[1]DARAAN
[2]‘104-10326-10080 : | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
[4]SECRET
[5]' SENSIND: -EO
[7]SECRET
[9]ACTION: EA/J (299) INFO: DCEA/OPE, EYESONLY, MDSX, ODPD, FILE, C/EA,
[11]DDO, EA/XO (4/W)
[12]PAGE 001 IN 3620327
[14]96 3620327
[15]260842Z MAR 96 TOKY 24344
[17]ASO
[19]SECRET 260832Z MAR 96 STAFF
[21]CITE TOKYO 24344
[23]TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR.
[25]DCEA/OPE, EA/XO
[27]FOR: LIMIT C/EA/J INFO CHIEF/EA,
[30]EYES ONLY - FOR C/EA/J - OFFICIAL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF TOKYO
[32]STATION
[34]SUBJECT:
[36]REF: DIRECTOR 700784 96 3598980
[38]TEXT:
[40]1. ACTION REQUIRED: PLEASE INCORPORATE THE FOLLOWING INTO THE
[41]*TALKING POINTS TO BE USED IN THE PRESENTATION TO THE<JFK>
[42]*<ASSASSINATION>RECORDS REVIEW BOARD.
[44]2. AMBASSADOR MONDALE, THE EMBASSY AND THE STATION STRONGLY
[45]OPPOSE RELEASE TO THE PUBLIC OF ANY REFERENCE TO THE EXISTENCE OF A
[46]CIA STATION IN JAPAN. SUCH ACTION COULD HAVE ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES
[47]FOR US-JAPAN RELATIONS AT A TIME WHEN A NUMBER OF DIFFICULT SECURITY
[48]AND ECONOMIC ISSUES REMAIN UNRESOLVED. IT ALSO WOULD RISK REIGNITING
[49]_EARLIER CONTROVERSIES OVER ALLEGED CIA WIRETAPPING OF THE MAN WHO IS
[50]TODAY THE PRIME MINISTER AND OVER PAST CIA FUNDING FOR THE LIBERAL
[51]DEMOCRATIC PARTY. PUBLIC CONFIRMATION WOULD, WITHOUT A DOUBT,
[52]DISRUPT COOPERATION WITH JAPANESE LIAISON SERVICES ON IMPORTANT
[53]COUNTERTERRORIST AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CASES. BY MAKING THE
[54]STATION THE OBJECT OF GREATER. PUBLIC AND POSSIBLY OFFICIAL SCRUTINY,
[55]IT WOULD LOWER THE CONFIDENCE OF EXISTING AND NEW SOURCES IN OUR
[56]ABILITY TO PROTECT THEIR IDENTITY AND SECURITY. ~ :
[58]3. IMPACT ON US-JAPAN RELATIONS: THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT DOES
[59]NOT PUBLICLY ADMIT THAT IT COLLECTS INTELLIGENCE, AND AS A COROLLARY,
[60]DOES NOT ADMIT TO HAVING LIAISON RELATIONSHIPS WITH US INTELLIGENCE
[61]AGENCIES. TOKYO AVOIDS PUBLIC ACKNOWLEDGEMENT BECAUSE IT KNOWS THAT
[62]INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION IS ANATHEMA TO THE LEFT WING OF THE JAPANESE
[63]POLITICAL SPECTRUM, AND ANY ADMISSION WOULD GIVE THE LEFT NEW ~~
[64]OPPORTUNITIES TO ATTACK THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY, WHICH WAS THE
[65]RULING PARTY FROM 1955 TO 1993 AND IS TODAY THE PARTY OF THE PRIME
[66]MINISTER AND THE LEADING PARTY WITHIN THE RULING COALITION. ANY
[68]OFFICIAL CONFIRMATION THAT CONTRADICTED EARLIER JAPANESE GOVERNMENT
[69]SECRET
[72]13-00000
[74]SECRET
[75]MHFNO: 96-3620327 SENSIND: EO ‘ PAGE: 2
[76]DENIALS’ OF CIA PRESENCE IN JAPAN WOULD BE USED AS A CLUB BY THE LEFT
[77]TO ATTACK LDP SUPPORT FOR THE US-JAPAN MUTUAL SECURITY TREATY AND THE
[78]PRESENCE OF US FORCES.IN JAPAN. WITH A STATE VISIT BY THE US
[79]PRESIDENT FAST APPROACHING AND DELICATE NEGOTIATIONS OVER US BASES IN
[80]OKINAWA LIKELY TO CONTINUE INTO 1997, THIS WOULD BE A PARTICULARLY
[81]BAD TIME TO OPEN THE DOOR TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS ABOUT US ACTIVITIES
[83]AND INTENTIONS IN JAPAN.
[85]4. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF CIA PRESENCE WOULD ALSO REVIVE OLD
[86]CONTROVERSIES THAT HAVE LARGELY RECEDED FROM THE HEADLINES. IN 1995,
[87]THE PRESS MADE A MAJOR ISSUE OF CIA FUNDING FOR THE LDP IN ITS
[88]FORMATIVE YEARS. ANYTHING THAT LENT CREDIBILITY TO THE STORY WOULD
[89]BE A SERIOUS POLITICAL LIABILITY FOR THE LDP. THEN. FOREIGN MINISTER
[90]AND LDP: PRESIDENT KONO YOHEI PERSONALLY ASKED AMBASSADOR MONDALE THAT
[91]THE US GOVERNMENT NOT RELEASE DOCUMENTS ON THIS SUBJECT. . KONO
[92]EXPLAINED TO AMBASSADOR MONDALE THAT THE LDP CAN DEAL WITH RUMORS AND
[93]EVEN UNCONFIRMED LEAKS, BUT OFFICIAL CONFIRMATION OF CIA ACTIVITY. IN
[94]JAPAN WOULD BE AN ENTIRELY DIFFERENT AFFAIR, THREATENING TO DAMAGE
[95]BOTH THE CONSERVATIVE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AS WELL AS THE US-JAPAN
[96]SECURITY RELATIONSHIP. KONO EXPLICITLY IMPRESSED ON THE AMBASSADOR
[97]THE NEED FOR THE US GOVERNMENT TO HOLD THE LINE AGAINST DISCLOSURE.
[99]5. IN THE FALL OF 1995, A NEW YORK TIMES ARTICLE ALLEGED THAT
[100]THE CIA HAD WIRETAPPED HASHIMOTO. RYUTARO, WHO HAS SINCE BECOME PRIME
[101]_MINISTER. IN RESPONSE TO THE ENSUING PRESS QUERIES, JAPANESE
[102]OFFICIALS OF THE CONCERNED MINISTRY DISMISSED THE STORY AS
[103]IMPLAUSIBLE. IF THE US GOVERNMENT DECLASSIFIES A DOCUMENT THAT
[104]CONFIRMS CIA PRESENCE IN JAPAN, IT.WOULD HAND THE JAPANESE PRESS NEW
[105]OPPORTUNITIES TO REOPEN THE ISSUE OF ALLEGED ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE AND
[106]ATTACK THE UNITED STATES AND ITS FRIENDS WITHIN THE JAPANESE
[107]GOVERNMENT . ; :
[109]6. DISRUPTION OF LIAISON RELATIONSHIPS: THE JAPANESE SERVICES
[110]GO TO GREAT LENGTHS TO KEEP THEIR RELATIONSHIPS WITH US INTELLIGENCE
[111]AGENCIES SECRET. ._ IN THE CASE-OF THE MOST IMPORTANT OF THOSE
[112]RELATIONSHIPS, ALL CONTACT COULD BE SEVERED IN THE EVENT OF
[113]DISCLOSURE AND EMBARRASSMENT. SUCH A RUPTURE IN THE RELATIONSHIP
[114]DEFIES EASY REPAIR. THE SOUTH KOREAN AGENCY FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
[115]PLANNING, WHICH SERIOUSLY EMBARRASSED JAPANESE LIAISON WHEN IT
[116]KIDNAPPED OPPOSITION POLITICIAN KIM DAE JUNG FROM TOKYO OVER TWO
[117]DECADES AGO, IS STILL TREATED AS A PARIAH TODAY.
[119]_ 7. IMPACT ON CONTINUING OPERATIONS: OUR ONGOING COOPERATION
[120]WITH A JAPANESE LIAISON SERVICE IN PURSUIT OF A MAJOR INTERNATIONAL
[121]TERRORIST GROUP COULD BE TOTALLY DISRUPTED BY DISCLOSURE. EXTREMELY
[122]IMPORTANT US LAW ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLIGENCE EQUITIES ARE AT STAKE
[123]IN THIS COOPERATIVE ENDEAVOR. THE TERRORIST GROUP IS PROBABLY NOT
[124]AWARE OF THE EXTENT OF US INVOLVEMENT IN THEIR PURSUIT. DISCLOSURE
[125]THAT REMINDED THEM OF THE POSSIBILITY OF US-JAPANESE COOPERATION
[126]AGAINST THEM COULD BE DETRIMENTAL TO OUR ABILITY TO COLLECT
[127]INTELLIGENCE ON THE GROUP.
[129]8. IMPACT ON SOURCES: STATION’S RELATIONSHIP WITH AT LEAST ONE
[130]*SOURCE PREDATES THE<JFK ASSASSINATION.> PUBLICITY ABOUT CIA PRESENCE
[131]AND ACTIVITY, EVEN IN THE PAST, OFTEN CAUSES SOURCES TO WONDER ABOUT
[132]SECRET
[135]13-00000_
[137]SECRET
[139]OUR ABILITY TO PROTECT THEIR SECURITY. OLDER SOURCES, NOT
[140]SURPRISINGLY, SEE EVEN PUBLICITY ABOUT THE PAST AS SOMETHING THAT
[142]COULD FOCUS ATTENTION ON THEM AS INDIVIDUALS.
[144]9. CL REASON: 1.5 (C); DECL ON: X1.
[146]10. FILE: NONE. DECL OADR DRV HUM 4-82.
[148]SND OF MESSAGE : ; SECRET
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