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[3]104-10306-10018) . | | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
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[10]. . | VA - 19 December 1963 = ,
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[13]MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
[14](Welder.
[16]SUBJECT: Meeting with the President on Cuba at 1100 on —_—_—
[17]19 December 1963
[19]1. Included in the meeting were Acting Secretary of State
[20]Ball, Acting Secretary of Defense Gilpatric, Secretary Cyrus
[21]Vance, Secretary Douglas Dillon, Ambassador Thompson,
[22]General Wheeler, Mr, Donald Wilson, Mr. McGeorge Bundy,
[23]Mr. Bromley Smith, Mr. Edwin Martin, Mr. Ted Sorensen,
[24]Mr. John Crimins, Mr, Gordon Chase, Mr. George Ready,
[25]Mr. Bill Moyers, General Carter, Mr. Helms, and Mr. Fitz-
[26]Gerald.
[28]2. The President, after full discussion, postponed any
[29]sizable operations by FitzGerald, primarily to avoid any possible
[30]embarrassment to our OAS negotiations on the Venezuelan arms
[31]cache, We are authorized to continue to put forward proposals
[32]for operations and also to continue preparations for air ops. The
[33]main thrust was to greatly increase political action with Canada,
[34]Britain, Spain, Italy, and others in an effort to promote greater
[35]economic blockade.
[37]3. Mr. Bundy later stated that his analysis of the meeting
[38]was that the President would continue to approve smaller
[39]FitzGerald-type operations even though they would be relatively
[40]unrewarding if they would assist in keeping up the morale of the
[41]troops on shore, of our agents, and otherwise help in keeping the
[43]ball rolling.
[44]i é
[46]-”
[48]Marshall S. Carter
[49]Lieutenant General, USA
[50]Acting Director
[52]AEG/OR
[53]OCUMENT
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[58]MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
[59]SUBJECT : Meeting at the White House 19 December 1963
[60]PRESENT: The President
[62]The State Department: Under Secretary George W.
[63]Ball, Deputy Under Secretary U, Alexis Johnson,
[64]Ambassador at Large Llewellyn Thompson,
[65]Assistant Secretary for Inter-American
[66]Affairs Edwin Martin, Coordinator of Cuban
[67]Affairs John H. Crimmins.
[69]The Defense Department: Deputy Secretary Roswell
[70]Gilpatric, Secretary of the Army Cyrus Vance,
[72]Joint Chiefs of Staff: General Wheeler,
[73]USIA: Deputy Director Donald M, Wilson,
[74]The Treasury Department: Secretary Douglas Dillon,
[76]The White House Staff: Executive Assistant to the
[77]President McGeorge Bundy, Messrs, George Reedy
[78]and Williams Moyers.and Gordon Chase,
[80]CIA: General Marshall 8, Carter, Messrs. Richard
[81]Helms and Desmond FitzGerald.
[83]1, The President arrived at the meeting approximately
[84]five minutes early -- prior to the arrival of several
[85]members of the group including Mr, Bundy. Without a formal
[86]introduction I commenced the scheduled briefing on the Agency
[87]Cuban program at the urging of the President and despite the
[88]activities of the Presidential photographer,
[90]2, The President appeared interested in the number of
[91]agents inside Cuba but made no particular comment concerning
[92]the program until the subject of economic denial was intro-
[93]duced. He asked to be told what additional measures could
[94]be taken to step up the denial program, I said that the
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[99]principal soft spots among free world countries appeared
[100]at the present time to be Canada, the U.K, and Spain, The
[101]President requested a memorandum setting forth specifics
[102]concerning leaks of economically strategic items from these
[103]three countries together with recommendations as to what
[104]could be done to stop these leaks, He requested Under
[105]Secretary Ball to prepare to make demarches to the govern-
[106]ments of these three countries as well as any others
[107]engaged in the Cuba trade contrary to our interests, He
[108]appeared particularly interested in the subject of econo-
[109]mic denial and returned to it several times,
[111]3, After hearing a brief description of our progress
[112]in connection with promoting disaffection among the Cuban
[113]military, the President said that it did not seem to him
[114]that we had gone very far along this line and that one
[115]day those concerned in Cuba matters, including himself,
[116]would have to face the "grand jury" (of domestic public
[117]opinion) to account for our progress in our attempts to
[118]find a solution to the Cuban situation. I pointed out
[119]that the program being presented was, with the exception
[120]of the economic denial item, entirely a covert program and,
[121]if run at full capacity, would tax the capabilities of the
[122]clandestine services -- in other words, that if new and
[123]broader measures against Cuba were to be undertaken, they
[124]would have to be within the overt field.
[126]4, After a brief description of the sabotage and
[127]harassment program the subject of the proposed Matanzas
[128]raid was discussed, After hearing the pros and cons the
[129]President stated that he did not feel that the present time
[130]was a good one to conduct an operation of this magnitude
[131]which carried a less than 50 percent chance of success, He
[132]said that he felt that such an operation, if pinned directly
[133]on the U.5S., might cause the Soviets to move in the wrong
[134]direction with respect to Cuba, i.e, increase their econo-
[135]mic aid or their military presence, Recognizing that a
[136]cessation of raids would have a bad morale effect within
[137]Cuba, he agreed that low risk operations, with admittedly
[138]lower economic and psychological impact, should be con-
[139]ducted, He further stated that planning for such opera-
[140]tions as Matanzas should be continued, General Wheeler —
[141]raised the possibility of air strikes against major targets
[142]by autonomous groups, This was discussed and it was agreed
[143]that in view of the fact that preparations would take at
[144]least three months, these preparations should proceed and
[145]the question re-examined at the time that capabilities have
[146]been perfected,
[149]st ham
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[153]5. On the question of autonomous groups the President
[154]asked the cost of these operations (five million dollars),
[155]He also asked the cost of Cuban operations for the current
[156]year (21 or 2 million dollars) and the total Agency budget,
[158]6, The intelligence summary concerning Cuba prepared
[159]by General Carter for the meeting was examined,
[161]7. \Mr,. Bundy then reviewed current U.S. policy vis-a-vis
[162]Cuba. He then went down a check list of possible new courses
[163]of action taken from the Department of State paper prepared
[164]for the December 13 Standing Group meeting, Unilateral
[165]actions presented were:
[167](1) Air attacks by our autonomous groups. No
[168]further discussion,
[170](2) Selective relaxation of U.S. controls against
[171]exile groups in Florida, No comment on
[172]Mr, Bundy's generally unfavorable presentation,
[174](3) Military feints. No comment on generally
[175]unfavorable presentation,
[177](4) Low-level reconnaissance flights. Comment by
[178]Assistant Secretary Martin concerning the
[179]value of keeping open the franchise for low-
[180]level flights. Acknowledgement of certain
[181]value to the intelligence community. No
[182]decision requested,
[184](5) Extension of efforts to eliminate free world
[185]shipping from the Cuba trade. No decision
[186]requested,
[188](6) Presidential declaration concerning U.S.
[189]policy on Cuba designed to stimulate anti-
[190]Castro dissidence in the armed forces,
[192]Mr, Bundy*s comments indicated that there
[193]was room for a stronger statement than that
[194]made by President Kennedy in Miami,
[196](7) Talks with the Soviets and the Cubans, Not
[197]elaborated and no comment,
[199](8) Other forms of covert actions. Not specified
[200]or elaborated.
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[206]4
[208]—,
[210].
[212]8. In connection with bilateral and multilateral
[213]actions involving the cooperation of the OAS and nations
[214]of the Caribbean, Mr. Bundy stated that the nature and
[215]import of the recently discovered arms cache in Venezuela
[216]constitutes a point of departure for such actions as search
[217]and seizure on the high seas or an OAS-sponsored quarantine
[218]against arms shipments. Mr, Helms then briefly described
[219]the nature of the arms cache and the plans involving those
[220]arms as set forth in captured Venezuelan communist documents,
[221]Mr, Helms showed a map prepared from those documents indi-
[222]cating the manner in which the arms would have been used
[223]to tie up the city of Caracas during the recent election.
[224]Mr, Martin then briefed concerning OAS action with regard
[225]to the arms cache, He said that the committee appointed
[226]by the OAS to investigate had called for additional
[227]evidence from the Venezuelan government which would take
[228]two to three weeks to assemble. He said that he felt that
[229]the OAS report would be out in mid-January although the
[230]question of Cuban defense against the Venezuelan charges
[231]had not yet been resolved. Mr. Bundy referred to the
[232]efforts being made to increase the effectiveness of sur-
[233]veillance of arms smugglers in Central America and referred
[234]to the possibility of an OAS-sponsored search and seizure
[235]on the high seas.
[237]9. Under Secretary Ball stated that the Department of
[238]_— Justice has warned that a number of students, some of more
[239]Sens respectable stripe than the last group which visited Cuba,
[240]were planning to try to visit Cuba during the Christmas
[241]vacation and that there is evidence of larger numbers
[242]planning to do the same thing during the summer. He said
[243]that the Attorney General was bothered by this and had
[244]suggested the relaxation of present rules concerning travel
[245]to Cuba. Mr. Ball said that the Department of State is
[246]tentatively opposed to such relaxation particularly because
[247]of its effect on Latin American countries. The President
[248]strongly concurred with the Department of State position,
[249]He said that he did not propose to change or relax present
[251]regulations.
[253]itzGerald
[254]Chief, Special Affairs Staff
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[258]4
[259]4 |e
[261]Le eee
[263]13 December 1963
[265]MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
[267]SUBJECT: Discussion with the President, 13 December - 9:30 a.m.
[269]1. Introduced General Carter but was unable to explain his
[270]responsibilities,
[272]2. Introduced Peer de Silva, The President spoke briefly of
[273]what he expects of the Station and the representatives of the Government
[274]in the Saigon community. G g
[276]3. Reviewed the Checklist. [1 emphasized (a) the dangers of the
[277]hostages in Bolivia, stating however that while 21 lives are extremely
[278]important, nevertheless, we must avoid a policy decision the conse-
[279]quence of which might mean the lives of an undertermined thousands
[280]of people in the future. In fact 1 was saying we must not give the
[281]Communists the upper hand in this argument. I explained the critical
[282]location of the prisoners, and (b) I called the President's attention to
[283]the international oil situation and the deadlock between OPEC and the
[284]international oil companies and the opening that this is affording the
[285]Italians and possibly the French, }
[287]9G .
[289]_ 4, [iXtotea Item C in the notes, stating we felt, from sensitive
[290]sources, Spinelli's observation was incorrect but there was a possibility
[291]of a sufficient withdrawal by the Egyptians to make a favorable demon-
[292]stration of intentions by which we could persuade Fiasal to withhold
[293]military aid to the Royalists for an extended period of several months. ]
[295]NOTE: Carter and de Silva left the room at this time.
[297]5.(4 told the President unZEoubject to Rusk's approval, I intended
[298]to issue a series of articles on the weakness of the Soviet economy,
[299]drainage on their gold supply, over-commitments on foreign aid, etc.
[300]for the political figures who are wavering between leaning on the]
[302]6
[304]AZ
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[309]see Bd
[312]9%
[314](Soviets or the West, such as Sukarno and certain South American
[315]Countries, so that they will understand they are not leaning on very
[316]much when they lean on the Soviets."]
[318]6. Explained that I had given a complete briefing to General
[319]Eisenhower and conveyed to the President General Eisenhower's
[320]expression of friendship and support.
[322]7. Discussed briefly my talk with Robert Kennedy and urged
[323]the President to send a message to Kennedy but not to see him until
[324]after the first of the year. I asked for the President's approval to
[325]invite Kennedy to accompany me to Saigon.
[327]NOTE: This invitation has been extended but Kennedy
[329]felt it was untimely because of personal family commitments,
[330]responsibilities to Jackie, concern on the part of his wife,
[331]Mrs. Kennedy, and for other reasons.
[333]8. Mr. Bundy joined in part of these discussions. The President
[334]asked what the Attorney General intended to do, that is, stay on or leave.
[335]I told the President the Attorney General intended to stay on as Attorney
[336]General, but it was not clear to what extent the President wished him to
[337]become involved in the activities outside the area of the Office of the
[338]Attorney General, such as, intelligence work, NSC problems, counter
[339]insurgency matters, etc. I explained to the President that I had told
[340]Bobby he could not bring back the intimacy of relationship with the
[341]President which he had had with his brother because that was a blood
[342]relationship, not an official relationship. A type of relationship which
[343]is seldom found between brothers and never found between officials,
[344]either in business or government.
[346]9. I gave the President a copy of the memorandum on Soviet
[347]Foreign Aid.
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[353]6 December 1963
[354]MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
[356]SUBJECT: Meeting with The President - 9:45 - 6 December 1963
[358]The first part of the meeting involved a discussion with Rusk,
[359]McNamara, Rostow, William Bundy and McGeorge Bundy concerning
[360]the procedures on MLF.
[362]Rusk requested, and received, approval to brief General
[363]Eisenhower and will arrange to have Amb. Merchant, Admiral Ricketts
[364]and General Goodpastor present at the briefing, Rusk reported that a
[365]group of 'young Republicans" opposed the MLF. ,
[367]Rusk also received approval to brief certain Congressional
[368]leaders in small groups, but to intimate that no government, including
[369]the United States Government, is committed to the MLF program.
[371][Rusk gave an opticestic report on progress and stated the
[372]most important objectives of the MLF was to give the Germans a sense
[373]of participation in nuclear weapons planning and operations under a
[374]scheme providing adequate control by other Allied nations, including
[375]the United States.7] -
[377](McNamara stated that Mr. von Hassel had advised him that the
[378]MLF was a ''must'' or else.the Germans would undoubtedly pursue an
[379]independent course in developing their own national nuclear weapons
[380]resources, Rusk indicated that failure to proceed with the MLF might
[381]force a German-French arrangement on nuclear weapons, McNamara
[382]stated there was no military requirement for the MLF but the force
[383]will have a military (?) utility and will permit a reduction in
[384]planned United States national capabilities and hence the cost, which is
[385]considerable, is not really an additional U.S. military cost."]
[387]The President then suggested a briefing of Congressional
[389](2
[391]leaders, both Democratic and Republican, Senate and House, substantially
[393]along the lines of the NSC briefing of yesterday afternoon. [I brought up
[394]the question of security and pointed out the dangers. The President
[395]asked that I develop a 10 or 15 minute briefing on Soviet strategic
[396]capabilities, Soviet defense and Soviet economy, going just as far as I
[397]possibly could without endangering sources and methods ,7/
[399]ACTION: Discuss with Cline, et al.
[401]7“ Omri
[402]: a
[404]IS
[406]ye
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[410](The meeting then continued with the President, McGeorge
[411]Bundy and McCGone, I discussed the foreign aid figures as included
[412]in the 6 December memorandum and the special report on Soviet
[413]Foreign Economics Programs of 25 October, and stated that I
[414]would prepare for the President some special graphics which would
[415]show Soviet foreign, economic and military aid, both extensions and
[416]draw-downs, to non-Communist countries and Cuba,
[418]NOTE: Mr. Rostow raised the question earlier
[419]as to the validity of comparing our aid figures with
[420]USSR's aid figures because the latter did not include
[421]aid to satellites, His position is that since we include
[422]aid to NATO countries, particularly Turkey, Greece,
[423]South Korea, etc., we should examine USSR aid to their
[424]satellites in addition to Cuba, This should be examined.
[425]I do not know whether the figures are available.)
[427]The President reviewed the Checklist and I made the following
[428]comments:
[430]1, E expect the USSR to expand the test ban agreement to cover
[431]underground tests and it was quite possible they would soon make claims
[432]for vast improvements in seismology. I mentioned the recent informa-
[433]tion on the LASER beam.]
[435]78
[437]2. [1 pointed out the seriousness of the Cambodian situation
[438]stating the fact that the Khmer Serei clandestine radio had been located
[439]in Southeast Thailand and that my information was that the Thais were
[440]not inclined to put it out of business because the Cambodians were
[441]broadcasting unfavorably against them]
[443]q
[444]3, fi noted the additional indicators of possible conflict over
[445]Malaysia.
[447]I then explained to the President the source of our information
[448]that the Soviet Intelligence Service, on orders from Moscow, was
[449]attempting to stimulate communications from India to him, Chief Justice
[450]Warren and the Attorney General, urging a full probe into the
[451]assassination of the President. I stated that this report comes from a
[452]very reliable penetration and we evaluate it quite highly.
[454]We then discussed the assignment of Peer de Silva to Saigon,
[455]I stated that the staff had made such recommendation to me, but that
[456]I felt it was only a good move if he was to remove Ambassador Lodge.
[457]He felt that to do this would have political repercussions and would be
[461]a
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[465]Cc C
[467]tantamount to a vote of no confidence in the military junta, that it
[469]would indicate President Johnson's support of Diem rather than the
[470]present authorities, Therefore he stated he could not move to remove
[471]Lodge but hoped that Lodge would remove himself and become a
[472]candidate for the Republican nomination for the Presidency and would
[473]be the nominee. (Note: I told the President he wanted things too
[475]easy). I told the President that Lodge would destroy de Silva if he
[476]opposed his assignment or did not like him, or wished to get rid of him,
[477]The President said he would communicate most emphatically with
[479]Lodge in this regard and asked Bundy to write an appropriate communi-.
[481]cation, I told the President this would do no good, that Lodge was
[482]absolutely unconscionable in matters of this kind and he had resorted
[483]to trickery time and time again during the Eisenhower ‘administration
[484]and that he never failed to use the newspapers in order to expose an
[485]individual or block an action. I therefore could only conclude that if he
[486]was going to keep Lodge on that it would be better to stay with David
[487]Smith as Chief of Station, who is a most competent officer but young
[488]and not fully experienced, but this proposal did not meet his request
[489]that the best and most experienced man we can find be, placed on the
[490]job. The President said he would exercise the full power of his
[491]office to keep Lodge in line and felt our responsibilities in South
[493]Vietnam are so great that CIA should have a "four- star man" on the job and
[497]that is what he wanted.
[499]JAM/mcm
[501]GA By «a
[503]a is
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[508]sane
[510]( meee ( We
[512]3 December 1963
[513]MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
[515]SUBJECT: Discussion with the President at his residence on Sunday, Dec. 1 -
[516]10:00 o'clock - about 30 minutes, No one was in attendance,
[518]1. Reviewed a series of reports. There was no Checklist.
[520]2. (The President asked about news from Venezuela, particularly
[521]concerned about Chenault.) 7
[522]Trae: . 7S
[523]3. [Briefly reviewed a clandestine report from Bonn as a means
[524]of indicating sources to CIA not available to others)
[526]7
[527]4, Reported to the President that the UN Commission to Saigon
[528]felt a bit critical towards the U.S. presence; however we are in some doubt
[529]as to whether they will include such criticism in their public report.7
[531]5. Briefly reviewed the final report on the Alvarado case in
[532]Mexico City.
[534]6. The President then brought up the question of men in government.
[535]Emphasized the need for men, particularly young men, I urged the President
[536]to discuss this matter with the Business Council and with the AFL-CIO group.
[537]He said that meetings would be arranged this coming week,
[539]cory G6
[541]7. fi advised the President that I was to meet with Halaby to
[543]pursue the SST problem.)
[545]8, [I requested the Presidét to instruct Bundy that Memorandums of
[546]Conversation with Heads of State should be distributed to me automatically,
[547]Also that the State Department be instructed to send such Memorandums to
[548]me. The President agreed.
[550]NOTE; This should be followed up by Mr, Cline.
[551]Bundy will apparently discuss this matter later
[552]with the President who agreed that such distri-
[553]bution should be automatic except in very special
[554]circumstances in which he wished distribution
[555]held to his own personal files for reasons of
[556]his own choice. I could take no exception to this
[557]decision?)
[559]9. We should contact Hoover concerning identification of people
[560]sending in ads and letters to the Dallas newspapers,
[562]NOTE: I should call Hoover concerning this.
[563]JAM/mfb (tape) ;
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[567]2 December 1963
[569]MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
[570]EYES ONLY--NO DISTRIBUTION
[572]SUBJECT: Discussion with the President, 30 November 1963
[574]Throughout the conversation the President mentioned a
[575]number of very personal problems and asked my help and also
[576]asked that Bundy and I act as a team in trying to help him solve
[577]some of his problems.
[579]l. He indicated that there must be some Cabinet changes,
[580]By inference he made reference to the Attorney General, but not by
[581]direct statement. Apparently he is waiting for the Attorney General
[582]to decide what role, if any, he wishes to play in the Johnson Adminis-
[584]tration.
[585]GSE
[587]2. (He stated that Secretary Celebrezze is very anxious for
[588]ee a judgeship and that he, Johnson, was extremely favorably impressed
[589]—_ with Sargent Shriver and thou ght he would be an excellent Secretary
[591]of H.E.W. This was enthusiastically endorsed by both Bundy and
[593]myself. ]
[595]3. He raised the question of whether Mrs. Kennedy might
[597]be a very able ambassador.
[598]; 98
[600]4, [He was deeply critical of the handling of Ayub. He questioned
[601]whether Ball was the proper man to have gone forward to negotiate
[602]with Ayub. He felt that we needed a new ambassador and he asked for
[603]recommendations, the name of an ambassador who could handle that
[604]Embassy, and more particularly handle Ayub. At this point he asked
[605]that Bundy and I work together in searching out names of individuals
[606]who might be helpful in a number of critical areas. I protested his
[607]criticism of Ball, stating that I felt that Ball had done a very good job
[608]in his mission to Pakistan. The President expressed the highest regard
[610]for Ayub. )
[612]one.
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[616]Cas
[618]GE
[620]5. {He then turned to a discussion of Latin America. Expressed
[621]criticism of the Alliance for Progress. Stated that Moscoso was not
[622]the man to handle it and he should be replaced and asked who could be
[623]his replacement. He also stated that we had not handled the OAS
[624]positively enough. He was very critical of our ambassador to the OAS,
[625]Acting Ambassador Ward Allen, and asked for recommendations for
[626]a replacement.)
[628]6. Throughout the conversation it appeared that President
[629]Johnson is not going to be satisfied with the organization as it is
[630]now composed and that he will make changes, and at the same time
[631]he does not intend to make changes just for the sake of change nor
[632]does he intend to move in the ''hangers-on of the last 20 years."'
[633]Apparently he has hada vast number of approaches from people who
[634]he termed to be political hacks and said he didn't want any part of
[635]any of them.
[639](tape)
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[643]Pe
[645]2 December 1963
[647]MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
[649]SUBJECT: Meeting with the President, 11:00 a.m., November 30th,
[650]in attendance Mr. Bundy, meeting lasted approximately
[651]11/2 hours
[653]1. Reviewed the Checklist. [The President immediately
[654]raised the question of what we were doing about Colonel Chennault.
[655]He expects most serious public reaction and has a feeling that we
[656]are "drifting" on this situation, I assured him we and the Venezuelan
[657]government were doing all that was possible. However, he requested
[658]more positive action on a report on the actions being taken.)
[660]NOTE: Wish a full report from the station for Sunday
[661]morning briefing.
[663]2. No other Checklist items raised any serious questions.
[665]3. The President again raised the question of what we were
[666]going to do in Cuba. Bundy advised that a policy meeting was scheduled
[667]for Monday, time not set, to discuss Cuban policy. I pointed out to
[668]the President the statements of President Kennedy on September 5th,
[669]September 13th, and November 20th, 1962 and then I showed the evidence
[670]that proved absolutely that arms had been imported into Venezuela from
[671]Cuba. I stated that most positive efforts should be made immediately
[672]to secure complete OAS agreement on a course of action which would
[673]involve a series of steps ranging from economic denial through blockade
[674]and even to possible invasion, but that it must be OAS action, otherwise
[675]it would involve confrontation with Khrushchev. I stated that if the
[676]action was a Hemispheric action I didn't see that the USSR could do
[677]much about it. The President agreed but decided to await the policy
[678]meeting on Monday.
[680]NOTE: DD/P and WH should prepare full recommendations
[681]for positive actions which might be taken unilaterally with
[682]the Caribbean states or with the OAS. for my use in the
[683]policy meeting.
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[687]4, I reviewed the report from Mexico City station, 27 November,
[688]advising the number of Soviets in Cuba, indicating that this report which
[689]we thought was quite responsible more or less verified our own current
[690]estimates.
[692]5. Reference the Oswald matter, reviewed with the President
[693]CAS Mexico City 7127 reporting on the interrogation of Alvarado. We
[694]briefly discussed the composition of the Review Board announced by
[695]the President on the 29th. Discussion of the Oswald situation was
[696]inconclusive and no action required.
[698]6. [The President then brought up the question of Pakistan
[699]and I reviewed briefly the intelligence community's feeling of concern
[700]and their view that our Pakistan relationship was of the greatest
[701]importance. Bundy mentioned the forthcoming December meeting
[702]between Ayub and General Taylor. The President made no comment
[703]but seemed to feel that Taylor should remain in the United States
[704]because of serious Defense budget problems. Bundy reviewed the
[705]great number of commitments we have made to Pakistan and that we
[706]would come to their defense if India should use our arms to attack
[707]Pakistan. The President expressed the greatest of confidence in
[708]Ayub and a feeling that we had not been forceful enough with him, had
[709]not given him a feeling of confidence in our motives and that he had
[710]drifted into the thought that we would abandon him in favor of India.
[711]He stated that he wished this corrected in a most positive manner. ]
[713]7. I reviewed our Cuban overflight program advising the
[714]President of the USIB criteria and the extent to which flights were
[715]being carried on,
[717]8. [Reviewed briefly the TACKLE China overilight and stated
[718]these had been stood down since the loss of the last plane but we intended
[719]to resume which the President thought was proper.
[721]ACTION: I wish flight plans to meet COMOR priority n
[722]targets for at least two flights for submission to the
[723]Special Group next Thur sday.9
[725]9. [i advised fe President that the ChiCom-India border flights
[726]had been completed and that we now planned to brief the Indians, Thailand
[727]and very possibly Pakistan. I stated the equipment had been withdrawn
[728]from Takhli.]
[730]Se
[732]14-0000
[734]10. [I advised the President that the CORONA mission was up
[735]and would be brought down on Monday. Also suggested that at an
[737]early opportunity I brief him on the CORONA program.)
[739]jl. [Reviewed the Venezuls overflight plan as outlined in
[740]memorandum for the Special Group and President approved.
[742]NOTE: I have communicated this approval to General
[743]Carter and instructed him to proceed. ]
[747](tape)
[750]14-00000
[752]29 November 1963
[754]Late developments on the Mexico City investigation of
[755]Oswald's activities
[757]1, Results of the first interrogation of Silvia Duran have been received.
[758]Reveals nothing other than confirmation of Oswald's effort to secure
[759]authority to enter USSR via Havana. His requests were refused,
[761]2. Result of second interrogation of Silvia Duran has not as yet been
[762]received,
[764]3. FBI dispatched a man from Washington to Mexico City at the request
[765]of Ambassador Mann.
[767]4. The Nicaraguan, Alvarado, has been turned over to the Mexican
[768]authorities for questioning, by the CIA station at the specific request
[769]of the FBI.
[771]NOTE: CIA Headquarters refused this turn-over until
[772]FBI request received because F Bilis in control of the
[773]investigation. ;
[775]‘sare Sane wlvarade's story becoming increasingly questionable because ofa
[777]public statement carried by Mexico City radio and press prior to
[778]Alvarado's entering the picture, to the effect that Oswald had
[779]received $5,000 from the Cuban Embassy.
[781]To be used by DCI in meeting with the President at 10:30 on 29 November 1963
[782]with Secty. McNamara and Bundy.
[784]14-0000
[786]pe
[787]29 November 1963 » \)
[789]MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD MN iP
[790]VY
[792]SUBJECT: Meeting at his residence with President Johnson
[793]10:00 a.m. - Thursday - November 28th.
[794]for approximately 30 minutes
[796]1. The President reviewed the Checklist and made the following
[799]a. {Are we doing all possible to keep Venezuelan
[800]authorities informed? I reviewed briefly our penetrations
[801]and our activities ~)
[803]b. What is the real future in South Vietnam? The
[804]President expressed the desire for an objective appraisal
[805]and any recommendations that I might have for modification
[806]of policy, changes of personnel and draw up a rough estimate
[807]of what is the outlook. The President continues to be
[808]concerned over public reaction and Congressional reaction
[809]against our activities in South Vietnam, The President is
[810]obviously opposed to Lodge (his opposition goes back to
[811]conflicts in the Senate). He asked for recommendations as
[812]to who would be a good man and who could run the American
[813]team,
[815]He noted Item b. in the Check list and I pointed out
[816]the press exaggeration and distortion which appeared in the
[817]New York Times. He asked that I personally meet with the
[818]head of the Times in New York, pointing out how such distorted
[819]reports seriously damage the American interests. I stated
[820]that I would do this.
[822]GE
[824](We discussed Item 2.f, having to do with the high level of
[825]communications traffic and I stated that this could be considered as an
[826]unfavorable indicator. ,
[828]The President noted without comment report on Israel, USSR,
[829]India military aid and Burma,)
[831]SF
[832]Cc. (The President asked wt the outlook was with Greece. I told
[834]him that we expected that Karamanlis would eventually be restored to
[835]power, The President stated that he had vigorously opposed our7
[837]| |
[838]hae
[840]_ opetet bry .
[841]dove ¥ Att yeTed/
[842]wo
[844]14-0000
[846]withdrawal of assistance to Karamanlis, which he felt had a great deal
[847]to do with his loss of office7
[849]d. [iE pointed out to the President that we could expect some
[850]trouble in Brazil. ]
[852]e. Fhe President asked about the future of Prime Minister Inonu
[853]of Turkey. I stated that we expected that his government would fall.
[854]and that he would lose office soon after his return]
[856]78
[858]f. fi repeated to the President briefly my meeting with President
[859]Macapagal which is covered in a separate memorandum prepared by
[860]Mr. Colby.]
[862]g. fiso I raised the question of the importance of our taking
[863]iniative in the Indonesia matter by working with Macapagal. We might bring
[864]Indonesia round and also straighten out the Malayasia problem. 7
[866]2. The President then turned to Cuba. He asked how effective our
[867]policy was and what was the future of Cuba. He asked how effective the
[868]economic denial program was and how we planned to dispose of Castro,
[870]He said he did not wish any repetition of any fiasco of 1961, but he felt that
[871]the Cuban situation was one that we could not live with and we had to
[872]evolve more aggressive policies. He looks to us for firm recommendations.
[873]In this connection we should prepare a briefing and also we should study
[874]Ear carefully various courses of action.
[875]; 78
[877]3. [ne President then raised the question of the deal between the
[878]Rumanian government and the Ferguson company for the procurement
[879]of a steel mill and asked whether I thought this was a good thing. I
[880]replied affirmatively, stating that in my opinion economic relations with
[881]the satellites would tend to break down the closemess of ties between
[882]the satellites in Moscow and this should be a very definite policy
[883]effort on our part. I noted that Moscow had discouraged the Rumanian
[884]steel mill because it did not fit into their pattern of economic integration
[885]of the satellites and the Soviet Union. The President then stated that he
[886]agreed that we should attempt to pull the satellites away. He then brought
[887]up the question of Tito and asked if I could give him the name of the best
[888]man who could serve as Ambassador to Yugoslavia who would be able to
[889]"win the girl away from Khrushchev." He said that in his opinion this man
[890]should be an experienced, able man, perhaps in his 50's and preferably a
[891]Republican, who could carry the confidence of the Republicans anda
[892]personality who could win Tito's confidence and allegiance. I responded by
[893]stating that I would prepare a list of competent people who I felt could 7
[897]aye
[899]14-0000
[901]g
[902]serve in this capacity and ad, in others. In this connection, the
[903]President stated that he was not satisfied with the Ambassador-elect
[904]to Yugoslavia and had therefore held up the appointment, His request
[905]for help and the suggestion of names in connection with Yugoslavia and
[906]the satellites is along the same line as to who would be a good
[907]representative in South Vietnam, |
[909]4. The President asked concerning our relationships on the Hill.
[910]I said that they were excellent. The only problem was a continual
[912]' harangue for a Joint Committee on Intelligence. I said that I felt that if
[914]Senator Russell would expand his Committee to include Fulbright and
[915]Hickenlooper, and Vinson expand his Committee to include two members
[916]of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, that the issue would be put to
[917]rest. The President said he thought this was a good idea and that he would
[918]speak to both Fulbright and Russell about it.
[920]5. LL then reviewed the brochure on the OXCART by giving the
[921]President a broad picture of this development, I explained that surfacing
[922]of it was a problem which had been under consideration by Defense and
[923]CIA which I had discussed with President Kennedy. I said that McNamara
[924]was pressing for a rather early release but that President Kennedy
[925]felt that the timing of the surfacing was of very great importance. I said
[926]that I felt that the timing was even of greater importance now and I had
[927]some reservations about surfacing this vehicle in the first few days of
[928]President Johnson's administration, The President seemed to agree and
[929]suggested that McNamara, Rusk, Bundy and I meet with him on Friday for
[930]a discussion of this problem.)
[932]No arrangements were made as to the time of Friday morning's
[933]briefing,
[935]JAM/mfb (tape)
[939]14-0000
[941]26 November 1963
[943]MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
[945]SUBJECT: Meeting with The President - 25 November and 26 November
[947]1, On Monday, November 25th, theré’was no briefing of the President,
[948]although there was a short visit with him at the State reception on Monday
[949]evening. The President then expressed regret that events of the day
[950]prevented a briefing and asked if there was any development requiring his
[951]attention. I replied there was none and would call him if any developments
[952]came to my attention.
[954]2. On Tuesday, the 26th, I briefed the President, reviewing all
[955]items on the Check List and the world reaction summary contained in the
[956]Bulletin, Briefing and discussion on other matters consumed about
[957]15 or 20 minutes. ,
[959]3. The President asked if our entire applicable resources had been
[960]made available to the FBI in connection with their report, which he had
[961]ordered. I replied affirmatively.
[963]NOTE: I should call J. Edgar Hoover concerning this.
[964](DCI did this at 11:20 on 11/26/63)
[965]2
[966]4, The President asked my appraisal of the situation in Vietnam.
[967]I replied that I was less optimistic than was the report received from
[968]Ambassador Lodge.
[970]5. Mr. Bundy stated the first order of business was to assist
[971]State and assign a Deputy Chief of Mission capable of running the Country
[972]Team and the American official community. Bundy recommended
[973]Mr. Sullivan, Harriman's deputy. The President plans to have a man in
[974]position not later than January first.
[976]6. McCone stated that there remained a number of individuals in
[977]Saigon who continued to be troublemakers and should be removed.
[978]Bundy confirmed this and stated actions were to be taken. No names
[979]were mentioned.
[981]NOTE: Apparently the President's appointment
[982]secretary will bea Mr. Moyts. We
[983]should get to know him.
[985]14-0000
[987]7. The President noted with some considerable contempt the
[988]fact that certain people in the Department of Justice had suggested
[989]to him on Saturday that an independent investigation of the President's
[990]assassination should be conducted by a high level group of attorneys
[991]and jurists, probably headed by Governor Dewey. President Johnson
[992]rejected this idea, and then heard that the identical plan was to be
[993]advanced in a lead editorial in the Washington Post. The President
[994]felt this was a deliberate plant and he was exceedingly critical. He
[995]personally intervened, but failed with Mr. Al Friendly and finally
[996]"killed" the editorial with Mrs. Graham.
[998]JAM/TMLee/mfb
[1000]14-0000
[1002]wee damn teen ata  ne eens .
[1004]"SEP 22 "98 1:46PM Cc
[1006]Pa
[1008]25 November 1963
[1009]MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
[1010]SUBJECT: South Vietnam Situation
[1012]ATTENDANCE: The President, Secretaries Rusk, McNamara, Ball,
[1013]Mesere. Bundy and McCone, Ambassador Lodge
[1014]Now 1uS - 38 Exac OFrcce Bide .
[1015]Se ee el
[1017]1. Ambassador Lodge reported that the change in government
[1018]had been an improvement, that he was hopeful over the outlook, that
[1019]he expected a speedup of the war, he thought by February or March
[1020]we would see marked progress. Lodge stated that we were not
[1021]involved in the coup, though we put pressurea on the South Vietnamese
[1022]government to change its course and those pressures, most
[1023]particularly on indications of withdrawal by 1965, encouraged the
[1024]coup. Lodge stated that there were indications that North Vietnam
[1025]might be interested in arrangements which would be of a nature
[1026]satisfactory tous. He did not elaborate. He that that everybody
[1027]was vary happy after the coup and showed some pictures of the
[1028]crowds in Saigon. He mentioned that Gen. Don would be here and
[1029]that those talking with him should influence him to put on all the
[1030]pressure he could. He spoke most highly of the Papal delegate and
[1031]hie intention to see the Pope on Wednesday. He carried with him a
[1032]letter from the Papal Delegate and also from the Bishop of Saigon,
[1033]apparently praising the actiona in upsetting the Diem government.
[1034]Lodge said he saw dangers of an anti-Christian move and this was
[1035]his purpose in seeing the Pope. He made a point that Bishop Thuc
[1036]had engaged in serious persecutions involving the imprisonment of
[1037]a great many people, including three Catholic priests. He also made
[1038]the point that Can, Diem's brother, also engaged in a variety of
[1039]activities of persecution and the execution of individuals and that
[1040]Can had, on his own premises, a burial ground for his victims.
[1041]Lodge said that we were in no way reaponsible for the death of Diem
[1042]and Nhu, that had they followed hia advice, they would be alive
[1043]today. He said that he saved Can from assassination and that
[1044]Bishop Thue was out of Saigon under orders from the Papal
[1045]delegate. (Note: I question whether the Papal. delegate can order
[1046]a Bishop out of a country.) The tone of Ambassador Lodge's
[1047]statements were optimistic, hopeful, and left the President with |
[1048]the impression that we are on the road to victory.
[1050]mrorne
[1051]50 OPT intul és
[1052]weed gore on recores
[1054]apo SO ns sqiatio"
[1056]ie v ° ° .
[1058]94
[1060]14-0000
[1062]|
[1064]At this point McCone stated that our estimate of the situation /
[1065]was somewhat more serious. We had noted a continuing increase
[1067]in Viet Cong activity since the first of November as evidenced by
[1069]a larger number of Viet Cong attacks. We also noticed with
[1070]considerable concern a high level of message volume on the Viet Cong
[1071]military and political networks and this might quite possibly reflect
[1072]preparationa for further sustained guerrilla pressures. Furthermore
[1073]I stated that the military were having considerable trouble in
[1074]completing the political organization of the government and were
[1075]receiving litle if any help from civilian leadership. Indeed it seemed
[1076]to us that the competent civilians were staying on the sidelines and
[1077]continuing their traditional role of critics rather than turning ‘in and
[1078]being helpful. I concluded by stating that we could not at this point
[1080]or time give a particularly optimietic appraisal of the future.
[1082]The President then stated that he approached the situation with
[1083]some misgivings. He noted that a great many people throughout the
[1084]country questioned our course of action in supporting the overthrow
[1085]of the Diem regime. He also noted that strong voices in the Congress
[1086]felt we should get out of Vietnam. Both of these facts give the
[1087]President considerable concern. He stated that he was not at all aure that
[1088]we took the right course in upsetting the Diem regime but this was a
[1089]decision that he did not have to make as it was a fait accompli. He
[1090]said now that it was done, we have to see that our objectives were
[1091]accomplished. (Note: The inferences were that, left to his own
[1092]devices, he would not have supported the courseg of action which led
[1093]to the coup.)
[1095]The Preaident then stated he hag never been happy with our
[1096]operations in Vietnam. He said there had bean serious dissension
[1097]and divisions within the American community and he told the
[1098]Ambassador that he was in total charge and he wanted the situation
[1099]cleaned up. He wanted no more divisions of opinion, no more
[1100]bickering and any person that did not conform to policy should be
[1101]removed. At this point Mr. Bundy stated that we were searching for
[1102]a replacement for Truehart and what we wanted wae a capable
[1103]administrator who could run the Country Team. The President again
[1104]repeated hia insistence that the Ambagsador waa the Number One man and
[1105]he, the President, waa holding the Ambassador personally responsible.
[1108]Secretary McNamara stated that he had examined the economle
[1109]situation and that he felt we must give generously of economic aid
[1110]and must not ask the South Vietnamese government to do the impoasible
[1111]at this particular time.
[1113]14-00000
[1115]2
[1116]“oe
[1117]o.
[1119]7
[1122]-
[1124]oer ce 7 wLerrrt ( ( P.4g
[1126]The President then said that he supported thie, but at the aame
[1127]time he wanted to make it abundantly clear that he did not think we had
[1128]to reform every Aaian into our own image. He said that he felt all
[1129]too often when we engaged in the affairs of a foreign muntry we
[1130]wanted to immediately transform that country into our image and this,
[1131]in his opinion, was a mistake. He was anxious to getdong, win the war -
[1132]he didn't want as much effort placed on so-called social reforms.
[1134]Note: I received in thia meeting the first ''President Johneon tone"
[1135]for action as contrasted with the Kennedy tone''. Johnson definitely
[1136]feels that we place too much emphasis on social reforms; he has very
[1137]little tolerance with our spending so much time being ''do-gooders";
[1138]and he has no tolerance whatsoever with bickering and quarreling of
[1139]the type that haa gone on in South Vietnam.
[1141]The meeting was followed by a statement to the press which waa
[1142]given out by Bundy to the effect that we would pursue the policies
[1143]agreed to in Honolulu adopted by the late President Kennedy. A
[1144]picture was taken of the President with Lodge, McNamara, Rusk and
[1145]Ball.
[1147]JAM (tape) /mfo
[1149]References: 1. IN-66988, 23 Nov 63
[1150]2. SC No. 11709/63, 18 Nov 63
[1151]Subj: The Military Situation in South Vietnam
[1153]14-0000
[1155]GELLADBPBOPBRBAA PAA AEA EAE CLL LAULELECULLOOONLLLL LLCO POLLO COC CCLCULOOLOLUO LLL COOL ll
[1156]' TOP SECRET(DINAR Jy5 |
[1157]— CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 9 O**4 4 Wee
[1159]on . a wv, k, (reb- Mork
[1160]uth. ak ae i 23 November 1963 a
[1162]. Cou Rhine }
[1163]Pepte gusts DAILY BRIEF a Ho!
[1165]i ee
[1166]ew oul *South Vietnam: The accelerated tempo of Viet
[1168]; “v Cong activity in the post-coup period continues.
[1169]Use, te
[1171]. _- previous week's record high of 233, the number is
[1172]wd still about 50 percent above normal for this year.
[1173]J “~~. The attacks continue to be ona small-scale. They
[1174]Gust porecutlere targeted primarily against strategic hamlets
[1175]yj “SB Apewe and outposts, with government paramilitary forces
[1176]Yj ——~ bearing the brunt.
[1177]Mew — 24
[1178]Yj Continuing(high message volumes on) Viet Cong
[1180]é pad § military and political networks may reflect prepara- |\'*
[1181]- _ tions,for sustained guerrilla pressures.
[1182]doce! 01h i) Coe
[1183]Anup The Saigon government apparently is proceeding —_ Gey
[1185]_ with a purge of military officers holding high mili- ; _
[1187]tg tary, intelligence, and provincial posts under Diem. =
[1188]al On 22 November it announced the suspension of 31 dot on
[1189]chant officers. Some of these are under arrest. The : “se ite
[1190]urges may be partly in response to the demands of of ae
[1194]student and Buddhist groups seeking revenge against
[1195]~~ prominent figures who sided with Diem during the
[1196]Buddhist crisis. (TOP SECRET(DINAR)
[1198]94
[1201]TOP See OINAR J
[1203]14-0000
[1207]Pes
[1209]26 November 1963
[1211]MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
[1213]SUBJECT: Discussion with President Johnson ~ Sunday,
[1214]November 24th at 10:00 a.m
[1216]I briefed President Johnson at his residence at 10:00 a.m
[1217]Briefing consumed approximately 20 minutes. Reviewed the
[1218]Checklist and I made the following points: g
[1220]: l. I explained the space event. [Soviet ships are in place
[1221]which would indicate a long range ICBM test. However, the ranges
[1222]are not up, the area is not cleared and therefore the possibility is
[1223]that a planned ICBM or Lunar shot has been deferred. “7
[1225]2. I statedI felt the President shoyld, atan early opportunity,
[1226]receive a briefing on Soviet long range Seeman capability, their
[1227]current air defense capability and the status of the Soviet economy.
[1229]3. I referred briefly to our estimate of the Cuban situation,
[1230]the condition of their economy and our operational plans against
[1231]Cuba.
[1233]4. I stated that we are watching Venezuela and Ecuador with
[1235]great care. I gave the President a copy of the November 24th Summary
[1236]of World Reaction to President Kennedy's Assassination.
[1240]Vane
[1242]14-00000
[1244]fa
[1246]25 November 1963
[1248]MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
[1250]SUBJECT: Discussion with President Johnson, November 23rd,
[1251]about 9:15 a.m. The conversation lasted approxi-
[1252]mately 15 minutes.
[1254]1. The President entered Mr. Bundy's office alone and
[1255]no one was present during the conversation.
[1257]2. The President opened the conversation by recalling a
[1258]long background of association and friendship with me personally,
[1259]his respect for the Agency, the fact that on a number of issues
[1260]that had arisen since I took office as DCI he and I had seen eye
[1261]to eye, he had complete confidence in me and expressed the wish
[1262]that I continue in the future exactly as I have in the past.
[1264]3. I confirmed my confidence in him, my desire to help and
[1265]support ‘him in every way and my willingness to continue in the
[1266]future as I have in recent months. :
[1268]4. The President then asked of any world developments. I
[1269]reviewed details of the Checklist with him and explained the institution
[1270]of the "President's Checklist" with which he was not familiar. I
[1271]stated that we would continue the publication of the Checklist in the
[1272]future as we had in the past.
[1274]5. It was agreed that for the next few days I would brief the
[1275]President in the morning personally and that senior staff officers
[1276]would brief the President's staff each morning as I have in the past.
[1277]The President asked that any matters of urgent importance be brought
[1278]to his attention at any time, day or night. He designated no inter-
[1279]mediary.
[1282]14-0000
[1284]6. At 12:30 I went to the President's office in the Executive
[1285]Office Building to tell him of the information received from Mexico
[1286]City. In attendance was Mr. Bundy. Following this I had a brief
[1287]exchange with President Eisenhower who was visiting with President
[1288]Johnson at the time.
[1290]7. This evening I called Secretary Rusk and reviewed with
[1291]him the information received from Mexico City, most particularly
[1292]the holding of a Mexican employee of the Cuban Embassy by
[1293]Mexican officials for interrogation concerning Lee Oswald. I
[1294]explained to Rusk the information that we had transmitted to the
[1295]FBI and to the authorities in Dallas. Rusk had not known of these
[1296]developments prior to my communication with him.
[1298]8. I offered the assistance on the part of Mrs. McCone and
[1299]me personally and also the Agency in connection with the appropriate
[1300]handling of official visitors arriving from all over the world who
[1301]might overwhelm the State Department's capacity. Rusk appreciated
[1302]this offer and said he would call on me. He further said that there
[1303]may be visitors we would like to meet with and, if so, he would make
[1304]appropriate arrangements. He indicated that he intended to avoid
[1305]having all incoming visitors appear as guests of the United States.
[1306]Each had their own embassy to take care of them, however, he
[1307]thought there might be some obligations in which I could be helpful.
[1308]He said that following the Arlington service on Monday afternoon
[1309]he would hold a reception in the Department which would be in the
[1310]form of some kind of a buffet and this would be the extent of any
[1311]planned activities. He thought it was quite probable that the President
[1312]would meet with several Heads of States at various times on Tuesday
[1313]and Wednesday.
[1316](tape)