[1]2 | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
[3]Vilma aay
[5]. Chret do Tate
[6]NOFORN CCL ka Val.
[7]copy no. 107
[8]. SC NO. 00550/63
[10]Lal
[11]104-10302-1002
[13]29 November 1963
[15]DAILY
[17]SUMMARY
[21]CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
[23]THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODE WORD MATERIAL
[25]NOFORN
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[38]DAILY SUMMARY
[39]oe 29 November 1963
[41]This summary of significant information has not been coordinated
[42]outside the Office of Current Intelligence. It does not representa
[43]complete coverage of all current reports received, nor does time
[44]‘| permit the complete evaluation of all reports which are included.
[46]CONTENTS
[48]CASTRO'S SPEECH;
[50]‘In his 27 November address, Castro first sought to exon-
[51]erate his regime of complicity in the death of President
[52]Kennedy and then provided a decidedly optimistic assess-
[53]ment of Cuba's economic situation. (Page 1)
[55]MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS:
[56]‘An unsuccessful combing operation was affected on the Isle
[57]‘of Pines for two persons who apparently escaped from the
[58]military prison there. (Page 3)
[60]CUBAN INTERNAL SITUATION:
[62]The Cuban Government may have instituted new controls on
[64]fishermen by eliminating night fishing along the north
[65]coast and by restricting fishermen to three and one half
[67]miles. from the coast, according to two clandestine sources.
[69](Page 3)
[71]INSURGENCY AND CIVIL UNREST:
[72]Three incidents of sabotage have been noted in recent in-
[73]tercepted messages--two in Matanzas Province and the third
[74]in Oriante. (Page 4)
[76]' A LOB operation against an insurgent band in Las Villas
[77]Province ended on 29 November without results. (Page 4)
[79]Department of State Security (DSE) officials in Camaguey ©
[80]Province have been alerted to a possible clandestine
[82]escape attempt during the night of 28-29 November; militia-
[84]men have been instructed to mobilize at Playa Santa
[85]Lucia. (Page 4)
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[93]' CUBAN EXILE AND REFUGEE ACTIVITIES:
[95]Comandos L is considering an attack against a Soviet
[96]vessel-in Cuban waters in the near future or when the
[97]seas become more quiet. (Page 4)
[99]Cubanos Libres may be planning to hijack a ship in a raid
[100]that would be staged from Miami. (Page 5)
[102]A small group of Cuban refugees may have attempted to
[103]infiltrate Cuba about 27 November, according to a promi-
[104]nent exile activist. (Page 5)
[106]BLOC RELATIONS:
[108]The Albanian ambassador spoke to a near-empty hall in
[109]Havana on 26 November at a celebration marking his country's
[110]‘national holiday; the audience was composed chiefly of
[111]Chinese embassy personnel, students, and journalists.
[112]The Cuban Government was represented by an official of the
[114]i« foreign. cultural council.:' (Page
[116]NON -BLOC. RELATIONS:
[118]A three-man "good-will" mission is en route to Morocco to
[119]smooth Rabat's ruffled feelings over presence of Cuban
[120]troops in Algeria. (Page 6)
[122]The director of the Cuban petroleum enterprise is scheduled
[123]to travel to Georgetown aboard the BAHIA DE TANAMO; an
[124]untested source in Georgetown reports that Cuba will
[126]supply fuel o11 for the British Guiana Electricity Cor-
[127]poration. (Page 6)
[129]Cuba may establish diplomatic relations with Somalia and
[130]is attempting to improve its relations with Tanganyika
[131]and Ghana, according to intercepted communications. (Page 7) -
[132]Two representatives of the Cuban National Association of
[133]Small Farmers are planning to attend a seminar in Chile.
[134](Page 7)
[135]; NON-BLOC COMMERCIAL RELATIONS:
[137]Cuba is continuing negotiations for the purchase of large
[139]amounts of construction equipment, probably from the Varmi
[140]company of Brussels. (Page 7)
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[149]‘ .
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[153]CUBAN SUPPORT OF EXTERNAL SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES:
[155]The Venezuelan Government has announced the discovery of
[156]a large cache of weapons of Cuban origin; this provides
[158]the best evidence in recent years of major Cuban support
[159]for Latin American subversives. Havana radio immediately
[160]denied the charge. (Page 8)
[162]Lii
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[170]CASTRO'S SPEECH:
[172]Fidel's 27 November speech to the students at Havana
[173]University evidently had been scheduled some weeks ago, be-
[175]‘fore the assassination of President Kennedy, and was in-
[177]tended as a fairly sweeping review of the country's economic
[178]situation, post-Hurricane Flora salvage operations and,
[179]lastly, the regime's plans for changes in the educational sys-
[180]tem. In fact, it was the third time in a week that Castro has
[181]addressed himself publicly and at length to the death of the
[182]late President and to imputations that the Castro regime was
[183]involved in any way. On 24 November Castro had displayed
[184]considerable apprehension that already strained US-Cuban re-
[185]lations would worsen markedly as a consequence of the assassi-
[186]nation. We do not have an adequate text of Castro's seemingly
[187]impromptu remarks of 26 November to a group of high school
[188]students; but that speech apparently went little beyond his
[189]statement on the Sunday following Mr. Kennedy's death. The
[190]address of 27 November obviously was a carefully prepared ref-
[191]utation of charges of complicity between Castro's regime and
[192]Oswald.
[194]Whatever the Cuban leader's intent, textual analysis of
[195]the speech neither proves nor disproves that he had advance
[197]knowledge of the plot. He is determined to indict unnamed
[199]"reactionaries" in the United States with conspiring to murder
[200]the President, using Oswald as their innocent dupe, and to
[201]frame Cuba in order to provoke punitive action by the US Gov-
[202]ernment against the revolution. To this end, he presented a
[203]considerable body of "evidence"--much of it admittedly specu-
[204]lative--based on what is generally known about Oswald, the
[205]"normal" behavior pattern of paranoiacs, the weapon the killer
[206]used, the technical difficulties presented by the use of a
[207]telescopic sight, the 36-hour Dallas police interrogation of
[208]the alleged killer and, finally, Oswald’s death at the hands
[209]of Jack Ruby in the basement of the Dallas police headquarters.
[210]Castro rehearsed the details of Oswald's 27 September
[211]application at the Cuban consulate in Mexico City for a Cuban
[212]visa and protested the 23 November arrest of two employees of
[213]the consulate by Mexican authorities. (Castro's remarks were
[214]followed up on 28 November by the delivery of a formal pro-
[215]test by the Cuban Foreign Ministry to the Mexican Government--
[216]which rejected it.) Oswald's Dallas television interview in
[217]July, his attempts to infiltrate the pro-Castro Fair Play for
[218]Cuba Committee,and his street brawl with anti-Castro refugees
[219]in New Orleans--all were intended by those behind Oswald to
[220]mislead public opinion, according to Castro. And, finally,
[221]the decision of the Dallas police to "close" the Oswald case
[223]_with the shooting of Sunday, 24 November, "demonstrates that
[225]the persons guilty of the death of Kennedy needed and urgently
[226]had to eliminate the accused at any cost...so that he would
[227]not talk,..." ;
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[235]CASTRO'S SPEECH - cont'd
[237]But, says the Cuban premier, the "shot has backfired."
[238]Alluding to statements made earlier in the week by physicians
[239]at Parkland Hospital, Castro claims that no one in a posi-
[240]tion to do so has said whether one or two bullets were used
[241]to kill the late President. He declared "they cannot estab-
[242]lish which are the entry and exit wounds ,"implying that more
[243]than one assassin was involved and that the President was
[244]struck both from in front and behind.
[245]In sum, while Castro obviously was well briefed and went
[246]to some length to select "evidence" proving the guilt of do-
[247]mestic reactionaries in the United States (conversely clear-
[248]ing himself of any involvement), nothing he said indicates
[249]advance knowledge of the crime or encompasses more factual
[250]data than can be presumed to have been gleaned from the press,
[251]The balance of the 27 November speech, the part which
[252]Castro told his listeners comprised the address he originally
[253]intended to deliver, was devoted to a somewhat rambling as-
[254]sessment of Cuba‘s economic health. It can be summed up for
[255]the most part with the quote: "Things are progressing in our
[256]4 ; country and they are going well, despite the obstacles, de-
[257]spite the hurricane,..." As he has done before, Castro blamed
[258]the sloth and ineptitude of the Cuban bourgeousie for the
[259]"mismanagement, lack of concern for expenditures, by lack of
[260]concern not only for the quantity but also the quality of what
[261]- we produced" ‘immediately after the fall of Batista. He re-
[262]' viewed the "tremendous ideological battle...it was a battle
[263]between ideas and theories..." within the regime during its
[264]first two years in power, said that the government officials
[265]had become too “argumentative,” and admitted that for a time
[266]the regime had been incapable of compensating for the loss of
[267]trade with the non-Communist world. Today, he boasted, Cuba
[268]"can trade with any country in the world; we can offer an ad-
[269]vantageous. exchange because we no longer have to sell sugar to
[270]Japan, England, Spain, France and most of the countries with
[271]which we traded, take their dollars and use them to pay the
[272]Yankee imperialists." Instead, Cuba can plow back into its in-
[273]ternal development revenue derived from foreign trade, and de-
[274]velop to the maximum the use of those natural resources which
[275]are in demand.
[276]Attempts to bar Cuba from the world sugar trade, he said, have
[277]} resulted only in increasing the price of sugar so that the Cubans
[278]; --though exporting less--are able to realize proportionately greater
[279]- profits from what they do sell and more than break even. "We. have
[280]been able to get wonderful prices, and we have sold sugar for 1965
[281]for approximately 10 cents. We have made sales for 1966 at. approxi-
[282]mately 10 cents." Though the Cuban sugar growers will be affectéd
[283]in some measure for several years by the attempts of nonbloc states
[284]to juggle sugar prices, "we shall be in a position /1970 or-7I7 .
[285]to resist any price decrease in the sugar produced In the cpaital-
[286]ist world." By then, "we shall be in a position to surpass the
[287]10-million-ton figure in sugar production.,..."
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[295]CASTRO'S SPEECH - cont'd
[297]Returning to the post-hurricane economic dislocation,
[298]Castro promised that by 15 December of this year full food
[299]rations would be restored and in many cases allotments in-
[300]creased. He called for greatly increased mechanization of
[301]agriculture and the use of the latest methods of cultivation,
[302]appealed for more food production and the recovery of arable
[303]land lost through neglect and erosion. He demanded an end
[304]to public "vice," such as official bribe-taking, theft,
[305]pilferage, etc. In the field of social welfare, Castro
[306]praised medical students for "volunteering" to serve in
[307]out-of-the-way country posts for minimum terms of two years
[308]and prophesied that "as the number of graduate doctors in-
[309]creases, the need for the establishment of socialized medicine
[310]once felt as a social need will not be quite as great."
[312]Castro concluded by appealing to Cuban youth to partici-
[313]pate “in the great task of opening new frontiers in every —
[314]field...you are in ‘a revolution that will never end." (CIA
[315]FBIS 07 and adds, 28 November, OFFICIAL USE ONLY)
[317]MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS :
[319]Armed Forces headquarters in Havana that two. persons who
[321]had escaped, probably from the military prison, had not yet
[322]been recaptured. The 27 November intercepted message re-
[323]ported that an unsuccessful combing operation had been
[324]effected in:an area indicated by two peasants who pases ||
[327]“Wilitary: headquarters on the Isle of Pines informed | 7
[329]|
[330]|
[332]saw the escapees. - (See Daily Summary of 26 November for
[334]; information on other personnel being sought on the Isle of
[336]| sips). (USN 856, 2X/SL/CUM/T405-63, 27 November, SECRET
[337]SABRE - : .
[340]ee > _ i a —
[342](_—
[344]We
[346]CUBAN INTERNAL SITUATION:
[348]The Cuban Government may have instituted new controls
[349]on fishermen, by eliminating night fishing along the north
[350]coast and by restricting fishermen to three and one half
[351]miles from the coast. A Florida law enforcement officer was
[352]informed by the former administrator of a fishing coopera-
[353]tive at Isabela de Sagua that on 12 November it was rumored
[354]that no night fishing would be allowed on the north coast
[355]of Cuba after 17 November. Reportedly, those who were fish-
[356]ing at sunset were to anchor their boats or risk being
[357]fired upon. Another source received information thirdhand -
[358]from an unidentified fisherman that in late November, Cuban
[359]fishermen were ordered by the Cuban general staff to do —
[360]their fishing between three and three and one half miles
[361]from the coast. No confirmation has yet been received of
[362]these reported changes in fishing regulations. (CIA TDCSDB-
[363]3/658 ,077, 27 November, SECRET/CONTROLLED DISSEM)
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[381]INSURGENCY AND Cx, IL UNREST
[383]a additional acts of sabotage have been reported by
[384]Bureau of Public Order (BOP) officials in Matanzas Province.
[385]On 25 November nearly four tons of sugar cane were burned
[386]on the Araujo farm near Maguanito and on 27 November two
[387]empty houses were burned on the Angelina farm in the dis-
[388]trict of Maximo Gomez.
[390]Meanwhile, First Army headquarters in Santiago de Cuba
[391]was informed by its southern sector Sierra Maestra head-
[392]quarters that 87,000 arrobas of cane were burned on 17 November
[393]at Algeria del Pio near San Lorenzo in Oriente Province. (USM,
[394]603, 2/YJ/CUP/R127-63, 28 November, SECRET KIMBO; and USN
[395]835, 2X/LR1/CUM/T669-63, 26 November , SECRET SABRE)
[397]On 27 and 28 November special anti-insurgent forces
[398](LCB) in Las Villas carried out an operation against Menendez
[399]Esquijaro and his band near Sancti. Spiritus. LCB field opera-
[400]tions headquarters in Santa Clara was informed on 21 November
[401]that the operations had ended without results. (USM 603, 2X/
[402]UJ/CUM/T350-63, 28 November; and 2X/YJ/CUM/T351-63, 29 Noven-
[403]ber, SECRET SABRE)
[405]Department of State Security (DSE) officials in Nuevitas,
[406]Camaguey Province, were. instructed on 28 November to mobilize
[407]militiamen. into an "easily seen land patrol" at Playa Santa
[408]Lucia in order to prevent a clandestine escape attempt dur-
[410]ing the night of 28-29 November. DSE headquarters in Camaguey —
[412]directed Nuevitas to coordinate the operation with LCP units
[413]and "to be especially watchful for boats.” (USM 603, 2/YJ/
[415]a. ~~ ae,
[417]CUP/R128-63, 29 November, SECRET KIMBO)
[419]CUBAN EXILE AND REFUGEE ACTIVITIES:
[421]Comandos L is considering an attack against a Soviet
[422]ship in Cuban waters, according to a member of a group of
[423]Cuban refugees who have provided useful reports. The raid,
[424]which was being discussed on 22 November, would take place
[425]inthe near future or when the seas become more quiet. Re-
[426]portedly, the plan would involve 15 men in three speed-boats
[427]who would rendezvous in international waters after leaving
[428]from three points along the Florida coast. In connection with
[429]the raid, Jesus Alvarez Amador picked up material on 22 Noven-
[430]ber, including one box of fragmentation grenades, three maga-
[431]zines for a 20-mm. cannon and 87 rounds of ammunition for —
[432]the same, and.15 ponchos. This equipment is being stored at
[433]the home of Jesus Vazquez, owner of Super Cake S8.A., La Gran
[434]Via Bakers, Miami :. Vazquez! -home télephone number is 379-5218.
[435]Other ‘weapons to be used in the operations are two 20-mm.
[437]‘cannons, one 57-mm. cannon, four machine guns, and two Garand
[439]rifles, "alvarez planned to’ go to West Palm Beach on 22 Noven—
[440]ber to borrow some additional weapons. (CIA TDCS-DB-3/658,
[441]110, 28 November, CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED
[442]DISSEM)
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[458]CUBAN EXILE AND REFUGEE ACTIVITIES - cont'd
[460]Cubanos Libres may be planning to hijack a ship in a
[461]raid that would be. staged from Miami, according to a mem-
[462]ber of a group of Cuban refugees who have provided useful
[463]reports. | The source reported that funds for the raid were
[464]to be raised at a dinner scheduled for 24 November in Le
[465]Tre Venezie restaurant, 472 West 9th Avenue, New York City.
[466]At the dinner, Cubanos Libres was planning to show films
[467]of their raids against Cardenas Bay in October 1962 and the.
[468]Arechabala Refinery in June 1963. (CIA TDCSDB-3/658,109,
[469]28 November, CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM)
[471]A small group. ‘of ‘Cuban refugees may have attempted to
[472]infiltrate Cuba about 27 November, according to a prominent
[473]exile activist who received the information from a close
[474]associate of a person involved in the attempt. Reportedly,
[476]a 20- to 22-foot speed—-boat left Key Biscayne, Florida, the
[477]night of 26 November to rendezvous off Key Largo with a Cuban
[478]fishing boat and then proceed to an infiltration point on the
[479]north coast of Las Villas. The fishing boat is reportedly
[480]based in a shrimp. fishery on the southeast coast of Key Largo.
[481]The persons involved in the operation were Manuel Pedro
[482]Gutierrez Cardenas, and presumably two infiltrees--Emilio
[483]Perez Fernandez and Luis Aguiar Perez. Two crew members,
[484]known only by nicknames, were "Comacho" and ‘'Vascoy," possibly
[485]Jose Bascoy Barrios. (CIA TDCSDB-3/658,104, .27 November ,
[486]SECRET/CONTROLLED DISSEM)
[488]BLOC RELATIONS:
[490]The Albanian ambassador to Cuba, Josif Pogace, delivered
[491]a speech to a nearly empty hall in Havana on 26 November. A
[492]Polish correspondent in Havana informed Warsaw that the speech,
[493]in celebration of Albania’s national holiday, was attenddéd by
[494]only 80 people, mostly Chinese Communist embassy personnel,
[495]students,and journalists. Cuba was represented by an official
[496]of the. Cuban foreign cultural council. . The Polish correspond-
[497]ent reports that the audience applauded the ambassador's words
[498]on the subject of "contemporary revisionism" and "the revision-
[499]‘} ist blockade of Albania" but reacted with silence to his at-
[500]’ tack on "false guarantees for Cuba." (CIA FBIS 105, 27 Noven-
[501]ber, OFFICIAL USE ONLY) .
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[513]NON-BLOC RELATIONS: ——~ a
[514]oT The Castro vegine, which has yet to acknowledge publicly ~
[515]the Moroccan Government's severance of diplomatic relations. "|
[517]following the arrival of Cuban troops in Algeria in late
[518]September, is attempting to placate Rabat. On 26 November, H
[519]| Foreign Minister Raul Roa advised the secretary general of the
[520]| Moroccan Foreign Ministry that a three-man "good-will mission,"
[521]composed of Dr. Antonio Carrillo Carreras, Enrique Vian Audivert),
[522]of the Ministry of Foreign Trade,and Dr. Enrique Rodriguez
[523]Loeches, the Cuban ambassador to Morocco, would leave for
[524]Rabat the next day "to begin conversations with your illustrious |
[525]government with a view to clearing up the unfortunate mis-
[526]understandings which may have arisen....'"" The Moroccans, who
[527]since breaking off formal diplomatic relations have become |
[528]alarmed by the realization of the extent to which they depend
[529]on their sugar imports from Cuba and the dislocation which
[530]| the loss of these imports would entail, probably will give
[531]_{ the Cuban delegation a sympathetic hearing. Nevertheless it .
[532]is unlikely that Rabat will agree at this time to return an
[533]ambassador to Cuba or to disavow publicly its renunciation of
[534]diplomatic ties so long as Cuban troops remain in Algeria.
[536]On 21 November, Rabat instructed one of the junior members ;
[537]of its embassy who had remained in Cuba when the ambassador
[538]departed to remain at his post until he had closed out all
[539]financial dealings with Cuban banks, etc., and to forward per-
[540]tinent documents on his activities to Morocco's Permanent ~
[541]Mission to the UN- Two days later the secretary general of
[542]the Moroccan Foreign Ministry cabled Havana that his government
[543]was inclined to receive a Cuban good-will mission. (NSA
[544]3/0/MRD/T329~63, 21 November; 3/0/MRD/T329-63, 23 November;
[545]3/0/MRD/T335-63, 26 November, TOP SECRET DINAR)
[549]The director of the Cuban Government - owned Consolidated
[550]Petroleum Enterprise, Salvador Salas Portuondo, is scheduled
[551]to travel to Georgetown, British Guiana, on a Cuban vessel.
[553]On 21 November Cuban shipping headquarters in Havana informed
[554]| the captain of the BAHIA DE TANAMO that Salas would be
[555]| traveling to Georgetown from Santiago de Cuba. Meanwhile, an
[557]untested source who is a member of the board of the British
[559]Guiana Electricity Corporation reports that GIMPEX has been
[561]\ awarded the contract to provide fuel oil for the electricity
[562]corporation for 1964. GIMPEX, Jagan's party's trading enter-
[564], prise, reportedly intends to import the oil from Cuba. The
[565]electricity corporation will pay $240,000 for the oil. (USM-
[566]{1 84, 2X/0/CUC/T406-63, 27 November, SECRET SABRE; and CIA TDCS-
[568]|
[569]3/566, 043, 23 November, CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
[571]L J
[572]a |
[573]pT TS Ce ne eee ine eet leer tee eS
[574]oe ne
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[584]NON-BLOC RELATIONS - cont'd _ ee -
[588]‘Cuba, and instructed him to determine the level at which the
[590]_ Cuban Embassy in Accra, Nevris Vernier, attaché at the embassy
[592]Cuba may establish diplomatic relations with Somalia ‘|
[594]‘and is attempting to improve its relations with Tanganyika
[596]and Ghana, according to intercepted communications. In a
[597]27 November intercepted message, the Somali Government in-
[598]formed its United Nations representative that the Council of
[599]Ministers had approved the establishment of relations with
[601]Cubans wanted to exchange representatives. In a.26 November
[602]message, the Cuban Foreign Ministry requested its Prague
[603]embassy to obtain customs exemptions for three personnel who
[604]were on their way to Tanganyika. Cuba does not currently have
[605]diplomatic representatives in Tanganyika and the Cubans may be
[606]on a good-will mission which is expected in that country. (See
[607]article above on good-will mission to Morocco.) . The three
[608]Cubans--Juan Felipe Benemelis Varona, second secretary of the
[610]in Accra,and Jose Antonio Benitez Cabrera, an attaché of the
[611]Cuban Embassy in Prague--were scheduled to arrive in. Prague on
[612]27 November. In another intercepted message of 25 November,
[613]Havana instructed its ambassador in Ghana to sign a cultural
[614]pact with Ghana during the first part of December. The Cuban
[615]representative was told to sign the Ghanaian-inspired pact "out
[616]of political considerations." (NSA 3/0/SOD/T202-63, 27 November,
[617]TOP SECRET DINAR; NSA 2X/0/CUB/T2439-63, 27 November, SECRET —
[618]SABRE; NSA 3/0/CUD/T1385=63, 27 November, TOP SECRET DINAR)
[620]The Cuban Government requested Chilean visas for two
[621]members of National Association of Small Farmers (ANAP)--
[622]Juan Jorge Valdez Paz and Adelfo Martin Barrios~~to attend
[623]a “cooperative seminar" (sic; possibly, seminar on coopera-
[624]tives) to be held in Santiago. An 11 Novembér intercepted
[625]message stated that their visit would last 15 days. (NSA
[626]3/0/CLD/T1086-63, 27 November, TOP SECRET DINAR)
[628]—. oe _ . _ _ ee
[630]RON-BLOC COMMERCIAL RELATIONS:
[632]Cuba is continuing negotiations for the purchase of large
[633]amounts of construction equipment, probably from the Varmi
[634]company of Brussels, (See Daily Summary of 7 November for
[635]details of Varmi's offer.) “According to an employee of
[636]the Spanish export-import firm CILASA who has access to the:
[637]company's files, a seven-man Cuban delegation was expected.
[638]to arrive in Brussels on 30 November with authorization to.
[639]let contracts. The group reportedly plans to examine, dis-~
[640]assemble, and test the equipment and has a total budget of
[641]$3,5 million. (It was previously. reported that Varmi has
[643]- offered to sell $1 million worth of construction equipment.)
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[654]4
[656]NON-BLOC COMMERCIAL RELATIONS - cont'd.
[658]The delegation is also interested in visiting European
[660]_ Manufacturers of spare parts for the machines; they were
[661]principally interested in visiting Spain. The members of
[662]the delegation are Rene Narbona from the Cuban enterprise
[663]for the import of machinery, in addition to representatives
[664]named Respall, Hernandez, Rodriguez, Alemida (sic), Duran,
[665]and Morales, They were to stay at the Hotel Metropole in
[666]Brussels. (CIA Madrid IN 69382, 28 November, SECRET NO FOR-.
[667]EIGN DISSEM)
[669]CUBAN SUPPORT OF EXTERNAL SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES:
[671]The discovery of a large cache of weapons of Cuban origin,
[672]announced by Venezuelan authorities on 28 November, provides
[673]the best evidence in recent years of major Cuban support for
[674]Latin American subversives.
[676]The Venezuelan foreign minister has announced that Caracas
[677]will lay formal charges concerning the arms cache before a
[678]special meeting of Latin American Foreign Ministers scheduled
[679]for December. Following this, Caracas will ask that the Coun-
[680]ceil of the Organization of American States be convoked for con-
[681]sultation on the matter.
[683]There is definite proof to support the Venezuelan claim |
[684]that the weapons came from Cuba. The approximately three tons
[685]of weapons include light automatic rifles and submachine guns
[686]identified as among those: shipped to Cuba from Belgium in 1959.
[687]and 1960. There were also mortars, bazookas, recoilless rifles,
[688]and ammunition of US manufacture,
[690]Communist documents sétzed by Venezuelan authorities
[691]earlier this month indicate that the equipment was destined
[692]for the Venezuelan Communists’ paramilitary arm, the Armed Forces
[693]of National Liberation.
[695]The cache was found on 1 November on a beach in Falcon
[696]State, scene of the most active guerrilla effort. The Vene-
[697]zuelan Government assumes that the weapons were sent from Cuba
[698]by sea. This is not confirmed, but Cuban fishing vessels were
[699]used to transport weapons to South America during the latter
[700]: - part of October, according to several recent clandestine re-
[701]s, ports,
[702]br. For more than three years, the Castro regime has tried to
[703]avoid actions that would clearly implicate it in direct sup-.
[704]port of Latin American subversives. This exception seems to
[705]demonstrate either the high degree of urgency which Castro |
[706]now gives to his subversive effort, or his estimate that the
[707]Venezuelan situation now is ripe for a final offensive...
[711]TOP SECRET DINAR
[713]13-00000
[715]TOP SECRET DINAR
[717]CUBAN SUPPORT OF EXTERNAL SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES - cont'd
[719]A Havana radiobroadcast immediately denied that Cuba
[720]was involved in the arms-infiltration attempt. The broad-
[721]cast, which quoted no official source, stated that "this
[722]is a new campaign of President Romulo Betancourt against
[723]Cuba and its revolutionary government, blaming the Cubans
[724]for the explosive. situation in his country and the instabil-
[725]ity of his government. " (SECRET)
[727]9.
[729]TOP SECRET DINAR