[1]12 A804
[2]104-10306-10024) —
[4]| 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
[5]ne ; a :
[7]28 January 1963
[9]‘ ; MEMOPANDUH FOR Reseed
[11]WELT; Cubs
[13]Tho Executive Comittee met on Friday, January 25th, and
[14]! approved the rew policy as outlined by the Coov‘inator.
[16]Dacisions bearing on covert operations were ceached ss follews:
[18]1. The Special Group will have the responsibility of
[19]continuing review of thé program for infiltration of covert intelli-
[20]pence avents. Progress will be regularly check-d with the Group.
[21]Higher authority wade a particular point of saying that, although
[22]the objective of ‘intensified covert collection’ is approved,
[23]nonethsleas, CIA should not feel it ¢68 under pressure to "yet good
[24]men killed'’ in the ~rocass. In other words, the advantages to ba
[25]gained From intenstited collection must be continually weighed
[26]ageinst the risks. This will be done by the Special Group.
[28]2. The sctorney General expressed great interest in the
[29]extent to which key members of tho Brigade will be brought into
[30]planning and current operations. He thought that they should be
[31]thoroughly consulted on plans for intelligence teans and he indicated
[32]that he will personally keep an eye on progress in this regard.
[34]3. The use of propaganda balloons was disapproved at this
[35]time. It apparently wes not clear as to exactly how far CIA should
[36]go in maintaining its current capability for launching balloons. ,
[38]teivirtctrs
[40]At Mr. Bundy'a suggestion I had a long talk with Cottrell on
[41]Saturday, the 26th. We discussed in particular the method of operation
[42]with the Brigade. I pointed out some of the security aspects that
[43]would have to be watched, but expressed the opinion that a workable
[44]method of operation could be devised eo that the Brigade leaders
[45]could provide motivation and could feel a sense of participation,
[46]without having to bring them so closely into the details of target
[47]areas, dispatch, COmMRO y etc., as to constitute a security hazard.
[49]_ I cited the Agency's experience with the NTS as a possible guideline —
[50]in this regard. Wea agreed that after Mr. PitzGerald returns from
[51]Panama, about the first of February, the three of us should discuss
[52]thie matter further.
[54]TAP
[56]SECRET
[57]EYES ONLY
[59]8 February 1963
[61]MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
[63]SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 8 February 1963
[65]_ PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Gilpatric, Mr. McCone, Mr. Hilsman,
[67]and Mr. FitzGerald
[69]1. Agent Operations in Cuba
[71]Mr. FitzGerald discussed with the Group the CIA paper of
[72]6 February which recommends a total of five maritime infiltration/
[73]exfiltration operations during the next thirty days.
[75]He emphasized that these black operations are entirely of an
[76]intelligence nature and that they should be viewed only as a
[77]supplement to intelligence coverage accomplished by other means.
[78]In the latter connection, the point was made that information ob-
[79]tained by agents of this type can contribute to the targeting of
[80]aerial reconnaissance sorties and can assist in making the process
[81]of photo interpretation more meaningful, ,
[83]Mr. FitzGerald also emphasized that the teams now proposed
[84]are comprised of only one to three agents. He noted that the agents
[85]available are particularly well motivated, and that those whose
[86]primary motivation was toward action rather than intelligence have
[87]been weeded out.
[89]The consensus of the Group was that while agent operations of
[90]this type cannot be considered as a primary or major source of
[91]intelligence, nonetheless this type of operation is consistent
[92]with U.S. objectives in the Cuba situation and that approval of:
[93]these five should be recommended,
[95](These missions were approved by higher authority, 9 February
[97]1963)
[98]Subsidy t to , Venezuelan n Newspaper _
[100]= Mr. McCone reported on financial arrangements which have been
[101]made in connection with subsidy of, the Venezuelan newspaper, which
[103]SECRET
[104]EYES ONLY
[106]13-Q0000
[109]| | EYES ONLY
[115][vse approved at’ the meeting of 31 January 1963. He said that Agency :
[117]funds on deposit with the Morgan Guaranty, which will serve as i
[118]7 collateral against the bank's loan to the new entrepreneur of this -
[119]newspaper, would draw interest at 4%, while the purchaser will pay |!
[120]the commercial rate of 6%. The Chairman expressed satisfaction i
[121]with this arrangement: .
[123]week Parrott
[125]Distribution
[126]Mr.- Johnson
[127]Mr. Gilpatric
[128]Mr. McCone
[130]SECRET
[131]EYES ONLY
[133]1 3;00000
[135]: BOW TIE to check on this. It was pointed out that the. BOW TIE
[137]- SECRET
[138]EYES ONLY.
[140]28 February 1963
[142]MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
[143]SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 28 February 1963
[144]PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. McCone
[146]Colonel Steakley was present for Items 1-3
[148]1. [Reconnaissance - DOD Monthly Forecast .
[149]The Group had no objection to the BOW TIE missions as planned.
[151]| Mr. -McCone alluded, however, to. the unexplained military activity
[152]' that is going on in eastern China, and asked about the capability of
[154]program consists of comparatively shallow penetration which would
[155]probably not reach the kind of military target Mr. McCone had in mind.
[156]Accordingly, Colonel Steakley was asked to confer with COMOR to find
[157]out whether requirements exist for deeper penetration in the area,
[159]and if so to bring in an appropriate proposal to the Special -Group.
[161]In connection with project AMOS, Mr. Johnson read a message from
[162]Lord Home to the Secretary of State. Home said that while the RAF
[163]and the Air Ministry will be glad to have the advantage of the.
[164]intelligence resulting from the mission, nonetheless this represents
[165]a departure from the previous pattern of flights in the area.
[166]Additionally, the flight will, according to Home, go closer 'to the
[167]coast than the RAF is allowed to go. He was willing to agree to the
[168]mission, provided it was not viewed as establishing a precedent, and
[169]on the stipulation that Secretary Rusk personally accepts the risk
[170]entailed, Mr. Johnson said that Secretary Rusk is willing to accept
[171]this risk.
[173]The Group approved AMOS, subject to check by Mr. Bundy with
[174]higher authority, and on the understanding that the Group will have
[175]a chance to take a last look at it shortly before the scheduled date
[176]of 19 March, Colonel Steakley was also asked to report to the Group
[177]on the results of the mission. (This mission was later approved by
[178]higher authority.)
[180]In this connection, Mr. McCone commented on the great importance |
[181]of obtaining intelligence on the Soviet low-level SA-3 system. The |
[182]Group agreed that thisis a high-priority requirement, in order to] 7
[184]SECRET
[185]EYES ONLY
[187]13-00000
[191]: [provide a basis for estimating accurately the chances for successful
[193]ow-Level penetration of the USSR. Mr. McCone will arrange to have
[194]a USIB paper prepared on this subject.
[196]The Group noted the DESOTO destroyer voyage, which will now in-
[198]elude a courtesy call at Djakarta.
[200]Colonel Steakley told the Group that CINCLANT has tried out the
[201]MELON PATCH photography missions, operating under the ten mile re-
[202]striction which was laid on by the Special Group at its meeting of
[203]31 January. It is now apparent to CINCLANT that adequate photography
[204]of the desired areas cannot be obtained at that distance. The Group
[205]agreed that the ten mile restriction should remain in force. In n
[206]coming to this conclusion they made the point that in case of real
[207]need for this type of coastal intelligence, there ‘would be adequate
[208]time to obtain it after an emergency actually was in effect; -and
[209]further, any such information collected now would have to be up-dated
[210]before operations could be mounted based on it. ai
[212]The revised RED DOG missions, to bé flown in C-47's, and the Hl
[213]proposal to fly some BRASS KNOB missions from the Canal Zone, were :
[214]approved.
[216]Colonel Steakley was asked to give the Group a report on the
[217]results obtained from the last mission into the Sea of Okhotsk.
[219]Colonel Steakley told the Group that the JCS will make no
[220]recommendation on low-level coverage of Laos. (ABLE MABEL) until after
[221]the results of the Agency effort explained below.
[223]The Group made a point of saying that although the time is not
[224]now propitious. for covering the COMOR priority targets in Cuba with i
[225]low-level flights, it may well prove desirable to do this on fairly :
[226]short notice. Therefore this matter should be kept under constant
[227]review by operating elements.)
[229]2. ” [Reconnaissance >_CIA Monthly Forecast ;
[231]Mr. McCone told the Group that the weather has suddenly opened ‘
[232]up over North Vietnam and that the mission to cover that area, via :
[233]Laos, which was approved by the Special Group on 17 January, will “|
[234]actually be launched tonight. He said that after this is completed :
[235]the airplane will be ferried to Taiwan in accordance with the dis-
[236]cussion at the meeting of the 25th of February, transiting Laos on
[237]the way. Mr. McCone also reported on the recent successful GROSBEAK
[239]. mission. a _ et
[241]er aney
[242]oe WAR
[244]EYES ONLY Ly ,
[246]17-00000
[248]without specific approval by higher authority. 7]. .. wees eee
[250]eh:
[252]* removal of Soviet troops from Cuba. Mr. Bundy stated that the
[253]' official government position is that available information is in-
[255]6. ‘hite - Proposed Political actich?
[257]SECRET
[258]EYES ONLY
[262]wee ee . we .
[265]3. fiumovat of Soviet Troops
[267]Mr. McCone said that we still do not know very much about the
[269]sufficient to justify any change in the estimated figures of Soviets |
[270]on the island. He added that no change can be made in these ° figures,
[272]-}
[274]4, Testimony on Cuba
[276]Mr. McCone commented on the difficulties encountered by
[277]officials who are required to testify. before Congressional committees
[278]on the Cuban situation, in light of the propensity of these committees
[279]to question witnesses on statements made by other officials. Mr.
[280]Bundy recognized that this is a problem and said that in an attempt
[281]to alleviate it he has had several documents brought together. These
[282]include a compendium of the President's remarks on the subject; the
[283]DCL's report to the Killian Committee; a report by Assistant Secretary
[284]Martin; and most recently, the CIA-prepared paper on subversion in
[285]the hemisphere. He added that the basic responsibility for co-  .
[286]ordinating public statements rests with the Secretary \ of State.
[288]wT a jr ay |
[290]q.
[291]5. {Italy = ~ ‘Status | Report on Election Operation
[293]The Group noted that this project is progressing, but is still
[294]in its early stages. 7
[296]The Group approved the proposal dated 25 February, subject to
[298]ee by higher authority. (This was later granted.) 7
[300]7. [Asency Operations in Latin America 98
[302]Mr. Gilpatric inquired as to the feasibility of mounting 7
[303]intelligence or other operations against selected military personnel
[304]in Latin America, Mr. McCone said that some of this is being done
[305]but that he will have» it studied further. 7
[307]Tree oe
[309]8. Progress on Cuban Operations
[311]Mr. McCone told the Group that none of the five agent operations
[312]approved by the Group on the 8th of February has been successful.
[313]He noted that there have been a number of aborts due to weather,
[315]ceERET
[316]EYES ONLY
[318]1
[319]ae - rd f .
[321]Vane
[323]13-00000
[325]fo er
[326]7 EVES ONLY
[330]failure of equipment, and failure of rendezvous plans. He said
[331]that efforts are continuing to carry out these operations success-
[332]fully, but indicated some unhappiness with the results to date and
[333]the prospects of success. He alluded particularly to the qualities
[334]of the agent personnel. ,
[338]Thomas A. Parrott
[340]Distribution
[341]Mr. Johnson
[342]Mr. Gilpatric .
[343]Mr. McCone
[345]SECRET
[346]EYES. ONLY.
[348]DET) HE | cert ee cuneate OPIS SPORTS TA te TERR LTST OREN Cree on Cece C ee ee rc eh
[350]13-OQ00 Qerypissueresmsromnarea ert entra ame mtamuae rita
[352]or .
[354]14 March 1963
[356]MEMORANDUM FOR MEMBERS OF THE SPECIAL GROUP ; 7
[357]SUBJECT: Approval of Cuba Papers
[359]All members of the Special Group have now approved the
[360]following memoranda from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs:
[362]a. “Covert Propaganda to Stimulate Passive Resistance
[363]and Low-Risk, Simple Sabotage," 8 March 1963.
[365]b. "Proposed Infiltration/Exfiltration Operations in
[366]Cuba - 15 March 1963 to 15 April 1963," 11 March 1963.
[368]SMiuparehk
[370]Thomas A. Parrott
[372]Distribution
[373]Mr. Johnson
[374]Mr. Gilpatric
[375]Mr. McCone
[378]13-00000
[380]26 March 1963
[382]MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
[384]SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 26 March 1963
[386]PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. McCone.
[388]Dr. Scoville, Mr. McMillan, and Colonel Steakley were
[389]. present for Items 1-5.
[391]Mr. Lundahl was present for Item 1.
[393]Mr. FitzGerald was present for Item 5.
[395]1. | Low- Level Reconnaissance, Cuba
[397]i
[399]In connection with the USIB recommendation for resumption of
[400]low-level coverage of Cuba, Mr. Lundahl showed the Group examples
[401]of the additional information that can be obtained from low-level
[402]photography as contrasted with high-level coverage. This had to do
[404]particularly with identification of materiel, spotting of personnel,
[405]etc. .
[407]‘ Mr. McCone emphasized that low-level coverage would give us
[409]. additional information on the numbers of Soviet troops and possibly
[410]on Soviet intentions, and similar subjects, but that it would not
[411]represent a qualitative shift in the body of intelligence available,
[412]It would. not reveal anything that would be of major security interest
[413]to the U.S. and which could not be picked up by high-level coverage.
[415]Mr. McCone ‘also, referred to the progress of certain negotiations
[416]which have been holding up active consideration of low-level photo-
[417]graphy. He said that there are differences of opinion among people
[418]' closest to this situation as to what the effect of resumption of such
[419]i photography actually might be on the negotiations.
[421]Mr. Gilpatric said that Defense is not convinced of the urgency
[422]of this proposition and would not favor it at, this time, unless others
[423]feel that there is an overriding political reason for.undertaking the
[424]project. He said that he would prefer to see this capability reserved
[425]for identifying the type of threat that we might otherwise not be
[427]aware of, or used at a time when there was some political advantage to
[428]be gained by low-level flights. 7
[430]ee eee epee oe SEE See special minutes
[431]aoe or additional item
[433]i
[435]3-00000
[437]_, disapproved by higher authority.)
[439]| Mr. Johnson said that the Secretary of State does not believe i
[441]pa _ wanes coe eee
[443]o 98 WSS ORT TEDW ILE SR EE aa Ve -
[444]5 %
[447]that-there is any foreign policy reason for mounting the operation \
[448]at this time, and in fact the Secretary and other high officials in
[449]the Department feel that from a policy point of view it would be
[450]inadvisable now.
[452]The Group then agreed that the resumption of low-level coverage
[453]would not be recommended at this time, but that it would be kept
[454]under weekly review. ]
[456]46
[458]2. (Reconnaissance Indonesia
[460]The Group noted the intelligence justification for this proposal
[461]and the political objections to it, and the Chairman agreed to discuss |
[462]it with higher authority as an example of a situation where clear-cut
[463]differences of interest exist. He said that if there was any doubt ‘
[464]from that quarter he would have all the principals participate in
[465]further discussion with higher authority. (The proposal was later
[467]98
[468]3. { Peripheral Reconnaissance Operations ‘i
[470]a. Colonel -‘Steakley gave the following brief reports ona
[471]number of peripheral missions:
[473](1) The ELINT coverage of-the; Sea of Okhotsk produced good
[474]results. He said that this area is now so well covered with
[475]radars that consideration should probably be given as to whether
[476]the rules requiring an abort in case of an AI lock-on should be
[477]relaxed. ; j
[479](2) The AMOS mission, directed against SA-3's in the
[480]Baltic, did not result in any ELINT take from the radars
[481]associated with the SA-3's. He said that some question now
[482]arises as to whether these weapons are in fact. SA~3's or
[483]perhaps a later generation of the SA-2.
[485](3) A DESOTO destroyer mission off the Soviet Maritime
[486]Provinces resulted in Soviet instructions to shut down their
[487]radars when the ship approached.
[489]b. The Group approved four missions (UNA, DANIEL, FLOYD and
[490]GEORGE) using new ASD-1 equipment, This includes two in the Baltic
[491]area, one in the Black Sea, and one flying from England to the Black
[493]Sea.'7
[496]13-00000
[498]1 fi
[500]y
[501]“
[502]i
[504]EYES ORY
[507]4. ‘(ums Balloons 98 2s
[510]Dr. Scoville gave the Group details of the operation in the
[511]Sea of Japan, employing balloons against TALL KING radars. He said ‘
[512]that the results indicate that perhaps these radars are not as :
[513]efficient as we had thought , but that further analyeis is _Proceeding.
[515]5. Covert “operations, Cuba
[519]Noting that the shipping sabotage paper of 19 March had
[520]not been considered by the Cottrell committee as a body, the Special
[521]Group asked that such proposals be considered in that way before
[522]submission to the Special Group. In passing the recommendations to
[523]the Special Group it should be indicated what the position of the
[524]various Cottrell members was, just as is done in the case of political
[525]projects coordinated with State and the ambassador. Each member of
[526]the Cottrell committee would see to it that his own agency staffed
[527]the paper in the normal way for submission to the Special Group.
[529]b. Sabotage of Shipping
[531]The substance of the 19 March paper was then considered.
[532]Mr. McCone raised a question as to exactly what the U.S. objective
[533]now is in this and related fields, and questioned in addition whether
[534]we may be trying to manage exile groups too closely...
[536]There was some discussion as totthe actual value of carrying
[537]out the proposed sabotage, that is whether enough damage could be
[538]done to hurt the Castro regime seriously. The consensus of the Group
[539]seemed to be that activity of this kind should not be undertaken if
[540]it could be expected to yield only small gains, but that if its
[541]effect would be really significant then that would be a different
[542]matter.
[544]Considerable doubt was expressed. about the proposal for
[545]sinking and setting fire to ships. None of the members felt that
[546]there was any particular objection to the use of abrasives or other
[547]damaging materials.
[549]The proposal was then remanded for group consideration by
[550]the Cottrell committee. This committee is asked to look at the pro~
[551]posal in relation toeeverything else that is going on or is under
[552]serious consideration, in order to assess its true potentiality.
[554]Mr. FitzGerald was authorized to modify the proposal to the extent
[556]19-0000. Pere UUme: St epee OS Crs Te Lae
[557]Poe a!
[559]SELON SOTO EEO St SEEN CSL BeS
[561]cere. peg
[562]eo Soule
[566]of considering possible unilateral action as opposed to using an
[568]‘exile group as a cutout. Mr. Bundy will explore-exactly what the
[570]feeling of higher authority is with respect to relations with exile
[571]groups.
[573]Ce. Additional Programs
[575]Mr. Johnson mentioned the activities of the NIS, which has
[577]been broadcasting in Russian to the Soviet troops over. Radio Caribe
[579]in the Dominican Republic. Mr. FitzGerald agreed to add this to the
[580]possibilities listed under radio broadcasting.
[582]Mr. Johnson questioned the extent to which proposition b.,
[583]involving inciting Cubans to commit aggressive acts against Soviet
[584]personnel, is in accord with current objectives.
[586]On the matter of propaganda balloons, most members of the
[587]Group felt that these might be useful in connection with the particular
[588]target mentioned - the May Day concentration which is expected in Havana.
[589]Mr. Johnson had some reservations which he wanted to check out further
[590]in the Department. It was agreed that should State take a favorable
[591]view, then the matter would be presented to higher authority.
[593]As to the request for Defense training facilities, Mr.
[595]_ Gilpatric asked that Mr. FitzGerald discuss the needs with Secretary
[597]Vance. Mr. FitzGerald said that the principal requirement which can-
[598]not be met in CIA facilities is adequate space for weapons training,
[599]Members of the Group recalled that the objection to the use of Defense
[600]facilities at the time it was presented during the MONGOOSE period,
[601]was that this would make it difficult, if not impossible, to deny
[602]official U.S. involvement. Mr. Bundy said that he saw no objection
[603]iff the purpose was to train Cubans for eventual open hostilities, but
[604]thought that in this case the objective might be better achieved by
[605]having them undergo regular U.S. Army training. The other members
[607]agreed.
[608]Thomas ¢ Parrott
[609]Distribution
[610]Mr. Johnson
[612]Mr. Gilpatric
[613]Mr. McCone
[617]13- 0006
[621]NY
[623]SAHOO
[625]0 LASS Natal |
[627]mmm be ddddddddddé
[629](BYE-12693-63 *
[630]Cy 1
[632]Handle Via Indicated Controls —
[634]Wt
[635](BYEMAN)
[637]eS
[639]WARNING
[641]This document cont infor offec! the nel of the ted Stotes wi thin the mean-
[642]i of the espion «te ows ue "s Co de 7 te abel ‘Ses i = 798 6 na 794, The law prohibit ronsmi
[643]ion or the revel tion of it 1 to person, as rel
[645]manner prejudicial h of the “Un ite 4 Sta for the benefit of ony f gn g
[646]ment tc the detrim f the U d ste « Itis to sly by U.S lesp ul d
[647]trinoted and auth formation in the desig d ol ci | b
[648]meintoined in occord with regul pertaining he d d control
[650]ULE. WLLLZE:
[652]Zz
[654]13-00000.
[658]4 April 1963
[660]MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
[661]SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 4 April 1963
[662]PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Gilpatric, Mr. McCone, Mr.’ Hughes
[664]Dr. Scoville and Colonel Steakley were present for
[665]Items 1 and 2.
[667]Commander Yates was present for Item l.
[669]1. [pon Peripheral Reconnaissance 76 . ,
[671]aa he PS eer
[673]The DOD monthly forecast of peripheral reconnaissance activities
[674]“wag noted. Special note was taken of mission ULCER GULCH, which.all
[675], members approved. Consideration of YANKEE PASHA was deferred for at "
[676]‘ least a week because of certain points raised hy the Secretary of :
[677]_ State. Mr. Bundy said that he himself would normally have no objection :
[678]: to this operation but that conditions at the moment make it in- :
[679]i , advisable to go ahead at this precise time.
[681]‘Colonel Steakley was asked to brief the Group on the special
[682]navigational safeguards which would be used in the YANKEE PASHA
[683]operation, at a later meeting when Mr. Johnson could be} present.
[685]Commander Yates briefed the Group on certain submarine operations.
[686]Mr. Gilpatric undertook to assure himself: that adequate: procedures
[687]exist for notifying members of the Special Group and other key officials
[688]in the event of an untoward incident » 7
[690]2. “Reconnaissance } Missions, Far East IS
[691]J
[692]eee Mr. McCone briefed the Group on the results of two recent missions.
[693]yr He pointed out that there are now no authorizations ougstanding for
[694]| high- performance reconnaissance in the Far East.
[696]x
[698]The recommendations in the NRO paper for the Special Group, dated
[700]. 4 April, were approved with the exception of 7. b (Laos), which was 1
[701]: . deferred for later consideration, Mr. McCone agreed to mention these
[702]approvals cto higher authority, but it was felt that no further formal
[704]‘| approval was required. ]
[706]Peatelehal
[709]13-00000
[711]dese eee RAE TERT OMG i tab Mae ete orem tee atte ce a
[715]fete,
[717]EVES ONLY
[723]{ All members of the Group expressed their interest in gétting on
[725]with plans for resuming FALCON missions. It was noted that one of the;
[726]ji principal problems in this area is the question of a base. It was I
[727]* agreed that we should probably approach this from the point of view £
[728]i; Of obtaining a standby agreement with the Indian Government to permit '
[729]“staging in and out of that country. Dr. Scoville said that a message |
[730]‘had gone out to the field on this point last night. The Chairman \
[731]. asked that word be sent to the Ambassador that high-level interest t
[732]‘in this proposition does exist in Washington. ’]
[734]3. (Gratus Report on Italian ‘Elections
[735]CIA's paper. of 1 April was noted. ]
[737]' \
[738]4. [Lewctevel recon’ ssance Cuba .” . '
[740]i The Group took no action on this sub ject J ‘
[742]5. ‘(Govert Subsidy for Kong £2 aa
[744]. . ,
[746]a
[748])
[750]rao) (At Mr. Hughes' suggestion, it was agreed that CIA should look into |
[751]” the possibilities of a covert Payment to Kong Le.]
[752]: 6. Cuban “Operations
[754]The Group recommended approval of the following papers from the
[755]Coordinator of Cuban Affairs:
[757]a. Sabotage of Shipping, 19 March, as amended by a
[758]memorandum from the Deputy Coordinator, 2 April 1963.
[760]b. Russian Language Broadcasts, 2 April 1963.
[762]c.. Propaganda Inciting Cubans within Cuba to Attack
[763]Soviet Troops, 2 April 1963.
[765]Mr. Bundy and Mr. FitzGerald will obtain final approval from
[767]higher authority.
[768]Thomas \ . aya
[770]Distribution
[771]Mr. Johnson
[772]Mr. Gilpatric
[773]Mr. McCone
[775]ye
[777]13-00000
[781]9 April 1963
[783]MEMORANDUM FOR MEMBERS OF THE SPECIAL GROUP
[785]SUBJECT: Status of Approvals for Covert Actions, Cuba
[787]1. Propaganda Inciting Cubans to Commit Acts Against Soviet
[788]_. Troops .
[790]Approved by higher authority, on the understanding that.
[791]the propaganda will be non-attributable to the United States.
[793]2. Sabotage of Cuban-Owned Shipping
[794]This. was approved by higher authority. It was noted that
[796]“the suggestion for external explosive charges had been deleted from
[798]the proposal approved by the Special Group last week. (This will
[799]be considered along with other suggestions in an over-all sabotage
[800]paper, in accordance with decisions reached at the special meeting
[801]of 3 April.) ce
[803]3. Soviet. Language Broadcasts
[805]The Radio Liberty proposition has been approved, with the
[806]understanding that there will be no “opening fanfare" in connection
[807]with the inauguration of the program; if a ceremony is unavoidable
[808]it must be played in a low key. The proposal for a Unidad Revolucion-
[809]aria program is disapproved. The suggestion for intrusion on Radio
[810]Moscow broadcasts is disapproved.
[812]4. Leaflet Balloons
[814]This proposal has been disapproved by higher authority.
[816]Thomas fp Parrott
[818]Distribution
[819]' Mr. Johnson
[820]Mr. Gilpatric
[821]Mr. McCone
[823]SECRET
[824]EYES ONLY
[826]13-00000
[828]cone
[830]a EYES ONLY ~
[832]12 April 1963
[834]MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
[835]SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 11 April 1963
[836]PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. McCone
[838]Dr. Scoville, Colonel Ledford and Colonel Steakley
[839]were present for Items 1 - 3.
[841]Mr. FitzGerald was present for Item 4,
[843]46
[845]1. acommatssane Northern Laos
[847]It was agreed that the proposal for this coverage, which was
[848]contained in the NRO paper of 4 April and which was deferred last
[849]week, should be approved.
[851]Mr. McCone mentioned the difficulties which have arisen with
[852]Sarit, noting particularly that he is unwilling to give permission
[853]|, for the renewed use of Takhli until certain Thai officials return
[854]| to Bangkok from Paris, which will be around the 20th of this month,
[855]Mr. McCone mentioned the possibility of basing the aircraft in the
[856]Philippines or Taiwan, if the Takhli possibility should fall through
[857]completely. ,
[859]The DCI said that if it proves impossible to mount missions
[860]designed to cover the Sino-Indian border, then three will be required
[861]for Laos and North Vietnam, If on the other hand the Sino-Indian
[862]missions are run, then only two additional ones. would be required to
[863]cover Laos and North Vietnam, since some of the area could be covered
[864]in the process of the Sino-Indian coverage.
[866]Mr. Bundy will clear these proposals with higher authority. ]
[868]2. [Coverage of Sino-Indian Border Area 96
[870]wees J
[872]Dr. Scoville reported on the difficulties encountered in ob-
[873]taining Indian approval for staging aircraft through that country,
[874]stressing the fact that the chief of the intelligence service will
[875]not be available in India until the 16th of this month, and no
[876]. decision can be expected before then. He said that the time before
[877]i the onset of the monsoon season is getting short. Dr. Scoville said ©
[878]that efforts are continuing to get staging approval from the Indians,’
[879]as well as approval from the Thais to base in Takh1i.)
[881]crerey
[882]EVES Oia
[884]Lat
[886]13-00000 |
[888]ad
[890]2
[892]i
[893]i
[895]i
[897]“aircraft, since January 1961.
[899]: was considerably higher. Mr. Bundy asked him to provide for the Group
[901]SECRET 7
[902]EYES ONLY Me
[906]pete cs, eh Eee Aen Ae ~ GE - rs -_ nn - ; '
[908]3. (Inadvertent Overflights by 2 Reconnaissance Aircraft
[910]Colonel Steakley distributed a. memorandum listing the four
[911]‘inadvertent overflights of Soviet territory by U.S. reconnaissance
[913]He commented that in previous years the rate of such incidents |
[914]|
[915]in the next week or so a recapitulation of such incidents, going back |
[916]to approximately 1949.
[918]Colonel Steakley said that both CINCPAC and the Joint Reconnais-
[919]sance Group believe that the incident of 10 April, when an ELINI ;
[920]aircraft flew over one of the Kuriles, appears to represent a violation:
[921]of established procedures and instructions. CINCPAC has asked for |
[922]a full report. “
[924]Mr. McCone questioned the efficacy of the system of advising \
[925]Special Group members of such incidents. Colonel Steakley said that
[926]a procedure has been specified and he undertook to: provide a copy to
[927]‘Mr. Parrott for the information of the Group, He said that he would \
[928]take Special measures _temake sure that these instructions are followed. \
[930]&. ‘Cuban Operations
[932]Mr. FitzGerald expanded orally on the paper of 9 April, giving
[933]a summary of the recent results in the agent infiltration program,
[934]and outlining proposals in this field for the next month, The Group
[935]approved this projection. In response to. a question about the status
[936]of Manolo Ray's people, Mr. FitzGerald said that CIA was in touch with
[937]him from time to time, and that any plan he has to offer for activity
[938]against Cuba will be sympathetically received, but that he has not to
[939]date come up with any such proposal.
[941]The comments from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, dated 11 April,
[942]on the three papers being considered at today's meeting were noted,
[943]The Group requested that these comments be withdrawn and destroyed
[944]for security reasons. With specific reference to the comment that a
[945]proposed sabotage action should not be carried out on the target date
[946]of the 20th or 21st of April, Mr. FitzGerald pointed out that this date
[947]had been set before the status of the Donovan negotiations was known.
[948]He said that of course no activity of this kind would be allowed to
[949]interfere with those negotiations at this stage.
[951]There then ensued a lengthy discussion of the entire question of
[952]sabotage. The Group agreed that the papers before it were responsive
[953]to requests which had been levied on CIA to come up with general and
[954]specific proposals. On the other hand, all members of the Group
[955]recognized that a searching examination must be undertaken in the light
[957]ereney
[958]EVES ONLY
[959]| Joye
[961]13-00000
[967]nee, See
[969]i of all pertinent factors, to determine whether we wish to change the
[970]| present policy. It was agreed that in order to provide a firm basis
[971]of for judgment, we must get a clearer picture of capabilities, of the
[973]4 prospects of success, the extent of benefits to be gained from
[974], . successful operations, the dangers of repercussions and of reprisals,
[975]etc., etc.
[977]With respect to external operations to be mounted by exile groups,
[978]it was agreed that this sort of activity poses a real dilemma.
[979]Particularly in view of the recently-enunciated policy toward exile
[980]raids, it becomes increasingly difficult to disavow plausibly
[981]\ responsibility for such acts. The U.S. is thus placed in the position
[982]4 of either appearing to be ineffective in controlling the exiles or
[983]: of bearing the onus of active involvement in the operations.
[985]Mr. McCone expressed great skepticism about the desirability of
[986]proceeding with sabotage operations, to include training, until an
[987]over-all policy is made clear on steps to be taken to assure the re-
[988]moval of Soviet troops and on the problem of Castro. He also com-
[989]mented on the ineffectiveness of Cuban agents and the fact that they
[991]- would undoubtedly talk if captured. Mr. FitzGerald confirmed the
[992]¢ second point, but felt that these particular Cubans are perhaps more
[993]effective than the usual run.
[995]It’ was decided that. probably Friday, the 19th of April, a pre-
[996]sentation should be made to higher authority at which time all
[997]responsible individuals should have an opportunity to express their
[998]views. A paper will be prepared, outlining: a proposed broad program
[999]for sabotage as well as examples of specific operations; a sense of
[1000]the scale of activity which could reasonably be expected and the
[1001]benefits from it; an estimate of what could be achieved by the use of
[1002]internal assets; possible repercussions; and how such activity would
[1003]fit into overall policy. CIA is to coordinate with State in the
[1004]preparation of this Paper. cee ee oy onieeieseececpmete eee
[1008]5. * (Annexes to Internal Defense Plans
[1009]The Colombia annex was noted, Im view of the fact that the
[1010]basic IDP for Bolivia had earlier been remanded for revision by the
[1012]Special Group (CI), the covert annex for that country was held over
[1013]» until the overt plan is considered by the CI Group.)
[1015]6. (Roreh Vietnam operationg ©
[1017]The monthly report was noted and approved.) - ——
[1019]ereney
[1020]EYES ONLY
[1022]13-00000,
[1024]SORT
[1026]EYES ONLY | OAL | lig
[1028]18 April 1963
[1030]ER. 63-3278
[1032]SUBJECT: Minutes. of Meeting of the Special Group, 18 April 1963
[1034]MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
[1036]PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. McCone
[1038]The Attorney General, General Taylor, Mr. Murrow, and
[1039]Mr. FitzGerald were present for Item l.
[1041]1. Cuban Operations
[1043]Mr. FitzGerald said that in view of the postponement of the
[1044]meeting tentatively set for tomorrow with higher authority, the
[1045]proposed sabotage actions for April will be cancelled and two caching
[1046]operations, in Pinar del Rio and Matanzas, will be substituted. The
[1047]Group approved this.
[1049]Mr. FitzGerald told the Group that in view of the negative
[1050]decision on balloons, he was proposing to dismantle the capability,
[1051]which is expensive to keep in being. He said that if it were desired
[1052]to start the program up at any time after dismantling, it would take
[1053]about three months. A number of members of the Group felt that ina
[1054]real crisis balloons could be of considerable value. Accordingly, it
[1055]was agreed that balloons and helium should be stockpiled, with the
[1056]idea that if a situation should arise in which balloons would be use-
[1057]ful, launching could be accomplished by a'U.S. vessel, without worrying.
[1058]too much about attribution under those circumstances. In commenting
[1059]on his opposition to the earlier proposition, Mr. Murrow said that he
[1060]believes that balloons can be useful as a part of an integrated
[1061]program.
[1063]The Group then turned to discussion of the papers from the Co-
[1064]ordinator of Cuban Affairs dated April 16th, 17th, and 18th. It was
[1065]noted that there had not been time for adequate staffing of these papers
[1066]and that the principals had not been able to examine them carefully.
[1068]In this connection, Mr. McCone said that he wanted the Office of
[1069]National Estimates of CIA to review the papers, in light of their
[1070]estimative content. It was thus agreed that the papers should be
[1071]staffed and sharpened up for presentation at next week's meeting. Mr.
[1072]Johnson suggested that a possible format might be to produce one paper
[1073]which would be prefaced by the guidelines currently contained in the
[1075]Coordinator's paper of April 18th. This would be followed by a
[1076]"summary of sabotage capabilities and the pros and cons of various
[1078]types, and then recommendations.
[1080]SECRET
[1081]EYES ONLY
[1083]13-00000
[1085]|
[1086]|
[1087]|
[1088]i
[1089]|
[1091]2.0 (Heconnaissance of Laos © GF
[1093]a
[1095]: authority. ]
[1097]. ~ SECRET ~
[1098]EYES ONLY |
[1102]Mr. Bundy and Mr, McCone expressed some doubts as to whether we
[1103]are in a position to decide major problems of this type until we
[1104]have a clearer picture of what the over-all policy toward Cuba is
[1105]likely to be for the next six months to a year and a half. Mr. Bundy
[1106]pointed out that the noise level which would be involved in many of
[1107]these proposals would be considerably more than it has been to date,
[1108]and he felt that we must decide whether we are willing to accept this.
[1109]He added that he did not feel that such a development would necessarily
[1110]be bad, but it would certainly be different from the low-level
[1111]activities prevailing now. He was not sure whether, or to what extent,
[1112]it would be possible to embark on the activities proposed in the
[1113]Coordinator's papers, without a drastic change in U.S. policy. In this
[1114]connection, Mr, Johnson said that he particularly likes the proposals
[1115]for supporting internal resistance operations, since these will not
[1116]generate a high noise level.
[1118]Mr. FitzGerald pointed out that the paper of April 17th, on a
[1119]"Maximum Covert Action Program" consists basically of sabotage and
[1120]harassment, plus support to Cuban exile groups and individuals who
[1121]may be responsive to our advice but certainly not to our command,
[1123]He mentioned some of the difficulties that would flow from supporting
[1124]one group and not others. Mr. McCone said that if such groups become
[1125]active, it will be obvious that’ they have U.S. support because it is
[1126]well known that they do not have adequate assets now. He and Mr,
[1127]Bundy agreed that, despite the fact that some Central American govern-
[1128]ments might be used as cutouts, the U,S,. would be blamed for their
[1129]activities and this must be clearly recognized before embarking on
[1130]such a course. They felt additionally that we must be sure that such
[1131]a program would contribute to over-all policy objectives. |
[1133]Mr. McCone and Mr. FitzGerald referred to the CIA estimate that
[1134]time iscrunning in favor of Castro, and Mr. FitzGerald ‘said that
[1135]some of these activities are designed to slow down or, possible stop
[1136]the trend of events in his favor. .%
[1138]eA
[1139]It was noted that the program for shipping sabotage, which has
[1140]already been approved, is in process of possible implepcat ton It
[1141]was agreed that this process should not be interrupte a
[1143]A COMOR paper, suggesting that certain targets in Southern Laos
[1144]“be included in the proposed missions for Northern Laos, was distributed
[1146]‘and no objection was expressed to it. Mr. Bundy noted that he had not
[1148]yet had an opportunity to clear the ortiginal proposal wen higher
[1150]SECRET +
[1151]EYES ONLY. -
[1153]4
[1155]13-00000
[1157]25 April 1963 .
[1159]MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
[1160]SUBJECT: . Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 25 April 1963
[1161]PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. McCone,
[1163]Dr. Scoville and Colonel Steakley were present for
[1164]Items 1-4. a. t
[1166]Mr. FitzGerald was present for Items 1-5.
[1167]Mr. Jorgensen was present for Item 3.
[1169]Mr. Tweedy was present for Item 6,
[1171]1. (Forecast of NRO Activities for May
[1173]- This fotecast was noted. ]
[1174]- [Reconnaissance of Laos and Vietnam 78
[1176]“Mr. McCone referred to a paper prepared by the JCS at the
[1178], request of the Secretary of Defense, outlining a possible schedule
[1180]eof reconnaissance missions over Laos and Vietnam, which seemed to
[1181]Mr. McCone to be unduly heavy. Mr. Gilpatric explained that the
[1182]paper had been drawn up as an annex to a draft contingency plan,
[1184]and was responsive to a direct request from the Secretary of Defense
[1185]to indicate a sizeable capability for high-level reconnaissance for
[1186]intelligence purposes. Mr. Gilpatric added that it is clearly under-
[1187]stood that such activity would not represent a "show of force," and
[1188]that the latter would requfre low-level activity. Mr. McCone agreed
[1189]with this peint and emphasized the unusual sensitivity of any high-
[1190]level reconnaissance of denied areas.
[1192]Mr. Gilpatric assured the Group that these plans are all of a
[1193]contingency nature and that at this point they are by no means
[1195]GS
[1197]re
[1199]3. Propose, "Feint" Operations, GROSBEAK
[1201]Mr. Jorgensen summarized the paper of the 22nd of April. He
[1203]said that these proposals are frankly regarded as experimental.’
[1205]SECRET
[1206]EYES ONLY =
[1208]13-00000
[1210]Mr. Bundy added that there is high-level interest in reviewing this
[1212]- SECRET.
[1213]EYES ONLY
[1219]) (Cotone1 Steakley said that from the JCS point of view, such
[1220]| feints might represent a tactical advantage, in that they could
[1222]| divert enemy defenses from actual operations. On the other hand,
[1224]the JCS procedures are designed so as not to be provocative in
[1225]connection with peripheral and BOW TIE missions. He felt that this
[1226]proposal, which is frankly designed to be provocative, could have
[1227]the effect of inducing quicker and more intensive reaction to the
[1228]JCS flights.
[1230]On the understanding that the feint activities would be closely
[1231]coordinated with military missions in the area, it was agreed that
[1232]the proposed program should be tried for the month of May. At the
[1233]end of this period, a report on the results will be made to the
[1234]Special Group. ]
[1236]4.0 (Low-Level Reconnaissance, Cuba 9G
[1238]- The DCL said the USIB unanimously reaffirmed yesterday the
[1239]‘priority intelligence requirements for low-level coverage of Cuba.
[1241]situation,
[1243]Mr. Johnson said that in the view of the Bureau of Intelligence
[1244]and Research of the State Department, the Soviets would interpret
[1245]a resumption of low-level flights as an indication of the adoption
[1246]by the U.S. of a harder line toward Cuba. More significantly,
[1247]Ambassador Thompson is very much opposed to such resumption at this
[1248]time; he feels that this could result in a reduction in the rate of
[1249].withdrawal of Soviet troops or a Soviet decision to withdraw none at
[1250]all in the future, and it might affect Soviet policy in Laos in a.
[1252]manner adverse to U.S. interests. The importance of the Harriman. i”
[1254]mission with respect to this last proposition was noted. Mr. Johnson
[1255]said we should know the results of the Harriman mission in a day or
[1257]* two.
[1259]It was agreed that the matter would be discussed with higher
[1261]authority this afternoons].
[1263]5. Proposed ‘New Policy and Program toward Cuba
[1265]Mr. McCone opened the discussion of this topic by pointing out
[1266]that the overt and multilateral pressures now being applied to Cuba
[1267]are useful; on the other hand, while they will slow Castro down they
[1268]will not hurt him critically, and the interest of our allies in
[1269]maintaining such pressures will almost certainly erode as time passes.
[1270]Similarly, any sabotage program can hurt the Castro government, but
[1271]not lethally; and in order to be effective at all, it must be done on
[1273]SE RET
[1274]EYES ONLY
[1276]Ye:
[1278]13-00000
[1280]on eo SEGRET
[1281]ae EYES ONLY
[1287]i a continuing basis and cannot be subjected to a stop-and-go treatment,
[1288]The DCI went on to say that any such activity is bound to be attributed
[1289]to the United States and if we are to carry through with it, we must
[1290]be prepared to accept the accompanying noise level. He said that a
[1292]- sabotage program will not be entirely beneficial to U.S. interests;
[1293]on the minus side, there is the fact that this will complicate the
[1294]running of intelligence operations and it could result in Cuban
[1295]retaliation, Additionally, Mr. McCone said he is not in favor of
[1296]extreme types of sabotage such as complete destruction of crops,
[1297]contamination of water supplies, etc. He would prefer open inter-
[1298]vention to this kind of thing.
[1300]The DCI said that the combination of economic and other
[1301]pressures with sabotage activities, might provide a feasible climate
[1302]for a successful attempt to fragment the Castro organization. He
[1303]foresaw the possibility of such fragmentation leading to assumption
[1304]of power by a military dictatorship, which would probably be friendly
[1305]to the U.S. In this connection, Mr. FitzGerald said that we have
[1306]a line on certain high-ranking officers who are not entirely sympa-
[1308]. thetic to the regime. He pointed out, however, that a major opera-
[1309]_ tional obstacle to capitalizing on this situation is the difficulty
[1310]( of persuading dndividual Cubans of this type to place their trust
[1311]in each other. In addition, we will have to be able to assure them
[1312]that the U.S, will be sympathetic to possible successors to the pre-
[1313]sent government, even though such people may have been former Castro
[1314]supporters.
[1316]Mr. FitzGerald touched on the proposed support to selected Cuban
[1317]exile groups, for autonomous operations, as being one of the key points
[1318]of the possible new program. He made the point that there is no use
[1319]in the U.S. trying to deny that it backs such operations, since it
[1320]will be accused of this in any case, and the accusations will be
[1321]generally believed; further, such a posture is not detrimental to U.S.
[1322]interests. Mr. Bundy agreed with this point. He added, however,
[1323]that a "scenario" will have to be worked out, clearly indicating who
[1324]in. the government should respond to accusations in this field and
[1325]what in general they should say.
[1327]Mr. Bundy questioned a statement in the paper to the effect that
[1328]covert action which might. be used as a pretext for overt military
[1329]intervention is ruled out. Mr. McCone and Mr. FitzGerald said that
[1330]the purpose of this statement was to indicate that the covert program
[1331]is not specifically directed toward the end of providing such a
[1332]pretext, but that it is not intended to preclude such a situation if
[1333]it should turn out to be desirable at some time in the future.
[1335]{ : Mr. FitzGerald then described a number of possible sabotage
[1336]. Operations. In this connection, he pointed out that the paper con-
[1337]tains a proposal for the placing of limpets, carrying suitable delay
[1338]mechanisms, on the outside of Cuban ships so as to explode at sea.
[1340]Gener EYES ONLY
[1342]fe
[1344]13-00000
[1346]He noted that Secretary Vance does not particularly like this pro-
[1347]position because of the possibility that the explosions would be
[1348]attributed to torpedoes. While recognizing the validity of Mr.
[1349]Vance's argument, Mr. Gilpatric felt that this risk was acceptable.
[1351]The Chairman summed up the preliminary reactions of the Group to
[1352]the proposals as follows:.
[1354]a. The proposition for dealing with selected exile groups
[1355]is a good one, but the method of dealing with them will have to be
[1356]more carefully defined. ,
[1358]b. There is no objection to limpets, subject to further
[1359]technical studies.
[1361]‘c. Surface attacks on Cuban ships do not appear particularly
[1363]_ attractive, nor do shore-based attacks of a similar nature. ae
[1365]d. Externally mounted hit-and-run attacks against land
[1366]targets appear worthwhile. The operations in this category which
[1367]can be run in May, will be discussed with higher authority. Refineries
[1368]and power plants seem to be particularly good targets. Operations
[1369]of this kind will be especially valuable if done in conjunction with
[1370]other resistance activities.
[1372]-e@. Internal resistance should be stimulated, again in
[1373]conjunction with related operations.
[1374]ART Ca eee oe ee ee
[1376]6. Covert Action, Congo en enna
[1378]The CIA paper of 19 April was approved with Little discussion.
[1379]The Chairman said that hts only concern was whether we are committed
[1380]to spending money at this rate forever. Mr. Tweedy said first that
[1381]Lf the Adoula government should fall, it would probably be in the’
[1382]U.S. interest to support a successor government in a somewhat similar
[1383]way and, secondly, he pointed out that there are no firm commitments
[1384]made, although of course the recipients do come to expect a subsidy.
[1386]Mr. Bundy said he would mention this project to higher authority.
[1388]7. Final Status Report, Italian Election Project
[1390]Mr. McCone ran over the highlights of the prognostication for
[1391]the Italian elections, as summarized in the CIA paper of the 22nd of
[1392]April. He noted that virtually all the allocated money will have
[1393]been passed by this time. Mr. Bundy said that the CIA forecast is
[1394]generally consistent with reports he has had from Italian sources.
[1397]13-00000
[1399]3,
[1401]British Guiana
[1403].. Mr. McCone said that representatives of CIA and of MI-6 are
[1404]scheduled to meet on the 30th of April and the first of May. They
[1405]will consider: an up-to-date assessment of the situation; a proposed
[1406]British operational plan; alternative proposals if thispplan proves
[1407]not feasible; identification of Indians who might provide alternative
[1408]leadership to Jagan; the division of operational responsibility; and
[1409]an inventory of operational assets.
[1411]The DCI said it is estimated that a continuation of the current
[1412]strike would require expenditures on the order of $10,000 a day.
[1413]The Group felt: that if this could result in the defeat of Jagan, it
[1414]would be well worth it. Accordingly, Mr. McCone undertook to look
[1415]into the situation immediately and to assure that support for the
[1416]strike is not cut off, pending a broader decision. He said he might
[1417]see James Fulton of MI-6, during his forthcoming trip to Europe, to
[1418]coordinate views. oo
[1420]. SLIT
[1422]Thomas A. Parrott
[1424]Distribution
[1425]Mr. Johnson
[1426]Mr. Gilpatric
[1427]Mr. McCone
[1431]13-00000
[1433]26 April 1963
[1435]MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP
[1437]SUBJECT: Proposed New Covert Policy and Programs Toward .Cuba
[1439]As a follow-up to yesterday's Special Group discussion on the
[1440]proposed new covert policy and programs toward Cuba, the following
[1441]decisions have been made:
[1443]On Item 1. of the summary from the Coordinator of Cuban
[1444]Affairs, dated 19 April, additional planning and consultation is
[1445]approved. This will include further refinement of the Rules of
[1446]Engagement (in this connection, also see the minutes of yesterday's
[1448]- meeting); an assessment of the capabilities of specific groups;
[1450]and an estimate of the scale and scope of activities which selected
[1451]groups could carry out successfully.
[1453]Item 2.a. of the above-mentioned paper is approved, To
[1454]the extent possible, it is desired that the Special Group be in-
[1455]formed in advance of specific proposals under this heading.. It is
[1456]recognized that this willin many cases not be feasible.
[1458]‘Item 2.b. is disapproved.
[1460]Further planning for individual elements of Item 2.c. is
[1461]approved, with the understanding that targets will be justified in
[1462]terms of their usefulness rather than with regard to the noise level
[1463]they might generate. Specific operations will be referred back
[1464]through normal channels (i.e., the Special Group in the first instance)
[1465]for final approval before execution.
[1467]“Item 2.d. is approved.
[1469]Thomas \ . Parrott
[1471]Distribution
[1472]Mr. Johnson
[1473]Mr. Gilpatric
[1474]Mr. McCone
[1476]EVES Of ny
[1478]missions (both contained in papers from the Coordinator of Cuban
[1479]Affairs dated 7 May).
[1481]There was no objection by the Group to any of the infiltration/
[1482]exfiltration operations, This approval includes the seven CIA
[1483]operations, the infiltration of a radio operator in support of the
[1484]U.S. Army, and approval of rendezvous opportunities which may arise
[1485]without adequate time to bring them to the Group. The Group also
[1486]noted Mr. Cheever.'s description of a proposed exfiltration to be
[1487]carried out by the MRR, with some support by CIA.
[1489]With regard to the two sabotage missions, Mr. Cheever said that
[1490]he thought the chances were excellent of carrying them out successfully.
[1491]He said, however, that the critical problem would arise the following
[1492]morning, when sea and air interception might well take place. He
[1493]emphasized that under the circumstances that could be expected in the
[1494]aftermath of such sabotage, the Cubans might well disregard any
[1495]territorial limits in the course of hot pursuit of the saboteurs.
[1496]He added, in answer to questions, that there is no doubt that Cubans
[1497]would recognize these operations as being externally mounted, and
[1498]that. the agents would certainly talk if captured.
[1500]Mr. Cheever mentioned three possible operational plans which might
[1501]minimize the danger of capture by Castro forces, but emphasized that
[1502]these were by no means operationally well-designed nor was he re-
[1503]commending them, and further that they did not come within any exist-
[1504]ing policy approvals.
[1506]The feeling of the Group was that the damage that could be done
[1507]to the Cuban economy by successful execution of either of these
[1508]missions was not sufficient to outweigh the disadvantages. The Group
[1509]recognized that the responsible CIA operators feel themselves under
[1510]obligation to continue to develop suitable proposals, and they thought
[1511]that CIA should be encouraged to keep on doing this. The difficulty
[1512]of maintaining agent morale in the face of continued inaction was
[1513]recognized. Mr. Cheever was commended for his frank and explicit
[1514]outlining of the pros and cons.
[1516]4. Cuba --NTS Broadcasts
[1518]Mr. McCone and Mr. Cheever’ said that CIA does not object to the
[1519]’ Department of State's proposal to subsidize NTS broadcasts from the
[1520]Dominican Republic, addressed to Soviet troops in Cuba. They pointed
[1521]out that this concurrence is subject to the caveats that the Agency
[1522]will be unable to accept responsibility for monitoring and control of
[1524]13-0000Q
[1526]CER MUR aN ER seta ae aida De a a ie ce ee
[1528]at BRET
[1529]EYES CALY
[1533]the content of the broadcasts, and that contact with the NTS will
[1534]have to be made through its headquarters in Frankfurt, rather than
[1535]directly with the U.S. representative of the NTIS. With these under-
[1536]en the _Proposal was approvery- eee eee,
[1538]5. [Political Action Bolivia
[1540],
[1542]| The CIA paper of 3 April 1963 on the above subject was approved. / 7
[1544]6.) (air Proprietary, East Africa 96 f
[1546]i The ‘CIA paper of 3 May 1963" on 1 the above Subject | was es approved]
[1548]7. Intelligence < on Cuba _
[1550]Mr. McCone said that he is concerned about gaps in U.S. intelli-
[1552]gence on Cuba. He said that this leads him to favor resumption of
[1554]low-level reconnaissance. The other members of the Group felt that
[1556]under existing circumstances, this type of reconnaissance will not
[1558]meet the needs that Mr. McCone perceives. Mr. Johnson suggested
[1559]that penetrations of the Cuban Government would be more productive
[1560]in trying to assess Castro's possible intentions.
[1564]Thomas A. Parrott
[1566]Distribution
[1568]Mr. Johnson |
[1569]Mr. Gilpatric.
[1570]Mr. McCone
[1572]Ye
[1574]ME sai ce a rattan caren mene ct ess reeeameneansed Eames sanannanseicee
[1576]9 May 1963
[1578]MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
[1580]SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 9 May 1963
[1582]PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, Mr. McCone
[1583]Dr. Scoville was present for Items 1] and 2.
[1584]Captain Dankworth was present for Item 1.
[1586]Mr. Cheever was present for Items 3 and 4.
[1588]id. ' (Peripheral Reconnaissance
[1590]2° The Group approved operation YANKEE PASHA, which had been
[1592]originally presented at the meeting of 4 April and deferred at that
[1593]time, with the understanding that the aircraft would not approach . Mh
[1594]the Soviet coast closer than 15 miles.‘] om
[1596]2. 2. [nconnatssance of the Sino- India Border 93
[1598]6 With particular reference to an incoming’ message from Ambassador
[1600]Pi Galbraith, the Group noted, that the Indians had refused, to grant
[1602]' staging rights in India or to allow refueling over that country. In
[1604]light of this, all “members of the Group felt that plans for these va
[1606]missions shouldbe shelved for the time being. Mr. McCone noted that’
[1608]the’ ‘aircraft. now at Takhli will, ‘therefore, depart’ before the th of if
[1609]May; the date’ on which SEATO exercises begin.” ~ .
[1611]s
[1615]The’ Group specified’ that in conveying “the decision to the”
[1616]Indians it should be made perfectly clear that the standdown is due
[1617]to their own view of the urgency of such Coverage, not to any re-
[1618]luétance on our part’.
[1620](The point was made that in the meeting of the CI Group, just
[1621]concluded, an allegedly improved road network south of Tchepone, in
[1622]Laos, had been mentioned. The CI. Group. had felt that harder intelli- —
[1623]gence should be obtained on this network. Dr. Scoville undertook to
[1624]make sure that this target is highlighted in planning for additional
[1625]high- performance coverage of Laos. I -
[1627]3. ‘Cuba - “Proposed Agent. Operations
[1629]Mr. Cheever outlined in some detail the infiltration/exfiltration
[1630]operations proposed for 15 May to 15 June, and the two possible sabotage
[1632]Tmo
[1637]an ace
[1639]o June 1963
[1641]MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
[1642]SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 6 Jure 1963
[1644]PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Jehnson, Mr. Gilpatric ({trems |-7), and
[1645]Mr. McCone a,
[1647]Colonel Steakley was present for’Items 1 and 2.
[1648]Mr. Lundahl was present for Item 2.
[1650]Mr. George Miller was present for Item 5,
[1652]Mr. FitzGerald was present for Item ?.
[1654]Mr. Karamessines was present for items S and 9,
[1656]opt re
[1658]A GB rn a _ : moon a
[1660]1. (pop Reconnaissance
[1662]wev> With respect to the two PAYSTATION missions which were deferred
[1664]last week, the Group decided‘that the l2-mile proposal should be a
[1665]scrapped and that the 30-mile one should be flown for ELLENT only.)
[1666]m . . \
[1668]78 | - .
[1670]i
[1672]| [Reconnaissance of Cuba
[1673]a
[1675]oa Mr. Lundahl showed the Group sample pictures from the two PEG
[1676][, LEG missions of 5 June.
[1678]Mr. McCone said that before making any recommendation as to
[1679]further missions of this kind, he wished to have the USIB consider
[1680]the matter. In the meantime CIA and DIA are analyzing the results.
[1682]Mr. Lundahl and Colonel Steakley raised the question of the
[1683]advisability of including some color film in future missions, The 7
[1684]Group felt this kind of thing should be left to the best judgment of
[1686]the operators. ]
[1687]98
[1689]3. (Far Base Reconnaissance
[1692]L {
[1693]7 So, . i
[1694]Mr. McCone reported that two out of the existing four authoriza- if
[1695]tions for high-performance reconnaissance of China have been exhausted. -!
[1697]It was agreed that the "bank" should be restored to the original four. ;
[1698]a . |
[1700]: ‘It was noted chat no further requirements now exist. for this type © 4;
[1702]: of reconnaissance of Laos, but there are some targets remaining in ‘
[1703]1) North Vietnam,
[1705]| et nang]
[1708]13-00000. .. hs ge
[1710]e a ”
[1714]ssance of the Middle East
[1716]: Mr. McCone reported that the British will probably not approve a
[1718]the request. to.use an.-RAF base-on Cyprus for high-performance '
[1720]/ coverage oi Middle East areas. He said that the feasibilicy of
[1721]' wsing Wheslus is being explored and that a new recomaencation will
[1722]‘ko be forthcoming to the he Groups] . an
[1724]dg | |
[1726]ler briefed the Group on ELINT projects OARAGE ' (Cuba) and
[1727]an). No objection was voiced to either proposal. ] 4
[1729]Mr. Mil
[1730]+ MOONBEAM (Ja
[1732]o.° Channels to Castro
[1734]The Group discussed various possibilities of establishing channels
[1735]of communication to Castro. All members of the Group agreed that this
[1736]is a usefu! endeavor. Mr. Bundy caurioned that of course Castro
[1737]should ‘not be made privy te any official U.S. positions, while Mr.
[1738]McCone emphasized the necessity of keeping any such approach entirely
[1739]secret so far as the public is concerted, It was ‘agreed that pro-
[1740]posals of tnis kind which are particularly unusual, would be discussed
[1741]with the Special Group in advance.
[1743]i. Cuba Operations
[1745]Mr. FitzGerald briefed the Group on the results of infiltration/
[1746]exfiltration operations during May, and on proposals for the coming
[1747]month. The latter | were “approved, . ,
[1749]ieee foe a
[1751](leat, Assessment of Results of Election 1 Operation |
[1753]Mr. Karaimessines discussed with the Group the results of the
[1754]* recent Parliamentary elections in Italy, and the effect of the
[1755]election project, so far as can be ascertained. He elaborated on
[1756]the CIA paper of 4 June.]
[1758]9. »fisats Proposed Aid to PSI Autonomists . A
[1759]i Mr. Karamessines briefed the CG; roup further on the preposal to
[1761]‘ give aid to Nenni and his autonomisc group of the PSI, as autiined in
[1765]the CLA paper of 1 June. , a
[1767]Yone
[1769]13-00000 . -
[1771]. . oe “
[1772]-
[1774]ee oo nein . Te ED
[1776]oN
[1778]: The Group agreed to recoumend approval of this project to
[1779]~ higher authority. Mr. Bundy will take this up on Monday, June LOth.
[1780]‘He suggested chat in the meantime all aecessary preliminary alerting
[1781]\be accomplished, so that Nenni can be informed in the even: of
[1783]A;
[1785]Loe
[1787]. favorable action, defore the meeting of the PSI Central Conmittee
[1788]‘on June 12th.7
[1790]4
[1794]Distribution
[1795]Mr. Johnson
[1796]Mr. Gilpatric
[1797]Mr. McCone
[1799]13-00000
[1800]“v
[1804]co ethene nee Sera eh
[1806]ee ee REE rt er a We nt cr “rena sean pe a
[1810]20 June 1963
[1812]MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
[1813]SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 20 June 1963
[1815]PRESENT: ‘Mr. Bundy, Mr. Gilpatric, Mr. McCone, and Mr. Hughes.
[1819]Colonel King was present for Item 3.
[1820]Mr. Colby was present for Item 4.
[1821]‘Mr. Critchfield was present for Item 6,
[1823]ty eth Ee ee oe ne eee i ae “y
[1825]oo ee
[1826]1. [Reconnaissance of Southeast Asia
[1828]Mr. McCone’ reported that all high-performance missions
[1830]“ scheduled for this area had been held up during the past week,
[1832]due to bad | weather]
[1834]2. Sabotage Program, Cuba
[1836]In connection with the new Cuba sabotage program approved
[1837]yesterday, Mr. McCone suggested that CIA make a report to the Special
[1838]Group every two weeks. The Group agreed. with this procedure. They
[1839]felt that such a report need not be in written form nor very elaborate,
[1840]and that it should consist of a briefing on activities during the
[1841]preceding period and those planned for the next one. Mr. Bundy
[1842]commented that keeping the Group informed in this way constitutes
[1843]protection to the operators, since all agencies concerned are thereby
[1844]given a continuing feeling of just what is going on.
[1846]_,7-* | The CIA paper of 17 June was approved. Mr. McCone said he has
[1847]‘some reservations about the quality of any possible replacements for
[1849]Duvalier, but agreed that it is necessary to take some action in order
[1850]to prevent Haiti eventually going very far to the left. Colonel King,
[1851]in support of the paper's recommendations, said that in his opinion
[1852]we have no feasible alternatives but to cooperate with Bosch in.
[1853]attempting to‘unseat Duvalier, and that if this is not done we are !
[1854]likely to end up with a.far worse situation. ;
[1856]Mr. Hughes told the Group that the State Department shares the-
[1857]reservation about the quality of alternatives, but it also recognizes
[1858]the necessity of taking some action. He said.the Department is
[1859]principally worried about the possibility that the U.S. hand in any
[1860]such operation might be revealed.)
[1862]pe
[1864]13-00000 ,
[1866]t
[1867]| : Goosen, King” cautioned that we'will not be ina position to
[1869], ’ know how many useful exiles can be recruited until we give it a
[1870]fe try. Mr. _McCone and Colonel King said that probably the most pro-
[1871]mising way in which the desired objective can be obtained is
[1872]/ eventually to accomplish “the defection of “significant elements of
[1873]aa the Ary, the Palace Guard, eres]
[1875]|
[1876]|
[1878]“by Monthly Report ‘on a North’ “Vietnam Operations
[1880]Mr. Colby gave a report on results of operations during the past
[1881]month, and those phanned for the immediate future. :
[1883]of “Special Ana fink a) se
[1885]4 (Domes)
[1886]. 1g. fe
[1887]6. [iraq - Soviet Materiel Objectives and Related Problems | 7
[1889]ae The Group approved the recommendations contained in CIA's paper
[1891]re “ The Group approved the State-CIA proposal to hold the Congo i
[1893]. paramilitary project, originally approved on 29 November 1962, in |
[1894]t
[1895]|
[1897]/ of the 19th of. June.
[1898]i
[1899]Mr. McCone pointed out that this sort of action could conceivably; |
[1900]' lead into considerably broader activities, and emphasized that the j
[1901]dl ' proposal immediately at hand is carefully limited. ‘The Group agreed f
[1902]i ' /: that approval of these recommendations does not imply any sort of is
[1903]| commitment to additional actions. ] ot
[1904]| ns
[1905]i
[1907]'
[1908]ty
[1910]. 7. [zians for Immediate Future GE
[1911]/ ““ Mr. Bundy asked Mr. McCone to act as Chairman of the Special
[1912]Group next week, if he wishes to have a meeting. During the time
[1913]that the Presidential party is away, DOD peripheral flights, ;
[1914], particularly in the European area, should be carefully screened. } :
[1916]Thomas A. Parrott
[1918]Distribution
[1919]Mr. Johnson
[1920]Mr. Gilpatric
[1921]Mr. McCone :
[1924]13-00000 Een Meee en an eee
[1927]. Sy
[1929].e - f
[1931]ot,
[1935]that the U.S. government stands behind previously-expressed commit~
[1937]ments to ensure that India does not use its own. increased military
[1938]‘strength to mount an attack on Pakistan.
[1940]| It was agreed that State and Defense should draft a paper for
[1942]i higher authority, outlining this proposed approach to the Pakistan
[1944]government, with a CIA representative participating in the drafting
[1945]of the paper to the extent necessary to assure that the intelligence
[1948]Distribution
[1949]Mr. Johnson
[1951]Mr. Gilpatric
[1952]-Mr. McCone
[1954]Von
[1956]interests and the views of the Special Group are adequately reflected.
[1958]13-00000 o ;
[1961]27 June 1963
[1963]MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
[1964]SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 27 June 1963
[1965]PRESENT: Mr. McCone, Mr. Johnson, and Mr. Gilpatric.
[1967]Colonel Steakley was present for Items 1-3.
[1968]Mr. FitzGerald was present for Item 5.
[1970]ne 2 cle nt eee es Tag wecege ee 7 oF 9g
[1971]1l., ‘[pritish Suggestion Regarding Reconnaissance Flights
[1973]The Group reviewed the message received from the British
[1975]Foreign Office through the British Embassy, suggesting that during
[1977]the period of the Harriman-Hailsham visit to Moscow reconnaissance
[1979]flights be suspended, as well as the suggested draft reply pre-
[1980]'t sented by Mr. Johnson. The Group approved the language of the
[1981]: reply, the gist of which was that while appreciating the UK sug-
[1982]gestion, we do not find.it possible to agree to suspend all such ae
[1983]i. flights. We believe that most of them have virtually no risk, and va
[1984]that to cancel all of them would break a routine long familiar to 1
[1985]-. the Soviets; we might then find it difficult to resume. However, i
[1986]i; we undertake to screen with particular care all flights scheduled
[1987]', during the period of this visit, so as to reduce selectively to a
[1988]minimum those which might be regarded by the Soviets as sensitive.
[1990]i In. the course of the discussion of these messages, the members
[1992]|: of the Group agreed that probably the British motive in making the :
[1993]i suggestion is to provide a political gesture that would be apparent i
[1994]‘} to the Soviets. From this point of view, the. pattern of DOD . F
[1995]: peripheral flights was examined and the conclusions were that: | ,
[1996](a) Particularly sensitive flights are gcheduled sporadically. j
[1997]Therefore, no isolated definite pattern in any one area that would
[1999]be noticed by the Soviets if cancelled and that would provide
[2001]political impact on Soviet leaders, can be identified. (b) A world-
[2002]wide stand-down during the. period of the visit could accomplish this
[2003]purpose, but would be undesirable for the reasons set forth in Mr.
[2004]Johnson's draft. (c) Peripheral flights in particularly sensitive
[2006]areas (i.e., Baltic Sea, Black Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk) are
[2008]subject to Soviet reaction in the form of identification intercept
[2010]by fighters. However, it is believed that these have become sufficiently
[2011]routine so they are not brought to the attention of high levels of]
[2013]4 . os vy
[2015]OF “See special minutes
[2016], for additional items.
[2017]Lares
[2018]arid ay
[2022]13-00000
[2024]4
[2030]the Soviet government. (d) In the case of the Sea of Okhotsk,
[2032]owever, no flights will be scheduled during the visit. Baltic .
[2033]flights will be very carefully reviewed. Black Sea flights should of
[2034]not require cancellation, In general, all flights around the Soviet
[2035]periphery will be subject to special review during this period.
[2037]2. (= Forecast G6 ; "
[2039]‘The NRO-monthly forecast for July was approved. ]
[2041]r
[2042]3.' (Use of Chinese Pilots in Southeast Asia 7@
[2044]he NRO paper of 25 June, proposing the substitution of Chinese 4
[2046]Nationalist pilots for Americans for the high-performance coverage |
[2048]“of North Vietnam and Laos, was discussed.
[2050]Mr.-Johnson said that the State Department's view is that if
[2051]Chinese Nationalist missions out of Taiwan are so scheduled as to
[2052]cross over the border into North Vietnam from time to time, they have -.
[2053]no real objection (on the understanding that the cover story would i
[2054]be that the pilot had strayed off course.) On the other hand, the I:
[2055]Department is unable to concur in any deep penetration into the :
[2056]southern part of North Vietnam, or into Laos, The latter country is
[2057]considered particularly sensitive in this respect.
[2059]In. light of the State position, the Group agreed to proceed as
[2061]- at present with the modifications suggested by Mr. Johnson.7
[2063]4. [Spain - Labor Program 9
[2064]a The CIA. _paper of 21 June was approved as presented.)
[2066]al
[2068]5. ‘Guba - Infiltration/Exftleration Operations
[2070]Mr. FitzGerald briefed the Group on the results of the previous
[2071]month's ‘operations,
[2073]Mr. McCone called particular attention to the continuing buildup
[2074]of fast patrol boats in the Cuban inventory, and said that in light
[2075]of this we must begin to draw contingency plans for alternate methods
[2076]of delivery of agents and supplies against the eventuality that the
[2077]patrol boats may become too great a hazard. He suggested the possi-
[2078]bility of such means.of delivery as submarines.
[2081]13-00000
[2083]4
[2085]Mr. McCone went on to say that continuing reports are now being
[2086]received, alleging the existence of various exotic items of materiel
[2087]in Cuba. No one report appears to stand up, but he has directed
[2088]that all such reports for the past ninety days be examined in total
[2089]context, so as to see whether on this basis any possible pattern
[2090]might emerge. Mr. McCone added that he personally feels very uneasy
[2091]about the situation in Cuba.
[2095]Thomas A. Parrott
[2097]Distribution
[2098]Mr. Johnson
[2099]Mr. Gilpatric
[2100]Mr. McCone
[2103]1 of egw ce”
[2108]ad
[2112]oN a a
[2114]ll July 1963
[2116]MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
[2117]SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 11 July 1963
[2119]Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Mr. Johnson, *xxftkipetricj;andk
[2120]Mr. William Bundy and Mr. McCone
[2122]Colonel Steakley was present for Item 1.
[2124]Mr. R. Jack Smith was present: for Item 2.
[2126]Mr. FitzGerald was present for Items 2 and 3.
[2127]Mr..Colby was present for Items 4 and 5.
[2129].
[2131]5 a noe areata G6 5 ee a
[2133]1. '|feeripheral Reconnaissance
[2137]2 The Group approved the agreement reached last week between
[2139]State and the JRC on the handling of certain possibly sensitive
[2140]operations during July. Specifically, REX 1 and 2 were approved
[2141]with the understanding that. the nearest point to the Kuriles would
[2142]be 15 miles. instead of 14, at the northern end of the track. URBAN
[2144]-and RAY were approved, in light of the fact that overt flight plans
[2145]will be filed.
[2147]. It was noted that the Chiefs had already deferred operations
[2148]YANKEE PASHA, VERNE and THOMAS at least until after completion of
[2149]the Harriman mission, .
[2151]Of the three new missions presented by JRC, RED DOG /HAWKEYE and
[2152]the special photographic operation in European Turkey were approved
[2154]as presented. Mission RAINHAT-Track 2 was approved with the stipula-
[2155]_tion that the nearest point to the target country will be 12 miles
[2157]rather than 10.
[2159]The British note concerning proposed reconnaissance of the
[2161]-Soviet Northern Fleet (British name, Operation BARGOLD) was discussed.
[2162]Colonel Steakley stated that the standard British restrictions on such
[2163]operations are that no aircraft will approach closer than a quarter of
[2164]a mile or will go under 500 feet, but he said that we have been‘unable
[2166]to determine whether the current restrictions, mentioned in the ;
[2167]British note, are more stringent than this. He told the Group that
[2168]U.S. rules provide for no harassing action and for no flights below
[2170]2000 feet (this height limit being primarily because of flight safety,
[2171]in view of the expected presence of British aircraft at a lower level).
[2173]The Group felt there is no objection to overflying Soviet vesséls
[2174]under these conditions, despite the apparent British ban on this for
[2176]their own aircraft.
[2178]TTT = 7 ne NET PS OE ETS. 2 ETT TA I
[2180]13-0900
[2182]96 !
[2185]f
[2187]2 (State will inform the British Minister that we Propose to pro- 4
[2188]‘ceed in this manner: ] y
[2190]a a cee _
[2192]2. “Cuba -. “Status. “of. “Soviet “Personnel. and Materiel
[2194]Mr. McCone reminded the Group that he had asked for a review of
[2195]intelligence reports on the situation inside Cuba over a 90-day
[2196]period, so as to see whether any possible pattern might emerge. He
[2197]said this review is just now being completed, it having involved
[2198]examination of 30,000 to 40,000 separate reports. He expects a draft
[2199]to be availablie to him by Monday or Tuesday. This will. probably take
[2200]the form of an Agency memorandum, but DIA will be asked to review it.
[2202]The Chairman said that the Cuban situation will be of great
[2203]importance in connection with Governor Harriman's negotiations;
[2204]accordingly, he asked that an informal reading on the results of
[2205]this review be made available as soon as possible, before a formal -
[2206]paper is fully completed. .
[2208]Mr, Smith then. summarized CIA's latest views on the status of
[2209]Soviet personnel and equipment. He said that there is insufficient
[2210]evidence on which to base any change in the current estimate of
[2211]12,000 to 13,000 Soviet troops. He said that it appears the Soviets |
[2212]are now engaged in training Cubans for eventual transfer of Soviet
[2213]‘equipment to them. No combat equipment has been seen leaving Cuba,
[2214]since last fall.
[2216]Mr. Smith added that the equipment which was seen leaving on
[2217]6 July appears on close examination by photo interpreters to be
[2218]communications and generator vans, rather than missile guidance
[2219]equipment.
[2220]g
[2222]_Mr. McCone said that the (Japanese. ‘Ambassador to Cuba has ex-
[2223]pressed his conviction that some offensive Soviet missiles still
[2224]remain in Cuba. CIA and State will debrief. the Ambassador on this
[2225]point today.
[2227]3. Cuba ~ Agent Operations
[2229]Mr. FitzGerald told the Group about two additional infiltration/
[2230]exfiltration operations which were carried out in the last days of
[2231]June, after his last report. He then mentioned highlights of proposals
[2232]for the next month. These proposals, as presented in the Coordinator's
[2233]paper of 9 July, were approved,
[2235]mc EE A et te a ne RR RE
[2237]13-00000
[2240]5. Tibet - Status Report GL
[2242]Mr. McGeorge Bundy said that by the 26th of July the Harriman
[2243]negotiations in Moscow might have reached a crucial stage; he asked
[2244]how flexible are the sabotage operations planned for that day (as
[2245]explained by Mr. FitzGerald to the Standing Group on Tuesday). He
[2246]said he was not suggesting that any change in the basic guidance for
[2247]sabotage operations is indicated, but it is evident that in times
[2248]of particular sensitivity all potentially provocative activities
[2249]should be subject to review.
[2251]In this connection, Mr. FitzGerald said that because of light
[2252]factors these operations could not be run any later than July 28th,
[2253]in this month's moon period. He pointed out that if it should appear
[2254]that it would be advisable for political reasons to postpone the
[2255]operations until the August dark-of-the-moon period, then as much
[2256]advance notice as possible should be given the agents,iin order not
[2257]to damage their morale unduly. It was agreed that by. the time of
[2258]next week's Special Group meeting it should be possible to make some
[2259]kind of judgment about the possible progress of the Harriman talks, —
[2260]and that a decision could be made at that time whether or not to
[2261]postpone these particular operations.
[2263]4, Vietnam - Monthly Status Report
[2265]Mr. Colby outlined the results of the past month's agent operations.
[2266]In summary, he said that he believes the covert propaganda activities
[2267]are beginning to catch on, but that so far there is not a great deal
[2268]of tangible result to report in the sabotage field.
[2270]Mr. Colby expanded briefly on the paper of the 8th of ‘July, on
[2271]the status of projected Tibetan agent operations. He emphasized that
[2272]the trainees will be sent back to India in the very near future, and
[2273]that discussions will then take place jointly with the Indians as to
[2274]details of overland infiltration into Tibet. Planning for aix drops
[2275]of agents is being deferred until sufficient operational intelligence
[2276]can be built up to permit reasonable decisions.) _ EEK
[2278]—_ S
[2280](6. Guatemala.- Covert Annex (Revised) to Internal Defense Plan q
[2282]This annex was noted by the Group. Particular attention was
[2283]called to the agreed assessment that the Arevalo threat no longer exists.
[2287]Thomas A. Parrott
[2289]Distribution
[2290]Mr. Johnson : . Loe
[2293]Mr. McCone
[2295]13- 0 OIE SAPO Erma 7ex1 ROW Nasa LAER semmrmmere mms rnceeeeee omer Se =
[2297]bmg ate te
[2299]18 July 1963
[2301]_ MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
[2302]SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 18 July 1963
[2303]PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. McCone
[2305]Colonel King was present. for Item 2.
[2306]Mr. FitzGerald was present for Item 3.
[2307]Mr. Sheldon was present for Item 4.
[2309]1. [fecsiaissace BH
[2311]aa Mr. McCone reported that during the last week no high-performance
[2312]-- missions were flown in the Far East, due to bad weather. ]
[2314]2. [fais - Political Action GE 7
[2316]: Mr. McCone and Colonel King reported that the following changes
[2317]. have taken place in the Haitian picture since the Special Group 7
[2318]| approved, on June 20th, the proposal to reach a covert understanding is
[2319]with President Bosch on the use of Haitian exiles in the Dominican ody
[2320]Republic. The developments are: '
[2322]a. It has been demonstrated that these exiles are of
[2323]very little use, because of insecurity, lack of cohesive purpose or
[2324]of adequate leadership, etc.
[2326]; b, President Bosch has now decided that he is unwilling :
[2327]1+ to allow such an exile force to use his country as a base forymilitary |
[2328]' .operations against Duvalier. . :
[2330]c. Duvalier's own capabilities have improved greatly, due
[2332]to such things as: the widespread purge of potentially-dissident Army
[2333]' officers; clearance of the border areas; and, most recently, the ,
[2334]elimination of the Barbot brothers. .' an
[2336],., ° > Colonel King said that everyone concerned with the project
[2337]agrees that Duvalier must be removed in some manner or other. However,’:
[2338]in light of the factors mentioned above, operating elements have con- ©
[2339]cluded that the existing plan is unworkable, and that it is best to
[2340]switch to a different kind of operation. This would include in the ;;
[2341]first instance, training of selected exiles in intelligence collection,’
[2342]in communications, and in cross-border operations. Such training 7 |
[2344]| pe.
[2348]q be om ry
[2350]'
[2352]7 presented, in the light. of the changed conditions. ns).
[2354]: ‘objectives would be to establish a clandestine organization capable
[2358]feould be given at a base in the Continental U.S. or in Puerto Rico;
[2359]Support and facilities may be required from DOD. The long-range 4)
[2361]of gathering intelligence and eventually building up and arming an
[2362]effective opposition in Haiti; to establish friendly relations with,
[2364]and if necessary, support individuals capable of playing a constructive |
[2365]role in a future Haitian government; to encourage and support indi-
[2366]viduals and organizations who are both anti-Duvalier and anti- ~Communist ;
[2367]and to attempt to spread dissension among Duvalier advisers and to
[2368]subvert some of them.
[2370]Colonel King emphasized that the $200,000 already approved would
[2371]cover the training activities, but that it is impossible to estimate
[2372]now how much the subversion operations might require, if suitable
[2373]opportunities should be identified.
[2375]The Group agreed to recommend this new course of action to higher
[2376]authority.
[2378](There was no objection by higher authority to the program as
[2380]ie. , . 2
[2381]3. “Cuba = . Sabotag e erations
[2383]Mr. .FitzGerald was asked to reschedule tentatively for the
[2384]middle of August the special operations planned for the 26th of July,
[2385]in light of the negotiations going on in Moscow. Mr. Bundy cautioned
[2386]that it is entirely possible that by the middle of August the negoti-
[2387]ating. process might have gone into another phase which would make it
[2388]necessary to cancel the operation ¢ once more.
[2390]4. f techriteat tn Installations - Pakistan GE
[2392]The Group considered the CIA paper of 17 July, with attachments,
[2393]which outlined the difficulties which have been encountered recently
[2394]in getting the Pakistani government to go along with expansion of our
[2395]special intelligence facilities in that country. Mr. McCone emphasized .
[2396]his feeling and that of the USIB as a whole, that any wasting of this i
[2397]asset would represent a very serious loss to the intelligence community. —
[2399]After some discussion the Group agreed that the best method of ;
[2400]approach is to make it entirely clear in presenting the proposed three- ;
[2401]year MAP program to Pakistan authorities that the maintenance and {
[2402]expansion of U.S. intelligence facilities at Peshawar is an essential '
[2403]part of the bargain. It can also be reaffirmed to Ayub at that time’)
[2405]ye
[2407]ye
[2409]15 August 1963
[2411]MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
[2412]SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 15 August 1963
[2413]PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr, Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. McCone,
[2415]Mr. FitzGerald and Mr. Cheever were present for Items 1,
[2416]2 and 5.C.
[2418]Dr. Whelan, Colonel Ledford, and Mr. Cunningham were present
[2419]for Items 3 and 4.
[2421]1. ‘A Non-Violent Program to Inhibit Free World and Neutral Tzade
[2422]with Cuba ;
[2424]The operational proposal dated 12 August, was approved by the
[2425]Special Group, with the two changes in wording made by the State
[2426]Department. Mr. FitzGerald pointed out that to make this operation -
[2427]convincing, a “big bang" on a Cuban ship will be carried out before
[2428]the operation is implemented. He further pointed out that in paragraph
[2429]2.a. of the paper, the reference to "real ... sabotage" applied to
[2430]Cuban shipping only. Item 2.c. in the operational proposal was thought
[2431]to be of low priority and is to be placed at the bottom of the list.
[2433]2. Cuba - Support of Autonomous Anti-Castro Groups
[2435]Mr. FitzGerald recommended that the paper dated 13 August be
[2436]submitted at this time for discussion only rather than decision by the
[2437]Special Group. This recommendation was made because the members of
[2438]the Group had not been given sufficient time to study the proposal.
[2439]The paper had been presented in hasty fashion because CIA had received
[2440]reports that the exile group in question was beginning to scatter and
[2441]prepare for an operational program not influenced by CIA.
[2443]There was some discussion of the effects of using a British
[2444]island for launching these operations and as to the desirability of
[2445]striking Cuban shipping on the high seas. Decision on this operation
[2446]was deferred until the next meeting.
[2448]. eo
[2450]See special minutes
[2451]for additional items
[2456]re Loe,
[2458]eyes
[2460]to ry ,
[2461]CORE
[2468]va
[2469]a
[2471]3. [Beteneive Armament for GROSBEAK Aircraft
[2473]The Special Group approved the paper of 11 August as presented, :
[2474]'. subject to confirmation that the sidewinder heat-seeker missile, already
[2476]compromised, would not lead to a security problem should a GROSBEAK
[2477]\ Plane be lost.
[2479]4. [onospeax Overflight of Laos G8
[2480]: The proposal was approved to overfly Laos in order to fulfill |
[2481]+ COMOR requirements for radar order of battle information in support
[2482]of current and future missions. 7
[2484]5. [Miscellaneous Items G g
[2485]A. Mr. McCone briefly described the current status of Radio
[2486]'. Free Europe (RFE) and Radio Liberty (RadLib). He stated that he hoped
[2487]/ there would be no change in the State Department policy with respect to
[2488]: the radios because of the extensive commitments, international agree-
[2489]ments, and political implications in RFE and RadLib. Mr. McCone :
[2490]indicated that there appeared to be a feeling in some quarters of the :
[2491]Department of State that, because the U.S, may be entering a period of :
[2492]"detente" with the Soviet Union, efforts should be made to reduce the i
[2493]causes of tension and conflict, Since the two radios are major
[2494]!, igritants to the Soviets, CIA should, therefore, modify or reduce .
[2495]"some of these activities. The Special Group opined that this was not
[2496]the time to change U.S. policy with respect to RFE and RadLib, Mr,
[2497]Johnson said he would look into this further. —
[2501]1
[2503]fe
[2505]|
[2506]i
[2508]7 B. The matter of the Soviet attempt to establish a consolidated
[2509]\ headquarters at Lietzenburger Strasse in West Berlin, was raised by !
[2510]. Mr. McCone, He opposed such a development forthe following reasons: \
[2511]i a The formation of such a headquarters would lay the
[2513]groundwork for future Soviet claims to an equal footing with the
[2514]U. 5. in West Berlin.
[2516](2) Its establishment would severely handicap CIA operations
[2517]against the USSR target in West Berlin,
[2519](3) Such a center would improve on the USSR's- ability to :
[2520]concentrate its operations against Western targets. a
[2522]7 os (4) It would in effect increase Soviet prestige in West |
[2523]mop Berlin. 7 . in
[2525]{ eee four 7 oS LUT pipeerss etter oor 707
[2528]PTET RR RTE IRBs ee omen UI GE pe
[2530]aD ” ee gkbnenoede BAT GET TT TE RL recat tenbititeteew ches grerrebalaites
[2533]13-00000°
[2535]Or Ager
[2536]ova Mt ss A
[2538]EYES ONLY
[2544]98 ee append ET
[2546]i (ur. Bundy stated he was aware of the problem and believed that
[2548]the British who had been reluctant to support. the position of the y
[2550]U.S. and the French, now concurred that-a refusal to the Soviets . \
[2552]‘ ghould be made, This concerted action, it was believed by: the Group,
[2554]. | would succeed in preventing the Soviets from establishing such a .
[2555]| eonsolidated headquarters.
[2557]C, Mr. FitzGerald reported that recent discussions held with ;
[2558]Artime have indicated that he is somewhat disgusted with Luis Somoza i
[2559]who has not behaved sensibly, but that he does have respect for his
[2560]brother, General Anastasio Somoza, with whom he can deal more rationally, °
[2561]Artime will make greater use of Costa Rica in order to decrease his
[2562]operational commitments in Nicaragua and increase his Security!) ;
[2564]de eel
[2566]Distribution
[2567]Mr. Johnson
[2568]Mr. Gilpatric
[2569]Mr, McCone
[2572]13-00000 (°° at
[2574]8 August 1963
[2576]MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
[2577]SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 8 August 1963
[2578]PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and General Carter
[2580]Mr. FitzGerald was present for Item 1.
[2581]Mr. Herbert was present for Item 2.
[2582]Mr. Baird was present for Item 3.
[2584]1. Cuba - Infiltration/Exfiltration Operations
[2586]_ Of the 13 Cuban operations approved by the Special Group, 2 are.: to be
[2587]externally-mounted sabotage operations which will be subject to ;
[2588]possible reconsideration up-to 12 August 1963, The other 11 operations
[2589]approved are designed to meet the need for expanded intelligence
[2591]‘collection activities and to develop viable internal resistance
[2592]organizations. :
[2594]‘Mr. FitzGerald made a special report o. Luis Somoza's conversa-
[2596]tions with exile leaders. Somoza wants the Cuban exiles to begin
[2598]' aggressive harassment operations against Castro and indicated that
[2599]the Nicaraguan government was willing to give them a base as well as
[2600]‘support, including military aid. Somoza intimated that this may result
[2601]in Castro's launching an offensive against Nicarague. If this occurs,
[2602]Somoza would expect U.S. protection and possibly intervention, Mr.
[2603]FitzGerald further stated that Manuel Artime, leader of the Movement
[2604]for Revolutionary Recovery, would be in the U.S., at which time all
[2605]aspects of his program would be examined. In.order to avoid unfavor-
[2606]able complications. with Somoza, two operational changes will be
[2607]suggested:
[2609]a.  Artime should concentrate on getting resistance started
[2610]inside Cuba and de-emphasize armed attack and external sabotage.
[2612]b. Artime should shift the main weight of his operations to
[2613]; . Costa Rica. There. should be no break, of course, between Artime
[2614]é and Somoza. ,
[2616]SERS as RY PETER LS ERTS sabes aed Cor re eer TC mee
[2618]In.this connection Mr. Johnson raised the Costa Rican Foreign
[2619]Minister's question regarding Artime, It was agreed that Mr. FitzGerald
[2620]would work out the language of the reply with Mr. Cottrell, giving as
[2622]ae es SRSAANV Fl atatan HEEL
[2624]: . See special minutes
[2625]5 ; ; - for additional items
[2627]A CES OMLY
[2631]Lf
[2633]organized by Pawley, would not be desirable.
[2635]much. encouragement to Costa Rica's support of Artime as possible
[2636]without showing his activities.
[2638]create a situation which might: ultimately require U.S.
[2640]General Carter mentioned the eagerness of William D. Pawley to
[2641]implement an operational plan against Cuba, purportedly designed to
[2643]intervention.
[2645]The consensus of the Special Group was that an independent operation
[2647]Efforts should be made
[2649]to bring him into CIA's current operational thinking.
[2651]from Guatemala.
[2653]Mr. FitzGerald also reported that the Attorney General had sent
[2655]Mr. Harry Ruiz Williams to the Agency to present a plan which turned
[2656]out to.be a series of 4,2 mortar attacks on the Cuban coast mounted
[2658]It was agreed that such attacks, in addition to being
[2660]impractical logistically, would also tend to give substance to the
[2662]"Somoza plan"
[2664]During fiscal 1963, CIA sent over 2000 students to 1275 courses at 166
[2665]government and educational institutions.
[2667]2. | Ere - Covert t Action”
[2669]an oral report on CIA's counterinsurgency training and courses.
[2670]Baird emphasized that ever
[2672]and therefore should be discouraged.
[2674]58
[2676]‘The CIA paper of 2 August was approved. ]
[2678]3. [aa Training Activities
[2680]Matthew Baird, Director of CIA's Training Activities, made
[2682]Mr.
[2684]of training.
[2686]GE
[2688]Mr.
[2690]since the establishment of the Office of
[2691]Training in January 1951, CIA has concentrated on the covert aspects
[2692]It has not duplicated in any way courses offered by the
[2693]Department of Defense, the Foreign Service Institute or universities.
[2695]In addition, during the same
[2697]year, CIA trained 4214 students in 432 runnings of 64 different courses, \.
[2698]all directly or indirectly relating to counterinsurgency. :
[2700]Mr. Baird said that strong emphasis has always been placed on
[2702]The e
[2704]resistance operations and guerrilla and paramilitary activities.
[2705]methodof instruction in CIA is based on case studies of current ©
[2706]CIA trained, during fiscal 1963, 150 junior officers (with
[2708]operations.
[2710]a drop out of less than four per cent) and gave instruction to 174
[2712]foreign personnel in counterinsurgency, or directly related fields. r
[2714]Mr. Bundy raised the question as to how CIA courses were inspected.
[2716]General Carter replied by pointing out that these courses are con-
[2718]tinuously inspected b; the Inspector General, 5
[2719]Consultants, and the Deputy Director, Plans, who heads up the clandestine
[2721]services.)
[2723]the President's Board of
[2725]13-00000 ffennen
[2727]4
[2729]The consensus was that Central Intelligence was meeting its
[2731]counterinsurgency training obligations and that because of the covert,
[2733]character of the training, an inspection team external to CIA was
[2734]probably not desirable.
[2736]Goue Phe
[2738]Paul Eckel
[2740]Distribution
[2741]‘Mr. Johnson
[2742]Mr. Gilpatric
[2743]General Carter
[2746]13-00090.
[2748]-
[2750]L
[2752], 7 oe
[2753]i
[2755]29 August 1963
[2757]MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
[2759]SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 29 August 1963
[2761]PRESENT::. Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and General Carter
[2763]Colonel Steakley was present for Items 1’and 2.
[2764]‘Mr. Cheever was present for Item 3._
[2766]we
[2768]1. [ionth1y Reconnaissance Forecasts 98
[2769]a. NRO
[2771]“ The NRO forecast for September was approved as presented,
[2773]with one exception. This had to do with the second Laos/North Vietnam,
[2775]flight, which had been requested in order to "replenish the bank."
[2777]Mr. Johnson asked that he be briefed on the results of previous
[2779]reconnaissance in this area so that he could weigh the value of the
[2781]product against the political risk involved.
[2783]It was noted that this procedure will not delay operations,
[2784]since one approval remains outstanding for Laos/North Vietnam.
[2786]b. DOD
[2788]. The DOD September forecast was approved with the exception
[2789]of the proposed trip of the USS THOMASON, Mr. Johnson objected to
[2790]the proposal to transit the Kita Uruppu Suida Passage. He said that
[2791]the Department.is in. favor of continuing to exercise our rights of: 7
[2792]free navigation in the Sea of Okhotsk; but the projected voyage of .
[2793]the hydrographic ship REHOBOTH satisfies this requirement. Further, i ae
[2794]U.S. merchant shipping does transit the Passage. In view of these ; ae
[2795]considerations, he did not believe it desirable at this time to send « wa
[2796]a U.S. warship on this route, The Group concurred with Mr. Johnson's
[2798]position.
[2800]General Carter said that in view of certain other indications
[2802]‘recently received, YANKEE PASHA is considered by the intelligence
[2804]community to be even more urgent than before.
[2806]Mr. Johnson raised a question about the mission of the USS
[2807]STATEN ISLAND in the Chukchi Sea, asking whether the objective could
[2808]not be met by staying 15 miles from shore rather than 12. Colonel’)
[2810]re
[2811]Ohne.
[2812]hn Va oe
[2814]EVES OF
[2816]Smt)
[2819]13-00000
[2821](Steakley explained that the mission of the ship is to obtain informa-
[2822]tion on hydrographic "stations" located 12 miles out and that the
[2823]restriction suggested would not enable the vessel to accomplish this.
[2824]Mr. Johnson then concurred.
[2826]; Colonel Steakley. briefed the Group on certain sensitive
[2827]reconnaissance operations.
[2829]Colonel Steakley gave a brief summary of the deployment of
[2830]MIG fighters in the China coastal areas. He said that as of now there
[2831]are no MIG-21's in the area, the MIG complement consisting of 17's
[2832]and 19's. He saw no need to revise any of the projected BOW TIE
[2833]missions because of these fighters. ]
[2835]2. [Negotiations for Indian Base G e
[2837]The Group noted the report from New Delhi that the Indian
[2838]': Intelligence Service finds itself unable to give assurances to the
[2839]’ Prime Minister about the security of personnel. on the projected
[2840]: temporary base at Char Batia, and that approval for use of this base
[2841]' has, therefore, been withheld.
[2843]- Mr. Gilpatric and General Carter pointed out that the DIA is
[2844]anxious to have the Sino-Indian border area covered, because this has a
[2845]not been done since January. General Carter said that he had intended iA
[2846]to have the USIB reassess the priority of this requirement at its ‘
[2848]+} meeting yesterday, but that other matters had made it impossible to
[2849]bring it up. ,
[2851]sy The Group felt that this should be discussed with USIB next week.
[2853]' They agreed, however, that in the absence of a really persuasive case
[2854]for the priority of the requirement, it would be inadvisable to attempt
[2855]to run the operation once more out of Takhli without Indian assistance.
[2856]They felt that other things being equal, it would be preferable to
[2857]revert to the original proposal of having a permanent Indian base
[2859]available in December. ")
[2861]ooct re ha - oe
[2863]3. Cuba
[2864]a. The Group then turned to consideration of the paper from
[2866]the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs dated 12 August 1963, “Support of
[2868]Autonomous Anti-Castro Groups."' In answer to questions, Mr. Cheever
[2870]said that the project for support of Commandos L would be useful but
[2872]not essential, He felt that the economic damage which this group might
[2874]inflict would probably be comparatively minor. On the other hand there
[2876]would be some psychological advantages to be gained, and also such
[2877]operations would serve to keep the Cuban security forces busy.
[2880]13-00000
[2883]Seb Ae) -
[2884]. EYES ONLY
[2887]In view of the personal interest expressed by Mr. McCone ©
[2888]in the project when it was tabled at the meeting of 15 August, it was
[2889]agreed that no decision should be made until after the DCI's return.
[2891]b. Mr. Cheever briefed the Group on the successful disposal of
[2892]the contaminated sugar which has been in Puerto Rico.
[2894]c. Mr. Cheever discussed the "After Action Report" on the two
[2895]sabotage operations conducted the middle of August. Mr. Johnson
[2896]commented on the amount of materiel that had been left behind at the
[2897]site of one of these operations, and asked whether it is possible that
[2898]the Cuban agents did this deliberately, in order to involve the United
[2899]States. Mr. Cheever acknowledged this possibility, but felt that it
[2900]had simply been a question of "green troops" behaving in this manner
[2902]their first time under fire.
[2904]The Chairman asked that an estimate be prepared, assessing
[2905]Castro's probable reaction to this sabotage, He also asked Mr. Cheever
[2906]to see that the Attorney General is briefed on the results of the’
[2907]operations. ae ok
[2909]<bean oe sme a Gf eee sours
[2911]4, ‘(Gosta Rice - Re-establishment of Institute for Political Education
[2912]The CIA paper of 26 August was approved as presented. 7
[2913](GRosBEak Armament GO - -
[2915]es an , h make it clear
[2917], o the Chinese
[2918]GROSBEAK aircraft
[2919]verification that
[2920]al can, therefore, ]
[2922]nA anes
[2924]Thomas A. Parrott
[2926]Distribution
[2927]Mr. Johnson
[2928]Mr. Gilpatric
[2929]General Carter
[2933]mura nat i
[2934]EVES GNLY
[2936]5 September 1963
[2938]MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
[2939]SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 5 September 1963
[2940]PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. McCone.
[2942]Mr. FitzGerald was present for Items 1 and 2.
[2943]Mr. Colby was present for Items 3-5.
[2945]1. Cuba - ent Operations
[2947]. Mr. FitzGerald commented on several reports from inside Cuba,
[2949]' which indicate that the morale of the people was raised considerably
[2950]as a result of the Santa Lucia and Casilda sabotage operations, He
[2951]cautioned that some of these reports might be somewhat overdrawn,
[2953]but it appears certain that the sabotage did have a beneficial effect
[2954]in this way. . .
[2956]He then discussed with the Group the general philosophy of these
[2957]operations, and plans for the future within the capabilities of the
[2958]available agents. Among other things, he pointed out that there is
[2959]a limited number of targets on or near the coast and that the most
[2960]attractive ones are, at the same time, the most difficult to attack;*°~
[2961]the available teams are not yet ready for assignments of this difficulty.
[2963]- On the other hand, smaller and more vulnerable targets are being: ‘selected.
[2965]Te is Proposed to hit a lumber mill in September.
[2967]Mr. FitzGerald went on to say, in connection with the scope and
[2968]pace of these operations, that it would not be desirable to knock out
[2969]all available targets in the near future, even if it were possible
[2970]to do so. This is because this type of attack is designed to stimulate
[2971], -Yesistance inside Cuba, apart from whatever intrinsic value it might
[2972]The Group agreed with the approach. They felt that the reaction _
[2973]‘to the two missions in August was most satisfactory and that it is
[2974]essential to keep this sort of thing up, selecting a limited number of
[2976]_ worthwhile targets. Mr. Bundy commented particularly on the silence
[2978]that had been maintained by the agents, which has resulted in the
[2979]noise level being of a different character than might have been ex-
[2980]pected otherwise. Mr. FitzGerald was authorized to proceed with a
[2981]relatively soft target, such as a lumber mill.
[2983]See special minutes
[2984]for additional items
[2986]__ SECRET
[2987]EYES ONLY.
[2989]Trina es cemerrersemen se cteemsenepen
[2991]13-0000 0 emnemenn sept
[2993]i
[2994]i
[2996]1
[2998]wed
[3000]There were some questions as to the feasibility of having some-
[3001]what larger teams, but Mr. FitzGerald pointed out that that is not
[3002]practicable now. Mr. Bundy suggested that special attention be given
[3003]to electric power installations to the extent that adequate assets
[3004]are available for that purpose.’ He also noted that the two August
[3005]operations had been carried out in a professional and sophisticated
[3006]manner, which leads naturally to the accusation of Agency sponsorship.
[3007]He urged that to the extent possible attempts be made to vary the ,
[3008]method, for example by launching the attack from the shore side rather
[3009]than from the sea, as Mr. FitzGerald had previously said will be the
[3010]case with the lumber mill. Mr. Bundy felt that in this way the "CIA
[3011]signature" might be blurred.
[3013]_ The Group then discussed the paper prepared by the Board of
[3014]National Estimates, on possible Castro reaction to sabotage opera-
[3015]tions. No issue was taken with the conclusions of this paper, but
[3016]there was some discussion as to how the Soviets would react to any
[3017]requests made of them by Castro to assist him in combatting sabotage.
[3018]In this connection, Mr. McCone called attention to the increasing
[3019]currents of tension between the USSR and Cuba.
[3021]Mr.-FitzGerald then summarised the results of last month's
[3023]Anfiltration/exfiltration operations and those proposed for next
[3025]month.
[3027]2. Guba ~ Support of Autonomous Anti-Castro Group
[3029]The Group then turned to further discussion of the paper from
[3030]the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs dated August 13, on the subject of — :
[3031]Comandos Le :
[3033]In response to objections stated at earlier meetings to the use
[3034]of a British base, Mr. FitzGerald said that it would be feasible to
[3035]take off from a point in the northern Bahamas, rather than from one of
[3036]the keys very near Cuba, This would considerably reduce the dangers
[3037]of hot pursuit.
[3039]Mr. Johnson said that purely apart from the British problem,
[3040]whether or not such a change in location would alleviate it, he does
[3041]not feel that the type of activity proposed accomplishes the agreed
[3042]objective of reaching internal resistance elements.
[3044]The Chairman, Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. McCone all felt that support
[3045]of this group in the manner outlined, should be considered as action
[3046]additional to that designed to contact the resistance. Further, they
[3047]felt that it would be perfectly feasible, and in fact necessary, to
[3048]avoid any involvement with the British in this matter. It was finally
[3050]suit f
[3052]EYES qn
[3054]wart nreseeeres
[3056]- Mr. Johnson.
[3058]general nature and asked whether this could be accomplished if larger
[3060]'- diction of Route 7 in Laos by a thousand-man force of Meos, in early
[3061].. August. He pointed out that the success achieved could be attributed
[3063]EY ES GRLY
[3065]decided that Mr. Bundy would discuss the proposal with higher authority,
[3067]noting the reservations expressed by Mr. Johnson, In the event of
[3068]favorable reaction by higher authority, Mr. Bundy will talk further to
[3070]rena ieee aye a enon oa rape oe ree eT
[3072]Mr. McCone said that he would like to see more activity of this
[3074]‘numbers of Cuban personnel were obtained. Mr. FitzGerald replied that
[3075]the problem is not numbers, but the degree of training and competence.
[3076]In this connection, he noted that the Artime group should be ready ¢ to
[3077]goin November, 000 es
[3078]3. 3. {[lnteraiceton a Operations . Along Route 7 98
[3080]Mr. Colby briefed the Group in detail on the successful inter- \
[3082]qo petite sep ce meget eres te
[3084]to adequate operational’ intelligence, security, size of the group, and
[3086]. the support of the Parus.7] i
[3088]4 . GE
[3090]4, [hort Vietnam Status Report Number 7
[3092]me Mr. Colby touched on the highlights of agent activity in North
[3093]Vietnam during August, and on plans for similar activity during the
[3095]—_ coming month, 7
[3097]5u | Qperations in Denied Areas of the Far East GE
[3099]a Mr, Colby said that: a review has been made of experience with
[3100]-,', agent operations in the denied areas of the Far East, including North
[3101]- Korea, China, Tibet and North Vietnam. He said that as a result of
[3103]this review, serious doubts have arisen as to the results that can be ©:
[3105]"expected from’ small teams, either in intelligence or in action, He
[3107]said that he proposes to discuss with the DCI in the near future, "
[3108]’ certain changes in the method of operation.in such areas. This might /
[3109]take the form of concentrating on developing a spirit of resistance
[3110]rather than on a search for resistance elements or on carrying out
[3111]minor sabotage. It might also involve much larger groups of people.
[3112]In this. connection, he pointed to the success (of the thousand-man
[3114]operation against Route *)
[3117]4% te
[3119]“ ‘use of South Vietnamese nationals for activities of this nature in _ i!
[3120]North Vietnam, is to be discussed next week with the Joint Chiefs. |
[3121]_ Mr. McCone suggested that the Chiefs should be briefed by Mr.. Colby. 7
[3123]Mr. » Gilpatric noted that the Wheeler report ’ recommending the
[3129]Thomas A. Parrott
[3131]Distribution
[3132]Mr. Johnson :
[3133].” Mr. Gilpatric «©
[3134]_ Mr. McCone
[3136]ar
[3137]H
[3139]13-00000.
[3141]rn ae _ SECRET oF 4.0
[3142]Me BYES ONLY 7
[3143]24 October 1963
[3144]os
[3146]MEXORANDUM FOR RECORD
[3147]SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 24 October 1963
[3148]PRESERT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. McCone
[3150]Mr. Heime was also prasent.
[3151]| Mx. MesGerald and Mr. Cheever were present for Items 2-5.
[3153]1. (Gost States Evaluation Board 1 (use) 96 |
[3155]Mr. Helas reported that the USEB wes established in 1950 by a
[3156]Netionsl Security Council Intelligence Directive. The Board wae re-
[3157]quired to perfora certain functions in connection with 0.5. cover —
[3158]; and deception programs. Mesbership on the Board wae limited to the
[3159]i Service Departments, FHI, CIA, JCS, and the Department of State.
[3161]According to Mr. Heluws the USEB has not met in recent years.
[3163]_ However, it was agreed by the Special Group that ite functions had
[3164]considerable significance end should be continued. Since USEB was
[3165]originally organised only to deal in the military sphere, it was re-
[3166]commended by Mr. Helos chet a new directive be written and coordinated, | 5
[3167]which would encospase all national deception programs, and be sub- | \ aé >
[3168]misted co the Special Group for epproval. It was also determined \s =
[3169]that the new home would eps to the 1al. Group. the fers
[3171]2. cuba © at 01 ¢ botase rations _ a wee sD
[3173]_ The proposed sabotage operations for Noveaber through January
[3174]was noted by the Group. The operation plan against petroleum storage
[3175]facilities in Niquero was deleted and an operation egaiast a sawmill
[3176]located et Canete in Northarn Oriente Province, was substituted. Specific
[3177]operational propos@le for Noveuber will be submitced to the Special Group
[3178]_ fet approval at che next mecting.
[3180]3. Guba - Proposal for Air Strikes Ageinst Cuban Targets
[3182]‘This cperetional proposal was deferred by the Special Group
[3183]pending au estimate to deteraine the Cuban reaction to an air strike
[3184]oo the Santiago refinery, and specifically what effect it might have.
[3185]en the 0.8. reconnaissance operation. CIA will prepare the estinate.
[3188]for additional ites
[3191]SEK Vv
[3192]FY ed Uivlt
[3197]Ne ee ar, ree
[3199]‘SECHET _
[3201]EYES ONLY
[3202]4, bol lo a s for 58 rt o°
[3203]Autonomous Ant i-Castro Croups ,
[3205]Mr. FitsGarald informed the Group that CIA ie dropping ite
[3206]earlier proposal te support Consndos L, due to the crackdown on
[3207]exile raids by various U. &. and British government agencies. He
[3208]recomended that a plan of "selective relaxation" ba adopted, designed
[3209]to relex current stringent controls on selected anti-Castro groups in
[3210]order to avoid all raide being charged to CIA. ,
[3212]The suggestion is that the “selective relaxation" be accoaplished
[3214]by authorising CIA to tell appropriate U.5. enforcement agente that
[3216]eertein activities are of interest to CIA and should not be molested.
[3218]‘CIA would not actually gat Lavolved but would singly screen chese
[3220]groups to permit some freedos of movement on the part of the better
[3221]ones. Thié would be without the knowledge of the groups. —
[3223]Me. Johneca caised che question of difficulties of controlling
[3224]exile groupe should eny group succeed in engaging in activities not
[3225]te the liking of the U.8. Governsent. ‘This possibility was admitted,
[3227]Mc. FicsGerald cited the Manolo Bay group aa one group which a
[3228]“selective relexation™ would assist. Thia autononcus group is re-
[3229]ceiving financial and limited logistic assistance fron CIA, and desires
[3231]te mount en infiltration operation from Florida. He has good cone
[3233] peetions in Cubs and should be urged to proceed. Mr. Bundy steted he
[3235]was not enthusiastic about Bay operating frow U.S. texritery. Mr.
[3236]Bundy steted he would discuss thie propesesi with higher autbority.
[3238]‘Se ~ Jnfileratic e
[3240]ue, FitsGexald reported chet one of the aualil boats used in the
[3241]21 Cctober infilerstion operation reached Mexico aud is in the hands —
[3242]of local authorities, friendly to us;. There were three persons on
[3243]beard, one dead, ons injured, and the other all right. ;
[3245]The fete of the second eneil boat fe unknown. ‘The mother ship
[3247]weich escorted the two emall boats was attached, but evaded its
[3249]attackers and escaped. There ia a possibility that soua teas or beat
[3250]crew senbero may heve been captured and if so, a “show trial" may be
[3252]expected.
[3253]hoa TOE “TITY Se GE en Ty - ole
[3255]6. | Proposal. to ° fore. ond. Suppert a Political Action Comittee on
[3256]- Beligious Freedom in the UssB
[3258]This projecs was not approved as proposed. It was agreed that
[3260]the concept wea ecund but there should be further. exploration as to] i
[3262]Pe
[3268]SECRET ~
[3269]EYES ONLY,
[3273](gether private capital could not be used instead of governsent funds. |
[3274]The project was referred back to CIA with the euggestion to explore
[3276]: whether the World Council of Churches or the Nationel Counctl of
[3278]i!
[3280]Protestants and Jews might be interested in obtaining end conertbuttag g
[3281]_ funds for carrying out the eine eet forth in the paper) :
[3283]- (om 7s
[3285]This cperation vas sppreved although . thea” “‘Spectal Group sexdera
[3287]' agreed chat until after the elections there should be no new effort ? ,
[3289]PITT greg par on eget
[3291]8. Yiesnan = Coup Plotting —
[3293]Mr. MeConus expressed hie fear that the top U.&. diplomecic aad
[3294]wuilicary officiale in Gaigon are becoming too invelved in conversations
[3295]between General bon and Consin. Such involvement could destroy
[3296]Conein's usefulness and involve Ambassedor Lodge end General Harkins
[3297]fa operations difficult to deny.
[3299]The Syectel Croup authorised the eonding of 9 coordinated massage
[3300]te Lodge acd Harkins euphasising (4) the setting vp of a sore secure
[3301]systea of contacts vith General Don and other Vietnancse atilitery;
[3303](>) che preperation of an E-baasy assesement of General Don's status,
[3304]the group he represents aud future plane; (c) the tightening of contrel
[3305]ever tha. Doa/Consia mpetings.
[3307]Special Grovp meubers agreed that they shovld firm up their policy
[3308]thinking with respect co Vietnam befere Anbassador Lodge returns to
[3309]Washiogton, and then heer what Mr. Hodes has co say on what couress
[3310]_ of action should ‘be taken.
[3312]te initiate operations! activity among the Greek en)
[3314](Signed)
[3315]Paul Eckel
[3316]Distribution
[3317]Me, Johnecs:
[3318]Mr. Gilpatric
[3319]Mr. HeCone
[3321]Oras cow
[3322], pas afd
[3323]ITO AME
[3325]13-00000" .-: 9 Pee
[3327]- oft aed
[3329]Bovis Sg a
[3330]as Hy an
[3331]OR
[3335]EYES ONLY
[3337]6 November 1963
[3339]MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
[3341]SUBJECT: Minutes of the Special Meeting of the Special Group,
[3342]5 November 1963 : ;
[3344]PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Vance, and Mr. McCone.
[3345]The Attorney General, Mr. Helms, Mr. Cheever, Dr. Wheelon,
[3347]“and Colonel Steakley were present for Items land 2. The
[3348]_. Attorney General and Mr. Helms were present for Item 3.
[3350]“1, ‘Cuba - Sabotage Operation in Southeast Pinar (No. 3105).
[3352]Mr. Helms briefed the Group on the background of the mission and
[3353]on'events leading up to the infiltration attempted on 21-22 October.
[3354]On the basis of available information, the best estimate is that Castro's
[3356]_ Security forces penetrated the reception committee and laid a trap which
[3357]' resulted in the capture of some personnel.
[3359]The subsequent press coverage of this affair renders the further
[3361]- operational use of the mother ships REX and LIDA to be undesirable in
[3363]awe
[3365]the immediate future,
[3367]2. Cuba - Infiltration/Exfiltration Operations
[3369]Mr. Cheever presented a low-key sabotage operation, No. 3111, against
[3370]a warehouse and pier on the north coast of Cuba. This activity is to be
[3371]carried out by a small commando team which will land on the pier and the
[3373]. warehouse.
[3375]Mention was made by Mr. Cheever of some problems with British patrols
[3376]which have unwittingly exposed some of CIA's operations, Mr. Bundy stated
[3377]that he would mention this to the British Ambassador and CIA would follow
[3378]up on a service-to-service level in order to prevent further unnecessary
[3379]incidents.
[3381].In addition, the Special Group tentatively approved two other operations. :
[3383]These are No. 3112, a sabotage operation against a sawmill located in northern
[3385]Oriente Province and No. 3115, the infiltration of a radio operator to provide
[3387]. communications for a ratline.
[3389]Mr. Bundy has placed the above three operations on a "fail safe" basis
[3391]° pending concurrence in each case by higher authority.
[3393]See_special minutes
[3394]for additional items
[3397]13-00009.. a . et ous
[3399]a - eves ANY
[3403]3. Cuba. - Peace Feelers
[3405]Mr. Bundy stated that is has come to the attention of the White
[3406]House that Castro would like to have a talk designed to bring about
[3407]some kind of "arrangement" with the U.S. To hear what Castro has to
[3408]say and to know on what basis he might wish to negotiate would be of
[3409]some use to the U.S. Mr. Bundy suggested that for this initial talk
[3410]Mr. William Attwood, currently on the staff of Mr. Stevenson at the
[3411]United Nations, might be a likely candidate since Mr. Attwood has been
[3412]in touch with Mr. Carlos Lechuga Hevia, the Cuban Ambassador to the
[3413]United Nations. Also, Attwood has a fairly friendly relationship with
[3414]Castro based on previous acquaintance.
[3416]In the Group discussion which followed it was thought inadvisable
[3417]. to allow Mr. Attwood, while on the UN staff, to get in touch with Castro.
[3418]The suggestion was made that he might be removed from his official UN
[3419]status and then go to Cuba for the ostensible purpose of writing an
[3420]article for Look magazine. In this way it might be learned how badly
[3421]Castro might want a detente with the United States.
[3423]It was suggested by Mr. Helms that it might be profitable to
[3424]“war game’ this problem and look at it from all possible angles before.
[3425]making any contacts.
[3427]A further suggestion was made by Mr. Bundy that Dr. Rene Vallejo
[3428]Ortiz, Castro's aide and personal physician, might be flown to Mexico
[3429]with Castro's proposals and discuss them with the U.S. Ambassador in
[3430]Mexico City.
[3432]The Attorney General emphasized that as a prelude to all this the
[3433]U.S. must require some fundamental steps such as the end of subversion
[3434]in Latin America and removing the Soviet troops in Cuba before any serious
[3435]discussion can take place about.a detente.
[3437]Mr. McCone stated that it might be possible to use again Mr.
[3438]_James Donovan who is known to have excellent relationships with Dr. Vallejo.
[3439]Vallejo might be flown to the UN for such talks or better still Donovan
[3440]could go to Cuba.
[3442]It was decided by the Special Group members not to try to reach a
[3443]firm decision at this time but to study the problem for several days and
[3445]attack it again.
[3446](fu Shh
[3448]Gu Eckel
[3450]Distribution
[3451]Mr. Johnson
[3452]Mr. Gilpatric
[3453]Mr. McCone
[3458]6 November 1963
[3460]"MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP
[3462]SUBJECT: Cuban Operations
[3464]At a special meeting of the Special Group on 5 November,
[3465]it tentatively approved, subject to higher authority concurrence,
[3466]three Cuban operations scheduled for implementation on 8, 10, and
[3467]13 November. On 6 November higher authority disapproved all
[3469]. Cuban operations scheduled to be run into Cuba before 12 November.
[3471]The two operations dated 8 and 10 November are therefore disapproved.
[3473]| Distribution |
[3475]Mr. Johnson’ —
[3476]Mr. Gilpatric
[3477]Mr. McCone
[3481]'
[3482]t
[3483]i
[3484]'
[3485]i
[3487]13-00000
[3488]|
[3490]12 November 1963
[3492]MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
[3494]SUBJECT: Cuban Operations
[3496]A meeting was held this morning with higher authority on the
[3497]above subject. Present were: Mr. Rusk, Mr. McNamara, Mr. Robert
[3498]Kennedy, Mr. Bundy, Mr. McCone, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, Mr.
[3499]Vance, General Taylor, Mr. Heins, Mr. FitzGerald, Mr. Cheever, and
[3500]Mr. Shackley.
[3502]Mr. McCone gave a brief summary of recent developments inside ~
[3504]‘Cuba. He stated that the military is generally loyal to Castro. -:°
[3506]There have been some disorders but not very extensive. Castro's ._
[3507]internal security forces appear to be well organized. He has devel-
[3508]oped a system of informers which is becoming increasingly effective.
[3509]The economic situation is deteriorating largely because of the
[3510]enforcement of economic sanctions, and Hurricane "Flora" although
[3512]its damage was not as great as originally thought. The Soviets
[3513]appear to be continuing the gradual withdrawal of personnel from Cuba
[3514]although recently 1,000-2;000 troops have come in. There now seems
[3516]to bea kind of "Soviet MAAG" program concerned mainly with training
[3518]Cubans in all types of military activity including the handling of
[3519]missiles, There has been some removal of the more sophisticated types
[3520]of electronic equipment. Some new tanks have arrived in Cuba, esti-
[3521]mates run from 25 to 50. Ss
[3523]Mr. FitzGerald reported on Cuban operations under six main
[3524]headings: (a) Covert Collection, (b) Propaganda, (c) Economic Denial,
[3525](d) Disaffections in the Military, (e) Sabotage and Harassment, and
[3526](£) Support of Autonomous Anti-Castro Groups.
[3528]. (a) Covert Collection. Mr. FitzGerald pointed out that
[3529]inside Cuba CIA has three kinds of agent activities: (1) "singleton"
[3530](2) collection nets, and (3) agents involved in "black net": operations.
[3532]® While there is encouraging improvement in the geographical spread of
[3534]these agents, there is still, understandably, a fairly heavy concentra-
[3535]tion of agents in the Havana area.
[3537]A question was raised as to how many agents in.all of
[3539]these activities have been lost. Mr. FitzGerald said that in the
[3541]neighborhood of 25 had been either captured or killed in the past year.
[3543]EVES ORLY
[3545]13-00000
[3547]The reasons for these casualty figures are the increasing effectiveness
[3549]of Castro's internal security forces and discovery brought about when
[3551]agents try to obtain food. No matter how good the documentation, an
[3552]outsider in a community is viewed with suspicion.
[3554](b) Propaganda. The activities of CIA in this field are
[3555]the mailing of leaflets and.radio broadcasts. Some 30-40,000 leaflets
[3556]per month have been mailed and during a day there are 32 hours of
[3557]programs emanating from seven different stations. It is believed that
[3558]there is a very excellent listening public. The programs appeal to
[3560]people in a wide variety of jobs and professions. There is some jamming
[3562]but it is spasmodic and generally confined to Havana.
[3564](c) Economic Denial. Mr. FitzGerald reported that the U.S.
[3565]economic denial program is contributing to Cuba's declining economy.
[3567]‘Mention was made that the economic denial program would be more effec-
[3569]tive if the Canadians were willing to cooperate. Up to now they have
[3570]not gone along with U.S. efforts, and they are supplying many items
[3571]essential to Cuban economy. The UK and Spain are continuing to deal
[3572]in certain types of goods required by the Cubans. Commodities going
[3573]into Cuba in 1962 from the free world. reached $101 million. While this
[3575]represents less than in 1961 the amount is still too high.
[3577](d) Disaffections in the Military. While the military is
[3579]loyal to Castro as has been noted there are indications that: some leaders
[3580]would like to break with the regime but lack courage and opportunity.
[3582]Mr. FitzGerald commended a CIA-DIA task force which prepared a report
[3583]covering some 150 Cuban military leaders. Out of this figure there are
[3584]some 45 which look interesting from CIA's operational viewpoint. Mr.-
[3585]FitzGerald reported that CIA is in touch with three persons who are in
[3586]the military or who have highly placed contacts. in such circles. The
[3587]aim is to use these three individuals to establish contact with military
[3588]personnel inside Cuba. The principal aim is to get military leaders who
[3590]-have become disenchanted with the Castro regime to dare to talk and plot
[3592]Castro's downfall with each other.
[3594](e) Sabotage and Harassment. Mr. FitzGerald ment ioned four
[3595]successful sabotage operations against a power plant, oil storage’
[3596]facilities, a sawmill, and an underwater demolition operation against a
[3598]. floating crane in one of Cuba's harbors. It is believed that the publi-
[3600]cation of these successful sabotage activities in the Cuban press has
[3601]tended to raise appreciably the morale of the people. Also, such
[3602]sabotage continues to keep pressure on the Castro regime and adds to the
[3603]growing economic problems facing the country.
[3605](£) Support of Autonomous Anti-Castro Groups. The question
[3607]was asked from-where would the autonomous groups operate. Mr. FitzGerald
[3608]replied that they would operate from outside U.S. territory. He mentioned
[3611]13-00000
[3613]two bases of the Artime group, one in Costa Rica and the other in
[3615]Nicaragua. Also. it was hoped that the autonomous group under Manolo Ray
[3616]would soon get itself established in a working base, possibly Costa Rica.
[3617]Mr. FitzGerald said that much could be accomplished by these autonomous
[3618]groups once they become operational.
[3620]A question was asked as to what decisions remain to be made. Mr.
[3621]FitzGerald replied that we were looking for a reaffirmation of the program
[3622]as presented, including sabotage and harassment. When asked what was
[3623]planned in sabotage for the immediate future, he said that destruction
[3625]-operations should be carried out against a large oil refinery and storage
[3626]‘facilities, a large electric plant, sugar refineries, railroad bridges,
[3628]harbor facilities, and underwater demolition of docks and ships. The
[3629]question was also raised as to whether an air strike would be effective —
[3630]on some of these principal targets. The consensus was that CIA should
[3631]proceed with its planning for this type of activity: looking toward ~
[3632]January.
[3634]The State Department raised questions with respect to sabotage
[3635]activities in Cuba. The thought was advanced that there may be a
[3636]relationship between such hit and run attacks on Cuba and the delay of
[3637]American convoys en route to Berlin. A further question was posed as
[3638]to the over-all importance to the United States of sabotage operations,
[3639]especially since it is so difficult to keep. them from being directly
[3641]‘attributable to the U.S. It was thought that the hit and run type effort
[3643]might in fact invoke loss of support inside Cuba and may even result in
[3644]bringing more Soviet troops back into Cuba. Somehow the U.S. must pin
[3645]responsibility for these activities on:Castro. The U.S. in fact must be
[3646]ready to retaliate when it can be fairly well established that Castro is
[3647]attempting with arms, money and men to foment Communist uprisings in any
[3648]Latin American country.
[3650]The consensus was that since CIA's sabotage operation is in the
[3651]main low cost and since it does worry the Castro regime, denies him some
[3652]essential commodities, stimulates. some sabotage inside Cuba and tends to
[3653]improve the morale of the Cubans who would like to see Castro removed,
[3654]CIA should proceed with those operations planned for the coming week end
[3655](November 15 through 17).
[3657]The view was expressed that CIA, in connection with the Department
[3658]of Defense, should concentrate on attempting to catch Castro red-handed
[3659]delivering arms to Communist groups in Latin American countries.. It-was
[3660]determined that during-the next 90 days from this date an attempt would
[3661]be made by means of air patrols and surface ships to identify ships
[3662]carrying arms for Castro to Latin American countries. It was hoped that .
[3663]a ship with Cuban arms could be picked up. Conversations are to be :
[3666]13-00000 . .
[3668]te ee ae : i
[3669]Ev ES men Vv Jobe
[3670]initiated by the Secretary of the Navy with CIA to map out a three-month
[3671]operation against Cuban shipping. It was also determined that the
[3672]Colombian and Venezuelan governments should be asked to join with the
[3673]U.S. in developing a joint patrol designed to identify ships. carrying
[3674]weapons from Cuba destined for revolutionary groups in Latin Anerican
[3676]countries.
[3677]hide
[3680]13-0000. «ss Fo a nee BS
[3681]- . Lot a i :
[3683]15 November 1963
[3685]MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP
[3686]SUBJECT: Minutes of the Special Group Meeting, 14 November 1963
[3687]PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. McCone.
[3689]General Taylor and Dr. MacMillan were present for Item 1.
[3690]Mr. FitzGerald was present for Items 2 and 3.
[3692]ae Oo Lona ice os - . GS oe Te Sa
[3693]1. ff S. Support of Foreign Paramilitary Forces ;
[3695], “ General Taylor proposed that an ad hoc group be formed consisting
[3696]‘of a representative from CIA, Department of State, and Department of
[3698]; Defense to review U.S. programs involving support of foreign paramili-
[3699]Qn tary forces. The countries given in the following list have internal
[3701]/" security problems and all have received U.S. support for paramilitary
[3704]: Bolivia | Iran
[3705]pie Brazil Iraq
[3706]a * Colombia Cambodia
[3707]Ecuador Thailand
[3708]Venezuela Laos
[3709]i Peru Indonesia ~
[3710]i Guatemala Pakistan
[3712]The Special Group approved General Taylor's recommendation.
[3714]7 Mr. Bundy suggested that the agencies concerned make recommendations
[3716]r for membership on the ad hoc committee to the Secretary of the Special
[3717]Group. This committee will arrange for reviewing programs in the
[3719]df above-mentioned countries and prepare briefings, reports, and recom-
[3720]a mendations for. Special ‘Group action. "7] _ ce ee
[3722]2. Cuba - vedi fication of Revised Schedule of Proposed Infiltration/
[3723].. Exfiltration Operations for the Month of November 1963.
[3725]_ Approval was granted by the Special Group for the following:
[3727]Operation No. 31111: The exfiltration of a previously-
[3728]infiltrated agent.
[3730]Operation No. 3711: The exfiltration of two members of
[3731]-— an existing resistance net.
[3733]See special minutes
[3735].for additional. items
[3738]x
[3742]Wet e s
[3743]mreaoere
[3747]A sea rendezvous with Cuban fishermen
[3748]for the purpose of establishing a
[3750]Operation No. 31110:
[3751]ratline into Cuba.
[3753]An exfiltration operation to be
[3754]accomplished by members of the
[3756]Operation No. 31112:
[3757], DRE using MRR-owned vessels.
[3759]3. Cuba - CIA Request for Department. of Defense Support of Autonomous
[3760]. ene pee ae 7 ne ray
[3762]Operations.
[3764]Operation approved.
[3765]4. || Laos - Review of the Total CIA Program. .
[3766]The paper on the above subject was noted by the Special Group.) ; |
[3768][give - Status Report. Ig
[3769]oe The paper on Tibetan operations was submitted by Mr. McCone to the
[3770]Special Group for information. Since the paper was concerned with . fH
[3771]collecting intelligence no Special Group action was required. 7
[3774]10. IE as
[3776]6. (Benen Vietnam _-. Monthly Report. No.
[3777]This report was noted ‘by the Special Group). as
[3779]Se
[3781]7 | : . . - Va mall
[3783]Distribution .
[3784]Mr. Johnson
[3786]Mr. Gilpatric
[3787]Mr. McCone
[3789]tee
[3790]nae
[3792]iu Fee te huled
[3794]1300000. ye om ne
[3796]t “eceuber 1963
[3798]MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
[3799]SUBJECT: Minutes of the Special Group Meeting, 6 December 1963
[3800]PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. McCone.
[3802]Also present were Mr. Helms and Mr. Cheever.
[3804]Cuban Operations.
[3806]Mr. Cheever briefed the Special Group on Cuban operations proposed for
[3807]December, Approvals were granted for the following: —
[3809]Operation No. 3121: The infiltration of agents for the purpose of
[3810]establishing a base on an off-shore key for a ratline.
[3812], Operation No. 3113: The infiltration of a team, including a radio
[3813]operator, designed to establish operational contacts with Cuban
[3814]' military personalities.
[3816]Operation No. 3114: The infiltration of an agent into and exfil-
[3817]tration of agents out of an existing internal net. :
[3819]Operation No. 3122: The placing of a 3,000-pound cache of arms,
[3820]ammunition, and demolitions in support of an existing internal
[3821]resistance organization.
[3823]Operation No. 3123: The infiltration of a team to further develop
[3824]an existing ratline. .
[3826]_ Operation No. 3117: An underwater demolition operation designed to
[3827]sink or damage a Kronstadt or other Cuban patrol vessels while in
[3829]anchorage.
[3831]Operation No. 3124: The placing of a 100-150 pound cache of radios
[3832]and weapons on-the northern coast.-of Cuba.
[3834]Operation No. 3126: The infiltration and subsequent exfiltration of
[3835]a team which will attempt to establish contacts for the development
[3836]of a ratline. , :
[3838]The two sabotage operations, No. 3125, against a sugar central, and
[3840]No. 3116, against the transformer yard of an electric power plant, were
[3841]deferred by the Group for further discussion at its next meeting.
[3843]bfediglel
[3845]Distribution
[3846]Mr. Johnson
[3847]Mr. Gilpatric
[3848]Mr. McCone
[3851]13-00000 OT
[3853]5 December 1963
[3855]CE
[3856][he
[3857]MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP :
[3859]SUBJECT: Cuban Operations
[3861]Special Group mawbers approved hy telephone on 5 Decemb
[3862]the following: “
[3864]a. Operation No. 3711, the éxfiltration of three aenbers
[3865]of an existing resistance net.
[3867]b. Operation No. 3118, the infiltration of a five-man
[3868]team for the purpose of sabotaging a railway bridge.
[3870]c. Operation No. 31110, the establishment of a ratline
[3871]inte Cuban ports.
[3873](Signes, -
[3875]Paul Eckel
[3877]Distribution
[3878]i Mr. Johnaon
[3879]Mr. Gilpatric
[3881]og Mr. McCone
[3882]Yen