[1]180-10143-10227 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 aw ‘
[4]- Agency in 1973. At the time of the assassination of President Kennedy
[6]area of Soviet operations, but had no official cover. He arrived
[8]_infrequent contact with the CIA station in Paris. He estimated that
[10]_? .
[13]Classification: _ °=C®=" 1 of 9 pages
[15](This form is to be used for material extracted
[16]from ClA—controlled documents.)
[18]INTERVIEW OF THOMAS CASASIN
[19]AUGUST 17, 1978
[20]AMERICAN. EMBASSY/ PARIS, FRANCE
[22]By Surell Brady
[24]d
[25]f
[27]Casasin stated that he retired from the Central Intelligence
[28]in November, 1963 he was stationed in Paris; he was working in the
[30]in Paris in September, 1962.
[32]Z
[33]He stated that in September, 1960 he was assigned [defense cover]
[34]as Branch 6 Chief. He worked for two years in Section &
[36]Casasin said that during his assignment in Paris he had not
[37]the contact occurred every two and a half weeks. The contact was made
[39]on the outside by telephoning a person with official cover. He said he
[40]never made written contact with the station.
[42]“Gla “GH.
[44]Casasin explained that the function of Section 6 was operations
[45]in support of the Soviet Russia Division of the CIA. He said the .
[46]work consisted of amassing information in support of the SR Division;
[47]he characterized that work as classical espO@ijnage work against the’;
[48]USSR. He said it involved penetration for the purpose of espidanag®’
[49]and included cartography, demography, sociology, and experts in the
[50]fields of science and political science. He stated that the section
[51]was in a "down" phase when he entered and that it consisted of only
[52]20-25 persons.
[54]Casasin worked in Japan from February 1955 to June 1960. He served
[55]as Chief of the Soviet Base of the North Asia Command. He said his
[56]unit was attached. to the Far Eastern Command. of the Armed Forces. He
[57]explained that his unit was one of four bases: Soviet, Japan, North
[58]Korea and Red China. Each of those geographical areas was a target.
[59]The Soviet base in which he worked was therefore targeted against the
[60]Soviet Union. He was assigned head of that base in 1955.
[64]He said the operations out of the Soviet base included espionage.
[65]The covert operations consisted of psychological warfare and radio
[66]transmission to internal Soviet audiences. He said the espionage also
[67]included spying against Soviet naval and industrial targets in Soviet
[68]ports, using mainly Japanese operatives who had access to the ports.
[70]Casasin said that his base had extremely limited work with the
[72]Classification: °°" garckeround Use Only
[74]4 ' Do Net Reproduce
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[78]LS LF a, ;
[79]1o1Y¥3 -/6aa7 Ipc)
[82]ea a a a a
[84].
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[92]military. He said it consisted primarily of briefing the military on
[93]items of mutual interest. He said the CIA had tried to work with clan-
[94]destine units of the military, including the Army (he said the Navy
[95]had no clandestine units), but it was the opinion of the CIA that the
[96]military had too low a degree of professionalism for the successful
[97]operation of clandestine projects. Casasin stated that during this
[98]time the military said it was actually running operations, but it was
[99]never confirmed by the CIA and they found no evidence of such military
[100]operations.
[102]Casasin identified two military intelligence personnel in the
[103]area when he was stationed in Japan: Captain Perez, OSI, and John B.
[104]Stanley, Army head. ;
[106]Casasin said, however, that the Navy did provide some operational
[107]support for his base. It consisted of providingfcd er]for persons
[108]running operations against the Soviets.
[110]Casasin said he cannot recall any specific information that the
[111]military was using American military personnel in any of its operations
[112]He said, however, that there Was. occasional rumors that an American
[113]serviceman was trafficking with suspected foreign subversives. He said
[114]the individual intelligence agencies would have handled any such cases.
[115]He stated that he never heard any concrete information of American
[116]contact with the Soviets.
[118]Casasin could not recall the name of the Chief of the North Asia
[119]Command in 1955; he believed the man was a retired vice admiral ‘and tha
[120]his last name began with the letter "O." Harry Little succeeded that
[121]person in 1957.
[123]Casasin said that most of his communications during that time from
[124]Japan went back to headquarters. He explained that the North Asia Com-
[125]mand at that time was tied up with the situation of Korea and Japan.
[127]Casasin said that he does not know who had the oversight ver
[128]bility or authority for the U-2 program. He cited that as an example
[129]of how well compartmentalized their work was. He said he never learned
[130]who was in charge of the U-2 program out of Japan. He said that he
[131]assumed it was some type of paramilitary operation. He said the
[132]North Asia base ran no paramilitary operations and that most such
[133]smaller units usually did not. (
[135]Casasin said he does not recall any discussions concerning the
[136]. possible use of American defectors to penetrate the Soviets. He said
[137]one reason for no interest in such use was probably that the First
[139]ae Noe Classification: _ S&CRET
[143]| Classified by derivation:
[144]‘ LP LF F&F aT he Le a MT .
[146]CZ
[150]A 3 of 9 pages
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[157]Chief Directorate of the KGB would suspect any such American from the
[158]beginning as being CIA connected. He said the CIA at that point knew f
[159]a lot about the KGB and its thinking because they had had experience
[160]with displaced persons from the communist bloc.
[162]were much more short range than the type of slow, long-range project
[164]of working an American defector into some sensitive or intelligence-
[165]productive position within the Soviet Union. He said that was simply
[167]not the American way of conducting intelligence and that that thinking
[168]precluded such programs.
[170]Casasin explained further that American intelligence interests :
[172]Casasin said lessening of tensions between the United States and
[173]the Soviet Union from such things as the Spirit of Camp David did
[174]allow some shallow penetration. This consisted primarily of using
[175]short-term tourists and foreigners on legitimate business within the
[176]Soviet Union. But he said these projects had no direct or obvious
[177]effects on our intelligence gathering against the Soviet Union.
[179]dated 25 November 1963 from Thomas B. Casasin to Walter P. Haltigan
[181]on Mr. Lee Harvey Oswald. Casasin says he does remember the memo.
[183]I asked him to explain the cover memo dated 12 December 1963 by Robert
[184]G. Lamprell to Chiefs of SR and WH re: GPFLOOR-Lee Harvey Oswald.
[186]Il referred Casasin to CIA Document 435-173-A, which is a memo
[188]Casasin explained that Lamprelli (whose real name was [William ronerf
[189]Sinclair} he died of cancer a few years ago) was one of Casasin's
[190]contactS in Paris. He said that Lamprell was the Senior Officer in
[192]the Soviet Office in the Paris Station, and served as the second in 3?
[193]command. Casasin said that Walter Haltigan (whose real name was (James
[194]Flint) was his normal contact in Paris. He surmised that his memo
[196]was Sent out by Lamprell because Haltigan might not have been available
[197]He does not know the reason for the delay between the date of his
[199]memo, 25 November, and the transmission by Lamprell, 12 December. i
[201]Casasin said he recalls that he wrote the memo spontaneously
[202]when he heard a news cast about Oswald after the assassination. He
[203]recognized Oswald when he heard the news information that Oswald had
[204]lived in Minsk in the Soviet Union and had married a foreigner. He
[205]remembered those details from State Department information he had seen f
[207]Casasin explained the cryptonym REDWOOD as clandestine operations;
[208]the Chief of the SR Division was responsible for that project. He
[209]explained that was separate from the REDCAP program, which was operatiog
[210]against Soviets outside of the USSR.
[212]Casasin explained the relationship of the Counterintelligence
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[226]staff to other divisions. He said Counterintelligence had primary
[227]vesponsibility for staff review, but supposedly no command voice.
[228]However, they did have their own closely held operations. Counterin-
[229]telligence gave approval on every operation. Casasin said that it was
[230]possible or even probable that Counterintelligence ran operations in
[231]his geographical target. .
[233]Casasin said research was one of the functions of the 6 Branch.
[234]But he cannot recall research's exact mandate within the 6 Branch.
[235]He listed the branches besides 6 Branch: (1) Scandinavia; (2) Western
[236]Europe; (3) Middle East and Latin America; (4) ? ; (5) Far East; and
[237]the Inter-Branch.
[239]Ns SE SE Gh.
[241]Casasin said the the research unit of Branch 6 would get information
[242]_ from defectors about Soviet realities and details about Soviet life
[243]“ which could be used to assist persons working inside the Soviet Union.
[244]He said such defectors were normally pumped about personal life in the
[245]USSR. However, Casasin said he does not personally know of any defector
[246]being used as a source in his brief time in the SR Division. He said
[247]the agency also benefitted from FBI debriefings of such defectors. In
[248]part this was due to the CIA's limited charter domestically in the
[249]United States. But the Contacts Division (00) did have a domestic
[250]mandate within the U.S. Casasin said he thought the American defector
[251]to Czechoslovakia, Fields, had been debriefed by the agency. Casasin
[252]said he believed the agency also got information on Americansin the
[253]Soviet Union from State Department information about visas or from the
[254]press.
[256]RA.
[258]nn.
[260]Casasin said he cannot remember who served as Chief of the
[261]Section 6 research branch while he was there. He said the deputy
[262]chief was an older woman near the age of retirement. He said that
[263]Rudolf Balaban worked with him and is still at the agency; he could
[264]probably remember the names of the others in the section.
[266]I asked when Casasin recalled the discussion took place which he
[267]refers to in his memo. He said it was the last days of his work with
[268]the section; he assumes it was the third or fourth week of July, 1962
[269]when he left the section, so he believes the conversation about Oswald
[270]took place the first week of July, 1962.
[272]Casasin said at the time he assumed Oswald had been sent out of
[273]the Soviet Union by the KGB, so he exercsied caution and did not
[274]attempt to debrief Oswald.
[276]Casasin gave the following dates in an effort to pin down when the
[277]conversation took place. He said he left Japan on June 25, 1960 and
[279]des ce SECRET
[280]Classification:
[282]“Ea. Ea, Sa ‘GHA ERA. Va Ua.
[284]| Classified by derivation:
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[295]travelled through Europe on leave with his family until Spetember,
[296]1960. He said therefore the conversation could not have taken place
[298]in the summer of 1960 as the memo states. He said he used the wrong yea
[299]. in the memo.
[301]a, A
[303]Casasin identified KUJUMP as ‘the Operations Division. He said it
[304]had a contacts division fot debriefing persons. He said the "suitable
[305]channels" for debriefing referred to in the memo were the Immi gration
[306]and Naturalization Service and the FBI. He said he believed he had
[307]received maybe one State Department dispatch on the returning American.
[308]He said the dispatch probably originated if Oswald had given up his
[309]passport at the Embassy in Moscow and had had to reapply to the embassy
[310]to be able to return to the United States. Casasin said he believes
[311]Oswald's contacts with the Embassy in Moscow were initiated by
[312]Oswald. Casasin said he only knew whatever appeared in the State Depart
[313]ment dispatches about Oswald.
[315]=. GA UGE.
[317]; He said his statement in the memo that Oswald looked “odd" was the
[319]CIA's evaluation of Oswald. This was based on the fact that he was
[320]allowed to live in the Soviet Union and permitted to marry a Soviet
[321]citizen. Casasin said he believed some type of controlled intelligence
[322]station should approach Oswald; they would be able to contact and talk
[323]to him in a perfunctory manner for debriefing purposes.
[325]Casasin said that during the period 1945-60 no more than 10
[326]American defectors came to their attention from the State Department
[327]and the military.
[329]Casasin identified the REDSKIN cryptonym as the legal travellers
[330]program. It involved using persons to give information about the
[331]Soviet Union who had a “very legitimate" presence in the Soviet Union,
[332]such as scientists, etc.
[334]Casasin said the agency which conducted the debriefing of these
[335]people and defectors would write the information and pass it on. He
[336]believes therefore that if Oswald had been debriefed he would have seen
[337]the information in that form.
[339]Casasin said he believes it is inconceivable that Oswald would
[340]have been any type of operative of the CIA. However, he also gave his
[341]opinion that the nature Of KGB operations made it conceivable that Os-
[342]wald could have been a "lay-low" Soviet operative.
[344]I asked about the CIA interest in Minsk which is reflected in
[345]Casasin's memo. Casasin said it was known that there were some type
[346]of special design plants in Minsk which were of interest to the CIA.
[348]a. Se Ta “Sit aa Sa “SEA.
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[364]Casasin said that type of special design plant dealt with aviation,
[365]nuclear energy, bacterialogical warfare, etc. He said that he cannot
[366]remember specifically which type of plants were located in Minsk, but
[367]the city was of interest for that reason. Additionally, anyone in the
[368]area of those plants was of interest to the agency. Casasin said he
[369]is: confident that Oswald was not -working in any type of security faci-
[370]lity. He said even with the presence of the design. plants, Minsk was
[371]not identified as a security or military priority area. Casasin said
[372]also that he believes. they had some type of encyclopedic information
[373]at the agency on the radio factory in Minsk where Oswald worked. He
[374]said that kind of information was maintained in’ the Office of Research
[375]and Reporting. Casasin said he was not aware of a KGB facility in
[376]Minsk.
[378]; Casasin said the Legal Travellers Program was headed at the time
[379]of his memo by Alexander Sokaloff (phonetic) of the Soviet Russia
[380]Division. He said the program began pre-1960 with the lessening of
[381]tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. He said Soka-
[382]loff had come out of the Soviet Union with his parents as a child.
[384]He explained that defectors such as Sokaloff were kept at arms length
[385]for security reasons by the agency.
[387]The Legal Travellers Program operated in such a way that the
[388]agency contact was in touch with the traveller well before the pro-
[389]posed trip and would be informed as to which areas would be visited,
[390]what he would be doing in the country, etc. The agency contact would
[391]then be able to give the traveller the agency's "requirements" for
[392]information while he was abroad. Casasin said he was not involved in
[393]the program. He said he was opposed to it because it was too short—
[394]term to justify the investment of resources and the risk involved.
[396]He said he believes the travellers were told that their contacts were
[397]CIA, but he doesn't know for sure. He said cover may have been used by
[398]the contact.
[400]I asked Casasin what the reference to the "Harvey Story" in the
[401]last line of his memo referred to. He said at first that it must have
[402]been some kind of cryptonym he was using at the time. He pondered a
[403]while. hen he said he would need some kind of prompting of his
[404]memory. He said he doubts that it would have been someone's true name.
[406]Casasin said he has never been contacted by anybody, including
[407]the Warren Commission, about the memo.
[409]He said that his interest in Oswald as expressed in the memo was
[410]just a lead. He said the fact of no follow-up on that lead was not
[411]unusual. He said Oswald's going to the Soviet Union was unusual, but
[412]that left him open to the possibility of KGB contact. He therefore
[414]ope . SECRET
[415]Classification:
[417]2OLO37)
[419]Classified by derivation: __
[421]aI I I I TI I eT ae
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[428]ultimately was of only marginal interest to the agency.
[430]Casasin said it was normal to not make a check for a 201 file
[431]on a person like Oswald, meaning that it was not unusual that he did
[432]not check for Oswald's 201. He said this was epsecially not unusual
[433]since they had made the decision not to use Oswald. It's possible
[434]that a colleague of Casasin's might have checked, but Casasin said
[435]he doesn't recall any such check.
[437]Casasin said his subordinates in the Branch 6 were, Balaban,
[438]aman named Richard, last name possibly[{Wwink]7 and/CharYes Cox) who E
[439]was the liaison with the Technical Supports Divisfén (i.e., ncealment
[440]devices). He said deputies in the branch were David Chachavadze (in
[441]1960 for three or four months), A.T. Stewart (possibly Averill); Stewar
[442]stayed on in the branch and Casasin believe he could be of more help
[443]in remébering details about the branch; also, Becky Balaban, who is
[444]married to Rudolf Balaban.
[446]Casasin said that the purpose of a 201 is to indicate that a
[447]request had been made for provisional operational approval. He said
[448]the file would indicate operational interest and would then refer one
[449]to the specific office with the interest in the individual. He said
[450]he doesn't know fhat actual criteria for opening 201's. He said also
[451]that after initial interest was shown in an individual by the opening
[452]of a 201, the number might remain with the individual without the
[453]persen actually being developed as an asset.
[455]Casasin mentioned that agency people were assigned to the military
[456]base at Atsugi. |
[458]Casasin referred agin to the "Harvey Story" reference in his memo.
[459]He sated that "Whatever I meant by Harvey had nothing to do with him
[460](Oswald) ."
[462]I showed Casasin the Personality (201) File Request form from
[463]Oswald's 201 file. He said he had never seen it before and did not know
[464]there actually existed a 201 file on Oswald. Referring to the source
[465]of the form, CI/SIG, Casasin said Ci stood for Counterintelligence. :
[467]. He said he thought SIG stood for Signal Intelligence, but he was not
[468]sure. He said that notation would mean that NSA or the military had
[469]picked up Oswald's name in some type of transmission. He asked if Oswald
[470]had access to any type of radio transmissions. He said he thought the
[471]201 section of the Registry Office could answer questions about the
[472]notations on the form.
[474]Referring to the "AG" notation in the Other Identification
[476]SOL OIT. Classification: ___ SECRET
[480]| Classified by derivation:
[483]. have an interest in the Oswald file.
[485]A 427 4 42 427 49 4 4 a7 “
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[494]block on the form, Casasin said he does not know what it stood for.
[496]I asked him if he understood why some of the notations were crossed
[497]out and new notations had been made; he said he could not explain that.
[498]He said-he thought the Permanent Charge notation meant that the file
[499]would stay in the Office of Registry and that the file therefore had no
[500]operational significance. In this file he said he thought it would be
[501]routine to open a file on defectors such as Oswald, so it may have had
[502]some other office charge because of that. He said Branch 6 did not
[504]-I asked how he would have come across the State Department commu-
[505]nications on Oswald. He said the normal distribution of such State
[506]Department information would mean that the dispatches would be circu-
[507]lated for information and then routed back to registry where they would
[508]be kept on file as Third Agency documents. He said he believes from
[509]the dispatches he saw on Oswald that they were in a consecutive series
[510]as received from the State Department. He believes from the memo that
[511]he must have seen several such dispatches with information about Os-
[512]wald.
[514]Casasin explained the operational interest various divisions
[515]within the agency might have in this way:
[518]1-4 Psychological
[520]Foreign intelligence Political Paramilitary
[521]Line Divisions
[523]He said he believes the 201 Personality form in Oswald's file is
[524]passive and not operational and sees nothing to indicate operational
[525]interest. He said the above scheme means that only the line divisions
[526]would carry the operations, and he does not see any indication of such
[527]an interest on the form. The fact that only Counterintelligence is
[528]indicated on the form seems to preclude any operations.
[530]Casasin talked further about suspicions about Oswald. He expressed
[531]the feeling the Oswald and Marina got their visas to leave the Soviet
[532]Union too easily. He expalined the "unusual behavior" of Oswald as
[533]being his defection: his reasons.were unknown, he seemed disoriented,
[534]he married a Russian. Casasin said that while he does not believe Os-
[535]wald was sent back to the United States by the Soviets, he cannot pre-
[536]clude that possibility.
[538]I asked if the Americans were able to follow Oswald's activities
[541]Classification:
[543]Sama. Sa. SEER, GEA, A, Se, SE. a, Sa, oN ». N aA.
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[563]while he was living in the Soviet Union. Casasin said he doesn't believ
[564]we were able to monitor him inside the USSR. He said it would have
[566]been too risky to run the chance of exposing any operatives inside the
[567]country.
[569]I asked if Oswald's threat at the Embassy in Moscow to reveal
[570]milit ary secrets to the Soviets wouldn't have made Oswald of more
[571]intelligence interest. Casasin said if he had revealed secrets he
[572]would have been of interest for security.
[574]; I asked Casasin if a memo would have existed from the time of
[576]the conversation referred to in his 1963 memo about interest in Oswald.
[577]He said he doesn't think so; he said it was not customary to write
[578]memos about such leads which were discussed and not follow“up. He does
[579]not remember preparing any such memo. ;
[581]f
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[586]ence? specs .
[589]Classified by derivation:
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