[1]14-0000
[3]104-10103-10112
[5]Dis. 2025 r A UNDER THE PRESIDENT. JOHN Fe KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
[7]hy & 3 ONLY QUALIFIED
[8]= 3 HEADQUARTERS OESK
[9]6 JUDGE INDEXING
[11]PRIORITY
[13]- ACTION: " “Request Headquarters decision on continuation or
[14]termination of Project. AMTRUNK ,
[16]1, . Attached - herewith is an , operational review of and progress
[17]‘report on the AMTRUNK team: for the period of 4 through 31 March.
[18]Station views on the operation are summarized below.
[20]'2. The AMTRUNK operation has the following disadvantages or weak-
[21]nesses: . .
[23]: y is to|their advantage. It
[24]is believed that if the operation were to develop, control would
[25]diminish rather than increase in the advanced stages of the operation,
[26]Since the need for KUBARK assistance will dectease as operational
[27]successes increase. It is believed that _AMIck uid by
[28]Hesitation “selling out" the operation to any one of the major re-
[29]: ical groups at any at he felt it advantageous to
[30]do so. It is believed that, if he is not already doing so, he is
[31]most likely to collaborate with either the Segundo Frente del Es-
[32]cambray, headed by . Eloy, Gutierrez Menoyo, or the MRP faction headed
[33]by Manuel Ray. In the meantime AMICE/27 will attempt to have his
[34]own way with the operation. He hkelieve pat Sed ee becia
[35]attention because of his ZRM. rade connections, “and.
[36]g Ki
[38]“ea her authori if the iperation of KUBARK handling of the]
[40]AMTRUNKS does not progress td his liking. Since Al TRUNK/1, accbrding
[41]to AMCAPE/1,"masterminded" tHis operation in the fliirst place, ijt may
[42]be assumed that the AMTRUNKS |will withhbpld nothing| from AMTRUNK 1.
[44]SZULC L
[46]" eG G- Vf
[47]. . | “a : se Bate 'k | | gily STATE STATE,
[48]Distribution: i rot », £ 1G os “DATE DISPATCHED
[49]eet : : ape 8 PH?
[50]~ . oe Pe ate lt a el eee det late ieliee -
[51]UFGA-8381
[53]' | HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
[55]RETURN To cA
[56]» Bask kground Use Only
[57]'@ Not Reproduce”
[59]paired
[61]14-0000
[63]"+ CQNTINUATION OF Poe ee Piero ono. ao rowan
[64]"DISPATCH om at UFGA - 8381
[66]B. This ‘operation has avery high "tlap potential" if any AMTRUNK
[68]agents are picked up by. ; only will
[70]KUBARK stand to suffer, but ODACID will be tied directly in to the
[71]|. operation, - as may. also QKFLOWAGE, by whom AMTRUNK/1 is employed,
[73]csc rae: TTC BEATA recognized as a possibility, if
[74]not a probability, in’ the event any of the AMTRUNK team fall into
[75]Castro's ‘hands.
[77]C. The security of this operation has certain questionable aspects.
[78]' At least six people were told about the operation in varying degrees
[79]prior to the time the team was safehoused. Two of the age:
[80]AMICE/27 and AMICE/14, did ot! piaiisieclori yd Saolve the
[81]t ait inert
[83]ing information .of an unknown nature from his KUBARK con-
[84]tacts. An undercurrent of friction has recently developed between
[85]_ AMICE/14 and AMTRUNK/3 which manifested itself in a fistfight on
[86]29 March, This was precipitated by AMTRUNK/3 who called AMICE/14 !
[87]the Cuban term for a. homosexual, the ultimate insult to a Cuban. , \
[88]' This in turn gives rise .to the question whether AMICE/14, with a :
[89]_ Possible history of homosexual activity (see UFGA-8411), has made
[90]‘such an approach. to AMTRUNK/3, ;
[92]D. The commitments made to AMICE/27 or which AMICE/27 claims were
[93]- made to him are a matter of concern to the Station. This is an
[94]> area over which future misunderstanding or aggravation might easily
[95]develop.
[96]E. The Phase I landing point appears highly risky. It is within
[97]five miles of a cruise missile site radar, and in an area frequently
[99]patrolled by sea. ; RABEL Nune2
[100]_ | |
[102]Sree ie lack “in the AMTRUNK Operation,
[103]possibility of the two operations crossing or targetting on the same
[104]individual will be present.
[106]3. In examining the strengths of the AMTRUNK operation, the AMTRUNK
[107]group as a whole represents superior agent materiel. (ae ‘of the
[108]‘four have’ been dy aces in training. They appear to have a
[109]number o airiy we placed contacts on the inside whom they ex-
[110]pect to be able to call on for assistance, Although they have
[112]+ been out of ,direct touch with a number of these contacts for periods
[113]ranging ton. to two years, this is frequently..the case in this type
[114]of operation The objective of the operation is worthwhile.
[116]and the advantages and
[117]4 .
[119]. 3
[120]quarters’ decision is to continue with the operation at this time, |
[121]operational plans for Phase I and Phase II will be submitted as ‘
[123]formulated. a
[125]END OF MESSAGE )
[127]PN
[129]om 4 Wy
[132]CLASSIFICATION ‘ PAGE NO.
[134]: 20" 53a . USE PREVIOUS EDITION. ‘| . s 'E C RE Tt ["] CONTINUED 2,
[137]14-0000
[139]poe ee 7 oO 31 March 1963
[140]| 1 PROJECT ANTRUNK OPERATIONAL REVIEW |
[144]I. STATUS REPORT ON. TRAINING AND PROCESSING, 4-31 MARCH,
[145]a
[147]. The AMTRUNK Team, consisting of AMICE/27, AMICE/14, AMTRUNK/2,
[148]‘and AMTRUNK/3 were safehoused on 4 March 1963 at Safesite #164
[149]on Plantation Key. Andrew S, PARMERS, KUROAR instructor from
[150]headquarters, was already at the training site when the team
[151]was brought there by the two case officers, Irving N. PEGGINS
[152]and Hobart J. VANDEBORN. PARMERS remained at’ the safesite
[153]until 16 March during which time he conducted training in
[154]clandestine. methods and techniques, This training included
[155]security, cover and compartmentation, clandestine communica-
[156]tions, agent spotting, selection, recruitment and management,
[157]and operational planning and reporting. The training included -
[158]group discussion and participation in a series of ‘appropriate
[159]operational situations, several problems, and daily physical
[160]training. During this two.week period, either PEGGINS or
[161]VANDEBORN visited the safesite every day, spending an average
[162]of two or three hours with the group in operational dis-
[163]cussions and processing. During the week of 18 thru 23 March,
[164]‘both case officers spent a majority of the time with the group,
[165]‘debriefing them in detail on their operational contacts, workin
[166]out operational details of their infiltration, and continuing —
[167]their training on an informal basis. The week of 25 through
[168]30 March was spent in PM-type training with emphasis on compass
[170]-and map reading, including two night problems, and on weapons
[172]: familiarization and firing, During the period under dis-
[174]” cussion the AMTRUNK group were all LCFLUTTERED, were assessed
[175]by the KUROAR assessment team, were given an initial series
[176]of immunizations, were issued clothing, were processed for
[178]_ alias documentation, were processed for disguises, and were
[179]further processed on cover and finance problems. The re-
[180]sults of the LCFLUTTER examinations were sent to headquarters
[181]under cover of UFGA-8111, on 13 March 1963. Based on DIR
[182]26430, no further LCFLUTTER is planned at the present time,
[184]wa Transmitted as attachment ."A" to this dispatch is PARMERS
[185]SN report on his training of the AMTRUNK group, transmitted as
[186]saN attachment "B" are the results of the assessments of the
[187]as _ AMTRUNK group, and transmitted as attachment "C" is the
[188]be 4 training report for the week of 25 March.
[189]=O |
[190]area ; II. AMTRUNK MISSION OBJECTIVE.
[192]gee >
[194]ON...
[195]Egy
[197]Bag : hee % nan
[199]ie v ty eid FY i
[201]Lo t aeheaie
[203]ashi .
[205]. Bre oe Cb Se.
[206]CS chs Sn ce ee
[208]“eee eden et ode
[210]14-0000
[212]A secondary and subordinate ~
[213]e climate prevailing among the
[214]populace in Havana for organizing resistance elements capable
[215]of either passive or active sabotage. This secondary mission
[216]is .exploratory in nature only, through the first phases of
[217]_ the project. In order to accomplish the foregoing missions,
[218].the operation has been split into two initial’ phases, which -
[219]' will.be compartmented from each other. qlane One_ involves
[220]- the black infiltration of AMTRUNK/2 and e north coast
[221]of Havana province. These two individuals plan to go into
[223]Havana for a period of approximately two weeks, and then
[224]exfil trate pLack from the same point at which _they infiltrated.
[226]ac] Ss
[227]of. Matanzas. These two individuals will likewise_go into -
[228]Havana for a period of several weeks and then exfiltrate black.
[230]These two phases are’ discussed in detail in following para—
[232]make initial contacts among certain select high level militar
[233]figures in Havana. The following paragraphs discussing these
[234]phases are not designed to be operational plans. Detailed
[235]‘operational plans for each phase will be forwarded as de-
[236]‘veloped. -
[238]II, PHASE I.
[240]A. AMTRUNK Personnel 0%
[242]. ier perress is a(21)year old Cuban who’ is mature for his
[244]years, an n some degree experienced in clandestine opera-
[245]tions. He attended C (Catholic Social) JIniversity in Havana for
[246]_ two years, majoring in Social Studies. Prior to Fidel's
[248]' takeover. A/2 was allied to student elements of the Partido
[249]Autentico which upheld the constitution of 1940. He supported
[250]the revolution against Batista till it became apparent that
[251]Castro had cast his lot for a Communist regime. During his
[252]university years from 1959 to 1961 he was actively engaged
[253]in supporting anti-Castro groups with weapons and materials.
[254]Following the Playa Giron invasiond great many in the Havana
[255]underground were rolled up but A/2 avoided compromise. He
[257]ere this _work through 1961 and rena) TY aibbnube,
[258]Yio Air in icanuary[ 1962, Although A/2_ does not consider
[259]himself an al KUBARK he has been cooperative throughout
[260]vtraining. He.is a pensive individual who displays good
[261]- . judgement. His present attitude ‘towards KUBARK appears to
[262]be one ‘of "wait and see". In the meanwhile, he is con-
[264]“ sciedtiously applying himself in preparation for his mission.
[268][ana - ’ a
[270]a
[272]Mie nr a ERE Sp oO Ree eA Ti ene MEM He
[275]14-0000
[277]re
[279]wit is appealing to his.
[280]fellow team members. He worked under A/2 in the underground
[281]aS an action type, principally engaging in sabotage, His
[283]; underground’ work began while he was in secondary school
[285]when in 1958 he supported the revolution against Batista, .
[286]In late 1960 he sided with the counter-revolutionaries and
[287]began full time anti-Castro activities, After the crack
[288]down following the Bay of Pigs invasion he avoided detection
[289]and continued to engage in underground activities. Finally
[290]when the ituation became hopeless he left Cuba by air for
[291]Miami ih fugust) 1962, While A/3 has performed satisfactorily
[292]in his f eusust ) up to date, his performance falls far short
[293]of. the other three members. A/3 feels KUBARK should onl
[294]function as support for this operation and should nov ee
[296]he operation, Fartunately his
[298]BS]
[299]‘role in this operation. is comparatively minor and he appears
[301]willing to comply with whatever A/2 decides. Nevertheless,
[302]| problems in the future
[304]Conduct black infiltration landing at ‘Punta La Jigjira
[305](Aus 3785 me?) and establish gontact with t farm manager at
[306]/3's father's) farm in the ek: 3885 III,
[308]Coords 99; 614) .) o§
[310]2. Through contacts of A/3 obtain transportation for A/2
[312]to Guanaba or Havana, . a
[314]3. Although not definite, ‘A/3 may remain at nis Gather’ s
[315]farm \and train assets in maritime reception and clandestine
[317]‘communications, Having completed this he would then be ex-
[319]filtrated at Punta Jijira.
[321]4, A/2 will go to Havana and obtain safehouse and operational
[322]support through his contacts, .
[324]5. A/2 will contact and develop two potential assets with
[325]high level connections within the Rebel Army.
[327]6. A/2 will train support and operational assets in clandes-
[329]tine communications as well as arrange for transportation for
[330]his exfiltration..
[332]oF Exfiltration of A/2 at Punta La Jijira or Puerto Escondido
[333]CAMS 8885 II).
[336]14-0000
[338]4
[340]VE ’ oF
[341]aay .
[343]| j ‘
[347]INFIL-EXFIL PLANS
[349]1. The tentative date for, the infiltration of A/2 and 3 at
[350]Punta La Jijira is 18 May 4963. The infiltrees will make
[351]their way to fA73's father's} farm one kilometer from the coast
[353]- and from theré A/2 will be provided with transportation to go
[355]', -to Guanabo or Havana.
[357]dD.
[359]-two men will work their way to rm owned 3 from by
[361]2. The exfiltration of A/3 will occur three days after. his
[362]infiltration. This arrangment, as yet, is not definite.
[364]3. ‘The exfiltration of A/2 is tentatively planned for 31
[365]May 1963 at Punta La Jijira or Puerto Escondido, A/3 feels
[367]. that Puerto Escondido would afford a more secure point for
[369]exfiltration but that a reconnaisance of the area would be
[370]necessary. before final decision is reached. Prearranged
[371]telegram signal would indicate his preference, ‘
[373]4. The above dates fall within a favorable moon phase for
[374]maritime operations, In addition the infil-exfil schedule
[375]will allow for an extra margin beyond the 10 days which A/2
[376]considers the minimun acceptable period of time to make his
[378]contacts...
[380]OPERATIONAL ASSETS WITHIN CUBA
[381]SEEN CUBA
[384]father ‘and Santos SUAREZ] located kilometer) from the “point
[385]of infiltratio -06They will’make cdntact wit he manager of
[386]the farm named (Pédro CRUZ.) (CRUZ)is (35 to 40 )¥ears of age,
[387]is married and has an eleme ary school education. He has
[389]1. Following the successful infiltration of A/2 and s (A/8 24
[390]A
[392]6 (ee record of underground activity. A/3 will depend upon
[393]06(C.
[397]RUZ]to make the following contacts in order to obtain
[398]ransportation to Guanabo or Havana:
[400]a ;
[401]; . Goman HERNANDEZ \ whg lives brow kilometers away in
[402]o€ (sierra del Arzobispo) (ERNANDEZ owns ‘a small farm and a
[403]oo tcher shopjJin the area and also owns a truck. He is
[404]v8 [37 to 4 years of age, married with six or seven children,
[405]He was jailed for a brief period in the past for counter-
[406]revolutionary activities.
[407]— 06 eer 4 8
[408]b. If (cruz jis uccessful i getting (HERNANDEZ) truck
[409]he will contact |Augusto MACHIN/who o ates a farm. next
[410]i Fears old, married,
[412]no children, wife's name is (Alicia}o He was the(mayor of >
[413]Santa Crug del Norte)in 1954, He ‘owns a jeep.
[415]av Vabakt Di ne di ae ek NB Na NT
[418]14-0000
[422]) .¢. Another contact of A/3 is (Ramon CALZADILLE) age 21,
[424]: ‘Single, 8th grade education. e provided support in
[425]the form of food and safehousing tq underground workers
[426]in the past. Hi sgiome address is (Corojo #1, Cotorro, Joe
[427]Havana. He owns (butcher) shop in the Cotorro) ction
[428]of Havana. Subject will be contacted by A/3 ifhe needs
[430]. to be safehoused in Havana.
[432]2. The following assets would be contacted by A/2 after
[434]arriving in Havana. They will be contacted in the order
[436]listed. Their function will be to provide safehouses and
[438]vehicles for A/2, ;
[439]so . 06,08.
[441]"a. (Eisa Maria NEGRIN, 25Jyears of age, born in Havana.
[442]A/2 first met her when she was a student at the University
[443]of Havana majoring in Social Sciences. Presently she
[444]lives with her aunt in Havana and A/2 has maintained cor-
[445]respondence with her, She has helped previously in
[446]providing .safehousing for the underground. She also has
[448]a car. 06, 06
[450]b. Boge, IGLESIAS Betancourt, age 55) bor inGavana.
[451]He is Grveicie who lives and practices/medicine) in
[452]Havana .obcy IGLESIAS] has helped A/2 in underground activi-
[453]ties previously. ‘He has a brother, two daughters and
[454]a son now residing in the U.S, His daughters live in'
[456]. New Jersey and were last seen by A/2 about six months
[457]ago. Subject was a member of the. Partido Pueblo Cubano
[458]an anti-Batista group, and was a professor of (medicine]ae
[459]at the U iversity,of Havana up. until 1961 en he re-
[461]” . ‘signed. IGLESIAS) es also a close griend of (Elsa NEGRIN) 06
[462]0
[463]c.. Ser io MENDEGS® egabout (0) born in Cienfuegos, a
[464]; ormer (senator (1954) "as well as the former head of the
[465]00 (Railroad system in Cuba.| Subject was originally a member
[466]of the Autentico Party dnd claimed,to be a KUBARK con-
[467]fidante during Castro's takeover .°O(MENDEZ}has an apart-
[468]‘ment and two cars and has previously helped A/2 in under-
[469]ground activities. He has a daughter who works for the
[470]government but is not sympathetic to the regime. The 0
[471]. husband-of this daughter, however, Sen Ot for (Che Guevara]
[472]_ 4/2 has maiptained correspondencg with (MENDEZ.
[473]. ra)
[475]|
[476]t
[477]Q
[478]a] - d. ({sabe1 MENOCOD, fe, about Gs,) born in Havana, single.
[479]‘ an ; Subject is an(English) teacher who runs a small private
[480], ot of toring] school in nglish}’ n Havana, She was A/2's
[481]. -'7 06(Eriglish teacher].and offered support to the underground.
[483]* @GIMENOCOD) lives by herself, has an automobile and is a
[485]close friend of A/2 and his wife.
[487]i
[493]BBC RET,
[496]14-0000
[498]St - 6 - of
[499]7 tt ; 0G oO ;
[500]Te e. (Gloria BANCTALA] age(23-24, horn in Havana, single,
[501].4 > mother ‘and father d ceased. 6 e attended_the University
[502]of Havana and Villanova from lisse to 1960] She became
[503]a close griend of A/2 during heir student days in-
[504]Havana.oOShe has no record of underground work. She
[505]~. lives in (ee Beach) during the summer. A/2 felt he
[506]—- might attempt to contact her if she was living at
[507]08 (Guanabo ‘Beach} in order to safehouse A/3 there if necessary
[509]3. The following two operational assets will be contacted by
[510]A/2 after he is safehoused in Havana. Their function will be
[511]to spot Army officers disaffected wae the Castro Regime,
[513]. 9 _ 0
[514]a. (Gorge aus) age Gate 30s early 40S) married. Subject
[515]holdS the rank of (Captain n the Rebel Army but is ‘not
[516]presently on active duty.0He was a friend of Castro's
[517]during the revolution and A/2 claims he,still maintains
[518]some contact with Fidel. He also clai ALS]has been
[519]working in a limited fashion against Fidel and was
[520]originally associated with the MRR and Monte Cristo
[521]groups (VALS) prinacy Satorecs has been trying to or-
[522]ganize his.frie gs within the Rebel Army against Fidel.
[523]A/2 feels (wats) ¢ a very discreet individual who has
[524]not been identified as an anti-Castro organizer bY of
[525]the G-2. A/2 claims to be a close friend of (VALS) and
[526]rusts him completely, 'A/2 saw and talked to (VALS) in
[527]04 962} price to his flying out of PBRUMEN as a refuges§ .
[529]STE PEE
[531]. ts) re)
[532]; ° ose DUARTE Oropesa) age early (40s ,)servea in the
[533]od(u:s. Army}during World War II. Accdrding to A/2,
[534]” _ 06\{DUARTE)was made commander of the [Sth Military District)
[535]y Camilio Cienfhiegos JO8Following the disappearance of
[536]06 Cienfuegos] (DUARTE) gas removed from the post and pre-
[537]sently lives on an Army pension as well as royalties
[538]rom property confiscated by the government. He said
[539]O0¢ (DUARTE )started working against Castro within the MRP
[540]under Manuel RAY. For a timehe was the(military | o¥
[541]secretary of the MRP and became quite involved i
[542]plotting against Fidel.ofA/2 also stated that it was
[543]rumored at the time that UARTE was working for the
[544]RP that he was also a KUBARK agent. Eventually
[545]Ob (buanrn) as placed on a G-2 suspect list, but according
[546]“to A/2 DUARTE) S able to evade detection. Subject
[547]has good connections within the Rebel Army and re-
[548]-volutionary government, A/2 trusts this individual
[549]and has confidence in him as_a potential operational
[550]* -t- . lead in spite of conflicting reports which mention
[551]96 (DUARTE) as an opportunist.
[553]* weg . a
[554]fo, oe.
[555]ore . - . “4
[557]es
[559]AER Oy tg SS:
[564]14-0000
[566]. E. COVER AND COMMUNICATIONS
[568]24
[570]. . ss rm
[571]1° e@, A/2 may also attempt to contact the following
[572]operational asset if he has an opportunity to make.
[573]contact,: . 6 so, ,
[574]a 06
[575]: Gester RODRIGUEZ) age Gate 30s early 40s,] married,
[576]. ‘former member of the Partido Pueblo Cubano. He
[577]-fought with Raul Castro in the Sierra Cristobal Area.
[578]Following the Castro takeover he served as (head of Jo
[579]--one of the military zones within Havana province, .
[580]Eventually ,he was given gesser assignments and A/2
[581]thinks he®is now working fin INRA) in Oriente Province,
[582]' He claims DRIGUEZ)assisted his underground group
[583]. during. 19 by supplying trucks for transporting
[584]weapons and materials. .
[586]1. Cover |
[588]A/2 will. be issued documentation Claiming he is an employee
[590]of a local brewery in Havana. A/3 on the other hand will be
[591]issued documentation as a bus driver within the city of Havana.
[592]‘Both will also be issued drivers licenses and additional
[594]‘items such as immunization certificates, Cuban receipts, etc,
[596]' The two men will also-be outfitted with disguises.
[598]2. Communications
[600]Primary communications will be established through an SW
[601]system. Both men will be given SW instruction and will be
[602]issued accommodation addresses in Miami. This instruction
[603]and these addresses in turn will be passed on to the recruited
[604].assets in PBRUMEN for use as the operation develops. Pre-
[605]arranged signals will also be devised for use by the team via
[606]. telegram to indicate their progress and confirm their place
[607]and time of exfiltration. Both members will also be given an
[608]OWVL system to provide them with quick instructions in case
[610]of an emergency, Se .
[612]OPERATIONAL AND SECURITY EVALUATION
[615]1. The operational aspects of Phase I portrays a mission which
[616]has considerable potential but also considerable risk, The
[617]area of infiltration is within five miles of a cruise missile
[618]site and its accompanying radar. .In addition boat patrols are
[619].known to work this portion of the coast at frequent intervals.
[621]/ Once: infiltrated the team will not have to travel far before
[623]heir first contact. However, A/3 is leary of Staying at his
[624]ther's farm/for any length of time and he does not want his
[626]zee father}to know of his presence in Cuba. For this reason the
[628]. problem of what .to do wi'th'A/a=
[630]"farm will not be able to serve as a safehouse, A/2 plans on
[631]leaving the farm the same day lands. This presents the
[632]On approach is to take A/3
[634]PCA SRN aide ‘,
[638]ia
[641]14-0000
[643]_ rebuttal to these remarks is that |DUARTE)
[644]* the past and when the chips wer
[646]td Guanabo or Havana and safehouse him. . This, however, may
[647]jeopardize the operation because A/3 lacks the maturity and
[648]patience necessary to stay put while A/2 goes about his busi-
[649]‘ness, He may take advantage of his visit to Havana to under-
[650]take a clandestine assignment on his own, When A/2 and 3
[651]step ashore in Cuba, control will vanish. Fortunately A/2
[653]. -has .a sufficient resource of judgement to go about his busi-
[655]ness competently, Unfortunately A/3 gives no such indication.
[656]For this reason an attempt will be made to steer A/3 towards
[657]developing assets around his father's farm)with maritime
[658]reception capabilities. ca
[660]2. .A/2, on the other hand, appears to have a sufficient -numbe:
[661]of supporting assets tg ovide for his*“safety while in Havana.
[662]However, he has not seskly and UARTE) for over a year, In
[663]addition both men are presently outside of the Cuban Army
[664]organization and this position may dampen their e ctiveness
[665]in recruiting within the Army. ; Station reports 6 DUARTE) con-
[666]flict with A/2's evaluation ofthis man. While there is no
[667]evidence to verify that ANTE is pro-regime, thexe has been
[668]a recent report on him from AMLEO/3 which claims DUsRTE) is an
[669]opportunist who might work for th ha ghes§ bidder 06 4/ "s
[671]Ic S assisted him in
[673]own he continued to aid him
[674]in his underground activities.olThis still leaves a question
[675]mark next to the worth of( DUARTE which unfortunately can only
[676]be resolved by direct contact between him and A/2, There are
[678]. other security implications which should be discussed in this
[680]evaluation, Both A/2 and A/3 cannot be considered truly se-
[681]curity conscious. While safehoused A/2 wrote a letter to a
[682]contact in Miami which was to be transmitted by his case
[683]officer. The letter gave an indication that A/2 was seeking
[684]contacts in Havana and conveyed the impression that a trip
[685]was in the dfing. A/2 has written several other letters
[686]not seen by his C Os which might have given the same impres-
[687]Sion -—ddnon the other hand talked quite 1 is
[688]is on tot
[690]: at he Olning
[691]operation that would take them
[693]R .
[695]first to Miami and chem to Cuba. Once there they would go
[696]to his (father's farm }a d_ begin to make contacts. A/3 also
[697]stated that a man naited (DUARTE) Would be one of their con-
[698]tacts. This loose talk Coupled with A/3's attitude that
[699]KUBARK exists only to serve him makes him a Marginal candi-
[701]_ ,date for this operation, However, if A/3 is exfiltrated
[702]. -three -days after his entry into Cuba, the operation will
[703]'. gain his usefulness and eliminate some of the risk he
[705]presents.
[707]Let manta pee
[710]seirjunjancniiehieeisc
[713]14-0000
[715]| i . _ -~2-
[717]1 3.’ - The above evaluation stresses the operational and security
[718]‘ ' weeknesses in this operation. In contrast to these weaknesses
[719]are the positive considerations of this mission. A/2 has the
[720]: oo intelligence, competence, and confidence to approach and re-
[721]- cruit two assets with the potential for developing anti-regime
[722]' operations. at a high level within the Cuban Army. The results
[723]‘which ‘these anti-regime activities can accomplish is a matter
[724]for conjecture but it appears that they carry potential.
[725]Nevertheless, if the operation continues, it will bear close
[726]watching in terms of security and control for these factors
[727]will jeopardize the operation as well as KUBARK's position
[728]if not properly contained.
[730]IV. PHASE It
[731]A. AMTRUNK PERSONNEL
[732]. ans
[734]year old PBRUMEN citizen from a wealthy hig family.
[735]His father, now deceased, was a prominent individual in Law
[736]and politics and was at one time a senator. A/27 himself -
[737]graduated from law school in Habana and was a practising
[738]lawyer. In 1959 he became legal adviser to Camilio Cienfuegos.
[739]Following the disappearance of Cienfuegos in October 1959,
[740]4/27 began to engage in counter-revolutionary activities.
[741]In May 1961, at which time he held the position of Under-
[742]Secretary of Public Works, he felt that his underground
[743]‘activities. had come to the attention of the government and
[744]he took refuge along with his wife in the Venezuelan Embassy.
[745]* He was given safe conduct from the Embassy to PBPRIME in late
[746]1961. Subject is intelligent, articulate, and highly moti-
[747]vated. He has some experience in’ counter-revolutionary
[748]activities and has demonstrated an excellent capacity for
[749]learning clandestine techniques. He has a very large ego,
[750]and aristocratic pride, is very sensitive, and is quick to
[752]SS ere re
[754]take offense tent Set bank to state that he has a low opinion.
[755]‘of KUBARK, that he is not 2 ' e) Le deeply re
[756]- sonts2nv implication that he is works wUBARK He
[757]states that he is working for the overthrow of the present
[759]regime in his own country and that he will accept KUBARK aid
[760]and advice but will not accept KUBARK control, His attitude
[761]although not hostile, is frequently critical, and he pre-
[762]sents a difficult handling problem.
[764].2. - AMICE/14 is a 26 year old Cuban citizen who is also a
[765]7 _ Yaw graduate of the University of Havana, He has been in-
[766]; _ ‘volved much of his adult life in clandestine activities, —
[767]Subject arrived. by small boat in June 1961 in PBPRIME .He
[768]is highly motivated, is intelligent and objective, and has '
[769]».& very highly developed security consciousness, developed
[770]from his counter-revolutionary experiences. From January
[771]to July 1961 he made J ween ti ltration/exfiltration
[772]‘trips to and from Cubg tae, and has an excellent .
[773]‘ B,area. He is easy to work
[775]AGG
[777]a
[779]i
[781]SS.
[783]SP Ripe seen, Ll
[786]14-0000
[788]ate / . Tet - 10
[790]to with and has evidenced “hittle of the hostilities or anti-  -
[791]KUBARK feelings shown by AMICE/27 uo
[793]“a . -AMTRUNK/4, Subject is a (49 year old. fisherman from the
[795]; o8(earacnac area who took refuge in PBPRIME in February 1963,
[797]He had previously assisted A/14 in infils and exfils and will
[798]_be used as a maritime guide,
[800]B. TASKS
[802]1. Make preliminary black maritime infiltration by small
[804]boat onto Cinco Leguas Key (AMS Map 4085 III) to contact
[806]_ individuals who. formerly assisted AMICE/14 in infil-exfil
[807]. ‘operations. So, : _ .
[809]- 2. . Through contacts on Cinco Leguas Key, organize a ratline
[810]into the mainland, including making arrangements for trans-
[812]portation into Havana, 7 . ] !
[814]3. Through the mechanism established above, move to Havana
[815]and obtain safehousing and operational support.
[817]4, Make ‘all necessary arrangements for subsequent exfil-.
[818]tration and future infiltrations, —
[820]5. Approach and recruit two key individuals with contacts
[821]among important military figures,
[822]6. Establish internal and external communications.
[824]7.. Exfiltrate from Phase II.
[825]C. INFIL-EXFIL PLANS
[827]ntative] 1 infiltrate AMICE/27, AMICE/14,
[828]INK/4 into the Cinc Leguas Keys area’ on or about
[830]‘23 April, Subjects will take a small boat with silent motor
[831]ER cys area and remain in the area for approximately
[832]' three days, during which time they. will remain black, keap
[833]the boat hidden in the mangroves, and contact individuals
[834]known to them on Cinco Leguas. They will make arrangements
[835]with contacts at that point to re-activate contacts of AMICE/14
[836]on the mainland at Casualidad (Map 4085 III, Grid Square 1747)
[837]and contacts in the town of Marti and Cardenas. Plans will be
[838]yorked om: his time wi t 2.32CON fal
[840]pee t OL |.
[842]nd ( ‘ again go in Cinco Leguas and expect to be
[843]‘passed on through these contacts to Havana, Subjects will
[844]exfiltrate by small boat on or about 26 April and will be met
[845]by the parent craft in open water to the north of Cayo Cruz
[846]del Padre (Map sheet 4085 IV).
[849]14-0000
[851]mo _ oo Lo : . | -~ill-
[853]D. OPERATIONAL ASSETS WITHIN CUBA _ . OS _
[855]‘ 1. Cayo Cinco Leguas. This key is used for production of |
[856]charcoal and salt. Residents are reported solidly anti- ;
[857]Communist. A/14 has two contacts here that he used prevjously
[858]for infils and exfils.. One is_'"Tango" (Garcia Lezcano.) 9 06.0
[860]- Tango is a brother of (EuStiquiano Garcia Lezcano (201-307338))"
[861]‘whom-A/14 wanted to use as a guide in this operation, but who
[862]was already being utilized elsewhere\, The other contact is
[863]the owner of ‘the(Salina (salt drying peds)} ra A/14 has not yet
[864]been able to. recall this individual's name ©
[866]2, Finca Casualidad. This area is directly south of Cinco
[867]Leguas,.on the mainland. Key contacts here are (Antonio o¢ °
[868]“Garcia)\(not related to Tango, above) and (Pablo Lopez) both
[869]of whom have small farms in the area, ol
[871]3. Town of Marti. -Contact here is''Pe igo", LNU. Subject is
[872]about 50:years old, is employed bylLINRA}’ and has a jeep which
[873]was used previously by A/14 for operational purposes.
[875]; . a oO , _ 0 .
[877]_ Git City. of Cardenas. _Contact is [Pedro Barbi} ‘owner of the
[879]oo te Marino restaurant Subject is a close friend of A/14
[880]who assisted him previously with transportation for maritime .
[881]‘receptions .ob(Barbi) would be used to take A/14 and A/27 to
[882]Havana. Owns a car. ‘
[884]5. City of Matanzas. A-14 has a friend here naned (Carlos; 06
[885]Pedraza who also ssigted A/14 in underground activities in
[886]1961. Subject is(60 years old, married, and is_a forma
[887]oo o8 (ot public works) in e city. Subject has a son (Carlos) ow.
[888]_ in New York City 2 Gearazaywilt be contacted for transpor-
[889]tation to Havana. Owns a~car.
[891]'6,. Varadero. "Pio" Pineiro) Sans a car and was formerly a
[893]. close friend of A/14, “Subject was formerly active in the
[894]underground*4nd might be_used by A/14 in the event he could
[895]. ot use (Barbi or (Pedraza} for obtaining transportation. 06, &
[896]& (@ineird is the brother of the communist |Manolo Pineiro, aka
[897]"Barba Roja",\ but is reported to be anti-communist himself.
[899]7. Havana ob |
[900]a. (Adolfina (Suarez) wore J Subject is single and lives
[902]with her mother. Is friend of AMICE/27 (possibly mis-
[903];,, tress) and can pPkused as safehouse keeper. Subject is
[905]ob
[906]- ’ + 1) sister of (Rafael (Suarez) More) a \Commandante inthe Navy |
[907]. “who, according to A/27, was at one ‘time(chief of naval
[908]ob operations -) His present assignment or Iocation is
[910]unknown.
[914]mae ace ai opti sl
[917]14-0000
[919]4
[920]| Se remained there 10 days, infiltrating back into
[924]GU
[926]a. bk. (Manuel (Gar a)_ Sanchez g Is a ‘close friend of A714
[928]and is uncle of{A/1l4's wifeJ*°Can be used for operational
[929]support, a car, and safehousek oping. Was formerly a Lt.
[930]in Oriente under (Calixto Garcia\?®but no longer in army.
[932]_ A/14 believes he is now an adminstrator of some type of
[934]. industry in Havana, “ol
[936]c. (Maria Josefa (Isalgue) ) Subject is aunt of A/14
[937]and can be used as safehouse keeper. She is single, lives
[938]alone except for ten cats. Does not have a car, Was
[939]formerly a teacher but now has a pension and does not work.
[941]a, . o
[943]a. (Gonzalo (Lopez) dé la Torre.} Subject is a relative of
[944]A/27 and. can be called on for ops support or safehousing..
[945]Subject has a car, is married, no children, is in his
[946]sixties. a
[949]7 Bebe. Orozsa)l, To be recruited by “A/14 as his prin-
[951]cipal agent in Havana. Subject and.A/14 previously worked
[952]together in the underground ,06 ozco/was in the Sierra
[954]‘ with Castro and also fought in Camaguey. He resigned from
[955]the army in February, 1959, although he has maintained many
[956]contacts within the army. Was one time active in t o6
[957]Movimiento Democratico Martiano and was-a friend of (Capt.
[958]Bernardo Corrales/who was shot by Castro in Pinar del Rio.
[959]Subject came to PBPRIME in April 1961 with A/14 to obtain
[961]Cuba without his absence having been known i the authori-~
[962]ties. Was responsible for safehousekeeping(Vargas Gomez}
[963]for nearly one month when authorities were searching for
[964]him. Will be used for intel collection and spotting on
[965]defectable army officers, He is also known to A/27, but
[966]not well. A/14 was last in touch with rozco Hy letter
[968]:, about two months ago. ob
[970]Gu Diaz. Subject to be recruited by A/27
[972]as principal agent. Would be used for operational in-
[973]telligence and spotting among disaffected rmy officers,
[974]Would be kept entirely compartmented from(Orozco}o% Guin
[976]is an army Comandante, now managing a large INRA farm
[977]complex outside of Havana. He is known to A/27 and A/14,
[978]‘both of whom believe he can be contacted safely. He is
[979]anti-Communist) and is one of the group of Camilo Cienfuegos
[980]officers contapted by A/27 in early 1961 to join in an
[981]overthrow of.the government. ;
[984]. Co. tlefemda Tn Cube Gial - 1 Pelee.
[986]she ek
[987]bows LRA BhswyiverMt
[989]14-0000 .. w
[990]vek . oe ' +
[991]: 3 ‘ , a
[993]io g. Target personalities who are suspected of being .dis-
[994]~ ' y affected and on whom A/27 and A/14 will attempt to gather
[996]if ' ‘information in Havana are as follows:
[997]1. Comandante "Macho" Parra
[998]2. Cdte. Oscar Guerra
[999]3. " Jose Pinares .
[1000]4. Capt. FNU Lawton
[1001]5. "Manuel: Avila
[1002].6,. Cmdte. Rene de los Santos
[1003]7... " Pedro Miret
[1004]8.. Capt. Juan Nuiry
[1005]9. Cmdte. Rafael Suarez More
[1007]10. Capt. Fernando Fernandez Superville ©
[1008]11. Capt. FNU Guerra Matos ,
[1009]to . 12. Capt. Sandy Olivares
[1010]yo . ; . li, -* Jose Fernandez Alvarez
[1012]through JMWAVE RI and
[1014]In a majority of cases
[1016]to indicate the subjects
[1017]In the case of Jose Pinares however,
[1019]\ e is completely loyal to the regime,
[1021]This information was passed on to A/27 and A/14, RI files
[1023]AMICE/27 and. AMICE/14 will live black during their entire Stay
[1024]‘in Cuba. They will be equipped with alias documentation and
[1025]with disguises. Both of them have Previously lived in the
[1026]Havana area and know the city well. They will be trained in
[1027]Secret Writing (SW) and will Plan to train at least two and
[1028]‘possible ‘three agents in Havana. in SW, prior to their own
[1029]\exfiltration, In addition, it is Planned to train A/27 and
[1030]»A/14 in OWVL,. At the time of infiltration, exfiltration plans
[1031]‘will have been laid on with the agents. In the event that a
[1032]Change in time or location of exfiltration becomes necessary,
[1034]- an OWVL message could be sent to the agents. Any urgent and
[1035]immediate message which might have to be sent by the agents
[1036]-during their short Stay in Havana would be on a prearranged
[1037]Open code system by commercial telegram. Such a System will
[1038]be worked out to cover several possible contingencies. In-
[1039]ternal communications of whatever net is organized by A/27
[1040]and A/14 will be a ranged by courier, cut-out, live and dead
[1041]drops, — . ; a
[1043]g e
[1044]the training personnel who have been in
[1045]close contact with these individuals that both agents are
[1047]secutaelcnltaiate et, ot
[1049]14-0000
[1051]Vv.
[1053]aa, According poor following principle, which he
[1057]highly - ‘motivated and strongly anti-communist, this point “will
[1058]remain basically unresolved since it is almost certain that
[1059]A/27 would retuse a second LCFLUTTER. sxamsna tion if asked.
[1061]Although “he says “that “he aid aot eiae any details
[1062]of the operation, he does admit to having discussed it in
[1064]._ very general terms with two individuals whom he named at
[1066]- the time of the. LCFLUTTER test. One of these oe
[1067]7rinGutserremieneze and one, 2 fracnd of vargas. Gomez..
[1069]Tied oe same Ususpre 6s v0. Leet Ce 2 0
[1071]3.° AMICE/27 has not seen his contacts in the army for the .
[1072]past two years. Although it is difficult: to assess how well
[1073]he knows various persons in the military about whom he speaks,
[1074]‘lit is the case officer's opinion that few of these contacts
[1075]might be considered really close. .AMICE/14 has been out of
[1076]direct touch with his operational contacts since July ‘1961.
[1078]4s The infiltration into Cayo Cinco Leguas is dependent
[1079]upen having a good guide in the boat. At this time, Phase
[1080]‘Il is awaiting the recruitment of AMTRUNK/4 as guide.
[1082]5. Control over AMICE/27 and AMICE/14 is ‘basically lacking.
[1083]Some control can be exerted through the implied threat of .
[1084]‘withholding support to the operation. Control however will
[1085]remain tenuous at best and A/27. will continue to be a dit-
[1086]ficult handling problem.
[1088]6. On the. positive side of ‘the ledger is the calibre of the
[1089]-agents, both of whom are well educated, astute, and “ine ope
[1090]motivated. Both asents have expe ce in Cclandes i oper
[1091]jong. aperticularly A/14 who has “nade” a number of 5
[1092]clandestine entries and exits and has many operational con-
[1093]tacts. To date both have performed in a superior manner in _
[1094]training. — .
[1096]FUTURE PLANS .
[1098]Duringthe week of 1 through 6 April, the team will receive
[1099]maritime instruction, During the week 8 through 13 April,
[1100]they will receive SW training, possibly OWVL training, dis-
[1101]guise training, and further operational planning sessions.
[1103]on
[1105]"COMMITMENTS
[1107]a_commitment from ODYOKE . was enunciated during his
[1110]14-0000
[1112]democratic principles; ODYOKE does not-desire to impose a
[1114]government of its own choice upon Cuba".. A/27 has made a
[1115]. big point of discussing this “commitment”, It is apparent
[1116]. that he intensely dislikes (or fears?) Batista and his
[1117]{followers. It is also apparent that in his mind he links
[1118]oe / Batista and KUBARK, and fears that KUBARK would back Batis-
[1120]pe ip: : / tianos ina post- -Castro government.
[1124]whe ( government which is anti-Communist and which operates on ~
[1125]et
[1128]YS,
[1131]_
[1133]a
[1136]y} 3. Another commitment which AMICE/27 claims to have discussed
[1138]| in ZRMETAL is that ODYOKE should give “official recognition"
[1139]‘ to members of a conspiracy which culminates in a successful
[1140]' coup d'etat, following the coup, in order that. these individual:
[1141]i will not be treated as political criminals by a future regime,
[1142]This means recognition of an individual's participation in
[1143]‘;the conspiracy, not a promise of recognition of a specific
[1144]/ government formed by the conspirators themselves.
[1146]_ 4, ‘Discussion of the above "commitments" has been pressed
[1147]‘several times by A/27. PEGGINS has not agreed to any of these
[1149]commitments with A/27. However, A/27 feels that the com-
[1151]mitments have already been made by ODYOKE in ZRMETAL. PEGGINS
[1153]has told A/27 that he will report these "commitments" back
[1155]to ODYOKE to determine if, in fact, ODYOKE considers them as
[1157]commitments. ;
[1159]hrough PEGGINS has
[1161]en ei A ag eet” ee
[1163]while on the mission,..jhei LJ PBPRIME..
[1164]assisted for_a “reasonable ‘amount a tine financial
[1165]PEGGING declined to state what that time would be or hoW much
[1166]financial assistance would be involved.
[1168]6. One further negative commitment has been discussed between
[1170]. ‘mitment will be made at this time to support any internal
[1171]\) \ group organized by the AMTRUNKS with weapons or explosives
[1172]\ *\-land that this extends specifically to no promise to support
[1173]Wy | ettye sabotage with demolitions. jee
[1175]\ | PEGGINS and A/27. PEGGINS has stated to A/27 that no com-_