[1]Vac 104-10423-1 10423- 10337 | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
[2]Penk oa . TAL ; Lene’ _ f
[4]SSIF TIO
[5]PROCESSING
[7]{DISPATCH |  ss-crcr [ae [ cm [am
[9]: | [MARKED FOR INDEXING {|
[10]Chiefs of all Stations NO INDEXING REQUIRED
[11]ONLY QUALIFIED
[13]HEADQUARTERS OESK
[14]CAN JUDGE INDEXING
[16]“mon . | \S passtracr |
[20]SUBJECT
[21]Warre ommission estimony - Selected Kcerpis - —
[22]ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES -
[23]FYI
[25]1, The Warren Commission's Report on the assassination of
[26]President Kennedy focused attention on the magnitude of the problem
[27]involved in the protection of the Chief Executive. As you know, it is
[28]our responsibility, overseas and in headquarters, to render every
[29]support possible to the Secret Service in the conduct of its statutory
[30]responsibilities in the United States, and especially when the President
[31]travels abroad. ;
[33]2. The circumstances confronting the Warren Commission
[34]produced discussion and testimony on various aspects of the problem
[35]of Presidential protection and on interagency operational cooperation,
[36]which normally do not find their way into the public domain. These
[37]include the acquisition and dissemination of information, ‘consultation, _
[38]coordination, and operational interchanges, I believe you will be
[39]interested in the attached extracts of testimony given before the Warren
[40]Gommission by U.S. intelligence and security officials. Pertinent
[41]portions have been side lined, I commend these materials for reading
[43]. by all officers in positions of senior responsibility in headquarters and
[44]overseas,
[48]FLETCHER M, KNIGHT
[50]DATE TYPED DATE DISPATCHED
[52]2 FEB &
[54]23 Dec. 1964
[56][eRoae REFERENCE tS ~~~ ~~~ ~~" “T5iSPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
[57]| - :
[58]Book Dispatch No, 4726
[60]HEAOQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
[62]CLASSIFICATION
[66]13-00000 _
[68]AF Division
[70]|
[71]Ac cra
[73]laddis Ababa
[75]‘Algier: s 7
[76]Bamako
[77]Brazzaville
[78]Buy jumbura)
[80]‘Dakar
[82]‘Dar-es- ~Salaam)
[84]‘Kampala]
[86]| | Lagos oe
[88]Lome}
[89]Lusaka |
[91]Monrovia}
[92]poe
[95]Salisb alisbury)
[97]Tananarive \
[98]Tripoli
[100]/Tanis \'
[103]The above listing has been
[104]reviewed in the AF Division.
[106]24 v
[107](Initials)
[109]S-E-C-R-E-T
[111]Distribution For.
[112]Book Dispatch No. 4726
[114]EE Division
[116]Athens |
[117]Bern nm)
[119]The above listing has been
[120]reviewed in the EE Division.
[122]L a! iy
[123](Initials)
[125]FE Division
[127]Honolulu \
[128]‘Kuala Lumpur)
[129]Manila) —_
[130]Melbourne |
[132]a |
[134]so -
[136]The above listing has been
[138]reviewed in Division.
[140]_
[142](Initials)
[144]S-E-C-R-E-T
[146]13-00000
[148]S-E-C-R-E-T
[150]NE Division
[152]Adén—
[153]Amman ]
[155]Baghdad
[156]Beirut}
[157]Cairo}
[158]Colombo }
[159]Damaséus
[160]‘Jidda VO
[162]Karachi 71
[163]‘Kathmandu
[164](Kuwait | 1
[166](Tehran \
[168]The above listing has been
[169]reviewed in the NE Division.
[171](Initials)
[175]poe
[179]Distribution For
[180]Book Dispatch No. 4726
[182]WE Division
[184]Brussels]
[186]| Copenhagen
[187]The Hague/
[188]lHelsinki ]
[189]Lisbon ]
[191]H London 7
[193](Paris s J LCPIP PIT}
[194](Reykjavik |
[196]stockholm’ | |
[198]The above listing has been
[199]reviewed in.thé W 44Division,
[201](Initials)
[203]S-E-C-R-E-T
[205]13-00000 |
[207]WH Division
[209]Asuncion
[210]Bogota ) ;
[211]Buenos Aires]
[212]Caracas if
[213]Georgetownl._.
[214]Guatemala City
[215]Kingston}
[217]La Paz:
[219]‘Lima a
[220](Managua :
[221]‘Mexico City}
[223]Panama City)
[227]Port of Spain)
[228]‘Quito 7]
[230]Rio de Janeiro;
[231]‘San Jose ;
[232]isan Salvador]
[233]Santiago 3
[234]‘Santo. Domingo’
[235](Tegucigalpa
[237]The above listing has been
[238]reviewed in the WH Division.
[240](Initials)
[242]S-E-C-R-E-T
[246]S-E-C-R-E-T
[248]Distribution For
[249]Book Dispatch No. 4726
[251]DDP
[252]ADDP
[254]C/TSD
[255]C/CA
[259]C/FI
[263]C/AF
[265]C/AF/1
[266]C/AF/2
[267]C/AF/3
[268]C/AF/4
[269]C/AF/5
[270]C/AF/6
[272]ee aS)
[274]' C/EE
[275]C/EE/G
[277]C/EE/SA
[279]Se = Dp
[281]C/FE
[282]C/FE/CH
[283]C/FE/HULA
[284]C/FE/JKO
[285]C/FE/PMI
[286]C/FE/TBL
[287]C/FE/VNC
[289]eS)
[291]C/NE
[292]C/NE/1
[293]DC/NE/AA
[294]C/NE/4
[295]C/NE/5
[296]C/NE/6
[298]oe oe oes)
[300]Originated by: Chief, CI/R&A, Ext, 7468/23 December 1964
[301]Gra Me. A.E, Dooley, Ext. GIF
[303]S-E-C-R-E-T
[305]Headquarters Distribution for
[306]Book Dispatch No. 4726
[308]C/WE
[309]C/WE/1
[310]C/WE/2
[311]C/WE/3
[312]C/WE/4
[313]C/WE/5
[314]C/WE/BC
[318]C/WH
[319]C/WH/1
[320]C/WH/2
[321]C/WH/3
[322]C/WH/4
[323]C/WH/5
[324]WH/COPS
[325]WH/POA
[326]WH/POB
[327]WH/ Plans
[331]CI/R&A
[333]CI/ LIA
[335]CI/ OPS/ AF
[336]CI/ OPS/EE
[337]CI/ OPS/FE
[338]CI/OPS/NE
[339]CI/OPS/SS
[340]CI/ OPS/WE
[341]C1/OPS/WH
[343]oe
[345]1 RID
[347]S-E-C-R-E-T
[349]13-00000
[351]oh Ve _ ALAN Kh. BelnenT 4 ssismenT Te Te breecreR ye G |
[352]in i May 6) 196M
[354]Mr. Stern. I think he might be able to highlight the answer. We have the
[355]exact answer on ‘the record, and I thought it might——
[357]The CHareMAn. Well, highlight it, if there is anything in addition I would
[358]think that would be relevant and pertinent. But to ask him to paraphrase
[359]that which he has done with great meticulousness would seem to me to be
[360]pnsaetiain-n * abortive and would take a lot of our time, and I don’t see what it would prove.
[361]If you have anything in addition that you want to ask him, if you want to
[362]_ ask him if there is anything in addition he has not put in there, that is all right. -
[364]But to just ask him to paraphrase answers that have been done with great
[366]eare would seem to me to be confusing the record, and serve no purpose.
[368]Mr. Stern. I might ask, Mr. Belmont, whether there is anything you would
[369]like to add or amplify in these questions?
[371]Mr. BeL_mont. I believe the answers speak for themselves, although in view
[372]of Mr. McCloy’s questions a little while ago, I would be very happy to make
[373]clear our approach to this matter. For example, the fact that our interest.
[374]in defectors, in this case, is shown by the fact that in early November 1959"
[375]we opened a file on Oswald based on the newspaper publicity as to his defection.
[376]And the fact that he had applied to renounce his citizenship. We checked our
[377]files then to see was this a man we had a record on, and found that we had a |
[378]fingerprint record solely based on his enlistment in the Marines.
[380]We had no other record on him but we placed a stop or a flash notice in our
[381]fingerprint files, at that time so that if he should come back into the country
[382]unbeknownst to us and get into some sort of trouble we would be immediately
[383]notified. That is our opening interest in the case with the thought in mind
[384]that should he come back to the country. we would want to know from him
[385]whether he had been enlisted by Soviet intelligence In some manner.
[387]That is our procedure because of our experience that these things have hap-
[388]pened, and we consider it our responsibility to settle that issue whenever we can.
[390]Mr. Srern. Could you explain, Mr. Belmont, this procedure of placing ¢
[392]’ gtop in the files that you just referred to?
[394]Mr. BELMonT. We merely notify our identification. division to place what- we
[395]eall.a flash notice in the man’s fingerprint file, which means that should he
[396]be arrested and the fingerprints be sent to the FBI, that the appropriate division,
[397]in this case the domestic intelligence division, would be notified that the man
[398]had been arrested, for what and where he was arrested, thus enabling us to
[399]center our attention on him. .
[401]Our ‘next interest in this man arose as a result of the fact that his mother
[402]had sent, I believe, $25 to him in Moscow, so we went to her in April 1960
[403]and we talked to her. At.that time she told us that he had told her that he
[405]wonernses would possibly attend the Albert Schweitzer College in Switzerland.
[407]So as a followup, we had our legal attache in Paris make inquiry to see
[408]whether he had enrolled in this college. The resultant check showed that while
[409]they had expected him and a deposit had been placed that he did not show up
[410]at the college.
[412]Mr. Sreen. I think that is all covered in quite adequate detail in the answer
[413]to the first question.
[415]Mr. Dutres. I have one question. I would like to put to you on the first ques-
[416]tion and answer in your letter of. April 6, in Exhibit 8833—the Bureau's letter
[417]of April 6. You refer, first, to the fact that the first news you got about Oswald
[418]was from a news service item, and then later on at the bottom of the second .
[419]full paragraph you state, “A: file concerning Oswald was prepared and as
[420]communications were received from other U.S. Government agencies those
[421]communications were placed in his file.” :
[423]‘Phe record: may show the other communications, I guess our record does
[424]show, but do you feel that you adequately were advised by the State Department
[425]as this case developed or by the CIA or other agencies that might have known
[426]about it?
[428]Mr. BeLmonr. Yes. We received a number. of communications from other
[429]agencies, and we set up a procedure whereby we periodically checked the State
[430]Department passport file to be kept advised of his activities or his dealings
[431]with the Embassy in Moscow so that on a periodic basis we were sure we had
[432]all information in the State Department file.
[434]Atnwiens
[436]7
[438]13-00000
[440]TATA
[442]We received communications from the Navy, and from other agencies.
[444]Mr. Dutues. Is there any general procedure with respect to Americans abroad
[445]who get into trouble. Do you get informed so in case they come back you can
[446]take adequate precautionary measures? Is that established SOP?
[448]Mr. Becmont. Yes, Mr. Dulles. We do receive such information, and if we
[449]pick up the information initially as we did here, from press reports or otherwise,
[450]we go to the other agencies and ask them whether they have any information and
[451]‘establish an interest there so that if they have not voluntarily furnished us the
[452]information. they will do 50 upon our request.
[454]Mr. Duties. Thank you.
[456]Mr. Steen. On page 8, Mr. Belmont, in the answer to question No. 3, the
[457]second paragraph, could you tell us why the FBI preferred to interview Oswald
[458]after he had established residence and why it was not preferable to interview
[459]him upon his arrival in New York? .
[461]Mr. Betmont. This is a matter of experience. Generally speaking when an
[462]individual such as Oswald arrives back in the country and the press is there,
[463]there is an unusual interest in him. Immigration and Naturalization Service
[464]has a function to perform, and we prefer, unless there is a matter of urgency,
[465]to let the individual become settled in residence. It is a much better atmosphere
[466]to conduct the interview, and to get the information that we seek. If it is
[467]& matter of urgency, we will interview him immediately upon arrival.
[469]Mr. Steen. On page 4, Mr. Belmont, in your answer to question No. 6, was
[470]it ordinary procedure for Agent Fain to re-interview Oswald so soon after his
[471]first interview under the circumstances? Is there anything unusual about that?
[473]Mr. Be_mont. There is nothing unusual whatsoever. Agent Fain interviewed
[474]Oswald on June 26, 1963—1962, I believe it was, was it not?
[476]The Cuarmman. Yes; 1962.
[478]Mr. Beton. And was not satisfied that he had received all the information
[479]he wanted nor that it was a matter that should be closed at that time.
[481]Therefore, he set out a lead to re-interview Oswald, and after an appropriate
[482]period he went back and re-interviewed him. This is within the prerogative of
[484]the investigative agent, and certainly if he was not satisfied with the first .
[486]interview it was his duty and responsibility to pursue the. matter until he was
[487]satisfied.
[489]Mr. Stern. In your answer to question No. 5, does the response of Oswald to
[490]the question why he went to Russia seem typical to you of the returned defector,
[491]or unusual?
[493]Mr. Betwonr. There is no such thing as a typical response. Hach case is an
[494]individual case, and is decided on its merits and on the background of the
[495]individual, and the circumstances surrounding it.
[497]Mr. Steen. Would it be usual for the defector to agree to advise you if he got
[498]acontact? Are they generally that cooperative?
[500]Mr. BeLMont. We ask them because we want to know, and the purpose of our
[501]interview with him was to determine whether he had been recruited by the
[502]Soviet intelligence, and we asked him whether he would tell us if he was con-
[503]tacted here in this-country. He replied he would. Whether he meant it is a
[504]question. However, you must bear in mind that this man, I believe it was
[505]when he was interviewed in July of 1961 in the American Embassy, the inter-
[506]viewing official there said it was apparent that he had learned his lesson the
[507]hard way, and that he had a new concept of the American way of life, and
[508]apparently had decided that Russia was not for him.
[510]When we interviewed him likewise he told us that he had not enjoyed his stay
[511]in Russia. He likewise commented that he had not enjoyed his stay in the
[512]Marines. So that in direct answer to your question, it is customary for us in
[513]such a case as this, to ask the man if he will report a contact, and it is customary
[514]for him to say yes, because frankly, he would be putting himself in a rather
[515]bad light if he didn’t say yes.
[517]Mr. Steen. Turning to——
[519]Mr. Duties. Could I ask a question there: Do I correctly read your report
[520]and those of your agents to the general effect that you had no evidence that
[521]there was any attempt to recruit Oswald in the United States?
[523]Mr. Betmont. No evidence whatsoever.
[525]8
[527]in view. of the fact that we have practically—we have all the reports, he says -
[528]we have all the reports that are in that file, and it just seems like thrashing
[529]old straw to go over it and over it again.
[531]Mr. McCrory. Do we have copies of all these telegrams that are in here from
[532]the Embassy?
[534]Mr. BetMont. You are looking at——
[536]Mr. McCrory. Not Embassy; here is one from Mexico. Do we have that?
[537]We don’t have these in our files, for example.
[539]Mr. Betmont. This is subsequent to the assassination. You see your area
[540]of interest at this point is information, all information we had prior to the
[541]assassination. I did not remove from this file the items that started to come
[542]in subsequent to the assassination, you see,
[544]Mr. McCuoy. My feeling is that somebody on the Commission should examine
[545]that file. I can’t come to any other conclusion after reading it all, because I
[546]don’t know what is in it, what is in our record, and what is in that file. There
[547]is a good bit of material there that is narrative, which I think would be relevant.
[548]Certainly, I don’t believe we can be possibly criticized for deleting or not pro-
[549]ducing a file which contains the type of information that you are speaking of.
[550]We are just as interested in protecting the security of your investigative proc-
[551]esses as you are.. But I don’t think that when it is on the record that we have
[552]this file, that may contain material that was not in our files, and we are given
[553]the opportunity to examine it, without disclosing these confidential matters that
[554]we ought not to have somebody go through it. ‘ .
[556]Mr. Duties. I agree with that but I think we could save time if we checked
[557]off first what we have already and that would cut out about half of that file
[558]probably. © :
[560]Mr. McCvoy. I think in a rapid glance through it, I think just about half. of it.
[562]The CHarmMAN. Well, suppose you do that then, get those and let's see. All
[563]right, proceed, Mr. Stern.
[565]Mr. Stern. I think perhaps we ought to leave the entire matter of the file
[566]then until we can give you the information.
[568]The CHarmMan. That is right.
[570]Mr. Steen. May we admit for the purposes of the record this list at this time,
[571]Mr, Chief Justice, which has been marked No. 834?
[573]The Cuamman. Yes. There are no security matters in this?
[575]Mr. BetmMonr. No, sir.
[577]The CHaramMan. It may be admitted as Exhibit No. 834.
[579](The document referred to, previously marked Commission Exhibit No. 884 for
[581]identification, was received in e¥idence.)
[583]Mr. Stren. Mr. Belmont, can you identify this letter dated February 6 with
[584]an attached affidavit which has been marked for identification as Commission
[586]“Exhibit No. 885?
[588](The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 835, for
[589]identification.)
[591]Mr. BeLmont. Yes; this is a letter dated February 6, 1964, to the Commission
[592]from the FBI to which is attached an affidavit by Director J. Edgar Hoover.
[594]Mr. Stern. What is the subject?
[596]Mr. Betmont. Stating flatly that Lee Harvey Oswald was never an informant
[597]of the FBI.
[599]Mr. Duties. Would you define informant. Obviously in the sense he knew
[600]some information as previously indicated from the previous interviews. I mean
[601]for the record, would you Just define what you mean by an informant in this
[602]sense?
[604]Mr. Belmont. An informant in this sense is an individual who has agreed to
[605]cooperate with the FBI and to furnish information to the FBI either for or with-
[606]out payment.
[608]Mr. Stern. Thank you.
[610]Mr. Betmont. This would not, of course, include the cooperative citizen to
[612]‘whom we go, and who frequently and frankly discloses any information in his
[614]possession, but rather someone who joins an organization or seeks out informa-
[615]tion at the direction and instance of the FBI relative to subversive or criminal .
[617]14
[619]13-00000
[621]eters : matters. In other words, I want to make it clear we do not regard patriotic ~
[622]. citizens as informants.
[624]Mr. Stern. I take it you also would not have regarded Lee Oswald as an in-
[625]formant from the contacts with him that you have told us about and the other
[626]agents have told us about?
[628]Mr. BeLtMont. Indeed not; in no way could he be considered an informant; in
[629]no way.
[631]— Mr. Steen. Did you supervise or assist in the preparation of the information
[632]contained here? .
[634]Mr. BetMonrt. Yes, sir.
[636]Mr. Steen. And you are familiar with it?
[638]Mr. Betmonr. Yes; I am.
[640]Mr. Steen. And to your knowledge, does it accurately and completely state
[641]the Bureau’s practice in recruiting a prospective informant?
[643]Mr. Betmont. That is correct.
[645]Mr. Steen. Is there anything you would like to add to. the information covered
[646]in there with respect to your practices regarding informants?
[648]Mr. Brtmont. No; only in my personal knowledge this is a correct statement
[650]' and Lee Harvey Oswald was not an informant of the FBI.
[652]Mr. Steen. Did you ever use the term “agent” to apply to anyone other than
[653]an employee, a special agent employee of the FBI?
[655]Mr. Betmont. No; we do not.
[657]Mr. Dutxes. Could I ask you, Mr. Belmont, whether Mr. Fain’s separation
[658]from, the FBI had anything whatever to do with the Oswald case or in. his
[659]handling of the Oswald case?
[661]Mr. BeLMont. No; indeed not. Mr. Fain came to the retirement age and de-
[662]cided he wanted to retire, which is his privilege, and he retired and is presently
[663]working in Texas and very happy, I understand.
[665]Mr. Duties. Thank you.
[667]Mr, BELMONT. He retired in good graces, good standing, so far as the FBI is
[668]concerned. ;
[670]The Cuarmman. And a year before the assassination.
[672]Mr. Betmonr. Frankly, I don't recall.
[674]The CHarrMAN. Yes; it was August 1962, he testified. .
[676]Mr. Srexn. You have already covered this, Mr. Belmont, but just so that the |
[677]record is completely clear on this point, was Lee Oswald ever am agent of the
[678]FBI?
[680]Mr. Be_Mont. Lee Oswald was never an agent of the FBI.
[682]Mr. Sreen. The letter of February 6, 1964, from Mr. Hoover, alludes to testi-
[683]fomens mony furnished the Commission by District Attorney Wade. Have you subse-
[684]e quently been advised that Mr. Wade had mot testified before the Commission?
[686]Mr. Betmowr. Yes; we received a letter from the Commission advising us
[687]tLat the incident referred to was an informal discussion rather than actual testi-
[688]— . mony before the Commission.
[689]were Mr. Sreen. And also to complete the record, have you been advised that Mr.
[690]oA Wade was not suggesting that he believed the rumor about Oswald as an in-
[691]formant, but felt obliged to call it to the attention of the Commission?
[693]Mr. BetMont. The Commission’s letter so advised us.
[695]Mr. Steen. Mr. Chairman, may this be admitted with No. 835?
[697]The CuarmMan. It may be admitted under that number.
[699](The document referred to, previously marked Commission Exhibit No. 835
[700]for identification, was received in evidence.)
[702]Mr. Sreen. Mr. Belmont, I show. you a letter dated February 12, 1964, a
[703]number of affidavits by special agents, attached to it. It was identified yester-
[704]day, parts of it were identified yesterday and it therefore carries the number for
[705]identification 825.. Can you identify this letter for us?
[707]Mr. Betuont. In order to be sure—I beg your pardon. This is a letter dated
[708]February 12, 1964, to. the Commission from the FBI, to which is attached affidavits -
[709]of FBI personnel who had reason to contact Lee Harvey Oswaid and who were in
[710]a supervisory capacity over the agents who contacted Oswald. —
[712]Mr. Stern. Did you supervise the preparation of this material?
[714]Mr. BeLMont. These affidavits were prepared, of course, by the men themselves.
[716]15
[719]1300000
[721]Nene pes
[723]I have read the affidavits, and they were compiled as an enclosure and sent
[724]over with this letter.
[726]Mr. Stern. You have reviewed them in preparation for your testimony before
[727]the Commission?
[729]Mr. Betmont. Yes, sir.
[731]Mr. Stern. To your knowledge, are they accurate?
[733]Mr. Be_monr. They are accurate, to my knowledge, yes.
[735]Mr. STERN. Are they complete?
[737]Mr. BELMonT. Yes.
[739]Mr. Stern. They do not omit any significant fact you know of?
[741]Mr. BELMONT. No.
[743]Mr. Stekn. In connection with the material they cover?
[745]Mr. BELMonT. No.
[747]Mr. Stern. Unless there are any questions on that, Mr. Chairman, I suggest
[748]we admit this document.
[750]The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted as No. 825.
[752](The document referred to, previously marked Commission Exhibit No. 825
[753]for identification, was received in evidence.)
[755]Mr. Stern. Mr. Belmont, I show you a letter dated March 31, 1964, from
[756]Director Hoover to Mr. Rankin, the General Counsel of the Commission, with
[758]- a series of attachments. Can you identify this which has been marked for
[760]identification as No. 886. Can you identify this for the Commission?
[762](The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 836 for
[763]identification.)
[765]Mr. BELMONT. This is a letter dated March 81, 1964, to the Commission from
[766]the FBI to which is attached the instructions contained in our manuals as to the
[767]type of information which should be disseminated to Secret Service and our
[768]relations or liaison with Secret Service.
[770]Mr, Stern. It was prepared in response to a request from the Commission?
[772]Mr. BeLmMontT. That is correct.
[774]Mr. Steen. Did you supervise or assist in the preparation?
[776]Mr. BeLmonrt. I did.
[778]Mr. Stern. Have you reviewed it recently?
[780]Mr. BEtMontT. Yes.
[782]Mr. STERN. Is it complete with respect to the matters covered?
[784]Mr. Betmont. Yes; it is.
[786]Mr. Stern. Is there anything you would like to add to it with respect to the
[787]matters covered?
[789]Mr. BELMont. Well———
[791]Mr. Do .tes. May I just interrupt here a moment. Is this inquiry directed to
[792]the question of whether it is now adequate or whether this is complete as of the
[793]time of the assassination? I think we have two questions there to consider.
[795]Mr. BeLmontT. Mr. Dulles, this letter outlines our relations with Secret Serv-
[796]ice and the material that is attached covers both the instructions to our agents
[797]prior to the assassination and the current instructions.
[799]Mr. Dues. Subsequent to the assassination?
[801]Mr. Betmonr. Yes, sir. (
[803]Mr. DULLEs. Yes.. : .
[805]Mr. Steen. What were the criteria you employed and instructed your agents to
[806]employ before the assassination in determining what information should be
[807]reported to the Secret Service regarding threats against the President, members
[808]of his family, the President-elect, and the Vice President? -
[810]Mr. BeELMont. These are contained in detail in the attachments which repre-
[811]sent sections of our manual of instructions which are available to all of our
[812]personnel in the field as well as the seat of Government, and also in the FBI
[813]handbook which is in possession of the individual agent inthe field. Urhese
[814]instructions require that any information indicating the possibility of an at-
[815]tempt against the person or safety of the persons mentioned by you must be
[816]referred immediately by the most expeditious means of communications to the
[817]nearest office of the Secret Service. Further, that our headquarters in Wash-
[818]ington must be advised by teletype of the information and the fact that it has
[819]been furnished to Secret Service.
[821]16
[823]13-00000
[825]wate acne
[827]Mr. Sreen. Specifically, the kind of information you were interested in, that ©
[828]is before the assassination?
[829]Mr. BeLmont. Yes. Specifically the kind?
[831]Mr. Sten. Yes.
[832]Mr. Be_mMonT. Any information indicating the possibility of c threat against
[834]the President and Vice President and members of the family.
[835]Mr. Stern. Have you broadened——
[836]Mr. BeLtmont. I may say, sir——
[838]Mr. Srern. Yes.
[839]Mr. BetmontT. That this practice was assiduously followed, and you will find
[841]that the files of the Secret Service are loaded with information over the years
[842]that we have furnished them. That was a practice religiously followed and a
[843]practice voluntarily followed without request. In other words, we do not have
[844]a written request for this ‘type of information but rather considered it our re-
[845]sponsibility and duty to furnish this information.
[847]Mr. Steen. Did you ever participate in or do you know of any discussion with
[848]the Secret Service before. the assassination regarding the kind of information
[849]they were interested in?
[851]Mr. Betmont. We had close liaison with Secret Service, and I have no doubt
[852]that in oral discussions that the question came up. I wasn’t present but I
[853]syould . assume it has come up, particularly as, we were constantly furnishing
[854]information. We have no written criteria, you might say, as to what Should
[855]be furnished. .
[857]Mr. Stern. That is, established by the Secret Service.
[859]Mr. BeLMont. That is correct. /
[861]Mr. Sreen. And you yourself never participated in any discussion of——
[863]Mr. BELMONT. No; I did not.
[865]Mr. Steen. This liaison function.
[867]Mr. Betéont. This is something we have done for years on the basis that we
[868]consider it our responsibility. not only as far as the President goes. AS you
[869]know, Mr. Chairman, we have also followed the same policy relative to other
[870]high officials when it appears desirable.
[872]Mr. Sven, Have you subsequent to the assassination augmented your in-
[873]structions to special agents in this respect?
[875]Mr. Betmont. Yes. On December 26, 1963, we prepared additional instruc-
[876]tions reiterating those already in effect, and adding other dissemination to Secret
[877]Service concerning the security of the President. :
[879]The Cuareman. Where do those new ones appear in the exhibit, Mr. Belmont?
[881]Mr. Betmont. They appear as an attachment—working from the back, I think,
[882]Mr. Chairman, I can help you most.
[884]The CHamman. Yes.
[886]Mr. Bermont. Hight pages from the back it starts, it reads, “Manual of In-
[887]structions Section 83.”
[889]The Cuarmman. Yes; I have it.
[891]Mr. Bretmont. The first page is the same information that we previously fur-
[892]nished to Secret Service involving threats.
[894]The Cuarmman. The first page is intact, as it was before.
[896]Mr. Betmont. There may be some slight changes in wording but essentially
[897]it is the same dealing with possible threats.
[899]. The CHarrMan. Yes.
[901]Mr. Durtrs. Mr. Belmont, I wonder if it would be possible for the Commis-
[902]sion’s convenience to date each one of these papers as of a certain date. It is
[903]quite difficult going through it now without referring to the letter in each case
[904]to determine whether the instructions are as of the date of the assassination
[905]or as of the present date?
[907]Mr. Betmont. We can do that without any difficulty. I would be glad to do
[908]it with the staff, or can I help you here?
[910]Mr. Duties. Well, I think we can do that later but I think it would be useful
[911]when this goes into the record for our later reference in studying ‘this to have
[912]those dates available to us on each one of the attachments.
[914]Mr. Betmonr. Very good.
[916]17
[918]13-00000
[920]Taree
[922]Mr. Duties. Thank you.
[924]Mr. Betmont. Coming back to this item you inquired about, sir, the other
[925]dissemination to Secret Service concerning the security of the President is set
[926]forth on pages 2 and 3 of this inclusion in our manual, and it extends the dis-
[927]semination to “‘subversives, ultrarightists, racists, and fascists, (@) possessing
[928]emotional instability or irrational behavior, (0) who have made threats of
[929]bodily harm against officials or employees of Federal, State or local government
[930]or officials of a foreign government, (c) who express or have expressed’ strong
[931]or violent anti-U.S. sentiments and who have been involved in bombing or bomb-
[933]. inaking or whose past conduct indicates tendencies toward violence, and (d)
[935]whose prior acts or statements depict propensity for violence and hatred against .
[936]organized government.” That was prepared in an effort to provide additional,
[937]and a voluntary effort, without request, to provide additional information that
[938]might be helpful to avoid such an incident as happened November 22, 1963.
[940]Mr. Stern. This did not come about, this change did not come about, through
[941]any request from the Secret Service or discussion with the Secret Service?
[943]Mr. Betmont. No. We made these changes, as I say, in an effort to provide
[944]any additional information in the light of what happened that might be of
[945]assistance to Secret Service and might assist in protecting the President.
[947]Mr. Dottes. I wonder, Mr. Belmont, whether you would consider possibly
[948]changing in section (@) the word “and” to “or” whose prior acts or statements
[949]depict propensity for violence” and then it nodw reads “and hatred against
[950]organized government”. There have been cases, I believe, where the propensity
[951]for violence had not been previously noted but the hatred of organized government
[952]has.
[954]Mr. Betmont. We will be happy to change that.
[956]Mr. Duties. I just suggest for your consideration, I don’t wish to rewrite it.
[958]Mr. BELMontT. We would be happy to change it, Mr. Dulles.
[960]Mr. Stern. Following Mr. Dulles’ thought, in the line above that, Mr Belmont,
[961]should that “and” before (d) be “and” or “or”? Do you mean these——
[963]Mr. Betmont. We do not mean that all of these items must be coupled together
[964]if that is your thought.
[966]Mr. Steen. That is right. ;
[968]Mr. Bermont. We will be happy to change the “and” before (d) to an “or”. .
[970]Mr. Stern. This means any of the broad classifications of people, subversives,
[971]ultrarightists, racists or fascists who meet any of these four tests.
[973]Mr. Betmont. That is correct.
[975]Mr. Steen. Can you give the Commission some notion of the increase in volume
[977]which the broadening of your criteria has brought about? By volume, I mean
[979]the volume of your references to the Secret Service.
[981]Mr. Bretmont. I do not have an exact figure, however, I do know that more
[982]than 5,000 additional names have gone over to Secret Service under these criteria.
[984]The CHarrman.. In what period of time?
[986]Mr. Betmont. Since we put them out.
[988]The CHarmman. I see.
[990]Mr. Betmont. Which was December 26.
[992]The CuHareman. Yes.
[994]Mr. McCuoy. Have you included defectors in this list?
[996]Mr. Betmonr. Yes, sir; we do include defectors.
[998]Mr. Stegn. You mean as of December 26,1963?
[1000]Mr. Be_monrt. Correct.
[1002]Mr. STERN. Has the expansion of your criteria led to any problem or difficulty
[1003]for you or for individuals or do you anticipate any problem or difficulty under
[1004]the expanded criteria?
[1006]Mr. BeLMontT. It seems to me that there is a necessity to balance security
[1007]against freedom of the individual. This is a country of laws and a government
[1008]of law, and not a government of men. Inevitably the increase in security means
[1009]an increase in the control of the individual and a diminishment, therefore, of his
[1010]individual liberties. It is a simple matter to increase security. But every time
[1011]you increase security you diminish the area of the rights of the individual. In
[1012]some countries the problem of a visiting dignitary is met without much difficulty.
[1014]18
[1016]13-00000
[1018]nine Ara
[1020]Persons who are suspect or may be considered dangerous are immediately -
[1021]rounded up and detained while the individual is in the country. The authorities
[1022]have no problem because in those countries there is not a free society such as we
[1023]enjoy, and the people who are detained have no redress. The FBI approaches
[1024]this whole field of security—I am not boring you with this, am I?
[1026]The CHAIRMAN. No, indeed. This is tremendously important.
[1028]Mr. BeLmont.:The FBI approaches this whole field of security and its tre-
[1029]mendous responsibilities to protect the internal security of the country as a
[1030]sacred trust. In carrying out our investigations and our work in the security
[1031]field, we do it in such a manner under the law that we strengthen rather than
[1032]weaken the free society that we enjoy. It is for that reason that our men are
[1033]trained carefully, thoroughly, and supervised carefully, to insure that their
[1034]approach to the entire security fleld, which inevitably touches on centrol of
[1035]thought, is handled with extreme care. Our activities are directed to meet the
[1036]terrific responsibility we have for the internal security of the country, but to
[1037]meet it under the law. We feel that to place security as such above the rights
[1038]of the individual or to increase these controls beyond what is absolutely essential
[1039]is the first step toward the destruction of this free.society that we enjoy.
[1041]We have been asked many times why we don’t piek up and jail all Commu-
[1043]‘nists. The very people who ask those questions don't realize that if action,
[1045]unrestrained action, is taken against a particular group of people, a precedent
[1046]is set which can be seized on in the future by power-hungry or unscrupulous
[1047]authorities as a precedent, and which inevitably will gnaw away at this free
[1048]society we have, and sooner or later will be applied to the very individuals who
[1049]are seeking this action. Up until the time of the assassination we religiously
[1050]and carefully and expeditioushy furnished to Secret Service immediately on a
[1051]local basis as well as on a national basis, headquarters basis, any and all infor-
[1052]mation that in any way was indicated to be a possible threat against the
[1053]President. This permitted Secret Service to take such action as was required
[1054]against these individuals who had by their action set the stage for appropriate
[1055]restraint or observation based on something they did. Therefore, they were not
[1056]in a position to complain legitimately because they had by some word or deed
[1057]set in motion a threat against the President of the United States.. Since the
[1058]assassination, as I have testified, we have. broadened the area of dissemination
[1059]in an effort to be helpful. It stands without question that we could have said,
[1060]“No; we won't go any further.” But we felt that it was our responsibility to do
[1061]whatever we could do and, hence, we have broadened these criteria, and we have
[1062]distributed thousands of pieces of information on individuals to Secret Service.
[1064](At this point in the proceedings, Representative Ford enters the hearing
[1065]room.) .
[1067]We are not, entirely comfortable about this, because under these broadened
[1068]criteria after all we are furnishing names of people who have not made a threat
[1069]against the President, people who have expressed beliefs, who have belonged or
[1070]do belong to organizations which believe in violent revolution or taking things
[1071]into their own hands. Unless such information is handled with judgment and
[1072]care, it can be dangerous.
[1074]For example, we know that in one city when the President recently visited, the
[1075]police went to these people and told them, “You stay in the house while the
[1076]President is here or if you go out, we will go with you.” We know that these
[1077]people have threatened to consult attorneys, have threatened to make a public
[1078]issue of the matter on the theory that-this is restraint that is not justified as
[1079]they have made no threats against the President. Now, when you examine this
[1080]a bit further, we give these names to Secret Service. Secret Service must do
[1081]something with those names, and Secret Service solicits the assistance of the
[1082]police, quite properly. But I don’t need, I think, to paint this picture any further,
[1083]that when you get away from a specific act or deed of threats against the Presi-
[1084]dent, and you go into the broader area of what, perhaps, a man is thinking and,
[1085]therefore, he may be a threat, and you take action against the man on the basis
[1086]of that, there is a danger.
[1088]That is why, despite the fact that we have given this additional information
[1089]and will continue to do so, we are uneasy. Again, if I may be permitted to
[1090]continue, this is inherent in the entire approach of the FBI to the security field.
[1092]19
[1094]13-00000
[1096]eerercer
[1098]We go as far in our investigations as is necessary. But we go no further. We-
[1099]do not harass people. We do not conduct an investigation of a man for what
[1100]he may be thinking. We attempt to the very best of our ability to carry out this
[1101]responsibility for internal security without adopting tactics of harassment or
[1102]unwarranted investigation, and we will not pursue a security matter beyond
[1103]that which is essential to carry out our responsibilities. Now, I say that because
[1104]that is the broad field of our policy, and I say it with complete sincerity, because
[1105]I know. I have been in this work with the FBI both in the actual investigative
[1106]field and in the policymaking and supervisory field for 27 years, and I know the
[1107]policies and the procedures that are followed, and the care with which this .
[1108]problem is approached, and I agree with it fully.
[1110]Mr. MoCtoxy. You are going to impose a pretty heavy burden on the Secret
[1111]Service. when you dump them with the 5,000 more names than they have been
[1112]used to having. .
[1114]Mr. BeLmuonrt. It will be more than 5,000, sir. This will continue
[1116]Mr. McCrory. From your knowledge of the situation, do you feel that the
[1117]Secret Service is equipped to cope with this added burden? Is it something that
[1118]you feel——.
[1120]Mr, Be.tmont. The Secret Service, as it has in the past, is required to call on
[1121]the police for assistance in this field when the President visits a city. I do not
[1122]know the exact complement of personnel of Secret Service, but they are a
[1123]relatively small organization. .
[1125]Mr. McCrory. It may be they will have to reorganize some of their procedures
[1126]to cope with this, won’t they?
[1128]Mr. BreLtmont. I do not know.
[1130]Mr. McCrory. You have got a pretty broad classification here. “All investiga-
[1131]tive personnel should be alert for the identification of subversives, ultrarightists,
[1132]racists, and Fascists (@) possessing emotional instability or irrational behavior.”
[1133]That may include a good many people in the United States and maybe some mem-
[1134]bers of this Commission—I am speaking for myself. There is irrational be-
[1135]havior that I have been guilty of many times. [Laughter.] This doesn’t mean
[1136]you are going to send everybody over there, but the names that—all those under
[1137]your classification, all of those in your opinion come under that classification
[1138]unless you feel they have some, there is some, reason behind it. In other words,
[1139]you are selective in this list. You purport to be selective in the numbers that
[1140]you are going to convey to, the names you are going to convey to, the Secret
[1141]Service.
[1143]Mr. BELMONT. We endeavor to use good judgment, sir. Now, as you indicate
[1144]there are what, 190 million people in this country, and who knows when someone
[1145]may adopt abnormal! behavior.
[1147]You cannot tell tomorrow who will pose a risk. This is an effort to be as
[1148]helpful as possible and, as we have in the past, we will use our best Judgment.
[1150]‘But this will broaden considerably the type of people and the number of people
[1152]who go to the Secret Service.
[1154]Mr. McCLoyr. That is what I am getting at really, Mr. Belmont. .You are not
[1155]saying that all those people that you characterize here under this paragraph 2.
[1156]will ipso facto be sent over to the Secret Service every time the President makes
[1157]amove. This simply says that all investigative personnel should be alert in that
[1158]situation; am I right in that?
[1160]Mr. BetmMont. No, sir. If you will follow in the next paragraph, we say, “If
[1161]cases are developed falling within the above categories, promptly furnish Secret
[1162]Service locally a letterhead memorandum” with the information.
[1164]Mr. McCrory. So without any further ado all the people in your list who are
[1165]in that category will be transferred over to the Secret Service when there is an
[1166]occasion, when the President travels?
[1168]Mr. Betmont. No. This is a continuing procedure. In other words, during
[1169]our investigations we come across someone who is in this area or category, and
[1170]this is a requirement that that man’s name go to Secret Service with a brief
[1171]description of him, and Secret Service then has that filed and is in a position
[1172]to know that that individual has been referred to them.
[1174]Mr. McC oy. Well, that brings up again the comment that I originally made.
[1176]20
[1178]This does put a big burden of investigation and judgment on the Secret Service,
[1179]one which they have not heretofore presumably had placed on their shoulders.
[1181]Mr. Betmont. I think you are correct.
[1183]Mr. McCoy. The reason I am asking these questions is because by implica-
[1184]tion, at least, one of our directives is to look into this situation for the future
[1185]protection of the President, and we want to see that we have got something that
[1186]is practical as well as cautious.
[1188]Mr. DuLLes. Do the memoranda attached, Mr. Belmont, to this exhibit indicate
[1189]what classes were so identified for investigation under the procedures existing
[1190]at the time of the assassination and what change has been made, how it has been
[1191]extended?
[1193]Mr. BeLmont. Yes, sir. If you——
[1195]Mr. DuLLEs. By the definitions under paragraph 2 of the Manual of Instruc-
[1196]tions.
[1198]Mr. BeLmont. The previous page and the paragraph right above No. 2 sets
[1200]forth the same information that we acted on prior to the assassination.
[1202]Mr. Duties. That is paragraph 1?
[1204]Mr. Betmont. Yes, sir.
[1206]Mr. DuLLEes. The Manual of Instructions, section 83.
[1208]Mr. Betmonrt. Yes, sir.
[1210]Mr. DULLEs. What are the various categories given now at the top of page 2
[1211]of this exhibit which have been added?
[1213]Mr. Bertmont. At the top of page 2, sir, that is the information that should
[1214]be included in the notification to headquarters as to who the individual is and
[1215]the background information that was furnished to Secret Service so that we,
[1216]too, can disseminate to Secret Service here.
[1218]Representative Forp. Under the new criteria would Oswald's name have gone.
[1219]to the Secret Service automatically?
[1221]Mr. BeLMont. Well, Congressman, right now we are including all defectors
[1222]automatically.
[1224]Now, the question whether Oswald meets these criteria here as set forth is a
[1225]question of judgment. As I say, right now we do furnish all.defectors.
[1227]Representative Forv. Defectors are for the time being at least a special cate-
[1228]gory other than what is set forth here unless for some other reason they would
[1229]fall into one of these categories.
[1231]Mr. Betmont. Yes.
[1233]Mr. McCroy. Do you under that category send forward all Communists?
[1235]Mr. BELMONT. ‘Yes.
[1237]Mr. McCLory. All Communists, yes.
[1239]Mr. DULLEs. Mr. Chairman, I wonder whether or not it would be wise for the
[1240]record at this point to read into the record, in view of the importance of this,
[1241]this paragraph which we are now discussing and which, as I understand it,
[1242]contains the new definition of investigative cases? —
[1244]The CHArEMAN. Yes; we can put it into the record.
[1246]Mr. DuLLEs. Mr. Belmont, as I understand it, the new criteria are set forth
[1248]-in paragraph 2 on page 2 of the Manual of Instructions, section 88; is that
[1250]correct?
[1252]Mr. Betmont. That is correct.
[1254]Mr. McCrory. Which, as I counted, is the 12th page of the Commission's Exhibit
[1255]No. 836; is that right, Mr. Stern?
[1257]Mr. STERN. That is right number of the exhibit.
[1259]Mr. McCrory. 836, and I think it is the 12th page.
[1261]Mr.. Dues. For convenient reference I suggest that when this be included
[1262]that we add the dates and the page numbers.
[1264]Mr. Stern. I think thé witness can do this immediately.
[1266]The CuarrMan. We will give a copy of it to the reporter and he may copy it
[1267]and incorporate it later in the record.
[1269](Paragraph 2 reads as follows :)
[1271]“Other dissemination to Secret Service concerning security of the President.
[1272]All investigative personnel should be alert for the identification of subversives,
[1273]ultrarightists, racists, and Fascists (@) possessing emotional instability or
[1275]irrational behavior, (0) who have made threats of bodily harm against officials
[1277]21
[1279]13-00000
[1281]Mr. Betmont. That is correct, sir.
[1283]The CuareMan. They find themselves in a mousetrap then.
[1285]Mr. BeLmont. That is correct, sir; that is right.
[1287]Mr. McCtoy. In other words, you would expect your agents to exert some
[1288]selection before they would send these names over to the Secret Service.
[1290]Mr. BeLmont. Our agents use judgment in the pursuance of this work, and
[1291]they would continue to use judgment in the selection of people who meet this
[1292]criterion. Otherwise if you carried this to the extreme you would get out
[1293]of hand completely. So that there is judgment applied here and our agents
[1294]are capable of applying the judgment.
[1296]Representative Forp. What has been the reaction of the Secret Service to
[1297]this greater flow of information ‘that they have received?
[1299]Mr. Betmonr. They have taken it. There has been no official reaction, to
[1300]my knowledge.
[1302]Representative Forp. Have they objected to. the greater burden? ;
[1304]Mr. BeLmont. No, sir; I would like to say, I don’t know whether you are
[1305]going to cover this, Mr. Stern, that our relations with the Secret Service are
[1306]excellent. We work closely together. ;
[1308]As a matter of fact, since the assassination, at the request of Mr.. Rowley,
[1309]we have furnished agents to assist on occasion in the protection of the Presi-
[1310]dent, which is primarily a function of Secret Service, but as a cooperative
[1311]gesture we have on a number of occasions made-agents available at the request
[1312]of Mr. Rowley. I think the figure runs -to something like 139 agents—yes, 189
[1313]agents that we have made available.
[1315]We do have a very close liaison with Secret Service both at the seat of
[1316]Government and in our field offices. We have a supervisor here at the seat
[1317]of Government whose duty it is to stay directly in touch with Secret Service,
[1318]to cut redtape and produce results both for ‘Secret Service and for the FBI; to,
[1319]see that the problems are handled immediately. He has direct access to Mr.
[1320]Rowley, and we have on a number of occasions at the request of Secret Service,
[1321]sent one of our agents with the Secret Service when the President travels abroad,
[1322]particularly where we have a representative in the countries being visited,
[1323]because our relations with the law enforcement officials in. those countries
[1324]have been built up over the years, and we are thus in a position to assist
[1325]Secret Service in establishing the necessary security measures and the flow of -
[1326]information to serve their purpose. :
[1327]' In addition, when the President travels abroad we alert all of our offices to-
[1328]advise us of any information which may pertain to the travel of the President,
[1329]and we set up a supervisor back here to receive that information and cable it
[1330]or get it immediately to our man who is accompanying the “President when he
[1331]makes this trip.
[1333]This. is done, this agent going with Secret Service is done, at the invitation
[1334]and request of Secret Service.
[1336]Representative Forp. 169 agents of the FBI who have assisted since the
[1337]assassination. Did Secret Service make a specific request for their help in
[1338]these instances? :
[1340]Mr. BeLmMont. Yes; Mr. Rowley advised that he needed help, it was offered
[1341]to him by Mr. Hoover, and when the President is going to visit a city. and
[1342]Secret ‘Service does not have sufficient personnel in that particular city to
[1343]cover what they consider is necessary, they need specialized help from us, they
[1344]will make the request to us and we will authorize our local agent in charge to
[1345]make those men, the designated number, available to the Secret Service
[1346]representative, who then uses their services while the President is there.
[1348]Representative Forp. I gather that: prior to the assassination such requests,
[1349]specific requests, had not: come from Secret Service to the Bureau.
[1351]Mr. BELMontT. No. There were never any such requests before.
[1353]Mr. Stern. At the level at which the requests have been made so far, have
[1354]they proved to be a difficult burden for the FBI?
[1356]Mr. BetMonr. Mr. Stern, any time that we have a pending caseload of some-
[1357]thing like 115,000 investigative matters, which is what we have, and our agents
[1358]are assigned about 20 to 25 cases apiece across the country, ranging from matters
[1359]of immediate urgency to matters which can be handled in due time, and whenever
[1361]24
[1363]13-00000
[1367]= REET
[1369]our agents are putting in an average of over 2 hours overtime a day voluntarily, —
[1371]the loan of 139 men will be felt.
[1373]Representative Forp. 169. -
[1375]Mr. Beimont. I believe it was.139, sir. I think the letter says 139.
[1377]Mr. Stern. 189 on 16 separate occasions. .
[1379]Mr. Betmont. Yes. I do not wish to overplay this. We are not complaining.
[1381]We do feel that at such time as Secret Service is able to increase its per-
[1382]sonnel or meet this problem within the organization that it is properly their
[1383]problem. But: meanwhile we are following this procedure and we are not
[1384]complaining.
[1386]‘Mr. Duties. I had hoped, Mr. Chairman, that at some time while Mr. Belmont
[1387]was hére, we could ask him to just briefly define for us, going back to the assassi-
[1388]nation day, a clear definition of the respective functions of the FBI and the
[1389]Secret Service prior to and immediately after the assassination. There seemed
[1390]to have been at one time a little confusion there. Naturally in a situation of this
[1391]kind it always happens, but I am not absolutely clear in my mind as to—
[1393]Mr. Betmont. At the time of the assassination?
[1395]Mr. Duties. Yes. Just before, I mean what your responsibilities were just
[1396]before the assassination, and just after as contrasted with the functions of the
[1397]Secret Service.
[1399]Mr. Bevmont. The Secret Service has the. responsibility for protecting the
[1400]President and his family, and the Vice President and so on. That is a basic
[1401]responsibility.
[1403]Mr. Duties. And you have no auxiliary function to that——
[1405]Mr. Bexmont. No, sir. :
[1407]Mr. Duties. Except to furnish names and suspects, as you have indicated.
[1409]Mr. Betmont. That is correct. We have no function there. That is a primary
[1411]responsibility and function of Secret Service.
[1413]Now, we do have what we have considered our responsibility, to furnish to
[1414]Secret Service any indication of a threat to the President, and that we have
[1416]-. done religiously.
[1418]After the assassination the President ordered us into an investigation of the
[1419]assassination which changed the picture as far as this particular case was
[1420]concerned.
[1422]Mr. Duties. You mean President Johnson, immediately after the assassina-
[1425]Mr. Bretaont. Yes, sir.
[1427]Mr. Duties. And there was a period there, there was a period though, after
[1428]the assassination and before President Johnson took the oath of office—did this
[1430]_ order come to you during that period or after he had taken the oath of office?
[1432]Mr. BeLMont. It was very rapid, probably within a day.
[1434]Mr. Duties. I see. It wasn't immediately after.
[1436]Mr. Beciuonr. No.
[1438]Mr. Duties. ‘It wasn’t this period I am speaking of.
[1440]Mr. Betmonr. You see, Mr. Dulles, the Federal Government still has no juris.
[1441]diction over the assassination of the President. That was a murder and was
[1442]within the province of the local police who immediately took hold of it and
[1443]started the investigation.
[1445]Mr. Dutzes. I realize that.
[1447]Mr. BeLwont. And started the investigation and it was theirs.
[1449]Mr. Duties. You were only in there by courtesy. What you did was by
[1450]courtesy of the local authorities.
[1452]Mr. Betmonrt. Yes, sir; we went to the Dallas Police Department and immedi-
[1453]ately went into action because of what had happened, and there was no time
[1454]for us to stand, on priorities. But we felt we should be of the utmost. assistance,
[1455]and we sent men to the police department to assist in the interview and do
[1456]anything else we could. This wasn’t a time, of course, to sit back and say,
[1457]“This isn’t our job.”
[1459]Mr. Duttes. I understand.
[1461]Mr. BELmont. Yes.
[1463]The CHarrman. Mr. Belmont, just one question. Do you know of any legisla-
[1465]25
[1467]13-00000 -
[1469]tReegueuse ne
[1471]tion in recent years that might have been.introduced in the Congress to make :
[1473]an attack upon the President a Federal offense?
[1475]Mr. BeLmont..J do know that there is legislation presently pending.
[1477]The CuareMan. Since the assassination?
[1479]Mr. BeLmonrt. Since the assassination.
[1481]The CHarRMAN. Yes. But had it been considered in recent years? I know it
[1482]had at the time of other assassinations, but so far as you know were there any
[1483]recent legislation to that eftect?
[1485]Mr. BeLmont. Mr. Chairman, I must plead ignorance. I haven’t done research
[1486]on it, and I just don’t know.
[1488]The CuarrMan. Yes. Well, we can find that out very easily.
[1490]Representative Forp. Mr. Chairman, just the other day in the House of Repre-
[1491]sentatives a bill was approved giving Federal officials the right to take certain
[1492]action when a chief of state from a foreign country was within the United
[1493]States; a. broadening of their authority when they had a suspicion or they had
[1494]some reason to believe that au attack was being made on a foreign dignitary.
[1496]At the time it went through the House I thought of the same question you
[1497]just raised, and I wondered whether there were any specific legislative matters
[1498]pending before any committee on this particular point.
[1500]Mr. Be_mont. I am sure there is a pending bill because my recollection is
[1501]that it was called to our attention—I cannot pinpoint it for you—but I think
[1502]there is pending legislation now in this matter.
[1504]Mr. McCtoy. I noticed in some Law Review article recently reference to the
[1505]fact that previous bills had been introduced but had gone into the wastebasket.
[1507]The CuareMan. That is true.
[1509]Mr. McCrory. In respect of other incidents.
[1511]The CuarnMan. When the emotion died down.
[1513]Mr. McCrory. When the emotion died down, that is true.
[1515]I have some further questions.
[1517]The CuarrMan. Have you finished, Mr. Stern?
[1519]Mr. Sreen. I want to get one thing established that came up yesterday. Mr.
[1521]_ Belmont, yesterday the Commission was interested in determining, if possible,
[1523]when Agent Hosty recorded the interviews that he had taken on October 29,
[1524]November 1, and November 5. He wasn’t certain, except that he thought it had
[1525]been done after the assassination. Have you caused a check to’ be made on that?
[1527]Mr. BeLtmont. Yes; we checked with our Dallas office, and they do not have
[1528]a specific. record of when that information was recorded.
[1530]Mr. Srern. Was it recorded in substantially the same form in some con-
[1531]temporaneous communication?
[1533]Mr. BetmMonr. Yes; within a day or two, I think on November 4, if I recall
[1534]correctly, the fact that Hosty had talked to the neighbor of Mrs. Paine and
[1535]had located Marina Oswald, was sent in by AIRTEL.
[1537]Mr. Stern. You might refer to Commission Exhibit 834, page 9, items 64 and
[1538]67, just so the record is straight. ;
[1540]Mr. Betmont. Item 64 is an AIRTEL frow the Dallas office to the head-
[1541]quarters dateo October 30, wherein Hosty reported this interview that he had
[1542]had with the neighbor of Mrs. Paine.
[1544]On November 4 the Dallas office reported by AIR'EL the resulta of his con-
[1545]tact with Mrs. Paine on November.1, so that the results of his interviews were
[1546]incorporated at that time, October 30, November 4, but the actual insert for the
[1547]report was not prepared until some time later. To the best of Hosty’s recollec-
[1548]tion it was after the 22d and prior to December 2, but he was already on record
[1549]by these AIRTELs.
[1551]Mr. Stern. Thank you, Mr. Belmont.
[1553]I have no further questions.
[1555]The CHargMan. Mr. McCloy.
[1557]Mr. McCrory. I have one or two questions.
[1559]Mr. Belmont, you do know the charge has been made by some that Oswald
[1560]was what is called a secret agent. Do you have any information whatever
[1561]that would cause you to believe that Oswald was or could have been an agent
[1562]or an informant of the FBI?
[1564]26
[1566]13-00000
[1568]TAMAR AY
[1570]Mr. BeLmonr. I have covered that in some considerable detail, Mr. McCloy,
[1571]and I will make a positive statement that Oswald was not, never was, an agent
[1572]or an informant of the FBI.
[1574]Mr. McOroy. In the course of your investigation do you have any reason to
[1575]make you believe that he was an agent of any other country?
[1577]Mr. BeLMoNnt. No, sir; we have no reason to believe that he was an agent of
[1578]any other country.
[1580]Mr. McCuroy. Or any other agency of the United States?
[1582]Mr. BeLmont. Or any other agency of the United States.
[1584]Mr. McCroy. You said this morning, I believe, or at least I guess Mr. Hosty
[1585]said, that the assassination of the President and any leads in connection with
[1586]it are still of constant concern to the FBI.
[1588]- Do you feel there are any areas as of the present time that you feel at the
[1589]present time require or justify further investigation other than routine check-
[1590]ups that have -not already been undertaken?
[1592]Mr. Betmont. No, sir; frankly, I don’t. I will say that from the requests we
[1593]have received from the Commission, you have explored this most thoroughly.
[1594]We do not have any unexplored -areas in this investigation that should be
[1595]explored. There are some pending requests that you have made, and we are
[1596]running them out as rapidly as we can.
[1598]Mr.. McCoy. Maybe this isn’t a fair questidn to ask you, but, after all, you
[1599]have had a long record of criminal investigation, and. you have had a-long
[1600]exposure to investigation in this case.
[1602]As a result of your investigation do you feel that there is any credible evidence
[1603]thus far which would support a conclusion or an opinion that the death of the
[1604]President was the result of a conspiracy or anything other than the act of a
[1605]single individual? -
[1607]Mr. Beximont. No, sir; we have no evidence, and I could support no conclu-
[1608]sion that this was other than an act of Oswald.
[1610]Mr. McCrory. Now, the investigation does lead you to the conclusion that he
[1611]was the President’s assassin?
[1613]Mr. Betmont. Yes, sir.
[1615]Mr. McCrory. Did you ever at any time have any connection whatever—you or
[1616]the agency—have anything to do with the Walker, General Walker, case?
[1618]Mr. BELMontT No, sir; that was a’ matter handled by the Dallas police. I
[1619]am drawing on my recollection of it now, but, as I recall it, after the incident,
[1620]we offered to examine the bullets that were recovered—
[1622]Mr. McCrory. Bullets.
[1624]“Mr, Betmonr. And the police apparently wanted to retain them, so that we
[1625]did not conduct the examination of the bullets until subsequent to the assassina-
[1626]tion itself.
[1628]Mr. McCrory. Until recently.
[1630]Mr. Bretmont. No; we had no connection with it, with that investigation.
[1632]Mr. McCoy. In your investigation of the President’s- assassination, did you
[1633]have odeasion, after the event, to make an investigation of Ruby’s background
[1634]or Ruby’s relationship to Oswald?
[1636]Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir; we went into that very thoroughly.
[1638]Mr. McCrory. Have we got all your reports on that?
[1640]Mr. Be.monr. Yes, sir.
[1642]Mr. McCrory. Have you come to any conclusions or opinions in regard to
[1643]Ruby and his connection with Oswald, if any?
[1645]Mr. BeLmont. The reports, of course, speak for themselves. But in summa-
[1646]tion, we did not come up with anything of a solid nature, that is anything that
[1647]would stand up to indicate that there was any association between Ruby and
[1648]Oswald. We had numerous allegations which we ran out extensively and care-
[1649]fully, but there is nothing, no information, that would stand up to show there
[1650]was an association between them. ; .
[1652]Mr. McCuor. Maybe this is in the record, but do you—by reason of your very
[1653]close association with this investigation, I venture to ask this question—do
[1654]you, from your knowledge of the investigation find—was there any evidence in
[1656]27
[1658]13-00000
[1660]Mr. Duttes. Do you have some more?
[1662]’ Mr. McCtoy. I think I have got all the questions J wanted to ask.
[1664](At this point in the proceedings, Representative Ford leaves the hearing
[1665]room.)
[1667]Mr. Duties. I have two or three questions.
[1669]As you know, Mr. Belmont, there have been a wide variety of rumors that have
[1670]been spread abroad very particularly with regard to the assassination.
[1672]I have before me, just received last night, a book just being published in
[1673]England, it is coming out in the next day or 2, called “Who Killed Kennedy,” by
[1674]Thomas G. Buchanan, published in London by Secker and Warburg. I- have
[1675]not.had an opportunity yet to read the book. I have read a good deal of the
[1676]background material on which it is based.
[1678]I would like to ask though when this book is available to you, and we will
[1679]make a copy available to you and see that you get one promptly, whether you
[1680]would have the Bureau read this, an appropriate person in the Bureau familiar
[1681]with the case or yourself, and possibly give us your views with regard to certain
[1682]of the allegations here within your particular competence.
[1684]Mr. Bermont. As I understand it, Mr. Dulles, this is. probably a compilation
[1685]of the articles that he wrote in the French press. .
[1687]Mr. DuLres. Express; yes.
[1689]Mr. Betauonr. Which, I believe, we sent over to the Commission as we received
[1690]them.
[1692]Mr. Duis. That is correct.
[1694]Mr. Betmonr. And from my recollection of perusing those articles, they are
[1695]filled with false. statements, innuendoes, incorrect conclusions, misinformation,
[1696]and certainly what I would term false journalism. In other words, he has
[1697]stated as fact or as a correct conclusion many things which the Commission’s
[1698]investigation has disproved completely. /
[1700]We will be glad to read the book and. to furnish you with a general comment
[1701]on it. But to take down. each statement in there and go into it would probably
[1702]result in a critique of 500 pages. |
[1704]Mr. Duties. We do not want that. I don’t think we need that.
[1706]Mr. Bretéonr. Where actually many of these allegations have already been
[1707]resolved by the Commission, I am.sure. We will be giad to. read it and give
[1709]. you a—
[1711]Mr. Duties. I think that would be useful for the ‘Commission to have, Mr.
[1712]Chairman. Do you agree?
[1714]The CHamnMan. Very well; yes. If you find any factual matters in there that
[1715]contradict your.findings, We would expect you to call it to our attention..
[1717]Mr. BeLMont. Most certainly, sir. -
[1719]The Carman. But otherwise I don’t think we want a review of the book.
[1720]That is your idea, ig it?
[1722]Mr. Duuxes. Not-a review of the book, but if there are allegations there, any
[1723]evidence you can factually deny, that would be helpful to have it.
[1725]Mr. McCrory. Do you have any record of: Buchanan? Do you know anything
[1726]about Buchanan’s background?
[1728]Mr, BeLmMont. No, sir; I do not recall.
[1730]Mr. Duties. I wish you would check.
[1732]Mr. Betmont. We can send you a letter.
[1734]The CHammMan. We have the record.
[1736]Mr. McCoy. He seems to be very much Ivy League, Lawrenceville School
[1737]and Yale.
[1739]Mr. Duties. He was at one time, I believe, he admitted to being a Communist
[1740]at one time. He was at one time employed by the Washington Star, I am ad-
[1741]vised, and I believe, according to the information I have, that he was terminated
[1742]by the Star some years ago.
[1744]Mr. Betmont. I thought he had been in touch with the Commission.
[1746]The CuairMAN. He came in, he did come in here, and made a statement which
[1747]we have recorded. His testimony wasn’t taken. He just walked in off the
[1748]street.
[1750]Mr. Dutzes. I have one or two more questions, Mr. Chairman.
[1752]30
[1754]13-00000
[1756]B, EbGaR MoovER
[1757]Pray +4, 1964
[1759]will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
[1761]Mr. Hoover. I do.
[1763]The CuainMan, Mr. Rankin will carry on the examination, Mr. Director.
[1765]Mr. Rankin. Mr. Chief Justice, do you want to tell him briefly what our
[1766]purpose is?
[1768]The Cuarrman. Ob, yes; it is our practice to make a brief statement before
[1769]the testimony of each witness, and I will -do it now.
[1771]Mr. Hoover will be asked to testify in regard to whethe: Lee H. Oswald
[1772]wag ever an agent, directly or indirectly, or an informer or acting o1. behalf
[1773]of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in any capacity at any time, and
[1774]whether he knows of any credible evidence of any conspiracy, either domestic
[1775]or foreign, involved in the assassination of President Kennedy.
[1777]What he has to say about an article in the National Enquirer, Commission
[1778]Exhibit No. 837, and concerning the failure to include the. name and informa-
[1779]tion concerning special agent Hosty in the initial report of the Oswald address
[1780]book and any suggestions and recommendations he may have concerning im-
[1781]provements or changes in provisions for the protection of the President of the
[1782]United States. Now, Mr. Rankin, you may proceed.
[1784]Mr. Rankin. Mr. Hoover, will you state for the record -your name and.
[1785]position?
[1787]Mr. Hoover. J. Edgar Hoover, Director of. the Federal Bureau of Investi-
[1788]gation of the Department of Justice.
[1790]Mr. Ranxin. Where do you live, Mr. Hoover?
[1792]Mr. Hoover. I live at 4936 30th Place, Northwest, Washington, D.C.
[1794]. Mr. Ranxin. And you have been Director of the Bureau for some 40 years
[1795]according to the newspapers?
[1797]Mr. Hoover. That is correct ;.since 1924.
[1799]Mr: Ranxin. You have furnished us a considerable amount of information,
[1800]Mr. Hoover, about whether or not Lee Harvey Oswald was ever an agent or
[1801]acting for the Bureau in any capacity as informer or otherwise at any time.
[1802]Are those statements correct?
[1804]Mr. Hoover. They are correct. I can most emphatically say that at no time
[1805]was he ever an employee of the Bureau in any capacity, either as an agent or as
[1806]a@ special employee, or as an informant.
[1808]Mr. Ranxrn. I call your particular attention to Exhibit 835, and suggest
[1809]that you will find that that is your letter, together -with your affidavit about
[1810]this subject matter, and other matters that you furnished to ts converning
[1811]this particular subject.
[1813]Mr. Hoover. That is correct.
[1815]Mr. RANKIN. Do you wish to add anything? .
[1817]Mr. Hoover. No; there is nothing that I desire to add to what appears in this
[1818]letter and my affidavit which accompaniéd it to the Commission. ;
[1820]Mr. RaNKIN. You have provided many things to us in assisting the Commis-
[1821]sion in connection with this investigation and I assume, at least in a general
[1822]way, you are familiar with the investigation of the assassination of President
[1823]Kennedy, is that correct?
[1825]Mr. Hoover. That is correct. When President Johnson returned to Washington
[1826]he communicated with me within the first 24 hours, and asked the Bureau to
[1827]pick up the investigation of the assassination because as you are aware, there
[1828]is no Federal jurisdiction for such an investigation. It is not a Federal crime
[1829]to kill or attack the President or the Vice President or any of the continuity of
[1830]officers who would succeed to the Presidency.
[1832]However, the President has a right to request the Bureau to make special
[1833]investigations, and in this instance he asked that this investigation be made. I
[1834]immediately assigned a special force headed by the special agent in charge at
[1835]Dallas, Tex., to initiate the investigation, and to get all details and facts con-
[1836]cerning it, which we obtained, and then prepared a report which we submitted
[1837]to the Attorney General for transmission to the President.
[1839]Mr. Rankin. From your study of this entire matter of the assassination and
[1840]work in connection with it, do you know of any credible evidence that has ever
[1841]come to your attention that there was a conspiracy either foreign or domestic
[1842]involved in the assassination?
[1844]98
[1846]13-09000
[1848]BAAS
[1850]+ eerie
[1852]Mr. Hoover. I know of no substantial evidence of any type that would support
[1853]any contention of that character. I have read all of the requests that have
[1854]come to the Bureau from this Commission, and I have read and signed all the
[1855]replies that have come to the Commission.
[1857]In addition, I have read many of the reports that our agents have made and
[1858]I have been unable to find any scintilla of evidence showing‘any foreign con-
[1859]spiracy or any domestic conspiracy that culminated in the assassination of
[1860]President Kennedy.
[1862]Representative Forp. May I ask this, Mr. Hoover. As I. understand your
[1863]testimony, it is based on the evidence that has heen accumulated thus far?
[1865]Mr. Hoover. That is correct; sir.
[1867]Representative Forp. Is the Federal Bureau of Investigation continuing ‘its —
[1869]’ investigation of all possible ramifications of this assassination?
[1871]Mr. Hoover. That is correct. We are receiving and we, I expect, will con-
[1872]tinue to receive for days-or weeks to come, letters from individuals that normally
[1874]- would probably be in the category of what we would call crank letters in which
[1876]various weird allegations are made or in which ‘people have reported psychic
[1877]vibrations. We are still running out letters of that character and in turn
[1878]making a report to this Commission upon it, notwithstanding the fact that:
[1879]on the face of it the allegation is without any foundation. Individuals who could
[1880]not have known any of the facts have made, some very strange statements.
[1881]There have been publications and books written, the contents .of which have been
[1882]absurd and without a scintilla of foundation of fact. I feel, from my experience
[1883]in the Bureau, where we are in constant receipt over the yeurs of these so-called
[1884]crank letters, that such allegations will be going on possibly for some year’
[1885]to come.
[1887]I, personally, feel that any.finding of the Commission will not be accepted by
[1888]everybody, because there are bound to be some extremists who have very pro-
[1889]nounced views, without any foundation for them, who will disagreé violently
[1890]with whatever findings the Commission makes. But I think it is essential that
[1891]the FBI investigate the allegations that are received in the future so it can’t be
[1892]said that we had ignored them or that the case is closed and forgotten.
[1894]Representative Forp. Could you give us some idea of how many agents: are
[1895]currently working to one degree or another on any aspects of this case? _
[1897]Mr. Hoover. I would estimate; Congressman Ford, that there are at the
[1898]present time at least 50 or 60 men giving their entire time to various aspects of
[1899]the investigation, because while Dallas is the office of origin, investigation is
[1900]required in auxiliary offices such as Los Angeles or San Francisco, and even in
[1901]some foreign countries like Mexico. We have representatives in Mexico City.
[1903]At the outset of the investigation, following the assassination, it was the
[1904]desire of the President to have this report completed by the Bureau just as
[1905]quickly as possible, and as thoroughly as possible, and I would say we had about
[1906]160 men at that time working on the report in the field, and at Washington, D.C.
[1908]Now, all the reports that come in from the field are, of course, reviewed at:
[1909]Washington. by the supervisor in charge of the case, and then in turn by the
[1910]assistant director of the division, and then in turn by Mr. Belmont, who is the
[1911]assistant to the Director.
[1913]Reports in which there is a controversial issue or where statements have
[1914]been made of the existence of some particular thing that we have never heard
[1915]of before, I myself, go over these to see that we haven’t missed anything or
[1916]haven't had any gap in the investigation so it can be tied down.
[1918]Recently the National Enquirer had a fantastic article in it as to the existence
[1919]of a letter that had been written or a request that had been made by the Depart-
[1920]ment of Justice to Chief Curry of the Dallas Police Department, to withhold
[1921]arresting Rubinstein, or Ruby, and Oswald after the Oswald attempt on Gen-
[1922]eral Walker’s life.
[1924]First, I had the agent in charge at Dallas interview Chief Curry and I have
[1925]sent to the Commission a letter as to what Chief Curry had to say. He branded
[1926]it as an entire lie—that he had never received any request of that kind. I had
[1927]our files searched to be certain we had not written any such letter as that and
[1928]found we had not. I requested the Department of Justice to advise me whether
[1929]they had written any such letter and Mr. Katzenbach advises there is no ref-
[1931]99
[1933]13-00000
[1935]mntanes.
[1937]erence in the Department files to the alleged letter from any Department of
[1938]Justice official to Chief Curry nor any reference that an FBI official was asked
[1939]to request.the Dallas police not to arrest Oswald or Ruby. A letter is being
[1940]sent to the Commission today setting forth this information.
[1942]Representative Forp. The point that I think ought to be made is that despite
[1943]the magnitude of the effort that has been made by the FBI and by other agencies,
[1944]and despite the tremendous effort that has been made, I believe, by the Com-
[1945]mission to help and assist and to consolidate all of the evidence that we possibly
[1946]could, that there is always the possibility at some future date that some:evidence
[1947]might come to the surface. :
[1949]Mr. Hoover. That.is, of course, possible; yes.
[1951]Representative Forp. I want just to be sure that no leads, no evidence. regard-
[1952]less of its credibility will be ignored, that it will be pursued by thé Bureau or
[1953]any other agency to make certain that Jt is good, bad or of no value.
[1955]Mr. Hoover. Weill, I can assure you so far as the FBI is concerned, the case
[1956]will be continued in an open classification for all-time. That is, any informa-
[1957]tion coming to us or any report coming to us from any source will be thoroughly
[1958]investigated, so that we will be able to either prove or disprove the allegation.
[1959]We found in the course of our investigations that individuals have made state-
[1960]ments. Yet, when we investigate they will frankly admit that. the statement
[1961]is an entire falsehood, or that they don’t know why they wrote the letter or
[1962]why they made the stutement. But, nevertheless, we have the record and
[1963]generally in those instances we try to get a signed: statement from that individual
[1964]so it can be made a part of the record.
[1966]Representative Forp. Under your authority from tne President, the authority
[1967]which gave you the FBI, the responsibility to conduct this investigation it is
[1968]not an authority with a terminal point. It is an authority that goes on
[1969]indefinitely?
[1971]Mr. Hoover. Very definitely so. The President wanted a full and thorough
[1972]investigation made of this matter, and we have tried to do so. As I. have
[1973]stated, I think we will continue to receive allegations. I think this will be a
[1974]matter of controversy for years to come, just like the Lincoln assassination.
[1975]There will be questions raised by individuals, either for publicity purposes or
[1976]otherwise, that will raise some new angle or new aspect of it. I think we must,
[1977]and certainly we intend in the FBI to continue to run down any such allegations
[1978]or reports of thar kind.
[1980]Representative Boags. Mr. Chairman.
[1982]The CHareMAN, Yes, Congressman Boggs.
[1984]a= Representative Bocas. Mr. Hoover, I don’t want any. cover—to cover. any
[1986]ground wnich has been covered but I just have.one or two questions. First, let
[1987]me say that you and the Bureau have been very cooperative with this Commis-
[1988]sion.
[1989]Mr. Hoover. Thank you. :
[1990]Representative. Bocas. And tremendously helpful. I have been concerned.
[1992]. about some of these wild press reports and concerned about what impact it may
[1994]have ultimately on the history of this thing. For instance there is a man
[1995]named Buchanan who has written a series of articles,
[1997]Mr. Duties, A book now. A book is out: yes.
[1999]Representative Boaas. A book now. I ‘understand they have been widely
[2001]‘.eirculated in the European press, and this man came here and was, as I got it
[2003]from some other sources, he took in some people here, some American journal-
[2004]ists, and I am told that this man has a Communist background, and in addition
[2005]to that is a most unreliable person. He has made these allegations that the
[2006]Dallas police force was involved in the assassination and s0 on.
[2008]Would you have any suggestions on how this Commigsion should deal with
[2010]| this sort of thing?
[2012]Mr. Hoover. We have received a request rrom the. Commission to review that
[2013]book and to make a report upon any, portions of it that can be contradicted
[2015]| or substantiated by actual facts or documents. I know Buchanan's background.
[2016]: He worked on the Washington Star and he was dismissed from the Washington
[2018]Star because he was a member of the Communist Party. He spent much of his
[2019]time in recent years in France writing for French newspapers. I have fol-
[2021]100
[2023]13-00000
[2025]lowed the articles that he has written about this matter and they are what I
[2026]would call “journalistic garbage.” There is not a scintilla of truth to most
[2027]of the things he has written in these articles and in -his book which I have had
[2028]a chance to scan but haven’t actually reviewed yet. It is being reviewed by
[2029]my research section. Some of the allegations are utterly fantastic. I often
[2030]wonder where some of these individuals get such ideas and why they make
[2031]such statements without foundation.
[2033]Now, he makes many wild charges there, and to read it, a. person not know-
[2034]ing him, or his views, or his background, would be inclined. to wonder. . I think
[2036]"you are going to have that problem, as I say, for years to come. I don’t know
[2038]how you can handle individuals like him other than to have the record clear
[2039]upon the facts of the case, and either substantiate or disprove his statements.
[2040]I don’t think too much time should be given to these individuals who have
[2041]such unsavory backgrounds as Buchanan has and who makes statements that
[2042]have been proved to be untrue. But, at the same time I think when a book
[2043]like that comes out or an article of that type comes out that deals with the
[2044]assassination of the late President, I think it should be gone into from an in-
[2045]vestigative point of. view. We should then submit to this Commission, even
[2046]after it-has concluded its hearings, for record purposes, what we have found
[2047]in each particular instance.
[2049]Representative Boaas. Now, on the other side of the ferice-———
[2051]Mr. Duties. May I-add one other thing just’ to interrupt. I wish you would
[2052]add to your list a book called ‘The Red Roses of Dallas” by a man named Gun.
[2053]He is a more reliable correspondent.
[2055]Mr. Hoover. He isa Philadelphia correspondent.
[2057]Mr. Duties. He has beeu' living in this country since 1946. I have met him
[2058]over here. Let’s see, he was at Dallas at the time. He was then reporting, I
[2059]think, for the Italian newspaper Hpoca.
[2061]- Mr. Hoover. That is not the same one,
[2063]Mr. Duties. He might have been lying. This book is full of lies. But I
[2064]think it is a book that ought to be added, too, and I will see that a copy is sent
[2065]to the Bureau.
[2067]Mr. Hoover. I would appreciate that. _
[2069]Representative Bocas. On the other side of the spectrum some professor out
[2070]at the University of Illinois wrote a piece in which he alleged the President
[2071]was a Communist agent, President Kennedy, and Buchanan’s allegations are
[2072]that the extreme right assassinated the President and this fellow’s allegations
[2073]are that the Communists asgassinated the President. Would you care to com-
[2074]ment? Have you read that piece? :
[2076]Mr. Hoover. I have read that’ plece. My comment on it is. this in general:
[2077]I. think the extreme right is just as much a danger to the freedom of this
[2078]country as the extreme left. There are groups, organizations, and individuals
[2079]on the extreme right who make these very violent. statements, allegations that
[2080]General Eisenhower was a Communist, disparaging. references to the Chief
[2081]J ustice and at the other end of the spectrum you have these leftists who make
[2082]wild statements charging almost anybody with being a Fascist or belonging.
[2083]to some of these so-called extreme right societies. Now,.I have felt, and I have
[2084]said publicly in speeches, that they are just as much a danger, at either end
[2085]of the spectrum. They don’t deal with facts. Anybody who will allege that
[2086]General Eisenhower was a Communist agent, has something wrong with him.
[2088]A lot of people read. such allegations because I get some of the weirdest letters
[2089]wanting to know whether we have inquired to find out whether that is true. I
[2090]have. known General Hisenhower quite well myself and I have found him to be
[2092]a sound, level-headed man.
[2094]In New York City there is a woman by the name of Kraus who must be
[2095]mentally deranged as she stands on a Broadway corner there handing out
[2096]leaflets in which she charges me with being in the conspiracy with the Com-
[2097]munists to overthrow this Government and so forth.
[2099]Well now, if any person has fought communism, I certainly have fought:
[2100]it. We have tried to fight it and expose it in democratic ways I think that is!
[2101]the thing we have to very definitely keep in mind in this whole problem in the’
[2103]101
[2106]eee renee
[2108]security of the President and the successor to office. Just how far you are going |
[2109]to go for his protection and his security. I don’t think you can get absolute
[2110]security without almost establishing a police state; and we don’t want that.
[2111]You can’t put security in a black groove or a white groove. It is in a gray
[2112]groove, and certain chances have to be taken. You are dealing with a human
[2113]being when you are dealing with the President of the United States. President
[2114]Johnson is a very down to earth human being, and ‘it makes the security prob-
[2115]lem all the more difficult, but you can’t bar him from the people.
[2117]There are certain things that can be done, and I submitted a memorandum
[2118]to the Secret Service, and to the White House on certain security steps that
[2119]might be taken and tightened up. But you are dealing with the general public
[2120]and that is what has given me great concern in the recent expansion, -of the
[2121]criteria for dissemination that we adopted after the assassination. -
[2123]Prior to that. time we reported to the Secret Service all information that
[2124]dealt with individuals who were potential killers or by whom acts of violence
[2125]might be anticipated. The Secret Service would take that information and
[2126]would do with it as they saw fit. I gave great consideration to it because I am
[2127]not very happy with the criteria expansion, but I felt we had to include subver-
[2128]sives of various character, and extremists. We have, in turn, ‘furnished their
[2129]names to the Secret Service. I think 5,000 names up to the present time already
[2130]have been submitted and there are at least three or four thousand more that
[2131]will be submitted within the next few months.
[2133]Then you come to the. problem of what you are going to do when the Secret
[2134]Service gets those names. They have to cal! upon the local authorities. Just
[2135]recently, in the city of Chicago, when the President was there, the local qu-
[2136]thorities were asked to give assistance as they usually do to the Secret Serv-
[2137]ice and they went to the homes of some of these people, and it resulted really
[2138]almost in a house arrest.
[2140]Now, I don’t think there is any place in this country for that kind of thing,
[2142]‘but these people who belonged to extreme subversive organizations or organiza-
[2144]tions that ‘advocated the overthrow of government by force and violence were
[2145]told that they couldn't leave their house or if they did they would be ac-
[2146]companied by a police officer. ‘That gives me great concern because in New
[2147]York City.alone, you run into maybe three or four thousand such individuals
[2148]who would be members of subversive organizations, and then you get into the
[2149]twilight zone of subversive fronts.
[2151]Now, there again, merely because a man belongs to a subversive ‘front organi-
[2152]zation, in my estimation doesn’t mean that he is blacklisted and is a menace
[2153]to the country for life. If he belongs to'20 of them, it certainly shows either
[2154]one of two things, he is either very gullible and dumb or. he is a. menace. That
[2155]has. been my attitude in regard to Government service where you find a Goyv-
[2156]ernment employee who belonged to. one or two, maybe in his early days. I
[2157]don’t believe this necessarily makes him a security risk. Rather, this would
[2158]be dependent on the degree of his activity in the front group and his purpose and
[2159]intent-in associating himself with it. But, where he has belonged to 15, 18, 20
[2160]of them, I don’t think he has enough good judgment to be in the Government.
[2162]Some ministers’ get drawn into organizations, some of. which are under the
[2163]domination of the Communist Party. Now, those ministers don’t know that.
[2164]They are just as loyal and patriotic as you and I are, but they happen to belong.
[2165]Now, that'is where the question of human judgment has to be used. We try
[2166]to use it.in selecting these names. But I was startled when I learned of
[2167]the incident in Chicago because there you come pretty close to a house arrest
[2169]and we don’t want that. We don’t want a gestapo. We have to, I think, main-
[2171]tain an even balance.
[2173]T think it- was very well expressed—
[2175]Mr. Duties. May I ask you, Mr. Hoover, was this house arrest based on
[2176]names you had furnished the. Secret Service and they furnished the local
[2177]authorities?
[2179]Mr. Hoover. Yes, sir.
[2181]Representative Boaos. That brings me back to the question I think I heard
[2183]102
[2187]Congressman Ford ask you as I came into the room, because I think this is the .
[2188]crux of our investigation.
[2190]I read the FBI report very carefully and thé whole-implication of the report
[2191]is that, number one, Oswald shot the President; number two, that he was. not
[2192]connected with any conspiracy of any kind, nature or description.
[2194]Mr. Hoover. Correct.
[2196]Representative Boggs. Do you still subscribe to that?
[2198]Mr. Hoover. I subscribe to it even ‘more strongly today than I did at the time
[2199]that the report was written. You see, the original idea was that there would
[2200]be an irivestigation by the FBI and a report would be prepared in such form that
[2201]it could be released to the public.
[2203]Representative Boaes. Surely.
[2205]Mr. Hoover. Then a few days later, after further consideration, the President
[2206]decided to form a commission, which I think was very wise, because I feel that
[2207]the report:of any agency of Government investigating what might be some short-
[2208]comings on the part of other agencies of Government ought to be reviewed by
[2209]an impartial group such as this Commission. And the more I have read these
[2210]reports, the more I am convinced that Oswald was the man who fired the
[2211]gun; and he fired three times, killed the President, and wounded Governor .
[2212]Connally.
[2214]And I also am further convinced that there is absolutely no association be-
[2215]tween Oswald or Ruby. There was no such evidence ever established.
[2217]Mr. DuLLes. Or Oswald and atiybody else?’ Would you go that far?
[2219]Mr. Hoover. Anybody else who might be—
[2221]Mr. Duties. In connection with the assassination? |
[2223]Mr. Hoover. Yes; I would certainly go that far. There was suspicion at first
[2224]this. might be a Castro act. .
[2226]Representative Boas. Right.
[2228]Mr. Hooves. We had information that had been obtained in Mexico City by
[2229]another intelligence agency indicating there was a man who had seen a certain
[2230]amount of money passed to Oswald at the, Cuban Consulate. I think it was
[2231]$6,000 that was passed. We went into that very thoroughly: .The man later
[2232]retracted his statement and stated it was not true. He was asked whether he
[2233]would take a lie detector test, and he did. The lie detector test showed that
[2234]he was telling a lie.
[2236]As to the lie detector, I do want to make this comment on n it. I have always
[2237]held to the opinion that it is not a perfect piece of machinery. It is an inter-
[2238]pretation made by human beings of what the machine, the polygraph, shows. I
[2240]would never want to convict or to send to the penitentiary any person solely
[2242]on the evidence of the lie detector. It is a contribution in an investigation,
[2243]a.more or less psychological contribution.
[2245]But I have seen individuals who have failed the lie detector test: and who
[2246]were just as innocent as they could be. That particular lead in Mexico City
[2247]was completely disproved; there was no foundation for it.
[2249]We found no associations between Oswald and Ruby. There has been a story
[2250]printed that Ruby and Oswald worked together and were close friends.
[2252]There was no evidence, there was never any indication that we could find
[2253]that Oswald had ever been in Ruby’s nightclub or had had any association with
[2254]bim. -
[2256]Ruby comes from Chicago, he was on the fringe of what you might call the
[2257]elements of the underworld there. He came to Dallas, opened up the nightclub
[2258]and it was a place where, certainly not the better class of people went, but it
[2259]wasn’t any so-called “joint,” to use the vernacular. It was: just another night-
[2260]club. So far as we have been able to establish there was no relationship or
[2261]contact between Oswald and Ruby or anyone else allegedly involved in this
[2262]assassination. :
[2264]Representative Boacgs. The FBI interviewed practically everybody who ever
[2265]associated with Oswald?
[2267]Mr. Hoover. It did.
[2269]Representative Boaes. You didn’t find any indication of why anyone should
[2270]even suspect that Oswald would do this, did you?
[2272]103
[2275]sei oe
[2277]RN
[2279]slowly. It wasn’t going at a high rate of speed, so that he had. perfect oppor-
[2280]tunity to do it.
[2282]Now, some people have raised the question: Why didn’t he shoot the Presi-
[2283]dent as the car came toward the storehouse where he was working?
[2285]The reason for that is, I think, the fact. there were some trees between his
[2286]window on the sixth floor and the cars as they turned and went through the
[2287]park. So he waited until the car got out from under the trees, and the limbs,
[2288]and then he had a perfectly clear view of the occupants of the car, and I
[2289]think he took aim, either on the President or Connally, and I personally believe
[2290]it was the President in view of the twisted mentality the man had.
[2292]But he had given no indication of that—we had interviewed him, I think,
[2293]three times. Of course, our interviews were predicated to find out whether he
[2294]had been recruited by the Russian intelligence service, because they frequently
[2295]do that.
[2297]Representative Boacs. And had he been?
[2299]Mr. Hoover. He had not been, so he said, and we have no proof that he was.
[2300]He had been over there long enough but they never gave him citizenship in
[2301]Russia at all. ‘I think they probably looked upon him more as a. kind of a
[2302]queer sort of individual and they didn’t trust him too strongly.
[2304]But just the day before yesterday information came to me indicating that
[2305]there is an espionage training school outside of Minsk—-I don’t know whether
[2306]it is true—and that he was trained at that school to come back to this country
[2307]to become what they call a “sleepér,” that is a man who will remain dormant
[2308]for 3 or 4 years and in case of international hostilities rise up and be used.
[2310]I don’t know of any espionage school at Minsk or near Minsk, and I don't
[2311]know how you could find out if there ever was one because the Russians won't
[2312]tell you if you asked them.
[2314]They do have espionage and sabotage schools in Russia and they do have
[2315]an assassination squad that is used by them but there is no indication he had
[2316]any association with anything of that kind.
[2318]Representative Bocas. Now we have some people, including this man’s mother, ©
[2319]talk about Oswald having been an agent of the Government of the United States.
[2320]I think his mother mentioned the.CIA; she has made these statements publicly
[2321]for money, apparently.
[2323]Mr. Hoover. Yes; she has. :
[2325]Representative Boces. Just for the purpose of the record, I think it would be
[2326]well if you would comment on that, Mr. Director.
[2328]Mr. Hoover. Of course, we have interviewed his mother and his wife, and
[2329]all his relatives, and everybody that he is known to have associated with. His
[2330]mother I would put in a category of being emotionally unstable. She has’
[2331]been around the country making speeches, and the first indication of her
[2332]emotional instability was the retaining of a lawyer that anyone would not
[2333]have retained if they really were serious in trying to get down to the facts.
[2334]But she has been in New York City; she has been in Chicago; I think other
[2335]parts of the country, always speaking for money.
[2337]Now, that kind of an individual is the type we have seen over the years,
[2338]who will say almost anything to draw a crowd. Just to.be able to say some-
[2339]thing ‘sensational. Many times we have gone out to such people and asked
[2340]them spectfically, “Now, what is your basis for this?” And they will say,
[2341]“Well, I just had a feeling that that was true, so I said it.”
[2343]She has never made that statement to us, but we have many other instances
[2344]where that kind of statement is made. They don’t have the legal evidence that
[2345]you must have if you are going to take any positive action. I would put very
[2346]little credence in anything that his mother said.
[2348]I think his wife was a far more reliable person in statements that she made,
[2349]so far as we were able to ascertain, than his mother. I think the mother had
[2350]in mind, naturally, the fact she wanted to clear her son’s name, which was
[2351]a natural instinct, but.more importantly she was going to see how much money
[2352]she could make, and I believe she has made a substantial sum.
[2354]. Representative Bosas. And the allegations she has made about this man being
[2355]an agent either of the CIA or the FBI are false?
[2357]Mr. Hoover. Well, I can certainly speak for the FBI that it is false, and I
[2359]105
[2361]13-00000
[2363]have discussed the matter, naturally, with Mr. McCone, the Director of CIA,
[2364]and he, of course, will no doubt appear himself, but there is no indication at
[2365]all that he was employed by them. We frequently get that kind of a story
[2366]from individuals who, when they get into some kind of difficulty, will claim they
[2367]were working for the CIA or they were working for the FBI.
[2369]Representative Boaes. Surely.
[2371]Mr. Hoover. Now, no one can work for the FBI without the approval being
[2372]given at Washington and a record kept of it, even of the confidential informants.
[2373]That is very tightly controlled. We have no so-called lump sum that we can
[2374]use to hire people. So there has to be a voucher and specific details of payment.
[2375]And I know at no time was he an informant or agent or a special employee or
[2377]i working in any capacity for the FBI.
[2379]As to the interviews we had with him in which he. gave us some informa-
[2380]tion, some of it was not the truth, but this was not particularly significant.
[2381]The interviews we had with him I would not term as talking with an informant.
[2382]He was interviewed while under arrest by the New Orleans police, and then
[2383]after he had committed this act of assassination we interviewed him in police
[2384]headquarters in Dallas. But they were the only contacts we had, I think
[2385]four contacts altogether, and he received no money of any kind, no promise
[2386]of any kind, and there was no indication that he was rendering assistance to
[2387]the U.S. Government. We looked upon him as a criminal after the assassination,
[2388]of course, and prior to that time we looked upon him as an individual who we
[2389]suspected might become an agent of the Soviet government. There was, no
[2390]proof of that, and we checked him carefully.
[2392]We knew of his contact with the Soviet Embassy. here at Washington, his
[2393]contact with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee in New York, and his contact
[2394]with the Worker publication in New York. And none of those contacts gave
[2395]any indication of any tendency to commit violence.
[2397]There are many people who read the Daily Worker, or what is now the
[2398]Worker, and you certainly can’t brand them as hazards to the security of the
[2399]country or as potential assassins. It is in that area that.I am particularly
[2401]: concerned that we don’t become hysterical and go too far in restricting the
[2403]“ettgeeess . citizens of our country from. exercising their civil and constitutional rights.
[2404]The mere fact a person disagrees with you in a matter on communism doesn’t
[2405]mean he should be arrested. Many Communists make very violent speeches, ©
[2406]atid we know them, but I don’t feel that the time has come that they should be
[2407]arrested. If they have violated the laws of the United States, we will, then,
[2408]proceed with prosecution, and the cases can then go through the courts. Such
[2409]eases last for years before they get to the Supreme Court, and even then such
[2410]vette eases often start over on some legal angle. But, all in all, I think that the
[2411]enforcement of security and the enforcement of laws dealing with subversion
[2412]ought to be handled in the American manner. - ;
[2414]I am criticized by the extreme right for that. They put me in the category,
[2415]I guess, along with General Eisenhower. But the extreme left criticizes me,
[2416]saying I believe that any person who has on a red necktie may be addicted to
[2417]communism, and, therefore, is a great danger. That is why I say the extremists
[2418]at both ends are bad, and I have repeated that several times publicly.
[2420]Representative Boces. No doubt about the problem being a difficult one.
[2421]I remember some years back when these fanatics started shooting up the
[2422]House of Representatives. . :
[2424]Mr. Hoover. I recall that.
[2426]Representative Boces. I happened to*be there on the occasion and there were
[2427]many suggestions that we build a bulletproof glass enclosure around the Mem-
[2428]bers of Congress and so on. Of course, all of us rejected those ideas because
[2429]it would be totally incompatible with our democratic institutions: and this,
[2430]obviously, becomes a problem in the security of the President; that is what
[2431]you are telling us, isn’t it?
[2433]Mr. Hoover. That is the great problem. We have participated in the pro-
[2434]tection of the President since the assassination. The Secret Service indicates
[2435]how many agents it needs when the President is traveling somewhere or going
[2436]somewhere in Washington, and then I assign that number of agents to the
[2437]Secret Service. They are not under my direction. They are under the direction
[2439]106
[2442]13-00000
[2444]of the Secret Service because under law they are charged with the protection
[2445]of the President. We have never done that before, but I felt that it was some-
[2446]thing we must do if the Secret Service desired it. Sometimes, such ag at the
[2447]funeral of the late President Kennedy, the procession walked up Connecticut —
[2448]Avenue, which created a very, very grave security problem because they were
[2449]walking with these tall building on either side. As I recall, we had the respon-
[2450]sibility for the Cathedral, and we had 43 agents in the Cathedral during the
[2451]services. I was more concerned about these tall buildings, because all the
[2452]small buildings have been torn down along Connecticut Avenue, and there were
[2453]about six or seven blocks to walk. Not only the high officials of this Government,
[2454]including the President, but the Queen of Greece. General de Gaulle, Emperor
[2455]Haile Selassie, and many Prime Ministers were present. They were a perfect
[2456]target for someone in some window.
[2458]Now, you can't empty these buildings. It is impossible to do that, because
[2459]you can’t: go to the Mayfiower Hotel and say all front rooms must be vacated.
[2460]Other office buildings are there, even taller than the Mayfiower, and you can’t
[2461]make them keep everybody out of the front offices because then you get into
[2462]a police state.
[2464]The Secret Service does try to check to find out who have these various offices.
[2465]We also check so if there is anything in our files on those individuals the Secret
[2466]Service is at once advised. When the President goes to a banquet or a social
[2467]occasion, all of the employees in the hotel,.the cooks, waiters, and busboys,
[2468]ae and so forth, are all checked by Secret Service to be certain there is no one
[2470]with a background that would indicate a hazard to the President. But that
[2471]is as far as I think you can go.' You can’t put in-a whole new staff of waiters
[2472]and you can’t make people move out. People going to a Presidential function
[2473]are generally invited by card or by list. and that is very carefully checked at
[2474]the entrance by the Secret Service.
[2476]We suggested a few more things that possibly could be done, and some of
[2477]which I have doubts about. You speak about this matter of glass around the
[2479]. galleries in the House. One of the suggestions that we made was that there
[2481]be bulletproof glass in front of the President’s lectern. In my own mind, I
[2482]question whether that is wise. Knowing this President as this President is, he
[2483]wants to get close to the audience; he wants to reach over and shake hands
[2484]with people. That concerns me because you never know when an emotionally
[2485]unstable person may be in that crowd. As you noted, he has frequently brought
[2486]groups into the White House gardens and waiked around with people he didn't
[2487]know. I know the Secret Service people are concerned about it. I am con-
[2488]cerned about it.
[2490]‘President Truman last week expressed his concern that the President was
[2491]taking unnecessary chances.
[2493]But the governmental agency having the responsibility for guarding him, the
[2494]Secret Service, has a natural hesitancy to say, “You can’t do this.”
[2496]Representative Boces. Of course, for the record, President Kennedy: had the
[2497]same difficulty.
[2499]Mr. Hoover. That is right. It was best expressed at Parkland Hospital.
[2500]One of President Kennedy's staff made the statement that the whole fault in
[2501]this matter was that, in the choice between politics and security, politics was.
[2502]chosen. That is exactly what happened. It was an open car. I am thoroughly
[2503]opposed to the President riding in an open car.
[2505]They did not have any armored car’ in the Secret Service at that time.
[2506]I have now sent one of our armored cars over for the President, but it is.a
[2507]closed limousine. But on occasion, such as at Gettysburg and Atlanta the other
[2508]day, the President got out of. the armored car which had been flown there for
[2509]his-use, and commandeered the car of the Secret Service which is wide open,
[2510]so he could wave and see the people. Now, that is a great hazard. I think
[2511]he should always be in an armored car that is closed, that can’t have the
[2512]top put down. But as you recall, President Kennedy had the bubble top off
[2513]of the car that he was in. It was not armored and the bubble top was made
[2514]of plastic so a bullet could have gone through it very easily.
[2516]Representative Forp. Mr. Hoover, you have categorically testified that ine |
[2518]107
[2521]13-00000
[2523]oe maniabd ene
[2525]FBI never at any time had Oswald as an agent, as an informant, or in any -
[2527]. other way.
[2529]Mr. Hoover. That is correct. I couldn't make it more emphatic.
[2531]Representative Forp. And Mr. Belmont testified to the same last week when
[2532]he was before us.
[2534]Mr. Hoover. Yes, sir.
[2536]Representative Forn. Both you and he would be fully familiar with all of
[2537]the records of the FBI in this regard?
[2539]Mr. Hoover. We would, and we would not only be fully familiar with it
[2540]because while Mr. Belmont is in charge of the Investigative Branch of the
[2541]Bureau—we have two assistants to the Director, one in charge of administrative
[2542]work and the other in charge of investigative. work—we have also checked the
[2543]administrative records where vouchers or payments would have been made.and
[2544]there is no indication that any money was ever paid to Oswald. We have
[2545]obtained, and they are on file with the Commission, the affidavits of the agents,
[2546]who at various times were in contact with Oswald, to the effect that he was not
[2547]an informant; that they had never paid him anything; that he was being
[2548]questioned as to possible recruitment by the Soviet intelligence; so there was
[2549]no evidence at any time indicating employment by the FBI.
[2551]Representative Foro. And you were not under any limitation or restriction
[2552]from any other authority in this regard?
[2554]Mr. Hoover. Absolutely not. I have the entire control of whether a man
[2555]shall be an informant or shall not be an informant. ‘That comes under.my
[2556]chain of command from the local office which has the matter at hand. They
[2557]ean’t just put on an informant without our approval. The recommendation
[2558]on security informants comes to the Bureau; it goes through the Assistant
[2559]Director of the Domestic Intelligence Division, and, in significant cases, goes
[2560]to Mr. Belmont, and then to my desk for my specific approval. So I, or my
[2561]seat-of-government staff, have to approve every one of those who are used a8
[2562]informants in all classes of cases, not only in intelligence cases but in white-
[2563]slave cases, automobile thefts, and all of these cases.
[2565]Representative Forp. There is no limitation on what you can tell'us about
[2566]this situation? :
[2568]Mr. Hoover. None whatsoever.
[2570]Representative Forp. No limitation; no restrictions?
[2572]Mr. Hoover. No restriction. So far as the record of vouchers in the Bureau .
[2573]are concerned, they are open to the inspection of this Commission at any time
[2574]going back as far as you may want to-go. .
[2576]Senator Coorer. May I ask just one question there? I think you have an-
[2577]swered it, but in your examination of this aspect as to whether or not Oswald
[2578]was an informer or employee or held any relationship to the FBI, you, yourself,
[2579]have looked into all of the means you have of determining that fact when you
[2580]make the statement to us?
[2582]Mr. Hoover. I have personally looked into that for two reasons: Because the
[2583]President asked me personally to take charge of this investigation and to direct
[2584]it, and I knew that the report ultimately would be made to-him. For that rea-
[2585]son I became familiar with every step and every action that was taken. Then
[2586]when the allegation was made by someone—I think it was the mother of Os-
[2587]wald first, if I recall correctly—that he was employed. by some Government
[2588]agency, the CIA, or FBI, and maybe both, I insisted upon a check being made.
[2589]and any record showing any indication of that being brought to me. When
[2590]they could find none, I then asked for affidavits from the field force that had
[2591]dealt with Oswald as to whether they had hired him or paid him anything or
[2592]given him anything, and the affidavits are on file here that they had not.
[2594]Senator Cooper. I think you have said there is no sum available to the FBI
[2595]which would enable these men, these agents, to employ him out of any funds
[2596]that are made available to them.
[2598]Mr. Hoover. Oh, no; it must be done by voucher, and those vouchers are ex-
[2599]amined by the General Accounting Office every year or so.. We have no lump
[2600]sum in the field offices for employment of informants as such which is not sup
[2602]rted by vouchers.
[2604]Senator Cooper. I have just about two questions, I may have to go in a few
[2606]108
[2610]minutes to the Senate. I would like to direct your attention to that period
[2611]of time when Oswald was a defector, beginning when. he left the United States
[2612]and when he returned.
[2614]Mr. Hoover. Yes, sir.
[2616]Senator Coorer. During that period, did the FBI have any jurisdiction over
[2617]intelligence regarding him, or any capacity to know?
[2619]Mr. Hoover. While he was in Russia?
[2621]Senator Cooprrr. Yes.
[2623]Mr. Hoover. No; we did not. We were interested in knowing what he might
[2624]say in Russia that appeared in the press.. That was our first intimation that
[2625]this man hed defected, when we read it in a newspaper article. We were, of
[2626]course, interested in knowing when he would return or if he would return.
[2627]We had no jurisdiction as to what he was doing in Russia after he had gone
[2628]there.
[2630]Senater Coorer. As I understand it, you had no capacity at that time to
[2631]follow his activities?
[2633]Mr. Hoover. That is true. We have no agents in Russia. Foreign intelli-
[2634]gence is handled by the Central Intelligence Agency, and our responsibility is
[2635]domestic. We work very closely together.
[2637]Senator Cooper. Have you had the: jurisdiction since the assassination or
[2638]the occasion to examine persons connected with the State Department concern-
[2639]ing the activities of Oswald in Russia?
[2641]Mr. Hoover. Well——
[2643]Senator Coorrr. Would that be a matter for some other agency?
[2645]Mr. Hoover. That could be a matter for CIA or for us after Oswald had re-
[2646]turned here.
[2648]Senator .Coorrg. Yes.
[2650]Mr. Hoover. Then he becomes a civilian in the country here. Now, there is
[2651]what we call a delimitation agreement among the Government intelligence
[2652]agencies. For instance, the military branches of the Government have their
[2653]own intelligence services and they handle all military deviations in regard
[2654]to espionage or things of that kind. If they want our assistance and ask for
[2655]it we, of course, will always cooperate. In regard to CIA, there are many cases
[2656]which CIA and the FBI work jointly on, of individuals that may have been
[2657]recruited over in Europe by the CIA, not by us, because we don’t have authority
[2658]to do that abroad, but when that man comes to this country, the best ends of
[2659]intelligence are served by having the two agencies work very closely together,
[2660]eonduct joint interviews, and exchange information very, very freely. That
[2661]has been going on ever since I can recall CIA being existence.
[2663]Mr. Dutes. I would like to testify to the fact that that cooperation existed
[2664]during the whole period I was Director, and I am sure it has continued now
[2665]with great cooperation on- both sides.
[2667]Mr. Hoover. It is a very necessary thing, because the intelligence agency of
[2668]many of these foreign countries will cover the whole world and the country
[2669]itself. Whereas in this country you have separate agencies covering espionage
[2670]activities. CIA covers the foreign activity, and the FBI the domestic activities,
[2671]and they must be interlocking. An espionage agent of the Soviet Government
[2672]can arrive in New York today by plane from Paris and he can be in Mexico
[2673]City tomorrow. Then, CIA would pick him up there. We would not pick him
[2674]up there. We would watch him while in this country, but as soon as he takes
[2675]that plane and leaves the United States CIA moves in 6n him. If he comes
[2676]back to the United States, we move in on him. Therefore, we have a very.close
[2677]liaison.
[2679]As a matter of fact, what:we have done in government agencies is. to have
[2680]a liaison agent in our Bureau assigned to contact CIA, the Pentagon, State
[2681]Department, and various other agencies to cut out the red tape of writing letters
[2682]back and forth. In order to orally relay information which has come to his
[2683]attention, our representative can immediately phone it over to the FBI, and if
[2684]there is need, for instance, to meet a plane coming in to New York or a boat that
[2685]is docking at New York, it is all accomplished within a matter of 46 minutes or
[2686]an hour.
[2688]109
[2692]If you went through this letter-writing process and the paper war that Boes
[2693]on so often in the Government it might take a week or 10 days.
[2695]The I'BI does have 10 legal attaches attached to 10 embassies abroad. Their
[2696]purpose is not operational. They don’t investigate in those countries any matters
[2697]that have to be investigated. That, if it is to be done, is handled by CIA: Our
[2698]purpose in being there is to maintain liaison with our opposite number such as
[2699]the Surete Nationale in France and with the national police in the Philippines,
[2700]to exchange information that is vital to our internal security, and also vital to
[2701]the internal security of the other country. ;
[2703]Senator Cooper. May I ask one other question?
[2705]Is there any, considering the number of defectors in the United States to
[2706]Communist countries, which cannot be large, I would assume——
[2708]Mr. Hoover. I think there are about 36.
[2710]Senator Coorer. Which would indicate, I would think either a lack of re-
[2711]liability on their part and stability or beyond that a dedicated purpose to become
[2712]Communists, then upon their return, wouldn’t it seem to you they should be given
[2713]some special attention?
[2715]Mr. Hoover. We have now-
[2717]Senator Coorer. To determine whether they are a risk to become Soviet or
[2718]Communist espionage agents or in fact become dangerous?
[2720]Mr. Hoover. We have taken steps to plug that gap.
[2722]Prior to the assassination of the President, a ‘defector, before he came back
[2723]was always cleared for return by a representative of the State Department: or
[2724]the military abroad. When he came back we immediately interviewed him
[2725]if he was a civilian. It had to be done promptly to determine whether he could
[2726]be a potential intelligence agent.
[2728]Now, in December of last year, following the assassination, we expanded the
[2729]criteria of what should be furnished to the Secret Service, and all defectors
[2730]automatically go on the list to be furnished to the Secret Service.
[2732]There are 36 defectors that we know of in this country who have been under
[2733]investigation. Some of those men may have changed their views sincerely.
[2734]Some of them may not have. But as a matter of general precaution, as a result
[2735]of the Oswald situation, we are seeing that all go to the Secret Service.
[2737]Mr. Duties. That includes military defectors, does it not?
[2739]Mr. Hoover, Military defectors and defectors from any private agency, after
[2740]they return to the U.S. and become civilians. Some have defected to China,
[2741]to the satellite nations and to Russia.
[2743]Senator Cooper. Just one other question, because I have to go.
[2745]In the course of this investigation, as you know so well, there have been a
[2746]number identified who were very close, at least to Mrs. Oswald, and a few, I
[2747]can’t say that were close to Oswald yet they had association with him, such as
[2748]the man who drove him back and forth, Mrs. Paine, with whom Mrs. Oswald
[2749]lived, and others, has there been any credible, I won't say credible because if
[2750]you had you would have presented it to us in your report, has there been any
[2751]claims by persons that these people are in any way related to the Communist
[2752]Party?
[2754]Mr. Hoover. We have had no credible evidence that they have been related
[2755]to the Communist Party in this country.
[2757]Now, as to Mrs. Oswald, the wife of Oswald, there is no way of knowing
[2758]whether she belonged to the Russian Communist Party in Russia. She ia a
[2759]rather intelligent woman, and notwithstanding that you have to talk with her
[2760]through an interpreter, we have had no indication of her association with
[2761]Communists in this country, nor have any of her close friends or relatives.
[2763]As to his mother, we found no indication she is associated or closely asso-
[2764]ciated with the Communists. She is the only one of the group that we have
[2765]come in contact with that I would say is somewhat emotionally unstable. Our
[2766]agents have interviewed her. She sometimes gets very angry and she won’t
[2767]answer questions. As to-the rest of the group who had been friends of his, or
[2768]worked with him in the Texas School Book Depository, none of them have
[2769]indicated any Communist associations of any kind.
[2771]Senator Coorrr. Thank you.
[2773]110
[2776]13 99900
[2778]Mr. Hoover. Thank you.
[2780]Mr. Ranxin. Mr. Hoover, I hand you Exhibit 863 and ask you to examine
[2781]that and state whether or not that is the letter that you referred to in which
[2782]you answered questions of the Commission concerning the National Enquirer
[2783]magazine or newspaper? :
[2785]Mr. Hoover. This letter of May.8 addressed to the Commission is the letter
[2786]that dealt with our interview with Chief Curry and was predicated upon the
[2787]article which appeared in the National Enquirer of May 17, 1964.
[2789]Mr. Rankin. I ask you if you would care to add anything to that letter except
[2790]what you have already testified to?
[2792]. Mr. Hoover. No; I have nothing to add to that. Chief Curry was very spe-
[2793]cific, I am told by my agent in charge at Dallas, that this article is an absolute
[2794]lie; that none of these things set forth in the article occurred; that he received
[2795]no phone call or any request of any kind oral or by phone or in writing from
[2796]the Department of Justice or from the FBI. As I stated earlier, the report
[2797]from the Department of Justice indicated that they made no request. °
[2799]Mr. RankxKIn. Mr. Chairman, I offer in evidence Exhibit 863, being the letter
[2800]just referred to.
[2802]The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted. :
[2804](The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 863 for
[2805]identification and received in evidence.)
[2807]Mr. RanxIN. Mr. Hoover, is Exhibit 837 the article that you referred to in
[2808]the National Enquirer?
[2810]Mr. Hoover. Yes; that is the one.
[2812]Mr. RaNnxIN. I call your attention to Exhibit 8386 and ask you if that is the
[2813]letter that you referred to which describes the criteria in the handling of the
[2814]security of the President that you have described in your testimony. ;
[2816]Mr. Hoover. This is the letter. It sets forth the criteria which were adopted,
[2817]originally about 1942 and later incorporated in the manual of instructions in
[2818]1954. It also includes the amended instructions to our field offices, prepared
[2819]in December of 1963, which extended the criteria.
[2821]Mr. Ranxin. Does that Exhibit correctly set forth the information you had
[2822]in regard to those matters? ;
[2824]Mr. Hoover. It does.
[2826]Mr. Ranxin. Do. you care to add anything to it?
[2828]Mr. Hoover. No; I have nothing to add to it at all. ;
[2830]Mr. RANKIN. Now, in light of what happened. Mr. Hoover, I think the Com-
[2831]mission would desire to have your comments or whatever you care to tell them,
[2832]concerning the reasons why you did not furnish the information you had con-
[2833]cerning Lee Harvey Oswald to the Secret Service > Prior to the time of the Presi-
[2834]dent’s assassination.
[2836]Mr. Hoover. Well, I have gone into that very thoroughly because that was
[2837]obviously one of the questions that I had in my mind when the tragedy occurred
[2838]in Dallas.
[2840]In going back over the record, and I have read each one of the reports dealing
[2841]with that and the reports of Mr. Hosty who had dealt with the Oswald situa-
[2842]tion largely in Dallas, we had the matter that I have previously referred to, the
[2843]report of the State Department that indicated this man was a thoroughly safe
[2844]risk, he had changed his views, he was a loyal man now and had seen the light
[2845]of day, so to speak.
[2847]How intensive or how extensive that interview ‘in Moscow was, I don't know.
[2848]But, nevertheless, it was in a State-Department document that was furnished
[2849]to us.
[2851]Now, we interviewed Oswald a few days after he arrived. We did not inter-
[2852]view him on arrival at the port of entry because that is always undesirable by
[2853]reason of the fact it is heavily covered by press, and any relatives generally
[2854]are there, so we prefer to do it after the man has settled down for two or three
[2855]days and become composed. We do it in the privacy of our office or wherever
[2856]he may be, or in his own home or apartment. We interviewed him twice in
[2857]regard to that angle that we were looking for. We had no indication at this
[2858]time of anything other than his so-called Marxist leanings, Marxist beliefs.
[2860]111
[2863]13-00000
[2865]aa.
[2867]ane
[2871]We wanted to know whether he had been recruited by the Soviet government
[2872]as an intelligence agent, which is a frequent and constant practice. There is
[2873]not a year goes by but that individuals and groups of-individuals, sometimes on
[2874]these cultural exchanges, go through Russia and recruits are enlisted by the
[2875]Russian intelligence, usually through blackmail. The individual is threatened
[2876]that if he doesn’t come back to this country and work for them they will expose
[2877]the fact that he is a homosexual or a devenerate or has been indiscrete.
[2879]Pictures are usually taken of individuals who become implicated in that sort
[2880]of thing, so the individual is really desperate. Such blackmail has occurred
[2881]year after year for some time.
[2883].In Oswald’s case we had no suspicion that any pressure like that had been
[2884]brought to bear on him because he had gone voluntarily and had obviously
[2885]wanted to live in Russia and had married a Russian woman.
[2887]-—es After those interviews had been completed, the next incident was the difficulty
[2889]he had at New Orleans. We were concerned there as to whether he was
[2890]functioning officially for the Fair Play for Cuba Committee which was financed
[2891]and supported by Castro and Castrvu’s government, and if he was, where he
[2892]obtained money and with whom he had dealt.
[2894]He apparently had the leaflets printed himself on plain ordinary paper. There
[2895]was no reason for us, then, to have any suspicion that he had any element of
[2896]danger in him.
[2898]However, we did not ignore or forget the fact ‘that he was still in the country.
[2899]We kept track of him when he went from New Orleans to. Dallas, and that
[2900]was one of the reasons why Hosty went to the home of Mrs. Paine. She told
[2901]us where Oswald was working, at the Texas book house. Hosty gave her his
[2902]telephone number and his name so that if there was any information or any
[2903]contact she wanted to make she could phone him at the Dallas office.
[2905]Mrs. Oswald, the wife, took down the license number of Hosty's car which
[2906]was incorrect only in one digit. The name, the telephone number, and the
[2907]automobile license were later found in Oswald's memorandum book.
[2909]However, that in itself was not significant because many times we will go
[2910]to see a person and tell him now, “If you think of anything you want to tell
[2911]us or you have any information you want to give us, here are my name and
[2912]address, telephone number, and call me,” and that is. what was done with Mrs.
[2913]Paine because Hosty wasn’t there at the time. He was at work.
[2915]Incidentally, those items in Oswald's notebook requiring investigative at-
[2916]tention were first set out in an investigative report of our Dallas Office dated
[2917]December 23, 1963. This report was not prepared for this Commission but
[2918]rather for investigative purposes of the FBI and, therefore, the information
[2919]eoncerning Hosty'’s name, telephone number and license number was not in-
[2920]cluded in the report as the circumstances under which Hosty’s name, et cetera,
[2921]appeared in Oswald's notebook were fully known to the FBI.
[2923]After our investigative report of December 23, 1963, was furnished to the
[2924]Commission, we noted that Agent Hosty’s name did not appear in the. report.
[2925]In order that there would be a compléte reporting of all items in Oswald's note-
[2926]book, this information was incorporated in another investigative report of. our
[2927]Dallas Office, dated February 11, 1964. Both of the above-mentioned reports
[2928]were furnished to the Commission prior to any inquiry concerning ‘this matter
[2929]by the President's Commission.
[2931]There was nothing up to the time of the assassination that gave any indica- -
[2932]tion that this man was a dangerous character who might do harm to the Presi-
[2933]dent or to the Vice [resident. Up to that time, as has been indicated.
[2935]Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Hoover, may I interrupt, you said Hosty was not there at
[2937]_the time, he was at work—did you mean Mr. Oswald?
[2939]Mr. Hoover. That was my mistake. I meant Mr. Oswald. Hosty talked with
[2940]Mrs. Paine and Mrs. Oswald. Mrs. Paine speaks Russian and she could inter-
[2941]pret for her.
[2943]Oswald was at the Texas Book Co., and then, as I say, Hosty left his tele-.
[2944]phone number and name, and Mrs. Oswald for some reason took down the
[2945]license number. I don't know whether she was convinced this was an agent
[2946]of the FBI, or why she did it.
[2948]112
[2950]13-00000
[2952]But, anyway. that was in the book that was later found. and which contained
[2954]many other things that Oswald had entered in the book.
[2956]Now, as I say, up to that time, there had been -no information that would
[2957]have warranted our reporting him as a potential danger or hazard to the security
[2958]or the safety of the President or the Vice President, so his name was not fur-
[2959]nished at the time to Secret Service.
[2961]Under the new criteria which we have now put into force and effect, it
[2962]would have been furnished because we now include all defectors. As to the
[2963]original criteria, which we felt were sound and sufficient and which we felt
[2964]no one, not even the most extreme civil rights proponent could take exception to,
[2965]we limited the furnishing of names to S.S. to persons potentially dangerous
[2966]to the physical well being of the President. We included emotionally unstable
[2967]people who had threatened the President or Vice President.
[2969]At my office during the course of a week there are sometimes three or four
[2970]callers who have to be taken to a Hospital because of their mental condition.
[2971]They claim they are being persecuted by radio beams and they want to see
[2972]me or. the President to have those beams stopped. Now you never know what
[2973]tangent they are going to take. If such.a person is living in some part of the
[2974]country where the President may be going his name would be furnished to the
[2975]Secret Service. ;
[2977]One car last year, I think, crashed through the gates of the White House;
[2978]the person driving wanted to see the President. The guard wouldn't let him in
[2979]and so the car crashed through and got within 20 feet of the first door. The
[2980]guards, by that time, had their revolvers out and took him into custody.
[2982]Last year a gentleman drove all the way from Arizona to see me. He drove
[2983]up the marble step. of the Department of Justice, and by that time the guards
[2984]had come out and took him into custody. I think he was incarcerated in Arizona.
[2986]People of this type are among those we would have furnished to the Secret
[2987]Service. They have the potential to harm somebody. .
[2989]We get names from members of Congress, of people who come to the Capitol
[2990]and try to threaten them or harass them. They let us know about it, and we
[2991]make the investigation or advise the police. If we can get the family to have
[2993]‘the person put into an institution, we try to do so. If:they don't, we may take
[2995]steps to have him incarcerated through other legal means.
[2997]Mr. Duties. How many names, Mr. Director, in general, could the Secret
[2998]Service process? Aren't their facilities limited as to dealing with vast numbers
[2999]of names because of their limited personnel?
[3001]Mr. Hoover. I think they are extremely limited. The Secret Service i is a very
[3002]small organization and that is why we are fortifying them, so to speak, or supple-
[3004]menting them by assigning agents of our Bureau which is, of course, quite
[3006]a burden on us. Our agents are assigned about 24 to 25 cases per agent and
[3007]cover such involved matters as bankruptcy and antitrust cases.
[3009]Now, the Secret Service has a very small group and I would estimate that
[3010]the names we have sent over number some 5,000. I would guess there are about
[3011]another 4,000 that will go over in the next month. to them. Frankly, I don't
[3012]see how they can go out and recheck those names. We keep the records up to
[3013]date; if additional information comes in on these names we furnish it to the
[3014]Secret Service. They will have to call upon the local authorities, unless the
[3015]Secret Service force is enlarged considerably so that they can handle it entirely
[3016]on their own. I think the Secret Service is entirely too small a force today
[3017]to handle the duties that they are handling. The great crowds that are at the
[3018]White House all the time. around the gates, that «o to church where the President
[3019]goes, all of those things, of course, have to be checked over by them. They
[3020]always check in advance and just recently, a few Sundays ago, they found
[3021]some individuals in the basement of St. Mark’s church in Washington, where
[3022]he was going to attend on Sunday morning. His arrival was held up until they
[3023]could ascertain who they were. They were deaf mutes whose identity had not
[3024]been cleared with the Secret Service.
[3026]Now, the Presidential party was delayed about 5 or 10 minutes in reaching
[3027]the church by reason of the radio call to the White House to hold it up.
[3029]We are giving to Secret Service more and more names. The total, in addition
[3031]| a |
[3033]to the names they already had, will reach 10,000. I don't see how they are ~
[3035]1138
[3037]| going to be able to handle the situation as they would want to handle it. They
[3038]{ have to depend upon local police organizations. Many local police departments
[3039]are capable and efficient; some are not. Many have good judgment and some
[3040]have not. Wherever you have a police department of 10,000, 15,000, 20,000 men
[3041]you are bound to find a few who will just barge in and do something which
[3042]better judgment would dictate should not be done, as in the incident which
[3043]occurred in the Midwest where they placed people practically under house arrest.
[3044]I think it was very bad judgment and should not have been done but the Secret
[3045]Service, of course, turned the names over to the local authorities, and the local
[3047]them in the house until the President gets out of town nothing can happen
[3048]from them.” That is what you would call totalitarian security. I don’t think.
[3049]you can have that kind of security in this country without having a great wave
[3050]of criticism against it. There is a great tendency for people to expect the intelli-
[3051]gence forces and the law enforcement agencies to be able to go out and a:cest
[3052]people and bring them in and hold them endlessly and talk to them. We can’t
[3053]arrest a person, without probable cause, or unless he commits a crime in our
[3054]presence. We have to arraign him promptly and if not done promptly, the
[3055]confession that he may have made generally cannot be used against him.
[3057]Just as a collateral matter we faced that problem in California in the case
[3058]of the kidnapping of Frank Sinatra, Jr. One of the kidnappers we arrested
[3059]near San Diego confessed but we didn’t arraign him because the other kidnap-
[3060]pers would have left California and it would have been difficult to find them.
[3061]However, the next day after arraignment he made changes in the confession
[3062]and signed it so the court held that it was admissible. :
[3064]The Secret Service, of course, is faced with the same problem. They just
[3065]can’t arrest people because they may not like their looks. They have to have
[3066]to go out and do these things. We have stressed in the FBI that there must be
[3068]authorities do what they think is right.
[3069]Now, I guess their attitude with all justice to them is, ‘Well, we will resolve
[3070]the risk in our favor. If we keep these people under surveillance and keep
[3072]facts justifying detention but the public conception is that you have a full right
[3073]full compliance with the laws of this country and with the decisions of the
[3074]Supreme Court. That is the law of the country. Now, whether a person likes
[3075]it or not and there are some groups that are very violent against the decisions
[3076]of the court while others are very much in favor of them, it is not for the FBI
[3077]to take sides. We have a job to do and we do it under the rulings of the courts
[3078]and we have been able to do it effectively.
[3080]-I know when the ruling came down on the prompt arraignment, there was
[3081]great shouting and some strong editorials claiming that it was going to wreck
[3082]law enforcement. It hasn’t wrecked us. It has.made it more difficult but I
[3083]think we have to face up to the fact that law enforcement in a free country
[3084]must abide by the laws of that country irrespective of how difficult it is. Some
[3085]persons talk about putting handcuffs on the law enforcement officers and taking
[3086]them off the criminals. That is a nice catch phrase to use in a speech or article
[3087]but operating within the law has not interfered with our work.
[3089]Mr. Ranxrn. Mr. Hoover, I ask you about Exhibit 825 which is first a letter
[3090]and then encloses certain affidavits of your agents.
[3092]Mr. Hoover. Yes, sir.
[3094]Mr. RANKIN. You are familiar with that?
[3096]Mr. Hoover. I am familiar with that. I read all of that and signed it..
[3098]Mr. Ranxin. You know those are the affidavits in regard to whether Lee
[3099]Harvey Oswald was an agent or connected in anyway with the Bureau that you
[3100]have just testified to?
[3102]Mr. Hoover. That is correct; and the affidavits of all agents, who had. any
[3103]eontact with him.
[3105]Mr. RaNnkKIN. I call your attention to Exhibits 864 and 865, and ask you if
[3106]you have seen those before or, you have seen the original of 864 and 865 is a
[3107]photostatic copy of your letter to us in answer to 864, is that correct?
[3109]Mr. Hoover. That is correct; yes. I recall very distinctly.
[3111]Mr. Rankin. Do you recall those letters involved an inquiry as to any con-
[3112]nections of Lee Harvey Oswald with Communists or any criminal groups .or
[3113]others that might be conspiratorial?
[3115]114
[3117]13-00000
[3119]Pre oe
[3121]refrained from further comment but of course by that time the identification
[3122]of the gun was known, the caliber of the gun, where it had come from, where
[3123]it had been bought and the information we had run-down in Chicago and had
[3124]furnished to the Dallas Police Department.
[3126]If the case had been in the hands of the FBI none of that information would
[3127]have been given out: Because of the publicity you had to face the charge that
[3128]the prejudice of the community would require a change of venue. With the
[3129]publicity, I don’t know where you could have changed the venue to, since news-
[3130]papers all over the State covered it. I think a Houston reporter was the first
[3131]one ‘who wrote that Oswald was an informant of the FBI. We went to the
[3132]newspaper reporter. He refused to tell us his source. He said he had also
[3133]heard it from other persons. We asked him the names of these persons and we
[3134]interviewed them but none of them would provide the source. In other words,
[3135]I was trying to nail down where this lie started. That, of course, is always
[3136]the result where you are daily giving out press interviews because the press
[3137]wants stories desperately. We have always adopted the policy in the Bureau
[3138]of no comment until we have the warrant and make the arrest. Then a release
[3139]is prepared briefly stating what the facts are, what the written complaint says,
[3140]the fact. The complaint was filed with the Commissioner, and that ends it.
[3141]We don’t try to run it out for a week or 10 days, It is up to the U.S. attorney
[3142]thereafter and the court to-try the case. \
[3144]I was concerned about the demand for change of venue, because all the evidence
[3145]was being given out. At that time, of course, we didn’t know that Oswald was
[3146]going to be killed, and there was a possibility that he might be confronted with
[3147]some of this evidence. If it had been kept secret and used in the interrogation
[3148]of him, just confronting him with what was found, such as his picture with the
[3149]gun. might have been helpful.
[3151]A small thing can often make a man break and come forward with a full
[3152]confession. If he knows in advance that you have certain evidence he will be
[3153]on guard against answering questions. Of course, he is always advised of his
[3154]rights and that he can have an attorney. We always make a point of this. We
[3155]generally have a reputable physician of the community present in our office
[3156]while the prisoner is there, to administer to him and be able to testify that he
[3157]has not been subjected to third degree methods. He is examined when he comes
[3158]in and he is examined before we take him to the commissioner. Taking him
[3159]before the commissioner in 2 case like Oswald's would probably have been done
[3160]within 4 or 5 hours. Generally we try to arraign a prisoner within an hour.
[3162]That makes it more difficult; you have to work faster. But again I say I am
[3163]in favor of having the procedures of law: enforcement officers as tightly bound
[3164]down 8s we can, with due respect for the interests of society.
[3166]Of course, there must be an equal balance. For years we have had a rule.
[3167]against third degree methods, but years ago many police departments used the
[3168]third degree. I- think very few of them use it now because if they use it they
[3169]violate the civil rights statutes and we investigate them for having brutally
[3170]handled a prisoner. Many allegations are made unfairly against police officers
[3171]that they have used third degree methods and we are able to prove they haven't
[3172]in our investigations. That is particularly true where civil rights matters are
[3173]involved. We have such cases in many areas where civil rights agitation is
[3174]going on. :
[3176]Mr. Rawxin. Mr. Hoover, to remind you of my question, any suggestions that
[3178]‘you may have concerning the protection of the President, and the information
[3180]that the Commission has that you have a special appropriation in that con-
[3181]nection for the Bureau?
[3183]Mr. Hoover. -We do not have a special appropriation for. the protection of the
[3184]President. The Secret Service, of course, has that responsibility. On Decem-
[3185]ber 2, I prepared this memorandum for the President, and for the chief of the
[3186]Secret Service at the request of the President, outlining suggestions that I felt
[3187]should be considered to tighten up on the security of the President. If the
[3188]Commission desires I will be glad to leave this or I will be glad to read it to the
[3190]_ Commission.
[3192]Representative Bocas. Why don’t you ask the Director just to summarize it.
[3193]Mr, Rankin. Will you summarize {t?
[3195]116
[3197]13- 00000
[3199]Mr. Duress. Can we have a copy of it?
[3201]Mr. Hoover. Qh, yes.
[3203]Representative Forp. Could the copy be put in the record as an exhibit?
[3205]Mr. Hooves. Yes, sir; that is all right with me. T have no objection to it.
[3207]Regarding travel, first, advise the Secret Service as far in advance as possible
[3208]of the President’s travel plans and proposed itinerary. The reason for that is
[3209]there have been Presidents who suddenly decide they are going somewhere and
[3210]the Secret Service does not have the chance always to cover the area and check
[3211]the neighborhood and check the hotel or place where it may be. ;
[3213]Representative Bocas. You have one like that right now, Mr. Director.
[3215]Mr. Hoover. I know from experience.
[3217]Second, avoid publicizing exact routes of travel as long as possible. Again,
[3218]it has been the practice in the past to announce the President is going along a
[3219]certain route and, therefore, great crowds will gather along that route. And,
[3220]therefore, I thought that was something that should not be given out and the
[3221]President should be taken along some routes which are not announced. At
[3222]the present time, he goes to cities and he wants to see people and the crowd
[3223]wants to see him In Dallas, the route was publicized at least 24 hours before
[3224]80 everybody knew where he would be driving.
[3226]Third, use a specially armored car with bulletproof glass and have such cars
[3227]readily available in locations frequently visited. The President, as I observed
[3228]earlier in my testimony, had no armored car. He has one now which I supplied
[3229]to Secret Service and they will have one made no doubt in due time for the
[3230]President's use. But if it had been armored, I believe President Kennedy would
[3231]be alive today.
[3233]Fourth, avoid setting a specific pattern of travel or other activity such as
[3234]visiting the same church at the same time each Sunday.
[3236]Regarding publit appearances. First, use maximum feasible screening of
[3237]persons in attendance including use of detection devices sensitive to the amount
[3238]of metal required in a firearm or grenade.
[3240]Second, use a bulletproof shield in -front of the entire rostrum in public ap-
[3241]pearances such as the swearing in ceremony at the Capitol on inauguration day, |
[3242]the presidential reviewing stand in front of the White House on the same day
[3243]and on the rear of trains.
[3245]Third, keep to 2 minimum the President’s movements within crowds, remain
[3246]on the rostrum after the public addresses rather than mingling with the
[3247]andience. | Again, there is great difficulty in that field.
[3249]Fourth, in appearances at public sporting events such as football games,
[3250]remain in one place rather than changing sides during half-time ceremonies.
[3252](Discussion off the record.)
[3254]Mr. Duttes. About the armored car you said if Kennedy had an armored
[3255]ear that might have saved him. Would the back of the armored car have some
[3256]protection to protect his head?
[3258]Mr. Hoover. Oh, yes.
[3260]Mr. Durres. Because if the armored car had been open——
[3262]Mr. Hoover. He must never ride in an open car; that has been my recom-
[3263]mendation.
[3265]Mr. DuLtes. The back never comes down?
[3267]Mr. Hoover. The back never comes down, and it is bulletproof. The top,
[3268]sides, and underpart are all of bulletproof construction. So that except by
[3269]opening a window and waving through the window the occupant is safe. A
[3270]person can shoot through the window if the glass window is lowered.
[3272]Fifth, limit public appearances by use of television whenever possible.
[3274]Sixth, avoid walking in public except when absolutely necessary.
[3276]‘Now, on legislation. First, I recommended that the President and the Vice
[3277]President be added to the list of Federal officers set out In section 1114, title 18
[3278]of the U.S. Code which deals with assaults which are punishable under Federal
[3279]law.
[3281]Mr. Rankin. You would add to that I understood from your prior remarks,
[3282]the Speaker and the President Pro Tempore?
[3284]Mr. Hoover. In view of the situation which prevails at the present time the
[3286]117
[3288]1390000
[3290]Speaker ‘and President pro tempore, in other words, the line of succession
[3292]under the Constitution but not below that.
[3294](Discussion off the record.)
[3296]Mr. Hoover. Second, furnish the Secret Service authority to request assistance
[3297]and cooperation from other U.S. agencies including the military, particularly
[3298]in connection with foreign travel. :
[3300]Now, my reason for that is that sometimes requests for assistance have to
[3302]_ clear through red-tape channels here at Washington through some high official
[3303]of Government. If an emergency arises abroad, or even in this country, it
[3304]may be of such character that you do not have time to telephone back to Wash-
[3305]ington or to telephone back to the Pentagon. Aid ought to be immediately
[3306]available by calling on the local authorities and the nearest military authority.
[3308]Third, improve control of the sale of firearms requiring as a minimum
[3309]registration of every firearm sold together with adequate identification of the
[3310]purchaser. The problem of firearms control is under extensive debate, in both
[3311]the House and Senate at the present time.
[3313]The gun that Oswald used was bought by mail order from a mail-order house
[3314]in Chicago, no license for it, no permit for it, no checkup on it. The only
[3315]way we were able to trace it was to find out where in this country that Italian-
[3316]made gun was sold. We found the company in Chicago and later the mail-
[3317]order slip that had been sent by Oswald to Chicago to get the gun. Now,
[3319]. there are arguments, of course——-
[3321]“rreireceoe Mr. Duties. In a false name.
[3323]: Mr. Hoover. In a false name. : :
[3325]There is argument, of course, that by passing firearms legislation you are
[3326]going to take the privilege of hunting away from the sportsmen of the country.
[3327]I don’t share that view with any great degree of sympathy because you have
[3328]to get a license to drive an automobile and you have to get a license to have
[3329]a dog, and I see no reason why a man shouldn’t be willing, if he is a law-abiding
[3330]citizen, to have a license to get a firearm whether it be a rifle or revolver or
[3331]other firearm.
[3333]It is riot going to curtail his exercise of shooting for sport because the police
[3334]make a check of his background. If he is a man who is entitled to a gun, a
[3335]law-abiding citizen, a permit will be granted.
[3337]Of course, today firearms control is practically negligible, and I think some
[3338]steps should be taken along that line.
[3340]Fourth, a ban on picketing within the vicinity of the White House as is now
[3341]done at the U.S. Capitol and Supreme Court. Some of these pickets are well-
[3342]meaning and law-abiding individuals, some are for peace and some are more
[3343]or less dedicated Communists.
[3345]Representative Boags. It is illegal to picket a Federal court now, Mr. Director,
[3346]I happen to be the author of that law.
[3348]Mr. Hoover. Yes; I am glad you had that law passed.. Of course, they picket
[3349]public buildings, they march around the Department of Justice Building, now
[3350]Dale and then, but the principal places they prefer to go are the Supreme Court
[3351]Building, the Capitol and its grounds and the White House.
[3353]I think such picketing at the White House, of large of small groups, should
[3354]be forbidden. I think at the White House they tried to get the pickets to
[3355]walk across the street along Lafayette Park. That at least takes them away
[3356]from being close to the gates at the White House. I think there ought to be
[3357]some control. Picketing, of course, is legitimate if it is orderly. Many times
[3358]it doesn’t continue to be orderly, and sometimes pickets, as in this city, have
[3359]thrown themselves on the pavement and the police have to come and pick them
[3360]up or drag them away. Then, of course, the charge is made of brutality right
[3361]away.
[3363]Delegations of colored groups have visited me and asked why I don’t arrest
[3364]a police officer for hitting some Negro whom he is arresting in a sit-in strike,
[3365]lay-in strike or demonstration in some southern cities.
[3367]We have no authority to make an arrest of that kind. ‘Under the authority
[3368]the Bureau has we have to submit those complaints to the Department of
[3369]Justice and if they authorize us to make an arrest we will do it.
[3371]118
[3374]13-00000
[3376]ween
[3378]have the number 866 assigned to the memo that Mr. Hoover is going to send about.
[3379]protection of the President, and have it admitted to this record under that
[3380]number.
[3382]The CHaigMAN. Yes; it may be.
[3384]Representative Forp. Also a2 number for this letter Mr. Hoover is going to
[3385]submit.
[3387]Mr. RaNnkKIN. May I assign 867?
[3389]The CHaIRMAN. Yes.
[3391](Commission Exhibit Nos. 866 and 867 were marked for identification. and
[3392]received in evidence. ) :
[3394]TESTIMONY OF JOHN A. Me CONr AND RICHARD M. HELMS
[3396]The CHarrMAN. The Commission wat be in order.
[3398]Director McCone, it is customary for the Chairman to make a short state-
[3399]ment to the witness as to the testimony that is expected to be given. I will read
[3400]it at this time.
[3402]Mr. McCone will be asked to testify on whether Lee Harvey Oswald was
[3403]ever an agent, directly or indirectly, or an informer or acting on behalf of the
[3404]Central Intelligence Agency in any capacity at any time, and whether he knows
[3405]of any credible evidence or of any conspiracy either domestic or foreign in-
[3406]volved in the assassination of President Kennedy, also with regard to any
[3407]suggestions and recommendations he may have concerning improvements or
[3408]changes in provisions for the protection of the President of the United States.
[3410]Would you please rise and be sworn? Do you solemnly swear the testimony
[3411]you are about to give before this Commission shall be the truth, the whole truth,
[3412]and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
[3414]Mr. McCone. I do.
[3416]The CHarrMan. Will you be seated, please? Mr. Rankin will conduct the
[3417]examination.
[3419]Mr. Ranxin. Mr. McCone, will you state your name?
[3421]Mr. McCone. My name is John Alex McCone.
[3423]Mr. Rankin. Do you bave an official position with the U.S. Government?
[3425]Mr. McCone. Yes, sir; I am Director of Central Intelligence.
[3427]Mr. Ranxin. Have you been Director for some time?
[3429]Mr. McCone. Yes; a little over 24% years.
[3431]Mr. Rankin. Where do you live, Mr. McCone?
[3433]Mr. McCone. I live at 3025 Whitehaven Street in Washington.
[3435]Mr, Ranxin. Are you familiar with the records and how they are kept by
[3436]the Central Intelligence Agency as to whether a man is acting as an informer,
[3437]agent, employee, or in any other capacity for that Agency?
[3439]Mr. McCone, Yes; I am generally familiar. with the procedures and the
[3440]records that are maintained by the Central Intelligence Agency. Quite nat-
[3441]urally, I am not familiar with all of the records because they are very extensive.
[3443]Mr, RanKin. Have you determined whether or not Lee Harvey Oswald, the
[3444]suspect in connection with the assassination of President Kennedy, had any
[3445]connection with the Central lntelligence Agency, informer or indirectly as an
[3446]employee, or any other capacity?
[3448]Mr. McCone. Yes; I have determined to my satisfaction that he had no such
[3449]connection, and I would like to read for the record—— ;
[3451]Mr. RANKIN. Will you tell us briefly the extent of your inquiry?
[3453]Mr. McCone. In a form of affidavit, I have gone into the matter in consider-
[3454]able detail personally, in my inquiry with the appropriate people within the
[3455]Agency, examined all records in our files relating to Lee Harvey Oswald. We
[3456]had knowledge of him, of course, because of his having gone to the Soviet
[3457]Union, as he did, putting him in a situation where his name would appear in
[3458]our name file. However, my examination has resulted in the conclusion that
[3459]Lee Harvey Oswald was not an agent, employee, or informant of the Central
[3460]Intelligence Agency. The Agency never contacted him, interviewed him, talked
[3461]with him, or received or solicited any reports or information from him, or com-
[3462]municated with him directly or in any other manner. The Agency never fur-
[3464]120
[3466]13-00000
[3468]nished him with any funds or money or compensated him directly or indirectly
[3469]in any fashion, and Lee Harvey Oswald was never associated or connected
[3470]directly or indirectly in any way whatsoever with the Agency. When I use
[3471]the term “Agency,” I mean the Central Intelligence Agency, of course.
[3473]Representative Forp. Does that include whether or not he was in the United
[3474]States, in the Soviet Union, or anyplace?
[3476]Mr. McCone. Anyplace; thé United States, Soviet Union, or anyplace.
[3478]Mr. Ranxrn. Mr. McCone, is that the affidavit you are going to suppiy the
[3479]Commission in connection with our request for it?
[3481]Mr. McCone. Yes; this is the substance of the affidavit which I will supply
[3482]to you.
[3484]Mr. RankKIN. Mr. Chairman, I ask leave to mark that Exhibit 870 and have it
[3485]introduced in evidence as soon as we receive it from Mr. McCone as a part of
[3486]this record.
[3488]The CyarrMaNn. It may be admitted.
[3490](Commission Exhibit No. 870 was marked for identification and received in
[3492]_ evidence.)
[3494]Mr. Ranxin. Would you tell us about your procedures in regard to having
[3495]an agent or informer or any person acting in that type of capacity? Does that
[3496]have to pass through your hands or come to your attention in the Agency?
[3498]Mr. McCone. No; it does not have to come through my personal hands.
[3500]Mr. RanKIN. Without disclosing something that might be a security matter,
[3501]could you tell us how that is handled in a general way in the Agency?
[3503]Mr. McCong. Mr. Helms, who is directly responsible for that division of the
[3504]Agency’s activities as a Deputy Director, might explain. Would that be
[3507]Mr. Rankin. Could we have him sworn then?
[3509]The Cuarrman. Yes.
[3511]The Cuarrman. Would you raise your right hand and be sworn. Do you
[3512]solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give before this Commission
[3513]shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you
[3514]God? .
[3516]Mr. Heims. I do. .
[3518]Mr. Ranxin. Mr. Helms, you heard the inquiry. just directed to Mr. McCone.
[3519]Could you answer the question directly?
[3521]Mr. Hetms. Yes; we have a specific procedure which we follow in all cases
[3522]where the Agency is in contact, for the purposes of acquiring intelligence or
[3523]whatever the case may be, with an individual. We not only have a record of
[3524]the individual’s name, but we also usually get information of a biographical
[3525]nature. We then check this individual’s name against our record. At that
[3526]point we make a determination as to whether we desire to use this man or not
[3527]to use him. It varies from case to case as to how many officers may be involved
[3528]in approving a specific recruitment. May I go off the record?
[3530](Discussion off the record.)
[3532]Mr. Ranxin. Mr. Helms, did you have anything to do on behalf of your
[3533]Agency with determining whether or not Lee Harvey Oswald was acting in any
[3534]of the capacities I have described in my questions to Mr. McCone?
[3536]Mr. Hetos. Yes; I did.
[3538]Mr. RANKIN. Will you tell us what you did in that regard?
[3540]Mr. Hetms. On Mr. McCone’s behalf, I had ail of our records searched to see
[3542]if there had been any contacts at any time prior to President Kennedy's assassi-
[3544]nation by anyone in the Central Intelligence Agency with Lee Harvey Oswald.
[3546]We checked our card files and our personnel files and all our records.
[3548]Now, this check turned out to be negative. In addition I got in touch with
[3549]those officers who were in positions of responsibility at the times in question
[3550]to see if anybody had any recollection of any contact having even been sug-
[3551]gested with this man. This also turned out to be negative, so there is no ma-
[3552]terial in the Central Intelligence Agency, either in the records or in the mind
[3553]of any of the individuals, that there was any contact had or even contemplated
[3554]with him.
[3556]121
[3558]1D ae a errr BR LDA AL ie LAR ATI DAN ll Pa EIETE PTTL RO ee | JOTO
[3560]13-00000
[3562]6 ee ete ETC area ean RAT LER eC
[3564]bated
[3566]Mr. Rankin. Mr. Helms.
[3568]Mr. Dues. Could I ask one question there? Do you recall.or do you know
[3569]at what time the namé of Lee Harvey Oswald was carded, first came to your
[3570]attention so it became a matter of record, in the Agency?
[3572]Mr. Heras. Sir, I would want to consult the record to be absolutely accurate,
[3573]but it is my impression that the first time that his name showed up on any
[3574]Agency records was when he went to the Soviet Union.
[3576]Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Helms, in connection with your work you have supplied
[3577]information to the Commission and we have requested many things from your
[3578]Agency. Can you tell the Commission as to whether or not you have supplied
[3579]us all the information the Agency has, at least in substance, in regard to Lee
[3580]Harvey Oswald?
[3582]Mr. HeLms. We have; all.
[3584]Representative Forp. Has a member of the Commission staff had full access
[3585]to your files on Lee Harvey Oswald?,
[3587]Mr. HELMS. He has, sir.
[3589]Representative Forp. They have had the opportunity to personally look at
[3590]the entire file?
[3592]Mr. HELMs. We invited them to come out to our building in Langley and ac-
[3593]tually put the file on the table so that they could examine it.
[3595]The CHAIRMAN. I was personally out there, too, and was offered the same op-
[3596]portunity. I did not avail myself of it because of the time element, but I was
[3597]offered the same opportunity. : ;
[3599]Mr. ‘RANKIN. Mr. Helms, can you explain, according to. the limitations of
[3600]security, the reasons why we examined materials but did not always take them,
[3601]in a general way?
[3603]Mr. Hev_ms. Yes; I can.
[3605]In our communications between individuals working overseas and in Wash-.
[3606]ington, we for security reasons have a method of hiding the identities of individ-
[3607]uals in telegrams and dispatches by the use of pseudonyms and cryptonyms. For
[3608]this reason, we never allow the original documents to leave our premises. How-'
[3609]ever, on the occasion when the representatives of the Commission staff looked
[3610]at these files, we sat there and identified these pseudonyms and cryptonyms and
[3611]related them to the proper names of the individuals concerned, so that they
[3612]would know exactly what the correspondence said.
[3614]Mr. RanKINn. By that you mean the representatives of the Commission were
[3615]able to satisfy themselves that they had all of the information for the benefit
[3616]of the Commission without disclosing matters that would be a threat to security ;
[3617]is that right?
[3619]Mr. Heras. It is: my understanding that they were satisfied.
[3621]Representative Forp. Mr. McCone,. do you have full authority from higher
[3622]authority to make full disclosure to this Commission of any information in the
[3624]. files of the Central Intelligence Agency?
[3626]‘Mr. McCone. That is right. It is my understanding that it is the desire of
[3627]higher authority that this Commission shall have ‘access to all information of
[3628]every nature in our files or in the minds of employees of Central Intelligence
[3629]Agency.
[3631]Representative Forp. On the basis of that authority, you or the Agency have
[3632]made a full disclosure?
[3634]Mr. McCong. That is correct.
[3636]Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Helms, I have handed you Exhibits 868 and 869 directed
[3637]to you acting for the Agency, the first one being from the Commission to you
[3638]and the second one, 869, being your answer in regard to your full and complete
[3639]disclosure in regard to your records; isn’t that correct?
[3641]Mr. Hetms. That is correct. May I say, Mr. Rankin, that any information,
[3643]' though, subsequent to this correspondence which we may obtain we will cer-
[3645]tainly continue to forward to the Commission.
[3647]Mr. Ranxriy. Thank you. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask leave to have those two
[3648]exhibits, 868 and 869, received in evidence at this time.
[3650]The CHairMaNn. They may be admitted under those numbers.
[3652]122
[3654]13-Q0000
[3656](Commission Exhibits Nos. 868 and 869 were marked for identification and
[3657]received in evidence.)
[3659]Mr. Ranxin. Mr. McCone, if I may return to you, I will now ask you if you
[3660]have any credible information that you know of or evidence causing you to
[3661]believe that there is any or was any conspiracy either domestic or foreign in
[3662]connection with the assassination of President Kennedy?
[3664]Mr. McCone. No; I have no information, Mr. Rankin, that would lead’ me to
[3665]believe or conclude that a conspiracy existed.
[3667]Representative Forp. Did the CIA make an investigation of this aspect of
[3668]the assassination?
[3670]Mr. McCong. We made an investigation of all developments after the assas-
[3671]sination which came to our attention which might possibly have indicated
[3672]a conspiracy, and we determined after these investigations, which were
[3673]made promptly and immediately, that we had no evidence to support such an
[3674]assumption.
[3676]Representative Forp. Did the Central Intelligence Agency have any contact
[3678]with Oswald during the period of his life in the Soviet Union?
[3680]Mr. McCone. No; not to. my knowledge, nor to the knowledge of those who
[3681]would have been in a position to have made such contact, nor according to any
[3682]record we have.
[3684]Representative Forp. Did the Central Intelligence Agency have any personal
[3685]contact with Oswald subsequent to his return to the United States?
[3687]Mr. McCone. No.
[3689]Mr. Ranxin. Mr. McCone, your Agency made a particular investigation in
[3690]connection with any allegations about 4 conspiracy involving the Soviet Union
[3691]or people connected with Cuba, did you not?
[3693]Mr. McCone. Yes, we did. We made a thorough, a very thorough, investigation.
[3694]of information that came to us concerning an alleged trip that Oswald made to
[3695]Mexico City during which time he made contact with the Cuban Embassy in
[3696]Mexico City in an attempt to gain transit privileges from Mexico City to the
[3697]Soviet Union via Havana. We investigated that thoroughly.
[3699]Mr. Ranxin. Do you also include in your: statement that you found no
[3700]evidence of conspiracy in all of that investigation?
[3702]Mr. McCong. That is correct.
[3704]Mr. Ranxin. And also the investigation you made of the period that Lee
[3705]Harvey Oswald was in the Soviet Union?
[3707]Mr. McCone. That is right.
[3709]Mr. Ranxin. Mr. McCone——
[3711]Mr. Dutzes. Could I ask one question there? Does your answer, Mr. McCone,
[3712]include a negation of any belief that Oswald was working for or on behalf of
[3713]the Soviet Union at any time when you were in contact with him or knew about
[3714]his activities?
[3716]Mr. McCone. As I have already stated, we were never in contact with Oswald.
[3717]We have no evidence that he was working for or on behalf of the Soviet. Union
[3718]at any time. According to his diary, Oswald did receive a subsidy from the
[3719]Soviet Red Cross which we assume had the approval of the authorities. Such
[3720]@ payment does not indicate to us that he even worked for the Soviet intelli-
[3721]gence services. Furthermore, we have no other evidence that he ever worked
[3722]for Soviet intelligence.
[3724]Representative Forp. Is the Central Intelligence Agency continuing any
[3725]investigation into this area?
[3727]Mr. McConeg. No, because, at the present time, we have no information in our
[3728]files that we have not exhaustively investigated and disposed of to our satis-
[3729]faction. Naturally, any new information that might come into our hands
[3730]would be investigated promptly.
[3732]Mr. Hetms. I simply wanted to add that we obviously are interested in any-
[3733]thing we can pick up applying to this case, and anything we get will be immedi-
[3734]ately sent to the Commission, so that we haven’t stopped our inquiries or the
[3735]picking up of any information we can from people who might have it. This is
[3736]on a continuing basis.
[3738]Representative Forp. In other words, the case isn’t closed.
[3740]Mr. Hevas. It is not closed as far as we are concerned.
[3742]123
[3744]|
[3746]Mr. RANKIN. Would that be true, Mr. Helms, even after the Commission
[3747]completed its report, you would keep the matter open if there was anything
[3748]new that developed in the future that could be- properly presented to the
[3749]authorities?
[3751]Mr. Hetms. Yes. I would assume the case will never be closed.
[3753]Mr. RANKIN. Mr. McCone,-do you have any ideas about improving the security
[3754]provisions for the President that you would like to relate to the Commission?
[3756]Mr. McCone. Well, this is, in my opinion, a very important question which I-
[3757]am sure this Commission will—has and will—devote a considerable amount of
[3758]thought to, and undoubtedly have some recommendations as. part of its. report.
[3760]Mr. Rankin. Your Agency does have an important function in some aspects.
[3762]Mr. McCong. We have a very important function in connection with the
[3763]foreign travels of the President, and I would like to inform the Commission as
[3764]to how we discharge that responsibility by quickly reviewing the chronology
[3765]of the Central Intelligence Agency’s support of President Kennedy’s visit. to
[3766]Mexico City from the 29th of June to the 2d of July 1962. :
[3768]Mr. RaNnKIN. Will you please do that.
[3770]The CHarirMAN. Director, is that a security matter?
[3772]Mr. McCone. No. I think I can handle this for the record.
[3774]The Cuargman, Very well.
[3776]Mr. McConsg. If I have to make a remark or two off the record I will ask that
[3777]privilege.
[3779]That visit, as I said, started on the 29th of June. On the 28th of April, in
[3780]anticipation of the visit, instructions were transmitted to Mexico for the
[3781]Ambassador to coordinate planning and informational guidance for the advance
[3782]party of the Secret Service.. ;
[3784]We asked that the Secret Service be given information on local groups and
[3785]persons who would cause disturbances, embarrassments or physical harm, an
[3786]estimate of the determination and ability of the Mexican government to prevent
[3787]incidents, and preparation for special briefings to the Embassy officials and. the
[3788]Secret Service, and such additional support and communications personnel that
[3789]might be required.
[3791]These instructions were given two months before the trip.
[3793]On the 15th of May, we received confirmed information that the President
[3794]would visit Mexico on the specific dates. On the 1st of June the Secret Service
[3795]was supplied by the Agency with the detailed survey of Mexican security forces .
[3796]that would be called upon to protect the President.
[3798]Friendly and allied governments were informed of the visit and their coopera-
[3799]tion and pertinent informational support was solicited. From this date through
[3800]the 2d of July daily information reports were furnished to the State Department,
[3801]the Secret Service, the FBI and the military services..
[3803]That is from the Ist of June to the 2d of July, a period of 31, 32 days. On
[3804]the 8th of June the Secret Service advance party was briefed in detail by a
[3805]group of officers of the Agency on the Mexican government's plans for the
[3806]protection. of the President, including current information on the size, strength
[3807]and capabilities of potential troub‘emakers.
[3809]Hazardous locations and times in the planned itinerary were identified,
[3810]political and economic issues that might be invoked by hostile elements for
[3811]demonstrations were specified.
[3813]On the 11th of June, the Secret Service advance party left for Mexico sup-
[3814]ported by additional security personnel to assist in coordinating an informational
[3815]report and the followup activity required.
[3817]Especially prepared national intelligence estimates on the current security
[3818]conditions in Mexico was approved by the United States Intelligence Board
[3819]on the 13th of June.
[3821]On the 15th of June arrangements were completed to reenforce communica-
[3822]tions facilities. On the 24th of June a conference at the State Department was
[3823]held at the request of the President for reviewing security measures, and this
[3824]meeting I attended personally, and reported to the State Department on the-
[3825]essence of all that had: gone before.
[3827]Emergency contingency plans were discussed and a consensus was reached that
[3828]the President should make the visit as scheduled.
[3830]124.
[3832]13-00000
[3834]my net
[3836]On the 27th of June, a final updated special national intelligence estimate was
[3837]prepared, and this indicated no basic changes in the security assessment that
[3838]Mexican government was prepared to cope with foreseeable security contingencies.
[3840]On the 28th of June, a final briefing report was prepared for the Director's
[3841]use which indicated the security precautions of the Mexican government had
[3842]effectively forestalled major organized incidents, and our informed estimate
[3843]was that the President would receive a great welcome.
[3845]The report was presented to the President personally by the Director at noon
[3846]in a final meeting prior to departure on this trip.
[3848]From the 29th of June to the 2d of July in Washington headquarters, head-
[3849]quarters components remained on a 24- hour alert for close support of the
[3850]embassy and the Secret Service.
[3852]So, not only was the Central Intelligence Agency and its various components
[3854]‘involved in this for a period of 2 months in close collaboration with the Secret
[3856]Service, but by bringing in the United States Intelligence Board we brought
[3857]in all of the intelligence assets of the United States Government in connection
[3858]with this particular trip. I thought this procedure which is followed regularly
[3859]on all trips that the President makes out of the country would be of interest
[3860]to the Commission.
[3862]The CuHammMAN. That is the normal format of your procedures?
[3864]Mr. McCone. Yes.
[3866]The CHarmMan. When the President goes abrbad?
[3868]Mr. McCong. Yes, I selected this one. The same was true of his trip to
[3869]Caracas or Paris or elsewhere. :
[3871]Mr. RANKIN. Mr. McCone, in your investigation of the Oswald matter did
[3872]you use the same approach or a comparable approach to a liaison with the
[3873]other intelligence agencies of government to try to discover anything that
[3874]might involve your jurisdiction. j
[3876]Mr. McConge. Yes. We were in very ¢losé touch with the Federal Bureau
[3877]of Investigation and with the Secret Service on a 24-hour basis at all. points,
[3878]both domestic. and foreign, where information had been received which might
[3879]have a bearing on this problem.
[3881]Mr. Ranxin. Assassination?
[3883]Mr. McCons. Assassination.
[3885]Mr. Ranxin. Do you have an opinion, Mr. McCone, as to whether or not
[3886]the liaison between the intelligence agencies of the United States Government
[3887]might be improved if they had better mechanical, computer or other facilities
[3888]of that type, and also some other ideas or methods of dealing with each other?
[3890]Mr. McConer. There is a great deal of improvement of information that might
[3891]be of importance in a matter of this kind through the use of computers and
[3892]mechanical ‘means of. handling files, and you, Mr. Ohief Justice, saw some of
[3893]our installations and that was only a beginning of what really can be done.
[3895]The CHAIRMAN. Yes; I did.
[3897]Mr. McCone. I would certainly urge that all departments of government that
[3898]are involved in this area adopt the most modern methods of automatic data
[3899]processing with respect to the personnel files and other files relating to indi-
[3900]viduals.. This would be helpful.
[3902]But I emphasize that a computer will not replace.the man, and therefore, we
[3903]must have at all levels a complete exchange of information and cooperation
[3904]between agencies where they share this responsibility, and in going through
[3905]this chronology, it points out the type of exchange and cooperation that the
[3906]Central Intelligence Agency tries to afford both the Secret Service and the
[3907]Federal Bureau of Investigation in matters where we have a common respon-
[3908]sibility.
[3910]I would like to emphasize the very great importance of this exchange, which
[3911]is not always easily accomplished because it is cumbersome.
[3913]Sometimes it becomes involved in distracting people from other duties, and
[3914]so on anid so forth.
[3916]I have given a good deal of thought to the matter of some incentives to bring
[3917]out informers, thinking about the old informer statutes.in which some of them
[3918]are still on the books, in which people were rewarded for.informing when others
[3919]conducted themselves in a damaging way.
[3921]125
[3924]13-00000
[3926]Bem IESE
[3928]Mr. DULLES. Smuggling cases?
[3930]Mr. MoCong. Smuggling cases. But I believe that something could be done.
[3931]I call to the attention of this Commission one of the laws relating to atomic
[3932]energy, namely the Atomic Weapons Reward Act of 15 July 1955 wherein a
[3933]substantial reward is offered for the apprehension of persons responsible for
[3934]the clandestine introduction or manufacture in the United States of such nuclear
[3935]material or atomic weapons. It is suggested that the Commission may wish to
[3936]recommend that original but similar legislation be enacted which would induce
[3937]individuals to furnish information bearing on Presidential security by offering
[3938]a substantial reward and preferential treatment. Substantial reward could
[3939]represent a significant inducement even to staff officers.and personnel of secret
[3940]associations and state security organs abroad who are charged with assassina-
[3941]tion and sabotage. We have information that such personnel and police state
[3942]apparatuses have expressed and, in certain cases, acted upon their repugnance
[3943]for such work and for the political system which requires such duties to be
[3944]performed.
[3946]Mr: -RankKIN. Is it your belief, Mr. McCone, that the methods for exchange
[3947]of information between intelligence agencies of the Government could be mate-
[3948]rially improved.
[3950]Mr. McCong. I think the exchange. between the Central Intelligence Agency
[3951]and the Federal Bureau of Investigation or the Secret Service is quite adequate.
[3952]I am not informed as to whether the exchanges between the Secret Service
[3953]and the FBI are equally adequate. I have not gone into that. I would -have
[3954]no means to know. Certainly it is most important that it be done.
[3956]Mr. Duties. Looking back now that you have the full record, do you feel that
[3958]‘you received from the State Department adequate information at the time that
[3960]they were aware of Oswald's defection and later activities in the Soviet Union,
[3961]did you get at the time full information from the State Department on those
[3962]particular subjects?
[3964]Mr. McCone. Well, I am not sure that we got full information, Mr. Dulles.
[3965]The fact is we had very little information in our files.
[3967]Mr. Heums. It was probably minimal
[3969]Representative Forp. Why did that happen?
[3971]Mr. Hetms. I am not sure, Mr. Ford. I can only assume that the State
[3972]Department had a limited amount. Interestingly enough, it is far enough back
[3973]now so that it’s very hard to find people who were in the Moscow Embassy
[3974]at the time familiar with the case, so in trying to run this down one comes
[3975]to a lot of dead ends and I, therefore, would not like to hazard any guess.
[3977]Representative Forp. Whose responsibility is it; is it CIA’s responsibility
[3978]to obtain the information, or State Department’s' responsibility to supply it to
[3979]Central Intelligence and to others,
[3981]Mr. McCone. With respect to a U.S. citizen who-goes abroad, it is the respon-’
[3982]sibility of the State Department through its various echelons, consular service
[3983]and embassies and so forth,
[3985]For a foreigner coming into the United States, who might be of suspicious
[3986]character, coming here for espionage, subversion, assassination and other acts
[3987]of violence, we would, and we do exchange this information immediately with
[3988]the FBI. .
[3990]Representative Forp. But in this particular case, Oswald in the Soviet Union,
[3991]whose responsibility was it to transmit the information, whatever it was, to
[3992]the Central Intelligence Agency?
[3994]Mr. MoCone. Well, it would be the State Department's: responsibility to do
[3995]that. Whether there really exists an order or orders that information on an
[3996]American citizen returning from a foreign country be transmitted to CIA,
[3997]I don’t believe there are such regulations which exist.
[3999]Mr. Heims. I don’t believe they do, either.
[4001]Mr. McCone. I am not sure they should.
[4003]Representative Forn. It wouldn’t be your recommendation that you, the head
[4004]of Central Intelligence Agency, should have that information?
[4006]Mr. Duties. In a case of an American defecting to a Communist country,
[4007]shouldn’t you have it?
[4009]Mr. McCong. Certainly certain types of information. What we ought to be
[4011]126
[4013]13-00000
[4015]Pere reser se
[4017]careful of here, would be to rather clearly define the type of information which
[4018]should be transmitted, because after all, there are hundreds of thousands or
[4019]millions.of Americans going back and forth every year, and those records are
[4020]the records of the Immigration Service, the Passport Division.
[4022]Mr. Duties. I was thinking of a person who having defected might, of course,
[4023]have become an agent and then reinserted into the United States and if you
[4024]were informed of the first steps to that you might help to prevent the second step.
[4026]Mr. McCone. Well,-certainly information on defectors or possible recruitments
[4027]should be, and I have no question is being, transmitted.
[4029]Representative Forp. What I was getting at was whether the procedures were
[4030]adequate or inadequate, whether the administration was proper or improper in
[4031]this particular case, and if some files you have that started when he attempted
[4032]to defect are inadequate why we ought to know, and we ought to know whether
[4033]the basic regulations were right or wrong, whether the administration was
[4034]proper or improper, that is what I am trying to find out.
[4036]I would like your comment on it.
[4038]Mr. McCons. Well, I think the basic regulations should be examined very
[4039]earefully to be sure that they are copper-riveted down and absolutely tight.
[4040]What I am saying, however, is because of the vast number of Americans who
[4041]go abroad and stay in foreign countries for indefinite periods of time, it would
[4042]be an impossible task to transmit all information available in the State De
[4043]partment and Immigration Service as files to the Central Intelligence. Agency.
[4044]It would not be a productive exercise. What must be transmitted and is being
[4045]transmitted, while I cannot recite the exact regulations is information that
[4046]is, becomes, known to the various. embassies of suspicious Americans that
[4047]might have been recruited and defected, and then returned so that they would
[4048]be agents in place.
[4050]‘Representative Forp. In this case, Oswald attempted to defect, he did not,
[4051]he subsequently ‘sought the right to return to the United States, he had contact
[4052]with the Embassy. Was the Central Intelligence Agency informed of these
[4053]steps, step by step, by the Department of State?
[4055]Mr. McCone. You might answer that.
[4057]Mr. Hetms. Mr. Ford, in order to answer ‘this question precisely I would
[4058]have to have the file in front.of me. I have not looked at it in some time so
[4059]I don’t have it all that clearly in mind. But it is my impression that we were
[4060]not informed step by step. When I say that there is no requirement that I am
[4061]aware of that the State Department should inform us and when I said a moment
[4062]ago that we had minimal information from them, this was not in any sense
[4063]a critical comment but a statement of fact.
[4065]But an American going to the American Embassy would be handled by the
[4066]Embassy Officials, either consular or otherwise. This would be a matter
[4067]well within the purview of the State Department to keep all the way through,
[4068]because we do not have responsibility in -the Central Intelligence Agency for
[4069]the conduct or behavior or anything else of American citizens when they are
[4070]abroad unless there is some spetial consideration applying to.an individual, or
[4071]someone in higher authority requests assistance from us. So that the State
[4072]Department, I think, quite properly would regard this matter as well within
[4073]their purview to handle themselves within the Embassy or from the Embassy
[4074]back.to the Department of State without involving the Agency in it while these
[4075]events were occurring.
[4077]Representative Forp. I think it could be argued, however, that the unique-
[4078]ness of this individual case was such that the Department of State might well
[4079]have contacted the Central Intelligence Agency to keep them abreast of the
[4080]developments as they transpired. This is not—and when I say this, I mean the
[4081]Oswald case—is not an ordimary run-of-the-mill-type of case. It is far from
[4082]it. Even back in the time, well, from the time he went, and particularly as time
[4083]progressed, and he made application to return, there is nothing ordinary about
[4084]the whole situation.
[4086]’ Mr. McCone. That is quite correct; there is no question about that.
[4088]Representative Forp. And I am only suggesting that if the regulutions were
[4089]not adequate at the time and are not now, maybe something ought to be done
[4090]about it.
[4092]127
[4094]1
[4096]13-00000
[4098]Mr. kankIn. Mr. McCone, when you said that supplying all of the information
[4099]about U.S. citizens who went abroad and came back to the country would not
[4100]be a profitable exercise, did that comment include the thought that such an
[4101]intrusion upon all citizens would be questionable?
[4103]Mr. McCone. Such an intrusion?
[4105]Mr. Rankin. Upon their right to travel.
[4107]‘ Mr. McCone. Well, I think this would have a bearing on it. I did not have
[4108]that particular matter in mind when I made that statement, however. I was
[4109]just thinking of the—— :
[4111]Mr. Ranxin. Burden?
[4113]Mr. McCone. Of the burden of vast numbers involved.
[4115]Mr. Rankin. Do you have any thought in regard to whether it would be an
[4116]intrusion upon their rights?
[4118]Mr. McCone. Well, that would be a matter of how it was handled. Certainly,
[4119]if it was handled in a way that the counterpart of providing. the information
[4121]: was to impose restrictions on them, then it would be an intrusion on their
[4123]oan rights.
[4125]Mr. Rankin. Yes.
[4127]‘Senator Coorer. May I inquire?
[4129]The CHarrnmMan. Senator Cooper. -
[4131]Senator Coorrr. I missed the first part of Mr. McCone's testimony; I went to
[4132]answer a quorum call. Perhaps the question has been asked.
[4134]seca: It has been brought into evidence that a number of people in the Embassy
[4136]: , talked to Oswald when he first defected, and the various communications with
[4138]7 the Embassy and, of course, when he left to come back to the United States.
[4140]Have we been able to ascertain the names of officials in the Embassy or em-
[4142]ployees with whom Oswald talked on these various occasions?
[4144]Mr. McCone. I am not familiar with them ; no.
[4146]Mr. Hetms. Neither am I, sir.
[4148]Mr. McCong. I presume that the Department's inquiries have covered it.
[4150]Senator Cooper. Is it possible to ascertain the names of those employees?
[4152]Mr. Ranxin. Senator Cooper, I can answer that. We have inquired of the
[4153]State Department for that information, and are in the process of obtaining it all.
[4155]Senator Cooper. Taking into consideration your answers to the previous ques-
[4156]tion, would it have been possible in your judgment to have secured more com-
[4157]prehensive information about the activities of Oswald in Russia?
[4159]Mr. McCone. It would not have been possible for the Central Intelligence
[4160]Agency to have secured such information because we do not have the resources
[4161]to gain such information.
[4163]The CHArmMAN: Anything more? Congressman Ford?
[4165]Representative Forp. Did the Central Intelligence Agency investigate any
[4166]aspects of Oswald's trip to Mexico?
[4168]Mr. McCone. Yes; we did.
[4170]Representative Forp. Can you give us any information on that?
[4172]Mr. McCone. Yes; we were aware that Oswald did make a trip to Mexico
[4173]City and it was our judgment that he was there in the interest of insuring
[4174]transit privileges and that he made contact with the Cuban Embassy while
[4175]he was there.
[4177]We do not know the precise results of his effort, but we assumed, because he
[4178]returned to the United States, he was unsuccessful. We have examined to
[4179]every extent we can, and using all resources available to us every aspect of
[4180]his activity and we could not verify that he was there for any other purpose
[4181]or that his trip to Mexico was in any way related to his later action in assassinat-
[4182]ing President Kennedy.
[4184]Representative Forp. Did the Central Intelligence Agency make any investi-
[4185]gation of any alleged connection between Oswald and the Castro government?
[4187]Mr. McCone. Yes; we investigated that in considerable detail, because infor-
[4188]mation came to us through a third party that he had carried on a rather odd
[4189]discussion with Cuban officials in the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. The
[4190]allegation was that he had received under rather odd circumstances a substantial
[4191]amount of money in the Cuban Embassy, and the statement was made by one
[4192]who claimed to have seen this transaction take place. After a very thorough
[4194]128
[4197]13-00000
[4201]Bere
[4203]and detailed examination of the informer, it finally turned out by the informer’s
[4204]own admission that the information was entirely erroneous, and was made for
[4205]the purpose of advancing the informer’s own standing with ‘the Central Intelli-
[4206]gence Agency and the U.S. Government and it was subsequently retracted by
[4207]the informer in its entirety.
[4209]Representative Forp. Was there any other evidence or alleged evidence——
[4211]Mr. McCone. Parenthetically, I might add a word for the record that the date
[4212]that the informer gave as to the date in time of this alleged transaction was
[4213]impossible because through other, from other, information we determined. that
[4214]Oswald was in the United States at that particular time.
[4216]Representative Forp. Did the Central Intelligence Agency ever make an
[4217]investigation or did it ever check on Mr. Ruby's trip to Cuba or any connections
[4218]he might have had with the Castro government?
[4220]Mr. McConn. Not to my knowledge.
[4222]Mr. Hetms. We had no information.
[4224]Mr. McCone. We had no information.
[4226]Representative Forp. Central Intelligence Agency has no information of any
[4227]connections of Ruby to the Castro government?
[4229]Mr. McCone. That is right.
[4231]Representative Forp. Did you ever make a check of that?
[4233]Mr. Heims. We checked our records to see if we liad information and found
[4234]we did not.
[4236]Representative Forp. What would that indicate, the fact that you checked
[4237]your records? ;
[4239]Mr. Hers. That would indicate that if we had received information from
[4240]our own resources, that the Cubans were involved with Mr. Ruby in something
[4241]which would be regarded as subversive, we would then have it in our files.
[4242]But we received no such information, and I don't, by saying this, mean that
[4243]he did not. I simply say we don’t have any record of this.
[4245]Representative Forp. That is all. :
[4247]The CHarmmmMaNn. Director, thank you very much, sir, for coming and being
[4248]with us and we appreciate the help your department has given to us.
[4250](Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the President’s Commission recessed.)
[4252]Thursday, June 4, 1964
[4254]TESTIMONY OF THOMAS J. KELLEY, LEO J. GAUTHIER, LYNDAL L.
[4255]SHANEYFELT, AND ROBERT A. FRAZIER
[4257]The President’s Commission met at 2:10 p.m., on June 4, 1964, at 200 Mary-
[4258]land Avenue NE., Washington, D.C.
[4260]Present were Chief Justice Harl Warren, Chairman; Senator John Sherman
[4261]Cooper, Representative Gerald R. Ford, Allen W. Dulles, and John J. McCloy,
[4262]members.
[4264]Aiso present were J. Lee Rankin, general counsel; Norman Redlich, assistant
[4265]counsel; Arlen Specter, assistant counsel; Waggoner Carr, attorney general of
[4266]Texas; and Charles Murray, observer.
[4268]‘TESTIMONY OF THOMAS J. KELLEY
[4270](Members present at this point: The Chairman, Representative Ford, Mr.
[4271]Dulles, and Mr. McCloy.)
[4273]Mr. Specter. Mr. Chief Justice, we have witnesses today who are Thomas J.
[4274]Kelley of the Secret Service; Leo J. Gauthier, Lyndal I. Shaneyfelt, and
[4275]Robert A. Frazier of the FBI. They are going to testify concerning certain
[4277]129
[4279]13-00000
[4281]soa Taney Ti Rowlly, ower SecagT france
[4282]Tv FIG NFCA
[4284]‘Mr. Row1ey. I think there are certain things that you have to allow the man
[4285]who is operating as a politician, and not as head of state. I mean this makes
[4286]a difference in your operation. .
[4288]Mr. Ranxin. Chief Rowley, did you give us a report of the activities in pro-
[4289]tecting the President at and around Parkland Hospital?
[4291]Mr. Row ey. Yes, sir.
[4293]Mr. Rankin. And is that Commission Exhibit.No. 1026?
[4295]Mr. Rowtey. Yes, sir.
[4297](The document referred to was marked Coumission Exhibit No. 1026 for
[4298]identification.)
[4300]Mr. Ranxmn. Mr. Chairman, I offer in evidence Commission Exhibit No. 1026.
[4302]The CHamMan. It may be admitted.
[4304](The document heretefore marked for identification as Commission Exhibit
[4305]No. 1026, was received in evidence.; .
[4307]Mr. Rankin. Do you have any additions or corrections you care to make in
[4308]that: exhibit?
[4310]Mr. Row ey. No, sir. ;
[4312]Mr. Ranxrn..Chief Rowley, did you give us.a report about protective activity
[4313]subsequent to Dallas on behalf of the Secret Service?
[4315]Mr. Rowiery. Yes, sir.
[4317]Mr. RanxIN. I will hand you Commission Exhibit No. 1027 and ask you if
[4318]that is the report that you have just referred to. ‘
[4320](The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 1027 for
[4321]identification.) |
[4323]Mr. Row ey. Yes, sir.
[4325]Mr, Rankin. Chief Rowley, I ask you, are there any problems with regard to
[4326]Commission Exhibit No..1027 concerning security, and whether that should-be—
[4327]that document should be made public? You just take yonr time if you want to
[4328]glance over it.
[4330]Mr. Row ey. No; as I read it, it is general enough, sir, that it ean be included.
[4332](At this point, Mr. Dulles entered the hearing room.)
[4334]Mr. Ranxrn. Mr. Chairman, I offer in evidence Commission Exhibit No. 1027.
[4336]The Cuarmman.. It.may be admitted. .
[4338](The document heretofore marked for identification as Commission Exhibit
[4339]scimeern No. 1027, was received in evidence.)
[4340]ee] (At this point, Representative Boggs entered the hearing room.)
[4342]_ Mr. Ranxin. Are there any of the various answers that you give in the an-
[4343]swers to the questions attached to Commission Exhibit No. 1027 that you care.
[4344]to elaborate on at this time?
[4346]I am not asking you or urging you to do it, because I assume that you. anwered
[4347]them with care at the time. I just wanted to give you that opportunity.
[4349]. Mr. Row ey. No;-not at this time.
[4351]Mr. Duties. May I ask a question there?
[4353]You consider that the criteria as now furnished by you to the FBI and other
[4354]investigative agencies would cover a case like Oswald’s?
[4356]Mr. Rowtey. Yes, sir.
[4358]Mr. Duties. You think they would?
[4360]Mr. Row ey. Yes, sir.
[4362]Mr. DuLtes. You think they understand that?
[4364]Mr. Row ry. Well, as. we stated in the covering letter when we sent this
[4365]out—we haven't gotten any reaction—-we asked tor their cooperation and sug-
[4366]gestions in connection with such guidelines.
[4368]Mr. Duties. Defectors are not specifically covered, are they, by your criteria?
[4369]Mr. Row tery. Well, they are given to us now. (ive are being furnished th
[4370]names of defectors, and they are being investigated, so that their background and
[4371]history will be furnished to us, and we will be in a position now to determine
[4373]whether they represent a risk or not.
[4375]Mr. Rankin. Chief Rowley——
[4377]Representative Boecs. May I ask a question there?
[4379]Would you have any notion as to why names of defectors were not provided
[4380]to you prior to November 22?
[4382]Mr. Rowrey. Yes; under the broad picture, Mr. Congressman, there was no
[4384]471
[4386]snacnere
[4389]13-00000
[4393]indication that they had made any threat toward the President or members of
[4394]his family. Whenever there was a threat made, we were furnished promptly
[4395]by the different agencies the information on the individual’s name. And this was
[4396]done in voluminous reports by the FBI, and the other agencies. When they got
[4397]any information, they would notify the local office, notify their liaison, who
[4398]notified us by telephone, and confirmed by memorandum. The same obtained
[4399]with respect to the CIA.
[4401]Representative Boces. This fellow was interviewed by the FBI several times—
[4402]he was interviewed in New Orleans when he allegedly had his Fair Play Com-
[4403]mittee. If my memory serves me correctly, Mrs. Paine was interviewed about
[4404]him shortly before the visit of the President, after he had gone to work at the
[4405]Texas School Book Depository. I agree that there had been no indication of
[4406]a threat on the President's life. But, obviously he was a person in the FBI
[4407]files who was under some degree of surveillance. It would seem to me strange
[4408]that the FBI did not transmit this information to the Secret Service..
[4410]Mr. Row.ey. The FBI, Mr. Congressman, are concerned with internal security.
[4411]And I think their approach was internal security as it related to this individual,
[4412]whether or not he was a potential recruit for espionage, intelligence, or some-
[4413]thing like that.
[4415]Their concern was talking to him in this vein, in the-course of which there
[4416]was no indication that he bore any malice toward anyone, and particularly to
[4417]the President of the United States. If someone said that Henry Smith didn’t
[4418]like the President, and we got his file, we would get to the point where you
[4419]have 3 million names in the file. How effective are you going to be then?
[4421]Representative Bocas: Well, that is right.
[4423]Mr. Row ey. And then you get in the area of civil rights and all, if you start
[4424]going into individuals——
[4426]Representative Boces. And if I remember correctly, there hag never been—
[4427]we have had no testimony from anyone that Oswald ever threatened the Presi-
[4428]dent of the United States. Is that correct?
[4430]Mr. Ranxr. That is correct.
[4432]Representative Boggs. That was the only question I had.
[4434]' Mr. Dutzes. Along that line, I just ralse the question as to whether maybe
[4436]_ too much emphasis is not put on the threat angle, because a clever fellow, if he
[4438]is going to. assassinate the President, the last thing he is going to do is go
[4439]around and talk about it and threaten it.
[4441]Mr. Row ey. That is right. Well, this has been so with loners, too.
[4443]As you say, you read the assassinations. Some of them just kept to them-
[4444]selves, and traveled, and the next thing you know they confronted their victim.
[4445]Sometimes they were successful, other times they were not.
[4447]Mr. Dutzzs. I recognize the difficulty of. working out adequate criteria. But
[4448]I just think you ought to do some more. seeking, and there is more work to be
[4449]done on that.
[4451]Mr. Row tery. Yes, sir.
[4453]Senator Cooper. May I ask this question: It hasn’t been clear to me. Is it
[4454]correct that now a defector does come within the scope of your Service?
[4456]Mr. Row try. Yes, sir; we are furnished the names of defectors by the FBI.
[4457]‘And they investigate these people. And then in their report, if it shows that the
[4458]individual has emotional instability or propensity for violence, we pick it up from
[4459]there. But.all the reports on the known defectors in this country are submitted
[4460]to us, and then we evaluate from the case history of the report whether or not
[4461]he would be a risk for us subject to investigation.
[4463]Senator Cooper. I understood that was the procedure before. But my ques-
[4464]tion is now, is the defector per se classed as one of those against whom you
[4465]would take protective measures?
[4467]Mr. Row ery. No, no, sir; not unless we had——
[4469]Senator Cooper. Since the assassination?
[4471]Mr. Row ey. Not unless we had these three categories of factors we just
[4472]enunciated.
[4474]Senator Coorer. I would euggest—frat, I understand there are not many de-
[4475]fectors who have returned to the United States.
[4477]Secondly, it seems to me 2 man who has defected from the United States to
[4479]472
[4483]ga to Russia or a Communist country indicates that he has pretty strong con-
[4484]victions against the United States, or else there is something questionable about
[4486]his mental processes.
[4488]I would think that fact alone would make it important to watch his activities
[4490]when he came back.
[4492]Mr. Row tery. It would. And I think the FBI properly conducts the inves-
[4493]tigations, from the standpoint of internal security, and furnishes us a report.
[4494]And then if there is something in the report that indicates he could be a risk to
[4495]the President or the Vice President, we could take it from there.
[4497]Representative Boacs. Mr. Rankin, I have to go to a meeting in 2 or 2 minutes.
[4498]There is-just one question I would like to ask before leaving.
[4500]Is it not a fact that probably the greatest deterrent that you have is the very
[4501]fact that the public knows that there is a Secret Service?
[4503]Mr. Row .ey. Yes, sir.
[4505]Representative Boaas. That you do guard -the life of the President. And
[4506]that the chances of an assassin escaping with his own life are pretty remote.
[4507]So this psychological weapon is one of the things you rely on?
[4509]Mr. Rowtey. That is correct.
[4511]Representative Booes. And you must necessarily keep a degree of secrecy
[4513]about the methods you employ.
[4515]Mr. Row tey. Yes, sir; otherwise they could develop countermethods, to thwart
[4517]anything we might set up.
[4519]Representative Boeas. Exactly. Thank you very much.
[4520]Mr. Rankin. Chief Rowley, do you'in the Secret Service obtain the benefit
[4521]of cooperation with other governmental agencies in the protection of the
[4523]President?
[4525]Mr. Row Ley. We receive cooperation from every agency. If I may name a
[4526]few—we were scheduled to visit Puerto Rico in 1948 or 1947—-I am not quite
[4527]certain—with President Truman, who was then vacationing at Key West. We
[4528]had no office in Puerto Rico at the time. ‘We did not know the situation other
[4529]than that it could be sticky because of the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico.
[4531](At this point, Representative Boggs withdrew from the hearing room.)
[4533]Mr. Row.ey. Our advance man called me and asked me if I would-not talk
[4534]to Mr. Hoover to see whether or. not we could have the assistance of some of
[4535]their agents who were down there in an office established there. And I com-
[4536]municated then with the Assistant Director, who said, “I will get back to you”
[4537]and got the approval. That was an example of the beginning of the cooperation,
[4539]when I was at the White House, with the FBI.
[4541]Now, in the years subsequent to World War II, anytime we were abroad, I
[4542]made personal contact with Mr. Dulles, and I think for national security we
[4543]should go off the record on this, because this is something that pertains today.
[4545](Discussion off the record.)
[4546]The CHamMaNn. Batk on the record.
[4548]Mr. RanxKIN. Now, Chief Rowley, are you familiar with the provisions in the
[4549]appropriation act with regard to the FBI concerning their protection of the per-
[4551]son of the President?
[4552]Mr. Row ey. Yes.
[4553]Mr. RanxIN. You know of that, do you?
[4555]Mr. Row ey. Yes; Ido. Historically, that was first passed in 1910. It stated
[4556]that because of the limited number of Secret Service men at that time, that
[4557]appropriation—a certain given figure—was to be used by the U.S. marshals to
[4559]assist the Secret Service.
[4561]Mr. RanxKIn. Was the Secret Service opposed to that provision in the appro-
[4563]priation act for the FBI?
[4565]Mr: Rowtey. No; it has never opposed that provision over the years. I
[4566]started to say, Mr. Rankin—subsequently, after the founding of the FBI, this
[4567]was transferred, apparently, from the marshals to the FBI, and it has been in
[4569]the appropriations as long as I can remember.
[4570]appropriation.
[4572]We have never objected to that
[4574]Mr: RaNnKIN. Now, there is some language in H.R. 4158, I understand, which
[4575]deals with the permanent organization of the Government that you are objecting
[4577]to; is that right?
[4579]473