[1]| 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
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[5]1990000
[6]104-10307-10024
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[9]D TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE
[11]T 27 November 1962
[13]Note: Discussed 27 November
[14]1962 by DD/P with DCI
[15]and approved generally
[16]in principle by DCI.
[17]Fully concurred in
[18]by DD/P.
[20]MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
[21]THROUGH : Deputy Director (Plans)
[23]SUBJECT: Operational Plan for Continuing
[24]Operations Against Cuba
[26]1. Action: This memorandum is for your information
[28]and pursuant to your request. Recommendations for action are
[29]contained in Paragraph VY below. The purpose of this memorandum
[30]is to delineate an operational plan for the action which we
[32]believe should be taken by CIA against Cuba for the predictable
[34]future. In summary the plan provides for continuing, even
[35]intensifying, the intelligence effort against Cuba and for
[36]the reorientation of the current effort into a long term
[38]denied area type of operation of the highest priority.
[40]I. ASSUMPTIONS:
[42]A. The United States Government will give public
[43]assurances that, provided no nuclear or offensive weapons are
[44]present or re-introduced into Cuba, and provided Cuba does
[45]not take action to threaten the peace and security of the
[46]Western Hemisphere, the United States does not intend to
[48]invade Cuba or support an invasion of Cuba,
[50]TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE
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[54]B. These assurances will preclude any meaningful CIA
[55]action on a phased basis to provoke a revolt inside Cuba, since
[56]unless there are major changes in operational and internal con-
[57]ditions in Cuba, such a revolt if provoked would be totally
[58]destroyed by Cuban counteraction in a matter of hours or, at
[59]the most, a few days unless supported by a major United States
[60]Military commitment. In addition, the non-invasion assurances
[61]as a practical matter will preclude invading Cuba on the pretext
[62]of a contrived provocation such as an attack on Guantanamo,
[64]C. CIA operations involving a high noise level and a
[65]distinct element of attributability, particularly paramilitary,
[66]guerrille, and commando type operations will be unacceptable
[67]as a matter of policy.
[69]D. The Castro-communist regime will remain in power for
[70]the indefinite future with its security and control apparatus
[71]relatively intact and with the capability not only of crushing
[72]unsupported resistance activity, but of making operational
[73]conditions in Cuba increasingly difficult. While it is
[74]possible that recent and future developments including the
[75]Soviet action in removing the offensive weapons from Cuba may
[76]serve to weaken and discredit Castro, there is as yet no hard
[77]indication that the control of the Castro-communist regime over
[78]Cuba has been substantially weakened.
[80]E. The United States assurances of no invasion and no
[81]support of an invasion will, in effect, constitute giving to
[83]Castro and his regime a certain degree of sanctuary. This will
[87]j
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[93]severely damage the morale and motivation of anti-regime Cubans ;
[95]both inside and outside of Cuba, which will make it increasingly
[97]difficult for us to recruit. agents, maintain agents already
[101]recruited, and continue or intensify our intelligence and other
[102]efforts against Cuba and the Castro-communist regime.
[104]F. Despite the above factors, Higher Authority probably
[105]whe will continue heavy pressure on the CIA for a maximum effort
[106]against Cuba and may even continue to contend that the ultimate
[107]objective is the overthrow of the Castro-communist regime,
[109]This is an unrealistic objective, however, except on a very
[110]long-term basis as the United States Government, we believe,
[111]will be unwilling in the immediate future to commit troops
[113]to support such an overthrow. The United States Government
[114]in its overt dealings with the Cuban exiles probably will not
[116]express the above factors to them in the context or with the
[118]Ri
[120]bluntness stated here.
[122]G. In view of these factors, the so-called “Track Two"
[123]course of action, i.e., unlimited support of Cuban exiles
[124]and exile groups with no real control or objective purposes
[125]in the hope that these groups will be able to shake the
[126]Castro regime will, although unrealistic, become increasingly
[127]attractive at various levels in the United States Government.
[129]H. As a matter of policy, political pressures and
[130]economic pressures short of blockade, raids, and aggressive
[132]sabotage against Cuba will be continued.
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[137]ry
[139]C €
[141]I. In view of the above assumptions paramilitary, commando
[142]and sabotage operations, except in rare selective instances
[143]will serve little purpose; also they will be counter-productive
[144]since, if undertaken, they will make the collection of intelli-
[145]gence more difficult and should only be undertaken in those very
[146]few instances where an unusually high return can be demonstrated.
[147]Regardless of what other pressures are placed on CIA for
[148]action against Cuba, it would appear clear that Higher Authority
[149]will insist on a continued, even intensified, intelligence
[150]coverage of Cuba,
[152]J. In view of the policy factors, an increased use of
[153]facilities, real estate and basing outside the United States,
[154]particularly in Latin America, will be both necessary and
[155]desirable.
[157]K. Adequate aerial reconnaissance of Cuba will continue.
[159]Velidty oy Bis 0thryption 0 gusctordlé )
[161]II. OBJECTIVES:
[163]‘Based on the above assumptions, the following objectives
[164]appear to be proper for continuing CIA operations against
[165]Cuba:
[167]A. Take all feasible clandestine action to isolate
[168]and assist in isolating the Castro-communist regime in Cuba
[169]from the rest of the Western Hemisphere and the rest of the
[170]Free World.
[172]B. To the maximum extent possible, discredit the Castro-
[173]communist regime in Cuba and in the Western Hemisphere and the
[174]rest of the world.
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[181]. C ¢
[183]C. Maintain through clandestine means, short of commando
[184]and guerrilla type operations, the maximum economic and
[185]political pressures on the Cuban regime and economy not only
[186]for the purpose of hampering the Cuban regime, but for the
[187]additional purpose of insuring the maximum possible drain on
[188]Bloc resources used to support Cuba.
[190]D. Maintain maximum possible intelligence and counter-
[191]intelligence coverage of Cuba, including particular emphasis
[192]on:
[194]1. Capabilities and intentions of the government.
[196]2. Activities of the Cuban G-2 and its other
[197]security organs.
[199]3. Soviet and Bloc activities in Cuba.
[201]4. State of potential resistance, including the
[202]morale and temper of the populace.
[204]5. Militia and military order of battle and equip-
[205]ment.
[207]6. The loci of power and of possible stresses
[208]and strains in the power centers in the Cuban government.
[210]7. Relationships between Cuba, USSR, Red China,
[211]the Bloc, Latin American nations and other Free World
[212]and uncommitted nations.
[214]8. The level of and the weaknesses in the Cuban
[216]economy.
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[223]a
[225]E. Take maximum action to induce a split in the Cuban
[226]regime and maintain the capability of capitalizing immediately
[227]through clandestine means to the extent possible on any
[228]significant uprising, revolt, resistance, split in the regime,
[229]or strains and stresses among Cuban leadership or in Cuban/
[230]Bloc relationships.
[232]III. OPERATIONAL PLAN:
[234]A. Espionage and Intelligence Collection - All feasible
[235]effort should be undertaken to continue and intensify intelli-
[236]gence collection concerning Cuba. The status of our intelli-
[237]gence collection and related operational activity at the
[238]present time and its development during the past six months
[239]is delineated in detail in Attachment A, which was prepared to
[240]serve as the basis for the IG's report on this particular
[241]matter to the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign
[242]Intelligence. You will note that this lengthy document
[243]breaks down under numerous sub-headings the intelligence
[244]coverage which has been developed by the Clandestine Service.
[245]Set out below are specifics of operational action it is
[246]proposed to take to continue and, as possible, increase in-
[247]telligence coverage of Cuba.
[249]1. Intelligence Exploitation of Refugees: As you
[250]know, with the quarantine and the cessation of air
[252]travel the heavy flow of Cuban refugees has dwindled
[254]almost to nothing. In view of this and in connection
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[261]an
[262]. .
[264]y pd
[266]with the contingency planning for supporting any possible
[267]military action in Cuba, the Opa-Locka Interrogation
[269]Center as such was dismantled, although the personnel
[271]- of the Center have been retained intact. In order to
[273]re-establish the flow of intelligence from refugees,
[275]it is proposed that Pan American Airways and KLM be
[276]induced to reinstitute their regular flights from
[278]Havana to Miami. This should be done as soon as
[279]possible after the settlement of the current negotiations
[280]and UN discussions. Coincident with this, the Opa-Locka
[281]refugee interrogation center will be re-established
[283]with the same personnel, |
[285]2. Resident Agents in Cuba: Every effort will be
[286]made to continue to exploit to the fullest, preserve the
[287]viability of and, where necessary, re-establish communica-—
[288]tions with the(131)recruited agents now resident in Cuba,
[289]To an extent, the speed and effectiveness of this effort
[290]will of course depend upon the stringency of future
[291]Cuban security and control action, which it is impossible
[292]as yet to accurately forecast.
[294]3. Third Country Operations: The priority on re-
[295]cruiting agents in third countries for dispatch to Cuba
[296]will be reiterated and strengthened and every effort
[297]will be made to increase this coverage, both through
[299]the development of additional resident agents in Cuba
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[306](6M
[308]and through the development of additional legal travellers.
[310]4, Liaison Operations: We will continue to press
[311]the liaison services who are assisting us in the effort
[312]against Cuba for additional coverage, including the
[313]recruiting of agents within their own areas for joint
[314]dispatch to Cuba. The services most effectively co-
[315]operating at this point in this connection are the .
[316][British Butch} (French) Spanish] (italian) (Greek . a
[317]GHorwegiay, Danisi} (Nest Getuary (Hexidany (Argentinian)
[318](Urugtlayan)(Canadlany Ghi lead) (ana Idrae1d) Direct
[320]approaches to several of these services either by you
[322]personally or in your name, as you prefer, are
[324]being separately recommended. Personal representation
[326]by you to the services underlined above would be useful.
[327]In addition, we will re-survey all other liaison services
[329]with which we are in contact and reiterate to those
[331]appearing to have any assets usable against Cuba our
[332]extreme interest in maximum coverage of this problen.
[334]In connection with the liaison problem generally, we will
[335]endeavor to induce all of the liaison services to make
[336]greater use of their national assets, both inside and
[338]outside of Cuba. Particular attention will be given to
[340]. \
[341]possible utilization of the (Vatican)
[342]5, Maritime Operations: In addition to increasing
[343]efforts to get at seaman agents and other maritime
[345]assets through liaison services, we will continue our
[347]unilateral third country efforts to recruit seamen and
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[353]now running as controlled agents.
[355]particularly Cuban seamen, to increase the (wenty)
[356]officers and crew members aboard(six )Cuban vessels we are
[359]6, Penetration of Cuban Installations Abroad: At
[360]the present time we are running (12) Guban diplomats
[361]stationed outside Cuba as controlled agents and have viable
[362]operations aimed at an additiona1 (20) tdban diplomats.
[364]We propose to continue and intensify the current program
[365]of attempting to recruit or defect every Cuban official
[366]representative abroad to whom we can gain access and
[367]concerning whom we have any reason to believe a
[368]susceptibility to approach exists. These additional
[369]penetrations will be attempted both through unilateral
[370]operations and where appropriate in conjunction with
[371]liaison services.
[373]7. Audio Penetrations of Cuban Installations
[374]Abroad: At the present time we have audio and/or
[375]telephone tap coverage of Cuban official installations
[376]in (Chie) (1tary, (lexico), (The Netherlands) (@nglana)
[377]Gruguay ’ Greece) Gaia, (rance) fna Canada) No
[378]major expansion of this coverage is presently
[379]contemplated, but we will continue to survey additional
[380]targets of opportunity and wherever possible install
[381]coverage in those cases where the additional intelli-
[382]gence from this type of source over and above what we
[383]are now receiving would appear to make such installation
[384]worthwhile.
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[393]8. Gommunications Intelligence: We will continue
[394]our present CIA Close Support coverage from the KOLA
[395]station in Miami at the same level and will continue
[396]to press NSA for additional coverage of Cuban communica-
[397]tions. As the current situation "normalizes" it should
[398]be possible for NSA to reinstitute and perhaps even
[399]increase their Seaborne) intercept coverage of Cuban
[400]communications. 24
[402]9. Communist Party Operations: A complete survey
[403]has been made world-wide of all Communist Party
[404]penetration operations and wherever any such penetration
[405]can be directed against Cuba either by dispatching the
[406]agent to Cuba or by pointing the agent against Cuban
[407]targets, this will be done, except in those cases where
[408]such action would result in unaceeptableprejudice to
[409]the operations in the area where the agent is now based.
[410]It is believed that the most lucrative field for the
[411]redirection of such operations to the Cuban target will
[412]be Latin America where there are (68) pénetrations of
[413]various communist parties. Of this (68) the survey
[414]we have conducted indicates that (23) have some direct
[415]pertinent access to Cuban targets. All of these(23, wh11
[416]be directed against these targets unless in any case
[417]there are overriding reasons to the contrary. The
[418]remaining cases in the total of G5)ar bein individually
[420]examined to see if they can be diverted to Cuban targets.
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[429]( (
[430]10. Illegally Infiltrated Agents: The two
[432]| successful black infiltrated teams (COBRA and AMTORRID)
[433]which have produced substantial intelligence will be
[434]continued, resupplied, and reinforced but pointed
[435]primarily at continued intelligence collection and at
[436]the recruitment for intelligence collection purposes of
[437]other Cubans who already are legally resident in Cuba
[438]in the areas where the teams are operating @inar del 4
[440]' Rio and Oriente}. In addition, on the most carefully
[442]selected basis, where it appears feasible, additional
[444]agents and teams will be infiltrated black into Cuba
[446]in an effort to duplicate the performance of the COBRA
[448]and AMTORRID teams and particularly to recruit and, as
[450]possible, train additional agents legally resident in
[452]Cuba.
[454]ll. Exfiltration: As feasible, agents and potential
[455]recruits now in Cuba will be exfiltrated for
[457]training, indoctrination, supplying with communications,
[459]and motivation. They will then be re-infiltrated into
[460]Cuba, primarily on intelligence missions, Where possible,
[461]this will be done through legal travel channels, but
[462]where this is not possible, it will be done wherever
[463]feasible through our black infiltration-exfiltration
[465]facilities, primarily our maritime assets.
[467]I -11-
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[471]Spl Hp ine. THE REGIME
[472]SPLITTING ENE NEES
[473]B.// Much of the above effort as noted will be primarily
[475]directed towards developing all possible evidences of stress
[477]or strain within the regime and between the regime and other
[479]nations, particularly the Bloc. An intensive program will
[480]be continued to take advantage of any possible opportunity
[481]eats to weaken, subvert, or split the regime in any possible
[483]— fashion, This is basically a long term effort. A great deal
[485]of work already has gone into this and the current
[487]status of this program and the proposed further expldtation
[489]of the numerous leads we have developed is being made, in
[491]the interests of brevity in this memorandum, the subject of
[493]a separate compilation. The effectiveness of assets aimed at
[494]actually splitting the regime, i.e., a palace revolt, will of
[496]course depend, to an extent, on the willingness of.the United
[498]States Government to support them and it is entirely possible
[499]that any such effort might fail unless supported with military
[500]forces which on the basis of the assumptions in Paragraph I
[502]above would appear unlikely.
[504]C. Sabotage: On the basis of the assumptions set out
[505]above, commando type sabotage, minor sabotage, and other
[506]acts of sabotage inside Cuba would appear to serve little
[507]purpose and should not be undertaken except in the rare
[508]instances where an opportunity is presented with acceptable
[509]risk to do major damage to the Cuban economy. It is proposed
[510]to continue searching for such limited opportunities, but
[512]no active or wide scale program is contemplated.
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[524]D, Paramilitary, Commando, and Guerrilla Type Operations:
[525]Given the assumptions in Paragraph I above, no wide scale
[526]program of such activity should be undertaken, However, we
[527]propose to maintain in being our present facilities and
[528]the capability of undertaking such operations in order to
[529]fully exploit any substantial change in internal Cuban con-
[530]ditions or any substantial revolt or uprising which might occur.
[532]E. Economic Warfare: It is proposed to continue and
[533]intensify the program already undertaken to deny through
[534]clandestine and covert means critical materials to the Cuban
[535]economy. This consists primarily of denial operations, possibly
[536]some preclusive buying and inducing friendly U.S. and allied
[537]firms and governments to prevent the shipments of strategic
[538]materials to Cuba.
[540]F, Counterintelligence: The current counterintelligence
[542]and counterespionage program against the Cuban G-2 and
[543]related services will be continued and as possible intensified.
[544]This program has developed substantially and it should be
[545]possible within the coming months to increase its effectiveness
[546]considerably in countering not only Cuban but Bloc intelli-
[547]gence operations mounted against United States interests
[548]from Cuba,
[550]G. Political Action, Propaganda, Psychological Warfare:
[551]In this field the following tasks will be continued and where
[552]appropriate intensified:
[554]1. Assist and support State in any feasible action.
[556]-L3-
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[560]an
[566]to develop and exploit current OAS and Latin American
[567]attitudes favorable to the containment and/or overthrow
[568]of the Castro-communist regime.
[570]2, Assist State in the development of post-Castro
[571]concepts, leaders, and political groups.
[573]3. Stimulate, support and guide covertly the
[574]propaganda and political action activities of the CRC
[575]and other Cuban political groups and individuals, as
[576]appropriate, who offer a potential for impact inside
[577]Cuba.
[579]4. Develop, maintain and exploit the will of the
[580]Cuban people to resist Castro-communism, making maximum
[581]use of the downgrading of Castro and his regime during
[582]the missile crisis.
[584]5. Discredit and ridicule Castro and his regime
[585]in Cuba, in the Hemisphere and elsewhere, with emphasis
[586]on the theme the missile crisis demonstrated con-
[587]clusively that Castro is nothing but a mere pawn of
[588]Soviet imperialism,
[590]6. Continue "Radio Americas" and other CIA-
[591]sponsored Cuban exile radio broadcasts as appropriate.
[593]7, Launch propaganda balloons after an operational
[594]capability has been established and policy authority is
[595]granted to conduct propaganda balloon operations.
[597]8. Continue the infiltration of propaganda material
[598]into Cuba via open mails, legal travellers and couriers,
[599]with special emphasis on selective black operations.
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[605]meodigittclg iy.
[607]H. Exploitation of Exile Groups: We will continue
[609]the clandestine exploitation of exile groups for intelligence
[610]collection, psychological warfare and other approved missions,
[611]As feasible, we will act to mount as much of this effort as
[612]possible from areas outside the continental United States, and
[613]particularly from Latin America. If Higher Authority decides
[614]on a “Track Two" concept or on any similar concept which .
[615]contemplates heavy uncontrolled and only generally directed
[616]action operations of Cuban groups against Cuba, it is believed
[617]that efforts should be made to transfer as much as possible
[619]of the responsibility for this non-clandestine, non-intelligence
[620]type operation into the political field, which is the province
[621]of the Department of State. In this connection, it is believed
[622]it would be advisable to press for the creation within the
[623]Department of State of an office of Cuban Exile Affairs to
[625]handle the overt government relationships with Cuban exile
[627]‘ groups.
[629]IV. ORGANIZATIONAL AND PROCEDURAL CHANGES:
[631]| Maximum fimplementation of the above plan which provides
[632]for the most intensive feasible collection of intelligence,
[633]the implementationof related programs as outlined, and the
[634]maintenance of capabilities to exploit targets of opportunity
[635]as well as take advantage of any future substantial changes
[636]in internal Cuban conditions will, it is believed, permit
[638]and make advisable the following:
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[646]A. A gradual but substantial reduction in the expenditures
[648]and personnel of Task Force W.
[650]B. Consideration of the re-positioning of Task Force W
[652]within the Clandestine Service, possibly as a major component
[653]of the WH Division under different direction.
[654]C. The abolition of the operational Mongoose mechanisn,
[655]D. The removal of the past framework which required
[656]detailed consideration by the Special Group (Augmented) of
[658]even minor operational details and decision by committee on
[660]points which it is believed are completely within the purview
[661]of the DCI and those officers to whom he delegates decision.
[662]VY. RECOMMENDED ACTION:
[664]A. Your concurrencé in the above general operational plan
[666]is recommended.
[668]B. It is recommended that you discuss this plan with
[669]the Special Group (Augmented) and secure its concurrence.
[670]C. It is recommended that you secure from the Special
[672]Group (Augmented) policy approval to attempt to induce Pan
[674]Anerican Airways and KLM to resume their flights between Miami
[675]and Havana at the appropriate time.
[677]D. It is recommended that if any “Track Two" concept
[678]is proposed, you endeavor to transfer to the Department of
[679]State all possible overt aspects of this type of uncontrolled
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[685]nr i
[687]¥.
[689]subsidy and support of Cuban exile groups.
[691]E. It is recommended that the Mongoose operational
[692]mechanism be abolished.
[694]F. If you concur in this concept, specific recommendations
[695]will be made to you concerning the re-positioning of Task Force
[697]W within the DD/P.
[699]s
[701]WILLIAM K, HARVEY
[702]Chief, Task Force W