[1]124-10185-10214) | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
[3]. . “ «
[4]ly “ya _DAVIDL BOREN, DELANDLIA CHARMAN SECRET
[5]sl * + WILUAM 5. COHEN, MAINE, VICE CHAIRUAN
[7]tet
[8]. iW HAT
[10]SAH KUNN, GEORGIA GRPUH HATCH, UTA
[11]ERNEST F, HOLLINGS, SOUTH CAROUNA FRANK MURKOWSEL ALASKA
[13]BILL BRADLEY, NEW JERSEY ARLEN SPECTER, PEANSYLY:
[14]CALIFORNIA JOHN WARNE!
[16]Sion. Seno Wited States whe
[18]SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE -_ :
[20]GEGRGE MCTCHEL, MAINE, EX OFFICIO. ‘
[21]AODERT DOLE, KANSAS, EX OFFICIO WASHINGTON, OC 205 10-6475
[22]“GEORGE J, TENET, STAFF OCRECTOR -
[23]JAMES 1. DYSTRA, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR
[24]L BATT SNIDER. GENERAL COUNSEL
[25]KATHLEEN P, MEGHEE, COEF CLEAK ; Fe 990
[27]"90 FEB-20 9:22 PM
[28]SSCI #90-505
[30]The Honorable James A. Baker, III
[31]Secretary of State
[33]- Department of State
[34]‘Washington, D.C. 20520
[36]Dear Secretary Baker:
[37]- A s
[38]The Senate Intelligence Committee, as part of the annual
[40]‘budget authorization process, will hold a hearing on U.S.
[41]counterintelligence and security programs on May 10, 1990, in
[42]Room SH-219 of the Hart Senate Office Building. We request
[43]that you make available to testify at that hearing Mr. Ivan
[44]Selin, Undersecretary of. State for Management. Other
[45]witnesses invited to testify are FBI Director William 8.
[46]Sessions, Mr., Ted Price, the announced successor to Mr.
[47]Gardner Hathaway as CIA Associate Deputy Director for 7
[48]Operations and head of the CIA Counterintelligence Center;
[49]and Mr. Rich Haver, Special Assistant to the Secretary of
[50]Defense for Intelligence. |
[52]We are asking all witnesses to be prepared to discuss
[53]with the Committee the results of the Administration's review
[54]of counterintelligence and security programs for the 1990s,
[55]whether recent changes in the threat and operating
[56]environment require modifying objectives in the 1990s, and
[57]the implications for NFIP and non-NFIP resource allocation,
[58]program direction, and possible legislation. The hearing
[59]will also consider issues identified in testimony from a
[60]group of prominent citizens scheduled for March 22, and. we
[61]will be in touch with you further on those matters.
[63]We would like Mr. Selin to address in his written
[64]testimony and be prepared to discuss the following questions:
[65](1) To what extent has political change -in the Soviet Union
[66]and Eastern Europe affected their intelligence threat in the
[67]1990s and the requirements for CI operations and security
[68]measures against, that threat? (2) To what extent do other
[69]traditional threats, such as the PRC and Cuba, require
[70]greater attention in the 1990s? (3) What are the emerging
[71]threats in the 1990s from third world and "friendly" |
[72]intelligence services, as well as narcotics traffickers and
[73]terrorists? (4) What new challenges do technological —
[74]advances and transfers to criteria countries and terrorist
[75]-groups pose in the 1990s? - (5) What are the consequences of
[76]these changing threats for embassy security. prioritieé and.
[77]protection of diplomatic, military, and a
[79]Lose (NG
[81]“8
[84]"Sry snabert NOW ARSE Som waaeta Vaan ®
[85]eee Se = Wnlted States Denare
[87]7 GELECT COMMITTEE OM INTELLIGENCE
[88]SONG WTO UL, MANE Bt OFROD WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6476
[90]wT #00 courte, ,
[91]cATULON? McONtE CiOl? CLERK February 7, 1990 .
[92]SSCI #90-507
[94]The Honorable William Sessions
[96]Director
[98]Federal Bureau of Investigation -
[100]J. Edgar Hoover Building ;
[101]Washington, D.C. 20535 .
[103]Dear Director Sessions:
[105]The Senate Intelligence Committee, as part of the annual -
[106]budget authorization process, will hold a hearing -on U.S.
[107]counterintelligence and security programs on May 10, 1990, in
[108]Room SH-219 of the Hart Senate Office Building. We invite you
[109]to testify at that hearing as FBI Director and as chairman of
[110]the DCI's Advisory Group on Counterintelligence. Other ~— _
[111]witnesses invited to testify are Undersecretary of State Ivan
[113]Selin, Mr, Ted Price, the announced successor to Mr. Gardner *
[114]Hathaway as CIA Associate Deputy Director for Operations and .
[115]head of the CYA Counterintelligence Center, and Mr. ch Haver, —
[117]Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.
[119]We are asking all witnesses to be prepared to discuss with
[120]the Committee the results of the Administration’s review of ~
[121]counterintelligence and security programs for the 1990s, =
[122]whether recent changes in the threat and operating environment
[123]require modifying objectives in the 1990s, and the implications
[124]for NFIP and non-NFIP resource allocation, program direction,
[125]and possible legislation. The hearing will also consider .°- |
[126]issues identified in testimony. from a group of prominent. “,
[127]citizens scheduled for March 22, and we will be in touch with -
[128]you further on those matters. os
[130]We would like you to address in your written testimony and
[131]| be prepared to discuss the following questions: (1) What are
[132]the results of the Administration's review of counter-
[133]intelligence and security programs to. meet the needs of the
[134]1990s? (2) How will the Administration coordinate national
[135]policy in these areas? (3) What national policy initiatives
[136]are required for the 1990s, i.e., personnel security standards,
[137]actions to deter leaks? (4) To what extent has political
[138]change in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe diminished their
[139]intelligence threat in the 1990s and the requirements for CI
[140]; operations and security measures against that threat? (5) To
[141]what extent do other traditional threats, such as the PRC and
[142]Cuba, require greater attention in the 1990s? (6) What are the
[143]emerging threats in the 1990s from third world and "friendly"
[144]intelligence services, as well as narcotics traffickers and
[146]ba-He2is— [75
[149]ah rd
[152]"and the requirements for CI operations and security measures.
[154]‘are FBI Director William 8, Sessions, Undersecretary of State
[156]Wnited States Senate
[158]SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
[159]WASHINGTON, OC 20510-0475
[161]February 7, 1990
[163]SSCI #90-S06
[165]The Honorable William H. Webster
[166]Director of Central Intelligence
[167]Central Intelligence Agency
[168]Washington, D.C. 20505 ; :
[170]Dear Judge Webster:
[172]- The Senate Intelligence Committee, as part of the annual
[173]budget authorization process, will hold a hearing on U.S,
[174]counterintelligence and security programs on May 10, 1990, in
[175]Room SH~219 of the Hart Senate Office Building. We request
[176]that you make available to testify at that hearing Mr. Ted
[177]Price, the announced successor to Mr. Gardner Bathaway as
[178]Associate Deputy Director for Operations and head of the CIA
[179]Counterintelligence Center. Other witnesses invited to testify
[181]Ivan Selin, and Mr. Rich Haver, Special Assistant to the
[182]Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. | .
[184]We are asking all witnesses to be prepared to discuss with
[185]the Committee the results of the Administration's review of
[186]counterintelligence and security programs for the 1990s,
[187]whether recent changes in the threat and operating environment
[188]require modifying objectives in the 1990s, and the implications
[189]for NFIP and non-NFIP resource allocation, program direction, ov
[190]and possible legislation. The hearing will also consider at
[191]issues identified in testimony from a group of prominent : [f :
[192]citizens scheduled for March 22, and we will be in touch with
[193]you further on those matters. —
[195]We would like Mr. Price to address in his written
[196]testimony and be prepared to discuss the -following questions:
[197](1) To what extent has political change in the Soviet Union and
[198]Eastern Europe affected their intelligence threat in the 1990s
[200]against that threat? (2) To what extent do other traditional
[201]threats, such as the PRC and Cuba, require greater attention in
[202]the 1990s? (3) What are the emerging threats in the 1990s from
[203]third world and "friendly" intelligence services, as well as ,
[204]narcotics traffickers and terrorists? (4) What new challenges
[205]do technological’ advances and transfers to criteria countries
[206]and terrorist groups pose in the 1990s? (5) What are the
[207]consequences of these changing threats for operations and :
[208]security at CIA stations, embassy security priorities, and :
[209]protection of military, diplomatic, and intelligence secrets? °
[210](6) Are US computer and 4 - PAs y efforts
[212]Za an
[214]wood .
[215]woods, Amat
[216]Mets eS
[218]br SOUTH CAROLINA reentnetse °
[219]4 OWSKL ALASKA
[220]ee renee ARLEN SPECTER, POINSTLYAEA OFFICE oF WE rr
[222]SSCI #90-508
[224]The Honorable Dick Cheney
[225]Secretary of Defense.
[227]The Pentagon
[229]Washington, D.C. 20301
[231]Dear Secretary Cheney:
[233]' The Senate Intelligence Committee, as part of the annual
[234]budget authorization process, will hold a hearing on U.S.
[235]-counterintelligence and security programs on May 10, 1990, in
[236]Room SH-219 of the Hart Senate Office: Building. We request
[238]' that you make available to testify at that hearing Mr. Rich
[239]-Haver, Special Assistant. to the Secretary of Defense for
[240]Intelligence. Other witnesses invited to testify at this
[241]hearing are FBI Director William S. Sessions, Mr. Ivan Selin,
[242]Undersecretary of State for Management, and Mr. Ted Price,
[243]the announced successor to Mr. Gardner Hathaway as CIA
[244]Associate Deputy Director for Operations and head of the CIA
[245]Counterintelligence Center.
[247]We are asking all witnesses to be prepared to discuss
[248]with the Committee the results of the Administration's review
[249]of counterintelligence and security programs for the 1990s,
[250]whether recent changes in the threat and operating
[251]environment require modifying objectives in the 1990s, and
[252]the implications for NFIP and non-NFIP resource allocation,
[253]program direction, and possible legislation. The hearing
[254]will also consider issues identified in the testimony from a
[255]group of prominent citizens scheduled for March 22, and we
[256]will be in touch with you further on those matters.
[258]We would like Mr. Haver to address in his written
[259]_ testimony and be prepared to discuss the following questions:
[260](1) What are the results of his review of DoD counter-|
[261]intelligence which you stated was “an early and high
[262]priority" in your letter of May 31, 1989? (2) To what extent
[263]has political change in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
[264]diminished their intelligence threat in the 1990s and the
[265]-requirements for CI operations and security measures against
[266]that threat? (3) To what extent do other traditional
[267]threats, such as the PRC and Cuba, require greater attention
[268]in the 1990s? (4) What are the emerging threats in the 1990s
[269]from third world and "friendly" intelligence services, as
[270]well as narcotics traffickers and terrorists? (5} What new
[271]challenges do technological advances and transfers to
[272]criteria countries and terrorist groups pose in the 1990s?
[273](6) What are the consequences of these changing threats ope
[275]a
[277]a nae ht Oe
[279]MEAN GANSTON. pesurania * oKKw ; a: tee
[280]Se So B United States Sen cre ne
[281]5 ; SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELUGENCE u | [fs 393
[282]oro roR Aaa eee WASHINGTON, De 20810-4478 é9
[283]GEORGE 2. TENET, STAFF \
[284]wonton
[285]RATHLEEN P, McGHEE, CHIEF CLERK _ February: 7, 1990
[287]ZIG
[288]_X52444
[291]Memornadum to Director, FBI
[293]12, ISSUE: The Committee believes the FBI does not share all
[295]information contain in its files with other members of the
[297]intelligence community when asked and that a centralized file would
[298]‘ensure full information is available to all intelligence agencies.
[300]QUESTION: What are the advantages and disadvantages of a single
[302]database for CIA, FBI, and DOD?
[304]RECOMMENDATIONS: 1. That the INTD, ASD, CID, and RMD prepare
[305]responses for the questions identified above and submit those
[306]questions to the Congressional Affairs Office by close of business
[307]April 5, 1989 in the format currently in use classified as appro-
[308]riate with a heading for issue, question, summary response, details,
[309]and approval signed by the appropriate Assistant Director or Deputy
[310]Assistant Director and date signed. a,
[312]_ APPROVED: , S¢-fidm. Sono,
[314]. Crim. Inv
[315]Ident.
[316]Director. __. Inepecti
[318]&xec. AD-Adm. _ Intel:
[319]" Exec, AD-Inv. Laborato:
[320]" Exec, ADLES —___ Legal Coun.
[322]Off. of Cang. & A etsy
[324]of Lia,
[325]intl Affe. “a
[326]_ Rec. Mgmt.
[327]Tech, Servs.
[328]Training ———__.
[330]2. .That the Congressional Affairs Office coordinate the
[331]preparation of briefing materials and prepare the Director's opening
[332]statement and briefing book. Mor ;
[334]Exec. AD-Adm, __ I
[335]Exec. AD-Inv, _- mta
[337]APPROVED: “Adm. Servs, :
[338]. i> Grim. Inv.
[339]lent, :
[340]Director me DHE aint Af
[343]oes ry Tech,
[344]Exec, AD-LES —_ Legal cout, traning = ——t
[347]' + GAMIDL SORE CHLAHONA, CHAIRMAN OG : ‘ : Some
[348]"gb. ce" LIAS. CONDE MANE, Vice CHARON . ;
[349]WHUAM Y. : ae .
[351]a so  *Wnited States te
[353]eoeenr WEST VIRGDIA, EX OFFICIO WASHINGTON, DC 205 10-6475
[354]ROBERT DOLE KANSAS, EX OFFICIO #88-3613
[356]DYKSTRA, CLERK .
[357]RATHLEON P MCGEE, CHIEF October 17, 1988
[359]Honorable William Sessions .
[360]Director
[362]Federal Bureau of Investigation
[363]Washington, D.C. 20535 —
[365]Dear Director Sessions:
[367]The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence is ;
[368]conducting a comprehensive review of U.S. counterintelligence
[369]| and security programs and capabilities. Included in this
[370]: review will be Executive branch efforts to stem the flow of
[371]sensitive technology and equipment to foreign governments.
[373]Recent press reporting has alleged that such transfers
[374]have been made by the military offices of Egypt and Israel.
[375]Accordingly, I request that the FBI brief the Committee staff ‘
[376]on any unauthorized transfer of technology and equipment from
[377]the United States by the Egyptians and by the Israelis. For
[378]the latter, we are particularly interested in any role played
[379]in these transfers by the Israeli Defense Procurement Mission
[380]and Trade Center in. New York.
[382]Sincerely,
[384]“David L. Boren
[386]vVige Chairman
[388]= UST HBIS/ 777
[390]boot — _
[393]ad oe r7
[394]ny a
[397]Exec AD Adm__
[398]Exec AD Inv__
[399]Exec AD LES
[400]Asst.Dir.:
[401]Adm.Servs.__
[403]Crim.Inv.
[404], ; ‘ : . Ident.__
[405]To ; Mr. Ss. M. ey Date 4/20/88 nsP-__
[406]‘ : : , Intell.
[407]. : Lab,
[408]From ae ‘Legal Couns.__
[410]Oo. ‘ 7 Public Affs.___
[411]ot } Subject 3, SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE (SSCTI) OLTA__
[412]~~ REQUEST TO DISCUSS THE OFFICE OF LIAISON AND. Rec. Mant. _
[413]‘ INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (OLIA) AND THE Tech. Servs.___
[414]' COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SITUATION IN WEST BERLIN: Training__
[416]Telephone Rme_
[417]Director's Sec'y
[419]This communication is classified SECRET. - oo
[421]Reference memorandum captioned as above dated 4/14/88.
[423]To set forth results of briefing « of John Eliff,
[424]Professional Staff, SSCI, conducted by Office of Congressional
[425]Public. Affairs Supervisory Special Agent John S. Hooks, Jr., Unit
[426]Chief Roland 0. L'Aliier, Jr., Intelligence Division, and
[428]OLIA Deputy Chief Martin V. Hale on the issue of Federal Bureau
[429]of Investigation (FBI) xvepresentation in Berlin.
[431]0 TION: re oe . Cog
[433]- . None, for information only.
[435]]
[437]|
[439]| . Servs, Olt. of Cong.
[440]APPROVED: oan. i & Public Aff
[442]Ident, _______ Ol of kia,
[444]Dirdetor Inspection ———_____ & Intl. Affe!
[445]Exec. AD-Adm, __— Intali. Rec. Mg
[446]Exec. AD-nv. __-. Laboratory. Toon, Se
[447]Exec. AD-LES ___- Lega! Coun. Training
[449]- S. M. McWeeney A \ =
[450]- J. H. Geer - os ; I }
[451]Attn: J. E. Tomlinson ; Mt A
[452]J. K. O'Brien:
[454]“Attn: J. S. Hooks, Jr.. ‘ ; ,
[455]- S. A. Pimentel
[456]- T. E. Crosson
[457]- M. V. Hale
[459]PLN)
[461]PREP FP FR
[462]'
[464]SECRET a,
[465]Classified by: 3642-
[466]Declassify on:
[468]: _ . (CONTINUED = OVER)
[469]|
[471]‘|
[473]Ry
[475]| 1 BEC $2 1968
[478]SECRET
[480]Memorandum from M. V. Hale to Mr. S. M. McWeeney :
[482]Re: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCT)
[483]Request to Discuss the Office of Liaison and.
[484]International Affairs (OLIA) and the
[485]Counterintelligence Situation in West Berlin
[489]Mr. Hale opened the session, advising Mr. Eliff that, on
[490]his recent trip to Western Europe to visit certain U. S.
[491]Embassies and establishments, including the U. S. Mission in
[492]West Berlin, where Legal Attaches were desired and needed, he had
[493]conferred with appropriate U. S. military, U. S. Department of
[494]State (USDS) and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) personnel in
[495]order to present the FBI's case for representation in .
[496]West Berlin. During these discussions, Mr. Hale was advised that
[497]staff members of the SSCI had recently visited West Berlin
[498]concerning counterintelligence issues and Mr. Hale, in that
[499]context, wished to brief Mr. Eliff regarding the FBI's
[500]perspectives on opening a Legal Attache, particularly from a
[501]counterintelligence point of view. -
[503]Mr. Eliff stated that although he had not recently
[504]visited West Berlin, he was intimately. familiar with the .
[505]intricacies of the counterintelligence atmosphere in West Berlin
[506]and supported the FBI's presence there. He indicated he was well
[507]aware of the gap which existed in the counterintelligence
[508]coverage of U. S. civilians, both students and businessmen in
[509]that neither the U. S. military nor the U. S. civilian |
[510]intelligence intelligence components were addressing the threat
[511]to these individuals and this for two reasons.
[513]. The first involved the basic functions of the U. S.
[514]intelligence components in West Berlin, a function he described
[515]as being the collection of positive intelligence as opposed to
[516]counterintelligence, the latter being at best a secondary
[517]requirement. ; ot
[519]u
[521](CONTINUED ~ OVER)
[524]a
[526]/ , . SECRET
[528]‘Memorandum from M. V. Hale to Mr. S. M. McWeeney
[530]Re: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI)
[531]Request to Discuss the Office of Liaison and
[532]International Affairs (OLIA). and the
[533]Counterintelligence Situation in West Berlin
[535]DETAILS CONTINUED:
[537]The second reason for this gap involves the legal
[538]guidelines under which the U. S. military, virtue of their
[539]authority of an occupying power in West Berlin, conducts
[540]_ technical surveillarice and mail openings. Mr. ELiff stated that,
[542]as an occupying power, the U. S. military, much like the FBI
[543]domestically, is the entity which conducts telephone monitorings
[544]o£ criteria country establishments and personnel in the U. 8.
[545]sector of West Berlin. It also opens certain mail of interest
[546]from the East which passes through this sector. However,
[547]whenever there is an overhear of a U. S. national or whenever
[548]there is mention made of a U. S. national in a piece of
[549]correspondence, that U. S. national's name is not disseminated to
[550]any other U. S. intelligence agency. This lack of dissemination
[551]is as a result of a lawsuit in the early 1970s against the U. Ss.
[552]Army which, at that time, had in fact been monitoring the
[553]activities of U. S. nationals. As a consequence of this lawsuit,
[554]very stringent guidelines were written which compelled the U. Ss.
[555]‘ military to use the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to
[556]monitor Americans including stringent guidelines for. minimizing
[557]overhears of U. S. nationals when monitoring non U. S. nationals.
[559]The net results of these restrictions is that, according
[560]to Mr. EL1iff, 15 years worth of overhears of U. S. nationals as ~
[561]well as the like potential collection of names of U. S. persons
[563]via mail openings has been lost.
[565]Mr. Eliff advised it was his belief these minimization
[566]restrictions were too stringent and should be amended to allow
[567]for dissemination. He however stated that he thought the issue
[568]should be brought: up after the upcoming elections in that he did
[569]not believe a "lame duck" administration would be interested in
[571]undertaking the issue.
[572](CONTINUED - OVER)
[574]SECRET
[578]so,
[579]np . .
[580]q ’
[582]SECRET |
[584]Memorandum from M. V. Hale to Mr. S. M. McWeeney
[586]Re: Senate Select Committee on:Intelligence (SSCI)
[587]Request to Discuss the Office of Liaison and
[588]International Affairs (OLIA) and the
[589]Counterintelligence Situation in West Berlin
[591]DETAILS CONTINUED:
[593]As an aside, Mr. Eliff indicated that Allan Kornblun,
[594]Office of Intelligence Policy and Review, Department of Justice,
[595]had visited West Berlin on two occasions and was conversant with
[596]this U. S. military monitoring issue.
[598]Mr. Eliff also stated that he further supported an FBI
[599]presence in West Berlin in that his study of the .
[600]counterintelligence venue in that city indicated to him that the
[601]many double agent cases run by the U. S. military there were run
[602]for parochial reasons with no strategic view of
[603]counterintelligence. He stated that even though the U. S.
[604]military services were professional and did coordinate the
[605]turnover of some of their many double agents to the FBI when
[606]these agents are rotated back to domestic assignment, he believed
[607]the FBI should have input at the outset of these double agent
[608].cases insofar as the double agent technique was a fundamental
[609]counterintelligence tool which demanded consultation with the
[610]principle counterintelligence service, the FBI, at their
[611]pacept on in order to better globally address counterintelligence
[615], He stated he believed FBI presence in West Berlin would
[616]therefore be necessary if the U. S. were to have a coherent
[617]national counterintelligence strategy. .
[619]Mr. EBlif£ concluded by reiterating his support for the
[620]FBI's presence in West Berlin, by indicating that he would be
[621]willing, were we to ask, to indicate his support of this position
[622]to the USDS, the U. S. military and the CIA as well as Mr. Jeff
[623]Smith, Chief Staffer for Senator Sam Nunn, the latter also well
[624]versed in counterintelligence issues and a potential strong
[625]supporter of the FBI's cause.
[627]Messrs L'Allier, Hooks, and Hale thanked Mr. Eliff for
[628]his time and indicated that the FBI had designated a new ;
[629]assistant Legal Attache in Bonn whose function would largely be
[630]to travel weekly to West Berlin in order to prepare the FBI's
[631]case for a permanent presence there.
[633]SECRET
[638]UY8
[640]M
[644]t
[646]+. .
[647]_AGENCY INSA} AND CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY {CIA} COMPONENTS |
[648]|
[650]Cc |
[652]PAGE THREE DE H@ DISSSECRET
[653]_it. _ CURRENT FBI RELATIONSHIP WITH THE “NATIONAL SECURITY :
[655]fev-wew-vore. ) tHe STAFF MEMBERS HAVE REQUESTED THAT THEY BE
[657]| GIVEN A TOUR AND BRIEFING AT THE| REGAHUT ACILITY. ACCORDING TO}
[658]-SSCI STAFF. NENBER, NSA HAS. POSED NO “OBJECTIONS 4 AND INTD HAS NO |
[659]| opuectzoNs EITHER. HOWEVER: TOUR AND BRIEFING SHOULD BE HANDLED,
[661]_BY THE SUPERVISOR AND COMMENTARY SHOULD BE GUARDED- UNDER NO
[663]SHOULD ENSUE WITH REGARD TO COVERAGE OF OR PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED
[665]|
[668]I.
[669]CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD TARGETS BE IDENTIFIED, AND NO DISCUSSION |~
[672]I
[676]WITH COVERAGE OF NON-HOSTILE TARGETS.
[678]THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FBI AND CIA SHOULD BE CHARACTERIZED:
[680]_AS EXCELLENT." ; SSCI STAFFER REQUESTED THAT INVITATION BE
[682]Dima “a
[684]R
[686]| EXTENDED ro( new YORK CIA FOREIGN RESOURCE DIVISTON arenx_| J
[687]" REPRESENTATIVE TO ATTEND THIS PORTION OF THE DISCUSSIONS. _ THIS”
[688]"-REQUEST HAS BEEN DENIED, AND SSCI STAFFERS HAVE BEEN ASKED TO
[691]‘.CONGRESS- SSCI STAFFERS HAVE EXPRESSED INTEREST. IN KNOWING
[693]t
[694]|
[695]'
[696]2} UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS AND PROPOSED LEGISLATION BEFORE : Lo
[697]-~VIEWS OF FIELD ON ‘UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS § PROBLEMS.- VALUE, ETC-? ! |
[700]'
[701]i)
[705]1
[706]1
[709]| INTD SUGGESTS DISCUSSION BE CONFINED TO DESCRIBING "SHOPRITE"
[711]sev |
[713]Cys)
[715]JF
[716]LVyC8)