[1]AAAAN
[2]Taod. 10306- 61006 Bey, as 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
[4]26 March 1963
[6]ADDITIONAL NOTE IN MY MEMORANDUM OF DISCUSSION WITH THE
[7]PRESIDENT:
[9]The President and I engaged in a brief discussion of the Soviet
[10]plans with respect to Cuba. He indicated that he once felt that the
[11]Soviets would withdraw all of their forces from Cuba, but that he had
[12]now reached the conclusion that the plan had changed. Bundy volunteered
[13]that they.at no time had said specifically that they were to withdraw all _
[14]of their forces, in fact their particular wording was somewhat vague.
[15]McCone ‘stated that indicatorg were conflicting. On the one hand, certain
[16]information such ps the mee Brazilian)intercept, jand report of Castro's
[17]own statements would lead one to the. conclusion that a gradual and
[18]continuing withdrawal would take. place;. that the Cubans were trained and
[19]became proficient in operating advanced sophisticated Soviet equipment,
[20]This would take many months, probably the balance of the year and
[21]_ Castro welcomed this period of time because it would mean a continuing
[22]Soviet interest in Cuba, On the other hand, DCI pointed out that building
[23]of permanent installations and the arrival of undisclosed but apparently
[24]sophisticated equipment, although in small quantities, nevertheless
[25]important volume would indicate a conclusion that Soviets were there to
[26]stay, but perhaps on a somewhat reduced scale,
[28]_JAM/ji_ (taped)
[30]pe.
[34]SUCHET.
[36]The President then suggested a meeting be held this
[37]afternoon to determine a number of matters.
[39]“1. We should establish what our contacts are with the groups
[40]so that we can guide them effectively, whether we can stand down
[41]the operations.
[43]2. A policy statement which State is undertaking.
[45]3 The question of prosecution which the AG would undertake.
[47]4. Discussing with UK since there is evidence that much of this
[48]originated in the Bahamas. ;
[49]~ 5, The question of any informal discussion with the Soviet Union.
[51]At the meeting attended by AG, McNamara, McCone, .Cotrell,
[52]Douglas Dillén, it was decided to send a group to Miami this afternoon
[53]for discussion with the Miami representatives of the FBI and CIA, Immigratio:
[54]iununionex officials, Coast’'Guard, etc. Principal purposes would be to:
[56]1. Find out all we know about the groups, who they are, where
[57]they are, and what can be done about them.
[59]2. Lateral transfer of information between CIA and FBI Miami.
[60]Apparently there is not sufficient exchange between CIA and FBI in Miami.
[62]3. Ways and means of using Customs and Coast Guard for some
[63]of this.
[64]4, Warning the unauthorized groups in advance of actions we
[66]intend to take against them. Also warning the suppliers of explosives;
[67]arms, etc.
[69]5. FCC shut down illicit radio stations, provide a truck equipped
[70]with DF-equipment to locate the stations.
[72]6. Explore what could be done to influence the groups away from
[73]Soviet targets. In this connection, the AG favored a complete standdown
[74]before any attempt was made to guide the groups.
[76]7. Alexis Johnson expressed greatest concern over the plane’
[77]matter and asked that the group take immediate action to immobilize
[78]the plane.
[81]13-00000
[83]Excerpt from President's Press Conference -- April 3
[85]THE PRESIDENT: As you know, our best information is
[86]that they did not come from the United States. We have already
[87]indicated that we do not feel that these kind of raids serve a
[88]useful purpose. It seems to me in some ways they strengthen
[89]the Russian position in Cuba and the Communist control of Cuba
[90]and justify repressive measures within Cuba which might other-
[91]wise not be regarded as essential. So that we have not supported
[92]this and these men do not have a connection with the United States
[93]Government. I think a raid which goes in and out does indicate
[94]the frustrations of Cuban exiles who want to get back home and
[95]-who want to strike some blow, but I don't think that it increases
[96]the chances of freeing Cuba.
[98]13-00000 ~~ ~ - a my mo
[99]_ a 7 CONFIDERTIAL Attachzent Orbe a. Ae Crpee_/
[100]; Los . ‘ORE TREN 3 y
[102]DEPARTMENT OF STATE
[103]Executive SECRETARIAT
[105]March 26, 1963
[107]Draft letter to the Preatdent
[108]‘ from the Secretary regarding
[109]_ the problem presented by
[110]Cuban refugee growpe
[112]- The President Ine called an BEC Executive Comat ttes
[113]Meeting for Priday, Merch 29 at 22:30 p.m, to discuss
[114]the prodles posed dy Cuhan refugee Groups.
[116]The Secretary ins esked me to make available to
[117]you the attached proposed letter from him to the Presi- |
[118]‘dent vhich will serve as @ beatae for discussion at
[119]tomorrow's secting.. The tetter has sot yet deen
[121]signed by the Secretary but presumbiy will go to the
[122]‘Presidest io ite present form. If any subdstentive
[123]changes are ede st the tiue of sigonture I shall so
[125]tefora you.
[127]Gaecutive Geretary
[129]As stated.
[131] CONPIDENTZAL Attachwent
[133]13-00008
[135]CONFIDENTIAL a Group I
[136]Excluded. from
[138]automatic down-
[140]THE SECRETARY OF STATE grading and de-
[142]. ‘classification
[143]Washington
[145]DRAFT LETTER
[146]TO BE USED AS A BASIS FOR DISCUSSION AT THE NSC EXECUTIVE
[148]COMMITTEE MEETING FRIDAY, MARCH 29 at 12:30 p.m
[150]Dear Mr. President:
[152]I am concerned that: hit and run raids by Cuban exiles
[153]may create incidents which work to the disadvantage of our
[154]national interest. Increased frequency xf these forays
[155]could raise a host of probiems: over which we wouid not
[156]have control.
[158]Actions such as yesterday's exile attack which
[159]ceused substantial damage t-. a Soviet vesse’ may
[160]complicate cur relations with the USSR without net
[161]advantage to us. :
[163]I therefore propose several measures which eculd
[164]impede or deter further attacks of this nature,
[166]First, the intelligence community could increase its
[167]efforts in Miami to develop hard information about
[169]_ projected raids. This is current?ly communicated to Customs
[171]authorities charged with invest# gation of violation of
[172]arms control.
[174]Second, Customs and the Coast Cuard, on the basis
[175]of this infcrmation can ston and search the vesse's.
[176](They now do this, and picked un about 50 men and four
[177]boats last year.) Arms and vessels are confiscated,
[178]and participants arraigned if'-a violation of ‘aw has
[180]The President,
[182]The White House.
[184]CONFIDENTIAL
[186]13-00000
[188]CONFIDENTIAL
[192]' occurred. Bail is set in accordance with the severity
[194]of the violation. An increase of one or more vessels
[195]to facilitate current customs and Coast Guard operations
[196]in the Miami area would be helpful.
[198]Third, CIA, FBI and Customs officials in Miami
[199]could quietly inform suspects in the exile community
[200]that the United States intends to intensify enforcement
[201]of violations of pertinent laws relating to exile raids.
[203]Fourth, the FCC could locate and close down i! lega!
[204]radio transmitters operating out of the Miami area in
[205]connection with these raids.
[207]Fifth, we can inform the British Government 2f our
[208]plans to try to control these activities and.express
[209]our understanding that the British Government has
[210]become increasingty concerned about the possibility
[211]that British territory in the B-hamas may be used for
[212]these raids and may be considering action to pstice
[213]these areas more effective'y.
[215]_ These measures have not been discussed with any 2f
[216]the senior officials of the Departments concerned, but
[217]if any of the measures commend themselves to you, I
[218]suggest that a meeting 2f the interested Departments
[220]_be called to discuss the rrob1em.
[222]Faithfully yours,
[224]Dean Rusk
[226]| CONFIDENTIAL
[227]March 28, 1963
[229]13-00000
[231]po
[233]29 March 1963
[235]MEMORANDUM
[237]SUBJECT: Unauthorized Cuban Raids
[239]1, Organizations such as the Second Front of Escambrey, Alpha 66,
[240]and Lamba 66 are well-known in the Cuban colony in Florida and Puerto
[241]Rico. Their plans are discussed openly, are picked up by CIA and
[242]reported almost daily in our CIA bulletins.
[244]2. There is no doubt that the individuals are in and out of Florida
[245]and Puerto Rico. The boats, outboard motors, guns, ammunition and
[246]explosives originate in the United States from legally licensed or
[247]unlicensed sources (of which there are many). We believe that the
[248]operations are staged out of the Bahamas and other non-U,S, areas.
[250]3, The operations are skillfully executed by men of obvious
[251]courage and dedication, Apparently the organizations are building up
[252]and we can expect more rather than fewer instances in the future.
[254]» 4, Obviously raids of this type will exascerbate problems with
[255]Castro and more particularly the Soviet Union and, from that standpoint,
[256]areAdesirable, However, successful harrassment will create very
[257]considerable annoyance, will stimulate internal dissension, will
[258]complicate Castro's problems and will have very considerable effect
[259]in discrediting Castroism in Latin America, Inability of Castro to deal
[260]with these raids might cause the Soviets to question the strength of
[261]his position and therefore reappraise their own position in Cuba. It is
[262]impossible to predict the result of such reappraisal. On the one hand
[263]it might cause them to question their presence in Cuba; on the other
[264]to reinforce it; and finally, might cause them to open up a discussion
[266]. of their presence with the United States.
[268]5, Finally, although it is outside of the competence of the
[269]Intelligence Community, itis my personal view that a concerted and
[270]publicized effort to "stand down" these operations would probably draw
[271]more public and press criticism in the United States than would result
[272]from tolerating these acts while officially disassociating the government
[273]from them through denial of both responsibility and control,
[275]JOHN A. McCONE
[276]Director