[1]14-001
[3]104-10106-10143, [2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
[4]. wo HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS
[8]-
[10]FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUNE: HSCA Request Ltr 8 May 1978 OLC 78-1573
[12]RERUN VO QD
[13]Oo wet ees)
[14]INCLUSIVE DATES: Directorate of S & T Memo 22 June 1978
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[33]NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE
[35]. Peed eee a cata satis tate’ Ann
[36]4 + .
[38]-
[39]A
[41]‘Tro:] NAME ANS-ADDRESS | DATE [iniTiats| Top Secret
[42]Scott Breckenridge, OLC a (Security Classification)
[43]| 2 | 6D15, Has. FT !
[44][3[ —<—;Cr:SC<Cidr
[45]2 CONTROL No. SC-01836-78
[46][ACTION ‘| —‘[OiRECT REPLY — | —s| PREPARE REPLY _| Copy
[47]__fapproval | [DISPATCH | _| RECOMMENDATION
[48][—feowment | {Fle | [RETURN
[49]| {concurrence [|__| INFORMATION Y TSIGNATURE
[50]FROM: NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO.
[51]AEOZDD 6E60 Hg X656
[52]Handle Via
[53]ay SSS f
[54]COMINT
[55]Channels
[57]Access to this document will be restricted to
[58]those approved for the following specific activities:
[61]Warning Notice
[62]Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
[63]NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
[65]Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
[69]Top Secret
[71](Security Classification)
[74]Ey
[78]14-0000
[80], «© TOP SECRET'- EIDER - CHESS
[82]SC-01836-78
[83]Copy_1
[85]MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of Legislative Counsel
[87]ATTENTION : Scott Breckenridge
[89]SUBJECT : HSCA Request
[91]REFERENCE : HSCA Letter Dated 8 May 78, OLC 78-1573
[92]1. (U) Reference requests access to information in
[94]six areas pertaining to the U-2 Project. As you know
[96]the U-2 Project files include about 150 boxes and over 650
[97]reels of microfilm, all located at the Records Center. We
[98]have reviewed the shelf listing titles to identify pertinent
[99]files that might be responsive to the areas of request. The
[100]information requested covers an era and an organization which
[101]was not a part of this Directorate. As a result much of the
[102]corporate memory is no longer available and research of the
[103]files by current personnel is time consuming and requires
[104]almost a learning process. We have depended a great deal
[106]on the written History of the U-2 Project for leads to files
[107]and for information contained in this memorandum.
[109]2. (U) The primary interest of reference refers to
[110]the U-2 Project, Detachment C, while stationed in Atsugi,
[111]Japan. Attached are replies keyed to the six areas in the
[112]HSCA letter.
[114]3. (U) We realize that the information supplied by
[115]this memorandum does not fully respond to all the areas
[116]requested. Because of the broad and encompassing nature
[117]of some of the requests in the HSCA letter and the fact
[118]that our files are not organized to readily respond to
[119]such broad requests we request that the HSCA staff review
[120]the material and determine if their requests could be
[121]limited or narrowed in some way.
[123]Yonue A Abid
[125]Thomas G. Ward
[126]Acting Executive Officer
[127]Directorate of
[128]Science and Technology
[130]Attachments:
[132]As stated we May be downgraded to
[133]Unclassified when
[135]removed from attachment.
[137]CL BY: 469804
[138]TOP SECRET - EIDER - CHESS
[140]14-0000
[142]TOP SECRET - EIDER - CHESS
[144], a . Attachment To:
[145]. SC-01836-78
[147]SUBJECT: DDS&T Interim Reply to HSCA Request, 8 May 78,
[148]OLC 78-1573
[150]General Background: Detachment C advance party of
[151]security and communication personnel departed the U.S.
[152]for Atsugi, Japan, on 20 February 1957, the second echelon
[153]of administrative personnel departed 4 March, and the main
[154]body of the detachment with two U-2 aircraft and equipment
[155]began deployment on 15 March. On 29 March Headquarters was
[156]notified that all personnel and equipment were on base.
[157]Operational readiness was forecast for the week of 8 April.
[158]Operating procedures and liaison had been accomplished with
[159]the following major U.S. components:
[161]Far East Air Force 3-3
[163]Far East Command and Theater Commander
[164]Agency's (Tokyo Statiom and local support unit
[165]54th Weather Reconnaissance Squadron
[167]Atsugi Naval Air Station
[169]Details or specific operating agreements or procedures
[170]with the above components have not been located.
[172]By mid-May 1957 the Detachment had flown 30 sorties.
[173]All of these operations were preparations for the primary
[174]mission of the Detachment. The first primary mission of the
[175]Detachment, a flight over part of the USSR, occurred on
[176]20 June 1957, however, this mission did‘not originate or
[177]recover at Atsugi.
[179]The first overflight of the USSR from Atsugi occurred
[180]on 1 March 1958 and this flight was the only and last flight.
[181]This flight, as other previous flights by other Detachments,
[182]was tracked by Russian radar, even though the U-2 aircraft
[183]had anti-radar applications, and a Soviet protest was made
[184]on 5 March 1958 by the Soviet Ambassador to Washington,
[185]Mikhail Menshikov. Attached are copies of the Soviet
[186]Aide Memoires of 5 March and 21 April 1958 (Tab A).
[188]; The Detachment continued to perform non-USSR missions
[190]in the Far East area until the Powers flight of 1 May 1960.
[191]Redeployment of the Detachment began in early July, the
[193]last U-2 aircraft departed Japan on 9 July and all personnel
[194]and other equipment cleared the base and turned the facilities
[195]back to the Navy on 19 August 1960. ;
[197]‘TOP SECRET - EIDER - CHESS
[199]UPJ
[201]14-0000
[203]TOP SECRET '- EIDER - CHESS
[205]During the deployment of Detachment C it performed
[206]approximately 86 operational missions, of these only 43
[207]originated and recovered at Atsugi.
[209]1. Any and all information pertaining to the take-
[210]offs and landings of the U-2 at Atsugi, Japan,
[211]limited to the years 1959 through 1962.
[213]We have been unable to locate files which would
[214]contain logs of all take-offs and landings of the U-2
[215]aircraft assigned to Detachment C. In addition to
[216]the mission flights stated above we must assume that
[217]there were a large number of take-offs and landings
[218]which would include flights for pilot familiarization,
[219]training, equipment testing, transitional and flights
[221](purely for cover purposes )3>
[223]2. <Any and all information concerning the radar
[224]procedures, facilities, and staff involved with
[225]the U-2 flights at Atsugi, Japan, limited to the
[226]years 1959 through 1962.
[228]As stated in the General Background above we have
[229]not located details or specific operating procedures
[230]or agreements with the local Navy base at Atsugi.
[232]nesters et 3. Any and all information pertaining to contact
[233]between Marine Air Control Squadron #1, Air
[234]Group II, lst Marine Wing, and U-2 personnel at
[235]Atsugi, Japan, including but not limited to
[236]housing, recreational, and eating facilities -
[237]limited to the years 1959 through 1962.
[239]We have not identified any relationship between
[240]Detachment C and Marine Air Control Squadron #1. On
[241]the subject of housing, we have noted that late in
[242]1957 families were permitted at Detachment C and as
[243]a result housing was provided in the compound assigned
[244]to the Agency Support Unit and ten houses were rented
[245]on the local market.
[247]4. Any and all information pertaining to defectors
[248]with knowledge of the U-2 program.
[250]The DDS§T has not located any information pertaining
[251]to defectors. We defer this request to the DDO.
[254]TOP SECRET - EIDER - CHESS
[256]14-0000
[258]» ys +. TOP SECRET’ - EIDER - CHESS
[260]5. Any and all information within the U-2 program
[261]file pertaining to defectors with knowledge of
[262]the U-2 program. ;
[264]See above.
[266]6. Any and all information concerning Soviet knowledge
[267]of the U-2 program previous to May 1,.1960.
[269]Attached is an extract from a report dated
[270]3 March 1958 concerning Soviet Air Defense which
[271]gives a summary of Soviet knowledge of the U-2
[272]overflights between 20 June and 10 July 1956 (Tab B).
[274]Also attached is a copy of the Soviet protest note
[275]of 10 July 1956 concerning Mission 2013 on 4 July 1956
[277]which was the first penetration of the Soviet borders
[278](Tab C).
[282]TOP SECRET - EIDER - CHESS
[284]14-0000
[286]5 March 1958
[288]_EMBASSY OF THE UNION OF
[289]SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
[291]AIDE MEMOIRE
[293]According to precisely established data, on March 2, 1958, at
[294]4:05 hours Moscow time, an American military jet aircraft, having
[295]appeared from the direction of the Sea of Japan, violated the state
[296]torder of the Soviet Union in the area of the settlement of Velikaya
[297]Xema and penetrated into the airspace of the Soviet Union, remain-
[298]ing over its territory for a considerable period of time. Thereafter,
[299]the aircraft left in the direction of the Sea of Japan in the area south
[300]of the Olga Bay.
[302]The information on this violation has been carefully checked
[303]and there is no doubt as to its authenticity. The military representa-
[304]tives of the United States, who in this case acted possibly without the
[305]knowledge of the Government of the United States, will perhaps deny
[306]the said violation, as has happened in the past. However, sucha
[307]denial cannot eliminate the fact of violation itself. In any case, the
[308]Soviet side would have no interest in commenting on this incident if
[309]it had not actually taken place.
[311]A the present time, when negotiations are being conducted
[312]on the holding of a summit meeting which could contribute to an im-
[313]provement of relations and to strengthening trust between states,
[314]the violation of the Soviet border by an American military aircraft |
[315]“may be evaluated as an attempt to undermine the efforts aimed at.
[316]convening such a meeting and to aggravate the international situation.
[318]From the messages of the President of the USA and his con-
[319]versations with the Soviet Ambassador, as well as from statements
[320]by other government officials of the USA, it is known to the Soviet
[321]Government that the Government of the USA desires a rapprochement
[322]between our governments and improvement in the relations between
[323]them. There can hardly be any doubt that such facts of violation of
[324]the borders of the USSR can have only one result--that of hindering
[325]this cause and upsetting Soviet-American relations.
[327]14-0000
[329]The attention of the Government of the USA is invited to
[330]the fact that in the present situation the violation of the airspace of
[331]the USSR by an American military aircraft takes on a particularly
[332]dangerous character since, as has been repeatedly reported, Ameri-
[333]can military planes make flights around the clock over many countries
[334]of the world carrying thermonuclear bombs. The Government of the
[335]USA cannot fail to be aware of what genuinely catastrophic consequences
[337]‘for the cause of peace will ensue when an American plane with sucha
[339]load will find itself shot down.
[341]The attention of the Government of the USA has already been
[342]previously directed to cases of violation of the state boundaries of
[343]the Soviet Union by American military aircraft. However, as proven
[344]by the case cited, the authorities of the USA have not taken the necessary
[345]easures to prevent such violations.
[347]3
[349]It is absolutely obvious that it is the duty of the governments of
[350]the USSR and the USA to do everything possible to prevent any acts . :
[351]capable of complicating the situation and the relations between the
[352]Soviet Union and the USA.
[354]The Soviet Government cannot but protest against the violations
[355]of Soviet frontiers by. an American military aircraft and it expects that
[356]the Government of the United States will punish severely those guilty
[357]of the violation of the airspace of the USSR which has taken place and
[358]tha: it will take steps to prevent such violations in the future.
[360]Taking into account the present situation, where a summit con-
[361]ference is being prepared, and also the spirit and purpose of the nego-
[362]tiztions being conducted between our governments, the Soviet Government
[363]would not like to make this matter public or subject it to discussion in
[364]the UN.
[366]The hope is expressed that this matter will be settled satisfac-
[367]torily between the governments of the USSR and the USA and that there
[368]«will be no need for the Soviet Government to resort to other means for
[369]its settlement.
[371](Initialled by M. Menshikov) Washington, March 5, 1958
[374]14-0000
[376]-
[378]21 April 1958
[380]EMBASSY OF THE UNION OF
[381]SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
[383]Note No. 9
[385]The Embassy of.the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
[386]presents its compliments to the Department of State of the United
[387]States of America and, referring to the Aide-Memoire of the Depart-
[388]ment of State dated March 31, 1958 and containing a reply of the
[389]Government of the United States of America to the Aide-Memoire of
[390]the Soviet Government dated March 5 concerning a violation of the
[391]Soviet state border in the Far East by an American military jet air-.
[392]craft, has the honor to communicate the following:
[394]In the reply Aide-Memoire of the Department of State an
[395]attempt is made to deny the fact of an American military aircraft.
[396]having violated the Soviet border. .
[398]As has already been communicated, the Soviet Government has
[399]at its disposal carefully verified data on this violation, the reliability
[400]of which leaves no room for doubt. According to these data, on March 2,
[401]1958, at 4:05 a.m. Moscow time, an American military reconnaissance
[402]aircraft of the Lockheed U-2 type, having appeared from the direction
[403]of the Sea of Japan, violated the state border of the Soviet Union in the
[404]area of the settlement Velikaya Kema, 32 kilometers south of that:
[405]settlement. Then the violating aircraft deeply penetrated the airspace
[406]of the USSR and, after remaining over its territory for a considerable
[407]period of time, passed beyond the limits of the Soviet territory 45 kilo-
[408]meters south of the Olga Bay at 8:ll a.m.
[410]In the light of the established facts the reply of the Government
[411]of the United States of America can in no way be recognized as satis~
[412]factory. Naturally, the question arises as to how to explain sucha
[413]reply of the American Government: whether it was misled deliberately
[414]by its military representatives in the Far East or whether it considered
[415]it possible to protect such persons subordinate to it, who, without re-
[416]evard to the possible consequences, sanction violation of Soviet borders,
[417]thus creating a threat of international complications.
[419]14-0000
[421]Such a reply of the Government of the United States of America
[422]to the communication of the Soviet Government cannot fail to cause
[423]serious concern, the more so since the new case of violation of Soviet
[424]airspace took place after warnings on the part of the Government of
[425]the USSR to the effect that American authorities should take the
[426]necessary steps to prevent such violations.
[428]In connection with the foregoing the Soviet Government expects
[429]that the Government of the United States of America will undertake
[430]further investigation of this act of violation of the airspace of the
[431]USSR by an American military aircraft and will punish severely those
[432]guilty of this violation. ,
[434]The Soviet Government also expects that the Government of
[435]the United States of America will take the necessary steps to prevent
[436]violations of Soviet airspace by American aircraft in the future and |
[437]states that in the event of new violations full responsibility for their
[438]consequences will rest with the Government of the United States.
[440]Washington, D. C.. April 1958
[442]14-0000 .
[444].
[445]. . , ‘, ty
[446]. “ ‘
[449]14-0000
[451]ae tap SELREL — EIDE — LHEDD
[453]“$C~O2164-58 -
[455]of Initial Missions
[457]viod from 20 June to 10 July 1956 the Soviet Bloc air defense
[458]ected to eight penetrations of an unprecedented nature, seven
[459]in a period of only eight deys. It must be remembered that
[460]the only basis of judging the performance of the Soviet
[462]s important because it is clear from REGAL rep ant thus nee |
[464]re]
[465]oO
[467]defense business is conducted over lendlines and thus not
[468]MIME. However, some tentative conclusions may be crawn frost
[470]Hts and these are indicated as follows:
[472]L. In spite of the fact that these missions come as a surprise,
[473]© of them went undetected. This is clear evidence that their
[474]20ers coverage extends above (72,000)feet.
[476]2 .
[478]- 236
[480]3 yp/ TOP SECRET —EIDER—CHESS ce
[482]Ta
[484]mission aircraft was over the USSR, and a second 2ction which is
[485]believed related is the moving of MIG-19 aircraft into East
[486]Germany and Poland on 7 duly 1956. Also MIG-19's were moved
[487]‘into Hungary at ahout this time. 7 : ;
[488]3- The performance of ‘the Soviet system on the 5 J Ly mis ion,
[489]- 201), was indeed curious. While the action evident tron(courne zy
[490]is not clear an explanation which appears to fit the known facts
[491]is offered as follows: As a vesult of the previous missions, the
[492]Soviets had concluded the essential facts concerning the missions, 24
[493]i.e., that they were for reconnaissance, that they flew above 65,000
[494]feet, and that a penetration as deep as Moscow weS possible. ‘They
[495]probably surmised that the 5 July mission was headed for Moscow when
[496]the track appeared on a northeasterly heading. The loss of the ™,
[497]target when it entered Soviet terr tory was probably deliberate and
[498]the "red herring" track returning to the west was either a dodge
[499]or @ convenience to avoid broadcasting a track for all the system
[500]to see that a "hostile or intruder” was coming over Moscéw with no
[501]mcans available to stop it, Tais idea is Supported by the use
[502]of a raid munber assigned in the region just beyond the point q4
[503]were the track had been "lost". In addition, the track was not
[504]laceled "hostile or intruder" when it was broadeast after it
[505]- ha Ssed_ beyond Moscow, The reporting of the traci when it did
[506]Sppeer was only by Moscow and At has been Suggested that other
[507]stations had been instructed not to broadcast the track. Further, it my
[508]or Eay not be a coincidence that the height broadcast was almost
[509]i €xactly half of the true altitude of the mission aircraft, but on
[510]| the next missions » four days later » the altitude reporting was
[511]consistently ebove~50,000 feet, , _~
[514]h, By 9 July 1956, in addition to the evident recognition of
[515]the great height of the mission flights » tracking was better and
[516]in general the performance of the warning system ves much improved.
[518]3+ ‘The next day, 10 July 1956, the Soviet air defense warning
[519][sta closed a 3000 mile track with only two shart periods of ay
[521]confusion or track loss. Altitude reporting was over 60,000 feat
[523]| with one plot passed 68,800 which was only 100 feet off target.
[525]6. The first eight missions proved that the air defense Warning
[526]system is deployed in depth. This wes evident fran both the continuity 7) !
[527]oF track and most forcefully from the ELIVE? date collected. Soma 1461
[528]utereepts of Soviet Bloc radars operating in the 30c00 me/s band were
[529]ovainsd by project ELINT as follows: TOKET-1331, WOIF?-37, GAGE-26,
[531]PATTY CAKE-37, Other 30. These numbers cannot be equated to in- 4
[532]dividual radar sets Since the same redar may be interceoted more than +
[534]e
[536]QO, te
[538]onze. 616 TOKEN Sites were located, including 213 new Sites. Some
[539]343 additional TOKEN signals were identified but aveileble information ; :
[540]aces not permit Cetermination of location so that it must be con- | :
[542]oO
[544]cluded that these signals include both known and new sites, Because
[545]of the limitation of ELINT to the 3000 me/s band and the Soviet
[547]. practice of collocating radars on different frequencies the total
[549]i numer of radars may be expected to be at least double the number
[550]of sites.
[552]eo 2)
[554]wees
[556]TOP SECRET —EIDER—cHESg —
[558]14-0000
[560]\ an Wr JCUNE! TT MIU OUTED
[562]to | a 7. a SC-0216h-58
[564]presence of large numbers of fighters although the seturetion poin:
[566]T. “Confusion and track loss seamed to be related to the 4
[567](e2 not bsen determined because of insufficient data.
[569]Na
[571]| . 8. ‘The question of radars for height finding, the capabilities )
[572]of TOKEN in this role, the introduction o2 ROCX CAKEs and late:
[574]aevelopments are discussed in enother section. I+ is believed, |
[576]however, that these missions were a catalyst in the introduction
[578]i ROCK CAKEs. a9
[582]= 25.
[584]TOP SECRET — EIDER—CHESS
[586]A
[588]14-0000
[590]a
[592]a are
[594]ar:
[596]. wen
[598]Se se ted
[600](Text of Russian Protest: Unofficial Translation)
[602]Embassy of the Union of Soviet
[603]Socialist Republics 10 July 19567
[605]Note No. 23
[607]The Embassy of the Union of the Soviet Socialist
[608]Republics presents its compliments to the Department of
[609]State of the United States of America and, acting on in-
[610]structions from the Soviet Government, has the honor to
[611]state the following:
[613]According to precisely verified data, on July 4 of
[614]this year, at 8:18 a.m. Moscow Time, a twin-engined medium
[615]bomber of the United States Air Force appeared from the
[616]American Zone of Occupation in Western Germany and flew over
[617]the territory of the German Democratic Republic, entering «
[618]the air space of the Soviet Union from the direction of the
[619]Polish People's Republic at.9:35 in the area of Grodno. The
[620]aircraft which violated the air space of the Soviet Union
[621]flew on the route Minsk, Vilnyus, Kaunas and Kaliningrad,
[622]penetrating territory of the Soviet Union to the depth of
[623]320 kilometers and remaining-over such territory for one
[624]hour and 32 minutes.
[626]On July 5 of this year, at 7:41 Moscow Time. a twin-
[627]engine medium bomber of the United States Air Force, coming
[628]from the American Zone of Occupation in Western Germany,
[629]flew over the territory of the German Democratic Republic,
[630]and at 8:54 penetrated the air space of the Soviet Union in
[631]the area of Brest, coming from the direction of the Polish
[632]People's Republic. The aircraft violating the air frontier
[633]of the Soviet Union flew along the route Brest, Pinsk Bara-—
[634]novichi, Kaunas, and Kaliningrad, having penetrated Soviet
[635]territory to a depth of 150 kilometers and having remained
[636]one hour and 20 minutes over such territory. The same day
[637]another twin-engine bomber of the United States Air Force
[639]Department of State of the
[640]United States of America
[641]Washington, D. C.
[643]14-0000
[645]eats
[649]invaded the air space of the Soviet Union and penetrated
[650]to a significant depth over Soviet territory.
[652]On July 9 there took place new flights of United
[653]States aircraft into the Soviet air space, : :
[655]The above-mentioned violation of the air frontiers
[656]of the Soviet Union by American aircraft cannot be inter—
[657]preted as other than intentional and conducted for purp—
[658]oses of reconnaissance. , ;
[660]It must be underscored that these gross violations of
[661]the air space of the Soviet Union took place at a time
[663]~ when, as a result of the efforts of the Soviet Union and .
[665]other peace-loving governments, a definite lessening of
[666]international tensions has been achieved, when relations
[667]between governments are improving, and when mutual confi- —
[668]dence between them is growing. Such a development of inter-
[669]national relations is fully Supported by the peoples of all
[670]countries who are vitally interested in strengthening peace.
[672]One cannot, however, fail to recognize that reactionary
[673]circles hostile to the cause of peace in a number of coun-—
[674]tries are worried by the relaxation of international tension
[675]which has taken place. These circles do everything possible
[676]to interfere with further improvement of relations between
[677]countries and the creation of mutual trust among them. ;
[678]Among such attempts is the said gross violation by the’
[679]American Air Force of the air space of the Soviet Union,
[680]which consistently carries out a policy of strengthening
[681]peace and broadening businesslike cooperation with all
[682]countries, including the United States of America.
[684]In this connection, the fact attracts attention that
[685]the said violations of the air frontier of the Soviet Union
[686]by American aircraft coincided with the stay of General
[687]Twining, U. S. Air Force Chief of Staff, in the Federal
[688]Republic of Germany. ,
[690]The Soviet Government energetically protests to the
[691]Government of the United States against such gross viola-—
[692]tion of the air space of the Soviet Union by American mili-
[693]tary aircraft and considers this violation-as an intentional
[694]act of certain circles in the United States, planned to ag-
[695]gravate relations between the Soviet Union and the United
[696]States of America.
[698]14-0000
[700]Calling the attention of the Government of the United
[701]States to the inadmissibility of such violations of the
[702]air space of the Soviet Union by American aircraft, the
[703]Soviet Government states that all responsibility for possible
[704]consequences of such violations rests with the Government of
[705]the United States.
[707]The Soviet Government expects that steps will be taken
[708]by the Government of the United States to punish those
[709]guilty for the said violations and to prevent such viola—
[710]tions in the future. ;
[712]Washington, D. C.
[713]July 10, 1956 .