[1]Tie 104-10832-4 10332- 10002
[3]| 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
[5]~ oe | | 010 23-188
[7]25 June 1993
[9]MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Historical Review Group =,
[10]Chief, Information Management Service
[11]Director, Center for the Study of Intelligence
[13]FROM: John Berg
[14]. Special Assistant to the Associate Deputy
[15]Director for Operations
[16]SUBJECT: Release of JFK Assassination Records  <-~
[17]REFERENCE: A. Memorandum from DDO dated 9 June 1993:
[18]Subject: Release of JFK Assassination ~
[19]Records -- Differences;
[21]B. Memorandum by Dave Gries of 22 June 1993:
[22]Subject: JFK Assassination Records-- Proposal
[23]for discussion
[25]1. Regarding the items discussed in the referenced memos,
[26]it appears that a further interpretation is required.
[28]~-On the subject of cryptonyms, we cannot give wholesale
[29]approval for their release, but if the crypts have been
[31]- previously blown or exposed they can be released. There may be
[33]cases in which, if the crypt has been retired, does not relate
[34]to existing or another project and does not contain a valid .
[35]digraph, it may also be released. Note, however, that crypts
[36]which are related to a series (ZZBOAT/1, ZZBOAT/2 etc.), would,
[37]when exposed, link operations or assets to one another or which
[38]refer td other operations or projects cannot be released.
[40]--Qn-the subject of pseudonyms, if the pseudonym has been
[41]previously blown, there is no objection to its release. Note
[42]that release of pseudonyms serves to link officers with
[43]assets/operations and this “guilt by association” could lead to
[44]futher, undesireable, exposures. Care must also be taken so
[45]that the release of pseudonyms is not done in such a manner so
[46]as to enable a researcher to accummulate through an inspection
[47]of numerous documents the approximate size of a given station.-
[49](The sense of this is to mean that only a small number of
[51]pseudonyms would be considered for release.)
[53]13-00000
[55]SECRET
[57]SUBJECT: Release of JFK Assassination Records
[59]-=On the subject of cable, dispatch and file numbers,~there
[60]is no objection to the release of this information as it
[61]pertains to Mexico City, to include 201 numbers of key players
[62]in the JFK story. All hqs cable numbers can be released as can
[63]dispatch numbers to Mexico City. The release of cable/dispatch
[64]numbers from other Stations can only be done if. there has been
[65]prior public identification of a Station in that location. The
[66]release of file numbers pe se, however, would reveal the
[67]methodology by which we file/store and retrieve information--
[68]which is still in practice today and thus we cannot approve it
[69]on a blanket basis. Blanket release of 201 numbers: reveals
[70]similar information as well as targeting/acquistion
[71]methodologies which we similarly need to continue to protect.
[73]2- I realize that the above guidelines continue to mean
[75]‘that much information will be “blacked out." As bad as it may
[77]appear, none of this information is substantive and its
[78]omission does not detract from the “story.” ‘Its release,
[79]however, could permit detailed analyses of our commo,
[80]methodology, contacts and staffing which we cannot accept.
[82]New Subject: Release of William Pawley’s name
[84]3. It is agreed. that an attempt will be made to locate
[85]Pawley's next of kin to request their permission to release
[86]information pertaining to his relationship with CIA. I£ the
[87]next of kin cannot be indentified or located, the subject can
[88]be revisited. (Note: the information in the Congressional
[89]record or in the book “Deadly Secrets” notes that there was
[90]contact and even support between Pawley and the CIA but does
[91]not identify the full extent of that relationship.) _ -
[93](ptt pL
[95]SECRET
[97]13-00000
[99]1 November 1993
[101]_MEMORANDUM FOR: \ Linda. Flor a}
[103]C/MRS/LA/MRS
[104]FROM : Joanne Harris
[105]SUBJECT : JEK Project - Review of Cuban Files
[107]I reviewed 106 files to ascertain the status of Cuban assets which
[108]were listed in the attached. Seventeen were found to be former assets,
[109]pre-1970, and most of the seventeen were involved in the Bay of Pig Operation.
[110]Additionally, the following five appear to be candidates for protection
[111]from public disclosure. ~
[113]a. (AMIRE/1] ~ 201- 274049
[115]A Career Agent, AMIRE/1|\died of natural causes in October
[116]or November 1968. The DCI sent a letter of condolence to his wife.
[120]FBI Double Agent, PNINFINITE assisted in ops in Mexico.
[121]He was still active as of March 1982.
[123]c. “‘WKSCARLET/3._ - ~ 201+300985
[124]Formally terminated in 1974. Caracas Station}had contact
[125]with him until circa 1976, at which time he was implicated in bombing of a
[126]Cuban plane and was incarcerated in Venezuela. As of March 1993, he was still
[127]involved in questionable activities.
[128]d. AMICE-14 -' 201-307337
[129]. Worked for PNINFINITE through early 1970's.
[130]e. AMMUG/1 - 201-749651
[131]Cuban defector, He was terminated in 1967, but was used
[132]through 1971.
[134]SFERET
[136]13-00000
[138]a
[140]‘7. June 1995
[142]Memo for File
[144]Subject: ARRB request re “slug line” deletions
[146]The policy of deleting ALL crypts & designators in the slug
[147]line was questioned by ARRB members at the 18 May meeting
[148]with CIA. The DO representatives present (Sander) & McNair)
[149]deferred to the Office of Communications.
[151]Per’ 6 June 1995. discussion with{Don. Hatch}, DA/IRO, “the slug
[152]line is strictly an internal distribution line”, and the
[153]release of crypts or other designators in the slug line is
[154]not a communications issue; slug crypts are not “commo
[155]generated”. The DA has no objéction to the release of
[156]otherwise releasable crypts in the Slug line of CIA cables.
[158]The DA response was provide tow. Gunn, ARRB staff, and Bill
[159]McNair, DO/IRO, via phone on 6 June 1995.
[163]CC: HRG reviewers
[164]DO reviewers
[166]13-00000
[168]Bas
[170]Assassination Records Review Board
[171]600 € Street NW = 2nd Floor = Washington, DC 20530
[173]June 6, 1995
[175]Mr. John Pereira
[177]Director
[179]Historical Review Group
[181]Center for the Study of Intelligence
[182]Central Intelligence Agency
[183]Washington, D.C. 20505
[185]Dear John:
[187]As you know from our meeting with you on May 18, 1995, as well as from previous
[188]meetings with ARRB staff members, CIA’s current practice of redacting the sluglines
[189]from its cables in the JFK Assassination Collection is of interest to the Assassination
[190]Records Review Board. Asa result of discussion on this topic at the May 18 meeting,
[191]the Board in fact asked those present from CLA to provide it with any additional
[192]information available in support of this practice.
[194]If you have any further information in support of redacting otherwise releasable
[196]_¢eryptonyms when present in cable sluglines, we would appreciate receiving it by this
[198]afternoon, so we can present it to the Board at its meeting tomorrow morning.
[199]With many thanks for your assistance in this matter.
[201]Sincerely yours,
[205]David G. Marwell
[206]Executive Director
[208]13-00000
[210]. 27 September 1995
[212]Note to: HRG and DO reviewers
[214]Subject: Phone call from Bill McNair, 21 September, 1995, re
[215]AM crypts
[217]Bill left the following message on my voice mail:
[219]“I have just talked with(Peg Sanders) DC/LA Division,
[220]and unless we see a. specific incident where giving up an AM
[221]crypt.will betray an asset, then let it go . I don't
[222]believe there is any place we will see that. She is will to
[223]give up-d1l AM crypts simply because there are so many
[224]iterations going back...and things have been: changed.”
[226]Barry
[227]‘ HRG Senior Reviewer
[229]13-00000
[231]SECRET _ aw arsa
[233]MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Historical Review Group.
[235]FROM: Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.
[236]DO, Focal Point. for ARRB
[237]SUBJECT: Position on Release of Cryptonyms, Country
[239]Designators, Action Indicators and ‘Employee. True
[240]Names —
[242]During the period since the ARRB last met, the DO has
[244]considered the four issues listed below that have not yet been
[245]addressed with the Board. These issues appear throughout the JFK
[246]collection and by stating our position up front we hope to
[247]facilitate the Board’s review and to reach an agreement that will
[248]be mutually satisfying to the Board and the Agency. .
[250]Cryptonyms ~ Except for cryptonyms related to-
[251]operational assets or activities involving Mexico or “Miami,
[252]the Agency will release the main component of cryptonyms and
[253]withhold only the two-letter digraph. Treating cryptonyms -
[254]in this manner will. protect the nationalities of individuals
[255]and operations that are not pertinent to Oswald or the JFK
[256]investigation and render an easier reading of the written.
[257]material.
[259]Country File Designators - We will delete the first
[260]element of operational activity and operational interest
[261]files in those instances when the credibility of’ the.
[262]narrative is not affected. The first element of the file
[263]number corresponds to the alphabetical position of the
[264]country name which is easily discernible, whereas the
[265]subsequent two elements relate to type of activity or
[266]interest and specific subject.
[268]Action Indicator (Slug)-Lines - Generally, we will
[270]release the entire-action indicator line of a document.
[271]Occasionally, however, we will withhold portions when the
[273]a . GL By(0695930) ~
[274]RD ©. 4 DECL OADR 2
[275]a : " " DRV HUM 4-62 -
[277]SECRET
[279]13-00000
[281]“SECRET
[283]SUBJECT: Position on Cryptonyms, Country Designators, Action
[285]Indicators and Employee True Names
[287]context identifies a source or a relationship with a
[288]specific liaison service.
[290]True Names of Staff Employees - In most instances we
[292]will release names of employees who have retired in an overt
[293]status and were serving in Headquarters when cited in a
[294]document. We will continue to protect the true names of
[295]employees cited as serving in a field position. References
[296]to field personnel in true name are uncommon, however, since
[297]pseudonyms are normally used in correspondence between
[298]Headquarters and the field. .
[300]pre y . Wickham, Jr.
[302]SECRET
[304]13-00000
[307]. 7 , , ge Ce Cey
[309]8 November 1995
[311]MEMORANDUM FOR: Jeremy Gunn,
[312]; ARRB Staff
[313]FROM: . Barry Harrelson,
[315]SUBJECT: ° Issues re Cryptonyms, Country
[317]Designators, Action Indicators. and
[318]Employee True Names (U)
[320]Attached is memorandum from the DO Focal Point. .for. the
[321]ARRB addressing the release of cryptonyms, country’ .
[322]designators, action indicators and employee true names. “the
[323]memorandum is intended to provide guidance to you and your
[324]staff and complements information provided in previous
[325]discussions. Ellie and I welcome the opportunity to discuss
[326]these issues with your staff. (U)
[328]Attachment
[330]Unclassified When Separated
[331]From Attachment. , . ‘
[333]13-00000
[335]CONFIDENTIAL
[336]24 June 1998
[338]MEMORANDUM FOR: Historical Review Program
[339]_ATIN: | JFK Project Officer
[341]ee Oo
[343]Associate Information Review officer, DDA
[345]SUBJECT: ‘ISOLATION, ISOMETRIC, ISOTROPIC, MKCOSMOS
[347]1. This is further to our memorandum dated 16 June
[348]1998 (attached) wherein the Directorate of Administration
[349](DA) asked to provide a determination with respect to the
[351]release of. ISOLATION, _ISOMETRIC or ISOTROPIC;
[353]2. -On 16 June, we advised you that these three terms
[354]together with the term'MKCOSMOS were reviewed and the DS&T
[355]determined that’ ISOTROPIC, and’ MKCOSMOS' must be withheld in
[357]_ their entirety and the DA determined that \ISOLATION and
[359]‘ISOMETRIC must be withheld as well. Please be advised that
[360]the association to this Agency of the locations referred to
[361]by these four crypts is classified in light of the fact that
[362]the locations, themselves, are under military cover.
[363]Accordingly, any crypts, slugs, or other words associated
[364]with the locations and linking them with the CIA must not be
[365]released. .
[367]3. We hope the information provided above will assist
[368]you.
[370]Attachment: As Stated
[371]CONFIDENTIAL
[373]CL BY: (393504 -.
[375]CL REASON: 1.5(c¢)
[377]DECL ON: X1
[378]DRV FROM: LOC 1-82
[380]SECRET
[381]16 June 1998
[383]MEMORANDUM FOR: Historical Review Program
[384]ATIN: i
[386]FROM: Frieda
[387]Associate Information “Review Officer, DDA
[389]SUBJECT: (ISOLATION, ISOMETRIC, ISOTROPIC, MKCOSMOS
[391]1. This is in response to your request that we review
[392]the attached material and provide you with a determination
[393]as to whether {ISOLATION, ISOMETRIC or {ISOTROPIC can be
[394]released. We also reviewed the material with respect to
[396]‘MKCOSMOS : as well.
[398]2. The Directorate of Administration (DA) has
[399]completed its. review and we have determined that ISOLATION
[400]and ‘ISOMETRIC; must continued to be withheld. We ‘forwarded’
[401]your request to the Directorate of Science and Technology -
[402](DS&T) and DS&T has determined that’ ISOTROPIC. and /MKCOSMOS
[403]must continue to be withheld as well: I have identified
[404]below the documents in which these terms are used.
[406]Document No. Crypts
[408]104-10177-10248 ‘ISOLATION and ISOTROPIC
[409]104-10177-10228 ISOLATION and ISOTROPIC
[410]104-10177-10231 ISOLATION and ISOMETRIC
[411]104-10177-10230 ISOMETRIC and MKCOSMOS _
[413]3. Copies of the documents referred to above are
[414]returned herewith with these terms highlighted in yellow for
[415]deletion. Also returned are three documents that did not
[416]contain this information (10197, 10198 and 10199). This
[417]concludes DA action on this request. If you have any
[418]questions, please call Frieda on 31201 or Becky on 31204.
[420]SECRET
[422]UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
[423]OF ATTACHMENTS
[425]Attachments: As Stated
[428]13-00000
[430]SECRET
[432]OIM-98-0084
[433]06 August 1998
[435]MEMORANDUM FOR: (U) Executive Director
[436]Assassination Records Review Board
[438]FROM: (U) Lee S. Strickland
[439]- Chief, Information Review Group
[440]Central Intelligence Agency
[442]SUBJECT: (S) Protection of }IJDECANTER Cryptonym
[444]1. (S) This memorandum responds to the Assassination
[445]Records Review Board (“ARRB” or “Board”) regarding their current -
[446]deliberations as to postponement of certain very limited
[447]information in one_document -- specifically, the actual cryptonym
[448]of a CIA source (LJDECANTER) . It is our considered judgment that
[449]the release of this_ cryptonym, in the particular context of the ©
[450]given document (SxX- 59777 of “15 December 199k),
[452](with — the . Los “Angéles Times article ‘Of. | "29. December . 4994 would
[453]“provide al an identifiable benefit to the Russian
[454]counterintelligence effort and concomitant damage to US
[455]intelligence interests.
[457]2. (S) Mindful, however, of the Board’s statutory purpose
[458]and objectives, this memorandum also proposes a substitution of a
[459]fictitious cryptonym (e.g., “TRUSTED”) for the actual cryptonym
[460]‘IJDECANTER|} in this or any other document where it appears and
[461]would otherwise be releasable. ,
[463]3. (U) As a preliminary matter, I would respectfully ask
[464]the Board and staff to note the classified nature of this |
[466]. memorandum, to limit access to those individuals properly
[468]cleared, and to return it to Agency representatives at the
[469]conclusion of your deliberations.
[471]‘4.  (S) As the Board is aware, the relevant document has
[472]been released almost in its entirety. The released version
[473]reports that a Soviet official (Boris ZHURAVLEV) had provided
[475]CL BY! 0619849 C/IRG/OIM .
[477]. : . CL Reason: 1.5(c)
[478]Decl On: X1
[480]Orv From: HUM 4-82.
[482]SECRET
[486]13-00000
[488]SECRET
[490]SUBJECT: .(S) Protection of [IJDECANTER\Cryptonym
[492]information to the effect that OSWALD was a KGB source. It
[493]continues by stating that CIA did not believe ZHURAVLEV to be a
[494]credible source. It continues by, stating that this CIA
[495]assessment is supported by reporting from another source
[496](identity..redacted_but,_in fact, IJDECANTER).. It concludes_by____ #
[498]stating that this source (TUDECANTER) has had his "... bona fides
[499]. fully established {by CIA]." It is this final fact which is?
[500]er itical to our request. By having released this substantive.”
[502]info ation -- "bona fides ... established" ~- and by otherwise
[503]having; IJDECANTER known. to the public in true name and <rypt, we | |
[504]must protéet the cryptonym here so that the key intelligence “fe
[506]el
[507]A a en tr
[509]judgment ofc is not compromised. ta
[510]5. (C) The. practice of counterintelligence” (CI) -- and ;
[512]hence the issue of{\damage to national security. 7~ proceeds from
[514]four basic questions: oy
[516]¢ what information. was compromised?
[518]«¢ what foreign intelligence sérvice(s) - received the
[519]information? . fo
[521]e what understanding of te information did the
[522]service(s) have? Mi
[524]* what information did the intelligence service(s) |
[525]believe and thus act on to its benefit and to the
[527]detriment of tHe“United States? A - |
[529]6. (C) The first two questions are largely factual ‘and can
[530]; , be acquired through/a”combination of confessions, polygraph
[531]°*; interviews, and/or assumptions based on access. Questions three
[532]and four, however,’ are the most difficult and the most important
[533]\ for both the acquiring intelligence service and the target
[535]na
[537]7. 5 va With further respect to question three, if a
[538]impor) (they wilt fully understands the substance (i.e., a
[539])
[541]import they will be able to exploit the information fully and:
[542]the da mage will be far beyond the ostensible value. A perfect
[543]exa pLé of this is the Boyce/Lee espionage case. The information
[544]cont 9romised was a as 8 Ssemingry innocuous operational manual for a |
[546]eS
[548]i [Le — | (So
[550]SECRET
[553]13-00000
[555]SECRET
[557]SUBJECT: (S) Protection of [[UDECANTER \Cryptonym
[559]SL En EE te an Sirens
[560]— oo
[562]_ a ne ee atm woe a
[563]Pcareiiite. What the Soviets were able to deduce was devastating
[564]to American intelligence. The Soviets, based on other
[565]information they had acquired through signals intelligence,
[566]concluded that an imaging satellite they had believed to be non-
[567]operational was in fact operational and actively imaging their
[568]territory. Since the Soviets had believed it was non-
[569]| operational, they had taken no countermeasures (i.e.,
[570]| concealment) and the US had acquired a treasure trove of
[572]i
[574]‘| intelligence. Immediately upon learning the true status, they
[575]; | took extensive countermeasures and invaluable intelligence was
[576]/ | directly and immediately lost.
[578]8. (S) With further respect to.question four, we have the
[579]quintessential factor for exploitation. If the foreign service
[580]believes its asset, they act on the information to the detriment
[581]of the United States; if they do not, the United States may
[582]escape damage fully or. to some degree. This is the critical
[583]question that a foreign. country must answer and it is the
[584]critical information that we must protect vis- a-vis defectors in
[585]our fold.
[587]oe
[589]9. (S) In the matter at hand, we are very constrained by
[590]‘| what the Russian government knows by virtue of their own
[591]knowledge and what they have acquired from the substantially
[592]released document and the Los Angeles Times article. The
[593]Russians know that Sergei PAPUSHIN (i.e., IJDECANTER) defected to
[594]; | the United States; they know or suspect what he told the US; they
[595]i,j know or suspect that we fully understood the import of what he
[596]said; they do not know, however, whether we believed him and thus
[597]incorporated his information into our operational practices and
[598]activities. And it would be critically damaging today to confirm
[599][to the Russians the final piece of the PAPUSHIN puzzle and allow
[600]|. 1 them to have the ultimate benefit from what heretofore has been a.
[601]| US intelligence success.
[603]apenas
[605]10. (C) Indeed, as a reference point for this discussion,
[606]i we can look briefly to the NOSENKO story. Here, also, the
[607]Russians knew the first three parts of the puzzle. What they did
[608]not know was whether we had accepted his story or not. Indeed, —
[609]the CIA did not know the answer for a long period of time and
[610]{| this lack of knowledge was crippling to our FI effort against the
[612]Soviet Union and our entire CI program for a substantial period
[614]of time. eee a
[616]ea . 3
[618]SECRET
[620]13-00000
[622]' SECRET
[624]SUBJECT: (S) Protection of (IJDECANTER Cryptonym
[626]poor (sy “In sum, question 4 -- bona fides -- is the CI key.
[627]‘The CIA to date has released all of the substantive information
[628]relating to IJDECANTER in this particular document. But we must
[629]protect his cryptonym here, in this particular document, if we
[630]lare to preclude a substantial CI benefit to the Russian Federal
[631]Security Service when they assess this new information in light
[632]|of their previous knowledge and acquired information, including,
[633]- [of co gourse,—information—on_ the_public_record_via—the-media.—
[635]a 12. (S) While the foregoing showing of intelligence damage
[636]is the most critical and legally compelling issue, there are
[637]three additional points of relevance vis-a-vis harm:
[639]e First, is foreign relations. nt, . ;
[640](Russians are fully - expect.that, cae ich Ames?" the.
[641]it United States is considering avenues of reprisal. This|.
[642]aes release might well be viewed as a public move
[644]to embarrass them and it would serve only to exacerbate
[645]tensions
[647]Oe a. = — “ sh. a a a —
[649]e Second, is another potential intelligence benefit to
[651]arguably “provide them-with insights into our - capability
[652]to assess the bona fides of defectors. The Russian
[653]service knows if IJDECANTER was real; the CIA does not
[656]And third, there is an equitable issue. “The CIA_has. |
[657]-never_officially. confirmed that _ PAPUSHIN’was a defector
[659]' in our custody and under our controly the CIA has
[660]pledged to protect the relationship; but we agree that
[661]it is publicly known at least to some degree. However,
[662]because his wife, child and father remain in Russia
[663]today, we would urge the Board to be cautious and
[664]consider postponement also for this reason. Quite
[665]Candidly, I can not predict with any certainty whether |
[666]the Russian government today would take action against | |
[667]the family from this proposed release. But I would
[668]‘urge caution here since the information at issue is
[670]. minimal, not critical to the public understanding, and
[671]|. AEguaR EY. harmful to living persons.
[673]7 ee
[675]‘4
[677]SECRET
[679]13-00000
[681]: SECRET
[682]SUBJECT: (S) Protection of|IJDECANTER \Cryptonym
[683]13. (U) I would be pleased to appear before the Board in
[685]person to respond to any particular questions and am hopeful that
[686]this important information can be postponed from public release.
[688]Lee S. Strickland
[690]SECRET
[692]13-00000
[694]SECRET
[696]SUBJECT: Protection of |IJDECANTER|Cryptonym
[697]Fe
[699]OIM/IRG/LSS: blo/31287 (6 August 1998)
[701]Distribution:
[702]Orig - Adse
[704]- EXDIR
[706]- ER
[708]- D/OCA
[710]- D/OPA . :
[711]- Principal Deputy General Counsel
[712]- D/OIM
[714]- DA/IRO
[716]DCI/IRO
[718]- DO/IRO
[720]- DI/IRO
[722]- DST/IRO
[724]- LSS signer file
[726]- OIM/IRG Chrono
[728]- Subject File: ARRB
[730]PRE EHP BPR E PEP PP BP
[731]7
[733]g:/irg_fr’1\general\lss\arrb_ijd.doc
[735]SECRET
[739]. ‘ - Office of
[741]| OM,
[742]. . Cfmation Man ae
[743]SECRET
[744]CIA TALKING POINTS |
[745]re Protection of \\IJDECANTER!’ Cryptonym
[746]Before the Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB)
[747]. 26 Aucust 1998
[748]e The ADDO -- Jim Pavitt -- has asked that I address the Board
[750]on an issue of extreme importance to the Directorate of
[751]Operations and the CIA.
[753]e We request the postponement of certain very limited
[754]information in one document,_-- specifically, the actual
[755]cryptonym of a CIA source (IJDECANTER) .
[757][a ee eee
[759]e It is our considered judgment that the release of this
[760]cryptonym, in the particular context of the given
[761]document_(SX- 59777. of 15. December 1991), and juxtaposed
[763]ath the Bos Angeles Times article‘ of 29 December 1997,
[765](MOULD fe an
[767]e provide an identifiable benefit to the Russian counter-
[768]' aintelligence effort,
[770]e result in concomitant damage to US counter- intelligence
[771]interests, and, : .
[773]e have a chilling impact on cooperation of current and
[774]prospective intelligence sources given this disclosure which
[775]could be viewed as an official betrayal of confidence.
[777]e Mindful, however, of the Board’s statutory purpose and
[778]objectives, we propose however: .
[780]e a-substitution of a fictitious cryptonym (e.g.,
[781]“TRUSTED”) for the actual cryptonym(TJDECANTER) in this or
[782]any other document where it appears and would otherwise
[783]be releasable, and/or, ,
[785]— cL BY{ 0619849 C/IRG/OIM
[787], CL Reason: 1.5(c)
[788]Deci On: X1
[789]Drv From: HUM 4-82
[791]SECRET
[793]13-00000
[795]“e As the Board is aware,
[797]SECRET
[799]a textual explanation of the cryptonym in the
[801]if desired,
[802]Ya
[804]nature of a factual description of the source (e.g.,—
[806]valued American intelligence source who was a senior, but
[808]not general rank, official in the intelligence service .
[809](KGB) of the former USSR; 4g, ecifical: se aw B 8 ono)
[811]the relevant document has been released
[813]almost in its entirety.
[815]The released version reports that a Soviet official
[816](Boris ZHURAVLEV) had provided information to the effect
[817]that OSWALD was a KGB source...
[819]It continues by stating that CIA did not believe
[820]ZHURAVLEV to be a credible source.
[822]It continues by stating that this CIA assessment is
[823]Supported Py ae from. another source’ *(#dentarty :|.
[825]Fecconclados-by Stating That_shie-Jource(iJOUCRNTER) bap
[826]had-“his "... bona fides ... fully established [by CIA]. ae
[827]|
[828]|
[831]f
[835]It is this~final fact which is critical,
[838]By having released this>substantive information ~- "bona
[839]fides eee ~-== AND by—otherwise having
[840]IJDECANTER known-to the public in true hamé~and_ crypt,
[841]THEN WE-MOST’ PROTECT the cryptonym here so sae thee
[842]intelligence Judgment of CIA is not gomprami sed.— — Tt
[844]I would appreciate a few moments to explain, with I hope some —
[845]degree of specificity, why identifiable damage would come from
[847]this disclosure -- the disclosure of the crypt in this
[848]particular instance along with this key intelligence judgment.
[850]2
[852]SECRET
[854]13-00000
[858]Mgr
[861]‘and the target intelligence service.
[863]SECRET
[864][—se "The practice of counterintelligence (CI) -- and hence the
[865]issue of damage to national security -- proceeds from four
[867]basic questions:
[868]e what information was compromised?
[870]°e what foreign intelligence service(s) received the
[871]information?
[873]e what.understanding of the information did the receiving
[874]intelligence service(s) have? oon
[876]e what information did the receiving intelligence
[877]service(s) believe and thus act on to its benefit and
[878]to the detriment of the other party?
[880]The first two questions are largely factual and can be
[881]acquired through a combination of confessions, polygraph
[882]interviews, and/or assumptions based on access.
[884]Questions three and four, however, are the most difficult and
[885]the most important for both the acquiring intelligence service
[887]Question 3 is important (e.g., Boyce Lee case) but is not
[888]really an issue here since the US fully understood the
[889]information presented.
[893]Question 4, however, is the quintessential factor for
[894]exploitation.
[896]e If the receiving intelligence service believes its asset
[897](e.g., a.defector), they act on the information to the
[898]detriment of the other service.
[902]3
[904]SECRET
[907]13-00000
[909]SECRET
[911]| e In the matter at hand,
[913]= _
[915]If they do not, the other service may escape damage fully
[917]or to some degree.
[919]This is the critical question that a foreign country must
[920]answer and it is the critical information that we must
[922]protect vis-a-vis defectors in our fold.
[924]we are very constrained by what the
[926]Russian government knows by virtue of their own knowledge and
[928]In sum,
[930]ra
[931]i what they have acquired from the substantially released
[932]document and the Los Angeles Times article.
[934]The. Russians know that Sergei PAPUSHIN (1. e., IJDECANTER)
[935]defected to the United States;
[937]they know or suspect what he told the US;
[939]they know or suspect that we fully understood the import
[940]_of what he said;
[942]they do not know, however, whether we believed him and
[943]thus incorporated his information into our operational
[944]practices and activities.
[946]And it would be critically damaging today to confirm to
[948]the Russians the final piece of the PAPUSHIN puzzle and
[950]allow them to have the ultimate benefit from what
[951]heretofore has been a US intelligence success,
[953]question 4 -- bona fides -- is the CI key.
[955]The CIA to date has released all of the substantive
[956]information relating to TJDECANTER in this particular
[958]document.
[960]But we must protect his cryptonym here, in this
[961]particular document, if we are to preclude a substantial
[962]CI benefit to the Russian Federal Security Service when
[963]they assess this new information in light of their
[965]7
[967]tania eee
[970]ae,
[972]i
[974]1
[976]previous knowledge and acquired information,—including,—
[978]4
[980]SECRET
[982]a
[984]13-00000
[986]SECRET
[988]*e Any unilateral violation of a clandestine trust has a
[989]devastating, compounding consequence for an intelligence
[990]organization.
[992]e It insidiously feeds the concern of other foreign assets
[993]-- current and past -- who will logically fear that CIA
[994]will acknowledge their own clandestine relationship at
[995]some future point in time.
[997]o Their fear could be sufficient to force them to take
[998]self-protective measures (e.g., disengagement by current.
[999]assets or public statements by inactive ones) ..
[1001]e Additionally, such violations of a clandestine trust most
[1002]assuredly impact upon the willingness of potential future
[1003]assets to establish a clandestine relationship with CIA.
[1004]Indeed, we know form experience that this complicates our
[1005]ability to obtain critical intelligence, particularly
[1006]against the harder targets (e.g., terrorism).
[1008]e There are other damages that I will touch only briefly upon in
[1009]the interests of the Board’s time. They are not
[1010]insignificant, however. .
[1012]e ONE, is foreign relations.
[1015]» In our judgment, the Russians are. fully_expect—that,—after——. \
[1016]| Aldrich Ames, the United States is considering avenues of
[1018]' reprisal.
[1020]This specific release might well be viewed as a public move to
[1021]embarrass them and it would serve only to exacerbate tensions.
[1023]i ee vo — _
[1025]5
[1027]SECRET
[1029]13-00000
[1031]SECRET
[1033]TWO, is another potential intelligence benefit to the
[1034]Russian service.
[1036]This specific release could arguably provide them with insights
[1037]into our capability to assess the bona fides of defectors.
[1039]The Russian service knows if IJDECANTER was real; the CIA does
[1040]not know this for certain.
[1042]THIRD, is an equitable ‘issue.
[1044]“The CIA has never officially confirmed that PAPUSHIN was a
[1046]defector in our custody and under our control;
[1048]The CIA has pledged to protect the relationship;
[1050]“While we acknowledge that that it is publicly known at least to
[1052]some degree -- nevertheless his wife, child and father remain
[1053]in Russia today vulnerable to whatever official or unofficial
[1054]action the current government might take.
[1056]Quite candidly, I can not predict with any certainty whether
[1057]the Russian government today would take action against the
[1059]family from this proposed release.
[1061]But I would urge caution here since the information at issue is
[1062]minimal, not critical to the public understanding, and arguably
[1063]harmful to living persons.
[1065]6
[1067]SECRET
[1069]13-00000
[1071].
[1073]SECRET
[1075]g:\irg_frontoffice\general\1ss\arrbijtp.doc
[1076](last modified at 1500 hours, 25 august 1998)
[1078]‘SECRET
[1080]13-00000
[1082]New Memo\Standard
[1084]CL BY1031682-1998-DO
[1086]CL REASON: Section 1.5 C
[1087]DECL ON: X1
[1088]prv Fam: COL 1-82
[1090]25 September 1998
[1092]MEMORANDUM FOR: Bob Skwirot
[1094]’ FROM: Charles A. Briggs-Y- o — ;
[1095]OFFICE: DCI/CSI/HRG
[1096]SUBJECT: Mexico City Station History
[1098]REFERENCE:
[1100]The Mexico City Station History contains at least 99 separate cryptonyms, for the.most part
[1101]concerning projects, but in some cases, individuals, covering the period (1947 to June 1969. in
[1102]every case, there is identifying information included with the crypt, ranging from a brief
[1103]parenthetical phrase to Several pages of detail. Since the information far exceeds that thought
[1104]relevant to the JFK story, both in time and substance, an approach designed to provide a maximum
[1105]amount of information and guidance for historians concerned with the JFK assassination, with a
[1106]minimum of gratuitously useable leads for curious or hostile FOIA requestors concerning CIA
[1107]activities generally, was chosen and is reflected in the version the Board has for consideration.
[1109]The norm in handling cryptonyms when the entire crypt is not released is to protect the
[1110]digraph - the location indicator. What I've done here, to avoid unraveling, in effect, the whole __
[1111]history of Station activity for subsequent curiousity seekers, is to reverse the process, releasing the
[1112]digraph and protecting the root - ‘specifically because the text identifies each crypt. The Board is
[1113]familiar with the decision to release almost all Ll-crypts in full - while protecting identifying
[1114]information. The major relevant LI projects (LIENVOY, LITEMPO, LICALLA, etc.) have had both the
[1115]full cryptonym and most of the details released. Na. : ——
[1117]Station-and-Operation Directorate divigion histories are e among the most sensitive documents
[1118]in the Agency. They are very tightly controlled within. the area divisions - they are not available to
[1119]cleared employees in other directorates or, traditionally, outside of the division within the Operations
[1120]Directorate. Thus concern about the release of the Mexico City History pages that, viewed through
[1121]the widest of lenses, do not appear to be relevant to the JFK story,is very great.
[1123]de - . .
[1124]aa See peace anrene
[1128]New Memo\Standard