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[3]104-10150-10038) | - |
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[9]| 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
[11]- .  $en02164-58
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[23]Sivcra:y of Initial Missions
[24]SUSE OF sneeial i 3s.ons
[26]om 20 June to 10 July 1956 the Soviet Bloc air defense
[28]a period of only eight days. It must be remembered that
[29]the only basis of judging the performance of the Soviet
[31]Eowever, some tentative conclusions may be drewn frost
[32]and these ere indicated as follows:
[34]fact that these missions came as 2 surprise,
[36]This is clear evidence that their
[38]ia
[40]~ 236
[42]to elght penetrations of an unprecedented nature, seven
[44]2H
[46]a
[48]ve)
[50]14-0000
[52]Sd-02164-58
[54]2, By 5 July 1956, the fourth flight, the USSR was aware a
[55]of the purpose of the missions and were teking counter 2actlon.
[56]One positive action was the standdowa of civil flignts while the
[57]mission airexeft was over the USSR, and & second action waich is
[58]yHelieved xvelated is the moving of MOG-19 aircraft inte East
[59]Garnany and Poland on 7 July 1956. Also MIG-19's were moved.
[60]inte Hungery at about this time. :
[62]3, the performance oP the Soviet system on the 5 July migsior,
[63]gol, was indeed curious. While the action evident fron (COME 2 Y
[64]is not clear an explanation whieh appears to Pit the known facts
[66]is ofrered as Lollows: As a result of the previous missions, the
[67]Soviets had cmcluded the essential facts concerning the missiozus, :
[68]j.e., vnab they were for reconnaissance, that they flew ebove (6,000 4
[69]feet, and that a penetration 2s desp as Moscow wes possible. ihey
[70]procably surmised that the 5 duly mission wes heeded for Moscow when
[71]she track appeered on & northeasterly heeding. 1¢ Loss of the
[72]target Vnen it entered Soviet territory Was provaoly deliberate and
[73]the “red herring" track returning to the wast was either 4 dodge
[75]or a convenience to avoid proadcasting @ track for all the system
[76]+o ses that @ “nostile or intruder” was coming over Moscow with no
[77]means avellable to stop it. This jdea is supported by the use
[79]of 2 reid number assigned in the region gust beyond tas point 40
[80]snore the treck had been ost". In additioz, the track wes not
[81]labeled "nostile or intruder” when it ves proadeast after it
[83]had passed beyond Hoscows The reporting o? the treck when it did
[84]2p0eer Was only by Moscow and it has been suggested thet ovher
[85]stations had been instructed not to proadcast the track. Further, it my
[86]| oF nay not be a coincidence that the heigat prozdcast was almost
[88]| exactly half of the true altitude of the mission eirereft, but on
[89]the next missions, four days later, the altitude reporting wes
[91]i consistently apove 50,000 feet.
[93]a
[95](
[97]kh. By 9 duly 1956, in addition to the evident -recogaitioz of
[98]the great height of the mission flights, ¢trecking wes better and
[99]in general the performance of the warning systent was much improved.
[101]5, The next day, 10 July 1956, the Soviet air gerense warning
[102]ten closed @ 3000 mile track with only two short periods or
[103]sion or track loss. Altitude reporting was over 60,000 feet ee
[104]: one plot passed 68,800 which was only 100 fees off terget-
[106]6. ‘he first eigat missions proved that the eir defense warming
[108]zo s deployed in depth. This wes evident fran bovn the continuity
[110]of treck end most forcefully from the ELLIT dete collected. Some UhéL
[111]intercepts of Soviet Bloc radars operating in the 3000 me/s band were F
[112]chbainea by project EDIMT as follows: TCKEW-1331, WHIFF-37, GAGE-26,
[114]PATTY CAKE-37, Other 30. These numbers cannot be equated to in- {
[115]dividual radar sets since the same radar ray be intercepted more than |
[117]ae. 618 TOKEN sites were Located, including 213 new sites. Some I 9
[119]7)
[120]“
[121]“UW
[124][
[128]ones.
[130]343 additional TOKEN signals were identified but aveilleble information i
[132]dees not permit getermination of Location so that it must be con- I
[135]cluded that these signals include both known and nev sites. Because !
[136]| of the Limitation of ELINT to the 3000 me /s dand and the Soviet
[138]rectice of eollocating radara on different freauencies the totel \
[139]ex of radars may be expected to be at least double the number \
[141]Sip . oh -
[143]TOP SECRET — EIDER— CHESS
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[148]: a . SC-O2164.58
[150]T- Confusion and track loss seamed to be related to the 9 ~)
[151]presence of large numbers of fighters although the saturetion point |
[152]has not been Gatermined because of insufficient data.
[154]bee
[156]8. The question of redars for height finding, the carabdilities
[157]of TOKEN in this role » the introduction of ROCK CAKEs and leter
[158]acevelopments are discussed in another section. it is believed,
[159]however, that these missions were a catalyst in the introduction
[161]of ROCK CAKEs. 99 s
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[167]] _ TOP SECRET —EIDER—CHESS