[1]157-10014-10005
[3]| 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
[5]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[7]“AGENCY INFORMATION
[9]Date
[11]08/06/95
[12]Page
[14]1
[16]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[18]AGENCY : SSCIA
[19]RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10005
[20]RECORDS SERIES : HEARINGS
[21]AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 01-H-05
[22]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[23]ORIGINATOR : SSCSGO
[24]FROM : ANGLETON, JAMES
[25]TO 3:
[27]DATE : 06/19/75
[28]PAGES : 113 -
[29]SUBJECTS : ANGLETON, JAMES
[30]USSR
[31]CIA
[32]FBI -
[33]NOSENKO, YURI
[34]CIA, RELATIONSHIP WITH WC
[35]OSWALD, LEE, RUSSIAN PERIOD
[36]DOCUMENT TYPE : TRANSCRIPT
[37]CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
[38]RESTRICTIONS : NOT ASSASSINATION RELATED
[40]CURRENT STATUS RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
[42]DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/25/98
[43]OPENING CRITERIA
[44]COMMENTS : Box 1
[45][R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED -
[47]HW 50955 Docld:32423393 Page 1
[49]wr.
[51]Hearing held before
[53]Senate Select Coumittes to Study Governmental
[55]operations With Reapec
[57]eee ee er seer eet
[59]t to Intelligence Activities
[61]lt
[63]we. Thuraday 6 gn 19 19D ee ann a
[65]Washington, D.C.
[67](Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over
[68]to the Committee for destruction)
[70]WARD & PAUL
[72]410 FIRST STREET, S. E.
[73]WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003
[75](202) $44-6000
[77]TOP SEG
[79]t
[82]be
[83]wall
[84]2 4
[85]UY
[88]6.
[89]eo)
[92]TESTIMONY: OF
[93]James Angleton
[95]a
[96]ed
[98]Wve 2 OUve cooag ‘30 suo busean "3S “BAHENG BS ele
[100]i \ i
[103]cantina A aan a tte een
[105]P7600M@i rare
[107]WARD S SAUL
[109]ALO Farsi Stevat. S.E., Wamengion, O.c. 20003
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[129]EXECUTIVE SESSION
[131]Thursday, June 19, 1975
[132]United States senate,
[134]Select Committee to Study Government.
[135]operations with Respect to
[136]Intelligence Activities,
[137]Washington, D- Cc.
[139]The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:20 pem.,
[140]jin Room S.123, phe Capitol, Senator John G. tower presiding.
[142]Present: Senators Tower (presiding), Baker and Mathias.
[143]Also present: William Miller, Staff Director: Frederick
[145]A. O. Schwarz, gr., chief counsel; Charles Kirbow and David
[147]Aaron, professional Staff Members.
[149]TOP SECRET
[151]d
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[154]a
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[156][oy
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[161]S10 Feest Stewat, S.E., Wammnaton, 0.6. 20003
[163]Senator Tower. Mr. Angleton, I underatand that you came
[164]on very short notice. And I appreciate your accommodating
[165]the Committee.
[167]you will have to be sworn.
[169]Would you rise, please, and raise your right hand?
[171]Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about
[172]to give before this committee is the truth, the whole truth and
[173]nothing but. the truth, so help you God?
[175]Mr. Angleton, I do.
[177]Senator Tower. Counsel, you may proceed.
[179]TESTIMONY OF JAMES ANGLETON
[181]Mr. Schwarz. TI would like to first get your name and
[182]address on the record.
[184]Mr. Angleton. James Angleton, Arlington, Virginia.
[186]Mr. Schwarz. gust some procedural matters. You have a
[187]right to counsel, you understand that?
[189]Mc. Angleton. Yes, rt understand it.
[191]Mr. Schwarz. And if at any time you want to stop to ob-
[192]tain counsel you have a right to do that. And if you wish
[193]to claim any of your Constitutional rights you have a right
[194]to do that, you understand those things also, do you?
[196]Mr. Angleton. Yes, I understand them.
[198]Mr. Schwarz. You were employed at the CIA for what
[199]period of time?
[201]Mr. Angleton. From the beginning until December, the
[203]TOP SECRET
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[218]end of December.
[220]Mr. Schwarz. 1974?
[222]Mr. Angleton. 1974.
[224]Mr. Schwarz. And were you the chief of Counterintelligencd
[225]at the CIA for that period?
[227]Mr. Angleton. I was.
[229]Mr. Schwarz. For that entire period of time?
[231]Mr. Angleton. No, from 1954.
[233]th Israel! intelligence agencies?
[234]Angleton. That ig correct.
[236]can you briefly state the ¢
[238]ssusiness, oF are we trying to take
[240]Wedmay try to take Up
[242]What we are trying
[244]Schwarz. We are going to the Szule pus ines
[246]TOP SECRET
[249]Z
[250]2
[251]Pig
[252]s
[253]4
[254]a
[257]B
[259]10 Fast Street, S.E., Warmington, D.C, 20003
[261]Senator Baker. If I may say 30, 80 that
[262]not. be taken by surprise, there are one/e
[263]Tah Like to discuss. The nature of th@t/material would be
[264]o what you have already discus’ &@ with Rockefeller,
[265]having to with the Oswald situat 2 and other things.
[267]on. Well, to begit with, I went into OSS in
[269]1943, in 1943 freq the infant And then Iwas assigned to an
[271]were put together who
[273]And that included
[275]erewas a training intensive in
[277]to London.
[279]Gagression, the Germans were using a receiver machine cals
[280]TOP SECRET
[282]|
[285]WARO ® SAUL
[287]ALO Fast Street, S.£.. Wasmengion, D.C. 20003
[289]HW 50955 Docld: 32473393
[291]break of war, when
[293]prescience to know thate the systems cou d only be one thing,
[295]that it would be operat ive) Mn a time” “ot War.
[297]tend
[299]the counter intelligence
[301]ist of priorities, in
[304]in any fashion to the’ Germans would destroy A ilitary
[305]uses. And sm or when the Germans woe in to the
[306]war, they brow
[307]100 percent.
[309]And! Vv
[310]Z messages from the German high command. 1 kn
[311]the Bagi le of Tobruk was fought on six intercepts.
[313]So our job was to make use of the counter intelligence
[315]¢ the purpose of playing back German agents to their high
[317]fommand. And this was an elaborate deception. And when the
[319]war ended I would say that 99 percent of all reporting agents
[321]TOP SECRET
[323]Page 6
[326]west oader aliases, their only point of contact fof/ most
[327]— and money was to our agent under &
[328]And it was Balled the Safe Haven program. /
[330]So Londonswas in-asense a staging aes with full access
[331]to British, or th Méruits of British activity, going back
[332]through their onets NYstory And fies the advance head-
[333]quarters for General pohyan, and Mr. Murphy.
[335]I was then sent wo her inf1943. And I took over the
[336]counter intelligence for X
[338]wffone OSS, AFHQ, Allied Forces
[340]lleadquarters.
[342]Z
[345]rN
[346]e
[347]a
[348]s
[352]Subsequently f became the Ae of OSS Italy. And
[353]I want to say that my wotk then becat @ more broad in terms of
[354]espionage and all the/vother branches of toss. And I re-estab-
[355]lished the countegf XX And I brought the
[356]French back into poxistence, particularly endnan who
[357]originally scafices the code, and who worked ah tt for many
[358]years. And MH ents time it was shifted to one Gad aoe.
[359]I lef’ Italy in 1947 or 1948 and came back, ‘@nd was
[361]discharged and went into the Agency immediately. AN during
[363]the p he I was in the Agency, of course, I had oN
[365]M ions, long distance operations, and counter intelligence,
[367]some sabotage, black propaganda, infiltration.
[368]t
[370]410 Forst Street, S.E., Wasmingion, D.c, 20003
[372]And probably the €irst overnight operation that there was
[374]TOP SECRET
[377]WARD & PAUL
[379]#10 Foest Street, $.€., Warnsneton, B.C. 20003
[381]Italians in an airplane and having them fly over to ¢
[383]oumanian border and make very primitive snotoaranrif ot the
[385]Sond I was sent back to the Air Force. Afd then I had
[387]code operabions, embassy penetrations, anadd, on.
[389]sense the resuscitation L ve Italian service,
[392]bs Veter of the Interior,
[394]civil war in Greece, and Van of the international
[396]Brigade and in fact the sofdets ee up, when they were
[398]not fighting the war, ingthe post-waig, period, assassinations,
[399]and instability. :
[400]y >
[401]And throughout’ this we had very ciost\supervision from
[402]Mr. Murphy, and General Donovan. And we had oe interest
[404]in the vatican, ‘and what was happening in Berlimijbehind the
[406]And ‘che then acting Secretary of State for the¥vatican,
[408]fho is the present Pope. And so there was “fh
[409]Mein,
[411]5
[413]to dofthrough our channels, and General Donovan, with M
[415]the frope, who is now the Pope, one of the basic problems was
[416]: 2
[418]theycold war. We did not buy the cold war, jit came to us
[420]fad we worked with the Germans, and as we broke down the
[424]Be vosseion we began to find that we were not getting the
[426]TOP SECRET
[429]then I got into all fields ofylabor, subversion,
[430]. pone a a
[431]rants, and then revolutdon. I was in Greece.
[432]ns at that perfod’ were fairly high level and
[433]ction to Stalin.
[435]12
[437]13 || over to us at very hi
[439]2
[440]3
[442]a
[443]a
[444]f-]
[447]8
[449]14 And in the cour
[451]15 immigration. technic. ® still a part of AFHQ, which
[453]16 || was a combined ola nartea nsodighees And the British desires
[454]17 i Zeivities be directed in supporting their
[456]1g | responsibilie , te
[458]yg | vent the Lerten,
[460]A
[462]20 I think the ee ever re-
[464]2) Oy during that period was one we sent to . Murphy, and
[466]threugh General Donovan to the President. Tha
[467]3
[469]22 Li.
[470]23 /uas where w exercised our influences on the Ita 4
[472]ifs
[474]410 Ferst Street, $.£., Wasringion, o.c. 20003
[476]of, prevent immigration: And they addressed themselves
[478]5, issue, and they came back with an ambiguity, but it le
[480]TOP SECRET
[483]WARD & PAULUS
[485]410 Forst Street, S.E.. Wrasmengton, b.c. 20003
[487]A
[489]sageria, who
[491]had been Chvefyof the Italian Naval Intelligence, but was
[493]then the Commanding Admiral of the Tu anian Fleet generally
[495]south, where all Lie {ileqal immigrants collected and were
[497]sent down.
[499]And then they ble Irgum, and blew up the British
[500]embassy in Rome, who wy: posite numbers. And the man
[501]with whom we had set uptds the alian intelligence through
[502]the rest of the sradis -- we ha
[503]group, and then Ww the dilemma again as to whether we
[504]turned them ove Jeo the British sathoke ds, and so on.
[506]And we Ajére in a position to make d gions one way or
[508]“Yand eventually we came down o \ Aside of re-
[509]leasing em.
[511]Shad there is so much more of it. fT am try
[513]hread of it.
[515]Mr. schwarz. So you developed some kind of a rehat;
[516]dhip, perhaps a friendly relationship, with persons con
[517]with the new State of Israel or the hoped-for state of
[519]Israeli back in the 1940's?
[521]Mr. Angleton. That is right.
[523]TOP SECRET
[526]4
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[536]410 Farst Street, S.E., Wasnengton, 0.c. 20003
[538]Mr. Schwarz.
[540]we you kept the Israeli account, if that is the rl
[541]P,
[543]jYem was that you
[545]7 ana you had the
[547]problem. And one of my men
[548]the Zionist movement in hh th
[549]a connection to this man /
[550]So,coming vacy/ ad onsntnaton, I
[551]to Colonal Donald
[552]clandestine nig covered the world, on al
[553]clandestine dotivity.
[555]And subsequently t was Chief of Operations\ for Es-
[557]4
[559]Mr. Schwarz. In the period beginning in 1954 and la
[560]until 1974, when you left the Agency, did you have any
[562]relationship -- is the Israeli account the wrong way to say it
[564]TOP SECRET
[566]|
[568]A
[573]diane
[575]a
[577]0
[578]“ar
[579]‘air
[580]Gc
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[583]Wan
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[598]Mr. Angleton. It ig all right. It is as goo
[599]& Mr. Schwarz.
[601]No. That began in 1951
[603]1951 and 1974.
[605]Mr. Angleton. ; ted in 1951. And I was the
[606]/ Fell,
[607]r of Jerusalem, Pete
[609]Kollek, was at the@éther end of the negotiation. He was
[611]stationed in vachleaton. But during the Jewish Agency period.
[613]he was head ofthe intelligence in Turkey, duping the war and
[615]> in common.
[616]Be
[618]whegwas then Director. And he was to be succeeded by Gener i
[620]id ter Bedell Smith. And the decision was made during the
[622]far that Bedell Smith was to take over, and Allen Dulles retu
[624]TOP SECRET.
[627]WARD & PAUL
[629]10 Frest Sieeet, 5.E., Warnenaton, b.c. 20003
[631]to thia activity, that we
[632]relationship. And after 4 lot of bureaucratic prob
[633]gave me the account.
[635]Mr.
[637]eed upon between the two services? e
[639]Angleton. In most simplistic,
[641]Paper andop rations ,discussion.
[643]ority was the agree>
[645]Mr. Angleton. Under the authority ofthe Director of
[647]Fi entral Intelligence, and the Prime Minister 6
[649]the other side.
[651]Mr. Miller. And this involved the exchange of res
[652]of both countries?
[654]Mr. Angleton. The term “resources” is not quite
[656]correct. Everything except their own people. If was giving
[658]TOP SECRET
[661]Sicha a euptnmtte  o
[663]410 ECerst Street, $.£.. Warreneton, O.G. 2000)
[667]up papers and signals, communications intelligence, and
[669],»the other products of intelligence action.
[671]CIA, and eve
[672]Mr. Mille
[673]as an instrument of
[675]Mr. Angleton.
[677]President or
[678]the Agency.
[679]with Africa,
[681]If you
[683]things cleared 4
[684]obtained veon hf, Hill.
[686]Mr. udyher. Was it regarded as an obligatic
[687]commitment / from the U.S. to Israel on certain matter
[688]a Angleton. When you use the word U.S. while y
[689]we it as contracting officers and all that, there was
[690]d to writing. And it is a custom of
[692]telligence that intelligence supersedes writing. And
[694]J vere have been very few directors to my knowledge that would
[696]TOP SECRET
[699]WARD & PAUL
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[729]Sunderstanding.
[731]sign an agreement to some unde
[733]ut their pen to hand to
[734]Loew
[736]standing. It is based on a fiduciary relationship an ommon
[738]ced by events. WE had the arrest of the/nine doctors,
[740]rom in Russia. And obviously
[742]Va didn't go through
[744]eryone to see.
[746]a lot of bit@aucracy, it was there. for,
[748]And it had a dibrect impact on the qyestion of immigration of
[750](Ses along with it. And
[752]else that
[754]agents, and everyth:
[755]I think that character fydoa operation,
[757]Mr. Miller. How was it /possible for succeeding directors
[759]of the intelligence agency?
[761]agreements were a th
[763]service and the wy
[765]ase the Israeli intelligence
[767]telligence
[769]‘Nery simple. Theysaw the production to
[771]Mr. Angleto
[773]Lf,
[774]begin with. And i met with sirecto’ de the head of
[776]Israeli intelligence. And they met with Apoadors and prime
[778]ministers. yy they were very much involved,
[780]Mr,/ SChwarz. Just one more background guéstion and
[782]#341 turn to the principle subject.
[784]then w
[786]ollowing through on the subject of Israel upy
[787]rture in 1974, is there any connection between
[789]rture and handling of Israel? And if there is,
[791]the connection?
[793]Mr. Angleton. Well, I think I have said it all to tre
[795]TOP SECRET
[797]commission -- I don't now how wisely. You ean always 9g
[798]different information from different people. But € plis
[799]Sold them, so I would like to give him the benef
[801]on it. But over a period of time Colb
[803]reporting on superiors, until
[807]2
[808]2
[810]a
[811]e
[812]q
[815]g
[817]he began to regard’'t
[818]a #S
[819]thing where we Had to open the windows ‘and Jet the air in.
[821]And he used ph ases such as, WE must hel ‘ut Henry and a few
[823]position was that it was a political
[825]we were not bound, oF should hot be bound
[826]Nancy on tactical ventures when we had rela
[827]Aaihjich had strategic implications.
[828]But one must rembmer that there are still three
[830]million Jews in the Soviet Union. And the relationship i
[832]410 Fast Street, S.E.. Warmeaaion, D.c. 20003
[834]only place where you do it with high level agencies who wo
[836]for ideology and do not work for money. So it ia unique.
[838]TOP SECRET
[843]2
[846]ry
[847]a
[848]Q
[850]4
[851]3
[853]416 Foeat Street, $.£., Wasmengton, O.C. 20003
[855]and ‘axample is 500 Polish intelligence soho ers who were
[856]oi immigrated to Israel. They he about Polish
[857]intelligence” than the Poles. And the S he sg had worked with
[858]the Poles in the:
[860]SS
[862]had the cohesion o£
[864]their own congress pak
[866]Moscow.
[867]ob was to preserve the inte~
[869]loc, because the problem
[871]the return.
[872]And, thefefore, there is a certain Kind of parallelism,
[876]you vton/eol, between handling the communications intelligence
[878]f£ it and
[880](Recess.)
[882]Senator Tower. Will you go ahead and resume the que tren
[884]TOP SECRET
[887])
[888]2
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[899]movements.
[901]And,
[902]things, and so on, toNte seemed | Weolutely contrary to the
[903]spirit, and what had been soinkion for 22 years.
[905]And during that time wephad obtained, for example, by
[906]way of production, Khrushg ‘ cret speech which prac~
[908]tically created revolutd6ns in Hungary and Poland.
[910]I was just simply reiterating “ee of the immi-
[914]gration. This pen opening the doors a letting the light
[916]in, and breaking/down compartmentation, and bE
[918]Ape the production t ran from everything, such asi
[919]se xt speech of Khrushchev's against Stalin, it ran ints
[920]an hard information on nuclear explosives, and dit
[921]into practically the whole gamut. And I think in a cer
[923]tain period of time it resulted in over 22,000 reports deal-
[925]ing with the Soviet bloc which were unique. And much of this¥
[927]TOP SECRET
[930]Lh Ma a SE .
[932]210 First Steeet, S.E., Warmington, O.C. 70002
[934]WARG & PALL
[936]and our own defense budget.
[937]SA tom, our own way of handling it was to give
[939]attrifition, reports, so that if the report wa
[941]And to break down\the fiducfary relationship-- which is
[943]7 as the men I have had were
[945]went back to Tal Aviv; et cetera, ax’small group of men. It
[946]was probably the modt economical operation that has ever been
[948]devised in the ¥5, Government. I don ey think there was more
[950]than 10 peo
[952]I st&sted from the south side with twocSewish men who
[954]es
[956]f .
[957]worke “th me during the war. He sent them over as ordinary
[959]der cover to establish the working hoursyof things,
[961]mi
[962]y,
[964]And one of them rose to be Deputy Chief of the Serv
[967]b
[969]But it is a part of the whole fiduciary business.
[971]TOP SECRET
[973]3
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[977]3
[979]a
[981]a
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[988]For example, we had certain political overtones wie’
[989]we were used in an affirmative way under President edsenhower..
[990]anted to make a real attempt to see if there gare ever
[991]And with Alan nivies, his
[992]2 put up a plan
[994]pin Robert B. Anderson, who had/been Assistant
[996]dy emissary from the
[998]6 Israel, which was secret,
[999]black, AS ‘gen Gurion -- and Shaffetz was
[1000]the Foreign Minister “- a 6 who was in the Prime Minis-
[1001]ter'’s office, and later Mayers,
[1003]And we took him wal cone. And Kermit Roosevelt
[1005]would take him over tf and this went on back
[1006]and forth on men ps, until the Sghglusions were reached
[1007]that there wa be any peace. ‘
[1009]But those'/ypes of initiatives could, be done without.
[1011]ffnich underlay your Leaving the Agency?
[1012]Angleton. Yes. We offered me jobs or whats not.
[1013]ate these are matters of principle, as far as I am con
[1014]VA Mr. Miller. Mr. Angleton, you described the fiduci
[1016]relationship. Were there points along the way where the U.S¥
[1018]TOP SECRET
[1021]PTC DOSE ON TTC NT ENCOUNTER
[1023]: i
[1025]te
[1026]ct
[1028]ad
[1029]Cc
[1030][av]
[1034]d
[1035]a
[1037]a
[1038]4
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[1044]J£.. Wasnengton. B.C. 2000)
[1046]interests and the interests of Israel were in conflict?
[1047]Mr, Angleton. We never got into that,
[1048]only had to read the paper every day to see that,
[1050]Mr. MIller. But how did they come up ? 7:
[1052]counts of.
[1053]AY ro level.
[1054]Mr.
[1056]question.
[1058]Mr. Van It was not Unusual. I have had it
[1060]f :
[1061]with many €@hiefs of services in 80 fferent countries, so
[1062]it is wlan more unusual than a lot e Sothers. The French-
[1063]man who’ got the code is closer to me tha’ tthe
[1065]Isra@lis are.
[1066]Miller. Similar to the relations
[1067]. Angleton. I don't jike the word unusval} because to
[1069]usual.
[1071]Miller. Delete that. If your working relavic ship
[1072]TOP SECRET
[1075]Mr. Angleton. Wh
[1077]Senator Mathias. The
[1079]WARD & PAUL
[1081]had no commitments with Israel
[1084]! ! We had two aa had just fought a war with us, and
[1085]i og f
[1087]F both of whom betrayed us. And Eden's
[1089]{ Wa
[1091]4
[1093]i
[1095]1
[1097]A
[1099]for a different purpose.
[1101]Mr. Kirbow. Let me see if I can make a point on jus
[1103]S10 Foest Sieeet, S$... Warnengton,_0.C. 20003
[1105]common sense level.
[1107]TOP SECRET
[1109]. x
[1111]HW 50955 DociId: 32423393 Page 24
[1113]ys from
[1114]ce and Israel?
[1116]Senator
[1119]LOLEA A ote WM. Shara oe
[1121]that kind?
[1122]Mr. Angleton
[1124]days.
[1126]WARD & PAUL
[1128]lala at ciate aL ete awe a tia mite
[1130]tesfified here under oath as to certain matters
[1131](8 the approach that we are going to take now.
[1133]Is that clear?
[1135]Mr. Schwarz. I want to ask the question generall
[1137]ALO Faust Street, $.€., Wasnington, O.€. 7000)
[1139]first and then come to the other testimony.
[1141]TOP SECRET
[1143]HY 50955 Docild: 32423393 Page 25
[1145]Ee eee ES ies aia dia Meade fe
[1147]2
[1148]2
[1149]4
[1150]ry
[1152]o
[1154]a
[1155]4
[1157]810 Foeyt Street, SEL., Waininaton, 0.C. 70003
[1159]fexrring to, where the Agency, in me
[1160]" LO va
[1161]Mr. icCone, had some of the sharpest fo ds probably in the
[1162]history of s relationship.
[1163]Mr. Schusifz. You mentioned thos@ at lunch, and you might
[1164]stéte that to my knowledge the
[1166]raised’ the question of their atomic
[1167]interests, with one or
[1169]two small exceptions, wh
[1171]who had heen tea oy
[1173]to come back and attend some meé
[1174]level.
[1175]Mr. Schwartz.
[1176]the question/broadly enough.
[1177]e Agency take any steps to mak
[1178]to a any personnel who had knowled bout atomic
[1179]nated.
[1180]Yi Mr. Angleton. None whatsoever.
[1182]Mr. Schwarz. And specifically with respect t
[1184]let's go off the record for a minute.
[1186]TOP SECRET
[1189](Off the record.)
[1191]Mr. Schwarz. Back on the record.
[1193]Schwarz. To your knowledge was he ever put in con -
[1195]Schwarz.
[1197]Angleton.
[1199]rd
[1200]3
[1202]e
[1204]o
[1207]x
[1209]Schwarz.
[1211]4
[1212]1
[1213]1}
[1215]4
[1216]a
[1217]H
[1218]4
[1219]2
[1220]|
[1222]Schwarz. And did the “three of you then go for dinner
[1224]Mr. Angleton. That is correct.
[1226]uhbeoneaee. At that meeting did you discuss <-
[1228]to Israel?
[1230]430 Corer Street, $.0.. wasmeneton, O.C. 2000)
[1232]Mr. Angleton. Yes.
[1234]TOP SECRET
[1239]"A10 Ferat Street, SE. Wainington, D.C. 270003
[1242]]
[1244]6
[1246]6
[1249]8
[1251]Mr. Schwarz. What did he say to you?
[1252]Mr. Angleton. They prefaced his remarks by
[1254]ag not a professional scientist, but he was a
[1256]devolved, one sai!
[1258]Israelis, and as a follow-u
[1260]know-how by sending Dr.
[1262]Ss,
[1264]Mr. Schwar3
[1266]Mr. pe My response to him was, iewas wrong. But
[1268]he had not fidentified the scientist.
[1270]MrigScharz. When you say it was wrong --
[1272]he. Angleton. His statement was wrong.
[1274]Mr. Schwarz. So you denied the story that atomic
[1275]eéghnology had been transferred to Israel?
[1277]Mr. Angleton. I said, it is wrong.
[1279]Mr. Schwarz. I just want to make sure what it is.
[1281]TOP SECRET
[1284]2
[1287]a
[1288]a
[1289]o
[1290]a
[1292]3
[1294]420 Foret Street, $.£., Wastengion, O.C. 20003
[1296]does constitute a denial.
[1298]Mr. Angleton. His story was wrong.
[1302]terested in fact that, one, he ee Szule <= I am sorry
[1303]that I knew Hersh\-~ and that Hersh #o7d him that his source
[1305]was the man who ga him the Decenibér 22 article, and whether
[1307]he “had been set up
[1309]Senator Baker. What. De@ember 22?
[1311]Mr. Anglet
[1313]Senator Baker. Did they do thatdonce?
[1314]Mr. AngYeton, No, because neither disclosed their inde-
[1316]pendent soufces to the other.
[1320]ify for my
[1322]own purposes is that the conversation you just rélated you said
[1323]Lf .
[1324]volfbrons.
[1326]Do I understand you to mean that every material
[1328]Ney
[1330]of that statement was wrong?
[1331]Mr. Angleton. Yes. But I didn't know my motives on
[1333]lot of questions that I had with him. Because this was the
[1335]TOP SECRET
[1338]wee
[1340]|
[1342]a
[1343]3
[1344]A
[1346]“4
[1348]2
[1349]3
[1351]4
[1352]4
[1353]a
[1356]8
[1358]410 First Street, S.£ , Wasnengten, O.C. 20003
[1360]a
[1362]acaister: Hersh told him, according t6 Szulc, that
[1363]he was sch
[1365]2
[1367]ed of the story, because this wéshis source on the
[1368]S
[1370]December 2
[1372]Mr. Angleton.
[1374]Mr. Kirbow.
[1376]to Israel?
[1378]Be
[1379]i
[1381]Mr. NAGgleton. I denied it. But the conversation drifted
[1383](2 iS
[1384]a Szulce was .talking about a very\great agent
[1386]a
[1388]that if in the-Agency. And he was bragging abou
[1389]nah had more sources than Hersh had. And then he sad
[1390]youilknow Australia?
[1392]And 1 said, yes, I know Australia.
[1394]Does the word Sydney mean anything to me?
[1396]TOP SECRET
[1399]Pd
[1400]2
[1402]PS
[1403]4
[1404])
[1407]B
[1409]410 Forst Street, $ E.. Wainingtan, O.C. 20003
[1411]Yes, he word Sydney does mean something to me.
[1412]Do you know sho is bicycling in India?
[1414]And Teald, Iam afraid I am not with you.
[1416]And he said, Sidney X. And Sidney X is one
[1418]ve employees who retired, and is bicyeli
[1420]business of:‘this whole evening.
[1421]And he Wx he got that from his source,
[1422]Now, that } 's name is Sidney gGottlieb. And he was the
[1423]head of our technicah, services aepgtment, which means that
[1425]there is a cross Plantain our business, And the man who
[1427]‘was bugging and performin the hundreds of technical
[1429]services, has access, entepfiegeety ta many of our operations.
[1433]There is one ine pote, in the business where there
[1434]is a breakdown of compar Fennoiddee for him to indicate
[1435]that he knew Gottlign, and the sours hat had been raised in
[1436]my mind, since L/yas talking about a scl ist, plutonium,
[1437]atomic energy,#and all these matters, that A goures might
[1438]be in our Te¢ghnical Services Division, which, 4g he was, he
[1439]would knowsjeverything, or could get into everything.
[1441]LY. didn't tell him that.
[1443]fin fact, I expressed little or no interest in
[1444]other than asking him a few questions, is he Jewish, an
[1446]fot that and so on.
[1448]Senator Baker. Could I ask you « question at this poi
[1450]TOP SECRET
[1451]—— a)
[1454]Prone (Ares 202} 344-4000
[1456]m. Angleton. No. That information, sir
[1457]XQ
[1459]i Senator Baker. I am speaking more of%
[1460]3 / : Ri
[1462]a
[1464]in India. But the Way he went about /
[1466]ou think/fthis, and so on --
[1468]Senator Baker.
[1471]3
[1473]a
[1474]a
[1475]a
[1478]g
[1480]Mr. Angleton. It gtarted to worry me, because he was
[1482]talking plutonium, which’ was scientific. Gottlieb,
[1483]; Ss
[1485]before he went to tHat whole department of his, was transferred
[1487]fas,
[1489]to Carl Duckett fs that is the ceth Gottlieb left.
[1491]rn
[1493]Senator Baker. You mean he didn't ‘want to work for
[1495]“Mr #Angleton. That is part of it.
[1497]nd there are also questions of principlexy™
[1499]Wo another
[1501]Senator Baker. Is this the same Gottlieb who was
[1503]410 Faext Street. S.E., Wwasnengtan, O.C, 20003
[1505]charge of processing the photographs that were taken in Dr
[1507]TOP SECRET
[1510]seat nh ee swans Lanta Mint A piedinette Botha cid ete Net Diese wcet
[1512])
[1513]2
[1515]4
[1516]a
[1517]a
[1522]O.c. 20003
[1524]A410 Freat Street, $.£.. waaninaton,
[1526]Fielding's office?
[1527]Mr. Angleton. His office would have been.
[1528]Senator Baker. Do you know of that aitdy
[1529]Angleton. No, except --
[1530]tor Baker.
[1532]a
[1534]back to co rel.
[1537]to Colby about thesematters? Did yougever get any impression
[1539]=A
[1541]Was Her conversation in whiét Szule or Hersh talked
[1542]that they were imp\yidng that cophfins their source?
[1543]Mr. Angleton. \.The only, tKing that came up is that when
[1544]I saw Colby yesterday Vis the first time since
[1545]December -- he told me tha\@he had bought a theory of mine on
[1546]_Szule, but he did not ee th any misgivings on Hersh. Ne
[1549]said that one year v4 he hady-seen Hersh about the submarine
[1551]E
[1553]article, and that ,had Hersh been a Soviet agent, the Soviets
[1554]would not have peimitted the operation:\to take place.
[1555]And I dif him that he was erronecyd, that to use that
[1556]guide was siinply not to understand what vee is all about.
[1557]wage Philby was stationed in acho he helped
[1559]the PEE ain working on some communications intel
[1561]34
[1563]cf ‘
[1564]jye’s Fuchs go down the drain rather than hurt Philby.
[1565]a
[1567]Senator Baker. As an ultimate cover?
[1569]Mr. Angleton. Precisely.
[1571]TOP SECRET
[1574]Prone {Aree 207) $44-4000
[1576]CU
[1577]oS
[1580]4
[1581]a
[1584]a
[1585]a
[1590]410 Foest Street, $.0.. wasninaton, OC. 20002
[1592]covered he would have been today Chief of British ineggigence:
[1593]In the case of George Blake, who was in the prifish
[1594]ecret service, he gave to the Soviets one year inWadvance the
[1596]plans of our so-called Tunnel of Love, that is, the
[1598]one year in advance, the
[1600]save George atene 4/
[1603]the Soviets would or <a
[1604]is the objective “oe end 6:
[1606]“s
[1608]and destroy the agen
[1613]@duction of Or. Mann's name and so on simply didn
[1615]ser, and something was wrong.
[1617]But Dr. Mann is a suspect Soviet agent, a friend of
[1619]TOP SECRET
[1622]4
[1623]4
[1625]z
[1627]Prone (ares 202) 944-4008
[1629]CT
[1631]PS
[1633]2
[1634]a
[1636]a
[1637]6
[1638]a
[1641]g
[1643]ALG Forest Steeet, S.£., Wasmingion, D.C. 20003
[1645]Qo
[1646]# or the way I look at it, I
[1648]‘of an article he wrote, in the
[1650]f@bout the bugging situation?
[1652]a
[1654]we Chair was the most s§
[1655]Agency. And What it dealt with was ~~
[1659]house or thisf office .
[1661]sonar Baker. Off the record.
[1663]oi
[1665]a record.) %
[1666]‘Angleton. But let me put it this way.
[1668]e@ place in which to raise all this stuff.
[1670]wanted
[1672]Mr. Schwarz. This is Szulc?
[1674]Mr. Angleton. ‘This is Szulc.
[1676]TOP SECRET
[1679]FSA eh aaa lls ad La ae
[1681]<S
[1682]Hs
[1684]2
[1685]3
[1687]a
[1688]44
[1689]ce)
[1690]a
[1694]ALO Fost Steeed, $.£.. Wasningion, B.C. 70003
[1696]A
[1698]And in
[1700]I arrived.
[1702]Mr. Angleton... hat bothers me, that he is
[1703]either unwitting, or has a has knowledge and is
[1705]Ve
[1707]working for an oppo has a source who is mis-
[1709]chievously exploitin
[1711]ry.
[1713]Fig a rough time of saving a ver
[1714]Fcen Penthouse for supplying X number. articles.
[1715]that is my general feeling.
[1717]Senator Tower. Let's go back a moment. You sayythat he
[1719](dowd have come by knowledge of the Mann-Burgess~Phi lby.A
[1721]relationship through an external source?
[1723]TOP SECRET
[1726]re he aba eLearn chee Ge nee Se
[1728]WARD & PAUL
[1730]410 Ferat Street, $.E.. wasmengion, O.C. 20003
[1732]Mr Angleton. Yes, either witting or unwitting.
[1734]Senator Tower.
[1736]ehator Tower. That is a possibility? /
[1738]y,
[1740]the Roumanian .*
[1741]and he knows the
[1742]and on.
[1743]| So, he is dealing™ : people who will be reporting
[1744]‘ y
[1745]back to their casauer eX ry detailed -- assuming he is
[1746]Pe
[1748]totally innocent, and given¥his position in Washington,
[1750]Did Mr. Szule ever work\
[1752]“fi
[1753]our people in the field.
[1755]2
[1756]MiMr. Schwarz. Did he ever provide services?
[1758]Mr. Angleton. I don't know.
[1760]Mc. Schwarz. Have you heard that?
[1762]TOP SECRET
[1765]Prone (Ares 202) 346-8000 |
[1767]2
[1768]3
[1770]a
[1772]a
[1775]8
[1777]410 Fantt Street, $.£.. wainengtan. O.C. 20003
[1779]@December, without identifying him, and the
[1780]Bing through this business that he had
[1782]Bova that was Sidney Gottlieb,
[1784]entitled togene free shave.
[1785]a I know your successor. And I di me think he
[1787]actually mentioned the name. But in this article “ has jus
[1788]comef,Out he mentions him with his biographical sketch
[1789]Senator Baker. Who was your successor?
[1791]Mr. Angleton. Goorge Kalaris.
[1793]I had never known him before.
[1795]TOP SECRET
[1798]|
[1799]|
[1800]|
[1801]i
[1803]obviously he was talking to me ag somebody di
[1805]affected from the Agency, et cetera.I mean that is my“view
[1807]Prone (Ares 202} 546-8060
[1809]of why he was doing all this.
[1811]Whereas my concerns seve quite
[1814]dentist being inv » that dealt with the
[1816]hat dealt wien, Chair, that dealt with
[1818]bay Se
[1819]Fe
[1821]7ann o@,
[1823]: Angleton. No, I think it
[1825]Angleton. My chief words to him was
[1827]Ny said, do you
[1828]2] realizéfuhat a thing like this implies, and Ne would
[1830]s
[1832]o,
[1833]Ehé efforts in the Middle East?
[1835]410 Firat Steeet. S.£., Wasnneton, 0.C. 20004
[1837]Mr. Schwarz, But words like that are as consister
[1839]with beingtrue as being false?
[1841]TOP SECRET
[1844]Mr. Angleton, They were consistent, but they wegen't
[1846]stated in that fashion.
[1848]They were stated in the fashion that
[1850]go back im'to the fact of Mann's association
[1852]with me, Mann's
[1854]7 aseociation\Mth Philby, all this stuff “
[1856]s that, vA
[1858]8 Israelis and a regardless of
[1860]my actions with the
[1862]Ni what the U.S. Government
[1863]q _ 9 tells the Britisher the French, or@fhe Canadians, or the
[1864]4 ~ 10 Australians, or the \New Zealanders, all of whom have fundament
[1865]ss
[1866]a 114} ally the basic sntorms ion y ee be a confirmation to the
[1867]7 .
[1869]~ ¢ 12 based on very high level séépet information, that the story was
[1872]H
[1874]c 14 Senator Tower. yLet mé¢bursue just about three ques-
[1875]Cc 15 || tions here,
[1876]t oS
[1877]A < oe.
[1878]a 16 Did Szule spécifically ask yo
[1880]rf
[1882]eer or not, during the
[1884]17 | Carly sixties, ¢fissionable material,
[1886]long with nuclear
[1888]18 }} technology afd technological assistance, ‘was passed to the
[1890]Israelis? A,
[1892]Angleton. I can't remember it with precisely that
[1894]22 | typeof precision. The story that he gave was a venyhlucid,
[1896]sGraightforward story without any if's, and's and buf&t
[1898]Senator Twoer, Did you deny only in part the ue
[1900]of the question that he asked?
[1902]TOP SECRET
[1904]410 Fora Street, $.£., Wasmingion, 0.6. 20003
[1906]HW 50955 “Docld: 32423393 Page 40
[1908]Angleton. No, I denied his story - és ‘would like to
[1911]do with vectno
[1913]Le I can say is
[1914]closely the Nasser, p if
[1916]This is a thing that’ has Always concerned us, because
[1918],
[1920]in the last war we logt?-- and we . ll do this today, we
[1925]a
[1926]a
[1927]r]
[1930]x
[1932]don't know the Wea of this -- lost some of the installatigns
[1933]which we had put¥i/n there.
[1935]Mr. Schivar . When you say
[1937]igleton. The CIA --
[1939]When ‘he say
[1941]Mr. Angleton.The line of sight, electronics --
[1943]Senator Baker. YOu are not talking about -~
[1945]ALO Frest Street, S.L., Waenengton, O.C. 20003
[1947]Nr. Angleton. I am talking about the signal intel lig
[1949]And there was some very sophisticated gear that was put in
[1951]TOP SECRET
[1954]an nae
[1956]si caine nent
[1960]Prone (Ares 202) 544-4009
[1962]Pd
[1963]3
[1965]a
[1966]4
[1967]Q
[1970]B
[1972]410 Fest Street, S.£.. wasnngton, O.€, 20003
[1974]which had a direct bearing on using B-52's in vieéne
[1976]er I said, Yes wewe have worked on questions
[1979]we have always helped them oug technologically. And I think
[1981]And I think Wells will bear me out very Nekeacty on this,
[1983]that ithe injection of that could not be magic,
[1985]had bee rtold, it would be just another of the Many rumors
[1987]And Senator, there is something I forgot, and I want on
[1989]TOP SECRET
[1992]Prone (Ares 202) 544-6008
[1994]MS
[1995]Israels during the Cuban business ~~ had meét¥on a ship with
[1997]am Chief of the British + of who had a back-
[1998]ground in the
[1999]pared and ay
[2001]War. And this is®sll pris, a Was a tremendous pike
[2003]5
[2005]of Soviet materi ‘they va got much into our media, be-
[2007]cause it is directed to #ddle East in Arabic, and which
[2009]obviously they knew.
[2011]2
[2012]3
[2014]a
[2016]e
[2019]g
[2021]And, therefore,
[2024]eS
[2025]Oo
[2026](on)
[2028]Le]
[2029]is
[2031]The que:
[2034]here or wa’ it in Israel.
[2035]ug? Kirbow. Did you express any concer
[2036]sfjabout the use of Dr. Mann's name in this
[2037]Mr. Angleton. Not Dr. Mann's name. My ex
[2039]flat if you -- I said that article, false as it is,
[2041]Tony things injected in it -- 1 will be very frank with®
[2043]410 Frost Street, S.€.. Warmington, O.C, 20003
[2045]I became scared of the thought, because, one, the story o
[2047]TOP SECRET
[2052]Perea nee Di See
[2054]WARD a PAE
[2056]410 Fasst Street, $.6.. watniagton, D.C. 270003
[2058]Prone {Area 202) 344-6500
[2060]10
[2062]11]
[2064]12
[2066]14
[2067]15
[2068]16
[2069]1?
[2070]18
[2071]19
[2072]20
[2074]21
[2076]these two journalists was so implausable, and fr A
[2078]fo Ben a few times -- and I know him well -- and he ha
[2080]abs@lutely a stoney expression, no expression on
[2081]roe
[2083]hig was something very,. very queer, and theswhole thing
[2085]PA
[2086]Mr. Szulc,
[2088]was insets by him. And that was why I askeg
[2090]did he come YS or did you come to him.
[2091]Senator >
[2093]Mr. Schwarz.
[2095]» Did he come to your,
[2097]came to us.
[2099]Senator Tower. het me ask you.,one specific question,
[2101]“we during the late fifties
[2102]aN & the CIA made available to the
[2104]Israeli Government nay Gal as tee nee and the availability
[2105]NS
[2107]yes or no,
[2108]Did you confirm to 5
[2110]subsequent to the Suez W
[2112]of one or more aistinof nes nuc
[2114]3
[2116]Racrentiate or physicists
[2118]for the purpose of ggveloping vom Wapons?
[2119]Mr. Angleton/ That is completely Tange.
[2121]Mr. Aaroné Mr. Angleton, did you con Mitr or deny that
[2123]to Mr. Szulc?
[2125]Mr. An@deton.
[2127]4
[2128]statement £7
[2130]Ms
[2132]Aaron. So you didn't confirm and you didn’ \eeny,
[2134]is that’ correct?
[2136]Angleton. It is very difficult for me to res]
[2138]And furthermore, in the
[2140]TOP SECRET
[2143]Israelis in the nuclear field.
[2145]Mr. Aaron. What problems were those?
[2147]Mr. Angleton. They were very sensitive
[2148]I don‘ nS ink that they really shed any 14 i
[2149]you are tal ng about here,
[2151]Xs
[2153]Mr. “aardts Do you recall a conve satio
[2155]Mr. Schwarz in
[2157]said you felt under
[2159]Mr. Angleton, ‘ Anow I used that
[2162]was a denial. And I think hae, Wells would s
[2164]d
[2165]3
[2167]a
[2168]a
[2169]o
[2172]g
[2174]that there was a denial But wheh I got down
[2176]sproblems, And
[2177]Ay
[2179]© on things that
[2181]nowith me and
[2183]KS in Stecussing, this Same matter, you
[2185]phrase. There
[2186]econd the fact
[2188]to a lot of the
[2190]other questioning, myAt inking was@to try to lead him around
[2192]back into the meeting with Hersh, a lead h
[2193]g
[2194]source that had t6%do with Sidney Gott
[2196]Senator Tower.
[2198]im back to this
[2200]Mr. Angleton. I would say this to you, Senator. Whehs
[2202]TOP SECRET
[2204]WwW 50955 Doold:324273393 Page 45
[2207]first, I will have to explain we went to the restaufant, he
[2209]nvited us to the restaurant, he was insistent ofit. And we
[2211]géntire discussion
[2213]Bs
[2214]ecapitulation by him, in a restaureZicnat was fairly
[2216]6 full of sople. Hersh was a person who ,had requested a secret
[2218]7 meeting in
[2220]WARD & PAUL,
[2222]mind. I looked at h
[2224]of things.
[2226]And so ws got back to Wells‘ ho
[2228]anyone out there that you thought this might have bee
[2230]setup by a foreign source, or from internally?
[2232]Mr. Angleton. What might be a setup?
[2234]410 Fost Steeet, $.E., wasnimgion, D.C, 20003
[2236]M
[2240]r. Kirbow. That this whole Szulc interview, story an
[2242]TOP SECRET
[2244]RW 50955 Doold: 32423393 Page 46
[2246]Prone (Aves 202) 444-4003 |
[2248]J )
[2249]B®
[2250]2
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[2254]Z
[2255]z
[2256]a
[2257]4
[2258]a
[2261]g
[2263]everything else.
[2264]Mr. Angleton. I never discussed this w
[2266]mithe Agency until we had this lunch,
[2268]t ., —— é 4
[2269]Rs t do not I ee
[2270]because I en't have access to files <*A
[2271]to review a ‘Yet of material, 1£ think One has to review
[2272]Szulc's files, % /
[2273]Mr. Miller. ‘You spoke ,6f
[2275]it as a dossier.
[2277]security file. I thinkshe was one of the journalists, the
[2278]first one, who made
[2279]Pigs, and so on. and I think the\fact that he is foreign-
[2280]born, and the aliégations and so Ss, And so the Bureau has
[2281]Ps, ‘Ee
[2282]a similar filé And many of nen edies are created -- and
[2283]and therefore a
[2285]routine security check is made,
[2287]fe)
[2289]Angleton. No.
[2291]Schwarz. Past surveillance?
[2293]As I say,
[2295]ten years.
[2298]2
[2299]]
[2301]ry
[2303]J
[2306]z
[2308]410 Furst Stewet, 5.£., Weiningion, 0.0. 20003
[2310]Mr. Kirbow. In your official capacity in the
[2312]Szule. Were there files
[2314]Mr. Angleton.
[2316]Mr. Miller. An@/other America ‘a?
[2318]Mr. AngletontY A lot of them. S
[2321]Senator Baker. Hersh wrote a story# bout -- what did
[2323]he say -- 7, files. Was that right or ‘ong?
[2324]Mr. Angleton. I think it would be many
[2326]never counted them,
[2328]How many? A hundred thousa
[2330]TOP SECRET
[2334]4
[2335]|
[2336]‘|
[2339]: 6 CanNyou shed any light on that perf
[2340]3 K 7 || life, the AN
[2342]of the Watergate,
[2344]and we had all of these things,
[2346]great deal of this stuff was there,
[2348]but it wasn't béfng pro-
[2350]Senator Baker.
[2352]You have mentioned the Watergate twice,
[2354]5 Mr. Angheton,
[2356]in the Agency's
[2358]mpact that the Watergate investigation had or any
[2360]: 8 involvement ofthe Agency in any ofgtie so-called
[2361]_ 9
[2362]ina
[2363]10
[2364]<-
[2365]~. 11
[2366]3 é
[2367]™ 3 12 Sorry, sir, that is a debatable
[2368]a a .
[2369]& i 13 aS Get it accurate.
[2370]c 14
[2371]Cc 15 I don't wantito narrow it, I want to make
[2372]c .
[2375]19 || One, do
[2376]20 wotn
[2378]2) || in yeu break-
[2380]in or the preparation for the cové
[2382]22 atecmpted cover-up?
[2384]Mr. Angelton. My answer on that is, I do not,
[2386]410 Furst Street, 5.6. Wasningion, D.C, 20003
[2388]aa/[Poy that I am separating the midnight channel 26 things
[2390]ae newspapers. I know Jim McCord extremely well. ‘
[2392]TOP SECRET
[2394]‘Pp
[2398]im. Angleton. I am aware of what was i
[2399]eae wart fe
[2400]And Paul Nabami recently died who wrote tho etters, and
[2401]x
[2403]popal. relationships
[2405]SSS
[2407]Helms.
[2408]Mr. Angleton.
[2409]Senator Baker. I be
[2411]Mr. Angleton. In anySevent, I can say that Gaynor's
[2413]Py
[2416]a
[2417]4
[2418]i]
[2421]g
[2423]connection, because he a
[2425]was a very stubborn meagre he le ~ AGency on conviction,
[2426]7 _
[2428]I assume, or sey the Office of Security.
[2431]17
[2432]cs
[2433]CC
[2434]c
[2435]c
[2436]a
[2438]Nn
[2440]Senator Bake In connection with latergate?
[2441]Mr. Angleton’, He left much earlier.
[2442]Millér. He being McCord?
[2443]fry
[2445]Angleton. Yes.
[2447]416 Ferst Ste@et, 5.6. Wasnengton, ©.C. 20003.
[2449]Angleton, He wag not.
[2451]TOP SECRET
[2456]HW 50955 Docild:32423393 Page 51
[2458]Senator Baker. Did he have a prominent respon
[2460]Mr. Angleton. He was a man that had a very,
[2462]"t very wi
[2464]At
[2466]Doyou know why he went into the Watergate
[2468]gp, that wasn
[2470]eh
[2472]Complex?
[2474]Mr. Angléton. Minderstand it, because I would
[2476]say it was ideological w = There wasn't any difficulty
[2478]in understanding his viéws ona given subject.
[2480]of operation.
[2481]-
[2482]iE. him?
[2484]And that surprised
[2486]16 Mr. Ang lepon: That is what I read,
[2487]7
[2489]as
[2490]se as a rule -- let me put
[2491]'
[2493]this way, what
[2494]*,
[2496]ring everything.
[2498]So, instead of using anybody in the clandestin
[2500]“A :
[2501], McCord and the group and sent them to that counthy \for
[2502]| 8
[2504]/ six or seven weeks to work on it. So, McCord has great
[2506]knowledge of the -~ he knows the counter electronics. An
[2508]TOP SECRET
[2511]WARD & FAUL
[2513]4ID Forat Street, $.€.. Wasningion, 9.c, 20003
[2515]10
[2519]12
[2521]13
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[2525]15
[2527]16
[2529]17
[2531]18
[2533]19
[2535]20
[2537]2)
[2539]22
[2541]24
[2543]25
[2545]pator Baker. He was familiar with the mos
[2547]And that is why I can?
[2549]aa e
[2551]toin“what they have stated
[2553]Senator Baker. I don't want to lead you too far away fro
[2554]the original subject. But I would be interested in knowing wha
[2555]if any information you can give us about the Oswald situation.
[2557]For instance, does the Agency keep a file, or does it hav
[2558]a file on Lee Harvey Oswald? .
[2560]Mr. Angleton. They have a file. They have, I think, more
[2561]than one. I think they have a subject file, and in that they
[2562]have all the documentation that went to the Warren Commission
[2563]through Mr. Raymond Rocca, who is my deputy.
[2565]and then there is a lot of undigested material that was
[2566]brought out after the Warren Commission.
[2568]Senator Baker. Was there ever any inquiry? Or do you
[2569]have any opinion as to whether Oswald was a Soviet Agent?
[2571]Mr. Angleton. Yes, I have a very strong opinion. IT know
[2572]the time factor, I will try to shorten this.
[2574]But I tried to prevail on Mr. Dulles that there should
[2575]not be -- that there should be a statement to the effect that
[2577]the Commission, in the life of the Commission -~ that these are
[2579]TOP SECRET
[2582]ogy haldaia aed cat en hee oe
[2584]a ce 8
[2586]76090 if, Pia
[2588]WARD & PAUL
[2590]410 Feevt Street, $.€., Wasnengion, 0.C, 20003
[2592]10
[2593]11
[2594]12
[2595]13
[2596]14
[2597]15
[2598]16
[2599]17
[2600]18
[2601]19
[2602]20
[2603]21
[2605]22
[2607]24
[2609]25
[2611]the conclusions on the available evidence. But given the fact
[2612]that the Soviet Government has a Department 13, which is under
[2613]the Central Committee, who is taxed with the assassination of
[2614]Western Leaders, that the door is open, and that is for future
[2615]generations to speculate. So that it would not be closing the
[2616]door, that it would really mean the investigation would be
[2617]pursued.
[2619]Senator Baker. John MeCone, as I remember, was
[2620]queried once on whether we could establish the bona fides of
[2621]certain people, including Oawald.
[2623]Mr. Angleton. And Nosenko.
[2625]Senator Baker. Was there any advice by you at that
[2626]time to McCone or other wise that the bona fides of that
[2627]soviet person or of Oswald ought not to be stated in cate~
[2628]gorical terms?
[2630]Mr. Angleton. During the period of the Warren Commission
[2631]we prevented as far as we could any information from Nosenko
[2632]going under the record, on a question of bona fides.
[2634]Senator Baker. Why?
[2636]Mr. Angleton. Because we didn't regard him as bona fides.
[2638]Senator Baker. What did you regard him as?
[2640]Mr. Angleton. We thought he was a dispatch agent who
[2641]was sent to mutilated the leads. of very high grade Soviets
[2642]whom we had acquired prior to that.
[2644]Senator Baker. To mutilate leads relating to the Kennedy
[2646]TOP SECRET
[2649]Phone (Area 202) $44-6006 -
[2651]10
[2655]12
[2657]13
[2659]WARD & PAUL
[2661]14
[2663]15
[2665]16
[2667]17
[2669]18
[2671]19
[2673]20
[2675]21
[2677]22
[2679]24
[2681]41O Feest Steeet, S.£., wasningion. 0.6. 20003
[2683]25
[2685]HW 50955 Docld: 32423393 Page 54
[2687]assassination?
[2688]Mr Angleton. Relating to assassination, KGB agents,
[2689]VaSsALL
[2690]Vv ly, the British agents, and many agents in France, a
[2691]alleged penetration in the U.S., et cetera.
[2692]Senator Baker. And did McCone accept your advice?
[2693]Mx. Angleton. He did, except that I understood that
[2694]a lot of it has been declassified. And when he gave this
[2695]Sch ant
[2696]interview recently with Shor, I called his executive officer
[2697]Elder and I asked him, and he said, who in the Agency ever
[2698]alleged to McCone that we now had re-established the bona fides
[2699]And I said, he is an old man and doesn't think too
[2700]well, et cetera, and don't give me that stuff.
[2701]And he said, well, I will give it to you.
[2702]And I never heard from him since. But McCone was a man
[2703]whowould not have made this statement. He has total recall.
[2704]Senator Baker. I am sure he does.
[2705]Do you have an opinion as to whether or not Oswald was
[2706]infact a Soviet agent? 7
[2707]Mr. Angleton. Well, let me put it this way.
[2708]I don't think that the Oswald case is dead. There are too|
[2709]. . 4
[2710]many leads that were never followed up. There's too much in-
[2711]formation that has been developed later. |
[2712]For example, in 1966, in a Soviet book on Cuba there is |
[2713]a photograph of Khrushchev, a photograph of Castro, a photograp
[2715]Alonte fig Li tyy
[2717]of a man called Alexiev, real name Shettov, KGB, with the first
[2719]TOP SECRET
[2720]t
[2722]HW 50955
[2724]7 fy +e] ia] A | u AS y
[2726]WARD & PAU
[2728]a1Q Fest Street, 6.E., Wasnengion, O.c, 70003
[2730]10
[2731]1
[2732]12
[2733]13
[2734]14
[2735]15
[2736]16
[2737]17
[2738]18
[2739]19
[2740]20
[2742]21
[2744]Soviet Ambassador to Havana, and a man named Leontov, who was
[2746]the Soviet KGB operational man in Mexico. When the Mexican
[2748]police arrested Castro as & student, they found in hia note~
[2750]a
[2754]oe
[2756]pooks the name of Leontov, KGB, Mexico.
[2758]Now, photographs 61, and so on, are in a KGB journal for
[2759]Soviet citizens abroad. It is a pible,75 percent KGB stafe.
[2760]Photograph of Brezhnev, Castro, Alexiev, Leontov.
[2762]Now, we had & double agent after the assassination,
[2763]who made a number of allegations that he acquired from the
[2764]Chief of KGB, Mexico, Yatskov and he was a superior of Leontov.
[2765]Now, after the assassination Khrushchev was in Cairo on 4 stat
[2766]visit. And he pulled an American journilist aside, and totally
[2767]out of context, expressed the view that there was a con
[2768]spiracy: and it involved the Right Wing of the U.S.
[2770]The thingwas totally out of context. and he planted
[2771]this bug in this fellow’s ear.
[2773]WE had double agents who stated that the KGB put all of
[2774]their personnel for six months on working on the assassina-
[2775]tion, and had concluded that an American Right Wing business
[2776]under Johnson was to succeed in power. And I am not talking
[2777]‘about petty informants. I am talking about men whowere ascer=
[2778]tained members of the KGB and part of the Soviet elite.
[2780]And I can multiply that. Those cases, those leads have
[2781]been followed up. one is because of Lack of manpower.
[2783]never
[2785]the general problem in Washington and the government
[2787]TOP SECRET
[2789]Two,
[2792]|
[2793]4
[2794]4
[2796]4
[2797]a
[2798]|
[2800]‘WW 50955
[2802]eae a a genre
[2804]prone (Area 202) 344-6008: 5
[2806]WARD & PAUL
[2808]B10 Fost Steed, S.L., Mrasnenaton, D.c. 70003
[2810]that there is no forum which can adjudicate issues in the
[2811]intelligence community. of a counter-intelligence nature.
[2813]I may have allegations, very firm, that relate to somebody in
[2814]high office. But there isn't anyone, ombudsman or somebody, to
[2815]whom you can go with the information and talk to the Soviets and
[2816]pull the puroau and ourselves and everybody together.
[2818]Senator Baker. Could you give us at your leisure a memor~
[2819]andum of your recommendations in that respect, how that might
[2820]be constituded?
[2822]10 Mc. Angleton. It would not be 4 pleasant one. I have
[2823]11 || submitted -- and I don't think it is breaking any confidence —~
[2824]12 such a memorandum to the Commission. And I have submitted
[2825]a personal letter to the Vice Prsident. And my whole plea
[2826]was that my days were numbered, but regardless, that in and
[2828]14
[2830]15 || beyond the life of that Commission, that in his position as
[2832]16 | Vice president he had a rare opportunity the first time these
[2834]j7 }} matters were ever aired, and that the disaster of Hoover's deat
[2836]ie || and Gray, and the Watergate and so forth, has destroyed the -
[2838]counter-intelligence forces.
[2840]19
[2842]And this
[2844].
[2847]added thing of Hersh has about deait the final |
[2850]ed
[2852]HY 409545
[2854]ronn0M@ racy
[2856]la Prone (Ares 202} 344-6608
[2858]WARD & FAUL
[2860]ALO Fasst Steeet, 5.£.. Warningion, O.C. 7000)
[2862]Very, very poor.
[2864]Mr. Angleton.
[2866]I have put in there, and I think it is very ¢
[2868]gainy substantial information about
[2870]10 have
[2872]Sem
[2874]2
[2876]We u.S. such as the infiltration
[2878]11
[2880]12
[2882]14
[2884]15 and so on.
[2886]t is inclusive Of all the American life,
[2887]rly visits to the sottte Union, and so on.
[2889]ensitive which was
[2891]16 and in partic
[2893]17 | Thereare cémmunications intelligence mor
[2895]would not be admissible. And there are a lot of problems
[2897]We have worked on it, and we brought the British, the
[2899]TOP SECRET
[2901]there.
[2904]a common denominator of the military and other agr
[2906]none {Aras 202) 444-4008,
[2908]ere they do share common information,
[2910]ss) Werator Daker. Do you know of any cases#/ though, deal--
[2912]netration of a Congressional orsbil
[2913]hleton. No. But my statement doesn't mean anything,
[2914]8 because I ca Byoure you that it is endlone thingl have
[2915]9 been crc some mf have seen these
[2917]t be surprised. And this is
[2919]449 °C].
[2920]TH
[2923]10 | allegations in the Baber, I wouldns
[2925]c
[2927]11 |) the second time in my Mife, or HG third time, I have ever
[2929]12 been here, To come here ‘and“see how this whole set up is is
[2931]iF
[2933]13 quite a shock,
[2935]en cree EERIE
[2937]WARD & PAUL
[2939]ana @ | {
[2941]14 Senator Baker. “a communications intercept,
[2943]15 Congressional conversa fone. are youNaware of any methodical
[2945]ce,
[2946]16 effort by the Russians or the KGB vis-a Congressional tele-
[2948]17 || phone conversations?
[2950]7 6
[2952]18 Mr. Angleton. Absolutely. I think -- I amBassuming. now
[2953]eS USA?
[2954]19 that the peophe in NSR are correct, they usually
[2956]fe, that the
[2958]x &
[2959]20 telephone, /tHe formal telephone company traffic appalgently,
[2961]J cnoweage of the caller, is quickly shifté
[2964]x
[2966]a
[2967]That runs into hundreds of thousands of teléphone
[2969]21 without th
[2973]Now, I used to be quite deeply involved in the
[2975]410 Fiett Street, $.€., Wasnemaion, O.C. 20003
[2977]Acehetration of embassies, and so forth, in my youth. And it
[2979]TOP SECRET
[2981]HW 50955 Docild:32423393 Page 56
[2983]“HW 50955 Dd
[2985]76000811454 SS
[2988]Prone (Aras 202} $446-4688
[2990]4
[2991]5 beg n to know much
[2992]6 rk YD, scouptes it.
[2994]i and transmitted them
[2996]10 || mostly related to g
[2998]ll to the Soviet Union, and, mdividual files on them, would
[3000]12 you confirm that for me?
[3002]14 my view correct. And I yi
[3003]15 could respond to th would be Dx
[3005]now, I think, sé a a consultant there.
[3007]WARD ® PALL
[3009]ou Tordello, a retired
[3011]410 Ferst Street, $.E., Wasnengton, &.c. 20063
[3013]10
[3017]12
[3019]WARD & PAUL
[3021]14
[3023]15
[3025]16
[3027]17
[3029]19
[3031]#10 Bus Stieet,,50.0i0nene2no.0. 6.2000,
[3033]“Fa ENE AEH
[3035]HW 50955 Docld: 32423393
[3038]“and who weren't in the U.K., were those who were on thé
[3040]@imerican whom they had handled in Washington wh
[3042]“discussions and a&guments djs on the subject. We have
[3044]Anglo~American Desk, which meant that there was a
[3046]Yiows the agent.
[3048]tmaasferred to London where the case ee ae
[3050]Gand that statement, official statement was put out with-
[3052]SE
[3054]out any Consultation with the Bureau oxssirselves. So, we
[3056]3
[3058]8 of Soyleta, and tim
[3059]i acigus
[3060]all the fallation kind of
[3062]are living Inpa dream world here in
[3064]is short, it iBedetente, and it £
[3066]Oh,
[3067]come to detente for Yin
[3069]orma Yon through operations and our
[3071]in thie Mid-west, he was from the United Nations Ra young
[3072]© y JN
[3073]fellow. And I asked the Bureau, was he a =
[3075]And they said, we put him to bed.
[3077]him. And I am still up there.
[3079]TOP SECRET
[3081]Page 60
[3085]HY 40955 Dact
[3087]cash
[3090]on two or three points. And I said, I am exercising my rights
[3092]Prune (ieee 202) 546-6000
[3094]. But he said, I have got to run, and it was about’ five
[3096]Rand I asked him if he understood in i 4 what
[3099]12 the reaction to him aniversot wan S
[3100]Ehometning I : sll have to negotiate.
[3101]o you mean oat
[3103]14 And I said, wha &
[3104]15 . And he vata Ae wits talk about it next wéek.
[3105]LE ana shook hands with him and aes out.
[3107]Oks
[3109]q
[3111]11 the foreigns with whom we wo
[3113]13 And he said, that
[3115]16 So, Ig
[3117]TOP SECRET .
[3119]Pmone (Aves 202)
[3121]“Ce
[3122]cs —)
[3125]410 Faest Street. $.€.. Wasnmengton, O.C. 20003
[3129]the Presidential apparatus? “
[3131]Mr. Angleton. Never, Sefator®
[3133]. xy
[3134]stuff in the apewfEE
[3136]Senator’Béker .
[3138]penetfated the taping capability in the Oval office?
[3140]7
[3142]Mr. Schwarz. Can I follow up some of the questions that
[3144]Senator Baker asked you about Oswald?
[3146]What about the pictures, one of which was a picture of
[3147]Leontov that was in a piece of paper found in Mr. Oswald's
[3148]pocket when he was arrested in Mexico?
[3150]Mr. Angleton. There is an allegation.
[3152]Mr. Schwarz. What connection is there between that
[3153]picture and that allegation and Lee Harvey Oswald?
[3155]Mr. Angleton. The only thing is, Oswald's trip to Mexico
[3156]was to go to Cuba allegedly to contact the Soviets.
[3158]Mc. Schwarz. And was Leontov then in Mexico, or -~
[3160]Mr. Angleton. I don't know, because the double agent
[3162]believe was actually controlled by the Soviets,
[3164]TOP SECRET
[3167]Prone (Area 202) 544-6008
[3169]2
[3170]3
[3171]4
[3172]Py
[3174]o
[3176]4
[3177]B
[3179]21m Firat Street, SE, Wasnenaton, O.C, 20003
[3181]4
[3183]Byetkov, gave us information which we would now regard as
[3184]private, which would tend to absolve the Soviets of any
[3185]implication with Oswald.
[3187]Mr. Schwarz. When you acquired from a number of sources
[3188]the information that the KGB had spent some six months ~~
[3190]Mc. Angleton. We. only acquired the hard stuff of six
[3191]months and what they did from one man who was very high in the
[3192]KGB. .
[3194]Mr. Schwarz. Without getting into what his name was,
[3195]when did you acquire the information?
[3197]Mr. Angleton. 1967, or thereabouts.
[3199]Mr. Schwarz. So it was after the Warren Commission had
[3200]reached its conclusions?
[3202]Mr. Angleton. Did you have any auch information during
[3203]the life of the Warren Commission?
[3205]Mr. Angleton. TI think the only thing was the Nosenko -~
[3207]Senator Baker. Which was suppressed by whom?
[3209]Mr. Angleton. We suppressed it, because Nosenko arrived
[3210]at a very brief time after the assassination as 4 KGB defector
[3212]Senator Baker. And he is the one that you think now as
[3213]a planted agent?
[3215]Mr. Angleton. Yes- They thought he was gent on @
[3217]-mission.
[3219]Mr. Schwarz. Suppressed by whom?
[3221]Mr. Angleton. Suppressed from the Warren Commission.
[3223]TOP SECRET
[3226]s
[3228]HW 50955 Docld:32423393
[3230]pron oM@y ray?
[3232]Prone (Arag 202) 544-6000
[3234]WARD & PAUL
[3236]210 Fusr Street, SE. Wasnenatan O.€. 26003
[3238]Mr. Schwarz. You said that Nosenko, one of the reasons
[3239]you suspected Nosenko was & double agent, or 4 planted agent,
[3240]rather, was because he was saying things that were contra~
[3242]dictory to some other high quality person who theretofore had
[3244]been giving you information before Nosenko came to this
[3246]country?
[3248]Mr. Angleton. That is right.
[3250]7
[3251]3 Mr. Schwarz. What was the nature of the information
[3252]relating to the Kennedy assassination that the high quality
[3253]9
[3254]person had given you?
[3255]10
[3257]Mr. Schwarz. Let me say this so that it makes a little
[3259]more sense.
[3261]12
[3262]In December 196) a member of the KGB in Helsinki defected
[3263]13 4 alt tnt .
[3264]to us. His name is Golitzen. He has never been in service,
[3265]14
[3266]except Jack Anderson came out with an erroneous account of it,
[3268]alleging that he had stated there was a plot to assassinate
[3269]16
[3270]Nixon. He did not make such a statement.
[3271]7
[3272]Mr. Kirbow. Oo you think this statement should be on
[3274]the record?
[3276]19
[3277]Mc. Angleton. I don't mind it being on the record after
[3278]20
[3279]the Anderson article. They have been looking for him.
[3280]2} -
[3281]Now, his is probably without any question the most major
[3283]| defection since World War II as far a8 Soviet intentions,
[3284]254
[3285]Soviet organization, and Soviet operations are concerned.
[3286]24
[3288]And the reason, among others, that it was so important was
[3290]TOP SECRET
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[3299]he had decided to defect many years prior to December of 1961,
[3300]if the opportunity ever arrived. And therefore he used those
[3301]many years breaking down the compartmentalization of the KGB
[3302]in order to acquire the kind of information which would be mos
[3303]valuable to the US, and to our allies.
[3305]Therefore he refused many assignemtns abroad, but tried
[3306]to always remain in headquarters and get himself appointed to
[3307]investigative commissions and other things of this sort which
[3308]would get into everybody elses's businesa. Among other things
[3309]he spent many years in the training schools for people who
[3310]came back for six weeks from different parts of the world to
[3311]brag about their achievements. And he absorbed all of this
[3312]information.
[3314]And among other things, he stated that he gave the
[3315]erytograms and circumstantial evidence of penetrations
[3316]throughout the West.
[3318]And then the Soviets rapidly transferred 300 of their
[3319]people after his defection. And as is normal in a case of
[3320]this kind, the big problem is to write a damage report, which
[3321]means the whole service would come to 4 standstill. And the
[3322]objective would be to review all paper files ad everything that
[3323]showed his initials. And you usually would have three
[3324]categories of information: you would have information which
[3326]he definitely had knowledge of, and information which he did
[3328]not have knowledge of, and information which you are not
[3330]TOP SECRET
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[3335]10
[3337]“12
[3339]13
[3341]WARD & PAUL
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[3361]ceratin about.
[3362]Now,
[3364]a
[3365]Dunlop who was worki
[3367]committed suicide,
[3369]mately 400,000 documents that he could have had access to,
[3371]although he may not
[3373]that after his assassination,
[3375]the Bureay,
[3377]to NSA relating to information
[3379]Senator Baker.
[3381]Mr. Angleton.
[3383]Mr. Miller.
[3385]Mr. Angleton.
[3387]Mr. Miller.
[3389]Mr. Angleton.
[3391]Mr. Miller.
[3392]charged, as you know,
[3394]Mr. Angleton.
[3396]In any event,
[3397]a plastic bag, as I
[3398]question of whether
[3400]Mr. Schwarz.
[3402]of
[3403]the 1969 Golitze
[3405]when we did a similar operation on the Sergeant
[3406]ng in the National Security Agency and
[3408]if I am not mistaken we came to approxi-
[3410]have had.
[3412]from Golitzen.
[3414]And it is interesting to note ©
[3415]in a search of the quarters,
[3417]or whoever did ‘the search, found six of my letters
[3419]Did you speak of the assassination?
[3421]What did you say?
[3423]Did you say Mr. Dunlop?
[3425]After his suicide.
[3427]t meant suicide.
[3429]fhe word is interesting, be
[3431]re
[3433]recall,
[3435]in the attic.
[3437]I am sorry.
[3439]You used the term assassination.
[3441]cause it is
[3442]that he was assassinated.
[3444]Maybe I was thinking out loud oF something J-
[3446]n reports to NSA were in
[3448]And there was 4
[3450]he passed them before or after.
[3452]Now, what we were ON WaS,
[3454]you testified earlier ~~
[3456]Mr. Angleton.
[3458]enormous to the West
[3460]t
[3462]I was asking you, |
[3464]=~]
[3465]I just wanted to say colitaén was sO
[3467]TOP SECRET
[3469]ern world because we immediately moved on
[3472]those cases which were perishable, the French, the British,
[3473]and ourselves, et.cetera. And we had never had a4 second Chief
[3475]Director, which means the FBI type of Soviet, defector in our
[3477]prone (Ares 207) 344-6000
[3479]jives, and all SE this out of the blue, and no contact as in
[3481]. ov
[3482]Geneva six months after the defection of Golitzen.
[3484]Me. Schwarz. And the date is when in relations to the
[3486]Kennedy assassination?
[3488]proves TE a)
[3490]Mr. Angleton. Well, this was 4 contact, this was not a
[3491]defection. He came to us once for information prior to the
[3492]assassination.
[3494]And then in Moscow the Soviets ~~ and I am not going
[3495]into a lot of names, 2 member of the Second Chief Directorate,
[3496]gave an American tourist a stack of documents from the second
[3497]Chief Directorate, the FBI, relating .to how they got
[3499]and others of our agents, which showed
[3500]they didn't get them through a two-headed source, but they got
[3501]it through a on our side.
[3503]So the leads rant into the thousands from Govitzén,
[3505]and thousands and thousands of pages of transcript, interro-
[3507]gation, exhibiting photographs, and identifications, which in
[3509]+s, O.C. 7000)
[3511]turn would refresh his memory on other courses. And out of
[3513]veasnemate
[3515]that ceme the finalization of the case of Philby, Burgess. and
[3517]all that, the Vassily case in the British Admiralty, and some
[3519]west Street, SE
[3521]other cases, and many cases in France and so on.
[3523]Mr. Kirbow. Did Oswald show up at that time?
[3525]TOP SECRET
[3527]anda we en aaa . :
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[3534]WARD & PAUL
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[3541]Mr. Angleton. No, not from Golitgen.
[3543]But when the assassination took place --
[3545]Mr. Schwarz. The Kennedy assassination?
[3547]Mr. Angleton. ‘When the Kennedy assassination took place,
[3548]colitzbn called me immediately and stated that the modus
[3549]operandi with any defector from anybody's army to the Soviet
[3550]Union required that he go through processing by the 13th
[3551]Department of the KGB.
[3553]Which is their assassination department?
[3555]Mr. Schwarz.
[3557]Mr. Angleton. Which is their assassination department,
[3558]which is called their Affairs for Executive Action.
[3559]And there are two reasons for it. Number one was, to
[3561]find out what sophisticated weaponry or training he might have
[3563]had that would be of use to them. And number two, whether it
[3565]$.0., Wasmimaton, O.C, 20003
[3567]310 Fest Sireet,
[3571]wag more Valuable to reinfiltrate him into the National Army
[3573]for future activity.
[3575]Of the nature of assassinations?
[3577]Mr. Schwarz.
[3579]Mr. Angleton. Of anything. It could be sabotage, or
[3581]intelligence, or whatever.
[3582]AND THIS WAS THE SOP on the dealing with military
[3584]defectors.
[3588]Now. when the Soviet Government turned over to the US
[3589]all the documents that led to the interest regarding Oswald
[3590]stay in the Soviet Union, there was nothing there indicating
[3592]processing by Department 13. Then after the assassination
[3594]TOP SECRET
[3597]Prone (Aras 202) 544-6000
[3599]a
[3600]2
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[3602]a
[3603]a
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[3611]-that the approach would have been under Philby in 1948, and
[3613]Nosenko, whom we hid once in Geneva, he went back to Moscow.
[3614]And in my view he would have never come back on the scene
[3615]HE RE PANU
[3616]because they brought this Cheraponov thing in to have the locud
[3617]shifted from where we would have controls, in Geneva, to
[3618]Moscow where they would have all the controls. And that would
[3619]be the Directorate. And therefore they would have the direct
[3620]means of counteracting and mutilating the Jeads and the
[3621]importance of Golitzen's defection.
[3623]But the tourist gave the documents to the American
[3624]Embassy. And we photographed them. The Charge insisted on
[3625]giving them back to the Soviets on grounds that it would be
[3626]appropriate.
[3628]Mr Schwarz. These are not the official documents deal-
[3629]ing with Oswald but the documents that ‘the man tried to pass
[3630]in Switzerland?
[3632]Mr. Angleton. The Second Chief Directorate, he took all
[3633]of the documents out of the FBI Soviet section and gave them
[3634]to the tourist and we read how we got caught on things.
[3636]So there is the assassination. Cheraponov allegedly
[3637]was chased to the turkish border and shot. And in my view
[3638]this is a myth, because in 1948 Cheraponov was stationed in
[3639]Belgrade, and he tried to defect to us, and at another time
[3640]tried to establish liaison and contact with the Birtish MI-6,
[3642]at a-time when Philby was Chief of Intelligence, meaning
[3644]TOP SECRET
[3647]TOP SECRET
[3649]then he reappears in the early 1960's ag a member of the
[3650]Second Chief Directorate,
[3652]That is enough of Cherapanov. But it is important only
[3654]Prone (Aces 202} $44-46000
[3656]from the Soviet point of view, the best laid plans fall apart.
[3658]And then out of the blue, Nosenko, whom we would never have
[3659]seen again, reappears after the assassination in Geneva, and
[3660]tells us he wants to defect.
[3662]Mr. Schwarz. And he provided information which was
[3664]inconsistent with Oswald being the Russian agent?
[3666]Mr. Angleton. I am coming to that.
[3668]So immediately we tried to get the breadth of his career
[3669]so that we know where the priorities are. And the first thing
[3671]he tells us is that while he was in_the Second Chief
[3673]4
[3676]a
[3677]a
[3678]ce)
[3681]z
[3683]Directorate in the American Section, Oswald's KGB dossier went
[3684]ever his desk. And his first story, as I recall it, was that
[3685]it was two volumes or three volumes. And finally it went down
[3686]to one volume and a small sheaf of papers.
[3688]Also he said that the dossier showed clearly that Oswald
[3690]was mentally unbalanced, and that he was a poor shot, and:
[3692]therefore couldn't get a hunting license, and a lot of stuff
[3693]of this sort.
[3695]And then on all of these outstanding leads -- penetra~
[3696]tions, of the French, the Americans, the British codes, bugging
[3698]of the Embassy, all of these different sorts -- Nosenko had
[3700]nen nd
[3702]AIG Frest Street. SLE. Wasmenaton, O.C, 20003
[3704]something to do which diverted us from Nosenko's leads. And
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[3717]g
[3719]in the normal course of events, we might have put Golitzen in
[3721]contact with Nesenko, which may have meant the assassination
[3722]of Golitzen, because the whole approach of Nosenko was one
[3723]where Logically you would bring them in and have two bodies,
[3725]1
[3727]at
[3728]one from the First Chiéf Directorate, that is, Golitzé
[3730]n, the
[3731]CIA part of the system, and the other from the FBI part of the
[3732]system, and therefore you would have a very strong balance
[3734]against the KGB. But we didn't do that. Because there were
[3736]certain things, litmus papers, questions put to Nosenko. And
[3738]as far as I was concerned, if he was bona fide he would have
[3739]answered one way, and he did not answer that way. And they ha
[3740]to do with some deeper secrets regarding a meeting of the
[3742]2000 members of the KGB and the Soviet Government in May of
[3744]1959, presided over by Shelepin and atténded by many members
[3746]of the Central Committee on the reorientation of the Soviet
[3748]Services and the return to Leninism wherever intelligence
[3749]oparations has a political objective. And this is a part of
[3750]the process of de-Stalinization. And so when we took him
[3751]unwittingly chronologically through his career, he : omits
[3753]all of this phase. And we had three or four or five other test
[3754]things, where their damage report would not show that colitzdn
[3755]had access, because it was part of his way of getting in and
[3756]breaking compartmentation. And therefore they would have no
[3757]evidence that he had sufficient knowledge.
[3759]Mr. Schwarz. And so Nosenko looked funny to you, he
[3761]TOP SECRET
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[3776]“UL
[3778]looked wrong to you?
[3780]Mr. Angleton. Absolutely.
[3782]Mr. Schwarz. He looked like a plant to you?
[3784]Mr. Angleton. Precisely.
[3786]Mr. Schwarz. And among the information that he provided
[3787]to you was that Oswald was a mental case and was a bad shot?
[3789]Mr. Angdeton. Right.
[3791]Mr. Schwarz. And you had also received from Nosenkao ~~
[3793]Mr. Angleton co1itsdn -- from colitzdn -~- information
[3795]. . Z zs
[3796]that suggested the normal practice was for Department 13,
[3797]which had responsibility from the Russian KGB for assasgina~
[3798]tions, to interview miléitary defectors. And -we had observed
[3799]that when the Russians transferred documents concerning
[3800])
[3802]Oswald, that there was no reference in there to any such
[3803]debriefing by Department 13. And another important part of
[3804]itis that there was a man who was handling George Blake from
[3805]London, who was Counselor of the Soviet Embassy. And when he
[3806]returned he became head of the 13 Department, General Rodin.
[3807]But he was there under an alias as a civilian. He was the
[3808]Chief of the KGB in London, and a very high grade man. Then
[3809]he took over the Department 13 and reinvigorated it.
[3811]Mr. Schwarz. And-what was his connection with Oswald?
[3813]Mr. Angleton. I am saying that he was head of Department
[3814]13, and was head of Department 13 at a time ~- I mean, he had
[3816]a long history in that, in other words, the prominence of
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[3832]12
[3833]Department 13 and this is a point I think I should make, that
[3834]the Agency, unlike the Soviets, does not have an assassination
[3836]department. The Soviets have always had an assassination
[3838]department, which is totally sealed off from the rest of the
[3840]organization. People from the outside kno very tittle about
[3842]what goes on in that. People career-wise stay in there. And
[3843]they report to the Chairman of the KGB, and drop off, who ‘in
[3844]turn report to the Politboro. And therefore it is an entirely
[3846]sealed organization which is capable of all forms of action,
[3848]whether it be sabotage ~~ an illegal sabotage or what, an
[3849]illegal directorace which is independent of the rest of the
[3850]KGB -- nuclear sabotage, and all this type of thing, and
[3851]infiltration of enemy forces in the event of war. And of
[3852]course assassination, the assassination of Ukrainian leaders
[3853]in West Germany.
[3855]x
[3857]Mr. Schwarz. Do you recount that simply because it makes
[3859]more significant the absence of any reference to oswald necaued
[3861]you are giving evidence as to the vigor of Department 13, of
[3863]did you recount it because there js a more direct connection
[3864]with Oswald?
[3866]Mr. Angleton. This ig related to what I told Mr. Duiles,
[3867]I thought it was absolutely wrong to close the door on the =
[3868]life of the commission, and instead there should be a statement
[3869]that .we are not in a position -- that on the fact available to
[3871],
[3872]us during the given period, these are our conclusions. And
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[3894]then to spell out in detail Department 13 and ite organization
[3895]~- and the burden of proof shigts. But not only the burden
[3896]of proof, but you never know when a worm goes into somebody's
[3897]head to defect from Department 13. And that bring you up on
[3898]the entire story. ;
[3900]Mr. Schwarz. So you have recounted the importance of
[3901]Department 13. You have recounted the significance in your,
[3902]mind of the absence of any reference to Department 13 in the
[3903]documentation on Oswald turned over by the Soviets to the US.
[3904]And you have recounted the strange nature of the information.
[3905]provided by Nosenko.
[3907]Mr. Angleton. Correct.
[3909]Mr. Schwarz. Let me ask you another line of questions
[3910]about each one of these jtems. As to the Nosenko information,
[3911]you stated that that information was suppressed from the
[3912]Warren Commission?
[3914]Mr. Angleton. The word suppression is probably not the
[3915]right word because, x will be very honest with you, I was told
[3916]the other day that the information was given classified, and
[3917]it was given to Helms or somebody, OF Mr. McCone, who passed.
[3918]it as a classified document. I have asked for it, but I
[3919]haven't seen it.
[3921]Mr. Schwarz. Why did you say a moment ago that it was
[3922]suppressed?
[3924]Mr. Angleton. Because I never knew where it went. When
[3926]TOP SECRET
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[3930]q
[3932]@ |
[3933]3 2
[3935]Fos
[3938]16
[3940]li
[3942]WARD & PAUL
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[3945]8
[3947]6
[3948]° C
[3949]¢ van
[3950]8
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[3967]14 TO P. SECRET. 73 7
[3968]I was sitting in the position as to where that information
[3969]would go, I was opposed to it. And my pffictal position was
[3971]that. And I ghought until relatively recently that it never
[3973]went.
[3975]And then all of a sudden they have declassified a lot of
[3978]stuff. And Mr. Rocha, who was the point of record of the
[3980]Agency’s dealing with the Warren Commission, told me that
[3981]his
[3983]Nosenko stuff was the stuff they were declassifying. Now,
[3985]Actually it was
[3987]role was not one of the executive nature.
[3988]simply because he was a great scholar and a great many other
[3990]things, and therefore he had the most catholic background to
[3992]handle something as eomplex as the Warren Commission, not in
[3994]exercising executive power, but working on behalf of the
[3995]Director and all the Directorates and everything pertaining
[3996]to the Warren Commission. He is a tidy individual. And in
[3997]fact Mr. Belin has made a great deal of use of him in the
[3999]Commission's business, and he is the one that had done all the
[4001]digging for the Commission, and so on, on a whole series of
[4003]matters that I am not familiar with.
[4005]But my point to you -- and this is very difficult to
[4007]explain -- is that the question of Nosenko created a very
[4009]great division in the Life of all counterintelligence as to
[4011]bona fides, as in all questions of when you are dealing with
[4013]double identification agents, there is always dispute.
[4015]But let me just Line up the order of battle here. Our
[4017]TOP SECRET
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[4024]Chief of the Soviet Division accepted the fact that the man
[4025]was a provocation. His Chief of Counterintelligence accepted
[4026]the fact that the man was a provocation.
[4028]Mr. Schwarz. Do you mean provocation, or providing
[4029]false information?
[4031]Mr. Angleton. An Agent Provocateur.
[4033]I said he was false. My man gaid he was false. And
[4034]isn't a parrot affair, each one reads the same stuff and
[4035]analyzes and come to their own conclusion. And colitgen,
[4036]who defected, based only on the Geneva, first encounter in
[4037]Geneva, not the defection, had predicted in advance that
[4038]because of the enormity of his defection they would send a
[4039]provocateur into the West to destroy and mutilate his leads.
[4041]So it was a question of awaiting, you might say, who
[4042]knocks on the door. And here is Nosenko.
[4044]Now, since then the Chief of the Soviet Division who is
[4046]no longer there, has recanted in a way -- the Inspector
[4048]General went into all this -- he is today the NIO dealing in
[4050]Soviet Affairs, the National Intelligence Officer on Soviet
[4052]Affairs. And his counterintelligence man, a fellow named
[4055]Pete Bagley, who is the brother of the two Admirals Bagley,
[4057]and one of the best men we had, left the Agency and is now
[4058]in Belgium in private life. And I can go all the way through
[4060]these other people who have been dispersed. But the record
[4062]will clearly reflect that the preponderance of all individnals
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[4081]TOP SECRET
[4083]was that Nosenko was sent on a mission.
[4085]Mr. Schwarz. And provided false information?
[4087]Now, is it your current understanding that what was
[4088]provided to the Warren Commission was the raw infomration
[4089]brought by Nosenko, or was the Warren Commission also provided
[4090]with the opinion of persons such as yourself and others as you
[4091]have recounted that he was providing false information?
[4093]Me. Angleton. I don't think the Warren Commiasion was
[4094]ever faced with the issue of the internal issues of Golitadn
[4095]or Nosenko.
[4097]Mr. Schwarz. You first said that the information was
[4098]suppressed from the Warren Commission, and then you said no,
[4099]it is your understanding now -~
[4101]Mr. Angleton. well, the word suppression isn't the right
[4103]word, I said. One went to argue the matter and it was agreed
[4105]by higher authority that the information shouldn't be --
[4107]Senator Mathias. There was a value judgment made as to
[4108]the usefulness of the material?
[4110]Mr. Angleton. That is right -- and not to do what the
[4111]Soviet in our mind wanted us to do, which-fas to give it
[4112]prominence and have it come out as an official part of the
[4113]record and documents and articles, and so on.
[4115]Mr. Schwarz. But your current understanding is that the
[4117]information was provided?
[4119]Mc. Angleton. That was classified, and never came out in
[4121]TOP SECRET
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[4140]public.
[4142]Mr. Schwarz. But was nevertheless provided to the
[4143]Commission?
[4145]Mr. Angleton. It was made known to them in some fashion.
[4147]Mr. Schwarz. Was it made known to them at the same time
[4148]that at leat certain experts withing the Agency thought it
[4149]was false information?
[4151]Mr. Angleton. I think, as I understand it now, that in
[4152]spite of our feelings, either Helms or McCone made a
[4153]presentation of it.
[4155]Mr. Schwarz. But without mentioning your feelings,
[4156]certain experts thought that it was false?
[4158]Mr. Angleton. I can't respond to that. I don't know.
[4160]Mr. Schwarz. What about the information derived from
[4161]Golitzen, which indicated in your expert opinion that the
[4162]documents provided by the Soviet Union were, I think you put
[4163]it, funny, or strange, or misleading, because they did not
[4164]include any reference to debriefing by Department 13, was that
[4165]information provided to the Warren Commission?
[4167]Mr. Angleton. I don't know. TI don't think so. But all
[4168]I can say there is this, to be realistic. No one would expect
[4169]the Soviet Government, regardless, to provide documents,
[4170]secret documents, on Oswald, whether he was or was not their
[4171]agent. And I say, I can go all the way back through history,
[4173]the way they falsified the official record, they had it with
[4175]TOP SECRET
[4178]Prone (Arta 207) 344-6000
[4180]i
[4184]4
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[4190]410 First Street, $.£., Wasmengton, O.C. 20003
[4192]the Italians in 1923, Consatatinople, and cases on diplomatic
[4193]issues, the complete thing was fabricated, and so on. And 1.
[4194]there is no way of testing them, the security is such that
[4195]they can't be tested.
[4197]So we are not under any illusions of expecting them to
[4198]state that he went through the 13 Department, which asked him
[4199]the following questions.
[4201]Mr. Schwarz. So you say that as far as that matter goes
[4202]there is no possibility that anybody on the Warren Commission
[4203]was fooled?
[4205]Mr. Angleton. I mean, I don't think anybody was. I
[4207]pee la
[4209]didn't follow the Warren Commission, Rocha followed it, and he
[4210]was running over there all the time, and so on.
[4212]Mr. Kirbow. Let me ask you. There would have been no
[4213]reason why anyone on the Warren Commission would have known
[4214]that as a matter of everyday business that they did in fact
[4215]run every defector through Department 13?
[4217]Mr. Angleton. I don't think we ever told them. But you
[4218]see, Allen Dulles -- that is what I am coming to ~~ I used to
[4219]see Allen Dulles regularly, and I was an advisor officially
[4220]to him on a lot of headaches, and I dida lot of leg work for
[4221]him. And I regarded him as a very personal friend. And I am
[4222]Executor of his papers, among other things.
[4224]But the point I am coming to is, to try to give him
[4226]guidance of what the jungle is around here in terms of the
[4228]TOP SECRET
[4231]Prone (Area 202) $44-6600
[4233]ALO First Street, S.0.. Wasmengtan, O.C, 20003
[4235]FBI's position and Mr. Hoover's, and ao on, so that he would
[4236]be more sensitive to the things, no longer being Director,
[4237]that were no longer germain to his position on the matter.
[4239]Mr. Schwarz. Was there a connection between the FBI and
[4240]Oswald?
[4242]Mr. Angleton. I don’t know the full ‘FBI story. I know
[4243]there was a tremendous flap in the Bureau. And one of the bes
[4244]men they had in my view is a professional a man called Burt
[4245]Turner, who I understand just got his law degree. And Burt
[4246]Turner was one of the finest men on Soviet KGB activities in
[4247]the US, one of the analyzts. And he was in the Washington
[4248]Field Office. And it is my understanding -- and this is
[4250]basically hearsay, but from pretty good sources -- that Burt
[4252]Turner was handling the Oswald org related matters at the time
[4254]the President made the trip down to Texas, and that there was
[4255]some confusion that the Bureau had not turned over, or had
[4257]not taken enough initiative in turning over, all the informa-
[4258]tion on Oswald to the local police. I had been told that
[4259]there was a black mark put against Turner's name, and that he
[4260]confronted Mr. Hoover and stated he was not going to permit,
[4261]or have it be known to his children, that his negligence was
[4262]responsible for the death of the President. And he was pretty
[4263]forceful about his position. And as a result, this was
[4264]expunged or something to that effect. And that is the reason
[4266]he went to the Washington Field Office instead of staying in
[4268]TOP SECRET
[4271]Prona (Aran 202) 544-6000
[4274]3
[4276].
[4277]4
[4278]Fe]
[4281]z
[4283]ATO Feat Street, 5.£., Warnengton, 0.0. 20003
[4285]Headquarters,
[4287]And then he retired. And I think his retirement had
[4288]something to do with this fact.
[4290]But this is all by virtue of hindsight with the thousands
[4291]of cases. And I cannot see any Western intelligence service
[4292]seizing on-‘facts that Oswald will return to the US, and then
[4293]going and saying, we will get all of this, and we will send
[4294]it to Texas.
[4296]What I am trying to say, is that the difference in their
[4297]system. With the manpower and the computers, which are mainly
[4298]ours, and whatnot, a situation of that sort is automatic. And
[4299]we know enought about the Second Chief Directorate and the
[4300]controls, the total controls, to know that if a Soviet returned
[4301]automatically, to any part of the Soviet Union he went, there
[4302]would be a dossier that would go, and there would be also an
[4303]operational directive to put him on tap, check his mail, to
[4304]do the following, and so on and to put an agent near him.
[4305]There wouldn't be any leaking anything in the air on that.
[4306]There would be tetal encapsulation of that individual until
[4307]it was ceratin beyond a shadow of a doubt that he was not sent
[4308]back as an agent.
[4310]Mr. Schwarz. A moment ago in talking about the line-up,
[4311]as I think you put it, of views on Nosenko, you recounted the
[4312]views of a number of people. And you said that one person
[4314]had changed his mind or recanted subsequently. And you made
[4316]a reference in that connection to an Inspector General's
[4318]TOP SECRET
[4321]Prove (Area 202} 548-6006
[4323]410 Faest Street, $.£., Wasminaion, O.C. 20003
[4325]What was that report?
[4327]Mr. Angleton. At one stage in all of this -- and it was
[4328]much later, after all the dust settled -- Helms got the
[4329]inspector General, who had come from the clandestine side of
[4330]our business, to institute -- I don't like to use the word
[4331]inspection, it is too authoritative -- to go into the Nosenko
[4332]matter and see if there is anything there that he should know,
[4333]because Helms is fully aware of the split on this whole
[4334]question of bona fides, and it bothered him, hecause I had
[4336]brought him in touch with Golitzen, and he was fully aware of
[4338]all my activities, and travels and so on.
[4340]And so this person who was chosen began to interview
[4341]everybody and reopen the whole thing. I mean, there were 21
[4342]safe leads of stuff if you really got into all of the Golitzen
[4343]and Nosenko and the other things that pertained, as I pointed
[4344]out. to the Warren Commission, to the asininity of what has
[4345]happened, of “27 years of experience of myself and my two
[4347]colleagues, that these are the facts, that there are 20 cases
[4349]Mr. Schwarz. You said Warren Commission. You mean
[4350]Rockefeller?
[4352]Mr. Angleton. Excuse me, Rockefeller.
[4354]There are 20 some odd cases that a counterintelligence
[4355]officer in our busienss should know before he even begins to
[4357]get his feet wet.
[4359]TOP SECRET
[4362]Now, when Dr. Schlesinger came in, and I started hearing
[4364]all of these things of manaement by objectives, and synergisti
[4366]and a lot of other things, being applied to the art forms which
[4368]Prone (Ares 202) 544-6000
[4370]we had developed, I finally got so frustrated that I thought
[4372]I would take him up on his own thing. So I got statisticians
[4374]into take all the safes and figure out the linear footage of
[4375]every safe drawer, all the way on through, and to computerize
[4376]how long it would take the normal case officer to come up to
[4377]this elemental stage of being able to be launched.
[4379]That wag sort of a preparatory business. And they
[4381]figured it out and they gaid it would take 22 man years, we
[4383]meant that if we were 100 percent incorrect, it would be 11
[4385]man years. And that was simply to apprise Schlesinger, and
[4387]WARD & PAUL
[4389]Colby, who had never been in counterintelligence, of what all
[4391]this problem was about. They had the idea of transferring
[4396]people back and forth and all the rest gf it. And I nver chos
[4397]Ay
[4399]anybody in that job as a rule who had “either been in the FBI
[4401]or had not had very rich experience in counterintelligence.
[4403]And normally I kept outside leaks to anybody in the business
[4405]~- I had men who stayed with me for ll years, Rocca was with
[4406]me for 31 years, even though they went into operational situa-
[4407]tions abroad and returned, and so on.
[4409]And I say this to you, because here was an IG, and
[4411]Inspector General, who had had a very lofty mission in Germany J
[4413]A10 Furst Steeet, $.6., Wasminatan, OC, 20004
[4415]where we used to have two oF 300 new people -~-
[4417]so | TOP SECRET
[4419]HW 50955 DoclId:32423393 Page 64
[4421]cop ete mete ae ace
[4423]Prone (Area 202) $44-6000
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[4429]a
[4430]o
[4433]3
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[4437]410 Farsi Street, S.E.. Wainengion, D.C,
[4439]“
[4441]Mr. Schwarz. Was this Mr. Ermine?
[4443]Mr. Angleton. No, he was never brought. He was Gordon
[4444]Stewart -- and he is retired -- a very able man, and a fine
[4445]executive. And I mean this sincerely. He is one of the
[4446]really top-notch men.
[4448]'But he as to undertake this burden. And it was a farce
[4449]in terms ~- so he would talk to people and get their views
[4450]and so on.
[4452]When I went to the former Chief of the Soviet Division,
[4453]who was then stationed in Paris -- and this is only hearsay,
[4454]I never read the report -- the former Chief of the Soviet
[4455]Division stated, when I look back it, perhaps I have given
[4456]too much latitude to my subordinates. And he wouldn't say yea
[4457]or nay, but he withdrew his very firm statement of the past
[4460]that this man was an agent provocateur.
[4462]Mr. Schwarz. Did the review concern in any way the
[4463]handling of the matter with the Warren Commission?
[4465]Me, Angleton. No, not to my knowledge. I mean, this
[4466]may be something. TI don't think I have evern seen the review
[4467]-~ in fact, I don't know whether the review was ever put in
[4468]the paper. But I mention it simply so that you don't get the
[4469]idea that it was just the ciy state that had this view. This
[4470]was a view that was shared by numbers of people who had
[4472]dealings with Nosenko. And I think the greatest authority of
[4474]all is Golitzén himself, who was in the KGB, and who knew
[4476]TOP SECRET
[4479]Prona (Area 202) 544-4000
[4481]2
[4482]3
[4485]4
[4486]e
[4489]z
[4491]410 Fust Street. S.E., Warmington, O.C. 20003
[4493]everything. And he lived there for 16 or 18 yeara of his life.
[4495]Mr. Schwarz. Earlier you mentioned that you put Mr.
[4496]Harvey in touch with the Israeli's during the Cuban business.
[4497]And we have had a lot of testimony about Mr. Harvey, 30 we
[4498]are moderately well aware of his activities.
[4500]Mr. Angleton. I am sorry.
[4502]Mr. Schwarz. We know who Mr. Harvy is and we have had a
[4503]fair amount of testimony about some of the things he had done.
[4504]What was the connection between him and the Israeli's during
[4505]the Cuban business?
[4507]Mr. Angleton. [f will put it very briefly --
[4509]Senator Tower. What is the Cuban business specifically?
[4511]Mr. Schwarz. The witness used the expression Cuban
[4512]business. I guess I should ask first, what do you mean by the
[4514]Shad ;
[4515]Cuban business, and second, was is the connection between Mr.
[4516]Harvey and the Israeli¢s on this matter?
[4518]Mr. Kirbow. You are really asking, what is the
[4519]importance of putting him in touch with them in relation to
[4520]Cuba?
[4522]Mr. Angleton. Bill Harvey was put in charge of taking
[4523]over the Cuban business, the Cuban business being the
[4524]Clandestine Services activity into Cuba. Now, what struck me,
[4525]not having had any part of the Bay of Pigs, because of
[4526]differences with Bissell, was that it seemed to me that both
[4528]the Cubans and the Soviets knew everything that was being
[4530]TOP SECRET
[4536]Cc
[4537]cS
[4538]Nat
[4539]i
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[4555]25
[4557]planned. In other words, they had the thing penetrated, and
[4558]it was foredoomed.
[4560]Mr. Schwarz. Through the exile community in Miami?
[4562]Mr. Angleton. No, through Soviet agents and everything,
[4563]and so on, there was no cover or second investigation or
[4564]anything.
[4566]So when Bill took over in the Cuban business, then I
[4567]decided that since we were very close friends that I would
[4568]try to help him out by getting him a source totally unknown
[4569]to everybody. And I went to the Israeli's. And I had them
[4570]assign a man to Havana, whom I happened to know very well.
[4572]He was born in Bulgaria. He can speak Russian and the Balkan
[4573]countriest languages. He is today their senior man on Soviet
[4574]intelligence. He was a young officer in the days I am speak-
[4575]ing of. And he was sent to Havana, which meant that here he
[4576]was ~- and the communications were from him in a one time
[4577]pattern, I mean total security, from Havana to Tel Aviv, to
[4578]me, and from me to Bill. And no one knew of his existence
[4580]or his identify, except Harvey and myself, and of course,
[4581]Dick Helms.
[4583]Mr. Schwarz. McCone?
[4585]Mr. Angleton. I can't remember whether -- yes, McCone
[4586]would have know, but he wouldn't have been interested.
[4588]What I am trying to say is, he knew.
[4590]Mr. Kirbow. Helms knew because he was DDP --
[4592]TOP SECRET
[4595]Mr. Angleton. He knew, because even before I went into
[4596]this I told him what I was going to do, and he agreed, and
[4598]SO on.
[4600]Prone {Area 202) 544-6000
[4602]And also I wanted a person, because there was a radio
[4604]going to be put into Havana, and let somebody say we need a
[4606]radio in Havana, or drop some men in. And then the point is,
[4607]I get the radio to Tel Aviv, and to Havana and then put it
[4608]someplace, and then tell him, you go to such and. such a place
[4609]and find the radio, and then have some men come in and call
[4610]some men to make contact, with the view that I couldn't trust
[4612]the whole setup.
[4614]So for many a long period of time this worked perfectly.
[4616]This individual established his cover. They only had two or
[4618]WARD & PAUL
[4620]three people in the Embassy there. He would go to a
[4621]Hungarian restaurant where the Soviet officers would also go.
[4622]And he would spot one of the waiters or a headwater who was
[4623]Jewish and it wouldn't be long before he would say, you are
[4624]from the Israeli Embassy, and pretty soon one thing led to
[4625]another, and his production was without question the greatest
[4626]production there was.
[4628]Well, it got so complex in names and geography, and so on]
[4629]that is when I came to the point that I brought Harvey
[4631]together secretly with this individual, the only person I put
[4633]ek cw RRA 2 mney oe ee ee ee
[4635]in touch was an Israeli, in this context. So later on the
[4637]410 Forat Street, S.£.. Wasmengton, O.C, 20003
[4639]4
[4640]4
[4641]4
[4643]Soviets come out with the statement, is Bill Harvey on the
[4645]TOP SECRET
[4647]HW 50955 Docld: 32423393 Page 66
[4650]Prone (Aras 202) 544-6000
[4652]WARD & PAUL
[4654]10 Forat Street, S.E., Watnengton, O.C. 20003
[4656]with. It looks big today to you, but when you think of what
[4658]the Agency's efforts were at that time in the Miami base with
[4659]all the boats and the biggest Navy in the world, and all the
[4660]rest, a Little thing involving one man waa not a thing that
[4661]you went up and made a fuss to Mr. McCone about.
[4662]Mr. Schwarz. Did you know Mr. Harvey pretty well, was
[4663]he someone you knew?
[4664]Mr. Angleton. Very well indeed. In fact, I just called
[4665]him the other day, his mother died.
[4666]Mr. Schwarz. I heard that.
[4667]Did you know anything about his use of underworld
[4668]figures in connection with
[4669]Mr. Angleton. I know the allegations.
[4670]Mr. Schwarz. At the time did you know of that?
[4671]Mr. Angleton. I only know one incident.
[4672]Mr. Schwarz. Okay.
[4673]Mr. Angleton. Simply the Bureau, the FBI, ran a
[4674]surveillance. And Sam Papich, who was the Liaison Officer
[4675]_ of the FBI, who is now Head of the Criminal Commission in .
[4676]Thee 2
[4677]Te co, was at my house around 10 o'clock at night. And the
[4678]Washington Field Office or Headquarters Miami located Papich
[4679]at my house. They were absolutely boiling, because they had
[4680]surveiled the Mafia all the way from California to National
[4682]Airport, and he had got off the plane and was met by a man who
[4684]was the physical description of Bill to a tee“ And they
[4686]TOP SECRET
[4689]Prone (Area 202) $44-6000
[4691]4210 Faeat Street, SE. Wasnington, O.C. 26003
[4693]what to do.
[4695]Mr. Schwarz. That was Mr. Roselli, was it?
[4697]Mc. Angleton. I think it was.
[4699]Mr. Kirbow. And the Bill you speak of here is Bill
[4700]Harvey?
[4702]Mc. Angleton. Bill Harvey.
[4704]So I could get the gist of Bill's questions to them. And
[4705]I told him -- I made a motion to put his hand over the phone
[4706]and not to let them discuss it. And I said, tell them not to
[4707]do anything until they hear from you.
[4709]And that is what he told them, he said, stand down on
[4710]this and I will be back in touch.
[4712]And then Bill told me the whole story in detail of how
[4714]he had gone over from California and followed him in this
[4716]thing, and how Harvey had put him in his car and he went off.
[4718]Mr. Schwarz. That was in 1973 shortly before Mr. Harvey
[4719]went to Rome?
[4721]Mr. Angleton. It wasn't shortly before, it was, I think
[4722]quite a long time before.
[4724]So then I told Sam, I said, look, let's go very easy on
[4725]this -- because I didn't know anything about Bill's connection
[4726]with the Mafia and all that, but I @id know him well enough
[4727]to know that he was not a frivolous man, and that this thing
[4729]happened, and keep in mind that ex-FBI men, contrary to public
[4731]opinion, were not very much liked by Mr. Hoover when they left
[4733]TOP SECRET
[4736]Prone (Area 202} 344-6000
[4738]410 Esest Street, 8.0. Warmington, D.C. 27000)
[4740]the FBI.
[4742]So I called Bill's house, and I asked his wife, is Bill
[4744]around?
[4746]And she said, no, he is out to dinner tonight.
[4748]And I said, look, we have some very serious trouble.
[4749]Would you please tell me where I can locate him.
[4751]And she said, he is at Duke Zeibert‘'s. And I called
[4752]Duke Zeibert's and I managed to get him. And I turned the
[4753]phone over to Papich, because I did not want to be on the
[4754]record showing that this was Angleton, et cetera.
[4756]And Papich talked to Bill, and actually I didn't hear
[4757]the discussion. It was something about, I will see you
[4758]tomorrow.
[4760]And Sam told the surveillance and all the other people
[4761]to forget it, and the Headquarters would take over.
[4763]And that is my knowledge, direct knowledge of what
[4764]Anderson and everybody else has stated.
[4766]Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Angleton, to your specific knowledge
[4767]did Bill ever attempt to use the excellent contact he had in
[4768]Havana to carry out the mission of eliminating the leader down
[4769]there, or try to get any help out of him in that regard?
[4771]Mr. Angleton. He knows that I would have cut his throat.
[4773]Mr. Kirbow. That would have jeopardized your entire
[4774]contact with the Israeli‘'s?
[4776]Mr. Angleton. Yes sir.
[4778]TOP SECRET
[4781]Senator Tower. We will take a recess for
[4782]minutes while we go up and vote.
[4784](A short recess was taken)
[4786]Prone [Area 202) 344-6000
[4788]“SOMACOis Worderes
[4789]Schwarz.
[4791]Schwarz. I don't have anything more.
[4793]this gall
[4795]“c
[4796]GS
[4797]fro
[4799]Penthouse:
[4801]1956 Suez war, the EliSenhower Admin}
[4803]IE
[4804]@.
[4806]provide Israel with al soins in developing an atomic
[4808]weapon. The Israelis had\the ,
[4810]ence sources, the CIA was
[4812]ton
[4813]2
[4814]oo >
[4815]os
[4816]a
[4818]Fa
[4819]oO 5
[4820]Ga
[4821]co
[4823]la
[4825]Absolutely to the contra
[4827]“--Angleton directed the ebort?"
[4829]‘Me. Angleton. False.
[4831]410 Crest Steeet, S.E., Wartenutan, O.C. 70003
[4833]Senator Tower. That it totally false?
[4835]Mr. Angleton. That is totally false.
[4837]‘TOP SECRET
[4840]2
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[4854]to work with Dimona scientists.”
[4856]Mr. Angleton. False. I will
[4858]’ British-born physicist, now an
[4860]with special and esotertte ties to the CIA."
[4861]Mr. Angleton. iio" na Srecstses is false.
[4862]Senator Tower:
[4864]cover that one ,£g60, I assume.
[4866]fy.
[4868]“Persons cose to Angdeton have Av this account in
[4869]recent yon Reflecting Angleton™gitown position, howeve
[4871]they haveidenied assertions from other sou
[4872]team Wy fissinoable material -- plutonimum
[4874]the LSivaelies from United States stocks."
[4876]Angleton.
[4878]f
[4880]Senator Tower. I think it was taken care of in that
[4882]TOP SECRET
[4885]af
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[4897]second paragraph, is where all the questions are raises
[4898]Really, the CIA would be hard put to transfer
[4900]fissionable materials without the knowledge “wr Atomic
[4902]J Energy Commission, would it not?
[4904]SiN Mr. Angleton. Sir, I can assure a, hat the CIA ~~
[4906]ally know what the word i means anymore.
[4908]There is SO,much use of the atomic éiergy - We have atomic
[4910]battery 77
[4912]fee ciesigiible materials, I think the
[4914]reference here is t at, couvafibe converted to weapons.
[4915]Mr. Angleton. I 3 tt categorically ~~ in my whole
[4917]ver involved fissionable material
[4919]peculations regarding leakages
[4921]control ovgreyany stocks of fissionable,
[4923]aterials except through the knowledge oO
[4925]Mr. Angleton. That is right -- I hate to nitepy
[4926]y want to simply state that there was 4 problem in thepagency
[4927]once where you have, Sayr somebody simply approach you aged
[4929]state, I have access to fissionable materials, and there fo
[4931]if it is a covert thing, and it raises a big policy question
[4933]TOP SECRET
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[4950]how do we deal with those kinds of cases, where
[4951]allegedly, a confidence man, or whatnot, who wants to
[4952]ou the stuff? The purpose then was to penetrate, 9
[4953]rate. And I wonder if there wasn't a questignh/at one
[4954]» to what we do about it, and what the daagers would
[4955]be Lf we Ube the diplomatic pouch, and therefare thousands of
[4957]questions. it did happen in the Far pat. And it was a
[4959]GW
[4960]if
[4962]false case, Ny pdential case. But it Avs happen. There was
[4963]an offer to on eo fissionable’material or something.
[4964],
[4965],
[4967]knowledge, or an interestaof thdZcra in any shape or form
[4969]But my point is, mo never béen initiative to my
[4971]wanting any fissionable
[4972]Senator Tower.
[4973]Mr. Aaron. aT i te Mc. Szule said that "In
[4974]effect Mr. ;
[4975]Mr. Mann's name,
[4977]commit suicide
[4979]Mr. “Le I don't think I said ityfto him. But in
[4981]the naciie ny mind -- after I left you -- waghwhat I think
[4982]hi ‘S
[4983]yb
[4985]x
[4986]I a -- and maybe I didn't tell you, maybegl told Colby,
[4987]A ys.
[4989]someone tried to cut his throat in Philby's house in
[4991]TOP SECRET
[4994]Prone [Area 202) $44-6000
[4996]ze)
[4997]7
[4999]2
[5000]2
[5004][3]
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[5009]410 Forst Steert, $.£., Warmington, O.C. 20003
[5011]we had the report or not I don't know. So I ama little
[5013]ar
[5015]monfused as to that statement. Because I don't think?the
[5019]Mann and Philby, et cetera.
[5021]ad one other segment of his
[5023]fer recounting the story of the
[5025]ve could conf Many.
[5026]one, the timefrant Beas wrong, that itgiias not the early ‘60's, |
[5028]reg,
[5030]“ es
[5031]Late ‘So's after the Sueziwar, and number two,
[5033]x
[5035]Re was concerned there was Yisoesss by the
[5037]Yee:
[5038]Aaron. Did you make those two corrections
[5040]Angleton. I don't understand what you are s@ying.
[5041]Aaron. Did you make those two corrections?
[5043]Angleton. I don't understand what you are saying
[5045]TOP SECRET
[5048]Senator Tower. He is reading -- actually what
[5049]a little earlier to you was in terms of trying to b
[5051]that you did not agree with his story, that you d&
[5053]Prone {Mraz 202) $44-6000
[5055]eSnfirm the validity of it.
[5056].» Angleton. That part is correct. ie not follow
[5058]“last part you are reading.
[5060]running
[5061]Mr.
[5062]that is
[5064]Mr.
[5066]2
[5067]2
[5068]4
[5069]a
[5071]ic]
[5076]story.
[5078]koe page 40, from line 8,
[5079]"Mr. Angleton O14 me that essential this information was
[5081]a
[5083]correct," t a¢ is absolutely false.
[5085]And frover made any such statement¥that I could confirm
[5086]Ge
[5087]a ‘
[5088]it -- vA 19 and 20, “Angleton said he Rican ty taken back
[5089]Ay Uke ‘
[5090]y a he could confirm the two correctiliong." That is
[5091]we
[5092]Mr. Aaron. I think that covers it.
[5094]Mr. Angleton. And this is false: "one or more
[5096]ALG Feest Street. $.€., wasnenaron, O.C, 2000)
[5098]id distinguished pure scientists or physicists whose oye
[5099]a
[5101]were available to the US Government", that is totally fa
[5103]TOP SECRET
[5106]Prone (Ares 202) 548-6000
[5110]WARD & PRUK
[5112]SE. Wasnenaton, 0.C. 20003
[5114]410 Furst Street,
[5116]Mr. Aaron. Let me ask one last question.
[5118]Mr. Angleton. When I say technical assistance,
[5120]. quite different matter.
[5122]Mr. Kirbow. You do not mean technical assié
[5124]Tear field whatever?
[5126]Senator tater.
[5128]terms of intellige
[5129]Mr. aw 4 No, it wasn't a qu@stion of my admitting,
[5130]# -
[5132]I told him ene it was well-known that Sane whole field of
[5134]ay
[5136]ELINT and Any things, that we have worked
[5138]Senator Tower. But not specifically,
[5139]i
[5140]fh... and nuclear weapon development?
[5142]Angleton. That subject wasn't in existence.
[5145]Mr. Angleton. No.
[5147]Prone (Ares 202) $44-6609
[5149]“Let me just state my own feeling about some; this.
[5151]sources
[5153]to Israeli ifiéelligence. Well, I knew 7 t away that that
[5155]with some people,
[5157]was a lie. I s&{d, after 22 years' wo
[5159]they would have bed “ns me out E vee at 3 in the morning.
[5161]In other words, in 2 never known them to withhold
[5163]WARD & Pau
[5165]i
[5167]4
[5168]4
[5169]3
[5171]WT new doesn't exclude the Israelis.
[5173]410 First Sister, S.C, Watnengion, O.C. 20003
[5175]Mr. Kirbow. Do you have specific knowledge of instan
[5177]TOP SECRET
[5179]SEM cle hande atte ce ne
[5182]Prone (Aras 202) 344-4000
[5184]WARD & RAUL
[5186]410 Foust Street, $.2., Waininaion, O.C. 20003
[5188]HW 50955 Docld:32423353
[5190]aarower. In your
[5192]SER ENG
[5194]4 secrets?
[5196]Mr. Angleton. } an to that?
[5197]ye Would you Like to > a
[5198]“>
[5200]‘Senator Tower. We can go off the record.
[5202]ZUR ase seu OLN)
[5204]Senator Mathias. Mr. Chairman, I would suggest that
[5205]perhaps we defer that subject for the moment. I am sure we
[5206]will be meeting with Mr. Angleton again.
[5208]Senator Tower. Then, too, we can get the FBI matter in
[5209]the meantime.
[5211]I have just a couple of questions that I would appreciate
[5212]it if Mr. Angleton would give us his evaluations as an expert
[5213]on. And they go back to his testimony relative to the Kennedy
[5214]assassination.
[5216]As I recall, you said that immediately after the assassi-
[5217]nation Golitadn' on his own initiative communicated with you
[5218]and advised you that it was normal practice for a defector who
[5220]had a military background to be processed in Department 13?
[5222]~ Page 100
[5224]TOP SECRET
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[5243]Mr. Angleton. Interrogated, OX processed:
[5245]Senator Mathias. And that the implication certainly of
[5246]this was that Oswald was an ex-Marine, and had been through
[5247]this process, and that therefore at least that he might have
[5248]been acting within the context of the Soviet plan, is that
[5249]right? .
[5251]Mr. Angleton. That is the thrust of what he was trying
[5252]to say. His English is such that it igs very di€ficult.
[5254]Senator Mathias. I understand. But then some years
[5255]later -- my recollection is that you gaid it was in 1967 or
[5256]1969 -- you learned that the KGB had spent six month of
[5257]employment of their top operators in the investigation of the
[5258]Kennedy assassination, and wouldn't this fact in your mind
[5259]negate the implication of the. original colitgdn call or that
[5260]they were involved?
[5262]Mr. Angleton. I want to congratulate you, because that
[5263]man is a man who is also a Suspect of Nosenko.
[5265]Senator Mathias. You mean in 1967?
[5267]Mr. Angleton. Just to show you the ground you are
[5268]treading on, Golitzen gave us informatian regarding the
[5269]penetration of our own organization. And we worked down to an
[5270]identity. And the FBI disagreed with us. And I am talking
[5271]about not a few minutes, but several weeks and months of work.
[5272]And the Bureau's attitude was, you have got the wrong man, and
[5274]the allegation therefore does not affect the CIA, and we
[5276]TOP SECRET
[5279]Prone (Area 202} 544-6000"
[5281]3
[5284]a
[5285]4
[5286]o
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[5291]410 Crest Street, $.£., waininaion, D.C. 70003
[5293]advise that you send it to the Army.
[5295]And I might add, the man who wrote that memorandum was
[5296]the Burt Turner I mentioned who was one of the competent
[5297]FBI analysts. So it was in limbo. And we stated that "X"
[5298]was the penetration agent, and the Bureau refused to accept
[5299]that. And in 1967 a Soviet ~~ on whom we had a dossier on thi
[5300]thing, because he was once stationed in India, and therefore
[5301]we knew who he was, and ail the rest of it “= with an unknown
[5302]coming to us as Nosenko was, he was a real man, we had years
[5303]of surveillance on him, and so on. And he came, and he
[5304]alleged -- and he was a- noe, temporary duty in Washington
[5306]here -- and he established contact with the first Mrg. Helms.
[5308]- And eventually I was called to take the case. And he stated
[5310]that among his missions to the US was to effect the redefectio
[5311]or the return to the Soviet Union of a man, and that man was
[5312]the man whom we had identified as a Soviet agent. And he went
[5313]into the whole background, that this man was one of the
[5314]highest grade illegals that they. had ever had, and he was in
[5315]our Agency.
[5317]So this had a tremendous impact on Burt Turner, because
[5318]he was one of the two interrogating officers. And ~ can't
[5319]talk to you about professional pride, but for a man of his
[5320]competence to have done it the wrong way, that hurt.
[5322]So I had a question injected, which was, what do you know
[5324]about George Blake?
[5326]TOP SECRET
[5329]Prone (Ares 207} 544-4000
[5331]2
[5332]3
[5336]o
[5339]r
[5341]410 First Street, S.£.. Woinsngton, 0.C, 20003
[5343]6
[5345]And then his response was, he says, we thi he is dead.
[5346]‘ Ss
[5347]‘Now, hwere is a man who is supposed to be Special
[5348]L
[5350]Assistant to the Head of Counterintelligence in KGB, whose
[5351]mother was a secretary to Litvinov, and he comes therefore
[5352]from the aristocracy, as Nosenko does, because his father was
[5353]the Minister of Maritime Affairs. And there is a statue of
[5354]Nosenko's father. And Golitzen had told us that men chosen
[5355]for very dangerous missions of penetration and duplicity came
[5356]from the aristocracy. Everyone trusted them, and their fatherd
[5357]and their families are heroes of the Soviet Union.
[5359]So here was this man who said as to Blake, we think he is
[5360]dead.
[5362]Two to three weeks later is when Blake escaped from
[5363]Scrubb's Woods to the Soviet Union. Now, if he had come to
[5364]the US to exfiltrate as the Special Assistant to the Head of
[5365]Counterintelligence, to exfiltrate a person who worked in
[5366]the West as an illegal from the end of World War II, and
[5368]gradually worked into us, why wouldn't he have known the
[5370]nme.
[5371]exfiltartion plans of George Blake, which would have been
[5374]7
[5376]simultaneous, because he was a Headquarters man here on TOC.
[5377]So we handled him for six or seven weeks.
[5378]And some of the most telling parts of the interrogation
[5379]was that when he went back to the Soviet Union he would have
[5382]access to archives. And what was on our mind, and what
[5384]cryptonym that we wanted him to work up -- and this would
[5386]TOP SECRET
[5389]Prone (Ares 202) 544-6000
[5391]Z
[5392]2
[5394]a
[5396]o
[5399]2
[5401]A1O First Siteet, S.€., Warmimaton, 0.0. 20003
[5403]what did Golitzen know that they did not know he knew?
[5404]agents in the West could be under our control as a result of
[5405]Golitzen's disclosures regarding those things?
[5407]And you can see the tremendous quality this man had of
[5408]almost getting from our man those four or five- crytonyms,
[5409]which would have told them what they wanted to know, because
[5410]there are cases they are not sure whether he knows or doesn’t
[5411]know, and so on. And these are officials, and so on.
[5413]So he wasn't given that. He was given stuff that was
[5414]Sort of medium low level stufE£, you couldn't call it chicken
[5415]feed -- but we never told him we disbelieved in him. And he
[5416]said, if you do those things for me, I have an opportunity,
[5417]because of my mother and so on, to become Head of the American
[5418]Department of the KGB,
[5420]And the other thing he wanted, was, we took him to the
[5421]Soviet Agency and we came out later for contacts, and he “—
[5422]there was a telegram there, and he had been requested to
[5423]acquire all the information Possible on the whereabouts of
[5424]Golitzen and Nosenko. And Iwas actually in Wisconsin. And
[5425]I called my Deputy long distance and I said, if there is any
[5426]proposal put up by that individual that. would expose -- and I
[5427]use the crytonym name of Golitzen -- donte.
[5429]A week later is when he got to “Moscow and he sent a cable
[5431]to tell us that he can give them word on everything on
[5433]TOP SECRET
[5436]Prone (Area 202) 544-€000
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[5439]3
[5441]s
[5442]o
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[5447]210 First Steees, $.£., wasnemaion, B.C. 20003
[5449]44
[5451]Gollitzen.
[5453]Coming back to what you stated, with our litmus paper and
[5454]with our analysis of him, we treated him as a walk-in, as a
[5455]part of the thing to confirm Nosenko's bona fides, and the
[5457]build-up. And he is the one who gave the full description of
[5459]the fact that for six months the Place was immobilized for thi
[5460]investigation, of all the high level all over the works, 1s
[5461]the way he put dt.
[5463]Senator Mathias. You contrasted the way that the Russiang
[5464]treat a returned defector, ahd the way we treat them. And
[5465]in that connection, to your knowledge was Oswald every
[5466]interrogated when he teturned from Russia? .
[5468]Mr. Angleton. I don't know -~ I Probably would know, but
[5470]I don't know whether the military -- normally that would fall
[5472]within the jurisdiciton of the military, since he was a
[5473]military man who defected. So I don't know’ the answer to that
[5474]Senator Mathias. What about from Cuba?
[5475]Mr. Angleton. I can't answer that.
[5476]Senator Mathias. Or at-any time?
[5477]Mr. Angleton. I think the Bureau interviewed him.
[5478]Senator Mathias. The Bureau, not the CIA?
[5479]Mr. Angleton. I am certain we never did, no.
[5480]Senator Mathias. But you think the PBI did?
[5481]Mr. Angleton. That -is. just my sensation that they did.
[5483]Senator Mathias. We will follow that up.
[5485]TOP SECRET
[5488]Prone {Aras 202}
[5490]3
[5493]ry
[5495]co]
[5498]Ed
[5500]410 Forest Street. S.E.. Wattiagion, D.C, 200073
[5502]be RPA Biss
[5504]This is the very last question. You referred to filea
[5505]that are maintained on persons who have some contact with the
[5506]Soviet Union and the Soviet nationals. And I would like to
[5507]pursue that in a personal way.
[5509]About two years ago Arbotov was in this country, and he
[5510]came to lunch in my office. And we had several members of
[5511]Congress there. Would this kind of thing be a matter of
[5513]record?
[5515]ae Embassy, then my answer would. be yes.
[5516]Senator Mathias. My recollection is, he came wa
[5518]person witiish im, whose name I don't remember.
[5520]contacts, if the
[5522]Senat Gn’ Tower. Excuse me. You are talkin
[5523]Alon visiting members here on the Hill?
[5525]sSenator Mathias. Yes. And what I am trying to g
[5527]dossier might
[5530]Prone {Aras 202) $48-6500
[5532]At this point my question is on purely a an
[5534]ne
[5536]réup which is
[5538]Mr. Ang letoh..
[5540]Mr. Angleton. ‘ey are not living in a very ideal world
[5542]y
[5544]in the Agency. We can . process the hard material.
[5546]f
[5547]Senator Mathias. Hee is a hypothetical question,
[5549]Qthetical. Let's say our mission,
[5551]2
[5553]4
[5554]e
[5555]a
[5556]fe]
[5558]4
[5559]z
[5561]instead of visiting Moscow, vitsits Rome or Paris or someplace,
[5562]aX
[5564]where it is very easy,“for you tQ:operate. And there were
[5566]cf .
[5567]7, iN : ;
[5568]A wn to have visitied me in
[5570]meetings with Russidns who were kio
[5572]ty
[5573]thing which would get
[5576]Mr. Ang@éton. No. I imagine the ws MI-5, though,
[5577]Me &
[5578]ee Russians in London, would Poss through liaison
[5580]to us, Ge there was something suspicious, would, Pass through
[5581]Fa a
[5583]ay . A
[5584]a report on the meeting. And we have examples ere Czech
[5586]fe
[5588]degector told us about a member of Parliament, eS agent,
[5590]bia what the cryptonum was, and how he was recruited
[5592]410 Foeat Street, $.£,, Wasinengion, O.C, 20003
[5594]fe
[5595](24
[5596]Bor got other cryptonyms on British members of Parliam
[5598]TOP SECRET
[5601]that you have not then identified. We know what they
[5603]Or some of the stuff which was passed,
[5605]i
[5607]Prone (Aras 202) $44-4006
[5609]you would be Bkied in the file, whic
[5610]thick, of that soviet activity in My US. And there would be
[5611]the fact that he was
[5612]“he did this or that.
[5613]Senator Mathias.
[5614]file,
[5616]3
[5617]59
[5619]Mr. Angleton. That#is right
[5621]2
[5622]2
[5624]a
[5626]fe]
[5629]x
[5631]Jit
[5632]@ Attorney
[5634]General fang then there would be somebody in the Senate or
[5636]O.c. 20003
[5638]the Cofigress who would be contacted and notified, and so on.
[5639]And fiythink Mc. Hoover's practice was that he would Te@arn
[5640]thijéugh his own sources that a person who
[5642]y .
[5643]going to have lunch with a Congressman or
[5645]yand he would pick up the money -- or this
[5647]S10 Fest Street, SE. Wainingion,
[5649]And I think this is the way he handled it
[5651]TOP SECRET
[5654]Prone (Aras 202) 544-6000
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[5668]following, and there would be a notification that M
[5669]notified, et cetera. He called me once when eno
[5670]ugh time factor for him to send a letter fie. He said,
[5671]doing something at such and such an(Nour, you should
[5672]know that, this man is a homosexual, or aofen and so on. And
[5673]it may hav Sbeen useful to change the Saree in a hurry. But
[5676]Bureau. Whe’ Mr. Hoover intervened
[5678]elther a question of time or a
[5680]number of things, thei
[5682]mine once sia@id, that you don't get news
[5684]- Mathias. That is all, Mr.
[5686]person.
[5689]o
[5690](>)
[5691]Cc
[5692]Cc
[5693]Wan
[5694]i
[5696]3
[5699]a
[5701]t)
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[5706]410 Forst Street, $.£., Wasnaton, 0.C. 70003
[5708]Senator Baker. What would you do, Mr. Angleton, to
[5709]to rehabilitate the Agency .in particular in ae a
[5711]gence capability, since you feel that it is deteriorating.
[5713]awhat things in particular would you do?
[5715]fe
[5716]ia place, and if you go
[5718]to purgatory, my Vitew is, the “ the fires, the better.
[5719]So my view is, let Re come ft. And let people take the
[5720]consequences. I am notga veyfeves that an agency can have
[5721]two fathers. And I don't’ 5 feve in inferlors reporting on
[5723]their superiors by directives, And I don't believe that the
[5725]Agency below the Direétor has ‘tO, be responsive to two
[5727]gpd” Colby what it might be. But to throw the bur
[5728]-Fector to respond to 4 question on Chile, gives him
[5729]is always in that dual position. And gomething doesn't
[5731]to work that way. And the lower you go in the Agency, eve
[5733]TOP SECRET
[5736]Prone (Area 202) 544-6008 -
[5738]here are so Skemain to everything in thig Zountry relating to
[5740]the world balanddyot power and what ene” Soviets will strike
[5742]at, and what the rode of detente ish’ That ia what I-am trying
[5743]; By
[5745]“SC
[5746]7
[5748]Hy
[5750]to get at. The Executive -- inggther words, the intelligence
[5752]community has never realy hada day of peace in a way. When
[5753]any e/
[5755]Hoover passed away, and omer aboard, everyone in the
[5757]2
[5758]2
[5760]a
[5761]a
[5762]oe)
[5765]z
[5767]situation. It has never been normal before. Mr. Hoover never
[5769]a
[5771],
[5772]intelligence communit ae we can normalize this
[5774]attended an Agency: Heeting. Mr. H@aver never permitted one
[5776]of his representatives to go beyond this jurisdiciton question.
[5778]and he wants to reestablish }
[5780]I wouldn't accept it form him, they are the¥o,
[5782]410 farsa Sivect, $.E., Wasrington, O.C. 20003
[5785]4
[5786]2
[5788]ry
[5789]a
[5790]a
[5793]g
[5795]310 Forst Steeet, S.£., Wasnengion, 0.C. 20003
[5797]relates to, not Minter fw but the intelli-
[5799]gence community. And now I ams tre gly opposed to professionals
[5801]being Directors.
[5803]of the idea of two
[5805]have to be confirmed and whatnot. And
[5807]the busine'ss.
[5810]ggreter Baker. What do you think of the Roc
[5811]Commission reports?
[5813]Mr. Angleton. I don‘t see anything wrong with it
[5815]Senator Baker. Do you think it will work?
[5817]TOP SECRET
[5820]i
[5822]|
[5823]i
[5824]i
[5825]|
[5826]i
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[5833]a
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[5840]410 Ferst Steeet, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003
[5842]Mr. Angleton. I really don't know thia area, So TI am
[5844]not competent to speak or go around seeing what will happen
[5846]Py
[5847]a
[5849]in Congress, just on the simple question of Chile ane the
[5851]i
[5853]mentativel uthing.
[5855]Mr. Nireton. All the cases sgl sues in the
[5856]hands of the rong people, and our fiies in the hands of the
[5857]wrong people, would have very geisive political impact upon
[5858]our elections. Tha is wnat Mean, to be very frank about it
[5860]Senator Baker. Ruowgwould that happen?
[5862]Ae
[5864]Mr. Angleton. Bige are all kinds of information which,
[5865]AN
[5866]if it falls into gfe wren nanas Or should they want to use
[5868]it for their ow@u ulterior Otives, would be absolutely
[5869]damaging.
[5870]Senatgy/ Tower. in other weds, this information could
[5872]be vd V politicians as a polit tesa football?
[5875]4&7 angleton. Precisely. But a%man who would do it
[5877]subject to the call of the Chair.)
[5879]'
[5881]TOP SECRET