[1]177-10002-10012 | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
[2]JFK Assassination System Date: 8/26/201
[4]Identification Form
[6]Agency Information
[8]AGENCY: LBJ
[9]RECORD NUMBER: — 177-10002-10012
[10]RECORD SERIES: NSF, UNARRANGED FILES, LA/CUBAN SUBVERSION, BOX 5
[11]AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
[12]Document Information
[13]ORIGINATOR: = CIA
[14]FROM:
[15]TO:
[16]TITLE:
[17]DATE: 02/18/1963
[18]PAGES: 7
[19]SUBJECTS :
[20]NEED SUBJECT ASSIGNED
[21]DOCUMENT TYPE: DRAFT BRIEFING NOTES
[22]CLASSIFICATION : — Unclassified
[23]RESTRICTIONS : 1A
[24]CURRENT STATUS :
[26]/ J Redact
[27]DATE OF LAST REVIEW : ;
[29]OPENING CRITERIA :
[31]COMMENTS :
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[40]DRAFT BRIEFING NOTES 18 February 1963
[41]‘CUBAN SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA
[43]I, Introductory Statement
[45]The public pronouncements of Cuban leaders, the
[47]daily record of events in Latin America, and reports
[49]from our intelligence sources within Communist and
[51]other left-extremist elements throughout this hemis-
[52]phere all agree on one salient conclusion: that
[54]Fidel Castro is encouraging and supporting. the efforts
[56]of Communists to overthrow and seize control of the
[58]governments in Latin America.
[60]A. Analysis indicates that the immediate threat
[61]stems less from the subversive efforts of tra-
[62]ditional Communist movements than from Cuban
[63]support of any and all active revolutionary and
[64]terrorist movements.
[66]B. These distinctions are not precise. In some
[67]countries, Castro's original success has spurred
[68]the established Communist movement to action,
[69]and he supports it. In others, the old-time
[70]Communists may even oppose radical action at: this
[71]time, and Castro works with more ‘active and more
[73]militant revolutionists.
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[82]C. In any event, we know of only two coun-
[83]tries--Mexico and Uruguay=-where Castro
[84]appears inclined for the time being to
[85]forego inciting violence, and this only
[86]because he wants a favorable climate for
[87]his operations into other countries,
[89]II, Even before the October missile crisis-—~and
[90]with increasing rancor since then--Cuban leaders
[91]' have been exhorting revolutionary movements to
[92]violence and terrorism, and supporting their
[93]activities. |
[95]A. Cuban support takes many different forms.
[96]We have occasional evidence of direct
[97]participation by Cuban nationals, as in
[98]the La Oroya disorders in Peru in December.
[99]We know that some funds move, generally in
[101]cash by courier, from Cuba to the revolu-
[102]tionaries in other countries. While we have
[104]_ not been able to come up with the kind of
[105]“airtight proof a court would require that
[106]weapons move directly from Cuba to these.
[107]same groups, we do know that Cuba furnishes
[108]money to buy weapons, and that some guer-
[109]rilla forces in Peru, for instance, are
[110]equipped with Czech weapons which most
[112]logically would come from Cuba,
[113]_
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[120]But by and large, our evidence shows that
[122]Cuba is not now attempting a large program
[124]‘of physical support for Latin American rev—
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[128]olutionaries. — It is, rather, concentrating
[129]on supplying the inspiration, the guidance,
[130]the training, and the communications and
[131]technical assistance they require.
[133]In essence, Castro tells would-be revolu~
[134]tionaries from other Latin American coun-
[135]tries: "Come to Cuba; we will pay your
[137]way, we will train you in underground or-
[138]ganization techniques, in guerrilla warfare,
[139]in sabotage and in terrorism. We will see
[140]to it that you get back to your homeland,
[141]Once you are there, we will keep in touch —
[142]with you, give you propaganda support, send
[143]you. propaganda materials for your -movement,
[144]training aids to expand your guerrilla forces,
[145]secret communications methods, , and perhaps
[146]funds and specialized demolition equipment."
[147]Castro is not, as far as we know, promising
[148]these other Latin Americans any Cuban weapons
[149]or Cuban personnel--either leaders, ad-
[150]visers, or cadres. But he probably does
[152]tell them: “If you succeed in establishing
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[163]something effective by way of a revolu-
[164]tionary movement in your homeland, if your
[165]guerrillas come down out of the hills _
[166]and confront regular armed forces, then we
[167]may consider more concrete forms of assist-
[170]D. So far, it should be noted, none of the
[171]movements in South America has reached this
[172]final stage--and in fact even Castro's
[173]Sierra Maestra guerrillas never had to fight
[174]a pitched battle with regular military
[175]formations which might have required more .
[177]. advanced weapons than small arms, grenades,
[178]mines, and machineguns. In many ‘ways, Cuba
[179]under Castro is the Latin version of the old
[180]Comintern, inciting, abetting, and sustain-
[182]"ing revolution wherever it will flourish,
[184]III, Before going into more detailed evidence of Cuban
[186]’ subversion in Latin America, I should note that
[188]Venezuela is apparently number one on Cuba's
[190]priority list for revolution.
[192]A. Fidel Castro said so to the recent meeting
[193]of Communist front organizations for Latin
[194]American women.
[196]1. Che Guevara and Blas Roca both empha-
[197]sized the outlook for revolution.in
[199]Venezuela in speeches in January.
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[208]2. One of our established sources of proven
[209]reliability, high in the ranks of the
[210]Venezuelan Communist Party ({a veteran
[212]party member and leader of the FALN)),
[213]says the Central Committee agreed in Jan-
[214]uary that a "peaceful solution to the.
[215]present situation in Venezuela is out of
[216]' the question,"
[218]B, This same source reported that Communist guer-—
[219]rilla and terrorist operations in Venezuela
[220]were placed under a unified command in late
[221]1962, which coordinates activities with the
[222]other militant extremist group in Venezuela,
[223]the MIR. The result has been the creation of
[224]the FALN, , or Armed Forces of National Liberation,
[225]Ll. The FALN is currently trying to publicize
[227]its existence by' such acts as the hijack-
[228]ing of the freighter ANZOATEGUI, and by
[229]acts of sabotage and indiscriminate shoot-
[230]ings. These have also been designed to
[231]dissuade President Betancourt from his trip
[232]to Washington.
[234]2. I do not wish to minimize the violence in
[236]Venezuela. The sabotage is the work of
[238]-5'
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[246]experts, and is being done with advanced
[247]types of explosives. The shooting has
[248]reached the point in Caracas where it is
[249]not safe to go out ‘after ten at night in
[250]some sections of the capital. . But it is
[251]the opinion of both our people and the em~
[252]bassy that this is not a threat to govern-
[253]ment control. It is one thing for a group
[254]of young men to race down a dark street
[255]firing a machinegun from a speeding car,
[256]It is quite a different matter to stand
[258]up to the armed forces, or seize and hold
[259]government buildings.
[261]3. We believe that Cuba has given guerrilla
[262]training to more nationals from Venezuela
[263]than from any other country. I shall ex~
[264]plain in more detail later how we arrive
[265]at our figures on guerrilla trainees. ‘Our -
[266]best estimate now is that more than 200
[268]_ Venezuelans received such training in 1962.
[269]a. Many of these are engaged in terror-
[270]ism in the cities, and others were
[271]rounded up and given long prison
[273]sentences when they committed themselves
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[286]prematurely last spring ina country-
[287]side where the rural population strongly
[288]Supports the Betancourt administration,
[289]One of our best penetrations of the Com-
[291]munist Party in Venezuela tells us that
[293]at present the unified command has less
[295]than 150 guerrillas in’ the field, in
[297]widely separated groups of 15 to 25 men
[299]each.
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