[2]104-10306-10021
[3]oe
[5]2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 b
[10]io
[11]t
[12]7
[15]2 January 1964
[16]a ,
[18]MEMORANDUM FOR TEE RECGRD
[19]SUBJECT: Minutes of the Special Group Meeting, 2 January 1964.-
[20]PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Jchnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and General Carter.
[22]nnd 2.
[25]3 an
[27]Mr. FitzGerald was present for Items 1
[28]Coionel Steakley was present for Items
[29]ae .
[31]|
[33]4.
[35]m.
[37]‘L. Cuba - vrosmseatsttsottontostitecatio Onerations Burirge
[38]January 1964
[40]The infiltration/exfiltration operations in the January 1964
[41]forecast were approved. Three sapotage operations, numbers 3111,
[42]414, and 417, were approved by the Speciai Group subject to the
[43]concurrence of higher authority. Decision was deferred on a sabotage
[44]operation, ‘number 413, against the petroleum refinery and storage
[45]facilities'near Santiago. Mr. Johnson said that before he could
[46]exercise judgment as to the importance of this operation he must have
[47]an analysis as to what effect the total or partial destruction of
[48]this refinery would have on Cuban petroleum. production and economy
[49]generally.; The Group agreed that such an analysis shoule be prepared _
[50]ard be presented along with this sabotage operation for Special Group
[51]action ac its next meeting. :
[53]a
[55]2. Cuba - Infiltration/Exfiltration Operations During December 1963.
[57]Mr. FitzGerald reviewed the accomplishments during the month of
[58]December. He emphasized ea successful exfiltration activity of a
[60]recently activated ratline. This is .the second time in two months
[62]thet this ratline has successfully exfiltrated agents in danger of
[63]arrest. He also gave a resume of the underwater cemolition opexation .|
[64]{number 3117) which damaged a Cuban FT boat (Soviet-type P-6). Also,
[65]during the same operation self-destroying anti-boat mines were placed
[67]in the harbor entrance to. inhibit pursuit. One of the mines was detected
[68]vesulting in a Cuban goverament directive to all ports to take precaution-
[69]auxy measures. - a
[74]ma
[76]1933 ex: cessing
[77]the missicns
[79]t maissance
[80]. er. c A ne regarded
[81]vticularly sensitive, gucn e missions
[83]: nose flown
[84]s in al tituce of planes
[85]other radical variatioas
[87]; two planes in the sam:
[89]', Ge close to Soviet territory;
[90]/ wadle under surveilleace of Sovi
[92]‘| of route,
[93]i
[95]Mr. Johnson listed 14 BOX TCP missions on which State Department
[96]needed further study before approva L would be given. These missions are
[97]as follows: Jane, Paula, Ruby, Cliff, Alf, Eric, Mervin, Frank, Dwight,
[98]Kari, Lioyd, Everett, Hugh, and Caivin. ‘The Soecial Group requested a
[99]coordinated position on these missions as to their necessity aad whether
[101]they can be run without 4 significant or provocative pattern cnange while
[102]under Soviet racar surveillance. This coordinated position is to be |
[103]presented to the Speciai Group at its next meeting. All other missions
[105]‘ta the JRC forecast were approved. "]
[107]Reconnaissance Forecast.
[109]if The: NRO forecast (paper dated 20 Decesber 19633 was epproved as
[110]resented, General Carter gave a resume of the excellence and uniqueness
[111]i the information: obtained in the "T" and "C" series? ]
[113]{ze North Vietnam Working Group. GE
[115]nga Mr. Johnson reported that the Interdepartnental Working Group on
[116]North Vietnam Cperations has about concluded its report. Ali members
[117]of the Special Group agreed that the report should be critically noted
[118]at the highest levels of the Government It shows then be reviewed by
[119]"the Special Group and presented t to" higher author or decision] "
[121]ae . . oe a : 7 Ae ? Lf. hee
[123]Ste. 5 ;
[125]Paul’Ecke
[127]aot e
[128]fated
[130]we
[132]Distribution
[133]x. Johnson
[134]‘Mr. Gilpatric
[135]»-Mr. McCone
[137]pe
[139]Br
[144]10 January 1964
[146]MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
[147]SUBJECT: . Minutes of the Special Group Meeting, 9 January 1964
[148]PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. McCone.
[150]The Attorney General and Mr. FitzGerald were present
[152]for Items 1 and 2.
[153],
[155]: Colonel Steakley and Mr. Kiefer were present for Item 3,
[157]1, Cuba - Consideration of Sabotage Operations.
[159]. Mr. FitzGerald requested the Special Group to approve a sabotage
[160]operation against the petroleum refinery and storage facilities near
[161]Santiago. The proposal was disapproved.
[163]/ Another sabotage proposal was made by Mr. FitzGerald against a-
[164]sawmill located on the north coast of Oriente Province. The attack
[165].is to be conducted by a commando team which will place incendiaries
[166]and demolitions at critical locations throughout the installation. — .
[168]. A second target, which may be attacked as security factors permit, is
[170]a large floating. crane which has been anchored in the area and which .
[172]' appears to be used in loading ore from a near-by mine. ' This operational
[173]proposal with its ‘two targets was approved subject to the concurrence of -.
[175]. higher authority. Also, it was the consensus of the Group that the
[176]views of higher authority should be obtained on what ‘is desired generally
[178]‘in the field of sabotage activities in Cuba.
[180]2. Cuba - Proposed Clandestine Intelligence Operations.
[182]The Department of the Army requested approval for two operations:
[183]- (a) the establishment of a clandestine net using the Second National
[184]-Front of the Escambray, and (b) the infiltration of a radio operator
[185]’ .agent into Cuba. CIA has agreed to provide support for both these.
[186]proposals. The two operations were approved. .
[188]So See special minutes ~
[189]. a for additional item
[192]13-OOOOO attzma trocar takercnt ite ee Se a te tn eee pening
[194]re none.
[195]re. ‘ oh, - to. be. : ae
[197]mT gy
[199]3. [Revisea January ‘Peripheral Reconnaissance Schedule.
[201]a
[203]The JRC paper dated 8 January 1964 was approved as amended.
[204]No change was made in the following BOX TOP missions: Jane, Paula,
[205]Ruby, Eric, Marvin, Frank, Dwight, Lloyd, Karl, Everett, and Hugh.
[206]_ Operations Cliff and Alf were amended resulting in the cancellation
[207]"! of Operation Cliff. Mission Calvin's track was changed permitting
[208]:, it to approach the Latvian coast no closer than 25 nautical miles
[209]rather than 20 miles as originally proposed. ©
[211]; . , :
[212]Mr. McCone raised the question of the increasing number of flights
[214]authorized by the JRC. Colonel Steakley said that the number of sup-
[215]porting flights required for every reconnaissance platform was largely
[216]responsible for the increase. He also pointed out that there is
[217]» currently a review of COMOR requirements for Cuba being prepared to
[218], determine whether they can be eased in order to permit a considerably.
[219]‘ .., lessened operational schedule -]
[220]96
[222]4. (Benen Report No. 12 on North Vietnam.
[224]‘This report was noted by the Special Groups]
[226]_ S oy
[227]dee Sele
[229]aul Eckel
[231]Distribution
[232]Mr. Johnson — a ; . . ;
[233]Mr. Gilpatric Oo, oo a _
[234]Mr. McCone . :
[237]13-00000
[239]eu,
[241]we
[242]Pad
[244]31 January 1964 .
[246]HEMORAHDUN FOR THR SPECIAL GROUP
[247]“SUBJECT: | Proposed Cuban Operations for February 1964
[249]Special Group meubers approved by telephone the follouing
[250]infilerstion/exfileration operations proposed for February:
[251]Sunbere 411, 415, 421, 422, 423, 425, 3121, end 3126.
[253]Operations involving sabotage (Numbers 416, 424, 3111, and
[254]3412) were noe considered ty Group aszebera pending en overall
[255]review of Cuban operations, now completed but not yet studied.
[257]Peter Jessup
[258]Distribution .
[259]Mr. Johnson
[261]- Me. Vance .
[267]SRT
[269]Rae
[271]YES ONLY , February wee Vek
[273]MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
[275]“SUBJECT: Minutes of the Special Group Meeting, 13 February 1964
[277]PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Vance, and Mr. McCone.
[279]General Maxwell D. Taylor, Mr. Thomas A. Mann, and
[280]Mr. Desmond FitzGerald were present for Item 1.
[282]Lt. General Marshall A. Carter was present for
[283]Items 1 and. 2.
[285]1. Cuba - Covert Activities.
[287]A lengthy discussion took place on covert action potential
[288]to weaken the Castro regime. The first part of the discussion
[289]constituted an exchange of opinion of a general nature.
[291]The following points were emphasized: Continued covert
[292]action received support although divergence on the level of
[293]activity was registered. There was a consensus that the present
[294]level of operations was no longer effective in attaining the
[295]basic objective of toppling Castro but harassment might keep
[296]the regime off balance. There was an area of disagreement on
[297]proofs of effectiveness of current and past measures. :
[299]Mr. Bundy summarized the dilemma by noting that the high
[300]risk, dangerous operations are the rewarding ones and the low
[301]noise, innocuous operations prove to be unrewarding.
[303]Mr. Mann emphasized that considerably more hoiwework had
[304]to be completed before the next OAS meeting (presently unscheduled).
[305]Mr. Bundy indicated that a Cabinet level meeting with higher
[306]authority would have to be held eventually to determine how far
[307]the United States was willing to go. Mr. Bundy turned the discussion
[308]to the specific Department of Defense paper.
[310]On Sabotage, Mr. Vance stated that he could speak for
[311]the Secretary of Defense; his attitude had turned to a harder
[312]line.
[314]On Harassment of Free World Shipping to Cust, para-
[316]graph 2.a. was considered work in progress. 0% paragraph 2.b.
[317]the attitude was negative, particularly as to suips of other
[318]than Cuban flag.
[320]SECRET
[321]EVES ONLY
[323]13-00000
[325]On Covert Economic Activities, paragraph 3.a. is
[326]part of the present program, Paragraphs 3.b. and c.
[327]are parc of an overall blacklisting problem which remains
[328]to be explored.
[330]On Encouraging Dissidence Among Factions, the
[332]consensus was to intensify these activities.
[334]Actions againse Ciban Subversion in Latin America,
[335]paragraphs 1 and 2: A good look should be taken at this
[336]type of activity and a determination should be made ona
[337]country-by-country and case-by-case basis.
[339]On the last paragraph of the paper, it was decided ~
[340]that these efforts constitute work in progress with the
[341]exception of shipping surveillance which is under active
[342]study by the Departmenc of Defense. A paper on this
[343]problem Will be ready next week. It was understood that
[344]this was an expression of members’ opinion on types of -
[345]action but that specific operational proposals would be
[346]submitted to the Special Group as heretofore.
[348]Mr. Bundy then asked Mr. Mann to prepare papers covering
[349]the major issues of Caribbean surveillance, the blacklisting
[350]of firms trading with Havana, covert actions, and types of
[351]retaliation. .
[353]Review Programs
[355]‘On the review programs for Japan, France, Tibet, Taiwan,
[356]and China, it was agreed that the papers as prepared were the
[357]most useful way to present the material ‘to members. Mr. Vance
[358]indicated he had a number of questions in depth but that he would
[359]not take the time at this meeting. Mr. McCone then directed that
[360]the area specialists would be made available at Mr. Vance's con-
[361]venience to answer any questions he might have. Mr. Bundy
[362]concluded that since a time factor was not involved, formal approval %
[363]. of these papers could be made at a future meeting. Mr. Johnson
[364]remarked that State had already registered its approves
[366]peter Jessut |
[368]Distribution
[369]Mr. Johnson
[370]Mr. Vance
[371]Mr. McCone
[373]: “ma “7
[375]13-00000
[377]24 February 1964
[379]MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
[380]SUBJECT: Minutes of the Special Group Meeting, 20 February 1964
[382]PRESENT: . Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Vance, and Mr. McCone.
[384]{Ete “proposed Covert Funding of the Somali Parliamentary
[385]Elections" was s approved by the Special Group. .
[387]The previously considered review program papers on France,
[388]B Japan Tibet, Taiwan, - and China also were _approved.
[390]The minutes of the. Special Group meeting of 13 February 1964
[391]were modified at the request of Mr. Vance in the following context:
[392]In paragraph one under "Cuba - Covert Activities," subheading
[393]Sabotage, the phrase "he fully supported the paper under discussion"
[394]has been substituted for "his attitude had turned to a harder line."
[396]Peter Jessup
[398]Distribution
[399]Mr. Johnson
[400]Mr. Vance ©
[402]SS Mr.“ McCone -
[404]See Special Minutes
[405]for additional item
[407]Vorb
[409]13-OO0 OO Qatari aa ake fn al SRST wm tiem ie Se eee
[411]28 February 1964
[413]MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
[415]SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Specia! Group, 27 February 1964
[416]t
[418]PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Vance, and Mr. McCone. :
[420]Mr. Bruce Cheever was also present for Item 1.
[422]1... Cuba
[424]The Special Group approved the following infiltration/exfiltration
[425]and/or caching and resupply operations: Numbers 411, 3121, 415, 422,
[426]431, 3120, 432, 423, 416, 433, 434, and 3122, with the proviso that
[427]in regard to Number 434, a double agent operation, ‘the cache would
[429]contain money and medicine but no weapons.in case the Cubans decide
[430]to terminate the operation and publicize the cache.
[432]The four sabotage missions, specifically Numbers 414, 3111, 424,
[433]and 3119, were again placed in abeyance pending eventual resolution .
[434]by higher authority of the entire problem of higher noise level
[435]operations.
[437]GF. Co oe 7 Te
[439]2. [Rema
[440]_ ‘The Political Action. Operation on Kenya was approved without
[441]discussion.
[443]Un oes if
[444]Peter Joosk)
[445]Distribution
[446]Mr. Johnson
[447]Mr. Vance
[449]Mr. McCone
[451]Please see special minute
[453]for addicional iteus.
[454][oe
[459]i
[460]A
[461]SS
[463]3 April 1964
[465]MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
[466]| SUBJECT: Minutes of the Meeting of the Special Group, 2 April 1964
[467]PRESENT: | Mr. Bundy, Mr.. Johnson, Mr. Vance, and Mr. McCone.
[469]Mr. Desmond FitzGerald was present for Items 1 and 2.
[470]Mr. John Waller was present for Item 3.
[471]Colonel Ralph D. Steakley. was present for Item 4.
[473]on Cuba ~ Proposed Operations during April 1964.
[475]a In discussing the proposed Cuban operations for the month of
[476]noting, the following conclusions were reached: The five infiltra-
[478]---tion/exfiltration operations were approved as were the five caching
[479]operations, However, the five sabotage proposals were tabled.
[481]- Referring to the paper entitled, "Status of Sabotage and Raiding
[482]“Capability against Cuba," Mr. FitzGerald emphasized the. economic and
[484]” morale aspects of maintaining this potential and the influences of
[485]deterioration when it remains in stand-by status.. Mr. Bundy then
[486]stated that the time was overdue for submitting to higher authority
[487]the entire question of covert operations against Cuba. The problem
[488]of autonomous exile groups and their potential for conducting oper-
[490]os ations on their own and the momentum of these groups even if support
[492]should be cut off was also discussed. It was clear that the groups |
[493]headed by Artime and Ray’ constitute a considerable threat.
[495]Mr. Bundy indicated that next week he would call a meeting with
[496]higher authority and the Secretariés of Defense and State. Mr.
[497]‘FitzGerald would outline the current status of operations against
[499]; . Cuba, and it was hoped that definite policy lines could be determined
[500]:., for future covert activity against Castro.
[502]. oot a ee GS os _ . _ a
[504]- 2, Caine - Support for: Chilean Presidential Elections of
[505]. September 1964. ;
[507]_ The paper, "Support for Chilean Presidential Elections," was
[508]approved. Mr. FitzGerald announced that a solution to the slight.
[509]difference of opinion between Ambassador Cole and the CAS in Santiago
[511]Please see special minute
[512]for additional items.
[514]r
[519]13-00000
[523]2 approved
[525]7%
[527]ad been reached and that attribution of U.S. support would be
[529]indicated that this was operationally feasible.
[531]oo . | a 4%
[533]aS -
[534]3. ‘Gantivar - Proposed Political Action
[536]— The paper on Proposed Political Action in Zanzibar was
[537]approved. ‘Mr. Waller gave a short briefing on the operational |
[538].climace which emphasized the cooperative attitude of the British
[539]services and the growing likelihood that Jomg Kenyatta could be
[540]persuaded to support the West more actively. ]
[542]- JRC Month} Reconnaissance Forecast.
[544]na Monthly Reconnaissance Forecast for April 1964 was
[546]pororst 53 : cn . ee
[548]. Distribution
[550]- Mr. Johnson
[551]Mr. Vance
[552]:Mr. McCone
[554]ferred but there should be no evidence of proof. Mr. FitzGerald —
[556]| 23
[557]a [Bye 2656- eal
[558]: _ 28 .APR 1964
[560]frie,
[562]MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
[564]SUBJECT: — - Overflight of Cuba on 1 May ©
[566]1. Although it may, in fact, have little substance, the thought occurs ._-
[567]that if Castro is seriously considering a "shoot-down" of a U- 2, from a
[568]‘@ propaganda standpoint he could not select a better time than 1 May,
[569]the traditional Communist holiday, and more significantly the Fourth |
[570]‘Anniversary of the "infamous" Francis Gary Powers incident.
[572]2. From a psychological viewpoint, identification of a new U-2
[573]shoot-down with that incident on May Day four years ‘ago might have
[574]considerable appeal to Fidel and might. conceivably influence his judg-.
[575]ment.in reaching a determination. to take such action.
[577]3. Recognizing that this association is rather tenuous, it might |
[578]‘still be worth considering a stand-down of U-2 overflights on that one.
[579]day. This would not seriously impair our intelligence effort and it |
[580]would deprive Castro of the opportunity to exploit this rather unique
[581]‘circumstance should he have any inclination to do so. 0 KF oo
[583]JAMES A. CUNNINGHAM, JR.
[584]' Deputy Assistant Director
[585](Special Activities)
[587]" SECR Ei T
[590]13-00000 fiiissiis
[592]ay
[594]1 May 1964
[596]EEMORANDUM POR THE RECORD
[598]SUBJECT: Minutes of the Meeting of the Special Croup, 30 April 1964
[600]General Carter
[601]PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Hughes, Mr. Vance,/and Mr. McCone,.
[603]“Colonel J. C. King and Assistant Secretary of State Mann
[604]were present for Item 1.
[606]Mr. Bruce Cheever and Mr. Theodore Shackley were present
[607]for Item 2. Assistant Secretary Mann was also present
[608]for Item 2. ;
[610]1. FE Chilean Situation qb : ‘
[614]i PT a, During. a 35-minute discussion of the 4 September Chilean
[616]> “election, Assiscant Secretary of State Mann and Colonel J.C. King
[618]. ’ outlined some of the problems and prospects for the Frei candidacy.
[620]: ;, Colonel King, who had recently returned from Santiago, outlined some ;
[622]of the covert efforts planned or underway which included financial ;
[624]support to Frei, Italian CDU assistance, emphasis on the woman's vote,
[626]' Cactholic'‘and labor union assistance, fragmentizing the opposition
[627]Socialist party, distribution of propaganda, and possible assistance
[628]from long-standing United States industrial interests.
[630]! b. Some of the obstacles faced by the democratic forces were
[632]/ underscored: the strong Chilean anti-clerical tradition, the unimpeded
[633]rise in the cost of living, the formidable. outside. support being afforded
[634]Allende, the political apathy of the military and the third man candidacy
[635]of Duran,
[637]i i, c. The Special Group decided: (a) that contact should be made with .
[639]' Ambassador Cole to urge his return fc. a visit in the coming weeks,
[641]4 (b) that talks with American business interests should proceed to deter-
[643]: mine the amount and method of their support, and (c) It was further decided
[645]» that higher authority would be apprised of the closeness and importance of
[647]' this Chilean election and that the Group itself would continue to review
[648]the problem in the coming ead ;
[650]‘ Loe — .
[651]Som epe ee ° : SET) Ca eer popes wee Fl
[653]RE SPORE SO ee oe we eng poe
[655]2. The Current Cuban Operational Climate and the Proposed Operations
[656]for May 1964.
[658]a. A 25-minute briefing was provided on Cuban operations by the Chief
[659]of CAS, Miami, Mr. -Theodore Shackley. He gave a thorough summary of the
[660]policy framework in which programs have been established and provided detuil
[661]on the cechniques used to accomplish these missions. He enuwerated successes
[663]4
[664]t
[665]f
[666]i
[669]i
[670]i
[673]achieved to date and indicated the types of difficulty encountered.
[675]peers
[677]Inc.
[679]13-00000
[684]a
[686]“
[688]i
[690]w ots . , ™ ue -2~
[692]~GNLY
[694]The briefing was well received and members expressed the opinion
[696]that the session had been extremely useful.
[698]b. The Special Group approved the proposed. infiltration/
[700]exfiltration operations into Cuba during May 1964.
[702]vee a aa ea 9G"
[704]oh
[705]goo
[707]ficant number.
[709]b. As cthe minutes were going to press on 1 May, the Secretary of
[710]the Special Group was informed by telephone that Stace Department apreement i
[711]was obtained with the following proviso: That an intensive and high
[712]priority effort on training of South Vietnam Nationals be undertaken as
[713]rapidly as possible "for future maritime operations." 7 _ .
[715]4. [hetton 29 - OPLAN 34-A GS
[717]3. (Recruitment of Chinat Personnel for Maritime Operations of 34-A.
[719]- requested that the matter
[721]Action 29, OPLAN 34-a, proposed by DOD was disapproved,] .
[723]IS
[725]5.) [Honthty Forecasts
[727]a. The NRO Monthly Forecast for May 1964 was approved.
[729]Distribution
[730]4x. Johnson
[731]Mr. Vance
[732]Mr. McCone
[734]b. The JRC Monthly Forecast for May 1964 was approved]
[736]se ested
[739]a. On the proposal to recruit Chinat  personnél for maritime operations
[740]of 34-A, Mr. Vance and Mr. McCone were in favor and felt that enactment of
[742];. the maritime program was long overdue. It was noted that the Ambassador
[743]had already registered approval. State, however,
[744]' be held in abeyance until the return from Ottawa on 1 May of Alexis Johnson |
[745]and Secretary of State Rusk. Mr. Hughes felt that the introduction of
[746]additional Chinese Nationalists into this theatre was not in accordance
[747]with existing policy. Mr. Bundy was of the opinion that the proposed
[748]temporary introduction of 64 persons for sea operations was not e@ signi-
[750]oven) i ene
[751]. ee
[752]i
[753]Pa04 THK COGRDEINATOR GF CUSAN AYFAIRS
[754]|
[756]SUBJECT: Standby Copability fer the Launching of
[757]Propegenda Leaflet Balloons
[759]1. Tho purpese ef this sencrandus ie to present fer
[760]- your ceasiderstion and epprovel, 6 propomal te undify the
[761]: current status ef the CIA propaganda bellecs lnuaching
[762]| capability, If approved, CIA prepeses to conse the rentel
[763]| of helina end tacks, which will mean that if utiligstion of
[764]i «the enpsbility is desired, either Department of Defease
[765]will have te provide the heltus or it will have te be
[766]. cemercialiy procured at the time. These alternates are
[768]In the fall of 1962 the CIA as pert of
[769]the MONGOUEE progres, ee approved ty the Special Group
[771]| | Gugnentes), developed a covert capability for the leunchtas
[772]| capability consisted of properly outfitted merchant
[774]| | veawel, ostensibly chartered and operated by Cuban exiles.
[776]| sy Beecember 1908 sad in the early sonths of 1963, several
[777]proposals were ande by the CLA to utilize thia espability
[780]13-00000
[782]I.
[783]|
[784]|
[785]|
[787]i
[788]i
[789]'
[790]|
[791]|
[792]if
[793]f
[794]|
[795]t
[796]|
[798]a
[800]2
[802]but ench time they were tabled for further consideration.
[803]In April 1963 a specific propoasl to leunch propagence
[804]balloons on May Bay 1963 was eubsitted to the Special Group
[805]and on 9 April 1963, the propamal ens disapproved by higher
[806]suthority (cee Mencrandun for Henbers of the Special Croup
[807]from ir. Thomas Parrott, dated 9 April 1963). In view of
[808]the prevailing situation, the CIA proposed to diamatic the
[810]eupability ae tt wos expensive to mnintain aud ite security
[812]was sure to detericrate. However, at the 19 April 1969
[814]meeting ef the Speciel Group, several noubera of the Group
[815]felt thet in a eriaia euch « capability might be useful and
[816]2t we egreed the CIA would stockpile the bsalleoas, helius
[817]and other equipment and be prepared to aunt operations ae
[818]required utilining 0.8, Navy er other vegsels and creve,
[820]to he provided by the Dopnrtaent of Defenme. (See Minutes
[822]ef 18 April 1963 Meeting of the Special Group.) In eccerd-
[824]‘ence with thie directive, the CIA haw stored the required
[825]eqnipwent end ham been keeping helium on bend en # rental
[826]beats. |
[828]3. Tre anmavel expense for snintaining thie capability
[829]on a otandby basi hes besa spprexinately [$20,000 ]or whieh
[830][918,600/nee beun for the reatel of heliws teake and con-
[831]pressor. A review of the capability leads the CIA to tke
[833]Sant.
[836]13-00000-
[838].
[841]3
[843]conciusion that the eapebility can be aninteined st an
[844]neceptable degree of rendiness without heving the heliva
[845]tenks on hand, In the event utilization ie desired, the
[846]Departzent of Befeass would be able te provide the heliua
[847]ae well as the launehing vessele and crows or if necessary,
[848]helium could be commercially precured within the tiae
[849]factor necossnsy te ready the other camponents ef the
[850]eyetes, The CIA therefore propesca te tersizate ite
[851]current arrocgexents for the rental of the heliun tanks
[853]4. 1t 1m requested that approval ve grasted for the
[854]CIA to proceed, ac outlined in poregraph 2 above, with the
[855]teruination of rental contrects for helium tanks and con-
[856]presser, — .
[858]1 3-00006
[860]ia!
[862]re: <1)
[864]MEMORANDUM FOR THE BECORD
[866]At the request of Mr. McCone, the paper on the covert action
[868]‘program in Italy for FY-1965 was deferred until he had time to study
[869]pit: more corehully _ 4k
[871]2.°  NSAM 303
[873]NSAM 303 was circulated and the new designation for the Special
[874]ate reel 2 sec ENS SN
[876]‘Group 5412, the 303 Committee, was noted.
[878]3.0 (Gort Vietnam — a 7 GE Troe —_ -- . - ~
[880]a. The DOD paper dated 19 May 1964 entitled "North Vietnam
[881]Operations" was discussed at some length.
[883]b. Each annex of the paper was noted. In Annex A, Physical
[884]Destruction Target List, the members concurred in Mr. Vance's recom-
[885]mendation to accept all targets with the exceptions of “1, 5, and 7.
[886]Target 5 was brackered with Nos. 14 and 15 in Annex B and is subject
[887]to the same treatment indicated below.
[889]c. In Annex B, Psychological Operations, the listed targets
[890]were approved except that Nos. 14 and 15 were to be examined further
[891]by DOD and CLA on the operational. level. Mr. McCone stated that’in
[892]regard to the Mo tribesmen (No. 14) this had been a CIA operation for
[894]some months and should be continued to be handled in the same way. He
[896]further felt that tribal operations of this type should be done covertly.
[898]ard.to Annex C, Intelligence Operations, the targets
[899]aoproved and the Committee agreed to Mr. Vance's veto -
[901], See Special Minute
[903]oe for Additional Item
[905]EvES ONY
[907]This minute also notes the celephonic approval obtained from all
[908]rompers on 30 May for a single cmergency exfiltration operation in and
[909]out of Cuba scheduled for early June.
[913]Jess
[914]7 \
[915]Distribution
[917]lr. Johnson
[919]Mr. Vance
[921]Mr. McCone
[924]cites
[926]SECRET
[927]EVES (ay
[929]22 June 1964_
[931]MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
[932]SUBJECT: Minutes of the Meeting of the 303 Committee, 18 June 1964
[933]PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. McCone, Mr. Vance, Mr. Johnson.
[935]Mr. Mann and Mr. FitzGerald were also present.
[937]“ A general discussion was held on problems arising from increased
[938]activities on the part of organized Cuban emigre groups, independent
[939]adventurers, purported plots to assassinate Castro and the general edginess
[940]and instability on the island. |
[942]None of those present appeared to feel that it was either realistic or
[943]practical to sever connections with or to withdraw support from the two.
[944]principal emigre organizations, those of Artime and Ray.
[946]The recent escapades and overall capabilities of Manolo Ray were
[947]deplored but it was agreed first: that steps should be taken to get the Puerto
[948]Rican authorities to release his ship; second: that he should be promptly
[949]advised in accordance with the stated policy established by the late President
[950]to cease forthwith all activities from the United States Mainland and find _
[951]himself a new base of operations; third: no monies would be forthcoming,
[952]specifically a requested $25,000, until point two above has been accomplished.
[953]No help was to be offered in finding Ray a new Caribbean base. Mr. Mann
[954]was particularly interested that Ray not be encouraged to transfer to the
[955]Dominican Republic because of the fragility of the regime.
[957]The next subject discussed was the recent visit of Major Oliva to both
[958]the Attorney General and Assistant Secretary Mann. It was pointed out that
[959]Oliva is both a zealot and a man of integrity and that his only interest in life
[961]‘is leading a return to his homeland. Any attempts to put Oliva into business
[963]would be expensive and undesirable at this time. It was decided that
[964]Mr. Bundy would ask the Attorney General if he would be willing to dampen
[966]‘Oliva's ardor:
[968]The activities of Artime from Nicaragua were discussed next. Alexis
[969]Johnson pointed out that Artime raids could conceivably provoke Castro into
[971]utilizing Cuban SAM sites; he said this possibility should not be discounted.
[973]But it was also pointed out that Artime's recent sugar mill raid succeeded
[974]in leading Castro to mobilize many persons involved in important sugar
[975]harvesting and thus constituted a successful economic warfare byproduct.
[978]It was estimated that Artime's schedule of. one operation per month was
[979]overly optimistic; one every three months was about all Artime could
[980]accomplish. ‘The decision was to drive home to Artime that his greatest
[981]value was not in hazardous hit-and-run actions but in his survival as a
[982]continuing psychological threat in being,
[984]Mr. FitzGerald, in discussing the current situation in Cuba, stated that
[985]he believed the regime was in considerable difficulty. There has been a
[986]large increase in the number of executions and mass arrests. He also cited
[987]the fact that an entire CIA Pinar del Rio net has been rolled up by Castro's
[988]security forces and the key man executed. The sugar and crop prospects —
[989]were not good, the world price having dropped. Some of the members were
[990]surprised at this picture and stated it did not seem to conform to the daily
[991]bulletins. Mr. McCone said that he would ask for a SNIE on the current
[992]situation in Castro Cuba.
[994]A paper was discussed on alleged plans which involve the underworld
[995]to assassinate certain Cuban leaders. Mr. McCone was somewhat skeptical
[996]of the reported plots and stated that he would like to go into the matter further.
[997]Others, including Mr. Bundy, felt that the United States was being put on
[998]notice and should do everything in its power to ascertain promptly the veracity
[999]of the reports and then undertake prevention. It was decided that Mr. Bundy
[1000]would call'the matter to the Attorney General's attention as a matter of law
[1001]enforcement. a
[1003]Peter Jessup
[1005]Distribution:
[1006]Mr. Johnson
[1007]Mr. Vance
[1008]Mr. McCone