[1]176-10036-10179 | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
[3]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[4]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[5]AGENCY : NARA ‘
[6]RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10179
[7]RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
[8]AGENCY FILE NUMBER : :
[9]ORIGINATOR : DOS
[10]FROM :
[11]TO:
[12]TITLE : Status Report on Southeast Asia
[13]DATE : 7/11/1962
[14]PAGES : 10
[15]SUBJECTS :
[16]DOCUMENT TYPE :
[17]CLASSIFICATION :
[18]RESTRICTIONS :
[19]CURRENT STATUS :
[20]DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
[21]OPENING CRITERIA :
[22]COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 203: Vietnam Status 7/11/63. Box 1 —
[24]ao . . :
[25]4 SEC SANTITTED UCRLIDN PUd-si-3 25
[26]| “ i , ! 2 ?
[28]; SECRET
[30]STATUS REPORT
[31]ON
[33]SOUTHEAST ASIA
[35]JULY 11,1962
[37]PREPARED BY:
[38]TASK FORCE SOUTHEAST ASIA
[40]DEPARTMENT OF STATE
[42]SECRET ~
[44]af
[46]pl
[48]SECRET . Si
[49]VIET-NAM
[50]Current Overall Evaluation :
[52]+ The general trend appears slightly ‘favorable, with the GUN continuing
[53]té*improve its military, and to a limited extent, its political and econs-
[55]‘rd¢ position, Basic problems are being eroded but quick and decisive
[57]action is rare, There were no major breakthroughs or important victories” .
[58]and norPappear likely in the immediate future. The Viet Cong show no
[59]weakening in strength or determination despite reportedly heavy losses.
[61]On the military side, Operations Binh Minh and Hai Yen continued
[63]well, Viet Cong casualties were up and their activities dom (there is ~
[64]an unconfirmed news report that a major battle took place July 3, however,
[65]in which the VC defeated a regular army battalion)s ‘This may be due to
[66]reorganization and weather rather than GVN successes, The GVN took several
[67]good but minor: steps to increase popular support for the war effort, and
[68]several rural soc%al and economic programs moved ahead significantly. On
[69]the international front, there were some favorable responses to our efforts
[70]to set up an aid coordinating group of donor nations. Economic conditions
[71]improved somewhat, with stable prices, credit a little less tight, consu-
[72]mer goods sales and tax collections up, and rice deliveries contimed good,
[74]Fearing that the prospective Law settlement will facilitate Viet Cong
[75]activities and that it may presage a U. S. move to neutralize Viet-Nam it-
[76]self, the GVN has made difficulties at Geneva over several issues and
[77]threatens to boycott the conference. President Kennedy has sent Diem a
[78]personal letter stressing the importance we attach toa Laos settlement
[79]and our determination to continue to help Viet-Nam defend itself, There
[80]is no response as yet,
[82]Progress oa Action Program
[84]1, W Activity
[86]Viet Cong activity continued at a relatively low level, with armed
[87]attacks falling to the lowest point over a year, 60, for the period 20-27
[88]Juve and rising only slightly to 75 for the period June 27 - July . The
[89]lack of WC aggressiveness is likely due to the rainy season and their
[90]efforts to regroup in order to coumter the improved mcebility and perfar-
[92]_ mance of the GN forces, Observing that this appears to be a period of
[94]vC reorganization and assimilation of recent infiltrators, COMUSMACV ro-
[95]ports indications that VC units which previously operated as separate
[96]platcons and compenies are now being formed into battalions, Infiltration
[97]evidently continues, but good intelligence is scarce, MACV Jo2 estinates
[98]Sntiltration jn May at 800-1,000 and 800 for the first three weeks of June,
[99]but this information 1s unconfirmed and there are no reports of infiltre~
[100]tion since,
[102]"SECRET
[104]SECRET ~
[107]In spite ef reduced WC activity, VC casualties were high and included
[108]some main force personnel, For the vericd 20-27 June the VC suffered a
[109]reported increace of casuslties of almost 25 per cent over the previous |
[110]reporting period. Killed in action for the two week period were 965 VC
[111]end 141 friendly forces.
[113]Reports continue to indicate a critical VC shortage of medical supplies.
[114]Unconfirmed reports reise the possibility thet the VC are attaining an enti-
[115]sircraft capability. |
[117](Followiog items are keyed to the Viet-Nam draft action program of
[118]daly 3)
[120]2. Strengthen populsr sugsort. The GVN took several stess to generate
[121]more popular Support in the lest two weeks. These include the July 7 release
[122]of 794 prascners in connection with the celebration of the "double seven"
[123]holiday (anniversary of Diem's coming to power), a stepped-up drive to root
[124]out low-level corruption and abuse of power by GIN officials, and a Presiden-
[125]tially proposed amendment to the Constitution permitting the questioning of:
[126]Cabinet Maisters both by Cosmittees of the National Assembly and by the
[127]National Assembly in plenary session. The prisoners released may include
[128]leading oppositionist Phan Quang Dan, who has been in prison since his par-
[129]ticipation in the attempted 1960 coup, We have urged the last item on Diem
[130]in the past in an effort to increase the powers and prestige of the National
[131]Assenbly. ;
[133]Another favorable development is increased emphasig on working with anc
[134]for the pecple in the current training program for strategic hamlet cadres.
[135]Ngo cinh Nhu (President's brother in charge cf the stretegic hamlet progran)
[136]is concerned thet the program win genuine pooular support. He favors the
[137]election of hamlet officials by secret bellot instead ef by customary show
[138]‘of hands. Thies is now being done in some hamlets.
[140]k, Seek Internztional Support
[142](<) Cambodian Relations. The GVN replied mildly to the Cambodian
[143]note concerning the ARVN border incursions of June 16. but did not apologize
[144]or offer incennities. The note insists that all precautions sere taken to
[145]avoid crossing the poorly marked frontier, admits thst in spite of these pre-
[146]cautions the frontier may have been violated. points out that any such inad-
[147]vertenit crossing was not motivated by hostility toward Cambodia, denies the
[148]arrest of or harm to Cambodian inhebitants, and proposes a mixed border con-
[149]tre] committee to study frontier incidents and provide for future border
[151]coogeration.
[153]. Another source of GUN-RKG friction, disputed constal islands.
[154]was the subject of an exchange of notes which threatened to stir up further
[155]trouble between Cambodia and VieteNam, ;
[157]SECRET - nas
[160](b) Third Country Aid. The United States has suggested a
[161]Saigon, and poss a later Washington meeting of donor country repre-
[162]sentatives to coordinate aid to Viet-Nam. The intention is to stimlate
[163]more third country aid if possible, and to make sure that current third
[164]country contributions are being effectively applied. To date, Australia
[165]aud New Zealand have indicated willingness to participate in such meetings,
[166]Germany will take part in informal Saigon meetings but would not attend
[167]any formal Washington gathering, and the Japanese are “proceeding with
[168]caution" because of the expressed fear that too close identification
[169]with the U.S. will open up Japanese technicians in Viet-Nam to Viet Cong
[170]reprisals. Canada has declined to participate because of its membership
[171]on the ICC. The Belgians. Prench, Italians and the UK have not yet
[172]responded.
[174]Negotiations for the integration of Australian trainers into
[175]our MAAG appoear near completion. The GVN has indicated its willingness to
[176]receive a New Zealand medical team at any time and the details are being
[177]worked out with Wellington and Saigon.
[179]10. Military Civic Action
[181]The 3ist Engineer Battalion assisted the local population at
[182]Cheo Reo in Pleiku Province in the construction of a Buddhist temple.
[183]In addition to the 150,000 copies of a news sheet distributed weekly by
[184]soldiers to the local civilian population, 35,000 copies of the sheet
[185]were also air dropped.
[187]12. Develop and :
[188]Operations Binh Minh and Hai Yen. Saigon reports both clear-
[189]and-hold operations continuing to make progress without serious VC reaction.
[190]Increased contact with the VC is reported in the Hai Yen area, however, as
[191]the military move into WC territory.
[195]Hamlet Councils have been elected in the Hai Yen area, but the
[196]Embassy notes a serious problem in the fact that ea hamlet Council member
[197]receives only 360 piasters (about $).00) per month for what is theoreti-
[198]cally e full time job. In Operation Binh Minh, an effort will be made to
[199]induce the people to move voluntarily into the fourth village to be set
[200]up there. Tha plan calls for extensive propaganda and explanations in ~
[201]advance of the move. establishment of military control over the area so
[202]that the people will be free to move voluntarily, and up to 15 dzys to
[203]accomplish the move itself (previous regrouping actions allowed only a a
[204]very short period for the physical move ).
[206]Monta mards. Latest information developed as a result of joint
[207]surveys indicates the Montagnard situation is more 2 long term problem
[208]than an emergency. ‘There has in fact been a movement of some 17,000 Mon-
[209]‘tagnard ss a reaction to VC pressures, and this movement will probably
[210]continue, particularly if the GUN provides adequate food and security.
[212]SECRET
[215]SECRET _ id
[216]“be
[218]Almost all Montagnard refugees are at least temporarily resettled and re-
[219]ceiving minimum food, shelter and security.
[221]The Embaszy coments that uhile this information somewhat reduces
[222]the urgency of the problem, it does not change the problem's magnitude or
[223]importance. Difficulties stemming from the absence of a well directed,
[224]nstional Montagnard relief program, limited relief resources, and the Tiet-
[225]namese prejudice against the Montagnard continue. But the principal and
[226]most encouraging aspect is the fact that the Montagnard have fled the ve
[227]pressures and more may do so.
[229]Strategic Hamlet Program. The second ten day training course for
[231]490 strategic hamlet cadres was inaugurated by Ngo dinh Nhu in Saigon July 2.
[233]Future Plans. According to CAS, General: Dinh's plan for ‘the paci-
[235]fication of Binh Dinh province has been approved by Diem and will soon be
[236]presented to the Efhassy. The First Corps Commander is also reportedly de-
[237]veloping plans for two provinces in his area; these plans are said to stem
[238]from the U.S. interest and support for Hai Yen.
[240]15. Provide Increased Technical Assistance.
[242]Villege Radios. As of July h, 817 of the plenned 2500 village
[243]radios were ineteTied and operating. Tests of radios for use on trains
[245]were started.
[247]Defoliation. The Embassy has proposed a test of the effectiveness
[248]of defoliants against VC food patches in the mountainous area of Operation
[249]Hai Yen. Governor Harriman opposes the use of defoliants on food crops be-
[250]cause of the effect on Asian opinion.. Decision and action will be delayed
[251]until the Governor's return from Geneva.
[253]efforts associated with counterinsurgency plans opened July 3 in Qui Nhon.
[254]One hundred farmers will ‘atudy farming and stock raising methods for one
[255]month, including the use of fertilizers and pesticides. i.
[257]Provincial Hospitals. Construction of four of the 25 planned
[258]hospital surgical suites began on schedule.
[260]Anti-Rat Program. The USOM-supported rat destruction campaign was
[261]carried out in ten aorthern provinces June 12-22, resulting in the destruction
[263]of an estimated 15-20 million rats or 20,000 per village.
[265]25. : Publicize the War Within Viet-Nam and Internationally.
[267]Viet-Nam Photo Service. USIS Saigon ig sending out a veekly packet
[268]of photos designed to enlist third country interest and support for the GOWN
[270]SECRET
[273]( 4 ay i
[274]SECRET : UG.
[275]Se.
[277]war effort. Eight posts have reported favorably on the effort, imlicating
[278]no difficulty in plecing the photos in leading newspspers.
[280]28. Esteblish Network of USIS Sub-posts.
[281]The GUN has agreed.to the establishment of virtually any nunder
[283]of USIS sub-posts throughout the country. Negotiztions.on locations and
[284]physical arrangements are underway. ;
[286]SECRET
[288]SECRET -
[291]THAILAND
[293]‘Current Situation Evalustion
[295]fhe RIG has accepted the International Court decision awarding the
[296]disputed Phra Viharn Temple to Cambedie. Thsi delegates attended the
[297]Geneva Conference on Laos, which reconvened on July 2, but the RIG has
[298]aot yet announced its intention to attend the next meeting of the SEATO
[299]Council of Representatives in mid-duly.
[301]On July 2 the US begen the redeployment of 1,060 Merines from the
[302]Third Marine Expeditionary Brigade at Udorn. Possible Thai concern over
[303]this move vee lessened by our informing them at the same time of a US-
[304]financed program to improve logistic facilities in Thziland (see below).
[306]On June 29 police arrested one suspected Communist in Chiengrai and
[307]one in Lempang, both in the North of Thailand. The Thai press reports
[308]that subversive documents were conflecated at both locations. According
[309]to unconfirmed reports these documents originated from a Commanist pro-
[310]pagends ring operating out of Northeastern Burna..
[312]Progress on Action Pregram
[314]1. Improved Logistic Facilities -
[316]We have outlined to the RIG our proposed program to improve
[317]logistic facilities in Thailand. The program would consist mainly of
[318]a POL pipeline to Korat in the northeast, rolling stock, airfield im-
[319]provement, storage areas, and prepositioning of heevy military engineer-
[320]jingequipment. the Thai have agreed to the proposal in principle although
[321]Sarit reserved his decision on our request that the RIG provide the right-
[322]of-way for the pipeline and in-country transportation.
[324]2. Internal Security Plan
[326]EEO eI
[328]We have instructed Embassy Bangkok to ceble summaries of those
[329]portions of the plan which will not have been pouched in time to reach
[330]the Department by July 11. This will permit consideration of the basic
[331]components: of the entire plan during Secretary McNamera's forthcoming
[332]trip to Honolulu. ,
[334]SECRET
[336]SBORED
[337]te
[339]LAOS
[340]Current Situation Braluitioa
[342]The principal remaining issues before the. ‘Geneva Conference ’ , including
[343]-SEATO, having. been regolved. it is anticipated that the new Accords may be
[344]signed next week. There is nevertheless one sericus stumbling block, which
[345]endangers the satisfactory conclusion of the Conference, i.e., the possible
[346]refusal of the GYN to sign. The GUN's position stems from its belief that
[347]so many concessions have been made to the Communists that tle security of
[348]SYN is gravely threatened. We are, however, hopeful that Diem will still
[349]be persuaded that we have achieved the best obtainable compromise for Laos
[350]and that we stand firm on our commitments to SYN.
[352]There has been little progress on our action program. We are con-
[353]centrating at present on the following problems: ;
[355]1. Economic Assistance. Elaboration of our future aid to Laos awaits
[356]the visit of Souvanna Phouma to Washington, tentatively scheduled for
[357]July 25-27. In the meantime, we seek to spread the burden of providing
[358]Souvanna with the material assistance he requires ‘by enlisting contribu-
[359]tions from other Free World nations.
[361]2. RLG Diplomatic Relations. The RLG's decision to recognize 5 bloc
[362]countries and accept an exchange of Ambassadors poses @ major problem with
[363]respect to the GUN. GRC. Federal Republic of Germany and the ROK. Further
[364]action by the RLG is deferred until Souvanna's return to Laoge. In the in-
[365]terim wa are attempting to assist the pro-Western countries involved in
[366]establishing or maintaining satisfactory representation in Laos.
[368]3. ICC. We have asked our Geneva delegation to request the ICC to
[369]prepare a detailed budget and list of equipment needs so that we will be
[370]prepared to meet quickly our share of the requirements. With regard to
[371]the essentisl heavy equipment - helicopters and light aircraft - we are
[372]taking steps to make it immediately available to the ICC.
[374]lk. KBAAG Withdrawal. With the signing of the Accords, we will seek
[375]Canadian cooperation in utilizing to the full the 75-day period for the
[376]withdrawal of foreign military personnel. This will give us the maximum
[377]pessible opportunity to determine whether the DRV is abiding by its
[378]commitments and whether the Soviets as Co-Chairman are. carrying out
[379]their undertaking.
[381]SECRET
[384]CONFIDENTIAL
[386]BURMA
[388]Current Situation Evaluation
[390]The internal situation remains unstable. This fact. was highlighted
[391]by incidents on duly 7 and 8 when student demonstrations led by pro-
[392]Communist organizations were ruthlessly repressed by the police and army.
[393]These incidents could well lead to increased public disaffection with the
[394]Ne Win regime and to a rift between the regime and the cpportunistic
[395]leftist groups who have, heretofore, been its only outspoken civilian
[396]political supporters.
[398]Internal security conditions are apparently continuing to deteriorate,
[399]though not dramatically. A epecial Government amnesty offer expired June 30
[400]without producing significant response from the insurgents.
[402]Progress on Action Program
[403]1. Political
[405]It has been confirmed thet Brigadier Tin Pe of the Union Revolutionary
[406]Ceuncil will come to Washington for medical treatment as planned probably
[407]in late July, although precise dates have not been determined.
[409]2. Economic (AID)
[411]No new developments.
[413]a. The Burmese are ready formally to accept. the FY 1962 military
[414]"gales" program. State and DOD have agreed to accelerate deliveries of M2
[415]carbines as requested by the Burmese, to the extent production facilities
[416]permit, in order. to contribute to planned post-monsoon counter-insurgency
[417]operations. This action will alse, hopefully, earn some political credit
[418]for the United States.
[420]b. Embassy Rangoon has confirmed that United States training
[421]for Burmese officers will be continued under the FY 1962 program. 117
[422]prospective students heve been processed for the coming year.
[424]CONFIDENTIAL
[427]A
[429](Q/
[431]NS
[432]-9- |
[433]CAMBODIA
[435]Current Situation Evaluation
[437]Cambodia's differences with neighboring Thailand and South Viet~-Nam
[438]continue, but they have so far not significantly affected the presently
[439]generally satisfactory relations between the United States and Cambodia,
[440]_ Thai moves concerning Preah Vihear temple are being watched closely,. and
[442]it appears likely that if the announced decision to respect the World
[444]Court's award is. not implemented by September the matter may be brought
[446]by Cambodia to the attention of the UNGA, The dispute between Cambodia
[448]and. Viet-Nam over the ownership of islands off the Cambodian shore has come
[449]to the fore again, with the GVN rejecting a Cambodian protest against Vietna-
[450]mese naval movements near them on the grounds that they belong to Viet-Nem.
[451]Organization of a new Cabinet has been postponed pending religious rites.
[452]celebrating the World Court decision. New evidence of anti-Sihanouk plotting
[454]in Bangkok has developed.
[456]Progress om Action Program
[458]1. BXG-GYN Border Commission (Pol. 8). The GVN reply.to the RKG's proo
[459]test, against. the June 16 border violations is not entirely satisfactory, but
[460]Phnom Penh believes it may allow progress on the border commission proposal
[461]and has raised this possibility with the Foreign Ministry.
[463]2, Force Increase (Mil. 1). The initial reaction of the RKG to approval
[464]of the request for a force increase of 3,18), for MAP support only, is one of
[465]disappointment that military budget support was not included.
[467]3. New Aircraft (Mil. 5). Four T=28 aircraft, first increment of six-
[468]teen, have arrived in Cambodia, Formal turnover awaits the arrival of
[469]Ambassador Sprouse.
[471]ho. ZL ghway Repairs (Econ. 9). Invitations to bid have been sent out,
[472]and the repair contract is scheduled to be awarded by August 15. Contractors
[473]would be scheduled to commence work November 1, under the proposed contract.
[475]2
[477]SECRET