[1]178-10003-10016) 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE! PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
[2]JFK Assassination system Dat 87277201
[4]Identification Form
[6]Agency Information
[8]AGENCY: ROCKCOM
[9]RECORD NUMBER: — 178-10003-10016
[11]RECORD SERIES: ASSASSINATION FILE
[13]AGENCY FILE NUMBER: ASSASSINATION MATERIALS--MISC. ROCK/CIA (10)
[15]Document {Information
[16]ORIGINATOR: CIA
[17]FROM:
[18]TO:
[20]TITLE: | MINUTES OF MEETING OF THE SPECIAL GROUP, 30 AUGUST 1962
[22]DATE: 08/30/1962
[23]PAGES: 4
[25]SUBJECTS :
[26]CUBA
[27]DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[28]CLASSIFICATION: — Secret
[29]RESTRICTIONS: Consulted
[31]CURRENT STATUS: = Withhold
[32]DATE OF LAST REVIEW: — 07/15/1993
[34]OPENING CRITERIA :
[36]COMMENTS :
[38]v9.1 25
[39]MW 50955 Docld:32204599 Page 1
[42]. . {
[43]178-10003-10016 30 August 1962
[44]3 MEMORANDUM FOX RECORD
[45]3 . SVEJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 30 Auguse 1962
[46]i ; .
[47]. refSEit. Gin ral Taylor, Mr. Johnson, Mrs Cilpatric, General Carter,
[48]# Genecal Leuntezer, and Mr. Bundy
[49]i ' /
[50]a Colonel Steakley was present fur Items 1 -3e
[51]i : tug
[52]i Mr, f-ford Herbert was present for Items 4-6, o. +.
[53]i | ree a
[54]- e =
[55]c 2
[56]§ 1. Reconnatssance Ws ny
[57]: A. BOD Peripheral Fiiuhts —
[58]1 :
[59]4 The peripheral flights were approved as presented. It was
[60]y noted that LOLLY weuld-invelve only a single aircraft as opposed to
[61]: the previous two olane flights in this area, As to LUCESTTE and MICHELE,
[62]¥ it wis jointed out that these flights would not be flosm while the
[64]A APC EERSTE EPCOS ETERS I LRM, FP
[65]coerce ange owe vane erp nnn ye teeter CAS EAI HOA
[67]Soviet niclear test prohibited zone was atill in effect. In response
[68]to a gecaction fron Me. Jonnson as to why thesye flights were 40 rather
[69]thaa 59 utles off the conse, Colonel Steanley said that che distance
[70]selectec was 6 vartisble, depending on the purpose of the flight end
[71]other conditthons,
[73]Be Laos.
[75]Generel Taylor asked if anyone cared to reopen this instter,
[77]Mr. Giipatric presented the Defenne position, In view of the Soviat
[78]Craunsport edreraft stand down and the indications that the Cormunists
[79]were at least going through the motions of narrying out the agreement,
[80]Defense was in favor of not reopening the matter uacil the 75 day
[81]withdriwal period was cver ana an avaluution hsg been made of the degree
[82]eof Consunist compliance. Genersl Lemnitzer, while willing te taka the
[83]risk of waiting, said he vould bike to make fe clear that from the
[84]wailitary point of view it vas most important that we have good informa-
[85]tion on Communist activities. Thera Flights are our prime source of
[86]chard inforsaiion., The consensus of the’Group was that this subject would
[87]not be recpened until after the 75 day withdrawal period was over.
[89]AWWdaIT quod -y atwayo FHL WOM  KAODOLONA
[91]Cc. Crerfitshes of South Laoy
[92](3) Colonel Steakley pointed out that there was one problem, «
[93]in conection with « flat prohf{bitihon on photo flights over Laos, At '
[95]-
[97]present, PF-}OL's based {tn Thatland must overtly the southern panhandle *
[99][NG Ee
[100]_ UNMARKED _
[101]a -~ NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
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[105]genercd policy te modified to permit high eicicude overflights (35,0C0
[106]feet) te asd trom South Vietnan, by planes based in Thailand. Ic was
[107]brought ouc thet the average activity level was about two missions about |
[108]‘every three days. ‘There wig agreement thet photo recoanatsysance in
[109]Reneral ayainst yuerrilla taryets vas difficule but that thia made it
[110]all the more tmportant to do ail that-we cun, These fliches are
[111]essentially covert, as, current sereemeats precludé the filing of flight
[113]a plans for photo aircraft, Sir, Jonson eald chet the Department was
[114]Willing to g9 along with this activity, duct felt chat the matter had
[115]‘to be reviewed by At,uer euchority cue Lo hieocvery explicit previous
[116]instructions to the contrary. The Group's ceciaion to approve thin
[117]Specific exception cto the prohibition against photo flights over Laos
[118]was later reported to higher authority.
[120](2) In discussing the matter above, the desirability of
[121]redeploying the afirerart to South Vietnim was mentioned, This matter
[122]was referred to Defense for-forcher cxamfnastton. It was also recognized,
[123]that the South Vietnamese micht well be eiven some indigenous capabillty
[124]for photo reconnaissance. It was elso sucvested that possible Luog
[125]overfilehts, after the 75 day perfod had ciapsed, wight vell be puc in
[126]the suandard overfiignce category rarher than being naodied a& a separate
[128]. e , ¥.
[130]Bac aw anid a
[131]ya
[132]enroute to execute alsasiung in South Vietnam, He proposed that the
[134]tom.
[136]a, The ELINT flights from Thatland were discussed and approved
[137]with the understanding thae they would use the specific routes indicated
[139]AUWdGIT Gaod °y atwaas 4HL WOYd AdOoOLOHA
[141]E, The Agency's monthly forecast wee reviewed and noted, All
[143]of the fFilghts contesined therein had been previously approved, Ceneral
[144]_ Carter mentioned thac there might be an acditional requirement for .
[145]flights over Cuba. "
[147]KF. The dastroyer surveillance mission DESOTO was discussed and
[148]approved. It was pointed wut that the ship generally operates 29 wiles
[149]offshore, but closes to 12 miles under certain conditions. The Group
[150]requested that they be informed (f any of the vartous ELINT operations
[151]picked up unusual indications,
[153]G, The Group reviewed certain submarine activiticn and approved
[154]them as presented.
[156]. General Carter raised the auestfLon of exactly how eppreoval should o
[157]be obtained for ares and ammunition rasupply missions to the Meos. Let
[159]eed thac thin was a matter for censulcation betwsen the Department
[161]Prd
[163]Wad agre
[164]\ of State and CLA, and nead not be referred to the Group for decisisn..
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[168]HY 50955 DoclId:
[170]3. Sovirt Sipnal Intelligence Shivs
[172]Tne Grono considered an outline plan for “communication” with
[173]Comaunise crewa., Ine general consensus was that this plan ¢{@ noc
[174]fel within the purview of the Special Grova, It waa referred back
[176]103 for further cevelopment, The matter will be discussed at a
[177]Sraces Jes meeting to be hald in the naar ftucure. Mr. Glinatrfie also
[178]expsngsed inter.st in seeing a wore datakled daveloraent of the con-
[179]cope, Mr, Bundy palnced cut thot ve should be careful where such
[180]avtiviticy are pursued, Generally speakien, they should be Limited to
[181]the high seas or international air space General Carter raised tne
[182]point thar this concept should not be seretehed to incluce defection
[183]operations on lend, Thia {3 a highly skilled operation which requires
[184]special attention ard control. The Group took no particular position
[185]for or against the concept in referring-{t back to Defensa.
[187]4, Chile ,
[189]The Group reviewed the two Agency papers. Mr. Johnson strassed
[190]the necessity for concealing U.S. particlpation in this operation and
[191]also expressed some concern &bout the possibility of the fadicals
[192]pulling out prematurely and briaging the goverment down. The Apancy
[193]hent Lond the destrability of odlicy-level conversations with sultable
[194]Chileans so that they would be aware cf the future political arrange-
[195]meats United it is felt would be to the comson interests of Chile and
[196]the Uaited States, the Group approved the recosmendation in paragraph
[198]5 on page 7.
[200]5, Pontnican Prpublic
[202]The Croup noted thle paper. Cenoral Carter urged the Department
[203]of State to continue to press the interim goverreent on the desirabilicy
[204]of holding early electiona,
[206]_iRUVdGIT Guos -u aTwaaS aHL KONZ AdODOLOHA
[208]6. Parrisa
[210]Mr. Johnson said ther State covsurred in the general thrust of
[211]this paper, but would Like to limte the continuation of the progras to
[212]a three-conth period during which time it would ba reviewad in detail by
[213]State end CIA. The Group approved the proposal with this revsarvation.
[215]7, General Lemnitzar stated that Hg. McCone had called him and posed
[216]\ a possible requtremeat for low-level photography of eritical Cuban
[217]H targets, General leunftzer said that fren the mtlitary voint of view
[218]{ this was feasible, utiliving etcther AP-1l0OL or FSU aircrafe flown by
[219]i U.S. pllota from various bases or cerrfers in the Caribbean area. ths
[221]‘ “4
[224]la eh I Rath ter ook ER Dee one atid adie are A ERENT Sy SYS Ea OTN SBP Rt DRE RATE TIT eo ede ere pen
[226]32204599 Page 4
[228]. fine
[230]use of Cuban pilots would invelve a delny of some monthe due to the
[231]preciae trafairg required, > Gener Cartes pulated out that we ere
[232]sy oorooverfliphte in anv ease and thac the possibility
[236]Lests gaheaulid sat dissusde us fren making these flighes
[237]Pecessary, ff was pointed Gat that other types of phota-
[238]vousvtul fn pinpoineteas criticsi targets, dow. nat Rive:
[240]etall for orectse tdenciitcaricn of vertrata tpes of equizp-
[241]sone: discussion, the Group agreed to take cognizance of
[242]ane renuested tnat to be Teoper. ¢ 8. an appropriate tine
[243]Wrea specific targets and information neecs could be identified.
[245]8, Tt was agreed that the Agency would present 6 paper concerning
[246]Action Agatsat Narth Vietnam at next week's aeeting.
[251]we ke RR
[253]General Taylor did not have an opportunity to review these minutes
[254]prior to Ais departure,
[256]eO20 |
[257]ee \ N° . . s
[258]I By eta a tat
[259]3 ces ‘, .
[261]%, ~ Julian J, Bweil
[262]o Colonel, USA -
[263]So strihbucion
[264]OMe, Joneson
[265]Mr. Gilpacete _
[266]General Carter .
[267]General Taylor
[269], i
[270].
[271]bee la
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