[1]14-00000
[3]104-10102
[5]10224
[7][2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
[8]ss a u ‘
[13]i :
[14]. deter caeet netebineeennemnttad stan noe tte chee Aree eee cecal Leman eth atennes sae enact: ist ences oat anes ae ee a ~
[15]4 “oe - - .
[17]3 e
[20]j
[21]| SECRET - SENSITIVE
[22]! 4 -
[23]| , | Draft Memorandum to the DCI from William Harvey
[24]1 . .
[25]po
[26]: Dated 27 November 1962
[27]This is not a controlled item
[29]RETURN TO O48
[30]-( Background Use Gnly
[31]\ Do Not Reprocuce
[33]e US
[35]14-0000
[39]4. Maintain maxieun
[41]‘THIS DOCUMSNT Is age of Cuban inte!tiger >
[42]_ Fequizenents.
[44]A SOURCE REFOAENCE
[45]ee cs HISTORECAL - “e Me
[46]PAPER hO. e
[48]—D0 Nor DESTROY—=
[49]ae wprkeing, split ia ¢ _
[50]8 or epliz
[52]poe 7 D SECRET
[53]SENSITIVE —
[56]14-0000
[58]i rf Per
[59]: fe
[63]oa Cuban-Blos relationships.
[65]es coverage of *
[66]wich particular coptanis oa 1 tha followings
[68]apr
[72]Rvieg anil
[73]oe and
[75]tl
[76]cation
[79]meh, 3G
[81]DOT.
[84]14-0000
[86]nto se a,
[88]owe ert
[91]14-0000
[94]14-0000
[96]nana .
[101]Chines ‘sh ooge
[104]14-0000
[106]Menten! Shee ee Fa me ae hone
[108][= SECRET - SENSITIVE |
[110]{ a
[111]27 November 1962
[113]Note: Biscussed 27 tcyvece:
[115]1862 by DD/T with Cl
[116]end approved gener: |:
[117]ip principle by £CT,
[118]Pally concurred (yn
[120]: MEMORARDOM. FOR Director of Central Intelligence :
[122] PEROUGH: . ° Deputy Director (Plsns)
[123]SUBJECT: - Operstioual Plen for Continu! ing
[125]Operrt tens Ageinst Cubs
[127]it. Action: This memorandua is for your information
[129]‘and pursuant to your request. Recommendations for action rre
[130]contained ia Parugraph V below. The purpore of this memerrors!
[131]' iw to col ineate an operational pina for the action whick we
[133]believe should be taken by CIA ogsinst Cubs fur the predictshle
[134]future. In summary the plan provides for cratinuing, even
[135]intensity ing, the intelligence effort egeinst Cubs and f+
[137]the reorientation of the current effort inte » long tern
[139]denied area type of operation of the highest prtlority.
[141]I, ASSUMPTIONS:
[143]A. The United States Government will , lve public
[144]assurances that, provided no nuclerr or offeusive weapers © +r
[145]present or re-introduced into Cuba, end provided Cube dees
[147]von not take action to threaten the pesce ond security of the
[148]Western Henisphere, the United Btatés dees tot intend tc
[150]Creve rs
[151]Lnvade Cuba or ‘support #n invasion of Cuba: a seine .
[152][ue sxcust - SENSITIVE ] PAPER BO.
[155]7 eee
[157]——=20_ HOT praznoy
[159]14-0000
[161]a These assurances will preclude ony ‘meaningful CIA
[162]actlon “on a phased basis to Provoke a revolt inside Cubr, since
[163]unless there are major changes in operational and internal con-
[165]oe ditions’ in Cuba, such a revolt if provoked would be totally
[166]| destroyed by Cuban counteraction in a. matter of hours or, at
[168]7 riya! watens, oupyorted, by a najor, United States
[169]Sik Litszy! “commitnent. ia addition, ‘the ‘non-invasion assurances
[170]mo e8 a practical matter will. preclude invading Cuba on the pretext
[172]‘of a contrived provocation such as an attack on Guantanano,.
[173]2Oe CIA. operations Anvolving a high noise level anda
[175]" distiget @lenent. of -attributability, particularly paramilitary,
[177]“guerrilla, and comaando type operations will. be unacceptable
[179]ag a matter of ‘policy.
[181]Dy The Castro-communist regime will remain in power for
[183]a
[185]ithe indefinite future, with its security and control apparatus
[189], relatively intact and with the capability not only of erushing
[191]unsupported resistance activity, but of making operational
[193], conditions in Cuba increasingly difficult. While it. is
[194]possible that recent and future developments including the
[195]Soviet action in renoving the offensive weapons from Cube ney
[196]serve to weaken and discredit Castro, there is as yet no herd
[197]indication that the control of the Castro-communist regime over
[199]Cuba bas ‘been substantially weakenod. |
[201]. . Bs ., The United States assurances of no invasion and no
[203]- support of' an invesion will, in effect, constitute giving tr:
[205]Castro and his regime a certain degree of ssnctuary. This will
[208]14-0000
[210]~ . 7
[212]- | a
[214]| i* weverely denage the aorale and motivation of anti-regine Cubenes
[215]| _ both insiide sad outside of Cube, Which will make it ineressingiy
[216]- dittioult for us to. recruit agents, maintain agents already
[218]recruited, and. continue or intensify our iatelligence and other
[219]ar efforts Against Cuba and the Castro-communist regine,
[220]. - . eokog 8 Pespite. ‘the Bbove. factons,; Higher, Authority probebly
[221]y a ot “will; gontione ‘heavy. proamire, on: the’ cu: for a maxioun ‘effort
[222]ne against, ‘Cuba ‘end may even ‘cont Anue to contend that the ultinate.
[223]7 . objective ig the overthrow of the Castro-communist regime.
[224]“This. is an unrealistic objective, however, except.on o very
[225]4 long-term basis as thie. United States Government, we believe,
[226]a 7 will be unwilling in the. innediate future to commit troops
[227]to support wach an overthrow. The United States Governzent
[228]ia its overt dealings with the Capea exiles probably will not
[230]"express, ‘the above factors to them in the context or with the
[232]bdluntness: stated here. : .
[233]" -@. In view of these factors, the so-called ‘“Iesck Tru",
[234]. course of action, 1.@., unlinited support of Cuban exiles
[235]end exile groups. with no real control or objective purposes
[237]in the hope that ‘these groups will be sable to shake the
[238]Castro regine will, although unrealistic, become _increzs ing ty .
[239]attractive et various levels in the United Sta tes Government.
[240]H. As a matter of policy, political pressures and
[241]i . economic: prensures short.of blockade, raids, snd | aggressive
[243]sabotage against Guba: will be continued.
[246]14-0000
[248]a alee Men oem ga cetaenat cosets 6 cae
[250]t. 3 view of the above assumptions prramilitary, commanuth
[252]end sabotage. operations, except in rare selective instonces
[254]will serve little purpose; algo they will be counter-pracuct tye
[255]since, 4t ‘undertaken, they will make the collection of intelli-
[256]gence more ditfieult and should only be undertrken in those very
[258]' few instances. whore an upusually high return can be demonstreted,
[260]Regardless of what other pressures are placed on CIA for
[261]action against Cube, it would eppear clear that Higher Author diy
[263]. whl insist on 2 continued, . even intensified, latelligence
[265]coverage of Cuba.
[266]J, In. view of the policy factors, an increased use of
[268]facilities, veal estate aud basing outside the United States,
[269]' particularly in’ Latin Auerico, Will be both necessary snd _
[271]desirable. .
[273]x. Adequate aerial reconnaisssnce of Cuba will continue.
[277]_ Based on the ‘above assumptions, the following objectiven
[278]appear to be proper for continuing CIA operations against
[282]4, Take all feasible clancestine sction to isolate
[283]and assist in isolating the Castro-commnist regime in Culn
[284]from the rest of the Western Hemisphere and the rest of the
[285]Free World. ;
[287]“Bo” Fo. the maxinum extent possible, discredit the Castro-
[289]commnist. regine tn Cuba and in the Yestern Heuisphere and the
[291]rest of the world.
[294]14-0000
[296]. one
[298]Cc. Maintein through clandestine means, short of commands
[299]and guerrilla type operations, the maximum_economic and
[300]political pressures’ on the Cuban regiue and economy not only
[302]_ for the Purpose of hampering the Cuban regime, but for the
[304]additional purpose of insuring the maximum possible drain on
[306]°° Bles resources used to support (Cuba.
[308]De Maintain. moximua ‘possible intelligence and counter-
[310]“intent igence coverage of Cubs, "including particular emphasis
[312]ls. Capsbilities and intentions of the government.
[314]‘eer yw ‘ Activities of the Cuban G-2 and its other
[316]security. organs. a
[317]3, Soviet and Bloc activities in Cuba,
[318]ss a: State of potential resistance, including the
[319]morale and tenper of the ‘populace.
[320]| 8. " waritie and military order of battle snd equip-
[321]nent.
[322]. 6. The loci of power and of possible stresses
[323]snd strains in the power centers in the Cuban goverunont.
[324]-%. Belationships between Cuba, USSR, Red China,
[325]the Bloc, Latin American nations and other Free World
[326]‘end uncommitted nations.
[327]8. The level of and the weaknesses in the Cubsn
[328], economy, oe |
[334]14-0000
[336]Pruthe |
[338]‘R. Teko mnxzimua ection to induce a split in the Cuben
[339]regine gad maintain the capability of capitalizing immediately
[340]through clandestine neans. to the extent possible on any
[342]: significent uprising, revolt, resistance, split in the regina,
[344]or strains end stresses among Cuban leadership or tn Cubrn/
[345]1 Abbe, , Felationships,
[346]oie OPEZRATI Pua
[348]_ Espionage and Intelligence Collection - Ald fersible .
[350]‘effort “shoul be undertaken to continue end intensify intelli-
[352]gence: collection concerning Cuba. The status of our iatel1i-
[354]gence’ collection and xelated operational activity at the
[356]' present time and its development during the past six months
[358]-is delineated . in detail in Attachment A, which wes preprred tr
[360]serve as the basis for. the: ists report on this particuler
[362]; matter to the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign
[364]Intelligence. "You will. uote that this lengthy docusent
[365]breaks down under nunerous sub-beadiogs the intelligence
[366]coverage which has been developed. by the Clandestine Service.
[367]Set out below are specifics of operational action it is
[368]proposed to take to continue and, ag possible, increase in-
[369]telligence coverage of Cuba.
[371]l. Jutelligence Exploitation of Refugees: As yu
[372]know, with the quarantine and the cessstion of sir
[373]braver t the heavy’ flew of Cuban refugees bse dwindled
[375]f “almost to nothing. In view of this and in connection
[376]~G~
[378]14-0000
[382]j
[385]i
[386]|
[388]with the contingency plenning for supporting any persihis
[390]military action in Cuba, the Opa-Locke Interrogation -
[391]Center as such was disasntled, although. the personnel
[392]of the ‘Center have been retained intact. In order to
[393]- re-establish. the flow of intelligence from refugees,
[394]it is. proposed that. Pan Auerican Airweys and KLY be
[395]" dndusea’ to. reiastitute their: regular: flights from
[396]Havané ‘to Miami.’ This should be done 28 soon as ;
[397]- possible after the settlement of the current nogotinttons
[398]and UN discussions. Coincident with this, the Opa-Locka
[399]yefugee interrogation center will be re-established
[400]re vt ce oe pérsomnel. |
[401]. | . Resident Agents in Cuba: Every effort will be
[402]"made to continue to exploit to the fullest, preserve the
[403]viability of and, where necessary, re-establish communica-
[404]' ¢iens. with the 131 recruited agents now resident in Cube.
[405]". 9 an extent, the speed and effectiveness of this effort
[406]. Wall of course depend upon the stringency of future
[407]. Cuban security sad control action, which it is imposstble
[408]as yet to accurately forecast.
[410]3. Third Country Operations: The priority on re-
[411]eruiting agents in third countries for dispatch to Cubs
[412]will be. reiterated gnd strengthened and every effort
[414]at hie be nade to increase. this coverage, both through
[415]— . “the development of sdditional resident sgents in ‘Cuba
[420]14-0000
[422]the saaec services] who are assisting ud in the ‘effort
[423].  agninst Cuba for additional coverage, including the
[424]- recruiting of agents ance their own areas for joint
[425]wre dtepateh, to Caba., | The [services|Jacst effectively co-
[426]. operating at ‘this. point in this connection are the
[427][Bastian Dutch,.. reach, Spanish, Italian, Greek,
[428]Norwegian,. Danish, - West German, Mexican, Argentinian,
[429]‘Uruguayan, Cansdian, Chilean, and. Taraeii.J Direct
[430]os ‘ approaches to several of these (services either by you
[431]" personally or. in your name, as you prefer, sare
[432]being separately recommended, Personal representation
[433]| . by you to the[ services] underlined sbove would be useful.
[434]in addition, we will re-survey all other Gitaison services]
[435]. with which ve are in contact aad reiterate to those
[436]. ‘appearing. to. have any assets usable aga lnst Cuba our
[437]extrene interest in maxim coverage of this problem.
[438]In connection with the fitaison] probien generally, we will
[439]' endeavor to induce. all of the [tiaison. services] to make
[440]greater use of their [national] assets, both inside and
[441]. outside of Cuba. Particular attention will be given to
[442]. - possible utilization of the[Vatican]
[443]_ a -— 5. ritime rations: In addition to increasing
[445],
[446]4
[447]N
[449]a.
[451]i ee efforts to get at seaman agents end other aaritine
[452]24
[453]asscts through (Tinison: services;| we will continue our
[455]unilateral third country efforts to recruit seamen anc
[459]14-0000
[461]- ddan.
[463]‘.
[466]YY, ‘
[468]prrticularly Cubon seamen, to increane the twenty
[469]officers and. crew nenbers aboard gix Cuban vessels we sre
[470]now rupning. as controlled agents.
[472]- 6. Penetration of Cuban Installations Abroad: At
[474]' the: present tine we are running 12 Cuben diplomats
[476]stationed outsides Cube as controlled agents aad have visable
[478]|" operations ained: at. an ‘additional 20 cuban diplomats.
[479]' We ‘propose to continue and intensity the current progten |
[481]of attempting to recruit or defect every Cuben officia!
[482]representative abroad to whom we can gzin access ond
[484]soncerning whom. we have eny reason to believe a
[486]susceptibility to approach exists. These additionat
[488]penetrations will be attempted both through[untiatere)
[490]operations end where appropriate in conjunction with
[492]; [taison services, }
[494]4. Audio Penetrations of Cuban Installations
[495]Abroad: At the present time we have audio and/or
[497]_telephose tap coverage of Cuban officisl installations
[499]in Chile, Italy, uextoo! The Netherlands, England,
[500]Uruguay, Greece, Spain, France, and Cenaca | No
[502]major expansion of this coverage is presently
[504]contemplated, but we will continue to survey additicnst
[506]targets ef opportunity and wherever possible insts11
[507]coverage in those cases where the additional intelii-
[509]“getica tion this type of source over and above whet we
[511].3re now receiving would appear ‘to make such Lustalirtien
[512]worthwhile,
[515]3
[516]Sa
[518]14-0000
[520]esteem a aetna ne a eee tee erent
[522]ra St a nt ee ESE SESSION AN ARR rab
[524]PB, Sonunmunicrtions Intelligence: Fe will continus
[525]our present CIA Close Support coversge from the KOLA
[527]SL SO Ne Wh Nn
[529]station snfudentJa the same level end will continue
[530]to pross NSA: for sdditionsl coverage of Cuban comaynicr-
[531]* tions. As the current situation "nermelizes" it shewli
[532]be possible for NSA to reinstitute and perhaps even
[533]ye. Anerease their, seoborne intercept coversge of: Cuban
[534]| couunies tions. . .
[535]ss Communist Party Operations: A complete survey
[537]bas been made world-wide of all Communist Party
[539]penetration operations and wherever any such penetration
[540]“ean be directed egainst Cuba either by dispatching the
[541]egent to Cuba or by pointing the agent. against Cubsn
[542]‘targets, “this will be done, except in those cnses vhers
[543]such action would result in unacceptabl¢prejudice ta
[544]the operations in the srea where the agent ig now based.
[545]” It is believed that the. most lucrative field for the
[546] sedivection of such operations to the Cuban target will
[547]“pe Latin America where there sre 65 penetrations of
[548]various communist parties. Of this 65, the survey
[549]we bave conducted indicates that 23 have some direct
[550]pertinent access to Cuban targets, All of these 27 wi)
[551]be directed against these targets unless in any case
[552]there. are overriding. reasons .to the: contrary, The
[553]yemaining cases in the total of 6s are bein individually
[554]exanined to see if they can be diverted to Cuban trrgets.
[557]14-0000
[561]i” 10. Illegally Infiltrated Agents: The two
[563]siccessful black infiltrated teams (COBRA and AMTORGID)
[564]' Sliich have produced substential intelligence will be
[566]TE carl A aa OG IS EE NN NY EET A ly A ee
[567]s
[568]e
[570]continued, resupplied, snd reinforced but pointed
[571]‘primarily at continued intelligence cotlection and rt
[572]- the recruituent’ for intelligence collestion purposes of
[573]"other. Cabans who already are ‘legelly resident in Cubs
[574]in the sress where. the tenns are opersting (Pinar del
[576]Rio and Oriente). In addition, on the nost careful ly
[578]f | - selected basis, where it appears feasible, additional
[579]{ . agents. and tens will be. infiltrated black into Cuba
[581]in en effort ‘te duplicate the performance of the COBRA
[583]8nd ANTORRID teans and psrticularly to. recruit and, ca
[584]_ possible, train additional agents legally resident in
[585]Cuba. :
[587], 11. Extiltration: As feasible, egents end potentirl
[588]recruits now in Cuba will be exfiltrated for
[589]training, indoctrination, supplying with communications,
[590]and motivation. They will then be re-infiltrated inte
[591]Cuba, primarily on intelligence missions. Where possible,
[592]this will be done through legal trave! channels, but
[593]where this is not possible, it will be done wherever
[594]- feasible through our black infiltration-exfiltration
[595]facilities, primarily our maxvitine assets.
[596]'
[600]14-0000
[602]B, Much of the above effort as noted will be primarily
[603]directed ‘towards developing all possible evidences of stress
[604]or strain within the regime ond between the regine and other
[606]: antions, particularly the Bloc. An intensive program wi}
[607]be. continued to. take. asena soe. of any possible opportunity
[609]a | fashions fashion. This as ‘pastcally ® long: tera effort. sh great deal
[610]” of work. already has. goue into this and the current
[611]status of this prograa and the proposed further expldtation
[612]| of the nunercus’ leads wo ‘have daveloped is being. made, in
[613]the dniterests of brevity in this memorandum, the subject of
[614]g separate ‘compilation. The effectiveness of sssets aimed rt
[615]actually splitting the regine, i.¢., @ pairce revolt, will of
[616]| “course depend, to an extent, on the willingness of the United
[617]., 7 | States Governnent to support thea and it is entirely possible
[618]_ ‘that any: ‘gach effort might fstl unless supported. with militery
[619]forces which om ‘the basis of the assumptions in Paragraph I
[620]above would appear ‘unlikely.
[622]c. Sabotage: On the basis of the sesumptions set cut
[623]above, comendo type sabotage, minor sabotage, and other
[624]acta of sabotage inside Cuba would appear to serve little
[625]purpose end should not be undertaken except in the rare
[626]instances where an opportunity is presented with ecceptabic
[628]risk. to do za jor danage to the Cuban econony. it is proposed
[630]' to. contiiue searching for. such ‘Limited opportunities, but.
[632]no active or wide scale program is contempleted..
[634]-12~ |
[636]14-0000
[638]Se ee meee eter tee
[640]Given the Assumptions ia Paragraph I above, no wide scale
[642]D. Parnnta itary, Coumando, and Guerrille Type Operationm:
[644]program ot Buch activity should be undertaken, However, we
[645], - Propese to “maintain in being our present facilities sand
[646]the eipabiiity of undertaking. such operaticns in order to
[647]"Sally exploit any: substantial change in internal Cuban con
[648]ditions or ‘any substantial revolt or uprising which night oceny,
[649]Eg, Economic Warfore: It is proposed to continue end
[650]- intensify the progras already undertaken to deny through
[651]- olandestine aud covert means critical materials to the Cuben
[652]- ecotiony.. ‘This consists primarily of denizl operations, possibly
[653]sone preciusive buying and inducing friendly U.S. and allied
[654]firnas and governuents to prevent the shipments of atrategic
[655]"materials, to Cuba.
[657]ae a 2 Counterinteliigence: (The current counterintelligenca
[659]= and counterespionage progran agninst the Cuban GZ ond
[660]related services will be continued end as possible intensified.
[662]. This ‘program hes developed Substantially and it should be
[663]possible within the. coming tenths to increase its effectiveness
[664]considerably in countering not only Cuban but Bloc intelli-.
[666]* gence operations mounted ageingt United States interests
[667]from Cuba,
[669]G. Political Action, Propaganda, Paychologics1 Warfare:
[671]tom in thin fiele the following tasks will be continued and where
[673]neal
[675]appropriate intensified:
[679]le. Assist and support State in any. feasible acticn,
[680]. -13~ ,
[682]14-0000
[686]MENS Ne ee
[688]: ” ad co os
[689]- BEN
[692]to davelop ead exploit current OAS and Latin Aneric:n
[693]attitudes favorable “to the containzent end/or overtheny
[694]of the ©. Costro~communist regine,
[695]‘Assist State in the developnent of post-Cestro
[696]- coneyte, leaders, and political Broups.
[697]. . 3, Stimulate, Support. and Suide covertly the
[698]ae Propaganda and political action Rotivities of the cnc
[699]ond, other Cuban political Groups rnd individuals, fa
[700]. 'ppropriate, who offer a potential for impact inside
[701]Cuba, .
[702]ie the Dinetpy ndaten and exploit the will of the
[703]- Cuban people | to resist Castro-communian, making maximun
[704]use. of the downgrading of Castro and his regime during —
[705]‘the missile crisis,
[706]|» 8. Diweredit and ridicule castro and bis regine
[707]“in Cuba, in the Hewisphere snd elsewhere, with emphasis
[708]On the thene the missile crisis dexoustrsted con-
[709]Clusively that Castro is nothing but a sere pawn of
[710]Soviet imperialisa,
[711]6. Continue "Radio Auericas" fad other CIA-
[715]Sponsored Cuban exile radio brosdeasts «3 *Ppropriate.
[717]7. Leunch propaganda balloons after an operations!
[718]capability has been sstablished and policy authority is
[719]| Granted to conduct propaganda balloon operations,
[721]8. * Continue the infiltration of propaganda materini
[723]dato Cuba vis open mails, legal travellers and couriers,
[725]‘with special emphasis on selective black operations,
[729]14-0000
[731]Se et Ae
[733]i H, Exploitation o of ExLlo Groups: We Will continue
[735]the claidestine exploitation of exile groups for intelligence |
[737]7 Rae
[739]collection; psychological warfare pnd other approved missicns.
[740]‘As tesathle, we will act to mount a8 much of this effort cs
[741]-- posmible from: areas outside the continental United States, end
[742]particularly fron Latin Anerica. ig Higher Authority decides
[743]"Ont a “Track Two" concept. or on. any, ‘pimilar concept which
[745]: —— contemplates heavy uncontrolled and only generslly directed
[746]) , ection. operations of Cuban groups egainst Cubs, it is believer
[747]that efforts should be made to ‘transfer @B much as possible
[748]\ Sof the. esponsibility, for this non-clandestine, non-intelligencs
[749]| type operation intd the politics! field, which is the province
[750].. 10% the Departuent of State, In this connection, -it igs believed
[751]jit would be sdvisable to press for the creation within the
[752]. | Departuent of. State of on office of Cuban Exile Affairs to
[753]mo hendie the overt governnent relationships with } Cuban exile
[754]| eroups.
[755]- ‘IV, ORGANIZATIONAL AND PROCEDURAL CHANGES:
[756]Maximum inplomentation of the above plan which provices
[757]for the most intensive feasible collection of tntelligenc:,
[758]- the implomentationof related programs as outlined, and the
[759]muintenance of capabilities to exploit targets of opportunit:
[761]ag well as take advantage of any future substantial changes
[762]"4m internal Cuban conditions will, it is believed, permit
[763]and make advisable the following:
[766]14-0000
[770]A, A gracual but substantial reduction ‘n the expenditures
[772]and pergonnel of Task Force W. . “
[773]B. Consideration of the repositioning of Task Force W
[775]within: the Clandestine Service, possibly ag 8 major conponent
[777]of. the wa JAviaion under different direction.
[778]Cc... The abolition of the operational Mongoose mechaniaia,
[779]‘D. The removal of the past ‘frauework: which required
[781]detailed | consideration by the Special Group (Augmented) cf
[783]even minor operstional deteils and decision by comnittee on
[785], points which it, is: believed ore completely within the purviar
[786]of the DCI and those officers to whom he delegates decision.
[787]_¥., RECOMMENDED ACTION:
[789]A. Your concurrence in the above general operations plan
[791]is recommended.
[793]B, -It is recommended that you discusa this plan with .
[795]the © Special. Group (Augmented) and secure its comeurrence.
[797]c. It is recounended that you secure from the Specin
[798]Group (Augmented) policy approval to attempt to induce Fan
[799]American Airways and KLM to resume their flights between Ajax!
[800]ond. Hevena at the appropriate time,
[802]p. It ig recommended that if eny “Track Two" concept
[803]is proposed, you endesvor to transfer te the Department «f£
[804]State all possible overt aspects of this type of uncontrolled
[808]14-0000
[810]me. oud Support of. Cuban ile groups. _ 7 —
[812]at is: Fecomnended that: the: Mongoose operat
[813]nectinnion be abolished,
[815]= Rs it you soncur in this concent,
[817]done 1
[819]Specific recommendat fon.