[1]176-10033-10145
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[28]: 2/14/2001 .
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[32]DATE OF LAST REVIEW
[34]| 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
[36]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[37]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[39]NARA
[41]Church Committee
[42]WH
[44]Schlessinger, Jr.
[45]Kennedy, John F
[46]CIA Reorganization
[48]15
[50]Paper, Textual
[51]Declassified
[53]SANIT ED Mu Ls dolaA Sir
[55]June 30, 1961
[57]MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
[59]SUBJECT: CIA Reorganization
[61]f aubmit the following viewa aa one whe worked in OSS during the
[62]war and served as 3 pertadic CIA consultant in the years eince.
[64]On balance, CIA's record has probably been very goad. In the
[65]nature of clandestine operations, the triumpha of an intelligence
[66]agency are unknown®; all the public hearg dbout (or ehould hear
[67]about) are ite crrora, But, again tn the nature of the cage, an
[68]agency dedicated to clandestine activity can afford damned few
[69]visible errorg. The important thing te recognize today, in my
[70]judgment, i¢ that the CIA, as at present named and constituted, has
[71]about used up ite quota. ite margin for future orror fe practically
[73]non-existent, One more CIA debacle will shake faith considerably
[75]in US policy, e¢ home aa well as abroad. And, until CIA ie vieibly
[76]reorganized, it will (ae in the Algerian instance} be widely hlamed for
[77]Gevelepmente of which i¢ ic wholly innocent.
[79]The argument of thie memorandum to that CIA's treuble can be traced
[80]to the autonomy with which the agency has been permitted to operate;
[81]and that thid autonomy fe due to three main causes: (1) dn inadequate
[82]Gactrine of clandestine operations; (2} an inadequate conception of
[83]the relationship between operations and policy; (3} an inadaquate
[85]«te ahould he «« a gros and repeated Cu failing hae been {its
[87]eccadional réadineda to euccumb to the temptations of favorable
[88]publicity. The Guatemalan and Iranian operationg were almost
[89]nullified by the Dood of self-congratulatory publicity wiitch followed
[90]them fe. g., the articles by Richsrd and Gladye Harkness, “The
[91]Mysterious Doings of CLA," Saturday Eve Poet, Oct. 30, NN, 6,
[92]1}, 1954). :
[94]SECRET
[96]SECRET
[98]conception of the vetationghip betwen operations and intelligence.
[100]The memorandwn digo suggests ways in which ¢ome of thuse prab-
[101]leme can perhape be allevisted.
[103]1 SIA Autonseny
[105]CIA conducts three main fostan of eeezet work: elesdsotineg fntelite
[106]genee collections cavert political operations; and
[108]pargmilitery
[109]- activities. i carvieg on thege functions with relative autonomy.
[110]‘The vegsone for the sufsnomy are histaricst.
[112]When CIA began, the State Department, atl thinking teo mach to
[113]tezrne of ite traditional migsions in foreign affeiza, iocked an this
[114]new ventore with cuppicion dad tenpunced the epportuaity to ecize
[115]establich any effective eyetem ef clearance far GEA activities: and
[117]come ambascadors frankly preferred not to know what CIA wae up to
[118]in their cousteiee. After 1953 the face that the Sceretary of Stato and
[119]the Divsctor of Content intelligence ware brothers farther cantirmed
[120]GiA's indepandence from eugervisten by State Department deske:
[122]in the meantime, GIA grow in otze and power, Busing the fies it
[123]pantensn ta the quality of
[125]a isege comber of able ani depen winded men, fF
[126]cated batillaat estiviate ta ite evath, tho mare eameatum iso operations
[127]developed, ‘and the greater rote it played tn tie intetation af policy.
[129]By the time that State had begun te he folly aware af the pecbierse
[130]crasted by an active and autvcomoss CIA, tt had tong since minced
[132]tia change to eatanlteh tke wom clttmate ¢ | While State roo
[133]tained @ peevitton aver covert politeat opeyations, thie wse
[134]ca come dagneolloe vy Ca teteney co pees ¢ prope coeraio
[135]é figocer Collection: ant aad ## bad Lot ground ta euch
[137]arene ae over plies porting ad even nto fasteanace of
[138]overt diplomatic 4c 2
[140]SECRET
[142]sees,
[144]SECRET
[146]For ites part, CIA had developed a whole series of functions paral-
[147]leling already existing functions of the State Department, and of ©
[149]the Defense Uepavtment eg well. Today it bas ite own political
[150]deeke and military staffa; it haa in effeet its own foreign services
[152]it has (or hae had) ite own combat forces; it even hae {te ows air
[153]force. its annual budget ie about times that of the State Depart-
[154]ment. The contemporary CIA possesses many ef the characteristics
[155]of a state within a sfate.
[157]I Doctrine
[159]Though GlA's autonomy developed for hiatarical reasons, it hae been
[161]able to endure becauge there ip no doctrine governing our donduct of
[162]clandestine operations, The prublem of doctrine fer CIA te the extent
[163]te which {te various clandestine missions are cormpatibie with a frce
[164]and open society.
[166]It is idle to argue that, boeauss the Communtste can do such-asd-cueh,
[167]we are free to de it tes, Communiom tc 4 creed nurtured in cone
[169]epiracys end -tho whole point of Communist social and potittes! organi- .
[171]sation is to make conspiracy effective, I ‘fighting fire with fire’ means
[172]contracting the freedome traditienally enjoyed by Americane in order
[173]ta give more freedom to CIA, so ene serioualy wiehes to do that. Yet
[174]i do not feel that we have tried rigorously to think through the Mmits
[175]which the maintenance of an open caciety places on secret activity,
[176]Until thie te dene, CIA's rote will not be clearly defined and under
[177]steed: The problem which must be faced ia; what enet of secret
[179]‘gdtivity is conatctent with the preservation ef a free social order? .
[181]We muet begin. i believe, FF ecg ae ee ae ee ct etnne end
[182]will continue to bs @ ndtica in which politiciane will. ack questions asd
[183]make speeches, reportese will dig out ctertes, newspapera will pub-
[184]Mah editertiale, individuals, dviven by pramptinge of canscience, will
[185]bluse out thinge harmful to the state, and seam, We do not eish to
[186]change these thingé and could net do co without violating the easence
[187]af our aocicty.. pinee tinge make 5p the tn eee edn ee
[188]rust operete,, In hort, they constitute the problem: aad, ae
[189]General Maeahall used to say, "Theve's ug point to fighting the
[193]SECRET
[196]SECRET
[200]Thare @ follows from this, i would think, the conclusion that secret
[201]p= B45 g aa the yr. Go ots care Eupt, the
[203]Each form of 6ecret activity presents ite wn problem, Clandestine
[204]inteliigance collection hge been a treditionnl functian of the agtional
[205]otete. He reulee and usages oro fairly well cotabiiehed. In the
[206]orest eapionage, if conducted with discretion. chouwld predext no
[207]Howevee, when conducted with an opse checkbook
[209]great problem.
[210]or4.a broad mandate, even opionage con begin 60 push agaiagt the
[212]ireite of sacest activity in.an open sestety, E concider later, for
[214]- @zamnple, the question of the Controlied Américdn Source {CAG} and
[216]whether the overdo verdoing of GAS te ret beginning to harm other activities
[218]- of the goverament, .
[220]Govert political operations prevent @ trickier probiem. Cccasicns
[221]avige when it fo neceseary to subsidice newopspere, politicians asd
[222]ovganiaations in other cuunteies;, But corruption of the political life
[223]of another netton fe not @ esepensibility te be lightly aasumed. 1%
[224]wonder whether CIA hae not-done tco much of its for the joy of it.
[225]Pazamilitary activicies ¢7eate an even more Gifficult problem, if
[226]oily becsuse the probleme of concealment are eg mach more difficult.
[228]is geneval, I would cuggsat that any cecret operetion whore encoess ta
[229]dependent on the cuppreagion of newa, on lying to Congeesamen and
[230]fournalicts and en the Gaception of the electorate chould be. undertaken
[231]anly when the eeicts te co considerable that the gulns seally ecem to —
[232]outweigh the dteadvanaaue This auggeste that the of tha pros
[233]may be of crucial importance, ‘Sprations oa
[234]' af ancompanying corruption.
[235]the vieibility of the onesation, the more (te euceess epente on
[236]thwartiag the tmpuiees and denying the values-of Gn open society,
[237]the sickier (¢ Becomes, and the more urgent ft ts tat om overwheteaing
[238]ease bo mode for ite neesealty,.
[240]In chort, when confronted with « proposed operation, we must aot only
[241]ask ehethor the operation te technically fenaitis is tte own terme; we
[242]must oak whether tte Gueceda requirns our open aociaty t be in say
[243]cartons way falee to Ke dun Principlogy
[245]SECRET
[247]SECRET’) —
[249]6
[251]Clandestine activities diould te assessed nat ently in the centoxt
[253]of their relationship & an cpen socisty but aldo in the context of their
[254]eelationship to United States foreign palicy.
[256]GIA operations have uot bedn held effeceively subordinate to U.6.
[257]forcign pelicy.
[259]sé collection is, by charter, free from
[261]State Department control. ‘This face expoess Américan foreign poltey
[263]to a woultitude of embarragsemente when CIA ts diecovercd recruiting
[264]agents or developing sources in a feiendly country. Tho receat
[265]Singapor
[267]e case, when CEA, without notice to the Congul General,
[268]tried to subvert e member af the Special Branch af the Singapere -
[269]Police provides en instructive example, After complications of
[270]ludicrous complexity, including an attempt te dubject the recruit to
[272]@ lie-detector test, it turncd out that the recruit had long since
[273]lnformed bio eupertore ef tho CLA approach and wos leading CLA
[274]into a trap which, when aprung, preduced considergbiec embarrass-
[275]mant ¢o relations horusen the Ue Gad the Singapore goverament. |
[276]Théve have been troubles ef a compsrabic sort ta Pakistan and ta
[277]Japan (where a group of Chinese Nationale were emuggied into Sascho
[278]to work in a CIA-NGSA operation. —__
[280]CIA hes eatd that, ia such cases, neither the Embassy nor the Departe
[281]ment ia Washington is agrmally informod of this type of.
[283]in chort, no ene knows haw many potential peehtems for US foreign ;
[284]policy -- and how much patcatias frictian with friendly states -- are
[285]boing created at thiq moment by CIA clandestine intelligence operations,
[286]Sugely there ia an aggumest for permitting State to decide whether the
[287]advantage to be gained by the operation ferg,, the information derivable
[288]from an agent within the Special Branch of the Gtegapore Police) eut~
[289]motghe the wish (eoge» exaaperating the local goverament and shaking
[290]ite confidence both in cur purposes and in our senac).. Clendestine
[291]intelligence cperations dhould plainly be cleared both with the Depart.
[292]ment of State and (anve fer exceptional inetances and on agreement of
[294]- the Secretary of State} with the lecal U.3,. Ambastador,
[296]SECRET . | é
[298]SECRET
[299]6.
[301]2. Covert political epesations technically require State
[302]mavence. In practice, however, CLA has often beon
[304]able to seize the initiative in ways which zeduce State's sate almoedt
[306]to that of a rubber atarep.
[307]This has been partly the censequance of the Superior drive and
[309].gctiviers of CIA perecune!, especially ee compared with the diffidence
[311]of State Bepartment personnel. Yor example, when men come te CIA
[312]with the assignment of developing cavart political campaigne or
[313]organising coupe or prepézing for paramilitary warfare, these mea
[314]naturally fall to work with ingenuity and real; thoy probably feel thet
[315]they ave not earning their pay unless, aay, they organize as many
[316]coups ss possibile. The concept of 'ceatingency planaing’ hse
[318]legitimatized the concrete preparation of operations sul presumably
[320]plenning, ' when carried ta the stage of recruitment end training of
[321]personnel, creates & vosted interest which often transforma contine
[323]project theough (lt £@ exguot) will invite the disappotatmcut and .
[324]alienation of the grdip} a6 the peaacure increases to fellew through
[325]on what had started a9 a pure speculation. This wae a contral facter,
[327]@§ eaurse, inthe Cuban decision «« the fact that distandment of the
[329]Guhan force in Guatemals just ecemed te create too many probleme and
[330]embarresgmente. Haeving entered inte reletiens with peveaaalities in
[331]Sorcign lanés, CA hae sometimes ecemed to feel thet we must there
[332]efter do pretty much what they want -« oy cleo thoy will blow accurity
[333]of oven go over te the Gommuniats. This appreach hag meds us on
[335]_ Seaaaien the prigancee of our cum agents, 3
[337]SWe becoma prisencre of our egente in anuther eause too. The Guban
[338]opieode leaves the atreng impresatien that CLA te nat ablo te control its
[339]own tow-level cperativee,, While the CIA people in Washington are man
[340]of exceptionally high quality. the men attencted te field jobs are same-~
[341]times tough eal aven victous peaplc motivated hy drives cftheirewa
[342]py tnt simies Aart grerenma tiie eenpien ts ay nner Dewey? dow a
[343]af the operatias.. Such actigne. as lecking op the Revolutionary Council,
[345]such enterprises 86 Gpevation 40 in Miams where GIA agente reportedly
[346]trained Cubans in methods of torture, such episodes os the detention and
[347]third degree reportedly édrministered te De, Rodolf Nodal Tarafa and
[348]46 other democratic Cubané thie Febvuary «- elf theae suggest that things
[349]go on under CIA spentorehip with which CIA in Washington te enky dimly
[352]SECRET
[354]SECRET
[356]ft has meant too that the State Department, oftea cpprtced of an
[357]operation only in ite tater etsges, is under great preesure fo
[359]endorse the operation 46 already mounted beesuse of the alfegad
[361]evi. consequences of exercising avete. i well ramember Tom
[362]Mann's remesk the dey the deciston wes mide to eo dhead on Cubat
[364]. “— would never have favoved initiating thie operations but, since it
[366]- has gone aé far ae it had, f do not think we can risk calling tt off, *
[367]Moreover, at 6 time when there ie Increaging premium on actividm,
[368]State, when it queations CYA operations or initiative, cents itech? in
[370]a priasy. eiasy, segative yoie. The advocate of clandestine activitios
[372]geome "tough! and realistic: the cppanent bao to fevoke guch thiangibivs
[373]eo the réputation of the United States, world public opinion, “What
[375]do wo cay in the United Nations?" etc., ami aecine hopelogely
[376]hicaliatic, legaltetic ond ‘galt. '
[378]the eenuls of GIA's laltiative in covert polfticsd operations hae been
[379]te create altuations which have foveed policy on the State Depavtment.
[380]Thig wag oot the original idea behing CIA. Ao Allon Dulles wrote
[381]. ia hia 1947 memorandum te the Geaate Armed esvicss Cormmitecy,
[382]“Phe Central intelligence Agency should have alfhing to.do with policy. °
[383]Yet, in the yeare since, CLA hae, in effect, ‘made’ golicy in many
[384]parte of the world. A number of governmente stil in power kage
[385]ane a eee eae eee co aos elec factinen waned ho
[386]@ state of mind colenigted to stimulate fetcndly feelings toward the
[387]United Gtatee.. Indenosis, of courag, te @ pene cmanpl ey.
[389]Fils experience ougjette thst the prevent ayotsmn by whlch CiA nasitee
[390]State of & projected covert cperatian te inadequate to protect US
[391]fagereste. There must be some means by whieh State can be tufermed
[392]_ af such operations st an catty enough stage to affect the
[393]ané preliminary plgnning cf the operatiqn: eekse GIA vill cen
[394]oe ontnacs beare eich peopoatiions having punsotias tsapaet ac
[395]faxcign policy but et too lato © point to aubject that tmpect Co eagtone |
[397]hae nearly ee many pacple under odflcial caver $3 make
[398]$900 to 3760, Abous £560 of thaee are wider State Be attr
[400]49061 Docld:32629331 Pane a
[402]SECRET
[404]&.
[406](the other 2200 eve presumably tinder military or other nan-+State
[407]@riginally the uge of State Department covor for _
[408]GIA personnel wae guppaged to be atrictly limited and temporary.
[410]fhe Pulles-Correa-Jackgon report etated in 1948, “The ClA chauid
[411]not use State Department caver aa 3 simple dnawer to all ite probleme,
[412]But should proceed to davelop ite own cutside caver and eventually in
[413]‘hie way and through increased efficiency of ite .overeeas personnel, —
[414]find 6 way to ternper its demands upon the State Department.” None-
[415]-thelesa CIA has staadily increased ite requigitiona for efficial cover.
[417]official cover).
[419]There gre eevoral reasons why CIA has abandoned ite original intentios
[421]of developing systems of private cover.
[423]it io eacies to arranges cover
[425]through State; {¢ is lege azpensive; it ie quicker; it facilitates the
[426]security of operations ae woll as of communications; {¢ insures 3
[427]pleasanter Ufe for the CIA people. But the effect is to further the
[428]CfA encroachment on the traditions? functiqns of State.
[430]tn gome missions, § understand, CAS personnel qutnumbers regular
[431]State Department pereoantl. Is the American Embasey in Vienna,
[433]‘gut of 20 persone Hated in the October 1960 Foreign Service Lict 68
[434]‘being in the Politics! Saction, 16 are CAS pereamels of the 31 efficera
[435]s¢tivities, ovar half gre CAS, Of the
[436]t3 officere listed fa the Political Sectica in our Embaesy tn Chile,
[438]bi are CAE. On the dsy of President Kennedy's Inacguration 47 porcent
[439]of the politica’ cfficere aerving ta United States Embasctes were CAS,
[440]Sometimes the CIA miesion chief has béen in the country tenger, hae
[441]more money at hie digposst, wilds more influence (nd fe abler} than
[442]the Ambassador. Often he bas direct access to the local Prime
[443]BMinister. Sometimes (ae Curing a critical pezied in Lacs} ke purgques
[444]a different palicy from that of the Ambsaeados:. Also he ie gencrally
[445]well known tecally ae the CZA representative.
[447]In the Paste Embasvy today, there are 128 CIA pecpte. GIA ta Paste
[448]hae tong since begun to move inte areas of political reporting
[449]tuternal
[451]licted as ¢
[453]eccupied by State, The CLA men doing
[455]in rep
[457]. Sutnumber ¢hoae in the Embassy'e palitienl section by 1Gs2, GIA bse
[458]oven gought to monapelise cantact with certain French polities! pergonalt. —
[459]tied, among tham the Peeaident of the Netional Agsemity. CLA occupics
[461]the top Alay of the Parte Pauksagy. 6 fact well konwn locally! 428 on
[463]SECRET]
[467]$2
[470]~ SECRET
[472]the night of the Genesale' revolt ta Algeria, pagtere-by noted
[473]with emugement that the tep fleor wae abinuee with lights. Gam .
[474]informed that Ambaceadar Cavin wae able te decure entrance that
[475]night to the CIA offices only with difficulty. }
[477]CIA ie apparently sow firmly committed to the GAS approach ass
[478]permanent golution for its prohiema. it ts pregzing to have GIA
[480]- people. given the rank of Counselor. Sefore State loses control of
[482]ragte and more of ite presumed overacas peragunsl, and before GAS
[483]becomes p integgated info the Fuveign Service, it would
[484]eeem portant {a} to aggute every ambageador the fizm control
[485]aver the local GAS atatiun norminglly promiced in the NSC Directive
[487]-of January 19, 1961, ond (b} to review the carsdnt CAS altuation with
[489]an eye toe steady reduction of CAS pergannet.
[490]y warfare, i gather, ig cegarded (n some quartere
[492]abmatt no GLA funetian mogy pesultarty dependant on the peliecat
[494]; content than paramilitary waelay
[496]There are savers! reacens fer thie. Pur one thing, a paromilitaey
[497]operation ie An ita nature @ Iavge ené attributable aparation and theechy.
[499]support ef slready extsting gueprilie activities,} For nother, the
[500]monet end political peice of Crest pareanitieasy fatiare $6 Spurs fat
[502]Communiste, when they ctimulate paceeniiitary sctivity, are
[503]dettg @hat the world eupoete from thors wher we do ft, wo appear
[505]te betray our own professed principies and theseiges cannst atlord to
[507]compound Gelinguenty by defeat; BMoreaver, 9a the recent Algerian |
[508]epicede showed, once we egavines the world that wa are committed to 3
[509]engeavor, wo will be bicmed for alk corte of things, And,
[511]paramilitary
[512]Ge the recent teacterseforepriganers eptsade ghowed, when we de cond —
[513]peered a~senshmai WO cGangt lightly write them off and close the
[515]Fhe Communietd, on the other hand, have no cerupics about
[517]| Meaty 6 tenes
[519]SECRET
[521]“Khe,
[522]SL Mer ee
[524]SECRET
[525]10.
[527]Moveover, guerrilla warfare te fought, much morse than military
[528]men ordinerily realize, in an ideological context. The guorriila
[530]_ suceeede when his prégram enlists gregerodte dupport: and it is
[532]very diffieult indeed to beat Rim whes the countryside t¢ with him.
[533]Van Mook told General Marghall in 1946 not to worry about the
[534]guerrillas in Indonesia; "we are sending 56, 000 men out there
[535]aud will clean the aituatién up in the three months." Marehall,
[536]who had had exparience fighting guerrilla¢ in the Philippines,
[538]‘replied, ‘Ts won't bs eg easy. You will find that they will bleed
[540]you to death." Cypruea and Algeria illustrate the difficulty of over+
[541]coming guerrilla resistance through sheer weight of niilitary force.
[543]Serious guerzitle mevementa have been defeated only three times eines
[544]the end of the Second World War: tn Greees, because Tito’e defection
[546]closed the northern border; in the Philippines; and in Malaya. fo
[548]the last two cages tho gusrvilia resistance ended becanse re
[549].combination of political ang military Gountesensssures. The ctruggic
[551]in Malaya, ae © eld Bas : dey i said}, wae for
[552]the mings: and hanste of tho peeplar it therefore lavolved not only
[553]paramilitary operaticns but 6 vaet educational program, organisation
[554]of trode anions, political reform ang an affor of national independence.
[555]If the guersilials power lice tn hie revoluttemary program, the enéwor |
[556]lies in past tn meeting the nteds which enable the guerrilla to rouse
[557]the countrygide.. “Without a political geal," wrote Mao Tac-tung,
[558]guerrilla wasfare muct fall, a9 tt must {f ice solitiéal objectives do
[559]not ot eotnciéa with the sépiestions of the people and tf their sympathy,
[560]esoperation and agéistance cannct be:gnined,” He added, “De we
[561]want the supgort of the mgeses? Bf we dc, we must go among the
[562]eee Svouso ‘them to activity: concern euvecives with their weal
[564]_ For theee reasons, wastage cannot be considered ad
[566]paremitiary
[567]primarily military weapon, [ te primarily @ political weayon aud
[568]muet therefare be aubfectad to close and careful political qverdight,
[569]i probably ebould be retsined in @ reconstituted CIA rather than
[570]teangloreed to Defends:
[572]~ SECRET
[574]Britigh expottence ight Get be cf value. The nottble feature of the
[575]Britieh tatalligense ayetem ie the determination to Reep clandestine
[576]activiey under atelot Foreign Cfkice control. Thid control ie achieved
[578]in 8 number of waya!
[580]pndhenrsiiieectienanipn-ptaarh-easahteirindiae Arr ttastd
[582]@) Secret Intelligence Service {MiG} iteelf operates under
[583]tho direction of the Joint Intelligence Committee, which hee a
[584]Foreign Office chisivman (until #ecently Sip Patrick Bean, who
[585]ta now the Britieh cepresentative at the UN) and which includes
[586]the Susvice Intelligence Greeters and reproeantatives of the
[587]Goloniat Offtce and tha Commonwealth Relations Cifice ae well
[588]‘ a9 the Chief of SIS.
[590]rh hosts pabthiet waesane disecttven Are orient ust
[591]Lon a Research
[593]a} working groups under IRD cheferasnehip govern epere-
[594]tlang tn epacial area2, such aa, for example, Sino-faviet rela
[595]slena on the Weeks Youth | Postivils .
[597]e)} a Foreign Offtce Staff Lisicon Officer site next to the S19
[598]Chief, and Foraign Office efficisie cerve toure of duty in S35
[599]ecctiong,
[601]see eoeiaal ta tones Danaeeet nt eledeande «2 & clearance te be
[603]SECRET
[605]SECRET.
[607]2.
[609]eatorced by directives, by State Department chatemeanship of
[610]working groups, and by the infiltration of State Depa:
[611]personnel inte the inteligence agency.
[613]Gbviougly this deteup would aot euecead, however, unlees the
[614]State Depgrtraent f were prepared to evercome ite inbred
[615]habite of diffusion, négativiem and delay and to take 6 firm and
[616]parposetal grip on the situation.
[618]iv. ations and Intelligence
[620]the relationahip between operetione aad 2 intelligence vaiace particu-
[621]larly perplexing questions. &‘Iatelligence’ incledes two separable
[622]activities: cigadsetine ¢olfectisas and resesech, analyete ond
[623]evaluation. The firet desta with that smeli portian of raw intelli»
[624]gence procured by secret means (ig. Rullvs datimated in 1947 that _
[625]"a proper analysia of the tateiligence oitatnstio by. . . overt,
[626]normal, and aboveboard mosses. would supply ua with ever 80 percent,
[627]I chould eetiraste, of the information required fer the guidance of cur
[628]national palicy"}: tho eecend tavelves the collation and interpretation
[629]@$ oli ferme of intelitgence, however. obtained and the production of
[630]‘detimetes,
[632]" Under the Beitioh ayétem, clandestine collection ie entrusted to the
[633]Secret Intelligence Services. The research, qnalyete cad ecttrantiog
[634]function te located in the Foratgn Office Rassarch Op
[636]Water the Amoricen gyetery CIA has sesganathility for both
[637]clandestine collection end research ang enalysia;, The Stete Bepart+
[638]men's Bureau of intelligences and Reeearch alee hes ecacaech and
[639]eualyéte secponainitsie’s hut, in practice, CIA hae established
[640]contre! over the machinery for praducing attiondt eatimetes {n ouch
[641]@ way 06 to reduce State's contethution to submitting ita views to CIA
[642]for Becepianes O° ee la cther words, where in Creat Britain
[643]the Feecign Office plays the ceordinating vole in the intelligence field,
[644]in the United States that role hae been asaumed by CLA,
[646]B &
[648]SECRET;
[650]"wo enanre
[652]SECRET
[654]. The argument againet tucarporating the regcaech and estimate
[656]function in State wae ouide by Dulles in 1947: “Yor the proper
[657]judging of the situation in any fozelgn country {6 ia tmportent that
[658]tofeymation should be processed by an agency whage duty it ie to
[659]weigh facta, and to draw conclusions from those facte, without
[660]baving cither the facte or the conclusions werped by the inevitable
[662]and even proper projudices of the mén whoge duty it ie to determine
[664]policy and who, having once determined a policy, are too likely to
[665]be bitnd to any facte which might tend to prove the policy to be
[668]Brociaely the came Gtgument can be used with equal effect against
[670]he incorporation of the research and estimate function in CLA a.
[672]vee if intelligence ta tad closely ceanected with operations, then
[673]these committed to.6 particular operation wilk tend to acicct out the
[674]intelligesco which validates tho eperaticn,
[676]Obviously both argumsuty conclude in 6 cage for eho entablichment of
[677]a falsty iadepeadeet recessch and estimate greup, But, t tho RAE
[678]group te too independent, ane rune inte the oppesite danger? thet ie,
[679]aria mathee policy nae eperstions will be subjected to adaquate
[681]intelligence checks,
[682]The trouble withthe Coban operation, tor example, ‘wae not chat
[684]the aagumption, for «x p
[685]bad veushod the petab tn Gebo amece @ eucgecetat handing ¢
[686]would preveke upetsings Behind the Haea aad defeetions fram the
[687]RA, ta Dacemher and Febresry, the Offtce of Nations! Estimates
[689]tion-was based, These exiated, in ghost, tthe tients
[691]SECRET
[696]SECRET
[697]14,
[699]that knowledge of the Cuban operation, Gaunted in Miami bare
[701]by any number of lowelevel ggentes in the operdtions branch of CLA,
[702]wad denied to even the top officiate of the intelligence branch. The
[703]Bureau of Intalligence 4nd Research of the Department of State
[704]knew even lega about the Cuban operation.
[706]The problem, ‘then, {a {6 have an R&E group sufficiently independent
[707]ef both policy and opsrations te resist the pressure to make the cace
[708]for vested ideas and intercéts -- yet qufficiently clase to be able to
[709]subject projected operations or policies t to the moat intense and
[710]searching écrutiny.
[712]Whexe could thie group he tacated? If the GIA were ta become
[713]qubordingte to State, 4d bif-G is to the Foreign Office, then the R&B
[714]function might be vested in @ coordinate subagensy, somewhat inde-
[715]pendent of both State and CLA, yet closely connected with beth in day~
[716]teeday operations. The R&E eubagency would receive intelligence
[717]from CLA and from State, 43 well ae from the services and, of course,
[718]fvem public sources. it would represdat, in effect, a fusion of CIA/DDE
[719]and State/intéliigance and Research, it might alee take aver certain
[720]of the gervice functiong now confided te CIA <« photographie taterpre-
[721]tation, biographical data, foreten breadcadt monttoring, overt cellec~
[722]tian, mépé, etc.. There might be in addition o Joint Intelligence Board
[723]with representatives from aii the intelligence agencies and with
[725]State Department or White House chatrman,
[727]We. Consiuston,.
[729]The argument of thie memeréadum tenption & fedsly Greetic rearrangee
[730]ment of our present tatelliguace seteup. it alae implies the cagacity
[732]: 6f the ditustion Gnd to do
[733]go in an eifective and purposeful ways 1 the State Department o¢ at
[734]preacnt staffed ig ned copable of ecauming effactive command, thie {s
[735]not, in zy judgment, an argument against 6 ratiengt reorgeniastion of
[737]intelligence. & ig dn Gxgument for a dragtic overhaul of the State
[738]Department.
[740]SECRET
[743]ZT aanet
[747]RanaTa.3necanane
[749]SECRET
[750]15.
[752]‘The atructure which would meet the criteria suggested in this
[753]memorandum would be é¢ follows:
[755]1) The State Department would be granted general
[756]clearance authority over all clandestine activity. This
[757]might be effectuated on the British mode! by the appointment
[758]of a Deputy Undersccrétary of State for Intelligence, who
[759]would act for the Secretary in these matters and who might
[760]serve as chairman of a Joint Intelligence Board.
[762]2). The Joint Intelligence Board would include repre-
[763]gentatives from all olements in the intelligence Somenunity
[764]and also from the White House.
[766]' 3) The operating branches of tho present CIA would be
[767]reconstituted under gome blameless title (the National Informa-
[768]tion Service}. . This new agency would be charged with responsi-
[769]bility for clandestine callection, for covert political operations
[770]and fer paramilitary activities. 2 would submit projects to the
[771]Deputy Undersecretary of State for Intelligence for clearance.
[773]In general, the agency would bear gomewhat the same relations
[774]ehip to State ag the Digsemament Admintstration and ICA
[775]presently do. —
[777]4} A acconé ecentstndopendent. ageucy would be ect w, again
[778]bearing a blamelees title (the Foreign Reeaarch Agency}, coordic
[779]nate with the operations agency. This agcacy would be charged
[780]with responsibility for collation and interpretation. t¢ would
[782]include CIA/DDL, the Bureau of Intelligence ang Recearch in
[784]State, and the various service functions now carried on by CIA
[785](photographic interpretation, tiegraphical files, ferdign broadcast
[786]monitosing, scientific intelligence, mapa, avert collection, ete. },
[787]It might well be located in the CIA building in MoLean.
[789]; Axthue Gehieginger, je.
[790]The Attorney General
[791]Mr. Bundy
[793]Mr. Dungan
[795]SECRET