[1]1§7-10011-10093 ; | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
[3]Date: 10/06/93
[4]Page:1
[5]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[6]@ IDENTIFICATION FORM
[7]@ _ AGENCY INFORMATION :
[9]AGENCY : SSCIA
[10]RECORD NUMBER : 157-10011-10093
[12]RECORDS SERIES@:) i
[13]AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
[14]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[15]ORIGINATOR : ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION
[16]FROM : ROETHE, JAMES, N. *
[17]TO : FILE
[19]TITLE :
[21]SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW WITH PAPICH, SAM J.
[23]DATE : 03/05/75
[24]PAGES : 18
[26]SUBJECTS :
[27]| PAPICH, SAM J. (INTERVIEW)
[29]DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT °
[30]CLASSIFICATION : S
[31]RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
[32]CURRENT STATUS : P
[33]DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/29/93
[35]OPENING CRITERIA :
[37]COMMENTS :
[38]SSCI Box 294, Folder 15
[40][R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED ie a tess cee ee
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[44]SECRET _F-
[46]During this period Papich developed a good relationship with Jim Angleton
[47]of Counterintelligence and found that he could work effectively with Angleton,
[48]In the early 1960's the relationship between the two agencies was probably
[49]the best that it ever got. While some flaps continued to occur, both
[50]agencies seened to be making an effort to learn the responsibilities and
[51]jurisdiction of the other.
[53]Relationships. Between 1965 and 1970
[55]During the Johnson Administration there was a deterioration or a cut in
[56]the number of projects directed towards the Soviets. Hoover's desire to
[57]become engaged in extensive counterintelligence work lessened. Many of
[58]the FBI's programs to identify illegal aliens attempting to penetrate
[59]the U. S. Government broke down. Hoover became extremely cautious and
[60]conservative in the area of counterintelligence, which greatly disturbed
[61]Papich, who felt strongly about the Soviet threat and who was convinced
[63]aon ee SE ERT ee TT r
[65]that strong counter-me es were necessary. For example, Papich tried _
[66]eee cor the Memmi of & Gop-level Somiet official
[68]eS @ CIA agent. This was to be a joint CIA-FRI eperation,but fit was slageed :
[69], down by Hoover. Murther, a pmeposed joint operation MSEC
[70]Clectromic conamge of suspected Sovigriactivitieg: S\
[72]sear
[74]During 1967 and early 1968 Papich saw no signs from Hoover that the pro-
[75]grams and projects that Papich felt so necessary would be reinstituted.
[76]Papich was receiving the message that his relationship with Hoover was
[77]coming to an end. . Papich was physically and mentally worn out trying to
[78]keep the two agencies working together. In 1968 Papich wrote a polite
[79]letter to Hoover expressing his concern with what was happening in the
[81]area of counterintelligence. He appealed to Hoover to reinitiate some
[83]of the effective programs aimed at Soviet penetration of the United States.
[84]While Hoover was extremely angry at Papich for writing such a letter, he
[85]did not fire him to the surprise of many. Further appeals by Papich to
[86]Hoover to reinstate programs were of no avail. From that point on, the
[87]relationship between Papich and Hoover chilled and any idea that Papich
[88]brought to Hoover from the CIA concerning joint counterintelligence efforts
[89]was generally rejected.and accompanied by a critical remark.
[91]While Papich's 1968 letter had brought no change in Hoover's attitude,
[92]Hoover did keep Papich on as liaison. In the Fall of 1969 Papich con-
[93]fided to his wife that he was seriously considering retiring in the Spring
[94]of 1970. By the first of the year he realized that his career was effec-
[95]tively at an end and that he could no longer effectively accomplish his
[96]responsibilities as liaison between FBI and CIA. He decided to submit his
[97]letter of resignation, to be effective in early April of 1970.
[99]+ | SECRET
[100]eo |
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[105]EFfO2TS TO IMPROVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CIA AND FBI
[107]Eiforts by Papich
[109]Under Hoover there was little exchange of ideas at the highest levels
[110]of the CIA and FBI. This was merely Hoover's Style. Papich was able
[111]to get people exchanging ideas at the working level and this was done
[112]with tloover's approval.
[114]Papich supported CIA innovative approaches to targets of mutual interest
[116]to both agencies and frequently became involved in conflicts with Hoover.
[118]for such interest and action. When any CIA promoted projects were ap-
[120]proved, the responsibility was placed on Papich to assure that there
[122]would not be anv invasion of FBI jurisdiction or violation of agreements. -
[123]For instance, tne CIA through the Domestic Operations Division (now the 1B
[125]Foreign Resources Division) was always” looking for foreigners in the
[127][ae BN ‘also That al ahem :
[129]perations Division could recruit without con-
[130]flicting with the Bureau, Papich set up a program and sent it to Hoover
[131]recommending approval, but Hoover indicated that.hg was concerned with
[133]he oe jurisdiction eG Was en) cad tance eae Seu 8 | Qa
[135]P b fin the United Sta they scuid Lanedtacniy contact the FBI pan. ‘He=
[136]4 “ruling on individeat ‘ond furmmish Papich with al infomation ebtaimed
[137]* Seem that ¢ individeal which perteimed to imtemal. aiMiafvs, arches, ‘the
[138]x Sadividuad “wast So bo made available go the PBI if he pesscssed substan-
[139]tial intomation within the PL's jursdietian. ts § poresaaait ingest
[140]dm @ Mewor cadet.  ageresran ddl ih caine Te dated |
[141]ib sree : a well” and much valuable in’
[142]‘ormation Was given to the FBI which satisfied Hoover. Perhaps more
[143]importantly, new CIA/FBI relations at the field level were developed.
[144]However, Papich was well aware at the time the program was set up that
[145]if it flapped, Hoover could immediately kill the project.
[147]Papich also advocated the exchange of lecturers between CIA and FBI to
[148]give the two agencies some understanding of what the other agency was
[149]doing. Such an exchange of lecturers and training facilities did not
[150]come about until about the time that Papich retired.
[152]Papich also suggested an actual trade of personnel for short periods of
[153]time so that personnel from one agency could become familiar with the
[154]various problems that faced personnel from the other agency on the working
[155]level. This suggestion was never approved while Papich worked for the FBI.
[157]= sae emer eeemnepey “mn
[159]Panich reiterated the fact that he had a very good working relationship
[160]with Jim Angleton. He fecls that this relationship was probably respon- f
[161]sible for the FaI's arrest of the Russian spy Rudolph Abs], Apparently a Soviet
[162]agent came to the CIA with information on Able. The FBI was contacted
[163]] concerning the debriefing of this agent, but Hoover wanted nothing to do
[164]with it. Papich cooperated with Angleton, and the information obtained
[165]® led to Able's arrest and conviction.
[167]SECRET ~
[168]By
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[174]The following grey areas were delineated by Papich;:
[176]1. The question of whether the FBI should recruit agents in the United
[177]States for use by the CIA overseas or whether this should be left
[178]to the CIA. .
[180]PAchivities with séspect eo: deGsctor ‘aid Spon oae Lg ” e i as
[182]United States. (AE preseat the FBI generally Tees © ea ae
[184]Snacking as long as the Ml is given access to the ma within a
[185]the at baie aeve boon
[187]Peeasomable tine, On cceastion the bone fides of devteetons
[188]od by GEA and the PBI.) | —
[190]MENPCWSE TO moniter the mmy defectors press
[191]: Papich feels thet these.
[193]4. The question of who should provide cover in the United States for
[194]CIA operations overseas,
[196]5. The handling of agents Suspected by CIA to be Communist agents over-
[197]@ seas who travel to the United States.
[199]6. Inadequate communication between the two agencies in resolving
[200]bona fides of defectors of interest to both agencies.
[202]7. See the subheadings below.
[204]Papich believes that in fairness to the men in the field a more clear-cut
[205]delineation of jurisdiction is needed. He did state that from time to
[207]time documents were put forth by Hoover concerning the FBI's jurisdiction in
[208]particular areas. Generally such a guideline would be issued following
[210]a particular flap in an operation involving both the FBI and the CIA.
[212]Papich could not point to any specific document but suggested that we
[214]ask Kelley for this type of information.
[216]Papich did feel that there were some areas of jurisdiction that were clear-
[217]cut. For instance, CIA is not to investigate violations of the law in the
[219]United States. However, it is not Papich's opinion that the determining
[220]factor of jurisdiction is a Strictly geographic one. (At least it shouldn't
[221]be.) : ; .
[223]Espionage Matters
[225]Papich felt strongly that the FBI had the responsibility to investigate
[227]any possible violations of the espionage laws. He could point to no case
[228]a where the FBI refused to undertake this responsibility where reasonable
[230]evidence of espionage existed, even if the Suspect was an employee of the
[231]@ CIA. In some instances, the CIA might cone to the FBI with information /
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[235]Ober's Operation: (continued)
[236]a CONTINUE) ©
[238]had the personnel, and the FBI would have become aware of such acti-
[239]vity on a massive scale. However, Papich did receive a continuing
[240]Supply of information from Ober. Most.of this information related
[241]to the relationshin between domestic end foreign groups. Inciden-
[242]tally, information pertinent to internal security may have been
[243]Picked up and passed’on to the CIA, Papich is also aware that some
[244]of Ober's recruits were gathering information in the United States
[245]a5 well as overseas on occasions when the student's travels ended
[246]and he or she returned to the States. This information was also
[247]passed on to Papich, Papich acknowledged that on occasion the FBI
[248]would provide CIA with an introduction to a Sympathetic student in
[249]a dissident group,
[251]RMERRIEWNC: loffice of seeunto(S
[253]Projec
[255]Papich knows almost nothing of efforts to penetrate dissident groups |
[256]by the Office of Security. He feels that if such a project had been
[257]extensive, the FBI would have become aware of it, as FBI had a large
[258]Washington Field Office and was very interested in the dissident
[259]groups and constantly monitoring then. Papich couid not recall an
[260]incident where a CIA asset working for Women's Strike for Peace was
[261]turned over to the FBI. He did recall Occasions when Ober'ts group
[262]turned over assets to the FBI when the asset returned from overseas
[263]and no longer wished to work abroad. Papich believes that only a
[264]small amount of.information on dissidents was ever sent to the FBI
[265]from the Office of Security.
[267]WE)
[268]per
[269]air
[271]Papich states that during this entire period of-the dissidents, the atmos-
[273]phere was such that something had to be done by someone to learn what the
[275]More Militant of these dissident groups were planning. Riots, bombings,
[276]and destruction of property were rampant. Citizens and newspapers were
[277]screaming for action to bring this unrest to an 2nd. It was a difficult
[278]time for all Federal agencies,
[280]Criminal Cases
[281]a MESES
[283]Papich is not aware of any instances when the CIA has undertaken law en-
[284]forcement tasks in the United States. This does not mean that there was
[285]not Some cooperation between the [FBI and CIA in criminal cases. For
[286]instance, Angleton's overseas agents would frequently obtain information
[287]connecting Americans with criminal activities in the U.S. Angleton would
[288]contact the FBI and together Papich and Angleton would develop the CIA's
[290]_source of information to assist the FBI. A good example of this led to
[292]the arrest and conviction of a New York City official during the Lindsay
[293]Administration.
[295]SECRET
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[299])
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[304]Penetration of Embassies in the United States
[306]Papich ba
[308]sarge oe of ave Cla Seerorts to obtain positive os
[310]t tes, euithough
[311]occasion attempt to reeruit Embassy pexsemnel, for activities
[312]0 che. pie eal Menorendin of Undsrstandine.of Reb. 7
[314]man a to gain positive in-
[316]S)
[318]Papich is unaware of any instance where CIA has made use of tax returns i
[319]to obtain information on Americans. » ;
[323]Information Obtained From Tax Returns
[325]PAPICH'S PHILOSOPHY AND MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS
[327]It is Papich's belief that while the intelligence services of the United
[328]States presently obtain great amounts of information through new techno-
[329]logical developments, they are still unable to read the minds of the
[330]leaders of foreign countries. Consequently, they must attempt to pene- -
[331]trate through clandestine efforts. The only way to successfully penetrate
[332]is to permit those conducting the operation to go about their business
[333]unburdened by numerous reporting requirements. Papich's philosophy is
[335]"If you want the job done right, give me X number of men and leave me
[336]alone.'' He questions whether this philosophy can be adopted in the United
[337]States in 1975, as faith in the leadership is.an essential factor. He be-
[338]lieves that such operations can be controlled and overseen by the Director |
[339]of the CIA, the Director of the FBI, and the President.
[341]Papich indicated that the differences between Hoover and Sullivan have
[342]nothing to do with CIA. Hoover was convinced that all dissident groups
[343]were directed by the Commmist Party, whereas Sullivan disagreed. These
[344]differences affected the Hoover-Sullivan relationship only after Papich
[345]retired.
[347]Papich believes that the FBI lost stability when A. H. Belmont (the No. 3
[349]man at the time) retired in 1967. He presently resides in Palo Alto,
[350]California. Belmont was loyal to Hoover, but he had excellent rapport
[352]with the agents and could put things in their proper perspective. In
[354]fact, Belmont was most useful in resolving differences between CIA and Hoover.
[355]Belmont's successors (DeLoach and Sullivan) could not measure up.
[357]JNR/var
[359]Cc: D.Belin SECRET
[360]Senior Counsels
[362].
[363]|
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