[1]1404-10330-10060] , (2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 f***
[2]er tt : SECRET
[4]te
[6]Q
[8]15 October 1996
[10]al
[11]mEMoraibum FOR: Assassination Records Review
[12]: Board
[14]FROM: John F. Pereira
[15]Chief, Historical Review Group
[17]SUBJECT: Foreign Government Information
[18]Australia)
[20](We request that this memorandum be returned to CIA once the
[21]Board has completed its deliberations on the issues discussed
[22]below.)
[24]1. (S) Issue: This memorandum will address CIA's position
[25]on the review and declassification of foreign government
[26]information that appears in the JFK collection. This issue has
[27]come to CIA's attention because of the recent review by the JFK
[28]Board of “Australian Tiaison=documents. The Agency believes it is
[29]important to address this issue at_ this time because this is the
[30]first instance that this type of foreign liaisonsdocument has
[31]been reviewed by the Board and it is possible that such
[32]information will appear again in CIA's collection. This memo
[33]will, therefore, focus on the larger issue of a:-United States
[34]Government (USG) agency's legal obligations in the dissemination -
[35]and declassification of foreign gevernment information jbut will
[36]also address the spécific issue of the six “Australian documents "
[37]- (documents: 104-10012-10078, 104-10012-10079, 104-10012-10080,
[38]104-1,)Q32-10081, 104-10009-10222, 104-10009-10224) .
[40]2. (S) Conclusion: CIA does not object to the release of the
[41]information in these six documents, but is only concerned about
[42]protecting foreign government information. Therefore, the Agency
[43]does not object to the release of the four CIA documents in the
[44]redacted form proposed by the Board. With regards to the
[45]tAUStralian Tettérs) the Agency has no authority to unilaterally
[46]agree to their release in any form. Pursuant to its legal
[47]obligations, CIA ordinarily seeks the consent of the foreign
[48]government prior to declassifying their information. However,
[49]for réasons_described hérein, it—is-not possible to even seek the)
[51](éonsent of thé “Australians at this time, nor?would it be likely)
[53]ithat. the Australians woWld give it. Rather than going_to, the .._!
[55]‘Australians against its better.judgment or requesting the °
[58]a y
[60]se rene et TH
[62]CL BY: (2224130. °
[63]CL REASON: 1.5(d)
[64]DECL ON: X5
[66]DRV FM: LIA 3-82
[70]. SECRET
[72]SUBJECT: Foreign Government Information
[74]\President to agree tio the unilateral declassification of foreign’)
[76]( government information, - CIA proposes that the release of the | .. 4
[78]_taustralian documents be either _Rostponéd” for a short time or that *->
[79]zai . ; Aerie Mae ee ve earn sek wee
[80]a Subs eitution be made
[82]3. (U) Legal Authorities: The procedures governing the
[83]declassification and dissemination of foreign government
[84]information are set out in Executive Order 12958, as well as
[85]Director of Central Intelligence Directives (DCIDs). Executive
[86]Order 12958 defines foreign government information as including
[87](1) information provided by a foreign government, or any element
[88]thereof, with the expectation, expressed or implied, that the
[89]information and/or the source of the information, are to be held
[90]in confidence; or (2) information produced by the United States
[91]pursuant to or as a result of a joint arrangements with a foreign
[92]government, or any element thereof, requiring that the
[93]information, the arrangements, or both, are to be held in
[94]confidence. Id., at §1.1(d)
[96]4. (U) Foreign government information is subject to a
[97]classification determination under E.0. 12958, section 1.5(c).
[98]When so classified, U.S. government agencies are obligated to
[99]protect that information from unauthorized disclosure. The E.O.
[100]requires that foreign government information shall either retain
[101]its original classification or be assigned a U.S. classification
[102]that shall ensure a degree of protection at least equivalent to
[103]that required by the entity that furnished the information. Id.
[104]at 1.7({e). Furthermore, agencies are required to safeguard
[105]foreign government information under standards that provide a
[106]degree of protection at teast equivalent to that required by the .
[107]originating government. Id., at 4.2(g).
[109]5. (U) Pursuant to his authority as head of the
[110]nae ence community to protect all classified information from
[111]unau rized disclosure, the Director of Central Intelligence has
[112]issued Directives (that is, DCIDs) setting out the procedures for
[113]the declassification and dissemination of foreign government
[114]information. Intelligence obtained from another government or
[115]from a combined effort with another government, may not be
[116]released or authorized for release without its consent. DCID 5/6
[117]attachment -3. Furthermore, the release of intelligence that
[118]would be contrary to agreements between the U.S. and foreign
[119]countries is expressly prohibited. Id., at c.5.
[121]6. (U) Finally, the very fact of intelligence cooperation
[122]between the U.S. and specifically named foreign countries and
[123]government components is classified SECRET unless a different
[124]classification is mutually agreed upon. DCID 1/10-1. Such
[125]infeamation may be declassified only with the mutual consent of
[126]the U.S. and the foreign government whose interests are involved.
[127]DCID 1/10-
[129]2
[131]SECRET
[134]13-00000
[136]* SECRET
[138]SUBJECT: Foreign Government Information
[139](Australia,
[143]the U.S. and the foreign government whose interests are involved.
[145]DCID _1/10-1.
[146]7.. (U) National Security Considerations: The importance of
[148]suchscéordination with foreign governments prior to the release
[149]of their information cannot be overemphasized. Should CIA, or
[150]for that matter any (USG) agericy fail to coordinate where
[151]required, not only would it be a violation of the aforementioned
[152]E.O. and directives, but it would chill relationships it has
[153]developed with foreign services over the years. If such lack of
[154]coordination became known, foreign services would hesitate to
[155]share crucial intelligence information with CIA if they believed
[156]it would be released, in spite of any agreements or U.S. laws to
[157]the contrary, without their consent. Furthermore, the U.S. could
[158]not expect foreign services to safeguard U.S. government
[159]“information that it shares with its liaison partners in order to
[160]pursue authorized intelligence and foreign policy objectives.
[162]8. (S) According to its legal obligations described herein,
[163]CIA coordinates the dissemination and/or release of foreign
[164]government information. Its obligation to do so is similar to
[165]its obligation to coordinate declassification efforts with
[166]another USG agency should the CIA possess any of that agency's
[167]documents. For example, CIA could not declassify and release to
[168]the public FBI information located in CIA files without
[169]coordinating with that agency. Similarly, CIA has no authority
[170]to unilaterally declassify foreign government documents or
[171]information in its files.
[173]en gee
[174]Te
[176](ers alia: As two of the documents. |
[177]at issue here are letters from the Australian servicé (104-100095 \.
[178]|. 102247~104-10012-10080)\ CIA is legally obligated by E.O. and
[179]‘ “agreement with the Australie
[181]9. (8) Ccoordination..with A
[183]nS to seek the consent of the
[185]‘Rustralians»prior to their release, even in redacted form. The
[187]Oo —_— cat noire . . . meas ek g RATAN gl permite a RON emt > q acta ‘ .
[188]! assué 6f coordinating with the cAiistralian, servicé.is a timely
[189]tone. In most cases, CIA would not have an objection to going to
[190]i ‘the foreign government and seéking their consent for declas-
[191]sification. However, several events that have occurred in the
[192]last few months depict just how seriouslyéAlstrdlia\considers any
[193]| findication that the U.S. is unable to protect from release their .
[194]4 classified information. Based on the incidents described an
[195]wwibelow, it is CIA's position that even asking the ~Australians>for
[196]_onsent to release would threaten the current relationship.
[200]L
[202]{ 1
[204]. le Within the last year, a demarche was made by the (Australian nt
[205]\ government expressing strong concern that U.S. declas-
[207]Lee
[209]-
[213]sification legislation expressly spell out that no information
[215]\ i
[216]| { provided to the USG by theyAustralian Séxrvicé}be declassified |. .
[217]. wakh®ut its permission. A copy of this demarche is provided
[219]. | for the Board's review. (See attached.) It is worth noting N
[221]ee pee EN ee cee en ea fet. . —— a et
[223]3
[224]SECRET
[227]13-00000
[229]SECRET
[231]SUBJECT: Foreign Government Information
[233]fa WE EE eee Lt yrs
[234]f rather between governments -- it waS literally delivered by Rk
[235] q the Australian Ambassador to the National Security Council ands_| :
[236]ff te the U.S. Ambassador to Austxalia... “he manner in which the
[237]yy Augtralians treated the demarché demonstrates that the a j
[238]y °° Pp ction of classified information is receiving top priority
[239]{ in the Australian government and is not just a concern of . 3
[240]i their intelligence community. S
[242]a TUTE : °
[243]A _p On two recent but’ separate occasions the Australian sevice ~ ~~¥
[244]| passed to CIA information indicating that there would be 4
[245]assassination attempts on two non-U.S. citizens. CIA
[246]-) =<requested that it pass this information on to the targets, but
[247]| the Australians refused. They argued that the information was
[248]ro not specific-enough and would endanger a source. The
[249]/ , Australians stated that if they believed thé’ information was ;
[250]| useful, they would pass it themselves. The Australians were .
[251]OY concerned that CIA had even asked to pass,on this information,.—
[252]nog) and queStioned what they perceived as CIA's willingness to ~ . mt
[253]“|, # share their information with third parties. Finally, they
[254]i stated that the easiest way to protect their information was Ss
[255]4 simply not to..pass it to CIA anymore. a
[257]a = a
[259]48 Just this month, a senior official of the Australian service _ |
[260]\ “approached the CIA with accusations that a former Agency
[261]~ employee allegedly_may have disclosed their classified
[262]‘\ information. The Australians believe that this disclosure" 5
[263]id may be related to the loss of all agent reporting sources »=————"- '
[264]3 ina country of particular interest to them. The DDCI a bo
[265]Loe promised the head of the Au: Australian service to launch _an : i |
[266]\ investigation into the matter
[268]_ q_imvestigation into the matters
[269]ye THE Australian service recently expressed grave concérn to CIA
[270]. about a book published by~an American USG official which =| ‘
[271]| ' , alludes to a relationship between the CIA and the Australian 3
[272]= service. Even though“this book was not an official CIA are
[274]:; \.. acknowledgment of a liaison relationship, to the Australians, —
[275]| 3 this incident called into question the CIA's ability to protect
[277]ji that relationship. er
[279]-_ 10. (S) Under the. circumstances, it. would be an affront to
[280]me the Australians to be asked for their consent in light of the
[281]yt \Nabove events which have all occurred in the last year. The- -
[282]sAustralians would not only be extremely upset with CIA, but would ~~ ¥
[283]ycertainly deny their consent. Should the Australians deny their }
[284]consent, CIA would have no authority to agree to the. release of
[285]dbthe nPormation and would be obligated to do all. it_ ‘could to
[286]prevent disclosure. It is cruct#al not only*to CIA's mission but
[288]os i
[290]a
[292]Fg Eto ene
[296]we . 4
[298]SECRET
[301]13-00000
[305]ee , SECRET
[307]SUBJECT: Foreign. Government Information
[309]| Gaustealis
[310]cise’ to the
[312]also to the conduct _ of US foreign relations that the USG is seen i
[313]i as abiding by its agreements with foreign services aS well as its ph
[314]| own laws on n_the release of information, ee
[316]f ta (s) Finally, the importance of maintaining good _
[317]. relations with the Australians cannot be overemphasized. As a
[318]|’*~Fesult of our valuable relationship with our Australian liaison
[320]__. _ a aaa mene TTT ae ney
[322]counterparts, thé USG.. receives. a large volume of finished “~“
[323]; imtelligence.. Due to our shrinking resources; much of this
[324]yr information would not be available to U.S. policy makers were it 5
[325]-senot provided by the Australians. Additionally, we work together “os
[326]._ with the Australians around the world on joint collection a
[329]\, activities that cover the full spectrum of USG.inteTligence
[331]" priorities. Finally, there are several critical collection
[333](|) efforts vital to the USG where we do not have the entrée to _
[335]7, collect intelligence independently. In these cases, we rely
[336]entirely on. the continued good will of the Australian services to
[338]| provide us with the assistance necessary to meet U.S.
[340]“{S) In light of all the above, CIA submits the
[341]7 kenge two proposals for the Board's consideration. First-— !
[342]the Board could postpone these two documents from release for a ae
[343]short period (we propose 10 months) at which tint CIA can S|
[344]reassess its relationship with the Australians. It is possible :
[345]that the relationship with CIA and Australia could change so that -/
[346]{ it would be possible: to seek their consent for release in full. 7
[347]i, However, should we seéek-the consent of the Australians at a
[348]a future date and the Australians object“fo the release of the j
[350]wen
[352]: {, Gocuments, we would ask-that the Board seriously consider any
[354]its" negative reaction from the Australians in its deliberations and™
[356]if abide by their desires. A second option would be for CIA to
[358]{ - coordinate with the JFK Staff a substitution or some sort of
[360]4 Summary: OF the Australian documents for immediate rélease. This
[362]Ss would hide the fact that the letter came from the
[364]| Australian service, but would reveal what the subject of the
[365]letter was. This would avoid the problem of having to go the
[367]ii Australians to seek their consent, which we would havesto do even
[369]Wk in in the case.of redactions. | wale! CT ne eae eee ae per
[371]et Te raglan, Uf ee aes Ene Fo
[373]13. (U) Should the Board reject these proposals, CIA is”
[375]| willing to work with the Board to reach another mutually
[377]| agreeable solution. We strongly believe, however, that any
[379]| approach which suggests that the U.S. Government may ignore its
[380]‘obligations and commitments to foreign governments would
[381]seriously undermine the vigorous. and healthy diplomatic as well
[382]\as intelligence relationships that we currently enjoy.
[384]a ea EO, =
[387]——Srge (S) With, regard to eo the remaining four do documents (104—
[389]10012-10078, 104- -10012-10079, .104-10012-10081, 104-10009-10222, $<
[391]these are CIA documents and with the ‘redactions proposed by “they
[393]ere hn ae Se eon! Ct —_ ad eed
[395]i SECRET
[397]13-00000 |
[398]ws SECRET
[400]SUBJECT: Foreign Government Information
[401]Australia:
[403]— : a se
[407]jgovernment . ‘As such, CIA consents to the™ release of these.
[408]aan documents with the redactions proposed. (Pye the Board. . ; i
[409]i 15. (S) Proposal for Future Coordination: With regards to’:
[410]any wkifer foreign government information that may exist in the
[411]| files, CIA proposes that it approach its liaison services to
[412]xequest their consent in the release of their information when it
[413]would be appropriate to do so. Although recent events with
[414]| Australia\make it impossible for CIA to approach them at this \
[415]\ . ‘(€ime, this may not be so with other services. In cases were CIA
[416]believes, because of the nature of the relationship, that it
[417]would not be possible to request the consent of the service, cra
[418]- proposes.that the documents. either be postponed from release or
[419]’ that CIA “and Board' s staff coordinate a summary.
[421]val Sa
[422]94 Gouin ‘
[424]John F. Pereira
[426]Attachment
[428]6
[430]SECRET
[433]13-0Q000. . °
[435]Attached is a copy of the Australian Demarche on US. legislation on declassification.
[438]His Was given to the U.S. Ambassador to Australia, / Ambassador Perkins by Philip oy
[439]=o E ee EF
[441]wn eseee . ne
[442](Roc tfien Director of the Office of National peeemenis CNA in September 1995. ~
[444]This -demarche was also given to-Sandy Berger at,the-National Security Council by
[445]“a
[447]‘Australian Ambassador to the United States Don Russell on 4 August 1995. >
[449]4
[450]t,
[453]13-00000
[455]“ "CONFIDENTIAL
[457]AUSTRALIAN COMMENTS ON
[458]BXECUTIVE ORDER 12958 ——
[459]CLASSIFIED NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
[461]The Australlan government wishes to register fis concern over the 17 Apri
[463]“Order on Classified National Security Information and the apparent omission of any
[464]pt x explicit provision to. protect foreign-sourced information or documentation from
[465]auromatic declassification once it ix over 25 years old.
[467]The Australian governitient unders
[469]improving access to government. information, but aré maintaining provisions to
[470]_ protect forelgn-sourced Information — including U.S, information,
[472]We do not agree that these principles can be applied by one foreign government to the
[473]information or documentation of-another government without pri
[474]‘clearance. Australlan-sourced information was and continues to be pas
[475]government on the understanding that It will be protected. We adopt precisely the
[476]samie approach to information that tho U.S. shares with us.
[478]; sulla f the. Austra &n governnicnt, not
[479]be in keeping with the. 1962: U. S.-Australla General Security: of Info
[481]countries and compromise intelligence sources and methods (upon which the U.S.
[482]depends in part),
[484]. Australian concerns could be addressed if provision for clearance with originators of 4
[485]= {oreign-sourced materlal was embodted in the Information Securlty Oversight Office
[487]= ¥ Implementation directive to U.S. agencies. — :
[488]C — such an approach should not impede or delay the declatstfication process —
[490]“= Austrulia is not seeking this, Por example, catogorics of sensitivity for Au
[492]‘could be identified. A reasonable tlmc Limit could be put on Ausculian response
[493]mé¢_aftéc which the U.S." co free to declassify (we have a sie
[494]; urrangement with the U.K.) ; ; ~~