[1]180-10110-10100) ~ | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
[2]. JFK Assassination System Date: 10/20/20
[4]Identification Form
[6]Agency Information
[8]AGENCY: HSCA
[9]RECORD NUMBER:  180-10110-10100
[11]RECORD SERIES: SECURITY CLASSIFIED FILES
[13]AGENCY FILENUMBER: = 125-JFK
[15]Document Information
[17]ORIGINATOR: CIA
[18]FROM:
[19]TO:
[21]TITLE:
[23]DATE: 00/00/0000
[24]PAGES: 1
[26]SUBJECTS :
[28]OSWALD, LEE, POST-RUSSIAN PERIOD, TRAVEL, TRIP TO
[29]MEXICO
[31]DOCUMENT TYPE: REPORT
[32]CLASSIFICATION: — Unclassified
[33]RESTRICTIONS: 1A
[34]CURRENT STATUS: — Redact
[35]DATE OF LASTREVIEW: — 01/01/2003
[37]OPENING CRITERIA :
[39]COMMENTS: — Box 4.
[41]v9.4 1
[43]HY 50955 Docild: 32263505 Page 1
[45]ee Ty ets Dosen eee ya “ of . : Ehime
[46]ar Gt 9 De es
[48]CHRONOLOGY OF OSWALD'S VISITS TO THE SOVIET AND ‘CUBAN EMBASSIES.
[50]September 26, 1963 A man claiming to be Oswald vists the Cuban
[52]Thursday @ Embassy between 10:00 A.M. and 2:00 P.M.
[53]. The visit probably occurs around: one o'clock.
[54]f ~ “Oswald" is ‘discribed as 5'6" tall, blond hair,
[56]sunken cheeks, very thin, aquiline nose, very
[57]straight eyebrows, approximately 35 years old
[58]eo. and wearing a light blue Prince of Wales suit. |
[59]pe He was said to look very cold with a hard face
[60]-and a penetrating cunning way of looking at you.
[61]"Oswald" was seeking an intransit visa to Cuba’
[62]on his way to Russia. He displayed documents
[63]that showed his membership in the Fair Play
[64]for Cuba Committee and the American Communist
[65]Party. He was told that he would have. to
[66]first obtain a visa to Russia before he could
[67]be issued an intransit visa. He is also told
[68]that he should return to the Cuban Embassy
[69]with his passport and a copy of a photograph
[70]in order to fill out the visa application.
[72]September 27, 1963
[73]Friday
[75]Circa 10:30 A.M. a. | Oswald" calls: the Soviet Military Attache (SMA)
[76]— with whom he speaks in Spanish. He tells the
[77]SMA that he is looking for a visa to Odessa.
[78]The SMA tells him to call the Consulate. "Oswald"
[79]asks for directions to the Embassy and recieves
[80]them.
[82]eX 2
[84]of "Oswald" calls the Soviet Consulate and asks to
[85]co . speak to the Consul in Spanish. He is told that
[86]—the Consul is not in. He is told that he can
[87]call back at 11:30. "Oswald" says that he is
[88]looking for a visa to Odessa.
[90]10:37 A.M.
[92]~ circa 11: 30 A.M. "Oswald" goes to the Russian Embassy where he
[93]once again exhibits the documents he has already
[94]wl” ©) shown the Cubans as well as other documents such |:
[95]as his and Marina's marriage license. "Oswald" —
[96]discusses his situation with someone at the
[97]Embassy and comes away with the understanding
[98]that everything would be expeditiously handled. |
[99]circa 12:15 P.M. Someone from the Soviet Embassy calls Azcue
[100]: het whom he is aware of because of what "Oswald"
[101]ne ~ has told him, and tells him that they have to
[102]get authorization from Moscow to grant him a
[103]visa and that it will probably take four months.
[105]circa 12:45 A.M. ® "Oswald" returns. to the Cuban Embassy. with ‘the
[110]9/27/63
[111]12:45 (cont'd)
[115]$i 00 |
[116]7 ;
[117]1:25 P.M.
[119]4:05 P.M.
[120]-+, 2
[121]Th be? ©
[122]4:26 P.M.
[124]Night
[126]WW. 50955. Docld:32763505 Page 3
[128]“stating that he would like to leave in three
[130]_take to get the visa. Azcue explains his
[132]‘Azcue throws Oswald out. \puran feels sympathetic ©
[133]to Oswald, gives hin { 2ss,)and promises wib.
[135]“talk to him.s. She said that she would and to
[136]“come back at four o'clock. If the call was not
[138]. Silvia Duran calls the Soviet Embassy. She
[139]‘the man seeking the visa wants to know with whom
[141]‘-he spoke because he had been assured that there
[143]A Soviet Official returns Silvia's call. The
[145]night with Silvia.
[147]photo and completes the visa application,
[148]days. He asks Azcue about how long it will
[150]misconception to him, an argument results and
[152]to help in any way-she-canyg” She feels that
[153]Oswald should have been granted the visa with
[154]no problems and that Azcue’s actions are wrong.
[156]Oswald calls the Soviet Consulate in an attempt
[157]to find out what has gone wrong with the arraing-
[158]ment he thought he had. In Spanish, he asks for
[159]the Consul. (He is told that the Consul is out
[160]and that he canbe contacted between four and
[161]five on Mondays and Fridays. [This call may have
[162]been from Duran's phone.) If it was he then told
[163]her that he could get hold of the Soviet he had
[164]his deal with and would she be kind enough to
[166]made then Oswald got this message to Silvia and
[167]the same arraingments for Silvia's four o'clock
[168]call were made. ; :
[170]tells them the American citizen, the one who
[171]wants a visa to Cuba in transit to Russia, is
[172]there. She asks who he talked to at the Soviet
[173]Embassy when she sent him there to get a Soviet
[174]visa so he could get an intransit visa to Cuba.
[175]She tells the official she is speaking with that
[177]would be no problem. The man at the Soviet
[178]Embassy puts another man on the phone and Silvia
[179]goes through it again. He tells her that her
[180]‘call will be returned... °
[182]situation is explained to Silvia. She realizes
[183]that she cannot give him a visa because of the
[184]delay on the Soviet end and the fact that he
[185]does not know anyone in Cuba. What does Silvia
[186]tell Oswald who is still setting there waiting?
[187]In light of subsequent events it was probably
[188]something that would keep his. hopes up.
[190]Oswald goes to a party at Rubin Duran's with _
[191]Silvia and two American friends.. This may have
[192]been, more likely was, the night of the 26th.
[194]He is seen by Elena Garro de Paz. He spends the
[196]SBIR OPS ESAS a DER MRL AAAI LNB UR AA Maa ORY CN AR AE, ASA
[198]page Three.
[200]September 28, 1963
[202]Saturday .
[203]eirca 11:00 A.M. Oswald is back at the Soviet Embassy bugging
[204]; © them to expedite his visa. They send him back
[205]to the Cuban Embassy to get an address.
[206]11:51 | , . Duran calls the Soviet Consulate and puts Oswald.
[207], 4 en the phone. He tells them that he is returning
[208]lo 5 to the Soviet Embassy with the address. | :
[209]circa 12:00 ~ , ‘ Oswald returns to the Soviet Embassy and is
[210]Cone : assured that a telegram will be sent and that
[211]. a mo 1, _'  4t will be handled as quickly as possible.
[212]: afternoon — ; Oswald decides that he needs more help and
[214]tracks down a revolutionary, pro-Castro Cuban
[215]group on the campus of the University of Mexico.
[216].Maybe he hopes that he can find someone who
[217]-, ; . will say they know him in Cuba. In any case,
[218]re ; he seeks some sort of assistance from these
[219]Pro-Castroites. He spends the night with them.
[221]September 29, 1963 ;
[222]Sunday Morning _ Oswald spends the day with the Pro-Castro group..
[224]Sunday Afternoon/
[225]evening and night
[227]co)
[229]‘September 30, 1963 ? Note: the association with the Cuban group
[230]Morden could have been anytime between the afternoon.
[231]_ _ of 9/28 and the afternoon of 9/30. Contreras.
[233]said that he met Oswald in the afternoon and
[234]spent the rest of the day, that night and part
[235]of the next day with him. :
[237]oi a
[239]October 1, 1963 oo Te :
[240]10:31 A.M. Oswald calls the Soviet Military Attache
[242]Tu sedty, inquiring about a telegram. He is refered
[243]to the Consulate. ,
[247]10:45 A.M. Oswald calls the consulate with the same inquiry
[248]. , and learns that the telegram has. been sent but
[249]L “no reply has been recéived. He is discouraged.
[250]__- Obyedkov hangs up on him. a
[252]‘later or earlier ‘Oswald calls the man with whom he had made ‘his
[253]"arrangement" and discusses the assistance that
[254]Q was prdmised him. He is dangled and the man ,
[255]> eventua ly hangs up on him.
[257]later or on the 2nd. _ Oswald leaves Mexico.
[260]> On or about , 8 this: may have happened —
[261]9/30/63 : MCS récieves a transcript in which ‘Silvia
[262]A Q Duran discusses an American and his prob-
[264]_lem with a Soviet Coxnsyl. Win Scott
[265]“Can. we. identify?" on transcript.
[267]“notify: Flick of any conversation involving
[268], Xo “in: ‘English. ete, Haowavdes
[270]lick listens” ‘and ‘hears “the inan™
[271]ID himself as Oswald. He pulls the tape
[272]and marks it "urgent" and notifies
[273]. Goodpasture that they have an ID on
[274]an American. The tape is delivered to
[275]Tarasoff for immediate transcription.
[276]It is recieved late this day or early on
[277]the second by Goodpasture. "Disposition
[278]of tape unknown, could "urgent" tapes
[279]have been routinely retained for longer
[280]. period? Goodpasture now has ID but does
[281]Goodpasture ties in 9/28 not know for sure that it is the one that
[283]~ Soviet conversation re: ; Scott has asked about. The guy in the
[284]address. 9/27 conversation sounds real interesting
[286]but there is nothing in this conversation, on
[287]that.clearly connects. She discusses v
[288]reporting it with Manell. There is some
[289]disagreement over whose responsiblity it
[291]is to report. Either decgsion is made, or
[292]conflict continues until photos. is checked.
[294]10/7/63 Photos from 10/1, 10/2, 10/3, 10/4. (2)
[295]are recieved in base. from Soviet Embassy.
[297]. 10/8/63 . _ B. Manell drafts report cable. Goodpasture
[298]adds paragraph 2.
[300]10/10/63 ' (in interim: Goodpasture tries to ID
[301]MMM photo? how?) HQ response recieved.
[302]Descriptions don't match. Controversy in .
[303]station on whether, Oswald, s, same. 9/27% 912
[305]conversation tied“in ‘for 0" during this
[306]week. wy Similaciry of subtantvwe CoNt em’
[308]oF! cA LAND aon Vits ATION AMD voree
[309]PAP ARSSON®
[310]10/16/63 Oswald "p" file opened.
[311]10/18/63 by this time ne photo of MMM recieved at
[313]Station. Goodpasture picks up on it.
[314]This MMM photo one from Cubemb on 10/15.
[316]HY 50955 Docld:32263505 Page 5
[319]10/21/63 © eS 10/15 MMM shown to penetration agents
[320]We , . “°° by this time. What response?. MCS
[322]‘cables HQ asking for a photo of LHO.
[323]For what ‘purpose? - Was “it just to compare. ” :
[324]surveillance photoes? Were -they-planning-..«
[325]on showing-to. ‘7p na rath n agents?: why,
[326]note: ‘quite a-few.\people <s
[327]“Level was high--so what actions were
[328]taken?” : .
[330]HW 50955 Docld: 32263505 Page 6
[333]COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 24 august: 1978 Viapas
[335]HSCA Interview of David Atlee Phillips at HSCA offices, 8/23/78, 1:20 to
[336]4:35 P.M., by Dan Hardway, Charles Berk, and Caeton Fonzi.
[338]Mr. Phillips was reminded that the CIA omnibus release letter still
[339]applied to our discussions and that he should feel free to answer. our
[340]questions in spite of any secrecy oath that he may have executed during
[341]Ais employment with. the CIA, He was asked if Ke remembered and under=.
[342]stood the letter and if he wanted to review the letter again, Mr, Phillips
[343]stated that he tememBered the letter and dia not think it necessary: to
[344]see the letter again,
[346]Mr, Philiips was asked aBout. his activities: in Mexico that related
[347]to fide job as Chief of Covert Action in the Mexico City Station from
[348]1961 to 1963, Me. Phillips was asked how many persons were in his
[349]propoganda shop in Mexico City, He said that it was manned only By
[350]fimself, a case officer under his: directton and a secretary, He later
[351]added that there was also one other case officer under his direction who
[352]worked under .deep cover cutside of the Embassy, Mr, Phillips stated that
[353]from 1961 to 1963 Re ran only about 6 or 7 operations or projects. He
[354]added that there. would. have also Been many. "ad hoc” actions. Under
[355]questioning, He stated that it is possible that he was responsible for
[356]ag many: ag 14 to 17 ongoing operations and 3 to 6 developmental stage
[357]operattons, Most of these. operations were directed at the Cuban target
[358]and “tHe preat: percentage of them Had an anti-Cuban or anti-Soviet Bias.’
[360]1
[362]Mr. Phillips was asked about the handling of agents, He stated that
[363]he. himself. Handled "yery-very: feu! agents, “Usually T met with someone
[364]who was: working deep cover and they in turn would handle several agents."
[365]Mr, Phillips did recall handling one agent pergonally, a radio-TV
[367]broadcaster. .He also said that he would often meet with other agents even
[369]COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
[371]HY 50955 DociId: 32263505 Page 7
[373]Phillips, page 2. COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
[377]though. he was: not handling them on a day. to day- basis, He stated that at
[378]all times he had at least one deep cover officer: working: outstde of the
[379]Embassy and that, sometimes, he had two such’ officers,
[380]Mr, Phillips: stated that he did Have access, atid did use in some of:
[381]his propoganda activities, agents who were located’ outside of Mexico,
[382]Mr, Phillips also stated that he did use a few assets that he had developed
[383]prior te His transfer to Mexico Citys fe specifically tecalled’ a man
[384]named SAYAS, who fad Been a newspaperman in Cuba’ and went to workin
[385]Mexico City, He satd that whftle he had been a propoganda officer for
[386]the JMARC operatton he had used assets: that he Had developed during his
[387]‘prior tour of ‘duty tn Hayana, Mr, Phillips said that guch assets were
[388]usually Handled. by him- personally. during the: Bay: of Pigs.
[389]Mr, Phillips stated that during the Bay: of Pigs operation he
[390]travelled to Miami "fairly. frequently; every: 6 weeks, 3 .weeke, 5 weeks."
[391]He. stated that responsibility for propoganda operations were divided
[393]between Him-and_ tits; subordinate in Miami, William Kent, When asked to
[395]explain that division Mr, Phillips stated:
[396]Kent reported to-my stiop in Washington, He had. day. to,day-
[397]contact with. the groups: we were supporting down there, the
[398]student group and the doctors or whatever, and the people
[399]involved in Radto Swan,
[400]Phillips stated that Radio Swan was run out of Miamb, through the
[401]mechantsm-of the Gibralter Steamship Company, He did say that he was
[402]in contact with. the agent. who ran Radie Swan, He said that he felt uncom-
[403]" fortable naming, than agent and suggested we ask the Agency for his identity,
[404]“Mr, Phillips stated that when he traveled to Miami he often went
[406]to see the people. he knew: from. Havana, tneluding those fe was: running
[408]as: agents himself, He would also, on ‘oceassion, meet with. agents whiom
[410]GOMMITTEE SENSITIVE
[411]HY 50955 Boclda:32263505 Page 8
[414]COMMITTEE. SENSITIVE
[415]Phillips, page 3,
[417]Bill Kent was: running "if BEL Kent got’ to the: point. where: fe. felt he
[418]would like a little weight," “Sometimes He went down to’ ‘Miamt on a
[419]“trouble. shooting" aéesion, as: when" problems: developed with: a. 4 comperctal
[420]radio station the. Agency: was funding,
[422]Mr , PHELPS stated that he. had had no tecent contact with: Mr,
[424]‘ Ként . relaeine ta’ anything. Being done: by thie” Comittee, “He dia state
[425]that, ‘approximately a. mont. ag ro) when Me, Kent retired from: tte CTA, ie
[426]received a call fromAtr , Kent, He said that Mr, Kent said that He was
[427]setting sup an executive employment agency and fad ‘asked’ for Mr, PRiLLips
[428]Help in finding jobs: for former employees of the’ ageney. as. well as
[429]referring people. £or- specific skilled jobs, They- did not discuss: the
[430]HSCA at all, ‘according to Phillips,
[432]Mr. Phillips. stated that it would be accurate to state
[433]that there were two "sets" of propoganda activities during
[434]the Bay of Pigs; one that was run out of the Miami offices
[435]coordinated by Bill Kent and a second set that he personnally
[436]ran without coordinating with Mr. Kent. Most of Mr. Phillips
[437]prior established assets were in the second set of propoganda
[438]operations. |
[440]Mr. Phillips said that even after he became Chief of
[441]Cuban Operations in Mexico City he still worked very closely
[442]with the propoganda shop, and his successor as head of that
[443]shop, James Flannery, in propoganda operations.
[445]Mr. Phillips said that his "Cuban shop" covered the
[447]activities of the Cuban Embassy and that a special group
[449]covered the airport. He said that a good deal of time was
[451]COMMITTEE SENSITIVE:
[452]HW 50955 Docld:32263505 Page 9
[455]Phillips, page 4. SITIVE
[457]spent looking for opportunities to recruit Cubans who came to
[458]Mexico City. The shop also ran a debriefing center for Cubans
[459]who left Cuba by way of Mexico. . He also said that one of the
[460]primary activities of the Cuban shop would have been to identi-
[461]fy the DGI officers in the Cuban Embassy and their functions,
[462]duties and assignments whenever possible. Mr. Phillips said
[463]that he was still involved in propaganda activities at this
[464]time specifically recalling a Mexican broadcaster whose tadio
[465]station could be heard in Cuba. Mr. Phillips pointed out that
[466]he had been a close friend of Mr. Flannery's and that Mr.
[467]Flannery was made Chief of Covert Action in Mexico on his,
[468]Phillip's, recommendation.
[470]Mr. Phillips' said that he had "quite good" relations
[471]with Win Scott and that he reported directly to him as opposed
[472]to reporting through the Deputy Chief of Station which would
[473]have been the routine manner. Mr. Phillips stated that he thought
[475]~ that Robert Shaw had been in charge of the Cuban photographic
[476]surveillance operations and that they had two penetration
[477]agents in the Cuban Embassy. He stated that he could not
[478]remember the names of the penetration agents and was not sure
[479]of the cryptonyms.
[481]Mr. Phillips was asked why his name came up so infrequently
[482]in a review of Agency documents of this period from Mexico
[483]City. He said that his name should appear on any "formal
[484]project" he had going, but that he "did like to delegate work."
[485]He said that his name must be on many papers.
[487]AAReMeree CENSITIVE
[489]1
[490]HY 50955 Docld:32263505 Page 10
[492]@OWMITTEE SENSITIVE
[493]Phillips, page 5.
[495]Mr. Phillips said that there was a CI responsibility in the
[496]Cuban shop. “You always watch out for it, but there was no
[497]formal program.". He said, however, that "I never really under-..
[498]stood what CI was." Phillips said that there were some CIA
[499]officers who made counter-intelligence their primary concern
[500]during their entire careers but that he was not one of them.
[502]He described the CI effectiveness of the Mexico City Station
[503]as "average" and its Cuban section as "less than average."
[505]Mr. Phillips stated that he.was aware of the existence —
[506]of the Special Affairs Staff in Washington that dealt with
[507]Cuban matters. He was also aware that the SAS had its own
[508]counter=intelligence section. He recalled meeting the Chief
[509]of that section, Hal SWENSON, on a trip to Washington. He
[510]also said that it would have been routine for Mr. Swenson to
[511]have traveled to Mexico City on “routine trips" or special
[512]cases. He said that he had probably seen Swenson in Mexico
[513]but that he did not recall any specific meetings.
[515]Mr. Phillips recalled that the Legat office of the U.S.
[516]Embassy in Mexico was large; that it had 11 to 20 officers -
[517]assigned to it. He said that there was a close relationship
[518]between the Agency station and the Legat office. He said
[519]that the Legat got "drop copies” of most reports. He said that
[520]it would have been routine to advise the Legat of “interesting
[521]cases" and..that an American reporting to a foreign embassy
[522]would have been such a case. He said that a local dissemination
[524]would have definately been routine and that this liaison
[526]COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
[527]HW 450955 Docld: 32263505 Page 1i
[529]COMMITTEE. SENSITIVE
[530]Phillips, page 6
[531]- relationship would have been at least partially responsible
[532]for reporting such a visit to Headquarters.
[533]Mr. Phillips was queried about whether, in such a case,
[534]it would have been routine for the Agency station to take any
[535]action other than just reporting the information that had come
[536]to its attention. Mr. Phillips said that it could have happened
[537]in certain circumstances, such as if the contact looked as if
[538]he had recruitment potential or was a serious security case.
[539]In those instances it was possible that other actions would
[540]be taken. Mr. Phillips remembers one..such instance specifically
[541]and pointed out that it is related in his book, Nightwatch,
[542]on pp. 126-128. This is a.story of an American military
[543]officer who offered to spy for the Cubans and an operation
[544]mounted against him by the Agency in Mexico. In response to
[545]a direct question Mr. Phillips acknowledged that the Station
[546]other than just reporting
[547]could, and often did, take actions/in regard to Americans in
[548]Mexico that were in contact with Soviet or Bloc Embassies
[549]without a specific request from another interested agency; i.e.,
[550]they often took investigative and operational action on their \
[551]own initiative. Mr. Phillips said that the reason that the
[552]Station could do this was Mr. Scott's ranking (informal) in
[553]the agency. Mr. Phillips illustrated this point by saying
[554]that when Mr. Scott returned to Washington to report he did
[555]not go to the Chief of Western Hemisphere Division but directly
[556]to either the DCI or DDP. He pointed out that Scott had been
[558]a division chief himself prior to his assignment as Chief of
[559]) Station in Mexico. COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
[561]HY 50955 DociId: 32263505 Page 12
[563]COMMITTCE SENSITWE
[564]Phillips, page 7.
[566]Mr. Phillips was asked if the CIA shared assets and
[567]informants with the FBI in Mexico. He said that he did not
[568]know of any such cases but there was coordination and liaison
[569]with the Bureau on the surveillance operations...
[571]Mr. Phillips acknowledged that one additional area in
[572]which the Station and the FBI shared an interest was the
[573]colony of American expatriates in Mexico. ‘He said that he
[574]was not sure of who had the responsibility for that area in
[575]the Station but that it may 3 been Ms. Ann Goodpasture. Mr.
[576]Phillips stated that he was not aware of any Agency liaison
[577]in Mexico City with either Army or Navy regarding counter-
[578]intelligence or counter-espionage cases. He said that he had
[579]never heard of any arguments that may have occured concerning
[580]whose responsibility it was to report Oswald's initial contact
[581]with the Soviet Embassy or about the extensiveness of the
[582]Station's reporting after the assassination.
[584]Mr. Phillips does remember Viola June COBB. "Blonde,
[585]flew an airplane, track record for hitting a lot of beds in
[586]Cuba, had a twin sister involved in aviation. That's what
[587]comes to mind." He vaguely remembers messages or reports
[588]from or about her coming out of his Cuban shop but he believes
[589]that she was run out of Washington or Miami as.an asset and
[590]that someone from one of those two places would have regularly
[591]come to Mexico to run her.
[593]Mr. Phillips stated that he did not recall an officer
[594]with a hair lip or who spoke with a lisp.
[596]COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
[598]HW 50955 Docl4:32263505 Page 13
[600]COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
[601]Phillips, page 8.
[603]Phillips stated that he did not know if Ms. Cobb was also
[604]an informant for the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
[606]Phillips stated that he recalls three or four members of
[607]the Warren Commission staff coming to Mexico. He said that
[608]he may have chatted with them informally but he had no formal’
[609]dealings with them. He said that they spent most of their
[610]time with Mr. Scott.
[612]Mr. Phillips said that he first heard the name of Silvia
[613]Duran about the time he arrived in Mexico, as soon as he started
[614]reading the telephone tap transcripts. "Her name appeared time
[615]and time again." He added: "We had no interest in her. She
[616]wasn't friendly with anyone." Mr. Phillips had previously
[617]mentioned, in his discussion of the Cuban shop's interest in
[618]recruiting agents, the name of Ambassador L&chuga and their
[620]interest in pitching him. Mr. Phillips was shown Slawson's
[622]memo concerning his trip to Mexico where Scott told him that
[623]the CIA had a substantial prior interest in Duran because of
[624]her affair with LAachuga. Phillips seemed surprised and said
[625]"No one let me in on this operation." Mr. Phillips. said that
[626]it is possible that the Agency pitched Duran. "At one time
[628]we pitched almost everyone at the Cuban Embassy. She must
[630]have been considered." Mr. Phillips said that it was possible
[631]that she was not pitched because the station could not identify
[633]any of her weaknesses. At this point Mr. Phillips was told
[635]i
[636]about the LITAMEL/9 reports on Duran that said that all that
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[644]atdi—that would have to be.done to recruit her was get a blonde,
[645]blue eyed American in bed with the. little "puta." Mr. Phillips
[646]admitted that it sounded like she had at least been targeted
[647]and that the station's interest was substantial and that the
[648]weakness and means had been identified. He pointed out,
[649]however, that targeting does not necessarily mean that she
[651]had been pitched, or,.even if she was pitched, that she had
[652]accepted the pitch. Mr. Phillips said that he was not aware:
[653]that a pitch had been made.
[655]Phillips stated that Ms. Duran's 201 file should be
[656]"very thick". He stated that a thin 201 file prior to the
[657]assassination "would be very surprising". He said that a
[658]name trace should come up with at least a lot of 3x5 cards
[659]that predate the assassination.
[661]Mr. Phillips stated that he saw L&chuga only three times
[662]after he left Cuba: once on an airplane from Miami--"we just
[663]nodded"--; once at the inauguration of Mexican President
[664]Diaz Ordaz; and once when he was having lunch at a fancy
[665]resturant near the American Embassy in Mexico. On the last.
[666]encounter Phillips said that he knew Lachuga was going to
[667]be there and that he had specifically gone there to talk to
[668]him. He said that Lachuga turned off all the advances he made. —
[670]Phillips was asked why the Agency had sent a cable to
[671]Mexico after Ms. Duran's arrest saying "don't allow any
[672]Americans to have contact with her." (paraphrase). He
[673]said: "Don't know. I can't tell you why they did that. Tf
[675]can't guess why." He said that he was not aware that the
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[681]Warren Commission staffers who were in Mexico wanted to talk
[682]to Duran. He said that he knew Clarence BOONSTRA well, that
[683]the last he heard he was in North Florida, but that he had
[684]never discussed the assassination or Oswald with him.
[686]Mr. Phillips said that he vaguely remembered that Win
[687]Scott did have a safe in his office. He guessed that Scott
[688]and his secretary would have been the only people who had
[689]access to that saff. He said that Scott had had several
[690]secretaries over a period and that he only remembers the first
[691]name of one of them: Dottie. He said that he had no idea of
[692]what Scott kept in his safe. He said that when nevis chieg
[693]of station in the Dominican Republic, Brazil. and Venezuela,
[694]he kept really "very sensitive" material in his safe in his
[695]office. He assumes that the same would have been true of Mr.
[696]Scott. Phillips offered the example that someone would call
[697]and say that someone at the Embassy was a prostitute, he would
[700]note that for the record in keep it in the private safe. He
[701]guessed that the material in the safe would have been material
[702]Scott generated himself. He said that memos of meetings with
[703]the Mexican president in which sensitive topics were discussed
[704]would have been a likely candidate for retention in Scott's
[705]safe. He said that he does not know what happened to Scott's
[706]safe after he died but that he has heard a vague story that
[707]someone went out and found a lot of documents that Scott had
[708]kept.
[710]Mr. Phillips stated that he thought that the Chief of
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[718]the DGI in Mexico was a man. named "LUNA."
[720]Mr. Phillips was asked about the story in his book con- ,
[721]cerning the DGI officer with the penchant for antique jewelry.
[722]that appears at page 133. He said that he does not remember the
[723]name of that person, but says he took some literary license
[724]because he doesn't specifically recall if the person was, in
[725]fact, a DGI officer. "Thank God my next book is fiction,"
[726]he said.
[728]Phillips. was asked about the following DGI officers:
[729]Orestes Guillermo Ruiz Perez--"vaguely familiar";
[731]Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez--"Yes, familiar.";
[733]Manual Vega--could have been Chief of DGTI;.
[739]Alfredo Mirabal-~"familiar";
[741]Eusebio Azcue~-the consul, "to my knowledge he was not Cuban
[742]intelligence.":
[744]Mr. Phillips was asked if Proenza was a CIA asset. He
[745]said "The name is familiar but I don't recall the context."
[747]‘He also could not remember if Luisa Calderon. had been an asset..
[748]He said: "I don't really remember the true names of the agents.
[749]I never saw them or dealt with them." He stated that he could
[751]not remember whether the Agency had ever pitched Ruiz but that
[753]"there were several attempts to pitch intelligence types."
[755]Mr. Phillips was shown Carlos Blanco's report of 28 June
[756]1963. He stated that he had probably seen it previously.but
[758]does not remember it specifically. He said that the name
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[766]Carlos Blanco had probably been made up for the purposes of
[767]this one report. He said that he recalled the name of Luisa
[768]Calderon.a bit better after reading the document. He said
[769]that she may have been the asset.who worked in the Embassy
[770]for the Agency but he still could not be certain because he
[771]could not recall the true names. He said that he did not
[772]know if there would have been a "further report" and that, if
[773]there was, it would not have necessarily been sent to Head-
[774]quarters unless it had been of special interest.
[776]Mr. Phillips was then shown the dispatch concerning
[777]Luisa's sister. (CIA # 3715.) He said that he does not know
[778]whether she was ever identified, contacted or used. He said
[779]that he had never heard of a "domestic exploitation section"
[780]and pointed out that the words were not capitalized.
[782]Mr. Phillips stated that he did know Mr. Barney Hidalgo.
[783]He does not recall him ever being in Mexico but said that it
[784]was possible that Mr. Hidalgo could have been there and that
[785]he would not have known about it. He said that he had on
[786]occassion worked with Mr. Hidalgo. He said that. Hidalgo did
[787]not have any executive talents, but he was involved in a lot
[788]of operations. He said that Hidalgo had some problems: "I
[789]don't want to say he was crazy, but I was always uncomfortable
[790]around him." Mr. Phillips also recognized the cryptonym
[791]AMMUG/1.
[793]Mr. Phillips was shown CIA #'s 3665 and 3662. which are
[794]reports from AMMUG that the Cubans believed that Calderon had
[796]been recruited by the CIA and had, therefore, called her back
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[804]to Cuba. Mr. Phillips said that that did not help him recall
[805]that much about Calderon other than to make him think that
[806]she was not a Cra agent "because she went back to Cuba."
[808]Mr. Phillips stated that he was not aware that after the |
[809]assassination that Thomas Mann expressed a great deal of interest
[810]in the Mexico City investigation. He also said that he did not
[811]know why Mann would have been pressing for the arrest and
[812]questioning of Luisa Calderon. He said that, in fact, he had
[813]never known or heard that such was the case.
[815]Mr. Phillips was shown the transcript of the Calderon
[816]call. (CIA 3717.) He said "I've seen this document before...
[817]when we.were reviewing things after the assassination." He
[818]was asked what the Mexico Station had done to follow up on
[819]that conversation. He said that he could not recall that any-
[820]thing was done other than forwarding the conversation to Head-
[821]quarters. He said that he did not know what Headquarters had
[822]done with it. He said that he could not remember being tasked
[823]or his shop being tasked, with anything concerning this lead.
[825]He said that he did not know if this conversation was given
[827]to the WC by HO but acknowledged that it was not shown to the
[828]staff members who visited Mexico. He does not recall any specific
[829]follow up regarding Calderon. He does not know why Calderon
[831]was not arrested.
[833]The section of Carlos Blanco's report concerning Teresa
[834]Proenza was pointed out to..Phillips. He said that he thought
[835]the report may have been written by a person used by the station
[837]that thought that everyone was a communist. He said this may
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[844]have been LIHUFF/1. He said that the document did not hélp
[845]his memory that much and that "I don't know of any reason why
[846]she would be termed dangerous."
[848]Phillips was shown the LITAMEL/9 contact report regarding
[849]the firing of Teresa Proenza (CIA # 3714.). Mr. ‘Phillips
[850]stated that he dos not know why Teresa. Proenza was fired. He
[851]said that he did recognize the cryptonym AMROD. He said that
[852]it was a disinformation operation and that it may have been
[853]aimed, in part, at Teresa Proenza. He said that the person
[854]in his book that he refers to as a cultural ataache with
[855]a penchant for antique jewelry was not Teresa Proenza. He said
[856]that he remembers that the person he refers to in that story
[857]was definately aman. Phillips stuck adamantly to this contention.
[859]Phillips stated that he does not recall that the Mexico
[860]City Station ever developed any information that Oswald was in
[861]contact with anyone else at the Cuban Embassy other than
[862]Azcue and Duran. Mr. Phillips was shown the FBI report of an
[863]interview with Ms. Proenza's brother. Mr. Phillips stated that
[864]it did notvring any bells and he could not recall ever having
[865]heard of such a thing. Mr. Phillips was also informed of the
[866]FBI report from a CIA source that indicated that Oswald had
[867]had contact with Proenza. He said that he had never heard of
[868]it. Mr. Phillips then. stated that some things were coming
[869]hack to him. He asked if Proenza was a lesbian but he didn't
[870]recall if that was a fact or part of the disinformation campaign
[872]aimed at her.
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[881]The timing of the departures of Calderon and Proenza was
[882]pointed out to Mr. Phillips as well as the indications that
[883]they had met Oswald, had prior knowledge of the assassination,
[884]the nominal reason regarding Proenza over the Raul Roa note.
[885]He was asked if he knew if their ‘recalls were connected and
[886]if they were connected with the assassination. He said that
[887]he did not know, maybe Calderon and Proenza had been lovers,
[888]but that may have been part of the disinformation, he just
[889]could not remember which, fact or fiction.
[891]Mr. Phillips stated that it was very possible that HQ
[893]Cuban
[894]or JMWAVE could have recruited and run/agents in Mexico without
[895]the knowledge of the Mexico Station. Phillips said: "I suppose
[896]it would have been possible for an agent in Mexico City to
[897]be run out of JMWAVE station in Miami without my knowledge,
[898]but I would have been furious if I found out about it:. He
[899]said that this may have even been "probable" in the case of a
[900]“sensitive operatig," but he pointed out that anyone doing
[901]that took the risk of crossing Win Scott who was close to both
[902]the DCI and DDP. This lead Mr. Phillips to say that if that
[903]was the case then the DDP, at least, would probably have
[904]approved the WAVE use of an agent in Mexico. We took Mr.
[905]Phillips through the documents on Ms. Calderon again and
[906]asked him if this could have been an instance such as that
[907]we were talking about. He said that it very well could have
[908]been but that he had no knowledge that would indicate that that
[909]‘was the case. He said that this was the kind of thing "they
[911]might have asked Barney Hidalgo to do." Phillips agreed that
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[918]CIA #3665 indicates that a pitch to Calderon was to be made
[920]by someone outside of Mexico. "If it was someone from the CIA
[921]there would be something in her 201 files... but possibly it
[922]could have been run out of a soft file." He said that her file
[923]should be substantial. He said he could not explain why the
[924]Calderon conversation would not have been in her 201 while it
[925]was in Oswald's.
[927]Mr. Phillips was informed of the testing of the impulse
[928]camera beginning on September 27, 1963. He stated that he had
[929]"no recollection" of the disposition of the photographs obtained
[930]during that testing.
[932]Mr. Phillips stated that if another cable (a third) was
[933]sent to HQ regarding Oswald prior to the assassination that he
[934]did not know about it.
[936]Mr. Phillips was asked if there was a way for HQ and a
[937]Station to communicate without the commo becoming part of the
[938]permanent record. He stated that there was at least one way
[939]that he knew of in addition to telephone and personal courier.
[940]He said that it was technically possible to set up a "“telcom"
[941]system by persuading the cable operators to set it up ona
[942]"back channel". He stated that such a system would work on a
[943]question and answer Sheme. He said "It has been done on occassion
[944]but I don't recall it ever having been done in Mexico." Mr.
[945]Phillips also stated that he did not believe that there had
[946]been any telephone communications concerning the assassination.
[947]Refuting documents were not shown.
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[955]Mr. Phillips acknowledged that the FBI would manipulate
[957]their files on employees of the CIA at the Agency's behest.
[959]He also said that he would not be surprised if other cat&gories
[960]of files could be manipulated, including internal CIA files.
[961]Mr. Phillips was asked what factors would make him suspicious
[962]of a file. He said that missing references, pages that had
[963]half of them torn off, things like that would arouse his sus-
[964]picion. He also listed a missing report from a sequentially
[965]numbered series of reports as one thing that would arouse his
[966]suspicion. In response to a direct question, Mr. Phillips said
[967]that, if what we had told him about Ms. Duran's file was true,
[968]_ then wercould be fairly certain that her file had been "manip-
[969]ulated."
[971]Mr. Phillips was asked about James Angleton. He said: .
[973]"He didn't tell me anything about his operations. He kept
[974]promising to tell me, but he never did." He said that Angleton
[975]held his operation very tightly to his vest. Phillips said
[977]it is possible that J.C. King mignt have had some operations
[978]outside of the JMARC structure but that they could not have
[979]been funded without someone knowing about them. A division
[980]chief does have access to operational and developmental funds
[981]but, Phillips said, he has never heard of a discretionary fund
[982]available to Division Chiefs. He said that the developmental
[983]fund usually had a lot of money in it but that it eventually
[984]had to be accounted for. "I can't remember having such a fund
[986]that I didn't account -for through the DDP."
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[994]Mr. Phillips said that he did not participate, nor was
[995]he aware of, in any campaign after the assassination to spread
[996]misinformation about the death of Kennédy. He could not explain
[997]why the misinformation that came from the Cuban groups and
[998]individuals that tended to point to Castro involvement were
[999]predominantly from assets that he had handled personally as
[1000]opposed to ones that had been ran out of.the Miami station..
[1002]He said that he agreed that it was strange that the one peice
[1004]of evidence that tended to show at least DGI foreknowledge
[1006]was not pursued by his shop while disinformation ‘from his former
[1007]assets occupied the attentions of investigators in that area.
[1008]Mr. Phillips stated that he did not kow of any hard evidence
[1009]that existed in 1963 that pointed to Castro's involvement.
[1011]Mr. Phillips was asked about his operations in Havana,
[1012]specifically the names of the operations he was involved in,
[1013]when he worked there as a covert operative from 1958 to 1961.
[1015]He said he went to Cuba in the summer of 1958 after he had retired
[1016]“from the Agency. He said the Agency heard he was setting up
[1018]his own public relations business there and asked him to
[1020]continue working for them, not on a staff status but on a
[1021]contract basis. Most of his work, he said, involved propaganda
[1022]operations for Latin American coundtries and not Cuba. He did
[1024]do what he termed "ad hoc" stuff as it came along and he did
[1025]develop propaganda news stories and editorial material that was
[1026]sent out to the provincial newspapers. He also specifically
[1027]recalled attending a meeting of a group of businessmen who
[1029], hao
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[1037]began talking about developing anti-Castro activity, but that group
[1038]never got off the ground because there was an informant in the
[1039]group and most of the participants were shortly afterwards
[1040]arrested.
[1042]When asked about his relationsip with Julio Lobo, he
[1043]became a bit upset and said he thought he had covered that
[1044]adequately in his deposition. He sais as far as he Wan recall
[1045]he met Lobo only one time, perhaps it was even in Madrid and
[1046]not Havana, he doesn't recall, and he had no substantial dealings
[1047]with him. He wanted to know if Veciana's story about Bishop
[1048]is still being considered and if any decision about his being
[1049]Bishop had be’ ‘conclusively arrived at. He said he doesn't
[1050]like living under the fear and tension of possibly being called
[1051]before the television cameras and having Veciana suddenly stand
[1052]up and point his finger at him and say that he is Bishop and that
[1053]he saw him with Oswald. Phillips was told by the interviewers
[1054]that they had no authority to disclose anything of substance —
[1055]about our investigation to him. He asked that the interviewers
[1056]seek permission to let him know what was going on. He was told
[1057]that his request would be brought to high-level attention but
[1058]that a response of any kind.at all could not be assured.
[1060]Phillips stated that he did not know Paal Bethel very
[1061]well. but it was not Bethel who introduced him to Lovez-Fresauet.
[1062]He said that that introduction was made by Bethel's boss,
[1064]Dick Cushing. |
[1066]‘Phillips Said that he had no additional recollections
[1068]on Jack Cogswell other than he remembered that he was an
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[1074]Phillips, page 20.
[1076]American businessman in Havana.
[1078]Mr. Phillips stated that he "probably" did have some
[1079]contacts with someone or some persons associated with the Moa
[1080]Bay Mining Company, but he did not recall any specific names.
[1081]He also "must have" had some contact with Freeport Sulpher
[1082]peopl "I was fairly socially active at the time and the
[1083]name of the company is familiar to me."
[1085]Mr. Phillips said that he did not have many public relations
[1086]clients during that time. He could recall. only: the man who -
[1087]owned Ambar Motors-and .the El Mundo newspaper. He also traded
[1088]for free French lessons at the Berlitz School although. he can
[1089]not recall exactly what kind of public relations work he did
[1090]in return.
[1092]Phillips did not recall the name Darnell.
[1094]He said that he did know Wayne Smith, political attache
[1095]at the American Embassy, very well. He remembered him as a
[1096]big guy because they were in a little theatre group together
[1097]and in one play Phillips had to throw Smith out of a window.
[1099]Phillips said. that he did not know Roberto Vale.
[1101]Phillips was asked about the procedure of traveling out of
[1102]the country on covert operations, He said he always traveled
[1103]out under his true name and with his legitimate passport. He |
[1104]would have other documentation on him for use with his alias
[1105]when he arrived in the country. ‘He said that's the way it was
[1106]always done by every agent as far as he knew unless it was a
[1107]"very sensitive operation." He knew of no specific sensitive
[1108]operation in which a phoney passport was issued by the agency.
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[1115]"I don't know how that mechanism worked," he said. He added
[1116]sthat he had never had a phoney passport.
[1118]Mr. Phillips said that he had met McClendon (Gordon)
[1119]once wherit they were in college. He said that he had not seen
[1120]him again until September of 1976 when he attended a Retired
[1121]Intelligence Officers meeting. Later McClendon had called him
[1122]and reminded him of an incident mentioned in Nightwatch involving
[1123]a shool day's episode and MecClendon told him that he was the
[1124]kid who picked him up in his car. As far as Phillips can recall,
[1125]he never had any contact with McClendon during the intervening
[1126]years. He never met McClendon at any time during 1963 in Dallas.
[1128]Phillips stated that he has no familiarity with the
[1129]Catherwood Foundation or Cummins Caterwood or E. Wharton Shober.
[1130]He was not specifically familiar with the Foundation's Cuban
[1131]Aid Relief operation in Miami.
[1133]Phillips said that the debriefing centers: in Miami were under
[1134]the aegis of the CIA but the Agency only got the product from
[1135]them, they were actually run by another agency. He said that
[1136]they may have been ran by military intelligence. He said that
[1137]he had never met any of the supervisory personnel who ran those
[1139]centers.
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