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[15]The Special Investigations Group of the CI Staff (CI/SIG)
[17]CI/SIG (the Special Investigations Group) did not exist
[18]prior to the establishment of the CI Staff in early 1955, Its
[19]major functions as described in CSI No, 70-1 of March 1955 are
[20]much more modest than the functions ascribed to it in a write-up
[21]by the Staff in early 1973. The 1955 description of functions
[22]is as follows: 7
[24]"Special Investigation Unit
[26]"Major Functions
[28]"Performs the CI investigation and analysis of any
[29]known or potential security leak in the Clandestine
[30]Services organization, whether in headquarters or in
[31]the field, from the standpoint of its effect on (1)
[32]existing operations, and (2) the cover of personnel.
[33]In performing this function, maintains close working
[34]relations with the Security Office, the latter being
[35]primarily concerned in such cases from Agency
[36]sectrity rather than an operational security stand-
[39]By 1973 the description of tasks which had been assigned
[40]to CI/SIG or which they had absorbed during the course of
[41]events over a period of nearly two decades provides a much
[42]broader range of functions and responsibilities, They are listed
[43]as follows;
[45]"CI/Special Investigations Group
[47]"1, Conducts research into the long-range validity
[48]of CIA operations in terms of known or potential hostile
[49]capabilities, including penetrations, and of Agency security.
[51]"2, Carries out coordination with the Office of Security
[52]in such cases.
[54]"3. Maintains and uses sensitive counterintelligence
[55]holdings, including certain Comint and defector materials,
[56]to match these against operational and personality data
[57]and thus to derive operational leads.
[59]"4, Coordinates and cooperates with counterintelligence
[60]and security elements of other departments and agencies of
[61]the USG to detect, tabulate, and take counter-action against
[62]hostile plans or approaches abroad for the recruitment of
[63]American officials (American Targets Program).
[65]SECRE T
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[73]"S. Plays a direct role in sensitive counterintel-_
[74]ligence liaison with closely allied foreign intelligence
[75]services on hostile penetration plans and operations,
[77]"6. Reviews: compatibility between cover and
[78]assignments of CIA staff members.
[80]"7, Maintains central data on leaks to the news
[81]media and assists the Office of Security, as necessary,
[82]in determining the sources of leaks.
[84]"8, Maintains central data on the nature and
[85]extent of known compromise of Agency staff personnel
[86]to intelligence services, whether liaison or hostile.
[88]2 "9, Prepares studies of individuals, including
[89][journalists) whose foreign intelligence connections are
[90]a source of concern.
[92]10, Carries out additional and sensitive tasks as
[93]assigned by the C/CI,"
[95]The first chief of the Special Investigation Unit (SIU) (as
[96]it was called in CST NO. 70-1) was Birch O'Neal, a former FBI
[97]officer who had transferred to CIA after World War I1,* In the
[98]mid-fifties,SIG had rather slim picking and appears to have spent
[99]most of its time investigating various aspects of the [Lemay Foiti7
[100]complex (the [boris “Norrod] case) as it affected US interests based
[101]on information the Agency acquired from foreign sources. Then in.
[102]1962 SIG received its biggest shot in the arm with the defection
[103]of Golitsyn who brought with him several dozen leads to American
[104]citizens including some supposedly in CIA. The handling of these
[105]leads was assigned to SIG by Angleton, including the information
[106]emanating from Golitsyn, which related to foreign countries. Thus
[107]O'Neal and his assistant, Jean Evans, played a major role in
[108]directing the handling of the Golitsyn leads (or "Serials" as
[109]Angleton invariably called them). The activity continued through-
[110]out the sixties reaching its apex in the period 1964-65 when the
[112]HONETOL investigations (of CIA staff officers) was at its most
[114]*The term Special Investigations Group (SIG) became common
[115]usage in the sixties but no exact date can be assigned for
[116]this change.
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[139][Isract, and a contract agent in New York. In addition to the
[140]Office of the Chief (including two special assistants and a
[141]Secretariat) the Staff was composed of seven "Divisions" and
[142]four "Groups.”} y
[144]2
[146]For fiscal year 1958 the CI Staff budget was sf, 650, 000).
[149]The sun of {1,800,004 was allotted for Fiscal Year 1959, and.
[151]2
[152]82,060,006] was to be requested for 1960. Specific figures were
[153]quoted in the appropriate sections for projects or support,
[154]such as travel. ‘Otherwise the budget was almost solely for
[155]salaries of Staff personnel.
[157]The survey next gave brief attention to deception, agreeing
[158]that it had to be carefully compartmented and that it best
[159]belonged jn the CI Staff. On the subject of the “Special Investi-
[160]gation Unit, however, the survey took its first serious exception
[162]te
[163]to the organization and operation of the Staff stating: -
[164]"Hence, in order not to contaminate a senior staff
[165](CI Steff) with Agency employee investigation and/or
[167].exploitation, this should be done by individuals with
[169]CE ability within a special section of the Office of
[171]Security. It is ;
[173]"Recommended that:
[175]‘a, The DD/P release for assignment to the Office
[177]of Security several individuals, as may be appropriate,
[179]of proven CE ability to handle and exploit all cases of
[181]CE aspect involving Agency personnel;
[183]". SID and its function be eliminated from CI
[184]Staff; and
[186]"c. The DCI approve the above recommendations."
[188]The survey team took special note of the Projects Branch of |
[190]CI Staff, the section that handled the mail opening project.
[192]How it was operated and viewed in 1959 is not without interest
[194]in view of its subsequent role in the “Family Jewels" issue when .
[196]it was revealed to the Rockefeller and “Church Committees. Thus
[198]it is revealing to note the 1959 survey found nothing wrong with
[200]SECRET
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[212]2 ade shed . .
[214]the mail opening program except they worried about its security
[215]and also thought it would be more effective if expanded. This
[216]is how the survey described the project in 1959:
[218]"a. The Project Branch conducts a project of
[219]censorship within the US of mail from the USSR which
[220]is called HTLINGUAL. Originally this project was
[221]developed by the Office of Security at the request
[222]of SR Division in 1952. Its purpose was to identify
[223]and to obtain samples of handwriting and basic back-
[224]ground facts on long established correspondence
[225]between persons in the USSR and the United States.
[226]Such information was to be used operationally to
[227]sustain any communications with secret writing,
[229]_which would likely pass the Soviet censors and could
[230]be picked up in the U.S.A. The interception is done
[231]at the central Post Office in New York, and the
[232]letters are delivered to the Agency for processing
[233]and return. As the need for Soviet communication
[235]' camouflage lessened with the increase of legal
[236]travel to and from the USSR the Project was re-
[237]oriented and expanded toward direct CI and FI goals
[238]in September 1956, and it was taken over by the
[239]CI Staff. ;
[241]27
[242]~ "b. At present this sroup,jncludes live]
[243]employees in New York and[fiftéep] at Headquarters, «
[244]Those in New York are under the Office of Security;..
[245]those in Headquarters under the CI Staff. The
[246]yearly cost is the total of the various salaries,
[248]"c. The primary purposes of this Project are to
[249]produce CE information, operational leads and any
[250]positive intelligence that can be gleaned from the
[251]mail.
[253]"d, The operation in New York photographs
[254]about 50,000 envelopes per month out of a total of
[255]about 200,009 ‘letters coming from the USSR to in-
[256]dividuals in the U.S.A. via New York, These films
[257]are forwarded to Headquarters and examined in the
[259]’Projects Branch and some 10,000 of them are selected
[260]on the basis of Agency interest in the areas of
[261]origin in Russia. These 10,000 negatives are then
[262]made into prints, and the names of the addressees
[263]are recorded alphabetically on IBM cards. From the
[264]IBM cards RI makes a continuing record and a copy
[265]of this record of names is returned to the Projects
[266]Branch. .
[268]"e, About 1,000 of these intercepts are opened
[269]per month in New York by the Office of Security,
[270]the letters verifaxed and copies sent to the Projects
[271]Branch at Headquarters. There is a watch list of
[272]some 500 names on file both in the Branch at Head-.
[273]quarters and in the Security Office in New York and
[274]any letters coming from or going to any of the names
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[285]omit ree te wrens
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[291]on this list are opened. This watch list is revised
[292]quarterly. It is made up of names of interest princi-
[293]pally to CI, SR Division, and the Security Office,
[295]and includes names listed by the FBI.
[297]"f, There are trained linguist-analysts in the
[298]Branch who extract information of interest from the
[299]intercepts, and the disseminabjlity of this information
[300]is determined by the Chief of Projects Branch. At
[301]present the rate of dissemination from Projects Branch
[302]runs at an average of about 150 per month and the
[303]number is. increasing. Sixty percent of these dissemina-.
[304]tions are positive intelligence. The disseminations :.~
[305]are controlled by the Deputy Chief of CI Staff.
[307]"g. SR Division’ has obtained valuable operational
[308]leads from this Project, and the FBI wants as much>*
[309]information as it can get by this means. .
[311]"h, There are 40 individuals in CIA who are
[312]officially cleared to know about this Project, These
[313]include members of SR Division, Office of Security,
[315]CI Staff, and RI Machine Records, COPS, DD/P, DD/S,
[316]Director of Personnel (due to his previous service in the
[317]DD/P) and the Chief, FI Staff. The DCI, DDCI and the IG
[318]Staff also have access. to the Project.
[320]w"i. It would appear from present results that much
[321]moTreevalue could be obtained from this Project if more
[322]intercepts were opened. Project Branch is at present»
[323]handling four times as much volume as it did in the past
[324]with the same number of personnel and at the same cost.
[326]“Its staff at Headquarters is capable of handling 2,000
[328]per month with the present T/0, but the New York staff
[329]could not supply that number of opened intercepts unless
[330]its personnel was increased. It is felt by the Branch
[331]that a rate of 4,000 intercepts per month would be a
[332]good future goal. It is estimated that this would
[333]require an increase of one interceptor, one secretary
[334]and one letter opener in New York and an addition to
[335]Project Branch at Headquarters of four linguist-analysts,
[336]four clerical personnel and one reports officer.
[338]"j. The Office of Security, which works with
[339]Project Branch, is agreeable to the’ gradual expansion of
[340]the operation. It would be in favor of expanding at
[341]present to the extent of opening more intercepts, and 7
[342]taking samples of these intercepts for S. W. This could
[343]be done by the aforementioned increase of Security Office
[344]personnel in New York without an immediate increase in the
[345]Headquarters staff. It would be operationally much more
[346]feasible if a secure room could be obtained in the Post
[347]Office in New York for their sole use.. Since the DCI
[348]made the original arrangement for this operation with the
[349]Chief Postal Inspector, any changes in the system of
[350]operation should be made in the same way. This is the
[351]only level at which such arrangements could be accom- ;
[352]plished securely." _
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[368]versus area division prerogative in the conduct of operations.
[369]Noting that there might have been some immediate reasons for the
[370]CI Staff to take on operational aspects in its efforts to increase
[371]CI activity, nevertheless it concluded these reasons were not
[372]necessarily based on the best operational and organizational pro-
[373]cedures and methods. ‘The normal staff functions, the survey
[374]opined, could be carried out effectively with a much smaller but
[375]highly experienced staff whose impact and counsel would more
[376]favorably be received by the operating elements of the DD/P. The
[377]team also concluded that there had been insufficient attention
[378]given to penetrating hostile intelligence organizations and
[379]recommended that: ;
[381]"Chief, CI direct the efforts of the Cl Staff: toward
[382]the development of programs for the aggressive pursuit of
[383]penetration activity against hostile intelligence services."
[384]Ina forward to the report, the “Inspector General of the day,
[386]Lyman “Kirkpatrick, directed special attention to one particular .
[387]aspect of CI work.
[389]"The “Special Investigation Division assists the
[390]Office of Security in using DD/P assets to trace leads
[391]concerning CIA employees. This is probably a necessary
[392]assist to the Office of Security but should be handled
[393]with the utmost of discretion and security. It would be
[394]very seriously damaging to the efforts’ of the CI Staff
[395]if it ever became known that it was engaged ‘in any_ .
[396]activities involving CIA employees. An analgous situation
[397]is the stir caused by the occasional misimpression created
[398]abroad that CIA reports on‘other US Government employees.
[399]Thus within CIA the. Office of Security must be the sole
[400]unit to bear the stigma of being concerned with fellow
[401]employees." \
[403]Unfortunately this sensible warning was not heeded by CI
[404]Staff management, or by the management of the Clandestine Service
[405]as a whole for that matter. Instead, in.the mid~1960s the CI,
[406]Staff, with SIG in the vanguard, hypnotized by the allegations
[408]v
[409]of Golitsyn, launched HONBTOL - the active investigation of.
[411]numerous Agency employees (five in particular) - with generally
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[432]had written a provecative analysis that found Nosenko bona
[433]fide and challenged as incorrect the Monster Plot
[434]assessments to the contrary. Even more provocative, he had
[435]provided a copy directly to then DDCI Richard Helms when
[436]stymied within tha Soviet Division in promoting his view.
[437]Kalaris first learned of this well after McCoy joined the
[438]staff, when McCoy himself told him. Angleton, on the other
[439]hand, was certainly not unaware of this part of McCoy's
[440]background, and it is likely that he and Rocca and Miler
[441]interpreted Kalaris's selection of McCoy as evidence that
[443]Kalaris was out to discredit then.
[445]Kalaris, originally having been summoned home to take
[446]over temporarily until a replacement. for Angleton could be
[447]found, had a title in the beginning as “Acting Chief,
[448]crlors.* In March, Nelson told him, "We haven't found
[449]anybody yet," and as time went on it looked increasingly as
[450]if he and colby were not going to find anyone. But by this
[451]time Kalaris was becoming intrigued with what he was doing,
[452]and with the potential of the job. fie went back co[srasitial’7
[453]to see his family in late March, and when he returned he
[454]told Nelsen he would take the job on a permanent basis. In
[455]June, the “Acting” was dropped and Kalaris became Chief,
[457]CIOPS.
[459]What Kalaris Found...
[461]The state of Affaire
[463]As he looked around, Kalarig found what struck him as a
[464]desolate situation. Mountains of traffic were coming in to
[465]the staff, but none of it seemed to be of much importance.
[467]The staff had no relationship vith the Soviet Division or
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[491]any of the other geographic divisions. If the divisions had
[493]t
[495]any significant cases, Kalaris was unaware of them because
[496]the divisions were giving him nothing of substance. McCoy's
[497]arrival in the staff made thie picture unmistakably clear
[498]since, fresh from SE Division and a position therein that
[499]made him privy to virtually al] the division's sensitive
[500]cases, he was able to tel) Kalaris what he was missing on
[502]the SE front.
[504]It also before long became evident that there was an
[505]element of a two-way street in thie eituation. Soviet-East
[506]European cases were discovered in CY Staff files that the
[507]area divisions had never been informed of or had only
[508]limited information about. Thase included such cases as
[509]MORINE (8 past FBI source of voluminous GRU operational
[510]documents who was known to the Soviet Division but whose
[511]operational leads had been shared neither with that division
[512]nor with the other geographic divisions in whose territory
[513]the Soviet agents were working) ;[ KITTYHAWK] (a KGB officer
[514]who had contacted CIA during a visit to the United States
[515]several years back and who figured in a double-agent gane
[516]being run by the FBI) ; [GRIDIRON] (Leslie Jamas Bennett,
[517]former senior officer in Soviet counterespionage in the
[518]Canadian RCMP who had resigned from that service in 1972
[519]under a cloud of suspicion engendered by the Angleton staff
[520]and its guru Anatoliy Golitsyn--a case never briefed to
[523]either SE or EUR Division); and {we tvor) also known as [ozone]
[524]( Eonatantin Dunitracneson, a Romanian jintelligence officer
[525]who defected in [istaei) in 1972 and subsequently came to this
[526]country and was debriefed by CIOPS officers, but whose
[527]information and leads had not been furnisned to the axea
[529]@ivisions) .
[531]Many of the people in the staff had been hand-picked by
[532]Angleton. They had been in their jobs for a number of years
[533]and were well settled into their way of doing things. So
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[546]wall in fact that: most had given up hope of ever going
[547]anywhere else or accomplishing anything new.
[548]Compartmentation was a way of life, and management was
[549]remote from the rank and file. Kalaris was appalled to
[550]learn that his chief of support, who had worked in the staff
[551]for four or five years, had never mat Angleton; he had only
[552]Ff seen him from a distance, The overall atmosphere seemed to
[554]Kalaris to be conditioned by doublethink and mirrors.
[556]Compartmentation in the Angleton staff had been carried
[557]to such extremes, however, as to become counterproductive.
[558]With Angleton not. disposed to be forthcoming with his
[559]successor, and Rocca and Miler taking their lead from him
[560](and Hood already having left the staff and the Agency some
[561]months earlier), it was difficult for the Kalaris team to
[562]find out what the staff had been doing. Like the blind men
[563]and the elephant, the parsonnel below the top leadership had
[564]never been exposed to more than thair own narrow slice of
[565]staff activities, and accordingly even with the best of will
[566]they were limited in what they were able to tell the new
[567]management. The MORINE' case (see below) provided a vivid
[569]illustration of this point.
[571]McCoy, with his Soviet Division background, was
[572]particularly struck at the almost total absence of Soviet
[573]Ff expertise in the staff. There was no Russian language
[574]capability and no realistic area knowledge, and what
[575]experiance there was in Soviet matters was dated and
[576]limited. This was the case not only in R&A, but in the
[578]Operations Group as well.
[580]One of the first things Kalaris had to do after
[581]assuming office was find out what was in the 6afes and
[582]vaults in the Angleton premises. This ultimately took
[584]months, as there were several vaults and many safes
[586]containing among them large quantities of paper. All this
[588]a t
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[607]had to be reviewed, and not only for the purpose of
[608]determining what it was all about. Significant segments: of
[609]this material, it was discovered, were unique to the CI
[610]Staff and had never been integrated into the DO file and
[611]records system. Information from the mail-intercept
[612]program, for example, was indexed inside the CI Staff, put
[613]reflected nowhere outside. Other material largely
[614]duplicated files maintained by other elements. Some files
[615]contained Mostly press clippings. Decisions had to bé made
[616]and action taken, item by item, on indexing, transfer of
[617]files, determinations of what needed to be retained and what
[618]could or should be destroyed, etc. As the magnitude of this
[619]task became evident, arrangements were made for personnel
[620]from IMS to be detailed to the etaff on a long-term basis to
[622]go through the material.
[624]In a vaulted area across from Angleton's office a
[625]couple of safes were found for which no combination could be
[626]located, and which accordingly had to be drilled by
[627]specialists from the Office of Security. Kalaris rejects as
[628]untrue the image conveyed in Mangoid's hook about Angleton
[629]that has him personally leading SWAT teams of safecrackers
[630]as they went about opening the Angleton safeas,* but it is
[631]correct that he was present during the drilling. He had
[632]Naver seen this operation performed before, and was
[634]interested to observe how it was done.
[636]Some curious and some disquieting things turned up as
[637]the new team gradually made its way through the Cl Staff
[639]premises.
[641]--On the lighter side, in one safe two Bushman bows and
[642]some arrows were found. Concerned about the poesibility
[644]that the arrows might be poisoned, Kalaris had them sent--
[646]* Tom Mangold, Cold Warrior, Simon & Schuster, 1991,
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[661]very carefully--to OTS for examination.* When they were
[662]retuxned, with a judgment that they were harmless, Kalaris
[664]gave them to Angleton as a personal memento.
[666]VF
[668]° CI ‘Staff Memo CI 136-75, 10 July 1975
[670]‘ho
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[699]--In a more gerious vein, files vere found on the
[701]assassinations of President John F. Kennedy and his brother
[703]‘Robert F. Kannedy. These included autopsy pictures of the
[705]remains of Robart Kennedy. Although Nosenko's account of
[706]the KGB'6é involvement with Lee Harvey Oswald and his denial
[707]that the KGB had anything to do with the murder of John
[708]Kennedy ‘might reasonably explain an Angleton interest in the
[709]John Kennedy assassination, neither Kalaris nor Blee, with
[710]whom Kalaris cansulted on thie bizarre finding, had any idea
[711]why Angleton had the pictures. Neither could they think of
[712]any reason why it was appropriate for CI Staff files to
[714]contain them. They were accordingly destroyed.
[716]--Angleton's dogged pursuit, inspired by Golitsyn and
[717]his theories, of Saviet intelligence penetration of CIA had
[718]led to secret investigations, stretching ever a period of
[719]many years, of over forty serving CIA officers. Known a6
[720]the HONETOL cases, and later sometimes referred to in the
[721]popular literature as the Great Molehunt, this activity had
[722]produced extensive files in the CI Staff.* In addition,
[723]eeverai hundred files were found on American citizens who
[724]were not CIA personnel but on whom Golitsyn analysis had
[725]similarly cast some sort of KGB shadow. Among the most
[726]noteworthy of these were files on W. Averell Harriman and
[727]Henry Kissinger. Most of these files were composed entirely
[729]of newspaper reports and a few FBI reports.
[731]--Classified materials, in quantities that ultimately
[732]filled several packing boxes, were eventually found in
[733]Golitsyn's possession at nis[upseat new York/ farm hause.
[734]Some of this material consisted of personnel-type files on
[735]CIA staff officers. Golitsyn, who resisted returning these
[737]s
[738]documents when Kalaris sant people to retrieve then, ‘
[740]* The term “HONETOL,* used as an acronym, allegedly derives
[741]from a combination of parts of the last name of FBI Director
[742]John Edgar Hoover and the first name of Soviet KGB defector
[744]and Angleton guru Anatoliy Golitsyn.
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[769]a
[771]maintained that Angleton and Miler had given these files to
[772]him to review and to keep as long as he needed them, and he
[773]was not finished with them yet. Ultimately, all the files
[775]that were found were retrieved from Golitsyn, though it has
[776]never been possible to be certain that this represented all
[778]the files that he in fact had.
[780]-~A potentially explosive find surfaced in June: a bag
[781]of mail from the mail-intercept--HTLINGUAL--progqram. It had
[782]been the public exposé of HTLINGUAL and the MHCHAOS program,
[783]infiltration of domestic leftist and dissident groups in
[784]search of insidious foreign sponsorship, in a front page
[785]story by Seymour Hersh in The New York Times on 22 December
[786]1974 that had precipitated Colby's decision to force ©
[787]Angleton's retirement, and led to establishment in 1975 of
[788]the Rockefeller Commission on CIA Activities in the United
[789]States, and the Church (Senate) and Pike (House) committees
[790]to investigate CIA and its activities. Both these programe
[791]had been CI Staff responsibilities. CIA was receiving
[792]letters from citizens who believed CIA had intercepted their
[793]mail, a CI Staff representative had just finished briefing
[794]the Senate Select Committee Start on the subject,* and Colby
[795]en 16 July would he making a etatement on the mail-intercept
[796]program before the Postal Facilities, Mail, and Labor
[797]Management Subcommittee of the House Post Office and Civil
[798]Service Committee. The bag of mail was a hot potato.
[799]Kalaris's memorandum to ADDO Blee dated 3 July 1975 tells
[801]the story. **
[803]"1. In the course of preparing for a move of CI
[804]Project materials from one vault to another, we found, on
[805]top of a shelf, a dispatch [dated] 27 March 1972 from{cos
[806]Panama city] to Chief WE. This dispatch forwarded 114 items
[807]mailed from the Soviet Union to various persons in the U.S.
[809]_- 3
[810]+firnest Taikerdanag) CI 088-75, 17 June 1975
[811]ee CI 113-75, 3 July 1975 .
[813]42
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[834]These had been in a package delivered to a doctor in the
[835]lo 16-7 _
[836]feanal zone), who turned them ovar to the [Station] which in
[838]turn forwarded them to Headquarters. The dispatch was
[840]passed to CI Staff by WH Division in 1972. A note on the os
[841]dispatch indicates that CI Staff took no action other than
[843]to process the materials into its files; but the cI Project
[845]continued to hold the originals. At the time CI Projact
[847]theorized that a mailing label on a package fron(Olympus 27
[849]Corporation] in New Hyde Park, New York, to the fcanat zone]
[851]doctor had fallen off the package for the doctor, and been
[853]erroneously fastened toe the package containing the Soviet
[855]mail.
[857]"2. This is the only case as far as we know in which
[858]the original mail has been held by this Agency. In all
[859]other cases we examined the mail, opened it surreptitiously,
[860]photographed it, and put it back into the mail channels for
[861]delivery to the addressee. Thus, this presants us with a
[862]peculiar problem. The letters have all been opened with a
[863]letter opener. We do not know at what point along the way
[865]the letters were opened.
[867]"3. We solicit your advice. There seams to be at
[868]least two courses which we might pursue. We could send
[869]these items to the people to whom they are addressed, under
[870]cover of a letter explaining how we had acquired the mail
[871]and apologizing for our delay in forwarding it. Another
[872]course of action would be to reinsert the mail into the
[873]postal system by forwarding it under cover of a memorandum
[874]to the U.S. Postal] Service, In the memorandum we would
[875]state that the mail came into our hands overseas, and was
[877]inadvertently held. The memorandum would further state that
[880]this Agency does not know at what point the mail was opened.
[882]“Attachments: 114 Items
[884]2 [iungarian custdn's {sic} Declarations/
[886]i 5]
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[903]1 U.S. Registered Mail/Return Receipt
[904]65 Post Cards
[905]25 Letters
[907]2
[908]1 Gvedisn custom's (sic} Declarations]
[910]~-The person who brought the letters to Kalaria, the
[911]supervisor of the summar employee who actually found then,
[912]was known to be an Angleton loyalist, and Kalaris could see
[913]a trap unfolding in front of him if he mishandled the
[914]matter. The deliverer could be expected to tell Angleton
[915]just what was done with the letters, and Angleton to find
[916]ways to exploit any ill] conceived decisions. After due
[917]deliberation, the staff of the Senate committee was
[918]informed, and on 16 July, not quite two weeks after the
[919]initial memorandum on this subject, the DCT sent the mail to
[920]the Postmaster General under cover of a letter explaining
[921]the situation. The Postmaster General in turn sent a copy
[922]of this letter, along with the actual mail and a letter of
[923]his own, to each addressee. The Postmaster General's letter
[924]referred to “apparent interception and acknowledged
[925]retention of this mail py the CIA," and described the matter
[926]as "a serious violation of your rights" and “abuse of the
[927]mails."* In due course some of the recipients wrete letters
[929]to the DCI asking whether CIA had dossiers on them. .
[931]in April a folder with some|MORINE. material was found
[932]in an R&A safe and delivered to McCoy, who, believing that
[933]he had stumbled upon an overlooked vein of
[934]counterintelligence gold, brought the matter to Kalaris's
[935]attention. HORINE in fact had not been overlooked by
[936]Angleton, but this was not apparent at the time. The
[937]discovery of this folder le@ to a memorandum to Nelson a few
[940]days later, entitled “Skeletons in the CIOPS Closet,
[942]* OF 180-75, 15 August 1975
[944]se
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[961]the etaff, on its own and wien coordination with the
[962]division, had passed to (foreign liaison) a copy of a Fiss ~
[964]containing division-controlled NOFORN information.
[966]co: 5. sposal an
[968]The paper-and-records problem was high on the agenda of
[969]issues that needed to be addressed. The quantity that the
[970]Angleton vaults and safes contained was almost overwhelming,
[971]and much of this had never been made available outside the
[972]staff. Integration of this uniqua data into the DO records
[973]system not only made common sense; it was an obvious
[974]prerequisite to the staff rejoining the directorate.
[976]Kalaris had no problem in principle with the concept of
[977]keeping certain information within the staff, as SE did with
[978]ite fazsTorac# system, but the Angleton team had gone
[979]overboard. Whether for reasons of bureaucratic style or
[980]fear of penetration of the Agency, information of all kinds
[981]and from ail kinds of sources had been held privately. All
[982]this had first to he reviewed to identify what was
[983]appropriate to retain and what was not, and the appropriate
[985]then made retrievable.
[987]In the wake of the Rockefeller Commission investigation
[988]and the Church and Pike committee hearings, the Agency and
[989]the DO were busy writing regulations and providing
[990]guidelines to operating elements on what was and was not
[991]proper activity, particularly vis-a-vis US persons. For
[992]the cI Staff, this heavily involved definitions of subjects
[993]and activities that merited staff attention. Executive  ° +
[994]Orders would later provide a framework, albeit often
[995]maddeningly imprecise, for these questions, but the first of
[997]these addressing US foreign intelligence activitites, E.0.
[999]53 Yo
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[1023]11905, was not issued until February 1976." In the
[1024]meanwhile, advice from the Hill and the lawyers supplied the
[1025]framework. And there appeared to be hundreds, perhaps
[1026]thousands of files in the Angleton staff that had been
[1027]created and maintained according te criteria, e.g.,
[1029]anticommunism, that did not fit these guidelines.
[1031]Establishment of a guideline that counterintelligence
[1032]files were not to be established and maintained solely on
[1033]the basis of items in the prese provided for elimination of
[1034]a large percentage of the material that had been collected
[1035]by the Angleton staff, prominent among this being files on
[1036]Henry Kiesinger, W. Averell Harriman, and some 30-40 US
[1037]congressmen, among others. Common sense provided other
[1038]working guidelines such as, for example, the simplistic role
[1039]of thumb: if a file has some linkage to reality, retain it;
[1040]if not, destroy it. People from RID were brought in to help
[1041]decide what should go into the overall records system, and
[1042]what did not belong there. Some of them effectively moved
[1043]into the staff. And they were not the only outsiders to do
[1044]this. In July 1975 the Department of Justice sent some
[1045]lawyers to review the HTLINGUAL material, and when they
[1046]discovered that there were 27 boxes of it in one of the
[1047]etaff vaults it was decided that the best place for them to™
[1048]do their work would be right there. Three desks were set up
[1050]for them in the vault.
[1052]Some statistics fram monthly reports at the time give a
[1053]glimpse of the Augean task of dealing with all of this paper
[1055]and records.
[1057]-- January 1976: Five Branch personnel spent 2-1/2
[1059]days reviewing all files held in the branch fer a count of |
[1061]* Signed by President Gerald R. Ford, February 18, 1976.
[1063]$4 S
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[1083]how many of these fileé were on US citizens. Total count
[1084]was 1,018 files on Americans.
[1086]-- March 1976: All (41 linear feet) Golitsyn file
[1087]material held in records center has been recalled and a
[1089]review begun. In May six more feet were acquired from SE,
[1091]-- July: CI/RGA Index currently contains about 255,000
[1093]ecards, down over 11,000 in last ten months.
[1095]-- August: Golitsyn material nas now been
[1097]consolidated; about 15 linear feet have been destroyed.
[1099]-~ September: Approximately 40,000 cards vere
[1100]destroyed; they duplicated a more complete index maintained
[1102]by SE/CI.
[1104]‘== October: CI/R&A index has been purged of all cards
[1105]duplicated in DO main index--over 12,000 cards were removed
[1107]and destroyed.
[1109]-- February 1977: Four ISG analysts were assigned to
[1110]R&A to assist in the processing and integration of CI Staff
[1112]records into the DO central systen.
[1114]The "HONETOL" files appalled the new CI staff in their
[1115]nunbers and, as they were read, their scope and the
[1116]hollowness of the reeds upon which they had been built.+*
[1117]HONETOL had not yet become natorious to the outeide world,
[1118]but inside it was perceived as a problem of major
[1120]proportions, If, on the one hand, these files actually
[1122]« The term "HONETOL" maant Golitsyn leads to a penetration
[1123]of the United States--CIA as well as other US institutions.
[1124]This led to two kinds of files: the leads themselves, as
[1125]Golitsyn provided and described them (e.g., a file on the
[1126]lead “Sasha"); and files on suspects, i.e., pereons
[1128]suspected of being the subject of a lead. Actual leads were |
[1129]very few; suspects were very many. .
[1131]5S
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[1147]contained evidence of a penetration of CIA, this clearly was
[1148]eof vital importance. If, on the other hand, they did not,
[1149]_it was important that this be recognized and the files and
[1150]suspicions appropriately dealt with. Furie Fox} a lawyer
[1151]by education who joined the staff in late summer 1975, was
[1152]assigned to study these files. A procedure was developed
[1153]whereby he reviewed each one by one, and prepared a summary
[1154]of its contents. This went forward to Kalaris with, in each
[1155]instance, a recommendation on the cover sheet for
[1156]disposition. On file after file these cover sheets ended up
[1157]saying the same thing: that the file had been reviewed,
[1158]that the conclusion had been reached that there was nothing
[1159]of merit in it, and the file should be destoyed. The review
[1160]of the file on Richard Kovich, for example, which was eight
[1161]pages long, was dated 22 December 1975.* Kalaris,
[1162]concurring, sent it to ADDO Blee with a handwritten note
[1163]that the material in this case would be packaged and held
[1164]with instructions that it should be destroyed as soon as the
[1165]Senate released CIA from its embargo on destruction, and
[1166]that the summary memo and cover sheet would constitute the
[1167]only future recard. The HONETOL files received steady but
[1168]not priority attention. It took somewhat over a year for
[1169][Fox] to make his way through all of then. Nothing of merit
[1171]was found in any of then.
[1173]A special approach was developed to get the MORINE/ data
[1174]into central indices. As a result of the compartmentation
[1175]applied to, MORINE’ in the Angleton staff, much of the
[1176]existing ‘MORINE information was squirreled away and not
[1177]immediately appreciated. The rejuvenated exploitation
[1178]program produced a flaad of ZRTAPFY] correspondance with
[1179]field stations, but this was slow to yield indexable
[1180]material. It was not until the end of 1975 that a focused 4
[1182]* Richard Kovich was one of the three CIA staff officers
[1183]most severely affected by the HONETOL witch-hunt.
[1185]56 a
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[1195]analytical effort on MORINE got underway. Beginning then
[1197]with the cassette material (ec cpst) tnternational Department”
[1199]trainee names), and later with country summary reports when
[1200]sé analysie and liaison feedback fleshed out an understanding
[1202]of GRU residency personnel and operations, ,MORINE’ data were
[1204]provided by the staff to SE Division, which in turn conveyed
[1206]them on to RIO0 under SE Division documant (SX) numbers as
[1208][Aestoracd information. Names of GRU officers, code names
[1210]and true names (where known) of agents and davelopmentals,
[1212]support assets, etc. were indexed in this fashion.
[1214]Res i
[1215]-
[1216]The Kalaris staff inherited responsibility for 4
[1217]handful of defectors and certain contract personnel who had
[1218]heen working for the Angleton staff. This responsibility
[1220]was not particularly welcomed, but it had to be dealt with.
[1222]yr The defectors were Golitsyn, Nosenko, Deryabin, and
[1223][Rastvorov, “and a former Romanian Jintelligence officer by the
[1224]name of}/Constantin Dumitrachescu,] also known as[unpivor/if
[1225]The Soviets were well known, at least by reputation, to the
[1226]SE alumni on the staff, but the (Romanian was a total
[1228]surprise. They had never heard of him,*
[1231]In early 1972 the [Israeli internal service (Shin net)}
[1232]had approached CIA through Angleton and asked for aseistance
[1233]QO in arranging the defection and resettlement of bok
[1234]* Chief, SE (Blee) had been avare of (Dunitrachesen's/
[1235]defection at the time, and had deduced, and ultimately
[1237]obtained confirmation from the DDO, that Angleton had
[1238]arranged to bring him to the United States and had him
[1240]squirreled away.
[1244]14-0000
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[1259]This would suggest that Angleton may have lacked the
[1260]epportunity that others had had to observe the kinds of
[1261]behavior Soviet defectors have displayed in sorting out who
[1262]the important players are in matters affecting their future,
[1264]and figuring out how to deal with them. *
[1266]--In the eyes of some who knew him, Angleton viewed
[1267]himself more as chief of an operational entity than of a
[1268]staff. Few gave him high marks as an effective staff, as
[1269]opposed to operations, officer. His secret travels in
[1271]Weatarn Europe, not to mention to Israel, to meet with
[1273]senior liaison officials with whom he had developed
[1274]confidential relationships constituted a form of independent
[1275]operational activity. The proposal, ultimately stillborn, |
[1276]in 1965 for Angleton to develop special counterintelligence
[1278]units in Vietnam*s displayed certain parallels with his |
[1279]conduct. of counterintelligence abroad as Chief of the cr
[1281]Staff in the way in which the local station would be |
[1282]effectively cut out and command channel and communications
[1284]would run direct to counterintelligence headquarters in
[1286]Washington. The proposed special caunterintelligence (SCI)
[1288]units for Vietnam were modeled after SCI units employed by
[1290]X-2, the counterintelligence arm of the wartime OSS--where
[1292]Angleton began his intelligence career. Perhaps those early
[1294]experiences shaped in some way Angleton's dater preference
[1296]for conducting counterintelligence--by himself, without
[1298]invoivement of the araa divisions and stations.
[1300]--,and What To Do About Iti Game plan
[1302]The Pian
[1304]In assessing the state of affairs in the staff, it did,
[1306]* Angleton may have had some exposure, probably during the
[1307]1950s, to pre-War (1938) KGA defector Aleksandr Orlov.
[1309]*#*#-Ak described in Clevaland C. Cram's history of the CT
[1310]Staff (to 1974),[Vvol.x, pp. 1004 ££°
[1312]24, a
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[1317]* . '
[1318]1 ry
[1320]6treamline our procedures."*
[1322]By 1976 the office of the Executive Officer of the’
[1323]| Staff included a Privacy Act Section with four positions in
[1324]addition to a three-person Records and Registry Section.
[1325]| (FOIA and Privacy Act requests were handled together.) But
[1326]this by no means solved the problem. In the fall of 1977,
[1327]| as DO ceiling and personnel reductions were being meted out
[1328]and the staff was trying to gear itself to getting along
[1329]with less, the DDO was advised that the staff's Privacy Act
[1330]Section was 60 strained and ite personnel under so much
[1331]preséure that henceforth it would not accept deadlines
[1332]imposed by elements outside the staff. When requirements
[1333]were received, the section would advise the requester how
[1335]much time would be required te complete the work.
[1337]But norma) FOIA and Privacy Act requests were not all;
[1338]~ there were also specialty ragquests that had to be met. All
[1339]had the common denominator of the staff's unique files and
[1341]recorde. These included such matters aa:
[1343]-- FOIA requests for information concerning Lee Harvey
[1344]Osewald.** Handling these required the creation of a task
[1345]force of 13 operations officers and analysts, plus clerical
[1347]personnel, and their full-time efforts for over a month.
[1349]-- Requests for interviews and/or information from the
[1350]Senate and House Select Intelligence Committees, and the
[1352]Department of Justice.
[1354]-- A review of the Resanberg case by a Federal court,
[1356]which caused problems with reqard to related VENONA
[1358]* CI 131-78, 9 July 75
[1359]*k Nosenko's assertion that he was familiar with the KGB's ,
[1360]. asseesmant of and involvement with Oswald in the Soviet
[1361]i. Union had led to endless debriefing, analysis, and cross-
[1362]checking research on this subject.
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[1376]United Statea: “In each case you open a file on there nust
[1377]be a demonstrable Cf interest. Please assure that thie
[1378]guideline is followed meticulously." ,
[1380]eub e e~ Was charged with the
[1381]és conduct of and coordination on double agent operations
[1382]abroad. Since the vast majority of DA cases were run by the
[1383]US military services, the FBI, or--in some instances--
[1384]“foreign-liaison services, the branch was very heavily a
[1385]coordinator rather than active runner of operations.
[1387][axe o io 76 -- Was charged with
[1388]coordination with the area divisions on matters of CI
[1389]interest, and with stimulating CI disciplines and practices
[1390]in the area divisions and field stations. The centerpiece
[1391]of the branch's activity was management and conduct of the
[1392]CI Survey program. Consisting itself only of the branch
[1393]chief and two clericals, the branch staffed its survey teams
[1394]with detailees from the area divisions and CI Staff officers
[1396]borrowed from other branches of the staff, both Ops and R&A.
[1398]one Branch -- Was charged with
[1399]operations designed to counter and disrupt the activities
[1400]abroad of foreign intelligence services inimical to US
[1401]f interests. Charlies Anderson, an LA Division officer who was)
[1402]brought in to the staff by Sternfield to head the branch,
[1403]had had considerable experience in CA operations, and the
[1404]branch's activities reflected this background. virtually
[1405]all had a clear CA character, from promotion of a hook about
[1406]the Tupamdros and terrorism in Uruguay, to a press campaign
[1407]in Europe designed to expose the Curiel apparatus as an
[1408]_inetrument of Soviet intelligence, to a paper on the Cuban
[1409]intelligence residency in Chile during the Allende regime.
[1410]Primary orientation was toward Latin America, with heavy as
[1411]focus on terrorist organizations and activities. Anderson's
[1412]operations tended to be highly imaginative, often complex, /
[1414]71
[1415]SECRET SENSITIVE NOFORN
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[1425]PAPER: THE IMS TEAM FINALLY GOFS HOME
[1427]In May 1980 the IMS analyst group detailed to the CI
[1428]Staff to deal with the paper inherited from the Angleton
[1429]Staff finally completed its work and returned to IMS, In
[1430]all, @auring the preceding four and a half years some 600 feet
[1431]of CI Staff files had been reviewed, about 375 feet by IMS
[1432]and 225 feet by CI Staff personnel The Analysis Group matin
[1434]index had been reduced from 500,000 cards in 1975 to 28,000,
[1436]DERYABIN RETIRES
[1438]Peter (Petr) Deryabin retired in January 1981 on the eve
[1439]ef hig 60th birthday, One of the early group of KGB officers
[1440]to come to the West following the death of Stalin in 1953, he
[1441]had defected in Vienna in 1954. Since that time he had been
[1442]continually assaciated with, and in effect a ward of the CI
[1444]Staff. For a number of years he, along with other defectors,
[1446]. 14
[1448]8 ECRET / NOFORN