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[22]6/30/1961. Box 1
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[41]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[42]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[44]NARA
[46]National Security Files
[48]Johnson
[50]Meeting of Vietnam Task Force June 19 1961
[52]5
[54]9/10/2000
[56]National Security Files, Box 193: Vietnam General 6/19/1961-"
[58]Fe ne re ene te re eine ©
[60]C. C. SECRET
[61]_ aa
[62]+. . June 20, 1961 NUK- 75-26
[63]. . Nox OZ2- Ble, 1/03
[64]MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW
[65]SUBJECT: Meeting of the Task Force on Viet Nam on June 19, 1961
[67]intelligence Briefing
[69]Among the interesting items reported in the intelligence
[70]briefing was a response from Embassy Saigon on the Cambodian
[71]border problem,.. .Embassy Saigon did not agree with the view of
[72]Embassy Phnom Penh that this is an insignificant problem. At
[73]present, Saigon reports, Cambodia is used primarily -as-a safe
[74]haven by guerrillas in Viet Nam rather than as an area from
[75]which operations are mounted, The Embassy provided specific’
[76]information on VC activity in Cambodia which, it suggested,
[77]should be shown to Sihanouk, There was also a report that the
[78]Indian member of ‘the ICC has stated in the ICC that that body
[79]should investigate subversion. This was said to have caused
[80]the Polish member to ask fora recess of the ICC in order to
[82]- permit him. to prepare a ‘reply. _(This report, if confirmed). is.
[83]in line with an earlier TDCS indicating that instructions
[84]Along these lines had gone” to the Indian’ member of the cc, ).
[86]It was also reported that on Friday there may have’ been a
[87]clash between Pathet’ Lao and South Vietnamese forces just in-
[88]side Laos ‘on the highway connecting Laos.and South Viet Nan.
[89]‘(South Vietnamese forces have been in this area for some time.)
[91]The. following table. on operations for May was also presented.’
[93]Killed Captured Surrendered Deserted
[94]Viet -Cong “B24 "30 37 one —
[95]GVNe.- 240 158 © none © ‘HL
[97]The Local Currency: Costs _ Problem
[99]Mr. Cottrell reported on the current status of the.
[101]"problem of meeting the local currency sosts of the 20,000 nan
[103]increase, A message has beer sent to $éigon. requesting the
[104]Embassy to undertake negotiations with=the GVN ana offering
[105]three. alternatives. in descending, order of preference:
[107]a. The U. Ss. would commit $5.1 -million equivalent . in
[108]piasters, provided the GVN ‘proceeds without. delay with
[109]mobilization and meets the balance of the local currency
[110]costs’ from its own resources.
[113]C SERRE
[115]Mee
[117]“be. If the proposal ‘under a above is not adequate to
[118]obtain GVN agreement, we would offer an additional $4.85
[119]million in piasters., This is estimated to be sufficient
[120]to cover local currency costs in 1961 of the call-up of
[121]the additional 20,000 men,
[123]ce If neither of the above proposals roves accept-
[124]able, the U.S. would offer an additional $4.55 million in
[125]assistance in 1961 which, if the GVN would accept a. dollar/
[126]piaster rate of 73, would be ‘sufficient to meet the piaster
[127]cost for 19616
[129]‘As of yesterday afternoon,: no reaction had been obtained
[130]from Saigon. In a long coriversation with Ben Wood, the Deputy
[131]Director of the Task Force, Thuan was told before he left. the
[132]U. S..of our offer: under a above. On the basis of this offer,
[133]he indicated that he would send instructions to Saigon to in-
[134]itiate the call-up of the 20,000 men, even in the absence of a .
[135]final agreement. This problem, therefore, seems on ‘its way
[137]toward solution.
[140]The Situation in Laos in: Relationship to South Viet. Nam
[142]A large part. of. the meeting was devoted to discussion of .
[143]a draft memorandum that Cottrell read to the Task Force con-
[144]taining his ideas with respect to the situation in Laos and
[145]what should be done about it; You are generally familiar with
[146]his ideas as a result of your conversation yesterday with him. —
[147].I did not attempt to take detailed notes on the memorandum, but |
[148]his proposal runs along the following lines.
[150]Cottrell does not - believe that any arrangement. to create
[151]‘-a neutral Laos will be viable. He does not believe that we
[152]-should withdraw in favor of the French in Laos, The French
[153]‘cannot be depended upon to do a good job and the reestablishment
[154]‘of their presence will be deeply resented throughout the former
[155]Indo-Chinese states; The military situation in Laos is alarming.
[156]‘The Pathet Lao are: now posing a serious threat in southern Laos,
[157]-Cottrell proposes that: we seize upon some plausible excuse to
[158]break off. the Geneva Conference. The failure of the ICC to
[159]stabilize the situation would provide such an excuse. He would
[160]then introduce Thai special forces and “hunter-killer" forces
[161]now being trained ‘in South Viet Nam into southern Laos in an
[162]effort to clean out the Pathet Lao "infection" there. In the
[163]discussion of his proposal, the question was raised as to.
[164]whether the introduction of U. S. forces would not be necessary.
[165]Cottrell acknowledged that this was a real ‘possibility and
[166]emphasized the importance of our not letting our friends in
[167]Southeast Asia down by refusing to use force if that ‘Should
[168]prove necessary.
[170]SECRET
[172]Tee
[174]Co SECRET ©
[176]Members of the Task Force were asked for their.reactions
[178]' to the paper. ‘There was a rather surprising degree of agree-
[180]ment that something along this line must be done or it will be
[181]virtually impossible to deal with the situation in South Viet
[182]Nam. (There was no State Department representative present at
[183]the time except Cottrell himself.). The ICA member and the
[184]representative of Jack Bell's office did raise questions as to
[185]whether political and economic action by the Diem regime was
[186]not a more important precondition to solution in Viet Nam than
[188]military action in Laos<.
[190]I made the following points. about. the proposal: First, I
[191]observed. that this would seem to/me to raise important questions
[192]of policy which had been considered and decided in the past at
[193]the highest levels of government. I. indicated that I would be’
[194]unable to take a personal stand on the issues raised. I ex-
[195]pressed.:some surprise about ‘the. apparent, unanimity of view that,
[196]unless’ we undertake military action in Laos, it would be
[197]virtually impossible to deal effectively with the situation in
[198]Viet Nam. I said that; while I could see no objection to the
[199]Viet Nam Task Force raising these questions, it seemed to me
[200]that they should be raised: much more clearly in the context of
[201]the Viet Nan problem. That is, the proposed memorandum should
[202]make clear why the present situation in Laos will make it -
[203]difficult, if not impossible, to carry out an effective program
[205]against the Viet Cong in Viet. Nam. -Cott¥ell agréed to take’
[209]_ agreement in the Task Force). © se 7 7
[211]account of this suggestion (with which there seemed to. be some
[213]Ts
[215]Vie feeling: of frustration. which has
[217]. prompted Cottrell to produce his memorandum; I. specifically
[219]share his doubts with respect to getting the French back into
[221]‘Laos. (I had. thought that this proposal -had .been dropped as a
[223]result of adverse reaction from various sectors. .)> The: Cottrell
[225]‘ proposals, howéver, raise. very directly the question: of U. 5S.
[227]military ‘intervention in Laos. It seems to me inconceivable
[229]-that his objective’ could be achieved without such intervention.
[231]The proposals also’ would have the effect, it seams to me, of -
[232]merging the war in Laos with the war in Viet Nam.’ I.do not
[234]- think that this would be a good: idea..
[236]I think that. there is a sérious question as to whether the
[238]situation in Laos, is not deteriorating’ so Senaouniye that any —
[240]i tical”solution will mat leave it as a serious source
[241]nto: both Viet Nam and Thailand. .But I wonder
[242]whether this question cannot be better reviewed in the context
[243]of contingency planning for Laos itself. In this’ connection,
[245]I do feel that the military contingency plan that’-we have seen.
[246]for Laos is based upon too narrow a contingency. -- i.°8., a -
[247]clear failure’to achieve a cease fire or the breaking of a
[248]cease fire by the Communists. We need to plan against the
[251]|
[253]C . SECRET”
[255]SECRET
[257]possibility that the Geneva Conference will be. prolonged in-
[258]definitely and that meanwhile the PL-will take over Southern
[259]Laos piece by piece and bit. by bit “as it appears to be doing.
[260]I wonder whether you want to check again with Alexis Johnson
[261]on the status of contingency planning? I wonder whether it
[263]isn't about time to have the NSC and the President review the
[264]Laos situation? : :
[266]‘Other Matters
[268]I raised the question as to the next step in consideration
[269]of Diem's proposal for a 100,000 man increase in GVN forces... I
[270]was told that the matter was being studied in Defense, It was
[271]the view of the DoD representative that the possibility‘of such
[272]an increase was academic until some time in 1963 because it .
[273]would take until then to raise the 20,000 men already authorized
[275]and the. 30,000 currently under consideration. (The 30,000 would
[277]be a part of the 100,000 since Diem was using 4 170,000 man base. ).
[279]‘I also raised the question of whether food supplies were
[280]being cut off by the. Viet Cong.(as suggested. to you by a
[282]‘Vietnamese. I was'told that the onl € of Viet Cong
[284]action in this area-was the recent seizure of seven barges |
[285]carrying sugar. However, it was also stated that the GVN has
[286]given this fear as“an explanation for reduction in rice ex-
[287]ports. That is, the GVN has.withheld rice from international
[288]markets because of a fear that ‘the rice .may..be needed in Viet
[289]Nam if the:VC. should begin to cut food supply lines. Thus it
[290]may be related to the argument about GVN foreign exchange
[292]peMenesy 6SeyVeS.-
[294]There seemed to be’no great concern in the. Task. Force
[295]with this as a current'real problem. Following the meeting I
[296]talked to the ICA representative about whether it would’ be de-
[297]sirable to build up Vietnamese rice stocks to relieve them of
[298]their fear that rice supplies may be cut off and thus to. per-
[299]mit them to sell more of their rice abroad; “He indicated that
[300]politically it was’very difficult to ijustify export of rice to
[302]_ Viet Nam which was itself a rice exporter.
[304]; (Today I talked with Jack King of CIA. (ONE) about*this
[305]question,. He had not made a specific study of it, of course...
[306]It was-his impression that, while there was .some VC interference
[307]with rice movements; the problem was not one of independently
[308]serious proportions. That is,.it was .a.reflection of the ;
[309]general VC problem which was serious, but not in itself a cause
[310]for alarm. It was also his impression that GVN exports of rice
[312]had been surprisingly well maintained.) -
[314]-nh -
[316]SECRET
[319]a rn St ee
[321]. ecbnt! (L
[322]Ce . C: . _ &
[324]Finally; I raised the question of what planning was: . being
[325]done to internationalize the border problem. In response
[326]Cottrell simply referred to his plan for dealing with the.
[327]situation in Laos. .Today I talked with Bob Cleveland in State
[328]about the same poitit; He referred to the arrangements that are
[329]being made for a meeting of MAAG and USOM Chiefs of countries
[330]in the area sometime in July at which the border problem,
[331]among others, will be discussed. He also referred to the fact
[332]that Ben Wood is currently working on a counter insurgency plan
[334]_to cover all of Southeast Asia. Defense had earlier been asked
[336]to prepare such a plan but had failed to do so. (I finda
[337]great inertia, apparently rooted in a basic lack of sympathy,
[339]‘whenever I attempt to raise the question of finding some means
[341]to involve the international community in the border question.
[342]Neither Cottrell nor the State Department: representatives..seem
[343]very much. interested; Have you ever discussed this question
[344]with Alexis Johnson? I think it might be useful to do “so.)
[346]Following the ‘meeting ‘I followed up with Cottrell. on the
[347]conversation you had had with him in the morning, asking hin
[348]whether he didn't think it would be desirable to send General
[349]Taylor to South Viet Nam-to consider the request for-a=k00,000
[350]man increase and also to make surb that our military activities
[351]in South Viet Nam were... ‘really being reoriented. He reacted"
[352]negatively. to ithis ‘proposal, taking the view that it was’ un-
[353]desirable to continue sending missions out to inspect the work —
[354]of people in the field. In a later conversation with someone
[355]else in State I gota much more favorable reaction to this idea.
[356]The more I think about it the more I am convinced that it would
[357]be highly desirable. I very much share your uneasy feeling about
[358]the situation. : - ;
[360]Robert H, .Johnson