[1]178-10004-10396)
[3]AGENCY :
[4]RECORD NUMBER :
[6]RECORD SERIES :
[8]AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
[10]ORIGINATOR :
[11]FROM:
[12]TO:
[14]TITLE :
[16]DATE:
[17]PAGES:
[19]SUBJECTS :
[21]DOCUMENT TYPE :
[22]CLASSIFICATION :
[23]RESTRICTIONS :
[24]CURRENT STATUS :
[25]DATE OF LAST REVIEW :
[27]OPENING CRITERIA :
[29]COMMENTS :
[33]JFK Assassination System
[34]Identification Form
[36]Agency Information
[38]ROCKCOM
[41]BAKER-WEIDNER FILES
[43]B-W VII-K
[45]Document Information
[47]ROCK
[48]WEIDNER, JOHN
[49]FILE
[51]INTERVIEW WITH JOHN STEIN
[53]03/18/1975
[54]8
[56]CIA
[58]NOSENKO, YURI
[60]STEIN, JOHN
[62]SECRET SERVICE
[64]OSWALD, LEE, RUSSIAN PERIOD
[66]PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[67]Secret
[69]1B;1C
[71]Redact
[73]02/13/2001
[75]Includes "Advice and Waiver" statement.
[77]HW 50955 DoclId:32105622 Page 1
[79]Date:
[81]2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
[84]COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES
[85]Washington, DC 20500 y
[87]March 18, 1975
[88]Nelson A. Rockefeller, _ 9 David W. Beilin,
[90]; Chairman Executive Director
[91]John T. Connor
[92]C. Dougias Dillon .
[93]Erwin N, Griswold SECRET - SENSITIVE
[94]Lane Kirkland
[95]Lyman L. Lemnitzer
[96]Ronald Reagan
[98]~ Edgar F. Shannon, Jr. 178-10004-10396
[100]MEMORANDUM FOR: File
[101]FROM: james B. Weidne Alon
[103]SUBJECT: Interview with John Stein
[105]Il interviewed Mr. Stein in his office at the CIA Headquarters, Langley,
[106]Virginia on March 18, 1975. The interview commenced at 11:10-a,m, and
[107]continued until approximately 1:20 p.m. No one else was present, At
[108]the outset of the interview, Mr. Stein signed an Advice and Waiver which
[109]is annexed hereto,
[111]Mr. Stein, along with several other Deputies, were assigned to an Ad Hoc
[112]Committee to review various alleged domestic activities of the CIA.
[113]Stein's particular area was the counter-intelligence staff, except for
[115]the activities of that staff relating to the CI/SO project and to the mail
[116]intercept project,
[118]Stein said that, after his review, he concluded that the job of the CI
[119]staff was essentially to "horse! the FBI into doing something. In fact,
[120]according to Stein, once you eliminate CI/SO and the mail intercept
[121]project from the CI staff, their activities were benign insofar as the
[122]scope of this Commission's scope of inquiry was concerned, He said
[123]that, unless you conclude that keeping records relating to Americans,
[124]per se, is improper, the CI staff files contained little of interest.
[126](a) Action-oriented Matters
[127]Il asked Stein whether he had found any evidence of domestic breaking
[128]and entering directed by the CI staff. Stein said that he had found no
[130]Such activities, with one possible exception. Stein stated that, if such
[131]activities seemed appropriate, the CI staff would inform the Bureau
[133]raty a
[134]ay,
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[138]SECRET - SENSITIVE
[140]which would accomplish the activities. This was because, if anything
[141]were discovered by virtue of the action which would lead toa prosecution,
[142]the action should be taken by the FBI, since the Department of Justice
[143]would have responsibility for the prosecution.
[145]The only possible exception to the absence of any “breaking and entering"
[146]by the CI staff was the/Toftilcase. uPoftilwas a long term employee of
[148]the Agency, who put his house up for rent, Coincidently, another Agency
[149]employee went to look at the house for possible rental. In the cour se of so
[150]doing, the second employee found that there were quite a number of
[151]classified documents on the third floor of the house. The employee then
[152]reported what he found to the Agency, which sent personnel over to recover
[153]the documents. (The documents related to world-wide proprietaries of
[155]the Agency with which (Tottishad been involved. Ultimately3(@hc ftijexplained
[156]that he intended to write a book about these matters and that was why the
[157]records were in his home.) The Agency undoubtedly did not have time
[159]to advise the Bureau much in advance (if at all) of the Agency's effort to
[160]recover the subject documents, Stein also noted that this incident did not,
[161]in fact, involve ''breaking and entering" since the house was already opened
[163]to allow prospective renters to examine it,
[165]Stein said that he had found no instances of physical surveillance done by
[167]the Cl staff, although the staff would probably have been aware of surveillance
[168]accomplished by other agency components or by the Bureau. Stein cited
[170]as an example an instance where a female Agency employee was found to
[172]be living with a man who could well have been working for a foreign
[173]Government. The Office of Security, therefore, puta surveillance on her hous
[174]for approximately three weeks. Discussions were also had with an informant
[175]within the Agency concerning this employee. . (Files on this case would be
[176]maintained by the Office of Security).
[178]Stein found no evidence of any electronic surveillance or telephone taps
[179]accomplished domestically by the CI staff, The staff had no personnel
[181]who could actually take any action. The staff, in this regard, would
[183]‘have had an advisory capacity, if it participated at all. The Cl staff
[185]would simply advise the Bureau or other components of the Agency such
[187]as the Office of Security or the Office of Technical Services. In such
[188]instances the CI staff would not hold the file, except perhaps a memorandum
[189]relating to the particular case, but Stein found no such memoranda.
[191]SECRET - SENSITIVE
[195]Sg fon ty
[196]2 ag
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[203]As a digression, Stein commented that, to the extent that CI staff may
[204]have gotten into "gray" areas, this may well have been as a result of
[205]an effort to restrict knowledge of a particular incident to the smallest
[206]possible number of people. Thus, rather than going to the Bureau, where
[208]’ control over the dissimilation of the subject information would not be
[209]possible, the staff might go to another Agency component such as the
[210]Office of Security. Similarly, where an investigation proved fruitless, conti-
[211]nued maintenance of relevant files by the CI staff, rather than by the Agency
[212]or the Bureau generally, constituted part of an effort to avoid prejudicing
[213]the particular subject of the investigation.
[215]Another general area mentioned by Stein was that involving the use by
[217]Cl staff of people having an historical relationship with the staff. These
[218]persons would be used against clearly foreign targets in the United States.
[220]As an example, Stein said that such persons might be used to obtain access
[221]to codes or the like in this country.
[223]Stein mentioned the allegations relating to the reported breaking and entering
[224]into the{C} lianiEmbassy. I told him that we had already reviewed this
[225]instance, and, therefore, there was no need for him to review it any detail.
[227](b) Files on Americans,
[229]The major source of files on Americans maintained by CI stafi@was the:
[230]_'tAmeri¢an Targets Program" (ATP) -j This program involved | . informa -
[231]tion received by CI staff from Agency sources, from the State Department,
[232]and from the Military. Information might also be received from the FBI, The
[233]purpose/ofsATR. was to collate all contacts between any American and any
[234]foreign intelligence officers, particularly those from the USSR. The concept
[235]of the program was that all such contacts would be reported to Cl staff,
[236]which would index them for future reference,
[238]Stein noted that, although the State Department actually had a formal regu-
[239]lation requiring that all contacts with Soviets be reported, it was extremely
[240]difficult to convince State officers so to report, {Stein spent a substantial
[241]amount of time overseas! under State, cover,| He Said that, as a result of
[242]that experience, he knows that State officers are reluctant to report this kind
[243]of information. (A State officer probably will not achieve promotion by his
[244]contact with Soviet personnel.) As a result of this reluctance, the informa -
[245]tion obtained by the CI staff generally originated with the State Department's
[246]Office of Security.
[248]SECRET - SENSITIVE My
[250]3), Lk
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[256]The ‘ATP brogram for filing was simply that when a name was reported
[258]to Cl staff, it was mechanically processed by personnel who exercised
[260]no judgment in recording the name, The names of both the Soviet and the
[261]American people involved in the contact would be recorded. As a result of this
[262]process, the /ATP{file index was able to develop a great deal of information
[264]on Soviet contacts with Americans. If, as a result of information obtained,
[266]Cl staff had reason to believe that a aprticular person had been recruited
[268]by the Soviets, that information would be forwarded to the Office of Security
[269]for the Agency, if any Agency officer were involved, or to FBI, if an Americar
[270]outside the Agency was involved.
[272]Stein explained that this program was condu ted by Cl staff instead af by
[273]the FBI or State, because the program might well contain information
[274]which would be relevant to CIA purposes, but not relevant to the purposes
[275]of the other Agencies, Thus, the files might well contain infor mation:
[276]concerning known KGB Agents. That information, in turn could have
[277]derived from a sensitive source, the identity of which CIA would not want
[278]to have revealed. Accordingly, the information was stored by the Agency
[279]rather than the other possible Governmental components. - Information
[280]relevant to those components, however, was made'‘available to them(from’
[281]the ATP projects]
[283]The information utilized by{A'
[285]See
[287]Bcould have been derived,as noted, from
[288]reports of other Governmental components or from info mation provided
[289]by any American, This would be information provided voluntarily, either
[290]by a person actually having a contact with a foreign intelligence officer
[291]or by persons with knowledge that someone else had had such a contact,
[292]The information could be particularly useful, not only to the CIA, but to
[293]other Governmental components, For example, the State Department's
[294]Office of Security might report that a State officer had hada contact over
[295]a long period with a Soviet, The CI staff could check all its information
[296]on that Soviet and confirm whether they had reason to believe that the
[297]Soviet was in fact an agent,
[299]Another source of files on Americans held by CI staff might be the product
[300]\-ef code-breaking by NSA. Thus, in reading codes, names of Americans
[301]may appear. Some of these may be innocuous, and some may be spies.
[302]In any event, all these names are also indexed, although the index is.
[303]separate from ATP, because of the sensitivity of the NSA program as well
[304]as the information derived therefrom.|
[306]SECRET - SENS |
[307]SENSITIVTY Say fo
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[315]The information plugged into the indexing system will not become an
[317]actual file until there is some reason for opening a file ona particular
[318]person, At that point (for example, a file search requested by another
[319]Agency) all information relating to a particular person will be collated
[321]in one place. This, in turn will be developed into a separate file (a
[322]personality file). If the information on a particular person is requested
[324]by a CIA field office, the collation process would occur and the field would .
[325]be told how the particular person had come to the attention of the Agency
[327]in the first instance and would also be told any derogatory information which
[328]the field station would want to know.
[330]Other Cl files derived from on-going cases. Part of these files emanate
[331]from information provided to the Agency by defectors. For example, one
[332]element of this information is designated ‘Soviet leads." (This is because the
[333]Cl staff learned from a defector that all Soviet women employed in the United
[334]States Embassy in the USSR during a certain period were Soviet agents.
[335]Some of these women, in turn, married Americans, and, as a result, now
[336]live in the United States. The FBI is advised of the identity of all these
[337]women, The Cl staff, under official cover, occasionally goes out to inter~
[338]view these women, in an effort to convince them to reveal what they know
[339]about KGB operations. The effort was first to determine whether the |
[340]wornen continue to be KGB agents, and, if not, to gather information from
[341]them. The general modus operandi would be to tell the women. that we know
[342]that at one time they were KGB agents and, while we did not intend to take
[343]any action against them, to request them to reveal information that they
[345]may have learned at that time concerning KGB operations. Generally,
[347]the women would agree to do so. If they did not, ithe) contract would, at
[348]least temporarily, be dropped. These women arefused: as 'tdefectors who
[349]did not defect".
[351]Other examples of going cases are:/a journalist} who had private contact
[352]with George Blake, a former KGB agent in England; an American who
[353]was tied into the Able cage {in this instance, the actions are taken by
[355]the Bureau, but guidance Ieiven by CI staff); and a journalist who the KGB,
[356]on three occasions, attempted unsuccessfully to recruit, *
[358]Other files may relate to actions begun because of some kind of counter-
[359]intelligence implication in a particular situation, In these instances Cl
[360]would maintain the files because of the particular sensitivity of the matter,
[361]even though action may be taken by another Agency component.
[363]UE aEEEEenseEnennenmnt
[365]+Stein noted that the decision as to whether to utilize someone as a double agent is
[366]made by the CIA. If the decision is affirmative, the double agent would be handled byt
[367]Agency (if he is abroad) or by the FBI (if he is in this country). The only exceptions to
[368]this pattern would be where the double Agent is in the United States for only a brief tim
[369]or where he has a special relationship with a particular CIA officer.
[370]5 Photocopy
[371]from
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[375]SECRET - SENSITIVE
[377]Other files are maintained concerning the Soviet Embassy. CIA's position
[378]on this matter is that this is a State case which the Agency is running on
[379]behalf of State.
[381]There is also a file on Vesco held by the CI Staff. The Agency became
[382]involved in this situation because John Dean of the White House called and
[383]stated that/President Nixon's brother had obtained a job with IOS. He.
[384]wanted to know what IOS was all about. CIA, in fact, had a file on 10s,
[385]because it was known that the Soviets had been attempting to penetrate that
[386]institution as a vehicle for getting agents into this country or at least,
[387]allowing them to learn of economic matters relating to the United States.
[388]Stein said that, at one point,. Vesco's| lawyer called to say that he wanted
[389]to have an account of everything which had been said about ‘Vescolover
[390]South American radio channels, The Agency refused this request, stating
[391]that it was beyond its charter.
[393]t
[395]{c) Defectors
[397]There are four sorts of defectors handled by the CI Staff. The first
[398]group are those under low level cover which are being used to scan Soviet
[399]publications and to extract anything relating to Soviet intelligence which
[400]they, in light of their expertise, may recognize. The second group of
[401]defectors are those with "talents", This group are former KGB agents
[402]who, asa result, have special knowledge. [They may be used from time
[403]to.time to go and talk with (either in the United States or abroad) USSR
[404]citizens | ‘Another sort of defector is one from(Czechoslévakia:| This
[405]particular person is highly knowledgable in Maxist-Leninist matters. ,
[406]Accordingly, he is used to write propaganda which is dis seminated abroad.
[407]The last category of defectors are those who are no longer in regular
[408]contact with the agent. These particular persons are seen from time to
[409]time for some particular reason which could simply be an administrative
[410]matter concerning their pensions, etc.
[412]The . Cl Staff also maintains a file ondefectors from America
[413]to some other country (uch as the Soviet Union, Cuba and others).
[414]These names are recorded because the. persons involved may eventually
[415]end up in the United States once again or in some country other than the
[416]Soviet Bloc. This would not necessarily mean that that person is a Spy,
[417]put it does mean that he would be of counter-intelligence interest, At
[418]approximately the time of the Kennedy assassination the Secret Service
[419]and the FBI became particularly interested in potential defectors from
[421]SECRET - SENSITIVE
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[427]the United States. (Recall that Oswaid had had connections with Russia).
[428]This was an operation which the CIA did not particularly want to under-
[430]take, Nonetheless the Agency did trace the names which the Bureau and
[431]Secret Service provided in this regard. The number of these names was
[432]perhaps 2,000 including crackpots who may haveas an off hand comment,
[433]suggested that they intended to defect to, for example, Russia. The CIA
[434]attempted to turn the program over ta the Secret Service for the Bureau, but th
[435]would not take it. The ClAultimately stopped the project and cleared all the
[436]files out. This would have been approximately three years ago. Stein noted
[437]that although the files had been eliminated, it was possible that some of
[439]the names provided to the Agency had made it into the Central Agency files,
[440]and would not have been eliminated therefrom,
[442]I briefly discussed the NOSENKO Case with Stein. Nosenko had defected
[444]to the United States and was admitted to this country as a "parolee", That
[445]is, the Immigration and Natufalization Bureau have a quota of persons
[446]which the Agency can bring into the country without regular immigration
[447]papers, These persons are the responsibility of the Agency. There was
[448]some initial doubt, as to whether, in fact, Nosenko had been sent to the
[449]United States by the KGB. Information obtained from another defector
[450]tended to confirm this suspicion. The question then was what to do with
[451]Nosenko. It was decided for a variety of reasons, that it would be unwise to
[452]attempt to deport him; as a result,he was kept in the United States in isolation.
[453]After several years it was determined that Nosenko was, infact, not an
[454]attempted double agent. He was thereafter’ rehabilitated and now lives
[455]happily in the United States. Although the Cl had an interest in this case,
[457]it was actually run by the Office of Security. ,
[459]As one aspect of the Agency's duty to help in services of common concern
[461]to all Governmental agencies, the CIA recorded in computer form at the
[462]request of the FAA, all information relating to hijackers, Stein thinks that
[463]this was probably because the CIA had the only equipment which could
[464]handle the needed material in the proper fashion, The information so
[465]provided would, for example, include names of all those who were on board
[466]hijacked planes, Approximately two years ago the CIA tried to give this
[467]program to the FAA. That Agency, however, would not accept the program,
[468]and, therefore it was terminated by CIA,
[470]SECRET - SENSITIVE ag, beey
[471]a
[473]“aay,
[475]C37
[477]HY 50955 Docld:32105622 Page 8
[479]7 . ss ADVICE AND WAIVER
[481], ‘Place Abie L, Ve
[485]con ne eentennennrnnngnenanepa
[487]Time fbs€0 lew
[491]Before you make any statement to, or answer any questions from,.
[492]the Commission or its investigators, you should understand that
[493]you have the right to remain silent. If you choose to answer, —
[494]anything you say can be used against you in court.. _ De
[496]You may consult a lawyer for advice before any questions are put,
[497]and you may have a lawyer with you during questioning. If you~
[498]-ceannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed for you before
[499]_ questioning if you wish. If you decide to answer questions without
[500]_a lawyer present, you still have the right to stop answering at any
[502]time; or you may defer your answer until you talk to a lawyer. ©
[504]WAIVER
[506],
[508]t have read and understand the foregoing advice. T.am willing |
[509]to make a statement and answer questions Pree Fy f without_/
[510]a lawyer at this time. No promises or threats have been made to
[511]me, and no pressure or coercion of any kind has been used against
[513]mMe€.
[515]yy .
[516]Witness: L&E . Dricetenen
[517]Witness:(- |
[519]Witness:
[521]Gs "0;
[523]hag ay
[524]hey
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