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[3]104-10306-10003 | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
[5]26 March 1963
[7]MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
[9]SUBJECT: Notes on Special Group Meeting, 26 March 1963
[11]GB
[13]1. Low-level reconnaissance of Cuba. Comparative result of high-
[14]level versus low-level photography were demonstrated by Mr. Lundahl,
[15]After considerable discussion, it was decided that the matter would be
[16]held in abeyance for a week pending further developments on the Donovan
[17]matter, In general, Gilpatric's attitude was against low-level on the basis
[18]of Defense intelligence needs, but would agree if State felt periodic low-
[19]levels would establish "right of access", Johnson expressed general ‘
[20]objection at this time. McCone expressed two prevailing viewpoints within
[21]CIA, but recommended proceeding with low-level, Bundy agreed to put 2
[22]the matter to higher authority for final decision. McCone suggested he
[23]was willing to accept responsibility for further delay.
[25]Action: Matter to be reconsidered each week. ]
[27]2. [Reconnaissance of Lo snesia. State, Defense, and Bundy alli
[28]opposed overflying Indonesia. McCone recommended we support the
[29]British effort and it was agreed that the matter would be put to higher
[30]authority for decision, 7
[32]GE
[34]3. {Monthly Report of NRO was reviewed. McCone reported in detail
[35]on the failure of recent CORONA shots; specifically referred to failures
[36]of January, February, and March, and the fact that November and
[37]December were not usually productive of good photography. He advised
[38]Special Group that new estimates of Soviet capability could not be made
[39]until the Fall, rather than in June and July as is customary. He advised
[40]that the next flight was scheduled for Saturday, 30th of March, and it
[41]will be a standard CORONA, Gilpatric reported that adequate emergency
[42]back-up arrangements were being made, and delays of a type occurring
[43]in the last 90 days would not be recurring.
[45]McCone reported the difficulties incurred with the U~-2 generators
[46]and brushes and the fact that this had caused a standdown of flights in the
[47]Far East, but not in Cuba. Condition was reported as having been cor-~
[48]rected and the North Korean, North China flight is on a weather alert.]
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[52]4, The two papers from tne Coordinator of Cuban Affairs
[53]on sabotage operations and additional covert programs were
[54]returned for consideration by the Cuban Affairs Committee. It
[55]was noted that the Cottrell Committee had not acted on these papers,
[56]The procedure adopted was for Cottrell Committee action and
[57]recommendations in much the same way that we now get Ambassador
[58]endorsement of covert activities elsewhere. There was a general
[59]concensus that actions against Cuba shipping would not be final
[60]although it would be an irritant, since plan called for damaging and
[61]making ships inoperative rather than destroying them. Several
[62]details of the additional Covert Action Program were discussed,
[63]The paper is to be revised and reviewed by the Cottrell Group.
[65]_5. [Col, Steakley reported on the results of several recent
[66]Elint missions, and Elint destroyer operations in the Far East and
[67]Elint operation into the Baltic, Dr. Scoville reported on the
[68]Chasse operation.]
[70]c
[72]6. [Question was raided as to the results from overflights over
[73]Laos.
[75]Action: I would like a thorough briefing on this as I have
[76]heard nothing on this. 7
[78]Te fic was reported that SAC seriously questioned CIA's con-
[79]clusion that the SA-3 sites in Russia are low-level intercept
[80]ground-to-air missile sites, Apparently SAC has prepared a report
[81]on this, Gilpatric noted the March 18th CIA memorandum reaffirming
[82]our conclusions,
[84]Action: DD/I must pursue this matter and explore with
[85]SAC their reasons for questioning our conclusions, This
[87]is the second time in weeks that these conclusions have been
[88]questioned, Advise mee]
[90]JAM /ji
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[94]26 April 1963
[96]MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
[97]SUBJECT: Special Group (5412) meeting, 25 April 1963
[99]Attended by Bundy, Johnson, Gilpatric, McCone
[101]1. CIA weekly report on our activities was reviewed without
[102]comment. No requests were made. No actions are needed.
[104]2. (Extensive discussions of DCI's recommendations for low -
[105]| level reconnaissance of Cuba. Gilpatric raised the question of political
[106]| consequences. Johnson responded that Mr. Hughes had submitted a
[107]paper to him indicating the Soviets would take a harder line under these
[108]provocations. He reported that Thompson appeared to feel that low-
[109]levels would be used as a basis to halt withdrawal and possibly intensify
[110]the situation in Laos and eleewhere and that our interests would be
[111]adversely affected. I took the position that intelligence requirements
[112]were such that low-levels must be tontinued. It was agreed to go to
[113]higher authority with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense
[114]present. Arrangements were made for a meeting about 6:30, 25 April]
[116]3. Mr. FitzGerald presented the proposed new covert policy
[117]toward Cuba, reviewing the situation and specific operations in con-
[118]siderable detail. The Group were impressed with the planning. They
[119]were not prepared to act, and suggested the matter be discussed with
[120]higher authority, and also that action be withheld until the Standing
[121]Group had further deliberated on the question.
[123]78
[124]4. (covert action in the Congo was discussed. Bronson Tweedy
[125]reported briefly. The CIA proposal was approved. /
[127]5. [The proposed (be operations of GROSBEAK were discussed
[129]. in some detail. Colonel Steakley suggested this operation might prejudice
[130]their ELINT operations. However, it was agreed that the exercise would
[131]be undertaken during the May dark-of-the-moon period and the results
[132]reported back to the Special Group prior to reaching a decision for reaching
[133]approval of continuing operations. Jorgenson was instructed accordingly.
[135]ACTION: CIA is authorized to undertake this operation;
[136]it should be watched carefully, reported accurately and
[137]fully, and brought before the Special Group at the time
[138]we're considering the © June operations. /
[140]Fine.
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[144]78
[145]6. {The status report on the Italian elections was briefly
[146]discussed. Approval was expressed on the manner in which this
[147]had been handled. Apparently, the poHtical observere on Mr.
[148]Bundy's staff views coincided with those reported by the Rome
[150]Station.) ° y €
[152]7. (MeCone reported on the proposed plan for the April 30-
[153]May 1 meeting on British Guiana. Mr. Bundy and Mr. Johnson
[154]expressed the view that it was important that the strike be continued.
[155]They were concerned that it might be settled prior to May 30 and
[156]CIA was instructed to look into this and jointly with MIG take euch
[157]action as might be indicated as desirable to ensure the continuation
[158]of the strike. Mr. Bundy expressed the view that the $10,000 a day
[159]figure in the CIA paper would be cheap if a continuation of the strike
[160]for a protracted period would ensure the fall of Jagan and the destruc-
[161]tion of his political support.
[163]ACTION; McCone should discuss with Helms and,
[165]if desirable, to arrange for a discussion with Fulton
[166]by Cline or by McCone in Paris over this coming
[167]weekend. ]
[169]JAM/bd (tape)
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[173]ll April 1963
[175]MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
[177]SUBJECT: Special Group (5412) Meeting, 11 April 1963
[179]1. [Reconnaissance of Laos and North Vietnam was reviewed. .
[180]The Group expressed approval of the CIA program. They authorized two
[181]flights over Laos and North Vietnam on the assumption that one of the
[182]NEFA flights would cover the extreme western targets desired by Sarit.
[183]If, on the other hand, the four India - Communist China border flights
[184]were not executed at thistime, then CIA was authorized to fly three
[185]flights over Laos and North Vietnam to cover all of the targets desired
[186]by both Sarit and COMOR.]
[188]2. [Status of negotiations for India - Communist China recon-
[189]naissance was reported. It was agreed that this question should be
[190]pursued further by CIA. No immediate action was indicated. Dr. Scoville
[191]reported that no further information would be forthcoming from either
[192]India or Thailand until about the 20th of April]
[194]3. Cuban operations. The proposed infiltration-exfiltration
[195]operations, past and projected, were reviewed and approved. The
[196]proposed program of sabotage and harrassment, both the general
[197]program and the detailed plan, was discussed at length. It was reported
[198]by Mr. Bundy that this program was developed more or less at the
[199]direction of higher authority. It was not the intention of higher authority
[200]to approve and authorize specific actions; what he was seeking was de-
[201]tailed information concerning our capability and what might be expected
[202]ona series of operations which were within our capability. I took the
[203]position, which was supported by Alexis Johnson (somewhat less vocally,
[204]however) that I questioned the advisability of proceeding with the program
[205]until we had crystallized the total policy designed to remove the Soviets
[206]from Cuba and also remove Castro. I said I was not clear as to how this
[207]was to be accomplished, nor did I feel that there was any agreed series
[208]of actions designed to meet this end objective. Therefore, it appeared
[209]to me that we are projecting a few of the annoying operations, none of