[1]202-10002-10124 | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
[3]AGENCY
[4]RECORD NUMBER
[5]“RECORDS SERIES
[7]ORIGINATOR
[8]FROM
[10]TO
[12]TITOOE
[14]DATE
[16]PAGES
[17]SUBJECTS
[19]DOCUMENT TYPE
[21]CLASSIFICATION :
[23]RESTRICTIONS
[24]CURRENT STATUS
[26]DATE OF LAST REVIEW
[28]OPENING CRITERIA
[29]COMMENTS
[33]Page : 1
[35]JPR ASSASSINATION. SYSTEM
[36]EDENTIPICATION FORM
[38]AGENCY INFORMATION
[40]JCS
[41]202-10002-L0124
[43]: JCS CENTRAL FILES
[44]AGENCY PILE NUMBER :
[46]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[48]OSD
[49]CYRUS R. VANCE
[51]: MULTIPLE RECIPIENTS
[53]CUBAN AFFAIRS IN-THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
[54]06/26/65
[56]27
[58]ICCCA, ADMINISTRATION
[60]PSYCHOLOGICAL PROGRAMS - CUBA
[62]SECOND LATIN AMERICAN YOUTH CONGRESS
[64]POSSIBLE RETALIATORY ACTIONS BY CUBAN GOVERNMENT
[66]PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[67]CONFIDENTIAL
[69]LA, LC
[71]RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
[72]05/15/98
[74]gcS Central File, Box 3, 4 of 15. Memo from Vance to
[75]SecArm, SecNav, SecAir, CCS, and ASD(ISA) re: Cuban
[76]Affairs in the Dept. of Defense. TCCCA report on
[78]Possible Retallatory Actions by the Castro Government.
[83]OSA
[85]a) Y
[87]a : x oe 31 December 1963 SON
[88]_— cia HIS an oN oe
[89]| pes of Ws 8 nowt
[91]| oi
[93]. MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL HAIG
[95]OFFICE.OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL , DA
[96]Subject: Payehological Programs Subcommittee - Cuba
[98]1. Ap informal meeting of the Interdepartmental Subcommittee 7
[99](Psychological Programs) on Cuban Affairs was convened in i
[101]Room 7519, New State at 1430 hours, 30 December 1963. The
[103]agenda for the meeting was not pre-announced, Present from VA
[104]State were Chairman Bowdler, Sylvester, and. Montenegro; COA
[105]from CIA, Tilton and| Holloway from USIA, Murphy; and the Ca
[106]undersigned. er,
[108]@. The following topics were discussed:
[110]MPa Montencere.” State Labor advisor for Latin tmerice;
[112]described the anticipated meeting as a "founding" assemblage
[114]of left-wing labor leaders, socialists, and commnists who
[115]will attempt to resolve their differences. State believes
[116]that there will be a concerted effort by the communists
[118]_ sto wrest the leadership of the fledgling federation from
[119]‘Mexican socialist elements. Following actions were
[121]- discussed:
[123](1) State to cable US Ambassador to Brazil to ..
[124]\ “aseertain the degree to which local. (mot national):
[125]. governmental elements will support disruptive and
[126]“harassing actions before and during the meeting.
[128]mae (2) State to circularize Latin American posts .
[129]with the suggestion that local influences be brought
[131]to bear in order to discourage country delegates
[132]from attending the meeting. _
[134]ae (3 USIA to consider VOA broadcasts. to Latin
[135]America in order to exploit exposes of Cuban,
[136]East German, and Chinese. Communist Labor conditions. _
[138]oe (4) CIA.to continue black propaganda operations
[139]we Ad[presit nich suggest | postponement of the: meeting. — COI
[140]a NY
[142]Sp
[144]“DOWNGRADED AD 7 YEAR INTERVALS;
[146]| ma ig years. | fo
[147]1 A8 ¢ dm. mig br 200.20 ee “a
[148]|
[151]Septernber 21, 1963
[153]. MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JORN HH, CRIMMINS
[154]Coordinator of Cuban Affairs
[155]Department of State
[157]- Affairs: Possible Retaliatory Actions by the Castro
[159]Reference: - Memorandom. from the Coordinator of Cuban Affaire
[161]a
[163]In response. to reference mernorandum, outlined below is the
[164]status of existing contingency plans for those priority situations agreed’
[165]upon at our meeting of Septamber 12, 1963, The numbering of the para.
[167]_ §taphe below corresponds to the format utilized in the attachment to
[168]_ §8eference memorandum and includes those actions for which Department
[169]eee | Defense apeéific or related military contingency plane exist,
[173]“WAL Actions Against Ue S. Targets in Guba
[174]Be Harassment of Guantaname
[176]fa) outing off of the water supply"
[178]Boe Hie ia made ee
[180]cae which would require
[182]: of e en day. g and which would be implemented on order
[183]» of CINCLANTFLT,/ In addition, evacuation of non-essential personnel
[184]in 24 hours or ledS can be accomplished if directed.
[186]"(b). Closing access to the base by Cuban workerg
[187]who > commute”
[189]ia Tes O2dy
[191]_ STE REVIEWED
[192]Cony” cere ~=3 a ai
[194]ao i Pay
[195]POWRGRADED AT 12 YEAR FNTERVALS
[196]NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED
[200]BW 50955 .DocId:324275002 Page 3
[202]SUBJECT: ny Interdepartmental Coordinating Conirmittee of Cuban © . _ € : < ie
[204]Government (U) i ee
[206]Dept. ae State, subject as 8 above, 13 Sep 630 7
[208](hot /bore Saela (a9 ver 8) 001 B/E 01 b
[213]Big em, ;
[214]oe ae
[216]7 oe
[217]| Piwtpose of substantially reducing the time required for the U.S. - pO Raia
[218]fighter airerafe to veach the scene. fuch overflights may be author cee
[220]lized only by specifically designated commandera,
[222]“5S. ditteck on staping areas employed by exiles in the
[225]con Actions Against Targets im the US : _—
[227]“1. Sabotage or terroristic bombings'*
[229]COMMENT: The level of intensity of such actiona contemplated within
[230]the context of the poser ia not coneidered to exceed the capabilities of
[231]law enforcement agencies to control, There are military contingency
[232]plans to protect ageinst this tye of activity at a much higher level of ©
[233]Intensity. oe - So,
[234]ae . -
[236]“é.  dexaming of US padio stations*
[238]oe COMMENT: There are tianding operating procedures ta overcome
[239]_daterference and jaramiag methods employed against military communi
[240]ations, OL
[242]tollitary plans, retaliatory in nature, which range up te and include adall —
[243]Seale military invasten of Guba, me ue
[245]re itwas generally agreed at the September 13, 1963 mecting of -
[246]ee ‘he Gonmnittes that the most likely actions of the Cuban government are
[247]_ ' thowe which would not provoke United Stites retaliation seriously and
[249]a immediately endangering the Castro regime. It appears more likely
[250]that Castro might intensify his support of subversive forces in Latin
[252]8 ge
[255]“NW 50955 Daecid: 32425002 Page 4
[257]: The sumesries of actions at forth above are essentially defensive a
[258] Peactions to Cuban initiatives. There are, of course, existing and related ~ = [
[261]fo ce
[262]bey
[263]“sages”
[265]REPORT CONCERNING POSSIBLE RETALIATORY |
[266]ACTIONS BY THE CASTRO GOVERNMENT
[268]1. The numbering of the subparagraphs below corresponds
[270]_ to the numbering of those actions for which specific or
[271]Pelated military contingency plans exist. A brief summary
[272]of the action contemplated by those plans is also provided.
[274]"As Actions Against U.S. Targets in Cuba
[276]"4, Harassment of Guantanamo
[278]RM 1d i
[279]implemented rde INCLANTPLT
[281]OF non-essential personnel in 24 hou vr iless if -
[282]~ directed and consistent with national poliey.
[284]"(b) Closing access to the base by Cuban workers who ©
[287]COMMENT Provision is made for the introductio
[288]“Callored Naval Construction Battalion unit
[289]ntaining necessary skills, the requisite labor
[290]force, and the possibie stationing of a repair
[291]ship at Guantanamo Bay aboard which are personnel
[292]{with appropriate skills. Critical personnel
[293]jwould be transported by , to arrive within
[294]48 hours, when ordered by CINCLANTFLT. ———
[298]n offa
[300]"(e) Staging demonstration and riots at the gates" —
[302]COMMENT Execution of measures appropriate to the
[303]degree, kind, and exact location of the disturb-
[305]nee, ranging ‘from no.action. UCh measures! —- f.
[306]ee th Pipe . e a
[307]Db se,
[309]e of fire hoses
[310]nea be te a
[312]"(d) Sniping at base sentries resulting in injury
[313]or death"
[315]COMMENT Measures may be taken appropriate to the
[317]DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS;
[318]NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED.
[320]Enclosure
[322]OO 50955. Docld: 32425002 Page 3
[326]| pease
[327]Ngee”
[329]circumstance and situation ranging from no action,
[330]through action taken in self de nse by a wounded
[331]Sentry or those assisting hin, (through increased
[333](defense conditions, placing pex onnel in positions
[335]\protected from fire, and n of fire if appro-
[336]| e and red as. d by the Commander
[338]priate ane
[339]\Naval Base
[341]cise nature of .
[343]GUC)
[345]"Ce) Sabotaging of base facilities™ -
[347]COMMENT Extensive security measures are taken to
[348]prevent such sabotage by the Commander U.S,
[349]Naval Base, Guantanamo. The nature of the action
[350]taken would depend upon the nature of the
[351]Sabotage and be designed to assure the continued
[352]functioning of the Base.
[354]"B. Actions Against U.S. Aircraft and Shipping
[356]"1. Harassment of U.S. Shipping using Yucatan Channel,
[357]Florida Straits, Windward Passage"
[359]COMMENT The rules of engagement, which have been
[360]approved by the highest national authority
[361]provide that ships or aircraft ordered to the
[362]arca may take immediate protective measures
[364]ie i but not into, Cuban air.
[366]Commanders are
[368]oo BOS Lae iberately a -
[370]Tsuing force. U.S. pilots are not authorized
[372]to attack unless either they or the ship they
[374]are defending is endangered by Cuban attack.
[375]in the event Cuban aircraft limit their action ._
[376]| to harassment, U.S. pilots are limited to making
[377]their presence known by flying close aboard the
[378]Cuban plane.
[380]"CG. Actions Against Cuban Exiles:
[382]"1. Shooting down of pirate planes, possibly of US
[383]registry.
[385]"2, Hot pursuit of or attack on ralding planes over
[386]the high seas or another country's territory. toe
[388]Wie ML . 2 Enclosure
[390]RW 50955. Docld:32425002 Page 6
[395]"3. Hot pursuit of or attack on raiding boats on the
[396]high seas or another country's territorial’ waters
[398]th, Attack on mother ship or exile raiders on the
[399]high seas or in another country's territorial waters
[401]COMMENT It is noted that it is contrary to national
[402]policy to permit raids on Cuba originating from
[403]U.S. territory, however, at the time a ship or
[404]aircraft 1s discovered to be under Cuban attack
[405]it may be diffieult to identify it as a "pirate!
[406]"raider", "mother ship" or ‘exile raider", even
[407]though this, in fact, may be the case. All the
[408]Situations, set forth above, are covered, at
[409]least in part, by the rules of engagement which
[410]have been approved by the highest national
[411]authority. However, the action summarized below
[412]is authorized only in the case of U.S. ships and
[413]aircraft and those not clea. ide .
[414]perng of foreign registry. Commanders are not,
[415]Suthorized to organize deliberately a pursuing
[416]force, however fips or sires rt oodercd to che a
[417]area of the attack r diate protective.
[419]; but not into,
[421]hey are defending
[422]In the event Cuban.
[423]; rt limit: action to harassment, U.S.
[424]BO ay : are limited to making their
[425]GYY) _ presence known by flying close aboard the Cuban
[426]: <a plane. Overflight of Cuba by fighter aircraft —
[427]ahh S$ authorized only ih those instances where it.
[428]has been established that Cuban attack is being»
[429]made ona U.S. ship or aircraft and then only
[430]for the purpose of substantially reducing the —
[431]time required for the U.S. fighter aircraft
[432]to reach the scene. . Such overflights may be
[433]\Eieeandere only by specifically designated ©
[435]wee
[437]commanders.
[439]"5. Attack on staging areas employed by exiles in
[440]the Caribbean
[442]COMMENT|With regard to Castro att
[443]America, plans exist fo milit. :
[444]espond. to requests for stance.by Latin,
[445]erican governments subject rrangenent for tq]
[447]the
[449]acks on areas se eta) |
[450]» U. coe ,
[452]military:
[454]“\approval. There is also an arrangement for
[456]3 Enclosure
[458]HW 50955. Docid: 32425002 Page 7
[460]va
[463]HY 50955 Docld: 32425002 Page 8
[465]interchange of information between the U.S,
[466]Coast Guard and British naval forces wity
[467]regard to possible Staging areas which m-y be
[469]ed by exiles in the Bahamas,:
[471]"Ee Actions Against Targets in the US
[473]"1. Sabotage or terroristie bombings"
[475]COMMENT The level of intensit
[476]; within the context of +
[478]agencies to control, There are mi
[480]Plans to protect against this type of activity
[481]at a much higher level of intensity.
[483]"2, Jamming of US tadio stations"
[485]COMMENT There are standing Operating procedures to
[486]overcome interference and jamming methods
[487]employed against military communications,
[489]2. "Any additional pertinent information on existing
[490]or related plans" and "recommendations, if any, on other
[491]_ dikely actions which might be taken by the Castro govern-
[492]‘ment in retaliation for Cuban exile raids" was also
[493]requested. The furnished list of possible retaliatory
[494]actions by the Castro government were of "the level of
[495]intensity which the committee agreed to be in the most
[496]Likely category." It is inferred that what the committee
[497]Radin mina by the most likely "level of intensity"
[498]provoke the United States
[499]into taking extensive counterteasures whie
[500]endanger the Castro regime. The summaries
[502]There are, however, existing
[503]plans, retaliatory in nature, which
[505]qopee up to and include a full seale military invasion of
[508]3. If it is assumed that the most likely actions of the
[509]Cuban government are those which would not provoke United
[510]States retaliation seriously and immediately endangering —
[511]the Castro regime, it appears more likely that Castro mieht
[512]intensify his Support of subversive forces in Latin America
[514]u Enclosure
[517]HY 50955 BDocld: 32425002 Page 9
[519]. ae
[520]to 31 December 1963 wg yo DEST oR
[521]. rae . Cia MES SIRICATION yg utHEN
[522]s .
[524]MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL HAIG
[525]. OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, DA
[527]Subjects Psychological Programs Subcommittee - Cuba
[529]1. An informal meeting of the Interdepartmental Subcommittee —
[530](Psychological Programs) on Cuban Affairs was convened in i
[531]Room 7519, New State at 1430 hours, 30 December 1963. The
[532]agenda for the meeting was not pre-announced. Present from , @
[533]State were Chairman Bowdler, Sylvester, and Montenegro; CO
[535]from CIA, Tilton an “from USTA, Murphy; and the GCA)
[537]undersigned.
[539]2, The following topics were discussed:
[541]a. CUTAL (Unified Labor Federation for Latin America)
[542]meeting scheduled for Rio de Janeiro, 2 = 28 Jamary 1964. -
[544]Mr. Montenegro, State labor advisor for Latin America,
[545]described the anticipated meeting as a "founding" assemblage
[546]of left-wing Labor leaders, socialists, and communists who
[547]will attempt to resolve their differences, State believes
[548]that there will be a concerted effort by the communists
[550]-to wrest the leadership of the fledgling federation from
[551]‘Mexican socialist elements. Following actions were
[552]discussed:
[554](L) State to cable US Ambassador to Brazil to.
[555]~ ascertain the degree to which local {not national)
[556]~ governmental elements will support disruptive and
[558]‘harassing actions before and during the meeting.
[559](2) State to circularize Latin American posts .
[560].. with the suggestion that local influences be brought
[561]. oto bear in order to discourage country delegates
[562]' from attending the meeting.
[564]7 (3). USTA to consider VOA broadcasts to Latin
[565]America in order to exploit exposes of Cuban, ;
[566]East German, and Chinese Communist labor conditions.
[568]en CIA .to continue black propaganda operations Va) |
[569]a4 : nich suggest postponement of the meeting. cy) |
[570]mS 2 . |
[572]we uf
[574]DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS; |
[576]Aes Ag cade, * : . S Ss weet Ths ra YEARS
[577]O84, ASS Covtral 1k ooy-—~ PEERS aD DR 8200.10
[581]September 21, 1963 9 SO
[583]nb MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JOHN H. CRIMMINS Cel ge
[584]Coordinator of Cuban Affairs a |
[585]Department of State vo
[587]-. SUBJECT: Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban | ge Bae
[588]: aa . Affairs: Possible Retaliatory Actions by the Castro, veg EES
[589]. Government (u) ; mars 2
[591]- Reference! — Mernorandum from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs —
[592]ae Dept of State, subject ag above, 13 Sep 63... _
[594]. In response to reference mernorandum, outlined below la the
[595]- gtatas of existing contingency plans for those priority situations agreed
[596]- upon at our meeting of September 12, 1963, The numbering of the paras _
[597]graphs below corresponds to the format utilized in the attachment to
[598]: reference memorandum and includes those actions for which Department
[599]-. of Defense specific or related military contingency plans. exiat. :
[601]3
[603]* ‘"A. Actions Against U. S. Targets in Guba
[604]“4 Harassment of Guantanars
[605]“{a) Cutting off of the water supply"
[608]in addition, evacuation of non-essential personnel —
[609]GUrs OF loos can be accomplished if directed.
[611]"(bp Closing access to the base by Cuban workers
[612]who commute!
[614]phot bogt CislaloowerD ori Clee k
[616]a &S OR RS) top
[617]SYSTEMATICALLY REVIEWED * owing AT 12 YEAR ENS
[618]‘ i
[620]A Nees rls | ear AR 289--c5stes CONFIDE! I
[622]NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASS! tHE
[624]“poo DIR $200.10
[626]OCOFSA 7 21/684
[628]HY 50955 Docld: 32425002 ‘Page 10 : : : ee pedis |
[631]COMMENT: Provision is made for the intreduction of aa |
[635]| Mie} Staging demonstration and rote at the gates”
[637]COMMENT: Execution of measures appropriate to the degree, king, F |
[639]aed exact. location of the disturbance, ranging from no action| Z Soe
[640]- . eee a ee. cal
[641]“(d} Sniping at base sentvies resulting in injury or
[643]death"
[645]COMMENT: Measures may be taken appropriate to the circumstances
[646]_ 8nd situation ranging from no action, through action taken in self. defense .
[647]CMY) . by a wounded sentry or those assisting hive, Voce,
[653]"{e) Sabotacging of base facilities"
[655]j/ COMMENT: Extensive security measures are taken te prevent guch
[656]i Sabotage by the Comrnander U, 8, Naval Base, Guantanamc, The nature —
[657]of the action taken would depend upon the nature of the sabotage and be
[658]designed t@ aasure the continued functioning of the Base.
[660]"D, Actions <gaingt WU. S, Alrerate and Shisolng
[662]"1, Havassment of U. S. Shipping using Ucatan Channel,
[663]Plorida Straits, Windward Passage"
[665]COMMENT: . The rules of engagen nent; whieh have heen approved by
[666]the highest national authority pvovide that ships or aincrait ordered te
[668]Fre
[669]a
[671]|
[672]|
[673]|
[675]|
[676]|
[678]HY 50955 BDocld: 32425002 Page 11
[681]pote “ BORFIDENTIAE
[682]take imme. eotective mondure: ee oe
[683]. .. Actions Agzinst Guban Exiles €-
[685]a om a2, Hot pursuit of or attack om raiding planes over the
[686]BORG OF Bnother country's territory.
[688]of another country's territerial waters,
[690]ao _ "4, Attack on mother ship or exile raiders on the high
[691]: - Of in another country's territerial waters."
[693]“ _ SOMMENT: itis acted that it is contrary to national policy to permit _
[694]Die waide on Cube originating from U. S, territery, however, at the time
[695]athip er aircraft is discovered to be under Cuban attack it may be diffie
[696]cult ta identify it ag a “pirate,” “raider,” "mother ship" of “exile raiders"
[697]even though thig, in fect, may be the case. All the situations, set forth
[698]above, ave covered, atleast in part, by the rules of engagement which
[699]have been approved by the hishest naticanl guthority. However, the a¢ton —
[701]“1. Shooting down of pirate planes, possibly of US reglatey.
[703]"3. Hot pursuit of or attack on raiding beats on the high seas
[704]x
[706]fumimarized below ig authorized only in the case of U.S. shies and aire ee
[708]bigh _
[709]“
[711]Stag
[713]- Seatt and those not cleasly identified as being of foreign registry.
[715]HW. 50955 Docld: 32425002 Page iz
[718]"8. Attack on staging areas employed by exiles in the
[721]om
[723]COMMENT: (
[725]“WE, Actions Against Targets in the US
[727]“i. Sabotage or terreristic bombings"
[729]the context of the poper ig not coneideved to exceed the capabilities af
[730]law enforcement agencies to control. There ave militasy contingency
[731]plane to protect against this tyne of activity at a much higher level af -
[732]intensity. . es
[733]a
[735]"&. Jeroming of US waddle stations"
[737]SOMMENT: There are blanding operating procedures te overcome
[738]anaes reicenieanianerseenntey . *. .
[739]interference and jamming methods employed egalast military commuuni«
[740]cations, : re
[742]écale milltary invasion of Cuba,
[744]4 tee itwas generally agreed at the September 13, 1963 rneeting of
[746]- the Committee that the rocet Mkely actions of the Cuban goverament are
[747]a“ _ those which would not provoke United States retaliation seriously and_
[748]immediately endangering the Castro regime, It appease more ikely
[749]that Castro might intensify his support of aubversive forcea in Latin
[751]# Abn
[754]HY 30955 . Docld: 32425002 Page 13
[756]COMMENT: . The level of intensity of such actions contemplated within —
[758]The summuvies of actions sét forth above are essentially defensive — = |
[759]reactions to Cuban initiatives, Thore are, of course, existing and related —
[760]military plans, retallatory in mature, which Tange up to and include afull
[763]REPORT CONCERNING POSSIBLE RETALIATORY
[764]ACTIONS BY THE CASTRO GOVERNMENT
[766]le The numbering of the subparagraphs below corresponds
[767]te the numbering of those actions for which specific or
[768]~Yelated military contingency plans exist. A brief summary
[769]of the action contemplated by those plans is also provided. ~
[770]"A. Actions Against U.S. Targets in Cubs .
[771]"4, Harassment of Guantanamo .
[773]"Ca) Cutting off of the water supply" -
[775]: Mouation.
[776]ag “OSSeitlal personne. in 2 no less if
[777]directed and consistent with national policy.
[779]COMMENT
[781]"(b) Closing access to the base by Cuban workers who
[782]commute!
[784]COMMENT Provision is made for the introduction offs .
[788]ie)
[794]"(e) Staging demonstration and riots at the gates"!
[796]COMMENT Execution of measures appropriate to the
[797]degree, kind, and exact location of the disturb~_
[799]DCB Vane ye? Pee : a
[801]"Cd) Sniping at base Sentries resulting in injury
[802]or death"
[804]COMMENT Measures may be taken appropriate to the
[806]art DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS;
[807]AL NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED.
[809]Enclosure
[811]I $0955 DoclId:324275002 Page i4
[814]ecireumstance and situation ranging from no action, —
[815]through action taken in self defense b a wounded _
[816]sentry or those assisting hin, '
[818]Cle)
[820]“"Ce) Sabotagine of base facilities": -
[822]COMMENT Extensive security measures are taken to
[823]prevent such sabotage by the Commander U.S. —
[824]Naval Base, Guantanamo. The nature of the action
[825]taken would depend upon the nature of the
[827]sabotage and be designed to assure the continued
[828]functioning of the Base,
[830]"B. Actions Against U.S. Aircraft and Shipping
[832]"1. Harassment of U.S. Shipping using Yucatan Channel ,
[833]Florida Straits, Windward Passage"
[835]COMMENT The rules of engagement, which have been
[836]approved by the highest national authority _
[837]provide that ships or aircraft ordered to the
[839]_ area may take immediate srotective measures
[841]60NL) a
[845]"Cc, Actions Against Cuban Exiles:
[847]"1. Shooting down of pirate planes, possibly of US
[848]registry.
[850]"2. Hot pursuit of or attaek on raiding planes over
[851]the high seas or another country's territory. 7
[853]HAS 2 Enclosure
[856]- GBNFIBENHAL |
[857]"3. Hot pursuit of or attack on raiding boats on the
[858]high seas or another country's territorial’ waters
[860]"4, Attack on mother ship or exile raiders on the
[861]high seas or in another country's territorial waters
[863]COMMENT It is noted that it is contrary to national
[864]policy to permit raids on Cuba originating from
[865]U.S. territory, however, at the time a ship or
[866]aircraft is discovered to be under Cuban attack —
[867]it may be difficult to identify it as a "pirate!!
[868]"raider", “mother ship" or "exile raider", even
[869]though this, in fact, may be the case. All the
[870]situations, set forth above, are covered, at..
[871]least in part, by the rules of engagement which
[872]have been approved by the highest national
[873]authority, However, the action summarized below.
[874]is authorized only in the case of U.S. ships and
[875]alreraft and those not cleatly identified a5
[877]being of foreign registry... |
[879]a
[881]"5, Attack on:staging areas employed by exiles in
[882]the Caribbean a
[884]So
[886]COMMENT)
[888]oC)
[890]3 Enclosure
[892]iW 50955. Docld:32425002 Page 16
[895]BocId: 32425002 Page 17
[897]Sereciill
[899]"E. Actions Against Targets in the Us
[900]"1. Sabotage or terroristic bonbings"
[902]COMMENT The level of intensity of such actions ec atemplated
[903]within the context of the paper is not considered
[904]to exceed the capabllities of law enforcement
[905]agencies to control, There are military contingency
[906]plans to protect against this type of activity
[907]at a much higher level of intensity. —
[909]"2. Jamming of US tadio stations"
[910]COMMENT There are Standing operating procedures to
[912]overcome interference and Jamming methods
[913]employed against military communications,
[915]2. "Any additional pertinent information on existing
[916]Of related plans" and "recommendations, if any, on other
[917]likely actions which might be taken by the Castro govern-
[918]tent in retaliation for Cuban exile raids" was also
[919]requested. The furnished list of possible retaliatory
[920]actions by the Castro government were of "the level of
[921]intensity which the committee agreed to be in the rost
[922]likely category." It is inferred that what the cormittes
[923]had in ming by the most likely "level of intensity"
[924]was that level which would not provoke the United States
[925]into taking extensive countermeasures which might seriously
[926]endanger the Castro regime. The summaries of actions,
[927]set forth above, which might be taken under existing
[928]military contingency plans are essentially defensive
[929]reactions to Cuban initiatives, There are, however, existing
[930]and related military plans, retaliatory in nature, which
[932]aange up to and include a full seale military invasion of
[934]Enelosure
[937]NW.50955 Docld:32425002 Page 16
[939]than risk direct confrontation with the United States, In
[941]the long run, such action is more dangerous and difficult
[943]to combat, and in the short run is less likely to provoke
[944]“immediate and effective United States retaliation. Such
[945]actions would be in keeping with Castro's repeated declara~
[946]tions that Cuba is the main source of guidance inspiration
[948]for the “inevitable” Latin American revolution. Whereas an
[949]inflamed American public opinion over the killing of even a
[951]few sentries might require strong countermeasures, the
[953]training of a greater number of Latin American guerrillas
[955]than the 1500 or more trained in fiscal year 1962, probably
[956]would not. Nor is it likely that the return of those trainees
[957]to Latin American countries, their establishment of @vuerrilla
[958]training bases, recruitment of additional personnel, and
[959]engagement in insurgency actions would be as immediately
[960]provocative as interference with the water supply at Guantanamo.
[961]Similarly, closing access to the naval base Cuban workers who
[962]commute would deprive Castro of a source of foreign exchange.
[963]While such items as, "the harassment of air traffic into and out
[964]of Guantanamo," or ‘ithe harassment of US aircraft operating in
[965]the vicinity of or overflying Cuba," might be Added to the list,
[966]it is considered that Specifie provocative actions are less
[967]likely and less dangerous than the intensification of support
[968]to subversive forces in Latin America. Such action not only
[970]is in keeping with the declared communist intention to support
[971]"national liberation movements of Oppressed peoples" but may
[973]be done by means which avoid an invitation to overt US military
[974]countermeasures which would endanger the Castro regime. Thus,
[975]they are considered as of that level of intensity which places
[976]them in the most likely category as well as being in the
[977]category of most dangerous to the long range interests of the
[978]United States.
[980]iat —— 5. Enclosure