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[26]CO unctasstrieo 0] SP omty [1] CONF“DENTIAL [1 SECRET
[28]ao ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
[30]SUBJECT: (Optional) The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence
[31]by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks
[32]FROM: “Norbert A. Shepanek eenson
[33]0/SA/DO/0 ; “DATE
[34]2D0109 1542 8 April 1977
[36]TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
[37]building) OFFICER'S COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
[38]INITIALS to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.}
[40]RECEIVED | FORWARDED
[44]'. Philip F. Fendig
[45]SA/DO/0
[47]3. Mr. William Wells
[48]DDO
[49]7E26 Has.
[51]fom 610 “EG [] SECRET [] CONFIDENTIAL [J [STERNAL = [7] UNCLASSIFIED
[54]13-00000
[56]‘ : . DD/O_??. yoy |
[58]8 April 1977
[60]MEMORANDUM FOR: A111 Divisions and Certain Staffs
[62]FROM :. Philip F. Fendig
[63]SA/DO/0
[65]SUBJECT — : The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence
[66]by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks
[68]1. Subject book was published in 1974 with 168
[69]deleted items demanded by CIA and involved court
[70]trial and decision. The lawyer for the authors has,
[71]in effect, requested that a review be made of the
[72]168 deleted items to determine which can now be
[73]declassified and removed from the court's injunction,
[74]particularly in view of the official disclosures
[75]since the publication of the book. The Department of
[76]Justice has advised that such a review is in order.
[78]2. Since. the courts decided the 168 deleted
[79]items were properly classifiable and classified in
[80]accordance with the appropriate Executive Order in
[81]effect: at the time of the initial classification,
[82]including Executive Order 11652, the review at this
[83]time must include two points:
[85](a) Is the item still classified under
[86]Executive Order 11652,
[88](b) Has the item been placed in the public
[89]domain by official disclosure by the United
[90]States, such as by an official in the Executive
[91]Branch authorized to declassify the item, or by
[92]a report of a Congressional committee, or by.
[93]the courts.
[95]3. Each addressee is requested to appoint a
[96]focal point officer to review each component's
[97]respective items which are held by this office.
[99]This office also has the DDO documentation submitted
[100]in support of deleting each item in 1973. These can
[102]‘be reviewed by each focal point official as necessary.
[104]13-00000
[106]A review will also be needed of those items which
[107]may have been cleared or released by CIA when
[108]reviewing manuscripts submitted by other authors
[110]‘since the publication of the Marchetti book. A
[112]few items will need to be referred by some of the
[113]components to other departments and agencies of
[114]government for their review.
[116]4. Please advise this office of the name of
[118]“your focal point officer by COB 11 April 1977.
[120]e
[121]Fendig
[123]0/SA/DO/0.: SHalpern: (NAShepanekx1542)
[125]Distribution
[127]i DDO
[129]- C/EA
[131]- C/EUR
[133]- C/LA ;
[134]- C/FR : ,
[135]- C/NE
[137]- C/AF
[139]C/SE
[141]- C/DCD
[143]- C/SIA info only
[144]- c/PCSs '" t
[146]- C/CI t tt
[148]- SA/DO/0O
[150]oO
[158]'
[160]NRPP EP BRP ee eRe ee
[161]i]
[164]13-00000 _ -
[167]13-00000
[169]a
[171](pees |
[173]Dom ata dae « 7 ae Pcke Be A + the ne eS
[174]») tha d ferent ao A. XL be, I 2% Z yo 7 ff Aa "ep as ; .
[176], : ; Ee . 4 a Ken, .
[177]2 Ee ane Radke? LOTS Zo. 4 7
[178]1
[180]_ biel
[183]13-00000
[187]- SUBJECT: Review of Deletions from Marchetti Book for Declassification -
[188]Request for Documents.
[190]1. In order to review the deletions from the Marchetti book, The
[191]Cult of Intelligence, Mr. Halpern must determine if any official of the
[192]U.S. Government placed any of the classified material in the public
[193]domain in open testimony before a Congressional Committee, The following
[194]material or information is required:
[198]Is there any index to public statements by senior government
[199]officials on the subject of intelligence? Is there any index
[200]to the Pike Committee or Church Committee testimony ?
[202]Mr. Halpern would like to have copies of the open testimony
[203]before a Congressional committee by senior officials of the
[205]CIA;.
[207]NSA,
[209]State Dept,
[210]Dept of Defense,
[211]_ FBI,
[213]which deals with intelligence.
[215]Any open testimony before Congressional committees by senior
[216]U.S. officials dealing with the cutoff of AID during the
[217]Cyprus disturbances. ,
[219]Any testimony (open) concerning American POWs (MIA) in Vietnam
[220]and CIA's method of communication with them.
[222]13-00000
[224]Hussein on
[226]Following the disclosure that Jordan’s .
[228]King Hussein had for years taken seeret
[229]payments from the CIA, NEWSWHEK’S
[231]Arnaud de Borchgrave jlo to Amman’
[233]‘last week for an exclusive interview feat :
[235]the King. The result was what Hussein
[236]called “my first and very last words” on
[237]The Washington Post's relation of the
[238]payments and their possible impact on
[239]chances for peace in the Middle Bast.
[240]Some excerpts:
[242]‘DE BORCHGRAVE: How much truth is
[244]there in. the story that appeared in The Wash-
[247]HUSSEIN: The whole thing is ridicu-
[248]Jous and insulting. But Iam prepared to
[249]answer questions about it, :
[251]Q. Your government spokesman said the ©
[253]story was a combination of “fabrication. and
[254]distortion.” What has been fabricated and
[255]what has been distorted? .
[256]“A. What was fabricated in the story was
[257]everything about funds handed over per-
[258]sonally for private benefit. When friend-
[259]ly Arab countries extend aid, it has been
[261]traditional for the checks to be made out:
[263]to, the Head of State; which then are
[264]deposited ‘in the state hudget accotint.
[265]This is not an uncommon practice. ‘All
[266]assistance received by us is handled in
[267]the same way. What is true is that fora
[268]number of years, we have been offered
[269]security and intelligence assistance
[270]which the government of Jordan accept:
[271]ed gratefully.
[272]As for the story that the CIA paid for,
[273]the protection of my children at school
[274]in America, my request was made to the
[275]State Department which kindly agreed
[276]to ensure their security. Remember that
[277]there have been many extremist plots
[278]against me and ny family and this was a
[279]perfectly nomnal request. If Amy Carter
[280]decided to come to school in’ Jordan,
[282]we would, needless to say, be responsi-
[284]ble for her sectrity and would not be.
[285]sending a bill to the U.S. Government
[286]for an elementary courtesy and ‘security
[287]measure.
[289]Q. How do you feel about President Carter
[291]ordering the arrangement—code-named “No .
[293]Beef’ —stopped? .
[295]A. We had, T promise you, never heard
[296]anything about all this before. H the
[297]reference is to the ‘a ance we have
[298]been receiving for security and intelli-
[299]gence, then I have not been advised
[300]thout its suspension, either officially or
[301]unofficially.
[303]Q. The intelligence Oversight Board set up
[304]in February 1976 reported to President Ford a
[306]few months later that they regarded the pay- -
[308]nents as improper and he did nothing about
[310]'t. What do you feel was improper about those
[313]' A What is a proper way lo support a
[314]friend and ally is strictly your business.
[316]Newsweel, March 7, 1977
[318]La ae
[320]/The subject never came up before and 1",
[322]was totally unaware that this assistance
[323]to Jordah had come into question last
[325]-year, What is proper in some minds’ is’.
[327]apparently improper i others. As far.
[328]as:‘T am concerned, anything [can get -.
[329]for Jordan: and my pénple is proper.
[331]And five of your Presidents [Eisenhow- °
[333]er, Kennedy,. lohuson, Nixon, Ford{’
[334]thought so, too. fo -
[336]Q. Since you say the assistance was proper |
[337]and just another form of U.S. aid, why; then,
[338]the secrecy‘and method of payment?
[340]A. [f you mean the report that pay-
[341]ments were made directly to the King.
[343]‘and for his [personal] benefit and with
[345]political conditions and obligations, this.
[348]e made as the
[350]oloc against us. It was!
[353]: Hi iy « IA Mi : » tal that. these ‘attacks v :
[354]: : is : oney ‘peace offensive was picking up steam
[356]and on the very day that Secretary
[357]Vance arrived in Amnon. It is obvious
[358]to me that those who wish to sabotage
[359]the peace process—and help Israel stay
[360]put in the occupied territories—are
[362]even willing to engage in character -
[364]assassination of persons whose dearest
[365]wish is for a just and durable peace.
[367]Q. Who benefits?
[369]‘+ AL Two quarters: One, in your own
[371]country, that has been trying to under-
[372]mine one of your key institutions. en-
[373]gaged in a-worldwide struggle to try to-
[374]neutralize the actions of the KGB in its
[375]efforts to promote Communism. The oth-
[376]er isa powerful group that is not interest-
[377]ed ina settlement and which also-feels it
[378]has'a score to settle with Jordan. Don't
[380]Choice of targets: Jordan’s King Hussein taking aim on the shooting range
[382]is & complete fabrication. The assistance
[383]was designed. only to enhance our in-
[384]telligence and security capabilitics
[385]period. ; co,
[386]' To us, the CIA is a part of the U.S.
[387]Government. We have sought to acquire
[388]know-how, equipmentand new capabili-
[389]ties to defend ourselves in the face of a
[390]worldwide battle, be it hot or cold, which
[391]is still with us. And wherever there is an
[392]‘identity of interests between our bywo'
[393]comntrics, ] will Gontinue to advocate
[394]fruitful and mutual cooperation.
[396]Q. What do you feel was the principal
[397]motivation of those [sources | who contribut-
[398]ed to the Washington Post story? .
[400]A. Yo undermine the credibility au
[401]integrity of those who are able and
[402]willing to contribute to the forces ol
[403]peace: My people know me and 1 know
[404]them and these attacks are futile in
[406]_terms of the Jordanian scence, We are.
[408]stronger than anything that can be lev-
[410]Newsweek, March 7, 1977 _
[412]forget it was the Isracti lobby that
[413]launched the campaign to. block ‘the
[414]Hawk anti-aircraft missile defense sys-
[415]tem to Jordan. Fortunately, the lobby
[416]” failed.
[418]Q. How much af a setback do you feel the
[419]story has been to the peace-with-Israel
[420]campaign?
[422]A. T lervently hope. of course, that it
[423]will not be a setback. Admittedly, it may
[425]have a deleterious effect on or peace
[426]efforts, but T plan to persevere regard-
[427]less of attempts to sabotage a just and
[428]durable peace.
[430]Q. What, for example, do you feel the story
[432]will do to your differences with the PLO and
[434]_ attempts to form a joint delegation for the
[436].Geneva talks? Is. a joint delegation still a
[437]realistic possibility? .
[439]A. A PLO delegation is in Amman this
[441]week and the whole question of a joint
[443]delegation is still very much in question.
[446]The d
[449]was ¢
[451]ean b
[452]thing
[453]few n
[454]tion o
[456]Qt:
[457]ready.
[458]coexis
[459]Gaza:
[461]AL”
[462]But it
[463]the Is
[464]the P
[465]There
[467]Pales
[470]Qi
[471]PLOT
[472]tween
[475]we
[476]y
[478]Butt
[481]if it
[483]then
[485]back
[487]fore’.
[489]Q..
[490]affect
[491]ed Sti
[493]A.
[495]‘been
[496]of th
[498]your
[499]our
[503]deer
[505]in. th
[507]M
[508]hum
[511]road
[515]sam.
[517]Ure
[518]very
[520]my)
[521]free
[522]F-
[524]you
[526]not
[532]an ;
[534]identity of interests between our byo’
[535]countries, 1 will continue to advocate’
[537]13- 00000
[539]His CIA Money
[541]a T he subject never came up before and 1
[543]was totally unaware that this a ance
[544]to Jordan had come into question Tast
[545]year. What is proper in some minds: is
[546]apparently improper in others. As far
[547]as-T am concerned, anything I can gel
[548]for Jordan and my people is proper
[550]And five of your Presidénts [Eisenhow-’
[551]Ford}
[553]‘er, Kennedy,. Johnson, Nixon,
[554]thought so, too, ., -
[556]Q. Since you say the assistance was proper °
[557]and just another form of U.S. aid, why, then,’
[559]the secrecy-and method of payment?
[561]A. [f you mean the report that pav-
[562]meuts were made directly to the King
[563]and ‘for his [personal] benefit and with
[565]political conditions and obligations, this
[567]cled against us. Tewas tcirdly coinciden-
[568]tal that. these ‘attacks ve cre made as the
[569]peace offensive was preking up steam
[570]and on the very das that Secretary
[571]Vance arrived in Amun. It is obvious
[572]to me that those who wish to sabotage
[573]the peace process—and help Israel stay
[574]put in the occupied territories—are
[575]even willing to engage in character
[576]vassination of persons whose dearest
[577]wish is for a just and durable peace.
[579]Q. Who-henefits?
[580]= AL Two quarters: One, in your own
[581]country, that has been trying to under-
[582]mine one of your key institutions .en-
[583]gaged ina worldwide struggle to try to
[584]neutralize the actions of the KGB in its
[585]efforts to promote Communism. The oth-
[587]erisa powerful group that is not interest
[588]edina settlement and which also feels it
[589]has-a score to settle with Jordan, Don't
[591]Alexandra de
[593]Choice of targets: Jordan’s King Hussein taking aim on the shooting range
[595]is a complete fabrication. The assistance
[596]was designed, only to ‘enhance our in-
[597]telligence and security capabiliti is
[598]period. .,
[599]To us, the CIA is a part of the ULS.
[600]Governments We have sought to Megan.
[601]know-how, equipment and new capabili-
[603]ties to defend ourselves in the: face ofa.
[605]worldwide battle. be ithat or cold, which
[606]is still with us. And wherever there is an
[608]fruitful and mutual cooperation.
[610]a. What do you feel was the principal
[611]motivation of those [sources] who contribut-
[612]ed to the Washington: Post story?
[614]A. Pp ‘undermine the credibility’ ari!
[615]integrity of these who are able’ aud.
[617]willing to cc ontribute to ‘the forces it
[618]peace: My people know me and TL kneke
[619]them and these attacks are’ futile in
[621]terms of the Jordanian scene. We are
[623]stronger than anvthing that can be lev
[625]Newsweek; March 7, 1977 |
[627]forget it was the Israeli lobby that
[628]launched the campaign to, block ‘the
[629]Hawk. anti-aircraft missile defense sys-
[630]tem to Jordan. Fortunately, the lobby
[631]failed. :
[633]Q. How much of a setback do you feel the
[634]story has been to the psace-with- Israel
[635]campaign?
[637]A. I fervently hope, of course, that it
[638]will not be a setback. Admittedly, it may
[640]‘have a deleterious effect on our peace
[642]efforts, but T plan to persevere regard-
[643]less of attempts to sabotage a just and
[644]durable peace.
[646]a. What, for example, do you feel the story
[647]will do to your differences with ihe PLO and
[648]attempts to form a joint delegation for the
[650]Geneva talks? Is. a joint delegation still a
[651]realistic possibility?
[653]A. A PLO delegation is in Amman this
[654]week and the-whole. question of a joint
[655]delegation is still very much in question.
[660]y ‘ ) T STOR Ok AS
[661]The dialogue (Arter Any’
[663]ed hy the Jorda-
[664]nian civil war'in INTC.
[666]when tae PLO
[667]‘a dat of Amman} has barely
[668]begun. ‘To what degree political action
[669]can be coordinated ian ong us is? some-
[670]thing we will be expiosing aver the next
[671]few mouths. And the x hole Arab. pasi-
[672]tion on this problem + vet to crystallize.
[674]Q. is it your impression that the PLO is now
[675]ready to amend its basic charter and agree to
[676]coexist peacefully with Israel in a West Bank-
[677]Gaza state? |
[679]A. ‘This is the clecision they must face.
[681]But it is equally important to know what
[682]the Esracli position will be. Why should
[683]the PLO take such a step uiilatevally?
[684]There must be a degree of simultane-
[685]itv—tsrael recognizes a West Bank-Gaza
[686]Palestinian state and the Palestinians
[687]recognize Israel.
[689]Q. Is it your intention to negotiate with the
[690]PLO prior to Geneva a new organic link be-
[691]tween a possible Palestinian state on the West
[692]Bank and Jordan proper? :
[694]“A. This has been suggested hy many
[695]leaders in the area as a possible con-
[696]structive development and we certain-
[697]ly plan to explore the possibilities.
[698]But I must caution vou against overopti-
[699]mism. The resumption of the Geneva
[700]conference by itself means nothing and
[701]if it doesn’t produce quick results ..
[702]then zthere will be the danger of a
[703]letdown, of the pendulum swinging
[704]back and the extremists coming to the
[705]fore again.
[707]-Q. How doyou think the latest CIA story will
[708]affect relations between Jordan and the Unit-
[709]ed States?
[711]A. Throughout all these years I have
[713]‘been very proud of the growing strength
[715]of the relationship with our American
[716]friends. We identified with principles
[717]your forefathers held dear. We built
[719]cour relations on the basis of mutual
[721]respect, confidence and faith, and be-
[722]yond that anything I did to cement
[723]relations with the U.S. was based on-a
[724]deep conviction about our common ob-
[725]jectives—stability, peace. and progress
[726]in.the Middle East.
[728]My duty is to develop my country, its
[729]hunian resources, armed forces and secu-
[730]rity and iitelligence services, to face the
[731]tremendous threats that lie ahead. The
[732]road is strewn with mines to sabotage the
[733]peace process. One has just exploded in
[734]Washington. There will be others. But
[735]bear in mind that Jordan is not unique in
[736]receiving such help. Israel falls into the
[737]same category and is a far greater exam-
[738]ple of all kinds of assistance. As far as 1
[739]Jun concerned, these will be ny first and
[740]very last words ou that matter. My per-
[741]sonal pride is a very touchy sebject. And
[742]my main concern is to preserve Jordan in
[743]freedom.
[745]Finally, regarding your media attacks
[746]against a branch of your government, if °
[747]you choose to denude a vital arm that is
[748]there to protect you, that is vour affair,
[749]not Jordan’s.
[752]13-00000
[753]eT SECRET
[755]21 April 1977
[757]MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Officer to the DDA
[759]FROM : M. L.. Latta
[760]Deputy Chief, Plans and Review Group
[761]Central Cover Staff
[763]SUBJECT :. Fairways Corporation
[765]1. Per our ‘telephone conversation ‘today, attorneys
[766]for Victor Marchetti have requested release of the 168
[767]‘items previously deleted by court order from the book, —
[768]The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence. Fairways Corpora-
[769]tion was referred to CCS by the SA/DO/O for review in .
[770]this connection.
[772]2. Fairways Corporation is the subject of four items
[773](107, 128, 129, 279, on pages 123, 132, 133, -and 403 respec-
[774]tively,) in the original manuscript. The position of CCS on
[775]all four items is that they are still classified, since they
[776]describe intelligence sources and methods by identifying an
[777]operational support facility located in the U.S., and are
[778]therefore exempt from declassification under Section 5(B) (2)
[779]of the General Declassification Schedule contained in Executive
[780]Order 11652.
[782]3. According to CCS files, in April 1975 Director Colby
[783]was asked by an NBC reporter about CIA sponsorship of Fair-
[784]ways in connection with a planned TV documentary on Agency
[785]proprietaries. CCS files are unclear on the point, but there
[786]are indications that Director Colby may have responded to
[787]the question in a manner which could have been construed as
[788]admission of CIA sponsorship of Fairways. In any case, CCS
[789]files contain other evidence that the matter was considered
[790]to be still classified as recently as December 1976, when .
[791]Director Bush wrote to the Administrator of the Federal
[792]Aviation Administration regarding CIA sponsorship of Fair-
[793]ways and asked that the subject be withheld from public
[794]disclosure.
[796]WARNING NOTICE —
[797]SENSITIVs INTELLIGENCE SQURCES ; ae
[798]ANDO METHODS INVOLVED SEGRE?
[800]E2 EMPDET
[801]CL BY 026089
[804]13-00000
[806]SECRET
[808]4. Per our conversation, CCS has stated in its
[810]response to the SA/DO/O that DDA would comment further
[812]on the extent to which CIA sponsorship of Fairways may
[813]have been placed in the public domain since the court
[814]order (i. e., since February 1975). :
[816]5. - Please direct your comments to SA/DO/0.. For
[817]your information, Mr. Halpern, Room 6 D 0120, red line
[818]x9588, is preparing an overall response on the subject
[820]for the SA/DO/0.
[823]./L. Latta.
[825]SECRET
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[957]13-00000
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[961]— <Q i
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[965]52 DAP Ad’ |
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[971]56 GREAT BRETMEN | a
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[974]59 CA ADE An’ iw Tee b cant BE SECMTCE
[976]60 MUSTRM TAB
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[983]64 PRANK FERT
[984]65 ATHBaAS
[985]&G MUN Dew
[986]Gl BELLE
[989]76 PARIS
[990]ZL Ba Ly £4
[992]72 Bee by EA Palreeele ence S8@VECE |
[994]75 BRABTE
[996]74 RLASPLEM Dvpeeceoenee Seevicee |
[998]13-00000
[1000]75 Kenya
[1001]76 KEN YAN | PANT FEC LE CHEE A CVECE.
[1003]77 TORD IAW
[1005]78 SURDAWEAN EN Teeercente Seka
[1007]TI Phat Aoah on
[1008]oO Pan AMA NDAN : Ea PELLICBNCE  SERUECE
[1009]Sl FeRBas BupenHAan | |
[1010]$2 MExEbce
[1012]¥3) MBy LCA En! FELCEC ENCE ‘GR VECE
[1014]a era
[1016]13-00000
[1018]Oo UNCLASSIFIED Cy INTERNAL 0. CONFIDENTIAL secret
[1019]ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET | 7
[1021]SUBJECT:  (Optional}
[1025]Acting Chief, Latin America
[1027]DATE .
[1028]Division 21 April 1977
[1030]TO: (Officer designation, room number, and .
[1031]building) _ OFFICER'S | COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom:
[1033]. - “INITIALS to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.) :
[1034]. RECEIVED | . oe
[1035]" §A/DO/0 . . Oo
[1039]comm 610 “riete"* ] SECRET ©] CONFIDENTIAL [-] INTERNAL =) UNCLASSIFIED
[1041]13-00000
[1043]SECRET
[1045]22 APR 1977
[1047]MEMORANDUM FOR: SA/DO/O
[1049]FROM | -: George V. Lauder
[1050]Acting Chief, Latin America Division
[1051]SUBJECT : The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence
[1052]by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks
[1053]REFERENCE . : SA/DDO/O Memorandum dated 8 April 1977
[1055]The following are the LA Division comments on the
[1056]review of the 168 court ordered deletions of subject book.
[1058]Item 1, page 11, Chile
[1059]Classified. Dept. of State/INR
[1061]Item 3a, page ll, Chile ;
[1062]Declassified. Page 168, Senate Select Committee Hearings,
[1063]Volume. 7, Covert Action
[1065]‘Item 3b, page 11, Chile
[1066]Declassified. Pages 105, 190 of Senate Select Committee
[1067]Hearings, Volume 7, Covert ‘Action
[1069]Item 4, page 12, Chile
[1070]Declassified. Page 168, Senate Select Committee Hearings,
[1071]Volume 7, Covert Action ;
[1073]- Item 5, page 12, Chile
[1074]Declassified. Pages 105, 190 of Senate Select Committee
[1075]Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action
[1077]“Item 11, page 15, Chile
[1078]Declassified. Pages 170, 172 Senate Select Committee
[1079]Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action and Page 231 Senate
[1080]Select Committee Interim Report on Alleged Assassination
[1081]Plots Involving Foreign Leaders ©
[1083]E2 IMPDET
[1084]CL BY 012180
[1086]SECRET
[1088]13-00000
[1090]SECRET
[1092]Item 29, page 49, Guyana
[1093]Classified. Executive Order exemption 5 (B) 3
[1095]Item 46, page 70, lines 20--24, Chile
[1096]Declassified. Pages 148, 165, 166, 171 of Senate Select.
[1097]Committee Hearings, . Volume 7; Covert Action
[1099]Item 89, page 106, Cuba (39
[1101]Declassified. 75" Senate Select
[1102]Committee Interim Report on Alleged Assassination Plots
[1103]Involving Foreign Leaders
[1105]Item 201, page. 222, Brazil
[1107]Classified. Executive Order exemption 5 (B) 2
[1109]' Item. 261, page 338, Panama
[1111]Classified. Director of Intelligence Operations, ACSI
[1113]Item 292, page 420, Chile
[1115]Declassified. Page 205 Senate Select Committee Hearings,
[1116]Volume 7, Covert Action
[1118]Item 307, page. Be, Cuba 129 ff.
[1119]Declassified. Senate Select
[1121]Committee Interim Report on Alleged Assassination Plots
[1122]Involving Foreign Leaders ©
[1124]Item 317, page 468, Chile
[1125]Declassified. Pages 168, 189, 205 of Senate Select
[1126]Committee Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action
[1128]Ttem 318, pages. 469, 470, Chile
[1130]Classified. Executive ‘Order exemption 5 (B) (2). There
[1131]is no record that the intelligence report on which this
[1132]item was based has been declassified.
[1134]Ttems 322, 323, pages 473, 474, Mexico
[1135]Classified. Executive order exemption 5 (B) (2) ;
[1136]There has never been official acknowledgement by. either
[1138]the Mexican or U.S. Governments of this case.
[1140]SECRET
[1142]13-00000
[1144]SECRET
[1146]Item 338, page 508, Chile ©
[1148]’. Declassified. Appendix A (Covert Action in Chile
[1150]1963--1973), pages 144--209 of Senate Select Committee
[1151]Hearings, Volume 7; Covert Action
[1153]Item 339, page 509, Bolivia, Brazil
[1155]Problem area. CIA presence. in Brazil and Bolivia has not
[1156]been officially acknowledged and is classified information.
[1157]Executive Order exemption 5 (B) (2). However, David Phillip's
[1158]book, The Night Watch, Chapter 8, is titled Brazil, Venezuela.
[1159]Page 209 of | The Night Watch: concerns CIA in Bolivia.
[1163]Deas. laccon
[1165]George V. Lauder
[1167]3 \
[1168]SECRET
[1170]13-00000
[1172]SECRET
[1174]22 APR 1977
[1176]MEMORANDUM FOR: SA/DO/O
[1178]FROM : George V.. Lauder
[1179]Acting Chief, Latin America Division
[1181]SUBJECT
[1183]REFERENCE : SA/DDO/O Memorandum dated 8 April 1977
[1185]The following are the LA Division comments on the
[1186]review of the 168 court ordered deletions of subject book. .
[1188]Item 1, page 11, Chile
[1189]Classified. Dept. of State/INR
[1191]Item 3a, page 11, Chile .
[1192]Decilassified. Page 168, Senate Select Committee Hearings,
[1193]Volume 7, Covert Action
[1195]Item 3b, page 11, Chile ~e
[1196]Declassified. Pages 105, 190 of Senate Seleet Committee
[1198]Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action .
[1200]Item 4, page 12, Chile
[1201]Declassified. Page 168, Senate. Select Committee Hearings,
[1202]Volume 7, Covert Action
[1204]Item 5, page 12, Chile
[1205]Declassified. Pages 105, 190 of Senate Select Committee
[1206]Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action
[1208]Item 11, page 15, Chile .
[1210]Declassified. Pages 170, 172 Senate Select Committee
[1211]Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action and Page 231 Senate
[1212]Select Committee Interim Report on Alleged Assassination
[1213]Plots Involving Foreign Leaders
[1215]EZ IMPDET
[1216]CL BY 012180
[1218]SECRET
[1220]13-00000
[1222]we
[1224]“SECRET
[1226]Item 29, page 49, Guyana...
[1227]Classified. Executive Order . exemption 5 (B) 3
[1229]Item 46, page 70, lines 20-24, Chile
[1230]Declassified. Pages 148, 165, "166, 171 of Senate Select
[1231]Committee Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action .
[1233]Item 89, page 106, Cuba
[1234]eclassified. Senate Select
[1235]Committee Interim Report on Alleged Assassination Plots
[1236]Involving Foreign Leaders
[1238]Item 201, page 222, Brazil |
[1239]CTassified. Executive Order ‘exemption § (B) 2
[1241]Item 261, page 338, Panama.
[1242]assified. Director of Intelligence Operations, ACSI
[1244]Item 292, page 420, Chile .
[1245]eclassified. Page 205 Senate Select Committee Hearings,
[1246]Volume 7, Covert Action
[1248]Item 307, page abe, Cuba a
[1250]eclassified. Senate Select
[1251]Committee Interim Report on age 3 "Assassination Plots
[1252]Involving Foreign Leaders ;
[1254]Item 317, page 468, Chile...
[1255]Declassified. Pages 168, 189, 205 of Senate Select
[1256]Committee Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action
[1258]Item 318, pages 469, 470, Chile .
[1260]CYassified. Executive Order exemption 5 (B) (2). There
[1261]is no record that the intelligence report on which this
[1262]item was based has been declassified.
[1264]Items 322, 323, pages 473, 474, Mexico |
[1266]Classified. Executive order exemption 5 (B) (2)
[1268]There has never been official acknowledgement by either
[1269]the Mexican or U.S. Governments of this case.
[1271]SECRET
[1273]13-00000
[1275]SECRET
[1277]Item 338, page §08, Chile .
[1279]Declassified. Appendix A (Covert Action in Chile
[1281]1963--1973), pages 144--209 of Senate Select Committee
[1282]Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action
[1283]¥ .
[1285]Item 339, page 509, Bolivia, Brazil
[1286]Problem area. CIA presence in Brazil and Bolivia has not
[1288]been officially acknowledged and is classified information.
[1290]Executive Order exemption 5 (B) (2). . However, David Phillip's
[1291]book, The Night Watch, Chapter 8, is titled Brazil, Venezuela.
[1292]Page 209 of the Night. Wate “concerns CIA in Bolivia. ;
[1294]/sf Geor
[1296]George V. Lauder
[1298]SECRET
[1300]13-00000
[1302]-|* - . Pe . L. .
[1303][1 UNCLASSIFIED =) se ONLY (CONFIDENTIAL (A SECRET
[1305]— . ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
[1307]SUBJECT: (Optional)
[1309]EXTENSION
[1311]ERICH W. ISENSTEAD | | 9164
[1312]c/ccs GH-56 Hqs. 5407 21 APR 1977-
[1314]“4 TO: fficer designation, ber, and ,
[1316]“Boa fer cesgnamens room number a DATE OFFICER'S COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
[1317]: : INITIALS ta whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
[1318]RECEIVED FORWARDED
[1320]HAND CARRY
[1322]4 B 4405 Hass
[1323]4. Attn: Wm. Phelps
[1325]CALL
[1327]5.
[1328]C/LA
[1329]3 C 2019 Has. -
[1330]Attn: Wm. Sturbitt
[1332]C/NE
[1333]6 D 3107 Hgs.
[1334]Attn: George Walsh
[1337]OR RT ET
[1339]PL iLL SS BERR] ING
[1341]C/CA
[1342]3 D 0004 Hgqs.
[1343]10. Attn: Susan Watkin
[1347]SA/DO/0O
[1348]2 D
[1350]rom 610 “Eise* [] SECRET [] CONFIDENTIAL [-] INTERNAL =) UNCLASSIFIED
[1352]13-00000
[1354]te SECRET]
[1356]21 APR 1977
[1358]MEMORANDUM FOR: SA/DO/0
[1360]FROM : Erich W. Isenstead
[1361]Chief, Central Cover Staff
[1363]SUBJECT 2 The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence
[1364]y Victor Marchetti an ohn D. Marks
[1366]REFERENCE . : Memo for All Div and Certain Staffs, _
[1367]—— fr SA/DO/O, dtd 8 Apr 77, Same Subject
[1369]oe 1. Pursuant to Reference request, CCS has reviewed its.
[1370]files and effected coordination with interested components
[1371]on classification of the 26 items given to CCS for review.
[1372]Results are described below. ,
[1374]zZ. It has been determined that the following items
[1375]continue to be classified under E.0. 11652, and are exempt
[1376]from the E.0. General Declassification Schedule, as indicated
[1377]by paragraph citations in brackets:
[1379]a. Item 24, page 47 -- RTV. Classified SECRET;
[1380]describes intelligence sources and methods of oper-
[1381]ations based in Jordan. [Section 5(B)(2), (B)(3)] -
[1383]b. Item 48, page 7la -- BERLINER VEREIN.
[1384]Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources ©
[1385]and methods as related to several magazine publica-
[1386]tions. [Section 5(B)(2)] NOTE: EUR Division con-
[1387]firms the need for continued classification and will
[1388]comment separately. No CCS record.
[1390]c. Item 48, page 7la -- AFRICAN FORUM.
[1391]Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources
[1392]and methods as related to several magazine publica-
[1393]tions. [Section 5(B)(2)] NOTE: CA Staff confirms
[1394]the need for continued classification and will
[1395]comment separately. No CCS record.
[1397]d. Item 48, page 7la -- AFRICA REPORT.
[1398]Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources
[1399]and methods as related to several magazine publica-
[1401]tions. [Section 5(B)(2)] AP-Bivieter advises that .
[1402]CA S fa
[1403]WARNING NOTICE pce £2 IMPDET |
[1404]SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SO - ; CL BY 026089
[1405]AND METHODS INVOLVED S ECR ETI ;
[1407]13-00000
[1409]SECRET;
[1411]-the African American Institute, which published Africa
[1412]Report, is included in a list of Agency proprietaries
[1413]in B k
[1415]VI of the Senate Select Committee Final Report,
[1416]pg- 263. _ However, the Report. gave as its ‘source for
[1418]Ross, pp. 247n-248n. This citation should. not be con-
[1419]sidered official Government disclosure of. Agency, sponsor-
[1420]ship of the Institute. NOTE: CA Staff confirms the need
[1421]for continued classification and will comment separately.
[1423]e. Item 48, page 7la -- PREUVES. Classified SECRET;
[1424]describes intelligence sources and methods as related to
[1425]several magazine. publications. [Section 5(B)(2).] NOTE:
[1426]CA Staff confirms the need for: continued classification
[1427]and will comment separately.
[1429]f. Item 48, page 7la -- ENCOUNTER. Classified
[1431]' SECRET; describes intelligence ‘sources and methods as
[1433]related to several magazine publications. [Section
[1435].5(B).(2)] NOTE: .CA Staff confirms the need for. con-
[1437]tinued classification and will comment ‘separately.
[1439]g. Item 48, page 7la -- FORUM. Classified SECRET;
[1441]. describes intelligence sources and methods as related:
[1443]to.several magazine publications. [Section 5(B)(2)]
[1444]NOTE: CA Staff confirms the need for continued classifi-
[1445]cation and will comment separately.
[1447]h. Item 50, page 72 -- AXEL SPRINGER. Classified
[1448]SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods of.
[1449]operations based in Germany. [Section 5(B)(2)] NOTE:
[1450]EUR Division confirms the need for continued classifica-
[1451]tion and will comment separately.
[1453]i. Item 51, page. 72 .-- FODOR and FODOR GUIDES.
[1454]Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and
[1455]methods of operations based in Europe. [Section 5@)
[1457](2)] -
[1459]j. Item 55, page 80 -- RTV. Classified SECRET;
[1460]describes intelligence sources and methods of opera-
[1461]tions directed against Egypt.. [Section 5-(B)(2)-]
[1463]k. Item 56, page 81 -- RTV. Classified SECRET;
[1465]describes intelligence sources and methods of opera-
[1466]tions directed against Egypt. [Section 5(B)(2)]
[1470]SECREI.
[1472]13-00000
[1474]SECRET]
[1476]1. Items 107, 128, 129, and 279 on pages 123, 132,
[1477]133, and 403 respectively -- FAIRWAYS CORPORATION.
[1478]Classified SECRET; describe intelligence sources and
[1479]methods by identifying an operational support facility.
[1480]located in the U.S.. [Section 5(B)(2)] According to
[1481]CCS files, in April 1975 the DCI was asked by an NBC
[1482]reporter about CIA sponsorship of Fairways Corporation
[1483]in connection with a planned TV documentary on Agency:
[1484]proprietaries. CCS files are unclear on the point, but |
[1485]there are indications that.the DCI may have responded
[1486]to the question in a manner which could have been con-
[1487]strued as admission of CIA sponsorship of Fairways.
[1488]However, CCS: files contain other evidence that CIA
[1489]sponsorship of Fairways was considered still classified
[1490]as recently as December 1976. NOTE: The DDA/Air
[1491]Advisor confirms the need for continued classification
[1492]and will comment separately.
[1494]m. Item 130, page 133. -- PAN AFRICAN AIRLINES
[1495](NIGERIA) LTD. Classified SECRET ;. describes intelligence
[1496]sources and methods of operations “based in Nigeria.
[1497][Section 5(B) (2) ]
[1499]n. Item 130, page 133 -- SAFARI AIR SERVICE LTD.
[1500]Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and
[1501]methods of operations based in East Africa. [Section
[1503]5 (B) (2)]
[1505]o. Item 226, page 257 -- GRACE SHIPPING LINES.
[1506]Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and
[1507]methods by describing a cover arrangement with a com-
[1508]mercial company. [Section 5(B)(2)]
[1510]p. Item 278, page 400 -- INTERNATIONAL: CORRESPONDENCE
[1511]SCHOOLS WORLD LIMITED, INC. Referred to in the manuscript
[1512]as "a cover company which sold high school equivalency
[1513]diploma courses (advertised on the backs of match books)".
[1514]Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and
[1515]methods exposing an operation. which provided cover.
[1516][Section 5(B)(2)]
[1518]q. Item 280, page 404 -- RTV. Classified SECRET;
[1520]describes intelligence sources and methods which expose
[1521]an operation targeted against Egypt. [Section 5(B)(2)]
[1525]SECRET,
[1527]13-00000
[1529]i - SECRET;
[1531]Yo
[1533]_ 3. The. following items were heretofore classified SECRET
[1534]because they described sources and methods in identifying a
[1535]support base located in the United States, but are now con-
[1536]sidered to. have been placed in the public domain.
[1538]Items 124, 126, and 127 on pages 129 and 130 --
[1539]INTERMOUNTAIN AVIATION, INC. Intermountain Aviation,
[1540]Inc. is named as an Agency proprietary in Book I of
[1541]thé Senate Select Committee Final Report, pp. 208-9,
[1542]and in the Report of the Rockefeller Commission on
[1543]CIA Activities Within the United States, pg. 218.
[1545]4. The following items fall into the questionable area
[1546]ae as to whether they have been placed in the public domain by
[1547]. authorized Government officials:
[1549]a. Item 49, page 7la -- ROME DAILY AMERICAN.
[1551]soe = Classified SECRET. because it describes intelligence
[1552]sources and methods as related to several newspaper.
[1553]publications. . However, CCS files contain a newsclip
[1554]from the September and October 1974 edition of the
[1555]Columbia Journalism Review which states, "Landon K.
[1556]Thorne, Jr., the CIA's Bross, and a lawyer for CIA,
[1557]Benjamin Shute, then a partner in the prestigious
[1558]Wall Street law firm of Cravath, Swaine, and Moore,
[1559]now acknowledge that the fourth partner [in the
[1560]purchase of the Rome Daily American in 1956] was the |
[1561]CIA. [Bross] recently called the arrangement ‘atypical’
[1562]of what the Agency was doing, 'a bad example'." It is
[1563]questionable whether the remarks made by Mr. Bross, who
[1564]retired from the Agency in 1971, and Mr. Shute, who
[1565]left the Agency long before that, can be considered
[1566]as. constituting official Agency disclosure of this ©
[1567]information.
[1569]b. Item 54, page 80 and item 236, page 262 -- FORUM
[1570]WORLD FEATURES. Classified SECRET because they describe
[1571]intelligence sources and methods and identification of
[1572]operations based in England. Forum |
[1573]referred to -- but not by name -- in the Senate
[1574]Select Committee Final Report, page 199, ‘as follows:
[1575]"Another example of the damages of [propaganda] ‘fallout’.
[1576]involved two proprietary news services that the CIA main-
[1577]tained in Europe .... the larger of the two was subscribed
[1578]to by over 30 U.S. newspapers. In an effort to reduce the
[1579]problem of fallout, the CIA made a senior official at the
[1580]major dailies aware that the CIA controlled these two
[1584]SECRET,
[1586]13-00000
[1588]press services."' It may be argued that although Forum
[1590]‘World Features continues to be protected to a degree
[1591]by deletion of its name in the Senate Report, CIA dis-
[1592]closure to newspaper editors, if it in fact took place
[1593]and depending on how it was handled, placed the subject
[1594]in the public domain. NOTE: EUR Division and CA Staff
[1595]confirm the need for continued classification and will
[1596]comment. separately.
[1598]one ds )
[1600]ERICH W. ISENSTEAD
[1603]C/EUR
[1604]: C/LA
[1605]a C/NE
[1606]C/CA
[1608]CONCUR:
[1610]Date
[1612]22 fon.
[1613]Ae
[1615]VV FE
[1616]Date
[1618]Srl 24., 1977
[1620]Date ..
[1622]“Ze Beth
[1625]-5-.
[1627]SECRED
[1629]13-00000
[1631]“TSENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
[1633]SECREY
[1634]21 APR-OI7
[1636]MEMORANDUM FOR: SA/DO/0
[1638]FROM . : Rrich W. Isenstead
[1639]Chief, Central Cover Staff
[1641]SUBJECT : The CIA and the Curt. of intellige ence
[1643]REFERENCE : Memo for All Div and Certain Staffs,
[1644]fy SA/DO/O, dtd 8 Apr 77, Same Subject
[1646]1. Pursuant to Reference request, CCS has reviewed its
[1647]files and effected coordination with interested components
[1648]on classification of the 26 items given to CCS for review.
[1649]Results are desctibed below.
[1651]2. It has been determined that the following ‘items
[1652]continue to be classified under H.O. 11652, and are exempt
[1653]from the 8.0. General Declassification Schedule, as indicated
[1654]by paragraph citations in brackets:
[1656]a. Item 24, page 47 -- RTV. Classified SECRET;
[1657]describes intelligence sources and methods of oper-
[1658]ations based in Jordan. {Section 5(B)(2), (B) (3) l
[1660]b. Item 48, page 7la -- BERLINER VEREIN.
[1661]Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources
[1662]and methods as related to several magazine publica-
[1663]tions. [Seetion 5{B)(2)] NOTH: BUR Division con-
[1664]firms the need for continued classification and will
[1665]comment separately. No CCS record.
[1667]c, Item 48, page 7la -- AFRICAN FORUM. ;
[1668]Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources
[1669]and methods as related to several magazine publica-
[1670]tions. [Section §(B)(2}] NOTE: CA Staff confirns
[1671]the need for continued classification and will
[1672]comment separately. No CCS record.
[1674]d. Item 48, page 7la -- AFRICA REPORT.
[1675]Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources
[1676]and methods as related to several magazine publica-
[1677]tions. [Section 5(B)(2}] AF-Biviedon—advises that
[1679]cr shaff
[1681]EZ IMPDET
[1683]= cuaraaaet . a a E
[1684]WARNING NOTICE CL BY 026089
[1686]SECRET;
[1688]__ANG METHODS 4NVOLVED
[1691]13-00000
[1693]SECREL
[1695]Whe African American Institute, which published Africa
[1696]Report, is included in a list of Agency proprietaries
[1698]in Book VI of the Senate Select Committee Final Report,
[1699]pg. 263. However, the Report gave as its source for
[1701]the 11st the book The jnvisibie. Government, by Wise and
[1702]Ross, pp. 247n-248n. ¢ oh should not be con-
[1703]sidered official Government disclosure of Agency sponsor-
[1704]ship of the Institute. NOTH: CA Staff confirms the need
[1705]for continued classification and will comment separately.
[1707]6. Item 48, page 71a -- PREUVES. Classified SBCRET;
[1708]describes intelligence sources and metho#s as related to
[1709]seteral magazine publications. [Section 5(B)(2)] NOTE:
[1710]CA Staff confirms the need for continued Classification
[1711]and will comment separately,
[1713]£. Item 48, page 7la --  BNCOUNTER. Classified
[1714]SECRBT; describes intelligence gources and methods 4s
[1715]related to several magazine pubBications. [Section
[1716]5(B)(2)]. NOTH: CA Staff confirms the need for con-
[1717]tinued classification and will comment separately.
[1719]g. Item 48, page 7la -- FORUM. Classified SECRET;
[1720]describes intelligence sources and methods as related
[1721]totseveral magazine publications. [Section §(B) (2)]
[1723]NOTE: CA Staff confirms the need for continued classifi-
[1724]cation and will comment separately.
[1726]h. Item 50, page 72 -- AXEL SPRINGHR. Classified
[1727]SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods of
[1728]operations based in Germany. [Section 5(B)(2}] NOTE:
[1729]BUR Division confirms the need for continued classifica-
[1730]tion and will comment separately.
[1732]i. Item 51, page 72 -- FODOR and FODOR GUIDES.
[1733]Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and
[1734]"yee ‘of operations based in Burepe. [Section 5(B)_
[1736]2
[1738]j. Item 58, page 80 -- RTV. Classified SECRET;
[1739]describes intelligence sources and methods of opera-
[1740]tions directed against Egypt. {Section 5(B)(2)]
[1742]k. Item 56, page 81 -- RTV. Classified SECRET;
[1744]describes intelligence sources and methods of opera-
[1745]tions directed against Egypt. [Section 5(B) (2)]
[1749]SECRET
[1751]13-00000
[1753]SECR EL
[1755]1. Items 107, 128, 129, and 279 on pages 123, 132,
[1756]133, and 403 respectively -- PAIRWAYS CORPORATION.
[1757]Classified SECRET; -dtescrits intelligence sources and
[1758]methods by identifying an operational support facility
[1759]located in the U.S. [Section 5(B)(2)] According to
[1760]CCS files, in April 1975 the DCI was asked by an NBC
[1761]reporter about CIA sponsorship of Fairways Corporation
[1762]in connection with a planned TV documentary on Agency
[1763]proprietaries. CCS files are unélear on the point, but
[1764]there are indications that the DCI may have responded
[1765]to the question in a manner which could have been con-
[1766]strued as admission of CIA sponsorship of Fairways.
[1767]However, CCS files contain other evidence that CIA
[1768]sponsorship of .Fairways was considered still czassified
[1769]as recently as December 1976. NOTE: The DDA/Air
[1770]Advisor confirms the need for continued elassifieation
[1771]and will comment separately.
[1773]m, Item 130, page 133 -- PAN AFRICAN AIRLINES
[1774](NIGERIA) LTD. Classified SECRET ; describes intelligence
[1775]sources and methods of operatfoms based in Nigeria.
[1776][Section 5(B)(2)]
[1778]Item 130, page 133 += SAPART AIR SERVICE LTD.
[1779]Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and
[1780]methods of operations based in Bast Africa. [Section
[1782]5(B) (3) ]
[1784]o. Item 226, page 257 -- GRACB SHIPPING LINES.
[1785]Classified SECRET ; describes intelligence sources and
[1786]methods by describing a cover arrangement with a com-
[1787]mercial company. [Section 5(B){(2)]
[1789]p. Item 278, page 400 -- INTERNATIONAL CORRBSPONDENCE
[1790]SCHOOLS WORLD LIMITED, INC. Referred to in the manuscript
[1791]as "a cover company which sold high s¢heool equivalency
[1792]diploma courses (advertised on the backs of match books)"
[1793]Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and
[1794]methods exposing an operation which provided cover.
[1795]{Section §(B)(2)]
[1797]q.- Item 280, page 404 -- RTV. Classified SECRET;
[1799]describes intelligence sources and methods which expose
[1800]an operation targeted against Egypt. [Section $(B)(2)}
[1804]-SECREM
[1806]13-00000
[1808]aa SECRET]
[1810]oo 3. The following items were heretofore classified SECRET
[1811]because they desvribed sources and methods in identifying a
[1812]support base located in &Rhe United States, but are now con-
[1813]‘sidered to have beenpplaced in the public domain.
[1815]Items 124, 126, and 127 on pages 129,and 130 --
[1816]INTERMOUNTAIN AVIATION, INC. Intermountain Aviation,
[1817]Inc. is named as an Agency proprietary in Book I of
[1818]the Senate Select Committee Final Report, pp. 208-9,
[1819]and inthe Report of the Rockefeller Commission on
[1820]CIA Activities Within the United States, pg. 218.
[1822]4. The follgwing items fall into the questionable area
[1823]as to whether they have been placed in the public domain by
[1824]authorized Government officials:
[1826]a. Item 49, page 7la -- ROME DAILY AMERICAN.
[1827]Classified SECRET because it describes intelligence
[1828]sources and methods as related to several newspaper
[1829]publications. However, CCS files contain a news¢clip
[1830]from the September and October 1974 edition of the
[1831]‘Columbia Journalism Review which states, "Landon K.
[1833]orne, Jr., the YS Bross, and a lawyer for CIA,
[1834]Benjamin Shute, thén a partner in the prestigious
[1835]Wall Street law firm of Cravath, Swaine,.and Moore,
[1836]now acknowledge that the fourth partner [in the
[1838]purchase of the Rome Daily American in 1956] was the
[1839]CIA. [Bross} recently called the arrangement ‘atypical'
[1840]of what the Agency was doing, 'a bad example'." It is
[1841]questionable whether the remarks made by Mr. Bross, who
[1842]retired from the Agency in 1971, and Mr. Shute, who
[1843]left the Agency long before that, can be considered as
[1844]asnconstituting official Agency disclosure of this
[1845]information. ;
[1847]b. Item 54, page 80 and item 236, page 262 -- FORUM
[1848]WORLD FRATURBS. Ciassified SECRET because they describe
[1849]intelligence sources and methods and identification of
[1850]operations based in England. Forum World Features was
[1851]referred to -- but not by name -- In Book I oF the Senate
[1852]Select Committee Final Report, page 199, as follows:
[1853]"Another example of the damages of [propaganda] “*fallout'
[1854]involved two proprietary news services that the CIA main-
[1855]tained in Europe .... the larger of the two was subscribed
[1856]to by over 30 U.S, newspapers. In an effort to reduce the
[1857]problem of fallout, the CIA made a senior official at the
[1858]major dailies aware that the CIA controlled these two
[1862]SECRET’
[1865]13-00000
[1867]_ SECRET
[1869]press services." It may be argued that although Forum
[1871]World Features continues to be protected to a degrée
[1873]by deletion of its name in the Senate Report, CIA dis-
[1875]closure t6 newspaper editors, if it in fact took place
[1877]and depending on how it was handled, prgced the subject
[1878]in the public domain. NOTE: HUR. Division and CA Staff
[1879]confirm the. need for continued classification and will
[1881]comment separately.
[1883]fo, ERICH W, ISENSTEAD
[1884]7 ERICH W. ISENSTEAD
[1885]ec: C/AF |
[1887]C/EUR |
[1889]“C/LA
[1891]C/NE
[1893]C/CA
[1894]CONCUR:
[1895]Chie?, EUR Division _
[1896]Chief, LA Division me
[1897]Chief, NE Division <——
[1898]a ta Date
[1900]SECREW
[1902]13-00000
[1903]SECRET
[1904]22 APR BF
[1906]‘MEMORANDUM FOR: SA/DO/O_
[1908]—F, FROM _  : George V.. Lauder
[1909]_ Acting Chief, Latin America Division.
[1910]SUBJECT =~: + «The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence
[1911]by Victor Marchetti and John D.. Marks
[1912]REFERENCE :. SA/DDO/O Memorandum dated 8 April 1977
[1914]The following are. the LA Division comments on the
[1915]review of the 168 court ordered deletions of subject book..
[1917]Item 1, page 11, Chile
[1918]Classified. Dept. of State/INR.
[1920]. Item 3a, page 11, Chile ; ,
[1921]is Declassified. Page 168, Senate Select Committee Hearings,
[1922]Volume 7, Covert Action |. -
[1924]Item 3b, page 11, Chile
[1925]Declassified. Pages 105, i90 of Senate Select Committee.
[1926]Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action
[1928]Item 4, page 12, Chile
[1929]Declassified. Page 168, Senate Select Committee Hearings,
[1930]Volume 7, Covert Action
[1932]Item 5, page. 12, Chile
[1933]oo Declassified. Pages 105, 190 of Senate Select Committee
[1934]i Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action
[1936]Item 11, page 15, Chile
[1938]Declassified. Pages 170, 172 Senate Select Committee
[1939]Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action and Page 231 Senate
[1940]Select Committee Interim Report on Alleged Assassination
[1941]Plots Involving Foreign Leaders
[1943], E2 IMPDET
[1944]CL BY 012180
[1946]SECRET
[1948]13-00000
[1950]SECRET
[1952]Item 29, page 49, Guyana
[1953]Classified. “Executive Order exemption S (B) 3
[1955]Item 46, page 70, lines 20--24, Chile
[1956]Declassified. Pages 148, 165, 166, 171 of Senate Select
[1957]Committee Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action -
[1959]Item 89, page 106, Cuba ,
[1960]Declassified. Footnote 1, page 177, Senate Select
[1962]‘Committee Interim Report on Alleged Assassination Plots
[1964]Involving Foreign Leaders
[1966]Item 201, page 222, Brazil
[1968]Classified. “Executive Order exemption 5 (8) 2
[1970]Item 261, page 338, Panama
[1971]Classified. . Director of Intelligence Operations, ACSI
[1973]: Item 292, page 420, Chile
[1975]Declassified. Page 205 Senate Select Committee Hearings,
[1976]Volume 7, Covert Action
[1978]Item 307, page 468, Cuba ; -
[1979]Declassified. Footnote 1, page 177, Senate Select
[1980]Committee Interim Report on Alleged Assassination Plots
[1981]Involving Foreign Leaders
[1983]Ttem 317, page 468, Chile
[1985]Declassified. Pages 168, 189, 205 of Senate Select
[1986]Committee Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action
[1988]Item 318, pages 469, 470, Chile
[1990]Classified. Executive Order exemption 5 (B) (2). There
[1991]is no record that the intelligence report on which this
[1992]item was based has been declassified.
[1994]Items 322, 323, pages 473, 474, Mexico
[1995]Classified. Executive order exemption 5 (B) (2)
[1997]There has never been official acknowledgement by either
[1998]the Mexican or U.S. Governments of this case.
[2000]2
[2001]SECRET
[2003]13-00000
[2005]“SECRET
[2007]-Item: 338, page 508, Chile
[2009]Declassitied. Appendix A (Covert Action in Chile
[2010]1963--1973),.pages 144--209 of Senate Select Committee
[2011]Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action
[2013]Item 339, page 509, Bolivia, Brazil
[2015]Problem area. CIA presence in Brazil and Bolivia has not
[2016]been officially acknowledged and is classified information. ~
[2017]Executive Order exemption 5 (B) (2). . However, David Phillip's —
[2019]book, The Night Watch, Chapter 8, is titled Brazil, Venezuela.
[2021]Page 209 of The Night Watch concerns CIA ‘in Bolivia.
[2025]f La ot Lda, Loe -
[2027]George’ V. Lauder |
[2029]3
[2030]SECRET
[2032]13-00000
[2034]SECRET;
[2036]9 + APR iT .
[2037]MEMORANDUM FOR: SA/DO/0O
[2038]FROM ': Erich W. ISenstead
[2039]Chief, Central Cover Staff
[2040]SUBJECT : The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence —
[2041]By Victor Marchetti and John DB. Marks
[2042]REFERENCE =: Memo for All Div and Certain Staffs,
[2044]fr SA/DO/O, dtd 8 Apr 77, Same Subject
[2046]1. Pursuant to Reference request, CCS has reviewed its
[2047]files and effected coordination with interested components
[2048]on classification of the 26 items given to CCS for review.
[2049]Results are described below.
[2051]2. #j.QIt has been determined that the following items
[2052]continue to be classified under E.O. 11652, and are exempt
[2053]from the E.0. General Declassification Schedule, as indicated
[2054]by paragraph citations in brackets:
[2056]a. Item 24, page 47 -- RTV. Classified SECRET;
[2057]describes intelligence sources and methods of oper- .
[2058]ations based in Jordan. [Section 5(B)(2), (B}(3)] .
[2060]b. Item 48, page 7la -- BERLINER VEREIN.
[2061]“Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources
[2062]and methods as related to several magazine publica-
[2063]tions. [Section 5(B)(2)] NOTE: EUR Division con-
[2064]firms the need for continued classification and will
[2065]comment separately. No CCS record.
[2067]c. Item 48, page 7la -- AFRICAN FORUM.
[2068]Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources
[2069]and methods as related to several magazine publica-
[2071]' tions. [Section 5(B)(2)] NOTE: CA Staff confirms
[2072]the need for continued classification and will
[2073]comment separately. No CCS record.
[2075]d. Item 48, page 7la -- AFRICA REPORT.
[2076]Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources
[2077]and methods as related to several magazine publica-
[2078]tions. [Section 5(B)}(2)] AF Division advises that
[2080]E2 IMPDET
[2081]CL BY 026089
[2083]aes] SECRET!
[2085]SECRET,
[2087]the African. American Institute, which. published Africa
[2088]Report, is included in a list of Agency proprietaries
[2090]in Book VI of the Senate Select Committee Final Report,
[2091]pg- 263. However, the Report gave as its source for
[2093]the list the book The Invisible Government, by Wise and:
[2094]Ross, pp. 247n-248n. This citation should not be con-
[2095]Sidered official Governinent disclosure of Agency sponsor-
[2096]ship of the Institute.’ NOTE: CA Staff confirms the need
[2097]for continued classification and will comment separately.
[2099]e. Item 48, page 71a -- PREUVES. Classified SECRET;
[2100]describes intelligence sources and methods as related to
[2101]several magazine publications. [Section 5(B)(2}] NOTE:
[2102]CA Staff confirms the need for continued classification
[2104]and will comment separately.
[2106]£. Item 48, page 7la -- ENCOUNTER. Classified
[2107]SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods as
[2108]related to several magazine publications. [Section
[2110]7 5(B)(2)] NOTE: CA Staff confirms the need for con-
[2112]tinued classification and will comment separately.
[2114]g. Item 48, page 7la -- FORUM. Classified SECRET;
[2115]describes intelligence sources and methods as related
[2116]to several magazine publications. [Section 5(B)(2)]
[2117]NOTE: CA Staff confirms the need for continued classifi-
[2118]cation and will comment separately.
[2120]h. Item 50, page 72 -- AXEL SPRINGER. Classified
[2121]SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods of
[2122]operations based in Germany. [Section 5(B)(2)] NOTE:
[2123]EUR Division confirms the need for continued classifica-
[2125], tion and will comment separately.
[2127]i. Item 51, page 72 -- FODOR and FODOR GUIDES.
[2128]Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and
[2129]methods of operations based in Europe. [Section 5(B)
[2131](2)]
[2133]j. Item 55, page 80 -- RTV. Classified SECRET;
[2134]describes intelligence sources and methods of opera-
[2135]tions directed against Egypt. [Section 5(B)(2)]
[2137]k. Item 56, page 81 -- RTV. Classified SECRET;
[2138]describes intelligence sources and methods of opera-
[2139]tions directed against Egypt. [Section 5(B)(2)]
[2142]13-00000
[2144]SECRET;
[2146]1. Items 107, 128, 129, and 279 on pages 123, 132,
[2148]133, and 403 respectively -- FAIRWAYS CORPORATION.
[2149]_Classified SECRET; describe intelligence sources and
[2151]methods by identifying an operational support facility
[2152]located in the U.S. [Section 5(B)(2)] According to
[2153]CCS files, in April 1975 the DCI was asked by an NBC
[2154]reporter about CIA sponsorship of Fairways Corporation
[2155]in connection with a planned TV documentary on Agency
[2156]proprietaries. CCS files are unclear on the point, but
[2157]there are indications that the DCI may have responded
[2158]to the question in a manner which could have been con-
[2159]strued as admission of CIA sponsorship of Fairways.
[2160]However, CCS files contain other evidence that CIA
[2161]sponsorship of Fairways was considered still classified
[2162]as recently as December 1976. NOTE: The DDA/Air
[2163]Advisor confirms the need for continued classification
[2164]and will comment separately.
[2166]m. Item 130, page 133 -- PAN AFRICAN AIRLINES
[2167](NIGERIA) LTD. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence
[2168]sources and methods of operations “based in Nigeria.
[2169][Section 5(B) (2)]
[2171]n. Item 130, page 133 -- SAFARI AIR SERVICE LTD.
[2172]Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and
[2173]methods of operations based in East Africa. [Section
[2175]5(B) (2)]
[2177]o. Item 226, page 257 -- GRACE SHIPPING LINES.
[2178]Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and
[2179]methods by describing a cover arrangement with a com~-
[2181]mercial company. [Section 5(B) (2)]
[2183]. Item 278, page 400 -- INTERNATIONAL CORRESPONDENCE
[2184]SCHOOLS WORLD LIMITED, INC. Referred to in the manuscript
[2185]as "a cover company which sold high school equivalency
[2186]diploma courses (advertised on the backs of match books)".
[2187]Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and
[2188]methods exposing an operation which provided cover.
[2189]{Section 5(B) (2)]
[2191]q. Item 280, page 404 -- RTV. Classified SECRET;
[2192]describes intelligence sources and methods which expose
[2193]an operation targeted against Egypt.* [Section 5(B)(2)}
[2196]SR ET
[2198]3. The following items were heretofore classified SECRET
[2199]because they described sources and methods in identifying a
[2200]support base located in the United States, but are now con- .
[2201]Sidered to have been placed in the public domain.
[2203]Items 124, 126, and 127 on pages 129 and 130 --
[2204]INTERMOUNTAIN " AVIATION?" INC, Intermountain Aviation,
[2205]Inc. is named as an Agency proprietary in Book I of
[2206]the Senate Select Committee Final Report, pp. 208-9,
[2208]‘ and in the Report.of the Rockefeller Commission on
[2209]CIA Activities Within the United States, pe. 218.
[2211]: 4. The. following items fall into the questionable area
[2212]' as to whether they have been placed in the public domain by
[2213]authorized Government officials:
[2215]a. Item 49, page 71a -- ROME DAILY AMERICAN.
[2216]Classified SECRET because it describes intelligence
[2217]sources and methods as related to several newspaper
[2218]publications. However, CCS files contain a newsclip
[2219]from the September and October 1974 edition of the .
[2220]Columbia Journalism Review which states, "Landon K.
[2221]Thorne, Jr., the CIA's Bross, and a lawyer for CIA,
[2222]Benjamin Shute, then a partner in the prestigious
[2223]Wall Street law firm of Cravath, Swaine, and Moore,
[2224]now acknowledge that the fourth partner [in the
[2225]purchase of the Rome Daily American in 1956] was the
[2226]CIA. [Bross] recently called the arrangement ‘atypical'
[2227]of what the Agency was doing, 'a bad example'."’ It is
[2228]questionable whether the remarks made by Mr. Bross, who
[2229]retired from the Agency in’1971, and Mr. Shute, who
[2230]left the Agency long before that, can be considered
[2232]. as constituting official Agency disclosure of this
[2233]information.
[2235]b. Item 54, page 80 and item 236, page 262 -- FORUM
[2236]WORLD FEATURES. Classified SECRET because they describe
[2237]intelligence sources and methods and identification of
[2238]operations based in England. Forum World Features was
[2239]referred to -- but not by name -- in Book I of the Senate
[2240]' Select Committee Final Report, page 199, as follows:
[2242]- . "Another example of the damages of [propaganda] 'fallout'
[2243]involved two proprietary news services that the CIA main-
[2244]tained in Europe .... the larger of the two was subscribed
[2245]to by over 30 U.S. newspapers. In an effort to reduce the
[2246]problem of fallout, the CIA made a senior official at the
[2247]major dailies aware that the CIA controlled these two
[2250]SECRETS
[2252]press services. It may be argued that although Forum
[2253]World Features continues to be protected to a degree
[2255]by deletion of its name in the Senate Report, CIA dis-
[2256]closure to newspaper editors, if it in fact took place
[2257]and depending on how it was handled, placed the subject
[2258]in the public domain. NOTE: EUR Division and CA Staff
[2259]confirm the need for continued classification and will.
[2261]-comment separately. 1
[2263]Lone AL Go stat —
[2265]ERICH W. ISENSTEAD
[2267]“cc: C/AF
[2268]C/EUR
[2269]C/LA
[2270]C/NE
[2271]C/CA
[2273]Chief, AF Division a Date
[2274]Chief, BUR Division ; Date
[2275]lief, ivision Date
[2276]Chief, NE Division Date
[2277]ref, ta Date
[2280]13-00000
[2282][1] UNCLASSIFIED =) {TERNAL [1 CONFIDENTIAL C1 SECRET
[2284]ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET |
[2286]SUBJECT: (Optional)
[2287]Alyson Ward 6343 | pate
[2288]SIA/I (ud 1602 22 April 1977
[2289]TO: (Officer designation, room number, and | wt
[2290]building) COMMENTS (Number each comment! to show from whom
[2292]fo whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.
[2293]RECEIVED | FORWARDED )
[2295]1.
[2297]iN,
[2298]C/SIA/T 22 W
[2300]9.2, APR 1977
[2302]SA/DDO/O
[2303]2D0109 Hqs.
[2305]scot’ 610 “tose (] SECRET [[] CONFIDENTIAL ([] [NTERNAL =) UNCLASSIFIED
[2307]13-00000
[2309]SECRET
[2311]22 April 1977
[2313]MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to DDO for
[2314]; External Oversight
[2316]VIA : Chief, Staff for International Activities
[2318]FROM : Robert D. Wiecha
[2319]Chief, SIA/Israeli Branch
[2321]SUBJECT : The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence
[2322]by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks
[2324]REFERENCE : Memorandum dated 8 April 1977 from
[2325]Mr. Fendig, same subject
[2327]1... This office has reviewed the five items concerning
[2328]Israel which were deleted from subject book, and has
[2329]determined that all items are still not releasable for the
[2330]following reasons:
[2332]a. Item 182 age (196: According to Mr. Vernon
[2333]Weimar, the CIA's liaison contact in the Federal
[2334]Bureau.of Investigation, this item is still classified
[2335]"SECRET" under Executive Order (£.0.) 11652, Section -
[2336]5(B) (2) (intelligence sources and methods).
[2338]b. Item 197, page 218: This item is still
[2339]classified "SECRET" under E.0O. 11652, Section 5
[2340]_(B) (1) (foreign liaison) and (2).
[2342], c. Item-198, page 219: This item is still
[2343]classified "TOP SECRET" under E.0. 11652, Section 5
[2345](B) (2).
[2347]d. Item 224 age 252: This item is still .
[2348]classified "TOP SECRET" under E.0. 11652, Section 5
[2349](B) (2).
[2351]E2 IMPDET
[2352]CL BY 059748
[2354]SECRET
[2356]13-00000
[2358]e. Item 256 age 329: This item is still
[2359]classified “SECRET” under E.0. 11652, Section 5
[2360](B)(1) and (2).
[2362]2. Any questions regarding this memorandum should be
[2363]directed to Alyson Ward, SIA/I, extension 1602.
[2367]13-00000
[2369]SECRET
[2371]22 April 1977 Ce
[2373]MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to DDO for
[2374]Rxternal Oversight
[2376]VIA : Chief, Staff for International Activities
[2377]FROM : Robert D.. Wieche
[2379]Chief, SIA/Israeli Branch
[2380]SUBJECT : The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence
[2382]by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks
[2383]REFERENCE : Memorandum dated 8 April 1977 from
[2385]Mr. Fendig, same subject
[2387]1. This office has reviewed the five items concerning
[2388]Israel which were deleted from subject book, and has
[2389]determined that all items are still not releasable for the
[2390]following reasons: a,
[2392]a. Item 182, page 196: According to Mr. Vernon
[2393]Weimar, the CYATs page 106: contact in the Federal —
[2394]Bureau of Investigation, this item is still classified
[2395]"SECRET" under Executive Order (£.0.) 116582, Section
[2396]$(B)(2) (intelligence sources and methods).
[2398]b. Item 197 Rees e 218: This item is still
[2399]@r £.0.. 11652, Section 5
[2400](B) (1) (foreign Ladson) and (2).
[2402]c. Item a os SE This item is still
[2403]classifie under #.0. 11652, Section 5
[2404](B} (2). ;
[2406]H2 IMPDET
[2407]CL BY 059748
[2410]13-00000
[2412]SECRET
[2414]- > 9 TES 256, page 3291 This item ts stili-~ ~~
[2415]classified m@ECRET" under £.0. 11652, Section 5§
[2416](B)(1} and (2).
[2418]2. Any questions regarding this memorandum should be
[2419]directed to Alyson Ward, SIA/T, extension 1602.
[2421]Robert D. Wiecha
[2425]SECRET
[2428]13-00000
[2430]___| , | |
[2431]- (C) UNCLASSIFIED (1 Use onty C] CONFIDENTIAL [SECRET
[2433]° * . , ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
[2434]SUBJECT: (Optional) ; ye : ;
[2435]Addendum to LA Division Memorandum dtd 22 April 1977
[2437]George V. Lauder In EXTENSION
[2438]Acting Chief .
[2439]Latin America Division 1039
[2441]TO: - (Officer designation, room number, and . DATE
[2442]building) OFFICER'S COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
[2443]] - INITIAL . i .
[2444]: FORWARDED to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
[2446]SA/DO/O -
[2448]se" 610 “smere’* (] SECRET ©) CONFIDENTIAL [[] (RUERNAL §=©=—-[]_ UNCLASSIFIED
[2450]13-00000
[2452]SECRET
[2453]26 APR 1977
[2455]MEMORANDUM FOR: SA/DO/0
[2457]FROM : George V. Lauder
[2458]Acting Chief, Latin America Division
[2460]SUBJECT : Addendum to LA Division Memorandum
[2461]Dated 22 April 1977
[2463]- It was Mr. William C. Jones at Department of State,
[2464]INR/OTL who stated that item 1 page 11, item 34 page 59, and
[2465]item 337 page 509 are still classified.
[2467]2. Item 29 page 14, Chile
[2469]According to Mr. David Carpenter, State/INR/OIL
[2470]lines 14 through line 17 "So at Kissinger's urging" and
[2471]line 24 beginning "Ambassador Korry' through line 29 continue
[2472]to be classified. Line 17 beginning "the 40 Committee"
[2473]through line 24 ending "the covert action programs." has been
[2474]declassified. The substance can be found on pages 166-170,
[2475]190 and 205 of the Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7
[2477]Covert Action.
[2479]3. Item 10 page 15 Chile
[2481]Line 1 through "his nominal superior” and line 2
[2482]beginning "Meyer was'' through line 4 continue to be classified
[2483]according to Mr. Carpenter, State/INR/OIL. Lines 5 through
[2484]11 are declassified and can be found on pages 167-169 of
[2485]Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7 Covert Action.
[2487]4, Item 261 page 338 was discussed with Mr. Merrill T.
[2488]Kelly, Director, Intelligence Operations ACSI by Seymour
[2489]Young, PCS/LSN. Mr. Kelly stated the item is still classified.
[2491]Lag. loo cen
[2492]GeorgA V. Lauder
[2495]4
[2497]Le Auinine ST GL ORY. ANF... i
[2499]SECRET
[2501]13-00000
[2504]in
[2505]to
[2507]t
[2508]a
[2510]i
[2511]B
[2512]4
[2515]B
[2517]SECRET .
[2518]26 APR 1977
[2520]MEMORANDUM FOR: SA/DO/0
[2522]FROM : George V. Lauder
[2523]Acting Chief, Latin America Division
[2525]SUBJECT : Addendum to LA Division Memorandum
[2526]Dated 22 April 1977.-:
[2528]1. It was Mr. William C. Jones at Department of State,
[2529]INR/OIL who stated that item 1 page 11, item 34 page 59, and
[2530]item 337 page 509 are still classified.
[2532]‘2. Item 3/9 page 14, Chile
[2534]' According to Mr. David Carpenter, State/INR/OIL
[2535]lines 14 through line 17 "So at Kissinger's urging" and ;
[2536]line 24 beginning "Ambassador Korry" through line 29 continue
[2537]to be classified. Line 17 beginning "the 40 Committee" J
[2538]through line 24 ending ''the covert action programs." has been
[2539]declassified. The substance can be found on pages 166-170,
[2540]190 and 205 of the Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7
[2541]Covert Action.
[2543]3. Item 10 page 15 Chile
[2545]Line 1 through "his “nominal superior" and line 2
[2546]beginning "Meyer was" through line 4 continue to be classified
[2547]according to Mr. Carpenter, State/INR/OIL. Lines 5 through
[2548]11 are declassified and can be found on pages 167-169 of
[2550]Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7 Covert Action.
[2552]4. Item 261 page 338 was discussed with Mr. Merrill T.
[2553]Kelly, Director, intelligence Operations ACSI by Seymour
[2554]Young, PCS/LSN. Mr. Kelly stated the item is still classified.
[2556]Is/ George V. Lauder,
[2558]George V. Lauder
[2560]SECRET
[2562]13-00000
[2564]e .
[2565])unclassirit (INTERNAL [] CONFIDENTIAL ——-([[]_ SECRET
[2567]Oo ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
[2569]SUBJECT: (Optional)
[2570]DATE ,
[2571]25 April 1977
[2573]OFFICER'S COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
[2574]INITIALS to whom. Drow a line across column after each comment.)
[2576]Marchetti-Marks Manuscript
[2578]TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
[2579]building)
[2583]2. S -
[2585]JiltER om
[2587]HE
[2589]sar 610 “torore’®’ (] SECRET ([] CONFIDENTIAL ([(] [NTERNAL §=©6=«- [7] UNCLASSIFIED
[2591]13-00000
[2593]ca.
[2597]timely
[2599]eam ges ore a) APR ‘er7
[2600]SECRET
[2601]MEMORANDUM FOR: SA/DO/O 7
[2602]FROM: Donald J. Purcell
[2603]Chief, Covert Action Staff
[2604]SUBJECT: The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence
[2606]by Victor. Marchetti and John D. Marks
[2608]REFERENCE: Memo for All Divisions and Certain Staffs,
[2609]from SA/DO/O, 8 April 1977, same subject
[2611]Following are Covert Action Staff comments on items
[2612]24, 48, 54, 55, 56, 236, and 280, which are among the
[2613]passages containing classified information that were de-
[2614]leted before publication of the Marchetti-Marks manuscript:
[2616]a) Items 24 (p. 47), 55 (p. 80), 56 (p. 81),
[2617]and 280 (p. 404) are classified secret, and are
[2618]exempt from publication under Section 5 (b) (2) of
[2619]EO 11652, which protects intelligence sources and
[2620]methods of operation. Specifically, these items
[2621]name RTV, Inc. and describe it as a CIA proprietary:
[2622]that was used for clandestine operations in a variety
[2623]of countries. In addition, items 55 and 56 are
[2624]especially sensitive because they describe an opera-
[2625]tion in Jordan, exposure of which could be harmful to
[2626]United States relations in the Middle East ( Section
[2627]5 b 3).
[2629]b) Items 54 and 236 (on p. 80 and p. 262) are
[2630]classified secret, and are exempt from publication —
[2631]under Section 6) (b) (2) of EO 11652, which protects
[2632]intelligence sources and methods of operation. These
[2633]items name Forum World Features, describe it as a CIA
[2634]proprietary that was used for clandestine propaganda
[2635]operations, specify that the clandestine operations
[2636]were directed especially at the Third World, and further
[2637]specify that the man who ran FWF was an experienced
[2638]CIA operator. It may be worth noting that the Senate
[2639]Select Committee declined to publish the name of this
[2640]clandestine proprietary when the Agency advised the
[2641]Committee that publication would damage the former
[2642]director of Forum World Features, who had entered into
[2643]a clandestine relationship with the U.S. Government in
[2644]good faith. :
[2646]13-00000
[2648]prone
[2650]Cc
[2651]}-
[2652]i
[2654]€.
[2655]r
[2658]c) Item 48 (p. 7la) is classified secret, and
[2659]is exempt from publication under Section 5 (b) (2)
[2660]of EO 11652, which protects intelligence sources and
[2661]methods.of operation. This item names African Forun,
[2662]Africa Report, Preuves, Encounter, and Forum as
[2663]Magazines that received CIA subsidies. In the case
[2664]of Preuves, Encounter, and Forum, these magazines were
[2665]published by the former Congress for Cultural Freedom.
[2666]The Government has not acknowledged covertty subsidizing
[2667]CCF or its magazines, although Encounter magazine's
[2668]ties to CIA have been the subject of press speculation.
[2669]Preuves magazine has been the subject of little or no
[2670]press speculation, as far as we know, and it is our
[2671]understanding that French laws prohibit covert foreign
[2672]subsidies to French publications, which makes it
[2673]especially important to protect the former CIA tie to
[2674]: that magazine. Exposure of the two Africa magazines
[2675]: would be damaging to a number of prominent people and
[2676]organizations in this country and in Africa that have
[2677]worked for improved social conditions in Africa and for
[2678]good relations between this country and Africa, which
[2679]would be harmful to this country's relations with Africa.
[2681](Section 5 b 3)
[2685]13-00000
[2687]|
[2688]C1. UNCCASSIFIED =) uPA (1) CONFIDENTIAL [1 secrer
[2690]ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
[2692]SUBJECT: (Optional)
[2694]Richard S.. Sampson EXTENSION
[2695]Chief, European Division
[2697]0.
[2698]OATE 2 5 APR 1977
[2700]TO: (Officer designation, room number, and DATE
[2702]building) OFFICER'S | COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
[2704]INITIALS to whom. Draw a fine across column after each comment.)
[2705]RECEIVED FORWARDED
[2707]rome 610 ER (SECRET ©] CONFIDENTIAL [J INTERNAL = (7) UNCLASSIFIED
[2709]13-00000
[2711]SECRET
[2713]MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to DDO for
[2714]External Oversight
[2716]FROM:. Richard S. Sampson
[2717]Chief, European Division
[2719]SUBJECT: Marks-Marchetti Manuscript:
[2720]Review of Deletions i
[2722]1. As requested, the European Division has reviewed
[2723]the items pertaining to Europe which were deleted from the
[2724]original manuscript because of the Agency position they were
[2725]classified information. We can find only one instance in
[2726]which an authorized official of the U.S. Government has
[2727]placed any of these references in the public domain since
[2728]first publication of the book. The specific references are
[2729]listed below, together with the grounds. for classification
[2730]and the components who have been consulted.
[2732]2. References which European Division believes are
[2733]still classified and should remain so are:
[2735]E.0. 11652
[2737]-Name/Cite # /Page _ Exemption Category ' Coordination
[2738]Alex Springer (#50, ‘p 72) ; 5 (b) 2 EUR/G
[2739]Rome Daily American (#49, .
[2741]p 71a) 5 (b) 2 ccS, EUR/Italy
[2742]Magazines: Preuves, Forum .
[2744](#48, p 71a) - 5 (b) 2. CA
[2745]Encounter (#48, p 7la) _ See note
[2746]Forum World Features
[2748](#54, #256, p 80, p 262) 5 (b) 2 CA, EUR/BC
[2750]E2 IMPDET
[2751]CL BY 003283
[2753]13-00000
[2755]SECRET
[2757]E.0O. 11652
[2758]Name/Cite #/Page Exemption Category Coordination ;
[2759]LCPIPIT (#334, 335, 336, :
[2760]p 483-4) 5 (b) 3 CA
[2761]Bases in Germany (#234, ;
[2762]p 262) 5 (b) 3 EUR/G, CCS
[2763]Release of. Satellite
[2764]photos to British (#62, :
[2765]p 86) 5 (b) 2 EUR/BC
[2766]Liaison relations |
[2767]CANUKUS (#194, 5, 7,
[2768]p 215, 6, 8) (#308, p 437) 5 (b) 2 EUR/BC :
[2769]Liaison, others (#196, 225,
[2770]333, p 217, 253, 483) 5 (b) 2 AF
[2771]MAKARIOS, Base rental
[2772]deal (#296, 298, 300
[2773]p 425, 426) 5 (b) 1 EUR/CGT
[2774]Political subsidies: SPD, CDU,
[2775]Italy (#21, 273, p 45, 380) S (b) 3 ' BUR/Italy
[2776]Willy Brandt (#18 - 20, 28, 52,
[2777]p 42-45, 48, 77) 5 (b) 2 EUR/G
[2779]were provided to Encounter through the Congress for Cultural
[2780]®: Freedom has been released under the FOIA and Privacy Act.
[2782]ya?
[2783]“ch NOTE: CA Staff advises that information admitting CIA funds
[2784]Ne
[2786]RSS
[2788]Richard S. mpson
[2790]Sei |
[2792]25 APR 1977
[2794]MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to DDO for
[2795]External Oversight
[2797]FROM: Richard S, Sampson
[2798]Chief, European Division
[2800]SUBJECT: ; Marks-Marchetti Manuscript:
[2801]Review of Deletions
[2803]1. As requested, the European Division has reviewed
[2804]the items pertaining to Europe which were deleted from the
[2805]original manuscript because of the Agency position they were
[2806]Classified information. We can find only one instance in
[2807]which an authorized official of the U.S. Government has
[2808]placed any of these references in the public domain since
[2809]first publication of the book. The specific references are
[2810]listed below, together with the grounds for classification
[2811]and the components who have been consulted.
[2813]2. References which European Division believes are
[2814]‘still classified and should remain so are:
[2816]| ; E.O. 11652
[2818]Name/Cite #/Page Exemption Category Coordination
[2819]Alex Springer (#50, p 72) 5 (b) 2 EUR/G
[2820]Rome Daily American (#49,
[2822]p 71a) 5 (b) 27 CCS, EUR/Italy ~
[2823]Magazines: Preuves, Forum
[2825](#48, p 71a) 5 (b) 2 _ CA
[2826]Encounter (#48, p 7la) , See note .
[2827]Forum World Features
[2829](#54, #256, p 80, p 262) 5 (b) 2 CA, EUR/BC
[2831]E2 IMPDET
[2832]CL By 003283
[2834]~ SECRET
[2836]13-00000
[2838]Neme/Cite #/Page
[2840]LCPIPIT (#334, 335, 336, |
[2842]p 483-4)
[2844]Bases in Germany (#234,
[2845]p 262)
[2847]Release of Satellite
[2848]photos to British (#62,
[2849]p 86) .
[2851]Liaison relations
[2852]CANUKUS (#194, 5, 7
[2856]E.O. 11652,
[2857]Exemption Category
[2859]S (b) 3
[2861]S (b) 3
[2863]S (b) 2
[2865]p 215, 6, 8) (#308, p 437): . 5S (b) 2
[2867]Liaison, others (#196, 225,
[2869]333, p 217, 253, 483)
[2871]MAKARIOS, Base rental
[2872]deal (#296, 298, 300
[2873]p 425, 426)
[2875]S (b) 2
[2877]5 (b) 1
[2879]Political subsidies: SPD, CDU,
[2881]Italy (#21, 273,
[2883]Willy Brandt (#18 - 20, 28,
[2885]p 42-45, 48, 77)
[2887]on
[2889]C
[2890]pomp Ne
[2892]“¢
[2894]DDO/EUR/FP/FC:William Phelps:kdh
[2896]Distribution:
[2897]Orig §& 1 - Addressee
[2898]1 - C/EUR
[2899]1 - E/FP/FC
[2901]p 45, 380) 5 (b) 3
[2903]52,
[2904]5 (b) 2
[2907]SECRET
[2909]Coordination
[2911]CA
[2913]EUR/G, CCS
[2914]EUR/BC
[2916]EUR/BC
[2918]AF
[2920]EUR/CGT
[2921]EUR/Italy
[2923]EUR/G
[2925]NOTE: CA Staff advises that information admitting CIA funds
[2926]penn were provided to Encounter through the Congress for Cultural
[2927]. Freedom has been released under the FOIA and Privacy Act.
[2929]RS Serpe
[2930]Richard S. mpson
[2932](25 April 77) (x1872)
[2935]13-00000
[2937]‘CO UNCLASSIFIED = [INTERNAL C1 CONFIDENTIAL [1 SECRET
[2938]mS ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
[2942]SUBJECT: (Optional)
[2944]. SE/OSG"
[2945]5B4806
[2947]TO: (Officer designation, room number, and | ae :
[2949]building) : OFFICER'S. COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
[2951]: F receiveo | roRwanoeD | INITIALS to whom. Drow o line across column after each comment.)
[2952]RECEIVED FORWARDED
[2955]SA/DO/O
[2956]2D0109
[2958]rom 610 “Esmee ] SECRET (] CONFIDENTIAL [] INTERNAL = [7] UNCLASSIFIED
[2960]13-00000 9
[2962]SECRET
[2963]pg APR 1877
[2965]MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant ‘to DDO for External Oversight
[2967]FROM : George T. Kalaris ©
[2968]Chief, Soviet/East European Division
[2970]SUBJECT. : The CIA ‘and. ‘the Cult of Intelligence
[2971]by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks
[2973]REFERENCE : Your Memorandum, Same Subject,
[2974]dated 8 April 1977
[2976]1. We have reviewed the seven items relating to
[2977]SE Division interests of the 168 items deleted in.1974
[2978]from the Marchetti and Marks' book, The CIA and the Cult
[2979]of Intelligence, againt official disclosures and have
[2981]determined that with one exception, the items are still
[2982]properly classified under Executive Order 11652:
[2984]A. Item No. 53 relating to NTS remains
[2985]classified SECRET. It describes intelligence ©
[2986]‘sources and methods of operations directed
[2987]against the Soviet Union. It is exempt from
[2988]the General Declassification Schedule of ;
[2989]Executive Order 11652, exemption category 5B(3).
[2991]B. Item Nas. 58, 59 and 63 relating to
[2992]the Penkovskiy Papers remains classified SECRET.
[2993]They describe intelligence sources and methods
[2994]of an operation directed against the Soviet Union.
[2995]They are exempt from the General Declassification
[2997]Schedule of Executive Order 11652, exemption
[2998]category 5B(3).
[3000]C. Item Nos. 148 and 149 relating to the
[3001]AEIDOL case remain classified SECRET. They —
[3002]describe intelligence sources and methods of an
[3003]operation based in Tokyo directed against the
[3004]Soviets and also identify Agency personnel under
[3005]cover.
[3007]WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS
[3008]INVOLVED
[3010]SECRET E2 IMPDET
[3011]CL BY 014652
[3013]13-00000
[3015]_SS=
[3017]SECRET
[3019]2. The one item excepted is Item No. 57. This item
[3020]relates to the Penkovskiy Papers. Marchetti and Marks wrote
[3021]in their manuscript: ne oF the CIA's most famous venture
[3022](sic) in book publishing was The Penkovsky Papers (sic).
[3024]This chronicle of spying for the West inside the Kremlin
[3025]appeared in 1965, and it was allegedly taken from the journal
[3027]of the actual spy, Colonel Oleg Penkovsky."' The Penkovski
[3028]Papers are mentioned in the Final Report of the Select Committee
[3030]to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence
[3031]Activities, Book I, page 194, dated 26 April 1976, as follows:
[3033]"Another CIA book, the Penkovskiy Papers, was
[3034]published in the United States in 196s "for
[3035]operational reasons', but actually became commer-
[3036]cially viable. The book was prepared and written
[3037]by witting Agency assets who drew on actual case
[3038]materials. Publication rights to the manuscript
[3039]were sold to a publisher through a trust fund
[3040]which was established for the purpose. The publisher
[3041]was unaware of any U.S. Government interest."
[3043]3. In view of this published statement by the Senate
[3044]Select Committee, Item No. 57 has been placed in the public
[3046]domain by official disclosure by the United States. It can
[3047]no longer be considered classified under Executive Order 11652.
[3049]Ll MA |
[3050]George T. Kelaris\
[3052]SECRET
[3054]13-00000
[3056]SECRET : 7
[3057]og APR WI!
[3059]MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to DDO. for External Oversight
[3060]_ FROM - t George T. Kalaris oe ae
[3061]po Chief, Soviet/East. European Division
[3063]_[ sussect + The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence
[3064]ae by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks
[3066]po REFERENCE. - ? Your Memorandum, Same. Subject,
[3067]mo, : dated 8 April 1977
[3069]1. We have reviewed the seven items relating. to
[3070]SE Division interests of the 168 items deleted in 1974
[3071]from the Marchetti and Marks! book, The CIA and the Cult:
[3073]determined chat with one exception, the items are still
[3074]properly classified under Executive Order 11652:
[3076]A. Item No. 53 relating to NTS remains
[3077]classified SECRET. It describes intelligence
[3078]sources and methods of operations directed
[3079]against the Soviet Union. It is exempt from
[3080]-the General Declassification Schedule of
[3081]Executive Order 11652, exemption category 5B(3).
[3083]B. Item Nos. 58, 59 and 63 relating.to
[3084]the Penkovskiy Papers remains classified SECRET.
[3085]They describe intelligence sources and methods
[3086]of an operation directed against the Soviet Union.
[3087]- They are exempt from the General Declassification
[3088]Schedule of Executive Order 11652, exemption
[3089]_ category 5B(3).
[3091]C. Item Nos. 148 and 149 relating to the”
[3093]AEIDOL case remain classified SECRET. They
[3095]describe intelligence sources and methods of an
[3097]operation based in Tokyo. directed against the
[3099]Soviets and also identify Agency personnel under
[3100]cover.
[3102]WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS
[3103]INVOLVED
[3105]SECRET E2 IMPDET .
[3106]CT. RY A146?
[3108]13-00000
[3109]Tt ee SECRET
[3111]- 2. The one item ‘excepted is Item No. 57. This item
[3112]relates to the Penkovskiy Papers. . Marchetti and Marks wrote -
[3113]in their manuscript: “One of the CIA's most famous venture -
[3115]sic) in book publishing was The Penkovsky Papers (sic). —
[3117]his chronicle of spying for the West inside the Kremlin
[3118]‘appeared in 1965, and it was allegedly taken from the journal
[3119]of the actual ‘Spy, Colonel Oleg Penkovsky." The Pen covakey
[3121]; “Another CIA: book, the Penkovskiy Papers, was:
[3122]ouch" in the United States in 1965 ° oe
[3123]‘ operational reasons', but actually. became commer-
[3124]' cially viable. The. book was prepared and written
[3125]j; by witting Agency assets who drew on actual case
[3126]: / materials. Publication rights to the manuscript
[3127]Tors / were sold to a publisher through a trust fund
[3128]if which was established for the purpose. The publisher
[3129]J! was unaware of any U.S. Government interest. "
[3131]3. In view of this published statement by the Senate
[3132]Select Committee, Item No. 57 has been placed in the public
[3133]‘domain by official disclosuré by the United States. It can
[3134]no longer be considered classified under Executive Order 11652.
[3136]|
[3139]Ue Oe
[3140]‘ George T. Kalaris\
[3142]DDO/SE:JDKenney (x1705 26 April 1977)clh
[3144]Distribution:
[3146]: Orig § 1 - Addressee » 2 - SE/OSG
[3147]i 1 - SE/RAO
[3148]1 - SE/CI
[3150]SECRET
[3152]13-00000
[3154]© Fy unevassteio INTERNAL [) CONFIDENTIAL SECRET
[3155]a ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
[3157]SUBJECT: (Optional)
[3159]Memorandum
[3161]EXTENSION
[3163]parE A 7
[3164]WH April 1977
[3165]TO: (Officer designation, room number, and :
[3166]building) * - . OFFICER'S | COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
[3167]: Lo . INITIALS fo whom. Draw a line acress.column after each comment.)
[3169]SA/DO/O
[3170]Attn: Mr. P.
[3171]Room: 2D 01.09
[3173]seeo’ 610 “eathene* [] SECRET ([] CONFIDENTIAL [[] {WTERNAL =. (7) UNCLASSIFIED
[3175]13-00000
[3177]a
[3180]9
[3181]ten!
[3183]Chel
[3185]- 27 APR 1977
[3187]MEMORANDUM FOR: SA/DO/O
[3188]ATTENTION : Mr. Philip F. Fendig
[3190]FROM : Samuel H. Rickard
[3191]Chief of Operations, NE Division
[3193]SUBJECT : The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence by
[3195]Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks
[3197]1. The following deleted items in subject book have been
[3198]oe placed in the public domain as cited below:
[3199]a. Item 72, page 97: This item, which was placed in.
[3200]1 he public domain in.Harry Rositzke's book, The CIA's Secret
[3201]erations, on pages 173 and 174, is a problem area. The author
[3202]rae) this book is a former senior CIA officer who allowed the
[3203]got wAgency to review his manuscript prior to publication. However,
[3204]CIA did not approve the manuscript for publication and, there-
[3205]fore, in our view Item 72 remains classified under Executive.
[3206]Order 11652 under Exemption 5B (2).
[3208]b. Item 152, page 165 and Item 28, page 48: These
[3209]two items also fall in a problem area. The following references
[3210]to CIA's special relationship with the Shah of Iran imply, but
[3211]ent ze do not.specifically state, that such a relationship exists. See
[3212]‘Book 1 of the Select Committee to Study Governmental O erations
[3213]pant ioe Respect: to o Intelligence Tigence Activities, page 552, and Ray S.
[3214]- Cline's book entitled, Secrets, Spies and Scholars; Blueprint
[3215]. Sadar OL the Essential CIA, pages 131 and 132. Additionally, though
[3216]weer, “Cline, a former senior CIA officer, allowed the Agency to
[3217]neues his manuscript prior to publication, CIA did not approve
[3219]he manuscript for publication. Therefore, in our view Items
[3220]52 and 28 remain classified under Executive Order 11652 under
[3221]f Exemption 5B (2). .
[3223]as 2. The following items remain classified under Executive
[3224]Order 11652:
[3226]Item Manuscript Page uxemption
[3227]55 80 SB (2)
[3228]24 47 5B (2)
[3229]56 81 SB (2)
[3231]280 404 5B (2)
[3233]182° 165 5B (2)
[3235]E2 IMPDET
[3236]CL BY 056382
[3239]13-00000
[3241]t
[3242]i
[3243]H
[3245]Item Manuscript Page Exemption
[3246]23 46 5B (2}
[3247]22 46 5B (2) (3)
[3248]73 ; 97 5B (2)
[3249]172 189. 5B (2)
[3250]74 98 5B (2)
[3251]331 482 5B (2) (3)
[3252]332 482 5B (2) (3)
[3253]160 ; 182 5B (2)
[3254]224 ; 252 5B (2)
[3255]159 181 an 5B (2) (3)
[3256]160 ; 182 5B (2)
[3257]161 183 5B (2)
[3258]162 184 SB (2)
[3260]v . AY
[3261]Rast H. Rickard
[3263]20 gape
[3264]wna]
[3266]13-00000
[3268]- } | | by
[3269]er ion Y gomeentes
[3271]v9 Cot
[3273]hes
[3274]A) alien 239, page 509 mention
[3276]Reed
[3277]tA aw y
[3278]sts 231) Compe walid  S
[3279]aa an
[3283]WSC aga an
[3284])geny s tre a orion
[3285]Cc
[3287]coleman.
[3288]ble na ph
[3289]Rat gmt f 5.
[3290]| Fe a
[3291]. yo Hin 339 + ~
[3292]Qa, ctr ¢ |
[3293]7 peal mn peng
[3294]DA Wg dayne als “aE ow
[3295]- ae > 4
[3298]13-00000
[3300]te . INTERNAL
[3301][-) UNCLASSIFIED (J) se omy
[3303](-] CONFIDENTIAL
[3305]SUBJECT: (Optional)
[3307][] SECRET
[3308]ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET , .
[3310]_ Marchetti/Marks Book
[3311]FROM: |
[3312]Chief, Africa/Plans
[3314]TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
[3315]building)
[3317]DATE 24 APR 4977
[3319]OFFICER'S
[3320]INITIALS | to
[3321]SA/DO/0
[3323]COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
[3324]whom.
[3325]Attn: Mr
[3327]. Shepanek
[3329]Draw a fine across column after each comment.)
[3331]; FORM 610% PREVIOUS
[3333]EDITIONS
[3335]INTERNAL ~
[3337][] secret ([] CONFIDENTIAL [] se onty
[3339]13-00000
[3341]a SECRET
[3343]2 7 APR 1977
[3345]MEMORANDUM FOR: SA/DO/O
[3346]ATTENTION : Mr. Norbert Shepanek
[3348]FROM : Edward J. Foy, Jr.
[3349]Chief, Africa/Plans
[3351]SUBJECT : Marchetti/Marks Book
[3353]1. Mr. Sam Halperin has questioned our request
[3354]that Item 339, page 509 remain classified on the ground
[3355]that references to CIA activities in the Congo in an
[3356]official report of the U.S. Senate declassified the
[3357]reference to the Congo.
[3359]2. The existence of a CIA presence in the Congo
[3360]is reported in an interim report of the Senate Select
[3361]Committee on Intelligence dated 20 November 1975. It
[3362]may be argued therefore that to agree to declassification
[3364]. of the reference to the Congo would have the effect of
[3365]singling out the Congo in the Third World as an alleged
[3366]target of CIA operations. This would have an adverse
[3367]effect on our relations with the government of Zaire.
[3369]We believe the item should remain classified and that
[3370]exemption 5(b)(3) would apply in the case of the Congo.
[3372]Foyy Jr.
[3374]ING fone
[3375]© SOURCES
[3377]E2° IMPDET
[3378]CL BY 009904
[3380]SECRET
[3382]13-00000
[3386]_#
[3388]27 APR O77
[3390]MEMORANDUM FOR: SA/DO/O
[3391]ATTENTION : Mr. Norbert Shepanek
[3393]t
[3395]FROM : Edward J. Foy, Jr. ; i
[3396]Chief, Africa/Plans mt
[3398]|
[3400]SUBJECT : Marchetti/Marks Book
[3402]a)
[3404]1. Mr.. Sam Halperin has questioned our request
[3405]that Item 339, page 509 remain classified on the ground
[3406]that references to CIA activities in the Congo in an.
[3407]official report of the U.S. Senate declassified the
[3408]reference to the Congo.
[3410]2. The existence of a CIA presence in the Congo
[3412]_ is reported in an interim report of. the Senate Select
[3413]Committee on Intelligence dated 20 November 1975. It
[3414]may be argued therefore that to agree.to declassification
[3415]of the reference to the Congo would have the effect of
[3416]singling out the Congo in the Third World as an alleged
[3417]target of CIA operations. This would have an adverse
[3418]effect on our relations with the government of Zaire.
[3419]We believe the item should remain classified and that
[3420]exemption 5(b)(3) would apply in the case of the Congo.
[3422]/s/ EDWARD J. FOY, JB
[3423]Edward J. Foy, Jr. ais
[3425]EZ IMPDET
[3426]CL BY 009904 |
[3429]13-00000
[3431][1 UNCLASSIFIED “= (—) {TERNAL ) (] CONFIDENTIAL =. [[] SECRET
[3433]ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
[3434]SUBJECT: (Optional)
[3436]FROM: : EXTENSION | NO.
[3438]DATE
[3440]C/AF/PLS 1326 21 April 1977 |
[3441]TO: (Officer designation, room number, and | are .
[3442]building) OFFICER'S | COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
[3444](NITIALS whom. i .
[3445]receiven | FORWARDED to whom, Draw a line ocross column after each comment.)
[3447]SA/DDO/0O
[3449]Attn: Mr. Shepanek _
[3451]FORM PREVIOUS
[3453]rom 610 “iomere* [] SECRET © ([] CONFIDENTIAL [[] [ATFRNAL =) UNCLASSIFIED
[3455]13-00000
[3457]oe SECRET)
[3458]21 APR 1977
[3460]MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to DDO for
[3461]External Oversight
[3463]ATTENTION a Mr. Norbert A. Shepanek
[3464]FROM : Edward J. Foy, Jr.
[3465]Chief, Africa Plans
[3466]- SUBJECT : The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence
[3467]RE FE RENCE : SA/DO/O Memo dated 8 April 1977, Same Subject
[3469]1. The information which pertains to Africa and which
[3470]was deleted by court order from subject book remains
[3471]classifiable and classified. The information is national
[3472]security information, bears directly on the conduct of our
[3473]foreign affairs and requires protection from unauthorized
[3474]disclosure. None of the items of information ordered
[3475]deleted from the book by the courts has been declassified
[3476]by. any United States Government official authorized to
[3477]-declassify national security information.
[3479]2. The exemptions which apply to the deleted items
[3480]are as follows:
[3482]Item 29, Page 49 Exemptions 5(B) (2) (3)
[3483]Item 79, Page 100 Exemptions 5(B) (1) (2) (3)
[3484]Items 283 and 284, Exemption 5(B) (3)
[3486]Page 413
[3487]Items 286 and 287, Exemptions 5(B) (3)
[3489]Page 414
[3490]Item, 287a, Page 415 . Exemption 5(B) (3)
[3491]Item 288, Page 416 Exemption 5(B)}(1) (2) (3)
[3492]Items 290 and 291, Exemption 5(B) (1) (2) (3)
[3494]Page 417
[3496]E2 IMPDET
[3498]CL BY 009904
[3500]WARNING NOTICE
[3501]SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
[3502]AND METHODS JNVOLVED
[3504]SECRET!
[3506]13-00000
[3508]ce SECRET)
[3510]3. The following items, all of which relate to matters
[3511]of concern to Africa Division, also remain classified:
[3513]Item 41, Page 6fS Exemption 5(B) (2) (3)
[3515]Item 42, Page 65a Exemption 5(B) (2) (3)
[3516]Item 47, Page 71 Exemption: 5(B) (2) (3)
[3517]Item 48, Page 7la ' Exemption 5(B) (2) (3)
[3518]Item 55, Page 80 Exemption 5(B) (2)
[3520]Item 130, Page 133. Exemption 5(B) (2)
[3522]Item 170, Page 189 Exemption 5(B) (2) (3)
[3523]Item 197, Page 218 Exemption 5(B) (1) (2) (3)
[3525]Item 198, Page 219 Exemption 5(B) (1) (2) (3)
[3527]Page 427 .
[3529]Item 301, Exemption 5(B) (1) (2) (3)
[3530]Item 339, Page 509 Exemption 5(B) (1) (2) (3)
[3531]4, Items 283, 284, 286, 287, 287a, 288, 290 and 291
[3533]pertain to National Security Council proceedings.
[3535]Mr. William Edmondson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
[3536]for African Affairs, and Mr. Paul Henze, National Security
[3537]Council: staff, have been informed by telephone this date
[3538]that CIA will refuse the request of the attorney of
[3540]Mr. Marchetti and Mr. Marks to declassify these items.
[3544]SEGRET
[3546]13-00000
[3548]& 1 APR 1977
[3550]MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to DDO for
[3551]External Oversight
[3553]ATTENT ION : Mr. Norbert A. Shepanek
[3554]FROM : Edward J. Foy, Jr.
[3555]Chief, Africa Plans
[3556]SUBJECT : The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence
[3557]_ REFERENCE : SA/DO/O Nemo dated 8 April 197, Sane Subject
[3559]1. The information. which pertains to Africa and which |
[3561]was deleted by court order from subject book remains
[3563]' Classifiable and classified. The information is national
[3564]security information, bears directly on the conduct of our
[3565]foreign affairs and requires protection from unauthorized
[3566]disclosure. None of the items of information ordered .
[3567]deleted from the book by the courts has been declassified
[3568]by any United States Government official.authorized to
[3569]-declassify national security information.
[3571]; 2. The exemptions which apply to the deleted items
[3572]are as follows:
[3574]Item 29, Page 49 “Exemptions 5(B) (2) (3)
[3576]‘Item 79, Page 100  ~— Exemptions 5(B)(1) (2) (3)
[3577]Items 283 and 284, Exemption 5(B) (3)
[3578]~ Page 413. a
[3579]Items 286 and 287, - ‘Exemptions 5 (B) (3)
[3580]~  . Page 414.
[3581]Item, 287a, Page 415 Exemption 5(B) (3) |
[3582]Item 288, Page 416 Exemption 5(B)(1)(2)(3) °
[3583],
[3584]Items 290 and 291, Exemption 5(B)(1)(2)(3) :
[3585]Page 417. 7
[3588]CL BY 009904
[3590]SOR
[3592]WARNING NOTICE
[3593]SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
[3594]AND METHODS INVOLVED
[3597]13-00000
[3599]we SECRET!
[3601]t
[3602]1
[3604]3. The following items, all of which relate to matters |
[3605]of concern to Africa Division, also remain classified: :
[3606]Item 41, Page 645 Exemption 5(B) (2) (3) |
[3607]Item 42, Page 65a Exemption 5(B) (2) (3)
[3608]Item 47, Page 71 Exemption 5(B) (2) (3)
[3609]- Item 48, Page 7la Exemption 5(B) (2)(3)
[3610]® Item 55, Page 80 Exemption 5(B)(2)
[3611]Item 130, Page 133 Exemption 5(B)(2)
[3612]Item 170, Page 189 ' Exemption 5(B) (2) (3)
[3613]Item 197, Page 218 ‘Exemption 5(B) (1) (2) (3)
[3614]Item 198, Page 219 Exemption 5(B) (1) (2) (3)
[3615]Item 301, Page 427 Exemption 5(B) (1) (2) (3)
[3616]Item 339, Page 509. Exemption 5(B) (1) (2) (3)
[3618]4. Items 283, 284, 286, 287, 287a, 288, 290 and 291
[3619]pertain to National Security Council proceedings.
[3620]Mr. William Edmondson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
[3621]for African Affairs, and Mr. Paul Henze, National Security
[3622]Council staff, have been informed by telephone this date
[3623]that CIA will refuse the request.of the attorney of
[3624]‘Mr. Marchetti and Mr. Marks to declassify these items.
[3626]/s/ EDWARD J. FOY, JRe
[3627]. Edward J. Foy, Jr.
[3629]ae]
[3630]i
[3632]13-00000
[3635]13-00000
[3637]THE VIETNAM-CAMBODIA EMERGENCY, 1975
[3638]Part V—Cambodia Evacuation: Testimony of |
[3639]Ambassador John Gunther Dean
[3641]HEARING |
[3642]SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON: INVESTIGATION
[3644]OF THE ,
[3646]COMMITTEE ON
[3647]INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
[3648]HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
[3650]NINETY-FOURTH CONGRESS
[3651]SECOND SESSION
[3653]MAY 5, 1976
[3655]Printed fer the use of the Committee on International Relations
[3657]a
[3659]- U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
[3660]73-04 WASHINGTON : 1976
[3663]13-00000
[3665]672
[3667]made on behalf of Cambodia. To insure that the program was tailored to real
[3668]requirements, to insure that equipment was received ly personnel trained in
[3669]their use and to insure that material provided under MAP hud reasonab'.
[3670]expectancy of maintenance support, ites such as force structure, military orgs-
[3671]nization, technical assistance and logistics became matters that came under the
[3672]purview of the MEDTC. ‘fo have closed our eyes tu these aspects in my view.
[3673]would have ignored congressional concerns regarding efficient: management. I
[3674]did not.consider these functions a violation of the congressional intent in
[3675]banning advisors and these functions coutinued during my tenure. In wiy belie?
[3676]the ban would have been violated had personnel been assigned to military units
[3677]or activities on an around-the-clock basis and involved thewselves in most of the
[3678]watters affecting their units or activity. In prescribing the limits of our assix1-
[3679]ance, the views of the GAO report were useful in guiding our judgment.
[3681]Question 10. During your tenure as Ambassador, did any U.S, Military Attachés
[3682]serve with Khmer military units in the field?
[3684]—What regulations did the U.S. Ea:bassy have to govern the activities of
[3685]U.S. Military Attaches and the Military Equipment Delivers Team?
[3687]—Were any changes in the regulations made after the incident at Kampot
[3688]involving Major Lawrence Ondecker in Mareh 1974?
[3690]Answer. No U.S, military served with Khmer military units in the field. U_S.
[3691]personnel from both the Defense Attache Office and the Office of the Chie!
[3692]Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia routinely visited and reported
[3693]the military status of Cambodian military units as part of their duties ; however.
[3694]U.S. personnel did not remain with units in the manner which U.S. advisors d
[3695]in South Vietnam. U.S. personnel were extensively briefed upon arrival regard--
[3696]ing the Congressional restrictions azainst advisers ta the Cambodian military.
[3697]Yhe Kampot incident oceurred prior to my arrival in Cambodia. Shartiy after
[3698]mr arrival in Phnom Penh. T received the instructions in effect and determined
[3699]that they were adequate. I did, however. personaily impress unen my nilitars
[3700]staff, on several aecasions, the necd to abide serupuleusiy hy these instructions
[3701]and to avoid situations which might be interpreted as infringements cf their
[3702]prescribed duties.
[3704]Qucestian 17, In November 1974, the Washington Post reported and the Ne
[3705]fense Department acknowledged that data on potential hembinge targets in
[3706]Cambodia was gathered by American reconnaissance fights from Thafland and
[3707]passed on fo Cambodian military authorities.
[3709]—When da this practice begin?
[3711]—Did you know about it, and did rou have a role in it?
[3713]—Do rou consider it a violation of the Congreszional ban on American
[3714]advisors with Khmer Republic forces?
[3716]Answer. It would be inconceivable to me that in a situation as existed in
[3717]Cambodia that military information whieh we had would be deliberately withheld
[3718]or denied to a country to which we were providing enarmcus military ant
[3719]economic assistance. The information we had concerning enemy activities in
[3720]Cambodia was a by-product of our own intelNigence collecting effort on com-
[3721]munist forees throughout Indochina. This information was provided to Cam-
[3722]bodian military authorities but the decision on what ection, if anr, would be
[3723]taken was one which the Cambodians made for themselves. The provisiens of
[3724]information preceded my arrival and T am not aware exartle when the practice
[3725]mary have hegun, I was aware of the practice although I did not play a pivotal
[3726]part in the process and did not consider this procedure as violating congressional
[3728]: ictions on American advisors.
[3729]_aietion 12, Did CIA personnel in Camhodia ever act as advisers to Kbmer
[3730]epublic forces in a fashion similar to their activities in Laos (even if on a
[3732]smaller scale)?
[3733]—Could yon tell us what role China Airlines plared in Cambodia and if it
[3734]‘was in any way associated with CIA activities?
[3735]—What was the U.S. role in organizing and applying the Khmer “Middle
[3736]Range Reconnaissance Patrols” (MERPS) ?
[3738]Answer. Haviug served both in Laos and Cambodia, and knowing the CIA
[3739]operations in both countries, F can honestly say that the CIA did not act as
[3740]advisers to the Khmer Republic forces in a fashion simiiar to their activirie=
[3741]in. Laos. China Airlines, under contract to Air America. transported supplies. nei
[3742]inchiding. weapons and ammunition, for U.S. agencies in Cambodia. The Middle
[3743]Range Reconnaissance Patrols received US. inlitury equipment as part of the
[3744]Klunee Armed Forces and also received some intelligence collection training..
[3747]13-00000
[3749]o "UNCLASSIFIED [oy INTERNAL CO CONFIDENTIAL fk] SECRET
[3751]) ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
[3753]SUBJECT: (Optional) The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence,
[3754]by Vite Marchetti and John D. Marks
[3756]CEA/CA DATE
[3757]5D3102, Has 1383 15 April 1977
[3759]TO: (Officer designation, ber, and
[3760]building) ser cenenenens seems DATE OFFICER'S COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
[3761]| receveo | FORWARDED | [NITIALS | to whom. Oraw a fine across column after each comment.)
[3763]ACEA/OPS
[3765]FROM: Robert L. Skidifore
[3767]EXTENSION
[3769]SA/DO/0O
[3771]» fom 610 Ete EK] SECRET ©] CONFIDENTIAL] INTERNAL =) UNCLASSIFIEE
[3773]13-00000
[3775]re SECRET
[3777]16 APR 977
[3779]MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to DDO for External Oversight
[3781]FROM : William J. Graver
[3782]Chief, East Asia Division
[3783]SUBJECT : The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence,
[3784]by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks-
[3785]ce REFERENCE : SA/DO/O Memorandum, dated 8 April 1977,
[3787]Same Subject
[3789]East Asia Division officers have reviewed the deleted
[3790]subject book items per Reference request and conclude they
[3791]are:
[3793]1) still classified under Executive Order
[3794]11652,
[3796]2) still not in the public domain through
[3797]official disclosure; and
[3799]3) still not contained in material cleared
[3800]by the Publications Review Board.
[3802]Wi J Ba); be
[3804]Attachment - Detail Listing
[3806]WARNING NOTICE
[3807]SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES |
[3808]AND METHODS INVOLVED :
[3810]E2 IMPDET
[3811]CL BY 022438
[3813]SECRET
[3815]13-00000
[3817]Item
[3819]SECRET
[3821]Attachment
[3823]E. 0. 11652 Exemptions for Items in
[3825]Manuscript Page No,
[3827]os vo od vWD TD VD BE VB BE VB BE VSD VB VS VS 8
[3829]47
[3830]48
[3831]48
[3832]54
[3833]63
[3834]65
[3835]65 a ©
[3836]65 a
[3837]70
[3838]71
[3839]92
[3840]165
[3842]470
[3844]471
[3845]471
[3847]ECRET
[3849]Exemption
[3851]5 B (1) (2)
[3852]B (1) (2)
[3854]5 B (1)
[3856]5 B (2)
[3858]5 B (2) (3)
[3860]5 B (2) (3)
[3862]5 B.(2) (3)
[3864]5 B (2) (3)
[3866]5 B (2)
[3868]5 B (2) (3)
[3870]5 B (3)
[3872]5 B (1)
[3874]5 B (1)
[3876]5 B (2)
[3878]5 B (2)
[3880]5 B (2)
[3882]13-00000
[3884]16 APR 977
[3886]MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to DDO for External Oversight ©
[3888]FROM : William J. Graver
[3889]. ' Chief, East Asia Division
[3891]SUBJECT : The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence,
[3892]by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks
[3894]REFERENCE : SA/DO/O Memorandum, dated 8 April 1977,
[3895]Same Subject
[3897]East Asia Division officers have reviewed the deleted
[3898]subject book items per Reference request and conclude they
[3899]are:
[3901]1) still classified under Executive Order
[3902]11652,
[3904]2) still not in the public domain through
[3905]official disclosure; and
[3907]3) still not contained in material cleared
[3908]by the Publications Review Board.
[3910]Wa J Be
[3912]Attachment - Detail Listing
[3914]WARHING NOTICE
[3915]SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES Et IMPDET 8
[3916]AND METHODS INVOLVED BY 0
[3918]SECRET
[3920]13-00000
[3922]Item
[3924]26
[3926]27
[3928]28
[3929]31
[3930]38
[3932]At
[3934]42
[3935]43
[3936]46
[3937]47
[3938]or
[3939]152
[3940]197
[3941]319
[3942]320
[3944]321
[3946]Attachment
[3950]Manuscript Page No.
[3952]- 47
[3953]- 48
[3954]- 48
[3955]- 54
[3956]- 63
[3957]» 65
[3958]. 65 a
[3960]. 70
[3961]. 71
[3962]. 92
[3963]. 165
[3964]. 218
[3965]. 470
[3967]P
[3968]P
[3969]P
[3970]P
[3971]P
[3972]P
[3973]P
[3974]p- 65 a
[3975]P
[3976]P
[3977]P
[3978]P
[3979]P
[3980]P
[3981]p-. 471
[3982]P
[3984]SECRET
[3986]7), eS, >, >, Sn >, > 2 2,
[3988]EB. O. 11652 Exemptions for Items in
[3990]Exemption
[3992]w
[3996](1)
[3997](1)
[3998](1)
[3999](2)
[4000](2)
[4002](2)
[4003](2)
[4005](2)
[4006](2)
[4007](2)
[4008](3)
[4009](1)
[4010](1)
[4011](2)
[4012](2)
[4013](2)
[4015](2)
[4016](2)
[4018](3)
[4019](3)
[4020](3)
[4021](3)
[4023](3)
[4025]13-00000
[4029]ous a | ag APR IF
[4031]MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. John Greaney
[4032]Office of General Counsel
[4034]FROM © > William W. Wells
[4035]; Deputy Director for Operations
[4037]SUBJECT :: Review of the 168 Deleted Items in
[4038]"CIA and the Cult of Intelligence"
[4039]by. Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks
[4041]In reply to your oral request, attached is ~
[4042]the report of the review of the deleted items which
[4043]are the responsibility of the DDO. Appropriate
[4044]components of the DDO reviewed their respective
[4045]items for classification and their findings are
[4046]contained in the attached report. Specific classi-
[4048]' fication and exemption authority for each item
[4049]which is still classified is availabie, if needed,
[4050]in each component's response filed with SA/DO/O.
[4052]William ie Wells
[4054]William W. Wells
[4058]Orig G 1 - OGC
[4059]- 2 - DDO
[4060]2 - SA/DO/0O
[4062]E2 IMPDET
[4063]CL BY 018630
[4065]SECRET
[4068]13-00000
[4070]27 April 1977
[4072]MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations
[4074]VIA Mr. Ralph J. Katrosh
[4075]Special Assistant to the DDO
[4076]for External Oversight
[4078]FROM | : ‘Samuel Halpern
[4080]SUBJECT ~~: + Review of 168 Deleted Items in
[4081]; "CIA and the Cult of Intelligence"
[4082]. by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks
[4084](U) 1. This is the réport of the review done by ~
[4085]the appropriate DDO components of those deleted items
[4086]which are the basic responsibility of the DDO. The
[4087]remaining deleted items which are the basic responsi-
[4088]bility of the DDS§&T and DDA were reviewed by those
[4089]Directorates which are reporting directly to OGC.
[4091]_ Responsible components did the necessary inter- and
[4092]intraagency coordinations. | ;
[4094](U) 2. Several points need to be highlighted
[4095]concerning the completeness of the review, especially
[4096]‘as regards those items declassified by "official
[4097]public disclosure" as defined. by the courts. While I
[4098]am sure that as diligent a search as possible was done
[4099]— by the DDO components, a thorough and absolutely
[4100]complete search is impossible for the following reasons:
[4102](U) a. There is no index of any kind,
[4103]let alone having the material in machine form
[4104]such as in the RSM, to the fifteen published
[4105]hearings and reports of the Senate Select
[4106]Committee to Study Governmental Operations With
[4107]Respect to Intelligence Activities (Church
[4108]Committee), the six published hearings and
[4109]proceedings of the House Select Committee on
[4110]Intelligence (Pike Committee) or the one volume
[4111]Report to the President by the Commission on
[4112]CIA Activities Within the United States
[4113](Rockefeller Commission) ;°
[4115]E2 IMPDET
[4116]SERrE CL BY 018630
[4118]na i A
[4120]Se nr
[4122]13-00000
[4124](U) b. There is no comprehensive readily
[4125]available record of precisely what information
[4126]has been declassified.and released in accordance
[4127]with the Freedom of Information Act. and the
[4128]Privacy Act; there are separate collections
[4129]with a limited capability to retrieve some such
[4130]information; .
[4132](U) c. There is no available record of
[4133]the information that officials of the Executive
[4134]Branch of government, with authority to
[4135]declassify information, have said or written
[4136]in public either before Congressional
[4137]committees, TV talk shows, radio talk shows,
[4138]college symposiums, the general’ lecture
[4139]circuit, other public forums, etc.
[4141]In view of the above, it is impossible to guarantee
[4142]that those items which are still classified by the
[4143]DDO components have not been deliberately or
[4145]‘inadvertently declassified in whole or in part as”
[4147]"official public disclosure."
[4149](U) 3. Bearing in mind the above, attachment A
[4150]lists those items of the DDO deleted items which have
[4151]been declassified by “official public disclosure."
[4152]These thirteen complete and parts of four other items
[4153]can therefore be released from the court injunction.
[4155](S) 4. Attachment B (seven parts) contains
[4156]eleven deleted items (seven subjects) which are still
[4158]classified but about which there may be some possible
[4160]question. These are highlighted here so that
[4161]cognizance can be taken and final decisions made with
[4162]due regard for all legal and policy aspects.
[4164](U) 5. Attachment C lists all DDO remaining
[4165]items which the DDO components advise are still
[4167]classified under Executive Order 11652 as amended and
[4168]cannot. be released from the court injunction.
[4170]Freire (flips
[4171]per
[4173]Samie lH
[4175]SEGRET
[4177]13-00000
[4179]5
[4180]i u-
[4182]Item No.
[4183]i 3
[4184]4.
[4185]— s
[4186]9 (line 17 thru ninth
[4188]10
[4189]“11
[4190]46
[4192]57
[4194]89 .
[4196]word on line 24)
[4198](last four words of
[4200]MSS
[4202]p. no,
[4205]12
[4207]12
[4209]line 1 and first 11.
[4211]words of line 2;
[4212]and lines 5-11)
[4214](line 20 thru first
[4216]three words of ‘line’
[4218]24) Oo
[4220]126
[4222]127
[4224]15
[4226]70
[4228]84
[4232]130
[4234]ATTACHMENT A
[4236]Official Public Disclosure
[4238]Church Committee :
[4240]Vol. 7, pp. 168, 190-_
[4242]-Church Committee.
[4244]Vol. 7, p. 168
[4246]Church Committee
[4247]Vol. 7, p. 190
[4249]Church Committee.
[4250]Vol. 7, pp. 166-170, 190
[4252]' Church Committee
[4254]Vol. 7, pp. 166-170, 190
[4256]Church Committee ,
[4257]Vol..7, pp. 160, 170, 172
[4259]Church, Committee ;
[4260]Vol. 7, pp. 148, 165, 166, 171
[4262]Church Committee
[4263]Book I, p. 194
[4265]Church Committee, |
[4266]Alleged Assassination Plots
[4267]pp. 139 ff. ;
[4269]Rockefeller Commission Report
[4270]218 ,
[4272]Church Committee
[4274]Book I, pp. 208-209
[4276]Rockefeller Commission Report
[4277]p. 218
[4278]Church. Committee
[4280]Book I, pp. 208-209
[4282]Rockefeller Commission Report
[4284]Church. Committee
[4286]Book I, pp. 208-209
[4289]13-00000
[4291]No
[4293]Item .
[4295]292
[4297]307
[4299]317
[4301]338
[4303](line 1, third,
[4304]fourth, eighth,
[4305]ninth words; and
[4306]line 2, first
[4308]. three words)
[4310]MSS
[4311]p. no.
[4313]435.
[4315]468
[4318]509
[4320]ATTACHMENT A cont'd
[4322]Official Public Disclosure
[4324]Church Committee
[4325]Vol. 7, p. 205
[4327]‘Church Committee,
[4329]Alleged Assassination Plots
[4330]pp. 139 ff. .
[4332]Church Committee
[4333]Vol. 7, pp. 168, 189, 205
[4335]Church Committee
[4336]Vol. 7, pp. 144-209 ©
[4338]CIA presence has been
[4339]officially disclosed in
[4340]the following only:
[4342]a. Congo - Church Committee
[4343]report on Alleged Assassina-
[4344]tion Plots Involving Foreign
[4345]Leaders, pp. 13-70.
[4347]b. Cambodia - Amb. John
[4348]Gunther Dean testimony before
[4349]the Special Subcommittee on
[4350]Investigations of the
[4352]Committee on International
[4353]Relations, House of Representa-
[4354]tives, May 5, 1976, p. 672
[4356]_c¢. Laos - Director Colby,
[4358]13 September 1974, in an
[4359]address to the Fund for Peace
[4360]Conference on CIA and Covert
[4361]Actions and in Church
[4362]Committee Book I, oP: 120 and
[4363]155; Book IV, p.
[4365]d. Vietnam - Church Committee.
[4366]report on Alleged Assassination
[4367]pp. 217-224; Book I, pp. 23 ©
[4368]and 120.
[4370]e. Philippines - Church
[4371]Committee, Book I, p. 23.
[4374]13-00000
[4376]ATTACHMENT B (1)
[4378]Item No. 22, 28, 152, 172 MSS pp. ‘no. 46, 48, 165, 189
[4379](U) NE Division has highlighted these items.
[4380](S) Item 22 states in. part "A notable example of such
[4382]a ‘special relationship' is Iran, where a CIA organized coup
[4383]d'etat restored the Shah to power in 1953. The Shah was
[4385]understandably grateful... Item. 28 lists the Shah among
[4386]‘other "world leaders with “shon CIA has developed special.
[4388]relationships" as. does Item 152 and a similar statement is
[4389]made ‘in Item 179. ;
[4391](U) Ray S. Cline in his book "Secrets, Spies and
[4392]Scholars," pp. 131-132, states:
[4394]"l.. a covert operation so successful that it
[4395]became “widely known all over the world was carried
[4396]out in Iran. The Shah, then very young, had been
[4397]driven out of Iran by his left-leaning Premier,
[4398]Mohammed Mossadegh, whose support came from the
[4399]local Communist (Tudeh) Party and from the Soviet
[4400]Union. CIA mounted a modest effort under a skillful
[4401]clandestine services officer who flew to Iran,
[4402]hired enough street demonstrators to intimidate
[4403]those working for Mossadegh, instructed Iranian.
[4404]military men loyal to the Shah how to take over
[4405]the local radio station, and paved the. way for the
[4406]Shah's triumphal return."
[4408](U) _ The Church Committee, Book I, p. 111, briefly
[4409]mentioned ''the overthrow of Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran"
[4410]as one of CIA's “boldest, most spectacular covert
[4412]'. operations."
[4414]-(S) There is a vast difference between the classified
[4415]deleted items speaking about an active "special relationship"
[4416]with the Shah following the overthrow of Mossadegh and a .
[4417]statement about CIA's role in overthrowing Mossadegh. The
[4418]former is still properly classifiable and classified.
[4420]green
[4423]13-00000
[4425]ATTACHMENT B (2)
[4427]Item No. 49 - - MSS p. no. 71a. .
[4429]'  (S) Reference to CIA sponsorship of the Rome Dail
[4430]American is still classified SECRET because it describes
[4431]intelligence sources and-methods as related to newspaper
[4432]publications. CCS files contain a newsclip from the
[4433]September and October 1974 edition of the Columbia
[4434]Journalism Review which states; "Landon K. Thorne, Jr.,
[4435]the CIA's Bross, and a lawyer for CIA, Benjamin Shute, .
[4436]then a partner in the prestigious Wall Street law firm
[4437]of Cravath, Swaine, and Moore, now acknowledge that the
[4438]fourth partner [in the purchase of the Rome Daily American
[4439]in 1956] was the CIA. [Bross] recently called the arrange-
[4440]ment ‘atypical’ of what the Agency was doing, ‘a bad
[4441]example’'." It is questionable whether the remarks made by
[4443]‘Mr. Bross,who retired from the Agency in 1971, and Mr. Shute,
[4444]who left the Agency long before that, can be considered
[4445]'as constituting official _ Agency disclosure of this’ —
[4447]information.
[4450]13-00000
[4452]ATTACHMENT B (3)
[4454]Item No. 54, 236 | MSS p. no. 80, 262
[4456](S) Reference to CIA sponsorship of Forum World
[4457]Features is still classified SECRET because both items
[4459]‘describe intelligence. sources and methods and identifies
[4461]referred to - but not by name - in Book I of the Church
[4462]Committee Final Report, page 199, as follows: ‘Another’
[4463]example of the damages of 'fallout' involved two
[4464]proprietary news services that the CIA maintained in
[4466]- Europe... The larger of the two was subscribed to by
[4468]over thirty U.S. newspapers. In an effort to reduce the
[4469]problem of fallout, the CIA made a senior official at the
[4470]major U.S. dailies aware that the CIA controlled these
[4472]two press services."' While Forum World Features was not
[4473]named in the Senate report and therefore continues to be
[4475]“protected, it is possible that CJA disclosure to newspaper
[4477]editors may be considered as "official public disclosure."
[4480]13-00000
[4482]ATTACHMENT B (4)
[4484]Item No. 67 (lines 24, 25) MSS.p. no. 92
[4486](S) Under injunction as classified information is
[4487]"For its Tibetan operation of. the early sixties, the
[4488]Agency constructed extensive support facilities in ©
[4489]Northeast India and brought large numbers of guerrillas |
[4490]to a deserted Army base in Colorado for special training."
[4491]Underlining (ine 25, ninth thru twenty-third word).
[4492]indicates the questionable part of the item since MSS
[4493]page 97, lines 24-26 states "Some Tibetans were quietly
[4495]_brought to the United States for special paramilitary.
[4497]training at Camp Hale in the mountains of Colorado."
[4498]This sentence was originally deleted, then reinstated and
[4500]- appears in boldface type on page 115 in the published book.
[4503]13-00000
[4504]|
[4506]ATTACHMENT B (5).
[4508]Item No. 72 ~ MSS p. 97
[4509](U) NE Division has highlighted ‘this. ‘item,
[4511](S) The deleted item is "The CIA. quickly made contact
[4512]with the Dalai Lama and a close relationship was established.
[4513]Financed and advised by Agency covert operators, he was.
[4515](U) Harry Rositzke, in his book "The CIA's Secret
[4516]Operations" pp. 173-174, states "As the Korean war was
[4517]winding down, the CIA began sending intelligence agents
[4518]into Tibet to assess the situation and see what could. be
[4519]done to forestall the Chinese takeover that was in the.
[4520]offing. Tibetan agents equipped with radios were dispatched
[4521]by air and made contact with the Dalai Lama ‘in Lhasa, giving
[4522]him a channel of communication with. the West.
[4524]"When the Dalai Lama chose to flee from Lhasa to
[4525]- avoid capture by the Chinese’ forces in 1959, he was
[4526]accompanied on his flight by a CIA-trained radio operator
[4527]who. was able to keep Washington posted on his often
[4528]hazardous progress."
[4530](S) The classified deleted item speaks of a CIA .
[4531]"close relationship": with the Dalai Lama and his being
[4532]"financed and advised" by CIA which is quite different
[4533]from Rositzke's statement about CIA trained radio operators
[4534]being with the Dalai Lama.. These are two different —
[4535]comments with the first being properly classifiable and
[4536]classified. ;
[4538]lac lated
[4540]SEE
[4542]§ re 4
[4544]Es
[4547]13-00000
[4549]{ a
[4550]i
[4552]ATTACHMENT B (6)
[4554]Item No. 107, 128, 129, 279 MSS pp. 123, 132,133, 403
[4556](S)} CCS states that all four items which refer to
[4557]-Fairways Corporation as a ClA-owned proprietary company
[4558]are still classified since they describe intelligence
[4559]sources and methods by idéntifying an operational support
[4560]facility located in the U.S. and are therefore exempt from
[4561]declassification under Section.5 (B) (2) .of the General
[4562]Declassification Schedule contained in Executive Order 11652.
[4564](S) According. to CCS files, in April 1975 Director
[4565]Colby was asked by an NBC reporter about CIA sponsorship
[4566]of Fairways Corporation in connection with a planned TV
[4567]documentary ‘on Agency proprietaries. CCS files are unclear
[4568]on the point, but there are indications that Director Colby
[4569]may have responded to the question in a manner which
[4570]could have been construed as admission of-sponsorship of
[4571]Fairways. In any case, CCS files contain other evidence
[4572]that the matter was considered to be still classified as
[4573]recently as December 1976, when Director Bush wrote to
[4574]the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration
[4575]regarding CIA sponsorship of Fairways and asked that. the.
[4576]subject be withheld from public disclosure.
[4579]13-00000
[4581]aa a . _ . out
[4583]ATTACHMENT B (7)
[4585]Item No. 33900 MSS _p. no. 509
[4587](S)} CIA presence in Bolivia and Brazil has not been
[4588]officially acknowledged and is still classified because
[4589]it involves ‘sources and methods.
[4591]David Phillips ‘in his book” The Night Watch,
[4592]chapter 8, pp. 212-235, entitled "Brazil, Venezuela 1970-
[4593]1972" describes his. presence as Chief of Station of CIA
[4594]in Brazil. and on page 209 he discusses CIA in Bolivia.
[4596](S) In regard to the declassification of CIA presence
[4597]in the Congo (Attachment A, Item 339, MSS p. no. 509),
[4598]Africa Division states "The existence of a CIA presénce
[4599]in the Congo is reported in an interim report of the Senate
[4600]Select Committee on Intelligence dated 20 November 1975.
[4601]It may be argued therefore that to agree to declassification
[4602]of the reference to the Congo would have the effect of ©
[4603]singling out the Congo in the Third World as an alleged
[4604]target of CIA operations. This would have an adverse
[4605]effect on our relations with the government of Zaire. We
[4606]believe the item should remain classified and that
[4607]exemption 5 (b) (3) would apply in the case of the Congo."
[4609]_ It is nota question of whether to agree or not
[4610]to declassification of reference to the Congo. The Church |
[4611]Committee report as cited in Attachment A has already made
[4612]"official-public disclosure" of the matter, rendering the
[4613]subject moot. In addition, as Item 339-in Attachment A
[4614]shows, four other countries of the Third World are also
[4615]mentioned, thereby not singling out the Congo alone. What
[4616]no adverse effect could be expected now. by another public -
[4618]' -yeference to CIA presence in the Congo as of the original
[4619], 1974 publication date of the Marchetti/Marks book, is
[4620]difficult to comprehend. Since the government of Zaire has
[4621]; not changed since the 1975 release of the information by
[4622]| the Church Committee, it would seem that whatever adverse
[4623]effects there” might be have already occurred.
[4625]SECRET.
[4628]13-00000
[4630]ATTACHMENT C
[4631]ITEMS STILL CLASSIFIED IN MARCHETTI MANUSCRIPT
[4633]Item No. MSS _p. no. © “Item No. MSS p. no.
[4635]1 11 63. 86.
[4636]9 (lines 14-16;- 14 _ 67 92°
[4637]: line 24, last _ - 72 (+ 97
[4638]~~ two words 73 97
[4639]thru line. 29) 74 . 98
[4640]; ; 79 - 100
[4641]10 (line 1, .. 15 107 123
[4642]. first 7 words; ; : 128) 132
[4643]line 2, last 2 - . 129 133
[4644]words thru ; 130 ° 133
[4645]line 4) ; _ 148 155
[4646]° 149 - 156
[4647]18 - AZ: 152 - 165.
[4648]19 43 159 181
[4649]20 44 a 160 | 182
[4650]21 45 . 161 183
[4651]22 . 46 162 184
[4652]23 , 46 182 196
[4653]24 47 194 215
[4654]26 ae ‘47 195 216
[4655]27 4B 196 217
[4657]28 48. . 197 218
[4659]29 49 . . 198 219.
[4661]31 54 201 ‘ 222.
[4662]34° 59 224 252
[4664].38 63 225 253
[4666]41 65 226 257
[4667]. 42 65a 234 262
[4668]—: 43 , ' 65a 236 . | 262
[4669]46 (line 24, 70 256 329
[4671]fourth word .- 261 334
[4672]thru line 31) 273° 380
[4673]| 47 71 278 400
[4674]48 Tila -279 403
[4676]: 49. 7la 280° 404.
[4677]50 72 283 413
[4679]51 _ 72 284 — 7° L413
[4681]52 77 286 414
[4683]: 53 78 287 414
[4684]; 54 80. 287a 415
[4685]55 80 288 416
[4686]: 56 81 290 — 417
[4687]58 84 291 417
[4688]: 59 85 296 425
[4690]62 + 86 298 426
[4692]SECRET
[4695]13-00000
[4697]t 97 . ft
[4699]: Item No. - MSS p. no.
[4700]300 426 —
[4701]308 437
[4702]318 469
[4703]319 470
[4705]: 320 .- 471
[4707]: - 321, , 471
[4708]322 ; 473.
[4710]: «323 474
[4712]po - 331 , 482
[4714]. 332). . 482
[4716]333 a 483
[4717]334 483.
[4718]335 483
[4719]336 : 484
[4720]337 507
[4722]339 (line 1, first 509 ©
[4723]’ two words and
[4724]fifth, sixth
[4725]and seventh words)
[4728]13-00000
[4730]27 Ayrch >>
[4732]MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. John Greaney ;
[4733]- Office of General Counsel
[4735]FROM : William W. Wells
[4736]. Deputy Director for Operations
[4738]‘SUBJECT’ _ t’ Review of the 168 Deleted Items in
[4739]"CIA and the Cult of Intelligence"
[4740]by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks
[4742]; In reply to your oral request, attached is
[4743]the. report of the review of the deleted items which
[4744]are the responsibility of the DDO. Appropriate
[4745]components of the DDO reviewed their respective
[4746]items for classification and their findings are
[4748]contained in the attached report. Specific classi-
[4749]fication and exemption authority for each item
[4750]which is still classified is available, if needed,
[4751]in each component's response filed with SA/DO/O.
[4753]William W. Wells
[4755]Distribution:
[4757]Orig § 1 --:OGC
[4758]“2 - DDO
[4759]2 - SA/DO/O
[4761]’E2 IMPDET
[4762]CL BY. 018630.
[4765]13-00000
[4767]27 April 1977-
[4769]MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations ©
[4771]VIA : Mr. Ralph J. Katrosh
[4772]Special Assistant to the DDO
[4773]for External Oversight
[4775]FROM : ‘Samuel Halpern
[4777]SUBJECT _ : Review of 168 Deleted Items in
[4778], "CIA. and the Cult of Intelligence"
[4779]by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks
[4781](U) 1. This is the report of the review done by
[4782]. the appropriate DDO components of those deleted items
[4783]which are the basic responsibility of the DDO. The
[4784]remaining deleted items which are the basic responsi-
[4785]bility of the DDS&T and DDA were reviewed by those
[4786]Directorates which are reporting directly to OGC.
[4787]Responsible components did the necessary inter- and .
[4788]intraagency coordinations. .
[4790](U) 2. Several points need to be highlighted
[4791]concerning the completeness of the review, especially
[4792]as regards those items declassified by "official
[4793]public disclosure" as defined by the courts. While I
[4794]am sure that as diligent a search as possible was. done
[4795]by the DDO components, a thorough and absolutely
[4796]complete search is impossible for the following reasons:
[4798](U) a. There is no index of any kind,
[4799]let alone having the material in machine form
[4800]such as in the RSM, to the fifteen published
[4801]hearings and reports of the Senate Select
[4802]Committee to Study Governmental Operations .With
[4803]Respect to Intelligence Activities (Church
[4804]Committee), the six published hearings and
[4806]- proceedings of the House Select Committee on
[4807]Intelligence (Pike Committee) or the one volume
[4808]Report to the President by the Commission on
[4809]CIA Activities Within the United States
[4810](Rockefeller Commission) ;
[4812]- E2 IMPDET
[4813]OT CL BY 018630
[4815]13-00000
[4817](U) b. There is no comprehensive readily
[4818]available record of precisely what information
[4819]has been. declassified and released in accordance _
[4820]with the Freedom. of Information Act and the
[4821]Privacy Act; there are separate collections
[4822]with a limited capability to retrieve some such
[4823]information;
[4825](U) c. There is no available record of
[4826]the information that officials of the Executive
[4827]Branch of government, with authority to ;
[4828]declassify information, have said or written
[4829]in public either before Congressional
[4830]committees, TV talk shows, radio talk shows,
[4831]college symposiums, the general lecture
[4832]circuit, other public forums, etc.
[4834]In view of the above, it is impossible to guarantee
[4835]that those items which are still classified by the’
[4837]‘DDO components have not been deliberately or
[4839]inadvertently. declassified in whole or in part as
[4840]"official public disclosure."
[4842](U) 3. Bearing in mind ‘the above, attachment A
[4843]lists those items of the DDO deleted items which. have
[4844]been declassified by “official public disclosure."
[4846]- These thirteen complete and parts of four other items
[4848]can therefore be released from the court injunction.
[4850](S 4. Attachment: B (seven parts) contains
[4851]eleven deleted items (seven subjects) which are still
[4852]classified but about which there may be some possible
[4853]question. These are highlighted here so that
[4854]cognizance can be taken and final decisions made with
[4855]due regard for all legal and policy aspects. .
[4857](U) 5. Attachment C lists all DDO remaining
[4858]items which the DDO components advise are still
[4859]classified under Executive Order 11652 as amended and
[4860]cannot. be released from the court injunction.
[4865]Samuel
[4868]13-00000
[4870]Item No.
[4872]3
[4874]9 (line 17 thru ninth
[4875]word on line 24)
[4877]10 (last four words of
[4878]' line 1 and first 11
[4879]' words of line 2; .
[4880]and lines 5-11)
[4881]‘Ll. .
[4882]46 (line 20 thru first
[4883]- three words of line
[4884]24)
[4885]57
[4887]89
[4889]126
[4891]127
[4893]MSS
[4895]p. no.
[4897]11
[4898]12
[4900]12
[4902]15
[4904]70
[4906]84
[4908]106
[4910]130
[4912]ATTACHMENT. A
[4914]Official Public Disclosure
[4916]Church Committee :
[4917]Vol. 7, pp. 168, 190
[4919]-Church Committee
[4921]Vol. 7, p. 168
[4923]- Church Committee
[4925]Vol. 7, p. 190
[4927]Church Committee
[4928]Vol. 7, pp..166-170, 190
[4930]'” Church Committee
[4931]Vol. 7, pp. 166-170, 190
[4933]Church Committee
[4934]Vol..7, pp. 160, 170, 172
[4936]Church Committee
[4937]Vol. 7, pp. 148, 165, 166, 171
[4939]Church Committee
[4940]Book I, p. 194.
[4942]Church Committee,
[4943]Alleged Assassination Plots
[4944]pp. 139 ff.
[4946]Rockefeller Commission Report
[4947]p- 218
[4949]Church Committee
[4951]Book I, pp. 208-209
[4953]Rockefeller Commission Report
[4954]p. 218
[4955]Church. Committee
[4957]Book I, pp. 208-209
[4959]Rockefeller Commission Report
[4960]p. 218
[4962]Church Committee
[4964]Book I, pp. 208-209
[4967]13-00000
[4969]292
[4971]307
[4973]‘317
[4975]338
[4977]Item No.
[4979](line 1, third,-
[4980]fourth, eighth,
[4982]ninth words;
[4983]line 2,sfirst
[4984]three words)
[4986]and
[4988]MSS .
[4990]x no.
[4991]420
[4993]435
[4995]- 468
[4997]508
[4999]509
[5001]ATTACHMENT A cont'd
[5003]Official Public Disclosure
[5005]Church Committee
[5006]Vol. 7, Pp. 205
[5008]'- Church Committee,
[5010]Alleged Assassination Plots
[5012]‘pp. 139 ff.
[5014]Church Committee -
[5015]Vol. 7, pp. 168, 189, 205
[5017]Church Committee
[5018]Vol. 7, pp. 144-209
[5020]CIA presence has been
[5021]officially disclosed in
[5023]the following only:
[5025]a. Congo - Church Committee
[5026]report on Alleged Assas‘sina-
[5027]tion Plots Involving Foreign
[5028]Leaders, pp. 13-70.
[5030]b. Cambodia - Amb. John
[5031]Gunther Dean testimony before
[5032]the Special Subcommittee on
[5033]Investigations of the
[5035]Committee on International
[5036]Relations, House of Representa-
[5037]tives, May 5, 1976, p. 672
[5039]c. Laos - Director Colby,
[5041]13 September 1974, in an
[5042]address to the Fund for Peace
[5043]Conference on CIA and Covert
[5044]Actions and in Church
[5045]Committee Book I, pp. .120 and
[5046]155; Book IV, p. 68.
[5048]d. Vietnam - Church Committee.
[5049]report on Alleged Assassination
[5050]pp: 217-224; Book I, pp. 23
[5051]and 120.
[5053]e. Philippines - Church
[5054]Committee, Book I, p. 23.
[5057]13-00000
[5059]ATTACHMENT B (1)
[5061]Item No. 22, 28, 152, 172 MSS pp. no. 46, 48, 165, 189
[5063](U) NE Division has highlighted these items.
[5065](S) Item 22 states in part "A notable example of such
[5066]a 'special relationship' is Iran, where a CIA organized coup.
[5067]d'etat restored the Shah to power in 1953. The Shah was
[5068]understandably grateful.. Item 28 lists the Shah among
[5069]other "world leaders with whom CIA has developed special
[5070]relationships" as does Item 152 and a similar statement is
[5071]made in Item 179.
[5073](U) Ray S. Cline in his book "Secrets, Spies and
[5074]Scholars," pp. 131-152, states:
[5076]",.. a covert operation so successful that it
[5077]‘became. “widely known all over the world was carried
[5078]out in Iran. The Shah, then very young, had been
[5079]driven out of Iran by his: left-leaning Premier,
[5080]Mohammed Mossadegh, whose support came from the
[5081]local Communist (Tudeh). Party and from the Soviet
[5082]Union. CIA mounted a modest effort under a skiliful
[5083]clandestine. services. officer who flew to Iran,
[5084]hired enough street demonstrators to intimidate
[5085]those working for Mossadegh, instructed Iranian
[5086]military men loyal to the Shah how to take over
[5088]“the local radio station, and paved the way for the
[5089]Shah's triumphal return,"
[5091]_(U) The Church Committee, Book I, p. 111, briefly
[5092]mentioned "the overthrow of Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran"
[5093]as one of CIA's "boldest, most spectacular covert
[5094]operations," .
[5096]-(S) There is a vast difference between the classified
[5097]deleted items speaking about an active "special relationship"
[5098]with the Shah following the overthrow of Mossadegh and a
[5099]statement about CIA's role in overthrowing Mossadegh. The
[5100]former is still properly classifiable and classified.
[5103]13-00000
[5105]ATTACHMENT B (2)
[5107]Item No. 49 To , MSS p. no. 7la
[5109](S) Reference to CIA sponsorship of the Rome Daily
[5110]American is still classified SECRET because it describes
[5111]intelligence sources and methods as related to newspaper
[5112]publications. CCS files contain a newsclip from the
[5113]September and October 1974 edition of the Columbia
[5114]Journalism Review which states, "Landon K. Thorne, Jr.,
[5116]the CIA's Bross, and a lawyer for CIA, Benjamin Shute,
[5118].then a partner in the prestigious Wall Street law firm
[5120]of Cravath, Swaine, and Moore, now acknowledge that the
[5121]fourth partner [in the purchase of the Rome Daily American
[5123]in 1956] was the CIA. [Bross] recently called the arrange-
[5124]ment ‘atypical' of what the Agency was doing, "a bad
[5125]example'." It is questionable whether ‘the remarks made by
[5126]Mr. Bross,who retired from the Agency in 1971, and Mr. Shute,
[5127]who left the Agency long before that, can be Considered
[5129]as constituting official Agency disclosure of this
[5130]information.
[5132]Sierer
[5134]Webbed
[5137]13-00000
[5139]ATTACHMENT B (3)
[5141]Item No. 54, 236 7 MSS p. no. 80, 262
[5143](S) Reference to CIA sponsorship of Forum World -
[5144]Features is still classified SECRET because both items
[5145]describe intelligence sources and methods and identifies
[5146]operations based in England. Forum-World Features was
[5147]referred to - but not by name - in Book IT of the Church
[5148]Committee Final Report, page 199, as follows: "Another
[5149]example of the damages of 'fallout' involved two
[5151]_ proprietary news services that the CIA maintained in
[5153]Europe... The larger of the two. was subscribed to by
[5155]over thirty U.S. newspapers. In an effort to reduce the
[5156]problem of fallout, the CIA made a senior official at the
[5157]major U.S. dailies aware that the CIA controlled these
[5159]two press services." While Forum World Features was not
[5160]named in the Senate report and therefore continues to be -
[5161]protected, it is possible that CIA disclosure to newspaper
[5162]editors may be considered as "official public disclosure."
[5165]13-00000
[5167]ATTACHMENT B (4)
[5169]Item No. 67 (lines 24, 25). - MSS p. no. 92
[5171](S) Under injunction as classified-information is
[5172]"For its Tibetan operation of the early sixties, the
[5173]Agency constructed extensive support facilities in
[5174]Northeast India and brought large numbers of. guerrillas
[5175]to a deserted Army base in Colorado for special training."
[5176]Underlining (line 25, ninth thru twenty-third word)
[5177]indicates the questionable part.of the item since MSS |
[5178]page 97, lines 24-26 states "Some Tibetans were quietly
[5179]brought to the United States for special paramilitary
[5181]“training at Camp Hale in the mountains of Colorado."
[5183]This sentence was originally deleted, then reinstated and
[5184]appears in boldface type on page 115 in the published book.
[5186]mane
[5187]Wadi ke
[5190]13-00000
[5192]ATTACHMENT B (5)
[5194]Item No. 72° . MSS p. 97
[5195](U) NE Division has highlighted this item.
[5197](S) The deleted item is "The CIA quickly made contact
[5198]with the Dalai Lama and a close relationship was established.
[5199]Financed and advised by Agency covert operators, he was.
[5201](u) Harry Rositzke, in his book "The CIA's Secret _
[5202]Operations" pp. 173-174, states "As the Korean war was
[5203]winding down, the CIA began sending intelligence agents
[5204]into Tibet to assess the situation and see. what could be.
[5205]done to forestall the Chinese takeover that was in the
[5206]offing. Tibetan agents equipped with radios were dispatched
[5207]by air and made contact with the Dalai Lama in Lhasa, giving
[5208]hima channel of communication with the West.
[5210]"When the Dalai Lama chose to flee from Lhasa. to
[5211]avoid capture by the Chinese forces in 1959, he was
[5213]‘accompanied on his flight by a ClIA-trained radio operator
[5215]who was able to keep Washington posted on his often
[5216]hazardous progress."
[5218](S) The classified deleted item speaks of a CIA
[5219]"close relationship" with the Dalai Lama and his being
[5220]"financed and advised" by CIA which is quite different
[5222]from Rositzke's statement about CIA trained radio operators
[5224]being with the Dalai Lama. These are two different
[5225]comments with the first being properly classifiable and
[5226]classified.
[5228]SEGIEY
[5231]13-00000
[5233]ATTACHMENT B (6)
[5235]Item No. 107, 128, 129, 279 MSS. pp. 123, 132, 133, 403
[5237](S) CCS states that all four items which refer to
[5238]Fairways Corporation as'a ClA-owned proprietary company
[5239]are still classified since they describe intelligence
[5240]sources and methods by identifying an operational support
[5241]facility located in the U.S. and are therefore exempt from
[5242]declassification under Section 5 (B) (2) of the General
[5243]Declassification Schedule contained in Executive Order 11652.
[5245](S) According to CCS files, in April 1975 Director
[5246]Colby. was asked by an NBC reporter about CIA sponsorship
[5247]of Fairways Corporation in connection with a planned TV
[5248]documentary on Agency ‘proprietaries. CCS files are unclear
[5249]on the point, but there are indications that Director Colby
[5250]may have ‘responded to the question in a manner which
[5251]could have been construed as admission of sponsorship of
[5252]Fairways. In any case, CCS files contain other evidence
[5253]that the matter was considered to be still classified as
[5254]recently as December 1976, when Director Bush wrote to
[5255]the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration
[5256]regarding CIA sponsorship of Fairways and asked that the
[5257]subject be withheld from public disclosure.
[5260]13-00000
[5262]ATTACHMENT B (7)
[5264]Item No. 339. MSS p. no. 509
[5266](S) CIA presence in Bolivia and Brazil has not been
[5267]officially acknowledged and is still classified because
[5268]it involves sourcés and methods.
[5270]David Phillips in his book .The Night Watch,
[5271]chapter 8, pp. 212-235, entitled "Brazil, Venezuela 1970- -
[5273]1972" describes his presence as Chief of Station of CIA
[5275]in Brazil and-on page 209 he.discusses CIA in Bolivia. —
[5277](S) In regard to the declassification of CIA presence
[5278]in the Congo (Attachment A, Item 339, MSS p. no. 509),
[5279]Africa Division states "The existence of a CIA presence
[5280]in the Congo is reported in an interim report of the Senate
[5281]Select Committee on Intelligence dated 20 November 1975.
[5282]It may be argued therefore that to agree to declassification
[5283]of the reference to the Congo would have the effect of
[5284]singling out the Congo in the Third World as an alleged
[5285]target of CIA operations. This would have an adverse
[5286]effect on our relations with the government of Zaire. We
[5287]believe the item should remain classified and that
[5288]exemption 5 (b) (3) would apply in the case of the Congo.'
[5290]It is not a question of whether to agree or not
[5291]to declassification of reference to the Congo. The Church
[5292]Committee report as cited in Attachment A has already made
[5293]"official-public disclosure" of the matter, rendering the ©
[5294]subject moot. In addition, as Item 339 in Attachment A’
[5295]shows, four other countries of the Third World are also’
[5296]mentioned, thereby not singling out the Congo alone. What
[5297]adverse effect could be expected now by another public
[5298]reference to CIA presence in.the Congo as of the original
[5299]1974 publication date of the Marchetti/Marks book, is
[5300]difficult to comprehend. Since the government of Zaire has
[5301]not changed since the 1975 release of the information by
[5302]the Church Committee, it would seem that whatever adverse
[5303]effects there might be have already occurred.
[5305]SECRET
[5308]13-00000
[5310]ATTACHMENT C
[5312]ITEMS STILL CLASSIFIED IN MARCHETTI MANUSCRIPT
[5314]Item. No. MSS p. no. - Item No.  -MSS p. no..
[5316]1 11 "63 86
[5318]9 (lines 14-16; 14. ; 67 92 -
[5319]line 24, last 72 97-
[5320]two words 73°. 97
[5321]thru line 29) - 74 98:
[5322]a 79 100
[5323]10 (line 1, 15 : 107 12.3
[5324]first 7 words; os 128 132
[5325]line 2, last 2 129: ; 133°
[5326]words thru co 130.—; 133
[5327]line 4) ee 148 — 155
[5328]. , ‘149 "156
[5329]18 42. 152. 165
[5330]19 43 - 159 181
[5331]20 44 ; 160 182
[5333]21. .4S5 161 183 .
[5334]22 46 162 184
[5335]23 , 46 182 ; 196
[5336]24 47 ; 194 © 215
[5337]26 47 195 216
[5338]27 ; 48 196 217.
[5339]28 -  . 48 197 218
[5340]29 Oe 49 ; 198 219
[5342]31° 54 201 . 222 —
[5343]34 59 224. 252
[5344]38 63 225 253
[5346]41. 65 226 257
[5347]42 65a 234 , 262
[5348]43 65a 236 262
[5349]46 (line 24, 70 | 256 ' 329
[5350]fourth word - - 261 334
[5351]thru line 31) ; 273 380
[5352]47 71 278. 400
[5353]48 —  TWla 279 403
[5354]: 49 : 7la - + 280° - 404
[5355]i 50 72 283 413
[5356], 51. . 72 284 413
[5357]52 77 286. 414
[5358]53 78 287 414
[5359]54. Ci; 80 287a 415
[5360]55 80 288 416
[5361]56 81 290 417
[5362]58 84 ; 291 417
[5363]59. 85 296 425
[5365]62 + 86 298 426°
[5368]13-00000
[5370]Item No. “MSS p. no.
[5372]300i 426
[5374]“318 469
[5375]319 _ 470
[5376]320 | 471
[5377]321 ~ 471
[5378]322 473
[5379]323 474
[5380]331 . 482
[5381]33200 482
[5382]333 . 483
[5383]334.0 483
[5384]335 483
[5385]336 oo 484
[5386]337 507°.
[5388]339 (line 1, first 509
[5389]two words and
[5390]fifth, sixth
[5391]‘and seventh words)
[5394]13-00000
[5396]SECRET
[5398]MEMORANDUM FOR; ‘Mr. John.K. Greaney
[5399], Associate General Counsel
[5401]FROM - : Deputy Director for Operations
[5403]SUBJECT :. DDO Coordination on DDS§T's Review of |
[5405]Deletions from The CIA and the Cult
[5406]of Intelligence by Marchetti and Marks
[5408]REFERENCE : -DDS§T-5193-76/1-dated 27 May 1977
[5410]1. Appropriate Components of the DDO have reviewed
[5411]the following items (deletions) listed at Tab C of referent
[5412]for coordination with the DDO and concur with the DDS&T
[5413]that they are all properly classified in accordance with
[5414]E.O. 11652 and should so remain:
[5416]Item ; Manuscript Page
[5417]» 25 47
[5418]159 . 181
[5419]160 ; 182
[5420]161 7 183
[5421]162 184
[5422]163 _ 7284
[5423]164 - 185
[5424]205° oo 234
[5425]208 : 235
[5426]209 236
[5427]295 : 424
[5428]297 425
[5429]299 ao , 426
[5430]301 . 427
[5432]2. In Tab D of referent, the DDSET deferred to DDO
[5433]or OS the decision on the classification of Item 190, manu-
[5434]script page 214, relating to Soviet capabilities to make
[5435]intelligible the sounds picked up by audio devices discovered
[5436]in the code room of the American Embassy in Moscow. The
[5437]appropriate DDO Component finds that this item must remain
[5438]classified SECRET since it relates to cryptography and is
[5440]exempt. from the General Declassification Schedule of
[5442]on ae E2 IMPDET CL BY 018630
[5446]SECRET
[5448]13-00000
[5450]SECRET
[5452]I
[5454]| 5
[5456]|
[5458]i
[5460]E.0. 11652, exemption category 5B(2).
[5462]3. Specific classification and exemption authority for
[5463]each item, if. needed, is available from SA/DO/O.
[5465]| Oo William W. Wells
[5467]\ ; . _ ‘
[5468]. O/SA/DO/O:NAShepanek:kaw (1542)
[5470]Distribution Sc
[5471]Original §& 1 - Addressee
[5472]; ‘- DDO :
[5473]- ADDO:
[5474]- Ex Reg
[5475]- DDS&T
[5476]- SA/DO/O |
[5478]SRNR ENE
[5480]SECRET
[5482]13-00000
[5484]DDS&T-5193-76/1
[5486]B2 WAL 97.
[5487]MEMORANDUM FOR: ‘General Counsel .
[5488]ATTENTION .?  John.Greaney
[5489]SUBJECT -: Review of Deletions from The CIA and the
[5491]Cult of Intelligence by Marchetti and Marks
[5493]1. The responsible - and knowledgeable components of this
[5494]directorate have reviewed the appropriate deletions from subject
[5495]book per your request. The review was made to determine whether
[5496]each deletion was still classified under EO 11652 or whether the
[5497]information in each’ deletion has been. officially released by the
[5498]U.S. Government. ;
[5500]2. Attached, Tab A, is a list of the deleted items reviewed
[5501]by this directorate. Tab B is:a list of those items of primary
[5502]interest of this directorate. All of these items remain classi-
[5503]fied; however, portions of one item, 135, can be released. Tab C
[5504]is a list of those items which we determined are still classified
[5505]under EO 11652; however, some portions of three items can be
[5507]released, but we recommend that all of the items in Tab C be
[5509]coordinated with other indicated elements. Tab D is a list of
[5510]items we determined are not of concern to this directorate and
[5511]should be referred to other indicated elements. Tab E is a list
[5513]of the four items.mentioned above which we believe portions can
[5514]now. be released. The portions: in red brackets, remain classified
[5516]and should not be released,
[5518]3. Since many of the deleted items involved the National
[5520]Security Agency (NSA), we attempted to coordinate our determina-
[5522]tions. through our contacts at NSA. We were told that any
[5523]coordination must be handled between, the NSA and CIA General
[5524]Counsel. As a result, no further coordination with other ele-
[5526]ments was attempted.
[5528]4, This memorandum completes the DDS§T action on the
[5530]‘court ordered: ‘review of the deletions from subject book.
[5532]Aoocl f Lillew :
[5534]ernest’s J. ZELLMER
[5535]7 Associate Deputy Director
[5536]*. ; for
[5537]Science and. Technology
[5539]Attachments:
[5540]As. Stated
[5543]13-00000
[5545]Item
[5547]189
[5549]DELETED ITEMS IN THE MARCHETTI MANUSCRIPT
[5551]REVIEWED BY THE DDS&T
[5553]Page
[5555]47
[5556]104
[5557]104
[5558]105
[5559]106
[5560]107
[5561]134
[5562]135.
[5563]177
[5564]179
[5565]180
[5566]181
[5567]182
[5568]183
[5569]184
[5570]185
[5571]185
[5572]185
[5573]185
[5574]189
[5575]189
[5576]189
[5577]190
[5578]191.
[5579]191
[5580]"492
[5581]193
[5582]194
[5583]200.
[5584]201
[5586]202.
[5588]' Item
[5590]190
[5591]191
[5592]192
[5593]204
[5594]205
[5595]208
[5596]209
[5597]245
[5598]248
[5599]254
[5600]258
[5601]259
[5602]260
[5603]267
[5604]268
[5605]269
[5606]275
[5608]297
[5609]299
[5610]301
[5611]302
[5612]304
[5613]306
[5614]312
[5615]313
[5616]324
[5617]325
[5618]327
[5619]328
[5620]329
[5622]TAB A
[5624]235
[5625]236
[5627]' 268
[5629]269
[5630]327
[5631]331
[5632]331
[5633]331
[5634]337
[5635]337
[5636]337
[5637]394
[5638]424
[5639]425
[5641](426
[5643]‘427
[5644]427
[5645]430
[5647]431
[5649]4420
[5650]450
[5652]- 474
[5654]474
[5655]475
[5656]476
[5657]480.
[5659]13-00000
[5661]91
[5662]92
[5663]#135
[5665]136
[5667]158
[5669]163
[5670](165°
[5671]166
[5673]167
[5674]188
[5676]Manuscript Page
[5678]Tab B
[5680]ITEMS OF INTEREST. TO THE DDS&T
[5681]AND REMAIN CLASSIFIED
[5683]SECRET, 5B(2)
[5684]SECRET, 5B(2)
[5685]SECRET, 5B (2)
[5686]SECRET, 5B(2)
[5687]SECRET, .5B(3)
[5688]SECRET, 5B(2)
[5689]SECRET, 5B(2)
[5690]SECRET, 5B(3)
[5691]CONFIDENTIAL,
[5693]CONFIDENTIAL,
[5695]TOP SECRET, 5B(2)
[5697]*Can be sanitized and portions released.
[5699]and
[5700]and
[5701]and
[5703]and
[5705]and
[5707]and
[5709](3)
[5710](3)
[5711](3)
[5712](3)
[5714](3)
[5715](3)
[5717]5B(2)
[5719]SB(2).
[5721]13-00000
[5723]laD &
[5725]ITEMS OF INTEREST TO DDS&T AND SHOULD REMAIN
[5727]CLASSIFIED BUT SHOULD .BE COORDINATED WITH OTHER ELEMENTS
[5729]Item
[5731]#25 -
[5733]_#& 7)
[5734]88
[5735]157
[5736]159
[5737]160
[5738]161.
[5739]162
[5740]163
[5741]164
[5743]187
[5744]189 |
[5746]Manuscript Page
[5748]47
[5749]104
[5750]105
[5752]DDO
[5753]DOD
[5754]pop
[5755]0S
[5757]DDO,
[5758] ppo,
[5759]- DDO,
[5761]DDO,
[5763]DDO |
[5765]NSA
[5767]~ DOD
[5769]DOD
[5771]NSA
[5773]’ DDO
[5775]DDO
[5777]- DDO
[5778]“pop
[5779]' DOD
[5780]- DOD
[5782]DOD
[5784](DIA)
[5785](DIA)
[5787]OC, ERDA
[5788]OC, ERDA
[5789]OC, ERDA —
[5790]OC, ERDA
[5792]~ DDO -
[5794](Navy)
[5795](Navy)
[5796]and DDO
[5798](SAFSS) .”
[5800](SAFSS)
[5802](SAFSS) , NSC Staff
[5803](SAFSS)
[5805]*Can be sanitized’ and portions. released.
[5808]13-00000
[5809]Tab C
[5810]Continued
[5812]‘Item, Manuscript Page
[5813]259° 331 DOD (SAFSS)
[5814]260 331 7 DOD (SAFSS)
[5815]267 337 - -pOD (Navy) |
[5816]268-0 337, == sé (Navy) |
[5817]269 = 337, «DOD (Navy).
[5818]#275. 394 OL |
[5819]295 ar. DDO |
[5820]29725 ppo
[5821]299 426 "DDO, NSA a —
[5822]301 42700 pDo, OC, NSA
[5823]302 s=<“<«~=«CTSC‘(“ NS |
[5824]304 a 430° NSA
[5825]306° sts«C DOD (Navy)
[5826]312 a 2 44200: NSA
[5827]313 450 NSA |
[5829]7 *Can be sanitized and portions released.
[5833]13-00000
[5835]Tab D
[5837]ITEMS REFERRED TO OTHER COMPONENTS
[5839]Item
[5841]86
[5843]170.
[5844]171 ©
[5845]173.
[5847]174
[5849]“475—
[5851]176
[5852]Av
[5853]178
[5854]190
[5856]“-491-
[5858]192
[5860]324
[5862]325
[5864]327
[5866]328
[5868]Manuscript Page
[5870]0/DCI
[5871]NSA
[5872]NSA
[5873]NSA ~
[5874]NSA
[5875]NSA
[5876]NSA |
[5877]NSA
[5878]NSA |
[5880]pbO or OS |
[5882]State Department
[5883]State Department
[5885]DOD (JCS) and NSC Staff
[5887]‘DOD
[5889]DDI and DOD -
[5891]"DDI, DOD and NSC Staff.
[5894]13-00000
[5896]“COE L ‘Tab E
[5898]ITEMS SANITIZED. FOR POSSIBLE RELEASE
[5900]Item 135, Manuscript page 134
[5902]"A somewhat similar sale of a proprietary occurred in fioe7
[5903]when CIA’ decided to get rid of a technical research {laboratory} »
[5905]in the {Boston area."
[5907]Item 25, Manuscript page 47
[5909]“Over the years, the CIA closely collaborated with the
[5910]th ationalist§} first to run guerrilla attacks against imainland
[5911]hina! and then in mote recent years to use Waiwant ‘as a base
[5913]' for U-2 flights (flown over China by Nationalist’ Dilots
[5915]trained in the United States), electronic surveillance of
[5916]the mainland and such covert action programs as propaganda
[5917]and disinformation aimed at (China during the Cultural Revol-
[5920]- Item 87, Manuscript page 107
[5922]"The Agency also had a project to determine where American .
[5923]risoners of war were being held in North Vietnam and to
[5924][Eommunicate with them} Scale models of the prisons were
[5925]constructed from aerial fand satellite photography and from
[5926]other intelligence, and studies were made to learn which
[5927]prisoners had tried or might be willing to try to communicate.
[5928]Some of -the prisoners, on their own, had earlier used their
[5929]infrequent letters to their families as a means of sending
[5930]coded messages relating where they were being held. Thus,
[5931]the Agency worked out schemes to use return mail from the.
[5932]families to send answers back} Meanwhile, the Technical.
[5934]Services Division Of the"
[5936]Item 275, Manuscript page 394
[5938]new optics for satellite ‘cameras and improvements in ‘over
[5939]the horizon' radars? These technical contracts were almost
[5940]always drawn up under: the cover of being between the scholar
[5941](or the university) and some government agency other than the
[5942]CIA (the Defense Department or some component thereof were
[5943]the most"
[5945]SECRET | _.
[5947]13-00000
[5949]os Be . | Tab €
[5951]INTEMS OF INTEREST TO DDS&T AND SHOULD REMAIN
[5953][ CLASSIFIED BUT SHOULD BE COORDINATED WITH OTHER ELEMENTS
[5954]; Item, Manuscript Page
[5955]£9- he - 289 © 47 doo
[5956]* 87° | 104 | DOD. (DIA)
[5957]88 105 DOD (DIA)
[5958]| 157 179° Os
[5959]Cine/ Idee = 159? . 181°. DDO, OC, ERDA
[5960]. “ 1608 182 / DDO, OC, ERDA-
[5961]me 6® 183 ; DDO, OC, ERDA
[5962]. wo rel 184 DDO, OC, ERDA
[5963]s ‘ 163 | 184 DDO
[5964]; a ‘64? 185.0 DDO
[5965]172 189: NSA
[5966]187 200 DOD (Navy)
[5967]189 | a 202. DOD (Navy)
[5968]204 233 "NSA and DDO
[5969]WED 2089 | 234 bbe
[5970]= 208 235 + DDO
[5971]LA 236 ppo™.
[5972]245 268 ‘DOD “(SAFSS)
[5973]248 269" _ DOD (SAFSS)
[5974]254 327 pop (SAFSS);, NSC Staff
[5975](258° | 331 DOD (SAFSS)
[5977]' *Can be Sanitized and portions released.
[5979]13-00000
[5981]267° O37
[5982]268. 337
[5984]2939 gaz
[5986]og ct _femcyprs. 297 . 425_
[5988]= 299% - 426
[5990]306-43
[5992]“313 _ 450
[5993]329 = — 480
[5997]26002 331
[5999]269 337
[6000]AI75 394.
[6002]_ 3018 427°
[6003]304 430
[6005]31200 442.
[6007]Item Manuscript Page
[6008]259 331
[6010]DOD
[6011]DOD
[6013]’ DOD
[6015]DOD
[6016]DOD
[6018]DDO
[6021]“ppo,
[6022]DDO,
[6023]NSA.
[6025]NSA
[6027]. DOD
[6029]NSA
[6031]- NSA
[6033]NSC
[6037]OL .
[6039]Tab C
[6040]Continued
[6042](SAFSS)
[6043](SAFSS)
[6044](Navy)
[6045](Navy).
[6046](Navy)
[6048]NSA
[6050]Oc, NSA
[6051](Navy)
[6053]Staff
[6055]- *Can be sanitized and portions released.
[6057]13-00000
[6059]Tab D
[6061]ITEMS REFERRED TO OTHER COMPONENTS
[6063]Item
[6065]86
[6067]170 -
[6069]171
[6070]173
[6072]- 174
[6073]4175
[6075]- Manuscript Page
[6077]104
[6078]189
[6079]189
[6080]190
[6081]191
[6082]191
[6084]193
[6086]0/DCI
[6088]“NSA |
[6090]NSA:
[6091]NSA
[6093]NSA.
[6095]NSA.
[6097]NSA
[6099]NSA
[6100]NSA
[6101]DDO or os”
[6103]' State Department
[6105]State Department
[6108]DDI and DOD ©
[6109]' DDI, DOD and NSC Staff.
[6111]DOD (ses), and NSC staff
[6113]13-00000
[6115]t
[6116]i
[6118]' desire to counter its anti-American, anti-Hussein Vine (which was notfnew),
[6120]oe ro Be we ; _ _ . tp
[6122][iussein and the U.S. Government became increasingly concerned about the BH /
[6123]Ft
[6127]strong and strident propaganda vofce of Radia Cairo. Both parties shared a
[6129]Aw
[6131]expertise and management skills to put the station in operation. | G
[6132]Still another example of a country where the CIA enjoys a special | 7
[6133]relationship is Nationalist CHina. On Taiwan, however, the CIA's Link is 7 3
[6134]not with President Chiang Kai-shek but with his son and heir apparent,
[6135]Premier Chiang Ching-Kuo. One former CIA chief of station, Ray Cline, now the ~ /
[6136]‘State Department's Director of Intelligence and Research, became something - h
[6137]of a legend within the Clandestine Services because of his frequent all- /
[6138]-night drinking boutsfaith the younger Chiang. | tr
[6139]Fover the years, the CIA closely collaborated with the Nationalists first Cs
[6140]to run guerrilla attacks against mainland China and then in.more recent . L
[6141]years to use Taiwan as a base for U-2 flights (flown over China by Nationalist h
[6142]pilots trained in the United States), electronic surveillance of the mainland $
[6143]and such covert action programs as propaganda and disinformation aimed at l
[6144]China during the Cultural Revolution. | . !
[6145]In South Vietaam, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker insisted on personally 2
[6146]conducting al] important meetings, with President Thieu; sometimes Bunker was: 2
[6147]accompanied by the CIA chief, when there was Agency business to be discussed. 2
[6148]But there has been another CIA officer in Saigon who has known Thieu for z
[6149]many years and who has retained access to the Vietnamese President. 2
[6150]According to a former assistant to Ambassador Bunker, this CIA officer has | Zz
[6151]served as conduit between Thieu and the American government when a formal 4 2
[6152]‘meeting is not desired or when Thieu wishes to float an idea. \ 2
[6154]fersonelly with 4
[6155]' * }Over the years, the CIA has provided Thieu porsonndadjydeis mi11 fons of 2
[6157][Dyer the years, the CIA has provided phteu onsongetpivethe mi} 1tons of
[6158]dollars in untraceable, "black bag" funds, -tnerddttionto tha hiadvadecct —_/ Xz
[6160]13-00000
[6162]| ; the information straight forwardly, thereby, handtcapr'ing the. analysts in making
[6164]C "a confident judgment of tha accuracy of the report's content. * 7
[6166]. Some intelligence analysts, both inside and outside the CIA, receive!
[6167]large numbers of this type of report every day, many of which do come from &
[6168]actual agents. - But by mixing together information supplied by audio surveillance
[6169](which is, by definition, an accuzate account of what was adid) with agent
[6170]reports which are sometimes exaggerated or false, the ‘Clandestine Services
[6172]~ confuses and often misleads those people within the U.S. government whose
[6174]function it is to analyse foreign events and indirectly those leaders who make
[6176], decisions based on that intelligence analysts.
[6178]In the mid-1960s, the Far East Division of the Clandestine Services and @®
[6179]the experts of the Scientific and Tachnical Directorate combindddféeces to
[6180]carry. out one of the Agency's most imaginative (if ultimately unsuccessful)
[6182]Ce intelligence collection operations ever undertaken. At that time, top-level
[6184]U.S. government officials were distubed by repprts that Communist China was on
[6185]the verge of developing an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) system. .
[6186]They knew that the threat posed by Chinese ICBM's would play an important part
[6187]—_— in the decision, then under consideration, to go ahead with an American anti-
[6188]ballistic missile (ABM) deployment program. As a matter of the highest .
[6189]priority, the CIA was told to find out what was happening at Shuangch'engtzu, the
[6190]_ Chinese missile test site in the far western corner of Inner Mongolia.
[6191]| The Agency's technical specialists responded by designing a nuclear-
[6192]ppwered device which could monitor certain key electronic emissions coming from
[6194]the missile site, well over a thousand miles away, and then rely the information
[6196]to a CIA listening post. The plan was to emplace the device on a mountain ~
[6198]peak called the Nanda Devi, at an altitude of more than 25,000 feet, in the
[6200]a Lee me ema pe cane eee te eye oe
[6202]Indian Himalayas from where 1t would have an unobstructed "line-of-sight" to
[6204]the secret test facility. As the device was being perfected in the CIA
[6206]Tahorataries. the Clandestine Services took on the resoonsibility for the nost /
[6208]13-00000
[6210]©)
[6212][aitticute plase of the operation -~ installing the machine on the mountain to
[6214]pe
[6216]“The first thing that had to be done was to gain the permission of the
[6218]Indian government to implement the scheme, not a large problem in view of the
[6220]CIA's close relations with the Indian intelligence service. The Indians not
[6222]‘only agreed but, surprisingly, insisted on full participation in the project.
[6223]Next, the Agency recruited a group of experienced mountain climbers to carry
[6224]the device, complete wéth its nuclear powerpack, pp the mountain and put it -
[6226]into operation. ‘A well-known American mountaineer who had previously conquered
[6228]Mt. Everest, Barry Bishop, was contacted and convinced to lead the climb.
[6230]Overall control of the operation, however, was placed in the hands of an experfenced
[6232]O
[6234]2
[6236]aw Pon
[6240]CIA case officer. . |
[6241]That summer, the Agency operator along with the American and Indian
[6244]climbers, and a group of Sherpa porters, were brought together at a secret
[6246]CIA training base in the Rocky Mountains to practice as a team and to learn
[6248]how to assemble the monitoring device once they got it to the top: of Nanda Devi.
[6250]Cover for the operation was carefully built by Teaking information in international
[6252]. mountaineering circles that a joint American-Indian expedition was planning an
[6254]ascent of one of the more difficult Himalayan peaks. During the winter, the
[6255]technicians completed work on the sensor device, and a few months later the
[6257]CIA chief of station in Delhi reported that all logistical and cover arrangements
[6258]with Indian intelligence had been completed. The monitoring device was
[6259]clandestinely flown to a secure staging area in northern India by a transport
[6261]ga
[6263]plane from one of the Agency's proprietary airlines. Next, the climbers were
[6265]brought together and taken to the camp in the foothills of the Himalayas from
[6267]where they and the Sherpas would begin their long, difficult ascent of the Nanda
[6269]Devt.
[6273]Things went well at first, but after the expedition passed the snow line, the
[6275]Indians began to tire and became irascible, claiming that they were backpacking
[6277]too much weight. The CIA case officer redistributed the load by convincing the
[6279]A . 6 2 eet A ot A. dn - a a
[6281]13-00000
[6286]i
[6288]; 3
[6289]i
[6291]_ [would do. Progress slowed and, behind schedule, the team reached the base CD
[6293]C.
[6295]camp from where the final ascent to the mountain's summit would be made by’
[6297]a smal} party of climbers accompanidd by a few porters. Soon after the
[6299]group had started for the peak, one of the Sherpas returned to base camp to
[6301]tell the CIA man, who had remained behind to handle communications with the
[6303]staging area, that the Indians were causing trouble at the higher altitudes. .
[6305]The case officer immediately set out to reach Bishop and the summit team in’
[6307]an effort to restore peace among the climbers. The project was now wel off
[6309]. schedule, and any more delays would have endangered the entire expedition
[6311]because of the onset of bad weather. With some difficulty, the Agency
[6313]operator was able to get the team moving again, and it finally reached its
[6314]target near the top of the Nanda Devi. Amidst howling winds and at temperatures.
[6315]well below zero, the climbers assembled the monitoring device and put it into
[6317]Le . operation. With spirits high, the group returned to base camp and the news ©
[6319]of the successful installation was sadioed back to the staging. area.
[6321]But within a few short months, the signals that the sensor had been
[6323]sending from the Nanda Devi stopped. The CIA dispatched a plane to. fly over
[6325]the mountain and photograph the monitoring site. It was learned that the
[6327]device had been knocked over by a snow slide. When the Indian government
[6328]was informed of the development, it complained to the CIA station in Delhi
[6329]that the nuclear generator might be polluting the headqaters of the sacred —
[6330]Sanghes River which flow out of the Himalayas. The Indian concern was about
[6331]religious pollution, not ecological. , |
[6332]The CIA reacted by planning another climbof the mountain for the following
[6334]year, both to retrieve the damaged equipment and implace a ‘new monitoring
[6335]system -- this one powered by a non-nuclear generator. The climbing team,
[6337]C led by Bishép, was gathered together again and this time it reached the .
[6338]top of the mountain with comparatively little difficulty. The new device was
[6340]set up, but after an extensive search, the atomic generator from the year _[
[6342]13-00000
[6344][ before was not-found. Again after only a few weeks, the second sensor devick Zz
[6345]c stopped working. This time the failure was attributed to a mechanical .
[6346]. . . ‘
[6347]malfunction.
[6349]At this point, the Agency gave up on mountain-top monitoring of the
[6351]Coinmunist Chinese missile program, turning to other systems and new, improved.
[6352]A I
[6356]satellites for acquiring the information it was seeking. The Indians were
[6358]presented with secret medals by a grateful, but disappointed, CIA. | a ¢
[6360]I the fertile imaginations of the E2/S&T experts during the following
[6364]years produced many more unique codirction schemes aimed at solving the
[6368]mysteries of China's strategic missile program, Most eventually proved to be
[6369]unworkable, and at least one entailed a frighteningly high-risk potential.
[6370]The silliest of them all, however, called for the creation of a small one-man
[6371]C. airplane that could theoretically be packaged in two large suitcases. In :
[6372]concept, an agent along with the suitcases would somehow be infiltrated into
[6373]the denied area where, after performing his espionage missfon, he would ~
[6374]assemble the aircraft and fly to safety over the nearest friendly border. .
[6375]Even the chief of the Clandestine Services refused to have anything to do with
[6376]| this scheme, and the projectydied on the drawing boards. . | |
[6377]A second system was a device, Tong and tubular like a rocket, that could/ (G2
[6378]be dropped by a U-2 or another aircraft near the missile test site, its fall _
[6379]Slowed by a@ parachute so that the device would penetrate only two or three
[6381]feet into the ground on impact. Afterwards, the system, andaerial rising from
[6383]its top, would activate itself and perform its electronic sensing tasks. Still
[6385]later, the device would transmit its findings to a listening post, most
[6387]likely a circling aircraft. The need for secret air penetration deep into a
[6389]foreign and héstile power to deliver the monitoring device and additional
[6391]similar flights to retrieve the data collected and stored by the machine
[6392]ct
[6394]ratcad carinic miactinne ac tn the evstam'e utilitv and warth. The EYfsat
[6396]13-00000
[6398](specialists, fascinated by the technical aspects of the project, seemed, however (G4)
[6400]oblivious of the dangers involved in secretly flying near a Chinese missile . @
[6402]installation and dropping an object in an action that could quite easily appear :
[6404]to a startled radar operator as a-lone bomber engaging in a surprise nuclear 4
[6405]attack. Development of the €ostly system was, therefore, pushed ahead. The. | 8
[6406]technicians were more concerned with the fact that the test drops of the device. .—s-_ &
[6408]in the southwestern U.S, desert usually resulted in the system burying itself
[6410]several feet below the ground surface or so jarring the delicate instrumentation —
[6412]that the davice failed to self-activate and function properly. 7 . . '
[6414]fa third system was a model airplane roughly the size of a large bird, - Vay
[6415]such as a condor, which was powered by a miniature nuclear engine and which
[6416]could be Jaunched from outside China and guided to the missile test site well
[6417]over a thousand miles away, al7 the while searing in patterns that would resemble
[6418]on the air defense radar scopes the flight patterns of a large eagle. Once
[6419]over the target, the plane's electronic sensors and tiny television cameras
[6421]would be turned on to record activities below and relay the information either
[6423]. to its laugch site or much more likely a hovering aircraft that had penetrated
[6425]Chinese airspace for this purpose. Millions of dollars were expended by the
[6427]CIA in research on this “baby U-2" that called for numerous breakthroughs in
[6429]the state of the technical arts. Its chief advantage was, of course, that if
[6431]and when it was shot down there would be no pilot to confess it had been on an
[6433]Agency~sponsored spying mission. }
[6435]The technical difficulties involved in the fair-drop} system and thefmodet ] /6£
[6437]airplane Mevice were too great and time consuming for either to be fully . CF
[6438]developed by their inventors before improvenents in intelligence satellite |
[6439]surveillance programs were achieved, thus negating the justifying requirement
[6441]for these quest ionably and potentially provocative collection systems before
[6443]they could be put into operation. Other clandestine collection devices -- a few
[6445]more sensibly contrived, most, however, of dubious value -- were also being
[6447]13-00000
[6449]. ierstoma tes
[6451]VE ora__the—-Shah 0 nOWe Oya GA : a¥e hah had shown his—gratt ache by
[6453]allowing the Agency~to_use Iran as a base for electron and radar surveillance -
[6455]of the Soviet Union. The CIA Station chief in Iran usually maintained much -
[6457]~ closer contact with the Sha n tha AmerTCan~ambassador. (With the 1973
[6458]appointment of formér CIA Director Helms to the past of American ambassador in.
[6459]anh haGeEn - 2 on icts BRAR—PPEStTIGOUTyY a ppea ody ,
[6461]the case, CIA representatives carried out most of the negotiations with the
[6463]Iranis.] However, when Ambassador Armin Meyer was informed of the details of
[6465]#, 7 Lamang the Agency had developed a new type of over-the-horizan radar Gtos>
[6467]AG
[6468]which it wished to install neerthe Soviet dovder | in Iran, As was normally .
[6470]Z .
[6472]3
[6474]4
[6476]the proposed agreement, he raised some questions with the CIA station chief that x
[6478]blossomed into an inter-agency dispute. At this point Meyer cabled the State
[6480]Department for Instructions and advice.
[6481]In the way of background, it should be understood that CIA communications
[6483]clerks handle nearly all classified cables between American embassies overseas
[6485]and Washington -- for both the CIA and the State Department. To have a separate
[6487]code roon for each agency in every embassy would be a wasteful procedure, so a-
[6488]senior CIA communications expert is regularly assigned to the administrative
[6489]part of the State Department in order to oversee CIA’s communicators who work
[6490]under State cover. In theory, CIA code clerks are not supposed to read the
[6491]messages they send for State, but any code clerk who wants to have a successful
[6492]career quickly realized that his promotions depend on the CIA and that he js |
[6493]well advised to show the CIA station chief cppies of all important State
[6494]messages. The State Department long ago fmplicitly recognized that its most
[6496]secret cables are not secure from CIA inspection by setting up special
[6498]- communications channels which sppposedly cannot be deciphered by the CIA,
[6500]. [Thea in 1968, Ambassador Meyer ran into troubles with the CIA station chief
[6501]\ , e7 . 1!
[6503]in Teheran, Meyer switched his, communications, with State fin Washington,
[6505]: ." ~=6He needed to be able to discuss the 7
[6507]G
[6508]7
[6513]16
[6515]Ut
[6517]12
[6518]2
[6519]Hf
[6520]1S”
[6521]Ife
[6522]17
[6524]14
[6525]Zz
[6527]z
[6528]2
[6529]Zz
[6531]13-00000
[6533]1
[6535]a
[6537](situation in private with his superiors. But Bob and his cohorts at FI/D were i
[6538]‘one step ahead of Ambassador ‘Meyer. - They had figured. out a way to intercept "2
[6539]his cables and the replies he received from Washington. So shortly after each 3
[6540]State message was sent, Bob would appear in the CIA executive suite with a copy ‘Y
[6541]of the message for the personal inspection of the Director. Mritten on top of 55
[6542]each lintercepted cable was a warning that the contents of the cable should be &
[6543]kept especially confident because State was unaware thet the CIA had a copy. 7
[6545]Despite Agency knowledge of all of Meyer's instructions and information, ( _ $
[6546]Meyer and State's director of Iranian Affairs in Washington refused to yield —_ G
[6547]to Agency pressure for a quick settlement. Even-after these two men met at i ¢
[6549]. CIA headquarters with the Deputy Director of CIA, Vice Admiral Rufus Taylor, Hf
[6550]‘they still insisted that the Agency's plans for the new installation were -. - Ae
[6551]unacceptable to the U.S. government as a whole. CIA Director Helms was SO L
[6552]aggravated by this continued resistance thas he personally telephoned Secretary ft
[6553]of State Rusk to settle the matter. Rusk promptly ended the dispute by agreeing © j
[6554]completely to the CIA position. . /
[6556]| Bob was also involved in another series of events which started when FI/D — Gop
[6558]worked out a liaison arrangement with the codebreaking service of a certain , ‘
[6560]South American government. This arrangement was ostensibly for the purpose of F
[6562]allowing the CIA and the other country to cooperate in decoding messages sent
[6564]r
[6566]by third countries. However, FI/D tood advantage of the liaison to intercppt 2
[6567]the ‘secret communications of the host South American government. Such arrangements  ;
[6568]were norna1 }procedure to Bob. The intensely dedicated law and order advocate saw :
[6569]nothing wrong in practicing this sort of duplicity on an allied government which i
[6570]cooperated in good faith. ,
[6571]. FI{D's liaison with the South Amerfcan country continued for a long period i
[6572]of time until relations between the United States and that nation soured over é
[6573]unrelated issues, and as-a result FI/D was forced to break off the relationship. é
[6574]However, FI/D did not give up hope that the previous working arrangements could =
[6576]Be pestered 7
[6578]13-00000
[6580]i
[6581]i
[6583]re
[6584]; | Sometime later, Bbb Suggested to an officer in the CIA's executive suite Go)
[6587]- that the Agency should help the South American country obtain a channel in the
[6589]international satellite communications network, Comsat. Always the secretive |
[6591]operator, Bob did not explain why the Agency should do this, and the other
[6593]CIA man replied that CIA, afterall, was not the American foreign aid program; and
[6595]frether or not this particular country received a Comsat channel did not seem to.
[6596]be a matter concer.:ing CIA. Only Tater did the executive suite officer learn
[6598]ne ES Ee
[6599]from other sources that FI/D had worked out a deal with the South American
[6601]country in which liaison would be restored in return for a ‘Comsat channel (which
[6602]aah)
[6603]_ CIA would intercept). But Bob could not bring himself to share his scheme w¥en
[6605]with a fellow Agency employee in the Director's office. -
[6606]i
[6608]Eventually, the South American country received the Comsat channel; the
[6610]country restored liaison with FI/D; and CIA again had access to all of that
[6612]country's secret messages. /
[6614]Bob's job with FI/D is by no means one of the dirtiest jobs in the —.
[6616]Clandestine Services. There are operators in the paramilitary fields who
[6617]probably conceive and carry out more distasteful machinations. But Bob is in
[6618]a position where, on a regular basis, he misrepresents himself and even Hes
[6619]within the U.S. government -- not to mention the deceit he and his colleagues
[6620]perpetrate on friendly foreign governments which in good faith enter into
[6621]liaison agreements with FI/D.
[6623]Bob X fs one of these dedinary looking people who mow their Tawn, love:
[6625]their wives, and do some very nasty things for the CIA.
[6627]an
[6628]Fow other devoted family men who lived in suburban Washington homes
[6630]similar to Bob X's are named James McCord and f Howard Hunt. Both had long,
[6631]relatively successful careers with the CIA and rose to roughly the same upper- —
[6632]middle level of the bureaucracy as Bob X has. McCord was a CIA security
[6633]officer, specializing in protecting the Agency's physical facilities. Hunt
[6635]was an oneratar whn nlaved a leading role in the Bav of Pias and who took part
[6637]13-00000
[6639].
[6640]C Agency had become involved in a chain of events which forced
[6641]it to intervene militarily in a second country to protect its |
[6642]operation against Cuba. ‘The. Presi. ent way have get the original
[6643]- policy, but there was no way he could have known that simply.
[6644]by approving an attack on Guba, he would set in train Agency
[6645]paramilitary etivities against Guatamala.
[6646]CIA operations can have another unforseen effect on Amer-
[6647]ican foreign policys” fhey can subject the country to blackaail
[6648]if something goes wrong. For instance, after thy OLA, iphdot. was
[6649]shot down and captured by Indonesia in 1958, within rive days
[6650]the US government approved the sale for local currency cf 37,000
[6651]tons of American rice and lifted an embargo on $1 million in
[6652]small arms and other military equipment. Considering at that
[6653]Ce moment, the /oTA was, actively backing-an armed revolution against
[6654]the Sukarno regime Jhese would have | peen strange actions indeed
[6655]for the US governmat to take if it were not extrenely concerned . 1
[6656]about saving the captured pilot.
[6657]A somewhat similar incident occurred in 1 Singapore in 1960"
[6658]after a CIA lie detector expert was flown specially into the city.
[6659]: to make sure that a locally recruited agent was trustwor thy. -
[6660]When the Agency technician plugged us his polygraph machine ia
[6662]a hotel room, ‘he blew out all the fuses in the building.* he
[6664]*This was not the only time that the CLA blew major “vsss vier= CIE.
[6666]Seas. During the mid+1940s, the Ayency addjed to ite nusemor?
[6667]ST \vVSO6O0 0&0 8 ON
[6669]wet Kae
[6670]_ facilities on Taiwan by building e tmge electronic ime
[6673]13-00000
[6675]lie detector man, a CIA case officer,. and the local agent were
[6676]soon all under arrest. The Singapore government and the 8ritish,
[6677]who were in the process of granting Singapore its independence, -
[6678]‘were both quite disturbed bythe indident. Negotiations then. |
[6679]ensued to secure the men's release. According to Singapore
[6680]Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, the (US government offereds3. 3 mile .
[6681]lion to get thom out. Lee claimed that he wented ten “tines as -
[6682]much and consequently took nothing. In any case, the two CIA
[6683]. officials were subsequently freed, the newly installea Secretary
[6684]| of State, Dean Rusk, wrote a Hecret letter of apology: ‘to “the
[6685]Singapore leader. In 1965, Lee mentioned the affair in a speech
[6686]as an example of the type of activities engaged in bythe CIA.
[6687]The State Department then {ssued a routine denial furnished by
[6688]the ClA--State's press office not realizing the truth of Lee’s —
[6689]charges. Lee reacted by publicly producing Rusk’s letter of d-
[6690]pology, and State was forced to retract its original statement,
[6691]although it still maintained that no ransom had ever been offered.
[6692]me Y ' As well as embarrassing the US government and meking headlines
[6693]around the world, the incident caused the State Department to
[6694]revamp its anternal system for naking announcements about in-
[6695]telligence matters. . ,
[6696]= Blackmail was agin the theme in the mie-1960s when the — | CK)
[6697]President of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, quietly informed the .
[6699]for
[6702]en eee ey ape me ee cee
[6704][installation for surveillance of the Chinese mainland. When the -
[6706]device was turned on for the first time, it Knocked out a large @77)
[6707]part of the island's power. In this case, the local goverment a
[6710]“ .
[6712]reacted in a much more friendly manner than did Singapore’ Be
[6714]13-00000
[6716]US gover. nt that he might oust certain intelligence instal- 9,
[6718]lations from his island. the CIA had a major interest in the
[6720]matter, Ss... it operated a Foreign Broadcast Information Ser-
[6722]“vice FSIS) listening post there, and_the Pentagon was. also con- i
[6723]cerned about the possible loss of its large electronic surveil-
[6725]lance facilities. The view in the intelligence community was
[6727]that Makarics had to be mollified at practically all costs.
[6729]Pinally, government negotiators reached a secret deal with the
[6731]w ily old archbishop, and he received a special payment of about.
[6733]$10 million in return for letting the bases remain. The CIA
[6735]1G put up half of the money, using the Director’s Contingency Pund
[6737]for this unforseen expense. ee eR
[6739]In general, the presence of American intelligence facili-+
[6741]“ty oe . _
[6743]C ties in a foreign coumtry can have an.importent effect on Amer=
[6744]ican policy toward that country, especially in the Tgird World.
[6746]99
[6748]Closely aligned coumtries, such as}England, ‘fermany, Japan,
[6750]and Australia, have usually allowed the Unived States to set
[6752]TE up electronic spying bases as part of the gencral framework of
[6754]cooperation between allies. | But to the less developed countries,
[6756]the presence of an American installation is both a threa$ and
[6758]an opportunity. The threat comes from domestic opposition fore
[6759]ces who look on the base as an example of *neo=coloniciica”
[6760]and use it as a weapon against those in powers The opportunity
[6761]arises out of the fact that the United States will pay dearly
[6763]for the richt-to install its eavesdropphng equipment~-end te
[6765]t rele
[6766]¢ keep it in place, as [Archbishop Kakarios] discovered. C7
[6768]13
[6770]13-00000
[6771]be. . .
[6772][. ~ : :
[6774]i,
[6777]io marily intelligence facilities. These are Kagnew in Ethiopia .
[6779]I a. ae a Saas :
[6780]7 _ and Kenitra in Morocco. [potn host governments have been severely
[6782]eriticized by internal forces and neizhboring countries for
[6784]The only American military pases in Africa are in fact pri- Got
[6786]giving the United States a foothold in their nations, but both
[6788]have been handsomely rewarded in terms of receiving American 7 (
[6789]military and economic assistance which had added up over the :
[6790]| —s-years into the hundreds of millions of doll ars. while compara §
[6792]- tively modest amounts of aid would have probably beer ‘supplied,
[6794]even ae there had besn no bases, the larce size of the programs od
[6795]represented, in effect, a direct payment for the intellirence i
[6796]facilities. - 8s SE oy
[6797]Ce _ Similarly, from 1956 until thebna of 1969, the US Air dorce t
[6798]‘operated a huge base near Peshawar in Pakistan, which was pri- !
[6800]Jt marily an intelligence facility. For several years before Prencis —
[6802]Gary Powers* abortive flight over the Soviet Union in 1960,
[6804]CIA U2 planes used Feshawar as a principal take-off point for
[6805]| recomaissance flichts ‘over and along the edzes of the Soviet.
[6806]i Uniion. In additicn, Ini latary intellizence set up a vast array
[6807]of electronic 13 stening devices there to moniter activities
[6808]within the Soviet Union. { From the early days of the Eisenhower
[6809]administration, the United States had allied itself nore closely
[6810]with Pakistan than with India in those two countries* “traditional
[6811]struggle. Lot, at Least some experts on the region believe
[6812]i that an important factor in the American “tilt" toward Fakistan,
[6813]Co at least until the late 1960s, was the desire to hold on to the
[6815]13-00000
[6817]° penetration, while clearly fortuitous, are not unique in clandestine operations. t
[6819]7
[6821]I | ) |
[6823]In 1964, it was Tearned that the American embassy in Moscow had been thoroughly 2—
[6825]C bugged by the KGB. Scores of Soviet audio devices were found throughout the . 3
[6827]building. Counterespionage and security specialists determined that the . 4
[6828]equipment had been installed in 1952 when the embassy had been renovated, and =
[6829]that the bugs had been operational for roughly twelve years. The damige report G
[6830]asserted that during this entire pariod -- at the height of the cold war -- 7
[6832]: Soviet thtelligence had probably intercepted every diplomatic cable between 5
[6834]Washington and the embassy. [this assessment was based on the discovery of 2
[6836]| audio devices in the code room which wosteeeere allowed the Soviets to hear ‘ t
[6838]distinctly the sounds being maded by the typewriters and cryptographic equipment.
[6840]It was a reasonably easy technological feat -- well within Soviet capabilities --
[6842]to.translate such sounds into their true alphabetical meaning. | , oo f
[6843]- American suspicions about the Soviet eavesdropping were apparently aroused He
[6845]early in 1964 when Soviet leader Khrusbchev made a remark to Ambassador Fay Fey.
[6847]Kohler about Khhler's role in béocking the shipment to the Soviet Union of
[6849]steel for an important pédpeline. Taken in context, Khrushchav's remark indicated
[6851]to Kohler that there was a leak somewhere in American security. Kohler started
[6853]a massive investigation, and within a month or two, forty-odd bugs were found
[6855]embedded in walls throughout the embassy. Although Kohler would later claim — :
[6857]there was no connection between the discovery of the bugs and the investigation x
[6859]he ordered after his conversation with Khrushchev, the timing would seen to a,
[6860]| indicate otherwise. . . 4
[6861]|
[6862]- crucial years at the height of the Cold War, the Soviets almost certainly knew 2
[6863]every diplomatic secret which was communicated between the American embassy in 2
[6864]4 Moscow and Washington, The damage report noted, however, that this Soviet . | tC"
[6865]C. knowledge may well have worked to the advantage of the United States at least 2
[6866]in one instance in 1953 when the Korean War armistice was being negotiated. At 3
[6868]: the time, U.S. bargaining position with the North Koreans was that ff a particular 2
[6871]13-00000
[6873]DDA 77-2412
[6874]28 APR 1977
[6876]MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Halpern
[6878]FROM: H.G. Bean
[6879]Acting Executive Officer/DDA
[6880]SUBJECT: Fairways Corporation
[6881]REFERENCE: Attached memorandum from Central Cover Staff
[6883]1. With reference to paragraph 4 in the attached memorandum
[6884]from Mr. Latta, to the very best of our knowledge the CIA sponsorship
[6885]of the Fairways Corporation has not been officially placed in the
[6886]public domain. There has been at least one newspaper article relating
[6887]to Fairways and, in addition, at least one short television news’
[6888]item on the same subject. However, official confirmation of the
[6889]allegations of a relationship which was made in these media presentations
[6890]has been carefully avoided.
[6892]2. There has been official acknowledgement of the fact that
[6893]CIA's Office of Training runs a proprietary to provide executive
[6894]transportation. Such a statement appeared in the report of the
[6895]Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities. However, here
[6896]again there has been no acknowledgement that such an entity was
[6897]identical with or related to the Fairways Corporation.
[6899]3. The DDA concurs with the position of CCS as expressed in
[6900]paragraph 2 of Mr. Latta's memorandum.
[6902]Attachment
[6906]ere wee orp:
[6908]SECRET uote sos. 229.-
[6911]13-00000
[6913]SECRET 9 wan 7PARSHS
[6915]21 April 1977
[6917]MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Officer to the DDA
[6919]-_ FROM : M, L. Latta
[6921], Deputy Chief, Plans and Review Group
[6922]‘Central. Cover Staff
[6924]SUBJECT : Fairways Corporation
[6926]1. Per our telephone conversation today, attorneys’
[6927]for Victor Marchetti have requested release of the 168
[6928]items previously deleted by court order from the book,
[6929]The CIA and. the Cult of Intelligence. Fairways Corpora-
[6930]tion was referred to CCS by the SA/DO/O for review in
[6931]this connection.
[6933]2. Fairways Corporation is the subject of four items
[6934](107, 128, 129, 279; on pages 123, 132, 133,. and 403 respec-
[6935]tively,) in the original manuscript. The position of CCS on’
[6936]all four items is that they are still classified, since they
[6937]describe intelligence sources and methods by identifying an
[6938]operational support facility located in the U.S., and are
[6939]therefore exempt from declassification under Section 5(B) (2)
[6940]of the General Declassification Schedule contained in Executive
[6941]Order 11652.
[6943]3. According to CCS files, in April 1975 Director Colby
[6944]was asked by an NBC reporter about CIA sponsorship of Fair-
[6945]ways in connection with a planned TV documentary on Agency .
[6946]proprietaries. CCS files are unclear on the point, but there
[6947]: are indications that Director Colby may have responded to
[6948]the question in a manner which could have been construed as
[6949]admission of CIA sponsorship of Fairways. In any case, CCS
[6950]files contain other evidence that the matter was considered
[6951]to be still classified as recently as December 1976, when
[6952]Director Bush wrote to the Administrator of the Federal
[6953]Aviation Administration regarding CIA sponsorship of Fair-
[6954]ways and asked that the subject be withheld from public
[6955]disclosure.
[6957]E2 IMPDET
[6958]CL BY 026089
[6960]WANING NOTICE
[6961]SENStA\: INTELLIGENCE SQURCES
[6962]AND METHODS INVOLVED
[6964]“xf
[6965]ra
[6966]|
[6968]SECE
[6971]13-00000
[6973]Po SEER ET
[6975]4. Per our convérsation, CCS has stated in its
[6977]response to the SA/DO/O that DDA would comment further
[6979]on the extent to which CIA sponsorship of Fairways may
[6980]have been placed in the public domain since the court
[6981]order (i.e., since February 1975).
[6983]5. Please direct your comments to SA/DO/O. For
[6985]your information, Mr. Halpern, Room 6 D 0120, red line
[6986]x9588, is preparing an overall response on the subject
[6988]for the SA/DO/O.
[6989]JIM
[6991]-/L. Latta.
[6993]2
[6995]SECRET
[6997]13-00000
[6999]_ | MEMORANDUM FOR: [face
[7001]ne Spee
[7003]EPs,
[7004]Ll or Ee
[7006]| ty Matha Pratelall
[7009]13-00000
[7011]; ° wha we : ) , . . i
[7013]- 14 June ‘1977
[7015]MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution.
[7017]‘FROM : Norbert A. Shepanek —
[7018]: ; . * O/SA/DO/O |
[7019]SUBJECT” . . : “‘DDSET Request for DDO Coordination on
[7021]Certain Deletions in the Cult of
[7022]Intelligence by Marchetti - “Marks -
[7024]1, -In conjunction with the current. review of the dele-
[7025]tions in subject book for possible declassification, the
[7026]DDS&T has indicated certain items which they believe should ©
[7027]remain classified but has requested DDO coordination. Copies
[7028]of the deletions pertinent to your component are attached
[7030](see page 3).
[7032]. 2. Please review the deletions using the same criteria
[7033]_- applied during the review of deletions within the exclusive —
[7035]. purview of.the DDO. If you find that any of the items have
[7036].. been legally placed in the public domain, please provide the
[7038]details.
[7040]3. The following itenis should be reviewed by the
[7041]components indicated and response forwarded to the writer by
[7043]23 June 1977:
[7044]~ Item Manuscript Page = Review Responsibility
[7046]25 - 47— , EA Division
[7047]-159 181° . EA Division and NE Div.
[7048]160 182. Lid - ee mw Ut .
[7050]- 162 _— ; “184 Ww : " nT) mo
[7051]‘163 184 . . re eet tt "
[7052]164 ° 185 tf 1 a“ Ju
[7053]205° - 234 . NE Division —
[7054]208 235 LA Division ; ne
[7055]209 . 236 LA Division
[7056]295 , » 424 oo -EA Division :
[7057]297 425 ; EA Division and EUR Div.
[7058]299 426 ' - BA Division and EUR Div.
[7059]301 ' 427 AF Division —
[7060]* 190 214 . SE Division (Office of
[7062]Security may be appropriate
[7063]“action office for this item)
[7065]_E2 IMPDET CL BY 018630
[7066]SECRET
[7068]13-00000
[7070]SECRET
[7072]4, Where more than one Division is involved, a single
[7073]coordinated reply may be provided. If there are any questions,
[7074]please contact the writer on x1542.
[7076]N. A. Shepanek
[7078]Attachments
[7079]- As Noted Above
[7081]0/SA/DO/O:NAShepanek:kaw (1542)
[7083]Distribution .
[7084]Original - C/EA/cA™/?*-““"*
[7086]- E/FP/FC
[7088]- NE/COPS
[7090]- C/AF/Plans
[7092]_ C/SE/OSG
[7094]- TAT FOLAC™ |
[7096]- SA/DO/O
[7098]J NRE HER
[7099]'
[7101]SECRET
[7104]13-00000
[7108]7 WAY 1977
[7109]MEMORANDUM FOR: General Counsel”
[7110]ATTENTION. : ‘John Greaney
[7111]. SUBJECT : Review of Deletions from The CIA and the
[7113]Cult of Intelligence by Marchetti and Marks”
[7115]1. The responsible and knowledgeable components of this
[7116]directorate have reviewed the appropriate deletions from. subject
[7117]book per your request. The review was made to determine whether
[7118]each deletion was still classified under EO 11652 or whether the
[7119]information in each deletion has been officially released by the |
[7121]U.S. Government.
[7123]2. Attached, Tab A, is a list of the. deleted items reviewed _
[7124]by this directorate. Tab B is a list of those items of primary
[7125]interest of this directorate. All of these items remain classi-
[7127]‘fied; however, portions of one item, 135, can be released. Tab C
[7129]is a list of those items which we determined are still classified
[7130]under EO 11652; however, some portions of three items can be
[7131]released, but we recommend that all:-of the items in Tab C be.
[7132]coordinated with other indicated elements. . Tab D is a list of
[7133]items we determined are not of concern to this directorate and
[7134]should be referred to other indicated elements. Tab E is a list
[7135]of the four items mentioned above which we believe portions can
[7136]now be released. The portions in red brackets remain classified
[7137]and should not be released. ; .
[7139]3. Since many of the deleted items involved the National
[7141]Security Agency (NSA), we attempted to coordinate our determina-
[7143]tions through our contacts at NSA. . We were told that any
[7144]coordination must be handled between the NSA and CIA General
[7145]Counsel. As a result, no further coordination with. other ele-.
[7146]ments was attempted. ;
[7148]4, This memorandum completes the DDS§T action on the
[7149]court ordered review of the deletions from subject book.
[7151]Aowch f Gillon
[7153]ERNEST J. ZELLMER >
[7154]Associate Deputy Director
[7155]for .
[7157]Science and Technology
[7159]Attachments:
[7160]As Stated se QIN PTE
[7162]SECRET 20
[7165]13-00000
[7167]re _ ce re TAB OA
[7169]DELETED ITEMS IN THE MARCHETTI MANUSCRIPT
[7170]REVIEWED BY THE DDS&T
[7172]-Item Page a Item Page’
[7173]25 47 190 214
[7174]86 104 191 214
[7175]87 - 104 - 192. 215
[7176]88 105 204 233
[7177]91, 106 205. . 234
[7178]“92 ~ + 107 208 235.
[7179]135 . 134 - 209 ~ 236
[7180]136 135 245 . 268
[7181]155 . 177 248. 269
[7182]157 .179 254 "327
[7183]158 180 - 258 331
[7184]159 - 181 259 331
[7185]160 182 260 - 331
[7186]161 -183 267 337
[7187]163 184 268 337
[7188]164 185 269 ; 337
[7189]165 185 275 394
[7190]Ye 166. - 185 . 295 424
[7191], 167 185 297 425
[7192]170 ; 189 ; 299 426
[7193]171 189 301 427
[7194]172 189 302 427
[7195]173 190 © 304 430
[7196]174° _ 191 306 - 431
[7197]175 191 312 442
[7198]i 176 192 313 450
[7199]: 177 | 193 324 474
[7200]178 ; 194 325 474
[7201]187 200 327 475
[7202]188 201 - 328 476
[7204]189 202 - 329. 480
[7206]13-00000
[7207]Tab B |
[7208]ITEMS OF INTEREST TO THE DDS&T
[7209]AND REMAIN CLASSIFIED
[7211]' Item Manuscript Page
[7213]91 - 106 |. SECRET, 5B(2) and (3)
[7214]92 407 SECRET, 5B(2) and (3) |
[7215]2135s: SECRET, SB(2) and (3)
[7216]136 BS . SECRET, 5B(2) and (3)
[7217]155 477 > SECRET, 5B(3)
[7218]158 1g0 SECRET, 5B(2) and (3)
[7219]163 184 "SECRET, 5B(2) and (3)
[7220]165 185s SECRET, 5B(3)
[7221]166 © 485. . ~~ ‘CONFIDENTIAL, 5B(2)
[7222]- 167 185 CONFIDENTIAL, 5B(2)°
[7224]188 ~ 201 ' TOP SECRET, 5B(2)
[7226]*Can be sanitized and portions released.
[7228]13-00000
[7230]Tab C
[7232]ITEMS OF INTEREST TO DDS§T AND SHOULD REMAIN
[7233]CLASSIFIED BUT SHOULD BE COORDINATED WITH OTHER ELEMENTS .—
[7235]Item -: Manuscript Page
[7236]* 25 ; 47 oppo
[7237]* 87 — 104° - DOD (DIA)
[7238]88 105 -s:pOD. (DIA). .
[7239]157 | 179 -. 0s .
[7240]159 | isl _ DDO, OC, ERDA
[7241]iso 182 DDO, OC, ERDA~
[7242]161 183 DDO, OC, ERDA
[7243]-162  — -. 184 . DDO; OC, ERDA.
[7244]163 . 184 DDO
[7245]be | 164 185  DDO|
[7246], 172 . 189 NSA
[7247]187 200 DOD (Navy)
[7248]189 . 202 DOD (Navy)
[7249]204 (233 "NSA and DDO
[7250]; | 205 234 DDO
[7251]| 208 235 DDO
[7252]i 209 2360 DDO
[7253]| 245 . 268 DOD (SAFSS)
[7254]| 248. 269 DOD. (SAFSS)
[7255]| 254 327 DOD (SAFSS), NSC Staff
[7257]“258 — 331 DOD (SAFSS)
[7259]*Can be sanitized and portions released.
[7261]13-00000
[7263]Tab C
[7264]oo: * . Continued
[7265]Item - Manuscript Page
[7267]259 331 DoD (SAFSS) _
[7268]- 260 7 B81 DOD (SAFSS)
[7269]267 337 ~ DOD (Navy)
[7270]268 337 pop (Navy)
[7271]269 337 DOD (Navy)
[7272]“8275 304; Oo
[7273]295 424 . DDO
[7274]297 . 425° DDO
[7275]299 426 poo, NSA
[7276]301 427 . DDO, OC, NSA
[7277]302 4270 NSA
[7278]. 304 . 430 NSA
[7279]| 306 431 DOD :(Navy)
[7280]312 442 NSA
[7281]313 aso NSA
[7282]329 | 480 NSC Staff
[7284]*Can be sanitized and portions released.
[7288]13-00000
[7290]‘Tab D
[7292]' ITEMS REFERRED TO OTHER COMPONENTS
[7294]Item
[7295]86
[7296]170
[7297]171
[7298]173
[7300]174
[7302]175
[7304]325
[7305]327
[7306]328
[7308]Manuscript Page
[7309]_ 104 |
[7310]189
[7311]189
[7312]190
[7313]191
[7314]191
[7316]193
[7317]194
[7318]214
[7319]214
[7320]215
[7321]474
[7322]474
[7323]475
[7325]0/DCI
[7326]NSA
[7327]NSA
[7329]NSA
[7331]NSA
[7332]' NSA -
[7334]NSA -
[7336]NSA
[7338]NSA.
[7339]DDO or OS
[7340]State Department
[7342]State Department
[7344]DOD (JCS) and NSC Staff
[7346]. DOD.
[7348]DDI and DOD ©
[7349]DDI, DOD and NSC Staff
[7351]13-00000
[7353]SECRET tab E
[7355]ITEMS SANITIZED FOR POSSIBLE RELEASE
[7357]Item 135, Manuscript page 134.
[7359]"A somewhat similar sale of a proprietary occurred infiood
[7360]when CIA decided to get rid of a technical research laboratory}
[7361]in the Boston] area." _ ; . : m
[7363]Item 25, Manuscript page 47
[7365]"Over the years, the CIA closely collaborated with the .
[7366]atignalista first to run guerrilla attacks_against fnainland
[7367]hingjand then in more recent years to use {faiwanfas a base
[7369]for U-2 flights (flown over China by Nationalist pilots
[7371]trained in the United States), electronic surveillance of
[7373]the mainland and such covert action programs.as propaganda |
[7375]and disinformation aimed at China during the Cultural Revol- .
[7379]Item 87, Manuscript page 107
[7381]"The Agency also had a project to determine where American
[7382]‘prisoners of war were being held in North Vietnam and to
[7383]ommunicate with them Scale models of the prisons were
[7384]constructed from aerial {and satellite photographyj and from
[7385]other intelligence, and studies were made to learn which
[7386](Brisoners had tried or might be willing to try to communicate.
[7387]ome of the prisoners, on their own, had earlier used their —
[7388]infrequent letters to their families as a means of sending
[7389]coded messages relating where they were being held. Thus,
[7391]‘the Agency worked out rs back} use return mail from the
[7393]families to send answers bac
[7395]Meanwhile, the Technical
[7396]‘Services Division of the" ;
[7398]Item 275, Manuscript page 394
[7400]‘Bow optics for satellite cameras and improvements in ‘over
[7401]the horizon' radatS} These technical contracts were almost
[7402]always drawn up under the cover of being between the. scholar
[7403](or the university) and some government agency other than the
[7404]CIA (the Defense Department or some component thereof were
[7405]the most"
[7407]SECRET -
[7409]13-00000
[7411]Tab C
[7413]ITEMS OF INTEREST TO DDS&T AND SHOULD REMAIN
[7414]CLASSIFIED BUT SHOULD BE COORDINATED WITH OTHER ELEMENTS
[7416]| Item Manuscript Page |
[7417]| * 250 AT - > ppo
[7418]: . eT 104 ~ DOD (DIA)
[7419]i — BB . 105 DOD “(DIA)_
[7421]157 - amg 8S
[7422]159 481 * ~~. ~~—sDDO, OC, ERDA.
[7423]160 -  1g2- ~ DDO, OC, “ERDA
[7424]16lt—<—~iB DDO, OC, ERDA
[7425]162. 84 -DDO, OC, ERDA
[7426]163 184 oe DDO .
[7427](1640 185 DDO.
[7428]172 189° NSA
[7429]187 oo (2000 DOD (Navy)
[7430]189 202 DOD (Navy)
[7431]204 233 "NSA and DDO
[7432]| 234  pbo |
[7433]208 235 DDO
[7436]N :
[7437]oO
[7438]wm
[7440]245... ~.- 268 |. DOD (SAFSS) -
[7442]248°. = 269 ~S , DOD (SAFSS)
[7443](327... ‘DOD (SAFSS), NSC Staff
[7445]Ny
[7446]w
[7447]S
[7449]258 | 331. ~~ ~—«*DOD (SAFSS)
[7451]' *Can be sanitized and. portions released.
[7453]13-00000
[7455]_ Tab C
[7456]Continued
[7457]Manuscript Page
[7458]- 331 pop (SARSS)
[7459]331 pop (SAFSS):
[7461]337... |: «pop (Navy) >
[7463]337. DOD (Navy).
[7465]337 == DOD (Navy)
[7466]i.) |
[7469]425°. DDO
[7471]426° DDO, NSA
[7473]427. - DDO, OC, NSA
[7475]427  ~———sONSA
[7477]430 NSA
[7479]431 | DOD (Navy)
[7481]4420 - NSA 7
[7483]450 | NSA
[7485]480. NSC Staff
[7487]*Can be sanitized and portions released.
[7491]13-00000
[7493]Tab D
[7495]ITEMS REFERRED TO. OTHER’ COMPONENTS |
[7497]Item ._ Manuscript Page
[7498]86 9 °.:104. . O/DEI
[7500]17089 NSA
[7501]AML 189  NSAS
[7502]73 90S
[7503]174 yg) NSA
[7504]175 192 NSA
[7505]9176 NSA
[7506]177 aps NSA
[7508]190° 2 —-ppo or os’
[7509]191 “214 -. | * State Department °
[7510]192 2 21s State Department
[7511]3240 _ 7 ee pop (JCS). and NSC Staff
[7512]325. AT po
[7513]B27 ATS —“ppr and pop»
[7514]32800 ATO DDI, DOD and NSC Staff
[7517]13-00000 ,
[7519]~ CLuwecacsiriep, CTPA, = conFupenriaL DX). SECRET
[7520]or _ ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET = —
[7522](+f SUBECT: Optenath a
[7524]FROM Norbert A. Shepanek Co | Paes MO
[7525]O/SA/DO/ 0 : oa en ory a
[7526]200109" re | “14 June. 1977 |
[7528]TO: “(Officer designation, room number, and — ve Lo wg ~
[7529]building) OFFICER'S COMMENTS. (Number each comment to show from whom
[7530]a woe INITIALS ‘to whom. Drow a line across column after each comment.)
[7532]'. Ralph J. Katrosh
[7533]- SA/DO/O°
[7535]3. Mr. | d ; . - : ,
[7536]C/EA/CA : Paw vac. Th
[7537]_5D3102 Has. 7 j | ; °
[7541]e. L. Sedmae
[7543]Sm G10 “eee (] SECRET ©] CONFIDENTIAL §(-] (MTERNAL = [7] UNCLASSIFIED.
[7545]13-00000
[7547]SECRET
[7549]if
[7551]14 June 1977
[7553]MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution
[7555]FROM : Norbert A. Shepanek
[7556]0/SA/DO/0O
[7557]SUBJECT : DDS&T Request for DDO Coordination on
[7559]Certain Deletions in the Cult of
[7560]Intelligence by Marchetti - Marks
[7562]1. In conjunction with the current review of the dele-
[7563]tions in subject book for possible declassification, the
[7564]DDS&T has indicated certain items which they believe should
[7565]remain classified but has requested DDO coordination. Copies
[7566]of the deletions pertinent to your component are attached -
[7567](see page 3).
[7569]2. Please review the deletions using the same criteria
[7570]applied during the review of deletions within the exclusive
[7571]_ purview of the DDO. If you find that any of the items have
[7572]been legally placed in the public domain, please provide the
[7573]details. ;
[7575]3. The following items should be reviewed by the
[7577]components indicated and response forwarded to the writer by
[7578]23 June 1977:
[7581]Item Manuscript Page Review Responsibility
[7583]25 47 ; EA Division
[7584]159 181. EA Division and NE Div.
[7585]160 182 ! Ww tt
[7587]162 184 t m 1 tl
[7588]163 184 Lhd mW t W
[7589]164 185 tt Ww wt tt
[7590]205 234 NE Division
[7592]208 235 LA Division
[7594]209 236 LA Division
[7596]295 424 EA Division
[7597]297 425 EA Division and EUR Div.
[7598]299 426 EA Division and EUR Div.
[7599]301 427 AF Division
[7601]190 214 SE Division (Office of
[7603]Security may be appropriate
[7604]action office for this item)
[7606]E2 IMPDET CL BY 018630
[7607]SECRET
[7609]13-00000
[7611]SECRET
[7613]‘4, Where more than one Division is involved, a single
[7614]coordinated reply may be provided. If there are any questions,
[7615]please contact the writer on x1542.
[7617]Attachments
[7618]As Noted Above
[7620]0/SA/DO/O:NAShepanek:kaw . (1542)
[7622]Distribution .
[7624]Original - C/EA/CA
[7626]; - E/FP/FC
[7628]- NE/COPS
[7630]C/SE/OSG
[7631]- LA/FOIA |
[7632]- SA/DO/O
[7634]NEB Ee BS
[7635]1
[7637]SECRET
[7639]13-00000
[7642]i
[7643]1
[7644]|
[7646]'
[7648]es t”t*~<CS*~«S SET i
[7649][tussein and the U.S. Government became increasingly concerned about the CD 1
[7650]strong and strident propaganda voice of Radio Cairo. Both parties shared a a:
[7651]desire to counter its anti-American, anti-Hussein line (which was notgnew), 3
[7652]owned, New York based proprietary company, named RIV, provided the technical i ¢
[7653]ccpertise and managenant skills to put the station in operation] SCG
[7654]“Still another example of a country where the CIA enjoys a special i 7
[7655]relationship is Nationalist CHina. On Taiwan, however, the CIA's link is” : y}
[7656]not with President Chiang Kai-shek but with his son and heir apparent,
[7657]-Premier Chiang Ching-Kuo. One former CIA. chief of station, Ray Cline, now the /
[7658]State Department's Director of Intelligence and Research, became something — of
[7659]- of a legend within the Clandestine Services because of his frequent all- . /
[7660]night drinking bouts th the younger Chiang. | Do, n
[7661][over the years, the CIA closely collaborated with the Nationalists first Cy
[7662]to run guerrilla attacks against mainland China and then fn more recent f
[7663]years to use Taiwan as a base for U-2 flights. (flown over China by Nationalist | t
[7664]pilots trained in the United States), electronic survetllance of the mainland !
[7665]- and such covert action programs as propaganda and disinformation, aimed at t
[7666]China during the Cultural Revolution, | t
[7667]In South Vietaam, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker insisted on personally z.
[7668]conducting al] important meetings with President Thieu; sometimes Bunker was 2
[7669]of station
[7670]accompanied by the CIA chief, when there was Agency business to be discussed. a
[7671]But there has been another CIA officer in Saigon who has known Thieu for z
[7672]many years and who has retained access to the Vietnamese President. | 2
[7673]According to a former assistant to Ambassador Bunker, this CIA officer has — Zz
[7674]served as conduit between Thieu and the American government when a formal \ Z,
[7675], meeting is not desired or when Thieu wishes to float an idea. \ 2
[7677]“Personally with \
[7678]Over the years, the CIA has provided Thieu personadajyyete millions: of CA) Zz
[7679]aun er ce
[7681]"black bag" funds, dditten fhe —hunduadenat \g
[7682]aes Ke
[7684]dollars in untraceable,.
[7687]13-00000
[7689]; a confident: judgment of the accuracy, of the report’ s content.
[7692]' the information straight forwardly, thereby, handicapping the. analysts in making
[7694]x.
[7696]Some intelligence analysts, both inside and outside the CIA, receive’
[7698]Targe numbers of this type of report every day; many of which do come from
[7700](which is, by definition, an accugate account of what was adid) with ‘agent
[7701]reports which are: sometimes exaggerated or false, the Clandestine Services
[7702]confuses and often misleads those people within the U.S. government whose
[7703]function it is to analyze foreign events and indfrectly those leaders. who make
[7705]decisions based on that intelligence analysis. —
[7707]we
[7709]- actual agents. But by mixing together information supplied by: audio surveillance .
[7711][in the mid-1960s, the Far East Division of the Clandestine Services and &®
[7713]the experts of the Scientific and Tachnical Directorate combindddféoces to
[7715]carry ‘out one of the Agency’ 5 most imaginative (if. ultimately unsuccessful)
[7717]intelligence. collection operations ever undertaken. At that time, top-level:
[7719]U.S. government officials were distutbed by repprts that Communist China was on.
[7721]the verge of developing an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) system...
[7723]They knew that. the threat posed by Chinese ICBH's would play an important part
[7725]in the decision, then under consideration, to go-ahead with an American anti-
[7727]ballistic.missile (ABM) deployment program. As a matter of the highest
[7729]priority, the CIA was told to find out what was happening at Shuangch'engtzx, the
[7731]‘Chinese missile test site in the far western corner of Inner Mongolia.
[7733]The. Agency’ s technical specialists. responded by designing a nuclear-
[7735]_ ppwered device which could. monitor ‘certain key electronic emissions coming from
[7737]the missile site, well over a thousand miles. away, and then rely the information .
[7739]to a CIA listening post: The plan was to emplace the device on a'mountain ;
[7741]. peak called. the Nanda Devi, at an altitude of more than: 25,000 feet, in the ©
[7743]Indian Himalayas from where it would have an unobstructed "Hine-of-stght to _
[7745]the secret test facility. As the device was being perfected in the CIA
[7747]Tahoratortes, the Clandestine Services took yk on the resoons ibility for the mos Sfency
[7750]13-00000
[7752].
[7753]if
[7755]i
[7756]i
[7757](
[7758]i
[7759]'
[7760]i
[7761]1
[7762]i
[7763]1
[7765]So a 7 =
[7766][difficurt phase of the operation -- installing the machine on the mountain top. (do)
[7768](‘en
[7770]The first thing that had to be done was to gain the permission of the
[7772]Indian government toa implement the scheme, not a large problem in view of the
[7774]CIA's close relations with the Indian intelligence service. The Indians not
[7776]‘only agreed but, surprisingly, insisted on full participation in the project.
[7777]_ Next, the Agency recruited a group of experienced mountain climbers to carry
[7779]the device, complete weth its nuclear powerpack, pp the mountain and put it.
[7781]' into operation. A well-known American mountaineer who had previously conquered
[7783]Mt. Everest, Barry Bishop, was contacted and convinced to lead the climb.
[7787]an +b
[7791]Overall control of the operation, however, was placed in the hands of an expertenced
[7793]CIA case officer. . .
[7795]. . That summer, the Agency operator along with the American and Indian .
[7796]climbers, and a group of Sherpa porters, were brought together at a secret.
[7797]CIA training base in the Rocky Mountains to practice as a team and to learn
[7799]how to assemble the monitoring device once they got it to the top of Nanda Devi
[7801]Cover for the operation was carefully built by leaking information in international
[7803]mountaineering circles that a joint American-Indian expedition was planning an
[7805]ascent of one of the more difficult Himalayan peaks. During the winter, the
[7807]technicians completed work on the sensor device, and a few months later the
[7809]CIA chief of station in Delhi reported that all logistical and cover arrangements
[7811]with Indian intelligence had been completed. The monitoring device was
[7813]clandestinely flown to a secure staging area in northern India by a transport
[7815]ne I
[7817]plane from one of the Agency's proprietary airlines. Next, the climbers were
[7819]brought together and taken to the camp in the foothills of the Himalayas from
[7821]where they and the Sherpas would begin their long, difficult ascent of the Nanda
[7823]_ Devi.
[7825]‘Things went well at first, but after the expedition passed the snow Vine, the
[7827]Indians began to tire and became irascible, claiming that they were backpacking
[7829]too much weight. The CIA case officer redistributed the load by convincing the
[7831]A . | ~ -. a tA aA A da - a
[7835]13-00000
[7837][vould do. ‘Progress slowed and, behind schedule, the ‘team reached the base OD
[7839]~ camp from where the final ascent to the mountain's summit would be made by
[7841]a small party of climbers accompanidd by a few porters. Soon after the
[7843]— group had started for the peak, one of the Sherpas returned to base camp to
[7845]tell the CIA man, who had remained behind to handle communications with the
[7847]staging area, that the Indians were causing trouble at the higher altitudes. -
[7849]The case officer immediately set out to reach Bishop and the summit team in
[7850]; an effort to restore peace among the-climbers. The project was now webl off
[7851]schedule, and any more delays would have endangered the entire expedition
[7852]——} because of the onset of bad weather. With some difficulty, the Agency
[7854]operator was able to get the team moving again, and it finally reached its
[7856]target near the top of the Nanda Devi. Amidst howling winds and at temperatures -
[7858]well below zero, the climbers assembled the monitoring device and put it into
[7860]ron — operation, With spirits high, the group returned to base camp and the news —
[7862]_of the successful installation was sadioed back to the staging area.
[7864]But within a few short months, the signals that the sensor had been
[7866]sending from the Nanda Devi stopped. The CIA dispatched a plane to fly over
[7868]the mountain and photograph the monitoring site. It was learned that the
[7870]device had been knocked over by a snow slide. then the Indian government
[7871][ was informed of the development, it complained to the CIA station in Dethi
[7872]that the nuclear generator might be polluting the headwaters of the sacred
[7874]Ganghes River which flow out of the Himalayas. The Indian concern was about
[7876]religious pollution, not ecological.
[7877]The CIA reacted by planning another climbfof the mountain for the following
[7879]year, both to retrieve the damaged equipment and implace a new monitoring
[7881]system -- this one powered by a non-nuclear generator, The climbing team,
[7883]Ce. Jed by Bishép, was gathered together again and this time it reached the
[7885]top of the mountain with comparatively little difficulty. The new device was
[7886]Se eS eee SS
[7888]set up, but after an extensive search, the atomic generator from the year [ Rin
[7892]13-00000
[7894]4.
[7895]ad
[7897]similar flights to retrieve the data collected and stored by the machine
[7899]- a . | bY _ Srerel
[7901]before was not-found. Again after only a few weeks, the second sensor devic
[7903]stopped working. This time the failure was attributed to a mechanical
[7905]4
[7906]malfunction.
[7908]At this point, the Agency gave up on mountain-top monitoring of the
[7909]Communist Chinese missile program, turning to other systems and new, improved |
[7910]en
[7912]satellites for acquiring the information it was seeking. The Indians were
[7914]thanked and compensated for their cooperation. The American climbers were
[7916]presented with secret medals by a grateful, but disappointed, CIA. /
[7918]. [the fertile imaginations of the G2/S&T experts during the following
[7920]years produced many more untque coéIrction schemes aimed at solving the
[7922]"mysteries of China's strategic missile program. Most eventually proved to be :
[7924]unworkable, and at Teast one entailed a frighteningly high-risk potential.
[7926]The silliest of them all, however, called for the creation of a small one-man
[7927]airplane that could theoretically be packaged in two large suitcases. In
[7928]concept, an agent along with the suitcases would somehow be infiltrated into
[7929]the denied area where, after performing his espfonage mission, he would ~
[7930]assemble the aircraft and fly to safety over the nearest friendly border.
[7932]Even the chief of the Clandestine Services refused to have anything to do with
[7934]this scheme, and the projectydted on the drawing boards.
[7936]tay ow
[7938]ARK
[7940]A second system was a device, long and tubular like a rocket, that could (G2
[7942]be dropped by a U-2 or another aircraft near the missile test site, its fall
[7943]slowed by a parachute so that the device would penetrate only two or three
[7945]feet into the ground on impact. Afterwards, the system, andaerial rising from
[7947]its top, would activate itself and perform its electronic sensing tasks. Stil]
[7949]later, the device would transmit its findings to a listening post, most
[7951]likely a circling aircraft. The need for secret air penetration deep into a
[7953]foreign and héstile power to deliver the monitoring device and additional A,
[7955]we
[7956]vaiced carinuc anactinang as ta the evstem's utilitv and worth. The HEYSAat f°
[7960]Ae
[7962]13-00000
[7964]yo eee Ge SECRET
[7966]_ spectalists, fascinated by the technical aspects of the project, seemed, however GY)
[7967]Cc oblivious of the’ dangers involved in secretly flying near a Chinese missile 2
[7968]7 installation and dropping an object in an action that could quite easily appear :
[7969]7 to a startled radar operator as a lone bomber engaging in a surprise nuclear © &
[7971]attack. Development of the @os$ly system was, therefore, pushed ahead. The
[7972]technicians were more concerned with the fact that the test drops of the device é
[7973]“in the southwestern U.S. desert usually resulted in the system burying itself
[7974]' several feet below the ground surface or so jarring the delicate instrumentation
[7975]i | that the device failed to self-activate and function properly. {. '
[7976]— [A third system was a model airplane roughly the size of a large bird, WE
[7977]4 _ such as a condor, which was powered by a miniature nuclear engine and which |
[7979]could be launched from outside China and guided to the missile test site well
[7981]over a thousand miles away, all the while soaring in patterns that would resemble.
[7982]Co on the air defense radar scopes the flight patterns of a large eagle. Once | 4
[7984]over the target, the plane's electronic sensors and tiny television cameras
[7986]would be turned’ on to record activities below and relay the information either
[7988]to its Tauach site or much more likely a hovering aircraft that had penetrated
[7990]Chinese airspace for this purpose. Millions of dollars were expended by the
[7992]CIA in research on this "baby U-2" that called for numerous breakthroughs in
[7994]' - the state of the technical arts. Its chief advantage was, of course, that if
[7996]and when it was shot down there would be no pilot to confess ft had been on an
[7998]Agency-sponsored spying mission. } . a
[7999]i The technical difficulties involved in the /air-drop]systen and the[node? ] /6£
[8000][atrptane e device were too great and time consuming for either to be fully OF
[8002]developedtby their inventors before improvements in intelligence satellite
[8004]surveillance programs were achieved, thus negating the justifying requirement
[8005]io for these quest ionablz}and potentially provocative collection systems before
[8006]they could be put into operation. Other clandestine collection devices -- a few
[8008]more sensibly contrived, most, however, of dubfous value -- were also being
[8011]13-00000
[8015]Pa SORE
[8017]C | Agency had become involved in a chain of events which forced
[8018]it to intervene militarily in a second country to protect its
[8019]' operation against Cuba. The Presijent way have set the original
[8020]- policy, but there was no way he could have known that simply
[8021]by approving an attack on Cuba, he would. set in train Agency
[8022]paramilitary activities against Guatamala,
[8023]CIA operations can have another unforseen effect on Amer-
[8025]ican foreign policys fhey can subject the country to blackmail
[8027]4£ something goes wrong. For instance, after th _ GIA jpilot was.
[8028]shot down and captured by Indonesia. in 1958, within tive. days
[8029]the US government approved the sale for local currency of 37,000.
[8030]tons of American rice and lifted an embargo on $1 million in
[8031]small arms and other military equipment. Considering at that
[8032]ce monent, the Jota was actively baclcing- an amed revolution against
[8033]| the Sukarno regime ohese would have | been strange actions indeed
[8034]for the US governmeat to take if it were not extremely concerned
[8035]about saving the captured pilot. . .
[8036]A somewhat similar incident occurred in Singapore in 1960
[8037]| after a CIA lie detector expert was flown specially into the city
[8038]| to make ‘sure that a locally recruited agent was trugtwor thy.
[8039]| When the Agency technician plugged iu his polygraph machine in
[8040]|
[8042]a hotel room, he blew out all the fuses in the building .# The
[8044]*This was not the only time that the CIA blaw major “sea wver= LPS”
[8045]sease During the mid-1940s, the Azency added to its nusesor?
[8046]ee TT Om ODDO
[8048]a eo
[8049]facilities on Laiwan by building a huge electrunic ecg seiye’
[8051]Ce SECRET
[8054]13-00000
[8056]- ya © SEORES
[8057]lie de tector wan, a CIA case officer, ana the local agent were
[8058]soon all undér arrest. The Si ingapore government and the British,
[8059]who ware in the process of. zg ranting Singapore. its independency,
[8060]were both quite disturbed by the indident. | Negotiations then
[8061]ensued to secure the men's release . According to ‘Singapore a
[8062]Prine Minister Lee Kuan Yow, the XS governaent offereds3. 3 mil
[8063]lion to get thom out. Lee claimed that he wanted ten tines as
[8064]much and consequently + took nothing. In any cas a, the two CLA
[8065]officials were ‘subsequently freed, the. newly inst a Secretary
[8066]of State, Dean. Rusk, wrote a Hecret letter of apology: to. the
[8067]Singapore leader. In 1965, Lee mentioned the affair in 2 speech
[8068]as an example of the type of activities engaged in. bythe CIA.
[8069]The State Department then issued a routine denial furnished by:
[8070]the CIA--State's press office not realizing the truth of Lee’s
[8071]charges, Lee LER 2cted ‘by publicl y producing Rus k's letter of b-
[8072]pology, and State was forced to. retract its origin nal statement,
[8073]although it still maintained that no ransom had ever been offered.
[8074]As well as embarrassing the US government and making headlines |
[8075]around the world, the incident caused the State Department to
[8076]revanp its internal: system for aking announcements about in-
[8077]telligence matters. . |
[8078]i Black mail was agin the theme in the mid-1960s vhen the — Gi)
[8079]ios, quietly informed the
[8081]President of Cyprus, Archbishop Makar
[8085][installation for surveillance of the Chinese mainland. When the -
[8086]device wae turned on for the first time, it knocked out a large 77)
[8087]part of the island's power. In this case, the local government - é
[8089]reacted in a much more friendly Manner than did Singapore*s.
[8091]Stetn
[8094]13-00000
[8096]1
[8097]_
[8098]! .
[8099]t
[8101]t
[8103]t
[8105]13
[8107]for this unforseen - expense.
[8109]cooperation between allies.
[8113]US pove: leoat that he might oust certain intelligence instal-_ E773
[8115]lations: frow his island. ‘fhe CIA had a major interest in the.
[8117]matter, so. it operated a Foreign Broadcast Information Ser-
[8119]Vice PBIS ’ listening: post there, and. the Pentagon was. also con=
[8121]‘cerned about the possible loss of ts large electronic surveil-
[8123]lance facilities. fhe view in the intelligence community was -
[8125]that Makarics had to be mollified at practically all costs.
[8127]Pinally, government negotiators reached a secret deal with the
[8129]w ily old archbishop, and Jie received a speckal payment of about
[8131]$10 million in. return for letting the bases remain. The CIA
[8133]_ put up half cf the money, using the Director's Contingency, Fund
[8135]In goneral, the presence of American intelligence. facili+
[8137]ties in a foreign country can have an important effect on Amer=
[8139]ican policy toward that country, especially in the Tgird World.
[8141]~ Closely aligned coun mtries, such as England, lermany, Japans ; C245
[8143]and Australia, have usually allowed the Unived States to set
[8145]up electronic spying bases as part of the general framework of
[8147]But to the less developed countries,
[8149]the presence of an Anierican installation is both a threat and
[8151]‘an opportunity. — ‘The threat comes from domestic oppo sition for~
[8153]ees who ook on the base ag an ‘example of” "neo-colonialisa
[8154]and use it aS & weapon arainst those in power. The opportunity
[8156]arises out of the fact that the United States will pay dearly
[8158]for the right to install its eavesdropping equipment~-and to
[8160]keep it in piaco, as [ixehbi shop fiakarioz) Aisdovered. Joa
[8162]SECRET
[8165]13-00000
[8167]“TD unctassiFiep- INTERNAL =] CONFIDENTIAL - [1]. SECRET
[8169]JP SUBJECT: (Optional)
[8171]1s.
[8173]i
[8175]‘ed
[8177]“ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
[8179]“FROM:" ~ EXTENSION
[8180]Norbert A. She
[8182]' 2D0109 ©
[8183]TO: (Officer designation, ‘ro
[8184]building) :
[8188]1S ¥2 DATE . 7 —_
[8189]9564"° 14 June 1977 |
[8191]“ COMMENTS ‘(Number each commerit to show from whom
[8192]to whom. Draw a line: deross column. after each comment.) ~ :
[8194]om number, and
[8196]‘RECEIVED _
[8198]| Ralph J. Katrosh
[8201]3.. Crocky Hoge
[8202]' -LA/FOIA .° -
[8203]4 “Ho
[8205]Norbert Shepanek.
[8206]. 0/SA/DO/0. 3
[8208]ove To the best of our.
[8209]knowledge, :items 208 and
[8210]209 ‘have not been made...
[8211]public. - -
[8213]rom 610 “Erie ] SECRET ©] CONFIDENTIAL [[] INTERNAL =) UNCLASSIFIED
[8215]13-00000
[8217]- | SECRET.
[8218]14 June 1977
[8220]MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution
[8222]ae FROM Norbert A. Shepanek ~
[8223]mo = . - Q/SA/DO/0 ee
[8224]SUBJECT t DDS&T Request for DDO Coordination on
[8226]Certain Deletions in the Cult of |
[8227]Intelligence by Marchetti - Marks
[8229]1. In conjunction with the current review of the dele-.
[8230]tions in subject book for possible declassification, the.
[8231]DDS&T has indicated certain items which they believe should
[8232]remain classified but has requested DDO coordination. Copies
[8233]of the deletions pertinent to your component are: attached
[8234](see page 3).
[8236]2. Please review the deletions using the same criteria
[8237]applied during the review of deletions within the éxclusive
[8238]purview of the DDO. If you find that any of the items have:
[8239]been legally placed in the public domain, ‘Please provide the
[8240]details.
[8242]3. The following items should be reviewed by the
[8244]components indicated and response forwarded to the writer by
[8245]23 June 1977: ;
[8247]Item. - Manuscript Page - Review esponsibility
[8249]25 ; AT. , EA Division a
[8250]159° 181 | EA Division and NE Div.
[8251]160 . . 182 we . t " th
[8252]161 183 a a] tt tt Ww
[8253]162 184 . wt . t ii) Ww
[8255]164 185 . " on ff wt
[8256]205 234 — NE Division
[8258]208 "235 ' LA Division
[8260]209 ; 236 LA Division
[8262]295 _ .424 - EA Division
[8263]297 425 EA Division and EUR Div.
[8264]299 426 ‘BA. Division and EUR Div.
[8265]301 427 AF Division ;
[8267]* 190 214 SE Division (Office of
[8269]; Security may be appropriate
[8270]action office for this item)
[8271]E2 IMPDET: CL BY 018630
[8273]SECRET
[8276]13-00000
[8281]“SECRET:
[8283]Se 4.. Where more than one Division is involved, a single
[8284]oT, coordinated reply may be provided. If there are any questions,
[8285]please contact ‘the writer on x1542. oe
[8287](Signed) Norbert A. Shepanek
[8288]N, A. Shepanek -
[8290]Attachments _
[8291]As Noted Above
[8293]0/SA/DO/O:NAShepanek:kaw (1542)
[8295]Distribution _
[8296]Original - C/EA/CA
[8297]1 = E/FP/FC
[8298]- NE/COPS :
[8299]- C/AF/Plans
[8300]- C/SE/OSG
[8301]- LA/FOIA .
[8302]- SA/DO/0
[8304]- NPR ERR
[8305]t
[8307]SECRET
[8310]13-00000
[8312]ne
[8316](‘sitsation. in private with his superiors. But Bob and his cohorts at FI/D were /
[8317]one step ahead of Ambassador Meyer. They had figured out a way to intercept Z
[8318]his cables and the replies he received from Washington. So shortly after each eS
[8319]State message was sent, Bob would appear in the CIA executive suite with a copy Y
[8320]of the message for the personal inspection of the Director. Witten on top of s
[8321]each tintercepted cable was a warning that the contents of the cable should be @
[8322]kept especially confident because State was unaware thet the CIA had a copy. F
[8323]Despite Agency knowledge of all of Meyer's instructions and information, $
[8324]Meyer and State's director of Iranian Affairs in Washington refused to yield 7
[8325]to Agency pressure for a quick settlement. Even after these two men met at ¢
[8326]CIA headquarters with the Deputy Director of CIA, Vice Admiral Rufus Taylor, Hf
[8327]they still insisted that the Agency's plans for the new installation were Zé
[8328]unacceptable to the U.S. government as a whole. CIA Director Helms was so I
[8329]aggravated by’ this continued resistance thag he personally telephoned Secretary is
[8331]of State Rusk to settle the matter. Rusk promptly ended the dispute by agreeing /
[8332]completely to the CIA position. a i
[8334]| Bob was also involved in another series of events which started when FI/D Gop!
[8336]worked out a liaison arrangement with the codebreaking service of a certain
[8338]South American government. This arrangement was ostensibly for the purpose of
[8339]allowing the CIA and the other country to cooperate in decoding messages sent
[8341]by third countries. However, FI/D tood advantage of the liaison to intercapt
[8343]the secret communications of the host South American government. Such arrangements
[8345]were nora1} procedure to Bob. The intensely dedicated law and order advocate saw
[8347]i
[8349]we NO Ww
[8351]-.
[8353]nothing wrong in practicing this sort of duplicity on an allied government which i
[8355]cooperated in good faith.
[8357]FI/D's liaison with the South American country continued for a long period
[8359]of time until relations between the United States and that nation soured over
[8361]unrelated issues, and as a result FI/D was forced to break off the relationship.
[8363]However, FI/D did not give up hope that the previous working arrangements could
[8364]el nn Selena nase ns baa ceo
[8366]Be rested. 7
[8368]4
[8370]A,
[8372]S
[8374]13-00000
[8376]Pages BBS — greneT |
[8377]*y Sonetine later, Bbb suggested to an officer in the CIA's executive suite we GD
[8378]—— LE SAT
[8380]that the Agency should help. the South American country obtain a channel in the
[8382]‘international satellite communications network, Comsat. Always the secretive -
[8384]operator, Bob did not explain why the Agency should do this, and the other
[8386]CIA man replied that CIA, afterall, was not the American foreign aid program; and
[8387]father or not this particular country received a Comsat channel did not seem to
[8389]be a matter concer::ing CIA. Only later did the executive suite officer learn
[8391]from other sources that FI/D had worked out a deal with the South American  —
[8393]7 . . \ a . . .
[8394]country in which liaison would be restored in return for a Comsat channel (which
[8396]CIA would intercept). But Bob could not bring himself to share his scheme sten
[8398]. with a fellow Agency employee in the Director's office.
[8399]on
[8401]Eventually, the South American country received the Comsat channel: the
[8402]country restored liaison with FI/D; and CIA again had access to all of that
[8403]country's secret messages, , " .
[8405]Bob's jab with FI/D is by no means one of the ‘dirtiest jobs in the
[8406]Clandestine Services. There are operators in the paramilitary fields who
[8407]probably conceive and carry out more distasteful machinations. But Bob is in
[8408]a position where, on a regular basis, he misrepresents himself and even lies .
[8409]within the U.S. government -- hot to mention the deceit he and his colleagues
[8410]perpetrate on friendly foreign governments which in good faith enter into
[8411]Tiaison agreements with FI/D. |
[8413]Bob X is one of these dedinary looking people who mow their lawn, love
[8414]their wives, and do some very nasty things for the CIA.
[8416]Tone oe | 7
[8418]ten other devoted family men who lived in suburban Washington homes
[8419]similar to Bob X's are named James McCord and f Howard Hunt. Both had long,
[8420]relatively successful careers with the CIA and rose to roughly the same upper-
[8421]middle level of the bureaucracy as Bob X has. McCord was a CIA security
[8422]officer, specializing in protecting the Agency's physical facilities. Hunt
[8424]was an nneratar whn nlaved a leadina role in the Bav of Pias and who took part
[8426]we NO Wy Rh
[8429]13-00000
[8431]CL UNGLASSIFIED =| [[]_ INTERNAL CO SONFIDENTIAL. [1 SECRET
[8432]| ROUTING AND:RECORD SHEET |
[8434]SUBJECT: (Optional)
[8436]OM: .
[8437]E/FP/FC a
[8438]4 B 4406 { ‘1872 DATE
[8440]TO: (Officer designation, room number, and | ate une Y .
[8441]building) OFFICER'S | COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
[8442]| recewven | FORWARDED | INITIALS fo whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
[8443]RECEIVED FORWARDED
[8445]0/SA/DO/0 oo
[8446]- Myr. Shepanek
[8448]‘ oa oO ase" 7 SECRET — [[] CONFIDENTIAL OO WES «= UNCLASSIFIED
[8451]13-00000
[8453]MEMORANDUM FOR:
[8455]FROM
[8457]SUBJECT
[8459]REFERENCE
[8461]S-E-C-R-E-T
[8463]23 June 1977
[8465]0/SA/DO/0
[8467]William W. Phelps
[8468]EUR/FP/FC
[8470]Coordination of Deletions in Marks-Marchetti
[8471]Book
[8473]SA/DO/O Memorandum of 14 June 1977
[8475]European Division concurs that the two items involving
[8477]EUR (Item 297, page 425 and Item 299, page 426) should remain
[8479]classified.
[8483]E 2 IMPDET
[8484]CL BY 003283
[8486]S-E-C-R-E-T
[8488]13-00000
[8490]23 June 1977
[8492]MEMORANDUM FOR: 0/SA/DO/O
[8494]FROM : William W. Phelps
[8495]EUR/FP/FC
[8497]SUBJECT : Coordination of Deletions in Marks-Marchetti
[8498]Book
[8500]REFERENCE : SA/DO/O Memorandum of 14 June 1977
[8501]European Division concurs that the two items involving
[8503]EUR, (Item 297, page 425 and Item 299, page 426) should remain
[8505]classified.
[8507]William W. Phelps
[8509]E 2 IMPDET
[8510]CL BY 003283
[8512]S-E-C-R-E-T
[8514]13-00000
[8516](1 UNCLASSIFIED =) INTERNAL [1 CONFIDENTIAL | [[] SECRET
[8517]- ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
[8519]SUBJECT: (Optional)
[8521]FROM: EXTENSION
[8523]-NE/COPS x 9165 [pate
[8524]: 23 June 1977
[8526]TO: (Officer designation, room number, and -
[8527]building) , OFFICER'S COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
[8528]: INITIALS. to whom. Drow a line across column after each comment.)
[8530]SA/D0/0
[8531]Attn: Mr. Shepanek
[8532]TUBE: DX-6
[8534]rom 610 Se":[] SECRET [1] CONFIDENTIAL [] INTERNAL =f) UNCLASSIFIED
[8536]13-00000
[8538]4 SECHET
[8540]Jw 23 | ig fet, | 1977
[8542]MEMORANDUM FOR: 0/SA/DO/0O
[8543]ATTENTION : Mr. Norbert A. Shepanek
[8545]FROM > Joyce R. Herrmann
[8546]Chief of Operations, NE Division
[8548]SUBJECT  : DDS&T Request for DDO Coordination on
[8549]‘Certain Deletions in the Cult of
[8550]Intelligence by Marchetti - Marks
[8552]NE Division has researched the seven DDS&T items cited
[8553]in reference and to our knowledge none of the items cited
[8554]have been legally placed in the public domain. Therefore,
[8555]the items remain classified under Executive Order 11652 as
[8556]listed below:
[8558]Manuscript
[8559]Item Page ' Exemption
[8560]159 181 5B (2) (3)
[8561]‘160 182 5B. (2) (3)
[8562]161 183 5B (2) (3)
[8563]162 184 5B (2) (3)
[8564]163 184 SB (2) (3)
[8565]' 164 185 5B (2) (3)
[8566]_ 205 234 5B’ (2) (3)
[8568]Retna
[8570]ce. R. Herrmann
[8572]E2 IMPDET
[8574]SECRET CL BY 054979
[8577]13-00000
[8579]C] UNCLASSIFIED ==] [TERNAL G2, CONFIDENTIAL
[8581]ROUTING AND RECORD: SHEET © '
[8583][] sec RET
[8585]SUBJECT: (Optional)
[8587]1
[8588]2D0109 Lb,
[8589]. =
[8591]TO: (Officer designation, room number, and . DATE ,
[8592]building) : COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
[8593]. to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
[8594]RECEIVED FORWARDED
[8596]om 610 “tomers [1] SECRET © [[] CONFIDENTIAL (] ys RNA) =] UNCLASSIFIED
[8599]13-00000
[8601]“4 SECRET
[8603]23 JUN 1977
[8605]MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to the DDO for
[8606]External Oversight
[8608]ATTENTION : Norbert A. Shepanek
[8610]FROM : Katharine C. Hart
[8611]Acting. Chief, Soviet/East European Division
[8613]SUBJECT : Deletions in the The Cult of Intelligence
[8614]by Marchetti - Marks
[8616]REFERENCE : Your Memorandum, Subject: DDS§&T Request
[8617]for DDO Coordination on Certain Deletions ae
[8619]in the Cult of Intelligence by Marchetti -
[8620]Marks, dated 14 June ro
[8622]1. We have reviewed the item relating to SE Division
[8623]interests referred to the DDO for coordination by the DDS&T.
[8624]This concerns an item from the Marchetti and Marks book,
[8626]The Cult of Intelligence. Checking against official disclosures
[8627]we have determined the item is still properly classified under
[8628]Executive Order 11652.
[8630]2. Item No. 190, manuscript page 214, relating to Soviet
[8631]capabilities to. make intelligibie the.sounds picked up by dudio
[8632]devices discovered in the code room of the American Embassy in
[8633]Moscow, remains classified SECRET. This item relates to
[8634]cryptography and is exempt from the General Declassification
[8635]Schedule of Executive Order 11652, exemption category 5B(2).
[8637]Whe ¢Mat
[8639]Katharine C. Hart
[8641]SECRET E2 IMPDET
[8642]CL BY 014652
[8644]13-00000
[8646]ae | 23 JUN 177
[8648]MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to the DDO for Oo
[8649]; External Oversight
[8651]ATTENTION : Norbert A. ‘Shepanek oo | !
[8653]osFROM 0. ‘Katharine C. Hart - | ee eee
[8654]- : Acting Chief, Soviet/East European Division .
[8656]SUBJECT : Deletions in rhe The Cult of Intelligence
[8657]7 a by Marchetti * Marks . ;
[8659]. REFERENCE Your Memorandum ; Subject: DDSET Request
[8660]: ' for DDO Coordination on Certain Deletions
[8662]a in the Cult of “June 1677 by Marchetti -
[8663]; . Marks, date June
[8665]1. We have reviewed the item relating to SE Division
[8666]interests referred to the DDO for coordination by the DDS&T.
[8667]This concerns an item from:éhe Marchetti and Marks book,
[8669]- , The Cult of Intelligence. Chegking against official disclosures
[8670]' we have determined the. item. is stili properly. classified under ..
[8671]"Executive Order 11652.
[8673]2. Item No. 190, manuscript page 214, “relating to Soviet
[8674]capabilities to make intelligible. the. sounds ° picked up by. audio
[8675]‘devices discovered in the code room of the American Embassy in
[8676]- Moscow, remains classified SECRET. This item relates to
[8677]cryptography and is exempt ‘3g: the. General Declassification
[8678]Schedule of Executive Order “oe exemption category 5B(2).
[8680]Kh C, Hat |
[8682]Katharine C. Hart
[8684]SECRET. 82 IMPDET
[8685]a oo CL BY 014652.
[8688]13-00000
[8690]UNCLASSIFIED =») {NTERNAL (C1 CONFIDENTIAL [1 SECRET
[8691]oS ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
[8693]SUBJECT: (Optional) DDS&T Request for DDO cule of prtarag putt Certain
[8695]by Marchetti-Marks
[8697]Chief, Africa Plans
[8699]COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
[8700]to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
[8702]0/SA/DO/0
[8703]Attn: Mr. Shepane
[8705]cm GTO Emee’s (] SecReT =] CONFIDENTIAL §[[] {RTFRNAL = [7]: UNCLASSIFIED
[8708]13-00000
[8710]SO SECRET
[8712]6 JUL 1977
[8713]MEMORANDUM FOR: 0/SA/DO/0
[8714]Attn: Mr. Shepanek
[8715]FROM : Edward J. Foy, Jr.
[8716]Chief, Africa Plans
[8717]SUBJECT : DDS&T Request for DDO Coordination
[8719]on Certain Deletions in the Cult of
[8720]‘Intelligence by Marchetti-Marks
[8722]We concur in the DDS§&T's conclusion that Item 301,
[8724]page 247 remain classified.
[8726]/ Soto
[8728]Yo lb
[8730]Edward J. Foy, Jr.
[8732]E2 IMPDET
[8733]CL BY 009904
[8735]WARNING NOTICE
[8736]SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
[8737]AND METHODS INVOLVED
[8739]SECRET
[8741]13-00000
[8743]Py
[8745]oe SECRET
[8747]2
[8749]3 JUL O77
[8750]MEMORANDUM FOR: 0O/SA/DO/O
[8751]Attn: Mr. Shepanek
[8752]FROM : Edward J. Foy, Jr.
[8753]Chief, Africa Plans
[8754]SUBJECT : DDS&T. Request for DDO Coordination
[8756]on Certain Deletions in the Cult of
[8757]‘Intelligence by Marchetti-Marks
[8758]We concur in the DDS§T's conclusion that Item 301,
[8760]page 247 remain classified. 6
[8761]' ~e
[8763]J{a/ EDWARD J. FOY, JRe
[8764]Edward J: Foy, Jr.
[8766]E2 IMPDET
[8767]‘CL BY 009904
[8769]WARNING NOTICE
[8770]SENSITIVE INTELLIGENSE SOURCES
[8771]AND METHODS INVOLVED
[8773]Hany oe
[8774]: gas
[8776]virans
[8777]i Following is a transcrir.: of Presi-
[8778]| dene: Carter's news’ conference in
[8780]vecorded by The New-York Times
[8782]through th facilities of ABC News:
[8786]Opening Statement»
[8787]Gocd: afternoon everybody. I'd like
[8789]“to make a very brief statement as a
[8790]_ “progress report to the American people
[8792]of some items that are important to
[8793]j Bs. ’ ;
[8795]We have submitted and the Congress
[8796]‘is now considering legislation to give
[8798]‘me the authority to reorganize the
[8800]‘executive: branch of Government. The
[8801]._ Senate Committee under Senator Ribic-
[8802]- off has now completed ‘their hearings
[8803]“and they'll be marking up the bill
[8804]: beginning tomorrow.
[8806]The House Committee on Govern-
[8809]Jack Brooks has“scheduled hearings to
[8810]_ begin on March 1.
[8812]‘  $o because of the interest of the
[8813]. American people and the Congress and
[8814]myself in completing this very crucial
[8815]project I think the Congress is moving
[8816]with great expedition to give me that
[8817]_ authority.
[8819]- {. We've also initiated with, directions
[8821]:to the members of ‘the Cabinet and
[8822]other agency beads a new program to
[8823]cut down on the extremely great over-
[8824]load of paper work with a requirement
[8825]that those who prepare Government
[8826]regulations be responsible for the
[8827]preparation assigned them. I’ve asked
[8828]my Cabinet officers to read the regula-
[8829]tions that are forthcoming from their
[8830]departments each week until they see
[8831]the volume and the complexity of them,
[8832]and we hope to eliminate unnecessary
[8833]regulations, abbreviate those that are
[8834]necessary and express them in a Jan-
[8835]Zuage so that we can all understand
[8836]them. .
[8838]' ve also asked major elements of
[8840]our own society, the university profes-.
[8841]- sors and the state officials in this last
[8842]week to give me their suggestions on
[8843]chow the regulations might be improved.
[8844]We have done the same thing with
[8845]reports required by the Federal Govern-
[8846]ment. I hope:to ‘reduce drastically the
[8847]number of-reports and the frequency
[8849]of these reports and the, complexity. .
[8851]of them. .
[8853]We will complete the proposed fegis-
[8854]lation on creating a new Department
[8855]of Energy this week. The proposed
[8856]legislation is now on my desk, It will
[8857]be submitted to the Congress for action:
[8858]the first of next week. And we've con-
[8860]sulted very closely with the key leaders’
[8862]in the Congress and J believe there’s
[8863]going to be a rapid creatina of this
[8864]new department.and a heavv emphasis
[8865]on the importance of energy questions,
[8866]to our people. . : :
[8868]We will also present to the American
[8869]people. probably at a joint’ scssion of
[8870]thé Congress a speech by, me about
[8871]April 20, a comprehensive energy poli-
[8872]cy which would involve all the com-
[8873]plexities of the energy question. It’s
[8874]‘something that’s long overdue and it’s
[8875]. §0ing to be quite profound in its impact
[8877]on the American conscjousness and our .
[8878]society, and I hope it will be compre-.
[8879]es aT te « . as
[8881]cript of t
[8883]| Washington yesterday aftcrnoon, as:
[8885]I'm not going to, leave of not comment-
[8886]ing directly on any specific C.1.A. ac-
[8888]’ tivity. But I can tell you that I have
[8890]begun a complete analysis which will
[8891]be completed within the next week of
[8892]all activities by the C.1LA. I’ve received
[8893]substantial reports already.
[8895]I’ve reviewed the more controversial
[8896]revelations that have been publicized
[8898]in the last few days, some quite errone- ©
[8900]ous, some with some degree of accura-
[8901]cy. These same operations have been
[8902]reviewed by the Intelligence Oversight
[8903]Board, an independent board, and also
[8904]by my predecessory, President Ford.
[8905]I have not found anything illegal or
[8906]improper.
[8908]If in future assessments, which will.
[8910]come quite early,-I discover such an
[8912]. impropriety or an illegality I will not
[8914]only take immediate action to correct
[8916]_it but also will let the American people
[8918]know about it. .
[8920]I might say this. This is a very serious
[8921]problem of how in a democracy to have
[8922]adequate ‘intelligence gathered, as-
[8924], Sessed and used to guarantee the- se-
[8925]curity of our country. It’s not part of -
[8927]the American nature to do things in
[8928]secret. Obviously, historically and still
[8929]at this modern time there is a necessity
[8931], to protect sources of information from
[8932]other nations. Sometimes other Gov-
[8934]ernments cooperate with us fully;
[8935]sometimes they don’t.
[8937]But I'll try to be sure, and so will
[8938]Stan. Turner, who will be the next
[8939]director of the intelligence community.
[8940]He will try to be sure that every thing
[8941]we do is not only proper and legal,
[8942]but also compatible with the attitudes
[8944]of the American people.
[8946]One other point I'd like to make is
[8947]this. It can be extremely damaging to
[8948]our relationship with other nations, to
[8949]the potential security ‘of our country
[8951]24 FEB IFIF rue REW YORK TINTS,
[8953]he President's News Con
[8955]President Carter walking past reporters after news conference at the E:
[8957]with labor and management. Bu
[8958]whether I'll be successful, I don’t know
[8959]I’m just going to have to do my hest
[8961]6. Human Rights Abroad
[8963]Q. In your letter to Mr. Sakhzrov
[8964]you said that the United States would
[8965]use its good offices to seek the release
[8966]of prisoners of conscience. And you
[8967]said that you wanted to continue tc
[8968]shape a world responsible to human
[8969]aspirations. As you know there are
[8970]human rights problems in many. other
[8971]countries, And some of them like Iran
[8972]or the Philippines we support with
[8973]arms, Or we support with American aid.
[8974]These are countries where many people
[8975]believe we have more leverage than
[8976]we might have in the. Soviet Union.
[8977]What if anything do you plan to try
[8978]to do to help victims of political repres-
[8979]sion in these countries?
[8981]A. 1 think without my trying to take
[8982]credit for it there has been a substan-
[8983]tial move toward concern about It.man
[8984]tights throughout the world. I think
[8985]this has taken place in probably ‘a
[8986]dozen or more different cou: “ies,
[8987]There's an arou.ing interest in the posi-
[8988]tion that our own Government here in
[8989]our free country does take. Obviously
[8990]there are deprivations of human viyhts
[8991]even more brutal than the ones on
[8992]which we’ve commented up to now.
[8994]In-Uganda the actions there have dis-
[8995]gusted the entire civilized world and,
[8996]as you know, we have no diplomatic
[8997]relationships with Uganda. But h« 2 is
[8998]an instance where both Ambassador
[8999]Andrew Young and I have expressed
[9000]great concern about what is there. The
[9001]British are now considering asking the
[9002]United Nations to go into Uganda to
[9003]assess the horrible murders that ::y-par-
[9004]ently are taking place in that country—
[9006]13-00000
[9013]|
[9014]|
[9015]|
[9016]|
[9018]“) dings. Legislation is in the Con;
[9020]ata cu Vvigevos Gnu - OGY Ulivi
[9021]going to be a rapid creatina of this
[9022]new department and a heavy emphasis
[9023]on the importance of energy questions
[9024]to our people. . :
[9026]We will also present to the American
[9027]people. probably at a joint session of
[9028]the Congress a speech by me about
[9029]April 20, a comprehensive energy poli-
[9030]cy which would involve all the com-
[9031]plexities of the energy question. It’s
[9033]‘something that’s long overdue and it’s
[9034]. . Boing to be quite profound in its ‘impact
[9035]on the American consciousness and our _
[9037]society, and I hope it will be compre-.
[9038]hensive enough so that it can be well-
[9039]balanced and fair to all. :
[9040]1 We are quite concerned about the
[9041]Pressures Of inisation. ‘Ihe advisers to
[9042]me on economics are trying to assess
[9043]all Government programs and private
[9044]actions that contribute to inflationary
[9045]pressures. When this ‘analysis is done
[9046]will use every means that I -have
[9047]available to me to express ‘these con-
[9049]cerns and possibly corrective actions.
[9051]to the American people as ‘well. _ -
[9052]: And the last. point ‘is that we will
[9055]aow on deregulation. And the first
[9056]question is the deregulation of the air
[9058]now. We'll_be—submitting -a- mess
[9059]to Congress very shortly on that sub-
[9060]ject. We wilt not submit administration
[9061]legislation because the Congress has
[9062]already moved subst ntially forward in
[9064]’ dealing with this important: issue.
[9065]And now I'd like to answer questions, .
[9067]Mr. Frank Cormier.
[9068]Questions and Answers
[9069]1. Defense Budget
[9071].*. @. Mr. President, you told the Demo-
[9073]‘tratic Platform. Committee that you
[9075]thought present defense expenditures ©
[9077]could te reduced ‘by: five to seven bil-
[9078]lion dollars. Now I think you may have
[9080]modified your position somewhat since’
[9082]then. Obviously in. your. short time in
[9083]office you. didn’t find the opportunity
[9085]to make cuts like that in your precedes- .-
[9087]sor’s budget. But isn't ‘it also likely
[9088]that néxt year's budget for the defense
[9089]will exceed this year’s. .
[9091]A, Well because of inflationary ‘pres-
[9093]sures and because of an impossibility
[9095]of assessing the potential threat to our
[9096]country from other nations, it’s hard
[9097]to predict exactly what the level of
[9098]defense spénding will be. In the short
[9099]time that we had available to work
[9100]on the previous: Administration's budg-
[9101]et—about three weeks of hard. work—
[9102]we were able to reduce the suggested
[9104]expenditures by almost $3 billion, 1°
[9106]think about $2.75 billion. -
[9108]This was done—and I think Senator
[9109]Stennis in his recent public statements:
[9110]has confirmed that it has been done
[9111]without weakening-our own defense
[9112]capability. And the substantial savings
[9114]in defense spending that will'still leave ;
[9116]us muscle will be in such things as
[9117]the Standardization of weapons, ‘long-
[9118]range planning, a more businesslike al-
[9120]- location of defense contracting, an as-.
[9122]sessment: of the defense contracts for
[9123]construction or
[9124]standing. .
[9126]‘. A reassessment of priorities of the
[9128]evolution of new weapons which in the
[9129]future can become enormously expen-
[9130]Sive; a longer assignment of military
[9131]personnel to a base before they are
[9132]transferred; some emphasis on the cor-
[9133]rection of inequities and unfairnesses
[9134]in the retirement system. ;
[9136]__ These things obviously can’t be dona
[9137]in three weeks,
[9138]ongoing effort on my part. And I think
[9139]the 1979 budget, which will be my Ad-
[9141]Ministratinn'c firet hideent weltt ot
[9143]Be
[9147]but they will be an’
[9149]’ other natioris. Sometiines~otrier Guv--
[9151]ernmtents cooperate with us fully;
[9152]sometimes they don't.
[9154]But I'll try to be sure, and so will
[9155]Stan. Turner, who will be the next
[9156]director of the intelligence conimunity.
[9157]He will try to be sure that every thing
[9158]we do is not only proper and legal,
[9159]but also compatible with the attitudes
[9160]of the American people.
[9162]One other poirit I’'d like to make is
[9163]this. It can be extremely damaging to
[9164]our relationship with other nations, to
[9165]the potential security of our country
[9166]even in peacetime, for these kinds of
[9167]operations which are legitimate and
[9168]proper to be revealed. It makes it hard
[9169]for us 10. lay a gruutidauin on wiikic
[9170]we might predicate a successful meet-
[9171]ing of a threat to us in time of war
[9172]if we don’t have some degree of secre- -
[9173]cy. .
[9175]T’m quite concerned about the num-.
[9176]ber of people now who have access
[9177]to this kind of ‘information: And I’ve
[9179]been working very, closely with the
[9181]_ Congressional leaders, yesterday and
[9183]taday, to trv to reduce.the overall num-
[9184]ber of people who have access to the
[9185]sources of information. that. within the
[9186]bounds that. 've descrjbed—propriety-
[9187]‘and legalit; -and American attitudes to-
[9188]ward secre-y—I'l].do the best I can
[9189]not ever tc. make a mistake. And I’m
[9190]also assuming on a continuing basis
[9191]a direct personal reponsibility for the
[9192]operation of all the ingelligence agen-
[9193]cies in our Government to make sure
[9194]that they are meeting these standards.
[9196]3, Correcting’ Errors on CLA.
[9198]Q. If there has been erroneous infor-
[9200]mation, wouldn’t it behoove you to cor- -
[9202]rect the record?
[9204]A. In some ways we are correcting
[9205]the record, but if I began to either dis-
[9206]pute or confirm every individual story
[9207]that’s written whether correct or er-
[9208]roneous on every matter relating.to
[9209]the C.LA., then these matters whic
[9210]are necessarily secret would no longer
[9211]be secret, so I’m.not going to’ comment
[9212]on individual items that relate to intel-
[9213]ligence, :
[9215]4, Difference With Meany
[9217]Q. Mr. President, George Meany says
[9218]he won’t go along with your idea for
[9219]pre-notification on wage and price in-
[9221]. creases. And my question really is, how
[9223]hard, are you going to press Mr, Meany
[9224]to go along and do you have anything
[9225]else in mind that you could use in the
[9226]way of Government involving itself to
[9227]try to control inflation? Ss
[9229]A. I announced earlier my firm com:
[9230]mitment not to have mandatory. wage
[9231]and price Jaws or authority, not to have
[9233]“standby. wage and price authority. I've «
[9235]not made any proposal to Mr, Meany
[9237]or‘any other labor leader nor to any «
[9239]Tepresentative of. industry or manufac-
[9240]turing. But I. will retain the option in
[9241]the future of assessing what we need
[9242]to do to control inflation.
[9244]I've emphasized always the word
[9245]“voluntary.” And to the extent that
[9246]I can arrive at a common understand-
[9247]ing with industry and labor leaders that
[9248]a certain amount of cooperation and
[9249]information can. be exchanged before
[9250]a major proposal is made. I think that’s
[9252].a legitimate pursuit of mine. I can’t
[9254]force it. It’s got,to be voluntary. And
[9255]that’s as far as I can go with my an-
[9257]. Swer.
[9259]5: Wage-Price Guidelines
[9260]©. You mean iust directly about wage
[9262]. several countries,
[9264]there are ‘deprivations of human Fights
[9265]even more brutal than the ones on
[9266]which we’ve commented up to now.
[9268]In-Uganda the actions there have dis-
[9269]gusted the entire civilized world and,
[9270]as you know, we have no diplomatic
[9271]relationships with Uganda. But h« a is
[9272]an instance where both Anvbassador
[9273]Andrew Young and I have expressed
[9274]great concern about what is there. The
[9275]British are now considering asking the
[9276]United Nations to go into Uganda to
[9277]assess the horrible murders that :y-par-
[9278]ently are taking place in that country—
[9279]the persecution of those. who have
[9280]aroused the irc of Mr. Amin.
[9282]Vive express. t mv concern abu rte
[9283]prisoned posted ar aers ina
[9284]Korea, in Cuba. in many countris —-in
[9285]rather,—in S uth
[9286]America and Pil continue to do so, I
[9287]have never had an inclination to single
[9288]out the Soviet Union as the only place
[9290]. where human rights are’ béing abridged.
[9292]We.have, I think, a respofisibility and
[9294]-a legal right to.express our disapproval
[9296]of violations of human rights, The Hel
[9299]’ Three Provision, insures. that some of
[9301]these human rights shall be preserved.
[9302]We are a signatory of the Helsinki
[9303]agreement. We are ourselves culpable
[9304]in-somo ways for not giving people
[9305]adequate rights to move around our
[9306]country: or restricting unnecessarily, in
[9307]my opinion, visitation to this country
[9308]by those who disagree with us political-
[9309]ly. .
[9310]So I thiuk that we all ought to take
[9311]a position in our own country and
[9312]among our friends and allies, among
[9313]our potential adversaries, that human
[9314]rights is something on which we should
[9315]bear a major responsibility for leader-
[9316]ship. And 1 have made it clear to the
[9317]Soviet Union and to others in the East-
[9318]ern European community that I'm not
[9319]trying to launch a unilateral criticism
[9320]of them, that I’m trying to set a stand-
[9321]ard in our own country and make my
[9322]concerns expressed throughout the
[9323]world, not singled out against any par-
[9324]ticular country.
[9326]Q. Mr. President, the other day. get-
[9327]ting back to’ this C.I.A. thing, when
[9328]that story broke your Press Secretary,
[9329]when he issued what amounted lo a
[9330]“no comment” by the White House,
[9331]someone asked ‘thim if this story had
[9332]broken back during the campaign when. ©
[9334].you were running for Presiden:, v-ould
[9336]you have given a similar response? And
[9337]he said “well I don’t’ know.” So can
[9338]T ask you, what would have beer: you
[9339]response? Would it have been the
[9341]_same? A. I don’t know.
[9343]7. Review of C.I.A. Activities
[9345]Q. Mr. President, on that same sub-
[9346]ject, you said earlier that you review:
[9347]of C.LA. activities had found nothing
[9348]illegal or improper and you later said
[9349]that these activities are legitimate and
[9350]proper. Isn’t that a value judgment that
[9351]the American public might like to
[9352]share? But how can they if yer refuse
[9353]to’ give them any idea of wuat you
[9354]have discovered dur'ng this review
[9355]about payments, including ones made
[9356]in secret?
[9358]A. That is a value judgment. It’s made
[9360]‘by the independent Intelligence Over-
[9362]sight Board, which was established and
[9363]appointed by President Ford. This
[9364]beard has made itself available to the
[9365]Inspector General and to any employce
[9366]within the C.LA. or within the defense
[9367]intelligence agencies or any other to.
[9368]receive-even rumors of improoriety.
[9370]13-0000Qsures of imation. Ihe advisers to
[9372]me on economics are trying to assess
[9373]‘all Govérnment programs_and private
[9375]_actions that contribute to inflationary
[9377]“lings. Legislation is ‘in the. Congress.
[9379]pressures, When this ‘analysis is done
[9380]will use every means that I have
[9381]available to me to express’ these con-
[9382]cerns and possibly. corrective actions...
[9384]‘to the American peopile:as-well. . ~
[9386]: And the last. point ‘is that ‘we will.
[9388]hove (9 romnlate: analucie: indarwav
[9390]joy .on deregitation. And the first --
[9392]question is the deregulation of the air
[9394]“_ now,.We'll_be submitting -a-amessage
[9396]to Congress very shortly on that sub-
[9398]‘ject. We will not submit administration
[9400]legislation because the Congress has
[9401]already moved substzntially forward in
[9403]: dealing with this important. issue.
[9405]‘And now I'd like to answer questions. .
[9406]Mr.¥Frank Cormier, |
[9407]‘:* Questions and Answers
[9408]1, Defense Budget .
[9409]. Mr. President, you told the Demo-
[9411]“ératic Platform. Committee that you .
[9413]se
[9415]‘thought present defense expenditures —
[9416]could ‘be reduced ‘by: five to seven. bil-
[9417]Jion dollars, Now I think you may have
[9419].modified your position somewhat since
[9421]then, Obviously in. your. short time in
[9422]office you. didn’t find the opportunity
[9424]to make cuts like that in your precedes- -
[9426]sor’s budget. But isn’t it also likely
[9427]that next year’s budget for the defense
[9428]will exceed this year’s. .
[9430]A, Well because of inflationary ‘pres-
[9431]sures ‘and because of an impossibility
[9432]-of assessing the potential threat ‘to our
[9433]country from other nations, it’s hard
[9434]to predict exactly what the level of
[9435]idefense spending will be. In the short
[9436]time that we had available to work
[9437]on the previous Administration’s budg-
[9438]et—about three weeks of ‘hard. work—
[9439]we were able to reduce the suggested
[9440]expenditures by almost $3 billion. I
[9441]think about $2.75 billion. - ;
[9443]This was done—and I think Senator
[9444]Stennis in his recent public statements
[9445]has confirmed that it has been done
[9446]without weakening our own defense
[9447]capability. And the substantial savings
[9448]in defense spending that will stili leave °
[9449]us muscle will be in such things as
[9450]the standardization of weapons, ‘long-
[9451]range planning, a more businesslike al-
[9452]location of defense contracting, an as-.
[9453]sessnient' of the defense contracts for
[9454]construction or repair already out-
[9455]standing. : .
[9457]‘. A reassessment of priorities of the
[9459]evolution of new weapons which in the .
[9461]future can become enormously expen-
[9462]sive; a: longer assignment of military
[9463]personnel to a base before they are
[9464]transferred; some emphasis on the cor-
[9465]rection of inequities and unfairnesses
[9466]in the retirement system. ‘
[9468]_ These things obviously can't be done
[9469]in three weeks, but they will be an
[9470]ongoing effort on my part. And I think
[9471]the 1979 budget, which will be my Ad-
[9472]ministration’s first budget, will show
[9473]wee. improvements to a substantial de-
[9475]Q. Will. next year’s defense budget
[9476]actuatly be lower then than the one
[9478]’ that you just revised. A. .I can't say
[9480]Yet, on
[9482]f Q. Do you think dt was proper for:
[9483]the C.I.A. to pay off King Hussein and
[9484]other foreign leaders? And what steps
[9485]are you taking to make yourself more
[9486]knowledgeable and more accountable
[9487]for what the C.LA. does? .
[9489]“S 2. CLA, Accountability
[9491]p A. Well, I've adopted a policy which
[9495]a . meee
[9497]iuL us Ww ‘lay a Bivubusuvin Sabi Waialua
[9498]we might predicate a successful meet-
[9499]ing of a threat to us jn time of war
[9500]if we don’t have some degree of secre-
[9503]I'm quite concerned about the num-.
[9505]ber of people now who have access _
[9507]to this--kind -ef -informations And I've
[9509]been working very; closely with the -
[9511]Congressional leaders, yesterday and
[9513]i to try to reduce the overall num-
[9514]ber le who have access to the
[9515]sources of information. that’ within the
[9516]bounds.-that T° jbed- i
[9518]“and legality ‘and American attitudes to-
[9520]ward secret:;—I'l!.do the best I can
[9521]not ever tc make a mistake. And I'm
[9522]also assuming on a continuing basis
[9523]a direct personal reponsibility for the
[9524]operation of all! the ingelligence agen-
[9525]cies in our Government to make sure
[9526]that they are meeting these standards.
[9528]_... 8, Correcting’ Errors on C.LA.
[9530]Q. If there has been erroneous infor-
[9532]mation, wouldn’t it behoove you to cor- -
[9534]rect the record?
[9536]A. In"some ways we are correcting
[9537]the record, but if I began to either dis-
[9539]. pute or confirm every individual story:
[9541]that’s written whether correct or er-
[9542]roneous on every. matter relating. to
[9543]the CLA. then ‘these matters which
[9544]‘are necessarily secret would no longer
[9545]be secret, so I’m.not going to comment
[9546]on individual items that relate to intel-
[9549]- 4, Difference With Meany
[9551]" . Q. Mr. President, George Meany says
[9553]he won't go along with your idea for
[9554]pre-notification on wage and price in-
[9555]creases. And my question really is, how
[9556]hard. are you going to press Mr. Meany
[9557]to go along and do you have anything
[9558]else in mind that you could use in the
[9559]way of Government involving itself to
[9560]try to control inflation? :
[9562]_ A, I announced earlier my firm com-
[9563]mitment not to have mandatory wage
[9564]and price laws or authority, not to have
[9566]-standby wage and price authority. I've
[9568]not made any proposal to’ Mr. Meany
[9570]or‘any other labor leader nor to any -
[9572]representative of. industry or manufac-
[9573]turing. But I. will retain the option in
[9574]the future of assessing what we need
[9575]to do to control inflation. .
[9576]I've emphasized always the word
[9577]“voluntary.” And to the extent that
[9578]1 can arrive at a common understand-
[9579]ing with industry and labor leaders that
[9580]a certain amount of cooperation and
[9581]information can be exchanged before
[9582]a major proposal is made. I think that’s
[9584]_a légitimate pursuit of mine. I can’t |
[9586]force it. It’s got.to be voluntary: And
[9587]that’s as far as I can go with my an-
[9588]swer.
[9592]Q. You mean just directly about wage
[9593]and price “guidelines” which might be
[9594]voluntary. How js that for an idea?
[9596]A. Well I think rigid. guidelines are
[9597]a mistake. If we said, for instance, that
[9598]no price increase or no wage increase
[9599]could exceed 6 percent this would be
[9601]too restrictive. It would be contrary
[9603]to my own philosophy of Government
[9605]: and I think that because of the diversi-
[9607]ty of our society and the fact that it
[9608]is a free enterprise system, you've got
[9609]to have some flexibility.
[9611]But I'd prefer to deal with these
[9612]problems that arise on’ increasing
[9613]prices on an individual bases and I also
[9615]prefer, of course, to work harmoniously _
[9617]’ Three Provision, insures: that ‘some ‘of
[9618]__.these-humaa-rights-shallsBe preserved.
[9620]prisoned ptcue ou SPic aers A fad
[9621]Korea, in Cuba, in many countris in
[9622]several countries, rather,—in $ uth
[9623]America anid I'll continue to do so. T
[9624]have never iad an inclination to single
[9625]out the Soviet Union as the only place
[9627]- where -huntan rights ‘are being. abridged.
[9628]"  ‘We-have, I'think, a ‘resporisibility and ~ |
[9629]_- a legal right to.express our disapprovat
[9631]- of viotdtions of human rights. The He
[9633]sinki Agreemira, 77 Ree
[9635]We are a signatory of: the Helsinki
[9637]agreement. We are ourselves culpable- -
[9639]in some ways for not giving people
[9640]adequate rights to move around our
[9641]country: or restricting unnecessarily, in
[9642]my opinion, visitation to this country
[9643]by those who disagree with us political-
[9644]]
[9646]y- .
[9648]So I think that we all ought to take
[9649]a position in our own countr’ and
[9650]among our friends and allies, among
[9651]our potential adversaries, that human
[9652]rights is something on which we should
[9653]bear a major responsibility for leader-
[9654]ship. And I have made it clear to the
[9655]‘Soviet Union and to others in the East-
[9656]ern European community that I’m not
[9657]trying to launch a unilateral criticism
[9658]of them, that I’m trying to set a stand-
[9659]ard in our own country and make my
[9660]concerns expressed throughout the
[9661]world, not singled out against any par-
[9662]ticular country.
[9664]Q. Mr. President, the other day, get-
[9665]ting back to’ this C.LA. thing, when
[9666]that story broke your Press Secretary,
[9667]when ‘he issued what amounted to a
[9668]“no comment” by the White House,
[9669]someone asked him if this story had
[9670]broken back during the campaign when
[9671]you were running for Presiden:, vould
[9672]you have given a similar response? And
[9673]he said “well I don’t‘ know.” So can
[9674]I ask you, what would have beer, your
[9675]response? Would it .have been the
[9676]same? A. I don’t know.
[9678]7. Review of C.1.A. Activities
[9679]Q. Mr. President, on that same sub-
[9681]ject, you said earlier that you review”
[9683]of C.LA. activities had found nothing
[9684]illegal or improper and you later said
[9685]that these activities are legitimate and
[9686]proper. Isn't that a value judgment that
[9687]the American public might like to
[9688]share? But how can they if you refuse
[9689]to’ give them any idea of waat you
[9690]have discovered during this review
[9691]about payments, including ones made
[9692]in secret?
[9694]A. That is a value judgment, it’s made
[9696]by the independent Intelligence Over--
[9698]sight Board, which was established and
[9699]appointed by President Ford. This
[9700]beard has made itself available to the
[9701]Inspector General and to any employce
[9702]within the C.ILA. or within the defense
[9703]intelligence agencies or any other to
[9704]receive even rumors of impropriety.
[9706]. They have assessed these opcrations.
[9708]They made their inquiries in the past,
[9709]which is in accordance with an execu-
[9711]. tive order issued by President Ford to
[9713]the Attorney General of the United
[9714]States and also to the President.
[9716]Y have read that correspond.are. }t’s
[9717]quite voluminous and J think that il’s
[9718]accurate to say that Senator Inouye’s
[9719]committee in the Senate and tne appro-
[9720]priate committees in ihe House have
[9721]also received this injormation in the
[9722]past.
[9724]I have talked to Senator Inouye and
[9725]he confirms what I've just told you.
[9726]And I think he would also conirm that
[9728]pune
[9730]4
[9731]“Wl
[9733]13-00000
[9735]iN
[9737]HURSDAY, FEBRUARY 24, 1977
[9739]The New York Times/Teresa Zabala
[9740]chtive Office Buiding in Washington
[9742].the impropriety or the illegality does
[9743]ot exist on any ongoing C.LA. opera-
[9744]‘ion. .
[9746]8. Problems With Congress
[9748]Q. Mr. President, Charles Kirbo, your
[9749]friend Charles Kirbo seenis to feel that
[9750]‘you're going to be having a continuing
[9751]problem with.the Congress and that
[9753]to the people in order to get results.
[9754]s this true? ;
[9756]A. I think if you read the whole
[9757]statement that Mr. Kirbo made, which
[9758]is just a private citizen’s opinion, he
[9759]would say that every President has had
[9760]* arguments and debates and disagree-
[9761]» ments. with the Congress. And I think
[9763]“ that’s inevitable in our system of Gov--
[9765]“ernment. That's part of the checks and
[9766]~ balances that’s very precious to us.all.
[9768]" : IT have found up té now a growing.
[9770]sense of cooperation with the Congress.
[9771]' J think last week when I was asked
[9772]‘roughly the same question. that the
[9773]- troubles were perhaps underestimated
[9774]by the news media. I think now per-
[9775]“haps the troubles with the Congress
[9776]are overestimated. I have frequent
[9777]meetings wilh the Congressional] lead-
[9778]ers both Democratic. and Republican.
[9779]= And I think that the progress of the
[9780]legislation that ‘we consider to be cru-
[9781]cial which seemed to be moving very
[9783]Z slowly’ in the past is now speeding up -
[9784]: ave
[9786]So I don’t believe that we'll
[9787]‘nearly the problems with the Congress
[9788]. that has been the case in recent ‘years.
[9789], And I have to‘say in summary that
[9790]- Iam very pleased with my relationship
[9791]owith the Congress now.
[9793]“9, The Election Process
[9794]» Q. Mr. President, in view of your
[9795]" assignment to Vice President Mondale
[9796]» regarding the election laws, could you
[9797]ygive us your view, sir, on the direct
[9799]s program - will
[9800]voluntary: conservation, yet the public’s.
[9802]you'll have to go over Congress’s head -
[9804]n
[9806]ference on F oreign ¢ and Domestic Matters’
[9808]But I will work with Congress on
[9809]the deregulation: of natural-gas as a
[9810]part .of an overall energy policy. By.
[9811]April 20 I think we'll be’ prepared to
[9812]present to you, the news media, and
[9813]the people and the Congress more
[9814]specific proposals involving’ direct
[9815]legislation proposals that will answer
[9816]your question more fully.
[9818]12. Energy Program Sacrifices.
[9820]Q. Mr, President,, we've been told that
[9821]the. central thrust: of your new energy
[9822]involve sacrifice and
[9824]always reading stories in.the paper of
[9825]how the major oil companies are with-
[9826]holding natural gas. So I'd like to ask
[9827]how are you going to expect the public
[9828]to make ‘sacrifices when there’s such
[9829]widespread public suspicion about the
[9830]role of the oil companies in the energy
[9831]crisis. ©
[9833]A. I think the comprehensive nature
[9834]of the proposal that takes in all these
[9835]very disparate and sometimes ‘conflict-
[9836]ing elements at one time and a long-
[9838]Tange projection of our needs and a
[9840]tangible demonstration to. the Ameri:
[9842]‘can people, to the extent that I’m able
[9844]to put it forward, that there will he
[9845]direct ultimate benefits to them will
[9847]-be the elements that will cause them’
[9849]to make those sacrifices. At the same
[9850]time, I want to increase the surety that
[9851]we have that the reserve supply data
[9852]given to us by the oil companies and
[9853]others are accurate.
[9855]We are now conducting some admit-
[9856]tedly. superficial studies by Secretacy
[9857]Ceci! Andrus in Interior and also they'll
[9858]be followed up by more detailed studies
[9859]under Dr. Schlesinger, to see whether
[9860]or not the reserve supplies are ade-
[9861]quate and whether or not the oll com-
[9862]panies are giving us accilrate data. I
[9863]think it’s obvious to all of us that there
[9864]are some instances where natural gas
[9865]is withheld from the market. That's
[9866]‘understandable. If I was running an’
[9867]oi] company I would reserve the right
[9868]to release or to reserve some supplies
[9869]of natural gas.
[9871]With the emergency’ legislation that
[9872]the Congress did pass, I think in about
[9873]a week of assessment during the frigid
[9874]part of the winter—it’s still very cold—
[9876]we were given some authority to buy .
[9878]extra gas at a very high price. This
[9879]is obviously a transcient. circumstance.
[9881]But I believe the American people
[9882]will be willing to make, the sacrifices
[9883]required, if they are convinced that fu-
[9884]ture reports will be accurate, that sup-
[9885]plies will not be withheld from the mar-
[9886]ket and if we can let the oil companies
[9887]know in a predictable way what, our
[9889]‘policy will be two months or two years
[9891]or-20 years in the future—within the
[9892]bounds of human reason—then I think
[9893]they'll be much less likely ta withhold
[9895]. supplies of oif and natural. gas from
[9897]the market just hoping that they'll get
[9898]some bonanza iricreased price in the
[9900]future if the policies do change.
[9902]14. Rise in Gasoline Tax
[9904]Q. Another question, sir, on the sacri-
[9905]fices that you say your upcoming ener-
[9906]gy program is going to demand, Is it
[9907]likely that one of those sacrifices. is
[9908]going to come in the form ofa largely
[9909]increased Federal gasoline tax? -
[9911]A. I don’t know how to answer vour
[9913]fe pl 9 96 fete}
[9915]was a waste. You also promised td ott i
[9916]the waste out of the defense budget.
[9917]When would you expect to stop
[9918]production of the B-1 as opposed to
[9919]research and’development on the B-1?
[9920]A. I think I cut out about more than {
[9921]$200 million from the B-l program: “ine |
[9922]the budget just submitted to the Con-.
[9923]gress, I “have -serious questions about
[9924]whether or not the B-1 ought to be
[9925]in the future the center of our airborna
[9926]defense capability.
[9927]“have several more months before: |
[9928]T have to make a decision on that mate::
[9929]ter and the National Security Council
[9931]- which combines, as you know, State,::
[9933]Treasury, Defense and other elements,
[9934]of the Government, working very closez: :
[9935]ly with me, is now making a complete :
[9936]reassessment of the need for the 'B-
[9937]bomber. 4 nr coe
[9938]_ I don’t know whether we will decide:
[9939]to go on with it or not. And I don’t}
[9940]know whether we'll expedite produce
[9941]tion of it or not, at this time. rT
[9942]Part of the factor to be assesstd is.
[9943]the attitude of the Soviet Union. If-wee
[9944]can have a general lessening of tension,.
[9945]a demonstrated commitment on ‘their
[9946]part toward disarmament, it would cer-.
[9947]tainly make it less likely that we woulé
[9948]go ahead with the B-1. nites
[9949]But'l can’t answer that question unitiP
[9950]T complete my own study, and I thinks
[9951]that would have to be terminated. by"
[9952]the end of May. ily vow
[9954]18. Campaign Financing Law.
[9956]Q. Mr. President, T was a little unclear,
[9957]about what you're going to propose:
[9958]in the campaign finance law. Are you
[9960]saying that you will propose to have"
[9962]tf Congressional elections publicly
[9963]hanced? A. That's my preference, yes.
[9964]*Q. Is that what. you will propose ta
[9965]Congress? A. The Vice President is'nOy,
[9966]doing a study on a complete election
[9967]law package. And I'd like to reserve’
[9968]my own judgment until T see what his
[9969]report ig to me. But that’s my own.
[9970]inclination. It’s a position that I took:
[9971]during the campaign and so far,I ‘have.
[9972]no reason to change my mind.
[9974]19, Foreign Policy Turntable
[9976]Q. You gave us a kind of a timetable”
[9977]for your domestic program in your pre-
[9978]‘liminary statement. I wonder if “you
[9979]-have a similar timetable of what you
[9980]hope to achieve in foreign policy be-
[9981]tween now and the end of the year,
[9983]‘such as Middle East peace, Cyprus,, the.
[9985]treaty with Panama. 7 :
[9986]A. Of course I can’t answer. that
[9988]*, question specifically because I. don't
[9990]know what cooperation we will -get
[9991]from other nations and I don’t. know,
[9992]what the inclination of those nations.
[9993]in disputed regions of the world want
[9994]to do toward one another. :
[9996]_ Secretary Cyrus Vance has just. nes
[9997]turned from what I consider to bea
[9998]very successful trip to the Middle. East.,
[9999]He not only probed with the heads. oft
[10000]those Governments and their Cabinet.
[10001]members their own positions, both pubs
[10002]lic and private on -the controversial,
[10003]issues that have so far prevented-ra
[10005]“peace in the Middle East. He also had
[10007]a chance to compare their positions
[10008]on issues—which ones they found ta.
[10009]‘be in harmony, which,ones there was
[10011]13-00000
[10013]| And I have to‘say in Summary that
[10015]Tam very pleased with my relationship «.
[10017]| with the Congress now.
[10019]- 9, The Election Process
[10021]/ Q. Mr. President, in view of your
[10022]assignment to Vice President Mondale
[10023]regarding the election laws, could you,
[10024]_give us your view, sir, on the direct
[10025]election ‘of a President versus the Elec-
[10026].toral College. And also do’ you think
[10027]“that the public financing should be ex-
[10028]tended to Congress as weil as the Presi-
[10031]A. There are three basic questions
[10032]} that come up. In the first place, I do
[10033]«favor at least an automatic ‘vote by
[10034]presidential electors once the general
[10035]‘election is completed. 1 think the Elec-
[10036]i-toral Colllege, for instance, should: be
[10037]eliminated. Whether the ratio among
[10038]i.states of votes ought to be changed
[10039]kT'm not prepared to comment on now.
[10040]poe dee cs tng Ha eINg Of Congres-
[10041]| sional elections by public funds—it has
[10042]i proved to be successful, I believe, in
[10044]ithe Presidential election, I strongly
[10046]' favor that, yes. And the other element
[10047]‘of the overall package would be a sim-
[10048]ple way. for American people. who are
[10049]| citizens and 18 years old to register
[10050]to vole. And I am committed to that
[10052]-graciously consented to ‘take «on this
[10053]| joverall election process responsibility.
[10054]“Those three will be basic elements of
[10056]‘the proposals.
[10058]t 10, Relations With Cuba
[10059]i: Q. Mr. President, are you, prepared
[10061]: to jift the trade embargo ‘against Cuba
[10063]-as one Step toward normalizing rela- .
[10065]. tions? to. .
[10066].) AT think any substantial -move in
[10067]‘igur Yelationship with Cuba would have
[10069].to await further discussions with them.
[10071]“indirectly, and, also some tangible evi-
[10073]‘dence on our part that they are willing,
[10075]. to restore basic human rights in Cuba,
[10076]: involving the number of prisoners who
[10077]‘gre being held, their attitude toward
[10078]overseas adventures such as the’ one
[10079]‘|n Angola, and other matters. So Ican’t
[10080]i gay. what might come in the future.
[10081]'” Ym willing, though, to discuss these
[10082]" mattess with the Cuban leaders, At this
[10083]: fime we have mo direct relationships
[10084]: vith them, political. But through inter-
[10085]‘nediaries comments are being ex-
[10087]: bhanged back and forth. Most of my. -
[10089]-tomments are in public statements like
[10090]‘ this, but we do have messages coming
[10091]* back from people who visit Guba.
[10094]'* 11. Defense Savings Goal’
[10096]; Q. In answer to an earlier ‘question,
[10097]| Mr, President, you said that you could-
[10098]wt: say whether nezt year’s’ defense
[10100]| tudget will be lower or higher than
[10102]‘this year’s. But as I understood your
[10104]tegardiess of the overall level of spend-
[10105]ing. Do you still hold with that figure?
[10106]le 'that still your goal and a commit-
[10108]A, Yes. The analyses that I’ve made
[10109]‘if the defense budget so far—which
[10110]is you know has been limited to about’
[10111]month’s study just part-time—indi-
[10112]late that that’s a goal that will be
[10114]feached.
[10116]|{ 12. Natural Gas Deregulation
[10118]|, Q.-Mr. President, in letters to the
[10119]‘zovernors of Oklahoma, Texas and
[10120]! fouisiana last October, you said uncon-
[10121]jitionally that you would work with
[10122]Congress to deregulate new - natural
[10123]tas. And 1 wondered ‘if you: planned
[10125]lo keep that promise, and if so how
[10126]eee 101 me bn OF 7 7
[10128]proposition and the Vice President has ~
[10130]' tarlier postion, you did want to.achieve ©
[10131]a five to seven billion ‘dollar savings -
[10133]Tae Ab to peed UU CHanBgeEr ”
[10134]‘14. Rise in Gasoline Tax
[10136]_ Q. Another question, sir, on the sacri-
[10137]fices that you say your upcoming ener-
[10138]gy program is going to demand, Is it
[10139]likely that one of those sacrifices is
[10141]oing to come in the form of a largely
[10142]increased Federal gasoline tax?
[10144]A. L don’t know how to answer your |
[10146]questions about specifics of the propos-
[10147]al. I want to make this clear. The pur-
[10148]pose of .the energy policy evolution
[10149]is not to cause sacrifice or hardship
[10150]among the American people.Unless I
[10151]can demonstrate that in balance the
[10152]temporary sacrifices ina certain area
[10154]are far overcome by immediate and ul-
[10156]timate benefits then nobody's going to
[10158]buy it.
[10159]- And T believe that we've. now got.
[10161]such a horrible conglomeratton ‘of cari-
[10162]fusion in the energy field that nobddy
[10164]knowe whatle. goine to -happen. gent.
[10166]So I think that the sacrifices ‘w
[10167]far overcome by: |
[10168]American people-*#ill be easily -able to
[10169]discern-for themsel.s.
[10171]15. U.S. Ro!:: on Canada
[10172]Q. You said that. 'n spite of the fact
[10173]that the. Canadian “eople would have
[10174]to determine their future for them-
[10175]selves, particularly in regard to the
[10176]separatism issue in Quebec that .you
[10178]had: confidence that the issue would .
[10180]be straightened out relatively peaceful-
[10181]ly. Do you really think that there is
[10182]little concern in this country about the
[10183]‘future of a unified Canada and is there
[10184]anything really: that we can do about
[10185]it? .- . :
[10187]“A. There's a great deal of concern
[10188]in this. country about the future of
[10190]_ Canada ‘and I have complete confi-
[10192]dence, as I said ih an interview with
[10193]the Canadian news media in the sound
[10195]’ judgment of the Canadian people.
[10197]I'm familiar—and even more famillar
[10199]“today than I was two days ago after
[10201]Prime Minister Trudeau's visit—with
[10202]the problems in Quebec and the inclina-
[10203]tion of some of the French Canadians
[10204]to have an independent status from the
[10205]rest of Canadian Provinces.
[10207]I don’t know what’s going to be the
[10209]ultimate outcome. But.I believe that™
[10211]we are so Closely tied together with
[10212]Canada on a mutually berieficial basis,
[10213]sharing -problems, sharing. opportuni-
[10215]ties, sharing trade, sharing manufactur--
[10217]ing companies that have joint owner-
[10218]ship, our exchange of ‘energy sources,
[10220]‘our sharing of the St. Lawrence Sea-.
[10222]way, the Great Lakes as far as water
[10223]pollution is concerned, the bringing of
[10225]_ Alaskan oil and natural gas down to
[10227]us that we have got to have a continu-
[10229]- ing relationship with Canada.
[10231]My own personal preference would
[10232]be that the commonwealth stay as it
[10233]is and that there not be a separate
[10234]Quebec province> But that’s a decision
[10235]for the Canadians to make and I would
[10236]certainly ‘make no private or public
[10237]move to try to determine the outcome
[10238]of that great debate.
[10240]16. Keeping Campaign Promises
[10241]Q. Mr. President, you've had a month
[10243]- now to enjoy the view from the Oval
[10244]’ Office. Do you think you'll be able to
[10245].. keep fully all-the campaign promises
[10246]“you made?
[10248]A. As you know, we have issued what
[10250]" [believe is the complete book of my
[10252]campaign. promises, which is, I pre-.
[10253]sume, being made available to all of
[10255]-. you. My determination is to keep all
[10257]‘those promises.
[10258]Obviously if circumstances should
[10259]‘change I would have to reserve the
[10261]1 Aen nalnne manaln
[10263]‘be
[10264]by: the. benefits that the.
[10266]cee very SULLESSIUL TITY TOTAE MIGUIC Lasts
[10268]He not only probed with the heads. oft
[10269]those Governments and their Cabinet
[10270]members their own positions, both pube
[10271]lic and private on the controversial,
[10272]issues that have so far prevented as
[10274]‘peace in the Middle East. He also had
[10276]a chance to compare their positions
[10277]on’ issues—which ones they found tq.
[10278]be in harmony, which, ones there was
[10279]still a dispute. eer
[10280]“We also invited the leaders of. alk
[10281]those nations to meet with me. ‘They
[10282]fave ali accepted ta YT will be rceting
[10283]with the heads of the nations in dispute.
[10284]in the Middle East, all of them, before
[10285]the end of ‘May. The first visit of one
[10286]of those leaders will be Mr. Rabin.I
[10287]believe, March 12. And he will be fol-
[10288]lowed by the leaders from Egypt, fram
[10290]- Jordan and from Syria, from Saudia
[10292]Arabia-and I look forward to meating
[10293]with them. : : watts
[10295]At that point I hove 1. will have.a
[10296]very:-elear picture: of: wnat ivic the
[10297]American Government ought to-play.
[10299]The.same thing applies to the situa:
[10300]tion that exists between ourselves.and
[10301]Turkey, ourselves and Greece, -our-
[10302]selves and Cyprus onefire
[10304]We can’t impose our will on other
[10305]people. But if they honestly want to
[10306]seek a solution, we are perfectly -will-
[10308]ing to offer our good offices as a coun: :
[10310]try with influence and interest to help |
[10311]them resolve their own differences. But °
[10312]it’s got to be done primarily by those ,
[10314]countries involved. .
[10316]We have begun again, and within
[10318]the last week, our discussions on the
[10320]extremely good negotiators and I: hope
[10321]that we will have success there: Thera-s,
[10323]‘no way that I can say at this point
[10324]- what degree of progress we have made,
[10326]‘Its just beginning.
[10328]So throughout the areas of high diss
[10329]- pute, including South Africa and others
[10330]that I don’t have time to mention we're.
[10332]probing as best we can to discern soma
[10333]Possibility of resolution of those ten-
[10334]sion areas. ; _—
[10335]We are meeting today, in fact-all
[10336]this week with the British, to try to
[10337]get a renewed proposal to make con-
[10338]cerning the question surrounding Rho-.
[10339]desia. And then, of course, we'll still
[10340]have left Nambia and_ ultimately -ma-
[10341]jority rule question in South Africa.
[10342]But I've only been in office a month.
[10343]I don’t claim to know all the easy ans
[10344]swers. And these questions.that have
[10345]are not going to be easy to solve.: But
[10346]we'te going to do the best we can opens
[10347]ly and forcefully offering. our . good
[10348]services, not trying to impose our-will
[10349]on other people. wae
[10350]Q. Thank you, Mr. President.
[10352]Carter Errs on Rabin.
[10354]And U.S.-Uganda Ties
[10356]WASHINGTON, Feb, 23 (AP)—Presi-
[10357]dent Carter made two errors in. his
[10358]news conference today, which .the
[10359]White House staff later corrected. :
[10361]Mr. Carter used a wrong dale. for
[10362]the forthcoming visit to the United
[10363]States of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin
[10364]of Israel. The President said that he
[10365]thought the visit would take place
[10366]March 12. a
[10368]The White House later corrected that
[10369]to say “the proposed visit is tentatively
[10370]planned for March 7 and 8.” _
[10372]The White House also corrected the
[10373]President’s statement that the United
[10374]States doeg not have diplomatic rela:
[10375]tions with Uganda. voy
[10377]“This is not strictly accurate,"’.. the
[10379]- Panama Canal Treaty. We have two-
[10381]1 310Q00Q ungress a3 Weil as ule rive
[10382]mcy? Lo .
[10383]A. There are three basic questions
[10384]iat come wp, In the first place, I do
[10385]wot at least an automatic *vote by
[10386]residential electors once the general
[10387]ection is completed. I think the Etec-
[10389]yral Colllege, for instance, should: be _
[10391]iminated. Whether the ratio among
[10392]cates of votes ought to be changed
[10393]m not prepared.to comnrent on now.
[10394]eo ta Oo tad WIN Ge LOngres-
[10395]onal! elections by public funds—it has
[10396]roved to be successful, I believe, in
[10398]1e Presidential election.. I strongly ~
[10400]tvor that, yes. And the other element
[10401]* the overall package would be a sim-
[10402]le way.for American people. who are
[10403]tizens and 18 years old to register
[10404]» vote. And I am committed to that
[10406]-oposition and the Vice President has ©
[10408]raciously consented to ‘take ‘on this
[10409]verall election process responsibility.
[10410]hose three will be basic elements of
[10411]le proposals. ‘i.
[10413]"10, Relations With Cuba
[10415]Q. Mr. President, are you. prepared
[10416]» ift the trade embargo ‘against Cuba
[10418]s one step toward normalizing rela- |
[10420]ons? . .
[10421]A,;1 think any substantial.move in
[10422]ar Telationship with Cuba would ‘have
[10424]» await further discussions with them.
[10426]directly, and also some tangible evi-
[10427]ance on our part that they are willing
[10428]» restore basic humah rights in Cuba,
[10429]volving the number of prisoners who
[10430]‘e being held, their attitude toward
[10431]verseas adventures such as the one
[10432]Angola, and other matters, So I can’t
[10433]iy. what might come in the future.
[10434]Ym willing, though, to discuss these
[10435]attezs with the Cuban leaders. At this
[10436]me we have no direct relationships
[10437]ith them, political. But through inter-
[10438]ediarics comments are being ex-
[10439]ianged back and forth. Most of my
[10440]»mments are in public statements like
[10441]iis, but we do have messages coming
[10442]ick from people who visit Guba.
[10444]11. Defense Savings Goal.
[10445]Q. In answer to an earlier ‘question,
[10446]r. President, you said that you could-
[10447]t. say whether next year’s defense
[10448]jdget will be lower or higher than
[10449]ds year's. But as I understood your
[10450]irlier postion, you did want to achieve
[10452]five to seven billion ‘dollar savings -
[10454]‘gardiess of the overall level of spend-
[10455]g. Do you still ‘hold with that figure?
[10456]that still your goal and a commit-
[10458]A. Yes. The analyses that I've made
[10459]' the defense budget so far—which
[10460]3 you know has been limited to about:
[10461]month’s study just part-time—indi-
[10462]tte that that’s a goal that will be
[10463]‘ached. : .
[10465]12. Natural Gas Deregulation
[10467]Q. Mr. President, in letters to the
[10468]wernors of Oklahoma, Texas and
[10469]yuisiana last October, you said uncon-
[10470]tionally that you would work with
[10471]ongress to deregulate new natural
[10472]as. And I wondered ‘if you planned
[10474]1 keep that promise, and if so how
[10476]du will go about it?
[10478]A. I don’t know how I’ll go:‘about
[10479]. | do try to keep my promises, The
[10480]sition that I have taken, and the
[10481]sition. that the governors of Oklaho-
[10482]a and Texas took at governors con-
[10483]‘rences to which I was referring, was
[10484]ve deregulation of natural gas for a
[10485]mited period. of time, four to five
[10486]2ars, to see how it works out, leaving
[10487]<isting contracts in effect.
[10491]And I believe that we've np
[10492]_ such’a horrible conglomeration ie
[10495]is not to cause sacrifice or hardship
[10496]among the American people.Uniess I
[10497]can demonstrate thdt in balance the
[10498]temporary sacrifices in ‘a certain area
[10500]. are far overcome by immediate and ul-
[10502]timate benefits then nobody's going to
[10503]buy it. .
[10505]fusion in the energy field th:
[10506]knowe sshatic. gaine to —hey
[10507]So I think that the sacrifices
[10508]far overcome bj
[10510]i 1p
[10513]15. U.S. Rol: on Canada
[10514]Q. You said that. in spite of the fact
[10515]that the. Canadian seople would have
[10516]to determine their future for them-
[10517]selves, particuJarly in regard to the
[10518]separatism issue in Quebec that -you
[10520]had‘ confidence that the issue would .
[10522]be straightened out relatively peaceful-
[10523]ly. Do you really think ‘that there is
[10524]little concern in this country about the
[10526]‘future of a unified Canada and is there
[10527]anything really: that we can do about
[10528]te :
[10530]A. There's a great deal of concern
[10531]in ‘this: country about the future of
[10533]_ Canada and I have complete confi-
[10534]dence, as I said in an interview with.
[10536]the Cariadian news media in the sound
[10538]' judgment of the Canadian people.
[10540]I'm familiar—and even more familiar
[10542]“today than-I was two days ago after
[10544]Prime Minister Trudeau's visit—with
[10545]the problems in Quebec and the inclina-
[10546]tion of some of the French Canadians
[10547]to have an independent status from the
[10548]rest of Canadian Provinces,
[10550]I don’t know what’s going to be the
[10552]ultimate outcome. But.I believe that”
[10554]we are So closely tied together with
[10555]Canada on a mutually beneficial basis,
[10557]. sharing problems, sharing- opportuni-
[10558]' ties, sharing trade, sharing manufactur-
[10560]ing companies that have joint owner-
[10561]ship, our exchange of ‘energy sources,
[10562]‘our sharing of the St. Lawrence Sea-
[10563]way, the Great Lakes as far as water
[10564]pollution is concerned, the bringing of
[10566]. Alaskan oil and natural gas down to
[10568]us that we have got to have a continu-
[10570]‘ing relationship with Canada,
[10572]My own personal preference would
[10573]be that the commonwealth stay as it
[10574]is and that there not be a separate
[10575]Quebec province? But that’s a decision
[10576]for the Canadians to make and I would
[10577]certainly make no private or public
[10578]move to try to determine the outconie
[10579]of that great debate.
[10581]16. Keeping Campaign Promises
[10582]Q. Mr. President, you've had a month
[10583]now to enjoy the view from the Oval
[10585]’ Office. Do you think you'll be able to
[10586]- keep fully all. the campaign promises
[10587]“you made?
[10589]A. As you know, we have issued: what
[10590]I believe is the complete book of my
[10592]. campaign promises, which is, I pre-~
[10594]sume, being made available to all of
[10596]-. you. My determination is to keep all
[10598]those promises. _
[10600]Obviously if circumstances should
[10601]change I would have to reserve the
[10602]right to go back to the American people
[10604]. and say “now that circumstances have
[10606]changed. this a better approach to that
[10608]particular problem.” But I will do-my _
[10610]utmost to keep all the campaign prom-
[10611]ises that I made to the American peo-
[10613]ple.
[10614]17. Production of B-1
[10616]" Q. Mr. President, you said at various
[10617]times during the campaign that the B-1
[10619]st
[10621]be ©
[10622]y:-the. benefits that .the
[10623]n -peopleacill-be-easily-ablé to. ~
[10625]liave an accepted sod Twill be erecting
[10626]with the heads of the nations in dispute.
[10627]in the Middle East, all of them, before
[10628]the end of May. The first visit of one
[10629]of those leaders will be Mr. Rabin»
[10630]believe, March 12. And he, will be fol
[10631]lowed by the leaders from Egypt, from
[10632]dJofdan “and from ‘Syria, from Saudia.--~;
[10633]‘Arabia-and I.look forward to 'meating
[10634]with'them. - et wacte  |
[10635]' hat point I hone: I. will have.
[10636]ar picturesa® wnat iuie 2
[10637]‘American: Gavernment. ought to..play.
[10638]The.same thing -applies.to the-situas ...
[10639]tion that’ exists between ourselves,.and
[10640]Turkey, ourselves. and Greece, -our-
[10641]selves-and Cyprus. eo be
[10642]We can’t impose our will on other .
[10643]people. But if they honestly want to |
[10644]seek a solution, we are perfectly -will-
[10645]ing to offer our good offices as a couns ;
[10646]try with influence and interest to help :
[10647]them resolve their own differences. Bug '
[10648]it's got to be done primarily by those |
[10649]countries involved. yt
[10650]We have begun again, and within ; ’
[10651]the last Week, our discussions on ,the . ’
[10653]- Panama Canal Treaty. We have two:
[10655]extremely good negotiators and I- hope -
[10657]_ that we will have success there: There's,
[10659]no way that I can say at this point i
[10661]’ what degree of progress we have made, -
[10663]‘Hig just beginning. ch
[10664]So throughout the areas of high dis:
[10665]pute, including South Africa and others ,
[10666]that I don’t have time to mention we're |
[10667]probing as best we can to.discern some *
[10668]possibility of resolution of those ten-!
[10669]sion areas. . oy
[10670]We are meeting today, in fact: all i:
[10671]this week with the British, to try to
[10672]get a renewed proposal to make con-:
[10673]cerning the question surrounding Rho-,‘
[10674]desia, And then, of course, we'll still
[10675]have left Nambia and ultimately -ma- °
[10676]jority rule question in South Africa...
[10677]But I've only been in office a month, ;
[10678]JT don’t claim to know all the ‘easy aris .
[10679]swers. And these questions that have
[10680]are not going to be easy to solve. But
[10681]we'te going to do the best we can opene
[10682]ly and forcefully offering. our , good
[10683]Services, not trying to impose our-will
[10684]on other people. oka,
[10685]Q. Thank you, Mr. President.
[10687]Carter Errs on Rabin:
[10688]And U.S.-Uganda Ties |
[10690]WASHINGTON, Feb. 23 (AP)—Presi-
[10691]dent Carter made two errors in. his.
[10692]news oonference today, which the:
[10693]White House staff later corrected... ...
[10695]Mr. Carter used a wrong dalte. for”
[10696]the forthcoming visit to the United. -
[10697]States of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, -
[10698]of Israel. The President said that he.
[10699]thought the visit would take placa!
[10700]March: 12. : Ts
[10702]‘The White House later corrected that, |
[10703]to say “‘the proposed visit is tentatively ;
[10704]planned for March 7 and 8.” eae
[10706]The White House also corrected the
[10707]President's statement that the- United.)
[10708]States does not have diplomatic rela- ::.
[10709]tions with Uganda. toed
[10711]“This is mot strictly accurate,".. the ..
[10712]correction said, explaining: ‘, is
[10714]“While the: United States has with-.
[10715]drawn its mission from Uganda ancl,,
[10716]has no direct diplomatic representation
[10717]there, United States affairs in -the
[10718]Republic of Uganda are carried out-:
[10719]through the West’ German embassy and.”
[10720]the Republic of Uganda has an aperat- ..
[10721]ing embassy and charge d’affaires-in .
[10725]13-00000
[10727]‘tional security. Although the. CIA’s : The federal government ‘had previ.’ :
[10729]‘attempted to prove the need for sec- :
[10731]a | .
[10732]‘WASHINGTON POST b wm
[10734]CIA Admits - 5 ea oa
[10735]Working to. - 7 | Qu { ‘Cth
[10736]Raise Sub w qh Moe
[10738]_By Timothy S. Robinson
[10739]Washington Post Staff Writer . .
[10740]The Central Intelligence Agency t For example, Gesell was forced to -
[10741]has finally acknowledged publicly {ssue a secret opinion in the case last?
[10742]‘ October that even the: attorneys in-'
[10743]“ *
[10744]that it was “involved” in the Glomar volved still have not been able to
[10745]Explorer's attempts to raise a sunken - read. The opinion was issued in that |
[10746]Russian submarine from the Pacific secret fashion upon direct orders of
[10747]Ocean floor,” . ' the U.S. Court of Appeals, which in- :
[10748]The terse ‘acknowledgement ¢ came in _ Structed Gesell to accept secret affi- ;
[10749]filed the US. ‘davits from high-level government of. *
[10750]a court document filed in. the i ficials concerning the case. :
[10751]Court of Appeals -by the Justice De-' — pubtic aftidavits filed at the time by |
[10752]partment two’ weeks ago. The docu- former President. Ford’s top national |
[10753]ment asked that a suit against ‘the ' security adviser, Lt. Gen. Brent Scow- :
[10754]CIA by a private group concerning | croft, said disclosures of the CIA in- :
[10755]volvement or other details about the
[10756]the Glomar's financing be sent back project ‘might prompt. other nations ,
[10757]to.a lower court for further hearings. ~ offended by the project to Fetaliate :
[10758]The filing marks an abrupt change — against the United States. . ; ij
[10759]from the previous position taken by | -géoweroft ‘said’ ‘that retaliation { j
[10760]the Justice Department in the 18 inight take the: form of “strong ‘meas- i
[10761]month-old case that the mere acknowl-! ures” that might “endanger US mili.
[10762]edgement of the CIA’s involvement in | tary and diplomatic personnel and |
[10763]the project would be harmful to na-’ businessmen overseas.” .
[10765]operation of the project has been re- i ously acknowled ged only that the ship |
[10767]' ported in numerous publications, the | \/.. -part: of a 1969 classified .U.S. gov- |
[10769]agency has been adamant in its re- ernment “
[10770]project “to accomplish cer- |
[10771]fusal to say publicly whether ‘those re | tain secret tasks in furtherance of na- |
[10773]Ports were true, 20 tional, security: objectives. 7 _
[10774]The case brought by the nonprofit pe = - . ai
[10775]Military Audit Project, which moni- ; a
[10776]tors spending by the defense and in- ‘
[10777]telligence establishments, has in- :
[10778]volved an unprecedented amount: of -
[10779]secret court: proceedings as the CIA .
[10781]recy to U.S. District Court Judge Ger- :
[10782]hard A. Gesell. The suit seeks the fi- :
[10783]nancial details of the Glomar project. ;
[10785]7
[10786]3
[10787]i
[10788]i
[10789]H
[10790]H