[1]yq,2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
[3]* a foe wee a ee a
[5]‘ _. + TOP SECRET
[7]1. Attached is Annex A of the Top Secret study
[8]entitled, The Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB
[9]Defector - Yuriy I. NOSENKO dated February 1968 (copy 10).
[11]Copy 10 of this study had been forwarded to you earlier
[13]for your review.
[15]2. Certain portions of Annex A of this study are é
[16]: deleted since it contains information which bears on the
[17]security of ongoing, viable CIA operations, or is related
[19]thereto. }
[21]3. We request return of the study (copy 10) and Annex A. '
[23]: when your review has been completed.
[25]Attachment: As Stated Above
[27]WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE “SOURCES AND METHODS
[28]INVOLVED
[30]E2 IMPDET CL BY 011340
[32]2 mse dremnbd eh SR a SRR PSE RAR HST MAAR atin cat AT wr NaN azetinee ose
[34]7 ESS AI aenenran amenrnioan eterna RRL esa ERI RINGS ay Ste ADin a et ah
[36]jen amaaetiatey, G4 bet iene ane sine
[39]14-0000
[41]. iG a
[43]10 February 1964
[45]as saying it was presumed that NOSENKO had defected. coerce ee te im =
[48]3
[49]3
[51][>
[54]Soviet O£ffictals
[56]dbouc, NOSENKO
[58]if
[60]February 1564 a . - .
[61]NOSENKO defected Ln Geneva.
[63]& February 1964
[65]The Chief of che Soviet Disarmament Delegation notified
[66]the Soviet Ambassador in Bern shortly before noon that
[67]NOSENKO had disappeared, correctly placing the date as
[68]4 February. They speculated privately between therselves
[70]that he might have been “poisoned” or injured in an auto-
[71]mobile accident. ,
[73]a
[74]4
[75]‘a
[76]4
[82]& February 1964
[84]1
[86]An official spokesman of the Soviet Mission in Geneva
[87]reported to the Swiss police that NOSENKO, an “expert
[89]temporarily assigned to Geneva", had been missing for four : : ‘Bo
[90]days.
[92]be
[94]ashe oe
[98]3 February 196
[100]Evening news broadcasts in Geneva carried reports
[102]attributed to both Soviet and Swiss sources that KOSENKO
[103]had disappeared.
[105]+ bhatt Bel hte errors
[107]The Swiss press quoted unidentified Soviet sources
[112]Top Secret
[114](Annex A)
[116]10 February 1964 (cont Laued)
[118]A U.S. Department of State press release was {ssued
[119]tdentifying NOSENKU as KGS off{cer and acknowledging his
[120]request for political asylum iu the United States.
[122]long tenure in the KGB, KOSENKO would have a great deal of
[123]important information which he could inpart to intelligence
[124]agencies of other countries. Certainly, he would be
[125]acquainted with many KCR empluyees and could identify them.
[126]He alse would be intimately acquainted with a large number
[127]of Soviet agents working inside the USSR against American
[128]and British nationals.
[130]According t toa sensitive source,
[132]beers ng lie bulk of XOSENKO' xnowledge coacerning
[133]KGB activities would revolve around the intelligence .
[134]operations of the KGB in Moscow and also KGB personalities
[135]working in Headquarters. NOSENKO was also undoubtedly
[136]familiar vith all KC8 personalities in Geneva and certainly
[137]knew some KGB personalities in other countries.
[139]Comment: NOSENKO identified a number of KGB officers in
[140]. Geneva; he asserted that some othere,.. known
[141]by CIA to be connected with the KGB, were not.
[143]362.
[145]Top Secret
[147]lot ere a imiamemccemmmrace manredal semen eres
[150]14-0000 -
[152]Top. Secret:
[154](Annex A)
[156]AQ February 1964 (continued)
[157]Accordi 2 toa sensitive source
[159]"O Was
[161]E : affiliated vith the KGB for
[162]: approximately sixteen years, since about 1947, end was an
[163]ia employee cf the Second Chief Directorate in Moscow, His
[164]_™ father, now dead, was a Deputy to the Prime Minister of the
[166]Soviet Union and also Minister of the Shipbuilding Industry.
[168]There ts a shipyard uaned after NOSEN“KO's father in the.
[169]Ukraine.
[171]Comment: NOSENKU claims to have served
[173]in the GRU untii
[174]1953, when he entered the kG
[176]B.
[178]According to a sensitive source,
[180]c 3 - several KGS
[181]It appeared quite certain to ee
[183]officers that NOSENKO had the rank of lieutenant colonel in the KG3.
[185]se
[187]Comment: .NOSENKO was ac the time claiming to have been.
[189]a KGd ileutrenane colonel.
[191]According to a sensitive source,
[192]A from KGB officers
[194]newspapers fa not that of
[195]sores wit th NOSENKO for several years
[196]in KGB eatquarters; he described NOSENKO as a person who
[197]likes to be fashionably dressed at all times and is fond
[199]of women, by nature a friendly individual and generally
[201]well-liked by his fellow workers. NOSENKO worked in the
[202]Second Chief Directorate.
[204]RS ty tae nee oh
[206]the
[208]Fo nar oe ee tpe btpe oh,
[211](Annex Aj
[212]20 February 1964 (continued)
[215]5 -
[217]Comment:
[219]ee 2 mp ae EE es
[220]+ ‘The photograph accompanying Americen
[221]and Swiss prese accounts of NOSENKO's defection
[222]was by error not that of NOSENKO but’ of
[224]a sensitive source Vladimir SHUSTIOV, whon*@3GkM and NOSENXO both
[226]identified as a "clean" Soviet diplomat at the
[227]Geneva Disarmament Conference.
[229]Noting the publicity accompanying che defection of KG3
[230]officer NOSENKO in Switzerland, UGOLITSYN recalled that
[231]NOSENKO had been a Second Chief Directorate ecfficer working
[232]against American citizens.
[234]Comment: Routinely, GOLITSYN had reviewed in March 1962
[235](before NOSENKO contacted CIA) a list of
[236]. Soviet delegates co the Disarmament Conference.
[237], NOSENKO's .name,. which was on the list, did not
[238]. at that time prompt any comment from GOLITSYN.
[240]Al February 1964
[242]Ambassador DOSRYNIN informally notified the Department
[243]of State that a Soviet note would be delivered later to ask
[244]how NOSENKO had left Switzerland, to request hie release,
[245]and to demand an immediate interview with him.
[247]12 February 1964
[249]S.K. TSARAPKIN, the head of the Soviet Delegation to the
[250]Disarmament Conference, read a statecent at a press conference’
[251]in which he strongly condemned the Swias authorities for
[252]permitting NOSENKO's "kidnapping" and for hindering efforts
[253]to locate him. TSARAPKIN demanded that immediate eteps be
[254]taken to return NOSENKO to Soviet custody, = - .
[256]366 OC _ _
[258]“Top Secret
[260]Docatis Sine par eeiabe w pesnenee
[262]Copy
[264]ip DURE SEU a iat feb Rishon opel NAN ie OR Cte
[266]TS No. 197124
[268]tae ladaadaiverba Shlee Tiled
[270]vast al
[274]i
[275]y
[278]oo
[281]14-0000
[283](Annex A)
[285]12 February 1964 (continued)
[287]g At simultaneous Press conferences in Sern and Geneva, the
[288]Swiss rejected these accusations. of non-cooperacion and aoted
[289]the Soviet delay fn advist.z the police of NOSENKO’e disapsea~-
[291]vance and Soviet ratfiure to cooperate with Swiss authoricies
[292]in locating NOSENKO
[294]The Soviet note earller ‘promised. by DOBRYNIN was delivere:
[295]a to.the State Departnmint. A noncemmittal reply was given to
[296]Soviet queries concerning the requested interview and the
[297]means of NOSENKO's Jjeparture from Switzerland.
[299]2) . os The Swiss Embassy asked for a meeting with NOSENKO in
[300]order to obtain assurance that the defection had been
[301]veluntary. Arrau;euents were made to have NOSENKO meet with
[303]iB Swiss and Soviet representatives in Wishington as goon as
[305]7 possible.
[306]g OSENKO arrived in Washington at 2130 hours.
[308]‘ 32-13 February 1964
[311]i
[313]RIATR Le
[314]: remeron tas RUA Tor
[315]i ea, ES Se
[317]14 February 1964 : ft
[318]“In Moscow, Soviet Foreign Minister GROMYKO read to
[319]Anbassador KOHLER a statement deploring the "evasive" reply
[320]of the State Departuent to Soviet inquiries in Washington
[321]and terming the whole event of NOSENKO's disappearance &
[323]365
[325]Top Secrat_
[327]values eee naaienital Bales preteen! one ae
[329]a hie
[333]Sree end
[335]fe
[336]Fe
[337]a
[340]it Tee
[343]14-0000
[345]ee Top Secret
[349]: (Annex A) : a
[351]1s February 1964 (cont inued)
[353]“pross provocaticu by American lucelligence organs”
[354]GhOMYKO repeated the ccmand for NOSENKO's ammediate release — ‘ -
[355]from American custody.
[357]‘tne Counselor of the Swiss Embassy interviewed NOSENKO et
[359]the washington offices of the U.S. [mmigration and Natural{j-
[361]zation Service. Tie Seviet confrontation tnmediately after- ‘
[362]wards was handled by Minister Counselor G.M. KORNIENKO, and
[364]Third Secretary’ V.F. FSAROV, a recent arrival in'Washington.
[366]NOSENKO told both the swiss aed the Soviets that he had !
[367]defected of his own free will after careful consideration i :
[368]-and that he had no desire to retura to the Scvier Union. In ;
[369]response to KORNIENKO's questions, he specifically renounced
[370]his status and rights as a Soviet citizen.
[372]we
[374]ca
[376]wait
[378]rc 4 t . i 4
[380]18 February 1964 i !
[382]oo : Feliks KOVALEV, a Soviet diplomat in Buenos Atfres, told “4
[383]a CIA agent that he had actended the Institute of Inter- 8
[385]national Relations with NOSENKO. According co KOVALEV,
[387]NOSENKO had twice married, had a good family background, . ‘
[389]was the son of a Minister in the Government, was notorious
[391]for his “adventurous” nature, and "famous for his character”. |
[393]i
[395]vi s
[397]Seater OES
[399]Aint CEs -
[401]Sates eed meats
[404]14-0000
[406]amigo
[408]: : Rea ae ee oe eye
[412]y
[414]rh
[416]Jue
[418]be rebate sete
[420]a
[421]4
[422]4 Ee
[423]22 Stes SRE
[424]4 2a. F _ a
[425]ce ee ete er ean cee AEE oe
[426]Gaon Seed Se er
[427]ees wee ae .
[428]oe Loos
[429], Sa a atts
[430]e 3, Te ee Be 2 A :
[432]sasha See eae
[433]Site aT Lae :
[435]- 367
[437]Pl Mlle!
[440]14-0000
[442]Top Sesret
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[450]a]
[451]z
[453]ass Mertechte a eee ae
[454]oS TR AU ad a
[456]7 Tel PRES Si TRAE PRY VE Ra ID ey ME “EY PPD
[457]ene, EPCS UHE y em Foe ated ae TAR £000 SSA TER ET § SIRE KES eae,
[458]i READ. Gratis Newer ‘AUER _
[460]OF PEAT 38. ee ELAeHL CRON oa SO asa NE A SP
[461]$3, SO ER PSE ee RT Eee ats apres eey
[462]SOMATIC SEE | ENG Be CR a EA SS PEERS LOIS LD AS ED
[463]LSE LEERY TTT STE) GPE yh Gk EE . tae
[464]eS EEA Caste SRE SC LS EGA Ba SOS
[465]: PES RNP OT OTE BUY fT PE
[466]RINT ae PI Ls aa Ser Tern Fe 2S ea
[468]seth both ad e GSU mee
[470]Aaa eld AOE talent ve
[472]_ ee 2S MALS HCHO
[473]EE 2 ATER ASE Yl AT RS A
[475]TAMER MPR Ged
[479]a SihLO had been {n the second Chief Directorate
[480]for about 14 years and was acquainted with almoet all of the
[481]employees cf this directorate. He was awere of the structure
[482]of the KGB and knows many personne} of the Firet Chief
[483]Directorate. AYEES ¥ OF EEE
[485]iat : NOSENKO, as Deputy to the Chief
[486]Seventh Department, had in his possession a telephone
[487]directery which iisted the names of sone.10,000 KGB employees .
[488]in Moscow. Only Chiefs and Deputy Chiefs of Departments, h, :
[489]these phone books. GASES REBT TAS expressed pee a Nth officer
[490]opinicn that "NOSENKO is much more vaiuable to the FBI and
[491]CIA than was Oleg PENKOVSKIY because of che fact that he
[492]knows seo auch about the methods of work of the First and
[493]Second Directorates of the KGS and is familiar with so many
[494]individuals in the KGB both in Moscow and abroad. e@gitizagm>a KGB office
[495]CARBUS said that PLNEOVSKIY was able to furnish American and
[496]British Intelligence with a lot of information concerning -
[497]defense secrets of the Soviet Union, but NOSENKO is much
[498]more Knowledgeable ia Latelligence and counterintelligence
[499]operations of the KGB."
[501]Comment: NOSENKO has never commented on the KGB ;
[502]telephone book referred © above.
[504]Iya ag TNE eB etka
[506]14-00800
[508]Cade DST RESLEE 0 Bi ERUEPY RAREST EON BES SUP . i
[509]SL SO ERE RS FcR BREE. BRE MESO . - |
[515]sa Seats MALT Ra RT Iris OR ene
[516]SOROS: AAD TEASE SAM AAC GLAS CLL ATEN
[517]52: ORATOR BRU 8 SES SET SR ey a Sey eanse
[519]are PEN ar
[521]V5
[523]Milanese
[526]i.
[527]4
[528]|
[530]Pa,
[531]ane
[535]7 toe . - os - ot
[536]: 4
[538]. e'
[539]as troy
[540]a wy
[541]- . tot hos
[543]wasabi 2
[548]” According to a sensitive source,
[550]. , . 5 ‘
[552]in @ resporse 60 a question > | - " Se
[554]whether W°SEI“O actually cefected or whether @@eBe the defection might be a _ . x, :
[556]KG "trick", tha source replied fhat fron his own knowledze‘of this matter,
[559]he was convinced that U°SEix0's defection was rot a "trick" by the KGB,
[561]22 February 1964 oe .
[563]. : . *
[565]According to a sensitive source fron conversations with verdois unnamed KGB 8
[566]officers: NOCENKO worked ezainst personnel
[568]wecrrtonmevenewten wah wont ie . Se 3
[570]. stationed at : erisan Srl in Soveew, and with his +
[572]help agents were veloped among these Americans. [t is ; . 3
[574]: assumed by the KGO that he is familiar with the number and 4
[576]locatior of microvacnes cn che Tmoassy. - a
[578]4
[580]i
[582]Comment: Alct gh NOSENKO knew that there were micro-
[583]pheness in three seneral locations in the
[584]Emdain,+, his specafie daformacion regarding
[585]the number and location of microphones was
[586]lisited co that contained in a written lise
[587]brousht to Geneva in 1964, a List which he
[588]claimed no one in the KGB knew he had,
[590]24 February 1964
[592]Women clainiag .o be the wife and mother of NOSENKO
[593], visited the american imbassy tu Moscow for the first tise,
[594]"expressing disbelief that he had voluntarily betrayed his
[595]family and country ound requesting a perseunal meeting vith
[596]him.
[598]WEP sr eee pitdeg yates mt Ee Bo Tan aihe espe ieee rae
[602]Wey
[604]rs . re :
[605]TS. No. 197124
[606]Copy - 0 2ey :
[608]RRO ER EIR LENE ANS ho Nee cent sre AEs nA sneer ee en eee ee eee pine
[610].
[611]7
[614]14.90000
[616]AAS ALA I Ue Na EAL RB et
[620]z
[621]4
[623]3
[625]“24 Fepruary 196% (continuad) Se
[627]5: A AAD REA SPH A TE OTE PNET I A TAN
[629](Annex A) . ve one
[631]Comment? NOSENSO coafivmed thetr identities as hie wife
[633]und mothe: on the basis of physical deacrip-
[634]tions. On only one previcuse occasion have
[635]menbers of a defector's family called on a
[636]foreign embassy in Moscow. © Following the
[637]defection of Yuriy Vasilyevich KROTKOV in
[638]England in 1963, his wife appeared at the
[639]British Frbassy to make inquiries about hin.
[641]5 EON Sarat : ® KUROCHKIN (fnu),
[642]a KGB séf officer scheculed for assizgament to Washington,
[643]will not be sent us he is "well-known" to NOSENKO. In the
[645]‘course of-his duties in Moscow, KUROCHKIN had very often
[647]visited the department where NOSENKO worked and, as a
[649]result, NOSENKO is “more than casually acquainted with him".
[651]Comment: NOSENKO has never identified KUROCHKIN nor
[652]referred to the name. :
[654]* 1S No 1
[656]a
[660]Gre
[662]es seach epee Anka nan amacrine secsnnee eee Serene
[664]Fobruary 36964
[666]Nikolay ARTAMON 30V, who defected from the Soviet Navy in
[667]the late 195i's, noted the publicity accompanying KOSENKO' 3
[668]defection. He volunteered to CIA that he attended a naval
[669]preparatory school wita che son of Minister NOSENKO in
[670]1944-1946.
[672]Comment: ARTAMONOV's description of the school and of
[673]the dates involved differs from those. elaindd
[674]by NOSENKO.
[676]KGB officer Vladimir TULAYEV mentioned NOSENKO to a
[677]CIA double agent in Vienna. TULAYEV said that NOSENKO,
[678]whom he knew-well, cawe’ from a wonderful family, loved his
[679]wife and children, and earned a good salary. (TULAYEV |
[680]later said on. another occasion that. he had friends who
[681]knew NOSENKO well.)
[683]Comment: NOSENKO never identified TULAYEV by nane or
[684]photopraph. When asked, NOSENKO denied
[685]knowing him. : pone .
[687]neo Sa
[689]oo oO “1S No. 197124.
[691]ne i
[693]Top Secret
[695]. apy Ao.
[697]y
[698]2
[700](BE gatos ate a Ateae ower 6 (oe
[702]foo stage,
[704]February-March 1964
[706]A KG3 conmission
[708]was in the proces: of studying “the ecale of loss" {caused
[710]by NOSENKO's defection} to the USSR. The commission was
[712]very iarge, forned fron different cerartments of the KGB.
[713]The study (sic) was made “becauee ic ta supposed that
[714]NOSEAKO had access to many rocket matters, to many nuclear
[715]matters, to many strategical objects of the cuuntry...many
[716]details about life of the Jeaders of the country, in the
[717]governnent...that he knew very much sbout iaternal relations
[718]‘between the people working in the KGB, that he had many
[720]‘close friends among them and [spent] days and nighta
[722]“together with them. The whole history. of his life was
[724]studied step by step very carefully."
[726]See PK Bed sees aa
[728]'s. S.No. nia
[730]lata etters 2
[733]14-0000
[735]Oo
[738]According to a sensitive. @ source, : . :
[739]REE (from ccaveraations with varfous unnamed. KGB ~  ?
[740]officers ' NCSENXS knows many ,
[742]of the chtefs and ceputies of the XG® directorates and .
[743]departrents at KGB iieadquarte:3 {tn Mosccew. In KGB Head- - :
[744]quarters tiere ure four separate dining rooms for personnel
[745]who work there; one. such dining room is reserved for chiefs
[746]and deputies of departsents. Secause of thia fact, NOSENKO
[747]has a vast knowledge of the hierarehy of the KGB.
[749]i
[751]Coument: NOSENKO never referred to the dining rooms
[752]until che January-March 1965 tnterrogations, |
[754]when he volunteered that he had eaten occasionally i
[756]in the “chtefs' dining room”.
[758]- ¥8'No, 197124
[759]penal nee
[761]hae \
[764]14-0000
[766]o
[768]SIE SSA SERIE ASN SDR SOE
[771]a
[772]i
[773]4
[776]mb team -
[778]a
[780]2 BR EO RULES aca SAAT
[781]we ; eee EELS GE armLES UAE Ld eat SATE SAGE VETS De ESTO
[782]aoe <SPAN TA ARAL AES PRE AS AS TUT TENS WE AE
[784]23- March 1964 a en ; oF
[786]The tvo women claining to be the wife and mother of :
[787]NOSENKO made the last of five visits to the Embassy in
[788]Moscow. NOSENKO's wife had explained that she required
[789]some definite statement in writing from ner husband so that
[790]she could plen for her own future and that of tne NOSENKO
[791]children.
[793]A
[794]A
[796]Fa Sere
[798]14-0000
[800]a
[801]i
[802]i
[803]i
[804]i
[805]i
[807]3
[808]Hy
[809]i
[813]SA SNARE any OLY GRR TH RICE INE ct IMR AR PD
[815](Annex A)
[817]27 March 1964
[818]According to a sensitive source
[820]See (fron various unnamed KGB officers & Era
[821]@eGF: 3 fhere seems to be unaninous opinion among @BiS KGB
[822]chiets cig > that NOSENKO...could do the KCB a tre-
[823]wendous amount of harm. NOSENKO in his position as a de-
[824]puty chief {: one of the departsents of che Second Chief
[825]Directorate tould have been entitled to have one personnel
[826]directory of approximately J0 pages setting for the iden-.
[827]titfes: of all cf che supervisory officials in KGB Head-
[828]quarters, N“GSENKU would also have had a .00-page directory
[829]listing by naze and telephone number all the rank-and-file
[830]employees working in Moscow. The opinion was expressed by
[831]sone CikStew KGB “chiefs” & 5 te > that if NOSENKO
[832]were merely able to make these two directories aveilable
[833]to American Increlligence, the KGB would be severely damaged
[834]for the present and for several years to come.
[836]Comment: NOSENKO has never referred to the KGB direc-
[837]tories described.
[839]3 March 1964
[841]KGB officers I.1. PETUKHOV nad P.P..BORISOV in Canada
[842]told their agent George Herman SPRECHER to cease all intel-
[843]ligence activity for a year, to destroy any incrininating
[844]materials in his possession as well as to supply the Soviets
[845]with passport photographs so that “escape” docunents could
[846]be prepared for himself and his family. SPRECHER asked
[847]whether the action had any connection with NOSENXO's recent-
[848]ly publicized defection, but the KGB officers denied it,
[849]asserting NOSENKO “was just a secretary"
[851]FON Ren BO tee ty te ce ae arb ne
[853]mt) No. 197124
[855]Copy ane
[857]‘certain -
[859]Tey
[861]ann
[863]Weasel ad
[867]Breas
[870]14-0000
[872](Annex A)
[874]Bl March 1944
[878]March 1964
[879]According to 2a sensitiv
[881]briefed in hi
[883](continued)
[885]when PETUKHOV reconctacted SPRECHER in February
[886]1965, PETUKHOV acknowledged that NOSENRO had
[887]in fact heen the cause of KGB ec'ncern, that he
[888]had had sume connection with NOSENRO, and
[889]hOSENKO may have known something of what the
[890]KGB was doing in Canade.
[892]NOSENKO desceribed a KGB Illegal, whose name- -
[893]was unknown to hia, who apperently is-identical... ~
[894]to SPRECHER. ;
[896]source
[898]» was
[899]3 office in KGB Headquarters by a Second Chief
[901]Directurate officer of the American Departments Personnel
[902]of that Deparcrent, in which NOSENKO hed served until hie
[903]defection, were «9 shocked at the event that’ they would not
[904]Menlicn it ae all.
[906]. Comment:
[908]a sensitive source
[909]In this and other contexts has stated
[910]or implied that NOSENKO served in the American 3
[911]Department in 1963-1964: -NWOSENKO asserte he .
[912]left the American Departwest in Jenuary 1962
[913]and served in the Seventh Department until his
[915]defection. rn . .
[917]se dor heh ce
[922]14.00000
[924]coat
[926]a won er vd
[928]te setae
[930]nd
[932]No. 197124
[933]‘Copy 10
[935]14-0000
[937]: {Annex A)
[939]- April-May 1964
[941]FGR officer G.N. VLASOV, case officer of Robert Lee
[942]JOHNSON in Paria, began to meet JOHNSCN on the street rather
[943]than in varlous restaurants as had been thetr naabit. At one
[944]of their final meetings before JOHNSON returned to’ the United
[945]States, VLASGVY told JOHNSON that a Soviet Intelligence officer
[946]had defected to the Awericans in Geneva, and that extreme
[947]caution must therefore be exercised in JCHNSON's contacts
[948]with the “GB. VLASOV said that the defector-could not identify
[949]JOUNSON but that JGHNSON should dispoee of everything he had
[950]which might link him to Soviet espionage activities. (See
[951]p 24for a summary of the JOHNSON case.) .
[954]Paes NTS ;
[956]i Peer agit jig hae Pca et
[957]2 ee ae ae rine fi oF Pip te Fees
[958]ERE SUOUNYY SOE i NET EAT eHPE ee erie sang
[960]TERS SES «bay 5e ne ieenrenna Ei me a FBS.
[962]May 1964: According to a sensitive source
[963](from unidentified ocurces, presumably from KGB
[964]officers eRe THESE ETRE): Two commissions have
[965]been established by the crst" for the purposes: (a) to
[966]Jdetermine why KGB employees auch as DERYABIN, GOLITSYRN,’
[967]“ and NOSENKO defected while serving abroad, and (b) to attempt:
[968]to eliminate the "weak" employees | and improve the effictency
[969]/ of the KGB. .
[971]pr,
[973]ian BEE ta og
[979]wane rhe Freed tet te eames
[982]14-0000
[984]nee pnarumpnier opm er TE.
[986]savtase 5 tint thao ia del aalies tepae tub ie "wii bee tbat Plamen <annpsidtaaddN SS (REPEL ene + |
[987]ae ES REA Rat Sg APNE eat i RE TRIE LI ab aE eT aT CE OE
[989]Eee ae cet oe
[991](Annex A) : : . - no _ ot
[993]20 Mav lyos
[994]According to a sensitive source from a‘ KGB officer
[995]SEPES 2 eee prey — C a
[996]<a Bee ie The KCB was Lusky thac the Avericans ‘found only i.
[997]uicreshones fo the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Actually, fs
[999]about 260 microphones were concealed by the Soviets in the
[1001]hmoassy. “SOSLNKO waa respenelble for furnishing infornaacion
[1003]to the Anerfcans shich resulted in the microghones being :
[1004]found. NOSENKO knew only-the general locaticn of the 46
[1005]microphencs which were found and dees not have any knowledge
[1007]of the remaining ones,
[1009]12 June 1944. , :
[1011]Professor John M. THOMPSON reported at the American
[1012]Embassy in Moscow that an unnamed Soviet official with whon
[1013]he was acquainted told hin that NOSENKO waa a profligate
[1014]with two wives and many debts and is considered in Noscow
[1016]. to be somesne they are well rid of.
[1018]22 June 1964 id
[1019]According to a sensitive source : * : ON
[1020]9(fron various unnamed KGB. officersa t
[1022]sone . "
[1023]The consensus amongaKkGS employees &€ é i Si
[1024]1s that in the future’ the KGB will be feeling sharply the
[1025]effects of NOSENKO's escape to American Intelligence.
[1026]NOSENKO is considered to be vastly more important than either. iN
[1027]GOLITSYN or DERYABIN. This opinion appears to be based on:
[1028]Several factors: First, NOSENKO worked against personnel
[1029]Stationed-at the American Embassy in Moecow and with his help
[1030]®gents were developed among these Americans. Second, it fs...
[1031]assumed by KGB personnel that because of his closeness to:
[1033]14.90000
[1035]Top. Secret
[1037]oto: 22 Sane 1964 (sontinued) 7 _ : .
[1039]4 the American Es nbassy in the past, NOSENKO would also be
[1040]: familiar with the number of nlcrophones which had beea
[1041]i ‘{natalled in the Embassy by the KGB and the locations of
[1042], these microphones. Third, as a Deputy Chief of a depart=
[1043]“ment, NOSENFO would normally have had access to a telephone
[1044]directory listing all personnel in all directorates of the
[1045]KGB in Moscow. Another factor, which is a forridable one
[1046]in the mines cf other KGB erployees, 1a that NOSENKO
[1047]travelled in a rather influential cirele of friends in
[1048]: Moscow who were high in the Soviet Government. All these
[1049]; “ comments were cited as reagons for ROSENKO being en iN
[1050]“inportant catch” for American Intelligence, but no one in . H
[1051]the KGB really knows exactly how auch information NOSENKO
[1052]-had concerning the KGB. . . i
[1054]9 June 1964
[1056]: . ° GOLITSYN (from personal acquaintance): NOSENKO, the son
[1058]4 of the former Minister of Shipbuilding, was a KGB officer
[1060]i who had worked in the American Department and the Seventh
[1062]5 Department of the Second Chief Directorate. GOLITSYN, while
[1064]; on his own First Chief Directorate buginess, met NOSENKO two.
[1066]or three times in the American Embassy Section in 1953, :
[1068]' and had seen hin occasionally at work during 1958 and 1959.
[1069]When GOLITSYN asked him where he was working in 1959, NOSENKO
[1070]replied that he was assigned to the Seventh Department.
[1072]“ NOSENKO served in the American Embassy Section from 1953 |
[1074].until 1957 or 1958, and was specifically responsible for ; So
[1075]KGB coverage of American military personnel in Moscow during ; : } ee
[1077]i
[1079]amen teeretion eee
[1081]Sie
[1083]-1953. For the remainder of hie service in the Embaasy Section
[1085]‘until 1957 or 1958, NOSENKO may have had the same responsi-
[1087]‘bilities or may have been working againet other Embassy
[1088]personnel or correspondents, but he was definitely in the
[1089]American Department during the entire period. In 1957 or
[1091]1958 NOSENKO was transferred to the Seventh Department, and
[1093]was a senior case officer there as of 1959. NOSENKO did not
[1094]“work in the Arerican Department of the Second Chief Girectorate
[1096]American Department at any time during 1960; GOLITSYN visited
[1098]the Embassy Section on at least. three occasions from early
[1099]° 1960 to early 1961, and would have known if NOSENKO had been. .
[1100]in the Section, particularly {f NOSENKO had been Deputy Chief. . Jt ' Lot,
[1101]G.I. GRYAZNOV was acting as assistant of the Chief of the ot -
[1102]Section during this period. .
[1104]ne he ea
[1106]_: 382
[1109]_ Tep Secret
[1110](annex A) . : 7 of a - ” a4
[1112]29 June 196% (continued)
[1114]Pe
[1116]‘ Comment: NOSENKO claims he-lefe the Embassy Section in
[1117]i. ae ‘ (1955 and was assigned to the Seventh Department
[1118]B . until 1960, when he returned to the Embassy
[1119]. Section as Deputy Chief. NOSENKO did not
[1120]o -identify COLITSYN's photograph and had denied °*
[1121]i since defection thet he has ever met or’ aven'
[1122]seen hin. : ‘
[1124]the
[1126]wets Tea BLE tate
[1130]Line 1966
[1131]According to a ‘sensitive source
[1133]u ee ; x i 3
[1134]- = “Just after” HOSENKO's: | iy
[1135]defection V¥.S. MEDVEDEV from the Exita Commigsion of the : ;
[1136]a CPSU Central Committee travelled to Geneva to speak to the ~
[1138]Soviets stationed there and to Soviet delegates to the Disara- |
[1140]“ament Conference. MEDVEDEV underscored the seriousness of
[1141]the defecticn and urged greater vigilance against such acts.
[1142]The defection caused the recall of Nina Ivanovaa YEREMEYEVA,
[1144], a KGB secretary in Geneva. It was rumored that some.séxty
[1146]£ Soviet officials stationed abroad would be transferred from
[1148]wenn ubewinnbates elamichates am
[1150]thetr assignment as a consequence of tha NOSENKO affair.
[1151]V.A. POCHANKIN, a KGB officer with the permanent Soviet
[1152]Mission in Geneva, speculated that he had been completely
[1153]fy exposed by NOSENKO and would therefore have to returo to
[1154]Moscow. Yu. I. GUK who was kuown, : :
[1155]had been discharged from the KGb because he had: recommended
[1156]NOSENKO's travel to Geneva. ‘According Co one rumor, the
[1157]chief of the Department in which NOSENKO had been employed, . ‘
[1158]would also lose his job. :
[1160]4
[1163]can
[1165]a
[1167]CARS:
[1169]Leh aN Rew
[1171]Sate
[1173]3
[1175]i : -
[1177]wee
[1179]: Sons _ by .a sensitive source
[1180]Comment: MEDVEDEV, a “KGB officer formerly stationed tn x _ a
[1181]. .., New York City, was said by. to be one : er pe
[1182]of those from the CPSU Central Committee who | totes
[1184]conducted interviews with KCB personnel going te, ; -
[1186]abroad. @ ? identified MEDVEDEV, vw
[1187]Another sensitive source - Jogos 2oin
[1189]cl US Ga em
[1191].
[1192]td,
[1194]22s SBP SRAS eRe RRR ar MAUS RTE HLT tebe
[1195]' ss
[1200]7 Top Secret’
[1202](Annex A) : ., Sf
[1204]June 1964 (continved)
[1206]Comment: (Continued).
[1207]| REGS 3. Counselor of the Soviet Mission at the ’ t
[1208]United Natione, as the Communist Party organizer - :
[1210]and possibly a member of the KGB, but aaid that 2
[1211]MEDVEDEV's role is not important and that he “4
[1212]worked mainly with the Miniecry of Foreign Affairs. +
[1214]POCHANKINX, who NOSENKO had tdeatified as e ” :
[1215]KG8 officer, was sctill in Geneva in December 1966. : ;
[1217]Mat
[1219]29 July 1964
[1221]Accordin t i ‘
[1222]Chrom: san ed Seur ees , presumably KGB officers Mem
[1224]PF: : An invescigating commission of the
[1226]CPSU Central Committee checking into the circumstances :
[1228]surrounding NOSISKO's defection has thus far been responsible : i be
[1230]for the expulsion from the KGB of 15 Second Chief Directorate , nm
[1232]employees. These include GRIBANQV, who was also expelled
[1234]from the CPSU and was stripped of his rank of lfeutenant . : | ‘
[1238]co rr
[1240]“generel, GRIBANOV has been: given a very small pension, like
[1241]an ordinary Soviet citizen. This drastic acticn was taken
[1242]since the primary responsibility for the defection was placed
[1243]on GRIBANOV. It was realized that, in addition co being Chief
[1244]of the Second Chief Directorate at the time of the defection,
[1246]GRIBANOV was a perseunal friend of NOSENKO and had more or:
[1247]Jess treated NOSENKO as a protege and had taken many steps ‘
[1249]‘to further NOSENKO's career within the KGB. It was felt
[1250]‘that GRIBAXOV shold have been aware of NOSENKO's plans to
[1251]defect. Three of GRIBANOV's deputies were also expelled
[1252]from the KGB, cne of whom was a Major General BANNIK : a
[1253][BANNIKOV]. Of the 11 other Second Chieé Directorate euployees
[1254]expelled, some were found to have been personal friends of’ sone
[1255]NOSENKO and some of them were found to have confided to NOSENKO ~
[1256]details of operations in which they were working. $.M. GOLUBBY,
[1258]“a KGB officer stationed in Washington, would be leaving for’ ee hee tee
[1259]Moscow because the investigating commission had determined “ :
[1260]that Yu. I. GUK, a mutual friend of NOSENKO and GOLUBEY ‘told
[1261]NOSENKO that GOLUBEV had been assigned to the Washington Legal ot
[1262]Residency. GOLUBEV had himself vorked with NOSENKO in KGB poe oe
[1264]Schacter J ta weds £3
[1266]Top Secret
[1271]14-0000." + wee
[1273]S acianeeciarees ed
[1275](Annex A)
[1277]29 July 1964 (continued) . 7 ; f
[1279]Neadquarters sometime ‘in the past, but subsequently NOSENKO |
[1280]and GCOLUBLV were given different assignments within the KGB"
[1281]and thereafter did not associate with one another in rhe a .
[1283]course of their dally activit-es.
[1285]i
[1287]#.
[1289]i
[1291]3
[1295]i)
[1297]1
[1298]NOSENKO retracted in 1965 his earlier clains |:
[1299]that GRIBANCV had been instrumental in his :
[1300]advancement and asagignments. NOSENKO identi- |
[1301]fied by nave and photograpn GOLUBEV, whom he
[1303]Lad hnowa personally since 1959, but NOSENKO |
[1304]said he nad never worked with him at KGB Head-
[1306]oon meeteceitem eee preteens te
[1308]a
[1309]Fg
[1310]o
[1311]7
[1312]ts
[1313]ie]
[1314][3
[1315]md
[1317]Patent bate
[1319]Gan
[1323]efficient in the future”. The Legal Residency had not
[1324]before received any "reports or commentaries on NOSENKO' 8°
[1326]escape". : .
[1328]PRE
[1330]A quarters since -GOLUBEV had always been in the 4
[1331]F First Chief uirectorate. GUOLUSEV left for the i 3
[1332]USSR on 28 August 1964. ! J 2
[1333]. +
[1334]G : 4 5
[1335]_ JulyrAugust 1964 i}? ;
[1336]According to a sensitive source: . |. 5
[1337]5 phe first . 4
[1338]1 AEE NOS ve ay about 3
[1339]NOSENKO was ry fron KGB Headquarters which reported | | 4
[1340]the conclusions vf the commission which had been appointed | :
[1341]to prepare the damage report on NOSENKO's defection. The | :
[1342]letter, which was very brief, said that "the lose was very | ; 4d
[1343]great and some new forss of work should. be created to be. _ 4
[1346]4
[1347]4
[1349]3
[1350]i
[1352]November 1964 :
[1354]Asked while visiting the United States if the Russian .
[1355]people had been tuld of the ABEL-POWERS exchange, Soviet:
[1356]mathematician R.V. GAMKRELIDZE repiited cto an American
[1357]acquaintance that they had not been told officially’ but
[1358]they knew about it since there was “quite a grapevine” fn
[1360]»  . Moscow. It was im this way,;,GAMKRELIDZE stated, thet he.
[1361]learned of the NOSENKO defection and of ita significance.
[1362]According to the "grapevine", the defection was very .
[1363]damaging to Seviet Intelligence in that NOSENKO was the.
[1364]Chief of the American Section, and he knew the identities
[1365]of all Soviet agents in the United States.
[1367]2 sera aer Aa Art
[1369]Se pote dean
[1372]14-00000 -
[1374](Annex A)
[1378]November 1964 (continued) . . : .
[1380]GAMKRVLIDZE is suspected of having connections
[1381]with Soviet Intelligence because of his '
[1382]astatementa, actions, and unusual freedom of '
[1383]solitary movement while on visita to the United
[1384]States. GAMKKELIDZE rebuffed a CIA recruitment :
[1385]attempt in 1964, but added chat he "welcomed '
[1386]the opportunicy to meet with an American |
[1387]Inteiligence officer...to compare the Soviet ot
[1388]Intelligence officers he had met with their
[1389]American counterparte’. During that 1964
[1391]meeting GAMKRELIDZE again raised the subject
[1393]. of NOSENKO, describing hin as “obviously a } :
[1394]traitor to his country" ;
[1396]Decenber 1964 . :
[1397]— fo a Gees source :
[1398]Nikolay RESHETNYAK, NOSENKO's/roommate in Geneva at the /
[1399]time cf his defection, told € » that he had been
[1400]interrogated by the KGB in connecticn with NOSENKO'’s defection,
[1401]and that he had later attended the Moscow trial in which
[1402]NOSENKO was sentenced to death in absentia. RESHETNYAK !
[1403]reported to-d CRS »the dismissal.of large numbers of
[1404]KGB officers, including GRIBANOV and GUK. From what
[1405]RESHETNYAK sald, ® thought the KGB might go so far
[1407]source
[1410]i]
[1411]i
[1413]i
[1415]t
[1417]4
[1418]1
[1419]|
[1421]“TS No. 197124
[1423]1 waleat mnt Denies
[1425]'
[1428]eee perp semen eS
[1429]Cota
[1430]wvatecanth Seah
[1432]pein 7 eee
[1434]3
[1435]i
[1438]Sade Sebel ete ee SRT ARSE PE RID YET RO AOTC TE RANE Ta AEN es ret te AL ie eS
[1440]December 1964 (continued)
[1442](Annex A) - Se oy “ , ot
[1444]as to send someone to the United States to Locate and kill
[1445]NOSENKO. i
[1449]later identified RESHETHYAK as a KGB
[1451]officer.)
[1453]Comment: NOSENKO identified RESHETNYAK as a Ukrainian
[1454]Ministry of Foreign Affaire officer on the
[1455]staff of the Disarmament Delegation. .
[1457]29 January 1905
[1459]According to” toa sensitive source
[1461]Pacer employees that GRIBANOV was expelled from the KGB and
[1462]CPSU and is now on pension, parttal ratrer than full, as a
[1463]result of the NOSENKO defection. When NOSENKO was being
[1464]considcred for assignuent to Geneva (in 1964), a summary -
[1466]statement of his activities was prepared in the Second Chief
[1468]Directorate and sent to GRIBANOV. Thie summary contained
[1469]considerable. “coupromtsing information", concerning NOSENKO;
[1470]if acted upon properly, it would have tenoved hin frow
[1471]consideration for this trip. GRIHANOV read the summary -
[1472]material, ran a line through all of it, and, added the note-
[1473]tion: "Send him to Geneva." The general. feeling is that
[1474]GRIBANOV was willing to. overlook ‘a lot of NOSENKO's _ os
[1475]deficiencies because of GRIBANQV's long-time friendsht{p .
[1476]with NOSENKO's father.
[1478]- Haw thw
[1480]Comment: NOSENKO originally asserted that GRIBANOV
[1481]was responsible for sending him to Geneva in.
[1482]1964, but after retracting his claim that .
[1483]GRIBANOV had played any special role in his
[1485]“ros sums assignments, ha asserted that BANNIKOV. approved
[1486]: the 1964 trip. . NOSENKO-denies that his father
[1487]cs and GRIBANOV were acquainted. i 7
[1491]ear sres
[1493]"hak BR tarke anal
[1495]Sem ate ite AS heme
[1498]14-0000
[1500](Annex A) ‘ : . . :
[1502]5 & February 1965
[1503]"According to a ro a sensitive source from a’ KGB officer
[1505]Prior to NOSENKO' 8!
[1506]Chief of 2 department in the
[1507]“Walle working in the Seventh
[1508](Surveillance) Direccorate in Moocow, C3NaReis on three the KGB officer,
[1509]separate occasions participated in conferences between
[1510]“inportant people” of the Second Chief Directorate and the ;
[1511]Seventh Directorate. NOSENKO was present at all of these. !
[1512]Although SOSENEO was a Deputy Chief he held only the rank a
[1513]¢f captain an the AGB. @QBBMaB acteriftuced this (the the KGB officer |
[1514]- . disparity between tub and rank) to the influence which i
[1515]GRIBANGY exerted un the behalf of NOSE
[1517]: defection he was seputy to the
[1518]fi , Second Chief Directorate.
[1520]the KGB officer s
[1521]Consent: NOSENKO has never identified Qhuene NOSENKO : -
[1522]alvays claimed that he had been a lieutenant '
[1524]colonel in the KC3 until Cctober 1966, when he
[1526]retracted that claim and asserted that he had :
[1527]been ouly a captain.
[1529]According to a sensitive source from a KGB officer ' | 4
[1531]2k xe ‘GRIBANOV has been diszissed from |
[1533]the KCs, expe!led from the CPSU, and is presently living on ' .
[1535]* a small persion. His dismissal occurred immediately after ‘
[1536]NOSENKO'’s cefection. In addition, not less than 50 other ‘ : :
[1537]people were dismiszed, many of whom were close friends of :
[1538]GRIBANOV. Most of these were From the First and Second
[1539]Chief Directorates, with the mafority from the Second Chief
[1540]Directorate. The present Acting Chief of the Second Chief
[1541]Directorate is a Mafor General BANNIK, whose appointment
[1542]has vot yet been approved by the Central Committee of the
[1544]CPSU. One of his deputies is a Major General (7.A.)
[1545]SECHERBAK.
[1547].
[1550]ages LA IER os ae arts cage”
[1551]wu a ee
[1553]eC oR ae eas a .
[1555]18. Not 197124 rel
[1557]ae amen wscione tennant ont! Spee BEA
[1560]14-0000
[1562](Annex A) . . : -
[1564]8 February 1965 (continued)
[1566]Cormest: GRISANOV was reported in operarional confiact
[1568]with a sentor Western diplomac until late
[1569]autumn 1964 (almost a vear after NISENKO's
[1570]defection’, when he turne? over that contact
[1571]to another KGB officer.
[1573]G February, 1965
[1575]-According to a source from a XGB officer
[1577]se} IA we he amount of danage caused
[1578]by NOSES: 3's defection is “unpredictable”. NJSENKO knew
[1579]few empicyees of the Tirst Chief Directorate working abroad,
[1580]but knew many such employees serving in KGB Headquarters by
[1581]virtue cf seeing them {tu the dining room thich ts reserved
[1582]fer chiefs and deputy chiefs of KGB departments.
[1584]Eariy June 1965
[1585]According to a sensitive source
[1587](Pr conversations with KGS officers 5
[1588]: Major General BANNIKOV is curcently
[1589]temporary Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, having
[1590]replaced GRISAN9V who was expelled from the KG3 because he
[1591]Supported NCSENKO in his career. GRIBANOV is working in a-
[1592]small city outside Moscow aa the chiei of security at an
[1593]unimportant military plant and ts now a “nothing”.
[1595]i
[1596]i
[1597]de
[1598]1
[1600]ate
[1608]rot
[1611]14-0000
[1613]A)
[1615]15 Jul; 1965 .
[1616]According to a sensitive source froz a . xCB of ficer
[1618]een, wha attended the Hos cow meeting deseritenye A meeting
[1620], of all First Chief Directorate _peraonnel at KGB Headquarters - . a
[1621]was held con 15 July 1965. The meeting was devoted to “he : a Be
[1623]: ; i 4
[1624]cfreumstances ef the expulsion of.thé Chief of the Second : 4
[1625](Britis) Department of the First Chief Directorate, Ye. A. | } a
[1626]TARABRINS, about three and a half seaths earlier. I.A. BELOV i H “4
[1628]| : 4
[1630]official statezents made at the meeting, after the defection
[1631]of NOSENKO the KGB conducted an extensive investigation to
[1632]getermine which enployees knew him and the nature of théir
[1633]relationship. Curing this 1ARABRIN was questioned; he said
[1634]he knew NGSENKO, Lut only casually and only because of limited
[1635]contacts within the KGB. The-investigation determined, how-
[1636]ever, that TARABRIN attended several parties at which NOSENKO
[1637]was present, Girls tnvited by NOSENKO were also there.
[1638]described one such party. Thereafter, TARABRIN was
[1640]afforded a hearing and was accussed of willfully concealing \.-
[1641]ource wital information.
[1643]i
[1644]i and other officers also attended che meeting. According to
[1646]As a result he was expelled from the KGB oo
[1647]and the CPSU and was deprived of all pension rights. . 1
[1650]\ |
[1651]: Comment: KOSENKO had wost recently asserted that he met. }
[1652]q GRIBANOV soctally only three tines during his
[1653]KG3 service, and on each occasion TARABRIN was
[1654]Present. NOSENKO said he twice provided girls
[1655]for GRIBANOV and TARABRIN, once in October or
[1656]November 1963 in circumstances similar to those
[1657]referred to. NOSENKO said chat TARABRIN was
[1658]Chief of the British Department from 1958 to
[1659]1963, when he became Deputy Chief of “Service
[1660]to. 2", the reorganized Counterintelligence
[1661]Department of the First Chief Directorate. :
[1663]we tad acide
[1666]14-0000
[1669]7
[1674]af NOSENKO's cefection, many :
[1675]sallei fran 1s: Patziy, ated |
[1676]Lk. : i-RLE Caeirzan SERIV, and Seconéi
[1677]Chief “Sirectorate. Chief GRIBANOV had been expelled from the :
[1678]Party anc from the KGh. GRIBANOV had been especially
[1680]friendly with SOSENKU, had givea him many privileges, and
[1682]. they were "buddies and night buddles".
[1686]i
[1687]i
[1689]Comment: SEMICHASTNYY, not SEROV, was KGB Chairman in
[1690]1965. SEXOVY became head of the GRU in 1958.
[1692]Winter 1965-1966
[1693]Source, a
[1695]Salt ows Soave
[1697]self-professed former. XGB Second
[1698]Chief Directcrate agent (from KGB officer V.G. SVIRIN, a
[1699]colleague of her cone and at the State Conmittee for Scfence
[1702]that SVIRIN was later head of a KGB unit conducting operations 1
[1703]against the American Embassy in Moscow): i
[1705]3
[1706]4
[1708]NOSENKO's father was a Minister or General and his cother
[1709]was Jevish and "always ‘involved in some blackmarketeering”
[1710]NOSENKO was not a KGB officer put a “civilian” connected
[1711]somehow with the KGB. then KOSENKO defected, everyone said
[1712]he was detestable. NUSENKO told the Americans about the
[1713]microphones and things (sic) in the Embassy.
[1715]BRU er ete be whee eR oc ney concer er RE eG DE ae TAME TE sadchenedaanewe trestle Neetemima cnet A et
[1718]14-0000
[1720]‘eaters
[1722]Tep Secret
[1724](Annex A) : ; *
[1726]Winter 1965-1964 (continued). ; _ . 7
[1728]allegation {s the single report
[1729]describing NOSENKO as other than
[1731]i
[1732]Source’ S . . |
[1733]|
[1735]any
[1737]Janes
[1739]PE es
[1741]a KGS officer.
[1745]Marck 1966 _ ‘ 4
[1746]According to a sensitive source, : a
[1748]: 2 NOSENHO, |
[1750]‘who was not personally known vo A Was an important Source 3
[1752]vee w boss: in.the KOBS. «When: NOSENKO was a young man, he was in : 4
[1754]the GRU Mild:iary Acadeny and was then sent to the GRU |
[1755]Information Department for a short time; in all, perheps
[1756]for a year. NOSENKO had been a very undisciplined person i
[1757]while in the GRU and "not very good". He wan to have.been i '
[1758]discharged from the GRU; however, his father, who was a very i tt 4
[1759]influential person in the Ministry of Shipbuilding, was’ ,
[1760]able to get NOSENKO trarco*--red to the KGB. It was the opinion
[1762]Source of persons, to whom Ptalked that NOSENKO had. given
[1763]very, very. good information to the U.S. after his defection .
[1764]and that NOSENKO had had great access to KGB infornation !
[1765].which included all means of KGB coverage of people in 7 ; , .
[1766]Moscow, microptione systems in the embassies, etc. Based on | i :
[1767]NOSENKO's information the American Embassy found many of the ....-.... ‘
[1768]microphones. : t
[1770]volte om . yar
[1772]Tame
[1774]lpaarce
[1776]14-0000
[1778]erie
[1780]ed
[1782]sha,
[1784]Fast ere rae aeeneu! set
[1786]“ment
[1788]“Aeadeay w
[1790]NOSESEO has claimed that h rejected an offer
[1791]to attend the Military Diplomatic Academ.
[1793]abich he, like ype; called che “GRU Source
[1795]Military Ag “ademy), by choice accepting assign-
[1796]. “the Far East on entry to the GRU fin
[1797]the time, the Military Diplomatte
[1799]a four-year course; if NOSENKO
[1801]did attend the school, he could not heve
[1802]setvel asthe claimed in che GRU. C@edE is Source
[1803]the sole, source (Lesides NOSENKO) whe alleged
[1805]SENKO, ‘sérved in the GRU.
[1807]1953. At.
[1809]4
[1811]pect eicadtis atl Ed vatn tea
[1813]A
[1815]ares
[1817]ee waar casthatobcatcdl Seedy Oo a
[1819]Chace
[1821]etal de wes SERRE!
[1824](Arner AY. ‘ -_ . . Poo _ a
[1826]prceaeiaeeal
[1828]‘pe we tess
[1830]oaTaa a
[1831]Bie ota “stat seer nar
[1833]1 6 SFa
[1835]a5 =ESG
[1837]eee on SL EeEart ee arene
[1838]BP FP Pe PE GAB ES Be eh. Eee rae peri orettnaers
[1840]2 BCC G RI i ERT ONE — 2 e
[1841]SAF Da SL CRG BB
[1843]Taree
[1845]Bet ALS
[1847][se]
[1849]eae etn Serge tee
[1850]4, POS. 5 oo ee Bee A
[1852]Gh EE ee dae: % i ARTES BE BE ERATE
[1853]a pee ae aerate a ba oe Spe Bg
[1854]' tt sg ARE Pars w edad
[1855]% Selita: I SOMTOR Hn Petes Os oemre |
[1856]ERwin oda sutie Dd ee ie SELTETALT oe ede sags er
[1858]CB STP RY M2 A a
[1860]ry
[1862]a
[1864]|
[1865]'
[1866]a
[1867]H
[1868]'
[1869]1
[1871]i
[1872],
[1874]'
[1876]Geter it ars Sat Saal BE OFM LT A SEER ee PEN, CTRL we ;
[1877](Uta Gist AERGM CRY KALE EERO THD oa
[1878]ie BIEL SRY CSOT 9 12 C, BR ER SES CTO i PRT
[1879]amtrae (Rees Penies SUBSE EA ANE SVEN SAE Le 7:
[1880]POSEAT LS RR LET a
[1882]Tic Boe TTA
[1885]- “TS No.. 197124
[1886]. Copy. 10.
[1888]27 IN LAUT EE Ecc Ne ;
[1890]Bane
[1894]i
[1895]yeh oe on
[1896]a ew ald a Le Fiat!
[1898]y
[1900]& Pinseascua leg. -*
[1906]14-0000
[1908]D8 apt pngiae ses ya een ean PO helt og stats
[1910]Mid-1966
[1912]Yurty Dmitriyevich KOROLEV, a Soviet journalist, visited
[1913]Paris and spoke: with representatives of the French magazine
[1914]Paria Match. KOROLEV indicated that he would like to serve
[1915]48 a stringer for the French journal and proposed that he
[1917]- begin with a atory on the life ofthe family of a "Sovier
[1918]secret agent”. Ag KOROLEV apoke only broken French and ~
[1920]Englieah, the magazine ataff did not seriously pursue the
[1921]matter at that tine.
[1923]Comment: KOROLEV is believed identical with YurfLy FROROLEV
[1924]who, as of 1964, was employed part-time for
[1925]the United Press International Moscow corres~
[1926]pondent, Henry SHAPLRO, whoo both NOSENKO and
[1927]GOLITSYN have identified as an agent of the KGB
[1928]Second Chief Directorate. KOROLEV has travelled
[1929]previously to Brussels as a correspondeut for
[1930]the Soviet publication Sputnik, 2ad to Japan
[1931]and the United States es s correspondent for
[1932]Novosti, the Soviet news Agency. The offer by
[1933]an official Soviet press representative. of
[1934]information on a "Soviet secret agent", which
[1936]: : turned out to refer to NOSENKO, is without
[1937]. precedent.
[1939]October 1956
[1941]Soviet Journalist Yu. D. KOROLEV returned to Paris with
[1942]o an interpreter to renew his offer to Peris Match editors to..
[1943]Provide a story on the life of the family of a “Soviet secret
[1944]agent", The story «as to concern NOSENKO's family and their
[1946]rs
[1949]veer Fle ts Stat bat tae
[1951]wrestedhnl 5
[1953]toe
[1955]14-0000
[1957]Me)
[1959]», knew these matters better chan\t
[1961]CAnnex A) : ; oe
[1962]Setober 1946 (continued)
[1964]Statement KOKULEV provided Parts Match editors stated:
[1965]"NOSENKO, ahout 36-438, an officer of the Soviet Secret Polic
[1966]Organization, defected to the USA without his family about
[1967]two years a6 and asi.ed for polittieal asylum in the U.S.:
[1969]life in Moseuw since NOSENKO's defeccion. A short background
[1970]e
[1972]it was granted to him. This was the mest serious defeat of :
[1973]the Soviet Security organs as NOSENKO occupied important
[1974]positions fn vesptlonape and counterespionape departments and
[1976]also was clowely acquainted with the ccuntry's leading
[1977]families and tomes. - NOSENKO!s "family consists of a wife,
[1978]35, two dauyhturs, 10 and 12, a@ mother and a younger brother.
[1979]The family tu nee prosecuted (sic) but feel very badly adout |
[1980]the incident (the defection}. Very soon the wife will apply!
[1981]to the International Lawyers Organization fur a divorce and '
[1982]Compensation, Jt is possible that this case will be given.
[1983]nuch publictty, His wife has not heard from him since he
[1984]cefected, but tt is obvious chat he is still in the USA."
[1985]KUROLEV displayed a photo spread showing NOSENKO's wife and
[1986]family going about their daily affairs in Moscow, and :
[1987]indicated that additional photographs of NOSENKO's family i
[1988]could be obtained and that intarviews with then and with
[1990]others knowlny NOSENKO could be arranged for a Paris Match °
[1991]correspondent, :
[1993]i
[1995]Lomment: A divorce from a defector from the Soviet Union,
[1996]who is legally considered to be an enemy of the
[1997]_Gtate, is granted automatically upon the wife's;
[1999]Tequest. ,
[2001](from personal knowledge): Referring to his own |
[2003]ge of KGB organization, @gqe said if NOSENKO heard
[2004]his explanation, he would call
[2006]because he had’ served
[2007]at KGB lleadquarters longer. ;
[2009]be
[2011]28 January 1%) 7 y
[2013]a child, since NOSENKS
[2015]Seer
[2018]14-00000 4. 5 ” ’ Co a
[2019]4 dg :
[2020]teat aR Rd urges
[2022](Annex:-A) i , . ae wt
[2024]3 February 1967
[2026]i x “According toa “sensitive source
[2027]map (from unidentified GRU sources in Moscow)?
[2029]NOSENKO worked only in kU Information Deaparenent of the GRU,
[2030]and only for about five or six months, after which he went
[2031]“to the KGB. :
[2033]May 1967
[2034]ae “According to a sensitive source
[2036]Ne worked. on it, knew
[2037]al about it and exposed the whole system of work. He knew
[2038]all the posts, the sources (fev words unclear) he knew all
[2039]the surveillance groups and knew survetllants by sight.
[2041]4 According to a sensitive source
[2044]; NOSENKO worked in the Gav In rmation Department he worked
[2045]i only fi the Center (Headquarters) in Moscow. We worked badly
[2046]there, and received bad efficiency reports, as a reault of
[2047]which he had argunents. Then with hia father's help he went
[2049]to the KGB.
[2051]- 5S. June 1967.
[2052]According to a. sensitive source
[2053](Hest ESSA PrP aneee y: There had been some
[2054]. Kes sucpicions ef Pa vel Fedorovich SHAKHOV while he was ia
[2055]. Geneva, because he had allegedly had many American contacts
[2056]~cowhich he had not reported, and NOSENKO vas sent to Geneva .to
[2058]SHAKHOV.
[2060]‘Comment: NOSENKO claims he was sent to Geneva in 1962
[2061]to investiyate SHAKHOV.
[2063]investigate him. Rezident KULEBYAKIN is still suspicious of
[2067]Moone te
[2071]an Teal