[1]12A8e84
[2]104-10336-10034
[3]re ry
[5][2c 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF vn |
[7]1
[8]SN!
[12]17 September 1998
[14]MEMORANDUM FOR: Ms. Laura Denk
[15]Executive Director, ARRB
[17]FROM: J. Barry Harrelson
[18]JFK Project Officer, HRP/OIM
[20]SUBJECT: CIA-IR-35, Source Identified in RIF Number
[21]104-10151-1-206
[23]1. The following is in response to subject request.
[25]2. Searches were made for information responsive to
[26]subject request and materials were provided for examination
[27]by the ARRB staff. From that examination, staff members
[28]selected a number of documents. Those documents have now
[29]been included within the Lee Harvey Oswald 201 file to be
[30]processed and released to NARA.
[32]3. This concludes the Agency’s action on this request.
[33]If you have any questions, please advise.
[35]J. Barry Ha son
[39]13-00000_,
[41]MEMORANDUM
[43]September 12, 1998
[45]To: Laura Denk
[46]Executive Director
[47]ce: Bob Skwirot
[48]CIA Team Leader
[50]From: Michelle Combs Mirtle Zh
[52]Associate Director for Research and Review
[54]| Subject: CIA-IR-35 Source Identified in RIF 104-10151-10206
[56]In CIA Informal Request for Additional Records and Information CIA-IR-35, the
[57]Review Board requested additional information on a source identified-in RIF number
[58]104-10151-10206 as having given the CIA additional information on Lee and Marina
[59]Oswald and their time in the Soviet Union. At the request of the Review Board, the CIA
[60]searched its compartmented files and databases for additional information on this
[61]source and the raw intelligence information given by this source to the CIA. CIA
[62]provided the source’s 201 file which was examined by the Review Board staff. No
[63]assassination records were designated from this 201 file. CIA also provided sections of
[64]briefing reports, an audiotape, and portions of transcripts of conversations between the
[65]source and interviewers on Lee Harvey Oswald. A final memorandum from this source
[66]was also found to be located in the post-1978 volume of Oswald’s 201 file. All of these
[67]materials were designated as assassination records and will be included in the JFK
[68]Collection at the National Archives.
[70]Given the recentness of the information and the sensitivity of the source, the Review
[71]Board agreed to protect the source’s true name and cryptonym. Documents from this
[72]source are identified as the product of “a yalued American intelligence source who was
[73]a senior, but not general rank, official in the intelligence service (KGB) of the former
[74]USSR; specifically, he served in the Second Chief Directorate which was responsible for
[75]internal counter-intelligence efforts.”
[77]e:\combs \cia-ir35.wpd
[78]File 4.20.1 and 4.20.4
[80]13-00000
[82]SECRET
[84]OIM-98-0084
[85]06 August 1998
[87]MEMORANDUM FOR: (U) Executive Director
[88]Assassination Records Review Board
[90]FROM: (U) Lee S. Strickland
[91]Chief, Information Review Group
[92]Central Intelligence Agency
[94]SUBJECT: (S) Protection of [IUDECANTER /Cryptonym
[96]1. (S) The CIA Deputy Executive Director has asked that I
[97]respond to the Assassination Records Review Board (“ARRB” or
[98]“Board”) regarding their current deliberations as to postponement
[99]of certain very limited information in one document To
[100]specifically, the actual cryptonym of a CIA source (jIJDECANTER) .
[101]It is our considered judgment that the release of this’ cryptonym,
[102]in the particular context of the given document (SX-59777 of
[103]15 December 1991), and juxtaposed with the Los Angeles Times
[104]article of 29 December 1997, would provide an identifiable
[105]benefit to the Russian counterintelligence effort and concomitant
[106]damage to US intelligence interests.
[108]2. (S) Mindful, however, of the Board’s statutory purpose
[109]and objectives, this memorandum also proposes a substitution of a
[110]fictitious cryptonym (e.g., “TRUSTED”) for the actual cryptonym
[111]: ITJDECANTER in this or any other document where it appears and
[112]“would otherwise be releasable.
[114]3. (U) As a preliminary matter, I would respectfully ask
[115]the Board and staff to note the classified nature of this
[116]memorandum, to limit access to those individuals properly
[117]cleared, and to return it to Agency representatives at the
[118]conclusion of your deliberations.
[120]4. (S) As the Board is aware, the relevant document has
[121]been released almost in its entirety. The released version
[122]reports that a Soviet official (Boris ZHURAVLEV) had provided
[124]CL BY:,0619849 C/IRG/OIM
[125]~- CL Reason: 1.5(c)
[127]Dec! On: X1
[129]Drv From: HUM 4-82
[131]SECRET
[133]13-00000
[135]oo BL (CG) The practice of counterintelligence
[137]SECRET .
[139]SUBJECT: (S) Protection of (IJDECANTER }Cryptonym
[141]information to the effect that OSWALD was a KGB source. It
[142]continues by stating that CIA did not believe ZHURAVLEV to be a
[143]credible source. It continues by stating that this CIA
[144]assessment is supported by reporting from another source
[145](Gidentity redacted but, in fact, LJDECANTER). It concludes by
[146]“Stating that this source’ (LIDECANTERY has had his
[147]fully established [by CIA]." It is this final fact which is
[148]critical to our request. By having released this substantive
[149]information --_ "bona fides established" -- and by otherwise
[150]having (IJDECANTER/ known to the public in true name and crypt, we
[151]must protect the cryptonym here so that the key intelligence
[153]judgment of CIA is not _compromised. oe .
[155]&"(Giy -— and
[157]hence the issue of damage to national security -- proceeds from
[158]four basic questions:
[160]e what information was compromised?
[162]e what foreign intelligence service(s) received the
[164]information?
[166]what understanding of the information did the
[167]service(s) have?
[169]what information did the intelligence service(s)
[170]believe and thus act on to its benefit and to the
[172]detriment of the United States?
[174]6. (C)
[175]be acquired through a combination of confessions,
[177]interviews, and/or assumptions based on access.
[179]and four, however,
[180]for both the acquiring intelligence service and the target
[182]intelligence service.
[184]polygraph
[186]7. (S) With further respect to question three, if a
[188]foreign government fully understands the substance (i.e., the
[190]they will be able to exploit the information fully and
[192]import), y
[193]A perfect
[195]the damage will be far beyond the ostensible value.
[196]example of this is the Boyce/Lee espionage case.
[197]compromised was a seemingly innocuous operational | manual for « a
[199]wo _ - oe 7
[201]SECRET
[203]The informatio
[205]"... bona fides:
[207]The first two questions are largely factual and can
[209]Questions three
[210]are the most difficult and the most important
[212]oy)
[214]aS
[216]13-00000
[218]SECRET .
[220]SUBJECT: (S) Protection of (TIDECANTER/Cryptonym
[222]ca it —— _
[224]a Tm -
[226]satellite. What the Soviets were able to deduce was devastating
[227]to American intelligence. The Soviets, based on other
[228]information they had acquired through signals intelligence,
[229]concluded that an imaging satellite they had believed to be non-
[230]operational was in fact operational and actively imaging their
[231]territory. Since the Soviets had believed it was non-
[232]operational, they had taken no countermeasures (i.e.,
[233]concealment) and the US had acquired a treasure trove of
[234]intelligence. Immediately upon learning the true status, they
[235]took extensive countermeasures and invaluable intelligence was
[236]directly and immediately lost.
[238]8. (S) With further respect to question four, we have the
[239]quintessential factor for exploitation. If the foreign service
[240]believes its asset, they act on the information to the detriment
[241]of the United States; if they do not, the United States may
[242]escape damage fully or to some degree. This is the critical
[243]question that a foreign country must answer and it is the
[245]critical information that we must protect vis-a-vis defectors in
[246]our fold.
[248]9. (S) In the matter at hand, we are very constrained by
[249]what the Russian government knows by virtue of their own
[250]knowledge and what they have acquired from the substantially
[251]released document and the Los Angeles Times article. The
[252]Russians. know that Sergei PAPUSHIN (i.e., IJDECANTER) defected to
[253]the United States; they know or suspect what he told the US; they
[254]know or suspect that we fully understood the import of what he
[255]said; they do not know, however, whether we believed him and thus
[256]incorporated his information into our operational practices and
[257]activities. And it would be critically damaging today to confirm
[258]to the Russians the final piece of the PAPUSHIN puzzle and allow
[260]them to have the ultimate benefit from what heretofore has been a
[261]US intelligence success.
[263]10. (C) Indeed, as a reference point for this discussion,
[264]we can look briefly to the NOSENKO story. Here, also, the
[265]Russians knew the first three parts of the puzzle. What they did
[266]not know was whether we had accepted his story or not. Indeed,
[267]the CIA did not know the answer for a long period of time and
[268]this lack of knowledge was crippling to our FI effort against the
[270]Soviet Union and our entire CI program for a substantial period
[271]of time.
[273]3
[275]SECRET
[280]13-00000
[282]SUBJECT:
[284]11.
[286]The CIA to date has released all of the substantive information
[288]relating t
[289]protect hi
[291]SECRET
[293](S$) Protection of 'IJDECANTER/Cryptonym
[295](S) In sum, question 4 -- bona fides -- is the CI key. A
[297]o IJDECANTER in this particular document. But we must \,
[298]s cryptonym here, in this particular document, if we 7
[300]are to preclude a substantial CI benefit to the Russian Federal i|
[301]Security Service when they assess this new information in light
[303]of their previous knowledge and acquired information, includin
[304](of course, information « on the public. record _via the media.
[306]12. ~(S) While the foregoing showing of intelligence damage
[308]is the most critical and legally compelling issue, there are
[309]three additional points of relevance vis-a-vis harm:
[311]J
[313]e First, is foreign relations. In our judgment, the ; a
[315]Russians are fully expect that, after Aldrich Ames, the a
[316][ United States is considering avenues of reprisal. This Ly
[317]j specific release might well be viewed as a public move a
[319]Nn to embarrass them and it would serve only to exacerbate.
[320]\\~ tensions. . | a
[324]e Second, is another potential intelligence benefit to
[326]the Russian service. (This specific release could ~- oN
[328]arguably provide ‘them with insights “into our capabality — ~
[329][tS assess the bona fides of defectors. The Russian |
[331]service knows if IJDECANTER was real; the CIA does not 4
[333]| know this. for certain:-~-~~"~
[335]\ cere en ESET FL PSS mee a
[337]e And third, there is an equitable issue. i The CIA has. 7 .\
[340]fo never officially confirmed that PAPUSHIN was a’ deféctor
[342]/, in-our custody~and under our’ control; “thé CIA has \\
[344]'f pledged to protect the relationship; but we agree that
[346]| it is publicly known at least to some degree. However,
[348]| because his wife, child and father remain in Russia
[350]; today, we would urge the Board to be cautious and j
[351]| consider postponement also for this reason. Quite j
[352]i candidly, I can not predict with any certainty. whether..-7/
[353]i the. Russian.government. today would take” action against »
[354]~ _the family from this proposed release. ; But I would
[356]urge caution here since the information at issue is
[357]minimal, not critical to the public understanding, and
[358]arguably harmful to living persons.
[360]SECRET
[362]13-00000
[364]SECRET
[365]SUBJECT: (S$) Protection of {TIDECANTER /Cryptonym
[366]13. (U) I would be pleased to appear before the Board in
[368]person to respond to any particular questions and am hopeful that
[369]this important information can be postponed from public release.
[371]SOS
[373]Lee Strickland
[375]5
[377]SECRET
[379]13-00000
[381]. . . Office of
[382]e . . LO}; a Ft
[383]i V1:
[384]"oman a Manage™
[386]SECRET
[388]CIA TALKING POINTS
[390]re Protection of [ “IJDECANTER” Cryptonym
[391]Before the Assassination Récords Review Board (ARRB)
[393]26 Avucust 1998
[395]e The ADDO -- Jim Pavitt -- has asked that I address the Board
[396]on an issue of extreme importance to the Directorate of
[397]Operations and the CIA.
[399]e We request the postponement of certain very limited.
[400]information -in one document ~~ specifically, the actual
[401]cryptonym of a CIA source (jIJUDECANTER) .
[403]e It is our considered judgment that the release of this
[404]cryptonym, in the particular context of the given
[405]document (SX-59777 of 15 December 1991), and juxtaposed
[406]with the Los Angeles Times article of 29 December 1997,
[407]would:
[409]e provide an identifiable benefit to the Russian counter-
[410]intelligence effort,
[412]e result in concomitant damage to US counter- intelligence
[413]interests, and,
[415]*« have a chilling impact on cooperation of current and
[416]prospective intelligence sources given this disclosure which
[417]could be viewed as an official betrayal of confidence.
[419]e Mindful, however, of the Board’s statutory purpose and
[420]objectives, we propose however:
[422]e a substitution of a fictitious cryptonym (e.g.,
[423]“TRUSTED”) for the actual cryptonym |IJDECANTER in this or
[424]any other document where it appears and would otherwise
[425]be releasable, and/or,
[427]CL BY:'0619849 C/IRG/OIM._!
[428]~ CL Reason: 1.5(c)
[430]. Decl On: X17
[432]Drv From: HUM 4-82
[434]SECRET
[436]13-00000
[438]Re Puen TOS
[439]Bac ADU Morera) Oniiy
[440]SECRET Do Rot Rorratiuce
[442]if desired, a textual explanation of the cryptonym in the
[443]nature of a factual description of the source (e.g., “a av Ne
[444]valued American intelligence source who was a senior, but —
[445]not general rank, official in the intelligence service
[447](KGB) of the former USSR; specifically, he served in the
[449]Second Chief Directorate which was responsible for
[451]internal counter-intelligence efforts.”
[453]As the Board is aware, the relevant document has been released
[454]almost in its entirety.
[456]‘The released version reports that a Soviet official
[457](Boris ZHURAVLEV) had provided information to the effect
[458]that OSWALD was a KGB source.
[460]It continues by stating that CIA did not believe
[461]ZHURAVLEV to be a credible source.
[463]It continues by stating that this CIA assessmentis—_
[464]supported by | reporting from another source (identity /
[466]i redacted | but, “in fact, TJDECANTER)} .
[467]It concludes by stating that this source (fJ DECAN NFER} has
[468]had his "... bona fides ... fully established [by CIA].
[470]It is this final fact which is critical.
[472]By having released this substantive information -- "bona
[473]fides _ut+ established” -- AND by otherwise having
[474]IJDECANTER known to the public in true name and crypt,
[475]“THEN WE MUST PROTECT the cryptonym here so that the key
[476]intelligence judgment of CIA is not compromised.
[478]I would appreciate a few moments to explain, with I hope some
[479]degree of specificity, why identifiable damage would come from
[480]this disclosure -- the disclosure of the crypt in this
[482]‘ particular instance along with this key intelligence judgment.
[484]2
[486]SECRET
[488]13-00000
[490]. SECRET
[492]The practice of counterintelligence (CI) -- and hence the
[493]issue of damage to national security -- proceeds from four
[494]‘basic questions:
[496]e« what information was compromised?
[498]e what foreign intelligence service(s) received the
[499]information?
[501]e what understanding of the information did the receiving
[502]intelligence service(s) have? ‘
[504]e what information did the receiving intelligence
[505]service(s) believe and thus act on to its benefit and
[506]to the detriment of the other party?
[508]The first two questions are largely factual and can be
[509]acquired through a combination of confessions, polygraph
[510]interviews, and/or assumptions based on access.
[512]Questions three and four, however, are the most difficult and
[513]the most important for both the acquiring intelligence service
[514]and the target intelligence service.
[516]Tae _
[517]Re eegerere cer 7 SE i CREE SSDS 4h RE TT a eo aa a a
[518]a ena aR TAP CCAIR RAN La ore ies Miia a hat BESTE TA a Ae aa anita
[520]ea 2
[524]Question 3 is important (e.g., Boyce Lee case) but is not
[525]really an issue here since the US fully understood the
[526]information presented.
[528]Question 4, however, is the quintessential factor for
[529]exploitation.
[531]e
[533]° If the receiving intelligence service believes its asset
[534](e.g., a defector), they act on the information to the
[536]SECRET
[538]13-00000
[540]SECRET
[542]i . ae
[544]‘1
[545]1
[547]_ e If they do not, the other service may escape damage fully
[548]or to some degree. :
[550]ay
[552]This is the critical question that a foreign country must
[553]answer and it is the critical information that we must
[554]protect vis-a-vis defectors in our fold.
[558]fis Oo
[560]Seta
[562]Fi) ae
[564]In the matter at hand, we are very constrained by what the
[566]Russian government knows by virtue of their own knowledge and
[567]what they have acquired from the substantially released Hi
[568]document and the Los Angeles Times article. iy
[570]FOE Tay STE
[571]e
[573]ST lata EV
[575]: e The Russians know that Sergei PAPUSHIN (i.e., IJDECANTER)
[576]defected to the United States; . i
[577]* they know or suspect what he told the US; i
[578]e they know or suspect that we fully understood the import &
[579]of what he said; 4
[581]e they do not know, however, whether we believed him and °
[584]thus incorporated his information into our operational
[585]practices and activities.
[587]And it would be critically damaging today to confirm to 4
[588]the Russians the final piece of the PAPUSHIN puzzle and ,
[590]allow them to have the ultimate benefit from what oi
[591]heretofore has been a US intelligence success. ;
[593]e In sum, question 4 -- bona fides -- is the CI key.
[595]The CIA to date has released all of the substantive a
[596]information relating to IJDECANTER in this particular #
[598]document.
[600]e But we must protect his cryptonym here, in this H
[601]yoo particular document, if we are to preclude a substantial |
[602]CI benefit to the Russian Federal Security Service when
[603]they assess this new information in light of their
[605]previous knowledge and acquired information, including,
[607]a . ee - | ; oe | ’
[609]SECRET
[611]13-00000
[613]. SECRET
[617]4 of course, information on the public record via the J!
[618]media. a
[620]\ _
[622]i _-
[624]e There is additional damage that will accrue from not
[625]officially protecting the identity of | IJDECANTER;
[627]e Any unilateral violation of a clandestine trust has a
[628]devastating, compounding consequence for an intelligence .
[629]organization.
[631]=_ mo
[632]va - a
[634]a “ e It insidiously feeds the concern of other foreign assets
[636]a -- current and past -- who will logically fear that CIA
[637]will acknowledge their own clandestine relationship at
[638]some future point in time.
[640]e Their fear could be sufficient to force them to take
[641]\ self-protective measures (e.g., disengagement by current
[642], assets or public statements by inactive ones).
[644]e Additionally, such violations of a clandestine trust most
[645]assuredly impact upon the willingness of potential future
[646]assets to establish a clandestine relationship with CIA.
[647]Indeed, we know form experience that this complicates our
[648]ability to obtain critical intelligence, particularly
[650]. against the harder targets (e.g., terrorism).
[651]iN NK , . ee
[653]a SN co ee —
[655]oo
[657]® There are other damages that I will touch only briefly upon in
[659]the interests of the Board’s time. They are not
[660]insignificant, however.
[662]e ONE, .is foreign relations. | _
[664]few In our judgment, the Russians are fully expect that, after
[665]/ Aldrich Ames, the United States is considering avenues of
[666]‘f reprisal.
[668]\ e This specific release might well be viewed as a public move to
[669]embarrass them and it would serve only to exacerbate tensions.
[671]SECRET
[674]‘S,
[679]13-00000
[681]SECRET
[683]e TWO, is another potential intelligence benefit to the
[684]Russian service. ,
[685]i
[687]amy
[688]eS
[690]Semen cee OPT OTT Tae s PE. Fa RS
[692]The TT PY Spee Beg are Hy tat. leg Lee
[693]eg TP OEE See BU a arti ia oon
[695]This specific release could arguably provide them with insights
[696]into our capability to assess the bona fides of defectors.
[698]The Russian service knows if IJDECANTER was real; the CIA does
[699]Nees . wpot know this” for certain.
[701]. ao et ee
[702]ae aye 8 7
[706]° THIRD, is an equitable issue.
[707]a
[709]ow sg la gh ea RT
[710]a.
[712]The CIA ‘has never “officially confirmed that PAPUSHIN was a
[713]oe defector in our custody and under our control;
[715]be , The CIA has pledged to protect the relationship;
[717]ra e While we acknowledge that that it is publicly known at least to
[719]| some degree -- nevertheless his wife, child and father remain
[721]i in Russia today vulnerable to whatever official or unofficial
[723]« ion fhe current government mignee take. _ we
[724]a / Peg ae oa
[726]* Quite candidly, I can not predict with any certainty whether
[727]the Russian government today would take action against the
[728]family from this proposed release.
[730]But I would urge caution here since the information at issue is
[732]minimal, not critical to the public understanding, and arguably
[733]harmful to living persons.
[735]6
[737]SECRET
[739]13-00000
[741].
[743], SECRET
[745]g:\irg_frontoffice\general\lss\arrbijtp.doc
[746](last modified at 1500 hours, 25 august 1998)
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[750]SECRET