[1]nD ARAAN
[2]1704-10332-10020 | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
[3]‘Toa T030-10020) a SECRET
[5]oe Y
[6]Lk
[10]ESG 95-02
[11]14 July 1995
[13]MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Historical Review Group
[15]FROM: Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.
[16]DO, Focal Point for ARRB
[18]SUBJECT: Position on Release of Information Pertaining to
[19]Mexico City Station and the JFK Assassination
[20]Records
[22]1. At its monthly meeting on 17 July the ARRB will be
[23]addressing the issue of the Mexico City Station and its operation
[24]in light of any deletions made by the Agency to protect sources
[25]and methods. The issues of greatest concern are those
[26]surrounding (the fe joint) teltap operations run by the Agency( and the?
[27]Mexican Services) official acknowledgment of which could have an
[28]impact oni liaison and/ foreign relations. (We therefore, wish t@
[30](maintain protection of this informatior.
[33]2. We are willing to release information which indicates
[34]the existence of operational teltaps against the Soviet and Cuban
[35]Embassies (aS long as they appear unilateral and we can continue
[36]to- protect the existence of any participation of the Mexican _f
[38](Services. We are willing to release documents which indicate the
[39]existence of Mexico City Station during times outside the window
[40]which we have acknowledged when they contribute significantly to
[41]the historical record. These steps will be useful to the
[42]historic record and reveal the extent of coverage employed
[43]against these targets. We would want to continue protection of
[44]the information which identifies coverage of other countries and
[45]individuals other than Lee Harvey Oswald.
[47]3. We also agree to release of the following:
[49]A. Pseudonyms of employees, aliases of employees,
[50]and file numbers.
[52]CL BY 624343 }
[53]DECL OADR
[54]DRV COV 2-87
[56]SBERET
[58]13-00000
[60]SUBJECT: Position on Release of Information Pertaining to Mexico
[61]City Station and the JFK Assassination Records
[63]B. Cryptonyms, such as those in the LI series,
[64]unless they appear in the context, of liaison ;
[65]\operational equities ; (such as LITENSOR and
[66]LITEMPO) .
[68]Cc. We need to continue the protection of the cryptonym
[69]LIENVOY.
[70]This cryptonym is used extensively throughout the
[71]collect to describe the’ joint activity; from
[72]different perspectives. Individual occurrences may
[73]not seem to reveal anything significant but, when
[74]looking at the cryptonym in context over the entire
[75]collection it reveals) the joint activity, ‘which we
[76]are trying to protect:
[78]4. Regarding the revelation of names of employees who
[79]retired under cover, we request the Board to table its final
[80]determination until the individuals have been contacted and
[81]informed that their name is being considered for release. This
[82]will allow the individual to consider the impact it will have and
[83]convey relevant information. The Directorate database is not set
[84]up to track individuals who were involved in specific operations.
[85]We need the assistance of the employees to know their operational
[86]involvement’s. Office of Central Cover has prepared and is
[87]coordinating a letter to be sent to the employees which will both
[88]inform them and solicit their assistance/comments.
[90]Fredrick C. Wickham, | nies
[92]X
[94]13-00000
[95]\ ’ . . f
[97]September 11, 1995
[98]WORKING PAPER
[100]Notes from meeting w/ ARRB staff Sept. 11, 1995
[102]ARRB Attendees: Marwell, Gunn, Mary + one
[103]CIA Attendees : Barry, Ellie
[105]Issue: Inconsistency between Mexico City Chrono item
[106]#132 and ARRB document #31
[108]Gunn proposed that the Agency release the information in
[109]document 31 that was released by mistake in the Mexico City
[110]Chrono. Otherwise, the staff would have to take the
[111]document back to the ARRB for reconsideration which they
[112]felt would undercut the credibility of the CIA and the
[113]staff. The Board will not uphold a postponement ina
[114]specific document if that information is released by mistake
[115]in another copy of the same document.
[117]_Ellie's response - because the information deals with (Mex.
[118]liaison, she will have to take their proposal to a higher
[119]level. [response needed by 16 September]
[121]They also requested a “new” highlighted version of the
[122]Mexico City Chrono which reflects all information released
[123]to NARA in the multiple copies of the Chrono and in the
[124]documents referenced in the Chrono.
[126]Issue: The three documents of concern.
[128]‘GIBSON - Ellie reviewed the Gibson issues--the fact that he _
[129]had denied in court his affiliation with the CIA, etc. I .
[130]moted that since the document would not be included in the .|
[131]determination list would the Board be willing to reconsider. ~—
[132]Marwell said that we could make an addition pitch to the
[134]Board to reconsider, but he did not think it would have any
[135]effect on their decision.
[137]PROENZA - Ellie explained that out goal here was to protect
[138]the “asset” not the method and that the deletions could be
[139]reduced to those words that could result. in the
[140]identification of the agent.
[142]Marwell said that the Board may reconsider based on the need
[143]to protect a source.
[145]Mary ask who was the asset? Was it LIRING?
[146]Ellie said she did not know (it could have been some “AM”
[147]source.
[149]SECRET
[150]Mary ask for more information on LIRING.
[152]“PRIVATE LINE TAP” - According the Marwell, the Board
[154]considered the issue of the “private lines” but since the
[156]paragraph dealt with Oswald, voted to release. Mary said is
[157]was hard to defend the individual released since she did not
[158]have any information on the person.
[160]We pointed out that the this release impacted on other
[161]documents which dealt with private line taps plus the Board
[162]had not limited its release to the paragraph that mentioned
[163]Oswald but released the name in other calls which had
[164]nothing to do with Oswald.
[166]Marwell said the Board may re-look at the document as part
[167]of looking at similar documents.
[169]The issue of the taps on other Bloc embassies came up. Mary
[170]said the Board was inclined to release given the. end of the
[171]Cold War.
[173](Note: we will locate as many of the “private line tap”
[174]documents we can for special review]
[176]Issue: Removing the Proenza and Private line tap
[177]documents form the formal notification list
[179]Marwell clearly prefers not to do it at this time (said they
[180]would discuss). Has no problem with asking the Board to
[181]reconsider or giving us the opportunity to presence
[182]additional evidence since their next meeting was within the
[183]30 days set by the law, but felt that the Board was not
[184]inclined to keep tabling documents that: they had reached a
[185]decision on.
[187]Marwell asked -if the Agency plans:: ‘to “appeal”; he would like
[188]a heads-up.
[190]Later, in private, Marwell said that ‘he wanted to build into
[191]the process a loop that would handle these types of
[193]situations.
[194]Issue: Presentation to Board at Sept. 20/21 meeting
[196]It was agreed that. “STATIONS” would be the focus of the
[197]presentation -- 10:00 am, 20 Sept., one hour.
[199]Marwell recommended providing evidence of bilateral
[200]agreements as well as identifying current harm. Said that
[201]the Board was leaning strongly toward releasing stations.
[202]Mary pointed out that there were still issues on the Mexico
[203]City station window. There are documents from the 50s,
[205]“SECREL_
[207]13-00000
[209]—SECRET-
[211]references in summaries to the founding of the station and,
[212]most important, the visit by the HSCA to Mexico City.
[214]Ellie said there was the possibility of opening windows of
[215]stations when Oswald was present, however, this was a key
[216]issue for the Agency and a senior Directorate/Agency
[217]decision. She indicated that the DO would oppose expanding
[218]the Mexico City window jinto the 70s}
[220]As for the older documents, we pointed out that we had
[221]already agreed to the release of those documents.
[223]Marwell suggest that the 20 Sept. preSentation would be a
[224]good opportunity to address the Private Line and other Tel
[225]Taps issue rather than requesting a separate meeting.
[227]After the meeting Marwell elaborated on the presentation.
[228]He said to try a avoid going over old ground (US-Mexico
[229]relationship; when possible provide specific/hard evidence
[230](bilateral agreements carry weight); war-stories did not go
[231]over well and neither did Bill McNair. He emphasized the
[232]importance of using the language of the law.
[234]13-00000
[238]September 12, 1995
[239]WORKING PAPER
[241]Notes from meeting w/ ARRB staff Sept. 11, 1995
[243]Issue: Presentation to Board at Sept. 20/21 meeting
[245]It was agreed that “STATIONS” would be hole of the
[246]presentation -- 10:00 am, 20 Sept., one. hour.
[248]Marwell recommended providing evidence of bilateral
[249]agreements as well as identifying current: harm. Said that
[250]the Board was leaning strongly toward. releasing stations,
[251]particularly those in Europe.
[253]Mary pointed out that there were still issues on the Mexico
[254]City station window. There are documents from the 50s,
[255]references in summaries to the founding of the station and,
[256]most. important, the visit by the HSCA to Mexico City.
[258]Ellie said there was the possibility of opening windows of
[259]stations when Oswald was present, however, this was a key
[260]issue for the Agency and a senior Directorate/Agency
[261]decision. She indicated that the DO would oppose expanding
[262]the Mexico City window Gnto the 70s>
[264]As for the older documents, we pointed out that we had
[265]already agreed to the release of those documents.
[267]Marwell suggest that the 20 Sept. presentation would be a
[268]good opportunity to address the Private Line’ and other Tel
[269]Taps issue rather than requesting a separate meeting.
[271]After the meeting Marwell elaborated on the presentation.
[272]He said to try to avoid going over old ground (US-Mexico
[273]relationship); when possible provide specific/hard evidence
[274](bilateral agreements carry weight); war-stories do not go
[275]over well. He emphasized the importance of using the
[276]language of the law especially when citing harm. He
[277]specifically mentioned Sec. 6. (B){copy attached} which sets |
[278]a standard of “interfere with the conduct of intelligence
[279]activities”
[281](Note: In a previous meeting with Gunn, he stressed similar
[282]themes including avoiding what he called “chicken little”
[283]arguments. He also raised the question on sensitivity of
[284]acknowledging we had a station in Moscow during the 60s/
[285]“It would have been 1 logical to have one ‘during the Cold
[286]War.” ]
[289]13-00000
[290]SECRET
[292]rams . yor Central Intelligence Agency
[294]Nas MetiTy:
[296]Washington, D.C. 20505 FEB 0 2 1996
[298]MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Intelligence Coordination,
[299]Intelligence and Research, Department of State
[301]SUBJECT: Appeal of Unfavorable Determination by the JFK
[302]Assassination Records Review Board (AIUO)
[304]The JFK Assassination Records Review Board (Board) recently
[305]released documents revealing the existence of CIA stations in
[306]Helsinki, (Bern) Genéva) and(The Hague} a (joint tel-tap»operation
[307]with (Méxican liaison, and the identity of a unilateral
[308]penetratiog_of a liaison service> It is the CIA's assessment
[309]that such releases could seriously damage intelligence operations
[310]as well as adversely affect the foreign relations of the United
[311]States. CIA is presently preparing an appeal of these rulings by
[312]the Board and requests the support of the Department of State
[313]should these appeals be brought before the President. (S)
[315]Additionally, the Board has just released the existence of
[316]stations in‘(Rome, Madrid} Copénhagen; Oslo,> Brussels; and
[317]Stockholm, and in March-April, it will be reviewing a document
[318]that reveals the location of every CIA station in 1965. It-is
[319]anticipated that CIA will be preparing to appeal those releases
[320]and requests State Department's assessment as to the damage to
[321]foreign relations should the location of CIA stations be publicly
[322]acknowledged. (S)
[324]It remains essential that the U.S. Government stand by |
[325]assurances to persons and foreign governments that information
[326]they provide and activities they undertake based upon expected
[327]confidentiality remain protected for as long as necessary. These
[328]releases made by the Board seriously undermine the ability of CIA
[329]to uphold secrecy obligations it took on in the past and to make
[330]those assurances in the future. (C)
[332]CL BY 2103140}
[333]REASON 1.5(c)
[334]DECL X1; X5
[335]DRV LOC 3-82
[336]DRV LIS 3-82
[338]SECRET
[340]13-00000
[342]SUBJECT: Appeal of Unfavorable Determination by the JFK
[343]Assassination Records Review Board (AIUO)
[345]We have a critically short deadline in which to address
[346]issues concerning the release of Helsinki, (Berm, Geneva; and/ The)
[348](Hague}stations, the identity of the asset, and(Mexican liaison:
[350]The release of the identities of the remaining stations must be
[351]resolved over the next two weeks. We request your comments and
[352]expert opinions regarding the impact such releases would have on
[353]the foreign relations of the United States, and hope to cite
[354]State Department's support as we finalize our appeal. (S)
[356](David N. Edger
[357]Acting Deputy Director for Operations
[359]CWE ay Fear
[360]« Bavic No Fcger }
[362]CIR-316/ 00293-96
[364]13-00000
[366]SUBJECT: Appeal of Unfavorable Determination by the JFK
[367]Assassination Records Review Board (AIUO) ~
[369]-C/IMS/ESG/F.Wickham/tdn/x44448/2Feb96
[371]Distribution:
[372]Original i- Addressee
[374]- DDO/Reg
[376]- AC/DDO .
[378]- DCI/CSI/HRG
[380]- OGC
[382]EUR/LGL
[384]- LA/LGL
[386]- C/IMS
[388]- IMS/IRO
[390]- ESG
[392]NP PPP RPE PHY
[393]I
[395]13-00000
[397]From the Desk of Linda
[399]NOTE FOR: J. Barry Harrelson
[401]FROM: Linda GyGipriani,.
[402]DATE: ~ 03/18/96 06:24:14 PM
[403]SUBJECT: JFK Meeting today
[405]After speaking with you tonight about the results of the meeting taney. Jeremy Gunn called me and relayed his concerns about the
[406]Board's understandings (or misunderstandings} of CIA's position. ¢ (Bob Caudlésand I discussed what happened at-the JFK meeting and
[407]the following is our impression of what resulted. Basically /Edgen cid not commit himself on any specifics on these issues, but expressed
[408]his willingness to cooperate with the Board:
[410]1. (TerasalanyStation (Edger (Eager was more willing to negotiate this one, but does not agree to its release. CIA wants to present more
[411]homator eee (Edger was not under the impression that this station was to be discussed today so he did not come Prepared t to present new
[412]information on it. CIA should do this for the Board at the next possible opportunity.
[414]2. Open Period for Stations Edger {Edggryagreed that the staffs of the Board and HRG should work out the exact time period. He had
[415]no problem with the/Sept{63564%period and opening it up to Gian the Oswald file. He did not make any firm commitment on the dates to
[416]the Board, saying that the staffs should come to an agreement on this.
[418]3. Substitutions for(Nordi¢ytations - Although€dgensuggested "Scandanavig)Station" as a substitution, he clearly prefered
[420]something less revealing like (Notherh-European station 1, 2, etc.)". Using the former term has far less plausible deniability. The latter
[421]option basically gives up what we want to protect.
[423]- Once HRG hears oi Fas to what his understandings are, then someone needs to speak with Jeremy Gunn ASAP on Tuesday
[425]morning before the Board leaves. Jeremy said that unless we correct the Board on its mistaken i impression a about the above, they will
[426]leave assuming we have come to:an agreement and will refuse to revisit this at a latter date. .
[428]Let me know if you need me to help out in any way on this. FYI, { will be in meetings at 10AM and 2pm (Win Scott settlement
[429]discussions! !!)-tomorrow.
[431]ce: John F. Pereira
[432]Eleanor Neiman @ DO
[434]From the Desk of(Linda C. Cipriani
[436]NOTE FOR: Fredrick Wickham @ DO
[437]Cohnny Goins @ DO
[438]Eleanor E. Neiman @ 00
[439]FROM: Linde C-ciprani—s
[440]DATE: 03/29/96 11:52:57 AM
[441]SUBJECT: JFK release of Tokytstation(S)
[443]| just spoke.with EA legal and informed her. about the latest release by the JFK Board of(fokyo,station and the fact that we have a letter
[444]from the Ambassador objecting to the release. She indicated that Art Brownwould be a good candidate to go down to speak with the
[446]Board at their next meeting (what are the dates?} to request that they reconsider. It might also be more persuasive if we could arrange ~
[447]for a State Department person (Japatsdesk) to come to the Board with us and present the Ambassador's letter. (S)
[449]{ would appreciate hearing your thoughts on this course of action. If we plan on doing this, we need to arrange it with Marwell and then
[450]brief the appropriate people in the DO and State Department as soon as possible. {S)
[452]o
[454]cl By&224130 3
[455]CL REASON 1.5ic}
[456]DECL ON X1 5
[457]DRV FM LOC 3-83
[459]ce:
[462]13-00000
[464]21 March i997
[466]JFK PROJECT WORKING PAPER
[468]SUBJECT: Policy Guidance--”Atsugi” and “U-2”
[470]1. References to “CIA base/Station/representativ
[471]Atsugi, Japan” in the U-2 context is” :
[473]2. Information relating to- ‘th :
[474]and Agency representatives elsewhere:
[475]to be protected.
[477]3. The issue was coordinated
[479]< Wilcox), ‘DO (Lee Carle), the Air Forcé
[480]Rock) and the Department of State (Nina: Noring) ; allo
[481]had no objection to the declassification and/or releas
[482]“CIA Base at Atsugi, Japan” and “U-2” project / effor
[483]activities.
[485]J. Barry Harrelson
[487]File: G:\HRG\JAPOL.DOC
[489]SECRET
[492]MT “SEGRE pp/o 79-2057
[494]— | Ge 1995
[496]MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, JFK Assassination Records Review Board
[498]FROM: . David Cohen
[499]Deputy Director for Oparations
[501]SUBJECT: Release of JFK Documents
[503]i. I understand the JFK AARS is presently considering the
[504]release of documants which would identify CIA stations to the
[505]public. I am opposed in general to revealing the locations of
[506]eur stations and would prefer instead to substitute the station:
[507]name with a regional designation, e.g. European Station vica
[508]Brussels. I would ba willing, however, to open certain stations
[509]during a specific window of. time if they are substantively
[510]relevant to the assassination investigation and provided that the
[511]documents in question are sanitizedite conceal he pormanent 7
[513]| presence of the station
[515]a a . a :
[517]Ooo Begeit AL bat, & handed of instances, public acknowledgment
[519]of a station would he a political embarrassment to the host
[520]government and would threaten ongoing aensitive operations and
[521]liaison relationships. Ina few instances, the damage probably
[522]would be minimal or not at all as long as the presenca appears to
[523]be temporary. I. have surveyed the involved components and
[524]determined the damage to national security which would follow
[525]such release. (8)
[527]3. I strongly urge that you not allow the information
[528]regarding the Congo and Senegal to be released. The Congo is now
[529]Zaire and the station in the 60's would hava been in
[530]Leopoldvillea, now Kinshasa where we are currently located. Our
[531]current relationship with the Zaireans is not a full-blown
[532]liaison type, but more of a limited relationship with certain
[533]individuals from the services. In the past, we have had close
[535]cL BY (9695930 ?
[536]CL REASON: 1.5 (C)
[537]DECL ON: X1
[539]DRV FRM LOC 3-82
[544]fo.
[545].
[547]—SECRET
[549]SUBJECT: Release of JFK Documents
[550]an
[552]relationships with the Zaireans because of our nead for their
[553]cooperation in assisting with a Presidentially-mandated program
[554]and will need to improve our relationship over the next several
[555]months to accomplish our goals in that part of the world. We.
[556]alao continue to have a Station in Dakar, Senegal. We have
[558]_ liaison there and would not want to jeopardize it. In dealing
[559]with developmental contacts, there have been recent instances
[560]where potential assets. have voiced concern about our Agency's
[561]ability to keep its relationships clandestine. To expose our
[562]station there would further hamper developmental relationships
[563]and eventual recruitments. (8) . s
[565]4. Within the context of our European presence, I have the
[566]following comments:
[568]Brussels - Public acknowledgment would force the
[569]government and liaison service to pay closer attention to
[570]Station operations and therefore present a threat to ongoing
[571]sensitive operations. (3)
[573]Helsinki - A neutral country. Public acknowledgment
[574]of a CIA station would embarrass the government and liaigon;
[575]thereby inhibiting the close and productive liaison
[576]relationships we now enjoy as well as presenting» a threat to
[577]‘ongoing sensitive operations. (5S)
[579]Paris - No additional damage. (8)
[583]Bonn - No specific damage. (8)
[584]Berlin - No specific damage. (8)
[586]Luxembourg ~ Public acknowledgmant would embarrass the
[587]governmant and inhibit liaiaon cooperation; thus endangering’
[588]ongoing operations. (S)
[590]The Hague - Public acknowledgment would draw questions
[591]from tha press and create political problema for the
[592]government and liaigon. This would endanger the
[593]continuation of sensitive joint operations. (S)
[595]SECRET
[597]13-00000._
[599]en ery -
[601]GEGRET
[603]SUBJECT: Release of JFK Documents
[605]Oslo - Public acknowledgment would draw questions from
[606]the press and threaten very productive and very sensitive
[607]ongoing joint operations. (5S)
[609]Madrid - Publica acknowledgment would draw prasa
[610]attention and embarrassing questions for the government and
[611]liaison service. This would further damage an already
[612]delicate liaison relationship which is vital to us for
[613]counterterrorism operations. (8)
[615]‘ Stockholm - A neutral country. Public acknowledgment
[616]would be politically embarrassing for the government and
[617]liaison services. This would likely endanger any
[618]continuation of joint operations. (S)
[620]Geneva - A neutral country. Public acknowledgment
[621]would create political problems for the government and
[622]liaiaon service and force greater attention to our
[623]operations. This would create an intensive
[624]counterintelligence atmosphere for our operations; likely to
[625]cause a decrease in our operations. (8)
[627]London - No specific damage. (S)
[628]Ottawa - No specific damage. (3)
[630]. 5. Our Eastern European stations pose a unique problem when
[631]we considar public exposure. Prague Station is recovering from
[632]operating for almost fifty years in an undeclared status. During
[633]the laat three years we have managed, with much effort, to begin
[634]the establishment of good working relations with the host
[635]government and internal/external services. As a result, the
[636]station has recently begun some very sensitive and high-level
[637]bilateral operations. Thesa obviously depend upon the good will
[638]of the host service. The Czech citizenry came of age in an
[639]atmosphere in which digtrust of intelligence services in general,
[640]and the CIA in particular, was thoroughly ingrained. That
[641]distrust lingers in the public's mind even today. Exposure of
[642]our station's previously undisclosed presence and operational
[643]activities during the Cold War will necassarily raise quastions
[644]about our activities then, and almost certainly lead to further .
[649]a © .
[651]SUBJECT: Release of JFK Documents
[655]inquiry about our present relationship. It is doubtful that our
[656]relationship, and certainly our very sensitive operations, could
[657]withstand the resulting public debate. The existence of Prague
[658]Station, past and present, cannot be surfaced at this tima
[659]without serious damage to national security. (5S)
[661]6. Public acknowledgment of our stations in Managua,
[662]San Jose, Panama City, San Salvador, Santo Domingo, Buenos Aires,
[663]Lima, Santiago, and Montevideo would not further damage our
[664]operational capabilities in a specific sense. Overall, any
[665]release of information about a clandestine service breeds
[667]distruat in professionalism and will put future operations at
[668]risk. (8)
[670]7. We receive significant national collection syatems
[672]support from Australia which affects national system collection
[673].efforts against Tier IA targets throughout Asia. We would
[674]jeopardize this by releaaing the presence of our station to the
[676]' public. Tokyo is a special case in that there is continuing
[677]disagreement regarding our station. We should not complicate the
[678]current "Spy Mania" atmosphere in Tokyo. There have been two
[679]incidents regarding our presence in Japan during the present ~
[680]year. Any further disclosure’ would exacerbate the tension and
[682]create an untenable operational atmosphere for our station and
[683]pergonnal. (8)
[685]: 8. Public acknowledgment of a atation in India would be a
[686]problem for the U.S. Government. U.S. and India foreign
[687]relations are always delicate; the Indian Government is very
[688]sensitive to parceived slights to its national sovereignty, and
[689]public acknowledgment. of a station would prove embarrassing to
[690]the Indian Government which in turn could ask that the station be
[691]closed. If the station were closed or significantly downsized,
[692]it would affect a larga number of important intelligence
[693]collection operationa. (8)
[695]9. Public acknowledgment of a atation in Tunisia would be
[696]a problem for Tunisia vis-a-vis its Libyan neighbor. Libya and
[697]Tunisia share a border which means the Tunisian Government must
[698]act with some prudence regarding its relations with Libya. The
[699]Libyan Government would almost certainly respond very negatively .
[704]SUBJECT: Release of JFK Documents
[706]to a public acknowledgment of a station in Tunisia and might well
[708]\ engage in harassment/sabotage/terrorist actions in Tunisia to
[709]show its displeasure. If the Tunisian Government should ask that
[710]our station be closed, the U.&. Government would lose a
[711]capability to collect on Libya, north African stability, and
[712]Islamic extremiam. (8)
[714]10. Public acknowledgment of a station in Morocco would be a
[715]problem for Morocco vis-a-vis its Islamic fundamentalist
[716]population. Morocco, like so many countries with a majority
[717]Muslim population, has a growing Islamic fundamentalist problem, |
[718]and Islamic fundamentalists are frequently opposed to the U.8. in
[719]general and the Agency in particular. Public acknowledgment of a
[720]station in Morocco could cause its Islamic fundamentalist
[721]‘population to react negatively and demand that our station be
[722]closed. If the atation were closed, the U.8. Government would
[723]loge intelligence on the western Sahara conflict, north African
[725]‘etability and Islamic extremism. (5)
[727]11. In those instances where I have indicated damage to
[728]operational capability and national security, I would feel
[729]compelled to seek a reversal of any decision to make a public
[730]acknowledgment. In those cases where I indicate "no specific or
[731]additional damage", I am prepared to accept your decision yet I
[732]muat call your attantion to the general damage done to us by any
[733]disclosure of operational presence. Our operational capabilities
[734]are in direct proportion to the confidence placed in our ability
[735]to protect source identities and operational methoda. Disclosure
[736]to the public of our presence weakens this ¢ weakens this confidence. — AS)
[738]AA -
[741]INAS a oe
[743]David mach