[1]DARAAN
[2]Iitod-10431-10006 _. | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 2)
[5]Pog Ne .
[7]scertysensrivie | : ee fs mn
[9]31 January 1975 | : ce
[11]-. MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary of Defense
[12]..- James R. Schlesinger
[14]SUBJECT os Analysis of Soviet Policy towards the United States”
[15]Se by an ex-Member of the KGB
[17]de Several weeks ago I talked to Bill 1 Netson, DDO,* - ;
[18]regarding a.more thoughtful: use of. our Soviet KGB Source's know1-
[19]edge of fundamental Soviet Bloc policy.. The information relates. |
[20]to the clandestine programs of the KGB sponsored by the |
[21]..Central Committee in its reorientation in May of 1959 against the
[22]United States as the "main enemy." My sugges tion was to submit a
[23]= ; _ number of your speeches and solicit Source's critique as seen ~
[24]Sn a through the eyes of an ex-KGB officer. Mr..Nelson stated that he
[25]had no objection as long as there. was a description of the _
[26]Source with a statement that his study did not necessarily repre-
[27]sent the views of CIA.. I should add that the FBI and other serv-
[28]ices are on record to the effect that they have never been able
[29]to disprove Source's factual information although they do not
[30]necessarily agree with his hypotheses (see Attachment A).
[32]2. Attachment B sets forth the highlights and chronology of
[33]his professional career in the KGB. This alone does not convey the
[34]true significance of his defection to the Agency in December 1961.
[35]From 1953 until 1961 various circumstances and events led to his
[36]I disafféction with the system and hardened his determination to
[37]i defect should his family be reunited. His concern was for his’
[39]*Bill has taken sick leave for the next nee OE one |
[40]seen this letter. . _—_———
[42]. oe O 7 os
[43]| . SECRET/SENSITIVE .
[45]aud at h Bey 5 7 ol
[47]03037 bop Dane |
[49]SECRET/SENSITIVE
[50]. 200°.
[52]young. daughter who lived with her grandparents in Russia. In
[53]1961 she was permitted to visit Source and his wife abroad,
[54]and this triggered his defection. Overall, the case is one
[55]where we unwittingly had an agent.in place in the KGB who was —
[56]breaking down Soviet compartmentation of the KGB, both in the
[57]First and in the Second Chief Directorate. His purpose was |
[59]- to obtain information of great value to the West should he
[60]have the opportunity to defect. re
[62]3... By way of special ‘talents, he is ‘essentially an
[64]analyst and historian. - He was frequently called upon by senior
[65]members of the service to study and make recommendations where
[66]there were conflicts over cases affecting more than one depart-
[67]- ment. In-his-drive to gain more. knowledge outside of his par-
[69]’ ticular sphere, he managed on one occasion to be appointed to .
[71]the Inspector General's team which gave him access to the logs
[73]of KGB production indicating the overall .espionage production
[74]’ obtained by the KGB. The investigation was initiated by the
[75]-Politburo who complained of the delay in receiving the product
[76]. derived from espionage, such as British Admiralty, Cables and
[77]Plans, NATO documents, etc. This gave Source freedom to in-
[78]spect the processing of secret information and to trace its
[79]handling from the moment it arrived in Moscow, the translation of
[80]the product and-its preparation for the Politburo. Unfortunately,
[81]the names of agents were not indicated, but it enabled Source,
[82]after his defection, to identify the actual documents which were
[83]identified by Western services on the basis of his description. .
[84]This, in turn, led. to investigative action and important ¢ counter-
[85]intelligence successes in the West.
[87]4. Source has cooperated with some nine intelligence and .
[88]security services under our.aegis. He has imparted first-hand
[89]-knowledge of major covert political programs from the days of
[90]“LENIN to 1961. This knowledge was acquired from reading deeply
[91]into the archives and records of the activities of Soviet intelli-
[92]gence services beginning with the Revolution. Equally important
[93]' was his long tenure in the Higher Counterintelligence School -
[94]where he was able to milk. KGB officers from many departments of
[95]the Service abroad. who were brought back for short. periods of .
[96]retraining. ;
[98]5. Because the Adninistration, the State Department and
[99]the Agency, in part, appear to be firmly entrenched in their
[100]views regarding the policy of Detente, I believe that a prelimi-
[101]nary unofficial reading of these materials by an expert in your
[102]Department might generate an interest in the Source and his views. -
[104]SECRET/SENSITIVE
[106]O0000-€
[108]13-00000
[110]SECRET/SENSITIVE
[113]“This could lead’ te a symposfum “in which he would-be invited ‘ta °°"
[114]. participate and respond to adversary views.’ His reaction to
[115].. such a proposal is unknown... He has always resisted control in
[116]_ the sense of being an agent of any given country. Further, he
[118]does make demands for classified information and position papers
[119]including the nature of the sources before addressing himself to ©
[120]any particular problem, | Nevertheless, his paper on your speeches
[122]were obtained from him using only unclassified - information. !
[124]6. His production has run. into several ‘thousands of pages a
[126].of transcripts of interviews including meetings which he had
[128]with other foreign. intelligence and security services. The
[130]‘range of his information is so vast and detailed that we are
[132]hard put to use it as an overlay for interpreting current Soviet
[133]events. We have learned from experience .that if we. give him a.
[134]problem with an adequate data base, he will] computerize and re-
[136]-.arrange his basic information to support his analysis of any new
[138]subject. This approach has been fruitful because in supporting
[140]- his thesis, he often reveals new. information of value.
[142]7. Attachment Cisa sensitive report received from our
[144]Israeli liaison; Attachment D is an assessment regarding ‘the
[146]activities, role, modus operandi and reason for ,
[147]Ambassador DOBRYNIN's success vis-a-vis the United States (which So,
[148]is incomplete wherever an asterisk is indicated) ;_ and... ee!
[149]Attachment E is a rough draft of. his review of the following
[151]- books - SOVIET STRATEGY FOR THE SEVENTIES, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
[153]AS AN INSTRUMENT OF SOVIET-POLICY and CONVERGENCE OF COMMUNISM |
[154]AND CAPITALISM - A-SOVIET VIEW - submitted to us during your
[155]tenure in the Agency by Mr. Don Cotter. We intend to follow up -
[157].on this at some future date. This, and other attachments, are
[159]partly drawn. from a draft manuscript which he has in his posses-
[160]sion. The manuscript runs to over two thousand pages. He guards —
[161]it jealously and is reluctant to publish it at this time. He.
[162]has permitted me to read several chapters, and they are of unique
[164]‘interest because of the classified information (based « on documents )
[166]which he read in Moscow.
[168]8. By way of digression, a bird's eye view is set forth
[169]below of Source's ‘theme.
[171]‘9. The major reorganization (which produced ‘the KGB ©
[172]Department of Disinformation) and the gradual reorientation of the _
[173]KGB and GRU was completed at the end of 1958 when SHELEPIN suc-.  —
[174]ceeded General SEROV as the chairman of the KGB. (General SEROV,.
[175]who worked with KHRUSHCHEV in the Ukraine, was downgraded to head
[176]the GRU). This development climaxed two years of inspection by a
[178]SECRET/SENSITIVE
[181]13-00000
[184]or i
[186]special committee headed. ‘by: SHELEPIN. ‘who: worked under. the -
[188]Central Committee to investigate activities and policies of the
[190]KGB and GRU. They concluded that the Intelligence Services had
[191]not carried out deStalinization which required that the services -
[192]follow the Leninist concepts of intelligence and its role in
[194]‘ political action. By way of explanation, the OGPU and Cheka were | :
[196]credited under LENIN with having saved the Revolution. This was
[197]accomplished by. suppressing enemies at home, mounting successful - ..
[198]penetration operations into Western governments , the manipulation
[200]*. oF agents of influence and conducting massive disinformation pro--<.. oe
[202]grams by feeding deception tothe West through their intelligence.
[203]services. Under STALIN the services degenerated‘into instruments
[204]of personal. terror to preserve his cult of personality and lost ©
[206]- . Sight .of the overall political, economic, and military obdeck ives”
[207](of the Soviets. ;
[209]. 10. Before STALIN" Ss “death, there: were “anti-Stalinist ele-
[211]ments who were uncovered and repressed, but their cause to find =
[213]a Leninist solution to post-war problems continued after his. .
[214]death. For example, MALENKOV began serious investigations into .
[215]the KGB and other police organizations by enlisting the talents |
[216]of the Leninist/Marxist Institute. It was his objective to have
[217]the investigation culminate in open revelations regarding the |
[218]crimes of STALIN and the activities of the police state. The
[220]. course which was set would have ultimately led to the trials of |
[221]KHRUSHCHEV and many members in the leadership who were prominent — _
[223]in advancing the Stalinist regime as syncophants and "boot-
[224]lickers."
[226]1. MALENKOV was unfortunately -outmaneuverd by the collec-
[227]tive which voted against him on issues, particularly regarding .
[228]Germany. Even in victory, KHRUSHCHEV could not stem the tide
[229]let loose by MALENKOV; therefore, in order to survive, he had
[230]to "steal" the process of de-Stalinization and shape it to his
[231]own ends and the survival of himself and his friends. This led —
[232]eventually to the "secret speech" regarding STALIN's crimes in
[234]‘which he twisted the facts to exonerate himself and his followers.
[236]This led to unrest in the Bloc and the Hungarian Revolution which
[237]forced KHRUSHCHEV and his cohorts to initiate plans and programs -
[238]which represented a return to LENIN.
[240]12. %In May 1959, a secret, six-day series of meetings was
[242]- held for Government bureaucrats possessing a COMINT security
[244]clearance. It was attended by approximately two thousand members
[245]from different parts of the Government. The purpose was to hand
[246]down and explain in Leninist terms the decisions of the
[248]Central Committee relating to the deStalinization of the intelli-
[249]gence services and to set forth policies which would result in
[250]their reorganization and reorientation.
[252]SECRET/SENSITIVE
[254]13-00000
[256]/. OSECRET/SENSITIVE
[258]13. The principal speaker was SHELEPIN who was supported by.
[259]General GRIBANOV of the Second Chief Directorate as well as many
[260]other senior officials of the Government and Services. SHELEPIN ~
[262]_ gave a. broad analysis of the world situation stressing that the
[264]USSR and the USA had reached an atomic stalemate. Accepting this
[265]to be a fact, he stated that all plans for war such as stay--
[266]behind net-workers should be abandoned. . He outlined programs and
[267]reforms for the Intelligence Services which were accomplished
[268]under LENIN and which required the intelligence potential to be
[269]in harness with all other departments. of the Government. He
[270]stressed that each intelligence operation should be designed to
[271]help achieve broad political objectives. Noting that the letter
[273]“"P" (Politika) had been obliterated from OGPU by STALIN, re
[274]SHELEPIN announced the creation of the Department of Disinformation
[275]within the KGB but subject to the contro? and direction of. the. >.
[277]Central.Committee. The Department's task was to use all organs  -
[278]of Government to implement strategic disinformation in accordance
[279]with directives. This was meant to include all channels to the
[280]West; namely, diplomatic, press, military, cultural and economic.
[282]This was in addition to the use of double agents and provocateurs.
[284]14. In discussing the. various objectives, SHELEPIN expounded .
[285]on the wisdom of pursuing peaceful coexistence in the developed
[287]’ countries and wars of national liberation in the underdeveloped —
[289]countries, noting that these courses of action were not contra-
[290]dictory.
[292]15. Shortly thereafter, the central Committee charged the
[293]KGB with the recruitment of two thousand additional S&T staff
[294]officers in order to exploit on a broad basis the opening to the
[295]West. The purpose for this increase was to gain Western technology
[296]as well as to effect the recruitment of agents and agents of in- ,
[297]fluence in the Western scientific world. It should be noted that
[298]one of the more efficient and productive elements of the KGB and
[299]GRU had always been their successful acquisition of scientific
[300]secrets and R&D from the West. SHELEPIN noted that the change
[301]of balance of military power could only be achieved through this
[303]_additional strength of acquiring the technological and strategic
[305]secrets of the West. This would also strike at the USA and hasten
[306]its isolation.
[308]16. According to the Source, he learned in 1961 that the KGB
[310]’ had acquired approximately one thousand new staff officers for
[312]S&T in accordance with the Central Committee directive and that.
[313]about one thousand slots remained to be filled. In 1961 he and
[314]some six hundred KGB officers attended an important lecture given .
[315]by a senior general of the Defense Ministry. The lecture was to
[316]outline the S&T tasks which the KGB would be expected to undertake.
[318]SECRET/SENSITIVE
[320]13-00000
[322]oN
[324]- . SECRET/SENSITIVE. ~~.
[326]He stressed that the objective of the Soviet and the Bloc was -
[327]‘- not only to achieve parity with the West but to overtake the a
[328].. United States and swing the bal ance of military. power to the -
[330]Soviets.
[332]_ 17. The general stated that the issk was gourteen’ years
[333]behind the United States in electronic technology but that en
[335]gap would be remedied by coordinated action in the = following -
[338]aA greatly increased espionage effort.
[339]because of the addition of one thousand. staff -
[340]officers to the S&T of the. KGB and the + Academy:
[341]of Sciences;
[343]_ b. Disinformation, i.e., programs to mis-|
[344]lead the United States and the West regarding .
[345]Soviet technology which would lead the Western
[346]scientific community into expensive and time-
[348]wasting blind alleys of R&D;-.
[350]To acquire new technology through:
[351]trade agreements; and. .
[353]d.. To make treaties and | other diplomatic.
[355]’ arrangements by which the Soviets and.Bloc would
[356]acquire information and which would permit Soviet:
[357]scientists to gain access to the United States
[358]scientific community for the purpose of spotting
[359]potentials for the KGB and GRU. Most important,
[360]he said, was that treaties could be used to
[361]block the natural technological growth of the
[363]‘Western powers, in particular, the United States.
[365]18. As noted above, the lecture on shortcomings of Soviet
[366]technology in electronics was delivered in 1961. Attachment F -
[367]is a National Intelligence Bulletin (TOP SECRET UMBRA) dated —
[368]16 July 1974, which has a direct bearing on Source's information
[369]regarding the aforementioned lecture. The National Intelligence
[370]Bulletin begins with the following: oe
[372]"Leading officials of the Soviet electronics
[373]industry have told visiting US experts that the
[374]Soviet Union is four or five years behind the
[375]United States in integrated circuit technology.
[376]The US experts, who tested Soviet equipment. in
[377]’ this field, have confirmed the Soviet judgment.
[379]SECRET/SENSITIVE
[381]13-00000
[383]SECRET/SENSITIVE
[385]Integrated circuits are needed to meet the size, |
[387]weight, power, and reliability of modern military
[388]: equipment as well as the needs of many. civil
[390]electronic. systems.
[392]Admittedly, the question of electronics covers only one phase of ‘the.
[394]question of military power, and we have not been able to pursue this
[396]oe question of technology further, given our ever-shrinking assets.
[398]19. Since my days are numbered here, I do feel an obligation to
[400]‘dispatch these papers for analysis and coment by Y your. expert before
[401]my time runs out. ~ a,
[403]20. As. previously noted, this package represents a unique: dis- i
[404]semination, unofficial in character. It is requested that this © ~:
[406]_ exercise be tightly held and that we consider modalities for the.
[407]- future exploitation and/or discussions of the product. and the Source.
[409]We and our allies regard Source to be the most valuable Soviet
[410]defector since World War II. .
[412]21. At-your convenience I would appreciate a short acknowledge-
[414]"ment of the above and a reaction from your reader. In the event that
[416]these papers do not stimulate any worthwhile interest, I would ap-
[417]preciate their return for the use of my successor. Les
[418]YY .
[419], Kindest personal regards from,
[421]Sth | Cnylattoonn,
[422]danes-Angté ton :
[424]Attachments: as stated .
[426]SECRET/SENSITIVE
[428]13-00000
[430]y.5.S.R.
[431]Report Now: = 4-64.44
[432]Subject: | MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION
[434]Source: Born 1938 In RIGA, has an academic education and Is a
[435]soclologist by profession. He acquired his academic
[436]training In Moscow and Baku. tn 1962 he worked for _
[437]- about six months with the M.V.0. In Baku and efter that; — .”
[438]until 1963, he worked as a lecturer In philosophy In -
[439]Baku. In 1966-1967 he did his doctoral work at the. . ©
[440]University of Moscow. From. 1967 until December 1973
[441]when he left the U.S.S.R., he worked tn Yaroslavi
[442]and in Baku. He was a member of the Sociology Asso-
[443]citation of the U.S.S,R. From 1964 he was an active
[444]. member of the Communtst Party thn Azerbaydzhen and was.
[445]a member of its Central Committee. He was closely 7
[446]assoclated with the First Secretary of the Azerbaydzhanl
[447]Party. He cooperated willingly and made the impression
[448]‘of being a highly Intelligent and educated man with ©... ~
[449]analytical ability, good perception and excel lent memory.
[451]Or
[453]Validity of Information: November 1973
[458]13-00000
[460]U.S.S.R.
[464]THE U.S.S.R. AND CHINA
[466]1. On this subject, Source can report on the opinions of people IIke
[468]-KHALIPOV, ALIYEV, SUKHODEYEV, GVISHYANI (xosycIN's son-in-law), OSIPOV ~~ .
[470]and Polkovnik-General BYCHENKO (FNU) (Commander of the P.V.O. In the ,
[471]BAKU Area). The following is a gist of the main ideas:
[473]The danger of. war with China is not taken seriously in official
[475]circles of thé U.S. S.R. and particularly in military circles.
[477]+ General KHALIPOV said more than once that common interests
[479]outweigh-the differences between the two Communist countries.
[480]The majority in those circles are of the opinion that the
[481]spreading of warnings about war with China is a deliberate
[483]_-plece of dis-information by the Soviet authorities in order
[485]to justify the keeping of a large mobilized force. It was |
[486]often sald that neither China nor the Soviet Union fear an°
[488]attack by the other side. China needs anti-Soviet propaganda. —
[489]for her own Internal purposes and the U.S.S.R., in order to
[490]_ keep miltfons of mobilized soldiers. Be
[492]In those circles it Is thought that war with China Is Impossible
[493]. for. the fol lowing reasons: © °
[494]1) Even given the use of nuclear weapons, It would take a>
[496]tremendous effort to destroy just the military potential.
[498]> of China.- KHALIPOV mentioned a figure: 209 atomic bombs. :
[500]wcleee . :
[502]40
[504]Pt Peon pits ig igs eg ge Sat
[507]13-00000
[509](2) War with Chtna would in fact bea war of mutual attrition
[510]and even In the case of a formal Soviet victory and a
[511]' change-over in Chinese leadership ~ the U.S.S.R. wit! be.
[512]unable to feed the hungry masses of China. According to.
[513]_ GVISHYANI, there are a hundred mit tton hungry people in
[514]. China, and in the U.S.S.R. there ts not enough food for
[515]the popufation. A Soviet victory would thus double the
[516]needs of the Soviet Union tn this respect and would put |
[517]. too great a strain on her economy. .
[518]2, From some conversations maInty with KHALIPOV, Source concluded that —
[519]tha Soviet Union is preparing for war with Western Europe rather than |
[521]with China; here are his. reasons:
[523]a. The substitution of old weapons for new ones takes place first and _
[524]foremost in the western parts of the Soviet Union, and not on the
[526]border with China, except in the VLADIVOSTOK area, and this not be- ,
[528]cause It Is near to China, but, mainly, because It Is near to the
[530]U.S.A.
[532]b.. According to KHALIPOV, tvo or three days will be enough for’ the
[533]: Soviet Army to conquer Western Europe and he elaborated: — :
[534]England has about 920 tanks. and 1500 planes;-
[535]France ~ about 900 tanks and about 1500 planes;
[536]Germany - about 500 tanks and about 1000 planes;
[537]All this put together Is but about a sixth of what the U.S. 5. Re
[538]"ean putin the fleld against the West within 2 or 3 days; and. -
[539]‘until the West decides on counter-measures it will be too late.
[541]od, According | to Source, who bases his opinion on his conversat tons with ‘the o
[543]ain ‘People, not only is the Soviet Union ‘in. no fear of a war with China, but
[545]© even thinks China will foin her in acwar anatnet tha want. _
[550]WEIN
[553]13-00000
[555]U.S.S.R.
[557]Subject: | ANOROPOV, GRECHKO AND GROMYKO AS MEMBERS OF THE POLITBURO |
[559]4. -Many Soviet personalities, close to Government circles, are of the
[560]opinion that ANDROPOV's, GRECHKO'’s and GROMYKO's inclusion In the Polit-
[561]puro should be examined agalnst the backgroun of two tendencies current”
[562]within Soviet ruling circles with regard to U.S. S. R. policy towards China
[563]and. the U. S.A. ;
[565]a. A poltey of detente with China is supported, according to these
[567]personalities, by SUSLOV and SHELEPIN. These two think that the 7 .
[569]Soviet Union should strive for closer relations with China by
[570]adopting: a “ough policy towards the capitalist countries; a
[571]policy of detente with the West weakens the Soviet position Tn
[573]the International Communist Movement and at the same time ‘Strengthens
[575]_ the Ideological attitudes of China.
[577]-b. A pol ley of detente with the West
[578].. BREZHNEV, KOSYGIN, GROMYKO , GRECHKO, ANDROPOV and particularly.
[580]. "KIRILENKO. + on the other hand. - - support a policy of detente. with
[582]the West fn general and with the U.S.A. In particular. This group
[583]stresses the: need for the nioderntzation of Soviet production pro- —
[584]cesses. After this vital objective is achieved, the U.S.S.R. should
[585]"adopt an even n tougher policy towards the West than in the past.
[587]2. Thus the menbership’ of the three in the Politburo ‘Is designed to.
[588]'-$3¢engthen BREZHNEV's.position.. It should be remembered that these three
[590]- 2 @ personal debt to BREZHNEV: I+ was BREZHNEV who made them what they ©.
[592]FTE Ro it should also be kept In mind that the membership In the ©
[594]“ES
[596]NBT EIT TAT ERIN PONOT II IB GY
[598]shea h thaaahb. Bi SER ab Ui re 1 Pins
[601]13-00000
[603]Politburo of the Minister of War, the Head of the K.G.B. and of the Foreign
[604]Minister, has a special significance; It Is an Indication. that BREZHNEV is.
[606]. esout to make most important decisions and needs the ‘support of the Armed
[608]forces, the K.C.B. and of the Foreign Office.
[610]The general opinton In circles of the Intel ligentzia, and particularly in
[611]scientific circles, is that a war against the West is being planned.
[613]fecording to this opinion, BREZHNEV's admisston of these three Ministers .
[615]to the Politburo is a very unusual act In the history of the Soviet Union.
[616]A similar step was “taken only gnce before, when STALIN admitted VOROSHILOV, .
[617]SOLOTOY. and BERIA to the Pol itburo - about two months: before the outbreak Bot
[618]cof war between the. U. Ss S.R. and Germany. ee
[621]13-00000
[623]"DEVELOPMENTAL AND RECRUITHENT APPR LOACHES TO AMERICANS ~
[625]THE SOVIET SECURITY THREAT. IN THE DETENTE. PERIOD
[627]a oe The aura of detente in the Soviet ‘and Bloc. ‘relations. dur-
[628]ing the last year and a half, we believe, has created a-favorable __.
[629]climate for: recruitment and penetration in the West. This. paper...”
[630]‘deals with the problems as we see them. There are related counter- =~
[631]' intelligence issues which involve internal security:. the.leakage.*
[632].-and exchange of economic, scientific and political information; °°
[633]‘the sale of technological information; and the impact of disinfor-...+
[634]-- mation and agents of influence on American policy. -As has been. »,
[635]noted. in our previous forums, since 1961 when KAGO brought us 0 or
[636]- documentary evidence* that. Soviet intelligence had launched ‘a full--*
[637]-..scale penetration effort aga he Slain Enemy," we-have seen'a...
[638]- adv and continuing Soviet effort to effect pe .
[640]— fo. 4 as been clear. to Soviet intel-.. *,
[641]a . -digence, as it has been apparent to Western coun terintet)igence a
[642]that Soviet policy designed to exploit Western technology and,
[643]- hopefully, change the balance of military power has” created new:
[644], opportunities. for Soviet espionage. - , oss oe
[646]: 2. ‘These new “opportunities may. be characterized. as a plethora
[647]i. ° of. choices: a harvest almost unprecedented since. the New: Economic --..,
[648]t Policy (N.E.P.} period and the 1958 Central Committee. decision to
[650]assign.to the KGB a new vital role in the policy to exploit the. °°).
[651]West “by returning to the principles of LENIN. | Soviet intelligence
[652]now ‘finds more Americans, both official and unofficial: we
[654]a. Anxious to ‘exchange all ‘types of information; oe
[655]b. Willing to ‘discuss virtually any subject;
[657]c. ‘Inclined to believe there is truly a latent and _
[658]potentially viable dissident movement in the USSR which can ©
[659]be influenced if only the American people-to- people concept
[660]could prevail; ;
[662]*Re ferred to.and quoted in Attachment A.
[664]TOM a”
[668]sreprer — - oe _
[670]13-00000
[674]‘recruit. Americans, .
[676]d. Convinced that there is a bonanza for. the Ameri gan
[677]businessman in the USSR and that "business" can alter the
[678]“Soviet lifestyle and reduce. governmental, i. -G.5 cP control;
[680]‘e. Believing that the Cold War was a myth created by
[681]America; , woe
[683]vo, g.. Anxious | to atone’ ‘for the "sins" of Vietnan. and
[684]interventionist policies; oh
[686]ge Anxious about. China and nuclear. Weapons;
[688]h. Believing there is more merit to direct USSR- -USA 0 Of
[689]a negotiation if America attempts to negotiate in. tanden with
[690], its Western allies, or other nations ; Os, a
[692]ai. Ready. to believe: there. are’ many, if not legions, ‘of .
[693]Soviet citizens, particularly the young. "intellectuals," ° <0 ©
[694]who are willing to cooperate with _the West to advance: free-
[696]dom. for the Russians ; . oe ee! :
[698]= 5c Ignorant about: Soviet ideological ‘consistency and
[699]purpose. ; ee aie
[701]3. Addressing ourselves only to ‘manifestations ‘of the ‘Soviet.
[703]security threat outside the U.S., we are concerned that the climate -
[705]for penetration, particularly for the recruitment of Americans, has
[707]become. too permissive. .The attitudes outlined have not only made
[709]America more. vulnerable but have made the counterintelligence. job :
[710]more difficult. Not. only has. Soviet-American contact. increased in:
[711]geometric proportions, but there is also increasing evidence that .
[712]the always relatively loose security check rein on official Ameri- —-
[713]cans has lengthened even more. As. discussed elsewhere,-it is ap-..
[715]“. parent the Soviet-inspired attacks on Western intelligence, when _
[716]. coupled with domestic attacks of whatever origin against American”:
[717]-intelligence and security organs, have had a direct bearing on —
[719]opportunities for Soviet intelligence — to attempt to develop and -
[721]4, In” an attempt to cope with the. problem. ‘of ‘Soviet and Bloc
[722]recruitments and penetrations, we have - since August 1965 -
[723]collected statistics and case data on a government-wide basis of |
[724]recruitment attempts made against American personnel abroad and
[725]foreign employees of the United States Government. Our objective
[726]has been to collect, record, collate and analyze such information .
[727]in order to:. ; _
[729]a. Identify officers and agents of Soviet, Bloc, Cuban |
[730]and Chinese Communist Services; ;
[732]SECRET
[734]13-00000
[736]services by area, | date and modus. operandi 5.
[738]as” “appropriate, ’ information about the. scope ‘and type of pene- ©
[740]b. Identify U.S. Government: employees who are > being ae
[741]targetted by these adversary sgrvices; : oo
[743]c. - Determine. the scope of activity of these adversary
[745]de. Determin the. ‘scope “of targetting against any.
[746]specific U. S. Government agency; ;
[748]‘Help- us “understand the ‘extent of foreign intelligence
[750]- eftocts against the U.S. Government and to obtain other per-
[751]-spectives about. possible disinformation and deception
[753]operations;
[755]Fe “Facilitate management of double agent cases; .
[756]"Furnish. ‘counterintelligence. ‘and operational guidance.
[758]to. our field stations in their efforts to mount. aggressive
[759]operations against the adversarys
[761]che
[763]Provide the Agency and other: U.S. Government agencies, ~
[765]‘tration efforts. being made . against u. Ss. - Government installa-
[766]tions abroad. co ee Sy
[768]5. “Our. evaluated cases*. of a and. recruitment af .
[770]tempts over the last nine years By the ation Bloc, Cuban . and ~
[772]ese Communist services | are’ as “follows? |e as
[774]bob 6 6 bt
[779]“I
[780]co
[782]*The unit in these and the other statistics in this review is
[784]the single case of penetration or the recruitment incident as es-
[785]. tablished By €Valuation of confirmed reports, unconfirmed or cir-
[786]; cumstantial information, and other specific reporting and informa-
[787]tion.
[791]re 6.. Over the whole period the penetration and: recruitment SE,
[792]1 . forts have been fairly stably distributed by service as follows: .
[794]Soviet | 588 ‘of the cases
[795]Bloc ys 376
[796]oo
[798]-~ Over the: range ‘Of cases, recruitment and penetration ‘ef ;
[799]“forts nave been directed at U.S. officer personnel in 30%.of the- oe
[800]cases, other staff in 5%,.-communications personnel in 5%, enlisted:
[801]‘Tanks | in- 9%, -local employees in 505 F% others in 22% of the: cases
[803]ooking’ more. ‘particularly at our information on ‘Soviet ;
[804]and associated recruitment and penetration efforts for the Detente |.
[805]-period--the past four years--there is the following distribution |
[806]of adversary service.case effort:
[808]ee. t is clear that. Soviet penetration and: recruitment opera-
[809]‘tions; up to and including the last year, against U.S. Government.
[810]“installations and. representatives abroad have not been materially.
[811]-affected or inhibited by ''Detente." Some representative cases
[813]-since 1968 are cited in Attachment B. The cases have been sani-'::*:
[814]‘tized to protect the: innocent... They are included solély to suggest.
[815]“the range, precision and persistence of the Soviet, Bloc, Cuban and
[816]Chinese ‘Communist penetrations — effort.
[818]ae nd ‘of ‘the problem. ur ‘da a consis s-
[819]‘sentially ‘of information on approaches and pitches voluntarily °
[820]‘reported by American personnel. The 1973 case figures (and those
[821]for 1974, thus far) hold up very well as valid indicators of the °°:
[822]7 persistence of Soviet: and Bloc penetration efforts in spite of, or °
[823]“. because.of, Detente permissiveness. However we acknowledge that
[824]: we have no way yet of judging exactly the impact of Detente on the.
[825]reporting mood of the official Americans who are being targetted.
[827]- *This covers only local employees. outside of Iron Curtain in-
[829]a - gtallations. Local employees in U.S. installations behind the Iron
[831]Po Curtain are regarded as actually or potentially under the control
[833]: of their respective security services and are. therefore not con-
[834]sidered in this calculation.
[836]SECRET
[838]13-00000
[840]'
[841]I~ . os
[842]' sole
[844]H
[846]11. Soviet Bloc modus operandi--the operational ‘techniqués
[847]used against Americans--include ali the known gambit ts and have . .
[848]_ changed little over the past decade: There have been slight tacti- |
[849]_cal shifts both abroad and in the Soviet Bloc to take advantage of -
[850]the "spirit of Detente," for example, but the basic ‘4/0. remains.
[851]what it was. in the 1920's and 1930's. ne
[853]12. “Ta ‘addition ‘to diplomatic. and. official | access to U. Ss.
[854]. officials, Soviet Bloc intelligence officers frequent the places-- .
[855].. bars, restaurants, clubs and other international, national and _
[856]'. local organizations--that provide them with opportunities to meet’
[857]American personnel or U.S. Government employees. In their recruit:
[858]. ment efforts, Soviet Bloc intelligence officers have utilized the
[860]. theme of peace, friendship, and mutual cooperation and. they have.
[862]Poe offered the bait of exchanging information to develop "common"’
[864]oe -‘interests-and cooperation to obtain information.. They have utilized
[865]' the ploy: of professional advancement or business interests for one --
[867]. or both parties when attempting to gain cooperation or buy. informa-: °
[868]tion to try to remove the stigma of espionage in their development °~:
[869]. negotiations ‘as well as in some recruitment attempts... They con- .. ta
[871].. tinue. in their efforts to.obtain access to both American and in-;.. ~
[873]_- digenous female employees throughout the world by using: officers. or 7
[874]local indigenous male and female agents to cultivate these target ~
[876]personalities. Recently they have used the language :lesson gambit--
[877].. even with CIA personnel. Local personnel, ranging from servants to .
[878]oe higher officials, have. been recruited and targetted either to ob- —
[880], ' tain employment with Americans or to develop personal as well as
[881]official. access to American officials... They have attempted to
[882]recruit foreign local enployees to report about the interests and ~
[883]activities of their American employers.- They employ sex and Ms,
[885]-. financial remuneration as bait, use personal compromise as a threat,.
[887]- seek out. personal weaknesses to utilize as operational opportuni-
[889]7 ' ‘ties, make direct recruitment approaches based on compassionate or _
[890]i oe nationalistic grounds , utilize audio and other technical’ mechanisms ,
[891]SR etc. . vot he Se 7 =
[893]13. This summary examination of the ‘recent case’ evidence of |
[894]the essentially unchanged Soviet and Bloc recruitment effort me
[895]against official Americans abroad is not the whole Detente story.. .
[896]There is also a great interest by the Soviets in recruiting U.S. -_
[898]' students abroad. The primary objective of that recruitment effort
[899]as,°° guide the student eventually to obtain employment with the
[900]U.S. Government. Such efforts: are only indicative of the fact that.
[901]the Soviets view their penetration of the U.S. Government, via
[902]students, as a continuing and long-range. program. .,
[904]14. <A recent additional dimension to the problen of Soviet
[906]and Bloc recruitment of Americans has been the access. the Soviets.
[907]-have developed to American businessmen--many of whom are privy to
[909]SECRET
[913]So egret nmnmnelee rene erties tte papi cig ae
[915]; and the like.
[917]a delegations under their Chamber of Commerce cover, and they are :
[918]-.; applying what appear to be classic assessment techniques. It has.
[919]“*. been our experience to date that they are thinking long-range and.
[921]U.S. Government secrets through defense-related contracts--who~_
[922]travel to the USSR and entertain. Soviet trade delegations in the “.~_
[924]U; a The concern we have previously expressed about the role of _
[926]- General Yevgeniy N. PITOVRANOV and the Soviet intelligence -
[928]: officers in the foreign trade business was well founded and, in. a
[929]fact, we believe was somewhat understated. It is now. evident. that os
[931]PITOVRANOV controls most if not all of the activities going on °
[933]. where American business encounters Soviet trade. officials, in the:
[935]International Trade Center. to be built:in Moscow,. ‘in exhibits in.
[937]the USSR and abroad, in the patents and licensing agreements, in
[939]the supervision of ‘the travel. of trade delegations - (to. the U. Se
[941]41s. Reports which reveal that ‘the KGB is: “active among “american.
[942]businessmen are beginning. to. surface. Not too surprisingly, these -
[943]reports indicate that their. techniques are both subtle. and blatant. °
[945]One of the most blatant approaches to American business: ‘involves
[946]‘Igor ARTEMYEV,-who.is attached to the Soviet Embassy in Washington.
[948]ARTEMYEV claims to be a student in the U.S. to study relationships .
[950]- between U.S. companies and their foreign. subsidiaries and. licensing -
[952]“.: agreements between U.S. and foreign companies... In the course of -- -
[953]~. his research, ARTEMYEV sends detailed questionnaires to U.S. com=..-
[955]"| panies. The questionnaires are the kind required by our Securities
[957]. and Exchange Commission. . While some ‘companies do not respond,.
[959]‘there are those that do. ARTEMYEV also visits various companies to
[960]. talk with officials. ._On.one occasion he replied to a question |
[962]about the: level of classification of the meeting by saying it was:
[964]. "confidential." With that kind of access, who needs to ‘recruit ain’.
[965].. the. classic sense. a Le _
[967]16. PITOVRANOV's. ‘people are ‘very evident in various trade
[969]are themselves not interested in the cheap shot or quick pitch,
[971]"although these devices are being employed against some American ce
[972]' businessmen who visit Moscow. There are also strong indications —°:
[974]that the Soviets are using recruited agents among the rapidly ex-.
[976]panding demi-monde of fixers, many Russian-speaking, who gain =< .*
[977]“employment as the in-house experts who "know how to deal with the... -
[979]Russians" and who find employment with American firms as guides ©
[980]and advisors accompanying U.S. delegations to HNoscow.
[982]“Attachments
[984]Cnrannm
[986]13-00000
[988]The following are highlights of the chronology of Source’ Ss. : (Subjects)
[990]professional career:
[992]September 1944: Subject was mobilized and sent to the
[1000]| Officer, assigned to the Eastern Section |
[1002]| (otdeleniye) of the SK (Soviet Colony an
[1004]_. Student at the two- year course, Higher Loe
[1006]_ specialized in counterintelligence during -
[1008]Frunze Artillery School in Odessa where :
[1010]| he remained until July 1945. “At that. tine eo
[1011]Subject left the Artillery School before. _
[1012]"completion of the course and enrolled. in. a -
[1013]" Counterintelligence School.
[1014]' Student at the one year course, Military”
[1015]Counterintelligence s School, _GUER/"SMERSH, we
[1016]Moscow. .
[1018]7 Desk officer, Assistant operational Case a
[1020]_ security of Soviet officials abroad) Depart- pane
[1022]ment. (otdel) of the First Chief (Foreign an :
[1023]Intelligence) Directorate of MGB. _Head-— 7
[1025]quarters in Moscow. ‘During the period 7
[1027]November 1947 to September. 1948 Subject held po
[1028]‘the title of Referent and his office was” .
[1030]Te designated the Fifth (SK). Department of the
[1032]Third (Eastern) Directorate of the KI _
[1034](Committee for: Information), but his: functions
[1036]were “unchanged.
[1038]Intelligence School of the KL. Subject .
[1040]studied general subjects and the. English oe
[1042]language; he was one of 30 students who
[1044]the second ‘year of the course.
[1046]ae aes a Y oe emate
[1048]13-00000
[1054]Desk officer, operation Case Officer, 7
[1056]_ supervising SK activities in China,
[1058]assigned to ‘the SK Section, Eastern. Depart-_
[1060]ment, First Directorate of the MGB Head-.--
[1062]September 1951:
[1064]November 1951:
[1066]‘quarters in Moscow, the SK functions having.
[1068]reverted from the KI to the MGB in 1949. .
[1069]At his request Subject was transferred as
[1071]a desk officer to the Anglo- ~American Section,
[1073]“Coustterintelligence ‘Departnient of the ‘Fifst)
[1075]Directorate, ‘MGB Headquarters in Moscow.
[1077]Subject was promoted to "Senior Operational .
[1079]Case Officer."
[1081]December 19S1:
[1083]March 1952:.
[1085]The KI, was dissolved and former state security a
[1086]elements were returned to the MGB. Subject's
[1088]functions continued - the same, but, in, the a
[1090]‘reorganization, he was assigned to the cr 7
[1092]Section of the American Department of the
[1094]Anglo- -American (First) Directorate of the
[1096]First Chief Directorate of the MGB.
[1098]Subject and an unidentified young colleague
[1100]wrote a joint letter through the Central
[1102]September 1952:
[1104]- meeting, with his friend, with STALIN, :
[1105]MALENKOV, and BERIYA. STALIN thanked the two
[1107]officers for their suggestions, “discussed 7
[1109]to send him a letter with specific proposals -
[1111]Committee of the CPSU to STALIN making -
[1112]suggestions for a fundamental reorganization of
[1113]Soviet foreign intelligence and counter- = |
[1114]intelligence work. . oo
[1116]While on vacation in the Georgian SSR
[1118]Subject was ordered to Moscow for a four hour
[1120]intelligence matters in detail and asked them 4
[1122]13-00000
[1124]March 1953:
[1126]October 1953:
[1128]August 1954:
[1130]for necessary reorganizations, together _
[1132]‘with the names of recommended chiefs.
[1134]In a subsequent letter they recommended.
[1135]Sergey Ivanovich OGOLTSOV, then. in. prison
[1137]for "political crimes," and Yevgeniy,
[1139]Petrovich PITOVRANOV, then chief or deputy Oe
[1140]chief of the MGB in the Uzbekistan SSR.
[1142]~ STALIN met Subject and his. friend a ‘second
[1144]time. OGOLTSOV was released £rom prison and -
[1145]appointed Chief of the First Chief Directo-
[1147]rate, with PITOVRANOV as his. deputy. A
[1149]Chief Intelligence Directorate of the MGB
[1151]was then formed, containing a Counterintelligence
[1153]Department with an Emigre desk and - seven geo-
[1155]graphical desks. Subject. was appointed by
[1157]OGOLTSOV as chief of the American. Desk,.
[1159]supervising approximately 15 staff persons.
[1161]. When STALIN died and BERIYA. took over control
[1162]- of the State Security apparatus). which he. |
[1163]“combined with the MVD. into a unified MVD, he.
[1165]replaced OGOLTSOV with one of his own appointees.
[1167]' Subject was reassigned as deputy chief’ of ne
[1168]Russian Emigre Desk of the CI Departnent of
[1170]the Second (new designation for foreign .
[1172]Intelligence) Chief Directorate, ‘MVD. » Subject
[1173]supervised activities against emigres in a
[1174]Austria and Germany. oS
[1175]Subject was assigned to the MVD residency in. .
[1176]Vienna, “Austria, as an operational case. officer
[1177]in the Emigre Operations Group.
[1179]Subject was ‘transferred to the British Sub-
[1181]"Group of the Anglo- -Anérican- ‘French Group. of the —
[1183]KGB residency in Vienna. His duties were (of ao
[1185].counterintelligence nature, i. e. ‘concerned oe
[1187]with penetration of foreign intelligence services. .
[1189]13-00000
[1191]oy 1955-1959: oa One of 170 Students. at. _ading the four
[1192]. | year internal security- -counterintelligence
[1193]course, the KGB Higher, ‘School Juridical
[1194]Institute. He presented and successfully
[1195]defended his thesis on the subject of SK |
[1196]activities among Soviet delegations and
[1197]tourist groups traveling abroad. | He re-
[1198]ceived his diploma in August 1959. “During 7
[1199]his school tour Subject also spent several
[1200]weeks in on- the- -job. training as a student
[1201]assigned to pertinent elements. of the KGB's
[1202]Second . (Internal Counterintelligence) Chief
[1203]Directorate, with access to operational files
[1204]on foreign diplomatic personnel in Moscow a
[1205]‘who were KGB targets. a cee
[1206]September 1959: Subject was assigned as a | Senior Operational
[1207]Case officer responsible for NATO. information.
[1208]within the Treaty, Organizations Direction, a ag
[1209]Information (Reports) Department, First
[1210](Foreign) Chief, Directorate, KGB Headquarters, a
[1211]Moscow. His function was to translate, edit
[1212]and summarize information reports obtained by
[1213]_ KGB agents | abroad and to disseminate the 7
[1214]pertinent information to the Central Committee
[1215]of the CPSU, members of the Presidium, “including
[1216]KHRUSHCHEV, and, in. the. case of information |
[1217]"with military aspects, to MALINOVSKIY,. ‘the
[1218]- Minister of Defense. At one time, ‘during a |
[1219]CP cell meeting, criticism was voiced, about
[1220]the delays in translation and processing and
[1221]Subject was assigned to study the situation.
[1222]Thus he examined registry logs showing, the
[1224]titles of agent .information reports, the place —
[1226]e.
[1227]| acquired, the date received and the date of
[1228]dissemination of the finished Russian intelli= -
[1229]_ gence reports to the government.” .
[1230]Apeil 1366 Subject was tvansferred to the American. ect tien
[1232]13-00000
[1234]August 1960:
[1236]15 December 1961:
[1238]28 December 1961:
[1240]1962:
[1242]‘16 February 1962:
[1243]2 July.1962:
[1245]9 July 1962:
[1246]22 August 1962:
[1248]or tne CI Department of the First Chief
[1249]Directorate, KGB, to pr.gare for assign-
[1250]ment to the KGB residency under Soviet _
[1251]Embassy cover in Helsinki, Finland, as
[1252]the CI officer vorking against foreign
[1253]intelligence services. |
[1254]Subject was assigned to the KGB residency in a
[1255]Helsinki, under the name KLIMOV' (his true |
[1256]name was conpronised through . the 1954
[1257]defection of Petr DERYABIN in Vienna), and
[1258]with the cover title of Third Secretary.
[1259]Subject, with his wife and young daughter
[1260]defected to the U. S. ‘Government which ‘granted
[1262]them political asylum,
[1264]' Subject met Attorney General Robert. ‘KENNEDY
[1266]along with Mr. HELMS, ~DDP.°
[1268]‘Subject was debriefed by CIA eeicers,
[1270]officials from other ‘US Agencies and teams of
[1272]| Intelligence Officers. from Free World nations. _
[1274]Subject provided much valuable information on
[1276]the KGB, its organization, personnel, operations,
[1278]aims and efforts against the Free World.
[1280]' Subject, however, proved to be a ‘difficult.
[1282]handling problen, especially as a result of
[1284]his personality and his constant demands for —
[1285]regular meetings with high-level US officials
[1286]such as the President, the Attorney- -General,
[1288]the Directors of CIA and ‘the FBI and for a
[1289]policy role in the US Intelligence Community.
[1291]Subject had another meeting with the - ohn
[1293]pe
[1295]Attorney- ~General.
[1297]‘Subject met again with the Attorney- ~General
[1299]and Mr. HELMS. .
[1300]Subject had a conversation with Mr. feos.
[1301]Subject had interview with Mr. SORENSON of the
[1302]White House Staff and Mr. Edward R. MURROW, -
[1304]: Director of USIA.
[1306]13-00000
[1308]. ——,
[1310]- + 418 Nov. 1962:
[1312]27 Nov. 1962:
[1314]14 December 1962:
[1315]21 Feb. 1963. H
[1317]Spring 1963:
[1318]8 August 1963:
[1319]22 August 1963:
[1321]23 August 1963:
[1322]4 Sept. 1963:
[1324]October 1963-
[1325]April 1964:
[1328]_ June 1965:
[1329]August 1968:
[1331]October 1968:
[1333]July 1970
[1337]An FBI source reported. . hat the KGB was aware |
[1338]of Subject"s presence in the U. s. A. and ordered .
[1339]all Soviet 1s personnel to report immediately
[1340]any information which they may obtain regard-
[1341]ing Subject. |
[1343]Subject met Mr. McCONE, ‘ber, and protested |
[1344]treatment by the Agency.
[1346]Subject met again with the Del. a
[1347]‘Subject and his family left N.Y. c. on -
[1348]SS Sylvania for England. .
[1349]Subject worked with the British.
[1351]Subject returned to the U.S.A.
[1353]Subject met the Attorney-General again.
[1355]Subject: met: the DCI agsin. ~
[1357]. Subject. met the pcr again and stated ‘that he
[1359]wanted to become an advisor to the DCT and»
[1361]. the Intelligence. Community. on
[1363]Subject in contact “with the “Agency nostly an >
[1365]the N.Y.C. area. Subject was cooperative to
[1367]sone’ extent.
[1369]| Subject, according to a Dutch official,
[1371]visited The. Netherlands. _
[1372]Subject interviewed by the Canadians co)
[1374]in the N. Y. Cc. area.
[1376]Subject in contact with the British regarding
[1378]possible publication of his book. _
[1379]An FBI source indicated that he had no
[1380]current information concerning the KGB
[1382]attitude regarding Subject but the source oo
[1384]_ stated that if the KGB. knew Subject! s location
[1386]it might undertake. to. eliminate hin, 7
[1387]Subject was in contact with Agency personnel .
[1389]and visited Florida.
[1391]13-00000
[1392]‘sty?’ March (1972 A KGB defector, LYALIN, reported that he knew
[1397]the
[1399]that Subject had been sentenced to death —
[1400]by the KGB. An article regarding this
[1402]sentence appeared in The Chekist sometime after
[1404]1964, |
[1405]April 1972: Subject ¥ was in touch with CIA officials.
[1406]September 1972 A KGB defector, OGANESYAN, provided a ‘copy
[1408]of the 1969 KGB Alphabetical List of Agents _
[1409]of Foreign Intelligence Services, Defectors, -
[1411]Members of Anti- Soviet Organizations, Members. of
[1412]Punitive Units and ‘Other Criminals under.
[1414]Search Warrants. In this List the KGB listed
[1415]Subject and his wife as ‘under the sentence of
[1417]‘death for revealing Soviet State secrets. ee
[1419]13-00000
[1423]The following are highlights of the chronology of Source's (Subject's) .
[1425]professional career:
[1427]September 1944: Subject was mobilized and sent to the ._
[1428]Frunze Artillery School in Odessa where
[1429]“he remained until July 1945. At that time
[1430]a | Subject left the Artillery School before
[1431]completion of the course and enrolled in a
[1432] Counterintelligence School, .
[1433]1945-1946: _, Student at the one year course, ‘Military a
[1434]| _ Counterintelligence School, | GUKR/"'SMERSH, no
[1435]". Moscow. a
[1436]1946-1948: Desk officer, Assistant Operational Case. .
[1437]. "Officer, assigned to the Eastern Section pe on
[1438]- (otdeleniye) of the SK (Soviet Colony = a
[1439]_ security of Soviet officials abroad) Depart-—
[1440]ment (otdel) of the First Chief (Foreign :
[1441]Intelligence) Directorate of MGB . Head-—
[1442]quarters in Moscow. During the period - 7
[1443]November 1947 to‘September . 1948 Subject held
[1444]the title of Referent and his office was . -
[1445]designated the Fifth (SK) Department of the
[1446]Third (Eastern) Directorate of the KI
[1447](Committee for: Information), but his ¢ functions
[1448]were unchanged. ;
[1449]1948-1950: Student at the two-year course, Higher
[1450]Intelligence School of the KI. | Subject _
[1452]Studied goncral subjects and the English
[1453]z g :
[1455]language; he was one of 30 students who .
[1456]‘specialized in _counterintelligence during
[1458]the second year of the course,
[1460]9 B0 3s
[1462]13-00000
[1463]. r * 1950-3951: me Desk officer, Operation Case Officer,
[1465]~ “supervising SK activities in China,
[1466]assigned to ‘the SK Section, Eastern Depart-
[1467]ment, First Directorate of the MGB Head-
[1468]quarters in Moscow, the SK functions having
[1469]reverted from the KI to the MGB in.1949,
[1470]September 1951: At his request Subject was transferred as
[1471]a desk officer to the Anglo- -American Section,
[1472]“Couriterintelligeiice “Department ‘Of. the First
[1473]Directorate, MGB Headquarters in Moscow.
[1474]November 1951: Subject was promoted to "Senior Operational
[1475]. . - Case Officer." |
[1476]December 19S1: The KI, was dissolved and former state security
[1477]| a elements were returned to the MGB. Subject's —
[1478]functions continued the same, but, in the
[1480]reorganization, he was assigned to the cI.)
[1482]Section of the American Department of ‘the
[1483]- Anglo-American (First) Directorate of the |
[1484]First Chief Directorate of the MGB. .
[1485]March 1952: Subject and an unidentified young colleague _ oo
[1486]wrote a joint letter through the Central
[1487]Committee of the CPSU to STALIN ‘making
[1488]suggestions for a. fundamental. reorganization of.
[1489]Soviet foreign intelligence and counter-
[1490]intelligence work.
[1491]September 1952: While on vacation in the Georgian SSR
[1492]Subject was ordered to Moscow for a. four hour
[1493]meeting, with his friend, with STALIN,
[1494]MALENKOV, and BERIYA. STALIN thanked the two.
[1495]officers for their suggestions, discussed
[1496]intelligence matters in detail and asked them
[1498]to send him a letter with specific proposals.
[1500]13-00000 |
[1502]March 1953:
[1504]October 1953:
[1506]August 1954:
[1510]for necessary reorganizations, together
[1512]with the names of recommended chiefs. -
[1514]In a subsequent letter they recommended
[1515]Sergey Ivanovich OGOLTSOV, then in prison
[1516]for "political crimes," and Yevgeniy
[1517]Petrovich PITOVRANOV, then chief or deputy
[1518]chief of the MGB in the Uzbekistan SSR.
[1520]STALIN met Subject and his friend a second:: _
[1522]time. OGOLTSOV was released from prison and
[1523]appointed Chief of the First Chief Directo-
[1525]rate, with PITOVRANOV as his. deputy. A
[1527]Chief Intelligence Directorate of the MGB
[1529]was then formed, containing a ‘Counterintelligence
[1530]Department with an Emigre desk and - seven geo- |
[1531]graphical desks. Subject. was appointed by
[1532]OGOLTSOV as chief of the American. Desk,.
[1534]‘supervising approximately 15. staff persons.
[1535]; When STALIN died and BERIYA took over control
[1537]of the State Security apparatus, which he
[1539]combined with the MVD into a unified MVD, he.
[1541]replaced OGOLTSOV with one of his own appointees.
[1543]:. Subject was reassigned as deputy chief of the
[1545]_ Russian Emigre Desk of the CI Department of
[1547]the Second (new designation for foreign
[1548]Intelligence) Chief Directorate, MVD. Subject |
[1549]supervised activities against emigres in :
[1550]Austria and Germany. - _
[1552]Subject was assigned to the MVD residency in
[1553]Vienna, Austria, as an operational case. officer
[1554]in the Emigre Operations Group.
[1556]Subject was transferred to the British Sub-
[1557]Group of the Anglo- ~American- French Group of the
[1559]KGB residency in Vienna. His duties were of a
[1561]“ counterintelligence nature, i.e. concerned. -
[1563]with penetration of foreign intelligence. services.
[1565]13-00000
[1567]"1955-1959: “Tone oz 170 Students at ting the four
[1568]year internal security- counterintelligence
[1569]course, the KGB Higher, School Juridical
[1570]Institute. He presented and successfully
[1571]defended his thesis on the subject of SK
[1572]activities among Soviet delegetions and
[1573]tourist groups traveling abroad. He re-
[1574]ceived his diploma in August 1959, During
[1575]his school tour Subject also spent several”
[1576]weeks in on-the-job training asa student
[1577]assigned to pertinent elements of the KGB's
[1578]Second (Internal Counterintelligence). Chief
[1579]Directorate, with access to operational files ©.
[1580]on foreign diplomatic personnel in Moscow
[1581]who were KGB targets. . ao
[1583]September 1959: Subject was assigned as a Senior Operational
[1585]“Case. Officer responsible for NATO information
[1587]within the Treaty Organizations Direction,
[1588]| Information (Reports) Department, First. .
[1589](Foreign) Chief, Directorate, KGB Headquarters,
[1590]Moscow. His function was to: translate, edit —_
[1591]and summarize information reports, obtained by
[1592]_ KGB agents: abroad and to disseminate. the
[1593]pertinent ‘information to the Central Committee
[1594]of the CPSU, members of the Presidiun, including
[1595]KHRUSHCHEV, and, in the case of information
[1596]with military aspects, to MALINOVSKIY, the _
[1597]Minister of Defense. At one time, during a
[1598]CP cell meeting, criticism was voiced about
[1599]the delays in translation and processing and
[1600]Subject was assigned to study the situation.
[1601]Thus he examined registry logs showing the
[1602]- titles of agent information reports, the place
[1603]acquired, the date received and the date of
[1604]dissemination of the finished Russian intelli:
[1605]gence reports t the government.”
[1607]avit 32848: ay,
[1608]ADYAL Louu. ouULY
[1610]‘Se
[1612]- YR. @.. - owt Le rer en
[1613]G THe AMETLCah section
[1615]oI
[1616]a
[1617]Ha]
[1618]a
[1619]| ate Y
[1620]a
[1623]h
[1626]ct was tyr:
[1632]“Directorate, XGB, ‘to piv. Fe for assign-
[1634]ment to the KGB residency under Soviet
[1636]Embassy cover in Helsinki, Finland, as
[1638]the CI officer working against foreign
[1640]. intelligence services,
[1642]August 1960: Subject was assigned t to the KGB ‘residency in —-
[1644]Helsinki, under the name KLIMOV (his true |
[1645]name was compromised through the 1954
[1646]defection of Petr DERYABIN in- Vienna), - and
[1647]with the cover title of Third Secretary.
[1649]15 December 1961: Subject, with his wife and young daughter
[1650]defected to the U. S. Government which 1 granted
[1652]them political asylun,
[1654]28 December 1961: Subject met Attorney General Robert ‘KENNEDY
[1655]‘ along with Mr. HELMS, DDP.” ; .
[1656]1962: . Subject. was’ debriefed. by CIA ceticer,
[1657]officials from other US Agencies and teams of
[1658]- Intelligence Officers from Free World nations. |
[1659]Subject provided much valuable information on
[1660]the KGB, its organization, personnel, operations,
[1661]aims and efforts against the Free World. . -
[1662]Subject, however, proved to. bea difficult
[1663]handling problem, especially as a result of
[1664]his personality and his constant demands for
[1665]regular meetings with high-level US officials
[1666]such as the President, the Attorney-General,
[1667]| the Directors of CIA and the FBI and for a
[1668]policy role in the US Intelligence Community.
[1669]16 February 1962: Subject had another meeting with ‘the
[1670]Attorney-General. ; .
[1671]2 July 1962: Subject met again with the sone tei
[1672]and Mr. HELMS. a
[1673]9 July 1962: Subject had a conversation with Mr. HELMS.
[1674]22 August 1962: Subject had interview with Mr. SORENSON of thé
[1675]White House Staff and Mr. Edward R.. MURROW,
[1677]Director of USIA.
[1679]-18 Nov. 1962:° . OOS An FBI source reported “yt the KGB was aware
[1680]. ‘ . : . ee
[1682]of Subject’ s presence in ‘the U.S.A. and ordered |
[1684]13-00000
[1686]all Soviet 1s personnel to report immediately
[1687]any information which they may obtain regard-
[1688]; ing Subject. oo
[1689]27 Nov. 1962: Subject met Mr. McCONE, DCI, and protested
[1691]treatment by the Agency. _
[1693]14 December 1962: Subject met again with the pcr.»
[1694]21 Feb. 1963 : Subject and his family left N.Y.c. on
[1695]| SS Sylvania for England. - 7 |
[1696]Spring 1963: | Subject worked with the British.
[1697]8 August 1963: Subject | returned to the U. S:A.
[1698]22 August 1963: Subject met the ‘Attorney- ~General again.
[1699]23 August 1963: Subject met the DCI again. © re
[1700]4 Sept: 1963: Subject met: the DCI again and stated ‘that he
[1702]wanted to become an advisor to the DCI and
[1704]. the Intelligence. Community.
[1705]a
[1707]October 1963- - -
[1708]April 1964: Subject in contact with the Agency mostly in
[1709]| the N.Y.C. area. Subject was cooperative to. 7
[1710]some extent. _
[1711]1964/1965: . Subject, according toa Dutch official,
[1712]| visited The Netherlands. 7 .
[1713]June 1965: Subject interviewed by the Canadians RCMP)
[1714]din the N.Y.C. area. | oo
[1715]August 1968: Subject in contact with the British regarding
[1716]possible publication of his book.
[1717]October 1968: An FBI source indicated that -he had no
[1718]| . current information concerning the KGB
[1719]attitude regarding Subject but the source 7
[1720]stated that if the KGB knew Subject's location
[1721]it might undertake to eliminate him.
[1723]July 1970 _ Subject was in contact with Agency personnel |
[1725]and visited Florida.
[1727]y “ same ewer me me header Ore Pree
[1729]13-00000
[1731]that Subject had been sentenced to death |
[1732]by the KGB. An article regarding this
[1733]sentence appeared in The Chekist sometime after
[1734]1964. |
[1735]April 1972: | “Subject was in touch with CIA officials. |
[1736]September 1972 A KGB defector, OGANESYAN, provided a copy
[1738]of the 1969 KGB Alphabetical List of Agents
[1739]of Foreign Intelligence Services, Defectors,
[1740]Members of Anti-Soviet Organizations, Members of.
[1741]Punitive Units and Other Criminals under - | -
[1742]Search Warrants. In this List the KGB listed
[1743]Subject and his wife as under the sentence of =~
[1745]death for revealing Soviet State secrets.
[1747]13-00000
[1749]The following are highlights of the chronology of Source's (Subject's) .
[1751]professional career:
[1753]September 1944: Subject was mobilized and sent to the >
[1761]Frunze Artillery School in Odessa where
[1763]he remained until July 1945. At that time _
[1765]Subject left the Artillery School before
[1767]oi,
[1768]completion of the course and enrolled ina.
[1770]: Counterintelligence School.
[1772]Student: at the one year course, Military
[1774]Counterintelligence School, _ SUKR/"SMERSH," t.
[1776]" Moscow.
[1777]Desk officer, Assistant Operational Case
[1778]| Officer, assigned to the Eastern Section
[1779](otdeleniye) of the SK (Soviet Colony es
[1781]. security of Soviet officials abroad) Depart-
[1783]ment (otdel) of the First Chief (Foreign
[1784]Intelligence) Directorate of MGB. “Head- 7
[1785]quarters in Moscow. During the period |
[1786]November, 1947 to September . 1948 Subject held ;
[1787]the title of Referent and his office was 7
[1788]designated the Fifth (SK) Department of the:
[1789]Third (Eastern) Directorate of the XI
[1790](Committee for: Information), but his” functions
[1791]were unchanged.
[1793]Student at the two-year course, Higher
[1795]Intelligence School of the KL. - meee
[1797]studied gencral subjects and the English
[1799].
[1801]language; he was one of 30 students who ,
[1802]specialized in counterintelligence during
[1804]the second year of the course.
[1806]-.. 0203
[1809]13-00000
[1813]Desk officer, Operation” *. Case Officer,
[1814]supervising SK activities” ‘in China,
[1815]assigned to ‘the SK Section, Eastern Depart-
[1817]ment, First Directorate of the MGB Head--
[1819]‘quarters in Moscow, the SK functions having
[1821]September 1951:
[1823]November 1951:
[1825]December 1951:
[1827]reverted from the KI to the MGB in 1949.
[1828]At his request Subject was transferred as
[1830]a desk officer to the Anglo-American Section,
[1832]“Counterintelligerice Department of. the First.
[1834]Directorate, MGB Headquarters in Moscow.
[1835]Subject was promoted to "Senior Operational -
[1837]Case Officer."
[1839]The KI, was dissolved and former state security a
[1841]elements were returned to the MGB. Subject's.
[1842]functions continued the same, but, in the
[1844]reorganization, he was assigned to the cI-
[1846]Section of the American Department of the 9
[1848]Anglo-American (First) ‘Directorate. of the.
[1850]First Chief Directorate of the MGB.
[1852]March 1952:
[1854]Subject and an unidentified young colleague:
[1856]_ wrote a joint letter through the Central
[1858]September 1952:
[1860]Committee of the CPSU to STALIN ‘making |
[1861]suggestions for a fundamental. reorganization of.
[1862]Soviet foreign intelligence and counter- a
[1864]intelligence work. —
[1866]While on vacation in the Georgian SSR
[1868]Subject was ordered to Moscow for a four hour
[1870]meeting, with his friend, with STALIN,
[1872]MALENKOV, and BERIYA. STALIN thanked the two
[1874]officers for their suggestions, discussed
[1876]intelligence matters in detail and asked them
[1878]to send him a letter with specific proposals.
[1880]13-00000 |
[1882]March 1953:
[1884]October 1953:
[1886]August 1954:
[1888]em
[1890]for necessary reorganizations, together
[1892]with the names of recommended chiefs.
[1894]In a subsequent letter they. recommended
[1895]Sergey Ivanovich OGOLTSoV, then in prison
[1896]for "political crimes," and Yevgeniy
[1897]Petrovich PITOVRANOV, then chief or deputy
[1898]chief of the MGB in the Uzbekistan SSR.
[1900]" STALIN met Subject and his. friend a second <
[1902]time. OGOLTSOV was released from prison and
[1903]appointed Chief of the First Chief Directo-
[1904]rate, with PITOVRANOV as his. deputy. A.
[1906]Chief Intelligence Directorate of: the’ MGB -
[1908]was then formed, containing a Counterintelligence
[1910]Department with an Emigre desk and . seven geo- .
[1912]. ‘graphical desks. Subject. was appointed by.
[1913]. OGOLTSOV as chief of the American. Desk,
[1915]supervising approximately 15. staff persons.
[1917]; When STALIN died and BERIYA took over control
[1918]| of the State Security apparatus, which. he
[1920]combined with the MVD into a unified MVD, he.
[1922]replaced OGOLTSOV with one of his own appointees.
[1924]' Subject was reassigned as deputy chief. of the
[1926]Russian Emigre Desk of the CI Department of
[1928]the Second (new designation for foreign. . .
[1929]Intelligence) Chief Directorate, MVD. Subject
[1930]supervised activities against emigres ‘in
[1931]Austria and Germany. .
[1933]Subject was assigned to the MVD residency in
[1934]Vienna, Austria, as an operational case. officer |
[1935]in the Emigre Operations Group. .
[1937]Subject was transferred to the British Sub-
[1938]Group of the Anglo-American- French Group of the
[1940]KGB residency in Vienna. His duties were of a
[1942]-counterintelligence nature, i.e. concerned -
[1944]with penetration of foreign intelligence services.
[1946]13-00000
[1948]. "1955-1959: - One of 170 Students at: os ‘ing the four
[1949]year internal security- _éounterintelligence
[1950]course, the KGB Higher, School Juridical
[1951]Institute. He presented and successfully
[1952]defended his thesis on the subject of SK.
[1954]_ activities among Soviet delegations and |
[1955]tourist groups traveling abroad. He re-
[1956]ceived his diploma in August 1959. During
[1957]his school tour Subject also spent several
[1959]_ weeks in on-the-job training asa student
[1960]assigned to pertinent elements of the KGB's
[1961]Second (internal Counterintelligence) Chief
[1963]‘Directorate, with access to operational files
[1964]on foreign diplomatic personnel in Moscow
[1965]‘who were KGB targets, _ or
[1967]September 1959: Subject was assigned asa a Senior Operational pee
[1969]Case officer responsible for. NATO information
[1971]within the Treaty Organizations Direction, _
[1972]. Information (Reports) Department, First .
[1973](Foreign) Chief, Directorate... XGB. Headquarters,
[1974]Moscow. His function was to translate, edit ce ant
[1975]and. summarize information reports obtained by
[1976]a Se : KGB agents abroad and; to disseminate the |
[1977]| | _ pertinent information to the Central Committee
[1978]of the CPSU, members of the Presidiun, including ;
[1979]-KHRUSHCHEV, and, in the case of information _ .
[1980]with military aspects, to MALINOVSKIY, the
[1981]Minister of Defense. At one time, during a
[1982]CP cell meeting, criticism was voiced about
[1983]the delays in translation and processing and
[1984]Subject was assigned to study the situation.
[1985]Thus he examined registry logs showing the
[1987]titles of agent .information reports, the place.
[1989]e
[1990]acquired, the date received and the date of
[1991]dissemination of the finished Russian intelli-
[1992]gence reports to the government, -
[1994]April 1866 Subject was transferred to the American Section
[1996]13-00000
[1997]. . ; OL the Cl Department of the First Chief
[1998]a . ‘ foe _,
[2000]“ : “ * Directorate, XGB, to pie, ure for assign-
[2002]Pd
[2004]ment to the KGB residency under Soviet
[2005]Embassy cover in Helsinki, Finland, as
[2006]the Cl officer working against foreign
[2007]intelligence services. .
[2008]August 1960: Subject was assigned to the KGB ‘residency in
[2009]Helsinki, under the name KLIMOV (his true
[2010]name was compromised through the 1954 |
[2011]defection of Petr DERYABIN in Vienna), and
[2012]with the cover title of Third Secretary.
[2013]15 December 1961:. Subject, with his wife and young daughter
[2014]defected to the U. S. Government which granted
[2016]then political asylum.
[2018]28 December 1961: ‘ Subject: met | Attorney General Robert KENNEDY
[2019]. along with Mr. HELMS, DDP.:
[2020]1962: . | Subject was debriefed by CIA “Officers, —
[2021]. officials from other US Agencies and teams of
[2022]- Intelligence Officers from Free World nations. .
[2023]Subject provided mich valuable information on
[2024]‘the KGB, its organization, personnel, operations, |
[2025]aims and efforts against the: Free World. _ -
[2026]Subject, however, proved tobe a aveticult me
[2027]handling problem, especially asa result of
[2028]his personality and his constant demands for
[2029]regular meetings with high-level US officials ©
[2030]such as the President, the Attorney-General,
[2031]the Directors of CIA and the FBI and for a
[2032]policy role in the US Intelligence Community.
[2033]16 February 1962: Subject had another meeting with the es
[2034]_ Attorney-General. ; .
[2035]2 July 1962: Subject met again with the Attorney-General
[2036]and Mr. HELMS. -
[2037]9 July 1962: Subject had a conversation with Mr. HELMS.
[2038]22 August 1962: Subject had interview with Mr. SORENSON of the
[2039]White House Staff and Mr. Edward R. MURROW,
[2041]Director of USIA.
[2043]13-00000
[2045]* .
[2047]15 Nov.
[2049]27 Nov. 1962:
[2051]1962:
[2053]14 December 1962:
[2055]21 Feb. 1963
[2057]Spring 1963:
[2058]8 August 1963:
[2059]22 August 1963:
[2061]23 August 1963:
[2062]4 Sept.
[2064]_ October 1963-
[2066]Aprii 1964:
[2069]June 1965:
[2071]- August 1968:
[2073]October 1968:
[2075]July 1970
[2077]1963:
[2079]. the Intelligence Community.
[2081]in the N. Y.C.
[2083]om
[2085],An FBI source reported __it the KGB was aware
[2086]of Subject! s presence in the U.S.A. and ordered
[2087]all Soviet 1s personnel to report immediately .
[2088]any information which they may obtain regard-
[2089]ing Subject. |
[2091]Subject met Mr. McCONE, DCI, and protested
[2093]treatment by the Agency.
[2095]Subject met again with the DCI.
[2097]‘Subject and his family left N.Y.C. on
[2099]SS Sylvania for England.
[2100]Subject worked with the British.
[2102]Subject returned to the U.S.A.
[2104]“Subject met the Attorney- -General again.
[2105]Subject: met the DCI again. oe
[2107]— Subject met the DCI again and stated. ‘that he
[2109]wanted to. becone an advisor to the DCI and
[2111]Subject in contact with the Agency mostly in are
[2113]the N.Y.C. area. Subject was cooperative | to
[2115]sone" extent. -
[2117]| Subject, according to a Dutch official,
[2119]visited The Netherlands. 7
[2121]Subject. interviewed by the Canadians (RCMP)
[2122]area. . -
[2124]Subject in contact with the British regarding
[2125]possible publication of his book..: |
[2126]An FBI source indicated that he had no
[2128]current information concerning the KGB
[2130]attitude regarding Subject but the source ~
[2131]stated that if the KGB knew Subject's location
[2132]it might undertake to eliminate him. .
[2133]Subject was in contact with Agency personnel _
[2135]and visited Florida.
[2137]13-00000
[2138]+e 8 * "March 19725 A KGB defector, LYALIN, reported that he knew
[2139]oN
[2144]that Subject had been sentenced to death
[2145]by the KGB. An article regarding this
[2147]sentence appeared in The Chekist sometime after
[2149]1964. | |
[2150]April 1972: Subject was in touch with CIA officials.
[2151]September 1972 A KGB defector, OGANESYAN, provided a copy
[2153]of the 1969 KGB Alphabetical List of Agents
[2154]of Foreign Intelligence Services, ‘Defectors,
[2155]Members of Anti- Soviet Organizations, Members of
[2157]Punitive Units and Other Criminals under.
[2158]Search Warrants. In ‘this List the KGB listed.
[2159]Subject and his wife as under the sentence of -
[2161]‘death for revealing Soviet State secrets. |