[1]178-10003-10090 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
[2]. JFK Assassination Sysiem Date:
[4]Identification Form
[6]Agency Information
[8]AGENCY: KISS/SCOW
[9]RECORD NUMBER: — 178-10003-10090
[11]RECORD SERIES: CHURCH COM.
[13]AGENCY FILE NUMBER: 7506462 (2)
[15]Document Information
[17]ORIGINATOR: = NSC
[18]FROM:
[19]TO: RECORD
[21]TITLE: | MINUTES OF MEETING OF SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED) ON MONGOOSE, 9/6/62
[23]DATE: 09/06/1962
[24]PAGES: 5
[26]SUBJECTS :
[27]“CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS
[29]OPERATION MONGOOSE
[30]CUBAN EXILES
[31]ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITUES
[33]DOCUMENT TYPE: MEMORANDUM
[35]CLASSIFICATION: — Unclassified
[37]CURRENT STATUS: — Redact
[38]DATE OF LASTREVIEW: — 07/16/1993
[40]OPENING CRITERIA :
[42]COMMENTS :; Attached to 1781000310069. Unmarked but probably TOP SECRET.
[44]v9.1 716
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[47]Ps acne Riidoeeee es (0
[49]. DRAFT MONGOOSE Minutes - 9/6/62
[50]ae - TAP /mom vi
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[52]: , 7 Ris Ch
[53]‘MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD sop ty
[56]SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) on a
[57]‘Operation MONGOOSE, 6 September 1962
[59]‘PRESENT: Mr. McGeorge Bundy; the Attorney General; Mr. Martin;
[60]Mr. William Bundy, General Decker, General Lansdale and
[61]General Harris; General Carter; Mr. Murrow
[63]178-10003-10090
[64]178-10004-10264
[66]1. Sabotage Operation .
[68]General Carter reported that information should be available by
[69]‘Sunday as to the success of this previously-approved operation. Mr.
[70]. Bundy requested that the White House be informed as soon as the
[72]dntormation is obtained.
[74]2. General Lansdale commented in general on his paper of August 31st.
[75]~ He noted that some of the: ‘oparetional. representatives had . questioned
[76]whether this was responsive to the changed situation ogee, by the
[77]4dssuance oF NSAM 181, but said that ‘this plan had been ‘prepared within
[78]the framework of the previously-approved guidelines (those of August 16).
[79]Me, Bundy noted that most of the paperwork in response to.NSAM 181] has
[80]; ‘been done and the President's statement of Tuesday night had clarified
[82]; -the situation to a considerable degree. He thus felt that‘the approach
[84]- taken in the August 31st paper was satisfactory.
[86]“3. The following specific comments were then made on Activities
[87]Jisted in the paper: (It should be noted that final approval was not
[88]~given to the paper at this meeting.)
[89]a. “Mr. Martin said that number 20 (balloons) was tricky and that
[91]' he thought a very careful look should be taken when a specific proposal
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[103]is prepared. After considerable discussion, it’ was agreed that
[105]details should be presented to the Group, to include the content of
[107]the leaflets which would be dropped, and specifics as to the method
[109]and place of launching, the technical details of the release of
[110]“leaflets, etc., etc.
[112]b. Mr. Martin felt that number 25 ("discovery" of caches of
[113]arms) involves an important aspect of timing. He said, and the Group
[114]agreed, that any such action should be coordinated with U.S, objectives
[115]toward Cuba rather than confusing it with activities in connection with
[116]a third country. Mr. Bundy emphasized that any such undertaking should
[117]be done with: the idea of providing a-pretext--for further action,
[119]ce. In answer to the Chairman's question, Mr. Murrow, supported
[120]by State, said that Radio Swan (aumber 23) should be continued even
[121]though it is not entirely effective. This led into a discussion of
[123]’ the possibilities of intrusion into radio and TV channels in Cuba. Mr.
[124]Murrow explained the far-reaching reactions that the Cubans could mount
[125]against U.S. radio stations, and said that he felt on balance it would.
[126]not be profitable to provoke this kind of electronic warfare. The Group
[128]_ asked, however, that a detailed paper on the pros and cons of such
[129]intrusions, to include the legal aspects involved, be prepared. .
[131]d. At General Carter's suggestion, number 21 (propaganda directed
[132]at Bloc personne] in Cuba) was assigned to USIA and CIA, rather than
[134]- just to the latter. | .
[136]e. On number 28 (sabotage of assets outside of Cuba), the purpose
[138]was changed from crippling to harrassing Cuban commerce.
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[146]£, General Carter poinbed out that reference to support of ali
[147]Cuban exile groups (number 48) is -mpractical. The word was changed
[148]cto selected.
[149]Be ‘Mr. ‘Martin cautioned that results of mumber 50 (actions to
[150]be undertaken by other ‘Hemisphere governments) would mot ‘be expected
[151]. overnight. | .
[152]_ -ih, General Canter wrged that, dim conection vweiitth mumber 22
[153]- (submarine tbroadcasts),, General iansdale ghowild ibe gitven:more latitude
[154]. dn working wp other deception possibilities. Mr. Bunthy Felt, on the
[155]ether thand, that :particularily because of the possible Cuban counter-
[156]| mensures which thad been outlined iby Mr. Murrow, ithe Group should look
[157]at other possibilities in some detail.
[159]4, Ceneral Carter felt thet a Geteroinetiion should “be made as
[161]tho thow Sar tthe W'S. is prepared tte po im economic Iharransing actions.
[162]He emphasized tthat sabotage operations such as tthnase unter number a7
[164]WLLL mot im themeelwes be especially effective iin re the Cuban
[165]A
[167]enonomy. fan Jett Tho Phas 4] ;
[168]z ene ace : Tes . - aah ae, 5
[170]4, Whe Group itthen burned to a discussion of mumber 32 (agricultural
[172]sabotage). General Carter emphasized ‘tthe extreme senpitivity of any
[174]such operation and the disastrous results that would flow from some-
[175]ithing golmg wrong, iparideulerily ‘LE there weme abviious attribution to
[177]the U.'S. ‘He went. on ito say, ihowever,, that it would ibe possible to
[178]wxcoomplish tohis purpose iby methoils wore subtile tthan tthose indicated in
[179]fhe paper. He mentioned specifically ithe possibility wf producing crop
[181]; "2 eS ANNES FEET R FET
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[191]failures by the introduction of biological agents which would appear
[193]to be of natural origin. Mr. Bundy said that he had no worries about
[194]any such sabotage which could clearly be made to appear as the result
[195]of local Cuban disaffection or of a natural disaster, but that we must i
[197]avoid external activities such as release of chemicals, etc., unless
[199]‘they could be completely covered up.
[201]5. A suggestion was made that small explosives or incendiaries which
[203]could be distributed to Cubans should be infiltrated. General Carter
[205]explained that the problem is not one of such supplies, since they can
[206]be easily improvised, but rather that the people have shown no inclinatior
[208]to use such-materials despite many exile claims to the contrary.
[209]‘.
[213]6. Tt: was-suggested.that.the -matter.of.attacking and larrassing 6
[215]Soviet personnel within Cuba should be considered.
[217]7. The Attorney General and Mr. Bundy said that no reprisals against»
[219]exiles who undertake active operations on their own are contemplated.
[221]8. It was suggested that the possibilities of counterfeiting be looked
[223]into further.
[225]9. General Carter urged again that a decision be reached as to how
[226]much latitude would be allowed the operating elements of the government,
[227]within broad policy lines. The Chairman indicated that it would not be
[228]a simple matter to delegate responsibilities of this kind to any great
[230]degree. ,
[232]10. Mr. Bundy then raised the basic question of the entire spectrum
[233]of other contingencies beyond those envisaged in the MONGOOSE program.
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[241]He mentioned as examples what the’ U.S. response should be in the event
[242]of a revolt and whether or not a naval blockade should be mcunted.
[243]. - The Group agreed that such planning, in addition to the military continger
[244], " plans already prepared, rust be pursued.
[245]| ; , : Although recognizing that this type of activity is not within the
[246]. MONGOOSE framework, Mr. Bundy chat General Lansdale's group,
[247]a particularly the State representative, fat do the initial exploration
[248]_ of possibilities for later consideration by the Special Group, the
[249]‘Secretary of State and higher authority. On the other hand, General
[250]Carter felt strongly that if General Lansdale and his associates
[251]' were given the responsibility for developing the spectrum of possible
[252]decisionsof this kind, it would inevitably detract from the time
[254]available for MONGOOSE operations. Yhie matter was left open for further
[256]consideration at a meeting next week.
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