[1]Vie 104-10308- (10308-10062. 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
[3]10 .
[4]Deputy Chief, WH/SA
[8]ca in Mee: G 25)
[10]DI S p AT Cc Ly . CLASSIFICATION L PROCESSING . :
[11]at SECRET feoseo | tevin Aight
[13]|_| maRkeD for inpexina
[15]ONLY QUALIFIED
[16]HEADQUARTERS DESK
[17]CAN JUOGE INDEXING
[19]FROM NG ester
[20]Chief of Station, JMWAVE: Wo D£cf Cte
[23]7 thsuccesstul anti ltcation Attempt by M/V ADA{ 9-12 Ma 1964
[25]Zs REQUIRED - REFERENCES
[27]Action Required: None, FYI
[29]References: A. BARR-1606, dated 13 May 1964
[30]B. BARR-1607, dated 13 May 1964
[31]C. WAVE-6458, dated 13 May 1964
[32]D. WAVE-6433, dated 13 May 1964
[33]E. WAVE-6463, dated 13 May 1964
[34]F. BARR-1612, dated 14 May 1964
[35]G. BARR-1614, dated 14 May 1964
[36]H. BARR-1619, dated 15 May 1964
[37]I. UFGA-15986, dated 20 May 1964
[38]J. WAVE-6844, dated 21 May 1964
[39]K. UFKA- 130, dated 14 May 1964
[41]GENERAL BACKGROUND INFORMATION
[43]1. During the past year and a half AMLEO-3 has been placated,
[44]and kept. under control, by the continuous effort of KUBARK to assist
[45]him’ in obtaining asyltim for his wife and family in a third country
[46]diplomatic installation in Cuba, Since the failure of the last
[47]asylum attempt for Mrs, AMLEO-3 in March 1964, as reported in refer-
[48]ence I, and the refusal of Mrs. AMLEO-3 to even consider taking asylum
[49]without advance guarantees of a salvo conducto; AMLEO-3 lost what
[50]little optimism he had remaining for a safe method of bringing his
[51]wife and children out of Cuba, After the failure of the asylum
[52]attempt in March 1964, Mrs, AMLEO-3.again.renewed. her attack upon
[53]AMLEO-3 by phone. and letter, urging him to rescue her by any means
[54]at his disposal, and by her efforts she has successfully convinced him
[55]that his family will escape only if she can arrange an exfiltration
[56]mounted from inside the island, or if AMLEO-3 sends someone to get. her
[57]or comes himself to exfiltrate her and their children. Up until
[58]recently the C/O has been able to persuade AMLEO-3 that undertakings
[59]of this nature were foolhardy unless carried out by trained maritime
[60]assets skilled in clandestine infiltration and exfiltration, and
[61]equipped with the proper vessels and support to carry out the mission
[63]successfully, Now that the KUBARK asylum efforts have been discon- 1
[64]‘tinued, and AMLEO-3 is aware that KUBARK will not sponsor any maritime
[66]aan Cc eee8saea
[67]POUCH SHCURTTY VIOLATION one ea ey -
[68]_-b@ FIELD DISTRIBUTION
[69]Distribution:
[71]4 \wtls
[73]CROSS REFERENCE TO DISPATCH SYMBOL ANO NUMBER
[75]UFGA-15995
[77]13-00000 * vs : . .
[78]vs 4 Np a of ne one, . . —
[80]fe 7 - co ATION OF CLASSIFICATION . DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
[81]| DISPATCH - SECRET UFGA-15995
[83]| exfiltration attempts to rescue his family, he has decided that he
[84]would prefer to terminate his relationship with KUBARK so that he can
[85]carry out™such exfiitration attempts on his own in a completely
[86]independent manner,
[88]2. Since November 1963, JMWAVE has noted in all AMLEO progress
[89]reports that Mrs. AMLEO-3 was dabbling in exfiltration attempts in-
[91]i side Cuba, and has also successfully managed to pry funds out of
[92]! AMLEO-3 in attempts to buy her way into such efforts. As a result
[93]i AMLEO-3 has Porrowed money from AvSHED=1_and family relatives in the \
[94]L U.S. attemfting to support his wife in these attempts, and is now in :
[95]j debt_to these individuals to the tune o 55;900.00, On 5 May 1964,
[96]AMLEO-3 informed his C/O, that he had recentiy heard from his wife via
[97]the (Japanese diplomatic’ ourier channel) and in her letter she had é
[99]tol im that She planned to participate in an exfiltration attempt ils
[102]from_inside the he-weekénd oF I0 May I964. AMLEO-3 requested /
[103]the C/O to alert QKMAGNET €6 this attempt, and Said that he expected
[104]to have confirmation of the attempt by 1900 hours on 10 May 1964,
[105]Nothing was heard from AMLEO-3 the night of 10 May 1964, but the fol-
[106]lowing morning, at 0840 hours 11 May 1964, AMLEO-3 contacted the C/O
[107]and-gave him the following information:
[109]"The exfiltration of my family will begin on the night
[110]of 11 May 1964, and the group will consist of some 11
[111]adults and children. They plan to depart from Playa
[112]de Guanabo, between Havana and Matanzas, during the
[113]night of 11 May 1964 and expect to arrive in Key West,
[114]Florida sometime on 12 May 1964,"
[116]| AMLEO-3 claimed he knew nothing about what type of boat the group
[118]‘ planned to USé, nor the exact timé of departure, route the boat woul
[120]follow, etc. It was not until 13 May 1964, that AMLEO-3 mentioned
[122]to Bruce P. VEDDER and Leon C, FLUTEO, during a routine operational
[124]meeting, thajhe had sponsored and masterminded the-ahorted exfiltrattio
[126]operation,_and_that_the- operation -had_heen mounted from the U.S,, and
[127]e C/
[129]a
[131]a er
[133]not ‘from inside the island, as he had previously claimed to th 0.
[135]3. On 14 May 1964, the C/O contacted AMLEO-3 and requested an
[136]explanation of his sponsorship of the exfiltration operation, AMLEO-3
[137]i claimed he no longer felt bound to confide these activities on his
[138]part_to KUBARK,—since KUBARK had refused—to—centinue—its effort to
[139]i rescue his wife and family from Cuba, and furthermore that he would
[140]| ‘+; continue such unilateral exfiltration efforts with or without KUBARK
[141]help until he either rescued his family from Cuba, or died in his
[142]attempts to do so. AMLEO-3 claims he organized the trip of the M/V
[143]ADA by passing himself off as a PBPRIMER, and utilized the following
[144]individuals in the operation.
[146]\ A. Mario REMIS.. probably identical with Mario REMIS-
[147]! CAMEJO, A-12 834 780; PDOB) Havana, Cuba on 6/20/23; who formerly
[148]resided at Calle 130A, #36506, Wajay, Marianao, Havana, Cuba; came
[149]to the U.S. from Cuba in August 1962 departing from Guanabo by small
[150]boat with five other Cuban refugees, AMLEO=-3 claims he used this
[151]} individual as.his-principal organizer in_t pedififon, and REMIS
[152]had agreed to go into Cuba acting’ aS a guide and leader of the group.
[153]REMIS had previously resided in an area close to AMLEO-3's home in
[154]Wajay, Cuba and had agreed to go ‘tq A-3's home and bring his family
[155]gut. . REMIS-did recruit and organize the boat crew, but at the last
[156]minute supposedly was unable to make the trip because “of-other
[157]compitttments and instead turned his responsibilities over to the next
[159]j
[160]|
[161]i
[162]individual Daniel (RODRIGUEZ) Santos,
[163][
[165]B. Daniel ODRIGUEZ) Santos is the owner of the M/V .
[166]ADA, and brought the boat out from Cuba in his escape in November 1963:
[167]Since REMIS could not make the trip, he and A-3 reportedly briefed
[168]RODRIGUEZ on the location of A-3's home in Wajay, and supplied him
[169]with a recent photograph of Mrs, AMLEO-3 and her children, and AMLEO-3.
[170]wrote a bona fides message in his own handwriting on the back of the ©
[171]photograph ‘and also listed his home address without revealing (he says:
[173]CLASSIFICATION PAGE NO.
[175]2
[177]\ . %ORM
[179]\ 8 53a use PREVIOUS EDITION. SECRET [xl conrinven
[183]of
[185]13-00000 io neetiestenteteeeet tienen
[189]ca ee ee ny te nee oe
[190]7
[192]CONTINUATION OF |
[193]DISPATCH.
[195]DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
[197]UFGA-15995
[199]GLASSIFICATION
[200]SECRET
[202]the true name of his wife, (This photograph was brought back by
[203]RODRIGUEZ and returned to AMLEO-3). RODRIGUEZ then reportedly agreed
[204]to lead the infiltration mission, and personally contact AMLEO-3's
[205]family and the family of Jesus. GOMEZ Calzadilla in Guines, Cuba and
[206]take them to the exfiltration point. RODRIGUEZ also planned to bring
[207]out his fiancee, and the other boat crew members had agreed to bring
[208]out one or two relatives each, the total number of passengers was not
[209]supposed to exceed 15 persons,
[211]C. Armando BLANCO Lorenzo, Romelio LOPEZ Sosa, and
[212]AMBIG-4 yere_recruited by-RODRIGUEZ for the mission, and Supposedly
[213]AMLEO-3 did not have contact with them prior to the mission, nor were
[214]they witting that he was one of the sponsors of the mission. AMBIG~4
[215]was to bring out his father, mother, sister, younger brother, and his
[216]own and LOPEZ's fiancees; BLANCO his wife and daughter; RODRIGUEZ,
[217]his fiancee, and the wives and children of AMLEO-3 and Jesus GOMEZ
[218]Calzadilla. AMLEO-3 has never been informed by his C/O that AMBIG-4
[219]was a KUBARK asset, and AMLEO~3 has never indicated in any way that he
[220]knew AMBIG-4 was a KUBARK asset. Since the boat in question, the M/V
[221]ADA, was not equipped with a radio set, AMBIG~4 was obviously not
[222]desired for use as a radio operator by the group.
[224]4, AMLEO-3 informed the C/O that he had previously warned his
[225]wife that something was to happen the w weekend Of IO May 1964, and that
[226]someone wou @ coming to see her with bona fides from him. ffs.
[227]AMLEG-3 also was instructed to supply this contact man with all the
[228]pesos she had at her disposal, since the infiltrees reportedly were
[229]able to take in only $170.00 worth of pesos with them, SAnce- the
[230]abort of the mission, Mrs, AMLEO-3 has talked to A-3 by phone at least
[231]three times, ‘and she claims no one ever contacted her; that no one
[232]has bothered her since the failure of the mission; and that she is
[234]reported? r control or surveillance by the Cuban an Intelligence
[235]Services,
[239]CHRONOLOGICAL ACCOUNT OF UNSUCCESSFUL EXFILTRATION MISSION OF M/V ‘ADA:
[240]4 May - 8. May 1964
[242]5. During this period the gasoline, food, and other necessities
[243]were purchased along with four sets of green fatigues which the group
[244]bought in a local Army/Navy store. They were also equipped with two
[245]Colt .45 Cal pistols, one P-38 pistol, one Browning automatic .38 Cal
[246]pistol, and 250 rounds of ammunition for the four weapons, These
[248]weapons were taken on the mission for self defense purposes only.
[249]The boat, the M/V ADA, was located at Sunset Harbor Marina, Stock
[250]Island, Key West, Florida, 7
[252]9 May 1964
[254]6. On 9 May 1964, at approximately 1800 hours, the M/V ADA
[255]departed from Sunset Harbor Marina, Stock tegen? Key West, Fla for
[256]Cuba, The crew was made up of ee eae Santos, Rogelio LOPEZ
[257]Sosa, Armando BLANCO Lorenzo, and AMBIH-4, The M/V ADA was enroute
[258]fo Cuba “during the remainder of 9 May 1964, and nothing unusual
[259]_reportedly occurred during the voyage.
[261]10 May 1964
[263]7, YThe infiltration crew arrived in Cuba at a point approxi-
[264]mately 4 mile east of Playa Guanabo on 10 May 1964 at 1625 hours.
[265]There was no beach per se at this spot but reefs from 6 to 9 feet high.
[266]They had difficulty mooring the boat because the water was turbulent
[267]at the base of the reefs. In broad daylight, all four went ashore and
[268]walked across the highway 'Via Blanca', There were several empty
[269]trenches between the highway and the coast line, but the group could
[270]detect no vigilance in the area, ‘ LOPEZ was left hidden in the bushes ©
[271]near the highway, while the other three proceeded into Guanabo to
[273]gb meet RODRIGUEZ’ contact. (in the CAC debriefing LOPEZ named one
[274]guile MARTINED as RODRIGUEZ' contact in Guanabo, AMLABEL-1 states he
[276]agxed the name of this contact several times, but Gach time LOPEZ
[278]CONTINUED
[280]CLASSIFICATION
[282]SECRET
[284]PAGE NO.
[286]“3
[288]FORM
[289]9 £0 59a 0s US PREVIOUS EDITION.
[290]40
[292]1 3-00000 owe
[294]CLASSIFICATION
[296]DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
[298]CONTINUATION OF
[299]DISPATCH
[301]SECRET UFGA-15995
[303]maintained that he did not know, AMLEO-3 also refused to tell the
[304]C/O who the inside contact man in Guanabo was for the group. LOPEZ
[305]may have let the name slip during his CAC debriefing, or Piss. fabri-
[306]cated _a-name, )
[310]8. LOPEZ. began to count cars to while away the time. During
[311]the period 1630-1900 hours LOPEZ counted 38 6X6 type trucks with
[312]approximately 50 militia each, all travelling in the direction of
[313]Matanzas, One other truck, containing about 15 negroes and 6 whites,
[314]who LOPEZ states were not Cubans, was observed going in the same
[315]easterly direction, LOPEZ states that the traffic was unusually heavy
[316]in both directions, RODRIGUEZ returned about 1900 and he and LOPEZ
[317]went back to the boat, RODRIGUEZ told LOPEZ that he had been able to
[318]get transportation for both AMBIG-4 and BLANCO; AMBIG-4 to Quivican and
[319]BLANCO to Artemisa where their respective families are lacated,
[320]RODRIGUEZ and LOPEZ took the boat out about a mile, shut off the
[321]engine and went to sleep. (The above information in para 8 is the
[322]version AMLABEL-1 obtained from LOPEZ, )
[324]9. qo t the AMLEO-3 version of this period, again acquired from
[325]LOPEZ, AMLEO=3 reported the following activity: Upon his return to
[326]the boat about 1900 hours, RODRIGUEZ saw LOPEZ and told him to wait
[327]and then RODRIGUEZ returned to Guanabo to see his fiance and reportedly
[328]to establish contact with friends of A-3 in the GOC. A=3 would not
[329]say how these contacts were carried ont, but due to the time factor
[330]it -is assiimed they could only have been done by phone. A-3 claims
[333]eco acten en eet a a
[335]A. A high level civilian.official of the GOC, with the
[336]‘rank of Comandante probably in MINCONS, who is “willing to collaborate
[337]with the Rebel Army in exile, and willing to furnish their infiltrated
[338]agents with official GOC vehicles to travel anywhere in the provinces
[339]of Havana, Pinar del Rio, or Matanzas in order to carry out their
[340]missions,
[342]B. Some. unnamed. high level Cuban military officers.
[344]the Rebel ena
[346]hem untess they
[347]Beer rere or : ELY.
[349]me. ty _Stron uld prove they had strong outside
[351]e n aC J
[352]backing. “AMLEO-3 stated e would be more than willing to coltab-—
[353]—“Orate with KUBARK in furthering contact with these unnamed individuals
[355]4f_KUBARK—would-support pin in 2 cuture_extiltration to rescue his
[356]family from Cuba. AMLEO-3 refused to provide any further information
[357]relative to these supposed inside contacts of his. AMLEO-3 states
[358]that RODRIGUEZ returned to the boat about 2330 hours on 10 May 1964,
[359]and then he and LOPEZ boarded the boat and went out to sea for the
[360]night, A-3 also stated that LOPEZ told him that at least eight local
[361]fisherman dropped by to look at the boat while it remained at the reef,
[362]and nothing was done to insure the cooperation of the fishermen nor
[363]did LOPEZ attempt to hold them at the spot to prevent their informing
[364]on the infiltration to local security authorities.
[366]11 May 1964
[368]10. After putting out to sea, RODRIGUEZ and LOPEZ slept during
[369]the night and awoke the next morning, 11 May, at about 1130 hours.to
[370]find themselves directly across from the city of Matanzas. They
[371]returned to the Guanabo area about 2030 hours. (LOPEZ said the boat
[372]would only do about 4 to 6 knots). They took the boat back close to
[373]the original landing place, waited to see some light signals indi-
[374]cating all was clear, and when they didn't see them they decided to
[375]go in anyway and investigate. When approximately_20_yards_off shore,
[376]they were.fired_upon_by--automatica_weanons and-a—spotlight came on
[377]searching for them, The boat party was not hit by the fire and re-
[379]treated to the-—open sea,
[381]CLASSIFICATION
[383]SECRET
[385]FORM
[386]5- WD 58a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.
[387](4 :
[389]-
[390]CONTINUED
[392]DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
[394]. . . : CLASSIFICATION
[395]CONTINUATION OF .
[396]DISPATCH SECRET UFGA-15995
[397]ll. The boat then travelled east for approximately two to three
[398]miles down the coast from Guanabo, and they attempted to land on the
[399]‘beach again. Due to large rocks and heavy surf they decided-not to
[400]attempt a landing and instead anchored the boat beyond the surf line
[401](about 30 yards out) and both RODRIGUEZ and LOPEZ swam into the beach,
[403]RODRIGUEZ went inland and caught bus to Guanabo, and they went back
[404]to the safehouse of(Paulo MARTINEZ 6 At the safehouse he found the
[405]pickup team of and AMBIG-4, and some 28 people whom they had
[407]acquired as passéngers, These passengers were all relatives of BLANCO
[408]and AMBIG-4, and BLANCO and AMBIG-4 told RODRIGUEZ they had been unable
[409]to locate the homes of Jasus—GOMEZCalzadilia and AMLEO-3 and therefore
[410]had not been able to contact these families. They then returned the
[411]bona fides photos and messages to RODRIGUEZ to take back to AMLEO-3
[412]and GOMEZ. (AMLEO-3 commented bitterly on this point stating that
[413]AMBIG-4 and BLANCO probably went to their own homes first, and after
[414]seeing the number of their relatives who wanted to come, n even
[415]tried.to_find his home nor that of GOMEZ.) RODRIGUEZ, AMBIG-4, and
[416]BLANCO agreed upon another exfiltration point to the east of Guanabo,
[417]and arranged recognition signals, RODRIGUEZ then returned to the boat,
[418]leaving AMBIG-4 and BLANCO to convoy the passengers in three cars to
[419]the exfiltration point. — .
[420]piiiiabmaiasediendian a
[422]12. RODRIGUEZ and LOPEZ arrived at the exfiltration point about
[423]30 minutes after the appointedlour of 2300, and halted the boat about
[424]100 meters offshore, They saw a light on top of the reef at which
[425]point RODRIGUEZ told LOPEZ that the light was the proper signal,
[426](When asked about the recognition signals, LOPEZ stated that he did no1
[427]know what the exact signals were, but that they involved 2 or 3 lights
[428]and an exchange of names. He maintains that RODRIGUEZ handled all
[429]these details). They brought the boat right up to the reef at which
[430]point they were fired upon from the top of the cliffs from the directic
[431]of the highway. (AMLABEL-1 asked LOPEZ how they had planned to get
[432]women and children down these steep cliffs. LQPEZ replied that the
[433]difficulties.involved.had..not. occurred to_them, By the same token, ©
[434]they had no extra food on board the boat to feed the families, )
[436]13. RODRIGUEZ shouted to LOPEZ to jump overboard to use the
[437]boat as protection against the rifle fire. LOPEZ states that RODRIGUE:
[438]was hit as he jumped overboard, RODRIGUEZ could not swim because of
[439]his shoulder wound. On RODRIGUEZ' command, LOPEZ (who by this time
[440]had RODRIGUEZ around his neck) started to swim toward shore. LOPEZ
[441]decided this avenue of escape was foolish, and turned back toward the
[442]boat, LOPEZ pulled RODRIGUEZ aboard. He then claims that the rifle
[443](FAL) and machine gun fire was redirected, at this point, in toward
[444]land rather than out to sea toward their b3at. LOPEZ stateS fhat™
[445]this diversion was the only thing which saved them.
[447]14, LOPEZ started the motor and was proceeding north when he
[448]saw the signal lights of 6 or 7 small boats ringed in a semi-circle
[449]in front of his boat. LOPEZ apprised RODRIGUEZ (laid out flat on ‘the
[450]deck) of this new development. Even though bleeding and barely con-
[451]scious RODRIGUEZ asked LOPEZ if he could see the lights of Matanzas
[452]City. LOPEZ said he could. RODRIGUEZ advised him to head toward
[453]Matanzas hugging the coastline, The patrol craft (or fishing boats)
[454]had since extinguished their lights. LOPEZ followed his advice and
[455]several hours later arrived off Matanzas City having eluded the patrol
[456]craft. RODRIGUEZ then told LOPEZ to turn the boat to the left until
[457]the compass showed "N", straighten out and follow that course to Key
[458]West. Three or four of the gas tanks had been pierced by the barrage,
[459]and there was barely enough gas left to make it to Key West. Their
[460]last remaining water tank was also shot up. They arrived at approxi-
[461]mately 1730 hours at Sunset Harbor Marina, Stock Island, Key West,
[462]Fla. on 12 May 1964.
[464]15, Upon arrival in Key West, Fla, RODRIGUEZ was hospitalized
[465]and X-Ray pictures disclosed that the bullet had entered above his
[466]right shouder blade and came out on his right side and penetrated thro
[467]his arm, He had four cracked ribs, and it appeared that his right
[468]lung was not punctured, but there was some blood between his lung and
[469]the pleura @nd the Subject was operated on successfully the morning
[471]PAGE NO.
[472][| CONTINUED
[474]CLASSIFICATION
[476]FORM
[477]8-00 58Q@ USE PREVIOUS EDITION.
[478](40)
[480]SECRET 5
[482]13-00000
[484]DISPATCH SYMSOL AND NUMBER
[486]CONTINUATION OF
[487]DISPATCH
[489]CLASSIFICATION
[490]SECRET
[491]of 13 May 1964, RODRIGUEZ has since been moved to Miami, and is
[493]now hospitalized at Mount Sinai hospital, Miami, Florida, His con-
[494]dition is now satisfactory. i
[498]AFTER ACTION ‘REPORTS
[500]16. After the abortive exfiltration attempt hy the M/V ADA, .
[501]various relatives of people involved began to receive telephone calls
[502]and telegrams from Cuba reporting on the arrest or safety of various
[503]individwais. The following excerpts were taken from various BARR cabl
[504]and debriefings of .Romelio LOPEZ Sosa and AMLEO-3:
[506]A. On 13 May 1964, AMSWIRL-1 visited Tomas RODRIGUEZ
[507]Fuentes, of 1021 Margaret Street, Key West, former Captain with the
[508]National Police in Havana who had received a telegram from his daughte:
[509]Elsa OLIVERA, at 0920 hours 13 May 1964, (She was supposed to have co
[510]out with BLANCO and AMBIG-4 in the exfiltration). The telegram stated
[511](English translation) "Congratulations, we are well, love to all,
[512]embrace, Your daughter.'", and supposedly indicated the daughter was
[513]safe. ,
[515]B. On 14 May 1964, AMSWIRI-1 was told by Daniel RODRIGUE'
[516]Santos that Valentin BLANCO, relative of Armando BLANCO Lorenzo, had
[517]received three telegrams from Cuba: the first on 10 May stated
[518]"Armando arrived all is well" ; the second on 11 May stated, "Armando
[519]departed, all is well"; and the third on 13 May stated, "Yesterday's
[520]i cable no good, Armando admitted or hospitalized", meaning Armando
[522]BLANCO had been picked up by Cuban authorities.
[524]C. On 14 May 1964, AMLEO-3 called the C/O and informed
[525]him that the 14 year old son of Mario REMIS (see para 3 A above) had
[526]called his father in Miami at 1130 hours that same date, and told him
[527]he had been arrested along with his mother and some other people while
[528]tryingto leave“Cuiba, and that the police had let the children. free,
[529]but continued €06 hold the adults under arrest. Reportedly only
[530]one car had. been picked up near the exfiltration point, and the people
[531]in the other two cars had supposedly escaped arrest for the time being
[532]As of 23.May 1964, no other information has been reported to KUBARK
[533]on the fate of BLANCO, AMBIG=4, Or _the passeigers who were at the
[534]exfiltration point. = =~
[536]GENERAL COMMENTS ON TRIP OF THE M/V ADA
[538]17. As noted in paragraph 8 of reference J, various operational
[539]inconsistencies still exist in the account submitted above re the
[540]exfiitration trip of the M/V ADA to Cuba, WAVE is of the opinion
[541]that-some—of—these—inconsistenciéS Gan be attributed to genuine con-
[542]fusion of facts by the principal source of information, Rogelio LOPEZ
[543]Sosa, (who did not see the infiltration team of BLANCO and AMBIG-4 ._—
[544]again after their infiltration inland), and the withholding of facts
[545]by_AMLEO-3 who considers_this activity.was_his_own personal bisiness—
[546]and_had nothing to do with KUBARK. Daniel RODRIGUEZ Santos is
[547]probably more knowledgeable of exactly what occurred during the infil-
[548]tration, but due to his illness AMSWIRL-1 was not able to interrogate
[549]him in Key West, and reportedly RODRIGUEZ is still very ill and
[550]KUBARK does not consider it worthwhile to attempt an interrogation
[551]of him at this time. It is also believed that RODRIGUEZ will withholc
[552]information he considers privileged, and it has been noted that
[553]AMLEO-3's principal organizer of the expedition, Ma EMIS, has
[554]peen visiting RODRIGUEZ daily in Mount Sinai hospital in Miami, Fla.
[555]Since the two infiltrees, BLANCO and AMBIG-4, are either under arrest
[556]or in hiding it is doubtful that their inside activities relative to
[557]AMLEO-3's family etc.,, will ever be completely clarified. '
[559]18, As noted in paragraph 9 of reference J, AMLEO-3 continues
[560]to look for methods whereby he may exfiltrate his family from Cuba,
[561]and has reached the point where he is no longer rational in his
[562]reasoning re the risk factors to himself or his family, AMLEO-3 is
[564]CLASSIFICATION
[566]SECRET
[568]PAGE NO,
[570]6
[572]FORM
[573]5-60 58a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.
[574](4 ;
[576]CONTINUED
[579]13-00000- s= Seer ence aR cana RD eR” SRNR ne eens
[581]. f os . -_
[582]eo A on, : . a . —~
[583]. u . Vataka, ; :
[585]. H .
[586]a re ’
[588]: CLASSIFICATION DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
[589]CONTINUATION OF — ;
[590]DISPATCH SECRET UFGA-15595
[592]definitely acting out of desperation, and although he does not desire
[593]to burn all his KUBARK bridges behind him, he feels that he must since
[594]KUBARK will not permit him to undertake such activities while under our
[595]control, WAVE's position on the matter has been fully stated in .
[596]paragraph 9 of reference J, On 22 May 1964 WAVE requested BARR to con-
[597]tact AMSWIRL-1 and inform him that KUBARK was desirous of having him
[598]insure that the M/V ADA was not permitted to carry out further family
[599]rescue missions to Cuba at this time.
[601]Ch Cherry ‘4, ii) 20 de 2.
[603]Andrew\K, REUTEMAN
[609]pry VIOLATION
[611]:CUR
[612]POUCH SECURITY rosoW
[614]HO FIELD DI
[616]£S COPY.
[618]CLASSIFICATION PAGE NO.
[620]5.60 59a ss USE Previous EDITION. SECRET [| CONTINUED 7