[2]q04-10331-107164 | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF wa
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[6]re ot Secret
[8]5 March 1997
[10]Memorandum For: Fred Wickham, DO Focal Point for JFK
[12]Linda Cipriani, OGC Focal Point for JFK
[14]From: - Barry Harrelson GH
[16]JFK Project Officer
[18]Subject: - (U) CIA Employees Names in JFK Records
[20](AIOU) In meetings on March 4, 1997, I raised with
[21]David Marwell and Jeremy Gunn my concerns with the large
[22]number of employee names scheduled for review in May 1997
[23]and the potential harm to the Agency if most of these names
[24]are released. I found both receptive to our concerns and
[25]willing to re-open the issue of the release of CIA employees
[26]true names with the Board. Marwell cautioned, however, that
[27]they could not predict the Board's response and that we
[28]should move expeditiously to provide our “evidence” to the
[29]Board. ;
[31](w If you agree with my assessment of the situation (see
[32]below), I recommend we move quickly to engage upper
[33]management and prepare the necessary material. Please
[34]provide your response as soon as possible. .
[36]Background
[38](AIOU) In March 1996, the ARRB agreed to protect the
[39]names of all Agency staff employees that appear in JFK
[40]documents until May 1997. The agreement reflected the
[41]Board's recognition of the need to facilitate the document
[42]review, and that it would take time for the Agency to
[43]collect evidence to defend individual. names.
[45](AIOU) Jeremy Gunn's memo summarizing the Board's
[46]approach to the release of CIA employee names describes a
[47]name-by-~name approach and sets categories and specific
[48]requirements for the release or protection of an individual.
[49]Even if the DO is able to complete the research on all
[50]employees protected to date (590), it is unlikely that it
[51]will be able to develop the type of evidence required by the
[52]Board to protect most individuals. Under a name-by-name
[53]approach, we can expect a majority of the names to be
[54]released.
[56]CL By: (611637 a)
[58]CL Reason: 1.5 (c)
[59]DECL On: X1
[60]DRV From: PER 9-87;COV 1.1-86
[62]Secret -
[65]‘ SN
[67]ra
[69]Secret
[71]Issue
[73]_ (AIOU) There is considerable concern among HRG
[74]reviewers that the continued release of hundreds of Agency
[75]employees' true names has the potential to do unacceptable
[76]harm to US national security. The harm from release of a
[77]large number of names lies in the fact that the potential
[78]damage cannot be measured. This is due to the ripple effect
[79]that would occur among assets in many places, with many
[81]liaison services and multiple cover entities.
[83](U) To date, 590 CIA employee names, mostly DO, have
[84]been protected and are subject to review by. the Board in May
[85]1997. Most of these individuals have little or no
[86]connection to the JFK assassination story. This number is
[87]much larger than we anticipated when we agreed in March 1996
[88]to the case-by- case approach.
[90](S) The decisions made by the Board at the May meeting
[91]will set a precedent for the potentially hundreds of
[92]additional names not yet identified. We have reviewed only
[93]the Oswald 201 file and 12 boxes of the JFK sequestered
[94]collection. At this point it is impossible to determine the
[95]total number of employees mentioned in the JFK collection.
[96]For example in Box 48, there is a 155 page Position Control
[97]Register listing all employees in Far East Division
[98]including (the Tokyo: station).
[100]Recommendation
[102](AIOU) That the Agency re-visit the name issue with the
[103]ARRB based on the following considerations:
[105]* It should be recognized. that there are two separate
[106]aspects of the public interest involved in this matter,.
[107]and that it is necessary to achieve a reasonable
[108]balance between them. On the one hand, it is clear
[109]that it is now in the public interest to release as
[110]much of our JFK collection. as is possible. On the
[111]other hand, it is equally clear that it is in the
[112]public interest for this Agency to maintain its
[113]essential security and cover practices in order to be
[114]able to serve the nation effectively in accordance with
[115]its enabling legislation.
[117]* It is not in the public's interest for one of the
[118]fundamental principles of an intelligence agency--
[119]protecting the identity of covert employees--to
[120]continue to be eroded. While it is not always
[121]possible to show harm by the release of any one
[122]individual's name, the magnitude of the JFK release
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[128]wo - ‘ Secret
[130]clearly has the potential to do harm to the Agency as
[131]an institution and to national security. There is
[132]simply no way to measure the possible effect of such a
[133]release on past and future employees, agents, liaison
[134]relationships and operations.
[136]* Since most of the individuals involved have little or
[137]no connection with the JFK assassination, the release
[138]of their true names does not add to the assassination
[139]story. The substitution of pseudonyms or other
[140]identifier would meet the historian's need to track who
[141]is saying what to whom, etc.
[143]* However, the Agency does recognizes that there are some
[144]employees who are part of the JFK story (many of their
[145]names have already been released). We propose that the
[146]ARRB staff and HRG work together to establish a list
[147]of individuals who fit this category. These are the
[148]names that would be released unless the Agency is able
[149]to provide the required evidence of current harm.
[151]This approach would serve both the public's and the Agency's
[152]interests. It would also allow the Agency to focus its
[153]resources on completing the review and responding to the
[154]special requests of the Board, instead of spending an.
[155]inordinate amount of time and money on individuals of!
[156]marginal or no interest to the JFK story.
[158]poe ——
[160]— —~ ” Ree,
[161]; (C) [Note: | There is also the issue of State. Department
[163]aes -and: # “impact: of officially acknowledging as. CIA
[165]Proposed Action
[167](AIOU) We have a little over two months to resolve this
[168]issue and be ready for the ARRB meeting, May 12-13. Support
[169]from top managerient including a willingness to raise the
[170]issue. with the acting/new DCI and possibly the White House
[171]is critical to success. I envision a memorandum to the
[172]Board similar to the one prepared on sources. However, I
[173]recommend it be signed by the General Counsel. We should
[174]also be prepared to discuss the issue directly with the
[175]Board since we are asking them to reconsider a decision in
[176]which we initially concurred.
[178]’-(AIOU) Mr. Marwell recommends that we include examples
[179]of documents with names of marginal interest in our package.
[180]He also would like to start immediately preparing a list of
[181]those names which are “important to the assassination
[182]story”. If you concur, HRG and DO JFK reviewers could begin
[183]immediately on these two tasks.
[187]Secret
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[191]. a oo +
[194]eas .
[197]Secret
[199](AIOU) The Board has meetings. scheduled for 13-14
[200]March, 2-3 April and 23-24 April. I recommend that we begin
[201]discussions with ARRB staff as soon as possible with the
[202]goal of having the memo ready no later than the.2-3 April
[203]meeting. It is important that the DO continue to develop
[204]evidence on the individuals who are scheduled for review in
[205]May. The worst possible scenario is not succeeding with the
[206]new proposal, and then not being ready to defend those
[207]individuals who truly need to be protected.
[209]Secret