[3]104-10110-10245) | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
[5].
[7]Sremrc 2
[9]P Eee eet YK ET
[11]MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Support Branch DATE: 1 July 1963
[12]FROM: : Mr. Ramon R. Hart
[14]SUBJECT : Manuel F. ARTIME Buesa
[16]#210 838
[18]1. On 24 June 1963, Mr. Charles Matt, sAs/MOB/PM, extension
[19]6488, was referred to me by the SAS Security Officer, Mr. George
[20]Iadner, and visited me in Room 4 E 21 to request some operational
[21]support beginning 1 July 1963. Mr. Matt advised that two leaders
[22]of the Cuban Exile Group were coming to Washington, D. C., on that
[23]latter date to confer with CIA and other Government officials,
[24]including probably Robert F. Kennedy, the Attorney General, concern-
[25]ing the "new program” for the exiles,
[27]%, Mr. Matt explained that a covert site (#302 922) located
[28]at/ 9218 Aldershot Drive, Bethesda Maryland, had recently been
[29]procured to billet these exiles and to serve as the meeting place
[30]for these sensitive discussions to take place. Mr. Matt said that
[31]SAS is vitally interested in what these two exiles say to each other
[32]when the U. S. Government officials have departed after a day's
[33]discussions. He, therefore, requested that microphones be concealed
[34]in the house to monitor their comments.
[36]3. Mr. Matt said that the two men would arrive on 1 July and
[37]would be in Washington at the house for about a week or ten days.
[38]. The audio coverage was requested for this entire time, Mr. Matt
[39]* also said that the house would be retained for several more months
[40]i and that the two exiles would return to Washington several more
[41]times in that period and that an audio surveillance would probably
[42]i95) be requested for these latter visits also.
[44]ke 4. Mr. George Ladner supplied the true name of the leader of
[45]“ the two. men, the captioned Subject. Having been informed by Mr.
[46]- | Matt that the coyert site was a private dwelling place in an
[47]--—-¥ expensive neighborhood, I assumed that there would be only two
[48]__| methods of making an audio penetration of the premises:
[53]ASTUAM Toc
[54]Backoround Cae An}
[55]Do Wot Fiasrodune
[58]1400000
[60]0)
[64]2)
[65]8
[67]om
[68]4
[70]Page Two
[71]#210 838
[73](a.) Concealing a tape recorder in the attic, base-
[74]ment, or garage, and using a voice-operated
[75]relay to actuate the recorder.
[77](b.) With the use of directories, search the
[78]environs of the safehouse for the purpose
[79]of locating a potential listening post where
[80]radio transmissions could be monitored.
[82]5 After checking with Mr. Joseph Langan, Acting Chief,
[83]Operational Support Division, I assigned the case to the District
[84]Field Office and directed some agents to case the house and the
[85]neighborhood to determine which method of penetration should be
[86]used. Mr. John Cryer was designated responsible agent at the
[87]District Field Office, and after a quick survey, he reported that
[88]the concealment and servicing of a tape recorder on the premises
[89]would be impossible and that the only method would be the use of
[90]& transmitter and a nearby listening post.
[92]6. Using the directories in SRS, I ran the names of all the
[93]residents of the houses within a quarter-mile of gthe covert site
[94]ie SRD Indices and found ong [Fred C. Thonad? Ir.) (457 328),
[95]of] 912T McDonald Drive, Bethesda, Maryland, to be a Staff employee.
[96]Thrdigh telephone informtion, I located Mr.f Thtitas|at the Langley
[97]Headquarters Building and personally contacted him the first thing
[98]in the morning of 25 June 1963. I indicated to Mr. (‘Th s]the fact
[99]that there was a safehouse in his neighborhood which we wanted to
[100]"pug" and that he was the only Staff employee who lived within range
[101]of our covert transmitters. I asked him if it would be too much of
[102]an pages on om him for us to set up a listening post in his house.
[103]Mr. [Théints lexplained that he was scheduked to depart for [Karachi, 10
[104]Pakistan) on a PCS assignment in approximately a month but that he
[106]would bé“glad to make his home available as a listening post. He
[107]confided that his primary mission in/Karachi was to be the audio! 4)
[108]penetration of the) Commmist Chinese Embassy land so he would look . uf
[110]forward to the next week's operations in hig-home as valuable “<"2
[111]training. The next step I took was to set up & meeting among
[113]George Ladner, Charles Matt, Sam Halpern, Executive Officer of SAS,
[114]and myself in Mr. Halpern's Office. I advised Mr. Halpern that the
[116]SECRET Oh
[119]14-0000
[123]SECRET .-
[125]Page Three
[126]#210 838
[128]audio surveillance appeared to: be technically feasible since I
[129]had located a possible listening post. However, I admitted
[131]to him that, even though the Office of Security has the "charter"
[132]to conduct the surveillance, TSD controls the necessary expensive
[133]equipment; Mr, Halpern mist arrange for TSD to transfer this
[134]equipment to the Office of Security. Mr. Halpern declared that
[135]the procurement of the necessary equipment should pose no problem
[136]after he would mike a few telephone calls. I then returned to.
[137]my office and made out a list of the equipment which I felt
[138]would be necessary, and awaited advice from him as to whom to
[139]contact in TSD to obtain it. 03
[141]7. After checking with Mr. (Bi T. Bentlof the Audio Opera~
[142]tions Branch of TSD as to appropriate equipment and after check-
[143]ing through the specifications in the "Audio Manual" of TSD,
[145]I selected the following:
[147]Two voice-operated relays, QSC-2, $2,200.00
[149]Two Transmitter Radios, FM, 130 - 140 550.00
[150]MCS, SRI~6H, @ $275 each ;
[151]Two Battery Packs, 130 hrs. ops., 50.00
[152]UWB-7, $25 each
[153]Two Battery "A", 1.5 volts, Burgess 2 F 1.08
[154]» 54 each
[155]One Battery "B", 45 volts, Burgess A~-30 1.87
[157]TOTAL $2,802.95
[159]8. About Noon on 25 June, I received a telephone call from
[160]Mr. John W. McBee, extension aisi, of TSD, who told me that every-
[161]thing had been laid on by SAS for me to obtain from TSD any
[163]SECRET
[166]14-0000
[169]it
[170]OQ
[171]rt]
[173]7
[175]Page Four
[177]#210 838
[179]equipment necessary for this operation. Mr. McBee directed that
[180]I £112 out a Form #88 and haye the technicians hand carry it to
[181]the Franconia Depot in order to obtain the equipment. The use of
[182]the Form #88 disturbed me in this matter because I had assumed
[183]from Mr. Halpern that he would arrange it so that TSD would turn
[184]over the equipment to us without charge to anyone. The use of
[185]the Form #88 implies that a division is allocating funds for the
[186]purchase of equipment. However, I filled out the Form #88,
[187]listing the above equipment, and walked it down to SAS, where I
[188]gave it to Charles Matt to have signed. The form, bearing the
[189]SAS Cost Center #3132-5455~3400 » was completed and returned to
[190]me within an hour, whereupon I gave it to DFO Agent Stan Lach,
[191]who drove with it inmediately to the Franconia Depot. I called
[192]ahead to Bob Woods and Charlie Beall of the T & I Shop at Franconia
[193]and requested that they give a little briefing concerning the
[194]operation of this equipment to Mr. Lach and Mr. Cryer, who was to
[195]meet Mr, Lach there. Neither Cryer nor Lach had eyer had any
[196]experience with any of the pieces of equipment on the list. Mr.
[197]Woods and Mr. Beall were quite cooperative in this request.
[199]9. Several problems kept appearing and disappearing while
[200]the DFO technicians were transporting, installing, and testing
[201]the equipment. One problem was the payment of the equipment. I;
[202]received a telephone call from Mr. Dayton S. ("Doc") Barrows of
[203]TSD, informing me that SAS had reneged on paying the $2,802.95 for
[204]the equipment, but that if I would tell him what equipment we
[205]wanted, he might be able to arrange to lend it to us. I told Mr.
[206]Barrows that as far as I knew, we had indeed obtained the equipment
[207]with the Form #88 y but that if we needed anything else, I would
[208]contact him. Another problem which appeared was the rumor that
[209]it was not two Cuban exiles who would be residing in the safehouse,
[210]but only the captioned Subject and a Spanish speaking Staff employee.
[211]If the rumor were actually true, it would seem that an audio
[212]surveillance of the safehouse would not be necessary. I called
[213]Charles Matt for an explanation, and he informed me that Senor
[214]Artime was going to be the only person living in the house after
[215]each day's discussions were completed - no Staff employee would
[216]be living with him. I asked Mr. Matt to whom Senor Artime would be
[218]see we
[220]OF
[221]ry
[222]c
[224]|
[227]14-0000
[229]if)
[230]ir
[231]C).
[232]v
[235]us
[237]Page Five
[238]#210 838
[240]holding the conversations which we were to record. He replied
[241]that he was interested in any visitors which the Subject might
[242]receive and any telephone calls which he might make. I suggested
[243]that possibly a telephone tap might be sufficient under these
[244]circumstances. Mr. Matt disagreed and still requested a micro-
[245]phone installation to cover the whole house if possible,
[247]10. In addition to the equipment obtained from TSD, the DFO
[248]agents took their own SRR-4 tuneable receiver and the SRR-4 charged
[249]to the WFO. These receivers would be used in the listening post to
[250]pick up the radiations from the two SRT-6H transmitters. It was
[251]suggested to the DFO agents to borrow the two WFO transceivers to
[252]be used to commmicate during the installation between the listening
[253]post and the safehouse; however, the agents chose not to use them
[254]and relied solely on telephonic commmications. The "A" and "B"
[255]batteries picked up at Franconia were to be used in the SRR-4
[256]receiver so that checks could be made from an automobile to see
[257]just how far the radiations extended around the transmitters. A
[258]report on the area covered by the transmitters was requested of
[259]the DFO agents.
[261]arrests
[263]! ll. The first test of the SRI-6H from the safehouse to the
[264]/ listening post was a failure. Its 50 milliwatt output, ordinarily
[265]! good for a quarter mile, wasn't sufficient to reach the ‘receiver,
[266]j 2/l0th's of a mile away. Its failure was blamed partly on the
[267]; Gistance, partly on the brick construction of the listening post,
[268]! and partly on the hilly contours of the housing development, which
[269]i deflected the 135 megacycle, line-of-sight radiations.
[271]' 12. When this disheartening news arrived, I immediately
[272]telephoned Mr. Barrows of TSD and requested a pair of the more
[273]powerful 150 milliwatt SRT-~7 transmitters, I telephoned Mr.
[274]Barrows rather than filling out another Form #88 to avoid a
[275]possible furor within SAS, Mr. Barrows consented to loan two of
[276]these transmitters with their proper receivers on a hand receipt
[277]to us, and Stan Lach was dispatched to Franconia to pick them up.
[278]An ree ty to test it on 28 June 1963 was thwarted because
[280]Mr. s}was having foreign visitors in for cocktails ‘mmiezesiome
[281]that afternoon. But the equipment was installed and tested the
[282]next day, Saturday, 29 June, and appeared to work satisfactorily,
[284]SECRET (®
[287]14-0000
[289]Uy me DF ey 5 : :
[291]switch.which. would, enable. the case officers to turn the transmitter,
[293]off when they are “present at the house holding the sensitive dis- “.
[295]turn it.on when they leave. . fo
[299]“ 15 ver.fteomea) and his wife have consented to do most of the
[300]operating of the.tape recorder themselves in their own ‘basement. .
[302]-With, the-use-.of the_yoice-cperated. paces te
[305]receiver, actuator, and recorder. Mr. (ThOdae fs well-known to his
[306]bug", :and: the: preeene of the -new. equipment..in
[307]i ‘the his vist org