[1]14-00000
[2]104-102 10-10020}5, ONR
[4]Fe ORS AOE
[6]“
[8]| 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY
[10]ASSASSINATI
[14]y
[16]oe
[17]a?
[19]TOP SECRET =; -
[21]cor ree efnpents Sep enna o=
[23]Defector - Yuriy I. NOSENKO, dated February 1968 (copy 10).
[24]Copy 10 of this study had been forwarded to you earlier for
[26]i
[27]your review. | d
[28]4
[30]2. We have deleted certain portions of these pages
[31]containing information which bears on the security of
[33]ongoing, viable CIA operations, or is related thereto. ‘ : 3
[34]5. We request return of the study (copy 10), Annex A :
[36]and Attachment when your review has been completed.
[38]Attachment: Pages vi, vii, 20, 46, 47, 49, S0, 266, 277, 278
[39]281, 294, 295, 297, 313, 324, 325, 326, 336 and
[41]4
[42]4
[45]357
[47]Te em esie nramrtinme vot Senta ion
[48]on 7
[50]m
[52]= WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS
[53]INVOLVED
[55]E2 IMPDET CL BY 011340
[57]. TOP SECRET
[59]“Bipot retanthsce mtbEe Es
[61]a a
[62]TER OEE preememe me meee ie et
[65]a
[67]ETT REN, TE LIL TOE a AESOP EOS ATS SREP SSSR SEE Ae ewe eee TE SAFER EERE eee SHO ERR RT: SEERA YE NO SE AE RIN St Te
[68]me mens “ 7 * teas a0
[69].
[71]- ‘Top Secret -
[73]CONTENTS
[75]" VIIL SEVENTH DEPARTMENT (January 1962-January 1964)
[76]} : (Conc.)
[78]Deputy Chief of Seventh Department
[79]i : (Jply 1962-January 1964)
[80]KGB Operations
[81]Recruitment of SVENCHANSKIY
[82]Investigation of SLESINGER
[83]Arrest and Interrogation of KOTEN
[84]GRU Agent SUUBIN
[85]Arrest of BAKGHOORN
[86]Investigation of OSWALD
[87]Dey Residence in USSR
[88]Request to Return to USSR.
[89]Post-Assassination Review of KGB File
[90]The CHEREPANOV Papers
[91]Contents ; fee
[92]NOSENKO's Travel Document
[93]Return to Geneva (January-February 1964)
[94]. . Purpose of Trip
[95]: Visits to KGB Legal Kesidency
[96]/ Availability for Meetings with CIA
[97]x NOSENKO's \Writcen Notes
[99]4 The Recall Telegram
[100]. Knowledge of Other Seventh Department
[101]‘. Onerations
[102]Operational Activities (July 1962-
[103]January 1964)
[104]KGB Counterintelligence Operations Among
[105]; American Tourists
[106]Inforoation Furnished the KGB by
[107]George BLAKE
[108]KGB Study of American Intelligence
[109]Tourist Operations
[110]NOSENKO's Information
[111]Suumary
[112]Summary and Conclusion
[114]SRD TMT EA
[116]ma why
[118]oO 7 ; Top Secret
[120]PAGE
[122]293
[123]292
[124]292
[125]29)
[126]295
[127]296
[128]298
[129]303
[131]305
[132]307
[133]309
[134]314
[135]315.
[136]316
[137]31?
[138]318
[139]318
[140]319
[141]320
[142]324
[144]326
[145]327
[147]32?
[148]330
[149]331
[150]331
[152]Sek
[154]3
[155]“i
[156]i
[157]4
[159]“8B
[160]4
[161]4
[162].
[164]j
[166]y
[167]f
[168]4
[169]3
[170]3
[171]a
[173]tanSEy BAM ea!
[175]Ra orre
[177]engpe ametiegy Behe se ARMS TERT LEEW
[179]Sega
[181]; ‘Top Secret .
[183]CONTENTS
[185]IX OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMED KGB SERVICE
[187]Relationship with General GRIBANOV
[188]Communist Party Status
[190]Knowledge of KGB Forms and Procedures
[191]Awards and Decorations
[193]Sourcing
[195]Ranks
[197]X PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PSYCHIATRIC ASSESSMEN
[199]XI SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS: NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES
[201]Annex A ~ Statements of Soviet Officials About
[202]NOSENKO
[204]Annex B - Summaries of Cases Not Examined in Text
[206]Index of Personalities
[208](vii)
[210]335
[212]335
[213]338
[214]342
[215]345
[216]349
[217]350
[219]“ 355
[221]357
[223]361
[225]399
[227]437
[229]TS No. 197124
[231]. 7 ?
[232]..: Top Secret Copy 10 2 fb
[233]mre tah at ae re Oe RS Salama mstanintaan assim: nan!
[235]4
[236]i ;
[237]2
[238]it
[240]eertadt 1d 'a. 0
[242]saSiete stab ASST oe
[244]ella ine
[246]rath ia dane sdk
[251]14-0000
[253]SOD AAR eR nei AIC SINETAT EPI I A TOM OLY RUDE TE STOR AROSE he 0 Se tN Be Sem ee a
[255]~ Top Secret -
[257](FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS)
[259]Soviet Ofticials' Statecents About NOSENKO
[261]The portreit of NOSENKO which emerges from Soviet
[262]cfficialsa' statements about him siuce his defection coin-
[263]cides markedly with NUSLNAO'sS sett-deseripsion. Accerding
[264]to the comments cf Soviet officials, principally intelli-
[265]gence officers most likely to be speaking authoritatively,
[266]defector NOSENKO was the son of the deceased sinister, he
[267]served over a decad@ in the KGB, his personal shortcomings
[268]were overcome througn the patronage of KG3 General GRIBANOV,
[269]and in connection witn vperations against Americans ine
[270]occupied positions of progressively greater trust and
[271]responsibility, clcimately becoming Deputy Chief of the
[272]Jargest department in tie sey Second (Counterintelligence)
[273]Chief Directorate. According to these sources, his’ defection
[274]wrought severe damage “for years to come" to the KGB
[275]because of his krowledge of KGB operations against American
[276]targets, and his treacaery prompted the expulsion and
[277]disgrace of numerous senior KGB personnel, the cecall of
[278]many others from abroad, the virtual suspension of KGB
[279]operations in the United States, and extraordinary plans to
[280]assassinate him.
[282]These statements are related in chronological order in
[283]Annex A.
[285]; Top Secret ss Copy ——
[287]+m recreate nner Om a CRANE N in ventas Se
[289]TS No. 197124
[294]q
[296]|
[298]4
[300]i
[303]4
[305]4
[307]weathers
[309]Tet
[314]oe eeemeel es
[316]| Top Secret
[318]- | (PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY) ae oS oo
[322]Baku), where he finished the Eighth Class in spring, 1943.
[324]+ In a second version [more probable since entry to the Moscow
[326]: Special Naval School required prior completion of the f
[327]Seventh Class] NOSENKO said that when the war broke out he , i
[328]and his mother were evacuated to Chelyabinsk, where he . i t
[329]completed the Seventh Class in summer of 1942. They returned :
[330]to Noscow afterwards, and NOSENKO was then enrolled in the \ :
[332]i
[333]4
[337]ein Shae
[339]Moscow Special Naval School (then in HZuybyshev) where he
[340]completed the Eighth Class in 1943; in the fall o. 1943
[342]NOSENKO was enrolled in the Leningrad Naval Preparatory
[344]School (then in Baku).
[348]After just six months in Baku, without completing the : : 8
[349]Ninth Class, NOSENKO ran away frem school and returned to
[350]Moscow.
[352]= were
[354]Comment: NOSENKO has asserted variously that he ran i
[355]away and feught on the front at Tuapse, and
[357]that he had finished the Tenth Class in Baku L
[359]i
[361]and then spent the period 1943-1945 at the
[362]Frunze Higher Naval School, the cquivalent of
[363]Annapolis. He. has retracted both assertions.-
[367]i
[368]i
[370]i . i
[372]i { te
[373]i NOSENKO completed the Ninth Class in June 1944 at the 7
[374]a Moscow Mining Institute, and when the Leningrad Naval : - 4
[376]i Preparatory Scnool returned to Leningrad from Baku,.he :
[378]: resumed his studies there. Early in 1945, however, NOSENKO :
[380]: received a gunshot wound in the hand, and after being ' ;
[381]} hospitalized for a month, he left the Naval school. :
[382]i
[386]: Comment: NOSENKO has claimed both that he was shot by >
[388]i a jealous naval officer whom he then protected
[389]‘ : by stating that the wound was self-inflicted, °
[391]4 ane that he actually did accidently shcot him-
[393]5 a sensitive source cj "2 ’
[394]j the effect chat NOSENEO shot nimself to avoid ©
[395]é being sent to the front while attending: a naval ;
[396]| : '. college in 1942,
[398]: A . Top Secret -- = «Copy
[401]Mens Rat RR Lea dalales Rubbealital abeal cA mE 0
[405]14-0000
[407]Si
[409]a
[411]. 5
[413]PUTER Te de Pee
[415]LT erieireds he tanehuns a ceettmTadys a?
[417]nee anti sania be
[419]pe rgite gi eee a MEN UR TT a ae
[421]Top Secret
[422](PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)
[424]Comment: (Continued)
[425]After NCSENKO's defection was publicized,
[426]Sovjet tiaval defector ARTAMONOV volurteered
[427]to CIA that he had known the son'of the
[428]Minister NOSENKO in the naval school in
[429]Leningrad from 1944 to 1946.
[431]NOSENKO completed the Tenth Class at the Leningrad Ship-
[432]building Tekhnikum in June 1945, and he successfully passed
[433]the necessary examinations to qualify him for entrance to
[434]the Mescow Institute of International Relations that summer.
[436]Birth to 1945: Summary and Conclusion
[438]NOSENKO is virtually the sole source of information on
[439]his early life. However, this portion of his claimed
[440]biography is consistent with the NOSENKO family's where-
[441]abouts as publicized in press accounts at the time cf his
[442]father's death in 1956, and with the existence of the
[443]schools he claims to have attended.
[445]Allowing for exaggerated claims of boyhoed heroics
[446](fighting at the front, attending the Frunze Academy, and
[447]formal induction in and discharge from the Navy), all of
[448]which NOSENKO has retracted under interrogation, NOSENKO's
[449]claimed identity as the son of Minister Ivan I. NOSENKO
[450]and the substance of his claims about his life until 1945
[451]are accepted as true.
[453]ae oh a ee) oa .
[457]ov te nenemeee caeeeteememrnat as eR ese
[459]_ 1S No.. A97124.
[461]and
[463]teed 8 tat Tia hae Toh
[465]a cenit
[468]14-0000
[470]“Top Se acret
[472](PRE-¥.G8) BIGGRAPHY) .-
[474]JOSENKO has said at various times that the Institute :
[475]course was of feur years! duration and that he entered the '
[476]Naval RU on graduation in 1949; that it was four years’
[477]duration and that Lecause he failed a state examination he
[478]was graduated later, in 195 5Q; that it was of five years’
[479]duration and he gvaduated In 1950, on schedule; and that it
[480]was of £:ve years’ duration but he failed an examination
[481]which delayed iis graduation for three months.
[483]Comment: See p.307 for report that NOSENKO joined the KG? :
[484]upon graduation from the Institute in 1947.
[485]The duration of the Institute course and the
[486]Gate of NOSLNZO's completion are material to
[487]the plausibility of his claimed Naval RU service,
[488]whicis ne said followed almost immediately upon
[489]his departure from the Institute. '
[492]Naval RU Service (ca. 1951 - ca. 1953) | ‘
[494]NOSENKO claims that upon completion of his studies at {
[495]the Institute of International Relations he entered the
[497]Naval RU, serving in the Far Fast and then in a Baltic post, |
[499]finally successfully “transferring” to the KGB through the ; |
[501]|
[503]|
[505]intervention of his father's friend, KGB General KOBULOY.
[506]A sensitive source
[508]that NOSENKO
[509]m, NOSENKO attendad™ his
[510]and tnen served in the RU source
[512]is the sole source also asserting.
[513]served in the RU. According to eeu
[515]Pree
[517]LUO 2 al ite tte a alae ee EY
[519]the Military-Diplomatic Acadeny
[520]Information Department for about a year before securing a
[521]transfer to the KGR through his father's influence, NOZSENKO
[522]denies having attended the Military-Diplomatic Academy and
[524]has never claimed service in the RU Information (Rerorts) :
[525]Department, although he had on occasion claimed to have held
[526]Reports assignments. - '
[528]hast LEE A CTE RTT T BU Ha Hest
[530]“TS No. 197124 7
[532]Copy 10
[534]ane eg,
[537]14-0000
[539]3
[541]3
[542]i
[543]3
[544]j
[545]4
[546]4
[547]4
[548]4
[549]|
[551]... Top Secret
[553](PRE-4GB BIOGRAPHY )
[555]A sensitive source two ,
[556]SB has croted/KG3 officers
[557]respective Ye aS Stating NOSEXHD joined the- KGB in 1947
[558]or 1949.
[560]The significance of NOSENHO*‘s RU service is the fact
[561]that He claims it launcied his intelligence.career and
[562]served as the means througn which he secured appointment
[563]to the NCB aiter once having bees rejected. The two or more
[564]years he claimed to have servec in the RU represent a
[565]significant period cf his adult life. for which he should
[566]have ro difficulty accounting. Finally, the date of his
[567]actual transfer from the Naval ZU to the KGB is critical to
[568]Getermining the time from which nis claims about KG3 service
[569]can Le judged creditle.
[571]NOSENKO volunteered extensive comment on his Naval RU
[572]service at his first meetings wich CIA in 1962. After his
[573]19€4 defection, it was the tepic on which he made one of
[574]his initial retractions and his first admission that he had
[575]earlier made a false claim, tre subject of his Naval RU
[576]Service was consequently prominent in interrogations in
[577]1964, 1965 and 196€. However, throughout these interrcgations,
[578]challenges cf nis assertions abcut his RU service prcempted -
[579]adjustments in his claimed date of graduation from the
[580]Institute or claimed date of enery into the KGB, just as
[581]challenges” cn those latter tepics prompted amended: state-
[582]ments with resrect to his RU service. The extent of the
[583]still-unreconciled discrepancies and ccntradictions in
[584]NOSENKO's various accounts is best perceived in comparison
[585]of his statements made in 1962, 1964, 1965 and 1966.
[589]NOSENYKO. finished the Institute of International Relations
[590]in 1950 and immediately reporte: for duty with the RU.
[591]{He did not amplify how he drew such an assignment.] In
[592]SeptenLer 195¢ he was offered zssignments in Leningrad,
[593]Moscow, and in the Far East, and he chose the Far East "so
[594]no one would think he weuld take advantage of his father's”
[596]. position". He was assigned to a radio signals interception
[598]unit in Sovetskaya Gavan’ (on the Soviet coast opposite
[599]Sakhalin), where he collected Grder of Battle information by
[600]monitoring the communications of American units operating in
[602]50
[604]Top Secret. Copy.
[606]Beta ect
[608]SeaRE Aa Bolts we assist
[610]“TS No. 197124
[612]SE fet weibdes emen hii @ Fathall AER ie ar PV stan
[614]i
[616]|
[619]: oo
[621]ne
[622]3
[624]wate Ten an
[627]14-0000
[629]j
[630]i
[631]i
[633]Top Secret
[635]DEPARTMENT - January 1?62-January 1964}
[637]1. WAS @.VGeaK a
[638]sething.”
[640]nis “he was afraid and gave practi-
[642]id that alféagh he had recruited
[644]AIPPEL was not an agent." The KGb :
[645]t
[647]nevertheless hope PPEL would be reassigned to Nos-- Ot .
[648]cow at some future z See p.137 for details of the
[651]i)
[652]co
[653]fa
[654]ty
[656]ie]
[657]o
[658]u
[661]with NOSENKO that they met twice
[662]1963. Sowever, FRIPPEL asserts i
[663]ENKO an Oacessa in February 1962. i
[664]latly Genies. FRIPPEL is known :
[665]ta travel to the Soviet Union :
[666]ard tnere is no apparent reason :
[667]salse claim on this matter. i
[668]@, FRIFPEL, whe :8 now e
[669]a current target of the ge
[670]~ Soviet intelligence service,
[672]cette Te
[674]Nato e
[678]& sensitive source
[680]Jchannes PREISFREUND
[682]The KGB ccensidered PREISFREUND corpromised to American
[683]Inteiligence after GOLITSYN's defection [in December 1961] and
[684]thus unsuitable for further use against Americans at the Em-
[685]bassy in Moscow. For this reason, NOSENKO was tole to take
[686]PREIS? REUND with nim when he transferred to the Seventh De-
[687]partment. As the agent spoke only Finnish and Russian, however,
[688]he wes of no use against English-speaking tourists. NOSENKO
[689]met with PREISFREUND on the latter's visits to Moscow in 1962,
[690]but cid not-use him in any operations.
[692]Comment: PREISFREULDS asserts that he was no lorger a KG3
[693]agent after the STORSBERG operation (see p.175)
[695]. and that eithough he saw NOSENKO on his frequent - vet Reva erate
[696]return visits to Moscow, it was only because - of.
[697]NOSENKO sought a cozpanion for wenching and
[698]drinking.
[700]TS No. 197124":
[702]“is | Copy
[705]14-0000
[707]Sie daa BSR eR NE . an ik ata ai pees ete EN NI
[708]1 :
[710]Top Secret
[712]a (SEVENTH DEPARTBENT - January 1962-dJanuary 1964)
[714]| who was [erroneousiy) considered to ke a CIA officer .
[715]SHAKHOV “maybe” had some contact with MARK in 196¢ or
[717]A but KOSENKO did not know the substance of it. A coun
[719]g intelligence officer of the First Chief Directorate,
[720]GOLUBEV, hid once been on a delegation with. SHAKHOV an
[721]had noted “Little details". While SHAKHOY was in the
[722]States, earlier, he had been terminated (as an agent]
[723]KGB officers who ha? submitted a report stating that
[724]liked life in the Unites States, American products,
[725]money. in that KGB report he was Cepicted as "not
[726]and ‘not wanting to work as an agent".
[728]1
[729]NOSENKO stated chat SHZAKHOV had served with the Ministry ‘
[731]of Foreign Affairs in the United States and that Curing that '
[732]service he acted as an agent-recruiter for the KGB. SHAXHOV i
[733]was permitted to travel abroad even though suspected ct being t
[734]j
[738]an American agent, because he belonaed to the Ministry of j
[739]Foreign Affairs, and “the KGB could do nothing about his ‘
[740]trips abroad'. “There was no proof, only suspicions, and
[741]furthermore, SHAKHCY was a member of the personal staff of
[743]the head of the Soviet delegation, S.K. Tsarapkin." According
[744]to NOSENKO, SHAKHOV was not and never had been a KGB cfficer
[746]pentane ast
[748]Comment: SHAKHOY has served in and visited the United
[749]. States since 1942, when he was assigned to the
[750]Soviet Consulate General in New York. He at-
[751]tended the 1945 Conference on International
[752]Organization in San Francisco, and he had at-
[753]tended a number of sessions cf the UN General
[754]AssermLiy. Most recently SHAKHOV was assigned
[755]to the U.S. in 19¢3 as a member of the Soviet
[756]Missicn to the UN. KGB officer RASTVOROY 1¢en-
[757]tified him as an MVD [KGB) officer whom he us
[758]ce tain he saw at MVD Headquarters in Moscow,
[759]a sensitive sowrcey mp identified him as "an employee of the
[760]KGB": and KGB defectors PETROV and DERYABIN
[761]have reported that from a photograph, SHAKEOV'S 2 de
[762]_. . aner.s a. face "was familiar". An FBI source, however, seme Ear pedo 8 pes
[763]a ; in 1964 said that SHAKHOV was a “pure diplomat” i
[764]and that to his knowledge, SHAKHOV had engaged ; : a
[765]in no Soviet intelligence activity, until that - i . re
[766]time. .
[769]14-0000
[771]Top Secret
[773]7 - (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)
[775]ROSENKO described the varicus ways he had tésted suspicions
[776]of SHAKHOV im Geneva. He guve SHAKHOV disinformation and then
[777]watched: for an indication that he passed it on to his American
[778]contacts. SHAKHOV gas told to perform countersurveillance
[779]taske. during a meeting ky NOSLNKO with an imaginary agent,
[780]while other KGB officers checked for signs that SHAKNCV had
[782]; forewarned the Americans about the meeting. Finally NOSENKO
[784]‘ revealed to SHAKHOVY the location of a KGB dead drop and
[785]checked five days later to see whether the specially rrepared
[786]materials empiaced hid been disturbed in any way. NOSENKO's
[787]ccnclusion was that SHAKHOV was absolutely free of suspicion, .
[788]and it was his intention to report this finding when he re-~ j
[789]turned to G3 Headquarters fron Geneva.
[791]nd
[793]4
[795]4
[797]ai
[799]: Comment: Currently in the United States, SHAKHT7 is still
[800]Be "under suspicion", according to @& a sensitive source,
[802]Security Escort Officer for Soviet Disarmament Delegation
[804]man Soviet delegation to the visarmament. Conference and as.-
[805]such he was responsible for the security ard behavior of the
[806]entire delegation. [KGB officers 1.5. MAYOROV and i1.S. i
[807]TSYMBAL came with the delegation to Geneva, but they had left - ; |
[808]|
[809]i
[810]i
[813]NOSENKO said that he was the sole KGB officer with the 94- .
[814]t
[816]Geneva Lefore NOSENKO made the foregoing statement to CIA.)
[817]To assist him in carrying out his security functions, NOSENKO :
[818]had the services of a number of coopted informants of the KGB
[820]who were serving in the delegation. [NOSENKO has never re-
[822]ported what, if any, security checks he ran on the delegates
[824]ia his charge, or what, if any, information his informants
[826]provided him.] i ,
[828]SMR tee re ene latses niet
[832]NOSENXO has never been precise about how he spent his days
[833]and nights in Geneva, but he has indicated that he disposed
[834]of his time as he saw fit, and for the most part had little
[835]to do. He explained in 1962 that he could come and go as he . _
[836]pleased because Ambassador Zorin knew who he was, as did most
[837]of the delegation. No one paid him any attention. It was
[838]known that he was not really a Ministry of Foreign Affairs
[839]. officer, and he could absent himself from conference meetings -
[840]at any time.
[844]“TS No. 197124
[845]Ger -
[847]278
[850]14-0000
[852]Teo Secret
[854](SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)
[856]Yu.I. GUK re eS
[858]Implying that their friendship was..of long standing, 1
[859]NOSENZO related in 1962 that he and GUK were together nearly :
[860]every day in Geneva,-where they went out to chat and have a
[861]few drinks. As a conseytence, NOSENKO was granted access tc
[862]the residency and was able to elicit information arcuet sore
[863]of GUK's operations 1: Geneva. He described his "bic. big
[864]friend" GUK as the Bepury Legal Rezident in Geneva and the
[865]only “strong officer“ in the residency. :
[867]Comment: In 1964 NOSENKO attributed his gaining access
[868]+to the residency in 1962 to TSYMBAL, not to
[869]€Ux. According to several sources (see Annex A’.
[870]because of nis friendsnip with NOSENKC, GU was
[871]Gismisscd frea the KG3
[873]Famed aie
[875]M.S. TSYMBAL
[877]af
[879]In 1962 NOSENKO reported TSYMBAL's presence in Geneva and , 3
[880]identified hin as Chici of the Illegals Directorate of the 4
[881]KGB First Chicf Directorate. He alluded to having ssoken with 4
[882]him, but placed no particular. emphasis on their reiationsaip. 4
[883]4
[885]In 1964 NOSENKO claimed that he had been dealing with .
[886]TSYMBAL since 1960 or 1961, when he was looking for. some 4
[888]candidates for recruitment and came across some whos? back-
[889]ground would have made them suitable for the Special [Illegaisi : -
[890]Directorate. NOSENKO met TSYMBAL in Moscow in the KGB Head- oF
[891]quarters and ISYMBAL had asked him several times tc transfer i
[892]to the First Chief birectorate and suggested that he might be ; -
[893]assigned to the United States. In Geneva, he and TSYMBAL had
[895]dinner together several times a week, sometines accompanied
[897]by KISLOV and sometimes alone. It was TSYMBAL's influence,
[899]NOSENKO said, which secured NOSENKO access to the residency
[901]in 1962 and established the precedent from which he was . :
[902]granted access in 1964. ; :
[904]She ae ym em pee mtn at teed dyer “ah eet
[906]14-0000
[908]nae mR Haste PACA IIE SI WE NA HONE Tle ALINE OER aE res nha VR Rand ne Fae me eae rere
[910]em Bene pet
[912]Top Secret
[914](SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-1964)
[916]NOSENKO's Information |
[918]SLESINGER came under suspicion by the KGB First
[919]Chief Directorate because of his business transactions
[920]with a number cf Soviets who-visited his store and in
[921]whom he seemed to show more than casual interest. The
[922]First Chief Directorate was of the opinion that
[923]SLESINGER was trying to become closely acquainted with
[924]some Soviets, to study them. SLESINGER had visited the
[925]Soviet Union several times. Learning SLESINGER planned
[927]“another trip to the USSR, the KGB suspected that "he
[929]might make some contacts or do something interesting”
[930]while visiting the Soviet Union. The KGB wanted to
[932]esolve its suspicions’ that SLESINGER was possibly an
[933]agent or operational contact of the FBI. The KGB had
[935]a file on SLESINGER, md a senior case officer in the
[936]American Section of the Seventh Department, Yu. M.
[937]DVORKIN, was the responsible case officer. An agent
[939]of the Seventh Department who was director of a photo-
[940]graphic shop in Moscow was instructed to beccme friendly
[941]with SLESINGER while the latter was visiting the Soviet
[942]Union, and the two men later exchanged correspondence.
[943]SLESINGER went to Odessa to visit relatives, and DVORKIN.
[944]directed the Odessa KGB to "surround" him with agents. who
[945]could watch his behavior. If there had been any indication.
[946]of intelligence activities, the KG2 would have attempted.
[947]to recruit SLESINGER, but since no evidence was developed,
[948]no approach was made. SLESINGER had travelled to the
[949]Soviet Union before, several times.
[951]A sensitive source
[953]Bhad reported to the
[954]‘KGB suspected SLESINGER to
[955]plant" and that KGB officer
[956]fi "might be trying to develop
[957]SLE INGER to act as a courier or in some
[958]other agent capacity."
[959]NOSENKO's information was substantially
[960]. correct. Alfred Lazarevich SLESINGER, See te te
[961]. reported to the FBI in July 1962 of his
[962]June 1962 visit to Moscow and Odessa.
[963]In Odessa SLESINGER was contacted by a
[964]Soviet official who exhibited “intimate ... :
[965]knowledge" of his business in New York , ot
[966]city and had asked whether SLESINGER had Cogs
[967]“ever been bothered by the FBI.° ee
[968]298 ee S.No 197124
[970]_ “Copy ——
[972]Comments
[974]4
[975]a
[976]4
[980]Fab Nida d aes
[985]14.00000
[988]Ea Ge.
[994]‘particularly among Russian Jews. [NOSENKO explained in
[996]Top Secret
[997](SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-1964)
[999]Comment: (Continued)
[1000]In 1966 SLESINGFR- reported to the FBI that. .
[1001]he was .in touch with a Moscow photographic en cman
[1002]shop prcprietor, and he described evidence.
[1003]cf KGB interest in him during his visit to
[1004]Odessa in 1362. Previous to visiting the
[1005]Soviet Union in 1962, SLESINGER had been-in
[1006]contact with a number of Soviet cfficials
[1008]from tac Unites Nations.
[1010]NOSENI wag not speerfic in describing how he learned
[1011]of SLESINGER, who may represent a First Chief Birectorate
[1012]case.
[1014]KOTEN's Arrest and the KGB agent Bam
[1016]NOSENKO was asked in Geneva in 1964 whether he was
[1017]involved in the arrest of an American tourist in the
[1018]USSR in the fall of 1963. Almost at cnce, NOSENKO
[1019]identified the case as that of Bernard KOTEN, a guide for
[1020]Afton Tours in New York City (and hence an employee of
[1021]Alexander SVENCHANSKIY, see above) who had heen arrested
[1022]on homosexual charges in Kiev. NOSENKO ‘said that KOTEN”
[1023]was involved with an American agent of the KGB Scientific
[1024]and Technical (S&T) Directorate. NOSENKO did not know the
[1025]agent's nane, but from the description he provided he is
[1026]believed identical with a KGB S&T
[1028]agen identified earlier cn the basis c ay 1962 report
[1029]from .a sensitive source.
[1031]NOSENKO's Information
[1033]KOTEN was a longtime member of the American Communist
[1034]Party and a-frequent visitor after the Second World War .
[1035]to the Soviet Union, where he had extensive contacts among
[1036]dissident literary figures and other Soviet citizens,
[1037]another context that the KGB is wary of foreigners' contects a
[1038]with Soviet Jews because the Israeli Intelligence Service
[1039]has- frequently inspired such contacts.} Because of these
[1040]many suspicious contacts, coth the KGB First and Second te
[1041]Directorates had concluded that KOTEN might be a "provocation .
[1042]agent" planted in or recruited from the ranks. of the ©
[1043]Communist Party in the United States.
[1044]295 22h UTS Now 197124
[1046]seolebeacas Sabri bwibesbi
[1051]Top Secret
[1053](SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)
[1055]NOSENKO's Information
[1057]SHUBIN was a native of California of Russian ex-
[1058]traction, a Russian speaker, and a university professor
[1059]in New York City. SHUBIN, who nad visited the Soviet
[1060]Union twice vefore, visited the Soviet Union in 19538
[1061]or 1959, while NOSENKD was serving his first tour of
[1062]auty in the Seventh Department. At that time, SHUBIN
[1063]was the. target of Seventh bepartment case officer
[1064]A.A. VETLITSRIY, NOSENKO heard later that SHUBIN was’
[1065]placed under surveillance, and when the KGB surveillance
[1066]ebserved SHUBIN as a passenger in a Ministry of Defense
[1067]automobile, the GRU was asked about the American. "They
[1068]very furtively said that they were interested in him,"
[1069]from which the KGB concluded that SHUBIN was a GRU agent.
[1071]In 1962 (sic) NOSENKO was reviewing a list of foreign
[1072]visitors to the Sovict Union and he noted SHUBIN's name
[1073]and recalled his earlier identification as a GRU agent.
[1074]NOSENKO himself telephoned GRU General SOKOLOV's office
[1075]and informed SOKOLOV of SHUBIN's presence (or, according
[1076]to another version, SOKOLOV's office was advised by
[1077]others). SOKOLOV's office eventually apologized for
[1078]having failed carlier to notify the KGB of the GRU's
[1079]interest in SHUBIN.
[1082]a sensitive source
[1084]Comment: Earlier, & ‘identified av
[1085]agent apparently identical with SHUBIN :
[1086]and FBI sources reported SUUBIN's travel
[1087]to the USSR in summer 1961 and in
[1089]- September 1963.
[1091]SHUBIN had no valid U.S. passport
[1093]between 1940 and June 1961; if he visited
[1094]the Soviet Union during that period it was
[1095]not as an American tourist under his true
[1096]name. Consequently, he could not then have
[1097]been the tourist target of the Seventh
[1098]Department case officer, as NOSENKO claimed.
[1099]If NOSENKO erred, and actually was referring
[1100]to SHUBIN's visit in 1961, there is a. further
[1101]contradiction: NOSENKO could not have ae
[1102]noticed his name while reviewing tourist
[1103]lists in the Seventh Department, because
[1105]he claims he was in the American Department.
[1106]-at the time. . to,
[1108]TS No.. 197124
[1111]14-0000
[1113]ce oe et
[1115]Top Secret
[1117](SEVENTH DEPART NP - January 1962-January 19C4)
[1119]NOSENKG went to Gorkiy on the fourth day after CHFRE-
[1120]PANOV's disappearance. The alea was covered with very caeep
[1121]woods, “vhere a verson could los: himself for life" On the
[1122]seventh Gay CHEREPANOV was located and arrested in “nazu,
[1123]where he was on his way to the Iran:an border.
[1125]A special plane was immediately sent to Baku, carrying
[1126]S.M. FEDOSEYLV and several other American Department of £i-
[1127]cers. They brought CHEREPANOV immediately Lack to Moscow,
[1128]interrogating him cn the plane. He immediately confessed
[1129]to having given the ducuments to the Americans. Shen asked
[1130]why, he said he was “angry at the KGR, very angry", ard
[1131]besides, he theugnt ne might ask the Americans for somo
[1132]money in return for the documents. He confessed that on
[1133]4 November he nad passed the documents to an American tourist
[1134]sho was a librarian interested in Russian bocks. He said he
[1135]had given the documents to the American in the entrance
[1136]hallway in the building of the Ministry of Poreign Affairs,
[1137]the building in wi.ich the Ministry of Foreign Trad? was also
[1138]houscd.
[1140]Because CHEREPANOV he.) eluded the KGB between the two
[1141]fixed surveillance posts wnich had been established, the
[1142]Second Chief Directorate suffered considerable criticism
[1143]for not putting. CEERUPANOV under full,.round-the-clocx,
[1144]surveillance. CHEREPANOV himself, however, told the XGn
[1145]that if ne had detected his surveillants he would have
[1146]written to the government and newspapers a letter of protest
[1147]against "such an indignity, such persecution", and then
[1149]would have committed suicide, leaving the KGB without proof
[1150]of his guilt.
[1152]sensitive sources,
[1153]Comment: Other sources, including PT Ee Pe een
[1154]. have also reported various aspects of the
[1155]CHERNPANOV incident.
[1156]NOSENKO's assertions with respect to the
[1158]CHEREPANOV cae, however, are not material to
[1159](41, ses =. His claim that he was Deputy Chief of the
[1161]Seventh Department at the time.
[1163]TS: No. 197124.
[1165]ePY Ag.
[1167]due,
[1171]2 shat a
[1176]ae Top Secret
[1178](SEVENTH DEPARTNENT - January 2962-January 1964}
[1180]The Recall Telegr3: . .
[1181]HNOSEEKO's Information
[1183]Cn 3 February 1964, NOSENKO claimed, he visited the KGB
[1184]Legal Residency once during the morning before he ret with
[1185]Cr\ and again that evening after 13900; there were at those
[1186]times no KGB telegrams concerning him. On the morning of
[1187]4 February he again stopped in at the Residency, but there
[1188]were again no such messaacs for him. Later in the mornings
[1189]of 4 February, however, ufter attending a session of the
[1190]Disarmament Conference, he returned to the Residency and
[1191]found that a telegram fron KGB Headquarters had arrived,
[1192]instructing him to return to Mcscow immediately to partici-
[1193]pate in the FGB conference on tourism. After relating the
[1194]substance of the telegram, NOSENKO defected and was thence-
[1195]forth in CIA custody.
[1197]Comment: Special Intelligence does not confirm NOSENKO's
[1198]asserticn regarding the existence of the recall
[1199]telegram. According to Special Intelligence,
[1200]there were ercipiered cormunications Fron Moscow
[1201]to the Soviet Mission in Geneva earlier and
[1202]later, Lut there was none from 1815 on 3
[1203]February until 1730 on 4 February, several hours
[1204]after NOSENKO was in custody of CIA.
[1206]Top Secret ~
[1213]14-0000
[1215]Top Secret
[1217](SEVENTIL PREPARTHENT ~ January 1662-January 1964)
[1219]Eventual Retraction Regarding Recall Teiegram
[1221]NCSENKO maintained throughout sis interrogations
[1222]in 1964 anc 1965 that there was the recall telegram and that
[1223]it prompted iis defecticn, In October 1356, hovever, while
[1227]being quest:oned again, NOSENSO stated that there hal bee:
[1229]no telegram reculling him to Moscow E£ro- Geneva, end he !
[1231]signed the following statement: i
[1232]i
[1234]"On 46 February 1964, I told ny CIA certact
[1235]in Geneva that a telegram from Headquarters in i aae)
[1236]Noscow had Leen received in the KGE Residency in . |
[1237]Geneva recalling mo immediately to Moscow, 1 said
[1238]at the time that this telegram said that I was
[1239]recalled to participate in a conference to plan KGS
[1240]activity against tourists for the 1964 season. I
[1241]maintained this story as fact throuchout subsecuent
[1242]interviews and interrogations by American authcrities
[1243]in 1964 and 1965. No such telegram ever existed.
[1245]No telegram was received in Geneva. i admit that
[1246]the stor:; was a lie. I myself invent:d this teie-
[1247]gram in order to hasten my Cefection. I was rervcus
[1248]and afraid that :y contacts with American Intelli-
[1249]gence might be noticed."
[1253]Knowleége of Other Seventh Department Operations
[1255]The notes NOSENKO brought to, CIA in Geneva in 1°64
[1256](see p.319) included brief reference to thirteen cther KGB : r,
[1257]Operations conducted, ayainst what NOSENKO descriked as
[1258]tourists during the 1962-1563 period. Yer reasons cited
[1259]in the descrintion of these operations in Annex B, these
[1260]opcrations are not material to tOSENKO's claim to service
[1261]an 1962-1963 as cither Chief of the American-British
[1262]Commenvealti Section or as Deputy Chief cf the Seventh
[1263]Department.
[1265]dM TE te +
[1267]a ‘ } ‘ - t 4g
[1269]“TS No..1971242
[1270]1 Gepy Ae.
[1275]nositecramatecrietennnnsireli gaia Hii
[1278]ian
[1280]FAS PANNE SONAL OTE OE AITAIIE SELENA RMR ER te ERAN ISA ad ACA AOE et Heder Ayeneerrneen a eee
[1283]Biel coer anrsbeg a ar
[1287]Top Secret
[1289](SEVENTH CRPARTHENT - Jaruary 1952-January 1964)
[1291]Operetional Activities ~ July 1962-January 1964: Summary
[1293]To substantiate his claims to havine served as Deputy
[1294]Chief of the Seventh Lepartment during this period, NOSENKO
[1295]Gescribes KGB invelvement in the recruitment of SVMNCHANSKIY,
[1296]the arrests of KCTEN and SARGHOORN, and the investigations
[1297]cf SLESINGER, OSWALD, and cf former KG officer CHEREPANOV,
[1298]his discovery that SHUBI!) was a GRU agent, and his assignment
[1299]to Geneva. Even if HCSENNO learned cf the operations as
[1300]he Gescribed and they were as he describe@ (there are substan- ‘y
[1301]tial reasons why they might have been cenducted by KGS :
[1302]elements other than the Seventh Department), they are atypical
[1303]with respect to NOSENKO's oun description of Seventh Deparc<-
[1304]ment cperations. ‘They do net accurately characterize, as
[1305]NOSEN“O claims, KGB counterirntelligence operations against iy
[1306]tourists, and thus do net substantiate his Seventn Department 4 1
[1307]service, NOSENKO'S explanaticns for his assignment to .
[1308]Geneva in 1964 are no more plausible than for his earlier : ‘3
[1309]assignment there in 1962. NOSENKO has asserted that he was
[1310]not a lieutenant colonel as the temporezy duty authorization
[1311]indicated, but a captain, a rank incongruous with a Deputy
[1312]Chief of Department and one en which he presumably would
[1313]have been Fromoted as he as
[1315]KGB Counterintelligence Operations : . .
[1316]“Arong American Tourists : l
[1319]_ Because of his position as a Deputy Chief, then First
[1320]‘Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, NOSENKO claimed te Teen et eo ade
[1321]awareness of what the KGR posture was with respect to .
[1323]So TS Now. 197124
[1324]: Top Secret . oo. Copy 7
[1328]tisk Se iy REN RE POR a hats
[1330]14-0000 yO tee
[1332]a . - Top Secret
[1334]{OTESR ASPLCTS OF NOSFuNO'S KGB CAREER)
[1336]Other Sources - 1964 and 1965
[1338]4 mir eported «—
[1339]optained from
[1340]various KGB “colleagues. According to these reports, GRIBNNOV
[1341]was expelled frcem the KGB as a consequerce of NOSENKC's .
[1342]cefection, it was’ rumored that GRIRANOV was to Le fired f
[1343]hecause he whad Been: NCSUNNO's friend and patron, that
[1344]GRIBANOV was held resronsible for the defection of his
[1345]protege, that GRIBANOV had approved NOSENKO" Ss assionrent to ut
[1346]Geneva in 1964 despite xu.
[1348]incligible, that GRTBM
[1349]father, that LOSENKO had Loon a depaty to a Department. Chi
[1350]‘ a<spice his junior rank bLiocause of GRIBANOV's influence, a
[1351]; and that GRIDANOV was dismissed from the KGA and Party i \
[1352]Lecause he willfully withheld information about NCSLNZXO's 3
[1353]precuring women for parties which he and the General arzvarged. 7
[1359]5 ce iithe 2
[1360]De aia ne
[1362]NOSENKO's Information - Post 1964 ,
[1364]A
[1366]Imnediately following his defection NOSENKO continued to . *
[1367]refer to this special and personal relationship, which ‘
[1368]: touched on nearly every aspect of NOSENKO's KGB’ service.
[1369]Under interrogation, hewever, NOSENKO could not sustain
[1370]this claim. The extent NOSENKO'’s statements were retracted
[1371]! or contradicted with respect to GRIBANOV or contradicted by
[1372]H other evidence, is scen from the following examples excerpted
[1373]! from the earlier chronological examination: GRIBANOV wrote
[1374]j the very best fitness report on NOSENKO that could be giver . i
[1375]i (Retracted. GRIBANOV wrote none of NOSENKO's fitness . a
[1376]3 reports); KOSENKO and GRISANOV carroused together with women
[1377]: provided by NOSENKO (Retracted. NOSENKO recalied only two
[1378]i occasions, and could relate only one in any detail.);
[1380]4 recruited Edward SMITH (see p. 37) together with NOSENKO
[1381]i (Retracted. NOSENKO played no active role in-SMITH recruit-
[1382]t
[1384]1
[1386]ment attempt and was not in Embassy Section at time.);
[1387]NOSENKO accompanied GRIBANOV to diplomatic receptions in
[1388]1961 at which the latter learned that French Ambassador
[1389]DeJean was GRIBANOV's agent (Retracted. NOSENKO accompanied
[1391]3360 es .. -
[1394]14.00000 of ns
[1397]PME RRL:
[1398],
[1400]SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
[1402]CONCE GR 7XO'S SCNA FIDES
[1403]CONCH EET EG FIDES
[1405]NOSENKO claims that he Served for a decade in the XGB in
[1406]succeysively senior positions of authority from which he .
[1407]Gerived extensive raowledge of the scope, character, and. A
[1408]results of “G8 operations against Arericans in the Soviet
[1409]qi
[1411]Unien in the period 1353-1923. To substantiate his clain,
[1412]he provides an impressive array of information-ahout ¥GB
[1413]rsonnel, organization and operations which, to the extent
[1414]that it Las been contirmed, :S presumptive evidence of his
[1415]Lona fides. Various Soviet officials, including intelli-
[1416]2rg, have generally corroborated NOSEMNKO's
[1418]av
[1419]3
[1420]t
[1422]claims. HAecorcing ts some ci these sources, NOSENKO was
[1424]« Senior KGS offiecr who oecuried a series of sensitive
[1425]positions, «ho enjcyed consizerable authority ard trust
[1426]despite personal shortcomings, and whose defection, "the
[1427]greatest loss ever suffered Ly Soviet Intelligence", ss
[1429]petalyzed tie work of G7 163 GRU Meee (ETE TATED |
[1430]5 ROTI Risener! Vasher eee Ba. Se akies
[1432]ex
[1434]The examination has compared each element of NOSENKO's
[1435]bicgraphy relevant to his claimed KG3 service with known “4
[1437]§ facts. and reasonabie surmise. The examination reflects
[1439]eect tied Site hates
[1441]the test to which his accounts were put: whether his
[1443]accounts are internally coherent and consistent with known
[1445]fact, and whether he actually gained the information he has
[1447]from occupying the KGB positions he ciaims to have held.
[1449]In short, is he what he says he is, according to his: o«n
[1451]accounts? ; , Co we
[1453]ADS Lelia
[1455]LMT Fleet
[1457]TS No. 197124:
[1458]\ Copy 10 . .