[1]178-10004-10054) | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
[3]JFK Assassination system Date:
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[26]178-10004-10054
[28]» ASSASSINATION FILES
[30]MISC. ROCKEFELLER COM. AND CIA FILES (3)
[32]Document Information
[34]PFIAB
[35]KIRKPATRICK, LYMAN
[36]RECORD
[38]MEETING OF THE DCI WITH PBIAB, FRIDAY, DECEMBER 28, 0930 A.M.
[40]12/28/1962
[41]10
[43]SUBJECTS : . -
[45]DOCUMENT TYPE:
[46]CLASSIFICATION :
[47]RESTRICTIONS :
[48]CURRENT STATUS :
[49]DATE OF LAST REVIEW :
[51]OPENING CRITERIA :
[53]COMMENTS :
[55]Ww 52879 Docld:32112782 Page 1 ane
[57]. ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES
[59]CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS
[60]PFIAB
[62]MC CONE, JOHN
[63]OPERATION MONGOOSE
[64]CUBAN EXILES
[66]MEMORANDUM
[67]Top Secret
[69]1B
[71]Redact
[72]09/09/2016
[74]4/7/20)
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[87]Guba ALIS
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[90]ta firs
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[94]ub,
[95]a
[97]the Cuban
[99]bay
[101]2, _ “FO 2
[102]100-1700 ULE.
[105]SORT ah, TEL
[107](Oy) CONPID
[109]Ng
[110]“8
[112]SUT EcT
[114]neubive Offices Building
[116]eeheon (put?
[118]fon ai. Pricy-Board
[120]ia. Ros iia CG
[121]judddun tpanaratic
[123]Opry
[125]taport te trie
[127]THE WHITE HOUS
[129]WASH NGTON
[131]fo. soo.
[132]fis...) 4 IDEALIST, CORONA
[133]MEMORANDUM FOR ‘THE FILE [ances eerenne RETR
[135]“SUBJECT: Board Meeting of December 27 - 28, Lobe
[137]The Board convened at 9:CO0 a.m, on December 27. * Those
[138]present were Dr, Killian, Chairman, Board members Langer, Murphy ,
[139]Gray, Doolittle, Pace and Cliiford and Messrs. Coyne and Asn,
[141]De. Killian suggested thet Board members read tre draft
[142]report which had been furnished to the Board on the vreceding
[143]day by Mr. McCone, the Directcr of Central Intelligence, setting
[144]forth the results of the all-scource review which the Board had \
[145]requested concerning U. S. intelligence community activities with
[146]respect to the Soviet military buildup in Cuba during the 6-months
[147]preceding Cctober 22, 1962, ‘Tne Chairman asked that Boarc members
[148]make note of any comments and questions they might wish to raise
[149]. for discussion during this twc-day meeting. Dr. “illian said that
[150]ely he was not sure the DCI's repcrt had the approval of the inteili-
[152]: gence community at this point, for he understood that Mr. MeCone
[154]{ was at that moment reviewing the draft report in Seattle, and it
[156]- vas possible that some of the conclusions anda factual devails
[158]might not have yet received final approval by the agencies whien
[159]contributed to the preparatior of the report (CIA, DIA, State and
[160]NSA). &ecordingly, the Chaimran noted the importance or the
[161]@iscussions which the Board would have on the following day witn
[162]heads of the intelligence agercies. The Chairman also thought
[163]that the Board should aim for the preparation of a Board renort
[164]to the President at the close of this 2-day meeting.
[166]Dr. Killian said that he had very recently talked to Mr,
[167]MeGeorge Bundy who hopes that the Board will take the time it needs
[168]to produce a solid report on the handling given by U. S. intelli-
[169]gence agencies to the Soviet military buildup in Cuba. Mr. Bundy
[170]assured that the President will understand that the Board is going
[171]into the subject deeply and otjectively, About 10 days ago, the
[172]Chairman related, he had received a telephone cali from Mr, Bundy
[173]who said that he had seen an carly draft of the DCI's report (from
[174]a cenfidential source) and was concerned because the report did not
[175]get to the basic issues, and Mr, Bundy expressed an intention to
[176]taik to Mr. Mcvone about this. Dr, Killian stated that he had an
[177]appointment to see Mr. Bundy Jater in the morning at which time he
[178]would ask Mr, Bundy to meet with the Board during the course of
[179]this meeting. tet a
[181]: ere unable to attend,
[183]rile via BYEMAN
[185]4
[186]uh
[188]a LE, mo % wee
[190]‘oheday stay in Cuba,' “isequally
[192]arous Soviet and Cuban ‘plans “for further activities ‘involving
[193]other countries in this: Hemisphere, “Also ‘we- are; lacking intel- -
[194]ligence on Cuba/Communist China 3iscussions. Hr, Murphy reiterated
[195]his concern that our lack of information on such matters as these’,
[196]indteates the absence of an adequate intelligence capability to -
[197]keep our Government informed abot developments in Cuba at the pre-,
[198]sent time and in the future, - Soe, ;
[200]Dr; Killian at. this. point r2ported to. the Board on’ the con-
[201]versation whieh he hadjust-had sith Mr, ‘Bundy. «According to™
[202]-Mr, Bundy, tne President’is fully “aware that the Board 1s: con-
[203]ducting its review of ‘the Cuba situation... The President wants
[204]an objective report ‘froma group ‘oficitizens who have:no axe to
[205]grind, and he is placing ‘great store on this effort of*the Board,
[206]The Chairman said that Mr. Bundy was obviously concerned about - ::
[207]the prospect that tne Congress will make inquiries -into the Cuba
[208]matter. However, Mr, Bundy feels there is a pare possibility ‘that |”
[209]Congressional investigators will be more nesitent to raise hypo-
[210]thetical questions if they’ learn of the existence “of a study having *
[211]been made by a group such as the Board, It is ir. Bundy's hope
[212]that the Board will cavefully coisider’ the preparation of a sani-
[213]tized version of the report, but if ‘the. Board and the President feel
[214]that this cannot be done’ then-theBoard should try to prepare ‘a ©
[215]report which'could be-used in exacutive session of a Committee of
[216]tne Congress. fe ett mo
[217]Dr. Killian went on to report other matters which had been
[218]covered in nis discussion with Kir. Bundy. He said tnat Mr. Bundy:
[219]had expressed concern aver the failure of the DCI to accept the
[220]suggestion that there be submitted a move adequate report than the
[221]one vhich the DCI forwarded to tie Board cn December 26. fir, Bundy
[222]noted in stnis connection that the DCI's report assigns to policy
[223]makers prime responsibility for any failures with respect to
[224]intelligence handling. oe ;
[225]te ee : My at at . . ~
[226]On- the question of:availability of Special Group records for .
[227]purposes of the Boardésistudy, Mc, “Bundy infermed the, Chairman... :
[228]that certainly the Board ‘should :xamine such records and that ~
[229]they could be obtained, from.Mr, Parrott’ :(Mr, Bundy commented’ that
[230]the Board. is .the only .group whic. can have. this icind.ofyaccess).
[231]: Wiking etd de tapas ‘ Pee oS . wage
[233]se rs ya z
[237]ea ontry
[240]Cavan
[242]Ma, ONS AE SN Pe
[243]As to the Board's!'study, "Mr, {Bundy*told Dr. Killian -t
[245]the Board should include in its*1evicw discussions with the
[247]Secretaries of State and Defense and:the Chairmen of the Joint
[249]Chiefs of Staff -- Mr, Bundy ‘ind: cating that the Secretary of
[251]Defense has particular reservations about ithe DCI's report,
[253]Another matter mentioned .by. fir, Bundy was his belief? that
[254]the morale of tne intelligence, community as a vihole stands to
[255]suffer in the absence. of a carefully done review and veport
[256]whiten is being expected .from the Board, . wt
[260]With regard to the interim veport which the Board has under.
[261]way, Mr, Bundy informed the Chaiiman tnat the report could he .
[262]delivered to nin or 1¢ could be presented to the Tresident directly,’ '
[263]and ir, Bundy thought 1% important that the Board present it to...
[264]tne President in person,:” Onefotier matter discussed was the Board's
[265]roneern about any Intelligence 1:t-down in the wake of the Cuba ..°
[266]erisis, it being Hr, Bundy's vel .ef that no such let-down is in
[267]prospect if present direétives..aid discussions on the subject have
[268]any effect in Government. "is¥e. oi 7 .
[270](Ab the cenelusion of the Ciairmman's account of his discussion
[271]with Mz, Bundy, the Board recess:d-for lunch, , Doe
[273]At 2:30 p.m., the Board was briefed on the world situation by
[274]Hr. Thomas Lawlor, senior, intelligence officer in CIA's Office of.
[275]Current Intelligence (Mr, Ray “Cline, Deputy DCI /Intelligence was.
[276]on vacation leave and not availaoie to be present at this Board —
[277]meeting). Mr, Lawlor explained. chat his own responsibilities in-
[278]cluded tne handling of current iitelligence matters, the selection
[279]and write-up of current intelligence items (e.g., in the CIB and in.
[280]memoranda for the White House),. and the preparation of internal in-..)
[281]telligence nutes for use at the CITA working level. Mr, Lawlor
[282]pointed out that his duties were in the areas of analysis ane.
[283]production, not the coliection, of intelligence, His briefing of
[284]the Board includéd,.the following subject matters: “:
[286]: OC oa Lo . . . -
[287]USSR/Chicom rélations:/’Recfiminations between the USSR and
[288]Communist China are the greatest in the history of their dispute,.
[289]and an cpen break-in, par. relations.is,most likely near
[290]an Teor. . 7 Ri . Ryze ern ee a ae om
[292].
[294]a
[298]an as
[299]Ever
[304]Tyan 8 y rf
[306]es : rea : . ra " ms
[307]. USSR/Cuba: .. The:U3SR is: presently reappraising: its«forel
[308]policy positions. in the ilightiof athe, Cuba crisis aftermath
[310]Peay
[314]JSSR/Ber lin: WeThehUSSRiistatia™ ede ist
[315]F isytraceabl S2/Chicori .
[316]ORDO At te PSS
[318]at eat A Re figltzs
[321]. Mes ns : : wea rn . . ae
[323]‘The Chairman asked; theiNCI whether the MONGOOSE-activity:
[324]presented any particular“intelligence, problem inthe’ Cuba: .
[325]situation. Mr. McCone':said‘‘ihat.it had not. He said-that. -
[326]in the MONGOOSE activity! the’ Special’ Group and the Attorney
[327]General had given a-great del offconsideration to the need
[328]for intelligence collection sith: respect to Cuba, but “he
[329]intelligence needed/was primurilysfor"covert ‘action rather
[330]than other purposes. Nevertheless, the MONGOOSE activity’
[331]contributed to the. over-all’: ntelligence collection effort
[332]on Cuba. fic. MeCone recalled! that there was a hiatus in the‘
[333]collection of intelligence .on-Cuba, after the Bay of Pigs in- +
[334]vasicn,-and when he-vook: off:.ce in’ November 1961 Mr, MeCone
[335]-was surprised to learn*that*no “interrogation of Cuban refugees
[336]was aking places” Thereafter, following discussions with
[337]-. the Presiden’ and the : AttorneyGeneral they got the refugee;.
[338].., interrogations under, way 2%) aS ed a ne
[340]a
[341],
[343]Mr. Murphy wondered why there had been a let-down in -.*
[344]intelligence gathering after the Bay of Pigs incident. Mr.
[345]MeCone said that this took place before his time, but he
[346]assumed that the reasons had to do with discouragement and ”" -'
[347]other psychological factors. In response to Dr. Killian's :
[348]question as to whether another intelligence let-down was in
[349]store in the wake of the Cubs: crisis, "Mr. McCone said that © =
[350]there was in fact a great danger of such a development followin
[351]what some officials consider was an "Intelligence victory" if
[352]for the United States.” Mr.“TIlcCone, noting that the Soviet
[353]SA-2's remain in Cuba,’ said he-had brought this up forcefully
[354]a week ago at an NSC Executive Committee meeting, and:the. »
[355]President had agreed to get vord to the USSR that any inter-
[356]ference with our aerial recomnaissance of Cuba would be *.
[357]considered as being most grave -- and Messrs, hicCloy: and
[358]Stevenson have passed this.word. to Kuznetsov. . bir. McCone.
[359]added that while low-level» reconnaissance flights.have been;
[360]suspended, should ‘anyominou:. development ‘occur ,itwill be
[361]: necessary. to obtain; President.ial: approval: of the ‘resumption
[362]‘of. Low-level ‘flights Laks ; reavirhetes Sane
[364]. pee ae. 2
[366]. * a} Sa ‘
[367]-* Mr.’ Pace inauired“as.-to’ whether’ there were an °
[369]onthe conduct of. inteiligenc e’ operations with regard™to}Cuba ae
[370]Mr. McCone-said yes, it is ‘desired to follow.a more ‘aggressive:
[371]pattern of, agent“infiltration into. Cuba. . He .would': Like’:to? ‘see
[372]a™3.or°4'month effort: directed! toward the obtaining fof: zn
[373]_intelligence:on#Cubaii(in lieu of ;political warfare," J
[375]- to determine ithe; trendtof :So. .in,Cube.. Th
[376]that:.the ‘Soviets may{ ; t: sT
[377]egyt aU er tins pawl
[380]a - : to HES ’ : ey . te ‘
[382]"fact take. one step back‘and* wc ‘steps*forward, and hold'on to.
[383]the Cuba real estate "as.a. prope ganda and - insurgency base, '
[385]_as a means of keeping*Castro‘urder-control, or in order to. :
[387]retain a capability for“quick 1 estoration ofa Soviet offensive, +
[389]‘capability. The kindof concerted" intelligence action which <«Fs9
[390]the DCI had in mind: would’ incl de+(1)<penetration'ofvthe:Castr
[391]government regime, (2) ‘the placement of additional agent’ teams “A:
[393]in Cuba, (3) the continuation’ cf efforts to obtain the assistance
[395]:,of British, French andiGerman.1epresentatives in Cuoa, (4). thewss!
[397]' possible obtaining of-useful ir telligence from the attorney, —:
[398]Donovan, who is negotiating prisoner releases, and (5) vossibly,
[400]_ the obtaining of usefullinform.tion from the captain of the oe
[401]“african, Pilot whe {had ia’ 3-hour'italk-with Castro and who ace
[402]yesterday.asked.to 's U a intelligence officer,’ -
[404]. Se BETES A Pay BET a
[405]. Mr, Pace asked whether Mr, NMcCone would favor the use of ¢))’
[406]Guantanamo Naval Base as a base “for launching intelligence .and
[407]related operations against Cubr. Mr, -McCone said that he would.
[408]not be in favor of this because if we were caught using Guantanamo py,
[409]for intelligence operations Cas tro would obtain UN and other support. gyi
[410]for Cuba's demands for U,S. evacuation of the Naval Base, — a oie
[412]\ yt von the
[414]t
[418]a
[420]Answering General: Doolittle 's question, the DCI stated that’ ae
[422]-U-2 overflights of: Cuba were: gcing: at the rate of two a day, re--
[423]sulting in coverage of: all: tarpets once a week and in coverage of
[424]some important targets’ (e.g., liarbors) more often. Mr. MceCone said
[425]that COMOR and USIB. list..the ;tirgets and that he then establishes -,
[426]flight schedules, |: nN ee T 2B eS”
[428]BBE ee, Sra :
[430]: Going back to the subject:.f. Guantanamo, Mr, .Pace asked wheth
[431]the DCI had made a study of the expected intelligence return’ that=
[432]-would be obtained if intelligence operations were’ conducted’ from. ©
[433]‘the Base -- Mr. Pace.adding thit.he thought such a study'should be ™
[434]made before:a final .policy:dec:.sion was reached, ., Mr.:McCone said.
[435]that he had. not. madesuch, atstudy.*™He, added: that in -August the. :
[436]"operators" “in: CTA had}'proposeci to the ‘MONGOOSE. Group, that Guan-.,
[437]tanamo Base beso used ;}but:th:.s"was#opposed at' the policy level,
[438]Mr, MeCone said-that ih iwould:notiber opposed to..a restudy of. the
[439]proposal"at this: time<i¢2In, ansvergtoyDr.-Killian’s, inquiry, Mr
[442]icl-«noted ; that’ NSA had ,oF
[444]a
[447]ne Sc pase waa key we
[449]we Mr. Murphy’ asked, the-DCI: to state: the*meaning of, :MONGOOSE:
[450]“RB pLUS", Mr, MeCone explained” shat ‘in the MONGOOSE Group it
[452]was originally conceived ‘that Piase I would be one of gathering’
[454]intelligence on the possibiliti2s for the organization and supply ates:
[455]_ of resistance groups within Cuba,’ but’ this effort was "only fairly, >. peasy
[456]successful" because: Castro has. 3ome. 100,000’ informers’ in place -in-
[458]Cuba and exercises 4internal-sec arity controls through a system o
[460]ration cards, and therefore, CI4 did not get as many teams’ into-
[462]Cuba as had been hoped. On Augist 10,-Phase II was reached with:
[464]MONGOOSE planning. for, (a) .violeat actions .(b) a relatively high.
[465]- Leyel of actions, or: "B-PLUS",“and lesser act-cns, or "B MINUS",
[467]Mr; McCone said that he“ had not been prepared to endorse proposed:
[469]"RB pLUS" actions in the absence of plans for military packing, = ‘:\\: “
[471]because of his own speculation that the U.S. would be faced with «>
[473]MRBMs in Cuba. In any case, .the MONGOOSE effort became diverted
[475]by considerations of Soviet tivities in Cuba, Mr. McCone stated,
[477]’ a a “. :
[479]In answer to a question fron Mr. Muxphy “as to who chairs’ the a \
[480]MONGOOSE Group at this time, Mr. McCone said that he did not now «LR )
[481]whether Mr. Bundy or the Attorrey, General was now serving as. ll [es
[482]Chairman. we “ matin WS ot hea
[484]‘ ge
[486]With reference to the abserce of photographic evidence of Soviet —
[488]offensive missile deployment p:ior to October 14 photography, Mr.
[489]McCone said that if one locks <t photography of Cuba obtained on
[490]September 5 it is possible ‘to. spot evidence of activity at the San
[491]Cristobal MRBM site, but this <ctivity could have been that of
[492]agricultural workers and the evidence did not then point to missile
[493]activity. Dr, Killian noted tie Board's concern that Soviet cam-
[494]ouflage operations may be deceiving us. Mr. MeCone expressed his
[495]own great concern that the Soviets are deceiving us by camouflage
[496]methods, Acknowledging that our intelligence estimates leave a
[497]certain margin for error, Mr. licCone noted that it is nevertheless
[498]impossible for us to say that ye know all that is going on in the j
[499]_USSR with respect to missile activity, In response to Dr, Killian's."
[500]comment that public discussion: ,seem.to indicate that U. S. missile ..:
[501]capabilities are superior.'to,.those of. the USSR, the DCI considered:«-.:
[502]that any such conelusion is‘erroneous and dangerous and could lead.
[503]to a complacency which. might: well result in curtailment of.the.U. S,
[504]»missile program. by’ an economy-ninded Congress.»; Mr. MeCone,.added i>;,
[505]ject Committees of the-Congress he “”"
[506]‘ S.,imissile. superiority,
[508]20 Dp, Kill Lanjwondered*whether.the.:President ,* the Secretary. of
[509]‘Defense ,, and -thegCongressiunde: "stand \the danger: of conclusions that
[511]gno thing 185. aus: Gitticuntabe, seen! “tM: Me Cone;said: that;
[513]undoubtedlystheresiss Mtowardgheavysdep : “oh :
[514]maou eey ipsa cone dencsiton eg
[516]es craphicwintel Ligence:
[517]ee TRS
[518]SEU
[520]SPA i sfess aK 5
[521]Via CONN a eae
[522]oe ihe ny i ree
[524]*)