED ON NEXT
[3954]CARD
[3955]STAFF: Dawson
[3956]. DATE: 6/30/75
[3957]™ FILE: DATE: 6/30/75
[3958]Se :
[3960]“u
[3961]OCCURRENCE:
[3962]3 are
[3964]Boi LNELAS Ob Of$:) tha | °
[3965]SOURCE: STAPF:
[3967]a
[3969]PERSONS/ENTIVIES: DATES: CATEGORIES:
[3970]AMBASSADOR LODGE Loft ;
[3971]conte 10/3/63 DIEMY™
[3973]GEN. DUONG VAN MINH
[3975]_ ne
[3976]i
[3978]OCCURRENCE:
[3980]28 aheg SYIESHCE PLO ec6os AW
[3982]SOURCE:
[3984]STAFF: Dawson
[3986]Hearings, $.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Corein, Exhibit One, p.4
[3988]PILE:
[3990]DATE: 6/30/75
[3992]PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES:
[3993]McNamarra
[3994]Lodge
[3995]MeCone Oct 3 = 4,1963 DIEM v
[3996]Richardson Fon pe
[3997]Smith :
[3999]oll £ON EOS Do
[4000]re | 3 I ‘ints i
[4001]OCCURRENCE: Sere as ea wy
[4002]On October 3, Lodge wrote a personal letter to’ McCone stating that "I... agree with what
[4004]I understand McNamarra said to you. The time has come for a new face, but I also think
[4005]of Richardson as a devoted and a patriotic American..." On October 4, 1963 in a CIA
[4006]cable from Saigon, (SAIG1397) the’ following report appeared:"...,.it is clear that
[4008]Lodge wants a change in chief of station....departing Saigon 18 ~ 20 hours...". Ina
[4009]comment in the IG report it is noted that. Richardson's departure was based on a head~
[4010]quarters request that he return to headquarters on TDY as soon as possible. Upon
[4011]Richardson's departure his deputy David R. Smith, became acting chief of station."
[4013]SOURCE? STAFF:
[4014]IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 26 DATE: Dawson
[4016]PERSONS/ENTIT IES :
[4017]233
[4019]LODGE
[4020]CATEGORIES:
[4021]MCNAMARRA.
[4022]TAYLOR
[4023]DIEM ¥
[4024]ite fe eres} Sek ON Fa gp
[4025]_ OCCURRENCE: SER M :
[4026]wo NG Pte i
[4028]pow
[4030]On ? October 1963 in a
[4031]instruction that
[4032]cnn nat the
[4034]States cable to Saigon (
[4036]Ambassador should continu
[4038]: Stated as a fourth
[4040]DEPTEL5 344° was
[4041]his policy of "eooL correctness "toward
[4045]€9 s6eq GTI9LZFTE'PIOOG GCEe6os BLL
[4047]SOURCE;
[4049]nan
[4051]IG Report 1967 (CIA p. 30
[4055]MeNomarva.
[4057]Lodge . f
[4059]MaCone Oct 3 - 4,1963 DIEM
[4063]Sudth Pf k (8, 4
[4066]i
[4067]i
[4070]OCCURRENCE : » po wad ra —_
[4071]On October 3, Lodge wrote a personal letter to MeCone stating that "I... agree with what
[4072]Y understand McNamarra said to you. The time has come for a new face, but IT also think
[4073]of Richardson as a devoted and a patriotic American..." On October 4, 1963 in a CIA
[4074]cable from Saigon, (SATG1397) the following report. appeared:"..,.it is clear that
[4076]Lodge wants a change in chief of station....departing Saigon 18 - 20 hours...". Ina
[4077]comment in the IG report it is noted that Richardson's departure was based on a head-
[4078]quarters request. that he return to headquarters on TDY as soon as possible. Upon
[4079]Richardson's departure his deputy David R. Smith, became acting chief of station."
[4082]IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 26 . DATE:
[4084]Dawson.
[4086]$8 ahed CT9EZFZEPLOCG Coéos AW
[4088]PERSOUS/ENTITIES : DATES: CATEGORIES:
[4089]SODGE
[4090]Dept. of State ;
[4092]MCNAMARRA 5 Oct 1963
[4094]‘TAYEOR Popes
[4096]~ OC CURIE ONCE
[4098]On 5 “October 1963 in a states cable to Saigon CORPTERSAN Ite was stated as a fourth
[4099]instruction that the Avrbassador should continue his poliey of "cool. correctness"toward
[4100]GPN. so
[4102]SOURCE: STAFF:
[4104]IG Report 1967 (CIA p. 30 DATE:
[4106]FILE:
[4108]PERSONS/ENTITIES : DATES? CATEGORIES:
[4109]KENNEDY , | JOWN F.
[4110]LODGE, HENRY CABOT DIEM
[4111]WHITEHOUSE
[4113]October 5,
[4114]1963 a
[4117]In a White House cable to Saigon (CAP63560) of 5 Oct 1963, the following message appears:
[4118]..Presdient today approved recommendation that no initiative should be taken to give
[4119]any active, covert encouragement to a coup. It should be urgent covert effort with
[4120]closest security under broad guidance of Ambassador to identify and build contacts with
[4121]possible alternative leadership as it appears...."
[4123]Annee — es ——— ewe ene te se ee rae
[4125]SOURCE: - STARR?
[4126]1G Report 1967 (CIA) p. 30. | . Dawson
[4129]t no initiative should be taken to ee?
[4130]sent covert effort with ve
[4132]1 contacts with
[4134]ce abea cioccradtpioed GGb0e AH
[4135]m
[4136]Q
[4139]5
[4140]5
[4141]ct
[4142]8
[4144]SOURCE: -
[4145]IG Report: 1967 (CIA) p, TAPES
[4147]cee er ee en en ee ee ie a ne me ed ine ne ee eee
[4149]CATEGORIES:
[4152]Kennedy, John F.
[4153]Colby, Wiliiam
[4154]Coumodity Tisport Program Oet. 5, 1963 DIEM
[4155]McCone
[4158]On. 5 Oetober there was a Presidential weeting. on Vietnam, ‘The only CIA participant was
[4159]MeCone. He provided the following record. ‘The meeting was held to discuss matters that
[4160]became the subject of DEPTEL 5/34 (See later entry of 5 October.) DCI said it was the
[4161]opinion of CIA with the exception of Colby, Chief Fareast Division, that fiddling with
[4162]the conmodity import program as a political lever would be much more likely to create
[4163]an économie crisis undermining the war effort than to scare Diem and Nhu into a more
[4164]cooperative attitude, because it would seriously affect the confidence and planning
[4165]of the Vietnamese business community and quickly engender inflationary measures at
[4166]large of a more serious nature. It was the concensus of the meeting that some meaningful
[4167]political movements, had to be made but exactly what they should be was not determined.
[4169]SOURCE? , SUREF:
[4170]TH Ranart 1Q67 (CTA) o. 27 Dawton
[4173]99 ahead GI9EZPceiPlood sceos AH
[4175]PERSONS VP TT LES t DATES: . CATEGORIES:
[4176]SMUTH, DAVID ; 7
[4177]‘onin ‘ Oet 5, 1963 DIEM
[4178]i OLGE
[4182]Tn a CEA cable from Saigon (SATGIY47) of 5 October 1963, DAVE, SMITH, the Act Ing Chief of
[4183]Station cabled thit he had discussed this latest CONEIN/MINH meeting with Fase et
[4184]LODGE and DCN TRUEHART. SMITH reported that he had recommended eal :
[4185]that: “we do not set ourselves errovacably against the assassignation plo 2 sine ae
[4186]the other two alternatives mean either a blood baka in Saigon or . protracted strugg.
[4187]which can rip the Arty and the country asunder.
[4190]~~ _ Dawson
[4191]IG Report 1967 (CIA), p.28 DATE:
[4192]FILE: 6/27/75
[4194]on, “pre cnich ee see th et ae a Se i ee a a Ae eS ne ea ee ec ma a
[4198]CATEGORIES:
[4201]Nhu, Ngo Dinh Conein
[4202]CAn, Ngo Dinh Lodge
[4203]Diem
[4205]Minh, General
[4207]OCCURRENCE: Tos
[4209]On October 5, 1963 in a CIA Cable from Saigon (SAIGI445) it was stated that the
[4210]meeting with Conein (approved by Ambassador in October) General Minh requested a
[4211]statement of the U.S. Position with respect to a change in the GVN in the near future.
[4212]He said he did not expect U.S.G. support of a coup effort but did need USG assurances
[4213]that USG would not try to thwart his plans. He outlined three possible plans for the
[4214]accomplishment of the change of government: (a) assassinationof Ngo Din Nhu and Ngo
[4215]Dinh ein keeping President Diem in office; (b) encirclement of Saigon by various
[4216]military units; and (c) direct confrontation between military units involved in the
[4217]coup and loyalist military units.
[4219]Oct 5, 1963 |
[4221]SOURCE:
[4223]IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 27-28 Dawson
[4225]FILE:
[4230]BODGE, HENRY CABOT
[4231]‘RENNEDY, JOHN F.
[4232]RENNEDY, ROBERT F..
[4233]BIEM, MC CONE, JOHN:
[4234]i=]
[4236]PUCCURRENCE? vc CONE recalled a meeting with =. President KENNEDY and Attorney General _
[4237]“ROBERT F. KENNEDY had with him on or about October 5 or 6, 1963. The Attorney General was
[4238]M'rather non-committal in the meeting. He and I walked downstairs together, and he said,
[4239]mfohn, are you sure you are right? And I said, I think I am and he said I'm rather surprised
[4240]a the position you took. And I said, well, you didn't disagree with it...7(1) This dis-
[4241]éussion had nothing to do with assassinations. This was whether we should let the coup go
[4243]use our influences not to. Then interestingly enough, the President sent a series of mes-
[4244]gages to CABOT LODGE urging that he'd do all that he could to get DIEM to change his ways.
[4245]CABOT LODGE's first attempt failed and then he was called ~— CABOT LODGE was called by DIEMts
[4246]Sffice and DIEM said, you tell the President to tell me what he wants me to do and I'll do
[4247]it. Unfortunately, the forces were surrounding the palace at that very moment and the coup
[4248]was on. It was a kind of a dramatic little part of the history of that tragedy." .
[4250]SOURCE: SPAR:
[4252]Hearings; SSCI, June 6, 1975, MeCone , pp. 63-64 R. DAWSON
[4254]FILE: DATE: 29 June 1975
[4256]PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES:
[4257]KAHN No LODGE, TRUHART, WM. | -
[4258]Sn eA ° , 5-7 Oct. 1963
[4260]NGO DINH KAHN
[4262]SMITH, DAVID .
[4263]COLBY, WILLIAM, MC CONE, JOHN
[4265]dey! be
[4267]OCCURRENCE? CoLBY testified as to the events surrounding the cable, From Sango Oe ase.
[4269]ber 1963 which reads as follows: "We do not set ourse/ves sepeeueres te Saiaon or a pre-
[4270]i j 90d
[4272]ination plot since the other two alternatives mean either a And. the response on
[4274]‘ try asunder."
[4275]tracted struggle which could rip the army 6nd fhe vows: "WC CONE directs that you withdraw
[4277]63 whieh COLBY wrote for MC CONE as follows :
[4278]6 Octo tion to Ambassador concerning anne pian Ta ane eeganeering as ve
[4279]in a position to actively condone such course
[4280]Cant sponsibility, therefore COLBY explained that this Beene eae eysein dra tere Dl St
[4281]eliminate assassination as an alternative. COLBY state i Fe ea a eas sent on eee 7
[4283]tinue.
[4284]> s NHU and KAHN, NGO DINH KAHN, were to con a
[4285]amen response to the MC CONE cable saying that action was anne as directed, mean
[4286]jing that the Anbassador had been so informed to withdraw the recommendation.
[4288]TARE:
[4290]ee R. DAWSON
[4292]Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby, pp- 12-17
[4294]FILE: DATE: 29 June 1975
[4296]ee sheq CIQESPEEPLOOG Co60S AH
[4298]PERSONS/ENTITIES : DATES: CATEGORIES:
[4300]MCCONE ~ .
[4301]TODGE
[4303]SMYTH Oct 6, 1963 DIEM
[4305]In a CTA eable to Saigon (DIR7366lof 6 Oct) the following appears: "... MCCONE directs
[4306]that you withdraw reconmendations from Ambassador (concerning assassignation plan)
[4307]under MCCONE instructions as we can not be inposition actively condoning such course
[4308]of action and thereby’ engaging our responsibility therefore."
[4311]IG Report 1967 (CIA), p. 28 Dawson
[4312]FILE: DATE:
[4317]DATES: CATEGORIES:
[4318]TRUEHART ,
[4319]LODGE
[4321]SMITH Oct 7, 1963 DIEM
[4324]In a response to the CIA cable of Oct. 6, 1963, to Saigon, the station in Saigon
[4325]responded (SATG1463 7 Oct): "Action taken as directed." In addition since DORA
[4326]TRUEHART was also present. when original recommendation was made, specific withdrawal
[4327]reconmendation at MCCONE's instruction was also conveyed to TRUEHART. Ambassador
[4328]LODGE commented that he shares MCCONE'S opinion.”
[4330]SOURCE: " STAPF:
[4331]. IG Report 1967 (CIA), p. 29 Dawson |
[4332]PILE: DATE:
[4334]6/2015
[4336]PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES:
[4337]BUNDY COLBY iY
[4338]JOHNSON 1o[3/ 63 DIEM :
[4340]KILPATRICK SPECIAL GROUP
[4341]MCCONE
[4343]OCCURRENCE:
[4344]On October 8, 1963 at a special group meeting the DCI expressed concern that there
[4345]was a lack of intelligence coverage during the period when "the U.S. was maintaining
[4346]a posture of almost no official contact at top levels." They refer to. the fact 3
[4347]that NHU and DIEM are not being contacted by Americans. Mr. MCCONE also referred iL
[4348]to "theorientation of (Saigon) station functions." Mr. BUNDY pointed out that"for
[4349]Americans to resume top level contacts at this time would appear to represent
[4350]a political rapprochement. Ambassador LODGE might feel that this was running
[4351]counter to his policy." The Group gave its approval to the basis realignment of
[4352]station functions. (The nature of such functions are not outlined.)
[4354]68 aheq GTI9ESPee:PLIOG _GE60S AW
[4356]aoe De
[4359]poo
[4361]seer ahd is
[4363]SOURCE:
[4365]i
[4366]Minutes. of Special Group Meeting. Oct..17, voll y
[4368]Kelley
[4369]FILE: DATE: 6/28/75
[4370]PERSONS/ENTITIES : DATES: CATEGORIES:
[4371]Tung, Col. Smith, David Oct 8, 1963
[4372]Phillips, Rusus, AID Acting Chief of Station DIEM
[4373]Colby, William Aisvoad after 10/5/63 _
[4374]Richardson, John “Jocko"Aid to Diem Regime
[4375]OCCURRENCES LSSnosT a
[4377]On 8 September 1963, the CIA IG report reflacts In a conment that the U.S.
[4378]government publicly confirmed on Oct. 8, 1963 that aid had alraady been cut
[4379]quitely and over a period of some months. Bill Colby, Jock Anderson and Dave Smith
[4380]told us that the public armouncenent of the aid reduction was a signal to the
[4381]general and that the reduction was planned with that in mind. It may be that
[4382]the cut in aid was deliberately planned to spur the generals: on, but if so, that
[4383]intention did not find its way into the record. The nearest thing to it is in the
[4384]record of a presidential meeting of 10 September 1963. ‘The President asked
[4385]Rufus Phillips of AID what specific actions Phillips recemnended and he suggested
[4386]“eutting aid to Colonel Tung which would be viewed by the generals with much ,
[4387]enthusiasm as an indication of virgouous of American position. W “In. general,
[4388]aid cuts were discussed in terms of bring pressure on Diem to make needed changes in
[4389]hnis-reeéminpdevever pianied; p-heveverleoled—-un)en_by.the-T8. mga Aeteats : it. is.
[4390]clear Cee eee vietnamese considered the official confirmation of a Othe ss a clear
[4391]token of their support of coup planning.
[4393]DTT Re. iG Report 1967 (CIA), Dp. 17-18 DATE «
[4395]Dawson
[4397]06 ahead CToczPze:Plo0d Gc60S AH
[4400]KENNEDY, JOHN F, paves: — e-
[4401]RICHARDSON, JOHN an
[4403]Oct. 9, 1963 DIEM 1.
[4405]bli "I know that
[4406]c Servant , has led to
[4408]independent
[4410]ral Intelligence
[4412]he Director of
[4413]Cent
[4414]onal Security Counc
[4416]PERSONS/ENTITIFS: DATES: CATEGORIES:
[4417]LODGE, HENRY CABOT a
[4418]COLBY, WILLIAM Oct 9, 1963 pr /
[4419]KENNEDY, JOHN F.
[4421]TAM _erenn
[4423]OCCURRENCE: 2 a :
[4424]In a CIA cable to Saigon of October 9, 1963, marked eyes only for Ambassador (DIR74228)
[4425]which was originaed by WILLIAM COLBY thefollowing appears:"... while we do not wish
[4426]to stimulate coup, we also do not wish to leave theimpression that U.S. would thwart
[4427]a change of government or deny economic or military assistance to a new regime and if
[4428]it appeared capable of increasing effectiveness of military effort, insuring popular
[4429]support to win war and improving working relationships.with U.S." The cable urges
[4430]that the contact with MINH press for "detail information clearly indicating that
[4432]'s plans offer a high prospect of success." The text states that these "additional
[4433]general thoughts" have been discussed with the President and that the cable had been
[4434]cleared with high officials at White House, State and Defense."
[4436]SOURCE: STAFF:
[4438]Nawenn
[4440]T6 BHed GTILSPTEPTOOG GEs0S AN
[4442]PERSONS/ENLITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES:
[4443]KENNEDY, JOHN F,
[4444]RICHARDSON, JOHN Oct. 9, 1963 DIEM
[4446]OCCURRENCE: $a
[4448]Cn October 9, 1963 Presidential newsconference the President stated that "I know that
[4449]the transfer of JOHN RICHARDSON, who is a very dedicated public servant, has led to
[4450]surmises but I can assure you flatly that. the CIA has not carried out independent ;
[4451]activities, but has operated under closecontrol of the Director of Central Intelligence
[4452]operating under -- with the cooperation of the National Security Council and under
[4454]my instructions."
[4456]SOURCE: : STAPF:
[4458]TG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 32 Payson
[4459]FILE: DATE:
[4461]6/27/75
[4463]PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES:
[4464]LODGE, HENRY CABOT KENNEDY, JOHN F. wy
[4465]MINH, GENERAL Oct 10, 1963 DIEM
[4466]DON, GENERAL | OSE 9, 196D
[4468]— COLBY, WILLIAM
[4470]OCCURRENCE:
[4472]In a 10 October 1963 entry in the Saigon station's “history of the Vietnamese
[4473]generals coup" it is noted that the Ambassador instruct the CIA not to initiate
[4474]contact with General MINH or DON, but the generals initiate contact, such contact
[4475]were authorized. In the course of meetings with MINH or DON, assurances. were to
[4476]be given as specified in DIR74228 of 9 October wherein COLBY had stated that the
[4477]matter of MINH's plans be detailed clearly indicating that MINH's plans offer a
[4478]high prospect of success. " While we do not wish to stimulate a coup we also do
[4479]not wish to leave the impression that the U.S. would thwart a change of government
[4480]or deny economic and military assistance to a new fein if it appeared capable
[4481]of increasing effectiveness in military effort. ee
[4483]SOURCE:
[4484]IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 32 - 33
[4489]PERSOUS/ENT LPLES + DATES: . CATEGORIES:
[4490]Lobe, HERRY CAROL a ne
[4491]COLBY, WILLIAM Oct 9, 1963 DIEM
[4493]KENNEDY, JOHN F,
[4499]In a CTA cable to Saigon of October 9, 1963, marked eyes only for Anbassador (DIR7H228)
[4500]which was originaed by WILLIAM COLBY thefollowing appears:"... while we do not wish
[4502]to stimulate coup, we also do not wish to leave thelmpression that U.S. would thwart
[4504]a change of government or deny economic or military assistance to a new regime and if
[4505]it appeared capable of increasing effectiveness of military effort, insuring popular
[4506]support. to win war and inproving working relationships with U.S." The cable urges
[4508]that the contact with MINH press for "detail information clearly indicating that
[4509]MINH's plans offer a high prospect of success." The text states that these "additional
[4510]general thoughts" have been discussed with the President and that the cable had been
[4511]cleared with high officials at White House, State and Defense." ;
[4513]SOURCE: oo STAFF:
[4514]iG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 32 Dawson
[4516]: oo, 6/27/15
[4519]LODGE, HENRY CABOT KENNEDY, JOHN F. ~~
[4520]MINH, GENERAL Cet 10, 1963
[4521]DON, GENERAL Oct. 9,1963
[4522]COLBY, WILLIAM
[4524]OCCURRENCE.”
[4526]In a 10 October 1963 entry in the Saigon station's "history of the Vietnamese
[4527]generals coup" it is noted that the fmbassador instruct the CIA not to initiate
[4528]contact with General MINH or DON, but the generals initiate contact, such contact
[4529]wore authorized. In the course of meetings with MINH or DON, assurances were to
[4530]be given as specified in DIR74228 of 9 October wherein COLBY had stated that the
[4531]matter of MINH's plans be detailed clearly indicating that MINH's plans offer a
[4532]high prospect of success. ' While we do not wish to stimulate a coup we also do
[4533]not wish to leave the timpression that the U.S. would thwart a change of governinent
[4534]or deny economic and military assistance to a new regime, if it appeared capable
[4535]of increasing effectiveness in military effort...."
[4537]CATEGORIES:
[4539]DIEM
[4541]SOURCE: “TSTARFS
[4542]IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 32 - 33 DAWSON
[4545]E PasroouNoy Bat ee bi
[4546]retheoviws baa
[4548]S\MBASSADOR LODGE
[4549]acEN. MINH
[4550]SEN. DON
[4554]STAFF? Dawson
[4556]Pane S,
[4558]DATE? 6/30/75
[4560]ae ek ii i’ soni yy hi ee me ne ge me
[4562]PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: | CATEGORIES:
[4564](ODGE, HENRY CABOT KENNEDY, JOHN F.
[4565]MINH, GENERAL : ct 10, Ey DIEM
[4566]JON, GENERAL Oct. 951963
[4568]SOLBY, WILLIAM
[4569]OCCURRENCE:
[4571]In a 10 October 1963 entry in the Saigon station's “history of the Vietnamese
[4572]generals coup" it is noted that the Ambassador instruct the CIA not to initiate
[4573]contact with General MINH or DON, but the generals initiate contact, such contact
[4574]were authorized. In the course of meetings with MINH or DON, assurances were to
[4575]be given as specified in DIR74228 of 9 October wherein COLBY had stated that the
[4576]matter of MINH's plans be detailed clearly indicating that MINH's plans offer a
[4577]high prospect of success. " While we do not wish to stimulate a coup we also do
[4578]not wish to leave the impression that the U.S. would thwart a change of government
[4579]or. deny economic and military assistance to a new regime, if it appeared capable
[4580]of increasing effectiveness in military effort...." a
[4582]SOURCE: — STAFF:
[4584]IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 32 - 33 , DAWSON
[4585]FILE: = DATE: 6/27/75
[4587]ee a ee ne Aa SAD RE A SN HEC Ae mp
[4591]Senate Foreign Relations Committee
[4592]MCCONE .
[4594]DATES: CATEGORIES:
[4596]Oct 10,1963 DIEM
[4599]A briefing by MCCONE to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, it was noted that
[4600]“we have not seen a successor government in the wings that we could say positively
[4601]would be an improvement over DIEM. ‘Therefore it. has been our counsel to proceed
[4603]cautionsly, otherwise the situation might flare up which might result in something
[4604]of a civil war, and the Communists would come out the victor merely by sitting on
[4606]the sidelines."
[4608]£6 a6eq GTILTFSE:PLICM GCG60S AW
[4610]SOURCE: | STAFF:
[4611]IG Reprot 1967 (CIA) p. 33 Dawson
[4612]FILE: DATE:
[4613]6/27/75
[4614]PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES:
[4616]Senate Foreign Relations Comnittee
[4617]_MCCONE Cet 10,1963 DIEM
[4619]OCCURRENCE:
[4620]A briefing by MCCONE to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, it was noted that
[4621]‘we. have nob seen a successor government in the wings that we could say positively
[4622]would be an dinprovement over DIEM. Therefore it: has been our counsel to proceed
[4623]cautionsly, otherwise the situation might flare up which might result in something
[4624]of a eivil war, and the Conmunists would come out the victor merely by sitting on
[4626]the sidelines."
[4628]SOURCE: STAPF:
[4629]IG Reprot 1967 (CIA) p. 33 Dawson
[4631]8 4
[4634]6/27/15
[4637]605 AH
[4639]PERSONS/ENTIPLES: DAEES 3 CATEGORIES:
[4640]Scour eee BATES oR EEGOR LE 3
[4641]GENERAL DON
[4642]Fore 4228 Oat 23,1963 DIEM
[4643]acObGH, HENRY CAROL a ;
[4644]= ete p a
[4645]we og, ae a
[4646]& OCCURRENCE : rr ma -
[4648]In a October 23, 1963 entry into the Satgon stations, nyistory’ of ‘the Vietnamese Generals
[4649]Booup", it was noted that a meeting with CONEIN requested by General DON, DON said the
[4650]Generals had decided to try to ‘stage a coup within a week follcwing 26 October. CONTIN
[4651]gunder instructions passed the substance of DIR7'228 to DON. DON promised he would scek
[4652]permission of the coup conmittee to give CONEIN their political plan for the Aybassador's
[4654]ecyes only.
[4656]SOURCE: ~ STAFF
[4658]IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 33 DATE: Dawson
[4664]Lt. Col. PHAM NGOC THAO
[4666]OCCURRENCE:
[4668]Dawson
[4670]SOURCE: Hearings; > Ss woeGel., June 20, [I97>, Conéin, Exnibit 1; STAFF:
[4671]- PAQe 7,
[4673]RTT Ts | name.
[4675]AL
[4679]DATES: : CATEGORIES:
[4681]DIEM a
[4685]ONEIN
[4686]AMBASSADOR LODGE
[4688]ISON
[4690]OCCURRENCE:
[4692]96 sheq CLg9eZPeei pro
[4694]SOURCE:. earings, $.8.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit One
[4696]Page &, )
[4697]. DATE: 6/30
[4698]FILE: (30/5
[4699]PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES:
[4700]NEIN
[4701]NERAL DON
[4702]R74228 Oct 23,1963
[4704]IDGE, HENRY CABOT _ a
[4706]OCCURRENCE:
[4708]7
[4709]a October 23, 1963 entry into the Saigon stations, "Hi story of ‘the Vietnamese Generals
[4710]up", it was noted that a meeting with CONEIN requested by General DON, DON said the
[4711]nerals had decided to try to stage a coup within a week follewing 26 October. CONE IN
[4712]der instructions passed the substance of DIR74228 to DON. DON promised he would seek
[4714]mmission of the coup committee to give CONEIN their political plan for the Ambassador's
[4715]es only.
[4717]f
[4719]'
[4721]SOURCE: T STAFF: ;
[4723]E PERSONS/ENTIV LES ¢ WALEED 4S GM LLU based
[4725]al ee | .
[4726]SON Oct. 23, '63 | DIEM
[4728]OCCURRENCE :
[4734]SOURCE:
[4736]Hearings, 5,8.C.1.
[4738]6/30/75
[4740]DATES:
[4743]Oct. 235 63 |
[4746]»ONEIN
[4747]. HUAN
[4751]Hearings, 8.8.C.1I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, f 6 STAPF! Dawson
[4753]PILE: DATE: — 6/30/75
[4755]oc BH
[4757]PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES:
[4758]Sen. MINH , 10/18/63 DIEM &~
[4760]Don .
[4761]SEN. HARKINS
[4763]a
[4765]= ONEIN
[4766]8 OCCURRENCE:
[4769]tat
[4775]an
[4779]a
[4781][=
[4783]mn
[4785]‘io
[4787][=]
[4789]SOURCE: STAPF:
[4791]Hearings, S.8.C.1., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit One Dawson
[4794]Pa oA Qo dap, DATE?
[4798]SOURCE: . : 7 : TAPP
[4799]SOURCE? Hearings, 8.8.C.., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, STAPF? dawson
[4801]pages 13-14,
[4802]PILES: mine. 6/30/75
[4804]E: PERSONS/ENTITIES: | CATEGORIES:
[4806]SCone in i DIEM
[4809][Gen. Harkins .
[4810]gimbassador Lodge
[4812]5
[4814]a.
[4816]J OCCURRENCE:
[4817]4 .
[4819]i]
[4821]i
[4823]ho
[4825]a
[4827]oh.
[4829]=)
[4831]an
[4833]i]
[4835]a
[4837]et
[4839]7
[4841]Ao:
[4845]SOURCE: earings, S.5.C.I., 6/20/75, Corein, Exhibit One,
[4847]Po gee toh,
[4851]LAM NGOC HUAN
[4852]AMBASSADOR LODGE
[4854]CATEGORIES:
[4855]DIEM
[4857]Oct. 16, '63
[4859]OCCURRENCE:
[4861]o Pe eye
[4863]ante
[4869]PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES:
[4870]CONEIN
[4871]_MC NAMARA 12 October 1963 | DIEM x
[4873]NCU YEN QUANG © |
[4874]PHAM NGOC THAO .
[4876]OCCURRENCE? when CONEIN was asked to explain the reference to Secretary MC NAMARA at p.
[4877]5, Exhibit 1, he stated that there were different elements contacting the same group, i.e. :
[4878]NGU YEN’ and THAO. But did not. explain the reference to MC NAMARA, ps 29
[4882]Gite
[4884]OOT aHeq GTILSPEEPIIPG Co6OS AH
[4886]SOURCE: STAPF:
[4887]Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein R. DAWSON
[4888]FILE: . DATE:
[4890]—_vuly 1, 1975
[4892]ee te Fare i ie ss A OL SF SD MY, sh eee eae ey eee en pee sg A, Ashe, tes neh ts‘ nen mei
[4894]LTES: CATEGORIES:
[4896]DIEM
[4898]I
[4899]AMBASSADOR LODGE
[4900]SECRETARY MACNAMARA
[4902]OCCURRENCE:
[4904]Hearings 5 S.8.C.1., 6/20/75, Corein, Exhibit One,
[4906]"BIOOG Gcé6o0s AW
[4908]Tor abeq cagcePee
[4910]cee .
[4912]= PERSONS/ENTIVIES: DATES: _ sa.
[4915]DON
[4917]OCCURRENCE:
[4919]Ayla erase yf & ae
[4920]Coup Comme Low
[4921]MoW Owe :
[4923]CON'T ON NEXT
[4925]CARD
[4926]SOURCE: _ SEAPF? Dawson
[4927]nearings, S.S.C.I., June 20, 1975, Conein,
[4928]. Exhibi O moc an TF M3 a
[4929]PILE: ibit One. pee 7 . DATE: 6/30/75
[4931]SRST A en Ope ee eee
[4933]OCCURRENCE:
[4935]DATES: CATEGORIES:
[4937]- PERSONS/ENTITIES:
[4939]CONTINUATION OF
[4940]LAST CARD:
[4942]CONARpON NEXT
[4944]SOURCE:
[4946]OLAPR ;
[4948]x babes Adee x aa a obk ae BAP ok bat RAD dk GRA AG ow
[4949]m x a
[4951]=I
[4955]yo
[4959]a
[4961]oS “
[4963]4 OCCURRENCE:
[4964]4 CONTINUATION OF LAST TWO CARDS:
[4965]“
[4967]ho
[4969]fe
[4971]i
[4973]Ga
[4975]n
[4977]i
[4979]an
[4981]ao]
[4983]au
[4985]a
[4987]7
[4989]i
[4991]o.
[4993]ha
[4995]SOURC
[4997]FILE: DATE:
[5001]BZ ONEIN =
[5002]SEN. HARKINS °
[5006]£0T aHeq ClgesPree: Plopa
[5008]SOURCE; © Hearings,
[5009]| PAQES A 5
[5011]Dawson
[5013]DATE: 6/30/75
[5015]FILE:
[5017]ee re ee ee ee A ee rm me me rm pe ae cn Se en ee eine ee el eh a, —
[5019]ff ERR gre ee EE ee pe eid a co Oe ke ey wie ren reer rein mers ees we ne mee
[5021]DATES: i CATEGORIES:
[5024]JODGE, HENRY CABOT
[5025]TARKINS
[5027]3UNDY, MC GEORGE
[5028]JENERAL DON
[5030]JONSIN
[5032]JCCURRENCE: In a cable marked “eyes only" to LODGE and HARKINS from BUNDY dated October
[5033]24, CONEIN characterized this telegram as activating the disengagement between the U.S.
[5034]government and DIEM. The text of that cable is as follows: "There may be danger. NHU ;
[5035]attempting entrapment DON's approaches to CONEIN. Feel quite strongly that LODGE and HARKIN:
[5036]zan stand back from any non-essential involvement, It seems wise to maintain close control
[5037]over meetings between DON and CONEIN." p. 33
[5039]October 24, 1963! DIEM +~
[5041]OURCE: STAFF:
[5042]jlearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein R. DAWSON
[5044]P FENSUNS/ENELELES : DATES: CATEGORIES:
[5046]* BUNDY CONEIN A a
[5048]=JOHNSON Oct. 24, 1963 DIEM
[5049]SKILPATRICK SPECIAL GROUP —
[5050]MCCONE
[5052]i=]
[5054]CCURRENCEs
[5055]Fon October 24, 1963 Mr. MCCONE had a special group meeting “expressed his fear that
[5056]wthe top U.S, diplomatic and military officials in Saigon are becoming too involved
[5057]min conversations between General DON and COEIN. Such involvement could destroy CONEIN
[5058]Suse fullness and involve Ambassador LODGE and General HARKINS in operation difficult
[5059]Bto deny. " The Special Group authorized a message to LODGE and to HARKINS. emphasizing
[5060]"a secure system of contacts with Genral DON and Vietnamese military and an assessment
[5061]tof DON's status and his future plans and the tightening of control over the DON/CONELN
[5062]“meetings. The group agreed to firm up policy thinking re Vietnam before LODGE returns
[5063]to Washington and hear Mr. LODGE's views on what courses of action should be taken.
[5065]FOT she
[5067]SOURCE: STAPF ANS 7
[5068]— EP Ab dE pepo ay: tl y
[5069]Minutes of Special Group Meeting Oct ak a Ne 4 ke ley ic
[5070]PILE EEE el onres)) wiblts f
[5071]6/28/75
[5075]PDDGE
[5077]s3UNDY DIEM
[5079]ON, GENERAL :
[5081]SONEIN
[5083]OCCURRENCE:
[5085]na UIA cable from Saigon (SAIG1964) from LODGE to BUNDY:it was noted that: "CAS has
[5086]2en punctilious in carrying out my instructions. I have personally approved each
[5087]~eting between GENERAL DON AND CONEIN who has carried out my orders in each instance
[5090]SOURCE: : “STAFF,
[5091]IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 35 DAWSON
[5092]FILE: DATE:
[5094]6/27/75
[5097]Got eheg CTgcereeplocd coseoc AN
[5099]PR RSONS/ENUIVYLES: DATES CATEGORIES:
[5100]LODGE ~~ as
[5101]HARKINS .
[5102]BUNDY Oct 24, 1963
[5103]COMSIN
[5104]NHU {
[5106]OCCURRENCES ; mee COTES
[5107]In an eyes. only cable from CIA to Saigon for LODGE and HARKENS, from BUNDY ‘the Following
[5108]message appears: ..there may be danger NHU attempting entrapment through DON's
[5110]epproaches to one ..feel quite strongly that LODGE and HARKINS should stand back
[5111]from any nonessential involvement..,it seems wise to maintain close control over
[5112]meetings between DON and’ CONEIN."
[5114]IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 35 DATE: DAWSON
[5115]FILE: . ae
[5116]6/27/75
[5118]ee Se ie a ai a ik ae nie et eee vee Sele ne ares cee erie ee Se me re me tet pen ere ee co et eee ee ae eee ne ame ee Aa ae :
[5120]ne pee, eee ag ce a le a lm A Pe ence "sem, int Se ry ote SR. mm
[5123]BRENT 24 Oct 1963 DIEM
[5125]CRITIC
[5127]JGS headquarters
[5129]QECURAEMME? the IG Report notes that, "The fact that CONEIN was at JGS headquarters is
[5130]well known in official circles. On 24 October, headquarters had cabled the STATION: ‘In
[5131]future do not repeat not put message re coup plots or rumors in CRITIC channel. Rather you
[5133]should ‘slug them IMMEDIATE ATTENTION FOR BRENT.! As a consequence, the firse cabled reports
[5135]from the STATION came in as regular CIA cables and were put onto the CRITIC network here at
[5136]headquarters."
[5138]STAFF:
[5140]R. DAWSON
[5141]DATE:
[5143]SOURCE?
[5145]CIA IG Report, 1967, p. 42
[5149]PERSONS/ENTITIES : DATES: CATEGORIES:
[5150]g HANSEN, “BURMAU OF BUDGET ~ ee
[5151]SEXECUPIVE DIRECIOR OF CIA Get 24, 1963 DIEM
[5152]LODGE
[5153]RICHARDSON
[5155]OCCURRENCE: ~ “
[5156]“On October 24, 1963, there was a meeting between the executive director of CIA and
[5157]NKENNITH HANSEN, Bureau of the Budget, wherein HANSEN detailed charges made by LODGE at ,
[5158]Nhis initial meeting with LODGE, The memorandum for the récord prepared by the Executive
[5159]MDirector, details the following charges made by LODGE: 1, CIA was improperly dealing
[5160]@with NHU; 2. CIA was reluctant to turn over to the military its operation among the
[5161]giill tribes; g. CIA had inadequate penetrations of the GYN and the Buddist. and was
[5162]#eaught by surprise; 4, RICHARDSON had a. palatial mansion and entertained government
[5163]® officials there; 5. the CIA station was too large and too visible; 6. CIA acted on its
[5164]Sow initiative without coordination and without control either at the Ambassador or
[5165]Washington. HANSEN said he later reported to LODGE fhat he thought LODGE's charges were
[5166]erroneous. He said he was convinced that everything the CIA had ddone in Vietnam had
[5167]been approved in Washington, coordinated with and carried out under the directions of the
[5168]Ambassador.,_and had been carried out with eood judenent and with a high quality of
[5169]performaiZRCEHANSEN noted that at the time of his first meeting withSHGiik, LODGE hadnot
[5170]yet had a full breifing on what the Agency was doing. ‘This took place a few days later.
[5171](this appears to be a record by the CIA of a source which it had in 1G areau of the Budget
[5173]for findikEout what Lodges thinking _was at this time.
[5174]Fer Rear POET (ELA) De a )
[5182]DON, GENERAL
[5184]HARKINS, GENERAL _
[5186]_ CONEIN, Oct. 24, 1963 DIEM
[5187]OCCURRENCE: ~ -
[5189]In an entry of October 24, 1963 the Saigon's station "History of the Vietnamese Generals
[5190]Coup", it is noted that CONEIN held two meetings with General DON of 24 October. DON
[5191]reported he had been informed bv Gehtrel HARKENS that the U. S. military would not thwart
[5192]any coup plans. DON said the coup plans were complete; the necessary military units were
[5193]available; and that the coup would occur no later than 2 November. ‘The second meeting
[5194]DON said the coup committee refused to turn over the political plan but authorized DON
[5195]to outline its substance, which he did. ;
[5197]SOURCE: ’ STAFF:
[5198]: IG Report 1967 (CIA),p. 35 ; Dawson
[5201]K/97/7E
[5205]DATES: CATEGORIES:
[5207]Oct 24, 1963
[5209]OCCURRENCE: AS am
[5210]——— PS ta ad seer Oy
[5212]#In an eyes only cable f. ENS, INDY
[5214]2 meseape, appears: D e rom CIA to Saigon for LODGE and HARKENS, from BUNDY the following
[5215]: .. there may be danger NHU attempting entrapment through DON's
[5217]~ appenas es to CONBIN...feel quite strongly that LODGE and HARKINS should stand back
[5219]Fi om any nonessential involvement...it seems wise to maintain close control ove
[5221]a meetings between DON and CONEIN." .
[5224]a
[5227]pee STAFF:
[5228]IG Report 1967 (CIA) p.
[5229]PILE: ( )p. 35 DATE: DAWSON
[5230]pee ee 6/27/75
[5231]PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES:
[5232]HANSEN, “AUREAU OF BUDGET
[5233]EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF CIA Oct. 24 ; 1963 DIEM 4
[5234]LODGE . an ee ar ee oe
[5235]RICHARDSON :
[5237]OCCURRENCE:
[5238]On October 24, 1963, there was a meeting between the executive director of CIA and
[5239]KENNETH HANSEN, Bureau of the Budget, wherein HANSEN detailed charges made by LODGE at »
[5240]his initial meeting with LODGE. ‘The memorandum for the record prepared by the Executive i
[5241]Director, details the following charges made by LODGE: 1. CIA was improperly dealing id
[5242]with NHU; 2. CIA was reluctant to turn over to the military its operation among the i
[5243]hill. tribes; 2. CIA had tnadequate penetrations of the GVN and the Buddist and was |
[5244]eaught by surprise; 4. RICHARDSON had a palatial mansion and entertained government
[5245]officials there; 5. the CIA station was too large and too visible; 6. CIA acted on its i
[5246]own initiative without coordination and without control either at the Ambassador or :
[5247]Washington. HANSEN said he later reported to LODGE that he thought LODGE's charges were
[5248]erroneous. He said he was convinced that everything the CLA had ddone in Vietnam had i
[5249]been approved in Washington, coordinated with and carried out under the directions of the |
[5250]ed a with good judement ang 3 lity of
[5251]performawwehCEHANSEN noted that at the time of his first meeting withehGir, LODGE hadnot
[5253]vet had a full breifing on what the Agency was doing. This took place a few days later.
[5254]ee ee” nn vinta Ab had in the Pirean of the Budget |
[5257]80T SHeI CTIOLSPZEPIIOG So605 AH
[5259]PERSONS/ENTITIES : DATES: CATEGORIES:
[5260]DON, GENERAL t
[5261]HARKINS, GENERAL Y oo -
[5262]CONEIN,
[5264]Oct. 24, 1963 | DIEM
[5266]hf. y
[5269]OCCURRENCE:
[5271]In an entry of October 24, 1963 the Saigon's station "History of the Vietnamese Generals
[5272]Coup", it 1s noted that CONEIN held two meetings with General DON of 24 October. DON
[5273]reported he had been informed 4 Gehereal HARKENS that the U. S. military would not thwart
[5275]any coup plans. DON said the coup plans were complete; the necessary military units were
[5276]available; and that the coup would occur no later than 2 November. The second meeting .
[5277]DON said the coup conmittee refused to turn over the political plan but authorized -DON
[5279]to outline its substance, which he did.
[5281]SOURCE: STAFF:
[5283]IG Report. 1967 (CIA),p. 35 ; Dawson
[5284]FILE: DATE:
[5285]6/27/75
[5287]a RE Ee ee ce eee me a ES tt eA yp ee my ce ee ne en ee ce ge ces cn eS SS SE See SY ce me: ce
[5289]DATES: CATEGORIES:
[5291]/ 7
[5293]DIM RE RE
[5294]Q CHRP A
[5296]. 24, 1963
[5298]In a @IA cable from Saigon (SAIG1964) from LODGE to BUNDY.it was noted that: "CAS’ has
[5299]been punctilious in carrying out my instructions, I have personally approved each .
[5300]meeting between GENERAL DON AND CONEIN who has carried out my orders in each instance -
[5301]explicitly..." i
[5303]SOURCE: TARE:
[5305]IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 35 "DAWSON
[5309]E PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES:
[5311]CATEGORIES:
[5312]ONCCONE NHU ae
[5313]‘KENNEDY, JOHN F. Oct.25, 1963 DIEM
[5314]“TODGE |
[5315]PIEM . !
[5318]an October 25, 1963 Presidential meeting on Vietnam, with’ the only participant from
[5319]TA being MCCONE, MCCONE's notes show that the President stated that the purpose
[5320]the meeting was to consider: (1) recent actions in South Vietnam with respect to
[5321]Seoup planning and qualifications of the individuals reporting, and (2) our policy in
[5322]Sout Vietnam as he wished to be assured there was unanimity within the government _
[5323]wrior to the return of LODGE for corsultations. MCCONE stated his views in detail. :
[5324]in sessance, he held: (1) DON might be managed by NHU; (2) CIA has not control. and
[5325]™herefore could assume little responsibility; (3) DON could have a coup in the making
[5326]fand could pull it off; (4) we are handling a delicate situation in a non-professional
[5327]‘nanner; (5) successful coup would lead to confusion because generals would provide weak
[5328]rship; (6) one coup would be followed by another and the war-might be lost during
[5329]p OU Say Peet a Ont as Lurrs “Vv si wating Seuph-yiekn
[5330]be injected™Imto the government and exercise e Anes”
[5331]important political issues with DIEM because of the policy of "cool] correct attitude; (9) ;
[5332]we elthgy shave to work with DIEM and NHU or we have to take aggres BATEEPS to remove them ©
[5333]and it“Isnot clear that the succeeding government would be much ba =
[5335]IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 36
[5339]Feeepro
[5342]a)
[5344]Vet 27 Oe Vo
[5350]CATEGORIES:
[5351]MCCONE NHU _
[5353]KENNEDY, JOHN FP. ; Oet.25, 1963 DIEM
[5355]LODGE
[5357]DIEM
[5359]OCCURRENCE: a a y cd —
[5360]tober 25, 1963 Presidential meeting on Vietnam, with the only participan
[5362]orn being recon MCCONE's notes. show that the President stated that the purpose f
[5363]of the meeting was to consider: (1) recent actions in South Vietnam with respect x
[5364]coup planning and qualifications of the individuals reporting, and (2) our policy
[5365]Sout Vietnam es he wished to be assured there was unanimity within the governmen
[5366]prior to the return of LODGE for consultations. MCCONE stated his views in cotati.
[5367]Tn sessance, he held: (1) DON might be managed by NHU; (2) CIA has not control an
[5368]therefore could assume little responsibility; (3) DON could have a coup in " malig
[5369]and could pull it off; (4) we are handling a delicate situation in a non-pro essiona ak
[5370]manner; (5) successful coup would lead to confusion because generals would pret “ we
[5371]leadership; (6) one coup would be followed by another and the war:might be tos pring
[5372]pertodagtyponitical confusion; (7) civilians ca nine oy Haeinen-cond-not——
[5373]be injected into the government and exercise effective control;
[5375]garnet’ discuss (9)
[5376]; i it ‘ licy of "cool| correct attitude; (9
[5378]inportant political issues with DIEM because of the po : )
[5380]we eltingy nave to work with DIEM and NHU or we have to take aggresive ,Skeps to. remove them
[5382]Gé60s AW
[5385]“DON, GENERAL -
[5387]SLODGE,° AMBASSADOR
[5389]eCONEIN Oct. 28, 1963 prem’
[5392]3
[5394]i OCCURRENCE:
[5396]athe October 28, 1963 entry in the Saigon stations "History of the Vietnamese Generals
[5397]SCoup" notes that: General DON asked LODGE if CONEIN was. speaking, for bher Ambassador.
[5399]DGE replied in the affirmative. ' DON told the Ambas dof "thatf the “U:S. government
[5400]gshould not interfer with or try to stimulate a cov 4 The: assador agreed with DON.
[5401]rs oboe oi re
[5403]ay
[5404]7
[5405]a
[5406]SOURCE: STAPF:
[5407]oo, DAWSON
[5408]IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 36-37 DATE:
[5409]FILE: 6/27/75
[5410]PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES:
[5411]DON, GENERAL 28 October 1963] DIEM t-——~
[5412]LODGE, HENRY CABO?
[5415]OCCURRENCE: CONEIN said "in the latter part of October, he was informed by DON to convey
[5417]_ to LODGE that they were ready to have a coup arid that CONEIN was to stay home and await fur-
[5418]ther orders, and that the coup would be accomplished before November 2, 1963. LODGE ,. who
[5419]was preparing to retum home on the 31st of October, was requested through CONEIN by DON
[5421]that LODGE not change his plans as it. might be a signal to DIEM and NHU that something was
[5422]going on. p. 48,
[5424]SOURCE:
[5426]. STAFF:
[5427]5 | = R. DAWSON
[5428]Hearings, SSCI, Jume 20, 1975, Conein
[5430]PILE: DATE +
[5433]STILWELL, GENERAL RICHARD
[5434]SCONEIN
[5436]GENERAL DON .
[5437]SLODGE, HENRY: CABOT
[5439]DATES? ; CATEGORIES :
[5441]Latter part of DIEM
[5442]Qctober 1963
[5444]‘pro
[5446]SCCURRENCE: In the latter part of October, CONEIN stated, the people in Washington figured
[5447]chat CONEIN was being set up as "patsy" and that this would be highly embarrassing for the
[5448]#U.S. government in case he was found out to have been set up. Therefore, the people in Wash-
[5449]gington made made recommendations that somebody more senior to him and with extensive militar.
[5450]backeround should take over from him. When Washington. then sent a message to Ambassador
[5451]BLODGE and reconmended that a capable officer and a personal friend of CONEIN'’s, GENERAL
[5452]SSTILWELL take over, GENERAL DON and the coup members said, no, we trust CONEIN, we don't wan!
[5453]penybody else. pp. 31=32
[5455]SOURCE: STAFF:
[5456]Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein R. DAWSON
[5457]DATE:
[5458]FILE: July 1, 1975
[5459]PERSONS/ENTINTIES : DATES: CATEGORIES:
[5460]DON, GENERAL
[5461]“pDUk, AMPASSATOR
[5462]SONEIN Get. 28, 1963 : DIEM
[5463]OCCURRENCE: ° a a
[5465]he October 28, 1963 entry in the Saigon stations "History of the Vietnamese Generals
[5466]coup! " notes that: General DON asked LODGE if CONEIN was speaking for the Ambassador.
[5467]ADGE replied in the affirmative. DON told the Anbassador ‘that! the uls: government
[5468]should not interfer with or try to stimulate a coup (ihe, Ambassador P agreed with DON.
[5470]i ‘ J ’
[5472]SOURCE: ~~ | STAPF: ~
[5473]IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 36-37 name PAWSON
[5476]one tne VAwRD t CATEGORIES:
[5477]ADN, GENERAL
[5479]GONEIN Oct 28, 1963 DIEM
[5481]MPCCE, HENRY CABOT — ;
[5483]a ey i ee
[5485]2 OCCURRENCE?
[5487]j
[5489]a _ Se oes a .
[5490]$h an October 28, 1963 entry in the Saigon station "History of the Vietnames Generals
[5492]@oup" it is noted that: CONEIN met with Genral DON for the last time before the
[5494]@pup was launched. DON confirmed he had talked with
[5495]fr CONBIN. DON stated that he was leaving on 29 Oct
[5496]pans. DON requested CONEIN to remain at home until
[5497]notice. DON repeated that the Ambassador would have
[5498]Uegan, ,but when pressed on his previous commitment ‘to
[5499]advance, DON said that possiblythe hours. would onl
[5500]advarice. DON said that nothing would be happening, wi
[5501]if there was a good reason for the arbassador to chan
[5502]the Ambassador would be informed in time to make his
[5504]the Ambassador who had vouched
[5506]ober to coordinate final
[5508]30 October -- until further
[5510]the plans before the coup
[5512]make them available, 48 hours
[5514]y be made available 4 hours tn
[5516]thin the next 48 hours ‘and that,
[5518]ge his planned 31 October departure,
[5519]own decision.
[5521]SOURCE: STAFFS
[5522]IG Report 1967 (CTA) P. 37 DAWSON
[5523]PILE: DATE:
[5527]Proed Geeos BH
[5529]ETT shea GagEee Pee.
[5531]"PERSONS /ENTITIES: _ DATES j CATEGORIES:
[5533]CONTIN GEN. DO CAO TRI : a
[5535]GEN, NGUYEN KHANH Oct. 28 5 163 ; ‘ rom, PREREE
[5537]GEN, DOW . “ ie: : i TARE ye, 1
[5538]AMBAS. LODGE a ty bm B a
[5540]L a A nell
[5542]OCCURRLwws.
[5544]petite it
[5546]CON'T ON NEX'
[5547]CARD
[5550]acer
[5552]SOURCE:
[5554]FILE:
[5559]i
[5561]CON'T FROM LAST
[5562]CARD
[5564]SOURCE? p. $, Cont,
[5566]aoa an nae a
[5568]“So60S AH
[5574]oR CONS /ENTITIES.
[5576]OCCURRENCE :
[5578]fee teen ae
[5580]CONT. FROM LAST
[5581]CARD
[5583]pe erent ee AE AT OR
[5585]CATEGORIES:
[5587]STAFF:
[5589]DATE:
[5591]ce en ee ee te ee Se ee
[5593]C605 BH
[5596]Fink . i “
[5597]Rhine, CAPT Conein 11/2/63
[5600]ra . a
[5601]aha, eo Dinh
[5602]bam, Coed
[5604]id
[5607]Fam was returning with Diew and Nhu and an aide of Diow to the headaunarters
[5608]In an armored personnel carrier when tlinh in a separate column in radio com-
[5609]munications with Lam's celunn found out that Diem and “Nhu had been taken.
[5610]onein states that Hlinh with his aide, crossed the column, halted it and
[5611]ghungs stepped into the armored car and upon orders From Minh Uhens Lilled
[5612]Bhem. The bodies were then taken directly to the General Staff Meadeuarters
[5613]and later on-in the afternoon they were later removed From the Ceneral Staff
[5614]Neadanarters toe Clinique St. Paul.
[5616]SOURCE? Hearines, SSC Conein, June 20, 1975 STAFF: Hawson
[5617]DATE? TIL/ 7S
[5618]FILE:
[5619]PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES:
[5620]LODGE, HENRY CABOT
[5621]1 November 1963} DIEM
[5623]OONEIN
[5625]OCCURRENCE? Oy or about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon on November 1, 1963, there were
[5627]communications: between LODGE and DIEM. CONEIN was in both radio and telephonic contact
[5628]with the Embassy, keeping them posted of the units, the personalities and what was trans-
[5629]piring. CONSIN was to convey, one of the first messages from the generals that the genera
[5630]did not want any U.S. military officer or advisor with any of the attacking units. They d
[5631]not. want any American participation within the coup. p. 50
[5636]GG60S5 BH
[5638]. 2400 hours
[5639]RAN THIEN KHIEM Nov. 1, '64 DIEM a
[5640]TNH
[5641]RAN VAN DON
[5642]a)
[5644]i wewJHHENCH
[5646]i yee RABNOE t
[5648]Ga
[5650]n
[5652]ran
[5654]on
[5662]in
[5670]“SOURCE Ce pe pee STARS
[5671]===" Hearings, S.S.C.1., 6/20/75, Conein, CoE? dawson
[5673]Exhibit One, page 21. DATE:
[5675]FILE: 6/30/75
[5676]PERSONS/ENIT'PLES: DANES: CATEGORIES:
[5678]Diem UL
[5680]Nov. 1, ‘6
[5681]2400 hours
[5683]| ns oc aenenree
[5685]BENCH
[5687]TAD Pe. . Ss" APR:
[5689]pOUNE: Hearings, $.S.C.1., 6/20/75, Conein, STARS Dawson
[5690]Exhibit One, page 21.
[5692]gave: 6/30/75
[5694]PEN OVEO/ BN iT Lists DALES ¢ CATEGORIES
[5696]11/4/63
[5697]2140 hours —_
[5699]NHU
[5703]5
[5705]oe
[5707]LIT aheg CI9EePee PLOOO GoeO0s BH
[5709]SOURCE: — ; a STAPF:
[5711]— Hearings, S.S.C.1., 6/20/75, Conein, ~ Dawson
[5712]Exhibit One, page 19.
[5714]BILE: : DATE:
[5716]_ eee Se LTE
[5718]PERSON IS/ENT ITT : DAYES:
[5720]11/1/63
[5721]2400 hours
[5725]2
[5728]ha oh tha 7
[5729]bey
[5731]~ Hearings, $.S.C.1., 6/20/75, Conein, Dawson
[5733]et Exhibit One, page 21,
[5734]SLL:
[5736]TAM
[5738]MINH 11/1/63
[5739]AMBASSADOR LODGE
[5740]1925 hours
[5742]SOCUNRENCEE
[5744]~ SOURCE: j
[5745]~~" Hearings, 5.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit. One,
[5746]page 16. - DATE: boy bre,
[5748]LO pre
[5750]ST BARGES
[5752]CATEGORIES:
[5754]PERSONS/ENTITIES: . DATES:
[5756]11/1/63
[5757]2140 hours
[5759]i
[5760]|
[5761]i
[5763]pom
[5764]co
[5766]WEST RRENTE:
[5768]at
[5769]pa)
[5772]Hearings, S.S.C.1., 6/20/75, Conein, Dawson
[5773]Exhibit One, Page 19.
[5775]Bocld:324233615 Page 116
[5777]AW 50955
[5779]uosMeg
[5781]ae a PHONAUNADIO
[5782]QEN
[5783](/ SOSH
[5784]: aT Te
[5786]UOSMBQ Loo fauo qtatyuxy ‘uteucd *¢1/02/9 SepTiacata SsSutreay ce
[5787]_ VES | ee . cee ene DUNO
[5789]Page 119
[5791]324235615
[5795]T/TT OHL DOON NEXADN JuepTsezg 9oT
[5796]PSH LOA AV . : 7
[5798]POMEL TL,
[5800]Aj
[5801]HW 50955 DoclIa
[5805]DUONG VAN MINH . 1545 hoursy
[5806]TRAN VAN MINH . *
[5807]TRAN THIEN KHIEL be
[5809]he
[5811]ven id
[5813]Nae
[5815]DEC
[5817], 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit 1
[5819], Hearings, S.S.C.I.
[5820]PILE: page 16.
[5822]CATEGORIES:
[5826]GEN. NGUYEN KHANH L
[5828]5h a, aaqegarh & as
[5829]wea albiyimed S)s
[5831]Doe — STAFF: .
[5832]SOURCE: Hearings, $.S.C.1., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one pani Dawson
[5834]- page 16.
[5835]. pane: 6/30/75
[5837]32423615 Page 120
[5839]HW 50955 Docld
[5841]Nov. 1, '63
[5843]Lite Yothey dane ded tn ¢ WALES & CAPEUGORTES
[5845]13230 hours DIEM“
[5849]page 1h.
[5851]PILE:
[5855]fearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one,
[5857]DATE:
[5859]PERSONS/E
[5861]“STARE TG
[5863]Dawson
[5865]P/s0MS
[5867]COL. Le QUANG TUNG 11/1/63
[5869]~ SOURCE? Hee
[5871]PILE:
[5873]1400 hours DIEM j
[5875]tay Le a ee ee ne
[5876]ng <3 pet Lant3 etugnd GOO ETO Games
[5877]. 4 >
[5879]ao egpes ovine Savoie fhe stleces.,
[5881]Hearings, S.8.C.1., 6/20/75, Conein, Exnibit one, | SL ABIES”
[5882]pase rh,
[5884]DATE:
[5886]DATES + CATEGORIES:
[5888]Diem
[5890]6/30/75
[5892]AW 50955 Docld:32423615 Page 121
[5894]LOU AS 7 NEL. Lab t DATES : j CATEGORIES:
[5896]eee ao vu j e,
[5898]COLBY Noverber 1, 1968 DIEM
[5900]LODGE, H.C « :
[5901]“OCSTREENCE. When DIEM CALI LODGE CUYSCtly preceding cedt B Is Ceatin, COLBY states “tnat tne
[5902]Sees nee he saw of the summary of the conversation was that DIEM, "....said that he was
[5904]i i La ille ir: loyalty to the constitution, th
[5905]ing to require his officers to have filled their:oaths of t : ,
[5906]Vietnamese constitution, in his office as president. He was very stiff about his position
[5907]President." p. 67
[5909]— AR
[5910]SOURCE: STAPF:
[5912]i :
[5913]Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby | | pare: ‘1 July 1975
[5915]R. DAWSON
[5917]Se ee my a Sy Se ee A He en‘ ee
[5920]a EN EEE
[5922]DATES: CATEGORIES:
[5924]DON, GENERAL 1 Nov 1963 DIEM
[5926]STATION (sateen)
[5927]JGS headquarters
[5929]OCCURRENCE? On November 1, 1963,:."CONEIN went to JGS headquarters and remained at the
[5930]conmand post throughout the Struggle. Before leaving his home, CONEIN alerted the STATION
[5931]by radio. Upon arriving at JGS headquarters, CONEIN was. told by GENERAL DON that’ DON had
[5932]tried unsuccessfully to reach CONEIN earlier by telephone. A later check revealed that
[5933]CONBIN's: telephone was out of order. CONEIN was told that he was to keep a telephone line
[5934]open to the Ambassador. Because there was a CIA officer on the scene and in intimate con-
[5936]tact with the coup principals ,the STATION was able to report almost minute-—by-minute progres:
[5938]of the coup."
[5940]SOURCE:
[5941]CIA IG Report, 1967, pp. 41-42
[5943]PILE:
[5945]R. DAWSON
[5946]DATE: 29 June 1975
[5948]HW 50955 Docld:32423615 Baye 122
[5952]DATES: CATEGORIES:
[5954]CONEIN
[5955]COLBY, WILLIAM 1 November
[5956]DIEM 1963
[5958]MIHN, GENERAL
[5962]that the NHU brothers, DIEM and NHU, had committed suicide, CONEIN thought it incredible
[5964]on its face. This was because both brothers were very strong Catholics and CONEIN doubted.
[5965]that they would have done such a thing. According to COLBY, CONEIN was offered a chance
[5967]to look at the bodies but tured it down. In trying to reconstruct the period of the assass-
[5968]ination on November 1, COLBY reports that there was a telephone conversation between Presi-
[5969]dent DIEM and the generals. In fact there were several of them. President DIEM was very
[5970]strongly rejecting the generals, calling them to discipline, and so forth, in the early
[5971]stages. At a later stage, in the early morning of November 1, he called and indicated that
[5972]he would surrender if he would be properly handled. The generals then sent somebody down to
[5973]veceive that surrender and found that President DIEM was not there. He'd actually gotten
[5974]out through the back door of the palace and had gone down to another section of the city.
[5975]SOURCE: KIN was not in attendance. STAPF:
[5977]R. DAWSON
[5978]Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby, pp. 17-19.
[5979]FILE:
[5981]DATE: 29 June 1975
[5983]_ PERSONS/ENTITIES: . DATES:
[5984]CONEIN
[5985]CRITIC 1 Nov 1963
[5986]JGS headquarters
[5987]STATION
[5989]OCCURRENCE: the IG Report makes the following statement: "The fact that CONEIN was at
[5990]JGS headquarters is well known in official cireles", and bolsters that notoriety by the
[5991]following statement: “The first cable (on the coup) was: received at headquarters at 0117
[5992]hours, .(November 1, 1963,) Washington time, and was filed on the CRITIC network at 0159.
[5994]At 0256 hours, following receipt of the sixth non-CRITIC cable, headquarters instructed the
[5995]STATION to put the coup reporting on the CRITIC network at the STATION. Sometime during the
[5996]day of 1 November (the confirmation copy of the cable lacks a date/time stamp) headquarters
[5997]cabled a warning to the STATION against including the names of CIA personnel in ‘its CRITIC
[5998]cables. CONEIN is identified by and as being at JGS headquarters in eleven CRITIC messages,
[5999]seven of which were put into the CRITIC channel, without the name being deleted, here at
[6000]headquarters ."
[6002]SOURCE:
[6003]CIA IG Report, 1967, p. 42
[6005]STAFF:
[6007]R. DAWSON
[6008]DATE:
[6009]FILE:
[6011]29 June 1975
[6013]Docld:32423615 Page 123
[6015]BW 50955
[6017]VALS t CATEGORIES:
[6018]CONEIN 1 November 1963 DIEM «
[6022]==" When the generals took ie i :
[6023]let grily the embassy Lee tnt over the PIT which controlled the communications, they
[6025]; The telephone terminals had bee tak
[6026]coup and instead of lea “IN! i - ad been disconcen
[6027]Pe ving CONEIN's telephone into his home open, it had been disconnected
[6029]SOURCE:
[6031]Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein
[6033]PILS: R. DAWSON
[6035]July 1, 1975
[6039]i
[6040]_t J
[6041]COLBY, WILLIAM J November 1963 | DIEM
[6042]Nhu }
[6044]OCCURRENCE: conpy stated that "The CIA had nothing to do with the assassination of Pres-
[6045]ident. DIEM and Mr. NHU. The actual assassination was a shock and surprise to everyone in
[6046]ine United States government and when it was announced it was a matter of grave concern.
[6048]in retrospect, one must realize that there was, however, considerable debate about encoura;
[6049]ing and supporting the generals in an overthrow of the DIEM regime, and that the record is
[6050]very clear that the United States through itsoverall policy was in support of that overthr:
[6051]and, of course, I think it is fair to say that im launching a violent overthrow of a re-
[6052]@ime involved such as this, people are going to get hurt, and in this case, the leaders we:
[6053]killed in the process." pp. 19-20
[6056]a
[6057]a
[6058]oh
[6060]SOURCE:
[6062]R. DAWSON
[6063]Hearines, SSCI, Jume 20, 1975, Colby, po. 19-20
[6065]wo nm
[6067]TY AINE « SY Teas IAT
[6069]HW 50955 Docld:32423615 Page 124
[6071]PERSOUS/ENPTLTES + DATES: CATEGORIES :
[6073]GENERAL DINH DIEM
[6074]el. AUG. thru
[6075]16 SEPT. 163
[6077]a as Sa
[6079]OCCURRENCE:
[6081]SOURCE: | STAFF? Dawson
[6083]Hearings, $.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one,
[6084]age 12. TE:
[6085]vine: Pa? DATE? 6/30/75
[6087]nee ee ene cent eee a me ee een me ee er ene ee de nee ne Sneed eee in eee me Se ge eg ened ~
[6089]CATEGORIES:
[6091]DATES:
[6094]1 November 1943 DIEM
[6096]CONEIN
[6098]OCCURRENCE: CONEIN stated that on several occasions, he warned the embassy that certain .
[6100]shellings were going to take place, or bombings by aircraft were going to take place at a
[6101]certain time in order to alert American personnel who might. be living around the area to
[6102]wateh out or stay under cover, because theyxwotld find 105's in the center of the city.
[6104]There were no American casualities during this coup. ‘The Vietnamese suffered about. 100
[6105]dead. p. 51-52 7
[6107]SOURCE: R. DAWSON
[6109]Bocld:324233615 Page 1235
[6111]AW 50955
[6113]Presi / aye La LES ¢
[6115]OCCURRENCE:
[6117]SOURCE: sine
[6119]Se bestia, $.8.C.1.,; 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, ————" Dawson
[6120]age ,
[6121]cere, . DATE:
[6124]PERSONS/ENTITIES : DATES: CATEGORIES :
[6125]GEN. DINH 31 August. "63 DIEM e———~
[6128]COUNSELLER NHU
[6130]OCCURRENCE:
[6132]Dinh, on approximately 31 August, had the audaeity to inform both President
[6133]Diem and Counseller Nhu that he was their savior and requested a ministerial
[6134]post for himself.
[6136]7 SOURCE: Hearings, $.8.C, I., 6/20/75, © Conein, Exhibit one, STARE? pawson
[6138]pages le-13.
[6139]FILE: : DATR : 6/30/75
[6141]Docld:32423615 Page 126
[6143]HW 50955
[6145]DIEM
[6146]GEN. MINH
[6148]OCCUR TEN
[6150]CON'T, ON
[6151]NEXT CARD
[6156]SOURCE? son
[6158]Hearings, S.8.C.1., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one,
[6159]pages 11-12,
[6161]PILE: DATE: 6/30/75
[6165]PERSONS/ENTIVIFS: | DATES: CATEGORIES:
[6168]f
[6170]ger t
[6172]NMC
[6174]on ty.
[6176]v
[6179]7
[6180]a
[6182]At
[6184]Coa
[6185]Occ
[6187]SOURCE:
[6189]P, 12, LAST CARD CONTINUED
[6191]FILE:
[6193]32423615 Page 127
[6195]Bocld
[6197]AW 50955
[6201]COL. KHANGY
[6203]CATEGORIES:
[6205]CON'T ON
[6206]NEXT CARD
[6208]“rr Dock
[6210]SOURCE:
[6211]“~~ Hearings, SiS.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one,
[6212]page 12.
[6214]PILE: . = 6/30/75
[6216]Epa RANE
[6218]. PERSONS/ENTITIES : DATES : CATEGORTES:
[6220]me Loko ed
[6221]Avon te
[6223]GS
[6227]Page 12, con't,
[6229]32473615 Page 126
[6231]HW 50955 Docld
[6235]PERSONS ENTLY LES 3
[6237]DISH © .
[6238]MINE
[6239]DON
[6243]ha
[6245]| ; “SPAKE: Dawson
[6246]Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, —
[6248]page 13. DAVE: 6/30/75
[6250]32433615 Page 129
[6252]Docld
[6254]AW 50955
[6256]PURQUMD SEAN ULL bio j deren) t CALE Ios
[6258]OCCURRENCE
[6260]SOURCE? Hearings, $.S.C.1., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, STAPF! pawson
[6261]pages 13-14,
[6263]—— - spac, 6/30/75
[6265]I PLS: DATE:
[6267]DAES CATEGORIES:
[6268]NGO DINH NaU 11/1/63 DIEMU-—
[6269]GEN. DON
[6270]GEN, DINH
[6272]SOURCE? ten ; ~ PT SPARE T
[6273]oe Hearings, 8.8.C.1., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, | ~~" Dawson
[6275]page 13.
[6276]PTLE: ; . nape: 6/30/75
[6278]32423615 Page 130
[6280]HW 50955 DocId
[6282]CEN. DON a
[6283]CONETN : Nov. 1, '63
[6284]AMBASSADOR LODGE
[6286]2CCURR ENCE:
[6290]rite da
[6292]“CONTINUED ON NEXT CARD
[6294]SOURCE: ; ~ oO SARE
[6295]a Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, ———— Dawson
[6296]PAA A, DATE:
[6297]ce ~ , 6/30/7
[6298]1 pe RSONS/¥ INTITI Tis: : ‘DATES: : CATE CORTES :
[6300]“ONT FROM LAST CARD
[6302]scare —_—— : START
[6304]32423615 Page 131
[6306]HW 50955 DociId
[6308]‘praogd Gcceoc AH
[6312]ee |
[6314]HOHDOS |
[6316]Caio ob
[6320]Sree reece
[6322]WT HOME ROLLVONEINOD
[6323]a SHON
[6325]ALIN GO
[6327]A RRC AR RRNA Bt Rij NE SINT er cme ne Rte a in
[6331]uos.and
[6337]“CT ased
[6338]“T' OS's ‘ssupreey
[6340]Padi
[6342]rAd VALS |
[6344]SUTHOOULLYO. Sanya
[6346]NWAH *TO9
[6348]NOG ayaa
[6350]AHN HNIC Con
[6354]HOSA “
[6357]‘pIoOod Soé6oc AW
[6359]EET abea GTI9CePeE
[6361]SO me wee mpm me om meme eam fom ee mm: mete A te snc ec we mt, he, th eS a me te se a ee ee eee ten Se ie as dey nish Mn wh we ee
[6364]LOS MEL] AQTOD “GLGT ‘oz oung *yOSy “sSutrzroy
[6367]‘US-Gh Souvg 7 ALTUNOD OY VuTaveT uy sourgstsse qnoqr Suryqgowos uotquow
[6368]pEp S¥poy Lopessvywy ‘onotpoy y ‘fosuodsox ayy ‘dnoed OY FO uoousgzyv
[6370]a OZ UE SUM STU, "UOTZVNZTS STY2 JNoGe BuryzZoUes pooysropun om BSN DA],
[6371]auvu Aq (AYTO)) ou pur ofepsuvy pPeLoudy apNsues *g “yy OY JeYA pawn oj]
[6373]“uMOp StUZ Jnd O02 [eTIuosss ZL poaortpoq oy avy? puv fsptearouoy sty Aq uty
[6374]FSULETL apvu Juroq sea Jaojyo uves+,, *opqnerg SULATAL SEA OY ZuUYy pres word
[6375]"dnOD OZ JO UOOULOTJL OY. UO DSpoy o2 wWoTy WOLY Ope PTV. Lv syuNoDdoa YOTUA
[6376]UUIS9]O} B Sum orouz AdoDd oy} OARY ZOU pTp ey YsnouqpL aya powers Aqpe9
[6378]i SONS NOOO
[6379]AQTOD
[6381]| go/T/il
[6382]UOLOULOZYY eTepsury
[6384]Meee
[6386]*SATYOOaELVO >SaLVG OMT TINTON OOM T
[6389]HARKINS, LODGE, BUNDY, DON,
[6391]DATES
[6393]CATEGORIES:
[6395]30 Oct. 1963 |
[6397]OCCURRENCE? On 30 October 1963, LODGE replied to BUNDY's cable (DIR 79109) of the
[6398]same date by CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG 2063): "........do not think we have the
[6399]power to delay or discourage a coup. DON has. made it clear many times that this is
[6400]a Vietnamese affair...... I believe we should continue our present position of keeping
[6401]hands off but continue to monitor and press for more detailed information. CAS has
[6402]been anaylzing forces for some time and it is thelr estimate that the generals have
[6403]probably figured their chances pretty closely....... It. does not: seem sensible to have
[6404]the military in charge of matter which is so profoundly political as a change of govern-
[6405]ment....As to requests from the generals, they may well have need of funds at the last
[6406]moment with which to buy off potential opposition. To the extent that these funds can be
[6407]passed discreetly, I believe we should furnish them....If we were convinced that the coup
[6408]was going to fail, we would of course do everything we could to stop it. HARKINS has read
[6409]~ SOURCE: UhIS and does not caric START:
[6411]R. Dawson
[6412]CIA IG Report 1967, p. 39 DATE: ;
[6413]ILE: ——" 29 June 1975
[6416]FELT, ADMIRAL CINCPAC Commander <ASECORTES:
[6420]OCCURRENCE:
[6421]—————= CONEIN stated that on or about October 31, 1963, FELT came to Vi ;
[6422]landed and had an interview with DIEM in the morning. p. 438 etnam anc
[6424]SOURCE:
[6426]Héardngs,“SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein STAFF:
[6428]FILE: DATE:
[6430]Taster 7 pee teiod
[6432]Doclda:32423615 Page 134
[6434]BW 50955
[6437]LODGE
[6438]BUNDY
[6440]DATES: CATEGORIES:
[6444]30 Oct 1963
[6446]OCCURRENCE? On October 30, 1963 in a CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG 2094) the following
[6447]cable from LODGE (in its entirety) occurred: "Thanks for your sagacious instruction. Will
[6448]earry out to best of my ability."
[6451]a STAPF? R. DAWSON
[6452]CIA IG Report, 1967, p. 40
[6454]FILE: DATE: 29 June 1975
[6456]en at or om a na et ae ce A ae i i ey seers ee ae Sens ioe, ae es cep mee sey eek yh en nd ae, he ea OU ae me ee
[6458]PERSONS /ENTITIES: DATES;
[6459]TODGE
[6461]30 Oct 1963
[6463]quotation appeared: "....We do not accept as a basis for U.S. policy that we have no power
[6464]to delay or discourage. coup. ..We cannot limit ourselves to proposition implied in your
[6465]message that only conviction of certain failure justifies intervention....U.S. authorities
[6466]will reject appeals for direct intervention from either side.... " ( the IG Report here
[6467]states without further showing the author of the above message that "the White House re-
[6468]peats its instructions on command of the country team after LODGE leaves." The inference
[6469]ean probably be drawn that the message although looked upon as a CIA cable to Saigon, it
[6470]was. undoubtedly emanating from the White House.)
[6472]TAFF
[6474]R. DAWSON
[6476]CIA IG Report, 1967 p. 39
[6478]FILE: ° DATE: 29 June 1975
[6480]ae eee me nme AP em Se me Se ne hc ee hae a me ty SU ky MR ce a RS a A em ee A Se Se eT ERE RS SS fe SH ec sn a
[6482]HW 50955 Docld:32423615 Page 135
[6484]PERSOUS/ENTEITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES:
[6486]SMTDH, DAVID MCCONE
[6488]HARKINS, GENERAL HELMS > Oct.
[6489]TRURIARD, WILLIAM COLBY
[6491]KENNEDY, ROBERE
[6493]KENNEDY, JOHN FP.
[6496]In a Presidential meeting on Vietnam on October 29, 1963 with MCCONE, HELMS, AND COLBY.
[6497]tn attendance. ‘The following record by HELMS and COLBY shows that: it was supfested
[6498]that in the Ambassador's absence, HARKINS, 'TRUEHART, and DAVID SMITH act as a
[6499]committee to direct a coup operation. MCCONE. countered with the view that 8MITH should
[6500]not be tnvolved in such a policy making. function, although he would be in a position to
[6502]provide technical advise to HARKINS and TRUEHART as well as carry out their instructions
[6504]in the operations field. ‘The President stated that if the forces In Saigon were not
[6505]elearly in favor of the coup we should discourage its launching. The Attorney General
[6506]felt the U.S. was risking too much based on flimsy ev idence. The DCI stated his view
[6507]that even a successful coup would ereate a period of interregmum, confusion which might
[6508]only be solved by a second or third coup.
[6510]SOURCE:
[6511]IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 38
[6513]STAFF:
[6515]DATE: Pawson
[6517]FILE: om 6427/15
[6519]PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES:
[6521]HARKINS , DON ve peg ES
[6522]MINH KENNEDY, JOHN F. yes, 7 DIEM
[6524]LODGE Oct 30, 1963-J4 * te
[6525]BUNDY a oe
[6527]OCCURRENCE:
[6529]In a CIA cable to Saigon (DIR79109) of OCT 30, 1963, BUNDY wrote to LODGE saying that
[6530].chariées of action with or without our approval now so sighificant that we should
[6531]coeent ly consider our attitude and contingency plans. We believe our attitude to
[6532]eoup group can still have decisive effect. on itsdecision. ... We must have assurance
[6533]balance of forees clearly favorable...CONEIN should express to DON that we do not find
[6534]presently reveal plans. to give clear prospect of quick results...we badly need some
[6535]corroborative evidence ef men or others directly involved.. “highest authority desires
[6536]it clearly understood that after your departure HARKINS should participate in alt coup
[6537]contacts supervision and the event coup begins he become head of country team.
[6539]SRK | STAFF?
[6540]IG Report. 1957 (CIA) p. 39 Dawson
[6542]HW 50955 Docld:32423615 Page 136
[6544]Lee 6 DALES:
[6546]LODGE, AMBASSADOR CATEGORIES:
[6548]DIEM
[6549]NHU . Oct. 29, 1963
[6551]OCCURNENTE: 3
[6552]de! ‘ To i
[6554]In a CIA cable from Saigon (SAT 7 peg ,
[6555]+ & G2040) of 29 0 if A oead myit bee y
[6556]TIA 7 pf etober, sent’ thr : +t
[6557]hat 2 coub attenpt by ty on the seemingly inminent coup: "In cusmeny we. ald peo
[6558]che USG can prevent y the ganerals group is imminent...and that no posit’ would appear
[6559]re a coup attempt short of informing DIEM and NHU eer Hveaction by
[6560]a owe novugn ere
[6562]wave no requests to date by the
[6563]; : he generals for materi
[6564]mticipate that such requests may be fortheoning Or Simancial support, we mist
[6566]mit ;
[6568]SOURCE:
[6570]IG Report. 1967 (CIA) p. 38 STAFF:
[6572]PILE: Dawson
[6573]DATE:
[6575]6/27/75
[6577]PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES:
[6578]LODGE, AMBASSADOR
[6579]DIEM . 29, 1963 DIEM
[6580]NHU
[6582]OCCURRENCE onze er
[6583]; A ig ol ey pa .
[6584]In a CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG2040) of 29 October, sent™through eyes only” channels of:
[6586]CIA, LODGE gives his view on the seemingly inminent coup: ‘Tn summary, it would appear
[6587]that a coup attempt by the ganerals group is imminent...and that no positiveaction by
[6588]the USG can prevent a.coup attempt short of. informing DIEM and NHU.. .Althoughthere
[6590]have no requests to date by the generals for materials or finaneial support, we must
[6592]anticipate that such requests may be forthcoming..."
[6594]SOURCE:
[6596]IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 38
[6597]Dawson
[6599]PTI:
[6601]HW 50955 Docld:32423615 Page 137
[6603]10/28/63
[6605]PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: | CATEGORIES:
[6607]GEN. DON ;
[6608]AMBASSADOR LODGE
[6610]CONEIN
[6612]OCCURRENCE:
[6614]STAFF:
[6615]Dawson
[6617]TE:
[6620]him i yt Ne ie A
[6622]SOURCE:
[6624]Hearings, 8.8.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit One,
[6625]ie tn oH on po ee
[6627]FILE:
[6629]CATEGORIES:
[6632]SMITH, DAVID MCCONE
[6633]HARKINS, GENERAL HELMS
[6634]TRUEHARD, WILLIAM COLBY
[6635]KENNEDY, ROBERT
[6636]KENNEDY, JOHN F.
[6638]OCCURRENCE:
[6639]In a Presidential meeting on Vietnam on October 29, 1963 with MCCONE, HELMS, AND COLBY
[6640]in attendance. “The following record by HELMS and COLBY shows that: it was suggested
[6641]that in the Ambassador's absence, HARKINS, TRUEHART, and DAVID SMITH act as a
[6642]committee to direct a coup operation. MCCONE countered with the view that SMITH should
[6643]not be involved in such a policy making function, although he would be in a position to
[6644]provide technical advise to HARKINS. and TRUEHART as well as carry out their instructions
[6645]in the operations field. The President stated that if the forces in Saigon were not
[6646]clearly in favor of the coup we should discourage its launching. The Attorney General
[6647]felt the U.S. was risking too much based on flimsy ev idence. The CCI stated his view
[6648]that even a successful coup would create a period of interregnum, confusion which might
[6649]only be solved by a second or third coup.
[6651]SOURCE:
[6653]STAFF:
[6655]Bocld:324233615 Page 136
[6657]AW 50955
[6659]| PERSONS/ENTITUES DATES: CAREGORTES:
[6661]GEN. BON
[6662]GEN. DO CAO TRI
[6663]NGUYEN KHANH
[6667]GQu't.
[6668]NEAT
[6669]CARD
[6671]CONTINUATION OF LAS? CARD, p. lil.
[6673]STAFF:
[6675]SOURCE:
[6677]PILE:
[6679]32423615 Page 139
[6681]HW 50955 Docld
[6683]“PERSONS/ENTIPIES:
[6685]CONEIN GEN. DUONG VAN MINH
[6686]GEN, TRAN VAN DON
[6688]CATEGORIES:
[6690]TRAN THIEN KH ITEM
[6692]sess RAN VA u can ie
[6693]OCCURRENCE:
[6695]CONTINUED ON NES?
[6696]CARD
[6698]ee I tte perm a
[6700]SOURCE: STAFF?
[6702]_—— Hearings , * Si. I.; 6/26/75 , Conein, Exhibit one, Dawson
[6703]p AD gv on a
[6705]FILE: _ 6/30/75
[6709]pete ab” sma  2
[6710]CONT. FROM LAST
[6711]CARD
[6713]SOURCE: p
[6715]PILE:
[6717]32423615 Page 140
[6721]HW 50955 DocId
[6723]PERSONS/ENTITLES: . ‘DAPES:
[6725]11/2/63
[6726]TLCE PRESIDENT THO | 0310 hours —_—-
[6728]CATE: GORTRS
[6730]OCCURRENCE ——
[6734]Hearings, S.8.C.1., 5/20/95, Conein, oo
[6736]Dawson
[6737]Exhibit One, Page 22,
[6739]PILE: DATE? — 6/30/75
[6741]Docld:32423615 Page 141
[6743]BW 50955
[6745]pew Vins WIL Liss t
[6746]ee he
[6748]2
[6749]MINH
[6751]NHUNG
[6753]* CONEIN sta
[6754]tc MINH for the first tim.
[6755]not guarantee full honors, if and durin
[6756]another. DIEM stated that he would ord
[6758]that this took place at about 7:50, November 2, 1963.
[6760]. Stage, there were four armored cars and
[6762]ted that around 6:30 or 6-4
[6763]DIEM asked MINH for full honors and
[6765]DATES: CATEGORIES:
[6766]Novenber 1963 VTEM i acs
[6768]0 on November 2, 1963, DIEM talked
[6770]MINH replied that he could
[6771]& the tim that Vietanese were still killing one
[6773]er the cease fire at the palace and CONEIN recalls
[6774]CONEIN stated as follows: "At this
[6775]113's an escort of military police proceeded inme-
[6777]f headquarters toward GAT LONG PALACE. BIG MINH with
[6778]the general staff headquarters toward. the back of the go
[6780]TPS, went out the back road from
[6782]If course and took a different road
[6783]from the armored cars that went down Cong Le." p, 52-53
[6785]Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein
[6786]PILE:
[6788]PISRSONS/ENT IP TES :
[6790]MINH -
[6792]DATE: July 1, 1975
[6793]DALES: CATEGORIES:
[6794]11/2/63
[6795]2420 hours DIEM ~~
[6796]Odza(?)
[6798]OCCURRENCE:
[6800]pOURCE: Hearings, 5.5.C.1.,
[6802]Exhibit One, page 2
[6804]PILE 2 |
[6806]6/20/75, Conein, STAPP? Dawson
[6807]3.
[6809]| pave: 6/30/75
[6811]Doclda:32423615 Page 142
[6813]BW 50955
[6815]FEHSUNS/ENTLULES : DATES: | CATEGORIES:
[6816]er a. } a
[6818]Non, General |
[6820]Conein 11/2/63 | Dien”
[6822]OCCURRENCE:
[6824]Conein stated at the tine they were
[6825]wony on the capitulation of Dac,
[6826]im the press.) pace 74,
[6828]“going. to bring the press in For the cere-
[6829]Hon said" get the hell ont we are brineine
[6830]. coos ae
[6834]SOURCE:
[6836]. . STAFF :
[6837]rr aos SSc 7 7 y 5 ;
[6838]Nearings, SSC Conein, June 20, 1975 Dawson
[6839]PILE: | parE: P/US7S
[6840]PERSONS/ENTIVIES: DATES: CATEGORIES:
[6842]LAM, DUONG NGOC
[6844]oobectcea
[6846]oom her >, 63
[6848]NHU
[6849]XUAN
[6852]GENERAL MAI HUU
[6854]= io? Fe '
[6855]OCCURRENCE? XUAN and LAM receiving the message that DIEM and NHU had been spotted, took”
[6856]off with armored cars and went to the church. XUAN reported to the President, saluted,
[6857]and told him to get into the armored car. NHU protested and asked for a sedan, DIEM and NHI
[6858]were shoved into the car and were told by the commander of the ¢olum LAM, who was a little
[6859]fat guy who wore a mustache and used te command the civil guard and not the individual who
[6861]later became I-Corps commander, that the use of the armored car was for their physical pro-
[6864]SOURCE: STAFF? 3, DAWSON
[6865]Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein
[6867]HW 50955 Docld: 3242735615 Page 143
[6871]CATEGORIES:
[6873]Conein
[6875]Lodge, ic. 11/2/65
[6877]Nien Po a
[6880]Conch staten he kept contact with the junta "untal the day that the i. &,
[6881]officially recoanized the South Vietnamese sovernment. There were several
[6882]countries that recognized, and T was acting as ‘the liaison officer for the
[6883]anbassador to the junta durinue this period for approximately ten days or
[6884]Cwe weelks,
[6886][
[6888]SOURCE? Hearings, Sse Conein, June 20, 1875 STARR: Dawson
[6889]i
[6890]PILE: pe 1 DATE: T/AVLTS
[6891]PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: | CATEGORIES:
[6892]Tuan  Conein . T1/2/63 | Dien
[6893]Mh
[6895]OCCURRENCE:
[6897]Colby stated that another, officer who had worked with Conein was apparently
[6898]executed ahout that same time as Diem and Mhu were. Tuan had been head of
[6900]the Special Forces and had worked very closely with Diem and Nbu and Concin and
[6901]was executed by the Generals’ that morning. Page 27-28,
[6903]SOURCE: . STAFF:
[6904]Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby ; Dawson
[6905]PILES | ATE:
[6907]7/1/75
[6909]Doclda:32423615 Page 144
[6911]BW 50955
[6913]sa ace eitegee = arent pene emery rare i aoe cn nm gemrneertcemenenm nest ersnmrns gree en a eer ee
[6915]PERSONS/ENTITIES : DATES: CATEGORIES:
[6917]i .
[6918]11/2/63 Dieu
[6919]fink un
[6921]‘ra, so ana .
[6923]Trane th |
[6924]“OCCURRENCE:
[6926]Sonein explained that althoush it was baffling as to why Ddenm left the palace
[6927]te pa to the church in Cholon, and although he did not lmow exactly now they
[6928]rat out the general assumption was that there were secret tunnels.in the palace
[6929]which was the former Governer General's Palace called Gailong Palace. The
[6930]cunnel took them under amd tirouwsh the palace and the half block to Caty Hall.
[6931]Jad =
[6935]1975
[6937]Hearings, SSC Conein, June 20,
[6941]Bane, Chijor PPL naa . a
[6942]mane R ; . Ler te
[6943]Phen, Neoc Conein
[6945]Tan Min
[6947]OCCURRENCE:
[6949]Rane was in the armored column and returned about an hour after Minh had licft.
[6950]Conoin asked Bang (whom Conein had met in Hanoi in 1949 what his orders were. _.
[6951]Bane stated the orders soing through the palace was that we were not tn Eire
[6952]unless we were £ired upon and that they had not been Found at that tim
[6953]The expectation was and everybody assumed, that Minh and Yhu were at the
[6954]palace
[6956]Pawson
[6958]SRE anny , SSCA , Connin , G sof 57
[6960]32423615 Page 145
[6962]AW 50955 Docld
[6964]PERSONS/ENTITIES: CUNT ON NERY DAES:
[6967]Ey 0310 heurs
[6969]_ LIST OF OFFICERS Ustorels
[6970]PARTICIPATING IW
[6971]THE COUP: =
[6973]an
[6975]CON'T on NEXT
[6976]CARD
[6978]f wwe Ba
[6980]SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.1., 6/20/75
[6981]Exhibit One, page 22,
[6985]CATEGORIES:
[6987]DIEM +
[6989]PERSONS/ENTITIES : . DAWES:
[6991]NGUYEN CAO KY.
[6993]CATEGORTES
[6995]DIEM
[6997]Ic
[6999]OF OFFICERS PARTICIPATING IN THE COUP:
[7001]OCCURRENCE:
[7002]-_ ~~ 1 LIST
[7003]LAST CARO CONT.
[7005]oo in AT arg ct
[7006]fo Coben: e
[7008]patie Tos
[7010]SOURCE: , j
[7011]Hearings, S.S.C.1., 6/20/75, Conein,
[7013]po ae
[7015]HW 50955” DoclTd:32473615 Page 146
[7019]DIEM
[7020]ay PES
[7022]SEE
[7024]OCCURRENCE: Lisp OF OFFICERS PARPICIPAT CONTINUATION FROM
[7026]a LAST ae (Oc.
[7028]SOU REE ~ STARE:
[7030]. —
[7032]DATE:
[7034]AW 50955 Docld:32423615 Page i147
[7036]PERSONS /ENT LT Tics 2
[7038]CATEGORIES +
[7040]ore”
[7042]11/2/63
[7043]1330 hours
[7045]OCCURRENCE T
[7047]bo (Fh feo moet Ps Rye Fa OQ fbn hes 3oy rho
[7049]ee fearings, S.S,C.1,, 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit One, Dawson
[7050]Pages 2k - 25, . DATE:
[7051]PILE: “_ 6/30/75
[7052]PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES:
[7053]DIEM TTT
[7054]DON, GENERAL .
[7055]MINH, GENERAL 2 Nov 1963 DIEM *
[7056]CONEIN
[7057]JGS headquarters
[7059]OCCURRENCE? “pecording to one of CONEIN’s reports, DIEM called GENERAL DON at 0650 hours
[7060]e November and offered to surrender unconditionally. GENERAL MINH immediately ordered all
[7062]telephones removed from rooms in their JGS command post area. This cut off all communicatio
[7063]with the outside except. for radios under MINH's control.
[7065], ee R. DAWSON
[7067]Docld:32423615 Page 1436
[7069]BW 50955
[7071]PLES: ; mE TES t ; CATEGORIES:
[7073]Nov. 2, '63
[7074]1130 hours
[7076]NHO
[7080]SOURCE:
[7082]— rene | STAPF:
[7083]-=—"" Hearings, $.8.C.1., 6/20/75, Conein, —
[7085]— Dawson
[7087]Exhibit one, page 24, DATE:
[7088]PILE: | =" 6/30/75
[7092]CATEGORIES:
[7094]11/2/63 /S
[7095]1330 hours DIEM
[7097]“NCE?
[7099]OCCURR
[7101]SOURCE: STAFF:
[7103]“Hearings, $.S.C.1., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, Dawson
[7104]sete page 25. .
[7105]PYLE? PDATE:
[7107]Pope te
[7109]32423615 Page 149
[7113]Docid
[7115]HW 50955
[7118]11/2/63
[7119]AMBASSADOR LODGE 1000 hours
[7121]CATEGORIES :
[7127]===" Hearings, $.S.C.1., 6/20/75, Conein,
[7128]Exhibit One, page 24.
[7130]DATE:
[7132]Dawson
[7134]6/30/75
[7136]PERSONS/ENTIT IES :
[7138]GEN. MAT HUU XUAN 11/2/63
[7140]NHU
[7148]"=" Hearings, $.8.C.1., 6/20/75, Conein,
[7149]Exhibit one, page 24.
[7151]PILE:
[7153]DATE:
[7155]SRNR y Dawson”
[7157]6/30/75
[7159]HW 50955 Docld:32423615 Page 150
[7161]PERSONS/ENTILIES: DATES: CATEGORIES:
[7163]va 11/2/63
[7164]NHU . 1000 hours
[7166]OCCURRENCE:
[7169]SOURCE? Hearings, $.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein STAPF: Dawson
[7171]Exhibit One, page 24,
[7172]PILE: nate: 6/30/75
[7174]CATEGORIES:
[7178]NHU ; 1000 hours DIEM
[7180]OCCURRENCE:
[7183]SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.1., 6/20/75, Conein STARE? Dawson
[7185]Exhibit One, page 24,
[7186]PILE: DATE: 6/30/75
[7188]HW 30955 Docld:32423615 Page 151
[7190]PER SOUSG/ENT UP ERS ¢ Die
[7194]Vice President THO 11/2/63 aA
[7195]0420 hours DIEM
[7197]OCCURRENCE: 7 — a
[7198]Geiee IS. eaeaes EOGAVLOH E95 frie bilwisted
[7200]6/20/75, Conein, oe Dawson
[7202]Hearings, 5.5.0 2 ;
[7205]et,
[7206]Exhibit One, page
[7208]MELT EES | “St
[7209]11/2/63
[7210]1000 hours DIEM U—~
[7212]OCCURRENCES 7 eee
[7214]| acon Dawcan
[7216]Hearings, $.8.C.1., 6/20/75, Conein, | SEAR: —_
[7218]Docld:32423615 Page 152
[7220]HW 450955
[7223]DON
[7224]CONEIN 2 Nov 1963
[7226]CATEGORIES:
[7227]DIEM”
[7229]OCCURRENCE? On 2 November 1963, GENERAL DON informed CONEIN that he needed money to pay
[7230]the families of persons killed during the coup. CONEIN gave GENERAL DON an additional
[7231]1,750,000 pilasters. One bundle of 250,000 pilasters was overlooked and was found later in
[7232]CONEIN's safe, ‘(The IG<Report goes on to note as follows: "The passing of these funds is
[7233]obviously a very sensitive matter.")
[7235]SOURCE: AE:
[7237]CIA IG Report, 1967, pp. 40-41 R. DAWSON
[7238]FILE: DATE: 29 June 1975
[7240]ee i, RN CE SOUT Sra te Ses re ee iF ‘in Sl, poem ne rte eye te nee ee
[7242]Doold:32423615 Page 155
[7244]AW 50955
[7246]Page 154
[7248]324239615
[7250]HY 50955 Docld
[7252]PERSONS/ENTIVIES : . DATES: | CATEGORIES:
[7253]Pel shld wk Machetes “ene vee
[7255]KEANU i Jan. 1964 3 DIEM LY
[7257]MAJOR DANG SY
[7263]At the trial of Dang Sy by the Khanh regime th
[7264]coup leaders temporary or provisional government, Khanh's,.fii
[7265]deaths had been .caused-by American-supplied grenades a
[7266]use had been ordered by Dang Sy, and the convictiggyby}thedmilitary court was that the 8
[7267]deaths were caused by these concussion grenades “\H fins argues in her book that this
[7268]conviction is contrary to the Pentagon's assessmeng Of the MKIII grenade which found that
[7269]at worst the effects of such a grenade are non-fatal. Nor does such a grenade have suffi-
[7270]cient force to decapitate or mutilate persons, let alone bring down the ceilings, doors,
[7271]and windows that were adjacent to the veranda of the radio station. (95-96) Iiiggins also
[7272]states that: "The conviction of Major Dang Sy certainly throws no light on the matter
[7274]e8ded that of the
[7275]Oxecutor insisted that the
[7276]ype known as MKIII whose
[7278]eX
[7279]cS
[7281]one way or another. The trial was Clearly rigged from the start." (96-97)
[7282]SOURCE: [ START:
[7283]Our Viet Nam Nightmare, Higgins, Harper and Row,! Dawson, R.
[7284]1965 ; |
[7286]PILE: , — July 2, 1975
[7288]BW 50955 Docld:32493615 Page 155
[7290]J tows DANY LY iat DATES + CATEGORTES:
[7291]Thich Tri Quang Spring, 1965 Diem «_/
[7292]McNamara :
[7293]Diem
[7297]Higgins, in her book, quotes McNamara as stating in Spring of 1965 that: "Thich
[7298]Tri Quang has made serious trouble for us before, and he will again. Perhaps the
[7299]greatest mistake we made was_when we gave Thich Tri Quang at the U. S.
[7300]Embassy." (from September through November 1963) Page 103
[7302]SOURCE? Our Vietnam Nightmare by Marguerite Higgins, STAFF: Dawson
[7304]Harper and Rowe
[7306]FILE: ; DATE? Suly 3, 1975
[7308]Docld:32423615 Page 156
[7310]AW 50955
[7312]Colby, Wm. E. fearsoa, D.
[7313]Breckinridge
[7315]OCCURRENCE:
[7317]Breckinridge actually put to
[7318]response to a March 1967 Drew Pearson
[7319]was involved with eriminal syndicates
[7320]of discussions caused by the Pearson e
[7321]offiee were directed to put together r
[7322]assassination of Castro, Trujillo, and
[7325]Diem
[7327]3 (67 IX-Ci2-5
[7328]Castro
[7330]gether the I.G. Reports and he did so in
[7332]colum to the effect that the agency
[7333]toassassinaté Castro. As a result
[7334]olum, staff members in the I.G.'s
[7335]eports on CIA involvement in the
[7336]Diem (50).
[7338]DATE: 6/28/75
[7340]HW 50955 Docld:32423615 Page 157
[7343]IG REPORT
[7344]CONEIN
[7345]SPERA
[7346]DON, GENERAL
[7347]DIEM
[7349]DATES: CATEGORIES:
[7351]DIEM,
[7353]31 May 1967
[7355]OCCURRENCE: In concluding, the IG Report makes the following observations: "To recap:
[7356](a) CIA was not in favor of the decision to abandon the DIEM regime, but faithfully carried
[7358]_ out instructions. (2) CIA officers CONEIN and SPERA were the contacts with the coup gener-
[7359]als, but only as approved and under instructions. (¢) A CIA officer, CONEIN, was at the
[7360]generals' command post throughout the fighting. (d) CONEIN furnished, GENERAL DON about
[7361]$65,000 to buy off opposition military units while the coup was in progress. (e) CIA had
[7362]no hand in the assassinations and had no foreknowledge of them." .
[7365]oo R. DAWSON
[7366]CIA IG Report, 1967, p. 44
[7368]—" 29 June 1975
[7370]AW 50955 Docld:32423615 Page 153
[7372]f ubuoke t/a LS: DATES + H
[7373]COLBY
[7378]Yoreign nationalists, that "Certainly the foreigner makes his own decisions at various tir
[7379]the degree: to woniech he is going to do one thing or the other. ‘The U.S. eannot control it.
[7380]The U. S. can assist them, the U.S. can counsel him and advise him, vernaps influence hin,
[7381]but the control, that is....when you are dealing with essentially another soverign, why t:
[7382]are limits to your degree of authority over them.'" p. 76
[7384]“SOURCE:
[7385]Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby
[7387]a STAFF: ~
[7388]R. DAWSON
[7389]FILE: DATE: 1 July 1975
[7391]ee ee Se ye cee ee em ca ee
[7393]COLBY stated in response to the difficulty far the United States once it ha:
[7394]sougnt to accomplish objectives through foreign nationalists to control the actions of the
[7396]AW 30955 Docld:32423615 Page 159