[1]157-10005-10236| | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
[3]Date: 10/04/93
[4]Page:1
[5]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[7]a IDENTIFICATION FORM
[9]AGENCY INFORMATION
[11]AGENCY : SSCIA
[12]RECORD NUMBER : 157-10005-10236
[14]RECORDS SERIES :
[16]AGENCY FILE NUMBER : R445
[18]ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
[19]FROM :
[20]TO:
[22]TITLE :
[23]REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS/TRANSCRIPT
[25]DATE : 07/08/75
[26]PAGES : 257
[28]SUBJECTS :
[29]» TESTIMONY BY LANSDALE CONCERNING ALLEGED ASSASSINATION PLOTS
[30]|) EXHIBITS ATTACHED IN THE FORM OF MEMOS/NEWS ARTICLES
[32]DOCUMENT TYPE : TRANSCRIPT/EXHIBITS
[33]CLASSIFICATION : T
[34]RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
[35]CURRENT STATUS : P
[36]DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/04/93
[38]OPENING CRITERIA :
[40]COMMENTS :
[41]BOX 251-5
[43][R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED
[45]HW 50955 Docld: 32202426 Page i
[47]Phone (Area 202) 544-6000
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[58]WARD & PAUL
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[74]al
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[82]410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003
[84](£5
[86]TOP SECRET
[88]110
[89]Mr. Schwarz. These are minutes of the Special Group which.
[90]you attended, and it states: "Mr. Harvey gave a rundown on
[91]‘Progress to date with agent -teams and in the general field of
[92]intelligenca, including the Opa-locka interrogation center (and.
[94]| MENbe sel "Sizing
[96]Ssinesinvemss GatiChycenger. He outlined
[99]= a ER
[101]various difficulties encountered and said that three agent teams
[102]had been infiltrated,"
[103]Now did Mr. Harvey, at that meeting, state anything -- do
[105]you recollect Mr. Harvey making that report?
[107]General Lansdale. In general terms, yes.
[109]Mr. Schwarz. Did he state anything relating to the
[110]passage of pills to parsons to accomplish the assassination of
[111]Fidel Castro in the week prior to this meeting?
[113]General Lansdale. No. As a Matter of fact, we were very
[114]proud that he had gotten these teams in, that they had been
[115]infiltrated, and so forth, and collecting intelligence.
[117]Mr. Schwarz. Were they the first teams?
[119]General Lansdale. Yes.
[121]Mr. Schwarz. Did he Say anything at that Meeting that
[122]you Yecall about the subject of assassinations?
[124]General Lansdale, Nothing.
[126]Mr. Schwarz. Would you give the witness the May 7th '62
[127]memorandum of General Taylor, Subject, Report of Progress to
[128]Higher Authority?
[130]Now, Senators, that is supposedly slipped in your notebook
[132]TOP SECRET
[134]HY 450955 Docld: 3227027426 Page 2
[136]2
[138]r
[140]SENSITIVE
[142]TOP SECRET | Fi
[144]Program Review by , SENSITIVE
[145]=~ Brig. Gen. E, G. Lansdale,
[146]Chief of Operations ~ 18 January 1962
[147]CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO THE CUBA PROJECT
[148]DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR Us
[149]RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT 1
[150]AS SANITIZED I. OBJECTIVE
[152]Nie
[154]A
[156]ai ° .
[157]HW 50955 DocId:32202426 Page (3) io K 0 Na
[159])
[160]ice _\ The U.S. objective is to help the Cubans overthraw the Communist
[161]V regime from within Cuba and institute a new government with which the
[162]\ otUnited States can live in peace.
[165]) \ Il. CONCEPT OF OPERATION
[166]4 i CONGERS
[168]wee Basically, the operation is to bring about the revolt of the Cuban
[169]s
[171]people. The revolt will overthrow the Communist regime and institute
[172]a new government with which the United States can live in peace.
[174]The revolt requires a strongly motivated political action movement
[175]established within Cuba, to generate the revolt, to give it direction to-
[176]wards the objective, and to capitalize on the climactic moment. The
[177]political actions will be assisted by economic warfare to induce failure
[178]of the Communist regime to supply Cuba's economic needs, psychological
[179]operations to turn the peoples’ resentment increasingly against the regime,
[180]and military-type groups to give the popular movement an action arm for
[181]sabotage and armed resistance in support of political objectives.
[183]The failure of the U.S. -sponsored operation in April 1961 so shook
[184]the faith of Cuban patriots in U.S. competence and intentions in support-
[185]ing a revolt against Castro that a new effort to generate a revolt against
[186]the regime in Cuba must have active support from key Latin American
[187]countries, Further, the foreigness {Soviet Union and Bloc) of the tyranny
[188]imposed on the Cuban people must be made clear to the people of the
[189]Western Hemisphere to the point of their deep anger and open actions to
[190]defend the Western Hemisphere against such foreign invasion. Such an
[191]anger will be generated, in part, by appeals from the popular movement
[192]within Cuba to other Latin Americans especially.
[194]y The preparation phase must re sult in a political action organization
[196]in being in key localities inside Cuba, with its own means for internal ;
[197]communications, its own voice for psychological operations, and its own
[198]action arm (small guerrilla bands, sabotage squads, etc. ). It must have
[199]the sympathetic support of the majority of the Cuban people, and make this
[200]fact known to the outside world. (It is reported that the majority of Cubans
[201]are not for the present regime, but are growing apathetic towards what
[202]appears to be a hopeless future or the futility of their status.)
[204]The climactic moment of revolt will come from an angry reaction of
[205]the people to a government action (sparked by an incident), or from a
[206]{fracturing of the leadership cadre within the regime, or both, (A major
[207]goal of the Project must be to bring this about.) The popular movemer! ia
[208]; a
[209]y “Ny
[211]v
[213]Excluded from automatic
[214]regrading: DOD Dir. Copy Nd:
[216]al ly. A
[217]§200.10 does not apply L SENSITIVE
[219]TOP SECRET.
[224]HY 50955 Docld: 32202426
[226]Page
[228]TOP SECRET
[230]SENSITIVE
[231]H. TV intrusion’
[233]Status: Equipment to enable TV intrusion of Havana TV broadcasts .
[234]has been reactivated on a small vessel under CIA control. CIA plans to
[235]attempt intrusion on 22 January during Castro's forthcoming speech and
[236]parade demonstrations.
[238]I. Special sabotage support
[240]Status: State has explored, with negative results, the feasibility
[241]of pre-emptive action with respect to tanker charters (most Bloc ship-
[242]ments to Cuba are carried in Western bottoms). CIA has initiated
[243]action to contaminate POL supplies for Cuba, although visible results
[244](stoppage of some Cuban transport) is not expected until mid-1962, CLA
[245]is introducing iiZiR as ja corrosive additive, to,Guban locomotive
[246]diesel fuel oil through commercial “Sooke AEE De Waller)
[248]alexeteyeare sRéakgdown. CIA expects to be able
[250]to have at least “agent recruited by 28 February to attempt introduc-
[251]tion of a corrosive additive to jet fuel storage tanks in Cuba.
[253]1 rat
[255]J. Military actions
[257]Status: Defense has been tasked with preparing a contingency plan
[258]for U.S. military action, in case the Cuban people request U.S, help
[259]when their revolt starts making headway, This contingency plan will
[260]permit obtaining a policy decision on the major point of U.S. intentions,
[261]and is looked upon as a positive political-psychological factor ina
[262]people's revolt, even more than as a possible military action, Defense
[263]also has been tasked with fully assisting State and CIA, as commitments
[264]of Defense men, money, and materiel are required.
[266]K.- Major elements of the population
[268]ind: CLA are continuing to explore their capabilities
[269]negative to date) for mounting special group operations
[270]in dynamic elements of the population, particularly
[271]operations: through the Church to reach the women and families, and
[272]through Labor contacts to reach the workers. Other elements include
[274]. enlistment of. the youth and professional groupings. Special consideration
[276]is to be given to doing this through Latin-American operational contacts. ~
[277]This is vital to the success of our political action nucleus when CIA can
[278]put it into place. :
[280]L. Outlook
[282]Status: As reported to the Special Group last week, there has been a
[283]period of a realistic second look at CLA capabilities to mount the required
[284]clandestine operations against Cuba, and a subsequent start in "tooling up.
[285]After this second look, CIA has concluded that its realistic role should be
[286]te create at least the illusion of a popular movement, to win external support
[287]for it, to improve CIA operational capability, and to help create a climate
[288]which will permit provocative actions in support of a shift to overt action.
[289]This outlook, although arrived at thoughtfully within CIA, is far short of
[290]the Cuba-project's goala. CIA must take yet another hard look at its
[291]potential capabilities, in the light of the following. tasking, to determine
[292]if it cannot make the greater. effort required.
[294]4
[296]A gel? _ SENSITIVE
[297]Qe . TOP SECRET
[299]TOP SECRET.
[301]SENSITIVE
[303]“Ve. TARGET SCHEDULE
[304]2 ARGET SGHEDULE
[306]ba
[308]A, Intelligence
[309]Task 1: NIE 85-62 on Cuba due 7 February (CLA),
[311]Task 2: By 15 February, Opa Locka Interrogation Center to be made
[312]an effective operation for collection and Processing of intelligence (CIA
[313]with support of Defense, State, I&NS, FBI). °
[315]Task 3: Intelligence collection from Cuban refugees elsewhere than
[316]Miami area, CIA to survey other refugee points (Puerto Rico Be cinecuella,,
[317]etc.) and ona Priority basis to ensure maximum coverage of all sutP
[318]source points, 15 February target date,
[320]Task 4: CIA to continue its re-examination of intelligence assets,
[321]with priority on agents inside Cuba, and report on capability by 15 Feb-
[322]ruary. Also included is coverage of intelligence through third country
[323]sources, particularly those having diplomatic relations with Cuba.
[325]B. Political
[327]Task 5: CLA to submit plan by I February for defection of top Cuban
[328]government officials, to fracture the regime from within. This effort
[329]must be imaginative and bold enough to consider a "name" defector to
[330]be. worth at least a million U.S. dollars, .This can be the key to our
[331]political action goal and must be mounted without delay as a major CIA.
[332]project,-
[334]Task 6: CIA to complete plans by 1 February for Cover and Decep-
[335]tion actions, to help fracture the Communist regime in Cuba, Defense,
[336]State and FBI are to collaborate on this. :
[337]uary, CIA to submit operations schedule for
[338]ment within Cuba. This must include localities
[339]essment of sclected Cubans, their infiltra-
[341]» and political platform. One section must
[342]‘ound, "assess its true status and plans to use it,
[344]Task 8: State to follow up the OAS meeting by having U.S,
[346]Sympathy for the Cuban people and to increase hostility-towards the
[347]~ Communist regime in Cuba. State to submit report on results of this
[348]we assignment by 13 February, so further planning can be programmed,
[350]Task 9: By 15 February, State to submit an inventory of operational
[351]assets in the Caribbean area, including capabilities of loca} governments
[352]or Groups to mount operations on their own, to help achieve the Project's
[354]_ goals.. Plans for early use of such Capabilities are due by 19 February,
[356]Task 10: CIA to submit Operational schedule for using assets in the
[357]Caribbean area to achieve the Project's political action goals, The
[359]objective of working on dynamic elements of the Cuban population (such
[360]as workers, farmers) is underscored, Due 19 February,
[362]a / 5
[363]| m ager’ SENSITIVE
[364]aif _- TOP SECRET
[366]HW 50955 Docld: 32202426 Page 5
[368]te eRe >
[370]AS NO OBJECTION TO
[372]GIA p/oR
[373]LASSIFICATION AN
[374]DEC OF THIS DOCUM
[376]om 4
[378]HW 50955 Docld: 32202426
[380]Se
[384]i Awe VLU | {
[386]RECEIVED
[388]* JAN 29 1962
[390]OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
[391]WASHINGTON 25, D.C.
[393]MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Ab
[395]From: Brig. Gen, Lansdale ql
[397]Noting that you will be away from the country most of the
[398]month of February, there are some matters vital to our Project
[399]for which we should provide, Certain proposals should have
[400]evidence of your support. Some strong decisions may have to
[401]be made if our Project is to win its goal -- and the bureaucratic
[402]machine has too many people captive to it, one way or another.
[404]It is my hope that you will make someone specifically
[405]responsible to speak for your determined course and have the
[406]role of being your "presence" as far as possible. This demands
[407]a personal conviction, freedom from bureaucratic instincts, and
[408]reasonably direct access to the President, Perhaps Dick Good-
[409]win could fulfill this role. Secretary McNamara is an alternate
[410]suggestion; he has so many irons in the fire that I hesitated men-
[411]tioning him. You might be considering General Taylor, but I do
[412]not believe he can quite play this role; he is still too much a fine
[413]military bureaucrat at heart.
[415]As you know, I remain convinced that our goal can be won,
[416]Perhaps, if we can keep forcing U,S. agencies to work hard at
[417]it, the goal can be won through their efforts. Yet, their efforts
[418]haven't been impressive to date, and I still feel that we might
[419]uncork the touchdown play independently of the institutional pro-
[420]gram we are spurring.
[422]It may be a special effort which professional labor operators
[423]can launch to stir up workers in Latin America and Cuba. It may
[424]be through ethnic-language groups ;@seaithhas an untapped action
[425]potential, It could be a warming-upof the always lively youth
[427]element in Latin America and Cuba, through some contacts specially
[429], Orr we HE
[431]ee aN
[435]Bee
[437]used. It could be with the families s through the Church, with families
[439]TEPARTRENT OF WUSTiCE] R
[441]JUN 6 1962
[442]RECORDS BRANCH
[444]E
[448]Page 6
[450]of _g copies. Sertes_ 47
[453]TOP SECRET SENSITIVE
[455]: ear "  F. SABOTAGE SUPPORT PLAN
[456]“ ) nn)
[458]ACTIVITY PURPOSE CONSIDERATIONS
[459]settee Sollaatiacaet baer EEN NO
[461]Sabotage Cuban supply of nickel To deny supply to Soviets and to hinder
[462]te Soviets. :
[464]This can be an early sabota
[465]Cuba's ability to pay for loc imports.
[467]Nicaro Plant by a hit-and-run team based
[468]outside Cuba, Destruction of transformers,
[469]coolant pumps and towers seems more
[470]feasible than blocking the channel, Effect
[472]can be supported later by denial of (ae)
[473]Spare parts,
[475]ge action on the
[477]2. Sabotage fuel supply. To cripple transportation, Effects of CLA program of lubricating oil
[478]additive is expected on locomotive sgita Jee oie
[480]Much more can be done with fusi
[481]contaminants, particularly on jet and diesel
[482]fuels. Crews aboard Western tankers offer
[483]real opportunity for more vigorous program,
[485]3. Sabotage communications, To dramatize and encourage the
[487]Prime targets for hit-and-run teams based
[488]spirit of resistance.
[490]outside Cuba are CMQ TV and the Czech radio
[491]transmitter (believed now used to jam U.S,
[492]broadcasts), Attacks mounted only when
[493]operationally feasible. The G-2 micro-wave
[494]net should be dealt with when there are suf-
[495]ficient assets inside to make sabotage coincide
[496]with a critical need, in August-September,
[497]a
[498]This should be a concerted attack, as feasible
[499]in July-August, on power plants at Havana, °
[500]Santiago, Cinfuegas, Vicente, Santa Clara,
[501]Cuatro Caminos, Matanzas. It is of a type
[502]requiring detailed planning and Special equip-
[503]ment, and can be mounted from outside Cuba,
[505]CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
[506]DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
[507]RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMEN AU)
[509]AS SANITIZED pon oo Ww);
[510]ww TOP SECRET SENSITIVE ate :
[512]4. Sabotage power supply. To increase strain on regime and
[514]bring daily business to a standstill,
[516]by dramatic action all people will
[517]note,
[519]3
[521]PROPERTY OF
[523]G( 46
[525]Docld: 32202426 Page 7
[527]HY 50955
[529]S2FLOGCE PLIOgG Ccéoc AH
[531]g shed
[533]ACTIVITY
[534])
[535]4. * Caribbean Admission Center,
[536]Opa-Locka, Florida, fully
[537]activated by 15 March 1962.
[539]5. * Periodic intelligence esti-
[540]mates, as required by progress
[541]of operations,
[543]OTHER OPERATIONS
[544]SL NS
[546]e negotiating AGS
[548]motive lubricants,
[550]INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS
[551]ee Ne
[553]7. * Two teams of agents dis-
[554]patched to Cuba,
[558]TOP SECRET SENSITIVE
[560]CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
[561]DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
[562]RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
[564]AS SANITIZED 7
[565]q (at
[567]1-15 March 1962 (cont)
[569]PURPOSE
[570]To collect intelligence required for the
[571]Operations, to identify and earmark in-
[572]telligence assets as refugees arrive,
[574]and to provide security against Com-
[575]munist agent operations,
[577]To up-date NIE 85-62, so that current
[578]estimates can be considered at national
[579]policy levels. :
[581]To cripple Cuba's rail transportation.
[583]16» 31 March 1962
[585]To collect intelligence.
[587]TOP SECRET SENSITIVE
[589]CONSIDERATIONS
[591]This operation, in response to early recommendation
[593]as essential by the Chief of Operations, is moving at
[594]utmost speed to become fully active by 15 March, with
[596]a new building completed and occupied, anc witha
[598]staff of 43 at work. Operations commenced 15 February -
[599]and, as of 9 March, 33 people were active at the Center,
[600](CIA responsibility, with Support by Defense, Justice,
[601]State, USIA.) . :
[603]As the operations develop, there will be both increased
[604]inteNigence collection and a need for as current an In-
[605]telligence Estimate as the U.S. can produce meaningfully.
[606]It is likely that a more informal method of producing an
[607]Intelligence Estimate for use at the national level (than
[608]now governing the issuance of NIE's) may have to be
[609]followed. CIA is now publishing daily intelligence sum-
[610]maries on Cuba and is planning a bi-monthly or weekly
[611]report summing up intelligence for this purpose. (CIA
[612]responsibility, with support of others as required. )
[614]is required to undertake a successful
[616]sabotage of Cuban locomotives, through contaminating
[618]lubricants. It is expected that a minimum of 3 months
[619]is required before locomotives in Cuba start breaking
[620]down, once the contaminant is introduced.
[623]One team of 4 and one team of 3 agents. Both teams include
[625]personnel who have had resistance training and some past
[626]experience,
[628]Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962
[633]92FCOGEE
[635]6 25edq
[637]ACTIVITY
[639]8. Establish 2 additional third-
[640]country resident agents in
[641]Cuba.
[643]9. By 31 March, have 105 agents
[644]selected and 50 agents trained.
[646]10.* Develop intelligence potential
[647]of Cuban "colonies" in U.S.
[649]ll. * Develop additional interroga-
[650]tion centers in other areas by
[651]31 March 1962,
[653]OTHER OPERATIONS
[655]None,
[657]_ TOP SECRET SENSITIVE
[659]16 - 31 March 1962 (cont. }
[660]TC TOG (Cont. |
[662]PURPOSE
[664]To collect inte lligence.
[666]To ready agent operations,
[668]To exploit the intelligence possi-
[669]bilities of former residents of
[670]Cuba (including U.S. citizens) now
[671]in the United States.
[673]To collect intelligence in a Latin
[674]atmosphere, at different levels thar
[675]now seem possible in the continental
[676]U.S., to spot additional intelligence
[677]assets and to provide security
[678]against Communist agent operations.
[680]CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
[681]DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
[682]RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
[684]AS SANITIZED ~ | ae
[686](4H
[690]CONSIDERATIONS
[692]Possible future use in communications and support.
[694]Effectiveness and numbers are dependent upon purpose
[695]of recruitment, nature of training, and policy decisions
[696]controlling these factors. If the recruitment and train-
[697]ing are for resistance activities, ‘the task of recruit-
[698]ment and training will be much less difficult than if
[699]they are limited to intelligence-collection purposes
[700]only.
[702]There are "colonies" in Washington, D.C., and other
[703]U.S. cities which are "little Cubas." Family, Church,
[704]and business interests provoke unusual personal ties
[705]inside Cuba for some of these residents; a real potential
[706]exists for collection of intelligence not otherwise avail-
[707]able, (FBI support and coordination is basic in this
[709]effort. }
[711]As Opa-Locka becomes fully activated, CIA will activate
[712]other interrogation centers as promptly as feasible. A
[713]center is being activated in Se-Gnyp Negotiations with
[714]local authorities are being undertaken to activate centers,
[715]if possible, in@Wé : as San
[716]Juan, Puerto Rico wlcy are being sur-
[717]responsibility with sup-
[719]port by others as necessary.)
[721]* Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962,
[723]TOP SECRET SENSITIVE
[725]PROPERTY gt
[726]THE WHITE HOUSE Orrin
[728]f La. TOP SECRET
[730]OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
[731]WASHINGTON 25, D.C.
[733]~ SENSITIVE,
[735]MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED) . ao
[737]From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale>"{_ i" Cais
[739]NO OBJECTION
[740]ECLASSIFCATION AND/OF
[742]EOF THis DOCUMENT =
[743]By &/24 | 44
[745]As Operation Mongoose goes into the approved activities of Phase / ¥
[747]Subject: Policy Questions, Operation Mongoose Ps,
[749]a number of policy questions have started to arise. Current problems,
[750]necding resolution, are listed below. It is requested that the Special
[751]Group (Augmented) provide guidance, as a matter of some urgency.
[753]Use of U.S. military installations, CIA desires to train | small
[754]groups of Cuban nationals ,oc#veé De in By. dau Koreas sioniaat 5
[756]. gues gical, immediately. Defense reports that the proposed area ;
[757]is adequate for this training, but that such training of covert agents
[758]who will be introduced ultimately into Cuba represents a security problem
[759]and a departure from past security procedures, due to the fact that U.S.
[760]Government sponsorship will be apparent to trainees. Capture and
[761]interrogation of any of these covert agents could result in exposure
[763](in international news media) of U.S. official involvement in efforts to
[764]unseat the present Communist Cuban regime. A policy determination
[766]is needed as to whether or not agents to be infiltrated into Cuba should
[768]be trained on U.S. Government installations.
[770]cote opine 1B
[772]There are other U.S. military installations and properties, in
[773]the Southeastern U.S. and Caribbean areas, which CIA would like to use
[774]for similar training and operational purposes in the future. The same
[775]policy determination could cover all uses of identifiable U.S, Government
[776]aining and deployment of Cuban nationals for covert
[778]g. ‘Cuban guerrillas. CIA needs a policy determination on
[780]L yinguof '@ and equipment to deserving Cuban guerrillas, as
[781]joéated: assessed, and request help. Such requests are starting
[782]to surface, as the intelligence-collection effort is increased, and itis
[784]. EXCLUDED PROM ANTOUATIC
[785]RECRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10
[786]DOES NOT APPLY
[788]+ SENSITIVE
[790]TOP SECRET bony a ae cone pies. Series
[791]: . PROPERTY OF
[793]. THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE
[795]a . ERG Reece Sergey + hfe |
[797]HY 50955 Docld:32202426 Page 10
[799]. aiiprave po!
[800]- Has No oBvECTION TS witty
[802]Gl iAH amet a )
[803]iFICAT & . )
[805]i MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
[807]3 May 1962
[809]SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of Special Group (Augmented) on
[810]Project Mongoose, 3 May 1962
[812]PRESENT: General Taylor; Mr. Kennedy; Mr. Johnson; Mr. Gilpatric,
[813]General Decker, General Lansdale and General Craigs
[814]Mr. McCone, and Mr. Harvey
[816]1. General Lansdale gave an interim report on the progress
[817]of stepping up recruitment of Cubans into the U. S. Army. He said
[818]_the consensus is that there are not more than a thousand suitable
[819]individuals from whom additional recruits could be selected. The
[820]Attorney General commented that the President wishes to have a large
[821]number. General Lansdale said that various alternatives for training
[822]of such Cubans are being looked into.
[824]. 7 It was agreed that such a cadre of Cubans would be an ass
[825]to the U. S., which might be used in a number of ways. General
[826]Lansdale, supported by General Taylor, pointed out that in this
[827]connection the matter of holding the individuals and giving them
[828]useful employment after they are trained is an important and a
[829]difficult one.
[831]ye ae
[833]i 2, Mr. Harvey gave a rundown on progress to date with agent
[834]teams and in the general field of intelli nce, including the
[836]i : Opa-locka interrogation center and che geen gidBclandestine interroga-
[837]tion center. He outlined various difficulties encountered, and said
[839]_that three agent teams have been infiltrated and that five W/T sets
[841]1 : are in place. Approximately 72 actual or potential reporting sources
[843]to. are also in place. A significant development is that Major Duque has
[845]; , : refused to allow agents responsive to him to be dispatched on purely-
[846]intelligence-gathering missions. (This sort of attitude had been
[847]forecast earlier as a possibility, but it now assumes particular im-
[849]ortancein-view of Duque's stature.)
[851]arvey also commented on the two attempts made to intrude
[853]«programs. The Group asked that a check be made, as
[855]ble§ on how effective these operations were, They also
[857]y,.of the scripts used be made available, The Group
[859]tethate ie ts? worthwhile to check this capability out, as is now
[860]being-done, but questioned whether once proved effective it should not
[861],Perhaps be kept in reserve for a more meaningful time. -
[863]- Parrott
[865]ed . cc: General Lansdale
[867]PROPERTY OF
[868]. THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE
[870]en Ra, ERTS Fy 4s feet tis
[872]heme
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