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[2]\q04-10048-10124 | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
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[8]: Le SPECIAL CO ’ ~ SET Dhaaxto for rxextna
[9]— Chief, Special Ady REL SE A Ss! SAl NIT FIZ Ap _| no tnoexine aequinto
[11]ONLY QUALIFIED
[12]HEADQUARTERS OESK
[13]CAN JYOGE INDEXING
[15]he. - ; .
[16]Chief of Station, JUWAVE . Tee INN \ re
[17]sect TYPIC/OPERATIONAL. aes 0 one
[19]p pa Repo on JMWAVH'S Relationship with ANCARBON-1
[20]AETION REQUIRED - REFERENCES . ,
[22]ACTION REQUIRED: Paragraph 10 ate
[23]REFERENCES: A, WAVE 8981, dated 24 September 1962.44 wt
[24]Pi" B, WAVE 9169, dated 28 September 1962 sas Pactipeae &
[25]-C, WAVE 9343, dated 2 October 1962.n0,u¢ 2 Avte
[26]..D, DIR 40975, dated 6 October 196274 1 < auej |
[27](..B, UEGA 14417, dated 4 March 1964 21 2.4 -@ Ln,
[29]a 2 INTRODUCTION, In Reference E, JMWAVE forwarded a review
[30]of the nature of its relationship with ’ AMCARBON~2 This review
[31]indicates that the relationship with AMNCARBON-2 evolved from that
[32]action which was taken in September 1962 to insure that a security
[33]breach would not occur as a result of an investigation which was
[34]being carried out by the Identity 1 relative to the fact that the
[35]establishment .of the Identity 2 was being kept from the YOBELT
[36]South Campus as a: result of security restrictions which. were in some
[37]way,related to JMDUSK, While the relationship with AMCARDON-2
[38]stemmed from the remedial action which had been taken in a crisis
[39]situation, the establishment of a working relationship with the
[40]Identity 3 was on objective which JMWAVE had always hoped to obtain,
[41]As a matter of fact, in Reference A, the recommendation was made
[42]that JMWAVE be given. approval to contact the major South Florida
[43]news media in an attempt to work out a relationship with these new:
[44]media which would insure that they did not turn the publicity
[45]spotlight on those KUBARK activities in South Florida which might
[47]_ come to their attention, Thus, when a relationship was established
[48]with AMCARBON-2, it was carefully cultivated in order that JMWAVE
[49]might be able to use this contact at the Identity 3 as a means of
[50]achieving the objective of having a relationship with the Identity 3,
[51]which would simultaneously insure the security of JNWAVE's operations
[52]and give JMWAVE an outlet into the press which could be used for
[53]_ surfacing certain select: propaganda items. In the period October to
[55]ae tea : (CONTINUED)
[56]Attachments: ‘Usc a ,
[57]A - Five Newspaper clippings “s x
[58]Be Identities os
[59]~ “Distribution: | os
[60]i ‘3: cam Chiez, SAS, , watts, - . DATE TYPED ap DISPATCHED
[61]: 19 March 64
[62]i as ett TT eee eee ‘OISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
[63]; ‘. , UFGA~14781
[65]: CLASSIFICATION
[66]éerlesstlantny
[67]iene “3-E~C_—R-—P-
[68]a ORIGINATING.
[69]. ; OFFICE ext,
[70]a ; cos Andrew XK. REUTEMAN rtp 251
[71]RI Chrono COORDINATING
[72]1 — 201 file (0/cos
[74]y—orrice svmeot_| owed
[75]1.~ Cos Chrono
[77]_OFFICE SYMBOL 5 OFFICERS SIGNATURE
[78]POS /JMWAVE EPA ki 6/ | ANDREW
[80]%o 53 use previous eomon. REMcts ronu sien waren may ne ust, | HAR $1 19R4 Phe rm A Ms mane
[82]"|
[85]To ae a
[90]13-00000
[92]. moe . rn wy . .
[93]a meee es
[94]4 “ CONTINUATION OF . ; SLABSIFICATION o ORTON © ee mtr ee eer anes .
[96]DISPATCH ' 3 =e
[98]' UFGA-14781
[100]December 1962, al1 of JMWAVE's business with the Identity 3
[102]was handled via ANCARDON-2 In mid-December 1962, AMCARRON-2
[104]\ made the suggestion that introduce REUTEMAN to * AMCARDON-1
[106]; in order that there be a backup contact, in the evont that
[108]: ANCAREBON=~2 were out of to or unavailable at such times as
[110]; REUTEMAN might require assiistance from the Identity 3, REUTEMAN
[112]: agreed to AMCARBON-2's suggestion, and, as a result, AMCARDON-2
[114]; hosted a luncheon on 12 December joez a at the Miami Club in the
[115]Hotel Columbus, Miami, Florida, at which AMCARBON-2 introduced
[116]AMCARBON=-1 to REUTEMAN, As a result of this initial meeting on
[117]12 December 1962, an operational relntionship has developed with
[118]AMCARBON=1, and it is believed that this relationship contributes ,
[119]‘to the fulfillment of the over~all JMWAVE mission, In view of
[120]this, a apecial activities report is being submitted to cover the
[121]nature of JMWAVE's relationship with AMCARBON-1 during the
[122]period December. 1962 to March 1964,°
[124]2. "FRAME: or REFERENCE FOR JHWAVE'S RELATIONSHIP WITH AMCAR 2BON =I
[125]When AMCARBON-2 introduced All CON-T to REUTEMAN, ANCARLON=
[126]reviewed the ground rules under which he had been cooperating
[127]with REUTEMAN,:.This review was conducted for AMCARBON~1's
[128]benefit, in” order that he might clearly understand the frame of
[129]reference, which should prevail in his relationships with REUTEMAN,
[130]‘In this review, AMCAREON-2 pointed out that it was the policy
[131].of the Identity 3 that it would take no action which would
[132]purposely embarxass KUBARK or its South Florida operations, As
[133].@ result, if any embarrassing items relative to KUBARK's operations
[134]-4n South Florida: did come to the attention of the Identity 3, this
[135]material would’ be brought to REUTEMAN's immediate attention,
[136]AMCARBON-2 made it clear to AMCARBON=-1 that such items should be
[137]discussed with REUTEMAN in a frank manner, In addition, AMNCARGUN-2
[138]made the point that, after an item was discussed, AMCARBON-1
[139]’. should follow REUTEMAN's guidance relative to how any particularly
[140]embarrassing item might be handled by the Identity 3, so that it
[141]would not expose KUBARK operations and, at the same Lime, would
[142]not jeopardize the journalistic reputation of the Identity 3,
[143]In addition, AMCARBON-2 pointed out that, if ANCARBON—1 brought
[144]a potentially embarrassing item to REUTEMAN's attention and
[145]remedial action ‘on the matter was not taken, by REUTEMAN within
[146]a reasonable period of time, then thé Identity 3 would feel free
[147]to expose any ineptness on KUBARK's part. AMCARBON-2 pointed
[148]out that in return.for this cooperation from the Identity 3,
[149]_REUTEMAN had agreed that he would. be available for contact by
[150]telephone or periodic personal meetings at which AMCAREBON-1
[151]and AMCARBON~2 could discuss broad trends and developments in
[152]Latin American affairs, AMCARBON-2 advised AMCARBON~1 that this
[153]arrangement did not mean that AMCARBON-1 could expect to obtain
[154]any classified information from REUTEMAN. The point was also
[155]made that AMCARBON-1 should not press for the obtaining of
[156]classified information, but he should be alert to steering tips
[157]which REUTEMAN might furnish him on fast-breaking news storios,
[158]ANCARBON~1 indicated that he understood the frame of reference
[159]which had been outlined by AMCARBON-2, This frame of reference
[160]has prevailed throughout JMWAVE's relationship 5 with AMCAREON-1]
[161]during the period December 1962 to March “1964,
[163]| 3. AMCARBON-1'S JOURNALISTIC CARSER, AMCARBON~1 originally
[164]“gtarted to work for the Identity 3 in I957 on the City Desk,
[165]and subsequently advanced from this assignment to an assignment
[166]which entailed covering major political developments in Florida.
[167]At a later date, ANCARBON~1 became a feature writer for the
[168]Identity 3. Then .in July or August 1962, ANCARBON~-] was made
[169]' the Identity 4, This assignment was considered to be a significant
[173]oo 7 y
[175]Gi \GSIFICATION = PAGE NO.
[176]FORM ;
[177]8. o0 S38a sae PaEvioUs EDITION. tl
[178]ta SECRET CONTINUED 2.
[181]13-00000
[185]DISPATCH, * .
[187]JFGA=-14781
[189]promotion for AMCARBON-1, and it reflected confidence in him by
[190]the Identity 3 management. AMCARBON-1 is by no means an expert
[191]on Latin America, but he is developing his knowledge on the area
[192]and, at the moment, he gives every indication of wanting to be a
[193]long-term Latin American specialist. QDELF has been questioned
[194]about AMCARBON-1, and he has indicated that AMCAREON~1 is regarded
[195]in the journalistic trade as an extremely likeable fellow who has
[196]& keen mind but who lacks experience in depth on Latin American
[197]affaira, It is QDELF's opinion that given an appropriate lapse
[198]of time, ANCARBON-1 will develop into one of the leading Latin
[199]American specialists in U.S. journalistic circles, AMCARBON-~1
[200]has a working command of Spanish, and he is constantly attempting
[201]to improve his language fluency. It igs REUTEMAN's opinion that
[202]‘AMCARBON=1 has developed rapidly as a Latin American specialist,
[203]and he will continue to grow in this field, Thus, he is a contact
[204]who should be developed and harnessed for exploitation, bearing
[205]in mind that he does have long~term potential, _
[207]'4, AMCARBON-1'S CONTACTS AND SOURCES, In keeping with the
[208]traditional pattern of source protection which is common to —
[209]newspapermen, intelligence officers and law enforcement officers,
[210]ANCARBON=-1 attempts to guard the true identity of all of his
[211]sources, On the other hand, when pressed, ANCARBON-l1 has identified —
[212]some of his sources to REUTEMAN, in order that meaningful evaluations
[213]could be made of that information which AMCARBON-1 had passed to
[214]KUBARK, As a result of these occasional witting identifications
[215]of his sources, and, as. a result of general conversations with.
[216]AMCARBON-1, REUTEMAN has learned that ANCARBON-1's sources include
[217]the following persons: ‘
[219]he _Liiis**#FERNANDEZ Rocha (201-316766),, secretary ‘general
[220]of the DRE, 9: |. ;
[222]b. Manolo *RAY Rivero (201-239298), chief of JURE,
[224]Ce Carlos *TODD y Lobo (201-264141) of the defunct
[225]Havana Times. . ... ,
[227]a. AMBIDDY-1 (201-267437).
[229]e. Aureliano *SANCHEZ Arango (201-019245), leader of the AAA
[231]-' . £, - Edmund #LEAHY of the Washington News Bureau. AMCARBON-1
[233]regards this source as being particularly interesting, in view
[235]of the fact that LEAHY's daughter is a secretary in the office of
[236]Attorney General Robert KENNEDY.
[238]g. Frank *FIORINI (201-242256), free-lance pilot and
[239]' adventurer. ——— errr”
[241]h. Eduardo *SUAREZ Riva, public relations man for the MRR,
[243].
[245]i. Luis *HUNOZ Marin, governor of Puerto Rico,
[247]j. Juan *BOSCH Gavino (201-103272), former president of
[248]the Dominican Republic,
[250]k, - Charles *KEELY of the Copley Wire Service.
[252]1. Jorge *VOLSKY Kraisler (201-352252), an employee of
[253]“USITA in Miami, AMCARBON-1 is well aware of the fact that VOLSKY
[254]4g a defacto stringer for Tad SZULC of the New York Times, but this
[255]does not deter AMCARBON-1 from attempting to exploit VOLSKY as a
[256]source of information, ;
[258]a
[260]‘ORM
[261]“89 53a 0s Us PREVioUs EDITION.
[263]tees eee
[265]13-00000
[269]. 5. OPERATIONAL SUPPORT, On occasion, AMCARBON-1 is used
[271]to carry out certain operational support tasks, In such instances,
[272]AMCARBON-1 makes his inquiries or carries out the required action
[273]within the context of his normal journalistic activities, The
[275]use of ANCARBON=-1 for operational support tasks enables JNWAYE to
[276]harness the investigative facilities of the Identity 3, -Several
[277]uxamples of how AMCARBON=-1 has been used in operational support
[278]tasks are outlined below: :
[280]a a. ‘Andrew ORDONO Camps. In March 1963, Andrew *ORDONO
[281]Camps, DPOB 30 September 1914, Gibara, Cuba, A 12 837 G17, arrived
[283]-in Miami and was given routine CAC processing, The details of this
[284]processing are contained in MIAM-0085, dated 12 March 1963, After
[285]being released by CAC, ORDONO was interviewed by the Identity 3, and
[287]a sensational story was developed, In view of this story, JMWAVE
[288]tried to locate: ORDONO for debriefing. This effort was not productivd,
[289]thus AMCARBON-1 was asked to locate ORDONO, AMCARBON~1 did locate
[291]ORDONO in Houston, Texas. See WAVE-6307, dated 25 March 1963, for
[292]details, 7
[294]; b.: Discrediting Carlos BANDIN of the HRR Splinter Group.
[295]In UFGW-2555, dated 13 September 1963, Headquarters suggested that
[296]JMWAVE might be able to discredit Carlos BANDIN Cruz (201~309611)
[297]of the MRR splinter group as a result of BANDIN's overinflated claims
[298]relative to his faction invading Cuba, Headquarters' interest in
[299]discrediting BANDIN was also stimulated by the fact that BANDIN's
[300]irresponsible publicity stunts were causing problems for AMBIDDY~1,
[301]Ag'.a result of Headquarters’ interest in this matter, REUTEMAN had
[302]a luncheon session with AMCARBON-1 on 24 September 1963, at which
[303].AMCARBON~-1 was advised that the BANDIN faction of the MRR was.less
[304]than accurate in .its claims relative to its activities in Cuba.
[305]In view of this, REUTEMAN suggested that the Identity 3 might want
[306]to soft peddle any future war communiques which the BANDIN faction
[307]might release. AMCARBON-1 stated that, in view of REUTEMAN's
[308]comments, the Identity 3 would not only soft peddle, but would
[309]ignore the BANDIN faction in the future, Once BANDIN was discredited
[310]with AMCARBON-1, the word was soon leaked by ANCARBON-1 to other
[311]newspapermen that BANDIN was not a reliable source, As a result
[312]-of this action, the BANDIN group has received minimal media coverage
[313]in South Florida since September 1963.
[315]OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE, In the period February 1963
[316]_ to February 196%, ANCARBON~I has furnished JMWAVE with operational
[317]intelligence as outlined below: _ ;
[319]“sa, “In WAVE 4836, dated 21 February 1963, AMCARBON~1
[320]reported that AMBEND-1 was back in Miami and was the object of
[321].& great deal of press interest in view of AMBEND-1's release from
[322]a Havana prison, ‘-AMCARBON-1 also indicated that AMBEND-1 would
[323]probably be a knowledgeable source on the current activities of the
[324]UR in Cuba. This operational intelligence was most helpful in
[325]terms of keeping JMWAVE informed on AMBEND-1's movements, Subsequent
[326]developments revealed that AMCAREON=-1 could not contact AMBEND-1,
[327]and thus AMBEND-1's return to the United States did not cause the
[328]publicity stir that was initially anticipated,
[330]Lo . b. In WAVE 6176, dated 22 March 1963, AMCARBON~1
[331]reported that the Identity 3 was attempting to research a full
[332]feature article on the Bay of Pigs invasion. The intent of this
[334], article was. to furnish a recapitulation of the entire tactical
[335]situation, In this connection, AMCARBON~-1 pointed ont that he was
[339]vonm ~ ° CLASSIFICATION ° . PAGE NO.
[340]3.60. 53a | Usk PREVIOUS EDITION. . oe er \ ix] 4
[344]13-00000
[346]‘thinking about exposing the role of Miami attorney Alex E, *CARLSON,
[347]residing 145 Curtiss Parkway, Miami Springs, Florida, in the
[349]Bay of Pigs operation. AMCARBON~1 stated that, 1£ CARLSON were
[351]of any current interest to REUTEMAN, then the Identity 3 would
[353]soft peddle the CARLSON angle, REUTEMAN advised AMCARDON-1 that
[355]be had no interest in CARLSON but knew of him and was of. the
[356]Opinion that CARLSON was a sound and honest attorney. The receipt
[357]of this operational intelligence enabled JMWAVE to brief CARLSON
[359]on the Identity.3's over-all interest in the role that CARLSON had
[360]Played in the Bay of Pigs invasion. This briefing, in turn,
[362]enabled CARLSON to more adequately prepare himself for a meeting
[363]with AMCARGON-1, . While AMCARBON-1 did attempt to pursue this
[365]Bay of Pigs story, he never did put anything into print as the story.
[366]was overtaken by other developments before AMCARBON-1 could finish
[367]his research, ....
[369]c.. In- WAVE 0904, dated 9 July 1963, AMCARBON-l advised
[370]JMWAVE that Mr, Trevor *ARMBRISTER, an associate editor for the
[371]Saturday Evening Post, was in Miami during July 1963 attempting
[372]to research a story regarding the possibility that strategic
[373]missiles were hidden in Cuban caves. This information enabled
[374]JMWAVE to keep Headquarters informed on sensational-type articles
[375]which might be appearing relative to Soviet missiles in Cuba,
[377]<d, © In"WAVE 4701, dated 20 September 1963, AMCARBON-~2
[378]gave JMWAVE his resume of the discussions which he had with
[379]ANBIDDY~1 ‘atthe Miami Playboy Club on.19 September 1963. This .
[380]information was ‘useful in obtaining an insight into what AMBIDDY-1
[381]was telling. the press. — 4 ,
[382]; . +, "@,3-Im WAVE 5661, dated 10 October 1963, AMCARBON—1
[383].reported on a discussion that he had had on 10 October 1963 with
[384]| AMBIDDY-1's public relations man, This operational intelligence
[385]was useful in terms of keeping KUBARK advised as to what AMBIDDY-l1's
[386]‘representatives were telling the outside world about their
[387]operational activities, . .
[389], £. In WAVE 6910, dated 31 October 1963, AMCARBON-~1 |
[390]informed JMWAVE about the flood of telephone calls which were
[391]being received at the Identity 3 relative to so-called KUBARK
[392]vessels which were located in South Florida waters. This
[394]. dnformation alerted JMWAVE to the fact that press scrutiny wag
[395]‘going to be directed toward the Identity 5. Armed with this warn-
[396]ing, JMWAVE-was.able to take action which minimized the publicity
[397]repercussions from a renewed press interest in the Identity 5,
[399]g. In WAVE7671, dated 16 November 1963, AMCARBON-1
[400]reported to JMWAVE the fact that he had received a letter from
[401]Peru which contained an interesting operational lead to one
[402]Carlos MONTALVANO in Puno, Peru. This lead was examined by JMWAVE,
[403]Headquarters and the Lima Station. This examination revealed
[404]that the letter was written by a crackpot; thus, there was no
[405]real. operational potential in this lend, This incident did underscore |.
[406]the fact that AMCARBON~-1 is willing to bring potentially significant q
[407]operational leads to JMWAVE's attention,
[409]h. In WAVE 1614, dated 6 February 1964, AMCARBON-1
[410]advised JMWAVE that he had received numerous telephone calls
[411]indicating that Armando Andres GUIROLA Forte, who had defected
[413]* from.a Cuban fishing vessel might be an individual who had previousl
[414]been seen in Miami during November or December 1963, At the same
[415]time, AMCARGON~1 pointed out that he was suspicious and thought
[416]that these telephone calls indicated that GUIROLA was not a bona
[417]fide defector, but was either a GOC agent or a KUBARK plant, who
[418]was being used as.a means of creating an incident which would
[419]embarrass the GOC, as a result of their fishing boats penetrating
[422]-S-E-G-R-~E_T. _ Kl CONTINUED
[424]FORM ,
[425]8:00 58a jue Previous EDITION.
[428]13-00000
[430]f
[432]_” United States terractorial waters. REUTEMAN a. ised AMCARDON-1
[434]FORM
[436], SLASSIFICATION PAGE NO.
[437]8-60 S3Q USE PREVIOUS EDITION. - ; kx] 6 :
[438](40) . CONTINUED e
[440]that KUBARK had played no role in mounting a provocation operation
[441]against the GOC, At the same time, REUTEMAN pointed out that
[443]it was highly unlikely that curroLA was a GOC agent, As a result
[444]of this conversation, arrangements were made for JMWAVE to check
[445]out certain aspects of the GUIROLA story, At the same time,
[446]ANCARBON~l was prevailed upon not to write a story which might
[447]lead the public to speculate on whether GUIROLA was an agent or a
[448]plant in a propaganda play designed to embarrass the GOC,
[450]7. PROPAGANDA OUTLET, ABCARBON-1 has been used successfully,
[451]during the period dovéered by this report, as a propaganda outlet
[453]through which items of interest to KUBARK could be surfaced in
[454]the free world press. Examples of how AMCARBON-~1 has been harnessed
[456]in this field are outlined below: .
[458], | AMCRAB-1, The AMCRAB-1 defection story originally
[459]surfaced in. the Miami area on 13 October 1963 via the Diario de
[460]las Americas, which played up an API release from Montevideo,
[461]The API Montevideo story highlighted AMCRAB-1's information.
[462]relative to GOC activities in Uruguay. The story in the Diario
[464]‘de las Americas had an extremely limited impact on Spanish readers
[466]in the Minmi aren, As a result, it was decided to do a series
[468]of feature stories on AMCRAB-], pointing up the fact that AMCRAB-1 _
[469]was typical of the veterans of the Granma expedition, who felt
[471]they had been betrayed by CASTRO and had been relegated to positions
[473]- of obscurity :once the revolution had put CASTRO in power. AMCARBON-]
[475]was briefed in ‘detail on the AMCRAB-1 story, and he was given an
[477]- Opportunity to debrief AMCRAB-1 under controlled conditions in a
[479]JMWAVE safehouse.. After completing his debriefing, ANCARDON-1
[480]wrote a series of feature articles on ANCRAB-1, The first article
[481]in the series received front page headline play, The series of
[482]articles on AMCRAB-1 were well written, and they provided an
[484]‘excellent. peg for JMWAVE to mount a replay operation via other
[486]propaganda assets. . ANCARBON-1's story on AMCRAB-l was picked up
[487]by UPI, API and others, and it was played throughout Latin America.
[488]The details of this surfacing can be found in WAVE 5826, dated
[490]14 October 1963; WAVE 6092, dated 19 October 1963; and, WAVE 6174,
[491]dated 21 October 1963. ,
[493]sO ’ pb, - Charles GRIFFIN Shrimp Boat. Story. On 26 February 1964
[494]JMWAVE learned that when Mr. Charles GRIFFIN’S sons went to Cuba
[496]-to reclaim the hijacked shrimp boat, JOHNNY REB, they found that —
[498]. select items were missing from the boat when it was turned over
[500]to them, It was believed that this information would make a good
[501]human interest story which JMWAVE assets could use to counter GOC
[502]propaganda claims that United States officials had stolen items
[503]from.the Cuban fishing boats which had violated United States
[504]territorial waters, In view of this opinion, a steering tip was
[505]given to AMCARBON-1 to have the Identity 3 representative in
[507]Key West interview Mr, GRIFFIN. This interview was carried out,
[508]and an article outlining the points which were of interest to
[509]JMWAVE was published in the 27 February 1964 edition of the
[510]Identity 3. .
[512]c. LAYC Story, The March 1964 LAYC meeting in Santingo,
[513]Chile, was not receiving appropriate coverage in the South Florida
[514]newspapers; as a result, REUTENAN contacted AMCARBON-1 on 5 March
[515]1964 and suggested that the LAYC meeting was a story which the
[516]Identity 3 should pursue, AMCARBON~1l was grateful for this steering
[517]tip, and he assigned the task of preparing the story on the LAYC
[519]to one of the members of his staff. A story on the LAYC was .
[520]subsequently published in the 6 March 1964 edition of the Identity 3
[522](COMMENT: Copies of the articles cited in subparagraphs a through
[524]c above are attached for Headquarters information, ) ee
[527]13-00000
[529]8. POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE, Attempts have been made to
[531]obtain aisseminable positive Intelligence from: AMCARBON-1 during .
[533]the period covered by this report, This attempt .has beon fenerally
[535]unsuccessful, in that AMCARBON-1 does not have a great number of
[537]contacts in Latin America who would give him access to worthwhile
[539]intelligence apprecinbly in advance of the information appearing
[541]in the overt press, As a result, AMCARBON-~1 is usually not aware of
[543]inside developments in any Latin * Amer ican country; consequently,
[545]he is not a worthwhile source of positive intelligence, As a
[547]matter of fact, AMCARBON-1 is less valuable as a source of positive
[549]intelligence’. than’ most journalists, This is attributable solely
[551]to bis lack of long-standing contacts in the Latin American politica]
[552]- speene, It is believed that AHCARBON-1 will ultimately overcome :
[554]this shortcoming; thus, we will continue to attempt to harness him far fF
[556]the collection of positive intelligence, :
[558]9, COMMENT. tn the period covered by this report, AMCARBON-1
[559]has been Found to be a straight-forward individual who is honest,
[560]cooperative and: who understands the need for security, Our
[561]relationship also indicates that AMCARBON-1 is an accurate reporter
[562]of that information which he passes to KUBARK, In view of this,
[563]JMWAVE plans’ to:.continue to harness AMNCARBON~1 in the same manner
[564]that he has been used in the past. It is believed that our rela-
[565]tionship with AMCARBON-1 enhances our ability to conduct our
[566]operational mission in a secure manner, In addition, this relation-
[567]ship tends to minimize the possibility that JBWAVE might have diffi-|
[568]culties with .the media outlets in the South Florida area, As a
[569]result of our continuing relationship with AMCARBON-1, a special
[570]activities report will be forwarded at appropriate intervals.
[572]10, It. 418 yequested that a 201 number be assigned AMCARBON=1
[573]and that TUM AYE ‘be advised of the number,
[575]END OF DISPATCH
[577]CLASSIFICATION
[579]—SEORET
[581]AM
[582]2 53a 0s Uk PREVIOUS EDITION,
[585]13-00000
[587]ait . . ees mene
[590]~~ SLABSIFICATION Die
[592]i
[593]i
[594]i
[595]i
[596]1
[598]. . . a _—— H SYMBOL AND NUMBER .
[600]CL LUA LION OF - Separate Cover Attachmest |
[601]m ti:
[603]DISPATCH SECRET B to UFGA-14781 t
[605]-"\ yaentaties - 1 - Qhe Miami News:
[607]2 ~®inland Training Center for\
[608]etarded Children
[610]3 - fhe Wiami Herald
[611]4 ~atin American Editor,
[612]5 ~ The LEDA
[614]DISTRIBUTION
[615]3 - Chief,’ SAS |.
[617]2 = RI. Chrono - 7 a
[619]‘ 4. =» AMCARBON-1 201:
[620]2 = C08 Chrono
[622]dovnrrating and
[623]Cece ey
[625]oe i | Sopa 4y
[627]CLASSIFICATION | PAGE NO,
[628][] CONTINUED ’
[630]GROUP 4
[631]Excluded (rom automatic
[633]Ur 6 PREVIOUS EDITION.
[637]SECRET
[639]FT ae
[640]eaten teen nee tala an eoemtienemnaianeel