[1]157-10002-10001
[3]| 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
[7]. AGENCY :
[8]RECORD NUMBER :
[10]~ RECORDS SERIES :
[12]_ INDEX -CARDS
[14]_AGENCY’FILE NUMBER :
[16]ORIGINATOR :
[17]FROM :
[18]TO:
[20]- OPENING CRITERIA :
[22]COMMENTS :
[24]Box 133
[26]TITLE :
[28]“RESTRICTIONS :
[29]“2” CURRENT. STATUS + P
[30]‘DATE OF LAST: REVIEW :
[32]i i
[33]foo, ge Date:08/15/92
[34]", tho _ Page:1
[36]JFK ASSASSINAT ON. SYSTEM ;
[38]bes . .
[39]BBENTIFICATION PORM _. .
[41]AGENCY INFORMATION
[43]SSCIA
[44]157-10002-10001
[47]: 491
[49]: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[51]T
[52]REFERRED
[53]09/28/93
[55]Index Cards - June 1975 and July 1975
[57]HY 50955 Daocld: 3272761641
[59][R] ~ ITEM IS RESTRICTED
[61]Page 1
[63]Tpatecce :procg ccé60oc AH
[65], Zz 3heg
[68]Telns, Richard Castro”
[69]Leyland Bus Co. Mongoose
[71]QCCURRENCE? “Sielms testified that the aim of the Cuban operations was "to
[72]get rid of Castro or the Castro regime in Cuba; lets put it that way, and no
[73]limitations were placed on the means. In fact, T never yecall having been told by
[75]anybody do not do this, do not do that, do not do the other thing." (26)  €The
[77]above statements refer to Mongoose.) Ilelms testified that "the pressure was very
[78]intense and IT remember vividly it was very intense." The pressure led to several
[80]“very nutty schemes." (26) elms testified the pressure built up to the Bay of Pip:
[82]and then lag dormant for awhile and intensified again toward the end of 1961 and
[84]1962, The Cuban Hissile Crisis itself was the period of greatest intensity. After-
[86]wards interest tapered off, although Ilelms recalled cfforts in 1963 involving
[87]“economic warfare” such as turning of f oil deliveries and stopping bus deliveries
[88]including an attempt to stop the aay DY. thebeyland.’ Bus Company in-Spala sey buses te
[90]Cullis —“SAURCE: ; STAFF:
[91](27) ————= Helms 6/13/75 — Rhea
[92]FILE: DATE:
[94]6/28/75
[104](continuation)
[106]Cad 3d
[108]OCCURRENCE: Carp 3
[110]"CIA has initiated action to contaminate POL supplies for Cuba, although visible results
[111](stopage of some Cuban transports) is not expected until mid-1962. CIA is introducing
[112]"lubzol,"' a corrosive additive to Cuban locomotive diesel fuel oil ;through Commerciate:;
[113]Suppliers: tn Redken A similar project was noted for jet fuel storage tanks in Cuba-
[114]Varsdale noted that the CIA had concluded that its realistic role should be to at least
[115]create the illusion of a popular movement, to win external support for it, to improve
[117]CIA operational capability, and to help create a climate which will permit provocative
[118]actions in support of a shift to overaction. Lansdale wanted them to reevaluate
[120]to see whether or not they could make a greater effort. An outline of what the 33 tasks
[121]are for each of the entitities involved then follows in Lansdale's memo. The memorandum
[122]notes that the President directed that the Chief of Operations conduct the project through
[123]the appropriate organizations and departments of the government. In this regard the memo
[124]‘notes "Also, CIA apparently believes that its role should be to create and expand a popular
[126]SOURCE:
[128]FILE:
[130]DATE:
[132]PF sheg
[134]TRSTSECE pLo0gG Ccé0oc AH
[136]PERSONS/ENTITIES : DATES: | CATEGORIES:
[137]weeny . | Special Group Augmented
[138]LANSDALE, iecoeyp © ] . | MONGOQSE
[139]“== | Mar 13) 1962 | LUBAL
[140]Y,]-
[141]a Cari / 2
[142]OCCURRENCE:
[144]The planning for Operation MONGOOSE was prepared on a format of separate
[145]planning for each department and agency involved. Revised planning along that line. was
[146]submitted with this memorandum. Activities already approved were marked with an asterisk.
[147]Approved were dispatching one intelligence agent operation to a key area selected by the
[148]CIA, (‘'Many of the agents infiltrated into Cuba will be trained for paramilitary skills
[150]as well as intelligence collection,...However, CIA has noted that, once the agents are
[151]inside Cuba, they cannot be controlled effectively from outside Cuba, although every effort
[152]will be made to attempt such control.'’) (00207), Carribbean Admissions Center Cpa-Locka,
[153]Florida. Periodic intelligence estimates, continued freee iaiiratsomepiggetsny help in con-
[154]taminating locamotive lubricants, two teams of agents dispatched to Cuba approved for
[155]March 16-31, 1962, develop intelligence potential of Cuban "colonies" in U.S., develop
[156]additional interrogation centers in other areas by 31 March 1962 in South America and
[158]SOURCE: Memorandum for the Special Group Augmented FFT /
[159]from Lansdale re: Institutional Planning, Operation
[160]13.March 1962 (00206-00213) He
[162]adi Genova
[163]wel 1, 1975
[165]7
[168](§ ahed TPRETS2ZE'PIO0G Cc60c AH
[170]a 10
[171]HORAN
[174]a
[176]emer DATES: CATEGORIES:
[177]TRUS McNAMARA SS
[178]SPECIAL Grp. | August 10-11 CASTRO /
[179]1962
[181]FaCubar Geille Jou aa Yous. Gt
[182]fat the term assassinate’ was used in the discussion of Ke M.
[183]in “Cuba and it visibly upset_\.M. LASH, who preferred the term viel imenate (8s).
[184]DISCOVERY LEADS: Note: This discussion of assassination is taking place
[185]at the same time that DCI McCONE lodges his gheceere after the SPECIAL GROUP
[186](AUGMENTED) meeting, to McNAMARA's* the | pchni ue of assassination
[187]could be used against CASTRO. AE E
[189]STAFF: Baron
[191]SOURCE: 4G REPORT, 1967
[193]FIL": DATE: 7/2/75
[196]TRagTSZze ‘ploogd Cce0c AH
[200]oe gn To.
[202]HAS NO eee ANDO:
[204](PeclAss! ARs pooUMEN
[205]{ ty os 7
[207]RE SPRITIZED: Fo gees
[209]TOP SECRET
[211]DATES:
[213]CATEGORIES:
[217]August 14-23
[219]: ETAMSOM| cables CIA headquarters that “have no inten-
[220]tion give 7AM, LASH/ physical elimination mission as requirement but recognized
[222]this something he could or might try to carry out on his own initiative." (85).
[223]CIA headquarters replied tosWELEEASONSby cable on_18 August: "Strongly
[224]concur that no physical. elimination-misSions be given JAM. LASH/."" (85).
[226](enghoris eel
[228]SOURCE:
[230]IG REPORT, 1967
[234]i we a doky , , 274 Tel
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[294]Page 8
[296]Docld:32281841_
[298]HY 50955
[302]CATEGORIES:
[304]Edwards
[305]King
[306]Bannerman
[308]OCCURRENCE:
[310]ennai,
[312]O'Connell testified that when EDWARDS was on leave, once, KING spoke to
[313]Robert BANNERMAN (Who was not witting of Castro project) and O'Connell had
[314]to tell BANNERMAN that B. was not "privy"! to. project. O'Connell was embarassed.
[316]Castro
[318](Tr. 36, 99-100).- No one but KING, notggerey or fhioikeonive
[320]knew (100)
[322]Q
[324]ra Ney “ °
[325]SOURCE: STAFF:
[326]Testimony of James P. O'Connell, 5/30/75 John Bayly
[327]FILE: DATE:
[329]ASNT
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[387]Page 10_
[389]32781841
[391]HW 50955 Doctd
[393]TRSTSEZE ploog CCé0oc AH
[395]TT abeg
[397]CIA HAS NO
[398]JECLASSICATE aero
[400]RELEASE OF THIS DOcuIES
[401]Ko 23/2 oN
[403]CATEGORIES:
[405]DATES:
[407]w Ly [6 >|
[408]Nov. 21, 1962> (Special Group Augmented
[409]ae Operation Mongoose
[410]Cuba
[414]— KIRK PA TRICK
[415]William Harvey DUP ~
[416]Gen, Lansdale Mr. Halpern
[417]Walter Elder CHEEVER,
[418]DCI “—
[420]———=-==" With regard to paragraph 2 of Lansdale's memorandum to SGA dated 14 Nov.
[421]1962 Harvey states: 'The statement that. Operation Mongoose had had no information on-
[422]this operation since early October was patently false. ‘Specific references made to the
[423]pen ultimate paragraph and Lansdale’s memorandum concerning a report for the CIA which he
[424]used as a basis for memorandum dated 31 Oct. 1962 to Oswald Kirkpatrick. This refers to
[425]a telephonic. conversation on the evening of 30 Oct. 1962 between Lansdale and Cheever
[426]which is referred specifically in paragraph 2 on pages 7 and 8 of my reference memorandu.
[427]I have discussed this matter in detail with Cheever and clearly recollects that his
[428]conversation with Lansdale on that date took place as reflected in my reference memorandum.
[429]During this conversation there was no discussion of previous operations except a brief
[430]discussion of the COBRA andfAMikOMiiyteams and Lansdale did not ask, according to Cheever's
[431]recollection, any specific questions concerning assets inside or prior operations which
[432]—agunCE Would logically have Ted to the discussions at the Timp spAPT:
[433]—————" of the Matahambre operation." _——
[434]pul Wallach
[436]DATH:
[437]— July 1, 1975
[439]Mepgrandum dated Nov. 21, 1962 (01151)
[440]- se Lee a t . - aa by
[443]BA ONE