[1]157-10008-10241 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
[3]“
[5]-”
[7]Cipy
[8]7/2696
[9]Date:10/07/93
[10]Page:1
[11]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[12]( IDENTIFICATION FORM
[14]AGENCY : SSCIA
[15]DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
[17]RECORDS SERIES : RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
[19]IN THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZEO
[20]AGENCY FILE NUMBER : R602 Of) 19
[22]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[24]ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
[25]FROM :
[26]TO:
[28]TITLE :
[29]INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY
[31]DATE : 07/24/75
[32]PAGES : 7
[34]SUBJECTS :
[35]; INTERVIEW WITH BRUCE CHEEVER
[36]ow" ASSASSINATION INQUIRY
[38]DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[39]CLASSIFICATION : T
[40]RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
[41]CURRENT STATUS : P
[42]DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/07/93
[44]OPENING CRITERIA :
[46]COMMENTS :
[47]BOX 438-3
[49]HY 50955 Docld:32203749 Page Trp) - ITEM IS RESTRICTED
[51]_ 43 3 S © TERVIEH AND PEETING SUARY REC
[53]IN oo
[57]Phe we . - F
[59]( INTERVIEW WITH: Bruce Cheever UW
[60]REGARDING: Assassination rnquiry SSC! Co 43 8- 3
[61]SSE RON 858-5
[62]DATE“TIME-LOCATION: July 24, 1975 (og |
[63]PRESENT: Paul WALLACH and Joe DiGenova
[65]tL tn tet
[67]HAS OR SHOULD BE DIGESTED:
[69]FOLLOW UP REQUIRED:
[71]seen I ETA RRRAAAALALA tA UES EGFP egssnts ss nSSGGsAnLASSAh
[73]MATERIAL SUBMITTED BY INTERVIEWEE(S):
[75]EXECUTIVE SESSION: _ Yes __ flo
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[79]735
[81]F.0D
[83]INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY Page 1 of 6
[85]: an a Fae
[86]Y ND Of if PBB:
[88]This morning Joe DiGenova and I interviewed
[89]Bruce Cheever at the Carroll Arms. We focused on
[90]Cheever's tenure as deputy director of Task Force
[91]WwW.
[93]Background:
[95]1938-43 Marine Corps
[97]1943-44 OSS Parachute School
[99]1944-46 Marine Corps
[101]1950-53 Office Police Coordination; headed
[102]Plans Section for Western European
[103]Division 3
[105]1953-56 GH r ons: Gio 4
[107]1956-60 Deputy Chief, European Division
[109]1960-3/62 Headquarters, U. S. European Command
[111](U. S. representative)
[113]Deputy Director: Task Force W
[114]1965-71 GGHPEEAOf Stationy
[115]1971 Retired from Agency
[117]3/64-2/65 Deputy Chief, Special Operations
[119]Branch (developing paramilitary
[120]capabilities for Agency)
[122]3/62-65
[124]Apparently selected for Task Force W because
[125]of extensive paramilitary background. Not sure
[126]whether slotted by Harvey or Helms.
[128]Prior to his Task Force W'assignment, Harvey
[129]was known to Cheever by reputation only. He des-
[130]cribed Harvey as one of the finest operatives the
[131]Agency ever had, citing Harvey's Berlin tunnel.
[133]Cheever understood that Task Force W was
[134]Mongoose's instrument to get rid of the Castro
[135]regime; that the Cuban operations had White House
[136]backing; and that the Agency had been given an
[137]operational carte blanche, with the caveat that
[138]each operation had to receive explicit SGA approval
[139]prior to getting off the drawing board.
[141]GIA HAS NO OBJECTION T
[142]‘DECLASSIFICATION AND/OI
[144]E OF THIS DOCUME
[145]AS SANITIZED OCUME
[147]14 SR 94
[148]()CR)
[149]{¢ ce)
[151]Cheever told us: “You don't pull in fast~rising
[152]men like [Ted] Schakley unless you have solid back-
[153]ing." Cheever believes that Lansdale was RFK's
[154]representative and that Task Force W would not
[155]suggest aggressive covert action to the SGA with-
[156]out Lansdale's approval.
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[160]C
[164]INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY
[165]|
[167]i a .
[169]Cheever confirmed what we! ‘knew about ‘Harvey.
[170]Although Cheever worked closely with Harvey, he
[171]told us that Harvey was a loner and most surely
[172]would not inform him of operations unless he had
[173]a "must need to know". In Cheever's opinion,
[174]Harvey was one of the great believers in compart=-
[175]mentalization; Cheever "complained that Harvey
[176]turned him into his staff man” (as compared to an
[177]operational extension). Cheever also told us that
[178]Harvey was a two martini man at Lunch with thyroid
[179]problems; this often "led to problems for Harvey
[180]at early afternoon meetings".
[182]Cheever believes he attended at least ten SGA
[183]meetings. However ie*does*not recall RFK, only
[184]recalls briefing Bundy. (Maybe Cheever atténded
[185]other than SGA meetings -- the minutes do not re-
[186]flect his attendance.)
[188]Cheever met weekly with designees of the SGA
[189]principals in Lansdale's office (Messrs... Califano,
[190]Haig, Hurwitch, Craig, and Johnson). Cheever would
[191]brief these designees on proposed operational
[192]plans; discussion of the details would ensue.
[193]Subsequent to the staff meetings, the principals
[194]would meét and decide whether or not the particular
[195]plan would be approved. Cheever did state that the
[196]Group often rejected proposals. In one instance,
[198]' Max Taylor vetced the maritime infiltration of a
[200]small team. Taylor felt that the chances of success
[201]were small and attributability great. (Cheever
[202]agreed with Taylor -- “but it was one of Lansdale's
[203]brain childs.")
[205]Cheever told us that “around the Task Force W
[206]shop it was known that the Kennedys wanted to get
[207]rid of the Castro regime.” In order to get this
[208]done, “the Kennedys built a fire under the Agency's ©
[209]tail and installed Lansdale as Chief of Operations"
[210]According to Cheever, Lansdale and the SGA were ;
[211]“geared to keeping the Kennedys informed as to what
[212]was happening",
[214]However, after the Cuban missile crisis, Cuban
[215]operations were not pursued with the same sense of
[216]urgency.
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