[1][104-10169-10139 ; | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
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[33]i) veCASSSFIED © (} feet ~ = + O) CONFD -emiat x) SECRET
[34]ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
[36]aa .
[38]COMMENT (teeter once tonnes 1 show bom when t 4
[39]Orow © te eens catemn Gly each comment) 2
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[53]Ais SECRET (] CONFIDENTIAL =) {RTEANSL = (7)sUUNCLASSIFIED
[55]SEMA TR EU Th fa ae hiae colee. Oe by GONURMEINT PRINTING OFFICES 19M O64 aie i
[57]att we
[59]14-0000
[61]’ fanters connectes =ith Lt as snumeratad above, lead me to a
[63]will first. record thems
[65]DISPATCH
[67]Chief, Es Tt . 2 B
[68]Cnief, Sh (ATTN: “Sherman GO. CUSICK)
[69]Chief, se (ATTN: Leanara FP. SACKED?)
[71]ADMIN LSTHATIVE
[72]Handling of a Sovict Defecter
[74]1. I suggest that the story of AELADLE, from the aonent hs walked into the
[75]home. of Martin A. HOODINE untis be uss safely under aAlAsha custody in tue Laited
[76]States, deserves compiling, analysis, and publication in the form of an Gperae-. .
[77]tional Ald. It riehly ilustrates the asny probless «nich oust and oan be our-
[78]mounted, and could be nighiy lastructive to Culefe of Station in all comtries
[79]share the a:xt Soviet aefcotor aignt appear.
[81]“2. Here is the Frankfurt contribution (written at ay request) to such «
[82]Compilation: a eliffhanger from atart to fiaian, but also e Ovunmentary on tne
[83]mery types of probleus which can arise, and tne fect that.it taxes hard work and --
[84]skillful Laprovisation to solve thes, it was a oliffnanger botn before and after
[86]the Freakfurt chapter (1 nominate MOUDINE for @ modal for hie part) and ought to
[87]make excellent reading.
[89]on. ; : :
[91]_ de Tne bandiing|of defectors obviously te not a new reeponsibility to tie
[92]German Station, The (CAsZ oot facility wnich oxiste prigarily for the receipt, .
[93]establisncent of bona fides, daortefing, and resettiasont of derectors has oxiated
[94]here for the last decade, Hor ie the mvvenant by blaca.cvacuation-of.-cperational -
[95]Personnel a unique task for us t= perform. We have acvcapilehed this many tines
[96]by use of cur ow, integrated WUNIT facility and also by the furnisning of alias
[97]Gooumentation to the person of interest and accomplishing the transport via
[99]acheduled MATS flights. The algifioont points which cade uns ABRLADLE case uniques .
[101]may never again in their entirety be duplicated but in part they may well be,
[102]and therefore should bo enumerated: ‘
[104]; a. A Soviet diploamt, and maxber ef the HIS, stationed in a nen-
[105]_ Satellite but politically sensitive coun
[107]Gefection was wider considerable Soviet preesure.
[109]b. Tne fact that the actual cirowsatanses uomeermias Air ut of
[110]‘Gefeotion were such that an immedtcte desigion by tis cam on tue scens and
[111]to bo made to take advantage of tha opportunity.
[113]©. The fact that little altzrzative could be given, under the facts
[114]as described in (a) above, except to believe the defestor's statements
[116]aad acquiesce in his demands, 1.6., he possessed information of a Significant
[118]and perishable nature and vould disglase t¢ conpletsly only upos arrival ia
[119]the United States. :
[121]a. The fact that once the camitrents in (c) above were wade: every
[122]Feasonable effort hod to be made to accommodate the defector’s demand, |
[124]©. in order to acoomplish all this an untried method of evacuation, 1.0,
[125]black evacuation via coamarcial alroraft had to be accomplished in order to
[126]successfully proceed with the undertaking. ; .
[128]aa retrospective analysis ag to how this case oawncneed, and the unique
[130]uggest for Headquarters:
[131]Khat 1 have lersled as.
[132]druacatl, quite probabiy sould
[134]study what 1 refer to as “!indings” ond “areas of ‘atudy,"
[135]“rindings* in effect represent facts which, if not
[136]have Guprived ws in uormany of participeting Swcsssfully in the seovenent of the
[138]ARLADIS family. The “areas of study,” on tha other hand, ropreaent aithar anseare
[139]Gbhle questions or matters in areas wnerdin operstional disquasions may well take
[140]place to nee if same type of achool-book solution can be devised. .
[142]5. will elaborate below, where appropriate, on
[144]Sapo PSCOEV TEES
[146]0 due
[148]try, which at the tine ct ARLADIE'’s ~~
[150]geome of these “findings” but |
[152]‘he
[154]wert
[156]mnly.
[157], =) ; '
[159]~ we
[161]14-0000
[163]ro wale Taha aml SD
[164]t
[166]| BGJP-iscus, ii January 1d
[168]&. Tr@ eisdos uf AMAK onintalning in toe Buropean area at least ane ‘ield
[169]installation havigg osaigned to it persunnel representing tus saay csapetencies
[170]mecessary .n le intelligence Uworlakiag :@5 been recu. firmed.
[172]2. The «iedos of ottaining appropriate security ¢isqances, sai having
[173]Stations brief ard masse sitting of at least an AiS contact, tie resident senior
[174]United States citizen pors.anel of Lnitea States flag air car-riers operating
[175]eitain any Station's area.
[177]¢. The fallacy of depending OB aSrg:cal cr obsolescent eculpasnt to
[179]accomplish sensitive tassa of nign praority. we here refer to i7-year U->4 aire
[180]crat.,
[182]a. A realizaticn that a retic osists cetecen the muster of pcuple aade
[183]evere of a given undertaking iu rolation to tne chstacles encountered in success<
[184]fully ecoamp.isning tat undertaking.
[186]; 6. A feu cords of elaboration ere in order an tne four prunescing pointe.
[187]Because tne initial endeavor at clack evacustian ly AUOARKA alrcalt asorted, ue sere
[188]given an opportumity to see with gremt clar:ty tne apdviloatizn of t::ese state. If
[189]tne attempt to evacuste by AlUMik-sasigned aircraft bad been succeserul, tnen
[191]knowledge of tne defection could nave been held to Spprorimateiy ols staff and
[192]Qesigned ailitary personne). decause that endeavor uas unsuccesatul, at iesst nine
[194]aatter, plus tne Consul Uenoral and one of his senior ufficere. Additionally one
[195]private luited States citizen, the eesior Pan Amerioan official in rraakfurt, became
[196]very much.aeare of tnis sensitive case. This indrease in te nunoer of iad ividvale
[197]cese about ef an imzediate noed jate in te evening of Saturday, 16 December,
[198]to vee two(CARZOME stalfere to aasiat in the aefencusing function, a total of six
[199]DETOPAL steffera (dosweentation, graphics, photagreptits) to prepare aod issue.
[200]Craummieat end alles passpurts, and an sosigned enlisted man to act aa & safehouse
[201]guard. Tre Cunsulate UJensral umd to affix visas to tue fraudulent passports. ' The
[202]Bost erucial individual involved; however, was the Pen American official w.o to &
[204]‘| Certain degree put bie position in jeopardy by being as cooperative on the aotter ia.
[206]he whe.- bitnout previously-having cloared. ‘ené briefed this official. {iiie sounter=
[207]part in TkA io alse wo cleared and briefed) the a:cle undertaking would rave beon
[208]Presluded. It would Lave Leen laposaible to acconpliah Geparture without docusenta~
[209]tion.an @ commercial aircreft. without the connivance of the coomercial airline .
[210]involved. Imiced witn ausn ecunnlvance it uas difficult and risky oncugh. Finaliy,
[211]the point conceming chsolcecent equipment spenks for iteelf. licadquarters is fully
[212]Qvare of the Ceolings of this Station coswerning tne inadeyusoy for aur purpoces
[214]of aasigned aircraft. Suffice it to aay that «hen defectors apparantly of sianifie
[215]oar, value refuse te rids such aircraft <.: matter merita thorovg. sticty.
[217]J. Tre atter of “areas of stviy” eppeare to us to cuocapens at least te
[220]a. Average tive differences rences in transnitting high prec.sJence electrical
[221]geemmilestions betvsen snd saaig representative gro we of otatlonn Tae
[222]Geresn Station is extrozely fortunate in fbving AWecD alrcwits wits sond~
[223]quarters. It affords ua a (aollity for instentanevus commeicatian. ea can
[224]goke cortain rough eatisates as to how long it might take spoccrrinte Lead
[225]Guartera officiala to aNewer cur queries and wo can then Approxiasts the
[226]errivol time of answers to high precedence traffic. Ulnar Statiuns, however,
[227]Go not have KK-26 equipment, al] do not nave tie same type of oryptological
[229]' @quipment, and there is a different pattern aa to the type of cfroultry, 1.0.,
[230]d@ireot leased lines. twx, etratent commercial services, ete. Wa -bolicwa tiers
[231]fe mertt in the epprepriate Headquarters unit Ginleavering %o group geogriapie-
[232]Joally Stations and ten based en the type of cumunluations amd ersptuloyiaal
[233]equipment and the chamoei of trenamiasiun to coge up wlth prediotions ag to
[234]the average length of vine the transmission of @ priority or operational
[235]iemediate cable would take pet«cen and among the varieun representative
[236]groupinga. In the case under. study, wiloh ropresented a rather ‘fast-breaking
[237]‘eituation, 1% ses not pussibis. for us to walinsie we ez eth.of tics 1% tcok ©
[238]to transait an operavigual iemediate cable metssan (Se: : esi and Frankrurt.
[239]3 wWokid Rave Deen of value to ve to have had soto ges GN fie matter.
[241]b, _Cramiinabivn between U8 ALC Attealiog and COS. Ne velieve it would
[242]be worttwhile to cequest wach Chief of Statiuiin a location «nore tno Air
[244]very] USE PREVIOUS EDITION. , ‘ a AOE NG.
[246]GEPLACEA FORMS g Ba of k Zz ¢r 3 . 2
[248]et ees ea
[252]. . . a cn Pe ne aes
[253]LT a
[254]i re:
[256]14-0000
[258]EMIOEEE 2 Cavan mnerotenn Ge03 Ci hA Td Ne eA geo en oe ee gS :
[260]Wl
[262]7
[264]Attechzent,
[266]Ramo dated 18 Des 1951 b/s
[267]Identities uzo/tap ;
[269]Distrilution
[272]o w, te
[274]1+ watts
[276]foes
[277]ne S80 GRACES FORME ECRET
[279]— REO TTS) Tp atce So ech wed foo ; ,
[280]CONTINUATION OF ISECRET as
[281]DISPATCH RY BAT WKE-14004, 31 Janoary 1962
[283]Force or Havy has an essigned attache plans to establish procedures whereby the
[284]Air or Naval Attsche «111 advise COS of eny absence of the ettaone plane, the
[285]point of designation of tne alroreft, and the duration of the absense. inere
[286]have been previous defections unre attache planes cere used pe. the initLal
[287]vehicle of black evecuttion. In tno evacuation plan of [Stocktisuarjror ABLADLE,
[288]they informed us by onble that they proposal to use, *na Attache plane. ke are
[289]of the opinion that sben the statexent «os rade (Stisknc a jeade the assumption.
[290]the plane was immediately availavle, As was is a
[292]Glacowared ua the
[293]particular plono in questi at bleabaden and not (Sibdais This, however,
[294]wag Bone 61x hours after Giclaidin}stated ita intent to use that aircraft.
[295]While in this particular matters eventually worked out successfully tne
[296]story eight be otherzise in 4 diffrent set of facts. .
[298]@. Priority furctaning of traces. then & Station is alerted to a request
[300]to render operational support to tne noveaent of a defector and simultaneously
[301]Onswers & request in the negative if 1t can furnish traces, tne following
[302]procedure is worthy of stuiy. | if Headquartera pussesses, and tiae permits, wa
[303]believe 16 worthenile to forearm an imnediate summary to the Station rendering
[304]support if the backgrowes of the decicter is suck that it would be a catter of
[305]local interest. This would have been the case in AELADLE. As subaequent bead-
[306]quarters debriefing developed (and we assumed it sculd bave »een disclosed in
[307]Meadquarters traces) AKLADLE had previcusly deena etationed in Berlin. Had such.
[309]- -)> facts been known nere, end nad tice allowed, certain debriefing.on the borlim
[310]pericd designed to elioit any matter of imeodinta concern could have been uader=/:
[312]ga
[314]USE PREVIOUS FOITION. .
[316]90-78, 41-2BA ANO $1-29 FoNTINUED
[318]5 pemntren erence pater eu Ain SEA © PE A
[320]° : po . .
[322]ce ween tw nerne cr aaiemen es semen ra - . .
[323]. a . . . a . : “0 . ie . 4 woe , . a , . . . : - a
[325]14-0000
[327]oo . cones, #~ TO EGOT-14004, 31 Jan 1962
[329]18 December 1961
[331]MEMORANDUM FOR: ‘fhe Record
[333]SUBJECT: " Handling at German Station 16 and 1? December of
[334]. Soviet Defector from Russian Embassy at. Helsinki ©
[336]1. This pemorandus is designed to record, soon after the event,
[337]all facts pertaining ty the handling within the German Station of the. eee cinme wee
[338]evacuation of @ Soviet Vice Covnsg) (and-member of the K13) from the .-
[339]Ruasion Bobesey at Helsinki. ‘At the time of this writing there ia ae
[340]“ @t311 lacking certain information to Complete the entire story. Mowe
[341]ever, 1t ie felt worthwhile to- record all events while the memory ia
[342]" till fresh. In the following paragraphs the defector is referred to
[343]as "subjet" and pseudonyms and" identities are used in all other cases.
[345]-. 2. At appr tely 0730 hours Saturday, 16 December, Arnold J. _
[346]LYACK (Chief, EAReONE) contacted me at my home and asked: ne. to -procesd - -
[347], dmmediately to the residence of Joel D. RENTHAM (Chief of Station).
[349]arrival at BENTHUAM's residence, BENTHA J LYACK briefed me.on.... .
[351]Lookhe t4"afintent to endeavor to:
[353]Khdla[oable which cianounced Sts
[355]fly subject and family “black” from[Stob
[357]. Aly Attache airorart. Cable alao requested Frankfurt to have an aire
[359]: Graft available to receive immediately subject and family and take off
[361]. forthwith to the sateeeenaeans LYACK also mentioned an. IN cable froa
[362]tooknod
[364]. DIR which requested(s ls) to move family soonest to(CABEZONE in
[365]. Prenkfurt for establishvsnt of bona fides. Oa
[367]Bas Vgathen adjourned to the office and awaited more word fran
[368]os @ithor (StSsitivin,) whioh would advise on the arrival 44@.of the family
[369]"+ @t Prankflort, or from Headquarters sonourring in|[Stogkidim ‘s} request
[370]“ Lor iste dsparturs of ine family for the United States upon.
[372]-o:° @rivai al Frankfurt. EAQS was immediately alerted and they made
[373]“+ @rengesente to have a C-54 with augmented crew prepared to depart for
[374]" Sho United States by 1200 houra. A compartment for ‘the subject's —
[375]_o: amily wap put in the C-54 and the regularly assigned tail number was
[377]“:, Wemoved and a falee number put on the alroraft, Conrad V. LAPOLLA
[379]” {Aeting Chief, COS/KUSCDA) was Sontaoted and ark-d to come to the office
[381]immediately. Disoussions ware then held with LYACK and Carl T. UPDILL
[383]: oS  @&@ to the availability of a KUDOVE oase officor with Hussian language
[384]_-' @@pabLlity to act as escort.
[386]Se Se eOroNTS Ne SAREE vets ener of ten aes wee Roe ene we ys
[387]ne a er SERENE Setemmeiny Sait att
[391]wares
[394]14-0000
[396]LS | an
[397]&. Having neara nothing from either[Stocknola]or Headquarters “ 7 2. of
[398]by O345 hours OPIM trafric was sent, in both directions telling them -
[399]Gernary was prepared to receive and effect immediate black evacuation :
[400]of the faaily to tne United States, in the meantime, it had been : .
[401]@eternined tnat IDENTITY A would be used aa the security escort and
[402]Rossel K. MUCHANE (AD/PI Starr) would be on standby to serve as a
[403]EXDWE escort. ‘This was a contingency arrangement because we lacked
[405]l 19 Cprocunosy ies Dbrepared to travel with subject all the way to Washing
[407]S- Around 1100 hours T asked Edvard P. TOCHENSKY (Chief, EAB)
[408]* €o establish contact with the Wiesbaden Air n7sz*ower and lay on
[409]:, SFFangements to monitor the flight of the [Stocknoig} ir Attache plane.
[410]' This eas done decause we have had previous instances of “black™
[411]arrivals at yea ‘here the aircraft actually arrived before the
[412]BTA cable fron (the tatLed] diapatonine the body, At about 1115 hours . .
[413]TOCHENSKY inforwed ‘me: iy telephone that the/Stos ola Air Attache
[414]‘Ofrereft, a C-45, was and had been at the Wiesbaden Air Base since. yo.
[415](32 December, At about 1150 we cabled thie information to/Stockno1a)!/=3
[416]ys @md DIR and als offered to dispatch an atrorart to Copenhagen to make —
[417]- - Se Plekup if (Stdexholmoould move the body there. Because of = ;
[418]technical difficulties involving air clearances and ‘lengths of rimways,
[419]"W8 could not demeately get into any field north of Copenhagen.
[421]I ee TE LEY A te eer 8 tt ee ereemende: :
[423]6. At approximately 1145 hours & cable was received fron Head=
[424]conourring in the immediate evacuation fron Wiesbaden by EAOB
[425]atrereft of subject's family upon arrival. If such could not be
[426]“errenged we were then Fequested to hold subject and family at CAnEZom.
[427]| SIMD E oa. ;
[428]7. Having hearg nothing tron [Stooknoig ‘by Spprixicately 1600 ~~
[429]i | Bours: we again sent then OPIM trarfio asking that they inform us
[430]‘ Semediately of:their intentions. I had previously left the office
[431]erout 1450 hours tn order to get some lina end take @08 Of ane or +
[432]tats Psrsonml items. I hea called Helson H, POLIAKOFP (Deputy for
[433]i “~ Administration Staff) in to cover for me and had briefed him én the
[434]| : current eitustion, when 1 returned at 1600 hours MUCHANE had
[435]Cause into the office crapared for the trip, We then sent the “above=
[436]weationed cable and Buszcsted that MUCHANE return to hie quarters and
[437]emait further developments, 1 Phoned TOCHRNSKY ana Suggested that he
[438]. _ (7 and Ris communicator retusa to-their quarters. LAPOLLA, in the means —
[439]| : time, had gone to Rhein/Main Airport to meet an inooming staffer oarry-
[441]|
[443]4
[445]_ ‘ing clossified material and get him through Customs. ile then returned
[447]" , to his home. I lett word with the Signal. Center Watoh Officer that
[448]@ny incoming traffic on subjact's irip should be telaphoned immediately
[449]®o LAPOLIA who would cong in, review the traffic and contact m-,
[451]. iY
[452]ea!
[455]14-0000
[457]setae nese ITE
[459]' Which he and LAPOLLA took off immediately for Wiesbaden, They: took
[461]. & 0011 from LAPOLLA that Subject-and family had arrived, the turnover
[463]~ Wieabaden Commmicator. That message stated the BAOK aircraft was
[464]. immediately returning to wiesbaden because of & sick passenger, Tnuzedi<
[466]' bad gotten hold of the Air Base Flight Surgeon and was procending to
[468]' for Wiesbaden Air Base.
[470]a provigions were observed in: the area. Air Polise had the “Hangar 34
[471]'; Area" blocked off two blocks in either direotion,
[473]“ femediately arson SakG~-off subject's olx-yaareald daugitor had Desome
[474]_ @xtronsly airsick and suffered rospirszory diffioulties, tthe vas
[476]: Genanded that the atroraft lomediately be returned to ita point of
[478]Wateh Officer was @lso asked ¥0, imediately phon-: the Wiesbaden Com-—
[480]aunicator who in turn would contact TOCHENSKY and both of them would
[481]GO to their office.
[483]8. At approximately 1900 hours LAFOLLA conteated me at home fron 6
[484]the eaere) fenton and informed me that an KiA and other information was qk
[485]in from (Stodkholm J! Z,told him to stand by and { would immediately some _ ; i
[486]in, Based on Stockhcia's)cabled statement that Martin K. ROODINE Kentes' 27, (4-1}-
[487]of Station, Helsinkt)} was escorting subject to the United States, ‘ ~ oD ,
[489]“told LAPOLLA not to“@lert MUCHANE. I arrived at the office at 1930 cet eeu
[490]hours and immediately aetna eee guan’ Sergeant to buy certain :
[492]‘types of foods and magazines that /Btodkiolmasked to be put aboard the
[494]United States-bound Aircraft. We ‘contacted TOCHENSKY and ascertained
[495]that EAQS was in a state of immediate readiness. David it. MULPALL
[496](cos/xusapa office) then arrived with IDENTITY A. IDENTITY A was given
[497]® general briefing on the mission and his responsibility follcwing
[499]with thes the purchases of the Guard Sergeant.
[501]29+ I then procesded to the hone of Ronald SM, CORBANE (COS Lawyer)
[502]where we were guests for dinner. At Spproximately 2200 hours I received
[504]- Was made, and that the EAOB Aircraft was airborne at ®pproximately 2150
[505]hours. I telephoned this information to e
[507]do. At “pproximately 2245 hours I received a call from the Bignal
[509]@tely thereafter x received a call from LAPOLLA who was at the quarters
[510]of Arthur G@. DREIBS 1S (EAOB) in Wiesbaden, LAPOLIA stated that he
[512]the Air Base, He brew at thet tine ro athor details. I told him Chester
[513]B. FAGERLUMD (003 »uclosd Cificer) and myself would leave insodiately -
[515]ll. PAQERLUND was in attendance at the sazc dinner party and we
[516]departed iomediately for the Air Base. Upon arvivai at approxinately
[517]2500 hours the BAGS atroraft had Already larnied a4 NOxdmuG wenurity
[519]-12. TOCHENSKY met me outside the bullding snd informed ma thee
[521]edminiotered oxygen. The Mocher bagame hysterical and the father
[524]14-0000
[526]See beer oa Cn at hs Dee erat ee eres epee vem
[530]i
[531]| departure. He further stated he would not agree to further travel
[532]‘ to the United States “axcept by commercial jet. wa tnen entered the
[533]| Operations Office of the 7405th Flight Squadron where I was introduced
[534]f to ROINE, who recited bastoally the sama story as told by TOCHENSKY.
[535]We also ascertained that tho Plignt Surgeon had looked at the daughter
[536]_ €24 had fount nothing organically wrong. We then asked ROODINE to.
[537]bring FAGERLUND into the room where subject's fanily waa staying and
[538]introduce him as an "srican Intelligence Service Medical Officer"
[539]. and have PAGERLUWD oxamine the child, FACERIUND's resulta were tho
[540]» ation ws given the child. A
[541]en toak place as to how: best: to
[542]proceed with onward transportation arrangements. KOODINE took me aside
[543]and strenucusly icpressed me with the foot that sudject was of the
[545]_ “ ; Relations was of great Perishabiiity and that ub ject deeply felt his
[547]necessity to arrive tn Woahington and state this
[548]the next 28 hours. ROODINE also stated he concurred in sub‘eet's feel-
[549]ings. All KUBARK representatives then on the scene again got together
[550]and the undersigned made the deotsion to abort the alssion, arrange |
[551]imuediate safe-housing Overnight for subject and his family, and
[552]‘ettempt comercial transportation on Sunday.
[554]information witnin
[556]~~" U3. Earlier in the day LYACK informed me thet ke had cleared out
[558]their Eschborn safe-house in ease we should need tt. I immediately
[559]tried to contact LYACK by phone but there wag no anawer,
[560]Hehry RH. QANLINGAY (Deputy for Aduinistratioan Start) and asked hin to
[561]do for me the following things: 0 2
[563]~, ®e Conteot Stephen R. LACKLEN (c ) and tell him wo had
[564]“, en ismediats need to house & amily of three, Plus two
[566]KUBARK officers at Eschbo + To further tell LACKLEN to
[568]_ be standing by at opel Circle opposite the Minneapolis |
[570]Honeywell Building at 910) Heures ero’ be prepared to escort
[572]| @nother vehiele to Zs-ntomn, _
[574]Phone BEYTHAN and teil hin we wouldidron by his house
[575]later thas evening to brief him an any developments,
[577]Gs Phone IYACK:and tell him we were using Eschborn,
[579]48. All concerned Septirted Wieabaden Air Base at approximately
[581]0020 hours on 17 December end err! vad at the meeting point at Qpel
[582]Circle at exactly 0100 houre, Subjoot's family Plus MULFALL, who had
[583]- @ls0 gone immediateiy +o Wisstadsn,- foliowed LACKLEN's car to Keshhern
[585]PAOERUMD, LAPOLLA, ROODINE, and nig3@lf went immediately to BENTIAM's
[586]. house, . : : .
[588]3
[589]1
[592]14-0000
[594]pe Fepen emmeeet eateeteentie nes oe
[596]7
[598]5
[600]15. BENTHAM was then fully briefed on developments and ROODINE
[601]geve certain operational information of a sensitive nature fron subject
[602]to BENTHAM. After necessary analysis and discussion the following
[603]Geaieions were reached: . Lent im . ves
[605]fin
[607]@. .We would endeavor to rescve: the family out of Prankfurt
[609]by comercial atroraft that day, i.0., Sunday, 17 Deceaber,
[611]b. In the absence of the ability to accomplish this, we would
[612]@ndeavor to remove them on an Air Force Medical Eveountian
[613]Piight on Monday, 18 Decenbe:,
[615]©. <2Beph Q. KLEMCK (Chief, COG/KURIOT) was contacted by
[616]phone from HENTHAM's residense and said he.believed that
[617]Ris people could affix in the subject's passports a
[618]Pederel Kopublie entry stawp. This wag considered neces< |
[619]sary in order to prevent. eaburrassing questions by German
[620]immigration Authorities on Sunday when the family would
[621]Cepart by commercial air. The family nad entered the .
[622]Vederal iepublie “bleok" and Socordingly there was no
[623]entry pormit in their Soviet Diplomatio passports.
[625]+. ds We would return LAPOLIA and ROUDIME "to the safe-nouse and”
[626]I woi.td aleo send out one enlisted guard with aidearn.
[628]hespective missions. I proseeded to the Signal Center and reloased the
[629]érafted cable. ;
[631]lo ATs I arrived back at ay quartere about 0330 hora. At about 0420
[632]hours I received a oall from KLEMACK, wanting to get in touch with
[634]LAPOLLA on matters pertaining to the dooumentation work he was trying
[635]to accomlian. I gave him the telephone nunber of the Eschborn safe-
[637]house. .1t turned out that the cold weather nad affeated telephone com —
[639]mmicationa to Ksehborn and the phone vse dena, HiZHACK then went oie
[641]€o Rachborn and discussed his probicit with LAFOLLA and KOUDINE. I ag
[643], daformed, but as yet do’not know the tesonioal reason why, that KURIOT
[645]Guild not put in the sudjoot'a passport the required German entry stamp. |
[647]It wes decided at the meeting at the Kaohborn safe-house that KURIOT
[649]would try to make and have ready by tle noxt morning [Austrian] passporta
[650]oo, Y _
[652]i for subject and his family.
[654]- 18, At about 0600 hours I received a call from the Signal Center
[655]Watch Officer informing mo that Headquarters “approved your plan." 1
[656]aemediately tried to contact the Eschborn s@fo-house by phone but to no
[657]avail. Around 0630 1 contacted KLUNACK at the AUMiUr installation and
[658]was then informed by him of his earlior visit to Eschborn around 0400,
[659]He told me during iis phone converzation that LAPOLLA wae going to get
[660]up about O70 hours. I surmised that LAPOLLA would proceed immediately
[662]to the office and then did so myself,
[664]- " 36. A cable to Headquarters was drafted on the basis of all this
[665]information and everyone departed the HENTHAN reaidence for their
[667]10010 a et A Sc Ne mele a at
[668]en 7 cept enrages
[673]19. LAPOLZA arrived at the office sometime shortly after 0800,
[674]then discussed wnat our possibilities were, based : «
[675]we then sae it. we had no guarantee that the [Austrian] passports would 4
[676]be finisned sy AURIOP in time to be used by an “early afternoon United. i
[677]States flag comercial Jet. ke discussed again, as we nad the rravious
[678]evening, contacting Mr. willian Naylor,-the Pan Anerican Senior orfleer . 3
[679]fm Germany and a Cleared and witting contact, as to whether or not he. : ao
[680]could arrange to board passengers witnout going through Gersan iomigras : i a .
[681]tion, 1.0., Passport Control. The question of the availability of seats i an
[682]was also involved. LAPOLLA suggested tiat we Phone Naylor in his
[686]Parben Bullding and
[687]and Naylor agreed
[688]at khein/Main. to
[690]that day “ut at midnight on Sunday they were dispatching a C=135 cone
[691]He was further informed that 3% of
[693]© Air Force and 4) to the Army to be
[694]used only by Single military Personnel departing. to the States on”
[696]Curiatnas leave. No fenilies could be sent on the flight, Inasmuch as
[697]@ C-155 19 tho military cargo vereion of. a Boeing .707,.LAPOLLA and syself -
[698]di : get military
[699]authority to fly this family out. We decided against such course of
[700]aotion for severe) reasons, We anticipated that there would be too
[701]euch conversation among the single military personnel aboard the flight
[702]. When they observed five aivilians, three of whom were obviously «
[703]| family, flyirg m™m the same Plane. The fact that the six-year-old
[704]- @aughter spoke no English also contributed to the adverse situation we
[705]. anticipated. Secondly, subjeot and family had already been aboard ons
[706]_ @Argo type alroraft and were reported t; OODINE to have made & serlag
[708]. of uncomplinen reaarks of the typo transportation that they were
[709].  . being afforded, . . . . , .
[711]*. Naylor arrived at the office at about 1000 hours and wag made
[712]@@Merally aware of our problem. He was informed that the principal
[713]" traveler involved was @ defecting Russian diplomat, plus wife and. ehdida,
[714]- and that we were under obligation to expeditiously and securely retuen .
[715]‘thes to the United States by Jet atrorart. .He was further informed
[717]8 and we had no guarantee
[718]that wo would have- the documentation by flight departure time of
[720]+) PAA No. 75 at 1315 hours. We then asked him what he considered to ix:
[721]. the poasibilities or working out. a proseturg $5 board the party “black”
[723]_ Bnd to prevent any dlvulgencs cf their existence to the German Inmigrae
[724]‘tion Authorities. After considerable discussion it appeared that there
[726]. ; wea ,
[727]vo BRAT
[730]A
[731]™~,
[734]14-0000
[736]7:
[738]existed & very good possibility to get. ths passengers aboard the aire
[739]eraft and successfully circumvent Oerman passport cantrols, Naylor
[740]contacted his own assistant amd the PAA Operations Officer assigned to
[741]Rhein/Main, both of wnos are United States citizens, and asked that
[742]they proceed to tie airport and stand by to assiet him in tne handling |
[743]Of sowe very important personages Hic ware departing an PAA No. 73.
[745]He then ascertained that only three first class sents were available -
[746]om thig flight. He told his assistant to scat two paasongers in the >
[747]@iraraft lounge and he would accept full responsioility for 1%. This
[748]ie Gomewnat touchy in tie airlines business as lounge seats have no .
[750]eafety belte. He also knew additional first class scate were available.- - -- «--
[751]out of London. :
[753]1,
[755]-@1. Im the meantime, KLAMACK and one of nis sen working on the
[756]d@oownentation had returned to Eschborn to pictures of subject and
[757]his family that would be necessary for thefiusitr puasports. >The
[758], Best reading we could get froa the KURIOT people working.on the doou-.
[759]ments was that they would not be ready on time. Inasmugh as decisions
[761]had been made, we decided tc set the wheels in motica and started the
[763]. family to the airport. LAPOLLA accordingly took off for Eschborn and
[765]“@ plan was agreed upon where ho would arrive with the family in front
[767]- Of tho Rhein/Main Departure Hullding et 1230 hours,. Naylor «ould be - .
[768]standing by the entrance and take the family via a circuitous airport
[770]Building route to the PAA Operations Office which te located on the
[772] @eoend Floor of the building beyond Passport Control. Naylor departed
[774]at about the same time as LAPOLIA and went direatly to the airport.
[776]J feseatetdnc ners
[778]4
[782]22. Earlier in the morning I had asked BENTHAM 1f he could effect
[783]arrangements at the Consulate to have a Vieo Officer standing 4 to put
[784]United States visitors’ visas for subject's family in.the wsthisn] pass=
[785]’ ports. BaicSHAM accomplished this and, at Naylor's avggestion, we asked |
[787]if the Consulate Officer could go to.the FAA. Operations Office at Rhein/
[788]Mair, and etend by there to ascommligh his visa work. BF 66 Going we -
[789]could save spproximately 56 minuves time, 1 contacted Mr. Rollie White
[790]*, Of the Consulate office and ne agreed to mest us at the airport at. |
[792]- $245. houre. . : .
[794]ot . . 7 «
[795]SETTERS ET PT SE eer eee
[797]toy
[798]tee
[800]PO we
[802]“ 23. I next phoned BENTHAM ond made hie avsre of our situation. It |
[803]. id not look as if we would have any useble dosummtation to pass the
[804]fanily and would have to take tie chance of uircurventing the Passport
[805]Control. Our prinoipal concern was that a Geren Insigration Officer
[806]would be standing by the aircraft departure area and “ould ank to see
[807]Bubjeot's pagsport. Wo could not get subject's famLly aboard the
[808]Seguler bug that gees from tne departure bullding te the atroraft
[809].. because there was no way we would get them to tis bus loading area /
[810](7 Without going thro-gzh Pasaport Contrel, EENTA esked how we evaluated
[811]an ability to withdraw gracefully at plane side if onalienged by German
[814]14-0000
[816]authorities. I told him the chances were better than even and that we
[817]would appeal to the fact that this was a VIP party being handled out of
[818]the regular airport procedures and that tie passports had been left in
[819]the PAA «ffice. we would then. put the party back in tne vehicle ‘tnat’’ *
[820]took then out and just keep going. ‘BENTHAM authorised us to proceed
[821]with the “black” evacuation. . ; Lo
[823]@S. I then made one last call to KLRIOT and told them if they-could.
[825]BOL complete their work and get the passports to the airport. by 1315.
[826]houre to forget it. with that MULFALL and ayself left for Khein/Main,
[828]35. We arrived at Rhein/Main exactly at 1250 hours as subject's
[829]party was drawing up. The group nes then taken by a ciroultous route
[830]Geo the PAA Operations Cffice.. It-was cscertained that PAA No. T> would”
[831]arrive at 1245 hours, approximately thirty minutes late.
[833]' 86, During our weit at the PAA Operations Office, RODIME got me
[834]Seide three or four times and kept me continuously aware of subject's
[835]Tear that an attempt vould be asde to sabotage his plane. ‘le nad ,
[836]@videnced this concern ever sinre his arrival in Frankfurt. * Subject ~
[837]told ROODINE he felt sure that Soviet agents would be found among some
[838]Of the employees of the commercial airlines and the managenent of Knein/
[839]Wain Airport. He mentioned the section of the RI3 that works specifically ©
[840]OA ASsansinations and sabotage. He was fearful of. any baggage being |
[841]loaded very late or any "spare baggage” that might be fsund aboard: the
[842]@iroreft. I told ROGDINE we were very sympathetic but we were not about
[843]to ask Naylor, wno had now gone much further than one could be reasonably
[844]expected to on our behalf, to off-load the baggage of 184 passengers
[846]and search it. oS ‘
[848]27. Two events happened while we were waiting in the office to
[849]board the parties that were of some disturbance. The airplane Gaptain
[850]reported to the PAA Operationg Officer that a gun was found aboard: the:
[851]plane. Upon investigation it. was determined that this gun belonged to
[852]an Armed Poroes courier who hod carridd classified material on the air=
[853]orem to Frankfurt. Ths airplane sapiain, upon being asked by Naylor
[854]af tnore pad beon eny unusual activities on the part of the passengers,
[856]“then deacribed one party flying in the first-olass compartment, This
[857]Plight od eririnated in San Franoiasce and was flying around the world
[858]-Weatbouid., At New Delhi a United States citizen, a correspendent for
[859]@n unknown newspaper, boarded the plane with his wife and a female nurse,
[861]Tha fight orew hac bean informed that he wes en alechclis ard was ceing _
[862]retumes co the United States at the request of the United States Embassy
[863]@t New Delhi.. For zart of the trip he had aoted in scsewnat of an tone
[864]otnoxious feshion aii had insulted some of the other passengers. The
[866], Captiin had investigated the situation and was of the opinion that the
[868]Correspondent was now euffioiently drunk and Janked sufficient etamina
[871]14-0000
[873]te insult anybady. IT asked the Captain 3f there was
[875]® purser or a
[876]male attendant assigned to the first-class section,
[878]| gfave reservation about now going forward
[879]eorrespondent. It was @y opinion,
[881]E
[882]F
[883]g
[884]a
[885]z
[888]p
[890]8B, Bubject's party, accompanied by Maylor and the PAA Cperetions |
[891]Offtoer departed tne Offloe at 1525 hours, entered a PAA crew bus,
[893]29, At about 1500 houre sti phoned to RIO and tote Ralph 0,
[894]that he had another thirty minutes to get the(A y
[896]a to the airport because of tha Giroreft'a delayed departure. The
[897]“+ ht) Austrian peasporte arrived at approxisately 1345 hours,
[900]Hollie White
[901]toly atarted to enter in those passports the United Stare,
[903]viettor's visas, at approximately 1555 the FAA Ground Crew Giser .
[904]Rotified PAA Operations that Plight No. 73 was mechanically oleared for.
[905]_ oparture and completely loaded. At that time a PAA revreser*-tiva
[906]_ Started to rim ree the Ssparture Buliding to the plang with
[907]" plese of lucsass, Naylor was coming back from the Plane in
[908]bus. Ho intercepted the PAA employee and tock ths ‘bag and drove it
[909]Beok to the plane. He later tolé us he opened the bag, one of the
[910]- Oo tldgnt beg variety, and on his om initiative examined the contents.
[912]It contained items of ®ppare] used by ladies that will not be further
[914]6 ORES ate ee mr eee oomarncertere man —
[916]At 1400 the Ground Crew Chier stated again the plane ag r ay.
[917]. for departure and asked why the plane was being held up. It was being =~
[919]+ |. held up because Wnite bad not finished all the entries cx tis Pascporta,.
[920]> “+, However, the Pan Operations Officer informed the Ground Crew Chief that
[922]8
[927]14-0000
[929]tyes Senne,
[931]the “ignt of the loaded plane had been ioned and they were recam
[932]PUR total weignt. At about 1405 tne (Aus tan] bassporte with United
[933]: SYAV vieas vere carried in a bram eavelope by a PAA United Staves
[934], Bitiwen employes and gives to RODWDE. The plane was then cleared for
[935]_— Cepeiture and rolled out at 1418 hours.
[937]. Ay The only other information mom at the tine of this writing
[938]+> €0 RON the atrorart was diverted to Bermuda because of bad weatner
[940]- °; @90@AR one In Mew York. baylor telephoned me thit information about
[941], WS Noure on Monday morning, 15 Decender.
[943]a
[945]Peaperemnres
[948]14-9000