[1]157-10011-10066 | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
[2]JFK Assassination System Date: - —7/30/201
[3]Identification Form .
[5]Agency Information
[7]4
[9]AGENCY:  SSCIA
[10]RECORD NUMBER: — 157-10011-10066
[12]RECORD SERIES: MEMORANDUM
[14]AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
[16]Document Information
[18]’ ORIGINATOR: ROCK
[19]FROM: ROETHE, JAMES N.
[20]TO: FILE
[22]TITLE: | FURTHER INFO OBTAINED FROM BREWER, GEORGE
[24]DATE: 02/24/1975
[25]PAGES: 13
[27]SUBJECTS :
[28]ASSISTANCE TO LOCAL POLICE
[29]BREWER, GEORGE
[30]TECHNICAL OPERATIONS
[31]SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS
[32]CIA - WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE
[34]DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[35]CLASSIFICATION : ~ Unclassified ‘
[36]RESTRICTIONS : — Consulted; 1A; 3; Donor Restricted
[37]CURRENT STATUS: — Redact
[38]DATE OF LAST REVIEW: — (05/31/1994
[40]OPENING CRITERIA :
[42]COMMENTS : SSCI Box 286, Folder 11
[45]BY 50955 Docld: 32203834 Page 1
[47]Date:05/30/94
[48]. Page:1
[49]3 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[51]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[53]AGENCY INFORMATION
[55]AGENCY : SSCIA
[56]RECORD NUMBER : 157-10011-10066
[58]RECORDS SERIES :
[59]MEMORANDUM
[61]AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
[63]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[65]ORIGINATOR : ROCK
[66]FROM : ROETHE, JAMES N.
[67]TO : FILE
[69]TITLE :
[70]FURTHER INFO OBTAINED FROM BREWER, GEORGE
[72]DATE : 02/24/75
[73]PAGES : 13
[75]SUBJECTS :
[76]r BREWER, GEORGE
[78]“ TECHNICAL OPERATIONS
[79]ASSISTANCE TO LOCAL POLICE
[80]SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS
[81]CIA - WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE
[83]DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[84]CLASSIFICATION : U
[85]RESTRICTIONS : 1A, 3, DONOR REST., REFERRED
[86]CURRENT STATUS : X
[87]DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 05/31/94
[89]OPENING CRITERIA :
[91]COMMENTS :
[92]SSCI Box 286, Folder 11
[94][R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED
[96]HY 50955 Docld:32203834 Page 2
[100]COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNFTED-STATES
[102]Washington, DC 20500 PBGb-I|
[104]Nelson A, Rockefeller, David W. Belin,
[105]Chairman February 24, 1975 . Executive Director
[106]John T. Connor ; .
[107]t ota Oalton ; N&TE? Dpeidents wae thet Page Numbers a
[108]erwin N. Griswolc . pan . ; a,
[109]Lane Kirkland iNndicgted were Net spec i freafly
[110]Lyman L. Lemnitzar
[112]me ome « Are :
[113]Ronald Reagan ntrenecd in +he GOS cr pt.
[115]Edgar F. Shannon, Jr.
[117]SECRET/SENSITIVE | — SSCI Box 286, Folder 11 -
[119]MEMORANDUM FOR: FILE ee Hy
[120]FROM: JAMES N. ROBTHE — Record Number 157-10011-10066 ~
[122]NM lee ee a
[123]SUBJECT: Further Information obtained from George Brewer
[125](See February 18 Interview)
[127]fa
[129]On Monday, February 24, I again spoke with George Brewer in the Commission
[130]offices from approximately 9:00 am until 10:15 am. The following additional
[131]information was obtained.
[133]Technical Operations
[135]In 1960 and 1961, Brewer was primary involved in Bay of Pigs operations (pro-
[136]viding support to the liami Field Office in smuggling friendly Cubans into the
[137]United States). Ne was engaged in little technical activity curing that time.
[138]Between 1962 and 1965, he was involved in approximately 30 technical operations,
[139]only four of which were telephone taps (the rest were mike and wire cases).
[140]During that same perioi four or five other Support agents . were also engaged
[141]in technical activities, each performing approximately the same amount of tech-
[142]nical work that Brewer was performing. Some of the agents doing technical work
[143]were Jack Cryer, Shes and Bill Simpson, the latter being a former in-
[144]structor of Brewer's. Both Cryer and Simpson had been doing technical work for
[145]quite some time (throughout the 50's), a ae Cu 5t- 52)
[147]La a,
[149]In 1965 or 1966, following President Johnson's Executive Order precluding wire
[150]taps without court order or without approval of the Attcrney General in security
[151]cases, technical work performed by Brewer and others at the Washington Field
[152]Office almost stopped completely. Brewer can recall only two taps that were
[153]placed during that period. One of these was placed in a Safe House in the
[154]Washington area, and the other was placed in a New York apartnent in connec-
[155]tion with Project PARAGON. Brewer assumes that the appropriate approvals were
[156]obtained prior to his placing these taps. TID yay C1149~43)
[158]Most of the technical operations in the early 1960's were performed at the re-
[159]quest of the Operations Directorate. While Brewer was not privy to the purpose
[160]for cach technical operation that he performed, he believes that many involved
[162]CIA HAS NO OBJECT" mas
[163]sheet | FICATIC?
[164]| —e . EOS OF THIS DUcUwclT
[166]oe MAY 94-
[167]YF Ci)CA)
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[171]ro.
[174]“a E ;
[176]Safe Houses for use by defectors and the wiring of operations assets’ apart-
[178]ments or other premises where conversations with assets|would be forth-
[180]coming. For instance, in 1962 the apartment of a defector (Golitzen) was \
[181]wired. It was believed that Golitzen had become unhappy with CIA treatment
[183]and was considering leaving the country. A telephone tap was placed on his
[185]phone to attempt to verify this. Brewer believes that these cases involved
[186]positive foreign intelligence gathering as opposed to being security cases.
[188]From the names of the individuals whose conversations were to be recorded,
[190]Brewer presumes that most of these technical operations|were directed against
[191]foreigners.
[193]Brewer is aware of a few technical operations relating to ee One in-
[194]volved the bugging of the premises. of a former employee (pawl: © Oy
[195]about 1964 because of his questionable associates. Another, in ieee ‘involved
[196]a telephone tap on a newsman (although Brewer was unaware at the time the tap /
[197]was placed that it was being directed against a newsman) . (1/49)
[199]The Technical Division of the Office of Security may have been involved in “2g
[200]some technical operations in the United States during the 1960's and eatlier. |
[201]However, their primary responsibility was counter-audio work overseas. Brewer _
[202]does not believe that they would have been involved in significant amounts of
[204]technical work in the States. ; apete Peckiene at ‘
[205]7 et « = ees wt pen Seer correct VP FIs as ree yey
[207]as Bere aN i . LL & oe i , f CBee TF Late. Fee $9
[208]y Surveillance Operations ‘
[210]Prior to 1968, the Washington Field Office was performing some unsophisticated
[211]surveillance. This generally related to surveillance of defectors and training
[212]operations directed against perspective overseas CIA agents. The purpose of
[214]the training was to assist WFO in its surveillance techniques and to determine
[215]how wel] the perspective overseas agents could make contacts and "drops" without
[216]being detected. The Field Office had little equipment to undertake sophisticated
[217]surveillance at that time. (7)ju- -2e)
[219]In 1968, with the creation of the Surveillance and Technical Unit, a much more
[220]concentrated effort was made in the area of surveillance. C127)
[222]Assistance to Local Police
[224]Brewer remembers that at some point in time two sets of|/alias documents prepared
[225]by Technical Services were given to the Metropolitan Police Department. This
[226]included a social security card, driver's license, D. C. permit, etc.
[228]RRR HRRERR
[230]I again interviewed Mr. Brewer at approximately 2:30 pm on the same day, just
[231]rior to his leaving for the Commission hearings, at which he was testifying.
[232]indicated that it was the policy of the CIA to offer gratuities to various
[234]SECRET/SENSITIVE
[236]HW 50955 Docld: 32203834 Page 4
[240]police officers in the Washington, D.C., area for their assistance to the CIA.
[241]Each Christmas a list would be prepared of those individuals from local police
[242]departments who had provided assistance,and appropriate gifts would be given
[243]to these individuals, ranging from candy and liquor to $25 gift certificates.
[244]The money for these gifts was taken from CIA's "Blue Jay'' fund, used for mis-
[246]cellaneous sy Some police officials would not accept such gratuities.
[247]pete FEST aan
[249]Kas Ys algo aware of one occasion when police officials from several de-
[250]partments were flown to a hunting lodge owned by the Agency in southern Virginia.
[251]Brewer recalls several officers from the Montgomery County, Fairfax County (in-__
[252]cluding (GanonciMiteener);, and Metropolitan Police Department s(including&Asehisyeciivee:
[253]Benicimiivencs, but not (Chakigalizaision-who refused an invitation) attending, as well
[255]as a high police official from Boston. Brewer himself attended this gathering
[257]and indicated that as best as he can remember it was strictly a social affair.
[259]Brewer could not recall ever having agreed to provide(GOimeomlccnane of the
[260]Fairfax County Police Department with an automobile while $e cia was on vaca-
[261]tion in calm although he would not deny that he may have done so.
[263]aid) at oe 4
[265]Brewer indicated that all gratuities given police officials were approved by
[266]Headquarters and that none were specifically connected with any particular
[267]request being made of the police by the CIA. CLF )
[269](full distribu tion) _
[271]SNR/var
[272]SECRET/SENSITIVE
[274]HY 50955 Docid: 32203834 Page 5
[277]: * , COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES
[278]Washington, DC 20500
[280]February 20, 1975
[282]SECRET/SENSITIVE
[284]MEMORANDUM FOR: FILE
[286]FROM: JAMES N. ROETHE) . >
[287]SUBJECT: ' Summary of an Interview with George R. Brewer, Conducted :
[288]on Tuesday, February 18, 1975, ia the Offices uf the
[289]Commission by James N. Roethe and Robert Olsen
[290]The interview commenced at approximately 4:00 pm on February 18, 1975, and
[291]ended at approximately 8:30 pm on the same date. Mr. Brewer appeared
[292]voluntarily at the request of the Commission staff.
[293]Background of Mr. Brewer
[294]Mr. Brewer is a graduate of the University of Maryland. Hie has been with
[295]the CIA for over twenty years and is presently Chief of the Director's
[296]Security Staff. The interview concerned itself primarily with the activities .
[297]of the Washington Field Office of the Office of Security. Mr. Brewer first
[298]worked in that office from January 1955 to Februar. 1956, -From February 1956
[299]to April 1959 he was on Director Dulies' personal security staff. He served
[300]with the Headquarters Field Office (now defunct) from April 1959 to August 1969
[301]and again served with the Washington Field Office from August 1960 to July 1973, ;
[302]when he obtained his present position, £
[304]Activities at the Washington Field Office
[306]The Washington Field Office is made up of 35-40 agents. Clericals bring the
[307]total cf employees to about 100. It is by far the iargest security field
[308]office. The majority of the agents are designated as field agents, whose
[309]primary activity is investigating applicants for employment with the Agency
[310]and some covert investigations (investigations under cover, such as investi-
[311]gations of contractor's employees or individuals planning to be sent overseas
[312]under cover). The remaining agents are designated as Support agents (about §
[313]men} who provide a broad range of support to the field Agents. In 1966
[314]Nr. Brewer, a support agent, was designated as the Washington Field Office's
[315]liaison with the local police {including the Metronolitan Police Department,
[316]most Suburban police departments, and the Virginia and Maryland State Police),
[317]In November of 1968, Mr. Brower was placed in charge of a newly created
[318]"Surveillance and Technical Unit" of the Support Squad. He remained in both
[319]positions until he left the Office in July of 1973. Mr. Brewer emphasized
[320]that no activity was undertaken ty the ficld office without the approval of
[321]eadquarters. Requests for action in Mr. Brewer's areas of interest would be
[322]eceived by headquarters security, generally from the Operations Directorate,
[323]The "Security Support 3ranch" at headquarters would »ass the request on to the
[324]j
[327]HW 50955 DocId: 32203834 Page 6
[332]"Assistant Special Agent in Charge of Support"! at the field office (Mr. John
[333]Hutchinson during most of Mr. Brewer's tenure), who in turn would ask
[334]Mr. Brewer to carry out the request.
[336]The following persons have headed the Washington Field Office as "Special
[339]Charles Kane 1960-1963
[340]i Marvin Gentile 1963-1964
[341]John Noble 1964-1968
[342]| Ed Klippa 1968-1975
[343]Jack Cryer Present
[345]Covert Investigations by Field Agents
[347]Such investigations w cre conducted much less frequently than overt investiga-
[348]tions of applicants for employment. Several unofficial covers were used by
[349]b
[351]investigators to prevent the person being investigated from being exposed as
[352]a CIA contact.
[354]Technical Operations
[356](
[357]Technical operations consisted of the planting of electronic listening devices
[358](King) and the telephone taps (Queen), No technical devices were planted by
[359]the Washington Field Office after the formation in 1968 of the "Surveillance
[360]and Technical Unit." However, Mr. Brewer has pleuted technical devices prior
[361]to 1968: . :
[363]1. In about 1966 Mr. Brewer planted a listening device in an apartment
[364]at the Savoy Apartments in Yashington, D. C. (a CIA Safe House). This
[365]device was later removed and Brewer was told it was never used,
[367]2. - About 8 years ago Mr. Brewer placed several bugs in a Washington Safe
[368]- House. He believes they have never been removed. They have never been
[369]used to his knowledge.
[371]3. ; About 10 years ago Mr. Brewer was called back from vacation to bug 4
[372], cadillac to be used by two Chinese generals.
[374]4." At one time Mr. Brewer bugged hotel rooms in the Washington area where
[375]unwitting U-2 pilot applicants were being interviewed.
[377]5. In 1963 Mr. Brewer placed telephone taps on phones in a home in
[378]Washington (MOCKINGBIRD case). At the time he did not know he was
[379]tapping a news columnist's phone, but he later learned that that had
[380]been the case. ;
[382]6. Four houses in Miami were bugged by Mr. Brewer shortly after the Bay of
[383]Pigs incident.
[385]“ SECRET/SENSITIVE
[387]an
[388]na
[390]BW 50955 Dbecia: 32203834 Page 7
[394]7. A hotel room in Los Angeles was bugged by Brewer several years ago. It
[395]was to be used for some kind of interview.
[397]8. -A.home-in Bethesda, Maryland, was also bugged before being occupied by a
[398]Cuban National.
[400]|
[401]In all, Mr. Brewer believes he was involved in more than ten technical opera-
[402]tions, but less than 100 prior to 1968. In all cases he was merely supplying
[403]technical support for operations at the request of his superiors, and was not
[404]witting to the actual operation. In each case he assumed the propriety and
[405]lawfulness of the operation.
[407]Since 1966, Mr. Brewer has been engaged in only one technical operation
[408](Operation PARAGON~-threat against Director Helms and Vice President Agnew).
[409]When that threat was made, Brewer suggested that a line be run into the in-
[410]forming agent's apartment. Such a line was run from that agent's telephone
[411](a telephone tap). This operation was approved by higher authority.
[413]Surveillance
[415]Surveillance was conducted off and on through the period from 1960 to 1973.
[416]However, active surveillance did not begin until 1968 when the "Surveillance
[417]and Technical Unit" was formed, Prior to 1968, surveillance was restricted
[418]to training exercises and surveillance of defectors. Mr. Brewer estimated
[419]that he engaged in about ten such operations prior to 1968. Training sur-
[420]veillance continued after 1968, but only one surveillance of a defector was
[421]made during that time.
[423]In 1966 Headquarters requested that the Washington Field Headquarters form a
[424]sophisticated surveillance unit. Such a unit was not really created until
[425]Brewer took over the "Surveillance and Technical Unit" in 1968, After 1968
[426]surveillance took up « large part of the time of the "Surveillance and Techni-
[427]cal Unit's" time. The Unit consisted of 14 support agents and was expanded
[428]to 20-24 men during some surveillances. The Washington Field Office did
[429]surveillance for the entire country with regard to Security Office matters.
[431]If a surveillance was conducted anywhere in the country, Brewer believes he
[432]would: know of it. If surveillance was conducted in the territory of another
[433]fieldi office, that field office would have been in charge, with the Washington
[434]Office providing the Support. The following surveillance was undertaken by
[435]Brewer's Unit:
[439]1. Surveillance of Employees or Former Employees
[441]SECRET/SENSITIVE
[443]“
[444],
[446]HY 50955 Docld:32203834 Page 6
[448]SEGRET/SENSITIVE ; -~ 4 -
[450]HW 50955
[452]2.
[454]3.
[456]b, Project CAPUSTO (8 Ball): Employee associating with former defector
[458]was surveilled.
[459]Project TOMCAT: An associate of CAPUSTO was surveilled.
[461]Project MONEY: A former employee planning to attend the SALT talks
[462]with his new boss was surveilled. ;
[464]Project SIESTA: Surveillance on a former employee and the suspected
[465]Castro agent she was living with.
[467]Project PINEAPPLE: Surveillance of a former employee living above his
[468]means. Washisngton Field Office surveilled outside D.C. Anderson
[469]Associates surveilled in D.C. and at subject's Arlington home. Wash-
[471]ington Field Office did not participate in any break-in of subject's
[472]apartment.
[474]Project AMOS: Former employee surveilled to Champaign, Illinois.
[476]Project PIXIF: (last job): Two employees and son of another surveilled
[477]for suspected drug use and/or sale,
[479]- Project PARAGON: Informer who reported threat against Director Helms
[481]and Vice President Agnew surveilled in New York and Detroit.
[483]. MARCHETTI: Former employee threatening to publish classified material
[484](which he co‘:ld not have obtained during the course of his employment)
[485]was surveilled, Three cars were used in surveillance. No police cover.
[487]Surveillance of Newsmen (to determine source of security leaks)
[489]Mea’ Grewer knew that surveillance was to determine source
[490]Sreomkew publishing of classified information. Mr. Brewer ques-
[491]tioned his superior (John Hutchinson) about the case. He wondered why
[492]the FBI was not involved and understood agit FBI didn't want to
[493]OOF. LS Eee
[495]», Mr. Brewer also questioned this surveillance, but not
[497]SPeongly ase Be Was relatively unknown. Further, he really didn't
[499]Other Surveillances
[501]_ a. A nephew of an assistant to Director McCone was surveilled after he
[503]Doclda: 3272703834 Page 9
[505]went berserk and threatened to go to the Russians. He was surveilled
[506]for two days.
[508]SECRET/SEXSITIVE
[510]r
[512]| REET LT ERO PTET
[514]arerepye
[516]oe RI NTI EY ATELIER RA EL OE IE ES ETI FT see ns
[517]ia” Bg tng oe an
[519]sie mene
[522]SECRET/SENSITIVE - 53 -
[524]In all cases of surveillance, photographs of the subject and his contacts
[526]were taken. Further, the identity of the contact was also ascertained and
[527]reported to headquarters. No surveillance was ever placed on a Congressman,
[528]Senator, Judge or Justice or other public figure except the newsmen previously
[529]mentioned. Mr. Brewer believes that there were no cases of surveillance
[530]undertaken by his Unit which did not involve either (1) a threatened security
[531]leak: to newsmen, or (2} a potential security violation, except Project
[532]PARAGON .
[534]The records kept on surveillances include the letters assigning the surveil-
[535]lance to the Unit, the agents! logs, photographs taken and the final report
[536]of each project. This information was all sent to Headquarters. The Field
[537]Office would also retain copies but never made any use of these files.
[541]Mr. Brewer's Surveiliance Unit was only involved in one break-in in connection
[542]with Project SIESTA, involving a former employee living with a suspected
[543]Castro sympathizer. A photographic studio, jointly operated by the employee
[544]and her Cuban boy friend, was broken into. This didn't bother Brewer, as
[545]there was strong evidence suggesting a possible security violation. Further,
[546]the suspected pair ws soliciting passport photo business at CIA,which would
[547]give them information about the travels of CIA agents. A second break-in
[549]was effected by Anderson Associates (a CIA proprietary) in Project SIESTA.
[550]Brewer doesn't know who headed up Anderson Associites, He believes that
[552]Ralph True, Joe Langen and Don Connor may have hac. some connection with it.
[554]Mr. Brewer's Surveillance Unit was disbanded in June or July of 1972. Brewer
[555]is not sure why the Unit was disbanded. The Washington Field Office still does
[556]training surveillance and surveillance of defectors. There have been no in-
[557]stances (to Brewer's knowledge) of potential employee security leaks since the
[558]Surveillance Unit was disbanded.
[560]1
[562]Activity with Dissident Groups
[564]On three occasions (in 1969, 1970 and May 1971) the CIA participated with the
[565]‘ashington police in monitoring peace and anti-war demonstrations. In each
[566]case a. request was made by the Washington Police Department (MPD), through
[568]“ Gaaa think geery for assistance. The Washington Field Office of CIA
[569]furnished six vehicles with communications gear and men to operate the gear.
[570]Mr. Brewer believes that two CIA agents and one police officer occupied each
[571]car, (More CIA agents than police were utilized,as MPD didn't have the neces-
[572]sary manpower.) The only purpose of this operation was to monitor the move-
[573]ments of the crowds. ‘There was no attempt to penetrate any dissident organi-
[574]zation or to photograph the crowds. The CIA agents involved in the May 1,197],
[575]operation carried police ID's. CIA also provided a fully-staffed cemmunics-
[576]tions center at MPD to receive communications from the cars. This provided
[577]MPD a second radio frequency and freed PD's own channels for other police
[578]business.
[580]SECRET/SENSITIVE
[582]HY 50955 Docld:32203034 Page 10
[584]- SECRET/SENSITIVE ~6-
[586]Brewer believes that the primary purpose of ‘this operation was to render
[587]“communications ‘assistance to the local police.’ The secondary purpose was
[589]to monitor crowds sc as to protect CIA installations. (For example, MPD
[591]had obtained some information that various dissident groups planned to picket
[592]CIA Headquarters and planned to harass Director Helms during a planned. speech.)
[593]All of these CIA operations were verbally approved by Headquarters Support
[594]Branch (Mr. Cryer). Total period of time devoted to monitoring dissident groups
[595]with MPD (for all three occasions) was about five days. Brewer is not aware of
[596]any instance where the Washington Field Office tried to penetrate any dissident
[597]groups.
[599]Collection of Information on Dissident Groups
[601]During the period of the demonstrations in 1969-1971, all field offices and
[602]resident agents were requested by Headquarters to look out for literature
[604]and other informatior which might in any way affect the CIA. No conscious
[605]intelligence gathering of literature was requested.. Items to be looked for
[606]included campus news clippings, etc.. This project was not a continuing one
[607]over the three-year period when most demonstrations occurred. It was renewed
[608]from time to time as flare-ups in activity occurred. Mr. Brower does not know
[609]the quantity of material collected or the use made of that material. The only
[610]information that Brewer knows was collected by the Washington Field Office
[611]consisted of the weekly intelligence summary prepared by MPD. Headquarters
[612]specifically asked Brewer to get the summaries (either Jack Cryer, Tex Mills
[613]or Curt Rivers),and they were forwarded to Headquarters. No effort was made
[614]by Brewer to obtain information concerning any dissident group's intended
[615]activities.
[617]Police Cover Operations
[619]Mr. Brewer indicated that Washington Field Office agents have received police
[620]cover from the following police departments:
[622]1. Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) During the May 1971 demonstra-
[623]tions, MPD furnished ID's to those CIA agents monitoring the crowds along
[624]with pelice officers, These ID cards were in fact used. No other police
[625]cover was obtained from MPD. ”
[627]2. Fairfax Citv Police Denartment: _In connection with Operation SIESTA
[628](which included a break~in at the photographic studio in Fairfax City,
[629]operated by a suspected Castro Agent) cover was obtained from the police.
[630]One CIA agent was given a Fairfax City police badge in case some one
[631]walked in on the break-in, The badge was never utilized. Brewer didn't
[632]actually remember obtaining this badge, but it was obtained by some one.
[634]SECRET/SENS ITIVE
[636]HY 50955 DocId:32203834 Page 11
[640]3. Fairfax County Police Department: Apparently undercover CIA agents in the
[641]county (under DOD cover) were being continuously harassed and challenged
[642]in the county while on operations. They feared their cover might be
[643]blown and feit it would be good to have police cover to prevent this
[644]from occurring. Mr. Brewer himself may have suggested getting badges and
[645]identification from the county police. In any event, he thought it was a
[646]good idea and Headquarters approved it (per John Hutchinson, Assistant
[647]Special Agent in Charge of the Washington Field Se poeta
[649]Se
[652]some badges and’ : Col, eo:
[653]reluctant to give CIA the badges and ID, but in ori “spring of 1972 he
[654]changed his mind and relented. Brewer does net know if Osborn called
[655]AC Neaescr) or if there was any arm-twis tag by the CIA. Brewer himself
[656]did no arm-twisting. Nine patrolman's badges and one sergeant's badge
[657]were obtained, plus ten blank ID cards. The true names of CIA agents
[658]were placed on the cards by Brewer, It was understood that if the badges
[659]and ID's were ever used that SeOus Duss cn would immediately be notified.
[660]In fact, they were kept in a safe at Washingtcn Field Office Headquarters
[661]and never used. They have recently been returned to Fairfax County.
[663]No police cover was ever obtained by Washington Field Office, or used by them
[664]for the purpose of performing police activity. Brewer stated that local police
[665]were always kept informed of CIA activities in their jurisdiction.
[667]Other Assistance Rendered CIA by becal Police
[671]Project SIESTA:
[673]This project involveé the break-in into a photographic shop in Fairfax City.
[674]Three Fairfax City pulice assisted in the operation. One entered the apart-
[675]ment with several CIA agents; one stood watch on the front steps; and one
[676]waited in a squad car outside the building. Much material in the photographic
[677]studio was photographed. Surveillance was constantly maintained on the opera-
[678]tors | of the studio. while the break-in was being carried out.
[680]Use of Fairfax County Facilities:
[682]On at least one occasion the Fairfax County police station was used | for CIA
[683]training purposes. CIA desired to assure themselves that new recruits for
[684]covert overseas duty could not be "broken" if siezed by foreign authorities.
[685]Consequently, CIA officials would "arrest" these unwitting recruits on some
[686]bogus charge and take them to Fairfax County jail where they would be subject
[687]to strong interrogation to see if they would "break".
[689]SECRET/ SENSITIVE
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[695]Other Assistance
[697]Almost every police department has agreed to immediately notify the CIA if
[698]one of its agents is arrested.
[700]Assistance Rendered to Local Police by the CIA
[703]Sem te BS CREE SFR IRIE PRE OT AEN ES
[705]Training Programs:
[707]In late 1971 a course in photography was offered to officers of local police
[708]departments by the Washington Field Office, and in 1972 courses in both sur-
[709]veillance techniques and photography were offered. Representatives from MPD
[710]and most large suburban police departments attended. These courses were
[711]stopped after the printing of a New York Times article criticizing the train-~-
[712]ing of New York City police by the CTA.
[714]Metropolitan Police Department:
[716]1. May Day - 1971: MPD was furnished six cars equipped with communications
[717]gear, plus two men for each car,from the Washington Field Office (WFO).
[718]WFO also furnisheda central communications command post plus operators.
[719]The purpose of this assistance was to permit the monitoring of crowds.
[721]2. In about 1972, Brewer performed a telephone tap for MPD in connection
[722]with an interna] affairs matter where eleven police officers were poten-
[723]tially involved :n a bribe. Brewer und ioe that a court order was
[724]obtained before the taps were pat ¢ on, zo OU
[726]fhe could wire a “Tanp in the aparemont of a witting police ‘informant |
[727]sho had penetrated anti-war dissident groups. Brewer passed this re-
[728]quest on to security headquarters, and the Technical Services Division
[729]performed the wiving. CIA did not monitor or receive copies of any con-
[730]versations recorded. ;
[732]Bony
[734]‘Shortly after a CIA surveillance training course which several MPD
[735]‘officers attended, MPD became desirous of maintaining surveillance on
[737]one of its unwitting police informants to see if she was doing what the
[738]police paid her to do. MPD asked Brewer if his men would assist the new
[740]. trainees in the project. Brewer's surveillance unit did furnish assist-
[741]ance, including four cars and at least one man for each car. These CIA
[742]agents, together with MPD officers, surveilled the subject for one and one-
[743]half days. This is the only time Brewer's surveillance team actualiy
[744]provided manpower to assist NPD in a surveillance.
[746]S ECRET/SENSITIVE
[748]XN
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[754]‘S. - On two. or. three occasions between 1970 and 1972 the Washington Field
[755]Office loaned the MPD Morals Division a device to tap a _touch-tone "” |
[756]telephone. The request caine from fitieine eieonss Jovwemnd) and Sieaelegan. |
[758]Gein Ed Sayle of CIA was CIA's contact with hed bade andediganvan
[759]equipment requests. Dollard or Foran would call Sayle, who in turn
[760]would direct Brewer to provide the equipment.
[762]6. On two or three occasions between 1970 and 1972, Sayle directed Brewer
[763]to provide receiving devices to MPD. Once &juceebesutdana jof MPD per-
[764]sonally contacted Brewer and requested a receiver, It was provided
[765](ostensibly for training purposes) .
[767]7. On several occasions covert miniature transmitters were furnished to
[768]MPD on an indefinite loan.
[770]8. The Washington Field Office also gave MPD personnel technical advice
[771]on use of double tape machines and advice on photography from time to
[772]time.
[774]MPD received no assistance from the Washington Field Office when they set up _
[775]their Intelligence Division in 1967-68. No other assistance was ever rendered
[776]MPD concerning solving particular crime or interrogating a particular witness.
[777]Sometime after Director Schlessinger became DCI, the MPD was asked to return
[778]all equipment previously loaned: to it by the CIA,and most was returned. Appar-
[779]ently a list of this equipment has been prepared. (The list may include other
[780]police departments as well).
[782]In about 1970, Mr. Brewer loaned some transmitters to ae one i ;
[783]ands _ Gila ger ees the county police. They had already been loaned some re-
[784]ceivers before Brewer came with the Washington Field Office.
[786]Fairfax County Police Department
[788]le, Years ago the county was given an old Ampex 601 recorder equipped to take
[789]a telephone tap off a dial phone.
[791]2. On one occasion Brewer accompanied a county police representative to U.S.
[792]Recording on S. Capitol Street to help him pick out a dial recorder for
[793]telephone taps.
[795]3. In 1969-70, Brewer loaned some photographic equipment to the county police
[796]forces intelligence unit. The equipment has never been returned.
[798]No personnel have ever been loaned to the county. No assistance has ever been
[800]given conceming a specific crime or witness.
[802]SECRET/SENSITIVE
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[808]~~) Other ;
[810]1i° In 1969 or 1970 metal detection demonstrations were given at CIA. Head-
[812]quarters to representatives of all Virginia and Maryland Police Depart-
[813]ments.
[815]q
[817]YN SA PCN AIOE BRET I OCS TEE
[819]2. Director Helms owned a beach house near Lewes, Delaware. On one occasion
[820]Brewer met with the chief of police there concerning the security of the
[821]beach house, as Helms had been receiving threats. Apparently Osborn gave
[822]the police chief a box of flares and other equipment (as a gift to the
[823]department) for the chief's assistance.
[825]pioieretceserpinen tryeeman ena rene ar cart
[827]RRREKKEKRE KEK
[829]At some point during the interview, Mr. Brewer indicated that he had not
[830]discussed his testimony with any representative of the Agency prior to the
[831]interview--except the General Counsel.
[833]point was considering whether he should retain a luwyer. However, as we
[834]went along he opened up considerably to the point here I now believe I have
[835]a pretty good understanding of the Office of Security's Washington Field
[836]Office. It vould appear that the Washington Field Office did conduct much,
[837]if not most, of the physical and technical surveiliance directed against
[838]American citizens subsequent to 1968. In every case the surveillance was
[839]directed by higher authority. It also appears that the Washington Field
[840]Office gave substantial assistance to local police departments in the Wash-
[841]ington, D. C. area. Much of this assistance was ooviously an appropriate
[842]exchange of information between two intelligence units. Most disturbing is
[843]the incident where CIA agents assisted MPD officers in a bona fide police
[844]surveillance (a law enforcement function), but this seems to have been an
[846]IMPRESSIONS
[847]Mr. Brewer was originally somewhat reluctant to be interviewed and at one —
[848]isolated case. |
[850]JNR/vmr
[851]SECRET/SENSITIVE
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