[1]157-10014-10185
[3]| 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
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[33]JFK Assassination System Date: 7/7/2015
[35]Identification Form
[37]Agency Information
[38]SSCIA
[39]157-10014-10185
[40]MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE
[41]07-M-90
[43]Document Information
[45]SSCIA
[46]THE CONGO
[48]08/22/1975
[49]5
[51]CIA
[52]MOBUTU
[53]LUMUMBA, PATRICE, ASSASSINATION
[55]SUMMARY
[56]Unclassified
[58]Redact
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[65]Page 1
[67]Date : 08/07/95
[68]Page : 1
[70]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[71]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[73]AGENCY INFORMATION
[75]AGENCY. : SSCIA
[76]RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10185 .
[77]RECORDS SERIES : MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE
[78]AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
[80]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[82]OPENING CRITERIA
[83]COMMENTS
[85]ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
[86]FROM :
[88]TITLE : THE CONGO
[89]DATE : 08/22/75
[90]PAGES : 5
[91]SUBJECTS : LUMUMBA, PATRICE, ASSASSINATION
[92]CIA
[93]MOBUTU
[94]DOCUMENT TYPE : SUMMARY
[95]CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
[96]RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
[97]CURRENT STATUS : POSTPONED IN FULL
[98]DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 01/19/99
[100][R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED
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[104]a Cp Ren VTE
[105]852 Abe oP Cate.)
[106]va ;
[107]INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY
[109]"Victor Hedgeman" 9
[113]INTERVIEW WITH:
[115]REGARDING:
[119]PRESENT: “Bill Bader
[121]HAS OR SHOULD BE DIGESTED:
[123]FOLLOW UP REQUIRED: SEE PAGE 5 -- POSSIBLE INTERVIEWEES
[125]EXECUTIVE SESSION: YES NO
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[131]Interview and Meeting Summary ~- "Victor Hedgeman"
[132]w/Bill Bader, August 22, 1975, S201
[134]After an extended tour with the United States Army and
[135]some education at San Diego State, Hedgeman went to Harvard
[136]where he studied in the Department of International Relations
[137]working to a degree in political science. He didn't finish
[138]his degree but went after being recruited at Harvard into
[139]the OPC. ‘He then became an NOC in Europe and for a number
[140]of years worked in Belgium, Luxembourg and France. His pri-
[141]mary responsibility in Belgium was that of surveillance of
[142]Soviet operators in Europe. While in Brussels in 1959 he cam
[143]to meet a good percentage of the Congolese who would be
[144]important in the Congo after independence: Ileo, Mobutu,
[145]and Adoula. In January of 1960 he became the first Chief
[146]of Station in the Congo; prior to that time the Agency had
[147]had merely a liaison service. In late July of 1960 Hedgeman
[148]returned to the United States with Ambassador Timberlake to
[149]press for a U.S. policy of political action in the Congo.
[150]Hedgeman's position was that the Soviets were moving large
[151]amounts of equipment and manpower into the Congo and that
[152]something had to be done to head it off. At the time he
[153]first went to the Congo he was the only man in the Station.
[154]A year later there were five or six and eventually the Sta-
[155]tion would reach upwards of twenty.Hedgeman mentioned that
[156]the relationships and staff that he built in the Congo per-
[157]sisted, and that when the Laotian operation started the
[158]group would move almost intact to Laos. Hedgeman believed
[160]that the Congo was vitally important to American interests,
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[164]INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY Page __
[167]ay
[169]important to the United States' future, and ;sthat it was
[171]INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY Page °°
[173]despite some criticism of that point from the State Depart-
[174]FILE:
[175]ment. He felt that the economic wealth of the Congo was
[177]equally important that the Congo remain a viable unit. He
[178]said that there was very strong resistance at the State
[180]level for political action involvement in the Congo. For-
[181]tunately the Congo operation became one of Allen Dulles'
[182]projects. At the beginning, with the approval of the
[184]Special Group, it. was agreed that the CIA would begin to
[185]provide financial support for moderate Congolese politicians
[186]By August of 1960, however, Hedgeman and Timberlake were push
[187]ing for instructions that would allow them to pursue a course
[188]that would lead to a change in government. Hedgeman said tha
[189]those close to Lumumba at that time were Soviet agents. The
[190]way that it was initially pursued was to the building of
[191]personnel assets investing in labor unions to help them
[193]with their propaganda, a lobbying campaign, direct payments
[194]to politicians.
[196]The first major effort to rid the Congo of Lumumba came
[197]with a plan developed by Hedgeman to bribe enough members of ©
[198]the Senate in order to induce them to vote Lumumba out..This
[199]plan was to have taken place on the 7th of September, 1960.
[201]Hedgeman had arranged that the radio would be denied Lumumba
[203]after his defeat so that he would not be able to go on the
[204]radio to try to change the decision of the Senate. Unfortuneately
[206]and for reasons Hedgeman does not know to this day, Mobutu
[208]"jumped the gun and threw Lumumba out. Lumumba in turn went . sean
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[212]INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY Page °°
[214]to the Assembly and harangued them and got the vote and also got
[215]x FILE:
[216]the vote in the Senate by bringing troops out and surrounding
[218]the Senate building. Hedgeman said that up to this point he
[220]had been thinking largely in parliamentary terms; that the
[222]way to rid the country of Lumumba was through the paramilitar
[223]method. After this experience of the 5th through the 7th, he
[224]decided more drastic and direct methods had to be employed.
[225]Hedgeman contends that the coup of Mobutu seized control was
[226]arranged and supported, and indeed, managed, by the Central
[227]Intelligence Agency. During the course of the interview
[228]Hedgeman spoke glowingly of Mobutu, who he feels is a man wit
[229]good political judgment, a sense of history, and the capacity
[230]te be a Pan African leader. Mobutu was only twenty-nine at
[231]the time. Hedgeman says his most difficult time with Mobutu
[232]came in February of 1961 when the Kennedy administration decided
[233]that a federalized government, including all political factions
[234]was the only hope of averting civil war.. Hedgeman was charge
[235]with going to Mobutu and telling him that the United States
[236]had decided to withdraw all support from him and that he
[237]would have to resign. He said Mobutu was utterly shocked
[238]by this and could not possibly believe the United States
[239]could believe that the Congo was ready for parliamentary
[240]government. He said Mobutu was so upset that he drew his gun
[241]and waved it in the direction of Hedgeman and said "If this
[242]happens, I will die," and, looking at Hedgeman, "so will others."
[243]Hedgeman said Mobutu only put his gun away when Hedgeman
[244]told him that he did not personally agree with the decision,
[246]that he was just carrying out orders like a good soldier.
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[250]Hedgeman stressed that in. this period, 1960-1961, the
[252]Congo was fraught with utter confusion; he sais that what
[254]they were running was a Scotch tape and baling-wire opera-
[256]tion. As for paramilitary operations, Hedgeman: said they be-
[258]gan seriously in the end of 1962 with the arrival of a number
[260]of T-6's that he and Ed Guilion had asked for. He said that these
[261]aircraft were not intended to be used in combat, but only to
[262]reassure the Congolese that the United States was with them a
[263]provide them with a bit of black magic. Hedgeman professed t
[264]the paramilitary combat missions of 1963, in support of anti-
[265]rebel activities, were really quite minor affairs.
[267]Some specifics. Hedgeman contended that he had no knowle
[269]of the approval of funding of South African mercenaries and
[270]tribal leaders capable of resistance as approved by the 303
[271]Committee. He also said, though, that he had important conta
[272]with Mike Hoare mercenaries, they gave no direct or indirect
[273]Support to them. He also said there was ne, repeat no, com-
[274]plicity or support on the part of the CIAm the ouster of
[275]Kasavubu by Mobutu in November of 1965.
[277]Throughout the conversation, Hedgeman interspersed the
[278]most hair-raising tales of his and his daughter's brushes wit
[279]death in their dealings with unruly mutinous Congolese, ranging
[281]' from being placed before two different firing squads during
[282]one day and his evening as the selected victim of a hit con-
[284]tract given by the Union Miniere.
[285]As for CIA employees who might testify well, should the
[287]Committee handle the Congo issue in executive session, Hedgeman
[289]recommended Edward Korn-Patterson, Bronson Tweedy, and Glen
[291]Fields,
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