[1]1f04-10400-10316 12025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
[2]Jo, SEL SECURIT
[3]’ a : FOR CoO MMITTEES
[5]ll March 1977
[7]MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. James M. Potts wn ut
[8]; Chief, Africa Division
[10]Mr. Richard S, Sampson Oo Ae 7
[11]Chief, Europe Division
[13]Mr.. Alan D. Wolfe
[14]Chief, Near East Division
[16]Mr. Richard F. Stolz
[18]’ - Chief, Soviet/East European Division
[19]FROM : John D. Walker
[20]0/SA/DO/0
[21]SUBJECT . : Guidelines for Providing Information
[23]to the House Appropriations Committee
[24]Surveys and Investigations Staff -
[25]Concerning Foreign Intelligence and
[26]Security Services
[28]1. Since members of the S&I Staff will be
[29]talking with your Divisions in the near. future,
[30]it may be worthwhile to review the guidelines as
[31]to what may be said concerning relationships with
[33]foreign liaison services. In the broad sense,
[34]liaison services constitute both a source and a
[35]method.
[37]2. We are prepared to discuss the following:
[39]a. The identification and responsibili-
[40]ties of the liaison services.in a particular
[41]area to the extent that we can draw on
[42]sources other than information derived through
[43]the established liaison relationship, i.e.
[44]overt information or information from penetra-
[45]tions which will not endanger the source.
[47]b. In further describing the liaison
[48]services, we can provide information on the.
[49]objectives, key personnel, strength, budget
[51]E2 IMPDET
[52]CL BY 012860
[54]sh ET
[59]SECRET
[61]and methods of operations of services, provided
[62]that, such data will be drawn from open sources
[63]or penetrations and not from details of liaison -
[64]-arrangements with the services themselves.
[66]c. Agency manhours and funds devoted to
[67]liaison with the foreign services.
[69]d. In the case of SIGINT liaison, further
[70]details on such arrangements, including the
[71]scope of funds and equipment provided .to such
[72]foreign services. ;
[74]d. We are prepared to provide general
[75]comments on the degree of operational coopera-
[76]-tion with the Station. If technical support,
[77]for example, provides a useful input, we can
[78]state that the liaison service provides
[79]technical support, using a qualifying adjective
[80]to define, such as excellent, limited, etc.
[82]3. We have no objection to the provision of
[83]foreign intelligence reports based on liaison with
[85]'such services. Source descriptions should be those
[87]used in the disseminated report.
[89]4. We will not make available details on
[90]liaison arrangements, information on sources and
[92]methods of such services which have been obtained
[94]through liaison or jointly controlled sources or:
[95]other information which would reveal Agency sources
[96]and methods or violate the trust on which the
[98]. official liaison relationship is based.
[100]5. The S&I Staff approves close liaison
[101]relationships and believes that these relationships
[102]are cost effective.
[104]John Dt Walker
[106]0/SA/DO/0:JDWalker: kaw (1542)
[108]Distribution
[109]Original - C/AF
[110]1 - C/EUR
[111]1 - C/NE
[112]1 -' C/SE
[113]2 - SA/DO/O
[115]- SECRET
[118]13-00000 ! . '
[120]va >
[122]SO . Guidelines for Providing Information
[123]to Congressional Oversight Committees on
[124]Foreign Intelligence and Security Services
[126]These guidelines’ take into account the fact that
[127]foreign intelligence and security. services, when acting
[128]in connection with the Agency's official liaison with
[129]them, constitute both a source and a method and thus
[130]require the statutory protection accorded any other
[131]intelligence source or method: The guidelines also
[132]recognize that the duly constituted oversight bodies of
[133]the Congress have expressed an interest in such services |
[134]and in the general scope, nature and extent of the Agency's
[135]relationships with them. The purpose of these guidelines
[136]is to provide a formula for dealing with these two
[138]-. sometimes conflicting objectives.
[140]The Agency is prepared to provide, upon specific
[141]request, appropriately classified and sanitized information
[142]to oversight committees on the following aspects of
[143]foreign intelligence and security services:
[145]a. the identification of the governments with
[146]whose services CIA has liaison arrangements; |
[148]b. Agency man hours and funds devoted to
[149]liaison with foreign services;:,
[151]c. In the case of SIGINT liaison, further
[153]details on such arrangements, including the scope of
[155]Chaos
[156]a -
[158]Cea ad
[161]13-00000 ' “
[163]we .
[165]funds and equipment provided to such forcign services;
[166]d. Information on the objectives, key personnel,
[167]strength, budget and methods of operation of such services,
[168]provided that such data will be drawn from open sources or
[169]penetrations and not from the details of liaison
[170]arrangements with the services themselves,
[171]e. Where relevant, foreign intelligence reports
[172]based on liaison with such services.
[174]7 . The Agency will not make. available to the oversight
[175]committees the details of liaison arrangements with
[176]foreign services, information on sources and methods of .,
[177]such services obtained through liaison or jointly
[178]controlled sources, or other information which would
[180]reveal Agency sources or methods or violate the trust on
[181]which. these official liaison relationships is necessarily
[182]based. .
[183]In the event of substantial allegations of improper
[184]activities conducted by foreign intelligence or security
[185]-services with which the Agency is presumed to maintain
[186]liaison, every effort will be made to provide all relevant
[187]facts which bear on such allegations. Where this would
[189]' involve departure from the above guidelines, the Director
[191]will be prepared to meet with the Chairman or Vice-Chairman
[193]of the committce to seek a satisfactory resolution of such
[195]problems. ..
[198]13-00000 ,
[200]MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD |
[202]Mr. Colby, Mitch Rogovin and Mr. Knoche met with
[203]Chairman Otis Pike at 9/30, 7/24 in Chairman Pike's office
[204]to discuss groundrules, etc. for the House Select Committee
[205]on Intelligence,
[207]Mr. Colby left the following material with Pike:
[209]1. 16 June 1975 Letter to the Honorable Elmer B. Staats °
[210]Comptroller General of the United States, Signed by
[211]Mr. Colby. The letter deals with the GAO's audit
[212]of the Central Intelligence Agency. (Attached).
[214]2. Guide to Central Intelligence Agency Statutes and Law
[215]dated September 1970 (without the Ryan Amendment
[216]on Foreign Intelligence). _@iled in 6D0120)
[218]3, Three Groudrules papers: (Attached) ~s
[220]~-Agreements To Be SoughtBy the DCI With Chairmen » -
[222]of the Select Committees
[224]a eSeerecy Agreement
[226]- =-Guides for Protection of Classified Information
[227]““A nd Documents Furnished i The Select Committee...
[229]4, lt March 1975 1 Letter : from Colby to Senator Church,
[230](Attached)
[232]Rosemarie R. Hesterberg
[234]amen ie aan thane taa inka a cern nanan eR RR Eee ienemtimeee eatin deme aeaa.ctemercemenecdeat aman danietacion a aeenneeetaieandamemmmatel
[237]13-00000 , ‘,
[239]SECRET
[241]Checklist for DCI Discussion with HSC
[243]; oo,
[244]1, . Your intent to be cooperative and forthe aming.
[246]_ 2. Your responsibility to protect S&M. -Will need HSC understanding ~
[248]of particularly sensitive matters;' *"
[249]--names of agents. and sources. —
[251]--names of cooperating American organizations and
[252]contacts to whom v we have pledged confidentiality. —
[254]--material from foreign liaison.
[255]; -+sensitive intelligence. methods and techniques of collection,
[256]3.. will need to. work out segurity groundrules,
[258]--Chairman of USIB Security Committee and CIA Director
[260]of Security available to help work out custodial arrangements,
[262]compartmented clearances, etc.
[264]- , 0 an
[266]4, Importance of secrecy agreements. Your willingness ta ‘gus pend
[267]them to permit testimony by current and ex-employees,
[269]5. will ‘confirm with a letter and an employee bulletin which
[270]can be used by HSC in dealing with Agency witnesses and
[271]interviews. on 7 + ;
[273]nae ‘
[275]Po ay ft
[277]24 July 1975
[279]Classified by
[280]Exempt from genoral
[281]declassification schadute of E.0. 11652
[283]exemption schedu'a 5B (1), (2), (3)
[284]Automaticaty declassified on
[286]SEC RET Data impossible to Determine
[288]OS I a eS TIE ET
[291]13-00000 ° ty . ;
[293]AGREEMENTS TO BE SOUGHT BY THE DCI WITH
[294]CHAIRMEN OF THE SELECT COMMITTEES
[296]Vy ‘lt would be desirable 7; the. per could ‘secure agréement |
[297]. with the Chairmen of the Select Committees; as has been customary
[298]in. other Congressional proceedings regarding sensitive matters, Shats:
[300]' fa) ‘Departments’ and agencies shall have the right”
[301]to request that testimony be givenionly in executive session,
[302]‘that in some instances testimony be’ “off-the-record" and - ’
[303]that certain testimony be heard only by members and in
[304]"some cases, s,only by the Chairman and Vice Chairman.
[305]_ athe! we) Witnesses be. afforded an wn opportunity to review
[306]and. ‘comment on and/or correct the record of their * testimony —
[307]_ Prior to any pupueson of it. - a oe, a. ae
[308]e When que ) stioned about intelligence matters that
[309]-@ome under the purview of another organization, witnesses.
[310]m should be permitted tg state that a response fo the question |
[311]ee a ee _.is not properly within their authority and to respectfully .
[312]_ |, suggest that the appropriate party be called to testify © on
[313]ouch matters. m .
[315]2s tt would ‘also be desirable if the DCI could secure agreement
[316]with the Chairmen of the Select Committees that those agencies
[317]:. furnishing documerits to the committees be-authorized to excise from
[318]- those documents, prior to presentation, the names of their personnel
[319]a “under cover or whose personal safety might be jeopardized as wellas |
[320]mone tae those of other individuals whose safety or ‘individual privacy, may be
[321]- jeopardized by disclosure. ' Also’ excised. should be names of sources,
[322]operations, specific details of technical devices and systems main-
[323]. tained in compartmented channels and names of organizations
[324]cooperating ona highly c confidential basis.
[328]| 3... In view of their susceptibility to » foreign countermeasures,
[329]it would be desirable if the DCI could obtain agreement. with the .
[330]Chairmen of the Select Committees not to require presentation of details
[333]13-00000 ,
[335]TIER EL
[337]of the technology of the technical collection programs... It would also |
[339]" compartmented area.
[341]Hines which will be = Provided.
[343]be desirable if the Select Committees adopted. the use of Compart-
[345]' mented Control Systems to’ protect documents on these programs
[347]‘and cleared only those staff personnel with an absolute need-to-know.
[348]The responsible departments and agencies would be glad to advise. .
[349]and assist in ‘any arrangements the Chairmen would desire in this
[351]eb os to s 0 ee re
[353]Ae Further; it would be aesixtbte if the DCI attempt to -
[355]. secure an agreement with the Chairmen, of the Select. Committees :
[357]*. that they will entertain and consider security principles . and t guide— .
[359]we + we earte-sPrereeme
[362]13-00000 : .
[364]) -
[366]'
[367]i
[368]H
[370]'
[372].. . . . . : 2 ot
[373]wt . - " . nota . - . -
[375]- I,. Se _y in accepting employment
[376]‘ or assigament with the Select: Committee to Study Governmental
[377]Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, recognize the
[378]-. Special trust and confidence placed in me to protect classified infor- .
[379]. mation from unauthgrized disclosure. : ;
[381]. I I hereby agree to accept the specific obligations set forth.
[382]. below.as 2 condition precedent of my employment or assignment with.
[383]1 the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect
[384]_ to Intelligence Activities, established by the Senate of the United
[385]_ States, Resolution 21, agreed to on January 27, 1975, hereinafter
[386]_ referred to as the Select Committee, ; . . 7
[387]wei is my » under standing that i in the course of my employment
[388]-or assignment with the Select Committee .I will be given access to
[389]. information from departments. and agencies of the Government which
[390]is classified in accordance with the statidards set forth in Executive
[391]. Order. 11652 of March-8, 1972, as amended. All classified information
[392]. So acquired by me in the course of my employment remains the
[393]property of the United States of America and I further agree to
[394]_ surrender upon demand by the Chairman of the Select Committee
[395]‘or his designee(s) or upon my separation from the Select Committee,
[396]any classified material. which‘thas come into my possession as a : ,
[397]' .xesult of my employment or assignment with the Select Committee.
[399]Thereby agree that the burden is.on me to determine if -
[400]inforrnation is classified and that I will never divulge, publish or
[401]reveal by word, writing, conduct or otherwise any classified
[402]information which has come to my knowledge as a result of my
[403]employment or assignment with the Select Committee without prior
[404]written consent of the Chairman or the President of the Senate or
[405]their duly authorized xepresentative. -
[408]13-00000 |
[410]I hereby agree that any information learned during my
[411]employment or assignment with the Select Committce which is related ~
[412]to intelligence and prepared for publication by me will be. submitted to
[414]. the Chairman or the President of the Senate or their duly authorized
[415]° representative prior to discussing with or showing to any ‘publisher,
[416]. editor or literary agent for the purpose of determining whether said
[417]_ material contains any classified information as defined in Executive
[418]» Order 11652. Lagxee that the Chairmah of the Select Committee,
[419]- President of the Senate or their duly authorized representative has
[420]“the authority to make the final determination as to whether information
[421]vis classified and thus should be deleted from the material submitted.
[423]ae “Yhave been informed of the provisions ‘of 18 U.S.C. 793, 794, .
[425]' 798 and 952; and 50 U;S.C. 783 (b); and-42 U.S.C. 2274; and Executive °
[426]. Order.11652, all of which relate to the protection of classified infor——
[428]. mation, and understand their meaning. rr
[429]Further, 1 I agree to: abide by 5 such rules ‘and procedures as the
[431]-. Select Committee shall instjiute for the protection of classified material.
[432]~~ Lunderstand that any breach of any part of the obligations in this agree-
[433]ment could subject r me to legal. and/ or. 2 administrative action. :
[435]_ I further agree ‘that all the conditions and obligations imposed
[437]‘on ‘me with respect.to the protection of classified information by this
[438]agreement and applicable security regulations apply during my employ-
[439]ment or assignment and continue after that relationship has terminated.
[441]x take the obligations set forth above freely and without any
[442]mental reservations or purpose of evasion. ,
[444]woe . ar! oo st AAs tom . ney
[446]~.  . Signature
[448]re Date oo
[449]. WITNESS: oe I
[451]- Signature ; Dae es 7 Leo.
[453]Date.
[457]A ORIEN IE = saan fe ere
[460]13-00000, 3,
[462]'. “GUIDES FOR PROTECTION OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
[463]‘AND DOCUMENTS FURNISHED THE SELECT COMMITTEES
[465]» Ay
[467]1, Personnel Security Clearances * oS a an oe
[468]a} Background Investigation mo
[470]_ It would be desirable for the Select Committees t to stipulate,
[471]that no staff personnel is to be given access to any classified material,
[473]. 4 _. .. testimony or.information received or generated by the committees. ~~
[474]without prior receipt of a security clearance | based ona full field
[476]7 inve stigation.
[478]. (b) Secrecy Agreement
[479]: It would be desirable for the Select,Committees torequirea =,
[480]signed secrecy agreement of employees or individuals assigned to ,
[481]the committees! staffs. The agreement should include Provisions:
[482]1) That acceptance of committee secrecy regulations
[483]is a. condition precedent of employment or assignment;
[485]2) Recognizing US. Government property rights to
[486]classified information; eae
[488]+ . ,
[489]3) Requiring prioz written consent before divulgence
[490]of olassified information; Ot ae de
[492]‘Ay For recognition that breach of the secrecy rules
[493]and obligations contained in the agreement could subject |
[494]the signer to adrninistrative and/ or * legal action under
[496]- . *
[498]appropriate statutes; ee
[500]5) That there is no time limit on the terms - of the
[501]agreement,
[504]13-00000: 4
[506]- 2, Physical and Document Security
[508]The Select Committees should adopt rules to insure : that the
[509], secrecy of any sensitive information received or generated by it be
[510]-. preserved, These rules should be made known to the individuals. -
[511]- and agencies who will be called. upon to present testimony or foe
[512]- materials. Among. these should be wulgs,An-physical-seourity = ‘and oe
[513]" document security. ; . ce vere
[515]fa) Ph sical Securit _ . = OF a a Sy ;
[517]. tt would be desirable if the Select Committees adopt the following.
[518]rules related to physical security: ae
[520]oy All classified material will be stored i in > safes for
[521]7 safekeeping i in the registry of the Joint Committee on Atomic .
[523]. Energy or similar facility and handled in accordance with _7
[524]“4. the regulations of this registry for classified material.  .. :
[526]2), Twenty - four-hour guard protection, ‘supplemented
[527]. .by anti-intrusion. alarms, should be required on the storage
[528]oe. area. | ; ; a
[530]*.3) Areas selected for use in closed session should Oo
[531]_ be guarded against entry by unauthorized persons.
[532]AY “The committees should z arrange for the conduct of :
[533]” audio countermeasures to preclude the possibility of
[534].. unauthorized use-of transrnitters and/or recording devices. .
[535]It should be noted that a foreign clandestine transmitter w2s
[536]located in the Rayburn House Office Building on 12 2 February
[537]1973, . ; . we TET
[539]5) At the end of each session of the Select Committees,
[540]the hearing room should be examined by a cleared staff:
[541]. officer who will secure any misplaced « classified material
[542].. or waste.
[546]_ (») Document Security’
[550]6) Areas should be designated in which classified
[551]material can be reviewed. These areas should be secure
[552]against access by unauthorized personnel, Material should
[553]not be removed from these areas for the sake of conveniente _
[554]except when necessary for the work of the committees.and
[556]- ” sHould.not-be-teansported ovérnight to the office or residence,
[557]” of personnel of the committees. De
[559]-) Committees should select and identify a single
[561]o location and specific personnel authorized to sign acknow-~
[562]ce ledgement of receipt of clas sified materials provided to
[563]the committees. a . oe ments ae - ar ao
[565]: feat,
[566]le 7 -
[568]2) A sy stem of document control should be established
[570]- a : to permit control of glassified documents to provide for
[571]oo! accountability. oo er ee ot ue
[573]ee . . ee aot he _ woe TP
[575]* 3) ‘Duplication of documents should be controlled so
[577]as to require a record of the document. xeproduced, the
[579]- subject to the same controls: as the original.
[581], the destruction of classified waste,
[583]'. mwumber of copies reproduced and the custodian or receiving
[585]personnel. Reproduced classified documents should be
[587]4) Appropriate arrangements should be. made for.
[589]mas >
[592]+.B) Transcripts. The committees Should give ©
[593]consideration to the necessity of providing appropriate _ =
[595]. security in the transcription of testimony by committee cet
[597]transcribers. The committees may desire to charge each
[598]agency presenting testimony with this responsibility. In
[599]some, if not all cases, this might include escort of
[600]materials to the place of transcription, the securing of
[602]* carbons, waste and notes and the return of the transcribed .
[604]testimony to the committee for safekeeping in accordance a
[606]. with comimittce rules,
[608]CRE ROE Oe tee
[612]"need to know" in order to build, perfect, operate.or handle the.
[614]6) Early agreement should be reached on the
[615]‘disposition of classified materials such as storage
[616]_ under seal in the National Archives. The question of
[617]access should be determined by. the President of the
[619]‘Senate or. the Speaker of the House. es oa a
[621]3. _ Gompartmented Information. a ia ,
[625]‘There i is. some’ ‘extremely: sensitive information i in: nthe intelligence
[626]‘community which is disseminated only to those who have a very strict
[628]“' material produced by extremely sensitive’ foreign “intelligence collection
[630]“programs... The sensitivity of these programs rests upon the vulner-
[631]” ability to countermeasures which a foreign government could easily
[632]’ Justitute. if.details. of the means of collection. became known. Thus,
[634]even individuals cleared for Top Secret information do not have access -
[636]. ‘to compartmented information unless they ere required to have such
[637]'.. knowledge in.the performance of their duties. This information is
[639]handled in Compartmented Control Systems. It would be desirable -
[641]-if the Chairmen would adopt the Compartmented Control Systems on
[643]these extremely sensitive collection efforts and clear only those
[645]* staff personnel with an absolute "need to know” about such systems,
[647]:- and that documents related to such systems: be handled in a compart-_
[649]Ae, Securit Officer
[651]mented fashion by the Select Committee. The responsible departments
[653]_ and agencies would be glad to advise and assist in any arrangements.
[655]the. Chairmen would desire in this compartmented area.
[657]. or”
[658]ge BS
[660]; “Te would be desirable if the committees appointed a security
[661]officer with the responsibility of discharging the security rules adopted’
[662]by the committee and of serving as a point of contact with the depart-
[663]ments and agencies of interest to the committee. It would also be .
[664]desirable if the committee rules required each agency of interest to
[665]identify a single point of contact to facilitate provisions of security
[666]support required by the committee, mo
[669]13-00000,
[670]{~ ENTRNC WTEELICENCE AcE
[672]{asHINGTON, D.C. 20505
[674]a6 um age
[676]Honorable Elmer B. ‘Staats’ Doe
[677]Cornptroller Generai of the United States oo os, cot, .
[678]_ General Accounting Office CO : Te
[680]' 441 G Sireet . oo ea 0 ot
[681]Washington, D. oc. © 20548 = a ge
[683]Dear Mr. Sieats: ;
[684]eo. My attention has been directed toa a letict om Mr. Keller, General
[685]_. Accounting Office, to the Honorable William Proxmire dated May 10, 1974, .
[686].. which was > placed i in the Congressional Record. by Senator Proxmire on ese eb a
[687]a February 11, 1975.- The-letter deals with the intelligence community and <2.)
[688]-"r.- reviews the General Accounting Office's" right to audit and obtain information ne
[689]_— from the Central Intelligence Agency. Le a Es a
[691]* Yrasmuch as Mr. Keller has treated a a subject basic to this Agency" s
[692]capabllite to carry out work mandated by Congress, I believe it would serve’
[693]_' 2usefal purpose to review some of the background concerning the use of
[695]2 confidentia} funds and their relationship to the audit of CIA over the ‘Years.
[697]cleus Mr. Keller notes in his letterthat there are "a fairly substantial number
[698]“.. of instances where expenditures are accounted for solely upon a cerfification .
[699]. . by the head of the department or establishment involved." The need is clear
[700]! dm the case of this Agency. The necessity to safeguard certain truly vital
[701]' foreign intelligence secrets has been recognized by the Congress in its
[702]- direction to the Director of Central Intelligence-td protect intelligence sources
[703]_ and methods from unauthorized disclosure. This responsibility was complemented
[704].. by authorizing certain expenditures "for objects of a confidential, extraordinary,
[705]_ or emergency nature," to be accounted for solely on the certificate of the Director
[706]of Central Intelligence. Such expenditures -would apply, for example, toa
[707]: secret agent operating abroad in.a hostile climate whose identity must be pro-- |
[708]_'. tected not.only so that he can continue supplying the intelligence involved, but >
[709]_ also because his freedom7and.on ocpagion his, life--weighs i in the balance. | ;
[710]. ais ae LS rey
[711]a “Other intelligence activities do not have such obvious sécurity require =
[712]‘ments, but are, nonetheless, within the sources and methods concept. Liaison .
[713]with foreign intelligence and security agencies is extremely important in fields of _
[714]both positive intelligence and counterintelligence. Such liaisons to be effective
[715]., depend on the confidence of each service that the other will protect not only the
[716]mere fact of the relationships, but also its‘sources and methods and sensitive
[717]information. Compromise of any of these brings not only protests from the foreign
[718]liaison service , buti aim some cases a lessening or even cessation of its copperation.
[720]wt Line aT ?
[724]rage
[730]‘Even overt activities have 2 their own ‘security problems Thus, many U. Ss.
[731], éitizens and others are willing to provide sensitive information to overt intelligence _
[732]ae units s only « on condition. that their cooperation in this respect, be absolutely protected.
[733]. cee eg
[735]gee me
[737]: This need for the Special protection of intelligence sources and methods has
[738]been well recognized by officials in the executive, judicial, and legislative _
[739]‘branches of our Government. Mr. Lindsay C. Warren, then Comptroller General -
[741]’ of the United States, in a letter dated March 12, 1948, to the Director, Bureau of ..
[742]the Budget,” addressed the provision granting the Director of Central Intelligence
[743]the power to certify the expenditure of confidential funds by stating that while it
[744]provided "for the granting of much wider authority than I would ordinarily
[745]recommend for Government agencies, generally; the purposes sought to be
[746]a obtained i in the establishment of the Central. Intelfigence Agency are believed to:
[748]. bé of such paramount importance as to justify the extraordinary measures pro-
[749]. posed therein." He went on to-say that the "necessity for secrecy in such matters
[750]' ds apparent and the Congress apparently recognized this fully in that it provided |
[752]in section 102(d).(3)_of Public Law: 253, that the Director ‘of Central Intelligence ~
[753]“shal be responsible. for-protecting intelligence sources and methods from ~
[754]unauthorized disclosure." - Under these conditions, he stated,” ‘I do=riot feel
[755]:. called PPR. to object to the = Proposals advanced. eee ;
[757]“it has been and it remains ‘the policy of CIA to o rely upon vouchered funds —
[758]“wherever possible. (Vouchered furids are those which can be accounted for and -
[759]'- audited in conformance with the laws that apply to other Government agencies.
[760], + and with standard Government regylations and procedures.) Currently more |
[761].--. than half of the Agency's appropriafions are disbursed as vouchered funds.
[762]_-.. The confidential funds certification authority referred to by Mr. Warren in his.
[763]_ March 12, 1948 letter is reserved for “objects oF of a confidential, SEROTEDAEY  -
[764]ox emergency nature." i oo Ba Con.
[765]. From the beginning of CIA: records for ait\vouchered fund expenditures
[766]. | were made available to and were subject to a voucher audit by the GAO. Use of
[767]| the voucher audit procedure allowed the GAO to examine expenditure and
[768]_ collection. vouchers and related documents to determine whether expenditures
[770]", were made'legally and solely for the objects for which appropriations were made.
[771]Use of the voucher audit procedure also allowed CIA to protect those activities of
[772]a confidential, extraordinary, or emergency nature, i.e., intelligence | sources,
[773]and methods ? . .-
[775]neoaprehenetve ‘audit. se eroach, ” and raised with the CIA Subcommittee ¢ ‘of the Fe
[776]' House Armed Services Committee the desirability of an expanded audit of Agency -
[778]” activities. The Comptroller General stated by letter dated May 29, 1959 to
[780]. Subcommittee Chairman Kilday that he did "not recommend any change in section 10
[781](now section 8) of the Central Intelligence Act" and that "any broadening of our
[782]audit activities should not include an evaluation of the intelligence activities of
[784]the Agency."
[790]y
[792]ee | My. ‘Allen Dulles, th -
[794]' were made.known to the CIA Subcommittee in a letter of May 16, 196] from the
[795]. Comptroller General in which he said the.GAO planned to discontinue the audit
[796]of CIA activities. He acknowledged that various steps were taken by the CIA "to
[798]ae activities of the litelligence Component, but such reviews, in our opinion; will "nok: as
[800]y Director of Central Intelligence lagreed tha that GAO
[801]should expand its current audit activities in a letter to the Comptroller dated ;
[802]October 16, 1959, cautioning, however, that the comprehensive audit would have.
[803]to be limited so as to remain outside the area of sensitive security operations for
[804]which: by law the Director! s certificate must be deemed a sufficient voucher. oe,
[806]'. SThe results of the trial, period of comprehensive audit from 1959 to 1962 |
[808]place the General Accounting Office in a position to make a comprehensive audit |
[810]. of the overt activities of CIA." Nevertheless, he stated that GAO "cannot effectively
[811]_ review and evaluate-activities of the Support Component because the confidential ;
[813]_and overt activities of this.component are integrpted to such an extent that. we
[814]cannot make reasonably comprehensive audits." He further stated "we have been. eo
[815]- given sufficient access to make reasonably comprehensive reviews of the overt
[817]“be productive’ of significant evaluations because we cannot feasibly evaluate the -: om
[818]- extent to which needed overt. information is available for collection or ‘determine’ a
[819]the need for the intelligence inforniation selected for collation and use in the pros -
[821]- duction of intelligence reports.". In short, the Comptroller General was recognizing
[822]the conflict between the philosophy underlying a "comprehensive audit approach"
[823]‘and the Director's satutory responsibility and authority to protect i intelligence | :
[824]‘sources and methods. ; . _ whee: wee
[826]cor Both the Director and Chaifinan Vinson, of t the House Committee ¢ on a Armed.
[828]a genes requested that the Comptroller General continue to audit Agency affaiis
[830]\. 7 are necessary, I believe, for the proper protection of its intelligence activities -
[832], v.and shéuld be maintained.” The Chairman agreed, however, that in view of).
[834]“..-+" the Comptroller General's opinion that a continued: audit was ‘not a worthwhile “+725 »
[835]_ . effort, GAO might withdraw from further audit activities i 1m the Central 7 Intelligence
[837]+ ona limited basis, but after another trial period the Comptroller General reiterated ©
[839]‘his earlier view. In a letter to Chairman Vinson dated June 21, 1962, tHe Comptrolle:
[840].General stated his belief that for maximum effectiveness "it would be necessary .
[842]’ for our GAO audit staff to have nearly complete access to CIA activities," and
[844]' that even to:perform reasonably comprehensive reviews would require "complete -
[845]access to the administrative activities ... that are performed in support of both
[846]sensitive and nonsensitive operations of CIA. " , ;
[847]Chairman Vinson replied to the Comptroller General c on n Iily 18, “1962,
[848]stating that, "the restrictions you met within the Central Intelligence Agency -
[850]Agency...
[852]os Ty summary, T believe that several: supoints are » deserving of emphasis i in
[853]assessing the nature and history of GAO's audit activities with respect to > this
[855]Agency: a a _ - eo
[857]13-00000, ls,
[859]* (a) CIA cooper, d fully i in all respects in exten ig
[860]administrative support and in granting security clearances | ae
[861]' -and access to information related to vouchered fund activities. 7
[863]- b) The Chairman of the interested oversight committee -
[864]ip the House of Representatives was fully informed of the nature |
[865]ahd Status of the activity. ;
[867](c) ‘This Agency. encouraged ¢ GAO to conduct and to”
[868]continue to conduct its activities consistent with the operational .
[869]’ and statutory requirements imposed upon | this Agency. - 0.
[872]-. fay The decision. to. discontinue the audit activities
[873]was made solely by.GAO and was: approved? by the Chairman. 7
[874]., of the House Armed 1 Services Committees. co
[877]7 wy Ww. E. ‘Colby ; ;
[880]“Orig = Addressee a
[881]a “DDT. a : . . : 7 : - _ 7 ; an i - . : : a .
[882]“= OGC aa pent : i
[883]. “2 DDA-
[884]ae a ‘Compt - ee
[885]. 1- OF. oe . : a woo
[886]1-0S, | :
[887].- 2 -OLC Subject (GAO). nw[batic:
[888]:..11 ~ OLC Proxmire file’: 2 “
[889]J == -}=OLC Chrono’. 2
[890]_ OLC: WPY: Feg (13 Jun 75) -
[893]13-00000 ,
[895]o
[897]Farce ea
[899]hae a © DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL a
[900]. SO, ; WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505 .
[902]‘The Honorable Otis G. Pike, Chairman .
[903]Select. Committee on Intelligence
[904]House of Representatives
[905]- Washington, De. c. 20515,
[907]Dear Mr. Chairman:
[909]oe In our. conversation on . Friday you asked for the statutory .
[910]. basis fer the compartmentation principle. I wish first to mo,
[911]respond to your inquiry and then suggest a manner-in which your ...
[912]a staff can receive access to the sensitive material Protected °
[913]ly special com artmentation systems. | . one, woe
[915]. , The current basis: for the U.S. Government security _ oa
[916].°'. Classification system is Executive Order 11652, promulgated ae
[917]-- ..,0mn 8 March 1972. Historically, foreign. intelligence. has
[918]“i. been treated as. one category of classified national. security
[919] , information. There are numerous. statutory recognitions. of - 7
[920]“.. the importance of national security information, e.g., the — -"
[921]:.. Freedom of Information Act... Consequently, much foreign. .
[922]- dntelligence is classified CONPIDENTIAL, SECRFT or TOP
[923]- SECRET according to specifications set forth -in-the Order: .
[924]- Not‘all foreign intelligence, -however, is classified national
[925]security information under. the provisions of the Executive
[926]_ Order (e.g., an American:source providing foreign information
[927]. or assistance). Also, the potential risks attendant with
[928]' the compromise of a foreign intelligence. source or method
[929]‘differ substantially from the risks attendant with much ;
[930]classified defense information. a ee
[932]Section 102 (d) (3) of the National Security Act of 1947,
[933]as amended, provides: "That the Director of Central Intel-—
[934]“ligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence
[935]sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure:" In
[936]reccgnition of this responsibility, National Security.
[937]Council Intelligence Directive No. 1 (17 February 1972)
[938]instructs the Director of Central Intelligence to, :
[939]",..develop and review security standards and practices-as _
[940]they relate to the protection of intelligence and of .
[941]intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. "
[946]Since the . National Security Act ‘aia not provide for | an authority
[947]- . corresponding with the DCI's responsibility in this area,. . a
[948]the Directive provides that the Members of the U.S. Intelligence -
[949]- Board are responsible for: "The supervision of the dissemination — |
[950]and security of: intelligence. material." The Director of Central
[951]Intelligence, acting with the advice of the U.S. Intelligence
[952]Board, has promulgated a-number of. directives, regulations
[953]'. and ‘security: manuals.,.:related to the protection of foreign
[954]>. intelligence and foreign: intelligence sources and methods,
[955]a and applicable. to. the’ overall Uz S- intelligence community.
[957]+ 9 The. fundamental. ‘security principle. involved in the pro-- .
[958]“tection of foreign intelligence and. of its sources and. methods
[959]dis a strict application of "need to know" --a principle ;
[960]referred to in Executive Order 11652, Section 6(A). This © -
[961]‘applies the simple mathematical premise that the fewer the ©
[962]number of individuals: made- privy to a secret, the less likely
[963]that it will. be disclosed..:..The security principle of v
[964]“compartmentation" involving. special access and information
[965]dissemination controls is designed to ensure that only those
[966]individuals whose "need to know” has been specifically
[967]approved by some higher authority, who have been specially
[968]indoctrinated, and who. undertake ‘special commitments to |
[969]protect it are provided acéess to a particularly™ sensitive
[970]category of foreign intelligence sources and. methods. “ .
[971]Compartmentation assists in “the: application of the "need- to-
[972]know” principle by ensuring that individuals are. provided
[974]; access to only that information clearly essential to the
[976], Performance. of their duties.” a
[978]Compartmentation. was undoubtedly a major contributing
[979]"factor involved in. the nation's secret development. of ‘the
[980]_,, atomic.bomb during World War II, and the principle is still Mole
[981]-. implicit in security procedures related to ERDA’s "RESTRICTED ©
[982]‘DATA™ as reflected in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. In the ©
[983]. field of U.S. foreign intelligence activities, compartmentation:
[984]_.was practiced throughout the development and operation of the
[985]a U-2 reconnaissance program. One of the major foreign ;
[986]oe intelligence categories of activities using formalized com-
[987].. partmentation procedures today involves the matter of
[988]foreign signals intercept for intelligence purposes, i.e.,
[989]: communications intelligence. Title 18 of the U.S. Code
[990]-. Section 798 recognizes the special character of this
[991]material by providing specifically for prosecution for the
[992]unauthorized disclosure. of information concerning any -
[993]communications. activities of the United States without the
[996]13-00000
[998]necessity to show intent ‘to harm the United | States. - The |
[999]reason for. the application of strict compartmentation pro-
[1000]cedures to communications intelligence and other foreign
[1001]intelligence activities reflects the extreme vulnerability
[1002]of the sources. Once an opposition becomes aware of which
[1003]- of. its communications we are intercepting, it can take swift —
[1004]remedial action, and the. source can be forever lost.
[1006]; “On Friday afternoon, copies of the secrecy oath’ used >
[1007]. by. the executive branch.with respect to three compartmented -
[1008]“ access. control systems were made available to you along with | .
[1009]‘the. revised forms. developed for and executed by certain members :
[1010]of the staff of the: Senate Select Committee to Study Intelligence
[1011]Activities .-I. would: hope that the enclosed agreement modified
[1012]for the House Select: Committee, combining all “three ;
[1013]compartments . into: one. document,, would meet . Your, Particular .
[1015]Committee’ s use of the modified secrecy oath dealing with
[1016]compartmented access, the following House and Senate committees
[1017]have : obtained compartmented. ‘access. for their staffs, which “
[1018]was granted after the normal briefings and | signing | of the -
[1019]secrecy Oatii:. - 7 oo, a : : oS
[1021]RE) gebvices Committee
[1022]:Appropriations Committee _. oo
[1023]Aeronautical and Space Sciences: Connittee
[1025]“May 1 ‘reiterate: ‘the ‘points I made on. a Friday:
[1027]- a. No: material. is being withheld from members of .
[1028]_ the Committee. mo a os od 2 ey
[1030], be We are prepared to and aid brief the state of the
[1031]+ Committee on. noncompartmented matters, based upon your
[1032]certification of their security clearance and the fact .
[1033]‘that they entered into an appropriate secrecy agreement
[1034]with you, a copy of which. you provided.
[1036]4
[1038]-  ¢. -The compartmentation procedures of the.
[1039]- Intelligence Community have been established pursuart
[1040]‘to statute and National Security Council Intelligence
[1041]Directives. The simplest way for the staff to obtain
[1042]‘“‘access to this compartmented material would be to
[1043]_.' accept the normal secrecy arrangements as modified
[1044]- in the enclosed. This would ensure against difficulties
[1045]in access to such compartmented material throughout the
[1048]13-00000 *,
[1050]ite Bec
[1052]a: a a He e ner -  @
[1054]Intelligence’ Community. It is clear that the
[1055]obligations assumed here would run between the staff
[1056]member and the Committee and in no way would provide
[1057]any control or influence over them by me or any
[1058]element of the, Intelligence Community .
[1060]dy Tt would undoubtedly be. feasible to develop _
[1061]another procedure to ensure special protection of the
[1062]sensitive matters currently included in the compart:
[1063]mented systems, but this would involve review and
[1064]-s.. discussions: with various interested parties which
[1065]- would: undoubtedly take. some ‘time | and delay your
[1066]investigations
[1068]Ee ‘hope: you will agree that this” is the simplest and...
[1069]easiest manner of solving a practical matter so that we can
[1070]roceed with the substance. of your, investigations.
[1073]13-00000 « , '
[1075]2 “ a
[1076]Rene ee ag hee
[1078]Distribution:
[1080]4. -pct
[1082]1-IG
[1083]_1-OLC Lon,
[1084]1-E.H. Knocke
[1085]I- -SC/DCL
[1087]| White House’ Distribution:
[1088]L-Rod. Hills
[1092]ihe “Jay! French
[1094]. i ae aie et i i ie a eae an nr a
[1098]ar OT eNOS OU CE ea Ea
[1099]“3 .
[1101]“CONFIDENTIAL:
[1103]COMPARTMENTED INTELLIGENCE INDOCTRINATION” ~~
[1105]r have been. “informed ‘that pursuant to law (Sections 792,
[1106].° 793, 794, 795, 797 and. 798 of Title 18, United States Code) I --
[1107]am not. to discuss: ‘with or disciose to.any person any information
[1108]~- Yelating directly:or indirectly to the below identified compart
[1109]_. mented Programs, unless such person is currently authorized to.
[1110]discuss or receive such informa*ion or material of the particula
[1111]category involved.::..I:.am.aware that: the responsibility of —
[1112]ascertaining that:such an authorization for another. person is
[1113]Valid and current rests with me. - we
[1115]tr: ‘acknowle get at it ds ny ‘tesponsibility * to , inform,
[1116]myself of. the contents’ of the above mentioned sections of 7
[1117]itle:18, U.S. 'Code,.'as. they pertain to performance of my >
[1118]duties. I.am-aware further that if a change in my status
[1119]‘renders: it no longer necessary for me to receive compartmented
[1120]‘intelligence, my name will -be removed from the list of Persons
[1121]authorized to receive. such material. Bw ns : :
[1123]ae Ne ews media “reports | concerning any of ‘these compartuented
[1124]aterials does not relieve me of my obligation under the oath .
[1125]Signed below. - ok an . boy a
[1127]te a
[1129]F ‘I acknowledge: that. r have been briefed on the ‘following an
[1130]: compar’ meated » SyStems or _ Programs: _
[1132]- Fre
[1133]OATH OF SECRECY
[1135]. I do solemnly swear “that I will not | discuss with or Do.
[1136]disclose to any person, regardless of his official position ..
[1137]or status, any information: relating directly or indirectly to —
[1138]Compartmented Intelligence, any information derived therefrom,
[1139]. or the nature of the sources of such intelligence, until I
[1141]have ascertained that such ‘Person has _been authorized to discuss: ‘
[1143]-E-2 IMPDET
[1144]CL BY -
[1146]CONFIDENTIAL | .
[1147]BO Sy
[1149]oF
[1153]‘and handle this material, and that his authorization has not
[1154]been revoked, except. in the performance. of my official duties.
[1155]‘on the staff of the House Select Committee on Intelligence ‘and
[1157]in accordance with the requirements set forth in the rules’ of
[1158]such Committee. . re Foote OY
[1160]Witness
[1163]13-00000 |
[1164]Toa UN | =
[1166]CE “RAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY - a . a
[1167]. WASHINGTON,D.C, 20505 . :
[1169]WSC MAT. FURAN.
[1170]Review Staff: 752563
[1171]20 ) August 1975
[1173]Mr. A. Searle Field
[1176]Select Committee on Intelligence.
[1177]Room 232
[1178]Cannon House Office ‘Building
[1179]Washington D,C. 20515
[1181]_ Dear Mr, Field: | . : yee
[1183].. ‘Around the end of July, Mz. Roeder, obviously impressed ;
[1184]. by your admonitions about the need for security, asked ifI —-
[1185]'. gould work up a package of guidance on how to handle classified
[1186]documents, Our Office of S security put this together, and while
[1187]I think Mr, Roeder had in mind something more applicable to
[1188]. _. a8 individual than to an office, I thought I would pass this on to
[1189]: I a you for whatever use you care to make of it, co
[1191]; “Incidentally, we have not yet carried out the: ‘physical survey
[1192]'. of your quarters which you requested on 29 July. I have been
[1193]“. in touch with Ms, Hess, and our Office of Security will conduct
[1194]"one as soon as she is ready. We may have some other recom-
[1195]mendations for your consideration when that is done, _
[1197]‘Sincerely, ce - Oy
[1199]\ .
[1200]i
[1201]SUL
[1202]Jerrold B.A Brown
[1203]Assistant to the Director
[1207]ce: D/OS - _ - ; | soWNTION - AL
[1211]5 ;
[1213]Uaget sorbed viecocure ube ect to
[1214]Criminal Sarctions
[1221]“t
[1223]“ay
[1225](PRN ENTIAL
[1227]= 14 AUG 1975
[1229]|
[1231]| MEMORANDUM FOR: The Review Staff
[1232]| ATTENTION : Mr. Jerrold B. Brown
[1234]: a VIA 2 Acting Deputy Director for Administration
[1236]SUBJECT : House Select Committee on Intelligeace -
[1237]a Protection of Classified Materials _
[1238]| REFERENCE : Memo dtd 31 Jul 75 to D/Sec from Jerrold.
[1239]7 B. Brown, subject: Request for Security
[1240]_ Aids :
[1242]i In accordance with the request in the roferenced
[1243]memorandum for a “package'’ to be used by the House Select.
[1244]Committee on Intelligence for the protection of classified
[1245]material, the attached suggestions are provided for your
[1246]assistance. In view of the lack of a comprehensive phys-
[1247]ical security survey of thse area which will be used to
[1248]if ' store the Committee's classified material, specific rec-
[1250]i ommendations must be deferred. In this connsction, we
[1252]plan to have Nr. Edward J. McGrath of the Physical Security
[1254]Division {extension 3494) meet with appropriate represent-
[1256]atives of the Committee for the specific purpose of con-
[1258]ducting a security survey of the proposed quarters in the
[1260]i Rayburn Building. For your information, Mr. Searle Field,
[1262]Staff Director of the House Select Committee on Intelligence,
[1264]' requested such a survey on 29 July 1975. Pending the re-
[1266]i sults of this survey and its recommendations, the attached -
[1267]4 general physical security measures are recommended in an
[1269]effort to provide the requisite protection for the Com-
[1270]ar mittee's classified material.
[1272]Robert W. Gambino
[1273]Director of Security
[1275]- Atts.
[1276]Distribution: . ES. IMPDET
[1277]Orig § 2 - Adse . CL BY 056566
[1279]1 - ADD/A
[1280]OS S 12 065
[1282]CONFIDENTIAL
[1284]13-00000
[1286]i
[1287]__. ATTACHMENT
[1290]13-00000 + |
[1292]CONFIDENTIAL
[1294]GENERAL SUGGESTIONS
[1295]_ FOR THE
[1296]PROTECTION OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL
[1298]Designate a Committee member as the Security
[1299]Officer responsible for the overall control
[1300]handling and protection of the classified
[1301]material. —
[1303]‘Establish and maintain a register of all
[1304]Committee personnel who are authorized to
[1306]review classified material and insure that
[1307]no unauthorized personnel will have access to
[1308]the material.
[1310]Establish a central document control system
[1311]whereby all classified documents are properly
[1312]logged upon receipt and annotated as to
[1313]disposition.
[1315]Designate a Document Control Clerk who will
[1316]be specifically responsible for the logging
[1317]and control of all classified material.
[1318]Appropriate records should be established
[1320]to reflect that all classified material is
[1321]properly logged in and out, by date and time, —
[1322]to authorized members of the Committee.
[1324]In the event material is designated as being:
[1325]of a codeword or compartmented nature, spscial
[1326]physical security features as enunciated by
[1327]the Ad Hoc Security Committee of the United
[1328]States Intelligence Board and later adopted
[1329]as policy should be adhered to. (Specifics
[1330]regarding these requirements will be provided
[1332]in the course of the pending survey.) -
[1334]All guards assigned to the physical security
[1335]control over the Committesa'’s storage area
[1336]should be U. S. citizens and possess appro-
[1338]priate security clearances.
[1340]If feasible, a reading room should be es-
[1341]tablished within the designated storage area
[1343]CONFIDENTIAL
[1345]13-00000
[1347]8.
[1349]10.
[1351]Li.
[1353]13.
[1355]14,
[1357]“CONFIDENTIAL
[1359]for the Committee’s classified material, and
[1360]all research and review activities of the
[1361]material should be restricted to this area.
[1363]In those instances where the Committee meets
[1365]in Executive session, every effort should
[1367]be made to insure that the site being used has
[1368]been subjected to a technical security inspec-
[1369]tion to negate the possibility of unauthorized
[1370]transmitting or recording devices. This area
[1371]of concern could pese serious security deficien-
[1372]cies in the event the same area would be used
[1373]initially in public session and then closed for
[1374]the Executive session without such an inspection
[1375]being made..
[1377]Adequats safeguards should be utilized 4n the
[1378]transnission of classified material under the
[1379]cognizance of the Committee from one area to ~
[1380]another.
[1382]~A
[1384]Reproduction of any portion of ‘the Committee's
[1385]classified material should be prohibited
[1386]without the express approval of the Staff
[1387]Director. In this instance, notes, extracts,
[1388]summaries, etc., mada from classified material —
[1389]must also "be provided the same degree of .
[1390]protection as that provided to the source
[1392]material.
[1394]Access controls to the storage and reten-
[1395]tion area should be established to insure that
[1396]only authorized personnel are allowed entrance.
[1398]Storage of all classified material should be
[1399]within the designated area as opposed to any
[1400]areas or outside offices.
[1402]Security protection should be provided to
[1403]all Committee transcripts during the tran-
[1404]scription process as well as during the
[1405]periods while they are in transit.
[1407]A security check procedure should bea estab-
[1408]lished to inspect the areas where the Com-
[1409]mittee meats at the termination of each.
[1410]session to insure that no classified material
[1412]2
[1414]‘CONFIDENTIAL
[1416]13-00000
[1418]15.
[1420]16.
[1422]17.
[1424]18.
[1426]19.
[1428]CONFIDENTIAL
[1430]or notes, etc., are inadvertently left un-
[1431]secured. (Attached are examples of Security
[1432]Check Sheets.)
[1434]_Arrangements should ba made to insure that
[1436]there are adequate facilities for the
[1437]destruction of classified waste material.
[1439]In this instance, such waste material should
[1440]be provided protection until its final
[1441]destruction.
[1443]Only approved classified material destruc-
[1445]tion methods should be utilized. (Details
[1446]regarding this can be obtained in the course
[1447]of the pending survey.) oe
[1449]All Committee personnel granted access to
[1450]classified material by the Staff. Director
[1451]should be briefed on their obligations end
[1452]responsibilities regarding the unauthorized.
[1453]disclosures of such material.
[1455]Specific physical security recommendations —
[1456]applicable te the proposed storage area for the
[1457]Committee's classified material, consistent
[1459]with sound security principles, must be deferred
[1460]until the completion of the survey. This would
[1461]also include recommendations relative to the
[1462]type of storage containers which the Commitise
[1463]proposes to use.
[1465]Pending the completion of a security survey at
[1466]the new storage site, it-is suggested that the
[1467]protective measures currently in effect at the
[1468]temporary storage facility in Room 232, Cannon
[1470]' Building, not be changed.
[1472]CONFIDENTIAL
[1474]13-00000
[1476]ATTACHMENT - . my : a re ow,
[1480]13-00000 ° , ‘1 ’
[1482]SECLuITY CHECK SHEET.
[1484]FRoW: |" _ ens ——_]
[1486]TO LOCK
[1487]: TO CHECK
[1489]SAFES: DEPRESS CONTROL DRAWER LATCH WHILE DEPRESSING
[1490]EACH DRAWER LATCH AND PULL OUT BOTH DRAWERS. ON
[1491]“HERRING*HALL*MARVIN” SAFES TURN ORAWER HANDLE TO RIGHT
[1492](on new type, raise latch) AND PULL DRAWERS OUTWARD,
[1494]VAULTS AND DOOR SAFES: TURN HANDLE BACK AND FORTH
[1496]WHILE PULLING DOOR OUTWARD. .
[1497]ALARM SWITCHES: TURN TO “NIGHT” POSITION
[1499]CERTIFICATION
[1501]1 CERTIFY, BY MY INITIALS BELOW, THAT | HAVE OPENED OR
[1502]PROPERLY SECURED THIS VAULT, SAFE OR CABINET AND ALARM
[1504]MONTH({S) . .
[1506]OPENED BY | CLOSED BY rnccxes ay To GUARD CHECK
[1507]hNiTiALs| Time [iNiTIALs| Time [INITIALS] Time [INITIALS) TIME |
[1509]SECURITY CHECK SHeeT
[1511]{TO >: Office of Security ~
[1512]THRU: Component Security Officer |
[1514]| TO LOCK
[1515]| ROTATE DIAL FOUR CONSECUTIVE TURNS IN ONE DIRECTION
[1517]TO CHECK
[1519]SAFES: DEPRESS CONTROL ORAWER LATCH WHILE DEPRESSING
[1520]EACH DRAWER LATCH AND PULL OUT BOTH DRAWERS. ON
[1521]i *RERRING-HALL-MARVIN® SAFES TURN DRAWER HANOLE TO RIGHT
[1522]H (on new type, ralze latch) ANDO PULL DRAWERS OUTWARD.
[1523]‘VAULTS AND DOOR SAPES: TURN HANDLE BACK ANO FORTH
[1524]: WHILE PULLING DOOR OUTWARD,
[1525]: i ALARM SWITCHES: TURN TO “NIGHT® POSITION
[1527]CERTIFICATION
[1529]4 CERTIFY, BY MY INITIALS BELOW, THAT | HAVE OPENED OR
[1530]PROPERLY SECURED THIS VAULT, SAFE OR CABINET AND ALARM.
[1532]MON TH(S)
[1534]P[_orenco ey | eveseo ey | enecnen sy | GUARD Heck
[1535]E [inrvacs]_ tie [iwirtacs] rine [mrrvacs] tine [iniriacs] TOME | y
[1537]EXE K's CY REE dddddaaaneeee eee
[1539]jf | | | ft | eR
[1540]Ht
[1542]. 738" 108 ossoLeTe PREVIOUS EDITIONS
[1545]13-00000 , \,
[1548]‘ t
[1549]e
[1551]Area Security Check Sheet
[1553]Items to be Checked
[1554]Desks (Including Drawers)
[1555]Tables (Including Drawers)
[1556]Chairs
[1558]Floor
[1560]e
[1563]Window Ledges
[1564]Typewriters
[1566]Stenotype Machines
[1567]Reproduction Equipment
[1568]Trash Receptacles
[1570]7 Charts, Exhibits,
[1571]a : ‘Chalkboards
[1573]Notebooks, Paper Pads, etc.
[1574](Check to insure that
[1575]imprints of classified
[1576]notes not present)
[1578]ANIL
[1580]Checker
[1582]a
[1584]13-00000° | ‘ ,
[1586]} UNCLASSIFIED I. NAL oan ENTE CONFI. .ATIAL [secret
[1587]pos ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
[1589]SUBJECT: (Optional)
[1591]House Select Committee on Intelligence -
[1592]Protection of Classified Materials
[1594]ch sate 7S5+25G 3 Ao AaG ria
[1596]EXTENSION
[1598]Director of Security _ 6777
[1600]; 14 AUG 1975
[1601]boii Gesignation, rem number, and DATE OFFICER'S COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
[1603]INITIALS to whom. Drow a line ocross column after each comment.)
[1604]ave [ome
[1606]Edward Ryan
[1608]ADD/A
[1609]7D-26, Hqs.
[1611]4. The Review Staff
[1613]6D-0120
[1614]5s.Attn: Mr. Jerrold B.
[1616]ret G1Oiete C] secrer CRUISE =) ERM, «UNCLASSIFIED
[1618]13-00000
[1621]1
[1623]CONTEENTIAL
[1625]14 AUG 1975
[1627]MEMORANDUM FOR: The Review Staff
[1629]ATTENTION : Mr. Jerrold B.. Brown
[1631]VIA : Acting Deputy Director for Administration
[1633]SUBJECT . : House Select Committee on Intelligence -
[1634]Protection of Classified Materials
[1636]REFERENCE . : Memo dtd 31 Jul 75 to D/Sec from Jerrold
[1637]B. Brown, subject: Request for Security
[1638]Aids ©
[1640]In accordance with the request in the referenced
[1641]memorandum for a "package" to be used by the House Select ©
[1642]Committee on Intelligence for the protection of classified
[1643]material, the attached suggestions are provided for your
[1644]assistance. In view of the lack of a comprehensive phys-
[1645]ical security survey of the area which will be used to.
[1646]store the Committee's classified material, specific rec-
[1647]ommendations must be deferred. In this connection, we
[1648]plan to have Mr.. Edward J. McGrath of the Physical Security
[1649]Division (extension 3494) meet with appropriate represent-
[1650]atives of the. Committee for the specific purpose of con-
[1651]ducting a security survey of the proposed quarters in the .
[1652]Rayburn Building. For your information, Mr. Searle Field, ~
[1653]Staff Director of the House Select Committee on Intelligence,
[1654]requested such a survey on 29 July 1975. Pending the re-
[1655]sults. of this survey and its recommendations, the attached
[1656]general physical security measures are recommended in an
[1658]-effort to provide the requisite protection for the Com-
[1660]mittee's classified material.
[1662]ME fay Ee,
[1663]~ Robert W. Gambino
[1664]Director of Security
[1666]Atts.
[1667]Distribution: E3 IMPDET
[1668]Orig & 2 - Adse CL BY 056966
[1670]1 - ADD/A
[1671]OS 5 12 065
[1673]CONFIDENTIAL
[1677]a
[1678]7.
[1680]SECRET swaps) ann
[1682]: THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
[1684]; i
[1685]WASHINGTON, D. C.° 20505
[1687]i
[1688]ee pc er ne
[1690]Intelligence Community Staff DCI/IC 75-2620
[1692]2 September 1975
[1694]MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group
[1696]SUBJECT : House Select Committee on Intelligence
[1700]Attached is a paper from the Chairman, USIB Security
[1702]Committee, outlining security arrangements made by the House -
[1704]‘Select Committee on Intelligence.
[1706]E Thine
[1708]Jack E, Thomas
[1709]Major] General, USAF (Ret. )
[1710]Chiet/ Coordination Staff, Ics
[1712]Attachment
[1714]This Document May Be Downgraded
[1715]to Unclassified When Removed From
[1716]Attachment
[1718]chasstpizn sy 3290792 a
[1719]EX.M2T TROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
[1720]SCHEDULE CE £. 0. 12352, EXEMPTION CATEGORY:
[1721]§ sb! ., @. (33 or (4) (circle one or more)
[1722]“AGLOMIATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON
[1724]Date Impossible to Determine
[1726](unless iaposzible, insert date or rvent)
[1728]SECRET
[1731]ee SECRET
[1733]re — UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
[1734]| SECURITY COMMITTEE
[1736]SECOM-D-105
[1737]2 September 1975,
[1739]MEMORANDUM FOR:. Chief, Coordination Staff, ICS
[1741]SUBJECT : House Select Committee on Intelligence
[1743]On 29 August 1975, Mr. Robert Gambino, Director of
[1744]Security/CIA; Mr. William H. Standiford, Deputy Chief, Physical
[1745]‘Security Division, Office of Security/CIA; and I viewed the
[1746]permanent space of the staff of the House Select Committee on
[1747]Intelligence at the invitation of Mr. A. Searle Field, Staff Director
[1748]of the Committee. We believe the security arrangements made
[1749]and being made are satisfactory for the storage of compartmented
[1750]-information.” Attached is a memorandum outlining the security 9-0...
[1752]arrangements.
[1754]PtrahE Mle
[1755]Donald E. Moore
[1756]Chairman
[1757]Attachment
[1759]This Document May Be Downgraded
[1760]to Unclassified When Removed From
[1761]Attachment
[1763]cLassirizo Ey _ 320793
[1765]EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
[1766]SCHEGULE OF E. O. 11553, EXEMPTION CATEGORY:
[1767]§ 5b, @), (2) of (4) (circte one or more)
[1768]AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON
[1769]Date Impossible to Determine
[1771](unless imyossible, insert date or event)
[1773]SECREI
[1775]ede tee
[1777]13-00000
[1779]NY 07)
[1781]; , ‘ oo 2 September 1975
[1783]i 7 House Select Committee on Intelligence
[1785]1, The House Select Committee staff is now located in its
[1786]permanent space, B-316, Rayburn Building. Ms. Jacqueline Hess
[1787]is the Security Officer, telephone number 225-9696.
[1789]2. The only entrance is through B-316 and the space consists
[1790]of several adjoining offices all served by an inner walkway. A member
[1791]of the Capitol Police is stationed at a guard desk inside the door and
[1792]admits only authorized individuals. Visitors must sign in with the
[1793]guard, who'calls the appropriate staff employee and visitors are
[1794]allowed access to the space only in the company of staff employees.
[1795]‘Interview rooms are located in the staff area but separated from the
[1797]_ work area. During non-work hours two guards are on duty in the
[1798]space. :
[1800]3. All classified material is kept in a secure area at’ the. | ;
[1801]“Aréar of the space with one éntrance to the secure room, ‘This room
[1802]is to be locked at all times when specified.employees are not on
[1803]duty in the room. At the present time, Ms. Hess is the only one
[1804]who will be able to open the secure area and unless circumstances
[1805]‘change this arrangement will continue.
[1807]4. All classified material is kept in this secure area, and
[1808]stored in approved safes with three-way combination locks. At
[1809]present, Ms. Hess is the only Person who possesses the combination
[1811].. ,t0, these, safes. ” og Age ne Ph a vee re ne
[1812]5. Reading of classified documents is to be in a reading area,
[1813]consisting of several tables, in the secure area. A staff employee
[1814]desiring access to a classified document must make a request for
[1815]it, Ms. Hess then obtains it, the employee reads it in the secure
[1816]area and it is then returned to Ms. Hess for return to the safe
[1817]cabinet. Staff employees have been advised that notes.taken from
[1818]classified documents and material prepared from such notes or the
[1819]documents must respect the original classification and receive
[1820]corresponding security. Copying of classified documents is to be
[1821]strictly controlled, is to be done only on a copying device located
[1822]in staff space, and copies are to receive the same security protection
[1824]as the original.
[1825]chassistzn 57 __ 356793
[1826]___EXESIOT FROM GENERAL DACLASSIFICATION
[1827]SCHEDULE OF E, 0. 11352, EXEMPTION CATEGORY
[1829]d (3) of a) (circle one or ——
[1831]AU MATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON
[1833](uuless impos vides in insert date or ave vent)
[1834]a ene
[1836]13-00000 “
[1838]pe SECRET
[1840]6. The entire space has been swept and plans call for
[1841]additional periodic sweeping. There is a motion detector in the
[1842]secure area which rings at the guard desk in the staff area and
[1843]also at the main office of the Capitol Police in the Rayburn Building.
[1844]Tests have been made of this device and the response by the Capitol
[1845]Police was immediate. Two doors which normally serve as access’
[1846]to the secure area from space occupied by other House Committees
[1847]have been secured from the inside and alarms are to be installed
[1848]‘ on these doors. , ,
[1850]7. Mr. A. Searle Field, Staff Director, and Ms. Hess:
[1851]advised that staff employees have been alerted to telephone security
[1852]; and this will be continually stressed, Also they have tried to instill
[1853]! _ strong security consciousness among all the staff. Mr. Field
[1854]; indicated that at present it is not expected the staff will total more
[1855]than 35,
[1857]SECRET.
[1862]House Armed Services
[1863]Subcommittee on
[1864]Intelligence
[1866]and Military Application of Nuclear Energy"
[1868]The Subcommittee on Intelligence and. Military Application of Nuclear
[1869]Energy is newly established and the successor to the Special Subcommittee
[1870]on Intelligence Chaired by Representative Lucien N. Nedzi. The new Sub-—
[1871]committee has picked up the responsibility of the soon to be abolished
[1872]Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and is expanding its staff accordingly...
[1873]Representative Melvin Price's Chairmanship is due to his long years of
[1874]membership on the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. There will be an ever-
[1875]increasing involvement by the Subcommittee in military application of
[1876]nuclear energy and -we undoubtedly will be called upon to provide required
[1877]foreign intelligence.
[1879]* Members of the Subcommittee are as follows:
[1881]Melvin Price (D., I11.), Chairman
[1882]. Charles H. Wilson (D., Calif.)
[1883]Jack Brinkley (D., Ga.)
[1884]Dan Daniel (D., Va.) -
[1885]G. V. Montgomery (D., Miss.)
[1886]- Ronald V. Dellums (D., Calif.) — ’
[1887]Bob Carr (D., Mich.)
[1888]Charles E. Bennett (D., Fla.)
[1889]Samuel S. Stratton (D., N.Y.)
[1890]Bob Wilson (R., Calif.)
[1891]William L. Dickinson (R., Ala.)
[1892]Marjorie S, Holt (R., Md.)
[1893]Robert W. Daniel, Jr. (R., Va.)
[1895]Staff of the Subcommittee are as follows:
[1897]John Ford, Staff Director
[1898]‘William H. Hogan, Counsel -
[1899]Adam J, Klein, Professional
[1901]Mr. Ford is Staff Director of the full Committee and replaced
[1902]Mr. Frank Slatinshek, former Chief Counsel, who retired. Mr.-Hogan is
[1903]Counsel of the Subcommittee and will be the principal staff man on Agency
[1904]matters. Adam Klein is a specialist in atomic energy matters.
[1906]13-00000
[1908]ye
[1910]me
[1912]AN STRATE ITE
[1914]i
[1917]a
[1919]PROBLEMS
[1921]A. House Subcommittee on | Intelligence and Military Application of
[1922]Nuclear Energy
[1924]Former Chairman Lucien N. Nedzi fully exercised his perogatives
[1925]as Chairman of the Subcommittee on Intelligence and we could look to
[1926]him for support in any problems developing with other committees and
[1927]other members of the House not on the Subcommittee. Based on the
[1928]reactions of Chairman Melvin Price in the few instances that we have
[1929]approached him in this Congress for assistance, it is quite evident
[1930]that he is not the dominant’ personality as was Chairman Nedzi and will
[1931]not stick his neck out to defend the Agency. Nor does it appear that
[1932]the new staff director will be of the forceful personality as was
[1933]Frank Slatinshek who was very helpful in a number of problems. A few
[1935]“weeks ago former Chairman Nedzi suggested that we resolve a problem
[1937]involving Representative Donald M. Fraser by going to Speaker O'Neill.
[1938]This may have been his indication to us that we may have to look to
[1939]House leadership to resolve problems. Mr. Nedzi also suggested that we
[1940]contact someone in the White House on a problem. We. may be faced with
[1941]needed White House support on a problem before we approach the leader-—
[1944]B. House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control
[1947]The extent of Chairman Lester L. Wolff's oversight of the Agency
[1948]in its narcotics collection activities still remains a looming problen.
[1949]As indicated by the request for the seal, Mr. Wolff intends to extend
[1950]the Agency's activities to where there is maximum effective collection
[1951]of foreign intelligence on narcotics trafficking leading to arrest and
[1952]conviction without regard to the Agency's statutory prohibitions. The
[1953]only solution rests with the Attorney General and the White House giving
[1954]the Agency clear and precise guidelines to operate in this area which
[1955]the Agency can then point to in any disputes that may arise with the
[1956]Select Committee as to what the Agency's role should be.
[1958]ADGEIST RATIVE INTERNAL USE GHLY
[1960]__ DMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS °,
[1961]House of Representatives ~
[1963]' DEMOCRATS
[1966]JAMIE L. WHITTEN, Mississippi
[1967]ROBERT L. F. SIKES, Florida
[1968]_EDWARD P. BOLAND, Massachusetts
[1969]WILLIAM H. NATCHER, Kentucky
[1970]‘DANIEL J. FLOOD, Pennsylvania
[1971]TOM STEED, Oklahoma
[1973]GEORGE E. SHIPLEY, IMlinois
[1974]JOHN M. SLACK, West Virginia
[1975]JOHN J. FLYNT, Jr., Georgia
[1977](95th Congress, Ist Session)
[1978]GEORGE H. MAHON, Texas, Chairman
[1980]ROBERT H. MICHEL, Illinois
[1981]SILVIO O. CONTE, Massachusetts
[1982]JOSEPH M. McDADE, Pennsylvania
[1983]MARK ANDREWS, North Dakota
[1984]JACK EDWARDS, Alabama
[1985]ROBERT C. McEWEN, New York
[1986]JOHN T. MYERS, Indiana
[1988]J. KENNETH ROBINSON, Virginia
[1990]Te pablicans
[1993]ELFORD A. CEDERBERG, Michigan
[1995]CLARENCE E. MILLER, Ohio
[1996]LAWRENCE COUGHLIN, Pennsylvania
[1997]Cc. W. BILL YOUNG, Florida
[1999]JACK F, KEMP, New York
[2001]WILLIAM L. ARMSTRONG, Colorado
[2002]RALPH 8S. REGULA, Ohio
[2004]CLAIR W. BURGENER, California
[2005]GEORGE M. O’BRIEN, Illinois
[2006]VIRGINIA SMITH, Nebraska
[2008]‘NEAL SMITH, Iowa
[2010]ROBERT N. GIAIMO, Connecticut
[2011]JOSEPH P. ADDABBO, New York
[2012]JOHN J. McFALL, California
[2013]EDWARD J. PATTEN, New Jersey
[2014]CLARENCE D. LONG, Maryland
[2015]SIDNEY R. YATES, Illinois
[2016]FRANK E. EVANS, Colorado
[2017]DAVID R. OBEY, Wisconsin
[2018]EDWARD R. ROYBAL, California
[2019]LOUIS STOKES, Ohio
[2021]GUNN McKAY, Utah
[2023]TOM BEVILL, Alabama
[2025]BILL CHAPPELL, Florida
[2027]BILL D. BURLISON, Missouri
[2029]BILL ALEXANDER, Arkansas
[2030]EDWARD I. KOCH, New York
[2031]YVONNE BRATHWAITE BUREE, California
[2032]JOHN P. MURTHA, Pennsylvania
[2033]BOB TRAXLER, Michigan .
[2035]ROBERT DUNCAN, Oregon
[2037]JOSEPH D. EARLY, Massachusetts
[2038]MAX BAUCUS, Montana
[2040]CHARLES WILSON, Texas
[2041]LINDY (MRS. HALE) BOGGS, Louisiana
[2042]ADAM BENJAMIN, Jr., Indiana
[2043]NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington
[2045]KeitH _F. MAINLAND
[2046]Clerk and Staff Director
[2048][
[2050]Subcommittees
[2051]Whitten, Evans, Burlison, Baucus, Traxler, Alexander, Sikes,
[2053]AGRICULTURE & RELATED
[2055]AGENCIES - . Nateher
[2056]oe : Andrews, Robinson, Myers
[2057]DEFENSE Mahon, Sikes, Flood, Addabbo, McFall, Flynt, Giaimo, Chappell,
[2058]. Burlison
[2060]Edwards, Robinson, Kemp
[2062]- Natcher, Giaimo, Wilson, McKay, Burke, Benjamin
[2063]Burgener, Kemp
[2065]- Long, Obey, Koch, Wilson, Yates, Burke, Roybal, Stokes
[2067]DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
[2069]FOREIGN OPERATIONS
[2071]Young, Conte, Smit)
[2072]HUD—INDEPENDENT AGENCIES Boland, Traxler, Baucus, Stokes, Bevill, Boggs, Burlison,
[2074]Alexander i
[2075]. Coughlin, MeDade, Young ,
[2076]INTERIOR Yates, McKay, Long, Evans, Murtha, Duncan, Dicks, Whitten a
[2077]McDade, Regula, Armstrong te
[2078]LABOR—HBEALTH, EDUCATION & Flood, Natcher, Smith, Patten, Obey, Roybal, Stokes, Early aie
[2079]WELFARE - Michel, Conte, O’Brien . oo
[2080]‘LEGISLATIVE Shipley, Benjamin, Giaimo, McFall, Murtha, Traxler
[2081]‘ Armstrong, Coughlin, Cederberg
[2082]MILITARY CONSTRUCTION McKay, Sikes, Murtha, Steed, Long, Chappell a
[2083]. McEwen, Regula —
[2084]PUBLIC WORKS Bevill, Boland, Whitten, Slack, Boggs, Dicks, Shipley, Chappell
[2085]Myers, Burgener, Smit
[2086]- STATE, JUSTICE, COMMERCE Slack, Smith, Flynt, Alexander, Burke, Early
[2087]& JUDICIARY Cederberg, Andrews, Miller
[2088]TRANSPORTATION McFall, Steed, Koch, Duncan, Benjamin, Smith, Addabbo, Evans
[2089]Conte, Edwards, O’Brien ~
[2090]TREASURY-POSTAL SERVICE— — Steed, Addabbo, Roybal, Patten, Boland, Flynt
[2091]GENERAL GOVERNMENT Miller, McEwen
[2092]NOTE: Mr. Mahon, as Chairman of the Committee, and Mr. Cederberg, as Ranking Minority
[2093]Member, are ex officio members of all subcommittees of which they are not regular members. -
[2095]ero = 86-238-b January 26, 1977.
[2098]13-00000 .
[2100]Lo © Quaste alien
[2101]: Sepeus | 4
[2102]House Appropriations Committee team 14
[2104]| Room 2D 0117. Telephones: 5848, 5849 (B) and 1570 (R) se pag
[2106]“Leonard M. (Bucky) WALTERS,
[2107]Badge: blue House Committée
[2108]Clearances: SI, TK,*’ BYECOM
[2111]Charles #. (Chuck) HAYNES
[2112]Badge: green. ne: escort
[2113]Clearances: TK, BYECOM
[2115]Eugene B ILHEL
[2116]Badge: soe Ee se Co VECO
[2117]Clearar I, TK, /BYECOM
[2119]George C. BAIRD (Carter)
[2120]Badge: blue House Committee
[2121]Clearances: SI, TK, BYECOM
[2123]Leon F. (Frank) SCHWARTZ
[2124]Badge: blue House Committee
[2126]John LaytTen
[2128]Supervisory officials of HAC Surveys 4 Investigations Staff
[2129](not to be stationed at Hqs bldg, but may visit from time to
[2130]time):
[2132]Cornelius: R. (Lefty) ANDERSON, Chief
[2133]-Badge: green no-escort
[2135]Marion S. RAMEY, Deputy Chief
[2136]Badge: blue House Committee
[2137]OX 7-9371
[2139]James Brian HYLAND
[2140]Badge: mene blue House Committee
[2144]2 August 1976
[2146]MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
[2148]SUBJECT: Initial Meeting with House Appropriations
[2149]Committee Survey Group
[2151]1. ‘An initial session was held on 30 July 1976 of
[2152]about one and a half hours with six persons from the Surveys
[2153]and Investigations Staff of the House Appropriations
[2154]Committee, to-discuss the purpose of their survey of the
[2155]Directorate of Operations and to propose some arrangements
[2156]to govern their access to Agency personnel and documents.
[2157]The following attended:
[2159]Mr. Cornelius (Lefty) Anderson, Chief of
[2160]Surveys and Investigations Staff
[2162]Mr. Marion Ramey, Deputv
[2164]Mr. Leonard (Bucky) Walters, who will head the
[2165]team inspecting the Directorate of Operations
[2167]Mr. Charles (Chuck) Havnes, team member
[2169]Mr. Eugene Wilhelm, team member (former
[2170]Agency employee)
[2172]Mr. George C. Baird, team member
[2174]Attending for the Agency were:
[2176]Mr. Theodore Shackley, who chaired the meeting
[2177]Mr. Robert Gambino
[2179]Mr. Lyle Miller
[2181]Mr. Thomas B. Abernathy
[2183]Mr. Richard Point
[2185]Mr. Philip F. Fendig
[2187]~ 2. The meeting followed reasonably well the attached
[2188]agenda, which was made available to all at the beginning of
[2189]the meeting. The following paragraphs summarize the
[2190]important points covered.
[2192]3. Scope: Mr. Shackley asked the group to define its
[2193]mission, noting some of the topics mentioned in recent
[2194]conversations with Mr. Snodgrass suggested particular
[2195]interests whereas the Committee's report on the FY 77 budget
[2197]13-00000. °
[2199]ry
[2201]had suggested a different orientation. Mr. Anderson,
[2202]characterizing the enterprise as a survey rather than an
[2203]investigation, stated that his instructions were from the
[2204]Chairman of the Committee: .they called for a detailed
[2205]review of the operation of the Directorate in its entirety.
[2206]Mr. Walters would mention certain particular interests,
[2207]noted below, but that did not set limits to the ultimate
[2208]scope of the survey. Mr. Walters then took over:
[2210]“a. He expects to do a complete review, from
[2211]the managerial and substantive standpoint, of the
[2212]Directorate. His initial interests indicated an
[2213]auditor's approach to these questions - how budgets
[2214]are compiled, examination of accounting procedures
[2215]for. regular and special funds, cost systems and
[2217]the like.
[2219]b. He went on, however, to the management
[2220]aspects which they would also pursue to
[2221]determine the results of the Directorate's
[2222]operations - the value of intelligence produced
[2223]versus the costs involved in procuring it, and
[2224]areas of possible overlap in collection with
[2225]the military and with NSA.
[2227]c. Specific areas which would be explored,
[2228]given, as examples, included contingency reserves,
[2229]the "special retirement fund" (presumably
[2230]referring to MHMUTUAL), the procedures for
[2231]reimbursing the State Department for cover and
[2232]support, proprietaries (how created, their
[2233]justification, value and effectiveness), safe-
[2234]houses and. "CA cadres."
[2236]Mr. Anderson reluctantly agreed to Mr. Shackley's request
[2237]for a memorandum spelling out these objectives in sufficient
[2239]_detail so that we could take the managerial steps necessary
[2241]to resolve any conflicts in the priority of the time of our
[2242]managers and senior operations officers who would be
[2244]involved in current operations as well as overlapping
[2245]inquiries from other groups concurrently overseeing the
[2246]Directorate. Mr. Anderson also asked for any ongoing studies
[2247]which the Directorate might have which would aid the team
[2249]in its work.
[2253]13-00000 -
[2255]4. Duration: The team's first objective will be to
[2256]render an interim report to the Committee by 1 January 1977,
[2257]in order to meet the mandate that the survey be used in.
[2258]considering the Agency's FY 1978 budget. The team wishes
[2259]to start work immediately and will consist of either six or
[2260]seven members who will occupy. space in Headquarters building
[2261]and presumably do most of their work here; it was brought
[2262]out, however, that the team would also interview users of
[2263]our intelligence and other collectors. There was ambiguity
[2264]in the projection of the total length of the survey; I
[2265]interpreted Mr. Anderson's remarks to indicate that he
[2266]expected the team to be with us for most of calendar year
[2267]1977.
[2269]-
[2271]S. Security: Mr. Anderson explained the arrangement
[2272]by which the Committee limits access by even the members of
[2273]the Subcommittee to the reports of his group; they must be
[2274]reviewed in a specified area and they are stored, in very
[2275]limited numbers, in the tower of the Capitol in the special
[2276]facilities there for the Joint Atomic Energy Committee of -
[2277]Congress. Mr. Gambino explained the arrangements for badges,
[2278]certification of. clearances, and provided for the team's
[2279]consideration a copy of the "non-disclosure agreement" which
[2280]we would like members to sign. There was considerable
[2281]discussion, and some objection, to the issuance of blue
[2283]‘badges which will provide access to virtually all parts of
[2285]the building but which must be turned in and picked up at
[2286]the entrance each day. This arrangement was reluctantly
[2288]‘accepted but it was made clear at lunch and in later
[2290]discussion with the team and with Mr. Anderson they are
[2291]unhappy with this slight infringement on their convenience
[2292]and physical access to the building.
[2294]6. Access: Of more concern was the Agency position
[2295]that the SA/DO/70 would serve as a control point for the
[2296]team's further access to individuals and documents in the
[2297]Directorate. The requirement was explained in terms of the
[2299]“need to record, against later requirements such as in fact
[2301]now in progress stemming from another investigation, the
[2302]names, subject matter and general content of matters discussed
[2303]by Agency officers with team members. The requirement to
[2304]"monitor'' was explained as an effort to keep this type of
[2305]record, rather than to impose a third party from the office
[2307]of SA/DO/O on all interviews; the latter was clearly
[2308]considered by the team to be an unreasonable intrusion. It
[2309]was agreed after some discussion that we would proceed with
[2311]Ss Atma eee Me NN A rm RTE RRR EEN a ca eet cee EAE a GRP eects ee ennnntnmentrne sere
[2313]13-00000.
[2315]system outlined in the attached agenda, and that we would
[2316]reconsider procedures later if they seemed clearly to be
[2317]unwieldy. . We anticipated, however, that once the team
[2318]splits into smaller groups as is planned, and pursues
[2319]particular areas of inquiry, it will be possible to evolve
[2321]a workable system which meets the objectives. of both parties.
[2323]7. Other: There appears to be no difficulty in
[2324]protecting identities of sources, providing documents in
[2325]sanitized form, maintaining notes only in this building and
[2326]at the appropriate security level and introducing some
[2327]officers under cover in alias where necessary; all these
[2328]points were noted and none was objected to. Space and
[2329]other facilities may be cramped but it appears to be possible
[2330]to provide adequate space adjacent to the SA/DOQ/0O offices.
[2331]Mr. Anderson began by noting the outstanding cooperation on
[2332]the Angola and COMINT surveys done in the building (in which
[2333]relatively free access to personnel and files had been
[2334]afforded his team), and ended by stating that the coming
[2335]survey was not a witch hunt nor an investigation of abuses
[2336]and that therefore he believed that such access could have
[2337]very beneficial results for the Agency. It was agreed to
[2338]begin the survey formally with a briefing by the DDO or
[2339]ADDO on 3 or 4 August 1976. Mr. Walters with several team
[2340]members will, however, set up shop on 2 August to review
[2341]such general briefing papers as Mr, Fendig can make
[2342]available to them at that time.
[2344](signed)
[2345]Philip F. Fendig.
[2347]Philip F. Fendig
[2348]SA/DO/O:PFFendig:j1 (7368/1398)
[2350]Distribution: (all w/att)
[2351]Orig & 1 - DDO
[2353]a 1 - ADDO
[2355]1 - OLC (Mr. Miller)
[2357]1 - D/SEC (Mr. Gambino)
[2358]1 - COMPT (Mr. Point)
[2360]1 - SSA/DDO
[2362]1 - SA/DDCI (Mr. Bolten)
[2363]4 - SA/DO/O
[2365]E2 IMPDET
[2366]CL BY 012860
[2369]13-00000 |
[2371]+. a 7 SECRET
[2373]AGENDA FOR MEETING WITH e
[2374]HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE STAFF
[2375]30 JULY 1976
[2377]/Imlly
[2379]A. Request Statemeyt “from Committee representatives of
[2380]scope, duration and proposed procedure to be
[2381]followed by Committee investigators.
[2383]‘B. Discussion of arrangements for investigation:
[2385]1. Facilities: DDO will provide office space,
[2386]telephones and secure storage facilities for
[2387]investigators. Parking spaces and cafeteria
[2388]priveleges will also be provided.
[2390]Zz. Security:
[2392]a. Badges allowing unescorted access to
[2393]Headquarters building will be issued,
[2394]to be picked up and left with
[2395]receptionist. Agreement to be signed
[2396]when badge issued, per current
[2397]procedures governing all Congressional
[2398]staffs. ;
[2400]b. Clearances through necessary level to
[2401]be obtained prior to commencement of
[2402]briefings or interviews, level to be
[2403]determined on' basis of first meeting.
[2405]3. Access:
[2407]a. Orientation briefings on Directorate
[2408]and its subdivisions to be offered.
[2410]rs b. Access to personnel and docume s within.
[2411]gency to_be controlled by office of |
[2412]SA/DO/O, which will maintain record of
[2413]. all_interviews and_of documents provided .
[2414]c. Documents to be provided upon specific
[2416]request for study within building.
[2417]They will be sanitized. to protect sources
[2419]and methods usin uidelines previously ©
[2420]established for HSC and SSC.
[2421]cree esse eee
[2423]13-00000
[2425]d. Documents to be exam
[2427]examined by the
[2428]investigation team within Headquarters ;
[2429]building. If copies of documents are ;
[2430]desired, investigators will request
[2431]them from SA/DO/O who will see that
[2433]they are provided promptly in
[2434]‘ appropriate classified and sanitized
[2435]form. If required by the Committee
[2436](outside Headquarters building), same
[2437]procedure will be followed but will
[2438]be subject to review by SA/DO/O.
[2441]e. Formal questions are to be put_in ©
[2442]writing in order to provide proper
[2443]and full context so that most
[2445]complete and pertinent answers can
[2446]be provided.
[2448]£. SA/DO/O to monitor all interviews. az
[2449]a
[2451]g- Discussion of note-taking and reports:
[2453](1) Maintenance of proper security
[2454]and classification
[2456](2) Notes to retain same level of
[2457]security Classification as
[2459]documents or interviews on which
[2460]they based.
[2463]13-00000
[2465]1
[2469]1
[2471]a ~ ADMIT" “STRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONT’ “,
[2472]This notice expires 31 January 1978 | .
[2474]DON 5-218
[2476]DDO NOTICE GENERAL —
[2477]NO. 5-218 4 August 1976
[2479]SURVEY BY MEMBERS OF
[2480]THE HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE STAFF
[2482]1. GENERAL
[2484]Members of the staff of the House Appropriations Com-
[2485]mittee began an extensive examination of the Directo-
[2486]rate of Operations beginning the week of 2 August 1976.
[2487]They expect that it will take approximately 17 months
[2488]to complete this study. They state their activities
[2489]are necessary to better understand the appropriations
[2490]process. They emphasize that their objective is not
[2491]to dig out evidence of wrongdoing or improper activi-
[2492]ties. The staff members' activities will be coordi-
[2493]nated through SA/D0/O. The following paragraphs -
[2494]attempt to anticipate the procedures necessary to
[2495]exercise orderly control over the staff's activities. .
[2496]These procedures may be subject to modification as
[2497]future experience may dictate.
[2499]2. LOCATION
[2501]Members of this Congressional staff have been issued
[2502]blue badges bearing the words "House Committee” which
[2503]permit wnescorted access to all non-specially controlled
[2504]areas of the building, including the main cafeteria.
[2505]The staff will be provided suitable private office
[2506]space in Room 2 D 0117, adjacent to the office of the
[2507]SA/DO/O, which will be relocated in Room 2 D 0109 as
[2508]of 6 August 1976. It is expected that they will initi-
[2509]ally have a greater interest in interviews than they
[2510]do in documents. Since they will have adequate office
[2511]space, interviews should be conducted within their
[2512]‘premises. . :
[2514]3. CONTROL OF DOCUMENTS
[2516]a. The staff is expected to make any requests for.
[2517]documentation to the SA/D0/O. Individual officers
[2519]ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAT, USE, ONLY _
[2522]13-00000
[2524]“ % - > ADMIN*“TRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY ~ - =.
[2525]DON 5-218
[2526]DDO NOTICE a . . GENERAL
[2527]NO. 5-218 4 August 1976
[2529]h,
[2531]who receive requests from staff members for docu-
[2532]ments should ask that the request be put to the
[2533]SA/DO/O. All documents provided to the SA/DO/0
[2534]for transmittal to the staff will be logged in by
[2535]the SA/DO/O and logged back to the component after
[2536]the staff has completed its study. The SA/DO/C
[2537]will not, as a matter of routine procedure, retain
[2538]a copy of the document concerned.
[2540]All documents will be properly sanitized to protect
[2541]sources and methods. The staff has indicated that
[2542]it does not anticipate any need for such detail
[2543]and accepts the principle of sanitization. Any
[2544]questions concerning the degree of sanitization
[2545]should be referred to the SA/DO0/O. Growd rules
[2546]for sanitization are similar to those applied
[2547]during the activities of the Select Committees.
[2548]General guidelines will be provided separately.
[2550]On receipt of a document back from the SA/DO/O
[2552]the recipient should indicate the date received,
[2553]and that it had been made available to the staff.
[2554]The document should be retained by the recipient
[2555]in the form in which it was provided to the staff
[2556]for possible further reference; the record copy
[2557]of the document should also reflect the fact that
[2558]a sanitized copy was provided to the staff. Any
[2559]further copies of documents requested by the staff
[2560]will be made only by the office of the SA/DO/O.
[2562]INTERVIEWS
[2566]A representative from the office of the SA/DO/0
[2568]._ will not necessarily be present during interviews.
[2570]All interviews should be requested by the staff
[2571]through the SA/DO0/O. The SA/DO/O will maintain
[2573]a record of the date of interview; the name of
[2574]the person interviewed, and by whom; the alias
[2576]if one is used; and the subjects discussed. A
[2577]form will be provided to the interviewee to record
[2579]2
[2580]ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY
[2585]. +4 ae ADMIP"STRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ON}.
[2586]| DON 5-218
[2587]DDO NOTICE GENERAL
[2588]NO. 5-218 h August 1976
[2590]CF .
[2592]the essential facts. He should retain one copy
[2593]for possible future reference and one copy should
[2594]be forwarded to the SA/DO/0.
[2596]b. It is recognized that the badge access and the
[2597]length of the stay in the building by the staff
[2598]members may lead to unscheduled contacts. If
[2599]such contacts are connected with the official
[2600]duties of the staff, then appropriate comments
[2601]should be forwarded to SA/DO/O on the form cited
[2602]above. Officers should be careful not to allow
[2603]conversations to drift to areas of interest not
[2604]covered by official interviews. If this does take
[2605]place, however, we shall rely on the officer
[2606]concerned to inform the SA/DO/O of these develop-
[2609]SECURITY _
[2611]_ The blue badge should be sufficient to indicate that ~
[2613]staff members should be treated as visitors in the
[2614]presence of persons not connected with their official
[2615]duties. Persons introduced under alias should be
[2616]careful that the alias is protected if a chance
[2617]meeting takes place in the presence of other col-
[2618]leagues. In this connection, persons interviewed
[2619]should be careful not to expose associates who have
[2620]not been interviewed.
[2622]William W. Wells
[2623]Deputy Director for Operations
[2625]A/DIC/ (te. Ott) (Fury a
[2627]3
[2628]ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY
[2630]13-00000
[2632]|
[2634]t
[2636]27 August 1976
[2638]MEMORANDUM FOR: Chiefs of Divisions ‘and Staffs
[2640]. FROM : Philip F. Fendig
[2641]SA/DO/0
[2642]SUBJECT : Guidance for Interviews with House
[2643]Appropriations Committee Staff
[2644]REFERENCE - : DON 5-218, 4 August 1976
[2646]L-
[2648]1. You have been scheduled at the time indicated on
[2649]the cover sheet of this memorandum for a briefing to be
[2650]given to the five members of the Surveys and Investigations
[2651]Staff team from the House Appropriations Committee. The
[2652]subjects which the team would like you to cover are contained
[2653]in the memorandum distributed prior to the DDO staff meeting
[2654]on 25 August 1976 and discussed at that meeting. I have
[2655]explained to the Surveys and Investigations team that topic e
[2656](personnel policy and practices) will be discussed at a- .
[2657]separate briefing to be given by the Chief, Career Management
[2658]Group. You should touch on the other topics suggested in the
[2659]memorandum mentioned above.
[2661]2. General guidelines are contained in reference
[2662]notice. The following may bé helpful, however, in preparing
[2663]your briefing. Our general intention is to be as forth-.
[2664]coming as possible while drawing the line clearly at any
[2665]information which would lead to the identification of a
[2666]specific source, intelligence method, cooperating person or
[2667]group with which the.Agency has a relationship of confidence,
[2668]or confidential matter involving a cooperating foreign
[2669]intelligence service. The fact of liaison with foreign
[2670]services can in most cases be acknowledged, but details of
[2671]the relationship and the subject matter of joint or shared
[2672]operations should not be disclosed.
[2674]3. In the briefing contemplated. on management policies
[2675]and practices, most of the above sensitive areas would not
[2676]appear to arise, but you may find that questions will tend
[2677]to bring out some more sensitive areas and these should be
[2678]deferred with an agreement of looking into the possibility of
[2679]providing further information later. The staff has already
[2680]had access to basic budgetary material, including funds and
[2682]CONFIDENTIAL
[2685]13-00000
[2689]personnel strengths broken down by component,.and a listing
[2690]by cryptonyms and funding levels of all OPACTS. They have
[2691]been given a briefing on the current organization of the
[2692]Directorate of Operations and are aware that its staff
[2693]elements will shortly be reorganized. They have a listing
[2695]. Of all overseas stations and bases. If you have further
[2696]questions on material already provided to the Committee,
[2697]please check with this office.
[2699]4. Most of the briefings are scheduled to take place
[2700]in room 2 D 0117; if possible, a member of my staff will be
[2701]present. We would appreciate, however, a short Memorandum
[2703]' for the Record, using the attached "Interview Form" as a
[2705]general guide. Space is somewhat limited, but you should
[2706]bring any supporting personnel you desire to have participate
[2707]in your briefing. The Surveys and Investigations team is
[2708]aware that aliases may be used by those with solid cover
[2709]status; please’ advise this office if any persons intend to
[2710]use an alias during these briefing sessions.
[2712]; 5. We will be happy to assist in any way, including |
[2713]follow-up matters which may be developed in the course of
[2714]these briefings. ;
[2718]E2 IMPDET
[2720]CONFIDENTIAL CL BY 012860
[2723]13-00000
[2725]Laas
[2727]|
[2729]i
[2731]August 18, 1976
[2733]MEMORANDUM FOR; Mr. Philip F. Fendig
[2734]SA/D0/0
[2736]FROM . pn. Walters, Staff Member
[2738]House Appropriations Committee
[2739]Surveys and Investigations Staff
[2741]Request arrangement for comprehensive briefings with
[2742]appropriate officials regarding the subjects outlined below
[2743]be provided to HAC S&I Staff members George C. Baird and
[2744]Leon F. Schwartz.
[2746]1. Paramilitary Covert Action Cadre
[2748]Provide in this briefing data relating to the
[2749]organization, utilization and cost data .for this activity
[2750]for the periods FY 74, 75, 76 and projected data for FY 77
[2751]and FY 78. Organizational data should include manning and
[2752]equipment levels for the aforementioned periods.
[2754]2. Reorganization of the Directorate of Operations
[2756]Briefing should include rationale behind the proposed
[2757]reorganization and manpower and dollar savings to be effected
[2758]by such a change. If additional expenditures in either
[2759]dollars or manpower. positions are involved, justification
[2760]should accompany the presentation. Explain in detail how the
[2761]Directorate of Operations plans to absorb the FY 77 loss of
[2762]100 manpower positions, if imposed in the pending Appropriations
[2763]Bill.
[2765]3. The Special Projects Group
[2767]Explain the rationale behind the transfer of Israel
[2768]from the Near East Division and providing it with special
[2769]status by placing it directly under DDO. Additional manpower
[2770]and dollar costs accompanying this change should be addressed.
[2772]4, Coordination Within the Intelligence Community
[2774]Briefing should show the identity and purposes of the
[2775]various task groups established (both within CIA and community-
[2778]13-00000
[2779]4 1 a ‘ i - on
[2781]wide) which have been specifically established to deal with
[2782]the collection vs. analysis problem. Impacts and changes
[2783]brought about or anticipated within DO as a result of these
[2784]groups' actions should be covered.
[2786]5. Management Policies and Practices of Each DO Staff
[2787]sand Division, (a separate briefing by each) including but
[2788]“not- limited to: ,
[2790]ae Overview of role of staff or division
[2792]b. Decision-making processes and how coordinated
[2793]in DO, CIA and intelligence community
[2795]c. Organizational structure
[2797]d. Program development, and execution from
[2798]initiation to budgeting to implementation, including
[2799]development of annual plans, their flexibility, and degree
[2800]of autonomy of case officers, chiefs of stations, desk
[2801]officers and division or staff directors.
[2803]e. Personnel policies and practices including
[2804]recruitment, training promotion, position classification,
[2805]establishment of station complements and rotational policies.
[2807]f. Management and accounting controls to assure
[2808]compliance with laws, executive orders, policies and
[2809]regulations and assurance that funds and other assets are
[2810]properly used, expended and receipted for.
[2812]While the order of arranging the presentations is not
[2813]critical, it is suggested that, if possible, item (1.) be
[2814]presented earliest and that item (5.) be instituted the week
[2816]5 of August 30. Please coordinate with either Mr. Baird or
[2818]myself for prompt scheduling of these sessions. Also, it
[2819]would be appreciated if a copy of charts or other documentary
[2820]material used in the presentations could be provided to the
[2821]attendees during each briefing session.
[2824]13-00000
[2826]| Remarks: ¢ yess: To Shaperek, Seven
[2828]| ere Aft Ca teks )
[2831]my
[2833]i TOP AND BOTTOM
[2835]. SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICA]
[2836]| UNCLASSIFIED [| | CONFIDENTIAL
[2838]OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
[2840]NAME AND ADDRESS
[2842](4h Ferole _
[2844]NITIALS
[2846]JacTION = | CL DIRECT REPLY =| PREPARE REPLY .
[2847]TAPPROVAL = “ss| S| DISPATCH =| =| RECOMMENDATION
[2848][COMMENT = “$sS|; ST LE FFC—Ci‘C#SRETURN CS
[2849]|_| CoNcuRRENcE ~—s|_—s| INFORMATION | [SIGNATURE  —s_
[2851]Fon yun fo F haar ehlehal spe
[2852]bila DO/6 26- 3259 7 26 preg 1976, .
[2853]Lyrunauy Lis AlPOO% porekiin with
[2854]Me SNODERASS om MBG.
[2856]Oly 2a haet ato page frm Ge
[2857]DUI phodinud fs Lies. Crvavdle, ov he.
[2859]FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER
[2861]FROM: NAME. ADDRESS AND PHONE NO. | pate |
[2863]Wane jo Spf 16
[2864][ [UNCLASSIFIED |_| GONFIDENTIAL | | SECRET _|
[2865]: (40)
[2867]ron x 237 tse previous editions
[2869]2 ee amen age:
[2871]elie petntar petit ateteeeees a ee Ea
[2874]13-00000
[2876]SECRET
[2880]in attempting to be both forthcoming and helpful to him and the
[2881]«Committee in understanding the DDO's problems. At the same time
[2882]‘Mr. Snodgrass pointed out that while he had no quarrel with Mr. Shackley,
[2884]he continued to be irritated with the totality of the Agency's attitude toward
[2885]providing him with data. Mr. Snodgrass then launched into a long litany
[2887]‘on how the Agency had not been responsive in terms of his needs as he
[2888]perceived them in the time frame February to May J976. With thatas a
[2889]backdrop Mr. Snodgrass then launched into his inquiry as to why the Agency
[2890]was not willing to give him full access to Management by Objective docu-
[2891]ments. The dialogue which followed on this topic had a natural ebb and |
[2892]flow to it, but the key point that emerged from this is that Mr. Snodgrass
[2893]continues to feel that unless he can see the Management by Objective
[2894]documents he will not be able to have a firm understanding of DDO map-
[2896]} ower allocation proce . Secondly, Mr. Snodgrass claims that CIA's
[2897]position that it will show Management by Objective documents to members
[2898]of the Committee and not the Staff is an obstructionist tactic. His point.
[2899]being that the members of the Committee do not have the time to look at
[2900]such documents and they thus depend on the Committee Staff y_ thus depend on the Committee Staff for this type
[2901]of substantive review. According to Mr. Snodgrass this means that if the
[2902]Agency will not provide data to the Staff, it is in fact denying information
[2903]fo the Committee members. Attempts were made by Mr. Shackley to show
[2904]Siow men of good will on both sides of this question could have an honest
[2905]difference of opinion on the issue. In this framework Mr. Shackley re-
[2907]iterated the DDO position that access to Management by Objective docu-
[2908]ments by Mr. Snodgrass would impact adversely on the whale question of ~
[2909]sources hods as well as the integrity of the reporting system. As
[2910]a followup to this position an effort was made to find out exactly what it
[2911]was about the DDO manpower allocation system that Mr. Snodgrass did
[2912]not understand and which he thought he might find out about from an ~
[2913]examination of the Management by Objective documents. it was hoped
[2915]that through this line of inquiry an alternate approach could be discovered
[2916]which would enable us to deal with Mr. Snodgrass' problems. Our probes
[2917]in this direction were unsuccessful in clarifying the issue. One can only
[2918]conclude that Mr, Snodgrass is committed to finding some sort ofa
[2919]formula oregquation which will enable him to test our manpower aliscation /
[2920]system. "We have repeatedly outlined to him the variable factors that go
[2922]SECRET
[2925]13-00000
[2927]SECRET
[2931]into making judgments on operational deployment of manpower such as
[2933]what targets are in a country, what are the preat power interests in a
[2934]particular country, what is the operational environment in the country |
[2935]i.e., permissive or not, what are the cover possibilities, what are our
[2936]liaison equities, and what are our needs for regional support from a
[2937]particular country. These explanations are taken aboard by Mr. Snodgrass,
[2938]but he is looking for somethin se which has less variables in it when,
[2940]in fact, there is no magic formula for determining how one gets people to
[2942]commit treason. This portion of the meeting ultimately ended on a friendly
[2943]note but left unresolved the question of what was it that Mr. Snodgrass
[2945]’ really wanted on the issue of manpower allocations and what could CIA tell
[2947]him that we haven't already told him. (ACTION REQUIRED: Mr. Snodgrass
[2948]is currently preoccupied with drafting his report on the House Appropria-
[2949]tions Committee Mark-up of the DDO FY 77 budget. Once this task is.
[2950]completed Mr. Chin, OLC, will return to see Mr. Snodgrass and will try -
[2951]to obtain an elaboration of what specifically are the manpower issues that
[2952]trouble Mr. Snodgrass. In this context Mr. Chin has been asked to try to
[2954]determine if a review, position-by-position, of two or three typical Stations
[2955]within the DDO mi ive Mr. er rass the insight into manpower allo-
[2956]cations that he is currently seeking. )
[2958]9. Comment. In net assessment terms one would have to conclude
[2959]that the 25 May meeting achieved the optimum that could be expected from
[2960]this kind of an encounter. On the one hand the attached briefing book which
[2961]was examined by Mr. Snodgrass was accepted by the latter as a first rate
[2962]product. For this the A gency gets high marks. On the other hand, the
[2963]Management by Objective system, because he can't see the documents,
[2964]leaves Mr. Snodgrass frustrated and irritated. This evokes acrimonious
[2965]complaints from Mr. Snodgrass with the end result being that the burden
[2968]for seeking a solution toa problem created by Mr. Snodgrass is placed on
[2969]the Agency. In short, we have ended up where we expected to be. Put
[2971]another way,. there appears to be no prospect for. establishing the type of
[2972]dialogue with Mr. Snod i isfi i ests of both parties.
[2974]e are
[2976]i in an adversary relationshi rith him,
[2977]although it is incumbent on us to continue to minimize, to the extent that
[2980]SECRET
[2983]MB O-
[2985]Mr. Mahon. Would you please provide the Committee staff with
[2986]ened .
[2988]some samples of these performance reports, sanitized as you think
[2989]_ appropriate?
[2991]Mr. Bush. I would be willing to bring some down and discuss them with
[2992]the Committee off the record, Mr. Chairman. But I am reluctant to do that,
[2993]and I am even more reluctant to provide the documents themselves or to have
[2994]their contents described to the Committee by anyone who is not intimately
[2995]familiar with espionage, counterintelligence and covert. action operations
[2996]and with the entire managenent system used by the Operations Directorate.
[2998]There are a number of reasons for my position. One serious concern
[3000]revolves around. the effects on our internal processes of the sort of inquiry
[3001]. you propose. One of the primary reasons that our internal management. system
[3002]-is effective is that partici tion is_strictl limited to those immediately
[3003]concerned. Given that we are all human beings, there is no escaping the;
[3004]Se neat
[3005]“fact that knowledge that the reports in question are being read, or may at
[3007]some future time be read, by outsiders will lead to their being written 7
[3009]with a view to their possible impact on an extended readership, There will
[3011]bea tendency for the managers in the field to slant their discussions of -
[3012]“problems and to exaggerate accomplishments: ° Inevitably, the net effect »
[3014]_, will be’ to reduce ‘the usefulness of the system. .
[3016]_ Another difficulty involves security. To be useful for judging per-
[3018]formance, the reports must be very detailed. Thus they discuss ’ recruitments
[3019]ne
[3021]in terms “of numbers, ‘the ‘specific access s of agents to information, recruit-
[3022]OE TED ba)
[3024]ment techniques, and so forth. By the time all this. sensitive material on
[3026]mt
[3028]. sources and methods is removed, any samples are going to consist primarily
[3029]- ; o£ disconnected bits and pieces or of - unenlightening generalizations.
[3031]And I have a third problem with this request. The reports. themselves
[3033]are but one part of a very complex and thorough process we use for internal
[3035]management, It takes a detailed familiarity with the process to appreciate
[3037]its effectiveness. Thus, I feel strongly that someone from the. Agency ¥ who
[3038]a a nen .
[3040]' has that intimate Knowledge should be present if and when you want to.
[3043]wo ft
[3045]consider the reports.