[1]Vie 104-10306- P16 mE 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
[3]18 June 1964
[4]MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
[6]‘SUBJECT: 303 Committee Meeting - 18 June 1964
[8]1." Item I: Autonomous Operations.
[10]This was raised in view of Manuel Ray's request for
[11]- $25, 000 and indications that he is attempting to make a new expedition to
[12]Cuba in a chartered ship. Various courses of possible action with Ray
[13]were, discussed, ranging from.cutting him off altogether to giving him
[14]the money. It developed that Ray is acting inconsistently with the agreement
[15]with him which was that he would operate outside the United States. Therefore
[16]it was decided that we would tell him that he must abide by the agreement,
[17]that he must find.a base of operations outside the United.States and if he does
[18]we will endeavor to secure the release of his ship which is now in Puerto Rico,
[19]and that we will give him financial support.
[21]ao 2. With respect to antime 24 it was pointed out that Artime's
[22]operations are very costly. CIA has put($4.6 ‘million into , this operation
[23]this year - the future bill will be large, but not as great. FitzGerald
[24]reported that Artime ‘planned one hit and run operation a month, but he noted
[25]he would be lucky if he could pull off one every 3 months. Bundy seemed to
[26]feel Artime was more of a threat than an operator and should be maintained
[27]for that purpose and operations discouraged. FitzGerald pointed out this is
[28]not practical. It was agreed to proceed with Artime recognizing that U.S.
[29]or CIA support of him would probably be "blown". Furthermore it was.
[30]suggested that he be cautioned to be'careful and not follow unduly reckless
[31]courses of action.
[33]3. There was a. long discussion on the implications of the CIA
[34]June 10th memorandum reporting plans of Cuban exiles to assassinate leading
[35]Cuban government leaders. This report was taken most seriously by the group.
[36]It was felt that the purpose of advising us through CIA of these plans was to
[37]put us on notice and therefore we-should not fail to take appropriate precautionary
[38]actions to see that no assassination attempt of which we had knowledge was
[39]carried out. It was decided that appropriate authorities, i.e. Department of
[40]Justice and the FBI,  ~ should be notified and urged to take appropriate action
[41]against the individuals. involved. ;
[43]I took the position that we are overly exercised, that I was
[44]inclined to write the whole thing off as Miami cocktail party talk rather than
[45]definite plans. Had I seen the Memo before it was distributed, I would have
[46]investigated the sources and the credibility of the whole thing before taking
[47]action. However the group were more concerned than I and therefore planning to
[48]discuss the subject with the Attorney General and possibly Mr. Hoover.
[50]YAY
[52]13-00000.
[54]I pointed out that copies of the Memorandum had. been sent
[55]to the Attorney General and the Department of Justice but there had been
[56]no conversation on the subject.
[58].ACTION: Discuss with General Carter and Mr. Helms
[59]steps we should take to establish the
[60]credibility of the report; also communicate
[61]with the FBI through Mr. Papich. Also l
[62]should cali the Attorney General personally.
[64]4. Prior to the meeting Mr. Vance asked my opinion of using
[65]the 22 million psyops leaflets which inadvertently had been printed on
[66]U~CS. manufactured white sulphite paper, all as reported in MACV
[67]cable MAC SOG 5050 dated 18 June 1964 (IN 09143). I told Vance that I felt
[68]we should go ahead. It was too bad it had been done this way, but it is one of
[69]‘those things that a person not thoroughly acquainted. with this type of operation
[71]might overlook. He: was in agreement and presumably will instruct the release
[72]of the leaflets. ,
[74]“am/mfb
[77]13-00000 V4 . _ ; : fe
[78]. . Lo oo : TW. ee
[80]2 F
[81]NON CIA TELETYPED ios cans '$ |
[83], oe : . ray fm ar fet 37 .
[84]: : . . “~ } Uc. vs ue is ~- ae
[85](00 RUEPIA. . | Ursees # Ww
[87]A | .
[88]‘DE RUMSMA 1647F 18/0641Z -. BS | a
[89]0 1896272 : : _
[90]aan a ve “pDP
[91]TO RUEPCR/WHITEHOUSE =
[92]a 2-H DWP
[93]RUE PDA/SECSTATE .
[94]PDA/ {3-Sod
[95]RUEPIA/CIA | _ | Se ve
[96]RUEKDA/JCS - TS Ad a —* [O-RF
[97]INFO RUHPA/CINCPAC . 7 a
[98]ZEN/AMEMB SAIGON | 7 |
[99]RUHPA/CAS HONO © _ a pA ons4ind 9143
[101]BT
[103]TO Pp SECRET MAC SOG 5050-
[105]LIMITED 5 Sterereurton afectn, mano te SPECAT
[106]EXCLUSIVE STATE FOR SULLIVAN, 0 OSD FOR MCNAMARA an ANTHIS
[107]WHITEHOUSE FOR MCGEORGE BUNDY, CIA FOR MCCONE, CARTER AND
[108]HELMS, JCS FOR GEN TAYLOR, INFO AMEMB SAIGON FOR AMB- LODGE
[109]AND. NES, CINCPAC FOR ADM FELT.
[110]Ae OPLAN 344:
[112]1, IN ORDER TO MEET OPERATIONAL SCHEDULES FOR JUNE AND
[114]JULY PSYOPS LEAFLET DROPS, TWENTY ae ILL ION LEAFLETS Arg
[116]‘EE Rea
[117]Bee
[120]13-00000
[122]‘C{ARSIFIED” MESSAGE [TOP SECRET
[124]WERE PRINTED ON SIXTEEN POUND US GRADE WHITE SULPHITE
[125]_ PAPER. THIS WAS NECESSITATED DUE’TO UNAVAILABILITY OF
[126]OTHER PAPER SUITABLE FOR IHIGHSPEED LEAFLET PRESS;
[127]2. UNLESS THESE PRINTED LEAFLETS ARE AUTHORIZED FOR
[128]“DISSEMINATION OVER NORTH VIETNAM UNDER SCHEDULED OPLAN
[129]34n° ‘OPERATIONS NUMEROUS PSYOPS OPPORTUNITIES EXPLOITABLE
[130]UNDER PRESENT LIGHT OF THE MOON PERIOD WILL BE MISSED AND
[131]TIMELINESS OF SEVERAL OF THESE LEAFLETS WILL BE LOST.
[132]3, REALIZE SUBJECT OF PLAUSIBLE DENIAL BECOMES INVOLVED
[133]HERE BUT FEEL IN THIS CASE PROBLEM OF POSSIBLE ATTRIBUTION
[134]TO UNITED STATES UST BE JUDGED IN LIGHT OF FOLLOWING CIR-
[135]CUMSTANCES: a
[136]A. PAPER STOCK USED IS STANDARD US MANUFACTURE .OB-
[137]TAINED THROUGH US ARMY QUARTERNASTER SOURCES AND Is |
[138]ASSUMED TO BE AVAILABLE ON WORLD MARKET FOR SALE TO ANY
[140]CONSUMER. MAP SUPPORTED FORCES SUCH AS ARVN OR OTHERS
[142]COULD HAVE -ACCESS TO SAME TYPE PAPER.
[144]oe B. ANY DESIRE TO ATTRIBUTE OP: AN 344 ACTIONS TO us.
[145]COULD. BE MORE READILY SUB STANT IATED BY DRV PRODUCING. AGENT.
[147]PERSONNEL OR MORE CR Tr ICAL ITEMS LOST IN SOME PREVIOUS
[149]__TEAM OPERATIONS, : wee seen eons
[150]'C. PAPER STOCK ITSELF IS NOT ONLY. ATTRIBUTABLE ITEM,
[152]BUT ALSO OFFSET PRINTING | PROCESS EMPLOYED WITH OTHER TYPE
[153]PR INTED MATTER
[154]D4 IN ESSENCE ALL OPLAN 348 ACTIONS ARE DESIGNED -TO
[155]IMPRESS DRV THAT PRESSURE IS BEING APPLIED BY MAJOR POWER.
[156]“USE OF US PAPER AND J*IRECT IND ICAT ION oF us INVOLVEMENT
[158]i
[160]f ; [Tap sEceFT |
[162]13-00000 .
[164]See may . r . yr “
[166]aa eve . . .
[168]" "CLASSIFIED MESSAGE |
[170]| TOP SECRET | nN prot .
[171]tEND CONTRIBUTE TO THAT BASIC OBJECTIVE, |
[172]E. ONLY CHEMICAL ANALYSIS COULD ASCERTAIN THAT PAPER
[173]USED IS U.S. MANUFACTURED STOCK. | |
[174]Fs IN ANY EVENT, U.S, BLAMED BY DRV FOR ALL OPLAN 34A
[175]ACTIONS THEY CHOOSE TO PUBLICISE AND U.S. IN EACH CASE
[176]COULD CHOOSE TO DENY OR IGNORE ACCUSATIONS. |
[177]4, REQUEST. APPROVAL TO PROCEED WITH DISGEMINAT ION OF PRE-
[178]PARED LEAFLETS AT THIS TIME AND UNTIL SUITABLE FOREIGN
[179]SOURCE PAPER STOCK CaN BE OBTAINED WHICH SHOULD BE WITHIN T¥O WEEKS. |
[180]5. IN ORDER TO MEET. CURRENT JUNE SCHEDULE REQUEST REPLY
[181]"WITHIN, 48 HOURS.
[182]GP oe
[183]a
[185]TOP SECRET |
[187]13-00000_. : -
[189]MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD =: ‘
[191]SUBJECT: Special Group Meeting (5412) - 2 April 1964
[193]1 Briefly reviewed the status of North Viet Nam operations 34A,
[194]All concluded that the results have beén negative and disappointing.
[195]I took the position this was to be expected but that now the period of
[196]organization had past, we might get some better.r results. ee
[198]7 an GR. . 5
[199]ma The CIA IDEALIST- ‘TACKLE | program was s approved except |:
[200]i ; for the North Korean flight. Defense interposed an objection to this . vk
[201]flight on the grounds that they were nearing agreement for the release © zi
[203]|
[204]i of helicopter crews which have been held in North Korean custody.
[206]J Soe
[208]ACTION: This particular flight should be withheld. USIB
[209]and most particularly DIA should be informed in the meeting i
[211]_ On Wednesday, the 8th] .
[216](SSS 1% oy.
[218]a 2. “[Discussed the problem of captains and crews for the SWIFT
[220]_ and. NASTY craft and the necessity of withdrawing the German mercenaries |,
[221]“| and the Swedish captains. This was recognizedas a'must. It was agreed -
[222]that substitution of Chinese Nationalist captains was acceptable on an on
[224]in . . .
[225]i\ interim basis.
[226]. \
[228]\ ’ ACTION: DDP to arrange with Secretary Vance for appro- 7
[230]\ priate actions by the Department of Defense through their
[232]: representatives in Taiwan for the recruitment, movement, Ho
[233]He
[236]a a compensation and care of these captains 8]... ae
[238]pe
[240]x 0 ON St eee
[243]{epee a. [eviewes DoD peripheral reconnaissance which was approved
[244]; ‘after extended discussion of capabilities of the new radar in Cambodia.
[245]‘} It was agreed that the field would be instruded to carefully observe ‘
[246]i
[248]’ 7 ' 4 :
[249]“} up by it. If this turned out to be a regular practice by the Cambodians,
[250]: as the matter should be resubmitted for, reconsideration.
[252]7
[253]o JA _CTION: The field should follow this carefully with MACY v2)
[255]wees UF 0 MORI gi GE _ a
[257]ay A. Rosen of ground rules for U- 2 in North Viet Nam as outlined.
[259]Secretary Vance! s paper \ was '§ approved"7 es
[261]ee a
[263]3 April om Wee
[265]operation of this radar to determine whether the U-2s were being picked
[266]i
[269]13-00000_ _
[273], ‘in~ 5, |The recommendation to overfly Laos was held in suspension,
[274]; DoD was asked to bring in specific details of the particular 34A operations
[275]; which required such overflights and the probable advantages of continuing
[276]" the operations. by means of overflying L Laos. State held very positive view
[279]6. The proposed infiltration and exfiltration operations in Cuba
[280]were approved. Mr. FitzGerald was warned not to cache arms with
[281]- agents felt to be under Castro control. He stated. that this particular
[282]Cache involved money and other things, but no arms, The caching of
[283]. small quantities of arms elsewhere in Cuba was approved.
[284]Memorandum on the operation of autonomous exile groups was noted and no
[285]instructions were given to restrain these operations. The overall question
[286]of future sabotage eperations was discussed. Mr, Bundy agreed to bring
[287]the matter before the President and senior Cabinet officers Promptly. .
[288]S 98 -
[289]7. irae Chilean political action as outlined in the CIA paper of i
[290]April lst was approved, It was pointed. out that since the paper was | i
[291]‘drafted, COS and Ambassador in Santiago had reached an agreement about |
[292]the handling of funds] epee ogre esgp eee
[293]Go
[294]a 8s | Proposed political action in Zanzibar was approved. Mr. . Waller ;
[295]gave a brief account of the results of the favorable negotiations with the
[296]British. Understood thtat implementation of this paper was to be
[297]coordinated with the British in accordance with agreement reached in i
[298]London. ] cee le oe we eee ne eer
[300]OTHER MATTERS:
[302]och, {Statement was made that a. CIA U-2 was. "painted" with radar :
[303]‘on February 24th, ‘implication being that the CIA U- 2g’ in the vicinity of |:
[304]Phnom Penh. . el!
[306]ACTION: I would like to know the facts on this. ] Sy
[308]2. , [Question was raised about need for ‘continuing the 30 mile u
[310]intrusion into Cambodi‘and Laos. Indications were that the photography i
[312]‘had produced no useful. information for MACV. LE
[313]. KO
[314]: . . ff
[315]oe ACTION: This question should be studied and brought '
[316]‘| .up for discussion at meeting on April 9th. I should cable |
[317]f Carter to investigate ily 7 Lf
[318]L ee
[320]. ~ _ , ; -2-
[322]JAM/mfb
[325]Co. were c
[327]27 February 1964
[329]MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
[331]SUBJECT: Meeting of 5412 Group
[333]_— OF. ee
[335]1. “The e que stion of t the ‘extent of the SAG planes operations in South
[336]Vietnam was discussed against the background of Dr. McMillan's
[338]iletter of of February 26th.
[340]4 .
[341]1) a Overflights of South Vietnam -- O.K.
[343])
[345]i,
[347]i
[348]|
[350]| : 2. Overfly that part of North Vietnam which is within 30 miles
[351]‘of South Vietnam or of the coast line.. ;
[353]. 3. That part of Laos which is within 30 miles of the South
[354]Vietnamese border.
[355]4, That part of Cambodia which is not more than 30 miles
[356]_ from South Vietnam.
[358]7 ‘ With respect to 4. 7 instructions were to be given that the primary
[360]' purpose of the flights was to survey border activity and the 30 mile shot
[362]i is provided to give range and operational flexibility. I felt in reviewing
[364]J McMillan's proposal that if the SAC planes were to go as far north as the
[365]2lst parallel, then they should go all the way to the China border and the
[366]proposed CIA operation out of Takhli should be abandoned. This raised the
[367]question of whether civilian or military planes and pilots should be over 7
[368]North Vietnam to the extent which could not be explained as being “off
[370]All agreed that the SAC Air Force operations should be either ,
[371]It was }
[373]course",
[375]I interposed
[377]limited as outlined above or should cover the entire country.
[378]decided to refer the matter to higher authority for decision.
[379]no objection to SAC's overflight of North Vietnam but merely took the ij)
[380]position that if they went as far north as proposed by McMillan, they if
[382]should cover the entire country.) :
[384]2. The program of infiltration and exfiltration of Cuba was approved
[385]with the exception of one operation -- operation #434 -- about which
[386]Mr. Cheever explained that he thought the agents we were resupplying were
[388]under Cuban control and the resupply operation was for the purpose of
[389]deception. It was agreed that the resupply should be confined to money and
[392]: progress.
[394]medicine and that the small amount of arms involved should not be cached.
[395]Otherwise the operation was approved.
[397]Alexis Johnson and Mr, Bundy raised: questions of the consequences
[399]of finding an arms cache or knocking over an infiltration at the time of the
[401]OAS debate on the Venezuelan problem. Arguments were persuasive that
[403]we should go slowly during this period. I read from the February 25th
[404]Cuban checklist of the deterioration of the spirit of the people of Cuba,. the
[405]feeling that we were about to recognize the Castro government.and the apathy
[406]toward further resistance as evidence of the price we are paying for
[407]slow-downs and deferments of action against Cuba. I said that I thought our
[408]Cuban program was incomplete disarray. We had no policy or covert
[409]operations. We now are hesitating on infiltration and exfiltration, our
[410]economic denial program was failing, while Castro is. making significant
[412]3. Gre forcast of NRO activities for March was approved.)
[414]78 °
[415]4. [the « status report on political action in Kenya was 2s approved]
[417]SESS o ee cee pow 2 NTSa re
[419]JAM /mfb
[421]ge
[423]13-0090,
[424]on oe
[426]THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
[427]WASHINGTON 25, D.C. :
[429]February 10, 1964
[431]MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
[433]Attached isa paper which I would like to table for.
[435]discussion at the next meeting of the 5412 group,
[439]Cyrus “| t vance
[441]Attachment
[444]‘bis gr tart de trenton ‘
[446]i
[447]f
[448]Hl
[449]H
[450]H
[452]can
[453]Cc
[454]as)
[455]C4
[456]re
[457](a)
[462]13-00000
[464]( : . February 10, 1964
[465]/MEMORANDUM
[466]SUBJECT: Clandestine and Covert Activities Against Cuba
[468]The objective of the U. S, Government is to overthrow.
[469]the Castro/Communist regime in Cuba, In accomplishing its
[470]objective, the U. S, is not willing to risk nuclear war or, at
[471]this time, substantial deterioration. in its relations with its
[472]Allies, or significant escalation in tensions between this .
[473]country and the Soviets. Thus, any covert U. S. program
[474]should be set at a level that is not likely to incur such risks.
[475]Such a program would appear to be a low-risk, clandestine
[476]program of harassment and sabotage directed against Cuba.
[477]In addition, a program of higher risks ‘seems justified when
[478]it is directed against Cuban subversion of Latin America.
[480]Actions Against Cuba .
[482]1, Sabotage, A low level campaign of sabotage and
[483]tf harassment against Cuba might include such targets as the
[484]( Canete Saw Mill, smaller POL storage plants (such.as the
[486]one at Pilon), the Nazabal warehouse and pier, and ships
[487](such as barges or Cuban patrol boats). Where possible,
[488]it would. seem desirable to make the raids appear to have
[489]come from within Cuba, Cuban ships outside Cuba can be sabotaged
[490]by discreet means (such as placing sand in gears or sugar in fuel).
[492]2. Harassment of Free World Shipping to Cuba.
[494]a) Initiate a more comprehensive program of
[495]_ overt and covert pressure against Free World firms trading
[496]with Cuba. In this connection, develop.a comprehensive list
[497]of firms doing business with Cuba, check them against known
[498]DOD off-shore and foreign purchase suppliers so that
[499]appropriate retaliation ‘can be applied against those suppliers,
[501]b) Place unactivated incendiary and explosive
[502]devices.in cargoes and on ships bound for.Cuba and subse~ .
[503]quently "'tip’ off" port or shipping offigials so that they will
[504]search and discover the devices with the attendant publicity,
[506]COPY No. 4 ot. & copies
[509]13-00000- as
[510]“aE er oe C
[512]ia ; 3. Covert Economic Activities,
[514]a) Intensify covert activities directed against
[515]critical commodities destined for Cuba with resort, if
[516]necessary, to. carefully considered and controlled preclu-
[517]sive buying. ; co
[519]b) Make it known discreetly through the press
[520]that we maintain careful records of the companies dealing
[521]with Cuba, suggesting without saying so that these records
[522]constitute a potential "blacklist, "'
[524]c) Form a group of responsible and qualified
[525]Cuban exile businessmen to maintain pressure on firms
[526]trading with Cuba by indicating that such firms will have
[527]no future in a post-Castro Cuba.
[529]4, To the extent possible, encourage dissidence
[530]among different factions in Cuba - Peking, Moscow,
[531]Nationalist -~ by spreading rumors, internal and
[532]external sabotage designed to accomplish this purpose
[533]{such as actions against homes of leaders, etc). |
[535]( Actions Against Cuban Subversion in Latin America
[537]1. Develop a list of vulnerable Cuban agents in Latin
[538]America against whom a concentrated program of bribery,
[539]blackmail and coercion can be instituted,
[541]2. Carefully select key Latin American members of
[542]' the Havana-Peking school and institute a program of kidnapping,
[543]and personal and physical harassment, while attempting to
[544]‘attribute these acts to rivals who support Moscow, Institute
[545]the reverse process as a retaliatory program against Moscow
[546]. supporters, oo
[548]Any of the foregoing activities would be conducted against
[549]a background of U. S, propaganda (black, white and gray) and
[550]political activity designed to increase internal dissension within
[551]Cuba, to support economic isolation of Cuba, to avoid splitting °
[552]with our allies over the Cuban issue and.to reduce, and perhaps
[553]eliminate, Castro subversion of Latin America. In addition,
[554]surveillance activities should be significantly stepped up.
[556]COPY No. 4 of 6 COPIES