[4]08 wmeey ‘Batting a
[5]Scoestind 2s. 5 ear
[7]- Unboe. sy ; Jp ore
[9]3 Federal. Rireaw ‘of ievetigation
[10]Te Se or tad nt ofr: Fuatt se...
[12]-i Post. Offiee Sox 2015 -.
[14]oe ‘Beltleore: 3r. Fasten
[16]LE ee shetesing “for your dniviviation « copy. of °°
[17]; tater Antes, ‘Jane 8, 1950 fyou the Incistetal Esploynent.~
[18]"Review Board: to. jt. Sumey) also gepy of Mes, Gumeytd.
[19]1 letker & Dr. : Dyed, Pree iden’ of. Universit yor: Maryland, . ean
[20]ae iM thet you : HE, Re. faterce ted ‘ha Tote: Guney a ne 4 yen
[21]tere Lo gt : ate coe : noe me, .
[23]o tt 5 Su ‘have, any’ ‘piap'thes fafonatdon: ‘ogarding |
[24]- parhey = ule certainty. ayppresiate case, -I am. ale: -
[25]SS BRT ea to know something nore abouk: the. racuet ried -
[26]+ Beployaant “evlow “omd, espeelally sheer or -not- your ;
[27]- « Hinahnge are Avall she to, bad and th tapartanee. of. ite.
[28]nding .
[30]oe 4
[31]wet
[33]*.
[35]comming 9 70u: fee your king nese cy seoperattons ,
[37]“very y tet youre ones 7
[39]phe oe ara ey ee oe. By oi :
[40]rr “: Bpectel Aen
[42]88296" ‘Docid:32989624. Page Z-
[43]oF st | @) aa ° 0h ee od
[46]«Mae
[48], Docld:32589624 Page 3
[50]Mr. a a
[51]- Mr. W. 0. Cregar
[52]- Mr. T. E. Burns
[54]be ON,
[56]G2-116395 duly 25, L975
[58]UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
[59]©O STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
[60]WITH RESPECT TO INTELAIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC}
[62]RE: FURTHER DOCUMENTS PERTAINING 96 .
[63]THE FRI AND DEPARTMENT oF JuStrcE FAN
[64]port nD ; quart, TtON CORTE SS"
[65]POLICIES AND PROCEDURES eon 1S UNCEASBLFLED,
[67]DATE, REY 0 BSh Laan
[69]Reference is made te SSC letter dated May 14, 1975,
[70]with attached appendices, requesting certain decuments and
[71]ether information from the FEI, ~°
[73]Lten number 1. b., of Part I, Appendix B of refer-
[74]enced commutiieabion requested Combittee, Staff decess to all
[75]indices and control files pertaining to all programs operated -
[76]by the Intelligence Division for 1960 to the present.
[78]Attached to this memorandum is a list of all.
[79]retrievable programs, projects, surveys and progedures
[80]anployed in comnedtion with domestic intelvigerice operations
[81]of the PRI which may be of interest to you. There were a
[82]number of other programs, projects, surveys and procedures
[83]employed in connection with foreign counterinteliigence
[84]operations of the ¥BI which are not included. In the event
[85]you. desize information concerning these lather items, which
[86]inelude extremely sensitive matkers, we would be pleased to
[87]diseuss them with SSC Staff Members at FEE Headquarters.
[89]Enclosure
[91]Assoc. Dit. _—_ 1 . The Attorney General
[93]Dep. AD Adm.
[94]Dep. AD Inv. __
[96]asc Ote TRB: 1ek/lhb |h\y ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG
[97]Comp. Syst. (8) wy . : . ‘A
[98]Ext. Affairs —_ ’ oo ,
[100]Files & Com, __
[102]Gen. Inv.
[104]Ident.
[106]Inspection * ; SEE ‘NOTE PAGE 2 n
[107]Intell. fe
[109]Laboratory
[111]Plan. & Eval. Pun gol :
[112]Spec. Inv, y
[114]Training
[117]Legal Coun. |e ERCLESURS, a , 2K
[118]duce sey MATLROOMC] TELETYPE UNIT (I (gQ- -- /f 4 oa Ys 7 4 Y ’ GPO S54535
[122]Saar Caren afd.
[124]Pa rn ay eee Sr En en
[127]SPR in rg
[128]3 SHOW:
[132]4.
[134]6.
[136]t
[138]Tae pededee nae ereneteNer ene recereres
[140]oo Progen CLASS Pic atick
[141]beats pave mos T FES AT
[142]oats ay DES K oN THESE
[143]| CODE MNES /copewords
[145]€DS-
[146]ar 2 eSERRH need
[147]Further Documents Pertaining
[148]to the FBI and Department of Justice
[150]‘Policies and Procedures
[152]NOTE: Ke SECRET
[154]The Programs, Projects, Surveys and Procedures List
[155](PPSPL), enclosed, and the Counterintelligence PPSPL, infra,
[156]were generated by SA Thomas E. Burns, Jr. from a review of
[157]available INTD inspection reports and files. —
[159]COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PPSPI
[161]Intelligence Coverage of Friendly Foreign Countries ~ Developing
[163]positive intelligerice information regarding personnel in thé
[164]United. States from non-Soviet-bloc countries, .
[166]International Oxganization - Dangerous Aliens of Nations Outside
[168]2 SRE TTY Vee
[170]the Soviet-bloc — Centralized compilation of potentially danger’ .
[172]ous aliens with diplomatic immmity against whom the U. S. State .
[174]Departinent could initiate steps to deport or to lift
[175]diplomatic immunity in the evént of a war emergency.
[177]‘Name €hecks of Aliens ‘Holding Diplomatic -and International.
[178]Organization Visas - FBI maintaining results of name chécks
[179]conducted by various members of U. S. intelligence community
[180]based on information provided to such intelligence organizations
[181]by INS regarding aliens meeting established eriteria.
[183]Special Support Group (Use of non-Agent surveillance personnel). U
[185]Anagram ~ Penetration of foreign diplomatic establishments in] (sy
[187]the United States for procurement of cryptographic materials.
[188](Mr. Buchen, Counsel to the President, has advised that sensi-
[190]tive information such as that regarding (Anagram) and electronic Cs)
[192]surveillances is to be handled in an oral briefing to be given
[193]to Senators Church and Tower). .
[195]ifr SECRET
[199]NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 3
[201]NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page4
[203]5. (Aten - Uncovering of Soviet illegals entering the United states (s)
[206]9.
[208]LO.
[210]aL
[212]; Chinese University and. Graduate School “Thdex ~ tisk of ~~ - wtp
[214]12. [Cokma - Specialized physical surveillance directed. against ,
[215]foreign intelligence officers.)($) THwe FILE E5- 73750 : i
[217]. Oe : é
[219]13. (Gani. ~ Identification of Soviet illegals arriving in the ‘i
[220]United States from Europe through Canadas) ($s) 8
[222]14. Chicoin - Countérintelligence activities to thwart “DRC u
[223]efforts of Chinese intelligence in this country. 1) ye NS i
[225]15. Forest - Screening of records of foreign students at New York i
[226]University, other than those in authorized prograns, to uncover ee
[227]Soviet illegals. (¢) :
[229]NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 5
[231]Further . Documents Pertaining
[232]to the FBI and Department of Justice
[234]Policies and Procedures
[236]NOTE CONTINUED : ge SECRET
[237]Banpop ~ Identification of Soviet illegals through the transfer
[238]of funds through Swiss banks,
[240]a ne
[242]4
[246]of ethnic. Chinese legally entering the U.S. with
[247]intélligence assignments. ; —_
[249]Chinese Aliens Entering thé United States ~ Identification
[251]any
[254]Chinese Communist Contaets with Scientists in the United States ~
[255]Development of selected scientists of ethnic Chinese
[256]background as foreign counterintelligence assets to. be
[258]targeted against People's Republic of China (PRC) “
[259]personnel and establishments in the U.S. and Canada.
[261]Chinese Entering the United States Claiming Citizenship -
[262]Identification of Chinese legally entering the U.S. with
[263]intelligence assignments,
[265]Chinese aliens in the U.S.
[267]who have attended cotleges or
[268]graduate schools on the Chinese mainland and who are
[269]eonsidered potential candidates for development as U.S.
[270]assets. —
[272]KP SECRET
[275]NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 4
[278]ié.
[279]17 2
[280]18.
[281]19.
[283]22.
[284]23.
[286]24.
[288]25.
[290]21.
[292]Further Rocuments. Pertaining .
[293]to the FBI and Department of Justice
[295]Policies and Procedures
[297]NOTE. CONTINUED: 3 SECRET
[299]Proho —(Program to detect homosexuais who have been compromised :
[300]or recruited by Soviet intelligence.)(S FALE fe S+/4697%
[302]oe
[304]visitors to communist China and Contacts by U. Ss. Residerits ~
[305]With Chinésé Diplomatic Establishments. - Investigations. wt
[306] Gondiicted regarding certain individuals. meeting éstablished .
[307]exviteria,
[309]at
[313]Visitors to Iron Curtain Comtriés ~ Interviews of ‘sélected
[314]Uy S... tourists to. determine possible contact. by Soviet-bioc
[315]intelligence. 1)
[317]kid - Pechnical penetration of Soviet -establishmerits in the
[318]United - ‘States. (s) Five 10 5-/89362
[320]Cloverleaf - Technical penetration qf new Soviet residential
[321]complex, Riverdale, New York CityXD) Fut 5-2 3/856 |
[323]Sari Survey “ Screening of mail to Selected European cities ;_U
[325]Gus Survey ~ Screening of mail originating in New York, ¢)
[326]New York, destined for specific postal zones.
[328]Radio and Technical Equipment Purchased by the Soviets ~
[329]Racording of Soviet purchases in such areas--intelligence
[330]and counterintelligence purposes.
[332](Rega. - Identification of Soviet illegals entering the U.S.
[333]as aliens during certain years. )($) 65°78074
[335]Csecomex - Expanded Mexican border coverage to include |
[336]development of sources. against the Soviet Embassy in
[338]Mexico. 9) Free (05-/4 F076
[339]KP SECRET ;
[342]NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 5
[344]296 Docld:32989624 Page 6
[347]26.
[349]27.
[351]28.
[353]29.
[355]31.
[357]32.
[359]33.
[361]34.
[363]35.
[365]Hhw.88296 Docld:32989624 Page 7 meeniiinans
[367]vee te GRESTT S as kl greres mENTion ¢
[369]30.
[371]° pev Pore? memo
[373]“a Vie
[375]a aye ITSEL
[376]soeT CLASS # a)
[378]Further Documents Pertaining
[379]to the FBI and Department of Justice
[381]Policies and Procedures
[382]7 6
[384]Sobir ~ [nvestigation GE d¢ertain Soviet-bloc immigrants ana
[385]répatriates in an attempt to identify those previously
[386]reeruited by Soviet-bioc intelligencé.]/(s) 7
[388]NOTE CONTINUED: . fe SECRET
[390]Sodap ~ Review of certain records to identify Soviet
[391]illegals who have applied for documéntation as U.S.
[392]résidents as part of their oferty to establish a bona fide
[393]cover identity. ite ¢5-G6// _
[395]Vietnamese Refugee - Efforts to uncover possible
[396]infiltration of North Vietnamese agents in the refugee flow
[397]to the United States.
[399](Watkiok - Screening of requests for birth eertificates under
[400]an established criteria to identify such requests which
[402]may have originated with Soviet intelligence }(S)_ eret ae
[404]‘Weéhnical: ‘and Microphone ‘Surveillance : ad Survey of ‘telephone
[405]and microphone installations functioning at certain times. VU.
[407]Gi Fatah Automatic Data Processing Project - means of identifying
[409]Al Fatah members and théir contacts through use of ADP
[410]equipment...) ($)
[412]Cuban Refugee - Detectién of Cuban intelligence agents
[413]who might: tes strate into the U.S. through refugee
[414]channels. (S) 2
[416]Deseco ~ Development of selected contacts to be directed —
[417]against Soviet-bloc officials.
[419]Bast-West Exchange - Provided internal security safeguards
[420]regarding admission to the U.S. of Soviet and satellite’
[421]nationals. U
[423]4 Coverage - Screening of mail destined for the Soviet Mission
[425]to the United Nations. U
[427]aRe SECRET
[429]-5- .
[430]NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 6
[433]Panag POEVOne nd VED Cad bd bu MEM AIG AER by ALTE GE BE
[434]re yErnamenuyy SES RLALL LSS Cb Atak et
[436]Further Documents Pertaining
[437]to the FBI and Department of Justice
[439]Policies and Procedures
[441]NOTE CONTINUED: a ae SECRET
[443]36. Chiprop - Sereening of mail to the United States from Hong Kong
[444]* and the People's Republic of China (PRC).
[446]37. Chiclet - Screening of mail from the United States to Hong Kong
[447]and the PRC.
[449]38, Gacheny - "notional" Pro-Marxist - Leninist - Maoist domestic
[450]‘ revolutionary organization staffed by Bureau assets. directed at
[451]uncovering PRC intelligence activities in the United States /s)
[453]39. Geology - Verification of individuals entering selected
[454]foreign countries claiming U.S. citizenship--to identify
[455]Soviet illegais 7) (S) Fite es -799%03
[457]40, Hilev - Collection of high level foreign political
[458]intelligence by FBI Legal Attaches abroad fer th gt
[459]information of the. White House. \) Fr ut @U-) Yor Ren
[461]41. Coarpit ~ Checking of U.S. Post Office Boxes utilized by U.S,
[462]military personnel in the vicinity of selected U.S. fi ue
[463]Military bases--to uncover possible Soviet agents. SOM 96395
[465]42, (@hrenology ~ Efforts to identify Soviet illegals who formerly
[466]resided in a specific foreign country and whose present
[467]whereabouts are unknown)($) Fics 65 - 7s cof
[469]‘3, indefiniée.
[471]6 Docld:32989624 Page 8 _
[474]SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE
[475]CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE BEFORE COMPLETING.
[477]TO: Tutelligence Commu Fity Staff FROM:
[478]ATIN: Central Index
[480]SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees
[482]1. HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term. If a document was made available 2. DATE PROVIDED
[483]for review but not transmitted, so note.)
[485]x | vocumews | [errerine 7/25[75
[487]+ TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)
[489]. IDENTEFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer,
[490]interviewee, testifier and subject)
[492]Memorandum
[494]. IN RESPONSE TO (List date and item number if in response to formal request, other- 6. CLASSIFICATION OF
[495]wise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.) INFORMATION (enter
[496]u, c, S, TS or
[497]Codeward)
[499]SSG request 5/14/75, Part I, Appendix B, Item lb U
[501]. KEY WORDS (enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are
[502]used underline for emphasis)
[504]Information Handling
[505]Intelligence Collection
[506]Operating Procedures
[508]. SUMMARY (see reverse side. before completing this item)
[510]Aecess to all available indices and control files
[511]regarding all programs operated by the Intelligence Division
[512]from 1960 to present.
[514]62-116395
[516]AJD:ihb ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
[517](4) IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75,
[519]3791 (6-75)
[521]NW 62796 Docld:37929624 Page 9
[527]INSTRUCTIONS
[529]e Type,or print clearly. in ink... . moe
[531]e Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
[533].
[535]e Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
[537]e "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the
[538]information.
[540]e If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to
[541]HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a
[542]copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.
[543]SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8.. SUMMARY - enter brief -narrative statement describing
[544]substance of information and. showing relationship to. Intelligence Community
[545]matters if appropriate. Any feédbaék or evidence of investigatory interests
[546]should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be
[547]noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here,
[548]@.g., tastrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether
[549]interviewee is current or-former employee, ete. If actual document or transcript
[550]is: provided,.. that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional
[551]pages may be attached if necessary.
[554], rs . é :
[557]NW 88296 Docid:37989624 Page 10
[560]po . :
[562]OPFTONALFORMNO. 10 rt 5010-106 i, .
[563]GSA GEN. REG, NQ a7
[564]UNITER STATES G ERNMENT  ) . Assoc. Dir, st
[565]1 - Mr. J. B. Adams De aD een
[566]} = Memorandum Ls Mel 3. al Mintz ston
[567]1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall Con San
[568]o  : Mr. W. R. Wannall pate: 7/28/75 Files & Como
[569]. . 1+ Mr. W. 0. Cregar lew
[570]FROM : W. O. Cregar UOA in . mime —
[571]im | | Plen, & val =
[572]SUBJECT: _ SENSTUDY 75 . Trelning,
[573]No : | Eon
[575]a {Director Sec’y __
[577]This memorandum records for the record my effotts
[578]to meet with Mr, Thomas K. Latimer, Special Assi aes) Sto th
[579]Secretary and Deputy Secretary “Of Defense, orf 6/25/75,
[581]On the late afternoon of 7/24/75, Mr, Benson
[582]Buffham, Deputy Director, National Security Agency (NSA),
[583]made available to Liaison Agent Brian Murphy a copy of a
[584]"Top Secret" memorandum dated 4/20/71, written by Louis W.
[585]Tordella, who was the then Deputy Director of NSA. This
[586]Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Shamrock, copy of which
[587]is attached, makes reference to a file entitled Shamrock
[588]avaifable in the office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for
[589]Intelligence, United States Army. WA
[591]Pursuant to your instructions on the evening of ee
[592]7/24/75, I personally contacted Mr. Latimer at approximately
[593]8:00 a.m., 7/25/75. In my conversation with Mr. Latimer, I
[594]noted that it was imperative that I see him as soon as
[595]possible regarding the contents of the_Shamrock file,
[596]Mr. Latimer was informed that the Bureau was attempting to
[597]establish the line of authority relative to the Bureau's
[598]procurement of foreign government's cable traffic sent
[599]through international cable companies in the United States.
[601]RECS /, 2. G2 a “a
[602]Mr. Latimer indicated nc he Ll. “ceelind a afea
[603]from Mr. Buffham on the late afternoon of 7/24/75 and was
[605]aware of the Bureau's interest in reviewing certain memoranda
[606]in the Shamrock file. Mr. Latimer indicated that this was
[608]a matter of interest to the General “consult vith then. ga
[609]of Defense and that he would have to gonsult with vA.
[611]Enclosure } 8B JUL 37 107%
[612]62~116395 TOP SEGRET Mi wna ATA
[613], WOC:Lhb [lg
[614]tf. (5) n CONTINUED ~ i
[616]i QSURE
[617]| Rey JUL 3.4 1975 i
[619]NW 68296 Docld:32989624 Page 11
[622]Memorandum to Mr, W. R. Wannall
[623]Re: Senstudy 75
[624]62-116395
[626]He advised me he would have somebody from the General Counsel's
[627]office, Department of Defense, promptly contact me regarding
[628]a review of this file by FBI personnel.
[630]Not hearing from Mr. Latimer by the late morning
[631]of 7/25/75, I telephonically contacted his office, He was
[632]not available and I asked his secretary to have him return
[633]my call, Shortly before noon, Mr. Latimer returned my call
[634]and explained that he had discussed my request with
[635]Mr. "Marty" Hoffman (phonetic) of the Department of Defense.
[636]It was Latimer's understanding that Mr. Hoffman had gone to
[637]the White House to discuss my request with Mr. Philip Buchen,
[638]Counsel to the President. Latimer promised that he would
[639]telephonically recontact me as soon as he could establish
[640]contact with Hoffman. I again reiterated to Latimer that it
[641]was imperative the Bureau have access to the Shamrock file
[642]in order that we could advise the Attorney General as to
[643]its contents hoping to clearly: demonstrate that both the
[644]then Attorney General Thomas Clark and, in fact, President
[645]Truman himself were aware of certain information contained
[646]in the Shamrock file. Mr. Latimer said he understood clearly
[647]what was at issue here and that he > would get back to me as
[648]soon as possible,
[650]At 1:50 p.m., 7/25/75, I again called Mr. Latimer's
[651]office and his secretary informed me that Mr. Latimer had
[652]stepped out of his office and that she would give him a
[653]message to call me as soom as he returned. As of 4:00 p.m.,
[654]7/25/75, I had not received a return call from Mr. Latimer.
[655]ACTION :
[657]For information and record purposes.
[658]- - \
[659]h- AK By
[661]Pur
[663]| NW 88296 Dochd:32989624 Page 12
[666]- Johnson's own handwriting is a noté t6 the éffect that he showed the
[668]moms es am oe nema rccree, 9 OT .
[670]ce a fa € r
[672]ECAE
[674]Ms SECRET/LIMITED DISTRIBUTION
[676]MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
[678]SUBJECT: SHAMROCK
[680]Mr. Buffham and I had an opportunity this morning to read
[681]the SHAMROCK file in ACSI. Major General Joe! McChristian gave
[682]us permission to view it but once we had read it,after careful con-
[683]sideration he decided that he would not feel free to give NSA either
[684]the file or a duplicate copy without personal permission from SecDef
[685]inasmuch as SecDef had entrusted the file to ACSI] in 1949. All of
[686]us agreed that an approach to the Secretary would be unnecessary
[687]and perhaps would generate too many questions. He did agree
[688]after sealing the file again to limit access to the Secretary of Defense
[689]on demand, the Director or the Deputy Director, NSA, on demand,
[690]Chief of ACSI, and the Chief of the SSO, ACSI. Thos wmtd wheal m
[692]id uf f .
[694]a ry
[695]sve OS
[698]Pa tte te erect ee eth cet ROO RAAF ARACEAE ERA PAC PM TIO AL RRO ORY
[700]The file contained memoranda for record, one prepared after
[701]a meeting in Forrestal's office attended by senior « Officials - from ITT,
[702]Westém Union; and RCA plus” Markg I Teva (then Defense. General
[703]Counsél), Secretary Forrestal, and a representative from the Attorney
[704]General's office. Colonel Carter Clark from ACSI, who was present,
[705]prepared this memorandum. A subsequent meeting was held in Secre-
[706]tary Louis Johnson's office attended by representatives. of the same
[707]“three companies and I believe the Attorney General himself, In Mr,
[709]also-a “digcussed the matter with the Président. > Both memoranda ‘indi-
[710]cated that the ‘companies were informed that the work they were doing
[711]was of very great importance to the U.S. and every effort would be
[712]made to protect knowledge of its existence as well as to protect the
[713]companies in the event of exposure.
[715]The material is filed under TS Control No. 516652- 3~5 in the
[716]SSO ACSI files.
[720]a ‘Ly / tn,
[721]LOUIS W. TORDELLA :
[723]mAh 3. A Me BIS oR Director
[725]Pe SECaAeTr
[730]Paved ‘
[731]we “OPTIONAL FORM NO, 10 5010-106
[732]MAY 1962 EDITION
[734]rf UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT f Assoc, Dir.
[736]\ M. d 1 - Mr. J. Cochran, Jr. De AD ne a
[737]. 1 - Mr. RB. J. Gallagher Asst. Diss
[738]\ emoranaum 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall Admin.
[740]; e! VY 1- Mr. W. O. Cregar comp, Syst. —
[741]ANNALLS DATE: July 24, 1975 Fle & Com —
[742]1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan dont. —
[743]GAR i - Mr. A. B. Fuiton Insewcton
[744]1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan Laborotory ———
[745]yf 1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford ¢ bese! cou.—
[746]r:SENSTUDY 75 i - Mr. F. S. Putman Spee, Ines
[747]1 ~ Mr. J. W. Redfield Training
[748]TFs ot 1- Mr. T. J. McNiff & Telephone Rm. __
[750]Director Sec’y __
[752]My memorandum dated 7/23/75 captioned as above advised
[753]you that this Bureau had received from Central Intelligence Agency
[754](CIA) 190 pages ¢ extracted from a 693-page document prepared by
[755]CIA citing instances wherein CIA believed some of its activities
[756]may have exceeded its legal mandate. Some of the CIA activities
[757]cited in this document include references to Buredauw-operations” of
[758]an extrenely sensitive nature and it was also noted that the Senate
[759]Select Committee has had access to this document. It was recommended
[760]that pertinent pages extracted from the CIA document be routed to
[761]the respective Bureau Division and/or Intelligence Division Section
[762]believed to have an interest in the material contained therein for
[763]the purpose of fully identifying the subject matter and making an
[764]Nb. assessment as to whether any compromise to this Bureau's operation
[765]AY is involved.
[767]a
[769]: This is to advise that the following pages from the docu-
[770]* & ment were furnished to the following Divisions. and/or Sections of
[771]“) the Intelligence Division on the morning of 7/24/75 for the purpose
[772]of review, assessment, and recommendations, if any:
[774]General Investigative Division - Pages 107, 108, 111, 149-151, TA
[775]155, 156, 158-161, 178, 180, ———
[776]181, 296, 298, 301, 353 and 354
[778]Laboratory Division - Pages 65~67, 113, 118, 119, 182, 202, 221,
[779]222, and 234, (pages 238-240 and 248 were
[780]furnished for information purposes as these
[781]pages contained information concerning
[782]techniques used and/or developed by CIA
[783]which may be of interest).
[785]Intelligence Division pect { Ua ok tf te 3 Wr Yd J
[787]Section CI-1
[788]Pages 23, 24, 28, 29, 70, 72, 73, "77, T36, 740~142,
[789]298, 329, 582, 615, and 628,
[791]BS JUL 31 1975
[792]62-116395 con oneeomat
[793]TIM:ekw (12) CONTINUED - OVER
[795]Rul
[797]8A JUL3 1 1975
[799]NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 14 4
[802]Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
[803]RE: SENSTUDY 75
[804]62-116395
[806]Section CI~2
[807]Pages 30 and 329
[809]Section CI-3
[810]Pages 26, 59-61, 282, 290, 292, 295, 310, 334, 361-363,
[811]368, 371, 373, 376-379, 384, 385, 458, 468-470, 591-593,
[813]and 615.
[815]Section IS-1
[816]Pages 188, 189, 283, 330
[818]Section IS=-2
[819]Pages 29, 30, 171, 190, 191, 193, 194, 197, 198, 203,
[821]330, and 482,
[823]Section IS-3
[824]Pages 521 and 549
[826]Recipients of above pages were requested to respond to
[827]above request by memorandum captioned as above to reach the
[828]Senstudy Project, Room 4063 JEH by the afternoon of 7/28/75.
[830]ACTION ; None. You will be advised of results of above requested
[831]assessment,
[833]Existence of the 693-page CIA document and the
[834]information contained therein Should be closely
[835]guarded and disciosed only on a neéd—-to-know
[836]BAST
[838]asis.
[840]AA A
[842]-~ 2
[844]88296. Docld:32989624 Page 15 ; |
[847]‘based’ newsmen who, at the.time, had been publishing news articles
[849]‘who responded to a personal request by the Director of Security, Col.
[851]‘research of materials acquired therefrom, only 3 other Agency
[853]‘officials are on record as witting of the activity: the Deputy Director
[855]vof other sources were partially or tentatively identified, but the short span
[857]_of the activity precluded positive identification, [t was observed that through
[859]' to it which were retained, have been maintained under strict security access
[861]_ NW 88296 Docld:32589624 Page 16
[863]caine Scat a rr
[866]>. OJECT MOCHINGRIRE— @
[868]Project Meekingbird, a telephone intercept activity, was conducted
[869]between 12 March 1963 and.15 June 1963, and targeted two Washington-
[871]based on, and frequently quoting, classified materials of this Agency
[872]and others, including Top Secret and Special Intelligence.
[874]Telephone intercept connections were installed at the newmen's
[875]office and at each of their homes, for a total of 3. The connections
[876]were established with the assistance of a telephone company official
[878]Sheffield Edwards. Col. Edwards' authority for the activity was Mr.
[880]John A. McCone, Director of Central Intelligence. The latter conducted
[881]the activity in coordination with the Attorney General (Mr. Robert Kennedy),
[882]the Secretary of Defense (Mr. Robert McNamara), and the Director of
[884]the Defense Intelligence Agency (Gen, Joseph Carroll), In addition to
[885]Office of Security personnel directly involved in the intercepts and
[887]of Central Intelligence (General Marshall S. Carter), the Inspector
[888]General (Lyman Kirkpatrick} and the General Counsel, (Mr. Lawrence
[889]Houston). ;
[891]The intercept activity was particularly productive in identifying con-
[892]tacts of the newsmen, their method of operation and many of their sources
[893]of information. For example, it was determined that during the period they
[894]received data from 13 newsmen, 12 of whom were identified; 12 senators
[895]and 6 members of Congress, all identified; 21 Congressional staff members,
[896]of whom 11] were identified; 16 government employees, including a staff
[897]member of the White House, members of the Vice President's office, an
[898]Assistant Attorney General, and other well-placed individuals. A number
[900]these contacts the newsmen actually received more classified and official
[901]data than they could use, and passed some of the stories to other newsmen
[902]for release, establishing that many "leaks" appearing under other by-lines
[903]were actually from the sources of the target newsmen.
[905]Since the termination of Project Moekinevird, those materials related
[907]of two Office of Security professjonals. “ye ‘I, .
[908]CA Mo 375° FIR 0023
[910]ENCLOSOHE
[912]SECRET EYES ONLY
[914]VARHING HOTCE 7
[915]SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES |
[917]oun BIT TROAN tNaeVe.y
[923]ent, {,
[925]! . TE:
[926]p He
[928]SUBJECT: Soviet Defector
[930]"A Soviet defector,
[931]‘defected to a representative of this Agency in
[932]‘1964. The responsibility for
[933]his exploitation was assigned to the then SR Division of
[934]the Clandestine Service and he was brought to this country
[935]: After initial interrogation by
[936]representatives of the SR Division, he was moved to a safe-
[937]house in. Maryland, . where he
[938]was confined and interrogated until 13 August 1965 when
[939]he was moved to a specially constructed "jail'' in a remote
[940]wooded area at ISOLATION. The SR Division was convinced
[941]that he was a dispatched agent but even after a long
[942]period of hostile interrogation was unable to prove their
[943]contention and he was confined at HS@EATION in an effort
[944]to convince him to "confess."
[946]_This Office together with the Office of General
[947]Counsel became increasingly concerned with the illegality
[948]of the Agency's position in handling a defector, under
[949]these conditions for such a long period of time. Strong
[950]representations were made to the Director (Mr. Helms)-by
[951]this Office, the Office of General Counsel, and the
[952]Legislative Liaison Counsel, and on 27 Qctober 19, the
[953]responsibility for his further handling was transferred
[954]to the Office of Security under the direction of the Députy
[955]Director of Central Intelligence, then Admiral Rufus Taylor.
[957]The Soviet defector - was moved to a comfortable safehouse in
[958]the Washington area and was interviewed under friendly,
[959]sympathetic conditions by his Security Case Officer, Mr
[961]Bruce Solie, for more than a year. It soon became apparent
[962]| ‘that the Soviet defector was bona fide and he was moved to
[963]more comfortable surroundings with considerable freedom
[964]’ of independent movement and has continued to cooperate
[965]| fully with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and this
[966]Office since that time. He has proven to be the most
[968]1
[969]a
[971]i
[973], oo. 7 |  B2 IMPDET
[974]ni . L vr
[976]| CL BY 000988 = Qaga-
[978]| SECRET :
[979]\ se BYES SLY |
[981]INW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 17 _
[983]St ee ee eee oe _ ow ~
[986])- SECRET
[987]> TES Gil Ps
[989]valuable and economical defector this Agency has ever
[990]had and leads which were ignored by the SR Division were
[991]explored.and.have resulted in the arrest and prosecution
[992]of Soviet recruited agents — -in’ several
[993]countries throughout the world. He currently is living
[994]under an alias; secured a divorce from his Russian wife
[995]and remarried an, American citizen. He is happy, relaxed,
[996]and appreciative of the treatment accorded him and states
[997]“while I regret my years of incarceration, I have.
[998]no bitterness and now understand how it could happen."
[1000]2 00024
[1001]SECRET |
[1002]EVES ONLY Oo
[1004]| NW 68296 Docid:32989624 Page 18
[1007]SECRET
[1008]P soy @
[1010]SURVEILLANCES | \
[1012]- A, -SIBSTA
[1014]During the periods 1-20 February, 12 April-7 May,,.
[1015]and 9-20 August 1971, a surveillance was conducted of
[1016]Miss Deborah Fitzgerald, a former staff employee, and
[1017]Orlando Toro Nunez, a Cuban national with whom
[1018]Miss Fitzgerald had become professionally and emo-
[1019]tionally involved. Surveillance was predicated upon
[1020]information that Miss Fitzgerald had been seeking from
[1021]employees information in Information Processing Division
[1022]files, and that employees were visiting a photographic
[1023]studio operated by Miss Fitzgerald and Nunez in Fairfax
[1024]City, Virginia. In addition to physical surveillance,
[1025]one surreptitious entry of the photographic studio was
[1026]made, and an attempt to enter the apartment of Nunez
[1027]was aborted because of a door lock problem.
[1029]B. PARAGON
[1031]Pursuant to a request from the CI Staff, approved
[1032]by the DCI, surveillances were conducted of Iden 69
[1033]and her associates at various times’ from May to September
[1034]1971. Iden 69 » an acknowledged Latin American revolu-
[1035]tionary, had long been a source of the WH Division and
[1036]had given. information regarding a plot to assassinate
[1037]or kidnap Vice-President—Agnew and the BEE. Surveil-
[1038]lances included coverage of the activities of Iden 69
[1039]during two visits to the United States, technical cover-
[1040]age of debriefings of her by WH Division representatives
[1041]in New York City, and surveillance, including mail cover-
[1042]age, of several American citizens alleged to be part of
[1043]the plot. Although most of the surveillance occurred in
[1044]New York City, surveillance of one of the individuals
[1045]included extensive coverage of a commune in Detroit.
[1047]C. GELOTEXI
[1049]At the direction of the DCI, a surveillance was con-
[1050]ducted of Iden 180 of the Washington Post during
[1051]_ : faa .
[1053]E2 IMPDET
[1054]CL BY 000988.
[1055]Vf
[1057]PS O002G
[1058]~ 4
[1060]SECRET.
[1061]EYES OuLy
[1063]Pa
[1067]SS a ie
[1070]SkGici
[1071]e Be @
[1073]the periods 6-9 October, 27 October-10 December 1971
[1075]and on 3 January 1972.. In addition to physical sur- t
[1076]veillance, an observation post was maintained in the
[1077]Statler Hilton Hotel where observation could be main-
[1078]tained of the building housing his office. The sur-
[1079]veillance was designed to determine Iden 180 sources
[1081]of classified information of interest to the Agency
[1083]which had appeared in a number of his columns.
[1085]D. MUDHEN
[1087]At the direction of the DCI, surveillance was con-
[1088]ducted of Jack Anderson and at various times his "leg
[1089]men,’ Britt Hume, Leslie Whitten, and Joseph Spear,
[1090]from 15 February to 12 April 1972. In addition to the
[1092]' physical surveillance, an observation post was main-
[1094]II.
[1096]| Docld:32989624 Page 20
[1098]tained in the Statler Hilton Hotel directly opposite
[1099]Anderson's office. The purpose of this surveillance
[1100]Was to attempt to determine Anderson's sources for
[1101]highly classified Agency information appearing in his
[1102]syndicated columns.
[1104]BE. BUTANE-
[1106]At the direction of the DCI, a surveillance was
[1107]conducted on Victor L. Marchetti from 23 March to
[1108]20 April 1972. The purpose of this surveillance was
[1109]to determine his activities and contacts both with
[1110]Agency employees and other individuals in regard to
[1111]his proposed book and published magazine articles ex-
[1112]posing Agency operations.
[1114]POLICE SUPPORT
[1116]A. During 1969, 1970, and 1971, on several occasions,
[1117]the Intelligence Division of the Metropotitan Police
[1118]Department was provided a communications system to
[1119]monitor major anti-Vietnam war demonstrations in the
[1121]‘Washington area. This system consisted of a radio
[1123]receiver-and an Agent at the Intelligence Division
[1124]Headquarters and several automobiles from an Agency
[1125]Field Office equipped with radio receivers and trans-
[1126]mitters and manned bytwo Agency employees, as well asia
[1127]representative of the Intelligence Division, Metropolitan.
[1128]Police Department. The benefit to the Agency was that
[1129]the communications over this system were monitored at
[1130]the Headquarters Building to provide instant notice of
[1131]possible actions by the dissidents against Agency in-
[1132]stallations. . :
[1135]2
[1136]SEGEET
[1138]BE]
[1140]EYES SLY
[1143]a -  CEGRET
[1144]> EVES GLY @
[1146]- B. During the period from 1968 to 1973, several .
[1147], items of positive audio equipment consisting pri- \
[1149]marily of clandestine transmitters and touch-tone
[1150]dial recorders were loaned to the Metropolitan
[1151]Police Department, Fairfax-County,—Virginia, Police
[1152]Department, Montgomery—County;—Marytand; Police
[1153]Department, New-¥ork—Cits Police Department, and the
[1154]sSan-Franeisco;-€attformia, Police Department.
[1156]_LII, GENERAL SUPPORT
[1157]~ A. -SRPOINTER-
[1159]- Since 1953, this office has operated a mail inter-
[1160]cept program of incoming and outgoing Russian mail
[1161]and, at various times, other selective mail at Kennedy
[1162]Airport in New York City. This operation included not:
[1163]only the photographing of envelopes but also surrepti-
[1164]tious opening and photographing of selected items of
[1166]. Mail. The bulk of the take involved matters of inter-
[1167]nal security interest which was disseminated to the
[1168]Federal Bureau of Investigation. This program is now
[1169]in a dormant state pending a decision as to whether
[1170]the operation will be continued or abolished.
[1172]B. AELADEE
[1174]For several years the Office of Security has pro-
[1175]vided support to a Russian, defector of
[1176]interest to the CI Staff. This support has consisted
[1177]of numerous things, including documentation for a change
[1178]of identity on three occasions.
[1180]'C. REDFACE-—T-
[1182]In July 1970, this office made a surreptitious
[1183]entry of an office in Silver Spring, Maryland, occu-
[1184]pied by a former defector working under contract for
[1185]the Agency. This involved by-passing a contact and
[1187]3
[1188]VE se
[1189]seepey ‘00023
[1190]WV -
[1191]EVES ONLY An
[1193]NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 21
[1196]SECHE!
[1197]ems 4
[1199]sonic alarm system, entering a vault, and entering
[1200]a safe within the vauit. The purpose of the opera-
[1201]tion was to determine whether the individual had
[1202]any unauthorized classified information in his
[1203]possession. .
[1205]D. BUREAU OF NARCOTICS AND DANGEROUS DRUGS
[1207]In January 1971, the Director approved a request
[1208]from the Director, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous
[1209]Drugs, to provide covert recruitment and security
[1210]Clearance support to BNDD. This has been accomplished
[1211]: . through the medium of a proprietary of the Office of’
[1212], Security operating in
[1213]: Falls Church, Virginia. Support
[1214]includes covert recruitment, investigation, polygraph,
[1215]medical clearance, and training. It has been divided
[1216]into three phases: (1) A CI operation to place indi-
[1217]viduals in BNDD field offices to monitor any illegal
[1218]activities af other BNDD employees; (2) Recruitment
[1219]: of Chinese or Spanish speaking covert Agents; and (3)
[1220]. Recruitment of an individual used as an Agent by BNDD
[1221]but actually employed by BNDD, although this fact is
[1222]known only to the Director and Chief Inspector, BNDD.
[1223]In this case, arrangements were made for all pay and
[1224]Other employee benefits to come from CIA on a reim-.
[1225]bursable basis.
[1227]E. KITTENS PROJECT
[1229]As a result of a request from the Department of
[1230]State, approved by the DCI, this office has, since
[1231]October 1972, provided protection on a 24-hour basis
[1232]to two. sons. of a foreign leader who are attending school
[1233]in | the United States. This support includes
[1234]the financing of the protection and the detail to the
[1235]Department of State of six armed Agents of this office
[1236]who are documented as State Department Office of Security
[1237]employees. .
[1239]F. ~MERRIMAG—
[1241]From February 1967 to November 1971, an
[1242]Office of Security proprietary, recruited and handled
[1243]several Agents for the purpose of covertly monitoring
[1245]SECRET 000%
[1246]EYES CRLY
[1248]LNW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 22 |
[1251]PO gee
[1253]EVES Gy
[1255]dissident groups in the Washington area considered
[1256]to be potential threats to Agency personnel and
[1257]installations. One of these Agents _so, successfully
[1258]penetrated one dissident group that the Agent was turned
[1259]‘over to the FBI for handling. In addition, during
[1260]this period, the Office of Security field offices
[1261]were tasked with collecting available intelligence
[1262]on dissident groups. All such information was in-
[1263]cluded in a periodic report distributed to appro-
[1264]priate parts of the Agency and to certain outside
[1265]Government agencies.
[1267]io,  F. cANTDERS
[1269]Several months ago, at the request of CI Staff,
[1270]and with the approval of the DDP and the DCI, this
[1271]office arranged to move a sensitive defector out of
[1272]a European country via commercial transportation and
[1273]gain entry into the United States without leaving
[1274]any trace of his true identity.
[1276]i 00039
[1280]5
[1281]SECRET
[1283]1, . Re
[1284]| NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 23 EYES iv
[1287]os array
[1288]) a | By -
[1290]MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
[1292]SUBJECT: General: Office of Security Survey
[1296]li May 1973
[1298]1. At the Director's instruction, and with the concurrence
[1299]of the then DD/P, the Office of Security developed informants in
[1300]_RID to report on the activities of RID employees on whom security
[1302]questions had arisen.
[1304]This program, which included upwards ofa
[1306]dozen informants at its peak, has declined to its present level of
[1307]three, only one of whom is reporting regularly on matters of current
[1309]interest.
[1311]2. The principal object of Security's interest through this
[1312]informant is a female who was employed in RID for a number of years
[1314]until she resigned in 1969,
[1316]Her resignation coincided with the initiation
[1318]of a security review on her by the Office of Security, but Security does
[1319]not know whether the employee was aware of this security review at
[1321]the time of her resignation.
[1323]3. Security's interest in this employee was occasioned by
[1324]reports that she had developed an increasingly intimate acquaintance
[1326]with a Cuban national.
[1328]Reporting by one informant, who was also
[1330]being developed by the Cuban, suggested that the Cuban might have
[1332]an intelligence interest in the female.
[1334]The same informant also sub-
[1336]sequently reported that the Cuban had numerous other contacts among
[1338]clerical and secretarial employees of the Agency.
[1340]Among these
[1342]employees is one girl who works in a biographic section in SB Division.
[1344]4, Subsequent to her departure from the Agency, the ex-RID
[1345]employee entered into a common-law marital relationship with the
[1346]Cuban and joined him as partner in a photographic business. In this
[1347]capacity she solicited business among CIA employees, especially
[1349]those requiring passport photos.
[1351]Recently, she and the Cuban sought
[1353]to employ Security's informant in this business on a part-time basis.
[1355]CTLNT
[1357]like
[1359](NW88296 Docid:32989624 Page 24 : :
[1361]. . =a cL ev___--.-|
[1364]a
[1366]a 00059
[1367]ve .
[1373]Joram wee wes.
[1375]_ NW 88756 Docld:32989624 Page 25 _.
[1377]5, Information on the background of the Cuban is fairly extensive,
[1379]but it is inconclusive. e is known to have been a member of anti-
[1380]7
[1382]Castro organizations J this country. There are alNJJreports that
[1384]his mother was imprisoned in Cuba at one time. There are other -
[1385]episodes in his life that suggest intelligence involvement on his part
[1386]with some hostile service, but this is not yet definitely established.
[1388]6. The Office of Security has had at times a second informant
[1389]in this case. His reporting has tended to confirm reporting by the
[1390]principal informant.
[1391]. a
[1392]7. There is conclusive evidence that the Cuban expressed ;
[1393]interest in certain 201 files in the Agency, and there are good grounds,
[1394]for believing that the RID female employee delivered at least one such
[1396]‘file to the Cuban while she was still in RID. There is also evidence
[1398]that the female employee in SB Division has continued in frequent
[1399]contact with her friend,. the ex-RID employee, and the Cuban. On
[1400]one occasion, she served as intermediary for contact instructions
[1401]from the Cuban to O/S's principal informant. The informant has no
[1402]knowledge, however, of any other requirements that may have been
[1403]levied on or satisfied by the SB employee. Neither does he know of
[1405]. the extent of contacts by this couple with other Agency employees
[1407]except social contacts.
[1409]8. The Office of Security has been running this operation for
[1410]over two years, in an effort to obtain conclusive proof of its intelli-_
[1411]gence nature. CI Staff has been kept informed. The FBI, which
[1412]was informed of the case at an early stage, has declined to take re-
[1413]sponsibility for it, on grounds that it concerns CIA's internal security,
[1414]As a result, the Office ofSecurity has been inhibited in the actions
[1415]it can take against the Cuban suspect. On the other hand, Security
[1416]has not taken any action against Agency employees for fear of com-
[1417]promising the operation.
[1419]9. It would appear to me that the Office of Security has dallied
[1420]with this case long enough. Apparently unable through positive measures
[1421]to resolve doubts about the case, O/S has followed, the course of watch-
[1422]ful waiting, hoping the Cuban would take precipitant action himself that
[1423]would give us the evidence we seek. In the meantime, our knowledge
[1424]of the relationship between the Cuban and the several other current
[1425]Agency employees with whom he is known to have contact continues
[1427]own
[1430]to be quite limited. Neither the Cuban nor his girlfriend have made
[1431]any further approaches to Security's informant recently, although he ~
[1433]- continues to see the cially. Thus, there is slirMJJheason to believe
[1434]that further waiting will produce a break in the case.
[1436]10. There are two courses open to the Office of Se¢urity now.
[1437]It can attempt to have the Agency employees known to be in contact
[1438]with the Cuban transferred to nonsensitive positions. This might
[1439]alert the Cuban to our penetration of the operation, particularly
[1440]since a plausible reason for transfer would be difficult to develop
[1441]for some of the persons involved. Alternatively, Security could
[1442]move overtly and charge the Agency employees with violation of the
[1443]security regulation requiring reporting of contacts with foreign
[1444]nationals. This would, of course, terminate the Office of Security's
[1445]_Operation. _
[1446]ll, One of these courses of action should be chosen promptly.
[1447]The possibility that the employee in SB Division may be passing ‘
[1448]information on CLA's Soviet operations is too great to warrant further
[1449]delay in moving against her. Moreover, itis possible that the Cuban
[1450]has current productive penctrations of RID. Thus, the risk of damage
[1451]to the Agency seems clearly to outweigh any. possible gains from
[1452]continuing this CI effort.
[1454]Te.
[1456]i aserebebeing
[1457]ee .
[1458]need a
[1460]| reer |
[1462]-NVE88296~Decid:32989624 Page 26 : . wo
[1463]Sgr
[1466]NW G8296
[1468]_ individuals in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency--
[1470]Lobe h ie isa
[1472]willie Huilig cid ies nk UL abi
[1474]. co, 9 May 1973
[1476]MEMORANCUM FOR: Deputy Director for Management § Services
[1478]SUBJECT . 3 ,Press Allegations re Use of Agency
[1479]Polygraph. on,
[1481]-1.° This memorandum is for your information only
[1482]and confirms a report I made to you by telephone earlier
[1483]today. ;
[1485]2. On 22 July 1971, an article was carried on
[1486]American preposals relative to the SALT talks in The New
[1487]York Times over the by-line of Iden 181. It was
[1488]devastatingly accurate and contained direct quotes from
[1489]a Presidential advisory memorandum the White House had
[1490]sent to Mr. Gerard Smith, Director, Arms Control and
[1491]Disarmament Agency, a few days earlier. The President
[1492]was alleged to be furious with this unauthorized dis-
[1493]closure of classified information and directed a sweeping
[1494]investigation within the United States Government to
[1495]determine the source of the disclosure. Investigation
[1496]was conducted uncer the direction of Mr. Egil Krogh and
[1497]Mr. David Young, Staff Assistants to Mr. John Ehriichman,
[1498]Counsel to the President for Domestic Affairs.
[1500]‘3. On the basis of investigations conducted by
[1501]State Security and Defense officials, four individuals--
[1502]‘one individual in the Department of Defense and three
[1504]were tabbed as leading suspects. Mr. Egil Krogh contacted
[1505]me on 26 July 1971 and requested that we arrange to polygraph
[1506]the three suspects in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
[1507]and volunteered the information that the Federal Bureau of
[1508]Investigation would be asked to polygraph the one suspect
[1510]in the Department of Defense.
[1514]A
[1515]i
[1517]VAIO Aen penne ar OM
[1518]ADERISTRATERERAL USE mm
[1520],
[1521]o
[1523]00065
[1525]Decld:32989624 Page 27 ae —
[1528]PS Ab TD Tia accanl vai U7
[1530]4, I informed Mr. Krogh that from time to time
[1531]in matters involving the national security the Agency had -
[1532]detailed to Mr. G. Marvin Gentile, Director of State
[1533]. Security, a polygraph eperator and a polygraph machine for
[1534]his use in polvgraphing State Department employees who
[1535]were recipients of allegations concerning their loyalty.
[1536]I emphasized that this procedure had the Director's
[1537]approval and that State clearly understood that the examin-
[1538]ation was their total responsibitity. I further informed
[1539]him that this was the only way we could undertake to enter-
[1540]tain his request and that even then it would require the
[1541]specific approval of the Director. Mr. Krogh asked me to
[1542]obtain such approval and work out such arrangements with
[1543]Mr. Gentile.
[1545]S. Later that same day, Mr. Krogh called Mr. Gentile
[1546]and inquired es to whether the arrangements had been made.
[1547]Mr. Gentile indicated they had and suggested that the sane
[1548]polygraph operator be used to examine the Defense suspect.
[1549]Mr. Krogh informed Mr. Gentile that he considered this an
[1550]excellent idea and that he would instruct Defense officials
[1551]to make their man available to Mr. Gentile for a polygraph
[1552]examination.
[1554]6. The four individuals were Iden 182
[1555]of the Department of Defense and Iden 183
[1556]Iden 184 » and Iden 185 - of
[1557]the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The polygraph
[1558]examinations resulted in clearing the four men and the
[1559]| results of the examinations were forwarded over my signature
[1560]to Mr. Gentile on 29 July 1971. A copy of my covering
[1561]memorandum is attached.
[1562]| .
[1563]t
[1565]7. ° Iden 186 “, a staff writer for The
[1566]‘Washington Post, in an article dated 3 September 1977,
[1567]Stated that a State Department spokesman had acknowledged
[1568]at a news briefing that agents of the Federal Bureau of
[1569]Investigation had polygraphed State Department employees
[1570]suspected of leaking information on the SALT talks in
[1571]July. Mr. John Edgar Hoover, then Director of the Federal
[1573]= NW88296—<Docld:32989624_ Pag.
[1575]_NW.88296_Docld:32989624 Pag
[1577]* fDiandSiRiuisacueat BE Gil
[1578]eo . . @
[1580]- Bureau of Investigation, denied this allegation in a
[1581]Tetter to The Washinaten Post and said that the polygraph.
[1582]examinations nad been Concucted by another agency. -Specu-
[1583]lation centerec around the Agency, but after a day or so,
[1584]press speculation in this regard died away.
[1586]8. Iden 186 apparently has never been satisfied
[1587]and has been pressing Mr. Charles Bray, State Department
[1588]spokesman, for confirmation of Agency involvement. Mr.
[1590]Bray learned today that Iden 186 plans to use a press
[1591]conference to be held at 2:00 p.m. this afternoon to press
[1592]this point further. fir. Bray has been given guidance by
[1594]Mr. Gentile to avoid confirmation but if this is impossible
[1595]he will indicate the examinations were conducted by State
[1596]Department Security officials utilizing an operator and
[1597]a machine detailed to the Department for this purpose. I
[1598]do not know whether or not the fact that the government-wide
[1599]investigation was directed by Mr. Egil Krogh is known to
[1600]iden 186 but I suspect that it is and that this is the
[1601]reason why the matter has been raised again. Mr. David
[1602]Young was instrumental in pushing my office to conduct an
[1603]internal Agency investigation of this disclosure and the
[1604]White House was satisfied that no Agency employee was
[1605]the source.
[1607]baycach y Dire
[1609]loward 3. Osborn
[1610]Director of Security
[1612]Attachment
[1614]‘ ASIEN ATA fa ene: preery wa
[1615]Adnuisianivt- iaed Gates die ue
[1617]. coves
[1619]OTe TT
[1622]® | @... 1973
[1624]MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General
[1626]. SUBJECT , ¢ Items in John Clarke Memorandum
[1627]to the Director of Central Intelligence,
[1628]dated 9 May 1973
[1630]1. Two items in the attached memorandum had not
[1631]previously been reported. The first: ''~- Use of CIA funds
[1632]and facilities to acquire U.S. real estate for. FBI and pro-
[1633]vision of technical equipments by NSA (MHDOZEN) for use
[1634]against a common target in the U.S,"
[1636]2. Ina follow-up meeting with Mr. Clarke, he advised
[1637]that involved here was the use of funds appropriatedfor CIA
[1638]being given to the FBI in cashiers checks for the purpose of
[1639]buying an apartment building.
[1641]There was also
[1642]Agency help given in handling the purchase. Further, other
[1643]CIA monies in cashiers checks were given to NSA who, with
[1644]some OTS assistance, was working on new gadgetry for the
[1645]surveillance. Mr. Clarke said he thought the only problem
[1646]here was in the use of funds, not in the operation. He thought
[1647]the only source of additional information on this subject was
[1648]Mr. Ray Rocca of the DDO/CI Staff,
[1649]3. The second item: "-- Use of CIA funds to help
[1650]State Department defer Presidential representational expenses
[1651]of President Lyndon B. Johnson's trip to Southeast Asia."
[1652]; 4. Mr. Clarke said the total amount of money requested
[1654]- by State Department was $3,000, 000 but that the Director would
[1656]not agree to this amount. The Director did supply funds in
[1658]those instances where some operational activity was involved or
[1660]could be inferred, i.e., crowd control, politicalaction influence
[1661]_ activity, etc. Mr. Clarke was not sure of the’ ‘amount of Agency
[1663]00079
[1665]EET ryES feb yy
[1669]i. “a0: .
[1670]€anless Pmgetstlic, inssek ote or eves!
[1673]funds used.
[1674]additional detai
[1676]He fdalt that only Colonel White could supply
[1678]| He said Senator Russell dP Repre-
[1679]sentative Mahon were advised of this Agency activity but
[1680]asked not to be briefed in detail.
[1682]f a . .
[1683]bis G hee fark
[1684]Johr-G+Richaznds.
[1685]Inspector
[1687]Attachment
[1689]ee | | 00074
[1690]SEOPET-EYES GY
[1693]9 May 1973
[1695]MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
[1697]SUBJECT : Per your instructions
[1701]1, Ihave no recollection of specific contacts with the
[1702]Elisberg case, Watergate, or Young. Dick Helms' instructions
[1703]at the time regarding discussion of Hunt's previous employment
[1704]should be’a matter of record. -~ : , ,
[1706]2. Other activities of the Agency which could at some point
[1707]raise public questions should they be exposed and on which Bill
[1708]Colby is fully conversant are:
[1710]= Clactivity of Dick Ober, DD/D.
[1712][7 * «= WHEBRINEY and MHMUTUAL investments and
[1713]accumulation of Government capital.
[1715]= -~ Use of CIA funds and facilities to acquire U.S.
[1717]. {° real estate for FBl and provision of technical °
[1718]No.” fA equipments by NSA (MHDOZEN) for use against
[1719](2 [3 a common target inthe U.S,
[1720]& .
[1721]ar?)
[1722]-~ Use of CIA funds to help State Department defer x
[1723]Presidential representational expenses of L. B. J. A
[1724]7 : Mae trip to SEA. C
[1725]ai, | |
[1726]XN
[1727]WV
[1729]Clarke
[1731]EVES OiiLY . Ke
[1733]| NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 32
[1736]iN
[1738]“SUPJZCT t Items-in John Clark
[1740]_.
[1742]; Docid:32989624 Page 33 . 1
[1744]» 54 bne 1973
[1746]MEMCRANDUM FOR: Inspector General
[1748]to the Director of Central Intelligence,
[1749]dated 9 May 1973
[1751]1. Two items in the attached memorandum had not
[1752]praviously been reported. The first: "-- Use of CIA funds
[1753]and facilities to acquire U.S. real estate for FBI and pro-
[1754]vision of technical equiprnents by MSA (MHTDOZEN) for usé
[1755]against a common target in the U.S.'!
[1757]2. Ina follow-uo meeting with Mr. Clarke, he advised
[1758]that involved here was the use of funds appropriatedfor CIA
[1759]being given to the FEL in cashiers checks for the purpose of
[1760]buying an apartment building .
[1761]SO There was also
[1762]Agency help given in handling the purchase. Further, other
[1763]CIA monies in cashiers checks were given to MSA who, with
[1764]some OTS assistance, wa3 working on new gadgetry for the
[1765]eurveillance. Mr, Clarke said he thought the only problem -
[1767]’ hero was in the use of funds, not in the operation. He thought
[1769]the only source of additional information on this subject was
[1770]Mr. Ray Rocca of the DDO/CI Staff.
[1772]‘3, The second item: "+- Use of CIA funds to help
[1773]State Department defer Presidential representational exvenses
[1775]_ of President Lyndon B. Johnson's trip to Southeast Asia."
[1777]4. Mr. Clarke said the total amount of money reauested
[1778]by State Department was $3,000,000 but that the Director would
[1779]not agree to this amount. The Director did supply funds in
[1780]those instances where some operational activity was involved or
[1781]could be inferred, i.e., crowd control, politicayaction influence
[1782]activity, etc. Mr, Clarke was not sure of the amount of Agency
[1784]00073
[1786]CLL TTS mes
[1788]REP es Sern :
[1791]Vo
[1793](walissibsat os, tere. o
[1795]tae whew
[1797]VON
[1799]ewe ee Ue
[1801]Beer Ss
[1803]ae or ceerls
[1806]MEMORANDUM FOR:
[1808]. FBI referred to in para 1 is not shown
[1809].in other documents in the Agency. If
[1810]and has been kept very close with Mr. Yale,
[1811]“Mr. Magnusson, aind possibly Mr. Colby.
[1813]"All Files have been purged.
[1815]ForN RO« REPLACES FORM 10-101 4
[1816]1 auc 54 OL wnice mar BE USED. — . t ”
[1817]° .
[1818]. .
[1819]. .
[1820]- oo.
[1822]. ‘
[1823]se
[1824]a m
[1825]x {
[1826]“A :
[1827].
[1829]* we
[1830]we,
[1831]ye Aa
[1833]. @
[1834]ae . r 2
[1836]NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 34. .
[1837]He OBE. MOCK wee sbes Page 4
[1839],
[1841], ” : i
[1842]ih .
[1844]an
[1847]bd x . -
[1849]to . | 0% KAY 1973
[1851]> e
[1853]MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
[1855]VIA : Deputy Director for Management and Services
[1856]FROM : Director of Finance
[1857]SUBJECT -: Special Other Government Agency Activities
[1859]1. Project MHDOZEN - Colonel White, Executive Director-
[1860]-Comptroller, acting for the Director, authorized the Director
[1862]of Finance in a memorandum dated 17 November 1971 to obligate
[1863]$2,700,000 for a sensitive domestic FBI operation and to
[1864]disperse all or any part thereof in such manner as may be
[1865]determined by the receiving agency and relayed to Finance by
[1866]the Chief, CI Staff, DDP. This authorization was reaffirmed
[1867]by Mr. William Colby 18 April 1972. This Project is still
[1868]active. :
[1870]2. bPMEDLEY - Rental of office space in New York City
[1871]for National Security Agency at the request of Dr. Tordella,
[1872]Deputy Director/NSA and approved by Mr. Karamessines,
[1873]Deputy Director for Plans.
[1875]3. Detailees - The Agency has reimbursable.and non-
[1876]reimbursable agreements with the White House, Department of
[1877]Justice, Defense Agencies, etc., based on signed memoranda
[1878]between the Director of Personnel and the various Agencies.
[1880]4. ' Project TWOFOLD-- Reimbursement from Bureau of
[1881]Narcotics ana Dangerous Drugs for training of BNDD agents by
[1882]‘a domestic Agency Security proprietary.
[1884]‘Ss. Department of Justice - On 29 April 1971 the
[1886]Executive Director-Comptroller authorized a payment of
[1887]$858,555.70 to the Department of Justice for negotiated
[1888]sensitive services. Details were kept in the Office of the
[1889]Deputy Director for Plans.
[1891]E2 IMPDET
[1892]CL BY: 006567
[1893]‘ i
[1895]A
[1897].
[1899]Bae STele\rar,
[1901]—NW 88296 _Docld:32989624 Page 35 _
[1906]: 6 6
[1908]MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Management and Services
[1910]SUBJECT  : «Special Report
[1912]1. This memorandum is in response to a request to
[1913]provide information on situations or associations that
[1914]might appear to be irregular on the surface.
[1916]2. Details to the White House and Government Agencies -
[1917]‘Backsrouna: For many years the Centrai intelligence Agency nas
[1918]etailed employees to the immediate office of the White House
[1919]- per se and to components associated intimately with the immediate
[1921]office of the President such as the Council on International
[1922]Economic Policy and the President's Foreign Intelligence
[1923]Advisory Beard. We have furnished secretarics, clerical
[1924]employees and certain professional employees on a reimbursable
[1925]and non-reimbursable basis. At the present time, we have no
[1926]Clericals or professionals assigned to the immediate White
[1927]House office, but we do have one young man detailed to their
[1928]Communications Section. There are detailees to PFIAB and CIEP.
[1929]I might point out that we had detailed to the White House as
[1930]late as the fall of 1970 couriers, telephone operators, a
[1931]laborer assigned to the grounds and a graphics man who designed
[1932]invitations tor State dinners. By October of 1970, more funds
[1933]were apparently available to run the White House and most of
[1934]our detailees were hired as bona fide White House employees.
[1935]CIA is not the only Agency furnishing the White House with
[1936]detailees. Levies have been made by this Administration and
[1937]others on Defense and State and other Government entities
[1938]whose employees have Top Secret clearances.
[1940]Professional officers have been and are at the present
[1941]time assigned » the National Security Council and we have seven
[1942]clericals on detail to NSC on a reimbursable basis.
[1944]| In addition to the above, we have technical specialists
[1945]detailed to NSA, an instructor at the National War College and
[1946]security officers detailed to the Department of State to
[1950]ry mei E 2 IMPDET Cl By 003935
[1951]CONFIDEHTIAL : y 00395
[1953]00405
[1955]— '
[1956]oe ees oe
[1958]NW 88296. Docld: 32989624 Page 36 . ; = a “ ——
[1960]. i . : _ fer
[1963]-protect foreign visgtors. Recently, John ag wes detailed -
[1964]to the Secretary o he Treasury along with mr other Agency
[1965]employees. We have even, in rare. instances, detailed our
[1966]people to Congressional Staffs for short periods of. time.
[1968]-3. Details to the White House and Government Agencies -
[1969]Discussicn: Details to NSC, the Write House, NSA and the
[1970]National War College are probably quite cefensible. On the other
[1971]hand, there may be those who would question Agency employees
[1972]currently working at the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs
[1973]and Mr. Peter Petérson having an Agency employee as his
[1974]secretary when he was the Secretary of Commerce {she also made
[1975]@ trip with him to Moscow). She is still with him in his
[1976]present assignment but we expect that she will report to NSC for
[1977]a@ hew detail sometime this month. Iden 112 served for —
[1978]over ten years as Director of the Office of. Public Safety for
[1979]AID. This information has been kept "close to the vest" during
[1980]that entire period of time. He has been approved for disability
[1981]retirement and is presently on sick leave and will retire
[1982]automatically at the expiration of this leave.
[1984]Each detail of an Agency employee to the White House or
[1985]other Government agency has been carefully considered and
[1986]approval at a higher level obtained when professionals were
[1987]involved.
[1989]4. Project TWOFOLD I believe the support we are
[1990]providing to Project TROSOLD is an activity that should be .-
[1991]reported under your guidelines. Since this is an extremely
[1992]sensitive Project and the Office of Security is reporting on
[1993]it, I will not repeat the details in my memorandun.
[1995]S$. Individuals Engaged in Domestic Activities:. In a more
[1996]general sense, Contract Personnei Division prepares and executes
[1997]contracts with individuals engaged by the Agency to carry out
[1998]domestic activities. We also process Staff Agents who are
[1999]domestically assigned. None of these assignments are decided
[2000]in OP. I really have no way of knowing with any degree of
[2001]certainty what the specific duties of these individuals will be.
[2003]6. Arrangements with American Firms: In the interest of
[2004]reporting "too much, "I would remind you that Contract Personnel
[2005]Division writes "acreements" with domestically based American
[2006]firms to provide cover for Agency assets, The actual assign-
[2007]ments are overseas. The arrangements, however, are backstopped,
[2008]in | the main, in the United States.
[2010]oe _— C0106
[2011]CONFIDENT L ee!
[2013]WW 88256 Docid=33489624 Page 37 . ore a
[2016]7. Contractu Relationship - USJPRS: @« Agency
[2017]organization, USJPRE, has a contractual assocMation with
[2018]approximately 1,500 independent contractors and 45 contract
[2019]employees. These individuals are unwitting of the fact that
[2020]they really work for CIA in the performance of their domestic
[2021]activities. USJPRS (United States Joint Publications Research
[2022]Service) is a part of FBIS. They perform a translation service
[2023]of unclassified documents for the Government. The independent
[2024]contractors work in their own homes and are given assignments
[2026]as the need arises. The contract employees are "integrated"
[2028]into the Bureau of Standards and are located in Washington, D. C.
[2029]They are paid and administered by the Bureau. CIA reimburses
[2031]the Bureau. Their basic contracts of employment are prepared
[2033]in Contract Personnel Division.
[2035]"8, Hunt Requests a Lockpicker: This is. a record of
[2036]External Employment Assistance branch's action on a request
[2037]from Howard Hunt for a lockpicker who might be retiring or
[2038]resigning from the Agency.
[2040]Sometime in the spring of 1972, Iden 38 of EEAB
[2041]received a call from Hicward Hunt who asked tden 38 1f he had a
[2042]retiree or resignee who was accomplished at picking locks.
[2043]Iden 38 sent him a resume on Thomas_Amato who retired
[2045]‘31 July 1971. Iden 38 did not document his EEAB record
[2047]to show the date of this exchange, but Mr. Thomas-Hester (who
[2048]also works in EEAB) opines that it occurred sometime between
[2049]March and May 1972.
[2051]All of the above information was reported to the Office
[2052]of Security on 4 October 1972 following the FBI's contact with
[2053]the Agency regarding Howard Hunt.
[2055]9. Resume Sent to McCord: Ross Lambert, a contract
[2056]employee who retired in September 1971, was a client of the
[2057]External Employment Assistance Branch in his search for a job
[2058]after retirement. One of the leads given to Lambert was
[2059]James McCord's security business. EEAB sent a resume to
[2060]McCord, but Lambert was not hired.
[2062]In mid-summer 1972, Mr. Lambert telephoned EEAB from ~
[2063]Chicago. (He had a job there with the Halifax Security Co.,
[2064]a lead provided by EEAB, but until this telephone call he had
[2066]Ww
[2068]CONFIBENTIAL 00107
[2070]—NW-88296—Bocld 32989624 Page 38
[2073]ee as ~ T = — 7 7 rs aaa |
[2075]not notified EEAB that he had the job and had moved from
[2076]the D.C. area.) Hegjaid he had been visited@y a Special
[2077]Agent of the FBI wh¥told Lambert that his re™ume had been
[2078]found among McCord's papers. The Agent wanted to know if
[2079]Lambert had any connection with McCord. Lambert explained
[2080]how the resume got to McCord. After the Agent left him,
[2081]Lambert telephoned EEAB. Mr. Xennedy of OP and Iden 29
[2083]OS were notified immediately. ° ~
[2086]Ang). 1U4hen
[2087]; Harry B. Fisher
[2088]Director of Personnel
[2090].
[2092]ce AL OE 00268
[2094]NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 39 a ot oo —~
[2096]| gi KAY 1973
[2097].
[2099]MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
[2101]THROUGH : Deputy Director for Management and Services
[2103]SUBJECT : Sensitive Activities Performed by: the
[2104]Office of Logistics
[2108]1. This memorandum contains information for the Director
[2109]of Central Intelligence.
[2111]2. This memorandum is submitted pursuant to advice given
[2112]by the Deputy Director for Management and Services on 7 May
[2113]that Office Directors report on activities, either under their
[2114]cognizance or otherwise known to them, the nature of which
[2115]could possibly need explanation or justification when viewed
[2116]within the statutory responsibility and authority of the
[2118]-Director of Central Intelligence. The responsibilities of the
[2119]Office of Logistics (OL) are such that in all matters herein
[2120]reported, except two, the actions undertaken were at the re-
[2121]quest of another Agency component. We have prepared a brief
[2122]description of each action involved and then have included the
[2123]mame of the sponsoring component. The substantive reason for
[2124]the requests for action by this Office will have to be deter-
[2125]mined by inquiry to the designated sponsoring component.
[2127]3. Facts pertaining to both actions undertaken at the
[2128]initiative of this Office are as follows:
[2130]a. A covert procurement proprietary concern, dedi-
[2131]cated to the acquisition of firearms, ammunition, and
[2132]related police-type equipment, is operated in Baltimore,
[2133]Maryland. It was organized in 1969. This proprietary
[2134]is operated in order to give the Agency a capability to
[2136]‘obtain such materiel without associating the procurement
[2137]action with the United States Government. It is legally
[2138]_mecessary that the proprietary be licensed by both the
[2139]State and Federal jurisdictions. Since it is located in
[2140]Maryland, it is appropriately licensed by the Maryland
[2141]State Police to buy and sell firearms and ammunition.
[2143]EVES. OWLY
[2146]SENSIT 1 WE
[2148]-MW-88296—Docid:32989624 Page 40
[2151]Sensitive <ctivities Performed by th
[2153]Logistics
[2155]“SUBJECT: “Office of
[2157]The Maryland State Police have been briefed on the Agency's
[2158]association with this proprietary and have assisted us in
[2159]obtaining the appropriate State license. Similarly, a
[2160]Federal license has been obtained for the proprietary
[2161]through an arrangement with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
[2162]and Firearms of the Department of the Treasury. They, too,
[2164]have been briefed on the Agency's association with this
[2165]proprietary.
[2167]b. Under Title 18, Chapter 2512 of.the U. S. Code
[2169]- (1968), the sale of electronic intelligence equipment is
[2170]prohibited except to Federal agencies, and state and local
[2171]Jaw enforcement agencies. In essence, this law makes it
[2172]almost impossible to procure electronic intelligence
[2173]equipment in a covert manner so that no tie or relationship
[2174]to the United States Government is made. In order for the
[2175]Agency to covertly obtain such eauipment and hide any
[2176]Government interest, the Covert Procurement Staff cf the
[2177]Procurement Division. hag relied on an established working
[2178]relationship with aU.S. firm. | This firm, a prominent
[2179]supplier located in. Maryland, deals in a wide
[2180]range of law enforcement, police supplies, and equipment.
[2181]The Covert. Procurement Staff has. had a relationship withan officer
[2183]“4. in the firm for over 15 years. The officer agreed to
[2185]allow us to place orders through his corporation to major
[2186]suppliers of this equipment with a billing to 2” Agency national
[2187]proprietary.There is an understanding that. if any -inaquiry
[2188]is raised by the Department cf Justice, the firm's officer would
[2189]immediately call the Chief of the Covert Procurement Staff
[2190]who would, through appropriate liaison channels, contact
[2191]the Department of Justice, identify the.Agencv's interest
[2192]in the procurement action, and clear the officer of any
[2194]~responsibilitv.. Cn 10 September 1971, there was an inquiry
[2195]about the proprietary _fron_an FBI agent making a routine
[2196]investigation of. the officer's books. Through Office of
[2197]Security liaison with the Department of Justice and the FBI,
[2199]-.the agent was informed that it is an Agency
[2200]notional proprietary. This disclosure closed the inquiry
[2201]and, since that time, there has been no further inquiry.
[2203]Most of the DD/O area divisions from time to time submit
[2204]requisitions to us to acquire surveillance equipment. The
[2205]majority of the transactions are on behalf of the intelli-
[2206]gence service with whom liaison is conducted in various
[2207]foreign countries. By agreement between this Office and
[2209]- a SAs . _
[2210]EVES oly i
[2211]| SECKEL +. 002484
[2212]; 7 S ay
[2214]| WW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 41 : a , . woe
[2217].
[2220]'
[2221]Ss
[2223]| SUBJECT: Sensitive <ctivities Performed by tk
[2225]following items are pertinent:
[2227]‘Colonel White explained that the Technical Services
[2229]yO
[2231].Ment that has been involved in the undertaking.
[2233]other Government agencies from a contractual or materiel
[2235]“request, supported by a transfer of funds, the Agency
[2237]Office of
[2239]the DD/O, we will not honor any requisition fer surveil-
[2240]Jance equipment unless it has been approved cy the CI
[2241]Staff of the DD/O. - ,
[2243]Logistics
[2245]4; Within the area of contractual responsibilities, the
[2247]a. In February 1971, Colonel L. K. White, the then
[2248]Executive Director-Comptroller, called me to attend a
[2249]meeting in his office, also attended by Mr. William Colby.
[2251]Division (TSD) had been requested to provide assistance
[2252]to the FBI for a sensitive project _ .
[2254]; Oe » Colonel White did not dis-
[2255]Close the purpose of the assistance being provided by TSD
[2256]but did instruct me to assist TSD on purely contractual
[2257]matters. Since the Office of Logistics has no information
[2258]concerning the mission or purpose of Project sub- -
[2259]stantive questions concerning the subject should be
[2260]addressed te TSD. Other procurement actions accomplished
[2261]for the FBI_are..revorted below, Specific mention is made,
[2262]however, of the Project because of the dollar magnitude, ap-
[2263]proximately $1 million, and the complex technical equip-
[2265]b. The Procurement Division, OL, currently has two
[2266]requisitions in hand from TSD which would involve reim-
[2267]bursable sales to the FBI. One such requisition in the
[2268]amount of $356,900 is for two Westinghouse television
[2269]cameras. The second requisition in the amount of $11,200
[2270]is for two wide-angle surveillance probes manufactured by
[2271]Bausch and Lomb. No action is being taken on either of
[2272]these requirements pending further instructions which -
[2273]Will be sought from the Deputy Director for Management
[2274]and Services.
[2276]c. Over the years, this Agency has often supported
[2277]Standpoint. Upon the submission of an officially approved
[2278]would either enter into “accommodation procurements" for
[2279]the requesting agency or support the requesting agency by
[2280]the issuance of materiel from stock. Such actions are
[2281]legally accomplished under the Economy Act of 1925. This
[2283]Act authorizes one agency to support the needs of, or pro-
[2284]Vide a service for, another Government agency when such
[2286]EYES OMY ~
[2287]SECRET =, 4s OB
[2289]-NW'88296" Docld:32989624 Page 42 . ph a
[2290]Lo a ~ J
[2293]TWRYPEO UWi-lI
[2295]SUBJECT: Sensitive activities Performed by the Office of
[2296]Logistics
[2298]o é
[2300]action would be more economical and eliminate the need for
[2301]one agency of the Government to duplicate facilities
[2302]readily available from another. A typical example of this
[2303]procedure is purchasing photointerpretation gear for the
[2304]Defense Intelligence Agency element located at NPIC. In
[2305]connection with the current reporting requirement, however,
[2306]I have had our records researched for the past 2 years and
[2308]Attachment 1 reflects those transactions which appear to be
[2309]relevant to the subject of this memorandum..
[2311]d. In connection with the disclosures during the sunm-
[2312]mer of 1971 that the Rand Corporation was not properly
[2313]safeguarding classified documents, this Office undertook
[2314]two acts. I directed the Secnritwidéficer from our: West
[2315]Coast Procurement Office at the Iden 87 _. .
[2317]to visit the Rand Corporation and satisfy
[2318]himself that classified material furnished then by the
[2319]Agency was both properly safeguarded and accounted for.
[2320]7 , His report was affirmative. On 23 August 1971, the senior
[2322]. Security: Officer assigned to this Office forwarded a
[2323]letter to the Rand Corporation stressing and reaffirming
[2324]the procedures Rand must follow in safeguarding classified
[2325]information furnished them by the Agency. Of residual
[2326]interest in this matter, there is summarized the contents
[2327]of a memorandum of 2 July 1971 to the Executive Director-
[2328]Comptroller from the DD/I which is in our possession.
[2330]This memorandum reports that FBIS regularly
[2331]disseminated reports to the Rand Corporation
[2332]but that instructions had been issued to cease
[2334]- distribution of classified reports. While no
[2335]other direct dissenination went to Rand, other
[2336]USIB agencies, primarily USAF, were passing
[2337]"many" copies of DD/I products to Rand as au-
[2338]thorized under USIB regulations. The memoran-
[2339]dum also states that Rand personnel had ~
[2340]requested searches and document retrieval from
[2341]the CRS facility.
[2343]8. In connection with action taken for the Office of
[2344]Security, there are three relevant items:
[2346]. @. The Printing Services Division, OL," was requested
[2347]by the Office of Security to print a book written by
[2348]phy, Office of Security. The book was pre-
[2349]pared by ety under a Brookings Institution Federal
[2355]; ‘he .
[2356]Eee Yo 7 7 ‘OO1L3
[2358]|_nw.88296. Docld:32989624 Page 43
[2361]SUBJECT: Sensitive Activities Performed by the Office of
[2362]Logistics | .
[2364]Executive Fellowship.-- The book is entitled "Where's
[2366]What -- Sources of Information for Federal Investigators."
[2367]It is a full treatise on the existence of sources of in-
[2368]formation that may be useful to an investigator. The
[2369]book's first printing of 300 copies was made in June 1967.
[2370]Due to demand, a second printing of 600 copies was made
[2372]in September 1968.,...The. title page of the took gives
[2373]attribution to Metre, Office of Security, Central
[2374]Intelligence Agency, and the Brookings Institution Federal
[2375]Executive Fellowship. The book is classified Ccnfidential,
[2376]and it is our understanding that the distribution was mace
[2377]to appropriate agencies of the Federal Government. A copy
[2378]of Mr. Murphy's book can be made available for review if
[2379]desired, - . Lo
[2381]Sometime in 1972, a representative of the Law
[2382]Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) requested
[2383]that the Agency give consideraticn to our publishing, at
[2384]LEAA expense, an unclassified version of this volume. It
[2385]was the ‘intent of LEAA to make broad-scale distribution
[2386]to Police Departments throughout the country. The Director
[2387]of Security and I consulted on this matter and jointly
[2388]determined that the LEAA request should not be honored be-
[2389]cause the Agency should not put itself in the position of
[2390]publishing law enforcement material for general and un- -
[2391]classified purposes, and it would be an abuse of our print-
[2392]ing facilities.
[2394]b. On S January 1971, the Director of Security re-
[2395]quested that I approve his leasing up to eleven:motor
[2396]vehicles for use in connection with a special support
[2397]operation which would last approximately 3 months. The
[2398]Director of Security informed me, in his requesting memo-
[2399]randum of 5 January 1971, that "This support activity has
[2400]been undertaken at the specific instruction of the Director
[2402]‘and has his personal approval." The request was approved.
[2404]c. From 1968 to date, the Office of Security has
[2405]’ requisitioned from this Office a considerable amount of
[2406]materiel which we understand was to be given or loaned by
[2407]them to local Police Departments. In certain cases some
[2408]of this materiel was issued from Agency stocks and, in
[2409]other cases, direct procurement of the materiel was made
[2410]-by funds furnished by the Office of Security. A complete
[2411]listing of such materiel is found in Attachment 2.
[2413]SECRET 00428
[2415]NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 44 . 7
[2418]NW 68296 Docld:32989624 Page 45
[2421]SUBJECT: Sensitive activities Performed by the Office of
[2422]-Logistics
[2424]6. In connection with the responsibility held by this
[2425]Office to obtain, manage, and dispose of safe sites for all
[2427]Agency operating components, the following information is
[2428]relevant,
[2430]a. <A safe site, identified as "Safehouse 562" which
[2431]is Iden 88
[2432]was made available to General Cushman’ s
[2433]office on 23 July 1971. .
[2434]The subject safe site was acquired on 15 June 1970
[2435]as a replacement for a terminated OL standby safe site
[2436]and in keeping with the approved requirement for a com-
[2437]plement of five standby safehouses for all Agency use. .
[2438]The apartment has one bedroom and is located in an older
[2439]high-rise building along Iden 89. The nominal
[2440]lessee is Iden 90 a securityv-cleared
[2441]attorney With offices located at Iden 91
[2442]. - The cover story utilized is that
[2443]Iden 90,. > rents the apartment for business conferences,
[2444]meetings, and occasional overnight ‘stays by his staff
[2445]and/or his out-of-town clients. The original lease term
[2446]was for a l-year period, 15 June 1970 to 14 June 1971,
[2447]with month-to-month renewals thereafter. As an OL standby
[2448]safe site, the apartment has been used by various Agency
[2449]components to meet their short-term or crash requirements.
[2450]Control of the standby safe site and its security is the
[2451]responsibility of this Office. A record is maintained of
[2452]each user, component, and date of use; however, no record
[2453]is made of those persons being met at the site nor for what
[2454]purpose the site is being used (meetings, training, etc.).
[2455]Such information is maintained by the operating component
[2456]requesting the safe site. Records maintained by this
[2457]Office disclose only that the apartment involved was made
[2458]available to General Cushman's office on 23 July 1971 in
[2459]_ answer to a telephonic request.
[2461]b. This Office is aware, although it had no cognizance
[2462]nor responsibility, that an apartment was rented in Miami
[2463]Beach, Florida, during the period of the Democratic National
[2464]Convention, 10-14 July 1972, and the Republican National
[2465]Convention, 21-24 August 1972. The apartment was used as
[2466]a meeting place for officers of the Miami Station who were
[2467]in liaison with members of the Secret Service and rendering
[2469]EVES Cn LY : i | - _
[2470]SECRE!  * : _ _  O0ALe
[2473].
[2475]SUBJECT: Sensitive Activities Performed by the Office of
[2476]Logistics ;
[2478]@ . 4]
[2480]assistance in connection with the political conventions
[2481]that were being held. WH Division is the cognizant
[2482]operating component on this matter.
[2484]7 The above recitation of facts represents, to the best
[2485]of my knowledge and memory, those matters which appear to be
[2486]relevant to subject tasking given by the Director.
[2488]. ;
[2490]t . —s)
[2492]{ — a oe
[2494]Le bil
[2496]; John F. Blake
[2497]Director of Logistics
[2499]2 Atts | “
[2502]EYES; ORIN | 00245
[2504]-NW.88296 Docld:32989624 Page 46 SECRET : See ee _
[2507]PoP . MLA : : : 4
[2508]: _ EYES. O#LY
[2509]Receiving |
[2510]Requesting Date of U.S. Depart:
[2511]Office |. Request Item Quantity Unit Cost ment or Agen
[2513]Os 3/23/72 Telephone Analyzer 1 1,350 BNDD
[2514]TSD 5/16/72 Transmitters, Radio Beacon 8. 313 BNDD ,
[2515]os 3/23/72 Telephone Analyzer 1 “1,350 it White House .
[2516]. . Communicatic
[2517]" Ageng
[2518]os . 3/23/72 Telephone Analyzers ' 413 1,400 Air Force
[2519]0s 3/23/72 Telephone Analyzers “10 1,350 ' State
[2520]Os 3/23/72 Telephone Analyzers 2 " 1,375 AEC
[2521]TSD 11/16/72 Camera Sets , 20 656 EBI
[2522]- TSD. 4/17/72 Camera Sets .10 700 TRI
[2523]TSD 11/18/71 Actuators, Recorders ~ $80 "488 FBI
[2524]TSD 4/19/72  Tessina Cameras . 3 _ 700 - BNDD .-
[2525]wu. TSD -- 12/ 7/72 Camera, Video ‘i " 18,045 FBI ‘
[2526]ee TSD 10/13/72 Tube, Image, Burn-Resistance, Lo. 4,639. EBI
[2527]S " - Equivalent of WL 30691 ; ;
[2528]Tsp 3/26/71 Tubes, Image, W L 30691 2 4,607 FBI
[2529]p TSD 4/20/73 Cameras, Television 2 18,300 FBI
[2530]“VEN INS TOTICE EVES ONLY
[2531]. Rw ss2ge'Bigeldsbobdeed Baws ar | QUAD ET
[2534]|
[2535]| Requesting Date of. .
[2536]Office Request
[2537]TSD 12/14/72
[2538]TSD 10/20/72
[2539]TSD 10/13/72
[2540]'” TSD 5/26/71
[2541]TSD 4/22/71
[2542]TSD 4/22/71
[2543]TSD 4/22/71
[2544]OL 2/25/71
[2545]mes) 1/30/71
[2546]OL 8/12/70
[2548]TSD 6/28/72
[2549]8
[2550]bed TSD 7/26/71
[2551]ee)
[2552]Aw 86296 Docld:32989624 Page 48
[2554]EVES. ONLY
[2556]Item
[2558]Transmitters, Radio
[2559]Actuators, Recorder
[2561]Tube, Image, Burn-Resistance,
[2562]Equivalent of WL 30691"
[2564]Tube, Image, WL 30691
[2565]Transmitters ‘
[2567]Module, Plug-In
[2569]Power Supply - UWP-39A
[2570]‘Telephone Analyzers
[2571]Telephone Analyzers
[2573]Cable, Special- Purpose
[2575]Ink, Special Formula
[2577]Ink, Special Formula
[2579]Transmitter, Radio Beacon
[2581]EYES ONLY
[2585]Quantity
[2587]3
[2588]25
[2590]no YF FP WwW SS
[2592]22
[2596]1 lot
[2598]‘1 lot
[2600]Unit Cost
[2602]313
[2603]591
[2611]568
[2615]42
[2621]728
[2623]‘FBI
[2624]FBI
[2626]U.S. Forestry
[2628]Receiving —
[2629]U.S. Depart-
[2631]ment or Ageng
[2632]BNDD
[2634]FBI
[2635]FBI |
[2636]FBI
[2638]oe
[2640]FBI
[2642]Treasury
[2644]Treasury
[2646]White House
[2647]Communication
[2648]Agency
[2650]Immigration a
[2651]Naturalizatiu
[2652]Service
[2654]Immigration
[2655]Naturalizatio
[2656]Service
[2659]SUBJECT
[2661]THROUGH
[2663]OJCS-594-73
[2665]it
[2667]MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Central Intelligence Agency
[2669]MAY 1973
[2671]Deputy Director for Management and Services’
[2673]: Activities which might be considered sensitive
[2675]issues.
[2677]-
[2679]Most Sensitive Projects —
[2681]OICS Project Officer
[2682]Project Organization, &
[2683]Identification Telephone
[2684]TYDRY Richard Ober
[2685]. CI Staff
[2686]Red 1465
[2687]EANTA Iden 48
[2688]OS
[2689]“Red 9298
[2690]ORDSTAT John-Hutchings
[2691]. ORD
[2692]3061
[2694]Sensitive Projects
[2696]DRUGGS Iden 18
[2698]OMS
[2699]7792
[2701]EYES ON!
[2704]SECRET
[2705]oes INI, Ih
[2707]W 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 49
[2709]Vy
[2711]Nature
[2712]of
[2714]Project
[2716]A special pro-
[2717]ject initiated
[2718]by DCI
[2720]Machine
[2721]index to
[2722]security files
[2724]Information
[2726]trieval of drug
[2727]related data
[2728](GRD's project
[2730]-OF TEN)
[2732]Computer file
[2733]of drug data,
[2734]oe
[2736]Ihave listed below computer processing projects which the Office of
[2737]Joint Computer Support has participated in or is aware of and which
[2738]might be considered sensitive issues,
[2740]OCS
[2741]Reason for
[2743]Listing
[2744]Type of
[2745]data being
[2747]collected.
[2749]Type of
[2751]data in
[2752]- index.
[2754]Type of
[2755]data in
[2756]files.
[2758]Type of
[2759]data in
[2760]file,
[2762]COZ 43
[2764]ere
[2767]i ie
[2769]N
[2771]Ww
[2773]~ Sensitive Projects (Continued)
[2775]OJCS .
[2776]Project
[2778]Project Officer
[2779]Organization, &
[2783]“PROFILES-
[2785]TSD
[2786]362-1922
[2787](sterile)
[2789]Telephone
[2791]Nature
[2792]of
[2793]Proiht
[2795]Statistical -
[2796]analysis of
[2797]psychological
[2798]data. ;
[2800]OJCS.
[2801]Reason for
[2802]Listing
[2804]Source of
[2805]data. Con-
[2806]tractors are
[2807]involved
[2808]with project.
[2810]Sensitivity Unknown, but Possibly a Matter for Concern
[2812]TILAQ-
[2814]SPYDER
[2816]DMYREC—
[2818]APREGIN
[2820]88296 Docld:32989624 Page 50
[2822]Rebert-Hehn -
[2824]SB
[2825]Red 1185/
[2826]125]
[2828]George
[2829]Swegman—
[2831]5071
[2833]Iden 48
[2835]OS
[2836]Red 9298
[2838]Walter-
[2839]Kowalski
[2841]CI Staff
[2843]Red 9338
[2845]ONL
[2847]Pattern
[2848]analysis of
[2849]surveillance
[2851]data from
[2852]foreign liaison
[2854]service
[2856]Data on
[2858]radio {requen-
[2859]cies used for
[2860]support of In-
[2861]Piece Monitor-
[2862]ing-System, a
[2864]Nature of
[2865]data. Tech-
[2867]; niques of
[2869]system dis-
[2870]cussed with
[2871]FBI,
[2873]Project
[2874]originated by
[2875]James McCord.
[2877]system to identify
[2879]unauthorized
[2880]transmitters.
[2882]File of auto-
[2883]mobile license
[2884]numbers.
[2886]File of Agency
[2887]applicants who
[2888]were not
[2889]hired,
[2891]Nature of
[2892]data.
[2894]Nature of
[2895]data, .
[2897]a
[2900]— a a ==
[2903].
[2905]Sensitivity Unknown, but Possiblv a Matter for Concern {Continued)
[2907]OICS Project Officer Nature OCS
[2908]Project Organization, & of Reason for
[2909]Identification Telephone Proje — Listing
[2910]o~ Iden 187 . Cooperative Association
[2911]. ‘ IsD/DDO program with with the
[2912]"Red 1442 . Iden 188 named
[2913]: . , ' organization.
[2915]. - _ , in
[2916]- name grouping
[2917]techniques.
[2919]WBexbe Clues
[2922]JOHN D, IAMS
[2923]Director of Joint Computer Support
[2925]EVES ONLY = oosaz
[2927]NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 51
[2930]—_ , ee _ St 33289/73
[2932]rs | ry 1973
[2933]MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
[2935]SUBJECT: Summary, Special Programs Division (SPD),
[2936].. Office of Communications, Operational
[2937]Contacts with Other U.S. Government Agencies
[2939]a .
[2941]1. Prior to 1969 the OC COMINT intercept unit,
[2942]which was then in Miami, had relatively frequent contact
[2943]with the Miami bureaus of the FBI and FCC, Miami Police
[2944]and the Miami Beach Police. The staff provided support
[2945]to these activities in monitoring, identification and
[2946]DF of specific illegal agent transmissions conducted by
[2947]foreign nationals and American citizens in the greater
[2948]Miami area. Arrangements ‘for this support were made
[2949]through the DDO's Chief, WH, Miami.
[2951]2. In late September 1972, NSA, through Division D/
[2952]DDO, requested that the Special Programs Division initiate
[2953]a hearability survey of certain HF long-distance commercial
[2954]telephone circuits between the U.S. and South America.
[2955]The circuits carried drug related long-distance calls of
[2956]interest to the BNDD and other U.S. agencies. Because of
[2957]the availability of personnel and technical capabilities,
[2958]the survey was conducted at the OC Relay Station at Iden 92.
[2959]Virginia, where the circuits could be satisfactorily inter-
[2960]cepted. On 15 January 1973, formal NSA tasking of the
[2961]intercept was instituted, On 30 January 1973, all coverage
[2962]was terminated by Division D because of possible legal
[2963]complications.
[2965]3. The Chief and Deputy Chief, SPD and SPD/Special
[2966]Electronic Operations Branch have been engaged in informal
[2967]technical liaison with operating components of the FBI
[2968]for a number of years. Initial contacts and arrangements
[2969]for support of specific activities have been made by the
[2970]Division D/DDO. Support has been provided in the form of
[2972]DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
[2973]UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT
[2975]E2 IMPDET CL BY 061947
[2977]. SECRET .
[2978]ABE wrim-pecaailg «00240
[2979]porte pale -_ AARILE VIA bala, WAH E LS
[2983]NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 52 a _ |
[2985]S. 03289/73
[2987]8 May 1973
[2989]exchanges of technical information on techniques, technical
[2990]assistance and training, and the loan of Agency eauipmenc.
[2991]In the past several years, support has been rendered to
[2992]sensitive FRI projects &M HAWK, UNION and WUGRAVEL., Support
[2993]has been and is presently being given to FBI projects ORKID
[2994]and RESE. These projects are described in the attached
[2995]sealed envelope. .
[2997]4. An operational test of an NSA- developed HF/DF
[2998]system was jointly conducted by NSA, Division D/DDO and
[2999]OC-SPD personnel in the early part of the summer of 1972.
[3000]A location in Miami Beach, Florida was selected for the
[3001]tests because of similarity to the actual target site and
[3002]environment in Saigon. Receiving antennas were placed on
[3003]the roof of the hotei being used as the receiving/DF site.
[3004]A hotel employee asked why the materiel was placed on the
[3005]roof. A team member in effect told him that the group
[3006]was an advance security segment for the Democratic National
[3007]Convention. No further questions were asked; the tests
[3008]were completed and the equipment was returned to the
[3009]Washington area.
[3011]signed Iden 53
[3013]Chief, Special Programs Division, OC
[3017]- se TRP SESRET |
[3018]! ewes HANDLE VIA era CARES 00141
[3019]Si Gs : . |
[3021]d:32989624 Page 53 _— AR
[3023]Te
[3026], SENSITIVE
[3027]: . ® 9 My 1973
[3029]MOHAWK—
[3031]-
[3033]1
[3035]Electronic survey of Iden 63,
[3036]This operation was terminated apprOXimately two
[3037]months ago. SPD/SEO personnel participated for
[3038]two days.
[3040]Jden 98 flocding of tha cipher device employed by
[3041]the Iden 94 . Embassy on their diplomatic communi-
[3042]cation link. SPD/SEO.support terminated two
[3043]years ago. . ,
[3045]UNION.
[3049]Electronic surveillance of Iden 64
[3050]Washington, D.C. SPD/SEO involved ‘only in pianning
[3051]-at this time, (attendance at two meetings).
[3053]ORKID-
[3055]-ROSE Electronic surveillance of Iden 62
[3056]: . SPD/CMT personnel sexrformed an’
[3057]electronic search of the Iden 62 _ | area’ and SPD/SEO
[3058]personnel conducted a spectrum search/recording
[3059]of the spectrum covering -i-to-.6 GHz during the
[3060]period 16 to 20 April 1973. Plans call for contin-
[3061]ued support by SPD in the future as requested.
[3063]WOUGRAVEL
[3065]t
[3067]Division D operation involving a Ider 95 code clerk.
[3068]SEO provided equipment, trained case officer in
[3070]use of device and stood by in Iden 97,
[3072]Washington, D.C., to back up case officer if neeced.
[3073]The operation took place in July 1972.
[3075]¥, VW Cs ions car
[3076]Dey Uae . .
[3077]; jot .
[3078]y SENSITIVE . , 00142
[3081]prong Sten : ; i
[3082]gn a fo fr este @Laeclont 1" . " ‘ 7 |
[3083]SS AS2989624 Page 54 a
[3085]Ininin ci] oeciey party
[3086]ta iA ache aselsi
[3089]% . . ° F,
[3090]6 é
[3092]29 May 1973
[3094]MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General
[3096]SUBJECT :Mr.Colby's Request to Inspector General to
[3097]Determine Subject Referred to by Two Notes
[3098]‘ina PP/B Memo to DD/M&S
[3100]REFERENCE : D/PPB Memo to DD/M&S dated 23 May 1973,
[3101]. . Subject: Watergate Principals - Direct or
[3102]Indirect Involvement :
[3104]. 1, The two notes of 13 and 20 January 1972 refer to approval
[3105]by the DCI (at that time Mr. Helms) for the expenditure of $30-32K
[3107]asked that DDO records be checked.
[3109]2. .DDO records show that the funds went to the CI Staff for a
[3110]-project called Iden 99, This is a joint operation with the Iden 100
[3111]service for the collection of BEET intelligence. The activity is
[3112]handled by the Special Intelligence Group of the CI Staff,
[3114]*3.. The funds cited in the notes was transferred to Clon
[3115]13 January 1972. :It is believed by DDO/MPS and the CI Staff that
[3116]the two notes refer to the same appropriated amount,i.., ($30 to 32K
[3117]and not to two separate allocations,
[3119]PD Lircde
[3121]John C. C heed
[3123]—NW°88296 Docld:327989624 Page 55
[3125]for a sensitive CS project. No further details were given, Mr. Colby
[3127]ae aR 001445
[3129]SLES)
[3131]PAgrTt ; by
[3132]EN j . de lline cer cb ayo: oe SU |
[3136]. | MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Management and Services
[3138],
[3140]SUBJECT: _ Watergate Principals - Direct | or Indirect
[3141], ‘Involversent
[3143], 1. This memorandum responds to the Director's request for
[3144]a report of any involvement in any capucity since ] January 1969
[3145]*  .. with Messrs. Hunt, McCerd, Liddy, Young, or Krogh.
[3147]2. I have had none with Hunt, Liddy or Young.
[3149]. 3. My McCord contact was indirect and occurred sometime
[3150]during the late 1960's when I was Director, Oliice of Computer
[3151]., Services. I cpposed plans fer Technical Division, Office of
[3152]' - Security (under Mr. McCord) to acquire a separate computer for
[3153]Iden 101, ‘hed Hines of DD/S2T Cthen ORD)
[3154]was the computer individual working with TD and, I think, would
[3155]have details.
[3157]&. The Krogh centact also was indirect and involved his
[3159]request, first through OMB, that CIA fund forcign travel on behalf
[3161]of the Cubinct Co:smittee on Internations] Narectics Control. Indi-
[3163]vidual phone-discussions are noted in the atteched. The Arpency
[3165]“focal points were Iden 32 and Iden 3; f understand a -
[3167]Iden 3 has forwarded relevant documentation. Copies of
[3169]memoranda from Messrs. Krogh, Iden 3 and Colby are attached
[3171]_ also, . - .
[3172]20 5. I held a staff meeting yesterday to pass the request to
[3174]all OPPB employees. One officer who was attending a funeral will
[3176]not be available until temorrow.
[3178]O\DBE\ CV EHBEe\en ss 2520 (837794 52)
[3179]I - D\ESB EAv2 GL)JA ES = /s/ Charles A. Briggs
[3180]J- BES cojosk
[3183]OUB § 1 - sqg1szece Charles A.’ Briggs
[3184]. pIenips 10x: Director of Planning,
[3185]Progran uming, end Budgeting
[3186]Attachment , ’ , F
[3187]As stated \ oe
[3191]“NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 56
[3194]. : 2 .
[3195]. a, eo ; AQ@ereen:
[3196]° , 23 May 1773
[3197]4 Feb 72 Call from Jim Taylor, OMB re "Bud? Krogh-and his deputy,
[3199]Walter Minnick, of the Domestic Council who plan forcizn
[3200]travel in connecticn with their narcotics interests, Jim was
[3201]alerting us to their intention to ask us for funds for the
[3202]travel. ot ;
[3205]7 Feb 72 Follow-up from Taylor: Plan 3-5 trips fcr 3 individuals--
[3206]all in FY 72. Cost prebably SICK. Minnick ready tu make
[3207]first trip. Iden 32 is plugecd in. ExDir said GX re Tehran
[3209]visit. --
[3210]| 7 Feb 72 See attached memo from Egil Krogh, Jr. to Bill Colby and
[3211]| . follow-on memos from Seymour Bolton (21 Jul 72) and Colby
[3212]- (2 Aug 72).
[3214]12(?) May 72 John Hurley, OMB called, menticning possible Krogh/
[3215]Minnick attendance at a Latin American Iden 102
[3216]conference on narcotics. He aluo said Jeif Shepherd.
[3217]White House, was laying on « ‘aes withIden 32 for
[3218]himself, Shepherd and Mark Alger, OMB to Eurepe.
[3220]23 Jun 72 Iden 3 commented on Krogh/Minnick interest
[3221]: in getting CA activities, including large-scale PH,
[3222], on narcotics front, Iden 3 pushing small-scale PP.
[3223]6 Jul 72 Tden 3 called. Notes say only: *Minnick-Hurley film.
[3225]We will send.®
[3229]2 Aug 72 Iden 3 called re Colby letter (attached). Said travel
[3230]. orders ready; need money this. Fif (No record in my
[3231]notes as to who wus traveling when, but have faint
[3233]and, Iden 73. contacted by Iden 3.
[3234]1 Nov 72 Related? Iden 3 ‘call. Again notes are cryptic:
[3236]WH/GAO-Grace (Iden 32)-: Survey BNDD problems/
[3237]Mexico,* . .
[3239]SECRET
[3241]Ne 88296 -Docld:32989624 Page 57
[3243]) _
[3246]On Mr. Colby's copy only:
[3248]13 Jan 72 ExDir (Colby) said DCI had approved $30 for sensitive
[3249]CS project - no details. .
[3251]20 Jan 72 Reminded ExDir re $32K he said DCI OK'd.
[3253]a
[3257]SFeRFT ORS
[3259]| NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 58
[3262]“HW S8256 Docld:32989624 Page 59
[3265]er
[3267]° | ; 19 7907
[3269]MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
[3271]SUBJECT: Conversation with Jack Bauman
[3273]; 1. While on leave visiting Disney World in Florida, I
[3274]dropped in to see Jack Bauman who lives in Winterhaven, Florida.
[3275]Jack retired from the Agency about five years ago on disability due
[3277]- fo a serious heart condition, He was with the Office of Security for
[3278]about 20 years prior to his retirement. .
[3280]2. During a private conversation Jack told me that he had
[3281]been interviewed three or four times by the FBI in connection with .
[3282]the McCord-Hunt affair. Iasked him why he had been interviewed,
[3283]and he told me that in late 1971 he had béen contacted by Howard
[3284]Hunt who suggested that he consider an assignment as Security
[3285]Officer for the Republican Party. Jack visited Washington in
[3286]January 1972 to discuss the proposed position with Howard Hunt
[3287]who apparently was acting on behalf of the Republican Party. Jack ©
[3288]furnished a resume to Hunt and discussed the position with him.
[3289]Ultimately, he decided not to accept the position because he felt
[3290]that his heart condition would not allow him to become involved in
[3291]such activity.
[3293]3. According to Jack, during the meeting with Mr. Hunt
[3294]they discussed some of the requirements of the job. At that time
[3295]they discussed a need for both a positive and a counteraudio program
[3296]and a need for a good security system both before and during the
[3297]"National Convention, Jack indicated that he sincerely believed that
[3298]the Republican Party did need a security officer and a good security
[3299]- programmer but felt that he could not afford to accept the job even.
[3301]though it was a very lucrative offer. Apparently, money was not a
[3302]problem.
[3304]PITT ssy .
[3305]33 wipele ce pia
[3306]HIVE TA
[3308]Peasy.
[3311]3
[3312]'
[3315]4. When Jack declined, he indicated hgh: Hunt asked
[3316]for any other rec@#mendations he might have. Whiccording ta Jack
[3317]he told Mr, Hunt that most of the people he knew were still in the
[3318]Agency, but he did furnish the name of! IDEN-lus who might be
[3319]possibly ready to retire from the Agency. .
[3321]5. Jack informed me that he assumed that the Bureau
[3322]obtained his name due to the resume he furnished Mr. Hunt. He
[3323]said that the Bureau had talked to him on three or four occasions
[3324]and that he had written up about a 40 page statement concerning
[3325]his dealings with Mr. Hunt. When asked about Mr. McCord, Jack
[3326]said that he really did not know McCord that well and declined any
[3327]knowledge of Mr. McCord's technical capability.
[3329]6. ‘Mr. Bauman indicated that he had not been in touch
[3330]with Mr. Hunt since the early part of 1972 and knew aothing of
[3331]the Watergate operation. He stated that he had gained the impres-
[3332]sion from the Bureau interview that the technical devices were being
[3333]removed at the time of the arrest and were not being installed as
[3334]originally reported. :
[3336]7. AU of the above information was volunteered by Mr.
[3337]Bauman, and I really did not get involved in any discussion on the
[3338]matter other than to comment that I hated to see the Agency's name
[3339]connected with such an incident in any way. The above conversation
[3340]took place during a 10 or 15 minute period and no other discussion
[3341]relating to this incident was held. It is being reported for the record
[3342]and for information of the Director of Security. .
[3344]7 : - : nd
[3345]ct .. so EEE a HE
[3347]ee Charles W. Kane
[3349]{2 TAtren see
[3350]Rimesieeigia) °
[3351]Qariyy gis iggqdti - ;
[3352]EeHT|AL - 00459
[3354]oA z - - .
[3358]i - . a a : .
[3359]nw 88296 -Docid:32989624 Page 60 . . a
[3360]NW 88296. Docld:32989624 Page 60 0
[3363]DD/M&S 73-1509 ©
[3365]MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Management and Services
[3367]SUBJECT . » : Contacts with Individuals Named in the Watergate Matter
[3369]Ly
[3371]1. Jam addressing this to you instead of to the Director of Central
[3372]Intelligence since I doubt that the information contained herein is of such
[3373]Significance to warrant his interest and because it has been on record with
[3374]the Agency since July 1972. However, if you feel that the information is of
[3375]such interest that it should be forwarded to the Director I shall put it in the
[3376]. proper format to do so.
[3378]2. My only contact with anyone named in connection with the
[3379]Watergate and related matters was through Mr. Jack Bauman a former
[3380]Agency employee now retired and living in Winterhaven, Florida. In
[3381]December 1971 Mr. Bauman called me from Florida and advised that he
[3382]wanted to get in touch with Howard Hunt. He said that he did not have Hunt's
[3383]home phone number and that it was probably unlisted but that since Hunt was a
[3384]former employee, could I contact Hunt and ask him to give Mr. Bauman a call.
[3385]Thad only met Hunt once about 10 years before but | agreed to relay the message.
[3386]I-called Howard Hunt at his home and told him that Mr. Bauman did not have his
[3387]home phone and requested he call Mr. Bauman. Mr. Hunt thanked me for
[3388]relaying the message and said that he would call Mr. Bauman. This seemed of
[3389]little consequence to me in December 1971 but in July 1972 Iden 17 of the
[3390]Office of Security contacted me in regard to the FBI investigation of the Watergate
[3391]situation. At that time linformed Iden 17 ‘of the telephone call from
[3392]Mr. Bauman in December 1971. Attached is a copy of a Memorandum for the
[3393]Record prepared by Iden 17 as a result of our conversation,
[3395]3. In the summer of 1972 I took my family to Disney World in Florida
[3396]and took that occasion to drop in to see Jack Bauman. Mr. Bauman told me in
[3397]& private conversation that he had been interviewed three or four times by the
[3398]FBI in connection with the Watergate affair and he related to me his contact
[3400]we of one meen peeps Crapcy : JZ amwaer = OliO1S
[3401]AND BidihcuS i v0 eid Gish; Seville
[3403]NW 88296 Docihd:32989024 Page 61
[3406](2)
[3408]So e @
[3409]with Howard Hunt. On 19 July 1972 after my return from Florida I reported
[3410]this conversation to the Director of Security and made it a Memorandum for
[3412]the Record. This memorandum was sent to Mr. Colby and a copy of the
[3413]memorandum is attached.
[3415]4, Other than knowing Mr. McCord through his employment with
[3416]the Agency and meeting Howard Hunt once in about 1959, I do not know nor
[3417]have I had any contact with any individuals named or knowledge of related
[3418]matters now receiving attention in the press.
[3420]Ae tee
[3421]LA Hse a a
[3422]‘Charles W. Kane ~
[3423]Special Assistant to the ,
[3424]Deputy Director
[3425]for Management and Services
[3427]_ Atts
[3429]weg emt SECRET, gga
[3431]bast Coed
[3433]NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 62_
[3436]rm 88296 Doce: 32989624 Page 63
[3438]: worked for the Central Intelligence Agency. Previously, requests
[3441]‘how the Bureau obtained his name. He stated that he has‘seen
[3443]‘the Chief of Station, Montevideo. The meeting was occasioned
[3445]17 July 1972
[3447]e
[3449]MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
[3451]SUBJECT: Charles W.. Kane | oo
[3452]Iden 108
[3454]“a
[3456]1, Last week Special Agent Arnold Parham of the FBI con~
[3457]tacted the Acting DD/OS. He asked whether or net the Subjects
[3459]of this nature were followed OP by the FBI with an interview of the
[3460]subjects,
[3462]2. Ibriefed Mr. Colby who is the Agency's focal point on
[3463]the ''Watergate'! case and the Acting DD/S of the FBI inquiry.
[3464]Mr. Colby suggested that we determine the extent of involvement
[3465]and indicated that we advise the Bureau of their employment,
[3467]"3. When Agent Parham was again contacted and advised
[3468]of the Subjects’ employment with the Agency, he indicated that
[3469]the Bureau does not wish to interview them, : Ghinsaty a
[3471]"4, he office of the DD/PS will interview Iden 108 in Jb fe -
[3472]the same fashion as Mr, True was previously interviewed, a eg
[3474]5. Icalled Mr. Kane both et his office and his residence -
[3476]‘and learned that he is in Florida and will return to duty on 17 July.
[3478]I called Mr. Kane this morning to advise him of the inquiry.
[3479]. 6 Mr. Kane stated that he has no firm conclusion as to
[3481]Mr. Hunt’ oa only one occasion in 1959. At that time Hunt was
[3483]are)
[3486]| ‘ . -
[3488]| , . by the fact that Mr@fane accompanied a technic bsweep team
[3490]. ' " to,the Montevideo station, Mr. Kane stated further that around
[3491]Christmas time of 1971 he received a call from Jack Bauman
[3492]who wanted to get in touch with Mr. Hunt. Mr. Bauman asked
[3493]-Mr, Kane how he could get in touch with him.. Mr. Kane obtained
[3494]Mr. Hunt's telephone number tKrough telephone information channels
[3495]whereupon he passed the number on to Mr, Bauman. .
[3497]7. Mr, Kane stated that he has information that Jack Bauman
[3498]has talked to the FBI on several occasions in connection with the
[3499]current investigation and that he surmises that the Bureau may
[3500]have obtained his name from him.
[3502]signed Iden 17
[3506]Deputy Director of Security
[3508]ta’,
[3510]—NWE 88296 -Docid:32989624 Page 64 — - Le ath
[3513]. a . | SECRET/SENSITIVE
[3515]™ \ | . 7 8 May 1973
[3516]MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
[3517]THROUGH:: Deputy Director for Management and Services
[3519]SUBJECT: Involvement in Sensitive Domestic Activities
[3521]1. As chief of the DDP Systems Group prior to 1969, I was involved
[3522]- in providing data processing support for the following sensitive projects:
[3524]%.
[3526]: a. Cl Staff- Mr. Richard Ober's program for processing data
[3527]_ of U.S. citizens believed to be militants, subversives, terrorists,
[3528]etc. .
[3530]Ss
[3532]u
[3533]b. FI Staff and Office of Medical Services program
[3535]for recording data on foreign and U.S. physicians from American
[3537]Medical Association records.
[3539]c. A Systems Group sponsored program of common concern
[3540]listing travel of U.S, citizens to and from Communist countries.
[3542]2. In the same capacity my staff and I briefed police officers from
[3543]New York State and Chicago at the DCI's request (Admiral Rayborn) on
[3544]Gata processing techniques related to biographic intelligence (unclassified).
[3546]3. As a member of O/PPB, I have been aware of five programs with
[3547]possibly sensitive domestic overtones.
[3549]a. DDS&T/ORD's contract with the University Iden 103
[3550]for "The VIP Health and Behavior Prediction
[3552]System."
[3554]b. DDS&T/ORD's Project “which involved the collection
[3555]of data on dangerous drugs from U.S. firms. I believe Mr. Helms
[3556]terminated this program last Fall. 3 yw
[3560]~~ NW'88296 Docid:32989624 Page 65 ' ue
[3562]WemTRA NTT BLD
[3563]CONFI aWowliablb bve
[3567]SLLIECT: Research Project on Rotert Vesco
[3569]2. On 16 Gctoter 1972 Hesers. Ereckinridse end Heintzel~en,
[3570]in the course of 4 Survey, were trieéfed on activities of the
[3571]Atlsntic/Pecific Division of tne Office of Economic aeoorts.: One
[3572]project cited was a covery from the Lirectuor, apparently at the re-
[3573]quest of Secretsry Shultz, to the effect, "What do we xnow ebout
[3574]Vesco," the man then running 10S. Teo of Sli's anal sts uere assigned
[3575]to tue project and, werking throwgh tre ucmestic Contact vcarvice, -
[3576]spent a day going 0 over tre files of the Securities and Exchange
[3577]Commission. There apparently was some contact also with UR Vivision
[3578]ef tho Leputy Directorate for Plans and with the Office of Current
[3579]Intelligence.
[3581]2. The information atove is based on rough notes and obviously
[3582]is sketchy. It is cited nos not to suzzest any wrongdoing Lut because
[3583]of the current oublicity about Vesco end the protebility of continuing
[3584]probes into the subject ty the press end the courts.
[3586]Scott D. Preckinr idze
[3587]H. Henry Eeinteelaan
[3591]NW 682796 Docid:37989624 Page 66
[3594]@ 22 Ma 73
[3600]MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General
[3601]Bill--
[3603]Attached are the reports Bill Colby asked to see:
[3605]1.. Restless Youth (September 1968), No, 0513/68,
[3606]Secret/Sensitive/No Foreign Dissem (Copy 78).
[3608]This documént was produced in two versions--one
[3609]. with the chapter on radical students in America (pages
[3610]hel, + +, + 25-39) which was sent only to the President, Walt Rostow,
[3611]: and Cy Vance (former Deputy Secretary of Defense); the .
[3612]other version without the references to the American
[3613]scene was disseminated to twenty people outside the
[3614]Agency. This document without the material on the
[3615]US was updated in February 1969 and copies were sent’:
[3616]to the Vice President and Dr. Kissinger, A still more
[3617]abbreviated edition was sent to the Attorney General
[3618]in March 1969.
[3620]2. Black Radicalism in the Caribbean (6 August 1989),
[3621]~ No, 1839/69, Secret/No Foreign Dissem (Copy 142).
[3623]8. Black Radicalism in the Caribbean-~-Another Look
[3624]. (12 June 1970), No.. 0517/70, Secret/No Foreign
[3625]Dissem (Copy 98).
[3627]. - Please note that these are our record copies and should
[3628]- be returned.
[3630]; Edward W. Proctor
[3631]“fel, ¢ my. Deputy Director for Intelligence
[3633]Scciments os °
[3634]rn oy _ COA7s oh
[3636]SECRET /SENSITIVE
[3638]pe
[3639]NW 88296 _Doeld: S2989624 Page 67 ; ; _ a
[3642]NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 68
[3645]<ERATE
[3646]CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
[3648]8 May 1973
[3650]MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
[3651]FROM _* o: Deputy Director for Intelligence
[3653]SUBJECT : Activities Possibly Outside CIA's
[3654]Legislative Charter
[3656]i, This memorandum responds to your instruction to
[3657]report any activities which might be considered outside CIA's
[3658]legislative charter.
[3660]2, All Office and Staff chiefs in the Intelligence Directorate
[3661]have reviewed the past and present activities of their components,
[3662]Thave received responses from all of them, and none reported any
[3663]activities related to cither the Watergate affair or the break into
[3664]the offices of Ellsbereg's psychiatrist. Although contacts with
[3665]three of the people allegedly implicated in these incidents were
[3666]reported, these contacts were on matters other than the two
[3667]improper activities:
[3669]Hunt: Col. White, Richard Lehman, and I talked
[3670]to Hunt in late 1970 regarding his preparation
[3671]of a recommendation in support of the Agency's
[3672]nomination of R. Jack Smith for the National
[3673]Civil Service League Award.
[3675]a Py
[3676]£1 PoSEM/ col
[3678]Mitchell; While Mr. Mitchell was Attorney General,
[3679]an OCI officer was assigned the task of
[3680]providing him with daily briefings on
[3681]foreign developments,
[3683]ea ~y9Q3 fla. Q0469
[3687]tat LE
[3689]fi.
[3690]Bee
[3692]29OYQT TT
[3694]Br pars, An p> = Ka)
[3695]ne RO " mt maT 7O%3 Ces iied ty __UIso20 et
[3698]| app Doe fi
[3699]| 7 elnfek Haley we)
[3701]Gu
[3703]a °
[3704]we SS ee TG
[3706]Ve ou we ee Beret - :
[3707]CIA INTER NAL USE ONLY. i
[3710]~. Loung: Harry Eisenbeiss and Clarus Rice of CRS
[3711]~. .- _. +bad frequent contacts with Young during the
[3713]. summer of 1972 in connection with Executive
[3714]Order 11652 and the implementing NSC
[3715]directive. This involved visits by Young
[3716]to CIA to discuss information storage and
[3717]retrieval and several meetings of dn inter-
[3718]. agency group dealing with the implementation
[3719]_ wt “of the Executive Order and directive.
[3721]2 66 =
[3723]. oe. +). “*+3,-In accordance with my instructions, several Offices reported
[3724]-..domestic activities which might appear questionable to outsiders.
[3725]. Jour responses are attached. Most of these activities are clearly
[3726]. -s within the Agency's charter, but there are a few which could be
[3727]- -+. -sviewsed as borderline.
[3729]- DCS collects information on foreign students studying
[3730]in the US.
[3732]- DCS collects information on physicians practicing in
[3733]the US who have studied abroad (mostly foreign
[3734]nationals),
[3736]~ DCS accepts information on possible foreign
[3737]involvement in US dissident groups and on the
[3738]‘narcotics trade when sources refuse to deal
[3739]with the FBI and BNDD directly. ,
[3741]-. DCs assesses the suitability and willingness of
[3742]US citizens to cooperate with CIA,
[3744]- DCS, for six months in late 1972 and early 1973,
[3746]was acquiring telephone routing slips on overseas
[3747]calls, : ar an . {- *
[3748]Information deleted because it reveals sensitive operational
[3749]techniques and methods.
[3751]- NPIC and COMIREX review satellite imagery
[3752]s from NASA programs to identify photography
[3753]too "sensitive" for public release,
[3757]- Serger 00287
[3758]; CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
[3760]NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 70
[3763]OTsT LIN DIST NA as Oise
[3765]- NPIC has examined domestic coverage for special
[3767]purposes such as natural catastrophies and civil
[3768]disturbances,
[3770]~ OCI, in 1967 and 1968, prepared intelligence
[3771]memoranda on possible foreign connections -with
[3772]the US anti-war movement and world-wide student
[3773]dissidence (including the SDS) at the request of
[3774]the White House.
[3776]+ CRS is regularly involved with Customs in examining
[3777]the contents of motion picture film cans addressed to
[3778]the Soviet, and occasionally other forcign, embassiés
[3779]to acquire positive foreign intelligence,
[3781]-  JfBIS has on occasion supplied linguists to work
[3782]directly for another agency, e.g., to the FI to
[3783]_ translate Arabic in Washington,
[3785]- FRBIS monitors radio press dispatches and reports
[3786]covered by copyright. These are circulated within
[3787]the Government and stamped "Official Use Only",
[3788]This has gone on for three decades without problems,
[3790].« PRBIS has monitored and reported on foreign radio
[3792]broadcasts of statements and speeches of US citizens
[3793]such.as those by US POWs in Ilanoi, Jane onda,
[3794]and Ramsey Clarke.
[3796]~ BIS has run the Joint Publication Research Service
[3797]under Department of Commerce cover since 1957,
[3798]JPRS is a facility for obtaining translations of |
[3799]unclassified publications in foreign languages
[3800]and contracts with private individuals to do this
[3801]work, Most of these individuals are not witting,
[3802]of the CIA-JPRS relationship,
[3804]Coby. 74) tote
[3805]. EDWARD W. PROCTOR
[3806]Deputy Director for Intelligence
[3808]Attachments
[3810]~3- . cy ry .
[3812]| pec: CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY —
[3815]SECREP
[3816]“ e INTERNAL USE ONLY
[3820]‘7 May 1973
[3822]! MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence,
[3824]VIA : Deputy Director for Intelligence
[3826]1
[3827]Director of Current Intelligence
[3829]FROM
[3832]SUBJECT : Activity Related to Donestic Events
[3834]1. OCI began following Caribbean black radicalism
[3835]in earnest in 1968. The emphasis of our analysis was on
[3836]black nationalism as a political force in the Caribbean
[3837]and as a threat to the security of the Caribbean states.
[3838]Two DDI memoranda were produced on the subject: "Black
[3839]Radicalism in the Caribbean" (6 August 1969), and "Black
[3840]- Radicalism in the Caribbean-~Anothar Look" (12 June 1970).
[3841]‘In each a single paragraph was devotcd to ties with the
[3842]US black power movement; the discussion primarily concerned
[3843]visits of Stokely Carmichael and other US black power
[3844]activists to the Caribbean and other overt contacts.
[3846]2. In June 1970, Archer Bush of OCI was asked to
[3847]write a momorandum with special attention to links be-
[3848]tween black radicalism in the Caribbean and advocates of
[3849]black power in the US. The record is not clear where
[3850]this request originated, but it came through channels
[3851]from the DCI. The paper was to be treated as especially
[3852]sensitive and was to include material provided by the
[3853]Special Operations group of the CI Staff. The CI Staff
[3855]. material was voluminous but did not provide meaningful
[3856]evidence of important links between militant blacks in
[3857]the US and the Caribbean. This, in fact, was one of
[3858]the conclusions of the paper. The memorandum was produced
[3859]in typescript form and given to the DCI.
[3861]40 rn
[3863]Clasifed ty CLI sl SLD?
[3865]SECRET. ts
[3866]CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY,“ % & [A start
[3868]NW 60296 Docld:32989624 Page 72
[3870]’ e: SECRET ; ,
[3871]STA INTERNAL USE ONLY 6
[3873]3. For several months in the first half of 1968
[3874]the! Caribbean Branch wrote periodic typvescrinot memoranda
[3875]on Stokely Carmicnael's travels abroad during a period
[3877]‘when he had dropped out of public view. Our recollection
[3878]is that the memoranda were for internal CIA use only,
[3879]although a copy of one was inadvertently sent to the FBI.
[3881]a
[3882]|"
[3883]Richard Lehman.
[3884]Director of Current Intelligence
[3886]SECRET
[3887]CYA INTERNAL USE ONLY
[3889]NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 73
[3892]NW 68296 Docid:329896.
[3894]oe
[3895]ot t
[3896]: . . . a *
[3897]avatana f ao ree a ed
[3899]~ . 7 May 1973
[3901]’ MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
[3903]SUBJECT: DCS Domestic Activity
[3905]To the best of my knowledge, pes has not engaged in any
[3906]activity outside the CIA charter or that could be construed as
[3907]illegal. Some of the functions that we perform under HR 1-13f
[3908](i) of providing operational support within the US to all
[3909]elements of CIA and to the USIB-member agencies, however, are
[3910]perhaps borderline or could be construed as illegal if mis~
[3911]interpreted. For example:
[3913]1, Provide personality and assessment data on certain
[3914]foreign students and visiting foreign scientists and
[3915]officials,
[3917]2. Identify foreign students in the US through collection
[3918]of foreign student lists from certain universities,
[3920]3. Provide personality and assessment data on US citizens
[3921]to determine their suitability and willingness to
[3922]cooperate with the Agency,
[3924]4. Introduce cooperative US businessmen and academicians
[3925]to Agency personnel who are in alias but using ciA
[3926]eredentials,
[3928]5. Collect information on possible foreign involvement.
[3929]or penetration of US dissident groups, but only in a
[3930]passive manner and only when the source has refused
[3931]to pass the information directly to the FBI.
[3933]'6, Collect information on the narcotics trade, but again
[3935]only in a passive manner when the source has refused to
[3936]pass the information directly -to BNDD or the FBI,
[3940]w2.upaer cu reesne |
[3942]GIG af ~ UPRIOrvins
[3947]. . _ Cul, f Cutcriwe m
[3949]SUBJECT:. DCS Domestic Activity
[3951]7%. Collect specific information and supply duplicate or
[3952]master keys for foreign hotels,
[3954]meres
[3956]8. Collect medical information from cooperative contacts
[3957]on foreign. leaders who have received medical treatment
[3958]or examinations in the US.
[3960]95. Obtain computer tape records of physicians practicing
[3961]in the US who have studied abroad, Although most were
[3962]foreign nationals, some were US, The taped information
[3963]included school, present’ business address, date of birth,
[3964]and specialty.
[3966]10, Acquire routing slips recording the fact of overseas
[3967]telephone calls between persons in the US and persons
[3968]overseas and telephone calls between two foreign points
[3969]routed through US switchboards, This activity lasted
[3970]for approximately six months but has ceased,
[3972]lh,
[3974]This information deleted because it reveals sensitive operational
[3976]techniques and methods,
[3978]4 | : XQ] ~ Sie ea
[3981]ZANES R. MURPHY .
[3982]Director, Domestic Contact Service
[3984]- -
[3985]~2- ut
[3986]Gras IER PS tae come ene ‘
[3989]. eeu Lc aE ° 7 . 0048S
[3992]December 1967. (We no longer have a copy.) COAG
[3998]a . SECRET
[3999]- 6 EYES ONLY 6
[4001]7 May 1973
[4003]MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
[4005]VIA : Deputy Director for Intelligence
[4006]FROM :, Director of Current Intelligence
[4007]SUBJECT : Activity Related to Domestic Events
[4009]1. In late spring of 1968 Walt Rostow, then
[4010]Special Assistant to the President for National Security
[4011]Affairs, tasked the DCI with undertaking a survey of
[4012]worldwide student dissidence. Confronted-by timult at
[4013]campuses like Columbia and mindful of the violence
[4014]accompanying student outbursts at Berlin's Free University
[4015]and elsewhere, Rostow sought to learn whether youthful
[4016]dissidence was interconnected: spawned by the same causes;
[4017]financed and hence manipulated by forces or influences
[4018]hostil' to the interests of the US and its allies; or likely
[4019]to come under inimical sway to the detriment of US interests.
[4021]2. The paper was prepared by Paul Corscadden of OCI
[4022]with the assistance of the CA and CI Staffs. ‘The DDI,
[4023]D/OCI, and Corscadden mat with Rostow to elicit the reasons
[4024]for his or the President's concerns and to agree on the
[4025]sources to be examined, the research methods to be followed,
[4026]etc.
[4028]3. Written during the summer of 1968, the most
[4029]Sensitive version of Restless Youth comprised two: sections.
[4030]The first was a philosophical treatment of student unrest,
[4031]its motivation, histor, and tactics. This section drew
[4032]heavily on overt literature and FBI reporting on Students
[4033]for a Democratic Society and affiliated groups. In a sense,
[4034]the survey of dissent energed from a shorter (30 page)
[4035]typescript study of SDS and its foreign ties the same
[4036]author had done for Mr. Rostow at the DCi's ‘request in
[4038]SECRET
[4039]EYES ONLY
[4042]oo ’ SECRET -
[4043]+ ) EYES ONLY r
[4045]4. Because of the paucity of information on foreign
[4046]student movements, it was necessary to focus on SDS which
[4047]then monopolized the field of student action here and
[4048]abroad. A second section comprised 19 country chapters--
[4049]yanging from Argentina to Yugoslavia--and stood by itself
[4050]as a review of foreign student dissidence.
[4052]5. Because SDS was a domestic organization, the
[4053]full paper Restless Youth, inclucing the essay on world-
[4054]wide dissent went only to nine readers. A copy may be
[4056]_in the Johnson Library.
[4058]6. Following the paper's favorable reception by’
[4059]the President and Mr. Rostow, the DCI briefed the NSC
[4060]on student dissent. The sensitive version subsequently
[4061]was updated and sent to the White House in February 1969.
[4063]7. The less sensitive text was disseminated in
[4064]September 1968 and then updated and issued again in
[4065]March 1969 and August 1970.
[4067]fo )
[4069]7 \C Coe wf as
[4071]Richard Lehman
[4073]Director of Current Intelligence
[4075]SECRET.
[4076]EYES ONLY
[4078]C0824
[4082]. QOnonganded Hs Stet
[4083]Us fief
[4085]W2I¢S7 FO 7
[4086]ANV-88296-Dochd:32989624 Pag - . ut OO882
[4088]A
[4090]ae st SECRET UMBRA .
[4091]_? EYES ONLY r
[4093]7 May 1973
[4095]MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
[4097]VIA : Deputy Director for Intelligence
[4098]FROM : Director of Current Intelligence
[4099]SUBJECT : Activity Related to Domestic Events
[4101]1. In late 1967 OCI participated in the preparation
[4102]of several short intelligence memoranda dealing with the
[4103]foreign connections of US organizations and activists in-
[4104]volved in the anti-war movement. The main purpose of
[4105]these reports, prepared at the reaucst of the Wnite House,
[4106]was to determine wnether any links existed between inter-
[4107]national Communist elements or forciqn governments and the
[4108]American peace movement. The conclusion reached was that
[4109]there was some evidence of ad hoc contacts between. anti-
[4110]war activists at home and abroad but no evidence of
[4111]direction or formal coordination.
[4113]2. In october 1967 President Johnson expressed “'
[4114]interest in this subject and ordered a high level inter-
[4115]departmental survey. In response to his personal recuest
[4116]to the DCI, Mr. Helms asked the CI Staff to collect what-
[4117]ever information was available through our own sources and
[4118]through liaison with the FBI and to pass it to OCI, which
[4119]was directed to prepare a memorandum from the DCI to the
[4120]President.
[4122]3. A book message requirement was sent to all stations
[4124]to report whatever information was on hand relevant to this
[4125]subject. * Although agent reports on Conmunist front opera-
[4126]tions overseas were ‘of some value, the primary source of
[4127]information on the activities of US activists--and that was
[4128]quite limited--was sensitive intercepts produced by NSA,
[4129]which had been similarly tasked by the White House.
[4131]Clowifted vy ye.
[4133]P SHCRET UMBRA
[4134]. EYES ONLY
[4136]santon sched re
[4138]2
[4140]i
[4145]- vo, To aa SECRET UMBRA
[4146]"oO oe EYES ONLY
[4148].. <A Gruft memorandum was jointly prepared by
[4149]OCIan. CI Staf£.and forwarded to the DCI. He passed
[4150]this t;scscript memo, dated 15 November 1967, to the
[4151]Presid'-nt personally. The White House copy is ‘now in
[4152]the fiews of President Johnson's papers at the library
[4153]in Austin. ; ; ,
[4156]‘5: Brick follow-up memoranda were prepared and
[4157]_teruszued te the White House on Zi December and 17
[4158]- Sunue -196€. According to our best recollection, no
[4159]furthe _ .tinished intelligence reports on international
[4160]connect.ions,.of the peace movement were produced.
[4162]il if lew
[4164]- _ Richard Lehman
[4165]Director of Current Intelligence
[4167]6G SECRET UMBRA
[4168]EYES ONLY
[4172]NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 79
[4175]7 May 1973
[4177]MEMORANDUM FOR: O/DDI
[4179]SUBJECT: . Involvement In Domestic Affairs °"'
[4181]1. This memorandum responds to the DDI's
[4182]request for a listing of any questionable
[4183]involvements in domestic affairs. I do not believe
[4184]that CRS is doing anything that a reasonable
[4185]man could construe as improper.
[4187]2. CRS does, of course, have several programs
[4188]to acquire still pictures, movies, videotares
[4189]and books either privately, secretly or without
[4190]acknowledgement that CIA is the actual end user.
[4191]CRS is regularly involved with Customs in looking
[4192]at the content of film cans addxyessed to the
[4193]Russian Fmbassy in Washington. Customs occasionally
[4194]also provides access to other film from denied
[4195]areas. It may be addressed to private citizens
[4196]or organizaticns or other embassies. These efforts
[4197]are aimed at acquisition of positive foreign
[4198]information,
[4200]3. CRS files do not generally bear on U.S.
[4201]citizens or organizations. The biographic file-
[4202]building criteria specifically excludes U.S.
[4204]- nationals unless the person has become of such
[4205]major importance in the political life of a foreign
[4206]country that the file is essential. (To my knowledge,
[4207]only 2 persons so cualify. One is the wife of
[4208]the opposition leader of Guvana.and the other,
[4209]is Hope Lang. Our Cuban files probably include whee
[4210]some persons who are now U.S, citizens but we “eo
[4211]have no way to separate them; we have files on
[4212]U.S. defectors to Cuba.)
[4214]EAs ener te an
[4217]4056!
[4218]Coes LL AGIMPDET CL py.004058.
[4220]a
[4222]Wh YLSs
[4224]NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 80
[4227]NW 60296 Docld:32989624 Page 01 ; 4 Hp
[4229]SUBJECT: Involvement In Domestic Affairs
[4231]4, The CIA Library has several informal
[4232]snag files intended to aid the librarians in
[4233]answering the kinds of questions that they know
[4234]they will get on a continuing basis. An
[4235]appointnents file is a colle.tion of clippings
[4236]on appointed federal officials: who holds what
[4237]job when and what is his backaround? The extremist
[4238]files are a collection of folders on a variety
[4239]of organizaticns and a few people with intricate’
[4240]Organizational links. Any sort of extremism
[4241]is grist for these particular files. And a few
[4242]persons, e.g., Rap Brown and Eldridsae Cleaver,
[4243]have cossiers consisting almost exclusively of
[4244]clippings from public media. These files are
[4245]unclassificd and consist mostly of clippings
[4246]from the public press: U.S., foreign, underground,
[4247]scholarly.
[4249]5. I am not aware of any other kind of
[4250]involvement in domestic activities that is not
[4251]related to development of techniaues or logistics
[4252]or legitimate training of CRS personnel.
[4254]foe fo,
[4257]H. C. EISENBEISS
[4258]Director, Central Reference Service
[4260]con
[4261]ewe
[4264]ne)
[4265]we 8
[4266]an ™
[4268]x
[4269]were of
[4275]|
[4276]|
[4277]|
[4279]_ NW 68256 Docid:32989624 Page 32
[4281]* :  ) . @. May 1973
[4283]MEMORANDUM FOR:’ DDI
[4285]SUBJECT : Sensitive Activities
[4287]1. FBIS has been engaged in no activities related to the ‘Elisberg
[4288]and Watergate cases. *
[4290]2. FBIS operations occasionally extend to the domestic arena. From
[4291]time to time, FBIS linguists are made available to DDO or Office of
[4293]Conmunications components for special operations (usually abroad) involving
[4295]close-support SIGINT work or translation of audio take. ‘On one occasion
[4296]recently DDO, on behalf of the FBI, requested the services of several
[4297]FBIS linguists skilled in Arabic to work directly for the FBI on a short-
[4298]term project here in Washington. The arrangements were made by Mr. Oberg
[4299]of the DDO CI Staff. He said the project was very highly classified and
[4300]that FBIS participation was approved by Mr. Colby and the Director. FBIS
[4301]participation was.approved by the Director of FBIS after a check with
[4303]the ADDI. Other examples of sensitive linguistic support work are help
[4305]‘in the handling and resettlement of defectors, the recent assignment of
[4307]an employee to the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs to transcribe
[4308]recordings in a rare Chinese dialect, and the detailing cf another
[4309]Chinese linguist on two occasions to assist in the U.S. military training
[4310]of Chinese Nationalist cadets,
[4312]3. Within its responsibility for monitoring press agency trans-—
[4313]missions for intelligence information, FBIS publishes and distributes
[4314]some material which-falls in a "gray" area of copyright protection, libel,
[4315]and privacy of international communications. Press services controlled
[4316]by national governments and transmitted by radioteletype without
[4317]specific addressees, e.g. the Soviet TASS service and the PRC's WCNA,
[4318]are monitored by FRIS and the material is disseminated without restric—-
[4319]tion. The legality of this has been affirmed by decisions of the
[4320]Office of General Counsel. However, we also monitor some in-house,
[4321]correspondent-to-headquarters dispatches which are considered private
[4323]point-to-point transmissions. FBIS therefore avoids public distribution of
[4325]Material monitored from these circuits by labeling them with an "Official
[4326]Use Only" caveat. The same caveat is used on material which we monitor
[4327]from other press agencies which are protected by international copyright,
[4329]e.g. Agence France Presse (AFP), the Middle East News Agency (MENA), and the
[4330]Iraqi Nes Agency (INA). This procedure has allowed FBIS to disseminate news
[4332]OO RO!2
[4337]agency material for nearly three decades without problems. Recently,
[4338]however, the Office of General Counsel has ruled that an "Official Use
[4339]Only" caveat will not bar such material from the general public under
[4340]the Freedom of Information Law and we are accordingly looking into
[4341]alternative measures, among which are: (1) the purchase of news services
[4342]with rights to publish and disseminate; and (2) the classification of
[4343]those item$ vital to the government's business which we must continue
[4344]to monitor and report. An ultimate decision will be weighed against
[4345]the risk of present procedures.
[4346]13
[4347]4. The routine FBIS monitoring of foreign radio broadcasts often
[4348]involves statements or speeches made by U.S. citizens using those radio
[4349]facilities. Examples are statements made or allegedly made by American
[4350]POW's in Hanoi,- by Jane Fonda in Hanoi and by Ramsey Clark in Vietnan.
[4351]At the request of FBI and the Department of Justice, and with the
[4352]approval of the CIA Office of General Counsel, we have on occasion sub-
[4353]mitted transcripts of such breadcasts to the Department of Justice as
[4354]part of that Department's consideration of a possible trial. In such
[4355]cases, ve have been required to submit names of FBIS monitors involved,
[4356]presumably because of the possibility they might be required as witnesses.
[4357](in one case in 1971, an FBIS staff employee was directed to appear as
[4358]_ an expert witness in the court-martial of a Marine enlisted man charged
[4359]‘with aiding the enemy in a broadcast from Hanoi.) FBIS views all this
[4360]with misgivings. Monitoring of such broadcasts is incidental and we
[4361]rue attributiocn of their news to FBIS, and we should not be considered
[4362]policemen maintaining surveillance of traveling Americans.
[4364]5. FBIS is an overt organization, but one aspect of its operations
[4365]is under Department of Commerce cover. The Joint Publications Research
[4366]Service (JPRS) was established in 1957 to provide the means through which
[4367]great volumes of material from unclassified foreign publications could
[4368]be translated by large numbers of independent contractors in the United
[4369]States on a piece rate basis. Contractors are not witting of their CIA
[4370]employment. This use of cover is an anomaly in FBIS and cont:ains some
[4371]risk of embarrassment to the Agency and to Commerce if it becomes public
[4373]. knowledge. The surfacing of JPRS was given study in 1969, but after
[4374]consideration of all the pros and cons it was decided at the Executive
[4375]Director-Comptroller level not to proceed at that time. FBIS is presently
[4376]taking a second look.
[4378]ge pels
[4379]es “NOCHE
[4381]Director
[4382]Foreign Broadcast Information Service
[4384]SECRET -
[4385]Ob brE | o0202
[4386]GET .
[4388]NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 83 Givi
[4393]rine ra “SEUREL,
[4395]. : e
[4397]~ , 8 May 1973
[4399]MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Science & Technology
[4401]SUBJECT TSD Support to Other Agencies
[4403]1. Technical Services Division's charter (CSI 1-8) requires
[4404]that it provide technical assistance to both CIA operations and
[4405]other activities as may be dir ected by the Deputy Director for
[4406]Operations.
[4408]2. Over the years the chief non-CIA recipients of this
[4409]support have been the Department of Defense, the Federal
[4410]Bureau of Investigation, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous
[4411]Drugs, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department
[4412]of State, United States Postal Service, Secret Service, Agency
[4413]for International Devclopment, and the White House. \
[4415]3. While varying widely among the different recipients, these
[4416]services have included training and materials, and in a few in-
[4417]stances participation in the fields of audio and visual surveillance,
[4418]secrét writing and related communications, personal protection,
[4420], disguise,
[4421]concealment devices, electronic beaconry, illicit narcotics detec-~
[4422]tion, and counter~sabotage/terrorism.
[4424]4. In mostinstances requirements for this support are
[4425]received by TSD through higher echelons (Office of the Director
[4426]or Deputy Director for Operations). Unless the service involved
[4427]is a trivial or continuing one, the request is referred to the
[4428]Foreign Intelligence Staff Departmental Coordination Group for
[4429]coordination and approval at the appropriate Agency levels.
[4430]Approval within TSD by the Chief of Operations or Development
[4431]and Engineering and the Chief of TSD or his Deputy alsois re~
[4432]quired.
[4434]5. The attachment lists the primaty services provided to
[4435]the organizations named in Paragraph two.
[4438]CL BY 059098
[4440]SECRET 002485
[4442]NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 84
[4444]re . ty a Pe OLUINE
[4446]This information deleted because it reveals sensitive operational
[4448]techniques and methods,
[4450]8, Provision of forged documentation to non-DDO requesters,
[4451]whether they be CIA or other Agency requesters, always'requires
[4452]approval of non-TSD offices. Support to the military for instance
[4453]would be validated by FI Staff/Departmental Coordination Group
[4455]t Headquarters or by the COS overseas having responsibility for
[4456]coordination of the operation. BNDD requests are coordinated
[4457]with DDO/NARCOG. Requests for documentation of Immigration
[4458]and Naturalization Service is coordinated via the Alien Affairs
[4459]Staff.
[4461]9. Authentication items are issued on a loan basis and must
[4462]be returned to TSD or accounted for. After any documentation has
[4463]been issued, TSD retains photographs and records of such support
[4464]until the documentation has been returned to TSD, If the material
[4465]is not returned after a reasonable time, the requester is reminded
[4466]of the outstanding documentation. i
[4468]ar
[4469]A “1. i Zz LP,
[4471]. reg” :
[4472]Attachment ° Sidney Gotuieb”
[4473]Distribution: : Chief
[4474]“ O& 1 - Addressee,w/att ; Technical Services Division
[4476]QOZLS
[4478]NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 85 Dr
[4483]Department of Defense
[4485]Documents, disguise, concealment devices, secret writing,
[4487]flaps and seals; counterinsurgency and counter sabotage courses
[4489]_ have been furnished to all intelligence elements of the Department
[4490]of Defense and certain elements.of the Special Forces, All requests
[4491]are coordinated with the FI Departmental Coordination Group at
[4492]Headquarters and with the Chief of Stations overseas, In turn
[4493]these elements furnished TSD with exemplars of foreign identities
[4494]documents, foreign cachets, foreign intelligence secret writing
[4495]systems, foreign intelligence concealment devices. Selected
[4496]audio requirements have been furnished overseas for CI -type
[4497]cases,
[4499]Federal Bureau of Investigation
[4501]At the request of the FBI we cooperate with the Bureau }
[4502]in a few audio surveillance operations against sensitive foreign
[4503]targets in the United States.
[4505]Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs
[4507]Beacons, cameras, audio and telephone devices for
[4508]overseas operations, identity documents, car-trailing devices,
[4509]SRAC, flaps and seals and training of selected personnel
[4510]responsible for use thereof has been furnished this Bureau.
[4511]All requirements are sent to DDO/NARCOG for coordination
[4512]with area divisions and for action by TSD if appropriate.
[4513]Requests overseas are coordinated with the COS or his
[4514]designee before action by TSD is taken.
[4516]Immigrati on and Naturalization
[4518]CI analyses of foreign passports and visas, guidance in
[4519]developing tamperproof alien registration cards, ‘special
[4520]fluorescent stamp inks have been furnished the Service. Requests
[4521]are forwarded directly to TSD for coordination within TSD if
[4522]technical, with the FI Departmental Coordination Group if oper-
[4523]ational, \ i
[4525]. H . ‘ ”
[4526]Vv FIAT . a ‘ “yg
[4527]SECRET oor
[4529]_NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 86 . an
[4532]NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 87 t whe se 3
[4534]Department of State
[4536]Technical graphics guidance on developing a new United
[4537]States Passport, analyses of foreign passports, car-armoring
[4538]and personnel locators (beacons) for Ambassadors have been
[4539]supplied the State Department. In addition analyses and
[4540]exposure of black letter operations against the United States
[4541]abroad are made, All graphics requirements are forwarded
[4542]to TSD for further coordination within the Division, The
[4543]Department of State furnishes exemplars of foreign passports,
[4544]foreign visas andin ie past passports on a priority basis.
[4546]Postal Service
[4548]The Office of Chief Postal Inspector has had selected
[4549]personnel attend basic surveillance photographic courses, has
[4550]been furnished foreign postal information and has been the f
[4551]recipient of letter bomb analyses, furnished special fluorescent
[4552]ink, typewriter analyses. Requirements are coordinated with
[4553]the DDO and DDO/EA. The Post Office has furnished TSD
[4554]with exemplars of letter bombs and mail insertion capabilities
[4555]for CA material destined for foreign countries. We also have
[4556]an arrangement with the Post Office to examine and reinsert
[4557]a low volume of certain foreign mail arriving in the United States.
[4559]Secret Service
[4561]Gate passes, security passes, passes for Presidential
[4562]campaign, emblems for Presidential vehicles; a secure ID
[4563]photo system have been furnished this Service. Blanket approval
[4564]for graphics support has been granted to the Deputy Director for
[4565]Operations. In each case TSD requests approval from the DDO,
[4567]U. S. Agency for International Development
[4569]We furnish instructors to a USAID-sponsored Technical
[4570]Investigation Course (Counter Terror) at Los Fresnos Border
[4571]‘Patrol Academy, Los Fresnos, Texas. Instructors are under
[4572]Department of the Army cover and the funding of our participation
[4573]is under an approval of a Cl-Police Group project, Courses are
[4574]given Spring and Fall each year. Instruction is given at the
[4576]yes 0324
[4578]Onde
[4581]request of CI/PG. ‘trainees represent internal security or
[4582]national police from all countries participating in AID Police
[4583]assistance programs.
[4585]White House
[4587]‘Stationery, special memoranda, molds of the Great
[4588]Seal have been furnished the Social Secretary. The Deputy
[4589]Director for Operations is apprised of these requirements.
[4591]Police Respresenting Washington, Arlington, Fairfax and
[4592]Alexandria
[4594]During the period 1968 -- 1969 a series of classes
[4595]reflecting basic and surveillance photography, basic audio,
[4596]‘locks and picks, countersabotage and surreptitious entry
[4597]were given to selected members from the above mentioned
[4598]cities, Overall training was approved by the Director of
[4599]Centeral Intelligence and in turn validation was required for
[4600]each course from the Director of Security.
[4602]@hist OOF SF orst ° C0021
[4603]row Sac; |
[4605]NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 88
[4608]dad hia LI Mw 8 ahte v ea
[4609]— a
[4611]ROUTING AMD RECORD ShiieT
[4613]ECT. : ae -—h,
[4614]SUBJECT: (Optiencl x) ; ; eo. '
[4616]FROM: + EXTENSION NO,
[4618]Sidney Gottlieb ~
[4620]Chief, TSD _ | x-2831) vate
[4622]203 South Building | 8 May 1973
[4623]TO: (Gificer designation, room number, and DATE
[4625]1
[4626]COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from wher i
[4627]to whom, Draw a line across column after esen comments j
[4629]building) OFFICER'S
[4631]7 INITIALS
[4632]RECEIVED FORWARDED
[4634]Attached herewith are addition: i
[4635]explanations of TSD support to
[4636]other U,S,. Government agencies,
[4638]~ GEL? Luge erry f
[4639]Gus eled beta Latnd
[4641]14,
[4643]TI
[4645]FORM se eeeous - cinete [TERIAL
[4646]hei sazbil Hocld'sias6 iiasensIPapelast! O CONFIDENTIA USE GILY
[4648]03 far
[4652].
[4653]a
[4654]5
[4657]'
[4658].
[4661]ATTACHMENT _
[4663]; FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
[4665]TSD has had a close working relationship with the FBI over
[4666]the past few years. The FBI is the only organization that has
[4667]been fully briefed on TSD audio techniques and equipment. The
[4668]following are situations where TSD equipment and guidance were
[4669]involved in operations: ,
[4671](A) Identity 59 - Four masked transmitters were
[4672]installed. Two have failed and two remain workable.
[4674](B) Identity 60 - A TSD built masked transmitter
[4675]_ was-installed to collect emanations from a crypto~
[4676]_ graphic machine. The system continues to function
[4677]when samples of the emanations are needed.
[4679](C) Identity 61 - Two transmitters have been
[4680]installed and are operating. One is specifically
[4681]designed to collect the sounds of typewriting, the
[4682]other is a straight audio transmitter to collect con-
[4683]versations. A FBI agent is manning the listening
[4684]post. A third system is not oper-
[4685]ating, probably due to battery expiration. The tape
[4686]made from this room was made'by the National
[4687]Security Agency before failure.
[4689](D) Identity 62 - TSD furnished equipment and con-
[4690]sultation covering Identity 62
[4691]First masked switched trans-
[4692]mitters were used in two apartments used as tempor--
[4693]“ary quarters. Later masked switched transmitters
[4694]and microwave transmitters were installed in the
[4695]permanent quarters along with mic and wire installa-
[4696]tions, entirely furnished by the Bureau. This install- -
[4697]ation is not fully operational because the full comple-
[4698]ment of personnel have not yet arrived.
[4700]_ peas
[4701]SECRET coz:
[4703]_ NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 90
[4705]TO LUI TS
[4707](E) mm | - This is an operation -
[4708]participation by National Security Agency. Itis
[4709]designed in anticipation of the Identity 64
[4711]_ in Washington. The listening post was
[4712]obtained by using the Agency covert mechanisms
[4713]for procuring the property. New systems are
[4714]being designed and produced by using TSD's covert
[4715]contractor mechanisms and TSD engineers.
[4717](F) Identity 65 - Ten masked audio devices pur-
[4718]chased from TSD were installed in Identity 65
[4720]by the FBI. Part of the equipment was install-
[4721]ed in November and December 1971, the remaining
[4722]equipment was installed 17 - 25 March 1972. Tests
[4723]made by a TSD officer from a temporary FBI
[4724]listening post on 8 - 9 November 1972, proved that
[4725]the target equipment no longer functioned and was
[4726]_ believed discovered by the occupants,
[4728](G) TSD has furnished equipment items which constitute
[4729]an on-thé-shelf capability to engage in photo and
[4730]audio surveillance operations which might not be
[4731]known to the Agency. In one case it is known that a
[4732]relatively unsophisticated device was used against
[4733]a domestic target.
[4735]C0Rz2
[4737]SEC
[4741]NW 88256 Docld:32989624 Page 31
[4744]- , " £SD/SDB Memo #138-73
[4746]8 May 1973
[4747]MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, TSD
[4748]ATTENTION: Executive Officer
[4749]SUBJECT: Contacts with Domestic Police Organizations
[4751]1. In December 1968, July 1969 and December 1970, SDB
[4752]provided basic countersabotage familiarization training for
[4753]selected members of the Washington metropolitan area police
[4754]departments. The training was given at the Fairfax County
[4755]police pistol and rifle range. Authorization for the train-
[4756]ing came from DDP and Chief, Office of Security.
[4758]2, On occasion during the past few years, under the
[4759]auspices of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration of
[4760]the Devartment of Justice and with the approval of CI Staff
[4761]and Office of Security, SDB provided training and familiari-
[4762]zation to police officers of saveral domestic police
[4763]departments in the uses of the Explosives Residue Detection
[4764]Technique and Trace Metals Detection Technique. These tech-
[4765]niques had been declassified and are currently available to
[4767]e law enforcement community. The National Bomb Data Center
[4768]publishes periodic guidance in their uses.
[4770]3. In order to augment the SDB mission responsibilities
[4771]in.the field of countersabotage and counterterror, SDB offi-
[4772]cers have in the past two years visited, under appropriate
[4773]covers, the explosives disposal units of the New York City
[4774]police department, Dade County (Miami) Florida Dept. and the
[4775]Los Angeles Police Dept. Also, in March 1973, two SDB offi-
[4776]cers attended the Explosives and Ordnance Disposal Conference
[4777]in Sacramento, California, sponsored by LEAA. When the
[4778]recent letter bomb menace began in September 1972, our liaison
[4779]with the NYCPD bomb squad paid off in that we had complete in- |
[4780]formation on letter bomb construction in hours, enabling the: *
[4781]Agency to make worldwide dissemination within a day.
[4783]ta
[4785]/s/_ Identity 120
[4787]To
[4788]Oran - C/TSD/OPS/F % one
[4789]CODEN | ey OBR
[4793]NW.88296 Docld: 292 E2Z\IMPDET/CL BY 06222.
[4796]ORD- 2328-73
[4797]- 9 MAY 1973
[4799]MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Science and
[4800]Technology
[4802]SUBJECT : Repeated Survey of ORD for Non-
[4803]Foreign Intelligence Activities
[4805]The 7 May survey has been repeated and refined
[4806]with respect to all ORD services or dealings with
[4807]other agencies on domestic, non-forcign matters. In
[4808]addition, this report covers all our activities deal-
[4809]ing with the rescarch and development of intelligence
[4810]equipment for foreign use which has been tested in
[4811]the United States and might have collected domestic
[4812]information. Again, each member of ORD available
[4813]today was asked cither directly or through his super-
[4814]visor to provide the above requested information,
[4815]whether he was directly involved or not. We have
[4816]used ail diligence to search our records available
[4817]to us during this time period to ensure this is a
[4819]complete and factual list.
[4820]y, ete
[4823]Director of Research §& Development
[4825]Attachments:
[4826]1 - Contacts with Other
[4827]Governmént Agencies
[4828]2 - Domestic Tests
[4830]OLOTE ~ 09228
[4837]. CONTACTS WITH Oe: U.S. GOVERNMENT aces Mes WHICH
[4839]COULD OR HAVE RESULTED IN USE OF CIA-DEVELOPED
[4840]TECHNOLOGY IN ADDRESSING DOMESTIC PROBLEMS
[4842]Executive Office of the President
[4844]ORD represents DD/S&T on the R&D Sub-Committee
[4845]of the Cabinet Committee for International Narcotics
[4846]Control that is concerned with research support of
[4847]the narcotics control problem.
[4849](Dr. Leonard Laster, OST) (Cianci/LS)
[4851]Office of Telecommunications Policy
[4853]Technical surveillance countermeasures and
[4854]physical security information was exchanged with
[4855]them,
[4857].
[4859](Noe/TA)
[4861]Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD)
[4863]Techniques and equipment for navigation and
[4864]tracking was discussed with BNDD.
[4866](Mr. Charles Gaskin, BNDD) (Van Dewerker/TA)
[4867]v . . (Noe/TA) _
[4869]Technical information was exchanged relating.
[4870]to the development of simple, portable sensor systems
[4871]for the detection of concealed bulk narcotics and
[4872]narcotic laboratory effluents.
[4874]" (Mr. John Gunn and , (Parker/DSP)
[4875]- Mr. Bill Butler, BNDD)
[4877]Audio tapes were processed to improve their
[4878]intelligibility. The source of the tapes was unknown.
[4880](Mr. Charles Gaskin, BNDD) . (Scott/An)
[4881]\ ct
[4882]ih 00229
[4883]SEGRE - ATTACHMENT ‘1
[4886]| a
[4887]|
[4889]NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 94 __ . <j .
[4891]SUBJECT: Con@ts With Other U.S. Govenent Agencies
[4892]Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-
[4893]Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic
[4894]. Problems
[4896]BNDD (cont'd)
[4898]BNDD was given permission in the fall of 1972
[4899]to receive proposals from Aerospace, Inc., concerning
[4900]a Radar People Detector developed for. ORD.
[4902](Mr. Charles Gaskin, BNDD) ° Identity 125 /LS)
[4904]; A prototype bioluminescence sensor was developed
[4905]for the detection of narcotics for application in
[4906]Southeast Asia. BNDD was given a demonstration of
[4907]the instrument.
[4909](Dr. Laster/OST) (Terek/LS)
[4910](Mr. Stan Sobel, BNDD)
[4912]USIB Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Committee
[4914]Continuing contacts were maintained with the
[4915]intelligence community regarding technical surveillance
[4916]countermeasurs and physical security. This exchange
[4917]of information, reports, and equipment has been con-
[4918]ducted under the auspices of USIB TSCC and involves
[4919]State, FBI, Secret Service, NSA, DIA, Army, AF, and
[4920]Navy. . .
[4922]‘ (Noe/TA)
[4923](Noyes/PD) ©
[4925]’ State Department
[4927]| ‘Two contracts for development of countermeasures
[4928]| techniques were funded jointly with the State Department.
[4930](Noe/TA)
[4932]2 Y
[4933]7
[4934]Doak
[4935]_ 09289
[4936]orency
[4937]NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 95 SEGHE! ~
[4939]- SUBJECT: Contacts With Other U.S. Government Agencies
[4940]Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-
[4941]Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic
[4942]Problens
[4944]Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)
[4946]Some of the AEC Laboratories, e.g., Savannah
[4947]River Laboratory, are supported by CIA to develop
[4948]radio nuclide sampling and detection techniques and
[4949]devices. These Laboratories have used sampling
[4950]techniques developed for CIA to measure COKUS nuclear
[4951]plant releases,
[4953](Mr. B, Benson, AEC) (Walker/DSP)
[4955]At the request of AEC Security Officer, Mr. Richard
[4956]Cowan, the walls of the office of the Chairman of the
[4957]AEC (then Mr. Schlesinger) were X-rayed, The operation
[4958]occurred one evening and was an attempt to resolve some
[4959]anomalies created by the use of the non-linear junction
[4960]detector.
[4962](Mr. Richard Cowan, AEC) (Noyes/PD)
[4964]Law Enforcement Assistance Agency (LEAA)
[4965]Reports and information about the ORD-developed
[4966]yAdhesive Restraint, Non-Lethal Incapacitation System
[4967]were made available to Department of Justice, LEAA in
[4968]August 1972. If they developed the systen, it would
[4969]be used for civilian crowd and riot control,
[4970](Mr. Les Schubin, LEAA) Identity 125 /LS)
[4972]’ Technical surveillance countermeasures and physical
[4973]security infcrmation were exchanged with LEAA,.
[4975](Noe/TA)
[4979]| - Ubinas - a,
[4981]| NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 96
[4984]SUBJECT: Contacts With Other U.S. Government Agencies
[4985]Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-
[4987]Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic
[4988]° Problems
[4990]Treasury
[4992]Dr. Leahy is being detailed to Treasury Department
[4993]to assist in formulating their R&D program and organization
[4994]in anticipation of the establishment of the new drug
[4995]enforcenent administration. The request for his services’
[4996]was made by Identity 3, _ the Agency's Narcotics Coordi-
[4997]nator. Identity 3 discussed the request and cleared the
[4998]detailing through Mr. Colby.
[5000](Leahy/LS)
[5002]Customs/Treasury Department
[5004]Technical discussions were held with Customs relating
[5005]to detecting illicit nighttime aircraft intrusions over
[5006]the U.S. -Mexico border.
[5008](Mr. Martin Pera, Customs) lawrence DSP)
[5010]Alcohol § Tobacco Tax Div/IRS
[5012]. About five years ago, assistance was requested in
[5013]domestic search of 'moonshine™ stills using CIA infrared
[5014]scanners. This was turned down.
[5016](Lawrence/DSP)
[5018]Secret Service
[5020]We have had numerous discussions with the Secret
[5021]Service regarding navigation and tracking techniques
[5022]and equipment.
[5024]4
[5026](Van Dewerker/TA)
[5028]= 4. 00232
[5031]po ~ a eens |
[5033]ve SUBJECT: cones With Other U.S. GovAnont Agencies
[5034]a Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-
[5035]Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic
[5036]. Problems - -
[5038]Federal Aviation Agency (FAA)
[5040]The results of our research work in the detection
[5041]of metals (NOLIR) were. reported to FAA for possible use
[5042]in the detection of hijacker weapons.
[5044](MacAnlis/RP)
[5046]‘National Institute of Health (NIH)
[5048]At the request of ORD, OCS assigned a staff technician
[5049]to undertake to write a computer program for the Wisswesser
[5050]Line Notation (WLN) chemical notation method. This work was
[5051]done in cooperation with NIH.
[5053](Ms. Coniver, NIH) Identity 125 /LS)
[5055]Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA)
[5057]; LS/ORD met frequently with ACDA personnel in order
[5058]to structure ORD's BW/CW research programs to support
[5059]ACDA needs. 7
[5061]w _ Identity 125 /LS)
[5063]' Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
[5064]Technical information relating to detection of
[5065]radio nuclides in the environment was exchanged with
[5066]them.
[5068](Nr. Charles Weaver, EPA) _ (Walker/DSP)
[5070]I 99233
[5071]OTA Ee |
[5073]. weetl us Soe,
[5074]NW 65296 Docld:327989624 Page 98 Coiled. ay
[5077]SUBJECT: cones With Other U.S. Goveriiment Agencies
[5078]hich Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-
[5079]. Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic
[5081]. Problems
[5083]EPA (cont'd).
[5085]Technical discussions relating to uSing IR scanning
[5086]equipment to detect underground fires in a sanitary land
[5087]£il11 have been conducted.
[5089](Mr. Gene James, EPA) (Risinger/DSP)
[5091]Federal Bureau of Investigation
[5093]At their request, we described Imagery Enhancement
[5094]techniques germane to removing distortions from some
[5095]photography they had on an alleged bank robber. Request
[5096]for specific support in processing the imagery was turned
[5098]down.
[5099](Stephan/IPA)
[5100]Secret Service
[5101]“B
[5102]“UTS. Custons
[5103]v Mr. C.V. Noyes' total contact with other agencies
[5105]in terms of assistance with domestic operations has be2n
[5106]in the field of audio surveillance countermeasures, anti-
[5107]hijacking, or drugs.
[5109](Mr. Robert Burnell, SS) (Noyes/PD)
[5110](Mr. Thomas Allen, FBI)
[5111](Mr. Martin Pera, Customs)
[5113]"- ‘NASA and USDA (Agency association is classified SECRET)
[5115]We have an on-going program, Project TAMPER, to
[5116]“develop automated systems for exploiting satellite-borne
[5117]multispectral sensors for earth resources assessments.
[5119](Mr. William Ruble, USDA) (Galinaitis/IPA)
[5120](Mr, Leonard’ Jaffe, NASA) ; to!
[5121](General Smart) it
[5123]an
[5125]6 = 0023
[5127]_NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 99 Cree ny
[5132]SUBJECT: Contacts With Other U.S. Government Agencies
[5133]Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-
[5134]. . Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic
[5135]Problems
[5137]Proposec. Use of NASA ERTS Satellite (Agency association
[5138]would be SECRET)
[5140]The Agency is preparing a proposal for an experi-
[5141]mental program to aid in estimeting the Soviet wheat
[5142]crop. A part of the information would be obtained from
[5143]a satellite launched for other announced programs. Ground-
[5144]truth data will be collected on North American crops.
[5146](Briglia/PAS)
[5148]U.S. Department of Agriculture and Bureau of Narcotics
[5149]and Dangerous Drugs
[5151]CIA has requested the establishment of a two-acre
[5153]plot of opium poppies at a USDA research site in Washington -
[5154]state, to be used for tests of photo-recognition of opium
[5156]poppies.
[5157](Mr. Quentin Jones, USDA) (Lawrence/DSP)
[5158](Mr. Fred Garfield, BNDD) (Cianci/LS)
[5160]Army, Military Police Agency, Ft. Gordon
[5161]Air Force, Office of the Inspector Seneral
[5162]rmy , Office or rrovost marsnall General
[5164]We have exchanged technical surveillance counter-
[5165]measures and physical security information with them.
[5167](Noe/TA)
[5169]U.S. Arm : .
[5170]‘Rocky Mountain Arsenal, Newport Army Ammunition Plant,
[5171]oelle Ordnance Nepot
[5173]LS/ORD tested environmental samples from testing,
[5174]storage and production facilities in the U.S.
[5176]\; Identity 129/LS)
[5178]7 , 8) 00285
[5180]NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 100
[5182]SUBJECT: con Wes With Other U.S. cove Mncnt Agencies
[5183]Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-
[5184]Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic
[5185]Problems ~
[5187]U.S. Army, Edgewood Arsenal
[5189]LS/ORD is sharing expenses with EA in field testing
[5190]an IR remote detector of CW aerosols.
[5192]Identity 125 /LS)
[5194]U.S. Navy
[5196]BSD/ORD turned over about eight trained dolphins
[5197]to the Navy in December 1969, because we discontinued
[5198]our dolphin progran.
[5200](Lynch/LS)
[5202]U.S. Coast Guard
[5204]About six years ago, CIA infrared equipment was
[5205]made available for USCG tests to evaluate IR as a means
[5206]for night search of life boats.
[5208](then-Lt. James McIntosh, USCG) (Lawrence/DSP)
[5209]v ;
[5210]Identity 174 Sheriff's Office
[5212]ORD conducted polygraph tests on all applicants.
[5214]' Polygraph security findings were compared with the
[5215]Sheriff's own security findings.
[5217](Sheriff) | ; : Identity 125/LS)
[5219]A study was made on con-men techniques and assess-
[5220]ment methods in 1967- 68.
[5222]. (Sheriff) _— * Identity 125 /LS)
[5224]00235
[5225]t ws
[5228]NW 86296 Docld:32969624 Page 101 : -
[5231]roy eee ‘ . / ENG ad
[5233]a
[5235]SUBJECT: Contacts With Other U.S. Government Agencies
[5236]Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-
[5237]. Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic.
[5238]Problems
[5240]‘Chief, San Francisco Police
[5242]For security reasons, the Chief was made aware of
[5243]a study to evaluate attempts by non-Chiense to penetrate
[5244]Chinese social groups. (1967)
[5246](Police Chief) oo . Identity 125/LS)
[5247].
[5248]§ MP
[5249]i a pT .
[5250]one.  00RaY
[5252]_ NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 102
[5254]cary . : . oe
[5256]DOMESTIC TESTS FOR
[5257]AGENCY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS
[5259]1.'-As a normal part of ORD's efforts in the
[5260]research and development of equipment and techniques
[5261]for Agency applications in foreign intelligence, we
[5262]conduct experiments and tests in the United States.
[5263]Clearly, the design and development of our intelli-
[5264]gence cquipments can be done more economically and
[5265]more securely in this country. Although most of
[5266]the tests of our R&D equipments are performed in
[5267]Closed laboratories or in secure areas simulating
[5268]the foreign environment, some of the tests and experi-
[5269]ments, of necessity, reveal domestic information.
[5271]2. A review of the surveillance equipment or
[5272]techniques which have at some time or other been
[5273]exposed to domestic testing is as follows:
[5275]a. Laser Probe - About 1967, the laser
[5276]probe developed by ORD was tested by TSD in
[5277]San Francisco under very closely controlled
[5278]conditions. The ORD Project Officer witnessed
[5279]portions of the test. Recordings that were
[5280]made of laser probe output were carefully
[5281]controlled as classified material and it is
[5282]believed that the tapes have long since been
[5283]destroyed. (Wood/TA)
[5285]bs Microwave Intercept System - About
[5286]1968, this system was tes‘ed in a light air-
[5287]craft near the Naval Ordnance Test Station
[5288]in Identity 127:, California. This system is
[5289]designed to permit intercept of microwave
[5290]telephone communication channels of systems
[5291]such as Identity 130 oo » ‘It
[5292]works equally well against the Bell Telephone
[5293]TD-2, as they are generically the same. Re-
[5294]cordings of these telephone intercepts were
[5295]carefully controlled and were destroyed several
[5296]years ago.
[5298]OTAaT:T ATTACHMENT 2
[5299]Ciidisink
[5301]Oda
[5303]NW 60296 Docld:32999624 Page 103
[5306]° SUBJECT: von Meic Tests for Agency re Mcn and
[5307]. _~ Development Efforts
[5309]-¢. Telephone Intrusion Study - The objec-
[5311]tive of this current program is to develop a
[5312]means-to utilize foreign telephone systems as
[5313]@ communication link without the knowledge of
[5314]the host system. In order to carry out this
[5315]objective, it is necessary to learn the com-
[5316]plete supervisory signalling and sequencing
[5317]- control system hierarchy for the various foreign
[5318]telephone systems. Many of these are patterned
[5319]after the U.S. system and, for this reason,
[5320]limited monitoring to test the operation of
[5321]intercept equipment’ in the United States is
[5322]planned. The data to be collected would be
[5323]merely the signal tones from which supervisory
[5324]codes can be extracted. Message content is
[5325]of no interest and will not be recorded. Over-
[5326]Seas testing is planned at a subsequent date.
[5327]To date, some domestic testing of this concept
[5328]has been carried out at the contractor's plant.
[5329]No recordings have been made of such data. Ex-
[5330]tremely brief tests excercising U.S. and forcign
[5331]telephone systems through supervisory tone sig-
[5332]nalling have been carried out to verify initial
[5333]concepts. The duration of testing was less
[5334]than one-half hour.
[5336]d.- Other Sensor Testing - Examples of
[5338]" engineering development tests of special sensors
[5339]within the United States include infrared and
[5340]high-altitude photography, forward-looking IR
[5341](FLIR) flights, laser scanners, industrial efflu-
[5342]ent sampling for isotopes, and airborne magne-
[5343]tometer surveys for metal (rifles and trucks).
[5344]In al] these cases, the data output of such
[5345]testing has been used for engineering develop-
[5346]ment and the content has been restricted to
[5347]disseminaticn to those in Government involved
[5348]with the engineering design.
[5350]NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 104
[5352]' SUBJECT: Domegkic Tests for Agency Resdrch and
[5353]ee Devc@pment Efforts
[5355]_
[5357]e. Remote Physiological Measurements -
[5358]An ORD-developed cryogenic magnetometer is
[5359]being tested at a contractor's site for use
[5360]as a remote cardiograph (magnetocardiograph).
[5361]Some test subjects are witting, but most tests
[5362]are on naive subjects (they do not know they
[5363]are being tested). The magnetometer is com-
[5364]pletely harmless to the subject and the test
[5365]results are closely hela.
[5367]£. Personality Structure of Defectors
[5368]Study - ORD undertook to determine the per-
[5369]sonality structure of defectors during the
[5370]period 1966-69. The work primarily involved
[5371]an analysis of the open literature on known
[5372]defectors. An ancillary effort was concerned
[5373]with a study of the phenomenon of defection *
[5374]itself, i.e., leaving one religion for another,
[5375]or changing one set of political beliefs for
[5376]another. The work was conducted at Stanford
[5377]University. Identity 125/]S5) |
[5379]g. Trained Birds - Birds have been trained
[5380]and tested in the United States to carry small
[5381]intelligence collecting packages such as audio
[5382]surveillance devices, small cameras, and cur-
[5383]rent measuring devices. Any data collected
[5384]from unwitting domestic sources would have been
[5386]_ used only for engineering purposes and then
[5387]destroyed. ;
[5389]h. Communications Link Loading Study - In
[5390]the period from I970 through 1972 various means
[5391]were used to check out an intercept system designed
[5392]to operate against Iden 93 communications links.
[5393]Under carefully centrolled conditions, some U. S.
[5394]microwave communications were recorded and passed
[5395]through the intercept system under test to prove
[5396]quality of performance. All intercept material
[5397]connected with this was destroyed within a few weeks
[5398]of the time of intercept and the material was never
[5399]checked for substantive content. NSA participated
[5400]and controlled most elements of the U. S. material.
[5402]NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 105 , _
[5404]. . ern . a . _
[5405]e | Perera 5 @
[5407]ORD-2274-73
[5408]-7 May 1973
[5410]MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Science and
[5411]Technology
[5413]SUBJECT ° : Survey of ORD for Non-Foreign
[5414]Intelligence Activities
[5416]At 11 a.m. today, each division and staff chief
[5417]or his representative was instructed to query all of
[5418]his people and report back by this afternoon whether
[5419]or not they had provided any services or dealt with
[5420]any other agencies on domestic, non-foreign matters.
[5421]The. attached list is an inventory of all items we
[5422]were able to uncover. If additional information on
[5423]any of these topics is desired, we can provide either
[5425]_a verbal or a written report on very short notice.
[5427]CLL DY Bocce
[5429]Charles E. McGinnis
[5430]Scientific Advisor
[5432]to
[5433]Director of Research §& Development
[5435]. Attachment:
[5436]As stated
[5442]00244
[5446]Project TAMPER, an on- going program which may be
[5447]politically sensitive.
[5449]A proposed OER wheat estimate program vhich’ may be
[5450]politically sensitive.
[5452]Narcotics--our foreign activities are.well known
[5453]in DDS&T.
[5455].
[5457]A negative report from the Support Staff,
[5459]ORD's NOLIR work was reported to the FAA about
[5460]three years ago. No action was taken, to our knowledge...
[5462]Robert Scott - Performed intelligibility enhancement vA
[5463]of audio tapes for BNDD. Source of tapes unknown.
[5465]James M. Stephan - At the request of FBI, we described
[5466]Imagery Enhancement Techniques germane to removing
[5467]distortions from’ some photography they had on an
[5468]alleged bank ‘robber. Request for specific support
[5470]in processing the imagery was turned down.
[5474]CEP ary
[5475]Ne era : 00242
[5477]NW 88296 Docldi32989624 Page 107 |
[5479]) 7 May 197
[5481]C. V. NOYES
[5483]My total contact with other agencies in terms of assistance
[5484]with domestic operations has'been in the field of audio sur-
[5485]veillance countermeasures, anti-hijacking, or drugs. Speci-
[5486]fically, I participated in TSCC and RED Subcommittee meetings
[5487]which included technology exchanges and some equipment ex-
[5488]changes on a temporary basis ostensibly for testing or trial.
[5490]“I also assisted in x-raying the office walls of the Chairman
[5491]of the AEC (then Mr. Schlesinger) at the request of Mr. Richard
[5492]Cowan of AEC Security. The operation occurred one evening
[5493](date unknown) and was an attempt to resolve some anomalies
[5494]created by the use of the nonlinear junction detector.
[5496]Other persons contacted over the years have been:
[5498]Mr. Robert Burnett, Secret Service.
[5500]7 Mr. Martin Pera, U. S. Customs -
[5502]Mr. Marvin Beasley, DASA
[5503]Mr. Thomas Allen, FBI
[5505]"Major Jack Nelson, OSI/USAF
[5507]Major John Langager, ONI/USN
[5508]| Mr. Richard Cowan, AEC
[5509]| .
[5511]| NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 108
[5513]- SO Thomas P. Noe
[5516]i. Continuing contacts with intelligence community.
[5517]regarding technical surveillance countermeasures and
[5518]physical security. This is an exchange of information and
[5519]reports and has been conducted under the auspices of the
[5521]USIB Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Community.
[5523]State ot Navy
[5525]Aix Force - US Secret Service
[5526]_Army , ; NSA .
[5528]DIA
[5530]FBI
[5532]2. .doint funding of two contracts with State Depart-
[5533]ment (TRW/LLL). Two electret microphones were furnished
[5534]to State Department for test purposes. Joint funding of
[5535]one contract with NSA (Sandia). Participation in DNA/DOD
[5536]contract (Bureau of Standards).
[5538]3. Other DOD and Government contacts for information
[5539]collection or exchange only.
[5541]ARPA
[5543]LEAA/Dept. of Justice
[5545]DNA/DOD
[5548]Office Telecommunications Policy
[5549]Office of Army/Provost Marshal General
[5550]Army/Military Police Agency, Ft. Gordon
[5551]Air Force/Office of the Inspector General
[5552]Air Force/Electronic Systems Division
[5554]Oren aT . + O9243
[5556]Tres . ‘ . .
[5558]e . . . Cb
[5560]NW 68296 Docld:32989624 Page 109
[5562]| epreestiner ct emer
[5565]Wi 88296 Dochd:32989624 Page 110
[5567]: . - 7 May 1973
[5569]LS/ORD CONTACTS WITH DOMESTIC COUNCIL AGENCIES
[5571]1. BNDA(Charles Gaskin) was given permission to receive
[5573]proposals from Identity 135, concerning a Radar People Detector
[5575]developed for ORD. Time: Fall of 1972. Action wes approved by
[5577]D/ORD.
[5579]2. BSD/ORD turned about eight trained dolphins over to the
[5581]Navy. Time: December 1969
[5583]3. Developed Adhesive Restraint, Non-lethal Incapacitation System.
[5584]Reports and information was made available to Department of Justice, LEAA
[5585]in August 1972. If they develoved the system, it would be used for
[5587]civilian crowd and riot control.
[5591]3
[5592]ar
[5595]Ce
[5599]| . . * - .
[5600]@ 29 "AY 1973
[5602]MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Secretary, CIA Management
[5603]Committee
[5605]SUBJECT : Reported .Identity 61 _ Burglary
[5607]1. Attached is a report summarizing what we know about the
[5608]reported break-in of Identity 61, An investigative report
[5609]by an officer of the Executive Protective Service states that the
[5610]offices were ransacked and a number of personal items stolen.
[5612]2. The attached summary also describes a separate audio
[5613]operation conducted against Identity 61 . by the FBI, at the
[5614]Agency's behest and with its technical support. This presents a
[5615]related question that should be noted. James McCord's’ testimony
[5616]indicates that he placed telephone calls to the Identity 75 and Identity
[5618]61, - He says he picked the numbers at random, hoping
[5619]that if his phone was tapped his attorneys would be able to challenge
[5620]the evidence as being tainted, Another witness, John Caulfield,
[5621]says McCord called the two named Iden 75 and Iden 61 because he "was sure’!
[5622]they "were subjects of national security wiretaps."
[5624]3. In fact, there has been a long-standing telephone tap on the
[5625]Identity 75 ,» run by the FBI, about which CI Staff believes McCord
[5626]knew. It is possible that he also had an inkling of some sort of operation
[5627]agéinst Identity 61 *, and assumed that it was also a telephone
[5628]tap. One must speculate that he played for double insurance, hoping
[5629]that both his telephones and those of the Iden 75 and Iden 61 were tapped, and
[5630]that one way or another his case would be dismissed or dropped
[5631]because of tainted evidence or to avoid revealing the sensitive
[5632]operations, At this point, given the publicity of the Iden 61 break-in,
[5633]and the testimony of McCord and Caulfield, the current investigations
[5634]may lead to exposure of ihe operations.
[5637]SI
[5639]Alt Leip // fh ete
[5640]of Kein Vv. Broe
[5641]Inspector General OoGs!
[5643]Attachment:
[5644]As Stated Above
[5646]as oe Sele Se Se
[5647]sr . oa
[5649]NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 111 bee OF,
[5652]NW 88296 Dochd:32989624 Page 112 moet
[5654]24 May 1973
[5655]MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General
[5656]SUBJECT : Reported Burglary of the Identity 61 -
[5657]1. The press reported a burglary of Identity 61 _ 13-14
[5659]May 1973. An investigative report by an officer of the Executive
[5660]Protective Service states that the offices were ransacked anda
[5661]number of personal items were stolen. There were some latent
[5662]fingerprints, but no identification was made. The FBI, which states
[5663]that the incident was on 15 May, did not investigate because it deter-
[5664]mined that it did not have jurisdiction. The Identity 61
[5666]registered a formal complaint and American regrets were expressed,
[5667]Identity 61 making it clear that they suspected something other than
[5668]ordinary robbery. We have no additional information on the subject.
[5669]There had been an carlier intelligence operation against the Identity 61
[5670]which is described below.
[5672]2. On 16 April 1971 the Agency proposed to the FBI the instal-
[5673]lation of technical coverage of Identity 61 The opportunily
[5674]for such an installation came about when a domestic asset of Foreign
[5675]Resources Division reported that he had been asked to submit a bid
[5676]for a contract to renovate Identity 61 Upon securing the
[5677]contract the asset was willing to augment his work force as appropriate
[5678]or install material which would be provided him. The Agency proposed
[5679]to turn this asset over to the FBI and to provide technical and logistic
[5680]support. The value of such an operation to the intelligence community
[5681]was cited.
[5683]3. On 23 April 1971 FBI Director John Edgar Hoover turned
[5684]down the Agency proposal. That same day CIA Director Richard Helms
[5685]sent a letter to Aitorney-General John Mitchell requesting that the FBI
[5686]turndown be reversed, citing the importance of the Iden 61 target and
[5687]national intelligence needs to collect positive intelligence. On 24 April
[5688]the Attorney-General reversed the FBI decision and the Washington
[5689]Field Office of the Bureau was instructed to proceed with the operation.
[5691]yo
[5693]ODGES .
[5695]Ta ah wees f teens are
[5696]Cre if sy aes
[5698]tlt]
[5699]eta eee el!
[5701]pec fam ince Sane
[5704][
[5709]NW 68296 Docld:32989624 Page 113
[5711]4. During the period from 26 April to 18 May all the
[5712]technical equipment from the Agency.to the FBI was delivered,
[5713]installed and tested. Everything seemed to be working, No Agency
[5714]personnel were involved-in any way with actual installation of
[5715]equipment in Identity 61 From May to February Agency tech-
[5716]nicians helped calibrate, reset and do other repair work on occasions
[5717]of equipment failure in the FBI listening post. On no occasion did
[5718]they enter Identity 61,
[5720]5. The Agency requested that coverage of Identity 61 - be
[5721]stopped on 3 February 1972 after FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover
[5722]advised that he was scheduled shorily to testify in Congress and
[5723]might have to advise them that the installation in Identity 61°
[5724]was initiated at CIA's request. The operation and equipment, to the
[5725]best of the Agency's knowledge, was dormant until 8 December 1972
[5726]when the FBI was asked by the Agency to reactivate coverage, The
[5727]request at this time was occasioned by the knowledge that a Iden 76
[5728]delegation would be arriving in Washington for discussions on
[5729]nationalization of foreign holdings, While the FBI was still
[5730]in the process of reactivating the equipment, the Department of
[5731]State on 20 December 1972 requested the FBI to institute all possible
[5732]coverage of Identity 61 and on 22 December 1972 coverage
[5733]was partially reinstitutéd with full coverage in effect by 26 December
[5734]1972.
[5736]6. A review of the take from the operation, weighed against
[5737]the risks involved, led the Agency to conclude that the activity was
[5738]not worth continuing, On 16 February 1973 CIA requested the FBI
[5739]to discontinue the coverage. On 22 February 1973 the FBI advised
[5740]that microphone surveillance of Iden 61 was discontinued.
[5742]0 Keehanke
[5744]John C. Richards
[5746]Greet Grates
[5748]Gln wt Go: '
[5751]a , !
[5753][ Addendum . FY re
[5754]ak? We ferred to in JCRichards'! 24 iv 73 memo toIG >
[5755]F $,° od a . aragravh 2, re Identity 61™ _Break-in
[5756]gre \ l. The Foreign Resdurtes Division assetpvas Identity 77
[5758]c ;
[5759]ar a who owned the Identity 78 _ .
[5760]‘Som .- . :
[5762]« The Agency had initially agreed
[5763]to reimburse Iden 77 for losses suffered up to $2500, The final
[5764]amount of remuneration turned: out to be $4, 828,53. Another FR
[5765]asset who worked on this operation was Identity 79 plumber and
[5766]elettrician of McLean, Va. He was terminated by FR in January 1972.
[5768]2. TSD personnel who entered and worked in the FBI listening
[5769]post were: Identity 80, Identity 30 and Identity 45
[5770]of TSD and Harold Leith of Division D. GGLSESS
[5772]Ac ‘
[5774]a ;
[5775]e Po
[5776]. \
[5777]NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 114 _ a
[5780]bass isd hal
[5784]15 May 1973
[5786]MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
[5787]SUBJECT: Break-in at Identity 61
[5789]1. Information has been received from WH Division
[5790]which indicates that there was a break-in at - Identity 61
[5792]on the weekend of 13-14 May 1972. ThelIden76 Desk
[5793]of WH Division has no knowledge of Bureau coverage at that
[5794]time.
[5796]2. I discussed the Iden 76 matter with Iden 66
[5797]of CI Staff (Red 1751), who advised that the FBI did
[5798]have coverage of Identity 61, _ and the Agency sup-
[5799]-ported this operation. He indicated that this was identified
[5800]as Operation WUDCOR and he would be able to provide additional
[5801]details on this if Mr. Colby requests it.
[5803]‘[s/ Identity 10
[5805]Acting Executive Officer
[5807]ry TATUTTS
[5813]st fe |
[5814]weed bd nd
[5816]-E2 IMPDET ee
[5817]CL BY 008246 COGS.
[5820]J
[5824]Gin hit
[5825]Gms
[5827]APOT AEN | ran atrepae * yner ot
[5829]03 aurgek Yrbey we) | a
[5831]NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 116
[5833]ME MHORANDUL FOR: Deputy Director for Operations
[5834]SUBIZCT: WH -Cossaents on Jack Anderson Column
[5835]REPERENCE Jack Anderson's Washineton Merrv-Co~
[5836]. Ronnd Column of S March 1578: "Chilean
[5839]1. WH Division has reviewed the referenced colunn
[5840](copy attached) hy dack anderson and fiadcs that it eon-
[5841]tains no new information. -To the best knovisdags at the
[5843]ivisi there is foundation to the altesation tha’
[5844]Division, there is no foundation to the allegation that
[5845]%. Howard Hunt was engaged on bohaif of ITT in breaking
[5846]into Chilean diplomatic installations in Washinzton and
[5848]New York,
[5850]2. <Any connection between ITT and these break-ins
[5851]is purely conjectural and the colunn takes care to
[5852]point this our.
[5854]2 Harold Haendrvix, ITT Latin American repres enta-
[5855]Stay has told us that‘ho had no relationsnin with
[5856]nant’ on this or . He had anticivoatad
[5857]that Anderson 123 rolhationship in bis
[5858]coluan and nad is was not true.
[5860]As
[5862]/s/ Identity 81
[5864]. Chiez
[5865]Western Henisphere Division
[5867]Attachment: As Stated
[5871]fruc Fic anced Pin. wi wad
[5873]‘SRG aan a
[5877]7 6/70 | : .. EacCUTIVE PROTECTIVE SERVICE er
[5878]. . rn « SERIAL (CASE) HUWSER
[5879]Ie . INCIBENT REPORT 272 =39 B
[5880]i 12
[5882]y e. CATE cetya ft Pee
[5883]& .
[5885]&. LOCATION (STREEMIGORES 5) S. KATYRE OF INCIDENT
[5886]TARKATION)
[5888]Chile if mus lL
[5890]6. REPORTED BY: 7. ADDRESS
[5892]Fy est ~ neces S-7 ; 3
[5894]B. ..OME FRINE
[5896]on ~~ 7 . - .
[5898]| Hernan Haverro 1705 Hanlet Street, Sorinefield, Vel. 7 SALTS
[5899]IO. OFFICE ASSIGNED . V1. OATES 12, HOUR $3. DAY GF WEEX
[5901]Sergeant Stevens’ E. Butler
[5902]- Sergeant Rilev_ M. Richardson 05-15-72
[5904]14. WITNESS . : 15. ADGRESS
[5906]1330 hrs.
[5908]N/A ie WA
[5910]19. ADDRESS
[5912]20, ROME F
[5913]HE
[5914]24. OFFICE Frcs
[5916]N/A
[5918]18. WITRKESS
[5920]m
[5922]22. DETAILS OF INCIDENT (BRIEFLY DESCRIGE INCIDENT, CGHTIAUE ABOVE ITEMS AS NECESSARY INDICATING ITEM)
[5924]t
[5926]- ft Janproximately 13390 hours, Monday, May 23, 2972). Forci¢n Missions Division
[5927]Control Center wos sdvised by I PLN C,, 30, that a bonclor: had tskon mlzce atthe
[5928]Chancery of Chile, +3735 Uassachis s_Averua, IL, sonatine between 1ANQ hors on
[5929]Friday, May 13, 192, and on 0855 date.
[5931]Serresnt PR ey
[5932]1335 hours in
[5934]_Pichordecn ard the pndersicned vere di spetche doat approvinanely
[5935]Cruiser # 23.
[5937]The undersigned vas _edvised by Mr. Hernan
[5938]- of the Tbassy of Crile, that the Ch
[5939]were ransacked. Me tis th tine the ret
[5940]‘rw Navarro advises
[5942]“when detormuuatic
[5944]jan
[5946]MIOCLE AGURESS
[5948]CATE OF BIRTH SOCIAL SECURITY HO. RATICNALLS
[5950]LAST NAME FIRST
[5952]MIDOLE ACORESS
[5954]£2) RACE SEX REIGHT WEIGHT HAIR £YES DATE OF BIATH SOCIAL SECURITY HO. . RATIONALITE
[5955]| ,
[5956]25. ARREST PO 26. ARREST HO. 27. ARREST OF FICERANAME AND BADGE KO.) 28. OATE GF ARREST [23.0%
[5958]39. INCIDENT STATUS
[5960]ade oven
[5962]C. — UNFOUNDED ©. O CLEARED ay aztis”
[5964]31 REPORT fs Grp ke SEI SIGNATS HPE,NOW 27 32. APPROVING OF FACIAL (SIGHATURE) \ DATE
[5965]TT Lo aye Ze : \
[5966]ca 7 °
[5967]bleé CLIK. Fe 7 ker, were (\ itv: LU tomy
[5968]Si. ee Sent Stovens E. Putler ote He Ka
[5970]33. STATE é pert. OFFICIAL NOTIFIED
[5972]. [32. US55-1D CASE NS.
[5973]; N/A 8 tC HOUR: , H/A C O3B76
[5975]NW 88296 Bocid:32989624 Page 11f
[5978]C - : \ , 7 . ° INU] JER EPURT - SUPPLER —_ . 4. SERIAL ICASED ny
[5980]‘ . 7 . n :
[5982]_ . Fle 2. 200
[5983]2. RATURE OF INCIDENT Anatom
[5985]Burglary II a ; AN
[5986]3. REPORTED BY: . 4. ADORESS , S. ieee ne
[5987]1 A
[5988]Hernan (9°) HNevarro 605 NemMet Street, Springfield 8 eal in
[5990]Fo ADOITIGHAL DETAILS OF INCIGENT: |
[5992]_ . we
[5994]The following were previcusly on the scene: Sergeant Clifton 0. Gill, Badge. it wy 3
[5995](.P.D.C.,3D, and Officer Michael S. Kurdilla, Badge # 3770, M.P.D.C.,3D, also M.P.D.¢
[5996]Print Cruiser # 735. es . . a Ce
[5998]S/A Michael F, Murphy, USSS-PID (Foreign Branch), was notified.
[6002]CAST WAME Y FIRST | ~ MIDOLE, ACORESS |
[6004]RACE | SEX |. JBEIGHT | WEIGHT } Rain | eves | . DATE GF BIRTH | « SOCIAL SECURITY NO. NATIONALITY
[6006]FIRST \ MIDDLE \
[6008]RACE} «SEX, | HEIGHT |. WEIGHT | RAR |. eves | . DATE OF BIRTH | SOCIAL SECURITY HO. RATICNALITY
[6010]9. ARREST PO | 10, ARREST KO. } il. ARREST OFFICER (NAME & BADGE HO.) wad . . 13. Hoe?
[6012]$4, CURRENT CASE DISFOSTION | . + f-48. USSS+ID CASE KO.
[6013]rfgboer j . op{croseo “| c.[exrouxaeo | D.L] CLEARED BY ARREST |
[6015]- _ oe : . M/A
[6017]16. FINAL CASE DISPOSITION } : .
[6018]- a : . . . “00 hes
[6020]17, ner ine one seca (StcnaTuRe? | 18. DATE | 13. APPROVES [SISAATURE & TITLED MV)
[6021]G3 ? Stet, & Peller Mh -, VOR Wiad
[6023]Sorvceant Stevens E. Butler’ 05415~72 Captain Pete N. Manthos
[6024]296—Doeld2909604—-Page-T13
[6027](2, MATURE OF INCIDEXT
[6028]Burglary II
[6029]3, REPORTEO BY: . -_ 4 RDDRESS
[6032]lerpan GPT) Maver
[6034]7 AGOITICHAL DETAILS GF INCIGENT:
[6036]At approximately 1600 hours, Tuesday, May 6, 1972, Mr.’HNavarro contacted Officer
[6038]Adrian Romen-Soncalez ab 1310 L, Street, H.W. and Stated the following items missi
[6039]( Portable Radios), one (1) Sanyo AM/SH Portable Radio, tro (2) Panascnic AM/FM
[6041]and one (1) Westinshouse AX, TH/SH Radio. Also taken was one (1) Braun Electric She.
[6042]one (1) Womens pullover sweater, and an unknowm number of beoks.
[6044]8. SUSPECT-ARD/OR ARRESTED PERSONS, IDENTIFY BY NAME, ACDRESS, SEX, RACE, SCCIAL SECURITY KUMAER, DOB, EYES, ETC, AN
[6045]. . * v
[6046]Chel NAME | . FIRST « MIDOLE } ADDRESS |
[6048]CMEIGHT | WEIGHT | HAIR | EYES | . DATE OF BIRTK { . SOCIAL SECURITY KO.
[6049]a
[6051]-LAST KAME | First | MIDDLE | AGSRESS |
[6055]RACE | -SEX.| REIGHT |. WEIGHT | wan |. eves | . DATE CF BIRTH | SOCIAL SECURITY HO. JRATLONALIT
[6057]10, ARREST HO. | ‘te ARREST OFFICER (k AME & BA
[6059]S$. ARREST PO | 12. OATE
[6061]14. CURRENT CASE DISFOSTION | \
[6063]_ f * ‘et Sed oe . . .
[6064]sytSooen \ B-Pxuosen “| é.[uxrouxoso \ D.E} CLEARED BY ARREST |
[6065]py . oe . .
[6067]16, FINAL CASE DISPOSITION |
[6069]AS, USSS*1D CASE NO. |
[6071]° N/A
[6073]OPEN . = . oo 0024
[6075]ER (StSnaT PE) lor?
[6079]4 lin & EOr¢ lke tA e
[6080]Sexpeant Stevens E. iutles
[6082]1S. APPROVED (5 A vied
[6084]WE MON! ra 4.
[6085]Captain Pete H. vanthos
[6087]NW 88296. Docld:32989624 Page 119 . .
[6090]) PERSSON CR PROPER t
[6091]14. EX. COPIES] 15, DIST. RA
[6093]16. BEAT
[6096]| aes
[6097]18. COMPLAINANT’ S OCCUPATION ANO HRS
[6099]me ZZi
[6101]19. DESCRIZE LOCATION OR TYPE OF PREMISE
[6103]> CALE A G4ssyY
[6105]20. VEHICLE USED - TAS 10. AND STATE
[6107]Em O455
[6109]3. STREET ADDRESS
[6111]. | (73S FEISS, Ave pt’, LV,
[6113]608
[6115]7. SEX R, CRIME
[6116]b.
[6118]ENG, LL ™
[6119]3. LOCATION OF CRIME (Acéress)
[6120]I7BEC PASS. Ade cL tle
[6122]Ail. WEAPON, TOOL, FONCE G2 MEANS USED
[6124]RACE
[6126]COLORS)
[6128]7
[6129]> LZ
[6131]OOWNER Rs REPORTING G PERSON | 22. METHOD Useo
[6132]CODE: 6 CoMPLMTART P+ PARENT;GUAR [> ONK
[6134]22, NAME (Last, First, M.ccie)
[6136]wea VARLO, 72 KAMAN
[6137]> 3. Aitie! CaF AasiVve Cents eden
[6139]E| RES. ADDRESS Agr eked:
[6141]COS Ste ake Fsti
[6143]25, IDENTIFY SUSPECTS BY NUIMSER
[6144]IF ARRESTED Give AMREST RUIMSER AMD CHARGE ni
[6146](inefuta Movia, Address, Seg, Race, Ace, Heveht, Welskt,
[6148]R cascription if arrested)
[6150]Eyes, Keir, Clothing ets.)
[6152]27. HOSPITALIZED - WHERE?
[6156]26. TRANSPORTED BY 29. TREALED BY
[6158]39. TYPE OF PROPERTY TAKEN
[6160]i NK
[6161]. EXACT LG peda MOF PROF aR TAG HO. STATE
[6162]36. YC
[6163]NARRATIVE: PROPERLY gn Al
[6164]¥ PORT IF MORE SPACE OR N
[6165]men |
[6166]Gl Alo sen ve bane oF i Lf LEC, fp 5-72
[6170]| ofF joe
[6172]m fiegooT et ee ae
[6173]| C4U BAYS OS SoF ALL met SECCIE
[6176]| An / | LAY FBS av Sceve 2
[6178]Lore Z e172, 2 Of-. ALS, Ae fife ip T1580. DLS:
[6180]‘OFFICE USE ONLY
[6182]TT. NUMSER DATES UME THIS REPORT
[6184]SS 7A LO
[6186]37. OALE/TAE TPE GO.
[6188]EPORTING Gi GEN UMNT & BADE To Sk, UNPWREFERRED 10 |
[6190]DDS. Lat phe SO 37IQ Soest CG cLoseo O susPcnoeo poo
[6192]43, SECOND GFPiCi UNIT & EADGE NO, 44. SUP BAP PROWE Sot 45, REVIEWER
[6193]eit w saeet noe
[6194]Gl. Quwain Sap 6, OG, Gila
[6196]f 26.
[6199]w 8846" Docid:42989624 Page 120
[6201]MFETROPOLITS
[6203]HOME PHONE
[6205]74 | 2 [77721 \3 PEr>,
[6208]TAe Lmdassy OFF Ch: ‘Le ws aes He
[6210]RawsrakeE, thikderwwter ethstilas. Jp bow al. FA 08
[6212]42, UCR OF SFOS
[6214]4. HOWE PHO.
[6215]A
[6216]6. BUS. PHONE
[6218]VES —
[6220]17 EC
[6222]30, DATE, 22>
[6223]hs Jee “Te y
[6224]Raenanes
[6225]PHOTOS
[6226]oO Yes
[6227]FS
[6229]13. CLASS
[6230]b
[6232][eus. Pe:
[6237]cad
[6240]NW 88296 Dochd:32985624 Page 1271
[6242]OGC 73-0930
[6243].25 May 1973
[6245]MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
[6247]SUBJECT: Identity 61 Break In on 15 May 1972
[6249]1, On 24 May 1973 I telephoned Mr. James Robinson,
[6250]General Crime Section, Department of Justice and asked if he
[6251]had any information as to criminal prosecution of persons involved
[6252]ina breakin at Identity 61 -in Washington, D.C. on
[6253]15 May 1972, Mr. Robinson stated he had no knowledge of this but
[6254]suggested that it would be beiter to check with Mr. G. Marvin Gentile,
[6255]Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security, Department of State, and
[6256]the Secret Service since they had responsibilities for the Executive
[6257]Protective Service (EPS). I telephoned Mr. Gentile and he identi-
[6258]fied two State Department cables relative to the incident; one from
[6259]the embassy in Santiago to the Department, No. 2450, dated-
[6260]15 May 1972, Subject: Unauthorized Entry Outlining the Protest
[6261]of the Iden 76 Government presented to the American Embassy,
[6262]and the State Department reply to Santiago, No. 084655, dated
[6263]15 May 1972. Mr. Gentile also identified the EPS report of
[6264]investigation and suggested that I get a copy from the Secret Service.
[6265]I then called Mr. Tom Kelly at Secret Service and he had his liaison
[6266]man deliver me a copy of the EPS report of investigation.
[6268]; 2. On 25 May 1973 I received a call from FBI Agent
[6269]Ray Mullens on green phone No. 5303 stating that he had received
[6270]a telephone call from Mr. James Robinson relative to my inquiry
[6271]about prosecution. Mr. Mullens indicated that the FBI Washington
[6272]Field Office had recontacted the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD)
[6273]on 24 May and reviewed the report No. 248-424 filed with the 3rd
[6274]District, MPD which states that a break in occurred at Identity 61
[6275]between 5:00 and 8:00 a.m. on 15 May 1972, |
[6278]w
[6280]jon)
[6281]a)
[6282]C9
[6283]CS
[6284]fa a
[6287]Reparted loss at thane consisted of four am [i Phaios
[6288]and one electric razor. The police investigation identified
[6289]some latent fingerprints but no identification of those prints
[6290]was made. Since the reported loss was under $5,000 and there
[6291]was.no evidence of a crossing of state boundries, the FBI did
[6293]not make an investigation of the incident.
[6295]The MPD reported
[6297]that there had been no prosecution and no suspect was identified.
[6299]Mp eco
[6301]cc: Legislative Counsel
[6302]. Inspector General
[6303]OGC:IKGicav
[6304]Orig - Subject: Watergate Case
[6305]1 - IKG Signer
[6306]1-Chréno | ~
[6310]NW 68296, Docld:32989624 Page 122
[6312]Z
[6313]OHN K, CGRSSSsT
[6317]. we General Cdtnsel
[6319]awe
[6322]Ie LAE oe PI tee ane _
[6323]ou bee. aa . ATL TI NTS By
[6325]ea woe des, welts ,
[6326]A i tbe 3
[6328]1. June 1973
[6330]MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. William E. Colby
[6332]SUBJECT: Special Activities
[6334]1. Following our recent conversation, I have
[6335]searched my memory and Mr. McCone’s files for examples
[6336]of activitics which to hostile observers or to someone
[6337]without complete knowledge and with a special kind of
[6338]motivation could be interpreted as examples of activities
[6339]exceeding CIA's charter.
[6341]2. First, as we discussed, on 7 March 1962,
[6342]DCI McCone, under pressure from Attorney General Robert
[6343]F. Kennedy, agreed to tap the telephones of columnists
[6344]Robert S. Allen and Paul Scott in an effort to identify
[6345]their sources for classified information which was appcar-
[6346]ing in their columns. Because the primary source appeared
[6347]to be in the Department of Defense, MceCone ordered me
[6348]personally to brief General Joe Carroll, Divector of DIA,
[6349]orally, which I did. If understand more complete information |
[6350]on this operation is available from the Director of Security.
[6351]I, personally, managed to avoid gaining any knowledge of
[6352]what precise actions were taken, what information was paincd,
[6353]what was done with it, and when the operation was terminated.
[6355]3. As a result of a developing relationship with
[6357]IDE N-122 thelDEN-123representative in Washington,
[6358]and also as a result of certain information conveyed by
[6359]IDEN-124 » James Angleton, with the approval of
[6360]Dick Helms, agreed 1o mount a counterespionage operation
[6361]against the IDEN-95 in Washington. This involved
[6363]breaking and entering and the removal of documents from
[6365]: a eee acne teeta needs enteianniemnemens
[6366][ATEN PTA poy im oa pecans rece :
[6367]. ' 3 vas ;
[6369]a ra a : . ‘
[6371]Sst at eats OP aed ee ed eu as
[6373]NW 68296 Docld:327989624 Page 123
[6376]_ ww-88296_Doc!
[6378]-: ~ WM pera sayy ura
[6379]1s an ne wots 1)
[6380]oan - ar . Ja. oe by if
[6381]yr ke ell wayk WH d Bs
[6382]5
[6384], . ;
[6385]‘ . -
[6386]Pye .
[6389]ao 2
[6391]the: IDEN~-126 | On 18 June 1962, DCI McCone and
[6392]Helns briefed Secretary of State Rusk generally.on the
[6393]operation without going into operational details. Later
[6394]on the same day, President John F. Kennedy was briefed.
[6395]Actual breaking and entering occurred, somewhat later, and
[6396]on 15 April 1963, DCI McCone met with President Kennedy
[6397]alone and briefed the President on the details of this
[6398]new phase of the operation. On the same day, the Attorney
[6399]General was briefed and he agreed that he would not
[6400]mention it to the FBI unless the FBI themselves raised
[6402]it with him. On 3 February 1964, DCI McCone met alone
[6403]with President Lyndon B. Johnson and briefed him on the
[6404]operation. On 4 February McGeorge Bundy was briefed.
[6406]On 6 February 1964 in a briefing of Secrefary of State
[6407]Rusk on the results of the operation, Rusk expressed
[6408]reservations about: the propriety of such an operation.
[6410]He raised this same concern in subsequent conversations
[6411]with McCone on 17 April 1964. 28 May 1964, and 14 June
[6412]1964. On 12 September 1964 Rusk continued to express
[6413]grave reservations and repeatedly suggested that the
[6414]IDEN-93S be iniormed directly that we knew about their
[6415]espionage operations in the United States and ask them
[6417]to desist. In a meeting on 28 May 1964 Rusk expressed
[6418]these reservations in the presence of DCI MeCone and
[6419]President John F.. Kennedy. Secretary of Defense McNamara
[6420]was also present, and there is no record that he had
[6421]previously been made aware of this operation.
[6423]4. Although certain activities never got beyond
[6424]‘the planning stage, there are, I believe, three examples
[6425]of. such planning which could be subject to misinterpretation.
[6426]One involved chemical warfare operations against the rice
[6427]‘crops in both Cuba and North Vietnam. A second involved
[6428]a paramilitary strike against the Chi-Com nuclear instal-
[6429]lations. Outside the United States Government, General
[6430]“Eisenhower was briefed on such planning. A third, which
[6431]assumes a new Significance today, involved a proposal by
[6432]Angleton and Helms for a greatly increased intelligence
[6433]collection effort against foreign installations in this
[6434]country. This planning also involved a scheme for selected
[6436]ie emotes MP iene 0 eh he Oat heed ee ed
[6437]- . . *
[6439]i . * 4% .
[6440]We ea ot 23 Ne ei ee ad oe és
[6442]PVT ne |
[6443]am oly i 00453
[6446]Pane y
[6449]Wiss asa ii if Le tad wid dau ds
[6451]CISA Pitter
[6453]tO 6 Es ithe e
[6455]3
[6457]exposure of KGB activities and counteractions against the
[6458]Soviet intelligence service. The reasons are still unclear
[6459]to me as to why the FBI chose to brief the PFIAB to the
[6460]effect that CIA was planning to wiretap extensively and
[6461]indiscriminately in this country, to greatly increase
[6463]the Agency representation in the Moscow Embassy. and
[6464]generally to use KGB-type tactics, also extensively and
[6465]indiscriminately. This led to a heated exchange between
[6466]DCI sicCone and Mr. Belmont of the FBI, one such meeting
[6467]taking place in the presence of the Attorney General.
[6469]It is clear that the TBI was opposed to any such proposal
[6470]then, as now, and the plan never went forward.
[6472]5. During the period when Des FitzGerald was in
[6473]charge of the Cuban Task Force, DCI MeCone's office
[6474]learned, quite by accident, that FitzGerald had secured
[6475]the cooperation of several prominent US business firms
[6476]in denying economic items to Cuba. There was no question
[6477]but that the businessmen were glad to cooperate, but know-
[6478]ledge of this operation had to be rather widespread.
[6480]6. On 17 April 1964, Mr. Robert B. Anderson came
[6481]to DCI MecCone on behalf of American business interests,
[6482]offering to insert some $300,000 to try to secure a
[6483]favorable result in the elections in Panama. Shortly
[6484]after this approach, IDEN-128 of IDEN-129
[6486]made a similar proposal to MeCone in connection
[6487]with elections ‘in Chile. On 12 May 1964 at a meeting of
[6488]the 303 Committee, it was decided that the offers of
[6489]American business could not be accepted, it being neither
[6490]a secure way nor an honorable way of doing such business.
[6491]This declaration of policy at this time bears on the recent
[6492]ITT hearings, but I am not surprised that McCone has
[6493]‘forgotten thathe helped to set the precedent of refusing
[6494]to accept such collaboration between the > Agency! Ss operations
[6495]and private business.
[6497]7. At the direction of Attorney General Robert
[6498]_Kennedy and with the explicit approval of President Kennedy,
[6499]McCone injected the Agency, and particularly IDEN- 36
[6501]poe -
[6502]fat. oe _ ion.
[6503]ar . . : Cha de
[6505]Sob uM
[6506]Oa Bee wae aa Paste ed tte is
[6510]Bika bias
[6513].:
[6514]rt mares mr or a ee ae
[6515]AQP ey re A . Arad 2
[6516]t , os
[6518]CheotSu heed if Sica aid ueY
[6520]. -
[6521]. @ Pers pry “e
[6523]i239 bald
[6525]into the US labor situation, and particularly to try
[6526]to ameliorate the quarrel between George Meany-and
[6527]Walter Reuther. [DEN-34 steered a very skillful
[6528]course in this connection, but the Agency could be.
[6529]vulnerable to charges that we went behind Meany'’s back,
[6530]or were somehow consorting with Reuther against Meany's
[6531]wishes.
[6533]8. There are three examples of using Agency
[6534]funds which I know to be controversial. One was the
[6535]expenditure of money under Project MOSES in securing
[6536]the release of Cuban Brigade prisoners. Details of
[6537]this operation are best known to Larry Houston, Mike
[6538]Miskovsky IDEN-131 » and dames Smith. Second,
[6539]as you well know, when Lou Concin received his summons
[6540]to report to the Joint General Staff NWeadquarters on
[6541]1 Novenber 1963 a large amount of cash went with him.
[6542]My impression is that the accounting for this and its
[6543]use has never been very frank or complete. Third, at
[6544]one of the early Special Group meetings attended by
[6545]McCone he took strong exception to proposals to spend
[6546]Agency funds to improve the economic viability of West
[6547]Berlin, and for an investment program in Mali. His
[6548]general position was that such expenditures were not
[6549]within the Agency's charter, and that he would allow
[6550]such spending only on the direct personal request of
[6551]the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense, or
[6552]tue White House.
[6554]9. I raise these issues of funding because I
[6555]remember the Agency's being severely criticized by the
[6556]House Appropriations Subcommittee for having spent $3,000
[6557]for stamps in connection with a program to buy tractors
[6558]to secure the release of prisoners from Cuba.
[6560]10. Under the heading of old business, I know that
[6561]any one who has worked in the Director's office has worried
[6562]about the fact that conversations within the offices and
[6563]over the telephones were transcribed. During McCone's
[6565]fBES EIN art gtacae Ray pease Sar
[6566]. mo, . = “ptopo4
[6567]Oe Or re
[6568]‘4
[6569]VE pave
[6570]Pres Mestad
[6572]| 004
[6574]ti Os
[6576]NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 126
[6578]SAE V eR Pd RON IS ae
[6579]“hug * . . .
[6581]Pgh og bot t as a re
[6582]sag ha be a EAT bby
[6583]ane: dE fe
[6585]ea HP Be cig
[6586]gispwitea uy Awad Ge a
[6588].
[6589]ro Cy 7
[6591]ay id
[6593]5 .
[6595]tenure, there were microphones in his regular office,
[6597]his inner office, his dining room, his office in East
[6598]Building, and his study at his residence on White Haven
[6599]Street. I do not know who would be willing to raise such
[6600]an issue, but knowledge of such operations tends to
[6601]spread, and certainly the Agency is vulnerable on this
[6602]score. .
[6604]11. Also under the heading of old business, I
[6605]well remember the hue and cry raised, especially by Carl
[6606]Kaysen in the White House, when the Agency injected a
[6607]contaminating agent in Cuban sugar bound for the Soviet
[6608]Union. Shortly after the Cuban missile crisis, there was
[6609]a disposition in Washington to reexamine the Bay of Pigs,
[6610]and the fact that several Alabama National Air Guard
[6611]officers lost their lives in the Bay of Pigs was surfaced
[6612]with surprisingly little excitement at the time.
[6614]12. During my stint on the 7th floor there was
[6615]a special arrangement with the Office of Communications
[6616]whereby the Director's office gnined access to non-CIA
[6617]traffic. This surfaced briefly at one point shortly after
[6618]Admiral Rayborn became DCI. He had visited the Signal
[6619]Center and removed a copy of a telegram from the Embassy
[6620]in the Dominican Republic for Under Secretary Georve Ball,
[6621]Fyes Only. He returned to his office and proceeded to
[6622]discuss this telegram with George Ball who was naturally
[6623]quite curious as to how Rayborn knew about it, and also as
[6624]to how Rayborn had it in his possession before Ball did.
[6625]Ben Read in the Secretary of Stace's office and I spent
[6626]several weeks putting this one to rest.
[6628]13. Finally, DCI McCone, as you and I well know,
[6629]operated on a very lofty plane, and I think certain of
[6630]his activities could be misunderstood! One example was.
[6631]his decision in July of 1964 to have Aristotle Onassis and
[6632]Maria Callas flown from Rome to. Athens on Air Force KC 135.
[6633]Their arrival in Athens in this airplane attracted the
[6634]attention of the local press and in due course Mr. John
[6636]Serge Ng pam es toes eee
[6637]. EN obo.
[6638]. 2 . . 2
[6640]So cowutcs d j tee ad were dd fl ee
[6642]W 88296 Docld:37989624 Page 127
[6645].c ‘ Win Site df Gow ddd Ves
[6647]. @ EYES “124 vu
[6648]. Hs
[6650]~ 6
[6652]Hightower, Chicf of the Associated Press Bureau for
[6653]Washington, came to see me to ask about the propriety
[6654]of this action.
[6656]14. ° The use of IDEN-132 aircrait
[6658]has been remarkably secure, but DCI MeCone himself
[6659]forgot about the cover arrangement and became quite
[6660]exercised when he saw Candidate Goldwater land in the
[6661]San Francisco airport for the Republican National Con-
[6662]vention in 1964 aboard the IDE N-133 with
[6663]the -highly visible tail number [pen-i34, This was, I
[6664]explained to him carefully, a perfectly legitimate
[6665]charter, but he didn't like it.
[6667]15. McCone dealt quite extensively with newsmen
[6668]in Washington. In fact, they gave him a gift anda
[6669]luncheon when he leit Washington, which is perhaps
[6670]indicative of the press's relations with him. However,
[6671]in the case of the Ross and Wise book, The Invisible
[6673]Government, he did try to bring pressure on 2 the publisher
[6674]and the authors to change things. They did not change
[6675]a comma, and I doubt that this old saw willever sing
[6677]again.
[6679]. 16. Finally, and this will reflect my Middle
[6680]Western Protestant upbringing, McCone's dealings with
[6681]the Vatican, including Pope John XXIII and Pope Paul
[6683]Vi, would and could raise eyebrows in certain quarters.
[6685]17. The above listing is uneven, but I have a
[6686]sinking feeling that discipline has broken down, and that
[6687]allegations from any quarter which cast these things in
[6689]‘the wrong light would receive great publicity and attention,
[6690]and no amount of denial would ever set the record straight.
[6691]If I may be of any assistance in tracking down further
[6693]‘details, I am-of course at your disposal, but I would point
[6695]CO4G2
[6697]NW 882596 Docld:32989624 Page 128
[6700]. Take UTIL ho cata py
[6701]. , w A LP emu Ghat 3 Gta
[6702]. e
[6705]- 7
[6707]out that I was very much in the position of the
[6708]enlisted man who knew that the commissioned officers
[6709]were aware of these activities and better able to
[6710]judge their propriety and possible impact or misinter-
[6711]_pretation.
[6715]WALTER ELDER
[6717]ror ; . . 2 1
[6718]poe te. dead saeco G pid
[6719]Qe oy tite U j Béiedwavd BE Uis
[6721]ora Vesey . tr yt .
[6722]bess Ce . 7
[6723]0 00452
[6726]NW 882796 Dochd:32989624 Page 129 . A
[6727]a .
[6730]@ secret sENSITIVE @
[6732]SUBJECT: PLMPLODESTAR
[6734]Project MPLODESTAR is a Headquarters initiated program
[6735]which has as its fundamental objective the long term manipu-
[6736]lations of selected agent assets operating against EA Division
[6737]difficult targets in the leftist and communist milieu in various
[6738]parts of the world. Although targetted overseas these agents are
[6739]often exposed to and directed against American radical, leftist,
[6740]and communist targets to gain a practical knowledge of the leftwins,
[6741]radical, communist world. There is a possibility that an asset
[6743]“might become suspect and be accused of being an employee of the
[6744]Agency or the Bureau; or it might happen some asset would, for
[6745]some reason, become disenchanted with his role and expose his
[6746]Agency relationship and his activities, with resultant embar-
[6747]rassment. To minimize potential problems, therefore, each
[6749]case is cleared with the FBI and throush CI/SO the Bureau is
[6751]kept.informed on a regular basis.
[6753]SECRET SENSITIVE ° E2 IMPDET
[6754]CL BY 0610906
[6756]wo
[6758]NW_88296_Docld:32989624 Page 130
[6761]i
[6764]—~— office of the Ambassador's secretary which was
[6768]muewdbid de
[6770]MEMORANDUM
[6772]_. SUBJECT: Technical Operation Against IDEN-76 Embassy
[6773]in 1971 and 1972 .
[6775].
[6776]e .
[6778]. ry *
[6779]a . . °
[6780].
[6782]1. ¢«A technical penetration of the IDEN-76 Embassy in
[6783]‘Yashington, D. C. was mounted by the FBI with the support of
[6785]| this Agency in April-May 1971. This operation, which used
[6786]Agency equipment and technical expertise but was managed
[6788]operationally by the FBI, was initiated only after then-
[6789]Director Richard Helms had gone over the head of former
[6791]FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to obtain the approval of then-
[6793]Attorney General John N. Mitchell. The operation was dis-
[6795]continued at the Agency's request on 2 February 1972 when it
[6796]appeared that Director Hoover intended to testify before
[6797]Congress concerning audio installations in the U.S. and
[6798]identify this operation as CIA instigated.
[6800]2... The operation consisted of the following three
[6801]technical devices:
[6803]azv~ An AC- powered, masked transmitter and
[6805]two’ switches in the. office occupied by the Deputy.
[6806]~Chief of Mission. —
[6810]~— -
[6812]-b. An AC-powered, masked transmitter in-the-—
[6814]“oo™
[6816]. \i
[6818]Rea web edt 4
[6820]NW 88296 Docld:32989624-Rage-t3t———__
[6823]Lane ede
[6825].
[6827]“ .
[6828]v --
[6830]- designed to pick up high quality audio of typing
[6832]in the office. It was hoped to break these audio
[6834]signals into clear text using advanced computer
[6836]techniques developed by Division D. No useful
[6838]product, however, Was ever obtained. | ; °
[6839]c. A battery-powered, masked transmitter
[6841]and switch concealed in the _ door of the
[6843]Embassy,- which would supply crytographic information
[6845]— .. ° for NSA. (Produced excellenx quality signals
[6847]‘antal it became inoperative in early 1972 because of
[6849]battery failure.)
[6851]3. In December 1972 the Agency requested reactivation of
[6852]the operation for a 60-day trial period in spite of the limited
[6853]value of intelligence produced previously (22 disseminations
[6854]of only moderate interest). Reactivation was requested because
[6855]of strong interest in the special IDEN-76 ¢overnment mission
[6856]arriving in Washington in late December to conduct high-level
[6858]talks. with U.S. State Department officials concerning debt
[6860]renegotiation and-other major_items outstanding between -the-—
[6862]ease
[6864]two-countries. The operation was reinitiated on 21 December
[6866]1972 but was discontinued again on 22 February_1973 by Acting
[6872]SECRE a
[6874]Cc
[6875]. he
[6876]NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 132 _ ye
[6879]a ae Coody -
[6880]_ oo -3- ;
[6881]& . @ @ -
[6883]Director L. Patrick Gray at this Agency's request. Our request
[6887]Was prompted by a decision that the intelligence production of
[6888]this operation did not justify ‘the risks involved in continuing
[6889]to run it in the sensitive political climate caused by the
[6890]mounting disclosures about CIA involvement inLEN-76 This
[6891]was especially so because of our ‘reservations about maintaining
[6893]proper security for the listening post which, as with other
[6895]operational aspects of the case, was under FBI management.
[6899]NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 133 ee
[6902]® e
[6905]e. Alias’ Social Security Cards. 171 backstonped
[6906]accounts havé been established for Contract personnel
[6907]whose relationship with the Agency cannot be revealed
[6908]but who are entitled to Social Security coverage.
[6909]Following expiration of the contractual relationship,
[6910]at an appropriate time the alias and true name accounts
[6911]are merged permitting the individual to receive con-
[6912]plete bencfits upon reaching the age of eligibility.
[6914]£. Alias IRS Tax Accounts. 54 Social Security
[6915]numbers have been reesistéred Tor the purpose of open-
[6916]ing 54 new bank accounts since 1 July 1972. 87 in-
[6917]dividual tax accounts have been established with IRS
[6918]on an unwitting basis in 14 cities in the United States.
[6922]g. Notional Facilities. 311 notional facilities
[6923](43 corporations; 6Y sole-proprietorships; 207 lawyers
[6924]and 61 telephone answering service addresses are main-
[6925]tained by CCS in 58 cities in the United States.
[6927]h. Alias Signatories on Bank Accounts. 24 aliases
[6928]for signatives on 25 proprietary entity and one notion-
[6929]al company bank accounts are in use by 9 officers and 1
[6930]proprietary-hire as follows:
[6932]CCS/llqs - 5 officers (12 aliases) on 8
[6933]proprictary entities and l
[6934]notional company.
[6936]CCS/NY PMC# - 3 officers (9 aliases) on 13
[6937]proprictary entities.
[6939]. CCS/NY PMC* - 1 proprictary-hire Qa alias)
[6940]. . on 3 proprietary entities.
[6942]CCS/MD PMC* -—- 1 officer (2 aliases) on 2
[6943]proprietary entities.
[6945]*Proprietary Management Company
[6950]Nd |
[6952]Ca
[6954]_ 00
[6957]_
[6959]sensitive nonofficial cover cases under the guise
[6961]of normal commercial annuities. Backstopping for -
[6962]this arrangement is provided through CCS-procured
[6964]bank accounts and Post Office boxes. 19 retirecs
[6966]are currently being handled. rt
[6968]k. Credit Union Arrangements for Selccted Non-
[6969]official Cover Tersonnel, sivicends (interest) carned
[6970]on Credit tuion accouitS by individuals under cover
[6971]are not reported to the Internal Revenue Service based
[6972]| on 50 U.S, Code 403g or Intcrnal Revenue Code Section
[6974]6041. .
[6975]‘Individuals under cover may borrow money from the
[6976]“Credit Union for the purchase of real estate; however,
[6977]| the mortgage is recorded in the name of a cleared
[6978]lawyer and not the actual lendor (Credit Union).
[6982]Paragraph 1, deleted because it contains sensitive
[6984]Agency operational methods and techniques.
[6986]| : Poot - 00542
[6988]NW 85296 Docid:32985624 Page 135
[6991]oO SECRET,
[6993]CORPORATE COVER
[6995]1. Central Cover Staff (CCS) is responsible for the
[6996]placement of Agency operational personnel under the cover
[6997]of bona fide U.S, companies abroad and in the U.S. This
[6998]process involves the selection of companies; research on
[6999]their locations and key personnel; clearances; contacts
[7000]with companies to solicit cooperation with the Agency;
[7001]arrangements for integration of Agency personnel into the
[7002]companies, including letters of understanding; funding of
[7003]salaries, allowances and expenses; and, continuous monitor-
[7004]ing of each integrated case throughout the course of the
[7005]cover use, The overall objective is to match the individual
[7006]being placed, the company, and the location, in a manner
[7007]that will censure achievement of the Agency purpose and pro-
[7008]tection of the company integrity.
[7010]2. Currently, there are 191 integrees for whom cover
[7011]is provided by 140 companies; 179 integrees are located in
[7012]4.7 foreign countrics and 12 are located in the United States,
[7013]To maintain this placement level, CCS personnel ¢ are re-
[7014]searching and monitoring approximately 250 to 300 companies
[7015]at any given time,
[7017]3. To minimize the adverse consequences to a cooperating
[7018]company, and to preserve the Agency’s operational cauity in
[7019]the event of exposure of an individual under cover, it has
[7020]been established policy that no more than two individuals
[7021]would be furnished cover by the same company. At the present
[7022]time this ratio is confined to upproximately 25% of the total
[7023]number of companies now being used and efforts are under
[7024]way to effect further reductions toward the goal of one
[7025]individual per company.
[7027]4. In addition to the primary corporate cover function
[7028]described in-paragraph 1. above, CCS maintains continuing
[7029]contact with two U.S, car rental firms and two U.S, .credit
[7030]ecard firms for the purpose of obtaining backstopped credit
[7031]cards in alias for operational use in the United States and
[7032]abroad by Agency personnel. 42 such cards are now being
[7033]used by 34 individuals. .
[7035]‘ SE Apr EB AN OET <. avs eZ G ar
[7036]NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 136 Aves a 1OGZs
[7038]NW 60296 Docld:32999624 Page 137
[7041]tan rel. : -
[7042]DEVISED FACILITIES COVER
[7044]1. Central Cover Staff (CCS) maintains 311 back-
[7045]stopped notional facilities which were created to pro-~
[7046]vide cover: for Agency personnel in the United States
[7047]and abroad and to provide an attributable source for
[7048]Agency funds used in operations and requiring conceal-
[7049]ment of Agency or U.S, Government interest. The facilities
[7050]comprise 43 corporations providing personal status cover,
[7051]payrolling and tax attribution sources, and other miscel-
[7052]lancous support such as title to property,: funding, etc.;
[7053]61 sole-proprietorships providing status and operational
[7054]cover, including payrolling and tax attribution; and 207
[7055]non-registered companies providing support for high risk
[7056]operational requirements, agents abroad, corporate reim-~
[7057]bursements, and proprietary funding,
[7059]2. 224 Agency personnel engaged in operational
[7060]activities are payrolled by the facilities, an essential
[7061]procedure permitting the reporting of Agency salarics with-
[7062]out documenting the Agency as the source.
[7064]3. The facilities provide a capability for passing
[7065]Agency funds to 30 Agency proprictaries and 97 bena fide
[7066]companies on a continuing basis. 225 bank accounts
[7067]located in 36 banks throughout the United States provide
[7068]the mechanisms for transmittal of these funds.
[7070]Chan TT
[7071]Vint il]
[7074]- 7 e
[7076]PROPRIETARY ENTITY COVER
[7078]- 1. Central Cover Staff (CCS) maintains three domestic
[7079]proprietary management companies which provide funding and
[7080]operational support for 49 Agency entities, including 13
[7081]controlled and directed by CCS. :
[7083]e
[7085]2. The three proprictary management companies are
[7086]staffed by 9 cmployees; they furnish assistance in the
[7087]commercial, business and investment aspects of on-going
[7088]operations, manage the legal and commercial affairs of
[7089]entities supporting operations, dnd provide cover and
[7090]funding channels for operational activities as required.
[7091]Most importantly, professional services are furnished in
[7092]a manner responsive to required security standards and
[7093]at a cost considerably less than would be charged by
[7094]bona fide management firms.
[7096]3. The 13 proprietary entities directed by CCS pro-~-
[7097]vide cover for ten individuals in the United States and
[7098]three overseas, Operationally, the companies provide
[7099]commercial funding channels on a world-wide basis and
[7100]serve as corporate owners of equipment, inventory and
[7101]aircraft and as collection mechanisms for outstanding
[7102]notes and loans in order to conceal U.S. Government
[7103]affiliation or interest.
[7105]pews
[7106]OCS 23
[7108]ay 74
[7110]tree nai rastco ey snl.
[7111]LURLG,
[7113]NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 138
[7117]a)
[7120]3
[7121]a)
[7122]til
[7123]~]
[7125]e r"
[7127]- 7 May 1973
[7129]“-MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations
[7131]SUBJECT: Items for Possible Use in Briefing
[7132]the DCI
[7134]1. This Memorandun is submitted in order to
[7135]identify to you for possible briefing of the
[7136]Director activities which in certain contexts could
[7137]be construed as delicate or inappropriate.
[7139]2. At the request of the Director of Security,
[7140]from approximately mid-October 1972 to mid-January
[7141]1973 safesite number 585 was made available to the
[7142]‘ U.S, Marshal's Service for use as a secure residence
[7143]by an Assistant U.S. Attorney who reportedly was
[7144]under threat of assassination by organized criminal
[7145]elements. ,
[7147]3. SB Division over the past three months has
[7148]interviewed four sraduate students as prospective
[7149]candidates for assignments under American business
[7150]cover in the USSR. They were encouraged to locate
[7151]cover jobs on their own.
[7153]4. For approximately two years the SB Division
[7154]has ‘had the cooperation of the Commander of the
[7155]Morals Division of the District of Columbia Police
[7156]Department in training officers scheduled for
[7157]assignment to the USSR and Eastern Europe in how to
[7158]conduct themselves if placed under arrest. The
[7159]arrangement was made through the Office of Security.
[7161]S. Since late 1972 CIA has taken part in seven
[7162]FBI training courses at Quantico, Virginia in
[7163]response to requests from the FBI. We have shared
[7164]with them through lectures and discussions lessons
[7165]we have learned which are relevant to their counter-
[7166]espionage responsibilities.
[7168]E2 IMPDET
[7169]CL BY 059952
[7171]a
[7172]3
[7175]NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 139 we els
[7178]6. As a means of sharing more fully our operational
[7179]“experience we have invited three TBI officers to be
[7180]‘students in our Soviet Operatims Course from 14 to 25
[7182]May 1973,
[7184]7.:° <A Soviet defector - was
[7185]confined at a CIA facility from April 1964 to
[7186]September 1967 while efforts were being made to
[7187]establish whether he was a bona fide defector.
[7188]Although his present attitude toward the Agency is
[7189]quite satisfactory, the possibility exists that the
[7190]press could cause undesirable publicity | ‘if it were
[7191]to uncover the story.
[7195]. es eee Ol
[7197]David H. Blee
[7198]Chicf
[7199]- Soviet Bloc Division
[7201]im rare) it ys
[7205]PO tote
[7207]NW 88296 Docid:22989624 Page 140
[7212]MEMOR..wDUM FOR: Mr. Colby 7,
[7214]Attached is the material we requested of Dick
[7215]Ober: ,
[7217]A. Ten Reports, Subj: Foreign Support for
[7218]Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the ,
[7219]Republican National Convention
[7221]B. Five Reports, Subj: Foreign Support for
[7222]Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the
[7223]Democratic National Convention
[7225]-C. Two Memoranda re Agency support to
[7226]Secret Service for Democratic and Republican
[7227]Conventions
[7229]Ober advises that the only Arnerjcan we reported
[7230]on to the IEC is Rennie Davis ag (14 ye (ld May 73 73)
[7232]GO Vos DATE ho Beg
[7234]ieipeeenaeee"enenenaienenimeamemmrrerarerenmmeeeree TO
[7235]FOR NO, re REPLACES FORM 10-101
[7236]1 AUG $é@ WHICH MAY DE USED.
[7238]mee a
[7240]—NW"88296-ocld:32989624-Raget4t———
[7242]: | TAC he sty Ww D i “CONFIDES NTIAL SECRET .
[7243]OZFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
[7245]1. Tape
[7246]~fe fie (ATURE
[7248]Remarks:
[7250]Mr. Broe:
[7252]{ .
[7254]Dick Ober has been edvised that this package
[7255]is being sent to you. Since knowledse of the
[7257]existence of this Committee has been strictly
[7258]ae . Mirsited, Tie artead thet it he daliverad to ven
[7259]| nopened. Although if has an ER number on it,
[7260]it has not been sent through that office -- I gave
[7261]thern only the day, subject, and originator.
[7263]Se
[7265](oz) AA Ae
[7267]Conay
[7269]FOLO HERE TO FErTURN TO SENDER
[7271]FROM: KAIME. ADDRESS ANG PHONE NO.
[7273]O/E 5§/MC/Larbara Pindar
[7274]UNCLasniein [CONFIDENTIAL
[7276]FORM fo. 237 | Use prewGys eciticns
[7278]_NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 142
[7281]ROUMIG AND RECCAD Stilet i
[7283]SUBJECT: (Cptionolj
[7285]EXTENSION | NO.
[7289]Richard Ober 14 May 1973
[7291]JO: (Officer desgaanon, room number, ard
[7292]ovild-ag) OFFICER'S
[7293]INGTEALS
[7295]COMMENTS (Number ecch comment to show frat wore
[7296]to whom. Drow o tine across column cfter each commen’.
[7298]IDEN-73 |
[7299]G/NCI If-  w tapeg * fe. 2 “Attached are:
[7301], oF D..
[7302]. i a: t 1 . soit
[7303]ay Lf ty i :
[7305]i
[7306]bo Of, i a |. : :
[7307]a A Ce bl AY | shed
[7309]° i
[7310]: | | | : | 2. Copies of memoranda con- ry
[7311]4. “ — corning Agency supmert ce.
[7312]“oe | | | | Secret Service (7 Avril ard :
[7313]Co a [ | 23 June 1972). . i
[7315]OT | ° | | |
[7316]! i 1 EYES ONLY .
[7321]7. | | | ; :
[7324]rs _— Coss co OT j Deyeey ore egret
[7325]. . ! : en conten ne aren ee rennnsn marae amen en a
[7327]12.
[7329]13.
[7331][-} SECRET
[7332]NW 86296 Docld:32989624 Page 143 ;
[7335]. . Hho Gi — . 14 Bay 1973
[7336]| ® _ :
[7338]SUBJECT: Intelligence Evaluation Committee and Staff
[7340]1. Background: Formed December 1970 to’ produce
[7341]fully-evaluated national domestic intelligence studies,
[7342]including studies on demonstrations, subversion, extremisn
[7343]and terrorism. Membershin: Department of Justice (Chair-
[7344]man); Federal Bureau of Investigation; Department of
[7345]Defense; Secret Service; National Security Agency; Central
[7346]Intelligence Agency; and as necessary representatives of
[7347]other Departments or Agencies (following have partici-
[7348]pated: Treasury and State). Staff: IES Executive
[7349]Director John Dougherty and later Bernard Wells supplied
[7350]by Department of Justice with title of Special Assistant
[7351]to the Attorney General reporting to the Assistant Attorney
[7352]General for Internal Security Robert Mardian and later
[7354]William Olson. IPS has received requirements directly
[7355]fron and delivered renoris Cirictiy to ighn “ens oF the
[7356]White Hiouse. The White House has insisted that the
[7358]existence of this Committee be kept secret. Awareness _
[7359]of its existence within this Agency has been | limite ed to to
[7360]DCT, HnOT Car), C/CE and Tour orficers ot this ofsice.
[7362]2. CIA Participation: Contributions on foreisn
[7363]aspects (by memorandun with no Agency letterhead or at-
[7364]tribution). Contributions occasionally include foreign
[7365]intelligence provided by FBI and NSA. The Chief of the
[7366]Special Operations Group serves as the Agency representa-
[7367]®ve on the Intelligence Fvaluation Committee Staff and
[7368]as the alternate to the Agency representative on the.
[7369]Comnittee (who is the Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff),
[7371]: 3. Special Report: The Unauthorized Disclesure
[7373]of Classified Information, November 1971.” This study
[7374]‘was initiated in July If Lod by the White House as a con-
[7375]| sequence of the President's concern about the release
[7376]of the Pentagon Papers by Danicl Elisberg. Both Robert
[7377]Mardian and G. Gordon Liddy initially involved in tasking
[7378]the IES to produce this evaluation. Drafting done by IES
[7379]‘Staff members from Justice and FBI. Only Agency partici-
[7380]pation was editorial review.
[7384]i
[7385]i
[7387]eee yb
[7389]Pye ONY are
[7391]SERSTIIVE
[7393]; a
[7395]NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 144 SEORET oo ~
[7397]9
[7400]Z2etMepEr cu ny {2 4F
[7403]4, Republican National Convention (21-24 Ausust
[7404]1972): At’ the request of the White House, a series of
[7405]estimates was prepared by the IES on "Potential Dis-
[7406]ruptions at the 1972 Republican National Convention, fos
[7407]Miami Beach, Florida." The Agency provided from
[7408]February through August 1972 periodic contributions for
[7409]these estimates concernins foreign support for activi-
[7410]ties planned to disrupt or harass the Republican
[7411]National Convention {copies attached).
[7413]5. Democratic National Convention (10-13 July
[7414]1972): At the request of the White House, a series of
[7415]estimates was prepared by the IES on "Potential Disrun-
[7416]tions at’ the 1972 Democratic National Convention, Miami ° ;
[7417]Beach, Florida.'' The Agency provided between March and
[7418]July 1972 contributions on foreign support for activi- .
[7419]ties planned to disrupt or harass the Democratic
[7420]National Convention (copies attached).
[7424]a Pay oo.) 6 CO550
[7425]belied teak .
[7426]aN
[7428]we Re ereee vou
[7432]NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 145 C ayant '
[7435]NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 146
[7437]Q FGRIGH CISLELG BESS RONOND
[7439]PYVAaTS
[7441]oe . . SOSTRSELED i . i
[7442]- oo GGHINELLEa Losech) ;
[7444]TQ @ caereswe
[7446]. .
[7448]SUBJECT : Foreign Support For Activities Planned to Disrupt oo
[7449]co or Harass the Republican National Convention :
[7451]1. There are only limited indications thus far of
[7452]foreign efforts to inspire, support or take advantage of
[7453]activities designed to disrupt or harass the National °
[7454]Convention of the Republican Party in San Diego, 21-23
[7455]August 1972. ne
[7457]2. Some American participants at the Soviet-controlled
[7458]‘World Assembly for Peace and Independence of the Peoples of
[7459]Indochina, held 11-13 February 1972 in Paris/Versailles,
[7460]attempted unsuccessfully to include a call for international
[7461]demonstrations to take place at the time of the Republican
[7462]National Convention. <A representative of the San Diego
[7464]* Convention Coalition (SDCC), one of the domestic action
[7466]groups targetting on the Republican Convention, requested
[7468]_the American Delegations' Steering Committee at the World
[7470]Assembly to include a specific call for international
[7471]support of activities against the Republican convention
[7473]in their proposal to the Action Commission of the, World
[7474]Assembly. This request, however, was dropped as too
[7475]divisive by the Steering Committee, despite initial indica-
[7476]tions that the proposal would be taken to the floor of
[7478]the Assembly.
[7480]3. John LENNON, a British subject, has provided
[7481]financial support to Project "YES", which in turn paid
[7483]-.the travel expenses to the World Assembly of a representa-
[7485]tive of leading antiwar activist Rennie DAVIS. (DAVIS! repre-
[7486]sentative is tentatively planning to assist in preparations
[7487]for disruptive actions at the San Diego Convention.)
[7489]Project "YES" is an adjunct to another LENNO*-supported pro-
[7490]ject, the Election Year Strategy Information Center (EYSIC),
[7491]of which Rennie DAVIS is a key leader, which was set up to
[7492]direct New Left protest activities at the Republican
[7493]National Convention. In Paris Rennie DAVIS' representative
[7494]to the World Assembly met at least once with officials of
[7495]the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam;
[7496]it is not known if the Republican National Convention was
[7497]discussed. :
[7500]my 2 manres
[7501]: é 2 Hoga . . Ce
[7502]| | _e..
[7503]4. The SDCC is planning for foreign support for its
[7504]harassment of the Republican convention. A working draft
[7505]plan of the SDCC includes proposals for (a) the use of a
[7506]Special television network to broadcast video-taped messages
[7507]from other countries, including coverage of sympathetic
[7508]demonstrations elsewhere; and (b) broadcasts over public -
[7509]address systems of live telephone calls from the- Vietnamese
[7511]in Paris and from the Communist Chinese and others at the
[7512]United Nations. .
[7514].
[7517]ALLY ees) wala . aw
[7518]id:32989624 Page 147 Nani nicaree ua coarree genaen
[7521]Be wat Oocid, tJ LOST honda
[7523]TRAITS pieerry
[7524]CONTRGLLED DISSE
[7526]- “@ ot eo. 04 NAR 1372
[7528]Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
[7529]oon or Harass the Republican National Convention
[7531]SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION:
[7533]__Indications.remain limited, thus far, of foreign efforts
[7534]to inspire, support or take advantage of activities designed
[7535]to disrupt or harass the National Convention of the Republican
[7536]..Party in San Diego, 21-23 August 1972. The concept of coordinated
[7537]international support for domestic activities in the United
[7538]States was generally endorsed at the recent World Assembly for
[7539]Peace and Independence of the Peoples of Indochina; however, the
[7540]Conference issued no specific call for international support of
[7541]disruptive actions at the American national political conventions.
[7543]BACKGROUND: .
[7544]At the Soviet-controlled World Assembly for Peace and
[7545]Independence of the Peoples of Indochina, held in Versailles
[7546]from 10-135 February 1972, there was mention of American plans
[7547]for demonstrations at both the Republican and Democratic
[7548]National Conventions. The final draft resolution from the
[7549]Conference's "Action Commission" contains an appendix submitted
[7550]by American delegates whose goal was to secure global coordination
[7551]. £or domestic actions in the United States. It calls for inter-
[7552]~ national support to six weeks of domestic antiwar actions and
[7553]_ demonstrations, from 1 April to 15 May 1972, and concludes with
[7554]| the statement: “This campaign will: lead up to the Democratic
[7555]_.._Party.Convention at Miami on July 9, 1972, and the Republican
[7556]Party Convention in San Dicgo on August 21, 1972."
[7558]‘The final "Resolution of the Paris World Assembly for the
[7559]~——Pedce7~and Independence of the Indochinese People" of 13 February
[7560]1972,:drafted by the "Political Commission" states:
[7562]"In the United States particularly, the protest against
[7563]‘the war is voiced more and more strongly, under various
[7564]‘forms, such as draft evasions, desertions, resistance, demon-
[7565]Strations which now affect even the soldiers. The Assembly
[7566]. calls for support to these progressive and antiwar forces in
[7567]— _the United States, and asks the governments to grant asylun
[7568]to deserters and to support their right to repatriation.
[7569]All together, the peoples of the world will efficiently help
[7570]to impose on the U.S. Government the restoration of peace,
[7571]and independencé and freedom in Vietnan, Laos, and Cambodia.”
[7573]MIN Nl Reaapes } -
[7574]OOeEe areas a Wea Peas ht) . ! 0 oot
[7575]NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 143 n 5
[7578]. . oo . URLIGN bicdtid. nd bidde.d mpadvau
[7579]. os oot eth) ™\ ae
[7580]. ; ait
[7581]. . : . ‘ . vi
[7582]° i . Poe . Gs LLL iF iSOLhl
[7584]DEVELOPMENTS: - os
[7586]The San Diego Convention Coalition (SDCC), one of the
[7587]‘domestic action groups targetting on the Republican Con-
[7588]‘yention, is planning, in addition to demonstrations, for a
[7589]“large exposition in "the campsights (sic) called Expose 72,
[7590]which with movies, exhibits, displays will portray the struggles
[7591]of people all over the world.'' Plans for activities at
[7592]Expose 72 are believed to include (a) the use of a special
[7593]television network to broadcast video-taped messages from
[7594]other countries, including coverage of sympathetic denon-
[7595]strations elsewhere; and (b) broadcasts over public address
[7596]systems of live telephone calls.from the Vietnamese in Paris
[7597]and from the Communist Chinese dnd others at the United Nations.
[7598]In addition, the SDCC has suggested that, in order to “outflank .
[7599]NIXON domestically and internationally," international opposition
[7600]can be expressed "by obtaining the authority of other countriés
[7601]‘and liberation movements to carry their flags in SDCC demon-
[7602]strations." .
[7604]- 00555
[7606]PEM 7 hee « on TATA ITS § . 4,
[7607]NW 88296 Dochd:32989624 Page 149 a ; * Of fo aes ph
[7609]rez te at apes
[7612]a) A. APR.1972
[7616]"Foreign iQ: for Activities Piann® to Disrupt
[7617]' or Harass the Republican National Convention a
[7619]SUMMARY : oo oe _— Do, -
[7621]There is little new evidence of foreign plans” or efforts
[7622]to inspire, support, or take advantage of actions designed to
[7623]disrupt or harass the Republican National Convention in San
[7624]Diego, 21 to 23. August 1972. The Students for a Democratic
[7625]Society, in joining the ranks of domestic groups planning
[7626]‘actions at the Republican Convention, has adopted a proposal
[7627]to cooperate with Mexican workers and students in a demonstra-
[7628]tion in Tijuana, Mexico, during the Convention. The San Diego
[7629]Convention Coalition (SDCC}, another domestic group targetting
[7630]on the Convention, has received a letter of solidarity froin
[7631]the North Vietnamese. The letter is of interest as an indica-
[7632]tion of North Vietnamese contact’ with the SDCC; such contact
[7633]Will be required for the SDCC to implement its earlier-renorted
[7634]pians for broadcasts over public address systems during the’
[7635]ponvention of live telephone calls from the Vietnamese in
[7637]aris. .
[7639]DEVELOPMENTS:
[7641]. At its recent convention in Cambridge, Massachusetts,
[7642]held 30 March to 2 April 1972, the Students for a Democratic
[7643]Society (SDS} adopted a proposal to hold demonstrations at
[7644]the San Dicgo-Tijuana border during the Republican National
[7645]Convention. The proposal included a call for SDS to cooperate
[7647]. with Mexican workers and students in an action to occur during
[7648]a fiesta in Tijuana, where Convention delegates will be
[7649]entertained.
[7651]-
[7653]The North Vietnamese have given their endorsement to
[7654]the San Diego Convention Coalition (SDCC} in the form of a
[7656]Jetter from the Vietnam Committee for Solidarity with the
[7658]‘American People (VCSWAP), a quasi-official organ of the
[7659]North Vietnamese Government. The letter, which has becn
[7660]; Circulated by the SDCC and is dated 27 January 1972,
[7662]~ “expresses "great delight" with the formation of the SDCC,
[7663]: and conveys the Committee's “best wishes of militant soli-
[7664]darity and friendship. " The VCSWAP requests that the SDCC
[7666].. Write often and "send us materials you have."
[7669]Oren ey
[7671]4 “a
[7672]rae keel Gee
[7673]' renee preactrea nine fn
[7674]hd Toncie. bagae. teh mea eal Penang i
[7676]NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 150
[7681]RAMEE De) Pe yay
[7682]a = . oO bisa qiigLL eo: Docu
[7684]et . eg gertny 1872
[7686]. q q .
[7687]. . - a .
[7689]Me - - : “os e an . - . on * . -.
[7691]Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
[7692]--———or-Harass the. Republican National Convention °
[7694]a
[7696]SUMMARY: : _ an
[7697]oS Indications remain limited of foreign plans or attempts
[7698]‘.to inspire, support, influence, or exploit actions designed
[7699]to disrupt or harass the Republican National Convention i
[7700]Ww... ,wetiiami, Florida, 21-23 August 1972. A member of the Swedis
[7701]Committee for Vietnam, who is also a member of the Secre-
[7702]tariat of the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam, hes stated
[7703]that the U.S. National Elections are playing a role in
[7704]ee _the.Swedish Committee's wore The British-based Interna-
[7705]_ tional Confederation for Disarmament and Peace (ICDP) has
[7706]Gistributed a "Spring Orfensive Calendar" of activities
[7707]in the United States against the war based on a submission
[7708]by the Peoples! Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPIJ).
[7709]The calendar includes actions planned in connection with
[7710]+ the Republican Convention.
[7712]ats 4
[7714]Sn
[7716]te
[7717]> i
[7719]a
[7725].%- mid-April 1972, a member of the Swedish Commi
[7726]for Vi tnam, who is also an influential and well-infc
[7727]staff sember of the Secretariat of th coeckholm Conr
[7728]on Vietnam, stated in a private discussion cf the e
[7729].Committee's unusually heavy work load that “things wi
[7730]hectic right unti 1 the elections in the U.S."
[7732]a
[7734]The International Confederation for Disarmament and
[7735]Peace 5 a British-based antiwar organization and one of the
[7736]more prominent member organizations of the Stockholm Con-
[7737]ference, has attached a "Spring Offensive Calendar" to th
[7738]-April-Mey 1972 issue of its regular internationel publics
[7739]tion Vietnam International. The calendar had been furnished
[7740]; :by the People's Ucaliticon for Peace and Justice (PCPJ) and
[7741]..._..n¢luded the following entry: ; °
[7743]August 21-23 Repubdlican Convention, San Diego.
[7744]Le Demonstrations organized by the San
[7745]Diego Convention Coalitisn, Box 8267,
[7746]San Diego, Ca. 92103.
[7749]He
[7751]. The ICDP comaentary on the PCPJ calendar urges demonstration
[7752]| “in support of some of the dates'listed but does not specifiea2 ls
[7754]Nn +
[7755], call for actions in connection with the Republican Convention.
[7756]° A .
[7758]| =
[7761]| . 7 .
[7762]1 - i
[7763]! .
[7764]| ° .
[7765]| .
[7767]' . ‘ tris
[7768]PMEINT ' m rot neh : 00558
[7769]eeepc,
[7770]NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 152 ,., ,Soixitnesche eee sn so
[7773]. . ot _ _ 14 JUN 1972.
[7774]oe Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
[7775]-. or Harass the Republican National Convention
[7777]SUMMARY: es -
[7779]The only new indication of foreign plans or efforts
[7781]to inspire,. support, influence, or exploit actions. designed
[7782]to disrupt or harass the Republican National Convention in
[7783]Miami, Florida, 21-23 Ausust 1972, is an’ expression of
[7784]interest by a member of the North Vietnamese Delegation to
[7785]the Paris Peace Talks in the plans of the major antiwar
[7786]organizations in the United States for demonstrations in
[7787]connection with the political conventions of both major
[7788]parties.
[7790]DEVELOPMENTS:
[7792]In mid-May 1972, a member of the North Vietnamese
[7793]Delegation to the Paris Peace Talks invited a visitor to
[7794]contact him again when the visitor returned from an imminent
[7795]trip to the United States. The North Vietnamese official
[7796]gave the visitor the New York City addresses of the People's
[7797]Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ) and the National
[7798]Peace Action Coalition (NPAC), and asked the visitor to
[7799]inquire at their offices regarding their plans for demonstra-
[7800]tions during the coming summer. The North Vietnamese
[7801]official stated that he was especially interested in plans
[7802]for actions in connection with the Democratic and Republican
[7804]. Nagional Conventions.
[7808]= Ko FOE Ail pan bi
[7810]o
[7811]J
[7813]: Ur ELLER Lids i
[7814]NW 86296 Dochd:32989624 Page 153 | -*
[7817]es ns ae ENR Ee
[7818]i Bs
[7820]lege ert meester me er niece
[7822]‘Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
[7824]or Harass the Republican National Convention .
[7825]There are no additional indications of any substantial
[7826]foreign plans or efforts to inspire, support, or take advan-
[7827]tage of activities designed to disrupt or harass the National
[7828].Convention of the Republican Party in Miami, Florida, 21-24
[7829]August 1972. -
[7830]t ¢@ : Me .
[7831]~ Vy
[7832]| 00560
[7833]po
[7835]Ho Foreign Diseem/to Dissem Abraa |
[7836]—_ Contralte ed Dissem oe
[7838]44
[7840]NW 68296 Docld:32989624 Page 154 pot .
[7843]SF pear —
[7844], _ : aU Dlvdths ae
[7845]_ . .. 26 JUL 1972
[7847]Foreign Support for Activities Planned | to Disrupt
[7848]or Harass the Republican National Convention . i
[7849]SUMMARY:
[7851]Nev indications of foreign plans or efforts to inspire,
[7852]support, influence, or exploit activities designed to dis-
[7853]rupt or harass the Republican National Convention in Miami,
[7854]Florida, 21-24 August 1972, consist of the following: A
[7855]Jeader of the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice
[7856](PCFJ) has stated that demonstrations will be organized to
[7857]take place at United States and allied military installa-
[7858]tions abroad during the period immediately before and during
[7859]the Republican Convention. The PCPJ leader also stated that
[7860]representatives of the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam will
[7862]“participate in activities in connection with the Convention.
[7863]*fThe Anti-War Union (AWU), a domestic organization which has
[7864]been active in planning demonstrations in connection with the
[7865]Republican National Convention, has sent a delegation to
[7866]Paris, France, to meet with officials of the Democratic Re spub -
[7867]lic of Vietnam (DRV) and the Provisional Revolutionary Govern-
[7868]ment of South Vietnam (PRG). No information is presently
[7869]available, however, indicating that actions at the Republican
[7870]Convention have been discussed at these meetings.
[7872]. . DEVELOPMENTS:
[7873]In an early July 1972 meeting with prominent members of
[7875].. foreign antiwar.organizations, a representative of the People's
[7876]Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ), who occupies an impor-
[7877]tant position within that organization, discussed the plans
[7878]of the PCPJ in connection with the upcoming election campaign
[7879]in the United States. The PCPJ representative stated that
[7880]during the- period 14-23 August, a "Peoples Campaign Against
[7881]Bombing" would be waged in U.S. cities involved in the manu-
[7882]facture and shipping of materials for use in Vietnam, and
[7883]that similar actions will be organized at United States and
[7884]allied military installations abroad. The PCPJ representa-
[7885]tiye further stated that "dramatic demonstrations" in protest
[7887]. i .
[7889]are OM GECALLY elon. ie Ge
[7890]—— - Pye RVES: YAO
[7891]ise CE CO nee) PSSt4 Impossible to deters’
[7892]BEECE UKE tm pparray pyar ; le nen dio net Do
[7893]; 5 a 194 [RATev ey eens re smag Gualess inpor Sle inccet dite cr ae
[7894]| NW 8298 "Docidisy4e9624 Page 155 bl FRTret DNS PST BaD : “=
[7896]- = - *
[7899]; PERRSED sat
[7900]gdeiyrat byes 5
[7901]wot Ui huliy Ueglhi
[7903]©£ the bombing in@yctnen are being organi by the "Repub-
[7904]dican Party National Convention Coalition" to occur on
[7906]21 August 1972. In an apparent reference to the 21 August
[7907]actions, the PCPJ leader added that representatives of the
[7908]Stockholm Conference on Vietnan will speak on the subject of ~
[7909]the alleged American bombing of dikes in North Vietnam. ;
[7910](Comment: We have no.present information concerning plans of
[7911]Stockhoim Conference representatives to travel-to the United
[7912]States during the Republican National Convention; nor do we
[7913]have any additional information concerning plans of Stockholn
[7914]Conference representatives’ to participate in activities con-
[7915]nected with the Republican Convention. )
[7917]The Anti-War Union (ANU), a domestic group engaged in
[7918]organizing counter-activities at the Republican National Con-
[7919]vention, has sponsored the travel of a delegation of activists
[7920]to Paris, France, to meet with officials of the Democratic
[7921]Republic of North Vietnam (DRV) and the Provisional Revolu-
[7922]sationary Government of South Vietnam (PRG). An advance party
[7924]+ has already met with DRV and PRG representatives to discuss
[7925]the agenda for meetings with the full AWU delegation. Althouch
[7926]no information is presently available indicating that actions
[7927]at the Republican Convention have been discussed or are sched-
[7928]uled to be discussed at meetings between the AWU delegation
[7929]and the DRV/PRG officials, it is known that members of the ANU
[7930]advance party have asked for advice from the PRG officials
[7931]regarding the stance the ANU should take on certain questions
[7932]relating to the presidential elections. It is also known
[7933]that the DRV officials have questioned the AWU advance party
[7934]about the political mood in the United States. One of the
[7935]AWU delegation. members has stated that upon their return to
[7936]ths United States about 26 ‘July 1972, some of the members
[7938]‘will speak at rallies, over the radio, and on television,
[7939]to “educate the American people about the consequences of
[7940]‘voting for Nixon, and the need to end the war and defeat
[7941]Nixon." The delegation member added that the demonstrations
[7942].at-the Republican Convention will be "unique."
[7944]e
[7946]tet
[7947]GALROLLEE GO Siii
[7949]wy poortod por Msg cyan : ARTA : 8) frites
[7950]abit Nba neeete! oitu AERA an Haw
[7952]iat ar MOONEE |
[7953]I .
[7956]' s - Pe eh late wea
[7959]- ae 2 AUG 1372
[7960]ee |
[7962]Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
[7963]ox Harass the Republican National Convention
[7966]4
[7968]SUMMARY: : .
[7969]There are no new indications of specific foreign plans or efforts to
[7971]inspire, support, influence, or exploit activities designed to disrupt or
[7972]harass the Republican National Convention in Miami, Florida, 21-24 August
[7973]1972. Although meetings have been held recently in Paris, France, between
[7974]American antiwar activists and representatives of the Democratic Republic
[7975]of North Vietriam (DRV) and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of
[7976]South Vietnam (PRG), currently available information indicates that the
[7978]. DRV/PRG officials made no efforts to encourage or give guidance to the
[7979]American participants with respect to the upcoming Republican National
[7980]Convention. Private discussions, separate from the meetings with the entire
[7981]American délepation, were conducted by both the DRV and the PRG ofiicials;
[7983].at present, we have no information regarding the substance of these private
[7984]exchanges. A second group of activists, considered more important than
[7985]the first delegation, is scheduled to travel to Paris on or about 1 August 1972
[7986]for further consultations with the PRG and DRV representatives.
[7988]DEVELOPMENTS:
[7990]“Our
[7992]In recent meetings in Paris, France, with members of an American
[7993]del¥gation sponsored by the Anti-War Union (AWU), representatives of
[7994]the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and the Provisional Revolutionary
[7995]Government of South Vietnam (PRG) were very guarded with respect to dis~
[7996]cussing activities at the Republican National Convention. Although the Vietnam-
[7997]ese repeatedly questioned the Americans concerning the mood of the antiwar
[7998]movement in the United States, they made no direct reference to the Repub-
[7999]In. lican Convention, except for one instance when PRG Deputy Chief Nguyen
[8000]Nan TIEN accused President Nixon of using the private end public sessions
[8001]; of the Paris peace talks as "propaganda for the Republican Convention."
[8002]. | HEN then urged the Americans to promote and propagandize the Seven
[8003]Point Plan offered by the PRG. The Americans, too, for the most part,
[8004]refrained from discussing the Convention, other than to estimate that demon~
[8005]strators will number about 10,000 at the Convention.
[8007]- ereressre:
[8009]. . ‘ . J} CLASS. TIF BY —_
[8010]. . ET WT FROM Grease DE
[8012]SCHEELE G2 £003
[8014]Ae Tw gms POS 2 : § S3K1), OQ. (Sd er 4 5 (a re vie ens op ters.
[8015]Wwervertrartiitnli Le ed 2 Ae a rhe a
[8016]WAREHEG HOHCL baie ies Udy. AUYOMACALLY CELLS LD Oil
[8018]ENSHTVE BETELT Td at “RUE tS mi) Fares Beach TU ECS 05209 impossible t to determine |
[8019]' 2H , cas weit ee ateenhe per beers OOS :
[8023]Following their meeting on 22 July 1972 with the AWU delegation,
[8024]the PRG officials held additional talks with sub-groups of the delegation.
[8025]Additionally, at least one of the American participants was invited by
[8026]the DRV officials to return for further discussions. At present, there
[8027]is no information available concerning the substance of these private
[8028]exchanges :
[8030]A second, more important delegation of Americans connected with
[8031]the Anti-War Union is scheduled to travel to Paris circa 1 August 1972
[8032]for further consultation with DRV and PRG representatives. This second
[8033]group is scheduled to be led by Rennic DAVIS, founder and leader of the
[8035].AWU. This will be DAVIS! second trip to Paris within recent months for
[8036]discussions with DRV and PRG representatives, Upon his return from
[8037]his first trip, DAVIS publicly stated that the AWU would demonstrate at
[8038]both the Democratic and the Republican Convention, but that the AWU's
[8039]chief target would be the Republican Convention.
[8041]‘ RESP nae renncns
[8043]. ' l t a . ste
[8044]NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 158, en its ‘
[8047]Brae maennwee oon a eo aate
[8050]f ~ (Heo. te jpea eas
[8051]. GUiie ls Bivwsti
[8052]- 6 LO r veg AUG 1972
[8053]“ Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
[8054]mo _ or Harass the Republican National Convention -
[8056]There are no new indications, as of this date, of foreign plans
[8057]or efforts to inspire, support, or take advantage of activities designed
[8058]to disrupt or harass the National Convention of the Republican Party
[8059]in Miami, Florida, 21-24 August 1972.
[8061]; | _ OOSCSS
[8063]_ | CLASSIFIED BY
[8064]. EX
[8066]rn rer ne a ee
[8068]Trae Sines
[8070]SCHIHCLE OF E Go ira2. feat
[8072]Lal
[8075]a moh n S00. CG. ee Lone. rr ette
[8077]wmsat os ° pS TOT ESTA means § tthe Fe ;
[8078]VIQRAINS ndnee ; [tee Dos a. AUT OSIATCALLY ae wwidvacd W's
[8080]seitpes Piet at anuene Sneed a so aet :
[8081]SENSITIVE ere Lig aaiee SOURCES no fanane ritvese ny stsmiep Bataan impossible to determin?
[8082]NW-08296c Dorid: 32980624 Page 749 weveeedi ied bidet Pireted th .. tone
[8085]{Sensitive HECCUUIGERCE SUURCES
[8087]. ces ee nnacn .
[8088]' _ ‘e % © CONROE UcoLhi
[8090]ae o - : oo 7 a 6. : 16 AUS 1372
[8092]' Foreign Support’ for Activities Plarined to Disrupt
[8093]or Harass the Republican National Convention
[8095]‘There are no new indications, as of this date, of
[8096]foreign plans or efforts. to inspire, support, or take
[8097]_ advantage of activities designed to disrupt or harass
[8098]the National Convention of’ ‘thee Republican Party in —
[8099]Miami, Florida, 21-24 August 1972.
[8101]CLAS DIED oY ~~
[8102]Ex Mioy
[8103]SC tL" te a
[8105]TOtrihit aE ai . on enniten PREM
[8106]" AGS Wea 1} fyi
[8108]NWA B98 IDsuldIs2e898IM Paye t6No FORLLGI Bisset gsc Aunehd
[8110]2350f1), C2, cy cr G ny (ei -e!
[8111]PAU CO VTICALLY OC cLaL SE
[8112]Impossible to to- detern.S
[8115]'
[8117]ried Oe
[8119]ed
[8121]Cuakees wires. He. inze ins ert cite or e
[8122]n ae
[8124]33
[8126]_ resolution from the conference's “Action Commission" con- _
[8128]in the United States. It calls for international support
[8130]Convention at Miami on July 9, 1972, and the Republican
[8132]oN,
[8134]NW 8829§ Docid:32989624 Page 161 - pin ppsriey piece cy psy peaaTg
[8136]Fi bycey ro OES
[8138]< . . . .
[8139]. * . . .
[8140]_¢ . 8 . fi
[8141]F ar . . .
[8142]. . .- . woe B
[8143]. = 8
[8145]Foreign Support for Activities Planned to. Disrupt
[8146]Or Harass the Democratic National Convention
[8148]SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION:
[8150]There are no direct indications thus, far of foreign
[8151]efforts to inspire, support or take advantage of activities
[8152]designed to disrupt or harass the National Convention of
[8153]the Democratic Party in Midmi, 10-13 July 1972. The concept
[8154]of coordinated international support for domestic activities
[8155]jn the United States was generally endorsed at the recent
[8156]World Assembly for Peace and Independence of the Peoples
[8157]of.Indochina; however, the Conference issued no specific
[8158]call for international sunport of disruptive actions at the
[8159]American national political conventions.
[8161].
[8163], At. the Soviet-controlled World Assembly for Peace
[8165]‘and Independence of the Peoples! of Indochina, held in
[8167]Versailles from 10-15 February 1972, there was mention of
[8168]American plans for demonstrations at both the Republican
[8169]and Democratic National Conventions. The final draft
[8171]tains an appendix submitted by American delegates whose
[8172]goal was to secure global coordination for domestic actions
[8174]to six weeks of domestic antiwar actions and demonstrations,
[8175]from J April to 15 May 1972, and concludes with the state-
[8176]ment: "This campaign will lead up to the Democratic Party
[8178]Party Convention in. San Diego on August 21, 1972."
[8180]The final "Resolution of the Paris World Assembly
[8181]for the Peace and Independence of the Indochinese People"
[8182]of 13 February 1972, drafted by the “Political Commission"
[8183]States:
[8185]"Yn the United ‘States particularly, the protest
[8186]against the war is voiced more and more strongly,
[8188]Pecto' Sa
[8189]uss: te ceca oe Lal wl
[8191]BOM YS 5 0 1 bey
[8198]: oe = tL te) Pore Ulecarts Wo Uresctl lowe T
[8200]~ . ate re!
[8201]ee ee eas aren Ce es UL ARESS ‘ s ‘ a -_ ae
[8203]: 9 t
[8205]te THR GLEM Li. UOLni
[8208]OPS ee 2a a
[8210]eattet
[8211]or
[8213]ate!
[8215]-. under. various forms, such as draft “Vevasions; i
[8216]desertions, resistance, -demonstrations which
[8217]now affect even the soldiers. The Assembly
[8218]calls for support to. these progressive and -
[8219]antiwar forces in the United States, and asks -
[8220]the governments to grant asylum to deserters to,
[8221]: “7 -*  and to support their right to repatriation. .
[8222]meow" "ALL together, the peoples of the world will
[8223]Yao cs -ef£iciently help to impose on the U.S. Govern-
[8224]Jie 7, Ment the-restoration of peace, independence
[8228]ot and freedom in Vietnan', Laos and Cambodia."
[8229]ary . . 7 . . we ce .
[8230]z . . % . . . :
[8232]. a - . ‘
[8233]-. .
[8234]+ 7
[8236]~ .
[8237]: . . . 2 . . .
[8238]e 7 ‘ .
[8239]+ . . .
[8240]. . — r
[8241]‘1 i *
[8242]. . roy
[8243]” 4 C0553
[8244]- ar veeeraee 7 ora Mean | @ i .
[8245]NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 162, WHEN ehh _
[8247]OIA ranecine pratt 8 tn pen
[8249]teste Ne
[8253]_ mat roves, Peal in
[8258]iwelluecbot
[8260]a ee s wr
[8262]+ oe .
[8263]—, . ne
[8265]Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt.
[8266]or Harass the Democratic National Convention
[8268]are *
[8270]SUMMARY :
[8272]New indications of foreign efforts or plans to inspire,
[8273]support, influence, or exploit actions designed to disrupt |
[8274]or harass the Democratic National Convention in Miami, 10-15
[8276]' July 1972, are limited to a reiteration by a member of the
[8277]Secretariat of the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam of a
[8278]Statement previously issued by the World Assembly for Peace
[8279]and Independence of the Peoples of Indochina. The Assembly's
[8281]‘ pronouncement generally endorsed the concept of international
[8282]support to a campaign of anti-Vietnam War activities in the
[8283]United States leading up to the Democratic and Republican
[8284]Conventions, but made no specific call for support of dis-
[8285]Truptive actions at the conventions themselves. .
[8286]* . . : ‘
[8287]DEVELOPMENTS:
[8289]In early April 1972 an influential and well-informed
[8290]staff member of the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam discussed,
[8291]in private, the international anti-Vietnam War activities
[8292]conducted on 1, 15, and 22 April. The Stockholm Conference
[8293]member stated that these actions were part of an international
[8294]Campaign in support of domestic American antiwar efforts
[8295]during the period 1 April to 15 May 1972, and “will culminate
[8296]at the election conventions in July and August."
[8298]. The World Assembly for Peace and Independence of the
[8299]Peoples of Indochina, of which the Stockholm Conference was
[8300]a.major organizer, had earlier enunciated a similar statement
[8301]in an appendix to the final draft resolution of the Assembly's
[8303]"Action Commission." The appendix called for international
[8304]support to six weeks of domestic antiwar actions and demon-
[8305]strations, from 1 April to 15 May 1972, and concluded with
[8307]““the statement: "This campaign will lead up to the Democratic
[8308]Party Convention at Miami on July 9, 1972, and the Republican
[8309]Party Convention in San Diego on August 21, 1972."
[8311]AAT RMI S “—_ Pops ‘ _
[8312]GGG Ie3 U8 + BOSD
[8314]0 Posie O32
[8316]nce: (Rr
[8317]Usd " Noa ta
[8319]NWW-88296—Dochd:32969624 Pag
[8322]Lo . Tent An Thowdrvas
[8326]eo _ U8 jis TSI Sa
[8327]. ‘ bacweid
[8329]f
[8330]st
[8331]Lik Retiet
[8333]to ; . 83 WAY 1972
[8335]Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
[8336]-or Harass the Democratic, National Convention
[8338]SUMMARY :
[8340]Indications remain limited of foreign plans or attempts
[8341]to inspire, support, influence, or exploit actions designed
[8342]to disrupt or harass the Democratic National Convention in
[8343]Miami, Florida, 10-13 July 1972. A member of the Swedish
[8344]Committee for Vietnan, who is also a member of the Secre-
[8345]tariat of the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam, has stated
[8346]that the U.S. National Elections are playing a role in
[8347]the Swedish Committee's work. The British-based Interna-
[8348]tional Confederation for Disarmament and Peace (ICDP) has
[8349]distributed a "Spring Offensive Calendar" of activities
[8350]in the United States against the war based on a submission
[8351]by the Peoples! Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ).
[8353]The calendar includes actions planned in connection with
[8354]the Democratic Convention.
[8356]DEVELOPMENTS: .
[8358]In mid-April 1972, a member of the Swedish Committee
[8359]for Vietnan, who is also an influential and well-informed
[8360]staff member of the Secretariat of the Steckholm Conference
[8361]on Vietnam, stated in a private discussion of the Swedish
[8362]Committee's unusually heavy work load that "things will be
[8363]hectic right until the elections in the U.S."
[8365]The International Confederation for Disarmament and
[8366]Peace, a British-based antiwar organization and one of the
[8367]more prominent member organizations of the Stockholm Con-
[8368]ference, has attached a "Spring Offensive Calendar" to the
[8369]April- May 1972 issue of its regular. international publica-
[8370]tion Vietnam International. The calendar had been furnished
[8371]by the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ) and
[8372]included the following entry:
[8374].
[8376]July 9 - 12 Democratic Convention, Miami Beach.
[8377]. ; Demonstrations organised by Florida
[8378]People's Coalition, Box 17521, Tampa,
[8379]Florida 33612.
[8381]3 "Naty bad mars i . Lye
[8382]| Godel cen OOS7i
[8383]NW 88296 Docld:32980624 Page 164 NS PERE BRST CO ECE foaeng
[8385]a]
[8387]The ICDP commentary on the PCPJ calendar urges demonstrations
[8388]in support of some of the dates listed but does not specifically
[8390]. -call for actions in connection with the Democratic Convention.
[8392]l ‘
[8393]. e
[8394]: t
[8395]| .
[8396]i
[8397]. -
[8398]e
[8399]. . . .
[8400]'
[8401]1 2) trie ry
[8402]: PMT. Inn OO ty
[8403]| CORSE PSST
[8404]IW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 165. 1) FORTIN STL pie pecan
[8407]TCT eel haib
[8408]UYDALLER_prearn
[8409]MVIEEN DOLLY Uli
[8411]3
[8413]7 JUN 1972
[8419]a hae oe ae
[8421]_ Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
[8422]-or Harass the Democratic National Convention
[8424].
[8426]SUMMARY: 7 an
[8428]The only new indication of foreign plans or efforts
[8430]- to inspire, support, influence, or exploit actions designed
[8431]to disrupt or harass the Democratic National Convention in
[8433]' Miami, Florida, 10-13 July 1972, is an expression of interest
[8434]by a member of the North Vietnamese Delegation to the Paris
[8435]Peace Talks in the plans of the major antiwar organizations
[8436]:in the United States for demonstrations in connection with
[8437]the political conventions of both major parties.
[8441]In mid-May 1972, a member of the North Vietnamese Dele-
[8442]gation to the Paris Peace Talks invited a visitor to contact
[8443]him again when the visitor returned from an imminent trip
[8444]to the United States. The North Vietnamese official gave
[8445]the visitor the New York City addresses of the People's .
[8446]Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ) and the National
[8447]Peace Action Coalition (NPAC), and asked the visitor to
[8448]inquire at their offices regarding their plans for demon-
[8449]strations during the coming summer. The North Vietnamese
[8450]~official stated that he was especially interested in plans
[8451]for actions in connection with the Democratic and National
[8452]Conventions.
[8454].
[8456]( ren ch
[8457]ide et
[8459]BIA TORTOONM Marre ges
[8461]wy 88296 Docld:32999624 Page 1
[8462]a
[8464]r
[8467]Arye: tarry
[8469]: te - ek
[8470]3 'e tr wih vonbahw!
[8472]. « rd se of
[8474], -_ * . al .
[8475]. oe a eS Oe ee eT SL VS OE OE eS ey
[8476]7 . e* + * Bre “ owt * eee = 7 od x, . fe ten ne “t
[8478]. eae heed en
[8479]a
[8481]Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
[8482]or Harass the Democratic National Convention
[8484]There are no additional indications, as of this date, of foreign plans
[8485]or efforts to inspire, support, or take advantage of activities designed to
[8487]disrupt or harass the National Convention of the Democratic Party in Miami,
[8488]Florida, 10-13 July 1972. :
[8490].
[8492]| NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 167
[8496]ai
[8497]a}
[8502]ra , , 4g &
[8503]ue 231572 c
[8505]HEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director/Conptroller
[8507]VIA s Acting Deputy Director for Plans .
[8508]SUBJECT : Agency Surrort to the ULS. Secret Service
[8509](USSS) fer National Penocratic (20-14. july
[8510]$72) and National Republican (21-24 August
[8511]1972) Conventions
[8512]2. This memorandum is for the information of the Executive
[8513]Director/Cozmptroller. .
[8515]2. Authorisation for CIA suppor rt to the U.S. Secret Service
[8516]for the Democratic and Fenublican Mationnl Canventions is can-
[8520]tained in a menorandusa of 7 Anril 1272 fron Chie? c
[8524]4
[8526]sok Staff to
[8527]the CCl whica was concurred in hy the ADLUP and avcproved by the
[8528]PCL on 10 April 1372 (copy attached).
[8529]. 3. On i3 Arril 1972 the COS, Wifttland met with the iari
[8530]USSS representative and tir. “astrovito ef USSS beadgquarters to
[8531]discuss prelininary nlanning for Station Wii/tiani sunport to the
[8532]USSS prior to and duvina cunicet Conventions, mmo oL7 Awral boys
[8533]the C/unfess and C/TI/LSN met with “yr. Hastrovito at leadauarters
[8534]ta inplencat the prelininary plennine agreed uyon in ‘Hani and
[8535]to determine the extent of headquarters suppert reauired by the
[8537]USSS.
[8539]&, The basic aereenent tutually concurred in by the USSS
[8540]and licadquarters representatives provided that:
[8542]Na. Station Wi/Hianml vould conduct name “traces on
[8543]ali Cubans of interest to the USSS,
[8545]b. CIA! teadquarters would conduct name traces on .
[8546]all other foreiz “i born persons of interest to the USSS.
[8548]c. CIA would keen the USSS informed of any events
[8549]in the Caribbean and Latin American areas that weuld
[8550]have any bearing ow the USSS protective mission curing
[8551]the convention perieds. This would iaclude priefinc
[8552]on Cubs and Cuban policies teward the United States. and
[8553]On activities of Cuban intelliceace operations 3 which
[8554]could affect the security of the conventions.
[8559]x
[8561]ea
[8563]8 00826
[8566]6 a ©
[8567]d. Coverage of Latin Anerican exile croups in the
[8568]United States would be the responsibility of the FRI
[8570]Since CIA had coased the extensive coverace fornerly °
[8571]targeted against these yrouns Since it was now considered ;
[8572]an internal security sunction, .
[8574] §. On 27 April 1972 a meeting was held at a buffor office
[8575]of Station wh/‘iiani with the | USSS Chief of Comsunica-
[8577]tions, Station versoanci a Headquar ers representative, It
[8578]wWas.agreed that name traccs would he raneied by Piani security
[8579]Field office courier from the LESS toninfer office until the ESS
[8581]established communications links fron their command post in
[8582]convention center, at which time trace requests would be son
[8584]mt
[8586]from the command post to USSS headcuarteors and relayed to CIA
[8587]Neadquarters. Cuban nage traces are relayed to Station wif iami
[8590]by the Signal Center and non~-Cuban traces are conducted by &H/COS,
[8592]Replics to USSS requests on noneCubans are coordinated with
[8593]Ci/so.
[8595]. ani has arranned the rental of a safeheuse
[8596]about five minute on convention center which will provide a
[8597]secure and nearby meetinz site for USSS and Agency perscunel,
[8598]This safchouse wili be avaitaile just prior to and during both
[8599]conventions. A a adquarters officer will Tay to “dani cricr to
[8600]until the conventions adjeurn to
[8602]assis t the Station in providing the sepport descrived in paragraga
[8603]four above
[8605]G6. Station WH/"!
[8607]os
[8609]7. Station "E/Miasi is in daily contact with the YESS in
[8610]Miani, utilizine buifer office as a Beetine site when necessary. rie
[8611]Jocatsion of Station #H/itiani ras net been revealed to
[8612]the USSS. - (Station is located some distance frc= buffer office.)
[8613]Additionally, the Miani Sccurity Field Gifice maintains nornal
[8614]liaison with the local USSS ¢iiami unit.
[8616]; 8. The Station understands that no personnel will be present
[8617]at the convention hall, that they will not trevide any eguirment
[8618]unique to the Agency, nor will it provide the use of any otner
[8619]facilities other than tne safehouse described in paragraph six.
[8621]we
[8623]COARNT : 7
[8624]Cfo |
[8627]) é.., 1973
[8629]SUBJECT: Request for Information on Sensitive Activities
[8631]“You will recall that in Fiscal Years 1971 and 1972,
[8632]I believe, Agency funds were made available to the FBI.
[8633]' These funds may still be possibly held in a special
[8634]account for that use. This is one of the areas where
[8635]TSD has been very much involved. Chuck Briggs would
[8636]have the details as this was handled through the Executive.
[8637]Director's office and of course Angleton would have
[8639]additional information.
[8641]Signed
[8643]TeiN-hi
[8645]Chief
[8646]Missions and Programs Staff
[8648]Gy
[8650]E2 INPDET -CL BY 357737
[8651]eyes GY Po
[8652]bE Varad Sy 00SE2
[8654]SECREN
[8656]NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 171
[8658]6
[8660]b.
[8661]“+ _ . 8 May 1973
[8662]MEMORANDUM FOR : | Deputy Director for Operations :
[8663]SUBJECT : Areas of Possible Embarrassment
[8665]e
[8667]to the Agency
[8669]1, Sometime in the spring or early summer of 1971, Mr. John
[8670]Dean levied the requirement on the Agency for information relating to
[8671]the Investors Overseas Service (IOS). The original request was
[8672]non-specific but it gradually emerged that Dean was concerned with
[8673]the possible adverse publicity that might develop regarding the
[8674]President's nephew, who was employed by IOS.
[8676]2. There were multiple channels from the White House to the
[8677]Agency on this subject:
[8679]a. Presumably Haldeman and/or Ehrlichman to Director
[8680]Helms.
[8682]b. Someone (unnamed) in the White House to the DDCI,
[8683]General Cushman (sce attached telephone conversation),
[8684]Note that Ehrlichman is mentioned, and
[8686]c. John Dean to the CI Staff. These various channels
[8687]were sorted out in time and six reports were passed by
[8688]the Cl Staff to Mr, Fred Fielding for Mr, John Dean,
[8690]3. The telephone call of General Cushman's is of interest since
[8691]“it gives the flaver of White House concern. It took several days to
[8692]uncover the fact that the White House interest centered on the involve-
[8693]_ ment of the President's nephew with IOS and possible adverse publicity.
[8694]‘The reports submitted to Dean's office were routine in nature and were
[8695]coordinated with the DCI, After a few months, interest in this sub-,
[8696]ject died down and we did not pursue it further, :
[8697]. .
[8698]4, Please return the attachments when they have served your
[8700]purpose, Vs
[8701]E@iMPDET CL BY 0545)?
[8702]YT Anrep “os “ar
[8703]| ol | a4 00583
[8706], NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 172 oA
[8709]" ~.* Ts a are i OF ee ™
[8712]5. LIalso include a short note on the Intelligence Evaluation
[8713]Committee and Staff prepared by Richard Ober, The original
[8714]meetings were held in the office of John Dean at the White House
[8715]and the principal sparkplug for this group activity was the then
[8716]Assistant Attorney General for Internal Security, Robert Mardian
[8717]and then later his assistant, William Olsen. It is noted that Mr.
[8718]Mardian is now appearing before the Grand Jury andit is always
[8719]possible that he might draw in the Agency.
[8723]6. Before appointing Ober to the IES Staff as the Agency
[8724]representative, ] had attended various inter-agency meetings pre-
[8725]sided over by Mardian. l expressed the view to Director Helms
[8726]that Mardian would require very careful handling due to his inex-
[8727]perience, Furthermore, Mardian was deeply involved in the split
[8728]between Bill Sullivan and Mr. Hoover. Ona confidential basis
[8729]one or two senior FBI officials stated that Sullivan was secretly
[8730]passing files to Mardian without Mr. Hoover's permission. This
[8731]was one of the important reasons why Sullivan was dismissed from
[8732]the Bureau.
[8734]fecal Cot: oe
[8735]James Angleton
[8736]Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff
[8738]Attachments (5)
[8740]cenit on,
[8743]NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 173 oe
[8746]MEMOPANDUM FOR: Beputy Director for Operations
[8748]SUBJECT : Counter Intelligence Staff,
[8749]Police Groun Activitics
[8751]1. Counter Intelligence Staff, Police Greun (CI/?G)
[8752]is resnonsible for Staff coordination within the Office
[8753]of the Deputy Pirector for Gperations for activities and
[8754]nroqrans involvin® assistance to forsicn nolice/security
[8755]forces for the nurvose of exnloitins such activities and
[8756]programs for intellisence nurnvoses
[8758]2. CI/?PG ma Lintains liaison with the Office cf Public
[8759]Safoty, Arency for International “eveionvanat CoPS/400}
[8760]and its training facilitv, the International Police Acddeny
[8761](IP\). CI/PG alse adninisters and sumeryises Project
[8762]IDEN-171- and its trainine nromrictarvy facility OEN-172.
[8763]KISN-168 in addition, CI/PG coorcinates a Joint | OPS/ATD Tec%
[8764]Services Division, Contral Intellizesnce Asoncy €
[8765]Techaical Investications Course. e1/2 provides sulcance
[8766]and counsel to the Area Divisions in matters nertaining
[8767]to nolice/security functions and activities. Snecific
[8768]details of these functions are as follows:
[8770]LIAISON WITH OPS/ATD
[8772]CI/PG liaison with OPS/AID and IPA is conducted on a
[8773]daily basis and consists principally of:
[8774]A. exchange of information on IPA participants, some
[8775]of whom later attend IDEN-172 courses and who are
[8776]of interest to Agency cornonents,
[8777]B. arrancing for inclusion of Asency snonsored partici-
[8778]pants in IPA/OPS/AIS trainins prograns,
[8780]ines GQ tours far
[8781]Ntativies sponsored
[8783]Jos COSY?
[8785]SEED wliasa lone BRITO Le Metco IORI
[8787]C. arrancine for TDA/OPS/ATIVY Brie li
[8788]foreien nolice/security renrese
[8789]by CIA Area Divisions,
[8791]. det many
[8792]oom Bese Recta ther Et cL BY ek | 4
[8794]NW 85296 Docid:32909624 Page 174 ear tit
[8797]NW 60296 Dochd:32909624 Page 1/75 NOWEE:
[8799]Dd. obtaining hiogranhic and assessment data.on
[8800]PA/OPS/AID trainces,,.
[8802]E. providing general information pertaining to
[8803]police/security organizations, activities, equip-
[8804]ment, and personalities requested by Agency .
[8805]ope ratin © components
[8807]g tne Agency's narticination in the
[8808]nvestications Course desiuned to
[8809]the trainees vith the technicmue
[8810]nronerly investicate terrorist
[8811]wnerein explosives have been utilized,
[8812]G. obtaining OPS/AID cover for CIA personnel to serve .
[8813]abroad. At one time as many as 59 CIA employees
[8814]were covered in Latin America, the Far East and
[8815]Africa, Tris total as heen reguced durine the
[8816]past several years to 19 servine in Thailana, *
[8818]H. arranging contact between Desk officers and OPS/AIN
[8819]sponsored narticivants. .
[8820]ut wa at
[8822]PROJECT IDEN-171_ - PROPRIETARY IDEN-172— decane an os
[8824]Set patic-
[8826]MEN-172 Training \cade>y is a comtercial inter>rise. Clips
[8827]It was incornorated under tie laws of the State of “arvland i010!
[8828]in 1952 and conducts its business in the Mistrict of OSE
[8829]Colombie. It is engaged principally in training forcign COASHLT
[8830]police/securi ty nersonnel under an overt contract with Seevis
[8831]OPS/AUD, “and selling nolice/sscuri ty enuinment to forsion
[8833]police/securi ty personnel and orea ations IDEN-172 also
[8834]provices special training nrograns. and briecfinas to
[8835]foréien police/security versonnel of interest to Agency
[8836]operating divisions. It provides hiosranhic and assessment
[8837]data on trainees to country desks. PecentlyIDEN-172 has
[8838]acquired the capability of providing training to foreign
[8839]policc/security personnel in VIP protective security
[8841]for Chiefs of State.
[8843]* CIA personnel under this cover will not he replaced as
[8844]sucn and all will be vhased out by June 1974,
[8846]COMMENT . ~
[8848]CI/PG does not naintain direct contact or liaison
[8849]with any law enforcement organization, local or federal,
[8850]at home or abroad. When the need arises, such contact is
[8851]sometimes made on our behalf by OPS/AID or [DEM-172without
[8852]divulgins Ag Gncy interest. OGPS/AID has such contacts
[8853]at home and abroad because of the nature of its activities
[8854](trainina of foreisn nolice/security porsonnel] at hore
[8855]and abrows), and its Public Safety nroctrans around the
[8856]world. IDEN-172 has such contacts at hore - lecal and
[8857]federal level - hecause its nersonnel are nersenally
[8858]acquaintec with law enforcerent officers throug out tne
[8859]United States. Mombers of the IDEN-172 staff (not identified)
[8860]as CIA} have appeared as suest lecturers at suci federal
[8861]institutions as the U.S. Park Police, IPA, the U.S.
[8862]Secret Service, and the U.S. Treasury Inforcement Division.
[8864]3. In. addition to the liaison mentioned in the
[8865]previous paracrann, the Asency maintains liaison in varying
[8866]degrees with foreign police/securityv organizations throug!
[8867]its field stations. The existence and extent theraof,
[8868]hovever, is a decision to se nade by the Area Division,
[8869]and is not the responsibility of CI/?G,
[8871]4, The CIA station as a menber a the Country Team in
[8872]Montevideo, Uruguay, snay nave had se contact with Dan
[8873]Mitrione, ho vas murde red by the mu ataros Dan Mitrione,
[8874]an experienced and respected law enforcenent officer, was
[8875]a bona fide OPS/AIN officer assianed to the AID mission
[8876]in Urusuay, and was never a CIA emmloyee or accent,
[8878]ffi C2 Crome
[8879]James snsleton
[8881]Chief, tounter Intelligence Staff
[8883]NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 176
[8886]SENS HIVE
[8888]es | ® . CE
[8890]SUBJECT: The MHCHAOS Program — | ;
[8892]1. The MHCHAOS program is a worldwide program for
[8893]clandestine collection abroad of information on foreign
[8894]efforts to support/encourage/exploit/manipulate domestic
[8896]. U.S. extremism, especially by Cuba, Communist China,
[8897]-. North Vietnam, the Soviet Union, North Korea and the
[8898]Arab fedayeen. :
[8900]2. -The MHCHAOS program has not and is not conduct-
[8901]ing efforts domestically for internal domestic collection
[8902]purposes, Agency efforts are foreign. Foreign-oriented
[8903]activity in the United States has been of two types:
[8905]a. Selected FBI domestic sources who travel
[8906]abroad in connection with their extremist activity
[8907]and/or affiliations to make contact with hostile
[8908]foreign powers or with forcign extremist groups
[8909]have been briefed and debriefed by Headquarters
[8910]officers. The briefing has included appropriate
[8911]operational guidance, including defensive advice.
[8913]b. Americans with existing extremist creden-
[8914]tials have been assessed, recruited, tested and
[8915]dispatched abroad for PCS assignments as contract
[8916]agents, primarily sources offered for such use by
[8917]the FBI. When abroad they collect information re-
[8918]sponsive to MICHAOS program requirements, as well
[8919]as other Agency requirements. They are thus used
[8920]primarily for targeting against Cubans, Chinese Con-
[8921]munists, the North Vietnamese, etc., as their back-
[8922]ground and their particular access permits. It
[8923]— should be noted that the MPTROIKA aspect of the
[8925]ar MPLODESTAR project of the East Asia Division is
[8926]: ¢ Similar to the MHCHAOS PROGRAM.
[8928]'3. As indicated earlier, MHCHAOS is a foreign pro-
[8929]gram, conducted overseas, except for the limited activity
[8930]described above. The program is and has been managed so
[8931]as to achieve the maximum feasible utilization of exist-
[8932]ing resources of the Operations Directorate. No assets
[8934]q 1
[8936]re A EET.
[8937]Waitin PRICE
[8938]SENSITIVE PEELLLDE Sch SOURCES
[8939]ANU PHL CPA EIYOU¥YED
[8941]wave
[8943]SENSITIVE re =
[8944]- SECRET v1
[8946]NW 88296 Docld:32589624 Page 177 iyo
[8949]_ ww 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 178
[8951]have been recuited and run exclusively for the MHCHAOS
[8952]program. Instead, emphasis has been placed on the exploi-
[8953]" tation of new and old Agency assets who have a by-product
[8954]capability or a concurrent capability for provision of
[8955]information responsive to the program's requirements.
[8957]This has involved the provision of custom-tailored collec-
[8958]tion requirements and operational guidance. This collec-
[8959]tion program is viewed as an integral part of the recruit-
[8960]ment and collection programs of China Operations, Vietnam
[8961]Operations, Cuban Operations, Soviet Bioc Division opera-
[8962]‘tions and Korean Branch operations. Agents who have an
[8963]American "Movement" background.or who have known connec-
[8964]tions with the American "ovement" are useful as access
[8965]agents to obtain biosraphic and personality data, to dis-
[8966]cern possible vulnerabilities and susceptibilitics, and
[8968]to develop operationally exploitable relationships with
[8969]recruitment targets of the above programs. These assets
[8970]are of interest to our targets because of their connec-
[8971]tions with and/or knowledge of the American "Movement."
[8972]Over the course of the MHCHAOS program, there have been
[8973]approximately 20 important areas of operational interest,
[8974]which at the present time have been reduced to about ten:
[8975]Paris, Stockholm, Brussels, Dar Es Salaam, Conakry, Algiers, .
[8976]Mexico City, Santiago, Ottawa and Hong Kong.
[8978]4. The MICHAOS program also utilizes audio opera-
[8979]tions, two of which have been implemented to cover tar-
[8980]gets of special interest.
[8982]Paragraph a, deleted because it reveals a sensitive
[8983]foreign operation.
[8987]“
[8989]Paragraph b, deleted because it reveals a sensitive
[8990]Agency foreign operation,
[8992]SENSITIVE
[8994]Sa, 9) roa
[8995]aa Ss Sot
[8998]_
[9000]5. MHCHAOCS reporting from abroad relating to the
[9001]program originates in two ways: Individuals who are noted
[9002]in contact with Cubans, the Chinese Communists, etc., and
[9003]who appear to have extremist connections, interests or
[9004]background are reported upon. Other individuals are re-
[9005]ported upon in response to. specific Headquarters require-
[9006]ments received from the FBI because such individuals. are
[9007]of active investigatory security interest to the FBI.
[9009]6. All cable and dispatch traffic related to the
[9010]MHCHAOS program is sent via reStricted channels. It is
[9011]not processed by either the Cable Secretariat or the In-
[9012]formation Services Division. The control and retricv-
[9013]ability of information obtained, including information
[9014]received from the FBI, is the responsibility of the Spe-
[9015]cial Operations Group.
[9017]7. Information responsive to specific FBI require-
[9018]ments is disseminated to the FBI via special controlled
[9019]dissemination channels, i.e., by restricted handling cable
[9020]traffic or via special pouch and specially numbered blind
[9021]memoranda.
[9023]8. Information of particular significance, when col-
[9024]lected, has becn disseminated by special memorandum over
[9025]the signature of the Director of Central Intelligence to
[9026]the White House (Dr. Kissinger and John Dean), as well as
[9027]to the Attorney General, the Secretary of State and the
[9028]Director of the FBI.
[9030]NW 88296 Docid:32389624 Page 179
[9033]MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations °
[9035]CORTISMALCIT INS
[9036]| La
[9038]et ian Vas i ig
[9040]- FR 73-183
[9042]8 May 1973 |
[9044]BY
[9046]Foreign Resources Division Operational
[9048]SUBJECT:
[9049]Activities with Possible Flap Potential
[9050]REFERENCE: FR Memorandum, 73- 180, dated 7 Mey
[9052]1973, same subject .
[9054]1, The answers to your questions are as follows:
[9056]a. Question: Do we recruit Americans?
[9058]Answer: Yes, we recruit Americans to be
[9059]used as academic supnort assets and access agents,
[9060]These Americans are used for spotting and assess-
[9061]ment purposes only and do not perform any recruit-
[9062]ments.
[9064]Paragraph 1, b, andl. c. are deleted
[9065]because they contain sensitive agency ,
[9067]operational methods and techniques,
[9069]E2 IMPDET
[9071]CL BY: 057223
[9073]_ NW 88296 Dochd:32989624 Page 180
[9075]CGE
[9077]re
[9079]Late
[9081]d. Question: What is the arrangement re. recruiting
[9082]out of colleges? Any clearances or prohibitions?
[9083]Answer: As of now CSI 50-10 specifically
[9084]requires approval by the, ADDO or DDO for any
[9085]recruitment attempt made in the United States
[9086]against an American member of the academic
[9087]“community or a foreign target attending an American
[9088]academic institution. This regulation-is presently in
[9089]the process of revision in that this approval authority
[9090]for academic recruitments in the United States is to
[9091]be delegated to Chief, FR. The approval authority
[9092]for recruitment attempts against American students
[9093]outside the United States is to be delegated to the Chief
[9094]of the appropriate area division. The only prohibitions
[9095]at the present time are those precluding recruitment
[9096]attempts against foreign students here in the United States
[9097]on grants from Ford Foundation, Rockefeller or Fulbright.
[9099]2, If you have further questions, please let me know,
[9101]signed/IDEN-173
[9103]Acting Chief
[9104]Foreign Resources Division
[9108]eo ba Mou was ape “at ein dV be
[9110]_ NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 181
[9113], a ea ad uy: wae
[9114]i S2 Tp re
[9115]| a Re rvee
[9117]RT /35 Biss TP Py 7 eer
[9119]’ FR 73-180
[9121]7 May 1973
[9123]MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations ©
[9124]SUBJECT: Foreign Resources Division Operational
[9125]Activities with Possible Flap Potential
[9127]1, At thr risk of stating the obvious, almost all of the operational
[9128]activities carried on by FR Division in the United States run the risk
[9129]that unauthorized disclosure could create embarrassment to the Agency,
[9130]We have accepted this as a condition precedent and have proceeded with
[9131]our operational activities in the most professional manner possible under
[9132]the circumistances. There are certain rather unusual activities in which
[9133]FR Division has participated and/or is participating that contain some-
[9134]what greater possibility for embarrassment if discovered. I have listed
[9135]these below, not necessarily in order of embarrassment potential:
[9137]a. The New York Base provides a fairly considerable
[9138]amount of support to Dr. Kissinger in his contacts with the
[9139]Chinese, This support was authorized by Mr. Karamessines
[9140]and Mr. Helms. Thus far there has been no problem other
[9141]than the inordinate amount of time spent by New York Base
[9142]personnel, not to mention the fairly sizeable amount of
[9143]money that has been expended in support of these efforts,
[9145]b. A CIA Officer is to be assigned to FR Division. The
[9146]CIA Officer is presently assigned overseas under deep
[9147]cover; his cover is the Mullen Corporation. This is the cor-
[9148]poration that employed E. Howard Hunt. In discussions between
[9149]‘ NOCAD and the ADDO, it was decided that the Officer would
[9150]be pulled out and reassigned in the United States.
[9151]FR Division was directed to accept this officer for assignment.
[9154]E2 IMPDET
[9155]CL BY: 057223
[9157]CUS tists
[9158]eJlatisidrdiia F i erer: VSPPEVE
[9160]_ NW 88796 Docld:32989624 Page 182
[9163]NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 183 © -* "+"
[9165]We have concluded that the best solution is to have this
[9166]officer attend a university in the Midwest for at least
[9168]a year, working towards an advanced degree until there
[9169]has been time for the situation to clarify itself. We plan
[9171]to make no operational use of the CIA Officer whatsoever,
[9172]during the period of time that he is attending the’ university.
[9173]Upon completion of his year's study, we will review the .
[9174]situation and decide the next course of action at that time.
[9176]Paragraph l, c, is deleted because it contains sensitive
[9178]Agency operational methods and techniques.
[9180]d. FR Division has been briefed in general on the
[9181]existence of an audio operation done by the FBI but with close
[9182]TSD support in San Francisco, This operation is directed
[9183]against [DEN-62, I understand the operation has
[9184]been exceptionally well done. However, the responsibility
[9185]for this activity has come from Chief, TSD in conjunction .
[9186]with SB Division,
[9188]e. Three microphones were planted in various locations
[9189]in the IDEN- 61 by the FBI. The equipment was pro-
[9190]duced by CIA and the overall operation was joint, although no
[9192]CIA personnel have entercd the premises. The operation was _
[9194]deactivated and is presently dormant. The mikes, however,
[9195]are stillin place. If discovered the operation could cause
[9196]‘some embarrassment to the American Government, but it is
[9197]unlikely the finger would point to CLA.
[9199]. - .
[9200]: ~ a re ereia
[9201]epee TAN EN ETI ET a &
[9202]noe oa Sof wey, .
[9203]ne ub
[9206]Qe
[9208]ca » fe tau wena
[9210]Arn
[9212]3
[9213]Awd
[9216]1d:32989624 Page 184
[9218]Coordination
[9220]A. Internal
[9222]In developing its cadre of general. support assets.
[9223]and access agents, the FR Division maintains close contact
[9224]with the Domestic Contact Service of the Directorate for
[9225]Intelligence, using their assets wherever and whenever
[9226]possible to support FR's operational activities. To a
[9227]more ‘limited degree, FR Basés maintain contacts with Office
[9228]of Security and Office of Personnel field representatives,
[9229]pursuing the occasional leads surfaced by: these officers
[9230]and using their entre to specific individuals who can
[9231]provide access to targets of operational interest.
[9233]B. External .
[9235]FR officers in the field maintain coordination with |
[9236]their FBI countérparts. There is limited cooperation
[9237]with Bureau offices on internal security cases involving
[9238]Soviet and Bloc officials and the local FBI offices are
[9239]of- occasional help in operations involving other nationals.
[9240]The local field offices of the FBI are made aware of the
[9241]presence of FR officers in their jurisdictions and have on
[9242]occasion provided backstopping on cases. where there was.
[9243]some flap potential.
[9245]Coordination with the FBI of FR Division's agent
[9246]recruitment activity is governed by an agreement between
[9247]the Agency and the FBI dated 7 Fébruary 1966.
[9249]The Bases also have contact with local Immigration
[9250]and Naturalization Service offices although. these contacts
[9251]are less frequent and less important than the contacts
[9253]with “the FBI offices.
[9255]SECRET
[9257]OND
[9259]PN
[9262]if / SENATOR GARY W. HART 1
[9264](L- Bufile 62-116395
[9266]. 1 ~ Mr. Wannall (detached)
[9267]July 16, 1975
[9268]ra 1 =- Mr. Mintz (detached)
[9269]- 4 1 - Mr. Hotis (detached)
[9270]Mr. Daly (detached)
[9271]1~- Mr. Cregar (detached)
[9272]1 - Mr. Farrington (detached)
[9273]Reference is made to the letter to the Attorney
[9275]General dated May 28, 1975, and signed-py Senator Frank
[9276]Church and Senator John C. Tower. (i fe
[9278]. - wy Sy . ( ‘
[9280]A review of the central files of -the FBI revealed
[9281]that a file pertaining to your application for employment
[9282]with the Department of Justice and a file which lists you as
[9283]the victim in a case involving the Congressional Assassination
[9284]Statute are maintained by this Bureau.
[9286]Enclosed herewith are pertinent documents from the
[9287]Departmontal Applicant file. Certain data in this file is
[9288]exempt from public disclosure pursuant to the provisions of
[9289]Title 5, United States Code, Section 552 (b)(2), (b) (5), and
[9290](b) (7) (C) and (D). As I am sure you are aware, these exemptions
[9291]allow for the withholding of information related solely to the
[9292]internal personnel rules and practices of an agency; inter-
[9293]agency or intra-agency documents not available through discovery
[9294]proceedings during Litigation; information which would constitute
[9295]an unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of another
[9296]individual; and information which would disclose the identity
[9297]of a confidential source.
[9299]The other file pertains to an investigation concerning
[9300]a threat against your life. Although your name is carried in
[9301]the title throughout the file as the "victim," only a minimal
[9302]amount of information refers to you. The file indicates that
[9303]the Denver Police Department received information that a
[9304]particular individual was in Denver to kill you if you were
[9305]elected as United States Senator from Colorado on November 5,
[9306]1974; that the polls indicated you would be elected; that you
[9307]and your Denver Office were aware of this threat; that the
[9308]Denver Police Department afforded protection for you until you
[9309]departed Denver the morning of November 6, 1974, for vacation
[9310]in Mexico; and that an Agent of this Bureau attempted to see
[9311]you to display a photograph of the suspect, but was advised
[9312]by your assistant that the Denver Police Department had
[9314]1 - The Attorney Ceneral
[9316]2-~ The Deputy Attorney General vA y uf Loo
[9317]Attn: Susan M. Hauser ORL 4
[9318]Attn: K. William O'Connor NOT RECO Roa
[9320]SEE NOTE on Pace Shut 19 2/6
[9321]jdvicdj (14 Le
[9322]APES 2 maet erase Lp é, Le SE
[9324]ETT
[9326]oe
[9328]a a “AS Pe ieg
[9329]“530 eee 23 SPB. ae ml fre
[9331]1d:32989624 Page 185.
[9334]Senator Gary W. Hart
[9336]displayed the photograph to you and you did not recognize the
[9337]suspect. For your information this is no longer an active
[9338]investigation as the unknown subject was not identified and
[9339]the original allegation was not corroborated. Other than the
[9340]reasonably segregable portion of the references to you as set
[9341]forth above, this file is exempt from disclosure under the
[9342]provisions of the Freedom of Information Act, Title 5,
[9344]a ne Code, Section 552 (b) (2), (b) (5) and tb) (7) (C)
[9345]an D).
[9347]Also, our records contain two decuments from the
[9348]United States Department of Justice concerning you which have
[9349]been referred to the Attorney General.
[9351]T£ you wish to have any of the material reconsidered, i
[9352]it would be appropriate to discuss this matter with the
[9353]Attorney General. '
[9355]Enclosures (12)
[9357]NOTE: Sea Director, FBI, to the Attorney General letter dated
[9358]7/16/75, captioned, "Request For information in FBI Files by
[9359]Senators Gary Hart, Walter BD. Huddleston, Charles McC. Mathias,
[9360]Walter F. Mondale and Robert Morgan, Members of the U. S. Senate
[9361]Select Committee on Intelligence Activities." DRWsmlh. '
[9363]. Senator Hart is subject of favorable Department
[9364]Applicant file 77~93050. He is the victim of a civil rights
[9365]case under the "Congressional Assassination Statute,"
[9367]Bufile 44-62521. Airtel from Denver dated 3/3/75, sets forth
[9368]info that Carbon County, Wyoming is in the process of filing
[9369]First Degree Murder charges against Thomas Eugene Creech
[9370]{Suspect of Bufile 44-62521) in connection with the murder
[9371]of Ridgley Stewart McKenzie. Ascertained 6/11/75 from
[9372]Supervisor John Brockton, Denver, case closed for reasons
[9373]cited in’ instant letter, The 58 pages being furnished to
[9374]Senator Hart are located in Bufile. 77-93050.
[9377]the following records pertaining to you. It is noted that you A
[9379]NN a July 16, 1975
[9380]Tae ite 1 ~ Ur, Wannall (detached)
[9381]- Me. Mintz (detached)
[9382]fir. Hotia (detached)
[9383]Mr. Daly (detached)
[9384]lr. Cregar (dotached)
[9385]Mr. Parrington (detached)
[9387]SENATOR WALTER F. MONDALE
[9389]ft Fat et fot fet
[9392]i —
[9393]4
[9395]-
[9397]Reference is made to the letter to the Attorney General
[9398]signed by Senator Frank Church-and Senator John Tower dated
[9399]May 28, 1975. ~ meant
[9405]& review of the central flies of the FBI revealed
[9407]have not boon the subject of an FBI investigation; however, a ae
[9408]correspondence file pertaining to you has bean maintained since 1964.~
[9410]Also, our records contain three investigative files .
[9411]in which you are shown to haye keen the victim of an attemptcd
[9412]extortion. Copies of excised documents from two of these files
[9413]are enclosed. ‘The third file, comprised of one hundred and eighty
[9414]three documents, includes six extortion lettors which you or nan
[9415]one of your assistants furnished tha PPI. In this’ regard, your ar
[9416]office was advised of the final disposition of this matter by ,
[9417]the FBI on February 16, 1971. Although some of the documents from
[9418]this file aro subject to disclosure, they are not being included
[9419]since you would be aware of the contents of this data,
[9421]t
[9423]Additional information concerning you which is
[9424]contained in our central records is exempt From disclosure as
[9425]provided by Title 5, United States Code, Section 552 (b){1),
[9426](ob) (2), (b) (5), (2) (6), (b) (7) (Cc) and (Dp). These exemptions
[9427]protect, respectively matters that are specifically authorized
[9428]unier criteria established by an Executive Order to be kept
[9429]secret in the interest of national defense foreign policy;
[9430]information relating to the internal persongeY/rut b) dea 4p
[9431]practicas of this Bureau; inter-agency or intra~-aghe RECORGED
[9432]merrorandums or letters which would not be available neSngRPES
[9433]discovery proceedings during Litigation; informati€& .iyR ay 1976
[9434]personnel File the disclosure of which would constitute a
[9435]clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; “hrfermatiesm=
[9436]the disclosure of which vould constitute an unwarranted invasion
[9437]of privacy of third partics; and the identity of and information
[9438]furnished by sources pursuant to ar assurance of confidentiality.
[9440]ARIGINAL FILED IN
[9442]a
[9443]Ll ~ Tae~Attorney General : on
[9444]2- ApEn POPERR af “hie AK SEner a? 1j- Bufile 62-116395
[9446]ry
[9449]ttn oy"3 Ky Wi tam OtConnor am:dal (14) CONTINUED OVER
[9451]| NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 187
[9454]» .
[9455]Sevfator Walter I. Mondale
[9457]Z£ you wish to have any of the material reconsidered,
[9458]it would be appropriate to discusd this matter with the Attorney
[9459]Goneral,
[9461]Our records also revoaled a classified document fron
[9462]the Department of State pertaining to you. We have reforred
[9463]this docuwent to them with the request that they communicate
[9464]with you directly.
[9466]Bnelesures (39)
[9468]NOTE: fea Director, FBI, to the Attorney General memorandum
[9469]dated 7/16/75, captioned, "REQUEST FOR INFORMATION IN FRI oO
[9470]FILES BY SENATORS GARY HART, WALTER B. HUDDLESTON, CHARLES .
[9471]HeC MATHTAS, WALTER P, HONDALE AND ROBERT MORGAN, MEMDERE OF
[9472]THE U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTER ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES."
[9473]DRWmth
[9475]ot Senator Mondale is the subject of Bufile 94~-$0482 and
[9476]is shown as a viotim in Bufiles 9-44396; 5~52508; 9~-54758,
[9477]fhe original of excised documents released to the Senator are
[9478]in Bufiles 1~11800-2375; 9-52508—-1;2; 9-54750- 1;2;3; 61-3176-
[9481]200-454565-463; (105~25263~1047; L246; 1418; 1LO5-74565-2757 76s)
[9482]157-4-33-A-Washington Post and Times Herald 5-24-61; 157-7-6-43-25.
[9483]Sea memorandum Mr, MeDarmott to Mr. Wannall dated 6/3/75,
[9484]and 6/19/75 regarding classified material pertaining to Senator
[9485]Mondale exempted from disclosure. Also see Mr. MeRermott to
[9486]Mx. Wannall memorandum dated 6/16/75 captioned "Congressman
[9487]Donald W. Riegle“ regarding classification review of Bufile
[9488](i05-229897. Serials 81_p.6; 114; 117 p. 216; 113; 140 ep 2487
[9489]143 of Bufile 405-229907) Rotor to Senator Mondale.
[9491]By letter dated 5/14/75, CIA furnished 23 FRI documents
[9492]concerning Senator Mondale which they had surfaced in a review
[9493]of their Files in connection with a FOIA request from Senator
[9494]Mondale to Mr. Colby, Director of CIA. SA T. U, Bresson
[9495]advised CIA by telephone of our pending request for information.
[9497]ty letter dated 7/14/75 to Department of State reference
[9498](fos-198989-8}as referred to them for action.
[9502]NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 188
[9505]i ‘ 1 7" : ” ee 7 _ _ . i : . - ney a oe .
[9506]Fe gs 2, _ OT 1 - Mr. Farrington. (detached)
[9507]‘ Fo .° 2 = Mr. Wannall (detached)
[9508]~ ,1 = Mr. Mintz (detached)
[9509]1 -' Mr. Hotis- (detached): .-
[9510]1 - Mr. Daly (dejtached)
[9511]- Jaly. 16, 3975
[9513]= fo nen . .. | . , i: - Mr. Cregar (detached)
[9514]} Baron ROBERT MORGAN | Co.
[9515]x Se bby? ee
[9517]: ie made to the letter to the
[9519]_ Attorney Genazal tad Hay 28; 1975+ sigeed by
[9520]' Senators Prank Church ang John G - Tower.
[9522]og SEE aT
[9523]reve 0. records pertain. te you a.
[9524]which we are authorized to release. Other information - .
[9525]concerning you ts eteupt, from diavlosure pureuant
[9526]to Title 5, United States Code, Saation 5$2 {b) (2), .
[9527]and (b} (7) ic) and (b}). ‘These. exemptions allow the .
[9528]withholding of material which relates solely to the -
[9529]internal boraonnel xules and practices of an agency:
[9530]exeupts information thea disclosure of which would vo
[9531]constitute an unwarranted invasion’ of  poreonel privac privacy -.
[9532]of third parties; and exempts information which would
[9533]discloses the identity of a confidential source, and -
[9534]_informstion fornished under circumstances of . .
[9535]confidentiality. oO
[9537], Other Gocunente in our central . records
[9538]- Feveal that while in the official capacities of .
[9539]Attoxney General for North Carolina and Jadge for —
[9540]Harnett County, North Carolina, you were one of the
[9541]subjects in three Civil Rights investigations
[9542]conducted in 1956, 1971], and 1973. You were advisod
[9543]‘of the 1956 and 1973 investigations. The 1971 -
[9544]investigation was veferreda to the Criminal Division,
[9545]Department of Justice, for adjudication. to ‘oniy. -
[9547]omaman rm 3 7S 6 ep oj om >
[9549]° rafexrences concerni Zou per
[9550]Civil Rights aint in 29746) an. catovtion letter: .
[9551]received by you 31970 threatening Governor Robert
[9553]Seott; and tZformation xegarding your resignation
[9554]from the Office of the Attorney General of
[9555]Horth Carolina ‘to run for the United States Senate;
[9557]1- he Attorney General. my, iy ? a
[9558]2 = The Daputy Attorne General . . (pet
[9559]Attn: Susan M. deuser NOT RECORDEE”
[9561]q ; . :
[9562]| «Atent KR. William fe) ‘Connor 46 WAR 49 1976 7
[9563]1+ “ Bufile 62-116395 ; . cmos
[9564]pe ae: :mlh (14) ; . _.. SEE NOTE PAGE TWO ——
[9566]NW 88296 Docla: sguene Page 189 - ; Co, Le .
[9569]Senator Robert. Margan
[9571]“-R€-you wish to have any of the material.
[9572]‘reconsidered it would be appropriate to discusa this
[9573]mattex with the Ateouney General.
[9575]Snclosuxes (13) res
[9577]NOTE: See Director, FBI, to the Attorney General letter
[9578]‘dated 7/16/75, captioned, "Request for Information in —
[9579]. ‘FBI files by Seriators Gary Hart, Walter.D. Huddleston,
[9580]. Charles McC. Mathias, Walter F. Mondale and -Robert
[9581]Morgan, Members of the U. S. Senate Select Committee
[9582]“on Intelligence’ Activities." DRW: mlh-
[9584]‘Morgan, is subject “of Bufiles. 44- 13052, 44- 50587,
[9585]- 44- 57418 and 94-68460. He is also mentioned in eleven :
[9586]other files. These files contain no derogatory information,
[9587]and our relations with the Senator have been cordial.
[9590]NW 88296 Docid:32389624 Page 190 ;
[9593]16,
[9594]1 -~ Me. Vannall (Detached)
[9596]1 = Me. Mintz (Detached)
[9598]1 - Mr. Dotis (Detached)
[9600]Ll +lir. Daly (Detached) \
[9601]Ll Mr. Cregar (Detached) “\?
[9602]SEBEQR VALLE D. PUDDLUSTON 1 - Pr. Farrington ™~
[9604]July L975
[9606]t
[9608]ee Detached,
[9609]| es a )
[9610]') Reference is-rade to the Upteer to the
[9611]q ixttorney General dated Nay 28, 1975; siqned by Fenators ‘,
[9612]‘\ Frank Church and John Tl. Tower. \
[9613]K A review of the central files ef the BI
[9614]fr vevealed the enclosed records pertaining to you. Those ol
[9616]portions which have been deleted are] the remainder of the
[9617]files ara euerpt from disclosure pursuant to the provisions \
[9618]of the Preccom of Information Act, Title 5, United States
[9619]Coie, Sockion 552 (b} (2), (6) {5}, and (6) (7} (Cc), (P} and (F). \
[9621]Subsection (b})(2} exerets docurents which relate \
[9622]solely toe the internal rules an¢ practices of our agency. XN
[9623]Subsection (b) (5) exempts inter-agency and intra-aqency x"
[9624]reroranda the disclosnre of which would have a dotrimental nN
[9626]effect upon the developoent of policy, quidance and admini-
[9627]Strative direction. Subeections (6) (7) (Cc), (©) and (®)
[9628]allow withholding information the disclosure of vhieh
[9629]would constitute an unvarranted invasion of personal
[9630]privacy of those individuals interviewed or nontionad
[9631]duxing the course of an investication; roveal the identity
[9632]of and information furnished by confidential seurces; and
[9633]divulge investicative techniques and procedures.
[9637]ORIGINAL FIRED By
[9639]Z£ you wish to have any of the matorial
[9640]reconsidered, it vould be apprepriate toa discuss this
[9641]ratter with the Mtetorney Ceneral.
[9643]Inclosuras (13}
[9644]i - The attorney General
[9646]2~ The Deputy Attorney General eet
[9647]Nttention: K. William o'Connor n [fl i =
[9648]Attention: Suson iM. Mauser ir “ ~ .
[9650]FIOT RECORDED
[9652]46 MAR 19 i376
[9654]Feel
[9656]Gj Bufile 62-116395
[9658]Fee Note Page 2.
[9660]bi MARS op9)
[9662]NW 88296 Docid:32983624 Page 151
[9667]-. ‘s, @
[9669]Senator Walter B. Huddleston
[9671]NOTE: See Director, FRI, to the Attorney General memorandum
[9672]dated 7/16/75, captioned, “Request for Information in FBI Files
[9673]By Senators Gary Hart, Walter D. Huddleston, Charles McC. Mathias,
[9674]Walter F. Mondale and Robert Morgan, Members of the U. S. Senate
[9675]Select Committee on Intelligence Activities." DRW:zmih.
[9677]Senator Huddieston is identical with subject of
[9678]Bufiles 166-5980, 94+-67291, and 94-1-676~-300. Huddleston
[9679]was contacted by Bureau liaison to offer any assistance
[9680]to the newly elected Senator, which is standard Bureau policy.
[9681]Huddleston's Executive Assistant called the Congressional
[9682]Service Office on 1/9/75, and requested a speaker from the
[9683]PBI to address the Kentucky Chamber of Commorce Convention.
[9684]Speaker granted. Huddleston was alleged to have taken a
[9685]bribe of $15,000 while he was a State Senator in Kentucky.
[9686]Several persons approached him to find out if they could
[9687]establish a bank charter. His supposed reply was that this
[9688]could be accomplished for a certain amount of money. The
[9689]bank charter was eventually established and one of the
[9690]individuais who originally approached hin, hand-carried the of
[9691]$15,900 in cash to him at his office. On 9/5/73, the
[9692]. Department advised the FBI that it desired no more invest-
[9693]he igation in this case at that time. Senator Huddleston was
[9694]never interviewed regarding this matter. Excised documents
[9695]taken from 94-67291—3,2,1; 94-1-676-300; and 166-5980-9,7,5,4,
[9697]and 1.
[9699]88296 Docid:32989624 Page 192
[9705]- Wannall (detached)
[9706]. Mintz. (detached)
[9707]Hotis (detached)
[9708]Daly (detached) ©
[9709]Cregar (detached)
[9711]RR RRE
[9713]ed de
[9716]wai TS UQLASSTFIED RIGS GeO i
[9717]WHERE SHORE SLHSRWL SEs: ik ke B.
[9719]Caaf
[9722]ia
[9724]y 16, 1975
[9726]i
[9728]SENATOR CHARLES Mec. ACTA, 3 aR.
[9730]. x review of the central files of the PBI has been
[9731]conducted to locate records pe to you in accordance
[9732]with the letter to the Attorney General dated May 28, 297%,
[9733]signed by Senators Prank Chureh and John G. Tower.
[9735]. enclosed is one copy each of 52 documents from our
[9736]files. -The deletions which have been made were based on | the.
[9738]ty Jor
[9741]noe se U7,
[9742]SSIRED
[9743]CLASSIFY
[9745]. Freedom of Taformation Act.
[9747]SY
[9748]ON:
[9750]AAditional information concerning g you which is a
[9751]contained in our central records is exempt from disclosure as
[9753]4 provided by Title 5, United States Code, Section 552 (b) ah.
[9754]‘5B (2), () (5). tb) 2) (€) and (b)(7)(D). ‘These exemptions
[9755]=  gilew withhelding of information classified pursuant to -
[9756]Executive Ordex; information related solely to the internal
[9757]rules and practices of this agency: information within the ©
[9758]-Ramoranca not available through
[9759]a 2 during litigation: information the
[9760]Siaclogure of which could constitute an unwarranted invasion
[9761]of the personal privacy of a third party; and the identity
[9762]of ang information furnished by individuals under cireun-
[9763]- stances of confidentiality.
[9765]CLA
[9766],
[9768]a Ne
[9770]yo
[9772]Also. our records contain two documents from the
[9773]United States Dapartment of Justice concerning you which have
[9774]been referred to the Attorney General,
[9776]x¢€ you wish to have any of the material reconsidered
[9777]Enclosures (32)
[9779]1- Attorney General
[9780]2 = The Deputy Attorney General _
[9782]bat 163 1S
[9784]Attention: Susan M.. Hauser
[9785]Attention: K. William O'Connor NOT RECORDED
[9786]G)- susie 62-116395 - . 46 MAR 19 976
[9787]rar (14) © ; . Lo .
[9789]; | al |
[9790]61 MARQ 3 976.
[9792]WNW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 193 \
[9794]oy bites
[9796]ORIGINAL FILED my |.
[9799]it would be appropriate to diacuse this matter with the Attorney
[9805]Farrington (detached)
[9807]x
[9809]i
[9812]y
[9814]. NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 194 Copa te Tbe
[9818]SENATOR CHARLES MC CURDY MATHIAS = "3.4
[9820]1, $ ; .
[9821]NOTE: See Director, FBI, to the Attorney General letter
[9822]dated 7/16/75, captioned, "Request for Information in FBI
[9823]Files by Senators Gary Hart, Walter D. Huddleston, Charles
[9824]McCurdy Mathias, Walter F. Mondale and Robert Morgan, Members
[9825]of the U. 5S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities,"
[9826]DRW:mlh. Mathias is the subject of the following Bufiles:
[9827]945767 "Victim, Extortion” (3 serials); 9-47912 “Victim,
[9828]Extortion" (4 serials); 94-49643 "Victim, Extortion-Racial
[9829]Matters" (5 serials); 9-53432 “Victim, Extortion” (3 serials);
[9830]56-5105 "Possible Violation of Title 18, USC 602 and 603, |
[9831]Election Laws” (3 serials); 89-2560 "Possible Victim, Congres-
[9832]sional Assassination" (5 serials); and 94-54474 *R-Maryland*
[9833](13 serials). He is being furnished excised copies of the
[9834]following references: 9-53432; 9~45767; 9-47912:. 56-5105;
[9838]74060-589, 1168, and 1276. U. S. Secret Service documents
[9839]are being given per Robert Goff on 6/26/75, with "No objection
[9840]from USSS," 9/49543-1 and 4, UL. Miller, CIA Legal Office,
[9841]contacted SA D. R. Williams 7/15/75 concernino{FRI LiMs
[9842](dated 12/13/67 re Kerekes, “IS-HU"; 2/6/69 re Bubnov, "IS-R";
[9843]2/18/70 re Soviet Diplomatic activities, "IS~R"; 4/17/70
[9844]re Romanian Diplomatic Activities in the United States, "Is-
[9845]Romania"; and 6/8/72 re Peoples Republic of China Mission)
[9846]maintained in their filesy] they are in general terms referring
[9847]to documents in CIA response to Senator Hathias. He was
[9848]advised our review will cover these documents. Mathias is also
[9849]identified in the following references which are being denied:
[9850]73-15725-5, 100-429998-82 p.6, (05~-36731-429, 134-22930-15,7 G
[9851]100~434886-54 , (T05-18784-754, 105-124338-120, 105~229897-77 ”
[9852]ep.136, 105~-10828-1970, 89-2560, 65-74060-1205 p.49, and
[9853]95~45505-24. Justice Bepartment documents contained in 56~
[9854]5105-1 and 62-115695~4 are being referred. Per addendum to
[9855]memo from lir. McDernott to Mr. Wannall dated 6/19/75
[9856]the (b)(1) exemption is being utilized.
[9859]OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 :
[9860]9, JULY 1573 ED'TION
[9861]"GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
[9862]‘ "ED STATES “oon
[9864]Memorandum
[9866]TO Depyty Attorney General ,
[9867]i¥liam O'Connor
[9868]rector Kelley
[9869]FROM
[9870]Dougta Marvin
[9872]Attached is a
[9876]with the Senate Select Committee.
[9878]Please provide ‘your comments to me by
[9880]11:00 a.m. on Thursday,
[9882]° t
[9883]} Attachment f
[9885]"Dep. AD
[9886]Dep. AD
[9887]Asst. Dis.:
[9888]Admin.
[9890]Ext. Affa
[9892]Gen. Inv.
[9893]Ident.
[9895]Training
[9896]“| Telephone
[9898]| euapsunl?
[9902]Bf 4 Oe" Bocid:32989624 Page 195
[9904]Comp. Syst.
[9906]Files & Com,
[9908]Inspection ____
[9910]Spec. Inv.
[9912]Director Sec'y __ |
[9914][Kevot eater nb Girton
[9916]July 17.
[9918]pout
[9920]DATE: July 16,
[9922]oa.
[9928]6 o- (to F957
[9932]— Wr. Cdrrr
[9933]1-17-73 gd,
[9934]Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan
[9936]1975
[9938]| Raee Bi]
[9940]"62-6 395% 414
[9942]® AUG 5 1975
[9945]296 Docid:32989624 Page 196
[9946]a 5 a eae cn
[9948], | | orf
[9949]AUL 26 scanteon 6 CONTA TNE
[9951]: HEREIN TS UNCLASSIFIED
[9952]PROPOSED PROCEDURE paraye\t| 00... ByS¥ SKz pwede
[9954]The Committee will request those documents to which it
[9955]wishes access.
[9957]The Department will furnish access to those matters
[9958]requested to: -
[9960](a) the members of the Committee where it is deter-
[9961]mined by the Attorney General that the matters
[9962]are peculiarly sensitive; ;
[9964](b) in all other cases, the appropriately -cleared
[9965]staff will have access to the materials.
[9967]The Committee staff shall select those documents which
[9968]it deems pertinent to the Committee's inquiry and
[9969]necessary for the examination of witnesses or the
[9970]eStablishment of certain facts during the course of
[9971]the inquiry.
[9973]These documents may be reviewed and studied in Room 4171
[9974]of the Hoover Building and such notes may be taken as
[9975]deemed appropriate by the staff.
[9977]The notes.will be left in the secure room of the Hoover
[9978]Building during the study.
[9980]Upon completion of the study, the staff can prepare a
[9981]summary of the information which it considers appropriate
[9983]for Committee use.
[9985]The summary will be checked with senior Bureau executives ;
[9987]to ensure the protection of national security matters,
[9989]confidential sources of information and interests of
[9994]individuals in privacy. ‘Thereafter, the summary may
[9996]be removed to the Committee's office and all the
[9997]staff notes will be destroyed. The original documents
[9998]may be veferred to as extensively as necessary to
[10000]check the summary.
[10002](8) The Committee staff shall designate those documents that
[10004]‘it wishes to make copies of for transfer to the
[10005]Committee's offices. Before the copies of the docu-
[10006]ments are taken to the Committee's é£fices, appropri-
[10007]ate excisions of the documents will be made. If an
[10008]agreement cannot be reached at the staff level with
[10010]respect to the appropriate excisions, the matter shall
[10012]be taken to-the Attorney General and the Committee.
[10015]OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 . 5010-106 a
[10017]MAY 1962 EDITION »
[10019]GSA GEN, REG. NO. 27 a
[10021]UNITED STATES GO . Assoc. Dir.
[10023]m Dep. AD,Adm.
[10025]Comp. Sy, —
[10026]to +: MR, CALLAHAN pate: 1/24/75. aie: >
[10027]. L , 4 Ident m
[10028]4 eROM J. /B. ADAMS | inspection
[10029]. Ao yo Laboratory .
[10030]{ Ye Plan. & Eval.
[10031]sugjecT:/ REQUEST BY VARIOUS SENATORS ON Ay . vee
[10032]C SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO REVIEW Gal
[10034]THEIR FBI FILES yt Upiohige Re. —
[10036]At the meeting between Mr. Kelley and the Attorney
[10037]General, along with their respective staffs on 7/21/75, the Attorney
[10038]General determined that there should be broad disclosure of material
[10039]in the files of those Senators on the Senate Select Committee requesting
[10040]access to same and that in the main the Bureau should only restrict
[10041]access to revelation of live informants or information which would {
[10042]reveal the identity of live informants. In addition, he indicated that vi
[10043]in his review of the file on Senator Hart he noted certain derogator t
[10044]information on relatives which he felt Senator Hart should not see. |)
[10045]Also, there may be criminal investigations against one of the SenaforS
[10046]of such a nature that revelation should be restricted.
[10048]It was agreed that Deputy Assistant Attorney General .
[10049]O'Connor and I should review the files in order to determine problem _
[10050]areas and Mr. O'Connor would consult Wi gudee Tyler as,needed. “ty?
[10052]Files have been reviewed and there is general agréement
[10053]that almost all of the information can be revealed with certain limited
[10054]excisions taking care of problem areas, Mr. O'Connor-advised=on=cues
[10055]7/24/75 that he has been in touch with the Committee and they will make
[10056]arrangements to come to my office and review their fifes AUGm> pPesence
[10057]along with Mr. O'Connor. Senator Goldwater has addgelebis BIS aLoatn®
[10058]list and Mr. McDermott has been advised in order to insuré
[10059]material is accumulated. .
[10063]None. Information only.
[10065]Sr
[10066]1 - Mr. McDermott } Soe " A
[10067]<a a
[10068]4
[10069]ye
[10071]JBA:am,
[10072](3) faa
[10074]. fj .
[10075]1975
[10076]8 A AUG 3 cia 2989624 Page 198 j
[10078]OPTIONAL FORM NO, 10 my 5010=106 q
[10079]MAY 1962 EDITION .
[10080]GSA GEN, REG. NO. 27
[10081]G s Assoc. Dir.
[10083]UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT se08: Di
[10084]Dep. AD inv. .
[10086]Comp. Syst. ——
[10087]9 J . MR, CALLAHA pars: 7/29/75 File & Com:
[10088]ra
[10091]Vows Gen. Inv
[10092]~ pe ni ie ae
[10093]Flom : H, N, BASSETT we ae ele weg
[10095]ao ho oratory —.—
[10096]oy fi Legal Coun. ——
[10098]Plan, & Eval,
[10099]SENSTUDY 75 ar oa ‘ Spec. Inv. —_—_
[10101]Training
[10105]al Telaphone Rm. —
[10107]Director See’y _.
[10109]In compliance with instructions of Mr. J. B, Adams
[10110]as relayed through SA S, F, Phillips, there are attached hereto
[10111]Field Inspector's Manual #763 and Headquarters Inspector's Manual
[10112]#225 for turn over to the Senate Select Committee, These manuals
[10113]are currently charged to SA F, B, Griffith and should be removed
[10114]from his property record,
[10116]RECOMMENDATIONS:
[10118]1, That this memorandum be routed to the Intelligence
[10119]Division to turn over the manuals to Senate Select Committee
[10120]representatives,
[10122]2. That it also be routed to the Administrative Division f )
[10123]for removal of the manuals from SA Griffith's pr Le ty 4 ic’ Se H q
[10125]REESE,
[10126]wi Enclosures 2 AUG 5 1s
[10127]us
[10128]y 1- Mr, Adams ¢
[10129]“ 1- Mr. Walsh
[10130]1- Mr, Wannall
[10131]$ 1-Mr. Cregar Z0
[10133]di, wy
[10135]ie)
[10136]whe Ah 5 4. ge. 499
[10138]THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE S$ b .
[10140]WASHINGTON, D. C, 20505
[10142]Intelligence Community Staff
[10144]DCI/IC 75-2675
[10145]28 July 1975
[10147]Yoni on ad
[10148]es
[10150]MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of the USIB Ad Hoc “Coordinating
[10152]. Group
[10153]SUBJECT : Select Committee Requests
[10154]Attached for your information are four requests, two of Yp
[10155]which are levied on the Central Intelligence Agency, one on af
[10157]the Department of Defense and one on the Internal-Revenue Servicas™
[10158]The Central Intelligence Agency requests are dated July 22 and 25.
[10160]The request to the Department of Defense is July 22, and the
[10162]Internal Revenue Service request is dated July 9.
[10164]™ | : , | 4 ba “les 2 9 3 HM
[10165]LLovicth Mancih © AUG 5 1975
[10167]* Harriett D. Mowitt,,
[10169]Executive Secretar PE SSS seen
[10170]Ad Hoc Coordinating Group
[10172]on Congressional Review
[10174]Attachments: a/s ~ a
[10177]ee yg 62 - (0039S
[10178]mE juve
[10179]x to. ,
[10180]8 4 AUG5 1975
[10182]NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page; "200
[10185]he
[10187]+ OTISS, PIKE @ 7
[10188]Fnisy District, New York uo
[10189]. v . x
[10193]WAYS AND MEANS . _ Congress of the Ginitesy States + OFFICE MANAGER
[10195]NW 88296 Doc{l:32989624 Page 201 _
[10197]Washington, D..C. 20505
[10199]25 RAYSURN House Orrice BulLoInc
[10200]WASHINGTON. D.C. 20315
[10201]AREA Cope 202
[10203]MRS, BETTY ORR
[10205]Woause of Representatives 203 Wesy Mam Srnec
[10206]7 . RiverHeag, New Yor« . 11903
[10208]| Washington, BC, 20515 5° ‘Feversione; 727-2932
[10210]sa .
[10212]mee Sully 22, 1975
[10214]Mr. William E. Colby eg peg, hee
[10215]Director. . , “
[10217]RO ad
[10218]Central Intelligence Agency ee ae
[10219]aes oe
[10221]Dear Mr. Colby: . .
[10223]. As Chairman of the House Select, Committee on
[10224]Intelligence, I am hereby requesting that the Committee s.
[10226]_ be furnished with copies of all documents and materials
[10228]provided to the Senate Select Committee to Study Govern-
[10229]mental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities.
[10231]I would like to make a priority request for
[10233]all documents and materials related to budgetary authority
[10234]-and procedures, all budget information for the past 15
[10236]years, and any General Counsel's opinions of the authority,
[10237]mandate, or charter of the Central Intelligence Agency.
[10238]Until such time as the materials can be delivered to the
[10239]Committee, I request that arrangements be made for the
[10240]Committee staff to review them at the Agency.
[10242]oy Your cooperation in this matter is very much
[10243]‘appreciated. , ; oo
[10245]Sincerely, -
[10247]' Otis G. Pike
[10248]Chairman
[10250]ENCLOSURE, ”
[10252]_ :
[10254]* . “ . . an Soyo
[10255]Pears enugen, fOANO, CHAIRALAN © .
[10256]DOHA Ds sows, TEXAS, VICE CHATNMAN
[10258]@ put
[10260]ta. WANT, Maca, TOWANDd 1, NaAKaM, Jat, TEIN, D | | Vi, “Bias _3
[10261]Sag §. MONOALK, MINN, TANHY COLOWAT iN, AIC. with ww Le = es we ae XY
[10262]FER 1, HUDOLESTON, KY, CHARLES MCC, PATIIAS, Jit, MD, LY
[10263]Mae PeOuo'wN, ii moos RICHAKD S. BCHVRIMEIT, PAs ,
[10264]HARTY, COLO, . ert Be iz CS Service L Dy Vale Cab &
[10265]2 WILLIAM G, MOLLER, STAFF DInECTOR Coote PI RSETLES Bebe vay Le (- -
[10267]po LO mo, Sot GELICT COMMITTER TO : an
[10268]Rol tre et st J et | SSTUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH . yy
[10270]i are an ce TE tee te RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES ° Ar ~14
[10272]: ws . wae wee )
[10274]rursvany tos. RAS. Mt, HTH CONCRESS)
[10278]WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510
[10280]vouly 25, 1975
[10282]“Mr. Valter Elder, Poe
[10283]” Central Intelligence Agency
[10284]iangley, Vixginia
[10286]Dear, Walt: 2
[10288], - Whis is to confiim - our tetdpnone conversation of suay 25; “2975, | . _
[10289]tn which I conveyed to you the requests of the Senate Select Committee “ 2
[10290]~ for fou. and complete information on the, following fophes: ° mo
[10292]os Any “‘pinaneiig by owA,. “@irect or indixect, of vu. a Sat
[10293]- owned, including proprietaries, domestic or foreign sO
[10294]we +» media, including but not Limited to books; articles, a —
[10296]“y publishing houses, @ilns, TV PrOBrens, scholarly” : ee
[10297]Journal. 8, magazines: and news. services Le
[10299]Be - “Pu and cont ete information, ‘airect or ‘ndirect - we
[10300]_CTA use of United States citizens who are news- So
[10301]‘paper men, journalists, movie, f¥ or any other .. Pane
[10302]* ‘persons. -comected: with the media’ in any way. Ree
[10303]“Fell and complete intonation on the direct or ine
[10304]* Girect involvement of the CYA with U.6. citizens who
[10305]were connected directly with “religious groups, including
[10306]“churches and missionaries, with activities or “relation-
[10308]hips in a foreign countries. — ke Se
[10310]ies oe Tp ee
[10312]* Sincerely, oo coe nae ae oS
[10313]BM
[10315]William G.
[10320]a + = a ¥ ce . ” - . . . ’ . a et . . a . ’ .
[10322]i vow we : mo - ne = :
[10324]Moe w . a - so + . .
[10326]foe r-4 « a . . 5 . 3A25 Ravountt House Orrice turteteet
[10327]f ve. . a aye You . . : . oy . Po ol 7 Waotaneron, D.C, 20318
[10329]e “hog yee c . ’ . : 7 Lo AnraA Cove 202,
[10331]tay . oo . ~ ‘ - + ‘ : . Telernons, 225-3026
[10332]we. sunirrees o , re wee wi ; . . MRS. bry onA
[10333]? ; ws AND mee . ; Congress of the Ghirttety tates . . OFFICE banaern
[10334]a | , Botise of Representatives ggg buRTMIET Orr
[10335]Rivenued<p, New York
[10336] _ Hashinglor, AE. 20515 retention mia
[10338] “Suly 22,-1975-
[10339]The Honorable James R. Schlesinger
[10340]Secretary of Defense . .
[10342]The Pentagon
[10343]‘Washington, D. Cc,
[10345]Dear Mr. Schlesinger:
[10347]7 As Chairman of the House Select Committee on
[10348]Intelligence, I am hereby requesting that the Committee
[10349]‘be furnished with copies of all documents and materials
[10350]provided to the Senate Select Committee to Study Govern- |
[10351]“<2. “mental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities,
[10352]p . in relation to the National Security Agency, the Defense
[10353]‘Intelligence Agency, and Armed Services intelligence
[10356]coe TI would like to make a priority request for all
[10357]documents and materials related to budgetary authority and
[10358]procedures for the past 15 years, and any General Counsel's
[10359]opinions of the authorities, mandates, or charters of the
[10360]National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence. Agency, .
[10361]or Armed Services intelligence components. Until such time
[10362]as these materials can be delivered to the Committee, TI
[10363]yequest that. arrangements he made for members of the Com-
[10364]mittee staff to review them at the respective agencies,
[10366]. Your cooperation in this matter is very much _
[10367]appreciated. mo re
[10369]. “Sincercly,
[10371]_ ie An *. as
[10373]tis Pike ean on
[10374]Chairman ‘109 GS
[10376]Lyd
[10378]. Gale 37s
[10379], oe ENCLOSE |
[10381]IW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 203. . . ney te
[10382]WWW cass Uocifiodsadbed Mage fUs0
[10385]im, eeeeibenieniael
[10387]- ‘ cr rr La
[10388]. “ .
[10389]Pritngy a. tant, MICH. HOWARD H, HAKEN, St, THY a . . .
[10390]WALT. MoNGALE, Ait, DAPRY COLOWATEN, ANZ, . 2 . . . .
[10391]ve WALTEM ©, UODLES TOM, KY. es oe Sieamen a 'e * . . _
[10393]HONTRT HONGAN, BCs R . BORER, a _ f r
[10394]|g Senin, eto, Anilea Blates Beneke
[10395]fm ‘ WILLIAM G. MILLER, GTAFF DIRECTOR “ . . : ~ : ; .
[10396]: FREDERICK A. ©. SCHWARZ, JR. CHILE COUNSEL, . aan * SELECT COMMITTEE TO" °-
[10398]CURTIS fe BMOTHERS, MINOHITY COUNSEL STUDY, GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
[10400]RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
[10402]. ao - 6 - ‘o. *  (runsvanr YO 5S, RES, 2, soTH CONGRESS) . .
[10403]MDE u 5 ae WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510 :
[10405]; bi
[10409]: a t
[10411]z - an eo rr nr ceri oe raed
[10413]; pan | “o}20/0 8 Pome L a “guly 9, 1975
[10415]“Mr.’ Thomas V. Glynn
[10417]Assistant to the Commissioner ‘9 2"
[10419]Internal Ravenue Service ~ a ee
[10421]Washington, D.C. 20224 . re a tN ee
[10422]Dear Tom: _ ne ee
[10424]. . | We would appreciate your advising the Select
[10425]Committee of ‘the following regarding possible IRS
[10426]participation in or furnishing information to the Intelli-
[10427]“gence Evaluation Committee: 1) whether the IRS had a
[10428]' xepresentative on the IEC and, if so, who; 2) if there
[10429]' was such a representative, what duties he’ had; 3) what
[10430]information, if any, IRS furnished to IEC. -We request
[10431]that the IRS identify for inspection and copying by the
[10432]Select Committee staff all documents relating to or- .
[10433]constituting information furnished by IRS either ’
[10434]‘directly to IEC or furnished to persons in the Treasury
[10435]- Department or elsewhere which was ultimately provided to
[10436]. 'ZEC. , - a ; . on
[10438]; The Committee has reason to believe that at a
[10439]March 26, 1971, meeting of the IEC, Mr. Eugene fT. Rossides,
[10440]then Assistant Secretary of the Department of the Treasury,
[10442]. Enforcement and Operations Division, was introduced to the
[10444].. TEC as the person responsible for, inter alia, intelligence
[10445]. gathering by IRS, and that he would be called upon to make
[10446]".. , Contributions from that source to the Committee's work.
[10448]- Essentially, the Committee requests that the IRS
[10449]come forward with all information it has regarding direct
[10450]Or indirect IRS participation in the. work of the IEC.
[10452]NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page‘204- * a we ee
[10455]~ 7 eS eS . —_————s = =
[10456]A "ye at . toe on .
[10457]an. roe ga eon te wt \ _ et eta, . te ,
[10458]. : aan . wae . . ;
[10459]‘ an! * . . ' : . mo,
[10460]: ne . : ot . .
[10461]A : .
[10463]Joe" > Me, ghomas V. Glynn ee
[10464]. ‘Page two - oo, Soos ss July 9, 1975 2)
[10466]a
[10468]. . Mr. Arthur Jefferson of the Select Committee
[10469]staff is the individual primarily concerned with the
[10470]“investigation of IEC and will be in touch with you soon
[10471]xegarding the development of the requested information.
[10472]' Sincerel roe 2
[10473]é te ay / , 7
[10474]: Arthur W. Harrigan, Jr.
[10475]i
[10476]a ~
[10478].
[10480]NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 205
[10483]‘ 1 -Mr. Adams-~Encs.
[10485]1 - Mr. Mintz-Encs.
[10487]1-Mr. CregarEncs.
[10488]1 - Mr. Wannall-Encs.
[10490]The Attorney General July 21, 1975
[10492]1 - Mr. Hotis-Encs.
[10493]Director, FBI 1 - Mr. Daly-Encs.
[10495]O :
[10497]UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT re
[10498]COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL veg ey Emer ae
[10499]OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO .
[10500]INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES -yol2 Joo. SP rami
[10502]During the executive session of captioned Committes
[10503]on July 16, 1975, members of that Committee requested that they be
[10504]furnished answers to the following questions:
[10506]() How are files established on Congressmen?
[10508](2) How long are such files maintained?
[10510](3) Who has access to the Congressional files and
[10511]"official and confidential files?? \)
[10513]N
[10514]Attached for your approval and forwarding toto
[10515]Committee is an original of a memorandum in response te the above- }
[10516]mentioned questions. A copy of this memorandum is enclosed for mK x
[10517]S
[10518]a
[10520]your records.
[10522]av
[10523]~~ mr : QR: “& ONS
[10524]ee fad er OE - on
[10525]Enclosures {2) la2 a LL Hh ON
[10526]pula mene - ‘
[10527]§2~-116305 .
[10528]- @ AUG 5 1975 _
[10529]1 - The Deputy Attorney General Zoom, eee \\ (NO
[10530]Attention: K. William O'Connor IN x +.
[10531]| Asses. Dir, Special Coungel for We
[10532]aaa Intelligence Coordination INN >
[10533]“usn.. NOTE: The attachment to the enclosed letterhead memorandum entitled
[10534]cone. Sree — "NEB Information-Gathering Practices with Respect to Members of Congress”
[10535]Filse& com, _-, WAS Prepared in conjunction with the appearance of the Attorney General and _,
[10536]pens Inv. he Director before the Subcommittee on Civil Rights and Constitutional Rights - a
[10537]Inspection A OL the House Judiciary Committee. This statement is responsive to questions :
[10538]venaay (1) and (2). Question (3) was answered in coordination with Files and Communi.
[10539]Plan. & Eval. “oo Division. LA
[10540]Spec. Inv. —_ §
[10541]Training t
[10542]egal Coun, a Ae a ay
[10543]Teloshene Rm. = pat who “4 é nik oR ORY
[10544]Di age x HG BAT QFEM \eLETyPE UNIT (_] "ho asses
[10545]NW.88296 Docld:22989624 Page 206 |
[10547]1 -Mr. Adams
[10548]1 - Mr. Wannall
[10549]1 -Mr. Mintz
[10550]1 -Mr. Cregar
[10551]1-Mr. Hotis
[10553]duly 23, 1975
[10554]1 -Mr. Daly
[10556]UNITED STATES SGUATE SELECT COMLETTAL
[10557]£OQ STUDY COVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
[10558]WITH RESPOCT FO DVERLAICONCE ACTIVITIES {S5C}
[10560]Earring the appearance ofore the SSC on Liay 16, 1975,
[10561]the following questions were asked by raembers of that Subcommitice:
[10563](2) How are files established on Congressmen?
[10565](2) How font ave such files maintained?
[10567](3) Who has access to the Congressional files and
[10568]“official and confidential Hies''?
[10570]Attachad is a response in questions ane and two and,
[10571]in part, question three. With regard te that portion of question three
[10572]concernins access to the official and confidential files, be adviced that
[10573]those files are maintained in the Special Tile Room of the Federal Eurcad
[10574]of Investigation, Files and Coramunications Division. Access to these
[10575]files is strictly limited and thoce only having a necessity for aceoss may
[10576]veview these files. A log is maintained as to who has access to the
[10577]oficial and contidential files.
[10579]vA Enelos we
[10581]a 62116395
[10582]| 39 serve l&
[10583]f be, RE
[10584]i 1 - Fhe Attorney General sp eT A Weg
[10585]| ne walt Joo. Skane” ie
[10587]Agsoc. Dir.
[10588]Dep. AD Adm. _
[10589]Dep. AD Inv.
[10591]Asst. Dir:
[10593]Admin,
[10594]Comp. Syst. ___
[10595]Ext. Affoirs —.
[10597]Fils & Com. Q [-
[10601]Laboratory __. PVD: dk: (9)
[10603]Plan. & Eval. —
[10605]Spec. Inv.
[10607]Training
[10609]it |
[10610]Legal Coun. ___ "’ “
[10612]Telephone Rm. __ -
[10614]Director Sec'y__. +-«s-«sMAPL ROOMC_) TELETYPE uNIT(_] GPO 984-545
[10615]NW 88296 Docid:329896024 Page 207 a
[10618]aay Pair SCE NTNCOID et cn sere 2 Wen OE nn ee eee Ee re et ne rae
[10622]PO USSS DEE TV: Wee ny Lar nnns
[10624]“9 88 st Y _ / Va _
[10625]_ Nw 88296 Dochd:32989624 Page 703  - / G 3 A) ad Oo La
[10627]’ FBI INFORMATION-GATHERING PRACTICES
[10628]’ WITH RESPECT TO MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
[10630]There is a total of more than 6,500,000 files at
[10631]FBI Headquarters. Most of these contain information gathered
[10632]during investigation of matters--including some 100 types of
[10633]criminal, security, and applicant-employee cases--assigned to
[10634]the FBI by laws of Congress, directives of the President, and
[10635]orders of the Attorney General. : :
[10637]The remainder of these more than 6,500,000 files
[10638]include: .
[10640](1) Personnel files regarding FBI applicants and
[10641]employees;
[10643](2) General files regarding FBI contacts and
[10644]Gealings with a variety of individuals and
[10645]organizations concerning matters that do
[10646]not require or involve FBI investigation; and
[10648]; (3) Administrative-type files, such as those of a
[10649]policy nature, those containing statistical
[10650]reports, those detailing FBI cocperative
[10651]services, and the like. .
[10653]An unknown, but extremely small, percentage of
[10654]these more ‘than 6,500,000 FBI files contain information
[10655]regarding present or former Congressmen and Senators which
[10656]mays have been accumulated prior to, during, or after their
[10657]tenure in Congress.
[10659]‘WHAT FBI FILES CONTAIN ON CONGRESSMEN:
[10661]FBI Files contain substantially the same types of
[10662]information regarding Senators and Congressmen as is contained
[10663]in them about other citizens. Basically this information falls
[10664]into the following categories:
[10666]Violations of Law
[10668](1) Allegations that Congressmen or Senators have
[10669]violated Federal laws within the FBI's jurisdiction. ~—
[10671]ENCLOSURE y ‘ )
[10674]Ro -@ é
[10675]i . Oo .
[10676]i .
[10678]“The FBI investigates such allegations whether they
[10679]relate to Members of Congress or any other person, The
[10680]results of these investigations are furnished to United States
[10681]Attorneys and/or other prosecutive officials of the Department
[10682]of Justice. The investigation may establish (a) that the
[10683]Congressman or Senator has, in fact, violated a Federal law,
[10684](b) that a Federal law has been violated, but that the involve-
[10685]ment of the Congressman or Senator in that violation cannot be
[10686]established, (c) that a Federal law has been violated, but
[10687]that the Congressman or Senator clearly had no involvement
[10688]in its violation, or (d) that no violation of Federal law
[10689]was committed.
[10691]Included among such allegations invclving Congress-
[10692]men and Senators have been the following types of violations
[10693]within the FBI's jurisdiction: Bank Fraud and Embezzlement;
[10694]Conflict of Interest; Conspiracy to Obstruct Justice; Election
[10695]Laws; Fraud Against the Government; and Interstate Transporta-
[10696]tion in Aid of Racketeering,
[10698]TS RE RTE Sei Sr ae Rie A sae I ee
[10700](2) Violations of Federal laws within the FBI's
[10701]' jurisdiction involving Congressmen and Senators as victims.
[10703]The results of FBI investigations of such violations
[10704]are furnished to United States Attorneys and/or other prosecu-
[10705]tive officials of the Department of Justice. In many instances,
[10706]the original complaint in these cases is received from the law~
[10707]maker~victim himself; however, if the information originates
[10708]elsewhere, the FBI promptly notifies the Congressman or, Senator
[10710]_involved of the threat which has been made. In addition; other
[10711]law enforcement agencies which have a legitimate interest in
[10712]f 7 these cases are notified of the threat.
[10714]: ; “Violations of the Congressional Assassination, Kid-
[10715]naping and Assault Statute, Bomb Threats, and Extortion are
[10716]among the crimes within the FBI's jurisdiction which have
[10718]E involved lawmakers as victims.
[10720](3) Allegations that members of the staffs of
[10721]Congressmen or Senators have violated Federal laws within the
[10722]FBI's jurisdiction, or that these staff members have been
[10723]victims of such violations.
[10725]The PBI investigates such allegations and furnishes
[10726]the results to United States Attorneys and/or other prosacutive
[10727]officials of the Department of Justice. Where appropriate, the
[10729]Congressman or Senator involved is also advised of the investi-
[10730]gation.
[10732]NWEO296 Docld:32989624: Page 209
[10735]Ta waned Mate went het lS en Meee oe
[10737]Fate = eke aE Hck Sain! Clem web ee ewer fe Me a eRe URN, Raw A tnbate coe Somme one oak vim
[10739]Tao ae
[10741]7 7 ry | é
[10743]Congressmen and Senators may be interviewed by the
[10744]FBI in these cases involving Congressional aides--just as they
[10745]may be interviewed in connection with other types of FBI
[10746]investigations~-and both the fact of, and the results of,
[10747]such interviews are noted in the file reflecting the FBI
[10748]investigation.
[10750](4) Allegations that Senators cr Congressmen have
[10751]viclated laws within the jurisdiction of other investigative
[10752]agencies.
[10754]These allegations are brought to the attention of
[10755]the agency concerned--Federal, state, or local. Such allega-
[10756]tions are not investigated by the FBI. However, the coopera-
[10757]tive services of the FBI Laboratory, Identification Division,
[10758]and National Crime Information Center are available to other
[10759]law enforcement a4 agencies in the investigation of these, as
[10760]well as other, crimes.
[10762]Applicant Investigations
[10764](5) Present and former Congressmen and Senators
[10765]often are considered for positions in the Executive or
[10766]Judicial Branches of the Federal Government which require:
[10767]that the FBI conduct a thorough background investigation
[10768]of them. .
[10770]Dependent upon the nature of the position involved,
[10771]the results of these investigations are furnished to the White
[10772]House, the Department of Justice, and/or other appropriate
[10773]Government agencies.
[10775]" (6) Congressmen and Senators often are interviewed
[10776]in the course of applicant-type investigations regarding
[10777]other persons who are being considered for Executive or
[10779]Judicial positions--as well as during applicant-type investi-~
[10781]gations conducted by the FBI (at the request of the Committee
[10782]chairman involved) concerning staff members of a limited
[10783]number of House and Senate Committees. Both the fact of, and
[10784]the results of, the interview of the Congressman or Senator
[10785]are noted in the file reflecting the FBI's investigation.
[10787]Security Cases
[10789](7) Either prior to, during, or subsequent to their
[10790]tenure in Congress, there may be files pertaining to security-
[10791]type matters which relate to members of the House and Senate,
[10793]or Congressmen may be identified in FBI files as actual or
[10794]intended victims of acts by subjects of security-type cases.
[10798]NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 710
[10803]. >
[10804]"4 seo . eo - Pan
[10805]. 4 ry
[10807]The Statutes covering such matters are Title 18, Section 2383
[10808]‘(Rebellion and Insurrection), Title 18, Section 2384 (Seditious
[10809]Conspiracy), and Title 18, Section 2385 (Smith Act -
[10811]Advocating overthrow of Government by force).
[10813]Se he nee eR le aN AL ata OA CA Pe EN Ae erred a
[10814].
[10816]Oral oF Weitten Contact
[10818](8) An unknown number of FBI files contain copies
[10819]of correspondence between the FBI and Congressmen and Senators
[10820]concerning a wide variety of matters which include bills
[10821]pending in, or passed by, Congress; personnel matters; the
[10822]Bureau's cooperative services; and FBI policies, procedures,
[10823]and investigations. Many of these letters from Congressmen
[10824]and Senators have been prompted by inquiries which these
[10825]lawmakers have received from constituents or other interested
[10826]citizens.
[10828]The FBI's files also contain memoranda regarding ,
[10829]telephone calls and personal contacts the FBI has had with
[10830]Congressmen and Senators regarding the above-cited variety
[10831]of matters, -
[10833][at nereeereeaiehbmeleend weitebone we ESSE
[10835]‘Miscellaneous Tnformation About Congressmen
[10837](9) An unknown number of FBI files contain informa-
[10838]tion reflecting favorably or unfavorably upon the. character,
[10839]integrity, and loyalty of Senators and Congressmen-~which
[10840]information does not require investigative action at the time
[10841]received on the part of the FBI or other law enforcement
[10843]- agencies. It consists of:
[10845]a a ode
[10847](a) -Information contained in unsolicited letters
[10848]received by the FBI from persons and organi-
[10849]zations representing a variety of backgrounds,
[10850]viewpoints, and walks of life.
[10852]{(b) Information volunteered orally to FBI Agents by
[10853]the same broad range of individuals and organi-
[10854]zations as cited directly above.
[10856]{c) Newspaper clippings, as well as data from
[10857]magazines and other news dissemination media.
[10859](d) Miscellaneous information received from FBI con-
[10860]fidential informants and/or other sensitive sources.
[10862]FN Renna eaelle tate abc Rae fie Ste sia kin badtnciatttin enn Rie 4
[10864]NW 86296 Docid:32989624 Page 2711
[10866]Po we @
[10868]Fingerprints of Congressmen
[10870](10) The files of.the Identification Division
[10871]contain the fihgerprints of an unknown number of Senators
[10872]and Congressmen. Some of these relate to their having been
[10873]arrested for violations of Federal, state, or local laws.
[10874]Others are noncriminal in origin and largely pertain to
[10875]their having served in the Armed Forces or having been appli-
[10876]cants for various positions. These fingerprint cards have
[10877]been submitted to the FBI by Federal agencies, as well as-by
[10878]iocal, county, and state criminal justice agencies, throughout
[10879]the United States.
[10881]Fingerprint records are maintained by the FBI's
[10882]Identification Division, and they are kept entirely separate
[10883]and apart from all other files and records of the FBI.
[10885]ct phe a eaeeio ampey ee tne MR See et em X=
[10887]HOW INFORMATION ABOUT CONGRESSMEN REACHES FBI FILES:
[10889]There are two basic types of information regarding —
[10890]Congressmen and Senators in FBI files:
[10892]investigations involving the Congressman or Senator as either
[10893]a subject or a victim. This includes information of
[10894]pertinence to the case which the lawmaker himself has
[10895]furnished to the FBI.
[10897]t . *
[10899](2) Unsolicited information,
[10902]l
[10903]| (1) Information which the FBI has solicited during
[10904]i
[10905]r
[10907]fhere are many sources of the unsolicited information
[10908]that is included in FBI files: ,
[10909]. 4
[10911]a as
[10913](a) It is volunteered by citizens who are being
[10914]interviewed during investigations of matters
[10916]having no relationship to any of our Nation's
[10917]lawmakers.
[10919](b) It is volunteered in communications sent to the
[10920]FBI by individuals and organizations.
[10922](c) It is included in news articles and other reports
[10923]publicly disseminated by our Nation's news media
[10924]which come to the FBI's attention. ;
[10926](dq) It is received from FBI confidential informants
[10927]and, very infrequentiy, from telephone taps not
[10928]directed at a Congressman which have been
[10929]installed with authority of a Federal Court
[10930]and/or authority of the Attorney General.
[10932]A iene Means ene weanbieceditaiecdirimy Miswann a aticwbatteekataeiandtl oe, se
[10936]. > na . ’ -raqpe
[10937]NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 212 oe ee ; a ]
[10940]7
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[10943].
[10945]MLA ASL nhac Leama.
[10947]An,
[10949]re worry atare
[10951]a entered Kasha! ieee RRL OMUTAARL Kat Houde.
[10953]ee eee ae Seeking mi
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[10959]S é
[10961](e) In the case of information contained on finger-
[10963]print cards, it is sent to the FBI's Identifica~_
[10965]tion Division by authorized contributors,
[10966]including criminal justice agencies throughout
[10967]the United States.
[10969]‘HOW AND WHERE INFORMATION ABOUT CONGRESSMEN IS MAINTAINED:
[10971]Information regarding Congressmen and Senators is
[10972]included in the official FBI files--totaling more than
[10973]6,500,000 in number-~-that are maintained by the Files and
[10974]Communications Division on an upper floor of the J. Edgar
[10976]Hoover FBI Building.
[10978]The area where these files are maintained is staffed
[10979]and supervised 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, to assure
[10980]continuous security. .
[10982]General Index
[10984]The essential key to the effective use of these FBI
[10985]files is the Bureau's General Index which consists of 58
[10986]million index cards and which is located on a different floor
[10987]from the files themselves in the J.: Edgar Hoover FBI: Building.
[10988]To determine what files (if any at all) contain information
[10989]regarding an individual Senator or Congressman, it is
[10990]necessary to search the name of that lawmaker in the General
[10991]Index. ,
[10993]The General Index is staffed and supervised 24 hours
[10995]‘a Way, 7 days a week, to assure continuous security.
[10997]Rules Governing Use of Files
[10998]; These official FBI files are available only to FBI
[10999]personnel-~and they are available on a."need<-to~know" basis
[11000]only.
[11002]The Files and Communications Division maintains a
[11004]“record of files that have been charged out by Headquarters
[11006]personnel. Such files must be returned to the Files and
[11007]Communications Division as soon as possible; and during the
[11008]period that a file is charged out, it cannot be left even
[11009]momentarily in an unlocked room. If retained overnight,
[11010]the file must be kept in a locked cabinet inside a lockéd
[11011]room.
[11013]NW 88296 Dochd:32969624 Page #13
[11016]at heniencadenB unapmabtem duh nas hams nae ET ee
[11018]Pee Orn SO OO RE STee DeSean 7 SreWe wn WP tat. RWMDET CES Ver 8 -viSaae Sennen STOne eran
[11020]ee a ee tee rath ne AMR, eamlaiimafnteaattalM Daa 2 Lye nthe AREA Tah td AERC KAS
[11022]_ NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 214
[11024]The charge-out record is temporary in nature and
[11025]is. destroyed five days after the file has been returned to
[11026]the Files and Communications Division.
[11028]WHY THE FBI RETAINS INFORMATION REGARDING CONGRESSMEN:
[11030]The information regarding Congressmen and Senators
[11031]that is maintained in FBI files can be divided into three
[11032]major categories: ;
[11034](1) The results of investigations (criminal-,
[11035]security~, and applicant-type) involving a Congressman or
[11036]Senator as a subject or victim;
[11038](2) Information regarding a Congressman or Senator--
[11039]in addition to that gathered during investigation(s) of the
[11040]lawmaker involved-~-which the FBI has disseminated to other
[11041]Federal agencies (such as to the Internal Revenue Service if, for
[11042]example, the information involves a tax-related matter) and/or to
[11043]state and local law enforcement agencies (such as the police
[11044]department covering the lawmaker's home community if, for example,
[11045]the information involves an alleged threat against the lawmaker's
[11046]house or other property); and :
[11048]*(3) Other information that. the FBI receives from,
[11049]or receives about, a Congressman or Senator that is included
[11050]in the FBI's filess-without having been either investigated
[11052]or disseminated by the FBI.
[11054]The reasons this information is retained in FBI
[11055]files can be explained in legal and administrative terms,
[11056]as well as in practical terms.
[11058]Legal and Administrative Reasons
[11060]All investigative files and other records of the
[11061]FBI involving Congressmen.or Senators are within a class
[11062]of records which-~under the FBI Records Retention Plan
[11063]developed in 1969 by the National Archives and Records
[11064]Service of the General Services Administration--are con-
[11065]sidered of enduring archival value to ensure their preser~
[11066]vation.
[11068]This FBI Records Retention Plan was prepared under
[11070]the authority contained in the Federal Records Act of 1950,
[11071]which is contained in Title 44 cf the United States Code. °
[11073]- F=-
[11076]{ a . -_'* s
[11077]moe ” @ .
[11078].
[11080]i
[11082]j
[11084]| Included among the FBI records to be retained
[11086]{ under the Records Retention Plan formulated by the National
[11087]Archives and Racords Service are those which would have
[11088]historical value and would document policies,: procedures,
[11089]functions, legislative and budget matters, and the like--
[11091]| and reports of investigations of both civil and criminai
[11092]activities, including "crimes involving, and other records,
[11093]{ concerning, the Presidents and Vice Presidents of the
[11095]| United States, members of and delegates elected to the
[11096]Congresses of the United States, cabinet heads, judges and
[11097]i other officials appointed by the President."
[11099]j .
[11101]In «stablishing the FBI Records Retention Plan,
[11102]| the National Archives and Records Service noted, "Ordinarily
[11103]the records of a Federal agency that are worthy of permanent
[11104]retention amount to a rather small percentage of the total
[11105]volume of records generated. Many of the records produced '
[11106]by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, however, relate to
[11107]a number of controversial if not important aspects of the
[11108]history of the United States, particularly to the role of
[11109]the Federal Government in its relation to its citizens.
[11110]To be sure, mauy years will pass before these records can
[11111]be made available to the public for historical and other
[11112]serious research, Nevertheless, the archival value of these
[11113]records will not decrease nor will interest in them dissipate."
[11115]BD ee, me Bia Feet aml elemental oat eee
[11117]In addition, the FBI is also required by the
[11118]Federal Records Act to make records containing adequate and
[11119]proper documentation of its administration and operations
[11120]which, among other things, are designed to furnish informa-
[11121]tion necessary to protect the legal and financial interest
[11123]of the Government and of persons directly affected by FBI
[11124]activities.
[11126]SD at ome eS ce
[11128]Practival Reasons for Retaining Information
[11130]Logic, reason, and lessons learned from more than
[11131]six decades 0! law enforcement experience dictate that the
[11132]FBI should maintain records of investigations it has conducted
[11133](category #1 cited at the top of page 7) and records of
[11135]information it has disseminated to other agencies {category #2
[11136]on page 7). .
[11138]Such records enable the FBI to answer questions. or
[11139]chailenges (including those arising in judicial or administra-
[11140]tive proceedinzs) invoiving investigations FBI Agents have
[11141]conducted and;or information the FBI has disseminated to other
[11143]hin EFS EE EY SS OE SYS AAR ETT a SL LST ROR AD CF 2 NSS OEY CA SAS
[11145]NW 88296 Dochd:32989624 Page #15
[11148]” a . ‘
[11149]. .
[11150]we
[11151]mo. - .
[11152]. . > . .
[11154]agencies. Such records also endble the FBI to furnish additional
[11155]: copies of investigative reports or other information that has
[11157]4 been disseminated-~should additional copies be needed by the
[11158]original recipients or by other official agencies. Furthermore,
[11159]the information contained in these files often proves of
[11160]assistance in future investigations. '
[11162]Less obvious may be the reasons why the FBI retains
[11163]the third category of information about Congressmen and
[11164]Senators (data that has neither been investigated nor
[11165]disseminated by the FBI) cited on page 7.
[11167]If such information is of an administrative nature--
[11168]that is, if the information indicates the [awmaker is interested
[11169]in a specific FBI investigation, a specific area of the FBI's
[11170]jurisdiction, or specific PRI policies, practices and procedures~-~
[11171]it is filed for:
[11173]Te eA a a meena a A AN Witane ance tmin
[11175]{1l) the information and advice of FBI employees in
[11176]connection with future contacts or correspondence with that
[11177]Congressman or Senator;
[11179](2) consideration"of FBI personnel in connection
[11180]with possible future changes in FBI policies, practices, and
[11181]procedures.
[11183]te Sie alte gaa
[11185]If the information is of a personal nature~-that is,
[11186]if it reflects upon the loyalty, character, or integrity of a
[11187]. lawmaker-~it is included in FBI files for the following reasons:
[11189](1) The information may prove of value when a
[11190]. present or former Congressman or Senator is considered for
[11191]a position in the Executive or Judicial Branch of Government
[11192]which requires that the FBI conduct a background investiga-
[11193]tion of him.
[11195](2) The information could prove of value in
[11196]solving future crimes committed against the Congressman or
[11197]Senator--or against members of that lawmaker's family.
[11199](A person who berates and defames a lawmaker would be a
[11200]“ logical suspect if that lawmaker--or another Congressman
[11201]or Senator whose views coincide with his--becomes the
[11202]target of actual or threatened violence.)
[11206]ate cdeneRaiamacte >
[11208](3) The information could aid the FBI in solving
[11209]crimes committed against other persons. (For example, the
[11210]handwriting, typewriting, stationery, and/or distinctive
[11212]et Ant A
[11214]a
[11216]} NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 216 oe ; -
[11219]= aoeeart se Sa eeateet tether ap ART GATED at, me meer nt Garena ta ae
[11223]ies naehiae EN a OT we ae
[11225]phraseology in a letter defaming a Congressman could assist
[11227]the FBI in linking the writer of that letter to a subsequent
[11228]extortion note or written bomb threat that,does not involve
[11230]any member of Congress.)
[11232](4) The information frequently provides valuable.
[11233]insight into the character, stability, and reliability of
[11234]the person who has furnished it to the FBI. Thereby, it is
[11235]of value and assistance to the FBI in future contacts with,’
[11236]contacts by, or inquiries regarding, this individual.
[11238](5) The information provides a useful administra~
[11239]tive check on the performance of FBI field offices--
[11240]particularly with regard to the important consideration of
[11241]whether they are being fully responsive to the public needs.
[11242]Supervisory personnel regularly review complaints or
[11243]allegations received from the public to insure that the
[11245]appropriate action was taken--if, in fact, action was called
[11246]for. .
[11248]WHAT ITS REQUIRED TO DESTROY FILE INFORMATION:
[11250]Barring a new law of Congress and/or receipt of a
[11251]revised FBI Records Retention Plan from the National Archives
[11252]and Records Service, the FBI cannot unilaterally undertake
[11254]the destruction of information regarding Congressmen and
[11255]Senators in its files,
[11257]s
[11259]- 190 -
[11261]W 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 217
[11264]5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION |
[11265]WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535
[11267]Addressee: Senate Select Committee
[11268]LTR LHM Memo Report dated 1-21-75
[11269]us. S nate Select. Committee to study overnmen
[11271]Caption 4f Document: Operations With Respect to rat
[11273]Activities. Concerning 3 questions asked by that
[11274]Subcommittee,
[11276]EBI
[11278]Originating Office:
[11279]Delivered by:
[11281]Received by:
[11283]Title:
[11284]Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FB!
[11286]Sa a cmc ner En Ft Ht we
[11289]encrosune 2 - (| le 2%57~ U7]
[11291]NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 718
[11294]NW 68296 Docld:32989624 Page 219
[11296]SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE
[11297]CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE BEFORE COMPLETING.
[11299]Intelligence Community Staff FROM: ‘
[11300]Central Index
[11301]PET
[11303]SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees
[11305]1. HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term. If a document was made available 2. DATE PROVIDED
[11306]for review but not transmitted, so note.)
[11308]fgg [svcuwen [[errerime | [inwenview[ [resto | [omer | 2/28/75
[11310]+ TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)
[11312]- IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer,
[11313]interviewee, testifier and subject)
[11315]Memorandum ond encl@sura
[11317]. TN RESPONSE TO (list date and item number if in response to formal request, other- . CLASSIFICATION OF
[11318]wise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.) INFORMATION (enter
[11320]SSC oral request on 7/16/75
[11322]Codeword)
[11324]u
[11326]. KEY words (enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are
[11327]used underline for emphasis)
[11329]Gperating proceivres
[11331]. SUMMARY (See reverse side before completing this item)
[11333]PBL infernuation-gathering practives with respect
[11334]to mesbera of Congress
[11336]62-116395
[11339](4) ORIGINAL VIA LIATSON TO CENTRAL, COMMUINTTY INDEX
[11340]IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75
[11342]3791 (6-75)
[11349]INSTRUCTIONS
[11351]e Type or print clearly in ink.
[11352]® Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
[11353]e Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required,
[11355]e "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the
[11356]information. :
[11358]e If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to
[11359]HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a
[11360]copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.
[11362]SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY ~ enter brief narrative statement -describing,
[11363]substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community
[11364]matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests
[11365]should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be
[11366]noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here,
[11367]e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether
[11368]interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript
[11369]is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional
[11370]pages may be attached if necessary.
[11374]NW 88296 Docld?32989624 Page 220
[11377]_ ‘WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
[11379]Intelligence Community Staff 7 _ _ . DCI/ Ic 75- 2613
[11380]7 pe , 29 July 1975
[11382]at. 0, y ISN
[11383]MORANDUM FOR: --Member's.of the. USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating
[11384]é ; ' Group .
[11386]. _ ; moe |S 7
[11387]SUBJECT: : Security Clearances ieee : OR COTATNED
[11389]NAN
[11390]S . an or reeate : wes ALAILY
[11392]Attached i's an updated listing of staff personnel certified
[11393]¢ by the Staff Dir ector/Senate Select Committee as meeting the
[11394]requirements of Executive Order 10450 for access to classified
[11395]information up to and including TOP SECRET, Some of these a)
[11397]No
[11398]>_< individuals have been certified as meeting the requirements of a
[11400]DCID 1/14 and have been provided the appropriate briefing.
[11402]we . ., .
[11403]; . John.M. Clarke r
[11404]~ ° Associate Deputy to the DCI
[11405]for the Intelligence Commaymity HE
[11407]“Attachment | , us "gp Ud. Ll - Le rie
[11409]LO GE |
[11410]| ial, ie | =
[11413](e a be Uf oe 7 |
[11415]NW 88296 Docid:32989624 1 ‘Page 221 re _ Oo!
[11418]Staff Members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities who have received a security
[11419]investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation within the past five years and are certified as
[11420]meeting requirements of EO 10450 for access to classified information up to and including TOP SECRET.
[11422]’. Name
[11424]| . Aaron, David wae
[11425]' @..,5 William -
[11427]‘Bayly, John
[11429]Banoff, ‘Barbara bee i Sue
[11431]Barkey, Howard rr ae
[11433]Baton,. Frederick”. ,
[11435]| Benz, Charity 1.
[11437]Betts, Richard K. os
[11439]Birdsell, "Wayne » a
[11440]:.iB Ps rasieta, Susan vO
[11441]Bouschard, Samuel" .
[11442]‘Bris sett, Belva —_
[11443]. Brooks, ‘Nancy’ a
[11444]*Brown, C. Harold a
[11446]‘ Brown, Maxine’. .
[11448]NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 222» .
[11450]Cc ompartmented
[11452]oo ee
[11453]ar ad
[11455]4 eo ae, if
[11457]Clearance
[11459]; a Designated Briefed. .
[11461](SI, TK, B)
[11462]B 4/15
[11464]B, ant.
[11465]BB/19. os:
[11466]. B6/26
[11468]BL oo
[11469]B7/14:,
[11470]SSB 6/10,”
[11471]' B 6/10
[11473]B 5/23°
[11477]BO6/2. 0°
[11479]a: 5/23. Yous
[11481]IC STAFF VERIFICATION OF CLEARANCES
[11483]Date and '
[11485]‘ Place of Birth - , Security No. -'-
[11486]* genie
[11487]asp.
[11488]| 1226-44.
[11489]12-20-45.
[11490]So 26-17.
[11491]yaaa |
[11492]7023-46.
[11493] B+15-47
[11494]11 52-06
[11496]_ 3212-24
[11498]6-23-41
[11500]2-14-40
[11502]646-38 |
[11504]8-8-28 -
[11506]Ti.
[11507]NJ. -
[11509]“DC
[11510]‘Cal.:
[11511]“Mo. |
[11513]Conn. .
[11515]NY
[11517]pa
[11518]Ohio
[11519]Maine
[11521]Ok. ,
[11523]Ky
[11525]. Ohio’
[11527]. Ida..
[11529]Social
[11531]- 550-44-7971,
[11533]45-30-3377: T
[11535]| 57860-2308
[11539]| - 490-01-6758
[11541]o  aapa-szen, 00
[11543]| 053-38-7410' .
[11544]*-916-38-2619.
[11546]“. §7g203-1841 ”-
[11547]256-92-0841
[11548]007-18-3292
[11550]: 313-38-6773 | _
[11555]29. YUL 1975"
[11558]Compartmented So, Oo - - 29. JUL t975 |
[11559]' a we - Clearance me Dateand. .- Social: 9° 9. 7"
[11560]Name poet _ _— ' Designated Briefed - Place of Birth - Security No.
[11561]; CE _(SL TK, By . ; “
[11562]‘Bushong, David aa wo RE BTA 10-47 (2) Ohio’ 9)  © 289-40-1203 So
[11564]Carpenter, - Maxgaret,
[11566]ren _ 8-27-44" 2 Cale §55-62-6129
[11568]: Carter, Barry - - B 4/24 2 wa, “12-14-42 _ “Cal, 7 no 567-56-8854 -
[11570]@. cic, ieabe re fp ie rs) A=18-46, 0 WE) 390-46~2235, .
[11572]; Culbreth, Elizabeth | CE a ae 7B 7/2: i 6-23-42'. . NGC we '240~64~9040.. :
[11574]Davis Lynn : ; _BANTR9E- 96648 PR, 042-36-9155 : TF Badge -. |
[11575]OB 6/26 - - 2° 949452. (R Minn.’ -°""., 47160-1688 ~ a
[11577], Dawson, Thomas, - are a we te
[11578]7! Dawson, Rhett. 2 008 7 os BSg/19 12- 9-43, Ti. OT 38163494329
[11580]“DeMarco, James. re: bia 312-43 ~ W.Va. | 286-36-9097
[11582]Dennin, Joseph Francis, _ $B 6/239 or 1629-88 SONY 4, 56762-5353
[11584]f
[11585]fo DeOres, ‘Mary | - -B 6/26 3s, w, 6+13-47,. Ohio 287-42-6258 te,
[11587] Mecsive, Joieph 3 EL nor _ a eB 6726 | Doo 222-45 . Del. si. 28-8430
[11588]. Dick, Jamies oe /B 6/26. ° s+ 7425-47 Mase. |. 029-36-6745
[11589]ve Dillon; Molly - . . aan SE ye 27 8 6/10. 4-16-51 Vac. | 150-38-4588
[11590]“Doolittle, Patricia. : . et ao oy Te 7 on os ; g-12-43" * NC - ; oe 213-242-6360 .
[11591]° Dwyer, Daniel | ° 7 me os * pana” - 8-24-52 * : Mas.” 023-44-8792 _ . | a
[11592]r ‘Enuff, John. a 7 ra _ B.5/23 630441 DG. -345-34-2468 - - . _
[11594]. Epstein, Michael Taylor RL oy MB-6/26, 0 7", 3410-37) Mass. (026-428-6318
[11596]| wR?  SAPRoseoia Bags 223° : fo oo - \ oe "8-30-46 DC ee 215446~2988 en
[11598]"Name
[11600]Fenn, Peter
[11602]Ford, Harold
[11604]Ow eeermalawemememme tines meteni wale a nO ee nates earcwRnN  o ©
[11607]_ NW 88296 Doctd:32989§24 Page 224
[11609]Gitenstein, Mark Henry’
[11610]‘ ant, Bruce
[11612], award
[11613]‘Harrigan, Arthur
[11614]Hatry, Audrey Helen
[11616]Inderfurth, Mark K
[11618]. Iverson, ‘Portia « '
[11620]Jefferson, Arthur M.:
[11622]. Johnson, Dérothy
[11624]‘ Johnson, ‘Loch
[11626]@vre%05 ,» Anne
[11628].Kayden, Jeffrey |
[11629]Kelley, Robert, -
[11631]Kieves, Lawrence
[11633]7 Kirbow, Charles
[11635]‘Kirchheimer, Joseph ¢ _
[11637]Compartmented -
[11638]Clearance
[11640]Designated Briefed
[11641]Te, (SI, TK, B)
[11643]BA/24 |.
[11650]“B.5/28 . a ~
[11651]nan B7/2 00
[11653]sana
[11654]BSNS
[11655]Se
[11656]pa eee
[11657]“TB 6/267
[11659]'B 4/29 a
[11660]3B 5/28
[11662]= B 5/19 -
[11663]B 5/19" os
[11664]“B'A/24 es
[11666]Date and .
[11667]Place of Birth
[11669]ace 12-47 -
[11670]23-23-21,
[11671]327- 46 ,
[11672]6 16-16.
[11673])11,27-50
[11676]9-29-46 -
[11678]3216-44 |
[11681]“11-6-46
[11683]. 10-29-40
[11685]1-42.48
[11687]* 10-2-22 _
[11691]“Cal
[11693]NY
[11695]> The.
[11697]Ma, .
[11699]ala.
[11700]"Neb.
[11702]Germany 2
[11703]ONY
[11704]Ma.
[11706]t
[11707]NC
[11709]W.Va.
[11711]N. Zealand ”
[11713]Ma.
[11715]NYS
[11717]Ind.
[11719]Ga.
[11721]Social
[11723]Security No.
[11725]" ) 213-50-1123 |
[11726]a 550- 16-4630.
[11734]245-74-5617.
[11735]233-84-0847
[11736]. 141-34-1031
[11738]“/ 56 6-62-0478
[11740]065-40-7277°
[11741]559-54-1348-
[11743](+5 68-38-6464
[11746]“. 359-03-7843 -
[11748]29 JUL 1975"
[11751]we ne
[11752]t
[11753]°.
[11758]a)
[11760]TF Badge, * ™.
[11763]Compartmented -
[11764]Clearance
[11765]oh Designated Briefed a
[11766]hres (SI, TK, BY...
[11768]“Name -
[11770]Koppal, Diane VB 6/26 300 6-24-48
[11774]e
[11776]bo . LaVoy, Diane ~
[11778]t
[11780]. Liebengood, Howard.
[11782]Liombard, Charles -.
[11784]" “Lynch, Mary 316-2680
[11785]MacDonald, Naldeen _
[11786]|=, Madigan, Michael Jarhes: A LB43 1S
[11788]a Marshall, Benjamin”. . - 5419 ‘at!
[11790]Mar shall,‘ Burke : ; h- 1-22°5*
[11791]* _Masctoli, Cynthia . . no 1-451 ve -
[11792]: A Son, Judy a | | ’ 1-646 S
[11793]. Maxwell, Elliot Everett . : 7224-46 oe
[11795]: Mayo, Betty - ‘, . .- £2013-22 0° ;
[11797]‘Mecham, Martha Evané: --2x11-40 ny
[11798]_ Miller, William. Go
[11800]" Monaco,: Patricia
[11802]| NW 88796" Docta:sig9dge2a" Pai
[11804]' Date and ..°-
[11805]af Place of Birth
[11807]- 12-29-42 7) In,
[11808]Fs 6g2~30 2 8,
[11809]W.Va...
[11811]NY
[11813]. DC aan
[11815]Cale 8
[11816]© Bel5-BL 6.”
[11818]ry “10417235 “
[11820]Social
[11822]: . . ‘ a
[11823]Venezuela .
[11826]Brazil,
[11827]DC. *
[11829]A
[11831]“.< 578-60-7280
[11833]NY (wi Shs 133-34-4225.
[11835]Ohio / 1.) ° 27-14-4062
[11837]NY.
[11839]No .
[11843]: 165-40-3119 oe
[11846] 250-3821344 -
[11848]£042-34-3797, "
[11850]“+, 485-28-4503 0
[11852]8 B77-44-5241 7
[11857]- 109-26-4349°
[11859]Sl 15726-81005
[11861]ay ul ters.
[11862]. * . ; Ay _ . “- .
[11863]- Security No. 2a :
[11869]Clearance
[11871]. Designated Briefed ©
[11872]Te, (8h TK, B).
[11874]Name
[11876]Moore,’ Janet a 9-43
[11878]* Massy; Michael 3 |
[11879]. ‘Oo or James, Daniel:
[11880]Orloff, Jan... o
[11881]“Owens, ° -Drena
[11883]' Peterson, Joba: F
[11884]‘Pitts, Susan _ os
[11885]» Postal, Andrew ° +
[11886]- Pyle, Christopher
[11887]Quanbeck/ Elion.
[11888]a Ralston, “Theodore ;
[11889]. Rhga, Gordon ;
[11890]‘RW#ard, Eric. :
[11891]- Ricks, “Walter wn
[11893]m 8u25-48
[11894]i 3610-45
[11896]‘Romberg, Alan ve car
[11898]Rowe, James
[11900]: Schneider, ‘Ruth ©
[11902]ode 20-35
[11904]Schwarg, Frederik Ay 0. mm
[11906]“Ral: Lae
[11908]_ Seidel, ‘Lester _
[11910]AW 88256 ‘Botid: 2508644" Page 226
[11912]Date and
[11913]Place of Birth’
[11917]Le 14c4T
[11919]] 5015-26007 .
[11920]“azear-dg
[11922]“y6e62B1 oe
[11923]- 10-31-44 Cone
[11925]“NY vas
[11927]Py eta :
[11929]Social
[11931] 231-86-8829, .
[11933]7 558- 74— 8394
[11935]242 68 3271"
[11937]“ ro
[11939]“ 565-5627707 7
[11941]Sot 01-14-4534
[11943]*.412-74- 7901.
[11945]244-74-4304_
[11947]“De o
[11949]’. Security No, |
[11953]1 239- 62~ 2498 3
[11955]1020-40=7638
[11956]128-40-4695
[11957]-,019-30-9898
[11959]a 07-30-8583."
[11961]29 JUL ig7g
[11963]. 538-48-4673°
[11965]008-32-0180°
[11966]"84-30-2047 0 2
[11968]: a 21603825204 ° ! . .
[11971]_ e- Elizabeth
[11973]Smothers, Curtis” -”
[11975].) Talley, “Martha -.- 7.
[11977]Nene ate
[11981]- Shea, Patrick -
[11983]Smith, ‘John Li
[11985]-Trueheart, William 7
[11988]- Vance, James..- ~
[11990]. Wallach, Paul 2)". :
[11992]: Ward, Fred a 7
[11994]Compartmented
[11995]Clearance m
[11996]Designated Briefed - -
[11997]f+ (SI, TK,B)- ~
[11999]Name
[12001]Wea OB A/IBS oo 2028-48
[12002]Shelburn, Frank ‘
[12004]| 6-21-49
[12005]Smith, Stephanie - oe
[12007]Snider, Lewis Brittle
[12009]Thoben, Florence *” be2210, |
[12010]omas, Robert, "’ E
[12012]Towell, Mary: . OWN 4e25=44
[12014]Treverton, Gregory .; i. 1-21-47 .
[12016]. 6-29-53
[12017]Tschirgi, James: .':
[12018]malt 4-6-36
[12020]a
[12022]88296 - Dacld:32989624 Pagé 227, | ,
[12024]530013
[12026]343-39 . ~
[12027]OOS gases
[12028]fag Be26=43 1
[12029]Ol s1en2-4s -
[12031]re ee
[12033]128160255
[12035]“12-18-18 |
[12037]5 -2404.7 >
[12041]Date and.’ 7
[12042]Place of Birth. |
[12044]“NC.
[12046]vt Md.
[12048]Va.
[12050]v DC :
[12052]tet
[12054]Ind.”
[12056]“" Tern, o>
[12058]". Golo.“ )
[12060]» Cal”.
[12062]- Wyo.
[12063]. Ohio °
[12064]“NY *
[12066]. a
[12068]Social
[12070]| 528-64-1965
[12071]“ee, 33 8-24-6934. =
[12073]| 076-42-0199 °°
[12075]ss 22-58-6476 *
[12077]24672-0956 ° |
[12079]“he 31351261857 0 FF
[12080]“21914-5186 0 780s
[12081]) 56664-7628.
[12082]“52462-2459
[12083]| 228-20-6411.. 7 4
[12084]wT 215 464-7255
[12085]"Soe 2520-16-7290° =.
[12086]"5 078-28-3950_
[12089]Let 1 288-80-9983
[12093]_ 220-38-9869 .
[12100]Security Nos 28 SUL 1975
[12102]as wo
[12107]Le. 25-88-1368 5 2
[12109]eye .
[12110]a oe
[12111]. ‘,
[12112]wee -
[12113]“ .
[12114]. on
[12117]Compartmented
[12118]‘Clearance.
[12122]Briefed.
[12123]_ (SI,.TK, By.
[12125]Date and
[12127]Place of Birth’
[12129].8-8-39
[12130]6-14-41
[12132]Social .
[12134]. Security No. -
[12136]168-30-9147°
[12137]139-30~1936
[12140]OPTIONAL FORM NO, 10 é . >
[12141]JULY 1973 EDITION «!
[12142]GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6 ps
[12143]UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT Og Sa
[12144]TO : Clarence M. Kelley, Director DATE: July 16, 1975
[12145]Federal Bureau of Investigation
[12147]Mono tg
[12149]FROM : / Edward H. Levi Ee aes ee an \r1S:' .
[12150]Attorney General ] nt . - :
[12152]SUBJECT, United statesdenate Select Committee to Study Governmental
[12153]¢ Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities.
[12155]WN .
[12156]Sx The United States Senate Sélect Committee to Study
[12157]Se Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Acti-
[12158]— NG vities (the "Church Committee") has recently requested
[12159]> certain information regarding the functions of the Attorney
[12160]INN General with respect to the supervision of and policy-making
[12161]g for internal security and intelligence activities. I would 3
[12162]appreciate it if you would prepare by July—25, 1975 the full- X=
[12163]NS est possible response to the following questions: f
[12164]re 1. What standards and procedures has the
[12165]NG Attorney General adopted for the collec- WY
[12166]RNG tion, analysis, use, and dissemination of -
[12167]ee organized crime intelligence?
[12168]yO 2. To what extent have communications between
[12169]dre the White House and the FBI or other agencies
[12170]x under the jurisdiction of the Attorney General
[12171]Y bypassed the Attorney General? To what extent
[12173]should such communications be channeled throug
[12174]the Attorney General?
[12176]a
[12178]2XseefrttoleHale, Ding wd | -
[12179]Mlose ilo us 7 e
[12182]| U §
[12183]\ iho fe ManinStot.- nf Le VC2- LAG 3 ¥s a bY
[12184]Sere Pe LIA feu ob The3hrm eek frp :
[12185]Wr PIEDRA Gve)) 037
[12187]Pe Te errr eal
[12190]2X teckowt Yo Py Dob sie i aA ie Z 1975
[12192]MULL LS 7 \yy-
[12193]wafeener ie P Se
[12195]1975 Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan
[12197]5010-110
[12199]LNW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 229 . ”
[12202]f Assoc. Dir. .
[12203]f Dep.-A.D.-Adm, .. h
[12205]Dep-A.D-Inv, 2. f
[12206]Asst. Dir: i
[12207]§ Admin, . ..
[12208]§ Comp. Syst.
[12210]FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
[12211]COMMUNICATIONS. SECTION
[12215]Ext. Atha --]
[12217]eves ; fles & Com, .}
[12219]. 7 aA Ly “ ane f
[12220]' §RBO7 AT CODED LB pays | fuente
[12221]a ra [ene # Inspection s
[12223]10216 PM NITEL JULY 39, 1975 Wome TYPE {infaliu HEL
[12225]1 Laboratory —.. f
[12227]12. { Plan. & Eval, |
[12229]DIRECTOR  (62-116395) — ple | s —|
[12231]< Ths TAPORNOIT ON OCH PP [ Teainieg E
[12233](62-2854) MREIN 9S UNCLASSIST ED | Legal Cons. fi
[12235]: ware Vola OO 2S PA. targlazg| Tlemere Be
[12236]NSTUDY . we) 9 BUDED JILY 3 lt, 1975 e ETE ae ola g macs
[12238]RE BUREAU NITEL TO ATLANTA, JULY 25, 1975.
[12240]IN RESPONSE TO REQUEST SET FORTH, EXTENSIVE FILE REVIEW
[12241]AND RELATED ADMINISTRATIVE PROCIDURE WILL ENTAD. TINE WHICH
[12242]WILL NOT ALLOW ATLANTA TO MEET THE JULY 31, 1975, DEADLINE.
[12244]ATLANTA ANTICIPATES RECOVERY AND XEROXING OF MATERIAL
[12245]REQUESTED AND SUBMISSION OF AIRTEL TRANSMITTING Same BY THE- | \/A°
[12246]QLOSE OF BUSINESS, JILY 31, 1975, WHICH SHOULD REACH TIE,
[12247]BUREAU BY AUGUST 2, 1975.
[12248]END .
[12249]PLS HOLD FOR ONE MORE
[12251]a
[12253]bp 2-1E398 -
[12255]awe Sc1a:4980624 Page 230 ee
[12260]é eee a Oar ME OF INVESe. 4 a
[12262]he ute TIONS SEO ane bar
[12263]& “ Dep.-A.D.-Adm._,
[12264]a y it tsar
[12265]. A
[12267]Dep.-A.D.-Inv._.
[12269]Five & Com 1
[12271]: Asst, Dir: !
[12273]NR GG4 SF CODE Pe Aisne a |
[12275]“gon ast - it et 2 Gan, ie in
[12277]1246 PM URGENT 7/14/75 MCC> Pe ee |
[12278]10 RECTOR
[12280]|
[12281]|
[12282]FROM SAN FRANCISCO (62-6887)  4P x 2 i
[12283]\ 4
[12284]INTELLIGENCE DIVISION - MR. W,)O2) CREGAR
[12285]— lag Pr Rugs
[12286]UNITED STATES SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OP aie Shnon as
[12287]resi r Sec'y — }
[12288]Vn RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IS EXAMINING NMEASURES ~~~
[12289]\; DERECTED AGAINST THE) SLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP) IN. THE LATE
[12290]\psos | AND EARLY 1876S IN SAN FRANCISCO = OAKLAND, LOS ANGELES
[12292]AND SAN | DIEGO, CALIFORNIA, BY THE RIELD OFFICES “OF THE FEN ee os
[12296]RE BUREAU NITEL wuLy 9, 1975, (Sacjachu fy Cu
[12298]FOLLOWING IS A LIST OF ALL LOCAL POCICE—DEPAREMENTS AND
[12299]PERSONNEL CONTACTED BY THE SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION RELATIVE To
[12300]THIS COINTELPRO: .
[12302]IN NOVEMBER 1968, UNKNOWN OFFICERS OF THE SAN FRaNCISco
[12303]POLICE DEPARTMENT WERE CONTACTED IN ORDER TO GIVE WILFRED ¢ ,) ee
[12304]HOLIDAY, ALSO KNOWN AS CAPTAIN CRUTCH, SPECIAL PRIVILEGES AT |
[12305]CITY PRISON, SEE SAN FRANCISCO LETTER DECEMBER 2, 1968, Dp
[12306]ENTITLED “COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM, BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE
[12308]GROUP, RACIAL INTELLIGENCE (BLACK PANTHER PARTY), BUFILE t#@-448996,
[12309]y
[12311]fy BN st G2 eb ra — He
[12313]-,
[12315]AT5 4202 ae
[12316]GRATE CONTAINED
[12317]HEREIN, JS UNCLASSIEIED SOP aol Jope> nae
[12318]DAT i /Z.3 8 PE. =
[12320]a
[12322]Nive ae 8 a: Mr aa24 Page 231
[12325]PAGE TWO SF 62-6887
[12327]IN JANUARY 1969, UNKNOWN POLICE OFFICERS, BERKELEY POLICE
[12328]DEPARTMENT, WERE ADVISED THAT RICHARD AND SAM NAPIER WERE
[12329]MEMBERS OF THE BPP. THIS INFORMATION WAS FURNISHED TO THE
[12330]BERKELEY POLICE DEPARTMENT AFTER AN ARMORED CAR WAS HELD UP AND
[12331]A GUARD MURDERED AND THE GETAWAY CAR WAS FOUND TO BE REGISTERED
[12332]10 RICHARD NAPIER, SEE SAN FRANCISCO LETTER TO THE BUREAU
[12333]JANUARY 13, 1969, ENTITLED "COINTELPRO, BLACK NATIONALIST = HATE
[12334]GROUPS (BLACK PANTHER PARTY).
[12336]“IN EARLY 1969, AN UNKNOWN OFFICER, SHERIFF*S OFFICE,
[12337]ALAMEDA COUNTY, CALIFORNIA, AT OAKLAND, WAS ADVISED OF THE USE
[12338]BY A FILM COMPANY (MGM) OF BLACK PANTHERS AS "PROPS" EN THEIR
[12339]FILMING OF BERKELEY RIOT SCENES, THE SHERIFF'S OFFICE IN TURN
[12340]FURNISHED THIS INFORMATION TO THE BERKELEY PRESS. SEE SAN
[12341]FRANCISCO LETTER TO THE BUREAU MARCH 19, 1969, ENTITLED
[12342]“COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM, BLACK NATIONALIST ~ HATE GROUP,
[12343]RACIAL INTELLIGENCE, BLACK PANTHER PARTY.”
[12345]IN APRIL 1969, INFORMATION WAS RECEIVED THAT THE BPP WAS
[12346]PLANNING A MEETING BETWEEN SOME OF THEIR LEADERS AND SOME OF THE
[12347]PEOPLE WHO HAD LEFT THE PARTY IN AN EFFORT TO GET THEW BACK
[12348]TOGETHER, THIS INFORMATION WAS FURNISHED TO RICHARDYWAGNER,
[12350]So 5
[12352]NW 60296 Docid:32989624 Page 232
[12357]. “
[12359]PAGE THREE SF 62-6887
[12361]OAKLAND POLICE DEPARTMENT, ON APRIL 18, 1969, WHO, IN TURN,
[12362]APPARENTLY FED THE INFORMATION TO THE BLACK PANTHER RENEGADES
[12363]WHO CONSTRUED THIS APPARENTLY AS A "SET UP" AND DID NOT ATTEND,
[12364]THIS INCIDENT IS RECORDED IN SAN FRANCISCO SERIAL 157-601-201.
[12365]ON SEPTEMBER 26, 1969, SERGEANT stan erie, oatsano POLICE
[12366]DEPARTMENT, INTELLIGENCE UNIT, WAS"ADVISED THAT INFORMATION
[12367]HAS BEEN RECEIVED THAT THOMAS JOLLY, A BPP MEMBER, WAS PLANNING
[12368]TO CONTACT PROBATION OFFICER IN OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA, TO we
[12369]REPRESENT HIMSELF AS THE UNCLE OF BELVA NEWSON, ANOTHER BPP
[12370]MEMBER WHO HAD BEEN ARRESTED, JOLLY, WHO IS NOT NEWSON'S UNCLE,
[12371]“PLANNED TO ARRANGE FOR HER RELEASE TO THEM, THIS MATTER TS
[12372]RECORDED IN SAN FRANCISCO FILE 157-601-356.
[12373]SAN FRANCISCO FILE DOES NOT REFLECT MEDIA PERSONNEL
[12374]WERE CONTAC [N RELATION TO THIS PROGRAM, ee
[12375]ek sarwonn aslbeens, LAST KNOWN BY SAN FRANCISCO 10 BE x
[12377]CN enter mr mak
[12379]ASSISTANT LEGAT, TOYKYO, WAS NAMED COORDINATOR OF THE COINTELPRO -
[12381]BPP ON Arm. 5 3908: / HE CASE WAS REASSIGNED APRIL 18, 1968,
[12383]10 FORMER lef WILLIAMVCOHENDET WHO PRESENTLY RESIDES AT 1557 BALBOA
[12384]eamnetace ne SERIES et REPS a yrKgoe ee “eet
[12386]WAY, BURLINGAME, CALIFORNIA 94910, THIS MATTER WAS REASSIGNED
[12388]TO SA LEO S\/BRENNEISENMAY 16, 1969, THE MATTER WAS CLOSED ON
[12389]MAY 1, 1971. Nabe
[12391]le .
[12392]PES—MAKE—READ-LAST-PARAGRAPH-2.ND—LENE-—3RD-WORD- READ—TOKYO—-REPT-TOKYO
[12394]NW 68296 Docld:32989624 Page 233
[12397]\ a
[12398]L \
[12399]au .
[12401]PAGE FOUR SF 62-6887
[12403]THIS MATTER WAS SUPERVISED BY FORMER SA ALBERT PC/CLARK
[12404]FROM APRIL 3, 1968 TO MAY 9, 1979. CLARK PRESENTLY RESIDES
[12405]66 ELM AVENUE, LARKSPUR, CALIFORNIA 94939, COINTELPRO - BPP
[12406]| ELM AVENUE, LARKSPUR, CALIFORNIA 94
[12407]WAS SUPERVISED BY FORMER SA DAVID Ej/TODD FROM FEBRUARY 9, 1979
[12409]TO MAY 1, 1971, TODD RESIDES AT 2¢ COZZOLINO DRIVE, MILLBRAZE,
[12410]CALIFORNIA 94930. .
[12412]| Te ee
[12416]| END
[12417]— RERFWAUTXX-WAE TAME NUTE—ON-SRD-PAGE-2-g DXX-2-y-2ND—TOL
[12418]k .
[12420]ALAS-T~LINE—~LAST-29.4-—
[12421]WORD-READ—MELEBRAEREPT-MILLBRAE—
[12423]NW 65296 Dochd:32909624 Page 234
[12426]Assoc. Dir. f
[12427]Dep.-A.D.-Adm__
[12429]i Comp. Syst.
[12430]4 xt. Affairg
[12431]Files & Com. __
[12433]NR@IS BS CODED
[12435]S:G3PM NITEL JULY 24, 1975 Inspectio
[12436]; Intell. wien
[12438]f , § Laboratory [/E
[12440]/ y j Plan. & Eval, __
[12442]| Spee. Inv.
[12443]Training
[12447]A
[12448]jn DIRECTOR 62-116395
[12450]Legal Coun.
[12451]Telephone Rm. .,
[12452]Director See’y __
[12454]OSTON 66+4177
[12456]INTD, (SA W. 0, CREGAR)
[12458]@)
[12459]Cotustivy, 1975, . mn (UDELL
[12460]e a (|
[12465]ON JULY 24, 1975, JOHN F. KEHOE, JR», (FORMER 5a) 5212s By
[12466]COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., NL 2B
[12467]ADVISED THAT on JULY 23, 1975, HE HAD RECEIVED A TELEPHONE 5
[12468]CALL FROM PAUTS WALLACH, WHO STATED HE WAS, A STAFF MEMBER
[12469]OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE7ON INTELLIGENCE
[12470]ACTIVITIES. WALLACH GAVE HIS TELEPHONE NUMBER AS
[12471]202-224-1700. WALLACH ASKED KEHOE IF HE WAS A FORMER SPECIAL
[12473]AGENT OF FBI AND KEHOE REPLIED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE, WALLACH
[12474]THEN INQUIRED WHETHER KEHOE HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN
[12475]ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OR OTHER COVERT INTELLIGENCE
[12477]GATHERING ACTIVITIES IN NEW YORK CITY IN Ay 62-MVISYS.
[12479]= a J ‘
[12480]KEHOE TOLD WALLACH THAT HE HAD per dy SA ASSIGNED TO
[12482]er
[12486]-2GHE NEW YORK OFFICE IN 1946 AND 1947, WALLACH STATED
[12490]Moe
[12492]a)
[12493]ca YOU DIDN’ T GO BACK THERE TO DO SOME JOB DURING THE 6g°S
[12495]‘y
[12500]NW 68296 Dochd:32589624 Page 235
[12503]A
[12505]-. e : @e@
[12507]* PAGE Two BS 66-4177 °
[12508]ASKED IF KEHOE KNEW OF ANY OTHER SA'S NAMED KEHOE WHO
[12509]WERE ASSIGNED TO NEW YORK OFFICE DURING THE 1960°S AND
[12510]WHO WERE NOW RETIRED. KEHOE REPLIED IN THE NEGATIVE,
[12511]AT WHICH TIME WALLACH CONCLUDED THE TELEPHONE CONVERSATION.
[12512]_ THE ABOVE IS FOR INFORMATION OF FBIHQ.
[12514]END
[12516]W 68296 Dochd:32989624 Page 236
[12519]OPTIONAL FORM NO, 10 a 5010-106 e - .
[12521]“May"7962 ECITION
[12523]GSA GEN, REG. NO, 27 a Assoc. Dit.
[12524]UNITED STATES G RNMENT
[12526]Dep. AD Adm. —
[12528]1- Mr. N,. BP. Callahan Dep. AD inv.
[12529]Memorandum 1 = ir, J, B. Adams ma
[12530]2 - Mr. Jd. A. Mintz Comp. Syst. ——
[12531]Ext. Affairs
[12532]TO : Me. W. R. Wannall DATE: 7/11/75 be wa
[12533]} 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall or
[12534]“ yo 1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan ay
[12535]yon 7 iW. OO. Cregaly 1- Mr. RL. cer age x
[12536]: _ 1 —+Mr. W. O. Cregar
[12537]J o oN ~ & se cae —
[12538]' SUBJECTS SENST
[12540]s Invs
[12541]t pec.
[12542]UDY 15 Training
[12543]ot gutitnca nanan : Telephone Rm. —
[12544], Director Sec’y
[12546]This memorandum recommends that the Director raise the
[12547]question of privacy and source protection with Senators of the
[12548]Senate Select Committee (SSC) on the occasion of his anticipated
[12549]meeting in Executive Session with the SSC tentatively scheduled
[12550]for the week of 7/14/75.
[12552]By letter dated 7/9/75, Senators Frank Church and
[12553]John Tower of SSC requested the Attorney General and the
[12554]Director to appear before the Committee in Executive Session
[12555]during the week of 7/14/75. The purpose of this meeting is to
[12556]discuss the matter of concern to Mr. Kelley and steps which
[12557]might be taken to expedite the response to requests for documents2
[12558]essential to the Committee inquiry.
[12560]The Senstudy staff of the Intelligence Division is
[12561]preparing for the Director's use copies of each of the written”
[12562]requests received from SSC annotated with the dates of ou
[12563]response to each request; the date it was delivered to the
[12564]Department; and the date it was delivered to the SSC staff.
[12566]There remains, however, a serious problem precipitated
[12567]by three recent written requests of the SSC dated 6/30/75 (received
[12568]by the Bureau on 7/7/75); 7/1/75 (received by the Bureau on
[12569]7/8/75); and 7/8/75 (received by the FBI on 7/9/75). All three
[12570]of these requests appear,in part, to disregard the privacy of
[12571]certain individuals or requests the identity of sources mu
[12573]cooperating with the FBI. &y b2 Ahh 57
[12575]Enclosure NQ CONTINUED = OVER
[12576]yr. ~ . ,
[12577]woC:emg/dsh Bmmnfimmtiomtislss— -
[12578](9) 6 Serr tien
[12582]ats eee Boe ae ete
[12584]we, my al
[12586]pane nay
[12588]ww sbobllB Ga-s38h a4 Page 237
[12590]= N - .
[12592]4
[12594]Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
[12597]In this regard, in an exchange of letters dated
[12598]3/11 and 12/75, William Colby in his role as the Director
[12599]of Central Intelligence, wrote to Senator Church stating .
[12600]that "I am particularly appreciative of your recognition
[12601]that certain sensitive aspects of our intelligence activities
[12602]must receive special consideration and treatment by the Select
[12603]Committee in the course of your work. As we discussed, such
[12604]matters as the identities of our sensitive sources. ... «
[12605]should be protected not only from exposure, but indeed from
[12606]the risk of exposure. -We should also work together to protect
[12607]certain other information which, if improperly disclosed,
[12608]might impair the privacy rights of the individuals."
[12610]By letter dated 3/12/75, Senator Church stated as
[12611]follows, "It is the Committee's understanding that the members
[12612]of the Committee and designated staff will have access to any
[12613]or all information which the Committee deems necessary for its
[12614]inquiry. We recognize, however, that the Committee inquiry
[12615]may touch on sensitive areas, such as the identities of CIA
[12616]personnel, sources, or cooperating organizations whose
[12617]disclosure could place persons in actual jeopardy. In the
[12618]event that the Committee inquiry touches on such sensitive
[12619]areas, which matters we have already discussed in our meeting
[12620]of February 27, we should discuss jointly, and as you suggested
[12621]quickly, what procedures might be followed should the Committee
[12622]decide it requires more information in these specific areas."
[12624]The 6/30/75 SSC letter requests among other things,
[12625]a list of all police departments and personnel contacted
[12626]relative to a particular COINTELPRO operation; a list of all
[12627]media persons contacted in relation to this COINTELPRO and
[12628]the media affiliation.
[12630]The 7/1/75 SSC letter requests a list of all persons
[12631]outside the FBI (including, but not limited to, employees!
[12632]relatives, friendly media personnel, members of clergy,
[12633]federal, state and local law enforcement and other officials)
[12634]contacted in relation to four persons who were subjects of
[12636]CONTINUED ~ OVER
[12638]ew 88296 Dochd:32989624 Page 235
[12643]. @ o . .
[12645]Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
[12648]COINTELPRO opérations. This same letter also notes that one
[12649]Morris Starsky, one of the four persons referred to above,
[12650]was made known to the FBI during a conference on 6/12/75, as
[12651]@ person who would be the subject of a case study by the SSC,
[12652]This is not so. Inquiry was made of those Bureau supervisors
[12653]who attended the conference and a review of the memorandum
[12654]written following the conference was made. Neither the
[12655]memorandum nor the recollection of Bureau supervisors attending
[12656]the conferencé indicates the name Morris Starsky was mentioned
[12657]by SSC staff personnel.
[12659]The 7/8/75 SSC letter requests among other things:
[12660](1) all memoranda and other materials which relate to a meeting
[12661]between the President and Roy Wilkins, A. Philip Randolph,
[12662]Whitney Young, Mrs. Dorothy Haight, James Farmer and Jack
[12663]Greenberg on 11/19/64; (2) a copy of a November, 1964, telegram
[12664]from Dr, Martin Luther King, Jr., to Director Hoover and all
[12665]notes, memoranda, and any other materials reflecting the
[12666]disposition of, or actions taken as a result of the receipt
[12667]of, said telegram; (3) all memoranda and other materials which
[12668]relate to a meeting between the President and Dr. King on
[12669]2/9/65; (4) all other materials which relate to the transfer of
[12670]former Special Agent Robert C,. Nichols to the Oklahoma Office of
[12671]the FBI in June, 1969; (5) all forms and attachments including
[12672]forms entitled "Performance Rating Guide For Investigative
[12673]Personnel," from 1959 until retirement for former Special
[12674]Agents Robert C, Nichols and Alan Sentinella,
[12676]OBSERVATION :
[12678]It would appear the above-cited requests do, in fact,
[12679]violate the privacy of individuals and possibly place in jeopardy
[12680]the identity of persons who cooperated with the FBI. Consistent
[12681]with the agreement in the exchange of letters between Colby and
[12682]Church dated 3/11 and 12/75, it is believed the Director should
[12683]raise these questions with the SSC and attempt to get relief
[12684]from the requirement of revealing the names of FBI sources or
[12685]violating the privacy of individuals. Certainly the request for .
[12686]information on former Special Agents Nichols and Sentinella goes
[12687]to the heart of the privacy issue and appears to be a blatant
[12688]disregard for their privacy.
[12690]ACTION CONTINUED - OVER
[12692]NW 86296 Dochd:32589624 Page 239
[12695]Memorandum to Mr, W. RB, Wannall
[12698]ACTION:
[12700]If approved, the attached letter to the Attorney
[12701]General will be sent advising him of the Director's intention
[12702]to raise these issues with the SSC on the occasion of his
[12703]appearance with the Attorney General during the week of
[12704]7/14/75.
[12706]Wy ar
[12708]Que
[12710]| NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page #40 .
[12714]TO
[12716]FROM
[12718]SUBJECT:
[12720]: The Attorney General
[12722]NW 88296. Wocld:32989624
[12724].
[12726]-prTlgnaL ror NO. 10
[12727]MAY 1662 EDITIQN
[12728]GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-116
[12730]UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
[12731]Memorandum
[12733]DATE: July 15, 1975
[12735]+ Director, FBI
[12737]U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
[12738]ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIE&S :
[12740]By letter dated July 9, 1975, Senators Frank Church
[12741]and John Tower requested our appearance in Executive Session
[12742]before the Senate Select Committee to discuss matters of
[12743]concern to me and steps which might be taken to expedite
[12744]responses to requests for documents essential to the
[12745]Committee's inquiry.
[12747]It is my intention to/raise the question of privacy
[12749]Committee dated June 30 and July 8, 1975, copies of which are
[12750]in the possession of Mr. O'Gonnor, the Committee appears to
[12751]disregard the rights of cerfain individuals' privacy, going
[12752]so far as to ask for copies of the annual performance ratings
[12753]of certain former Special/Agents of the FBI,
[12755]it is my intextion to request the Committee to
[12756]relieve the FBI from the obligation of violating the
[12757]privacy rights .of indjwiduals or placing in jeopardy
[12758]the identities of cooperating sources of this Bureau,
[12760]1 - The Deputy Attérney General
[12761]Attention: William O'Connor
[12762]pecial Counsel for
[12763]Intelligence Coordination
[12765]of\' Me
[12766]oth Zs
[12767]F 9 aM Raseee | ry
[12769]wih 19 ee a
[12770]Bay sis
[12771]es
[12773]Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan
[12774]Page 241
[12777]The Attorney General 15, 1975
[12779]i : 1 - Mr, W. 8,
[12780]Director, FBI llimere
[12781]1 = Mr. R, Ie
[12783]U. S. SENATE SELaCT coumrrrm: 1 - Me. W.
[12785]ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
[12787]By letter dated July 9, 1975, Aenators Frank Church
[12788]and dohn Tower requested our appsaranc¢ in Executive Session
[12789]before the Senate Select Comittee to/diseuss matters of
[12790]concern to me and steps which might Ae taken to expedite
[12791]responses to requests for documents’ essential to the
[12792]Committee's inquiry.
[12794]It is my intention to /raise the question of privacy
[12795]as well as the protection of sgurces at this forthcoming
[12796]mecting. In the most recent vequests of the Senate Select
[12797]Comnittee dated dune 30 and July 8, 1975, copies of which ave
[12798]in the possession of Mr. O'Qonnor, the Committee appears to
[12799]disregard the rights of cevtain individuals! privacy, going
[12800]so far as to ask for copicss of the annual performance ratings
[12801]of certain former Special/ Agents of the FBE,
[12803]relieve the FBI from tHe obligation of violating the
[12804]privacy rights of individuals or placing in jeopardy
[12806]the identities of c erating sources of this wy Ge
[12808]£t is my intepwtion to request the Committee to a
[12810]1 ~ The Deputy Attorney General
[12811]Attention: K./ William O'Connor U
[12812]' y Special Counsel for
[12814]Vv Intelligence Coordination
[12816]Dep. AD Adm. — ‘ . *
[12819]tin \\ \ fe
[12820]Ext, Atoire _ NOTE: a * A .
[12821]Files & Cone — _ ‘See W. 0. Cregar to Mr. W. R. Wannall memorandum
[12822]he dated 7/11/75, captioned "SENSTUDY '75," prepared by
[12824]Inspection woc : eng/dsh .
[12826]Intell, ( uh
[12828]aboratory —_—.
[12830]fan. & Eval, i S
[12831]pec. Inv,
[12832]raining Vv —
[12833]at Coun, —___— g
[12834]lephone Rm. — ‘
[12835]etorSec'y MAIL ROOM(L_] TELETYPE unIT (LJ
[12837]882965 Docid:32989624 Page 242
[12839]GPO 955.546
[12842]4-812 (Rev, 12-11-73) é
[12844]Date of Mail _ 6/14/75
[12846]Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Section.
[12848]See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.
[12850]Subject JUNE MAIL IDY 75
[12852]Removed By
[12854]File Number _. Ss 62. -116395-463
[12856]Permanent Serial Charge Out
[12859]woth Gee
[12860]qos Oh al
[12861]_ pacrge 2 wld
[12862]paTs_l
[12864]ZOAUG 41975
[12866]boJ/ FBI
[12869]Assoc. Din WW if
[12870]Dep-A.D-Adu.—
[12872]} Asst. Dir: B:
[12873]4 Admin. FE
[12874]# Comp. Syst. —— bh
[12875]4 xt. Affaira —— f
[12876]Files & Com.
[12877]Gen. Inv. .....——
[12878]Ident. . 0.0 t
[12879]Inspection ..—— f
[12881]pean ge me RTT
[12883]Lu Ck ayer wat 8 S SCCTION
[12884]bite. om |
[12886]‘ . AUS 1 GETS
[12888]i) Ded os, ‘|
[12889]> sae oui .! i: “he . 4
[12890]x , ye fee a = 4 Laboratory ...
[12892]- Pldn. & Eval. ‘
[12893]4 Spec Inv. .... f
[12895]4 Legal Coun. ..—.. ff
[12896]Telephone Rm. ... |
[12897]‘ Director See’y —..
[12899]NR_961 SF CODE °
[12900]19:56 AM URGENT 6/16/75 MCC
[12901]70 DIRECTOR (62-1 16395)
[12903]“FROM SAN VRANCTSCO (62-6887)
[12905]| ATE a ORBEAR, INTD
[12906]Ly
[12907]( SENSTUDY 75, oe
[12909]RE SACRAMENTO “Tegtes stow ogre
[12911]he Sist Sdeias4b8o624 Page 244 - |
[12914]24
[12916]paneccreremeceneattn es
[12917]Assoc. Dir. -———~ |
[12919]Dep-A.D.~-Adm.—
[12923]Asst. Dir.: :
[12926]Comp. Syst. —— |
[12928]a ee 2
[12930]- NR 615 WF CODED Any, pxt, Affairs —)
[12932]oe Files & Gom — |
[12933]\ ga PM NITEL JUNE 16, 1975 WWC ee Go
[12934]Mo: DIRECTOR, FBI (62=116395) ne UME
[12935]4 Leboratty ———
[12936]} FROM: SACS WFO (62=19744) (P)
[12938]plon. & Eval. —%
[12939]Spee. Inv. —-—"
[12941]Legal Coun. -——-— |
[12942]Telephone ae -
[12943]Director ey
[12945]W e 0 e CREGAR .
[12947]| REFERENCE BUREAU TELETYPE DATED JUNE 13, 1975. \
[12949]BASED ON INFORMATION CONTAINED IN REFERENCED TELETYPE
[12950], WFO IS UNABLE TO_LOCATE ANY INFORMAT
[12952]N REGARDING ELECTRONIC
[12953]. . 4
[12954]SURVEILLANCE OF DR. MARTIN LUTHERAKING , JR. DURING PERIOD
[12956]INDICATED IN REFERENCED . COMMUNICATION.
[12958]ay
[12960]END. a
[12961]| ; , bn
[12962]NYAS
[12963]z RE Ue chin
[12964]Q a8 A a
[12965]rege MG
[12967]plele- “e8. ne
[12968]See od
[12970]64 Aue4 1970.
[12972]NW 88296 Dochd:32989624 Page 245
[12975]Admin. .———-
[12976]tl? UE STICATION Comp. Syst. ——
[12977]wie ee meryings ( Txt. Affairs —~
[12978]CABYS SECTION Files & Com. ——
[12979]Gen. Inv. -—--——
[12981]emenegesesnsernilartesit hist SORES TETES
[12982]. Assoe. Dir, ————
[12984]. 4 Dep-A.D-Inv.——
[12985]Le P Asst. Dir:
[12986]2 PAV nh we
[12987]ul NR‘6G1 SC CODE 1 ORS Tnspection —
[12988]: ai Leen Sntell, ere
[12989]19:30 aM URGENT 6416/15 VS vel Pe BE eee Bea
[12990]Plan. & Bval.
[12991]_ Inv. =
[12992]TO . DIRECTOR ¢69~116395) Toaiaing
[12993]; oo ” fi Legal Coun.
[12994]J Telephone Rm.
[12995]Director Sec’y —
[12997]“Wh. Le
[12999]S/23 JEM
[13001]_ SEHSTUDY 75.
[13003]al
[13004]“ae BUREAU TEL TO DETROIT, JUNE 13, 1975.
[13006]: REVIEW OF SACRAMENTO INDICES REFLECTS NO INFO RE ELECTRONIC
[13007]SURVEILLANCE » APRIL 23924, 1964, SENATOR HOTEL, SACRAMENTO, CALIF «
[13008]SACRAMENTO DIVISION ESTABLISHED 1967. ca
[13010]FOR INFO SAN FRANCISCO, RETEL STATED IN CONNECTION wit SENATE
[13012]SELECT COMMITTEE REQUEST, FOLLOWING DATA REQUESTED BY RETURN TELETYPE
[13014]ATTN: INTD - W. 0. CREGAR: Vr
[13015]ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANSE INDICES AT FBIHQ DO NOT inDICATE ‘OVER a
[13017]HEARS ON KNOWN TECHNICAL INSTALLATIONS ON MARTIN LUTHER /KING ’ IRs
[13018]FOR ABOVE DATE AND LOCATION.
[13020]1 -
[13021]SAW FRANCISCO REVIEY ELSURE INDICES AND FURNISH FB IHa FIRST DATE
[13022]XING OVERHEARD ON ABOVE TECHNICAL INSTALLATION. IF HE WAS NOT iG 0
[13023]HEARD, SO ADVISE. gp l Qu i We 8 39 a
[13024]END
[13025]_ VES FRIHG CLR cost ey: ? We 80 1975 |
[13026]cane ue af Ape ald sea TNR Sea
[13027]me ‘ ‘j1p}00 oes BRE we
[13028]| URE
[13029]84 AUG4 1975 =
[13031], NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 246 Somme
[13034]4.312 (Rev. 12-11-78) @ @
[13036]Date of Mail 6/16/75
[13038]Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Section.
[13040]See File 66-2554-7530 for authority. | m5
[13042]Subject JUNE MAIL op 75
[13044]Removed By 7OAUG 41975
[13046]File Number ______—<¥62-116395-459
[13048]Permanent Serial Charge Out
[13050]DOJ/ FBI
[13052]NW 88296 Dochd:32969024 Page #47
[13054]OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 5010-106
[13055](@ “RAY 1962 EDITION
[13056]¥ . GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
[13058]UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT Assoc. Dire —__
[13059]Dep. AD Adm. _
[13060]ep. AD Inv. __
[13061]Memorandum core
[13062]Admin,
[13063]Comp. Syst.
[13064]TO DATE: Ext. Affairs —_
[13065]j Mr. Clev : July 21, 1975 Files & Com.
[13066]Gen, Inv.
[13067]~ ent. Z
[13068]PROM; Fi arniogf
[13069]} : : R. Jd. McCa Pe Intell
[13070]" Laboratory
[13071]Plan. & Eva
[13072]y, SUBJECT: UNITED STATES SENATE,SELECT.COMMETTEE = Tetning. ZS
[13073]TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH Legal Coun
[13074]RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES ce eae ect
[13076]Director Sec’y __
[13080]| Reference is made to the Attorney General's letter, bhay
[13081]| July 16, 1975, captioned as above, requesting information : fi
[13082]| relating to the collection, analysis, use, and dissemination
[13084]of organized crime intelligence,
[13086]On June 25, 1974, the Director testified before
[13087]the FBI Oversight Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary -
[13088]Committee that the Bureau has "no statutory authority to
[13089]collect intelligence per se" but that it operates under the
[13090]general umbrella of 28 U.S.C. 533 (3), which authorizes the
[13091]Attorney General to appoint officials "to conduct...investiga-
[13092]tions regarding official matters...as may be directed by the
[13093]Attorney General." A listing of any directives issued by
[13094]the Department or the Attorney General with respect to organized
[13095]crime should be available in the office of the Assistant
[13096]Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice.
[13098]With respect to the FBI, all our investigations in
[13099]the organized crime field are aimed os one ultimate objective:
[13100]prosecttion.
[13103]gy labios vb l Aaa
[13104]During the course of our i sti ion of individual
[13105]hoodlums and the various criminal syndicates operating through-
[13107]out the United States, we naturally acquire considerable data
[13108]regarding the structure of the organized underworld, the
[13109]identities of its principal leaders, the extent of its in-
[13110]fluence, its primary sources of income, its payoffs to corrupt
[13111]officials, and the operations of its vast communteattons—retworks.
[13113]Mr. Wannall
[13115]Mr. S. F. Phillips
[13116]Mr. Cleveland
[13118]Mr. McCarthy
[13120]Mr. McHale
[13122]9 AUG 4 sly
[13124]et fet fet et pa
[13125]Prag
[13128]JEM: bkh ge
[13129](6). 3° nv oe ;
[13131]Rnseahbio Berd osoez4 Page 248
[13133]Memorandum to Mr. Cleveland
[13135]Re: United States Senate Select Committee
[13136]To Study Governmental Operations With
[13137]Respect to Intelligence Activities
[13139]Most of this information is obtained from paid
[13140]informants, from other law enforcement officers, from alert
[13141]citizens, and from court-approved electronic surveillances
[13142]installed under the provisions of Title III of the Omnibus
[13143]‘Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.
[13145]None of it, however, is intelligence for intelligence's
[13146]sake. The experience of the FBI over the years has shown that
[13147]criminal syndicates exist for the sole purpose of conducting
[13148]illegal operations and that anyone belonging to them may
[13149]reasonably be presumed to be engaged in one or more of these
[13150]activities. Therefore, our investigations of the organized
[13151]underworid are not aimed at developing general nonspecific
[13152]data but at establishing which criminal violations its members
[13153]are engaged in and then proving these violations in a court
[13154]of law.
[13156]Obviously, not every case opened, every lead followed,
[13157]or every bit of information received is going to wind up in
[13158]Federal court. On the contrary, much of this material relates
[13159]to offenses outside the investigative jurisdiction of the
[13160]FBI. When such is the case, we immediately disseminate the
[13161]inférmation.” to the appropriate Federal, state, or local agency.
[13162]As a result, information uncovered by the FBI during the past
[13163]five years alone has enabied the recipient agencies to make
[13164]more than 17,000 organized crime arrests; confiscate over
[13165]$151,000,000 worth of illicit drugs and narcotics, $9,000,000
[13166]worth of cash, property, weapons, and wagering paraphernalia,
[13167]and- $6,000,000 worth of counterfeit bills; and assess tax
[13168]liens against $19,000,000 worth of property arising out of
[13169]Federal gambling cases.
[13171]in addition, a considerable portion of the organized
[13172]crime intelligence information developed by the FBI is for-
[13173]warded to the various Federal Strike Forces coordinating
[13174]racket investigations throughout the country and to the
[13175]Criminal Division of the Department, which has entered this
[13176]information in its computerized data bank called “Racketéer
[13177]Profile.*
[13179]Don
[13181]NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page #49
[13184]Memorandum to Mr. Cleveland
[13186]Re: United States Senate Select Committee
[13187]To Study Governmental Operations With
[13188]Respect to Intelligence Activities
[13190]RECOMMENDATION:
[13192]' That, upon approval, this memorandum be routed to
[13193]Supervisor 8. F. Phillips, of the Intelligence Division,
[13194]‘who is coordinating the Bureau's reply to the Attorney
[13196]General's inquiry.
[13197]wre tt “a
[13199]AL
[13203]NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 250 |
[13206]4-812 (Rev. 12-11-78) 6 é
[13208]Date of Mail 7/28/75
[13210]Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Section.
[13213]<3
[13214]See File 66-2554-7530 for authority. a cr IN Fok
[13216]tA
[13218]10
[13219]Abt INFORM AsStF
[13221]mes
[13222]mw loo
[13224]Subject JUNE MAIL gs 75
[13226]Removed By AUG 41975 |
[13228]File Number ____62-116395-457
[13230]Permanent Serial Charge Out
[13232]DOJ/ FBI
[13234]NW 85296 Dochd:32989024 Page 231 |
[13237]« e
[13239]URGENT ‘
[13241]1- . Mi
[13242]1- Aral ai EDERAL BURCAU OF R/BRATR,
[13243]_ 1 -.Mr. Cregar OMMUNICATIONS SECTION
[13244]5 ; i - Mr. Hotis
[13245]K - Mr. Daly ; M
[13246]j | hen OM
[13247]T E
[13248]: RE BUREAU TELEPHONE CALL TO LOUISVILLE, 9/24/75.
[13250]THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE HAS REQUESTED THAT
[13251]SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE STANLEY S._ CZARNECKI OF THE
[13252]LOUISVILLE OFFICE BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR INTERVIEW CON-
[13253]CERNING HiS KNOWLEDGE OF THE BUREAU'S INVESTIGATION OF
[13254]KEY ACTIVISTS - NEW LEFT, THIS WILL BE A STAFF merenE 694 :
[13255]ee CONDUCTED BY STAFF MEMBER JOHN SMITH. SMITH REQUESTED > —s
[13256]@ é oe THAT THE INTERVIEW TAKE PLACE IN LOUISVILLE ON FRIDAY,
[13258]Se EQ 9/26/75, IF POSSIBLE.
[13260]be ae SAC CZARNECKI SHOULD TELEPHONICALLY CONTACT LEGAL
[13264]J BRIEFED CONCERNING THE INTER zr x
[13265]o ee
[13266]e APPROPRIATE | M THE INTELLIGENCE al |
[13267]r ber 1. 1975
[13268]Agece. Dir. é Personnel File - . Stanley S. Czarnecki ees EEE eee,
[13269]ben pmb’ NOTE: John Smith, Senate Select Committee staff member, requested the
[13270]nl interview of SAC Czarnecki concerning the Bureau's investigation of Key
[13271]Comp, Srats — Activists - NéwWELeft:: ;This communication will serve as approval for the
[13273]waiver of the ekistingtémployee agreement signed hy SAC Czarnecki,
[13274]ferenced telephone call alerted SAC Czarnecki.
[13276]dent. we .
[13277]tnepecilon . in t 7 ji L- te . p
[13279]Laboratory . ( . f f'-
[13280]” Plan. & Evol. - ( re .
[13281]Spec. Inv. _f’ ’ daly
[13283]FE Tat Re Sec” =p ose B, jee UNIT
[13284]iW BE age 25.
[13286]Files & Com. __
[13288]AS i~
[13290]¥ “p 4
[13293]ED ER EERE ON
[13295]OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 ”
[13296]MAY 1962 EDITION
[13297]GSA FPR (41 CFR 108—11.8
[13299]UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
[13300]Ml} Memorandum
[13302]Nee
[13303]» : Mr. J. B. Adams
[13305]Ext. Affairs
[13307]WZ, 7-24-75 Files & Com.
[13309]Gen. Inv.
[13312]Ins pe
[13313]Inkg
[13314]Laborator
[13316]Plon. & aie
[13318]Spec. Inv.
[13320]Troining
[13322]cae ee ' Telephone Rm. —
[13324]Pursuant to a request from SA Thomas J. MecNiff Director Secty
[13325]SA Daly of this Division contacted Michael Shaheen, Deputy Special
[13326]Counsel for Intelligence Coordination for the Department, on 7-22-75
[13327]concerning the current policy regarding excisions which may econanty Le
[13328]be made on documents being furnished to the Senate Select Committee
[13329]for their review in Bureau space and the policy concerning notes being
[13331]8 taken during the Committee staffers review of such materials.
[13333]E
[13335]Shaheen stated that there is no agreement currently in
[13337]B operation concerning excisions, however, he felt that excisions should VY)
[13338]be properly restricted to the protection of sources, sensitive techniques
[13339]nN a
[13341]mons E
[13343]Aly THPORATION COUTAT NED
[13347]i
[13348]BAY
[13350]an or methods concerning sensitive ongoing operations. He noted that this
[13352]et} is in general conformity. with the proposed agreement concerning this matter
[13353]3 ki which was being reviewed at the White House. Regarding the question
[13355]4 d raised concerning the taking of notes, Shahe®n indicated that the proposed
[13357]ey new agreement allowed for the taking of notes on these documents which
[13359]notes may be taken to the Senate Select Committee offices. In fact,
[13360]Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, K. William O'Connor, who
[13361]was present during this discussion pointed out it was the intent of the
[13362]aforementioned proposed agreement that “screened documents” may be
[13363]removed by the Committee staff members to the Senate Select Committee
[13364]offices. With this in mind, Shaheen stated we should allow the staff =L5
[13365]members to take notes and remove same to their tees (prtucl, wl Ace Aen ae
[13367]Lele fe)
[13369]mt
[13372]SA McNiff was orally advised of the wits of thigye & 1978
[13374]conversation. Aa.
[13375]eon patti ea
[13376]RECOMMENDATION: \ WP)
[13377]4 n ‘P
[13379]For information.
[13381]Oo A
[13382]; yy LY oo
[13383]1 - Mr. Wannall (| a”
[13384]1 -Mr. Cregar \ py
[13385]1 - Mr. Mintz Hf Run _o
[13387]1 - Mr. Hotis eS)
[13389]1-Mr. Daly
[13390]DN igh (7)
[13391]we #3 hoeld:32980624 BELL ah, Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan
[13394]OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 $010-106
[13395]AY 1962 EDITION
[13396]GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
[13397]Assoc. Dir.
[13399]UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT e208: Di
[13400]M, d SECRET Dep. AD lav.
[13401]1 - Mr. W.R, Wannall Asst, Dir:
[13402]emoranaum 1 - Mr. R.L. Shackelford #"
[13403]Ext. Affairs —_
[13404]TO oo: Mr, WR. vannaiis / DATE: July 29, 1975 Filer & Com —
[13405]dent.
[13406]( } ‘ if 1 - Mr. W.O. Cregar sr)
[13407]\/FROM =: J.W. Redfield pe 1 - Mr. W.A, Branigan iat —
[13408]\ } aay _ 1 ” Mr. JW. Redfield Legal Conn
[13409]7? : , ; Ta 1 _ Mr. J.F.. McGuire Plan. & Eval.
[13410]i. ». Spec. Inv.
[13411]SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75 \ Spee In
[13413]wm Telephone Rm. —_
[13414]Deena ode
[13415]. Director Sec’y __
[13417]PURPOSE:
[13419]To comment on items extracted from a 693-page (y fs
[13420]document prepared by CIA citing certain instances wherein | A
[13421]CIA believes its activities may have exceeded its legal
[13423]mandate,
[13425]BACKGROUND:
[13427]Memorandum W.O. Cregar to Mr. W.R. Wannall, dated
[13428]7/24/75, captioned as above, described the above-mentioned.
[13429]CIA document and requested a review of certain items
[13430]mentioned therein in order to fully identify the subject
[13431]matter thereof and to assess whether same may involve any '
[13432]compromise of FBI counterintelligence operations.
[13434]CIA item captioned "Antlers," relates tha CIA
[13435]arranged to move a sensitive defector out of a European
[13436]country by commercial transportation and gained entry into a
[13437]the U.S. without leaving any trace of the defector's true
[13438]identity. FBIHQ COMMENT: Our files contain no information
[13439]concerning the word "Antiers,'" in the context described by
[13440]CIA. More than likely, "Antlers" is a CIA in-house code word
[13441]used for the handling of a valuable and sensitive defector
[13442]source, While we have no information relative to "Antiers,”
[13443]it is noted that we do have access currently to two CIA
[13444]defector sources respectively code named TORTIS and TUMBLE,
[13445]both of whom were Romanian Intelligence Service (RIS) officers
[13446]whose whereabouts have been carefully concealed as both of
[13447]these defectors are targets of the RIS. Specifically, the RIS .
[13448]has indicated a desire to kidnap and/or kill the two defectors
[13449]mentioned herein, It is possible the CIA item referred to as
[13450]"Antlers" may relate to either TORTIS or TUMBLE. It is firmly £5
[13451]believed that public disclosure of the CIA ite ntapas 77,7 4A.
[13452]beyond that described in the attachment to W.0o” Gregari.s << ¢*.
[13453]memorandum of 7/24/75, could adversely affect the safety and’ Sx
[13454]security of TORTIS or TUMBLE, if in fact, either oneBisaihes ,
[13455]defector described in the CIA item. Lege e 978
[13457]62~116395 SECRET Sas
[13459]JFM:bew Classified by 2721 CONTINUED - OVER - AN
[13460](7) \e Exempt from GDS, Categories 2, 3 and 4
[13462]Date of Declassification Indefinite
[13466]ROUTE IN ENVELOPE
[13468]Givi cAbG DocilQTkps0624 Page 254
[13471]SECRET
[13473]Memorandum to Mr. W.R. Wannall
[13474]RE: SENSTUDY 75
[13475]62~-116395
[13477]CIA item described as Project WESTPOINTER apparently
[13478]invoived the examination of mail to the U.S. from Mainland
[13479]China during certain specific months of 1969, 1970 and 1971.
[13480]CIA indicated that Project WESTPOINTER was similar to Project
[13481]SRPOINTER, FBIHQ COMMENT: Our files contain no information
[13482]concerning Project WESTPOINTER. Memorandum from Acting
[13483]Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, dated 4/1/75,
[13484]captioned “Jane Fonda v. L. Patrick Gray, et al.; Civil Action
[13485]No. 73-2442-MML (C.D. Cal.)," describes a CIA covert operation
[13486]known as SRPOINTER which involved examination of mail to and
[13487]from the Soviet Union which was discontinued in 2/73,
[13488]Apparently, CIA had examined certain mail addressed to Jane
[13489]Fonda in connection with its SRPOINTER activity. While we
[13490]were not aware of CIA's Project WESTPOINTER, it is noted that
[13491]this Bureau did periodically examine mail coming from the
[13492]People's Republic of China (PRC) and Hong Kong to the U.S.
[13493]and mail from the U.S. to the PRC and Hong Kong during the
[13494]period 1956-1966, This activity, which was permanently dis-
[13495]continued 1/24/66, was carried under the code names CHIPROP
[13496]and CHICLET. Public disclosure of the CIA item referred to
[13497]above as Project WESTPOINTER might lead to a more detailed
[13498]public examination of this Bureau's periodic control of mail
[13499]in the CHIPROP and CHICLET operations.
[13501]ACTION:
[13502]For information in connection with Senstudy 75,
[13504]as K AE ao
[13506]eur
[13508]SECRET
[13511]NW 85296 Docid:32989624 Page #55
[13514]DCI/IC-75-0126
[13515]23 July 1975
[13517]MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of the USIB Ad Hoc
[13518]; _ Coordinating Group
[13520]SUBJECT: Key Word’ ter Central Indexing
[13521]: oO me
[13525]. * ~~, “
[13526]Future key wor ding 6finformation furnished to-the
[13528]' Community Central Index should include names of Agencies.
[13529]These will be helpful in identifying information in the
[13530]material which relates to another Agency's activities.
[13534]YL
[13535]ae | | 7D
[13536]{ | | Deda hewn >
[13537]; Harriett Mowitt
[13539]Executive Secretary
[13540]USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group
[13544]| oo eu
[13545]pegs Yo -l/ bP 9S 14
[13546]® aus ts |
[13547]ne
[13552]J jet
[13553]LY"
[13555]wi AnbUG ra dMBso Page 256
[13558]Gen. Inv.
[13559]Ident.
[13560]Inspect?
[13561]Intell.
[13562]Laboratory —_—
[13563]Plan. & Eval. —
[13564]Spec. Inv.
[13566]Training
[13568]Legal Coun.
[13569]Telephone Rm. —
[13573]. .8 8
[13574]~~ 8 " Me. J. B. Adams
[13576]Me: H. N. Bassett
[13577]-~ Me. J. A. Mintz
[13578](L - Me. J. B. Hotis)
[13580]The Attorney General Joly 22, 1975
[13582]1 - Me. W. R. Wannall
[13584]Divector, FBI 1 - Mr. W. 0. Cregar
[13585]pos O 1 - Mr. J. P. Thomas
[13587]Nt Be
[13590]TITED STATES SENATE. SELECT CONMITTEE ao ©
[13591]OW INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (Sscy ~~ o RK =
[13592]acne arenes sete, 5
[13594]x c :
[13595]8 fox
[13598]Reference is made to a letter from the SSC dated
[13600]May 14, 1975, with attached appendices A thru D requesting YO
[13601]certain documents and other information from the FBI. a *
[13603]Attached for your approval and forwarding to Ve. V8
[13604]SSC is the original of a memorandum which responds in part :~ .
[13606]3 Xi to one of the requests contained in above SSC letter. KG
[13608]Bm A copy of the memorandum is being furnished for as
[13609]RE rit - your records. nM
[13610]Bt! av
[13611]Xs Ay _ 2S.
[13612]Na 8;  Enelosures (2) ae Sot:
[13613]Rosy) 62-116395
[13614]8 oe. a
[13615]1 ~ The Deputy Attorney General wy rr
[13616]Attention: K,. William O'Gomnor ~~ af
[13617]Special Counsel for ly oa -/ f foo} at
[13619]\,
[13620]C' aprztnp [hb 2 AUG -& [ui wd
[13621](11) lamest: emma ETO s
[13622]a ; > ‘|
[13623]Assoc. Dir. —__. 4
[13624]Dep. AD Adm. — 4 p
[13626]ine — 9. BNI CLOSURE Ny
[13627]Ext. Affairs __ f  ~) * . } :
[13628]Files & Com. aw
[13630]Cx ih « 4P?
[13632]ry ;
[13633]y \ A h ( AK
[13634]ROOM ELETYPE UNIT (__} GPO : 1975 © - 569-920 ‘
[13636]fd:3. #4 Page #5f
[13641]- vin @ B. Adams
[13643]~ Mr. H. N. Bassett
[13644]~ Me. J. A. Mintz
[13646](1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
[13647]1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
[13649]62-116395 Jaly 22, 1975
[13650]1 - Me, W. 0. Cregar
[13651]1 - Mr. J. P. Thomas
[13653]U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE To
[13654]STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WETH
[13655]RESPECT FO LYTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
[13657]t
[13658]ay
[13661]NO et Re
[13663]‘RE: FURTHER nocuMmiTs PreTaTme
[13664]TO THE FBI AND DEPARTMENT oF oie 5
[13665]JUSTICE Deana
[13667]POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 4 “Sly. S
[13669]Reference is made to letter, with attached
[13670]appendices, dated May 14, 1975, to the Attorney General
[13671]from the Chairman of captioned Committee, requesting certain
[13672]documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of
[13673]Investigation (FBI).
[13675]Appendix B, Item I, Mumber 5 of referenced
[13676]appendices requested this Bureau to provide Committee Staff
[13677]access to annual inspection reports and related surveys for
[13678]the past ten years with respect to the following PBI field
[13679]offices: Vew York City; Chicago; San Francisco; Les Angeles;
[13680]San Diego: Sacramento; Springfield, Illinois; Buffaloe;
[13681]Atlanta; and Columbia, South Carolina; “umber 6 requested
[13683]-_ this Bureau to provide the annual inspection reports and
[13684]7s velated surveys for the past ten years pertaining to the FDI
[13685]Intelligence Division.
[13687]Agsoc. Dir,
[13689]CA hen St a conference held on May 30, 1975, betveen
[13690]Asst Dire Messrs. John T, ELLI£f and Mark Gitenstein of the Senate
[13691]Com. san, S@LEct Committee; Mr. K. William O'Cennor of the Pepartment
[13692]Est. AMfois of Justice; and Messrs. William 9. Cregar and Elmer 1.
[13694]'~ Larson of the FBI, it was agreed, in response to above request,
[13695]that this Bureau vould make available to appropriate personnel
[13696]of the SSC State, for review at FRING, copies of the roperts
[13698]Gen. Inv.
[13699]Ident.
[13700]Inspection
[13701]Intell.
[13702]Laboratory
[13704]Plan, & Eval. _ JPT: thb
[13706]Spec. Inv. 0 are
[13708]Training (10) Le 3 (‘Cs
[13709]ah
[13711]Legal Coun,
[13714]Telephone Rm, —
[13718]. ee Z
[13719]Direetor Sec'y_. © MAIL ROOML__] TELETYPE UNIT[[_] Iy i aa ~ Moo a
[13720]NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 258 LOSURE, g 2 -/ / .
[13723]Ra: Further Documents Pertaining to
[13724]the FBI and Department of Justice
[13726]Policies and Procadurasg
[13728]of the tywo inspections conducted of the Domestic Intelligence
[13729]Division, PBI Headquarters, during 1971, and of the
[13730]inspection of the San Franeisco Field Office o€ the FBI
[13731]during Oetober, 1970.
[13733]Pertinent documents, believed responsive to abova
[13734]agyreoment, ate now ready for review at FBI Headquarters by
[13735]apprepriate persormel of the SSC Staff. You will note that
[13736]portions of the San Francisco inspection report which relate
[13737]solely to investigations of criminal matters, with no
[13738]security ramifications, have been eliminated from the report.
[13739]Should the S5¢ deem such material pertinent te its mandate,
[13740]however, it can be made available for review by the SSC Staff,
[13741]wpon weitten request,
[13743]1 - The Attorney General
[13745]NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 259
[13748]ee at
[13750]5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
[13751]WASHINGTON, D. C, 20535
[13753]Addressee: Senate Select Committee
[13755]gs em epor eq 1-22-75
[13756]Oe. Seni e S deleat ‘Comnlit ise 0 ant y Governm Opér—
[13758]Caption of Document: ations. Re: Further Documents Portain-
[13760]* ing to the FBI and Dept. of Justice. Policies and Pro-
[13762]cedures, 5-14-75 request Appendix B, ItemI, #5.
[13764]Originating Ara
[13766]Title:
[13768]Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI
[13769]SA hE OT RO TN NTO RERNN al gE TS OM om wee oe
[13771]Delivered by:
[13773]Received by:
[13775]arnk\e
[13776]ponte SD, 16
[13777]nuh ai 38 ics By S
[13778]wi wee
[13779]ps at
[13781]ENCLOSURE (22, pee g IS
[13783]NW 50296 Docid:32909624 Page 260
[13786]e : BF: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE
[13787]; Sad CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE BEFORE COMPLETING.
[13789],
[13790]“ ”
[13792]TO: Intelligence Community Staff FROM:
[13793]ATIN: Central Index
[13795]FEE
[13797]SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees
[13799]1. HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term. If a document was made available 2. DATE PROVIDED
[13801]for review but not transmitted, so note.)
[13803]RL vocoment | —[omerine [[vwrervien| [testimony [[orwes | 7/29/75
[13805]FOR REVIEW
[13807]+ TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)
[13809]« IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer,
[13810]interviewee, testifier and subject)
[13812]Henoranduin
[13814]. IN RESPONSE TO (list date and item number if in response to formal request, other- . CLASSIFICATION OF
[13815]wise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.) INFORMATION (enter
[13816]u, ¢, S, TS or
[13818]S30 Letter 5/14/75, Appendix 8, Teen 7, £5 Codewor®)
[13820]. KEY WORDS (enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not Listed are
[13821]used underline for emphasis)
[13823]Qberating procedures
[13825]. SUMMARY (See reverse side before completing this item)
[13827]Made available to appropriate personnel of the SSC
[13829]Staff, for ravlew at FRIRQ, coples of the reports of
[13831]the two inspections aenducted of the Domastic Intelligence
[13832]DMvision, PBL Readgsarters, during 1971, and of the
[13833]inspection of the San Franciace Field Office of the PBE
[13834]during Ontobex, LO7O
[13836]62+116395
[13839](4) ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
[13840]IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75
[13842]TREAT AS WELUOW
[13844]CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE
[13845]3791 (6.75)
[13847]ENCLOSURE (9 [Ze 3 Z5
[13849]NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 261
[13852]INSTRUCTIONS
[13854]® Type or print clearly in ink.
[13855]e Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
[13856]e Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required,
[13858]e "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the
[13859]information.
[13861]e If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to
[13862]HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a
[13863]copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.
[13865]SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing
[13866]substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community
[13867]matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests
[13868]should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be
[13869]noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here,
[13870]e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether
[13871]interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript
[13872]is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional
[13873]pages may be attached if necessary.
[13877]cs
[13879]NW 88296 Docid:37989624 Page 262
[13882]i ‘ ™ ‘ ” . " Assoc. Dir.
[13883]” My / 6 VEDERAL £5 64 é aYtSTIGATION é Dep- AD- dma —
[13884]. y COMMUNICATICNS SECTION Doped
[13886]done
[13887]Admin.
[13889]‘ ll oy 1 Or, ae Gasp. Syst.
[13891]006 SE CODED . < xt. Attia =
[13893]Gen, Inv.
[13895]4:50 PM NITEL 7/21/75 SLA TELETYPE f Wdent.
[13896]. : : Inspretio pi
[13898]Tnietl. (OK,
[13901]\ \ Plan. & Eval, __
[13902], Spec Inv.
[13903]t , Troining 2.
[13904]\ ; Legal Coun.
[13905]Teleghone Rm. _
[13907]T1973. 0 | | -!
[13908]y DAL
[13909]FORMER EMPLOYEES LEROY W. SHEETS NO LONGER MAINTAINS RESIDE
[13910]AY MARYSVILLE, ‘WASHINGTON, JHE-HAS PURCHASED AN AIRSTREAM TRAILER \
[13911]1
[13912]AND ON JUNE 10, 1975), HE AND HIS WIFE LERT THE AREA FOR AN | NK
[13913]EXTENDED FOUR-NONTHS CROSSCOUNTRY TRIP, PRIOR TO LEAVING, sHeeTs “jy 4h ll
[13914]ADVISED SRA JOHN Es. CONNOR, EVERETT, WASHINGTON, THAT HE WOULD BE oy | :
[13915],
[13916]\,
[13918]TRAVELING CONT 1NUOUSLY QNTIL MID-OCTOBER, 1975, WHEN HE WOULD RETURN) af
[13920]At
[13921]{ y
[13922]TO THE MARYSVILLE, wasHiNneToN AREA. CURRENT LOCATION OF SHEETS IS Kon
[13926]UNKNOWN. . . a . iy
[13927]. J
[13928]SHEETS 1s BELIEVED TO STILL HAVE A MARRIED STEPDAUGHTER, “NAME
[13929]UNKNOWN, IN THE MARYSVILLE, WASHINGTON AREA. SHE MAY HAVE. ‘AN
[13930]ITINERARY FOR. SHEETS THAT COULD. LOCATE HIM FOR A POSSIBLE INTERVIEW.
[13931]IF BUREAU DESIRES HER CONTACTED, A REVIEW OF PERSONNEL FILE OF |
[13933]SHEETS AT HEADQUARTERS SHOULD PROVIDE HER NAME AND ADDRESS.
[13935]END Reg |
[13936]=e Lo- Mt 3 m2
[13937]ge a) ih ly
[13938]a :
[13939]rE b
[13940]ag cl yi“ an cara ae eo
[13942]DAM.
[13944]idee (bh4ctd-38889624 Page 263
[13946]~ 8 s
[13948]1 - ir. d. B. Adans
[13950]CODE TELETYPE HITEL
[13951]3 ~~ Mr, Jd ° A, Mintz
[13952]TO SACS ere ANGELES JULY 30, 1975
[13953]SAN DIEGO °
[13954]a SAN FRANCISCO . (1 - Mr. Hotis)
[13956]Mr, E, W. Waish
[13957]My. W. R. Wannall
[13958]Mr. W. 0. Cregar
[13959]Mr. S. F. Phillips
[13961]FROM DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)
[13962]REBUTEL MAY 2, 1975.
[13963]SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) STAFF MEMBER LESTER SEIDEL
[13964]HAS FURNISHED THE FOLLOWING TENTATIVE SCHEDULE FOR INTERVIEWS
[13965]IN YOUN OFFICE: SAN DIEGO 7-30-75 SAS EARL M. PETERSEN,
[13966]LAWRENCE F, WIRICK; LOS ANGELES §-5~75 WALLACE E. WARD, RICHARD
[13967]A. BLOESER, 8-7~75 ASSISTANT DIRECTOR ROBERT E. GEBHARDT; SAN
[13968]FRANCISCO 8-11-75 LEO S, DREWNEISEN, 8/11-12/75 SAC CHARLES W.
[13969]‘ BATES. PURPOSE OF INTERVIEW IS TO BE COINTELPRO AND BUREAU ~~
[13970]>’ INVESTIGATION OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY. ADDITIONALLY SAC
[13972]Pitt
[13976]He Bee
[13978]co
[13980]WEES wS
[13982]a
[13985]seta oy
[13986]Fuge
[13988]S0PY RETAINED IW
[13989]PERSONNEL RECORDS’ vari
[13991]Bl
[13993]BATES WILL BE INTERVIEWED CONCERNING KNOWLEDGE OF "ROUSTON PLAN”
[13994]at Y SSC STAFF MEMBER LOCiI ‘JOUNSON,
[13996]CINE I HAVE WAIVED YOUR EMPLOYINENT AGREEMENTS FOR PURPOSES OF
[13998]ay THESE INTERVIEWS. EACH SHOULD NOTE THAT HE HAS THE RIGHT TO
[14000]COUNSEL; HOWEVER, TOE ERI IS UNABLE TO PROVIDE PRIVATE COUNSEL.
[14002]{HERE ARE CERTAIN PRIVILEGED ARBAS CONCERNING WHICH SAS WOULD ]/ £ Hd!
[14004]Me OD adm Riese fo w foils Eh oe.
[14006]Dep. AD Inv. —
[14008]sst. Dir: ’
[14010]“nie PVD/SFP:njervic © AUG 4 1975
[14011]Comp. Sy (1.0) v2 ‘SEE NOTE PAGE THREE
[14013]Fie kcow ee Pee Se
[14014]Gen. Inv. _
[14016]went: TEDERAL BURLAU Oh iVESTIGATION . are io
[14017]el COMMUNICATIONS SECTION | Q,/
[14019]Laboratory : a - P ,
[14020]Plon. & Eval. — . ” a
[14021]nas 01975": yp” (7 wre,
[14022]Spec: JUL 3 wr Af ae C
[14024]Legal Coun. ey ee vag Ae] eur Ay
[14025]Telephone Rm. se
[14026]goiekis Direcror See? "E _ = [fui an TELETYPE UNIT ca (! :
[14027]24
[14029]GPO 7 O° fo9-02¢
[14030]Page 264 C5 o
[14033], NW 88296 Dochd:32989624 Page 265
[14035]PAGE TWO 62-116395
[14037]NOT BE REQUIRED TO ANSWER QUESTIONS. AREAS CONCERN INFORMATION
[14038]WHICH MIGHT DIVULGE IDENTITIES OF FBI SOURCES; INFORMATION
[14039]RELATING TO SENSITIVE METHODS AND TECHNIQUES; INFORMATION WHICH
[14040]MIGHT ADVERSELY AFFECT ONGOING FDI INVESTIGATIONS; AND INFORMA~
[14041]TION WHICH ORIGINATED WITH OTHER AGENCIES, INCLUDING FOREIGN
[14042]INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES.
[14044]SAN FRANCISCO NOTE RELEASE ALSO APPLIES TO FORMER SAS
[14045]ALBERT P. CLARK AND WILLIAM A, COHENDET WHO, ALONG WITT OTHER
[14046]EX-SAS ON WEST COAST, MAY ALSO BE INTERVIEWED, CLARK AND COHENDET
[14047]HAVE ALREADY RECEIVED FOREGOING ADVICE REGARDING PRIVATE COUNSEL
[14048]AND PRIVILEGED AREAS AND HAVE ASKED FOR CONSULTATION ASSISTANCE
[14049]WHICH BUREAU IS APPROVING AS BELOW.
[14051]NORMALLY, FBIHQ WOULD SUPPLY REPRESENTATIVE TO BE ON-THE-
[14052]SCENE FOR CONSULTATION PURPOSES. HOWEVER, DISTANCE AND TIME
[14053]SCOPE MAKES THIS NOT FEASIBLE IN THIS INSTANCE,
[14055]{TUE RANKING FBI OFFICIAL IN EACH OFFICE WILL SERVE FoR
[14056]CONSULTATION PURPOSES. IN HIS ABSENCE, AN SAC IN LOS ANGELES OR
[14057]ASAC IN SAN DIEGO AND SAN FRANCISCO MAY SO SERVE. PURPOSE OF
[14058]CONSULTANT, WHO WILL NOT BE PRESENT AT INTERVIEW BUT AVAILABLE
[14059]NEARBY, WILL BE TO SUPPLY ASSISTANCE IN THE EVENT PERSON BEING
[14066]\ NW 68296 Docid:32969624 Page 266 -~3-
[14068]PAGE THREE 62~116395
[14070]INTERVIEWED IS ASKED QUESTIONS IN ONE OF THE PRIVILEGED AREAS
[14071]OR QUESTIONS OUTSIDE THE SPECIFIED PARAMETERS OF THE INTERVIEW
[14072](COINTELPRO/BLACK PANTHER PARTY). SHOULD QUESTIONS ARISE WHICH
[14073]CONSULTANT REPRESENTATIVE CANNOT HANDLE, SUGGEST IMMEDIATE
[14074]TELEPHONE CALL TO LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION.
[14076]SHOULD ADDITIONAL FORMER SAS CONTACT YOUR OFFICE FOR ASSISTANCE,
[14078]COORDINATE WITH THEN WAIVER FROM EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT THROUGH
[14079]LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION AND FURNISH CONSULTATION SERVICES AS
[14080]REQUESTED.
[14082]" ‘NOTE THAN RANKING OFFICIAL SERVING IN CONSULTANT
[14083]POSITION DOES NOT REPRESENT THE PARTICULAR EMPLOYEE AS PRIVATE
[14084]COUNSEL. —
[14086]NOTE:
[14088]The referenced 5/2/75 teletype apprised all offices of
[14089]our cooperation with the SSC and furnished general background re
[14090]Bureau'’s servicing of its requests. Because of time element
[14091]relating te the first interview to take place in San Diego 7/30/75,
[14092]we are telephoning necessary instructions to that office. We
[14093]previcusly by teletype 7/9/75 advised current and former employees
[14094]on West Coast of SSC's intentions regarding these interviews. We
[14095]also previously released SAC Bates for purpose of interview re
[14096]Cointelpro/BPP and are now extending release to inchde interview
[14097]re "Houston Plan,” as requested by SSC Staff Member Johnson 7/25/75.
[14099]Former SAs Clark and Cohendet previously given necessary
[14100]advice by Legal Counsel Division as indicated above and offer
[14101]made for consultation services which they requested,
[14104]OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
[14106]MAY 1962 EDITION
[14108]GSA FPMR (41 CFR) TO1—11.6 es
[14109]ic.
[14111]UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT figs AD kde
[14113]Dep. AD Inv. —_
[14115]Asst. Dir.:
[14116]iva Memorandum ro
[14117]Comp. Syst.
[14118]Ext. Affairs ——
[14119]MR. CALLAHAN DATE: 6/9/75 Files & Com, —
[14120]. |
[14122]Gen. Inv.
[14125]Trai ning .
[14127]FROM . N, BASSETT
[14129]‘Gd. id - we.
[14130]SENSTUDY 75 >
[14133]In response to a Senate Select Committee request for
[14134]guidelines utilized by the Inspection Division, memorandum
[14136]H. N, Bassett to W. R. Wannall dated 6/2/7 B, captioned as above,
[14138]noted there would be no objection to a review of the Handbooks
[14140]for Headquarters and field office inspections by Commitiee Staff
[14141]members provided the review was conducted in FBI space with an
[14143]Inspection Division representative present,
[14145]SUBJECT:
[14147]Telephone Rm. ——
[14148]Director Sec’y —__
[14150]On 7/8/75 Mr. Mark Gitenstein of the Select Committee Staff
[14151]reviewed the FBIHQ Inspection Manual in the presence of SA _
[14152]Fred B, Griffith, Mr. Gitenstein was specifically advised these
[14153]Manuals are used solely as guidelines for the Inspection Staff and
[14154]are not binding on anyone but staff members, They cannot be used
[14155]to document any deficiencies noted during an inspection. He was told
[14156]such action would have to be based on applicable provisions in either
[14157]& the Manual of Instructions or the Manual of Rules and Regulations, v
[14159]“et
[14161]During the review it was noted Mr. Gitenstein made notes regarding’.
[14162]the following Sections: a
[14166]ANT, TMP STON CONTA THO
[14168]OLS UNCLASSTVLED
[14170]28 fe/eloa BY.
[14172]1, Section 2 (Recording the Inspection Findings), pages 5 and 6
[14173]which deal with the assembly and distribution of inspection reports and
[14174]work papers.
[14176]MOLISE
[14178]2. Section 4 (Specific Division naar pages 4 and 5 which are
[14179]concerned with surveys and audits. EG
[14181]Kes
[14183]a
[14185]on
[14186]3. Section 8 (Inspector's Summaries), pages 1, 2 and 4 wikich seas
[14188]with the summary for the Director, the letter to the ee a
[14189]the Director and personnel write-ups,
[14192]peer 0)
[14194]6
[14195]Mr. Gitenstein stated he would return ata later date to neve 19.975
[14196]field manual, ee
[14198]ACTION: None. . . . for information. DQ / »
[14199]ACTION Lf S$
[14201]1- Messrs. Adams, Wannall, Cregar ( ue eum 4
[14203]Bu wy U. LS, Savings Bonds Regularly WB rol Savings Plan
[14205]5} 2gg9624
[14208]¥FMDR/E
[14210]{GE TIPSEMATION COUTALNEO
[14212]t
[14213]SUBJECT:
[14215]LEE.
[14217]bail
[14219]PZ:
[14221]u iS WICLASSIPLED
[14222]BY
[14230]° is 1- Mr. Daly
[14232]Ident.
[14233]t Inspection
[14234]: Leg: Counseh fh — i “ig a
[14235]y * a
[14237]Bie
[14238]o-biactel: 3.
[14240]Perel FORM NO, 10
[14241]MAY 1962 EDITION
[14242]GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 10%—13.6 q  ) A
[14243]UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT s A ah “iy
[14245]veda
[14247]Memorandum ep
[14249]conn an
[14250]Ext. Mate —
[14252]: Mr. J. B. Adams pate: 7~%=75 Files & Com. —
[14254]Gen. inv.
[14256]SENSTUDY 75
[14258]* a ’ land& Eval, —
[14259]pa Spec. Inv.
[14260]4 Training :
[14261]Telephone Rm. —
[14262]Director Sec’y —~
[14265]By memorandum, 6-18-75, you were advised the
[14266]Department was considering preparing summaries of existing mat if it
[14268]of the so-called "Ki er 17" wiretaps to be furnished the Senate
[14269]Select Committéé (SSC). The Department was awaiting our approval
[14270]of this mode of response to the Committee. The referenced memorandum
[14271]recommended we advise the Department that we agreed on the preparation ay
[14272]of the summaries with the provision that we be allowed to review same
[14274]prior to the Department seeking Court approval for making them availab
[14276]to the Senate Select Committee, This recommendation was approved. y
[14278]Michael Shaheen, Deputy Special Counsel for intelligence”
[14279]Coordination in the Department, inquired of Special Agent Paul V. Daly
[14280]as to when the aforementioned summaries would be completed. He was
[14281]informed it was the Bureau's understanding the Department would prepare
[14282]the summaries. Mr. Shaheen, after consulting with K, William O'Connor,
[14283]Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, stated it was the Department's
[14284]desire that the Bureau prepare the summaries. He advised the Departmental
[14285]attorneys concerned with the litigation arising from these wiretaps will
[14286]review the summaries and seek Court approval prior to furnishing to the
[14288]Committee. REC-2 (om AY Co. isu - MY
[14290]RECOMMENDATION: 1é JUL 181975 i
[14291]Intelligence Division with the assistance of Legal Counsel——=
[14292]prepare the necessary summaries for forwarding to the Committee,
[14294]2
[14296]oo
[14297]f
[14299]1 - Mr. Wannall
[14300]1 - Mr. Cregar
[14301]1- Mr. Mintz
[14303]1 - Mr. Hotis
[14305]1- Mr. Peterson
[14307]VD:kis (8) ;
[14308]Me py Us U.S, Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan \\
[14309]age 2
[14314]CODE CABLEGRAM URGENT Pau
[14315]| ' 1-Legal Counsel Office .
[14316](Atin: Mr. Daly), 1/23/75
[14317]7 TO LEGAT LONDON 1-Foreign Liaison. ,
[14318]. l-Mr. Cregar _,,” a
[14319]FROM DIRECTOR FBI 1-Mr. Helgeson
[14321]O senate spLxcr commrres
[14322]MARK GITENSTEIN, SENIOR STAFF MEMBER, SENATE
[14323]SELECT COMMITTEE, WHICH IS CURRENTLY EXAMINING PRO-
[14324]CEDURES OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES, HAS ADVISED THAT
[14326]IST AND SUBVERSIVE INVESTIGATIONS. GITENSTEIN IS LEAVING
[14328]& THE COMMITTEE HAS EXPRESSED AN INTEREST IN HOW OTHER
[14331]5] ‘ COUNTRIES HANDLE THEIR DOMESTIC SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS;
[14332]BSG:
[14334]o> “ THAT IS, THOSE INVESTIGATIONS ANALOGOUS TO OUR EXTREM-
[14335]a
[14337]yD.
[14339]FOR LONDON AUGUST SIX NEXT AND HAS INDICATED A DESIRE TO
[14340]MEET WITH APPROPRIATE BRITISH OFFICIALS ANY TIME AUGUST
[14342]. #MDbR/ 6
[14343]tof Bo
[14345]ELEVEN OR TWELVE NEXT FOR A GENERAL BRIEFING IF THIS IS
[14347]x,
[14349]POSSIBLE, HE HAS NO OBJECTION TO LEGAT SITTING IN ON SUCH
[14351]BRIEFING.
[14352]yw GITENSTEIN'S REQUEST HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH/JOHN
[14354]Assoc. Dir.
[14355]Dep. AD Adm. — HER:enm
[14356]heeds (6) FEMCRAL BUREAU Ch iwesTieTion SEE NOTE PAGE TWO
[14357]Adin yn COMMUNICATIONS SECTION Ree agp aa g
[14358]Comp. Syst. —— [
[14359]Fn Com — duL a 91975 2 lv iK /. (e. OG t / ‘y- f
[14360]Inepccton Teeny CA x06! Am ~— er "
[14361]ell 19 JUL 31 1975
[14362]ere oan
[14363]gal Coun. —_ ;
[14365]Plan. & Eval. —
[14366]Spec. Inv. —___.
[14367]Training
[14370]Telephone Rm. — OOM mm TELETYPE UNIT
[14372]° R
[14373]nF EAA ead Page 269 So
[14376]. © @ ,
[14378]CABLEGRAM TO LONDON
[14379]RE: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
[14381][PARKER, COUNSELOR, MI-5, WASHINGTON, WHO SUGGESTS
[14382]YOU CONTACT MI-5 LIAISON TO DETERMINE HOW THIS SHOULD
[14383]BE HANDLED, BUREAU SUGGESTS THAT IN ADDITION YOU. a
[14384]CONTACT SCOTLAND YARD IF YOU FEEL IT APPROPRIATE. |(S)
[14386]HANDLE AND SUCAB ARRANGEMENTS, ATTENTION:
[14387]HELGESON, INTD.
[14389]NOTE: Gitenstein made the above oral request to Inspector
[14390]Helgeson during a meeting 7/25/75. This is being
[14391]coordinated with Supervisor Paul Daly with the Office
[14392]of Legal Counsel.
[14394]cf
[14396]Nw 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 270
[14398]Be
[14399]PTIONAL FORM NO. 10
[14400]may 1962 EDIT! i
[14402]2 EDITION:
[14403]GSA FPMR (41 CER) 10T=913.8
[14405]UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT Pagers ae
[14406]\ i Dep. AD Inv. L
[14407]w Asst. Dir:
[14408]<i Memorandum oa
[14409]Ext, Affaire _s
[14410]TO =: Mr. J. B. Adams ; DATE: 7/18/75 Gon be
[14411]c Iecnion aie
[14412]Intell. ex Vb
[14413]FROM : a oratory t
[14414]Legal comedif eee DE !)
[14415]Plan. & Eval. Le4f
[14416]Spee. Inv.
[14417]suBjecy\“gENATE-SELECT-COMMITTEE Tein
[14418]ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES Director Sosy —
[14420]ACCESS TO WITNESSES ’
[14422]At 11:40 a.m. on July 18, 1975, K. William O’Comnor,
[14423]Special Counsel in the Deputy Attorney General’s Office, telephonically
[14424]advised me that his negotiations with the Committee concerning more
[14425]restrictive limitations on Committee access to witnesses were not
[14426]successful. He said that the Department has determined that the
[14427]procedure in effect previously whereby the FBI Director would receive
[14428]a request for the availability of FRI personnel for interview and would
[14429]determine whether such personnel should be released from applicable
[14430]secrecy agreements would be reinstituted. —_——_
[14432]Iasked Mr. O’Connor whether this meant that the Department
[14433]no longer regarded all requests for interview of present or former employees
[14434]as "demand" situations requiring the specific authorization of the Department
[14435]as if a subpoena had been issued. Mr. O’Connor said that the Department
[14436][rake not consider such requests in that manner and that the FBI should
[14438]Su
[14440]FNOR| 6
[14441]Bi
[14443]ALY USPORMATION ORES!
[14445]make all determinations necessary for the appearance of witnesses for
[14446]interview.
[14448]IX
[14450]REC-36
[14451]RECOMMENDATION: FX-108 yo WEBI ie,
[14452]° 4) C7 et fs
[14454]For information. We will continue to discuss requests for
[14455]interview with individuals named by the Committge.in their requests,
[14456]and authorize waivers of the secrecy agreements on: ove a case- “ase-by-case
[14457]basis. W yuL 31 1975 -
[14459]1 - Mr. Wannall A. iat nee es
[14460]1M. Gress oH Ce ‘a
[14464]a Soe
[14466]Pact
[14468]MRUIT GS UCLA IEE
[14469]a bs
[14471]DA
[14473]1- Mr. Daly
[14474]1 - Mr. Mintz
[14476]Ae ey
[14477](6) *
[14479]| em 5 tAug Panes Jy on the Payroll Savings Pl
[14480]eo coezsoian EIQ HS Siting Bons Replat on tbe Pyrat Stings Plow
[14486]N a y
[14488]na €
[14489]NS my \
[14490]ROE
[14491]“mer
[14492]“. ° &
[14493]a
[14494]“or
[14495]Nae ~
[14496]we
[14497]Assoc. Dir.
[14498]Dep. AD Adm. —
[14499]Dep. AD Inv.
[14500]Asst. Dir.:
[14502]Admin,
[14503]Comp. Syst. —.
[14504]Ext. Affairs
[14506]Files & Com. _
[14507]Gen, Inv, —___
[14508]Ident.
[14509]Inspection
[14510]Intell.
[14511]Laboratory
[14512]Plan. & Evol. _
[14513]Spec. Inv.
[14515]Training
[14517]Legal Coun.
[14518]Telephone Rm.
[14520]| ai Awies298 Bocid Pease Pag Page 272
[14522]1- Mr. Mintz aot
[14523]1 - Mr. Wannall °-
[14525]1 - Mr. W.0O. Cregar’
[14526](Attn: S.F. Phillips)
[14530]CODE TELETYPE NITEL
[14531]1 - Mr. Deegan
[14532]1 - Mr. Nugen
[14535]JULY 25, 1975
[14537]w -* re. oe AN
[14538]: wake CA Neo Y Seo flol
[14539]FROM DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395) i
[14541]C(seustupy *75>>BUDED: 7/31/ 15.7 “ TEL Hepes:
[14543]f
[14545]FBIHQ IS PRESENTLY COMPILING PERTINENT DOCUMENTS PERTAIN,
[14546]ING TO CAPTIONED MATTER AT THE REQUEST OF THE UNITED states ‘
[14547]SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH.
[14548]RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC). :
[14550]INCLUDED IN THE SSC'S REQUEST IS ONE CONCERNING ALL MEMO
[14551]RANDA AND ANY OTHER MATERIALS INDICATING OR REFLECTING THE
[14552]INCEPTION OF (A) ALL HEADQUARTERS FILES AND (B) ALL ATLANTA ~
[14553]DIVISION FILES CONCERNING MARTIN LUTHER KING AND ORGANIZATIONAL
[14554]FILE CAPTIONED "COMINFIL OF SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP
[14555]CONFERENCE," (SCLC), TOGETHER WITH THE BASIS AND AUTHORITY FOR
[14556]OPENING SUCH FILES. g
[14558]SSC STAFF PERSONNEL HAVE ADVISED THE ABOVE REQUEST REFEES
[14560]NOT ONLY TO COMMUNICATIONS WHICH INITIATED ACTIVE INVESTIGA-Q
[14562]TION OF KING AND THE SCLC, BUT SHO D carey), ae Re yp is
[14563]WHETHER THEY BE OFFICE nn EGET, OR ofan Ath hits 8 (I
[14565]een oe ae Sal ide Sow wo o well wo
[14566]ES ake Daas
[14567]PE cy We
[14568]{WAP BE Wey
[14569]VEELIPE fm Xe
[14570]TELETYPE UNIT Pe me a
[14573]PAGE TVO
[14575]WEWSPAPER CLIPPINGS) WHICH FORMED THE BASIS FOR ESTABLISHING
[14576]THESE FILES PRIOR TO THE TIME ACTIVE INVESTIGATION WAS
[14577]INITIATED.
[14579]ATLANTA DIVISION PROMPTLY REVIEW ABOVE MATTERS AND
[14580]FURNISH FBIHQ WITH THREE CLEAR XEROKES OF ITEMS WHICH ARE
[14581]RESPONSIVE TO THE SSC'S REQUEST. THESE ITEMS SHOULD BE
[14582]XEROXED AS THEY APPEAR IN YOUR FILES, ANY EXCISIONS OF
[14583]DATA APPEARING THEREIN WILL BE HANDLED BY PBIHQ PRIOR TO
[14584]THE TIME THESE MATERIALS ARE MADE AVAILABLE TO THE SSC.
[14586]IT WILL NOT BE NECESSARY TO FURIISH HEADQUARTERS WITH
[14587]COPIES OF ANY INSTRUCTIONS RELATIVE TO INSTITUTING ACTIVE
[14588]INVESTIGATION IN THESE CASES WHICH EMANATED FROM FBIHQ.
[14589]WHERE SUCH IS THE CASE A SIMPLE STATEMENT TO THAT EFFECT
[14590]SHOULD BE MADE AND THE DATE AND CAPTION OF THE HEADQUARTERS
[14591]COMMUNICATION SHOULD BE FURNISHED.
[14593]EXPEDITE AND SUBMIT BY COVER AIRTEL IN ABOVE CAPTION
[14594]BY CLOSE OF BUSINESS 7/31/75.
[14596]NOTE:
[14598]Teletype being directed to the AT Division to obtain
[14599]information which is responsive to a request by the Senate
[14600]Select Committee. Bureau deadline deemed necessary in view
[14601]of request by this Committee.
[14603]| NW 68296 Docid:32969624 Page 273
[14606]OPTIONAL FORM NO~10 ®
[14607]MAY 1962 EDITION!
[14608]GSA FPAR (41 CFR) 101—11.6
[14609]UNITED STATES . ; 3 pen AD pdms
[14610]/ Dep. AD inv,
[14611]Asst. 'Dir.:
[14612]Admin,
[14613]Memorandum
[14614]Comp. Syst. __
[14615]iq Ext. Affairs ___
[14616]TO : Mr. jJ. B. Adams pate: 7-18-75 Files & Com, —
[14618]Gen. Inv.
[14620]Ident.
[14621]Inspection
[14623]FROM : Legal Counsef IN ia ‘Vert
[14624]ger
[14625]sunject;/SENSTUDY 75 Ee
[14626]Telephone Rm. _
[14628]Director See’y
[14630]Attached is a memorandum from K. William O'Connor,
[14631]Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, Department of Justice,
[14632]dated 7-18-75 requesting our observations concerning the type of access
[14633]certain Members of the Senate Select Committee would have to FBI
[14634]files concerning those Senators. This memorandum was received at
[14635]11:14a,m,, 7-18-75, and we were requested to furnish our response
[14636]no later than 1 p.m. on 7-18-75,
[14638]After consultation with Assistant Directors-Deputy |
[14639]Associate Directors Adams and Jenkins, Mr. O'Connor was telephonically “/
[14640]advised by SA Paul V. Daly that it was this Bureau's position that AO.
[14641]Option 3 with certain modifications would be this Bureau's choice. ae
[14642]Option 3, with modifications would read, "The file is assembled and the
[14643]Senator given access to it, with certain portions or papers withheld
[14644]and the Senator is orally advised of the reasons for withholding of the
[14646]P- 27 embhe
[14648]documents."
[14650]a RECOMMENDATION: . sor, om LEE
[14651]BoB ern agc2i / fed = tf, Ce oF 2 I MU
[14653]zm 0R IG
[14655]ATT, IMPOREATTON CONTAINS
[14657]3
[14659]For information. Ye
[14661]te a!
[14663]3 Enclosure fh we
[14664]“2 1- Mr, Adams - Enclosure atp-108 sf inl aca
[14665]eS 1 - Mr. Wannall - Enclosure S ja
[14666]= 1- Mr. Mintz- Enclosure ° JUL 31 1975 |
[14667]+ a 1.Mr. Cregar - Enclosure maces comeeman
[14669]1- Mr. Farrington - Enclosure fi ue
[14671]1 - Mr. Hotis - Enclosure pa?
[14673]1- Mr. Daly - Enclosure sll
[14676]PVD: his (9) (
[14678]at aH
[14680]84 A 1875 Buy U. 5. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan
[14681]NW 88296-Bocld:32989624 Page 27
[14684]A TG asa A Pile 2 eS TE AE
[14689]= ere
[14691]OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
[14692]WASHINGTON, &.C. 20530
[14694]JUL 18 1975
[14695]TC: See Distribution eid MOR 16
[14696]' / tenets aan er z ore vee
[14697]FROM: K. William O'Connor aa One DS
[14698]Special Counsel for Intelligence i,
[14699]Coordination :
[14701]SUBJECT: Congressional Access to Personal Files Maintained
[14702]by the FBI
[14706]Certain members of the Senate Select Committee have requested
[14707]access to their personal files. The preferred mode of access is the
[14708]subject of pending consideration by the Attorney General. As you
[14709]know, under the mandate of the Senate Select Committee, access to
[14710]the personal file of a member of the Senate Select Committee may be
[14711]had without any consideration of Freedom of Information Act issues.
[14713]The Atromey General has considered several options, and has
[14714]asked that you consider them and indicate hereon your view; he has
[14715]asked that these views be delivered to me not later than 1:00 p.m.,
[14716]this afterncon so that he may promptly consider them. ‘The options
[14717]considered are not exclusive. If you have any suggestions other
[14718]than the options indicated, please attach it to your response.
[14719]Responses should be delivered to me in Room 4213, Main Justice,
[14720]by the time indicated. Thank you for your cooperation.
[14722]OPTIONS
[14724]Option 1: Departmental staff examine the documents in the file and
[14725]delete any references to sensitive sources or ongoing criminal inves-~
[14726]tigation; thereafter, the file is made accessible to the Senator under
[14727]controlled circumstances at the Department of Justice.
[14729]Approved _______ Disapproved
[14730]Comment:
[14731][4X wiht
[14732]va neers A aN,
[14733]Ss . une EUS EE Gove
[14734]ana Docld:32989624 Page 275 Ape ee fe
[14737]a )
[14741]tion 2: Same as Option 1, except that a xerox of the. documents as
[14742]excised is delivered to the Senator.
[14744]Approved Disapproved
[14746]Comment:
[14748]Option 3: The file is assembled and the Senator given access to it,
[14749]with certain,papers withheld and the Senator is orally advised of
[14750]the reasons for withholding of the documents.
[14752]Approved Disapproved
[14754]Comment :
[14756]porte sor
[14758]Option 4: The Senator is furnished his entire individual file
[14759]without any excisions or deletions, for review at the Department
[14760]of Justice. .
[14762]Approved Disapproved
[14764]Comment:
[14766]Distribution:
[14768]Deputy Attorney General
[14770]Solicitor General
[14772]Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
[14773]Mr. Thornburg, Criminal Division
[14775]Mr. Pottinger, CRD
[14777]Mr. Scalia, OLC
[14779]Mr, Uhlmann, OLA
[14781]NW 88296 Dochd:32969624 Page #76
[14784]Mav 1962 EDINON / ;
[14785]GSA FPAR (41 CFR) 101=11.8 } vv
[14786]UNITEB STATES , f ‘Den AD AAS
[14787]aa Der, sip
[14788]‘~~ Memorandum ‘a
[14790]Comp. Syst, —_
[14792]Ext. Affairs —_ i
[14794]76 : Mr. J. B. Adams pate: 6/27/75 Files & Com —
[14796]FROM : Legal Counsel fi —— |
[14797]RSC omy
[14798]St Gin re a
[14799]SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON Li Spec: tow
[14800]INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES Telephone Rm. —
[14801]iractor Sec’y —__
[14803]ALLEGATION BY JopN/aErtrF CONCERNING
[14804]in! TERFERENCE WITH COMMITTEE INVESTIGATION
[14806]At 5:14 p.m., on 6/27/75, K. William O'Connor, Special
[14807]Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, advised me that he had received
[14808]a call from John Elliff of the Senate Select Committee complaining of
[14809]what he described as an attempt to interfezewith the Committee's investi-
[14810]gation by supplying information to the press that the Committee had been
[14811]furnished material which it had declined to use or to inquire into because
[14812]of its sensitive nature. O'Connor said that Elliff claimed that a journalist
[14813]who is friendly with the Committee had advised the Committee that he had
[14814]information from a Justice Department official that the Committee had been __/
[14815]furnished information originating in the FBI that Communist funds were io
[14816]used to financé Martin Luther King; that King had been related to the CP, USA¥’
[14817]and that the Senate Select Committee had treated this matter as a "hot potato"
[14818]and that the information also indicdted that "King laughed all the way to the
[14819]bank, "'
[14821]x
[14823]112/00 BSP ORE
[14825]VED
[14827]pul
[14829]O'Connor said that Elliff protested the apparent disclosures
[14830]by the Justice Department b9 the press and claimed that it appeared an
[14831]effort was being made to interferewith the Committee's work. O'Connor
[14832]told ENliff he had no knowledge of anyone in the Justice Department furnishing
[14833]any such information to the press and further, he told him that he did not
[14834]believe that information concerning CP funding of King had been furnished
[14836]to the Committee. st AOL geet® G2 -//6s7e- Me)
[14838]O'Connor said that he did not believe that att AB Aa furnished
[14839]such information to the news media but he wanted wastesbezaware-eof Elliff's ,
[14840]complaint. O'Connor said that it is possible that during interviews conducted |
[14841]by staff of the Committee, they have received statements indicating that |
[14842]Communist funds were used by King, but he does not believe that any docu-
[14843]mentation of that has been furnished to the Committee as yet.
[14845]1 CONE
[14846]RECOMMENDATION: For information. yea ff (ye
[14849]Moore
[14851]1 - Mr. Wannall
[14852]i Lun i Hotis = ee PAGE poe eee
[14854]1 - Mr. Daly.»
[14855]-M Miger
[14857]er, oe "y \
[14858]NW sessed Bbnaelmcnee CU, 5 Nes Regalarly on the Payroll Savings P Plan oo
[14861]x yeopntos sommes "OR 1G
[14863]ace ye RAY Aaa
[14864]eles Y3 UPOLAS
[14866]wale
[14868]XK
[14871]rs
[14873]rn , .
[14875]om
[14876]A fe
[14877]XK
[14879]NW 88296 Dochd:32989624 Page 278
[14881]ADDENDUM ” INTELLIGENCE DIVISION SFP:lhb 7/2/75
[14883]INID has received no report .or has any information
[14884]concerning the alleged leak referred to in this memorandum,
[14886]Concerning t2 the allegation in this memorandum
[14887]that information originated with the FBI that communist
[14888]funds were used to finance Martin Luther King, Jr., and that
[14889]King had been "related" to the CPUSA, the following is noted. f
[14890]We have never had any information that communist funds, .
[14891]literally, were used to finance King. We did have reliable
[14892]reports that King was helped in a financial way, particularly
[14893]as to advice regarding fund raising, by a close advisor,
[14894]Stanley David Levison, who was a secret member of the CPUSA.,
[14895]However, none of our reports are known to have claimed that
[14896]"communist funds’ were financing King. King was-never known
[14897]to have been a member of the CPUSA. It is true that he had
[14898]a number of close associates such as Levison who at the time
[14899]were either current or past CPUSA members.
[14901]INID is unable to pinpoint the report that "King
[14902]laughed all the way to the bank.”
[14907]. og
[14908]"OY, 2- m4 A. Mintz
[14909]’ 1“ Mr. J. B. Hotis)
[14910]L-~ Mr. W. R. Wannall
[14911]1- Mr. W. O. Cregar
[14912]il - Mr. Tf. EH. Burns
[14913]he Athorney Ceneral July 25, 1975
[14915]Diregtor, FBI
[14917]a)
[14918]UNLEED STATES SENATE SELECT COTIITTER »
[14919]ON INTEILIGRUCE ACTIVITIES {S8c) ~N
[14921]By letter dated Nay 14, 1975, with attached appendices,
[14922]the SSC requested cortain documents and other information
[14923]from the FBI.
[14925]Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the
[14926]Comittee is the original of a memorandum with an ue
[14927]enclosure which is in response to one of the Committec's V4
[14928]requests.
[14929]a
[14931]2 . . A
[14932]A copy of this memorandum with its enclosure is
[14933]being furnished for your records.
[14935]Mnelosures (4) ST
[14937]- 5
[14938]: oy. t >)
[14939]1 - The Deputy Attorney General ;
[14940]Att tention: KR. Williaa O'Connor poe 7 NS
[14941]Special Counsel for rn re 4H 4
[14942]Intelligence Coordination or “\
[14943]TEB:lek/thb|h|p ore, aye |
[14944](9) aan _— Fd OTE a
[14945]“ on aL IOIe ote. 2 oe oe ~
[14946]/ ee 7 “y
[14947]Assoc. Dir. , / 2 : ~
[14948]Dep. AD Adm. — a . (\ a7
[14949]Oe A ie 5 flee Pe .
[14950]Admin,
[14953]far Aone | fry oe
[14954]joss = ROUTE IN ENVELOPE \ ia
[14956]Intell 28
[14957]Laboratory -
[14959]Gen. Inv.
[14961]Ident.
[14963]Pian. & Eval. 1
[14965]Spec. Inv. ‘ {
[14967]Training a \
[14968]Legal Coun, 7 A
[14970]Inspedtion
[14971]Telephone Rm.
[14972]wi ee t —_ MAIL ROOM ay ETYPE unit L_]
[14974]Déctd:t8 pecta:étesz4 Page 279s~ 7)
[14976]i
[14979]- J. A. Mintz
[14980](l - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
[14981]~ Mr. W. R. Wannall
[14982]Mr. W. 0. Cregar
[14984]- Mr. T. E. Burns
[14986]Be ON
[14987]'
[14989]42-116 355 doly 25, 1975
[14991]GiIGHD STATES SHUATH SEEECT CONMTPTER
[14992]@O STUDY GOVERNLENTAL OPERATIONS
[14993]WIS RESPECT TO TITELBIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC}
[14995]RE: PHURTOER DOCUMINITS PERTAINING TC
[14997]\ THE FBI SUD DEPARTMENT oF gueTrcen He pre
[14998]a weer ane nea SERA ay
[14999]POLICIES AUD PROCEDURES my
[15001]er
[15005]Reference is made to S8C letter dated May 14, 1975,
[15006]with attached appendicas, requesting certain documents and
[15007]other information from the Fer,
[15009]Item number 1. b., of Part I, Appendix & of refor-
[15010]enced comunication requested Committee Staff access to all
[15011]indices and control files pertaining to all programs operated
[15012]by the Intelligence Division For 1940 to the present.
[15014]Attached to this memorandum is a List of all
[15015]retrievable programs, projects, surveys and procedures
[15016]employed in connection with domestic intelligence operations
[15017]of the PBI which may be of interest to you. There were a
[15018]muther of other programs z projects, surveys and procerfures
[15019]emploved in connection with foreign counterintelligence
[15020]operations o£ the FRI which are not included. In the event
[15021]you desire informetion concerning these latter items, which
[15022]include extremely sensitive matters, we would be pleased to
[15023]discuss then with 66C Staff Membors at FRE Headquarters.
[15025]BuclLosure
[15027]|
[15028], Agee. Di. 1. The Attorney General
[15029]fu Dep. AD Adm. —
[15031]f Dep. AD Inv. __
[15033]“a0 TER:lek/Ihb |h\y) ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG c
[15034]“ {8)
[15036]Admin, ®
[15037]Comp. Syst. __ 8) WN
[15038]Ext, Affairs
[15039]Files & Com,
[15040]Gen, Inv.
[15041]ident.
[15042]Inspection
[15043]Intell.
[15044]Leboratory
[15046]vs
[15047]fon. & Eval. — aro
[15048]Plan. va pun a y
[15050]_ Spec. Inv.
[15052]SEE NOTE PAGE 2 7
[15054]Training
[15056]ngay OUTS.
[15057]i ‘ nee Sey
[15059]Fclephone Rm.
[15061]res sec'y MAILROOMC—] ‘TELETYPEUNIT (7 DL
[15062]68296 36 Docid: 32989624 Page 230
[15065]Further Documents Pertaining
[15066]to the FBE and Department of Justice
[15068]Policies and Procedures
[15070]-
[15071]f
[15073]NOTE: ROP SECRET
[15075]| The Programs, Projects, Surveys and Procedures List
[15076](PPSPL), enclosed, and the Counterintelligence PPSPL, infra,
[15077]were generated by SA Thomas E. Burns, Jr. from a review of
[15078]available INTD inspection reports and files.
[15080]COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PPSPL
[15082]1. Intelligence Coverage of Friendly Foreign Countries - Developing
[15083]positive intelligence information regarding personnel in the
[15084]United States from non-Soviet—-bloc countries.
[15086]2. International Organization - Dangerous Aliens of Nations Outside
[15087]the Soviet-blicc - Centralized compilation of potentially danger-
[15088]ous aliens with diplomatic immunity against whom the U. S. State
[15089]Department could initiate steps to deport or to lift
[15090]diplomatic immunity in the event of a war emergency.
[15092]3. Mame Checks of Aliens Holding Diplomatic and International
[15093]Organization Visas - FBI maintaining results of name checks
[15094]conducted by various members of U. S. intelligence community
[15096]- «based on information provided to such intelligence organizations
[15097]by INS regarding aliens meeting established criteria.
[15099]4. Special Support Group (Use of non-Agent surveillance personnel).
[15100]5. Alen - Uncovering of Soviet illegals entering the United States.
[15102]6. Anagram - Penetration of foreign diplomatic establishments in
[15103]the United States for procurement of cryptographic materials.
[15104]oo Buchen, Counsel to the President, has advised that sensi-
[15105]information such as that regarding Anagram and electronic
[15106]eillances is to be handled in an oral briefing to be given
[15107]enators Church and Tower).
[15109]NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 3
[15111]10.
[15113]ii.
[15115]12.
[15117]13.
[15119]14.
[15121]15.
[15123]NOTE CONTINUED: ate SECRET
[15125]q
[15126]“ya
[15128]t
[15131]Further Documents Pertaining
[15132]to the FBI and Department of Justice
[15134]Policies and Procedures
[15136]Banpop ~ Identification of Soviet illegals through the transfer .
[15137]of funds through Swiss banks. {
[15139]Chinese Aliens Entering the United States ~- Identification
[15140]of ethnic Chinese legally entering the U.S. with
[15141]intelligence assignments.
[15143]Chinese Communist Contacts with Scientists in the United States -
[15144]Development of selected scientists of ethnic Chinese
[15145]background as foreign counterintelligence assets to be
[15146]targeted against People's Republic of China (PRC)
[15147]personnel and establishments in the U.S. and Canada,
[15149]Chinese Entering the United States Claiming Citizenship -
[15150]Identification of Chinese legally entering the U.S. with
[15151]intelligence assignments,
[15153]Chinese University and Graduate School Index ~ List of
[15154]Chinese aliens in the U.S. who have attended colleges or
[15155]graduate schools on the Chinese mainland and who are
[15156]considered potential candidates for development as U.S.
[15157]assets.
[15159]Ccokma ~ Specialized physical surveillance directed against
[15160]foreign intelligence officers.
[15162]Canil - Identification of Soviet illegals arriving in tle
[15163]United States from Europe through Canada.
[15165]Chicoin - Counterintelligence activities to thwart
[15166]efforts of Chinese intelligence in this country.
[15168]Forest - Screening of records of foreign students at New York
[15169]University, other than those in authorized programs, to uncover
[15171]Soviet illegals.
[15172]Ye SECRET
[15174]~ 3
[15176]NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 4
[15178]32589624 Page 702
[15181]Further Documents Pertaining
[15182]to the FBI and Department of Justice
[15184]Policies and Procedures
[15186]NOTE CONTINUED: Tp SECRET
[15188]16. Proho - Program to detect homosexuals who have been compromised
[15189]or recruited by Soviet intelligence,
[15191]17. Visitors to Communist China and Contacts by U. S. Residents
[15192]with Chinese Diplomatic Establishments ~ Investigations
[15193]conducted regarding certain individuals meeting established
[15194]criteria. . ®
[15196]18. Visitors to Iron Curtain Countries ~ Interviews of selected
[15197]U. S. tourists to determine possible contact by Soviet—bLloc
[15198]intelligence,
[15200]19, Orkid - Technical penetration of Seviet establishments in the
[15201]l - United States,
[15203]20. Cloverleaf - Technical penetration of new Soviet residential
[15204]complex, Riverdale, New York City.
[15206]21. Sam Survey - Screening of mail to selected European cities.
[15208]22. Gus Survey — Screening of mail originating in New York,
[15209]New York, destined for specific postal zones.
[15211]23. Radio and Technical Equipment Purchased by the Soviets -
[15212]Recording of Soviet purchases in such areas-~intelligence
[15213]and counterintelligence purposes.
[15215]24. Rega - Identification of Soviet illegals entering the U.S.
[15216]as aliens during certain years.
[15218]25. Secomex - Expanded Mexican border coverage to include
[15219]development of sources against the Soviet Embassy in
[15221]Mexico. :
[15222]nye SECRET
[15223]-~Ai~
[15225]NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 5
[15227]26.
[15229]27.
[15231]28.
[15233]29.
[15235]30.
[15237]31.
[15239]32,
[15241]33.
[15243]34.
[15245]35,
[15247]£96 Docld:32389624 Page 284 ro
[15249]Further Documents Pertaining
[15250]to the FBI and Department of Justice
[15252]Policies and Procedures
[15254]NOPE CONTINUED: ye SECRET
[15256]Sobir ~ Investigation of certain Soviet-bloc immigrants and
[15257]repatriates in an attempt to identify those previously
[15258]recruited by Soviet-bloc intelligence,
[15260]Socap - Review of certain records to identify Soviet
[15261]illegais who have applied for documentation as U.S.
[15262]residents as part of their effort to establish a bona fide
[15263]cover identity.
[15265]Vietnamese Refugee ~ Efforts to uncover possible
[15266]infiltration of North Vietnamese agents in the refugee flow
[15267]to the United States. .
[15269]Walklok - Screening of requests for birth certificates under
[15270]an established criteria to identify such requests which
[15271]may have originated with Soviet intelligence.
[15273]Technical and Microphone Surveillance - Survey of telephone
[15274]and microphone installations funetioning at certain times.
[15276]Al Fatah Automatic Data Processing Project - means of identifying
[15277]Al Fatah members and their contacts through use of ADP
[15278]equipment.
[15280]Cuban Refugea - Detection of Cuban intelligence agents
[15281]who might infiltrate into the U.S. through refugee
[15282]channels,
[15284]Deseco - Development of selected contacts to be directed
[15285]against Soviet-bloc officials.
[15287]East-West Exchange ~ Provided internal security safeguards
[15288]regarding admission to the U.S. of Soviet and satellite
[15289]nationals.
[15291]4 Coverage ~ Screening of mail destined for the Soviet Mission
[15292]to the United Nations, :
[15293]tye SECRET
[15296]NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 6
[15299]36.
[15301]37.
[15303]38.
[15305]39.
[15307]40.
[15309]41.
[15311]42.
[15313]Further Documents Pertaining
[15314]to the FBI and Department of Justice
[15316]Policies and Procedures
[15318]NOTE CONTINUED: 3B SECRET
[15320]Chiprop - Screening of mail to the United States from Hong Kong
[15321]and the People's Republic of China (PRC).
[15323]Chiclet ~ Screening of mail from the United States to Hong Kong
[15324]and the PRC,
[15326]Alchemy - "notional" Pro-Marxist - Leninist - Maoist domestic
[15327]revolutionary organization staffed by Bureau assets directed at
[15328]uncovering PRC intelligence activities in the United States.
[15330]Geology - Verification of individuals entering selected
[15331]foreign countries claiming U.S. citizenship--to identify
[15332]Soviet illegals.
[15334]Hilev - Collection of high level foreign political
[15335]intelligence by FBI Legal Attaches abroad for the
[15336]information of the White House,
[15338]Oarbit - Checking of U.S. Post Office Boxes utilized by U.S.
[15339]military personnel in the vicinity of selected U.S.
[15340]Military bases--to uncover possible Soviet agents.
[15342]Phrenology - Efforts to identify Soviet illegais who formerly
[15343]resided in a specific foreign country and whose present
[15344]whereabouts are unknown.
[15346]Classified by 6283, XGDS 1, 2 and 3, Indefinite,
[15348]Dee SECRET
[15350]32589624 Page 285
[15353]5.
[15355]10,
[15357]il.
[15359]12.
[15361]Her DE. |Fon oost8
[15363]Seer mite - ; ee - PY DK we y
[15367]NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 286 nein
[15369]PROGRAMS, PROJECTS, SURVEYS, and PROCEDURES
[15371]Administrative Index (Adex) - List of individuals who posed:
[15372]a realistic direct, and current dangar to the national
[15373]security of the United States.
[15375]Agitator Index ~ List of individuals who have demonstrated
[15376]by their actions that they have a propensity for fomenting
[15377]racial discord.
[15379]Anerican Rapatriate - Specific procedure toe be followed
[15380]concerning United States (U.S.) citizens who wore issued
[15381]Swiss protection passports to return to the U.S, From
[15382]Cuba, . .
[15384]Black Extremist Section of the Single Fingerprint File ~ Covers
[15385]black extremists who have propensity for violence or who could
[15386]be considered logical suspects in various crimes in which
[15387]Bureau might have an interest,
[15389]Black Student Groups on College Campuses ~ Disereat preliminary
[15390]inguiries, Limited to established sources, on black student
[15391]organigations and their leaders,
[15393]Bocov - Communist coverage along the Mexican border.
[15394]Characterization -~ Deseriptive statements concerning
[15395]certain organizations which have been subject to
[15396]investigation,
[15398]Cointalpro - Counterintelligence programs directed against
[15399]domestic subversive activities,
[15401]Communist Influence in Black Extremist Groups ~ Periodic
[15402]reports relative to communist influence in biack extremist groups.
[15404]Communist Influence in Racial Matters ~ Periodic reports
[15405]relative to communist influence in racial matters.
[15407]Computerized Telephone Number File - Computerized programing
[15408]of telephone numbers utilized by extremists and
[15409]revolutionaries and other individuals suspected of
[15410]involvement in interstate gambling activities.
[15412]Emorgency Detention ~ Provided for apprehension and detention
[15413]of persons considered potentially injurious to the national
[15414]defense and public safety of the U.S. in time of national
[15420]13. Extremist. Informant - Development of sources to provide
[15421]intelligence and evidentiary information concerning extremist
[15422]individuals and organizations.
[15424]14, Gherto Informant - Rovalopront of individuals living or working
[15425]in Ghotto areas who can furnish information with particular
[15426]onohasis on situations which may ¢ereate civil unrest.
[15428]215. Intensification of Investigation ‘of Weatherman and Other
[15429]Similar Yerrorist Grouos - Use of full resources of FBI and
[15430]use of innovative matheds to achieve a more comprehensive
[15431]coverage of such groups. .
[15433]16, Key Activist ~ Invastigation of individuals who were oxtremoly
[15434]active and vocal in their statements denounting the U,s.
[15435]and calling for civil disobedience and other forms of
[15436]wiiawful and disruptive acts.
[15438]17. Key Extremist ~ Provided intensified coverage of selected
[15439]extremists who were known to be activa and who had
[15440]praviously evidenced the potential for fomenting violence
[15441]or revolutionary activitics.
[15443]18, Docation of Non-Fugitive Weatherman Moambors - Intensified
[15444]efforts to locate non<fugitive Weatherman members.
[15446]19. New Left Extromist ~- False Identity - Attempt to provide
[15447]effective dissemination of voluminous data concerning
[15448]false idontities used by Weatherman porsonnel and other
[15449]Mew Loft extromists,
[15451]20, Wow Left Movement - Finances ~ Periodic information meade
[15452]available to the USDJ and the tihite House regarding inconc
[15453]source of various revolutionary groups.
[15455]21. How Left Movement ~ Publications - Coverage of Publications being
[15456]circulated by New Left Movement.
[15458]22. Potential for Racial Violence ~ Survey of localities having
[15459]potential for racial violence based on current social conditions.
[15461]23. Potential for Violence and Civil Unrest ~- Periodic assessment
[15462]o£ potential for violence and civil unrest throughout the
[15463]U.S. with emphasis on situations involving racial factors,
[15465]24, Prisacts - Extremist, revolutionary, terrorist, and
[15466]subversive activities in penal institutions.
[15468]a - ~ .
[15469]NW 88250 Docldt3 2085004 Paoe yet NESE mewn
[15472]26.
[15474]27.
[15476]28.
[15478]29.
[15480]30.
[15482]32.
[15484]33.
[15486]4 ¢
[15488]Presab - Protection of Strategic Air Command and inter-
[15489]continental ballistic missile bases of the U.S. Air Force.
[15491]Revolutionary Activities ~ Violence - Periodic reports
[15492]appraising potential dangerousness of the various
[15493]revolutionary groups,
[15495]Sceurity Index — Lint of individuals who were believed to be
[15496]dangerous to the internal security of the U.S. during
[15497]times of enorgency.
[15499]Seenrity Informant - Development of sources to provide intelli-
[15500]gence and evidentiary information concerning security matters.
[15502]Security of Spocial Agent Personnel ~- Communication to all offices
[15503]dated September 17, 1973, alerting field to information that
[15504]revolutionary and extremist activists and organizations have
[15505]instituted a program of collecting intelligence data against law
[15506]enforcement personnel and agencies. Et directed field to
[15508]advise FBI Headquarters if information developed that such organ-
[15509]izations and individuals are actively ongaged in confrontation
[15510]and harassment of FDI personnel.
[15512]Spectar - (Special Varget for Informant Pevelopment) ~
[15513]Development of quality informants to penetrate revolutionary
[15514]underground,
[15516]Stop Index Program on Administrative Index Subjects ~
[15518]Placing Adex Category 1 individuals in the "stop index"
[15519]operated by the Computer Systers Division in order to promptiy
[15520]Getermine inguiries received from local police concerning such
[15521]subjects.
[15523]Underground Wewspapers « Collection of conies of various
[15524]revolutionary newspapers,
[15526]Venceromos Brigade ~ Individuals subjected to background
[15527]investigation with view toward determining possible Adex
[15528]inclusion and analysis to determine whether or not subject \
[15529]could be targeted against hostile intelligence agencies,
[15531]Weatherman Fugitive (Neatherfug) Investigations ~ Efforts to
[15532]locate Weatherfugs,
[15534]Weatherman Automobile Hot Sheet + Commilation of Weatherman
[15535]vehicles for use by surveillance personnel,