[1]DARAAN
[2]\104-10332-10007 | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
[4]298 PSHe COUR AS WONG
[6]13-00000 | 1o4— 1lOB32Z-1O00T
[8]/. “6 :
[9]Ct ye : _ , Oly
[11]. CONFIDENTIAL
[12]we. . £
[13]CHO quide
[14]. None é
[15]7 January 1994 Cala a
[17]MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Barry Harrelson @ DA
[18]FROM: Bryant Rogers
[19]SUBJECT: . . MEETING WITHEINDAPRLORES ;
[20]REFERENCE:
[21]On 6 Jan we mat with{Linda Flores from the DO to discuss HRG concerns with regard to CIA's contacts in the 60's with well
[23]known Cubans and Cuban Organizations.
[25]The outcome of this discussion was that the DO agrees that we can release.the names of thosa major players with whom CIA
[26]worked with as long as we stay within the 60-63 time frame, with some overlap into 1964 for continuity, when needed. We then
[27]discussed aur relationships with major anti-Castro organizations. It was agreed that we could retease the fact that as a funding vehicle
[28]for.the US Govt, CIA provided support including funding in general terms. In some cases we may find it necessary to reveal gross ballpark
[29]figures for annual budgets. The-D0. would prefer that we continue to protect specific funding amounts where possible. They were
[30]specifically concerned about releasing specific amounts paid to individuals or families of Bay of Pigs members where individuals could
[31]claim that one was paid more than enother. In supporting these organizations it was acknowledged by the DO that wa could relaase
[32]generic operational activities: such as publishing journals or financing goodwill tours by prominent exile Cubans to.Latin America The DO
[33]reminded us that in reviewing these relationships with Cubans and organizations, it was important to protect CIA personnel agents and —
[34]assats and any specifics on tradecraft. ;
[36]When asked about Bay of Pigs training sites, Linda felt that the actual location should still be protected i in spite of the fact that
[37]they have been mentioned i in open literatura.
[39]’ With regard to DO location numbers (19 for Cuba) she thought this was OK for the 60-63 time frame but would check with LA
[40]Div. She had no problem with the release of the Belt location in cables since it was no longer used.
[42]cc: J. Barry Harrelson @ DA
[43]: Richard D. Kovar-Y- @ DA
[44]John F. Pereira @ DA
[46]CONFIDENTIAL
[48]13-00000
[50]a, SECRET
[51]: ? v . Co
[52]8 November | +1995 _
[53]e b ; ea es _
[54]MEMORANDUM FOR: Jeremy Gunn,
[55], ARRB Staff
[56]FROM: Barry Harrelson,
[58]SUBJECT: — Issues re Cryptonyms, Country
[60]Designators, Action Indicators and
[61]Employee True Names (UV)
[63]Attached is memorandum from the DO Focal Point. for, the
[64]ARRB addressing the release of cryptonyms, country” .
[65]designators, action indicators and employee true names. ‘The:
[66]memorandum is’ intended to provide. guidance to you and’ your
[67]staff and complements. information provided in previous —~
[68]discussions. Ellie and I welcome the opportunity | to dfscuss -
[69]these issues with your staff. (0) S 5
[71]pot pa
[75]Attachment. . 5. 7 oo , oS
[77]Unclassified When Separated
[78]From Attachment.
[80]SECRET
[82]13-00000
[84]SECRET JFL
[86]MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief,- Historical Review. Group
[88]FROM: Fredrick C. Wickham, on.
[89]. ' DO, Focal Point for ARRB
[90]SUBJECT: —- Position on Release of Cryptonyms, Country
[91]a Designators, Action Indicators and Employee. True
[93]Names
[97]During the period since the ARRB last met, the DO ‘has
[98]considered the four issues listed below that have not yet been
[99]addressed with the Board. These issues appear throughout the JFK
[100]collection and by stating our position up front we hope to
[101]facilitate the Board’s review and to reach an agreement that will _ -
[102]be mutually satisfying to the Board and the Agency. ;
[104]Cryptonyms ~ Except for cryptonyms related to-
[106]operational assets or activities involving Mexico or - Miami,
[107]the Agency will release the main component of cryptonyms and
[108]withhold only the two-letter digraph.. Treating cryptonyms
[109]in this manner will. protect the nationalities of individuals ~
[110]and operations that are not pertinent to Oswald or the JEK | ~
[111]investigation and render an easiér reading of the written .
[113]' material. — ‘
[115]Country File. Designators ~ We will delete the first:
[116]element of operational activity and operational interest
[117]files in those instances when the credibility of: the .
[118]narrative is not affected. The first element of the file
[120]“number corresponds to the alphabetical position of the
[121]country name which is easily discernible, whereas the
[122]subsequent .two elements relate to type of activity or
[123]interest and specific subject.
[125]Action Indicator (Slug) Lines - Generally, we will:
[126]release the entire-action indicator line of a document.
[128]Occasionally, however, we will withhold portions when the
[130]a oe CL ‘py (oss50a0~ .
[131]CR " .  ) DECL OADR®
[132]oS . '  DRV HUM 4-82 —
[134]SECRET
[136]13-00000
[137]DBUREL
[139]SUBJECT: Position on Cryptonyns, Country. Designators, Action
[140]Indicators and Employee True Names —
[142]‘context identifies a source or a relationship with a
[143]specific liaison ‘service.
[145]True Names of Staff: Employees - In most instances we
[147]-will release names of employees who have retired in an overt
[148]status. and were serving in Headquarters when cited in a
[149]document. We will continue to protect the true names of
[150]employees cited as serving in a field position. References.
[151]to field personnel in true name are uncommon, however, since
[152]pseudonyms are normally used in correspondence between ;
[153]Headquarters and the field. .
[155]SECRET
[157]13-00000
[159]Assassination Records Review Board
[160]600 E Street NW - 2nd Floor - Washington, DC 20530
[161](202) 724-0088 » Fax: (202) 724-0457
[163]November 9, 1995 a
[164]| CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
[165]; DECLAS SHS AOS it AND/OR
[166]HAND DELIVERED RELEASE OF CIA iNFORMATION
[167]IN THIS DOG “UMEN iT
[168]Mr. John Pereira, Director
[169]Historical Review Group .
[170]Center for the Study of Intelligence ;
[171]Central Intelligence Agency
[173]Washington, D.C., 20505 _
[175]Re: RRB requests for evidence
[177]Dear John:
[179]I thought that it might be helpful to you if I were to provide you with our current
[181]-assessment of the status of our review of the Agency's assassination records and-point ©
[183]to where we would like to proceed i in the future.
[185]I would like to begin by acknowledging the efforts made by the Historical Review
[186]Group to facilitate our review of records. It has been, as you know, a difficult and time-
[187]consuming process both for the Agency and the Review Board. We very much
[188]appreciate the personal cooperation of you and your staff.
[190]We continue to be concerned by the slow progress that has been made. Although we
[191]perceive that the task has-been more difficult and time-consuming than Cohgress
[192]anticipated; -wec+have found that the careful education process in which we have been
[193]involved has. helped educate us with respect to your concerns and, we hope, has helped
[194]demonstrate to you the Review Board's concerns.
[196]- We must, however, begin to pick up the pace. In many circumstances we are reviewing
[198]and then re-reviewing the same documents over and over again. We are also
[199]frequently put in the position of not being provided with evidence in a timely manner
[200]so that we can make our presentations to the Board. While many of these difficulties
[202]_ are understandable -- and perhaps even inherent to the start-up of the process in which
[204]we are engaged —~ we must expedite the process. Rather than dealing with dozens of
[205]records.at Board meetings, we need to move towards a schedule where hundreds of
[207]records willbe reviewed at Board meetings. From our perspective, it seems that it is
[209]essential that the Agency be prepared to allocate significant additional resources to the ©
[211]process of reviewing the records and making evidence available to the Board.
[213]Boarp Memeers: John R. Tunheim, Chair « Henry F. Graff + Kermit L. Hall - William L. Joyce - Anna K. Nelson -
[214]Executive Otrector: David G. Marwell
[216]13-00000
[218]Mr. John Pereira
[219]November 9, 1995
[221]_ Page 2
[223]We also believe that the Agency still is not providing the type of evidence that will be
[224]the most convincing to the Board. Where issues exist that the Board has not yet
[225]addressed, and where the Agency would like to see postponements upheld, specific
[226]information must be provided to support a postponement. General statements, while
[227]useful in identifying the underlying issues involved, do not provide the Board with the
[228]complete knowledge and understanding of the issue that is necessary to make an
[229]informed judgment regarding release of the information. —
[231]‘The Board is looking forward to receiving the CIA's evidence in support of the
[233]postponement of true names. As you know, we have planned for some time to devote —
[235]_ the Decemiber (12 and 13) meeting to this important issue.
[237]Additionally, you will find enclosed with this letter the next in our series of information
[238]requests, covering boxes 7-9 of the Oswald collection. We are submitting these requests
[239]now inan attempt to give HRG as much advance notice as possible.of which records we
[240]will be reviewing for the January 4 meeting. Evidence for records to be reviewed
[241]January 4 should be provided no later than December 13, 1995. ae
[243]We hope that during HRG's review of the January documents, the standards outlined in
[244]this letter will be kept in mind. If at any point an issue is deemed so sensitive that a
[246]_ briefing i is required, ARRB staff will meet with you at your convenience.
[248]Thank you for your attention to this matter.
[250]Sincerely yours, | \:
[252]i yeah Mois We le {?
[254]David G. Marwell —
[256]Executive Director
[258]Enclosures.
[260]13-00000
[262]SECRET
[263]11 December 1995
[265]NOTE FOR THE FILE
[267]SUBJECT: Briefing of JFK Board Staff: Cover
[269]1. Onr ‘December} Barry Gibson, Deputy Chief of the
[270]Office of Central Cover, briefed the Executive Director of
[272]' the Assassinations Records Review Board and other Board
[274]staff members. Also participating from CIA were (John. Goins }
[276]and Eleanor Neiman of IMS; (Linda Ciprian i), ‘occ; and Barry
[277]Harrelson and I from HRG.
[279]2. The focus of the briefing was on the need to protect
[280]the names. of former Agency employees that appeared in the
[281]JFK records. Gibson discussed the risks involved for people
[282]who retired under cover if they were identified in the ;
[283]public record as former CIA employees. He discussed the .
[285]‘efforts made by his office to obtain written statements from
[287]the more than 100 individuals whose names appear.
[289]3.0 The purpose of the briefing assist the Board
[290]in its review of names when it ‘meets 42-13 December The
[291]Agency was asked in particular to present, in writing,
[292]evidence of risk. for each of the names that will be
[293]discussed at the Board's meeting.
[295]Clee
[297]“John F. Pereira
[299]asy TOL
[301]CL BRASON: Cov —- sa SE
[303]DECL ON: AE
[304]DitV FROM: —At8 fe= 7
[306]SECRET
[308]13-00000
[310]MEMORANDUM
[311]. March 20, 1996 GIA HAS NO OBJECTION Yo
[312]ied ATION AND/OR
[313]To: | ———- Review Board THIS DOCUMENT
[314]cc: . David Marwell
[315]CIA Team
[316]From: ——sT.. Jeremy Gwi ih
[317]Subject: Board Guidelines on Kelens (a TA Officer Names.
[319]x
[321]The Staff understands the Review Board to accept the following general guidelines o1 on
[322]the release of true names of CIA officers: _
[324]When the true name of a CIA officer (i.e. past or present employee of CIA) appears ina
[325]document, the Board will bring to its review a presumption that the true name will be
[327]. released. In order to overcome this presumption of release, CIA must provide evidence
[329]demonstrating that release of the name would be harmful. In order to meet its burden
[330]of proving harm, CIA must tailor the evidence to satisfy one of the three categories
[331]identified in Part I (below). However, when the name of an officer is of such
[332]importance that the public interest would not be served in postponing a name, the
[333]Board may release the true name consistent with the principles identified in Part I
[334](below).
[336]Part I. Categories of Officers.
[338]1. Living officers. For living (present or former) officers, CLA must prove that:
[339]. (a) the officer is living outside the United States (or reasonably is expected to
[340]_ reside or travel outside the United States in the foreseeable future); (b) the officer
[341]_ is either working or is retired under cover; and (c) the officer objects to the
[342]release of his or her true name. If CIA satisfies this burden, the Board
[343]| presumptively (see Part II below) will release a pseudonym and postpone the
[344]officer’s true name until the year 2010.
[346]2. Where current status of former officer is unknown. Where CIA has been
[347]unable to contact the former officer because his or her location is unknown, CIA
[348]must present a good faith showing that reasonable attempts have been made to
[349]locate the officer. If the Board is convinced that CIA has‘made a good faith
[350]showing that it was unable to locate the former officer, the Board will postpone
[351]the true name until June 1, 1997. However, the Board may Postpone the true
[353]13-00000
[355]name beyond: June 1, 1997, if CIA provides to the Board, prior to May 1, 1997,
[356]additional evidence that satisfies the criteria of either category 1 (above) or
[357]category 3 (below).
[359]3. Names having effect on current intelligence interests. If CLA believes that
[360]the release of a true name may compromise currently existing intelligence
[361]operations or might otherwise cause an identifiable harm, it must provide
[362]evidence that: (a) the officer currently is engaged in clandestine activities; (b) the
[363]release of the true name would compromise ongoing intelligence operations or
[364]-would compromise operations with current intelligence value; (c) the release of
[365]the true-name would reasonably be expected to cause significant harm to a living
[366]person (including family members), or (d) the release of the true name would
[368] causea significant harm to the national security or the foreign relations of the _
[369]United States. If CIA satisfies this burden, the Board presumptively (see Part I
[370]below) will release a pseudonym and postpone the true name until 2010 or until
[371]such other date as CIA reasonably shows to be a date on which the release could
[372]be made without causing harm.
[376]Part II. Names of Officers Who Are Important to the Assassination Story.
[378]The Board presumptively will postpone the release.of names consistent with
[379]categories 1-3 of Part I. However, for certain persons whose names appear ina
[380]context that is important to the assassination story, the Board may nevertheless
[381]vote to release the true name. In all such instances, the Board will notify CIA of
[382]the importance of such a person and provide CIA with the opportunity to
[383]provide additional information in support of postponing the release of the
[384]names. These names shall be reviewed on a case-by-case basis, with due
[385]consideration being given to the importance of the person to the assassination -
[386]story and such evidence of harm as CIA may provide.
[388]13-00000
[391]. . ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY
[393]From the Desk of Linda C. Cipriani:
[395]NOTE FOR:
[397]FROM:
[398]DATE: I:
[399]SUBJECT: JFK - Central Cover appeal
[401]The General Counsel and { met with the JFK Review Board on Friday and discussed, among other things, how to-deal with the potential .
[402]public release of the identities of former employees retired under cover. The Board clearly wants to do the right thing here, but they feel:
[404]they are not getting enough information to make that decision.
[406]Jeremy Gunn (JFK Board's General Counsel) will soon provided me with some of the Board's suggestions on how to deal with this which |
[408]will pass on to you (including how:to deal with Whitten). :| would at the very least like to be able suggest that we attempt contact again
[410](either through CIA or the Board) with those retirees who have not yet responded to our letter. Of course; any suggestions you have at
[411]this point will be extremely helpful. My sense is that this issue of protecting retirees is something everyone at CIA will want to appeal
[412]just on the principal of it, but that we should do everything possible to avoid an appeal. [Until we work out an agreement with the Board,
[414]you should continue to prepare that appeal you are drafting]
[416]In the meantime, can you please provided me the following figures:
[418]1. The # of people we sent letters to regarding the potential Board releases. {isn't jt 150?) and the following breakdown if
[420]available: ,
[421]- # living abroad
[422]- # of those retired under cover vs. thse whose cover has been rolled back or lifted
[424]- # of those who still work for us in covert/avert capacity
[425]2. The # of responses we received to date. .
[426]3. The # of responses to date requesting that we don’t release.
[427]4. The # of responses to date saying that they didn't care.
[429]| realize you are all out of the office these days, but [ would appreciate getting this as soan as youcan, Thanks.
[431]cc: J. Barry Harrelson.
[432]Eleanor E. Neiman @ DO
[433]Frederick Wickham @ DO
[435]ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY
[437]13-00000
[439]ae mo ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY
[441]8 March 1996
[443]MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Barry Harellson
[444]John Pereira
[447]DCVOGCILD
[449]SUBJECT: - JFK - March 18 Board Meeting
[451]REFERENCE:
[453]ADMINISTRATIVE -. INTERNAL USE ONLY
[455]From the Desk of kinda C. Ciprianis,
[457]NOTE FOR: ‘ Paula A. Sweeney @ DCI
[458]. Robert 0. Davis @ DCI
[459]Robert 0. Caudle @ DCI
[461]FROM: Linda.C. Cipriani
[462]DATE: 03/08/96 02:50:39 PM
[463]SUBJECT: JFK - March 18 Board Meeting
[465]| have been informed that: Dave agers will be attending the next JFK Board meeting. | If this is the case, it would seem that Jeff should
[466]go as well.
[468]Two issues need to be discussed with the Board: stations and cover employees.
[470]1. Jeff and the Board agreed in principal to a “window” in which all stations would be opened (1980;64) Of course, if.
[471]there are particular stations which need to be exempted from this the Board will consider it upon the presentation of substantive
[472]evidence.
[474]- HRG and the Board think this is a good idea that would enable tham to avoid raising potential appeals every month
[476]Dave! Edger Teeds to be signed onto this idea.
[477]- Jeff, last month, presented additional information on ‘Osto,Stocktiolm; and Gopenhagen. Jeff and Dave should be
[478]prepared to answer questions or provide more information so that the Board will agree to protect these stations.
[480]2. _The Board recently released the names of! 16 cover employees. An appeal is being prepared (or sol am told). The
[481]thirty days runs on March 18. We need to finalize with the Board how to handle this issue. At the last meeting the Board agreed that
[482]this was a really important decision, but that they were not getting the information they need to make the right decision. At the fast
[483]meeting, the Board intimated that they might be willing to delay this release, if CIA and the Board could come to a mutually agreeable
[484]way to deal with cover employees. | understood from Jeff that this is an issue that CIA will appeal on just.the principal. If this is true,
[485]the Board should understand what our ultimate position is on this, but that we are willing to cooperate with them to find a suitable —
[486]alternative (using pseudos of generic descriptions like "case officer")
[488]3. { will be out all next week but Barry Harellson/HRG (30292) and John Pereira/CSI) (30373) will be happy to fill you .
[489]in on the details. Barry will be contacting Bob Caudie next week to find out how the March 18 meeting will be handled.
[491]ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY
[493]13-00000
[495]FROM:
[496]SUBJECT:
[498]1.
[500]29 July 1996
[502]MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief Historical Review Group
[504]Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.
[505]_ DO, Focal Point for ARRB
[507]Proposal for Dealing with Employees’ Names
[509]Cover mechanisms are an integral part of conducting .
[511]clandestine operations. We are concerned about individuals that
[512]continue to. be dependent on ‘particular cover legends and on the
[513]organizations. that. cooperatively work with us to provide those
[514]cover legends. The following proposal is offered to streamline
[515]the process of handling names and minimize the potential damage
[516]an inappropriate release could cause.
[518]A. Incomplete and Unidentifiable names:
[520]a. We will release the occurrence of a name when a
[521]common last name appears by itself or in conjunction ~
[522]with a common first name such that it does not tend
[523]to specifically identify the individual.
[525]b. We will release the occurrence of a name if it.
[526]remains unidentified after a reasonable search is
[527]conducted.
[529]B. Identifiable names for employees that retired
[531]overtly:
[533]In most cases, overt employees’ names will be released,
[535]-but..in some cases overt employees may have a
[536]‘portion of their employment remain under cover. Such
[538]cases will require the same review as that of an
[539]employee who remained under cover into retirement.
[541]ADMENES PRATIVE..._INTRRNBL Usr ony.
[543]13-00000
[545]SUBJECT: Proposal for Dealing with Employees' Names
[547]; C. Identifiable names for employees that retired
[548]covertly:
[550]a. We will make a reasonable attempt to locate a
[551]current address and contact the person. If the person
[552]ebjects to the release of his or her name for reasons
[554]‘associated with current life style issues, we will
[555]object to the release of the name. If the person does
[556]not have objections based upon personal circumstances we
[557]will review the name for: organizational issues j-- (See
[558]para C. c.) L ; 3
[562]b. If reasonable efforts fail to locate the
[563]current address, but it can. be determined that the
[564]individual is still receiving a pension, insurance or
[565]other benefit based upon-cover legend, we will need to
[566]continue to protect the name since source of income or
[567]benefits can not be altered without prior notification |
[568]to the individual. If we fail to identify a pension or
[569]other active benefit, we will review the name for
[570]organizational issues. (See para c. c.}
[572]c. We will make a reasonable attempt. to review the
[573]name to look for identifiable harm to. the person’s
[574]safety, family, ongoing operational activities, national
[575]security. or foreign relations. Assuming that none of
[576]the previous concerns are identified, we will review the
[577]potential damage to the cover mechanism or cover
[578]provider by the specific occurrence of. the name if
[579]released.
[581]'* 2. Because families of deceased employees could be the
[582]beneficiary of pensions or insurance provided under the employees
[583]cover legend, we must review them the same as we would the’
[584]employee. We also have second and third generation officers
[585]following in the footsteps of their parents that could be
[586]negatively impacted by the revelation.
[588]3. Our efforts to locate current addresses will include. all
[589]internal record systems maintained by Office of Personnel
[590]Security, Retirement Branch and Insurance Branch. We will
[591]include a checklist reflecting completion of these searches
[593]13-00000
[595]w
[597]SUBJECT: Proposal for Dealing with Employees' Names
[599]within the documentation when requesting continued protection of
[600]the name. a 3
[602]4. We considered options of contacting IRS or OPM during
[603]our attempts to locate current addressing information, but based
[604]upon the_fact that these offices would be unwitting of the cover
[605]arrangement for the individual, it was determined to be an —
[606]unreasonable risk to the cover of these officers.
[610]a
[611]a
[613]va te
[615]va _
[617]Z . ue, ay a . : ae
[619]aa PPL fre © y |
[620]bell
[622]Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.
[624]13-00000
[626]SUBJECT: Proposal for Dealing with Employees‘ Names
[628]IMS/RPG Fwickham:mjk (29 July 1996)
[630]Distribution: _
[631]' Orig & 1'- Addressee
[632]* J - C/occ
[634]1 - IMS/ESG/ALB
[635]1 - IMS/ESG/IRB
[636]1 - IMS/ESG/HCS
[637]1 - IMS/ESG-OIT/MSG/RDP
[638]1
[640]~, ESG Chrono _ . | .
[642]74
[644]13-00000 . oo
[645]- | Dree dew are,
[646]oo CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
[647]RELEASEIN FULL
[648]~~ 2000
[650]11 February 1997.
[651]MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
[652]FROM: Gary M. Breneman, IC
[653]SUBJECT: Comparison of ARRB and DO Memoranda re
[654]Treatment. of CIA Officer Names: in JFK
[655]Collection
[656]1. This memorandum is in response to an assignment to
[657]compare a 20. March 1996 ARRB memorandum written: by T. Jeremy
[658]Gunn and The Directorate of Operations response: dated 20:
[659]July 1966, authored by Fredrick on Wickham, gr. Both deal
[660]with the treatment of CIA officer true names which appear in
[661]the JFK collection -- when they will be postponed and when
[662]they will be released. | _
[664]2. Fixst the ARRB Memorandum Gunn describes in legal
[665]terms. the Board's position on the postponement or release of
[666]cIA officers' true names . He makes a proffer which states
[668]that: there is. a ‘presumption in ‘favor of release akin to a
[669]legal evidentuary rule. which . causes. a burden to shite to the
[670]other party (CTA) to prove something. In this. instance, it
[671]is factual evidence/proof sufficient to shift. the burden not
[673]only back to neutral but to the. other, side of neutral which .
[675]permits postponement .
[677]3. The Gunn memorandum then sets out the ‘criteria
[679]required to meet the burden under several situations.
[681]13-00000
[683]A. For officers who are still alive he states that the
[685]proofs required to postpone release of a name are three in
[686]number and all three must be met:
[687]i. @ FE be_livii id f the U.S
[689].. (presumably ,
[691]ii.
[692]. a current staff officer, contract employee,
[693]or independent contractor) -.- or ig retired
[694]under cover; |
[695]her.true'n am me. ,
[697]COMMENT : Mr. Gunn! 8 criteria are a little confusing
[699]and reach beyond the Board's authority. First, note. again .
[701]that! the three elements are joined by an a i ANDRE meahing all
[703]etencnt must be met to satisfy a postponement. Second, the
[705]firgt requirement of living or. traveling outside: of the U.S.
[706]is not tied to % cover. # Many officers: who do not work
[707]under cover all of the time are, in fact, ‘provided cover
[708]for. overseas TDY's ‘Thus, any officer who might. |
[710]reasonably’ be expected to travel outside of the U.S.
[712]would warrant postponement of his true name. This would
[714]13-00000
[716]seem to include every CIA employee, contract employee and
[717]independent contractor past and present.
[719]With respect to the third element, Mr. Gunn and the
[720]Board are simply in error. To my knowledge they have no !
[721]authority to require that an individual be consulted
[723]concerning his or her wishes to maintain cover, thus having
[725]his.or her true name postponed, or to give up his cover,
[726]. thus having the name released. This decision does not lie
[728]... in the. ‘first instance with the individual but is an
[730]"institutional decision which lies solely within the purview
[731]of the Agency and the executive branch of the government.
[733]- CIA as an executive agency charged with the creation,
[735] maintenance,. and dissolution of cover mechanisms is the only
[736]entity competent to make such a decision. It alone knows if
[737]. release of an officer's true name will compromise an
[738]existing cover mechanism which will, in turn, ‘expose others -
[740]“who share | or have shared the. same cover. It alone knows if
[742]lease of an officer’ 6 hame will expose CIA sponsorship (a
[744]gpitity) of-a sensitive activity, It alone knows if
[746]“release of an officer's name. will violate a promise of
[748]on ‘identiality toa commercial cover sponsor which could
[750]. ‘gause both embarrassment and possibly, financial hardship to
[752]the: ponsor and, in turn, substantially hinder the Agency's
[754]“ability to secure subsequent commercial cover sponsors.
[756]va Lo * .
[757]. Turning next to the wishes of a particular officer
[758](either current or retired) vis a vis staying with his or _
[760]her cover, these thoughts come to mind. For current
[762]13-00000
[764]employees, the decision is again not entirely theirs. If,
[765]after careful review, the Agency does not have a strong
[766]position on the employee maintaining the cover, the officer
[767]should be permitted to decide. He or she should -be .
[768]counseled however, that an action to remove cover could have
[769]an adverse impact on future assignments or TDYs. With
[770]respect to retirees, if, after careful review, the Agency
[772]does not object to the removal from cover, the individual
[774]sho 1d be permitted to decide. Note, that the responses to
[776]. this inquiry will be mixed. As a historical note, the
[778]; Agency over the years has been on an ever-swinging pendulum
[780]with respect to % cover into retirement,# % cover for
[782]life,® etc. There will be officers who petitioned hard
[783]unsuccessfully to have their cover removed when they retired.
[784]and will gladly consent to lifting the cover. There will be
[786]. those. officers who do not want their cover lifted under any
[788]aintenance « or lifting of cover.
[790]Be Former officers, status unknown. While the
[792]heading to this section would seem to suggest the CIA does
[794]nd know the cover/non-cover status of some of its former
[795]officers, the section does not rally deal with this issue.
[797]‘Rather, within the section, Mr. Gunn simply recognizes the
[799]fact the CIA may not be able to find all of its former
[801]officers to ask if they want to be opened up or remain under
[803]q
[805]13-00000
[807]as
[809]cover. The test required by Mr. Gunn to satisfy the Board
[810]and thus continue postponement until 1 June of this year.is
[811]a % good faith showing that reasonable attempts were made
[812]to locate the officer and failed. _
[814]The section contains the additional provision which
[816]advises the Board may continue a postponement beyond 1 June
[818]of this year (i.e., until 2010) if the CIA provides the
[819]board with evidence which satisfies the criteria of either
[821]category 1 or category 3. Such ¥& additional -evidence# must
[823]be provided by 1.May 1977.
[825]The requirements or tests of this section for the
[827]Agency are not onerous but should be set~-out as a series of
[829]uniform actions or check-off's taken in the attempt to_
[831]locate each % current status unknown officer. The record
[832]of these actions: could then be. ‘presented. to the ARRB .in
[834]support of a request for continued to postponement. The DO
[836]Memorandum mentions of the possibility. of asking the IRS or
[838]the OPM for assistance. in this regard: anc t is shoul d
[840]probably, be ‘done: I ‘recall however, ‘that ‘the ‘Service will
[842]assist, through cleared contacts at the National Office, but.
[844]- only to the extent of determining the whereabouts of the
[846]individual and then contacting him and’ “ask that he be in
[848]touch with his former employer. I have. ‘no current knowledge
[850]of Cleared: contacts at the OPM ‘but they existed ‘in. the past
[852]and’ T ‘assume they continue.
[854]C. Names having effect on current intelligence
[856]interests. The Gunn letter appears to subscribe a higher
[857]OO »
[858]t
[860]13-00000
[862]“anyone who shared the same. cove
[866]level of concern to this section and its criteria than the
[868]previous two, not recognizing the plain fact that the
[870]‘eriteria of all three sections are inextricable. It sets -
[872]out four separate criteria which, if CIA satisfies its
[873]burden, i.e. provides sufficient evidence to prove any one
[874]of them, will operate to postpone a true name until the year
[876]2010. Note again, the criteria required are four separate
[878]‘ones, each separated by a comma’ and between numbers 3 and 4
[880]and “ OR.” They are:
[881]i. The officer must be currently engaged in
[882]clandestine activities; OR,
[884]ii. The release of the officer's name. would
[886]compromise ongoing intelligence operations or operations
[888]with current “intelligence value. (presumably, the latter
[890]‘Penitee s a review into the officer 8 past activities, agent
[892]“person (including family. members read broadly, this
[894]| Broyision would include, the. ind dual, former agents,
[896]x cover position, i.e. a
[898]dedicated: Department of State ‘glo within an } embasey) ; OR,
[900]iv... The’ release, of the officer’ 8 name ‘would cause a
[902]sigti ficant harm to the national. security or the foreign
[904]relations of the U.S. (a criteria which is broad enough to
[906]-drive the proverbial Mack truck through) .
[908]13-00000
[910]of the -
[912]. from a f
[914]4. In Part II, the Gunn memorandum takes back part of
[915]what it gave in the previous section. It sets up a test of
[916]% importance to the assassination story vs. evidence of
[917]harm.# Essentially, it advises that the Board will weigh
[919]the CIA's evidence but, if within its view, the true name
[921]being considered for postponement is important to the
[923]assassination story, the Board will release it. This means
[925]for those few individuals who may be viewed as % important
[927]to ‘the story, § | truly substantial evidence must be brought
[929]to bear. - Absent such evidence, ‘the Board will release, and
[930]the ‘only recourse left to the Agency would be an appeal to
[931]the President.
[933]5. “The Directorate of Operations Memorandum. The »
[935]basic concern with the steps for handling names as contained
[937]within the memorandum’ is as. follows. For. officers who
[939]retired under cover, the first ‘step will be to contact them
[941]- and ask’ if _they want their true 3 name: released. Per the
[943] conménts 0 on page, three supra this should be the last step
[945]eview, not the first.
[947]AL Other Comments. The resources. and data bases
[949]"which will be. researched for éach name should be clearly
[951]‘established and followed ain a uniform manner. Deviation
[953]. orderly process, will open CIA determinations to
[955]. eriticism, objections and dismissal, i.e. release of a name
[958]that should be postponed.
[960]B. In. addition to the data bases described --
[962]retirement records, annuity pay records, the office of
[964]f
[966]13-00000
[968]an
[970]“. °
[973]‘there. is ‘some’ question,
[975]need t otis a8 our, ealen
[977]security, insurance lists -- consideration might be given
[978]to the Northwest Federal Credit Union, and overt data bases
[979]such as Phonedec. Like the IRS and OPM, the credit union
[980]might not be able from a legal standpoint to provide an
[981]address. However, it would probably be prepared to contact
[982]an individual and ask that he be in touch.
[984]C. A comment must be made about the idea of
[985]universally releasing the true names of overt employees. To
[987]the extent that any current employee, even overt employee,
[989]may ‘be ‘gent overseas on TDY ‘under light cover, the release
[991]of his ‘or her true name via these JFK documents which will
[993]receive widespread review could jeopardize his overseas
[995], mission and possibly, place his life in danger.
[997]6. These thoughts are intended to be talking points as
[999]we commence to ‘sort out the manner in which we will deal
[1000]: with. the true names. clearly, we “need to begin. to quickly
[1002]; identify those names which can be released, those on which
[1004]and those few on which we really
[1006]Gary M. Breneman
[1008]13-00000.
[1010]SECRET - WORKING PAPER
[1012]5 March, 1997
[1014]Memorandum For: Chief/HRG .
[1016]From: Barry Harrelson
[1017]Subject: Name Issue / Status of Review
[1018]Reference: - _ Meetings with ARRB staff (Marwell & Gunn)
[1020]4 March 1997
[1022]Name Issue
[1024]I met with Gunn and Marwell (separate meetings) to
[1025]discuss the reopening of the names issue per my memo to you.
[1026]Both Gunn and Marwell reacted positively. They found the
[1027]proposal to be reasonable one and they are willing to work
[1028]with us in approaching the Board. However, both said they
[1029]could not predict the Boards reaction. Per Marwell, one
[1030]member of the Board (Anna Nelson) seems to believe that if a
[1031]person worked for the CIA it should be known.
[1033]Apparently our timing is excellent. Marwell is
[1034]planning to propose to the Board that they change the
[1035]process from the focus on individual postponements to
[1036]documénts.. Under the new approach his staff would have the
[1037]authority to negotiate with the Agency on the release of
[1038]documents, and only issues/documents of disagreement would
[1039]be placed before the Board. Marwell is convinced that evén
[1040]with an additional year they will not finish the project
[1041]with the current approach. He sees our proposal on the
[1042]hames as an example of how the process would work.
[1044]Marwell recommends that we include examples of
[1045]documents containing names of little or no connection to the
[1046]story. Bob Skwirot (he was in the meeting with Marwell)
[1047]said that there were a number of names that appeared in only
[1048]one document and that the number of names had reached{ 590:
[1049]Marwell wants to start immediately on preparing a joint™ Tist
[1050]of important/releasable individuals.
[1052]Action: Advise DO, OGC, upper management of our proposal to
[1053]reopen the name issue (how?). Need to decide what level
[1054]would sign the memo to the Board, and who would prepare the
[1055]memo. If you agree I can send a copy of my memo to you to.
[1056]Linda) and Fred for background use.
[1058]HRG and DO team will collect examples of documents and
[1059]prepare (with ARRB staff) a list of individuals. The DO
[1060]should focus on any person on the list that needs protection
[1061]and prepare the evidence ASAP (i.e. not wait for the issue
[1062]to be resolved).
[1064]SECRET
[1066]13-00000
[1068]SECRET - WORKING PAPER
[1070]New ARRB Review Process
[1072]Marwell and I spent some time discussing how a new
[1073]process would work. He would like to test the process for
[1074]the April meeting. The following is a rough outline with my
[1075]comments:
[1077]1) HRG reviewers would review the documents the same
[1078]as they do now (postponements would be blue highlighted).
[1079]{no change in our procedures]
[1081]2) ARRB staff would review the blue highlighted
[1082]document.
[1084]a) If they agree, they would stamp the document
[1085]“ARRB approved” and return it to HRG to process
[1086]for NARA.
[1088]b) If they disagree they would highlight in
[1089]yellow (creating green highlighting). If the two
[1090]staffs cannot resolve the issue, then the document
[1091]would go before the Board.
[1093][Major change: ARRB staff would no longer record all the
[1094]proposed postponements, no DO damage review, no detailed
[1095]determination letter requiring HRG reviewers to use the
[1096]“grid” to determine what happen.]
[1098]3) Non-issue documents would be sent to the ARRB
[1099]staff when ready for NARA. At that time the ARRB staff
[1100]would prepare a simplified final determination notice and
[1101]letter to the Agencies.
[1103][ No action would be required; HRG would file. the final
[1104]determination notice with the document].
[1106]4) “Green” highlighted documents that go to the Board
[1107]would be handled the same as today.
[1109][The expectation is that a lot less documents would require
[1110]Board action. ] !
[1112]Comments: With some fine tuning, I think this process could
[1113]work, and we would be able to complete the re-review of
[1114]documents released in 1993 and 1994 by Oct. 1998.
[1116]Completing the entire project will depend on how quickly the
[1117]“non-related” material and the “addition records” are
[1118]reviewed by the ARRB staff.
[1120]SECRET
[1122]13-00000
[1124]SECRET - WORKING PAPER
[1126]Pending Issues
[1128]As part of the change in process, Marwell wants the
[1129]Board to focus on outstanding substantive issues as opposed
[1131]‘to micro managing the review. We discussed the following:
[1133]1) Nosenko. ARRB staff needs to review the non-related
[1134]material and make a recommendation to the Board. Marwell
[1135]leans toward not treating all of Nosenko as assassination
[1136]related. Could be a hard sell with some Board members.
[1138]Should we request that Nosenko meet with the Board? Marwell
[1139]thinks they would react favorably.
[1141]2) Personnel Files. Again the first step is to have
[1142]his staff confirm that only a part of a file is related and
[1143]that those documents are in the released material.
[1145]3) \. Gibson). FBI file issue; we need to present case to
[1146]the Board :
[1148]4)( LI. 9h Continuing to protect will be a hard sell
[1150]a Continul
[1151]given that( Newman . has 8 published} identity; we need to present
[1153]5) CRC Financial Files. ARRB staff needs to review
[1155]Annual Report and Extension
[1157]Marwell ask me to draw you attention to the Annual
[1158]Report and the request for an extension. He would still
[1159]like a letter from the Agency (could be addressed to him)
[1160]along these lines: “reviewed Annual Report”
[1162]“note that the Board has ask for extension”
[1163]“support the request/feel it is in interest of
[1164]Agency and public /or something along these lines
[1168]Other igsues (not discussed with Marwell/Gunn)
[1170]C Linda] (0GC). says CI Staff has ask Gunn to rewrite his
[1172]- notes, and opposes Gunn's suggestion to release pages from
[1173]the CI histories he reviewed. Gunn indicated in his notes
[1175]that some of the pages should be released and might be
[1176]considered assassination records. We are going to run into
[1177]similar problems with the other histories. Gunn will be in
[1178]HQ tomorrow to re-do his notes. She will discuss the “pages
[1179]issue” with the goal of having him drop the request to
[1180]release. As to the question of designating the pages as
[1181]assassination records, she will inform him that CI will
[1182]oppose. If he insist, she will refer back to HRG.
[1184]SECRET
[1186]13-00000
[1188]rf 97 . P : ;
[1189]gy 08/23/07 WED 15:53 FAX 202 724 0457 © __ARRB ues
[1191]S$ H-E E T
[1192]‘To: J. Barry Harrelson ; ——-
[1193]Fax 703-613-3063 _ _ CIA HAS NO OBJECTION To
[1194]Subject: _ Segregated Collections ' DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
[1195]“Dates = Aptil23,1997 | RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT’
[1196]Pages: _7, including this cover sheet.
[1197]Today the Board adopted the attached guidelines.
[1198]From ths desk of...
[1199]. T..Jeremy Gunn
[1200]: . General Counsel
[1201]Aseaesination Recorde Review Board
[1202]600 E Street, N.W.
[1203]Washington, 0.6, 20630
[1204](202) 724-0088.
[1206]Fax: (202) 724-0487
[1208]13-00000
[1210]04/23/97 WED 15: 53 FAX | 202 02 724 0457 AKKB wu
[1211]et ele —_ Se z a . "6
[1212]CIA HAS NO OBJECTION To _
[1213]DECLASSIFICATION ANDYOR-
[1215]RELEASE OF THI6 DOCUMENT
[1217]Assassination Records Review Board
[1218]Guldelines for Review of Postponements in the Segregated Collections
[1219]_ Adopted: April 23, 1997
[1221]Background
[1223]In order to ensure that the Review Board will be able to complete Its task of reviewing
[1224]all identified assassination records, the Board recently took two significant steps. . First,
[1225]on November 13, 1996, it adopted guidelines with respect to reviewing “Segregated
[1226]Collections” with regard to information that is “not believed relevant” (NBR) to the -
[1227]assassination. Second, in February 1997, the Review Board requested Congress to
[1229]- extend its tenure for one additional year.
[1231]It is the Review Board’s Judgment t that, even with the assumption that our operations
[1233]- may be extended through Fiscal Year 1998, the Review Board cannot hope to complete
[1234]review of postponements in-the Segregated Collections under the current method of
[1235]review. In particular, a reasonable modification of current postponement standards ~
[1236]would greatly expedite and facilitate the release of.additional Information and records.
[1237]Otherwise, the Review Board might cease operations without having reviewed. claimed
[1238]postponements in tens of thousands of pages of FBI and CIA records.
[1240]Postponement Criteria for the Segregated Collections
[1242]In a further effort to enhance the Review Board's work, the Review Board now issues
[1243]these revised guidelines for the review of records in the Segregated Collections.’ :
[1244](These guidelines do not affect the FBI's Core and Related Files or the CIA's 201 file on. _
[1245]Oswald.) The four principal factors that underlie these review guidelines are: first,
[1246]continuing, to the greatest reasonable extent, the Review Board's established _
[1247]guidelines for postponemenis that have emerged over the past two years; second,
[1248]establishing guidelines corisistent with the Review Board’s decision regarding NBR
[1249]records; s; third, establishing reasonable and workable » uidelines that will enable the.
[1251]The regulations adopted by the Board on November 13, 1996, define
[1252]“Segregated Collections” as including first, FBI records that were requested by: (a).the
[1253]House Select Committee on Assassinations (“HSCA”) in conjunction with its
[1254]investigation into the Kennedy assassination; (b) the Church Committee in conjunction
[1255]with Its inquiry Into issues related to the Kennedy assassination; and (c) by other bodies
[1256](e.g., Pike Committee, Abzug Committee, etc.) that relate to the Kennedy ;
[1257]assassination; and second, CIA records including (a) the CIA's Sequestered Collection
[1258]of.63 boxes as well as one box of microfilm records and the microfilm records.(box 64),
[1259]and (b) several boxes of CIA staff “working files.”
[1261]13-00000
[1263]04/23/07 WED 15:54 FAX 20Z 724 0457 0am | wave
[1265]ian
[1267]Review Board, the ARRB staff, the CIA, and the FBI to complete the signifi icant amount ;
[1268]of work that remains; and finally, to provide reasonably consistent standards for the .
[1269]review of postponements that would apply equally to CIA: and FBI records..
[1271]The following are, in summary form, guidelines for reviewing postponements in the
[1274]CIA Source and FBI Informant and National Security Asset. Postponements |
[1276]There are, of course, similarities and differences between FBI informants and CiA .
[1277]sources, Like FBI.informants and national security assets, CIA sources may or may not
[1278]be paid for the information that they provide and they may or may not be providers of.
[1279]information over the long-term. .When.providing Information to the Bureau, FBI .
[1280]informants generally are understood to be cooperating with law enforcement officials for |.
[1281]a legal and legitimate purpose. It is often the case; although not always, that FBI
[1282]informants understand that at some point their name might surface in conjunction with a
[1283]criminal prosecution and that they may need to:testify in court. Foreign CIA sources
[1285]and FBI national security. assets, however, are not necessarily deemed to be >»
[1286]cooperating with law enforcement officials but may, in fact, be committing the crime of
[1287]espionage against their native country by cooperating with US authorities. Furthermore,
[1288]unlike FBI informants, CIA sources and FBI national security assets presume that thelr
[1289]names will not be released publicly and they certainly presume (in the ordinary course) ~
[1290]that thelr identities will not surface in criminal trials. As a practical matter, it is generally
[1291]much easier today for the FBI to locate a former informant who resides in the United
[1292]States than it Is for the CIA and FBI to locate former sources and national security:
[1294]assets.
[1296]Despite these differences -- differances which would generally suggest a greater
[1297]degree of protection being owed to CIA sources and FBI national security assets -- the
[1298]issues in terms of postponements are fundamentally similar.
[1300]*The existing “NBR” guidelines allow the Review Board to remove from detailed .
[1301]consideration those records or files that truly have no apparent relevance to the
[1302]assassination, Nevertheless, a significant number of files in the Segregated Collections
[1303]contain records that shed some light on Issues that the HSCA explored as potentially
[1304]relevant to the assassination of President Kennedy. The following criteria would apply
[1305]to all records In-the Segregated Collections, including records containing sc some NBR
[1306]redactions,
[1308]13-00000
[1310]04/23/97 WED 15:54 FAX ZUZ 724 U457 : AKND wen
[1312]re ee i er
[1314]oA Sources a
[1316]The Review Board established guidelines, during Its December 1996 meeting, for
[1317]handling CIA source iesues and applied those guidelines at the January 1997 meeting.
[1318]These guidelines directed the protection of names and identifying information of CIA ~
[1319]sources in cases where the identity of the source Is of low public interest or is peripheral
[1320]to the JFK assassination. The Board's decision was based on two factors: the:concem -
[1321]that since CIA sources generally live outside the United States, they could risk harm If
[1322]their identities were revealed. Moreover, many of the sources referenced In CIA.
[1323]records appear infrequently and are of relatively fow public interest. Therefore, In
[1324]records where the identity of the source Is of Importance for understanding the
[1325]assassination, the CIA will be required to provide additional evidence to support the
[1326]protection of the source’s identity.° In cases where the identify of the source Is
[1327]peripheral to the assassination story, the information will be postponed until 2017.
[1329]FBI National Security Assets
[1331]FBI national security assets should be treated in the same manner as CIA sources.
[1333]FBI informants
[1335]informant issues represent the largest category of postponements in the FBI's
[1336]Segregated Collection, as they do in the “core” FBI assassination files. They also
[1337]provide the greatest opportunity for streamlining the review process, Currently, there
[1338]are ten.members of the Bureau’s JFK Task Force who are responsible. for researching
[1339]individual informants in response to evidence requests from the Review Board.‘ They
[1340]retrieve and review the informants’ files and attempt, through DMV, Social Security, and
[1341]other database. searches, to determine if the informant is alive. Under current Review
[1342]Board standards for “core” files, this work is necessary to provide evidence to support
[1344]_ redacting the informant’s name, regardless of whether the informant provided
[1345]Information. Removing the requirement of proving whether informants are alive in the
[1346]‘Segregated Collections would free up significant regources that could be deployed tc to
[1347]reviewing unprocessed HSCA subject files.
[1349]The new approach to HSCA subjects Is to protect Informant-ldentiying information,
[1351]3An example would be the case of John Scelso (pseud.), The Board found that
[1352]his identity is relevant to the assassination story and CIA offered evidence of a
[1353]continuing need to protect the identity. In.this case, “Scelso” documents would.
[1354]_ continue to be scheduled for release in five years.
[1356]‘Six work full-time on informant evidence, four devote about half their time to
[1357]informant evidence, .
[1359]13-00000
[1363]without requiring the Bureau to make a showing that the informant is alive. This
[1364]protection would extend to individuals characterized as symbol-number informants,
[1365]“PSls,” “PCls,” “established sources,” “panel sources,” and the like — designations that
[1366]indicate an ongoing relationship with the FBI. It would not extend to individuals who
[1368]requested that their identity be protected In an isolated contact with the FBI. or to local
[1370]and state law enforcement officers.
[1372]The. “intormant-identitying: information” to be protected would include the customary
[1373](ie., informant-specific) portions of informant symbo!.numbers and file numbers,
[1374]informant: names, and -- at least potentially —- descriptions of, and information recéived
[1375]from, the informant. How much, if any, of the latter type of information should be:
[1376]redacted would be the principal focus of staff-level discussions with the FBI. The staff's
[1378]“principal goal in this process, with regard to each informant, would be to release as
[1380]much information that is relevant to understanding the assassination as possible. In .
[1381]discussions with the FBI, the staff would be prepared, if necessary, to concede
[1383]. redaction of informant-identifying information that is unrelated to the assassination in
[1384]order to ensure that more pertinent information is released.®
[1386]The presumption will be that an informant’s identity will be released if the informant
[1387]provides “positive” information about an assassination-related Issue. To overcome this _
[1388]presumption of release for informants with “positive” information, the FBI would need to
[1389]make a particularized showing that the identifying information should not be released.
[1391]To the extent that an informant's identity is protected, it will be postponed until 2017,
[1393]CIA Employee Name Postponements..
[1395]Over the past year the CIA has addressed the employee name issue and has released
[1396]some names that it had previously asked the Board to postpone. But during that time
[1398]_the list of names has grown to a size that had not been imagined at the time the work
[1400]began. To date, the Review Board staff has identified in the JFK Collection over 650 .
[1401]names of CIA employees. These names appear in more than 1000 documents already
[1402]reviewed by the Board and numerous additional records that have not yet been
[1403]processed. While some of these employee. names are important to the assassination
[1404]story, many appear only a few times in the entire JFK Collection and seem to add Uttle,
[1405]if any, important information.
[1407]Sin HSCA subjects, there typically will not be information about Ruby, Oswald or
[1408]the assassination itself. However, in a file on, for example, Sam Giancana, there may
[1410]-be informant reports on Giancana’s support of anti-Castro activities, and reports from
[1412]the same informant on day-to-day numbers operations in the Chicago area. The staff
[1413]would set a higher priority on telease of the former reports than on the latter.
[1415]13-00000
[1417]04/23/97 WED 15:55 FAX PAK 20Z 724 vaor _ Arurup
[1420]ee ea
[1424]CIA's argument to protect employee names emphasizes a number of points. . First,
[1425]since many employees are “under cover,” the maintenance of that cover is critical to
[1426]gathering intelligence. CIA argues that identification of a name can identify the cover
[1427]provider and jeopardize operations, Second, although the majority of names are of
[1428]retired CIA employees, CIA has a confidentiality agreement with them and many do not
[1429]want their past Agency affiliation released, The argument here is that release may
[1430]jeopardize business relationships or personal safety. Such:arguments have already.
[1432]‘been presented to the Board.  Their.merit can only be determined on a case-by-case
[1434]basis. However, due to the volume of names in the JFK Collection, the individual -
[1435]review and evaluation of each case would delay significantly the review of documents
[1436]and ultimately lead to less total information becoming available to the public.
[1438]CIA has proposed, and the Review Board agrees, that CIA employee names be treated
[1440]in a manner similar to that applied to Source names: to postpone until 2017 those
[1441]employee names that are of low public interest or are of peripheral interest to the
[1442]assassination. It will be presumed that employee names will be released If their
[1443]identities are important to the assassination story unless the CIA is able to provide
[1444]specific information of a potential harm of release. (CIA acknowledges the presumption
[1445]of release unless specific evidence is provided to the Review Board that harm to
[1446]national security ¢ or to. personal safety would result from the release of the employee
[1447]name. 2.)
[1449]FBI “Foreign Counterintelligence” Postponements
[1451]it is presumed that the FBI will, at least partially, carry over its post-appeal standards for -
[1453]disclosing “FCI” activities targeting Communist-bloc nations. To the extent that the
[1454]HSCA subjects reflect “FCI activities against other nations that have not been
[1455]addressed by the Review Board in the “core” filés, the FBI will be allowed to redact .
[1456]direct discussion of such activities, unless the information in the proposed redaction
[1457]meaningfully contributes to the understanding of the assassination.
[1459]FBI and CIA Foreign Liaison Postponements
[1461]The criteria for these postponements would not, in the abstract, depart significantly from
[1462]the Review Board's current approach of releasing information received through liaison -
[1463]channels, while protecting direct acknowledgment of the source of the information. in
[1464]practice, however, the staff would be more flexible in protecting text that implies,
[1465]although may not unambiguously state, that a foreign govemment Is the source of
[1466]particular information. Nevertheless, the more significant the information Is to any -
[1467]assassination-related Issue, the more information n would be released under these
[1469]- guidelines.
[1471]aves
[1473]13-00000
[1475]_ CIA Stations and:Other Issues
[1477]Over the past two years the Review Board has established other guidelines that will
[1478]continue to guide the review process, some of which will be outlined here. For CIA
[1480]stations, all locations related to the Mexico City story will be released during the period
[1481]1960-69. “Outside of that window, they will be released on a case-by-case basis should —
[1483]the identity of the station be critical to understanding the assassination. Other stations,
[1484]except for those identified as particularly sensitive, will be released from the beginning
[1485]of the Kennedy administration until the publication of the Warren Commission report,
[1486](Le., January 1, 1961 to October 1, 1964). Outside of these windows, stations will be
[1487]postponed. Cable pretixes, dispatch ‘prefixes, and field report prefixes would be
[1489]postponed or released according to the same windows as the stations to which they
[1491]refer. CIA job titles also are redactéd or opened along with the Station at which the
[1492]officer served.
[1494]Crypts would be released along lines similar to other information. ‘All “LI? crypts, except
[1496]those considered particularly sensitive would be released through October 1, 1964, as
[1497]are "AM" crypts and U.S. goverment crypts. In other aréas, only the digraph Is _
[1498]protected. Again, the exception is sensitive crypts, which would be protected in their.
[1499]entirety. After October 1, 1964, the presumption shifts towards protection of the crypts,
[1500]except those that provide meaningful information about the assassination story. (For
[1501]example, crypts pertinent to: Garrison-era documents would likely carry the same _.
[1502]presumption of release as those generated during the Warren Commission.)
[1504]Surveillance methods will be released if the nature of the surveillance has a material
[1505]bearing on information related to the assassination unless CIA provides evidence
[1506]demonstrating the political or operational sensitivity, i in which case the Information will
[1507]be released In 2017.
[1509]santvogsievow.wpd
[1511]13-00000
[1513]"APR 15 "97 @4?55PM USGOVERNMENT “ors
[1515]to the Review Board that harm to the national security or toa
[1517]SECRET
[1518]Central Intelligence Agency
[1520]15 April 1997 _
[1522]MEMORANDUM FOR: David G. Marwell
[1523]Executive Director
[1524]‘Assassination Records Review Board ©
[1526]SUBJECT: CIA Employees
[1528]x
[1530]oo, (We request that this memorandum be returned to CIA *.
[1531]once the Review Board has completed its deliberations on the
[1532]issues discussed below.) ; t
[1534]1. (U) Iegye. The purpose of this memo is to relate '
[1535]CIA's concerns to the Review Board regarding the release of
[1536]the true names of CIA employees that appear in the JFK
[1537]Collection and to present a proposal on how this problem
[1538]might be addressed.
[1540].
[1542]I. ctyal fa} fe)
[1544]2. (U) To date, approximately 600 true names of CIA
[1545]employees have been identified in the JFK Collection. Some
[1546]of these employees are important to the JFK story, and CIA
[1548]‘ will continue to work with the Review Board to release as
[1550]many of these names as possible. Many names, however,
[1551]appear only a few timea in the entire JFK Collection and
[1552]appear | to ada nothing to the historical record.
[1554]3. (U) Under guidelines adopted by the Review Board
[1555]on or about 20 March 1996, any names of CIA employees are
[1556]presumptively released unless CIA provides specific evidence '
[1558]the employee would likely result from such release. Singe
[1559]these guidelines were adopted, it has become increasingly
[1560]clear that the number of names at issue, and, in most cases,
[1561]their tenuous connection. to the JFK story, make this 8
[1562]approach unworkable with regard to both CIA's obligation to
[1564]CL BY: - 2224130
[1566]CL REASON: 1.5(c)
[1567]DECL ON: X1
[1569]DRV FROM:- HUM 4-82
[1571]SECRET
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[1575]SECRET.
[1577]Subject: CIA Employees
[1579]protect national security information and the Review Board's
[1580]duty to inform the public about the JFK assassination in a
[1581]timely and accurate fashion. The task of locating and
[1583]- informing hundreds of former employees scattered all over
[1584]the country and the world has been a formidable one. Some
[1585]employees have contacted us to report their concerns about a
[1586]“suspicious" letter purporting to be from CIA which they had
[1587]received. It would not be surprising, therefore, if many
[1588]former employees ignored the letter for similar reasons,
[1589]even though they might have legitimate needs to protect
[1590]their identities.
[1592]4. (U) Contacting every named employee and collecting
[1593]information on each of them to present to the Review. Board
[1594]will clearly take more time and effort than any of us had
[1595]anticipated. This will have obvious ramifications for how
[1596]and when the Review Board releases information to the
[1597]public. More importantly, the decision to publicly.
[1598]acknowledge employees who may have been living for over 30 «
[1599]years under cover is a critical one that should be made not _,
[1600]by default, but rather by careful planning ‘and .
[1601]consideration.
[1603]5. (U) Relevant to this discussion is the fact that
[1604]the Review Board and CIA have recently agreed upon a policy
[1605]for releasing true names of sources of intelligence
[1606]information. It was agreed at that time that there would be
[1607]a presumption of protecting source names; but in cases where
[1608]a source was particularly important to the JFK story and
[1609]there was no overriding national security interest, the name
[1610]would-be released. Although the CIA recognizes that there
[1611]are some sensitivities involved with sources that do not
[1612]apply to covert employees, there are also many legal and
[1613]operational similarities, which are described herein, that
[1614]justify similar treatment by the Review Board. As is-
[1615]further detailed in Section Iv, CIA, therefore, proposes
[1616]that the Review Board adopt a general policy of protecting
[1617]employee names that appear in the Collection,. with .
[1618]exceptiona for those individuala whom the Board believes are
[1619]important to the JFK story.
[1621]II, Legal Considerationg
[1623]6. (U) As both covert CIA employees and clandestine’
[1624]reporting assets are types of “human sources" of
[1625]intelligence, many of the same laws apply. Although Section
[1626]11(a) of the JFK Act provides that, when the Act requires
[1627]release of information, it takes precedence ovar ail other
[1628]laws that would otherwise prohibit release, there are strong
[1629]governmental national security interests in protecting the
[1630]true names of CIA employees. CIA believes that it is
[1632]2
[1634]SECRET
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[1640]SECRET
[1641]Subject: CIA Employees
[1643]important for the Review Board to reconsider the laws which
[1644]protect classified information, because they clearly reflect
[1645]a larger US Government policy to protect covert CIA
[1646]employees from disclosure.
[1648]7. (U0) By Executive order and statute, the President
[1649]and Congress have made the Director of ‘Central Intelligence
[1650]responsible for protecting sources of intelligence. In his
[1651]Directive of 22 January 1946 that established the Central
[1652]Intelligence Group, President Truman made the DCI
[1653]responsible for protecting sources.~ With the establishment
[1654]of CIA, Congress also gave the DCI this responsibility. The
[1655]National Security Act of 1947, Section 103(d) (3),. codified
[1656]at 50 USC §403(3) (c) (5), requires the DCI to protect
[1657]intelligence sources from unauthorized disclosure. In
[1658]addition, §403(3) (d) (2) requires the DCI to ensure that
[1659]risks to the United States and those involved in the
[1660]collection of intelligence through human sources are
[1661]minimized...
[1663]a. (U) Protecting the identity of individuals working
[1664]for CIA, not only covertly but overtly as well, has been of
[1665]particular concern to US lawmakers since the establishment
[1666]of the Agency. For example, with Section 6 of the Central
[1667]Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 50 USC §403g, Congress ;
[1668]specifically exempted the CIA from the provisions of any law
[1669]requiring the publication or disclosure of the organization,
[1670]functions, names, titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel
[1671]employed by the Agency.
[1673]“9. (U) In 1980, Congress. passed the Classified
[1674]Information Procedures Act (CIPA) which sets out pretrial,
[1675]trial, and appellate procedures for criminal cases involving
[1676]or potentially involving classified information. Working .
[1677]with the Department of Justice and the courts, CIA has
[1678]successfully protected the namea of CIA employees from
[1679]public release even in criminal trials where there are
[1680]heightened (i.e., constitutional) considerations favoring
[1681]disclosure to the defendant of all government information |
[1682]relevant to the defense. CIPA allows for in camera ex parte
[1683]hearings in which the judge can rule on questions of
[1684]admissibility and relevancy of classified information,
[1685]including the identity of CIA employees who may have
[1686]information pertaining to the defense, before it is
[1687]introduced either to the defendant, defense counsel, or in
[1688]open court. In some cases involving CIA, the judge has
[1689]ordered that CIA information be turned over to the defense,
[1690]but only in some unclassified form-such as in’a summary. In
[1691]other cases, judges have reviewed the classified information -
[1692]and xculed that the harm to national security outweighs the
[1694]3
[1696]SECRET
[1698]P.4714
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[1702]SECRET ‘
[1704]Subject: CIA Employees
[1706]defendant's legal rights to the information. In still other
[1707]cases, the defense wag never notified that CIA even had
[1708]information bearing on the case, ag the judge ruled that the
[1709]mere fact that CIA possessed this information was classified |
[1710]and outweighed any rights the defendant had. Moreover,
[1712]under CIPA, the Attorney General has the authority to drop a
[1713]prosecution in those cases where the risk to national
[1714]security is too great. —
[1716]10. (U) In 1982, Congress again acted to protect CIA
[1717]employees by passing the Intelligence Identities Protection
[1718]Act of 1982, 50 USC §421 that criminalizes the revelation of~"
[1719]a covert employee or the identity of a source. This act
[1720]subjects anyone who reveals information that identifies a
[1721]“covert agent" to prosecution and provides up. to 10 years in
[1722]prison and $50,000 in fines as punishment. This act
[1723]specifically defines a “covert agent" as including “an
[1724]officer or employee of an intelligence agency... ."
[1726]11. -(U) Most recently, President Clinton signed
[1727]Executive Order 12958 on classified national security
[1728]information that became effective in October 1995. Although
[1729]it requires generally that agencies make greater
[1730]declassification efforts than under the prior executive
[1731]order, Executive Order 12958 affords human sources of
[1732]intelligence information, which would include employees,
[1733]extra protection from the declassification provisions.
[1734]Under £.0. 12958, information that is over 25 years old and
[1735]having historical value must be declassified within five
[1736]years. However, information revealing the identity of a
[1737]human source may continue to be protected.
[1739]12. .(U). The above federal laws show a long-standing
[1740]practice by the US Government to protect CIA employees from
[1741]disclosure to the public. In carrying out its statutory
[1742]obligations, the Review Board should give serious weight to
[1743]this policy and afford the protection of CIA employees a
[1744]‘high priority. oo te
[1746]IIL, Operational Considerations —
[1748]13. (U) For current CIA employees whose names may
[1749]appear in the JFK Collection, the operational considerations
[1750]for protecting their identity are similar to those for
[1751]sources. Many of these employees have worked “under cover"
[1752]for CIA. Cover igs used to disassociate entire installations
[1754]- and offices from open linkage to intelligence activities, to
[1755]enable intelligence personnel to enter and work effectively
[1756]in foreign countries, to shield Agency employees and
[1757]authorized clandestine activities from attention by hostile
[1758]elements and from madia exposure, to facilitate access to
[1760]; 4
[1762]SECRET
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[1768]Subject: CIA Employees
[1770]certain individuals of intelligence interest, to prevent
[1771]embarrassment to host foreign governments, and to permit
[1772]plausible denial of CIA's presence and activities in foreign
[1773]countries.
[1775]14. (U) The ability to maintain one's cover is
[1776]erucial to gathering intelligence. In either a "hostile" or
[1777]“friendly” country, should the local service become aware of
[1778]who the CIA employees are, it would increase surveillance
[1779]and make unilateral operations difficult if not impossible.
[1780]In some countries, the local $y oenment tolerates the CIA
[1781]presence and agrees to work with us as long as the local
[1782]population is not aware of the circumstances. Once it
[1783]becomes known among the locals that certain US Government
[1784]officials are actually CIA, pressure may be placed on the
[1785]government to el those Americans, disrupting liaison and
[1786]diplomatic relationships. More importantly, covert
[1787]employees and their families would face increased risk to
[1788]their personal safety. Even in "friendly" countries, our
[1789]employees could face some personal risks as well as risks to
[1790]ongoing operations from extremists who may be living among
[1791]an otherwise benign local population. In any of these
[1792]cases, should a covert employee's cover be publicly
[1793]compromised, that employee may have to be recalled from the
[1794]field; and it could be difficult to place him elsewhere in
[1795]an operationally and physically secure location. ‘Thus,
[1796]maintaining cover is important to a case officer's
[1797]effectiveness and to the continuation of a career with CIA.
[1799]15. (8) Maintaining the confidentiality of cover is
[1800]also important to cover providers. The Review Board will
[1801]recall from prior briefings by the Agency that covert CIA
[1802]employees, both in the United States and overseas, can work
[1803]under *official" (e.g., State Department) cover or "non-
[1804]official” (e.9., private company) cover. Disclosure of a
[1805]covert employee would not only be official acknowledgment of
[1806]the specific cover mechanism employed by CIA but would also
[1807]negatively affect the governmental or business mission: of
[1808]the cover provider, especially those who provide non-
[1809]official cover. Acknowledgment of an employee who had been
[1810]under non-official cover in a host country and possibly in
[1811]other countries could have a negative impact on the
[1812]provider's business interests and activities. It would also
[1813]cast suspicion on that provider's legitimate employees and
[1814]their families. Further, exposure of cover providers could
[1815]affect the recruitment and cooperation of such providers by
[1816]the Agency and Intelligence Community.
[1818]16. (8S) Although the majority of names that appear in
[1819]the Collection are retired CIA employees, the operational
[1820]considerations in revealing their affiliation with CIA are
[1822]5
[1824]SECRET
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[1830]Subject: CIA Employees
[1832]not diminished. Similar to sources, many former employees
[1833]still do not want their past. affiliation with CIA revealed.
[1834]Perhaps their current friends, family, or employers are not.
[1835]aware of this past affiliation; and revelation of that fact
[1836]could negatively affect personal and professional
[1837]relationships. Some former employees still live, overseas
[1838]where a revelation of CIA affiliation poses risks to their
[1839]personal safety. Other former employees travel overseas on
[1840]business, where a revelation of a past CIA affiliation can
[1841]threaten their business interests and personal safety.
[1842]One example of an amployee in this category is Robert
[1843]Fulton, whose name apparently appears only once in the
[1844]Collection.. Fulton retired under Department of State cover;
[1845]he currently has a consultant business and frequently
[1846]travels to China. Release of hia name would jeopardize not
[1847]only his business but perhaps even his safety. A similar
[1848]example is Walter McCabe, who also retired under State
[1849]cover. He is now working in Russia and several East
[1850]EBuropean countries for a private firm. He does not want his
[1851]name published, because it could be damaging to his current
[1852]employer and his professional status.
[1854]17. (8). Even if a former employee agrees to the
[1855]revelation of his name in the JFK Collection, thia might nor
[1856]be possible for other reasons. In some cases, officially
[1857]acknowledging a covert employee could threaten ongoing
[1858]operations on which that employee worked. Foreign nationals
[1859]recruited by the employee and still providing information to —
[1860]the US Government would be at risk of exposure. Public
[1861]acknowledgment could reveal the location of. CIA stations
[1862]where. the employee worked throughout his career, including
[1863]some not released by the Review Board. Any individuals who
[1864]had substantial contact with a former employee overseas and
[1865]may have believed they were legitimately providing
[1866]information to a US corporate representative would be upset
[1867]to learn they were, in fact, aiding the US Government.
[1869]18. (U) Finally, the identification of case officers
[1870]by their own service would have a chilling effect on
[1871]prospective assets. Prospective assets would be unlikely to
[1872]enter into a clandestine relationship with American
[1873]intelligence if they believe that CIA does not protect even
[1874]its own staff employees from public disclosure.
[1876]2Y. Proposal
[1878]19. (U) In light of the foregoing, CIA believes it is
[1879]important to work toward a general policy of protecting CIA
[1880]employees identified in the JFK Collection, with exceptions
[1881]made for those individuals who are important to the atory of
[1882]the assassination. The Agency proposes that in most cases a
[1884]6
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[1892]' Subject: CIA Employees
[1894]substitution for the true name be used. If the Review Board
[1895]ida concerned about tracking particular employees throughout
[1896]the records, a particular identifying substitution can be
[1897]used for a particular employee.
[1899]20. (S) CIA believes that this approach will not
[1900]undermine the Review Board's. obligations under the JFK Act.
[1901]A review of the JFK Collection reveals that approximately 44
[1902]‘of the 600 names appear only once in the entire Collection.
[1904]_ In such cases, it is difficult to see how the individuals'
[1905]identity can add anything of significance to the historical -
[1906]record; yet there may be some security concerns still
[1908]. associated with these individuals. For example, Arthur H.
[1909]Stimson retired under cover and is currently living in
[1910]Europe. When the CIA notified him that his name appeared in
[1911]the JFK Collection and was subject. to public release, he
[1912]told CIA that he was opposed to having his name released and
[1914]- believed such a release could pose personal and security
[1915]problems. Furthermore, he could not understand why his name
[1916]even appeared in the Collection, since he had no
[1917]recollection of being involved in anything related to the
[1918]assassination.
[1920]21. (9) With regard to the approximately 500 names
[1921]that appear more than once in the Collection, the vast
[1922]‘majority of these individuals played almost no role in the
[1923]-OFK story. One example of this is former DO officer
[1924]Alexander Brasko. His name appears approximately 20-30
[1925]times.in the Collection simply because he signed off on name
[1926]trace requests. Mr. Brasko was a covert CIA employee and
[1927]retired under cover. The public release of his name would
[1928]provide the public with no additional significant
[1929]information about JFK. Tom Flores ig another example of a
[1930]covert CIA employee whoge name appears in the Collection but
[1931]has little or no connection to the JFK story. Flores
[1932]retired under cover, is living in South America, and objects
[1933]to the release of his name. Mr. Flores' recent letter to
[1934]CIA is also attached for your convenience.
[1936]22. (8) The Agency, of course, recognizes that some
[1937]names may be particularly important to the JFK story
[1938]regardless of how frequently or infrequently they appear in
[1939]the Collection. One such example is former COS Mexico
[1940]Winston Scott who CIA has acknowledged as a CIA employee.
[1942]In such cages, the CIA will continue to work with the Review
[1943]Board for an appropriate regolution. The CIA proposes that
[1944]the Review Board and its staff identify those individuala
[1946]- whom it believes are important to the JFK story and whose
[1947]names should be released.to the public. These names would —
[1948]carry a presumption of release unless specific evidence is
[1949]provided to the. Review ‘Board that harm would likely. result
[1951]7
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[1962]Subject: CIA Employees
[1964]from such release. The CIA will conduct the appropriate
[1965]searchea to determine whether release would pose national
[1967]‘security concerns for the US Government or personal safety
[1969]concerna for the individual. In this way, CIA and the Review
[1970]Board can concentrate their. efforts on individuals who are
[1971]g@ignificant figures in the JFK story, expediting the review
[1972]of the sequestered collection.
[1974]23. (U) It is our hope that the CIA and the Raview
[1975]Board can agree on. and work out a mutually acceptable policy
[1976]regarding the identity of CIA employees that will not
[1977]undermine the important principle of protecting those who
[1978]work covertly for the US Government. My staff and I are
[1979]ready to discuss this matter with you at your convenience.
[1981]General Counsel.
[1983]Attachment
[1984]A. Tom Flores", letter
[1986]8
[1988]SECRET
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[1993]; SECRET
[1994]~ ps
[1996]“ Subject: CIA Employees
[1998]DCI/OGC/LD/LCCipriani 76124 (10 Apr 97)
[1999]0GC-97-50971 -
[2001]Distribution: .
[2002]Original - Addressee
[2003]- a
[2004]Lit File - LDGO0021
[2005]Lcc Signer
[2006]RDC - FYI
[2007]OGC Registry
[2009]Bee
[2011]9
[2012]SECRET
[2014]13-00000
[2016]a Secret
[2017]26 June 1997
[2019]Memorandum to: Jeremy Gunn
[2021]ARRB Staff
[2023]’ From: Barry Harrelson
[2025]JFK Project Office
[2028]Subject: Employee Names Scheduled for ARRB Review
[2029]Reference: 201 File and “A” Names Lists
[2031](We request that this memorandum and its attachments be
[2032]returned to CIA once the Review Board has completed its
[2033]deliberations on the names discussed below.)
[2035]1. The above reference lists identify the protected CIA
[2036]employee names in the Oswald 201 file and on the ARRB ;
[2037]staff's key figures list scheduled for action by the ARRB at
[2038]its.9-10 July 1997 meeting. This memorandum is a partial \
[2039]response to the ARRB's request for evidence and addresses
[2040]those individuals on the list currently employed by the
[2041]Agency and the changes in status of names.
[2043]201 List
[2045]Current employees requiring continued protection. “(see
[2046]attached Cover Staff reports):
[2048]Walter C. D'Andrade (Andrade, FNU)
[2049]‘Robert J. Austin
[2050]Robert F. Litviak
[2052]Release: - FNU Coplewood
[2054], Joan Field
[2055]N. Judkins
[2056]FNU Patten
[2057]Harrison L Scott
[2058]Carl Trettin
[2059]W. Walker
[2061]Corrections: Remove Kurt Johansson (source) --
[2062]incorrectly identified as an employee
[2063]Add Barbara Graham. (B. Graham) --
[2064]incorrectly dropped from latest list
[2066]CL BY: °©611637
[2068]CL REASON: 1.5(c)
[2069]DECL ON: X1
[2070]DRV FRM: COV 2-87
[2072]SECRET
[2074]13-00000 a 2 a so
[2077]‘Figures (A) List
[2079]Release: — FNU Connally
[2080]FNU Feinglass |
[2081]Daniel. Flores
[2082]Lorna McKay
[2083]George Misko
[2084]' David Wilsted
[2086]; 2. For the remaining 38 names on the lists, we will
[2087]provide evidence supporting their cover status and the need
[2088]for continued protection as available. By ‘7 July you should
[2089]have either specific evidence or a status of sgearch
[2090]statement for each individual. ;
[2092]Barry Harreison
[2094]Attachments:
[2096]Cover history printouts (3) [available in CIA SCIF]
[2098]SECRET
[2100]13-00000
[2104]“
[2108]¢ .
[2112]CONFIDENTIAL.
[2114]wm Lona
[2116]SECRECY AGREEMENT
[2118]1. 1, aecton Moubras Lal oem TE, understand that upon enter-
[2120]"ing on duty with the Central Intelligence Agency I am undertaking a posi-
[2122]tion of trust in that Agency of the Government responsible to the Presi-
[2123]dent and the National Security Council for intelligence relating to the
[2124]security of the United States of America. I understand that in the.
[2125]course of my employment I will acquire information about the Agency and
[2126]its activities and about intelligence acquired or “produced by the Agency.
[2128]2. I have read and understand the provisions of the Espionage Act, Title
[2130]18, USC, secs. 793 and 794, and I am aware that unauthorized disclosure
[2131]of classified information relating to the national defense may subject
[2133]me to prosecution for violation of that Act, whether such disclosure be |
[2134]made while I am an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency or at any
[2135]time thereafter. . ,
[2137]3. In addition, however, as I am undertaking a position of trust, I have
[2138]a responsibility to the Central Intelligence Agency not to diselose any ,
[2139]classified information relating to the Agency without proper authoriza-
[2140]tion. I. undertake, therefore, not to discuss with or disclose to any
[2141]person not authorized to hear it such information relating to the Central
[2143]Intelligence Agency, its activities, or to intelligence. material under
[2145]the control of the Agency. I further understand that this undertaking
[2146]is a condition of my employment with the Central Intelligence Agency, that
[2147]its violation may subject me to immediate dismissal for cause or other
[2148]appropriate disciplinary action, and that this undertaking shall be equally
[2150]binding upon me after my employment with the Agency as during it.
[2152]4, I understand that the burden is upon me to ascertain whether or not
[2153]information is classified and if so, who is authorized to receive it,
[2154]and, therefore, I will obtain the decision of authorized. officials of
[2155]the Agency on these points prior to disclosing information relating to
[2156]the Agency, and failure to obtain such a decision will be grounds for my
[2157]dismissal.
[2159]5. I understand that my unauthorized action or utterance in the nature
[2161]of a publication or which would reasonably be expected to result. in pub-
[2162]licity on intelligence or intelligence activities would be in violation
[2164]of Government and Agency regulations and would be grounds for -my dismissal.
[2166]~ CONFIDENTIAL
[2167]FORM NO- 368 oasoLeTE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
[2169]1 DEC 55
[2171]13-00000
[2173]CONFIDENTIAL
[2174](When Filled In)
[2176]6. I understand that, for all grievances and complaints there are estab-
[2177]lished procedures within the-Agency permitting appeal by any employee of
[2178]the Agency and to carry any such grievance or. complaint outside the Agency
[2179]will be considered a violation of the undertaking set forth above in
[2180]paragraph 3... If the appeal procedures are inadequate in any situation,
[2182]I am aware that the Inspector General is at all times available to any
[2183]employee with a legitimate criticism, grievance, or complaint.
[2185]7. I further understand -and agree that my employment by the Central In-
[2186]telligence Agency is conditioned upon my understanding of and strict
[2188]_ compliance with CIA Security Regulations, and the appendices thereto.
[2190]8. Inasmuch as employment by the Government is a privilege not a right, ~
[2192]-~in consideration of my employment by CIA I undertake not to publish or
[2194]participate in the publication of any information or material relating to
[2195]the Agency, its activities or intelligence activities generally, either
[2196]during or after the term of my employment by the Agency without specific
[2197]prior approval by the Agency.
[2199]9. I agree that all information or intelligence acquired by me in con-
[2200]nection with my official duties with the Central Intelligence Agency
[2201]remains the property of the United States of America, and I will sur-.
[2202]render, upon demand by an appropriate official of the Agency or upon -
[2203]separation from the Agency, any material relating to such information |
[2204]and intelligence in wy possession.
[2206]10. I take the obligations set forth above freely, without any mental
[2207]reservations or purpose of evasion.
[2209]ZB
[2211]; . . . : -
[2212]_IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have set my hand and seal this 7 day of
[2214]. Sely » 1962.
[2215]Vater Meeabats fpfpue “(seal)
[2217]Witness:
[2218]JUL 1962
[2220]YE ne cacy
[2222]CONFIQENTIAL
[2224]13-00000
[2228]Se i
[2229]- oe .
[2231]2. THE. UNCLASSIFIED SAE, COORDINATED |
[2232]CCS/0SB, tS AS FOLLOUS: ' " PRAFT nme te
[2234]__ SUMMARY: | TRILINGUAL SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE OFFIC
[2235](DEPARTMENT OF STATE 1962-1990) WITH EXTENSIVE EXPERIENCE
[2236]WORKING WITH THE U.S. CONGRESS, MORE THAN 16 YEARS WORKING AND
[2237]LIVING IN LATIN AMERICA (ECUADOR, URUGUAY, ARGENTINA, BRAZIL,
[2239]“PERU AND. MEXICO). ELEVEN OF THOSE YEARS WERE IN SUPERVISORY
[2240]"ANO SENIOR MANAGEMENT POSITIONS. RECEIVED A SENIOR EXECUTIVE
[2241]: SERVICE AWARD FOR HAVING MADE OUTSTANDING CONTRIBUTIONS “TO
[2243]OVERALL RELATIONS WITH THE VARIOUS HOUSE COMMITTEES CONCERNED Lye
[2245]WITH FOREIGN POLICY (TO INCLUDE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVIC
[2246]APPROPRIATIONS,. SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, er Leet
[2247]COMMITTEE ON NARCOTICS, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS). THIS WAS
[2248]COMPLEMENTED BY INDIVIDUAL LETTERS OF COMMENDATION FROM
[2249]MAJORITY AS WELL AS MINORITY MEMBERS OF THOSE COMMITTEES. IN
[2250]MEXICO, MAINTAINED. FRUITFUL CONTACT WITH CABINET MEMBERS AND
[2251]WAS A nAdOR PLAYER IN THE 01 ALOGUE AND POLICY GUIDANCE- BUILDING
[2252]OTIA Ml
[2254]Connect Ratt) GOTIATIONS AGREEMENT AND ENSUING
[2255]DETAILS: -42° tO Loe
[2257]ode .
[2259]-TOP SECRET AND SPECIAL COMPARTMENTED CLEARANCES.
[2261]“DRAFTER AND/OR COORDINATOR ON MYRIAD POLICY, POSITION
[2262]AND GUIDANCE PAPERS IMPACTING ON US PUSLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR
[2263]- RELATIONSHIPS WITH MEXICO. MAJOR PLAYER IN ENSURING THAT
[2264]HIGHEST LEVELS OF THE USG. FULLY UNDERSTOOD. THE. COMPLEXITIES OF
[2265]THE EVOLVING POLITICAL ANO ECONOMIC SITUATION IN MEXICO.
[2267]; ~DAILY INTERLOQUTOR WITH MEXICAN CABINET OFFICERS
[2268]DURING SLIGHTLY LESS THAN FOUR YEARS IN MEXICO CITY.
[2270]-IN PREVIOUS WASHINGTON ASSIGNMENT, OEALT EXTENSIVELY
[2271]WITH THE FULL RANGE OF FOREIGN POLICY ELEMENTS OF THE USG.
[2272]GAVE IN HOUSE AS WELL AS NUMEROUS INTER AGENCY SPEECHES ON A
[2273]VARIETY OF MATTERS OF MUTUAL CONCERN.
[2275]~1980-1984 ~- FLAGGED. TRE THEN EMERGING SENDERO LUMINOSO
[2276]AS A SERIOUS THREAT TO PERUVIAN SECURITY AND WAS THE FIRST
[2277]SENIOR OFFICIAL TO INSIST THAT PERUVIAN COCA PRODUCTION WAS TEN
[2278]TIMES THE PREVIOUS ESTIMATES. (SADLY, BOTH OBSERVATIONS HAV
[2279]TURNED OUT TO BE ALTOGETHER ACCURATE.) . .
[2281]~IN 1978-1980 PERIOD, WORKEO FOR THE OFFICE OF
[2282]LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS WITH RESPONSIBILITIES FOR OVERALL RELATIONS
[2283]WITH ALL COMMITTEES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. RECEIVED
[2284]A SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE AWARO AND EFFUSIVE LETTERS OF
[2285]APPRECIATION FROM MEMBERS OF SIX COMMITTEES. ,
[2287]-IN VARIOUS MANAGEMENT POSITIONS, TWICE WAS IN CHARGE
[2288]OF UNITS WHICH EXCEEDED TWO HUNDRED PERSONS. HIRED, FIRED, ©
[2289]NEGOTIATED, AND PROVIDED ADVICE, GUIDANCE “AND DIRECTION AS
[2290]APPROPRIATE. .
[2294]SECRET
[2296]SecRET
[2298]re
[2300]Ay r
[2302]13-00000
[2304]EN ce ae
[2306]I understand that the Summary of Agency Employment (SAE)
[2307]defines the outer limits of what I may disclose to unauthorized
[2309]persons concerning my employment by the Central Intelligence
[2311]‘Agency. I further understand that disclosure of information
[2313]about my Agency employment which is not contained in my SAE may
[2314]constitute. a violation of my Secrecy Agreement. I promise that
[2315]all statements which I make to unauthorized. persons concerning
[2317]my Agency employment will be consistent with my, SAE and limited
[2319]by its content.
[2321]Lex O93 [lat 7 fl
[2323]Date Signature
[2325]13-00000
[2327]a
[2328]OCcc-95-149
[2329]87 vee 1895
[2331]MEMORANDUM FOR: JFK Assassination Records Review Boar¢
[2333]VIA: Associate Deputy Director for Operations
[2334]Associate Deputy Director for. Operations/Human
[2335]Resources and Programs
[2337]FROM: Eric L. Qualkenbush
[2338]Chief, Office of Central Cover
[2340]SUBJECT: Proposed CIA Name Release
[2342]1. The Agency strongly objects to the release of names of
[2343]individuals presently under cover, whether active employees or
[2344]separated employees. .As described below, this action would
[2345]breach Agency commitments to these individuals who agreed. to work
[2346]under cover in addition to breaching our obligations. to the cover
[2347]providers.
[2349]2. Employees sign a secrecy agreement (Attachment A) upon
[2350]entering on duty with the Agency. This agreement pledges the
[2351]employee’s secrecy to information which is classified and has not
[2352]-been publicly acknowledged by the Agency and requires the
[2353]employee to protect such information from unauthorized
[2354]disclosure. This secrecy agreement, as long as it remains in
[2355]force by mutual agreement, obliges CIA to protect the identities
[2356]of Agency employees, our cover providers and covert activities.
[2358]3. Because this secrecy agreement creates a moral as well
[2359]‘as legal bond between the Agency and the employee, it is Agency
[2360]policy to protect the names of former employees who have
[2361]separated under cover unless the Agency. and the employee mutually
[2362]agree to remove the cover. Identifying as CIA those employees
[2363]who are mandated by the Agency to use a cover story, i.e.,
[2364]Department of State or the “ABC” Corporation, for their entire
[2365]Agency career as well as into their years after separation from
[2366]the Agency, jeopardizes: :
[2368]e the personal safety of former employees;
[2370]WARNING... NOTICE os CL 0489932
[2372]INTELLIGENCE SOWRCES CL REASON: 1.5. (c)
[2373]OR METHODS INVOLVED ; DECL ON: X1
[2375]DRV FROM: COV 2-87
[2377]SECRET
[2379]13-00000
[2380]~ . SECRET *
[2382]SUBJECT: Memo to JFK Assassination Records Review Board
[2384]e the second careers of former employees;
[2386]e the cover and identity of other employees who worked
[2387]with the covert employee whose name is released as.
[2388]CIA; and,
[2390]e the protection of sources and methods (what
[2391]individual would agree to a clandestine relationship
[2392]with American intelligence knowing the secret
[2393]association would become public knowledge?) .
[2395]4. Examples of how identifying covert employees as CIA will
[2396]affect. individuals follows:
[2398]e Mr. Walter McCabe retired under Department of State
[2399]cover and is currently working in Russia and several
[2400]Eastern European countries for a private firm which
[2401]converts “wartime” factories into peacetime use.
[2402]Revealing his name would damage his relationship
[2403]with his current employer, his position with the
[2404]firm and would be awkward at best regarding the host
[2405]countries. Attachment B is Mr. McCabe's
[2406]acknowledgement that he was aware he would be denied
[2407]as.a CIA employee and Attachment C is his signed
[2408]secrecy agreement.
[2410]e Attachment D is a signed ackowledgement from Mr.
[2411]John Whitten who retired under cover in 1970 which
[2412]shows that he was aware that he would be denied as
[2413]an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency from
[2414]the date he entered on duty through the date of his
[2415]departure. Attachment E is a personal letter
[2416]received from Mr. Whitten after he was notified that
[2417]his name might be released in connection with
[2418]declassification of CIA documents. Attachment F is.
[2419]Mr. Whitten’s signed secrecy agreement. It should
[2420]be noted that Mr. Whitten resides in Austria.
[2422]e Attachment G is a Summary of Agency Employment (SAE)
[2423]written by Mr. Morton M. Palmer and approved by the
[2424]Agency. Attachment H is a certification by Mr.
[2425]Palmer that he will abide by what is contained in
[2426]-hig, SAE and understands disclosure of other ©
[2427]infortratdon would be in violation of his secrecy
[2429]~ 2
[2431]“ SECRET
[2433]13-00000
[2435]. SECRET ‘
[2437]SUBJECT: Memo to JFK Assassination Records Review Board
[2439]agreement. Attachment I is Mr. Palmer’s signed
[2440]secrecy agreement. It should be noted that Mr.
[2441]Palmer resides in Mexico.
[2443]5. Our relationship with cover providers would be
[2444]jeopardized if it became publicly known that they were providing
[2445]cover to CIA employees. The Department of State could very well
[2446]raise objections to our future use of State cover. Of increasing
[2447]importance to the Agency at this time is the critical use of
[2448]private sector (nonofficial) cover providers. The private sector
[2449]would no doubt drop contact and avoid future dealings with us if
[2450]we reveal a covert relationship. Identifying covert
[2451]relationships with cover providers would paralyze Agency
[2452]operations which in turn could severely damage national security.
[2453]In addition, in the past it has exposed CIA to legal liabilities
[2454]and substantial monetary damages.
[2456]6. Headquarters Regulation (HR) 240-1 is the Agency’s
[2457]regulation on cover. It states that “cover is required for all
[2458]Agency operations, activities and installations abroad, including
[2459]‘personnel in PCS or TDY status.” HR 240-2, the Agency’s
[2460]regulation on cover after separation, states that “the
[2461]determination that an employee will retain all or a part of his
[2462]or her cover after separation from the Agency will be based upon
[2463]the judgment that separation in an overt status could result in
[2464]damage to the national security by compromising intelligence
[2465]sources, methods, activities, and/or information, or cause harm
[2466]to foreign relations. This determination will be made on a case-
[2467]by-case basis.” Please note that all Agency employees who retire
[2468]abroad must retire under cover.
[2470]7. Release of names of former employees who separated under
[2471]‘cover will make the entire Agency cover program vulnerable and
[2472]detract from our continuing efforts to enhance cover and conduct
[2473]sometimes dangerous. activities necessary to carry out the:
[2474]Agency’s mission. We can accept the purpose of the JFK
[2475]Assassination Records Review Act to declassify documents for
[2476]public consumption; however, we submit that the release of true
[2477]names of former Agency employees adds no value to the documents
[2478]in addition to risking physical harm to these individuals from
[2479]our public detractors. "We propose and emphatically encourage
[2480]that pseudonyms, aliases or generic job descriptions such as desk
[2481]officer be used in place of true names which would not diminish ©
[2482]the impact of the documents. _
[2484]7 mR og,
[2486]TO 3
[2488]SECRET
[2490]13-00000
[2492]SECRET '
[2494]SUBJECT: Memo to JFK Assassination Records Review Board
[2496]8. After your review and consideration of the above
[2497]information, we would appreciate notification of your final
[2499]decision prior to taking any action.
[2501]Eric L. Qualkenbush
[2503]Attachments:
[2504]As stated above
[2506]CONCUR:
[2507]Christine W. Wiley
[2508]nristine W. Wiley DEC 0 8 8
[2509]Associate Deputy Director for Date
[2511]Operations/Human Resources
[2512]and Programs
[2514]David N. Ea, ..
[2516]Associate Deputy Director for
[2517]Operations
[2519]Date, PES 81995 .
[2521]7 : 4
[2523]SECRET
[2525]13-00000
[2527]SECRET:
[2529]SUBJECT: Memo to JFK Assassination Records Review Board’
[2531]DC/OCC/OS G/EMathias: lae/37076 (6 Dec 95)
[2533]“Distribution:
[2535]Orig & 1 -
[2537]PPR PEO RPP
[2538]1
[2540]JFK Assassination Records Review Board
[2542]ADDO
[2544]ADDO/HRP
[2546]DDO Secretariat
[2548]DO/IRO
[2550]-OGC/LD - Linda ‘Cipriani
[2553]occ/OSG Chron a
[2554]OCC/OSG File 785-120-034
[2556]— 5
[2558]SECRET
[2560]13-00000
[2562]DEC 11°95 11:14AM
[2564]P.1
[2566]4 ~
[2568]FAX
[2570]To: Mr. Bury Hanetsca
[2571]Fax®& — (703) 351-2114
[2573]_ Subject: Decomber mocdng
[2575]Date; December 11, 1995
[2577]Pages: 3, including this cover sheet,
[2579]COMMENTS:
[2581]The types of information thatthe Rourd necds to know about each ofthe truc names on
[2582]the attached Ust for which CLA seeks continued protection are listed below:
[2584]1 a the individual a current or former CLA employee? If so, in what capacity
[2585]did that individual serve, and dld he or aha serve overtly or ccwertly? if
[2586]currently a retired CIA employee, did the individual retire under cover?
[2588]2. Ifnata CIA officer, dld the Individual verve CIA 08 an agent or asset oe in any
[2589]other capacity? -
[2591]4. Is the individual alive or dead? alive when ee o he eng and wha
[2592]is his or her current activity?
[2594]4. Wiatepeic an camping dmg wold asf i individual's true
[2595]namic pose to him or her at this time?
[2598]true names CIA no longer saake to protect.
[2600]| - Sec ret Alach nent = -
[2602]a
[2603]ToetvicalAaltut or Aman Sah enna
[2604]Assateination Boer!
[2606]' Swider
[2608]_ WL. OBrien.
[2611]PNU. Patten
[2612]104-10015-10163
[2613]104-10016-10006
[2614]104-10015-10138
[2616]Dave
[2618]Milly Rodsiguay.
[2619]104-10095-10001
[2621]Jane Roman
[2622]104-10015-10163
[2624]Tom
[2626]D.W. Schroeder
[2628]i
[2630]Forrest Shivers
[2632]104-10017-10031
[2634]‘Mr. Snight  -
[2637]Mr. Swenson
[2638]104-10015-10233
[2640]104-10015-10298
[2643]104-10095-10001
[2645]Ryan
[2646]104-10018-10096
[2648]_ 194-10017-10042
[2650]SECRET’
[2651]De, Stangjevic
[2652]_ 104-10017-10001
[2653]Borla Tarnsoff , -
[2654]104-10095-10001
[2656]104-10018-10062
[2658]RT, Wabh © ;
[2659]'104-10015-10386
[2660](Sanse as Mr, Walsh in
[2661]104-10017-100357)
[2663]T. Ward .
[2664]104-10004-10257
[2666]Franklin Anthony Wheelock Garcia
[2667]104-10015-10192
[2669]Zeltnes Rick
[2670]104-10017-10056
[2672]SECRET
[2674]13-00000
[2676]7
[2680]B
[2682]D'Alato
[2684]' Chaslone Abarg
[2686]104-10018-10089
[2687]104-10095-10004
[2689]Ray Brewer
[2690]104-10015-10001
[2692]Peter Buranowsk! .
[2696]104-10016-10033
[2698]Leona Cotter
[2700]104-10018-10099
[2702]Dasinti
[2704]|: 104-10018-10062
[2706]104-10015-10043
[2707]DeSanti .
[2709]104-10018-10062
[2711]104-10015-10305
[2713]PL, Dilloa _
[2714]104-10017-10042
[2716]jaquero .
[2719]Flick *
[2720]104-10095-10001
[2722]104-10015-10043
[2724]104-10017-10082
[2726]Harvey
[2727]104-10015-10158
[2729]104-10018-10062
[2731]William Johnsoa
[2733]104-10015-10396
[2734](“Johnson® released ig 104-10015-
[2736]10375)
[2738]Jim Jung
[2740]“Tom Keenan
[2742]104-10017-10002
[2744]104-10095-10001
[2746]Pam Lee
[2750]104-10015-10110
[2752]104-10015-10339
[2754]_ Anne McDonnell
[2756]104-10015-10155
[2758]SECRET _.
[2760]13-00000
[2762]ti
[2765]13-00000
[2769]SECRET
[2772]07 bEC 1995
[2774]MEMORANDUM = FOR: JFK Assassination Records Review Board
[2776]VIA: Associate Deputy Director for Operations. .
[2777]Associate Deputy Director for Operations/Human
[2778]Resources and Programs
[2780]FROM: _ Eric L. Qualkenbush
[2781]Chief, Office of Central Cover
[2783]SUBJECT: Proposed CIA Name Release
[2785]1. The Agency strongly objects to the release: of names of
[2786]individuals presently under cover, whether active employees or
[2787]separated employees. As described below, this action would .
[2788]breach Agency commitments to these individuals who agreed to work |
[2789]under cover in addition to breaching our obligations to the cover
[2790]providers.
[2792]2. Employees sign a secrecy agreement. (Attachment A) upon
[2793]entering on duty with the Agency. This agreement pledges the
[2794]employee's secrecy to information which is classified and has not
[2795]been publicly acknowledged by the Agency and.requires the
[2797]employee to protect such information from unauthorized
[2798]disclosure. This secrecy agreement, as long as it remains in
[2799]force by mutual agreement, obliges CIA to protect the identities
[2800]of Agency employees, our cover providers and covert activities.
[2802]3. Because this secrecy agreement creates a moral as well
[2803]as. legal bond between the Agency and the employee, it is Agency: —
[2804]policy to protect the names of former employees who have
[2805]separated under cover unless the Agency and the employee mutually
[2806]agree to remove the cover. Identifying as CIA those employees
[2807]who are mandated by the Agency to use a cover story, i.e.,
[2808]Department of State or the “ABC” Corporation, for their entire
[2809]Agency career as well as into their years after separation from
[2811]"the Agency, jeopardizes:
[2813]e the personal safety of former employees;
[2815]WARNING NOTICE: CL 0489932
[2817]INTELLIGENCE SOURCES CL REASON: 1.5 (c)
[2818]OR METHODS INVOLVED ; DECL ON: X1
[2820]DRV FROM: COV 2-87
[2822]SECRET
[2824]13-00000
[2826]at
[2828]SECRET
[2830]SUBJECT: Memo to. JFK Assassination Records Review Board
[2832]the second careers of former emplovees;
[2834]the cover and. identity of other employees who worked
[2835]with the covert employee whose name is released as
[2836]CIA; and, =.
[2838]the protection of sources and methods (what
[2839]individual would agree to a clandestine relationship
[2840]with American intelligence knowing the secret
[2841]association would become public knowledge?) .
[2843]4, Examples of how identifying covert employees as CIA will
[2844]affect individuals follows:
[2846]Mr. Walter McCabe retired under Department of State
[2847]cover and is currently working in Russia and several
[2848]Eastern European countries for a private firm which
[2849]converts “wartime” factories into peacetime use.
[2850]Revealing his name would damage his relationship .
[2851]with his current employer, his position with the
[2852]firm and would be awkward at best regarding the host
[2853]countries. Attachment B is Mr. McCabe's
[2854]acknowledgement that he was aware he would be denied
[2855]as a CIA employee and Attachment. Cis his signed |
[2856]secrecy agreement.
[2858]Attachment D is a signed ackowledgement from Mr.
[2859]John Whitten who retired under cover in 1970 which
[2860]shows that he was aware that he would be denied as
[2861]an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency from
[2862]the date he entered on duty through the date. of his |
[2864]-departure. Attachment E is a personal letter
[2866]received from Mr. Whitten after he was notified that
[2868]-his name might be released in connection with
[2870]declassification of CIA documents. Attachment F is
[2871]Mr. Whitten’s signed secrecy agreement. It should
[2872]be noted that Mr. Whitten resides in Austria.
[2874]Attachment G is a Summary of Agency Employment (SAE) -
[2876]. written by Mr. Morton M. Palmer and approved by the
[2878]Agency. Attachment H is a certification by Mr.
[2879]Palmer that he will abide by what is contained in
[2880]his SAE and understands disclosure of other
[2881]information would be in violation of his secrecy
[2883]2
[2885]SECRET
[2887]13-0000
[2889]SECRET
[2891]SUBJECT: Memo to JFK Assassination Records Review Board
[2893]agreement. Attachment I is Mr. Palmer’s signed
[2894]secrecy agreement. It should be noted that Mr.
[2895]Palmer resides in Mexico. ‘
[2897]5. Our relationship with cover providers would be
[2898]jeopardized if it became publicly known that they were providing
[2899]cover to CIA employees. The Department of State could very well
[2900]raise objections to our future use of State cover. Of increasing
[2901]importance to the Agency at this time is the critical use of
[2902]private sector (nonofficial) cover providers. The private sector
[2903]would no doubt drop contact and avoid future dealings with us if
[2904]we reveal a covert relationship. Identifying covert
[2905]relationships with cover providers would paralyze Agency
[2906]operations which in turn could severely damage national security.
[2908]-In addition, in the past it has exposed CIA to legal liabilities
[2910]and substantial monetary damages.
[2912]6. Headquarters Regulation (HR) 240-1 is the Agency’s
[2913]regulation on cover. It states that “cover is required for all
[2914]Agency operations, activities and installations abroad, including
[2915]personnel in PCS or TDY status.” HR 240-2, the Agency’s
[2917]regulation on cover after separation, states that-“the
[2919]determination that an employee will retain all or a part of his
[2920]or her cover after separation from the Agency will be based upon
[2921]the judgment that separation in an overt .status could result in
[2922]damage to the national security by compromising intelligence ©
[2923]sources, methods, activities, and/or information, or cause harm
[2924]to foreign relations. This determination will be made on a case-
[2925]by-case basis.” Please note that all Agency employees who retire
[2927]‘abroad must retire under cover.
[2929].7. Release of names of former employees who separated under
[2930]cover. will make the entire Agency cover program vulnerable and
[2932]_ detract from our continuing efforts to enhance cover and conduct
[2934]sometimes dangerous activities necessary to carry out the
[2935]Agency’s mission. We can accept the purpose of the JFK
[2936]Assassination Records Review Act to declassify documents for
[2937]public consumption; however, we submit that the release of true
[2939]names of former. Agency employees adds no value to the documents
[2941]in addition to risking physical harm to these individuals from
[2942]our public detractors. We propose and emphatically encourage
[2943]that pseudonyms, aliases or generic job descriptions such as desk
[2944]officer be used in place of true names which would not diminish
[2945]the impact of the documents.
[2947]3
[2949]SECRET
[2951]13-00000
[2955]Associate
[2957]SECRET
[2959]SUBJECT: Memo to JFK Assassination Records Review Board.
[2961]8. After your review and consideration of the above .
[2962]information, we would appreciate notification of your final
[2964]decision. prior to taking any action.
[2966]Eric L. Qualkenbush
[2968]Attachments:
[2969]As stated above
[2971]CONCUR:
[2973]Operations/Human Resoyrces
[2974]and Programs
[2976]. oe i: C , 7 —, a ;
[2977]nl thy — 6 ki eS
[2978]’ Associate Deputy Director. for : Date °
[2980]Operations
[2982]4
[2984]SECRET
[2986]13-00000
[2988]a rs
[2990]a .
[2992]SECRET |
[2994]SUBJECT: Memo to JFK Assassination Records Review Board
[2996]DC/OCC/OSG/EMathias:lae/37076. (6 Dec 95)
[2998]Distribution:
[3000]Orig & 1 -
[3002]PPPBPE NEE
[3005]JFK Assassination Records Review Board
[3007]' IMS/HRS-
[3009]ADDO
[3011]_ ADDO/HRP
[3013]DDO Secretariat
[3017]OGC/LD - Linda Cipriani
[3019]occ Chron
[3021]occ/OSG Chron .
[3022]occ/OSG File 785-120-034 . ‘
[3024]5
[3026]SECRET
[3028]13-00000
[3030]“ , c
[3031]Hy
[3032]- CONFIDENTIAL
[3033](When Filled In)
[3034]Tape meg
[3035]. “Alem |
[3036]SECRECY OATH
[3037]I, John M. Whitten » am about to terminate my association
[3039]with the Central Intelligence Agency. I realize that, by virtue of my duties
[3041]. with that Agency, I have been the recipient of. information and intelligence which
[3043]concerns the present and future security of the United States of America.. I am
[3044]aware that the unauthorized disclosure of such information is prohibited by the
[3045]Espionage Laws (18 USC secs. 793 and 794), and by the National Security Act of
[3046]1947 which specifically requires the protection of intelligence sources and
[3048]‘methods from unauthorized disclosure. Accordingly, I SOLEMNLY SWEAR, WITHOUT
[3050]MENTAL RESERVATION OR PURPOSE OF EVASION, AND IN THE ABSENCE OF DURESS, AS FOL-
[3051]LOWS:
[3053]1. I will never divulge, publish, or reveal ty writing, word, conduct, cr
[3054]otherwise, any. information relating to the national defense and security and
[3055]particularly information of this nature relating to intelligence sources, meth-
[3056]ods and operations, and specifically Central Intelligence Agency operations,
[3057]sources, methods, personnel, fiscal data, or security measures to anyone, in-
[3058]cluding but not limited to, any future governmental or private employer, private
[3060]-citizen, or other Government employee or official without the express written
[3062]consent of the Director of Central Intelligence or his authorized representative.
[3064]2. I have been invited to submit in writing any monetary claims which I-
[3065]may have against CIA or the United States Government which may in any way neces-
[3066]sitate the disclosure of information described herein. I have been advised that
[3067]any such claims will receive full legal consideration. In the event, however,
[3068]that I am not satisfied with the decisions of CIA concerning any present or
[3069]future claims I may submit, I will not take any other action to obtain satis-
[3070]faction without prior written notice to CIA, and then only in accordance with
[3071]such legal and security advice as CIA will promptly furnish me.
[3073]3- I do not have any documents or materials in my possession, classified
[3074]or unclassified, which are the property of, or in custodial:responsibility of
[3075]the Central Intelligence Agency, having come into my possession as a result of
[3077]my duties with the Central Intelligence Agency, or otherwise.
[3079]4, During my exit processing and during my period of employment with the
[3080]Central Intelligence Agency I have been given an opportunity to report all in-
[3081]formation about the Agency, its personnel, and its operations which I consider
[3082]should receive official cognizance. Hence, I am not aware of any information,
[3083]which it is my duty in the national interest to disclose to the Central Intel-
[3084]ligence Agency, nor am I aware of any violations or breaches of security which
[3085]I have not officially reported, except as set forth on the reverse “side of this
[3086]sheet or on other attachments.
[3088]CONFIDENTIAL
[3090]FORM USE PREVIOUS .
[3091]: : (12)
[3093]4-62 305 EDETION.
[3095]SECRECY AGREEMENT
[3097]1, I,.JOHN M. Witten, understand that by virtue of my duties in the
[3099]Central Intelligence Group, I may be the recipient of information and intelligence
[3101]which concerns the present and future security of the United States: and which be-
[3103]_ longs ‘to the United States. This information and intelligence, together with the
[3105]methods of collecting and handling it, are classified according to standards set
[3106]in the State, War, and Navy Departments. JI have read and understand the pro-
[3107]visions of the Act of Congress of June 15, 1917 (Espionage Act), as amended,
[3108]conceming the disclosure of information relating to the National Defense md I.
[3109]am familiar with the penalties provided for violation. thereof, »
[3111]2. I agree that I do not now, nor ‘shall I ever possess any right, interest,
[3112]title or claim in or to any of the information or intelligence or the methods of
[3113]collecting or handling of it which has come or shall come to my attention by
[3114]virtue of my connection with the Central Intelligence Group, but shall always
[3115]recognize the property right of the United States of America in and to such
[3116]mat ters.
[3118]3. Ido solemnly swear that I will never divulge, publish nor reveal either
[3119]by word, coriduct, or by any other means such classified information, intelligence
[3121]‘ or knowledge, except in the performmee of my official duties and in accordance
[3123]with the Laws of the United States, unless specifically authorized in writing in~ .
[3124]each case by the Director of Central Intel Ligence.
[3126]lee I understand that no change in my assignment or employment will relieve |
[3128]a of my obligation under this oath and that the provisions of this oath will
[3130]remain binding upon me even after the termination of my services with the United
[3132]' Stated. .
[3134]Se I understand that my employment by the Central Intelligence Group is
[3135]conditioned upon my understanding of and strict compliance with "Security
[3136]Regulations cle, " and the appendices thereto.
[3138]6. I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose
[3139]of evasion.
[3141]In witness whereof I have set my hand ‘and seal this » Bada of AUG z UST u 196%
[3143]Ph. Le (Seal}
[3145]Sworn to before me this aoindiay of
[3147]y]
[3148]at:
[3150]MY Commmniasion i ;
[3151]. SECRET en expires
[3152](712) oe me Mareh 22, 196)
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[3261]a OUR ics
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[3304]13-00000
[3306]wa | a | SECRET = rt
[3308]Theme,
[3310]RETIREMENT AND- RESIGNATION EXIT COVER BRIEFING |
[3312]Name (Last, first,middle) ' : STAFF OR DIVISION ccs FILE NG.
[3314]Fi/ors | 386%.
[3316]* 3 _ fue : | | vrvouenenn FUNDS
[3318]Mele Com [now Pa ang 170
[3320]}— Taesrenation | 3 :
[3323]LWOP
[3325]AGENCY JOB TITLE
[3327]AREA OF ASSIGNMENT
[3328]_ COUNTAY :
[3330]l
[3331]i p
[3332], 12
[3334]Miah |18e70| Withee, De. | Plat |
[3336]Ne 2
[3337]P| Watle De | tee t<| |
[3338]a ee
[3340]CEA 1S A MATTER OF RECORD AT (include acknowledgement by OP)
[3342]cong 255 eS aisns SECRET [eget (4 sruzeanl
[3344]13-00000
[3346]” ‘[ FOREIGN TRAVEL PLANS — .
[3347]OP inn teal Vien, oes
[3349]SENSITIVE. SPECIAL, OR COVERT SITE ASSIGNMENTS
[3351]LIST RELATIVES EMPLOYED @Y CIA ‘ . CIA AWARDS
[3353]MEDALLION | CERTIFICATE OF DISTINCTION
[3355]INTELLIGENCE MEDAL |” LENGTH OF SERVICE CERT.
[3356]OTHER (specify)
[3358]| | EMPLOYEE HAS seen] | pectareo | —_—‘| COMPROMISED
[3360]CREDIT BUREAU RECORDS INDICATE Ta | wow GERET NONAGENCY
[3362]THE EMPLOYMENT HISTORY ON PAGE 1 (S THE ACTUAL DESCRIPTION OF SERVICE. THE EMPLOYMENT HISTORY BELOW 15 THE COVER
[3363]STORY CONTRIVEO FOR USE AFTER DEPARTURE FROM AGENCY EMPLOYMENT. .
[3365]DATE
[3367]AREA
[3368]OF ASSIGNMENT
[3371]13-00000
[3373]wike A _NEE twsunanee —_—____ CONVERT
[3375], ee - DEPARTING EMPLOYEES ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
[3377]'T acknowledge that I have been briefed by the Central Cover Staff | on the date
[3378]noted below and do understand that I will be _
[3380]as an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency from the date I entered on duty through
[3382]the cate of departure in accordance with instructions as outlined above.
[3384]= have deen informed as to the employment references applicable in ny case.
[3386]SIGNATURE
[3388]REMARKS
[3390]. COORDINATION ; . : |
[3392]FINAL APPROVING AUTHORITY
[3394]SECRET © oo | ae
[3396]13-00000
[3397]~ SECRET
[3399]Ke
[3400]@ce WV
[3401])
[3403]BANKING INSTRUCTIONS
[3405]FOLLOW-UP ACTION TO BE TAKEN 8Y COVER OFFICER
[3407]BLOCK RECORDS IN OFFICE OF PERSONNEL [Xx] vs] ves]
[3408]NOTIFY OFFICE OF FINANCE TO. HANDLE THE CSC COMPUTATION FORMS IN A COVERT ane
[3409]MANNER FOR BLOCKING RECORDS AT CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
[3411]ve i CREDIT UNION QUERRIED
[3413]MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION PERTAINING TO DEPARTING EMPLOYEE
[3415]FORWARDING ADORESS NEW EMPLOYMENT ADORESS
[3417]IDENTITY AND ADORESS OF EMERGENCY CONTACT
[3419]tF SUBJECT HAS APPLIED FOR NEW EMPLOYMENT PRIOR TO CONTACTING CCS WHAT EMPLOYMENT REFERENCE 010 SUBJECT USE?
[3421]SUBJECT MAS NOT RETURNED ALL COVER DOCUMENTATION (OENTIFY OOCUMENTS THAT HAVE NOT BEEN RETURNED.
[3423]ANNUITY PAYMENT TO BE CHANNELED BY BANK TRANSFER
[3425]CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS: 1099 MAILING INSTRUCTIONS
[3427]: SUMMARY OF re OATE RECEIVED “| DATE. APPROVED :
[3428]“AGENCY EMPLOYMENT : a
[3429]cREDITS
[3431]SHOULD NOTICE or RESIGNATION BE se nestitrevep _PNHOUSE
[3433]~ SECRET _ -
[3436]13-00000
[3438]. *h . . : onan ; 7 . . al oy
[3439]} toe tl « , . ios ‘A «
[3440]; SECURITY REMINDER
[3442]i ee an
[3444]I, _ Walter C. McCabe shave “been reminded
[3445]that, by virtue of my duties with the Central Intelligence
[3446]Agency, I have been the recipient of classified information and
[3447]information concerning intelligence sources and methods, and —
[3448]that my. Entrance on Duty Secrecy Agreement requires me to pro-.
[3449]tect such data. Moreover, I have been given an opportunity to
[3450]review my Entrance on Duty Secrecy Agreement.
[3452]2. I have also been reminded that I ‘am not permitted to.
[3453]retain any documents or other materials which are the property
[3454]of the CIA or the custodial responsibility’ of CIA, and I affirm
[3455]that I do not have in my possession, nor am I taking away from
[3456]CIA any such documents or materials.
[3458]3. Finally, I am aware of my responsibility to notify the
[3459]_CIA promptly in the event I am called upon by properly constituted
[3460]authorities to testify or provide information that I am pledged
[3461]not to disclose and I will advise said authority of my secrecy
[3462]agreement and request that my obligation to testify be established
[3463]before I am required to. do so.
[3467]FORM 30 GCSSOLETE PREVIOUS |
[3468]£-97 5 cortions
[3470]13-00000 (
[3471]: ft (— SECRECY AGREEMENT
[3472], . ‘ . : . ' ' * ° .
[3473]' hbo (print full name), hereby agree to accept as a prior condition of my.
[3475]being employed by, or otherwise retained to perform services for, the Central, Intelligence Agency, or for staff elements of
[3476]the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence (hereinafter collectively referred to as the‘ ‘Central Intelligence Agency’),
[3477]the obligations contained in this agreement.
[3479]2. L understand that in the course of my employment or other service with the Central Intelligence Agency I may be
[3480]given access to information which is classified in accordance with the standards set forth. in Executive Order 12065 as
[3481]amended or superseded, or other applicable Executive Order, and other information which, if disclosed in an unauthorized
[3482]manner, would jeopardize foreign intelligence activities of the United States Government. I accept that by being granted
[3483]access to such information I will be placed in a position of special confidence and trust and become obligated to protect. the
[3484]information from unauthorized disclosure.
[3486]3. In consideration for being employed or otherwise retained to provide services to the Central Intelligence Agency, |
[3487]hereby agree that I will never disclose in any form or any manner any of the following categories of information or
[3488]materials. to any person not authorized by the Central Intelligence Agency. to receive them:
[3490]a. information which is classified pursuant to Executive Order and which I have obtained during the course of my
[3491]employment or other service with the Central Intelligence Agency;
[3493]b. information, or materials which reveal information, classifiable pursuant to Executive Order and obtained by me _
[3494]in the course of my employment or other service with the Central Intelligence Agency but which, because of
[3495]operational circumstance or oversight. is not formally marked as classified in accordance with such Executive Order
[3496]and which I know or have reason to know has not been. publicly acknowledged by the Agency;
[3498]c. information obtained by me in the course of my employment or other service with the Central Intelligence
[3499]Agency that identifies any person or organization that presently has or formerly has had a relationship with a United
[3500]States foreign intélligence organization, which relationship the United States Government has taken affirmative
[3501]measures to conceal.:.
[3503]4. I understand thatthe burden will be upon me to learn whether information or materials within my control are
[3504]~? :.’ .eonsidered by the Central- ‘Intelligence Agericy' to fit:the descriptions 'sét forth in paragraph 3; et whom the Agency has
[3505]authorized to receive it.”
[3507]5. As a further condition of the special confidence and trust reposed in me by the Central Intelligence Agency, I
[3508]hereby agree to submit for review by the Central Intelligence Agency all information or materials including works of fiction
[3509]which contain any mention .of intelligence data or activities, or contain data which may be based upon information
[3510]classified pursuant to Executive Order, which [ contemplate disclosing publicly or which I have actually prepared for public
[3511]disclosure, either during my employment or other service with the Central Intelligence Agency or at any time thereafter,
[3512]prior to discussing it with/or showing it to anyone who is not authorized to have access to it. I further agree that [ will not
[3513]take any steps toward public disclosure until I have received written permission to do so from the Central Intelligence
[3514]Agency.
[3516]6. I understand ‘tha 4 purpose of the review described in paragraph 5 is to give the Central Intelligence Agency an
[3517]opportunity to. determin’ ‘bet ther the information or materials. which 1 contemplate disclosing publicly contain any
[3518]information which I have.agre at to disclose. 1 further understand that the Agency will act upon the materials I submit
[3519]and make a response_to. ‘mer withinra. -yeasonable time. : ; ape See
[3521]ga
[3523]. Lunderstand that? CAlinteeiao. or materialg which I may. acquire in the colitse of 7 my employment or other service
[3524]with the Central Intelligenée Agency which fit the descriptions set out in paragraph’3 of this agreement are and will remain
[3525]the property of the United States Government. J agree to surrender all materials® ‘reflecting such information which may
[3526]have come into my possession or for which I am responsible because of my employment or other service with the Central
[3527]Intelligence Agency, upon demand by an appropriate official of the Central Intelligence Agency, or upon the conclusion of
[3528]my employment or other service with the Central Intelligence Agency.
[3530]8. I agree to notify the Central Intelligence Agency immediately in the event that I am called upon by judicial or
[3531]congressional authorities to testify about, or provide, information which I have agreed herein not to disclose.
[3533]9. I understand that nothing contained in this agreement prohibits me from reporting intelligeace activities which I
[3534]consider to be unlawful or improper directly to the Intelligence Oversight Board established by the President or to any
[3535]successor body which the’ “President may establish. | recognize that there are also established procedures for bringing such
[3536]matters to the attention of the AgencySinspector General or to the Director of Central Intelligence. I further understand
[3538]“that any information which I may report to the Intelligence Oversight Board continues to be subject to'this agreement for all
[3539]other purposes and that such reporting does not constitute public disclosure or declassification of that information. -
[3541]FORM OBSOLETE PREVIOUS . _*
[3542]9-79 368 EDITIONS, .
[3544]each case by the Director of Central Intelligence.
[3546]ft | RestRicTeD = 70978
[3548]SECRECY AGREEMENT
[3550]. 1. I, Na (hus Att Mc Cre , understand that by virtue of my duties in
[3551]the Central Intelligence Agency, I may be the recipient of information and intel-
[3553]ligence which concerns the present and future security of the United States and
[3555]which. belongs. to. the United States. ‘This information and intelligence, together cm
[3556]with the methods of collecting and handling it, are classified according to
[3558]security standards set by the Central Intelligence Agency. I have read and under- —
[3559]stand the provisions of the Act of Congress of June 15, 1917 (Espionage Act), as
[3561]amended, concerning: the disclosure of information relating to.the National Defense
[3563]‘and I am familiar with the penalties provided for violation thereof.
[3565]2. I. agree that I do not: now, nor shall I ever possess any right, interest,
[3566]title or claim in or to any of the information or intelligence or the methods of
[3567]collecting or. handling of it which has come or shall come to my attention by
[3568]virtue of my. connection with the Central. Intelligence Agency, but shall always
[3569]recognize the property right of the United States of America in and to such
[3570]matters.
[3572]3% Ido eolemly swear that I will never divulge, publish 1 nor reveal either
[3573]by word, conduct, or by any other means such classified information, intelligence”
[3574]or knowledge, except in the performance of my official duties and in accordance
[3575]with the laws of the United States, unless specifically authorized in writing in
[3577]4, ‘I understand that. no change in my assignment or employment will relieve ee
[3578]me of my obligation under this oath and that the provisions of this oath will .
[3580]’ remain binding upon me. even after the termination of my services with the United
[3582]States.
[3584]“Ss. I understand that my -employment by the Central Intelligence ‘Agency is
[3585]conditioned upon my. understanding of and strict compliance with "Security Regula-
[3586]tions CIA", and the appendices thereto.
[3588]‘6. I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or pur-
[3589]pose of evasion.
[3591]In witness whereof I have set. my hand and seal wna ZL1 day oc Lobuuady 19. SS
[3593]Witnessed by me this/ © ey
[3595]at WASHINGTON, D 0, .
[3597]oo Cbisee B. anton
[3599]A eee cade
[3601]FORM HO.
[3602]OCT 1959. 99-33
[3604]RESTRICTED
[3606]13-00000
[3608]oe . SECRET -
[3609]RETIREMENT AND RESIGNATION EXIT COVER ARES
[3610]ae (Last, Fiest, Middle) F479 : OX” oR aa
[3611]} 7 Ae | [coyreacr | CS
[3613]a : ; te p. NO.
[3615]; OVERT
[3617]Jo august af | 061360 Lee
[3618]ADE @ STEP SEPARATION DATE - LAST WORKING DAY
[3621]YRYIGO
[3622]RETIREMENT RESI GNATION ‘
[3624]Pacis — Cyese Cicta Ocse SSE OF SETURN
[3626][events
[3628]NONGOY ERNMENT
[3630]aie Ty LEAVE
[3632]REIGN TRAVEL PLANS
[3634]TOYS % thahan Eupe) ~~ om contiac!— . ON ON pe me
[3636]'
[3637]| .
[3639]NSITIVE. SPECIAL, OR COVERT SITE ASSIGNMENTS
[3641]. EMPLOYEE HAS not BEEN DECLARED‘ OR COMPROMISED
[3643]EMPLOYEE HAS “BEEN [| DECLARED {| compromised (specify)
[3645]BACKSTOPPING is NECESSARY CLIVE REASON
[3647]COVER BRIEFING
[3649]ACKNOWLEDGE AGENCY EMPLOYMENT FOR COMPLETE PERIOD OF ASSIGNMENT
[3651]DO NOT ACKNOWLEDGE AGENCY €MPLOYMENT, FOLLOW INSTRUCTIONS OUTLINED SELOW
[3653]ACKNOWLEDGE PARTIAL AGENCY EMPLOYMENT AS INDICATED GZLOW
[3655]‘E EMPLOYMENT HISTORY SELOW is THE COVER STORY CONTRIVED FOR USE AFTER SEPARATION FROM THE AGENCY.
[3657]oaTe AREA TYPE OF : ; .
[3658]FROM OF ASSICNMENT COVER. COVER ORGANIZATION Jor TITLE
[3660]Dey | SECRET wwsism [£2 wiroer cu ay: ovnso J SSP 17
[3662]Hemet
[3664]13-00000 -
[3665]. 1. ye
[3669]SECRET ~_ . -
[3670]FOLLOW-UP ACTION TO BE TAKEN BY COVER OFFICER
[3672]e : ix [ves] | no | oD. Bp
[3673]BLOCK RECORDS IN OFFICE OF PERSONNEL ‘ YES
[3674]. 0D (He Si.
[3675]SCC
[3676]i
[3677]{YES
[3680]PREPARE ISSUE 1.0. CARD We 2 FORM — HOSPITALIZATION INS. CARD
[3681]F - ?, $ ‘ ( : ; :
[3682]ORM 1551 TYPE: 7 v7 AE TYPE: Sf@ XK |tvee: AG:
[3684]. MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION PERTAINING TO DEPARTING EMPLOYEE :
[3686]if EMPLOYEE HAS APPLIED FOR NEW EMPLOYMENT PRIOR TO CONTACTING CCS WHAT EMPLOYMENT REFERENCE WAS USED?
[3688]BLOCK CREDIT RECORDS
[3690]BLOCK TELEPHONE LOCATOR RECGRDS
[3692]SUBJECT i : #AS NOT RETURNED ALL COVER OOCUMENTATION. IDENTIFY DOCUMENTS THAT HAVE NOT BEEN RETURNED.
[3694]RELATIVES EMPLOYED BY Cla (name and relationship)
[3696]Aone:
[3698]OEPARTING EMPLOYEES ACKNOWLEDGEMENT =~ . .
[3700]I certify that I have been briefed by the Central Cover Staff on this date and I
[3701]understand that: :
[3703]“| I will be acknowledged as an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency in.
[3704]accordance with the instructions set forth in the Cover Briefing Section above.
[3706]™ I will not be acknowledged as an employee of the Central Intelligence
[3707]‘Agency.
[3709]i have been informed of the employment, references applicable in wy case.
[3711]LB ce fac
[3713]StGNATURE
[3715]REMARKS
[3717]oe! sy: Rebrimint addrtse |
[3718]( Moenb—otr
[3720]2Hot “A ST Me
[3721]SAE: “¥ Wh wd west, De
[3723]EDF IYGIES, TU-78 | thy 1995 —
[3725]Reber "J tn Conline!
[3727]donned’ Sle LA
[3729]Céneo ao
[3731]~ COORDINATION
[3732]CCS/OCB/M ccSs/O0FB : . ccs/ccs ccs/cos ccs/cse
[3735]COMPONENT . . DATE
[3737]ces/e 7: 2-25~ Ff
[3739]SECRET
[3741]13-00000 .. .
[3742], DEC @7 795) 11:54AM
[3743]wotaa SECRECY AGREEMENT P33
[3744]1], (print full name), hereby agree to accept as a prior condition of my
[3745]being employed by, or otherwise retained to perform services for, the Central Intelligence Agency, or for staff elements of the
[3746]Director of Central Intelligence (hereinafter collectively referred to as the ‘Central Intelligence Agency’), the obligations
[3747]contained in this agreement.
[3749]2. T understand that in the course of my employment or other service with the Central” Tntelligence Agency I may be
[3750]given access to information or material that is classified or is in the process of a classification determination in accordance
[3751]with the standards set forth in Executive Order 12356 as amended or superseded, or other applicable Executive order, that if
[3752]disclosed in an unauthorized manner would jeopardize intelligence activities of the United States Government. I accept that by
[3753]being granted access to such information or material I will be placed in a position of special confidence and trust and become
[3754]obligated to protect the Information and/or material Losure.
[3756]3. In consideration for being employed or oth mpese Seine Weal ovide services to the Central Intelligence Agency, I
[3757]hereby agree that I will never disclose in any form 6r-@ e-aky person not authorized by the Cenrral Intelligence.
[3758]Agency to receive it, any information or material in githé fotidwi & categories:
[3760]Invlligener Agency that I Arow i ia in the process of wclassjfication determination.
[3762]4. I understand that it is hep responsibility to consult With appropriate managemen¢ Qs thorities in the component or
[3763]Directorate that employs me or/b bx ained my services, or with the Central Intelligence A *s Publications Review Board
[3764]if am no longer employed b qe Hed with the Agency, in order to ensure that Tia - Whether information or material
[3765]within my knowled DF ay Be catgsories paragraph 3 is
[3767]considered by the Cent shh
[3768]receive such ern te i)
[3769]5. As a further condidoire
[3770]by agree to submit for revied™by_ th
[3771]work of fiction, which contatfitas
[3772]might be based upon either dfh
[3773]actually prepared for public gi om
[3774]at any me thereafter, prior ssingat wi
[3775]set forth in paragraph 3.1 oa :
[3776]permission to do ul re the Paral Ses “4,
[3777]6. I und at mits mee
[3779]opportunity to d Ne Gihether trey
[3780]or material that J ed not to ais
[3782]a has authorized to
[3784]i A piligence Agency, I here-
[3785]bt beet in any form, including a
[3786]sformation or material that
[3787]Ll, @ publicly or that I have
[3788]With th Intelligence Agency ot
[3789]& shed oii Ave access to the categories
[3790]Cage a — til I have received writen
[3792]D NS Poon iniptt ig ¢ Agency an
[3793]ten ae oe wpa yar aly information
[3794]re
[3796]Bae ikem
[3798]- response to me Sab os 4hnable Ef cy’s peed sla tion on the basis
[3799]that the informs Sas “ INT uestion der: a y be called upo: yp be ‘ally identify such
[3800]sources. My failure prreka S159 iio so may a asa ‘r, ds WZ lose the information
[3802]or material in seer
[3803]7, L under tf eed iy Te: ae is
[3805]ii <a aig <a service with
[3807]the Central Intelligence a4 ither of the g dee prj h in n paragraph 34 Agreement are and will remain
[3808]the property of the United States: Govemnnent unles tay ¥ term! orming is <Y “ihe ppropriate official or final ruling
[3809]of a court of law. E agree to surrender ¢ yining co ing o Feet Fi mation or material upon demand -
[3811]- by an appropriate official of the Central Intelligencé, P alison of y’employment or other service with
[3812]the Central Incelligence Agency.
[3814]8. I agree to notify the Central Intelligence Agency immediately in the event thar [ am called upon by judicial or con-
[3815]gressional authorities, or by specially established Investigatory bodies of the executive branch, to testify about, or provide, in-
[3816]formation or material that I have agreed herein not to disclose. In any communication with any such authority or body, I shall
[3817]observe all applicable rufes or procedures for ensuring that such information and/or material is handled in a secure manner.
[3819]9. I understand that nothing contained in this agreement prohibits me from reporting intelligence activities that’! con-
[3820]sider to be unlawful or improper directly to the Intelligence Oversight Board established by the President, or to any successor
[3821]body that the President may establish, or to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives or the Senate.
[3822]I recognize that there are also established procedures for bringing such matters to the attention of the Agency’s Inspector -
[3823]General or to the Director of Central Intelligence, In making any report referred to in this paragraph, I will observe all applicable
[3824]tules of procedures for ensuring the secure handling of any information or material that may be involved. I understand that
[3826]- any such information or material continues to be subject to this agreement for all other purposes and that such reporting does
[3827]not constitute public disclosure or deciassification of that information or material.
[3829]or 368 saat rremous
[3831]13-00000. DEC wr “YS L1tDoHM _ ; Peed
[3832]é LA
[3834]* "10. Tunderstand that any breach of this agreement by me may result in the Central Intelligence Agericy taking admin-
[3836]‘istrative “action against me, which can include temporary loss of pay or termination of my employment or other service with
[3838]the Central Intelligence Agency. I also understand that if I violate the terms of this agreement, the United States Government
[3840]may institute a civil proceeding to seck compensatory damages or other appropriate relief. Further, I understand that the
[3842]disclosure of information that I have agreed herein not to disclose can, in some circumstances, constitute a criminal offense. —
[3844]11. T understand that the United States Government may, prior to any unauthorized disclosure that is threatened by me,
[3845]choose to apply to any appropriate court for an order enforcing this agreement. Nothing in this agreement constitutes a waiver .
[3846]on the part of the United States to institute a civil or criminal proceeding for any breach of this agreement by me. Nothing in
[3847]" this agreement constitutes a wavier on my part of any possible defenses [ may have in connection with either civil or criminal
[3848]proceedings that may be brought against me.
[3850]12. In addition to any other remedy to which the United States Government may become entitled, T hereby assign to the
[3851]United States Government all rights, title, and interest in any-and all royalties, remunerations, and emoluments that have resulted
[3852]or will result or may result from any divulgence, publication or revelation of information or material by me that is carried out
[3853]in breach of paragraph $ of this agreement or that involves information or material prohibited from disclosure by the terms of
[3854]this agreement.
[3856]13. IT understand and accept oe tht, unless I am provided a written release from this agreement or any portion of it by t the
[3857]Director of Central Intelligence. or the Director's representative, all the conditions and obligations accepted by me in this agree-
[3858]ment apply both during my employment or other service with the Central Intelligence Agency, and at all times thereafter.
[3860]14. Lunderstand that the purpose of this agreement is to implement the responsibilities of the Director of Central Intel-
[3861]ligence, particularly the responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methiods, as specified in the National Security Act of
[3862]1947, as amended,
[3864]15. These restrictions are consistent with and do not supersede conflict with or otherwise alter the employee obligations .
[3865]rights or liabilities created by Executive Order 12356; section 7211 of tide 5, United States Code (governing disclosures to
[3866]Congress); section 1034 of tide 10, United States Code, as amended by the Military Whistleblower Protection Act (governing
[3867]disclosure to Congress by members of the Military); section 2302(b)(8) of title 5, United States Code, as amended by the
[3868]Whistleblower Protection Act (governing disclosures of illegality, waste, fraud, abuse or public health or safety threats); the
[3869]Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982 (50 U.S.C., 421 er seg.) (governing disclosures that could expose confidential
[3870]Government agents), and the starutes which protect against disclosure that may compromise the national security, including
[3871]section 641, 793, 794, 798, and 952 of title 18, United States Code, and section 4(b) of the Subversive Activides Act of 1950
[3872](50 U.S.C. section 783(b)). The definitions, requirements, obligations, rights, sanctions and liabilities created by said Executive
[3873]Order and listed statutes are incorporated into this Agreement and are controlling.
[3875]16. I understand that nothing in this agreement limits or otherwise affects any provision of criminal or other law that .
[3876]may be applicable to the unauthorized disclosure of classified information, including the espionage laws (sections 793, 794 and
[3877]798 of Title 18, United States Code) and the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982 (P.L. 97-200: 50 U.S.C., 421 er
[3878]5€q.). .
[3879]17, Each of the numbered paragraphs and lettered subparagraphs of this agreement is severable. If a court should find
[3880]any of the paragraphs or subparagraphs of this agreement to be unenforceable. 1 understand that all remaining provisions will
[3881]continue in full force.
[3883]18. I make this agreement in good faith, and with no purpose of evasion.
[3885]19. This agreement shall be interpreted under and in conformance with the law of the United States. -
[3887]Signature
[3889]Date:
[3891]The execution of this agreement was witnessed by the undersigned, who accepted it on behalf of the Central Intelligence
[3892]Agency as a prior condition of the employment or other service of the person whose signature appears above.
[3894]WITNESS AND ACCEPTANCE:
[3895]Signature _ ere
[3896]Printed Name ~
[3898]Date