[2]124-10185-10099) - | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
[4]a
[8]MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director/Comptroller
[9]| VIA
[11]SUBJECT ‘Agency Surport to the U.S. Scerct Service
[12]| _ (U8SS) fer National Renocratic (20-14 July
[13]j- 1972) and National Republican (21-24 August
[14]: - 1972) Conventions : Hote
[16]es
[18]Acting Geputy Director for Plans
[20]oe
[22]a
[24]; 1. This menorandun is for the information of the Executive
[25]- Director/Cozptroller. ;
[27]2. Authorization for CIA support to the U.
[28]for the Renocratic and Renublican National Conve
[29]‘tained in a mwecorandus of 7 Avril 1272 from Chis
[30]the CCl which was concurred in by the ADLP and appr
[31]“PCI on 10 April 1572 (cepy attached).
[32]. JFK CYB)
[33]. 3. On 13. Arril 13 72 she(cos, 1 WH Namdimet with the dard
[34]USSS representative and ‘ir. “astrovito cf USSS beadquarters to  gete
[35]discuss prelininary : plana ing for (Station wast Gai sinport to the G8)
[37]USS prior ta and during wusicct CoAVSRLLORS » unm oLy Amril Po7?
[38]tho(C/ensess and c/TI/LSN met with “rr. Hastrovito at Usaderartess
[39]V ' arene . , ease :
[40]> ») to [rplesent the prelininary plonning agreed uvon in Hand and
[42]to determine the extent of Headquarters suppert required by the
[43]USSS, ;
[45]4, The basic arreenent cutually concurred in by the USSS
[46]and licadquarters representatives provided that:
[48]ee cy) va, (Station wi/#iast] would conduct naase traces, on
[49]all Cubans of interest to the USSS,
[51]be. CIA Headquarters would conduct name traces on
[52]all other forcizn born persons of interest to the USSS.
[54]ec. CIA would keen the USSS infotr cd of any events
[55]in the Caribkean and Latin American areas that would
[56]haye any bearing ow the USSS protective sission during
[57]the convention periods. This would taclude briefings
[58]on Cuba and Cuban policies toward the United States. and
[59](On activities of Cuban intellicence oper rations which
[60]could affect the security of the conventions.
[62]tome *
[64]2) 00576
[67]yr WY
[69](®) S. On 27 April 1972 a meeting was held at a buffor office
[71]aC) . = co ,
[72]SEONG, (Station W/Miani nas arranaed the rental of a safehcuse
[73]about five minutes fron coaventicn center
[75]a. Coverage of Latin Ancrican exile croups in the
[77]United States would be the resnonsinbility of the FRI
[78]since CIA had ccoased the extensive coverage fornerly -
[79]tarceted against these grouns since it Was now considered .
[80]an internal security function. .
[82]. oe
[84]of \Station wi/‘tiaaill a with the USSS Chief of Comsaunica-
[86]tiofs, Statien persoancl and a ileaduuarters representative, It
[88]Was-agrecd that name traces would te handled by Miani security
[89]PRES
[91]Ficld office courier fron the LESS tower office until the VSss
[93]ostablishec cox ‘munications links frea their connand post in
[95]convention center, at which tine trace requests would be sont
[97]from the connand pest tc uSSS headcuarters and relayed to CIA 150)
[99]Headquarters = Guban nane traces are relayed to\Station wif: fond}
[101]ty the Signal Center and non-Cuban traces are conducted [ty EH/ COS Je)
[102]Leplics to USSS requests on non-Cubans are ceordinated with
[104](ci/s6.] JPEG)
[106]which will provide a
[108]secure and nearby meeting site for USSS and Agency persennal,
[110]This. safchouse will Le availaule just prior to and during both 9
[111]conventions. A Headquarters orficer will T2Y (to “taniljericr to C
[113]the conventions ana remain until the couventions adjourn to
[115]assist tie Station in providing the support descrived in paragrayh
[116]four above, _—
[117]JFKOYO)
[118]USSS in
[120]7. Station we/iawifis in daily contact with the
[121]Miami, utiljzinc bulier office as\a meeting sitc when necessary. T!
[122]location of(Station #H/iiani pas net been revealed to
[124]1 come ai ed
[125]the USSS. - (Station ( is located sone 1) oetied Fe= ‘buffer office.) | yeeayhé)
[126]co)
[130]Additionally, the(iiiani Security Field Gf£fice}maintains nornal
[131]liaison with the cal USSS sijami unit.
[134]v
[136]8. The Staticn understands that no personael will be presen
[137]at the convention hall, that they vill not rrovide any egquinment
[138]unique to the Agency, nor will it provide the use of any otner
[139]facilities other than the Safehouse described in paragraph Six,
[141]an mee
[142]Chain
[144], ial eke tare : |
[147]r) oo é.., ‘1973
[149]SUBJECT: Request for Information on Sensitive Activities
[151]t
[153]-You will recall that in Fiscal Years 1971 and 1972,
[155]I believe, Agency funds were made available to the FBI.
[157]' These funds may still be possibly held in a special
[159]account for that use. This is one of the areas where
[161]TSD has been very much involved. Chuck Briggs would
[163]have the details as this was handled through the Executive.
[164]Director's office and of course Angleton would have
[166]additional information.
[168]Signed
[170]PeiN-he
[172]Chief
[173]Missions and Programs Staff
[175](7
[177]E2 IMPDET -CL BY 357737.
[178]EVES Ry os
[181],
[182]+s - oo, . 8 May 1973
[184]MEMORANDUM FOR : Deputy Director for.Operations
[186]SUBJECT : Areas of Possible Embarrassment
[187]. . to the Agency :
[189]e
[191]1, Sometime in the spring or early summer of 1971, Mr. John
[192]Dean levied the requirement on the Agency for information relating to
[193]the Investors Overseas Service (IOS). The original request was
[194]non-specific but it gradually emerged that Dean was concerned with
[195]‘the possible adverse publicity that might develop regarding the
[196]- President's nephew, who was employed by IOS.
[198]2. There were multiple channels from the White House to the
[199]Agency ¢ on this subject:
[201]a, Presumably Haldeman and/or Ehrlichman to Director
[202]Helms,
[204]oO b. Someone (unnamed) in the White House to the DDCI,
[205]' General Cushman (see atiached telephone conversation),
[206]Note that Ehrlichman is mentioned, and
[208]. ; c. John Dean to the CI Staff. These various channels
[209]were sorted out in time and six reports were passed by
[210]the CI Staff to Mr. Fred Fielding for Mr, John Dean.
[212]3, The telephone call of General Cushman's is of interest since
[213]‘it gives the flaver of White House concern, It took several days to
[214]uncover the fact that the White House interest centered on the involve-
[215]_ ment of the President's nephew with IOS and possible adverse publicity.
[216]‘The reports submitted to Dean's office were routine in nature and were
[217]coordinated with the DCI. After a few months, interest in this sub-,
[218]ject died down and we did not pursue it further. |
[219]. 1
[220]4, Please relurn the attachments when they have served your
[221]purpose, Vi
[224]E2IIMPDET CL BY 0545)?
[225]. . yA
[226]b. | | 2,
[228]CD
[229]ra |
[230]Co
[234]I"
[239]ne
[241]5. lLalso include a short note on the Intelligence Evaluation SRO)
[242]Committee and Staff prepared by|Richard Ober. | The original
[243]meetings were held in the office of John Dean at the White House
[244]and the principal sparkplug for this group activity was the then
[245]Assistant Attorney General for Internal Security, Robert “Mardian
[246]and then later his assistant, William Olsen. It is noted that Mr.
[247]Mardian is now appearing before the Grand Jury andvit is always ~
[248]possible that he might draw in the Agency. : .
[249]JERS)
[250]6. Before appointing[Ober}to the IES Staff as the Agency
[251]representative, I had attended various inter-agency meetings pre-
[252]sided over by Mardian, Iexpressed the view to Director Helms
[253]that Mardian would require very careful handling due to his inex-
[254]perience, Furthermore, Mardian was deeply involved in the split
[256]-between Bill Sullivan and Mr. Hoover. Ona confidential basis
[258]one or two senior FBI officials stated that Sullivan was secretly
[259]passing files to Mardian without Mr. Hoover's permission, This
[260]was one of the important reasons why Sullivan was dismissed from
[261]the Bureau,
[263]A eo. | Jee are) |
[266]Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff
[268]Attachments (5)
[270]PTT , . - q
[271]SECRE . gassed
[272]. . st
[274]MEMOPANDUM FOR: Beputy Director for Operations
[276]SUBJECT / >: Counter Intgelligence Staff,
[277]Police Group Activities SONS)
[279]" JeKOY®) JEKON8)
[281]1. Counter Intelligence Staff, (Police Grou: compre) | .
[282]is responsible for Staff coordination within the-Office
[283]of the Deputy Director for Gperations for activities an
[284]roqrans involvin assistancelto foreicn nolice/securi ty ‘eK OIE):
[285]“forces for the nurvose of exnloitins such activities and |~
[286]programs for intellisence DUrvOSeS «
[288]. FROMO) a. -
[289]2. GI pgjn aintains liaison with the Office, cf Public
[290]Safety, Acchey for Tuternational Teveaiomsnt MB/ ATS
[292]JP and its training facility, the International Police Acadeny
[293]9) (IPA). CIA) also administers and suvervises Project
[295]IWEN-IN- and its trainine rromrietary facility ,MEN-172.
[296]ENEN-168 An addition, CI PG coordinates a joint OPS/ATD Tecinteal | Jre eyes)
[298]Services Division, Central reso EMEC pond (TSU/CIA) |
[299]Technical Investiqdations rourse | CI (@Glprovides euidan
[300](ce) and counse] to the Area PivisioNs in matters vertainine
[301]ue gho(holice/s ecurity functions and activities.| Snecific
[302]yee” details of these functions are as follows:
[304]LIAISON “ITH OPS/ATD
[306]any eae witn OPS/AID and IPA is conducted on a
[307]daily basis and consists principally of:
[309]_ A. exchance of information on IPA participants, some
[310]of whom later attend IDEN+172 courses and who are
[311]of interest to Asency cornonents,
[313]B.-arrancine for inclusion of Agency sponsored partici-
[314]pants in IPA/OPS/AID trainine prograns,
[316]C. arra micine for IPA/OPS/ATY briefiacs and tours for 5 PKCD)
[317]foreirn volice/securi ty renresentativies spoasered_
[318]by CIA Area Divisions, ] ee 00537
[320]ory yee : Racittgpoey cL BY yk rs
[323]L Dd. obtaining biographic and assessment data.on
[324]mo, IPA/OPS/A ID trainces,.
[326]ER. providing general information pertaining to
[328]| police/security orga nizations, activities, equip-
[329]ment, and personalities requested by Agency _
[331]| operating components ,
[333]: F, coordinating the Agency's narticination in t!
[334]| Teciaical Investica tions Course desimned to
[335]faniliaricze the trainees vith the techniaue
[336]; required to nronerly investierate terrorist
[337]activities wherein explosives have been utilized,
[339]obtaining OPS/AID cover for CIA personnel to serve. .
[340]abroad, At one time as many as 59 CIA employees
[341]-were covered in Latin America, the Far East: and
[343]Fg
[345]alas
[347]| Sm) Africa. Tris total has heen reduced durin the
[348]C _past several years to 19 servine in Thailana, *
[349]' HH, arranging contact betveen Desk officers and OPS/AIN
[350]sponsored 1 narticina ints. .
[351]~ La nebivn ot |
[353]nv Nl NIL . WADDTTN p 7 eh cM“ :
[354]PROJECT IDEN-171 PROPRIRTARY IDEN-172- de “ IDEN-158
[355]; ns rn . . Sells cates
[356]CEN-172 Training Acades is @ comercial intermrise. Cline
[357]It was incornorated under to laws of the State of “larvland “li!
[358]in 1952 and conducts its: business in the Nis trict of OSE
[359]~Golombia., It is engaged principally in training foreign Consuyi
[360]-(. police/security nersonnel under an overt contract vit ; Seevis
[361]‘) OPS/ATD, ‘and selling police/socuri tv onninment to forsien \e
[362]police/security personnel and orsanications .IDEN- 172 also Nae
[364]provices special training programs and bricfinas to |
[366]foréicn nolice/security nersonnel of interest to Agency
[368]operating divisions, It provides hiosranhic and assessnen
[369]data on trainees to country desks. PecentlyIDEN-172 has
[371]vit acquired thd capability of providing training to foreign
[373]J police/security personnel in VIP protective security
[375]| WS [ for Chiefs of State.
[377]{ “(® CIA personnel under this cover will not he :replaced as Je
[378]such and all will be phased out by June 1974, (49)
[380]-
[385]-aits field stations,
[387]poe
[389]COMMENT
[391]. cifps Goes not maintain direct contact or liaison
[392]with any law enforcement organization, local or federal,
[393]‘at hone or. abroad | When the need arises, such contact is
[394]sometimes made on our behalf by OPS/AID or WEN-17fei.thout
[395]divulging Agdney interest.) OPS/AID has such contaéts
[396]at home and ahroad because of the nature of its activities
[397](training of forcizn nolice/security personne] at hore
[398]and abrow), and its Public Safety nrocrans around the
[399]world. JOEN-172 has such contacts at here - lecal and
[400]federal level - hecause its nersonnel are nersenally
[401]acquainted with law enforcevent of Sicers througout tie |
[402]United. States. embers of the [DEN-172 staff (not identified).
[403]as CIA) have appeared as auest lecturers at suci federal
[404]institutions as tne U.S. Park Police, IPA, the U.S.
[406]Secret Service, and the U.S. Treasury Enforcement Division.
[408]JreEWGO)
[410]JPR.OME
[412]3. In. addition to the liaison sentioned in the |
[413]previous paracranh, (the Acency maintains liaison in warying
[414]degrees with forcign police/security organizations through
[415]Tne existence and extent thereof,
[416]hovever, is decision to de nade py the Area livision,
[417]and is not the responsibility of CI/?G. yee ue)
[419]. 4, The CIA station as a member of the Country Tean in
[420]Montevideo, Uruguay, may have had some contact with Jan
[421]Mitrione, vho was murdered by the Tunanaros., Jan litriones,
[422]an experienced and respected law enforcenent officer, was
[423]a bona fide OPS/AIN officer assianed to the AID -nission
[424]in Uruguay, and was never a CIA employee or acent.
[426]JFKUY]
[428]ie]
[429]u“
[431]ACS owen. | AP ECILS)
[434]Chief, tounter Intelligence Staff
[435]'
[436]4
[437]J .
[438]4
[439]Io
[440]°° OOSS9
[443]ut
[444]. :
[445]Cha nod vise
[447]a
[449]SUBJECT: The MHCHAOS Program ‘
[451]-1. The MHCHAOS program-is a worldwide program for
[452]clandestine collection abroad of information on foreign
[453]efforts to support/encourage/exploit/manipulate domestic
[455]. U.S. extremism, especially by Cuba, Communist China,
[456]-,North Vietnam, the Soviet Union, North Korea and the
[457]Arab fedayeen.
[459]2. .-The MHCHAOS program has not and is not conduct-
[460]ing efforts domestically for internal domestic collection
[461]purposes.- Agency efforts dre foreign. Foreign-oriented
[462]activity in the United States has been of two types:
[464]a. Selected FBI domestic sources who travel
[465]abroad in connection with their extremist activity
[466]and/or affiliations to make contact with hostile
[467]foreign powers or with forcign extremist groups
[468]have been briefed and debricfed by Headquarters
[469]officers. The bricfing has included appropriate
[471]‘operational guidance, including defensive advice.
[473]b. Americans with existing extremist creden-
[474]. tials have been assessed, recruited, tested and
[475]dispatched abroad for PCS assignnents as contract
[476]agents, primarily.sources offered for such use by ,
[477]the FBI. When abroad they collect information re-
[478]e sponsive to MICIL\OS program requirements, as well
[480]as other Agency requirements. They are thus used
[481]primarily for targeting against Cubans, Chinese Con-
[482]munists, the North Vietnamese, etc., as their back-
[483]ground and their particular access permits. It
[485]ve yun: _ should be noted that the MPTROIKA aspect of the
[487]oer MPLODESTAR project of the East Asia Division is
[489]: ¢ similar to the MHCHAOS PROGRAM.
[491]'3. As indicated earlier, MHCHAOS is a foreign pro-
[492]gram, conducted overseas, except for the limited activity
[493]described above. The program.is and has been managed so
[494]as to achieve the Maximum feasible utilization of exist-
[495]ing resources of the Operations Directoraté. No assets
[497]i:
[501]Sanat
[503]VWihiatiits Titlt, _— yt . “eh ,
[504]SENSITNE RULE seh SOURCES SEIS ST] ee
[506]eee VE
[507]— a : ” SECKE T
[510]SECRET,
[512]6) a CORPORATE COVER
[514]“1. Central Cover Staff (CCS) is responsible for the
[515]placement of Agency operational personnel under the cover
[516]of bona fide U.S, companies abroad and in the U.S. This
[517]process involves the selection of companies; research on
[518]their locations and key personnel; clearances; contacts -
[519]with companies to solicit cooperation with the Agency; - -
[520]arrangements for integration of Agency personnel into the
[521]companics, including letters of understanding; funding of
[522]salavics, allowances and expenses; and, continuous monitor~
[523]' ing of each integrated case throughout the course of the
[524]cover use, The overall objective is to match tho individual
[525]being placed, the company, and the location, in a manner
[526]that will ensure achievement of the Agency purpose and pro-
[527]tection of the company integrity.
[529]2. Currently, there are 191 integrees for whom cover
[530]is provided by 140 companies; 179 integrees are located in
[531]47 foreign countries and 12 are located in the United States.
[532]' To maintain this placement level, CCS personnel are’ rem
[533]searching and monitoring approximately 250 to < 300 companies
[534]at any given time,
[536]3, To minimize the adverse consequences to a cooperating
[537]company, and to preserve the Agency’s onerational equity in
[538]the event of exposure. of an individual under cover, it has
[539]been established policy that no more than two individuals
[540]would be furnished cover by the same conpany.- At the present
[541]time this ratio is confined to upproximately 25% of the total
[542]number of companies now being used and efforts are unde
[543]way to effect further reductions toward the goal of one
[544]individual per company.
[546]4, In addition to the primary corporate cover function
[547]described in: paragraph 1. above, CCS maintains continuing
[548]contact with two U.S,. car rental firms and two U,S, .credit
[549]ecard firms for the purpose of obtaining backstopped credit
[550]cards in alias for operational use in the United States and
[551]abroad by Agency personnel. 42 such cards are now being
[552]used by 34 individuals. .
[554]SFE 08
[557]DEVISED FACILITIES COVER
[559]1. Central Cover Staff (CCS) maintains 311 back-
[560]Stopped notional facilities which were created to pro-
[561]vide cover: for Agency personnel in the United States
[562]and abroad and to provide an attributable source for
[563]Agency funds used in operations and requiring conceal-
[564]ment of Agency or U.S, Government interest. _ The facilities
[565]comprise 43 corporations providing personal status cover,
[566]payrolling and tax attribution sources, and other miscel-
[567]laneous support such as title to property,‘ funding, etc.;
[568]Gl sole~proprietorships providing status and operational
[569]cover, including payrolling and tax attribution; and 207
[570]non- registered companies providing support for high risk
[571]operational requirements, agents abroad, corporate reim-
[572]bursements, and proprictary funding. _
[574]2, 224 Agency personnel engaged in operational
[575]activitics are payrolied by the facilitics, an essential
[576]procedure permitting the reporting of Agency salarics with- .
[577]out documenting the Agency as the souree.. , :
[579]3. The facilities provide a capability for passing
[580]Agency funds]to 30 Agency proprictaries and 97 bona fide
[581]ahaes on a continuing basis. 225 bank accounts
[582]Jocated in 36 banks throughout the United States provid
[583]the mechanisms for transmittal of these funds.
[585]SADT
[586]Vint, al
[589]e covtiontt FORM NO. 10 6 snes
[590]MAY 1962 EDITION
[592]. O54 GER, REG.:NO. 27
[593]{ UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 4 Assoc. Dir.
[595]\ M d 1- Mr. J. Cochran, Jr. Der AD Adm, —
[596]. 1l- Mr. R. J. Gallagher ‘Asst. Dies
[597]\ emoran um 1 - Mr. W..R. Wannall Admin, —_—___
[598]. . Ci - Mr. W. 0. Cregarj erm Afters
[599]_DATE:. July 24, 1975 Files & Com. —
[600]1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan ldent, —_____
[601]_ 1- Mr. A. B. Fulton acaetien ——
[602]1- Mr. J. G. Deegan Laboratery —___
[603]. 1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford Legal Coun. __
[604]1 - Mr. F. S. Putman Hosea ihe
[605]1 -~ Mr. J. W. Redfield _ Tratning
[607]1 -~ Mr. T, Jd. MeNiff Telephans Rew —
[609]"My menorandun dated 7/23/75 captioned as above advised
[610]you that this Bureau had: received from Central Intelligence Agency \
[611](CIA) 190 pages ¢¥ extracted from a 693-page document prepared by)’
[615](CIA citing instances wherein CIA believed some of its” activities \
[616]may have exceeded its legal mandate. Some of the CIA activities
[617]cited in this document dyieIude references to Bureauoperations of.
[618]-an.extremely. sensitive«nature and it was also noted that the “Senate :
[619]. " Select. ‘Committee has had-access to this document. It was. _KecOttimended |
[620]that pertinent pages extracted from the CIA document be- routed to,
[621]the respective Bureau Division. and/or Intelligence ~™ Division Section
[622]- believed. to have an interest .in the material contained therein™ for,
[623]“the. -purpose of fully identifying the subject matter and_ making. an~ |
[624]assessment as to whether any compromise to this Bureau's operation
[625]Vis—involved,
[629]4
[631]£— ~ This is to advise that the following pages from the ‘aocus
[632]+ 2 ment were furnished to the following Divisions. and/or Sections of
[633]2a the Intelligence Division on the morning of 7/24/75 for the purpose
[634]7 Ed, ‘of review, ,assessment, and recommendations, if any:
[635]i
[637]rr General Investigative Division ~ Pages 107, 108, 111, 149-151, TA
[638]a 155, 156, 158-161, 178, 180,. <—=
[640]oe ° . 181, 296, 298, 301, 353 and 354
[641]YQ —
[642]fe St Laboratory Division - Pages 65-67, 113, 118, 119, 182, 202, 221,
[643]roa’ 222, and 234, (pages 238-240 and 248 were
[644]Site; furnished for information purposes as these
[645]ns ; pages contained] information -concerning
[646]techniques used and/or developed by CIA
[647]which may be of. interest). Gd Xb b)
[648]Intelligence Division ~ REC-BE. a ‘2 ——
[649]Section CI-1 ka Lt oN a
[651]Pages 23, 24, 28, 29, 70, 72, 73, “TT, 136, 170-142,
[653]298, 329, 582, 615, and 628, 3 JUL 31 1975
[655]62-116395 eet HE etree 7
[657]TaMsoky (12) CONTINUED - OVER
[658]Ku)
[660]84 JUL3 1 1975
[663]Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
[664]RE: SENSTUDY 75
[665]62-116395
[667]4 -
[669]Section CI-2
[670]Pages 30 and 329
[672]Section CI-3
[673]Pages 26, 59-61, 282, 290, 292, 295, 310, 334, 361-363,
[674]368, 371, 373, (876-379, 384, 385, 458, 468-470, 591-593,
[676]and’ 615.
[678]Section IS-1
[679]Pages 188, 189, 283, 330
[681]Section IS-2
[682]Pages 29, 30, 171, 190, 191, 193, 194, i97, 198, 203,
[684]330, and. 482,
[686]Section IS-3
[687]Pages 521 and 549
[689]a
[691]Recipients of above pages were requested to respond to
[692]above request by memorandum captioned as above to reach the
[693]Senstudy Project, Room 4063 JEH by the afternoon of 7/28/75,
[695]ACTION: None. You will be advised of results of above requested
[696]assessment. ;
[698]Existence of the 693-pag “Gta ldocument and the
[700]AL information containe erein shou e closely
[701]6) guarded and disclosed only on a need—-to-khow
[703]asis.
[705]Ar
[708]EProject Mockingbird] a telephone intercept activity, was conducted
[709]between 12 March 1963 and 15 June 1963, and targeted two Washington-
[711]‘based’ newsmen who, at the.time, had been publishing news articles
[712]based on, and frequently quoting, classified materials of this Agency
[714]|, and others, including Top Secret and Special Intelligence.
[716]' ‘Telephone intercept connections were installed at the newmen's
[717]office and at each of their homes, for a total of 3, The connections
[718]were established with the assistance of a telephone company official
[720]‘who responded to a personal request by the Director of Security, Col.
[721]Sheffield Edwards. Col. Edwards' authority for the activity was Mr,
[722]“John-Az: McCone, Director of Central Intelligence. The latter conducted
[723]the activity in coordination with the Attorney General (Mr. Robert Kennedy),
[724]the Secretary of Defense (Mr. Robert McNamara), and the Director of
[725]the Defense Intelligence Agency (Gen, Joseph Carroll), In addition to
[726]Office of Security. personnel directly involved inthe intercepts and ~~
[727]research of materials acquired therefrom, only 3 other Agency,
[728]‘officials dre on record as witting of the activity: the Deputy Director
[729]of-Central Intelligence (General Marshall S. Carter), the Inspector
[731]| (General- (Lyman Kirkpatrick) and the General ‘Counsel, (Mr. Law rence
[732]=Héuston).- a ‘ SG
[736]he intercept activity was particularly productive in identifying con-
[737]tacts of the newsmen, their method of operation and many of their sources
[739]of information. For example, it was determined that during the period they
[740]received data from 13 newsmen, 12 of whom were identified; 12 senators
[742]and 6 members of Congress, all identified; 21 Congressional staff members,
[743]of whom 11 were identified; 16 government employees, including a staff
[744]member of the White House, members of the Vice President's office, an
[745]Assistant Attorney General, and other well-placed individuals. A number
[747].of other sources were partially or tentatively identified, but‘the short Span
[748]_of the activity precluded positive identification, It was observed that through |
[749]these contacts the newsmen actually received more classified and official
[750]data than they could use, and passed some of the stories to other newsmen
[751]for release, establishing that many "leaks" appearing under other by-lines
[752]were actually from the sources of the target newsmen.
[754]Since the termination o ‘Project Mockinguird, Jthose materials related
[755]it which were retained, have been maintained under strict security access
[757]‘of two Office of Security professjonals.
[758]C23 Wo 395° YTS o0222
[760]ENCLOSURE
[762]WARMING HOGS |
[763]SENSITIVE JHTELURGENCE seuRcés
[764]oun CEE TUNN IAs VE) ‘
[766]-seoRer EYES ONLY
[768]eu
[771]gst, I,
[773]» EVES Wish | 6
[775]SUBJECT: | _ Soviet Detector | ;
[777]-1964. The responsibility -for-s
[778]his-exploitation was assigned to the then SR Division of
[779]the Clandestine Service and he was brought: to this country
[781]After initial interrogation by
[783]|
[784]. {\ \ | . .
[785]Bae “A Soviet defector, | .
[786]| ‘defect to a representative of this Agency in
[787]|
[789]representatives of the SR Division, he was moved to a safe-
[791]house in. . Maryland, . - where he
[793]was confined.and interrogated until 13 August 1965 when
[794]he was moved to a specially constructed "jail'’ in a remote
[795]wooded area ot] IS0LAFON. | The SR Division was convinced
[796]that he was a Spatched agent but even after a long
[797]period of hostile interrogation was unable prove their -
[798]contention and he was confined at/ESOLATION n an cffort
[799]to convince him to "confess."
[801]This Office together with the Office of General
[803]{\icounsel became increasingly concerned with the illegality
[805]of the Agency's position in handling a defector, under
[807]these conditions for such a long period of time. Strong
[809]representations were made to the (Director Mr. Helnsjif[by
[811]this Office, the Office of Generdt Counsel, and the
[813]Legislative Liaison Counsel, and on 27 Qctober 19¢=, the
[814]responsibility for his further handling was transferred
[815]o the Office of Security under the direction of fus Taylor. ]
[817][Director of Central Intelligence, then Admiral/Rufus Taylor
[819]The Soviet defector - Was moved to a comfortable safehouse in|
[821]the Washington area and was interviewed under friendly,
[823]ruce Solieg for more than a year. It soon became apparent
[824]i€f defector was bona fide and: he was moved to
[826][[erice' Sori onditions by his Security Case Officer, Mr
[829]at the Sov
[831]_ more comfortable surroundings with considerable freedom
[833]of independent movement. and has continued to cooperate
[834]fully with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and this
[835]Office since that time. He has proven to be the most
[838]_B2 IMPDET :
[839]. [cL BY 000988) on022
[841]secrer)” _ v ¥
[842]EVES ONLY | |
[847]eR SECRET
[850]valuable and economical defector. this Agency has ever
[852]had and leads which were ignored’ by the SR Division were
[853]explored.and.have resulted in the arrest and prosecution
[854]of Soviet Tecruited agents §. -in’ several
[855]countries throughout the world. He currently is living
[856]under an alias; secured a divorce from his Russian wife
[857]and remarried an. American citizen. He is happy, relaxed,.
[858]and appreciative of the treatment accorded him and states
[859]“while I regret my years of incarceration, I have.
[860]no. bitterness and now understand how it could happen."
[862]2 ;
[863]SECRET
[864]EYES GNLY
[866]so
[870]SECRET
[871]P EYES OLY
[873]SURVEILLANCES
[875]- A. -SEBSTA
[877]y, During the periods 1-20 February, 12 April- 7 May,.
[878]ifand 9-20 August 1971, fa torer st was conducted of
[880]} Mis¢ Deborah Fitzgerald,f/ a former staff employee, and
[882]Orlafido Toro Nunez, a.Cuban national with whom
[884]Miss Fitzgerald had become professionally and emo-
[885]tionally involved. Surveillance was predicated upon
[886]information that Miss Fitzgerald had been seeking from
[888]files, and that employees were visiting a photographic
[890]studio operated by Miss Fitzgerald and Nunez in Fairfax
[891]City, Virginia. In addition to physical surveillance,
[893]one surreptitious entry of the photographic studio was
[895]made, and an attempt to enter the apartment of Nunez
[897], Was aborted because of a door lock problem.
[899]PARAGOW
[901]Pursuant to a request from the CI Staff, “approved =
[902]by the DC1, surveillances were conducted of Iden 69
[903]and her associates at various times’ from May to September
[904]1971. Iden 69 °, an acknowledged Latin American revolu-
[905]tionary, had long been a source of the WH Division and
[906]had given information regarding a plot to assassinate
[907]or kidnap Vice—President—Agnow and the Ber. [ Surveil-
[908]lances] included coverage of the activities of Iden 69.
[909]lances] two visits to the United States, technical cover-
[910]age of debriefings of her by WH Division. representatives
[911]in New. York City, and surveillance, including mail cover-
[912]age, of several American citizens alleged to be part of
[913]the plot. Although most of the surveillance occurred in
[914]New York City, surveillance of one of the individuals
[915]pr ineinded extensive coverage of a commune in: Detroit. /,
[917]“a GELOTEX I
[920]i
[921]j
[924]NS
[926]At the direction of the DCI, a surveillance was con-
[927]ducted of Iden 180 of the Washington Post during
[929]SECRET ae as Beboee)
[930].
[932]an ns 00026
[933]BYES OnLy
[935]4
[936]7
[939]EYES et
[941]the vecsnae October, 27 October-10 December 1971
[943]and on 3 January 1972.. In addition to physical sur- \
[944]veillance, an observation post was maintained in the
[945]Statler Hilton Hotel where observation could be main-
[946]tained of the building housing his office. The sur-
[947]veillance was designed to determine Iden 180 sources
[949]of classified information of interest to the Agency
[951]which had appeared in a number of his columns. +}
[953]D. MUDHEN ~ " ; a -
[955]‘At the direction of the DCI, surveillance was con- |
[956]ducted of Jack Anderson and at various times his "leg |
[957]men," Britt Hume, Leslie Whitten, and Joseph Spear,
[958]_ £rom 15 February to 12 April 1972. In addition to the
[959]/ physical surveillance, an observation post was main-
[961]_ tained in the Statler Hilton Hotel directly opposite
[962]Anderson's office. The purpose of this surveillance
[963]was to attempt to determine Anderson's sources for
[964]highly classified Agency information appearing in his -[
[965].. Syndicated columns.
[967][By BUTANE-
[969]At the direction of the DCI, a surveillance was
[970]conducted on Victor L. Marchetti from 23 March to
[971]20 April 1972. The purpose of this surveillance was
[972]to determine his activities and contacts both with i]
[973]Agency employees and other individuals in regard to |
[974]his proposed book and published magazine. articles ex~
[975]posing Agency operations, 7
[977]> POLICE SUPPORT , + Sr
[979]A. During 1969, 1970, and 1971, on several occasions, .
[980]the Intelligence Division of the Metropotitan. Police
[981]Department was provided a communications system to
[982]monitor major anti-Vietnam war demonstrations in the
[983]’ Washingtom area. This system consisted of a radio
[984]receiver-and an Agent at the Intelligence Diyision
[985]Headquarters and several automobiles from an Agency
[986]Field Office equipped with radio receivers and trans-
[987]mitters and manned bytwo Agency employees, as wéll asia |}
[988]representative of the Intelligence Division, Metropolitan. |
[989]Police Department. The benefit to the Agency was that
[990]the communications over this system were monitored at if
[991]the Headquarters Building to provide instant notice of m
[992]possible actions by the dissidents against Agency in- (}
[995]| : Q00EY
[997]segsey EVES ONLY
[1000]III.
[1003]Ye
[1004]a
[1006]/+ Since 1953, this office has operated a mail inter-
[1008]SECRET
[1011]B. During the period from 1968 to 1973, several .
[1012]items of positive audio equipment consisting pri- ‘
[1013]marily of clandestine transmitters and. touch-tone
[1014]dial recorders were loaned to the Metropotitan
[1016]Police Department, Fairfax-County —Virginia, Police
[1017]Department, Montgomery—County—Marytand; Police
[1019]Department, New-York—CitxRolice Department, and the
[1020]San-Franeisco,-Catitforma, Police Department.
[1022]GENERAL SUPPORT ee ee
[1023]“A. SRPOINTER- |
[1025]cept program of incoming and outgoing Russian mail
[1026]‘and, at various times, other selective mail at Kennedy
[1027]Airport in New York City. This operation included not-
[1028]only the photographing of envelopes but also surrepti-
[1029]tious opening and photographing of selected items of
[1030]mail. The bulk of the take involved matters of inter-
[1031]nal security interest which was disseminated to the
[1032]Federal Bureau of Investigation. This program is now i]:
[1033]in a dormant state pending a decision as to whether er
[1034]the operation will be continued or abolished. .
[1036]For several years the Office of Security has pro- “SD
[1037]vided support to Russian, defector of
[1039]. e .
[1040]interest to the CI Staff. This support has consisted Ys
[1041]of numerous things, including documentation for a change |!
[1042]of identity | - on three occasions. =. |!
[1044]os
[1046]'C. REDFACE-F-
[1048]In July 1970, this office made a surreptitious
[1049]entry of an office in Silver Spring, Maryland, occu- -
[1050]pied by a former defector working under contract for i
[1051]the Agency. This involved by-passing a contact and
[1054]. . SEUHEL ; a
[1055]s . EVES my | é$ | wk
[1057]Lb. \
[1059]7) ‘, “sonic alarm system, entering a vault, and entering - \
[1060](tb ''- a safe within the vault. The purpose of the opera- =
[1062]. , tion was to determine whether the individual had i
[1064]' any unauthorized classified information in his Dy)
[1066]possession. <<
[1067]D. BUREAU OF NARCOTICS AND DANGEROUS DRUGS
[1069]In January 1971, the Director approved a request
[1070]from the Director, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous
[1071]Drugs, to provide covert recruitment and security
[1072]clearance support to BNDD. This has been accomplished
[1073]through the medium of a proprietary of the Office of’
[1074]Security operating in
[1075]: Falls Church, Virginia. Support
[1076]includes covert recruitment, investigation, polygraph,
[1077]yb) medical clearance, and training. It has been divided
[1078]hi into three phases: (1) A CI operation to place indi-
[1079]») viduals in BNDD field offices to monitor any illegal
[1080]- -activities of other BNDD employees; (2) Recruitment
[1081]of Chinese or Spanish speaking covert Agents; and (3)
[1082]Recruitment of an individual used as an Agent by BNDD
[1083]but actually employed by BNDD, although this fact is
[1084]known only to the Director and Chief Inspector, BNDD.
[1085]In this case, arrangements were made _for all pay and.
[1086]other employee benefits to come fromEC1A}on a reim-- |
[1087]bursable basis. C7
[1089]E. [-KETTENS PROJECT)
[1091]: ni) ' AS_a result of a request from the Department of
[1092], ie State,[approved by the DCI] this office has, since
[1093]Ka October 1972, provided protection on a 24-hour basis
[1094]J . to twa-sons. af a foreign leader who are attending school
[1095]in . the United States. This support includes
[1096]the financing of the protection and the detail to the:
[1097]Department of State of six armed Agents of this office
[1098]who are documented as State Department Office of Security
[1099]employees. . :
[1101]"R, -MBRRIMAG- Co
[1103]From February 1967 to November 1971, ~~ an
[1104]Office of Security proprietary, recruited and handled
[1105]several Agents for the purpose of covertly monitoring
[1107]SEoRET = 00089
[1108]BSOMY
[1111]and with the approval of the DDP and the DCI, this
[1113]“SECRET.
[1114]EVES On ,
[1116]@issident groups in the Washington area considered
[1117]to be potential threats to Agency personnel and
[1118]installations, One of these Agents so, successfully
[1119]penetrated one dissident group that the Agent was turned
[1120]‘over to the FBI for handling. In addition, during
[1121]this period, the Office of Security field offices
[1122]were tasked with collecting available intelligence
[1124]on dissident groups. All such information was in-
[1125]cluded in a periodic report distributed to appro-
[1126]priate parts of the Agency and to certain outside.
[1127]‘Government agencies.
[1129]Several months ago, at the request of CI Staff,
[1130]office arranged to move a sensitive defector. out of
[1131]a European country via commercial transportation and
[1133]gain entry into the United States without leaving
[1134]any trace of his: true identity.
[1136]‘i. 00039
[1141]mo a ~ _ " . MW May 1973
[1143]MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
[1145]SUBJECT: General: Office of Security Survey
[1147]a
[1149]1, At the Director's instruction, and with the concurrence
[1150]of the then DD/P, the Office of Security developed informants in
[1151]RID to report on the activities of RID employees on whom security
[1152]questions had arisen. This program, which included upwards of a
[1153]dozen informants at its peak, has declined to its present level of
[1154]three, only one of whom is reporting regularly on matters of current
[1155]interest.
[1157]2 The principal object of Security's interest through this
[1158]informant is a female who was employed in RID for a number of years
[1159]until she resigned in 1969. Her resignation coincided with the initiation:
[1160]of a security review on her by the Office of Security, but Security does
[1161]not know whether the employee was aware of this security review at
[1162]the time of her resignation.
[1164]3. Security's interest in this employee was occasioned by
[1165]reports that she had developed an increasingly intimate acquaintance
[1166]with a Cuban national. Reporting by one informant, who was also
[1167]being developed by the Cuban, suggested that the Cuban might have
[1168]an intelligence interest in the female. The same informant also sub-
[1169]sequently reported that the Cuban had numerous other contacts among
[1170]clerical and secretarial employees of the Agency. Among these
[1171]employees is one girl who works in a biographic section in SB Division.
[1173]4. Subsequent to her departure from the Agency, the ex-RID
[1174]employee entered into a common-law marital relationship with the .
[1175]Cuban and joined him as partner ina photographic business. In this ye
[1176]capacity she solicited business among CIA employees, especially /
[1177]those requiring passport photos. Recently, she and the Cuban sought
[1178]to employ Security's informant in this business on a part-time basis.
[1180]+ m qt ,
[1182]— 00059
[1184]. .
[1185]we: ANT “ _ = cL a
[1186]Rae 4 . 4 ee |
[1188]3
[1189]on
[1191]i
[1194]a a
[1197]“i. 8. {The -Office of Security has been running this operation for ~ Soy
[1198]oft
[1202]5. Information on the background of the Cuban is fairly extensive,
[1204], but it is inconclusive. He is known to have been a member of anti-
[1205]* Castro organizations this country. There are alM™ ‘reports that
[1207]his mother was imprisoned in Cuba at one time. There are other -
[1208]episodes in his life that suggest intelligence involvement on his part
[1209]with some hostile service, but this is not yet definitely established.
[1211]6. The Office of Security has had at times a second informant
[1212]in this case. His reporting has tended to confirm reporting by the
[1214]principal informant.
[1215]. a
[1217]7. There is conclusive evidence that the Cuban expressed ;
[1218]interest in certain 201] files in the Agency, and there are good grounds,
[1219]for believing that the RID female employee delivered at least one such
[1221]‘file to the Cuban while she was still in RID. There is also evidence
[1222]_ that the female employee in SB Division has continued in frequent
[1224]contact with her friénd,. the ex-RID employee, and the Cuban. On
[1225]one occasion, she served as intermediary for contact instructions
[1226]from the Cuban to O/S's principal informant. The informant has no.
[1227]' knowledge, however, of any other requirements that may have been
[1228]levied on or satisfied by the SB employee. Neither does he know of
[1230]. the extent of contacts by this couple with other Agency employees
[1232].
[1234]except social contacts, ©
[1236]a
[1238]over two years, in an effort to obtain conclusive. proof ofits intelli-  ~ \\
[1239]gence nature. CI Staff has been kept informed. The FBI, which
[1240]was informed of the case at an early stage, has declined to take re-
[1241]sponsibility for it, on grounds that it concerns CIA's internal security} i
[1242]As a result, the Office ofSecurity has been inhibited in the. actions if
[1243]it can take against the Cuban suspect, On the other hand, Security —
[1245]has not taken any action against Agency employees for fear of com- J
[1247]promising the ‘operation. J ; A
[1249]Qe
[1251]9. It would appear to me that the Office of Security has dallied
[1253]_with this case long enough. Apparently unable through positive measures
[1255]to resolve doubts about the case, O/S has followed, the course of watch-
[1256]ful waiting, hoping the Cuban would take precipitant action himself that
[1257]would give us the evidence we seek. In the meantime, our knowledge _
[1258]of the relationship. between the Cuban and the several other current
[1259]Agency employees with whom he is known to have contact continues
[1262]wo. .
[1263]W met wank,
[1266]A!
[1268]to be quite limited. Neither the Cuban nor his girlfriend have made a
[1269]any further approaches to Security's informant recently, although he
[1271]+» continues to see the cially. Thus, there is sli season to believe
[1272]that further waiting will produce a.break in the case.
[1274]10. There are two courses open to the Office of Security now.
[1276]It can attempt to have the Agency employees known to be in contact
[1277]with the Cuban transferred to nonsensitive positions. This might
[1278]alert the Cuban to our penetration of the operation, particularly
[1280]since a plausible reason for transfer would be difficult to develop
[1282]for some of the persons involved. Alternatively, Security could
[1283]move overtly and charge the Agency employees with violation of the
[1284]security regulation requiring reporting of contacts with foreign
[1285]nationals. This would, of course, terminate the Office of Security's
[1286]_ operation. _
[1288]ll, One of these courses of action should be chosen promptly.
[1289]The possibility that the employee in SB Division may be passing
[1290]information on[-CIA's Soviet operations fis too great to warrant further
[1291]delay in moving against her. Moreover, it is possible that the Cuban
[1292]has current productive penctrations of RID. Thus, the risk of damage
[1293]to the Agency seems clearly to outweigh any. possible gains from
[1294]continuing this CI effort.
[1296])
[1298]a |
[1300]a 09064
[1304][
[1306]SUBJECT . ¢ ,Press Allegations re Use of Agency
[1308]. individuals in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency-~- fr
[1314]9 May 1973
[1316]MEMGRANCUM FOR: Deputy Director for Management & Services
[1318]Polygraph.
[1320]2 This memorandum is for your information only
[1321]and confirms a report I made to you by telephone earlier
[1322]today. a °
[1324]2. On 22 July 1971, an article was carried on
[1325]American preposals relative to the SALT talks in The New
[1326]York Times over the by-line of Iden 181. . It was
[1327]devastatingly accurate and contained direct quotes from
[1328]a Presidential advisory memorandum the White House had
[1329]sent to Mr. Gerard Smith, Director, Arms Control and
[1330]Disarmament Agency, a few days earlier. The President
[1331]was alleged to be furious with this unauthorized dis-
[1332]closure of classified information and directed a sweeping
[1333]investigation within the United States Government to
[1334]determine the source of the disclosure. Investigation
[1335]was conducted uncer the direction of Mr. Egil Krogh and
[1336]Mr. David Young, Staff Assistants to Mr. John Ehriichman,
[1337]Counsel to the President for Domestic Affairs. —
[1339]~.0n the basis of investigations conducted by |
[1340]“State Security and Defense officials, four individuals-- Ht
[1341]‘one individual in the Department of Defense and three j
[1343]were tabbed as leading suspects. Mr. Egil Krogh contacted i
[1344]me on 26 July 1971 and requested that we arrange to polygraph
[1345]the three suspects in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency:
[1346]and volunteered the information that the Federal Bureau of 7
[1347]Investigation would be asked to polygraph the one suspect - |
[1348]in the Department of Defense. a
[1350]ry
[1352]A ind TRALVE- teabiatal Ist Dal
[1354]00065
[1356]“Washington Post, in an article dated 3 September 1571,
[1358]. Security, a polygraph eperator and a polygraph machine for
[1360]Memorandum is attached.
[1362]A Vobintaoiiicl Ud Oe
[1364]‘4. «6ST informed Mr. Krogh that from time to time
[1365]in matters involving the national security the Agency had -
[1366]detailed to Mr. G. Marvin Gentile, Director of State
[1368]his use in polygraphing State Department employees who
[1369]were recipients of allegaticns concerning their loyalty.
[1371]I emphasized that this procedure had the Director's
[1372]approval and that State clearly understood that the examin-
[1373]ation was their total responsibility. I further informed
[1374]him that this-was the only way we could undertake to enter-
[1375]tain his request and that even then it would require the
[1376]specific approval of the Director. Mr. Krogh asked me to
[1377]obtain such approval and work out such arrangements with
[1378]Mr. Gentile.
[1380]5. Later that same day, Mr. Krogh called Mr. Gentile
[1381]and inquired es to whether the arrangements had been made.
[1382]Mr. Gentile indicated they had and suggested that the same
[1383]polygraph operator be used to examine the Defense suspect.
[1384]Mr. Krogh informed Mr. Gentile that he considered this an —
[1385]excellent idea and that he would instruct Defense officials
[1386]to make their man available to Mr. Gentile for a polygraph
[1387]examination.
[1389]6. The four individuals were Iden 182
[1390]of the Department of Defense and Iden 183
[1391]Iden 184 » and Iden 185 - of
[1392]the Arns Control and Disarmament Agency. The polygraph
[1393]examinations resulted in clearing the four men and the
[1394]results of the examinations were forwarded over my signature
[1395]to Mr. Gentile on 29 July 1971. A copy of my covering
[1397]7. ° Iden 186 “  , a staff writer for The
[1399]stated that a State Department spokesman had acknowledged
[1400]at a news briefing that agents of the-Federal Bureau of
[1401]Investigation had polygraphed State Department employees
[1402]suspected of leaking information on the SALT talks in
[1403]July. Mr. John Edgar Hoover, then Director of the Federal
[1407]t
[1409]-RTERAL WE cnLy
[1413]Whitiied: she OL
[1416]Dandie RE Ci
[1418]: Bureau of Investigation, denied this allegation: ‘ina
[1419]letter to The Washingten Post and said that the. polygraph.
[1420]examinations nad becn Concucted by another agency. -Specu-
[1421]lation centeree around the Agency, but after a day or so,
[1422]press speculation in this regard died away.
[1424]8. Iden 186 apparently has never been satisfied
[1425]and has been pressing Mr. Charles Bray, State Department
[1426]spokesman, for confirmation of Agency involvement. Mr.
[1428]Bray learned today that Iden 186 plans to use a press
[1429]conference to be held at 2:00 p.m. this afternoon to press
[1430]this point further. tr. Bray has been given guidance by
[1432]Mr. Gentile to avoid confirmation but if this is impossible
[1433]he will indicate the examinations were conducted by State
[1434]Department Security officials utilizing an operator and
[1436]a machine detailed to the Department for this purpose. I .
[1437]do not know whether or not the fact that the government-wide
[1438]investigation was directed.by Mr. Egil Krogh is known to
[1439]‘Iden 186 but I suspect that it is and that this is the
[1440]reason why the matter has been raised again. Mr. David
[1441]Young was instrumental in pushing my office to conduct an
[1442]internal Agency investigation of this disclosure and the
[1443]White House was satisfied that no Agency employee was
[1445]the source.
[1447]Coypeacl Wok
[1448]foward J. Osborn
[1450]yh) ‘Director of Security
[1452]Attachment
[1454]Pan rare dit aure v= TOP ITA "ar YW
[1455]ADRISTRATNE iaebtatsiadh Jel " Wy
[1457]00067
[1460]SB rne-1973
[1462]_ MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General
[1464]SUBJECT ; $ Items in John Clarke Memorandum
[1465]to the Director of Central Intelligence,
[1466]- dated 9 May 1973
[1468]1, Two items in the attached memorandum had not ©
[1469]/previously been reported. The first: ''~- Use of CIA funds = {\
[1471]' and facilities to acquire U.S. real estate for. FBI and pro- \
[1472]‘vision of technical equipments by NSA (MHDOZEN) for use 4
[1473]against a common target in the U.S." \
[1475]2. Ina follow-up meeting with Mr. Clarke, he advised |
[1476]| that involved here was the use of funds appropriatedfor CIA
[1477]being given to the FBI in cashiers checks for the purpose of j
[1478](| buying an apartment building.
[1479]. There was also
[1480]Agency help given in handling the purchase. Further, other
[1481]‘CIA monies in cashiers checks were given to NSA who, with ‘
[1482]=. some OTS assistance, was working on new gadgetry for the
[1483])} surveillance. Mr, Clarke said he thought the only problem
[1484]here was in the use.of funds, not in the operation. He thought
[1485]A“ the only source of additional information on this subject was
[1486]Mr, Ray Rocca of the DDO/CI Staff.
[1490]7 . 3. The second item: "-- Use of CIA funds to help
[1491]“f State Department defer Presidential representational expenses
[1492]' of President Lyndon B, Johnson's trip to Southeast Asia." i
[1493]; 4, Mr. Clarke said the total amount of money requested
[1494]- by State Department was $3,000,000 but that the Director would
[1495]i not agree to this amount, The Director did supply funds in
[1496]| those instances where some operational activity was involved or i
[1497]\ could be inverse ise. ; crowd control, politicalaction influence i
[1498]\ _ activity, etc. . Clarke was not sure of the'amount of Agency /,
[1500]000'70
[1502]FOSET TUZA OU
[1503]sengl-fye5 cal
[1505]funds used. He falt that only Colonel White could supply
[1506]additional detai He said Senator Russell a
[1508]sentative Mahon were advised of this Agency activity but
[1510]Repre-
[1511]asked not to be briefed in detail. -
[1513]we
[1515]| fi
[1517](nw 6 Reland. 7
[1519]J ohn-Gi—Richards.
[1521]Inspector
[1523]Attachment
[1525]| 2+ — 000%4
[1526]- SERET-EYS GLY
[1528]§ May 1973
[1530]MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
[1532]SUBJECT '. ? Per your instructions
[1534]-
[1536]1, Ihave no recollection of specific contacts with the |
[1537]Elisberg case, Watergate, or Young. Dick Helms’ instructions
[1539]‘at the time regarding discussion of Hunt's previous employment
[1541]should bea matter of record. . ~ -
[1543]2. Other activities of the Agency which could at some point
[1544]raise public questions should they be exposed and on which Bill
[1545]Colby is fully conversant are;
[1547]Heal -- Clactivity of Dick Ober, DD/D.
[1549], o> WEEBRINEY and MHMUTUAL investments and
[1550]accumulation of Government capital.
[1553]\.
[1555]Use of CIA funds and facilities to acquire U:S.
[1556]real estate for FBI and provision of technical °
[1557]equipments by NSA (MHDOZEN) for use against
[1558]a common target inthe U.S,
[1560]Use of CIA funds to help State Department defer
[1561]Presidential representational expenses of L. B. J.
[1563]’ trip to SEA, |
[1564]THANO)
[1566]| EYES ONLY -_
[1567]SEGRET |
[1570]et
[1572].
[1574]oe a previously been reported, The first: "-- Use of CLA fonds _
[1576]’ hero was in the use of funds, not in the operation. He thought
[1578]Mr, Ray Rocea of the DDO/CI Staff. NO
[1580]State Department defer Presidential representational expenses \ ;
[1581]_ of President Lyndon B, Johnson's trip to Southeast Asia." vow
[1582]4. Mr, Clarke said the total amount of money reauested \
[1583]by State Department was $3,000,000 but that the Director would -
[1584]‘not agree to this amount. The Director did supply funds in \-
[1586]5
[1588]ine 1973
[1590]MEMCRANDUM FOR: Inspector General
[1592]3 tems: id John Ctariie)M2morandum
[1593]. to the Cirector of Central Intelligence,
[1595]dated 9 May 1973,
[1597]1. Two items in the attached memorandum had no
[1599]and facilities to acquire U. 5. real estate for FRI and pro- “
[1600]vision of technical equiprnents by NSA (MHDOZEN) for use \
[1601]against a common target in the U.S," ‘ “
[1603]2. Ina follow- -up meeting with Mr, Clarke, he advised
[1604]that involved here was the use of funds appropriatedfor CIA
[1605]being given to the FBlin cashiers checks for the purpose of
[1606]buying an apartment building
[1607]~ ‘There was also
[1608]Agency help given in handling the purchase. Further, other
[1609]CIA monies in cashiers cheeks were given to NSA who, with
[1610]some OTS assistance, was working on new gadgetry for the
[1611]surveillance. Mr. Clarke said he thought the only problem - -
[1613]2 Nn Neen an meme. tema
[1615]peer
[1617]the only source of additional information on this subject was
[1619]'3. Thea second item: '"-- Use of CIA funds to help
[1621]those instances where some operational activity was involved or 7
[1622]could be inferred, i.e., crowd. control, politicayaction Influence
[1623]activity, etc. Mr, Clarke was not sure of the amount of Agency
[1625]000°73
[1628]eee TN
[1629]we te SeehT]
[1631]i
[1632]CE SOR SOP SY PO Oe Oe
[1634]. . . .
[1636]Cc; PNT? _ Zeit’. C 3 et oe 8 Ge foe
[1638]2 ae3 « v
[1640]Cn
[1643]MEMORANDUM FOR:
[1645]. FBI referred to ia para 1 is not shown
[1646]-in other documents in the Agency. It
[1647]has been kept very close with lr. Yale,
[1649]“Mr, Magnusson, atad possibly Mr. Colby.
[1650]| °° All Filles. have been purged.
[1652]FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
[1654]. . 4 ‘
[1655]1 AUG sé MHICH HAY BE USED. — ; . _ en ,
[1656]. "8
[1657]i . : .
[1658]. . o: o
[1659]t e oe
[1660]i) € of
[1661]] . e ¢
[1663]oom,
[1664]NS «
[1665]“SN
[1666].
[1667]oe . ie
[1670]. @
[1673]= ss) .
[1674]MEMORANDUM FOR:
[1676]of Finance in a ‘memorandun dated 17 November 1971 to obligate | {
[1678]. .
[1680]Director of Central Intelligence
[1684]Deputy Director for Management and Services
[1686]VIA. _ H
[1687]FROM | . : Director of Finance
[1688]SUBJECT - $ Special Other Government Agency Activities ;
[1690]1. Project MHDOZEN - Colonel White, Executive Director-
[1691]Comptroller, acting tor the Director, authorized the Director
[1693]$2,700,000 for a sensitive domestic FBI operation and to
[1694]disperse all or any part thereof in such manner as may be
[1695]determined by the receiving agency and relayed to Finance by
[1696]the Chief,.CI Staff, DDP. This authorization was reaffirmed
[1697]by Mr. William Colby 18 April 1972. This Project is still
[1699]active.
[1701]2. &PMEDDEY - Rental of office space in New York City
[1702]for National Security Agency at the request of Dr. Tordella,
[1703]Deputy Director/NSA and approved by Mr. Karamessines,
[1705]Deputy Director for Plans.
[1707]3. Detailees - The Agency has reimbursable. and non-
[1708]reimbursable agreements with the White House, Department of
[1709]Justice, Defense Agencies, etc., based on signed memoranda
[1710]between the Director of Personnel and the various Agencies,
[1713]1
[1715]‘ 4. Project TWOFOLD-- Reimbursement from Bureau of
[1716]Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs for training of BNDD agents by
[1718]‘a domestic Agency Security proprietary.
[1719]: 'S, Department of Justice - On 29 April 1971 the
[1720]Executive Director-Comptroller authorized a payment of
[1722]$858,555.70 to the Department of Justice for negotiated
[1723]sensitive services. Details were kept in the Office of the
[1725]Deputy Director for Plans.
[1727]| . E2 inpoer J FAA)
[1728]GL BY: | 006567,
[1729]poo a
[1730]SECRET EVES Guy °° 0077
[1732](Trane a ees ee
[1734]en \
[1736]_ MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Management and Services
[1738]SUBJECT ::~«~Special Report
[1740]‘1. This memorandum is in response to a request to
[1741]provide information on situations or associations that
[1742]might appear to be irregular on the surface.
[1744]AY 2. Details to the White House and Government Agencies -
[1745]) ackground: For many years tne Central intelligence Agency nas
[1746]etailed e employees to the immediate office of the White House ©
[1747]- per se and to components associated intimately with the immediate
[1748]office of the President such as the Council on International
[1749]Economic Policy and the President's Foreign Intelligence
[1750]Advisory Board. We have furnished secretarics, clerical
[1751]employees and certain professional. employees on a reimbursable
[1752]and non-reimbursable basis. At the present time,’ we have no
[1753]Clericals or professionals assigned to the immediate White
[1754]House office, but we do have one young man detailed to their
[1755]Communications Section. There are detailees to PFIAB and CIEP.
[1756]I might point out that we had detailed to the White House as
[1757]late as the fall of 1970 couriers, telephone operators, a  —
[1758]laborer assigned to the grounds and a graphics man who designed
[1759]‘invitations for State dinners. By October of 1970, more funds
[1760]were apparently available to run the White House and most of
[1761]. Q our detailees were hired as bona fide White House employees.
[1762]/ (CIA’is not the only Agency. furnishing the White House with
[1763]/ detailees. Levies have been made by this Administration and
[1764]others on Defense and State and other Government entities
[1765]whose employees have Top Secret. clearances.
[1767]Professional officers have been and are at the present
[1768]time assigned t the National Security Council and we have seven .
[1769]Clericals on detail to NSC on a reimbursable basis.
[1771]- ' In addition. to the above, we have technical specialists
[1772]detailed to NSA, an instructor at the National War College and
[1773]security officers detailed to the Department of State to
[1777]Bm
[1778]ES
[1780]Titi
[1781]CONFIDENTIAL ® 2 Bro (ons
[1783]te
[1784]“4
[1786]00405
[1788]SIDA
[1789]protect foreign visi sors, Recently [ John Hag kas detailed -
[1790]* to the Secretary o he Treasury along with Air other Agency
[1792]employees. We have even, in rare. instances, detailed our:
[1793]people to Congressional Staffs for short periods of. time.
[1795]-3, Details to the White House and Government Agencies -
[1796]Discussion: Details to NSC, the White House, NSA and the
[1798]National War College are probably quite defensible.» On the other
[1800]hand, there may be those who would question Agency enployees
[1802]currently working at the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs —
[1804]and Mr. Peter Petérson having an Agency employee as his
[1805]secretary when he was the ‘Secretary of Commerce (she also made
[1807]a trip with him to Moscow), She is still with him in his
[1808]present assignment but we expect that she will report to NSC for
[1809]@ new detail sometime this month. Iden 112 served” for
[1810]over ten years as Director of the Office of. Public Safety for
[1811]AID. This information has been kept "close to the vest" during
[1812]that entire period of time. He has been approved: for disability
[1813]retirement and is presently on sick leave and will retire
[1814]automatically at the expiration of this leave.
[1816]Each detail of an Agency employee to the White House or
[1817]other Government agency has been carefully considered and
[1818]approval at a higher level obtained when professionals were
[1819]involved.
[1821]4. Project TNOFOLD:- I believe the support we are
[1822]providing to Project TSOFOLD is an activity that should be.
[1823]reported under your guidelines. Since this is an extremely.
[1824]sensitive Project and the Office of Security is reporting on
[1825]it, I will not repeat the details in my memorandum.
[1827]5. Individuals Engaged in Domestic Activities:. In. a more
[1828]_general sense, Contract Personnei Division prepares and executes
[1829]contracts with individuals engaged by the Agency to carry out
[1830]domestic activities, We also process Staff Agents who are
[1831]domestically assigned, None of these assignments are decided
[1832]in OP. I really have no way of knowing with any degree of
[1833]certainty what the specific duties of these individuals will be.
[1835]6. Arrangements with American Firms: -In the interest of
[1836]reporting "too much,” I would remind you that Contract Personnel
[1837]Division writes "agreements" with domestically based American
[1838]firms to provide cover. for Agency assets. The actual assign-
[1839]ments are overseas. The arrangements, however, are backstopped,
[1840]in | the main, in the United States.
[1842], _. fos 00206
[1843]CONFIDENTIAL =
[1846]" mined by inquiry to the designated sponsoring component.
[1850]‘Director of Central Intelligence. The responsibilities of the
[1852]| | “gh NaN 1973
[1853]) | ee
[1855]fo FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
[1857]‘THROUGH : Deputy Director for Management and Services
[1859]SUBJECT : Sensitive Activities Performed by. the
[1860]Office of Logistics
[1862]y*
[1864]1. This memorandum contains information for the Director
[1865]of Central Intelligence.
[1867]2. This memorandum is submitted pursuant to advice given
[1868]by the Deputy Director for Management and Services on 7 May
[1869]that Office Directors report on activities, either under their
[1870]cognizance or otherwise known to them, the nature of which
[1871]could possibly need explanation or justification when viewed as
[1872]within the statutory responsibility and authority of the
[1874]Office of Logistics (OL) are such that’in all matters herein o
[1875]reported, except two, the actions undertaken were at the re- :
[1877]quest of another Agency component. We have prepared a brief
[1879]description of each action involved and then have included the
[1880]name of the sponsoring component. The substantive reason for
[1881]the requests for action by this Office will have to be deter-
[1883]Se Facts ‘pertaining to both actions undertaken at the ‘i
[1884]initiative of this Office are as follows: :
[1886]a. A covert procurement proprietary concern, dedi-
[1887]cated to the acquisition of firearms, ammunition, “and
[1888]related police-type equipment, is operated in Baltimore,
[1889]Maryland. It was organized in 1969. This proprietary 1
[1891]_is operated in order to give the Agency a capability to
[1892]obtain such materiel without associating the procurement
[1893]action with the United States Government. It is legally
[1895]. necessary that the proprietary be licensed by both the
[1896]State and Federal-jurisdictions. Since it is located in
[1897]Maryland, it is appropriately licensed by the Maryland
[1899], State Police to buy and sell firearms and ammunition.
[1901]00320
[1903]EVES ONLY a:
[1904]SECRET | et 3- pi
[1907]. (1968), the sale of electronic intelligence. equipment is
[1909]‘responsibilityv.. On 10 September 1971, there was an inquiry
[1911]“SUBJECT:
[1913]supplier located in. Maryland, deals in a wide
[1915]. in the firm for over 15 years. The officer agreed to
[1917]-.the agent was informed that. it is an Agency
[1919]Most: of the DD/O area divisions from lancels time submit
[1921]Sensitive
[1922]Logistics
[1924]The Maryland State Police have been briefed on the Agency's
[1925]association with this proprietary and have assisted us in
[1926]obtaining the appropriate State license. Similarly, a
[1927]Federal license has been obtained for 'the proprietary
[1928]through an arrangement with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
[1929]and Firearms of the Department of the Treasury. They, too,
[1930]have been briefed on the Agency's association with this
[1931]proprietary.
[1933]stivities Performed by th Office of
[1937]b,. Under Title 18, Chapter 2512 of. the U. S. Code
[1939]prohibited except to Federal agencies, and state and local
[1940]law enforcement agencies. In essence, this law makes it
[1941]almost impossible to procure electronic intelligence
[1942]equipment in .a covert manner so that no tie or relationship
[1943]to the United States Government is made. In order for the
[1944]Agency to covertly obtain.such eauipment and hide any
[1945]Government interest, the Covert Procurement Staff cf the
[1946]Procurement Division. has relied on an established working
[1947]relationship with a U.S. firm. | This firm, a prominent
[1949]range of law enforcement, police supplies, and equipment.
[1950]The Covert. Procurement. Stare has. had a relationship withan officer
[1952]allow us to place orders thr ough his corporation to major
[1953]suppliers of this equipment with a billing to 28 Agency national
[1954]proprietary.There is an understanding that. if any. inquiry
[1956]is raised by the Department cf Justice, ‘the firm's officer would
[1957]immediately call the Chief of the Covert Procurement Staff
[1958]who would, through appropriate liaison channels, contact
[1960]the Department of Justice, identify the.Agencv's interest
[1962]in the procurement action, and clear the officer of any
[1964]about the proprietary £ron_an FBI agent making a routine
[1965]investigation of. the officer's books. Through Office of
[1966]Security liaison with the Department of Justice and the FBI,
[1968]notional propr letary. This disclosure closed the inquiry
[1969]and, since that time, there has been no further inquiry.
[1971]requisitions toe us to acquire [surveillance equipment. The
[1972]majority of the transactions are on behalf of the intelli-
[1973]gence service with whom liaison is conducted in various
[1974]foreign countries. By agreement between this Office and
[1976]EYES eek ae
[1977]SECRi » . 00444
[1978]3 he
[1981]: 7. Contractu@MRelationship - USJPRS: e Agency
[1983]organization, USJPR&, has a contractual assocwaution with
[1984]approximately 1,500 independent contractors and 45 contract
[1985]‘employees. These indiviquals are unwitting of the fact that
[1986]they really work forj/CIAjin the performance of their domestic
[1988]activities. [ -USJPRS (Unite d_States Joint Publications Research’
[1989]Service) is a part of FBIS._} They perform a translation service
[1990]of unclassified documents for the Government. The independent
[1991]contractors work in their cwn homes and are given assignments
[1993]as the need arises. The contract employees are "integrated"
[1995]into the Bureau of Standards and.are located in Washington, D. Cy
[1996]They are paid and administered by the Bureau. / CIA reimburses
[1998]the Bureau. Their basic contracts of employmen nt are prepared
[2000]in Contract Personnel Division.
[2002]"8, Hunt Requests a Lockpicker: This is.a record of
[2003]External Employment Assistance branch's action on a request
[2004]from Howard Hunt for a lockpicker who might be retiring or :
[2005]resigning from the Agency. -
[2007]Sometime in the spring of 1972, Iden 38 vf EEAB
[2008]received a call from Howard Hunt who asked tden 38 1f he had a
[2009]retiree or resignee who was accomplished at picking locks. qf
[2010]Iden 38 sent him | a resume onbIhomas_Amataiwho retired uA)
[2011]31 July 1971. .Iden38  . did not document his EEAB record 4
[2012]to show the date of this exchange, but Mr. Thomas-Hester (who
[2013]also works in EEAB) opines that it occurred sometime between °
[2014]March and Nay 1972.
[2016]All of the above information | was reported to the Office
[2017]of Security on 4 October 1972 following the FBI's contact with
[2018]the Agency regarding Howard Hunt.
[2020]9, Resume Sent to McCord: Ross Lambert, a contract
[2021]employee who retired in September 1971, was a client of the
[2022]External Employment Assistance Branch in his search for ‘a job
[2023]after retirement. One of the leads given to Lambert was’
[2024]_James McCord's security business. EEAB sent a resume to.
[2025]McCord, but Lambert was not hired.
[2027]In mid-summer 1972, Mr. Lambert télephoned EEAB from
[2028]Chicago. (He had a.job there with the Halifax Security Co.,
[2029]a lead provided by EEAB,. but until this telephone call he had’
[2032]1
[2034]CONFIBENTIAL “00407
[2040]not notified EEAB that he had the job and had moved from
[2041]the D.C. area.) 'O:;; he had been visited a Special
[2042]Agent of the FBI. wh¥?told: Lambert that his reWume had been
[2044]found among McCord's papers. The. Agent wanted to know if
[2045]Lambert had any connection with McCord. Lambert explained
[2046]how the resume got to McCord. After the Agent left him,
[2047]‘Lambert telephoned EEAB. Mr. Kennedy of OP and Iden 29
[2049]OS were notified immediately.
[2051]pled |
[2053]—_— e
[2055]Tem hull,
[2057]Harry B. Fisher .
[2058]Director of Personnel
[2060]CONFIDENTIAL = 1 gags
[2064]7 hoa yer te
[2066]Goth an wide!
[2068]eo .
[2070]15 May 1973
[2072]MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
[2073]SUBJECT: Break-in at Identity 61
[2075]1. Information has been reccived from WH Division
[2076]which indicates that there was a break-in at Identity 61
[2077]on the weekend of 13-14 May 1972. ‘The Iden 76 Desk
[2078]of WH Division has no knowledge of Bureau coverage at that
[2079]time.
[2081]2. 1 discussed the Iden 76 matter with Iden 66
[2082]of CI Staff (Red 1751), who advised that the FBI did
[2083]have coverage of Identity 61, and (the Agency sup-
[2084]ported this operation. He indicated that This tas identified
[2085]‘as -Operation WUDCOR and he would be able provide additional
[2086]‘details on this if Mr. Colby requests ited
[2088]“[s/ Identity 10
[2090]Acting. Executive Officer.
[2093]PONT ATITISY fo
[2094]POET -E2 IMPDET +A pete
[2095]te SS UTA . CL BY 008246. C02 Ae
[2098]Deputy Director for Operations ©
[2100]VI a7, LWtorn Sd ”™
[2101]MESORANDULE FO;
[2103]0}
[2104]“SUBIZCT:
[2106]WHE\Comments on Jack Anderson Column
[2107]REFERENCE: gack Anderson's Washinsvton tHerrv-Co~
[2108]' Ronad Colunn of S March 25972; "Chilean
[2109]Rreak-ins Reflect untergate"
[2111]i. WH Division has reviewed the referenced colunn
[2112](copy <¢ attached) by Jack anderson and fiads that it con-
[2113]tains no new infornation, -To toe best knowledge a the
[2114]Division, there is no foundation to the allexation that
[2115]3%. Howard Hunt wag enyagect on benalf of ITT in preaxing
[2116]into Chilean diplomatic installations in Washington and
[2117]New York,
[2119]: 2. “Any connection between ITT and these break~ins
[2121]is purely conjectura a and the colunn tak:
[2122]point this our.
[2124]ITT Latin
[2126]5 care to
[2128], 3. Harold Hendrix, Anierican repsesenta-
[2129]f tive, has told us that‘he bad no relationshin with
[2130]‘Hunt on this or any ITT matter. Ue had anticipatod
[2131]" Penat Anderson sight imvoly such a rolationshin.in bis
[2132]j co oluan and had assured us that this Was not true.
[2133]y
[2134]; j /s/ Identity 81
[2135]. , ’ Chief
[2136]Western Honisphere Div ision “
[2137]v
[2138]Attachment: As Stated .
[2139]u a
[2140]s-apaent h
[2141]. . wae cae o.8. fr
[2142]ABSA Fay Perens ere
[2144]Cia Fristoe, y Fee eed a fe. watt |
[2146]bes eurgat Yihy we)
[2148]oo
[2150]we
[2152]BY OpRA IE 2
[2157]USSa-EPS FORM 191 . .
[2159]- 6/0 / y. EqACUTIVE PROTECTIVE SERVICE erence
[2160]rn bo me . INCIDENT REPORT Fi-72-398
[2162]~ DATE occua.!. Sbueeetis pa asle sors
[2166]ARATION
[2168]5. RATIRE OF INCIDENT
[2170]rue} . hurgla
[2171]6. | 47. aodRESS B. ..OME FRINE +04
[2172]. . . , : 21-7222.
[2173]|. ~ ~ . 7 Br orrce
[2174]Hornen Haverro 1705 Handet Street, Springfield ve. 762-17 )5
[2175]i
[2177]10, OFFICE ASSIGNED WL.-OATE S> _ pte. Koua 43. OAY OF WLEX
[2178]Sergeant Stevens’ E. Butler “(3 4 8 & @)
[2179]- Ser M, Richardson . My 7 YW T F €)
[2180]. 1S, ADGALSS
[2182]£ . . 19. ADDRESS ~
[2184]| 22. DETAILS OF INCIDENT IGRIEFLY DESCRIBE INCIDENT, CORTINUE ABOVE ITEMS AS HECESSARY IKDICATING ITEM)
[2186]At_ aAnproyinately 2 359 hours Monday, May 13, 1972,. Forci¢n Missions Division.
[2188]fontrol Center ves sdyised by tu 2D that oa burelom:-had_telon wlece-at—ite
[2189]Chancery of Chile,-3735 asnashnget tis Avaria, TL ,sonetine betucen ase
[2190]Friday, Hey 13, A912» and on C85 hours this date.
[2192]aeeee in . Gnts ser or # ot
[2193]: The undersiened was edvised by Mr.
[2194]of the Trbassy of Crile, that the.
[2195]were ransec}]
[2197]a
[2198]ted. At this tire the met
[2199]Mr. Navarro advises that ne will. contact tha
[2201]' i 22. PnSTSS
[2203]: O Yes
[2205]£ miss
[2207]Jan {USE EPS FORM 102 + SUPPLEMENT FOS ASSITIONAL DETAILS)
[2209]LAST NAME MIDCLE . AOURESS
[2211]ee CATE OF BIRTH . RATIGNALS?*
[2213]LAST BAME FIRST MIDOLE ACORESS , :
[2214]° . .
[2215]42) Race sta i WEIGHT jHAIR EYES DATE OF GIRTH SOCIAL SECURITY HO. > pRATIGNALIST
[2217]26. ARREST HO. 27. APREST OF FICERANAME ANA BADGE AO.) 2B. OATE OF ARREST 29. no -*
[2219]30. INCIOENT STATUS “
[2220]ads oren 0. }{ ¢LOseO C. O URFOUNDSO 0.0 CLEARED ay asrtt
[2222]31. REPSAT es 32. APPROVING OFFICIAL [SIGIATURE) OATE .
[2223]te Leki in rA ye me \ ; ont.”
[2225]yy ae ALLOOZ ae Se Qos yi x it, Ly? i Ae A \ Warr a “| <> ———
[2226]gi feant Stovens B. Patler Cantein Pote i, Kanttos _ arcs:
[2228]33. STATE OCT. OFFICIAL natives DATE: 34. USSS-19 CASE NG.
[2230]N/A - ee err [ WA 00374
[2232]INUIDENT REFURT - SU i ee Ve StRaS (CASEI he teBE®
[2234]i —— Fyie22.— 398
[2235]2. ATURE OF INCIDENT ; 7 : La .
[2236]Burglary II _ 7 . ‘ : v
[2237]3. REPORTED BY: : 4. ADDRESS , y 3. How ioe ~
[2238]i , ela 23
[2239]: wT eed . . 6. OPER Fer |
[2240]Hernan O27) Nevarro 605 Nerlet Street, Snringfield, Va Level Th6
[2242]To ADDITIGNAL OCTAILS OF INCIDENT: |
[2246]The following were previously on the scene: Serzeant Clifton 0. Gil, Badge ; 1,
[2248]"¥MAP.D.C.,3D, and Officer Michael S. Kurdilla, Badge # 3770, H.P.D. 04430, also M.P.D.C
[2249]Print Cruiser vi 7356
[2251]“Ge a“ ot * -
[2253]S/A Michael Fe Murphy, USSS-PID (Foreign Brench), was notified.
[2255],
[2257]a . . ‘. a
[2258]. Low
[2259]« ~ “~ . . . *® ,.
[2260]| . : . . ’
[2261]- oo . .
[2262]Lt “ : ;
[2263]. . . ae
[2264]. id . . .
[2265]° . - .
[2266]. ° . °
[2267]> ~ oe. . .
[2270]. . . Pt ied
[2271]. - : : .
[2272]. . . : 4 .
[2273]jan f2 .. - |
[2274]de
[2276]8. SUSPECT AND/OR ARREST £0 PERSONS, ICEATIFY BY HAME, ADDRESS, SEX, RACE, SOCIAL SECURITY HUMBER, OOB, EYES, ETC.
[2278]LAST hAME FIRST |
[2280]os : « MIDOLE |
[2286]SEX |. HEIGHT | WEIGHT KAIR } eves |  OATE OF BIRTH | .o SOCIAL SECURITY NO. RATIONALITY
[2288]FIRST \ MIOOLE \ AGORESS
[2290]Race | = SEX. | KEIGHT |. WEIGHT | KAR |. eyes |. DATC OF BIRTH | SOCIAL SECURITY HO. RATIGNALESY
[2292]9. ARREST PO | 10, ARREST x0, | 11, ARREST OFFICER (NAME & BADGE KO.) 12, DATE 13, Hoe?
[2296]$4, CURRENT CASE OISPOSTION |
[2298]rGSrex J . edefcroseo -| ¢.[exrouxdeo | p.f)ctearco By aRRest |
[2300]+18. USSS-1D CASE KO.
[2302].
[2304]N/A
[2306]\e “00377
[2307]13, APPROVED (S25NATURE & TITLED zo. 98°*
[2310]Captain Pete li. Manthos
[2312]OPEN _ ‘.
[2314]16, FINAL CASE DISPOSITION }
[2315]AG ot seza Psttyatere) |
[2318]pled tie, 7 fi celles Ah
[2320]Sergeant Stevens 4. Butler ‘
[2322]18, DATE |
[2324]'}05-25~72
[2326]|
[2328]= rs
[2330]'{ 2. MATURE OF IKCIDERT . . : . . U
[2331]Burglary II . ;
[2333]iq. REPORTEO BY: = * . . "| 4, ADORESS = S. HOWE Frank
[2335]z 3+ REPORTED BY . . 127191!
[2337]a ; ; 6. OFF sf Fron ek,
[2339]lf Tain IPcT ) Navarro x 6OS Henlet erg refiold. Va UE Fe
[2341]7 ADDITICNAL OETAILS GF INCIDERT:,
[2343]At approximately 1600 hours, Tuesday, May w, 1972, Mr. Mavarro contacted Officer
[2344]fdriian Roman -Gonsalez ab 1310 L, Street, h.W. and stated the following itens missin st
[2345]( Portable Radios), one (1) Sanyo 4M/SH Portable Radio, tio (2) Penasenic AN/F*
[2346]and one (1) Westinghouse A} ‘/PU/SA Radio. Also taken was one (1) Braun Electric Shaver,
[2347]one (1) Womens pullover sveater, and an unknowm number of beoks.
[2349], “ .
[2350]7 . . .
[2351]| . . - ;
[2352][ : . °
[2353]| 7 oe .
[2354]i e
[2356]+ _ . /
[2357]. s g .
[2358]. s. e ‘ -
[2359]-
[2360]. ~ oy e .
[2361].
[2362]a]
[2363]: .
[2364]- .
[2365]. .
[2366]. -
[2367]> .
[2368]. ° ° e a
[2369]. .
[2370]- . .
[2371]ooe- ve. .
[2372].
[2373]e . .
[2374]. : .
[2375]. .
[2376]'
[2378]. .
[2379]. . .
[2380]. « .
[2381].
[2382]° .
[2383]. =—_—_—
[2384]- a)
[2386]8. ra ARRESTED PERSONS. IDENTIFY BY KAME, AOTRESS, SEX, RACE, SOCIAL SECURITY KUMBDER, DOD, EVES, ETc.
[2388]N/A
[2390]UXT NAME | . FIRST |
[2392]. . . MIDOLE}
[2393]oe - . .
[2395]|ACORESS |
[2397]RACE | SEX | _MEIGHT | WEIGHT |
[2399]HAIR } eves | RATIGNALITY
[2401]« DATE OF BIRTK { . SOCIAL SECURITY KO.,
[2403].
[2405]oLAST KAME FIRST | MIDILE |
[2407]. ACDRESS |
[2408](2) ‘ ee, o
[2410]RACE | -SEX.| "SOCIAL SECURITY NO. LRATIONALIT :
[2412]HEIGHT | .. WEIGHT | -_tves | . DATE OF BlaTH |
[2414]$. ARREST PO | 110, ARREST KO. |
[2416]12. DATE
[2418]41. ARREST OFFICER (RAME & Bass 40.) ‘
[2420]13, howe
[2422]14, CURRENT CASE DISFOSTION |
[2423]-s fo oa _ Look
[2425]usSpe j . B.PNtoseD “| éunrodxoeo | DEV CLEARED ey ARREST |
[2427]16, FINAL CASE DISPOSITION |
[2429]: . _- , . 27,
[2430]OPEN an oa 0038
[2432]H
[2436]t
[2438]\ AS, USSSe1D CASE XG,
[2440]° N/A
[2442]17, RC Tepe FF. fer (sienatupel ee . 1S. APPROVED (SPGNATUR me : pao. pat!
[2443]~ A flettéy < “Onell: LAF “¢ kU \ aan Wa 387
[2444]EL ont Stevens E,-Entle> Captain Pete N. Fanthos Q5-25°-
[2447]428. TRANSPORTED CY
[2449]CF Cr Ae
[2451]Em
[2453]3. STREET ADDRESS
[2455]LG SS
[2457]14. EX. COPIES} 15, . . A ;
[2458]cy, 1736 THAISS, Aue “a L/,
[2459]18. COMPLAINANT'S OCCUPATION AND HRS Garr 5S. WHEKE EMPLOYED OR SCHOOL ATiE: .
[2461]39, DESCRIZE LOCATION OR TYPE OF PheLtiise
[2463]> CALE FA IDASS
[2465]20. VEHICLE USED - TAS NO. AD STATE
[2467]9. LOCATION OF CRIME (Acgcess}
[2471]O—OWNER
[2472]. CODE: C—COmPL. LATS
[2474]22, HAE (Lact, First, M.2die)
[2476]AVA REO, ge Eri
[2478]cope! Res, ADORESS So wn Fr ble PHOME PHONE TL eUS Prine |
[2480]RI 7665 Anh Fi 4 \sa/- PAL | FES~, PEE=IF=|
[2482]25, IDENTIFY SUSPECTS EY NULISER tactsts Meme, Aedrass, See, Rare, Ase, Hes‘cht, Weisht, Eyes, Hair, Clothing ets.)
[2483]IF AKRESIED Gl¥e ARREST KUWSER AMD CHARGE Grit ceccription if arrested)
[2485]26. NATURE OF INJURIES AND LOCATION Ot sODY 27. HOSPITALIZED - ViHERE? . . : OADM
[2486]b oe
[2488]> Feira
[2489]4A
[2491]29. TREAIED BY, 4
[2492]| _ 447]
[2493]90. TYPE OF PROPEINY T/KER
[2495]32. TRADEMARKS, ay CONVERSATION. or SUSPECT
[2496]L7
[2497]Wh
[2499]. EXACT LOCATION C LOCATION OF PROPERTY 33 VEHECLE FEO ‘f TAG. HO. STATE YCAR AND MARE
[2500]Ls Le Fb assy
[2502]36. Gd) CO:7ti
[2503]; IED F5 st
[2504]iain PROPERTY INDICATE Dis MISE ALL
[2505]PORT IF: HORE SPACE IS HE RECORD VALUE OF LO
[2507]Wl LY Blonke Riucew
[2509]fouts. 6b Ll, 2 5-72 peste C O95, f.
[2510]Su/S-~ ZAe Embassy Of Cf he ws evTenedl anid gt. zee
[2512]| ofE le Ra sak, ‘dewwar caddie lila ts La hen AL TALS AL FAIS it,
[2514]te AcpoclT Je Zr low AAJEr,
[2516]cw Avs So GILL pov Scene ,
[2518]| Prt CAG 7B S pw Sceve : a
[2520]| OFF L ele of BLS, Aesiitg 27 1330 -Ars,
[2522]\ OFFICE USE OLY
[2524]| v.T. NUMBER DATE G& TIME THIS RELORT 37. DALE/Tie TYPE to. 33. REPROUL Te fet
[2525]ISG f SYS-72_ Ba0 _
[2526]39. SEFOR FING OFfloze Unty & PADS | 49. STAIUS (che: ; 8 GX UN|TREFERRED 10.‘ | 42, UCR OISFOSIT--
[2528]“1 Heres
[2534]43, SECOND GEMCz% UNIT & E.. ADSE ho,
[2536]EL. Low vt
[2538]PO 281 RLVISEO 37/1
[2540]VIS $5, REVIEWER. ~ he.
[2542]es. toe ehh. 2 _. 00879
[2544]MFIRTHOALITSH PALICE NEDLDTISONT WECLIMATAM 1
[2546]Pera
[2547]2
[2550]~ OGC 73-0930
[2551].25 May 1973
[2553]MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD » —_
[2555]SUBJECT: Identity61 | Break Inon 15 May 1972
[2558].
[2560]1, On: 24 May 1973 I telephoned Mr. James Robinson,
[2561]General Crime Section, Department of Justice and asked if he
[2562]had any information as to criminal prosecution of persons involved
[2564]' ina breakin at Identity 61 ‘in Washington, D.C. on
[2566]15 May 1972, Mr. Robinson stated he had no knowledge of this but.
[2567]suggested that it would be better to check with Mr. G, Marvin Gentile,
[2568]Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security, Departenent of State, and
[2570]the Secret Service since they had responsibilities for the Executive
[2571]Protective Service (EPS). I telephoned Mr. Gentile and he identi-
[2572]fied two State Department cables relative to the incident; one from
[2574]the embassy in Santiago to the Department, No. 2450, dated-
[2576]15 May 1972, Subject: Unauthorized Entry Outlining the Protest
[2578]of the Iden 76 Government presented to the American Embassy,
[2580]and the State Department reply to Santiago, No, 084655, dated
[2582]_15 May 1972. Mr. Gentile also identified the EPS report of |
[2584]investigation and suggested that I get a copy from the Secret Service.
[2585]I then called Mr. Tom Kelly at Secret Service and he had his liaison
[2586]man deliver me a copy of the EPS report of investigation.
[2587]2. On 25 May 1973 I received a call from FBI Agent
[2588]Ray Mullens on green phone No. 5303 stating that he had received
[2589]a telephone call from Mr. James Robinson relative to my inquiry
[2590]about prosecution. Mr. Mullens indicated that the FBI Washington
[2591]Field Office had recontacted the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD)
[2592]on 24 May and reviewed the report No. 248-424 filed with the 3rd
[2593]District, MPD which states that a break in occurred at Identity 61
[2594]between 5:00 and 8:00 a.m. on 15 May 1972, ~
[2597]00304
[2599]4
[2601]Reparted loss at thane consisted of four am [teh dios
[2603]and one electric razor. The police investigation identified
[2604]some latent fingerprints but no identification of those prints
[2606]was made. Since the reported loss was under $5, 000 and there
[2607]was.no evidence of a crossing of state boundries, the FBI did
[2608]not make an investigation of the incident. The MPD reported
[2609]that there had been no prosecution and no suspect was identified,
[2612]. haa f\ f af’
[2613]JOHN K, GREANES
[2616]‘ cc: Legislative Counsel
[2617]. Inspector General
[2618]OGC:JKG:cav
[2619]Orig - Subject: Watergate Case
[2620]1 -. JKG Signer a Lo
[2621]1-Chréno. ~-
[2623]re
[2626]1. June 1973
[2628]MEMORANDUM FOR: Mx. William E. Colby
[2630]SUBJECT: Special Activities
[2632].
[2634]1. Following our recent conversation, I have
[2635]‘searched.my memory and Mr. McCone's files for examples -
[2636]of activitics which to hostile observers or to somcone
[2637]without complete knowledge and with a special kind of
[2638]motivation could be interpreted as examples of activities
[2639]excoeding[ CIA's owes] TFKIV
[2641]2. First, as we discussed, on 7 March 1962,
[2642]DCI McCone, andes pressure from Attorney General Robert
[2643]F. Kennedy, agreed to tap the telephones of columanists
[2644]Robert S. Allen and Paul Scott in an effort to identify
[2645]their sources for classified information which was appear -
[2646]ing in their columns. Because the primary source appeared
[2647]to be in the Department of Defense, McCone ordered me
[2648]personally to brief General Joe Carroll, Director of DIA,
[2649]orally, which I did. TI understand more complete information
[2650]on this operation is available from the Director of Security.
[2651]I, personally, managed to avoid gaining any knowledge of
[2652]what precise actions were taken, what information was gained,
[2653]what was done with it, and when the operation was terminated.
[2655]3. As a result. of a developing relationship with
[2656]IDEN-122 _ thelDdEN-123representative in Washington,
[2657]and also as a reSult of certain information conveyed by
[2658]IDEN-124 » dames Angleton, with the approval of
[2659]Dick Nelms, agreed 10 mount a counterespionage operation
[2660]against the IDEN-95 in Washington. This involved
[2661]breaking and entering and the removal of documents from
[2663]Aman Aeys TIN BoA eran aes
[2665]. 7 a
[2666]-, ; iy!
[2667]Sree eeu d i Lhedswdidy Gu
[2670]as
[2672]8 Gs 00457
[2676]Tag vst
[2678]_ oo, oe i ;
[2679]8 soy 7
[2683]the: IDEN-126 On 18 June 1962, DCI McCone and.
[2684]Helms briefed Secretary of State Rusk generally. on the
[2685]operation without going into operational details. Later
[2686]on.the same day, President John F. Kennedy was briefed.
[2687]Actual breaking and’ entering occurred, somewhat later, and
[2688]on 15 April 1963, DCI MeCone met with President Kennedy
[2689]alone and briefed the President on the details of this
[2690]new phase of the operation. On the same day, the Attorney
[2691]General was briefed and he agreed that he would not
[2692]mention it to the FBI unless the FBI themselves raised
[2693]it with him. On 3 February 1964, DCI McCone met alone
[2694]with President Lyndon B. Johnson and briefed him on the
[2695]operation. On 4 February McGeorge Bundy was briefed.
[2697]On G February 1964 in a briefing of Secrefary of State
[2698]Rusk on the results of the operation, Rusk expressed
[2699]reservations about-.the propricty of such an operation.
[2701]He raised this same concern in subsequent conversations
[2702]with McCone on 17 April 1964, 28 May 1964, and 14 June
[2703]1964. On 12 September 1964 Rusk continued to express
[2704]grave reservations and repeatedly suggested that the
[2706]- IDEN-95 be iniormed direerly that we knew about their
[2707]espionage operations in the United States and ask them
[2708]to desist. In a meeting on 28 May 1964 Rusk expressed
[2709]these reservations in the presence of DCI MeCone and
[2710]President Jonn F.. Kennedy.- Secretary of Defense. McNamara
[2711]was also present, and there is no record that he had
[2712]previously been made aware of this operation.
[2714]' 4. Although certain activities never got beyond
[2715]‘the planning stage, there are, I believe, three examples
[2716]of. such planning which could be subject to misinterpretation.
[2718]One involved chemical warfare operations against the rice
[2719]“erops in both Cuba and North Vietnam. A second involved
[2720]a paramilitary strike against the Chi-Com nuclear instal-
[2722]_ilations. Outside. the United States Government. General
[2723]“Eisenhower was briefed on such planning A third, which
[2724]assumes a new significance today, involved a@ proposal by
[2726]Angleton and Helms for a greatly increased intelligence
[2728]collection effort against foreign installations in this
[2730]country. This planning also involved a scheme for selected
[2732]SN OT are Se RS er
[2735]‘ ‘ . 2
[2736]t Ne mat Wed da
[2738]Ww cue wed
[2741]. . . 3% a a 7 :
[2743]‘ ; tiie soda i futaeuedidd
[2747]ys rete
[2751]3
[2753]Wu, exposure of KGB activities and counteractions against the
[2754]Soviet intelligence service. The reasons are still: unclear
[2755]to me as to why the FBI chose to brief the PFIAB to the
[2756]effect that(CIA was planning to wiretap extensively and
[2757]eee ately in this country, to greatly increase
[2758]the. Agency representation in the Moscow Embassy .jand
[2759]' ‘penerally to use KGB-type tactics, also extensi ely and
[2760]indiscriminately. This led to a heated exchange between
[2761]DCI sicCone and Mr. Belmont of the FBI, one such meeting
[2762]taking place in the presence of the Attorney General.
[2763]It is clear that the TBI was opposed to any such: proposal
[2764]then, as now, and the plan never went forward,
[2766]5. During the period when Des FitzGerald was in
[2767]charge of the Cuban Task Force, DCI MeCone's office
[2768]learned, quite by accident, that FitzGerald had secured
[2769]the cooperation of several prominent US business firms
[2770]in denying economic items to Cuba. There was no question’
[2771]but that the businessmen were glad to cooperate, but know-
[2772]ledge of this operation had to be rather widespread.
[2774]6. On 17 April 1964. Mr. Robert B. Anderson came
[2775]to DCI MeCone on behalf of American business interests,
[2776]offering to insert: some $300,000 to try to secure a
[2777]favorable result in the elections in Panama. Shortly
[2778]after this approach. ‘IDEN-128 . of IDEN-129
[2780]made a similar proposal to MeCone in: connection
[2781]with elections in Chile. On 12 May 1964 at a meeting of
[2782]the 303 Comaittee, it was decided that the offers of
[2783]American business could not be accepted. it being neither
[2784]a secure way nor an honorable way of doing such business.
[2785]This declaration of policy at this time bears on the recent
[2786]ITT hearings, but I am not surprised that McCone has
[2787]‘forgotten thathe helped to set the precedent of refusing
[2788]to accept such collaboration between tte » Agency ' S operations
[2789]and private business.
[2791]7. At the direction of Attorney General Robert
[2793]ly Kennedy and with the explicit approval of President Kennedy,
[2794]. MeCone injected/the Agency ,Jand particularly IDEN- 36
[2796]gant 2% ye, "
[2797]* 3 o . . .
[2799]er : Nee
[2801]rica meee
[2803]hin. cs. _ ‘.
[2806]Pasi of ae .
[2807]fSebiVesund UL el
[2809]Foreign suet ‘for Activities Plann@® to Disrupt —
[2810]' or Harass the Republican National Convention a i
[2812]SUMMARY: Sa Bt .
[2814]There is little new evidence of foreign plans or efforts
[2815]to inspire, support, or take advantage of actions designed to
[2816]disrupt or harass the Republican National Convention in San
[2817]Dicgo, 21 to 23. August 1972. The Students for a Democratic
[2818]Society, in joining the ranks of domestic groups planning
[2819]‘actions at the Republican Convention, has adopted a proposal
[2820]to cooperate with Mexican workers and students in a demonstra-
[2821]tion in Tijuana, Mexico, during the Convention. The San Diego
[2822]Convention Coalition (SDCC), another domestic group targetting
[2823]on the Convention, has received a letter of solidarity froin
[2824]the North Vietnamese. .The letter is of interest as an indica-
[2825]tion of North Vietnamese contact’ with the SDCC; such contact
[2826]Will be required for the SDCC to implement its earlier-reported
[2827]plans for broadcasts over public address systems during the
[2828]Ponyention of live telephone calls from the Vietnamese in
[2830]aris. - ._ .
[2834]....At its recent convention in Cambridgc, Massachusetts,
[2835]held 30 March to 2 April 1972, the Students for a Democratic
[2836]Society (SDS) adopted a proposal to hold demonstrations at
[2837]the San Dicgo-Tijuana border during the Republican National
[2838]Convention. ‘The proposal included a call for SDS to cooperate
[2839]with Mexican workers and students in an action to occur during
[2840]a fiesta in Tijuana, where Convention delegates will be
[2841]entertained. . oy
[2843]The North Vietnamese have given their endorsement to
[2845]the San Diego Convention Coalition (SDCC) in the form of a
[2847]letter from the Vietnam Committee for Solidarity with the
[2848]‘American People (VCSWAP), a quasi-official organ of the
[2849]North Vietnamese Government. The letter, which has been
[2851]circulated by the SDCC and is dated 27 January 1972,
[2852]“expresses "great delight" with the formation of the SsDcc,
[2853]and conveys the Committee's "best wishes of militant soli-
[2854]darity and friendship." The VCSWAP requests that the SDCC
[2855].. Write often and "send us materials you have.” ;
[2857]tee
[2859]arab anes
[2861]Wee uy bi, : dl: TO ‘ .
[2863]. tn eenrens FASTIN Niners anne .,
[2864]. Hi9 Tuners! Dagens Wedin Lenant lt
[2866]. os . ANTRAL ns COSS5E
[2868]: an mintis
[2869]Usa GLEE . : . .
[2870]@ 7 .) 9 SHAY 872
[2872]Foreign Support for. Activities Planned to Disrupt
[2873]-—_———or-tiarass the, Republican National Convention
[2875]a
[2877]SUMMARY:
[2879]Indications remain limited of foreign plans or attempts
[2880]’.to inspire, suprort, influence, or exploit actions designed
[2881]to disrupt cr harass the Republican National Convention in
[2882]wwetHiami, Florida, 21-23 August 1972. <A member of the Swedish
[2883]Committee for Vie vnan, who is also a member cf the Secre
[2884]tariat of the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam, has stated
[2885]that the U.S. National Elections are playing a role in
[2886]—--——_-the.Swedish Committee's work. The British-based Interna-
[2887]tional Confederation for Disarmament and Peace (ICDP) ‘has
[2888]' @istributed a "Spring Offensive Calendar" of activities
[2889]in the United States against the war based on a submission
[2890]——“by the Peoples! Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ).
[2891]The calendar includes actions planned in connection with
[2892]the Republican Convention.
[2896]_I-. mid-April 1972, a member of the Swedish Committee
[2897]*. - for Vi Snam, who is also an influential and well-infermed
[2898]: staff s.ember of the Secretariat of the Stockholm Conference
[2899]- on Vietnam, stated in a private discussion cf the Swedisn
[2900]..Committee! S unusually heavy work load that "things will be
[2901]hectic right until the elections in the U.S."
[2903]ne The International Confederation for Disarmament and
[2905]bk eace, a British- based antiwar organization and one of the
[2907]. more prominent member organizations of the Stockholm Con-
[2908]‘ference, has attached a "Spring Offensive Calendar" to the
[2909].April-May 1972 issue of its regular internationel pudlic3-
[2910]tion Vietnam International. The calendar hed been furnished
[2911]iby the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ) and
[2913]_——Aneluded the Tollowing entry:
[2915]a
[2917]August 21-23 Republican Convention, San Diego.
[2918]: Demonstrations org -anized by the San
[2919]Diego Convention Coalition, Box 8267,.
[2920]San PAeEOs Ca. 92103.
[2922]NOTED TON Meee eg
[2923]ait . .
[2924]1
[2927]1
[2929]1
[2930]' eee ea
[2931]are ot
[2934]5 . The ICDP consent on the PCPJ calendar urges demonstrations
[2935]‘in support of some of the dates’listed but does not specificail:
[2937]“ee call for actions in connection with the Republican Convention.
[2939]A ‘ .
[2942]. ‘ , °
[2943]| . . v
[2944]. oe!
[2945]|
[2946]e
[2949]| . oe
[2950]. ‘ .
[2953]| vi
[2954]i. . soo, . Me
[2955]| oe Gens) «Ss OSE
[2957]bo. bee ~é Las AATF '
[2958]er ae athe Pye fi re a
[2959]Hive bo bol Ss Usrute : yy
[2961]ein remcesa PeNe Th ee PPT
[2963]. | . 14 JUN 1972.
[2964]a , Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
[2965]or Harass the Republican National Convention
[2967]_ SUMMARY:
[2969]The only new indication of foreign plans or efforts
[2970]to inspire,. support, influence, or exploit actions. designed
[2971]to disrupt or harass the Republican National Convention in
[2972]Miami, Florida, 21-23 August 1972, is an’ expression of
[2973]interest by a member.of the North Vietnamese Delegation to
[2974]the Paris Peace Talks in the plans of the major antiwar
[2975]organizations in the United States for demonstrations in
[2976]connection with the political conventions of both major
[2977]parties. .
[2978]DEVELOPMENTS: .
[2980]In mid-May 1972, a member of the North Vietnamese
[2981]Delegation to the Paris Peace Talks invited a visitor to
[2982]contact him again when. the visitor returned from an imminent
[2983]trip to the United States. The North Vietnamese official
[2984]gave the visitor the New York City addresses of the People's
[2985]Coalition .for Peace and Justice (PCPS) and the National
[2986]Peace Action Coalition (NPAC), and asked the visitor to
[2987]inquire at their offices regarding their plans for demonstra-
[2988]tions during the coming summer. The North Vietnamese
[2989]official stated that he was especially interested in plans
[2991]for actions in connection with the Democratic and Republican
[2992]. Najional Conventions.
[2994]o
[2996]Pad 7 long .
[2997]Ko FOQEICH oH pisces nfl at biSskid HEROAD
[2998]ited LED CISSai
[3001]SO Be .. og Wi 28 Jin 7
[3003]ad ae eaten ele rhilee, wet eet tee ese tee orem “ts sm Mel sr te Sa
[3004]. ee tees Mages : ery :
[3006]ot one + Rae ° eee ow et re
[3007]e
[3009]Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
[3010]‘* or Harass the Republican National Convention
[3012]There are no additional indications of any substantial
[3013]foreign plans or efforts to inspire,- support, or take advan-
[3014]tage of activities designed to disrupt or harass the National
[3015]. Convention of the Republican Party in Miami, Florida, (21-24
[3016]August 1972. - . .
[3018]No Foreign ‘Dissem/Ho Dissem Abrza:
[3020]—_Gontrolted Di soem a
[3022]ae - (|. POMERAT preeten
[3023]oa 4 CON ERSEE9 bivdaks 96 JUL 72
[3024]’ Is
[3028]Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
[3029]or Harass the Republican National Convention ; —
[3031]o
[3034]SUM. AARY': 2
[3036]New indications of foreign plans or efforts to inspire,
[3037]‘support, influence, or exploit activities designed to dis-
[3038]rupt or harass the Republican National Convention in Miami,
[3039]Florida, 21-24 August 1972, consist of the following: A
[3040]leader of the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice
[3041](PCPJ) has stated that demonstrations will be organized to
[3042]take place at United States and allied military installa-
[3043]tions abroad during the period immediately before and during
[3044]the Republican Convention. The PCPJ leader also stated that
[3045]representatives of the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam will
[3047]‘“participate in activities in connection with the Convention.
[3048]“The Anti-War Union (AhU), a domestic organization which has
[3049]been active in planning demonstrations in connection with the
[3050]Republican National Convention, has sent a delegation to
[3052]’ Paris, France, to meet with officials of the Democratic Repub-
[3053]lic of Vietnam (DRV) and the Provisional Revolutionary Govern-
[3054]ment of South Vietnam (PRG). No information is presently
[3055]available, however, indicating that actions at the Republican
[3056]Convention have been discussed at these meetings.
[3058]. . DEVELOPMENTS:
[3059]In an early July 1972 meeting with prominent members of
[3061]. foreign antiwar.organizations, a representative of the People! s
[3063]Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ), who occupies an impor-
[3065]tant position within that organization, discussed the plans
[3067]of the PCPJ in connection with the upcoming clection campaign
[3069]in the United States. The PCPJ representative stated that
[3071]during the- period 14-23 August, a "Peoples Campaign Against
[3073]Bombing" would be waged in U.S. cities. involved in the manu-
[3075]facture and shipping of materials for use in Vietnam, and
[3077]that similar actions will be organized at United States and
[3079]allied military installations abroad. The PCPJ representa-
[3081]tive further stated that "dramatic demonstrations" in protest
[3083]“nites so A) ICaLL i i oa ae C:
[3084]Impossible to deternis-
[3086]rales tzaperssdte, mt?
[3088]| WARRIG GantL
[3089]NSHie CUI LIGE RCE SOURCES
[3091]Alste O/C tetra eae wen
[3093]AMER ATED) paar
[3098]i
[3099]ma nF r STE ELMER
[3102]Toe se 2. GQUFRELIED BES)
[3103]. . oe oa adn Luoobs Uwdeil
[3104]° ca
[3106]“Of the bombing in@rcenen é are being organi by the "“Repub-
[3107]‘Lican Party National Convention Coalition" to.occur on
[3109]21 August 1972. In an apparent reference to the 21 August
[3110]actions, the PCPJ leader added that representatives of the
[3111]Stockholm Conference on Vietnam will speak on the subject of
[3112]the alleged American bombing of dikes in North Vietnam.
[3113]- (Comacnt: We have no.present information concerning plans of
[3114]Stockholm Conference representatives to travel:’to the United
[3115]States during the Republican National Convention; nor do we
[3116]have any additional information concerning plans of Stockholn
[3117]Conference representatives to participate in activities con-
[3118]nected with the Republican Convention. )
[3120]The Anti-War Union (ANU), a domestic group engaged in
[3121]organizing counter-activities at the Republican National Con-
[3122]vention, has sponsored the travel of a delegation of activists
[3123]- to Paris, France, to meet with officials of the Democratic
[3124]Republic "of North Vietnam (DRV} and the Provisional Revolu-
[3126]- sptionary Government of South Victnam (PRG). An advance party
[3128]* has already met with DRV and PRG representatives to discuss
[3129]the agenda for meetings with the full-AWU delegation. Althouch
[3130]no inforiation is presently available indicating that actions
[3131]at the Republican Convention have been discussed or are sched-
[3132]uled to be discussed at meetings between the AWW delegation
[3133]and the DRV/PRG officials, it is known that members of the AWY
[3134]advance party have asked for advice from the PRG officials
[3135]regarding the stance the ANU should take on certain questions
[3136]relating to the presidential elections. It is also known
[3138]that the DRV officials have questioned the AWU advance party
[3139]about the political mood in the United States. One of the
[3140]AWU delegation. members has stated that upon their return to
[3141]the United States about 26 July 1972, some of the members
[3142]‘will speak at rallies, over the radio, and on television,
[3144]to "educate the American people about the consequences of
[3145]‘voting for Nixon, and the need to end the war and defeat
[3146]Nixon." The delegation member added that the demonstrations
[3147]-at-the Republican Convention will be "unique."
[3149]ra MTT 3 at ninpre
[3150]rat eae ts:
[3151]i ra Vhs al Ul2orh,
[3153]- - Ite,
[3154]* al bi Naa rane) Artl Aneas ‘
[3155]na fe Ral O fos an eri) C: ioutut ABneHD aay 00582
[3158]Oo 8g Bug ta72
[3160]Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
[3161]or Harass the Republican National Convention
[3164]There are no new indications of specific foreign plans or efforts to
[3165]inspire, support, influence, or exploit activities designed to disrupt or
[3166]harass the Republican National Convention in Miami, Florida, 21- 24 August
[3167]1972. Although meetings have been held recently in Paris., France, between .
[3168]. American antiwar activists and representatives of the Democratic Republic
[3169]of North Victriam (DRV) and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of
[3170]South Victnam (PRG), currently available information indicates that the
[3171]. DRV/PRG officials made no efforts to encourage or give guidance to the
[3172]American participants with respect to the upcoming Republican National
[3173]Convention. Private discussions, separate from the meetings with the entire
[3174]American délegation, were conducted by hoth the DRV and the PRG officials;
[3175]_at present, we have no information regarding the substance of these private
[3176]exchanges. A sccond group of activists, considered more important than
[3177]the first delegation, is sclreduled to travel to Paris on or about 1 August 1972
[3178]for further consultations: with the PRG and DRV representatives.
[3180]DEVELOPMENTS: _ .
[3181]In recent mectings in Paris, France, with members of an American
[3182]del8zation sponsored by the Anti-War Union (AWU), representatives of
[3184]the Democratic Republic of Vistnam (DRV) and the Provisional Revolutionary
[3185]Government of South Victnam (PRG) -were very guarded with respect to dis-
[3186]cussing activities at the Republican National Convention. Although the Vietnam-
[3187]ese repeatedly questioned the Americans concerning the mood of the antiwar
[3189]my movement in the United States, they made no direct reference to the Repub-
[3190]lican Convention, except for’one instance when PRG Deputy Chief Nguyen
[3192]Nan TIEN accused President Nixon of using the private and public sessions
[3194]., of the Paris peace talks as "propaganda for the Republican Convention."
[3196]. TIEN then urged the Americans to promote and propagandize the Seven
[3198]Point Plan offered by the PRG. The Americans, too, for the most part, ©
[3199]refrained from discussing the Convention, other than to estimate that demon~
[3200]strators will number about 10,000 at the Convention.
[3202]00562
[3203].
[3204]mtaye, Pore Meiers Saha ent O. (3) a ) reat ns or tests,
[3205]AR PuIG wehiG tdi IGE mace WoLEy Uriel ss AUTOOLME ICALLY POAC id GH
[3206]CHSITIVE BTEULIECL “clit tS to FON: EISITH jp Bloor areas impossible to o determine
[3209]‘ . HA Panerai ne - wl
[3211]271 i ebrra |
[3213]My: Go. vu ap eS chL .
[3214]Following their meeting on 22 July 1972 with the AWU delegation,
[3215]the PRG officials held additional talks with sub-groups of the delegation.
[3216]. Additionally, at least one of the American participants was invited by
[3217]the DRV officials to return for further discussions. At present, there
[3219]is no information available concerning the substance of these private
[3220]exchanges.
[3224]A second, more important delegation ‘of Americans connected with
[3226]the Anti-War Union is scheduled to travel to Paris circa 1 August 1972
[3228]for further consultation with DRV and PRG representatives. This second
[3230]group is scheduled to be led by Rennie DAVIS, founder and leader of the
[3231].AWU. This will be DAVIS! second trip to Paris within recent months for
[3233]discussions with DRV and PRG representatives. Upon his return from
[3235]his first trip, DAVIS publicly stated that the AWU would demonstrate at
[3237]both the Democratic and the Republican Convention, but that the AWU's
[3238]_ chief target would be the Republican Convention. .
[3240]é Parag aa reese g
[3241]sUeE Ti wee Si2 i
[3243]an
[3244]Vidsilu.
[3246]ig Deceit “
[3248]Forcign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
[3249]. _ or Harass the Republican National Convention
[3253]There are no new indications, as of this date, of foreign plans
[3254]or efforts to inspire, support, or take advantage of activities designed
[3255]to disrupt or harass the National Convention of the Republican Party
[3256]in Miami, Florida, 21-24 August 1972.
[3258]Z 0
[3262]Scns EOF E O 4
[3264]sireev eer gee
[3267]re POT ry
[3269]ho. sa 8
[3270]So esicita. an i eg
[3272]Ka fees Sy Perens pre memes
[3275]VIARMIES
[3276]SENSITIVE
[3278]oer ares
[3280]© Semwendp ed bees rons
[3282]baale . or
[3286]g sity, C2 5, ee (i. i i :
[3287]AUIS: nA CARLY Ob ate Ut
[3289]impossible. to Getermi: i
[3291]Be
[3293]9 AUG 1972
[3296]Cow
[3300]iF
[3302]sod ©
[3304]as, f2 0uks
[3307]ete Fe .
[3309]“0.6 WAR 1972
[3311]ee . .
[3312]- . . .¢
[3313]e
[3315]Foreign Support for Activities Planned to. Disrupt
[3316]Or Harass the Democratic National Convention
[3318]- SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION:
[3320]: ; There are no direct indications thus. far of foreign
[3321]boo efforts to inspire, support or take advantage of activities
[3322]. designed to disrupt or harass the National Convention of
[3323]the Democratic Party in Miami, 10-13 July 1972. The concept
[3324]of coordinated international support for domestic activities
[3325]in the United States was generally endorsed at the recent —
[3326]World Assembly for Peace and Independence of the Peoples
[3327]. O£.Indochina; however, the Conference issued.no specific _
[3328]i +" ++ @all for international support of disruptive actions at the
[3329]7S American national political conventions... -,
[3331]BACKGROUND :
[3333]At. the Soviet- controlled World Assembly for Peace
[3334]‘and Independence of the Peoples' of Indochina, held in
[3335]Versailles from 10-15 February 1972, there was mention of
[3336]American plans for demonstrations at both the Republican
[3337]and Democratic National Conventions. The final draft =
[3338]_ resolution from the conference's "Action Commission" con- .
[3339]tains an appendix submitted by American delegates whose
[3340]goal was to secure global coordination for domestic actions
[3341]‘in the United States. It calls for international support
[3342]‘to six weeks of domestic antiwar actions and demonstrations, .
[3343].~ from 1 April to 15 May 1972, and concludes with the state-
[3344]- ment: "This campaign will lead up to the Democratic Party
[3345]‘Convention at Miami on July 9, 1972, and the Republican -
[3346]Party Convention in.San Diego on August 21,°1972."
[3348]The final "Resolution of the Paris World Assembly
[3349]-£for the Peace and Independence of the Indochinese People"
[3350]- of 13 February 1972, drafted by the "Political Commission"
[3353]. "In the United ‘States | particularly, the - protest
[3354].. °° @gainst the war is voiced more and more ‘strongly,
[3356]ows,
[3358]33
[3360]Pitas maar
[3361]’ te .
[3362]aeceated whee bi:
[3366]5.
[3367]Vv
[3369]OCSG
[3371]L,
[3372]Cc
[3375]nee Ge
[3377]e
[3378].
[3379]wee estes te . ane ante
[3381]‘) "under. various "forms, such as draft evasions;
[3383]desertions, resistance, ‘demonstrations which
[3384]now affect even the soldiers. The Assembly
[3385]calis for support to. these progressive and
[3386]antiwar forces in the United States, and asks -
[3387]the governments to grant asylum to deserters
[3389])° and to support their right to repatriation.
[3391]“All together, the peoples of the world will
[3392]‘efficiently help to impose on the U.S. Govern-
[3393]ment the-restoration of peace, independence
[3394]and freedon in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia."
[3396]ry . . . . ee
[3397]. .
[3398]e
[3400]. s -
[3401]e . . . 7
[3402]ae - -
[3404]. i,
[3405]. ee
[3406].
[3408]- zy .
[3410].
[3411]La -
[3413].
[3415].
[3416]- . .
[3419]se . baad
[3421]° le
[3422]. .
[3424]. . ~-
[3425]'
[3426].
[3427]¢ . a
[3428]. .* <
[3431]. nd “a
[3432]- .
[3433]. .
[3434]“4°
[3435]. ta
[3436]° .
[3437]‘ .
[3440].
[3441].
[3442]of .
[3445]: . .
[3446]: .
[3447]; 00
[3449]achat 5 ade MIATA
[3451]niin, ‘a sare "Eada
[3453]hk ol el 0 de La
[3455]owe PATRI ERSTE wee Se ada
[3456]fe ioe wot Leola: .
[3459]“h 9 May't
[3461]——————o .
[3462]. . :
[3463]. - : . . e
[3464]oe . . * a : .
[3465]t - . : .
[3466]. . : ;. aa -? a ie
[3467]oe so - . m. nt - eve : :
[3468]Woes ae age fe es * 4 io . po, . .
[3469]. C : . tot, - . “ .
[3473]oo. os * Foreign Support for Activities Pianned to “Disrupt”
[3474], or Harass the Democratic National Convention
[3476]SUMMARY :
[3478]New indications of foreign efforts or plans to inspire,
[3480]support, influence, or exploit actions designed to disrupt
[3481]or harass the Democratic National Convention in Miami, 10-13 °
[3483]' July 1972, are limited -to a reiteration by a member of the
[3484]Secretariat of the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam of a
[3485]statement previously issued by the World Assembly for Peace
[3486]and Independence of the Peoples of Indochina. The Assembly's
[3487]‘pronouncement generally endorsed the concept of international
[3488]support to a campaign of anti-Victnam War activities in the
[3489]United States leading up to the Democratic and Republican
[3491]. Conventions, but made no specific call for support of dis-
[3492]‘Yuptive actions at the conventions themselves.
[3494]. : toe .
[3497]DEVELOPMENTS :
[3499]; In early April 1972 an influential and well- informed
[3500]staff member of the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam discussed,
[3501]in private, the international anti-Vietnam War activities
[3502]conducted on 1, 15, and 22 April. The Stockholm Conference
[3503]member stated that these actions were part of an international
[3504]‘Campaign in support of domestic American antiwar efforts
[3505]during the period 1 April to 15 May 1972, and "will culminate
[3506]at the election conventions in July and August."
[3508]The World Assembly for Peace and Independence of the
[3509]Peoples of Indochina, of which the Stockholm Conference was
[3510]a-major organizer, had earlier enunciated a similar statement
[3511]in-an appendix to the final draft resolution of the Assembly's
[3512]‘"Action Commission." The appendix called for. international
[3514]Support to six weeks of domestic antiwar actions and demon-
[3516]. Strations, from 1 April to 15 May 1972, and concluded with
[3518]. “the statement: "This campaign will lead up to the Democratic
[3520]Party Convention at Miami on July 9, 1972, and the Republican
[3521]Party Convention in San Diego on ‘August 21, 1972."
[3523]te, _ a . . : / . . : \ ;
[3525]AUER Meepi oe me
[3526]. ( wie lle Wes] © + 8OS'20
[3527]10 Feseie DSS ED BSS £83349
[3532]Gallo Jie Quad y tes
[3534]a ws
[3536]HE GUTPSLLE TOREL
[3540]I a 2. 8 HAY 1972
[3542]4 . - .
[3543]. .
[3544]ws . . . . v..
[3545]: . “ wy . . ‘ey .
[3546]‘ No . a ” ,
[3548]me
[3549].
[3551]Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
[3552]OL ".Harass the Democratic. National Convention \ -
[3554]SUM: ARY: :
[3556]Indications remain linited of foreign plans or attempts
[3557]. to inspire, support, influence, or exploit actions designed
[3558]to disrupt or harass the Democratic National Convention in
[3559]Miami, Florida, 10-13°July 1972. A member of the Swedish
[3560]Committee for Vietnam, who is also a member of the Secre-
[3561]tariat of the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam, has stated
[3562]that the U.S. National Elections. are playing a role in
[3564]the Swedish Committee's work. The British-based Interna-
[3565]tional Confederation for Disarmament and Peace (ICDP) has
[3566]distributed a “Spring Offensive Calendar" of activities
[3568]in the United States against the war based on a submission’
[3569]by the Peoples' Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ).
[3571]The calendar includes actions planned in connection with
[3572]the Democratic Convention. .
[3574]DEVELOPMENTS : 3 ot
[3576]In mid-April 1972, a member of the Swedish Committee
[3577]for Vietnan, who is also an influential and well-informed
[3578]staff member of the Secretariat of the Stockholm Conference
[3579]on Vietnam, stated in-a private discussion of the Swedish
[3580]Committee's unusually heavy work load that "things will be
[3581]hectic right until the elections in the U.S." .
[3583]; The International Confederation for Disarmament and
[3584]Peace, a British-based antiwar organization and one of the
[3585]more prominent member organizations of the Stockholm Con-
[3586]ference, has attached a "Spring Offensive Calendar" to the
[3587]April- May 1972 issue of its regular. international publica-
[3588]tion Vietnam International. The calendar hdd been furnished
[3589]by the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCP) and
[3590]included the following entry:
[3592]July 9 - 12 Democratic Convention, Miami - Beach,
[3593]. : Demonstrations organised by Florida
[3594]People's Coalition, Box 17521, Tampa, ©
[3595]Florida 33612,
[3600]Vi
[3604]Ay? i minars ; 3: , ry
[3605]COS ae LEQ Tegra _ 005 rare
[3607]AiR Femeieit BESS: y
[3609]‘A mignry nays
[3611]Rats tials
[3614]maar ‘ ) Jo 2 . .-
[3615]t . .
[3616]AEA : .
[3618]_ The ICDP commentary on the PCPJ calendar urges demonstrations
[3619]i. in support of some of the dates listed but docs not specifically
[3621]wee : : . . . .
[3622]\ ; -call for actions in connection with the Democratic Convention.
[3623]| _ co, ot -
[3624]| : . ; oT : La,
[3625]i ~
[3628]e
[3629], . t
[3631]4
[3633]00572
[3636]7 JUN 1972
[3638]. * te . ate et at alae
[3639]a TN ates oat atte “. . Yount ° . ' of come tte :
[3641]_ Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
[3642]-or Harass the Democratic National Convention
[3644].
[3647]- SUMMARY: | - : ar
[3649]The only new indication of foreign plans or efforts
[3651]* to inspire, support, influence, or exploit actions designed
[3652]to disrupt or harass the Democratic National Convention in
[3654]' Miami, Florida, 10-13 July 1972, is’an expression of interest
[3655]by a member of the North Vietnamese Delegation to the Paris
[3656]Peace Talks in the plans of the major antiwar orgamizations
[3657]‘in the United States for demonstrations in’ connection with
[3658]the political conventions of both major parties.
[3660]DEVELOPNENTS : ,
[3662]. In mid-May 1972, a member of the North Vietnamese Dele-
[3663]', gation to the Paris Peace Talks invited a visitor to contact
[3664]him again when the visitor returned from an imminent trip
[3665]to the United States. The North Vietnamese official gave
[3666]the visitor the New York City addresses of the People's |
[3667]Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ) and the National
[3668]Peace Action Coalition (NPAC), and asked the visitor to
[3669]inquire at their offices regarding their plans for denon-
[3670]Strations during the coming summer. The North Vietnamese
[3671]boc -official stated that he was especially interested in plans
[3673]: _ for actions in connection with the Democratic and National
[3674]| Conventions.
[3676]MTNALICN migvorse 7
[3677]COATED COS) i
[3678]t
[3680]BFA PARP IO Mesorie. ges
[3683]See eens oe STE ot ote mwa ee rete PR She = te teed sete, betas cetera. eet nae
[3685].
[3688]~ .
[3692]Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt : “*
[3693]or Harass the Democratic National Convention
[3694]There are no additional indications, as of this date, of foreign plans
[3695]or efforts to inspire, support, or take advantage of activities designed to
[3696]disrupt or harass the National Convention of the Democratic Party in Miami,
[3697]Florida, 10-13 July 1972. - .
[3699]5
[3704]. . . re mat any Rea rt
[3705]. . : : QF awe “sy on aborg?
[3709]" | | BAS Coy
[3711]into the US labor situation, and particularly to try
[3713]to ameliorate the quarrel between George Meany-and
[3714]Walter Reuther. [ZN-36 steered a very skillful
[3715]course in this connection, but the Agency could be
[3716]vulnerable to charges that we went behind Meany's back,
[3717]or were somehow consorting with Reuther against Meany's
[3718]wishes.
[3720]8. There are three examples of using Agency
[3721]funds which I know to be controversial. One was the
[3722]expenditure of money under Project MOSES in securing
[3724]the release of Cuban Brigade prisoners. Details of ,
[3726]this operation are best known to Larry Houston; Mike .
[3727]Miskovsky - IDEN-131 » and Jamés Smith. © Second,
[3728]as you well know, when Lou Concin received. his summons
[3729]to report to the Joint General Staff Weadquarters on
[3731]1 Novenber 1963 a large amount of cash went with him.
[3732]My impression is that the accounting for this and its
[3733]use has never been very frank or complete. Third, at
[3734]one of the early Special Group meetings attended by
[3736]. McCone he took strong exception to proposals to spend
[3737]7 Agency funds to improve the economic viability of West
[3738]. Berlin, and for an investment program in Mali. His
[3739]general position was that such expenditures were not
[3740]within the Agency's charter, and that he would allow
[3741]such spending only on the direct personal request of
[3742]the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense, or
[3743]the White House,
[3745]oo : 9. I raise these issues of funding because I
[3746]"remember the Agency's being severely criticized by the
[3747]House Appropriations Subcommittee for having spent $3,000
[3748]for stamps in connection with a program to buy tractors
[3749]to secure the release of prisoners from Cuba.
[3751]10. Under the heading ‘of old business, I know that
[3752]any one who has worked in the Director's office has worried
[3753]about the fact that conversations within the offices and
[3754]over the telephones were _ transcribed. During McCone's.
[3756]Apa art gore Ray paca Cha Sie z°
[3757]. * ae | } q
[3759]1
[3760]nn irra CO Ty ee
[3762]0045
[3764]“airteyen raw snes Sar nie “"F
[3765]hore . : 1 i
[3766]15h " 3 coy
[3767]By ta By ms x] f4
[3770]wits vita bP Cade aa os
[3773]5 ,
[3775]oo ee |
[3777], tenure, there were microphones in his regular office,
[3778]his inner office, his dining room, his office in East
[3779]Building, and his study at his residence on White Haven
[3780]Street.. I do not know who would be willing to raise such
[3781]an issue, but. knowledge. of such operations tends to
[3782]spread, and certainly the Agency is vulnerable on this
[3783]score. - .
[3785]11. Also under the heading of old business, I
[3786]well remember the hue and cry raised, ially by Carl
[3787]Kaysen in the White House, when [the lgonoy injected a
[3788]contaminating agent in Cuban sugar bound for the Soviet.
[3789]Union J Shortly after the Cuban missile crisis, there was
[3790]a disposition in Washington to reexamine the Bay of Pigs,
[3791]and the fact that several Alabama National Air Guard
[3792]officers lost their lives in the Bay of Pigs was surfaced
[3793]with surprisingly little excitement at the tine.
[3795]12. During my stint on the. 7th floor there was
[3797]a special ‘arrangement. with the Office of Communications
[3798]whereby the Director's office gained access tofhion = -CIA
[3799]-tratfic. This surfaced briefly at one point shortly after
[3800]“Adhiral Rayborn became DCI. He had visited the Signal
[3801]Center and removed a copy of a telegram from the Embassy
[3802]in the Dominican Republic for Under Secretary George Ball,
[3803]Fyes Only. . Ile returned to his office and proeeeded to
[3804]discuss this telegram with George Ball who was naturally
[3805]quite curious as to how Rayborn knew about it, and also as
[3806]to how Rayborn had it in his possession before Ball did.
[3808]. Ben Read in the Secretary of Stace's office and I spent
[3810]several wecks putting this one to rest.
[3812]13. Finally, DCI. McCone, as you and I well know,
[3813]operated on a very lofty plane, and I think certain of
[3814]his activities could be misunderstood: One example was.
[3815]his decision in July of 1964 to have Aristotle Onassis and
[3816]Maria Callas flown from Rome to. Athens. on Air Force KC 135.
[3817]Their arrival in Athens in this airplane attracted the
[3818]attention of the local press and in due course Mr. John -
[3820]‘ .
[3822]wergn ney ss pyran Ren pe oN
[3824]. . . ma “a . :
[3826]ny oy oo, "
[3828]pet Ma a pe ee ue
[3830]oe NU ET oy lortaed ween dd Uv us
[3831]t
[3833]tery “is
[3835]peed al kE oo . 090
[3837]a)
[3838]a
[3840]e
[3846]i a
[3848]a
[3851]Hightower, Chief of the Associated Press Bureau for
[3852]Washington, came to see me to ask about the propriety
[3853]of this action.
[3855]-14. ° The use of '  IDEN-132 aircrait
[3857]“has been remarkably secure, but DCI McCone himself
[3859]forgot about the cover arrangement and became quite
[3860]exercised when he saw Candidate Goldwater land in ‘the
[3861]San Francisco airport for the Republican National Con-
[3862]vention in 1964 aboard the IDE N-133 : with
[3863]the highly visible tail nunber IDEN-134, This was, I
[3864]explained to him carefully, a perfectly legitimate
[3865]charter, but he didn't like it.
[3867]15. McCone dealt quite extensively with newsmen
[3868]in Washington. In fact, they gave him a gift anda
[3869]luncheon when he left Washington, which is perhaps
[3870]indicative of the press's relations with him. However,
[3871]in the case of the Ross and Wise book, The Invisible
[3872]Government, he did try to bring pressure on the publisher
[3873]and the authors to change things. They did not change
[3874]a comma , and I doubt that this old saw willoer sing
[3875]again.
[3877]16. Finally, and this will reflect my Middle
[3878]Western Protestant upbringing, McCone's dealings with
[3879]the Vatican, including Pope John XXIII and Pope Paul
[3880]Vi, would and could. raise eyebrows in certain quarters.
[3882]17. The above listing is uneven, but I have a
[3883]sinking feeling that discipline has broken down, and that
[3884]allegations from any quarter which cast these things in
[3885]‘the wrong light would receive great publicity and attention,
[3886]and no amount of denial would ever set the record straight.
[3887]If I may be of any assistance in tracking down further
[3888]“details, I am'of course at your disposal, but I would point
[3890]f
[3891]aoe et eg remy TN RN ne pom
[3893]Wet The op oh ee ee
[3895]7
[3897]ceo ‘oyrotd a it
[3898]awa i wate Us re ee
[3900]v
[3902]00 ASR
[3905]°° wr . .
[3910]| BES £3 City vw
[3912]~ 7,
[3914]“\ . . .
[3915]out that I was very much in the position of the
[3917]enlisted man who knew that the commissioned officers
[3918]were aware of these activities and better able to
[3919]judge their propriety and possible impact or misinter-
[3921].pretation,
[3925]WALTER ELDER
[3927]noe: . . . teu i)
[3928]We loti wita U j Caled We ii Uie :
[3929]\\,
[3930]4 Ban Q . \- an
[3931]Wextme ae , . ‘
[3937]_ SUBJECT: PLMPLODESTAR
[3939]OS MPLODESTAR | is a Headquarters initiated program
[3941]which has as its fundamental objective the long term. manipu-
[3943]lations of selected agent assets operating against EA Division
[3944]difficult targets in the leftist and communist milieu in various
[3945]parts of the world. Although targetted overseas these: agents are
[3946]often exposed to and directed against American radical, leftist,
[3947]and communist targets to gain a practical knowledge of the leftwinsg,
[3948]radical, communist world. There is.a possibility that an asset
[3949]“might become suspect and be accused of being an employee of the
[3950]Agency or the Bureau; or it night happen some asset would, for
[3951]some reason, become disenchanted with his role and expose his
[3952]Agency relationship and his activities, with resultant embar-
[3953]rassment. To minimize potential problems, therefore, each
[3955]* case is cleared with the FBI and through .CI/SO the Bureau is
[3957]kept. informed on a regular basis.
[3959]= | "SECRET SENSITIVE = E2 IMPDET
[3960]CL BY 061090
[3962]. 6. As a means.of sharing more fully our operational
[3963]‘,experience we have invited three FBI officers to be
[3964]‘students in our Soviet Operatims Course from 14 to 25
[3966]May 1973,
[3967]f Shing)
[3969]a 7. A Soviet defector - was’
[3970]“confined at a CIA facility from April 1964 to:
[3972]September 1967 while efforts were being made to
[3973]“establish whether he was a bona fide defector.
[3975]Although his present attitude toward the Agency i
[3976]quite satisfactory, the possibility exists that the
[3977]press could cause undesirable publicity ° ‘if it were
[3979]to uncover the story. 4
[3981]Ce gil Ht . Wer
[3983]David H. Blee
[3985]Soviet Bloc Division
[3988]ON m
[3989]oe oe tana
[3993]O08R5
[3995]MEMOR»iDUM FOR: Mr. Colby re,
[3996]ae is the material we requested of # Dich
[3997]Ober:
[3999]A, Ten Reports, ‘Subj: Foreign Support for
[4000]Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the ,
[4001]Republican National Convention
[4003]B. Five Reports, Subj: Foreign Support for
[4004]Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the
[4005]Democratic National Convention’
[4007]-C, Two Memoranda re Agency support to
[4008]Secret Service for Democratic and Republican
[4009]Conventions
[4011]Ober advises that the only American we reported
[4012]on to the IEC is Rennie Davis.p
[4014]v4 (lt May 73)
[4015]Y, (DATE)
[4016]7
[4018]0054S |
[4020](47)
[4022]FoR’ KO. lol REPLACES FOrM 19-101
[4023]3 AUG 54 WHICH MAY DE USEO.
[4025]CUAFINEATIAL. [| SECRET
[4026]OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
[4028]me ANO ADDRESS
[4030]Inspector General
[4032]- Remarks: -
[4033]oo, Mr. Broe: . - “
[4034]. —
[4035][nick Ober\has. been advised that this package s€CU G
[4036]is bing sent to you. Since knowledge of the .
[4037]existence of this Committee has been strictly
[4038]‘ Mriited. Ter artind thet it be delivered to vou
[4040]unopened, Although it has an ER number on it,
[4041]it has not been sent through that office -- I gave
[4042]then only the day, subject, and originator.
[4044]FROM: ISAME, ADDRESS ANG PORE NO,
[4046]O/ES/MC/Marbara Pindar
[4048]eL.b TT CONFIDENTIAL
[4052]UNCLA
[4054]FORM Ho, Use previous eoitions ' (40)
[4055]Ter Zod “se BN a .
[4058]-
[4061]ROUTING AND RECON
[4063]SUBJECT: (Cprional}
[4065]EXTENSION
[4067][pichara ober
[4069]JO: (Officer dessgaoion, room number, ord
[4070]ovildng)
[4072]11465
[4076]OFFICER'S
[4078]IDEN-73
[4079]O/T .tas . a .
[4081]2. _ j
[4082]v7 ' { i
[4083]As wo Gel Li to . :
[4085]— he |
[4088]“eS rs rs rs ae
[4090]| Se
[4092]a
[4093]a
[4094]“10. .
[4095]a | ee
[4097]1.
[4099]| |
[4101]re reo
[4105]610 ane" CE} secey  () conrinsarin
[4107]SHEET
[4109]DATE
[4111]COMMENTS (Mumber ecch commen! to show
[4112]INITIALS | fo whom, Drow o line ocross column cfter each com~ens,
[4114]‘14 May 1973
[4116]‘Attached are:
[4118]2.
[4120]Te on
[4121]wae i
[4123]Loo
[4124].S oT
[4126]per y
[4127]orning
[4129]‘ound mote an
[4131]our
[4133]2 ene OARS TR OTS ee ot
[4137]rewues.
[4139]Copies of memoranda con-'
[4140]corning
[4141]Secret Service (7 Avril
[4142]235 June 1972).
[4144]a gency
[4146]SUPNS: we
[4147]‘f
[4149].
[4151]EYES ONLY
[4153]fu . - , “es
[4157]00548
[4161]ard
[4165]eee eed Pe POOR AS Seal hs OO Mee
[4167]4 THe wees
[4168]| Co Wiuse
[4170]oft
[4174]@ - 14 May 1973
[4176]SUBJECT: - Intelligence Evaluation Committee and Staff
[4178]1. Background: Formed December 1970 to: produce
[4179]fully-evaluated national domestic intelligence studies,
[4180]including -studies on demonstrations, subversion, extremisn
[4181]and terrorism. Membership: Department of Justice (Chair-_
[4183]- man); Federal Bureau of Investigation; Department of
[4184]Defense; Secret Service; National Security Agency; Central
[4185]Intelligence Agency; and as necessary representatives of.
[4186]other Departments or Agencies (following have partici-
[4187]pated: Treasury and State). Staff: IES Executive
[4188]Director John Dougherty. and later Bernard Wells supplied
[4189]by Department of Justice with title of Special Assistant
[4190]to the Attorney General reporting to the Assistant Attorney
[4192]vt General for Internal Security Robert Mardian and. later '
[4193]mc Willian. Olson, ITS has received requirements directly
[4194]Trom and delivered renerss citectiy tO or fie of the
[4195]White liouse. | The White lfouse has “insisted that the
[4196]existence of this Committee be kept secret. Awareness
[4197]of its existence within this Agency has been - linited to
[4198]HCY, HHO™ Cary 4 C7 CT aad Your orficers ot tits office,
[4200]2. CIA Participation: Contributions on foreign
[4201]aspects (by memorandun with no Agency letterhead or at-
[4202]tribution). Contributions occasionally include foreign
[4203]intelligence provided. by FBI and NSA, The Chief of the
[4204]Special Operations Group serves as the Agency representa-
[4205]téve on the Intelligence Fvaluation Committee Staff and
[4206]as the alternate to the Agency representative on the .
[4207]Committee (who is the Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff).
[4209]: 3. Special Report: The Unauthorized Disclosure
[4210]of Classified Information, November 1971. This study
[4211]‘Was initiated in July 197 TI7i by the White House as a con-
[4212]sequence of the President's concern about the release
[4213]| of the Pentagon Pavers by Danicl Elisberg. Both Robert
[4215]| ’ “ Mardian and G. Gordon Liddy initially involved in tasking
[4216]the IES to produce this evaluation. Drafting done by IES
[4217]‘Staff members from Justice and FBI. Only Agency partici-
[4218]pation was editorial review. — . \ .
[4219]i
[4220]oi,
[4222]Fyne EN oe -
[4223]SENSITIVE :
[4224]SECRET J)
[4226]tf ,
[4227]— e 7
[4228]Dapper ce ny (24 ys!
[4232]4. Republican National Convention (21-24 August
[4233]1972): At’ the request of the White Ilouse, a series of
[4234]estimates was prepared by the IES on "Potential Dis-
[4235]ruptions at the 1972 Republican’ National Convention, parti gest
[4236]Miami Beach, Florida." The Agency provided from
[4237]February through August 1972 periodic contributions for
[4239]. these estimates concerning foreign support for activi-
[4241]ties planned to disrupt or harass the Republican
[4242]National Convention (copies attaclicd).
[4244]« Democratic National Convention (10-13 July
[4245]1972): At the request of the White House, a series of
[4246]estimates was prepared by the IES on "Potential Disrup-
[4247]tions at’ the 1972 Democratic National Convention, Miami . i
[4248]Beach, Florida." The Agency provided between March and
[4249]July 1972 contributions on forcign support for activi-
[4250]ties planned to disrupt or harass the Democratic
[4251]National Convention (copies attached).
[4255]eyes oy 00550
[4256]SENGNIVE oh,
[4258]OTR BEATE A RineceE ganas . : -
[4259]O FORIEH Ged ESL pono. we, :
[4262]SSRIS DSS
[4263]ce | oan @ (23 Fes iv72 .
[4265]SUBJECT: Foreign Support For Activities Planned to Disrupt _
[4266]i or Harass the Republican National Convention
[4268]1. There are only limited indications thus far of
[4269]foreign efforts to inspire, support or take advantage of
[4270]activities designed to disrupt or harass the National
[4271]Convention of the Republican Party in San Diego, 21-23
[4272]August 1972. “os
[4273]2. Some American participants at the Soviet-controlled
[4274]World Assembly for Peace and Independence of the Peoples of
[4275]Indochina, held 11-13 February .1972 in Paris/Versailles,
[4276]attempted unsuccessfully to include a call for international
[4277]demonstrations to take place at the time of the Republican -
[4278]National Convention. <A representative of the San Diego
[4280]* Convention Coalition (SDCC), one of the domestic action
[4281]groups targetting on the Republican Conventicn, requested
[4282]_the Anerican Delegations! Steering Committee at the World
[4283]Assembly to include a specific call for international
[4284]support of activitics against the Republican convention
[4285]in their proposal to the Action Commission of the. World
[4286]Assembly. This request, however, was dropped as too
[4287]divisive by the Steering Committee, despite initial indica-
[4288]tions that the proposal would be taken to the floor of
[4289]the Assembly... St
[4291]Jot . :
[4292]3. John LENNON, a British subject, has provided
[4293]| financial support to Project "YES", which in turn paid
[4294]*.the travel expenses to the World Assembly of a representa-
[4296]tive of leading antiwar activist Rennie DAVIS. (DAVIS' repre-
[4297]sentative is tentatively planning to assist in preparations
[4299]- for disruptive actions at the San Diego Convention.)
[4300]Project "YES" is an adjunct to another LENNOMN-supported pro-
[4301]ject, the Election Year Strategy Information Center (EYSIC),
[4302]of which Rennie DAVIS is a key leader, which was set up to
[4303]direct New Left protest activities at the Republican
[4304]National Convention. In Paris Rennie DAVIS' representative
[4305]to the World Assembly met at least once with officials of
[4306]the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam;
[4307]it is not known if the Republican National Convention was
[4308]discussed.
[4310]Ay
[4312]PMTASTEN] PYROTE
[4313]tet ge US Lt
[4314]LPO Pe re Ree ae ted a nar “ad teed
[4316]An on PS re
[4317]ell Welk AD
[4319]cay
[4320]uw Jes
[4325]U:Soeh)
[4327]. . e" — : @.
[4329]4. The SDCC is planning for -foreign support for its
[4330]harassment of the Republican convention, - A working draft
[4331]plan of the SDCC includes proposals for (a) the use of a
[4332]Special television network to broadcast video- ~taped messages
[4333]from other countries, including coverage of sympathetic
[4334]demonstrations elsewhere; and. (b) broadcasts over public
[4335]address systems of live telephone calls from the. Vietnamese
[4336]in Paris and from the Communist Chinese and others at the
[4337]United Nations.
[4343]Bem ANT ENE NISRA EE TN MAO EE ZEAE
[4345]_tperun DSS
[4349]; a . he wal olin, Ia Ay uh henner
[4350]. _ .. HE perry Sietatord
[4351]wo CONT RULLEU Lidatid
[4353]ee Se St
[4355]Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
[4356]mo. or Harass the Republican National Convention
[4358]SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION:
[4360]___Indications, remain limited, thus far, of foreign efforts
[4361]to inspire, support or take advantage of activities designed
[4362]to disrupt or harass the National Convention of the Republican
[4364]..Party in San Diego, 21-23 August 1972. The concept of coordinated
[4366]international support for domestic activities in the United
[4367]States was generally endorsed at the recent lWrorld Assembly for
[4368]Peace and Independence of the Peoples of Indochina; however, the
[4369]Conference issued no specific call for international support of
[4370]disruptive actions at the American national political conventions.
[4372]BACKGROUND : a re
[4374]At the Soviet-controlied World Assembly for Peace and
[4375]Independence of the Peoples of Indochina, held in Versailles
[4376]from 10-135 February 1972, there was mention of American plans
[4377]for demonstrations at both the Republican and Democratic
[4378]National Conventions. The final draft resolution fram the
[4379]Conference's “Action Commission" contains an appendix submitted
[4380]by American delegates whose goal was to secure global coordination
[4382]_ for domestic actions in the United States. It calls for inter-
[4383].' national support to six weeks of domestic antiwar actions and
[4384]_ demonstrations, from 1 April to 15 May 1972, and concludes with
[4385]the statement: “This campaign will: lead up to the Democratic
[4386]—__Party.Convention at Miami on July 9, 1972, and the Republican
[4387]Party Convention in San Dicgo on August 21, 1972." —
[4389]‘The final "Resolution of the Paris World Assembly for the
[4390]‘edée7-and Independence of the Indochinese People" of 13 February
[4391]1972, drafted by the "Political Commission" states: |
[4393]"In the United States particularly, the protest against
[4394]‘the war is voiced more and more strongly, under various
[4395]‘forms, such as draft evasions, desertions, resistance, denon-
[4396]—“Strations which now affect even the soldiers. The Assembly
[4397]calls for support to thése progressive and antiwar forces in
[4398]_the United States, and asks the governments to grant asylun
[4399]to deserters and to support their right to repatriation.
[4400]All together, the peoples of the world will efficiently help
[4401]to impose on the U.S. Governmcnt-the restoration of .peacc,
[4402]and independence and freedom in Vietnan, Laos, and Canbdodia."”
[4404]it
[4408]WW
[4409]PA PROTIAH Pigeediq Miser enoAAN
[4412]cs _ T tps
[4413]wa GOR noel) Bisdcil
[4415]DEVELOPMENTS: _ - _ =
[4417]RLIGHY bicstad. nd. Uidoend nuAtAD
[4419]oo . .
[4420]. .
[4421]. . ’
[4422]. e .
[4423]. . . .
[4425]The San Diego Convention Coalition (SDCC) , one of the |
[4427]‘domestic action groups targetting on the Republican Con-
[4428]‘vention, is planning, in addition to demonstrations, for a
[4430]“large exposition in the campsights (sic) called Expose 72,
[4432]which with movies, exhibits, displays will portray the struggles
[4434]of people all over the world. "Plans for activities at
[4436]Expose 72 are believed to include (a) the use of a special
[4437]television network to broadcast video-taped messages from
[4439]other countries, including coverage of sympathetic demon-
[4440]strations elsewhere; and (b) broadcasts over public address
[4441]Systems of live telephone calls.from the Vietnamese in Paris
[4443]and from the Communist Chinese dnd others at the United Nations.
[4444]In addition, the SDCC has suggested that, in order to "outflank
[4446]NIXON domestically and internationally, " international opposition
[4447]can be expressed "by obtaining the authority of other countries
[4449]‘and liberation movements to carry their flags in SDCC demon-
[4451]strations."
[4453]' . 7 = 00555
[4454]APMP TID TD petan
[4455]. s "a4 o . ie 4
[4458]masewd bid dy
[4460]MEMORANDUM -
[4461]_- SUBJECT: Technical ‘Operation Against. IDEN- 76 Enbassy
[4463]: in 1971 and 1972
[4465]. o
[4466]. . .
[4467]. . .
[4469]a
[4471]. 1. A technical penetration of the IDEN-76 Embassy in
[4473]Washington, D. C. was mounted oy the FBI with the support of
[4474]cyfin April-May 1971.
[4476]This operation, which used. .
[4477]agony equipment and technical expertise but was. managed
[4478]operationally by the FBI, was initiated only after then-
[4480]Director Richard Helms had gone over the head of former
[4482]FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to obtain the approval of then-
[4483]‘Attorney General John N. Mitchell. The operation was dis-
[4485]continucd at the Agency's request on 2 February 1972 when it
[4486]appeared that Director Hoover intended to testify before
[4488]Congress concerning audio installations in the U.S. and
[4490]identify this operation as[CIA instigated. {
[4491]“2... The operation consisted of the following three
[4493]techni cal devices:
[4495]. az— An AC- powered, masked” “transmitter and
[4497]two: switches | in the. office occupied by the Deputy,
[4498]_-~Chief of Mission. — —_
[4500]-b. An AC-powered, masked transmitter in-the
[4502]_,office of the Ambassador's secretary which was
[4505].* .
[4510]- designed to pick up . high quality audio of typing
[4512]in the office. It was hoped to break these audio
[4514]signals into clear text using advanced computer
[4516]techniques developed by Division D. No useful
[4517]product, however, was ever obtained, '
[4519]c. A battery- powered,” masked transmitter
[4521]and switch concealed in the | : door of the
[4522]Embassy,- which would supply crytographic information \
[4523]for NSA. (Produced excellent quality Signals
[4525]‘until it became inoperative in early ,1972 because of
[4526]- ot
[4528]— battery failure
[4529]3, In December 1972 the Agency requested reactivation of
[4530]the operation for a 60-day trial period in spite of the limited
[4531]value of intelligence produced previously (22 disseminations
[4532]a of only moderate interest). Reactivation was requested because |
[4533]: of strong interest in the special IDEN-76 covernment mission ;
[4535]arriving in Washington in late December to conduct high-level
[4537]talks. with U.S. State Department officials ‘concerning debt
[4539]enegotiation and—other major i items outstanding betwebn —
[4543]“two-countries. The 0} operation was reinitiated on 21 December
[4545]1972 but was discontinued again on 22 February_1973 by Acting.
[4547]CTs Tes 73 |
[4549]“SECRET
[4551]a
[4553]rion an Owe
[4555]A Director L. Patrick Gray at this Agency's request. Our request
[4557]_ WaS prompted by a- decision that the intelligence production of
[4559]this operation did not justify ‘the risks involved in continuing
[4561]to run it in the sensitive political climate caused by the
[4563]jiount ing disclosures about |CIA involvement jin LSEN-76 This. -
[4565]was: especially so because of our reservations about maintaining
[4567]proper security for the listening post which, as with other
[4569]operational aspects of the case, was under FBI management.
[4573]. ee
[4583]: e. Alias’ Social Security Cards, 171 backstonped
[4584]; accounts havé been estapfished for contract personnel
[4585]A Ab whose relationship with fthe Agency] cannot be revealed
[4586]“1 \ but who are entitled to Socia ecurity coverage,
[4587]UC — Following expiration of the contractual relationship,
[4588]at an appropriate time the alias and true name accounts
[4590]are merged permitting the individual to receive con-
[4591]plete benoLits upon reaching the age of eligibility.
[4593]. £. Alias IRS Tax Accounts. 54 Social Security
[4594]numbers have been repistered Lor the purpose of. open-
[4595]ing 54 new bank accounts since 1 July 1972. 87 in-
[4596]dividual tax accounts ‘have bcen established with IRS
[4597]on an unwitting basis in 14 cities in the United States.
[4599]g. Notional Facilities. 311 notional facilities
[4600](43 corporations; GY sole-proprictorships; 207 lawyers
[4601]and 61 telephone. answering service addresses are main-
[4603]tained by CCS in 58 cities in the United States.
[4605]he Alias Signatories on Bank eS 24 aliases
[4607]al company bank accounts are in use by 9 officers and 1
[4608]proprictary-hire as follows: ;
[4610]ccs/igs ~ 5 officers (12 aliases) on 8
[4611]proprictary entities and 1
[4613]ie). , . notional company.
[4615]oe _ OC8/RY PMC* - 3 officers (9 aliases) on 13
[4617]proprictary entities.
[4619]_ CCS/NY PMC# - 1 proprictary-hire ‘e alias)
[4620]° . _ on 3 proprietary entities.
[4622]cos/uD PMCX - 1 officer (2 aliases) on 2
[4623]proprietary entities.
[4625]*Proprietary Management Company
[4629]SE rat oa I"!
[4633]-
[4635]sensitive nonofficial cover cases under the guise.
[4637]of normal commercial annuities. Backstopping for :
[4638]this arrangement is: provided through CCS-procured
[4640]bank accounts and Post Office boxes. 19 retirecs
[4642]are currently being handled. - 4
[4644]k. Credit Union Arransements for Selected Non- _
[4645]official Cover Vorsonnel, Sividends (interest) earned
[4646]on Credit Union accounts by individuals under cover
[4647]are not reported to the Internal Revenue Service based
[4648]| on 50 U,S, Code 403¢ or Internal Revenue Code Section
[4650]6041. , ,
[4652]| . ‘Individuals under cover may borrow money from the’
[4653]; . Credit Union -for the purchase of real estate; however,
[4654]_ the mortgage is recorded in the name of a cleared
[4655]lawyer and not the actual lendor (Credit Union).
[4659]Paragraph 1, deleted because it contains sensitive
[4661]' ' Agency operational methods and techniques,
[4664]~~ 1. Central Cover Staff (CCS) maintains three domestic
[4665]proprietary management companies which provide funding and
[4666]operational support for 49 Agency entitics, including 13
[4667]controlled and directed by CCS.
[4669]e ;
[4671]2. .The three proprictary management companies are
[4672]staffed by 9 employees; they furnish assistance in the
[4673]commercial, business and investment aspects of on-going
[4674]operations, manage the legal and commercial affairs of
[4675]entities supporting operations, dnd provide cover and
[4676]funding channels for operational activities as required.
[4677]Most importantly, professional services are furnished in
[4678]a manner responsive to required security standards and
[4679]at a cost considerably less than would be scharged by
[4680]bona fide management firms.
[4682]3. The 13 proprietary entities directed by CCS pro-
[4683]vide cover for ten-individuals in the United States and
[4684]three overseas. Operationally, the companies provide
[4685]comercial funding channels on a world-wide basis and
[4686]serve as corporate owtiers of equipment, inventory and
[4687]aircraft and as collection mechanisms for outstanding
[4689]‘notes and loans in order to conceal U.S. Government
[4690]affiliation or interest.
[4693]L 1973*Safesite number 585 was made available to the
[4694]U.S. Marshal's Service for use as a secure residence
[4695]“by: an. Assistant U.S. Attorney who reportedly was —
[4697]‘elements.
[4699]_ - 7 May 1973
[4701]“-MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations
[4703]SUBJECT: Items for Possible Use in Briefing
[4704]the DCI .
[4706]1. This Memorandum is’ submitted in order to
[4707]identify to you for possible bricfing of the
[4708]Director activities which in, certain contexts could
[4709]be construed as delicate or inappropriate.
[4711]2. At the request of the Director of Security,
[4712]from/approximately mid-October 1972 to mid-January
[4714]under threat of assassination by organized criminal
[4716]3. SB Division over the past three months has
[4717]interviewed four zraduate students as prospective
[4718]candidates for assignments under American business
[4719]cover in the USSR. They were encouraged to locate
[4720]cover jobs on their own.
[4722]4. For approximately two years the SB Division
[4723]has ‘had the cooperation of the Commander of the
[4724]Morals Division of the District of Columbia Police
[4725]Department in training officers scheduled for
[4726]assignment to the USSR and Eastern Europe in how to
[4727]conduct themselves if placed under arrest. The
[4728]arrangement was made through the Office of Security.
[4730]5. Since late 1972[c1Al]has taken part in seven
[4731]FBI training courses at Quantico, Virginia in
[4732]response to requests from the FBI. We have shared
[4733]with them through lectures and discussions lessons
[4734]we have learned which are relevant to their cotnter-
[4735]espionage responsibilities.
[4737]E2 IMPDET
[4738]CL BY 059952
[4742]oe OU OO BA
[4744]have been recuited and run exclusively for the MHCHAOS
[4745]Program. Instead, emphasis has been placed on the exploi-
[4747]- tation of new and old Agency assets who have a by- product
[4749]capability or a concurrent capability for provision of
[4750]information responsive to the program's requirements.
[4752]This has involved the provision of custom-tailored collec-
[4753]tion requirements and operational guidance. This collec-
[4754]tion program is viewed as an integral part of the recruit-
[4755]ment and collection programs of China Operations, Vietnam
[4756]Operations, Cuban Operations, Soviet Bloc Division opera-
[4758]‘tions and Korean Branch operations. Agents who have an
[4760]American "Movement" background.or who have known connec-
[4761]tions with the American "Movement" are useful as access
[4762]agents to obtain. biographic and personality data, to dis-
[4763]cern possible vulnerabilities and suscentibilitics, and
[4764]to develop operationally exploitable relationships with
[4765]recruitment targets of the above prograns. These assets
[4766]are of interest to our targets because of their connec-
[4767]tions with and/or knowledge of the American "Movement.
[4768]Over the course of the MHCHAOS program, there have been
[4769]approxinately 20 important areas of operational interest,
[4770]which at the present time have been reduced to about ten:
[4771]Paris, Stockholm, Brussels, Dar Es Salaam, Conakry, Algiers,
[4773]Moxico City, Santiago, Ottawa and long Kong. ~
[4775]4. The MICHAOS program also utilizes audio opera-
[4776]tions, two of which have been implemented to cover tar-
[4777]gets of special interest. '
[4779]Paragraph a. deleted because it reveals a sensitive
[4780]foreign operation. ,
[4784]Paragraph b, deleted because it reveals a sensitive
[4785]Agency foreign operation. {
[4787]Ni TTT V —_
[4789]-5. MHCHAOS reporting from abroad relating to the
[4790]program originates in two ways: Individuals who are noted
[4791]in contact with Cubans, the Chinese Communists, etc., and -
[4792]who appear to have extremist connections, interests or
[4793]background are reported upon. Other individuals are re-
[4794]ported upon in response to.specific Headquarters require-
[4795]ments received from the FBI because such individuals. are
[4796]of active investigatory security interest to the FBI.
[4798]6. All cable and dispatch traffic related to the
[4799]MHCHAOS program is sent via reStricted channels. It is
[4800]not processed by either the Cable Secretariat or.the In-
[4801]formation Services Division. The control and retriev-
[4802]ability of information obtained, including information
[4803]received from the FBI, is the responsibility of the Spe-
[4804]cial Operations Group.
[4806]7. Information responsive to specific FBI require-
[4807]ments is disseminated to the FBI via special controlled
[4808]dissemination chanicls, i.o., by restricted handling cable
[4809]traffic or via special pouch and specially numbered blind
[4810]memoranda.. .
[4812]8, Information of particular significance, when col-
[4813]lected, has been disseminated by special memorandum over
[4814]the. signature of the Director of Central Intelligence to
[4815]the White fiouse (Dr. kissinger and John Dean), as well as
[4816]to the Attorney Ceneral, the Secretary .of State and the
[4817]Director of .the FBI.
[4819]SENSTIIVE
[4821]ne
[4822]SECRET 00593
[4826]8 May 1973 .
[4827]MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations *
[4829]SUBJECT: ° Foreign Resources Division Operational
[4830]Activities with Possible Flap Potential
[4832]REFERENCE: FR Memorandum, 73- 180, dated 7 May
[4833]1973, same subject .
[4835]1, The answers to your questions are as follows:
[4836]a Question: Do we recruit Americans?
[4837]Answer: Yes, we recruit Americans to be
[4838]used as academic supnort assets and access agents.
[4839]These Americans are used for spotting and assess-
[4841]ment purposes only and do not perform any recruit-
[4842]ments,
[4844]Paragraph 1, b. and 1, c. are deleted
[4845]because they contain sensitive agency _
[4847]operational methods and techniques.
[4849]Bo | E& IMPDET
[4851]cL BY: 057223
[4853]SE¢ 2, TTS ‘SITiVE 00
[4855]Se ies wa d i
[4858]of
[4859]whee
[4861]e
[4865]“Sh
[4867]d. Question: What is the arrangement re,recruiting’
[4868]out of colleges? Any clearances or prohibitions?
[4869]; y
[4870]Answer: As of now CSI 50-10 specifically
[4871]requires approval by the, ADDO or DDO for any.
[4872]recruitment attempt made in the United States
[4873]against an American member of the academic
[4875].
[4877]“community or a foreign target attending an American
[4879]academic institution. This regulation.is presently in
[4881].the process of revision in that this approval authority
[4883]for academic recruitments in the United States is to
[4884]be delegated to Chief, FR. The approval authority
[4885]for recruitment attempts against American students
[4887]outside the United States is to be delegated to the Chief
[4889]of the appropriate area division, The only prohibitions
[4891]_ at the present time are those precluding recruitment
[4892]attempts against foreign students here in the United States
[4893]on grants from Ford Foundation, Rockefeller or Fulbright,
[4895]If you have further questions, please let me know.
[4897]signed/IDEN-173
[4899]Acting Chief
[4900]Foreign Resources Division
[4902]COOGLA
[4904]cate, Tes poet OETA
[4905]an ee 7
[4907]haku Cd a 2 fe wie Nat b it
[4909]"activities carried on by FR Division in the United States run the risk
[4912]. ; ¢ aa FOUN DT oe on
[4914]en ead
[4916]FR 73-180
[4918]7 May 1973
[4920]a
[4922]MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations | ;
[4923]SUBJECT: | ‘Foreign Resources Division Operational
[4924]Activities with Possible Flap Potential
[4926]1, At thr risk of stating the obvious, almost all of the operational
[4928]that unauthorized disclosure could create embarrassment to the Agency.
[4929]We have accepted this as a condition precedent and have proceeded with
[4930]our operational activities in the most professional manner possible under
[4931]the circumstances. There are certain rather unusual activities in which
[4932]FR Division has partic!pated and/or is participating that contain some-
[4933]what greater possibility for embarrassment if discovered. I have listed
[4934]these below, not necessarily in order of embarrassment potential:
[4936]. JFK OYCR)
[4938]a. |The New York Basce|provides a fairly considerable
[4939]amount of support to Dr. Kissinger in his contacts with the
[4940]Chinese. This support was authorized by Mr, Karamessines
[4941]and Mr. Helms. Thus far there has been no problem other
[4943]VO,
[4944]than the inordinate amount of time spent by(New York Base SECIS)
[4945]personnel, not to mention the fairly sizeable amount of
[4946]money that has been expended in support of these efforts,
[4948]b. A CIA Officer is to be assigned to FR Division. ‘The
[4949]CIA Officer is presently assigned overseas under deep
[4951]; cover;[his cover is the Mullen Corporation, ](This is the cor- ] JFEWIE
[4952]oration that employed E, Howard Hunt. }In discussions between
[4953]’" NOCAD and the ADDO, it was decided that the Officer would
[4954]be pulled out and reassigned in the United States.
[4955]FR Division was directed to accept this officer for assignment.
[4958]E2 IMPDET
[4959]cL BY: 057223
[4960]. vi.
[4961]~ | , 00633
[4962]Le a is how ee
[4964]Piso INSEE EVE
[4966]. "GE rane ree pe Ee
[4967]. . Sete ete dine Soba dl . ta
[4969]We have concluded that the best solution is to have this
[4970]officer attend a university in the. Midwest for at least
[4971]a year, working towards an advanced degree until there
[4972]has been time for the situation to clarify itself. We plan
[4973]to make no operational use of tiie CIA Officer whatsoever,
[4974]f during the period of time that he is attending the’ university.
[4976]Upon completion of his year's study, we will review the .
[4977]situation and decide the next course of action at that time.
[4979]‘Paragraph 1, c, is deleted because it contains sensitive
[4981]Agency operational methods and techniques.
[4983],
[4985]d. FR Division has been briefed in general on the yee (8)
[4986]existence of an audio operation done by the FBI but with close
[4987]yrEOY (sp support in San Francisco. This operation is directed
[4988]against [DEN-62, I understand the operation has
[4989]been exceptionally well done. However, the responsibility
[4990]for this activity has come from Chief, TSD in conjunction . JFEGDLS )
[4991]JE Oe? with SB Division.
[4993]e. Three microphones were planted in various locations
[4994]in the IDEN- 61 by the FBI, (The equipment was pro- Jey aye)
[4995]duced by CIA and the overall operation was joint, although no
[4996]CIA personnel have entered the premises, { The operation was |
[4997]deactivated and is presently dormant, The mikes, however,
[4998]are still in place. If discovered the operation could cause
[4999]‘some embarrassment to the American Government, but it is
[5000]unlikely the finger would point to CLA.
[5002]COi'5
[5004]emurey rmece ey TN 24 2 00G oad
[5005]ere mes 2 oe
[5006]fr i rs ry ee ‘Ven
[5009]Coa kure nee | ou
[5011]SUBJECT: Sensitive activities Performed by the Office of
[5013]OM
[5015]Logistics .
[5016]action would be more economical and eliminate the need for
[5017]one agency of the Government to’ duplicate facilities |
[5018]readily available from another. (A typical example-of this
[5019]procedure is purchasing photointérpretation gear for th
[5020]“Defense Intelligence Agency element located at NPIC; Tn
[5021]“connection with the current reporting requirement, however,
[5023]I have had our records researched for the past 2 years and
[5024]Attachment 1 reflects those transactions which appear to be
[5026]relevant to the subject of this memorandum.
[5028]d. In connection with the disclosures during the sum-
[5029]mer of 1971 that the Rand Corporation was not, properly
[5030]safeguarding classified documents, this Office undertook
[5031]two acts. I directed the Secnritwiéficer from our: West
[5032]Coast Procurement Office at the Iden 87 ..
[5034]to visit the Rand Corporation and satisfy
[5036]himself that classified material furnished them by the
[5038]CAgency}was both properly safeguarded and accounted for.
[5039]His report was affirmative. On 25 August 1971, the gontor
[5040]Security. Officer assigned to this Office forwarded
[5042]letter to the Rand Corporation stressing and reaffirming
[5043]the procedures Rand must follow in safeguarding classified
[5044]information furnished then byfthe Agency.J Of residual
[5046]_ interest in this matter, there is summarized the contents
[5048]of a memorandum of 2 July 1971 to theCExecutive Director-
[5049]Comptroller from the DD/I which is in our possession,)
[5051]This memorandum reports that EEBIS regularly
[5053]but that instructions had been issued to cease
[5055]| ge disseminated reports to the Rand Corporation
[5057]distribution of classified reports. While no
[5058]other direct dissemination went to Rand, other
[5059]USIB agencies, primarily USAF, were passing
[5060]"many" copies offDD/I products to Rand] as au-
[5061]thorized under USIB regulations. The memoran-
[5062]dum also states that Rand personnel had -
[5063]requested searches and document retrieval from
[5064]the CRS facility. '
[5066]5. In connection with action taken for the Office of
[5068]Security, there are three relevant items;
[5070]by the Office
[5073]a. The Printing Services Division, OL,! was requested
[5074]£\Security to print a book written by
[5075]Office of Security. The book was pre-
[5076]hy pnder a Brookings Institution Federal
[5078]EVES OMLY sha
[5080]SECRETE (00413,
[5085]SUBJECT:
[5087]ge
[5089]Sensitive
[5090]Logistics
[5091])  -@®  @
[5093]the/ DD/0,/we will not honor any requisition fer surveil-
[5094]dance equipment unless it has been approved cy the CI
[5096]Staff of theLDD/O, 450) .
[5098]4. Within the area of contractual responsibilities, the
[5100]ztivities Performed by th Office of
[5102]following items are pertinent:
[5104]10)
[5106]a. In February 1971, [Colonel L. K. White] the then
[5107]Executive Director-Comptroller, called me to-attend a.
[5108]meeting in his office, also attended by Mr. William Colby.
[5110]‘Colonel White explained that the Technical Services
[5112]Division (TSD) had been requested to provide assistance
[5113]to the FBI for a sensitive ject .
[5114]So i7ey »[gotones white) dia not dis-
[5115]close the purpose of the asSistance being provided by TSD
[5116]but did instruct me to assist TSD on purely contractual
[5117]matters. Since the Office of Logistics has. no inrormation
[5118]concerning the mission or purpose of Project . sub- -
[5119]Stantive questions concerning the subject should be
[5120]addressed te TSD. Other procurement actions accomplished
[5121]for the .FBIl-Are..revorted below, Specific mention is made,
[5122]howéver, of the Project because of the dollar magnitude, ap- _
[5123]proximately §1 million, and the complex technical. equip-
[5125]. ment that has. been involved in the undertaking.
[5127]b. The Procurement Division, OL, currently has two
[5128]requisitions in hand from TSD which would involve rein-
[5129]bursable sales to the FBI. One such requisition in the
[5130]amount of $56,900 is for two Westinghouse. television
[5131]cameras. The second requisition in the amount of $11,200
[5132]is for two wide-angle surveillance probes manufactured by
[5133]Bausch and Lomb. No action is being taken on either of
[5134]these requirements pending further instructions which -
[5135]will be sought from the Deputy Director for Management
[5136]and Services. , ot
[5138]c. Over the years, thisfAgency] has often supported
[5140]other Government agencies from a contractual or materiel
[5142]Standpoint. Upon the submission of an officially approved é)
[5144]‘request, supported by a transfer of funds,Cthe AgencyJ
[5146]would either enter into "accommodation procurements" for
[5147]the requesting agency or support the requesting egency by
[5148]the issuance of materiel from stock. Such actions are
[5150]legally accomplished under the Economy Act of 1925. This
[5152]' Act authorizes one agency to support the needs of, or pro-
[5154]Vide a service for, another Government agency when such
[5156]EVES OLY yg
[5157]SECRET oT, Oorae
[5160]SUBJECT: Sensitive Activities Performed by the Office of
[5162]Logistics — . é . ;
[5164]Executive Fellowship.-. The book is entitled "Where's
[5166]What -- Sources of Information for Federal Investigators."
[5167]It is a full treatise on the existence of sources of in-
[5168]formation that may be useful t6 an investigator. The
[5169]book's first printing cf 360 copies: was made in June 1967.
[5170]Due to demand, a second printing of 600 copies was made
[5172]in September 1968., The. ti tle page of the book cives
[5173]attribution tof setae itis Office of Security, Central
[5174]Intelligence Agency] end. the Brookings Institution Federal
[5175]Executive Fellovsht The book is classified Confidential,
[5176]and it is our understanding that the distribution was mace
[5177]to appropriate,agencies of the Federal Government. A copy
[5178]of] Mr. Murphy's| book can be made available for review if
[5179]desired. . .
[5181]Sometime in 1972, a representative - of the Law
[5182]Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA). requested
[5183]that the Agency sive consideration to ovr publishing, at
[5184]LEAA expense, an unclassified version of this volume. It
[5185]was the ‘intent of LEAA to make broad-scale distribution
[5186]to Police Departments throughout the country. The Director
[5187]of Security and I consulted on this matter and jointly
[5188]determined that the LEAA request should not -be honored be-
[5189]cause{the AgencyJshould not put itself in the position of
[5190]publishing law enforcement material for general and un- -
[5191]Classified purposes, and it would be an abuse of our print-
[5192]ing facilities.
[5194]b. On S January 1971, the Director of Security re-
[5195]quested that I approve his leasing up to eleven:motor
[5196]vehicles for use in connection with a special support.
[5197]operation which would last approximately 3 months. The
[5198]Director of Security informed me, in his requesting memo-
[5199]randum of S January 1971, that "This support activity has
[5200]been undertaken at the specific instruction of the Director
[5202]"+ and has his personal approval." The request was approved.
[5204]c. From 1968 to date, the Office of Security has
[5206]’ requisitioned from this Office a considerable amount of
[5207]materiel which we understand was to be given or loaned by
[5208]them to local Police Departments, In certain cases some
[5209]of this materiel was issued froma ency stocksJand, in
[5210]other cases, direct procurement of the materiel was made
[5211]-by funds furnished by the Office of Security. A complete
[5212]listing of such materiel is found in Attachment 2. .
[5214]SECRET _ e0tds
[5218]SUBJECT: Sensitive activities Performed by the Office of
[5221]6. In connection with the responsibility held by this
[5223]Office to obtain, manage, and dispose of safe sites for all
[5224]Agency operating components, the following information is
[5226]relevant.
[5227]a. A safe site, identified as "Safehouse $62" which
[5228]is Iden 88 ;
[5229]was made available to General Cushman’ Ss
[5230]office on 25 July 1971. >
[5232]The subject safe site was acquired on 15 June 1970
[5233]as a replacement for a terminated OL standby safe site
[5234]and in keeping with the approved requirement for a com-
[5235]plement of five standby safehouses for all: Agency use.
[5236]The apartment has one bedroom.and is located in an older
[5237]high-rise building along Iden 89. The nominal
[5238]lessee is Iden 90 a security-cleared
[5239]attorney with offices located at Iden 91
[5240]- The cover story utilized is that
[5241]Iden 90,. * rents the apartment for business conferences,
[5242]_meetings, and occasional overnight ‘stays by his staff
[5243]and/or his out-of-town clients. The original lease term
[5244]was for a l-year period, 15 June 1970 to 14 June 1971,
[5245]with month-to-month renewals thereafter. As an OL standby
[5246]safe site, the apartment has been used by various. Agency
[5247]components to meet their short-term or crash requirements.
[5248]Control of the standby. safe site and its security is the
[5249]responsibility of this Office. A record is maintained of
[5250]each user, component, and date of use; however, no record
[5251]is made of those persons being met at the site nor for what
[5252]purpose the site is being used (meetings, training, etc.).
[5253]Such information is maintained by the operating component
[5254]requesting the safe site. Records maintained by this
[5255]. Office disclose only that the apartment involved was made
[5256]; available to General Cushman's office on 25 July 1971 in
[5257]\ _ answer to a telephonic request.
[5259]b. This Office is aware, although it had no cognizance
[5260]_ nor responsibility, that an apartment was rented in Miami |
[5261]Beach, Florida, during the period of the Democratic National
[5262]Convention, 10-14 July 1972, and the Republican National \
[5263]Convention, 21-24 August 1972. The apartment was used as
[5265]a meeting place for officers of the Miami Station who were
[5267]_ an liaison with members of the Secret Service and rendering
[5269]EVES ONLY: =
[5270]SECRET 4 : | COAL
[5273]SUBJECT: Sensitive Activities Performed by the Office of
[5274]; Logistics .
[5276]assistance in connection with the political conventions
[5277]that were being held. WH Division is the cognizant .
[5278]operating component on this matter.
[5280]7 The above recitation of facts represents, to the best
[5281]of my knowledge and memory, those matters which appear to be
[5282]relevant to subject. tasking given by the Director. -
[5284]. . ‘ ; . e .
[5285]f cn F
[5286]{ 7
[5288]- of.
[5289]wih. FF Lief.
[5291]1 Be “
[5292]John F. Blake ~
[5293]Director of Logistics
[5294]2 Atts _ | o
[5295]ce: DD/M&S
[5297]EYES, Oty ats
[5298]SECRET | |
[5300]~~. —- , . oom an a : ws
[5302]WTUOLUREL oN
[5304]EVES OHLY
[5306]| oo _ _ Receiving
[5307]Requesting Date of U.S. Depart
[5308]Office. Request Item Quantity Unit Cost ment or Agen
[5309]OS —S—=s«3/23/72 + ‘Telephone Analyzer - ou 1,350 BNDD
[5311]TSD 5/16/72 Transmitters, Radio Beacon . 8. 313 BNDD .
[5312]os ~ 3/23/72 Telephone Analyzer Te _—s | “1,350 cg White House .
[5316]Asorg
[5320]ETT00.
[5322]os . . - 3/23/72 Telephone Analyzers : ‘ 43 1,400 _ Air Force
[5323]os 3/23/72 Telephone Analyzers... "10 | 1,350 ‘'State |
[5324]. 0S . 3/23/72 Telephone Analyzers . - 2 - 944375 ane
[5325]TSD -—S»s«- 11/16/72 Camera Sets _ 7 29 656 EBT
[5326]TSD_ 4/17/72 Camera Sets | -10 700 ~~ ERE
[5327]TSD «11/18/71. Actuators, Recorders = SO | ° 488 FBI
[5328]". Tsp —s«4/49/72 ‘Tessina Cameras, | 3 700 BND |
[5329]ae: TSD -"  12/ 7/72 Camera, Video oe "1 - 18,045 FBI e . |
[5330]- RSD. 10/13/72. Tube, Image, Burn-Resistance, 1.) 4,639 EBE ws
[5331]a z . Equivalent of WL 30691 . . : .
[5332]TSD 3/26/71 Tubes, Image, WL 30691 - 2 ‘4,607 FBI .
[5333]TSD . 4/20/73 . Cameras, Television )
[5335]Nw
[5336]we
[5337]fe)
[5339]Ww
[5340]Lo)
[5341]So
[5343]w
[5344]a)
[5346]WANS COfICE
[5347]SENG EL Ua UT, SOURCES
[5348]Able he ens Vive vin
[5350]EVES ONLY
[5352]GUA RET
[5355]“ONLY
[5357]. _ oo. Receiving
[5358]1 Requesting Date of- . , — ; U.S. Depart-
[5359]Offic Request Item _-° Quantity Unit Cost ment or Agent
[5360]TSD - 12/14/72 Transmitters, Radio . 3 313 BNDD
[5361]TSD - 10/20/72 Actuators, Recorder =. 25 591 FBI ct
[5362]TSD 10/13/72 Tube, Image, Burn-Resistance, | 1 © 4,639 - FBI So
[5363]. Equivalent of WL 30691" , :
[5364]‘” TSD 5/26/71 Tube, Image, WL 30691 2 4,639 FBI e
[5365]TSD 4/22/71 ‘Transmitters’ 3 1,372 | FBI
[5366]-TSD | 4/22/71 Module, Plug-In 4 1,247 ‘FBI
[5367]. TSD -: 4/22/71 Power Supply - UWP-39A 1 - * 568 FBI
[5368]OL 2/25/71 Telephone Analyzers "2 1,350 Treasury
[5369]“OS 1/30/71 Telephone Analyzers . 22 1,350 Treasury
[5370]OL 8/12/70 Cable, Special-Purpose .
[5371]. Electrical 5,000 ft. - ~42 White House
[5372]_ . . oe ; Communication
[5373]_ - ; ., . ; Agency
[5374]_. “2. tsp ”—-1/10/73sInk, Special Formula > = ~~ «1. Lot 1,825 nmi Mttion a
[5375]Ot | oo, - ; ‘ss Naturalizatio
[5376]TR, ; m ' ; i Service
[5377]TSD 6/28/72 Ink, Special Formula -1 lot 3,700 Immigration 1
[5378]Naturalizatio
[5379]oo) Service -
[5380]an) . .
[5381]bao TSD 7/26/71 Transmitter, Radio Beacon 1 _ 728 U.S. Forestry
[5382]“ha : .
[5383]ee) a red “7 a.
[5384]EVES OWILY |
[5385]af CUD 4
[5388]TE EAO Loses ver
[5389]@.
[5391]MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Central Intelligence Agency
[5393]THROUGH : Deputy Director for Management and Services.
[5394]SUBJECT : Activities which might be considered sensitive
[5395]issues, os
[5397]' Ihave listed below computer processing projects which the Office of
[5398]Joint Computer Support has participated in or is aware of and which
[5399]might be considered sensitive issues.
[5401]Le a , “
[5403]Most Sensitive Projects a ~ a °
[5404]OJCS ' Project Officer Nature — ' OCS
[5406]Project . Organization, & of Reason for
[5407]Identification Telephone Project. Listing
[5408](Lever) Richard Ober A special pro- Type of
[5409], ; CI Staff ject initiated data being
[5410]Red 1465 by DCI . _ eollected.
[5411]£_sance | Iden 48 | Machine Ss ype of
[5412]. OS" index to _ data in
[5413]“Red 9298 security files - index,
[5414](erpsrat) Ct JohrHutchings ] Information | Type of
[5415]7 ORD : storage & re- data in
[5416]3061. trieval of drug files.
[5418]related data
[5420]' (ORD's project
[5422]Sensitive Projects ©
[5424]Tprvces) Iden 18 | Computer file Type of
[5425]OMS of drug data, . datain
[5426]71792 . ‘ x . file, \
[5428]EVES ONLY
[5429]SECRET
[5432]"+ Sensitive Projects, (Continued)
[5434]_ OCS . Project Officer Nature
[5435]- . Project & Organization, & of é
[5436]Kn of Identifica@: Telephone _ Proi
[5438]A s\ nt) _ mo Oo
[5440]4 W Li - PROFLIGES- Fokn—Winnte Statistical -
[5442]\\ - TSD - analysis of
[5444]: . 362-1922 © psychological
[5445](sterile) . data, .
[5446]r . . ‘
[5448]Sensitivity Unknown, but Possibly a Matter for Concern
[5450]TILAQ- RoebertHahn - Pattern |
[5451]: . : SB uo analysis of
[5452]Red 1185/ surveillance
[5453]1251 data from
[5454]re foreign liaison
[5455]. ; oo , , service
[5456]SPYDER George Data on
[5458]Os ’ cies used for
[5459]5071 support of In—-
[5460]- Plece-Monitor- -
[5462]ing-System,.a
[5464]system to identify
[5466]unauthorized
[5467]transmitters. .
[5468]DM¥REC— —_—Iden 48 “File of auto-
[5469]- Os mobile license
[5470]Red 9298 numbers.
[5471]'  #PREGIN Watter- File of Agency
[5472]; Kowalski applicants who
[5473]CI Staff were not
[5474]Red 9338 hired.
[5476]: niques of
[5478]| ns
[5479]SECRET |".
[5481]OJCS,
[5482]Reason for
[5483]List ing
[5485]Source of
[5486]data. Con-
[5487]tractors are
[5488]involved
[5489]with project,
[5491]Nature of
[5492]data, Tech-
[5494]system dis-
[5495]cussed with
[5496]FBI.
[5498]Project
[5499]originated by
[5500]James McCord.
[5502]Nature of
[5503]data.
[5505]Nature of
[5506]data, —
[5508]Sensitivity Unknown, but Possibly a Matter for Concern (Continued
[5510]OgcSs . Project Officer. Nature . OFCS
[5511]Project & Organization, & of Reason for
[5512]Identification Telephone Project — Listing
[5513]on ’ ‘Iden 187 : Cooperative Association
[5514]‘ ISD/DDO program with with the
[5515]ot “Red 1442 . Iden 188. named
[5516]. ; : . ' organization.
[5517]t
[5518]. -o. . an
[5519]: name grouping
[5520]techniques.
[5522]b° sua . .
[5523]' JOHN D, IAMS
[5524]Director of Joint Computer Support
[5526]‘00497
[5528])
[5532]= 29 May 1973
[5533]MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General
[5535]SUBJECT. :Mr.Colby's Request to Inspector General to
[5536]. Determine Subject Referred to by Two Notes
[5537]. ‘ina PP/B Memo to DD/M&S
[5538]REFERENCE H
[5540]: D/PPB Memo to DD/M&S dated 23 May 1973,
[5541]Subject: Watergate Principals - Direct or
[5543]: - (Xb) , Indirect Involvement —
[5545]\ . SS
[5546]The two notes of 13 and 20 January 1972 refer to approval
[5547]by the DCI (at that time Mr. Helms) for the expenditure of $30-32K
[5548]for a sensitive CS project. No further details were given, Mr, Colby
[5550]asked that DDO records be checked.
[5552]Zz. .DDO records “show that the funds went to the CI Staff for a
[5553]-project called [den 99. This is a joint operation with the Iden 100
[5554]service for the collection of ELEVT intelligence. The activity is .
[5555]handled by the Special Intelligence Group of the CI Staff,
[5557]*3, The funds cited in the notes was transferred to Cl on
[5558]13 January 1972. :It is believed by DDO/MPS and the Cl Staff that
[5560]the two notes refer to the same appropriated amount,i., , $30 to 32K
[5561]and not to two separate allocations,
[5563]iC Pecdarde)
[5565]John C; Richards
[5568]. |. MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Management and Services
[5570]SUEJECT: _ Watergate Principals ~- Direct or Indirect
[5573]1. This memorandum responds to the Director's request for
[5574]a report of any involvement in any capacity since J January 1969
[5575]| (*  .. with Messrs. Hunt, McCerd, Liddy, Young, or Krogh.
[5577]-
[5579]fj . - 2. 1 have } had none with Hunt, Liddy or Young.
[5581]3. My McCord contact was indirect and ocurred sometime
[5582]. @uring ‘the late 1960's when I was. Director, Ojfice of Computer -
[5583]., Services. . I epposed plans for Technical Division, Office of
[5584]| Security (under Mr. McCord) to acquire a separate computer for
[5585]Iden 101. : Ted Hines of OD/S2T (then ORD)
[5586]was the computer individual working awith TD and, I think, would
[5587]have details.
[5589]4. The Krogh centact also was indirect and involved his | os
[5590]request, first throush OMB, that CIA fund foreign travel on behalf |
[5591]of the Cubinet Co:smittee on Internationa] Narcetics Control. Indi- |
[5592], vidual phone discussions are noted in the atteched. The Agency
[5593]“focal points were Iden 32 and Iden 3; f tnderstand ;
[5594]Iden 3 has forwarded relevant documentation. Copies of
[5595]_ Memoranda from Messrs. Krogh, Iden 3 and Colby are attached
[5596]“also, —— : :
[5598]§. I held a staff meeting yesterday to pass the request to
[5599]all OPPB employees. One oificer who was attending a funeral will
[5600]not be available until tomorrow,
[5602]O\DbR\ CYS HBEe\E ss 1330, (5371252) = . ye
[5603]J - DAESB EAve OU]A LIT /s/ Charles A. Briggs a p\
[5604]- yew ET coh : — (Ne
[5605]ous gi - saqusveoe Charles A.’ Briggs
[5606]plemipayor: Director of Planning, -
[5607]rogramming, end udgeting ©
[5608]Attachment
[5609]As stated
[5611]ve SECRET
[5614]° . @. A Pooment
[5615], , ; ; 23M: uy 1723
[5616]4 Feb 72 Call from Jim Taylor, OMB re "Bud* Krogh-and his deputy,
[5618]Walter’ Minnick, of the Domestic Council who plan foreinn
[5619]travel in connection with their narcotics interests. Jim was
[5620]alerting us to their intention to ask us for junds for the
[5621]‘ travel, 7 .
[5624]7 Feb 72. Follow-up from Taylor: Plan 3 5 trips icr 3 individuuls--
[5625]all in FY 72. Cost probably $1¢K. Linnick ready tu make
[5626]first trip. Iden 32 is plugged in. ExDir said OK re Tehran
[5628], Visit. --
[5630]7 Feb. 72 See attached memo from Beil Krogh, Jr, to Bill Colby and
[5632]_ follow-on memos from Seymour Bolton (2 Jul 72) and Colby
[5633]| . (2 Aug 72).
[5635]12(?) May 72 John Hurley, OMB called, mentioning possible Krogh/
[5636]Minnick attendance at-a LatiA American Iden 102
[5637]conference on narcotics. He also said Jeff Shepherd.
[5638]White House, was laying on a hese with Iden 32 for
[5639]himself, Shepherd and Mark Alger, OMB to Eurepe.
[5641]23 Jun 72 Iden 3 commented on Krogh/Minnick interest
[5642]in getting CA activitics, ‘including large-scale Ph
[5643]on narcotics front, Iden 3 pushing small-scale PP.
[5644]6 Jul 72 Iden 3 called. Notes say only: "Minnick-Hurley film.
[5646]We will send, a
[5648]“
[5650]2 Aug 72 Iden 3 called re Colby letter (attached). Said travel
[5651]. orders ready; need money this .Fif (No record in my
[5652]notes as to who wus traveling when, but have faint
[5653]recolicction of its being to Mexico City). Sam Hines
[5654]and, Iden 73. contacted by Iden 3.
[5656]. | ; oe,
[5657]1 Nov 72 Related? Iden 3 ‘call. Agein notes are cryptic:
[5659]WH/GAO-Grace (Iden 32):: Survey BNDD problems/
[5660]Mexico," .
[5662]SECREI
[5665]On Mr. Colby's copy only?
[5667]1B Jan 72 ExDir (Colby) said DCI had approv ed $30x for sensitive” a7
[5669]id
[5670]i
[5672]CS project - no ‘details.
[5674]_20 Jan 72 Reminded ExDir re $32K he said DCI OK'd.
[5676]t
[5679]19 Jul Qo
[5681]MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
[5683]SUBJECT: ‘Conversation winf Jack peo] TRL
[5685]i .
[5687]Y) 1. While on leave visiting Disney World in Florida, I .
[5688]. Pesos ed in to ned(7ack Baumanjwho lives in Winterhaven, Florida.:
[5689]Gack etired fromthe Agency)about five years ago on disability dve
[5690]- to a“Serious heart condition. He was-with the Office of Security for
[5691]about 20 years prior to his retirement, :
[5693]2. During a private conversa ationJackstold me that he had
[5694]bee fyinterviewed three or four times by the FBI in connection with .
[5695]wv the( i MeCord- Hung affair, I asked him why he. had’ been interviewed,
[5696]a: and he told me that in late 1971 he had been contacted by Howard
[5697]Hunt who suggested that he consider an_assignment as Security
[5698]Officer for the Republican Party. (yack\visited Washington in
[5699]January 1972 to discuss the proposed position with Howard Hunt
[5700]who apparently was acting on behalf of the Republican Party. (Jack?
[5701]furnished a resume to Hunt and discussed the position with him.
[5702]Ultimately, he decided not to accept the position because he felt
[5704]that his heart condition would not allow him to become involved in
[5705]such activity. ' oe, .
[5707]3. According toldack? during the meeting with. Mr. Hunt
[5708]they discussed some of the requirements of the job. At that time
[5709]they discussed a need for both a positive and a counteraudio program
[5711]VA ah and a need for a good security system both before and during the
[5713]" National Convention, { Jack}indicated that he sincerely believed that
[5714]7 _ ; the Republican Party did need a security officer and a good security
[5715]| - programmer but felt that he could not.afford to accept the job even.
[5717]though it was a very lucrative offer, Apparently, money was nota
[5718]hoo problem.
[5720]Ne rot wt )
[5722]se
[5724]i a aa. dei. - al i Fa
[5725]: 1
[5727]‘Rate Prac
[5728]BEPIRER TI
[5731]“on sano Ox. “Des
[5733]wees ~~. weer eee .
[5735]* (Glas bs wasgiss, ifsc ny ba ersni/
[5736]es
[5739]i). 7: "
[5740]4, wherbig eDacctined, he indicated thaw Mr. Hunt asked
[5742]~ for any other recijmendations he might have. Wiccording tofjack]
[5744]he told Mr. Hunt that most of the people he knew were still in the
[5746]Ggenc but he did furnish the name of JEN- -lu8 who might be
[5747]possibly ready to retire from chetagency}
[5749]. 5. (Jaciinformed « ime that he assumed that the’ Bureau
[5751], ND obtained his name due to the resume he furnished. Mr. Hunt. He
[5753]Abe “said that the Bureau had talked to him on three or four occasions
[5754]and that he had written up about a 40 page statement concerning
[5755]his dealings with Mr. Hunt. When asked about Mr. MeCord (Jack)
[5756]said that he really did not know McCord that well and declined any
[5757]knowledge of Mr. McCord's technical capability.
[5759]6. ‘Mr. Bauman indicated that he had not been in touch
[5760]with Mr, Hunt since the early part of 1972 and knew aothing of
[5761]. the Watergate operation. He stated that he had gained the impres-
[5762], sion from the Bureau interview that the technical devices were being
[5764]es sna Bd | ae
[5766]removed at the time of the arrest and were not being installed as
[5767]originally reported, :
[5768]7. ALL of the above information was volunteered by Mr.
[5769](Bauman,) and I really did not get involved in any discussion on the
[5770]“matter other than to comment that I hated to sec theCAgency'g name
[5771]connected with such an incident in any way. The above conversation
[5772]took place during a 10 or 15 minute period and no other discussion
[5773]relating to this incident was held. It is being reported for the record
[5774]_ and for information of the Director of Security.
[5778]7 _ | op aass za-1609°)) :
[5780]MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Management and Services
[5782]SUBJECT ; 1: Contacts with Individuals Named in the Watergate Matter
[5784]h) 1. lam addressing this to you instead of to the{ Director of Central
[5786]. Intelligence ince I doubt that the information contained herein is of such
[5787]i you Significance to warrant his interest and because it has been on record with
[5788]4 . thd Agency)since July 1972. However, if you.feel.that the information is of
[5789]such interest that it should be forwarded to the Director I shall put it in the
[5790]. proper format to do so.
[5792]_
[5794]h) 2. My only contact with anyone named in connection with the
[5795]; \ M) “Watergate and related matters was throug Mir. Jack Bauman a former
[5796]A Agency employee now retired and living in Winterhaven, Florida, } In
[5798]J December 197 Mr. Bauman}called me from Florida and advised that he
[5799]wanted to get in touch with Howard Hunt. He said that he did not have Hunt's
[5800]home phone number and that it was probably unlisted but that since Hunt was a
[5801]former employee, could I contact Hunt and ask him to give(Mr. Baumapla call.
[5802]Thad only met Hunt once about 10 ycars before but [ agreed to relay the message.
[5803]I-called Howard Hunt at his home and told hi naMr. Baumanjdid not have his
[5804]home phone and requested he calf Mr. Bauman Mr. Hunt thanked me for
[5805]relaying the message and said that he would call/Mr. Baumap/ This seemed of
[5806]little consequence to me in December 1971 but in July 1972 Iden 17 of the
[5807]Office of Security contacted me in regard to the FBI investigation of the Watergate
[5808]Situation. At that time I informed Iden 17 ‘of the telephone call from
[5809]Mr. Baumanjin December 1971. Attached is a Copy of-a’Memorandum for the
[5810]Record prepared by, Iden 17 4s a result of our conversation.
[5812]a private conversation that he had been interviewed three or four times by the
[5813]FBI in connection with the Watergate affair and he related to me his contact
[5815]n) _ 8. In the summer of 1972 I took my family to Disney World in Florida
[5816]we and took that occasion to drop in to seq Jack Bauman) Mr. Baumatold me in
[5818]6
[5820]WARES? Lone . | ~.~.f 12
[5821]Hig ccs] oma ey QEOD ET [es
[5822]AND bigilicuS is LY9 cisd td we
[5825](2)
[5827]rn rr
[5829]with Howard Hunt. On 19 July 1972 after my return from Florida I reported
[5830]this conversation to the Director of Security and made it a Memorandum for
[5832]the Record. This memorandum was sent to Mr. Colby and a copy of the
[5833]memorandum | ‘is attached.
[5835]Other than knowing Mr. McCord throuzh his employment with
[5836]Athe Ageneylend meeting Howard Hunt once in about 1959, Ido not know nor
[5838]K (Kp _ have Lhad any contact with any individuals named or knowledge of related
[5839]6 cl matters now receiving attention in the press.
[5841]tS Lee
[5842]4 Aine TF Cah
[5843]Charles’ W. Kane °
[5845]Special Assistant to the.
[5846]Deputy Director
[5847]for Management and Services
[5849]Pa
[5851].  Atts
[5853]megeny SECREL =o.
[5856]17 July 1972
[5858]6
[5860]MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD, . - on,
[5862]Pood °
[5864]SUBJECT:] Charles W. ae Ti FEOA)
[5865], ‘Fden 108
[5867]_*
[5869]1, Last week Special Agent Arnold Parham of the FBI con-
[5871]Lt e) ; tacted the Acting DD/OS. He asked whether or net the Subjects
[5873]. + worked fod the Central Iatelligence Agency.) Previously, requests
[5874]of this nature were followed uP by the FBIWith aa interview of the
[5876]subjects. -
[5878]. 2. I briefed Mr. Colby who is the Agency's focal point on
[5880]the ''Watergate"' case and the Acting DD/S of the FBI inquiry.
[5882]Mr. Colby suggested that we determine the extent of involvement
[5884]and indicated that we advise the Bureau of their employment.
[5886]"3. When Agent Parham was again contacted and advis wed NO
[5888]of the Subjects’. employment with| the Agency,| he indicated that
[5889]the Bureau does not wish to interview them, | ‘
[5891]4, The office of the DD/PS will interview Iden 108 in Jhe a
[5892]the same fashion as Mr, True was previously interviewed.
[5894]5. I called/Mr. Kang)both at his office and his residence °
[5895]‘and learned that he is in Florida and will return to duty on 17 July.
[5896]I caile Mr. Kane)this morning to advise him of tae inquiry.
[5898]“Bho by (te. Keng stated that he has no firm conclusion as to
[5901]how the Bureau obtdined his name. He stated that he has‘seen
[5902]Mr. Hunt on only one occasion in 1959. At that time Hunt was
[5903].the Chief of Station, Montevideo. The meeting was occasioned
[5905]a
[5908]by the fact tra
[5910]to, the fact thal co
[5912]Christmas time of, ©: h Mee Kane]
[5914]to get in touch with Mr.: Hunt.
[5916]“Kane/how he could get in touch with him.,
[5917]Hunt's telephone number tHrough telephone information channels
[5919]wheseupon ‘he passed the number on to, Mr, Bauman)
[5921]e ccompanied a technic
[5922]Mr. Kant] stated furt
[5924]sweep team
[5925]ther that around
[5926]call (an ees Bauman
[5928][Mr Kane stated that he has information that{(Jack 5 Be sumep>
[5929]on several occasions in connection with the
[5930]“current savestigation and that he surmises
[5931]have obtained his name from him.
[5933]has anealee
[5934]that the Bureau may
[5936]signed Iden 17
[5938]Deputy Director of Security
[5942]' SECRET/SENSITIVE
[5944]._ e
[5946]8 May 1973
[5948]aN . ay ; . .
[5949]MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
[5951]THROUGH: Deputy Director for Management and Services
[5953]SUBJECT: Involvement in Sensitive Domestic Activities
[5955]1, As chief of the DDP Systems Group prior to 1969, I was involved
[5956]- in providing data processing support for the following sensitive projects:
[5958]ite |
[5960]WO b, FI Staff and Office of Medical Services program .
[5961](\ for recording data on foreign and U.S. phy sicians from American
[5962]Medical Association records...
[5966]of U.S. citizens believed to.be militants, subversives, terrorists;
[5968]a. Ci Staff - Mr. Richard Ober's. program for processing data” iy .
[5971].
[5973]c. A Systems Group sponsored program of common concern
[5974]listing travel of U.S. citizens to and from Communist countries.
[5976]2. In the same capacity my staff and I briefed police officers from. “~
[5977]_New York State and Chicago at the DCI's request (Admiral Rayborn) on v7
[5978]. “@ata processing techniques related to biographic intelligence (unclassified).
[5980]3. As a member of O/PPB, I have been aware of five programs with
[5981]possibly sensitive domestic overtones.
[5983]a. DDS&T/ORD's contract with the University Iden 103
[5985]for "The VIP Health and Behavior Prediction
[5986]System." :
[5988]b. DDS&T/ORD's Project “which involved the collection
[5989]‘of data on dangerous drugs from U.S. firms. I believe Mr. Helms
[5990]" terminated this program last Fall.
[5992]“SECRET /SENSITIVE S
[5994]a
[5996]S
[5998]| CONFIDE. TIal f-2
[6000]e
[6002]Mp
[6004]Oy
[6006]MEAORANDUY FOR THE RECORD
[6007]| .
[6009]SLiJiCT: Research Project on Rotert Vesco
[6010]- ; “ a
[6012]2. On 15 Gctoter 1974] Hesers) treckinridse end Heintreleen)
[6014]in the course of a Survey, were triéfed on activitiss of the :
[6016]Atlsntic/Pacific Division of tne. Office of Econemic aesorts.: One
[6017]project cited was a overy from the Lirectur, apgarently at the re-
[6019]quest of Secretary Shultz, to the effect, "hat do we Know ebout
[6020].Vesco," tke man then remning 19S, Two of OLK's anal, sts uare arsigned
[6021]to tLe project and, working through tre. ucmestic Contact vervice, |
[6023]“spent a dey going over tre Piles of the Securities and Exchange
[6024]‘Commission. There apnarently was sone. contact also with UR Division
[6026]of the Leputy Directorate for Plans and with the Office of Current
[6027]Intelligence.
[6029]2. The information atove is based on rough notes and obviously
[6030]is sketchy. It is cited nox not to sucgest eny wrongdoing tut because
[6031]of the current outlicity about Vesco end the probebility of continuing
[6032]probes into the subject ty the press end the courts.
[6034]Scott D. Preckinridge
[6036]sfteyyh Ges titi
[6038].
[6040]MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General
[6042]Bil--
[6044]' Attached are the reports Bill Colby asked to see:
[6046]1.. Restless Youth (September 1968), No. 0813/68,
[6047]Secret/Sensitive/No Foreign Dissem (Copy 78).
[6049]This document was produced in two versions--one
[6050]. with the chapter on radical students in America (pages
[6051]re, + «+. + 25-39) which was sent only to the President, Walt Rostow,
[6052]‘ and Cy Vance (former Deputy Secretary of Defense); the ~~
[6053]other version without the references to the American
[6054]scene was disseminated to twenty people outside the
[6055]Agency, This document without the material on the
[6056]US was updated in February 1969 and copies were sent’:
[6057]to the Vice President and Dr., Kissinger. A still more
[6058]abbreviated edition was sent to the Attorney General
[6059]in March 1969.
[6061]2. Black Radicalism in the Caribbean (6 August 1969),
[6062]‘No, 1839/69, Secret/No Foreign Dissem (Copy 142),
[6064]8. Black Radicalism in the Caribbean--Ancther Look
[6065]. (12 June 1970), No.. 0517/70, Secret/No Foreign
[6066]Dissem (Copy 98).
[6070]Please note that these are our record copies and should.
[6073]- be returned. . .
[6076]“ Edward W. Proctor
[6077]_ Deputy Director for Intelligence
[6079]the
[6081]SECRET /SENSITIVE
[6083]¢ I-A
[6084]“/! MOXY,
[6086]Attachments
[6090]| ee > CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
[6091]re
[6093]8 May 1973
[6095]MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
[6097]FROM Jf oy Deputy Director for Intelligence ;
[6098]SUBJECT : Activities Possibly wesaicta
[6099]Legislative Chartier
[6101]inh) ee .
[6102]coe 1, This memorandum responds to your instruction to — =
[6103]aa report any activities which might be considered outside CIA's. ,
[6104]: legislative charter, ©
[6105]. { .
[6107]2, All Office and Staff chiefs in the Intelligence Directorate
[6108]have reviewed the past and present activities of their components.
[6109]I have received responses from all of them, and none reported any
[6110]activitics related to cither the Watergate affair or the break into
[6111]the offices of Elisberg's psychiatrist, Although contacts with
[6112]three of the people allegedly implicated in these incidents were
[6113]reported, these contacts were on matters other than the two
[6114]improper activities:
[6116]Hunt: . Col, White, Richard Lehman, and I talked
[6117]to Hunt in late 1970 regarding his preparation |
[6118]of a recommendation in support of the Agency's
[6119]nomination of R, Jack Smith for the National
[6120]Civil Service League Award,
[6122]WL, Geiseliyrel
[6124]Mitchell; While Mr. Mitchell was Attorney General,
[6125]an OCI officer was assigned the task of
[6126]providing him with daily briefings on
[6127]foreign developments.
[6129]pret ila: = fists v9, Aoi h. 094.
[6131]on sil OH es: Ke
[6132]APERAUET Ean psy rees yong | [ers Ue
[6133]* Gh FS TU ork Tas fo Preocwadl - : 7 . 2 . 7
[6135]GEO shir ae)
[6137]bile
[6138]be a
[6140].
[6141]Dit
[6143]et
[6146]- . ee er
[6148]CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY.
[6150]. directive.
[6152].
[6154]DCS collects information on foreign students studying
[6156]in the US.
[6158]pcs collects information on physicians practicing in
[6159]the US who have studied abroad (mostly foreign
[6161]nationals).
[6163]DCS accepts information on possible foreign
[6164]involvement in -US dissident groups and on the
[6165]‘narcotics trade when sources refuse to deal
[6166]with. the FBI and BNDD directly.
[6168]DCS assesses the suitability and willingness of
[6169]US citizens to cooperate with CIA.
[6171]DCS,. for six months in late 1972 and early 1973,
[6173]was acquiring telephone routing slips on overseas
[6174]ae Jt.
[6175]Information deleted because it reveals sensitive operational
[6176]techniques and methods,
[6178]calls,
[6180]NPIC and COMIREX review satellite imagery
[6181]; from NASA programs to identify photography |
[6182]too "sensitive" for public release,
[6184]CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
[6186].. hour responses are attached.
[6190]if,
[6192]Harry Eisenbeiss and Clarus Rice of CRS
[6193]-had frequent contacts with Young during the
[6195]‘ summer of 1972 in connection with Executive
[6196]a Order 11652 and the implementing NSC
[6198]‘ This involved visits by Young
[6199]to CIA to discuss information storage and
[6200]retrieval and several meetings of an inter-
[6201], 2eency group dealing with the implementation
[6202]“of the Executive Order and directive.
[6204]eee ee By In accordance with my instructions, several Offices reported |
[6205]"1. domestic activities which might appear questionable to outsiders. r
[6207]Most of these activities are clearly
[6209]- Within the Agency's charter, but there are a few which could be
[6211]- viewed as borderline.
[6214]Aa PR ITErRy s)
[6216]r 6
[6217]NPIC. has examined domestic coverage for special
[6219]purposes such as natural éalastrophies and. civil
[6220]disturbances,
[6222]OCI, in 1967 and 1968, prepared intelligence
[6223]memoranda on possible foreign connections -with
[6224]the US anti-war movement and world-wide student
[6225]dissidence (including the SDS) at the request of
[6226]the White House.
[6228]CRS is regularly involved with Customs in examining AH
[6229]the contents of motion picture film cans addressed to "
[6230]the Soviet, and occasionally other forcign, embassies . ,
[6231]to acquire positive foreign intelligence,
[6233]FBIS has on occasion supplied linguists to work
[6234]directly for another agency, ¢.g., to the FI3I to
[6235]_ translate Arabic in Washington,
[6237]FBIS monitors.radio press dispatches and reports
[6238]covered by copyright. These are circulated within
[6239]the Government and stamped "Official Use Only".
[6241]This has gone on for three decades without problems,
[6243]FBIS has monitored and reported on foreign radio
[6245]- kroadcasts of statements and speeches of US citizens
[6246]such.as those by US POWs in Hanoi, Jane Fonda,
[6247]and Ramsey Clarke.
[6249]FBIS has run the Joint Publication Research Service
[6250]under Department:of Commerce cover since 1957,
[6251]JPRS is a facility for obtaining translations of |
[6252]unclassified publications in foreign languages
[6254]and contracts with private individuals to do this
[6255]work, Most of these individuals are not witting.
[6257]of the CIA-JPRS relationship,
[6259]Chea idyll 2: a
[6260]EDWARD W, PROCTOR
[6261]Deputy Director for Intelligence |
[6263]Attachments
[6266]CIA INTERNAL USI ONLY —_
[6269]SECRET
[6270]e INTERNAL USE ONLY
[6272]‘7 May 1973
[6274]MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence,”
[6276]VIA ; Deputy Director for Intelligonce
[6278]t
[6279]FROM : Director of Current Intelligence
[6281]SUBJECT : Activity Related to Domestic Events
[6283]1. OCI began following Caribbean black radicalism
[6284]in earnest in 1968. The emphasis of our analysis was on
[6285]black nationalism as a political force in the Caribbean
[6286]and as a threat to the security of the Caribbean statas.
[6287]{wo-DDI memoranda ware produced on the subject: "Black
[6288]| Radicalism in the Caribbean" (6 August 1969), and "Black
[6289]i Radicalism in the Caribbean--Another Look" (12 June 1970).
[6290]“In each a single paragraph was devoted to ties with the
[6291]US black power movement; the discussion primarily concerned
[6292]« Visits of Stokely Carmichael and other US black. power
[6293]activists to the Caribbean and other. overt contacts. —
[6295]2. In June 1970, Archer Bush of OCI was asked to
[6297]write a memorandum with special attention to links be-
[6299]tween black radicalism in the Caribbean and advocates of
[6301]' black power in the US. The record is not clear where
[6303]‘ this request originated, but it came through channels
[6305]| from the DCI. The paper was to be treated as especially
[6307]' sensitive and was to include material provided by the .
[6309]' Spacial Operations group of the CI Staff. The CI Staff °
[6311]“ material was voluminous but did not provide meaningful
[6313]' evidence of important links between militant blacks in
[6314]the US and the Caribbean. This, in fact, was one of
[6316]the conclusions of the paper. The memorandum was produced
[6317]in typescript form and given to the DCI.
[6322]SECRET.
[6325]' SECRET <a
[6326]STA INTERNAL USE ONLY 6
[6328]. 3, For several months in the first half of 1968
[6329]the! Caribbean Branch wrote periodic typescript memoranda
[6330]|
[6331]|
[6333]on Stokely Carmichael's travels abroad during a period Ms
[6334]‘when he had dropped out of public view. Our recollection
[6335]/ ds that the memoranda were for internal CIA use ‘only,
[6337]' although a copy of one was inadvertently sent to the FBI.
[6339]. a,
[6340], Richard Lehman.’
[6341]Director of Current Intelligence
[6343]SECRET
[6344]CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
[6346]0028
[6348]Cc rh han ce Lr |
[6349]. . . “3
[6351]Uw Vateal J Vecewe nabs
[6353]7 May 1973
[6355]’ MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
[6357]SUBJECT: DCS Domestic Activity
[6359]2 o . y
[6361]sim To the best of my knowledge, DCS has not engaged in any
[6363]-activity outside the CIA charter or that could be construed as
[6364]|) gllegal., Some of the functions that we perform under HR 1-13f
[6365](1) of providing operational support within the US to all ,
[6366]elements of CIA and to the USIB-member agencies, however, are
[6367]perhaps borderline or could be construed as illegal if mis-
[6369]interpreted. For example:
[6371]1. Provide personality and assessment data on certain
[6372]foreign students and ‘visiting foreign scientists and
[6374]officials.
[6376]2. Identify foreign students in the US through collection
[6377]of foroign student lists from certain universities.
[6379]3, Provide personality and assessment data on US citizens
[6380]to determine their suitability and willingness to
[6381]cooperate with the Agency.
[6383]4. Introduce cooperative US businessmen and academicians
[6384]to Agency personnel who are in alias but using CIA
[6386]credentials,
[6388]- 7 - + & Collect information on possible foreign involvement. -
[6389]\ or penetration of US dissident groups, but only ina
[6390]passive manner and only when the souree has refused
[6391]-to pass the information directly to the FBI.
[6393]“6, Collect information on the narcotics trade, but again
[6394]only in a passive manner when the source has refused to
[6395]pass the information directly -to BNDD or the FBI,
[6397]—004.8.4
[6399]NPEOITING
[6402]SE SG} friseliee
[6404]Luv. wWE PCS me
[6406]SUBJECT: ‘pes Domestic Activity
[6408]yO
[6410]%. Collect specific ‘information. and supply duplicate or
[6411]. master keys for foreign hotels,
[6413]Collect. medical information from cooperative contacts
[6414]on foreign leaders who have received medical treatment
[6415]or examinations in the US.
[6417]Obtain computer tape records of physicians practicing
[6418]in the US who have studied abroad. Although most were
[6419]foreign nationals, some were US The taped information
[6420]included school, present’ business address, date of birth,
[6421]and Specialty.
[6423]Acquire routing slips recording the fact of overseas
[6424]telephone calls between persons in the US and persons
[6425]overseas and telephone calls between two foreign points
[6426]routed through US switchboards, This activity lasted
[6427]for approximately six months but has ceased,
[6429]This information deleted because it reveals sensitive operational -
[6431]techniques and methods.
[6433]pe NJ Sil; fle
[6435]. . mF lee
[6436]! ot SANMES R. MURPHY . 7
[6437]_ to Director’, Domestic Contact Service
[6439]1 “8 ° ‘ . .
[6443]Gens tA IS Sel te eemey ee
[6445](VALET RSL | ~~ 00485
[6448]' December 1967. (We no longer iu copy.) | CO1S2
[6450]_ " SECRET ;
[6451]. . . ry EYES ONLY @
[6453]7 May 1973.
[6455]MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
[6457]VIA ; Deputy Director for Intelligence
[6458]FROM 2, Director of Current Intelligence
[6459]SUBJECT :
[6461]Activity Related to Domestic Events
[6463]1. In late spring of 1968 Walt Rostow, then an
[6464]Special Assistant to the President for National Security
[6465]Affairs, tasked the DCI with undertaking a survey of
[6466]worldwide student dissidence. Confronted. by timult at
[6467]campuses like Columbia and mindful of the violence
[6468]accompanying student outbursts at Berlin's Pree University
[6469]and clsewhere, Rostow sought to learn whether youthful
[6470]dissidence was interconnected: spawned by the same causes;
[6471]financed and hence manipulated by forces or influences
[6472]hostil‘ to the interests of the US and its allies; or likely
[6473]to come under inimical sway to the detriment of US interests.
[6475]; 2. The paper was prepared by /Paul Coracaddef] of octI
[6476]with the assistance the CA and CI Staffs. The DDI,
[6477]D/OCI, and corscadcen Inst with Rostow to elicit. the reasons
[6478]for his or the President's concerns and to agree on the
[6479]sources to be examined, the research methods to be folt owed,
[6480]etc.
[6482]3. Written during the summer of 1968, the most
[6483]Sensitive version of Restless Youth comprised two- sections.
[6484]The first was a philosophical treatment of student unrest,
[6485]its. motivation, histor, and tactics. This section drew
[6486]heavily on overt literature and FBI reporting on Students
[6487]for a Democratic Society and affiliated groups. In a sense,
[6488]the survey of dissent emerged from a shorter (30 page)
[6489]typescript study of) SDS and its foreign ties the same
[6490]author had done for Mr. Rostow at the DCi's irequest in
[6492]Caaawas ty SSS LES
[6493]soko i earns
[6495]EYES ONLY
[6498]~ on student diseont. The sensi [be
[6500]2 ‘i SECRET .
[6501]so e EYES ONLY )
[6503]4. Because of the paucity of information on foreign
[6504]student movements, it was necessary to focus on SDS which
[6505]then monopolized the field of student action here and
[6506]abroad. A second section comprised 19 country chapters--
[6507]ranging from Argentina to Yugoslavia--and stood by itself
[6508]as a@ review of foreign student dissidence.
[6510]‘5. Because SDS was a domestic organization, the
[6512]‘full paper Restless Youth, including the essay on world-
[6514]wide dissent went only to nine readers. A copy may be
[6516]_in the Johnson Library.
[6518]the President and Mr. Rostow, e DCI ]briefed the NSC
[6519]rsion subsequently
[6520]was updated and sent to the White House in February 1969.
[6522]6. Following phe paper's [tbe exper reception by’
[6524]7. The less sensitive text was disseminated in
[6525]September 1968 and then updated and issued again in
[6526]March 1969 and August 1970.
[6528]iC ( Po Wf.
[6529]Richard Lehman
[6530]Director of Current Intelligence
[6532]SECRET
[6533]EYES ONLY
[6535]00223
[6537]b Oo : ee
[6539]MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
[6541]SUBJECT: Summary, Special Programs Division (SPD),
[6542]. - O£F£ice of Communications, Operational
[6543]Contacts with Other U.S. Government Agencies
[6545]D ; |
[6546]ww, 1. Prior to 1969 thelOC CONINT intercept unit,J-
[6548]which was then in Miami, had relatively frequent contact
[6549]with the Miami bureaus of the FBI and FCC, Miami Police
[6550]and the Miami Beach Police. The staff provided support
[6551]to these activities in monitoring, identification and
[6552]DF of specific illegal agent transmissions conducted by
[6553]foreign nationals and American citizens in the greater
[6554]Miami area. _Arrangements’for this_support were made
[6556]through the @D0's C1) Chief, WH, Miami}
[6557]In late September 1972, NSA, through Division(D/ ~
[6559]ppod requested that the Special Programs. Division initiate
[6560]“a hearability survey ot certain HF long- distance commercial
[6562]telephone circuits between the U.S. and South America.
[6564]The circuits carried drug related long-distance calls of
[6565]interest.to the BNDD and other U.S. agencies. Because of
[6566]the availability of personnel and technical capabilities,
[6567]the survey was conducted at the OC Relay Station at Iden 92.
[6568]Virginia, where the circuits could be satisfactorily inter-
[6569]cepted. On 15 January 1973, formal NSA tasking of the
[6570]intercept was instituted, On 30 January 1973, all coverage
[6571]was terminated by Division D because of possible legal
[6572]complications.
[6574]3, The Chief and Deputy Chief, SPD and SPD/Special
[6575]Electronic Operations Branch have been engaged in informal
[6577]technical liaison with operating components of the FBI
[6579]for a number of years. Initial contacts and arrangements
[6580]for support of, specific activities have been made by the
[6581]Division€p/DDO} Support has been providéd in the form of
[6583]DOWNGRADED TO SECRET.
[6584]“UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT
[6586]E2 IMPDET CL By{o61947)
[6588]| SECRET auile 00240
[6589]TiAl LE ¥IA Geil, bit Hy
[6591]S. 03289/73
[6593]system was jointly conducted by NSA
[6595]b 7 a ge
[6597]exchanges of technical information on techniques,. technical
[6598]assistance and training, and the loan of(AgencyJequipnen:.
[6599]In the past several years, support has been rendered to
[6600]MGHAMSK, UNION and WUGRAVEL. Support
[6601]ORKID
[6603]sensitive FRI projects.
[6604]has been and is presently being given to FBI projects
[6605]and R@SE. These projects are described in the attached
[6607]sealed envelope.
[6609]4. An-.operational test of an NSA-developed HE
[6611]'Ppivision D/DDQ and
[6612]OC-SPD personnel in the early part of the summer of 1972.
[6613]A location in Miami Beach, Florida was selected for the
[6614]tests because of similarity to the actual target site and
[6615]environment in Saigon... Receiving antennas were placed on
[6616]the roof of the hotei being used as the receiving/DF site.
[6617]A hotel employee asked why the materiel was placed on the - |
[6618]roof. A team member in effect told him that the group j
[6619]was an advance security segment for the Democratic National
[6620]Convention. No further questions were asked; the tests
[6621]were completed and the equipment was returned to the
[6622]Washington area.
[6624]- signed Iden. 53
[6626]Chief, Special Prograns Division, OC
[6628]Att.
[6632]— TR Set MT
[6633]bi DLE NA eS Galil ELS: — GO442
[6635]- ‘
[6637]SENSITIVE
[6639]) | . 9 ,, 1973
[6641]Electronic survey of Iden 63, so i:
[6642]This operation was terminated approximately two
[6643]months ago. SPD/SEO personnel participated for
[6644]two days.
[6646]Jen 98 flooding of the cipher device employed by
[6647]the Iden 94. Embassy on their diplomatic communi- |
[6648]cation.link. SPD/SEO.support terminated two
[6649]years ago. . '
[6651]Electronic surveillance of Iden 64
[6652]Washington, D.C. SPD/SEO involved only in planning
[6653]sat this time, (attendance at two meetings).
[6655]- Electronic surveillance of Iden 62
[6656]e SPD/CHT personnel serformed an’
[6658]electronic search of the Iden 62 _.. ared” and SPD/SEO
[6659]personnel conducted a spectrum search/recording
[6660]of the spectrum covering -to-.6 GHz: during the
[6662]period 16 to 20 April 1973. Plans call for contin~
[6663]ued support by SPD in the future as requested.
[6665]Division D operation involving ‘a Ider 95 code clerk,
[6666]SEO provided ecuipment, trained case officer in
[6667]use of device and stood by in Iden 97, a
[6668]Washington, D.C., to back up case officer if needed.
[6669]The operation: took place in July 1972.
[6671]ert pHEAEMIE@ wee CeOET '
[6672]ih oct Bits Wl .
[6674]pase liddnsoke oy J
[6676]SENSITIVE
[6678]. EGUEGEE™
[6680]as SECRET UMBRA '
[6681] ) BYES ONLY . C)
[6686]7 May 1973
[6688]MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
[6690]Deputy Director for Intelligence
[6692]VIA :
[6693]FROM : Director of Current Intelligence
[6694]SUBJECT _' 4 Activity Related to Domestic Events
[6696]1. In late 1967Coct participated in the preparation s
[6697]of several short intelligence memoranda dealing with the ,
[6698]foreign connections of US orcanizations and activists in-
[6699]\\ volved in the anti-war movement. The main purpose of
[6700]C these reports, prepared at the request of the Wnite House,
[6701]was to determine whether any links existed between inter-
[6702]national Communist elements or foreign governments and the
[6703]‘American peace movement. the conclusion reached was that
[6704]there was some evidence of ad hoc contacts between. anti-
[6705]war activists at home and abroad but no evidence of
[6706]direction or formal coordination. :
[6708]2, In October 1967 President Johnson expressed
[6709]A )\ interest in this subject and ordered a high level: inter-
[6710]\ departmental survey. In response to his personal request
[6711]OY to the DCI, Mir. Helms asked the( CI Staff to collect whats
[6712]‘ever information was available through our own sources ‘and
[6713]~ thirough liaison with the FBI and to pass it to OCI, which
[6714]was dixected. to prepare a Memorandum from the ber to the
[6715]President ,. ;
[6717]3. La book message requirement was sent to all stations
[6718]to report whatever information was on hand relevant to this
[6719]subject._} Although agent reports on Communist front opera-
[6720]tions overseas were of some value, the primary source of
[6721]information on the activities of US activists--and that was
[6722]quite limited--was sensitive intercepts produced by NSA,
[6723]which had been similarly tasked by the White House.
[6726]Clacifed by corey yt
[6727]Feeagt I wn Feneral He date rot van ach fed it ‘
[6728]dott O. BS o nod
[6729]MG ; . P SECRET UMB wanCy at
[6731]- f BYES ONLY
[6733]Fs WISI FO
[6735]ora
[6737]ae wo @ He SECRET UMBRA
[6738]-- oo EYES ONLY
[6740]. yn Se A Orutt memorandum was jointly prepared by
[6741]OCI ane. CI: Staff\and forwarded to the€DCL2- He passed
[6742]\h this t;coscript memo, dated 15 November 1967, to the
[6743]. (| Presid nt personally. The White House copy is ‘now in
[6744]the fizus of Presicent Johnson's papers at the library
[6745]in Austin. oe .
[6748]‘5: Brief follow-up memoranda were prepared and
[6749]terwsieed te the White House on Zi December and 170
[6750]- Sanuez : 196@. According to our best recollection, no
[6751]furthe _ finished intelligence reports on intexnational
[6752]connec:.ions,.of the peace movement were produced.
[6754]Ne : | . il { / lo
[6756]oe, ’ Richard Lehman . ;
[6757]_ Director of Current Intelligence
[6759]362 SECRET UNBRA
[6760]oO RYES ONLY
[6762]| 0029-3
[6765]“only 2 persons so qualify. One is the wife of
[6767]have no way to separate them; we have files on
[6769]7 May 1973
[6771]MEMORANDUM FOR: O/DDI
[6773]. . oy
[6775]SUBJECT: Involvement In Domestic Affairs
[6777]‘1. This memorandum responds to the DDI's
[6778]request for a listing of any questionable .
[6779]involvements in domestic affairs. I do not believe
[6780]that CRS is doing anything that a reasonable
[6781]man could construe as improper.
[6783]2. CRS does, of course, have several programs
[6784]to acquire still pictures, movies, videotares
[6785]and books. either privately, secretly or without
[6786]acknowledgement that CIA is the actual end user.
[6787]CRS is regularly involved with Customs in looking
[6788]at the content of film cans addressed to the
[6789]Russian Fmbassy in Washington. Customs occasionally
[6790]also provides access to other film from denicd
[6791]areas. It may be eddressed to private citizens
[6792]or organizations or other embassies. These efforts
[6793]are aimed at acquisition of positive foreign
[6794]information.
[6796]3. CRS files do not generally bear on U.S.
[6797]citizens or organizations. The biographic file-
[6798]building criteria specifically excludes U.S.
[6799]nationals unless the person has become of such
[6800]major importance in the political life of a foreign
[6801]country that the file is. essential. (To my knowledge,
[6803]the opposition leader of Guvana.and the other.
[6804]is Hope Lang. Our Cuban files probably include
[6805]some persons who are now U.S. citizens but we
[6807]U.S. defectors to. Cuba. )
[6809]asuiu]
[6811]\O
[6812]ened gh Eade IMPDET CU BY.0 — 120
[6814]004 a
[6816]Zé
[6818]SUBJECT: Involvement In Domestic Affairs
[6820]4. The CIA Library has several informal
[6821]snag files intended to aid the librarians in.
[6822]answering the kinds of questions that they know
[6823]they will get on a continuing basis, An —
[6824]appointnents file is a colle tion of clippings
[6825]on appointed federal officials: who holds what
[6826]job when and what is his backaround? The extremist
[6827]files are a collection of folders on a variety
[6828]of organizations and a few people with intricate’
[6829]Organizational links. Any sort of extremism
[6830]is grist for these particular files. Anda few
[6831]persons, c.g., Rap Brown and Eldridae Cleaver,
[6832]have cGossiers consisting almost exclusively of
[6833]Clippings from-public media. These files are
[6834]unclassified and consist nostly of clippings
[6835]from the public press: U.S., foreign, underground,
[6836]scholarly. ‘
[6838]5. I am not aware of any other kind of
[6839]involvement in domestic activities that is not
[6840]related to development of techniaues or logistics
[6841]or legitimate training of CRS personnel.
[6843]foe f. fo.
[6844]/ ( fo, eee . BA i
[6845]H. C. EISENBEISS .
[6846]UAV Director, Central Reference Service y
[6848]n
[6849]mv
[6851]OQ
[6856]ae r . 6 May 1973
[6858]MEMORANDUM FOR:’ DDI
[6860]SUBJECT : Sensitive Activities
[6862]TFELYB)
[6864]1. FBIS has been engaged in no activities related to the ‘Ellsberg
[6865]and Watergate cases. * .
[6867]2. FBIS operations occasionally extend to the domestic arena. From
[6868]time to time, FBIS linguists are made available to DDO or Office of
[6869]Conmunications componeats for special operations (usually abroad) involving
[6870]close-support. SIGINT work or translation of audio take. ‘On one occasion .
[6871]recently DDO, on behalf of the FBL, requested the services of several
[6872]FBIS linguists skilled in Arabic to work directly for the FBI on a short-
[6873]term project here in Washington. The arrangements were made by Mr. Oberg
[6874]of the DDO CI Staff. He said the project was very highly classified and
[6875]that FBIS participation was approved by Mr. Colby and the Director. FBIS
[6876]participation was.approved by the Director of FBIS after a check with
[6877]the ADDI. Other examples of sensitive linguistic support .work are help
[6878]‘in the handling and resectlement of defectors, the recent assignment of
[6879]an employee to the. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs to transeribe
[6880]recordings in a rare Chinese dialect, and the detailing of another
[6881]Chinese linguist on two occasions to assist in the U.S. military training
[6882]of Chinese Nationalist cadets.
[6884]3. Within its responsibility for monitoring press agency trans-
[6886]missions for intelligence information, FBIS publishes and distributes
[6888]some material which’falls in a "gray" area of copyright protection, libel,
[6890]and privacy of international communications. Press services controlled
[6892]by national governments and transmitted by radioteletype without .
[6894]specific addressees, c.g. the Soviet TASS service and the PRC's CNA,
[6896]are monitored by FAIS and the material is disseminated without restrie—
[6898]tion. The legality of this has been affirmed by decisions of the
[6900]Office of General Counsel. However, we also monitor some in-house,
[6902]correspondent-to-headquarters dispatches which are considered private
[6904]point-to-poiat transmissions, FBIS therefore avoids public distribution of
[6906]material monitored from these circuits by labeling them with an "Official
[6908]Use Only" caveat. The sane caveat is used on material which we monitor
[6910]from other press agencies which are protected by international copyright,
[6912]e.g. Agence France Presse (AFP), the Middle East News Agency (MENA), and the
[6913]\ Iraqi Nes Agency (INA). This procedure has allowed FBIS to disseminate news
[6918][sy material for nearly three decades without problems. Recently,
[6919]however, the Office of General Counsel has ruled that an "Official Use
[6920]Only" caveat will not bar such material from the general public under
[6921]the Freedom of Information Law and we are accordingly looking into
[6922]alternative measures, among which are: (1) the purchase of news services
[6923]with rights to publish and disseminate; and (2) the classification of
[6924]those items vital to the government's business which we must continue
[6926]to monitor and report. An ultimate decision will be weigned against
[6927]the risk of present procedures. —
[6931]4. The routine FBIS monitoring of foreign radio broadcasts often
[6932]involves statements or speeches made by U.S. citizens using those radio
[6933]facilities. Examples are statements made or allegedly made by American
[6934]Pow's in Hanoi, by Jane Fonda in Hanoi and by Ramsey Clark in Vietnan.
[6935]‘At the request of FBI and the Department of Justice, and with the
[6936]approval of the CIA Office of General Counsel, we have on occasion sub-
[6937]jmitted trauscripts of such broadcasts to the Department of Justice as
[6938]jpart of that Department's consideration of a possible trial, In such
[6939]jcases, ve have been required to submit names of FBIS monitors involved,
[6940]|presumably because of the possibility they might be required as witnesses.
[6941](In one case in 1971, an FBIS staff employee was directed to appear as
[6942]an expert witness in the court-martial of a Marine. enlisted-man charged
[6943]with aiding the enemy in a broadcast from Hanoi.) FBIS views all- this
[6944]with misgivings. Monitoring of such broadcasts is incidental and we
[6945]‘}rue attribution. of their news to FSIS, and. we should not be considered
[6947]policemen maintaining surveillance of traveling Americans.
[6949]5. FBIS is an overt organization, but one aspect of its operations
[6950]is under Department of Commerce cover. The Joint Publications Research
[6951]Service (JPRS) was established in 1957 to provide the means through which
[6952]great volumes of material from unclassified foreign publications could
[6953]be translated by large numbers of independent contractors in the United
[6954]States on a piece rate basis. Contractors are not witting of’ their CIA
[6955]employment. This use of cover is an anomaly in FBIS and contains some
[6956]risk of embarrassment to the Agency and to Commerce if it becomes public
[6957]knowledge, The surfacing of JPRS was given study in 1969, but after
[6958]consideration of all the pros and cons it was decided at the Executive
[6960]Director-Comptroller level not to proceed at that time. FBIS is presently |
[6961]taking a sccond look,
[6963]fcneds
[6964]Ev H. Licoe a
[6966]Director
[6967]Foreign Broadcast Information Service
[6971]SECRET
[6973]RUAL 00203
[6974]CEI
[6978]= 8 May 1973
[6982]MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Science & Technology
[6983]SUBJECT . : TSD Support to Other Agencies
[6984]1. Technical Services Division's chartgr (CSI 1-8) requires
[6986]that it provide technical assistance to both}CIA operations and
[6987]other activities as may be dir ected by the Deputy. Director for
[6989]“Operations. J
[6991]2, Over the years the(,chief non-CIA yecipients. of this
[6992]support have been the Department of Defense, the Federal
[6993]Bureau of Investigation, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous
[6994]Drugs, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department
[6995]of State, United States Postal Service, Secret Service, Agency
[6996]for International Development, and the White House.
[6998]3. While varying widely among the different recipients, these
[6999]services have included training and materials, and in a few in-
[7000]stances participation in the fields of audio and visual surveillance,
[7001]secret writing and related ‘communications, personal protection,
[7003]; disguise,
[7004]concealment devices, electronic beaconry, illicit narcotics detec-
[7005]tion, and counter~sabotage/terrorism.
[7007]. 4. In most instances requirements for this support are
[7008]received by TSD through higher echelons (Office of the Director
[7009]or Deputy Director for Operations). Unless the service involved
[7010]is a trivial or continuing one, the request is referred to the
[7011]Foreign Intelligence Staff Departmental Coordination Group for
[7012]coordination and approval at the appropriate Agency levels.
[7013]Approval within TSD by the Chief of Operations or Development
[7014]and Engineering and the Chief of TSD or his Deputy alsois re-~
[7015]quired.
[7017]5. The attachment lists the primary services 5 provided to
[7018]the organizations named in Paragraph two.
[7020]“ CK ‘82 IMPDET
[7021]OY [| CL BY 059098
[7023]SECRET %. (00845
[7028]This information deleted because it reveals sensitive operational
[7030]techniques and methods,
[7032]Kok, Provision of forged documentation to non-DDO requesters,
[7034]whether they bd. GIA or other Agency requesters, always‘requires
[7035]approval of non-TSD offices. Support to the military for instance
[7036]would be validated by FI Staff/Departmental Coordination Group
[7037]Xt Headquarters or by theCOS loverseas having responsibility for
[7038]coordination of the operation. BNDD requests are coordinated
[7039]with DDO/NARCOG Requests for documentation of Immigration
[7040]and Naturalization Service is coordinated via the Alien Affairs
[7041]Staff.
[7043]9. Authentication items are issued on a loan basis and must
[7044]‘be returned to TSD or accounted for. After any documentation has
[7045]been issued, TSD retains photographs and records of such support
[7046]until the documentation has been returned to TSD, If the material
[7047]is not returned after a reasonable time, the requester is reminded
[7048]of the outstanding documentation.
[7051]. L477 - (o gle
[7052]AMA Loe
[7054]. . . Be te. ooh.
[7055]Attachment . * Sidney Gottlieb |
[7056]Distribution: a Chief
[7057]O& 1+ Addressee, w/att Technical Services Division
[7061]re CEPDET ae
[7064]} arrac (ent .
[7066]Department of Defense
[7070]Documents, disguise, concealment devices, secret writing,
[7071]flaps and sealsy counterinsurgency and counter sabotage courses
[7073]. have been furnished to all intelligence elements of the Department
[7074]of Defense and certain elements. of the Special Forces, All requests
[7075]are coordinated with the FI Departmental Coordination Group at
[7076]Headquarters and with the(Chief of Stations)overseas. In turn
[7077]these elements furnished TSD with exemplars of foreign identities
[7078]documents, foreign cachets, foreign intelligence secret writing
[7079]systems, foreign intelligence concealment devices. (Selected , oo.
[7080]audio requirements have been furnished overseas for CI -type -
[7081]cases.
[7083]Federal: Bureau of Investi gation
[7085]At the request of the FBI we cooperate with the Bureau |
[7086]in a few audio surveillance operations against sensitive forcign ;
[7087]targets in the United States. -
[7089]| Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs
[7091]a bs) Beacons, cameras, audio and telephone devices for
[7092]le? overseas operations, identity documents, car-trailing devices,
[7093]KW . SRAC, flaps and seals and training of selected personnel
[7095]/) responsiblé for use thereof has been furnished this Bureau.
[7097]All requirements are sent to. DDO/NARCOG/for coordination
[7098]with area divisions and for action by TSD if appropriate.
[7099]Requests overseas are coordinated with th€:COS)or his
[7100]designee before action by TSD is taken.
[7102]Immigration and Naturalization
[7104](er analyses of foreign passports and visas, guidance in
[7105]developing tamperproof alien registration cards, ‘special
[7106]fluorescent stamp inks have been furnished the Service) Requests
[7107]are forwarded directly to TSD for coordination within TSD if
[7108]technical, with the FI Departmental Coordination Group if oper-
[7109]ational, ~ . f i
[7111]: . Poo
[7113]SECRET © nay
[7116]x
[7118]Department of State
[7120]Technical graphics guidance on developing a new United
[7121]States Passport, analyses of foreign passports, car-armoring
[7123]and personnel locators (beacons) for Ambassadors have been
[7125]supplied the State Department, In addition analyses and
[7126]exposure of black letter operations against the United States
[7127]abroad are made, All graphics requirements are forwarded
[7128]to TSD for further coordination within the Division, The
[7129]Department of State furnishes exemplars of foreign passports,
[7130]foreign visas andin the past passports on a priority basis.
[7132]' Postal Service
[7134]The Office of Chief Postal Inspector has had selected
[7135]personnel attend basic surveillance photographic courses, has
[7136]been furnished foreign postal information and has been the
[7137]recipient of letter bomb analyses, furnished special fluorescent
[7138]ink, typewriter analyses, Requirements are coordinated with
[7139]thesDDO and DDO/EA,) The Post Office has furnished TSD
[7141]with exemplars of letter bombs and mail insertion capabilities
[7143]for CA material destined for foreign countries. We also have
[7144]an arrangement with the Post Office to examine and reinsert
[7146]a low volume of certain foreign mail arriving in the United States.
[7148]Secret Service
[7150]Gate passes, security passes, passes for Presidential
[7151]campaign, emblems for Presidential vehicles; a secure ID
[7153](
[7155]photo system have been furnished this Service. Blanket approval
[7157]for graphics support has been granted to the Deputy Director for
[7158]Operations. In each case TSD requests approval from the'DDO.
[7160]U.S. Agency for International Development
[7162]We furnish instructors to a USAID-sponsored Technical
[7163]Investigation Course (Counter Terror) at Los Fresnos Border,
[7164]‘Patrol Academy, Los Fresnos, Texas. Instructors are under
[7166]Department of the Army cover and the funding of our participation
[7167]is under an approval of a Cl-Police Group project. Courses are
[7169]given Spring and Fall each year. Instruction is given at the
[7171]rT Sa oP : 9)
[7172]. t
[7173]a)
[7176]Ont
[7178]X
[7181]request of ct/?G) Yrainees represent internal security or
[7182]national police from all countries participating in AID Police
[7183]assistance programs.
[7185]White House
[7186]‘Stationery, special memoranda, molds of the Great
[7187]Seal have been furnished the Social Secretary, The Deputy
[7189]Director for Operations is apprised of these xequireme nts.
[7191]Police Respresenting Washington, Arlincton, Fairfax and
[7192]Alexandria
[7194]During the period 1968 - 1969 a series of classes
[7195]reflecting basic and surveillance photography, basic audio,
[7196]‘locks and picks, countersabotage and surreptitious entry
[7197]were given to selected members from the above mentioned
[7198]cities. Overall training was approved by thel Director of
[7199]Genteral Intelligencejand in turn validation was required for
[7200]each course from the Director of Security. -
[7203]SEO UILY
[7204]sf f
[7206]ROUTING AND RECORD SHEE
[7208], SUBIECT: (Optional . ; ® 4 ous . |
[7209]NO, . : |
[7212]5
[7214]i
[7216]FROM: + EXTENSION
[7217]Sidney Gottlieb . -
[7218]Chief, TSD © '
[7220]203 South Buildin
[7222]YO: (Officer dasignotion, room number, ond
[7223]building)
[7225]DATE
[7227]x-2831 8 May 1973
[7229]OFFICER'S COMMENTS (Number éach comment to show from wtem
[7231]| seceved | ronwatoeo | INITIALS to whom, Draw o lina across column offer escn comment) j
[7233]Attached herewith are addition: i
[7234]explanations of TSD support to
[7235]other U.S. Government agencies,
[7237]ERNE EAN et 18 ue a ee
[7239]. Qe Ey TTA gry
[7241]Sed Pe Pe “yd
[7242]nie aed ee) Catad
[7244]O9RZ90
[7247]w
[7249]Be
[7250]= -
[7251]“4
[7252]'
[7255].
[7257]for USE OP Ev: se : he ree TE at een
[7258]sor GTO SES CJ secret «=O conriventiak =) WS. 0 C) uncLassiriza
[7260]ATTACHMENT |
[7262]= FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
[7264]TSD has had a close: working relationship with the FBI over
[7265]the past few years. The FBI is the only organization that has
[7266]been fully briefed on TSD audio techniques and equipment. The
[7267]following are situations where TSD equipment and guidance were
[7268]involved in operations: ,
[7270](A)
[7272](B)
[7274]Idéntity 59. ' - Four masked transmitters were
[7275]installed. Two have failed and two remain workable.
[7277]Identity 60  - A TSD built masked transmitter
[7279]_ wWas-installed to collect emanations from a crypto-
[7281]ae (09)
[7283](D)
[7285]. graphic machine. The system continues to function
[7287]when samples of the emanations are needed.
[7289]Identity 61 - Two transmitters have been
[7290]installed and are operating. One is specifically
[7291]designed to collect the sounds of typewriting, the
[7292]other is a straight audio transmitter to collect con-
[7293]versations. A FBI agent is manning the listening
[7295]‘ post. A third system _ is not oper-
[7297]ating, probably due to battery expiration, The tape.
[7298]made from this room was made‘by the Nationa
[7299]Security Agency before failure. . '
[7301]Identity 62 - TSD furnished equipment and con-
[7302]sultation covering Identity 62
[7304]First masked switched trans-
[7305]mitters were used in two apartments used as tempor--
[7307]“ary quarters, Later masked switched transmitters
[7309]and microwave transmitters were installed in the
[7310]permanent quarters along with mic and wire installa-
[7311]tions, entirely furnished by the Bureau. This install-
[7312]ation is not fully operational because the full comple-
[7313]ment of personnel have not yet arrived.
[7315]- poo,
[7316]SECRET doz
[7319]he
[7321](E) | - This is an operation -
[7322]participation by National Security Agency. Itis
[7323]_ designed in anticipation of the Identity 64
[7325], in Washington. The listening post was
[7327]obtained by usinglthe Agency coverf.mechanisms |
[7328]for procuring the property. New systems are
[7329]being designed and produced by using TSD's covert
[7330]contractor mechanisms and TSD engineers.
[7332](F) Identity 65 . - Ten masked audio devices pur-
[7333]chased fram TSD were installed in Identity 65
[7335]by the FBI. Part of the equipment was install.
[7336]ed in November and December 1971, the remaining
[7337]equipment was installed 17.- 25 March 1972. Tests
[7338]made by a TSD officer from a temporary. FBI
[7339]listening post on 8 - 9 November 1972, proved that
[7340]the target equipment no longer functioned and was
[7341]_ believed discovered by the occupants,
[7343](G) TSD has furnished equipment items which constitute
[7344]an on-thé-shelf capability to engage in photo and ,
[7345]audio surveillance operations which might not be
[7346]known to the Agency. In one case it is known that a
[7347]relatively unsophisticated device was used against
[7348]a domestic target.
[7350]COR
[7353]~ _ [. 8D/SDB, Meno save-73.J
[7355]‘8 May 1973
[7356]- .
[7357]"MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, TSD
[7358]ATTENTION: Executive officer
[7359]SUBJECT: Contacts with Domestic Police Organizations _
[7361]i... In December 1968, July 1969 and December 1970, SDB
[7362]provided basic countersabotage familiarization training for
[7363]selected members of the Washington metropolitan area police
[7364]departments. The training was given at the Fairfax County
[7365]police pistol and rifle range. Authorization for the train-
[7366]ing came from DDP and Chief, Office of Security.
[7368]_ 2. On occasion during the past few years, under the
[7369]auspices of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration of
[7370]the Department of Justice and with the approval of CI Staff
[7371]and Office of Security, SDB provided training and familiari-
[7372]zation. to police officers of several domestic police
[7373]departments in the uses of the Explosives Residue Detection
[7374]Technique and Trace Hetals Detection Technique. These tech-
[7375]niques had been declassified and are currently available to
[7377]e law enforcement community. The National Bomb Data Center
[7378]publishes periodic guidance in their uses.
[7380]3. In order to augment the SDB mission responsibilities .
[7381]in.the field of countersabotage and counterterror, SDB offi-
[7382]cers have in the past two years visited, under appropriate
[7383]covers, the explosives disposal units of the New York City
[7384]police department, Dade County (Hiami) Florida Dept. and the
[7385]Los Angeles Police Dept. Also, in March 1973,-two SDB offi-
[7386]cers attended the Explosives and Ordnance Disposal Conference
[7387]in Sacramento,. California, sponsored by LEAA, When the
[7388]recent Letter bomb menace began in September 1972, our liaison
[7389]with the NYCPD bomb squad paid off in that we had complete in-
[7390]formation on letter bomb construction in hours, enabling the: “
[7391]Agency to make worldwide dissemination within a day. ,
[7395]cout c/tsp/ors/s a)
[7397]i : \ vhs fee
[7399]EQVIMPUET/CL BY. 96233)
[7402]E
[7404]ORD- 2328-73 —
[7405]9 MAY 1973
[7407]7 ae
[7409]MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Science and.
[7410]; Technology
[7412]SUBJECT He Repeated Survey of ORD for Non- \
[7413]Foreign Intelligence Activities )}
[7415]The 7 May survey has been repeated and refined —
[7416]with respect to alllORD servicesSor dealings with
[7417]other agencies on domestic, non-forcign matters. In
[7418]addition, this report covers all our activities deal-
[7419]ing with the rescarch and development of intelligence
[7420]equipment for foreign use which has been tested in
[7421]the United States and might have collected domestic
[7422]information. Again, each member of{-ORDS available
[7423]today was asked cither directly or through his super-
[7424]visor to provide the above requested information,
[7425]whether he was directly involved or not. We have
[7426]used all diligence to search our records available
[7428]to us during this time period to ensure this is a
[7429]complete and factual list.
[7431]ae yb Vie
[7432]Lee
[7434]Director of Research § Development
[7436]Attachments:
[7437]-l - Contacts with Other
[7438]Governmént Agencies’
[7440]2 - Domestic Tests
[7442]reyares
[7447]COULD OR HAVE RESULTED IN USE OF CIA-DEYELOPED i
[7448]TECHNOLUGY IN ADDRESSING DOMESTIC PROBLEMS
[7450].
[7451]ae CONTACTS WITH O:: U.S. GOVERNMENT acess WHICH
[7453]Executive Office of the President.
[7455]{\\ b .ORD represents DD/S&T on the R&D Sub-Committee
[7456]AX of the Cabinet Committee for International Narcotics
[7457]Oo . ‘ Control that is concerned with research support of
[7458]the narcotics control problem.
[7460](Dr. Leonard Laster, OST) (Cianci/LS)
[7462]|
[7464]Office of Telecommunications Policy
[7466]Technical surveillance countermeasures and
[7467]physical security information was exchanged with
[7468]them.
[7470](Noe/TA)
[7471]Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) _
[7473]Techniques and equipment for navigation and
[7474]tracking was discussed with BNDD.
[7476](Mr. Charles Gaskin, BNDD) (Van Dewerker/TA)
[7477]an ae . (Noe/TA)
[7478]Technical information was exchanged relating:
[7479]to the development of simple, portable sensor systems
[7480]for the detection of concealed bulk narcotics and
[7481]narcotic laboratory effluents.
[7483]" (Mr. John Gunn ands- ‘.- (Parker/DSP)
[7484]’ Mr. Bill Butler, BNDD) . ae
[7486]Audio tapes were processed to improve their
[7487]intelligibility. The source of the ‘tapes was unknown,
[7489](Mr. Charles Gaskin, BNDD) ; (Scott/An)
[7490]YN , ' .
[7491]. 7 . 0022
[7492]SEG al + ATTACHMENT 1
[7494]“SECRET
[7496]ae ; SUBJECT: Con@ts With Other U.S. Govc@y ent Agencies
[7498]ay Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of. CIA-
[7499]/\ \\y ‘Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic
[7500](\ . Problems
[7502]BNDD (cont'd)
[7504]to receive proposals from Aerospace, Inc., concerning
[7505]a Radar People Detector developed for. ORD.}
[7507]” 8. t BNDD was given'permission in the fall of 1972
[7509](Mr. Charles Gaskin, BNDD) ° Identity 125 /LS)
[7511]A prototype bioluminescence sensor was developed
[7512]for the detection of narcotics for application in
[7513]Southeast Asia. BNDD was given a demonstration of
[7514]the instrument.
[7516](Dr. Laster/OST) : (erek/1s)
[7517](Mr. Stan Sobel, BNDD) . _
[7519]USIB Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Committee
[7521]Continuing contacts were maintained with the
[7522]intelligence community regarding technical surveillance
[7523]countermeasurs and physical security. This exchange
[7524]of information, reports, and cquipment has been con-
[7525]ducted under the auspices of USIB TSCC and involves
[7526]State, FBI, Secret Service, NSA, DIA, Army, AF, and
[7527]Navy. : oy .
[7529] (Noe/TA)
[7530](Noyes/PD) °
[7532]’ State Department
[7534]‘Two contracts for development. of countermeasures
[7535]techniques were funded jointly with the State Department.
[7537](Noe/TA) ,
[7539]SECREE ok
[7541]XM
[7543]* SUBJECT: Contacts With Other U.S. Government Agencies
[7544]Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-
[7546]Developed Technology. in Addressing Domestic
[7547]. Problems
[7549]Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)
[7551]Some of the AEC Laboratories, e.g., Savannah
[7552]River Laboratory, are supported by CIA to develop
[7553]radio nuclide sampling and detection techniques and
[7554]devices. These Laboratories have used sampling - if}
[7555]techniques developed for CIA to measure CONUS nuckear//
[7556]~ plant releases, .
[7558](Mr. B. Benson, AEC) - (Walker/DSP)
[7560]At the request of AEC Security Officer, Mr. Richard
[7561]Cowan, the walls of the. office of the Chairman of the ;
[7562]AEC (then Mr. Schlesinger) were X-rayed. The operation
[7563]occurred one evening and was an attempt to resolve some
[7564]anomalies created by the use of the non-linear junction
[7565]detector. ,
[7567](Mr.. Richard Cowan, AEC) (Noyes /PD)
[7569]Law Enforcement Assistance Agency (LEAA) _-
[7571]Reports and information about the ORD- developed
[7572]Adhesive Restraint, Non-Lethal Incapacitation System
[7573]were made available. to Department of Justice, LEAA in '
[7574]| August 1972. If they developed the system, it would |
[7575]| be used for civilian crowd and riot control. _
[7577]Mr. Les Schubin, LEAA) Identity 125 /LS)
[7579]’ Technical surveillance countermeasures’ and physical —
[7581]security infcrmation were exchanged with LEAA.
[7583](Noe/TA)
[7586]eo 6
[7588], . SUBJECT: Contacts With Other U.S. Government Agencies
[7589]4 b Which Could or Have Resulted In Use off CIA-
[7591]WP Lo Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic
[7593]a Problems
[7595]Treasury
[7597]OO Dr. Leahy is being detailed to Treasury Department
[7598]to @¥sist in formulating their R&D program and organization
[7599]/ in anticipation of the establishment of the new drug
[7601])
[7603]_ enforcenent administration, J The request for his services”
[7604]was made by Identity3, | the Agency's Narcotics Coordi-
[7605]- nator. Identity 3 discussed the request and cleared the
[7606]‘detailing through Mr. Colby.
[7609]Cx
[7611](Leahy/LS)
[7613]Custons /Treasury Department
[7615]Technical discussions were held with Customs relating
[7616]to detecting illicit nighttime aircraft intrusions over
[7617]the U.S.-Mexico border.
[7619](Mr. Martin Pera, Customs) (Lawrence /DSP)
[7621]Alcohol & Tobacco Tax Div/TRS
[7623]Z| ¥ Cavout five years ago, assistance was requested in
[7624]ee ‘domestic search of “moonshine” stills using CIA infrared
[7626]Dy scanners. This was turned down. J
[7628]C'
[7630]' - Sectet Service
[7632](Lavrence/DsP)
[7634]We have had numerous discussions with the Secret
[7635]' : Service regarding navigation and tracking techniques
[7636]and equipment.
[7638]4
[7639](Van Dewerker/TA)
[7641]00232
[7644]SUBJECT: a With Other U.S. cov@ncnt Agencies
[7645]Which-Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-
[7646]Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic
[7648]‘Problems -
[7650]Federal Aviation Agency (FAA)
[7652]The results of our research work in the detection
[7653]of metals (NOLIR) were.reported to FAA for possible use
[7654]in the detection of hijacker weapons.
[7656](MacAnlis/RP)
[7658]SD
[7662]At the request “ofl ORT, OCs assigned a staff technician
[7663]to undertake to write a computer program for the Wisswesser
[7664]Line Notation. (WLN) chemical notation method. This work was
[7666]done jin cooperation with NIH.
[7668](Ms. Coniver, NIH) | Identity 125 /LS)
[7670]Arms Control and Disarmanent Agency (ACNA)
[7672]; S/ORDInet frequently with ACDA personnel in order
[7673]to s ructure (QRD's}BW/CW research programs to support
[7674]ACDA needs. ’
[7676]‘Identity 125 /LS)
[7678]’ Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
[7680]Technical information relating to detection of
[7681]radio nuclides in the environment was exchanged with
[7683]then.
[7685](Mr. Charles Weaver, EPA) === = ~———s (Wa ker /DSP)
[7687])
[7688]00233
[7690]Cate b. ty .
[7693]“49
[7695]. 1
[7696]BU oatn
[7698]SUBJECT: contMes With Other U.S. cove Ment Agencies
[7699]Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of (CIA-
[7700]Developed| Technology 4 in Addressing Domestic
[7701]Problems
[7703]EPA (cont'd)
[7705]. Technical discussions relating to using IR scanning
[7706]equipment to detect underground fires in a sanitary land
[7707]fill have been conducted.,.
[7709](Mr. Gene James, EPA) (Risinger/DSP)
[7711]Federal Bureau of Investigation
[7713]At their request, we described Imagery Enhancement
[7714]techniques germane to removing distortions from some
[7715]photography they had on an alleged bank robber. Request
[7716]for specific Support. in processing the imagery was turned
[7718]own.
[7720]- (Stephan/IPA)
[7722]Secret Service
[7724]“YTS. Customs so
[7726]Mr. C.V. Noyes' total contact with other agencies
[7727]in terms of assistance with domestic operations has be2n
[7728]in the field of audio surveillance countermeasures, anti-
[7730]hijacking, or drugs.
[7732](Mr. Robert Burnell, SS) (Noyes/PD)
[7733](Mr. Thomas Allen, FBI)
[7734]’ (Mr. Martin Pera, Customs)
[7736]"NASA and USDA (Agency association is classified SECRET)
[7737]We have an on-going program, Project TAMPER, to
[7739]‘develop automated systems for exploiting satellite- -borne
[7740]multispectral sensors for earth Tesources assessments.
[7742](Mr. William Ruble, USDA) ; (Galinaitis/1PA)
[7743](Mr. Leonard’ Jaffe, NASA) m oo
[7744](General Smart) i
[7746]6 2 00234
[7751]SUBJECT: Contacts With Other U.S. Government Agencies
[7752]Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-
[7753]. Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic
[7754]Problems . ; ;
[7756]Erepeses. Use of NASA ERTS Satellite (Agency association
[7757]would be SECRET)
[7759]Che Agency is preparing a proposal for an experi-
[7760]- mental program to aid in estimating the Soviet wheat
[7761]crop, A part of the information would be obtained from
[7762]a satellite launched for other announced programs. Ground-
[7763]truth data will be collected on North American crops. 7.
[7765](Briglia/PAS)
[7767]U.S. Department of Agriculture and Bureau of Narcotics
[7768]an aAnecerous rugs
[7770]-CIA has requested the establishment of a two-acre
[7771]<plot of opium poppies at a USDA research site in Washington
[7772]~ state, to be used for tests of photo-recognition of opium
[7774]Poppies.
[7776](Mr. Quentin Jones, USDA) (Lawrence/DSP)
[7777](Mr. Fred Garfield, BNDD) , (Cianci/LS)
[7779]Army, Military Police Agency, Ft. Gordon
[7780]Air Force, Orfice of the Inspector General
[7781]Army, ( al
[7783]rrice of rrovost Marsnal General
[7785]We have exchanged technical surveillance counter-
[7786]measures and physical security information with them.
[7788](Noe/TA)
[7790]penny S. Arm , ,
[7791]oc ay Rocky Nountain Arsenal, Newport Army Ammunition Plant,
[7793]joelle Ordnance Depot
[7794]oy LS/ORD tested environmental samples from testing,
[7795]storage and Production facilities in the U. S.
[7797]\ Identity 124LS)
[7799]7 ~  QQ235
[7802]4
[7804]Sd
[7806]-
[7808]. SUBJECT: con Wes With Other U.S. cove Oncnt Agencies
[7810]Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-
[7811]Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic
[7812]° . Problems "
[7814]ULS. Army, Edgewood Arsenal . . r
[7816](_us/orp)is sharing expenses with EA in field testing
[7817]an IR remote detector of CW aerosols,’
[7819]Identity 125 /L,S)
[7821]U.S. Navy
[7823]ssp/orpJewrnea over “about eight trained dolphins
[7824]to the Navy in December 1969, because we discontinued
[7825]our dolphin Program.
[7827]~~ Cynch/1s)
[7829]U.S. Coast Guard
[7831]About six years azo[ CIA infrared. equipment Was.
[7832]made available for USCG Sts to evaluate IR as a means -
[7834].for night search of life boats.
[7836](then-Lt. James McIntosh, USCG) tawreceo/0se)".
[7838]Identity 174 ‘Sheriff's Office
[7839](corp conducted polygraph tests on all applicants.
[7840]Polygraph security findings were compared with the
[7841]Sheriff's own security findings. |
[7842](Sheriff) ; oo : = Identity 125 /LS)
[7844]A study was made on con-men techniques and assess-
[7845]ment methods in 1967- 68,
[7847]. (Sheriff) a \ tdentity 125/18)
[7850]SUBJECT: Contacts With Other U.S. Government Agencies
[7851]Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-
[7852]Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic.
[7853]Problems
[7855]‘Chief, San Francisco Police
[7857]; For security: reasons, the Chief was made aware of
[7858]@ Study to evaluate attempts by non- ~Chiense to penetrate
[7859](1967)
[7861]Chinese social groups.
[7863](Police Chief)
[7865]Identity 125/LS)
[7867]4° 00Ra7
[7870]NU oo DOMESTIC TESTS FOR . .
[7871]ye AGENCY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS
[7873], 1.'.AS a normal part of ORD's efforts in the
[7874]research and development of equipment and techniques
[7875]for Agency applications in foreign intelligence, we
[7876]conduct experiments and ‘tests in the United States.
[7877]Clearly,.the design and development of our intelli-
[7878]. gence equipments can be done more economically and
[7879]more securely in this country. Although most of
[7880]the tests of our R&D equipments are performed in
[7881]closed laboratories or in secure arcas simulating
[7882]the foreign environment, some of the tests and experi-.
[7883]ments, of necessity, reveal domestic information.
[7885].. @. A review of the surveillance equipment or
[7886]techniques which have at some time or other: been
[7887]exposed to domestic testing is as follows:
[7889]a. tkLaser Probe - About 1967, the laser
[7890]probe developed by ORD was tested by TSD in
[7891]San Francisco under very closely controlled
[7892]conditions. The ORD Project Officer witnessed
[7893]portions of the test. Recordings. that were
[7894]-made of laser probe output were carefully
[7895];controlled as. classified material and it is
[7897]“ believed that the tanes have long since been
[7898]destroyed. (Wood/TA) :
[7900]bs Microwave: Intercept System - About
[7902]1968, this system vas tes:ed in a light air-
[7903]craft near the Naval Ordnance Test Station . ‘
[7904]in Identity 127:, California. This system is
[7905]designed to permit intercept of microwave
[7906]telephone communication channels of systems
[7907]Such as Identity 130 oe - (It
[7908]works equally well against the Bell Telephone
[7909]TD-2, as they are generically the same. Re-
[7910]cordings of these telephone intercepts were
[7911]carefully controlled and were destroyed several
[7912]years ago. _
[7914]eran: ATTACHMENT 2.
[7915]CebstS iste d ‘ .
[7917]09238
[7920]SUBJECT: von Ceic Tests for Agency reMerch and
[7921]-~ Development Efforts a
[7923]- -€. Telephone Intrusion Study - The objec-.
[7924]tive of this current program is to develop a
[7925]means-to utilize foreign telephone systems as
[7926]a communication link without the knowledge of
[7927]the host system. In order to carry out this
[7928]objective, it is necessary to learn the com-
[7929]plete supervisory signalling and sequencing
[7930]control system hierarchy for the various foreign
[7931]telephone systems. Many of these are patterned
[7932]after the U.S. system and, for this reason,
[7933]limited monitoring to test the operation of
[7934]intercept equipment’ in the United States is
[7935]Planned. ‘The data to be collected would be.
[7936]merely the signal tones from which supervisory
[7937]codes can be extracted. Message content is
[7938]of no interest and will not be recorded. Over-
[7939]seas testing is planned at a subsequent date.
[7940]To date, some domestic testing of this concept
[7941]has been carried out at the contractor's plant.
[7942]No recordings have been made of such data. Ex-
[7943]tremely brief tests exercising U.S. and forcign
[7944]telephone systems through supervisory tone sig-
[7945]nalling have been carried out to verify initial
[7946]concepts. The duration of testing was less
[7947]than one-half hour.
[7949]d.. Other Sensor Testing - Examples of
[7951]' engineering development tests of special sensors
[7952]Within the United States include infrared and
[7954]high-altitude photography, forward-looking IR
[7955](FLIR) flights, laser scanners, industrial efflu-
[7956]ent sampling for isotopes, and airborne magne-
[7957]tometer surveys for metal (rifles and trucks).
[7959]In al] these cases, the data output of such
[7961].testing has been used for engineering develop- -
[7963]ment and the content has been restricted to
[7964]dissemination to those in Government involved
[7965]with the engineering design.
[7968]SUBJECT: Domegkic Tests for Agency Resdirch and
[7969]Devd@pment Efforts :
[7971]’ e. Remote Physiological Measurements -
[7972]An ORD-developéd cryogenic magnetometer is
[7973]being tested at a contractor's site for use
[7974]as a remote cardiograph (magnetocardiograph),
[7975]Some test subjects are witting, but most tests
[7976]are on naive subjects (they do not know they
[7977]are being tested). The magnetometer is com-
[7978]pletely harmless to the subject and the test
[7979]results are closely held.
[7981]£. Personality Structure of Defectors
[7982]Study - ORD undertook to determine the per-
[7983]sonality structure of defectors during the
[7984]period 1966-69. The work primarily involved
[7985]an analysis of the open literature on known
[7986]defectors. An ancillary effort was concerned
[7987]with. a study of the phenomenon of defection
[7988]itself, i.e., leaving one religion for another,
[7989]or changing one set of political beliefs for
[7990]another. The work was conducted at Stanford
[7991]University. Identity 125/LS) —
[7993]g. Trained Birds - Birds have been trained
[7994]and tested in the United States to carry small
[7995]intelligence collecting packages such as audio
[7996]surveillance devices, small cameras, and cur-
[7997]rent measuring devices. Any data collected
[7998]from unwitting domestic sources would have been
[8000]', used only for engineering purposes and then
[8001]' destroyed. .
[8003]h. Communications Link Loading Study - In.
[8004]the period from IS70 through 1972 various means
[8005]were used to check out an intercept system designed ||
[8006]to operate against Iden 93 communications links, :
[8007]Under carefully centrolled conditions, some U. S.
[8008]microwave communications were recorded and passed
[8009]through the intercept system under test to prove
[8010]quality of performance. All intercept material
[8011]connected with this was destroyed within a few weeks
[8012]of the time of intercept and the material was never
[8013]checked for substantive content. NSA participated
[8014]and controlled most elements of the U. S. material;--~|:
[8018]. _ ; ,
[8019]. ‘ .
[8020]. - e GU aes . .
[8021]* " G q
[8023]-~ . .
[8024]i ‘ . ‘
[8026]-7 May 1973
[8028]see? . : | [or-2274-73)
[8030]MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Science and
[8031]oo Technology
[8033]SUBJECT’ os Survey of ORD for Non-Foreign
[8034]Intelligence Activities
[8036]At 11 a.m. today, each division and staff chief
[8037]or his representative was instructed to query all of
[8038]his people and report back by this afternoon whether
[8039]or not they had provided any services or dealt with
[8040]any other agencies on domestic, non-foreign matters.
[8041]‘The. attached list is an inventory of all items we
[8042]were able to uncover. If additional information on
[8043]any of these topics is desired, we can provide either
[8045]. @ verbal or a written report on very short notice.
[8046]iN Ch. ED ines
[8048]Ca E. McGinnis:
[8049]Director of Research & Developnent
[8052]Scientific Advisor
[8053]As stated
[8055]SPITS
[8057]ot a aah
[8059]CLASSIE(ER Z it
[8064]. Sept | a Pe
[8066](Gales nigos ate, hteest cate or events
[8071]“
[8075]Cpt TAMPER, an on- going program which may be
[8077]politically sensitive. ]
[8079]A proposed OER wheat estimate program which may be
[8080]politically sensitive.
[8082](isregties som foreign activities are. yell known
[8083]45° n DDS&T._} .
[8085]A negative report from the Support Staff.
[8087][oes NOLIR “york was ‘reported to the FAA about |
[8088]| three years ago. No action was taken, to our knowledgeuc
[8090]Robert Scott - Performed sntetiighbsaiey enhancement VY
[8091]of audio tapes for BNDD. Source of tapes unknown.
[8093]James M. Stephan - At the request of FBI, we described
[8094]Imagery Enhancement Techniques germane to renoving
[8095]distortions from’ some photography they had on an
[8096]alleged bank ‘robber.. Request for specific support
[8098]in processing the imagery was turned down. —
[8102]7 May 197
[8104]C. V. NOYES
[8106]7)
[8108]. My total contact with other agencies in terms of assistance
[8110]with domestic operations has’ been in the field of audio sur-
[8112]veillance countermeasures, anti-hijacking, or drugs. Speci-
[8114]fically, I participated in TSCC and R&D Subcommittee meetings
[8115]“which included technology..exchanges and some equipment ex-
[8116]changes on a temporary -basis ostensibly for testing or trial.
[8117]“I also assisted in x-raying the office walls of the Chairman
[8118]of the AEC (then Mr. Schlesinger) at the request of Mr. Richard
[8119]Cowan of AEC Security. The operation occurred one evening
[8120](date unknown) and was an attempt to resolve some anomalies
[8121]created by the use of the nonlinear junction detector.
[8122]Other persons contacted over the years have been:
[8123]Mr. Robert Burnett, Secret Service
[8124]Mr. Martin Pera, U. Ss. Customs -
[8125]Mr. Marvin Beasley, DASA
[8126]Mr. Thomas Allen, FBI
[8127]_Major Jack Nelson, OSI/USAF
[8128]Major John Langager, ONI/USN
[8129]Mr. Richard Cowan, AEC : . !
[8131]ibm —' ) egeag’
[8133]ERE prove
[8135]ae ms _ Thomas P. Noe
[8138]a. Continuing contacts with intelligence community.
[8140]. ' xegarding technical surveillance countermeasures and
[8141]\ physical security. (This is an exchange of information and
[8142]reports and has been conducted under the auspices of the
[8144]USIB Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Community.)
[8146]State . 0 Navy
[8148]Air Force [- - US Secret Service
[8149]“Army NSA
[8151]DIA |
[8153]FBI
[8155]2. _ Joint funding of two contracts with State Depart-
[8156]ment (PRM/LLL) . Two electret microphones were furnished
[8157]to State Department for test purposes. Joint funding of
[8158]one contract with NSA (Sandia). Participation in DNA/DOD
[8159]contract (Bureau of Standards). ,
[8161]_ 3. Other DOD and Governnent contacts for information
[8162]collection or exchange only. |
[8163]ARPA :
[8164]LEAA/Dept. of Justice
[8165]DNA/DOD
[8166]Office Telecommunications Policy
[8167]Office of Army/Provost ‘Marshal General
[8168]Army /Military Police Agency, Ft. Gordon
[8170]Air Force/Office of the Inspector General
[8172]Air Force/Electronic Systems Division
[8174]Pr ae . . 00R43
[8175]SG at : . : ; . .
[8178].
[8180]T May 1973
[8182]LS/ORD COMPACTS WITH DOMESTIC COUNCIL AGENCIES
[8184]‘) ven. 1. BNDA(Charles Gask cin) was given permission to recéive 7
[8185]© proposals from Identity 135, concerning a Reder People Detector |
[8186]developed for ORD. Time: Fall of 1972. Action wes approved by
[8188]D/ORD. ;
[8190]\ 2. BSP/ORD turned about eight trained dolphins over to the
[8191]| Navy. Time: December 1969
[8193]a
[8195]aa 3. Developed Adhesive Restraint, Non-lethal Incapacitation ‘System.
[8196]Reports and information was made available to Department of Justice, LEAA
[8197]in August 1972. If they developed the system, it would be used for
[8198]civilian crowd and riot control.
[8200]CREASES
[8201]wun mf
[8203]cae z
[8204]err rn
[8206]@ 7 ay r 9 ny 973
[8207]- seed
[8209]MEMORAND UM FOR: Executive Secretary{ CIA-Management
[8210]. Committee
[8212]| ;
[8214]| . t ; : -
[8216]| SUBJECT : Reported Identity 61 _ Burglary
[8217]| .
[8219]|
[8221]1, Attached is a report summarizing what we know about the
[8222]reported break-in of Identity 61, An investigative report
[8223]by an officer of the Executive Protective Service states that the
[8224]offices were ransacked and a number of personal items stolen.:
[8226]y 2. The attached summary also describes a separate audio |
[8227]operation conducted against Identity 61 by the FBI, at the
[8228]| p § . vbY
[8229]N\OE  Kgency's} s 's] behest and with its technical support. This presents a
[8231]elated’ question that should be noted. James McCord's' testimony
[8232]indicates that he placed telephone calls to the. Identity 75 and Identity
[8233]61. - He says he picked the numbers at random, hoping
[8234]that if his phone was tapped his attorneys would be able to challenge
[8235]the evidence as being tainted. Another witness, John Caulfield,
[8236]says McCord called the two named Iden 75 and Iden 61 because he "was sure!"
[8237]they "were subjects of national security wiretaps. '"'
[8239], Ak 3. In fact, there has been a long-standing telephone tap on the
[8240]. XD Identity 75 , ran by the FBI, about which{ CI Staftelieves McCord
[8241]W knew. It is possible that he also had an inkling of some sort of operation
[8242]agéinst Identity 61 +, and assumed that it was also a telephone
[8243]tap. One must speculate that he played for double insurance, hoping
[8244]that both his telephones and those of the Iden 75 and Iden 61 were tapped, and
[8245]that one way or another his case would be dismissed or dropped
[8246]because of tainted evidence or to avoid revealing the sensitive
[8247]operations. At this point, given the publicity of the Iden 61 break-in,
[8248]and the testimony of McCord and Caulfield, the current investigations
[8249]may lead to exposure of the operations. :
[8250]. >
[8252]Pha
[8254]Ailey J VA
[8256]filliam V. Broe
[8258]Inspector General OC3SSi—
[8259]caret AEE,
[8260]Attachment: roa gs itt
[8261]As. Stated Above Cot oe 7 Fakes :
[8262]. Bootes Tee “2. OF ie
[8263]Miveee creed eLenteseneget 400
[8264]. rc ay al
[8265]ITT EN ere ty Cet be ee i. Tog at
[8266]rn oe ve tenes
[8268](eaters Lapaseibin, ttyeed Cote oe execs
[8269]~ ep
[8272]. 24 May 1973
[8274]MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General
[8276]SUBJECT 4 Repoitea Burglary of the Identity 61 -
[8278]1. The press reported a burglary of Identity 61 _ 13-14
[8279]May 1973. An investigative report by an officer of the Executive
[8280]Protective Service states that the offices were ransacked anda
[8281]number of personal items were stolen. There were some latent
[8282]fingerprints, but no identification was made. The FBI, which states
[8283]that the incident was on 15 May, did not investigate because it deter-
[8284]mined that it did not have jurisdiction, The Identity 61
[8285]registered a formal complaint and American regrets were expressed,
[8286]Identity 61 making it clear that they suspected something other than
[8288]ordinary robbery. We have no additional information on the subject.
[8289]There had been an carlier intelligence operation against the Identity 61
[8290]which is described below,
[8292]- 0 2. On 16 April 197 aa Agency) roposed to the FBI the instal-
[8293]ion of technical covera ity 61 The opportunity
[8294]for such an installation came Sabot when a domestic asset of Foreign
[8295]Resources Division reported that he had been asked to submit a bid
[8296]for a contract to renovate Identity 61 Upon securing the
[8297]contract the asset was willing to augment his work force as appropriate
[8298]or install material which would be provided him. {The Agency proposed
[8299]to turn this asset over to the FBI and to provide technical and logistic
[8300]K 4 support. ' The value of such an operation to the intelligence community
[8301]‘) \ b was cited.
[8303]3. On 23 April 1971 FBI Director John Edgar Hoover turned
[8304]down the Agency proposal. That same day CIA Director Richard Helms
[8305]sent a letter to Altorney-General John Mitchell requesting that the FBI
[8306]turndown be reversed, citing the importance of the Iden 61 target and
[8307]national intelligence needs to collect positive intelligence. . On 24 April
[8308]the Attorney-General reversed the FBI decision and the Washington ,
[8309]Field Office of the Bureau was instructed to proceed with the operation
[8311]sere ARO! one
[8313]e ce
[8314]a nnn
[8315]CRAOTT  eteranpresl at eens SAAS shee eee
[8316]Ved cane wiee F258F8 Late GF chet _-
[8319]QE
[8321]4. During the period from 26 April to 18 May all the
[8322]technical equipment from the Agency .to the FBI was delivered,
[8323]installed and tested. Everything seemed to be working. No Agency
[8324]personnel were involved-in any way with actual installation of
[8325]equipment in Identity 61 From May to February Agency tech-
[8326]nicians helped calibrate, reset and do other repair work on occasions
[8328]of equipment failure in the FBI listening post. On no occasion did
[8330]they enter Identity 61,
[8332]5, The Agency requested that coverage of Identity 61 - be
[8333]stopped on 3 February 1972 after FBI Director J, Edgar Hoover
[8334]advised that. he was scheduled shortly to testify in Congress and
[8335]might have to advise them that the installation in Identity 61°
[8336]was initiated af/CIA's)request. The operation and equipment, to the
[8337]best of the Agenty's knowledge, was dormant until 8 December 1972
[8338]when the FBI was asked by the Agency to reactivate coverage. The
[8339]request at this time was occasioned by the knowledge that a Iden 76
[8340]delegation would be arriving in Washington for discussions on
[8341]nationalization of foreign holdings, While the FBI was still
[8342]in the process of reactivating the equipment, the Department of
[8343]State on 20 December 1972 requested the F BI to institute all possible.
[8344]coverage of Identity 61 - and on 22 December 1972 coverage
[8345]was partially reinstitutéd with full coverage in effect by. 26 December
[8346]1972,
[8348]6. A review of the take from the operation, weighed against |
[8349]the risks involved, led the Agency to conclude that the activity was
[8350]not worth continuing. On 16 February 197% CL requested the FBI
[8351]to discontinue the coverage, On 22 February 1973 the FBI advised
[8352]that microphone surveillance of Iden 61 was discontinued,
[8354]John C. "Ric onde
[8356]00288
[8360]AK Oe CO Tee
[8362]| ddendum ”
[8363]Lk? We Bddvendum | 2:2: to in | ICRichards! za v 73 memo to ‘Ic ,
[8364]r 6," us agraph 2,. re Identity 6 Break-in
[8365]go” \ 1. The “F oreign Ressurees Division aeentfwas _ Identity 17
[8367](And . a
[8369]Ns 2 who owned the Identity 78 . - -
[8370][2a‘* - oe
[8372]—. ) a _« The Agency had initially agreed =
[8374]Ua to reimburse Iden 77 for losses suffered up to $2500, The final
[8376]\\ {| amount of remuneration turned: out to be $4,828.53. Another FR
[8378]\ asset who worked on this operation was Identity 79 plumber and
[8379]elettrician of McLean, Va. He was terminated by FR in January 1972,
[8381]2. TSD personnel who entered and worked in the FBI listening i
[8383]post were: ‘Identity 80, Identity 30 and Identity 45 |
[8385]of TSD and Harold Leith of Division D. Go 263 i
[8387]Wud
[8388]a 3.- -
[8389]x
[8391]Shes
[8393]4
[8395]Coordination
[8396]A. Internal . co
[8397]In developing its cadre of general. support assets”
[8398]and access agents, the FR Division maintains close contact
[8399]with the{ Domestic Contact Service|of the Directorate for
[8400]Intelligence, using their assets wherever and whenever
[8401]possible to support FR's ‘operational activities, To a
[8402]more ‘limited degree, FR Basés maintain contacts with Office
[8403]of Security and Office of Personnel field representdtives,
[8404]pursuing the occasional leads surfaced by’ these officers
[8405]and using their entre to specific individuals who can
[8406]provide access to targets of operational interest.
[8407]B: External
[8408]FR officers in the field maintain coordination with -
[8409]their FBI counterparts. There is limited cooperation
[8410]with Bureau offices on internal security cases involving
[8411]Soviet and Bloc officials and the local FBI offices are
[8412]of- occasional help in operations involving other nationals,
[8413]The local field offices of the FBI are. made aware of the
[8414]presence of FR officers in their jurisdictions and have on.
[8415]occasion provided backstopping on cases. where there was,
[8416]some flap potential.
[8417]. Coordination with the FBI of FR Division's agent
[8418]recruitment activity is governed by an agreement between
[8419]the Agency and the. FBI dated 7 Fébruary 1966.
[8420]The Bases also have contact with local Immigration
[8421]and Naturalization Service offices although. these contacts
[8422]are less frequent and less important than the contacts
[8424]with “the FBI offices.
[8426]SECRET
[8428]ONG 83