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[3][104-10179-10028, [2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 **esiitiatetbati
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[8]ies SECRET
[9]ant
[10]\ KEMORANDOM FOR THE RTCORD , ut - .
[11]-JTO6I3
[13]SURJECT: Contact Report on Meeting with AMRUMGL 2°
[15]1, On 5 Yovezter at 1130 hours, <MRCNG-] and -INTECXER were met
[16]at the washington Airoort by undersigned. They were then taken by
[17]taxi to the “ayflover Potel, where a room had been reserved ... for
[18]their use. ifter having lunch at the hcte?, the party sdJournad to
[19]the m, where ACE NGS] was given = stort briefing on rane! sco (9
[20]Castell, the -/T operator who waa schediled to meet AXSTNG-1 at
[24]2. At 18€0 hovrs, the under: eat to the lo‘ ty of the hotel
[25]. > where Francisco was waiting wtnliey © Carcial his escort officer,
[27], 03 (Garcia was instructed to bring Francisco vu? a\ the mon. It was :
[28]: 4 in advance of thia that all srincipals would with draw from >. {
[29]: the room to rive AYRUNC-2 an opportunity to talk with Francisco alone oF °
[30]; Forever, it wes sugrested that! Garcta\¥eturn a half hour before the
[31]: interview was terminated to clear u> any points as to the nature of
[32]Francisco's training, or any aspects that ¢MPUNG-1 right wish to
[33]olerify. The interview with Francisso «as terminated stout 1510
[34]hours, as AYEING.1 statod he would be oleasod to have francisco . '
[35]assigned to hin, All indications were that a happy racport was este- :
[36]blished between the vrincinpals and a camoleto understanding was ~ . ;
[37]reached as to the future role of Francisco ag the «/T operator for : }
[38]the AMYUM ercuo in Cuba, > :
[40]4 :
[41]3. At aporoximtely 1535 hours, |Andy Rogors| put in hie appearance |
[42]at the mon an’ was introduced to AMETNG.) as Mr. Rodrick. Prior to |
[43]this meeting, ““RUNG-l was told that Mr. Rodrick was the coordinator
[44]for operations and wwld lire to dise:ss some of the core snecific |
[45]aspects with hin, orior to hig return to Cuba. [Cecil Cartwright), who df .
[46]had escorted ASNCNG.) Yashington, asked to sift in on this ing 7 .
[47]along with "eters and Rorergpies he felt that MASH sheald be fully - me
[48]informed on watever operstiona] matters were discussed with AMAUNG-1 SO
[49]for rore effective future cooniistion between Headquarters and ¥ASE. . |
[50]i
[51]|
[53]- 0S Rogers\indicated no objections to this and stated he was glad to have ~
[54]sit in at this meeting.
[56]4. In substance, Rorera covered most of the hichlights dealing”
[57]with previcus attests to Suxply the ANTUM group with amas and ammo,
[58]and air-neritine overations currently being clanned. in this
[59]connection, ?°S0NGal was highly pleased to learn that a.~,000 pound
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[63]DB
[67]SECRET
[71]shipzent had been successfully infiltrated to his group during his absence
[72]and avain urged that wore euch sricments should bo etepped ur in the Suture,
[73]Ho 0} then briefly discussed tho SINS? operaticn and asked {*AUNG-1 if he
[74]ddn’t thank this area fer the Co wa. already "Clown? due to the number of -
[75]people whe alr-ady knew cf his o,eration. (This includes £ other people
[76]besides ANKUM]-1 and A GUNG-1.) AMEUNG-L stated he was not sure, tut would
[77]inve:tigate this upen hie return. However, ke felt that this wags an excel-
[78]lent DZ site and should be uticiized for any sutsncquent airdrop scheduled in. -
[79]the Pinar del Rio province dy [Rogers inferred AVAUNG-1 that his overlaya on .
[80]various LZ"s and £2's had beet rec@ived and were being reviewed by the, operae
[81]ticns peo,le. He corplirented avAUNG-1 on the excellent sork of his carto-
[82]gvrepher and oxpressed the vaew that thease [Z areas would be rut to good use.
[83]Finalsy, he assured avaCNGel that no stone is being left unturned to provide
[84]his grov, with the nosessary rateriel sup,;ort sich is critically nevded and
[85]thut this sup.ort «ill de step ed up as our infiltraticn Capabilities are ine
[86]creased both by air and sea. In parting, he cautioned a’ iUxGel not to tuke
[87]any unnecess «ry chances when he resumed operaticnal activities in Cuba, since
[88]his lesdershiv in the ANYUM group was vital to our overall interests, The
[89]meeting was terminetad about 1720 hours us| Rovers] and Peters took their deo
[91]partlure, or
[93]5. Sore of the more significant hiyblirhts of the conv-rsaticns unteti -
[94]tock place betwe.n AYAUNG=1l and the undersigned prior to his meetings with the
[95]W/T operator (Francisco) and Jie zersl ral aro noted herewith:
[97]a. Eecurity: Castro eg taken stringent acti n in tirhtening up
[98]his internal security a, ainst counterer:voluticnary forces inside
[99]Cuba. The raiitia arr being usea to search heus<:s ror concesled
[100]weapons (ustally by a hlock system), and anyone failing to produce
[101]proper identification ic removed for questicning by the NiFR.
[102]Hence, AMSUNC-1 and his orgsnizati 1 are largely confining thoir
[103]aCtivities te the daylicht hours from C700 to 2000 haurs. He
[104]considers night operaticns © particularly on the st:ects of Havana -
[105]as highly dangerous inasruch as the DJ-N (security orrans) are .
[106]cecnstantly on the alert to stop individuals cn the street to check
[108]their identification dccuments.
[110]b. Documentati:n of A,ents in Cuba: A¥AU'IC-) surgested using an
[111]identiricatin card issued by the Havana University for their
[112]students. Re had a sample copy in his ;ossess:on, wich he cleiza-
[113]was readily accepte? by Castro security. forces as being valid.
[114]Sirdlarty, a driver's Jicense prozerly authenicated along :with a _
[115]health certiricate were considored to ha gocd "cover" docurents Coe
[116]for agents cperating in the Havana arva. A supsly of blank identi- -
[118]ficaticn cards wi:i be turned over to the Staticn by AYAUNC-] fap :
[120]trenerittal to headquart-rse for any sutecquent Accurentation of”
[122]SECRET
[124]ae ea as ee
[126]2
[131]d.
[135]ob
[137]agente whe can be passed off as students at the Ravana University.
[138](He suggested preparing cae for tis n/T o;erator (Francisco),
[140]Cperaticnal Expenditures: CQue:ied on this aspect, *3UKG-1 stated
[141]his organizati n-weuld need a rinizum of 50 to 60,N0 pesos a
[143]month to cover their cverall operaticnal expenses. These funds are
[144]being used for safehouse raintenance, travel e>penses, purchase of
[145]vehicles and gascline, ailosaticn of funds to varicus sub- Lo,
[146]divisions of the AMYTM erganizaticn located in varicus provinces of
[147]Cuba, and purchase of food and sup ort of various arents whose :
[148]families may be in dire need of food and medical surrzlies.
[150]“/T_o.erators: To date, both A’PANIC<14 and AYCIZX-} have net
[151]met the requirements for effective coraunica‘ion with us on AXYUK
[153]operat.cns, However, A¥i0NG-1 feels that AVPANICAIS has not been
[154]compromised or turned by the DIZx and once he rets cover his nervous
[155]state, it is possible he can stil] be used. Sirilariy, althcugh -
[156]ANGLEN-1 ds considered to be a co d W/T cjeratar, AYStNGe] fecls
[157]his usefulnoss to hir has been considerably nejatet by the nature
[158]of his assignment at the Naval base end bis recent restrictions
[159]to this base by orders of the Castro regire. In stert, AYRUNGel
[160]feels com-unicaticn is the weabost link in his current cperativna
[161]and that direot com-unicati:ns with the Embassy is growing ine. -!
[162]creasingly hazardous, due to the fact that Embassy perscnnel cre
[163]under closo surveillance by the Castre cecurity forces. For this
[164]reason he feels that Francisco wili fill a sericus wid in this
[165]respect, once he is infiltrated into the AMY! K orjansaticon in
[167]Cuba.
[169]Support for other anti-Castro gro.ps in Cuba: aNaCMe2 stated that
[171]all materiel suport stould do funneled directly te bis orgeniza-
[172]ticn for dietrituticen to other anti-Castro gro-ss in Ceba. In
[174]his view thig would serve as a ccntrol factor in-unifying tke over.
[175]all effort of the varicus spiinter ,roups seeking svet suppcrt in .
[176]Cuba and ould alse entsance the pfestire of the MRE es the spears
[177]head for the FRINTE. He then went cn to acd that he was fully —
[178]aware of our efforts to supsort other groups in Cuba, which he — -
[179]assumed we were operating with on a unilateral basis, (i.e., he
[180]sited Nino Dias in Oriente). AMMUNG-1 felt this was a serious) ~
[181]pistuke, as this unilateral sup,ort would affect the leadership and
[182]directicn new being provided by the MAR throughout Guta. . The .
[183]undersigred told AMalNGel that he arreed on the desirabiiity of .
[185]&@ coordinate d effort on the part of all counter-revoict:o.ary
[187]groups seeking to overthrow Castro using the FRENTE as the rally. —
[189]4ng center. However, tie Guestion of supcort being :étee ted
[190]through one channel namely: his organization in Cundé, was neither
[191]feasible nor practical. The fect that Castro had tightened up
[192]security throughout the various previnces of Cuha, woul? make it
[193]difficult or iupossihle for the A! YUM group tc ship arss and other
[195]equipsent from Havana te the eastern rost Frovinces (ieee, Las
[197]SECRET
[200]14.99000
[202]t
[204]| ae
[205]Villas, Caraguay of Oriente) without jeopardiging both shiprents
[206]and person el. Hence, the need for unilateral action on our
[207]part to sup..y those fighting groups in these provinces. This
[208]explanaticn appeared te satisfy AYEUNG21, however he still insisted
[209]that his organizati n should at least be appraised of any valeriel
[211]support provided other groups in Cuba, He was sasured that wa
[212]would take Lis request under consideraticn.
[215]|
[216]f, abDID?Y-1: AMKUNG.1 feels that no useful purzose would be served
[217]in sending his a:stciate to Join forces with him in Havana. He
[218]feels that AFBID0Y-1 shculd continue te r-present the A‘YUK
[219]facticn in the FAD and when the counter-r veluti-r-ry forces aro
[220]Cully prepared to everthrew the Castro reg-re, ab PINtTY-1 will be
[221]: brought into the Pinar del Rio to direct the AY YY forces in this
[222]| province.
[223]| g- Manolo Ray: ALAUNG-1 considers RAY as a tiphly danverous individual
[224]i because of his great amb.ticn to pluy a presinent role in any
[225]| sudsoquent Cuban gov rnzent following the overthrow of the Castro
[226]regise. In his opinion, RY poses a sericua threat to VAHOKA's
[227]Jeadership and the FRD inside Cuba. Ho is attempting to draw a
[228]various dissident groups to hie banners «nd appears to hve support. .-
[229]from the riddle class represented by business intercsts, politiciaks,
[230]and the professicnal class. Should w¥ te persuated to join
[231]| forees with the FRD, AMAUNG.2 thinks he wi:] continue to operate
[232]| on & unilaterai basis while soeking to supercede the FRD with
[233]| his om cryanizaticn in Cuba, .
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[248]h. Tony Varona_and the FRD: Although AMRUNG-1 reccgnizes the neod
[249]to aupport the FRO as a political front for rallying counter-
[250]revolutionary grou;s against the Castro regi-e, he n netheless
[251]feels that the FHENIE and Tony VEiCNA hive Jozt eensiderable face
[253]i in Cuba by inaction and political maneuv-ring. He further pointed
[254]out that he is aware that thousands of doliars tad been poured inte
[255]the FRraTz, but dissident groups in Cuba h-ve s<en no evidence of
[256]any of this money to sup ort their efforts to cverthrow Castro. —
[257]Hence, ccnfidence in the FID is at a relatively low ebb amcnz the
[258]people in Cuba and a new shot in the arm in the form of materiel
[259]and financial support is needed to restcre this confidence... Ac-
[260]conding to “FKUNG-1 vhie eup, ort must be forti.coming soon because
[261]euch peo;¢ as Manolo RaY are taking the initistive and will socn
[263]contrcl the entire counter-revolut.onary movement in Cuba,
[269]John D. Peters
[271]ee SECA