[1]157-10014-10117 | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
[2]JFK Assassination System Date: VUT2015
[4]Identification Form
[6]Agency Informati on
[8]AGENCY :
[9]RECORD NUMBER :
[11]SSCIA
[12]157-10014-10117
[14]RECORD SERIES: MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTTEE
[16]AGENCY FILENUMBER:  07-M-23 ; . :
[17]Document Informati on
[18]ORIGINATOR: SSCIA
[19]FROM:
[20]TITLE: RICHARD GOODWIN BINDER
[21]DATE: 00/00/1975
[22]PAGES: 103
[23]SUBJECTS :
[24]ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES
[25]DOCUMENT TYPE: REPORT
[26]CLASSIFICATION : — Declassified
[27]RESTRICTIONS : 1B; 1C
[28]CURRENT STATUS: = Redact
[29]DATE OF LASTREVIEW: 03/21/2000
[30]OPENING CRITERIA :
[31]COMMENTS : CCBOX 453
[33]vot 1
[35]HW 50955 Docld:32423505 Page 1
[38]a Page : 1
[40]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[41]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[43]AGENCY INFORMATION
[45]AGENCY : SSCIA
[46]RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10117
[47]RECORDS SERIES : MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTTEE
[49]AGENCY FILE NUMBER 07-M-23 : y
[51]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[53]ORIGINATOR : SSCIA .
[55]TO : 7
[56]TITLE : RICHARD GOODWIN BINDER
[57]DATE : 00/00/75
[58]PAGES : 103
[59]SUBJECTS : ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES
[61]| DOCUMENT TYPE : REPORT
[62]CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET
[63]RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
[64]CURRENT STATUS : POSTPONED IN FULL
[65]DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 01/05/99
[66]OPENING CRITERIA : 4
[67]COMMENTS : CCBOX 453
[69][R] - ITEM Is RESTRICTED
[72]HW 50955 Docld:32423505 Page 2
[75]M.
[77]HW 50955 Docld:32493505
[79]4/26/61
[80]5/2/61
[82]5/4/61
[83]5/5/61
[84]5/24/61
[86]6/10/61
[87]7/8/61
[88]9/1/61 |
[90]11/1/61
[92]11/2/61
[94]“y/4/o1
[96]11/22/61
[98]8/10/62
[100]8/12/62
[102]8/14/62
[104]5/27/75
[106]Page 4
[108]a TABLE
[110]a
[111]We
[112]a
[114]Mi,
[115]va
[118]GOODWIN TESTIMONY NOTEBOOK
[120]bE CONTENTS _
[122]|
[123]'
[125]Summary) on Richard Goodwin by DiGenova.
[127]Memo to Bundy re "Cuba Problem" from Goodwin.
[129]Memo to’ Goodwin re "Possible Covert Activities against
[130]Cuba," from Bissell.
[132]’ Draft of NSC Action No. 2413.
[134]Draft Record of Actions, 483rd NSC meeting (5/5/61)..
[136]Menorandum of Conversation with Dick Bissell, Tracy
[138]Barnes, , by Goodwin.
[140]Memorandum for the President re "CIA Reorganization,"
[141]’ from Schlesinger. ;
[143]Memorandum for Mr. Richard Goodwin re "Cuban Covert
[144]Plan," from Schlesinger.
[146]Memorandum to the President re Cuban Task Force ©
[148]_ Meeting, 8/31, from Goodwin.
[150]Memorandum to the President, "Eyes Only for the
[151]President ,"" re concept of a “command operation'' for
[152]Cuba, from Goodwin.
[154]Memorandum, Eyes Only for the President and the
[155]Attorney General," re "operation should be organized —
[156]with five staff Components," from Goodwin.
[158]Memo , "Eyes Only," re recommendations that the Cuban
[159]Operation be organized. in five components."
[160]Memorandum to Sec. of State, Sec. of Defense, Director
[161]of CIAsi AG, Gen. Taylor, Gen. Lansdale, Richard Goodwin
[162]re"...sunmary of the major decisions which have been
[163]ads ‘in’ regard to the Cuba’ Operations" from Goodwin.
[165]Memoraridum for Record re "Minutes of Meeting of Special
[166]Group | (Augmented) on Operation MONGOOSE, 10 August, 1962.
[168]Memorandum for William Harvey, CIA, Robert Hurwitch,
[169]State, ‘Gen. Benjamin Harris, Defense, Don Wilson, USIA
[171]re "Alternate Course B," from Lansdale.
[173]Memorandum for Deputy Director (Plans) re "Operation
[174]MONGOOSE , " from Harvey.
[176]Summary of Goodwin Interview w. Aaron re "Intelligence
[177]Activities in Latin America.” ;
[179]Table of Contents - 2.
[181]by
[183]i Q. 6/10/75 Szule Testimony before SSC, excerpt.
[185]R. 7/17/75 Sumaty of documents produced by Goodwin on 7136/75,
[186]by meena. ,
[188]S. 5/13/61 _ Memorandum to Goodwin re "CIA Covert Activities in
[190]the Dominican Republic."
[192]T. 5/29/61 Drafts and original of cable from State Dept. to
[193]\ (date of cable) Dearborn.
[195]'
[199]HY 50955 Docld: 324235505 Page 5
[201]July 17, 1975 .
[203]To: F.A.O. Schwarz/Curtis sypothers
[204]. i
[206]From: - Joseph E. DiGenova
[208]Re: Richard Goodwin Materialls and Summary
[210]a
[212]“Summary
[214]A. Goodwin Interview of July 16, 1975
[215]Mr. Goodwin was interviewed for a second time
[216]on,July 16, 1975. He indicated that he chaired the "Cuba
[218]. | .
[219]Task Force" after the Bay of Pigs. Paul Nitze had pre-
[221]viously chaired the group. It was this Cuba Task Force
[222]: |
[223]that suggested the establishment of the Lansdale project.
[225]In this regard, Goodwin noted that Lansdale proved to be-
[227]very efficient. Goodwin indicated that he was present te
[228]i Ae oe ye
[230]during the conversation between President Kennedy and Tad 7
[231]Szulc concerning the question of assassinating Castro. poo
[233](See Szulc's testimony infra.) | He spoke with the President
[235]after that conversation and remembers JFK saying about
[236]. . . { .
[238]assassination: "We can't get into that -- we'll all be
[240]targets." He noted that Bissell never mentioned anything
[242]to him, Goodwin, about assassination attempts. With regard
[244]oe
[246]to the August 10, 1962, meeting, which he attended, Goodwin
[248]Ro.
[252]HWS50955 Docld:32493505 Page 6
[254]\ 1
[256]noted that Mecone | never made any oration - upon the. immorality
[258]-of assassinating Castro. He remembered the August 10 meet~
[260]ing and said that "assassination was not shot down". “When
[261]pressed for details at this point, and after being shown
[262]the Lansdale (8/13/62) and Harvey (8/14/62) memoranda, he
[264]said he wanted to think about the meeting before he made
[266]any more statements about who gaid and did what. He noted, o—
[267]however, that in (1966 while in pers with Robert Kennedy that
[268]Kennedy, in a fleeting retort to a series of questions
[270]i
[272]about U. S. assassination attempts against Castro, said
[273]t .
[275]"Tell him (the interpreter) I saved his (Castro's) life."
[276]co t oem
[277]At the conclusion of the interview he turned over ,
[278]to the Committee various documents related to Cuba which he
[280]had found in his personal papers. Those are appended to_
[282]this summary...
[284]_B. Goodwin Interview of May 27, 1975 , : —
[286]During the course of |this earlier interview, }
[288]Goodwin alluded to the Cuba Task Force. According to the
[290]Committee notes of that interview, the discussion went as
[292]follows:
[293]In general, Goodwin had not heard much
[295]specific talk of assassination, although
[297]it would not have surprised him if it had
[299]gone on. He mentioned one specific in-
[300]stance in which’ he had heard talk of
[302]HW 50955 Docla: 33423505 “Page 7
[304]assassinating Castro. After the Bay of
[305]Pigs, a Cuba Task Force was established,
[306]first chaired by Paul Nitze and then by
[307]Goodwin in his capacity as White House a
[308]Staff Officer. At a.meeting of the Task a
[309]Force, held at the State Department,
[310]McNamara suggested "getting rid of Castro",
[311]someone from the CIA, perhaps Bissell,
[313]then asked if McNamara meant "Executive |
[314]Action". McNamara responded that he did
[315]and stressed his interest in the idea.
[316]However, Goodwin did not bring the topic
[317]up later in the meeting after McNamara
[318]left. (See interview infra.)
[320]Cc. The Goodwin Documents
[322]The documents which Mr. Goodwin has furnished.
[324]the Committee are of no startling significance. One docu-
[326]ment, the May 2, 1961, memorandum from Bissell to Goodwin,
[327]is noteworthy because it does not advise him of the Roselli
[328]. connection or the efforts: to assassinate Castro. Bissell
[330]notes, "I have not attempted to, provide you with much
[332]detail." A May 24, 1961, Memorandum of Conversation with
[334]Bissell by Goodwin does not mention any reference by Bissell
[336]to actions against Castro on the assassination front. An
[338]Arthur Schlesinger memorandum of June 30, 1961, to the
[340]President discusses the need for revamping of the "intelli-
[343]gence set-up" of the United States. In a footnote in that
[345]memorandum, Schlesinger notes that the CIA is not ‘able to
[347]tere ger apie wee ne
[349]control its operatives once they are in the field and of
[351]the attendant dangers this poses. (See page 6 of the memo. )
[355]HW 50955 Docld:32423505 Page 8. 9 | vs ny oa
[357]The other documents ‘indicate the thinking that went on up
[359]to the point where the Lansdale group was established as
[361]the coordinated effort against |Cuba.
[363]Areas of Inquiry for Goodwin
[365]|
[366]-- What, if anything, does Goodwin remember of the August
[367]10, 1962, meeting of the Special Group which he attended?
[369]~- Is this meeting different than the meeting he refers to —
[370]in his initial interview where McNamara broached the sub-
[371]ject of assassinating Castro? Or has he simply confused
[372]them and are they one and the same?
[374]-- How does he explain McCone' $§ recollection of having given
[375]an oration on the immorality of assassinating Castro when :
[376]it was brought up at the August 10 meeting?
[378]-- Was McNamara the person who brought up the subject at
[379]that meeting?
[381]~~ What discussion, if any, followed?
[383]fea Sy ee ee rs eR es ae
[385]HW 50955 DocId:32423505 Page 9 | ss
[387]‘_MEMOR ANDUM
[389]“Fo
[391]Herve are a few scattered thoughts on
[393]Cuba is a threat to the eccurity cd
[395]3 McGeorge Bundy
[396]From: Dick Goodwin
[398]1. As a direct military mence
[400]- be ingfensificd as communist arris sh
[402]ipmcs we COM
[404]SO
[406]increased danger will ko minimal, oe
[408]defonse of any Amevic
[410]an nation which: ag ate
[412]mice
[413]ad
[415]moves 5 by Castre could bg iramedinte
[417]intervene in case of Ga
[419]2, As an e:morter of revolution:
[421]used as a base for exp
[423]oy by our forces, Sirallavly we could
[427]we
[429]Deoft
[430]4/26/61
[432]the "Cube" problem,
[434]the United Sintes in twe basic Way Si.
[436]wee
[438]aon, ¢. yaenace which will
[440]vik. Towover, oven this
[442]fray putes t Smee hl pn me rn tk mL
[445]cod directly, Any militar;
[447]stvo military old to queritla opcvcticns in the Americas.
[449]ort of the commurist
[451]H
[453]There ia no coult that Cuba i is being
[455]fidelista revolution, This ic
[457]done through the actual supply of dundg and technical assistance to insurgent
[459]elements, through wi
[461]spread and rea asonskly eZviective propaganda apparatus
[463]including aA news service aad radio ne
[465]‘example of the allicnce between fidclic
[467]identification wit! a
[469]even here, in the las
[471]eflectivencas. This has come because a of
[473]welfare of the peop
[477]throzts aad throuch Che use: of Guba as an
[479]mo and necessary social reform +~
[481]lo.
[483]This throat is csicnificant == eapeciclly in the Carribean areca, However,
[485]sics months there has becna significant decline ia Cuban
[487]e
[491]a
[493]o growing isolation of communist-«
[495]fie edlista cl ements fvom the Democvatig lott ao Castro's pro-Govict bont has
[497]HW 50955 Docld:32423505 Page 10
[500]. “© .
[502]i ert cars Te
[503]. orn oo
[506]. ont Oey an Pe a pee mame ate CVEent’ 2 -
[507]becomes more apparent; ami ac Castro hac become insreactngy CFF atic in
[508]: Was = en, ent ey rye brainy at 18 egg on em ed Wat yey
[509]7 uis persorcl tehnvior. Pacts S ectens, $2 eaot, thet, the count sists ave
[510]24 ae a * ~— Ma mine sea + nal eee af % “
[511]looking foz anothe?, more stable, hero -- morhaps Cardenas of towleo.
[512]: a wth ‘ ama a ttntne Getieeues of HG tepeaegam guepene ae
[513]3, While this means & ceclining imiucuce o- Hdelisuse over POpLler
[514]~~ pa a « = aes ’ 7 4 Ram ween ye 2 Pa yee meet ot
[515]movernonts; Ht does not necessarily essen the important of Cuban-Saviste *.
[516]War metat mined Ce tant eo, me ntetionecy PAGVaress ra : La
[517]Chinese materict and tecacc- rick to gevoboucnesy mgvernents, Tt ta dine
[518]' ne a. van hy oes Ve mee ee om 1 a ete 2a eat yay eee ’ apna
[519]portant to wemomber that cyon + Castro were Were cob tomereavy We would
[520]. eat fetes evi | cee : my ot Sig te San Tye ero 4 Pann
[521], not have solved tic prowie: Cs comimaniyt imeauence 2h fae f.srt in fact,
[522]le wens we ey ome 2 vm gy te a) TT wa tte Ae he Wage aed 2 Rate . .
[523]most of the gveniest Cnages spota (2.G. XS stheast Drasil, Gosumecs achk-
[524]sete . tae Soraineted te eepeen es due : _ 4
[525]counirys eoraraunist corsingtos oes pat ChGVGLnGNSs ott. } da pot ove elehnss
[526]s 2 an . « 7 Tey fe a Bigs fee nee « Sina ot ee est Snooty
[527]their existence oF strength to Gastro, tut ba deccd 20% independent leadszshipe.
[528]~ alt ore as ate
[529]steckbhy growinge a
[531]This danger has boon
[533]mocts will
[535]y
[537]a$ mee eet ee wae . ne & Pavey Fe Be PO ay de
[538]amiieCOmaer es many WPove 69 tenaats enh GALE oe m
[539]|
[541]Cubs for leadersaige
[544]gegen es
[546]ha ee, . ‘A
[547]6 yor Masses n
[549]support, tic prokwly de
[551]wan peoples tho
[555]oh
[557]om
[558]ad
[560]its impact en the ©
[562]slithes of undezgrouad organi
[564]|
[566]|
[567]|
[569]9 Bocld: 4 0 Page .
[570]55 i 32473505 1i i
[572]‘efficiency of his police
[574]Sthy chCe
[577]covarisbe renescssmacue f the velserablity of his regima -- the cenzee of
[578]'
[579]shining position of the Cutan ccsnomy and
[580]|
[582]ce, the possi-
[587]a nosessment it is.
[591]HW 50955  Docld:32423505 Page i2
[593]SSscre?t
[594]a Be
[596]imposeible to realistically determine wunt alternative courses of action aro
[598]open to wg. toy
[600]2 To mect the military throat i can work out defense agreements
[602]a
[604], 5 Se elas ; ; tat eee
[605]with Ccutwal American nitions aleng the Mags cugaestad with Professor Berle,
[607]|
[609])
[611]arms limitation conference. This conference should dcal with mothods of
[612]ctopping external arms ghipmeuts in the content of the over-all limitations
[616]i
[619]which are desparately needed in Latin America, Wo chould decide, before
[622]this meeting, whothor tue risks in on OAS blochade of arms shipments to Cuba
[624]are outweighed by the dangers Involved in halting and searching international
[626]shipping.
[628]4, Immediately consult with heads of major nations in Latla America
[630]: ae e H td « e rene
[631]to see how far they ave witling to go in! terms of collective action, This chould
[633]|
[634]. . { .
[635]be done via a personal cmissary. Although we should have a reasonably cleaz
[636]|
[638]idoa of what we waut to do, this should ba 2 gonuina consuliation among ailies,
[642]All the muyried proposals for OAS actioa, ectc., depend on tha reaction of other
[644]Latin nations «= a roaction as yot undctermined,
[646]5. Underlying all these proposals ia the fecling that we should not move
[647]|
[649]quichly in direct action against Cuba, Ido not believe that there is any course
[651]of direct action which we can wisely take on the basis of current knowledge and
[653]conditions.
[655]ae)
[657]ty —
[658]Q
[659]ya)
[660]3
[662]y : : : i 8 . , .
[663]3, Wo should approach the government of Chile to call an Inter-Amorican . |
[665]I
[670]Hy (50955 DocId: 32423505
[672]SEGR
[676]bas Ereatre)
[677]ate te had de
[679]ow hw
[680]fitemmnts to stool vest emert fi Gnastiveiem
[681]1, We Ghould provide Carribcan nations with the technical help
[682](es Ge radar to spot incoming planes) and navy p — assictouce to meet the
[683]danvers of arms chipmcnts fcom Cuba uvcgont ¢Lements in thoze notiond,
[685](2 Theve are two or tirce verl Cancer spots (2, rr. Dowtzlean Republic
[686]and init) where we chevld now bo ceveloping duimocratic alternatives to tz
[687]id | bee ee opt - 2 .'
[688]present regime a= orenuiniog reglicement coveramentc, If we do not do ents
[690]then the inev! table changes in ceveran
[691]Regimes. wh oa De smacceatic alternatly
[692]tacans of prec joltating the £212 of ‘weiiio ond Buvalter end nossibly Samone,
[693]in this way we can exert manbinna contecl over the type of replecemiont povern~
[694]ment -- the timing aad iniiative ¢ shor tld be curs.
[695]3, Melp provide countereprop, “insta, asgistance to Latin governments
[696]= e. @&e racio trausraisters. The more ws can work throuch Domisevaticn
[697]liberal forces ia Latia america, rather than thvongh UsLA alone, the more
[698]eii fective will be oar propaganda.
[700]Conetal otuntéerecovamnnist osrations
[702]i,
[703]o stratecy ia ths fe
[709]terns moericas showd hove Owo basic clemens
[710]rae ON SG
[711]. |
[712]I
[713]the organization of a atcong pout icel countereforce, We have
[715]ady inctressent ia the newly orgen
[717]are
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[1461]HW°30955 Docld
[1463]Page i5
[1465]32423505
[1467]. j
[1468]|
[1469]2 May L961
[1470]MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Richard N. Goodwin” ,
[1471]Assistant Special Counsel to the
[1472]President
[1474]SUBJECT: . Possible CovertActivities ayainst Cuba . r
[1475]. . ‘.
[1476]Attached is a brief statement re garding covert operations
[1477]against Cuba. In view of your familiarity with this subject
[1478]and our conversations over the past few days, I have not hee en.
[1479]attempted:to provide you with much detail,
[1480]. !
[1481]|
[1482](oad M. Bissell, ma) :
[1483]Deputy Director i
[1484]| (Plans)
[1485]Attachment: Paper as stated above
[1486]j
[1487]|
[1488]1 He
[1490]moe
[1492]ike “Soot
[1495]A need ee
[1497]f
[1500](2 May 1961
[1502]MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr, Richard N. Goodwin
[1503]Assistant Special Counsel to the
[1505]President
[1507]SUBJECT:
[1509]1
[1511]t
[1513]| :
[1514]Possible Covert Activities against Cuba
[1516]Attached is a brief statement regarding covert operations
[1518]‘against Cuba, In view of your familiarity with this subject
[1520]and our conversations over the past few days, I have not
[1522]attempted to provide you with muc
[1524]_Attachment: Paper as stated abov:
[1526]i
[1529]'
[1530]|
[1531]4
[1533]h detail.
[1535]4
[1537](Repo te keed U Beatl de
[1539]Richard M, Bissell, Jr,
[1540]- Deputy Director
[1541](Blans) ,
[1544]2 Way 1961
[1546]tr my anes “sy
[1549]ee ed
[1551]As indicated by the combined INR /ONE estimate, anti-Castro
[1552]activity within Cuba will probaoly be muted at least for the next
[1553]several months. Most individuals whose loyalty is in any way
[1554]suspect have been arrested, A recent report from the Swiss
[1555]Ambassador indicated that political prisoners now number 100, 000,
[1556]All internal services will continue to work ona theory of repression
[1558]4
[1560]plus undoubtedly swift and brutal penalties. Consequently, it will be
[1562]‘very difficult to.carry on any clandestine operations and itis doubtful
[1565]that such operations can have any significant impact in weakening
[1567]the Castro regime,
[1569]‘In spite of this, evidence is still available that there is opposition
[1571]|
[1573]laree and that such opposition
[1575]ro)
[1577]to the regime among individuals still at
[1579]is prepared to undertake action despite the risks involved. Moreover,
[1581]there are still agents distributed through most of the six provinces
[1583]and communications can still be had either directly or indirectly with
[1585]these individuals, At the very least these agents can and will continue
[1587]to collect information and to transmit it to the Agency, ‘In addition,
[1589]certain of these individuals, plus some additional ones who might be
[1591]infiltrated, could'attempt to carry out some sabotage, Individual
[1592]acts of sabotage are possible with relatively few men and small
[1594]amounts of material, Successive acts of sabotage or extensive
[1596]33493505 Page 18
[1598]'
[1600]Berg!
[1601]ar
[1605]Seta”
[1606]i
[1609]_
[1610]i
[1612]L:
[1616]i
[1619]mca ay
[1621]bale. F qt
[1623]th a.
[1625]|
[1627]sabotage operations are more difficult and inevitably more costly in
[1629]terms of loss of men, Nevertheless, it would be possible, starting
[1631]in the near future, to attempt limited sabotage with a view to determining
[1634]. ; i :
[1635]its feasibility and with the hope that gradually an increased program
[1637]might be developed,
[1639]A capability also exists for types of. maritime operations including
[1642]! i
[1644]infiltration and exfiltration of individuals} landing and caching of arms, '
[1645]under-water sabotage of shipping and sinall raider operations. Under
[1646]. i
[1647]present circumstances it would seem wrong to atteinpt these except on eee
[1648]a very limited scale and,in all likelihood, raider operations should not
[1650]'
[1652]be attempted until more information regarding feasibility has been
[1654]obtained,
[1656]The Agency also has a small air armjincluding some transport b
[1657]aircraft (C-54 and C-46 types) plus attack bomber aircraft (B-26), ras
[1658]Although it is not absolutely certain, there is reason to suppose that [o.:
[1660]. . | Pos
[1661]Cuban crews also are available for operational flights. At the mornent, Looe
[1662]. &
[1663]air operations should be substantially eliminated with the possible ja
[1664]exception of supply flizhts to support opposition elements unable’ to :
[1665]survive without such support. Even withirespect to such operations, Po
[1666]however, it should be remembered that the percentage of successful I a
[1667], Bare se’.
[1669]7 ke
[1671]night drops is extremely limited so that the urgency should be great
[1672]a . , . i .
[1673]4 ;
[1675]to justify the risk, B-26 strikes could, of course, be flown against
[1677]chosen targets (e.g. refineries, power plants, tire plants) and, if
[1679]HUSH par RUCTE ATA RINT. ARMA APS:
[1682]H
[1684]successful, might have the effect of extensive sabotaye, In. view
[1685]t :
[1686]|
[1688]of the risks involved, however, and the poor denialbility of U.S. :
[1689]. . . é
[1690]; i
[1691]support where aircraft are involved, /it is recommended that such
[1693]operations be avoided at least for the present.
[1694]Manolo Ray of the MRP has asserted. an independent MAP
[1696]capability to conduct infiltration, intelligence collection, sabotage
[1698]_ - and defection operations into Cuba, He recognizes a necd for U.S,
[1699]support but is very firm in his. desire to operate as independently
[1700]as possible of any official U.S. connection. His initial request
[1702]t
[1704]is for five boats, some materiel andjsome money, He admits,
[1706]however, that, looking ahead, additional support such as real :
[1707]estate, some help with training and communications will be required,
[1709]He offers to share bis information with the U.S, Government, seek
[1711]U.S, advice and, at least fora period of time, be willing to operate wade
[1712]. : . ! ‘ . ee
[1713]with the Revolutionary Council, The|Council's views are being ~ ee
[1714]mee,
[1715]canvassed and Ray has been asked to| prepare a prospectus giving , f Tale
[1717]in some detail his needs for U.S. support for the immediate future
[1719]and the step-up required over a period of time should his efforts
[1721]prove successful, :
[1723]The Ray proposal should certainly be examined and given support
[1724]within reasonable limits if the relationships proposed both with the |
[1726]Council and with the U.S, are satisfactory.
[1728]re “rik “ot
[1729]rhe NG om
[1731]HW 50955 DocTd:32423505. Page 20.
[1735]o . ing weal
[1737]In addition to the activities described above, propapanda
[1738]activities such as radio broadcasts and publication of magazines
[1739]and newspapers can be continucd independently by the Azency or
[1741]t
[1743]in support of Ray or the Revolutionary Council, Moreover, limited
[1745]‘political action operations are possible, As to both propaganda
[1747]and political action, however, the amount of effort and the type
[1748]of activity undertaken will depend to a large extent on the decisions
[1749]with respect to the operations described above, Consequently,
[1751]these will be noted here as mere possibilities,
[1754]Be
[1756]whe be. value
[1758]Ee
[1760]HY 50945 Docld:32423505 Page 22
[1762]DRAET TOP SECRET
[1764]Y. $. POLICY TOWARD CUBA
[1765](vISG Action Mo. 2413-c; Mane “for usc, sama subject, dated nay 4, 1961)
[1767]Agreed thet the political objective of U. 8. policy te~
[1769]ward Cuba ie to bring about the downfall of the Ceatro
[1771]regize.
[1773]Agreed thet the United States ahould not undertake mil-
[1774]itary intervention in Cuba nov, but should do nothing
[1775]that would foreclosa the possibility of military inter-
[1777]vention in ehe futures 7 a
[1779]Agread that the Cuban aficuation should be kept under
[1780]conatan: review, in the light of the possibility that
[1782]actions by Castro would proupt 6 reconsideration of _ oo x a
[1784]the dectaten aot to intervang.. _ a -
[1786]Agread that the United States should not ispose a naval
[1788]or alr blockade against Cuba at this tine.
[1790]Noted the importance the President » attaches to obtain= coe
[1791]ing timely and adequate intelligence aa to Cuban mili-"
[1792]tary capabilities, especially tha enhancement of such .
[1794]capabilitias by Sino-Soviet Bloc military assistance,
[1796]taking into account the possibility of U. 8. inter«
[1797]vention at a future OY date. |
[1799]DRAFT : TOP SECRET
[1801]&- Hoted the tapextanca the President attaches to publica~
[1802]tion in tha Free World press of tha terroristic actions
[1804]of the Castre ragine.
[1806]18 hy Hp? ” ny pyre tnt ar OL
[1808]a Noted the President's direction that the Taek Forea on
[1809]Cuba mako a datatled study of possible wealmesses and
[1811]. wulearabilities in the elements which exart control in
[1813]Cuba today.
[1815]for tha
[1817]i. Agxseed that no separate Cuban military force should be.
[1818]organized im the United States, bue thet Cuban nationals
[1820]would ba encouraged to enlist in the U. S. armed forces ~
[1822]and trained in-speciel_units-conmmteting-o§-Sparich--
[1823]. speskinguatierais, under a plan to be presented by
[1824]the Secratary of Dafanse in connection with hie review
[1826]of U. S. conventional forces, .
[1828]al © ‘under the {rection of
[1829]scence, wo prepare a
[1830]pordt ions a t to Cuba,”
[1831]ideration of/the PresideAt.
[1834]. - de Agreed that Cuban nationals now in the United States
[1836]fl he,
[1838]. de, 4g As opt
[1840]ey co
[1841]Van tee yaa oy poo
[1843]' “7
[1845]ale on ey
[1847]s ret
[1851]-, :, Other countries wader .t the Battle dct.
[1853]DRAFT TOP SECRET
[1855]wilt ba given refugee statue and assisted, under a.
[1856]program te be developed and directed by the Socretary
[1857]of Health, Education & Walfera, in carrying. on their
[1858]*}"| €oxrmer occupations.
[1860]encouraged te locate in other areas,
[1862]‘Refugees now in Miemi will be
[1864]Cuban nationals
[1866]entering the United States will be given refugee status. |
[1868]o Agreed net te iepose a, complets trade embargo on Cuba
[1869]for the present, but if later actions by Castro resulted
[1870]in @ decision te do so, all trade with Cuba would be. .
[1872]stopped. The Secretary o£ State agreed to send to the
[1874]Progident per an analypis o£ how a U. &. embarge on
[1876]trade with Cuba would affect our trade relations with
[1878]1. Noted that eha President would discuss with Canada the
[1879]position ef Canadian subsidiaries of BU. 8. corporations
[1880]in the event of U. S. impositions im trade enbargoes
[1882]on Cuba,
[1883]. 7 a
[1884]m. Agreed that tha United States should at once initiate
[1885]nagot tation te enlarge the willingness of other Ameri~
[1886]can states to join in bilateral, multilateral and OAS
[1888]. arrengenents te quarantine Castre, ouch ae Q breaking
[1890]|, dtplomatie relations with Cubes (2) controling
[1894]a “hag
[1896]Se
[1898]Be
[1900]Docld: 32423505 Page 25
[1902]' tion
[1904]“! eglexration ef t
[1906]DRA ET _. ROP SECRET
[1908]aubverolvs activictes of Cubsn ageotss q3) preventing |
[1910]tions vith cubes! 3) ereating & Caribbean security
[1912]forces 6) iatlating a naval patrol to prevent Cuben
[1914]inves lon of over, states in the Caribbean; and (7) de-
[1916]punciation of Castre as an agent of international come
[1918]munies by | all nations of this: hemisphere.
[1920]Agreed that the Alitance ‘For Progress should be
[1922]stroagthencd by ‘such measures &s Q rapid inp lementas
[1924]projects; (2) ace
[1926]other Latin Amex>
[1928]of colected gocial davelopuent
[1929]the “top lementab los of
[1930]ican aid; and (3) provision ef additional resources
[1932]for Batin American economic and social development,
[1934]; including consideration 9 of a svppienental eppropetay a a” oe
[1936]_ - tion for development loans.
[1938]Agreed chat tis uU. &. Information Agency would pa
[1940]expand its exiating program ia Latin America rather
[1942]chan initiate electronic warfare egainst the Castro
[1944]regime. eye
[1945]Do ype’ cea ate hE Lod
[1947]Agreed that U. S. military officers, wder genedal
[1949]guidance ro ba prepared by tha Department of State,
[1951]would discuss, the Castro threat. £0 all Letina Anarica.. -
[1953]with Latin. Avorican officers .
[1956]TOP SECRES
[1958]eb te! Agresd that the Secreta ry of State should prepere &
[1960]. Be
[1961]i |
[1962]( repert ou & possible ‘new juridteal basis for effec-
[1964]‘give anti-comauniet action.
[1966]Tun P ICAN RSPUBL HATEL
[1968]| pf Wy 8, POLICY TOR
[1969]on Cubs would prepare prooptly
[1971]Agreed that the cask Force
[1972]cy aad long-range plans for an
[1973]t of crises in Haiti or the ©
[1975]both emergen ti-communist
[1977]noved the President's view that
[1979] Domintean Republics —
[1980]throw of .
[1982]the Uaited states should not initiate the over
[1984]Trujilla ‘before we knew what govarmecnt. would sueceed
[1985]“y action ageing Teajthto should be. on tat - ve
[1987]ot him, and chat
[1989]° muletlacerals, -
[1990]o. ork Sw af ey “ty
[1992]Demy aren
[1994]i Ad ie,
[1995]ye
[1998]. f . fe . ‘4
[2000]F
[2001]fm
[2005]HW ales DocId: 32423505, ‘Page 26 a
[2007]intervention in the oven :
[2009]TOP SECRET
[2011]copy No, 5G} =
[2013]oo
[2015]DRAFT RECORD OF ACTIONS
[2016]483rd NSC Meeting
[2017](5/5/61),
[2019]7
[2020]|
[2021]1. U.S, POLICY TOWARD IRAN
[2022]Agreed that a Task Force should be established under. the Assistant
[2024]Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs to prepare and circulate
[2026]& report on the subject by May 15 for discussion by the Council on
[2028]May 19.
[2029]2. U, S, POLICY TOWARD KOREA CO 7 Cites
[2030]Agreed that a Task Force under the Assistant Secretary of State for greene
[2032]Far Eastern Affairs should be established to prepare and circulate |
[2033]t
[2034]i]
[2036]@ report on the subject by May 15 for discussion by the Council on |
[2038]May 19, _
[2040]3. U.S, POLICY TOWARD CUBA —
[2041](NSC Action No, 2413-c; Memo for Nsc, sama subject, dated May 4, 1961) a
[2042]a. Agreed that U. S. policy toward Cuba should aim at the downfall I
[2043]of Castro, and that since the measures agreed below are not .
[2044]likely to achieve this end, the matter should be ‘reviewed at
[2045]intervals with a view to further action, |
[2046]b. Agreed that the United States should not undertake military in- |
[2047]tervention in Cuba now, but should do nothing that would fore- | ;
[2049]closa the possibility of military intervention in the future.
[2051]a TOP SECRET
[2054]3.
[2056]Ee
[2058]Io.
[2060]DRAFT! TOP SECRET
[2062]Ur-8. POLICY TOWARD CUBA (Continued) .
[2064]Agreed that the United States should not impose a naval blockade
[2065]or attempt an air war against Cuba; it was noted that neither
[2066]course had the support of the Department of Defense or the Joint
[2067]Chiefs of Staff, - .
[2069]Noted the importance the President attaches to obtaining timely
[2070]and adequate intelligence as to Cuban military capabilities, e2-
[2072]pecially the enhancement of such capabilities by Sino-Soviet bioc
[2074]“military assistance, so that U. S. capabilities for possible in-
[2076]tervention may be maintained at an adequate level.
[2078]Noted the importance the President attaches to publication in the
[2080]‘Free World press of the terroristic actions of the Castro regiue,
[2082]and to possible political action to end the current terror,
[2083]Noted the President's direction that the Central Intelligence
[2085]Agency, with other departoents, should make a detailed study of
[2087]_ possible weaknesses and vulnerabilities in the elements which
[2089]exert control in Cuba today,
[2091]Agreed that relations with the Revolutionary Council should be
[2093]improved and made more open, and while it cannot be recognized
[2094]asa government- in-exile, support should be given to it insofar
[2096]as it continues to represent. substantial Cuban sentiment,
[2098]Agreed that no separate Cuban military force should be organized
[2100]in the United States, but that Cuban nationals would be encouraged
[2102]to enlist in the U. S, armed forces under plans to be developed
[2104]by the Secretary of Defense,
[2106]“25 ; TOP SECRET
[2108]en aye
[2111]Tepper
[2112]t
[2115]. » + .
[2118]DRAFT ! TOP SECRET
[2119]i
[2121]3. Us S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA (Continued) |
[2123]i. Agreed that Cuban nationals now holding U, 5. visitors' visas
[2125]will be given refugee status and assisted, under a program to
[2127]be developed and directed by the Secretary of Health, “Education
[2129]and Welfare, in carrying on their former occupations, Refugees
[2130]now in Miami will be encouraged to locate in other areas, Cuban
[2132]nationals entering the United States will be given refugee’ status, -e
[2134]All refugees will be eligible to apply for travel privileges, and
[2136]it was understood that they would also be eligible for citizen-
[2138]ship.
[2140]4. Agreed not to impose an immediate trade.embargo on Cuba, The
[2142]Secretary of State agreed to send to the President an analysis
[2144]of the effects of a U, S. embargo on trade with Cuba in relation
[2145]to the Battle Act. It was agreed that when an embargo is im- |
[2146]I
[2148]posed, it should be as complete as possible, with certain excep=
[2149]tions for Canada and with Réd Cross distribution of drugs,
[2151]k. Agreed that the United States should at once initiate negotiation
[2152]to enlarge the willingness of other American states to join in
[2153]bilateral, multilateral and OAS arrangements against Castro,
[2154]such as (1) breaking diplomatic relations with Cuba; (2) control-
[2155]ling subversive activities of Cuban agents; (3) preventing arms
[2157]r
[2159]shipments to Castro; (4) limiting economic relations with Cuba:
[2161](5) creating a a Caribbean security force; (6) initiating a naval
[2163]patrol to prevent Cuban invasion of other states in the Carib-
[2165]bean; and (7) denunciation of Castro. as an agent of internat ional ee
[2167]communism by all nations of| this hemisphere.
[2169]-3- . TOP SECRET
[2171]Ke ha
[2172]HY 50955. “Doel :
[2174]3. U, S<¢ POLICY TOWARD CUBA (Continued)
[2176]de.
[2178]Be
[2180]‘be continued under the chairmanship of Richard N. Goodwin, Assis-
[2181]I
[2183]DRAFT : ; TOP SECRET
[2185]Agreed that the Alliance For Progress should be strengthened by
[2186]such measures as (1) rapid implementation of selected social de-
[2187]velopment projects; (2) acceleration of the implementation of
[2188]other Latin American aid; and (3) provision of additional re=- -
[2189]sources for Latin American economic and social development, in-
[2190]cluding consideration of a supplemental appropriation for devel-
[2191]opment loans of the order of $200-$400 million,
[2193]Agreed that the U. 8, Informat fon Agency would expand its existe
[2194]ing program in Latin America, but not initiate electronic warfare
[2195]against the Castro regime; means of propaganda should. be made
[2196]available to non-U, S,. groups.
[2198]Agreed that U, S. military officers, under general guidance to
[2200]be prepared by the Department of State, would discuss the Castro
[2202]threat to all Latin America with Latin American officers.
[2204]Agreed that the Secretary of State should prepare a report on a
[2205]. {
[2207]possible new juridical basis for effective anti-communist action,
[2208]Agreed that pending appointment of an Assistant Secretary of
[2210]State for Latin American Affairs, the Task Force on Cuba should
[2212]tant to the Special Counsel ‘to’ the President,
[2214]abe _ TOP SECRET
[2218]HW 50955 _
[2221]TOP SECRET
[2225]: - DRAFT
[2227]4 4, U, Ss POLICY TOWARD THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND HALTI
[2229]Agreed that the Task Force 7) ‘Cuba would prepare promptly both emer-
[2231]gency and Long-range plans for anti- ~communist intervention in the
[2233]i
[2234]A
[2235]i
[2237]“event of crises in Haitl or jhe Dominican Republic, Noted the
[2239]President! s view that the united States should not initiate the
[2243]overthrow of Trujillo before we knew what government would succeed .
[2245]him, and that any action against Trujillo should be multilateral.
[2247]e
[2249]t
[2250]f
[2251]i
[2252]i
[2254]5. U, S. POLICY TOWARD BRITISH GUIANA
[2256]“agreed that the ‘Task Fore | on Guba would consider what can be done
[2258]in cooperation with the British to forestall a communist take-over
[2260]; i
[2261]in ‘that country. :
[2262]H
[2264]6, U. 8. POLICY IN MATNLAND SOUTHEAST ASTA
[2265]a, Noted that efforts mn be made to reassure Sarit and Diem
[2267]that we are not “abandohing Southeast Asia.
[2269]b; Noted-the President! 8 view that sarit could be told that we are
[2271]considering inclusion (of U. “Ss. troops in SEATO forces to be sta~
[2273]i
[2274]tioned in Thailand, | the timing to be dependent on developments
[2276]during or after the fortheoning l4-nation Geneva Conference.
[2278]c, Noted that the Secretaries of State and Defense would be sending
[2280]recommendations to the President promptly on the number of vu. S
[2282]training troops to be stationed in Thailand,
[2284]TOP SECRET
[2286]|
[2287].7 7
[2288]|
[2289]|
[2292]} May 24, 1961
[2294]| sexpert MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH:
[2296]Dick Bissell
[2297]Tracy Barnes
[2299]Mr. Bissell agreed that no major decisions concerning covert activities
[2300], 4n Guba should be made before the President returns from his European
[2302]/ However there are a few things he thought should be done immediately:
[2304]1, That he revise the internal CLA organization in preparation for possible
[2305]covert activities. This means changes bothehere and in Miami. —
[2307]2. That a small group (30 to 40) Cuban pilots be continued as pilote under
[2308]commercial cover {n Central America! and perhaps one or two American
[2309]. companies, No commitment should be made to them that they would be
[2310]used in future activities. They would be trained as individuals and not... _. .....
[2311]"ge any group or "movement." This is primarily to keep their skills | a
[2312]alive and to keep them available. =|
[2314]3. He wishes to clean up the Nicaraguan aituation. We have left a lot of
[2315]Military hardware there as a residue of the Cuban operation. He would
[2316]‘Like to pull this equipment out of there, turning some of the B 26's over
[2317];_ to Somoza and allowing some of the Cuban pilota to remain there to train.
[2318]" Nicaraguans in flying these planes. This would be at Somoza's request
[2319]7 and would only be done if he insisted upon it as a re-payment for services
[2320].' gendered, I streseed that no Americans should be involved in the train~
[2322]ing of Nicaraguan pilots. . | ; aa on.
[2324]4 He would like to train a few Cubans) as radio operators. They would be een
[2325]trained as individuals and would not know each other or that any others
[2326]were belng trained. This amounts to training some individual agents for
[2327]possible future use. No commitments would be made to any of the men
[2328]trained. It is felt that this much activity is necessary in the next few weeks.
[2329]5. ‘In addition, the Agency would like l survey the various potential insur-
[2330]__-vecttonary groups which now exist. There are several of these groups,
[2331]- three or four of which claim to have aa underground in Cuba. We should
[2332]“speak to them, We should tell them we could. make absolutely no commits ss ks
[2333]>| ment_as to any future activities. However, he would like from them an ie:
[2334]_ assesment of what they thought they could do in the future and -- if they
[2335]“were to be active -- what holp they would require from the United States.
[2337]TOP SECRET
[2340].
[2341]TOP SECRET
[2343]ue . : 7 ; | - 2|-
[2345]; |
[2346]_"’' This would enable us to make a jadgment as to whether we should ene.
[2347]... gage in covert activity based partly upon this information -- informa-
[2348]: tion which would tell us what help in specific terms would be required
[2349]and what we could expect from these groups. This has already been
[2350]done in the case of Mirona Ray. The groups contacted would include
[2351]the@Council, the MRP, UNIDAD and MRR.
[2353]6. In addition, he waa informed that Swan radio could not be used by-the
[2354]“"." USLA, They are unable to assimilate it into their system, I suggested |
[2355]owice > that we might try to And a good Latin [American group, e.g., The League
[2356]of Democratic Partics or the Institute lof Political Education run by Jase
[2357]Figures, touse it, I said that for the. Pouncil to operate the station did
[2358]not. seem to me to be desirable.
[2360]vos. J, I discussed the general situation in Miami and the various newspaper
[2361]reports. I pointed out that the RIA agents now in Miami ware known to
[2363]everyone, including the press, and were the same people who were
[2365]-.. identified with pre-invasion activities, Their presence I felt only in-
[2367]tensified the rivalry among Cuban groups and served as a focal point of
[2369]discontent. I requested that this group be broken up and that to the ex-
[2371]tent agents were necessary new peopls «~ people not identified with the
[2373]; pre-invasion activities -- should be sent to Miami.
[2375]. @. It was agreed that no future covert activities should be conducted fn |
[2376]‘ the Miami area and that the groups with whom we dealt should be scattered
[2377]“in other cities throughout the SoutSeastern part of the country. 1 said that
[2378]. working in Miami was like trying to carry on covert activities in the city
[2379]room of a newspaper.
[2381]9. We also agreed that Dr. Miro could be informed that we were making
[2382]a survey of other Cuban groups but that he should be told nothing more.
[2383]specific than that. :
[2384]10. I also referved to the newspaper stories which reported that Batistiancs
[2385]- were belag used supported by U.S. “Cla funds, They said this wae not
[2386]-accarate. They said that this would be very carefully looked into and that
[2387]the most specific instructions would be given that absolutely no Batistianos
[2388]should be supported directly or indirectly by the U.S. government.
[2390]Hy 50955 ‘Dectd: 32423505 Page 33
[2392]i
[2393][;
[2394]wae . : i
[2395]a
[2396]TOP SE ECRET
[2398]A
[2402]11. lam strongly of the opinion that wa must clear up the Miami ; area
[2404]ag soon as possible, Therefore, I will get Ribicoff to expedite the
[2406]Refugee program, probably through the use of Mutual Security funds
[2407]im order to get these people into jobs, Schoole, ete, in ather parts of
[2408]ao the country. Unless we do this we ure /going to have continually in-
[2409]hie creasing problems in the Miami aren,
[2411]¥,
[2414]Richard N. Goodwin
[2416]AAT See HEAT
[2417]WL HGORGS PDoananesiaees
[2419]re
[2420]aye
[2421]perigee
[2424]ty A
[2426]dyuae 3G, PI -,
[2428]hihdbe Sleds epee Bug, THO NAD E NT
[2430]ce a ee or Rega oles 200
[2432]aT ‘.
[2433]i
[2436]fogubosyidt tie fll ods views Re ana whe woyhked In CES dosing tee
[2438]Lay mod meeved 2g a pew iedh n@ CLA conwalsamt in the yeare inet,
[2440]Ly
[2441]i
[2442]i
[2445]Ie prokaby baen vexy yoo, In the
[2447]joma, the irbneopha of aa bitelligaacs
[2448]ageMey are uoknarp?; all € the puldic heave about (er ahoeld boas
[2449]shevtt are a crvera, But, apals in the neater of the cas, aa
[2451]| . ggavey dadicahre bw » atandeats ane aetivity cao aitowd éasnned fee
[2453]top bmhedca, CDSs xecaerd |
[2455]we
[2457]panne fees
[2459]awe Gl ciaadessting Sve a
[2461]witilde agree, Sosa dns ypertad thing te recagalss tesay, in ray |
[2462]jedgagat, da thet ths wt, | [ae at pracant gure ant mor etttuted. SM
[2463]nheewt owad up ite gues, itn margin for future eraoy ie sractiondty
[2464]mesuienent, tnd mere OFA dobacte will ohake tatu gancianenuiy :
[2465]ip OU poiley, af bien ae ne ae abroad, Aud, until CIA je vialoly
[2466]rsergusianad, U will (aa ba hae Algoringa lostancap bo widely blamed for
[2467]fovalaoeantea af whidk ib ie) whedhy pbibatetot. Bice
[2468]i ;
[2469]the sygunant of thia werasgenadumr in that CLAle qvenbla can he cracad
[2470]ty the aufonausy with whieh thes ageeay hae bem parmittad ta opseetes
[2471]aud that tate augauamuyp ba fre to farce main caysuns Fh} ae treticns rhe:
[2472]“icogeine of clandeattes eAerayc ouayp (8) oe Laasleuunts soerartden ce! -
[2473]the xaletlonbip hotweas eppaat Sou ata policg; (3) a0 lnedacarate”
[2475]Oey shoud we ~= B Bewas ie weperied GLA Catlins hw bia Loe
[2476]grcanicnst seating en to caged te tiow hencpicelae ad Oevaratls
[2478] publiahty, tha Crewe VnAis Guel tenatan cgarvadds cal sete abreast:
[2479]muliliied by the Moon af oe era ageedusdieny ob whian Epil cn
[2480]than le. ge, the vetlel} bal Rkegeodl anh (ipctee Soekes Ge “TI ue
[2481]téyater leas Leibogm af cua,
[2483]13, 1284). .
[2485]i
[2486]e
[2487]i
[2488]y
[2489]H
[2490]Y
[2491]i
[2492]i
[2493]i
[2496]eed eanneedekadatotbenchuten aecaatemaiamel abbded sae tenietehhahitanaend Fae Ae eat ee ea
[2498]agit tiki Leaaran bees
[2500]ee Ponwdertnae Dig wan seaweeds,
[2502]i
[2505]|
[2508]va - oo . Se CREEL
[2510]g,
[2512]i
[2513]HW
[2514]i
[2516]cuncepilan of the relaittonrhin, between cperstiens amd imelligence.
[2517]Tha memoerantam aise cuRESate waye in which some ef thapa prab-
[2518]lems can pexbeps be stevia.
[2519]|
[2520]k. CIA CIA Autonomy it
[2522]GLA condncta three nosin for ena of ageret works clantestins intelli-
[2523]gence enllaction;. covert political cperatinags; aod paramilitary
[2525]-gativities, It carsicg, on thege fuacticns with relative autonorny. | .
[2526]the ressens far tha Rutonen.y are nisterical. :
[2528]When OLA began, the State Lbpertineut, etaid thinking too miuch is
[2529]torma of ite traditionnt missions in foreign afalea, lowked on this
[2530]new venture with suspicios abd renunpunced the opportunity to aeize
[2531]firm control of CIA operations, It did net, for example, try to
[2532]esteblilah any afinctive systedn of clearance for CIA activities; and
[2533]gorae ambacsaders frankly pretexsed not to know what CIA waa upto
[2534]in theie countries. After 1953. the fact that the Secretary of Stata and
[2535]the Divector of Cevtral Intalligence were brothers further confirmed
[2536]CiA's indspeadones froan supery Saion by State Department éeeke.
[2538], In the menntima, CIA grew th sigs and power, Lnying ths fiftion is
[2539]begaa in seme arose to eutstrip the State Department in tha quality of
[2540]ite porgencal, Partly because CLA peid higher salaries and even —
[2541]more parhaps because Allen: Dallen gave hin paogle courageous pro-
[2542]tection against McCasthylis | attacks, CIA wee able te attract and hold |
[2544]' 9 large number of able and Ludepondent--minded mon, Tke mers it
[2545]_ eédied brilliant activists ta is octal, the mere momentum ite operations
[2546]develeped, anc the greater vale it played in the iniifetion of policy.
[2548]By the time that ftnve had begun to be fully aware of the probleme
[2549] gvested by as active end autemon:ous CiA, tt bad leng since missed
[2551]the chance ta establitt ita orm ultimmte authority. While Sinte ra.
[2553]tained a neminal suparvisiealover covert political epsrations, this was.
[2555]to come degren offant by CLASa temdency bo pregent @ proposed operation
[2557]almest as a int pccemolt RAs State never hed title to certral overt
[2559]clendestine intelligosse elections and it bed low aronnd ta such
[2561]ares as over’ pulltiez] reper ting ail oven in the rofimtonence el
[2563]evar ‘iplomatic contacts. ‘ t
[2566]i
[2567]|
[2569]i
[2574]For ita part, CEA had developed & whale enrigs af functions paral
[2576]' Ieling already oxieting funeticna of the State Departmen, aad of
[2577]the Defease Departarvmt as. well, Taday it bag its oon palitices
[2578]assks and military staffs; if has tn effect ite own fereiga gorvice;
[2579]it hag (or boa had) ite own combat forces; it even hae ite own alr
[2580]force, Ka arnval budget is akhovi  tlinee that af the State Degare-
[2581]man. The contemporary, CIA possssace mony of the characteristics -
[2582]ef & state within a Bia.
[2584]; i
[2585]4
[2586]th Bleectrina y
[2587]Taough CLS's eutenomy developed tor historical reaaanas, it has ten:
[2588]abla to endure becsusa there ia ne cectrins governing aur conduct ut
[2589]clandeating operations, Tha problem cf doctrine for CIA ta the aucent
[2591]to which ite varicus slandeating misetous are corepatikie with a free
[2592]and open gaciety. ,
[2596]Rin idte te argue that te¢ause the Carnmuniste can do guch-and-much,
[2597]we are {roe to da it feo, Communisra is a creed surtared in cone
[2598]epirsey! and the whole potne ef Cofnrauniet eociel and political er gani-
[2599]zation le to make conepiracy effective. Mf 'ighting ire with fire’ meana
[2600]contracting the freedoms troditionally enjayed by Amertcasa in ordar
[2601]to giva more freadom to CLA, no one saricusly wisnas te do that, Yat
[2602]Ido nat {eal that we heave tried rigorously to think through the liraila
[2603]which the maintenance of an open society places on ascret activity.
[2604]Ural thlg ia done, CIA's role will net be clearly ésfined ard under -
[2605]eteed, The prebdlem which must be faced ia: what cort of aceret
[2606]activity ia consistent with the preservation ef 4 free gecial order?
[2608]Wo rmuat begin, I believe, ly accepting the feet tint the Unitad Gratas
[2609]will continue to be @ netion In which polleictass vill ack questions end
[2610]roake epeechss, rénoariera will dig aw sterics, newsnspere will put.
[2611]lish editoviala, individuals, eriven by promptings ct conacience, will
[2612]blurt ont things harroful tothe state, and ea om We do not wish to
[2613]change theses things and could nat do ao elttyus victeting the eggenca
[2614]ef cur secioty, Thesr thinga make up the framework in which CLA
[2615]mugs operate, ia ghert, they constitute the problem: aod, ag
[2616]Cenaral Marghall used to aay, "There's ne point in fighting the
[2619]ean aus on
[2625]2 REN PY I
[2626]39495505 Page: 37
[2629]4.
[2631]peatetesae. tt , pormtani tle sae ae. ao they @ ton net t ceerupt the tha
[2632]ad practicas of ef « wv secie Ye 84 ond nd EDst Ebs¢ they 65299 to ha
[2634]principloas Row
[2635]pernlacthla when thar eaenet, ia it fo GaTYUDs nore priaciplas aud
[2636]neverna sorcaramerncinege-tenceennts werespncarreameanat es spemscoat an won al
[2638]wile wears
[2639]bv oneee vs menage rata oe manag
[2640]|
[2642]practices.
[2644]nach form of seerst activity ibresents ite own problarm, Clandautlue
[2645]iealligence cellection bag been a traditionnl function af the natlonal
[2646]einte. Ite rules and usayse are falrly woll established, In the
[2647]main, aeplonege, cacsueted with discrotien, should present no e
[2648]‘genat problem. Hewever, whan conducted with aa egen checkbook
[2649]aad a broad orandste, even espionage can bagin te paab againet tha
[2650]lirnite of eecrat activity in un.open society, Urensider later, for
[2651]eanmoplea, the quiseilen ed the Contre! lad Amorican Source (CAS) and -
[2652]whetner the overdaing of CAS 13 not beginning to harm other activitica
[2653]ef tho govaynment, . -
[2654]Cevert political operations praesn?t a trickler prethlam. QCscagiens
[2655]ariss when it is neceseery to.eubsidles newspipers, politicians asd
[2656]oveznisations in ether counts les. But corruption of thea political Hla
[2657]of another mation ia not a responaibility to be Matty gesamed, |
[2658]wonder whether CIA hea ent done teo much of thin for the joy of is.
[2659]Paramililary activitiaa arcate on oven more cificult preblem, if
[2660]enly bscauso the problems ef canceslinont area so moth more Gificult.
[2662]In general, Lopeld euggsct that any secret oparation whess wucces2 is
[2663]dependent on the eupgreasion. of nsws, on lying te Cangresemen end
[2664]journalists and o2 the Cecaption of tha electorate cheuld ho undertaken
[2665]only when the orlate is se conniiavable that the galing really sean to
[2666]cutwaigh tha diszdvantagee. | Thie suggsete thet ths eine af the pre-
[2667]posed eroratinn may be ef crusind aperteance. Sarath emraticnag can
[2668]be dove with a minimum ef accompanying coreugtion, The groster
[2669]the vieibility ef the cneraztion, the more ite euecase depends co
[2670]thwarting the impolece and denying the valuez of aa opza aecioty,
[2671]the risking lt beceres, atk the rove urgonk it ig that an everwheluiing
[2672]cnae bs mada for Ka merasity.
[2674]|
[2675]tn short, when confeonted with aprepessd operation, wa mast mol only
[2676]ank whether tha oparation le technically fensibia in ita awn tazime; we
[2677]must agk whether Me quecuas recuivas our apes egciesy te bs In any
[2678]gavigue way falso $e ite avn principles.
[2680]Hy 50955 — ‘Docld: 32423405 Page 36 ’ 4
[2682]| 5.
[2683]|
[2684]a
[2686]1 cpevations aad Sylicy
[2687]1, Speuatiens an RNSy
[2689]away 22 Hye
[2691]Clandestine sctivitier abcd ba agnzsaed net eniy ia the context
[2693]of theily veletionahl; ty an open secluty st shee in tixg cgmext of thalz
[2695]ralaticnsbip ta United ELReS feroign policy. ,
[2698]Cis wpervations have nm teen bate eliectively evkerdinata to U. g.
[2700]feveign polley. | i .
[2702]“A, Glandesting treeligencs collection 9+ °F chavter, tree frou
[2703]Seate Legaxtsiene ctowtcol, this fact anports American foreign policy
[2704]we aomoltiteds of mmcGeraysinente when CLA ta dleesverad recruiting
[2705]BEER OF develgcisy eourees tn @ fyinelly countrys The veces?
[2706]Sngaosee LHSLe hon CLA, without notice fo the: Cengul Genored,
[2708]tried ta gsulvest & pinmber of tha Ipacial Branch ef the Jingapore
[2709]Felice provides as tnetyuctive eutmopld. After complications cf -
[2710]adicraus conplositys inelnding an attempt to gubject the recruit to
[2712]2 lewdetector tent, tt tarned out that the rocruit kd long since
[2714]infer med hie superistd od tha CIA approach acd wee leading CLA
[2716]imo atrep which, whis Springs produced eenaiiexakie embartass-
[2717]mex? to relations between the US and the fingagpere gavernoment. - ,
[2718]There hays been trowkice of a cemparabie rert in Pakictaa and in
[2719]Jagan (where a group of Chineso Nationale werd erniggled iato Sasebe
[2720]to work in a CLAWNDA apesation).
[2722]CA bas easad that, in gach ensas, neither the Earckoosy ner the Dapari
[2723]ment ia Washington is narmally isformed of this type cA aneration.
[2725]th abort, no sae knows how many potential problams fer US ferciga
[2726]palley e~ end hew much potential frictlen with islendiy states << are
[2727]being created 6t this moment by CLA elendestine intelligence eperails.
[2728]Surely thera ig on argument fox pevmibsting Sinte tS éyeide whesher th
[2729]ndvantage to be goings by tha apsration {3. Ge the information desiva:
[2730]fyvam en agent withly the Special Branch of the Slagapore Poliez) ont~
[2731]weighs the riek (6.8. axseperating tho lecnl goveramert ered shaking
[2732]ite confidence both in our purpUese aud in cor 6eDR5T) Clendeatine
[2733]injohlignnes oparstions pheulé plainly be clagzod roth with the Nagert
[2734]mort of Siate and (enve for encentiocal inetances ad su ARTE6Ment o
[2735]the Beoretary of State) with gha Local U.S. Aimbacsedore
[2737]5
[2738]is
[2739]hl
[2740]H
[2741]4
[2743]ag.
[2745]4
[2747]a
[2750]&.
[2752]- 2. Covert politiens cpsrnitgas toshniesily geqaire State
[2753]Department clearance. In praciice, however, CEA haa often bean
[2754]able to seiga the Initiative in ways which erduce State's role almost
[2755]to that cf a rubber stan,
[2757]This hag bore pavtly tha eonos quence cf the supesisr drive asd
[2758]activiam of CIA personnel, sapacially a9 compared with (he diffidence
[2760]. of State Department pereoncel, For cnample, whan men coms to CLA
[2762]_ with the angignment of develaping covert political campaigaa or
[2764]organizing cenpa or prepezing for paramilitary warlsre, theee men
[2765]naturally fall to work with ingenuity and seal; they probably feel thar =”
[2766]they are noi cerning theiz pay unlese, cay, they organias aa many
[2767]cougs 08 poautble, || Bae concept of ‘contingency pleaning’ has
[2768]Jegitimatized tao coucrate praparation ef cperations oti) preaumally
[2769]tae hypeshetical arog £03 people did net at {iret notice thas ‘eantingsacy
[2770]planning, ' whan cagriad to the etage of recruitment and traloing of
[2771]porscnaes, crates & youted interest which cften tranclorms contin~
[2772]geacies inte apparent escoasitics, Thus, if @ grcep ia assembled
[2773]and revved up ono continganty basis, thea the failuve to caryy the
[2774]project through (it to argued) will invite the disapzoingment end
[2775]alienation of the greupi Ge the preosure lnercaces to fallow through
[2776]ea what had etoyted 29 3 pore eseculation. Thies wae a canteen factor,
[2777]of eqarse, in the Cuban daticion -« ths fact that distamiment of the
[2778]Cuban force in Guetemota fuct ocamed te cronte ten many problems and
[2779]arobaryesemante, Having csterad inte relaticns with perenmalities in
[2780]foreign lamde, CLA koe pometiines esomed te fen that we must thera--
[2781]after de pretty much what they wen -- or ding they will biew security
[2782]OF even go over to the Communists, Thies eppreach baa mode us on
[2783]etcaaion ths prisonszs of cana own agents.
[2785]2We heecine prisoners of cal ggenta in anetier senge tea, Tho Cubsn
[2786]spleade loayee the strong impression that CLA te mot able te ceatrol las
[2787]own lew-lerel sporativas. While the CLA pengie in Washinzien ara mon
[2788]ef exzeptionaliy high quality, tho mon attracted to field Jobs are somee
[2789]timas tough asd even viclocs progle motivated by évives of thet oun
[2791]and net necesenzily in pelitics! o¢ cran moral eympathy with the nurpoaes
[2792]ef the eparotion. Such actions as locking up tha Revolutienasy Counail,
[2793]such enterprises ss Operation 40 in Miand whera CIA egents eopertadly
[2794]trained Cubons in methode of tortura, ouch erisedts a3 the datentien and
[2795]third degrees repertadly administered to Dr. Aodalfa Nodal Tarsda aod
[2797]16 ether democratic Crbane thie Fereusry -- all (hice scegeat that things
[2798]go am under CLA epenparenip: mith which CLA in Ww AON ston $a only Ciroby
[2799]acquataied, ;
[2801]|
[2803]+f) Cys
[2805]"page xo.
[2807]FSherty
[2809]1
[2811]i has meant too thatthe Gtata Depertment, aftes apprised of an
[2813]optratien only in ite leter stagon, is umier great preacure te —_
[2814]endorse the cporation as eleready mounted besaues of the alleged
[2816]evil congseyuonces of onarclelug 2 vete, Lwell remember Tom
[2818]Mann's remark the day the decision was m2de to go ahesd on Cuba:
[2820]"l would never have favered inltinting this cperatlon: bet, aince te
[2822]aa gone aa far as it has, Ido not think we can elek ceiling it off.
[2824]Moreover, mi & tisas when there io increasing pramium on activist,
[2826]Eiate, when it quaations CIA cparationa or Initiztives, caste Koslf tn
[2828]aprinay, sisey, sogative rele. _ The advecate of clandestine activiiies .
[2830]gterma ough’ and coalietic! the eppeanst hee te invoke euch istengiblea
[2832]G3 the vepuictien of the United Statea, world publis epinfion, "What
[2834]do we say in th, Uniteal Nations ?T", ote., arnt eorine hopelessly
[2836]ideallatic, legalistia end ‘act *
[2838]The reouig of ClA'a initiative in covert polities] encrations has boon
[2840]t craste aitusticns which have forced pelicy on the State Departront.
[2842]This waa oot the ortginnl idee behind CIA, Aa Allen Dullss wrese |
[2844]in hie 1947 memorandum to the Sonata Armed Serviees Coammilice,
[2845]"Tha Central [atelilgenca Agency shewd hava rothing to de with palley. "
[2846]_ Yont, in tha ycare elnce, CLA has, in effoct, ‘nade’ pelicy in many
[2847]parte uf the world, A numbar of gowarnments etill in power kvow
[2849]that thoy have even been targnta of CLA attemrta m8 overthray «+ nf
[2851]& State of rind celeulated to etimulate friendly feallngs toward the
[2853]United Statea, nd maaln, cf courea, isa prime owarmple, —
[2855]Thia experience auggests that the preasat syetawn by which CIA retifies
[2856]Etate of a projected covert operation {9 inscaqrats to pretect US
[2858]tntereate, Thar mugt he some means by which ete can he infozmod
[2859]ef euch cocrations a¢ an early enough etaga te aifeet the conception
[2860]and prellminary planning ¢€ the eperntingn, Ctharwise CLA will con-
[2861]tinve to confrom Meta with Propovitiona having pstential limpet on
[2862]foreign policy but 6s tos lage | & point to subject thet anges? te reascn~
[2863]aNe gontrci. i
[2865]3% Ths e Contralles Av mestean Soures 3 (CAL) vopreesngts a particuing
[2866]agpect. of CIA's aneraachmosn on policy ermaking fanstiesa. CIA taday
[2867]bag nearly ag many peaple under ficial carvas erarvege ao ‘Stxte <»
[2868]39900 to B7OG. About £500 of these are undo Etat Department cover
[2870]Be |
[2873]af 7
[2876]8 e
[2877]|
[2879](eha other 2209 are preanemntly ander militazy < or other neneZtats
[2880]ofllcim cover), Cripinally the uge cf Siete Lepartenart cover for ~
[2881]CIA personnal was suppuotd to be etrictly limited and temporary.
[2882]Tha Wablen-Carrer-Jeckoon repoct etated tn 1943, “The CIA seovuld
[2884]eat use Biete Departrent cover #9 4 oimple anawer te all ite problenis,
[2885]put ghauld procetd to daveley ie own ovtaida cuver and evertusily in
[2886]this way end through Ineveased efficiency of ite overceas perscanrl,
[2887]find o way tu temper its decsands ypen the Siais Dopartmerst. " Mange
[2888]theless CLA haa menclly tneveaaed ita requiaittans for afficial cover.
[2891]There agen g¢veral rcagena why CLA haa abandoned its original tatentinc.
[2892]of develesing sytters cf private caver. i la easier to arrange cores
[2893]oecurh Siete; itis less acpensive; it ia quicker; if fecilltates tc.
[2894]sueurity of apecatinna aa well na of corarnunteationa; it insurae &
[2895]pleasanter iife fos the CJA pouple, but the affect is ta further the
[2896]GLA aencroathmant on the treditional functions ad State.
[2898]In ser;ne missioas, I landesstéind, CAS pereunnel cutaumbers regular
[2899]S1Bte Department personnel, [a the American Embagsy in Vienna,
[2901]out of 20 persons ilyted in tha Octobar 1940 Feretgn Bervice Liat es.
[2902]being {on tha Politiess Section, 16 are CAS paraonasl) ef the 3) officers .
[2903]listed oe engaging {a raporting activities, evey half are CAS, i tha
[2904]13 efficere listed in the Political Saction in cur Embaasy in Chile,
[2905]liara CA6. Gn tha dey of Preaident Kennedy's Inauguration 4? porcant
[2907]ef the political clficors aarving in United States Embaesios ware CAG
[2909]Samatimes the CIA iclscion shicf has been ta tha country longer, bag
[2910]nope enoeoy at his disposal, wields mere inflogres land ie abler) thas
[2911]tha Ambeseador., CUlten bo has direct eccess te the local Prime
[2912]Minister. Somatiniss fas during a eritical period ta Leon) be purausa
[2913]a differeat polley frora that ef the Ambassetor. Aloe be la goneraily
[2914]wall known lecally ao the CHA roprenerintivas
[2916]In the Paris Lmenasy today, | ‘there ars 128 CLA poeple. CLA in Parise
[2918]hae long gince bagun te mova isto avenn cf political gaporting morsvally
[2919]accupied by State. |The CLA mon daing overt lateral politienl reperting —
[2921]outnumber thege in the Embkasoy's political secthoa by 16-2. CLA kas
[2922]even sought to monspeliza contact with certain French pelldical parsenalt-
[2923]tle, amang ther tha Pronident of tha Natiocal Agacrably. CIA cceupica |
[2925]the top Door of the Paria Lenhassy, @ feat wall icnown locally; | awl ca
[2928]3.
[2929]“the might of the Goaerola! vevelt ia Algeria, possezo=by noted
[2930]‘with amugemsang that tha top flear was ablane with Mette. (Lam
[2932]infosmed that Ambagender Gavin waa oble to evters extrance that
[2933]night te the CIA offices only wrath csffieulty.)
[2935]CLA ig apparently nov firmly crmindgted to tha CAS approach an a
[2936]pormanend sabztion fer ite problems. BS le presaing ta have CLA
[2938]rsaphs given the rank of Ceunaeeler, Belers Stata lesoe contred of
[2940]rose Bat more of its pragumed overeess poreonne)l, amd boferce CAS
[2941]heegnws parrangotly integvoted lwie the Farsigs ervice, if would oa
[2942]gaan Limpertans (a) so Resure evary ambssradoe the fiom contre)
[2944]aver the lennl CAS astetlioa naminglly promiged ia the NOC Directive
[2946]cf dannexy 19,1963, amd (L) ite review ths currem CAS algustion with
[2948]ap oye toa steady rocuction ef CAS persensal,
[2950]4, Faramilitary warfare, gather, ta regarded tn soma quarters
[2951]aaa purely rezhaient meters, oauily detechalie frem policy and there.
[2952]fora & proper (unction of the Department of Defense, Yot there ia
[2953]almest no CIA function raged peculiarly dependant on the political
[2954]context then pavamilliery warlore.
[2956]These ave several ranaonn fee this. Fer ona thing, a pavamiiitacy
[2957]opeyatinn ie la ita otters 3 large end eitzinviaile epereticn and thareby,
[2958]ao suggested above, clavhes with the preaupreritions ef eur cpen |
[2959]soclety. (These ceariderctigss nead not agply, hewoves, to th
[2961]training of, say, the auth Virtonrnece in guorrille tactios er ts the
[2962]eugpert of alrnedy ealeting querrils activities,} Yer sucther, Ui
[2963]moral and polittend Fe oe af Clrest raremniiitery fstlure is acute for
[2964]va, Communists, whon they stimulate poramiitary activity, avo
[2965]daing what the world oxeects|frem them: when we de it, we appaar
[2966]to betray ous ewn proisesed | principles and tharefars canncé alinzd te
[2967]éompoand delinquency by detaat ', Mereover, ee tae reqent Alanriae
[2968]apleeda chewed, onte wo eonvines the werl4d that we axe ceonssiticd to a
[2969]paramilitary endenyer, we will bo blamed foe 231 ecria ef things. And,
[2970]na the recent tractera-far ~prlecusra egissde ehiwsl, chen wa do sand
[2971]moan te poasihie death, wa eanect lightly write them eff aad claze the
[2972]bookha, Thea Cernrevintste, on the other han, have ne sormmlaa akoat
[2973]Ueaaids Bing @ lealng phan
[2975]|
[2977]|
[2979]i
[2980]|
[2983]SLOREL 19,
[2985]Niereaver, fuarsillea wowiare As fought, much more than military
[2986]mtn orticarily realise, fa ex! lPesiogtcal centext, Ths gnarrliia
[2987]suceacde when hie pregsam onliets graterests npperts and & is
[2988]very Gifierlt indeed to bert him when the countrpaise is with bln.
[2989]Yoa Mook told Genazal MaretioN in 1946.act to wersy ebost the
[2990]querrilian in Indoneving “sro are sending $C, 00 men ont there
[2991]and wilh clean the efteation up in the three montha,"” Meggbsll,
[2992]eng bad had axpartesce fighting guo7ritias in the Philipgisaa,
[2994]yeplied, “Tt won't be eo ensy. You will find thet thay will bleed
[2996]you to death." Cppzus and Algeria Wlustrate the éiiReulty. of ever~
[2997]coming guerrills racistanca through sheer wolghs ef military force. °
[3000]the end of the Second Worlké ¥, ars in Grases, baraves Tite's defecticn
[3001]closed tha northern tos ate} In the Philipgines; mad in Malaya. In.
[3003]tha last two cas6e the guere dla rosietance exded kocause of far
[3005]combination. cf peliitent es gyi mlligary Conatermereuzes. | The Gtruggle
[3007]‘in AMaleya, ae Fheid NMozghal Tompler underet toon feed seid), waa for
[3009]the minds and hearts ef the peoples it therefera iovelved net ealy
[3011]paramilltary operatians bul @ vast educational program, exgaalsation
[3012]ef trade caatons, politics! reform sod an offar ef national indepanence,
[3013]if the guerrillas powsy lieg in hie revolutiocary pregrem, tie answer
[3014]lies in past in meating the neove which anahle the gusrrilte te rowse
[3015]the esuutrycide, my fthie vt a political goal, ' wrete Mao Tea-tung,
[3016]“guorrilla werlare nest faith, an it musi Uf ite politien] ebjectives co
[3017]not evincida with the. nopirsticas ef ths propio ami (f their apmpathy,
[3018]ceaperation asvi aasistusce cannot be gained,” lle aided, “Po wa
[3019]want the support of tha mannes? M wa do, wa aval go ameng to _
[3020]289003 arques them ta activity; ecncern oureeives with thois wead
[3021]aed woe." |
[3022]For thoes reasons, porecntitery variance canoe be ecasthersd ag
[3023]primarily a milltary WOERIAS RB to prbuarty & polltder’ wanpen end -
[3025]“snus therefore be aub§ ected ta alove and earciul petities! creratg he
[3027]B& prebably shauwd be retained ina recenetitutag CU rather thna
[3029]‘ ewansflarred to Dafenza. |
[3031]i
[3032]1
[3034]55 Docid: 32423505 . Page 44
[3036]ik. “
[3038] §. Haw to _Estattioh ‘ich Felicy Cantrel? Hora l wonder whether the
[3039]Pritioh experignes “rilght not not ba of vals. The noteble foxture of the -
[3040]British intelligences system in the determiration to keep clandestine
[3041]ectivity under otrist Foreign Cifles econtrcl, This contrel lo achicved '
[3042]fga number of ways! -
[3044]&) Secrat hittiNgence fervice (Mi-6) itself operates under
[3045]the direction of the Joini Intelligence Cemmitios, which has a
[3046]Foreign Office chairman (until recently Sir Pitrich Dean, who |
[3047]is now tha Britich representative et the UX) asd which includes ’
[3048]the Service Intelligence diractera end representatives of the a
[3049]Colonial Offics aod the Commonwaalth Relations Office as well
[3050]as the Chief of 54,
[3052]&) bnale political warfare directives are originated, act
[3053]by 355, bet by the ivermation Research Department ina the
[3054]Foreign Offics, aften in consultation with an imerdepertmental
[3055]Working Group on Esternsticanl Commnmist Fronts, aod omiar
[3056]the ultimate centrol of the Superintending Undar-fleeretary of
[3057]the Permanont Undey-Secretasy' 8 Deparimert tn the Foreign
[3058]ss . Cékiee.
[3060]¢) SIS covert pslitical action campalqaa moat net only tan
[3061]form to Foreign Cifics dizostives but mat ba cleared with the
[3062]eppropzstate Fereim Office gvogrenbkical Geakus
[3064]to, Se &) working grougs under IAD cheismanship gerera ogerae
[3065]tiene la epecial arcas, such en, fer exasenp hte GSino-Seviat vola-
[3066]thans or the Waxid Youth Fentival,
[3068]e) a Pereign Offices Stal Lisieen Officer eite nam te the 613
[3069]Chief, and Feraign Oniea i cificiate eorve tanre af deity in SB
[3070]aecticna,
[3072]ALD theas devices might ba s¢apisd for use by the Siete Dopartnaret,
[3073]Organizationally, thie would meta ibaa the intalligenes sgontdy weald
[3074]setain oporetionnl aumarcayy bus that its operntions wentd bo at th
[3075]paints eubject te Mate Doyartos ut clearante «> © elsatences ta be
[3077]Tepe et Pp Pe NR
[3078]BW 50955 DocId:32423505 Page 45
[3080]enforced by directives, by Suara Department chairmanship of -
[3081]working groans, and by the infiltration of State Derarimant
[3083]porsonnel ints the intelligance ageacy.
[3084]Otrvlousily thie osteus would act succeed, hawover. walsea the
[3085]soate Dapartroent Maslf ware prepared) te overcome its lebrod
[3087]hablies of dination, neguttviem aod delay anf to taxa a firm and
[3088]porpoesiul Bip © onthe situztion,
[3090]Iv. Gcorntions and teteitigones
[3092]Tha gelationship where egasttigne and intelligence raises particu.
[3094] lagly perplexing quectionn, ‘Intelligence! includes two separable
[3096]activities: clancedtion cellactios; and sescerch, aealysie andi
[3097]orzivstion, Tha Uvet decle with that amzll portion ef row ixtelll-
[3098]genes procured by aceret meang (Mr. Dulles estmated in 1947 thet
[3099]"a aroper snalygio cf tho inteliigance obtainahie by. . . avert,
[3100]nermal, and sbovebornd meane wenld sugply us with ever 06 percent,
[3101]i ehould oatimaio, of the taformation required for the guidance of our
[3102]antional policy"}; 2 secand involves the colleen and intirpretation
[3104]_ of ali forme of intelligeaca, however obtained and the production of.
[3106]agiimated.
[3108]Under the Britich syutem, elandestine collection ie entrusted to tho
[3109]Sserat Intelligence Gcervicoe, The resserah, ensiyets and estimating |
[3110]function te located in the Foreign Office Research Department.
[3112]Under the American eystom, CiA hee roaponsthility for both
[3113]clesstecting collection acd wesaaych and acalpnine Tho Stata Depart-
[3115]- mert’s Buresu of Inteli{ganea amd Reezarch oles hag rescares usd
[3117]analysis raeponsibilitiess Bae, im practice, GiA has eciabiiched
[3118]contrel over the machiaevy fer pradacieg natieoa’ eatimetes in auch
[3119]& wy as to reduco State's contribution ta aubmitting ite views to CLA
[3121]for acceptance or rejection in cthar words, where in Greet Britain
[3123]the Foreign Oifica playa the exoriinating rete in che inteliigense Sield,
[3125]in the United Statee that sale hso been aaaumand by Clits
[3128]13,
[3129]i :
[3130]| The argument agatdot incorporating the researeh and estirante
[3131]function in State was made by Oulles in 19471 "For the proper -—
[3132]. Judging cf the aitaation in ray foreign country it {9 important that
[3133]information should bs processed by an agency whose duty if {9 to
[3134]weigh facts, and to draw canclutions fram those facts, without |
[3135]having either the facta or the conclusions warped by the ineviteble.
[3136]and oven preper projudices of the mea whooa duty it ie te determine
[3137]policy and whe, having ome determined a pelicy, are too likely to
[3138]be blind to aay facts which might tend to prove the policy te be
[3139]faulty." a , on
[3141]_—s- Preeisely the came argument cen be used with equal effect against
[3142]uh tha incorporstion of ths rezearch end astimnte fuaction in CIA -- |
[3143]i.e., if intelligence fa tee cleeely connectad with operations, thea
[3144]thone committed te a particular operetion will tend te select out the
[3146]intelligence which valicstes the operatica.
[3148]Obviously beth arguments conclude in a case fer the establishment of
[3149]ae fairly indepondent rescarch and estimate grow, But, if the Rae
[3151]_ group ie too independent, ons runs inte the opposite danger: thet is,
[3152]: , that neither policy nor cperaiians will be eubjected te adequate -
[3153]intelligence checks.
[3155]The trouble with the Cuken aperetion, for example, was ont thet
[3156]intelligence and operations wore combinsd, bat preciaaly that the
[3157]Cuban operation evaded systematic intelligence jadgment. The in«
[3158]; talligence branch (DDY) ef CIA was asvar informed of the extotence
[3159]; of the Cuban oparation, The Office of Natienzl Ketimates cas never
[3160]asked te comment on the agewmption, for exemple, thet discontent
[3161]hed reached the point in Cuba whare a cuccesstel lamiing cperntion
[3162]would preveke uprisings behind the lines and defestians from the
[3163]: - Milttla, Ia December end February, the Oiiies of National Estimetes
[3164]produced general oppratenie ef the Cuban situation, but these wore
[3165]whetly independent of the Cuban eperation, I gnthoy that, tf ite
[3166]opinion had been invited, DDI would have given quite a diflezon?
[3167]; estimate of the etate of epinien tn Cuba from thst on which the opera-
[3168]tien was bavad, There exizted, in ahort, the sidiculons altustion
[3170]ss
[3171]HW 4
[3173]| SECREL
[3175]14,
[3177]thet knowledge of the Cuban uporation, Maunied ia Mlarad bars
[3179]by any number of low-level agesta in the cpevations byanch of CIA, = -
[3180]wae denied to even the top cfficinis af the lateliigence branch, Tho
[3181]Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of tare
[3183]Saew oven loess about the Cubin operation. .
[3185]Ths protiem, then, is to have en R&E gcreup sufficiently indepoadent
[3186]oi both policy and operations to resist the pressure to make the case
[3187]fos veoted ideas ant intsreste -- yet sufficiently clese to be abic to .
[3188]subject projected operations or policies to tha meet intenga and
[3189]sagrching acrstiny.
[3191]Where could this group ba located? U the CLA were te became.
[3192]subordinate to State, as Mi-é is to the Foreign Offices, thon the Kk i
[3193]fuactlon might be vested In a ceerdinata aubagency, semewhat inds-
[3194]pendeat of both Stzte and CLA, yet closely casnected with beth in day~
[3195]to-day operations, The R&E subagensy weld racetve intelligence
[3196]froan CIA and from Siete, as well ac frerm tha services and, of couros,
[3197]from public sources, i would repreeent, in effect, a fuaion ef CLA/DDI
[3198]and State/Intelligonce and Reeearch, H might sles take over certain
[3200]. ef the eezvice functiona new confided to CLA o« photegraphis Iaterpre-
[3201]tation, blegraphicol dota, foreign broadenet monitoring, evert ccllec-
[3202]tien, mapy, etc. Thore wight be la addition 4 Joint Intelligence Board.
[3203]with representatives fram ali the intelligence agencios and with a
[3205]_ State Department or White House chairman,
[3207]Ve “ Condiuston,
[3209]The argument of thie ywornsrandam ineplicn a fatsly dvastie rosrrange«
[3210]mont of cur prosent intelligence aet~up, EH ales implies tha capacity
[3212]ef the State Departroeat te asaume command of the eitusiien and to do
[3214]eo in an effective and puzpaseful way. © the Hate Department ee at
[3215]present staffed ia not capable of assuming elicctive commend, this ile
[3216]rot, in my judgraent, an argument against @ resional reorganization af
[3217]intelligence, If i9 an arqpainang for a drastic overhenl of the Erata ©
[3218]Department. a
[3221]oo . eh CRLA
[3223]: | 18,
[3225]The structure whieh would intet the crlte.s? * uggesiad in this
[3226]memorandum woud be ae fallows!
[3228]1) The Sate Oepartment weeld be granted genoral
[3229]‘elesvonce gutherily over ell clavdectina acticity. Thia
[3230]_ might be afeetuated on tha Britiah model by the aggolatment
[3231]. of a Deputy Undersecretary of State fay Gdolligence, who
[3232]would act for tha Gocretazy in theae matters eed who might
[3233]serve ad chairmen of a Faint imalligence Beard, .
[3234]-_ 2) Tha Jot ingalllgance Board crud tnclads FepTes
[3235], sentatives from all elamente in the intalligence community
[3236]and algo fram the White House.
[3238]3) The operating branchas of the progent CLA werald be
[3239]reconstituted under some binameloas titie (the Mationel Informa. ses
[3240]tion Service}. This new agency weeld be chavged with vreeponsle
[3241]bility for clandestine collection, for covert political operations
[3242]andi fer paramilitary activities, It would svbmit projects to the
[3243]Deputy Undersecretary of State for Intelligence fer clearance.
[3244]In gonoral, the Agency would beer semeavhst the game reletione
[3245]ehip to State ae the Disarmament Administration and ICA
[3246]presently da
[3248]4) A oecoud temicindspendent agency would be eet up, agadin
[3249]bearing a blameless tite (the Yoruign Naosarch Agency), coordi-
[3250]nate with the operntions agency. This agenty would be chargad
[3251]with reapanelbility for collagian and interpretation, & wauld
[3252]include CLA/DIDE, the Bureau of Intelligance aad Reerarch tn
[3253]Stats, and the varleva service functions new carried on by CLA
[3254](photographic interpratatian, biographical files, foreign breadcast
[3255]monitoring, eclantific intelligence, MmL8, overt caellaction, cic, }.
[3256]it might well ba located tn the CIA building in MeLean,
[3260]Asthay Cohlesingos, jr.
[3262]ect The Attorney Ceneral
[3263]Mr, Bundy —
[3264]Mr, Dungan
[3266]. east
[3267]Rs
[3269]aes . Fane
[3270]Hy ‘50955 Doctd: 32493505 Page 49
[3272]SECRET | hae
[3274]THE WHITE HOUSE
[3275]WASHINGTON
[3277]July 8, 1961
[3279]MEMORANDUM FOR MR, RICHARD GOODWIN .
[3281]SUBJECT: Cuban Covert Plan
[3283]Analysis of this plan shows that it envisages (a) ''an island-wide
[3284]resistance organization responsive to Agency direction"; "internal
[3285]assets under close Agency control and direction"; (b) "support and
[3286]guidance to those anti-Castro groups who are revealed to have a
[3287]potential for clandestine operations"; and (c) "primary operations
[3288]bases" inthe US. In short, what is intended is a CIA underground
[3289]formed on criteria of operational convenience rather than a Cuban
[3290]underground formed on criteria of building political strength sufficient
[3291]to overthrow Castro. | ,
[3293]Despite the pretense of political impartiality, the effect of these CIA
[3294]specifications is obviously to favor those groups most willing to accept
[3295]CIA identification and control, and to discriminate against those groups
[3296]most eager to control their own operations. lIe., the plan discrimi-
[3297]nates in favor of mercenaries, reactionaries, etc., and discriminates
[3298]against men of independence and principle. Thus these criteria elimi-
[3299]nate the Manuel Ray group; yet I ¢an find nowhere in the documents
[3300]any explicit exclusion of pro-Batista people.
[3302]Leaving aside the moral merits of this discrimination, the practical
[3303]effect is to invest our resources in the people least capable of generating
[3304]broad support within Cuba. The Agency fails to confront the key prob-
[3305]lem: i.e., that those most capable of rallying popular support against
[3306]the Castro regime are going to be more independent, more principled
[3307]and perhaps even more radical than the compliant and manageable
[3309]types which CIA would prefer for operational purposes,
[3311]My recommendation is that you stop this paper in its present form and
[3312]demand that it be recast to make political sense, The key is the
[3314]ee GE
[3315]’ tee ark
[3318]te SECRET
[3320]2.
[3322]statement that our covert activity should be viewed only as the -*
[3323]covert contribution to any national program designed to. bring :
[3324]about the eventual replacement of the Castro government, "This a
[3325]is correct; and there follows from it (a) that our covert activity ,
[3326]should encourage the spread of the political sentiments within Cuba
[3327]most likely to rally support for Castro's overthrow (which means, for
[3328]example, Ray rather than Batista), and (b) that our covert activity
[3329]should harmonize with our basic national policy of rescuing the Cuban
[3330]Revolution, as set forth in the White Paper, -
[3332]It is a fallacy to suppose that clandestine activity can be carried out
[3333]in a political vacuum.
[3335]a AS. Re
[3337]Arthur Schlesinger, jr.
[3341]seen nope eee rece - en ni
[3342]toe : 8
[3344]“SECRET
[3346]ite)
[3348]Page 51
[3350]September 1, 1962
[3352]oop Oe
[3354]MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
[3356]‘ey The Guban Task Force met at the White House on Thursday, August 31.
[3357]* ‘Deegent were Under Secretary Ball, Assistant Secretary Woodward, two
[3358]-., members of the ARA Bureau, Dick Bissell, Tracy Barnes and myself, ~~.
[3360]’" “The following decisiona were made:
[3362]1, We would proceed immediately to diacuss with other Carribean govern-
[3363]ments the possibility of organizing a Carribean Security Force, Thie could
[3364]be organized on the basis of informal understandings within the framework
[3365]of existing treaty arrangements, ag a series of new bilateral treaties, or a |
[3366]- formal, multilateral treaty. It was thought that the basis of organization
[3367]vung WOUL depend on the judgment of other Carribean countries aa to how they
[3368]“+"? gould accomplish the objective of establishing the force without running
[3369]‘serious internal political riske, The United States, for ita part, would pre-
[3370]fer the formal multi-lateral arrangement, Such a Carribean Security Force
[3371]would have at least four major aspects: DS ,
[3373](1) Advance committment to come to the aid of other signatories
[3375].. . threatened by Castro revolutions and, perhaps the designation |
[3376]of specific units for participation in neceasary multi-lateral
[3377]actiona. oi
[3379](2) The establishment of a pool of intelligence information con-
[3380]cerning subversive activities with provision for exchange of
[3381]guch information. a
[3383](3) The establishment of a Carribéan air and sea patrol to watch
[3384]for suspected infiltration of Castro arms or agents.
[3386](a) A training program in combatting subveraive tactics, police
[3387]organization and procedure, etc. ,
[3389]“* dt was conceded that the substantive aspecta of this arrangement could, if -
[3390]necessary, be achieved informally. However, the decision to seck a more .
[3392]«> formal arrangement was primarily arrived at on the basis of internal political ~~ -
[3394]'~ ‘considerations in the United States.
[3396]y SECRET
[3398]HW 60995.--Dowld: 3282350 5°. Baye HB Ee
[3400]A
[3402]beater
[3406]. P
[3411]2. It was decided that our public posture toward Cuba shouldibe as quiet as
[3412]. passible -- trying to ignore Castro and hia island,
[3413]Le, Cot , fo
[3415]~» 3, Our covert activities would now be directed toward the destruction of
[3417]_  targeta important to the economy, ¢.g., refineries, plants using U.S. equip-
[3418]_ ment, etc. This would be done within the general framework of covert opera-
[3419]_ tions «+ which is based on the principle that para-military activities ought to
[3421]_..be carried out through Cuban revolutionary groups which have a potential for
[3422]establishing an effective political opposition to Castro within Cuba. Within
[3424]-, that principle we will do all we can to identify and suggest targets whose dea-
[3426]a truction will have the maximum economic impact,
[3428]“4. We will intensify our surveillance of Cuban trade with other countries and
[3429]especially U, 5. subsidiaries in other countries; and then employ informal
[3430] mathods to alternpt tawilivert this trade -~ depriving Cuba of markets and
[3431]’ sources of supply. I understand that we have already had a few successes in
[3432]” thia effort, _ 7 Le uae
[3434]5, We will establish next week -- in the State. Department -- a psychological — ;
[3435]“warfare group, This will be a full-time group of three or four people charged = |
[3436]with the responsibility of assembling all available information on the Sovietiza-
[3437]‘tien of Cuba, repression of human rights, failure of the Cuban economy, etc. -
[3438]-- much of which has been hitherto classified -- putting this information into
[3439]. . readable, popularized form, and developing, methods of disseminating it through
[3440]_, Latin America, Such dissemination wouldbe primarily through USIA channels _ t
[3441]“but would include feeding it to Latin papers for "exclusive" stories, helpingto. ©. ~
[3442]|. prepare scripts for Latin American broadcasts, perhaps a direct mailing list
[3443]. of intellectuals and government officials to be handled by a front group, etc.
[3444]‘The basic idea is to get this stuff inte channels of Latin American communica~-
[3445]tion, instead of treating it as official U. S, Propaganda. We have selected
[3446]“gomeone to head this effort -- Jim O'Donnell of George Ball's office who was
[3447]a free-lance magazine writer (including work for the Saturday. Evening Post) 7
[3448]for many years and who Ball highly recommends, . a
[3449]6, The CLA was asked to come up «+ within ithe week -- with a: precise, covert
[3450]procedure for continuing the below-ground dialogue with the Cuban government, |
[3451]The object of thia dialogue ~~ to explore the possibility of a split within the boo.
[3452]governmental hierarchy of Cuba and to encourage such a split -- was fully de- | po anos
[3453]. tailed in my last memorandum to you, This is an effort to fin§ an operational.
[3455]_ technique.
[3457]. : 4,
[3459]i
[3461]Richard N. Goodwin
[3466]EW 40955 Docl@:32493505 #hge-
[3468]_EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT
[3470]November 1, 1961
[3471]MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
[3473]I believe that the concept of a "command operation" for Cuba, asdiiscussed
[3474]with you by the Attorney General, is the only effective way to handle an all- |
[3475]out attack on the Cuban problem. Since I understand you are favorably dia-
[3476]posed toward the idea I will not discuss why the present disorganized and
[3477]uncoordinated operation cannot do the job effectively.
[3479]The beauty of such an operation over the next few months is that we cannot
[3480]lose. If the best happens we will unseat Castro, If not, then at lease we will
[3481]emerge with a atronger underground, better propaganda and a far clearer
[3482]idea of the dimensions of the problems which affect US.
[3484]The question then ia who should head this operation. I know of no one current-
[3485]ly in Cuban affaire at the State Department whe can do it. Nor is it a very
[3486]good idea to get the State Department involved in depth in such covert activi-
[3488] tles, Ido not think it should be centered in the CLA. Even if the CIA can find
[3490]someone of sufficient force and stature, one of the major problems will be to
[3491]revamp CIA operations and thinking oo and this will be vary hard to do from
[3492]the inside.
[3494]I believe that the Attorney General would be the most effective commander of |
[3495]such an operation. Either I er someone else should be assigned to him as
[3496]Deputy for thie activity, since he obviously will not be able to devote full time
[3498]‘to it. The one danger here is that he might become too closely identified with
[3500]what might not be a successful operation. Indeed, chances of 1 success are very
[3501]speculative, Tiare are a few answers to this:
[3502](1) Everyone knowledgeable in these affairs -- in and out of govern-
[3503]ment -- ia aware that the United States ia already helping the underground,
[3504]The precise manner of aid may be unknown but the fact of aid is common
[3505]knowledge. We will be blamed for not winning Cuba back whether or not we
[3506]have a "command operation" and whether or not the Attorney General heads it.
[3508]EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT
[3510]@OP SECRET
[3513]EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT
[3515]~a-.
[3517].(2) His role should be told to only a few people at the very top
[3518]with most of the contact work in carrying out his decisions being left to his
[3519]deputy. If that deputy is someone already closely identified with the conduct _
[3520]of Cuban affairs then it would appear as if normal channels are being followed
[3521]except that decisive attention would be given to the decisions which came
[3522]through those channels, There are probably three or four people who could
[3523]fulfill this criterion, 7 -
[3524]This still leaves a substantial danger of identifying the Attorney General as
[3525]the fellow in charge. This danger must'be weighed against the increased _
[3526]effectiveness of an operation under hia command.
[3528]Richard N. Goodwin
[3532]i
[3534]EYES ONLY FRR’ THE PRESIDENT
[3536]‘TOP SECRET
[3538]fe ° woe . 7 : * mo cn le tas
[3539]HW 50955 Docld:32423505 “Page 55
[3542]4
[3544]THE WHITE HOUSE
[3545]WASHINGTON
[3547]EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
[3549]2 November 1961
[3551]MEMORANDUM . | oc . |
[3553]J believe that the operation should be organized with five staff components:
[3554]l, Intelligence collection and evaluation
[3555]2, Guerilla and underground ; ,
[3557]3, Propaganda ; :
[3558]4, Economic warfare (exclusive of covert activities within Cuba) ; {"
[3560]5, Diplomatic relations ;
[3563]Kach of these divisions would be headed by someone directly responsible to i
[3564]you. In addition you would have 4 deputy who would do the actual contact work , L
[3566]between this operation and the various government agencies involved. He ~
[3567]identified as the source of orders and directives when direct
[3569]would be the one
[3571]contact with the agencies was needed. an lehasdao
[3573]Ee eee He should be from CIA for reasons discussed below. 1
[3574]would act as Staff Assistant to yous My primary job would be to see that
[3575]current questions for decision were presented to youat your morning staff
[3576]meetings. with the alternatives fully discussed. 1 would have no direct opera~
[3578]tional duties; thus keeping in the back ground.
[3580]on EE Ee .
[3582]I have talked to MacNamara and he has promised to supply 4 topflight guerilla
[3583]and underground man, as well as whatever additional. personnel we need I
[3584]- think this is the best way to handle it. However, st will be necessary to use
[3585]the CIA apparatus and agents for this. That is why it will be valuable to as sign
[3586]‘a CLA man to you as deputy in order to keep them happy and™¢
[3588]deeply involved at the command level. In this way we can probably
[3589]gle between the CIA field operatives and the Defense
[3591]on
[3595]avoid an internal strug
[3596]command.
[3598]Both the diplomatic relations and economic warfare people can come from !
[3600]State. I have some ideas on this and -- if you give the signal -- will discuss
[3602]it with George Ball.
[3604]EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
[3606]TOP SECRET
[3608]geen en a
[3610]50955 Docld: 32423505
[3614]TOP SECRET
[3616]EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
[3618]am ae
[3620]One of Bob Amory's brightest young men should be assigned to intelligence
[3622]collection and evaluation.
[3623]b
[3625]As for propaganda, I thought we might ask Tad Szulc to take a leave of absence
[3626]from the Times.and work on this one =~ although we should check with Ed >
[3628]Murrow and Dick Bissell.
[3630]perhaps for a breakfast or post-breakfast meeting.
[3632]be done through your Deputy and myself. If this subject is discusse
[3633]then already too many people will know about ite
[3635]‘The first steps are {a} name the section chiefs (b) review with them all current
[3636]operations in their field, establish their authority over operations, get nec=
[3637]essary staff assistance (on as small as possible basis), and start them to
[3638]work; (c} establish the physical headquarters; {d) arrange for financing -~"
[3640]presumably coming largely from CiA.
[3642]approval.
[3644]4,
[3647]Richard N. Goodwin _
[3653]if
[3655]BYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
[3657]These people should have a headquarters. lt should probably be at the Pentagon .
[3658]because (a) we might get better security; (b) MacNamara will be easier to work:
[3659]with in terms of getting whatever staff services, secretarial personnel, etc;
[3661]{c) It is a relatively neutral place between State and CIA; (d) you could re=
[3662]arrange your schedule to stop in on the way to Justice every morning ~~
[3665]This operation should not be discus sed at tomorrow's meeting. Initially only”
[3666]George Ball (and Rusk, of course), MacNamara, McGone and Bissell should |
[3667]know of your participation. When they are named, the five section heads
[3669]will have to know =~ tre the initial organizing work and contact work should
[3670]d tomorrow
[3672]If this meets with your approval LT will begin work on the above items W
[3673]final decisions on personnel and other, matters subject, of course, to your
[3676]EYES ONLY
[3677]Bee oe | | ss Novernber 4, 1962 |
[3679]The following are some tentative recommendations meant to serve as &
[3680]basis of discussion:
[3682]I would recommend that the Cuban operation be organized | im
[3683]five componente:
[3685]_ - Be Intelligence collection and evaluation
[3686]aa b. Underground and guer ila
[3687]c. Propaganda
[3688]d, Economic warfare (other than covert activities
[3689]tithin Cuba)
[3690]Ge Diglomatic relations :
[3692]Although these sections will make use of available agency capabilities the
[3693]_ . operational authority for each of these agpects of the operation will be in
[3694]: the hands of the eection leader who ia responsible to the chairman ofthe —
[3695]group. All of these activities will be cormpartmentalized aa much a8 posaihte,
[3696]f.e., only the chairman will be kept completely laformed on all aspects of
[3697]the eperation.
[3699]_ The operation should have ite physical headquarters in the Department of
[3700]3, Befenge, both for maniroum security and to detach it a9 much as possible |
[3701]. ... from identification a3 a CLA activity,
[3702]The first steps gre:
[3703]i, Designation of section chiefs;
[3704]2 A complete survey by each section chief of currant
[3705]operations in hia fields
[3706]3. The establishment of controk over operations by the
[3707]section chief;
[3708]4. The expansion ol operations whore feaoibie,
[3710]Bob Amery should be asked to designate one of his beat men to contralize
[3711]the intelligence collection and evaluation. —
[3713]; The Defense Departmest should designate the section chief for underground
[3714]ao and seers, activities. . 4
[3716]EYES ONLY,
[3718]TOP SECRE ET
[3721](
[3723]EYES ONLY
[3727]pace WO should discuss expansion of propaganda operations with Ed Murrow |
[3728]“h"*"" Sad appropriate CLA officers -- not relating it to stepped up operations
[3730]- dn other fields. With these people we should sclect a single person to be
[3732]the propaganda chief, coordinating CLA and USIA operations. Ihave —
[3734]suggested that Tad Ssulc -> if he can be persuaded to take a leave of ab-
[3736]sence -- would be a useful person to advise on this aspect of the operation.
[3738]- Both economic warfare and diplomatic relations should be handled bya’
[3739](,. designee of the State Department, It ig important to keep the diplomatic —
[3740]ne relations aspect of this operation under some sort of control so that we
[3741]- con't involve ourselves in potentially embarrassing situations inthe OAS,
[3742]e.g. voting t& send an investigating committee to Cuba when our operations
[3743]are at a height and Fidel has avidence to present of U.S. participations
[3745]"The Deputy should be from CLA.
[3747]yey The President should not talk to the Prego. It may be that same eontactea - seo
[3748]with a few key newsmen should be made <= in the most general way. But i
[3749]the Presidont approaches them personally end the operation docs not succeed
[3750]tt ia inevitable that he will become the focus of another Cuban failure, There
[3751]are two typea of newemen involved here. There is a rather large group which
[3753]‘will hear rumors and stories of various kind, There ie nothing to be done
[3755]any approaches are to be made it should be restricted to these; although they
[3756]should never be told we are going to wage an all-out eperation. In addition,
[3757]ne much contact aad operational work as possible should be done outside the
[3758]Miami arcade Lh
[3759]h
[3760]Our next step should be to desigm te section chiefs, establish thelr authority
[3761]and have them make a complete survey of pessent operationa. Thia would in-
[3762]clude a survey of current covertioperations and capacities here and in Miami
[3763]{and anywhere else they are going on), as the first task of the Defense Depart-
[3764]ment desigace with CLA assistance. The physical headquarters should be
[3765]establiaheds
[3766]$ so. . . . ~
[3767]- Although the Attorney General should maintain a general aptrational super~
[3768]- vision, it is probably unwise for him to be the formal chairman of the group
[3769]:, because the risk of identification is fairly highe = a
[3771]re . TOP SECRET
[3773]EYES ONLY
[3775]E]
[3777]iw 50955. podsidiasl Rabbis bage: mS
[3779]‘+, bout them. Thera are a few newsmen whose contacts in the Cuban comuaunity .. -
[3780]“+ see ao extensive that they might be able to put together & coherent story. If". - :
[3783]| EYES ONLY
[3785]cero If such identification is made, and the operation is not successful, ane
[3786]other Cuban failure may be directly traceable to the President. I regard
[3787]this as fairly remote in this type of operation bat the danger can be de-
[3788]creased if the operation is formally headed by someone who is not so
[3789]clearly acting at the direct behest of the President. The Attorney General
[3790]" can give assistance and maintain general supervision on behalf of the President,
[3791]..., Working with the Chairman alone ; eo o rather than extending his contacts to ine aha
[3792]' elnde all the operation chiefa. |
[3794]i
[3795]i
[3796]. :
[3797]f i
[3799]TOP SECRET
[3800]EYES ONLY
[3802]|
[3804]: “RET Go ce gee ile Net et at
[3805]WY MSO. Biot IETS
[3807]Nowermnber 22, 1963 J booms
[3809]Bob «- |
[3811]if you approve this (se is baeed on a brief memo from
[3812]General Lansdale) 1 will send it on ita way. In addition ;
[3813]you thould have a meeting -- ge soon as possible <-- re
[3815]with Lansdale and the senior representatives of State, v
[3816]Defense and CIA, if you want to cali ma on this after
[3817]_ you have read the meme I will suggest @ procedure for
[3818]getting | them together, .
[3819]Richard N, Goodwin
[3823]TOP SECRET -- EYES ONLY
[3826]i. ate | . er : . sow te .
[3828]HW 50955 : “Doela: 32493983.- Page. e
[3830]November 22, 1961
[3831]MELIORARDUM TCh The Secretary of State
[3832]The Secretagy of Defense
[3833]The Diveotar ef CLA
[3834]The Altervey Ceneral
[3835]General Taylor
[3837]General Lensdate
[3838]. Richard Goodwin
[3840]The followicg a a sarmmary of the major decisions which have been made iu |
[3841]regard te the Cabs Operation,
[3843]i, He will go ahend with the discussed project to 5 help ¢ ar overthrow the come
[3844]munisé regime and establish a free Cuba. All available assets wih he directed _
[3845]to ele end ae 0 mastier of urgent nakione! prveritye a
[3846]20 The program will be conducted undas the general guidance of the Attorney eT od
[3847]Generel, with General Lanedale es hia cated of aperationa,
[3849]3. The progrars will be reviewed in two weoke in order te determize whether.
[3850]General Lansdale will contieue as chief of operations. .
[3852]4, The NSC 5432 group wilh be kept iotegmed af activities, oe bs
[3854]8 The Secvetarios of State and Defense aad the Director of the Central Intellle = 89 ~
[3855]gence Agency will appoint eentor officers of their department? as perageal tepre- —
[3856]sentatives to assiog the chief of operations ae required, These senior officers
[3857]shoald be able fo exercise << either themcalves op through the Sesretaries sad
[3858]Glrecter «- effective operational conteal ever all aspects of thely Department's
[3859]operations dealing with Cabae
[3861]be
[3863]6 Kaowledge of the existence of thia optratioa should be restricted to the recipients
[3864]of thia memorandum, membere of the $412 gyvoug, and the rapresentatives eppointed —
[3865]by the Secretarive and the Director. Any Gavther discemination of this knowledge
[3867]will be only with the authority of the Secretaries of State or Defense, the Attorney
[3868]Generel, ov the Cited of Cperetionse
[3870]FOO SECRETEYES ONLY
[3872]HW50955 “Dovid: 324235. Page” ‘62.
[3874]MEMORANDUL For RECORD
[3876]Neve y 7S
[3879]4
[3881]7 fA
[3883]NONGOosR
[3885]10 Auguste 1962
[3887]SUBJECT; Ninutes of Meeting of Spécial] Croup (Augmented) on
[3888]Operation MONGOOSE , Lo Auguse 1962
[3889]PRESENT: State: Mr, Rusk, Mr, Johnson, Mr, Martin, Mr, Goodwin,
[3890]: Mr, Yurwiteh
[3891]White House: Cenera] Taylor , Mr, Bundy
[3892]Defense/ycg. ti, Metamora Nr. ilpatric, Genera
[3893]fMinitzer, Genera] Lansdale
[3894]CIA; Mr, NcCone , Nr. Harvey
[3895]USTA: Mr, Murrow, Me. Wilson
[3896]Ll, Mix ‘NeCone Said that the ©On¢ lusion Of the Board of
[3897]Nationa] Estimates Was that the Soviets WI]L not let the Castro
[3898]Peginie fail because Of its Own Paherent) wealnescas: This Thouehe
[3899]had noe Deen COnlLained a8 such ip the Nrp. Luter in the
[3900]Mr, MeCong Sald thar he
[3902]believes vO my
[3904]Mecting |
[3906]6eY in g yeav or {Yo than
[3908]ExPlanation
[3909]Pdpers, He then ¢ BlO3§ Lo
[3910]Phase fr, now Completed, a, incensive
[3911]taken op Cuba, that we have learneg
[3912]Yet have g true 25S smene °
[3914]Of the
[3916]“S OF Iclion oy
[3918]INCCNligenes I
[3919]4 Sreat deal,
[3920]£ Fesistance Po
[3922]St Face the fact Chac Cuba
[3924]Ute is Now; he added hig. Pec-
[3925]ighe SOnSider °“SCablishing 40 MRBY
[3926]POints Ake noe
[3928]Necessarily
[3929]imategs Or by the USIB,
[3931]Insdale Gave a bries
[3932]Clined in recene
[3933]by Saying Chat during
[3934]ook has been
[3936]but Chat we
[3938]Cential
[3940]+. Nr, Rusk SUS ested fhe’
[3942]Sane 88d2 Of Bertin, the tog,
[3944]4, Perhans “Ngaginp i
[3946]Tele. oy MWOBES Led -tirag
[3948]be Close ¥Y meshed, Mr.
[3949]Chat he did
[3951]Stituce
[3955]3
[3956]: Page 6
[3957]5 Docld: 32423505
[3959]5
[3961]HY 509
[3963]Leg Shipping,
[3965]SONY Digas Should
[3967]ain oy Liis POing, Saying
[3968]ls king Would con.
[3970]» Whereas VOL Idavidg
[3972]9 di lloreny Matter,
[3974]L, PHO CRTY og
[3975]| Yee WHE! HOSE ay
[3977]HHO Oy bbe ge Ay
[3979]2B
[3981]“gE
[3983]aaa,
[3985]eat ps
[3987]4, Ne. Rusk emphasized the desirability of attem
[3988]create a split between Castro and old-line Communists,
[3989]out that such a splic would be bound to be beneficial ¢
[3990]interests no matter which way thelbalance of power swun
[3991]general connection, it was hard for him to visualize a
[3992]for U.S, military intervention in Cuba under any circum
[3993]currently foreseen, However, should reasonably viable
[3994]develop to the extent for example that some provinces m
[3995]the Havana Government, then the U.S, might desire to el
[3996]to such provincial officials. .
[3998]In response to the above, Mr. MeCone pointed
[4000]pting to
[4002]lle pointed
[4003]oU.S,
[4004]8. In this
[4005]valid pretext
[4006]stances
[4007]resistance
[4008]ight oppose
[4009]ve support
[4011]out’ that at
[4013]the moment the previously~cited frictions between Castro and the
[4015]-old-line Communists have been resolved in Castro's £avo
[4016]issue currently exists. There has additionally been at
[4017]teriporary rapprochement between Fidel and Moscow. le i
[4018]this of course may be temporary. fe said that ‘there ha
[4019]Success in recruiting Cuban officials abroad to work fo
[4020]and that there have been some defections, :
[4022]r, and no
[4023]least a
[4027]s been some
[4029]r the U.S,,
[4031]5. The discussion then turned to the objectives of the
[4033]MONGOOSE program. Mr, NeNamara que
[4035]the building up of agent assets within Cuba from action
[4037]stioned whether we cannot Séparate
[4039]s that would
[4041]hurt the U.S. in the eyes of world Opinion, This led to the suge
[4043]gestion by Ceneral Taylor that we should Consider chang
[4044]over-all objective from one of overthrowing the Castro
[4045]of causing its visible failure. ;
[4047]ing the
[4048]regime to one
[4050]In this context Mr. MeCone then- presented ‘an alternate
[4051]plan (called hereafter the "CIA variant") to the stepped-up Course B
[4053]described by General Lansdale, which he tgaid had been P
[4054]result of the conclusion that stepped-up B would not in
[4055]in the overthrow of Castro. He emphasized that the ste
[4056]should not be undertaken unless the U.S, is prepared to
[4058]attributability for the necessary actions, including the eventual
[4060]repared as a
[4061]fact result
[4065]accept
[4067]a)
[4069]‘use of U.S, tiilitary force. Mr. McCbne said that a stepped-up B will
[4070]risk inviting an uprising, which might result in a lungary-type blood
[4072]bath if unsupported, Not only would} the U.S. be blamed
[4074]would also be a high noise level ‘in the press and eventual
[4076]would be created which would require intervention,
[4078]» but there
[4080]On the other hand, the CEA lvariant now proposed would, in
[4081]Mr. McCone's view, avoid all of these dangers beeause it would not
[4082]invite an uprising, . Again he repeated his view that the U.S, might,
[4084]however, face a stronger Cuba in the future,
[4086]HW 50955 Docld:324273505 -Page 64
[4088]PROPERTY OF
[4090]e
[4092]THE WHITE HOUSE
[4094]ly a situacion
[4096]ON FOF
[4098]mo 7 6. The principal members lof the Special Group felt, after
[4100]. some discussion, that the CIA variant should be developed further
[4101]for consideration at next. Thursday's meeting of the Special Group.
[4102]Mr. NcCone was asked to stress economic sabotape, and to emphasize
[4103]measures to foment a Castro-oldline Communist split. It was
[4104]emphasized that any actions under this plan must be so designed as
[4105]to avoid major attribution to the U.S.
[4107]7. General Lemnitzer told the Group that the Navy does noc
[4108]‘wish Guantanamo used as a base for Operational activities, as
[4109]suggested by CIA. He said that ithe other Chiefs have not yet given
[4110]an opinion on this but he thoughe that they would agree with the
[4111]Navy, as he himself does. The view is that this base is too important
[4112]to the U.S, and too vulnerable tl Cuban pressure -to take the chance’
[4113]of provoking Cuban reaction. The State representatives agreed with
[4114]this view.
[4116]8. ‘tr. Bundy suggested chat. a hard look be taken at the
[4117]possibility of support to selected Cuban exiles on a strictly
[4118]"disengaged" basis; in other words, should they be given covert
[4119]financial and material support, with tlie idea of seeing what they
[4120]couid generate on their own, .
[4122]9. Mr. Rusk suggested that continued pressure should be
[4123]placed on Castro by keeping interest in the prisoner issue alive.
[4125]10. Action to be taken:
[4126]CIA to prepare a new version of its variant plan, ia
[4128]accordance with the above-summarized discussion. This should be
[4129]ready by Wesnesday, August 15th.
[4131]Thomas A.. Parrott
[4133]cc: General Lansd At
[4134]Julien Slates mn:
[4136]Attachment |- Agenda for Meeting
[4138]eyuPERLY OF
[4139]yur WHT HOUSE gr Fict
[4141]HW 50955 DocId:32423505 Page 65
[4143]4
[4146]jePECIAL HANDLI ING
[4148]iki,
[4150]OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
[4151]WASHINGTCN 25, D.C.
[4153]; | . 13 August 1962
[4155]MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM HARVEY, CIA
[4156]ROBERT HURWITCH, STATE
[4157]GEN, BENJAMIN HARRIS, DEFENSE <
[4158]LON WILSON, USIA
[4160]SK
[4162]‘From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale Sk
[4164]Subject: Alternate Course B
[4166]4 In compliance with the cesires and puidance expressed in the
[4168]i ; 10 August policy-meeting on Operation Mongoose, we will produce
[4169]dl an outline of an alternate Course B for submission. The CIA paper
[4170]“Operational Plan (Aeduced Effort)’ will be used as the starting
[4171]basis.
[4173]Since this is to be a bare outline, to permit further policy
[4174]guidance to be developed, I believe the paper need contain only
[4175]a statement of objectives and a lixt of irnplementing activitiea. .
[4176]The list of activities will be under the headinns of: Intelligence,
[4178]Political, Economic, Paychological, Faramilitary, and Military.
[4179]f .
[4181]We will hold an Operational Representatives work session in
[4182]my office, at 1460 hours, Tuesday, 14 Aucust, to complete the
[4183]outline paper for submigsion. Each of you is to bring 5 copies of
[4184]completed assigned work to this worn session, to permit each of
[4185]us to work from a full set of crafts.
[4187]Papers requires irom each of you for the Tuesday meeting:
[4189]Mr. Harvey: Intelligence, Political (splitting the regime,
[4191]f . “4, Feonomic (sabotasze, Mmited
[4192]deception), and Paramilitary. Also, any suggestions for inclusion
[4193]{n other sections of the paper.
[4195]Pad
[4197]Mr. Hurwitch: Statement of Objectives, Political, and
[4198]Economic. :lso0, any Suggestions for inclusion in other sections
[4199]of the paper.
[4201]‘ . . ; . es) TR. aNs | ~
[4202]. oe + By CLUDED - et ang
[4204]HW 50955, Dogid:32423505 Page 66
[4206]1 . oe
[4208]SECTEI-MOFGRN |
[4210]Gen. Harris: Economic (limited deception), Paramilitary
[4211]{Umited deception), and Military. Also, any suggestions for
[4212]inclusion in other sections of the paper.
[4214]Mr. Wilson: Psychological (including covert). Also, any
[4215]suggestions for inclusion in other sections of the paper.
[4217]HW 50955 DBocld:324273505 Page 67
[4219]mae - te
[4220]: . (py oes
[4221]; tae Hosa LN
[4223]( ae ~ So oe 14 August 1962
[4225]MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans)
[4227]SUBJECT ‘3 Operation MONGOOSE
[4229]1. Action, None, This memorandum is for your information.
[4230]2. Reference is made to our conversation on 13 Angust 1962,
[4231]concerning the ieinorandum of that date from General Lansdale,
[4232]: ' Attached is a copy of this rnemorandum, excised froin which are
[4233]four words in the second line of the penultimate parapraph on
[4235]page 1. ‘hese four words were "jnclading. liquidation. of leaders, i
[4237]3. ‘She question | of assassination, ‘particularly of Fidel Castro,
[4238]was brought up by secretary McNamara at the meeting of the
[4239]Special Group (Auginented) in Secretary Rusk's oifice on 10 August,
[4240]It was the obvious consensus at that meeting, in answer toa
[4242]; comment by Mr. Kd Murrow, that this is not a subject which
[4243]has been rnade a matter of official record. Itook careful notes on
[4244]the comments at this meeting on this point, and the Special Group
[4245](Augmented) is not)expecting any. written comunents or study on
[4246]this point,
[4248]4. Upon receipt of the attached memorandum, TI called
[4250]TLansdale's office and, in his absence, pointed out to Frank Hand
[4251]‘ the inadmis sibility: and stupidity of putting this type of comment in
[4253]weiting in sucha document, Ladvised Frank Mand that, as far
[4255]as CIA was concerned, we would write no document pertaining to
[4257]this and would participate in no open mecting discussing it. ;
[4259]I strongly urged Hand to recominend to Lansdale that he e: xcise
[4261]the phrase in que stion froin all copies of this Ynemoranduin, in-
[4263]cluding those disseminated to State, Defens and USTA. Shortly
[4265]thereafter, Tansdale called back and left the rnessape that
[4267]he are eed and. that he had done so,
[4269]8
[4273]: ‘ Att Va bh
[4275], | CEST
[4277]HW 50955 DoclId:32423505 Page 68
[4279]HY 409545
[4281]yo . ; . apt ats yet
[4282]Pave fee tt
[4283]Cbd s Cube
[4285]5. Bor your, information also,
[4286]the attached rnemorandum alyre
[4287]view of the possibility that this mig
[4289]‘attention, I informally jpric
[4291]Altachraent : .
[4292]Meino fx Gen Lans
[4294]earn
[4295]4
[4297]fe
[4299]Meee
[4301]Bocld:327493505 Page 69
[4303]ady h
[4305]fed Walt Elder on the above.
[4307]in your absence and since
[4308]ad been distributed and in
[4309]ht cormne to the Director's
[4311]heb 4
[4313]WILLIAM K. HARVEY
[4314]Chief, ‘Task Force W
[4316]dale did 13 Aug 62.
[4318]i Via
[4319]2 ; Ma dis 7
[4323]. ' : .
[4324]a sae
[4325]a .
[4327]INIERV{EW AND MEETING SUMMARY Page 1 of 6
[4329]. | NIG iI" ae
[4330]INTERVIEW WITH RICHARD GOODWIN Se Nou Wag ii
[4331]“S| FILE:
[4332]Date: May 27, 1975 ; Time: 10: 00 a.m.
[4334]Place: Goodwin's residence, 1536 32nd St. NW
[4335]Participants: Sel. Com. - David Aaron, Rick Inderfurth, Greg Treverton
[4337]Subject: Intelligence Activities in Latin America
[4339]Submitted by: ‘Gregory F. Treverton
[4341]During the 1960 Presidential campaign, Goodwin did foreign
[4342]policy work for John Kennedy, ‘specializing in Latin America. After the
[4343]election he moved into the White House to handle Latin America. During
[4344]that period he spoke with the President about a Latin American matter
[4345]on the average once a day. Goodwin left the White House in the fall of
[4346]1962, becoming Deputy Assistant |Secretary of State for Inter-American
[4348]1
[4350]Affairs under, first, Robert Woodward and then Edwin Martin. After
[4352]working for the Peace Corps, Goodwin was brought back to the White
[4354]House by President Johnson, ‘in the spring of 1964, after the Panama
[4356]crisis. At that time, however, he did not specialize on Latin America,
[4357]- instead writing speeches for Johnson. He left the Administration late
[4359]I
[4361]in 1965.
[4363]1. Assassinations:
[4364]a |
[4366]In general, Goodwin had not heard much specific talk of as~
[4367]sassination, although it would not have surprised him if it had gone
[4368]on. He mentioned one specific instance in which he had heard talk of
[4369]assassinating Castro. After the Bay of Pigs, a Cuba Task Force was
[4370]established, first chaired. by Paul Nitze and then by Goodwin in his
[4372]‘capacity as White House Staff Officer. At a meeting of the Task Force,
[4374]held at the State Department, McNamara suggested "getting rid of Castro,
[4376]someone from the CIA, perhaps Bissell, then asked if McNamara meant
[4378]HW 50955 Docld:324273505 Page. 70 : : , e
[4380]1
[4382]f : .
[4384]eo . oo
[4385]I
[4387]f
[4389]INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY Page 2 of 6
[4391]FILE:
[4392]"Executive Action." McNamara responded that he did and stressed his
[4394]interest in the idea. However, | Goodwin did not bring the topic up later
[4395]in the meeting after McNamara left. To Goodwin, the idea was not reason
[4396]able even apart from moral objections, for the Bay of Pigs had shown tha
[4397]Cuba was politically stable; Castro would merely have been replaced
[4398]with Raul or with Che Guevara, Lock worse than Castro. Somewhat later,
[4399]Goodwin sat in on an interview Tad Szule had with Kennedy in which the
[4400]President pledged not to kill castro. Szule reported that pledge in an
[4401]article in Esquire. When he finished his period as Chairman of the Cuba
[4402]|
[4403]Task Force, Goodwin wrote a memo recommending that the United States
[4404]let Castro alone; anything the United States did to him could only but-
[4405]tress his position in Latin America. .
[4407]During his time at the State Department, Goodwin met every
[4408]week or so with E. C. King, Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division
[4409]of the CIA, and King never mentioned a plan to assassinate Castro. Nor
[4410]did Robert Kennedy ever mention such a plan to Goodwin when Goodwin
[4411]worked for Kennedy, in 1966 and, 1967.
[4413]Goodwin did believe, however, that the United States was in-
[4414]volved, at least indirectly, in the successful plot on Trujillo's life.
[4415]During the Eisenhower Administration, the United States had severed
[4416]diplomatic relations with Trujillo and attempted to isolate the Dominica
[4417]Republic. There were frequent reports that Trujillo, was about to be as-
[4418]-sassinated, but the assassination never came off. In fact, the govern-
[4419]ment was surprised when it occurred. Henry Dearborn, the American Consul
[4420]in Santo Domingo, had been charged with staying in contact with anti-
[4421]Trujillo forces. Prior to the issassination, he had transferred some
[4423]i
[4425]: weapons, presumably handguns, to those forces. Goodwin suspected that
[4427]HW 50955 Docld:32493505 Pagé 7i ° | 5
[4429]a -.
[4431]1
[4433], i
[4434]INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY Page _3 of ¢
[4436]1
[4438]the President probably did not know of the gun transfer, but he said
[4440]that the assassination and the U.S. role with respect to it would have
[4441]come as no surprise to the President. He, doubted ‘that the CIA even
[4443]would have had to clear the transfer, although a general policy of that
[4444]sort might have been passed by ithe Special Group.
[4446]. Goodwin reported no other mention of assassinations. In fact,
[4447]he said he once heard a CIA man say that assassination was a bad idea
[4449]because once started, it never ended. However, an agent in the field
[4451]might regard killings of one sort or. another as within his mission in
[4453]supporting one political faction over another. And of course someone
[4454]might have gotten carried away. It was clear from the Bay of Pigs that
[4455]“the CIA sometimes acted without, or even against, instructions (e.g.
[4457]by bringing Batista followers into the Bay of Pigs invasion team). In
[4458]general, Latin American work seemed to attract the worst personnel in
[4460]"all Washington agencies including the CIA.
[4462]2. CIA Activities in Brazil: .
[4463]Goodwin knew little of CIA activities in Brazil. The United
[4465]‘States had strongly backed Quadros and never Liked Goulart. ‘In the
[4466]period before 1964, the U.S. gave political support to anti-Goulart
[4467]factions: ‘followers of Kubitschek and even to the Furtado in the
[4468]Brazilian northeast. The U.S. had been involved in Brazilian elections
[4469]for many years and presumably spent a good deal in the 1963 congres-
[4470]_ sional elections.On the military side, Walters was brought from Rome
[4472]to keep a contact with the Brazilian military. How much further
[4474]Walters' activities might have extended Goodwin didnot know.
[4478]HY 50955 DocTd:32423505 Page 72, Vi
[4480]INTERV{EW AND MEETING SUMMARY . Page 4 of ¢
[4481]PILE:
[4483]3. CIA Activities in Chile:
[4485]The Kennedy Administration decided that left wing democratic
[4486]forces in Latin America were the only means of combatting communist
[4487]influence and promoting development in the region. That decision was
[4488]applied to Chile,. and the U.S.|/ switched its support from the conserva-
[4489]tive Alessandri. Goodwin sat in on meetings of the Special Group only
[4490]rarely, only if Latin America vere the subject of the meeting. As he
[4491]remembered it, the proposals that came to the Special Group were genera
[4492]statements, policy papers, not. descriptions ef recipients of support or
[4493]conduits. .In line with the policy, support was given to left democrati
[4494]political elements. The U.S. certainly provided assistance to the
[4495]Christian Democrats in the 1964 elections, but Goodwin did not know
[4496]how much. The figure of $20 million, mentioned by Stern, did not seem
[4497]inconceivable to Goodwin. He contested, “however, the assertion that
[4498]the Chilean election was the most intensely watched election in Washing
[4499]ton since the 1948 Italian campaign. From his vantage point in the
[4501]White House it did not seem so.
[4503]4. Changes during the Johnson! Administration:
[4505]‘Johnson cared less about Latin America than had Kennedy--
[4506]Johnson was interested only in Mexico--and so knew less about covert
[4507]actions in the region. Thomas Mann was left to run Latin American
[4508]policy, although the President did become active in the two crises-~
[4509]Panama and then the Dominican Republic. Goodwin saw a sharp change
[4510]in United States’ policy under Mann. Mann supported the military and
[4512]conservative elements in Latin American societies, and American support
[4514]HW 50955 Docld:32423505 Page 73 | ?
[4516]“we
[4517]Ie .
[4518]'
[4520]INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY . Page 5 of ¢
[4522]FILE:
[4523]for left democratic reform ended. Goodwin professed himself puzzled
[4525]by Johnson's assertion that he had discovered a "murder incorporated"
[4527]in the Caribbean. The only specific instance Johnson ever cited was
[4529]Trujillo, yet Johnson had known about the Trujillo assassination from
[4531]the very beginning and so could hardly have "discovered" it after he
[4533]became President.
[4535]5. Covert Operations and Counterinsurgency:
[4537]When asked about the ethos surrounding covert actions during
[4538]the Kennedy Administration, Goodwin responded that the major emphasis
[4539]was counterinsurgency, not covert action. There was certainly no
[4541]. t
[4542]reluctance to use covert action, but no one believed that American
[4544]“objectives could be secured through it. Counter insurgency was some-
[4545]thing different. A good deal of money was spent training police throug
[4546]AID, much more was spent through the Pentagon equipping Latin American
[4547]militaries, and there was as well some CIA activity. At that point,
[4548]the U.S. really believed that the communists could not get elected to
[4549]power and that the threat was subversion. Paramilitary operations
[4550]‘were considered by the Special !Group (counterinsurgency). Latin
[4551]American matters were considered there, and in some ways Latin
[4553]America was considered a kind of training ground for Southeast Asia.
[4554]Goodwin believed that in sum U.S. counterinsurgency efforts made little
[4555]difference to the course of events in Latin America. “Cuba could not
[4557]in any case provide support to guerilla movements in South America
[4558]without substantial support from the Soviet Union, and the guerilla
[4560]movements that began had little indigenous support.
[4562]HW 50955 Docld: 32423505 Page 74
[4564]EW 50955
[4566]INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY Page 6
[4568]In response to a question about NSAM's, Goodwin noted that
[4570]these came out of the Bundy shop, which had little formal staff. Good-
[4572]‘win often wrote these documents. They were both general and, on
[4574]occasion, specific, indicating. groups to be supported and the like.
[4575]Kennedy wanted to know the details of American activities in Latin
[4577]America.
[4579]. |
[4580]6. Goodwin Suggestions:
[4582]Goodwin believed it impossible to control the: activities of
[4583]intelligence organizations without becoming involved in their day-to-
[4584]day operations. “What is required is an active Congressional committee,
[4585]on the model of the early Joint Atomic Energy Committee, with an active
[4587]staff. Once the President is permitted both to decide what is a major
[4589]operation, and thus needs to be communicated to Congress, and who to
[4591]tell, the game is over. Confidence in men will not do; institutional
[4592]checks are required.
[4594]With respect to people to be interviewed, Goodwin mentioned
[4596]i
[4598]that the Station Chief in Mexico functioned as a kind of regional sub-
[4599]director. He also thought we might talk with the FBI person in Puerto
[4601]Rico, with Arthur Schlesinger,. and with Tad Szulc, In response to a
[4603]. 4
[4604]question, Goodwin indicated that Nixon had been interested in the Bay
[4606]of Pigs through Cushman. He thought that Douglas Dillon might know of
[4608]that.
[4610]Bocld: 32423505 Page 75
[4614]Pnone (Area 202) 544-6000
[4616]10
[4618]12
[4619]13
[4621]14
[4623]WARD & PAUL
[4625]15
[4626]16
[4627]1?
[4628]18
[4630]19
[4631]20
[4632]21
[4633]22
[4634]23
[4636]/ 24
[4638]| 410 First Street, $.E., Washington, D.C. 20003
[4640]HY 50955 Docld:32423505 Page 76
[4642]2D
[4644]1OP SECRET
[4645]| 25
[4647]the United States. Several months later, I presume because
[4649]of that trip and ‘several other contacts I maintain with
[4650]representatives of the Cuban government at the United Nations
[4652]1 oe |.
[4653]and the Organization of AMerican States, beacause of my personal
[4655]friendship with a number of people at the White House and
[4656]I
[4658]Mr. Goodwin, Mr. Donnegan ‘and others, in a conversation with
[4660]Mr. Goodwin it was suggested that I come and see the Attorney
[4662]General. I was invited to lunch with Mr. Kennedy at the Justic
[4664]Department. We discussed in considerable langth the situation
[4666]in Cuba following the invasion, the pros and cons of some
[4668]_@ifferent possible actions by the United States government in
[4670]that context.
[4672]not ‘ 1 . .
[4673]At the end of this conversation, the Attorney General
[4674]asked me whether I would have objections to meeting with his
[4676]brother. the President. I said I would of course be pleased
[4677]i a .
[4679]1
[4681]to do so.
[4682]The following day I received a call from the White House
[4683]indicating that the President would like for me to come in at
[4685]11:00 o'clock in the morning on that day in November, which I
[4686]| . .
[4688]-did. And I was received by the President in the company of
[4690]Mr. Goodwin in tha Oval Office for a conversation which lasted,
[4691]if.memory serves, in excess of an hour and a half, in which the
[4692]. |
[4694]President discussed a number of his views on Cuba in the wake
[4696]of tha Bay of Pigs, asked ma a number of questions concerning
[4698]my conversations with Premier Castro, a general review of the
[4700]TOP SECRET
[4703]2.
[4706]Phone (Area 202) 544-6000
[4708]10
[4709]11
[4710]12
[4712]_ 13
[4714]WARD & PAUL
[4716]14
[4717]15
[4718]16
[4719]17
[4720]18
[4722]19
[4726]23
[4728]24
[4730]410 First Street, S.E., Wasmington, 0.C. 20003
[4732]25
[4734]HW 50955 DoclId:32423505 Page 77
[4738]TOP SECRET
[4740]Re
[4742]. . :
[4743]situation in Cuba, you know, what tha United States should do,
[4744]could do, might fe in terms of either in a hostile way or in
[4745]. ' . .
[4747]t
[4749]establishing some kind of a dialogue, most relevant of which
[4752]I suppose was that at one point the President rather unexpectedly
[4754]| |
[4755]turned to me and: said what would you say, what would you) think,
[4757]if. I.decided to authorize. the assssination of Premier Castro?
[4758]Let me add for the record that the precise wording appears’
[4759]in the Esquire article from the notes taken at the time. I am
[4761]now paraphrasing from memory. This was a rather -- ° }
[4762]. : i
[4764]Mr. Aaron. ~Let me:read this into the.record. "We chatted
[4766]for a while about Cuba, . and then Kennedy ‘leaned forward jin his
[4768]rocking chair and hurled a question at me: ‘What would.you think’
[4770]“Gf I ordered Castro ‘to be; assassinated?!"
[4772]Mr.. Szulc. Iwas taken aback and so indicated to the Preside:
[4774]PP the best of my recollection, I said in the first instance as a
[4776]practical matter I thought this would not make all that much
[4777]difference even if he were because I thought that by then the
[4779]Cuban structure had been bstablished to a sufficient degree
[4781]i.
[4782]H ‘
[4785]where the murder and disappearance of Fidel Castro wouldjnot
[4787]necessarily mean':tha collapse of the governing system, if this
[4789]CO _
[4790]were. the purpose jof the United States government.
[4792]In the second place, it was more important to ma, Tisaid
[4794]to the President, that my personal feeling was that the United
[4795]States government should not be party to murders and political
[4797]{ ' ; .
[4798]assassinations at which point the President leaned back and
[4800]TOP SECRET —
[4803]me FOR GECKET 7
[4804]3 1 smiled and said, well 1 was testing you. I agree with you
[4805]om i |
[4806]g 2 completely. |
[4807]g 3 And then he went on for a few minutes to make the point
[4808]3 4 || how strongly he felt and his brother felt that the United state
[4809]5 for moral reasons should never be in a situation of having
[4810]6 recourse to assassination in foreign policy. Again, the
[4811]9 precise quotes and the precise paraphrase I placed in the article
[4812]8 and again I'm paraphrasing from memory now. |
[4813]9 And the President added in this context that the-reason I.
[4814]10 have raised it with your or words to this effect, is because
[4815]ll I am under very, very strong or powerful pressure from cartain
[4816]; y. || People, whom he did not identify, to authorize an operation
[4817]on i 13 resulting in the assassination of Premier Castro. And I think
[4818]: 14 we talked about this for J few more minutes, and 1 think I
[4819]15  yapeated the points I made originally and the President said
[4820]16 he felt very strongly that same way and the fact he was testing
[4821]Wy me or trying to see what ny response as a reporter or as a
[4822]‘18 citizen would be. |
[4823]; 19 . I might: add that sevaral days ago Mr. Goodwin and I had
[4824]: 20 the opportunity to discuss this and compare our respective
[4826]: art recollections of it, and Mr. Goodwin's recollection is exactly
[4827]z 99 the same as mine. We discussed this at some length, this
[4828]z. oe
[4829]" 93 being last week, and the subject being relevant to the current
[4830]C i 24 flow of news and Mr. Goodwin made the point to me, obviously if
[4831]: 25 President Kennedy were planning to authorize the assassination
[4832]TOP SECRET a
[4833]HW 40955 Docld:32493505 Page 78 ” ;
[4835]amt TOP
[4836]_ 2A
[4837]3 1 of Castro, he would not Likely: be discussing it with you in
[4838](~ 3 _
[4839]; g a the full knowledge of a Yeporter and if Castro were killed
[4840]3 | .
[4841]< 3 or an attempt to kill himj would surface you would have the
[4842]8 -
[4843]& 4 professional duty to rush|to your:typewriter and report on ‘this
[4844]5 conversation, even though| it was on 2 personal basis. And
[4845]6 ||. Mr. .Goodwin's judqment, and in which I concur, was that
[4846]7 presumably the President would not have floated this issue
[4847]8 with me, and this is really responsive to my own effort to
[4848]9 re-evaluate after the passaqe of time the Prasident's sincerity
[4849]10 in disclaiming any desire’ to do so.
[4850]. | :
[4851]Ll My impression at tha time’ and today fourteen years later
[4852]; . 12 is that the President was sincere and serious in affirming his
[4853]f~ 3 | of
[4854]‘ 13 revulsion to such an idea! of assassination.
[4855]9 |
[4856]iia . i
[4857]: 14 Mr. Aaron. Let me ask you, when was your conversation
[4859]15 ||) with Mr. Goodwin?
[4861]16 Mr. Szule. The most] recent one?
[4862]17 Mr. Aaron. .Yes, the) one you just mentioned.
[4863]18 Mr. Szulc. Last Friday which would have been the 6th of
[4865]19 June of this year.
[4866]20 _ Mr. Aaron. May I read. into the record ‘the following
[4867]21 paragraph from your articlle. “Kennedy leaned back in his: chair
[4869]22 | smiled, and said: that he had been testing me because he was
[4871]23 under great pressure from advisers in the Intelligence
[4873]( . 24. community (whom he did not name) to have Castro killed, but
[4877]810 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003
[4879]25 that he himself violently, opposed it on the grounds that for
[4881]_ TOP SECRET
[4883]HW 50955 Docld:32423505 Page 79
[4885]— GOODWIN] (TRUJILLO)
[4887]The papers produced by Mr. Goodwin on 7/16/75
[4888]contained some Trujillo-related material. Certain
[4889]documents were selected from this material and are pro-
[4890]duced herein under Tabs Sand T. All of the attached
[4891]Trujillo-related documents have been produced before the
[4892]Committee, and Mr. Goodwin has been questioned concern-
[4893]ing them. They are attached again herein for possible
[4894]use in connection with questions concerning handwritten
[4895]notations appearing on the documents.
[4897]TABS, May 13, 1961 Memorandum to Goodwin.
[4898]oe re CIA Covert Activities in the
[4900]Dominican epublic
[4902]Page Z of this document contains, on the
[4903]original ribbon copy, a pencilled-in circle.
[4904]Goodwin stated on/7/16/75 that this circle
[4905]was placed on the original copy of the
[4906]memorandum by himjand indicates that the
[4907]encircled material (a report of the passage
[4909]q . .
[4910]of revolvers and carbines) struck Goodwin
[4912]as both significant and new to him. Further,
[4913]the word “neutralize” is underscored in
[4914]pencil on the original copy of the memorandum,
[4915]Goodwin might be questioned concerning the
[4916]Significance of this underscore.
[4918]TAB T. - Various drafts, together with the
[4920]——“oTiginal of the 5/29/61 cable from the State
[4921]Department to Dearborn are attached herein.
[4922]Goodwin stated on 7/16/75 that the handwriting
[4923]on pages numbered 237, 238, 239, and 240 is
[4924]his handwriting. The handwriting on pages
[4925]233, 234, and 235; a subsequent draft of the
[4926]same proposed cable is not Goodwin's. 7
[4927]Goodwin suggested this handwriting may be that
[4928]of President Kennedy.
[4930]HW.50955 -Docld:32493505 ‘Page 60.
[4933]{ “ot ot.
[4934]et he |
[4936]EYES Ou
[4938]MEMORANDUM: - ;
[4942]|
[4946]SUBJECT : CIA Covert Activities, Dominican Republic
[4950]13 May 1961
[4952]Attached is the special briefing paper on CIA covert activities directed
[4954]against the Dominican Republic which was requested by Mr. Richard Goodwin of
[4956]the White House. |
[4958]ee te
[4959]Theis
[4964]It.
[4966]PROGRAM OI COVERT ACTION FOR |THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
[4968]BACKGROUND ° i
[4969]A. On 29 December 1960 the special Group approved a plan of covert
[4970]action to support the internal and exiled Dominican dissidents which
[4972]involved provision for increased propaganda directed against Trujillo,
[4974]and the financial support of selected exiled groups. Additionally this
[4976]‘authority included authorization for CIA to make available to selected
[4978]exile groups communications and equipment support necessary for them to
[4979]develop a capability to undertake the infiltration of personnel and
[4980]equipment into the Dominican Republic. Since none of the exiled groups
[4981]had an existing underground organization within the area, it was the
[4982]Special Group's concept that this delivery capability could be eventually
[4983]used to support the plans and activities of the internal opposition with
[4984]whom the Agency and. the Consulate are currently in contact.
[4986]B. On 12 January 1961 the Special Group authorized CIA to make
[4987]available to Dominican dissidents a limited supply of small arms and
[4988]other materials on the condition that the internal opposition develop
[4989]the capability to receive’ these materials and that the materials be in-
[4990]troduced into the Dominican Republic by Dominicans themselves.
[4992]CURRENT COVERT ACTION OPERATIONS .
[4994]A. In late January 1961, CIA advised selected internal opposition
[4995]leaders that we were > prepared to make available to them limited supplies
[4996]of arms, communications, (equipment, ‘and sabotage materials which they
[4997]had repeatedly requested. provided they developed a capability to receive
[4999]‘|
[5001]4
[5003]! a
[5004]© RIES OLY
[5005]SECRET
[5008]it via air drops’ or sea infiltration.: To date the internal.opposition has
[5009]not been able to. develop this capability, nor have they been able to ~
[5010]nominate training candidates for code; radio operators or saboteurs.
[5012]This turn of events is primarily due to the comprehensive nature of
[5014]throughout the Republic of “being caught or suspected of anti- trasttle,
[5016]activities,~ wand the fact that the organized internal opposition ‘apparently ~-
[5017]consigté of only a few individuals with no real underground structure. * i
[5018]cuy has had in the direct custody of its Station in Ciudad Trujillo a
[5020]yery limited supply of weapons and grenades. In response to the urgent
[5022]feauests from the internal’ opposition leaders for personal defense
[5024]weapons attendant ‘to their, projected efforts to neutralize TRUJILLO,
[5028]tures ( (3) .38 Cal revolvers! and three |(3) carbines with accompanying
[5030]amiquni tion have been passed by secure means to the opposition. The ; f
[5032]west have repeatedly’. requested ‘additional armed support. ; 4
[5034]CA has established working: ‘relationships with selected exile™
[5036]groups. These relationships 1 have taken into account _that-President
[5040]- Betancourt of Venezuela has in effect designated former Costa Rican
[5042]President Jose Figueres as his emissary and representative to work with
[5043]Dominican exile groups. Through Figueres and with the knowledge of
[5044]President Betancourt, CIA is providibg financial support and technical
[5045]guidance to the following activities:
[5047]|
[5048](1) The development of a Dominican exile council in San Jose,
[5050]Costa Rica, composed of representatives of the two older exile organizations,
[5051]|
[5055]Fe
[5056]an
[5058]~ a representative designated by Betancourt, and chaired by Figueres : The
[5060]council had ites first organizational meeting in San Jose on 12 May 1961.
[5062]ore
[5064]Subject to CIA's review of the council's proposed program and with the
[5066]concurrence of President petancourt, CIA has indicated to Betancourt
[5068]and Figueres that it is prepared: to support, the council's program in
[5070]the amount of $15,000 @ month. It is Figueres! 4nitial concept that the
[5072]council will undertake propagends activities directed against Trujillo,
[5074]ted Dominicans in democratic process, administrative skills,
[5076]and train selec
[5078]and public administration so as to equip them to assume positions of res-
[5080]ponsibility in any successor government . ‘Fi gueres has also proposed
[5082]that an exile paremil
[5084]activity to date since neither petancourt nor Figueres ‘have indicated 6
[5086]clear plan for its eventual use- It is OIA! s judgment that the exile
[5088]groups represented on Figueres ' council have Little if any popular sup-
[5090]litary force be trained, put CIA has discouraged this bey
[5092]port among the internal dissidents. However one of the chief advantages 7 :
[5094]that can and is peing gained by support of the council is the number of
[5096]with Betancourt and Figueres in atilizing them in other operations -
[5098]i
[5099]credits that this gives to the United states Government in its dealings . [ -
[5100]+ has been adamant thet no action pe taken against Castro until i
[5102]I
[5104]|
[5105]Betancour
[5106]Trujillo is disposed of. This support has served to neutralize his - . 7
[5108]attitude on that point since. it amounts, to a guarantee to Betancourt of .
[5110]the United States's basic attitude toward Trujillo. Likewise it serves
[5112]to solidity the attitudes of aiseident exiled Dominicans so that they are
[5114]not anti-U. §. and will make them more approachable and amenable to
[5116]U.§. Government objectives once trujilto is overthrown. (2) . The conduct
[5118]7 EYES an iY
[5119]SECRET
[5121]MW 50955 DocId:3
[5123]Se te ote RATE ee
[5124]WIR Mnr as Ta ee
[5127]| SEGKHI
[5128]EYES ANLY
[5130]- ue
[5132]of radio propaganda from Ponee, Puerto Rico, which is under the direction
[5134]of Horacio ORNES, Secretary General of Vanguardia Revolucionaria Domini-
[5135]cana (VRD). This radio program is heard in the Dominican Republic as
[5136]the voice of the ORNES orgenization.
[5138]-(3) CIA has refurbished a small yacht belonging to ORNES so as
[5140]to give it the capability to deliver emall quantities of arms or _Personnel
[5142]into the Dominican Republic. This potential para-military boat capability
[5143]has. not been utilized to: date. It ts contemplated that both the ORNES
[5144]propaganda program and this Limited boat capability v will be absorbed by
[5145]the ‘exile council now being formed by Figueres.
[5147].C. With the knowledge of President Betancourt, and using his govern-
[5148]ment as the ostensible source of funds, CIA has provided limited financial
[5149]support to a small group of Dominicans who are developing 4 para-military
[5150]capability in Venezuela.
[5152]i D. CIA has recently re-located Dr. Juan Isidro Jimenez Grullon from
[5153]2 Venezuela to San Juan, Puerto Rico. Jimenez, a physician and university
[5154]professor, is a highly respected Dominican exile and enjoys the confidence
[5155]of the internal opposition. He isicurrently working with the Puerto
[5156]Rican Government in developing a training program within the structure of
[5157]the Puerto Rican Government. The objective of this program is to pro-
[5158]vide "on-the-job" training for selected Dominicans in democratic processes
[5160]and selected administrative skills. “Through Jimenez and 8 small group
[5162]of recently exiled Dominicans who were active in the internal opposition, |
[5164]CIA is in the process of establishing communication channels to the in-
[5166]A . ternal opposition which will supplement those currently in being through
[5168]BYES ANEY
[5169]SECRET
[5170]|
[5173]HW 80955
[5175]Til.
[5177]IV.
[5179]our Station in Ciudad Trujillo.
[5181]B, CIA has a continuing program utilizing news media assets through-
[5182]out the hemisphere in an effort to discredit Trujillo.
[5184]COVERT ACTIVITIES CIA IS PREPARED TO UNDERTAKE BUT HAS NOT INITIATED
[5186]A. -Train selected members of the internal opposition as code radio
[5187]operators. CIA has the appropriate radio equipment "on-the-shelf".at
[5188]our Station in Ciudad Trujillo. However, this program has not been ini-
[5189]tiated due to the internal /opposition's failure to provide individuals
[5190]who are able to undergo the required training outside of the Dominican
[5191]Republic and willing to run | the risk of having the radio equipment in,
[5192]their possession... i !
[5194]B. Train selected members of the opposition in sabotage and under-—
[5196]ground resistance techniques. Here again the internal opposition has
[5198]- provided no training candidates or developed a capability to receive
[5200]explosive materials through clandestine channels.
[5201]POSSIBLE COVERT ACTIONS WHICH REQUIRE ADDITIONAL AUTHORIZATION
[5203]A, CIA has a supply of four (4) calibre 45 sub-machine guns and a
[5205]small number of grenades which are currently in the direct custody of
[5207]i
[5209]our Station in Ciudad Trujillo. A secure means of passing these weapons
[5210]to the internal opposition for their: use in personal defense attendant
[5212]to their projected efforts to remove Trujillo can be developed by the
[5214]ad
[5215]i
[5217]Station.
[5218]B. CIA can initiate leaflet drops over the Dominican Republic,
[5219]; i | ;
[5221]in response to past requests from the internal opposition for leaflets
[5223]exploiting the excesses of the Trujillo regime.
[5225]EYES ONLY
[5226]SECRET
[5231]4
[5234]C. While to date the internal opposition has developed no capability
[5236]to receive arms or sabotage materials by either air or sea delivery, CIA
[5237]could initiate operations to cache jsuch supplies off the coast of the
[5239]Dominican Republic for later retrival by the opposition when they develop
[5241]such a capability. ;
[5243]D. Initiate the training of para-military cadres. CIA has, been
[5245]“reluctant to recommend the initiation of such training since current
[5246]. |
[5247]information indicates that any invasion of the Republic unless massively
[5248]1
[5249]supported by overt action would be impractical.
[5250]. ; ’ i :
[5254]em ee oe
[5256]rene) po arassGos: Belge BF eae
[5258]oe eo ° .
[5259]4,
[5261]ee we ; oe poe MOT LI et Ete te pee om
[5263]ye , THE WHITE © luse OFFICE | ene ehh oy 17H Wer EA:
[5264]—s Pete meren ge ae we
[5266]* * SECRET mThis document consists of 2 pages
[5268]: Copy Ko. of 9 copies; Series
[5270]os a | (Lupet pavfey)
[5272]te “EOR DEARBORN FRCM DEPARTMENT
[5274]i.e President has now approved contingency plans somewhat revised subscquen:
[5276]4 your departure and copy will be pouched to you soonest, Hope this will resolve -
[5278]uncertainties reflected ref but your comments and requests for any necessary
[5280]clarification wili be welcomed, :
[5282]2. Department appreciates Valuable work performed’ by Amo. Farland and your-
[5284]seif' and CAS in developing pro-US attitude among dissident elements. iiould hope
[5286]this could be retained end strengthened but only if ata cost acceptable fron
[5288]standpceint US national interest. If price tage for friendshin of dissicents,
[5290]whose action capabilities and realistic prosnects thus far repa.n unknown quant:
[5292]) ’ places too great strain upon moral position end principles for which US stances o.
[5294]iavolves risxs which in our considered judgment sneuld not be accepted, recl sur
[5296]|
[5297]you will agree we should stand firn,
[5299]“3, While fully congeizant Zunicue circumstances within Odgominican kepubi!
[5300]which precluded normal CAS operation, Department is hone theless decply concecras:
[5301]by degree to witch covert activities this case have been Yerced to cevicte &£on
[5302]normal cover and cut-out safeguards with xesufix result ISG too openly identif£ie
[5304]‘ . with what should be clandestine activities.
[5305]4, Running through entire Kitt dilemma has becn conflict between two objet
[5306]“(1} To be so associated with removal Trujillo regime as to cerive cre
[5308]L among DR dissidents and Libesal elenents throughout Latin America;
[5309]. . (2) To disassociate US from. any obvious intervention in Dominican
[5310]&N : Republic and. even more so from any political assassination which migns
[5314]occur,
[5318]BW 50955 Docld:32473505 Page 66.
[5320]1 spcRET PROPERTY OF
[5321]oo WHE WHITE ROUSE GFFICS
[5323]In Department's considered opinion, former objective cannot, repeat not, easily:
[5325]override latter, For this reason you should not, repeat not, inform trusted
[5327]opposition leaders at this x time of Graft document which you now hold nor delivers
[5329]copy to then,
[5331]5, In May 19 meeting here with, Yaguate and Cibao Department spokesman ssoush
[5333]disabuse -them expectation USG acting cither through Department or CIA could be
[5335]party to any political ‘assassination, At same time assured them this government’
[5337]y for legitimate aspirations Dominican pecple achieve represent
[5339]continuing sympath
[5341]-tive government offering civil rights and guarantees all citizens,
[5343]6. In response your comment ‘re.covert activities program you should be
[5345]aware Department's growing feeling any continuation thereof should be made cont#:.
[5347]upon deepening of cover arrangements so as effectively to disassociate USG.
[5349]. oo. a .
[5350]; Z. In light foregoing sSugse ost you wi nhole further action and to =EzX exteni
[5352]a ;
[5353]feasible substantave conversations
[5354]. J
[5356]with dissidents pending receipt documents now
[5358]to be pouched.
[5361]fi 4
[5362]: : i ,
[5364]; END CF MESSAGE
[5369]HY 50955 Docld: 327423505 Page 69 : ,
[5371]THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
[5372]WASHINGTON
[5374]May 26, 1961
[5376]MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. HeGeorse Lundy
[5377]The White House
[5379]Following un on our discussion of the Dominican Republic at.
[5380]yesterday's meeting of the Snecial Group, I am forwarding you a
[5381]draft telecram which we would like to send to Henry Dearborn, our
[5382]Consul General in Ciudad Trujillo, supplementiny the guidance he
[5383]will be receiving on the recently approved contincency plans.
[5385]The text of this draft telegram has been shown to the Agency and
[5386]agreed to by theme I am also forwarding copies of the exchange
[5387]with Dearborn leadinre up to the present draft telegram to him.
[5389]I mow it will be difficult for the President to find time
[5390]before he leaves to have a look at this but, in view of the situ-
[5391]ation in the Deminican Republic, I feel that he shovld approve it
[5393]personally so as to be sure that it is consistent with his views
[5395]as stated in the HSC Record of Actions for May 5,
[5397]Chester Bowles
[5399]Attachments:
[5401]Tab A - Proposed outroing
[5402]telegran
[5404]Tab B = Previous exchange
[5405]of telerrams
[5407]|
[5408]a
[5412]Bagter
[5414]1
[5417]Sees came SECRET
[5419]PROPOSED TELEGRAM
[5420]to US Consul General in
[5421]Ciudad Trujillo
[5423]FOR DEARBORN FROM DEPARTMENT
[5424]1. President has now approved contingency plans somewhat revised subse-
[5426]quent your departure and copy will be pouched to you soonest, Hope-this will
[5428]resolve uncertainties reflected your telegram of May 21 but your comments and
[5429]requests for any necessary clarification will be welcomed.
[5431]2. Department appreciates valuable’ work performed by Amb, Farland and your=
[5432]self and CAS in developing pro-US attitude among dissident elements, Would hope
[5433]this could be retained and strengthened but only if at a cost acceptable from
[5434]standpoint us national interest, If price tag for friendship of. dissidents, °
[5435]whose action capabilities and realistic prospects thus far remain unknown
[5436]quantity, places too great strain upon moral position and principles for which
[5437]US stands or involves risks which in our considered judgment should not be accepted,
[5439]feel sure you will agree we should stand firm,
[5441]3. While fully cognizant unique circumstances within Dominican Republic
[5443]which precluded normal CAS operation, Department is nonetheless deeply concerned
[5445]by degree to which covert activities this case have been forced to deviate from
[5447]ens
[5449]normal cover and cut-out safeguards with result USG too openly identified with
[5450]what should be clandestine activities. | |
[5451]4. Running through entire dilemma has been conflict between two objectives:
[5452](1) To be so. associated with removal Trujillo regime as to derive
[5453]credit among DR dissidents and liberal elements throughout Latin America;
[5454](2) To disassociate US from any obvious intervention in Dominican
[5456]Republic and even more so from any political assassination which might occur.
[5461]SECRET!
[5463]-2-.
[5465]In Department's considered opinion, former objective cannot, repeat not, easily
[5466]override latter, For this reason you should not, repeat not, inform trusted op-
[5467]position leaders at this time of draft document which you now hold nor deliver
[5469]copy to them. If you believe conditions specified in second and third paras
[5471]Department's telegram of May 17 fulfilled, you may advise trusted opposition
[5472]leaders that you assume any friendly group seeking to establish authority after
[5473]overthrow of Trujillo would promptly declare itself provisional government and
[5475]request armed assistance from OAS, US, Venezuela and perhaps other governments.
[5477]If reply affirmative, you may advise them orally lines you think such request F
[5478]should take. . _ _ . ; . —
[5479]5. In May 19 meeting here with Yaguate and Cibao Department spokesman sought i
[5480]disabuse them expectation USG acting either through Department or CIA could be |
[5481]age, . . : : : b
[5482]party to any political assassination, At same time assured them this government's can
[5483]continuing sympathy for legitimate aspirations Dominican people achieve represen- , ean
[5485]7
[5487]tative government offering civil rights and guarantees all citizens,
[5489]“6. In response your comment re covert activities program you should be
[5490]aware Department's growing feeling any continuation thereof should be made con-
[5492]tingent upon deepening of cover arrangements so as effectively to disassociate USG,
[5494]7. In light foregoing suggest further action and to extent feasible substan-
[5495]tive conversations with dissidents be withheld pending receipt documents now to
[5497]be pouched,
[5499]END OF MESSAGE
[5501]. SECRET
[5503]ni Sage Speeta;ase 23505. Barge”
[5505]ea:
[5506]“<
[5509]“ , bio Due
[5511]TOP ei THE WHELE HOUSE OFFICE
[5513]FOR DEARBORN FROM STATE
[5515]»)
[5517]1. President has now approved contingency plans dis-
[5519]cussed during your stay here with one major exception; You are note=
[5521]to request a pre-signed request for help from Dominican dissicent
[5523]groups.
[5525]2. We consider it essential that you continue to work £0 0 uae
[5526]strengthen pro-U.s. sentiment among dissident groups. Your
[5527]work along ehis line has been invaluable. However, we must
[5529]rot run visk: of. U.S. association with political neck ee
[5530]A “
[5532]VAS, Cw? Cron Wy é Seed puerta Cerenel bk lek Sep permary Siew! a . :
[5533]This last pz -inciple is Overr= ding and must preveil in oun ciel
[5534]situation. However, there is much you can do to prerect U.e.
[5536]al | bo.
[5538]f * interests within this framework of policy; iF cluding most o-
[5539]the. measures in which you are wow engaged. specific Anstrice
[5540]tions follow. . oe je
[5542]na
[5544]3. Continue to inform dissiden 1c elements of U.S. Super’
[5546]a7 -
[5549]for thar position. In case of ¢ Gopinabiomwm over caro a
[5550]prujillo--whe the 2X “ge! not injereted by PEO U.S. groupe- the
[5551]pro-U.s. pxoup should promptly wake every effort to cong ricuce
[5552]itself as reasonable and plaugible provisional, Bovernnen’:
[5554]tt should inmediately declare susel£ such ane request agsavcance |
[5556]from U.S., Vernczucla, Colombia and OAS. If advance digcussLons. -
[5558]wae,
[5562]HY 50955 — " Decla: 92493505.
[5564]Page 93
[5566](B®
[5568]HW 50955 | Docld: 32423505 wae en
[5570]- show that dissidents are favorable to this procedure discuss
[5572]; .
[5573]‘the specific ‘content of such a request and procedures for
[5575]‘and that jn the case of direct intervention it would te pre- a
[5577]PROPERLY OF
[5578]rue WHILE HOUSE OFFICE
[5580]handling it. All possible preparations should be made short -
[5582]_ of actual formulation in writing of a [saghoe, Eaoted) request in advance
[5584]of the event. Underlying this procedure is the policy that,
[5585]under no circumstances, can We take the chance of a communist ——
[5586]type takeover in the Dominican Republic even s£ we must intervene
[5588]without a request. | This last possibility should not be discussed |
[5590]with the dissidents.
[5592]4. Reference to multilateral action in record of actions pam
[5594]‘means only that further open sanctions will be multilateral;
[5596]ferable for forces to be multilateral. No broader interpreration -
[5598]is justified. “ALL other U.S. aetions--whether propaganda oF —
[5599]covert activities--will be continued on 4 bilateral basis.
[5601]5. Covert activitie 5 are, as you know, Very small. duc to
[5602]inability of dissidents to ‘develop a method of receiving supplics
[5603]which will effectively disassociate ULSey and failure to provide
[5604]candidates for raining as radio ‘operators or saboteurs. Our
[5605]offer to help along these Lines--provided they develop capacity
[5607]and effective cover--reimains opcn- However, you must request
[5609]perme TS
[5611]we rs
[5612]. . : 1
[5614]TOP SECRET au
[5616]~ i; . pe : Coat
[5618]Page 94
[5621]. ; TOL SECRET — PENFERTY Of
[5622]THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE
[5624]de -3- oo
[5627]\we/ : and receive further specific instructions for any specific
[5628]covert activity. At the present time we are unable to transfer. ~,
[5630]arms to dissidents. Tell them that this is because of our
[5631]suspicion that method of transfer may be unsafe. In actual
[5632]fact we feel that the cransfer of arms would serve very little 4
[5633]purpose and expose the United States to great danger of [leinase _—
[5636]Geet . .
[5637]sclosure-of-participacion 3 assassination attempt. The basic
[5639]policy is to continue to hold open offer of covert help, while
[5640]carefully examining and clearing the specific help requested.
[5642]This is feasible pécause, jn actual fact, the covert helv is
[5644]ra
[5646]very slight except for verbal encouragement and exchange of ;
[5648](®
[5650]information.
[5652]6. We intend to keep up anti-Trujillo propaganda cambalen
[5654]and other external pressures.
[5656]7. -FYI, im event overthrow of Trujillo milicary forces will”
[5657]ay ead MS Ure, :
[5659]be dispatched immediately to fprosimvesiou) positions. oa receipt _
[5661]of request from provisional government, and your concurrence,
[5663]ad Le ob retard) cat ome ow
[5666]we bee If no request is reéeived and there appears to
[5667]be any danger of communist takeover then decision will be made
[5668]{n Washington whether to intervene regardless. This makes it to
[5670]imperative that a request be obtained if ac all possible. End FY
[5672]wee ~
[5678]TOP SECRET
[5680]HY _50955...Docld:32423505 .Page-95-
[5682], . TO. SEUKEL Spies nn Ue
[5683]0 : ; 4 THE WHITE HUUSE OFFICE '
[5685]8. Begin conversations immediately with dissidents in-
[5687](@
[5689]forming them of U.S. position and the necessity for an immediate
[5690]his procedure take all ro
[5692]request. If they are favorable to t
[5694]. aa |
[5695]possible measures to prepare for the immediate transmittal ; t
[5696]4
[5698]of such a request short of the actual preparation of a written
[5700]document for advance transfer to you.
[5701]. : af
[5703]Daal? a .
[5705](@
[5707]TOP SECRET ;
[5708]a ; a
[5711]nn . vty yy OF
[5713]wo —— WRITE HOUSE OFFICE
[5714]Y  TYNG SECEET | ;
[5715]Fa Si eearn -[ar et.&
[5716]1. President has nce avproved contingency olan? discussed during your
[5717]stay here with one wos major excentions; You are now to request a pre-s igned re-
[5719]quest fer help from Dominican dissident groups.
[5721]2, We consider it essential that you continue to work, to sovtrngtnen prot, S. |
[5722]Pavel f- ,
[5723]sentiment among dissident crouns, “eur work along this Line had been innpiicoude,
[5724]ke. e Se wT :
[5726]However, we 3=60 must not sidamasicxef yernit i danger of di isclosing/&.S. association
[5728]with political sosdine tion \oe-iataeventiow inthe Hondnioan Republi This last
[5729]princizle is overriding and must prevail in dovhtful situatiom However, there is po
[5730]. : .
[5732]i
[5734]mich you can do to protect U.S. interasts within this fre enework of policy: including
[5740]Need j most of the measures in which you are now en caced, Specific instructions foito:
[5741]L ne
[5743]3. Tela Conitane to inform dissident elements of U.S. support fer their
[5745]position, /In case of a singtion or overthrow 22 Trujillo--vhet ther or not
[5746]void
[5747]initiated by pre- “U.S. croup--the group ‘should ncumsscts SRO mane ant ‘irmediat
[5749]2D
[5751]reauest for assistance fron U.S., Venezuela, Colombia and the 0 vhs Bax Chis request | -
[5752]will be responded to favorably dy the Jatbod States, Tas Gori decbars
[5754]sélve3 the provisional government and reques t hel shether or not they actually
[5755]Pp *
[5757]‘are able to agsume power’. if tinge are ‘f ravereble to this procedure roxcissdt
[5759]ay
[5763]So ayy SECRET
[5765]R
[5766]Ben declrn heed joer ét, & ;
[5768]1. President nas nou aporoved continge?
[5770]‘one ACE wa jer excen tions You are nov to
[5772]stay here with
[5773]quest fcr help from Dominican oiss+ ident ‘ groupse
[5774]“2, We consider it essential that you ¢ contime to
[5776]sentiment anong dissident grouns. Tour work alone
[5777]Navas
[5779]eee must not Sohdsaatyermt 9
[5784]However, We sae ‘danger 0
[5786]with politica « assdination lee datersention-
[5788]princinie ys overriding and mst prevail in ¢
[5790]much you can do protect Usde interest Wit:
[5792]most of tne measures in which you ara ner”
[5794]Cael -
[5796]4 o> ot not
[5797]@ net
[5798]ozvine® .
[5799]: ru L 1
[5800]~ ot 0 ex thro" of 7 pou} proroe
[5801]sera coup 8°
[5803]de . ot ‘
[5805]ase OF goer the pro Ve B". ye and aust
[5806]. gr? onad
[5807]aXe) Y.-S g reas
[5810]efto + neat] aS.
[5811]Ke every t te spout? Ait : corer} ane Or?
[5814]cove eneZ” .
[5815]cov 2008 ° ce con Ue? ? N
[5817]yest agguste™ an " LavUrecLe to this procedure Tose
[5819]a req . .
[5820]ch a vey
[5822]HW 5095 :
[5823]30955 Docla: 32493505
[5825]‘Page 96
[5827]cy plans disc
[5829]1) ene Borintice
[5830]rountful situations
[5832]shin whis frame
[5834]bn Sonet UE.
[5836]work to seecre: eyin .
[5838]Lv?
[5840]st OFFICE
[5842]this ine had peen iene
[5844]o
[5845]od
[5847]f£ gisclosin ing‘. 2.
[5849]slo. “oY
[5852]syork of A"
[5854]pal
[5856]request 4 pre-Sié
[5860]Bais
[5862]pwReanutiLic. Tic 7
[5864]Jeet
[5868]emir
[5870]. : : er OFF ot
[5871]oo : . re WHITE yguse OFFS
[5873]7 Tg , oe HRS ; _ pyar hoe _ |
[5874]i
[5875]bate,
[5879]“@Miscuss the specific content of such a request and procedures for handling ite tis
[5882]“ALL possible preparations should be made short of actual pasparshéon in writing of
[5884]A steneé requost in advmce of the event. Uncerlying this procedure is the
[5885]policy that, under no circumstances, can we take the chance of a communist
[5887], : in] vem , .
[5888]type takeover in tne Dintnican Republic evcu if we mst goren without a request.
[5890]. This last possitlity shoulé not be discussed with the dissidents.
[5892]he Merb taterat Reference to multilateral action in record of actions means
[5894]open ;
[5895]only that furthey sanctions will be multilateral,’ and that in the case of direct
[5897]“untervention it would be preferable for dex forfes to ve multilateral. "o
[5899]yaraden breader interpretation is justified. All other [ose actions--wwhether
[5901]propganca or covert activities--will be continued on a bilateral tasis.
[5903]4
[5905]5, Covat activities are; ag you know, very small due to inability of | —
[5907]‘dissidents to develop a method of receiving sunplies which will effectively
[5909]Aly
[5911]Ne dissacoitate U.S. and failure to previde candida-cs for training as radio
[5913]So
[5915]operatce o> saboteurs, Yur offer to help along these Lines--prov.ced they
[5917]develop capacity and effective cover--rerains OPene fgvever, we you asst mepen Lend
[5920]=).
[5921]Pee mene Lo 7 :) 7 ° s ry « “
[5922]kaye specific instructions. for any, specific covert activioy. At ide the present
[5924]time we are.unable tc transfer sere arms to dissidents, Tell then that tnis is
[5926]r '
[5928]because of our cuspicisn that method of transfer may ve u Maman peccan, Th
[5930]actual fact we feel that the transfer of arms “culad serve very little purpose
[5932]S508 Bage: 990."
[5939]Sh re Vy Tv ak ie
[5941]\ )
[5943]and expose the United States to: greav danger of sepeltiiete
[5945]re basic pr: Ley is to muxthes continue te ho
[5947]attempt . Pepqeiiganert Th
[5949]of covert nelp, whule carefully exdnining and clearing “ne Sp
[5951]e, in actual fact, the covert help i
[5953]ancouragerent and A
[5955]This is feasible becuss 5 very Slight exc
[5957]for verbal itormations.
[5959]6, We intend to Keep UP arti-!rujillo proaganda campaign and othe
[5961]pres FTUPES
[5962]i
[5963]or ‘In event overthros/ Tyyjitho militery forces will be dispatched im.
[5964]a“
[5965]ape eo
[5966]to ec SSeedigon positions. On rocept or request, from, iooldpobyies § provisional £
[5967]{2 Lopes aye ptwherdie: liad ,
[5969]‘and your concurrence, ro request is recei
[5973]we twill go Ure if;
[5976]Loe made in
[5978]) he eats sex any danger of commnist, tzekaover “hen decision wil
[5979]4 ‘Washington «nether bo interven egataleis. Mais maxes 1% tmoera vive trot a
[5980]ia g i
[5982]request ve oktained if at all possiole,
[5984]8. rsations smmaliate’y with dissidents infor dne
[5986]Begin conver
[5988]position ard the sbocorsbix necercity “or en jnaneciate sequest.
[5990]rrsnexes If trey are favorable to this nrocecurTe take all possivic MEESUTES
[5992]prepare for the immeditate teanemitye) of gen. a recgbst short of “he. actual
[5994]preparation of a written dosunent[Uy-the bres tients) £97 advance transfer *9
[5996]Say
[5998]Goodwin
[6000]. = ums | nnn of menor oe cme mmm OS en eee
[6002]a
[6004]iit "5b855 “b
[6006]acid:
[6008]32423505. Page 40@-—-—~-— .
[6010]isclosura: Gt j2so8s
[6011]id open offer
[6013]ecific help requested.
[6015]e
[6017]r external
[6019]yed end the eg_epre2rs
[6021]then of U.S.
[6023]M hese PITY ELE LE
[6027]NON»
[6029]|
[6030]i
[6033]pt
[6035]"e
[6037]9
[6040]2 RED i ee  POUTING.
[6041]fut’ Wii/3/DRH oo TOP SECREY ra
[6044]até: 29 MAY P961
[6046]OGM CIUDAL TRUJALLO (OP-RATIGiAL UXEDIATE)
[6048]om: DIRECTOR
[6050]wee baal
[6051]DEFERRED
[6053]contr, C/WH 1-5
[6054]#0 #F DCI 6; p/oci 7, oop 8, COP 900% 10 c/ca 1 11, S/C 11-12
[6057]REP2 TRUS 0009 (is 13990) % ally Te
[6059]ROUTINE
[6060]PATIONAL DoSDavs
[6062]TO? SECxET OUT 6%)
[6064]OPES
[6066]EDs , Lo . ° . co . . 7 : . . i
[6067]oO Officer ve ; . oy
[6068]FOR CIA/ © Frost STATE -_ - _
[6069]1,_PRESIDIST HAS HO." APTLOVED couIuamicY plate PISCUSS=D DUELNG YOUR ;
[6070]STAY HERS STLTH ONS VAJOR CRM TON Yor ZAKS CT To i QUEST aA PRE@SLGD ;
[6071]REQUEST FOR HELP MO" LOWLUAN DIS SuDigiT GRWUFS, en ond
[6073]2. We CONSIDMY IT 6 SuFLAL ‘iad Yoo CONLENUS TO uOLKK 10 STREXGTIEN
[6075]Prrno-v.s. SENT. zit “CONG iti Sa): aT “cROUPS. YCUR eatin ALONG THIS LINE EAS BSSN
[6077]INVALUAELY. HOE ty ee ust HOT iin 1s K CF U. S. ASS CLANTON wlTH POLITICAL |
[6079]ASSASSINATION SLCE Uys, al MATTER oF Gr.PAL POLICY CANHOT CONDOHE: ASEASSTATLON. :
[6081]‘TULS LAST PRINCA! PLS IS OVLRIDING ALD -UST-PASVAIL Li DCULIPOL SutVATLoii. ROWEVAL,
[6082]nNOS ad .
[6084]anna ;
[6085]THERE 1S HUCH YOU CA LO TO 2%, OTECT U.S, INTENTSTS HI! ILS FOALEORK OF ,
[6086]POLICY, INCLUDING e517 OF tus MEASURES Ti HICH You Ana iOs ZNGAGID. SPECLFiC oy
[6087]TNSIRICTIONS FOLLGW. 7 a oo oo oe oy 2
[6088]3. -CONTLE TO INFOF!: DLSSIDU'T BLGiENTS oF Veee SUPAURT POR THEIR 7
[6090]POSITION. iN CASs oF OVERLE2O. CF “entdvusomiaseeaen GR SOT Lit TAT iD Fi PhO=
[6092]U.S, GROUP=-THE P2O-!'.8, GROUP SHOULD TRULATLY CART Wad lPPOIT 16 COMSTLIVTE
[6094]TISSLF AS REASONAELS ALD PLALSI bbs. eROVIEAGUAL GOVT atk SHO LE LincDLATSLY ane
[6095]7 fer
[6097]“DECLARE LISMLF SUCH AND Wy BUT ASSISTANCE FPGe 04, VL SS SLA, GOLGIELA ALD vas, —
[6099]oo . COORDINATING OFFICERS . (CONisiw =D)
[6100]é ‘LEASING OFFICER
[6102]AUTHENTICATING OFFiCcéa
[6103]_ REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.
[6105]rete TA sh,
[6107]wre Docld: "32493505 Page 101 : : , ee
[6110]Me i 7 4 CLASSIFIED MESSAGE a
[6111]° , TOP SECRET
[6113]ROUTING
[6115]i. a: DIRECTOR
[6117]: CONF,
[6118]INFO? a
[6119]a PAGE TWO OUT. 60694 *
[6120]fo TRUS (OPIM) TOP SECRET. iro! an ete or 42443
[6122]IF ADVANCE DISCUSSIONS SHO! THAT DASSLDBITS ARE FAVORABLE TO THIS PROCEDURE,
[6123]“DISCUSS THE SPECIFIC CO!TzicT OF SUCH A REQUEST AND FROCEDURES FOR HANDLING IT.
[6124]“ALL POSSIBLE PREPARATIONS SHOULD BE MADE SHORT OF ACTUAL FORMULATION IN WRITING
[6126]: OF A REQUEST IN ADVANCE OF THO EVENT. UNDERLYING THiS PROCEDURE IS THE POLICY
[6128]TuAT, UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES, CAN WE TAKE THE CHANCE OF A COMMUNIST TYPE TAKEOVER
[6130]IN THE DCiINICAN REPUBLIC EVEN IF WE MUST INTERVENS WITHOUT A REQUEST. THIS
[6132]@A IAST POSSIBILITY SHOULD NOT EE DISCUSSED WITH THE LiSSIDETS. |
[6133]kh. REFERENCE’ 70 MULTILATSRAL ACTION IN RsCORD OF ACTIONS NEANS ONLY THAT
[6135]FURTHER OPEN SANCTIONS WILL BE MULTILATERAL: AND TAT IN THE CASE OF DIRECT
[6136]“INTERVENTION IT WOULD BS PRSFERAPLE FOR FORCES TO BS HULTILATCRAL. NO BROADER
[6137]_ INTERPRETATION LS JUSTIFISD. ALL OTHER U.S. ACTIONC=-iMETHER PROPAGANDA CR
[6138]“COVERT ACTIVITIES LLL BE CONTINUED OM A BILATERAL EAST. |
[6140]. 3. COVERT ACTLVITLES ARE, AS YOU WOW, VERY SHALL DUE TO IABILITY OF -
[6141]‘DISSIDaTS 1 TO DEVELO? A NSIHOD OF RECEIVING SUPPLIIS WiC WELL’ BFFECTIVSLY DIS-
[6143]_ ASSOCIATE U.S. AND FAILURE 10 PLOVADE “CANDIDATES FOR TRAINING AS RALIO OPERATORS
[6144]“OR SABOTEURS. OUR OFFER TO HELP ALONG THES LINSS--PMOVIDED TH:¥ DEV BLOP CAPACITY
[6145]AXD EFFSCT COEr--Re iAINS OPS. HONEVIR, YOU MUST VAUEET AD TECK AITKIR
[6146]| SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS FOR ALY SPECIFIC COVERT ACTIVITY. AT THD PRESEVT TINE WE
[6148]ARS UKABLE TO TRANSFER AV 90 DISSIDNTS. SLL Ti .: THAT THAS LS BECAUSE OF
[6150]COORDINATING OFFICERS
[6152]RELEASING OF PICER TOP SECKLT CCOUTAEM Pda rine Orricer
[6154]REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.
[6155]— wre mag tote, TE GAL Oe me Sota aes LATO a Te *
[6156]TEETER PO ee brace oe rare a tain i ail a a a ee CC BO Se a . We aE agg ’ te
[6160],
[6163]a
[6167]HY 50955° Bocld: 32423505 Page 102 : , Co
[6169]DIRECTOR
[6171]PAGS THREE
[6173]TRUS (ORL) TOP SECKET INFO coe Ferre ong Wah
[6174]OUR. SUSPICION THAT i JtHlGu Oy TRALSFAR HAY BE puSAED Iu acrtaL FACT We FEEL THAT
[6175]TE TRANSFER OF ARM: WOLLE SEAVE VARY LITTLE FURS fy AnD EXPOLS THE UNIT T2D STATES
[6176]TO GREAT DANGSz, OF ASECCLATIGN JATH ASSASSUNATION ATT-:PT. TIF, EASIC POLICY |
[6177]IS TO CONTLIUZ TO HOLD 0? at OFFR see COVERT H<LP, WiLLe CAI FULLY BALE
[6178]AND CLEAR! IG WE SPECLFIC AL? POQUECTED, THIS 48 FEM IELE EXCAUSS, IW ACTUAL
[6179]FACT, THE COVERT Hebe If WY SLIGHT EXcsP? FoR WREAL EICCURAGSUNT AND EXCHAXGE
[6180]OF INFOR‘ATION. | rr
[6182]6. WE IED 70 KS? UP ANTLA“GRNJILLO PEOPAGATTA GANCALG# AED OTHER .
[6183]EXTP MAL PRESSURES. | |
[6185]Te FYE, TS SVENT OVERTHRGW OF TSJLLLO “{LAtAuY WORCYS WILL E&é DISPATCHED
[6186][REDIATELY GO STARD-EY Pos aTLHS. ON RECLPT OF RAQUELT FHOH PS JUVISLONAL
[6187]SOVERIHHT, ALD YOUR  CONCMARINGZ, WE VELL BE PRSeATHD ty CG LN UOMDAATELY. LF
[6188]HO REQUEST IS RECELVAD ane ks APFoats TO LE ANY DAtioER UP COMPYIST YAKEOVER
[6189]rai pacis SLON 4b SG HADI 1 ie ASRS TUG diTHER TO 1 PERV svi RUGARDLESS. THIS
[6190]‘AKES A “Leosative TEAT A Pgh Bul OF iueD a AL ALL POSSIBLE, BID FYI. :
[6192]"8. PEGI: CONVERSATICis lu ceDIAYCLY WaTH Dac Sabi TS LuFCR iG THE. OF U.S. -
[6194]POSLTLON AND THE NEORESITY Aut AN Litebawy Reghht. 4P THDY ane FANCRALLE 76
[6196]CHLS PLOCSDUR] Take ALL SO. Oi bs hens 10. WUOVASS 2G THE DUSDLATE TEANS VITTAL
[6198]DF SUCH A BEQUEST SUCET OF THE ACTCAL oR DAPAVIOS (2 4 RATTT! QcCt ait pOa ALVANCE
[6200]COORDINATING GFFICERS
[6202](Gok Tru D
[6204]RELEASING OFFICER HENTICATI G OFFICER ‘
[6206]) REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED, | Copy No.
[6208]are
[6209]oe,
[6211]fed
[6213]at e's the
[6214]vas
[6217]“Docid: ‘3249 505 Page 103
[6220]PAGE FOUR .
[6222]CITE DIR - 4243,
[6224]“
[6226]Thid (OPii) TOP SECRET INFO
[6228]TO YOU.
[6229]END OF HESSAGE
[6230]oO oo officer
[6231]wl/Comert: “Ref wis nessa,e from CIA/ to State in which he asked what
[6232], . - guidance and encouragerient oe could sive dissidents, if he could
[6233]provide dissidents “ith draft document recuest v8. /0AS assistance
[6234]--4n event Thi JL LLO overtarown, and asked clarification of
[6235]President's state: ent thut any action against Tit JiLLO should be
[6239]--- 7 = . a
[6241]multilateral. |
[6242]|
[6243]a | ol
[6244]§ COMMENT: *#DISSEMINATION RESTRICTED. TEXT DIRECTED TO ANOTHER U.S. GOVT. |
[6245]ORGANI ZATION, ee . Po ae
[6246]. oe Te ”
[6248]|
[6250]} .
[6251]bee
[6252]we al.
[6253]- —— |
[6254]oS C/eHDe COORDINATING OFFICERS so _ C/.ik/3
[6255]RELEASING oreicéeé AUTHENTICATING OFFICER -
[6256]7 => REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE 1S PROHIBITED. Copy No