[1]ON RECORDS ACT OF 1992,
[2]Oo: : a
[4]2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATI
[5]ong z ol ne io
[7]cas oe
[9]124-10168-10040
[10]B
[12]as
[14]AGENCY INFORMATION
[16]AGENCY: FBI
[17]RECORD NUMBER:  124-10168-10040
[18]RECORD SERIES: HQ oo.
[19]AGENCY FILE NUMBER: 62-116391-41X
[21]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[23]ORIGINATOR: FBI
[25]FROM: PAPICH, SAM
[27]TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
[28]TITLE:
[30]DATE: 03/13/1970
[32]PAGES: 85
[33]SUBJECT: CIA ACT, ANTI-CASTRO ACT
[35]DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[37]ORIGINAL Secret NEW
[38]CLASSIFICATION: CLASSIFICATION:
[39]REVIEW DATE: 11/03/1998 UPDATE_DATE: 02/12/2001
[40]STATUS Redact ~
[41]RESTRICTIONS:
[42]JFK Act 6 (1)(A)
[43]JFK Act 6 (1)(B)
[44]JFK Act 6 (1)(C)
[45]COMMENTS: EBF, INC ADMIN PAGES
[46]\ 3
[48]HW 50953 Docld:327169160 Page 1
[50]Ome . wo : x
[53]See ee OPE SPEED NEAWEES GOVERSAIEN TE
[54], te
[55]. “.¢ au .
[56]Pe 999 FV 84 fan)
[57]LECTHOTE?R U! & pror | helease aS mute To
[58]guclefeller Comm S36a
[59]ro - The Director
[60]CLASS. & EXT.
[61]; REASON-FCIM II,
[62]PROM > SA Sam Papich DATE OF REVIEW
[63]Z 2, ZF ot -
[64]; ALL INFORMATION coNTAINED ©75° 7772 ow 4 z s/h 22
[65]SUBILCT: pDeL_AaTIONS WITH CTA HEREINIS UNCLASSIFIED woe ey Pec
[66]EXCEPT WHERE SHUWN Soh E, Gaco,/ ETO
[67]OTHERWISE .
[68]Reference is made to my lettors dated Marcel’ 2 and
[69]March 5, 197G, In my letter of March 5, 1970, I- stated "it
[71]HW 50953
[73]is important to oGr
[75]an extensive List
[76]standing that the
[78]snedoued herevith is
[80]This list
[84]review of Bureau
[85]speciizeally pecwurate
[86]of fi hes. Sho
[88]Wie CLA recurdss
[90]also must be
[92]of the alleved CIA
[94]tif the
[95]person
[96]lavailable until apr
[97]immediately x
[99]Director
[101]ACV IGH:
[102]For
[104]Enclosure
[106]BDelLoach
[108]1 - Tir,
[110]mphasize that the Bureau
[111]of justified
[113]showld
[115]3 predi
[117]enclosea lis
[118]ALLEGE Ule LEG Sen
[119]ent in mind
[121]rey UN
[122]grieva
[124]hereazvcer for
[126]information, a
[128]CtA HAS NO OBJECTION\TO
[129]DECLAESIFICATION A
[130]1 - ur * RELE
[132]can also produce
[133]grievances... It. is my under-
[134]desired thas this lisy be identiticd,.
[135]ef approximately 75 items.
[137]not be considered absolutely conmzle
[139]eated on my personal recollection and a i
[141]rector
[143]To iaske this list more conpiste cud
[144]nece review of thousands
[145]can be supported by Burcau reco
[146]2BLOMS LS UNaNO VG. RNS
[147]on with our evaluation
[148]previously listed, ~
[152]would esgitate the
[154]seeds,
[156]IC
[157]in connecetcsh
[158]wnces which I
[160]that at is presumptuous on my part, but
[162]ak discussion between the Director
[164]ils,
[166]hat our Burean work can benekit by a
[168]and mysclf, I am
[169]1976, I plan to leave the area.
[171]n
[173]an extended period,
[175]éo- ‘607 50 — Rs
[177]Er ema ob.
[180]fo APR-2 EK
[182]oc GF CIA |
[184]ay Exempt from ORS
[186]ae, eed : Date of Dee? :
[187]. 7
[188]4 “vy ;
[189]gp sioloes Nip d
[191]one G8
[193]DoclTd:327169180 Page 2?
[196]eS) 0d )
[198]“CENTRAL INTELL IGENCE AGENCY Val
[202]WASHINGTON, ob. ¢c. 20505
[204]office OF “THE DIRECTOR
[206]ty a bot at oat
[208]K BorweTed RZ we 20 March, 1970 . vs
[210]“€P Isle
[212].The Honorable.J. Edgar Hoover |
[213]Director
[215]Yederal Bureau of Investigation
[216]Washington, D.C,
[218]Dear Mr. Hoover: . , . en 2 oe 8 of Loe
[220]We have completed our review of domestic positive intelligence
[221]collection angendered by your letter of Il March 1970. We warmly
[222]welcome periodic reexamination by our two agencies of the implemen.
[224]taTION OL ING 1900 agreciiieue aud tie Coie eiUn ul positive intelligence
[226]which you proposed, I concur alse with your comments that there is
[227]a need for close coordination of our efforts in the field of positive and
[228]counterintelligence collection, To be most effective, I agree that it
[229]is essential for this Agency, icgether with your Bureau, to conduct a
[231]ontinuing analysis of clandestine collection activity. The product is
[232]of growing irnportance to the national security and to the United States
[233]Intelligence Cornmunity, Therefore we endorse your proposal for a
[234]reexamination and bespeak your desires as to how this might be
[235]conducted.
[239]i With regard to the 1966 set of ground rules, which you sent to ;
[241]. the then Director, Vice Admiral William F, Raborn, Jr., the compe- f
[242]¥tent work of our respective representatives did, in fact, produce an j
[244]( J ,effective and realistic agreement. Iwelcorne your statement that no
[246]‘om
[248]Fmajor problems have been encountered since its adoption.
[250]: I feel strongly that there are other related subjects, of similar
[251]‘importance to the national security, which warrant periodic recxamina-
[253]“tion since they have a direct bearing on domestic clandestine colt egfion
[254]of positive intelligence. *
[256]Pr
[257]“MAR 20 1970,
[259]nae
[261]Se omemesegmonees wee ot eee
[263]HW 50953 DoclId:32169180 Page 3 . =
[265]QE VITRS
[267]- As a result of our review, engendered by your letter, I believe
[268]that, the following subjects are deserving of your personal consideration: _—
[269]ne Tiere we UN" Auato eéverdige! “Audio ¢overage provides timely 7
[270]intelligence of inestimable worth to U.S. officials. for | oe
[271]policy planning, early warning and accurate guidance f
[272]necessary for the improvement: -of operational and collec-~
[273]| tion activity here and abroad. Audio coverage is unique
[274]Dpagigsnt. | production because itis readily. subject to-local cross-.. - cofant atts Seagitge let
[275]checking and evaluation which is far more difficult and
[276]costly to achieve abroad. Further, such coverage is on
[277]targets which affect directly the national interests.
[279]' For several years your Bureau had been recep-
[280]tive to x equirements and leads which resulted in valuable
[281]coverage. The quality of your production proved that
[284]your Burcau alone ae cated by capabsitsce onc oupensence
[286]‘On 2 October 19697 two. related requests for audio
[287]coverage were submitted by this Agency pertaining to
[288]positive intelligence targets, one of whom had KGB connec- ‘
[289](I refer to the case of Sun eee nd Cheawe
[290]popes.) Your Bureau replied that henceforth the
[291]Agency should refer all such cases directly to the Attorney
[292]General for approval, ;
[294]It is suggested that the question of audio coverage
[295]beireopened between representatives of your Bureau and
[296]this Agency. I would welcome your thoughts and observa-
[297]tions on this subject. ; ; ; os
[299]I wish to assure you ‘that I believe that this ‘sensitive
[300]= -| type of collection should be implemented under rigid and
[301]stringent controls, This is absolutely necessary in order to
[302]maintain the highest standard of security both in instituting
[303]the coverage and for the exploitation of the product, (An
[304]excellent example of this is demonstrated in your effective
[305]and secure production of BCOPE. )¥$)
[307]- ; SECRET
[309]Oe cere renin sre aman i ee cL TLE REFN RE 8 A RIO SRL SES LSS © OS NE
[311]HW 50953 Docld:327169160 Page 4
[313]ay
[314]oe
[316]| gence tool is mail-coverage.. -Its importance has been,
[317]proven inthe past. I have the impression that it has
[318]been discontinued, and I'would suggest that our represen-
[319]tatives should confer and examine together whether this
[320]asset might be deployed against communications of the
[321]poviet ae oT) New Left, and identified foreign agents. .
[322])
[324]st
[326]om 1 sy
[328](3) CIA Technical Services. A. significant expendi-
[329]— oS ture of this Agency's.moncy and personnel has been com~
[330]oo _° .Jmitted to research and development for the improvement
[332]' Joftechnical aids. This Agency has provided-your Bureau
[334]with an appreciation of our resources and capabilities, and
[336]has offered you at cost or gratis our most sophisticated
[338]ea:
[340]“i. VAlthowéh ‘we v
[341]pe any suggestions from your Bureau for improvement in the
[342]i _. [technical field including proposals how these assets can be
[343]yo _ \better employed. Your comments will be particularly
[344]view of our mutual interests in implementing
[346]+) oo a,
[348]appreciated in
[351]es
[353](4) Courses in Positive Intelligence Requirements and
[354]Reporting. Since ,the collection and reporting of positive
[355]forcign intelligence is, as you say, only incidental to your
[356]‘main internal security and counterintelligence responsibili-
[357]ties, I realize that your personnel are somewhat at a dis-
[358]advantage in carrying out the evaluating and reporting
[359]. processes necessary for the conduct of positive intelligence,
[360]- At our 1966 conference we offered to institute positive intel-
[362][jigence training courses, including reports writing and -
[364]n - oe his ceeLoow cbegenihes denies Z.
[365]SECRET |
[367]HW 50953  Docld:327169160 Page 5
[369]“5 (zy “Mail Covéragey” Another much néeded intelli-) «°°:
[371]LEE ae smncee nmin ames meet ne orate
[373]sneer eterna: Seen ben nt MP aa gen consntaeee
[375]- ‘analysis; ‘for FBI personnel, . In ‘soliciting your ‘views on A
[376], ¢ «mf the desirability. of this type of training,. I wish to reiterate tue
[377]our willingness to provide such instruction. It would be
[378]" designed to expose the needs of the Intelligence Community: °
[379]in depth, thus making the Current Intelligence Reporting
[381]48) * * Séraiinds lars on P OBsociticit Services. Given ‘the’ =
[382]‘growing sophistication a and increased capabilities of hostile
[383]intelligence services, it is suggested that CIA and FBI
[384]expexts in this field: meet as required at our respective
[385]Headquarters, the Washington and New York Field Offices,
[386]in order to keep abreast of new developments, modus
[387]operandi, operational tasks, and diverse missions of
[389]te — opposition services. I know that you will agree with me
[391]-- ° thatno opportunities for improvement should be over- ,
[393]Asrhishomight help te pemate the effarts of hostile
[395]‘sexvices who are char ged with undermining the security
[396]of the United States. These sessions should also provide -
[397]‘an opportunity to explore and devise new means to pene~
[398]trate and neutralize these inimical forces.
[400](6) Live Bloc Sources. The record of our coopera-.
[401]pe . . tion and coordination to exploit live penetrations and defec-
[402]' - tors from Bloc sources proves the success of our mutual
[404]effort. :
[405]' J believe that there is room for substantial improve-
[406]ment in achieving a more uniform and efficient exploitation —
[407]of the positive intelligence potential of certain of these
[408]sensitive sources, ’ I would invite your thoughts on how we
[409]may better coordinate requirements for these sources and
[410]establish a more thorough evaluation of their positive ,
[411]intelligence production before it is given general dissemina-
[412]| ¢ion within the Government. Our review would suggest. that
[413]there are good reasons for consultation to explore the
[414]development of higher quality live sources, for example
[415]feede clerks.
[417]HW 50953  DoclId:327169160 Page 6
[419]List (GIRL) more meaningful to your personnel. :
[422]“ON
[423]1
[426]HW 50953
[428](7) Live Sources in the } Non-Bloc Area.. Sources
[429]such asf{code clerksp@nd diplomats are a fertile field for ~
[430]procurement of much-needed intelligence relating to the
[432]_ jactivities of certain Latin American and Middle Eastern”
[434]“lcountries which are. expanding theit subversive and ©
[435]terrorist activities, -even te the. United States... Ido not.
[436]feel confident that both agencies have adequately exploited
[437]the full potential of this field, and would urge that this
[439]subject be explozed by our respective representatives.
[441]. (8) New Left and Racial Matters. There is already
[442]a substantial exchange of information in this field. Limi-
[443]tations of manpower raise a serious question as-to whether
[444]both agencies can keep pace with future unpredictable
[445]developments. The increasingly close connection between
[446]these forces in the United States and hostile elements
[447]abroad has been well-established by both of our agencies.
[449]I feel it would be in our mutual interest to determine how
[450]we can best eniplov more. wisely our iinited manpower,
[451]knowing that this problem, which embraces bombings,
[452]hijacking, assassination, and the demeaning of law enforce-
[453]ment officers, is international in scope.
[455]°(9) Relations with Domestic Field Offices and Legal
[456]Attaches. Ido not feel that there are any serious conflicts
[457]in this area but there may be room for improving the quality
[458]of liaison in order to expand positive intelligence collection,
[460]» |Given the changing situations both here and abroad, periodic
[462]re-examination of field relations could assist both agencies
[464]to make mutually-agreed adjustments.
[468]Mz. Hoover, I wish to assure you that I value highly your personal
[469]judgment in affairs bearing on the national security. I know that your
[470]experience is derived from a unique lifetime of dedicated service to our
[471]country. In this spirit, 1 welcome sincerely your observations on the
[472]foregoing agenda and solicit your thoughts regarding any other item
[473]which you deem worthy of the attention of your Bureau and this Agency.
[475]a
[477]Faithfully yours,
[479]: a, l ry . s
[480]: oo _ Richard Helms , a
[483]- _ SECRET
[485]DoclTd:327169180 Page 7
[487]'
[488]he
[490]QE
[491]Hy
[499]Eye
[501]tt Reisen ab esse on gc MORE PREETI BE
[506]secret
[508]- GASES ANDAC~ SLTUATIONS:
[509]INVOLVING CC... LICTS VITT THE
[510](CEuTR AL wonen se @ AGENCY (cra)
[512](1) Eocase (rry PORIS ORRCS CA
[515]t}
[516]_
[518].
[520]This “as a sensitive Soviet-espionage eas e.
[521]; which originated in 1943 wnd terminated for the most eae ng
[522]pape TA VSS92 Phe | @ase hed Hany Wide” foreian’ ramifil i
[523]cations and historicaliy has been, and undeuptedly
[524]will be, one of the most inno rtant and involved cases
[526]of Sovict orerations in this country and abroad. We °
[527]did not disseninnte any information of significance
[528]in this case until 1G54. On various ocensions when -
[529]the Lisison Agent has become involved in heated arsu-
[530]ments with CIA officials, they have seen fit to raise
[531]this ease as an outsvanding example of FBI failure to
[532]cooperate with the Agoncy, The position taken by CIA
[533]2s that it Should have been advised regarding the
[534]Soviet operational activity in foreign countries, -
[535]elaining that the Agency would have had the opportunity
[536]to develor more ang Oration of significance, identify
[537]Soviet an its, and pocsibly prepare conditions for
[538] recru..tneit or daubling ox Soviet operatives. We did
[539]hot disseminate our reports to CIA because of the
[540]‘extreme sensit ‘ivity of the case, We actuaily did not
[542]“permit CIA to handle any investiga tions relating to
[543]\the KOCASE until 1957,
[545]ry
[547]3
[549]In 1657, CIA complained that it coreaey ha
[551]every right to have received the information earli
[553]because many aspects of the MCCASE pertained to CIA. ~
[554]employces and onorations. CIA further argued that it
[556]had been greatly handienpped in effectively carrying out
[558]the’ leads in 1857 because the leads were given to the
[559], Agency at the same tine that the ease was publicized.
[560]‘The Areney arfucd’thet the failure of the Burezu to
[561]coordinate with CIA those French aspects of the case
[562]permitted the French, rather than the U, S., to play a
[563]| dominating rele in Europe.
[565]7S rerease (ek 2-14 26)
[567]»  femnoe sac (oe oe CRET
[569]| WG) ane -_
[571]oo (Fe fake 2/99 on up ,
[573]Eaot teed
[575]HW 50953 Docld:327169160 Page 6
[578]the years concerning our operationel activity in
[579]Mexico City is unknown, However, we shouldear-in . . oS
[581]_ ; | mind ‘that’ former Specii1“Agent Glorge tung] And led i vores ie |
[582]4, many of our oneraticus in i “ico, incwudins hey initere
[584]pmants, and subsequently béean performing services foro"
[585]CIA after Be left the Burenu, We also chould not
[586]forget that Americans operating in Latin American
[587]countrics for one agency are peavily exposed to the -
[588]vahe MESOurees. LEGRES OF, ~INVESTL GRAVE: terete
[589]" “agency. nes Agent. enows “fron. personal experience that i
[590]operating in these areas constitutes a “very small vorlid" :
[591]and the exposuzve to leaks and errors is considerable, 4
[593](3) THE ABEL L CAS SE
[595]j ; oO ; i
[597]; Althouch CEA has nov raised the point for
[598]‘several years, the preva .iling attitude was, and probably -
[599]still exists, that the FBI did not play At. square with Oo
[600]OTA jn otha Ahal AO | br. not motets cartain that othe . _— oa
[601]Agency was given the pre oper recognition fox its contri-# - az
[603]{puti ious. CIA fcols that the first place, there would
[604]‘not have been any U, 5S, access or availability to the
[605]source in this cuse, Reino Hayhanen, because CIA tock
[607]the full responsibility for moving Hayhanen from France
[608]{to the U. S. in 1857. CIA claims it took the risk and
[609]‘responsibility cf doing this after the Buresu declined
[610]to become involved in any oneration designed to transport
[611]Havhanen te the U.S. It should be noted that Hayhanen
[612]iwas an alecholic and that his first contacts with CIA _ moe
[613]jin Paris raised questions concerning Hayhanen's mental
[614]istability.. ,
[616]After Hayhanen arrived in the U. 8., we.
[617]‘arranged access to.him for a period, the purpose of
[618]which was to obtain a complete story of his intelii-
[619]gence activitics in the U. S. and we were particularly
[620]interested in identifying all of his associates, es-
[621]pecially the man who later was identified as Rudolph
[622]Abel. After a short handling period in the U. S., we
[623]dropped Hayhanen hecause he became @ problem, It vas
[624]an extremcly critical situation because we had not yet
[625]‘identified Abel. CIA < agreed to take the resnonsibility
[626]\for the carrying and safeguarding of Hayhanen but ve
[628]FR |
[630]HW 50953)  DoclId:327169160 Page 9
[632](8)
[634]Security Agency. xe (bute n (Crd
[638]O° geerer
[640]countrics with far better. impressions than in. the
[641]past. In addition, we have learned more about these.
[643]in, COUD itries,. their seryices, and their. securit Y chiefs.
[645]By spending a fey
[646]this. cand of. tree
[648]minutes with them, “Needless ‘to‘say, °
[649]EMER E, hes, 2159, immeasurably helped
[651]rf
[653]T in SOV ur
[655]SPICUAGE G8 ACTIV yity
[657]-In 1965, mnefbuten Internal Security Service JS)
[658]as in ghe process of investigating individuals in >
[660]{HollandpeWno allecediy, had been engaged in Soviet-espionare
[661] activity..: The (Dute! yanted to have certain,individuais
[662]‘in the U, S. interviewe
[664]d and approached (C14 oO make
[665]anguiry at the, ,Sureau. At that time, our Relations
[666]‘with the (DutchPiced been practically nonexistent because
[667]‘the fbutcH§had “faiied to honestly sieal with us in the
[668]‘case off[Joseph Petersen, & Dutch ficinl who hac been
[669]clandestinely collecting iptelliicence at the National
[670]fpproached us, we told
[671]quid submit their reaues
[673][the Agencypmheat tI
[675]thyough di Pioustic Channs?s. We subsequontiy tol cia JG
[676]we vould not pants the intervier 78 for the (butch fyve
[677]stuck to our position. (cz A surrendered bu elt that
[679],we were impairing heir effcerts to gather information
[680]‘concerning Sova etwespionage activities in Surope
[681]Walter G,. Kyvivitsky, Bufile - 100-11146)
[683]COLOREL SOR GROMBACH (PAT. O'REEEY 1)
[685]Colonel dehn Gronbach was a retired U. S,
[686]‘Army officer wo, during World War Ii, established a
[687]private. intelligence network, operating throughout the
[688]world but prinnrily. in Europe, His sources included
[689]any number of European exiles who came to the U. S. °
[690]While he was in business, he was financed by the State
[691]Department, then the Derartment of the Army, and in the
[692]later 1640's and into the 1950's by CIA, Grombach
[693]established contact with the Bureau throuch one of
[694]his subordinates, Pat O'Brien, who periodically called
[698]SECRET
[702]HW 50953 Docld:327169160 Page 10
[705]*y palationship: sith CIA
[707]a. om @n organization which gas financed by
[709](9) COMMESSION MN
[711]on. us and furnished infe vmation which Gronbach felt) 7” ue
[712]was of interest (|. us. This Cissemination through — GG
[713]Pat O*Srien continued during the period of Grombach'ts | i
[715]We néver informed CIA. thatiwe oor. cb oe ad
[717]were receiving such information which 21is0 was of oe
[718]‘interest ‘to the Agency,’ It isp soSsible that Gronbach a a
[719]had gi 2 Gata toa CRA but wa do not know, CIA
[721]and Gr aened and the relationship was severed
[723]in an & In the Jast
[725]. 3 ets oy
[726]ve bitterness,
[728]{tie Agencyphad
[729]suceessfu S organization and
[731]allegedly had identified many “OE “the sources, CIA- co, ;
[732]hinted to the Liaison Sgent that it had become BWAre | :
[733]of the relationship between Grombach's organization
[735]and the Bureau, How much CilA really learned about
[736]this:relationship is not known but if its penetrations
[737]were signisicant, the Agency may have developed evidence
[738]to justify a charge that the Hureau hed withheld infor~
[739]mation from CIA, particularly when we were receiving.
[741](Du fits . AOL ner
[744]wesw cape
[746]Seat yur
[747]bead, “EV ou
[751]_QGlerbert Uoover Commission - 19684)
[753]In October, 1954, = task force of the captioned
[755]Commission initiated a survey of CIA's operations under :
[756]the leadershinaf General Mark W, Clark, In vanuary, 1955,
[757]we were advised by 4 representative of th 1@ task force
[758]that Senator Jeseph NeCarthy had furnished the group 2@
[759]list of CIA employees who were censidered subversive.
[760]‘CIA became cognizant of this davelopment and there was :
[761]talk within the Ageney that the Bureau had furnished os
[762]the names to the Senator. When the Liaison Agent was
[764]informally appreached on this, he flatly told the Agency
[766]to officially submit its charges, The Ageney never did.
[768]What information CIA may have had on this matter as it
[770]pertained to the Bureru is not known, Iv is possible that
[772]the Agency's attituce was strictly predicated on a knowledge
[774]that we maintained liaison with the Senator's Committee.
[775](Relations with CIA, Bufile - 62-80750)
[777]SECRET
[779]HW 50953  Docld:327169160 Page 11
[781]REIGN. COU
[783]a ing the 1956's, we fave our. Legal Attaches © ©
[784]nunerous “te ds g from internm:l security cases in
[785]the U. Be th mn es we @id not see fit to
[786]a she Afency always maintained that
[787]te "internal Security" from "counter-
[789]a lend in Yrance pertaining to a-
[790]Senvrerranced advising C1 ‘not,
[792]at Veast
[794]ncy to handie the lend, In the
[795]last seve: is not believed that there is
[796]any basis - inint since we have regularly been
[797]notifying CIA concerning subjects of cases who travel
[798]abroad. If the Legal Attache is investigating, CiA is
[799]notified in erder to avoid duplicate eftorts, There
[800]have been eaeep tions where we have taken the position
[802]' , that CIA should not be notified beecsuse of the sensitivity
[803]of the natter. How many such exceptions are known to | ‘
[804]CiA cannot be established from our files; hovever, we Sy
[806]]
[807]SHOULG Weise Lu abou Whee b Yate Gin Lsuwed AuiGuneS BiVGSe ot
[808]tigate, they conta many of the same foreign officials
[809]normally contacted “oy Cita. How many of these forcign 4
[811]officials are CIA intormants,or on the Agency payroll,
[812]dis unknown,
[814](11) BUREAU OPERATIONS IN cuBA
[816]hea,
[818]We operated infermants in Cuba when x doa
[819]ported
[820]in
[822]re Legal Attache's Office in Havana, Inferments r
[823]on Aotave ties of communists and other subversiv
[824]‘tha country. During the period we operated th
[825]informants, we did not coordinate our operationgfwith
[826]CIA, We did not advise the Acency thet we had such
[827]sources Hovever, in 1960, after Castro’. came on the
[829]- _seene, it became infeagib? e to handie certain informants
[831]in a secure manner. Feovroval was granted to turn certain
[832]informants over to CIA, What these informants may have
[833]subsequently told CIA about past Bureau operations is
[834]unknown. This item is being cited in the event CIA had
[835]evidence to cstablish that we had been operation7l in
[836]Cuba and had n coordinated with the Agency pursuant
[837]to Directives; iM tenorandun Donahoe to Belmont, aire 5,
[839]dae 3
[841]2
[843]s
[844]se
[846]we 1960 2 re: "Partido Socialista Popular," 64—200~21 2377
[847]\ “gnd Memorandum Fra abose to Pelnong, Febnyary 3, 1960, re:
[848]* ca 50a oo .
[849]a Nar cisco Tauler :¢ neficto,"[P134 BOS I—4) (Ss) a
[850]_ . ao Ce i 4
[851]; 7 Co ~ SECR _ ne yj
[854]HW 50953 Docld:327169160 Page 12
[858]‘activities an
[860]oe .O SERED Os
[863]In“ 1959 the U. 8. “Ainbadducor “in"Beanit necused
[864]Attroh i “in UNCOOrG inated covert |
[865]“gatuse
[867]$ I believe
[868]exceeds his : 2
[869]indicated t
[871]the “Leral Attache
[872]tee egedly had told the Ambassador
[873]that-the Legeb Attacter had disseminated “in forita tion tro‘
[874]& source who was a fabricator or a provocator, This-
[875]Situation axvose as a rasuit of the ts Attaches
[876]operation of an informant in[Braci Some of the
[877]informetion that he received Fron he informant w
[879]4
[881]of a derogatory nature and related to a Gr agilian
[883]was ‘being touted 4s a Presidential candidate, CE!
[884]asked for the identity cf the infeymant and we teld
[886]the Agency that the pers ron could not be identified
[887]because he did not wish that his identity be disclosed,
[888]This case is being cited. becnuse_ CIA fae nave evidence
[889]That we nad pean opernticnal mn Brazil Mined not coordi#
[890]nated purcunnt to Directives, anc eed the hatter 4 We.
[892]further aeeravated because of the alleged unrelizbili ty.
[893]of the information, Hemorandum Roach to Belunont,
[895]May 1, 1859, re: "Williaa I. Friedman, Legal Attache,
[897]Rio ds Janeiro," G7 429840) and Glemorancun Roach to
[898]Belmont, may is 1959, re: "Seviet-Satellite Activities -
[899](Srazi i 38 607 ~48) ) ’
[901](13) BORDE! DER 2 Govnanes
[903]In June, 1957, our Phocnix Office presented a
[904]problem concerning the Burcau's handling of. informants. ~
[905]on the Hesican border, These informants were operating
[906]side Mexico, The problem was predicated on situaticns
[907]which miriit arise as the result of CIA's endeavors to
[908]Gevelop inforsiants who already were being handled by the
[909]Bureau, It was pointed out that CIA logically could
[910]come in contact with such sources and could make approaches
[911]for recruitment. It was recommended and approved that
[912]in order to protect our coverage in the border area, a
[913]valuable, trusted, and reliable confidential source would
[914]continue to be utilized even if he were contaced by CIA. |
[915]Our policy was that we would not identify our sources to
[916]the Agei. CV. «' ; ‘ : so - -
[918]SECRET
[920]- 10 ~
[922]HW 50953  Docld:327169160 Page 13
[924]|
[927]_ Shenta he iafasnad econeerning th:
[929](15)
[931]-As indicated,“he-later bt
[933]‘in Mexico, it could use‘such infor:
[935]" How much CIA learned ‘about oe bérdar- coverdite”
[937]Bureau Agent George Hunr y have been knowledgeable,.
[938]san: performing services for >.
[939]cra, I¢£ CIA learned that we were operating informants
[940]ation ag additional -
[941]evidence of Bureau fai 72 to ceonerate and ceordinate
[942]with the aieney Dursunnt to espe PLVCS.» (Hemorandum
[943]Roach to oe e"Communist Coverage
[945]is not kn6évnac Again, it: SA; pointed out that former’
[947]In Hay, 1987
[948]captioned cass 1 b.
[950]was to hn & meeting 2:
[951]june L6=mLSMYLOS7, A question
[953]the Bureauts double Agenk in the
[954]ee is Sopiet contactPthat he
[956]an uxying the period
[958]s
[960]Sg as to wheth CIA .
[961]ne ® Avant Biraven
[963]to @w. tac asd and [Sit WSs recommender and approve Pat Wwe
[965]not Bdvise CIA.
[967]contact withéGur double aren ~% one point, The Agency .
[968]may have had Turther. conta 2ct thout our knowlecze, The
[969]rye may. have also picked up the contact with the Goviet TS
[971]‘What is important Eh igs that CIA established
[974]in (Switz zer land. Fhe ease is being hithlicnted since we
[976]See
[977]cannot. ox joke the possibility that the Agency hag evidence.
[978]to demons 3 that we were onpers -tional (in EuropoPind we
[980]did not coor ‘dinate. With the Agency. (lemornndun Braniran
[982]to Belmont, dune 10, 1957, re; Cosson, " 105—2 25453~1825) Yo)
[984]Ci’ RE QUESTS FOR E REAU LECTURE ON COMMUNISM IN THE U. 8S.
[986]On Septémber 25, 1958, CIA inquired if W.C,
[987]Sullivan could give 2 lecture on the communist movement
[988]in the U.S. It was recommended that Sulliven give the
[989]lecture. Such lectures were being afforded in other parts
[990]of the Government. The Director made the notation "Ye
[991]cannot mane Sullivan avnilablo to this outfit." The
[992]Agency accepted this as an affront and a blatant refusal
[994]SECRET oo
[996]os Sa
[1000]HW 50953  DoclId:327169160 Page 14
[1003]i . OO . _—
[1006]“to cooperate.on: ‘a most “aper ta tnt subject of interest a cry
[1007]to Bee Te toes a Clenor randum Sullivan -to Bekmont, ce . :
[1008]October 1 ‘195s, re; "Request for Lecture on Cormniss
[1009]byCIA,") wolfe cet Cot vn S
[1011](16) Grss or
[1013]ad of the
[1014]Burak Cave
[1015]a a CIA cnpieyes. in Moscow, had been
[1016]invoived ‘in an * with a Soviet girl. According :
[1017]to our source, # allegedly had furnished information
[1018]to the Foviet firi. We cheeked with ne State Denartmen
[1019]and CIA und we coufirned that Boos had been invoived
[1020]an affair and that he had been ree valled, According to
[1021]Cié and State Dencytment, there was no indicntion that
[1022]mper been involved in any espionnge against the
[1023]A gave consideration to requesting the Burenu
[1024]ify Lts seuree and thon changed. its mind, Po
[1025]Crh has documented this as an instance where  — — i
[1026]the Bureau failed to coopers tte by not volunteering the =
[1027]source is a matter of conjecture but, it is a ense that :
[1028]should be kept in mind, (utile -
[1032]In April, 1963, we becam? involved with CIA in
[1033]that Agency's efi forts to coll t sensitive information
[1034]relating toffrench Go Governmeny Ihteations to conduct
[1036]espionage 2: 2. CYA had access to a sensitive
[1037]source,
[1039]who yas in a@ position to make ~
[1040]available freneape cuments, On-Apri},il
[1041]‘1863, CIA i orned as that ‘cur Lepfal Attache in Gorigoa’
[1042]locally contacted “CIA concerning this matter, CIA Hendea
[1043]quarters was highly disturbed because its office in Reris Ts)
[1044]had not been cut in on this operation and the Agency wanted
[1046]- ; ‘to be informed rerarding the nature and the extent of cur
[1048], disseninatidn of CIA information to our Legal Attache. We
[1050]_ . / ~ 12 =
[1052]SECRET
[1053]coe ed
[1055]HW 50953 Docld:327169160 Page 15
[1057]_ determi induirices ait
[1058]Gari ge ‘ sent fron “Burésauw
[1059]Heacquarters, This matter is being highlighted heccuse
[1060]it vasa vitally imvortant: oneriiion to CIA and. the Ageney.
[1061]LCATIORS that aniox emaiticn had been deaked
[1063]‘te veoh authorities IVa havo ‘no evidence or renson td.
[1064]beMieve that the Lesal Attache Oftice ever involved itself
[1066]2
[1068]in eny such leak, Howsaver, we should not, under any cir
[1069]> s
[1070]id: fact that CIAMMas pene tre Biod
[1072].eumstances, une the
[1073]Frencl ,
[1075]im [Paris . 2
[1076]ypliity of ¢ nes and installing microphones in
[1077]Garis Jgisve th ¢ nga on U, S, officials, including their ‘
[1078]residences should never be excluded. The information we
[1079]hed conve oved to gur Legnl Attache possibly may have been :
[1080]acquired by thef{French hrough elondestine coverage, CIA
[1081]bly coulda charge us with handling their sensitive
[1082]formation in an din ure pAanner by transmitting it to
[1083]Gorigyyithout conferring with the Agency.
[1085]Tn ennmertion enith nticzed frencif esvionace - i
[1086]‘activity in the U. S., CIA has never been sa .tisfied with
[1087]the efforts made by the Bureau, The Agconey possibly could
[1088]take the position that ve leoked tightiy et the allegations
[1089]and Gid not pursue @ me cer which, in nerited
[1090]a more aggressive appro.ch, (Bufile ~ )
[1092]For some time, CIA has held t osition that
[1093]the (French Intelliscence Service (spnesiPls enetrated by _ 7
[1094]| . . the FBoviets. fjrhe Arency has pointed out that if th [French]G >
[1095]. eve “Gollectins Sensitive information in the U, S., the ;
[1096]. : product is ending up inGloscow, In Janusry, 1964, pve
[1097]reviewed the status of our investigation of [FrencnMintel}
[1098]. ligence activities in the U. 8, . The Director commented
[1099]m a "J think this whole thing has been imaginary on
[1100]. of CIA which has been played as a.sucker by §@jeee
[1101]I would waste no more time on it at least until ail CIA
[1102]restrictions are removed," CYA did impose restrictions
[1103]by not permitting us to pursue certain loads because it
[1105]‘ feared that its sensitive seurce woul. be Jeopardiz sed.
[1106](Bufile ~
[1108]p
[1109]p
[1110]a
[1113]f
[1115]TO -13 -
[1117]ae SECRET
[1119]HW 50953  Docld:327169160 Page 16
[1121]ne Be Pe te Se ae
[1123]. ‘from CIA, We did not obtain ciesrance from CIA for
[1124]t+" -" “the inclusion of this information in-our-monogra woh .-
[1125]Clearance eee cow. wes not ou ed pecnuse of the
[1126]_rrituted becaute
[1128]3 S Minét Pholwtion of the cor tend snes
[1129]Fe eae a aver made any. protest. .
[1131]GUATEMALA Js )
[1133]“FE SH POSS ana 1967,” ‘6 were operating informants—..- 8) fr.
[1134]“gn Guatonatay JAt the inception of our operational ace
[1135]tivity, CIA was not informed. In one case, We finelly
[1136]were able to effect the necessary arrangements with CEA
[1138]whereby the Buretu would be poaraltted to run the informant
[1139]in Guatem aio JG)IN the second instance, we established an
[1140]agreement with CIA in October, 1967, tha, we eculid cone
[1142]tinue handling an informant in (Quatensia dich She under
[1143]gtanding that the Bureau cent, on the ocexsiop of GBcn
[1144]vigit, vould cenfer riin Gane local CIA offices pol itical
[1145]information collected from the informant. These two cascs a
[1146]had all the makings of @ conflict. CLA was under ihe SO
[1147]definite immression that we had been running these ; i
[1148]informants before ve a fing y coordinated with them,
[1150]It ig true that fhe CIA n Guatonal at as much
[1151]incensed but no issue tas ra TA Hondauarters and —
[1152]therattcr was put to rest. :
[1154]concrete evidence tha
[1155]we were operating in Guatenals earing in. mind that in
[1156]‘@ plegd such oS (Guatemala City $t would not be difficult
[1157]for 2 CIA intelligence officer to spot an FSi. Agent in
[1158]contact with Ga uavenalan s J6)our potemtias Vulnerability is
[1159]that we were operat : nBLle thout coor da Ne
[1161]CIA may have develop
[1163]| he information emanating from the caption J
[1164]sensitive Bureau operation has been disseminated to CIA
[1165]and other egencies for several years, | The sensitive 5
[1166]source has traveled abrozd numerous times end his trips  — ~ :
[1170]SECRET
[1172]HW 50953  DoclId:327169160 Page 17
[1174](26)
[1176]ESTABLISHUENT OF BURDAU LIAISON WITH
[1178].
[1180]Oger, OO
[1182]-
[1184]SECURITY SER
[1186]WICH (= 1650
[1188]VECH INTERNA L
[1190]In January, 1960, our Leral Attache, Bonn,
[1191]traveled to[Hollan oh) the purpose of exgploring arrangce=-
[1192]ments for liaison with appropriate
[1193]U. S. Ambassador raised questions,
[1194]the ycoars, all relaticns yith the]
[1195]been handled through CIA He ind
[1197]ButchPutherities, The
[1198]s0inting out thet over
[1199]Ratenteut thoriticd had
[1201]ated that before there
[1203]“WAS any change in procedure, it would be nece 2ssary Lor
[1205]CIA and FBI to come to same form of an agreement. Allen
[1206]Dulles subsequently enpressed dissppointment in that his
[1207]Agency ha ad net been contacted by the Bureau prior to
[1209]‘exploring the liaison arrangement, We. event ually conte rred
[1210]- with CIA and came to an agreement satisfactory to al
[1212]parties concerned,
[1214]Again, CIA could cite this as an instance where
[1215]we “failed to coordinate with the Apency in line with
[1216]National. Security Covuneil Nirentives, arendium Br
[1217]to Belnont, March 3, 1960, re: "Lagal Atiacne Operata
[1219]C
[1221]eae See
[1223]Norway, i anmark, Sweden, and the Hetherlands GE~1ES
[1225]“
[1227]In the latter part of 1959 we gave censideration to
[1228]establis shing a Leral Attache in Copenhagen,.Deanark, The
[1229]purpose of the assignnent was to follow Bureau leads in
[1230]Denmark, Nors TDQY, Sweden, and Holland, We did not inform
[1231]CIA of our ntentions, (ienorandum Frohbcose to Belmont,
[1235]‘January i4, “is 00, re; "Legal Attache Operations, The
[1237]Netherlands," S6-18973-113)
[1239]BUREAU DISSEMINATION OF COUNTDRINTELLIGENCE
[1240]IRVOMATION TO FORRIGN SERVICES 1962
[1242]. | By letter dated November 7, 1962, CIA raised
[1243]questions concerning the propriety of Burcau dissemination
[1245]of aqounterintelligence information to foreign intelligence
[1247]services. CiA, at that time, had particular reference to
[1248]inforpijtion which our Legal Attache had transmitted to the
[1249]GreekPintelligence. Service concerning. KGB operations, CIA
[1251]ook the position that pursuant to the coordinating -
[1253]~17 -
[1255]HW 50953  Docld:327169160 Page 18
[1257]“Cami mtr!
[1261]a + Directive, the Bureau was obligated to coordi fate with _
[1262]CIA prior to such dissemination. The par rticular data :
[1263]had emannted from cne of our sensitive mas sources
[1264]i » we res ided to CIA by stating that the
[1265]information was the product of an internal security
[1266]operation and did not relate to any operational activaty
[1267]abroad, CIA again surrendered, The Agency could axgu
[1268]. that it w sponsible for following Soviet matters
[1269]‘ with the (Great AP nteiii .sence Service and that we had an
[1270]obliga tion of coordinating with the Ba. ne! _ Clemorandum
[1271]. Brand ilivan, Noyember 9, 1062 re; YRS a
[1273](27) "THR UVISIBLS GOVERNMENT, "A BOOK AUTHORED BY
[1274]DAVIk: WISE AND THOMAS ROSS
[1276]. In August, 1963, we received information indi-
[1277]cating that Wise and Ross were in the process of gathering 4
[1278]material for a “hook pertaining. to activities of U. 8.
[1279]imtalts eanag: act ivdtias Rath Rass. and Wise cantactan . \
[1281]the Bureau. It was ree onded that liaison or2li y advise ;
[1283]~ CiA that these two individuals vere preparing a book cone i
[1284]. cerning U. &, intelligen ae agencies. The Director. noted
[1286]"Y see no reason doins so,'
[1288]~. It is not Knowa if CIA was aware of the contact
[1289]with the Bureau. Wise and Ross subsequently published the ;
[1290]book which contained extremely derogatery information
[1291]concerning CIA, (Cilenorand:m Jones to DeLoach, re: "David
[1292]Wise of the “New Yoru Heraid Tribune" and Thomas. Ross of
[1293]the "Chicaso Sun Tines") 7 i
[1295](28). COMMIT ACTIVIT DS = AFRICA Co
[1297], i .
[1298], |. In April, 1860, CIA inquirad if the Bureau would
[1299]‘give any consideration te acsisting the Agency. toward
[1300]developing coverave in Africa. CIA was looking for the ;
[1301]services of any Negro informant who might be available,
[1302]‘The Agency also inquired about placing a Negro in the.
[1303]Communist Party, USA, under a plan which would have as
[1304]an eventual objective, the sending of the informant to
[1306]secre, re
[1308]ett AIM ne me nein a, nee i
[1310]HW 50953 Docld:327169160 Page 19
[1312]In the” sane month, CLA inguired if the Bureau...
[1313]etablish technical surveillance coverage on
[1314]who CIA felt was a key figure in the .
[1315]scient.fie latelligence data.to.the .
[1316]Lligence vorvice ISi0 declined to reinstitute ..
[1317]‘CIA considered the matter: important beenuse.
[1318]of its relstiot nship to thefiid deast Crisis, 6)
[1320]On October 21, 1968, we toid CIA that future
[1321]. requests from CIA for technical surveillance coverage -
[1322]> should be transmitted by the Agency directly to the
[1323]no . Attorney General. :
[1325]; CIA has never made any official comment or
[1326]protest but it has considered the aforc-mentioned action
[1327]by the. Burenu as unfriendly and uncoonerative., The Agency
[1329]aS lesked to the Burcnu “as the logical point of contact and
[1330]as the only organiantion having the resources and capabilities
[1331]of adequately Getermining 4 af. such coverage is even feasible,
[1333]FON sey rinne Ave meer wrens.
[1334]qawey Beh dh Bel Oe wi tlraitele BAY dA UP a AE
[1336]a The Liaison Agent recalls fragnents of oth:
[1337]Situaticns or conflicts which occured over the years und .
[1338]which resulted _ the voicing«af CIA displeasure or criticism.
[1339]The Agent cannot recall the names of the cases which is
[1340]necessary to nequise the required data. There was one
[1341]instance carly in the 1960's which involved information
[1342]recoived from a source of unknown reliability charging
[1343]Alien Dulies with having been a communi:t and @ spy while
[1344]in Burope, We disseminated the information to several
[1345]agencies, Bulles exploded but never ledged a protest.
[1347]The Agent also has recollection of instances when
[1348]CIA. alleged that its source or informant was compromised by
[1349]Bureau revelation ,of CIA information during the course of
[1350]interviews conducted by us, Techuically, this would be a
[1351]‘violation ‘Of the third agency rule and, if CIA had hard
[1352]core facts, we would be vulnerable, pa ticularly if an
[1353]important informant was lost, . CIA never made any official
[1354]issue or protest. : :
[1356]- 24 =
[1358]eo SECRET
[1360]arr cere inne MRE tea
[1362]HW 50953  Docld:32169160 Page 20
[1365]'
[1367]“oy
[1368]Lf
[1369]o~)
[1370]_
[1372]cet SECRET
[1374]. . . . toe . eo
[1375]a ee oe ON Senet Be A te ae et leben
[1376]r BURY MAU ERLE
[1378]‘ uf ne a Ne ee et rr ers
[1379]wes wt vo pe, an Co ates
[1381]1, ATTACKS UCAINST BbURPAU CIEXICO CITY AND FRANCE - 1951)
[1383]Althoush asment FPenich did not pevin handling Liaison
[1384]with Cis. until 1652, it is important to reter to hignly signi-
[1385]ficunt differences with CIA which culminated in a sericus
[1386]conflict in the Fall of 1953, Our Legal Attaches in
[1387]and pexis renorted that CIA representatives were attocking the
[1389]7 Bureau, wore endeavoring to piace us in an undavorahte digas,
[1390]were ques stioninz our jurisdiction, and were naning sparaging
[1391]remarks concerning the Bureau. Seme of this was sumed up by
[1393]characterising it as covert hastility within CIA, stemming
[1394]largely fron aisgruntled tormer employees of the FBI.
[1396]4
[1398]In October, 1951, General Walter Beddil Smith, then
[1400]Directoy of CIA, asked to meet with the Director and other
[1401]Bureau representatives for the purpose of discussing the
[1402]existiny differences. General Smith denied that there was any
[1403]covert hostilitv against the Buresu and maintainod that there
[1404]WAS & gene aj) feeling of respect for is. He admitted that
[1405]there nad been isclated instances of friction for which CIA
[1406]_must accept its share of responsibility.
[1408]It is my recollection. that the Director and other
[1409]Buresu officials did meet with Goneral Smith, at which time
[1410]guidelines were set forth for maintaining future relations
[1411]between the tro agencies, I was not able to find menoOrAangen
[1412]of record caverin meeting. : :
[1414]2. PROSELYTING GE EGR PASO
[1418]¢.
[1420]The. Agent clearly recalls that carly in the 1950's
[1422]wea encountered difficult with CIA because the Agency allosedly
[1423]was recruiting Bureaueemplioyed personnel, We vigorously pro-
[1424]tested,and subsequently ihe Agency advised that it would follow
[1426]a policy of not having’any contact with a Bureau employee until
[1428]the individual had been separated from the Bureau for a pericd
[1430]of at lenst thirty days. the Ament could not locate the back-
[1432]- ground of this matter in the files reviewed by him. It is pos-
[1434]\ Sible that the pertinent information lies in the persennel file
[1436]of some former Bureau Atent.
[1438]SA SECRET ( Barrereny §
[1439]; | a ca (eshte
[1441]HW 50953 Docld:327169160 Page 21 .
[1444]OM ORE Eee tor
[1445]politiconi weyiun whieh 4 :
[1446]sailors who had boaen seized by the “Caines
[1447]General Eetts disseminat a mor : indieating
[1448]of the Committee had agreed that a viow of commitme made.
[1449]by the Unitcd States and Chinese offi iciais, that failure to
[1450]arvarge reentry Yor the Polish seamen would have an adversa
[1451]“ effect on the overeall United States Defector Program, We
[1452]emphasized te Gencral Betts that this matter had never been
[1453]officially presented | 2efore the Defector Committee. He was
[1454]infoxrned that I action was not conducive to mutual cooperation,
[1456]8. CYA INTERV
[1458]TIE UNITED STATES - DISCUSSION , .
[1459]WITH ARLEN I ay
[1461]a7, 285 55
[1463]_ On September 27, 1955, the Liaisern Agent met with
[1464]Allen Dulles, at which tine the CIA Dircetor's attention was i
[1465]referved two 8 matter vhseh Aad not yet developed inte a serious ;
[1466]situation but if not properly followed could lead to conflicts
[1467]betywcen the'tvo agencies. Dulles wag referred to the contacts i
[1468]‘of aliens in the Ur states mage by CIA personnel without
[1470]Ss)
[1472]first obtaining the necessary cl Leavance from the Buresu, The
[1473]requirement for such clearance was clear-cut and pursuant to an
[1474]established agreement, (62-80755; memorandum Roach to Belmont .
[1475]September 28, 1955, "Relations with CIA")
[1477]9, CIA APPROACH OF A HATIGNAL ACADEMY DEN GRADUATE (1955)
[1479]@® National Academy exaduate to utilize his vervicesMin Guatemzlia,
[1480]This approach was made while the graduate was att tending National
[1481]Academy clesses, <A protest was made to key CYA officials for) u)
[1482]not having ¢ advised us prior ta establishing contact with the
[1484]Academy graduate, (fe: ¢ a .
[1486]in November, 1955, an incident arcse ‘when A A approached
[1488]In December, 1955, we received information i. dicating
[1490]that CiA wes in contact ‘eath an indivicuel whom the Bureau was
[1492]developing for utilization in « double arent operation, We
[1494]learned that CIA representatives had established contact with
[1496]E Sand had given him some advice and gfuidance without
[1497]eCking with the Buresu, We protested to CIA, :
[1499]SECREL
[1501]HW 50953 Docld:327169160 Page 22
[1503]" 0 . . : - “ . , cad
[1505]5 “the rp
[1506]* VOUT 1 “We: ha
[1508]aye es
[1509]eal dah
[1512]tea tha tea: “4
[1513]described m
[1515]han@ling of
[1517].
[1519]On duly
[1521]® had been in
[1522]Washington, Dp. C. i
[1523]CIA employes. We wore
[1524]the Agency hag no ind
[1525]contacts wilt Cre
[1526]it wv as in a: thet
[1527]a nan al eoncern
[1528]2» protested
[1529]Belmont to
[1531]beta
[1533]£2 Soviet agent Wes being per-
[1534]6 +
[1536]so thet his activities
[1538]mitted to enter the United
[1540]could be covered and go that the Bureau would be in a position
[1542]to promote a defection, fae Buresu was not in possession of
[1543]any information dndaic ing that we had sanetioned the entry
[1544]of the subject for. tho purpose described above, The State
[1546]WD, iabie te reenall the name cf the CIA
[1547]employee involved; inguiry at CIA was negative, We were not
[1548]in a2 position to identif
[1549]investigation within
[1550]up with the identity.
[1552]o
[1553]rs)
[1554]3
[1555]ry
[1556]oh
[1557]3
[1558]Q
[1559]in
[1560]ct
[1562]Pa
[1563]eed.
[1564]be
[1565]Q
[1566]pet
[1568]i
[1569])
[1571]on
[1573]nout,the Agency comin
[1574]SEP wu)
[1575]17.
[1577]By letter dated November 8, 1955, we strongly. pro~
[1579]‘tested to CIA bcecexuse representatives of that Agency had inter-
[1581]viewed an alien in the United States without firs st obtaining
[1582]clearance from the Buresu. It should be noted that there was
[1583]a well-established afi cement. whereby it was incumbent upon
[1584]CIA to first check with the Bureeu before interviewing any
[1586]i United States, (Letter to CIA November &, 1956,
[1588]Oo SECRET
[1590]HW 50953  Docld:327169160 Page 23
[1594]Cla employee without conduc ting
[1596]ade |
[1597]t that a CIA cawleyoe allegedly
[1599]Sli. Meese
[1602]' a. ,
[1603]en aren)
[1605]sity eS
[1607]En December po weft ote
[1609]shit nt Goiumbis Unive
[1610]had been in contact becuse of his
[1614]with
[1615]eowethe
[1616]Ag SS, Rh,
[1618]that the writer
[1619]interested in aocn
[1621]: : eng that
[1622]£ the United States, When ame
[1623]returned to the Unite we. pounitred CréA to intesviow.
[1624]‘the subject because of -t : forets é, intelligence inter--
[1626]» ests, We subsenuently intery : Cx at which tine he.
[1627]infoxmed Us that he bad been 4 vutioned oF "CIA not to furnish
[1628]iucormation to the Bureau, CIA denied that any such
[1630]wae mode, Che: Bosse Patyiek Hamner js
[1632]19. CIA REQUES ICERNING A HYGH-SPEED CA
[1633]1957
[1635]The San Francisco Office furnished information
[1636]indicati that CIA had requested a firm in California to furs
[1638]yds Lira Agency Suluria tien be
[1639]‘pertaining to e-hi
[1640]the om cee WEG ¥ev
[1642]CEA we
[1644]SOULE BAL LURGLEA LuGuas ae
[1646]tHespeed efmere manufactured by the cen
[1647]ved becau ve wanted to be certain that
[1649]Gur jurigdiction, We did not. develop
[1651]had overstepved its jurisdiction, The Director
[1653]& notation, "O.K., but it does seem to me we give CIA
[1655]viee authority to explore such a field, H"
[1657]Be liso ane to Boardman April 16, 1957, "Flow of
[1659]soviets and Satellites throush
[1661]On May 28, 1957, CIA advised that one of its repr
[1662]sentatives. in the field had interviewed the cépticned GEE
[1663]alien who had 2 tO cooperate with the Agency aeter he
[1664]returned to « CIA conducted this interview vwithout >
[1665]first obtainine clearances from the Bureau. Such clearance Was
[1666]necessary pursuant to an estnblis shed 2¢ ecment. ~A vi
[1667]rast wag made to the Agency. (Re:
[1669]sot secret
[1671]HW 50953 . Docld:327169180 Page 24
[1673]n duly, ots
[1674]Gotonbie offieiais whe w
[1675]invitation CiA was t
[1676][Cox On biang| beecnuss 32 ]
[1677]rossily insulted
[1679]anbasancon's chauitfour on
[1681]If we so desire
[1682]accusing CIA of trying to
[1683]considered undesirable in
[1684]Cfemorandun Je o
[1685]of Colombaen
[1686]by CIA) CR).
[1688]22,
[1690]REQUEST F
[1694]Ha PVT
[1695]PALEY
[1697]YORE
[1699]On Novenber 15,
[1700]tacted by the local CIA re
[1701]formed if the Burenu coul
[1702]premises of the Council o
[1704]United Nations Delegatior
[1706]across the street from 2 Cee
[1708]that his visit
[1710]received fron Allen Dulles
[1711]the possi baLity of thao
[1712]convers att ens and discuss
[1714]-It should be noted thet t
[1715]_Welleknown pergonalities,
[1716]States Governuent, Uv)
[1717]Pursuant to ins
[1719]on November 18, 1957, tha
[1720]by CIA in that such a sen
[1722]the field level rather ‘tha
[1723](Henorandum Roach to
[1724]on Foreign Rela tions")
[1726] geeRER
[1728]CIA requested a tour
[1730]Beimont Novenber ig,
[1734]ron COLOMBIAN INTELLIGENCE
[1736]for several:
[1737]ere corning to this country under CIA
[1738]that no tours wow be eiven to the
[1740]12 past a[Colombianbtfabassador had ;
[1743]we had @¥rested the
[1744]White Glave Traffic Act che arge. (®)
[1745]d, we could give consideration to
[1746]impose upon us individusls whom we
[1747]light of the forenging.
[1748]Noach to. Belnont {Reps osentatives
[1749]Servicef- Request Tor Bureau Tour
[1751]S)
[1752]FOREIGH (a)
[1754]SURVEY OF COUNCIL ON i
[1755]_Ciy 1257 i
[1758]1857, Reel New York Office was con~
[1759]presentative who desired to be ine i
[1760]a ‘coneuet R security survey ct the i
[1761]n Foreign Relaticns which were located. '
[1762]occupied by th oviet -
[1764]The CIA representative indicate’
[1766]to our offiee was pursuant to instructions
[1768]& Whoggliezedly was concerned about
[1769]vietsWYstablishing coverage of
[1771]ions which might be held at the Council,
[1772]he Council included as members many
[1774]including officials of the United
[1776]tructions, Allen Dulles was informed
[1777]t we did not like the arproach used
[1778]sitive matter had been taken up at
[1779]an through Bureau Headquarters,
[1780]1957, re "Council ~
[1782]SECREL
[1784]HW 50953 Docld:327169160 Page 25
[1786]ed
[1788]O
[1790]scientist then visiting in tHe
[1791]We followed developments through | fs 5
[1792]Q The, Agency was duliy aware-of. the. .
[1793]portly knew that we were in contact with
[1794]q
[1795]N
[1797]a ‘Se received: ‘information fron ==)
[1799]‘States mi eee) LOCe
[1800]and wa. hept. cia. adv:
[1803]VW
[1805]Q bee
[1810]3
[1812]elived information indicating that
[1813]loyee, esteolighed contact with
[1814]eveloping information concerning “(S)
[1815]protest wag mide to CIA for not
[1816]rests with us, bearing in mond
[1818]mel
[1819]sibly could have jeopardised
[1821]prone coordi natir
[1822]that the action take
[1823]a2 Burenu ons aration,
[1825]ted February 10, no) we directed a.
[1826]protest ta Cra ting that Arency with inte wing the
[1827]subject rene ten, without first ob: the S
[1829]sfrance Loin the Bureau, (Re: wy
[1831]cesary c
[1833]25, iSONSTION CF FRY. EMPLOYEE
[1835]e@ received information indicating
[1836]hed represented herself as being
[1838]arrange an interview with
[1840]le ntcrnations Ll Association of.
[1842]2 ave a signed.statement
[1844]ved @ phone call from a
[1845]Ee Igon checking with
[1846]eniled that she had made
[1847]to Belmont April 25,
[1850]Ci4é, we were informe
[1851]“such representati
[1852]°1958, "Unknown Sub njec
[1854]26,
[1856]; By letter dated May 12, 1958, the Bureau protested
[1858]to CIA for interviewing an alien in the Detroit area without
[1860]first obtaining the necessary clearance from the Bureau. 7
[1861](ten chen sary pursuant to established agrecment.
[1862]Rey :
[1864]SECREL
[1866]~ 8 -
[1868]HW 50953 Docld:327169160 Page 26
[1870]et
[1872]- June 1 153 ad Scheral Beinhard” 7 ~~
[1873]voor Gehlert eae: hond. of the : intelligenc OLE resell ey ee
[1874]becanG avare of this in¥Ptation an Amency coprosent@tive
[1875]informed our Lesal Attusc! Lb ag not desired that the
[1876]LeEgav Visit with [G tos” our Legat was inetructed by the Bureau
[1877]to accept the invtta tio regardless oi the CIA position,
[1878]* We could evealuste the CIA position in this natter as
[1879]being uncooperative, Ciomorandum Raach to Belinont June 17,
[1880]1858, "Relations with CIA")
[1881]Si. CTA Ni
[1882]In June, ‘ we 4hecd the question concerning
[1883]crAts failure dheze to an agrcement relating to CIA's G
[1884]recruitment of Chinese fe aa i he United States for over
[1885]qaag Griellirenta néer the agreement, CFA wns
[1886]not to approact without first checking with(S)
[1887]us. 4 situat Linois indicating thet CIA
[1888]allerediy Kn yecruiting an alien and
[1889]even toon 99t checking with us Vie
[1890]expressed tter to CIA June 12, 1958
[1891]CM orAanc : tune @, 196s, ‘Reoradesent S)
[1892]of[ ch nese Aliens in the United States for Overseas
[1894]32, CIA OFFICIAL's CRAITICISN OF “MASTERS OF DCE?"
[1895]Qur Legal Atta he, Tokvo, obtained a copy of ar
[1896]randum sent to an official-in curl Embassy in Tokyo by &@ a,
[1897]Chief of the CIA Office in Japan, | In his communication S)
[1898]elittled the value of "Masters of Deceit’ as an anticommunist
[1899]weapon in foreign countries. He claimed that the book nertained
[1900]only to the Communist Party, USA, which he characterized as a
[1901]small, ineffective, £ tion-ridden organization. He svated
[1902]that ‘ 2 author of the book was not an intellectual but rather
[1903]@ policeman, Ciemorandum Roach to Belmont dune 12 and 24, 1955,
[1904]"Masters of Deceit.")
[1905]“ 7 \ 7 a - i?
[1906]: SECRET
[1907]Me oS ot ~ 10 -
[1909]HW 50953 Docld:327169160 Page 27
[1912]Scand volunteer oy
[1913]°&@ gource by CIA e
[1915]cin BURP Gs What actually happened at the United States Embass
[1921]LESURE
[1923]hy, WORE GAILY.,. v,
[1924]date
[1928]ing some lagormation ‘to.
[1929]the Ageney, In 24, 1953, we told CIA
[1930]that in the cnse of EB A, Wwe eit that the * Agency should
[1931]have notified us at an earhicer date in order that we could
[1932]have considered coreneen for internel seguFity purrs
[1934]oh By,
[1935]at the outset. (le: /IndonesianLActivities - j10 On 25474 YS)
[1938]L GOLRNYEYUSEI, AK ADR BINRICH SCHULZE ale
[1940]ne ae ARE N
[1942]Tha carhdaat
[1944]and furnishea axtre
[1945]ss of this case include -
[1946]cerning CLA coopers tion,
[1948]Service,
[1949]veiveble
[1951]In June, 1988, we developed informatio indicating
[1952]that CIA: May nave opened a letter in itzerlandpWhich had
[1953]been addressed to the Director by an idividual who had
[1954]identified hi fF asfor. Heinrich Schutze ae weiger further
[1955]indicated that he might be connected with “the (B BE ntelligence —
[1956]Service. The hotber addvesseod to. the he the FB cen olsced
[1957].in ag envelone tury ended up in the pees of
[1958]thefUnited State ‘ dox t tS, bsequentily
[1959]recived @ copy of the. particuls omuunieation from Cis, — .
[1960]and the contents were such at ¢t time that no action was
[1962]m <7?
[1964]-regquived by the Burcau, We asked CIA for particulars. leading
[1966]to the alleced opening of the Letter which had been. addressed
[1968]to the Director. CIA claimed that it had not opened the
[1970]letter, We tere confidentially informed by an Arency repre-
[1971]sentative that the (Ambauvsadorphad opened the letter and then
[1972]referved the matter to CYA, ‘ne contents were such thut inves~-
[1973]tigative action of an extensive nature was required by CIA
[1975]is semcthing. we may never know. [Ciichal Golenicwski - 65-65192
[1977]SECRET
[1981]HW 50953 Docld:327169160 Page 26
[1983],
[1984]1
[1985]5
[1986]t
[1987]'
[1990]a
[1993]Sei
[1995]roe te ey pet % “4 a v
[1996]35, * eet
[1997]» . aot . . A . *s
[1999]By letter dated June “26
[2001]58, we oiced our concert
[2002]rerardink Cra ‘sca bhaced: darter view Sean vom a)
[2004]was con adering for overseas reeruitment, CIs denice that
[2006]ch alien bad boon, wOw Our, inves t: it ic
[2007]e anatine- m-CkA, (Res
[2008]. Bie eas ee PAE SD,
[2009]oa —_ THs, CIN requestéd the Bureau fom.
[2010]_ permigs to folay a’recording of a telephona een Tee
[2014]ad throucn ourfsenusitive coverage
[2016]Vashineton, Dp, Cc. On dune 5, 16538,
[2017]« Ee nversation between Mabnoud
[2019]and the Egvptieg Air ttache Tf)
[2021]Lied that PounaanpPwnas wosleine
[2023]“yen ly. CTA developed
[2025]! fas a key figure in a
[2027]plot, the objective bf which was to overthrow
[2029]obtained by tik? Gureau pr Mu
[2030]recordingphad been deve
[2032]fo the MFPvntian Fmbassy
[2033]we had obtained the con
[2034]Rousan of the Jordanian: Em
[2035]The conversation gtrong ty |
[2036]closely with the 3
[2037]information indict
[2039]evolutionary
[2040]Vt Meet
[2042]i :
[2043]Rousenptionicad any tuph LC ‘
[2044]he wes stpongly supy , ropta: op of field ‘als she
[2045]Gordan rianPGovernnen on ¥ at he was on the
[2048](Spot and that he nce
[2049]jactivity. CTA asked. Fhe Epcording | to be
[2050]was the only way [Kine
[2052]‘played to the Kings
[2053]Hassel] could be convi
[2055]On July 18, 1958, a CIA of ficis
[2056]the Bureau posi thye ly would. not avant pormis toppiavying
[2057]of the recording) We maintained that if we ¢ ed such
[2058]permission, out other (Coverage of. a sensitive nate ure peoule
[2060]be seriously imperiled @) >)
[2062]On July 23, 1958, Allen Dulles asked if the Bureau
[2063]would reconsider its position in view of the critical situation
[2064]in[the Middle Fast ) Pursuant to instructions, CYA was ther
[2065]tol@ that in vier™ef the position in which the Bureau had been
[2066]placed, we neceded to Bulles' request. CIA was further told
[2067]that we were seriously considering: the termination of all of
[2068]eur technical surveillancespaiecause we aid not intend to be
[2069]placed in such a position ‘in the future
[2071]advised that
[2073]On July 22, 1958, Dulles told the Liaison Ament
[2074]that he was very much disturbed over the Director's reaction
[2075]He stated that he was not interested in- holding | a pistol to
[2077]So SECRET ==
[2079]HW 50953 Docld:327169160 Page 29
[2081]Daddy ts Nene nnd: he “guvther indiggted that ha was “deFihor~"
[2082]satains whether -or not the feccardinFehould She used, ee ek ee
[2083]recomm rendad that the Liniwses the matter for phe
[2084]ve" pirrotal taf boritittinn yep tt fa t67Be Used | by rCh
[2085]The Director's notat . is in the~fire
[2086]“and Ata) Useless ta whst ’ “y
[2087]ear of any dota
[2089]OE ate
[2091]The strong mowe took in resis
[2092]dissemination of such se tive ww Porsa tion | to foreis
[2093]~ _governn fully 1 ch .to Belmont, 0 1 |
[2094]“dated: 2, 1SHs, ssion to[Pla me
[2095]Survod
[2097]a Yechnic
[2099]Linnee Recording te King Huss ton Jordan’ HS) 4
[2101]#5
[2103]Ad on! RONM vr
[2104]ICAW Gf SYER ENT
[2106]Yn 1958,
[2107]enstged in. a pracran ‘ :
[2108]‘activity in Hexice We became: ‘con
[2109]vas “to involve deporta eee of uncda
[2111]-ecommiinbsts ves eds ng | in
[2114]plonenta tian of Bru
[2116]PRO ei Vo Oh Stee aca
[2117]to the United. it Was engaged in any
[2118]operation : Amotican communists. :
[2119]In September, mt the Mexican Government :
[2121]had embarked on
[2122]Americ ins were ord ere i
[2123]Agency's ray (, in
[2125]involved (XH) UW):
[2127]: program and certain
[2128]We cheened with CrlAé and the . ‘
[2129]ime ed that his Agency was net °
[2131]: The Liais 207
[2132]strictly confidential bas
[2133]been in contact with certs xiean officials concern :
[2134]possible anticommunist ectivities., The Ambassador had consulted
[2135]with the lecal CIA chief and had asked for a list of Americans
[2136]-who could he cons heered as being devortable, ne Cia officer
[2137]reportedly furnished a Mist of eer ee ap ames. MEMO ~
[2138]randum Reach to “elmont, epten 1985, Lenal Attache/s
[2139]Office, Mexico City, Relations with Dnmbassy and C13 U)
[2141]Subsequent ty was informed on a
[2142]erican Ambassador had
[2147]= we
[2148]5 4
[2150]Ie pea
[2152]“
[2154]ty 4
[2156]38.
[2158]We xpress
[2160]ed our. displensure to cra itkseptenber
[2162]1958 hecaus 2 of he Agency's suthorized. investigation in
[2163]the United States of eters: nian tigen whoowas here in 4
[2164]nce a .
[2166]tion with an excha ELAM, rh Romanian#indicated ta a
[2167]fneriean friend that he was intereatrd in stiying in the “ty
[2169]States, but wes not roady for actual defection because of U\
[2171]SECRET
[2173]HW 50953  Docld:327169160 Page 30
[2175]“to! noLizy" the Pagoda. * A To ‘bby “dated Sépte mbor 16, 1959, ‘was
[2176]oa. 4 Alsorsont.to-§ ish etioy s tolt “thet the Bare: ‘ati hos
[2177]vo dis cappointe od boca he had failed to make any objection
[2179]chad’ ‘not alostod “Ws -conedrnitig: the’ impending’
[2180]Bureau, (Memorandum Frohbose to Bolmont,
[2181]‘Allen Dulles: ). America's Global - ober loci,
[2182]true! Hearn ine, ceptenber, 1S59"s< and Memeorandum, Frohbo Se. to”
[2183]Beluont, September 4, 659, "Allen Dulles") 9
[2185]45. ACTIVITIES OF COMPAOTS DIVISS 3 DIVESITON OF CTA - 1956 SC)
[2187]13
[2188]‘te ‘the dtticlo nd.
[2190]attack against ¢)
[2191]a jAugus
[2193]We received infomation in September, dese, that
[2195]as as es
[2197]. the Conta Lon of CYA had held interviews with American
[2198]business
[2199]the businessmen and visiting ovietsWSIcrA reportedly was inter-
[2201]ested in developing positive ovictgplas in informationgkbut it
[2204]so happened thag,yone of ¢t! SovietsPWas involved in af double
[2206]agent operat ighf®he ing handied by ¢ Burgeau. The Buretu already
[2208]had notified CIA of our interest in the (oviet,] By Mths. ne
[2210]Geter September 29, 1959, “we voiced our objection to the m&iner
[2211]no wi doh CTA hag yondied this, (he @ a9, Bureau
[2213]WNPISHE TISLER BEFORE ‘THE
[2215]nan ACTIVITSE C LICUA) = 1659
[2216]: On November 6, 1959, information was received
[2218]indicating that HCUA was inte srested in obtaining Colonel Frantisek
[2220]Tisler, a Caech defector, to testify before the Committee, CUA
[2221]advised us that it had contacted the State Bopartment who, in
[2222]turn, head conferred with C1lA, Allen Dulles allegedly informed
[2223]HCUA that Tisler was agreeable to appearing before the Commitice
[2225]and that he would be made available pursuant to certain security |
[2227]instructions,
[2229]The Director asked whether or not CIA had authority ~
[2231]to make a defector availcble to a coneressional committee without
[2233]first checking with other pntercsted agencies. The Girector was
[2234]informed that CIA did not have such authority because a National
[2235]Security Council directive made it very clear that this not
[2236]be done without processing the matter through the Inter-:
[2237]Defector Committee, In this particular case the aforementioned
[2238]Comnittee had not called a mecting, but the chairman, a CIA
[2239]official, had made certain phone calls, . A Bureau representative
[2240]was contacted by ‘phone on November 6, 1959, but et that time we
[2241]had not formulated a position. Allen Dulles allegedly contacted
[2242]the chairman of the mmittee and was told that the Committee
[2243]had no ebjection to Tisler available,
[2245]SECRET.
[2247]Boo . oe : -17 - : “
[2249]HW 50953 . DoclId:327169160 Page 31
[2251]3 “the Beston area, which dealt with meetings between
[2255]P" One Novenber “135.1959, CIA representatives: were (oe
[2257]informed that: oppesed ttocaking. the defector. availdah 4
[2259]to HCUA.. On late we were told that CIA was infor .
[2261]pete HIOUA. Etowas re - peidtom rand that apon roconsidera a
[2262]7) Gt’ did-not feel Tisler could-be made available. “4
[2264]“dirted Nexvenber’ 14, “2959; the-develepei st
[2265]reviewed and it was recommended that —
[2266]Deteecor Committee meeting we stronely
[2268]ono in the handline of the HCUA request.
[2270]iments in
[2271]‘at.the next
[2272]protest CIA's
[2273](Bureau file
[2275]47, CRYTIC
[2277]“ ee.
[2279]On April ll, 1
[2281]Company Caracas, Venezuelan
[2284]Enbassy in Caracas.
[2286]o compli ¥
[2288]: EB Reicco
[2289]che Bureau that he reeentliy
[2290]fficial of the Uls. |
[2291]Lt ‘ ) MEER took excent
[2292]i leary statements mide by foncerning the Direc
[2293]and the FBI. SP stated that the Director should have retired
[2294]five years ago for the good.of a11 concerned, A protest was made
[2295]April 20, 19650. Vora nd unm Frohbos 32 to Relmont,
[2297]wt SDS
[2299]Anse te TO {5 taararoerye ee nn eee SOLER PORTIS, 11 - : soe i
[2302]TA Are . i
[2303]F ADVOCATING. i
[2305]Posi Lior
[2308]on Fouuds tion, -eered iutormation
[2309]ts ey made hy : ee a ten ‘
[2310]ailesedly advocated recernit thon of Red ,
[2312]yoiuint
[2314]cone myrwoge Staten
[2315]CIA official.
[2316]China.
[2318]This: matt called to the attention of Allen ; 4
[2319]‘Dulles and on Anril 2 ; Dulles informed the Linison Agent
[2320]that he Read canducted . uiry, had review wed a tape recording
[2321]of & ey talk, and was satisfied that @had not made the
[2322]4
[2324]statement attributed tol
[2325]The above is, be ing cited in the event we desire ty
[2326]dispute the pos taker 1 by Dulles, If the evidence clenriv
[2327]established that £ MP had made such a statement, we could woe
[2328]the information vo ort a position that we would have fern
[2329]varvanted in being most circumspect with (Memorandum.
[2330]Frohbose to Belmont, April 21, 1960, :
[2332]LLAT MICN OF MICRGPHONES ON U.S,
[2333]BY CTA
[2335]49.
[2337]ALLUGID INSTA
[2339]my ane a .
[2340]* ; A State bopartment representative informed the tarcan
[2341]: that a microphone had bec found in the U.O. Minbassy, Mester ' 1iss
[2342], that it had been planted by CIA; and that Allen Dulles allerett's
[2343]_ — SECRET :
[2344]oo, -~ i184
[2345]. : - en er ns ana) D8 meen oer
[2347]HW 50953 Docld:327169160 Page 32
[2349]. : 4 . a . a 2 ms ; en
[2350]sa .
[2352]oO SECRET
[2354]7:
[2357]‘had imadintained® that “VF CTA UV:
[2358]to know. what owas
[2360]S to operate @ffoetively, it Had”
[2361]coing of, im US. : stablishments . The implication
[2363]y yas Left that CIA was covering aetivities of other U.S. agencics
[2364]“os throush sechities} ‘Enstad data Inquiries: developed in rfou
[2365]“tion indicatiig that CLA’ had installed | a microphone #n the a
[2366]-in 1952 atthe. requcst of a Rte Department official, The.
[2367]-¢ pesecuritysdn State Pepa tia thine .e rontacted™ in amr-erfort
[2368]pin this fown ip 2 more specdric mnnmer, We were told Dy
[2369]“that their records: did not’ an any anv i
[2370]the mic crophone, ‘
[2371]meee ee pce uahbly, a ‘Letter was’
[2372]. Attaches instruct zag | them to be on the “to
[2373]instalintions vback : DULESU Of vations, Gionorandws
[2374]L'Allicr to ; ‘installation of Microphones
[2375]on U.e. Deon ines ;
[2376]50.
[2377]Saudienting that the
[2378]; subject of a Bu
[2379]tigetion, “had pla Tork City.
[2380]ben OFA-rogrec gubdcot TS
[2381]-to orient him se that fleet. would be derived
[2382]throurch wh piper pubbieig a ‘told that -the CIA vopre
[2383]senlocivQ® in Now Yorl Cityi@ind been instructed by his headauarte
[2384]to tell the°subjeeu that he would not be prosecuted by the US.
[2385]Governnont. We complained to CIA sti vossing that the: Agency
[2386]hed no power or authority to promise the subject immunity. ly)
[2387](Memorandum L'ALiier ta Belmont, September 36, 1660, ae
[2388]ss, a CIA gmployce, obtagned A
[2389]position as a secreta in the Orfice off tho ee
[2390]i to the United HaAtions, jPrior to receiving tit
[2391]} sureau. Ths Lh 3 gont aubsceduently len
[2392]! iforme ge the that she was Lonvins
[2393]ineuivreg if che could recommend somebody
[2394]| the nane of another CIA employee, hiss
[2395]The Liaison Agent informed CIA that the Agency was
[2396]out of line by not first ¢ ing with the Bureau pefore recon-
[2397]“mending iggthes 8, thet the Burcau was intere
[2398]in developing intelifsrence information which might be useful
[2399]to the U.5, Governnenty and that, in this instance, CTA was
[2400]° Olsteuct ini opernt ions by Not appronriately coordinating with
[2401]. wenn,  Clongrandun L'Allior to Belmont, October 31, 1966,
[2402]: >A) SECRET
[2403]° - 19 -
[2405]HW 50953 Docld:327169160 Page 33
[2407]|
[2409]Lc aeaeet ed
[2411]r —— = angel
[2413]nee SECRET a.
[2415]contacted.
[2416]Bene clear:
[2417]RPoafd document.
[2418]4 wes SOG tlie, ‘ om
[2419]3 fk reaue eted one. .of His
[2420]ne dure to preven ito oa recurrence
[2422]elmont, reh SO, Leal,
[2424]© °° Allen Dulles:
[2425]. . For use of
[2426]oe NO. mown
[2428]cahondina
[2430]such
[2432]Lge tte: a
[2433]53s, oPY IN Tf
[2435]1, MONATE .
[2437]‘In duly, 1961
[2438]proofs of the book “Ep;
[2439]A review of these proofs
[2440]| portrayed our counteresn
[2441]light. Since CIA w
[2442]/ owhiech he might perform,
[2443]fo turned out that CIA had not bee
[2444]the book. We were told that st
[2446],
[2448]icaro Office received walley
[2449]S.,'' written by Pawel Monat.
[2450]ed several references which
[2451]cnpabilitie s in an unfavorable
[2452]for Monat and for any writing
[2453]ey was discussed with CIA, 1t
[2454]following the preparation of
[2455]would be taken to protect
[2456]bs ‘gan InFomest, Phe publishers had indicnted té6 CIA that, they
[2457]would coopernte on cha Se a some changes were made,
[2458]the book still cane out with some indermation which was not
[2460]enti J favorable to (Pawel Monat, Bureau file
[2461]105-40510
[2465]54. CONSLICT, WITS LEGAL ATTACH 1961 | w)
[2468]es
[2470]yeceived information
[2472]city wes planning. to
[2473]Intelligence, ‘The Lega
[2474]that the Agence. was mot invalved., Cn October 12,
[2475]same CIA of fis ree Changed las position and admitted
[2476]been involved to a certain extent. The Liaison Agent objected ~
[2477]to these tactics, ity anportant to hin to know the facts
[2479]so he could be guided a rdingiyv. (Hemorandunf’L'Allie: to
[2480]Sullivan, October 16, Ve 61 “Eczcchoslovaiian Histomatic
[2482]’ “~ F
[2483]Activities|}- Mex ico HSS)
[2485]55, CIA TRCHNICAL SUPUEILLANCH ACTIVITY IN THE
[2487]Cn October 6
[2488]in
[2490]haregesment of its personnel by a
[2492]1 Attache was told by thegglocn L CIA office
[2493]: the
[2495]the
[2497]FA had
[2499]ok
[2501]a
[2502]u
[2503]pa
[2505]When he defected in Decembe ot y
[2506]furnished int vmeation concerning alleged penetration of American
[2507]intelligence. Iuguiries and review conducted by CIA within, the
[2508]Agency surcested thet va CIA intelligence officer, ©
[2510]“SS was a logienl suspect. We conferred with CIA and on
[2511]‘ 162, we advised the Agency that we would take over the inves
[2512]: gation. Ab. \ : ET .
[2513]: — — SECR .
[2514]-~ 290 -
[2516]CET OPT TE we et ee
[2518]HW 50953  Docld:327169160 Page 34
[2520]nee.
[2522]1661, our Legal Attache, xico eo
[2523]leating that thegzech Babe vesyRin tha
[2529]Ld and we then: learned in’
[2530]Le: y plnaned ta mate, a veerniin
[2531]S$ taken. up with CYA headquarters and
[2532]& Of: vide discrepancy: in the -
[2534]LNT ons. CM
[2536]Sonmtet
[2538]OO. Epetrucdtions %
[2539] Bicw. York City Mthat CIA
[2540]-iipreach, . $HE matter ws
[2541] aQopretest- was wade beca
[2542]“pepor ts: “we veceived on. Cia
[2544]Sullivan, Aprilk, 18, .1066,_
[2546]_ . _ ain Seneenber ,. LOGG, pan . 5
[2547]that: sof PBI docu cs hac - Senator Byrd
[2548]‘CIA. The” matter was digeussed, w a bir ector af Ci
[2549]7 Ageney subce Leaipion
[2550]that ene-
[2551]a name chee!
[2552]who
[2557]wield oin question,
[2559]in contact with
[2560]instituted a name
[2561]employee named
[2563]CIA and in this
[2564]Section. He adm
[2565]the cuff basis"
[2567]Tt heomy yvorsliention that ano
[2568]were sui equently fizved aeiged to ra
[2570]+ 1966, "he ak of
[2572]tor Robert Cc. Byrd")
[2574]UL DOUPLE AGENT st HRY u)
[2576]protested to CLA in connectig
[2577]nua interest in afchemis;
[2579]Brennan te
[2580]Concerning
[2582]6&. Al LEGGED COMPROUT
[2583]t
[2585]In}
[2586]With a matter
[2587]connected with¢
[2589]HOLS
[2591]Ve were utilizin we Chon G AS Chowbie agen’ an onerat
[2592]directed ageinst 3 j “head estaulis a velation
[2593]shiv with the fun YuUPrros ie) ivaing
[2595]Mi
[2597]that oa CEA “otfic 2a
[2599]withou e" Lidon mo mised our relationship wit the
[2600]binonist “disc Lne the ter with the president of the
[2602]irm, Veloach, March 15, 196
[2605]e
[2607]pent et
[2609]oyandunm Brennan to
[2611]Lor
[2613]Yi
[2615]In July, 1967, we protested to CIA in a case where
[2617]the Agency allegedly had failed te report to us concerning a
[2618]conmunication whic a an Cuban. exile, residing in the United St
[2619]had received from the Cuban Intell
[2620]oT Communication hae tnatras
[2622]SERRE
[2624]yo
[2626]HW 50953 . Docld:327169160 Page 35
[2630]genee Service, 9 The: particula
[2631]ved the exile to initiate preperations
[2633]_&
[2635]i
[2636]ne eee 61