[1]104-10226-10001 | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
[3]i ue, . . ‘
[4]t .
[5]: OLD Serseary 1965
[6]: AHA DUM FOR Bacuits
[7]i SUBJECT: Yuriy Tvinovien AUSENZO..
[8]: Jo, The pov and Chie, met wien Awiz lor .
[9]“4 Thompson in his wliiee to pe hin of or + s to
[10]oi proved tu hosiéte bute rre jum in ordes clarify the .
[11]: SOSiL 2 aise. The DUP exnigined that | lad reached
[13]i tur and thar jigstile fe order, we
[14]. decided to review these ce iOUS entatives
[15]of tin: ERE. After one un dable erics of
[16]meetings Was fake with the foat the j Deputy
[17]Pirector for Gecurity, Nr. Tlian Cc. Tia The Find-
[18]ings of the il, stich asreed youer ally with vor osn Views,
[19]: vere formulated iu Petco. ty the Yireerer shed by John
[20]: iidear Moovec. 4 coy of MOMOTA ao shorn to. Ambas-
[21]j sider Thompson by the uP n the ce 4 the FBI
[22]i and ourselves nov have a cosscua unders 2 on the case
[23]> which was something bo HCL and the Wirector, FRI,
[24]r , apreed would be aece: are
[25]7 yir toon to coy vnat we woutd Rape to begin
[26]i hostile inte rrog tions in tue near Putire before we :
[27]: did, we wanted to, discuss case with Awbessader Thompson
[28]j in Jieht of the various cont: eneles which wight arise
[29]during the cou of thes a5, UDP felt that :
[30]Ar sson well in
[32]jt was prefoerab
[33]advanee of our Litentions se that
[34]the State Depart became even
[35]pbaisis., Ambassader i wuuald he
[36]backhoe round, : son Ci
[37]sure that NOSENZO could not escape aad tery
[38]the Soviet Embassy. We tobd Nim that we £
[39]him in a countcy Bouse with a darge s
[40]we felt made escape imp robag iv. :
[41]asked if there was ty that &
[42]suicide, We said psychiateists did not
[43]type to do so ad that our curity. sury
[44]that we were alert to this possibility
[45]prevent it. A sgador Tremeson abso w
[46]had been any communications concerning NOS
[48]tations with:
[49]Y ona contingency
[50]in possessien of the
[52]f if we were
[53]nself into
[54]established
[55]puard which
[56]Jompson then
[57]wicht commit
[58]eve he was the
[59]Qjunce was such
[60]xould try to
[61]red if there
[62]‘) from the
[64]LL ime CUTE Sy Mab TIVE EMA
[66]i
[68]tea!
[70]14-0000
[72]through the. Eubassy in Moscow bit added
[74]_Sinec.
[76]since the .
[77]arrival ip
[78]Soon severad La
[80]Soviet side, he replied there dad teon none
[81]von Crontation bast year Pollowiue NOSENKONS
[83]this country. We then meutioned the atbompt
[84]occas lots by NUOSENKO'S wife and mother
[86]that these attenupts
[87]8 beea heard Crom -them
[89]Coased in Mareh 196d and aothing has
[91].  Aubassadur Thompson tien asked if NOSENKO Ihad
[92]do tnformation which would discredit any American
[93]We auswered in the negative, pointing out!
[94]reparted on former French and Canadian
[95]We “Luter qualified the statement on Americans ,.
[97]PYovids
[100]that pe had
[101]pidors,
[103]aah it
[105]poineine out that NOSENKO did provide information. on a. few .
[106]Mnericuns of desser rank as well as private citizens. :
[107]4d. ° The DDP then noted that after we reached a :
[108]point of ne return in our interrogations, we might decide :
[110]> that SOSENKO would have to be turned back. Ambassador
[111]Thompson expressed coiicern that the Soviets might use’ tliis 2
[112]ction Co discourage defections, We explained that. when we ‘
[113]came to the pointe that a turn-back uppearcd desirable, we ; ‘
[114]uitdg by the Uy S. Govern- =
[116]would hope that a statement could be
[118]ment whica would establish NOSEMKO as a provocateur, The
[120]OOP taen- described the AEJOYFUL case in bricf terms to
[121]Ambassador Thompson, emphasizing the pargblel planning and
[122]the possibility that a quadripurtite statement by the govern-
[123]nents mivht be considered. The DUP did note, however, that
[124]ARJOYFUL was in British hands ‘and that they have the major
[125]responsibility even thoush we end other security and intelli-
[126]Hence services had agreed on the handling of the case. The
[127]BOP then noted that in past cases where we had turned hack
[128]people with intelligence backgrounds at their own request,
[129]the Soviets had not made publicity capitnhl of these actions.
[131]The carlier mention of our discussions with the
[132]ador Thompson some of the material on
[133]Soviet political issues which he has been recciving; recently
[134]from the FRI. Ue commented that it was his very'strong im-
[135]pression that the information was being Fed to us by ‘the |
[136]Soviets. Me said that it cither consisted of information
[138]we already knew or that which the Sovicts would not object
[139]to our havine. Te asked: our views on this. The DvP com-
[141]c
[142]de
[144]FRE recalled to Ambass
[146]to contact him. yO
[150]14-0000
[152]iw opinion of several officers in
[153]bervices that some OF taese ERS sources.
[154]Wherees the Eps believed then |
[156]Rented that at
[157]the Clandestine
[158]Vere under Soviet coutrol
[159]to be nenuine, ; .
[161]O. In sumding up our position on the LOSEXKO case
[162]for Avbassador Thomson, the DOP referred to the Kinds of
[163]information the Sovicts had piven up throne: SOSENKO, fie
[164]Mande oarticular reference to the Jolson cose and observed
[165]thet if the Soviets vere Prepared to provic. .this kind of
[166]build-op to insure the success of NOSENEO's mission, it
[167]must tiem be very important to them. Ju conclusion, the
[168]DUP said that he would send a letter for the record to
[170]Ar. Wiphes on the topie of NOSENKO to which Anbassador
[172]Thompson agreed, |
[174]David Ey Murphy .
[175]Chiel’, SR Division
[177]eat suse