[1]157-10014-10006 | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |"
[2]JFK Assassination System Date: WH2015
[4]Identification Form
[6]Agency Information
[8]AGENCY: SSCIA
[9]RECORD NUMBER: — 157-10014-10006
[10]RECORD SERIES: HEARINGS
[11]AGENCY FILENUMBER:  01-H-08
[12]-Document Information
[13]ORIGINATOR: SSCSGO
[14]FROM: ANGLETON, JAMES; MILER, SCOTTY
[15]TO:
[16]TITLE :
[17]DATE: 01/22/1976
[18]PAGES: 74
[20]ANGLETON, JAMES
[21]CIA, METHODOLOGY
[22]MILER, SCOTTY
[23]DEFECTORS
[24]FBI
[25]COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
[26]DOCUMENT TYPE: TRANSCRIPT
[27]CLASSIFICATION: — Top Secret
[28]RESTRICTIONS: — Consulted
[29]CURRENT STATUS: — Withhold
[30]DATE OF LASTREVIEW: — 06/24/1997
[31]OPENING CRITERIA :
[32]Box I
[34]COMMENTS :
[37]HW 50955 Docld: 32423394
[39]Page 1
[41]Date 07/31/95
[42]Page 1
[43]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[45]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[47]AGENCY INFORMATION
[49]AGENCY : -sseseo Sso/A%
[50]RECORD NUMBER : 157~10014-10006
[51]RECORDS SERIES : HEARINGS
[52]AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 01-H-08
[54]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[56]ORIGINATOR : SSCSGO
[57]FROM : ANGLETON, JAMES; MILER, SCOTTY
[58]TO :
[60]DATE : 01/22/76
[61]PAGES : 74
[62]SUBJECTS : ANGLETON, JAMES
[64]COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
[65]CIA, METHODOLOGY
[66]FBI
[68]MILER, SCOTTY
[70]DEFECTORS
[71]DOCUMENT TYPE : TRANSCRIPT
[72]CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET
[73]RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
[74]CURRENT STATUS : POSTPONED IN FULL
[75]DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/24/97
[76]OPENING CRITERIA :
[77]COMMENTS : Box 1
[79][R] ~ ITEM IS RESTRICTED
[81]HY 50955 ° BDocld: 32423394 Page 2
[84]Trew easy polahe SP et Se
[85]i Du NM ORMATION
[86]wt wee a rabe fi
[91]yh id
[93]Report of Proceedings erating
[95]Hearing held before
[97]Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental
[99]Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities
[101]Thursday, January 22, 1976 .
[103]Washington, D.C
[105](Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over
[106]to the Committee for destruction)
[108]WARD & PAUL
[110]410 FIRST STREET, 8S. £.
[111]WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003
[113](202) 644-6000
[116]TESTIMONY OF:
[118]James Angleton
[120]Scotty Miler °
[122]a
[123]3
[125]ry
[127]t?]
[130]2
[132]4160 First Steowt, SE... Warmington, D.C. 20003
[134]SECRET
[137]FOREIGN AND MILITARY SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING
[139]Thursday, January 22, 1976
[141]United States Senate,
[143]Select Committee to Study Governmental
[144]Operations with Respect to
[145]Intelligence Activities,
[147]Washington, D.C.
[149]The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:10 o'clock
[151]p.m., in Room $-407, the Capitol, the Honorable Gary Hart
[153]presiding.
[155]Present: Senators Hart of Colorado (presiding), and
[157]Z
[158]2
[160]a
[162](o)
[166]ad
[168]Schweiker.
[170]Also present: William G. Miller, Staff Director; and
[171]Joseph diGenova, Charles Kirbow, Jim Johnston, Brict Snider,
[172]Loch Johnson, Elliot Maxwell, Elizabeth Culbreath, Bob Kelley,
[173]Michael Epstein, Rick Inderfurth, Charles Lombard, and Pat Shea;
[175]Professional Staff Members.
[177]410 First Street. S$... wasmington, O.C. 20003
[179]TOP SECRET
[182]Senator Hart of Colorado, Gentlemen, let's go ahead and
[183]be sworn and get under way if you don't mind.
[184]Do you swear the testimony you're about to give will be
[186]the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help
[188]you God?
[190]Mr. Angleton. I do,
[192]Mr. Miler. I do.
[194]Senator Hart of Colorado. Thank you very much,
[196]Mr. Angleton at least has been before us before, and
[197]routinely we remind all witnesses that they preserve all of
[198]their constitutional rights, including the right to counsel,
[200]the right to remain silent and so forth and so on, and to have
[202]a
[203]2
[205]a
[206]a
[207]a
[209]q
[210]B
[212]a member of the Committee present during all of the testimony.
[213]It is my understanding we have no prepared statements to
[216]Start with, so I think I'll just open it up to staff questions
[218]and interject some of my own, and I understand that the general
[219]subject matter to be discussed here today -- and we are interested
[221]in your expertise regarding the question of counterintelligence:
[223]50, we'll just have the staff members start,
[225]410 Ferst Street, 5.E., Watningtan, 0.C. 20003
[227]TOP SECRET
[230]]
[233]a
[234]4
[235]t)
[238]z
[240]410 Ferst Street, $.E., Watnington, O.C. 20003
[242]TESTIMONY OF JAMES ANGLETON
[244]ACCOMPANIED BY SCOTTY MILER
[246]Mr. Johnson, I wonder if we could begin by having both
[247]of your gentlemen give us some information on your backgrounds,
[248]beginning with Mr, Angleton,
[250]Mr. Angleton. I entered the OSS in 1943 from the Army,
[252]went into training in Washington and environs and then to
[254]London, and then eventually to Italy, and 1 took over as
[256]Chief, Counterintelligence in Italy, and eventually took over
[257]as Chief, oSS.
[259]I returned in about ‘47, '48, and various jobs in both
[260]espionage and counterintelligence. At one time Chief of
[261]Operations and eventually Chief of Counterintelligence, and
[262]that was from about 1954 ‘until 1974.
[264]Mr. Johnson. Mr. Miler?
[266]Mr. Miler. I entered OSS in 1946. I was sent to China.
[268]I was in China until 1949, transferred to Japan, became involved
[269]in intelligence aspects of the Korean War, I served in Thailand,
[270]the Philippines, as I said, China, Japan, Ethiopia. I traveled:
[271]extensively, was a station chief abroad, and for the last ten
[272]years I have been in Counterintelligence, first in the .
[273]Special Investigations, and subsequently as Chief of Operations’
[274]for Mr. Angleton's Counterintelligence Staff.
[276]And when I left the Agency in December of '74, that
[278]my position.
[280]TOP SECRET
[283]WARD ® PAUL
[285]410 Forst Street, S.E., wasnington, B.C. 20003
[287]Mr. Johnson. So both of you left the CIA in December, 1974
[289]Since that time we understand there have been some changes
[290]in how counterintelligence is conducted at the CIA,
[292]Could you give us some understanding of those changes?
[294]Mr, Angleton, I would like to defer to Mr. Miler on this,
[295]if I may?
[297]Mr. Miler. Yes,
[299]|
[300]|
[302]My understanding is there have been some rather fundamental
[303]and substantive changes which are 4 continuation, actually,
[304]of changes that were made first in 1973, in July of 1973
[305]when many of the centralized counterintelligence functions were
[306]decentralized and reallocated to different components of the
[307]Directorate of Operations, Such things as agent approvals and
[308]security, operational security reviews for intelligence
[309]collection and covert action operations, the oversight on
[310]intelligence operations, and oversight on counterintelligence
[312]operations in the field were decentralized. Research and
[314]Analysis has been curtailed, and the emphasis on it has changed |
[316]There have been changes in the record procedures,
[317]Mr. Johnson. Could you be more specific on these changes, |
[318]for example, in research?
[320]Mr. Miler, In research, the research is now, as I under-
[321]stand it, pretty much on a case by case basis, not in an
[323]overall perception of worldwide or national counterintelligence
[325]problems. There is no -- the application of historical cases,
[327]TOP SECRET
[330]historical problems is not being applied, as I understand it,
[331]to current operational efforts or investigative needs. There
[333]an entirely different philosophy being applied as to what may
[335]Prone {Ares 202)
[337]be required in terms of understanding the counterintelligence
[338]threat to this nation. There is very little emphasis, if any, dr _
[339]concern with such things as deception and disinformation. Therg
[340]is little application of analytical and assessment work to the
[341]Overall role of foreign intelligence and security services in
[342]political action,
[344]There have been some fundamental changes in operational
[346]philosophies stemming from an application of what is termed
[348]management by objectives as it is being applied in the CIA to
[350]operations, and there is a -- has been a distinct change in
[352]Z
[353]3
[355]a
[356]r
[357]o
[359]4
[360]B
[362]some of the attention which has been previously placed on the
[363]problem of penetration from foreign and particularly hostile
[364]intelligence services into the American community.
[366]And there has been a very, very substantive change in
[368]the perception and the conduct of counterintelligence in that
[370]there has been what is in my view a very serious erosion
[372]of security and compartmentation of operations, and leakage
[373]of information which has not been to the best interests of
[374]a national counterintelligence effort.
[376]Mr. Johnson. So, from going from a rather centralized
[378]apparatus to a decentralized situation, the dangers of penetration
[380]$10 Foest Street, $.£., Watneington, D.C. 20003
[382]have increased,
[384]TOP SECRET
[387]Phone (Area 202)
[389]2
[390]3
[392]a
[393]a
[394]o
[397]3
[399]410 Forst Street, S.E., Washington, O.C. 270003
[401]Mr. Miler. The dangers of penetration have increased
[402]significantly, and this extends also to the methods by which
[403]relations with foreign intelligence services are conducted.
[405]Mr. Johnson. But how do you respond to the criticiam that
[406]during your tenure and Mr. Angleton's tenure, too tight a
[407]rein was kept on counterintelligence information, and individuals
[408]in the field at: the station level failed to get the information,
[409]they needed to conduct their counterintelligeance operation? |
[411]Mr. Miler. I would have to respond to that, Mr. Johnson,
[412]and I could only respond to it in the context of specifics.
[414]To my knowledge, and as practiced from my position as Chief of
[415]Operations, whenever there was information which was judged
[417]to be of significance, importance to a field station, that
[418]field station was advised, unless there was some overriding
[419]security source protection or other considerations, and the
[421]decision then not to advise them was made at the Deputy
[423]Director for Operations, as it is now called, or the Director
[425]level.
[427]There was, certainly, a very tight security, a very
[428]tight compartmentation of counterintelligence information and
[429]activities, which in ny view was essential, and still is
[430]essential, and will be even more essential in the future if
[431]we are to regain a counterintelligence initiative and to do
[433]our job in the future, And I think this is the fundamental
[435]question that the management of the CIA and the Senate and the
[437]of
[438]TOP SECRET
[442]eo)
[444]a
[445]e
[446]o
[449]3
[451]410 First Street, S.E., Wasnington, D.C. 70003
[453]Executive ‘have to decide, is do we want a counterintelligence
[454]effort, and if so, then we have to gat to it, and we hava to
[455]put our best minds to it.
[457]Mr, Johnson. Were there instances during your period in
[459]counterintelligence where the Counterintelligence Staff would
[460]conduct ita own counterespionage activities, without the knowled
[461]of the various geographic division chiefs?
[463]Mr, Miler. There were very few of them, with the chiefs.
[464]There may have been some.
[466]Mr. Johnson. In those cases where there were such
[467]operations, were they cleared with the DDO?
[469]Mr. Miler. Every single one of them was cleared with the
[470]pDO and/or ‘the Director and/or the Deputy Director.
[472]Mr. Johnson. On important counterespionage operations,
[473]could you tell us in more detail what the approval and clearance
[474]process is? .
[476]We know that for covert action the 40 Committee frequently
[477]becomes involved. What about for important counterespionage
[478]operations?
[480]Mr, Miler. Well, Mr. Angleton might want to qualify my
[481]response, because obviously he was involved more in this
[482]than I was, but there would be the two primary considerations.
[483]One was a strictly CIA, counterintelligence or counterespionage
[484]t
[486]activity. The derivation of the authority for this came from
[488]the statutes which set up the CIA and from National Security
[490]TOP SECRET
[493]2
[496]e
[497]e
[498]a
[501]z
[503]410 Ferst Street, S.E., Wasnington, O.C. 20003
[505]Council directives 53, 55 and so forth. The authority rested
[506]in there. The approval would go to the then DDP, now Deputy
[507]Director for Operations, the Deputy Director and/or, the
[508]Director. |
[510]The authorities, if it were a significant counterintelligeric
[511]or counterespionage case, the authorities, as I understood it |
[512]then, might require the Director to go outside the Agency to
[513]the White House or the Attorney General and so forth.
[515]Alternatively, we in the CI Staff might be directed to
[516]coordinate this with the FBI. We would go to the FBI, explain
[517]the case and so forth. The FBI would then go to the Attorney -3
[518]the Department of Justice and get authorities, whatever
[519]authorities they would require in order to pursue the investi-
[520]gations, conduct the case, and do it according to whatever
[521]stipulations that the Department of Justice: would put on it
[522]in order to either neutralize the suspected spy or agent, and/ot
[523]conclude the case by prosecution.
[525]And I am talking now of primarily in terms of a serious
[526]counterespionage case involving an American citizen.
[528]Mx. Johnson. Mr. Angleton, do you know of any instances
[529]where the CI Staff or higher authority within the CIA went
[530]outside the Agency for approval for important counterespionag.
[531]operations?
[533]Mr. Angleton. i know of cases, yes.
[535]Mr. Johnson. And what would the approval system be?
[537]TOP SECRET
[540]Mr, Angleton. Well, it would be an ad hoc discussion
[542]between the Director and the Secretary, and probably others,
[543]the Attorney General.
[545]Mr. Johnson. Does this happen frequently? Is this a eypidal
[546]procedure for a major counter operation?
[548]Mr. Angleton. If it's a major matter, it's on the basis
[550]of need to know.
[552]You have another kind of case where a foreigner came to
[553]me and stated his government had a defector from the Bloc, an
[554]excellent agent, and they would be prepared to give us the
[555]if we would take it over lock, stock and barrel, handle it
[556]in such a fashion that there would be no exposure, because
[558]the political consequences to their government.
[560]Pd
[561]2
[563]6
[565]3
[568]x
[570]I would go to the Director and the Deputy Director, spell
[571]out the matter, and come to a determination with them whether
[572]we wanted to take the case on. This particular case involved
[574]not only a person who had been in the intelligence service of
[576]the opposition a long time, but he had access to codes, and alsd
[578]a great deal of deciphered material. So it was kicked back
[579]and forth, and there was a determination made that we would
[580]take it over, the staff would take it over in its entirety.
[581]And therefore, it meant that I called in Scotty and we
[582]pulled together our team, we sent them abroad. We handled the
[584]man in the field for a long time, and then eventually brought
[586]410 Ferst Street, SE. Warrington, &.C. 20003
[588]him back here.
[590]TOP SECRET
[593]J
[594]3
[596]a
[597]4
[598]o
[601]s
[603]410 First Street, $.£., washington, G.C. 20003
[605]‘In a case of that sort, the instruction was agreed upon
[606]by all concerned, and the Director's instruction was that the
[607]Division was not to be informed, the Division where this
[608]individual came from, the Bloc area, should not be informed;
[609]that the Bureau, only two or three people in the Bureau, by
[610]name, should be informed, and that we would run the operation
[611]and bury the individual at the end,
[613]Now, it went along --
[615]Mr. Johnson. Did you say "bury the individual"?
[617]Mr. Angleton. I'm not using it in your Committee terms.
[619]Mr. Kirbow. You'd better clear that up for the record.
[621]Mr. Miler. We would integrate him in to the American
[622]society in such a way that he would be non~identifiable.
[624]Mr, Angleton. He would be buried.
[626]Mr. Miler. May I ‘just: add here also that the authorities,
[627]the approval are very specific in terms of the agents' and the
[628]CIA's responsibility to advise and get the approval of the
[629]Attorney General in bringing someone like this into the
[630]United States.
[632]The Director got this approval. It was a formal letter
[633]to the Attorney General, a formal reply. ‘There was a formal
[634]but very limited advice to the Immigration. All of the legal
[635]requirements required by the Attorney General, Immigration,
[637]all other agencies, were done. However, in this instance, the-
[639]were done on a very narrow, select basis,,directly to Attorney
[641]TOP SECRET
[644]es
[646]General and so forth, rather than to go through the normal
[647]bureaucratic chain of command out of the CIA and ita various
[649]components.
[651]i
[652]Mr. Angleton, With the added fact that we did not disclos¢
[654]all of the facts, nor identity. —
[655]Now, this is important, because the individual was of
[657]such prominence that the country concerned would be placed in
[659]jeopardy diplomatically, the placa where he was residing on
[661]tour. There would be intensive investigations by his head-
[663]quarters, and therefore we had to have covers. And so we
[664]laid on in such a fashion that another service received infor-
[666]mation regarding the target country that would induce them to
[668]take certain observable actions, and then to spread the word
[670]WARD & PAUL
[672]that the fellow had actually defected to another country, so
[674]that their entire investigative thrust would be directed toward
[676]that country.
[678]Senater Hart of Colorade. So far we've talked about
[679]process, and I think we'll keep going on it, and return to
[680]it, but I would like to quantify some of this if I can.
[682]First of all, by terms of definition, is the phrase or
[683]the term "“counterintelligence” interchangeable with counter-
[687]Mr, Angleton. It can be. I think technically counter-
[689]intelligence is regarded to be all forms of investigative
[691]416 First Street, $.£.. Wasnington, O.C. 20003
[693]activity, travel control, your data files, your dossiers, all
[695]TOP SECRET
[698]a
[699]3
[702]a
[703](e)
[704]rf
[706]B
[708]410 Forst Street, $.£., Wastongton, D.C. 20003
[710]a Poe
[712]: ECRE
[713]B SECR
[716]the systems that go into counterintelligence as such.
[718]Out of that emerges a product, and one of the products is
[719]counterespionage,.
[721]Senator Hart of Colorado. I ‘see.
[723]How big was the Counterintelliganca Staff?
[725]Mr. Angleton. When? Well,-when it was in its prime it
[726]was around, it was 200 some odd people. After this decentraliz4-
[727]tion took place, when we lost international Communism, which in
[728]no service in the world has it ever been divorced from
[729]counterintelligence; we lost our police division where we
[730]train police from throughout the world; we lost operation.
[731]approval, which is approval of agents; we lost our controls
[732]over the Technical Services Division; we lost the geographic
[733]representation; we lost liaison, which was the liaison was with
[734]the FBI and 26 other government agencies who do investigations.
[736]Mr. Miler. They took counterintelligence and liaison
[738]away from the counterintelligence component, if you can imagine
[740]such a situation.
[742]Mr. Angleton. So that reduced us to less than 80 people,
[743]and this comes to, Senator, if I can just point to one of the
[744]most important things in the legislation or in whatever the
[745]Executive does, is that you cannot have in my view a Director
[746]of the FBI and a Director of CIA who are independent of one
[747]another. You have to have some higher authority to whom you
[749]can make an appeal when decisions of this sort are made so that
[751]TOP SECRET |
[754]it is aired, and it is not done without the knowledge of anyone
[756]and then breaks, as it aid, in the New York Times and what not.
[757]Mr. Johnson. Yesterday we had the Bureau representatives
[759]telling us that there wag really no problem or conflict when
[761]it came to questions of this, and that there was no problem
[763]with higher authority, i Apparently. you vewduld.:
[765]disagree with that.
[766]i
[767]Mr, Angleton. I disagree in ‘total with. that; -:t'm.saying the
[768]9 || decline in the Bureau over 20 years from when they had very high
[769]10 jgrade counterintelligence until today when there has probably
[770]11 been -- well, it is least effective.
[771]12 Senator Hart of Colorado, Why is that?
[773]13 Mr. Angleton. Well, I think it has to do with the number
[776]3
[779]a
[780]a
[783]x
[785]14 of diversions it had in the days of the Vietnam war, when
[787]15 |} internal security lost a tremendous number of men to other
[789]16 || assignments and duties.
[791]17 Second, I don't think that counterintelligence or the
[793]18} real thrust of Soviet Bloc intelligence has ever been brought
[795]19 up to policy level, and, more important, anything that inwolves
[796]20 penetration has always been swept under the rug. In other
[798]words, the question of penetration in this government or
[799]penetration in any agency has never been brought to a responsible
[800]level of finding out how it happened and what has gone wrony.
[802]And let's take one defector who said -- in this case he
[804]410 First Street. S$... Washington, D.C. 20003
[806]spent 16 years in the Soviet Union in the KGB. He gave us
[808]TOP SECRET
[811]J
[812]2
[814]a
[815]4
[816]a
[819]z
[821]410 Ferst Street, $.E., Wasnengton, D.C. 20003
[823]leads of penetration in France, and it occasioned my
[824]drafting a letter for Mr. McCone to give to President Kennedy
[825]to give to DeGaul. “Decaul secretly sent to this country one
[826]of his highest trusted military men. He was here incognito. lie
[827]met with the defector for three days.
[829]c
[831]The French original reaction to President Kennedy's letter
[832]was, it was Soviet provocation, because this was at the stage
[833]when France was making certain very sensitive agreements in ‘the
[834]1
[835]atomic field and otherwise with the United States, and therefore
[836]these allegations of penetration had a very direct bearing on
[837]those negotiations. And so the General who came over was
[838]totally prepared to believe this was provocation, but after
[839]three days with the defector, in a meeting with Nelms and .
[840]myself, he stated without any question that this man was 100
[841]percent bona fide, because he could ask him those questions
[842]right on the nerve of their secrets, and he got the responses,
[846]Now, this defector also gave considerable data on the
[848]status of penetration in the U.S. Government, documents which
[851]he’ had seen in Moscow, cryptonyms of operating agents, documents
[852]which could only have been prepared by our organization, and
[853]many other cases going back into the early '50s, going almost
[854]to Cabinet level. So all of this information was made availabl
[855]to the Bureau. But in due course Mr,.Hoover regarded or made
[857]the pronouncement -- and I won't say when he makes a pronounc
[859]that it is one that has been recommended to him from higher
[861]TOP SECRET
[864]WARD & PAUL
[866]410 First Street, S.E., Washington, B.C. 20003
[868]Teese
[870]level <= that tha defector in question was probably a proveca-
[872]tion, and the Bureau ceased contact with that individual, and
[874]I would say they have not had any contact with him since 1965,
[876]Senator Hart of Colorado. Why did Hoover make that
[877]decision?
[879]Mr. Angleton. Well, among other things, this defector
[880]wanted to have access to ongoing and to past cases with the
[881]view that he had a tremendous amount of data that he could not
[882]relate to anything, but if he could see things that were going
[883]on, then it would be meaningful to him in terms of what he had
[884]to contribute, And I can take the example that, with another
[885]allied service; immediately we brought them into it and he had
[887]1
[889]seen certain naval documents that dealt with infrastructure and
[891]budget. This happened to be British.
[893]In time they found the documents, and when they presented
[895]them to him, he could identify those he had seen and those he
[897]had not seen. This led to the apprehension of Vassil, who
[899]rn
[901]was in the admiralty. And this was the quality of his
[903]t
[904]I
[905]1
[907]information.
[909]All through the west agents were apprehended on the basis |
[910]of his information. But there is a tremendous bulk of it which
[911]is made up of fragments, made up of documents he's seen wherc
[912]we have not been able to identify the document; a great number
[913]of cryptonyms of reporting sources. where we cannot find the
[915]body to fit the cryptonym. So this is the reality. And he is
[917]TOP SECRET
[920]]
[923]6
[924]4
[925]a
[927]4
[928]z
[930]£10 First Street, $.£., Washington, 0.C. 20003
[932]‘ a a . i
[934]being contacted perhaps by nine different intelligence services
[936]Now, there ig no one who has supported the question of
[937]his mala fides. In other words, everyone, to a man, has
[938]stated that he is bona fide, that they have never been able to
[939]disprove a statement of fact that he has given as a statement of
[940]fact, although they do not necessatily agree with his hypothese
[941]That is the official statement.
[943]Mr. Miler. May I just add two things on this?
[945]First, Mr. Johnson, it goes back to the business of
[946]compartmentation and not advising stations. In the case Mr.
[947]Angleton cited, the Paris station of the CIA was not told
[948]anything about the information, and I think this is a very goodi
[949]example of why you would not.
[951]The second point I would like to follow up on is with
[952]respect to this defector's information, there were five leads
[953]which were passed to the FBI about penetration which involved
[954]the CIA, for action. And one case was solved, but it was
[955]solved only after the FBI officially sent us a letter saying
[956]that they concluded that there was no substance to this
[957]information.
[959]They had to reopen the investigation --
[961]Mr. Angleton. And they also said: send it to the Army.
[963]Mr. Miler. Yes, send it to the Army.
[965]Now, they had to reopen the investigation when their
[967]surveillance spotted a man coming out of the Soviet embassy, and
[969]TOP SECRET
[972]2
[977]t]
[980]Ef
[982]4EO First Street, SE., Wasnington, O.C. 20003
[984]it was subsequently proved that he was a soviet spy.
[986]Mr. Angleton. Now, that individual had perforned four
[987]separate missions for Soviet intelligence since about 1938 or
[988]*39. One, he had been dropped in by the Soviets into Germany
[989]on a mission with the wT set, to be captured in order to be
[990]Played back and to penetrate the German intelligence.
[992]Second, he had moved from that into the penetration of
[994]VtASey
[995]the Vassilov movement, which were the captured Russians’ in the |
[997]i
[998]yEASoy¥
[999]German: . ~-.in the Vassilov Army.
[1001]Third, he had penetrated the anti-Soviet forces in Germany}
[1002]and then he waa taken on by us in 1948 or 'S1 ia when they
[1003]sent to renew his inks. _
[1005]So he was with us from '51 to around ‘60.
[1007]Well, when the defection occurred, it was ‘62,
[1009]Mr. Johnson. And Mr. Angleton, you used a term that is
[1010]unfamiliar to us: his inks.
[1012]Mr. Miler. Secret inks.
[1014]Mr. Angleton. Secret inks. “In other words, the Germans
[1016]had captured a Soviet agent who had the same kind of
[1018]inks, and so therefore the inks were compromised, so they laid
[1019]on a large operation in Berlin and trained him in highly
[1020]sophisticated inks. And he is now residing not too far
[1021]distant from us.
[1023]But I might add that it is very important to note that whil
[1025]we maintained that he is a Soviet agent, and the Bureau disagreec
[1027]|
[1028]1
[1030]TOP SECRET
[1032]e
[1033]d
[1036]2
[1037]2
[1041]6
[1044]g
[1046]410 First Street, SE., Wasnington, 0.C. 20003
[1048]and told us to send this off, wa had a development occur which
[1049]it is not necessary for ma to go into, it’s still a relatively
[1050]live case, in which proof positive came that he was a Soviet
[1051]agent, and it was in the face of ‘that proof positive that the
[1052]Bureau moved in and interrogated him. And that is what prompted
[1053]him to go to the Soviet embassy.
[1055]And after some hours there he came out, he was asked why
[1056]did you go to the Soviet embassy, and he said I went there to
[1057]get my personal history and particulars regarding my family
[1058]since those are the questions you have been asking me. In
[1059]other words, instead of -- in this case the man had a wife
[1060]who was having an affair off and on with a Japanese military
[1061]person here --. instead of recruiting the Japanese and the wife
[1062]to work in to him, because what we wanted was a confession,
[1063]because the point I want to stress here is in.a case of this
[1064]sort, a penetration there, he is not there as a solo person.
[1065]He is there as a spotter. He is a person used for entrapment
[1066]abroad. He is a person who can originate an operation,
[1067]induce you to go into the operation and bring in a weak
[1068]element, and put them in a position for curther recruitment.
[1069]And I can stretch this on and on,
[1071]And the classic example is the Philby case. philby
[1072]would have been Chief of British Intelligence. He was also
[1073]identified positively in the end by this defector. When the
[1075]defector first knew about it, it was called the Ring of Five
[1077]TOP SECRET
[1080]]
[1081]2
[1083]a
[1084]4
[1085]a
[1088]3
[1090]ALO First Street, $.E., Wasnrington, O.C. 26003
[1092]in the Soviet intelligence, five people, Philby being one.
[1093]But from the time he knew about it, in actual fact it
[1094]was a ring that went into the twenties, because the purpose
[1096]of the penetration is simply not to be a passive figure; itis
[1098]to be an aggressive figure who creates situations for recruit-
[1100]ment. And that case has. never been prosecuted. The man has
[1101]never confessed. He's never been broken. Ani yet it was in
[1102]the heart of our SB, Soviet Division activities.
[1104]Senator Hart of Colorado. Could. you give us, back to the
[1105]quantification, could you give us some figures for numbers of
[1106]counterintelliyence cases handled per year?
[1108]Mr. Angleton. Scotty, you can.
[1110]Senator Hart of Colorado. Just so we can have an idea
[1111]of the magnitude of volume.
[1113]Mr. Miler. Well, for example, one, program that we had
[1114]going was an attempt to record penetration recruitment attempts
[1115]of U.S., American officials abroad, strictly abroad. And over
[1116]a ten year period the number of attempts to recruit and
[1117]penetrate hit close to 1200. So we were running around 250 or
[1118]so a year, just in that one small area of counterintelligence
[1119]concern.
[1121]The number of cases that we had would vary, but I would
[1122]say that from defectors in the last ten year, from Soviet
[1123]and Soviet Bloc defectors, we averaged around 150 cases a
[1125]year, “At one time ~~ I do know that at one time we had over
[1127]TOP SECRET
[1130]2
[1133]a
[1134]a
[1135]is]
[1136]r
[1138]Ed
[1140]450 First Street, S.E., Wasnington, D.C. 20003
[1142]500 active cases which required investigation.
[1144]We were concerned with approximately 140 to 160 double
[1145]agent operations a year. We had investigations which woild
[1146]Probably have a range, 25 to 30, significant investigations
[1147]that were going on, in addition to which we would have a
[1149]number of investigations, leads and operations with cooperative ;
[1151]foreign intelligence and security services which would probably,
[1152]hit an average of about 50, if you would.
[1154]There were other operations which were generated from other
[1155]investigations and so forth, leads from the FBI, leads from
[1156]the military services, which would perhaps hit 30 or 40 .
[1157]a year.
[1159]Senator Hart of Colorado. What about the number of cases
[1160]involving penetration, successful or otherwise, of thé Agency
[1163]Mr. Angleton, Well, the basic responsibility would be
[1164]the Office of Security. In other words, we would work with
[1165]them, but it tends to be a one way street, as it should be,
[1166]namely, they are responsible for personnel and for installations.
[1167]But from the one defector alone, I would say there were five
[1168]hard leads.
[1170]- Senator Hart of Colorado. Over what period of time?
[1172]Mr. Angleton. Of this one defector who came out in
[1174]December of ‘Gl. But his leads were going back to ‘S51, 1951.
[1176]Mr. diGenova. Is this the same defector with whom the
[1178]TOP SECRET
[1181]Prone (Ares 202) 344-6009
[1183]Pl
[1184]2
[1187]4
[1188]o
[1193]410 First Street, $.E.. Wasnington, O.C. 70003
[1195]FBI has had no contact since 1965?
[1197]Mr. Angleton. That's correct.
[1199]Mr. diGenova. Has the Agency had any contact with him
[1200]since 1965?
[1202]Mr. Angleton. Yes, we've had it, but we've had our
[1203]ups and downs.
[1205]Mr. diGenova. And what have those ups and downs been
[1206]attributable to?
[1208]Mr. Angleton. Well, they are basic ~- well, first, there
[1209]are two different attitudes in the American intelligence
[1210]community regarding defectors. One of them is to give them
[1211]the harsh treatment and to treat them as second class citizens,
[1213]and we actually have taken on more salvage cases in the
[1214]Counterintelligence Staff and rehabilitated these people. In
[1215]fact, we came into that case basically because the fellow had
[1216]gone sour. And --
[1218]Mr. Kirbow. Meaning he had failed to continue cooperating:
[1219]or was not giving you the right information?
[1221]Mr. Angleton. That's right. Well, no, it was simply that
[1222]he refused to cooperate any further, because one didn't appre-
[1223]ciate the ideological reasons for his defection,
[1225]So these ups and downs would:go on -- I mean, we would
[1226]have to change case officers because they would simply have a
[1228]breakdown in communication.
[1230]Mr. diGenova. Did the failure of the FBI to utilize this
[1232]TOP SECRET
[1235]asset inhibit -you in any way from using the asset or the Agency |
[1236]from utilizing it? |
[1238]Mr. Angleton. Absolutely, because so much of the infor-
[1239]mation that we wanted to take up with him was also related to
[1240]FBI information.
[1242]Mr. diGenova. In other words, you needed access to
[1243]information the FBI had, and you couldn't get it?
[1245]Mr. Angleton. We could get it but they wouldn't give
[1246]permission that their information would be submitted to him.
[1248]Mr. @iGenova. In other words, you had a third agency
[1250]rule blocking you?
[1252]Mr. Angleton. A third agency, also in the attitude.
[1254]For instance, in one session in which I participated, the
[1256]2
[1257])
[1259]a
[1260]a
[1261]Q
[1264]8
[1266]Bureau asked him to give the name of a source. He refused to
[1267]give it on the grounds chat the man was in the KGB, was a
[1268]friend of his, and he didn't. want that man's name ever to
[1269]get back to the KGB because it would mean the man's life.
[1271]And therefore he had a direct confrontation, refusing to give
[1273]LS)
[1275]it, very understandable,
[1277]0.c. 20003
[1279]Mr, diGenova. Was this lack of cooperation directly
[1283]attributable to Mr. Hoover, to your knowledge?
[1284]Mr. Angleton. no.
[1285]Mr. diGenova. Was this problem ever brought to the
[1287]attention of the President of the United States at any time?
[1289]410 First Street, S.£., Wasmington,
[1291]Mr. Angleton, No, but he raised it with the Attorney
[1293]TOP SECRET.
[1296]we
[1298]General Mr. Kennedy,.he had a direct meeting with him.
[1299]Mr. diGenova. And what, if anything, happened?
[1300]Mr. Angleton. Ohly encouragement.
[1301]Mr. diGenova. Could you amplify on that?
[1302]Mr. Angleton. Well, the Attorney General handled him
[1303]well indeed, but nothing. further came out of it.
[1305]Mr. diGenova. But there was no commitment on the part of
[1307]the Attorney General to see if he could budge: Mr. Hoover to
[1309]assist the Agency?
[1311]Mr. Angleton. Well, the issue didn't come up in that
[1313]fashion, just the general, the general agreement that he was
[1315]prepared to work. for the United States at the highest level,
[1317]because the intelligence he had went far beyond simply KGB.
[1319]2
[1323]e
[1325]rs
[1327]z
[1329]It went into Soviet policy. It went into Soviet reorientation.
[1330]It went into Soviet Bloc. It went into Soviet defense matters.
[1331]It went into some of the major secrets. And therefore it wasn'
[1332]simply counterintelligence. It had to do with policy or
[1334]political action.
[1336]Ue knew, for example, the identity of a Prime Minister
[1337]who was a Soviet agent, who at that time was trying to get us
[1338]to go into several political arrangements, and he knew
[1339]exactly how he was recruited and how he was being used as an
[1341]agent of influence.
[1343]So these were matters that went beyond simply intelligence
[1345]410 Forst Street, 5.€., Wathington, O.C. 20003
[1347]scope.
[1349]TOP SECRET
[1352]Mr. Kirbow. How long is a man like that good for, Mr.
[1353]Angleton? I mean, by this time, or a decade from now, a lot
[1354]of that information is of no longer any value to you.
[1356]Mr. Angleton. Nu, that's not so. It 4g @ fact that the
[1357]man has a computer mind. In other words, if you took all of
[1359]his interrogation reports, they ran to some 20 filing cabinets.
[1361]You try to have anyone retain in their mind, to apply that
[1362]same data against a new problem that comes up, it requires an
[1363]individual who lived that to be able to look at a case that
[1365]10 has arisen, and he knows the case officer on the Soviet side,
[1367]11 and he can give an analysis that this fellow was on the Scandi-!
[1369]12 navian desk and that he was promoted to this, and that his :
[1371]i
[1372]13 background is ciphers. He had not told you that he: was ciphers
[1374]P]
[1375]3
[1377]a
[1378]e
[1379]i]
[1382]z
[1384]14 before because it wasn't relevant. So it's a new, added
[1385]15 factor.
[1386]16 And then you find that -. someone.is - known
[1388]17 as a code clerk, and therefore the pieces begin to fit
[1390]128 together, that the man who was sent to the field by the Soviets
[1392]. 1
[1393]. . . 1
[1394]19 to handle some unknown American is a cipher expert, and therefore
[1396]20 you look among who are the code clerks.
[1398]21 Mr. diGenova. I'd like to
[1400]Mr. Miller. Could I interrupt just a moment?
[1402]You spoke in this instance of 20 file cabinets from tho
[1404]interrogation of one defector.
[1406]410 Farst Stroet, SE., Wasnington, D.C. 20003
[1408]Mr. Angleton. Yes,
[1410]TOP SECRET
[1413]2
[1416]a
[1417]a
[1418]a
[1421]5
[1423]410 Firat Street, $.£., Wasnington, D.C. 20003
[1425]SETTERS
[1427]'S E
[1429]Mr. Miller. What kind of volume did you put together in
[1430]your years dn this activity? If this is the product of one
[1431]interrogation, what kind of volume did you put together to
[1432]make a workable capability?
[1434]Mr. Angleton. Well, the first thing was to computerize
[1435]everything, and the second was to break it out case by case,
[1436]British cases, Australian cases, New Zealand cases, Dutch
[1437]cases, Finnish cases, French cases, Italian cases, all the
[1438]way on across the board, American cases; and then to take all
[1439]of the data, all of the voluminous stuff that was pertinent
[1440]to each of the leads, including the unknowns , in other words,
[1441]Unknown 1, Unknown 2, Unknown 3, etc.
[1443]So you had the ability to pick out a file on X% subject or
[1445]X individual, and there would be the direct quotation from the
[1447]interrogation, and then whatever traces there were of follow-up4,
[1449]action taken, dissemination, etc.
[1451]Mr. Miller. Just to press that ~~ yes.
[1453]Mr. Miler. I think your question is the total volume of
[1454]the files that were available to the Counterintelligence?
[1456]Mr. Miller. Yes. I was impressed by the fact that one
[1457]interrogation yielded 20 file cabinets, and was wondering the
[1458]total volume.
[1460]Mr. Miler. What were the figures on the cases to read?
[1462]Mr. Angleton. Well, I think I've already presented that
[1464]once, but when we were dealing with the new management and it
[1466]TOP SECRET
[1469]was all this business of objectives and management by objectives,
[1470]and the idea of changing Counterintelligence personnel every
[1472]two years and new faces and open it all up and the rest of it,
[1473]we ran a basic job on how many, if you took 20 cases that were
[1474]imperative for a Counterintelligence officer to read, what the
[1475]statistical side would be. Those 20 cases would run into enough
[1476]linear footage, which according to the mathematicians in the
[1478]Agency would take 22 man years to read, or if they were 100
[1480]percent incorrect, ll years to read. Those would be the 20
[1481]basic counterintelligence cases. |
[1483]And the purpose of it was simply to show that it was a
[1484]profession, and that there had to be longevity to build up
[1486]Counterintelligence officers.
[1488]]
[1491]a
[1493]i]
[1496]z
[1498]Mr. Johnson. Generally speaking, within the counterintelli-
[1500]gence organizations, it seems; to! you perform four activities:
[1501]1 a
[1503]liaison, research, operations and security.
[1504]Could you give us an idea of your own priorities in
[1505]terms of distributing manpower across those four activities?
[1506]Can you break it out that way?
[1507]Mr. Angleton. Well, it is difficult to break out, but
[1508]the orimary thing of all is the question of penetration in the
[1509]U.S. Government, and then in allied governments. That would le
[1511]my priority. In other words, when we had a defector from the
[1513]Cuban service who had information of an agreement made between
[1515]410 Furst Steeet, $.€., Wasnington, B.C. 20003
[1517]the KGB and the DGI in Cuba to work against the U.S. and now
[1519]TOP SECRET
[1522]they would differentiate ‘the priorities, and areas where the
[1523]KGB was oversurveilled, the DGI would take over the surveillanc
[1524]of our personnel and so on. .
[1526]The moment this defector arrived in the United States, I
[1527]sent Scotty to the airport immediately to see him because that's
[1528]the number one priority. Nere was an individual whose job
[1529]was to work on Americans and who allegedly had seen information
[1530]from one of our embassies. Now, that is the highest priority,
[1531]and particularly because information of a counterintelligence
[1533]nature is perishable. Some is and some isn't,
[1535]The moment there is a defector, the opposition runa a
[1537]PAUL
[1539]damage report. So you know certain information will be known
[1541]to them immediately that is compromised, and they will take
[1544]a
[1547]g
[1549]action to correct it. But there are certain secrets that the
[1550]man knows that their damage report will not turn up. Those
[1552]you put on the back burner. But the ones you reach for first
[1553]are those that are perishable, and this is -- the priority is
[1554]established by the fact that here is a live, highly valuable
[1556]Bre ka
[1557]force, and we only have so much time to extract the cream off
[1559]of him and determine those things that would disappear.
[1560]Mr. Miler. But the whole thrust of all of our operations,
[1562]research, analysis, everything, was toward that goal. And much!
[1563]of the reason for the security of the compartmentation for !
[1565]the CI activity was to protect that concern.
[1567]$10 First Street, $.€_, Wasnington, pe. 20003
[1569]Mr. Lombard, I wonder if I could ask a question concerning
[1571]TOP SECRET
[1574]4
[1577]rs
[1578]e
[1579]a
[1580]g
[1582]8
[1584]416 First Street, S.E., Washington, O.C. 20003
[1586]the Bureau,
[1588]“Would it help today if there was a separate Bureau under
[1590]the Attorney General for counterintelligence, separate from the!
[1592]FBI?
[1594]Mr. Angleton. You are posing the same problem that the
[1595]RCMP ‘in Canada had. In other words, they set up, Io might add
[1596]because of us, because wa brought them into counterintelligence |
[1597]in a way they had never been brought into it, we brought them
[1598]down when this first defector, this major defector came out,
[1599]and the cases that were revealed to them, cryptonyms, telegrams:
[1600]that were taken from them, an ambassador who was recruited,
[1601]One of their ambassadors and all this, led in time to the
[1602]Canadian Prime Minister desiring to set up a special counter-
[1603]intelligence. And so they had this problem of how you take
[1604]a law enforcement force and what do you do about it. And
[1605]their ultimate decision was that you had to keep it within the
[1606]RCMP. You created the separate office, and you created sort
[1607]of a director general of it, but the cadre, your people came
[1608]from the regular force, even though they are separated from
[1609]the rest of the RCMP, and they are independent of the Commissios
[1610]of the RCMP. I mean, they are there for rations and quarters.
[1612]Mr. Lombard. I guess what I had in mind was more the
[1613]British model of the Yard having --
[1615]Mr. Angleton. Well, the British model is the most
[1617]d
[1618]overexaggerated model in the world. I think I can quite
[1620]TOP SECRET
[1623]honestly state that since World War II the British have never
[1624]caught an agent where the lead didn't come from us or somebody
[1625]else. It was never self-generated.
[1627]Now, in the last year or so maybe they caught an agent,
[1628]but up until that time they have never caught an agent.
[1630]Mr. Lombard. So your answer, in effect, would be that
[1632]the counterintelligence function should stay within the Bureau.
[1633]Mr. Angleton. That is correct. I mean, not that it's
[1634]ideal, but in terms of the realities, in terms of the realities
[1635]it should be kept within the Bureau. It should, be greatly
[1636]enlarged, and the head of that should be, in my view, a Deputy
[1637]Director of the Bureau.
[1638]Mr. Lombard. All right.
[1640]Now, let me ask you this. In your experience were there
[1642]a
[1643]3
[1645]a
[1646]4
[1647]a
[1649]4
[1650]z
[1652]problems where the law enforcement impded the running of
[1654]counterintelligence or counterespionage operations domestically?
[1656]In other words, were there times when you would have liked to
[1657]have run an agent domestically for a longer period of time
[1658]in order to get the rest of the guys, but they said no, we've
[1659]got to take this fellow to court now?
[1661]Mr. Angleton. That used to be prevalent back in the '50s.
[1663]Today I don't think they've got many cases. I mean, I don't
[1665]think that the job is being done, not in the last ten years.
[1667])
[1669]Mr. Johnson. Mr. Angleton, when I asked you earlier
[1671]416 First Strewt, $.£.. Wasmington, O.C. 20003
[1673]what your priorities were, you mentioned making sure that
[1675]TOP SECRET
[1678]WARD & PAUL,
[1680]410 First Street, S.E., Wasnington, 6.c. 20003
[1682]we were not penetrated in conducting investigations to see if
[1683]in fact we were, which seems to give the impression that we
[1684]are defensively oriented, and that was your main priority.
[1686]Mr. Angleton. Well, I think that how could you have it
[1687]any other way? -
[1689]If you've got a cryptonym of telegrams disappearing and
[1690]are in possession of the opposition --
[1692]Mr, Johnson, But isn't the aggressive dimension even
[1694]more important and trying to penetrate the hostile service?
[1696]|
[1697]|
[1698]Mr. Angleton. Those are all kind of theoretical argunents|
[1699]i
[1701]to my way of thinking.
[1703]Mr. Miler. You have to know what you're penetrating first.
[1705]Mr. Angleton. Imean, this idea of running operations is
[1706]not really understood.
[1708]To run a double agent operation requires a tremendous
[1709]amount of manpower. It is a commitment that very few people
[1710]understand. If you are going to run a double, I mean, to start’
[1711]from the beginning, you've got to be able to keep a diary.
[1713]Now, one is the real life is the real life of the agent and
[1714]the other is his double life, because you can have a question
[1715]from his headquarters that says, that agent you had three
[1716]years ago, would you please go back to him. You've got to
[1718]be able to read into a diary of the fictional life in order
[1720]to answer that guestion.
[1722]Now, this takes manpower. You've got to have meetings.
[1724]TOP SECRET
[1727]d
[1730]6
[1732]i‘
[1735]B
[1737]410 Forst Street, 5 €., Wasmington, o.c. 20003
[1739]You've got to be able to satisfy
[1741]he quastionnaires, and you
[1742]can go all the way on dowa the line. This ties up thousands of
[1743]man-hours.
[1745]Mr. Johnson. Could you explain that “satisfy the
[1748]What does that phrase mean, "satisfy the queationnaires?"
[1750]Mr. Angleton. The opposition wants-to know, find out
[1751]from your sources the following questions.
[1753]Mr. Miler. In other words, the requirements they put
[1754]on the agent. ‘
[1756]Mr. Angleton. Now, that agent is allegedly in the CIA
[1757]and there is a penetration, then you are just going through
[1758]games, and they will play such an operation. They could have
[1759]a very senior penetration into the Agency and play along on
[1760]a double in order to lead you to believe that they do not have
[1761]a penetration. And they can tie up your manpower and put
[1762]doubles underneath him and another agent, and they can give
[1763]him a radio set, and with the radio set they can give him
[1764]crystals, and he needs other crystals, and it involves more
[1765]and more of your own personnel and manpower. And you can
[1766]tie up NSA | monitoring all the links.
[1768]And so this idea that has all of a sudden been novel and
[1769]newly discovered in the Agency that Counterintelligence must
[1770]pe aggressive is in my view a joke. It's a joke.
[1772]Mr. Miler. You have to know what you're dealing with.
[1774]TOP SECRET
[1777]Z
[1778]3
[1780]a
[1782]a
[1785]z
[1787]410 Ferst Street, $.E.. Washington, 0.C. 20003
[1789]You have to understand the enemy intéliilgence service before
[1790]you're going to penetrate it, and you have to be secure from
[1791]penetration yourself, and you then have to run that penetration
[1792]very securely and on a very compartmented basis.
[1794]Mr. Angleton. And there is one added proviso, then, that
[1796]you can only run a first rate double agent if you have a
[1798]source superior to him that he is unaware of, In the war,
[1800],
[1802]when we broke the German code, it was no problem to run German
[1804]double agents because we could read their messages back to
[1806]their headquarters, re-enciphered, and the headquarters messaqes
[1808]back to the control, back to our double. So questions of
[1812]danger signals, questions of alerting him that he was under
[1813]control and so on was taken care of because of communications
[1814]intelligence.
[1816]‘When you don't have communications intelligence, then
[1817]the only other source that is superior is penetration, that is, !
[1818]somebody who can read back from their headquarters how they are,
[1819]in fact, absorbing the thrust of that double agent. And those
[1820]conditions do not exist for the’ Bureau or for ourselves,
[1822]Mr. Miler. Or for the military services, to run a lot
[1823]ef double agents.
[1825]Mr. Angleton. I mean, they do not have the superior
[1826]source of control over double agents.
[1828]Senator Hart of Colorado, Why is that?
[1830]Mr. Angleton. Ueccause they are one, not breaking codes, o
[1832]TOP SECRET
[1835]they don't have the penetrations in the opposition against whom
[1836]you run the double.
[1837]Senator Hart of Colorado. But what is the prescription?
[1838]that mean we can't do that or we aren't, or what?
[1839]Mr. Angleton. Well, we haven't succeeded, 1 mean, we
[1840]had Popov and Penkosky, and both of them are dead. They
[1842]shot.
[1844]Mr. Johnson. It must be easier to penetrate the so-called:
[1845]Third World than it is the so-called Soviet Bloc.
[1847]Mr. Angleton. Absolutely.
[1849]Mr. Miler. But that's not getting you exactly what you
[1850]want or need either. And you can divert an awful lot of time,
[1852]effort and manpower to running what in essence would eventually
[1857]ry
[1858]4
[1864]boil down in a year OF two years to operations for operations '
[1866]gake. It will look good in:statistics. It will justify your
[1868]pudget request to the OMB, It will justify your counterintellir
[1869]gence effort in terms of management objectives, because you've
[1870]increasea from 22 double agent operations to 46 last year, but
[1872]what is the net result, and how much time, effort and so forth
[1874]are you actually using, and where are you losing focus on
[1876]what the real problems are facing the country in terms of
[1877]penetration and in terms of knowledge and in counterintelligence:
[1878]Mr. diGenova. The picture which both you and Mr. Angleton
[1880]paint this new face of counterintelligence from your point of
[1882]410 Feest Street, SE. wasnington, 0.C, 20003
[1884]view is a rather gloomy one because your comments seem to
[1886]TOP SECRET
[1889]2
[1890]2
[1892]a
[1894]i)
[1896]4
[1897]8
[1899]B10 Fist Street, S.E., Waihington, O.c. 270003
[1901]indicate that you believe that this dacentralization, Lack of
[1902]compartmentation and in general, spreading the counterintellige
[1903]function around is eventually going to lead to a breakdown in
[1904]the end product. We're not going to be yetting what we should
[1905]be getting. You may be getting bigger statistics, and on the
[1906]face it may look like we're getting more, but in fact we're
[1907]not.
[1909]Mr, Miler. You're not going to get substance.
[1911]Mr. diGenova. Why ws that decision made? That seems to
[1913]be so fundamentally apparent by the way you explain it? surely,
[1915]the Director must have made that decision for a reason?
[1917]Do you know why?
[1919]Mr. Angleton. Mr. Miler has known him more than ~~
[1920]than I have. Would you?
[1922]Mr. Miler. Yes, t'il offer my opinion on it.
[1924]Mr. diGenova. We would jike to have it.
[1926]Mr. Miler. The basic reason is that neither the current
[1927]director nor the incumbent DDO understand or perceive of what
[1928]counterinteliigence actually igs and what function it has, and
[1930]what the CIA's responsibility is for counterintelligence to
[1932]the nation. That is my personal opinion. They do not -- they
[1934]have not had experience in counterintelligence. They've never
[1935]worked in counterintelligence. And quite frankly, they do not
[1936]understand the problems involved in counterintelligence.
[1938]Counterintelligence, as articulated previously by the
[1940]TOP SECRET
[1943]current DDO, was station security“ and liaison.
[1945]Mr. Kirbow. Can you see this getting any better with
[1946]your new selectee who is coming from the outside world?
[1947]Probably knows the term counterintelligence, but knows nothing
[1948]about the intelligence community basically?
[1950]Mr. Miler. I don't -- quite frankly, I couldn't comment
[1951]on Mr. Bush at all, but if Mr. Bush is going to have to rely
[1952]on the current management and the current management of counter:
[1954]intelligence in the CIA, it is my view that he will get
[1956]completely erroneous information and not have the advantage
[1958]of understanding counterintelligence, and would be forced to
[1959]make decisions which ultimately will be tragic to this
[1961]country as far as counterintelligence is concerned, from
[1963]2
[1964]3
[1966]i
[1967]a
[1968]6
[1971]B
[1973]ignorance.
[1975]Senator Hart of Colorado. What kind of erroneous
[1976]information?
[1978]mr, Miler. What counterintelligence is, how it should
[1979]be organized, what the threat to the nation is that can be
[1980]hopefully countered by an effective counterintelligence organi-
[1981]zation which is integrated between the CIA, the FBI, the
[1982]military services, the Department of State, and all other
[1984]agencies concerned.
[1986]You are going to have to have a perception of the real
[1988]problems and what is involved in counterintelligence in order
[1990]410 Firsa Street, SE. Washington, D.C. 70003
[1992]to organize or reorganize the CIA's counterintelligence efforts,
[1994]TOP SECRET
[1997]4
[1998]2
[2000]a
[2001]4
[2002]a
[2005]z
[2007]&10 First Street, S.E., Wasmingion, 6.C, 20003
[2009]to promote the best kind of a national pr gran.
[2011]Senator Hart of Colorado. Assume something about, Mr.
[2012]Angleton mentioned. earlier, about the tendency to sweep
[2013]penetrations under the rug in this country.
[2015]Nas there been a pattern in the past that still prevails
[2016]of reluctance on the part of professional intelligence
[2017]officials as well as administration officials to admit
[2018]we are sueceptible to that?
[2020]Mr. Angleton. Well, I think there ig no question
[2021]there has been a tromendous dishonesty in facing up to
[2022]facts an intelligence.
[2024]rai take the Yom Kippur war as an example. As you know,
[2025]it was a complete failure in terms of prediction. As I main-
[2026]tained in my testimony, if you cannot make a proper estimate
[2027]in a primitive area, then God help you when you come into the
[2028]Bloc area, and I still hold by that conviction.
[2030]But in that case, a few days prior to the Yom Kippur war,
[2031]the FBI disseminated a report to the President, the Secretary
[2032]of State, Defense and the Director of CIA which purported to
[2033]be a discussion between Gromyko and a very senior source
[2034]to the effect that they had given up on the Arabs, that toey
[2035]would no longer support the ara§s, they would no longer give
[2036]them arms, that they were going to recognize Israel, and in
[2038]‘fact they had the draft notes ready for the recognition of
[2040]Israel.
[2042]TOP SECRET
[2045]2
[2046]2
[2049]CT]
[2050]6
[2053]5
[2055]410 First Street, $.€., Wasningion, 0.0. 20003
[2057]Now, I have never seen the post mortem of the whole projec
[2058]on the estimation, but I would assume that any estimator who
[2059]received information by letter or memorandum, hand-carried,
[2060]quoting Gromyko, would tend to discount tha fact that the Arabs!
[2061]were about to attack Israel where they would have to depend on
[2062]Soviet arms, and therefore the question of the Yom Kippur war
[2063]would be out of the question. In other words, that one report, ;
[2064]I give it as an example.
[2066]Now, independently a study group of the Joint Chiefs came
[2067]up with the whole question of Soviet disinformation, strategic
[2068]disinformation to put us off balance on our estimating process
[2070]Now, in our own Agency we were heavily frowned upon for
[2071]raising these questions, that there was a strong element of
[2072]Soviet deception and disinformation that had been injected into
[2073]the intelligence collecting program.
[2075]Mr, Miler. Prior to the Yom Kippur war.
[2077]Mr. Angleton. Prior to that. But the important thing
[2078]is that that source who provided the Bureau with that infor-
[2079]mation has been providing information over a number of years,
[2080]but no one has made a study of information in hindsight in
[2081]order to evaluate that source.
[2083]And I could go' into many more sensitive cases of where
[2084]again intention has come through a highly questionable source,
[2086]and yet there has been nao re-examination. There has been no
[2088]grouping or forum in which there can be any disputation. Each
[2090]TOP SECRET
[2093]a
[2094]3
[2097]a
[2098]a
[2099]t
[2103]410 First Street, SE. washington, 0.€. 70003
[2105]TOP SECRET
[2108]Senator Ilart of Colorado. It seems tome that you're
[2109]suggesting at the very least a.naivete on the part of our
[2111]government and at the worst, I.don't know what.
[2113]Prone (Ares 202)
[2115]i
[2116]Mr. Angleton, Well, I do suggest that there is a naivete.}
[2117]There is no counter-disinformation group. There's no one who ever
[2119]studies: --. most of the information today that goes into tauch
[2121]of =- it's mainly scientific. The human part of it is small.
[2123]Now most of it is from overt sources,
[2125]Mr. Johnson. What about tho Inner-agency Committee on
[2126]Defectors? Poesn't that review?
[2128]Mr. Angleton. It has nothing to do with it.
[2130]Mr. Joanson, What does that do?
[2132]tr. Angleton, That only allocates or handles the mechanics
[2134]4
[2137]a
[2138]4
[2139]a
[2142]z
[2144]of who talks to the defector and what are the priorities ane
[2145]questionnaires and whatnot.
[2147]‘ty, diGenova. The order of interrogation.
[2149]nr. Miler. It is a clearing house to get the inforiation |
[2151]W disseminated.
[2153]“ty, diGenova. Mr. Angleton, t'm interested in going
[2154]bac to one nart of your inmost recent response about the fact
[2155]i of your or the CT staff's concerns about the Israeli problean
[2157]which you alluded to was frowned upon within the Agency.
[2159]What forn did that take? I'd be interested to know that.
[2161]tr, Angleton. “ell, it took this form, that a person
[2163]4)0 First Street, $.€., Watrinaton, O.C. 70003
[2165]working with Scotty who takes his military duty over there,
[2167]TOP SECRET
[2170]a
[2171]3
[2174]6
[2175]a
[2178]z
[2180]20003
[2182]S1G First Stemet, $.€., Waimngton, B.C.
[2184]two weeks every year and whatnot, and who is very high on S&T
[2185]intelligence, arranged for these Joint Chiefs and this group
[2186]to come over and to address an audience of hand~picked peoplc.
[2187]So this covered both the overt side of the Nouse --
[2189]Mr. Miler. The three directorates; intelligenca,
[2190]operations, and S&T. .
[2192]Mr. Angleton. And they laid out their entire thesis,
[2193]i
[2195]and we added to that to the FBI report to which I referred.
[2197]i
[2198]Afterwards I was severely criticized for having wasted everybody's
[2200]time on that matter and told that if they realized it was’
[2201]going to be that type of thing, we would never. have permitted
[2202]it to have taken place, et cetera, et cetera,
[2204]Me. Kirbow, Was this by the three directorates?
[2206]Me. “Lller. No, that was from the directorate of
[2207]operations. The directorate of SaT , Scientific. and Technical
[2208]was impressed hy the presentation and subsequently said that
[2209]there was very great need for thought in this. And I think
[2210]also, dim, that concurrently in the operations I had an officer
[2211]who was working on discernible or apparent deception as reflectce
[2212]in CIA reporting from the field of Soviet disinformation
[2213]concerning the situation in the Middle Last.
[2215]And wo did a tremencoun study on this and which was
[2216]commletely discounted and thrown out and it wasn't even
[2218]considered,
[2220]Mr. Miller. Well, in the Yon Kippur War, if I'm not
[2222]TOP SECRET
[2225]1 | mistaken, there was “a SIGINT. alert. the HSA ‘collection systems
[2226]- ware of such nature their analysts said it looks like there's
[2227]going to be a war within 24 hours. They.-predicted the time.
[2228]They sent it over, It was immediately said, go back to bed.
[2229]‘gs || Ia that correct?
[2230]6 Nr. Angleton. All I know about it is tho alleged part
[2231]7 | of that. XY remember the Pike Report that caused a great deal
[2232]g | of comment. I thought that the four magic words were that
[2233]g || NSA was not able to make a contribution hecause the Egyptians
[2234]10 had gone into a high SIGINT alert.
[2235]11 In other words, that through SIGINT they couldn't learn
[2236]12 the intention. I don't know this fact that you are tabelling.
[2238]13 Mr, Miller. I think Mr. Miler is
[2240]J
[2243]a
[2245]a
[2248]z
[2250]14 Mr, Miler. he. point that we're trying to make in this
[2252]15 connection is part and parcel of Soviet espionage, Soviet
[2254]16 intelligence service activity and Soviet bloc intelligence
[2256]7 service activity is in the political field. It involves
[2258]18 decention and disinformation, A properly coordinated and run
[2260]19 counter-intelligence effort will bring research and analytical! :
[2262]20 work to hear which would give an analysis and an assassment
[2263]2] the situation, which should be of value to policy-makers
[2264]be
[2266]the government, to the intelligence directorate of the cr..,
[2267]thea Director of the CIA, and that what has happened in th.
[2269]CIA sinea mid-1973 is that there has been erosion of this
[2271]410 Feat Street, $.£., Washington, O.C. 20003
[2273]facility which cannot be divorced from counter-intelliyence
[2275]TOP SECRET
[2278]Phone (Araa 202)3%4-6000
[2280]4
[2282]4
[2283]a
[2284]4
[2285]fe}
[2288]z
[2290]410 Fost Steeet, $.€., Wasmingtan, O.C, 20003
[2292]1
[2294]2
[2296]3
[2298]because as you focus and even as you focus on what the current
[2299]popular term, aggressive counter-intelligence operations, you
[2300]have to have some knowledge of this in order to be able to
[2301]equate, assess and avaluate your so-called penetration of
[2303]a Soviat or Soviet bioc intelligence service to see if it is
[2304]real, You have to havea litmus paper to judge your penetration
[2305]And without that litmus, you are completely at the mercy of
[2307]a system which is orchestrated and which is essentially
[2309]directed and controlled.
[2310]Mr. Miller. So what you're saying is from mid-1973 on
[2311]the country, or at least the CIA has lost a valuable asset.
[2312]What happened in '73? What was the decision?
[2313]Me. Angleton. That's the decentralization, when all
[2314]of these components were taken away from us, including the
[2315]liaison and whatnot, inclucing international communist parties.
[2316]So this commletely viscerated the counter-intelligence
[2317]as we have built it up since 1954.
[2319]tle were, I would say without question in the Westorn
[2321]; world, we save the leadership. We created all of the inter-
[2323]governmental committees, We brought services from einy
[2324]fragmented units up into major components of their government,
[2325]tho five major countries, which meant we reoriented their
[2326]services along oriorities that met our reauirements, and I
[2327]don't think there was any question that we were the acknowlnd
[2329]Jeaders in the Western world.
[2331]TOP SECRET
[2334]2
[2339]o
[2342]B
[2344]20003
[2346]$.E., Wasnengton, 0.€,
[2348]A1G Feese Street,
[2352]Ry the same tokan, it induced people to bring their casas
[2353]to us for analysis, They came to g@e@ us many times to see
[2354]the defectors, the stable of defectors that we had for
[2355]interrogation.
[2357]j
[2359]So that alone was a tremendous acquisition of counter-
[2360]intelligence data which would not have otherwise have been
[2361]available to this country.
[2363]Mr. Kirbow. And it's not available today because of this
[2364]spreading of the --
[2366]Mr, Angleton. Well, that's what they say. I mean I've
[2367]had one or more chicf of intelligence who have surreptitiously
[2368]seen me since my departure. And they will naturally work
[2369]as far as they can with the agency.
[2371]Mr, Miller. When you say us, who do you mean?
[2373]tr. Angleton, How did I use it?
[2375]“Mr. “Miller. You wera referring to your canability prior
[2376]to 1973.
[2378]Miler. The CI staff,
[2380]Angleton. ‘The CI staff.
[2382]Miller. The CI staff. Well, what were the numbers,
[2383]what was the capability that, you had translated into seople,
[2384]into files?
[2386]. Angleton, Well, at the highest point we hada lite}
[2388]over 290 neople. That was clerical and officers.
[2390]ur, Miller. What seems a fairly small group.
[2392]TOP SECRET
[2395]WARD & PAUL
[2397]206603
[2399]SiG Fest Stewet, $.£., Wasnenaton, O.C.
[2401]Mr. Angleton, Well, they ware a hardworking group. We
[2403]were understaffed. Thera wera many thinga we could have
[2404]taken on and I'll give you one example because it is still
[2405]pending, and it gets down to the question of penetration,
[2407]But when Philby was stationed in Washington, he was
[2408]given communications intelligence clearance so iff NSA broke
[2409]into the Bulgarian traffic, he could go to his Soviet control
[2410]and tell them that we were reading Bulgarian traffic. A secret
[2412]f that sort permits them to make use of the Bulgarian
[2413]traffic as a deception channel the moment they know you are
[2414]reading it. That hecomes a powerful instrument in their
[2415]hands to deceive.
[2417]Now my point is this: ‘lo one has made an analysis fron
[2418]the day that he was briefed on that particular traffic of whv
[2419]the traffic continued for two more years and then gradually
[2420]pnetered out of what was put into that traffic which, ££ you
[2421]took that and identified an item of decention that cane from
[2423]he opnosition, vou then look at your own agent reports and
[2425]ind what agents at the same time were fortifving that lie
[2427]for that niece of deception, And it would point a finger on
[2429]yacents who, in fact, were under control,
[2431]Now this is just one small exercise, HSA nas preserved
[2433]Navary single niece of paper. Tn other words, there's literally
[2435]hundreds of thousands of paves G2 available material for such
[2437]an analysis, ane I worked very closely with Lou ordella.
[2439]TOP SECRET
[2442]2
[2443]3
[2445]a
[2447]i}
[2448]a
[2450]z
[2454]410 Fass Street, S.£., Watningten, D.C.
[2456]In fact, one of our effort or common efforts was I brought him
[2457]into counter-intelligence. I brought him in with all these
[2458]foreign chiefs and whatnot in order to anlarge the scope of
[2459]NSA, since thay can study and frame these patterns, they
[2461]can get into illegal traffics and get into many facets.
[2463]It's one, of the bast outfits, as far as I know, in the
[2464]U.S. government, but they had always heen denied these facts
[2465]that I just stated, such as Philby's access, the clearances,
[2466]the various espionage cases that have happened in the west,
[2467]the people that have had communications intelligence clearance.
[2469]Senator Hart of Colorado. Could we have a Philby level
[2470]penetration of our intelligence community?
[2472]Mr, Angleton. I'm not stating that there is one, but 1
[2473]have probably done more recruitment of higher level people in
[2474]my vouth in the business and I have never peen any respector
[2475]of rani. I've dealt with prime ministers, and I've dealt with
[2476]them at all levels.
[2478]And therefore, my point ts it is conceivable, it's
[2479]conceivable if you've got enough information, spotting informs:
[2480]tion, and you can nut a person into a certain kind of situatic:
[2481]recardless of his rank, you will find that he is recruitallo.
[2482]It ds a process of a fingernail, finger, hand, arm and hedy.
[2484]Senator liart of Colorado. But all of the grills that
[2486]Pam: pannle of tha Agency have to go through, lie detector ant
[2487]i 4 vy
[2489]so on, you're saying that they can get through that.
[2491]TOP SECRET
[2494]2
[2497]a
[2499]a
[2502]z
[2504]310 Furst Street, S.E., Wasmington, 3.0. 20002
[2506]10
[2508]11
[2510]Mr. Angleton. I don't think anyone regards the lie
[2511]detector to be anything more than just another investigative
[2512]instrument. It does help in the sense that there are certain
[2513]people susgeptible,.
[2514]past which they should have revealed, which, if you had
[2515]discovered independently, would have given you grounds to heliev
[2516]they were penetration, but once the machine begins to find that
[2517]they're goggling’ on something) then they :tome:out!and tees
[2518]say, well there's a story I haven't told you when I was in
[2519]Turkey, et cetera, et catera, et cetera, and wipes the slate
[2520]clean.
[2522]So it serves a useful purpose, But it's not -- I
[2523]wouldn't give it 20 percent credibility. Now the Office of
[2524]Security probably gives’it 70 or Maybe higher,
[2526]Me. diGenova., Mr, Angleton, the point you mada of the
[2528]lack of study of traffic which followed the deception in the
[2529]|
[2531]cable traffic, as I understand it, you're saying that there's
[2532]{ .
[2534]been no analysis that you're aware of since that time done of
[2537]i
[2538]I,
[2539]it
[2541]of everythine since then.
[2543]il ". Angleton. There's never been anv analysis ever.
[2544]diGenova. Is the current research set-un which cr
[2546]staff now has which is oriented toward instant studies, quote
[2548]junquote, to provide data for ongoing operations inconsistent
[2550]with wanting to achieve that sort of goal, like analyzing that
[2552]data?
[2554]TOP SECRET
[2557]Prone (Ares 202) S4-6009
[2559]2
[2560]2
[2562]rN
[2563]a
[2564]i)
[2565]a
[2567]z
[2569]20003
[2571]210 First Street, S.E., Wasnington, 0.C.
[2575]Mr. Angleton, ‘Well, I don't know what that really means,
[2576]instant analysis. I mean we've always done instant analysis.
[2578]Mr. diGenova, I know that but it's our understanding,
[2579]we've learned from the Agency that there has been a movement
[2580]away from in-depth historical research toward more current
[2581]sort of analyses,
[2583]What you're suggesting to me by saying that there's
[2584]been no analysis done of those cables is that we've lost a
[2585]valuable CI tool since that study hasn't been done, and I'd
[2586]like to know if your assessment of the current trend toward
[2587]research is a bad one?
[2589]Mr. Angleton. I think it makes no sense whatsoaver.
[2591]Mr. Miler. It's disastrous. It will lead to complete
[2592]chaos within a very short time because you're trying to analyse
[2593]an individual case without having the ability to relate 40
[2594]other cases to that case.
[2596]Mr. diGenova. Theré's no integration in other words.
[2598]Mr. Miler. That's right and you cannot operate in a
[2599]vacuum,
[2601]Mr. Angleton, We have learned from one defector, the
[2603]one of Necember ‘61 a complete new understanding of what
[2605]happened from the days of Lenin.
[2607]That is not in the public record. A complete new
[2608]picture of the growth of the OGPU and of the Cheka. And in
[2610]the reorientation of KGB part of the deStalinization in May
[2612]TOP SECRET
[2615]WARD & PAUL
[2617]200048
[2619]450 Ferst Street, SE. Waihingion, B.C.
[2621]of 1959, it was a raturn to the modus operandi of the Cheka.
[2623]And this is from an individual, fully, who had seen all of the
[2625]documents, fully versed in it so that thia plunged us back into
[2627]it and we began then to find leads. And I give one example.
[2629]Goneral Orlov, who died not long ago in the United
[2630]States, was the most senior NKVD KGB officer aver to defect,
[2631]and he died last year. The Bureau had interrogated him in
[2632]1953 after the death of Stalin with little or no success. He
[2633]knew the code name of Philby. The Agency tried to contact him
[2634]in '58 and had a very unhappy handling problem. We went back
[2635]into it shortly thereafter and we were able to go through his
[2636]book with him and he gave us the true identities of 34 agents
[2637]in France.
[2639]His uncle had been one of the senior men under Lenin,
[2640]head of NKVP in the Ukrain but with tremendous operations,
[2642]2
[2643]we spent up until his death, Mr. Recef, who was my deputy,
[2645]would travel to the Midwest and spend several weekends with him
[2647]‘of dredqing out and recreating the operations and penetrations
[2649]in British intelligence and the British navy and whatnot,
[2650]eventually qetting down, by recreating and reconstructing,
[2651]down to the identity. Now this is research, and these are
[2652]cases whera the Soviets had every reason to helieve that those
[2653]agents vere safe and secure because nothing had happened.
[2655]And when you make that tyne of identification unbeknownst
[2657]TOP SECRET
[2660]to them, then it gives you tremendous leverage of how you want
[2661]to play it, whether you move in to take him on as a double
[2662]or whether you move in to arrest him,
[2664]Mr. diGenova. And that isn't being done today.
[2666]Mr. Angleton, Well, thay can't do it because they don’t h.
[2667]‘Mr. Rooce and they have fired most of the personnel. One of .
[2668]the best men we had was from the Library of Congress and
[2669]knowing where to find every piece of information. inimhetgovern- j
[2670]ment has just heen transferred to, or he's been released or
[2671]hired back on contract, and when they are putting hin in the
[2672]Freedom of Information section as a contract agent.
[2674]ms .
[2675]And he has handled Ukraing, he's run agents, he speaks
[2677]2
[2682]a
[2685]3
[2687]Russian.
[2689]Mr. Johnson. We are going down with a represe::!/
[2690]of military intelligence later on this afternoon, Could you
[2691]tell us about the coordination hetween military CI and CIA
[2692]CI especially in the area of double agentry.
[2694]Mr. Angleton, Then I will just say one thing and then
[2695]Scotty will speak authoritatively to it,
[2697]Ye all came out of the war and therefore we are very
[2698]strongly in favor of a very strong military counter~intelligence..
[2700]And therefore, we've always given them highest priority of our
[2702]time. We've done the original training of the OSI people,
[2704]S10 Feest Street. S.£.. Wasmanaton, OC. 20003
[2706]We trained teachers who went out, who in turn trained
[2708]other people. ‘That was a three months course, if I recall,
[2710]TOP SECRET
[2713]Phone (Aree 202/464-4600
[2715]WARD ® PAUL
[2717]20003
[2719]410 Forst Street, $.€.. Waar gton, 3.0.
[2721]We rean a seminar using the highest talent that we had and
[2722]revealing as much information as we could conceivably reveal.
[2724]And so our whole mental attitude was that counter-intelli-
[2726]own forces. And I'm not going to justify the mail program at
[2729]I
[2730]gence, one of its highest priorities is the defense of its |
[2731]1
[2733]this time, but some day I'll justify it in print or otherwise
[2735]6
[2736]because it represents only .001 percent of Americans <- a.
[2737]small coterie of Americans who wrote to the Soviets when we
[2738]had troons in the field on two occasions, and our primary
[2739]duty was the support of those troops,
[2741]So that background Scotty can tell you but the relationshi
[2743]had with the military.
[2745]Mr. Miler. Well, the relationships with the counter~
[2746]intelligence with the military have varied. I would say that
[2747]for the most part it has been reasonably good, it has been
[2748]perhaps better in Washington than it has heen in the field.
[2750]With few excentions CIA field representatives have not heen
[2752]terribly concerned with conducting counter-intelligence. They
[2754]i have not cooperated to the extent that the military commanders
[2756]iin the field have wanted.
[2758]Some of this has to do with priorities that are imvose:!
[2759]on the CIA representatives from washington. Some of it has
[2760]to do with lack of manpower. Some of it has to do with the
[2761]fact that in the opinion of many of the CIA operatives, the
[2763]| Arinyy in particular, to a lesser extent the other services,
[2765]TOP SECRET
[2768]WARD & PAUL
[2770]BLO First Steeet, SE | Wasmengtian, OC. 20003
[2772]of a high enough level to justify the time and attention,
[2773]particularly of senior CIA representatives abroad.
[2775]It is, I- think, also a bit of a problem because the
[2776]priorities of military counter-intelligence in many instances
[2777]do not parallel or support CIA's priorities, They hava the
[2779]responsibility for the protection of thelr installations and
[2781]; .
[2782]there have also been imposed on the military the requirement
[2784]to build assets, what we term double agents which the military
[2785]term controlled foreign assets, as a contingency for possible
[2786]deception use.
[2788]Traditionally, also, the CIA, and in recent years thir
[2789]has been quite true, the CIA fleld operatives have wanted to
[2790]exploit military counter-intelligence assets for what is
[2791]termed aggressive positive intelligence or recruitment attempts
[2793]of the enemy agent or officer who was controlling the double
[2795]agent of the controlled foreign assat,
[2797]There has been traditionally a problem of coordination
[2799]; setween the military services, the CIA, and the FBI on double
[2801]agent operations.
[2802]I think overall this has worked reasonably well, given
[2804]the fact that -- in particular, for example, the system of
[2806]| chain of command in the Army is a very confused one and is not
[2808]i aasy to put your finger on. There are various echelons and
[2810]reporting procedures and so forth.
[2812]TOP SECRET
[2815]Me 7
[2817]From the counter-intelligence staff standpoint, in
[2818]particular what I was concerned with was an attempt to make
[2819]sure that there was a full integration. You see, under the
[2820]operating procedures and the responsibilities, the military
[2821]services are required to advise the CIA of its activities,
[2822]counter-intelligence and so forth abroad. In turn, they
[2823]advise the FBI of their counter-intelligence activities and
[2824]so forth here in the United States.
[2826]So you have, when an activity here in the United States,
[2827]the individual involved, the double agant, the controlled
[2829]foreign asset transfers abroad, then there is a transfer of
[2831]coordination and vice versa.
[2833]Mr. Angleton, I'd like to inject this. There is
[2835]2
[2838]ry
[2839]a
[2840]a
[2841]a
[2843]3
[2845]coneurrent jurisdiction sinca the double is usually an American |
[2847]citizen. So regardless of where he is, we would always persuade
[2849]the Army or whoever it is, to notify the Bureau through their
[2850]own channel because you're dealing with Americans, so
[2851]geography is not really the important element.
[2854]Mr. Miler. From a counter-intelligence standpoint,
[2856]it has had, there have been some problems as a result of that
[2857]in terms of the regular CIA representation abroad, There is
[2858]a means of working together with the military services and
[2860]so forth in terms of notifying each of the services, each of
[2862]ALO First Street, S.£.. Wasnengton, D.C. 20003
[2864]the agencies of the potential for deception feeding and
[2866]c
[2867]so forth.
[2869]TOP SECRET
[2872]WARGO @ PAUL
[2874]410 Forest Street. S.E.. Washington, O.C. 20003
[2876]Mr. Johnson. Does the CIA have veto powers over military
[2877]proposed double-agents?
[2879]Mr. Miler. No, not the veto power.
[2881]Mr. Angleton. Well, it never really comes up to a veto.
[2882]But it we took a stand against it and supplied reasoning that
[2883]made sense, they would go along the way that we wanted. We've
[2884]never had a head-on collision,
[2886]Mr. Miler, There would oftentimes be differences in the
[2887]field, that would be presented through the proper channels,
[2888]say from the Army back to the ACST from our field station
[2889]to headquarters. And then there would be a discussion and a
[2890]resolution at the Washington level.
[2892]Now obviously, in any kind of a situation like that,
[2893]there have been instances where, you. know, there was bad
[2894]feelings and misunderstandings and so forth. But I think that
[2895]overall, at least in my experience in the way we try to
[2896]conduct the business was that it was mutually beneficial.
[2898]Now the military services have complained to me because
[2899]I represented and a couple of my people represented the
[2900]Agency on double agents to the military services and so forth,
[2901]that we were not as forthcoming in providing them information
[2902]about our nossihle assets and so forth as they were.
[2904]Their system was different. They had a clearinghouse
[2906]system where this was available and so forth. Our position
[2908]on it was that if we had a requirement, we would perhaps find
[2910]TOP SECRET
[2913]i)
[2915]‘End Tape 4%
[2917]Begin 4B
[2918]t
[2920]2
[2921]3
[2923]a
[2924]4
[2925]fe]
[2926]a
[2928]z
[2930]410 Feest Street, S.E.. Wasnington, OC, 70003
[2934]8
[2936]9
[2938]10
[2940]a source or an asset in which to fulfill the requirement.
[2942]But for security and compartmentation reasons, not exclusively
[2943]due to the counter-intelligence concerns but also to the
[2944]general security and operations procedures of the Agency as
[2946]a whole, there was a reluctance to put this information forward
[2947]except when and as needed.
[2949]Mr. Angleton. And there's another point that has to be
[2950]raised here. That is when you get into the field of deception
[2951]you are bound by cartain charters, Those charters have not
[2952]been approved at the highast policy level, Soe there's been
[2953]a great deal of tactical military cover and deception.
[2955]Our interest is more on the strategic deception, and
[2956]that paper has been resting with Pr. Kissinger for some 2 1/2
[2957]years or more for approval.
[2959]Mr. Miler. Three.
[2961]Mr. Angleton. Three years.
[2963]So that is bogged down a great deal of the whole overall
[2965]: deception program.
[2967]Mr. Maxwell. The paper that is in front of Dr. Kissinger |
[2969]2 tow makes what deceptions?
[2971]Mr. Angleton, It was a paper that was pulled together
[2972]by the Joint Chiefs, ourselves, and the FBI.
[2974]Mr. Maxwell, And it proposes what?
[2976]Me. Angleton. It outlines procedures for strategic
[2978]deceptions, political deception and other deception,
[2980]TOP SECRET
[2983]J
[2986]a
[2987]6
[2988]o
[2991]3
[2993]410 Ferst Street, S.E., Wascegton, 0.C. 20003
[2995]Mr, Johnson. Could you giva a brief axample of the CIA
[2997]in strategic deception, a specific example?
[2999]Mr. Angleton. No, I can't, I mean I could get into
[3000]cases but it's too vague. It's always been something that
[3001]has been arrived at ad hoc and it served the purpose, but I
[3002]wouldn't call it strategic.
[3004]Mr. Miler. No program, in other words,
[3006]Mr. Angleton. In other words, the proper strategic decep-|
[3007]tion would be’ the President calls inthe Director and saya, no
[3008]one knows that in three months I'm going on the following trip.
[3009]I will have meetings with the following people. I'm not
[3010]going to announce it until a week before I leave.
[3012]So it gives you a time span of two months to use all of
[3013]your sources to put across disinformation or information, a
[3014]letter in the mailbox to the proper addressee that, you know,
[3015]favor his role or favor his mission and helps him out. And
[3016]that's what we are trying to seek and have been trying to seek
[3018]for a long time. But there has to be a way of knowing what
[3020]are some of the intentions of the government in order to
[3021]advance it through disinformation or deception.
[3023]Nr, Miler. With respect to the military, if I may
[3024]return to that, I think that one of the -- probally the greatest
[3025]difference and Failure with respect to CIA counter-intelligqence
[3026]relationships with the military was with respect to the
[3028]situation in Vietnam because CIA did not perform a counter-
[3030]TOP SECRET
[3033])
[3034]3
[3036]a
[3037]a
[3038]Q
[3041]3
[3043]B10 First Street, SE. Wasninatan, D.C. 20003
[3045]3
[3047]5
[3049]intelligence function of any responsibility or significance
[3051]in Vietnam, That was 4 tragic failure on the part of CIA
[3053]and it goes back to the basic problem of the present management,
[3054]to answer your earlier question, the present management becausc
[3055]the present management of the CIA was involved in the decisions
[3056]which prohibited a good counter-intelligence effort in Vietnam.
[3058]Mr. Shea, In that paper that is before Dr. Kissinger,
[3059]are there any proposed control mechanisms that would act as
[3060]a filter so.that the misinformation in a sense could not flow
[3061]back into the policy circles within the United States?
[3063]Mr, Angleton. Well, there: wouldn't be. The kind of
[3064]channels used, there wouldn't be any of that happening. This
[3065]would be information given to an agent who was reporting,
[3066]say to the KGB back, say it would never hit the light of day.
[3068]Mr. Shea. So the process of misinformation as it
[3069]normally relates to the intelligence field is totally separate
[3070]in terms of the active process of misinformation as it goes
[3072]in counter-intelligence?
[3074]Mer. Angleton. We are not dealing in overt. There tay
[3076]“be sone overt things put out that support a document that was
[3078]qiven to a double who woule pass it to KGB. But if the man
[3081]is regarded to be an agent of the KGB, the KGB is not going to.
[3083]i publicize that document without having blown the alleged ayeon..
[3085]“yr, Shea. But they could work on it in their process
[3087]of disinformation to come hack, and you would be caught. ~
[3089]TOP SECRET
[3092]Mr. Miler, No. To be successful you would have to have
[3093]a means of monitoring. You would have to have your penetration
[3094]of, you would have to have your own litmus to see where it
[3095]is played back or what reflections or what requirements are
[3096]put on other double agents on the basis of the information from
[3097]this agent.
[3099]That requires a centralized screaning and control of
[3101]double agents.
[3103]1
[3105]t
[3107]Mr. Angleton. If you sent the information through. Agant N
[3109]to KGB headquarters in Moscow, part, of -your testing would-be to see.
[3110]whether your other double agents received questionnaires
[3111]which you knew related to that document.
[3113]Mr. Shea, But it seems like in order to make strategic
[3115]2
[3117]4
[3118]a
[3119]6
[3120]a
[3121]g
[3122]q
[3123]2
[3125]misinformation functional, you would have to have the same
[3126]requirements that you had when you were talking about having
[3128]a double ayent: namely, somebody in a superior point of
[3130]information penetrated into that organization to make sure
[3132]| that they are getting that information you're sending out
[3134]70003
[3136]| is misinformation.
[3137]Mr, Miler. Not necessarily.
[3139]Mr, Angleton. It's not quite the same,
[3141]Mr, Willer. It's not quite that simple hecause you could
[3143]see reflections of it perhaps in other areas in political
[3145]actions, in failure to act.
[3147]410 Fest Street, §$.E., Wasrington, O.C.
[3149]Mr. Angleton, ‘There are other ways of doing it. You
[3151]TOP SECRET
[3154]can go to a diplomat who has a weak cipher system and you
[3155]yourself can tell that diplomat in great confidence a whole
[3156]series of things. You know the Soviets are going to break the
[3157]code and read that message.
[3159]That would be one way of doing it. ‘There are other ways
[3160]of having, telling .a:. friendly foreign sarvice whom you
[3161]know is penetrated.
[3163]Imean it's all case by case, But once you are given the
[3164]task, that's when you begin to look at all of your assets and
[3165]you begin to do the creative side of running a double, or how
[3167]are you going to put this across. And there are many ways of
[3169]doing it without bringing many people in.
[3171]Mr. diGenova. I'd like to change the subject matter juse
[3173]2
[3174]3
[3176]4
[3177]6
[3178]o
[3181]z
[3183]; briefly. Part of the responsibility of the CI research personnel
[3184]is to produce reports on various subjects which include current
[3186]analyses on proprietary companies used by foreign intelligence
[3188]| Services.
[3189]I would like to know whether or not either of you could
[3190]shed anv light on the question of whether or not we have any
[3191]:ovidence that foreign intelligence services have establishec
[3192]band used nroprictary companies in the United States?
[3194]Mr. Anqleton. Well, there's one case that comes to mind.
[3195]{I can't remember the details but I think that as a result of
[3197]jit, one of our daputy directors had a big project with this
[3199]210 Fist Street, SE. Wasmingtan, D.C. 20003
[3201]company and they dronped it because the Foreign Intelligence
[3203]TOP SECRET
[3206]Service had quite a penetration into it,
[3208]Mr, diGenova. Would that be the only instance of which
[3209]you are familiar that there was in fact knowledge of an operatin
[3210]proprietary company run by a foreign intelligence service
[3211]within the continental United States?
[3213]Mr. Angleton. Offhand I can't say because the Office of
[3214]Security would be working with the Bureau, usually. I mean to
[3215]say that SéT are the most likely people to have contracta with
[3216]a number of contractors and companies. It would be Office
[3217]of Security's job.
[3219]i
[3220]1
[3221]j
[3223]Mr. diGenova, Maybe I'm not making my point clear. I
[3225]“just thought that maybe in the course of your counter-intelligence
[3227]function you may have discovered hy whatever means that there
[3229]a
[3230]3
[3232]a
[3234]i]
[3237]z
[3239]was in fact such a company operating in the United States
[3240]which was being used, not to contract with the Agency but to
[3242]contract or just do anything, whether it was a bookkeeping
[3244]firm or a law firm or anything, and was in fact engaged in
[3245]espionage.
[3247]mre. Miler. Well, we've had a number in the past. We've
[3248]had a number of leads which were to the effect that Soviet
[3249]intelligence money was in such and such a company, or somethin:
[3250]guch as that, That was turned over to the FRI. And whether
[3252]or not we aver heard anything hack or did anything further on
[3254]it, no.
[3256]410 First Street, S.E.. Washington, O.c. 20003
[3258]In other words, unless there was an investigative angle
[3260]TOP SECRET
[3263]a
[3264]_) .
[3265]N
[3266]w
[3268]Phone (Area 202)
[3270]2
[3271]3
[3273]e
[3275]i)
[3278]z
[3280]410 Forst Street, $.£., Washington, O.C, 2009°
[3282]which we could pursue abroad or something, I'm a little bit
[3283]confused by the question because it's outalde -- the investigatipn
[3285]of such a thing is outside the purview of the CIA unless it is
[3287]abroad, unless it would he funded through Switzerland or Luxem-
[3289]bourg or unless:.there was'a Messagerie Maritime :connectionvwhere
[3291]Soviet money was being put in and they had representation here.
[3293]Mr. diGenova, ‘lell, the staff has been given information
[3294]that these analyses are done by CI research personnel or
[3295]proprietary companies of foreign intelligence services, and
[3296]either that information is wrong or we just do not understand
[3297]each other.
[3299]‘tr, Angleton. well, I mean it's.true that there have
[3300]been analyses done, But the one that comes to mind is the
[3301]one I mentioned, was the one where in this case it was French,
[3302]had a heavy penetration of a company and that company was
[3303]contracting with our STT people and therefore, our question
[3304]was rather a project for large sums of money of using this
[3305]company would’ proceed, and the decision based on our -counter-
[3306]intellicence analyses was to drop the project.
[3308]- tr, diGenova, I'd like to ask the question.
[3310]We've been told that one of the benefits which occurs
[3311]to US, counter-intelligence when it focuses on hloc countries
[3312]is the fact that these totalitarian reqimes have a habit of
[3313]acculring reat amounts of information about their citizenry
[3315])
[3316]and storing it, and that this is, on occasion, accessible te
[3318]TOP SECRET
[3321]and makes them somewhat vulnerable as 4 result of that.
[3323]Turning the coin around a little bit and looking at our-
[3324]selves, are the computerized systems which we now have in our
[3325]country which put in ‘a. central location large amounts of
[3326]information about individual citizens and large groups of
[3327]citizens, making us vulnerable to panetration in terms of
[3328]information, more vulnerable in terms of penetration by
[3329]foreign counter-intelligence services?
[3331]Mr. Angleton. Vulnerable in what sense?
[3333]Mr, diGenova, Getting information about us, period,
[3335]which I understand is one of the key goals of counter-intellivenre,
[3337]finding out what the other side is doing.
[3339]d
[3340]a
[3342]a
[3343]6
[3344]ts)
[3345]e
[3347]3
[3349]tr. Angleton. You mean surreptitiously getting it from
[3351]us or officially getting it from us?
[3352]Mr. diGenova. Both. The fact of the matter is the
[3353]information exists and it's vulnerable for them to have it,
[3355]is it vulnerable for us to have it?
[3357]Me. Angleton, Well, I wouldn't put it down as vulnerable
[3358]because when anyone makes a request on you for information,
[3359]the first question is why, 30 the burden is on them to justi.
[3360]that they have a counter-espionage reason for asking for that
[3362]information. And in the bulk of the cases you'll find. that thes
[3364]are doing your work for you.
[3366]In other words, they've come across a telephone tap o¢
[3368]410 First Street, S.E., Watmington, D.C. 20003
[3370]gome American who's arrived, he's made a call to the Bulgarian
[3372]TOP SECRET
[3375]embassy and it looks as though:there's a maating being set up,
[3376]80 immediately you get a flash. And thay ask that service for
[3378]traces on the individual and you come back with the why, i.
[3380]and they tell you about the entire Bulgarian business. And
[3382]so we start an investigation as to Bulgarian antecedents
[3384]anything dealing with Bulgaria, et cetera, And if it's
[3385]justified, we give them the information, :
[3387]Mr, diGenova. Well, I don't think, Mr. Angleton, that's
[3388]not what I'm getting at. -
[3390]We as a country are amassing properly, quote, unquote,
[3391]large amounts of information about ourselves through the use
[3393]of computer systems.
[3395]‘Mr. Anadleton. That's right.
[3397]WARD &@ PAUL
[3399]Mr, diGenova. .The CIA tells us that that is one of the
[3401]things they like so much about foreign countries, because the
[3403]totalitarian regimes have the tendency to amass large amounts
[3404]of information ahout their citizenry and when we penetrate
[3405]and get that information, that helps us.
[3407]My question is when we do that, when we centralize the
[3408]information by using our own computer systems, no matter whore
[3409]it is, do we hely them?
[3411]And in this regard I would note that in 1970 the Insnector
[3413]General's renort on the question of cover noted that the fact
[3415]that credit bureaus in this country were amassing so much
[3417]4106 First Street. S.£., Wasrington, O.C. 20003
[3419]information about people, including CIA personnel, that it
[3421]TOP SECRET
[3424]d
[3425]3
[3426]4
[3428]a
[3429]+]
[3432]g
[3434]Sk Furst Street, $.£., Washington, B.C. 20003
[3436]posed a major threat to maintain cover, both in the United
[3437]States and abroad for CIA agents.
[3439]Now the question I raise is are we cutting off our nose
[3440]to spite our face by using computers to really marshall together
[3441]large amounts of evidence which can be made accessible to
[3442]foreign powers either by surreptitiously or by simply openly
[3443]getting it?
[3445]Mr. Miler. Yes, the answer is yes. , . ;
[3447]Mr, diGenova. Good.
[3449]i
[3450]Mr. “Miler. Because it's very easy to get this information.
[3451]And, for example, the Soviets have had, you can confirm this
[3453]t
[3454]fror the Dureau, have had a systematic system of purchasing ;
[3455]from the State of Maryland, the District of Columbia, the
[3457]State of Virginia, the business directories, residence
[3459]directories, license directories for less than 3350 apiece,
[3461]Mr. Johnson. If we're going to keep on our schedule,
[3463]wa've got a witness who's supposed to be here at 3:30, 80
[3464]s there a final question?
[3466]Mr, Kirbow. I have two questions. Because of the
[3467]vast years of experience, Mr, Chairman, that we snould ask
[3468]then to comment on, and either one of you all should answer.
[3470]‘That do vou all consider today to be the major threats
[3471]to this country? And the second cuestion is, what has been
[3473]the major foreiqn covert action program directed against this
[3475]country in your lifetime and experience in the Agency?
[3477]TOP SECRET
[3480]Mr. Angleton, Well, I think, no question, it's the
[3481]Soviet bloc services that represent the major threat because
[3482]they are really a small, they ara directly subordinated to the
[3483]central committee and to the basic ebjectives, as I've seen ther!
[3484]all my life to the change and balance of military power,
[3485]Purther, that practically all intelligence operations more!
[3486]and more have political objectives, and I think it is the fact
[3487]that sinee '59 they have elevated the Cuban intelligence and
[3488]all of the other bloc services to @ very high degree of
[3489]efficiency, that they are coordinated and they work as equals.
[3490]And I think that is the major threat, that is the
[3491]inability of the PBr by lack of personne! and manpower to be
[3494]able to cover these people. There isn't the minimal coverage.
[3496]]
[3497]2
[3499]a
[3500]a
[3501]fs]
[3504]z
[3506]The people they cover are people who have been “identified, "
[3507]and I defy anyone to have a list of identified agents in this
[3509]country,
[3511]Now that is the legal side of it. “Mow the larger part
[3512]sof it is the illegal, where there's been little or no success,
[3513]i Hy .
[3515]i The only one that has really come out is the Abel case, which
[3516]Ha haven
[3518]we handled through iahdanan. And then there was one or two
[3519]minor ones,
[3521]But that is a whole program of bloc activity, and
[3523]according to one of the best gources we had, his view was that
[3525]the illegals would he Mlaced primarily in airports, docks,
[3527]410 First Stewet. 5.6. Washington, 0.C. 20003
[3529]factcries, and they give a whole listing. And these are the
[3531]TOP SECRET
[3534]Pa
[3536]4
[3538]6
[3539]o
[3541]4
[3542]z
[3544]20003
[3546]410 Ferat Street, $.£,, Wasnington. D.C.
[3548]areas wherevyou have’ sdbotige, “you hayé:-explosionscyottcan't |
[3549]iGentify,.et cetera.
[3551]Now the illegal directorate represents a very major part
[3552]of Soviet intelligence and bloc intelligence and we just -~
[3553]there are not successes, It's just happenstance,
[3555]Mr. Epstein. It's disruption of our defense effort?
[3557]Is that what you're speaking of now? Their goal being
[3558]disruption of this country's defense effort?
[3560]Mr. Angleton. Well, they have many assignments. But
[3561]the point is they have also the sabotage-assassination part,
[3562]which is totally apart from the body politic of the KGB, and
[3563]it raises questions in everybody's mind when there is sabotage
[3564]and all other kinds of activities and you cannot find the
[3565]culprits.
[3567]One defector stated that he helieved that the computer
[3568]fire they had in the Pentagon several years ago was KGB. Ke
[3569]was NOB. But he stated in effect that he thought that was
[3570]one of their operations.
[3572]Scotty? -
[3574]Mr, Miler, The inajor threat to the U.S., I think, is
[3575]base] on the fact, as we referred to earlier, as this should
[3576]affect counter-intelligence, the national counter-intelligence
[3577]effort, is to have your national counter-intelligence focune!
[3578]on the fact that the Soviets and the Soviet hlocs, since “av
[3580]of 1959 have rededicated themselves to the principles of
[3582]TOP SECRET
[3586])
[3588]ry
[3589]4
[3590]a
[3593]g
[3595]410 Feest Stroet, S.£.. Washington, D.C. 20003
[3597]Leninism, They have rededicated themselves to the shift in
[3599]the military balance of power, They have reinstituted, in
[3600]effect, what was the policy of the NEP period, the New Economic
[3601]Policy, the attraction of Western business, the attraction of
[3602]Western capital into the Seviet Union to bolster the Soviet
[3603]Union, tha disruption of the economies of other nations, which
[3604]would have an adverse effect on the economy of this nation --
[3605]all of this centrally controlled and directed, used through
[3606]such countries as Romania, where we have for several years now
[3607]deluded ourselves that Romania is independent, through Bulgaria,
[3608]through Hungary, through Poland, all the rest of it.
[3610]This is the major threat to the United States. Counter-
[3611]intelligence is probably, in my view, at least, one of the
[3612]major ways that you're going to be able to counter this and
[3613]at least get the information brought to the attention of the
[3614]people who are making the decisions and making the policy
[3615]for this country.
[3617]‘Mr. Epstein. Has our penetration effort heen good enoudh
[3619]‘to establish whether or not the Soviet Unien has been involve
[3621]in jrect covert action against the United States, such as
[3622]to undernine our economy, not using other countries hut
[3625]Mr. Angleton. Thera's bean a tremendous amount of
[3627]information on this, I mean, for exanple today the second
[3629]|
[3630]|
[3632]head of the Chamber of Commerce in Moscow is General Pitovranov.
[3634]TOP SECRET
[3637]2
[3638]2
[3640]a
[3641]a
[3642]cy)
[3643]a
[3645]3
[3647]410 First Street, $.E., Wasnington, D.C. 20003
[3649]Prdor, he was Deputy Chief of the NKVD, ie was the resident.
[3650]KGB resident in Peking, He's the one who with Mao set up the
[3651]undergreund that took over China. He was the head of Karlshorst
[3652]the largest KGB ih Germany, He operated people like George
[3653]Blake, Ne organized the kidnapping of Otto John, the head
[3654]of Security, West Germany,
[3656]Ne has now been placed as the Deputy Chief, or Deputy
[3657]Chairman, of the Moscow Chamber of Commerce, the same role that
[3659]wANER AMIN GY
[3661]Lenin had perjensky: ' in the NEP, That is the role to he
[3662]able to deal with Western capitalists with the view of abroad
[3663]recruitments and with the view of using them as agents of
[3664]influence.
[3666]Now there's a tremendous amount of data. Now this is
[3667]what I'm trying to say, that counter-intelligence has always
[3669]been kept at a very low level as far as its ability to submit
[3671]such studies or whatnot to the National Security Council or to
[3673]‘N
[3674]‘a forum where they are debated. But they happen to be the
[3676]only hard intelligence because they are coming from men who
[3677]were 16 years in this one case, a part of that mechanism and
[3678]who read all the files.
[3680]Mr. Epstein, What happens to all that?
[3682]Mr. Angleton. Well, that's been used by directors in
[3683]briefings but there's never yet been a forum where vou can
[3684]actually have a confrontation with people who hola contrary
[3686]views,
[3688]TOP SECRET
[3691]4
[3692]2
[3694]e
[3696]a
[3699]z
[3701]410 First Street, S.E., Washengton, O.C. 20003
[3703]Mr. Miler. In other words, how significant ia the fact
[3704]then, how significant would it be if our Congress, our Executive
[3705]and our business people knew that as of 1974 the last figures
[3706]T have of 187 Soviets identified with the USSR all union
[3707]chamber of commerce, tha people that are doing all of the
[3708]business with our businessmen who are coming here to the United
[3709]States, work them and so forth, when 47 of those were appointed
[3710]to that from the KGB.
[3712]I mean, what significance does this have to the United
[3713]States?
[3715]Senator Schweiker. 47 out of how many?
[3717]Nr. Miler. About 182,
[3719]Mr. Angleton, Let's qo to the scientific side on this,
[3720]The scientific side, in May of 1969 the central comnittee
[3721]ordered that there he added 2,000 staff officers to KGB from
[3722]the Academy of Sciences in order to exploit the opening to the
[3723]vest and the seientific levels.
[3725]Mr. Epstein. And how would that exploitation be
[3727]i
[3729], accomplished?
[3731]Mr. Angleton. For recruitment and exploitation of
[3732]lcontacts in. the West in the scientific exchanges.
[3734]Mr. Fostein. The goal heing espionage or something elsn?
[3735]Mr. Angleton. Nspionage,
[3737]Mr. Miler, Espionage and influence. How many KGB
[3739]officers?
[3741]TOP SECRET
[3744]WARD & Pau,
[3746]410 Ferst Street, $.£.. Wainengton, 0.C. 20003
[3748]Mr. Angleton. In 1961, 1000 of those had been pulled
[3750]together, There was a briefing given by the general staff to
[3752]high KGR people regarding the field of military electronics,
[3754]and during that briefing it was pointed out that they were 14
[3755]years behind us, but they would overcome and surpass us through
[3756]three means: Number one was the Central Committee adding the
[3757]2,000 staff officers for espionage; Second would be disinfor-~
[3758]mation leading our scientific efforts in the wrong directions;
[3759]And third was to enter into those kind of treaties which would
[3760]bind our own scientific progress in military fields.
[3762]When I left the Agency, I read a report by a man who
[3763]knew nothing of this lecture, and this was a group of American
[3764]electronic experts who had made a very sensitive, Top Secret
[3765]study which stated that in this field the Soviets were four
[3766]years behind us.
[3768]This was in 1974,
[3770]Mr, Epstein. A final question, In the last 10 or 15
[3771]years have you exnerienced any situations where any hostile
[3772]powers were involved in covert action against the election
[3773]process in this country?
[3775]Mr. Angleton. Well, IT think there's no question that
[3776]influence has heen hrought to hear.
[3778]“r, Inderfurth. low?
[3780]Rpstein, Meaning what?
[3782]Angleton, Propaganda, among other things.
[3784]TOP SECRET
[3787]Por example, one of the nost famous of the disinformation
[3788]agents, I mean they had established contact at political levels
[3789]in this country,
[3791]Me. Epstein, low about campaign financing?
[3793]Mr. Angleton. Iodon't think it figures unless it would
[3794]ba the cP,
[3796]But just to add one last point to this question of the
[3797]threat, it is my view, seeing Angola and Seeing the unwilling-
[3798]ness of this country to resist or to define its purpose, or
[3799]to deal fairly with its allies, that within a period of four
[3801]years there will be a form of confrontation on an unpopular
[3803]issue between the Soviet bloc and the United States in which
[3805]we will back down, ‘We will then qo into our suprena isolation,
[3807]4
[3808]2
[3810]ry
[3812]o
[3813]ry
[3815]z
[3817]because in December of '61, when this Soviet defected and he
[3818]had read the political action programs, he spelled out in
[3819]detail that one of the primary purposes of the reorientations
[3821]was that all intelligence operations or political objectives,
[3823]; and the main political objective was to reaffirm the United
[3825]States as the main enemy, to achieve its isolation and ta achieve
[3826]political hegemony over most of Afxica and Latin America.
[3828]ia pointed out that the two largest and newest Givisions
[3829]ereated in KGB were Africa and Latin America,
[3831]How this was not speculative, This was reading actual
[3833]docunents of a Ton Secret nature in which you had to have a
[3835]410 First Street, SE. Wasnengton, O.C, 20003
[3837]communications intelligence clearance to even have access to
[3839]TOP SECRET
[3845]ry
[3847]a
[3850]z
[3852]410 Fost Street, S.€., Washington, 0.C. 20003
[3856]12
[3858]13
[3860]14
[3862]15
[3864]16
[3866]17
[3868]18
[3870]19
[3872]20
[3874]2)
[3876]when I took him to many: countries we talked on higher: levels
[3877]than we could talk in the United States, And i took him to
[3878]some countries that we could talk to Prime Ministers. I have
[3879]seen Prime Ministers and have been able to expose this. But
[3880]the machinery hera is not of such a nature that you can get
[3881]into these matters. .
[3883]Mr, Epstein. Are they diaseminated>
[3885]Mr. Angleton. We'ra not going to disseminate, . These .
[3886]are matters that should go to the Secretary of State, They
[3887]shouldn't he going up, through people because many of the
[3888]secrets are within that,
[3890]“uc. Epstein. Do they go to the Secretary of State?
[3892]Mr. Angleton. No,
[3894]Mr. Epstein, Why not?
[3896]fir. Angleton. I don't think the Secretary of State has
[3897]ever been much interested in asking for opinions. on Romania
[3898]| We sent something to the President prior to our trip,
[3899]| ‘ir. Epstein, But the documents you're talking about,
[3900]the Top Secret decuments --
[3902]Mr. Angleton. We don't have the document, I'm Stating
[3904]he read those documents in Moscow,
[3905]Mr. [pstein. But the report that he read, was that
[3908]Mr. Angleton. I don't know. It went to the Director anc
[3910]TOP SECRET
[3913]DER eo ernper income eee
[3915]2
[3916]3
[3918]a
[3920]a
[3923]z
[3925]+ S-E., Wasnington, O.€. 20003
[3927]410 Ferst Street
[3929]it went to many other people. But whether it actually got to
[3930]the Secretary of State, I do net know,
[3932]Mr. Miler,
[3934]the so-called aggressive Operations,
[3936]® program within the CIA which is’ going to focus
[3937]on attempting to provide the government, policy-makers and
[3938]So forth, with the kind of information and analytical product
[3939]that is necessary if wa're geing to have €@ successful counter-
[3940]intelligence,
[3942]Mr. Johnson, t Would like to thank the witnesses. and
[3943]unless Senator Schweiker hag any questions, wa will adjourn
[3944]for five minutes,
[3946]Is that acceptable?
[3948]Thank you very much.
[3950]Senator Schweiker. Thank YOU very much,
[3952]CMereupon, at 4:10 O'clock p.um., the hearing
[3954]above-nientionad matter was concluded.)