[1]| 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
[3]157-10011-10078
[5]AGENCY :
[6]RECORD NUMBER :
[8]RECORDS SERIES :
[10]AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
[12]ORIGINATOR :
[13]FROM :
[14]TO:
[16]TITLE
[17]TESTIMONY OF OSBORN,
[19]DATE :
[20]PAGES :
[22]SUBJECTS :
[23]MAJOR SUBJECTS TO BE
[25]DOCUMENT TYPE :
[26]CLASSIFICATION : T
[27]RESTRICTIONS :
[28]CURRENT STATUS : P
[30]DATE OF LAST REVIEW :
[32]OPENING CRITERIA :
[34]COMMENTS :
[36]SSCI Box. 288, Folder 9
[38]HY 50955 Docld: 32203346
[40]Date: 10/06/93
[41]. Page: 1
[42]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[44]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[46]AGENCY INFORMATION
[48]SSCIA
[49]157-10011-10078
[51]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[52]UNKNOWN
[54]HOWARD J.
[55]02/17/75
[56]22
[57]COVERED IN TESTIMONY OF OSBORN, HOWARD
[58]PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[59]REFERRED
[61]09/29/93
[63][R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED
[65]Page 1
[67]a SS ga ee meg os
[68]Lo _. SSCI Box 288, Folder 9 _. 288-9
[69]TOP SECRET (xcps) <_< auEEECEcEE
[71]Record Number 157-10011-10078 ~
[73]eB MAJOR SUBJECTS TO BE COVERED IN THE
[74]TESTIMONY OF HOWARD J. OSBORN
[75]ne UOBORN
[77]February 17, 1975
[79]Background of Mr. Osborn
[81]See the written statement submitted to the Com
[82]Mr. Osborn dated February ll, 1975.
[84]Activities of the Office of Securit Giving Rise to Questions
[85]ee Rise to Questions
[86]1. Taping Systems in Certain CIA Offices
[88]In the offices of the DCI, the Deputy DCI, the Executive Director-~
[89]Controller, the Deputy Director for Support (now Administration),
[90]the Director of Security, and the Deputy Director of Security, a
[91]system of telephone taps and microphones has existed. This
[92]system has made it possible to record covertly any telephone con-
[93]versation or office conference taking place in those offices. All CIA
[94]officials in whose offices such equipment was installed were fully
[95]es aware of its presence md its Capability of being activated on
[96]Portions of the system have been disconnected in recent yea
[98]2. Covert Uses of Listening Devices by the Office of Security
[100]In each instance the installation of listening devices was ‘expressly
[101]approved by the Director of Central Intelligence:
[103]mission by
[105]rs.
[107]a. A conversation which occurred in a motel between Siren Mer eing
[108]and Admiral Rufus Taylor, former Deputy Director of Central tn-
[109]telligence, was covertly recorded. This was a meeting arranged
[111]vy Admiral Taylor for the purpose of attempting to persuade Mr.
[113]et otis | ot to divulge sensitive information in a book which he
[114]was then writing;
[116]b. Interviews with defectors have been covertly recorded from time
[117]to time;
[119]c. With the approval of Attorney General Katzenbach, a telephone tap
[120]was placed on the telephone of a CIA employee who was alleged to
[121]bea spy of a foreign country;
[123]; CIA we TOP SECRET (XGDS 5B(2) Eo 11652
[124]@ DECL ARNO OBJECTIoY TO
[126]JECLAS, By Authority of:
[129]AS Sanitizeg "'S DOCUMENT
[131]F AUG 94.
[132]HW 50955 Sor lBboaact Page 2
[134]ly by them.
[136]: so a
[138]Sale cia dd ves PCL TRS
[140]var
[144]PRR TES NETL BOONE LIST MT ORD ERSTE PAT OMAN POET SOT ITF LO IE G/T PS OE PT
[147].
[149]TOP SECRET ~2-
[150]ae ' d. BPolygraphs of job applicants and some contractors have been
[151]routinely covertly recorded;
[153]i
[157]By
[158]8
[161]y
[163]e. The field offices of the CIA have from time to time installed covert
[165]recording devices to record conversations of CIA employees with
[166]others where there was some reason to be concerned about the
[167]loyalty of such employees.
[169]3. Physical Surveillance
[171]Physical surveillance of individuals in this country has been very rare
[172]as far as the Office of Security is concerned. Circumstances under
[173]which surveillance has been conducted have been limited to the following:
[175]a. CIA employees and contract agents believed to be divulging classi-
[176]fied information to unauthorized persons;
[178]° Tease ert o find out if he was getting informmatim from current
[179]employees of the CIA;
[181]Sp RENT POT CFR. PE EI
[183]c. “Jack Anderson, Les Whitten and another jegma t9 o determine their
[184]Eten a staff writer
[186]GA
[188]d. <A female contact of the Latin American Division (and some of her
[189]associates) who reported to the CIA the existence of a plot to
[190]assassinate the Vice President and to kidnap the Director of Central
[191]Intelligence. :
[193]4. Watergate Contacts Doe
[195]a. The McCord Letters
[197]b. The Pennington Matter
[199]c. Assistance to E. Howard Hunt and White House re Ellsberg
[200]5. Covert Informers Employed by the Agency
[201]a. Within the Agency and Its Contractors
[203]The Office of Security employs a wide range of confidential in-
[204]formers from among the general roster of employees of the Agency.
[205]Included here are plumbers, chauffeurs, guards, telephone main-
[206]tenance men, electricians, members of the char force, etc. These
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[213]employees are paid additional compensation to act as infomers
[214]and to report to the Office of Security on any potential security
[216]problems which they observe among their fellow employees at
[217]the Agency.
[219]ONAL TRAC TENT AT OO IBN
[221]A few outside employees, i.e., non-employees of the Agency, are
[222]also retained for the same purpose. This would inchide employees
[223]of the telephone company and construction workers engaged in the
[224]construction of Agency buildings. In all instances, however, the
[225]purpose is to maintain security among CIA ermployees and those
[226]working for CIA contractors.
[228]satigatiions 6 of daa is
[230]ee pee
[232]b. Outside the Agency
[234]In 1967 and 1968 the Office of Security arranged for Anderson Security
[235]Associates to have its employees attend meetings and other functions
[236]of various organizations thought to represent potential threats to CIA
[238]. personnel or installations and to report on such threats. A list of
[240]@ organizations to be checked for indications of such threats was pro-
[241]vided to Anderson Security Associates, which in turn provided regular
[242]reports to the Office of Security on the activities of the organization
[243]monitored.
[245]There was also coordination between the Office of Security and local
[246]police departments to cover the same activity. An effort was made
[248]to determine the size of anticipated demonstrations and to anticipate
[249]what security forces would be necessary to cope with them.
[251]In 1967 and 1968 the Office of Security directed the field offices to
[252]solicit or report information on anti-war and dissident elements.
[254]The CIA was concerned about the safety of its personnel, such as
[255]recruiters nn college campuses, and its offices around the country.
[256]The field offices were directed at about that time to establish a
[257]clipping service on campus and other newspapers to report on organi-
[258]zations and individuals who might represent threats to CIA personnel
[259]or offices.
[261]i
[262]yt
[263]3
[264]j
[265]|
[267]|
[268]E
[270]2
[272]As a result of the information fed inte the Office of Security relating
[273]to organizations and individuals who may represent such threats, a
[274]substantial number of files were accumulated on individuals and or-
[276]e ganizations.
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[284]6. Mail Intercept Programs in New York and San Francisco
[285]Mail Intercept Prog a en eee eee
[287]7. Cover Operations Using Local Police Cover
[288]Arrangements were made several years ago with Coles D 25
[289]the Fairfax County, Va., Police Department for the issuance 0
[290]badges and other police identification for use by CIA security personnel.
[291]This involved about 15 sets of identification.
[293]These badges and othez,identification were never used by the CIA. They
[295]Similar arrangemests have been made with other police departments.
[296]Strict orders were issued that the use of identification as local police
[297]officers was to be limited strictly to situations involving actual cover
[299]eS for surveillance purposes.
[301]8. Training of State and Local Police and Other Assistance
[303]Assistance was rendered to many local police departments, including
[304]those of the cities of New York and Chicago, and to the Maryland and
[305]Virginia state police during the period 1965 to1972. He states that this
[306]program was.vigorously and enthusiastically approved and supported
[307]by Mr. Helms.
[309]Assistance consisted of training of personnel, the loaning of equipment,
[310]and the declassification of materials and techniques in such areas as
[311]photo analysis, surveillance techniques, metals detection, explosives
[312]detection, locks and picks, hidden microphones, telephotography and
[313]covert photography, and the setting up, handling, and organization of — -
[314]intelligence operations.
[316]This program was terminated upon passage of an amendment to the Law
[317]Enforcement Assistance Act, which prohibited assistance to local and
[318]state police departments by the CIA.
[320]9. Break-Ins Without Warrants
[322]& Mr. Osborn states that the only break-ins which have occurred to his
[323]knowledge by security personnel of the CIA have been those involving
[324]employees, former employees, or CIA contact agents who were under
[325]investigation for suspected disclosure or classified information.
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[332]10. Counter-Audio Sweeps
[334]At the request of other departments and agencies, including Congres-
[336]sional Committees, the Office of Security conducts "counter-audio
[338]sweeps" of their offices to protect against telephone taps, hidden
[339]microphones, and other intercepts of audible communications.
[341]R56 te PLE ALR | TS TT ET ET ET MET TTT BTN TAT ERLE OT ERIE SO TIRING PETE EE PAE Te
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[347]TOP SECRET (XCDS)
[348]COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES
[350]2 7 . Washington, DC 20500
[352]Nelson A. Rockefeller, David W. Belin,
[353]Chairman
[355]Jonna T, Connor wary
[357]C. Dougias Dillon Pebr . 13, 1975
[359]Erwin N. Griswold
[361]Lane Kirkiand
[363]Lyman L. Lemnitzer
[365]Ronald Reagan
[367]Edgar F. Shannon, Jr.
[369]Executive Director
[371]MEMORANDUM FOR THE PILE
[372]FROM: ROBERT OLSEN
[374]SUBJECT: Summary of an Interview of Howard Osborn, conducted on February 10
[375]and 11 in the offices of the Canmission by Mr. Robert B. Olsen
[377]Present throughout the interview, which was conducted from 2:00 pm to approxi-
[378]mately 5:30 pm on February 10 and from 12 noon until 2:45 pm and from 4:45 pm
[379]to approximately 8:00 pm.on February ll, was the attorney for Mr. Osborn,
[381]Jack Debelius.
[383]Mr. Osborn ageared voluntarily at the request of the Commission staff. At the
[384]@ outset, Mr. Debelius raised a series of questions:
[386]1. He asked us to supply an outline of the authority of the Commission. He
[387]was handed a copy of the Executive Order creating the Conmission and spelling
[388]out its duties and powers.
[390]2. He asked whether the Commission had subpoena powers,and he was advised that
[391]it did not.
[393]3. He asked whether the Commission had power to grant immmity to witnesses, and
[394]he was advised that the Commission does not have such power.
[396]4. He asked what liaison has been established, or will be established between the ~
[397]Commission and the various Senate and House Committees which will be investi-
[398]gating the CIA and other intelligence activities. He was told that the Com-
[399]mission expects to establish such liaison, but that none of the ground rules
[400]or arrangements have yet been agreed upon.
[402]5. He asked whether Mr. Osborn would have an opportunity to review the transcrint
[403]of any recorded testimony that he may give to the Commission or to the Com
[404]mission staff. He was told that the Commission staff had agreed uoon a policy
[405]of allowing any witness to examine the transcript of his own testimony.
[407]6. He asked whether Mr. Olsen had been cleared for security and whether Mr.
[408]Osborn was free to reveal all levels of classified information in the course
[409]& of the interview. He was advised that such a clearance had been obtained for
[410]Mr. Olsen and that Mr. Osborn was free to answer fully any questions put to
[411]him within the scope of the responsibilities of the Commission.
[413]GOP SECRET (xGDS-5B(2) EO 11652
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[420]Mr. Debelius stated that he had carefully reviewed his own situaticn as a
[421]former employee of the Office of Security within the CIA and that he had
[422]concluded that there was no prospect that he would be called as a witness
[423]either by the Commission or by any Congressional or other conmittes. Hence,
[424]he did not feel that there would be any conflict in his representation of
[425]Mr. Osborn under the canons of ethics applicable to the legal profession.
[427]Background of Mr. Osborn
[429]Howard Osborn graduated from the Virginia Polvtechnic Institute in 1940 and
[430]shortly thereafter entered the military service. After World War II he was
[431]briefly with Firestone Tire and Rubber Company, and then joimd the Central
[432]Intelligence Agency in late 1947. He served in various assigwments within
[433]the United States and Furove prior to September 1963, including assignment
[434]as Assistant to the Inspector General and positions within the Directorate
[435]of Plans. In September 1963 he was named Deputy Director of Security. At
[436]that time the Director of Securitv was Rob Bannerman. On July 1, 1964, he
[437]was named Director of Security, and he continued in that position until earlv
[438]March 1974 when he applied for disability retirement and went on sick leave.
[439]He was retired on disability on December 31, 1974, having not returmed to
[440]work since going on sick leave .on March 8, 1974. He states that he had no
[441]involvement whatever with Agencv activities after March 8, 1974.
[443]Activities of the Office of Security
[445]The Office of Security provides guards and security personnel to protect the
[446]phvsical facilities of the Agency. It has resoonsibility for overall security
[447]measures for all CIA installations, both in the United States and in foreign
[448]countries.
[450]Counter: Audio Sweeps
[452]At the request of other departments and agencies of the United States Government
[453]it conducts “counter-audio sweeps" of their offices to protect against telephone
[454]taps, hidden microphones, and other irtercepts of audible communications.
[456]In the case of Congressional committees and subcommittees, it conducts such
[457]sweeps of hearings rooms on the occasion of classified presentations bv CIA
[458]personnel. Mr. Osborn further stated that there may have been other occasions
[459]wnen such sweeps were made of Congressional committee rooms, at the committee
[460]request, where classified presentations were to be made. Mr. Osborn does not,
[461]however, specifically recall such other occasions.
[463]. . woe unter.
[464]It also seems to Mr. Osborn that the Office of Security has made similar faudio
[465]sweeps for one or more individual congressmen or senators of their offices in
[466]the Senate or House Office Buildings, but he again has no specific recollection.
[467]The Office of Security also makes such sweeps of the homes of officials of the
[468]CIA with their knowledge.
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[475]ee He knows of no case in which the CIA has made a sweep of any other residences.
[477]It does make sweeps of private firms who have CIA contracts, but always with
[478]the knowledge and consent of the firm.
[480]He states that his Office has never used equioment for counter-audio sweeps for
[481]“positive intelligence."
[483]the sweeps conducted included physical inspection, checking all telephones for taps,
[484]checking desks, walls, ceilings and floors for listening devices or radio
[485]receivers, and may involve such sophisticated measures as counter-laser measures
[486]and the use of a Dodge mobile home equipped with sophisticated equirment capable
[488]of picking up a radio transmission from-nearby premises.
[490]eran tear J WLP ETEE Oe OR ERR ORR CERI
[492]Taping Systems in Certain CIA Offices
[494]Mr. Osborn stated that Mr. Helms had authorized for use in his office,
[496]in the office of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, in the office of
[497]the Executive Director-Controller, in the office of the Deputy Director for
[498]Support (now Administration), in the office of the Director of Security, and
[500]in the office of the Deputy Director of Security a system of telephone taps and
[501]secret microphones which made it possible to record covertly any telephone con-
[502]versation or office conference taking place in those offices. The taping system
[503]could be activated with respect to telephones by depressing a button on the tele-
[504]phone in the office or on the telephone at the desk of the secretary in the
[505]adjacent office. The taping system to record office conversations would be acti-
[506]vated by depressing a buttan under the carpet in the vicinity of the desk of the
[507]person occupying that office. All CIA officials in whose offices such equiprent
[508]was installed were fully aware of its presence and its capability of being acti-
[509]vated only by them.
[511]The recorded conversations from all of these offices, except those in the Office
[512]of Security, were recorded in a central ban of recorders located in the base-
[513]ment of the building. Those emanating from the Office of the Director of Security
[514]or Deputy Director of Security were recorded on tvin recorders located down the
[515]hall from those offices.
[517]All recorded telephone and office conversations were transcribed. In some in-
[518]stances the tapes were retained, and in some instances they were erased. It is
[519]not known whether the Agency retains any copies of the typed transcripts. From
[520]time to time, particularly as an official has departed from the CIA, he has
[521]o.dered tapes erased and transcripts destroved.
[523]Mr. Osbom reports that Mr. Colby directed the removal of the recording and tele-
[524]phone taping equipment from his office when he becam Executive Director-
[525]Controller of the Agency and again when he became Director of Central Intelligence.
[526]Mr. Bannerman also had the equipment taken out of his office when he became Deputy
[527]Director for Support (Administration). Apparently all other officials in whose
[528]offices such equipment was installed used it from time to time.
[530]Positive Uses of Counter-Audio Equipment
[532]Mr. Osborn stated that he wishes to clarify his previous testimony that counter-
[533]audio had not been used in a positive sense. What he meant was that it had not
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[540]been used in the positive sense under any of the circumstances referred to
[541]above. There were, however, several situations in which telephone tapes and
[542]covert recording devices were employed by the Office of Security:
[544]l. A conversation which occurred in a motel between suiret nae cee and
[545]Admiral Rufus Taylor, former Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, was
[546]covertly recorded. This was a meeting arranged by Admiral Taylor for the
[547]Purnose of attempting to persuade@ i @ineineraeeniiinot to divulge sensitive
[548]information in a book which he was WILtLng;
[550]2. Intervievs with defectors have been covertly recorded from time to time;
[552]3. With the approval of Attorney General. Katzenbach, a telephone tap was placed
[553]on the telephone of a CIA emplovee who was alleged to be a spy of a foreign
[554]country; .
[556]4. Polygraphs of job applicants and some contractors have been routinely
[557]covertly recorded;
[559]5. The field offices of the CIA have from time to time installed covert
[560]recording devices to record cx«wersations of CIA employees with others
[561]where there was same reason to be concermed about the loyalty of such
[562]employees. In each instance the installation of such listening devices
[563]was expressly approved by the Director of Central Intelligence. Mr. Osborn
[564]recalls only three such instances: ;
[566]a. In 1972-73 such a device was installed in an effort to uncover details
[567]where an old defector was being forced to make kickbacks of his compensa-
[568]tion fram CIA to his CIA case officer;
[570]b. At a date which could not be recalled by Mr. Osborn a device had been
[571]installed to record activity of a female employee of the CIA who had
[572]become closely and intimately associated with persons believed to be
[573]dissidents;
[575]c. In about 1968 or 1969 at the request of Mr. Frank Bartamo of the Depart-
[576]ment of Defense the CIA planted listening devices at the apartment of a
[577]serviceman doing highly sensitive cryptographic work. This was done wit!
[578]the full knowledge of Mr. William Sullivan of the FBI. Mr. Osborm specie
[579]lates that the CIA was called upon to accomplish this task for the De-
[580]partment of Defense because Mr. Sullivan believed that J. Edgar Hoover,
[581]Director of the FBI, would not approve.
[583]Mr. Osborn states that there may have been other instances where such listening
[584]devices were installed within the United States, but he does not recall any
[585]others. He is emphatic to the effect that after President Johnson issued an
[586]Executive Order prohibiting telephone taps without the authority of the Attorney
[587]General, the CIA never to his knowledge covertly tapped a telephone within the
[588]United States except in the one incidence authorized hy Attorney General
[589]aKatzenbach.
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[595]ROPE LET SE AE RAID SIS
[597]i
[599]|
[601]|
[602]r
[603]d
[606]TOP SECRET ~5-+
[608]Physical Surveillance
[610]Mr. Osborn states that physical surveillance of individuals in this country
[611]has been very rare as far as the Office of Security is concerned. He doubts
[612]that it has exceeded ten times during his tenure in the Office of Security.
[614]He describes those circumstances under which surveillance has been conducted
[615]as being limited to the following:
[617]OE LEP BTR p sre eet Poe ces TAFT
[619]1. CIA employees and contract agents believed to be divulging classified.
[620]information to unauthorized persons; :
[622]Vélotor Da ela fii to find out if he was getting information from current
[623]employses of the CIA; ,
[625]3. Jack Anderson, Les Whitten and anoth
[626]of classified information,and fehl
[627]{ iechingten Post, for the sam@ purpose?
[628]4. A female agent of the Latin American Division who reported to the CIA the
[629]existence of a plot to assassinate the Vice President and to kidnap the b
[630]Director of Central Intelligence. This surveillance was conducted under the
[631]supervision of Mr. Ober, of the Directorate of Operations, with the full
[633]knowledge of the FBI.
[635]g
[636]i
[637]Also included in this surveillance was some of the contacts of this agent |
[638]in Detroit, Miami, and New York City. The agent involved here was Thelma 5
[639]King, and the surveillance took place in 1971. (Mr. Osborm reports that
[641]a conversation between Miss King and her case officer in a New York hotel
[643]was also covertly recorded.)
[645]Mr. Osborn is emphatic to the fact that every instance of phvsical surveillance
[647]in his experience was authorized by the Director of Cen‘iral Intelligence except
[648]that Mr. Brownman, the Deputy Director for Administration, may have been the
[649]official to authorize the surveillance of employees, but it is possible that
[651]these also were approved by Mr. Colby as PCI. Mr. Osborn is also emphatic to the
[652]effect that no member of Congress has ever been placed under physical surveillance,
[653]has ever had his telephone tapped, has ever been covertly monitored with respect
[654]to any conversations or commmications, or has ever had a security check performed
[655]on him by the CIA.
[657]Watergate Contacts
[659]1. The McCord Letters: Mr. Osborn states that a letter directed to Mr. Ilelrs
[660]in late June 1972 was referred to his office as a part of the “crank mail"
[661]received that day. He recognized the signature on the letter as being that
[662]of a former employee of the Office of Security, Mr. James McCord. Mr. McCord
[663]had shortlv before that been arrested in connection with the breakin at the
[664]Democratic National Headquarters on June 16, 1972. Mr. Osborn states that he
[665]immediately brought this letter to the attention of Richard Helms, the DCI.
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[674]McCord Letters (continued) ; |
[676]Mr. Helms directed that the lettér should be retained in the file, but that
[677]nothing further should be done about it and that he would take care of it.
[678]Thereafter a series of letters vere received from Mc. McCord by Paul Gaynor,
[679]then the Chief of Security Research Staff within the Office of Security.
[680]These letters were received by Mr. Gaynor at his home. Each letter was _
[681]promptly brought to the attention of Mr. Helms. The thrust of these letters
[682]was that the Cammittee to Re-elect the President and high officials within
[683]the Nixon Administration were planning to blame the CIA for the Watergate
[684]break-in. Mr. Helms directed that these letters not be referred to the
[685]Justice Department and that. he would take care of them. Mr. Osborn recalls
[686]being present when the matter was discussed with the General Counsel of the
[688]CIA, Mr. Houston, who advised that the CIA was not obligated to reveal these
[689]letters to the Justice Department.
[691]SYS BATONS ABEL CTRL FEES
[696]At a much later date, Mr. Osborn gave full testimony with respect to these
[697]McCord letters and the actions regarding them to the Nedzi Subconmittee of
[698]House Appropriations Committee and to the counterpart Senate Subcommittee.
[700]The Pennington Matter: For many vears a man named Lee Pennington, a former
[701]FBI agent, has been retained by the CIA as a confidential informant. His
[702]compensation from the CIA has been $250 per month. Mr. Osborn stated that he
[703]has no idea what kind of information has ever been supplied to the Agency by
[704]Mr. Pennington in exchange for the compensation paid him. ae
[706]In August 1972 Mr. Osborn was on vacation during the time his deputy, Emnal
[707]Geiss, was in charge of the Office of Security. (The Office of Security had
[708]been designated by the DCI as the liaison with all other governmental agencies
[709]and departments relating to Watergate matters.)
[711]While Mr. Osborm was on vacation anFBI agent named Arnold Parham contacted
[712]the Office of Security and requested information on a man simply named
[713]"Pennington". The request was directed to Steve Kuhn of the Office of
[714]Security. Mr. Kuhn's Aeputy, Hollis Whitaker, took the request of agent
[715]Parham to Ermal Geiss and asked whether the FBI should be given the names
[717]of both Penningtons or just one of them. Mr. Geiss instructed Whitaker that
[718]Parham should be supplied only with the name of Cecil Pennington, a retired
[719]employee of the CIA, who was not related in any wav to Lee Pennington. Geiss
[720]instructed Whitaker that Lee Pennington's name should not be given to Parham.
[722]Mr. Geiss would have known that James McCord while he was employed in the
[723]Office of Security had acted as the case officer for Lee Pennington, that
[724]McCord was involved with the Watergate break-in, and that the FBI was really
[725]interested in Lee Pennington. .
[727]Mr. Osborn states that all of the above information came to this attention in
[728]February 1974 and that he had no knowledge of it until that tire.
[730]TOP SBCRET
[732]HW 50955 Docld:32203846 Page 12°
[735]HW 50955
[737]Pennington Matter (continued)
[739]Lee Pennington and a man named Charles Wylie were the only two omfidential
[740]informants who Osborn can think of who were emploveed as such by the Office
[741]of Security during his tenure with that office. (This is in addition to
[742]CIA emplovees and the employees of propriety investigating companies who
[743]have been used as informants.) Mr. Wylie was a journalist and writer who
[744]was paid $10,000 per year, plus certain travel expenses, by the CIA to
[746]act as an informant, but Mr. Osborn has no idea what kind of information
[747]he provided to the Agency in recent years. He does recall that many
[748]years ago Wylie provided information regarding the Vienna, Austria, Youth
[749]Festival and also some information gathered on the trip he made to Japan.
[750]Mr. Osborn states that he has never met Lee Pennington or Charles Wylie,
[751]nor has he ever talked with either of them in person or by telephone.
[753](Mr. Pennington was apparently terminated as a CIA informant on December 31,
[754]1973.) Mr. Osborn states that he "started action" to terminate Wylie in
[755]about January or February 1974. He thought that Wlie had never provided
[756]anything to the Office of Security and that it was "no time to have a domestic
[757]informant."
[759]Both Pennington ane Wylie had been informants for the Office of Security for
[760]many years. wey had been retained in that capacity even before Mr. Oshorm
[761]became Deputy Director of Security in 1963.
[763]In February 1974 in connection with a search of files in the Office of Security
[764]some indication was turned up that Mr. Osborn had been informed in January 1973
[765]about the fact that Lee Pennington had entered the home and the office of
[766]James McCord at the request of Mrs. McCord on January 22, 1972, to locate and
[767]destroy records which would have revealed a “link" between Mr. McCord and the
[768]CIA. Mr. Osborn denies that he received any such information. The informa-
[769]tion was allegedly given to him by Paul Gaynor, Chief of Security Research, in
[770]the Office of Security.
[772]Mr. Gaynor retired in 1973 at the request of Mr. Osborn, who had been directed
[773]to cut a GS-16 from his staff in a personnel reduction move. He states that
[774]Mr. Gaynor accepted this request gracefully and retired.
[776]Osborn and Gaynor have never discussed with each other the subject of Lee
[777]Pennington or the deception practiced on the FBI in August 1972. Osbom does
[778]not think that Gavnor opened up the subject, but he does believe that Gaynor
[779]has testified before either one of’ the Congressional committees investigating
[780]Watergate or the Special Prosecutor's Office.
[782]After Mr. Gaynor retired, Lou Vasaly of the Office of Security has handled
[783]contacts with Wylie and Pennington.
[785]In January or February 1974 Mr. Osborn sent Sidney Steinbridge of the Office
[786]of Security to New York to terminate Mr. Wylie.
[788]Lee Pennington died in the fall oi 1974 of natural causes. He was in his
[789]middle 70's.
[791]TOP SDCRET_
[793]Docld: 32203946 Page 13
[795]Pee ART RE
[799]CNP FAGAN ATES SPE ET te be DEE ©
[802]TOP SECRET ~g-
[804]Watergate Contacts (contineud)
[806]3. Assistance to E. Howard Hunt re Ellsberg Breax-In
[808]Mr. Osborn states that the Office of Securitv had no involvement whatever
[809]with the assistance rendered by the CIA to Mr. Hunt in connection with
[810]the break-in of the offices of Ellsberg's psychiatrist and that he had
[811]no knowledge of that matter prior to the break-in. He is now acquainted
[812]with the White House request made to General Cushman for assistance to
[813]Mr.Hunt in 1971. He is also now familiar with the fact that the CIA
[814]vrovided to Mr. Hunt disguise equipment, false identification pavers,
[816]and a camera , in response to the White House request. He also now knows
[817]that Mr. Hunt arranged for the development of the photographs which he
[818]had apparently taken on the occasion of the break-in at the office of
[820]Mr. Ellsberg's psychiatrist.
[822]i
[824]In 1971 Mr. Osborn received a request from Mr. Young at the White House
[825]for the psychological profile on Daniel Ellsberg. He says that Mr. Young
[826]stated that the White House had been very pleased with the profile which
[827]had been developed by the CIA on Fidel Castro and would like the same
[828]kind of profile on Ellsherg.
[830]Osborn stated that he responded to Young that the CIA personnel had a
[831]areat deal of biographical material on Ellsberg. Young assured Osbom
[832]that the White House would provide material on Ellsberg. Osborn re-
[833]sponded that such a request would have to be approved by the DCT,
[835]Mr. Helms.
[837]PETE RL BOY OVAL IMR ALY LT
[839]Osborn then took the matter to Mr. Helms, who approved the project and
[840]told him to provide the remuested assistance to Young.
[842]Young thereafter sent materials from tire to time to Osborn relating to
[843]Ellsberg. It was Osborm's impression that these materials were very
[844]fragamentary and would not be sufficient to provide a meaningful psycho-
[845]logical profile . Nometheless, the request and the materials were
[846]turned over to the doctors at CIA and a draft of a profile was ultimately
[847]worked up. Mr. Young did not appear to be very well vleased with the
[848]draft.
[850]Mr. Osborn surmises that the break-in at the offices of Dr. Fielding
[852](Elisbera's psychiatrist) was accomplished for the purpose of gathering
[853]more information with which to develop a better psvchological profile.
[855]TOP SECRET __
[857]HY 50955 Docld:32203046 Page 14
[859]Top SIC ~9o-
[863]Covert Informers Employed by the Agency
[865]The Office of Security employs a wide range of confidential informers from
[866]among the general roster of employees of the Agency. Included here are
[867]plumbers, chauffeurs, guards, telephone maintenance men, electricians, merbers
[868]of the char force, etc. These employees are paid additional compensation to
[869]act as informers and to report to the Office of Security on any rf ‘tential
[870]security problems which they observe among their fellow employees at the Agency.
[871]If an emplovee,. for example, has been convicted of a crime or is thought to be
[872]engaging in any contact which would make him susceptible to blackmail, that
[873]matter is supposed to be reported to the Office of Security. Likevise, if any
[874]employee is observed conducting himself in a suspicious manner, such as request-
[875]ing information from files which do not concern him, that is to be reported.
[877]A few outside emplovees, i.e., non- emplovees of the Agency, are also retained
[878]for the same purpose. This would include employees of the telephone company.
[879]In all instances, however, the purpose is to maintain security among the CIA
[880]emplovees and those working for the CIA.
[882]The only staff employees retained as informers are those who work in the records
[883]office of the Directorate of Operations. Several staff emplovees in that office
[884]were recruited at the reauest of Mr. Thomas Karamessines because of the extremely
[885]high level of sensitivity and the records maintained in that office.
[887]When the CIA Headquarters was constructed in the late 1950's, the Office of
[888]Security recruited various members of the construction work force to maintain
[889]security against the installation of listening devices, telephone taps, or other
[890]penetrations of the premises. PBS eb. CUespsosaa OF 3. im Gaae Saaurh ty :
[891]ettere, tie Ofdier GF Security ongan :
[893]p invest
[895]In 1967 and 1968 the Office of Security arranged for the Anderson Security
[896]Associates to have its employees attend meetings and other functions of various
[897]oraanizations thought to represent potential threats to CIA personnel or installa-
[898]tions and to report on such threats. A list of organizations to be checked for
[899]indications of such threats was provided to Anderson Security Associates, which
[900]in turn provided regular reports to the Office of Security on the activities of
[901]the organization monitored.
[903]Lone ths ‘persorn.d, of compe
[905]Se
[907]Anderson Security Associates was in reality nn by Mr. Ralph True, a CIA Heac-
[908]quarters case officer, who also ran a similar wholly-owned propriet ary company on
[909]the West Coast, General Personnel Investigations, Inc.
[911]The Anderson company has since folded.
[913]whatsoever Of Gither Kedar, Covenant Gr Gls interest, or Involvement: Jl
[915]tive of this categany « eines ‘ok Che Ws
[916]saconnaigemes planes. ipsiing, Conic tt
[918]HY 50955 Docld: 322703046 Page 15
[922]reat hk dil ith ccmia eS BPEL TE BOO! LITT Le PT RR
[924]TOP SOCKET ~10-
[926]Surveillance of Dissident Groups and Activity
[928]It has been mentioned above that Mr. Osborn informed us of the activity of the
[929]Anderson Security Associates in maintaining in the Washington, D.C. area a
[930]check on individuals and organizations who would represent potential threats
[931]to CIA personnel or organizations.
[933]There was also coordination between the Office of Security and local police
[934]departments to cover the same activity. An effort was made to determine the
[935]‘size of anticipated demonstrations and to anticipate what security forces
[936]would be necessary to cope with them.
[938]In 1967 and 1968 the Office of Security directed the field offices to solicit
[939]or report information on anti-war and dissident elements. The CIA was concerned
[940]about the safetv of its personnel, such as recruiters on college campuses and
[941]its offices around the country. Its recruiting office in Ann Arbor, Michigan,
[942]had been bombed at about that time. Mr. Osborn also believes that the field
[943]offices were directed at about that time to establish a clipping service on
[944]campuses and other newspapers to report on organizations and individuals who
[945]might represent threats to CIA personnel or offices.
[947]As a result of the information fed into the Office of Security relating to
[948]organizations and individuals who may represent such threats, a substantial
[949]number of files were accumulated on individuals and organizations.
[951]Mail Intercepts
[953]Me. Osborn reports that a mail intercept progrem in New York City began in about
[954]1952 and ended in 1973. He learned of this program when he became Director of-
[956]the Soviet-Russian Division in the Operations Directorate. He states that the
[957]program involved the identification of parties within the United States sending 2nd
[958]receiving mail with persons in the Soviet bloc countries and the identificaticn cf the |
[959]persons in the Soviet bloc sending and receiving such mail. Selected items of :
[960]mail were also opened and photographed, and then resealed ard forwarded. Mr.Osborm
[961]states that he cannot recall any specific use made by the CIA of the information so
[962]obtained. The primary purpose of the program as he understood it was to provide
[963]information to the FBI. He recalls several conferences regarding the program.
[965]It was his position that the three personnel from the Office of Security who
[966]worked on the program were not performing any useful service for the Office of
[967]Security, that it was a drain on the budget of his office, and that the CIA had
[968]no business tampering with the mail in the first place. Mr. Colby, when he was
[969]Executive Director-Controller of the Agency supported Mr. Osborn's position on the
[970]Matter, It was opposed by Mr. Angleton of the Directorate of Operations, who
[971]argued primarily that the information derived from the project was vitally neces-
[972]sary to the FBI. Mr. Helms electad to have the program continue. It was finally
[973]terminated bv Mr. Colby during the time that Mr. Schlesinger was DCI in 1973.
[975]Top SECRET
[977]HW 50955 Docld:32203046 Page 16
[979]TOP SECREY - ile
[981]7
[983]E
[984]g
[986]lr. Osborn also thought that continuation of the program was too risky in the
[987]light of public and Congressional attitude toward the CIA. He thinks that the
[988]program originated while Allen Dulles was DCI and that it was undertaken with
[989]the knowledge and consent of the Postmaster General. However, this is hearsay,
[990]according to Mr. Osborn.
[992]Mr. Osborn is also acquainted with the fact that from 1969 to 1971 the project
[993]Of mail surveillance occurred from time to time in San Francisco. The Office
[994]of Security ade the arrangements with the Post Office Department for this
[995]brogram, but it was carried out by the Far East Division and the Technical
[996]Services of the Directorate of Operations. The Technical Services Division
[998]at that time was headed by Rod M. Kenner, who is now retired and living in
[999]Florida.
[1001]_ The arrangements with the Po.t Office Department were made by Jack Turton of
[1002]the Office of Security. Mr. Osborn has only the vaguest knowledge of the pur
[1003]Pose of this project and could offer no further light than that it involved
[1004]some checking on the stamping and postmarking of mail from the Peoples Republic
[1005]Of China. The project was orally okayed by Mr. Helms. Mr. Osborn has no knowl-
[1006]edge of any other mail undercover projects in New Orleans or elsewhere.
[1008]Cover Cperations Using Local Police Cover
[1010]‘ir. Osborn stated that arrangements were made several ye. rs ago withiemmen nim th
[1011]of the Fairfax County, Virginia, Police Department for the issuance of badges ard
[1012]other police identification for use by CIA security personnel. It is Mr. Oskorn's
[1013]recollection that this involved about 15 sets of identification.
[1015]aaa hide
[1017]security personnel in conducting a physical surveillance of (/@eae Echiaptl./
[1018]seems that Lgwevememelived in a residential community and his*home was™
[1019]a cul-de-sac. is
[1021]made it extremely difficult to cruise by his hare or station a
[1022]security car anywhere near his home without attracting the attention of other
[1023]residents in the neighborhood. Security personnel who may have been sitting ina
[1024]car within several blocks of the [URIRIS@eietresidence would have attracted the curio-
[1025]sity of the residents and the operatfGn wotild be threatened if such residents
[1026]approached the car and asked what the occupants were doing there and if they vere
[1027]given straight-forward answers. According to Mr. Osborn, it was highly desirable
[1028]that the security personnel be able to respond to such inquiries by saying that
[1029]they were police performing official duties. Most citizens, he savs, would accept
[1030]that as sufficient, whereas their curiosity would be even further aroused if the
[1031]sccurlty personnel identified themselves as being with the CTA,
[1033]-. Osborn states that he had issued strict orders that the use of identification
[1034]local police officers was to be limited strictly to situations involving actual
[1035]ver for surveillance purposes.
[1037]TOP SECRET
[1039]HW 50955 Docld: 32203346 Page i7
[1041]TOP SECRET , ~12-
[1043]te. Osborn seems to recall that the Office of Security had similar arrangements
[1044]with the Washington, D. C. Metropolitan Police Department, and he thinks that
[1045]there were instances in which such cover was actually used, but he does not
[1046]recall specific cases. He also states that it is possible that CIA field offices
[1047]would have used similar cover of local police departments, but he has no knowledge
[1048]of such instances.
[1050]“ATURE PEE 70 ROAR
[1052]Wire Taps
[1054]Me. Osborn states that he has no acquaintance with the wire tans made of the
[1055]office and hove phones of two syndicated columists in Washington in 1962 and
[1056]1963, which wire taps are revealed in the file as having been authorized bv
[1057]Attorney General Robert Kennedy. (The file reveals continuation of activity
[1058]with respect to the surveillance of these columists into the period of when
[1059]Mr. Osborn was in the Office of Security as its Deputy Director. The file does
[1061]not, however, show any indication of actual avareness on the part of Mr. Osborn
[1062]that telephone tapping was involved. On the contrary, there are indications
[1063]in the file that these telephone taps were discontinued immediately prior to
[1064]Mr. Bannerman becoming the Director of Security in 1963, at which time Mr.Osborm
[1065]also became the Deputy Director of Security.)
[1067]Taining of State and Local Police and Other Assistance
[1069]Mr. Osboim states that assistance was rendered to many local police departments,
[1070]including those of the cities of New yOrk and Chicago, and to the Marvland and
[1071]Virginia state police during the period 1965 to 1972. He states that this
[1072]program was vigorously and enthusiastically approved and supported by Mr. Helms.
[1074]Pssistance consisted of training of personnel, the loaning of equipment, and tha
[1075]declassification of materials and techniques in such areas as photo analysis,
[1076]surveillance techniqu:s, metals detection, exmnlosives detection, locks and picks,
[1077]hidden microphones, telephotography and covert photography, and the setting up,
[1078]handling, and organization of intelligence operaticns.
[1080]this program was terminated upon passage of an amendment to the Law Enforcement
[1081]Assistance Act, which prohibited assistance to local and state police departments
[1082]by the CIA. ;
[1084]Mr. Osborn feels verv strongly that the program of cooperating with and assisting
[1085]police departments in improving their capability to fight crime was proper and
[1086]that its termination is a serious disservice to the American people. Referring
[1087]to the prohibition on CIA "police and law enforcement functions" in the National
[1088]Security Act of 1947, Mr. Osborn is of the coinion that the CIA in sharing its
[1089]information and technical developments with state and local police departments
[1090]was not exercising any police or law enforcement function.
[1092]TOP SECRET
[1094]HW 50955 Docld: 32203846 Page 16
[1096]TOP SECRET -13-
[1098]The Huston Plan
[1100]Mc. Osborn states emphatically that the Office of Security had no knowledge
[1101]whatever in developing or assisting in the so-called "Huston Plan," relating
[1102]to domestic security operations. He states that he had never heard of it until
[1103]it hit the papers at the time of the Watergate investigation. All relation-
[1104]ships with the Inter-Agency Domestic Intelligunce unit was handled for the CIA
[1105]by Mr. Helms and Mr. Ober.
[1107]BET OS Fe RAST ATH aE BE HRD SRE
[1109]Ella Milas eA Bie cae
[1111]The Nosenko Affair
[1113]Nosenko was a KGB agent who defected to the United States in Switzerland in the
[1114]early 1960's. His interrogation was handled under the supervision of the SR
[1115]Division of the Directorate of Operations, especially by David Murphy and Peter
[1116]Bagli-y of the SR Division.
[1118]Mr. Osborn states that he repeatedly protested the treatment of Nosenko. After
[1119]more than two years of solitaixry confinement in a special facility for which the
[1120]Office of Security provided all security measures, Mr. Bruce Solie of the Security
[1121]Office finally arranged for the release of Nesenko and gradually increased his
[1122]privileges and freedan.
[1124]Me. Osborn states that Nosenko has proved to be the most valuable defector in
[1125]the entire history of the CIA. He has been responsible for identifying nine
[1126]Soviet agents, including a major in the Pentagon.
[1128]Surveillance of Justice Douglas
[1130]7
[1131]i
[1133]|
[1135]Me. Osborn has no knowledge of the alleged surveillance of Justice Douglas
[1136](referred to in an article in The Washington Post on February 3, 1975, page D-11).
[1138]Contact with The White House
[1140]Mr. Oshorn states that he was not involved and has no information regarding anv
[1141]request from the White House for files relating to the coup in which Premier Dien
[1142]was overthrown in Vietnam, or regarding the Bay of Pics operation in Cuba. The
[1143]CIA versonnel who would have been involved in such matters were Willian Nelson,
[1144]Deputy Director of Orerations, on the Bay of Pigs matter; and George Carver, then
[1145]Svoecial Assistant to the DCI for Vietnam affairs, with respect to the Diem coup.
[1147]The only other contact of any nature. with the White Howe recalled by Mr. Osborn
[1148]was one which he seems to remember occurring in about 1963 when the Office of
[1149]Security was congulted by the Secret Service with respect to counter-audio measures
[1150]to protect against buaging and wire taps i: the White House. He thinks this
[1151]occurred during the Presidency of Lyndon Johnson.
[1153]Unauthorized Break-Ins
[1155]tr. Osbor states that the onlv break-ins which have occured to his knowledge
[1156]ay sccuritv personnel of the CIA have been those involving employees, former
[1157]employees, or CIA contact agents who were uncer investigation for suspected
[1158]disclosure of classifica information. (Details are in the files provided to the
[1159]Conmission,)
[1161]TOP _SECTET_
[1163]HW 50955 DoclId: 32203346 Page 19
[1165]TOP SFCRST ~14-
[1167]General
[1169]e
[1170]ON RK BOT RS fe CORTESE
[1172]e
[1173]k
[1174]a
[1176]Mr. Osborn states categorically that the Office of Security has never to his
[1177]knowledge: .
[1179]=- conducted any audio surveillance, telephone taps, physical surveillance
[1180]or personal investigation of any member of Congress or public official;
[1182]-- maintained any file for political or other inproper purpose of anv such
[1183]congressmen or public official;
[1185]|
[1187]i
[1189]i
[1190]~~ pulled any file for examination for purpose of checking up on anv such 3
[1192]membex of Conress or public official. ‘
[1194]Mr. Osborn states that he does not recall any instance during his career with
[1195]the CIA to which any particular activity of the Agency was examined in the
[1196]specific light of Section 403 of the National Security Act of 1947; i.e., he
[1197]Gora not recall any assessment of a proposed or ongoing activity from the
[1198]si dpoint of whether it was improper as a “police®, “law enforcement”, or
[1199]“internal security" function.
[1201]Iroression
[1203]Mc. Osborn impresses the interviewer as being honest, intelligent, and dedicated
[1204]to the interests of the United States and its people. His memory appeared to be
[1205]in error in some details, but considering the wide range of the interview and
[1206]the time period involved, coupled with the wide breadth on responsibilities and
[1207]the number of personnel under his .supervision in the Office of Security, this
[1208]is to be expected.
[1210]There is one area in which the interviewer was doubtful concerning the complete
[1211]candor of Mr. Osborn. That was the area of his knowledge conceming the
[1212]Pennington matter.
[1214]TOP SECRET
[1216]HY 50955 Docld:32203046 Page 20
[1218]Led SW SAITS
[1219](Le -
[1221]STATEMENT
[1223]Mr. Vice-President, Governor Reagan, distinguished
[1225]members of this Commission. I am here willingly at your
[1227]|
[1230]invitetion; I shall answer all of your questions fully and
[1231]eandidly.
[1233]My federal service has extended over a 32 year period, 27
[1234]of these years were spent with the Central Intelligence Agency.
[1235]I am proud of my service with the C.I.f., and I am proud of the
[1236]thousands of dedicated men and women with whom I worked in the
[1237]C.I.A. I retired from the C.I.A. on December 31, 1974, after
[1238]having been on sick leave from March 8, 1974, until the date
[1239]of my retirement. My last ten years of active service with the
[1240]C.I.A. were spent as the Director of Security. I was responsible
[1242]to the Director C.I.A. and to other senior C.I.A. officials for
[1244]personnel security and for the security and protection of classified
[1245]information, data and installations, both in the United States and
[1246]abroad. During my tenure as Director of Security, I served
[1247]successively under Mr. John A. McCone, Admiral William Raborn,
[1248]Mr. Richard Helms, Mr. James R. Schlesinger and Mr. William F.
[1249]Colby.
[1251]I am aware of allegations given recent prominence by the
[1252]news media that C.I.A. conducted improper activities in the
[1253]United States. Since my departure from active status in March,
[1254]1974, I have had no access to Agency files or records with which
[1255]to verify or refute such charges. I can assure the members of
[1257]this Commission my full cooperation but it is possible that my
[1259]recollection of dates and details may be imprecise or unclear
[1261]without access to particular files and records of the C.I.A. To
[1263]ath r
[1265]HW 50955 DociId: 32203046 Page 21
[1267]the best of my knowledge and belief, all.of the actions and
[1268]eetivities in which ~ participated, or which I rected are
[1269]recorded and documented in C.1T.A. files.
[1271]At all times, while serving as Director of Security I oS
[1273]acted with the knowledge and approval and at the instruction
[1275]of the Director of C.I.A., and in many, if not most instances,
[1276]with the knowledge and approval of other senior Agency offic sais”
[1277]in the chain of command. I should like to emphasize that Secu wity
[1278]in the Agency is a service and support function and its activisies
[1279]are not self-generated. Among other services, the Office of
[1280]Security provided guidance and assistance to employees with
[1281]personal problems; it provided support to other Agency component =
[1282]upon authorized request and performed tasks and special inquiri.:
[1283]assigned to it by the Director of C.I.A. The Director of Cras
[1284]was empowered and directed by the National Security Act of 1gt7
[1285]to "protect intelligence sources and methods" By virtue of and
[1287]extension of that authority, those actions and activities within
[1289]my purview were designed to prevent potential penetration of che
[1290]Agency by hostile intelligence services, afford protection to”
[1291]the Agency's domestic installations and to determine the sources
[1292]of unauthorized disclosure of classified and sensitive intelligenss" ==
[1293]information to public media.
[1294]While I am not now privy to precise statistical data,
[1295]I believe the United States Government Agencies involved in
[1296]intelligence activities can document the fact that the number”
[1297]of hostile foreign intelligence representatives in our countr.
[1298]has increased significantly in the last ten years. One of |
[1300]their prime targets is the United States Intelligence Communit by.
[1302]HY 50955 Docld:32203046 Page 22
[1306]huy investigation and review of C.1.A., or any othe element
[1308]of thet community should be made within that context.
[1310]"BE ORT RA EZ 9a PNR
[1312]After many years of service in the security field, I
[1314]can fully understand the extreme sense of frustration among
[1315]the United States Government officials regarding unauthorized
[1317]disclosure of classified information. It is devastating to
[1319]read the contents of a highly classified document disseminated
[1321]in the intelligence community and then a day or two later, to
[1323]RET SELEY” Bs sag
[1325]read the same information ad literatum in the press. I believe
[1326]most firmly in freedom of the press, but I believe also that
[1327]there should be a sense of responsibility accompanying such
[1328]freedom; that sense of responsibility seems often tobe buried
[1329]or absent in the publication of classified information which
[1331]could endanger our national security.
[1333]I welcome the opportunity to appear before this Commission
[1334]and to assist it in acquiring facts relevant to its investigation.
[1335]In the course of developing such facts, I am hopeful the Commission
[1336]will look at the possible consequences of the Agency's failure to
[1337]act even if the Commission should find fault with individual
[1338]conclusions or judgments made by Agency officials.
[1340]I shall endeavor to answer all of your questions and I
[1341]shall put aside my citizen's schield against self-incrimination.
[1342]That decision is based on my desire to assist the Commission to
[1343]the full extent of my ability and for the equally cogent reason
[1344]that I do not believe that any action I performed was unlawful
[1346]or in derogation of my duties to the United States Government.
[1348]a f a : .
[1349]. Len ee ‘ tC SS Iona. ce:
[1350]“ “ HOWARD J. OSBORN
[1352]HY 50955 Docld: 32203846 Page 23
[1354]-4.
[1356]5.
[1358]TOP SECRET -2-
[1360]d. Polygraphs of job applicants and some contractors have been
[1361]routinely covertly recorded;
[1363]e. The field offices of the CIA have from time to time installed covert
[1364]recording devices to record conversations of CIA employees with
[1365]others where there was some reason to be concerned about the
[1366]loyalty of such employees.
[1368]. Phys ical Surveillance
[1370]Physical surveillance of individuals in this country has been very rare
[1371]as far as the Office of Security is concerned. Circumstances under
[1373]-which surveillance has been conducted have been limited to the following:
[1375]a. ClA employees and contract agents believed to be divulging classi-
[1376]fied information to unauthorized persons;
[1378]b. Mictorghs [ameHetti¥ to find out if he was getting informatim from current
[1379]employees of the CIA;
[1381]c.  faePanderson= PS Hitter! and another legman to determine their
[1383]Rene eS Po “
[1384]sources of classified information, and Michwel@ettner,, a staff writer
[1386]for the Washington Post, for the same purpose;
[1388]d. A female contact of the Latin American Division (and some of her
[1389]associates) who reported to the CLA the existence of a plot to
[1390]assassinate the Vice President and to kidnap the Director of Central
[1391]Intelligence. ,
[1393]Watergate Contacts eee
[1395]ae The McCord Letters
[1397]b. The Pennington Matter , -
[1399]<. Assistance to E. Howard Hunt and White House re Ellsberg
[1401]Covert Informers Employed by the Agency
[1403]a. Within the Agency and Its Contractors
[1405]The Office of Security employs a wide range of confidential in-
[1406]formers from among the general roster of employees of the Agency.
[1407]Included here are plumbers, chauffeurs, guards, telephone main-
[1408]tenance mzn, electricians, members of the char force, etc. These
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[1414],
[1416]A
[1419]x
[1421]B
[1422]5
[1425]‘TOP SECRET -~ 5 =
[1427]Physical Surveillance
[1429]Mr. Osborn states that physical surveillance of individuals in this country
[1430]has been very rare as far as the Office of Security is concerned. He doubts
[1431]that it has exceeded ten times during his tenure in the Office of Security.
[1433]He describes those circumstances under which surveillance has been conducted
[1434]as being limited to the following:
[1436]1. CIA employees and contract agents believed to be divulging classified
[1437]information to unauthorized persons;
[1439]2 AiropoueMaeenSee to find out if he was getting information from current
[1440]employees of the CIA; ,
[1442]Pies.hitten and another legman to determine their sources
[1443]of classifietimformation,and Miiehael=Gestier, a staff writer for the
[1445]Washington Post, for the same purpose;
[1447]Eee ee
[1448]3. Jacks Ander sony
[1450]4. A female agent of the Latin American Division who reported to the CIA the
[1451]existence of a plot to assassinate the Vice President and to kidnap the
[1452]Director of Central Intelligence. This surveillance was conducted under the
[1453]supervision of Mx. Ober, of the Directorate of Operations, with the full
[1454]knowledge of the FBI.
[1456]Also included in this surveillance wads some of the contacts of this agent
[1457]in Detroit, Miami, and New York City. The agent involved here was Thelma
[1458]King, and the surveillance took place in 1971. (Mr. Osborn reports that
[1459]a conversation between Miss King and her case officer in a New York hotel
[1460]was also covertly recorded.) ,
[1462]Mr. Osborn is emphatic to the fact that every instance of phvsical surveillance
[1464]in his experience was authorized by the Director of Cen‘xal Intelligence except
[1465]that Mr. Brownman, the Deputy Director for Administration, may have been the
[1466]official to authorize the surveillance of employees, but it is possible that
[1468]these also were approved by Mr. Colby as DCI. Mr. Osborn is also emphatic to the
[1469]effect that no member of Congress has ever been placed under physical surveillance,
[1470]has ever had his telephone tapped, has ever been covertly monitored with respect
[1471]to any conversations or commumications, or has ever had a security check performed
[1472]on him by the CIA.
[1474]Watergate Contacts
[1476]1. The McCord Letters: Mr. Osborn states that a letter directed to Mr. Helms
[1477]in late June 1972 was referred to his office as a part of the "crank mail"
[1478]received that day. He recognized the signature on the letter as being that
[1479]of a former employee of the Office of Security, Mr. James McCord. Mr. McCord
[1480]had shortlv before that been arrested in connection with the breakin at the
[1481]Democratic National Headquarters on June 16, 1972. Mr. Osborn states that he
[1482]immediately brought this letter to the attention of Richard Helms, the DCI.
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[1488]LES TE OP OE Sv" PRLS BLE INTEGERS CITES
[1491]McCord Letters (continued)
[1493]Mr. Helms directed that the letter should be retained in the file, but that
[1494]nothing further should be done about it and that he would take care of it.
[1495]Thereafter a series of letters were received from Mc. McCord by Paul Gaynor,
[1496]then the Chief of Security Research Staff within the Office of Security.
[1497]These letters were received by Mr. Gaynor at his home. Each letter was
[1498]Promptly brought to the attention of Mr, Helms. The thrust of these letters
[1499]was that the Cammittee to Re-elect the President and high officials within
[1500]the Nixon Administration were planning to blame the CIA for the Watergate
[1501]break-in. Mr. Helms dirécted that these letters not be referred t® the
[1502]Justice Department and that he would take care of them. Mr. Osborn recalls
[1503]being present when the matter was discussed with the General Counsel of the
[1505]CIA, Mr. Houston, who advised that the CIA was not obligated to reveal these
[1506]letters to the Justice Department.
[1508]8 STOR SENET MOE OO EES
[1510]Sy
[1512]i.
[1514]At a mich later date, Mr. Osborn gave full testimony with respect to these
[1515]McCord letters and the actions regarding them to the Nedzi Subcommittee of
[1516]House Appropriations Committee and to the counterpart Senate Sudcommittee.
[1518]2. The Pennington Matter: For many vears a man named Lee Pennington, a former
[1519]FBI agent, has been retained by the CIA as a confidential informant. His
[1520]compensation from the CLA has been $250 per month. Mr. Osborn stated that he
[1521]has no idea what kind of information has ever been supplied to the Agency by
[1522]Mr. Pennington in exchange for the compensation paid him.
[1524]In August 1972 Mr. Osborn was on vacation during the time his deputy, aoe:
[1525]GEES was in charge of the Office of Security. (The Office of Security had
[1526]been designated by the DCI as the liaison with all other governmental agencies
[1527]-and departments’ relating to Watergate matters.)
[1529]While Mr. Osborm was on vacation anFBI agent named Armold Parham contacted
[1531]the Office of Security and requested information on a man simply named
[1532]"Pennington". The request was directed to Steve Kuhn of the Office of
[1533]Security. Mr. Kuhn's eputy, Hollis Whitaker, took the request of agent
[1534]Parham to ExangilgGeiiss and asked whether the FBI should be given the names
[1536]of both Penningtons or just one of them. «MEHEGéifes7instructed Whitaker that
[1537]Parham should be supplied only with the name of Cecil Pennington, a retired
[1538]employee of the CIA, who was not related in any wav to Lee Pennington. <GSieery
[1539]instructed Whitaker that Lee Pennington's name should not be given to Parham.
[1541]‘RIGSHSswould have known that James McCord while he was employed in the
[1542]Office of Security had acted as the case officer for Lee Pennington, that
[1543]McCord was involved with the Watergate break-in, and that the FBI was really
[1544]interested in Lee Pennington.
[1546]Mr. Osborn states that all of the above information came to his attention in
[1547]February 1974 and that he had no knowledge of it until that time.
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