[1][202-10001-10187| | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 | -
[3]le wae Date : 08/28/98
[4]Page : 1.
[5]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[6]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[7]AGENCY INFORMATION |
[8]AGENCY : Jcs
[9]RECORD NUMBER : 202-10001-10187
[10]- RECORDS SERIES : FOIA SERIES
[11]AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOC 188
[12]| DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[13]ORIGINATOR : OSD.
[15]a TO x
[16]TITLE ; MINUTES OF MEETING OF THE SPECIAL GROUP ON. MONGOOSE 6
[17]| SEP 62
[18]- DATE : 09/06/62
[19]PAGES : 5
[21]SUBJECTS : MONGOOSE
[23]DOCUMENT TYPE : MEMORANDUM
[24]CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET
[25]RESTRICTIONS : 1B, 1¢
[26]CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
[27]| DATE OOP LAST REVIEW : 07/30/98
[28]OPENING CRITERIA =:
[29]COMMENTS : Reviewed by JCS, OSD, CIA and State.
[31]NOJOINT STAFF OBJECTION
[32]CoO ee Sr CATION
[34]AW 50955 DocId: 32424918 Page 1
[37]a”
[39]other hand, that particularly because of
[41]WW O95 I : Docld: 32424918 Page 2
[43]overn. ght.
[45]‘bad | The Group then turned to a discussion of dumber 32 ‘Gare
[49]£. General Carter pointed out that reference to support of all
[50]Cuban exile groups (number 48) 1s impractical, The word was changed
[51]to selected.
[53]e
[55]&. ‘Mr. Martin cautioned that results of n ber 50 (actions to
[57]be undertaken by other Heulephere governments) would aot. be. expected
[59]., Several Carger urged that, in gommetticn vien [number 22 L
[61]in working up other -dé aption men. ||!
[63]Re possible Cuban counter-
[65]measures which had. been outlined by Mr. Murrow, the Group should look.
[67]at other possibilities in some detail.
[69]a. General Carter fele that a determination should ‘be made as
[70]to. how far the U.S. is prepared to go in economic hartassing actions. a8
[71]He emphasized that sabotage operations such as those under number 27 .
[73]will not in themselves be especially effective in: yrecking che ‘Cuban
[75]‘rs, Pest Dhow
[77]wabotage). General Carter emphasized the extrene sensitivity o¢ any
[78]Such operation and the disastrous results that would flow from some-—
[79]thing aoing wrong, particularly if there were obvious actribution ‘to
[81]the U.S. He wenc on to say, however, that it would be possitle ro
[83]accomplish this purpose by methods more subtle than those indicated in
[87]the paper. He mencioned specifically the possibility ofproducin
[90]«ho
[93][failures /by the introduction of biological agents which would appear
[95]LS they could be completely covered up. fe aim citi
[97]oS 4 wey ‘A suggestion was made that small explosives or incendiaries which
[98]Poop. cee - :
[99]= _ could be distributed to Cubans should be infilgrated. General Carter
[101]explained that the problem is not one of such supplies, since they can
[103]to use such materials despite many exile claims to the contrary.
[104]“ :
[106]lt was suggested that the matter of attacking and harragsing of
[107]et personnel within Cuba should be considered, Hi
[111]7, The Atcorney General and Mr. Bundy said “that no reprisals against
[113]exiles who undertake active operations on their own are contemplated.
[115]8. It was Suggested that the possibilities of counterfeiting be looke: ~
[117]into further.
[119]9. General Carter urged again that a decision be reached as to how
[121]much Llatitwde would be allowed the operating elements of the government
[123]within broad policy lines. The Chairman indicated that ic would not be:
[125]a@ simple matter ro delegate résponsibilities of this kind to any great :
[127]degree.
[129]10. Mr. Bundy then raised the basic question of the entire spectrum
[130]oo. ee teseanet eh mw A. weet wa med
[132]day eh | REREAD ess en
[134]HW 30955. Doeld:32424918 Page 3
[136]zo bel of natural origin. Mr. Bundy said that he had no worries about |
[137]any such sabotage which could clearly be made to appear as the result L.
[138]of local Cuban disaffection or of natural disaster, but. chat we suse |
[140]avoid external activities such astrelease of chemicals, etc., unles¢ coe
[142]f ee
[144], be-easily improvised, but rather that the people have shown no inclinat:
[149]f. General Carter pointed out that reference to support of all
[150]Cuban exile groups (number 48) is impractical. The word was changed
[151]to selected.
[155]Be Mr. Martin cautioned that results of number 50 (actions to
[157]Ps
[159]be undertaken by other Hemisphere governments) would not be expected
[161]over: Ce : a [> ; 4 |
[163]General Carter urged that, in connection with
[165]whd be given” more laticude
[167]MN) General Lansdale sh
[169]in working up other déeption possibilities « Bundy felt, on the
[171]other hand, that particularly because of eiie’ possible Cuban counter~
[172]measures which had been outlined by Mr. Murrow, the Group should look
[173]at other possibilities in some detail.
[175]i. General Carter fele that a determination should be made as
[176]to how far the U.S. is prepared to go in, economic harrassing actions,
[177]He emphasized chat sabotage operations such as those under number 27
[179]i
[181]will net in themselves be especially effective in grecking the Cuban
[183]economy. Pedr h % qh AK\ . | =
[185]“4./ The Group then turned to a discussion of number 32
[187]General Carter emphasized the extreme sensitivity of. any
[189]such operation and the disastrous results that would flow from some-
[190]thing going wrong, particularly if there were obvious attribution to
[192]the U.S. He went on to say, however, that it would be possible to
[194]8 enti
[196]accomplish this purpose by methods more subtle than those indicated in
[200]the paper. He mentioned specifically the possibility og
[207]Mr. Bundy said that he had no worries about
[209]any such sabotage which could clearly be made to appear as the result
[211]at .
[212]aor of local Cuban disaffection or o but that we must
[214]. @vold external activities such a
[216]a ‘a :
[218]Se
[222](0 -~-3. A suggestion was made that suiall explosives or incendiaries which
[223]reed ~
[224]L Ve could be distributed te Cubang should be infiltrated. General Carter
[226]explained that the problem is not ome of such supplies, since they can
[227], be easily improvised, but rather that the people have shown no inclinatic
[229]to use such materials despite many exile claims to the contrary.
[232]i
[233]i C oe t was suggested that the matter of attacking and harrassing of
[236]\y"! 6 ét personnel within Cuba should be considered ||
[240]7, The Attorney General and Mr. Bundy said that no reprisals against
[242]exiles whe undertake active operations on their own are contemplaced.
[244]8, Tt was suggested that the possibilities of counterfeiting be looked
[246]into further.
[248]9. General Carter urged again that a decision be reached as to how
[249]much Latitude would be allowed che operating elesients of the government,
[250]within broad policy lines. The Chairman indicated that it would not be
[251]a simple mamter to delegate responsibilities of this kind to any great
[253]degree.
[255]10. Mr. Bumidy them raised the basic question of the entire spectrum
[257]AE Pe wm cern oo gerne
[259]Ta mone BRA BRR AR aimee wm da Rta MOIS CSO EY ue gtk ee ed im