[1]DARAAN
[2]\it04-10534-10773 | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
[3]3
[5]te .
[6]s
[8]SECRET
[10]1. Attached is Annex A - Statements of Soviet Officials
[11]About NOSENKO - which is part of the summary entitled,
[12]Conclusions and Comments in the Case of Yuriy Ivanovich
[13]NOSENKO, (copy number 7) dated 1 October 1968. The
[14]aforementioned summary was forwarded for your review on
[16]13 March 1978.
[18]2. Certain portions of Annex A of this study are
[19]deleted since it contains information which bears on the
[20]security of ongoing, viable CIA operations, or is related
[22]thereto.
[24]3. We request return of the study (copy 7) and Annex A
[26]when your review has been completed.
[28]Attachment: As Stated Above
[30]Declassified and Approved for Releas
[31]by the Central Intelligence Agency 3
[33]Date: > 003
[35]WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS
[36]INVOLVED
[38]E2 IMPDET CL BY 011340
[40]13-00000
[42]: es
[43]; 1,
[45]1. Attached are the following pages of the Top Secret
[46]study entitled, The Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB
[47]Defector - Yuriy I. NOSENKO, dated February 1968 (copy 10).
[48]Copy 10 of this study had been forwarded to you earlier for
[50]your review.
[52]2. We have deleted certain portions of these pages
[53]containing information which bears on the security of
[55]ongoing, viable CIA operations, or is related thereto.
[57]3. We request return of the study (copy 10), Annex A
[59]and Attachment when your review has been completed.
[61]Attachment: Pages vi, vii, 20, 46, 47, 49, 50, 266, 277, 278
[62]281, 294, 295, 297, 313, 324, 325, 326, 336 and
[63]357
[65]WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS
[66]INVOLVED
[68]E2 IMPDET CL BY 011340
[70]TOR—SEERET
[72]DB O.O 00 Oe SE
[74]oN, Top Secret
[75]' CONTENTS
[76]PAGE
[77]VIIT SEVENTH DEPARTMENT (January 1962- ~January 1964)
[78](Cont.) _-
[79]Deputy Chief of Seventh Department. ; ;
[80](July 1962-January 1964) 291
[81]KGB Operations 3 q . 292
[82]Recruitment of [SVENCHANSKIY> - : 292
[83]Investigation of SLESINGER’ . ; 293
[84]Arrest and Interrogation of KOTEN. 295
[85]GRU Agent..SHUBIN. 2.96
[86]“Atrest of BARGHOORN 7 298
[87]‘Investigation of OSWALD ~ - 303
[88]Residence in USSR ; 303
[89]‘Request to Return to USSR 305
[90]Post-Assassination Review of KGB File 307
[91]The CHEREPANOV Papers 309
[92]Contents 314
[93]NOSENKO's Travel Document 315
[94]Return to Geneva (January- February 1964) 316
[95]Purpose of Trip 317
[96]Visits to KGB Legal Residency , 318
[97]Availability for Meetings with CLA 318:
[98].NOSENKO's Written Notes - 319
[99]NOSENKO's Defection . - 320
[100]The Recall Telegran 324
[101]Knowledge of ‘Other Seventh Department a,
[102]Operations _ 325
[103]Operational Activities (July 1962-
[104]January 1964) : 326
[105]KGB Counterintelligeice Operations Among
[106]American Tourists 326
[107]Information Furnished thé KGB. by ,
[108]Géorge BLAKE | ; 327
[109]KGB Study of American Intelligence
[110]ra Tourist Operations ~~. 327
[111]NOSENKO's information , 330
[112]Summary ; 331
[113]Sumaty and Conclusion - ‘331
[115](va) TS No. 197124
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[120]> Secret
[121]CONTENTS
[122]PAGE
[123]IX OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMED KGB SERVICE 335
[124]Relationship with General GRIBANOV 335
[125]. Communist Party Status 338
[126]Knowledge of KGB Forms and Procedures 342
[127]Awards and Decorations 345
[128]Sourcing : 349
[129]Ranks 350
[130]X PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PSYCHIATRIC ASSESSMENT , ° 355
[131]XI SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS: NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES 357
[132]Annex A - Statements of Soviet Officials About
[134]NOSENKO 361
[135]Annex B - Summaries of Cases Not Examined in Text 399
[136]Index of Personalities . 437
[138](vii)
[140]TS No. 197124
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[147]_Top Secret
[149](FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS)
[151]Soviet Officials' Statements About NOSENKO
[153]The portrait of NOSENKO which emerges from Soviet
[154]efficials' statements about him since his defection coin-
[155]cides markedly with NOSENKO's self-description, According
[156]to the comments of Soviet officials, principally intelli-
[157]gence officérs most likely to be speaking authoritatively,
[158]defector NOSENKO was the son of the deceased ifinister, he
[159]served over a decade in the KGB, his personal shortcomings
[160]were overcome through the patronage of KG3 General GRIBANOV,
[161]and in connection with operations against Americans he
[162]occupied positions of progressively greater trust and
[163]responsibility, ultimately becoming Deputy Chief of the
[164]largest department in the key Second (Counterintelligence)
[165]Chief Directorate. According to these sources, his defection
[166]wrought severe damage "for years to come" to the KGB
[167]because of his knowledge of KGB operations against American
[168]targets, and his treachery prompted the expulsion and
[169]disgrace of numerous senior KGB personnel, the recall of
[170]Many others from abroad, the virtual suspension of KGB
[171]operations in the United States, and extraordinary plans to
[172]assassinate him.
[174]These statements are related in chronological order in
[175]Annex A.
[177]20
[179]TS No. 197124
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[188](PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)
[190]Baku), where he finished the Eighth Class in spring, 1943.
[191]In a second version [more probable since entry to the Moscow
[192]Special Naval School required prior completion of the
[193]Seventh Class] NOSENKO- said that when the war broke out ha
[194]and his mother were evacuated to Chelyabinsk, where he
[195]completed the Seventh Class in summer of 1942. They returned
[196]to Moscow afterwards, and NOSENKO was then enrolled in the
[197]Moscow Special Naval School (then in Kuybyshev) where he
[198]completed the Eighth Class in 1943; in the fall of 1943
[199]NOSENKO was enrolled in the Leningrad Naval Preparatory
[200]School (then in Baku).
[202]After just six months in Baku, without completing the
[203]Ninth Class, NOSENKO ran away from school and returned to
[204]Moscow.
[206]Comment: NOSENKO has asserted variously that he ran
[207]away and fought on the front at Tuapse, and
[208]that he had finished the Tenth Class in Baku
[209]and then spent the period 1943-1945 at the
[210]Frunze Higher Naval School, the equivalent of
[211]Annapolis. He has retracted both assertions.
[213]NOSENKO completed the Ninth Class in June 1944 at the
[214]Moscow Mining Institute, and when the Leningrad Naval
[215]Preparatory School returned to Leningrad from Baku, he
[216]resumed his studies there. Early in 1945, however, NOSENKO
[217]received a gunshot wound in the hand, and after being
[218]hospitalized for a month, he left the Naval school.
[220]Comment: NOSENKO has claimed both that he was shot by
[221]a jealous naval officer whom he then protected
[222]by stating that the wound was self-inflicted,
[223]and that he actually did accidently shoot him-
[224]se wees a quoted Ge See to
[225]the effect that NOSENKO shot himself to avoid
[226]being sent to the front while attending a naval
[227]college in 1942.
[229]a sensitive source
[231]a KGB offic
[233]46
[234]TS No. 197124
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[241]foes -
[243]Ca
[245].
[247](PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)
[249]Comment: (Continued)
[250]After NOSENKO's defection was publicized,
[251]Soviet Naval defector ARTAMONOV volunteered
[252]to CIA that he had known the son of the
[253]Minister NOSENKO in the naval school in
[254]Leningrad from 1944 to 1946.
[256]NOSENKO completed the Tenth Class at the Leningrad Ship-
[257]building Tekhnikum in June 1945, and he successfully passed
[258]the necessary examinations to qualify him for entrance to
[259]the Moscow Institute of International Relations that summer.
[261]Birth to 1945: Summary and Conclusion
[263]NOSENKO is virtually the sole source of information on
[264]his early life. However, this portion of his claimed
[265]biography is consistent with the NOSENKO family's where-
[266]abouts as publicized in press accounts at the time cf his
[267]father's death in 1956, and with the existence of the
[268]schools he claims to have attended.
[270]Allowing for exaggerated claims of boyhood heroics
[271](fighting at the front, attending the Frunze Academy, and
[272]formal induction in and discharge from the Navy), all of
[273]which NOSENKO has retracted under interrogation, NOSENKO's
[274]claimed identity as the son of Minister Ivan I. NOSENKO
[275]and the substance of his claims about his life until 1945
[276]are accepted as true.
[278]ca a4 ae ay r
[280]47
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[291](PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)
[293]NOSENKO has said at various times that the Institute
[294]course was of four years' duration and that he entered the
[295]Naval RU on graduation in 1949; that it was four years'
[296]duration and that because he failed a state examination he
[297]was graduated later, in 1950; that it was of five years'
[298]duration and he graduated in 1950, on schedule; and that it
[299]was of five years' duration but he failed an examination
[300]which delayed his graduation for three months.
[302]Comment: See p.jo7 for report that NOSENKO joined the KG
[303]upon graduation from the Institute in 1947.
[304]The duration of the Institute course and the
[305]date of NOSENKO's completion are material to
[306]the plausibility of his claimed Naval RU service,
[307]which he said followed almost immediately upon
[308]his departure from the Institute.
[310]Naval RU Service (ca. 1951 - ca. 1953)
[312]NOSENKO claims that upon completion of his studies at
[314]the Institute of International Relations he entered the
[315]Naval RU, serving in the Far Fast and then in a Baltic post,
[316]finally successfully "transferring" to the KGB through the
[318]intervention of his father's friend, KGB General KOBULOV.
[319]A sensitive source
[321]: EP is the sole source also asserting
[322]served in the RU. According tag a
[324]the Military-Diplomatic Academy and then served in the RU
[325]Information Department for about a year before securing a
[326]transfer to the KGB through his father's influence. NOSENKO
[327]denies having attended the Military-Diplomatic Academy and
[328]has never claimed service in the RU Information (Reports)
[329]Department, although he had on occasion claimed to have held
[330]Reports assignments. ,
[332]that NOSENKO
[334]49
[336]TS No. 197124
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[344]PSUR Ah aad itn annie en
[346]‘eg
[347].
[349]Top-Secret
[351](PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)
[353]A sensitive source :
[354]has quoted /KGB officers® Be IRE,
[355]respectively, as stating NOSENKO joined the KGB in 1947
[357]or 1949,
[361]THe significance of NOSENKO's.RU service is the fact
[362]that he claims it launched his intelligence career and
[363]served as the means through which he secured appointment
[364]to the KGB after once having been rejected. The two or more
[365]years he claimed to have served in the RU represent a
[366]significant period of his adult life for which he should
[367]have no difficulty accounting. Finally, the date of his
[368]actual transfer from the Naval RU to the KGB is critical to
[369]determining the time from which his claims about KGB service
[370]can be judged credible.
[372]NOSENKO volunteered extensive comment on his Naval RU
[373]service at his first meetings with CIA in 1962. After his
[374]1964 defection, it was the topic on which he made one of
[375]his initial retractions and his first admission that he had
[376]earlier made a false claim. The subject of his Naval RU
[377]service was consequently prominent in interrogations in
[378]1964, 1965 and 1966. However, throughout these interrogations,
[379]challenges of his assertions about his RU service prompted
[380]adjustments in his claimed date of graduation from the
[381]Institute or claimed date of entry into the KGB, just as
[382]challenges on those latter topics prompted amended state-
[383]ments with respect to his RU service. The extent of the
[384]still-unreconciled discrepancies and contradictions in
[385]NOSENKO's various accounts is best perceived in comparison
[386]of his statements made in 1962, 1964, 1965 and 1966.
[390]NOSENKO finished the Institute of International Relations
[391]in 1950 and immediately reported for duty with the RU.
[392]{He did not amplify how he drew such an assignment.] In
[393]September 1950 he was offered assignments in Leningrad,
[394]Moscow, and in the Far East, and he chose the Far East "so
[395]no one would think he would take advantage of his father's
[397]position". He was assigned to a radio signals interception
[399]unit in Sovetskaya Gavan' {on the Soviet coast opposite
[400]Sakhalin), where he collected Order of Battle information by
[401]monitoring the communications of American units operating in
[403]50
[404]. TS No. 197124
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[409]a ae 1. a Le
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[414](SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964}
[416]>FRIPPEL was.a weak agent: "he was afraid and gave practi-
[418]cally nothing." NOSENKO said that alfiiough he had | recruited
[419]him, “honestly speaking, FRIPPEL was not an agent. The KGB
[421]nevertheless hoped that FRIPPEL would be evaceioned to Mos-
[422]cow at some future date. (See p.137 for details of the
[423]FRIPPEL case.)
[425]Comment: FRIPPEL agrees with NOSENKO that they met twice
[426]in the USSR in 1963. However, FRIPPEL asserts
[427]he also met NOSENKO in Odessa in February 1962.
[428]which NOSENKO flatly denies. FRIPPEL 1s known
[429]to have planned to travel to the Soviet Union
[431]at that time, and tiere is no apparent reason
[432]why he would make a false claim on this matter.
[433]According to Miapeeay FRIPPEL, who 1s now
[435]in New York City, 1s a current target of the RD
[436]: vee “Dyk FALSE B Soviet intelligence service,
[438]a sensitive source
[442]Johannes PREISFREUND
[444]The KGB considered PREISFREUND compromised to American
[445]Intelligence after GOLITSYN's defection [in December 196]] and
[446]thus unsuitable for further usé aqainst Americans at the Em-
[447]bassy in Moscow. For this reason, NOSENKO was told to take
[448]PREISFREUND with him when he transferred to the Seventh De-
[449]partment. As the agent spoke only FPinnish’and Russian, however,
[450]he was of no use against English-speaking tourists. NOSENKO
[451]met with PREISFREUND on the latter's visits to Moscow in 1962,
[452]but did not use him in any operations.
[454]Comment: PREISFREUND asserts that he was no longer a KGB
[455]agent after the STORSBERG operation (see p.175)
[456]and that although he saw NOSENKO on his frequent
[457]return visits to Moscow, it was only because
[458]NOSENKO sought a companion for wenching and
[459]drinking.
[461]266
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[469]. *
[471]Top—Secret-
[473](SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)
[475]who was [erroneously] considered to be a CIA officer.
[476]SHAKHOV “mavbe" hac seme contact with MARK in 1960 or 1¢%él1,
[477]but NOSENKO did not know the substance of it. A counter-
[478]intelligence officer of the First Chief Directorate, S.i.
[479]GOLUBEV, had once been on a delegation with SHAKHOV and he
[480]had noted “little details". While SHAKHOV was in the United
[481]States, earlier, he had been terminated [as an agent] by
[483]KGB officers who had submitted a report stating that SHARHOV
[484]liked life in the Unites States, American products, anc
[485]money. in that KGB report he was depicted as “not gocd”
[487]and ‘not wanting to work as an agent”.
[489]NOSENKO stated that SHAKHOV had served with the Ministry
[490]of Foreign Affairs in the United States and that during that
[491]service he acted as an agent-recruiter for the KGB. SHAKHOV
[492]was permitted to travel abroad even though suspected cf being
[493]an American agent, because he belonged to the Ministry of
[494]Foreign Affairs, and "the KGB could do nothing about his
[495]trips abroad". "There was no proof, only suspicions, and
[496]furthermore, SHAKHOV was a member of the personal staff of
[497]the head of the Soviet delegation, S.K. Tsarapkin." According
[498]to NOSENKO, SHAKHOV was not and never had been a KGB cfficer.
[500]Comment: SHAKHOV has served in and visited the United
[501]States since 1942, when he was assigned toa the
[502]Soviet Consulate General in New York. He at-
[503]tended the 1945 Conference on International
[504]Organization in San Francisco, and he had at-
[505]tended a number of sessions of the UN General.
[506]Assembly. Most recently SHAKHOV was assigned
[507]to the U.S. in 1963 as a member of the Soviet
[508]Mission to the UN. KGB officer RASTVOROVY iden-
[509]tified him as an MVD [KGB] officer whom he is
[510]certain he saw at MVD Headquarters in Moscow,
[511]a sensitive sowceg me identified him as "an employee of the
[512]KGB": and KGB defectors PETROY and DERYABIN
[513]have reported that from a photograph, SHAKHOV's
[514]face “was familiar". An FBI source, however,
[515]in 1964 said that SHAKHOV was a “pure diplomat”
[516]and that to his knowledge, SHAKHOV had engaged
[517]in no Soviet intelligence activity until that
[518]time.
[520]277 TS No. 197124
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[526]a
[532]-Fep Secret
[534](SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)
[536]NOSENKO iiescribead the various ways he had tested suspicions
[537]of SGHAKHOV in Geneva. le gave SHAKHOV disinformation and then
[538]watched for an indication that he passed it on to his American
[539]contacts. SHAKHOV was told to perform countersurveillance
[540]tasks during a meeting hy NOSENKO with an imaginary agent,
[541]wnile other KGB officers checked for signs that SHAKHOV had
[542]forewarned the Americans about the meeting. Finally NOSENKO
[543]revealed to SHAKHOV the location of a KGB dead drop and
[544]checked five days later to see whether the specially prepared
[545]materials empiaced hed been disturbed in any way. NOSENKO's
[546]conclusicn was that SHAKHOV was absolutely free of suspicion,
[547]and it was his intention to report this finding when he re-
[548]turned to KGB Headquarters from Geneva.
[550]comment: Currently in the United States, SHAKHOV is still
[551]“under suspicion", according to 4 Ww a sensitive
[553]Security Escort Officer for Soviet Disarmament Delegation
[555]NOSENKO said that he was the sole KGB officer with the 94-
[556]man Soviet delegation to the bisarmament Conference and as
[557]such he was responsible for the security and behavior of ‘the
[558]entire delegation. (KGB officers I.S. MAYOROV and M.S.
[559]TSYMBAL came with the delegation to Geneva, but they had left
[560]Geneva before NOSENKO made the foregoing statement to CIA.]
[561]To assist nim in carrying out his security functions, NOSENKO
[562]had the services of a number of coopted informants of the KGB
[563]who were serving in the delegation. [NOSENKO has never re-
[564]ported what, if any, security checks he ran on the delegates
[565]in his charge, or what, if any, information his informants
[566]provided him. j
[568]NOSENKO has never been precise about how he spent his days
[569]and nights in Geneva, but he has indicated that he disposed
[570]of his time as he saw fit, and for the most part had little
[571]to do. He explained in 1962 that he could come and go as he
[572]pleased because Ambassador %orim knew who he was, as did most
[573]of the delegation. No one paid him any attention. It was
[574]known that he was not really a Ministry of Foreign Affairs
[575]officer, and ne could absent himself from conference meetings
[576]at any time.
[578]278
[580]TS No. 197124
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[584]source.
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[588]Top Secret
[590](SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)
[592]Yu.l. GUK
[593]Implying that their friendship was of long standing,
[595]NOSENKO related in i962 that he and GUK were togetier nea:iy
[596]every day in Geneva,-where they went out to chat and have a
[597]few drinks. As a consequence, NOSENKO was granted access ¢
[598]the residency and was able to elicit information about some
[599]of GUK's operations 1 Geneva. He described his "big. big
[600]friend" GUK as the Deputy Legal Rezident in Geneva and the
[601]only "strong officer" in the residency. ,
[603]or,
[605]Comment: In 1964 NOSENKO attributed his gaining access
[606]to the residency in 1962 to TSYMBAL, not to
[607]GUK. According to several sources (see Annex A’,
[608]because of his friendship with NOSENKC, GU was
[609]dismissed from the KGB.
[611]M.S. TSYMBAL
[613]2 Gh 6 3 22 23 3 GG € «&35
[615]In 1962 NOSENKO reported TSYMBAL's presence in Geneva end
[616]identified him as Chie’ of the Lliegals Directorate of the
[617]KGB Pirst Chief Directwrate. He alluded to having spoken wrth
[618]him, but placed no particular emphasis on their relationshiz.
[620]In 1964 NOSENKO claimed that he had been dealing with
[621]TSYMBAL since 1960 or 1961, when he was looking for some
[622]candidates for recruitment aud: came across some whose back-
[623]gxound would have made them suitable for the Special [TLllegals:
[624]Directorate. NOSENKO met TSYMBAL in Moscow in the KGB Head-
[625]quarters and TSYMBAL had asked him several times to transfer
[626]to the First Chief Directorate and suggested that ne might be
[627]assigned to the United States. In Geneva, he and TSYMBAL had
[628]dinner together several times a week, sometimes accompanied
[629]by KISLOV and sometimes alone. It was TSYMBAL's influence,
[630]NOSENKO said, which secured NOSENKO access to the residency
[631]in 1962 and established the precedent from which he was
[632]granted access in 1964.
[634]281
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[645]NOSENKO's Information
[647]SLESINGER came under suspicion by the KGB First
[648]Chief Directorate because of his business’ transactions
[649]with a number cf Soviets who visited his store and in
[650]whom he seemed to show more than casual interest. The
[651]First Chief Directorate was of the opinion that
[652]SLESINGER was trying to become closely acquainted with
[653]some Soviets, to study them. SLESINGER had visited the
[654]Soviet Union several times. Learning SLESINGER planned
[655]another trip to the USSR, the KGB suspected that "he
[656]might make some contacts or do something interesting"
[657]while visiting the Soviet Union. The KGB wanted to
[658]resolve its suspicions that SLESINGER was possibly an
[659]agent or operational contact of the FBI. The KGB had
[660]a file on SLESINGER, md a senior case officer in the
[661]American Section of the Seventh Department, Yu. M.
[662]DVORKIN, was the responsible case officer. An agent
[663]of the Seventh Department who was director of a photo-
[664]graphic shop in Moscow was instructed to become friendly
[665]with SLESINGER while the latter was visiting the Soviet
[666]Union, and the two men later exchanged correspondence.
[667]SLESINGER went to Odessa-to visit relatives, and DVORKIN.
[668]directed‘ the Odessa KGB to "surround" him with agents. who
[669]could watch his behavior. If there had been any indication
[670]of intelligence activities, the KGB would have attempted.
[671]to recruit SLESINGER, but since no evidence was developed,
[672]no approach was made. SLESINGER had travelled to the
[673]Soviet Union before, several times.
[675]A sensit ive source
[677]Comment :
[679]é eee nad reported to the
[680]FBI that the KGB suspected SLESINGER to
[681]be an FBI “plant" and that KGB officer
[682]Gitte “might be trying to develop
[683]SLES INGER to act as a courier or in some
[684]other agent capacity."
[686]NOSENKO's information was substantially
[687]correct. Alfred Lazarevich SLESINGER,
[688]. reported to the FBI in July 1962 of his
[689]June 1962 visit to Moscow and Odessa.
[690]In Odessa SLESINGER was contacted by a
[691]Soviet official who exhibited "intimate |
[692]knowledge" of his business in New York
[693]City and had asked whether SLESINGER had
[694]“ever been bothered by the FBI."
[696]294
[698]—TopSecret
[700]TS No. 197124
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[704]a)
[706]Top Secret.
[707](SEVENTH DEPARTMENT ~ January’ 1962-1964)
[709]Comment: (Continued), _ a
[711]'  ° . Jn 1966 SLESINGER: repertéd to the FBI. that.
[712]he was in. touch: with a Moscow photographic
[713]shop proprietor; and he described evidence
[714]of KGB interest in him during his visit to
[715]Odessa in 1962. Previous to visiting the
[716]Soviet Union in 1962, SLESINGER had been. in.
[717]Contact with a number of Soviet officials »
[718]from the United Nations.
[720]NOSENKO was not specific in describing how he learned
[721]of SLESINGER, who may répresent a First Chief Directorate
[722]. case. .
[724](KOTENTS) Arrest and the KGB Agent
[726]NOSENKO was asked in Geneva in 1964 whether he was
[727]involved in the arrest of an American tourist in the
[728]USSR in the fall of 1963. Almost at once NOSENKO
[729]identified the case as that of (Bernard guide
[730]Fton Tours in New York City /(and hence an eupioges of
[731]lexander SVENCHANSKTY,/ see above) who had been arrested
[732]on homosexual charges in Kiev. NOSENKO. said that
[733]was involved with an American agent of the KGB Sciéntific
[734]and Technical (S&T) Directorate. NOSENKO did not know. the
[735]agent's name, but from the description he idéd he is
[736]believed identical with : ma KGB S&T
[738]® identified earlier on the basis of a May 1962 report
[740]mea sensitive. source.
[742]NOSENKO's Information
[744]Was a longtime member of the American Communist
[746]‘Party’ and a frequent visitor after the Second World War
[748]to the Soviet Union, where he had extensive contacts among
[749]dissident: literary figures and other Soviet citizens,
[750]particularly among Russian Jews. [NOSENKO explained in
[751]another context that: the: KGB is wary of foreigners' contacts
[752]with: Soviet Jews because the Israeli Intelligence Service
[753]has: frequently inspired such contacts.] Because of these.
[754]“many suspicious contacts, both the_KGB First and Second
[755]‘Directorates had concluded that WY might be a "provocation
[756]agent" planted in or recruited from the ranks. of the
[757]Communist. Party in the United States.
[759]fa OO 298 TS No. 197124
[761]Top Secret QK rr 10
[763]>)
[765]BEA pen : 7 :
[767]13-00000
[769]Jop-Secret
[771](SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)
[773]NOSENKO's Information
[775]SHUBIN was a native of California of Russian ex-
[776]traction, a Russian speaker, and a university professor
[777]in New York City. SHUBIN, who had visited the Soviet
[778]Union twice before, visited the Soviet Union in 1958
[779]or 1959, while NOSENKO was serving his first tour of
[780]duty in the Seventh Department. At that time, SIIUBIN
[781]was the target of Severith Department case officer
[782]A.A. VETLITSKIY, NOSENKO heard later that SHUBIN was
[783]placed under surveillance, and when the KGB surveillance
[784]observed SHUBIN as a passenger in a Ilinistry of Defense
[785]automobile, the GRU was asked about the American. "They
[786]very furtively said that they were interested in him,"
[787]from which the KGB concluded that SHUBIN was a GRU agent.
[789]In 1962 (sic) NOSENKO was reviewing a list of foreign
[790]visitors to the Soviet Union and he noted SHUBIN's name
[791]and recalled his earlier identification as a GRU agent.
[792]NOSENKO himself telephoned GRU General SOKOLOV's office
[793]and informed SOKOLOV of SHUBIN's presence (or, according
[794]to another version, SOKOLOV's office was advised by
[795]others). SOKOLOV's office eventually apologized for
[796]having failed earlier to notify the KGB of the GRU's
[797]interest in SHUBIN.
[799]4
[801]a sensitive source
[803]Comment: Earlier, € identified a@™
[804]agent apparently identical with SHUBIN
[805]and FBI sources reported SHUBIN's travel
[806]to the USSR in summer 1961 and in
[807]September 1963.
[809]SHUBIN had no valid U.S. passport
[811]between 1940 and June 1961; if he visited
[812]the Soviet Union during that period it was
[813]not as an American tourist under his true
[814]name. Consequently, he could not then have
[815]been the tourist target of the Seventh
[816]Department case officer, as NOSENKO claimed.
[817]If NOSENKO erred, and actually was referring
[818]to SHUBIN's visit in 1961, there is a further
[819]contradiction: NOSENKO could not have
[820]noticed his name while reviewing tourist
[821]lists in the Seventh Department, because
[822]he claims he was in the American Department
[823]at the time. .
[824]a 297
[826]TS No. 197124
[828]\\_ Top Secret Copy 10 _
[830]| sameeren we
[832]13-00000
[834]Top-Secret
[836](SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)
[838]NOSENKO went to Gorkiy on the fourth day after CHERE-
[839]PANOV's disappearance. The area was covered with very deep
[840]woods, "where a person could los himself for life". On the
[841]seventh day CHEREPANOV was located and arrested in Baku,
[842]where he was on his way to the Iranian border.
[844]A special plane was immediately sent to Baku, carrying
[845]S.M. FEDOSEYEV and several other American Department offi-
[846]cers. They brought CHEREPANOV immediately back to Moscow,
[847]interrogating him on the plane. He immediately confessed
[848]to having given the documents to the Americans. When asked
[849]why, he said he was “angry at the KGR, very angry", and
[850]besides, he thought he might ask the Americans for some
[851]money in return for the documents. He confessed that on
[852]4 November he had passed the documents to an American tourist
[853]who was a librarian interested in Russian books. He said he
[854]had given the documents to the American in the entrance
[855]haliway in the building of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
[856]the building in which the Ministry of Foreign Trade was also
[857]housed.
[859]Because CIEREPANOV had eluded the KGB between the two
[860]fixed surveillance posts which had been established, the
[861]Second Chief Directorate suffered considerable criticism
[862]for not putting CHEREPANOV under full, round-the-clock
[863]surveillance, CHEREPANOV himself, however, told the KG?
[864]that if he had detected his surveillants he would have
[865]written to the yovernment and newspapers a letter of protest
[866]against "such an indignity, such persecution", and then
[867]would have committed suicide, leaving the KGB without proof
[868]of his guilt.
[870]sensitive sources,
[872]Comment: Other sources, including @g ae.
[873]have also reported various aspect
[874]CHEREPANOV incident.
[876]NOSENKO's assertions with respect to the
[877]CHEREPANOV case, however, are not material to
[878]his claim that he was Deputy Chief of the
[879]Seventh Department at the time.
[881]of the
[883]313
[884]TS No. 197124
[886]Top Secret _ Copy 10
[889]Top Secret |
[891](SEVENTH DEPARTMENT ~ January 1962-January 1964)
[893]The Recall Telegram
[894]NOSENKO's Information
[896]On 3 February 1964, NOSENKO claimed, he visited the KGB
[897]Legal Residency once during the morning before he met with
[898]CIA and again that evening after 1800; there were at those
[899]times no KGB telegrams concerning him. On the morning of
[900]4 February he again stopped in at the Residency, but there
[901]were again no such messages for him. Later in the morning
[902]of 4 February, however, after attending a session of the
[903]Disarmament Conference, he returned to the Residency and
[904]found that a telegram from KGB Headquarters had arrived,
[905]instructing him to return to Moscow immediately to partici-
[906]pate in the KGB conference on tourism. After relating the
[907]substance of the telegram, NOSENKO defected and was thence-
[908]forth in CIA custody.
[910]Comment: ##Special Intelligence does not confirm NOSENKO's
[911]assertion regarding the existence of the recall
[912]telegram. According to Special Intelligence,
[913]there were enciphered communications from Moscow
[914]to the Soviet Mission in Geneva earlier and
[915]later, but there was none from 1815 on 3
[916]February until 1730 on 4 February, several hours
[917]: was in custody of CIA.
[919]324
[921]PE No. 197124
[922]Top Secret
[925]13-00000
[927]NOSENKO's Eventual Retraction Regarding Recall Telegram
[929]NOSENKO maintained throughout his interrogations
[930]in 1964 anc 1965 that there was the recall telegram and that
[931]it prompted his defection. In October 1966, however, while
[932]being questioned again, NOSENKO stated that there had been
[933]no telegram recalling him to Moscow from Geneva, and he
[934]signed the following statement:
[936]"On 4 February 1964, I told my CIA contact
[937]in Geneva that a telegram from Headquarters in
[938]Moscow had been received in the KGB Residency in
[939]Geneva recalling me immediately to Moscow. I said
[940]at the time that this telegram said that I was
[941]recalled to participate in a conference to plan KGB
[942]activity against tourists for the 1964 season. I
[943]maintained this story as fact throughout subsequent
[944]interviews and interrogations by American authorities
[945]in 1964 and 1965. No such telegram ever existed.
[947]No telegram was received in Geneva. I admit that
[948]the story was a lie. I myself invented this tele-
[949]gram in order to hasten my defection. I was nervous
[950]and afraid that my contacts with American Intelli-
[951]gence might be noticed."
[953]Knowledge of Other Seventh Department Operations
[955]The notes NOSENKO brought to CIA in Geneva in 1964
[956](see p.319) included Lrief reference to thirteen other KGB
[957]operations conducted against what NOSENKO described as
[958]tourists during the 1962-1963 period. For reasons cited
[959]in the description of these operations in Annex B, these
[960]operations are not. material to NOSENKO's claim to service
[961]in 1962-1963 as cither Chief of the American-British
[962]Commonwealth Section or as Deputy Chief of the Seventh
[963]Department.
[965]325
[967]TS No. 197124
[969]TopSecret Copy _10_
[972]Top Secret
[974](SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January. 1962-January 1964)
[976]Operational Activities = July 1962-danuary 1964: Summary
[978]To substantiate his claims to having served as Deputy
[979]Chief of the Seventh Department during this period, NOSENKO
[980]describes KGB invealvement in the recruitment 6f
[981]the arrests of Y and BARGHOORN, and the investigations
[982]of SLESINGER, OSWALD, and of former KGB officer CHEREPANOV,
[983]his discovery that SHUBIN was a GRU agent, and his aasignment
[984]to Geneva. Even if NOSENKO learned of the operations as
[985]he described and they were as hé described (there are substan-
[986]tial reasons why they might have been donducted by KGB
[987]elements other than the Seventh Department), they are atypical
[988]with respect to NOSENKO's own description of Seventh Depart-
[989]ment eperations. They do not accurately characterize, as
[990]NOSENKO claims, KGB counterintelligence operations against
[991]tourists, and thus do not substantiate his Seventh Department
[992]service. -NOSENKO's explanations: for his assignmerit to
[993]Geneva in 1964 are no more plausiblé than for his earlier
[994]assignment there in 1962. NOSENKO has asserted that he was
[995]not a lieutenant colonel as the teriporary duty authorization
[996]indicated, but a Gaptain, a rank incofgruous with a Deputy
[997]Chief of Department and one from Which he presumably would
[998]have been promoted as he assumed the senior KGB positions |
[999]which hé claimed to have held. fe :
[1001]KGB Counterintelligence Operations’
[1002]~ Among Américan Tourists
[1003]. 1962-1963 i
[1005]“Because of his position as a Deputy Chief, then First
[1006]Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, NOSENKO claimed
[1007]awareness of what the KGB posture was with respect to |
[1009]xS No. 197124
[1010]Top Secret 3
[1013]13-00000
[1015]Top-Secret
[1017](OTERR ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER)
[1019]Other Sources - 1964 and 1965
[1021]io
[1023]a sensit ive source
[1024]As indicated in Annex A, 4 SEs eported
[1025]several items of information he stated he obtained from
[1026]various KGB colleagues. According to these reports, GRIBANOV
[1027]was expelled from the KGB as a consequence of NOSENKO's
[1028]defection, it was rumored that GRIBANOV was to be fired
[1029]because he had been NOSUNKO's friend and patron, that
[1030]GRIBANOV was held responsible for the defection of his
[1031]protege, that GRIBANOV had approved NOSENKO's assignment to
[1032]Geneva in 1964 despite knowledge of facts making NOSENKO
[1033]ineligible, that GRIBANOV was a long-time friend of NOSENKO's
[1034]father, that NOSENKO had been a deputy to a Department Chief
[1035]d@cspite his junior rank because of GRIBANOV's influence,
[1037]and that GRIBAHWOV was dismissed from the KGB and Party
[1038]because he willfully withheld information about NOSENKO's
[1039]procuring women for parties which he and the General arrarged.
[1041]NOSENKO's Information - Post 1964
[1043]Immediately following his defection NOSENKO continued to
[1044]refer to this special and personal relationship, which
[1045]touched on nearly every aspect of NOSENKO's KGB service.
[1046]Under interrogation, however, NOSENKO could not sustain
[1047]this claim. The extent NOSENKO's statements were retracted
[1048]or contradicted with respect to GRIBANOV or contradicted by
[1049]other evidence, is seen from the following examples excerpted
[1050]from the earlier chronological examination: GRIBANOV wrote
[1051]the very best fitness report on NOSENKO that could be given
[1052]{(Retracted. GRIBANOV wrote none of NOSENKO's fitness
[1053]reports); NOSENKO and GRIBANOV carroused together with women
[1054]provided by NOSENKO (Retracted. NOSENKO recalled only two
[1055]occasions, and could relate only one in any detail.);
[1056]recruited Edward SMITH (see p. 3%) together with NOSENKO
[1057](Retracted. NOSENKO played no active role in SMITH recruit-
[1058]ment attempt and was not in Embassy Section at time.);
[1059]NOSENKO accompanied GRIBANOV to diplomatic receptions in
[1060]1961 at which the latter learned that Prench Ambassador -
[1061]DeJean was GRIBANOV's agent (Retracted, NOSENKO accompanied
[1063]aS 336
[1064]\ \ TS No. 197124
[1069]13-00000
[1071]SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
[1073]CONCERNING NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES
[1075]NOSENKO claims that he served for a decade in the KGB in
[1076]successively senior positions of authority from which he
[1077]derived extensive knowledge of the scope, character, and
[1078]results of KGB operations against Americans in the Soviet
[1079]Union in the pericd 1953-1963. To substantiate his claim,
[1080]he provides an impressive array of information about KGB
[1081]personnel, organization and operations which, to the extent
[1082]that it has been confirmed, is presumptive evidence of his
[1083]bona fides. Various Soviet officials, including intelli-
[1084]gence officers, have generally corroborated NOSENKO's
[1085]claims. According to some of these sources, NOSENKO was
[1087]a senior KGB officer wno occupied a series of sensitive
[1088]positions, who enjoyed considerable authority and trust
[1089]despite personal shortcomings, and whose defection, "the
[1090]greatest loss ever suffered by Soviet Intelligence”
[1091]paralyzed the work of @& ; ARES PG
[1093]The examination has compared each element of NOSENKO's
[1094]biography relevant to his claimed KGB service with known
[1095]facts and reasonable surmise. The examination reflects
[1097]the test to which his accounts were put: whether his
[1098]accounts are internally coherent and consistent with known
[1099]fact, and whether he actually gained the information he has
[1100]from occupying the KGB positions he claims to have held.
[1102]In short, is he what he says he is, according to his own
[1103]accounts?
[1105]357 TS No. 197124
[1107]_Tep Secret Copy 10
[1110]13-00000
[1112]. s.
[1114]~TOP_SECRET
[1116]1. Attached is Annex A of the Top Secret study
[1118]entitled, The Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB
[1120]Defector - Yuriy I. NOSENKO dated February 1968 (copy 10).
[1121]Copy 10 of this study had been forwarded to you earlier
[1123]for your review.
[1125]2. Certain portions of Annex A of this study are
[1126]deleted since it contains information which bears on the
[1127]security of ongoing, viable CIA operations, or is related
[1129]thereto.
[1131]3. We request return of the study (copy 10) and Annex A
[1133]when your review has been completed.
[1135]Attachment: As Stated Above
[1137]WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS
[1138]INVOLVED
[1140]E2 IMPDET CL BY 011340
[1142]TOP-SECRET
[1144]13-00000
[1145]> ST
[1147]Top-Secret—
[1149]Annex A
[1151]Statements of Soviet Officials About NOSENKO
[1153]4 February 1964
[1155]NOSENKO defected in Geneva.
[1157]6 February 1964
[1159]The Chief of che Soviet Disarmament Delegation notified
[1160]the Soviet Ambassador in Bern shortly before noon that
[1161]NOSENKO had disappeared, correctly placing the date as
[1162]4 February. They speculated privately between themselves
[1163]that he might have been "poisoned" or injured in an auto-
[1164]mobile accident.
[1166]8 February 1964
[1168]An official spokesman of the Soviet Mission in Geneva
[1169]reported to the Swiss police that NOSENKO, an "expert
[1171]temporarily assigned to Geneva", had been missing for four
[1172]days.
[1173]9 February 1964
[1175]Evening news broadcasts in Geneva carried reports
[1176]attributed to both Soviet and Swiss sources that NOSENKO
[1177]had disappeared.
[1179]10 February 1964
[1181]The Swiss press quoted unidentified Soviet sources
[1182]as saying it was presumed that NOSENKO had defected.
[1184]361 TS No. 197124
[1186]Top Seeret Copy 10
[1189]13-00000
[1193](Annex A) .
[1195]10 February 1964 (continued)
[1197]A U.S. Department of State press release was issued
[1198]identifying NOSENKO as KGB officer and acknowledging his
[1199]request for political asylum in the United States.
[1201]According to a sensitive source,
[1203]SERN RRET aaa ee el Because of his
[1204]long tenure in the KGB, NOSENKO would have a great deal of
[1205]important information which he could impart to intelligence
[1206]agencies of other countries. Certainly, he would be
[1207]acquainted with many KGB employees and could identify them.
[1208]He alse would be intimately acquainted with a large number
[1209]of Soviet agents working inside the USSR against American
[1210]and British nationals.
[1212]According to a sensitive source,
[1214]SOREL Raa ae eae The bulk of NOSENKO' s knowledge concerning
[1215]KGB activities would revolve around the intelligence
[1216]operations of the KGB in Moscow and also KGB personalities
[1217]working in Headquarters. NOSENKO was also undoubtedly
[1218]familiar with ali KCB personalities in Geneva and certainly
[1219]knew some KGB personalicies in other countries.
[1221]Comment: NOSENKU identified a number of KGB officers in
[1222]Geneva; he asserted that scme others, known
[1223]by CIA to be connected with the KGB, were not,
[1225]362
[1226]TS Ne. 197124
[1227]Top Secret Copy _.
[1231]13-00000
[1233](Annex A)
[1235]10 February 1964 (continued)
[1236]According to a sensitive source
[1238]Seat 2 La Dat Rac De Sg NOSENKO was affiliated with the KGB for
[1239]approximately sixteen years, since about 1947, and was an
[1240]employee of the Second Chief Directorate in Moscow. His
[1241]father, now dead, was a Deputy to the Prime Minister of the
[1242]Soviet Union and also Minister of the Shipbuilding Industry.
[1243]There is a shipyard named after NOSENKO's father in the
[1244]Ukraine.
[1246]Comment: NOSENKU claims to have served in the GRU until
[1247]1933, when he entered the EGR,
[1249]According to a sensitive source,
[1251]It appeared quite certain to Sapa Soc REDON PARAS a RRC NRE S be
[1252]officers that NOSENKO had the rank of lieutenant colonel in the KG8.
[1254]Comment: NOSENKO was at the time claiming to have been
[1255]a KG Lieutenant colonel,
[1257]According to a sensitive source,
[1258]aE from KCB officers :
[1260]fm ia ; The
[1261]photograpk U.S. newspapers is not that of
[1262]NOSENKO.One mia i Vorked with NOSENKO for several years
[1263]in KGB Neadquarters; he described NOSENKO as a person who
[1264]likes to be fashionably dressed at all times and is fond
[1266]of women, by nature a friendly individual and generally
[1267]well-liked by his fellow workers. NOSENKO worked in the
[1268]Second Chief Directorate.
[1270]363
[1271]TS No, 197124
[1273]Tea ee $ , ret Copy 10
[1275]-
[1277]13-00000
[1279]Top Secret
[1281](Annex A)
[1283]10 February 1964 (continued)
[1285]Comment:
[1287]: The photograph accompanying American
[1288]and Swiss press accounts of NOSENKO's defection
[1290]wus by error not that of NOSENKO but of
[1291]a sensitive source” Vladimir SHUSTOV, whom *@@@RBGW and NOSENKO both
[1293]identified as a "clean" Soviet diplomat at the
[1294]Geneva Disarmament Conference.
[1296]Noting the publicity accompanying the defection of KGB
[1297]officer NOSENKO in Switzerland, GOLITSYN recalled that
[1298]NOSENKO had been a Second Chief Directorate efficer working
[1299]against American citizens,
[1301]Comment: Routinely, GOLITSYN had reviewed in March 1962
[1302](before NOSENKG contacted CIA) a list of
[1303]Soviet delegates to the Disarmament Conference.
[1304]NOSENKO's name, which was on the list, did not
[1305]at that time prompt any comment from GOLITSYN.
[1309]Ambassador DOBRYNIN informally notified the Department
[1310]of State that a Soviet note would be delivered later to ask
[1311]how NOSENKO had left Switzerland, to request hia release,
[1312]and to demand an immediate interview with him.
[1314]12 February 1964
[1316]S.K. TSARAPKIN, the head of the Soviet Delegation to the
[1317]Disarmament Conference, read a statement at a press conference
[1318]in which he strongly condemned the Swiss autiorities for
[1319]permitting NOSENKO's "kidnapping" and for hindering efforts
[1320]to locate him. TSARAPKIN demanded that immediate steps be
[1321]taken to return NOSENKO to Soviet custody.
[1323]364
[1324]TS No. 197124
[1326]_ Yep Secret Copy
[1329]13-00000
[1331]_Top Secret
[1333](Annex A)
[1335]32 February 1964 (oonurinued)
[1337]At simultaneous press conferences in Sern and Geneva, the
[1338]Swiss rejected these accusations of non-cooyeration and noted
[1339]the Soviet delay in advising the police of NOSENKO's disappea-
[1340]rance asd Soviet failure to cooperate with Swiss authori¢ies
[1341]in locating NOSENKS.
[1343]The Soviet note earlier promised by DOBRYNIN was delivered
[1344]to the State Department. A noncommittal reply was given to
[1345]Soviet queries concerning the requested interview and the
[1346]means of NGSENKO's departure from Switzerland.
[1348]The Swiss Embassy asked for a meeting with NOSENKO in
[1349]order to obtain assurance that the defection had been
[1350]veluntary. Arrangements were made to have NOSENKO meet with
[1351]Swiss and Soviet representatives in Washington as soon as
[1352]possible.
[1354]NOSENKO arrived in Washington at 213¢ hours.
[1356]12-13 February 1964
[1358]14 February 1964
[1360]In Moscow, Soviet Foreien Minister GROMYKO read to
[1361]Ambassador KOHLER a statement deploring the “evasive” reply
[1362]of the State Department to Soviet inquiries in Washington
[1363]and terming the whole event of NOSENKO's disappearance a
[1365]365
[1366]TS No. 197124
[1368]_Tep Secrat- Copy 10 _
[1370]13-00000.
[1372]-Tep Secret
[1374](Annex A)
[1376]i4 February 1964 (continued)
[1377]“gross provocation by American Tutelligence orgens"”.
[1378]GROMYKO repeated the cemand for NOSENKO's immediate release
[1379]from American custody
[1381]The Counselor of the Swiss Embassy interviewed NOSENKO at
[1382]the Washington offices of the U.S. Immigration and Naturali-
[1383]zation Service. The Suviet confrontation immediately after-
[1384]wards was handled by Minister Counseior G.M. KORNIENKO, and
[1385]Third Secretary V.F. TSAKOV, a recent arrival in Washington.
[1386]NOSENKO told both che Swiss and the Soviets that he had
[1387]defected of his own free will after careful consideration
[1388]and that he had no desire to return to the Soviet Union. In
[1389]response to KORNIENKO's questions, he specificaliy renounced
[1390]his status and rights as a Soviet citizen.
[1392]1&@ February 1964
[1394]Feliks KOVALEV, a Soviet diplomat in Buenos Aires, told
[1395]a CIA agent that he had attended the Institute of Inter-
[1396]national Relations with NOSENKO. According to KOVALEV,
[1397]NOSENKO had twice married, had a good family background,
[1399]was the son of a Minister in the Government, was notorious
[1400]1
[1402]for his “adventurous” nature, and ‘famous for his character”.
[1404]366
[1405]TS No, 197124
[1410]13-00000
[1412](Annex A)
[1414]367
[1415]TS No. 197124
[1416]“ an
[1418]13-00000
[1420]TS No. 197124
[1421]Copy
[1424]13-00000
[1426]é k NOSENKO had been in the Second Chief Directorate
[1427]for about 14 years and was acquainted with almost all of the
[1428]employees of this directorate. He was aware of the structure
[1429]of the KGB and knews many personne) of the First Chief
[1430]Directorate. ag : £ : Pea
[1432]S a NOSENKO, as Deputy to the Chief
[1434]of the Seventh Department, had in his possession a telephone
[1435]directory which listed the names of some 10,000 KGB employees
[1437]in Moscow. Only Chiefs and Deputy Chiefs of De artments had officer
[1438]these phone books. @& pexpressed the
[1440]opinicn that "NOSENKO ts much more valuable to the FBI and
[1442]CiA than was Oleg PENKOVSKIY because of the fact that he
[1444]knows so much about the methods of work of the First and
[1446]Second Directorates of the KGB and is familiar with so many
[1447]individuals in the KGB both in Moscow and abroad. e@@@y@mmgmmba KGB office
[1448]Qe said that PENKOVSKIY was able to furnish American and
[1449]British Intelligence with a lot of information concerning
[1451]defense secrets of the Soviet Union, but NOSENKO is much
[1453]more knowledgeable in intelligence and counterintelligence
[1454]operations of the KGB."
[1456]Comment: NOSENKO has never commented on the KGB
[1457]telephone book referred @& BEG, YO above.
[1459]369
[1460]TS No. 197124
[1462]Fep Sécret Copy 10
[1465]13-00000
[1467]370
[1469]TS No. 197124
[1472]13-00000
[1476]Sa
[1478]According to a sensitive source, @QMEM in.@ response bo a question
[1480]whether NISENKO actually cef
[1482]ected or whether Qi the defection might be a
[1484]KGB "trick", the source replied fhat from his own knowledge of this matter,
[1486]22 February 1964,
[1488]he was convinced that MOSENZ
[1490]O's defection was not a "trick" by the ‘KGB,
[1492]According to a sensitive source from conversations with varénus unnamed KGB
[1495]officers: NOSENAO worked agai
[1497]stationed at the Asn
[1499]nst personnel
[1501]rascow, and with his
[1503]& .
[1505]erisan Y4assvo in M
[1506]help agents were developed amenyg these Americans. It is
[1507]assumed by the KGE that ne is Eamiliar with the number and
[1508]location ef micropuenes in the Embassy.
[1509]Camment: Alchscen NOSENKO knew that there were micro- Fy
[1510]phones in three reneral locations in the
[1511]Embassy, his specifie information regarding
[1512]the number and location of microphones was
[1513]limited to that contained in a written list
[1514]breunhc to Geneva in 1964, a list waich he
[1515]claimed no one in the EGR knew he had.
[1516]24 February 1964
[1517]Women claining :« te the wife and mother of NOSENKO rg
[1518]visited the American Embassy in Moscow for the first time,
[1519]expressing disbeliet that he had voluntarily betrayed his
[1520]family and country ond vequesting a personal meeting with
[1522]him.
[1524]371
[1526]Top Secret —
[1528]TS No. 197124
[1529]Copy _10
[1531]Me
[1533]13-00000
[1535]a
[1539]“on Seesst— ; t
[1541](Annex A)
[1543]24 February 196° (coatiuuad)
[1545]Comment: NOSENKO confirmed their identities as hia wife
[1547]and mother on the basis of physical deacrip-
[1548]tions. On only one previcus occasion have
[1549]members of a defector's family called on a
[1550]foreign embassy in Moscow. " Following the
[1551]defection of Yuriy Vasilyevich KROTKOV in
[1552]England in 1963, his wife appeared at the
[1553]British Embassy to make inquiries about him.
[1555]205 aceite z Bb PE ek EE SE a es ET cre A RR SS KURGCHKIN (fnu),
[1557]a KCB S&T officer scheduled for assiganent to Washington,
[1558]will not be sent as he is "well-known" to NOSENKO. In the
[1559]course of his duties in Moscow, KUROCHKIN had very often
[1560]visited the department where NOSENKO worked and, as a
[1561]result, NOSENKO is "more tian casually acquainted with him".
[1563]Comment: NOSENKO has never identified KUROQCHKIN nor
[1564]referred to the name.
[1566]TS No. 197124
[1567]Copy -
[1570]13-00000_
[1572](Annex A)
[1574]“Eobrvary . 1964
[1576]Nikolay ‘ARTAMONOV, who defected from. the Soviet Navy in
[1577]the late 1950's, noted the publicity accompanying NOSENKO's
[1578]defection. ‘He volunteered to CIA that he attended a naval
[1579]preparatory school with the son of Minister NOSENKO ‘ina
[1580]1944-1946.
[1582]Comment: ARTAMONOV's description of. the school and of
[1583]the dates involved differs from these. chaimdd
[1584]by NOSENKO.
[1586]KGB officer Vladimir TULAYEV mentioned NOSENKO to a
[1587]double agent in Vienna TULAYEV' said that NOSENKO,
[1588]e knew well, came from a wonderful family, lovad his
[1589]wife and children, and earned a good salary. (TULAYEV
[1590]later said on another occasion that he had’ friends who
[1591]knew NOSENKO well.) :
[1593]Comment: NOSENKO never identified TULAYEV by name or
[1594]; photograph. When asked, NOSENKO denied:
[1595]knowing him. : .
[1597]373
[1598]ae -TS.No. 197124
[1599]Yop Secret - Copy. 10
[1602]13-00000
[1604]a
[1606]According to a sensitive source
[1608].
[1610]ae : : Vln peas Poche act Paha | ya tus A KGB commission.
[1611]was in the process of studying "the scale of loss" [caused
[1612]by NOSENKO's defection] to the USSR. The commission was
[1613]very large, formed from different departments of the KGB.
[1614]The study (sic) was made "because it is aupposed that
[1615]NOSENKO had access to many rocket matters, to many nuclear
[1616]matters, to many strategical objects of the country...many
[1617]details about life of the leaders of the country, in the
[1618]government...that he knew very much about internal relations
[1619]between the people working in the KGB, that he hed many
[1620]close friends among them and [spent] daye and nighta
[1621]together with them. The whole history of his life was
[1622]studied step by step very carefully."
[1624]TS No. 197124
[1626]13-00000
[1628]According to a sensitive (jp source,~ ;
[1629]ee (from conversations with various unnamed KGB x
[1631]officers fe Be ; NOSENKO knows many
[1633]of the chiefs and deputies of the KG8 directorates and
[1635]departments at KGB lieadquarters in Moscow. In KGB Head-
[1637]E quarters there are four separate dining rooms for personnel
[1639]who work there; one such dining reom is reserved for chiefs
[1641]and deputies of departments. Because of this fact, NOSENKO
[1643]has a vast knowledge of the hierarchy of the KGB.
[1647]Comment: NOSENKO never referred to the dining rooms
[1648]until the January-March 1965 interrogations,
[1649]when he volunteered that he had eaten occasionally
[1650]in the “chfefs' dining room".
[1654]TS No. 197124
[1656]Secre Copy 10
[1659]13-00000
[1661]_Top Secret
[1663](Annex A)
[1665]23 March 1964
[1667]The two women claiming to be the wife and mother of
[1668]NOSENKO made the last of five visite to the Embassy in
[1669]Moscow. NOSENKO'’s wife had explained that she required
[1670]some definite statement in writing from her husband so that
[1672]she could plan for her own future and that of the NOSENKO
[1673]children.
[1675]376
[1676]TS No. 197124
[1678]—Fep-Seeret— ' Copy —-——
[1680]13-00000
[1682]Bate,
[1684]‘Top Secret
[1686](Annex A)
[1688]27 March’ 196%
[1689]“According to to a sensitive source -
[1690]Qiages (from various unnamed KGB officers @Riiee :
[1691]Ge: here seems to be unanimous opinion Papers
[1692]chiefs GRRBmmae® that NOSENKO...could do the KGB a tre-
[1693]mendous amount of harm. NOSENKO in his position as a de-
[1694]puty chief in one of the departments of the Second Chief
[1695]Directorate would have been entitled to have oné personnel
[1696].‘directory of approximately 30 pages setting for the iden-
[1697]‘tiries of all of the supervisory officials in KGB Head-
[1698]“quarters. NOSENKO would also have had a 200-page directory
[1699]listing by name and telephone number all the rank-and-file
[1700]employees working in Moscow. The opinion was expressed by
[1701]' some @@iimy KGB "chiefs" Qi : MeeP that if NOSENKO
[1702]were merely able to ‘make these two directories available
[1703]to American Intelligence, the KGB would be sevetely damaged
[1704]for the present and for several years to come.
[1706]certain
[1708]Commefit: NOSENKO has never referred to the KGB direc-
[1709]Be tories described...
[1711]KGB officers (1.1. PETUKHOV nad P.P..BORISO in Canada )
[1712]told their agent \George Herman SPRECHER Ato cease ali intel-
[1713]ligence activity-for a year, to destroy: any incriminating
[1714]materials in his possession as well as to supply the Soviets
[1715]with passport photographs so that “escape” documents could
[1716]be prepared for himself and his family. (SPRECHER asked
[1717]whether the action had any cotinection with NOSENKO's recent-~-
[1718]ly publicized defection, but the KGB officers denied it,
[1720]“asserting NOSENKO "was just a secretary"
[1722]377 :
[1723]TS No. 197
[1725]Top Secret Copy 10
[1728]13-00000
[1732]Top Secret:
[1734](Annex A) a RE
[1738]31 March 1964 (continued) Ee ae *
[1741]won
[1743]Comment :. When /P recontacted/SPRECHEW in February :
[1744], _ 1965, 2 acknowledged that NOSENKO ‘had ..
[1745]a in fact been Ehe cause of KGB concern, that he ~ -
[1747]had had some connection ‘with: NOSENKO, and
[1748]NOSENKO may have known something of what the
[1750]KGB was doing in Canada, a
[1751]NOSENKO désetribed a KGB Illegal, whose name
[1753]wag unknown to hin, who apparently ia identical |
[1754]to §
[1756]March
[1757]fcco ding toa sensitive source who
[1759]ees | . beh Pe Tine, was
[1760]briefed tn his office in KGB Headquarters by.a Second Chief
[1761]Directorate officer of the Americs Spartments Personnel
[1762]of that Departement, in which NOSENKO hed gerved until his
[1763]defection, were so shocked at the event that: they would not
[1765]‘mention it at all.
[1767]oo, _ ooo ta ‘sengitive source
[1768]Ng Comment:. In this and other contexts @ ® has stated
[1769]of implied that NOSENKO served in the American :
[1770]Department in. 1963- 1964: “*NOSENKO asserts he
[1771]left the American Department in January 1962:
[1772]and served in the Seventh! Department uatil his
[1773]defection.
[1775]378
[1777]>. Top Secret.
[1780]13-00000
[1782]1
[1784]TS, No. 197124
[1785]Copy 10
[1787]13-00000
[1789](Annex A)
[1791]April-May 1964
[1793]KGB officer G.N. VLASOV, case officer of Robert Lee
[1794]JOHNSON in Paris, began to meet JOHNSCN on the street rather
[1795]than in varicus restaurants as had been their habit. At one
[1796]of their final meetings before JOHNSON returned to’ the United
[1797]States, VLASOV cold JOUNSON that a Soviet Intelligence officer
[1798]had defected to the Americans in Geneva, and that extreme
[1799]caution must therefore be exercised in JOHNSON's contacts :
[1800]with the KGB. VLASOV said that the defector-could not identify
[1801]JOUNSON but that JOHNSON should dispose of everything he had
[1802]which might link him to Soviet espionage activities. (See
[1803]p. 24for a summary of the JOHNSON case.)
[1805]May 1964: According to a sensitive source
[1806]aE (from unidentified sources, presumably from KGB
[1807]officers <a : Suites): Two commissions have
[1808]been established by the CPSU for the purposes: (a) to -
[1809]Jjdetermine why KGB employees such ag DERYABIN, GOLITSYN, ’
[1810]_S and NOSENKO defected while serving abroad, and (b) to attempt.
[1812]to eliminate the "weak" employees and improve the effictency
[1813]of the KGB. .
[1815]_ TS No: | 197124 ;
[1816]So Copy
[1819]13-00000
[1821]; i a es nner ceerens
[1822]* no were ima pmmnnaarinne ncemreratinn, mevemmenceermiin nme oem
[1824]ct Sarbanes Tee ort sate names Percy pert ge ean-eeeryyererceereengmerean och neenre-oor=eerense” ng Cena
[1826]Top Secret .
[1828](Antiex A) . oo BE
[1830]s
[1832]20 May 1964 , :
[1833]‘Kee ording to a sensitive source from a ‘KGB officer,
[1836]: The KGB. was lucky that the ‘Americans found only
[1838]a0 microphones in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. ‘Actually,
[1839]about 200 microphones were concealed. by the’ Soviets in the
[1840]Embassy, NOSENKO was responsible for furnishing information
[1842]'té the Americans Which resulted in ‘the microphones being
[1843]found. NOSENKO knew only the general location of the 40.
[1845]microphones which were found and daes not have’ any knowledge
[1846]of the remaining ones... :
[1848]12 June 1964
[1850](Professor John M, THOMPSON reported ‘at. the American oe
[1851]Embassy in Moscow that an unnamed Soviet offictal with whom _
[1852]he was acquaintéd told him that NOSENKO was a ‘profligate
[1853]with two wives and many debts and is considered in Moscow:
[1854]to be someone they are well réd of. on
[1855]22 June 1964 L ee
[1857]According to a sensitive source ~~ E oe —_ COON
[1858]BES (from various unnamed KGB. officersé
[1859]+ The consensus amongakGB employees q rca EA eg
[1860]is that in the future the KGB will be feeling sharply the
[1861]effects of NOSENKO's escape to American. Intelligence. |
[1862]NOSENKO is considered to be vastly more -importatt than either \
[1863]GOLITSYN or DERYABIN. This opinion appears to be based on
[1864]Several factors:. Firet,: NOSENKO worked against personnel
[1865]Stationed at the American Embassy in Moscow and: with his help
[1866]agents were developed among these Americans. Second, it is.
[1867]assumed by KGB personnel that because of his ¢loseness to
[1869]esta Top Secret © «=: Copy 10
[1872]13-00000
[1874]'
[1876]22 June 1964 (continued)
[1878]the American Ex spassy In the past, NOSENKO would also be
[1879]familiar with the number of microphones which had been
[1880]installed in the fmbassy by the KGB and the locationa of
[1881]these microphones. Third, as a Deputy Chief of a depart-
[1882]“ment, NOSENKO would normally have had access to a telephone
[1883]directory listing all personnel in all directorates of the
[1884]8GB in Moscow. Another factor, which is a forridable one
[1885]in the minds cf other KGB employees, is that NOSENKO
[1886]travelled in a cather influential circle of. friends in
[1887]Moscow who were high in the Soviet Government. All these
[1888]comments were cited as reasons for NOSENKO being an
[1889]“important catch" for American Intelligence, but no one in
[1890]the KG8 really knows exactly how much information NOSENKO
[1891]had concerning the KG#
[1893]29 june 1964
[1894]~ GOLITSYN (from personal acquaintance): NOSENKO, the son
[1896]of the former Minister of Shipbuilding, was a KGB officer
[1898]who had worked in the American Department and the Seventh
[1899]Department of the Second Chief Directorate. GOLITS$YN, while
[1900]on his own First Chief Directorate business, met NOSENKO two .
[1901]or three times in the American Embassy Section in 1953, ~
[1903]and had seen him occasionally at work during 1958 and 1959.
[1905]: When COLITSYN asked him where he was working in 1959, NOSENKO
[1906]| replied that he was assigned to the Seventh Department.
[1908]i NOSENKO served in the American Embaesy Section from 1953
[1910]until 1957 or 1958, and was specifically responsible for
[1912]KGB coverage of American military peraonnel in Moscow during
[1913]1953. For the remainder of his service in the Embassy Section
[1914]until 1957 or 1958, NGSENKO may have had the same responsi-
[1915]bilities or may have been working against other Embasay
[1916]personnel or correspondents, but he was definitely in the
[1917]American Department during the entire period. In 1957 or
[1919]1958 NOSENKO was transferred to the Seventh Department, and
[1920]was a senior case officer there as of 1959. NOSENKO did not
[1921]work in the American Department of the Second Chief Directorate
[1922]American Department at any time during 1960; GOLITSYN visited
[1923]the Embassy Section on at least three eccasions from early
[1924]1960 to early i961, and would have known if NOSENKO had been
[1925]in the Section, particularly {f NOSENKO had been Deputy Chief.
[1926]G.I. GRYAZNOV was acting as assistant of the Chief of the
[1927]Section during this perlod.
[1929]382 ,
[1930]“4s No. 97124
[1932]_Top-Secret— Copy
[1935]13-00000
[1937]CAnnex A}
[1939]29 June 1964 (continued)
[1941]Comment: NOSENKO claims he left the. Embassy Section in
[1942]1955 and wags assigned to the Seventh Department
[1943]until 1960, when he returned to the Embassy
[1944]Section as Deputy Chief. NOSENKO did not
[1945]identify GOLITSYN's photograph and had denied *
[1947]since defection that he has ever met or even
[1948]seen him. ,
[1950]wune 3964
[1951]According to a sensitive source
[1953]x*
[1955]“Just after" NOSENKO' 8
[1957]defection V.S. MEDVEDEV from the Exits Commission of the
[1959]CPSU Central Committee travelled to Geneva to speak to the
[1960]Soviets stationed there and to Soviet delegates to the Disarn-
[1961]ament Conference. MEDVEDEV underscored the seriousness of
[1963]the defecticn and urged greater vigilance against such acts.
[1964]The defection caused the recall of Nina Ivanovna YEREMEYEVA,
[1966]a KGB secretary in Geneva. It was rumored that some sédxty
[1967]Soviet officials stationed abroad would be transferred from
[1968]thetr assignment as a consequence of the NOSENKO affair.
[1970]V.A. POCHANKIN, a KGB officer with the permanent Soviet
[1971]Mission in Geneva, speculated that he had been completely
[1972]exposed by NOSENKO and would therefore have to return “to
[1973]Moscow. Yu. I. GUK who was known eee. E ren pag
[1974]had been discharged from the KGB because he had: recommended
[1975]NOSENKO's travel to Geneva. “According to one rumor, the
[1976]chief of the Department in which: /NOSENKO had been employed,
[1977]would also lose his job. : : .
[1981]by .a sensitive source
[1983]Comment: MEDVEDEV, a KGB officer formerly/stationed in
[1984]New York City, was said by. to be one
[1985]of those from the CPSU Central Committee who .
[1986]conducted interviews with KGB personnel: going ©
[1987]abroad. g@ : identified MEDVEDEV, a
[1989]x
[1991]ee -*4§ No. 197124
[1992]Too Secret — "Copy
[1995]13-00000
[1997](Annex A) : , .
[1999]June 1964 (continued)
[2001]Comment: (Continued)
[2002]SM a Counselor of the Soviet Mission at the
[2004]United Nationa, as the Communist Party organizer —
[2006]and possibly a member of the KGB, but said that
[2008]MEDVEDEV's role is not important and that he
[2010]worked mainly with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
[2011]POCHANKIN, who NOSENKO had identified as a ;
[2013]KGB officer, was still in Geneva in December 1966.
[2015]29 July 1964
[2016]Accordin
[2018]eS Crrom. snnamed sourees, presumably KGR officers Sm
[2019]piemnney) © «6 AN vuinvestigating commission of the
[2020]CPSU Central Committee checking into the circumstances
[2021]surrounding NOSENKO's defection has thus far been responsible
[2022]for the expulsion from the KGB of 15 Second Chief Directorate
[2023]employees. Thess include GRIBANOV, who was also expelled
[2024]from the CPSU and was stripped of his rank of lieutenant
[2025]general. GRIBANOV has been given a very small pension, like
[2026]an ordinary Soviet citizen. This drastic action was taken
[2027]since the primary responsibility for the defection was placed
[2028]on GRIBANOV. It was realized that, in addition to being Chief
[2029]of the Second Chief Directorate at the time of the defection,
[2030]GRILANOV was a personal friend of NOSENKO and had more or -
[2031]less treated NOSENKO as a protege and had taken many steps
[2032]to further NOSENKO's career within the KGB. It was felt
[2033]that GRIBANOV sho.ld have been aware of .NOSENKO's plans to
[2034]defect. Three of GRIBANOV's deputies were also expelled
[2035]from the KGB, cone of whom was a Major General BANNIK .
[2036][BANNIKOV]. Of the 11 other Second Chief€ Directorate employees
[2037]expelled, some were found to have been personal friends of .
[2038]NOSENKO and some of them were found to have confided to NOSENKO
[2039]details of operations in which they were working. S.M. GOLUBEV,
[2040]a KGB officer stationed in Washington, would be leaving for
[2041]Moscow because the investigating commission had determined
[2042]that Yu. IT. CUK, a mutual friend of NOSENKO and GOLUBEV ‘told
[2043]NOSENKO that GOLUBEV had been assigned to the Washington Legal
[2044]Residency. GOLUHEV had himself worked with NOSENKO in KGB
[2046]TS No. v97i24 -
[2047]Copy: -
[2050]13-00000
[2052](Annex A)
[2054]29 July 1964 (continued)
[2056]Headquarters sometime in the past, but. subsequently NOSENKO
[2057]and GOLUBEV were given different assignments within the KGB
[2058]and tiereafter did not associate with one another in the
[2059]course of thelr daily activities. ~
[2061]neat: NOSENKO retracted in 1965 his earlier claims
[2062]that GRIBANOV had been instrumental in his
[2063]advancement and assignments. NOSENKO identi-
[2064]fied by name and photograph GOLUBEV, whom he ©
[2065]had known personally since 1959, but NOSENKO
[2066]said he had never worked with him at KGB Head-
[2067]quarters since GOLUBEV had always been in- the
[2068]First Chief Directorate. GOLUBEV left for the
[2069]USSR on 28 August 1964.
[2071]July-August 1964
[2072]a
[2075]information Qeigeeeenns WE ECR Wa ahh eee : wey about
[2076]NOSENKO was @geyeems from KGB Headquarters which reported
[2077]the conclusions of the commission which had been appointed
[2078]to prepare the damage report on NOSENKO's defection. The
[2079]letter, which was very brief, said that “the loss was very
[2080]great and some new forme of work should be created to be
[2081]efficient in the future". The Legal Residency hdd not
[2082]before received any “reports or commentaries on NOSENKO's
[2083]escape". : .
[2085]“TS No. 197124
[2087]< Top Secret Copy 10
[2089]Le eR ND aR LR seta eo
[2093]13-00000
[2095](Annex A)
[2097]November 1964
[2099]Asked while visiting the United States if the Russian .
[2100]people had been told of the ABEL-~POWERS exchange, Soviet: :
[2101]mathematician R.V. GAMKRELIDZE replied to an American |
[2102]acquaintance that they had not been told officially but!
[2103]they knew about it since there was "quite a grapevine" in.
[2104]Moscow. It was in this way,,GAMKRELIDZE stated, that he
[2105]learned of the NOSENKO defection and of its significance.
[2106]According to the "grapevine", the defection was very
[2107]damaging to Soviet Intelligence in that NOSENKO waa the.
[2108]Chief of the American Section, and he knew the identities
[2109]of all Soviet agents in the United States.
[2111]386
[2113]TS No. 197124
[2114]Copy —
[2117]13-00000
[2119](Annex A)
[2121]November 1964 (continued)
[2123]Comment: GAMKRELIDZE is suspected of having connections
[2124]with Soviet Intelligence because of his
[2125]statements, actions, and unusual freedom of
[2126]solitary movement while on visits to the United
[2127]States. GAMKRELIDZE rebuffed a CIA recruitment
[2128]attempt in 1964, but added that he "welcomed
[2129]the opportunity to meet with an American
[2130]Intelligence officer...to compare the Soviet
[2131]Intelligence officers he had met with their
[2132]American counterparts. During that 1964
[2133]meeting GAMKRELIDZE again raised the subject
[2134]of NOSENKO, describing him as “obviously a
[2135]traitor to his country".
[2137]December 1964
[2138]@ Qe source
[2140]Nikolay RESHETNYAK, NOSENKO's/roommate in Geneva at the
[2141]time of his defection, told 4% ® that he had been
[2142]interrogated by the KGB in connection with NOSENKO's defection,
[2143]and that he had later attended the Moscow trial in which
[2144]NOSENKO was sentenced to death in absentia. RESHETNYAK
[2145]“reported to-Qimm the dismissal of large numbers of
[2146]KGB officers, ae GRIBANOV and GUK. From what
[2147]RESHETNYAK said, @& > thought the KGB might go so far
[2149]source
[2151]387
[2152]TS No. 197124
[2154]a ret | 7 Copy 10
[2156]13-00000
[2158](Annex A) —— - - 7 o ‘
[2160]December 1964 (continued)
[2162]ag to send someone to the United States to locate and kill
[2164]NOSENKO. later identified RESHETNYAK ae a KGB
[2165]officer.) -_ :
[2167]Comment: NOSENKO identified RESHETNYAK as a Ukrainian
[2168]Ministry of Foreign Affairs officer on the.
[2169]staff of the Disarmament Delegation.
[2171]29 January 1965
[2173]According to a sensitive source
[2175]~GB employees that GRIBANOV was expelled from the KGB and
[2176]CPSU and is now on pension, parttal rather than full, as a
[2177]result of the NOSENKO defection. When NOSENKO was being
[2178]considered for assignient to Geneva (in 1964), a dgummary
[2179]statement of his activities was prepared in the Second Chief
[2180]Directorate and sent to GRIBANOV. This. summary contained
[2181]considerable “compromising information", concerning NOSENKO;
[2182]if acted upon properly, it would have removed him from
[2183]consideration for this trip. GRIBANOV read the summary:
[2184]material, ran a line through all of it,’ and, added the nota~
[2185]tion: "Send him to Geneva." The general feeling is that
[2186]GRIBANOV was willing to overlook a lot of NOSENKO's os
[2187]deficiencies because of GRIBANOV's. long-time friendship -
[2189]with NOSENKO's father.
[2191]Comment: NOSENKO originally asserted that GRIBANOV
[2192]was responsible for sending him to Geneva in
[2193]1964, but after retracting his claim that .
[2194]GRIBANOV had played any special role in hia
[2195]assignments, he asserted that BANNIKOV approved
[2196]the 1964 trip. . NOSENKO denies that his father
[2197]and GRIBANOV were acquainted. ;
[2199]388
[2201]Ts Ne. 197124
[2202]Copy
[2205]13-00000
[2207](Annex A)
[2209]8 February 1965
[2211]According to a sensitive source from a KGB officer
[2213]Lae Prior to NOSENKO's
[2214]Chief of a department in the
[2215]While working in the Seventh
[2217]defection he was Deputy to the
[2218]Second Chief Directorate.
[2219](Surveillance) Directorate in Moscow, ag
[2221]the KGB office
[2223]foes on three
[2225]separate occasions participated in conferences between
[2226]important people" of the Second Chief: Directorate and the
[2228]Seventh Directorate. NOSENKO was present at all of these.
[2230]Although NOSENKO was a Deputy Chief he held only the rank .
[2232]of captain in the KGB. Qe actributed this (the the KGB officer
[2234]disparity between job and rank) to the influence which
[2236]GRIBANOV exerted on the behalf of NOSENKO
[2238]the KGB officer
[2239]Comment: NOSENKO has never identified & B  NOSENKO
[2240]always claimed tiat he had been a lieutenant
[2241]colonel in the KGB until October 1966, when he
[2243]retracted that claim and asserted that he had
[2244]been only a captain.
[2246]Accor dane to a sensitive source from a KGB officer
[2248]a mP: GRIBANOV has been dismissed from
[2249]| the KGB, expelled from the CPSU, and is presently living on
[2250]asmall pension. His dismissal occurred immediately after
[2251]NOSENKO's defection. In addition, not less than 50 other
[2252]people were dismissed, many of whom were close friends of
[2253]GRIBANOV. Most of these were from the First and Second
[2254]Chief Directorates, with the majority from the Second Chief
[2255]Directorate. The present Acting Chief of the Second Chief
[2256]Directorate is a Major General BANNIK, whose appointment
[2257]has not yet been approved by the Central Commiectee of the
[2259]CPSU. One of his deputies {is a Major Generai (F.A.)
[2260]SHCHERBAK. ,
[2262]389
[2263]TS No. 197124
[2265]Den Bo ne
[2268]13-00000
[2270](Annex A)
[2272]8 February 1965 (coutinued)
[2274]Comment: GRISANOV was reported in operational contact
[2275]with a senior Westera diplomat until late
[2276]autumn 1964 (almost a year after NOSENKO's
[2277]defection}, when he turned over that contact
[2278]to another KGB officer.
[2280]9 February 1965
[2281]According to a sensitive source from a KGB officer
[2283]: iam mg): The amount of damage caused
[2284]by NOSENKO? s defection is "unpredictable". NOSENKO knew
[2286]few employees of the First Chief Directorate working abroad,
[2287]but knew many such employees serving in KGB Headquarters by
[2288]virtue of seeing them in the dining room which {ts reserved
[2289]for chiefs and deputy chiefs of KGB departments.
[2291]Early June 1965
[2292]AS
[2294]rding to a sensitive source
[2295]2 (Fron conversations with KGB officers & i
[2297]ew: Major General BANNIKOV is cureently
[2298]temporary Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, having
[2299]replaced GRIfZANOV who was expelled from the KGS because he
[2300]supported NOSENKO in his career. GRIBANOV is working in a
[2301]small city outside Moscow as the chief of security at an
[2302]unimportant military plant and is now a "nothing"
[2304]390
[2305]TS No. 197124
[2309]13-00000
[2311]2 <
[2312]“According to a sensitive source from a KGB officer
[2314]@SRSA who attended the Moscow meeting described): <A meeting
[2315]of all First Chief Directorate personnel at KGB Headquarters
[2316]was held on 15 July 1965. The meeting was devoted to the
[2318]i circumstances of the expulsion of the Chief of the Second
[2320](British) Department of the First Chief Dixectorate, Ye. A.
[2321]TARABRIN, about three and a half months eariter. I.A. BELOV
[2322]and other officers also attended the meeting. According to
[2323]official statements made at the meeting, after the defection
[2324]of NOSENKO the KGB conducted an extensive investigation to
[2325]determine which employees knew him and the nature of théir
[2327]é relationship. During this TARABRIN was questioned; he said
[2329]he knew NOSENKO, but only casually and only because of Limited
[2330]contacts within the KGB. The-“inveetigation determined, how-
[2331]| ever, that TARABRIN attended several parties at which NOSENKO
[2332]was present. Giris invited by NOSENKO were also there.
[2333]described one such party. Thereafter, TARABRIN was
[2334]afforded a hearing and was accussed of willfully concealing
[2336]Foource vital information. As a result he was expelled from the KGB
[2338]and the CPSU and was deprived of all pension rights.
[2340]a sen-—
[2343]Comment: NOSENKO had most recently asserted that he mat
[2345]A GRIBANOV socially only three times during his
[2346]KGB service, and on each:occasion TARABRIN was
[2347]present. NOSENKO said he twice provided girls
[2348]for GRIBANOV and TARABRIN, once in October or
[2349]November 1963 in circumstances similar to those
[2350]referred to. NOSENKO said that TARABRIN was
[2351]Chief of the British Department from 1958 to
[2352]1963, when he became Deputy Chief of “Service
[2353]No. 2", the reorganized Counterintelligence
[2354]Department of the First Chief Directorate.
[2356]391
[2358]TS No. 197124
[2360]_Top Secret _ Copy:_10 _
[2362]13-00000
[2364]x
[2366](Annex A)
[2368]AS Deresult of NOSENKO" O's efecnnen many
[2370]aitiad, aat fram tha Party, and
[2372]: ne rii. These sichuded KOt Cheirmen SERDV, and Second
[2373]Chief birectorate Chief GRIBANOV had been expelled from the
[2374]Party and from the KGB. GRIBANOV had been especially
[2375]friendly with NOSENKO, had given him many privileges, and
[2376]they were "buddies aud night buddies"
[2378]Comment: SEMICHASTNYY, not SEROV, was KGB Chairman in
[2379]1965. SEROV became head of the GRU in 1958.
[2381]Winter 1965-1966
[2383]Source, a
[2385]a ay self-professed former KGB Second
[2386]Chief Directorate agent (from KGB officer V.G. SVIRIN, a
[2387]colleague of her husband at the State Committee for Science
[2388]and Technology (GKKNR) in 1960-1962. @ Rass
[2389]that SVIRIN was later head of a KGB unit conducting operations
[2390]against the American Embassy in Moscow):
[2392]NOSENKO's father was a Minister or General and his mother
[2393]was Jewish and "always involved in some blackmarketeering".
[2394]NOSENKO was not a KGB officer but a “civilian” connected
[2395]somehow with the KGB. When NOSENKO defected, everyone said
[2396]he was detestable. NOSENKO told the Americans about the
[2397]microphones and things (sic) in the Embassy.
[2399]392 a
[2400]. TS No, 197124
[2403]13-00000
[2405](Annex A)
[2407]Winter 1965-1966 (continued)
[2409]Source's
[2410]Comment:
[2412]Hees af allegation is the single report
[2413]from any source describing NOSENKO as other than
[2414]a KGB officer.
[2416]Source
[2418]March 1966
[2420]According to a sensitive source,
[2422]cas (from unidentified sources in Moscow): NOSENKO,
[2423]fas not personally known tog 7, was an important
[2425]who Source
[2427]_boss in the KGB. When NOSENKO was a young man, he was in
[2429]the GRU Military Academy and was then sent to the GRU
[2430]Information Department for a short time; in all, perhaps
[2432]for a year. NOSENKO had been a very undisciplined person
[2433]while in the GRU and “not very good". He was to have been
[2434]discharged from the GRU; however, his father, who was a very
[2435]influential person in the Ministry of Shipbuilding, was
[2437]able to get NOSENKO tr nsferred to the KGB. It was the opinion
[2438]of persons to whom @ oe talked that NOSENKO had given
[2439]very, very good information to the U.S. after his defection
[2440]and that NOSENKO had had great access to KGB information
[2441]which included all means of KGB coverage of people in
[2442]Moscow, microphone systems in the embassies, etc. Based on
[2444]NOSENKO's information the American Embassy found many of the
[2445]microphones.
[2447]393
[2449]TS No, 197124
[2450]. Copy 10
[2453]13-00000
[2457]March 3966 (continued)
[2459]Comment: NOSENKO has claimed that he rejected an offer
[2460]to attend the Military Diplomatic Academy
[2461](which he, Like &@ Rm, called the GRU Source
[2462]Military Academy), by choice accepting assign-
[2463]ent to the Far East on entry to the GRU in
[2464]1951. At the time, the Military Diplomatic
[2465]Academy was a four-year course; if NOSENKO
[2466]did attend the school, he could not have
[2467]served as he claimed in the GRU. Gage
[2468]the sole source (besides NOSENKO) who alleged
[2469]NOSENKO served in the GRU.
[2471]Wad R eT OF tat?
[2475]i,
[2477]TS No. 197124
[2478]Top Secret —. Copy ———_—_.
[2480]°° AAR: FEE a RET me Serpe ene ee ne
[2482]is Source
[2484]13-00000
[2486](Annex A) :
[2488]395
[2489]TS No. 197124
[2491]. copy 10:
[2494]13-00000
[2496](Annex A)-
[2498]‘Top Secret i 7
[2500]Mid=1966
[2502]Yurdy Dmitriyevich KOROLEV, a Soviet journalist, visited
[2503]Paris and spoke with representatives of the French magazine
[2505]Paris Match. KOROLEV indicated that he would like to serve
[2507]as a stringer for the Freich journal and proposed that he
[2508]begin with a story on the life of the family of a "Soviet
[2509]secret agent". As KOROLEV epoke only broken French and
[2510]English, the magazine staff did not seriously pursue the
[2511]matter at that time, ,
[2513]Comment: KOROLEV ig believed identical with Yurty KOROLEV
[2514]: who, as of 1964, was employed part-
[2515]the United Press Internacional
[2517]Second Chief Directorate} KOROLEV has travelled
[2518]previously to Brussels as a correspondent for
[2519]the Soviet publication Gputnik, and to Japan
[2521]and the United States as 6 correspondent for,
[2522]Novosti, the Soviet news Agency. The offer by.
[2523]an official Soviet presse representative of
[2524]information on.a "Soviet secret agent", which
[2525]turned out to refet to NOSENKO, is without.
[2526]precedent. :
[2528]O€tober 1966
[2530]Soviet journalist Yu. D. KOROLEV returned to Paris with
[2532]an interpreter to renew his offer to Paris Match editers to
[2534]provide’a story on the life of the family of a "Soviet secret
[2535]agent". The story was to concern NOSENKO's family and their
[2537]396
[2538]oo TS No. 197124
[2539]Tep Secret — Copy -
[2542]13-00000
[2544](Annex A) , -
[2546]October 3966 (continued)
[2548]life in Moscow since NOSENKO's defection. A short background
[2549]statement KOROLEV provided Paris Match editors stated:
[2550]"NOSENKG, about 30-38, an officer of the Soviet Secret Police
[2551]organization, defected to the USA without his family about
[2552]two years apo and asied for political asylum in the U.S.:
[2554]it was granted te him. This was the most serious defeat of
[2555]the Soviet Security organs as NOSENKO occupied important
[2556]positions in espionage and counterespionage departments and
[2557]also was closely acquainted with the country's leading
[2558]families and homes. NOSENKO's family consists of a wife,
[2560]35, two daughters, 10 and 12, a mother and a younger brother.
[2561]The family is net prosecuted (sic) but feel very badly about
[2562]the incident [the defection]. Very soon the wife will apply
[2563]to the International Lawyers Organization for a divorcee and
[2564]compensation. It is possible that this case will be given
[2565]much publicity. tis wife has not heard from him since he
[2566]defected, but it is obvious that he is still in the USA."
[2567]KOROLEV displaye: a photo spread showing NOSENKO's wife and
[2568]family going about their daily affairs in Moscow, and
[2569]indicated that additional photographs of NOSENKO's family
[2570]could be obtained and that interviews with then and with
[2571]others knowing NOSENKO could be arranged for a Paris Match
[2572]correspondent.
[2574]Comment: A divorce from a defector from the Soviet Union,
[2575]who is legally considered to be an enemy of the
[2577]state, is granted automatically upon the wife's
[2578]request.
[2580]28 January 1967
[2581]A rding to a sensitive source
[2583]e (from personal knowledge) : Referring to his own
[2584]Ze of KGB organization, said if NOSENKO heard
[2585]his explanation, he would call a child, since NOSENKO
[2586]knew these matters better chanl@ pbecause he had served
[2587]at KCB Headquarters longer.
[2589]Source
[2591]397
[2592]TS No. 197124
[2594]—Fop-Seeret— Copy -
[2597]13-00000
[2599](Annex A)
[2601]Eebruery 1967
[2602]~ According to a sensitive source
[2603]go (from unidentified GRU sources in Moscow):
[2604]NOS ENKO worked only in Ri! Information Department of the GRU,
[2606]and only for about five or six months, after which he weat
[2607]to the KGB. :
[2609]May 1967 .
[2610]"According to a sensitive source
[2612]The KGB assumes that NOSENKO divulged the whole
[2613]syst of survetllance of Americans. He worked on it, knew
[2614]all about it and exposed the whole system of work. He knew
[2615]ali the posts, the sources (few words unclear) he knew all
[2616]the surveillance groups and knew surveillants by sight.
[2617]According to a sensitive source
[2620]NOSENKO worked in the GRU Information Departmen he worked
[2621]only #8 the Center (Headquarters) in Moscow. lle worked badly
[2622]there, and received bad efficiency reports, as a result of
[2624]which he had arguments. Then with his father's help he went
[2625]to the KGB. ;
[2627]5 June 1967
[2628]ccording to a sensitive source
[2630]& 7: There had been some
[2631]KGB suspicions of Pavel Fedorovich SHAKHOV while he was in
[2632]Geneva, because he had allegedly had many American contacts
[2633]which he had not reported, and NOSENKO was sent to Geneva to
[2635]investigate him. Rezident KULEBYAKIN is still suspicious of
[2636]SHAKHOV.
[2638]Comment: NOSENKO claims he was sent to Geneva in 1962
[2639]to investiyate SHAKHOV.
[2641]398 7
[2642]TS No. 197124
[2644]—FepSeeret— Copy -
[2647]13-00000
[2649]ANNEX A - STATEMENTS OF SOVinT OFFICIALS
[2651]ABOUT NOSENKO
[2654]13-00000
[2656]STATEMENTS OF SOVIET OFFICIALS ABOUT NOSENKO
[2658]Pages 361 - 398 of the previous summary contain statements
[2659]by Soviet officials including sev eral sources in regard to NOSENEO.
[2660]These remarxs cover the period of February 195% to June 1967.
[2662]. 4 .
[2663]None of the quoted information with the exception of a statement
[2664]i
[2666]a Source (a self- “professed former KGB Second Chief Directorate agen
[2668]by M who siaicd NOSE NKO was nota KGS
[2670]officer buta "civilian" connected somehow with the AGB, raiscs a
[2673]question concerning the identity of NOSENKO or whether he was
[2675]actually a KGB oificer. it is not considered that the remark by
[2676]SOURCE
[2678]can be given any particular weight or that it repre-
[2679]sents any material evidence he was aot a KGB officer,
[2680]Of the cited information from Soviets in regard to NOSENKO,
[2682]the most important, other than statements by GOLITSYN which are
[2683]; sensitive Source #1, sensitive Source #3
[2684]cited elsewhere, is the information from 3a, aan @ and
[2686]sensitive Source #2 Source #1, Source #3
[2687]5 B and probably in that order, S@QSi, “QERzEEE
[2689]and
[2691]So 2
[2692]teen had no personal knowledge of NOSENKO and most of their
[2694]comments were based on information from third parties or obtained
[2696]Source #1
[2697]through conversation, There are discrepancies between what
[2698]P
[2700]Source #2
[2702]and
[2704]have reported about NOSENKO and what NOSENKO has
[2707]13-00000
[2708]s
[2710]Source #1 Source #2
[2711]said, but under the given circumstances of how Gia@e@RRR and a
[2713]acquired the information, certain discrepancies should be expected,
[2715]No discrepancies would appear highly suspicious. It should be noted
[2716]Source #2, Source #3 and Source #1
[2717]that Hie > SS es a nd ARMEe have furnished no inforrnation
[2719]is
[2721]that NOSENKO is not a bona fide defector.
[2723]Sou€fce #1, Source #3 and Source #2
[2724]It is felt that information from Gia, GRIREREEEE and Gina
[2726]is a factor which should be given due consideration in the NOSENKO case,
[2727]but the fact that they furnished no information indicating that NOSENKO
[2728]is not a bona fide defector should not be considered as absolute proof
[2730]» _ he was not dispatched by the KGB. A decision as to whether NOSENKO
[2731]was or was not dispatched should be based ona full consideration of
[2732]all available information, It must be realized there is a possibility
[2734]Source #1, Source #3
[2736]Seat Ek Seg
[2738]Pee
[2740]NOSENKO could have been dispatched by the KGB and
[2741]Source #2
[2742]and 4
[2744]#be completely unaware; conversely, a determination that
[2746]NOSENKO was not dispatched by the KGB does not establish the bona
[2747]Source #1, Source #3 or Source #2
[2749]fides of GEE, <& or GEE
[2751]NOSENKO, until October 1966, stated that a telegram had been received
[2753]in the Geneva Residentura ordering NOSENKO to return to the USSR in
[2755]ay
[2757]hee 8
[2759]3 connection with an expected conference on tourist matters. The telegram,
[2761]13-00000
[2765]according ta NOSENKO in interviews prior to October 1966, had beer.
[2766]reccived is the Residentura the morning of the sarme day he mez his
[2767]CIA contacts and stated he had defected,
[2769]In October 1966, NOSENKO responded iv a casual mention of
[2770]the "recall telegram" with a complete retraction of his previous state-
[2771]ments on the subject, NOSENKO stated, and has subsequently maintained,
[2772]that there was not a ‘recall telegram.'' He has explained that he invented
[2773]the recall telegram" matter because he was concerned about his personal
[2775]safety in remaining "in place" for a ionger time, NOSZNKO has stated
[2777]_he thought the alicged "recall telegrara" would Le accepted by CLA as
[2779]& logical reason ior his precipitate deiection,
[2782]13-00000
[2785]13-00000
[2787]Certain of the ciscrepancics noted in the previous summary
[2788]b L Pa
[2790]Source #] Source #2
[2791]between iniormation Jc orn <BR and aes
[2795]have been clarified and certain discrepancies could not be clarizicd.
[2797]Source #1 and Source #2
[2799]ane
[2801]taal
[2803]of the reporcn, vy
[2805]the absence
[2807]of any reason to Guestion this his life as sclated by NCSENEO.
[2809]Exemples are information from
[2812]13-00000
[2814]Source #2.
[2816]that NOSENKO attended the GRU Military Academy and that NOS ENKO
[2818]worked in the GRU Information Department in Moscow, There are also
[2820]Source #2,
[2822]certain discrepancies between information furnished by
[2823]Source #1 and Source #3 in
[2824]fv and? fl in regard to the life and career of NOSENKG
[2826]prior to 1964,
[2828]In regard to discrepancies previously noted between information
[2829]Source #1 . : Source #1
[2830]BY as to certain KGB officers whom oer? understocd
[2832]NOSENKO had personaily met and concerning whom NOSENKO had pre-
[2833]viously indicated no knowledye, a satisfactory cxplanation has been
[2834]obtained for certain of the discrepancies during current interviews with
[2836]NOSENKO. In certain other instances, a completely adequate explana-
[2837], 7 re *
[2839]tion is not available but there is just as adequate reason to believe
[2840]Source #1
[2842]@ had obtained incorrect or incomplete information as there
[2843]is to believe NOSENKO is being deceptive in his iailure to recognize
[2844]a name and/or photograph,
[2846]Ags an example of previous noted discrepancies which have now
[2847]been completely clarified, it was previously stated that NOSENKO had
[2849]Source #1
[2851]never commented on the KGB telephone book which had re-
[2853]ported NOSENKO, had in his possession.
[2855]During current interviews, NOSENKO, in response to a query concerning
[2857]13-00000
[2859]how an officer in the SCD wouid obtain the telephone number of an
[2860]FCD officer, gave a detailed report including informaticn that there
[2861]was at least one complcte SCD telephone directory in each room
[2862]occupied by SCD officers, In addition, NOSENKO stated he had access
[2863]toa directory which was maintained in the office of the Chief of the
[2864]Gepartment and which listed the KGB officers down to Section Chiefs
[2865]in the various geographical Directorates throughout the USSR.
[2867]It is interesting to note that there is a discrepancy between the
[2869]; Source #1
[2870]information furnished by aaaam
[2872]coucerning the telephone directory
[2874]and the description furnished by NOSENKO, This is quite logical!
[2876]# could hardly give an accurate description of a telephone
[2878]directory which he had never seen,