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[3]104-10232-10004
[5]| 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 | ...
[7]10 Cetober 196)
[9]MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
[10]SUBJECT: Nesting with Dr, N:1KC Cardona on 6 Cctober
[12]R. De, i414 arrived aboubd 3:50 ®.m, for the mocting we had
[13]set at 16:56; again ne was driven by his secratary whom he introduced,
[14]As during the first meeting, she remained outside In the car, Our
[15]meeting lasted uxtii 12:00 noon, _ woe
[17]2. Fivet, De, MIRO handed me a note in t\ongland lating the
[18]topics diceussed with ms on 5 Wctobor, These points ara:
[20]a. Groups conducting propaganda, etc. with Agency support
[21]Should receive theiz support aad be coordinated through the Council,
[23]‘ b A propaganda campalsn should bo waged by tho Council
[24]aimed at:
[26]a) fuba, via a tong wave radio station in Koy Woar.
[27]{2) Cubans. in Milami and other U, 8S, areas by:
[29]fa) Subsidiaing Diario de las Americas.
[31]{b) Contracting for time on radio stations.
[33](3) Latio America, with a plan auch ao the Cperacicn
[36]c. Usaderground Activities.
[38](1) Provision of monthly funds to Council fur procuring
[39]Cuban pesca to send to the seven-odd reslatance
[40]sfoupa in Cuba through rellable channels (such aa
[41]previoualy sent through the ftalian & mbaaey),
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[47](2) Commando action as outlined In plan presented
[48]to me on 6 Cctober, .
[50]3. Commando Plan
[52]: Then Dr, M120 handed me a plan (in English) for clandestine.
[53]action prepsred by his military collaborators, whom ho named ag
[54]Colonel Manuel VAKELA Caotro, an officer of the Acadomy, Captain
[55]Enrique DESPAIGNE, and Colonel (fnu) MONTBACUDL, He Statod.
[56]that they were of the BAROUIN group and had boon prisonara,
[58]With reapect to tho plan for ‘clandestine Operations in Cuba,
[59]he otated that 300 ren could be counted apon for commando action, part
[60]of them here, part in Coba, Ho reiterated that @ Commande operation
[61]was essential to bolster moraje among tha anti-Castro elamonts in Cuba
[62]acd in exile aa well as to conduct sabotace that would furthor weaken
[63]Cubana economy and tae Communist regime, He gaid that for thia operation
[64]U. S. be'p would be arceseary in providing weapons, arnmo, dernolitions,
[65]equipment, and funds, ta pyoposed that ff this plan was considered to
[67]- havo merit, that J arrange to have someone rooet with his military men
[69]to work out the detatis. After all preparations had pean made and
[70]materie! provided, etc, the operation would be purely a Cuban affair,
[71](NOTE: Pian turned over to Thoinpson at our nz eting at 15:30 on
[73]6 Cetobor for tranarmnission, )
[75]4, Request for Aria, etc, to send to Facambray
[77]Dy. MIRO reroarked that Over a2 month ago ho had made a requeat
[78]to Clark for are for the anti-Castro insuryents in the Hecambray, but
[79]to date had heard nothing relative to the request. He commented wryly,
[80]“Taek but never hear an answer," He said that the fightere there should
[81]be supported, Dr. MI2O stated that he had a beat (provided by us) and
[82]& means for delivery of the arms, Cavaldo RAMIREZ ie chief of the
[84]Escambray group. }
[85]COMMENT: Has anythlag boen done about this request?
[87]5. Information on Arma Received by Castro Ra ime
[88]an ne ae celved by Castro Ragime
[90]De. MUAC nanded mo a long report which he said was drought
[91]to him by the Argentine Ambassador to Cuba whon the latter caine to the
[92]U. 3. at the time of resident FRONDIZ ['g visit.* tle sald the Ambassador
[94]would not divulye the source of the inforinatioa but commented, "You will
[96]know,"
[97]*Report turned over to Thompson on 6 October,
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[103]_ to ineure victory, Anothor defeat
[105]Cay.
[106]giuiel
[108]Or, LIRG said there was Do way to deiermine the accuracy
[109]of tho figures given of Plaves, gung, ete. received from the Soviet blac
[110](and aly and Canada) but even if the figures were exageeratod 100 per
[111]cont, thoy would still be impresatve,
[113]; - Ha added that Caetro ie daily becoming stronger militarily
[114]with weapons and with a large militia of close to 300, G00 being trained
[115]ta use them while the economy continues to deteriorate, Perhaps aunty
[116]half the militia would be effective. But that is sizeable, Thus, he eaid,
[117]the langer the delay fn positive aullitary action to overthrow Castro, the
[118]Greater will be the task, ‘We oust act goon, vigorously and offectively,
[120]would be disaatroua and would make
[121]Cabans, Latla Asoertcange and others believe Caatro ta be invincibte,
[122]Thea would come accommodationa and even werss, tho lraplanting of
[123]Castro-backed regiroge in the heaulaphere. And the U.S. would suffer
[124]woret of all, being discredited for dsfeat and “guilt of interference."
[125]“In tho UN no nation would stand boeide the U. 5.”
[127]6. FPrepozal that Counei! go to Cuba with Can:mando Group and
[129]Establish a Government on Cuban doll
[131]Dr. MING then declared that he was coavinced that Castre
[132]weld never be overthrown by all the propaganda, the Babctace, commaado
[133]ralde, guerrilla activities, rupture of diplomatic relations and deteriorating
[134]Sconomy, and that it waa inconceivable to establish a governmont-inexile
[135]for nothing would ¢- mo of it; that the only solution for defeating tho
[136]Castro regime wae for the Revolutidnary Couacil to go to Cuba and estab-
[137]lish @ governmert on Cuban Bol, ask recognition by all friendly countries
[138]and military assletance of its priminal ally, the U. 4., and that the U.S.
[139]be ready to intervenc immediately with its Forces, This would all have
[140]te take place ina matter of 49 hours, otherwise it would fail, I recognise
[141]that thio is a bold plan, but doldnoss ia necessary, There will be many
[142]risks, many may be killed, As for myoelf, I don't care if Idie. Tt have
[143]lest all my persona! posseasiona and my oon is a prisoner,’ He rejterated
[144]that all must be well prepared in advance, there nrast be no vacillatioa,
[145]Svorytiing must proceed Fapidly. Firet, a comaisado raid in force to
[146]ssize a piece of Cuban territory, prefarabiy near Cuantanamo, and imme-
[147]diately the members af the Council yo ashore, proclaim a provisional
[148]govarament, broadcast by radio to all nations &@n appeal for recognition
[149]{and cadles prepared in advance would algo bo cent outs, requset UL 5S,
[150]Sesistance, aod the U. S. should fursish such assistance at once in ado-
[152]quate strangth to casure victory,
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[156]Before such an acticn ia undortaken, the enemy must be
[157]softened by propaganda, sabotage, raids, underground action, and the
[158]mass of the psople of Cuba muct be prepared to accept the Provisions)
[159]government through propaganda, increased knowledge of tha Council
[161]and fte unifying efforts,
[163]- Dr. MIRO asked me what I thought of this project; did I think
[164]that Castro could be overthrown in any other way. I adroitted that
[165]strong military action appoared necessary, I stated furthor that
[166]of ¢ourso his plan would have to be studied at the highast government
[167]levels. He proposed that he michi elaborate a plan with hig military
[168]collaborators, and I suggested that ha do thio co that it might be examined
[170]and considered,
[172]that the U.3. (9 and will be blamed fsr al! anti-Castro Propazanda,
[173]Sabotage, etc. and that enemy states will denounce it for intervention
[174]in Cuba, but that U the U. ©. £08 to the aid of a fricadly wevolutionary
[175]regime established {a the country and holpa it defeat the covtet-backed
[176]Communist regime, ail friendly governments will applaud,
[178]“I have no personal political ambitions," declared MIAO,
[179]“I merely am trying to chair the Council, whose mission is to unify the
[180]Sati-Castro clemeats inside and eutside of Cuba, If the team ton't con=
[181]sidered effoctive, then change the pitcher, But I believe the Council must
[182]establizh itself on Cuban oufl, and secon. Time {3 againat as."'"The . unta
[183]del Este agreement will bacifira avainst the U. 8, if Castro ie allowed
[184]to remain fn Cuba, Ina year, after the politicos of the countries ra-
[185]ceiving U. &. aid have gotten their hands oa U. 5. gold, they will say,
[186]*Thanke to Cactro, wa got this.’ And they wil) Spend It aa in the past
[187]with no benefits to the Social and economic welfare of the people,”
[189]7. Views about the Judzes and Lawyers
[190]EOS ane Lawyers
[192]I queried Dr, MIRC as to his views relative to the judges and
[193]lawyers and their futare status. He said he hoped that they could all
[194]Feunite and that they could be civon assistance ais in the past. He dee
[195]clared that Dr. ALABAU was not qualified to be a justice and that be.was
[196]doing acthing but making politics and trying to discredit the Council
[197]and MIRC and VARGNA, Dr. AlIRO declared that he, as Prime Minister
[198]in the early days of the Castro government, had named - LABAU to the
[200]Say :
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[204]nat
[207]Supreme Court, but that now he considered « LABAU unfit to hold any
[208]judicial position.
[210]8. Members of the Revolutionary Council
[212]Dr. MIRO remarked that ho had a meoting of the Council on
[213]10 Cetober. I asked what elements now Composed it and what he pro-
[214]posed to add, Ho named the following as progently in the Consejo:
[216]Raacate
[218]30 ds Noviembra .
[219]MRR -
[221]Accion Demoeratica
[223]20 de Mayo
[225]AAA Independienta
[227]MDC
[229]Monteeristi
[231]Ho said he had invited to join:
[233]MRP
[234]Unidad Revolucionaria
[236]and awaited thetr reply,
[238]Ke would also lke to have the Workers, Students, and the
[239]Profeasionais (Doctors, Lawyers, ctc.) come into the Council, He be-
[240]Heves Batistianos and Cormunistas and eloments unwilling to cooperate
[241]should be excluded, but that al! other groups should bo brought together
[243]under the Council,
[245]He contends that all anti-Castro activities, except clandestine
[246]and military, should be coordinated by mombers of the Council, but that
[248]the excepted activities should be known only to him (MIRO),
[250]9. Probable Argentine Rupturo of Relations with Cuba
[252]Dr. MIRO declared that he belfeved imminont the Argentine
[253]rupture of relations with Cuba. He said the Argentine Ambassador to
[254]Cuba (Julio AMCF LO) «za ordored to return to Havana fhe had bean
[255]vacationing in the U. S. after FRONDIZI's visit); that VILLANUEVA, a
[256]Secretary of the Argentino Embassy in Cuba was coming to see MIRO
[257]today; and further that he (MIAC) had received a phone call last night
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[261]'
[263]from a Spaniard (Nicanor FERNANDEZ) in Buenco Aires, urging MIRO
[264]to go to Buenos Aires to arouse antl-Castro sentiment of the people,
[265]inaamuch 39 some Argontine action against Cuba appeared imminent,
[266]{FERNANDEZ said he had already written MIRC a letter.) MIRO eays,
[267]“Of course, I cannot go. Thave the Consojo meeting un the 10th.
[268]Furthermore, lam going to New York on October 11th oF 12th for the
[269]SIP (Socieded Interamericans de Prensa) meeting and have been allotted
[270]12 minutes to addrecs the meeting.” . ; cs
[272]10, MIRO to attend Homage to LACE RDA (Brazilian who
[274]Precipitated GUADKCY' resiznation) on October 15
[276]_,, De. MIRC sald he planned to remain in New York City {after
[277]M1 and 12 Cctober SIP macting) until October 15th to attend the homage
[279]‘for LACERDA, the Governor of Guanabara province in Brasil. MIRO
[280]. Probably will stay at the Park Chambers Hotel, but will advise Clark
[282]of his location.
[284]I commented that I would probably romain tn Waehington next
[285]week in view of his plans, but that 1 might go to New York City to meet
[286]with him; if so, [{ would get in touch with him and arrange 4 mecting
[288]time and place through Clark,
[290]11. Propaganda Commission
[292]Tasked Dr. MIRO about hie ideas on the future organization
[293]and structure of the Propaganda Commission. He otated that it is out-
[294]side the Consejo and net uncer his direct control, although the Couneil
[295]accountant has been passing funds to it. Ho said CATR RILLO had resigned
[296]as heed of Propaganda and that he would lke CONTE AGUERC to handle
[297]it. He claimed that MESTRE had not dona anything with propaganda,
[299]12. MIRO's Views Relative to Supreme Court Juatice or PRIO
[301]being Kecounized as Head of a Provisional GCoveramoent
[302]aoing Mecoyunized ae Head of a Provio: ee AE
[304]lasked Dr, MIRO If he believed that there were many anti-
[305]Castro Cubans (both 1a and cut of Cuba) who favored PRIC, or the head
[306]of the Supreme Court to be the provisiona! president if a government were
[307]to be established on Cuban soll, Dr, MIRO declared that the revolution
[308]fa a fact, and that practically nobody wants to go back to any former
[309]regime. The people in Cuba would resist any ouch poseibility, He de-
[313]. MIRO said, “The business phone is also in my ho
[314]excep? in my house, but that phone io always busy (JEfforson 2- 4680),
[317]nounced PRIO's activitica against the Council and ito efforts to unify
[318]the anti-Castro elements. He said that the People should be given an
[319]Opportunity to elect their chief of atate aiter Castro's overthrow and
[321]reestabilahment of ordcr in tho island,
[323]13. Offices of Council (Consejo Revoluciona rio)
[325]When questioned about his business and private telephones,
[326]use, Ihave no office
[328]So use tha other phone (JEfforson 4-275}) when you wish to call me, "
[330]"I nged to have a small office somewhere away from my home
[331]decauge all the activitics there are driving my wife crany. I want to
[332]find something modest so that no accusation can be made of ostentation «
[333]merely a room for myself, one for my secretary, and ono for meotings,
[334]of tho Council, etc. The FRD had a place but at that place also was the
[335]proses, the rofugee center, ete. R would not bo satiofactoty, The FRD
[336]is aow practically dead, BR wae the forerunner of tho Consejo as the
[338]unifying agency of the anti-Castro resistance,"
[340]14, MIRO's Views oa Coordinating the Activities of Cther Exfle
[341]G
[343]Foups
[345]After Dr, MIRO reiterated his view that he should be the
[346]channel for {unde and coordinating the activities of groups outside the
[347]Consejo such as the Students, FORD (Labor), ote., I said that I under
[348]Steod that sore of these elomonts weve unwilling to function under the
[349]Consejo; and that in view of that situation, did ho consider that an .
[350]Activity Committee might be organised with a delegate from each of
[351]these groups and under the chatrraanship of a member of the Consejo.
[352]Thie would serve to coordinate their activities, give them a tie-in with
[353]the Consejo, yet not make them subservicnt to it. Dr. MIRO replied
[354]that this would morely set up cncther Conoejo outside of and parallel to
[355]the exiating Consejo. I did not pursus this (urther, not having enough
[356]background of thege organisations to be able to distuge tho matter.
[358]effectively.
[360]15, Telephone Convorsation with MIRO on 7. Cctober
[362]Before my departure from Miami for Washington oa 7 Cctober,
[363]Ttelephaned to Dy. MIRO from the airpert. He appreciated the call and
[364]asked if I had seen in the morning paper the action taken yesterday by
[366]wal. sa
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[370]Sabi.
[372]the ALABAU Lawyers’ group in proclaiming Julio CARCE RAN (one
[373]of the chief justices tn exils) aa 'Prosident of Cubs at War, " He exe
[374]preosed his indignation at this unilateral "political" move by ALADAY
[375]and his adherents amonz the exiled lawyors and judges. Ho added his
[376]best wishes to ms and retninded mo that ho would probably go to New
[377]York on Cetobsr 11th or 12th for the SLP (Sociedad Interamericana de
[378]Pronsa) meetiag. 1 ropiied that I would appreciate if he would contact
[379]Clark after his arrival to give his location in Now York City, and that
[380]Clark might have a request from me for an appointment with him, if
[381]thie seamed doolrable, 1! suggested that tn future phone conversations
[382]I would be known as JUANITO, He agreed with pleasure that this would
[384]be a geod procedure, I wieshad hirn Godspeed and he rapiled ikawtse
[386]to me.
[387]16. Comment
[389]During these first two meotings 1 andea:,ored to establish
[390]myself favorably with Dr, MIRO and therefore refrained from bringing
[392]up dotalls of budget or opposition to any of hie specific proposals.
[393]I listenod, asked various questions, and ho talked at length,
[395]in future mectings, after I have gAined further background and
[396]have more policy guidanco, 1 6hal} be able to discuss with him apeeific
[397]issues and endeavor te reach agreements of Compromises, aa may be
[399]- wequired,
[401]lees
[402]i
[403]e