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[50]SPESIALISTS* ASSESSMEITS OF HOSE™KO
[51]Opinions on Intelligence and Personality
[52]Grephoicaical Analysis
[54]Three pages of penciled notes and Jottings in Russian made
[55]: Guring en early debriefing session were submitted on
[56]March 1964 to CIA handw together with a nwater
[57]ling NOSENKO. The
[58]ly that the writer was a Rucsian male
[60], that he had a university-level education, and that he was
[61]én intelligence officer by profession.
[63]Their report, which was
[64]qualified due to limitations on the amount of NOSENKO's handwriting
[65]em, is quoted below. .
[67]specimens submitted to th
[71]14-0000
[73]2. Reports by Psychologist
[75]&. Psychological Testing Results
[77]A CIA psychologist interviewed NOSENKO and administered a
[78]series of psychological tests on 9 July 1964, The psychologist's
[79]report, including answers to questions raised by the CIA handlers
[80]of NOSENKO is quoted in the following paragraphs.
[83]14-0000
[85]ee me ee ere Sor
[87]606.
[89]+0P-SEGRE
[91]NOSENKO
[93]“
[95])
[96]a
[97]c
[98]v
[101]g
[103]Seal,
[104]i‘
[105]all:
[106]a
[107]4
[109]-Perso
[111]er
[113]“Social Relations and Int
[116]ations an Y' y_to Hig Pa
[119]ia Ke
[120]Sob
[123]volumes have
[125]Many
[127]Structure;
[130]~“
[132]5
[133]a)
[136]a.
[138]wall
[139]Ce
[140]|
[141]on
[142]Fy:
[144]oO
[145]a
[146]Oe
[151]Alterna
[153]b.
[156]Ee So
[165]14-8000
[167]'& A comparison of information obtained during this series of
[169]ec. Psychological Interrogation:
[171]. Por fourteen days between 3 and 21 May 1965, the same CIA
[172]psychologist interviewed NOSENKO on his entire early history,
[173]from birth until about 1953, when he said he entered the KGé,
[174]The main purposes were to collect additional information on this
[175]period,* to gain further psychological insights into NOSENKO's
[176]personality, and to find possible ways of obtaining a truthful
[177]account. Although conducted under the. physical conditions of
[178]interrogation, the questioning was relaxed and fo!lowed no rigid
[179]outline.- There were relatively few changes of story from pre-
[180]vious versions; at the same time, however, NOSENKO described in
[181]detail some incidents which he has subsequently admitted to be -
[182]untrue, An extract from the psychologist's report of these
[183]interrogations is given below.
[185]interrogations with information given earlier and later by
[187]NOSENKO-can_be_found_in_Part IV.
[191]3. Report by Psychiatrist
[193]During the year April 1964-April 1965 NOSENKO was under the
[194]medical care of a CIA psychiatrist who visited NOSEUIXO at regular
[195]intervals, usually weexly, to examine him physically ard to listen
[196]to any comments NOSENKO might have about himself and his situation.
[197]The psychiatrist femiliarized himself with available materials on
[198]NOSENKO, particularly with reports of his behavior in the months
[199]immediately following the dcfection. <A report which he submitted
[201]on 20 December 1964 is given below.
[205]14-0000
[207]» FOP SECRET
[209]C e
[210]615.
[212]B. Views of Intelligence Personnel
[214]1. Statement by DERYARIN
[216]@ Introduction
[218]Former KGB officer Peter Sergeyevich DERYABIN has followed
[219]closely the entire course of CIA's investigation of NOSENKO and
[220]his information. He took pert in the interrogations of NOSENKO
[221]in April 1964, January-February 1965, and Octoker 1966 as an ob-
[222]server and consultant, and he personally questioned NOSENKO during
[223]July and August 1965 concerning certain aspects of his personal
[224]past and early KGS career. On the basis of his direct, personal
[225]knowledge of conditions within the Soviet Union and of KGB organi-
[226]zation and procedures prior to his @efection in February 1954,
[228]_*supplemented by continuing study of later information from a
[229]"variety of sources, DERYABIN is of the opinion that much of what
[230]NOSENKO has said akout himself and the KGB is purposefully false
[231]or distorted. Although DERYABIN has been able to offer authorita-
[233]” tive comment on many aspects of HOSENKO's story, the following
[235]_.gection of this paper is limited to his remarks concerning NiOSEN-
[236]KO's entry into the KGB (then MYD) and-his Communist Party affili-
[237]ation, both of which fall into the period when DERYABIN was active
[238]as a KGB (then MVD) staff officer, DERYABIN personally interro-
[239]gated NOSENKO on these topics in the summer of 1965. Since DER-
[240]YABIN was a personnel officer of the KGB (then MGB and MVD) in
[241]Moscow, with long experience in Communist Party ectivities, at
[242]the time NOSENKO claims to have entered the American Department
[243]of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, he is particularly qualified
[244]to comment on these aspects of NOSENKO's story.
[246]DERYABIN, as a Soviet Army officer, vas gracuated in 1945
[247]from the higher counterintelligence school of Snersh (counter-
[248]intelligence sith the Soviet Armed Forces). Following this he
[249]@orked in Naval.Smersh in Moscow and in March 1947 began to work
[250]in the MGB as a case officer in the Central Personnel Directorate.
[251]Shortly afterwards, when his superior was appointed Deputy Chief
[252]of the Chief Guards Directorate for Personnel, DERYABIN trans-
[253]ferred with him to the Guards Directorate. He served as a Guards
[254]Directorate personnel officer until May 1952, rising through the
[255]ranks from case officer to the position of Chief of Section. One
[256]of his responsibilities was the approval of personnel for service
[257]in various units of the Guards Directorate, and he was also in
[258]charge of supervising personnel and security matters concerning
[259]one of the Directorate’s surveillance sub-sections.
[261]After requesting a change from personnel to operational
[262]duties, DERYABIN was transferred in May 1952 to the Austro-German
[263]Department’ of the MGB Foreign Intelligence Directorate. Until
[264]December 1952 he served as the Deputy Chief of a sub-section in
[265]the Counterintelligence Sektor (desk) of the Austro-German Depart-
[266]ment. He was then appointed Deputy. Chief of the intelligence
[268]:.. .Sektor of. the same department, a position he held until March
[270]- '¥953.. From March until September 1953, DERYABIN was the Deputy
[272]Chief of the section in MGB Headquarters which was responsible
[273]for the security of Soviets stationed in Austria and Germany. |
[274]In September 1953 he was transferred to Vienna, where he became
[275]Deputy Chief of the section in the MVD Legal Residency respons-
[276]ible for the security of Soviets in Austria. He defected to
[277]American authorities on 15 February 1954.
[279]14-0000
[281]ies ra
[283]1OP SEC
[285]ne
[287]ae re er
[288]rn ve
[289]DERYASIN joined the Kemsomol in 1936 wad remained a memver
[290]until 1940, when he became a candidate member of the Communist
[291]Party of the Soviet Union; he became a full Party member in
[292]August 1941. During his Party career he reld a number of responsi-
[293]ble posts. Before the war, when DERYABIN was a teacner in Altay
[294]Kray, he as the secretary of a local Komsomol unit and simultan-
[295]eously served £8 a member of the Komsomol Plenum in the rzyon
[296]where he lived. Prom October 1940 uncil November 1941 he was
[297]Secretary of the Komsomol Committee of the 107th Engineer Battalion
[298]of the Red Army and from June 1945 until April 1946 held the same
[299]position in the Komsomol Committee of the tlaval Smersh. This was
[300]the unit which had particular responsibility for counterintelli-
[301]gence work within the Naval GRU, which NOSENKO said he joined in
[302]1951, ‘In the MG@ DERYABIN wae a member of the Party Committee of
[303]the Personnel Section of the Guards Directorate and, after his
[304]transfer, was elected Secretary of the Party Bureau of the Austro-
[305]German Department of the Foreign Intelligence Directorate. He held
[306]this post from January 1953 until his transfer to Austria in Sep-
[307]tember 1953. .
[309][re se toc
[315]The following statements by DERYAGIN are based on his question-
[316]ing of NOSENKO between 26 July and 13 August 1965. The questions
[317]asked and the statements attributed to NOSENKO (referred to as
[318]Subject) sere during this period. Although the Soviet State Secu-
[319]rity Service did not become known as the KGB until March 1954,
[320]this term is use@ for convenience sake, except where the specific
[321]organization of the MGB or MVD is under discussion. DERYABIN's
[322]comments follow:
[324]“"NOSENKO's Acceptance into State Security*
[326]- "Taking NOSENKO's. own statements at face value, it is highly
[327]improbable that a person such as he has described himself to be
[328]would be acceptable for a position as a staff officer in State
[329]Security. The following factors are important in this regard: o
[331]a. It was the policy of State Security to avoid hiring
[332]the children cf high government officials. :
[334]b. Until STALIN's death in March 1953, KO2ULOV, the
[335]man who supposedly helped NOSENKO gain @ntrance into the
[336]service, had no influence inside the MGS apparatus. From
[337]about 1948 until 9 or 10 March 1953, KOBULOV had no office
[338]irside the MGB or the “VD buildings... I know personally that
[339]in these years KOBULOV worked in Germany as Deputy Chief of
[340]the GUSIMZ (Chief Directorate of Soviet Properties Abroad) **
[341]which was once directly under the Council of Ministers and
[342]later under the Ministry of Foreign Trade. The office was
[343]located.on Chkaiova Street, near the Kurskiy Railroad
[345]Station (three blocks from my. former apartment)... | . ae
[347]*# See also Part V.B.
[349]#* WISMUT A.G. in Germany was subordinate to GUSIMZ: for a
[350]further discussion of KOBULOV's role in helping NOSENKO
[351]join the KG3, see Part V.B.
[354]14-0000
[358]617.
[360]c. It was physically impossible at the time for NCSENKO.
[361]to be recomended for and accepted into State Security, as he
[362]has told us, all in one month, March 1953. (If one accepts
[363]his earlier version that he had his talk with KOBULOV in Jan-
[364]uary or February, his account is similarly impossible because
[365]KGBULOV was not then in State Gecurity.) It would normally
[366]have taken a much Jonger time, but in addition to this it was
[367]a pericd of reorganization and the personnel staff was not
[368]actively conducting their work at that time, and perasanent
[369]staff officers were rot sure that they would retain their
[370]positions,
[372]@. In March 1953. NOSEXKO was’ already twenty-five and a
[373]half years old and only a member of the Komsomol. He had no
[374]recommendation for Party membership. and could not become a
[375]member for a full year because of his transfer from one ser-
[376]vice (GRU) to another. It is impossible that State Security
[377]would accept him knowing in advance that on his birthday fhe
[378]would be twenty-six years old and without either Komsomol or
[379]Party membership. ven for the son of a Minister, the Secre-
[380]tary of the Komsomol Committee of the KG3 would have to talk
[381]with the Personnel Cffice and would not give a recommendation
[382]for his acceptance, especially for the Internal Counterintel-
[383]ligence (Second Thief) Directorate. In the case of a son of
[384]a Minister and one who is recommended by KOBULOV, the secre-
[385]tary would request from NOSENKO a recommendation for Party
[386]membership from the members of the Communist Party where
[387]NOSENKO uséd tO work, in this case the GRU. In this way the
[388]secretary of the Komsomol would be sure himself that NOSENKO
[390]would become a candidate member of the Communist Party during
[391]the next year, .
[393]““However, even accepting that despite these obstacles and
[395]"contradictions the KGB sould have accepted him, ore must also
[397]remember (according to NCSENKO's own statemenis) that NOSENKO's
[398]file contained the foliowing negative points.* They are serious
[399]factors and certain of them alone would be enough to cause the
[400]rejection; the totality makes it difficult to believe that at a
[401]time of crisis in the State Security organs anyone would take the
[402]resporsibility of accepting him:
[404]a. Subject was already married and divorced before entry
[405]into State Security.
[407]b. He had been married to General TELEGiIN's daughter
[408]and TELIGIN had been arrested by State Security and was in
[409]jail the day that Subject entered State Security.
[411]c. NOSENKO said that there was a file on "!IOSENKO's
[412]father in which compromising material was collected on. -
[413]-. - Subject's family. NOSENKO agreed that one piece of infor-
[414]- mation that would-have-been in this file was the fact that
[415]his maternal grandfather died in a Soviet prison while under
[416]sentence as a counter-revolutionary.—
[418]d. The social status background in the life of Subject's
[419]mother was nobility.
[422]* "See also Part IV.B.
[424]i
[425]i
[426]i
[427]|
[428]i
[431]i
[433]met tare enna ie Net
[437]a a
[441]— - _ - mc ee ee ern mn,
[445]618,
[447]e. The shooting incident in Leningrad during World
[448]War Il and his desertion from the Naval School in Baku
[449]would have played a very negative role in any consideration
[450]of his acceptance into State Security.
[452]f. Subject never completed high school in the normal
[453]fashion. ose
[455]a
[457]g- Subject was a poor student at the Institute of Inter-
[458]national Relations. :
[460]h. It should be added that the KGB would definitely
[461]krno# that NOSENKO was involved in an automobile accident
[462]in 1947 and was interrogated by the Militia (traffic court),
[463]‘found guilty, and fined. This would definitely play a
[464]negative role in NOSENKO's admission to the KGB,
[466]4. NOSENKO would never be allowed to enter the KGB having
[467]just recovered from tuberculosis.* In fact, there was a rule
[468]at that time that no person who ever had tuberculosis (even
[469]twenty years earlier) would ke permitted to work in the KGB.
[471]“In addition, after acceptance, the fact that KOBULOV was a
[472]personal friend of Subject's father, as he has told us, would
[473]hav2 keen noted in the file and would have piayed a negative role
[474]in permitting Subject to continue to work in State Security after
[475]KOBULGV's arrest in June 1953. '
[477]“I asked Subject how he answered some of the questions in the
[478]anketa (entry questionnaire), particularly the questions on his
[479]former wife, her relatives, and on his mother's ancestry.** I
[480]then asked Subject how it was, taking into account his mother's
[481]aristocratic ancestry, the fact that her father died in jail, the
[482]Trotskyite allegations against Subject's father, the fact that
[483]Subject's former father-in-law (TELEGIN) was still in jail, and
[484]the fact that Subject was present when TELEGIN's apartment was
[485]searched--that he had been accepted into the KGS, particularly
[486]in 1953 during the confusion and chances after the death of STALIN.
[487]Subject admitted that the question was logical, and said that he
[488]could only assume that the influence of KOBULOV and the important
[489]and influential position of his own father outweighed these nega-
[490]tive factors. He also cited his GRU experience in this connection.
[492]“I then asked Subject how he had reported his second marriage
[493]tc the KGB. He replied that before the marriage he had mentioned
[495]* NOSENKO first mentioned having had tuberculosis during the June
[496]1962 meetings, when he described it as a minor case but said he
[497]was under out-patient treatment until 1958. He next mentioned
[498]his ilIness in 1966, describing how he sometimes coughed up a
[500]- “glass of blood" at a-timey Although DERYABIN's questioning” = toot
[502]covered this part of NOSEIKO's life in detail, there was no
[503]mention of tuberculosis in July and August 1965. DERYABIN's
[504]comment is based on the 1966 information but is included here
[505]for purposes of context.
[507]**The anketa and DERYABIIN's questioning on this subject are dis-
[508]cussed further below,
[510]*e pte, ”
[512]a
[514]| EY AFORE
[516]econ celine me
[518]—— te
[522]- {
[523]1 Ren ame oe +
[525]14-0000
[527]S  topsecat ©
[529]619.
[531]it briefly to GORBATENKO, and that he hed unofficially run a name
[532]check on his prospective bride (which was ‘clean'), and that after
[533]the marriage he had £illed out another anketa in which he included
[534]all the required data on his wife and rer relatives. After con-
[535]siderable prompting, Subject said that he tad indicated that she
[536]and her parents had been in France, but that he had concealed the
[537]fact that her grandmother nad been in German-occupied territory
[538]during the war. (He admitted that the KGB would have learned this
[539]in a routine check, however.) I then reviewed for Subject the
[540]negative security factors mentioned above, adding the arrest of .
[541]KOBULOV, the fact that his nea wife and her parents had been
[542]abroad, the fact that her grandmother was in German-occupied
[543]territory. the fact that Subject was now over-age for the Komsomol
[544]but not yet a Party member or candidate, and the fact that Subject
[545]received a 15-day sentence for misuse of cover documents and in-
[546]curring venereal disease, and asked if ‘he didn't think that his
[547]personnel file had been reviewed in 1954, and if so, what grounds
[548]there could have been for retaining him in the XGR. Subject said
[549]that he thought that his file probably was reviewed but that
[551]again the influence of his father had saved him. Subject added
[552]that another important factor was prooably his language qualifi-
[553]cation and particularly his higher education. I pointed out to
[554]Subject that if his second wife and her parents had been abroad
[556]it was impossible that her name check could have been negative.
[558]He admitted it was illogical, but insisted that this was 50.
[560]"NOSENKO's Knowledge of KGB, 1952-54
[562]“Entry Date into KGB: NOSENKO was reminded that he had pre-
[563]viously given varying dates for his entry on duty in the KCB. He
[564]replied that he did not remember the exact @ate, but he was sure
[565]that it was in the middle of March 1953 - perhaps 13 or 15 March
[566](15 March 1953 was a Sunday). He would give no explanation for
[567]why he previously claimed to have entered the KGB in «+> . ° -
[568]1952.* In fact it would be very unusual for a KGB officer to
[569]forget his exact entry-on-duty date to the very day because it
[570]is used to compute length of service and must be entered on vari-
[571]ous forms from time to time.
[573]"Numerical Lesiqnation of the Intelligence and Counterintelli-
[574]gence Directorates in 1953: Asked to aescribe what directorates
[575]existed in tne MVD while BERLYA was Minister (March-June 1953),
[576]NOSENKO named the First Chief Directorate (FCD) and the Second
[577]Chief Directorate (SCD) which he said were the intelligence and
[578]counterintelligence directorates respectively. Asked if he were
[579]sure, NOSENKO said he was positive, and that the only change: that
[580]took place was that later, under KRUGLOV, for. a few months only,
[581]the FCD became the ScD, ard vice versa, NOSENKO stuck to this
[582]even when told he was wrong; he did not say he did not know or
[583]did not rememker,. perhaps realizing that he could not claim not
[584]to remember what directorate he served in. (Actually, the change
[585]4n numerical designations was instituted by BERIYA right after
[586]STALIN's death in March 1953 and persisted until the KGB was
[587]organized in March 1954. Thus, NOSENKO does not know what the
[588]correct designation of his own directorate was at the time that
[589]he allegedly entered on duty with Soviet State Security and for
[590]the entire first year of his alleged service there.
[593]_ * NOSENKO on other occasions has given various reasons why he
[595]told CIA that he joined the KCB in 1952. See Part V.B.
[598]14-0000
[600]WTOP Sunes e
[602]620.
[604]“MVD Leadershi 1953-54: Asked to nane the chiefs cof the
[605]directorates and separate departments of the MVD under BERIYA
[606]and KRUGLOV, NOSENKO named nine out of 28, He was unable to name
[607]the Chief of the Intellicence Directorate, saying that he remem-
[608]bered only SAKHAROVSKIY (PANYUSHKIN was chief untis 1955). «sked
[609]to name KRUGLOV's deputies, NOSENKO named only RO:4ASHKOV ani
[610]SEROV, and was ignorant of such prominent deputies es LUNEV a:
[611]SHATALIN, Told that a Secretary of the Central Committee of th
[612]CPSU was one of KRUGLOV's deputies at this time (SHATALIN), Nos-
[613]ENKO flatly denied that this was possible.
[615]"Organization of KGB: NOSENKO did not know when the KGS was
[616]organized (March 1954). He said that it was in early 1955 or
[617]late 1954, Told thet he was a year off and asked to think it
[618]over, NOSENKO insisted that he was right.
[620]"Processing Procedures for Employment with KGB: NOSENKO's
[621]story about how he was processed for employment with the KGB in
[622]1953 is inconsistent with the procedures used at that time. He
[623]does net know many of the things that he should know about en-
[624]trance procedures; he is wrong about many of the things that he
[625]claims to remember, The disparities are so creat that they can-
[626]not be explained (as NOSENKO attempts to do) by the claim that
[627]KOBULOV's recommendation resulted in a simplified entrance pro-
[628]cedure for NOSENKO.
[630]“The most important document filled out by prospective em-
[631]ployees of Soviet State Security is a detailed personal history
[632]questionnaire, called in Russian Anketa spetsialnoco naznacheniya
[633]sotrudnika KGB. This exhaustive questionnaire is 16 pages long,
[634]and filling it out is an experience that one is not likely to
[635]forget. A background investigation ig run on the basis of this
[636]questionnaire, which itself becomes a permanent and prominent
[637]feature of the employee's personnel file. NOSENKO remembers
[639]. filling out a questionnaire, but does not know its designation.
[641]He asserts that it was only 4-6 pages long. He asserts that he
[642]filled it out at home, and submitted it in two copies shortly
[643]before entering on duty. Actually, this questionnaire was re-
[644]quired in ore copy only, and was never permitted to be taken
[645]home since it was a classified document (even when not filled
[646]in) .* .
[648]"NOSENKO insists that he did not have to take a medical exam-
[649]ination prior to entering the KGB. This is not possible. Such
[650]an examination was a routine and mandatory part of the processing.
[651]I cannot think of any instance in which it would be waived.**
[653]* DERYABIN's views are based on NOSENKO's statements in August
[654]1965. In his original biographical statement (1962), NOSENKO
[655]said that no enketa was required. He implied as auch in his
[656]most recent statement in April 1966, after being questioned
[657]by: DERYABIN. This- statement is given in Part V.8. _
[659]**See remarks above concerning NOSENKO's alleged treatment for
[660]tuberculosis from 1952 to 1958. _ oo -
[663]14-0000
[665]Ror secre & |
[667]621.
[669]Ve af
[671]“"NOSENKO's description of the secrecy agreemen* that he
[672]signed #when entering on duty with the KGB is completely unlike
[673]the agreement that was in use at that time for staff employees.
[674]It may be significant that NOSENKO's description of tha secrecy
[676]- agreement he recalls signing resembles the serrecy agreements
[677]that were taken from agents.
[679]“NOSENKO insists that he did not fill cut any otner forms,
[680]questionnaires, or papers when entering the KGs. Actually, there
[681]were a number of other routine forms that had to be £ilicd out by
[682]applicants and new employees.
[684]“Location of ROZHENKO's Office: NOSENKO says that all his
[685]entry processing was handled by a personnel officer ramed ROZHEN- ;
[686]KO and his staff. He asserts that ROZHENKO's office, which nOS-
[687]ENKO visited several times in early 1953, was located on the 6th :
[688]floor, 8th entry, S3uilding No. 12, Dzerzhinskiy Street. In fact,
[689]neither ROZHIENKO nor any officers or units of the Personnel De-
[690]partment were located in the 8th entry. They were all (including
[691]ROZHENKG) located on the 6th and 7th floors of the 7th entry of
[692]Building No. i2.*
[694]"Rank Pay: Asked about his salary when he first started to
[695]work in the KGB, NCSENKO said he got a basic salary of 1700 rubles
[696]as a case officer, 500 rubles for his rank of lieutenant, plus
[697]secrecy, languace, and longevity pay. He insisted that this was
[698]correct, even «nen told that KGB officers were no longer being
[699]paid for cenk in March 1953, and said that although he remembered
[700]that there was one year--1954--when they were not paid for rank,
[701]he was sure that when he first entered on duty he received this
[702]pay. Salary for rank was taken away from State Security officers
[703]in September 1952 and was not restored until April 1954. °
[705]"promotion to Senior Lieutenant: In giving the chronology
[706]of his promotion to various military ranks, NOSENKO claimed to
[707]have been promoted to senior lieutenant in April 1953, shortly .
[709]‘after joining the KGB, Told that this was impossible, and that
[710]no one in the KGB was promoted at this time, NOSEXNKO replied that od
[711]he couldn't say about anyone else but he was sure that he had re-
[712]ceived his promotion at that time. In fact, this is impossible:
[713]all promotions in the KGB were frozen from the time BERIYA took
[714]over as minister (March 1953) until late 1953.
[716]“visitor's Pass Procedures: In talking about his first visit
[718]to. the KSB to process for employment, NOSENKO was unable to re-
[720]call the procedures employed by the KGS Pass Office in issuing
[722]visitor's passes. Specifically, he maintained thet the name of
[724]the interviewer was not indicated on the pass. In fact,. the
[726]name of the interviewer did appear on the pass and the inter-
[728]viewer had full responsibility for the visitor while he was on
[730]KGB premises. While it is understandable that NOSENKO might
[732]have forgotten the details involved if he had only visited there
[734]“a few times more than ten years ago, if he worked at KGB-Head=- -— -.
[735]~—-~quarters for over ten-years-as a staff officer and particularly. .—- .
[737]as a supervisor he would have frequent occasion to admit visitors,
[739]_and thus should know visitor's pass procedures quite well.
[741]Ee
[743]*NOSENKO has since said that he spoke to no personnel officers
[744]prior to acceptance by the KGB or afterwards, thereby indicatiag
[745]that his statements to DERYABIN were untrue. See Part V.B.
[747]Hl
[748]1
[751]420098
[753]Jor steal
[754]622.
[756]"Unescorted Entry into KGB Building with Visitor's Pass: In
[757]describing his first day at work, NOSENKO saié@ tnat he went from
[759]the Pass Office, where he optained @ visitor's pass, to the 4th
[760]entry of the Building No. z, where his pass was checked by the
[761]quards, and then went unescorted to KOBULOV's office on the third
[762]floor. Challenged on this point, he said he was sure that it was
[763]possible to enter without an escort. In fact, it was absolutely
[764]impossible to go through any entry of Building No. 2 without
[765]escort if you did not have a properly stamped KG5 (MVD) identity
[766]@ocument (see below).
[768]"KGB Identity Document: NOSENKO was asked to describe the
[769]KGB identity document that he received when he first entered the
[770]KGB. He was then asked if there was anything unusual in connec-
[771]tion with this document at that time. He replied thet he knew of
[772]nothing unusual. He was then reminded that ef:er STALIN'S death
[773]and again after EERIYA's arrest 1t was necessary to have special
[774]stamps placed in the identity documents to vatidate them. With-
[775]out the right stamp it was impossibie to ente: the KGB Duilding.
[776]NOSENKO was ignorant of this and was unable to recall anything
[777]about it despite a numrer of hints and leading questions, Actu-
[778]ally, during the period of upheaval following STALIN's death and
[779]again after 3ERIYA's arrest, all KGB identity documents were tem-
[780]porarily withdrawn in order te have special validation stamps
[781]placed in them, and it was literally impossicvle to get in the
[782]KGB kuildings if one did not have the right stamp. This was the
[783]subject of numerous anecdotes at the time and is hard to believe
[784]that an officer who served in the KG@ at the time could have for-
[785]gotten it completely.
[787]"Gastronom: Asked to describe the sign in front of the KGB
[788]Club, NOSEXKD said that he did not remember any sign (there was
[789]one in 1953) but mentioned that there was a Gastronom (food store)
[790]next to the KGB Club. Asked when the Gastroncm was cpened, he
[792]said firmly that it was already there when he started to work
[794]in the KG3. In fact, this Gastronom was definitely not there as
[795]of 1954. It was opened sometime ketween 1955 and 1957, as Moscow
[796]directories show. The KSB Club is in entry No. 1 of Building
[798]No. 12, Dzerzhinskiy Square, and NOSENKO would have had to pass
[799]it every day he went to work.
[801]“Chief Directorate of Militia: Asked where the Chief Direc-
[802]torate of Militia of the USSR was located in 1953-54, NOSENKO
[804]replied that he did not know, and knew only that later it was
[805]lecated on Ulitsa Ogareva. Actually, in 1953-54 it was located
[806]next to the main KGS building at Dzerzhinskiy No. 2. A staff
[807]officer in the counterintelligence directorate would have fre-
[808]quent occasion to deal with the Chief Directorate of Militia.
[810]®K.1. (Committee of Information): Asked where the Intelli-
[811]gence Directorate of the MVD was located in 1953, NCSENKO replied
[812]that it was scattered between Dzerzhinskiy No. 2, the Acricultural
[813]Exhibition, tne K.I. building, and Kiselniy Pereulok. This is
[815]a confused and incorrect answer. “Asked for clarification, NCS-="— ~
[817]ENKO said that he had never visited either the K.I. or the First
[818]Chief Directorate building at the Agricultural Exhibition. Thus,
[819]NOSENKO seems to be unaware that the K.I. has not existed since
[820]1951, and that the K.I. building and the building at the Agri-
[821]cultural Exhibition were one and the same place.
[823]|
[825]Spemmenan UN eae
[828]14-0000
[831]| “" Top secreT * og
[833]““NOSENKO's Claim to Have Been a Komsomol: Secretary in the
[834]Second Chief Directorate, KGs
[836]. “NOSEXKO claimed to have become a member of the Komsomol
[837]Organization (K/O) of the KGB when he entered on duty in March
[838]1953, to have been elected as Secretary of Komsomol Organization
[839]of the Second Chief Directorate in the fall of 1953, and to have
[840]served in that capacity until the fall of 1954, when he was re-
[841]moved because he used operational—alias documents in obtaining
[842]treatment for a venereal disease he had incurred. He claims to
[843]have been excluded from the Komsomol, without prejudice, when he
[844]attained his 27th birthday in October 1954.
[846]"Asked to describe how he transferred from the Kei;somol Crgan-
[847]ization of the Naval Intelligence Post in the Baltic to the Kom-
[848]somol Organization of the KGB, NOSENKO qave an entirely incorrect
[849]description of this procedure, both as regards deregistration from
[850]the K/O in the Baltic, and registration with the K/O in the KGB.
[851]He stated that he was issued a new Komsomol registration card by
[852]the KGB K/O, without reference to the previous K/O in the Baltic;
[853]this is impossible.
[855]"NOSENKO gave an incorrect account of how a K/O secretary is
[856]elected, stating that he was elected at a meeting of the K/o. In
[857]fact, the K/O meeting can only select the K/O committee, which will
[858]convene separately to elect the Secretary.
[860]“NOSENKO could not describe the duties of a K/O secretary ina
[861]specific manrer.
[863]"NOSENKO did not know who was the secretary of the overall KGB
[864]. K/O. The secretary of the SCD K/O would be directly subordinate
[865]| : _ to him and would deal with him frequently.
[867]“NOSENKO was unable to describe his dealings with the KGB K/O
[868]or the identities or responsibilities of the people with whom he
[869]dealt there.
[871]: "NOSENKO insisted that in 1953-54, the maximum age for a Kom-
[873]: somol member was 27. In actual fact, the maximum age was 26 (it
[875]: was raised later). This point is important, both because NOSENKO
[876]should know exactly if he had served as a K/O secretary, and also
[877]because it refutes his story that he was excluded from the Kom-
[878]somol for over~age in 1954.
[880]1
[882]; "NOSENKC maintained that all the members of his K/O paid dues
[884]i in the amount of 2 percent of their monthly salaries. This is
[886]i incorrect, as monthly Komsomol dues were calculated on a sliding
[888]f . scale determined by wage group: at that time, Komsomol members
[890]{ . . earning up to 500 rubles monthly paid 0.5 percent: those earning
[892]: 500 to 1500 rubles paid 1 percent, and those earning over 1500
[894]_ rubles paid 1.5 percent. The K/O secretary collects the dues, ~ : :
[895]and must know the right™ amounts ~~ > 00 ree
[897]_ "NOSENKO did not know whether or not a Komsomol Congress
[898]took place while ne was K/O secretary, saying that they took
[899]place every year. In actual fact, the 12th Komsomol Congress
[901]which convened in March 1954 was the first since 1948? at this
[903]12th Congress a number of changes were made in the Komsomol Rules
[905](Ustay). As secretary of a K/O NOSENKO would have been involved
[908]14-0900
[911]> yup SECRET % —-
[915]in a good deal of preparatory work for this Congress, which was
[916]a big event in the life of every Komsomol worker at the time, and
[917]could not be forgotten," .
[919]Although DERYABIN's direct knowledge of the KGB ended in 1954,
[920]his detailed information of KGB procedures has been updated BY :
[921]his _more recent examination of reports from other sources. Wit :
[922]regard to what NOSENKO has said about KG3 procedures, DERYABIN
[923]stated: "Asked to describe how he conducted name checks on a
[924]Seviet citizen and on a new arrival to the American Embassy in
[925]1953-54, NOSENKO gave a superficial descripticn of how such
[926]checks were done. However, he resisted every attempt to get him
[927]to describe this process in detail, and he mace several blunders
[928]which show that he never actually ran such a check himself. For
[929]example, he did not know where the records of all Soviet citizens
[930]who have been tried are kept, and he attempted to improvise an
[931]answer (completely wrong) that they would check with the Militia
[932]about this. NOSENKO correctly said that Archives were located
[933]on Kirov Street, but he was completely unabie to stretch his
[934]limited knowledge to provide a description of now these various
[935]repositories were actually checked. NOSENKO was also asked to
[936]describe in detail how he ran such a check on a Soviet citizen
[937]in the 1956-59 period. Here again he was in difficulty and re-
[938]fused even to try. He did not even know the everyday term Spets-
[939]proverka, which means a check for clearance.
[941]"It was particularly interesting that he did not feel able to
[942]dispute my challenges of his infgrmation, even though he undoubt- :
[943]edly knows that I do not have first-hand knowledge of procedures . oo}
[944]in this period. I even tested this on one occasion by asking So.
[945]NOSENKO the difference between the lst Spets Otdel (Special '
[946]Department - KGB cards and files) and the Operativno-Uchetniy
[947]Otdel (Operational Reports Department - the functional name for
[948]the lst Special Department). He answered that the lst Special
[949]Department holds the files on Soviet criminal cases wrile the
[950]Operational Reports Department is for political and ¢spionage
[951]cases. It seems he invented this answer on the spot. In addi-
[952]tion, it is wrong that political and security cards are separate
[953]from criminal enes in the lst Special Department, They’ were
[954]in my time and must still be combined in one card file.
[958]“NOSENKO states that he’ knows nothing about the files of
[959]the First Chief Directorate. It is unkelievable that in ten
[960]years of service in the Second Chief Directorate NOSENKO never
[961]faw a First Chief Directorate file; how else would he be able
[962]to check information on foreigners, especially on American En-
[963]bassy personnel? The first stage in such a check is an inquiry
[964]to the First Chief Directorate and a check of aay files they
[965]May have on the subject. According to his own account, NOSENKO
[966]should have keen doing this type of thing the whole of-his ten
[968]' years of service, without regard to whether he was_assigned to a
[969]- _ | the” American Department or the Tpurist Department."
[971]SSS A CER Pe ere re
[973].
[975]14-0000
[977]ED ORDER se Se ae ees cee et
[979]TOP SECRET
[981]625.
[983]2. Remarks by CIA Handlers
[985]wat =
[986]a. Introduction inate
[987]gery -
[989]Five CIA case officers who worked directly with NOSENKO have
[990]recorded their personal observaticns on his behavior and actions.-
[991]The principal case officer, the first CIA representative to meet
[992]NOSENKO in 1962, participated in all of the meetings and inter-
[993]rogations (either personally or monitoring from off-stage} since
[994]then; he is a senior officer with 17 years of operational experi-
[995]ence, including extensive agent handling and dealings with more
[996]than 10 officers of Soviet and Satellite Intelligence and Security
[997]Services who were defectors or agents in place; he has also had
[998]desk or supervisory responsibilities connected with at least 20
[999]other such sources. A second case officer, who participated in
[1000]the meetings in Geneva in 1964 and in all subsequent phases of
[1001]the operation, has spent the 16 years of his career solely in
[1002]Soviet operations and has handled several Soviet sources in place,
[1003]as well as defectors. Three othar officers, who began to work
[1004]with NOSENKO after his arrival in the United States and conducted
[1005]the bulk of both the debriefing and the hostile interrogations,
[1006]have spent most of their careers in Soviet counterintelligence
[1007]operations; “mong them, they command an extensive knowledge of
[1008]the Soviet Intelligence Services, and they have had a variety
[1009]of agent- and defector~handling experience.
[1011]NOSENKO was talked to and questioned in several types of
[1012]circumstances:
[1014]; _- In five tightly organized meetings in 1962 in
[1015]Geneva with limited time available for each of a wide
[1016]range of topics, none of which could be ignored but none
[1017]of which could be covered in detail.
[1019]- In cgncentrated, but somewhat longer meetings in
[1020]place in Geneva in January-February 1964, with the know-
[1021]ledge by all participants that items not adequately covered
[1022]then covld be dealt with after the defection.
[1024]- In routine debriefing sessions after his defection,
[1025]first in a Frankfurt safehouse, then in a safehouse in
[1026]the Washington area, where a spectal effort was made not
[1027]to put pressure on NOSENKO or express doubts about his
[1028]statements.
[1030]. - Under detailed hostile interrogation (especially
[1031]April 1964 and January-March 1965).
[1033]- In extended, detailed debriefing sessions which
[1034]NOSENKO could not evade (May-November 1964, May 1965,
[1035]July-August 1965, and Ogtober 1966).
[1037]Thus there were opportunities to note his per formance and reac-_ _
[1039]“tions. under varied degrees of stress and control.
[1041]7 The features of NOSENKQ'’s conduct, manner, and. techniques
[1042]@iscussed below are confined to those which were clearly and con-
[1043]sistently observed by all of the officers involved.
[1045]fe tenet
[1047]14-0000
[1051]626.
[1053]b. NOSENKO's Conduct in Meetings
[1055]NOSENKO in brief, superficial, uncritical debriefings (of
[1056]the sort which characterized the 1962 and 1964 Geneva meetings
[1057]and the debriefings.prior to 4 April 1964) was reasonabiy con-
[1058]vincing in his manner. For example, on the basis of the hur-.
[1059]ried sessions of June 1962 in Geneva, which did not allow time
[1060]for systematic or detailed questioning, the CIA case officer
[1061]in commenting on NOSENKO's conduct mentioned “the ease of his
[1062]manner, the sureness of his knowledge of matters which he should
[1063]have known, and the amount of checkable information he provided,”
[1064]NOSENKO seemed to that case officer to be “urder little or no
[1065]restraint as to the amount and nature of what he told us” and
[1066]“made a convincing and good personal impression: a vigerous,
[1067]temperamental and vital man.” Similarly, nothing in NOSENKO'S
[1068]manner caused doubts on the part of the Fal representatives who
[1069]took NOSENKO's reports in February, March, and early April 1964.
[1071]It became apparent, however, when the cases KOSENKO had
[1072]mentioned briefly in early meetings were taken up in detail in
[1073]leisurely debriefings after the defection, that he could not add
[1074]facts consistent with what he had said before. He was unable to
[1075]recall related incidents or additional Circumstances which did
[1076]not come to mind in the first telling, despite being aided by
[1077]questioning from different angles or in different coatexts. The
[1078]same results were obtained in exhausting his store of operational
[1079]leads (with a half dozen exceptions) and his information on XGB
[1080]procedures, installations, and operational methods: Having once
[1081]reported on these general topics, NOSENXO could offer nothing
[1082]more when debriefed again, regardless of the method of question-
[1083]ing tried. Repeatedly he used the same stories to illustrate
[1084]his points; new stories did not emerge. In a peric? of nine
[1085]months, NOSENKO was drained of information "6n nis personas and
[1086]professional experiences and knowledge., Never before hag the |
[1087]CIA case officers encountered a. defector who was totally ce-
[1089]1 briefed. - - comers re ee
[1091]A technique NOSENKO has frequently used to explain his in-
[1092]» ability to supply details and to forestall further questicning
[1093]<ahas been to claim poor memory. "Different people have cifferent
[1094]at s of memories,” he has said on many Occasions, Or on Others:
[1095]YT Fave-tora what I remember.” The case officers who have
[1096]handled NOSENKO agree, on the other hand, that he has an excel-
[1097]lent memory, although perhaps a peculiar one: NOSENKO did not
[1098]always recall most easily those events which had occurred most
[1099]recently, or those incidents which were most closely related to
[1100]{ him. He was able, for example, to remember detailed information
[1101]i on the penetration of the Courier Transfer Station in Paris and
[1102]: to give a long, detailed, and ordered account of she compromise
[1103]i of PENKOVSKIY, in neither of which he claimed any personal role;
[1104]| he has been able to name hundreds of KGB officers, to give the
[1105]dates on which many of them transferred from one component of
[1106]the Second Chief Directorate to another, and to describe their ©
[1107]responsibilities at particular times. Yet NOSENKO forgot where
[1108]he himself served in the GRU; he could not consistently dis-
[1109]cribe the circumstances of his divorce; he failed to provide a
[1110]consistent date for his entry into the KGB and fcr his transfer
[1111]| from the American Department to the Tourist Department in 1962.
[1112]I
[1113]I
[1115]Likewise, NOSENKO remembered details of KGB operations which,
[1116]like the “ANDREY” case in 1953, took place in the relatively dis-
[1117]tant past, but he could not recall the travels, friends, and
[1118]activities of his own target,cohn V. ABIU.AN or details of opera-
[1119]tions against many American code clerks in 1960 and 1961. ©
[1123]and a lack of emotion when describing the compromise. of Soviets:
[1126]TOP SECRET |
[1128]red
[1130]627.
[1132]These limitations of krowledce ar.d quirks of memory were
[1133]evident rot only during meetings when NOSENKO wes being desriefed.
[1134]They were also apparent in the interrogations which supplanted
[1135]the debriefings.
[1137]c. NOSENKO's Behavior Under Interrocation
[1139](i) Introduction
[1141]In the many and long interrogation sessions there emerged
[1142]habits of behavior noticeable t> each of the CIA officers present.
[1143]Trese characteristics of NOSENKO were his manner of recounting
[1144]events and his evasiveness, improvisétions, ard other defensive
[1145]techniques. They are reviewed below.
[1147](ii) Manner of Recounting Events -
[1149]Typical of NOSENKO's performance in the interrogations were
[1150]the following points.
[1152]- Talking about operations he supervised and about his per-
[1153]sonal role in the KGB Headquarters aspects of other operations,
[1154]NOSENKO habitually used the passive voice ("it was decided") or
[1155]indicated that he was not alore in these activities ("there was
[1156]no atcounting on who was working on any ccde cierx case--it was
[1157]GRYAZNOV, XOSCLAPOV, NCSENKO, and also working was KLYPIN, GRIBAN-
[1158]OV," or “We made the decision--1 and KOVSHUK and GRYAZNOV," or "I
[1159]and GRYAZNOV discussed this with him.") When asked where a par-
[1160]ticular conversation took place, he rarely !ocated it in his own : 8
[1161]office ("I was in KOVSEUK's office when, KCSLCY called him about
[1162]the trip" or “I was in KLYPIN's office and he was talking to
[1163]KOVSHUK") . .
[1165]- At the other extreme from being impersonal, NOSENKO some-
[1166]times quoted conversations in which he tock part (“I then said,”
[1167]“he said to me," etc.), but it was in just such matters that
[1168]KNOSENKO most often contradicted himself (e.g.. his relationship
[1169]with GRIEANOV ard his part in the recruitment approach to the
[1170]American ¢ode clerk James STORSBERG).-
[1172]- In repeating certain stories (the CHEREPANCV case and the
[1173]provocation against Professor Frederick BARGHOCFN are examples)
[1174]NOSENKO gave them in precisely the same order, without addition
[1175]or omission. -In relating the PENKOVSKIY story, which he stressed
[1176]he iearned “little by iittle' from several different sources, he
[1178]_ presented the facts each time in nearly identical order. Asked
[1180]for more details on these cases, he invariably insisted--often
[1181]with irritation--that he knew nothing more and if he did, he
[1182]would have reported it. Other factors contributed to the im-_
[1183]pression that in such instances NOSENKO had delivered his infor-
[1184]mation by rote: Statements like “I don't remember what I told
[1185]you before" when queried agair on a particular case: detachment
[1187]who, like himself, had cooperated with American latelligence:
[1189]POPOV, PENKOVSKIY, and CHEREPANOV; an inability to correlate
[1191]dates and events in different operations which he said he was
[1193]handling (such as conflicts in the timing of his approach to :
[1194]W.E. JOPNSON and in the date he gave for John V. ABIDIAN's visit re
[1195]to the Pushkin Street dead drop. and conflict between the dates :
[1196]of his participation in the MCRONE. case and his travel cto Cuba).
[1198]14-0000
[1200]2 TOP SECRET
[1202]628.
[1206]- ~ NOSENKO, with a few excupticns (notably the compromise of
[1207]PENKOVSKIY and the ASIDIAN visit. to the dead drop site), could
[1209]not supply specific or approxisate dates for operational activi-
[1210]ties during the period of his service in the U.S. mimbassy Section.
[1211]Beyond recourse to the phrase "1960, 1961,” he refused to estimate
[1212]the dates or to associate these activities with the time of the
[1213]year or events in his personal life.
[1215]week Be etree.
[1217](411i) Evasion, Improvisation, and Other Defenses
[1219]In the debriefings before the interrogations, NOSENKO avoided
[1220]questicns and topics not of his own choosing, saying that he would
[1221]give full details “later,” when systematic debriefing began.
[1223]When the question or topic came up anew in a later debriefing, ft
[1224]re would plead fatigue or boredom and propose: “This morning :
[1225]we drink; tomorrow we work.” prior to 4 April 1964 he provided
[1227]only accounts of operations selected by himself; it was only
[1229]after 4 April 1964 that he could be, constrained to reply to de-
[1231]tailed questioning on other matters. -
[1233]From that point on, other evasive tactics became familiar
[1235]to his interrogators. He would try to change the subject or
[1237]to shift from the specific event to a generalized account of how
[1239]such things were done in principle. He would claim bad memory .
[1241]on grounds that, for example, operations against U.S. Embassy
[1243]personnel were hopeless and useless anyway. lie would dismiss the ‘
[1245]details or the entire operation as unimpertant (for example, the
[1247]microphones in the U.S. Embassy). He would set out reasons for
[1249]his ignorance of things he admittedly should have known (his own
[1251]"poor performance,” preoccupation with other matters, inattention
[1253]to duty, absence from the KGB while on yacation, lack of time to
[1255]master details because he was a superviscr). Unable to name or
[1257]talk about KGB indigenous agents working against Americans, in-
[1259]cluding those in operations under his supervision, NOSENKO
[1261]disparaged the quality of, such agents ("they never reported any-
[1263]thing of interest on anyone"); he cited their low educational
[1265]level and their inferior status 4s servants and employees as
[1267]one reason none of them could give the KGS operationally useful |
[1268]i
[1270]renee
[1272]information. In fact, the record of many indicated previous em-
[1273]ployment which would demand at least the equivalent of a college
[1274]degree or certificate from a technical institute. Numerous maids
[1275]were former school teachers, one was formerly a chemist.
[1277]When evasion failed, it seemed to the interrogators that
[1278]NOSENXO improvised his answers. Some of these evident improvisa-
[1279]tions led him into unacceptabie statements or positions. To use
[1280]i his responseg to the questioning on Jchn V. ABIDIAN as an example:
[1281]: Not knowing about ABIDIAN's car, he said the KGB could not get
[1282]i at it. (In fact, the car was held by. Soviet customs for two
[1283]; weeks, and later NOSENKO himself spoke about the way the KGB used
[1284]t Embassy chauffeurs for access to cars.) Not knowing of ABIDIAN'S
[1286]trips out of the USSR, he claimed that the KGB had no way to
[1288]find out where Embassy officers went when they made trips out of
[1290]the country... (In fact, ABIDIAN had told his languege teacher —
[1292]each time and she, as NOSENKO said, was a KGB agent; a130, ABIDIAN
[1293]_ arranged_his trips by long-distance phone from Moscow to his des- |
[1295]tination abroad, and the KGB can cover such calls.) Not knowing
[1297]of ABIDIAN's trip within the USSR, he spoke of a vacation which
[1299]he latter admitted to be false. Asked why he did not know personal
[1301]o
[1303]“ $
[1304]10P SECRET
[1306]629.
[1308]data on ABIDIAN from the State Department Bicqraphic Register, é
[1309]he said “only the First Chief Directorate” uses pe; when tne, ;
[1310]interrogator parsued the point, NOSENKO said he romembered that
[1311]KOVSHUK did have a copy in his office, “but an old one, 1956,
[1312]which didn't list ABIDIAU." Under pressure about ABIDIAN's visit
[1313]to Pushkin Street, NOSENKO said the FGB thought that ABIDIAN may
[1314]not have entered the building on Pushkin Street; yet he had earl-
[1315]der given extensive details about how the KG3 had analyzed the
[1316]precise number of seconds ABIDIAN had been inside, to‘determine
[1317]where the drop, if any, might be. As another example, when he
[1318]was initially asked about Gcozgé BLAKE, tl.2 KGB agent in MI-6,
[1319]the context of the question was a discussion of Second Chief
[1320]Directorate operations. NOSENKO labeled it as such and said it
[1321]“was not ag important as VASSALL." Later, when the name was men-
[1322]tioned again, he asked: “Who's BLAKE?"
[1324]On other occasions, when his self-contradictions were pointed
[1325]out or when he admitted ignorance of matters he acknowledge he
[1326]should have known, NOSENKO would fall back upon cne of the follow-
[1327]ing lines of defense:
[1329]- “What I know I tell you; what IT remember I tell
[1330]you," or “I den't know," "I can't cxplain," -~ or a shrug.
[1332]- The details, even if confused or contradictory, are
[1333]not important. What is important is the “whole” or entirety
[1334]of the facts, their importance and their “reality." It is
[1335]this that American Intelligence should evaluate, not de-
[1336]tails. —
[1338]= He must be genuine because otherwise “how could I
[1339]have been working with ‘SARDAR' and 'PROKHOR'?" (Johan
[1340]PREISFREUND whose KGB cryptonyr was "PROKHOR," did con-
[1341]firm NOSENKO’s role.} “How else could I “tel? you about
[1342]STORSBERG?" “The KGB would not use a staffer as a provo-
[1343]cateur,” nor would the KGB supply information on "live
[1344]cases" such as the Paris case (JOHNSON) and VASSALL,, and
[1345]reveal the names of its officers abroad.
[1347]~ If American Intelligence checked his story "fully,"
[1348]it woula learn that despite all this confusion, he was genu-
[1349]ine. He repeatedly urged that his interrogators check
[1350]via an independent penrcration of the KGB--there it would
[1351]verify that his name is registered as the case officer who
[1352]opened, held and turned over the ABIDIAN file and thus that
[1353]he was a KGB officer.* a
[1355]NOSENKO referred to this method of corrcborating him at least
[1357]20 times during the interrogaticns of January-March 1965. He said
[1358]on 1 February 1965. that “maybe the day will come when you have
[1360]a source to check and you will find out" (that he was ABIDIAN's
[1362]case officer). Later in the same interrogation session, he added:_
[1363]-*T see how poor and miserable I'm looking with ragarad to ABIDIAN's
[1364]file, but anyone who can check in [KGB] Archives will see.“ On
[1366]> February he said, "I greatly wish that you will have as. soon - -— ~
[1367]as possible an agent in the KGB. It is simple to look at the
[1369]a was the only such source at the time.
[1371]TAN orearTr ,
[1373]nae eet oh A ne mcneegeme anqeeemyanne ee temiine <= +
[1375]te pe geen
[1377]eo oe eaten nee se:
[1378]t
[1380]14-0000
[1384]630.
[1386]file on ABIDIAN. On the first pege is written thet ‘I, NOSENKO,
[1387]Yuriy Ivanovich, opered this file'.* On 1é February he said: “Time’
[1388]will show I am what I say." On 3 March he referred nine times with-
[1389]in one hour to a check via such a source. He repeatedly stated
[1391]that “time will show" that he is not a provocateur. At one point
[1392]he engaged in the following dialogue with his interrogators:
[1394]er or
[1396]NOSENKO: I'm telling you that, if you check, you'll find
[1397]that I‘m right.
[1399]INTZRROGATOR: We're not disputing that you worked for the KGB.
[1400]We're disputing that you held the positions you
[1401]say you held in the KGB.
[1403]NOCSENKO?: That's what I'm saying.  I£ you could check you
[1404]would find thet I was only in these two departments
[1405]and only in these positions...
[1407](later in the session)
[1411]NOSENKO: I can't tell you anything wore. TI can't prove
[1412]anything. Maybe the future will shew.
[1414]INTERROGATOR: What can the future show?
[1416]NOSENKO: X don't know. But from what I understand the check~
[1417]ing has not gone very far. Maybe you can check
[1418]further... I mean, if you have any possibility now,
[1419]I mean by chance, have anyone in the KGB or out of
[1420]the KGB, with any of my acquaintances, friends.
[1422]INTERROGATOR: You mean our acquaintances, don*t you?
[1424]NOSENKO: Yes, but maybe your acquaintances can check wi
[1425]someone, because anyone in the KGB should know
[1426]that, yes, there was a NOSENKO.
[1428]INTERROGATOR: Should we ask someone like VAKHRUSHEV or SUSLOV?
[1430]i NOSENKO: — No, of course not, because I gave you their names.
[1431]: Check someone else, not known to me, so you can be
[1432]sure.
[1434]ad. Additional Observations
[1436](i) Inquisitiveness About CIA
[1438]NOSENKO’s questions about CIA and its activities seemed to his
[1439]interrogators to be beyond the interest or curiosity expected of
[1440]-. Soviet Intelligence defectors. Frequently he asked, even while
[1441]! discussing his own KGB responsibilities: "You tell me about a case,
[1442]i and I will remember details." Other examples of NOSENKO's inquisi-
[1445]- When shown the CIA publication "Checklist of Soviet
[1446]Officials Abroad” during the 1964 meetings in Geneva, NOSENKO
[1447]_- -  - made inquiries about what organization prepared “t and to what
[1448]part of the U.S. Government that organization is subordinate.
[1451]14-0000
[1455]- In January 1964, entirely out of context, he asked
[1456]whether GOLITSY! had reported to CIA that Finnish President
[1457]KEKKCNEN was a KGB agent. (He was not able to explain in
[1458]later questioning why he had not informed CIA about the case
[1459]before he made the foregoing inquiry.)
[1461]- NOSENKO asked precisely how American Intelligence col-
[1462]lection in the USS& is directed and coordinated. The CIA case
[1463]officer responded: “What was that question?” NOSENKO there-
[1464]upon said: “It was not a question--just general interest.”
[1465]When the case officer urged him to repeat the question, he re-
[1466]fused to talk about it and diverted the conversation to other
[1467]matters.
[1469]- He asked where CIA secretaries resided in the Washing-
[1470]ton area. ,
[1472]- NOSENKO tried to find out the grades of the CIA offi-
[1473]cers in contact with him.
[1475]- NOSENKO inquired in early 1964 whether the CIA of fi-
[1476]cer who met him in Geneva two years earlier had received a
[1477]medal for that phase of the operation.
[1479](li) Acceptance of Contrary Information from Other Sources
[1481]Under interrogation, even when accused of lying, NOSENKO
[1482]rarely challenged the validity of CIA's information nor claimed
[1483]superior knowledge. The only facts he challenged strongly were
[1484]incontestably true, such as the date of GOLITSYN‘'s defection, the
[1485]date of ABIDIAN's visit to the Pushkin Street dead drop, KOSC-
[1486]LAPOV's travel separate from JENNER, and KOSOLAPOV's November 1960
[1487]trip to Helsinki. It seemed at all times that he accepted that
[1488]CIA knew more than he did on tovics including ccnditions in the
[1489]USSR and cases and people for whom he claimed direct responsibility.
[1491]‘Be never challenged DERZABIN's statements abcut KGB procedures,
[1493]although: aware that his own information was more recent.
[1494](e) Discussions with NOSENKO on His Own Performance
[1496]After admitting his inability to respond to questions about
[1497]operations in which he said he participated, NOSENKO sometimes
[1498]gave a general appraisal of his own performance. He would admit
[1499]that it was “impossible to have such memory breaks" and agree
[1500]that his response was neither reasonable nor acceptable ("In your
[1501]place I wouldn't believe it either," or on another occasion, "It
[1502]will look bad to your boss"). Admitting that the questions were
[1503]fair, logical, and clearly put, he acknowledged at least a dozen
[1505]_times during the January-March 1965 interrogation that his per-
[1507]formance under questioning was bad and unacceptable.
[1509]largely useless. Out of the 150--or—so--he-said_he_had_ provided,
[1511]he stated that the great majority were "no good,” unimportant, or
[1512]people with whom the KGB had not worked ("Maybe “ANDREY' became
[1514]- not interesting to KGB, changed jobs, and was not so important any
[1516]more"; “some of the agents recruited by the Seventh. Department _
[1517]weren't meeting the KGB"; etc.) He consistently estimated, how-
[1518]ever, that there were about 20 to 25 "good" leads. :
[1520]___ __He also admitted that most of the leads he had passed were : |
[1522]l ur SECRET «
[1525]14-00000
[1527]TOP SECRET
[1529]Cc. Polygraph Testing
[1531]a.) Test in Apral 1964
[1533]Shortly after his defection, NOSENKO agreed to undergo a
[1534]polygraph examination which tre CIA handlers had told him was a
[1535]routine part of his defector processing, He was informed on
[1536]3 April 1964 that the test would be administered the following
[1537]morning, and that it was therefore advisable for him to get a
[1538]good night ‘s rest and to refrain from alconolic Leverages. NOS-
[1539]EXKO @rank heavily on the night of 3 April, did net enter his
[1540]bedroom until 0290 hours on 4 April, and following breakfast at
[1541]0739 hours on 4 April consumed several gin-and-tonics. Subse-
[1542]quently, when NOSENKO thought he was not being observed, he was
[1543]geen to remove nis hand from his lips hurriedly.*.
[1545]Following a medical examination by a physician who noted
[1546]that NOSENKO had been drinking, he was ir.troduced to the CIA
[1547]polygraph operator. An expes:ernced interroga-or, Fluent in the
[1548]Paussian language, this polygraph operator conducted the test in ;
[1549]Russian from 1045 to 1515 hours on 4 April. His report is quoted ‘
[1550]below.
[1552]“The question of Subject's {NOSENKO's) willingness to par-
[1553]ticipate in the polygraph test was one of minor consideration,
[1554]since he had, on previous occasions: agreed that he would take
[1555]the test. However, whether Subject would continue with the
[1556]polygraph testing if confronted with atrempted deception after
[1557]an initial test run, was one of the considered problems. Con-
[1558]sequently, in order to preclude the possibility of Subject's
[1559]terminating the test prior to its completion: it wes decided
[1560]that a minor deviation. from the accepted poiysreph technique
[1561]would be used during the polygraph testing: specifically, to
[1562]insure that a polygraphic rece:¢ of Subject's rezctions to all
[1563]the pertinent questions be obtained prior to challenging him on
[1564]any significant polygraphic deception ungications his charts
[1565]might reflect... This plen was followed throughout the poly-
[1566]graph interview...
[1570]* On 18 May 1964 a report was received on the chemical analysis
[1571]of six types of tablets which had been taken fren NOSENKO's
[1572]personal effects. In this report, a CIA chemical expert made
[1573]the following remarks based on chemical, microscopic, and in-
[1574]strumental analysis including the use of X-ray: “Sample No.
[1575]4238 consisted of three (3) gray tablets wrapped in a piece
[1576]of paper with the name ‘Phenomin' written in Russian. Micro-
[1577]scopic analysis of these tablets established the presence of
[1579]cee ee ee a a te
[1581]_a@-small.amount_of dl-amphetamine sulfate, a large amount of .
[1582]lactose, and a small amount of corn starch; dl-azphetamine is—--——-—
[1584]|
[1586]ee eR ERI 6
[1588]pe, Penn em
[1590]a sympathomimetic agent employed mainly as a central nervous
[1591]system stimulant. The effect of taking amphetamine as a drug
[1592]in conjunction with a polygraph test could exaggerate decep-
[1593]tion responses especially for a weak reactor. No phenothi-
[1594]azine (a tranquilizer) which 1s the active ingredient in
[1595]'Phenomin' was present in these tablets. The tablets do not
[1596]appear to be of U.S. manufacture. ...ASs a result of the above
[1597]examinations it was established that none of the items sub-
[1598]mitted are of the barbiturate family. Although either sul-
[1599]faguanidine (Sample No. 4242) or aspirin (Sample No. 4240)
[1600]could be used (and indeed have been used) as secret ink, they
[1601]are also rormal medicinals which a traveler might carry, and
[1602]there (a nnathine ir the farmilation of the tablets to suadest
[1604]14-0000
[1608]drug prior to testirg, there is no guestioa, based both on analysis
[1610]of Subject's polygraph charts as well as persoral observation dur-
[1612]ing the interview, that Subject has attempted ccliberate ceception
[1614]in the specific pertinent areas which are mentioned below in this ; |
[1615]t
[1617]: i
[1618]“Although the Subject had used both alcohol and some unknown ; . {
[1621]repe st.
[1623]"rt is [my] conclusion that Subject is not a bona fide defector,
[1624]but is a dispatched agent sent by Soviet Inteliigence for a spe-
[1625]cific mission or missicns.
[1627]“According to the plan, the differert phases involving various
[1628]pertinent areas were covered with Subject polyagrachically. Chal-
[1629]lenge of Subject's reacticns was indirect and ‘sort.’ On no occa-
[1630]gion did Subject even attempt to volunteer any explanation of the
[1631]possible causes for his polygraph reactions. He continually denied
[1632]and refused =o admit that there was anyching to any of the questions
[1633]which were asked of him. when the final test questicns were com~
[1634]pleted and a record was cbtained of all of Subject's polygraphic
[1635]responses, the nature of the caallenge and probing was changed.
[1639]"Subject was told thet he was lying to numerous pertinent ques-
[1640]tions and was accused of being a dispatched agent. Subject's only
[1641]explanation to [ay] direct accusation was that ne could not be a
[1642]dispatched agent because of the amount of information he had volun-
[1643]teered to American Intelligence.
[1645]cone ee
[1647]"Subject, who before and throughout testing reflected com-
[1648]plete self-control and ccmposure, now exhibited a completely dif-
[1649]ferent picture. His composure was non-existent, his eyes watered,
[1650]and his hands tremblei. Prior te being confrontec with (my] opinion
[1651]thac Subject was a dispatched agent, when Subject was asked on
[1652]one of the last test runs (a) 1f he were sent to penetrate Ameri-
[1653]can Intelligence and (b) if Subject received instructions from KGB
[1654]on how to attempt to beat the polygraph, his answers were given
[1655]in a voice that actually trembiec...
[1657]"Listed below are all of the questions asked of Subject.
[1658]“series #1:
[1660]Were you born is the Soviet Union? Yes. (No reaction)
[1662]Were you born in the city of Nikolayev? Yes. (No reaction)
[1664]Were you born on 30 October 1927? Yes. (No reaction)
[1666]Did you deliberately give any kind of misinformation when
[1667]you told us your autobiography? No. (Reaction)
[1669]Is NOSENKO the surname which you had at time of birth?
[1671]- “5 o-——----+ - --¥ess--(Reaction)- aa nel
[1673]Are you concerned about the fact that the polygraph test
[1674]- may discover that you are hiding the truth from me? .No.
[1675](No reaction) : .
[1677]Was your father the Minister of Shipbuidling? Yes.
[1678](No reaction)
[1681]14-0000
[1683]sameeren teen nen ass em es see
[1685]634.
[1687]Were you a member of the Comnunist Party before 1356? No.
[1689](No reaction) .
[1690](Subject stated that he applied for candidacy to the Commu-
[1691]nist Party in 1956, and 1n mid-1957 was accepted as a member.)
[1693]Die you deliberately give any misinformation about your work
[1694]and service in the KGB? No. (so reaction)
[1696]Besides your children, is there anything in your life on
[1698]the basis of which someone may blackmail you? No. (No re-
[1699]action)
[1701](Subject stated that his love for his children was the only
[1702]thing that is of any consequence which the Soviets might use
[1703]for blackmail purposes. “However, Subject said he was not
[1704]worried, because reyardless of threats against the welfare
[1705]of his children, he would not allow himself to be black-
[1706]mailed or controlled.)
[1708]Have you ever engaged in any homosexual activity? No.
[1709](Reaction)
[1711]Did you give deliberate misinformation about your education?
[1712]No. (No reaction)
[1714]Did you ever commit a major crime? Ne. (Xo reaction)
[1716]Did you give deliberate misinformation about your military
[1717]service? No. (No reaction)
[1719]"Series #2:
[1721]Did you establish contact with American Intelligence in Geneva
[1722]in 1962? Yes. (No reaction)
[1724]Did you establish contact with American Intelligence in
[1725]Geneva in January 1964? Yes. (No reaction)
[1727]Did you voluntarily defect to the Americans? Yes. (No
[1728]reaction)
[1730]Did you ask for the right of political asylum from the
[1731]Americans? Yes. (No reaction)
[1733]Were you sent to the Americans by the organs of Soviet
[1734]Intelligence (with a special mission)? No. (Reaction)
[1736]Do you have a sincere desire to fight against the KGB and
[1737]all other punitive organs of the Soviet Union? Yes. (No
[1738]reaction)
[1740]Did you establish contact with American Intelligence on
[1741]_orders of the KGB? No. (Reaction)
[1743]oe
[1745]Did anyone know of your intention to defect to the Americans?
[1746]No. (No reaction) ;
[1748]Does the KGB have a pre-arranged signal for establishing
[1749]contact with you in America? No. (Reaction)
[1751]te eee Annan
[1753]y
[1756]14-0000
[1758]ry
[1760].
[1764]w joe SECREEC
[1766]635.
[1768]Do you have a pre-arranged signal for establishing contact
[1769]with Sovict Intelligence? No. (No reaction)
[1771]Do you have a concrete plan to return to the Soviet Union
[1772]sometime in the future? No. (Reaction)
[1774]Are you performing a4 special mission for Soviet Intelligence
[1775]in connection with your defection? No. (Reaction)
[1777]Are you deliberately hiding penetrations made by Soviet
[1778]agents into American Intelligence about which you are
[1779]aware? No. (Reaction)
[1781]_ Are you witting of other recruitments made by Soviet Intel-
[1783]ligence of American Embassy personnel which occurred after
[1784]RHODES and 'ANDREY'? No, (No reaction)
[1786]Are you an agent of the KGB or other Soviet Intelligence
[1787]organs? No. (No reaction)
[1789]Was there any pre-arranged signal included in the letters
[1790]you wrote to your wife (since your defection)? No.
[1791](No reaction)
[1793]"Series #3:
[1795]Did you defect to the Americans in 1964? Yes. (No reaction)
[1797]Did you defect to the Americans in Geneva? Yes. (No re-
[1798]action)
[1800]Did you defect to the Americans with the assignment of un-
[1801]covering plans of American Intelligence against USSR? No.
[1802](Reaction) ot .
[1804]Did you defect to the americans with the assignment to find
[1805]out more about the structure and methods of operation of
[1806]American Intelligence? No. (Reaction)
[1808]Did you defect to the Americans with the aim of penetrating
[1809]American Intelligence? No. (Reaction)
[1811]Did you defect to the Americans because you were dissatis-
[1812]fied with the Soviet system? Yes. (Reaction)
[1814]Did you defect to the Americans with the aim cf discredit-
[1815]ing Soviet officers of the KGB who defected earlier? No.
[1817](No reaction)
[1819]Did you defect to the Americans with the aim of giving mis-
[1821]information about Soviet'agents' -penetration of American.
[1823]ab
[1825]re
[1827]we
[1829]te oe
[1835]we the ae
[1837]it renee ertaenee _—eresbemenscenenmemngemions - +
[1839]pee ng ee mm pee
[1841]2 an een +
[1843]Intelligence? No. (No reaction)
[1845]"Series #4:
[1847]Did you hide anything from American Intelligence about your
[1848]trip to Geneva in 1962? No. (No reaction) ;
[1850]Did you hide anything from American Intelligence about your
[1851]trip to Geneva in 19647 No. (No reaction) a
[1855]14-0000
[1857]EERE nnAnRenenan
[1859]\“ jue SECRET
[1861]Did you hide anything from American Intelligence about your
[1862]trip to Cuba in 1960? No. (Reaction)
[1864]Did you hide anything from American Intelligence about your
[1865]trip to London in 1957? No. (No reaction)
[1867]Did you hide anything from American Intelligence about your
[1868]trip to London in 1958? No. (Xo reaction)
[1870]Did you personally participate in the search for CHEREPANOV
[1871]in December 1963? Yes. (Reaction)
[1873]Is it true that KOVSHUK visited the United States in 1957?
[1874]Yes. (Reaction)
[1876]Did GRIBANOV visit Switzerland in 1962? No. (Ko reaction)
[1878]To your knowledge, did GRIBANOV visit Switzerland in 1964?
[1879]No. (No reaction)
[1881]Was CUK in Switzerland in 1964? Yes. (No reaction)
[1883]"Series #5:
[1885]Did you work for Soviet Intelligence in 19622? Yes. (No
[1886]reaction)
[1888]Did you work for Soviet Intelligence in 19642 Yes. (No
[1889]reaction) ;
[1891]Did you tell us the truth about Lee Harvey OSWALD? Yes.
[1892](No reaction)
[1894]Did you tell us the truth about Yuri KROTKOV? Yes.
[1895](Reaction)
[1897]Were the CHEREPANOV papers especially prepared and ‘passed
[1898]to the Americans by the KGB? No. (Reaction)
[1900]Is it true that Soviet Intelligence has an agent, whose
[1901]name is unknown to you, among the American representatives
[1902]in Paris? Yes. (Reaction)
[1904]Did you bring with you personal identity documents which
[1905]were fabricated by KGB? No. (Reaction)
[1907]Did you give truthful information about the structure of
[1908]the First and Second Chief Directorates of the KGB? Yes.
[1910](No reaction)
[1912]Are you misinforming American Intelligence according to a
[1913]specially--developed—KGB-plan?_—No. (No_reaction)
[1915]-&
[1925]i
[1927]H
[1928]t
[1931]Is it true that AGAYANTS is the Chief of Department D (Dis-
[1932]information)? Yes. (Reaction)
[1934]To your knowledge, was PEDOSEYEV the Chief of the American
[1935]Department of the Second Chief Directorate in 1963 and 1964?
[1936]Yes. (Reaction)
[1938]t
[1941]14-0000
[1943]; a i) - 0p secret ro) - a >
[1945]637.
[1949]Did you drink more than you told me? No. (Reaction) oa
[1950](Subject admitted to having only one gin and tonic prior
[1951]to testing.)
[1953]Did you know that American Intelligence uses the polygraph? , _
[1954]Yes. (No reaction) \ .
[1956]Did anyone in the Soviet Union explain to you anything about” ; i
[1957]American Intelligence's use of the polygraph. . (No - ‘,
[1958]reaction) .
[1960]Did anyone in th: KGB explain anything about the polygraph j
[1961]to you? No. (No reaction) i
[1963]During the last twenty-four hours, did you take any medi-
[1964]cine or pills? No. (Reaction)
[1966]Did you receive instructions from the KGB on how to attempt
[1967]to beat the polygraph? No. (Reaction) \
[1969]Were you ever hypnotized by anyone? No. {No reaction)
[1971]Did you bring any types of medicine or pills with you (from |
[1972]abroad or from the Soviet Union)? No. (Reaction)
[1974]Do you have any pills or medicine about which you have not
[1975]told me? No. (Reaction)
[1977]pills with him which he brought from Mescow and which [were]
[1979]in his portfolio, he declined to admit that he had had more liquor
[1980]than he told [me], that he had received specific instruc- Sant
[1981]tions about the polygraph from the KGB, or that he had taken any
[1985]“Although Subject later admitted that he had two types of |
[1986]type of pills during the last twenty-four hours.* |
[1987]|
[1989]t
[1992]14-0000
[1994]Cres tots
[1995]yu MS
[1997]638.
[1999]2. Test in October ).965 on Lee Harvey OSWALD
[2000]a. Introduction
[2002]CIA conductec ¢ volygraph examination of NOSENKO on
[2003]18 October 1966 on tte subject of Lee Harvey OSWALD. *
[2005]Since the previous polygraph test in April 1964, NOSENKO
[2006]had been under close security guard, his movenents restricted,
[2007]and tn the interin had been interrogated in detail and accused
[2008]of bad faith in dealing with U.S. Government authorities.
[2009]NOSEAKO had not been interviewed by CIA during the six months
[2010]prior to October 1966. He had had no access to alcohol or
[2011]drugs, his food consumption had been normal, ard his sleep
[2012]had been adequate. .
[2014]NOSENKO was given no advance notice of the polygraph
[2015]examination. Upon entering the room where it was to take
[2016]place, he immediately recognized the officer present as the
[2017]person who administered the first CIA polygraph test two and
[2018]one-half years earlier. NOSENKO correctly said that they had
[2019]first met on 4 April 1964.
[2021]In the pre-test interview, questions on the OSWALD case
[2022]were put to NOSENKO in Russian, his answers (also in Russian)
[2023]were recorded, the operation of the machine vas explained,
[2024]and clarifications of the questions ard his answers were
[2025]made. The three series of questions pertaining to the OSWALD
[2026]case are given below in their entirety, and they are followed
[2027]by the conclusions of the polygraph expert.
[2029]b.. Results
[2030]"Series No. 1
[2031]1. Was Lee Harvey OSWALD ever in the Soviet Union?
[2032]ARfswer: Yes. (No reaction)
[2033]2. Was OSWALD in the Soviet Union from 1959 to 1961?
[2034]Answer: Yes. (No reaction)
[2036]3. Did you receive special instructions about what to
[2037]tell the Americans about the OSWALD case?
[2039]Answer: No. (Reaction)
[2040]4. Did you personally meet OSWALD?
[2042]Answer: No. (No reaction)
[2044]a eae ee tee Speman
[2046]i
[2048]5. Was OSWALD recruited by KGB as an agent?
[2049]Answer: No. (No reaction)
[2051]6. Were you glad that President Kennedy was killed?
[2052]Answer: No. (Reaction)
[2054]7. Other than what you told me, did you'actively parti-
[2055]cipate in the OSWALD case prior to 1963?
[2057]Answer: No. (No reaction)
[2059]Ne a aa nen
[2060]ee 22. Mek KONE Bae Jae dT ae MCUTAT I
[2063]14-0000
[2065]_ =). _ 7 4 =)- as
[2066]~-TOP:SECRET
[2068].
[2070]639.
[2072]8. Did you see a photograph of OSWALD in 1963?
[2073]Answer: Yes. (Reaction)
[2074]9. Was Marina PRUSAKOVA an agent of KGB?
[2076]Answer: No. (No reaction)
[2078]9a. Before her marriage to OSWALD?
[2079]Answer: No, (Reaction)
[2081]9b. After her marriage to OSWALD?
[2083]Answer: No. (No reaction) i
[2084]10. Did you personally meet Marina PRUSAKOVA?
[2085]Answer: No, {No reaction)
[2087]ll. Did OSWALD have any kind of contact with the 13th
[2088]Otdel of the First Chief Directorate?
[2090]cage ie oe me
[2092]Answer: No. (No reaction)
[2093]12. Did KGB prepare OSWALD for committing assassinations?
[2094]Answer: No, (No reaction)
[2096]13. Was OSWALD prepared (trained) by KGB to kill President
[2097]Kennedy?
[2099]Answer: No. (No reaction)
[2101]24.* Did you hear of OSWALD (case) prior to President
[2102]Kennedy's assassination?
[2104]Answer: Yes. (Reaction) .
[2106]"“Subject's (NOSENKO's) most significant reactions on
[2107]this test series were to questions 3 and 24--other reactions
[2108]of a lesser significance were evident to questions 6, B, 9a,
[2109]and 10.
[2111]"Series No. 2
[2113]20. Is the name OSWALD familiar to you?
[2115]Answer: Yes. (No reaction)
[2117]21. Did-you ever read the OSWALD case?
[2118]Answer: Yes. (No reaction)
[2120]22. Was this the full and official KGB case on OSWALD?
[2121]Answer: Yes. (Reaction)
[2123]23. Did you give us any kind of information about
[2124]OSWALD?
[2126]Answer: Yes. (No reaction)
[2128]*Before the beginning of the examination, the polygraph operator
[2130]14-0000
[2132]i, —_
[2133]ad ww
[2135]Top Seni
[2137]. |
[2138]pe i
[2139]ne ae Beatie be Wa "
[2141]640.
[2143]Fr
[2144]r
[2145]i
[2146]Be,
[2149]24. Did you hear of the OSWALD (case) prior to President
[2150]: Kennedy's assassination?
[2152]Answer: Yes. (Reaction)
[2154]24a. Did you hear of the OSWALD (case) only after President
[2155]Kennedy's death?
[2157]oo eepeecenere:
[2159]Answer: Instead of the usual yes or no énswer,
[2160]Subject answered: ‘Before and after.‘
[2161]When the question was repeated, he again
[2162]answered: ‘Eefore and after.' Only when
[2163]the question was asked a third time on a
[2164]subsequent test did he answer ‘No.' (Reaction) i
[2165](Subject reacted when he answered ‘Before and
[2166]after,' and when he answered ‘No,"
[2168]A ap
[2170]25. Did the KGB consider OSWALD atnormal?
[2171]Answer: Yes. (No reaction) {
[2173]26. As far as you know, did Marina OSWALD know about her
[2174]husband's plen to kill President Kenneay?
[2176]Answer: No. (No reaction)
[2178]: 27. To your knowledge did OSWALD talk with a KGB officer
[2180]i in Mexico?
[2182]i io
[2184]‘ Answer: No. (No reaction) ; an |
[2185]28. Did OSWALD return to the United States in 19612? , ,
[2187]Answer: Yes. (No reaction) Subject's reaction
[2189]: to this question was inconsistent when he
[2191]i answered 'Yes.' hence the (No reaction)
[2193]4 notation. However, it is noteworthy that
[2195]' Subject did not attempt to correct the
[2197]! date of OSWALD's departure to the U.S.? Hy
[2199]OSWALD returned to the U.S. in June 1962
[2200]and not. in 1961. ‘
[2202]29. Is your contact with the OSWALD case part of your
[2203]legend (cover story)? :
[2205]Answer: No. (Reaction)
[2207]30, Did you really take part in the OSWALD case in 19597
[2209]- “Answer: Yes. (Reaction)
[2211]"Subject's most significant reactions were to questions
[2212]22, 24, 24a, 29 and 30.
[2214]“Series No. 3
[2217]er
[2219]13.
[2221]17a.
[2223]18c.
[2225]3a.
[2227]collect material cy “SWALD?
[2228]Answer: Yes. (Reaction)
[2230]Did you personally talk on the V. Ch. with Minsk
[2231]about the OSWALD case in 1963?
[2233]Answer: Yes. (Reaction)
[2235]Were you instructed on the OSWALD case by one of
[2236]the KGB operational officers?
[2238]Answer: No. (Reaction)
[2239]Did the KGB instruct you to tell us OSWALD was
[2240]a bad shot?
[2242]Answer: No. (No reaction)
[2244]Do you know definitely that OSWALD was not of opera-
[2245]tipnal interest to KGB?
[2247]Answer: Yes. (Reaction).
[2249]Did KGB give the OSWALDs asy kind of help in their
[2250]departure from the Soviet Union?
[2252]Answers No. (No reaction)
[2254]“Did you receive special instructions from the KGB
[2256]about what to tell the Americans about OSWALD?
[2257]Answer: No. (Reaction)
[2259]"Subject's reactions to the questions so: indicated
[2261]were about equal in consistency and significance. .
[2264]“On the basis of an analysis of the polygraph charts
[2266]obtained during Subject's polygraph interrogation and
[2268]‘testing during the 18 October 1966 session, it is [my|
[2271]opinion that:
[2273]a. Subject was not personally or actually
[2274]involved in the OSWALD case from 1959 to 1961 while
[2275]OSWALD was in the Soviet Union.
[2277]b. Subject heard of OSWALD only after Kennedy's
[2278]assassination; however, he was not an active partici-
[2279]pant in 1963 as he indicates, but was probably
[2280]briefed on the case by a KGB officer.
[2282]. se + ene -
[2283]JOP SECRET
[2284]641. |
[2285]16, Did you personally order RASTRUSIN, in 1959, to |
[2286]|
[2287]|
[2289]OAR IER AR eee ERROR nA A NRNRNTS oo OA * A RASA BRI FOS TS SS SS eg tee
[2291]Cre Subject-received-special instructions
[2292](from the KGB) about the OSWALD case and what to
[2293]tell American authorities about it."
[2295]TAD CECRQET
[2297]14-0000
[2299]D 2.
[2301]642.
[2303]L ery .
[2305]VIIZ. NOSENKO'S BONA PIDES: ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
[2307]h. Introduction
[2309]It is standard procedure to assecs the bona fides of each
[2310]intelligence and counterintelligence source, and special care is
[2311]required in assessing sources of information relevant to the secu-
[2312]rity of the. United States.
[2314]One difficulty in doing so with a Soviet source is that
[2315]Soviet realities, particularly in the KGB, are imperfectly known:
[2316]Bxcept where independent informatic>, is available, it is risky to
[2317]say ard impossible to prove what the Soviets--most notably the
[2318]KCB--would or would not do in any given situation, or what any
[2319]given KGB officer should or should not know. Independent informa-
[2320]tion, voluminous in quantity although never comprehensive and
[2321]entirely current, nevertheless has been assimilated from the re-
[2322]ports of the several KGB staff officers who have defected, from
[2323]the KGS agents who have confessed, and from the Western services
[2324]which nave investigated KGB activities. There is, therefore, 4
[2325]base of reliable knowledge upon_whicn to predicate an assessment
[2326]of a source reporting on the KG3, even one who peincipally covers
[2327]a KGB component (in this instance the Second Chief Directorate) :
[2328]upen which there previously had Leen relatively little inside |
[2329]i
[2332]|
[2333]|
[2335]Pe OTE Deen
[2337]cnformation. Moreover, in the absence of direct evidence from
[2338]other sources, it would be arbitarily confining if an assumption
[2339]dece not made that certain KGB standards are at least comparable
[2340]to these of Western services. Such prior knowledge and, to a
[2341]limited extent, such an assumption are factors in the assessnent
[2342]of Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO that is submitted here.
[2344]A much more prominent factor in this assessment, however,
[2345]is NOSENKO's ow testimony. CIA has exhaustively debriefed and
[2346]interrogated NOSENKO, his leads were checked, his information wa3
[2347]studied, and a large body of facts pertinent to his bona fides
[2348]was thus assembled. These details, a5 well as direct evidence
[2349]from other sources and the views of specialists affiliated with
[2350]CIA, have been presented in Part ITi. through Part VII. of this
[2352]paper.
[2354]Tre basic questions with recard to the bona fides of
[2355]NOSENKO are the following:
[2357]_ I5 there reason to question the general accuracy
[2358]aud completeness of NOSENKO's accounts of his situation
[2359]and motivations in contacting CIA and later defecting,
[2360]his personal life, military service, positions in the
[2361]KGB, personal participation in KGB operations, know-
[2362]ledgeability about KGB activities and the way he learned
[2364]of them, and his associations with KGB personnel?
[2366]| . - If£ there are grounds for doubting the general
[2367]accuracy and completeness of these accounts, then what
[2368]are the explanations for NOSENKO's actions, for the , |
[2370]nature of the information he has provided, and for
[2371]\ other Soviet sources having authenticated his personal
[2372]- \ life and KGB career?
[2374]In assessing the bona fides of NOSENKO, the classic method
[2375]has been used: evaluating his production and sourcing, examining
[2376]his autobiography, and appraising him and the circumstances of
[2377]this operation. These points, with the conclusions drawn from
[2378]each, are reviewed below. Tne ciscussion continues with a survey
[2379]of the sources who have corroboratec NOSENKO's background and .
[2380]status, and this is followed by argumentations on the various
[2381]hypotheses which could explain NOSENKO as a source. The final
[2382]portion is a summary of conclusions about NOSENKO's bona fides.
[2384]14-0000
[2386]B. Evaluation of Production
[2388]1. Introduction : “oe
[2390]What a Soviet source reports is one factor in assessing his : tk
[2391]good faith. Rarely, however, can it be conclusive: Even a genuine . :
[2392]and conscientious source may be poorly informe’ or misinformed; he
[2393]may be hampered by forgetfulness, mental shortcomings, or lack of
[2394]education; his reporting may be incomplete because he is not avail-
[2395]able long enough to permit amplification and clarification of his
[2396]information. On the other hand, a Soviet-controlled agent who is
[2397]planted on the opposition may be supplied with useful, voluminous,
[2398]and accurate information.
[2400]There are several standards which may be applied to the assess-
[2401]ment of a source's production. Each of them is qualified; none ts
[2402]likely to be conclusive by itself; and ali of them tougeliier may not
[2403]permit a definite conclusion, although they do contribute to a
[2404]broader assessment cf bona fides. The standards are:
[2406]First, how does the information equate, in terms of complete-
[2407]ness, accuracy, and detail, with the source's claimed or proven
[2408]position and access to information? (In this, one judges the in-
[2409]ternal consistency of the source's reporting and also compares it
[2410]with information from other sources and fron investigations.)
[2412]Second, dces the information harm the opposition? (This point
[2413]is risky to judge, for a genuine source may simply not know any-
[2414]thing harmful to his country. Also, information which seems harm-
[2415]ful to the USSR may not actually be such in Soviet eyes; for ex-
[2417]— ample, the loss of an apparently valuable agent could be mitigated
[2418]po by the KGB‘s possession of better or comparable assets still un- :
[2419]; exposed. } . a |
[2421]Third, is the information important or useful to us? (This
[2422]point may in some cases ke irrelevant, for information useful to
[2423]us may not harm the opposition, ard the apparent usefulness of in-
[2424]formation may not balance against the time and effort required to
[2425]process and investigate it.)
[2427]These standa.ds have been applied in evaluating the production _
[2428]of NOSENKO on the topics discussed below.
[2430]NOSENKO's production is exclusively in the field of counter-
[2431]intelligence information. As described in Part VI.A., he did not
[2432]have any useful positive intelligence. This coes not necessarily
[2434]: affect the question of his bona fides, however, for NCSENKO ciaims
[2435]: to have been a KG3 internal counterintelligence officer. From a
[2437]: comparative standpoint, not one of the previous KGB officers who
[2438]defected to Western services has protuced significant military,
[2439]economic, or scientific information on the USSR, and only a few
[2440]-have supplied political intormation (usually concerned with the
[2441]personalities and relationships in the ruling group of the Comu-
[2443]nist Party). Therefore, nothing of positive intelligence conse-.--—-—-—- oe bee
[2445]quence is expected of NOSENKO, altt.ough some question might be
[2446]raised about his inability to report on the leadership of the
[2447]Soviet regime in view of his father's position and NOSENKO's
[2448]continuing contacts with the leadership after his father's death.
[2449]The failure of NOSENKO to respond to questionnnaires along posi-
[2450]tive intelligence lines is not considered unusual.
[2452]14-0000
[2454]a
[2458]644.
[2460]NOSENKO's counterintellicence production includes all of his
[2461]information on the Soviet intelligence and security organs?
[2463]~ their structure, functions, methods, end procedures;
[2464]~ their officers, and their agents of Soviet citizenship:
[2466]- their operetional activities inside and outside the
[2467]USSR.
[2469]For the most part this portion of the paper (as in Fart ViII.C.
[2470]through Part VIII.F.) follows a format in which the evidence is
[2471]summarized, the facts interpreted, and conclusions presented.
[2473]2. SB Orgenization, Personalities, Methods
[2475]Ability to discuss the structure of his service in general
[2476]and at least some of its components in particular is an absolutely
[2477]minimal requirement for aryone who claims to have beer employed
[2478]within that service. At the same time, current infoms:ation or the
[2479]organization of an intelligence service is of class:c interest to
[2480]opposing intelligerce and security services.. Organizational
[2481]changes are indicators of policy and planning trends in the ser-
[2482]vice: shert of a penetration of the service's leadership, such
[2483]changes are perhaps the most reliable reflection of changes in
[2484]operational emphasis and tactics.
[2486]Had NCSENKO's information on the organization of the KGB
[2487]been novel in this sense, it would have been of corsiderable
[2488]value, while the exposure of this information--elthough perhaps
[2489]rot a major loss to the Soviets--woule nonetheless have been
[2490]against the KGB's best interests. MOSENKO's reperts on the
[2491]organization of the. KGB in 1964 (Paces 352-358) agree with and
[2492]are a logical extension of that framework of KGB organization
[2493]newly revealed py the 1961 sources, but this weighs neither for
[2494]nor against him as the source: In the absence of contradictory
[2495]information, he cannot be subject to criticism or to suspicion
[2496]because his reports show no redirection of the thrust of the
[2497]KGB. Purtnermore, SNOSENKO's statements indicating that there’
[2498]have been no major changes in the years between the 1959 re-
[2499]organization and 1964 are acgeptadie in the light of available
[2500]information from other sources. The information which NOSENKO
[2501]provided on the KGB's organization therefore neither supports
[2502]nor discredits his bona fides.
[2504]ROSENKO's information o: some 1,090 Soviets connected with
[2505]intelligence end security activities is an impressive echieve-
[2506]ment of memory. These identifications, however, must be evalu-
[2507]ated according to the Gamage inflicted upon the Soviets by his
[2508]exposure of these personalities. In tnis respect, the discus-
[2509]sion must concern new identifications, for intelligence person-
[2510]alities previously exposed could not be damaged any further by
[2511]a repetition of their compromise. This discussion mzst be fur-
[2512]ther restricted to new identifications of staff persoznel, be-
[2513]cause the entire Soviet population is available to the KGB for
[2514]occasional use as it sees fit, with the loyalty and discretion
[2515]of the individual as the only limiting factors; to learn that a
[2516]Soviet employed at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow is an agent re-
[2517]porting to the KGB is to learn nothing that has not already
[2518]been taken for granted, and besices, no action on such infor-
[2519]mation can be taken. Finally, the new identifications also
[2521]anrancrnt
[2523]'
[2524]i
[2526]'
[2528]dt TM
[2530]= em a ee
[2532]14-0000
[2534]a 2 Vi eevuel a
[2536]645.
[2538]must be amcng persons who are tdentifiabte ane accessible, or the
[2539]information is useless to Western services ar2 4s ro loss to the
[2541]t. Soviets. On this kesis, omy ¥GB First Chief L:rectcrate as well
[2542]as GRU identifications merit inclusion ir this -weluation, since
[2543]“hese are the officers who normally appear akroad and participate
[2544]in agent operations. Although KGY Second Chief Directorate per-
[2545]sornel have in the past transferred to the First Chief. Directorate,
[2546]this ig rot a predictable event and cannot be considered in dis-
[2547]cussion of current damage.
[2549]i
[2551]NOSENKO idertified 165 First Chicf Directcrate personnel, but
[2552]only 149 could be located in CIA files (i.9., were identifiable ty
[2553]name); the remaining 16 nanes from NOSENKO were valueless as they
[2554]were untraceable. Of the 149, there were 37 «ho were not knoen or
[2555]suspected as intelligence officers prior to the receipt of NOSENKO's 4
[2556]information. Cr 37, there were 24 who ex;ther resided sbroad at the ; ‘
[2558]_time of NCSENKO's defection or were cont abroad since that time.*
[2559]! Assuming that NUSEIKO was correct in his idertifications of all
[2560]| 24 members of the KGB who were accessible, ** 4% cannot ve said _
[2561]that the nurber is so large that the danage to XGB agent opora- t
[2562]4 cions «as substantial. None of NOSENKO's unique GRU idencifica-
[2563]tions were abroad et tne tine of nis defection or have been eince.
[2564]These personality identificazions hence do not serve as evidence
[2565]of NGSENKO's bona fades. At the sate tine, nis inability to do
[2566]further measurable t.arm to the KCB ir this regacd cannot be: held
[2567]against him, either, for he has clai:sred service only an the Second
[2568]Chief Directorate throughout his cereer and zo cannot be expected '
[2569]to know a high percentage of the First Chief virectorate comple-
[2570]ment. Therefore, NOSENKO's intelligence personality identifications
[2571]do not constitute a factor in finding for or acainst his bona fides.
[2573]NOSEKKO has been the source of many interesting details and
[2574]examples of KGB modus operandi (Pages 359-360), but while useful
[2575]for ilizstrative purposes and valuable because of the fact that
[2576]the meterial was easily coliatable for study purposes, none of
[2577]the methods described could ke consicered new and revealing, and
[2578]their exposure in any event would rot prevent their continued use
[2579]in the future. NOSENKO's ciscussior of the only double agent case
[2580]in whicn he claimea to have played a role, however, demonstrates
[2581]his lack of knowledge of the principles and purposes of such an
[2582]operation. This case, PELITSKIY, is a subjeawt of sensrate
[2584]sensitive sources f eg Sa >
[2585]* CE these 24, ten were identified by % pee yice wei as KGB
[2586]if and thereafter, and two became prominently ecrive in
[2588]insecure KGB operations shortly after NOSENKO identified them.
[2590]i *#Cther evidence has contradicted staterents by NOSENKO to the
[2591]effect that certain Soviets were not affiliated with the KGB; i
[2592]in Geneva, for example, where he had daily access to the KGB |
[2593]Legal Residency for months and claimed nearly complete know- |
[2594]ledge of KGB personnel, he ramed 15 of a KGB staff which he .
[2595]said totalled ac the most 18; CIA identifications of KGB of fi- :
[2596]cers in Geneva on the basis of other sources, investigations
[2597]and analysis totalled at least double this number and probably
[2599]: triple, as many as 55 of the approximately 120 Soviets station-
[2600]- 1 : . -ed there (a proportion which ts consistent with other areas:
[2601]and defectors' estimates). NOSENKO was not entirely accurate
[2602]: concerning even KG8 officers on his own delegation in Geneva,
[2603]i as noted on Pages 12 and 13. Therefore, the accuracy of oo {
[2604]i NOSEIKO's original idertifications. positive or negative,
[2605]cannot be accepted without question.
[2607]en eenermemnnnne ee
[2609]TOP SECRET
[2611]14-0000
[2613]ener pe enema arene inne emai ne et re
[2617]TOP SECRET
[2619]646.
[2621]discussion below. This subject, tuo, must be considered neutral
[2622]evidence in the bona fides assessment.
[2624]NOSENKO has shown himself to be both uninformed and inaccurate
[2626]‘in nis answers to questicns on KGB Headquarters staff procedures
[2628](Page 360 and Pages 619-624). He has been unadie to contribute
[2629]any new information, although there has been no detailed repcrting
[2630]on the subject since 1954, (GOLITSYN in 1962 provided some new
[2631]material on procedures but was never comprehensively cebriefed on
[2632]the topic.) Thus, information on the more up-to-date forms, co-
[2633]ordinaticn requirements, mechanization of records and tracing
[2634]mechanisms, etc., could have been a singular contribution to our
[2635]knowledge; NOSENKO could not describe anything of this sort. When
[2636]he replied to questions about such matters for the period covering
[2637]his entry into the KGB. on which vorevious reporting is available
[2638]in detail, he answered incorrectly ca numerous points. NOSENKO's
[2639]tendency to improvise when he did not know the correct answer or
[2640]when he had. forgotten has been characterized by a CIA psychelogist
[2641]as the behavior of a pathological liar saviny face in a tight
[2642]psychological situation. When he could not produce a correct
[2643]answer in this area of reporting, NOSENKO may have improvised
[2644]because he is a liar or because he is concealing an ignorance
[2646][based on Aot having been a KGB Headquarters officer.
[2648]3. Cperational Leads
[2650]a. Introduction
[2652]Consideration of NOSENKO's operational leads must take into
[2653]account the KGB positions and personal associaticns (with attendant
[2654]access to information) which NOSENZO has claimed for himself. He
[2655]todicated that the Leeadth of his knowledge about KGB agent opera-
[2656]tions and development cases increased as he rose from case officer
[2657]in the U.S. Embassy Section in 1953-1955 and in the American Yourist
[2658]Section in 1955-1958 to become Deputy Chie of the latter section
[2659]in 1958-1959, Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Secticn in 1960-1961,
[2660]and finally Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department from 1962 until
[2661]his defection. Simultaneously he established iasting contacts with
[2662]his KGB colleagues so that, for example, even after leaving the
[2663]U.S. Embassy Section for the second time, in December 1961, NOSENKO
[2664]kept abreast of its most important activities. On these grounds
[2665]NOSENKO presented himself as an authoritative source, one who
[2666]could detail the successes and failures of the KGB in recruiting
[2667]Westerners--especially Americans--in the USSR over the years from
[2668]1953 through 1963. Repeatedly NOSENKO asserted that his leads to
[2669]KGB agents constituted proof of his bona fides.
[2671]b. Operations Involving Americans
[2673]NCSENKO drew a picture of the recruitment scene in Moscow
[2674]showing that: .
[2676]- Since the—"ANDREY"-case of the early 1950's* the KGB
[2677]recruited no Americans on the U.S. Embassy staff, succeed-
[2678]ing only in recruiting one contract employee who was in
[2679]Moscow on TDY. NOSENKO reported on recruitment approaches
[2680]to six American officials stationed in Moscow, all of whom
[2682]FHONENET placed thre recnied tment date prior to hia entry into
[2683]the vat in earty bel, fat Dayle Wy EMETH Ceo eryptonym
[2684]PANUKEY") said he became 4 KGB agent 20 Novemler or December
[2685]1953.
[2687]TNb Ornn.
[2690]20000
[2692]TOP SECRET
[2694]647.
[2696]refused to collaborate with the KCB, He discussed 14 develop-
[2697]ment cases which never culm:cated in recruitment approaches
[2699]to these U.S. Government employees in Moscow, and he named
[2701](2) officials at the Moscow Embassy who were investigated by
[2702]the KGB, ‘These operations, NOSENXO assertcd, comprised ther
[2703]total KGB activity acainst Embassy personnel] with the ex-
[2704]ception of the technical penetrations (see Part VIII.B.4.).
[2706]~ Seven American correspondents in Mescow had been re-
[2707]cruited Ly the KGB, four cf them known to NOSENKO from the
[2708]years 1953-1954 when he was working against U.S. newspaper-
[2709]men. Another two were under development by the KGB during
[2710]that period. .
[2712]- The Arerican Express Company representative in Moscow,
[2713]Arsene FRIFPEL, had become a KGS agent in 1959; NOSENKO was
[2714]the case officer. .
[2716]- The number of American visitors recruited by the KGS
[2717]in 1962-1963 was 14, and if there had been others, NOSENKO
[2718]would have kaown ebout them in light of his senior position
[2719]in the Tourist Cepartment curing tnat period. Moreover, for
[2720]the years kefore 1962, NOSFE::KO provided leads to 19 other
[2721]American tourists whem the KGB recruited, plus one who was
[2722]serving the GRU when he came to Moscow. NOSENKO also de-
[2723]scribed 18 development cases and nine investigations in
[2724]which the targets were American tourists.
[2726]As for KGB operations outside the Soviet Union, NOSENKO gave leads
[2727]to four recruited Americans about whom he learned through conver-
[2728]sations with KGB associates:. a U.S. intelligence officer having
[2729]the KGB cryptonym "SASKA" (still unidentified), a pen2tration of
[2730]Orly Courier Transfer S5:ation (identified as Sergeant Robert Lee
[2731]JCHNSCN), and two agents in Geneva (naines not given and as yet nct
[2732]positively identified). NOSENKO leagned of the KS5 agent status
[2733]CoG afre G. LUNTA an Averican professor, because he toc
[2735](LUNT's recruitment while on TDY_ in fia, and of the & ;
[2736]Legal agent GRE farm because of the connection
[2737]between pand Bernard K an American tourist with whose
[2738]case NOSENKO was personally involved. In addition, NOSEIKO de-
[2739]scribed two development cases with U.S. citizens. From his know-
[2740]ledge of the "SASHA" operation, NOSENKO also knew that the KGB
[2741]had no ager.t sources able to supply information concerning the
[2742]Cuban missile crisis of October 1962.
[2744]esidenc
[2746]{i) Completeness, Accuracy, Detail and Consistency of Reporting
[2748]If he occupied the various KGB positions as claimed, if his
[2749]access were as broad as he said it was, NOSENKO has provided a.
[2751]. comprehensive. review of KGS: operations involving Americans in
[2753]the USSR.
[2755]Other information, however, contradicts NOSENKC's assurances
[2756]that he reported on all major cases involving Americans working
[2757]at the U.S. Exbassy in Moscow: -
[2759]_- GOLITSYN's reports indicate that a U.S. military code
[2760]Clerk was recruited in 1960, and other factors point toward
[2761]this person being James STORSBERG or possibly William HURLEY
[2762](Pages 166-182). NOSENKO, the supervisor of Operations
[2763]against Embassy code clerks.in 1960-1961, stated that
[2765]|
[2768]400000
[2770]ee ec a RE AE
[2774]_— 2 SECREL,
[2776]648.
[2778]y
[2781]2M Ohaa Wi
[2783]STORSBERG rejected the recruitment approach, and when inter- :
[2784]viewed on the basis of the NOSENKO lead, STORSBERG confirmed . :
[2785]this. Both agree the approach was made in the latter part
[2789]~ GOLITSYN's reports cover six other operatipns (Pages
[2790]595-598) which NOSENKO has not mentioned: The KG3's recruit-
[2791]ment of a female employee at the Embassy in 1957, the pre-
[2792]sence of a code clerk in the Embassy in 1960 who was a KG3
[2793]agent, an unsuccessful recruitment approach to a female sec-
[2794]retary at the Embassy prior to July 1960, the KG2 plan to
[2795]complete the recruitment of en Anericen Giplomat following
[2796]his reassignment from Moscow in 1959, the KGB's recruitmer.t
[2797]of or planned recruitment approach to a U.S. Embassy employee
[2798](possibly a code clerk) prior to April/May 1960, and a KGB
[2799]officer's trip t9 Helsinki to accompany ar Embassy ‘code clerk:
[2800]traveliing py train to Moscow. (There is documentary evi-
[2801]dence to support the accuracy of GOLITSYN's statements ebout
[2802]the last of these cases; see beiow.)
[2804]|
[2805]|
[2809]On the basis of available information, NOSENKO cannot be
[2810]faulted on the completeness of his reporting about American tour-
[2811]ists recruited, approached, and under development by the KGB, but
[2812]he could cite only one instance of KGB investigations uncovering |
[2813]tourists dispatched to the USSR by American Intelligence (Pages . i
[2814]145-150).* He knew nothing concerning two documents of CIA origin su
[2815]which described "legal travel" operations, one discussing forth- se
[2816]coming tasks of American agents in the tourist season of 1959, a See
[2817]year in which NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the American Tourist toe 4
[2818]Section. These documents were placed in the hands of the KGB by _
[2819]George BLAKE of MI-6 in July 1959 (before the end of the tourist arene 5
[2820]: a season) and in 1960; NOSENKO was not familier with any aspects of 4
[2821], : the KGB operation with SLAKE, That the Tourist Department was :
[2822]aware of U.S. Intelligence sending agents under tourist cover to
[2823]the Soviet Union in the years when NOSZNKO was Deputy Chief of
[2824]the American Tourist Section is demonstrable by four cases of
[2825]1958 and 1959 cited in‘a KGB document supplied by GOLITSYN, NOS-
[2826]ENKO, although having no information on KGB countermeasures
[2827]. against American tourists in 1958 and 1959, knew that the docu-
[2828]: . ment had been passed to CIA by COLITSYN and that it had been
[2829]i written in the Tourist Department. Where NOSENKO's reporting
[2830]io on American tourist cases is checkable, therefore, it has been
[2831]found to be incomplete.
[2833]t
[2835]i ee
[2837]! * NOSENKO reported that of nine other tourists investigated by
[2839]po, the KGB, eight were suspected of having current connections
[2841]| ; with American Intelligence. The KGB was correct with regard
[2842]-- ..2°° go Thomas BARTHELEMY and Robert CERISTNER, who were on CIA
[2844]: missions, and Alfred SLESINGER, an FBI informant who neverthe-
[2846]a poe less had no American Intelligence mission when he visited the
[2848]USSR in 1961° and 1962: Frederick BARGHOORN, arrested in the —
[2850]i USSR in 1963, had been affiliated with U.S..military intelli-
[2852]; gence many years before, and Ray GARTHOFF had severed his
[2854]por. association with CIA as an overt employee before he went to
[2856]Moscow in 1963. Concerning the rest reportedly suspected by
[2858]the KGB--Donald ALBINGER, Bernard KOTEN, and Gabriel REINER--
[2860]none was associated with American Intelligence in any way.
[2863]14-0000
[2865]pop Oe
[2866]bus eLliail .
[2868]649.
[2870]NOSEXKO's reporting on individual cases wherein he was 8 per- ‘
[2871]sonal participant or supervisor is not, with few exceptions, con- f |
[2873]° tradicted by information available from other sources. Nearly all {
[2874]of his statements have proven accurate when they could be compared
[2875]with collateral information: In fact, the Americans whom he cited
[2877]dia visit or live in the Soviet Union, and many of them are known
[2879]. to have been of operational interest to the KGS, as NOSENKO said.
[2880]+ The exceptions to his general accuracy of reporting, however, are
[2881]of major importance in thenselves and in reference to his claimed
[2883]positions in the U.S. Embassy. Section during 1960-1961:*
[2885]rod
[2887]NOSENKO Collateral .
[2888]U.S. Embassy Security Officer CIA records on the PEXYKOVSKIY i
[2889]John V. ABIDIAN, for whom NOSENKO case, in which the Pushkin :
[2890]was the responsible KGB officer, Street dead drop was used, show :
[2891]visitea the Pushkin Street dead that ABIDIAN visited the site {
[2892]drop site in 1960 or at the begin- only once, on 30 December 1961 !
[2893]ning of 1961, Later that same at 1130 hours. KOZLOV left New ,
[2895]day KOZLOV, Chief of.the KGB Sur- York City on the same day, :
[2896]veillance Directorate) went to the travelling via France, at the :
[2897]scene. -oON completion of a TDY in the i
[2898]i United States. (Pages 231- |
[2900]j let af 2357 this subject is discussed
[2901]on at greater length in Part
[2902]VIII.B.6.)
[2903]; KOSOLAPOV, NOSENKO's direct sub- Travel records show that KOSO- Ae a
[2904]ordinate, made but one TDY to LAPOV was twice in Helsinki : '
[2905]Helsinki in the 1960-1961 period; during 1960, in March-April
[2906]- NOSENKO would Nave Known about if and again in November. (Pages
[2907]. not approved other TDY's in these 186-200).
[2908]years wher. he was Deputy Chief of .
[2909]the U.S. Embassy Section.
[2910]Returning from his single TDY to Travel records show that JENNER .
[2911]Helsinki, KOSOLAPOY was abroad and KOSOLAPOV travelled on. ;
[2912]‘ the same train as his target, the separate days. (Pages 186-200)
[2913]oe American military code clerk Paul
[2914]pot JENNER; as supervisor of all oper-
[2915]- ations against code clerks at the
[2916]U.S. Embassy, NOSENKO was familiar
[2917]Tee, with the details of all such major
[2918]. : activities.
[2919]i =) he KGB knew that the U.S, mili-  KEYSERS reported the recruitment
[2920]tS tary code clerk James KZYSERS, approach immediately after it }
[2921]i . whom NOSENKO personally contacted occurred, and the report was
[2922]{- * gn an effort to persuade him to submitted in an Embassy room j
[2923]defect, did not report the earlier later found to have a concealed
[2924]recruitment approach by the KGB. microphone. (NOSENKO stated that |
[2925]7 - to - os . ~~ he was a customer for microphone
[2926]: intercepts at the time and that ace ©
[2927]. . | this micrephone was monitored on ot
[2928]a continuous basis by KGB per- ;
[2929]sonnel.) (Pages 213-219) |
[2933]* An example of NOSENKO's inaccuracy on events during his later
[2934]service in the Tourist Department related to his accounts on the
[2935]arrest of American Professor Frederick BARGHOORN: According to
[2936]NOSEIKO, the approval for this KGB action in which he had a per-
[2937]sonal part was obtained from BREZHNEV in KHRUSHCHEV's absence
[2938]from Moscow, and the arrest was made a few hours later; BARG-
[2939]HOORN was arrested on 31 October 1963, and on that day and the
[2940]day before KHRUSHCHEV made public appearances in Moscow, (BREZH-
[2941]NEV was not seen in Moscow between 29 October and 2 November |
[2943]cg enennatnes anaes am eneeets emen et eee me Re ee oe
[2949]i C¢
[2952]650.
[2954]In addition, a number of Americans--e.g., Walter RASK, Adam
[2955]BROCHES, Henry APISSON, Herbert HOWARD, Vasiliy VOLKOV, dilliam
[2956]WALLACE, Thomas Whitney, and Stanley ZIRING--denied having keen
[2957]recruited by the KGB, as NOSENKO said they had been.
[2959]The only noteworthy internal inconsistencies in NOSENKO's
[2960]reporting on KGB operations involving Americans appear in the
[2962]HARMNSTONE case, where he has given conflicting information on the -.,
[2964]KGB's ability to obtain photographic evidence of tis nomosemality,
[2965]and in his advace on how to identify "ANDREY"--that he was the only
[2967]witness to testify in Roy RHCD=S' trial and that he did not testify J
[2969]at Roy RHODES' trial but was enly interviewed in the pre-trial in-
[2970]vestigation once, Part VIII.D. covers the extent of his kncewledge
[2971]about American cases in which he took part persoreliy or as 4
[2972]supervisor. Regarding others to which his official positions did
[2973]not give him access, NOSENKO has indicated that it was his per-
[2974]sonal contact with KGB colleagues which enabled him to report on
[2975]nine recruitments (Herbert HOWARD, Sam GAFFE, the KGB agent in
[2976]France, the YOUNGER couple, "SASHA", and two unnamed agents in.
[2977]Geneva); three development cases (George VAN LAETHEM, Attorney:
[2978]General Robert KENNEDY, and Stephen HOFFMAN) ; three unsuccessful
[2979]recruitment approaches (Richard HARMSTONE, Peter BINDER, and
[2980]Collette SCHWARZENBACH); and three investigations (Thomas BARTHE-
[2981]LEMY, Lewis BOWDEN, and George WINTERS). NOSENKO's alleged asso-
[2982]ciates in the KGa thus gave him the names of four recruited agents
[2983]and sufficient details for one more to be identified by subsequent
[2984]investigation, JOHNSON. All of the NOSENKO leads to developmental
[2985]operations, unsuccessful recruitment approaches, and investigations
[2986]have been identified.
[2988](11) Damage to the Soviets
[2990]Three criteria can. be used in assessing the harm to Soviet
[2991]interests caused by NOSENKO's operational leads to Americans:
[2993]First, the originality of his information on recruited
[2994]agents and unsuccessful recruitment approaches;
[2996]Second, the agents' access to classified information
[2997]at the time he reported on them; and
[2999]Third, the possibility of identifying them on the
[3000]basis of the details provided or in ectiins tion with details
[3001]received from other sources. ~
[3003]There is no reason to believe that NOSENKO's information on 22
[3004]Americans under investigation while in the USSR could have damaged
[3005]the KGB, especially since all of them had left the Soviet Union
[3006]before the NOSENKO leads were received (Pages 402-410). In an-
[3008](Pages 379-397), there is no means for evaluating their impor-
[3009]tance to the KGB because it is impossible to estimate with con-
[3010]fidence the likelihood of the KGB recruiting some or any of these
[3011]targets; vulnerability and assessment data, when coupled with
[3012]spasmodic or even continuing KGB access to the target, would be
[3013]ho guarantee that he is recruitable. Nevertheless, following
[3015]the criteria listed above, NOSE..KO0's statements on KGB operation-
[3016]al interest stemming from their homosexuality did bring about’ the
[3017]recall of Robert ARMSTRONG and Stephen HOFFMAN from the U.S.
[3018]Embassy in Moscow.
[3020]|
[3022]-- --other- category, -NOSENKO-'s. leads. to.35.-Americans under development. __
[3024]orinast
[3025]on agg
[3028]1
[3029]Aj
[3030]i
[3031]i
[3035]i
[3038]14-0000
[3040]651.
[3042]NOSENKO was the first source to report on tue KGB recruit-
[3043]ments of 22 tourists (none with access to Classified meterials
[3044]and on 11 of whom there was previous derogatory information) ;
[3045]four correspondents (one gaid by NOSiL.KO to have becone inactive
[3046]and on two of whom there was previous derogatory information) ;
[3047]the American Express Company representative in Moscow: a contract.
[3048]employee of USIA who had earlier declared his intent to marry 4
[3049]Soviet national; and two agents wnose names were not known to
[3050]NOSENKO but who were identifiable. The latter two agents were:
[3054]- Dayle W. SMITH (KGB cryptonym "ANDREY"), a cipher
[3055]machine mechanic at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow recruited in
[3056]1953. Despite NOSENKO's statement that "ANDREY" was current-
[3057]ly supplying valuable information in June 1962, SMITH lost
[3058]his access to classified information through retirement from
[3059]the U.S. Army on 30 November 1961, or about six months before
[3060]NOSENKO first reported on him (Paces 413-4726).
[3062]_ - U.S, Army Sergeant Robert Lee JOHNSCN, who with his
[3064]A wife Hedwig began collaborating with the KGB in i952 and
[3066], who made James MINTKENBAUGH an agent of the KGB in 1953
[3067](Pages 427-462). Hedwig JOUNSCN discontinued her role in
[3068]the operation in 1953, although thereafter remaining know-
[3069]ledgeable of the KGB activities of her husband and MINTKEN-
[3070]BAUGH; according to MINTKENBAUGH, who lost access to classi-
[3071]fied information in 1954, he had no direct contact with the
[3072]KGB after the late summer or early autumn of 1963 (about
[3073]three to five months before NOSENKO first gave the lead on
[3074]JOHNSON); JOHNSON was still on active duty with the U.S.
[3075]Army and in contact with the KGB when NOSENKO reported in
[3076]January 1964 about the existence of this agent.
[3078]Thus from a total of 30 original and identifiable leads, only one
[3079]agent had access to classified information as of the date when
[3080]NOSENKO's reporting on him began. By the criteria given in the
[3081]preceeding paragraph, the single operational lead from NOSENKO
[3082]which could have damaged Soviet interests was that which un-
[3083]covered JOHNSON,
[3085]It is debatable, however, whether the JOHNSON lead consti-
[3086]. tuted a serious loss to the KGB. In the first place, if JOHNSON
[3087]: can be believed, he gave the Soviets but one classified document
[3088]while in charge of the "“C‘assified Control Center" at Camp Des
[3089]Loges between August 1963 and May 1964. His KGB case officer
[3090]later told him, JOHNSON said, that the information he could pro-
[3091]vide was not worth the risk involved and that no future attempts
[3092]of this sort should be made. JOHNSON also stated that he felt
[3093]his espionage work at Camp Des Loges had not been very profitable
[3094]for the Soviets, adding that his case officer had shown dis-
[3095]co interest in his proposal to obtain for the KGP a top secret
[3096]—-.-- —-t- - ---. document he (JOHNSON) thought_of greater importance than any
[3097]: other to which he had access. (NOSENKO indiceted that JOHNSON =
[3098]; lost his access in the spring of 1963, while at the Orly Courier
[3099]Transfer Station.) In the second place, as the KGB knew, the
[3100]behavior of Hedwig JOHNSON, a mental case, was unpredictable.
[3101]Finally, the JOHNSON couple and MINTKENBAUGH repeatedly dis-
[3102]regarded the KGB's instructions to compartment their activities
[3103]and to observe other routine security precautions. The KGB
[3104]seems to have #voided full exploitation of JOHISON in the latter i
[3105]stages of the operation, to have been concerned over Hedwig's . re 3
[3106]mental condition as early as 1962, and to have regarded the
[3108]TAN arance
[3110]14-0000
[3111]yo.
[3113]TO? SECRET
[3115]swnnestee en DEERE Tee 8
[3117]652.
[3119]threesome as difficult handling problems. Given these apparent
[3120]factors, the NOSENXO lead may have been consicered expencabie by
[3121]the KGB, without iong-lasting adverse effect cn the fulfillment
[3122]of its overall! intelligence requirements.
[3126]r
[3128]|
[3130]i
[3132]i NOSENKO was the first source to identify James STORSBEPG, a
[3134]| U.S. military code clerk stationed at the Moscow Embassy, as a
[3136]\ target who had rejected the KGB's recruitment offer (Pages 165-
[3138]i 185). The information was received from NOSENKO after STORSBERG
[3140]! was discharged from the U.S. Army, and when interviewed on the
[3142]| basis of this information, STORSBERG generally confirmed NCSENKO'S :
[3143]reporting on the case. GOLITSYN had earlier reportec cn what may i:
[3145]{ have been the same KGB operation, but GOLITSY.é believed the mili-
[3147]} tary code clerk had ween recruited; from what GOLITSYN had pre-
[3149]| viously told CIA and from later investigations, it seems possible
[3151]s
[3153]I
[3155]|
[3157]i
[3159]|
[3162]that the KGB recruited either STOKSBERG or William HURLEY (who l
[3163]NOSENKO said was rect recruited or approached by thé KGB). If it
[3165]is assumed that STCRSBERG was not recruited in the approach de-
[3167]scribed by NOSENKO and in the operation discussed by GOLITSYN,
[3169]the KGB suffered no loss in the American services learning of
[3171]this case. 1f€ it is assumed cn the other hand that STCRS3ERG or
[3173]HURLEY was recruited, the reporting by NOSENXO assisted the KGB-- ;
[3174]not the American services--by deflecting security investigations
[3176]from a recruited agent of the KGB. .
[3180](iii) Importance or Usefulness
[3182]‘@pe American leads from NOSENK9O enabled U.S. security euthor-
[3185]- Confirm previous information en the recruitments of
[3186]-—~ 13-tourists and three correspondents;
[3188]- Verify previous derogatory informatioa on 11 tourists,
[3189]two correspondents, and perhaps one ‘military code clerk,
[3192]- Remove two homosexuals from the U.S. Embassy in
[3193]Moscow; and
[3195]~- Identify 32 KGB agents including Hedwig COHNSON and
[3196]MINTKENBAUGH. * . :
[3198]One or possibly two of these 32 agents (SMITH and possibly HOWARD)
[3199]in the past had been in a position to pass classified infcrmation
[3200]to the KGB, and a third (JOHNSON) had current access to Classified
[3201]information and current contact with the KGB; the two homosexuals
[3202]at the Moscow Embassy (APMSTRONG and HOFFMAN) presumably also had |
[3204]. access to classified information. From the standpoint of pro- -._ _ |
[3206]____tecting the security of the U.S. Government, NOSENKO brought to
[3208]an end the JONNSON Operation and the KGB's potential for rect’
[3209]ing ARMSTRONG and HOFFMAN. . : - ct
[3211]Against this product of NOSENKO's reporting must be balanced
[3212]the amounts of money and manpower that were needed for U.S. secu-
[3213]rity authorities to exhaust and investigate NOSENXO's information
[3214]on 49 recruitments, 35 developmental targets, seven unsuccessful
[3215]recruitment approaches, ard 33 investigations by the XGB--a total
[3216]of 113 operational leads. CIA carried the burden of the debriefing :
[3217]and interregation of NOSENKO on these cases, but the investigative
[3219] _W"Rnong these 32 agents were many whom the GB had not recontacted
[3220]after their return to the United States from the Soviet Union, J
[3221]others who had breken contact with the KGS, some who were known 3
[3225]14-0000
[3227]Re or a
[3233]653. Loge
[3234]work in the United States was accomplished mostly by other
[3235]agencies. It would seen, however, that the JOHNSON operation
[3236]was the only NOSEXKO lead to be important or useful.
[3238](iv) Remarks
[3240]Judged by his major inaccuracies and by the cemonstrable in-
[3241]completeness in scme of his reporting, NOSENKO is not an authori-
[3242]tative or reliable source of information on operations against
[3243]Americans by the U.S. imbassy Section and the American Tourist
[3244](Section. Proven uatrustwortay in other categories of operational
[3245]ileacs, there is no reascn to accept at face value NOSENKO's state-
[3246]iment that SMITH’was the only Moscew Embassy emplcyee working with
[3248]“the KGB from i953 thrcugh 1963; indeed, evicence to the contrary
[3250]exists. The same may be true regarding Americes tourists and
[3251]Correspondents in Moscow, i.e., other recruitmeats not mentioned
[3252]by NOSENKO could have occurred. Furthermore, with the question-
[3253]able exception of the JOHNSON case, the KGB lost nothing of great
[3254]value in consequence of NOSENKO's leads but gained an advantage
[3255]by occupying the attcenticn and facilities of American security
[3256]authorities.
[3258]It is therefore concluded that NOSENKO has withhold infor-
[3259]mation on recruitrents of Americans in !oscow, or he is unable to
[3260]provide a comprehensive review cf such activities because he did
[3261]not_hold.the claimed positions in the U.5. Embassy and American
[3262]Tourist Sections. Either explanation forces strong reservations
[3263]about the bona fices of NOSENKO as a genuine scurce, and these
[3264]reservations are reinforced by the relative costs to the KGB and
[3265]U.S. security authorities of the NOSENKO leads. By itself, this
[3266]evaluation of his production on American cases suggests the possi-
[3267]bility that the KGB dispatched NOSENXO to report to CIA, and that
[3268]the KGB did so for the purpose of misleading the U.S. security
[3269]services.
[3275]othe emit
[3281]TOP SECRET oY
[3283]pt00000
[3285]c. Cperatiors Involving Other Westerners
[3286](4) Introduction
[3288]As already indicated, NOSENXO's principal knowledgeability
[3289]of KGB operations is related to Americans in the Soviet Union.
[3290]with the exception of one German and one Norwegian tourist case,
[3291]his only other personal participation in third-national (i.e., non-
[3292]American) operations stems from his ageociation with the section
[3293]of the Tourist Department concerned with United kingdom and Canad-
[3294]ian, as well as fimerican, tourists. Where he has commented on
[3295]gources for the rest of his tnird-national leads, he indicated
[3296]his knowledge was acquired either through conversaticns with
[3297]other officers or through his position as Reputy Chief of the
[3298]Tourist Department in 1962-1963. Thus he made no clain for com-
[3299]pieteness of his coverage, nor necessarily for absolute accuracy
[3300]and ful} details on ery one case. No attempt will be made here,
[3301]therefore, to compare his infcrmution with cther sources, except
[3302]in terms of whether NCSENKO's reportiny harmed the Soviets and
[3303]assisted American security.
[3305](ii) Discussion
[3307]a of the 90 third-naticaal recruitment leads (Pages 474-562),
[3308]\22 have not yet~bean positively icentitics. These cannot be
[3309]evalueted at all except to point cut that only two si then 2rc.
[3310]potentially significant, the_sAto penetra:ion_in. Belyiun ip ich?
[3311](which may be the sare as _a_lead from another source) and a code
[3312]clerk in the west Cernan Embassy in Moscow in T3627 Without
[3313]knowing the status of these tro overaticns at the time NOSENKO
[3314]told CIA abcct them, it is not possible to measure the value to
[3315]tus or the damage to the Soviet Union threugh the compromise of
[3317]these cases.
[3319]Of the remaining 68 known or possible agents who have been
[3320]identified, 35 were unique leads when NOSENKO provided them. No
[3321]eenclusive investigation results have yet been obtained on 30 of
[3322]these, but the majority were said by NOSE'NKO to be travel agency
[3323]employees (guides, bus drivers, etc.). Five of the .30 held
[3324]positions of trust in their respective governments; these five
[3325]leads are discussed below in terms of fotential value to U.S.
[3326]security and potential damage to the KGB. Of the five who have been
[3327]interviewed on the basis of the NOSENKO_ information, four denied
[3328]bei ited by the KGB, including& map tthe only one
[3329]or those interviewed holding @ government rosit:cn), discussed
[3330]below. Reporting on the one remaining lead, a Dutch woman, is
[3331]unclear and inconclusive--she admitted only to having been ques-
[3332]tioned while in the USSR.
[3334]Among the’ 35. new leads from NOSENKO, a total of five had
[3335]positions of trust, with known or presumes access to sensitive
[3336]information, in their respective governments: .. -. oe
[3338]KGB was w rking
[3339]in Moscow,
[3343]Soviets whom he suspected of dDeing intelligence officers,
[3344]and in 1964 he reported a social visit in Vienna by
[3345]General GORBUNOV (an operational alias of GRIBANOV), whom
[3347]t
[3348]'
[3349]i
[3350]E
[3352]3
[3354]4
[3355]t
[3358]14-0000
[3360]LS erapviewed directly
[3361]or hoes he ceported a re-
[3363]he nad known jn iinscow. he
[3364]on the casis of the NCErNro
[3365]cruitment approach.
[3367]Sis, 1S see
[3369]- P c PSB NOSESEO has identified him as
[3371]a KGB ace wath be further information. itationed at tha
[3372]Indian Exmtassy in Moscow frir 19%? to 19951, ze e
[3373]a : eee TS 2; re Ne te
[3375]Al tide
[3378]atory internation on nim in CIs files.
[3380]- Indonesian atehe
[3381]in Moscow: ldet
[3383]1 tre KS5 recru
[3385]-. at eat 9"
[3387]Agree Retake Fee FES
[3389]: 5 hough NCSENKO had
[3390]spelled out the name in .¥ ] could recall no
[3391]such case but thought this must h. . a Pistake for the
[3392]case of (RS «ho had reen the Bigg Pepe hat
[3393]time. Aside from the fact that corditicss in Indonesia
[3394]precluded CIA's passing this lead to the Indonesian service
[3395]for investigation, Indonesia‘s fosition until 1956 was thet
[3396]_ of a semi-satellite of the Commrenist Else, and revelation
[3397]- of such a recruitment in the prevailing satuation would
[3399]‘Rave been of no value to the United States nor harm to the
[3400]Soviet Union.
[3402]Thus of the third-national leads oriaginiting with NOSENKO,
[3403]five micht be considered to be important e of their posi-
[3404]tion in government. In two cases (@RRL Re he was
[3405]not able to say whether there was a recruitmer:, mowever, while
[3406]a third (assumirg that there was no further corfusion om NOSEN-
[3407]KO's part) cannot ke considered in imports.t lead because of che
[3408]Communist bias of the Indonesiszn Governnent. AMBRE position as
[3409]an agent or contact loses siqnificance tr view of nis previously
[3410]reported support cf a powerful leftist political figure, The
[3411]possible importance o: the & lead carnot be assessed
[3412]without investigation results. °
[3414]The William VASSALL case (Pages 307-507) was the one third-
[3415]national lead which NOSEXKO himself considered most important.
[3416]He invariably included this lead when talking about the impor-
[3417]tance of his reporting. The British security services neverthe-
[3419]: Lbncden ice wd we
[3421]i
[3422]a
[3424]settee tae
[3430]14-0000
[3432]PR~ ae
[3433]“TOP SECRET
[3435]656.
[3437]less vere Wel ne atat to identifying the source of the
[3438]Aamiralty documents identified by GOLITSYN, having narrowed
[3439]their list of suspects to 20 {including VASSALL) ky 11 June 1962.
[3440]When they received the fragnent of NOSENXKO information which
[3441]focused on the British Embassy in Moscow, the number was reduced
[3442]to VASSALL and one other. Although the HOSENKO information
[3443]apparently confirmed the already solid suspicions of VASSALL,
[3444]there is reascr lieve that the identification would have
[3445]been Sccomplished without this information. The lead was theré-
[3446]fore not new or exclusive information, and NOSENKO himself ad-
[3447]mitted in 1964 that he knew that GOLITSYN had known of the case
[3448]from the latter's work in the Information (Reports) Department.
[3450]Of the identified third-nationals whom NOSENKO said were
[3451]being targetted or investigated by the KGB, nore held positions
[3452]of significance, with the le excention of the then member of
[3453]the British Parliament. ae «Whose personal life
[3454]and career the Soviets subsequently ttemptcd--with considerable
[3455]success--to cestroy through a campaign of scandal.
[3457](iii) Remarks
[3459]On the basis of the avove examination, NOSENKO's information
[3460]on KGB operations against third-nationals cannot be considered 8
[3461]positive factor in the assessment of his bona ficese 28 8 poss-
[3462]ible negative factor in consideration of his bona fides, the in-
[3463]significance of NOSENKO'sS reporting on third-national leads must
[3464]be measured against the criteria of his claimed access and con-
[3465]trary evidence. In the case of foreign tourists his leads show--
[3466]ard he himself has commented--that such _reqruirments Were of no
[3467]particular value; assuming that NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of th2
[3468]Tourist Department, he snould be able to make such a statement
[3469]without challenge. To cate no independent evidence of foreign
[3470]tourist recruitments has emerged which contradicts him. Opera-
[3471]tions against other Western embassies in Moscow are a slightly
[3472]different matter. NOSENKO's information, or lack thereof, can-
[3473]not be evaluated on the basis of completeness because he has made
[3474]no claim to full access to such information or to positions which
[3475]would have given him better access. -Except for tnose he said he
[3476]was informed of in connection with possibie use agéinst U.S.
[3477]Embassy targets, he has usually sourced such third-national
[3478]leads as he did have to particularly close relations with the
[3479]responsible case officer. ‘It weuld not be valid to argue that
[3480]a source cf one lead should have told him of others, Or that he
[3481]should have had mere close friends in the KGB. Thus on all
[3482]applicable criteria. the NOSENKO leads to operations against
[3483]third-naticnals must be excluded as a factor weighing for or
[3484]against his bona fides.
[3486]- RA mt ee OE TTS AS OT
[3488]piesena 4
[3490]|
[3492]TOP SECRET
[3494]14-0000
[3498]v .
[3499]yer SEURET, : :
[3501]657. a
[3503]4. Technical Operations Against the u,S, Emtag oy
[3505]a. Discussion
[3507]2 v9, Pubacsy (Pages
[3508]n reporting on KGB microphones in the “e rae tdme a our
[3510]248-269), NOSENKO said in 1962 that there were 4 i
[3512]or five points," later adding a sixth, from which conver Bat oe
[3513]were heard. They included the offices of the Minsatec Counselor,
[3514]the Military Attache, the Naval Attache, the Alr ALcaches One
[3515](unidentified) "State Department employee, " and the aye iculeura
[3516]Attache. He also referred to a non-productiva microphone OKO.
[3517]code room but did not count this as one of the pointes Bee ed
[3518]did not supply details of the information which Ely KAM OBER sD
[3519]from any of these microphones except to make qenrral atluston®
[3520]to the importance of the materials from thore in the Oecd
[3521]the Minister Counselor and the Military Attache. tle al roBee
[3522]that the existence of these microphones was the Kai's biage ee
[3523]secret" and that only a very few people know of Lhielie in 19
[3524]NOSENKO gave more details and provided a written hist of the |
[3525]ones where microphones were actively monitored 1960 an
[3527]NOSENKO's information on the microphones would appear, on
[3528]the basis of the findings of the sweep team in {yoa, to ba gener
[3529]aliy accurate. Where NOSENKO reported there waa
[3530]but microphones were found audible, the discrepancy c
[3531]plained by KGB technical failure to receive the iniervepts after
[3532]they left the point at which the sweepers tented? whers HOSENKO
[3533]reported materials were obtained (such a3 from the AIT Attache's
[3534]office) and the sweepers found the microphone inaudible, Le could
[3535]be conjectured that the microphore died between nat ly 1962 and
[3536]the date of the sweep in 1964. However, NOSENKO 'a Peportsng did_
[3537]not harm the Soviets, because GOLITSYN knew and hal seported on .
[3538]one specific microphone, and another earlier (ana provably come
[3539]promised) source had also reported that the micti) ined Were
[3540]there. The microphone known to GOLITSYN, when focal
[3541]back to the point where its wires left the pulling, would lead
[3542]to the uncovering of all the other microphones, 9 in fact happen-
[3544]ed with the find in Room 1008 (Page 256).
[3546]NOSENKO was unabl ophone information
[3547]a nable to expand on his microp jatatla of the
[3549]after his defection. Questioned repeatedly (ur § h
[3550]operation or examples of the product of those micrephonas, Ae gave
[3551]almost no cperational details* and could supply only re alread
[3552]three generalized exemples of their product which We hat phon y
[3553]given in 1962: the unproductivity of the code Loon ML CFOPHONS?
[3555]oe
[3556]One of the few concrete incidents which NOSEUKO recounted
[3558]connected to the microphone operation (with the except ton
[3560]of the North Wing planning, see below) was tha jase uh &
[3561]document reporting the product from one of Lhe mbecopnoness
[3562]GOLITSYN had already told the same story (Page 20776 COLIT~
[3563]SYN said he was present during the search for hia document
[3564]and it was under these circumstances that he jearhed apect=
[3565]fically that there was a microphone in the arrice OF Ehe
[3566]Minister Counselor. NOSENKO in 1962 streaaed What Ande
[3567]microphone was the most important in the Empaa bys
[3569]eg and traced:
[3573]TOP SECRET.
[3575]14-0000
[3577]JT eLuat ,
[3579]658.
[3581]the Minister Counselor's dictation, including fitness reports
[3582]which NOSENKO said were of operational interest to the KGA but
[3583]could not say how many of them there were or whom they concerned;
[3584]and the Military Attache’s planning of trips «hich permitted the
[3585]KGB to seize equipment in Stalingrad 1n 1955. Of these three
[3586]examples given by an efficer who séid he culled all the micro-
[3587]phone materials for two years, one concerned a non-operating and
[3588]therefore useless micrcphone, the second concerned a microphone
[3589](in the Minister Courselor’s offices already reported by a pre-
[3590]vious defector, and the third concerned a well known incident
[3591]which took place years earlier (and which NOSEiKO should have
[3592]plerned and helped corduct, according to his claimed position in
[3593]1955; KOSENKU said he played no such role).* .
[3594]In 1964 NOSENKO Erought to CIA a sheet of paper which he
[3595]said was in KOVSHUK's handwriting ard which had been obtained in
[3596]1960 or 1961 during a conference (Pages 260-251). This, he said
[3597]then, was how he knew of the exact locatioas of all the actively
[3599]—_———— Ss oC PND .
[3601]* K comparison betweer. NOSENKO'S cshird exanple and a 1956 messace
[3602]from a sensitive 3ource who is believed to have been compromis~
[3603]ed to the KGB after that messace (but before 1962) reveals sim-
[3605]ilarities which may not be coincidental,
[3607]~ NOSENKO (11 June 1962; see Page 260): "We are listening
[3608]to your Military Attaches there. We know where they intend
[3609]to travel, what they want to find out. We know what machin-
[3610]ery and what targets interest ttea... Some of the things
[3611]they say are surprising. They discuss, among other things,
[3612]where to go, what to see, what to take with them - electric
[3613]equipment or not. And we are hunting for this electronic
[3614]equipment and now have permission, if we are absolutely cer-
[3615]tain that one of your people is taking electronic apparatus
[3616]with him on an intelligence trip outside Moscow, to take, to
[3617]steal it. We-now have authorizstion to take any necessary
[3618]steps to steal 1t. Because you now have improved your equip-
[3619]ment. .We stole some equipment in Stalingrad in 1955..."
[3621]- Sensitive source, 1956 (see Pase 254): %... All rooms
[3622]are being monitored by the KSB... The 'flap' involving the
[3623]American directios - finding specialists in Stalingrad in
[3624]the summer of 1955 «as organized by the KGB because conver-
[3625]sations were overmeard in the rooms of the American Embassy.
[3626]As you know, as 4 result of this flap, the KG3 seized valu-
[3627]able direction-finding equipment from the American Intelli-
[3628]gence officers.«.” .
[3630]It is possible that both NOSENKO and the sensitive source were
[3631]reporting a well-knowm event, because GOLITSYN reported in
[3632]1962 that the 1955 Stalingrad incident was written up in KGB
[3633]training materials as an example of Second Chief Directorate
[3634]work. The training version may have included the role of the
[3635]microphone information (although GOLITSYN did not report that
[3636]it did), which may thus have come naturally to the attention
[3637]of NOSENKO and the sensitive source. However, this would call
[3638]into question NUSENKO's allegation of direct access to all of
[3639]the microphone product.
[3641]sO TOP SECRET
[3643]|
[3644]|
[3646]ca cere nee eepmerenene
[3649]14-0000
[3651]pene SEE gree A EL OE Meme nemrene mnie Sm nae at
[3653]- 659.
[3655]monitored and productive “points” in 1960-1961. NCSENKO was not
[3656]able to explain why he would need this List to know the locations
[3657]of the microphones when he had been daily receiving, selecting,
[3658]and distributing the product of all of them for two years. Sim-
[3659]flarly, it was never clear why NOSENKO did not remember in 1962
[3660]that there were eleven points--as the List showed--rather than
[3661]the four-to-3ix NOSENKO reported on in 1962.
[3663]NOSENKO's account of how the product from the microphones was
[3664]distributed and exploited would inevitably mean that all KGB case
[3665]officers who had served in the U.S, Embassy Section since the
[3666]microphones were installed would know of their existencs--despite
[3667]any effort to paraphrase and disguise the product 43 “agent re-
[3668]ports." NOSENKO nonetheless maintained in 1962 that “it is a
[3669]tremendous secret that we are listening to you," and that the
[3670]microphones were known to so few that any countermeasures the
[3671]Americans might take on the basis of NOSENKO's statements could
[3672]reflect dangerously cn him as’ the source.* :
[3674]Accepting at face value NOSENKO's claimed lack of aptitude
[3676]and interest in technical matters, and therefore nis inability
[3677]© provide specific technica! details concerning electronic oper-
[3678]ations against the American Embassy, it is still noteworthy that:
[3680]- NOSENKO did not know the purpose of the so-called
[3681]"Moscow beam," sometimes saying it was to jam Embassy
[3682]communications and at other times that it was used to
[3683]monitor them.
[3685]- Although he claimed to have personally participated
[3686]in the planning for the installation of audio devices in
[3687]the North Wing of the Embassy, he did not know of the ex-
[3688]istence or the purpose of the coaxial cables and grill
[3689]found there ky American technicians in 1964. (NOSENKO
[3690]insisted that there were no audio devices installed in the
[3691]North Wing at the time of its, renovation for occupancy
[3692]by Americans.)
[3694]~ NOSENKO knew nothing of the general lines of research
[3695]and development to substitute for or improve the fading
[3696]microphone coverage of the U.S. Embassy.
[3698]These three points relate to aspects of the KGE's audio-technical
[3699]attack on the U.S, Embassy in which the reporting of a source in
[3700]NOSENKO's claimed position, no matter what his technical aptitude,
[3701]could have been detrimental to Soviet interests.
[3703]¢ * Both GOLITSYN end the 1956 source cited on Page 254 were First
[3705]Chief Directorate officers. That they both knew of the micro-
[3706]phones suggests that NOSE\KO exaggerated the sensitivity of
[3707]the microphone cperation, which had moreover always been
[3708]assumed by the Embassy to be active.
[3710]TOP SECRET
[3712]Loa es
[3717]14-0000
[3721]659a.
[3723]b. Remarks
[3725]NOSENKO's sourcing of his information on electronic opera-
[3726]tions against the U.S. Embassy in Moscow was unclear and unlikely.
[3727]His knowledge of the location and production of these microphones,
[3728]as well as the existence, nature, and purpose of other electronic
[3729]operations directed against the Embassy, was not ccemensurate with
[3730]his alleged position in the U.S, Embassy Section and his particu-
[3731]lar responsibility for audio sperations. Significartly, the
[3732]essential element of the information which NOSENKO did report,
[3733]the exister.ce of the microphone in the Minister Counselor's
[3734]office, would presumably have been considered by the KGB to have
[3735]been compromiked Six months earlier, with the derectron of WriT-
[3736]SYRr——Discovery of this microphone, as an outgrowth of action on
[3737]GOLITSYN's informstion, would have !ed t2 all the others. Thus
[3738]the Embassy microphones must have D2en ccnsidered by the KCB to
[3739]have been compromised before NOSENKO first spoke of them in 1962.
[3740]radec to this is the fact (supported by NOSENKO himself) that
[3741]the efficiency of the Embassy microphone installation as a whole
[3742]had seriously diminished by late 1961 oc early 1962 due to, first,
[3743]nomaal deterioration of equiprent and wiring and, second, the
[3744]installation of secure rooms and the implerentation of more
[3745]stringent security precautions at the Embassy. For these reasons
[3746]and in the absence of any information concerning other forms of
[3747]electronic attack against the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, it cannot
[3748]be considered that the information provided by NOSENKO in 1962
[3749]and 1964 was harmful to the interests of the KGB nor helpful to
[3750]American authorities, NOSENKO's Genial of any installations in
[3751]the north wing, in the light of the later discovery there of
[3752]coaxial cables, the purpose of which appears serious and is as
[3753]yet unclarified, and in the light of NOSENKO's specific claim to
[3754]have been responsible for the operational planning for the north
[3755]wing at the time it was being prepared for Anrerican occupancy,
[3757]would appear to be purposeful deception.
[3758]Ae eS
[3760]mot pee erent OF
[3765]I
[3768]14-0000
[3771]Jute weile
[3773]nat 660,
[3775]5, The BELITSK!Y Case
[3777]a. Introduction
[3779]NOSENKO reported to CIA in June 1962 (as one of the two items
[3780]he wanted to sell) that One of its agents. the Soviet interpreter
[3781]BELITSKIY, was in fact a KGB double agent who had been planted on
[3782]CIA (Pages 517-529). NOSENKO said that this wa3 a case run by the
[3783]Second ("Active Line") Section, but that he personally had a role
[3784]in the management of the case in May 1962 in Ceneva. NOSENKO was
[3785]able to give certain inside information on this case; for exemple,
[3786]he knew the nicknames used by the CIA case officers with the egent.
[3788]b. Discussion
[3790]NOSENKO's information, at least in its general outlines, was
[3791]correct. CIA had been running BELITSKLY as an agent, and the CIA
[3792]case officers (alias "Bob" and "Henry," the latter from Washington
[3793]as NOSENKO said) nad just completed a series of meetings with
[3794]BELITSKIY in Geneva. Important aspects of his information were
[3795]inaccurate: BELITSKLY had been recruited a year before NOSENKO's
[3796]date of 1959, and in Brussels, not London. Also, NOSENKO's claim
[3797]that this was a Second Chief Directorate operation aimed at en-
[3798]ticing CIA into meetings in the USSR was not borne out by the
[3799]history of the case or by PELITSK1Y'sS conduct, although it cannot
[3800]be excluded that this was a long-term objective which the KGB
[3801]still sought without appearing to. NOSENKO's account of the case
[3802]thus is not as accurate as could be expected if his own role in
[3803]it had been as claimed.
[3805]NOSENKO's description of his own involvement is not consis~
[3806]tent with observed Soviet practice or with operational logic.
[3807]NOSENKO said in both 1962 and_1964 that he had had orders to
[3808]supervise the handling of this case in Geneva in the spring of
[3809]1962. The reason was that the case officer for BELITSKIY in
[3810]Gereva (ARTEMEV) was young and inexperienced and had not even
[3811]worked on the BELITSKIY case before. NOSENKO was saying in
[3812]effect--with the authority of direct knowleige and official re-
[3813]sponsibility--that BELITSKiY, a prominent Soviet citizen having
[3814]personal contacts with well placed memkers of the Soviet Govern-
[3815]ment, a man who had been under the ostensible control of a hos-
[3816]tile intelligence service (CIA) for four years, was sent by the
[3817]: KGB to Geneva for the purpose of recontacting CIA, with pre-
[3819]i pared information, but that the KGB did not send with him the
[3821]: responsible case officer or any member of the section responsible
[3823]i for the operation. Instead, the KGB turned over the responsi-
[3825]i bility to a young and inexperienced KGB officer who happened to
[3826]be in Geneva to protect the security of a delegation and who
[3828]: had had no prior connection with the BELITSKIY case nor even
[3830]i local knowledge of Geneva cenditions; then, after BELITSKIY was
[3832]: already in Geneva, the KGB had cabled instructions that NOSENKO,
[3834]who had no need to know of the case and had learned of it only
[3836]unofficially from conversations in 1960-1961 with the Section
[3838]Chief responsible, who had no experience or training in handl-
[3840]ing double agent operations, and who was similarly in Geneva
[3842]yup SECRcT
[3844]wees
[3846]KR
[3848]cs
[3850]14-0000
[3852]paneer ene a A A RR SO
[3854]oat
[3856]661. . ea
[3858]by chance with delegation security functions, shoulé guide the
[3859]other “less experienced” case officer.* As NOSENKO showed
[3860]under questioning, he did nct know the contents of any of the
[3861]positive intelligence BELITSKIY waa to pass to CIA a8 disinfor-
[3862]mation; he did not know BELLTSKIY's Moscow or Geneva pattern
[3864]of movement or contacts; he did not know in detail how or when
[3865]the operation started; he did not know the nature of degree of
[3866]British involvement, nor the operational details and contact
[3867]arrangements. NOSENKO said that BOLITSKIY had been placed ona
[3868]Geneva delegation in the hope that CIA might be able to *find"
[3869]and recontact him, **
[3871]c. Remarks
[3873]The circumstances above not only cast doubt on NOSENKO's
[3874]version of the case and his own access but also suggest that
[3875]KNOSENKO did not have a theoretical appreciation of how double
[3876]agents are handled. The examples he gave of his “guidance” to
[3877]ARTEMEV are few in number. NOSENKO also stated in 1964 that he
[3878]had arranged the actual introduction to vELITSKIY of XISLOV, the
[3879]TASS man, to provide for BELITSKIY's neca of a notioral subsource
[3880]for some of his disinformation; NOSENKO by October 1966 had appar-
[3881]ently forgotten this event, for he stated unequivocally that KiS-
[3882]LOV had had no connection whatever with the aELITSKIY case. nNos-
[3883]ENKO claimed to have met RELITSKIY, but did not recognize his
[3884]pheto when shown it in 1966.
[3886]Did NOSENKO's report to CIA on the BELITSKIY case harm the
[3887]XGB? It was useful to CIA, since despite freguently expressed
[3888]doubts of BETITSKIY’s bona fides, CIA was handling the operation
[3889]as if it were genuine (but not intending to go to the extent of
[3890]exposing to BELITSKIY CIA assets inside the USSR). (The KGB is
[3892]© HOSENRO has reported that he handled only one American agent
[3893](FRIPPEL); he had practically no knowledge of CIA nor even
[3894]vicarious exposure to the substance of any other double agent
[3895]operations. ARTEMEV had had extended contact with a CIA
[3896]tourist agent as early as August 1958, a role in other opera-
[3897]tions against American tourists in 1959--including clandestine
[3898]search (see Page 146), and continuous American Department
[3899]service since then. NOSENKO did not know of the 1954-1959
[3900]operational activities of ARTEMEV, although they feil in the
[3901]operational area NOSENKO claimed to have supervised at the
[3902]time as Deputy Chief of the American Tourist Section.
[3904]#* NOSENKO was seemingly unaware that BELITSKIY had contact
[3905]arrangements which would presumably guarantee recontact.
[3908]14-0000
[3910]Rf ee.
[3914]ae ene genre cere mre atte name ema mes rom orm
[3916]662. “eens
[3918]aware, as Suviet Bloc counterintelligence guidance demonstrates,
[3919]of the dangers inherent in having disinformation recognized as
[3920]such.) The meetings in Geneva in May 1962 would have made it
[3921]clear to the KGB that CIA had no intentions of meeting BELITSKIY
[3922]inside the USSR, and, in KGB eyes, the case may have reached the
[3923]point of diminishing returns. It is perhaps significant that
[3924]NOSENKO did not contact CIA and report on the BELITSKIY case until
[3925]10 days after BELITSKIY's series of meetings with CIA in Geneva
[3926]had been completed, which would have given the KGB time for final
[3927]appraisal of the operation's potential.
[3929]NOSENKO's account of his own role in this operation appears
[3930]to have been false, and nothing in the available evidence would
[3931]preclude Soviet sacrifice of this already tired operation. Since
[3932]NOSENKO provided some inside details of a sensitive KCB operation
[3933]which could have been known to only a few, it is difficult to
[3934]find any other explanation of NOSENKO's access to.this information
[3935]except that the KGB briefed him about it.
[3937]10° SECRET | aan
[3940]14-0000
[3942]6. KSB Investigations®
[3944]8. Compromise of POPCY
[3946](1) Introduction
[3948]663.
[3950]Fixing the date and cause of che compromise of POPOV, the
[3952]CIA penetration source in the CRY
[3953]the evaluation of NOSENKO's production.
[3954]is basically true, his story of
[3955]been reported by other sources)
[3956]has not harmed the KGB nor measuratly a
[3958]EUPCV's compromise
[3959]is not particularly important and
[3960]ssisted CIA:
[3962]Pages 530-534) could affect
[3963]If what ‘OSENKO has said
[3965](which has also
[3967]The KGB
[3969]assumes an ewareness by CIA thet it conducts survelllance of U.S.
[3971]Embassy personnel,
[3972]erican Intelligence conneet ions
[3973]If NOSENKO or the other hand has been incemplete
[3974]in his statements about tie ccmpromise of Fc
[3976]especially those
[3978](as with LANGELU
[3980]POV,
[3982]hevirg known cr suspected An-
[3983]E and, WINTERS).
[3984]or inaccurate
[3985]then his cl2ims
[3987]to knowledgeability on this subject mest be questioned.
[3989](ii) Discussion
[3991]The information from NOSFNKS and other sources on the POPOV
[3992]compromise may be collated and summarized in tabular form:
[3994]Cause
[3995]KGB surveillance
[3996]KGB surveillance
[3998]KGB intercept of
[3999]letter
[4001]KGB surveillance
[4002]Embassy officer
[4004]KGB surveillance
[4006]KGB agent
[4008]* Under this heading,
[4009]and CHEREPANOV are considered; t
[4010]material available for an evaluation of
[4012]of WINTERS
[4014]of WINTERS .
[4016]WINTERS
[4018]of U.S.
[4020]of LANGELLE
[4022]vate Implied
[4023]21 January 1959
[4025]21 January 1959
[4027]21 January 1959
[4029]none
[4031]4 January 1959
[4033]7
[4035]pricr to 23 Nov-
[4037]- ember 1957
[4039]Source
[4042]CHEPEPANOV
[4043]document
[4045]POPOV message
[4046]of 18 September
[4048]GOLITSYN, fron
[4049]the KGB orienta-
[4051]the PCPOV case
[4053]etarnt
[4057]only the compromises of POPOV, PENKOVSKIY,
[4058]here is insufficient collateral
[4059]NOSENKO's information
[4061]on Vladimir KAZAN-KOMAREK (pages 569-570) and Alfred SLESINGER
[4062](Pages 571-575).
[4064]#* NOSENKO reported that the KGB observed WINTERS| mailing a
[4066]letter which, upon bein
[4067]to POPOV; he has contradicted himsel
[4069]applied metka to this letter.
[4070]***DOPOV is believed to have been under KGB control in composing
[4072]his letter.
[4074](Footnotes cortinued on next page.)
[4076]TOP SECRET
[4078].
[4080]checked, was found to be addressed
[4081]f about wnether the KGB
[4083]ee ewer atm nnanes'ee atl oe
[4085]seasitive
[4086]source
[4088]SAT UR. SP. ER ORIN Lat en ss etme = santa ene etn ne ott
[4090]ower ee AN oath RT AF
[4092]14-0000
[4094]Beem
[4096]664. —
[4098]The only other evidence avaiable is analytical. POPOV was
[4099]transferred to the Illegals handling unit in Berlin on 28 June
[4100]1957, an assignment of high sensitivity. Until mid-August he
[4101]handled five Illegals, thereafter only one, TAIROVA, in October
[4102]1957. - Following home leave €rom 12 December 1937 to 19 January
[4103]1958, he was again transferred, this time to a position where
[4104]Illegals and productive GRU sources of intelligence were not ex-
[4105]posed to him. Between March and November 1958 there were signs
[4106]of a KGB investigation of the Illegals handling. unit where POPOV
[4108]formerly served, and he was recalled to Moscow in:November of that:
[4110]year. These facts can be interpreted as follows::
[4112]- POPOV's status as & CIA source wags not compromised before
[4113]his transfer to the Illegals handling unit.
[4115]- POPOV's status was compremised before his recall to Moscow
[4117]in November 1958, probably before his reassignment from the
[4118]Illegals hendlinyg unit in January 1958, and possibly some time
[4119]earlier. The latter possibility is apperent from the Soviets’
[4120]knowledge that the TAIROVA couple was under surveillance in
[4121]December 1957 (and until March 1958); it is also noteworthy
[4122]that, after having met five Illegals in less than one and one-
[4123]half months prior to i3 August 1957, POPOV subsequently was
[4124]involved personally with only one other, TAIROVA, in October
[4125]1957.
[4127]- The KGB, realizing that POPOV was a CIA source, chose to
[4128]keep him in Berlin until November 1958 in order to investigate
[4129]the possibility of his operating in conjunction with other
[4130]CIA sources. ‘
[4132]This line of reasoning, if accepted, would confirm GOLITSYN's in-
[4133]formation that a KGB agent compromised POPOV prior to the arrival
[4134]of ZHUKOV in Berlin, an arrival date falling some time before
[4136]23 November 1957.
[4138]ne
[4139](Footnotes from preceeding page.)
[4141]##***Since such orientation papers are written for general circula-
[4142]tion within the KGB, it is doubtful that KGB security prac-
[4143]tices would permit their conterts to reveal sensitive infor-
[4144]mation; other sources have indicated that orientation papers
[4145]-sometimes are sanitized; this particular paper, however,
[4146]reportedly did state that the KGB learned from an agent in
[4147]about 1957 (GOLITSYN's estimate) that American Intelligence
[4148]had a source which had provided GRU information.
[4150]*teettThis date, which is consistent with that cited in the final
[4152]sentence of the preceeding footnote, was derived from the
[4154]time when POPOV reported the presence of the KGB officer
[4156]ZHUKOV in Berlin; according to GOLITSYN, ZHUKOV was sent to
[4157]Berlin after POPOV had been identified by a KGB agent as
[4159]‘ being a source of CIA.
[4161]TOP SECRET
[4163]see
[4165]3
[4167]emanate esa naar maser sen +:
[4169]Soran oeemererenmmrse «
[4174]14-0000
[4176]7?
[4179]- im
[4183]665.
[4184](444) Remarks .
[4186]The completeness and accuracy of NOSHNXO's information on
[4187]the compromise of PCPOV, supported as it is Dy %& g and the
[4188]CHEREPANOV document and POPOV's message but contradicted by
[4190]\ GOLITSYN and analytical evidence, cannot re finally evaluated.
[4192]Only with resoiution of the bona fides of NCSENKO can a judgment
[4193]be made on this part of his production.
[4195]TOP SECRET
[4198]Soa eben
[4199]wo ’ : .
[4203]cee een neti an Baie ne
[4205]wee Pte ee
[4209]|
[4211]14-0000
[4217]b. Carpromise of PEMKOVSE!Y*
[4219](1): introjucticn
[4221]Hecause has direst responsibility for ccverage of ABIDIAN
[4222]1s an essential element in NOSENKC's story cf his 1960-2951 career,
[4223]becewse he insists that the FGB had no 1:sea of U.S. involivencnt in
[4224]the FINKCVSKIY case until Richard JADA wert te tre Pushkin Street
[4225]dead @rop on 2 Novemcer 1962, and recéuse he is alamart or the
[4226]point thet the KGs until elmose the end ef the FELKUVEKIY case knew
[4227]ef ro connection between PENRUVEKTY and the Fusnain Street site
[4228]Which ABIDI2 visited, NOSEIKO's story of the conpromise of PENKOV-
[4229]EKIY appears to bear directly on the question of SOSENKO's bona
[4230]fides. Each of the verious versions of the compromise cf PENKOV-
[4231]S41Y mast Le exam:ned and compared with NOSENKO:'s story and with
[4232]the establisnea facts.**
[4234](ii) Discussion
[4236]sources agree ecm the cause, and two cn.the timing.
[4237]NOSENKO, GZORSOER, and the “official KG! report" attribute the
[4238]compromise to the fact that surveillance detected a meeting be-
[4239]tween Mrs. CHISHOLM and the Soviet wncem tre KCE later identified
[4240]a@s PEXKOVSKIY, NCSENKO dated this as around ‘overber or December
[4241]1961, the official report stated this cccurred on 30 December 1961,
[4242]ard GQSe NR did not give a date.
[4244]8 gave the cause as surveillance, tut of Greville WYNNE
[4245]and PENKCYCXLY rather than Mrs. CIHISUCIM, ard stated that the com-
[4246]promise Gated from siay 1962. Sey ge gave two diferent
[4247]accounts, one that FENSOVSKIY was invest.iygitea for reasons unre-
[4248]lated to eny suspicions of espionage and was thereby fourd out as
[4249]aspy. the other that his excessive spending ercd sale of foreign
[4250]mercnandise led to an investigation which resulted in detection of
[4251]his espionage activities. She placed the timing of the first ver-
[4252]sion in 1561, without citing the time cf year: ia the second, she
[4253]associated the taming with a warning against association with
[4254]PENKOVERIY which ene and rer husband rereived ae aout ovember
[4256]* See Paces 535-567 for discussion of this case,
[4258]**It does nct seem unusual for several sources to have reported
[4259]on the compromise cf PENKOVSK1Y: Fresumably this was the sub-
[4260]ject of widespread discussicn within the two Soviet services,
[4261]for it was covered in the Soviet press and ir. at least one
[4262]“official report" disseminated by the KCB. Altnough their
[4263]differing situations within the Soviet services could partially
[4264]explain the differirg versions thet these sources have given,
[4265]some of them revertreless have claimed either direct knowledge
[4266]of the compromise or specially informed sub-sources. There-
[4267]fore the discrepancies among the reporting of NOSENKO on the
[4268]PENKOVSKIY compromise, the accounts by other sources, ana the
[4270]facts on the hardling of the case by CIA and MI-6 are pertinent
[4271]to the question of NOSFIKO's bona fides.
[4273]t
[4274]cd
[4276]4
[4277]4
[4280]whos Pee 0 oe ore
[4283]14-0000
[4285]pate 42/7 7
[4287]LOST/MISSING MATERIAL
[4289]THE DOCUMENT OR PAGE(S) LISTED BELOW WAS/WERE MISSING
[4290]DURING THE DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW BY THE HISTORICAL
[4291]REVIEW GROUP, CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF INTELLIGENCE.
[4293]DOCUMENT NO. DATED:
[4295]paceyer 667
[4297]FROM:
[4299]CIA JOB NO.
[4301]pox no. YER Ree/ SG
[4303]FOLDER NO. Zz
[4306]14-0000
[4308]668"
[4310]PEIKOVSKIY that he had visited the site after he chose it in 1960, °°
[4311]although it is posa:ble, especially as he had not been informed
[4312]of ASIDIAN having been eent to check on a possikle signsl fron
[4313]him about the dead dro sensitive co:rec
[4315]- Avie ee KO nowever, makes it clear
[4316]that the ABIDIAN visit sas not the ‘first observed activity =|.
[4317]at Pushkin Street to stir KSB investigative intecest in the :
[4318]site. As the report states, when massive survceiisance of
[4319]U.S. Embassy targets detected an American visiting this
[4320]address the first time, he was not followed inside by sur-
[4321]veillants, but on the second occasion he was followed
[4322]closely and the surveillant observed that he was kneeling
[4323]down apparently tying his shoe.* eB went on to say
[4324]that, although this was not very unusual, it was sufficient
[4325]to arouse suspicion in view of the fact that this American
[4326]had been observed visiting the sane address on two occasions
[4327]for no apparent reason, There is no question about the
[4328]fact that ABIDIAN visited the Pushkin Street drop site on
[4329]one eccasion only, and that was on 30 December 1961. The
[4330]reference to this as a eecond visit to this address by an
[4331]American fron the Embassy is a clear indication that the
[4332]KGB hed surveilied the first such visit, which was mace
[4334]Ly the CIA officer MALONEY 0s ig January 1961, and not by
[4335]ABIDIAN. Thus where Ee ORO. erred by indicating
[4336]one Anerican went to Pushkin Street twice, the KG3 must
[4337]have known that MM!ONZY went there first, in January 1945)
[4338]and ABIDIAN went there next, on 30 December 1961. Ga S
[4339]said that the 24-hour fixed surveillance resulted from
[4340]the second visit,. and beccuse of it PEIKOVGOKIY was sub-
[4341]sequently observed to enter the vestibule of this address
[4342]but did not visit anyone there. it was determined that
[4343]no one living at thet acGdress knew PINKOVSKIY and he be-
[4344]came a target of KGS suspicion and investigation.
[4346]The rest of the ¥& story is completely in disagreement
[4347]with the facts of the case and does not warrant discussion here.
[4348]It must ke noted, nonetheless, that this is the only instance
[4349]among all the versions which places the compromise cn the Aner-
[4350]ican side of the case, and the only one which makes a direct
[4351]connection between the Pushkin Street dead drop and the KGB
[4352]Getection of PENKOVSKIY. (All others attribute the compromise
[4353]to surveillance of British Embassy personnel, and NOSENKO claim-
[4354]ed that the KGB was unaware of American Intelligence participa-
[4355]tion until the operation was terminated.) It is also in direct
[4356]conflict with NOSEXKO, who had no knowledge of any U.S. Embassy
[4357]official visiting the Pushkin Street site prior to ABIDIAN. In
[4358]this regard, NOSEIKO insisted that the date of ASIDIAN's visit
[4360]* RBIDIAN reported that a woman encered the vestibule behind
[4361]him while he was in there, and he knelt down pretending to
[4362]tie his shoelaces until she proceeded past him and on up the
[4363]stairs. .
[4365]**NOSENKO was not aware that MAHONEY had beer identified to the
[4366]KGB as a CIA officer well before MAKONEY's October 1960 arri-
[4367]val in Moscow. .
[4369]|
[4371]AGP SEGRET
[4374]14-0000
[4376]Re re
[4378]Yh
[4380]6649
[4382]was the erd of 1960 or the very begirning of 1941. wrereas in
[4383]fact MAHOUEY's visit was in Januery 1961. Despite? the errors
[4384]relating to loadings and unloadings of deacaurwps et che Pushkin
[4385]Street locatigg aiter tie second (ARTDIAU) visit there, this
[4386]story £ron GELEF c seal ishes KGB knowletge of M’iGUTY's casing
[4387]of Pusrmkin Street. ;
[4389]Greville AINNE's testimony concerning his interrogations by
[4391]the XGB alse jAtroduce? el ticting the versions of
[4392]WOSEVKC, CQEMRESS hod ied hae bea BG and Qipasly Guimes
[4393]As indicated 1m agiscussisn Of ‘a stury of the ea con-
[4395]versation with LULACKI (Freges 536-538), the KB was convinced
[4396]that PINKOVSKIY's question about his girlfriend “ZzP" was an im-
[4397]portant allusion ana they demanded tnat dYsue explain t&. NE
[4398]either had forgotten the name cr had never known it, and he was
[4399]unable to tel) the KGi who “ZEP" was. The fact that tre MCB had
[4400]@ recorling of this 27 May 1961 conversation shows also that the
[4401]KGB was at least suspicious of the relationsnip before that con-
[4402]versation took place and must have then tecone aware of the con-
[4403]spiratorial aspect of the PENKOVEKLY-sUE relationship ty virtue
[4404]cf the cryptic nature of that conversation, The additional fact
[4405]that the KGB surveilled WYNNE to the apartment of an unidentified
[4406]officer of British Intellicence on the sarc day the “ZEP“ conver-
[4407]sation between WYNNE and PRAKOVSKTY was monitored 1s evidence
[4408]thac both #s¥NNE and PENKOVSKLY were under strong suscicion of
[4409]espionage as of that day. if not earlier. Nor could those 5u3s-
[4410]piciens have been explained away by the fact that POUMOVSKRIY and
[4411]WYNNE hed legitimate cover reasons for contact. in view of the
[4412]content of their conversation--there was nothing tn their overt
[4413]relationship which requiced secrecy or ever caution in conversa-
[4414]tion.
[4416]- The indication From ES) gee P that the KG2 was aware
[4417]of MAHOMEY's visit to the inside vestiouie cf the Pustkin Street
[4418]site in January 1961 18 not only missing from atl other vercions,
[4419]bat conspicuously so from NOSENKO's story? he claimed to know
[4420]everything the KGB knew about this Anerican dead drop site, be-
[4421]cause of ADIDIAN's visit there. NOSENKO on one occasion said
[4422]that he thougnt an Anerican tourist {not a U.3. Embassy officer) -
[4423]might have visited the site a year or two earlier than ARIDIAN.
[4425](411i) Remarks
[4429]NOSENKO did not know or did not report to CIA that the
[4430]only other American who had visited the Pushkin Street dead drop
[4431]area was MAHONEY.. This fact suggests that either NOSETKO was
[4432]deliberately withholding from CIA information of vita, import-
[4433]ance in the PENKOVSKIY compromise. or he was unaware of the
[4434]KGB's possession of this information, despite his claimed posi-
[4435]tion in the U.S. Embassy Section ana responsibility for cover-
[4436]age of ABIDIAN. The fact that his story on the PENKOVSKIY
[4437]compromise, like the “official report” of the KGB, does rot
[4438]show the seriousness of the evidence in the KGB's possession
[4439]as of 27 May 1961 additionally points to his withholding of in-
[4440]formation on the subject of the timing of PEIKOVSKIY’s compro-
[4441]mise, which was definitely no later than this date. If NOSE!KO
[4442]was deliberately withholding information on this subject and
[4443]lying about the PENKOVSKIY compromise, then he is mot a bona
[4444]fide defector. If he is unaware of the information which the
[4445]KGB has in its possession, then he was not in the U.S. Embassy
[4446]Section in 1960 or 196] as claimed, ard hence his bena fides
[4447]would be disproven.
[4449]JOP SELRET
[4452]14-0000
[4454]1 NMA TOM peta, [aden itivemets aeneine vameceinene en ne enapane eneenemnamemn outs 20
[4456]nn O-. ne
[4458]670.
[4459]c. Ccnmoronmise of CHEREPANOV
[4461](i) Introduction
[4463]NOSENKC’s stories on the compromises of POPOV and PENKOV-~
[4464]SKIY were examined for their accuracy as to timing and cause, In
[4465]the case of CHEREPANOV (Pages 548-558), there is no question about
[4466]when the so-called CHEREPANOV papers were passed, nor how the KGB
[4467]openly learned of the U.S. Embassy's possession of the papers.
[4468]The chief question is the authenticity of the documents themselves,
[4469]with the subsidiary implications, if they are not authentic, that
[4470]the passage of the papers was instigated by the KGB, and that
[4471]there could have been neither a compromise of nor a search for
[4472]CHEREPANOV, as described by NOSENKO and attested to by his travel
[4473]authorization (sae also Part VIII.D.8.).
[4475](ii) The Operational Plan in Draft
[4477]Examination of one draft document--the- operational plan
[4478]against the CiA officer' WINTERS --reveals ‘the following points
[4479]related to forn:
[4481]- Although only a draft, the title of the case officer,
[4482]the designation of his office, the title of his supervisor
[4483]as approving authority, and the designaticn of his office
[4484]component as well as the title of the confirming authority
[4485](the nead of the department) are spelled out in full, even
[4486]including the subordination of the KGB to the Council of
[4487]Ministers of the USSR. KG8 practice, as reported by
[4488]cther sources and as logic would dictate, does not require
[4489]that this be done, cumbersome as these designations are,
[4490]and the typist routinely fills them in as the official
[4491]copy is typed from the draft.
[4493]- Although only a draft, this document has been signed
[4494]by KOVSHUK as being approved, which is against common
[4495]sense and KGB practice. NOSENKO himself noted this dis-
[4496]crepancy, asking himself aloud why KOVSHUK had done’ this.
[4498]- Although only a draft, the name of the target of
[4499]the plan appears several times, but earlier KGB defectors
[4500]have stated and NOSENKO himself has confirmed that the
[4501]name is left out of drafts so the typist in the typing
[4502]pool will not know the identity of the subject of the
[4503]report; a blank line is used wherever the name is to-
[4504]appear to be filled in by hand by the case officer after
[4505]the document comes back from the typist.
[4507]- On the basis of references to LANGELLE and POPOV,
[4508]this plan (which is not dated) would have to have been
[4509]drafted sometime after October 1959. WINTERS by this
[4510]time had been in Moscow since August 1958, had been de-
[4511]tected in operational letter-mailing, and had been
[4512]associating with KGB officers, etc. Neither this
[4517]14-0000
[4519]671.
[4521]operational plan nor any other of the drafts included in
[4522]the CHEREPANOV package cited a KG3 cryptonym for hin, and
[4523]he ie always referred to in true name, put this is contrary
[4524]to the usage in the other operational plans in the package.
[4525]It ts also contrary to KGB practice, as described by NOSEI-
[4526]KO and other sources.
[4528]- The draft cited several technical aids to be used in
[4530]the clandestine study of WINTERS. It not only gives the KGB
[4532]eryptonym of metka and “Neptun-80" for two of these techni-
[4533]ques, but inmediately thereafter explains for what purpose
[4534]each one of them is used. In the other operational plans
[4535]from CHEREPANOV, and in conformance with the established
[4536]KGB practice of inserting cryotonvms for such devices,
[4537]these preparations are not only not described, but the
[4538]blank line typed by the typist has been filled in by hand
[4539]after typing.
[4541]In adaition to the above points of form, this same document
[4542]contains statements which run counter to rigid KGB practice and
[4543]which are internally contradictory, especially noteworthy in an
[4544]approved draft. One of the objectives amnounced in the plan is
[4545]to investigate two Soviet citizens who were detected in contact
[4546]with WINTERS in Moscow; one of the two is identified parenthetic-
[4547]ally as having gone abroad. This document, if genuine, would be
[4548]an admission on the part of the case officer, and an approval
[4549]thereof by his supervisor, that a Soviet citizen wno had been
[4550]observed in contact with an identified officer of Averican Intel-
[4551]ligence had been cleared by the KGB for travel abroad before the
[4552]nature of that contact had been satisfactorily determined by the
[4553]KGB, This is in contradiction to all available information con-
[4554]cerning KGB travel clearances, which are denied on the basis of
[4555]unauthorized contacts between Soviet citizens and foreigners in
[4556]the Soviet Union, not to mentaon Western Intelligence officers.
[4557]The draft, which consists of only three paragraphs, can be sum-
[4558]marized briefly by paragraph to demonstrate the internal contra-
[4559]dictions: .
[4561]- To establish the nature of WINTERS' intelligence
[4562]activities in the USSR, six special tasks will be carried
[4563]out, including round-the-clock surveillance, metka,
[4564]“Neptun-80," hidden microphones. other. audio-devices.
[4565]and investigation of already identified Soviet citizens.
[4567]- Because he already been identified as an intelli-
[4568]gence operator. and he has a hostile attitude toward the
[4569]USSR, there is no basis for recruitment; therefore the
[4570]actions outlined in the first paragraph will not be
[4571]carried out because they might alarm him and cause hin:
[4572]to leave the USSR prematurely.
[4574]- Despite the statements of the second paragraph,
[4575]which indicate that recruitment is out of the question
[4576]and which precludes putting into effect the measures
[4577]outlined in the first paragraph. this third paragraph
[4578]sets forth the expectation that just before WINTERS’
[4579]scheduled departure and depending on further accumula-
[4580]tion of materials on WINTERS, and the prevailing pelit-
[4581]ical climate the time. an opportunity 1s likely to
[4582]arise which will permit testing the possibility of
[4583]recruiting him. .
[4585]-Aner. aTeaCT:
[4587]ij Saree Ererenere
[4590]14-0000
[4594]672.
[4596]If the WiNTERS\operat:on plan were a draft like the others jn
[4597]this collection, the atove confifcting and confuzin.g paragraphs
[4598]might be explained as variations jotted down as possible ap-
[4599]proaches to presenting a plan for the future, as ye* undecided
[4600]in direction. This document, however, is the one which--to
[4601]NOSENKO's puzzlement--had been approved end signed in draft by
[4602]KOVSHUK, as Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section, fAmericen Depart-
[4603]ment, KGB Second Chief Directorate. The preparing case officer,
[4604]KUSKOV, had furthermore indicated to the typing posl that it was
[4605]to be typed in one copy, which gives the document the appearance
[4606]of a draft which had been or was about to be made 4 matter of
[4607]official KGB record.
[4609]The foregoing review of errors, contradictions, and dis-
[4610]regard for security considerations in preparation constitutes
[4611]evidence that this is not a genuine KGB draft cocument.
[4613](414) Tue Summary on LANSELLE
[4615]A second document, a handwritten note in what NOS ENKO
[4616]identified as CHEREPAIOV's own handwriting, alse is pertinent
[4617]to the authenticity of the papers and of NOSENKO's account on
[4618]CHEREPANOV. This if a short sumnary of the operational activity
[4619]of the CIA officer LANGELLE, covering the compromise of POrOoV,
[4620]The document says in part: "In January 1959 a letter with secret
[4622]writing mailed by a co-worker of the Embassy of the USA in Moscow,
[4624]WINTERS, was intercepted and was addressed. to a Soviet citizen,
[4625]POPOV, a worker of the General Staff of the Soviet Army. Accord-
[4626]ing to the contents of the letter, it was clearly established
[4627]that FOFOV was an Averican agent..."
[4629]This coincides precisely with NOSENKO's account of POPOV's
[4630]compromise (see Pages 532 and 663). Unlike GOLITSYN's recollec-
[4631]tion of the official report which he read, there is no reference
[4632]in this document to che report of about 1957 from an agent source
[4633]that there was a leak of GRU information; nor is there reference
[4634]to the indication that the KGS knew that LANGELLE had been posted
[4635]to Moscow in order to nandle a special agent, for this reason
[4636]placing LANGELLE under heavy surveillance. If both of these
[4637]items were in the official report which GOLITSYN read, their
[4638]omission from the sumaary report in what purports to be CHERE.
[4639]PANOV's handwriting is noteworthy, particularly since CHEREPANOV
[4640]was supposed to have been in the same office (room) as the case
[4641]officer working against LANGELLE during the time the LANGELLE/
[4642]POPOV cperation was investigated by the KGB. The latter posi-
[4643]tion should lend authority to CHEREPANOV's version of the com-
[4644]promise and termination of the case; yet GOLITSYN--informed
[4645]only from the official, and presumably sanitized, account--had
[4646]more detail, as well es conflicting information, on the same
[4647]case. While it is reasonable that a sanitized case summary
[4648]would conceal an agent source of a lead by imputing the dis-
[4649]covery to surveillance, it seems less likely, and indeed un-
[4650]necessary, to conceal a detection via surveillance by imputing
[4651]it to an agent source, In this supporting NOSENKO ard others
[4652]as to the cause of PUPOV's compromise, and contradicting
[4653]GOLITSYN (who is supported by other evidence accumulated in-
[4654]dependently), this document too appears to be a XGB fabrica-
[4655]tion. : -
[4657]The authenticity of another passage in the sane document is
[4659]likewise open to question. This is the description of LANGELLE's
[4660]two visits to Lenin Hills, which the documents stated were for
[4662]TOP SFeRET
[4665]14-0000
[4667]wy toes wr _ .
[4668]673. mt
[4670]the purposes of casing & Grop site end putting down the dead
[4671]drop, respectively. The document further stated that the dead
[4672]drop had been put down for REPNIKOV, an agent of Auericen Intel-
[4673]ligence who had recently been arrested by the Moscow KGB. Two
[4674]errors of fact in this passage belie KGB practice 45 known from
[4677]- There is no reason to dovbt that the KGB observed \
[4678]LANGELLE on the two occasions of his visits to Lenin Hills,
[4679]both times to case a proposed dead Grom site. oth sites
[4680]involved staircases, but they were two different stair-
[4681]cases in the same general area of the Lenin Hills park.
[4682]Since it is a fact that LANGELLE did not put down a dead :
[4683]drop on either occasion, KGB survetllance cowld not have :
[4684]seen him do so. If the KGB nad reason to suspect that he .
[4685]had done so, but could not locate it (since it was not
[4686]there). the KGB would feel the necessity--even more than
[4687]in the case of ABIDIAN and the Pushkin Street drop--to put
[4688]2$-hour surveillance on the area for a reasonable length
[4689]of time, in order to apprehend tna agent for whom it was
[4690]intended. The dead drop was not actuelly put down until
[4691]7 June 1958 (during twilight), ten days after the second
[4692]casing. Assuming the KGB had not stepped its coverage
[4693]of the area after only ten days, the CIA agent who did
[4694]put down the dead drop must have been observed doing this.
[4695]CHEREPANOV's note thus erred by ettribating to LANGELLE
[4696]an action which the KGB knew he had not taken and which
[4697]the KGB almost certainly knew someore else had taken.
[4700]|
[4702]: ON
[4704]- At the time the dead drop was put down, it had not ° ,
[4705]been Gesignated for any agent. REPNIKOV included. It :
[4706]was a contingency dead drop, to be activated at some
[4707]time in the future as necessary; the agent for whom it
[4708]might have Leen designated could conceivably not even
[4709]be recruited until long after the dead drop was loaded.
[4710]REPNIKOV, identified in the document as the person in-
[4711]tended to unload it, was not a recruited agent of Ameri-
[4712]can Intelligence either at the time of the drop-loading
[4713]or at any time thereafter: neither was any cead drop
[4714]contemplated for him in the event that he might be re- /
[4715]cruited. Nothing that was in the drop could have sug-
[4716]gested REPHIKOV as the intended recipiert. Again,
[4717]GHEREPANOV's note erroneously and groundlessly assigned
[4719]* the dead drop to REPNIKOV whereas in fact this dead drop
[4720]was unassigned by CIA. .
[4724]If this document were or purported to be the official
[4725]version of the activities of LANGELLE, in typed or printed
[4726]form, these errors in fact could be interpreted as intentional
[4727]and part of the sanitization, or part of an effort to make the
[4728]KGB investigative work look better than it was. As it isa |
[4730]ct eee eee meena a RN met
[4732]handwritten copy, supposedly in the writing of. the person who
[4733]intended to give the document to the U.S. Government and harm
[4734]the KGB, and since CHEREPANOV supposedly would have had access i
[4735]to the true facts, the absence of some comment further indi-
[4737]4 cates that the document was intentionally inaccurate and in-
[4739]t . complete.
[4741]_TOP SECRET_____
[4746].
[4747]1
[4748]ry
[4749]- eh ane dhemmer>
[4751]14-0000
[4753]674.
[4757](iv) Remarks
[4759]That at least two of the documents were not authentic is
[4760]evidence that the CHEREPANOV papers were designed by the KGB
[4761]for American Intelligence consumption. oo,
[4763]There is no sensitive information contained in any of the
[4764]documents; that is, they are not worth the risk of stealing
[4765]either in helping the West or a@amaging the KGB. It is further
[4766]questionable how CHEREPANOV was able to steal drafts destined
[4767]for destruction which are dated August 1958, March 1959, and so
[4768]on, if he had not acquired his motivation of bitterness against
[4769]the KGB until 1961, as indicated by NOSENKO and other sources.
[4771]It is also possible to question numerous other aspects of the
[4772]CHEREPANOV case, some dating from the earliest known history of
[4773]the man and others more recent. This seems unnecessary in view
[4774]of the analysis of the WINTERS document and the LANGELLE summary.
[4776]It follows that the CHEREPANOV incident was a’ provocative
[4777]plan of the KGB. NOSENKO's story about CHEREPANOV, a mutually
[4778]confirming source on KGB affairs, must be interpreted as an
[4779]indication that he has deliberately lied in reporting on the
[4780]CHEREPANOV case and his part in the investigation, now shown
[4781]to have been spurious. He has also lied in attesting to the
[4782]validity of the CHEREPANOV documents and thereby to the validity
[4783]of his own information on the same topics which those documents
[4784]also covered.
[4786]Tap sone
[4788]wet oe
[4790]ee va Te sttednanen inne daanaaendl
[4792]|
[4794]me
[4796]Ldemmeprnere te:
[4799]14-0000
[4801]“
[4804]C. Evaluation of Sourcing
[4805]1. Llatroducticn
[4807]NOSENKO was able to provide logical ana plausible sourcing ' - 3
[4808]for most of his American leads, through his claimed professional : :
[4809]assignments. Asong his foreign leads, these to which he haz no wos
[4810]plausible direct access have been variousty sourced to hearsay : ‘
[4811]from case officer friends (as with VASSALL, from nis friend
[4812]CHURANOV) and invoiverent in peripheral activities (su has his
[4813]TDY to the city of Viedimir after the A WEN IESE
[4814]had been spotted as + hemusexual during a visit Scere).
[4815]able sourcing by NOSENAG Has occurred in his statements cn his
[4816]one couble agent case, four American cases and three involving
[4817]foreigners. They are reviewsd below because they include the
[4818]most impoctant ieads FOSENKO has provided.
[4820]2. Discussion
[4822]There are two KGB Secon! Chief Directorate operations in-
[4823]volving fimericias which MOSEKKO has sourced inconsistently or
[4824]falsely.
[4826]He denunstrated uncertainty in his knowledse cf the facts
[4828]of the “ANDREY” case (Pages 412-420) by making veque allusions
[4830]to having heard of it in “bits and pieces" from c runber of case
[4832]officers involved in the case at Gifferent times; his first know-
[4834]ledge of it, he said, was due to his own etployment in the U.S.
[4836]Embassy Section in 1953-1955, “although I worked there quite a
[4838]bit later. But it was knewn." (in 1962 Le repeatedly dated the
[4840]reeruitment as 71949-50.") . Bayle SMITH, identified as "ANOFEY",
[4842]fixed his recruitment cate around December 1953, end he did not
[4844]jeave Moscow until April 1954. Sinze ‘SMITH was directly sub-
[4846]ordinate to the office of the Army Attache, which was responsible
[4848]for the Embassy's code roon, NOSENKO as case officer for the Army
[4850]Attechnes had a logicai reason for knowing rore than he claimed .
[4852]about the case, including the agent's name. MNULE, who succeeded fo
[4853]: VAN LAETHEM as ‘cryptographic security officer and S4ITH's super- 4
[4854]! visor, was supposed to be one of NCSENKO's more active cases at : * 3
[4855]‘ this time. It is clear from NOSENKO's inability to claim direct : -
[4856]knowledge of the case that he was not aware of these, facts.
[4858]: In the case of Edward Ellis SMITH (Pages 463-469), the U.S.
[4860]Embassy Security Officer from 1954 to 1¥58, NOSENXO’s ignorance
[4862]: of the objective facts of the case led him into statements con-
[4864]cerning his own knowledge of the case which cannot be true. IA
[4866]1962 he claimed to have played a significant role in the attempt
[4868]to recruit SMITH, but he admitted after the defecticn that tnese
[4870]claims were exaggerations designed to make him lock better than
[4872]he was at the time. He said the case officer was KOVSHUX, and
[4874]GRIBANOV was personally running the operation, but that ina ;
[4875]sense he did play 2 role; he was assigred to a phone watch in P
[4876]support of surveillance during the final phase cf the case. Once
[4878]again it is clear that he did not know tre dates of SMITH'S
[4880]assignment to Moscow (1954 to 1956) ner did he know that the
[4882]opezation he has described tock place between 1 and 5 June 1956,
[4884]and that SMITH was recalled from Moscow on 8 June i956. Tris is
[4886]a full year after NOSENKO said he transferred froa the U.S. Lmbassy
[4888]Section. -
[4890]cites semen an eee ee ett ete
[4893]oo ee rn ere ee
[4895]TOP SECRET ood.
[4898]14-0000
[4900]‘instance, as in the Edward SUITH case, SOSENKO's iuforaation ‘és
[4901]inadequate for his sourcing.
[4903]to have learned atout through his friend in that Directorate, GU.
[4905]676, :
[4907]NOSENKO clained to have kad a direct rote as the sunervisirg i
[4909]‘ease officer in the BELITSKIY case in tts 1962 Geneva phase. As \
[4910]“a first-hand source, however, he was wrong about the origins of
[4911]“the operation end ignorant of the content end the operational plas-
[4913]ning of the 1962 reetings he was supposedly supervising. In this
[4915]-NOSEXKO provided leads to nine KGS operations which had orig-
[4916]inated with the First Chief Directorate. 1x of these he clained
[4918]who was personally tnvolved in mest of these operations.* Of the
[4920]other three, two--the Paris agent (JCHNSON) and the Brussels/NA7T9O
[4921]case--ne said he picked up in bits and pieces from technicians of - :
[4922]the Second Chie‘ Directorate's Spccial Section sho had assisted tn ;
[4923]thes. For both of the latter operations, nuserous coincidences
[4925]were alleged by NOSENKO to have enabled him to obtain the fragaen-
[4927]tary ipformation froa his sub-fources, and he «as never able to
[4929]clarify what parts he learned from which cf the four technicians
[4931]be named as sub-sources.
[4933]Ip describing his acquisition of infornaton on the riath
[4934]case, "SASHA," NOSENKO has contradicted hinself: He first said he
[4935]had learned sbout “SASHA fron SHATYAPIN, providing lergthy and
[4936]involved explanations of how he became aequainted with SHALYAPIN
[4937]at the time of the latter's retirement fron the KGB in 1962. cater,
[4938]under interrogation, NOSENKO did not recall his statements that
[4939]CRSLYAPIN was the original source of the "SSSHA" story, first
[4940]attributing it to others and-later saying that he could not rémen-
[4941]ber wher and from whos he first heard itt, but SHALY4PIN and others
[4942]had talked about it. This was despite the fact that by the time
[4943]he heard of "SASHA" he had already met and agreed to cooperate
[4944]with CIA; furtherzore, when asxed if “SASHA” was an important lead,
[4945]ne agreed that it was a serious matter. Except for this one
[4946]occasion he had consistently failed to appreciate the significance
[4947]of such:a lead, indicating that it was not considered importast ia
[4948]the. KGB.
[4950]Also casting doubt on his sourcing of “SASHA" is the fact
[4951]that, in his first reference to “SASHA and the Cuban zissile crisis
[4952]of Cctcber 1962, NOSENKO said he had learred of this item fron a
[4953]SHALYAPIN, whereas later he said it was rot from SHALYAPIN (but ‘ke
[4954]fea) not identify arother source from whom'he had heard this de-
[4955]tail). ;
[4957]sterners, the case. of
[4958]Sthe RCMP‘ s sie
[4959]yo Bre EE r : “heey, as to sourcing.
[4960]BOSENKO first s m of the case un-
[4961]officially, GUX having been involved in the eperation in Soscow.
[4962]When asked why GiK should be involved in a Caradian. case in 1963
[4963]when he was supposedly working in the First Chief Directorate's
[4964]American Department against American targets, NOSENKO. retracted
[4965]his initial stateaest and said that GUX somehcw got in contact
[4966]with hin, not as a KGB officer but sinply as an acquaintance.
[4967]Despite the non-official nature of GLK's relationship as thus tia-
[4968]plied by NOSENKO, GLY. able to tell hia all the operational de-
[4969]tails coacerning GefS except his name. This case has an odd
[4971]th
[4973]*Although he had met GUK many years before, NOSENKO indicated that
[4974]they did not becore -friends untal his visit to Geneva in 1962. and
[4975]only then did GUK begin to reveal operational details to hia.
[4977]TOP SECRET.
[4979]. ‘orem.
[4980]SS recommen cnt 0 Mperrne nem aascometeer time emewern fe
[4982]a ee
[4985]14-0000
[4987]aspect which NOSENKC failed to see: He said that chi d
[4989]ccme to Mosccw on a Soviet visa issusd on a separate
[4991]paper, rather than entered in the ran's passport, so re
[4993]would not ce a cercanent record of his trave: te the his
[4994]implies, and Pah Aes confirmed, that he travelied ur yrus
[4996]nane to Moscow. : urthermore confirmed thst gone :
[4997]as a tourist, enterzng the USSR cn a Soviet tuur.st In view
[4999]of the First Chief Directorate's operaticnal jurisdiction in this
[5001]otherwise normal tourist, there was an obvious necessity for coor- !
[5002]dination between the First Chief Directorate'’s Arcrican Departrent
[5003]and the Second Chief Directorate'’s fourist Lepartoeat, to prevent
[5004]any slippage (such as NOSEN‘O descrited in the SiUJIN case, when coe
[5005]the CRU failed to ccordinate with the KGP}. Yes despite logical “4
[5006]rofessional need-to-know on NOSENXO's part, he Cirst made his own . : '
[5007]xnowledzge unofficial, and then his subscurce's knewledge unofficial ‘ : :
[5008]as well.
[5010]was unable to in how he had learned of the case
[5012]oF: French @4aks re, shen pressed for a
[5013]subsource, he claiaed that he had attended a recention at the Indian : >
[5014]Exbassy in 1953 or 1959 wit) GRIEANOV, and when CFISANOV tolcohinm to : -
[5015]take a glass of wine to Heep he understood scnehow cha Sygite as :
[5016]an agent cf GRIBANOV's. :
[5018]His sourcing for the case of the French businesszan,
[5019](Page 484), is not unlike that of Goat jie said he had known
[5020]that there was a French businessman enc kas an arent. On one occa-
[5021]sicn when NOSENKO was duty officer for the Second Chicf Directorate
[5022]a call for GRIBANGY cave_in and he ashed whos was calling. When he
[5023]was told it was then he knew somehow tiat this was
[5024]GRIBANCV's agent.
[5026]3. Remarks
[5028]NOSENKO's errors concerning "ANDREY" (particularly his early
[5029]insistence that “ANDREY" had Icft Moscew years before NOSENKO en-
[5030]tered the KGB) make it impossible that NOSENKO could have learned
[5031]of the case in the way he later said he did.
[5033]NOSENKO's acccunts of how he learned cf the "Paris agent" -are
[5034]vague and vary with each telling; they also depend heavily on coin-
[5035]cidence. Jt is noteworthy too that he clained to have been told of
[5036]this one operation by no less than four individuals, whereas the
[5037]rest of what he learned of First Chicf Directorate operations in
[5038]eleven years of KG3 service came from only two ether individuals.
[5039]Furthermore, his knowledge of "SASHA" stecned from elaborate and
[5040]apparently contrived sourcing which he himself was unable to recon-
[5041]struct when pressed for exact details. NOSENKO's inability to
[5043]. give any clear and consistent account of how he heard of either the
[5044]"Paris agent" or "SASHA" must be judged ia the light of the fact that
[5045]he first heard of beth cases only just after proaising to collect
[5046]such inforzation for CIA. because these were amcag the most ispor-
[5047]tant and the most fortuitous items he ever picked up, it could
[5048]reasonably be expected that he would remember how he did so, espe-
[5049]cially since only a little over a year elapsed until his next
[5050]meeting with CIA.
[5053]illogical and fabricated. It also appears that NUTENKO has given an
[5054]§naecurate version of the way in which he would have learned of
[5055]‘not an Illegal as NOSENKO indicated, but an agent).
[5057]TOP oc (RET oa
[5060]14-0000
[5064]678.
[5066]D. Examination of SOSENKO's Intelligence Carcer
[5067]1. Introduction
[5069]What follows is an examination of NOSENKO's accounts of his
[5070]Soviet Intelligence career, beginning with the years 1951 and
[5071]1952, in the naval GRU and continuing with his 11 years in the
[5072]U.S. Embassy Section and the Tourist Departrent of the KGS Sec-
[5073]ond Chief Directorate. NOSENKO’s naval service opens the dis-
[5074]cussion primarily because, according to his story, it provided
[5075]a springboard for his entrance into the KGB in 1953 with the
[5076]rank of lieutenant.
[5078]The discussion of each period in his career has two cen-
[5079]tral topics: First, NOSENKO's own descripticn of his positions,
[5080]responsibilities, and access: and second, arn assessment of this
[5081]description from the point of view of internal consistency,
[5082]accuracy, and the commensurability of his knowledge, cperational
[5083]activities, and performance with his claimed senior and respon-
[5084]sible posts with the KGB and his rise to these posts. This
[5085]assessment is based on a comparison of the information supplied
[5086]by NOSENKO with collateral information from a variety of overt,
[5087]official, defector, and clandestine sources.
[5089]NOSEXKO's accounts of the various periods in his career are,
[5090]of course, cumulative in that his clained positions and activi-
[5091]ties during one stage necessarily affect those of succeeding
[5092]periods. Insofar as possible, each period is evaluated witzin
[5093]itself and independently of conclusions earlier reached.
[5095]TOP SECRET
[5097]J ee eecrennee cern met
[5099]sree cee we Se
[5104]14-0000
[5106]ana ae
[5107]nelly ve gna es cee ane me a nme to
[5109]|
[5111]TO? vic
[5113]= - , 679.
[5114]2. Kaval GRU Service
[5115]a Introduction
[5117]' TROSENKO's accounts* of his naval GRU service (Pages 64-77)
[5118]have. teen. reviewed for their internal consistency and credibility,
[5120]and examined for accuracy against information from other sources.
[5122]th tro.
[5123]b. Discussion
[5125]Briefly, the outlines of NOSENKO's account of his military
[5126]service are about as follows:
[5128]- He studied for the equivalent of 7th, 8th, Sth and
[5129]part of 10th school years in naval schools in Kuibyshev, Baku
[5130]and Leningrad. This would normally have nothing to co with
[5131]military service, exceat that NOSENKO says he took the mili-
[5132]tary oath at the Baku School in the fall of 1943, at the
[5133]age of 16. (According to available collateral information,
[5134]the oath--fcrm:} entcy into the military forces-~was at no
[5135]time given before the age of 17, and never for purposes of
[5136]“show* or “morale” as NOSENKO claimed it was here.) He .
[5137]clains to have deserted this school after taking the oath.
[5138]Also, he shot himself in the hand only about two months
[5139]after starting anew later the same year in the naval school
[5140]in Leningrad and never finished school properly.
[5142]- He was comnissioned in the "reserves® in 1947 after
[5143]completirg his second year at the Institute of International
[5144]Relations in Moscow. However, he cannot renember what
[5145]branch of the service he was in, except that it was not the
[5146]navy. He avoided active military duty thereafter by volun-
[5147]tarily doing military translations at the Institute. while
[5148]at the Institute he contracted venereal disease at least
[5149]twice and this went on his record.
[5151]- In the spring of 1950, he was assigned to the Navy
[5152]by a mandate commission at the Institute. However, he
[5153]failed one of his examinations ("Marxism-Leninism") upon
[5154]completicn of the Institute of International Relations later
[5155]in 1950 which delayed his Ciploma--and hence entry into
[5156]the service--until successful re-examination later that
[5157]year. (At about the same time, he was considered and turned
[5158]down by the KGB [then G3] because of his scnool record,
[5159]drunkenness, and. other bad marks in his record.)
[5161]- He was processed for entry into the naval GRU in
[5162]1950. He said he visited the GRU personnel cffice several
[5163]times for interviews and to fill out questionnaires and
[5164]write his personal history in connection with the required
[5165]security check. He was accepted into naval GRU despite a
[5166]record which showed desertion, self-inflicted wound in
[5168]*— There is no Single account of this period of NOSENKO's life
[5169]which can ke examined because NOSENKO has altered the cir-
[5170]_cumstances and dates importantly from one telling to the next.
[5177]14-0000
[5179]680.
[5181]wartime, drunkenness, vencreal cisease, still-valid marriage
[5182]to a State criminal's daughter, rejection for MGB enoloy-
[5183]ment, and a bad academic record including failure of a
[5184]course in Marxism-Leninism just at thiactime.
[5186]LS.
[5188]- He was called to active duty as a senior lieutenant
[5189]on 12 Maren 1951, and without any indoctrination or train-
[5190]ing, he departed four or five days later in civilian clothes
[5191]for his fisst duty station, Scvietskaya Gavan in the Soviet
[5193]Par East. SOSENKO claims to have chosen this post, con- |
[5194]sidered generally to be the least desirable of all naval
[5196]assignments, on his own initiative, to prove to his father
[5198]that ne wae a man, (The above was his account in 1966, in
[5200]all earlier accounts he saie he went to the Soviet Far East
[5202]in the fall of 1950, and in fact saic that he had two months'
[5203]leave in 1952, one for each of two years there. However,
[5205]according to the i956 account, his service there lasted only |
[5206]one year.) {
[5208]- In fovetskaya Gavan NOSEMKO's job was to extract in- i
[5209]formation fron American publications reporting naval de-
[5210]velopments. Asked in April 1964 for any personal account t
[5211]of his own work, KOSENKO was able to think of oniy “four or :
[5212]five trips” on small ships to the coast of Sakhalin,* and
[5213]three to Hukxaido, to drop or pick up agents. His own role,
[5214]he said, was as a trainee; he was taken along oniy "to searn
[5215]how it was done;" he himself never trained or dispatched any
[5216]agents, nor did he know the identities cr missions cf any
[5217]others. is also could not descrite the ships he had travelled
[5218]: on. Questinned on the location of Sovetskaya Gavan’ in 1965,
[5219]. : NOSENKO insisted that this city is lccated in Primorskiy
[5220]Kray, although it is actually located in Khabarovskiy Kray.**
[5222]i
[5223]t
[5225]1
[5227]1
[5228]t
[5229],
[5231]~- NOSENKO said he returned on routine leave (or, accord-
[5233]ing to otter accounts, because of having contracted tubercu-
[5234]losis) in April 1952. We then spent two months either in
[5235]his parents’ Moscow home or, according to other accounts, in
[5236]a sanitorium near Moscow under treatment for tuberculosis.
[5237]He said he was coughing up “half a glass of biood at a time.”
[5238](X-rays and medical examinations from February 1964 have
[5240]a detected ny indications that NOSENKO ever suffered from
[5242]‘ tuberculosis.)
[5244]i - At this time, the summer of 1952, NOSENKO said he was
[5245]i offered in ¥oscow ar opportunity to attend the GRU strategic
[5246]: intelligence school, the Military-Diplomatic Academy, but
[5247]turned it down because he had already studied most of the
[5248]course matter in the Institute of International Affairs; ba-
[5249]sides, NOSENKO said in October 1966, he failed the physical
[5250]examination when sugar was discovered in his faeces.
[5252].- NOSENKO was then transferred--without returning to
[5253]the Far Bast--to the Intelligence Staff of the Baltic Fleet
[5254]at Baltiysx. He invented a story in 1964 about going there
[5256]¥ In October 1366 NOSEKKO was asked whether he had ever been
[5257]to Sakhalin; his answer was no.
[5259]** This is the equivalent of being stationed for a year in Port-
[5260]land, Oregon and thinking oneself in California.
[5265]|
[5267]14-0000
[5269]Ce
[5271]JOP SECREL ,
[5273]681.
[5275]via Naval Intelligence Points in Berlin, Rostock, and Sass-
[5276]nitz, but then said this was a lie he told because he felt
[5278]his interrogators would not believe hin if ne had said he
[5279]successfully turned down an assignaent to these points,
[5281]then closing down, and had travelled directly to Baltiysk.
[5283](As pointed out to NOSEKO, the assignment to the cold,
[5285]damp Baltic climate of a recent 7B-sufferer appears unthink-
[5286]able, particularly when that person is a Government Minister's
[5287]son; he acknowledged this but said, “There were no other
[5288]positions available.”)
[5290]- He could not remember the name of the place he served
[5291]near Raltiysk. He had named it as Primorsk in 1962 (which
[5292]fitted his description of its size and location) but from
[5293]1964 on insisted it was Sovetsk. There is no such village
[5294]in the area, but there is in the region a well-known city
[5295]by that name (the former Tilsit) far inland and far away.
[5297]He did not know (as contemporary Soviet maps show) that
[5298]a rail line went to Baltiysk from Primorsk.
[5300]- In the Baltiysk area, he claimed in 1962, he had
[5301]trained agent teams to be sent behind enemy lines in time of
[5302]war. Under interrogation in 1964 he changed his description
[5303]of hie functions, saying he merely prepared training mater-
[5304]ials and delivered supplies, never having direct contact with
[5305]or knowledge of the agent work. His service there wa3
[5306]limited to about six months, since he said he left there at
[5307]the beginning of 1953. He either had had cne or two leaves
[5308]from there, depending on which telling is accepted: In 1964
[5309]NOSENKO said that in August or September 1952 he was given
[5310]a special leave from his duties in Sovetsk to travel to Mos-
[5311]cow in order to formalize his divorce from his first wife;
[5312]in April 1956 he wrote that he was divorced during his leave
[5313]before going to Sovetsk.
[5315]~ NOSENKO said he returned to Moscow on his own initia-
[5316]tive and against the wishes of nis commanding officer at the
[5317]end of 1952 and began steps to get out of the GRU. He has
[5318]told conflicting stories of where he stayed and in what
[5319]leave status. It was during this period, he said, that
[5320]his conversation with KOBULOV led him. to shift to the KGB.
[5322]- In April 1966 NOSENKO wrote that he was promoted to
[5323]the rank of lieutenant of the Administrative Services while
[5324]stationed in Sovetsk. In earl:er accounts he said that he
[5325]was promoted to the rank of lieutenant while stationed in
[5326]the Soviet Far East. ; .
[5328]Remarks
[5330]‘The notes above on NOSENKO's career do not treat most of the
[5332]changes cf story, contradictions, corrections, or inaccuracies in
[5333]ROSENKO's accounts: Variations of dates may be attributable to
[5334]faulty memory, changes in the story might have resulted from his
[5335]own elaborations and exaggerations, and inaccuracies might be
[5336]explained by his inattention or indifference to detail. IF all
[5337]the details were to be considered, the story would become even
[5338]more confused. . . .
[5340]Certain general aspects stand out, however:
[5342]nee eens peerage ne:
[5344]TOP-SECRET, —
[5346]14-0000
[5348]se aetna none I IIE pe
[5350]10?
[5352]632.
[5354]oe . ics rf
[5355]ser Settee here .
[5356]atcordin
[5358]yg to ail availa. ot have been accepted
[5359]into the naval GRU, one of the particularly sensitive parts
[5361]of the navy. Either the life history is false, or the GRY
[5362]officer service is, or both.
[5364](z) ‘Ine story is vague, unsubstantial, and contra-
[5365]dictory; no substance has been added to the base outlines
[5366]of the story despite frequent questioning. One might expec:
[5367]of an educated or reasonably intelligent person some recol-
[5368]lection of military service completed 10 years eariler--the
[5369]locations whece he served, whether he did or did not have
[5370]TB, how and when he entered or transferred from one place to
[5371]another, and what he did or what he experienced,
[5373](3) NCSENKO's knowledge of military procedures, of
[5374]the navy, and of the units with which he served is practic-
[5375]ally non-exiztent. He has provided no reason whatever to
[5376]make one believe that he actually was a naval officer.
[5378](4) The functions he claims to have fuifilled involved
[5379]no direst involvement or personal respongeibilities: They
[5380]sound like the bare outlines of a legend, not like real life
[5381]or personal experience.
[5383]That this period is fictitious is supported by the findings
[5384]of the psychologist (Pages 665-611).
[5386]NOSE:KO'’s description of his naval GPU service cannot be
[5387]accepted as true. On the basis of his statements, it appears
[5388]moreover that he was never a naval officer, nor an officer of any
[5389]other regular military service.
[5391]Since NOSENKO claims that his GRU status and service provided
[5392]him the platform fora transfer into the KGB (without such for-
[5393]malities as medical examination, personnel interviews or question-
[5394]naires), this conclusion is relevant to his claim of KGB staff
[5395]status from 1952 or 1953. oe
[5397]e
[5399]TOP SECRET
[5403]14-0000
[5405]a
[5407]683.
[5409]3. Entry into the KGB
[5410]a. Eligibility
[5412]The previous section discussed NOSENKO'S eligisility for
[5413]admission to the naval GRU and concluded with the remark that,
[5414]on the basis of what NOSENKO has to!d CIA about his earlier
[5416]‘life, he could not have been accepted for service in Naval
[5418]Intelligence. According to information available to CIA from
[5419]several knowledgeable sources, the #GB has more stringent entry
[5420]requirements than any other Soviet organization. The candidate's
[5421]family background, personal conduct. and Party or Komsomol rec-
[5422]ord must be impeccable. NOSENKXO would have American Intelli-
[5423]gence believe that in his case the KGB--specifically the offi-
[5424]cers responsible for signing their nawes to the approval--accepted
[5425]a person whose record showed (a3 noted on pages 679-680 above)
[5426]desertion from the armed forces self-inflicted wound in wartime,
[5427]drunkenness, venereal disease, previous =arriege tc the daugnter
[5429]oF B state criminal, A bad déazeAte record including failure oF —
[5431]a~CuUTTe Li-Mareism-Leninism; and a prior réjection_by ‘the KGB
[5432]itseli. 1re-enty trange since the earlier’ rejection had been,
[5433]according to NOSENKO, two years of undistinguished military ser-
[5434]vice in the Naval GRU, 9 oT
[5436]Moreover, during this naval duty NOSENKO said he had con-
[5437]tracted tuberculosis, for which he «as still under treatment
[5438]at the Cime he entered the State Security Service. NOSENKO has
[5439]indicated on separate occasions that his illness was a matter
[5441]of record with the Gru, and that the reason he did not have to
[5443]take a physical examination for entry into the KGB was the avail-
[5444]ability of GRU records. According to DERYABIN, however, KGB
[5445]regulaticns at that time would have preciuded admission to KGB
[5446]ranks if there was a recent history of tuberculosis even though
[5447]already arrested.
[5449]b. Date of Entry .
[5451]NOSENKO has given a variety of dates for his entry on duty
[5452]with the KGB and has provided severa! reasons for his changes of
[5453]story (Pages 86-89). During nis first meeting with CIA, when
[5454]NOSENKO gave a brief personal anc professional autobiography, he
[5455]said that he had joined the KGB is. February or March 1953. In
[5456]1964, however, first while still ettached to the Soviet Disarma-
[5457]ment Delegation and later when reviewing and signing a bio-
[5458]graphic history prepared by CIA on the basis of his own account,
[5459]NOSENKO set this date back a year, to early 1952. During the
[5460]interrogations of April 1964, after naming several other dates,
[5461]NOSENKO returned to the original one, March 1953, and has remained
[5462]with this version since that time. NOSENKO has given two Gif-
[5463]ferent reasons for this change of dates (which, he said in Octo-
[5464]ber 1966, was conscious deception). In the April 1964 interrogations,
[5465]he explained that he had failed his examination in Marxism-Leninism
[5466]at the Institute of International Affairs, which forced hin to
[5467]take all his exams over again and delayed his career: This was
[5468]“unpleasant," NOSENKO said, and he was attempting to conceal it
[5469]from CIA. In the October 1956 interrogations, NOSENKO gave a new —
[5470]and different reason. He described how he had been rejected for
[5471]employment by State Security while at the Institute and was trying
[5472]to cover up for this because he thought CIA would not believe
[5473]that he had first been rejected and then, later, accepted by the KGB.
[5475]NOSENKO's change of story tock place in 1964 while still in the
[5476]relatively relaxed circumstances of an operational meeting in
[5477]Geneva; he came tack to his original account only during the
[5478]April 1964 interrogations. NOSENKO’s explanations of why he re-
[5480]vised the story have been inconsistent and have forced him into
[5482]“an Sf cRET
[5484]]
[5485]t
[5487]fee inte nem eS +
[5489]t
[5490]t
[5491]|
[5492]'
[5493]1
[5494]i
[5495]i
[5496]i
[5498]|
[5499]|
[5501]14-0000
[5503]684.
[5505]further inconsistencies. Because of this and, in the absence of
[5506]any pressure of any kind (including any apparent psychological
[5507]pressure) to lie about his date of entry, the most logical explana-
[5508]tion fer this change is that NOSENKO forgot in early 1364 either
[5509]when ke joined the KGB and/or what he nad told CIA in 1962.
[5510]DERYABIN has commer.ted on the significance which the date of entry
[5511]holds for a KGB officer. He expressed the opinion that it would
[5512]be unusual for a KGB officer to forget this date.
[5514]NOSENKO was questioned at length by DERYABIN (Pages 616-619)
[5515]concerning the taming of his entry on duty with the KG2. As a
[5516]result of this interrogation it was cetermined that NOSENKO was
[5517]unaware that at the time he said he joined the KGS, the present
[5518]First Chief Directorate was designated the Secord Chief Direc-
[5519]torate and vice versa. Therefore, NOSEXSO would have joined a
[5520]component entitled the First Chief Directorate in March 1953,
[5521]not the Second Chief Directorate as he says. NOSENKO cid not
[5522]know or had forgotten various other facts, including the date
[5523]that the MVD was redesignated the KoB, and misstated the loca-
[5524]tiors and existence of various buiidings and offices in the
[5525]vicinity of the KGB Headquarters building in early 1953.
[5527]Ir. June 1962 NOSENKO said’ several times, in different meet-
[5528]ings, that the KGB agent “ANDREY" (Pages 413-414) had been re-
[5529]cruited and had left Moscow before he, NOSENKO, entered the KGB.
[5530]Me estimated the date as 1949-1950. NOSENKO knew that "ANDPEY®
[5531]was associated in Moscow with RiODES and when told that RHODES
[5532]was there from 1951 to 1953, admitted that the date he gave might
[5533]be wrong. NOSENKO continued to say, however, that “ANDREY” was
[5534]recruited before he (NOSENKO) became a KSB officer, and later
[5535]reverted again to his estimate that “ANDRE1" was recruited in
[5536]1949-1950. Wher he returned to Geneva in 1964, NOSENKO changed
[5537]this story and said that during his 1953-1955 tour in the U.S.
[5538]Embassy Section he saw cipher specialist SELEZNOV, who had come
[5539]there to consult on the then-active "ANDREY” case. NOSENKO was
[5540]unable to explain how he could have been sure in 1962 that the
[5541]"ANDREY® case was before nis time) when ne said in 1964 that
[5542]this was not so. Dayle SMITH confessed that he was recruited by
[5543]the KGB in late 1953, and records show that he left Moscow in
[5545]early 2954.
[5546]c. Circurstances of Entry
[5548]NOSENKO has consistently related his entrance into the KGB
[5549]to discussions he had with General KOBULOV in early 1953 in Mcs-
[5550]cow, after returning from the Baltic. However, he has changed the
[5551]date of these discussions with KOBULOV virtually every time he
[5552]has told this story. In June 1962, NOSENKO said he talked with
[5553]KOBULOV at the NOSENKO decha while on leave in March 1963; during
[5554]the April 1464 interrogations he changed the date to February
[5555]1953; in April 1965 NOSENKO said he spoke to KOBULOV at the
[5556]KOBULOV dacha in January 1953 while on leave and that he lived
[5557]at home and was at the “disposal of GRU personnel” during Febru-
[5558]ary and March. Finally, in April 1966, MOSENKO said he first
[5559]spoke to KOBULOV at KO3ULOV's dacha on New Years Day 1953, that
[5560]he was subsequently “resting” at a sanitorium connected with his
[5561]tuberculosis of the year before, and that he spoke again to
[5563]_KOBULGV cr. the day of STALIN's funeral, while home for a few days
[5565]from the sanitorium, 1t was at this second encounter with KOBULOV
[5566]that the latter promised to concern himself with NOSENKO's entry
[5567]into the KGB. ;
[5572]Lue SECRET.
[5576]a be
[5578]14-0000
[5580]Tae
[5582]V0P. a
[5584]In 1962 NOSENKO described the simple procedure by which he
[5585]entered the KG3, volunteering that there was no need to fil! out
[5586]a questionnaire (arxeta) as the KGB already had his files from
[5587]the GRU. In April 1967 when asked if he had not been required
[5588]to fill out any questionnaires or other docutents, NOSENKO ces-
[5589]cribea the anketa and other forms he completed (saying he took
[5590]them home to do so) and his various interviews with KGB per-
[5591]sonnel officers. He was interrogated in detail on these claims
[5592]by DERYABIN in 1965, to whom he gave descriptions, albeit in-
[5593]accurate, of the varicus forms and of his visits to KGS Personnel.
[5594]In 1966 NCSENKO wrote in his autobiography that there were no
[5595]talks with KGB Personnel before or after his acceptance and in-
[5596]plied that there were no forms to fill out. .
[5598]d. Remarks
[5600]Accordirg to all of NOSENKO's stories, his GRU service was
[5601]the springboard for his acceptance into the KGB. He met KOBULOV
[5602]while home in Moscow from Primorsk/Sovetsk, he entered the KG3
[5603]as a lieutenant since this was his naval rank, his admission
[5604]according to the early version was facilitated by the availability
[5605]of his GRU personnel file; yet CIA has concluded that NOSENKO
[5606]was never a GRU officer and it appears highly improbable that he
[5607]waa ever in Primorsk under any circumstances.
[5609]On the basis of generally available information concerning
[5610]Soviet realities at the time of NOSENKO's claimed entry into the
[5611]¥GB, supported by the expert testimony of DERYABIN (who was in
[5612]the KGB, then MVD, in Moscow at tha time anda h-d been himself a
[5613]KGB personnel officer until less than a year earlier), a person
[5614]with the background NOSENKO has given could not be accepted into
[5615]the KGB in the manner he claims. His health alone would seem
[5616]to have precluded this, but in addition, NOSENKO described a
[5617]series of incidents in his life equally likely to cause rejection.
[5618]NOSENKO's mistakes, changes of story, and apparent fabrications
[5619]add to the unlikelihood of his account.
[5621]It is concluded that, aS in the case of NOSENKO's GRU ser-
[5622]vice, either NOSENKO and those who have supported aspects of
[5623]his story have seriously distorted his past life, or he did not
[5625]enter the KGB.
[5627]Tope oro
[5629]2 pe en eee
[5631]1 a sat my ANIA tenets a et a ee
[5633]TOP-SECRET
[5637]Se met ep nen ete
[5639]14-0000
[5641]_ TOP > oF - 4
[5643]686. 7 : |
[5645]4. Initial Service in the U.S. Embassy Section
[5647]‘ a. Introduction t
[5648]NOSENKO claims to have served in the U.S. Fmbassy Section of
[5650]the American Department, Second Chief Directorate, curing the
[5651]period-from his entry on duty with the “GB until June 1955. His
[5652]targets during these two years were at first American correspond-
[5653]ents in Moscow and later American Army Attaches at the Embassy.
[5655]NOSENKO sought to avoid discussion cf his o«nlor.other KGB
[5656]activity during this period and on occasion he has tried to dis-
[5657]miss the whole period as “not relevant" and "cf ne consequence.”
[5658]NOSENKO has repeatedly said that he “found himself” only after his
[5659]initial service in the U.S. Embassy Section, (He varicusly dated
[5660]his self-discovery as occurring in 1955, when he transferred to
[5661]the Tourist Department; in June 1956, in connection with his par-
[5662]ticipation in and awara for the BURGI case; ana after Aucstst 1956,
[5663]when the death of his father forced him to pull himsei: together.)
[5665]Before this, KOSENKO said, he was a wastrel and “did not pay
[5666]attention to the work.”
[5668]b. Work Against Anerican Correspondents
[5670]MNOSENKO exempted himself from reporting details of KGB work
[5672]against any specific American correspondent in Moscow in 1953-
[5673]1954 (Pages 93-96) by saying that, as a new, very junior employee
[5674]he had no access to operaticnal files and did not participate
[5675]personally in the handling of any of the corresponeents. Although
[5676]able to identify four correspondents in Moscow who were then re-
[5677]cruited KGB agents, NOSENKO learned this information either in
[5678]conversations with his superior KOZLOV or at some point and in .
[5680]: some undefined way after he no longer was working against these i
[5682]i targets. NOSENKO's early months in the job were spent reading
[5684]: personality (not operational) files on a number of the corres-
[5686]pondents in Moscow (none of which indicated the individual's de- i
[5688]velopmental or agent status) and familiarizing himself with KGB i
[5690]methods. Later NOSENKO was assigned the “agent network" of .
[5692]drivers, clerical personnel, and domestics surrounding four. of
[5694]the correspondents (two of whom were recruited ¥G5 agents at
[5696]the time); he met with them periodicaily to determine whether
[5698]they had. developed any important information. Even here, however, ;
[5700]NOSENKO appears to have been given very little responsibility: '
[5702]His superior KOZLOV often went along to the meetings with NCSENKO,
[5704]. first to show him how to handle the agents and afterward when-
[5706]H ever something interesting would begin to develop. In fact,
[5708]according to NOSENKO, KOZLOV would accompany him to meetings
[5710]with these Soviet citizens-agents even when there was a “hint”
[5712]that something of interest might develop. NOSENKO has been able :
[5714]to identify some of these agents, but for all but a few he re- : : : }
[5716]called neither their names nor personalia concerning them. : {
[5718]ce. Work Against Army Attaches
[5720]Regarding NOSENKO‘'s work against American Army Attaches, he
[5721]claimed a specific area of KGB responsibility, one for which he
[5722]alone was accountable and one about which something was previously : :
[5723]known from U.S. records. Only 20 months at the longest, it is
[5725]J
[5727]LOP S¢¢¢@ ———————*#
[5729]E
[5731]See —- A
[5735]14-0000
[5737]: re
[5740]the last period in which NOSENKO had no supervisory responsibility
[5742]. to divert his attention from personal operational duties.
[5744]NOSENKO could not remember when he touk over responsibility
[5745]for the Army Attsches, and he named two other KGB officers before
[5746]settling upon BUDYLDIN as the person from whom he received the
[5747]Attaches' files. Y¥hen belittling his earlier responsibilities
[5748]for correspondents, he has said several times that he had heen in
[5749]that job “only about six months.” Assuming that NOSENKO entered
[5750]the KGB in the middle of March 1953, this would date his transfer
[5751]to work against the Attaches in the fall of that year. In dis-
[5752]cussing this transfer itself, however, NOSENKO has consistently
[5753]said that it took place in 1954. Asked when in 1954, NOSENKO
[5754]bas variously replied “at the beginning of 1954," January 1954,
[5755]and Yey 1954. Under interrogation in early 1965, NOSENKO re-
[5756]fused to estimate when he took over this responsibility. He has
[5757]always said that he turned over these duties and transferred from
[5758]the U.S. Embassy Section in June 1955, when the Tourist Department
[5759]was established within the Second Chief Directorate. .
[5761]NOSENKO has said in different contexts that as the American
[5762]Department case officer responsible for cperations against the
[5763]U.S. Army Attaches he received and*was responsible for assinilat-
[5764]ing the product of a wide variety of gources on the indivicuals
[5765]who were’ his targets. He bas mentioned information received fron
[5766]the KGB First Chief (Foreign Intelligence) Directorate; the
[5767]Archives of the MGB/MVD/KGB; micropnones which were enplaced
[5768]about a year before NOSENKO entered the American Department*; a
[5769]network of Soviet chauffeurs, cooks, language instructors, and
[5770]other agents in the Enbassy who together provided little uscful
[5771]information; permanent and roving surveillance patrois outside
[5772]the Embassy; fixed observation posts next to, across from and
[5773]near the Embassy; advance notification of intent to travel by
[5774]the Attaches and their itineraries; and reports from outside Mos-
[5775]cow, including surveillance, egent networks, the Militia, and the
[5776]military. The point of collecting and assimilating this infor-
[5777]mation, NOSENKO said, was to be able to know what the Attaches
[5778]were doing in Moscow ard thereby to control their intelligence
[5779]collection activities. Far less important was the goal of re-
[5780]ecruiting Military Attaches; NOSENKO knew of only several in-
[5781]stances when this was attempted, and all of these efforts fatled.
[5783]The KGB's principal interest in control rather than recruit-
[5784]went has been NOSENKO's explanation for knowing little about the
[5785]backgrounds ard personal lives of his targets--such information,
[5786]he stated, simply was not pertinent to the primary mission of
[5788]*0n some occasions NOSEAKO has said that the microphones in the
[5789]Argy Attache offices were his most valuable source of informa-
[5790]tion on his targets of 1954-1955; at other times he has said
[5792]that he knew nothing of these microphones until he reentered the
[5793]U.S. Embassy Section in 1960; and at still other times he claimed
[5794]to have known ooly of their existence during 1953-1955 but not
[5796]where any were located.
[5799]14-0000
[5803]Ce Pte
[5806]r
[5807]i
[5808]i
[5809]i
[5813]SR er eri oe emma ER TAPE rT Ska Rn
[5815]deal of vulnerability data on an Army Attache, was described by
[5816]NOSENKO in connection with the approach to Walter MULE (Page 104).
[5817]On the basis of these cxpianations, NOSENKO's knowledge of the
[5818]official and unofficial activities of nis alleged targets in this
[5820]period deserves attention. ‘
[5822]independently to CIA, which were within the sphere of what he
[5823]claimed was his direct, personal responsibility:
[5825]_
[5827]688.
[5829]control. * He has also usec this:explanaticn to support his claim
[5830]that there were no recruitments of ailitary attaches during this
[5831]period. oo :
[5833]“An exception, wherein the KGB ‘did carefully compiie a great
[5835]fee ree ere
[5837]NOSENKO knew almost. nothing about the personal backgrounds
[5839]and families of the @ight ‘members of the Arny Attache Office :
[5840]whom he identified as his targets (Pages 99-106). Although he was r
[5841]able to identify each by rank and position in the "~bassy~--some-
[5843]times inaccurately--and in a few cases to cGescribe certain of
[5845]their operational activities, ne was unaware of or had forgotten
[5847]such facts as:
[5849]- Colonel Earl L. MICKELSCN, the Army Attactic in 1954
[5850]and 1955, was arrested twice Ly the Militia outsice of Mos-
[5852]cow in 1954.
[5854]- Assistant Army Attache Ira RICHARDS was a language
[5855]student of GROMOKOVA (identified by NOSENKO as a KGB egent);
[5856]by RICHARDS! account she sought to elicit biographic data
[5857]from him curing the lessons.
[5859]- William STROUD, the Assistant Amy Attache, travelled
[5860]to Kharkov in May 1955 to interivew an American defectcr.
[5861](NOSENKO has identified Frank SISCOE, who accompanied STROUD;
[5862]as a suspected CIA officer; he was coopted by CIA.)
[5864]NOSENKO, furthermore, was ignorant of important events, known
[5866]~- NOSENKO claimed direct personal responsibility for
[5867]the file of and operational activity against Lieutenant
[5868]Colonel Howard FELCHLIN (Pages 191-103). He ciaimed to be
[5869]receiving agent information on him but could not recall the
[5870]names or cryptonyms of any such agents. (ie said, for
[5871]example: "I think FELCHLiN must have had a maid, and she
[5872]would have been a XGB agent.") NOSENKO descripecé FELCHLIN
[5873]as by far the most aggressive of his targets and hence the
[5874]object of special interest; yet he did not know or remember
[5876]*IOSENKO himself, when giving the reason why he did not know
[5877]more details about the U.S. Embassy Section's targets while
[5879]he was its Deputy Chief in 19€0-1961, said that as a supervisor
[5880]he was too busy overseeing subordinates; hence,. NOSENKO con-
[5881]tinued, he could not be expected to remember as many such de-
[5882]tails as would be possible had he been a case® officer working
[5883]daily with only four or five files. In another context, NOSENKO
[5884]explained why he was unable to supply the details of planning
[5885]and organizing operations against tourists in the period 1955-
[5886]1959; he contrasted operations acainst tourists, who often {
[5887]came and went in a matter of a few days, to the work against i
[5888]the Military Attaches and dipiozats stationed in Moscow on . in
[5889]permanent assignments, who could be studied systematically and |
[5891]slowly.
[5893]— TOP SecRET.
[5897]LaF iN
[5901]MELA CE a EE
[5903]14-0000
[5905]689.
[5907]anything about FELCHLIN's background, presutably well docu-
[5908]mented by the KGB beczuse FELCHLI: had been to the USSR in
[5909]two different capacities, merchant seaman and diplomatic
[5910]courier, pricr to arriving in Moscow as the Assistant Army
[5911]Attache; also FELCHLIN had had prior official association
[5912]with GRU officers in Austria, Germany, and the United States,
[5913]and he continued to be ir liaison with one of them in Moscow.
[5914]NOSENKO could recall nothing about FELCHLIN's intelligence
[5915]activities in the USSR or his trips about the country, or
[5916]what had been done about them by the KGB. In speaking of
[5917]FELCHLIN's expulsion from the Soviet Union, NOSENKO reported
[5918]the KGB file noted that FELCHLIN had been caught taking
[5919]photographs on some occasion, but he did not know trat FEL-
[5920]CHLIN in June 1954 was arrested in kiev with another Assist-
[5921]ant Army Attache, F.J. YEAGER. (Erroneously identified by
[5922]NOSENKO as an Air Force Attache, YEAGER likewise should have
[5923]been NOSENKO's target.) NOSENKO also did not know that
[5925]FELCHLIN, with another Army Attacne and two Air.Force Attaches,
[5926]in September 1953 had made an unprecedented train trip through-
[5928]out Siberia and that six months later, at the end of March
[5929]1954, had been the subject of a newspaper article which
[5930]charged that they had lost "spy documents" on the train.
[5931]NOSENKO was unable to crovide a date for FELCHLIN's expul-
[5932]sion from the Soviet Union, and he knew nothing of the un-
[5933]usual circumstances of FELCHLIN's departure from Moscow;
[5935]he insisted that nobody else was declared persona non grata
[5936]along with FELCHLIN. In fact, FELCHLIN was Eepetled atong
[5937]with Air Force Major ‘walter McKINNEY, and the Soviets re-
[5938]fused to permit the two to leave Moscow aboard the Ambassa-
[5940]dor's personal plane until ambassador BOHLEN himself protested.
[5942]Confronteé by his lack of knowledge of the persona non
[5943]rata action, NOSENKO said that he could not be expected to
[5944]now the details because this incident occurred after he
[5945]transferred from the U.S. Embassy Section to the Tourist
[5946]Department in June 1955. NOSENKO was then told the recorded
[5947]date of the expulsion, 3 July 1954, and he replied that this
[5948]was not true.
[5950]- Discrepancies appeared in NOSENKO's account of one
[5951]of the best kncwn incidents in the history of KGB operations
[5952]against the American officials in the Soviet Union, the
[5953]subject of reports by GDLITSYN and other CIA sources and the
[5954]subject of training materials. This was the seizure of
[5955]sensitive technical collection equipment on 5 May 1955 in
[5957]‘Stalingrad from three Assistant Military Attaches from the
[5958]U.S. Embassy--Major John S. BENSON, Captain STROUD, and
[5960]Captain MULE--and their expulsion from the Soviet Union two
[5961]days later. NOSENKO claimed direct responsibility for KGB
[5962]work against these officers (Pages 103-105); he described
[5963]an earlier attempt to defect MULE, his own plans for seizing
[5964]this equipment at a railroad station outside Moscow, and his
[5965]role in developing plans for the successful operation in
[5966]Stalingrad. When NOSENKO was pressed under interrogation to
[5968]give the entire story of the equipment seizure~and the persona
[5969]5 out
[5971]non grata action, he said that the operation was carrie
[5972]after he was in the Tourist Department and therefore he knew
[5973]no more about it. when told that the operation took place
[5974]at least a month before his alleged transfer, NOSENKO could
[5975]offer no explanation for his lack of knowledge.
[5977]TOP SECRET :
[5985]pa ee Pe Segal
[5987]eit aN ge lies Sable | del
[5989]ve OPN 4 oes Og eh“
[5991]_
[5995].v)
[5996]690.
[5998]- NOSENKO identified George VAN LAZTHEM as an Assistant
[5999]Air Attache in 1953 or 1954: he was a target of another U.S.
[6000]Embassy Section officer, and an unsuccessful KGB development
[6001]operation was carried out against him. NOSENKO did not know
[6002]that V+N LASTHEM-was actually an Assistant Army Attache, who
[6003]left Moscow in March 1953 and was succeeded by NOSENKO's own
[6004]target Walter MULE (see above). What NCSENKO additionally
[6005]did not know is that in Moscow VAN LAETHEM was the Attache
[6006]‘cryptographic security officer, the superior of Dayle SMITH
[6007](the subject of NOSE:KO's "ANDREY" leaa--see below) and a
[6008]friend of the motor pool sergeant Roy RHODES, a KGB agent.
[6009]NOSENKO furthermore did not know that on 19 March 1955,
[6010]again as an Army Attache, and only two years after being
[6011]transferred from Moscow, VAN LAETHEM:was again sent to Mos-
[6012]cow, ostensibly on a PCS assignment but actually on tempor-
[6013]ary duty. During this latter assignment, when NOSENKO by.
[6014]his own account should have been responsible for him, VAN
[6015]LAZTHEM was in Moscow to review the entire electronics
[6016]program at the Embassy. (VAN LAETHEM's second tour in
[6017]Moscow invelved the planned use of the electronic equipment.
[6018]which was seized in Stalingrad while VAN LAETHEM was still
[6019]in Moscow.) ~
[6021]d. Additional Reporting
[6023]His information on two other operations involving Americans
[6024]was said by NOSENKO to stem from his 1953-1955 service in the U.S.
[6025]Enbassy Section. One was the recruitment of the military cipher
[6026]machine mechanic having the KGB cryptonym “ANDREY" (Dayle SMiTH,
[6028]‘See Pages 413-426 and further comments in Part VIII.B.3. and
[6030]VIII.C.). NOSENKO in 1962 was sure not only that this recruit-
[6031]ment tock place before he joined the KGB but that "ANDREY" had
[6032]left the USSR by then as well: he repeatedly estimated "“ANDREY's"
[6033]recruitment date as "1949-1950," At all times he has claimed
[6034]certainty that “ANDREY" was the last KGB recruitment in the
[6035]Embassy until the time of NOSENKO's defection in January 1964.
[6037]In 1964, however, NOSE:.KO changed his story and said “ANDREY"
[6039]was active while NOSENKO was in the U.S. Embassy Section ii. 1954-
[6041]~,
[6043]|
[6045]1955. The other operation was an unsuccessful recruitment approach
[6047]to the U.S. Embassy Security Officer Edward Ellis SMITH (see
[6048]Pages 468-469 and further comments in Part VITI.B.3. and VIII.C.
[6049]above) at a meeting with the KGB arranged through letters which
[6050]had been sent to SMITH. This occurred in 1954 or 1955, NOSENKO
[6051]said, and in support of the recruitment approach, he handled
[6053]the surveillance phone-watch, SMITH admitted to U.S. authorities
[6054]having received four letters from the KGB between 2 and 5 June
[6055]1956 (a year after NOSENKO dated his departure from the U.S.
[6056]Embassy Section), but he denied having had any personal meetings
[6057]with KGB officers.
[6059]e. Remarks
[6061]NOSENKO's accounts of the 1953-1955 period are confused,
[6062]contradictory, and, when compared with collateral information,
[6063]incomplete and inaccurate. He has been inconsistent in dating
[6064]his shift of responsibilities within the U.S, Embassy Section,
[6065]in dating his_departure from the Section (viz., the timing of
[6066]the Stalingrad incident and the approach to SMITH), and in dating
[6067]his first knowledge of the microphones in the Embassy. Having ~
[6069]TOP SECRET
[6071]i
[6072]i
[6074]er ee
[6077]74-0000
[6079]SL et ee ee
[6081]waa Das
[6083]em mae
[6085]RUNS rg wee UL Ae ete OEP Spam So EE Be
[6087]tA mae tg a
[6089]en a
[6091]eee tee
[6093]a
[6095]OR age ae”
[6097]it vet
[6099]MN ERS Se I DE ne
[6103]691,
[6105]few new details of importance on the American correspondents,
[6106]NOSENKO has proven unreliable regarding his work against Army
[6107]Attaches: He misidentified two (YEAGER and VAN LAETHEM), he
[6108]claimed to have almost no information on the backgrounds and acti-
[6109]vities of the others; and he lacked even .the most important de-
[6110]tails on security affairs involving the majority of his eight
[6111]alleged targets. In addition, NOSENKO has told CIA almost noth-
[6112]ing about the work of his colleagues in the U.S, Embassy Section,
[6114]The statements by NOSENKO about this period therefore hold
[6115]so little substance and the manner of his reporting was so uncon-
[6116]vincing, that his claim to have been an officer of the U.S.
[6117]Embassy Section in the years 1953-1955 cannot be true.
[6119]cele fee
[6121]wos.
[6123]114-00000
[6127]at i! La adel
[6129]Wras
[6131]a
[6132]Z
[6133]i
[6134]if
[6136]h
[6138]A ai Salle sia
[6140]Af jae,
[6142]. . . rete
[6143]. Jr ae
[6145]692.
[6147]5. Tourist Cecsartment (June 1955 to January 1960)
[6148]a. Introduction
[6150]NOSENKO's activities from June 1955 to January 1966, his
[6151]first period of alleged sezvice with the Acerican-British-Canale
[6152]ian Secticn of Tourist Department of the KGB Second Chief Direc-
[6153]torate, are descrited in Pages 167-151. For the purposes of the
[6154]following digcussion, it ig ccnvenient to divide this period into
[6155]two parts. The firse uf these covers the ycars from June 1955
[6156]to June 1958, when NOSENKO said ke was a staff case officer,
[6157]handling and recruiting agents and planning ard minaging opera-
[6158]ticnal activity. The second part covers NOSENKO's service froin i
[6159]June 1953 to the beginning of 19€0 as Leputy Chiet of this secticn.
[6160]Rpart from his fgersonal involvement in a number of recruitment
[6161]Operations in the latter pericd, it is this service which provices
[6162]a basis for SOSENKO to claim awarencss of 61] important arrests
[6163]of spies and recruitments from emong American tourists visiting
[6164]the Soviet Unicn) it is also this survice as Ceputy Chief cf Sece
[6165]tion which NOCEN*O citcs as a bacis for his involvement in the
[6166]case of Lee Harvey OSWALD inside the Sovict Union.
[6168]b. The Early Period (1955 to 1958)
[6169](i) General
[6171]Recording to NOSENKXO's story, he stegs among the First case
[6172]efficers in the Tourist becpartment. He arrived there just as
[6173]the Department was beir.y formed and took part with other officers
[6174]assianed in the acquisition of an agent network from within
[6175]inturist, in the establishment of facilities ard methods, and in
[6176]generally “getting things going." Several months later he parti-
[6177]cipated in what he says was his first operation against an Ameri-
[6178]can tourist. This was NOSENKO's behind-thce-scenes (and hence
[6179]uncor.firmed) organization of an unseccussful attempt to compromise
[6180]Martin MALIA (Pages 112-113). NOSENKO's next case (the first
[6181]operation in which his participation is confirmed) toox place a
[6182]year later, in June 1955, when he assisted in the homosexual en-
[6183]trapment and recruitment of Richard BURGI (Pages 113-120). This
[6184]recruitment, which cccurred close in time to the Minister NOSEMKO's
[6185]death, was by NOSENKO'sS account a turning point in his personal
[6186]and professional life. ‘itn it, NOSENKO began to acquire a sense
[6187]of self-confidence and responsibility and began to "grow" from a
[6188]wastrel into an effective and successful KGB officer. As a re-
[6189]sult of this cperation, the first successful recruitment in the
[6190]then short history of the Tourist Department, NOSENKO first came
[6191]inte personal contact with Gencral GRIBANO¥Y. according to ali
[6193]‘ accounts prior to October 1965, when he retracted the claim,
[6195]NOSEKKO received the first of a series of KG3 awards for opera-~
[6196]tional performance because of the BUFGI case--a ietter of con-
[6197]mendation. Within a month of this oreration, NOSENYO said, he
[6198]was prometed from the rank of lieutenant to captain, his last
[6199]promotion prior to defecting eight years later.
[6201]NOSENKO's direct operational activity ia the next two years,
[6202]before his appointnent as Deputy Chief of the Section, was des- _
[6203]cribed by NOSEXXO as follews: Sometime in 1957 he was involved
[6207]| hee
[6209]dn—the- attempted -recruitinerit of the German businesscan §&
[6210](Pages 120-121); after surrounding him with agents, KOSENKO . ‘
[6212]TOP SECRET :
[6215]#00000
[6217]a Rate es a Reape ge EIT
[6219]'
[6220]“4
[6221]Rd
[6222]a
[6225]693.
[6227]personally spoke to him, NOSZNKO exypiained his (unconfirred)
[6228]participation in this case, which was not among the reaponsibili-
[6229]ties of hig section, by saying there was no ¥GS cfticer available
[6230]who spoke German put Bor WAR was kr.own to speak “a little Eng-
[6231]lisa," a language in whicn NOSENKO hed fair fluency. In 1957
[6232]NOSENKO was also irvolved in the sexval and bleckmarket entrap-
[6233]ment of Some Norwegian journalist (again, not a target of
[6234]NOSENKO'’s section, being neither Amesican, Lritish or Canadian):
[6235]NOSEXKO has rot explained how he cate to be involved in this
[6236]operation, but he said his role was that of inyelving Bw ith
[6237]women and blacxmarseteers so that arcther officer, ARKHIPOV, could
[6238]recruit hin. wee nas rot identifiec NOSENKO, but reported on
[6239]an indiviéval whose role corresponds to the one NOSENKO claimed
[6241]as his own (Pages 121-122). NOSENAO'S third operaticn in 1357
[6243]was really not an cperation at all. he was assigned to accompany
[6244]the British Ganyey Send the latter's interpreter Giee Ron
[6245]a tcur of Soviet publishing houses (Page 121). NOSENKO said his
[6246]purpose was only to watch (MRA a suspected intelligence agent
[6247]or officer. His presence was confirrec by (2m who recognized
[6248]NOSENKO's photograph.
[6250]This is the sum cf NOSENKO's reported, ecretimes verified,
[6251]operational role curing the three years preceding his promotion
[6252]in June 1958 to the position of Deputy Chief of the Anerican-~
[6253]Canadian-British Tourist Section, hereafter referred to as the
[6254]American Teurist Section. “
[6256]The onty case of the June 1955-June 1958 period resulting
[6257]in agent contacts abroad, and the one to which NCSENKO ascribed
[6258]the greatest importance, was the recruitment %f BURGI. For this
[6259]reason, the BUPGI operation is discussed in detail below, with
[6260]particular attention being given to those aspects of the case
[6261]which reflect upcn HNOSENKO's own personal role. :
[6263](ii) The BURGI Case
[6265]NOSENKO's statements of this operation generally agreed with
[6266]that BURGI proviced to the F3I in 1957. The part NOSENKO played
[6267]in the case, both in his brief initial presence with the two
[6268]homosexuals in the Moscow restaurant on the evening of 3URGI's
[6269]compromise (20 June 1986) and in the fiev events (23-28 June 1956)
[6270]would appear to be one nermally taken by a KGB staff officer.
[6272]The identities of the other two KGb participants in the Kiev
[6273]recruitment, KGZLOV and PETRENKO, seem clearly established. There
[6274]were discrepancies between NOSENKO's and BURGi's versions, but
[6275]most of these could stem from NOSEXKO's faulty merory nine years
[6276]after the events. {Such discrepancies incluce “9S=NKO's Zailure
[6277]to remember his first Moscow meetings with BURGI;: the identity,
[6278]role, or even existence of the person “Anatoliy” whom BURGI says
[6279]introduced him to NOSENKO and participated in the homosexual
[6280]compromise; whether NOSENKO was at the Kiev airport to meet BURGI;
[6281]the locaticn of NOSENKO‘s bedroom in the Kiev Hotel as compared
[6282]to BURGI's; NOSENKO's reference to BURGI"s “interpreter® when in
[6283]fact BURGI neither had nor needed one; and NOSENKO's failure to
[6284]remember the unusual circumstances of BUFGI's departure from
[6285]Kiev.) Other contradicticns and omissions in NOSENKO's reporting
[6286]relate to matters of greater operationai consequence:
[6290]cements nee et Lee oe
[6292]TOP SECRET
[6295]14-0000
[6297]yor St an
[6299]694,
[6301]~ NOSENKO was unable to say when or how the KGS first
[6302]learned that BURGI was a homosexual, nor could he remember
[6303]who first proposed an cperation against him.
[6305]- NOSENKO gave a confused and evasive account of his
[6306]dealings with the Pirst Chief Directorate on this case.
[6308]~ NOSENKO insisted that there was no official file on
[6309]BURGI, and that none was opened as a result of this opera-
[6310]tion. The initiative for the operation came, he said, fron
[6311]the Second Chief Directorate, and when NCSENKO traced BURGI:
[6312]in the First Chief Directorate, there was no information on
[6313]him there.* The KGB's only information on BURGE at the
[6314]time of the compromise came from BURGI's visa: application
[6315](which showed him to be a professor of Russian) and a few
[6316]agent reports from the preceding days in Moscow: BURGI,
[6317]on the other hand, reportec that during the recruitment:
[6318]KOZLOV, the senior Soviet present, showed knowledge of the
[6319]names of BURGI's sister, mother and father and knew the
[6320]sister's occupation; details of BURGI's background, work, and
[6321]military service, BURG!‘s relations with the Russicum in
[6322]Rome, which BURGI said he had never mentioned in the USSR;
[6323]and BURGI's acquaintance in the U.S. with Alexander KERENSKY.
[6325]NOSENKO cited “his" recruitment of BURGI in Kiev in 1956 as
[6326]one of the main reasons for his rapid rise in the KGB. BURGI's ©
[6327]story of the recruitment, as reported to the FBI, definitely
[6328]establishes NOSENKO's role as having been subordinate to that of
[6329]KOZLCV-~it waa KOZLOV, not NOSENKO, who made the recruitment.
[6331]* DERYABIN interrogated NOSENKO on this case. NOSENKO's answers
[6333]to such detailed questions as how the traces were done, how
[6335]the travel to Kiev was arranged, details concerning the person-
[6336]nel involved, the contents of the file, and other mechanics
[6338]of the case, betrayed an almost total lack of memory.
[6340]centineeee meeeee
[6342]TOP SECRE
[6344]14-0000
[6346]Ve Cit]
[6348]695.
[6350]c. Promotion to Deputy Chief of Section
[6352]NOSENKO said that in June 1958, when the unit that had
[6353]formerly handled tourists from all countries was reorganized into
[6354]two sections, he was promoted from the rank of senior case offi-
[6355]cer to that of Deputy Chief of the newly created American Tourist
[6356]Section. NOSENKO said that this section was the most important
[6357]in the Tourist Department, and that he did not know why he,
[6358]in particular, had been chosen its Deputy Chief but was certain
[6359]that GRIBANOV had no voice in the decision.
[6361]d. Knowledge of Section’s Staff and Agent Personnel
[6363]NOSENKO has named with clarity and consistency the other
[6364]officers of the American Tourist Section during this period. The
[6365]Soviet agents of his section whem NOSENKO has identified were
[6366]mostly his own; he said that the agents were constantly shifted
[6367]from case officer to case officer znd hence it was “difficult to
[6368]say just who handled which agents." NOSENKO said he nad approxi-~
[6369]mately eight Soviet agents in 1958 ard about 12 or 14 in 1959, ~
[6370]most of them employed by inturist (Pages 109-112). With the ex-
[6371]ception of the two homosexuals, YEFPE!OV and VOLKOV. discussed
[6372]separately below, NOSENKO cannot suppiy personal cata on nis own
[6373]agents or remember specific jobs they did for the KGB.
[6375]e. Knewledge of Section's Activities
[6377]As of June 1958, according to NCSENKO, the work of the
[6378]section of which he was deputy chief was "just getting going."
[6379]Its mission was, first of ail, to detect Western Intelligence
[6380]officers and agents among the increasing flow of tourists visit-
[6381]ing the Soviet Union; only secondarily was the section directed
[6382]toward the recruitment of KGB agents from among these tourists.
[6383]In his new positicn NOSENKO was responsible for supervising
[6384]other officers in the section in efforts along these lines. Be-
[6385]cause of this and because at GRISANOV's request ne personally
[6386]reviewed KGB information on the use of tourist cover by Western
[6387]intelligence services and KGB counteraction thrceugh 1953 (Pages
[6389]-145-146), NOSENKO made a number of statements concerning these
[6391]subjects during the 1955-1959 period.
[6393]CIA started its so-called “legal travelle.” program in
[6394]1955 and by 1958 was deeply committed to such operations. Now
[6395]there is . firm collateral information on what the KGB knew of
[6396]this operational program. In view of NOSENKO's duties in the :
[6397]American Tourist Section and the section's prime mission, he should
[6399]have knowledge of agent compromises during 1958 and 1959. More-
[6401]over, thanks to collateral holdings, what NOSENKO aid and did not
[6402]know can be compared with information from other sources. These
[6403]facts are reviewed below. :
[6405](i) BLAKE
[6407]A valuable source of information for the KGB in its planning
[6409]“€or the operational activity of its Tourist Nepartment in the
[6411]late 1950's and early 1960's was the Englishman, George BLAKE
[6412](Pages 146-147). BLAKE has confessed that in the summer of 1959
[6414]-he—passed_the,KGB_a_19-page_summary of the_results_of_a three-day
[6416]|
[6419]meeting during the first week of June 1959, between representa-
[6420]tives of CIA and MI-6; these sessions were on the subject of
[6421]“legal travel" intelligence operations against the USSR. This
[6423]10P Scope
[6427]14-0000
[6429]Os ol — : . L ate
[6432]ty !
[6434]summary spelled out in detail the complete CIA operational doc- i
[6435]trine pertaining to tourist-type operations and stressed CIA's
[6436]reliance on tourist agents for the spotting, recontacting, aessess-
[6437]ment, and communications support of internal assets. ,
[6439]While NOSENKO has displayed some familiarity with CIA modus '
[6440]operandi in the field of tourist operations, he has never mer-
[6441]tioned that the KGB was in possession of documentary reporting i.
[6442]which described these methode in full detail. NOSENKO does :
[6443]not appear to be aware of who BLAKE was, much less of his im-
[6444]portance to the KGE. NOSENKO never volunteered the name of
[6445]BLAKE in his Gebriefings, and when specifically asked in 1962
[6446]about BLAKE, the KGB agent in Britisn Intelligence, he said
[6447]that he had read the dossier and thet BLAKE had been “an agent
[6448]of che Second (British) Depertment (of the Seccnj ict Dire
[6450]‘ as not nearly e3 valuable as the
[6452]r the other Englisnmman" (VASSALI.).
[6453]ia rot recall any such ecent of the British Department.
[6455]When the name SLAKE was mentioned, he asked: ‘Who's BLAKE?™
[6457]BLAKE had, in addition, passed to the KGB a photocopy of
[6458]a 2l-page summary report of a second, {s!i0w-up conference be-
[6460]tween CIA and MI-6 on “legal travel" op+:.:tions which was held
[6461]in Washington from 20 to 25 Apriai 1960. ‘0SENKO, although not
[6462]in the Tourist Department at the time the latter report was |. --s7 7
[6464]received by the KG3, said that he reviewed all important ma- .-
[6465]terials of the American Tourist Section when he became its Chief
[6466]in January 1962. Asked whetner the Tourist Department had re-
[6467]ceived documentary information from any agent source while ;
[6468]NOSENKO was away from the department in the years 1960-1961, te
[6469]he replied that none had and that he knew of no agent who could
[6471]have provided such documentary information,
[6473]we
[6475](ii) GOLITSYN Document
[6477]NOSENKO in 1964 reported knowing that GOLITSYN at the time i
[6478]of his defection in December 1961 took with him an official j
[6479]top secret KGB documert concerning Western Intelligence opera- i
[6480]tional activity in the field of tourism (Pages 147-149). He }
[6481]did not mention this fact in the June 1962 meetings. Althoush :
[6482]NOSENKO also stated that this document had been prepared by
[6483]the Tourist Department, he has nct been able to cescribe the
[6484]document in detail and specifically did not mention that this
[6485]_ particular document was in large part based, as subsequent
[6486]i . analysis has shown, upon the above-mentioned reports submitted
[6488]; to the KGB by George BLAKE.
[6490](iii) Tourist Agents
[6492]NOSENKO assertec that the KGB detected no agents among
[6493]American tourists during the years 1958 or 1959, and that no
[6494]tourists had been caught in the act of mailing letters, servic- :
[6495]ing dead drops, or contacting agents, except one in 1959 whose i
[6496]name, NOSENKO said, was MacGUIRE (actually McGOWAN in 1958). i
[6497]NOSENKO signed a statement attesting to these facts. ‘
[6499]2 eae eterna
[6503]OP SECRET :
[6505]pone
[6507]Aa PR aN Teas Ri eck EAA Poy Oa feed psttene oT SFT AT Rs Divas *
[6510]a
[6513]b
[6514]j
[6515]b
[6516]3
[6517]r
[6521](Ur SECRE] -
[6523]697.
[6525]The KGB document supplied cy GOLITSYN, however, refers to
[6526]a number of cases cf American tourists who were found by the
[6527]RGB to be engaged in intelligence coliection or intelligence .
[6528]support activities. In addition to McGOWeN, the GOLITSYN cocu-
[6529]ment cited the cases of SIMARD, GRAY and PRANCIS, all of them —
[6530]CIA agents detected ty the KGB in 1958 and 1959. These years
[6531]coincide with the time when NOSENKO claims to have been Deputy
[6532]Chief of the section which was responsible for monitoring and
[6533]uncovering activities of this sort, but NOSENKO has never =zen-
[6534]tioned them. Furthermore, the annual reports cf the section
[6535]which NOSENKO would have helped to write, by virtue of his
[6536]Claimed position as Deputy Chief of the American Tourist Section,
[6537]presumably included all of these cases.
[6538]f. NOSENKO's Tourist Paper ONY
[6540]NOSENKO was questicned at length on the review of Western
[6541]tourist operations which he claimed to have written for GRIBANOV.
[6542]He said he gatheced the material for this study from earlier
[6543]annual reports of the Tourist Department and by talking with
[6544]various case officers, then took the study to GRIBANOV's
[6545]office. NOSENKO could not remember whether he discussed his
[6546]findings with GalBANOV, could noc give any examples of the
[6547]information which ke included in the report (other than statis-
[6548]tical information on the increase in foreign tourism), could
[6549]not recall what the report said about CIA tourist operations
[6550](other than there appeared to be increased use of tourists
[6551]travelling by automobile), and cid net know what other american
[6552]Intelligence services were sending egents into the Soviét Union
[6553]under tourist cover during these years. On the basis of his
[6554]research for this report and his cw experience, KCSENKO said
[6555]he knew that KGB operations against tourists had been develop-
[6556]ing slowly and that, ac the time the report was written during
[6557]the tourist season of 1959, the KGB knew little about the use
[6558]of tourism by the American services.
[6560]BLAKE's confession that he passed documentary information
[6561]on this subject to the KGB, but more particularly the intensity
[6562]of KGB operations against tourists at this time as reflected
[6563]in the GOLITSYN document and other reports indicate, that this
[6564]statement by NOSENKO must be erroneous.
[6566]g. The OSWALD Case
[6568]According to NOSENKO's account of his direct involvement
[6569]in the case of Lee Harvey OSWALD (Pages 136-144), his partici-
[6570]pation seemed to stem solely from his supervisory role as
[6571]Deputy Chief of the American Section. In this capacity, NOSENKO
[6572]said, he was the cne who made the Gecision that OSWALD was
[6573]“not normal" and of no interest to the KGB. On other occasions
[6574]NOSENKO has reported that he made this cecision together with
[6575]his subordinate KRUPNOV, or that “they decided,” or “it was
[6576]decided." NOSENKO’s information or the handling of OSWALD in
[6577]1959 is unique, and there is no collateral information against
[6578]which it can be reliably measured. The resuits of the poly-
[6579]graph examination in October 1966, hcwever, indicated that
[6580]NOSENKO lied in having said that he was personally connected
[6582]-with any aspect—cf the-CSWALD-case_and_that_ne_hac heard of.
[6584]sm Rs ee eget
[6586]OSWALD before the assassination of President Kennedy. The
[6587]polygraph results aiso indicated that the KGB gave NOSENKO
[6588]special instructions on the OSWALD case and what he should tell
[6589]U.S. authorities about it. ,
[6591]. ive SECRET
[6593]Va vevRc]
[6595]€98.
[6596]h. WNOSENKO's Coerational Acrivitics 01950-21959)
[6597](i) General
[6599]NOSENKO appeared in one operation snorely aftr: being pro-
[6600]moted to the position cf Deputy Chief, tne reeruictnent of the
[6601]American woman EAPRIS in September 19°38 on the b..3sis cf har
[6602]romantic involvement with a Soviet male. HARRIS tentatively
[6603]identified NOSENKO's vhotosraph as thet of one or two Soviets
[6604]who approached her in Moscow and said that, of the two, te was
[6605]“definitely the man in charge.” She denied having had further
[6606]contacts with the KGB after leaving the Soviet Union. In i963,
[6607]KOSENKO said, he also supervised the sexual entraprent of
[6608]but did not become personally involvei in the approach, which
[6609]was made by his superior DULAS. Scr time during this year,
[6610]NOSENKO said, he recruited the scconc of his pair of h mosexual
[6611]agents, YEFREMOV. Beginning in the srping of 1959 he used the
[6612]two in a series cf successful recruitvent approaches ti
[6614]1 and & ; oR
[6615]as a commercial representative @ in Moscow, was not the
[6616]reeponsibility cf NOSESKO's section, NOSENKO was asned to make
[6617]the appreacn because he was 2 “specialist” in this type of
[6618]operation.) In 1259 NOSENKO aiso use? these agents in opera-
[6619]tions against two Anerican guides at the Sokolniki Exhipit,
[6620]BRRRETT and WILLERFORD. Firally, KOSENSO said, in 1959 he
[6621]accomplished the recruitment of the fAcerican Express Company
[6622]representative in Moscow, FRIPPEL,on the basis of sexual coa-
[6623]promise.
[6626](ii) The Pomosexuals YEFREMOV and VOLYOV
[6628]There is a preponderance of homosexual recruitment opera-
[6629]tions in NOSENKO's account ef his KG3 carcer. He has referred
[6630]to several homosexual agents with whon he has worked on Spe-
[6631]cific recruitnent-entrapzent cperations, Fut said that he nin-
[6632]self was never their cfficial case officer. They include
[6633]“LUCH,"” "“STROYEV," "NIKOLAYEV,® "SIBIRYAK” and KOSHKIN. de has
[6634]remembered only a few of their names end nas supplied no
[6635]personality inforraticn about thea. He identified caliy VOLKOV
[6636]ana YEPREMOV as his own agerts.
[6638]NOSENKO claimed to have re-recrvited VOLKOV, a former
[6639]agent (cryptcnyn "SHMELEV") end recruited YEFREMUVY (cryptonya
[6640]*"GRIGORIY") and to have bees their scle cese officer from the
[6641]beginning of their KGB carecrs in 1957-1958 until they were
[6642]deactivated in 1963 because they became too well «known. He met
[6643]them frequently, directing them in at least a dozen entrapment
[6644]operaticns or cther nomesexual encounzers. NOSENKO took then
[6645]with him shenhe transferred to the American Department in 1960
[6646](but used them in no cperations during 1960 and 1961) and back
[6647]again in early 1962 to the Tourist Department (where they were
[6648]used only cnce, immediately after his return). He gave a rela~
[6649]tively clear account of the recruitment (Pages 107-108), buts
[6651]- He has never been able to remember YEFREMOV'S
[6652]patronys.
[6654]= He does not know the home address, general area
[6655]of Moscow resiJence, family circwastances, job details,
[6657]Fy Sn eee
[6659]__or other basic informaticn about either of them.
[6661]i
[6662]|
[6666]t
[6667]a
[6672]l
[6673]+ St ABR
[6675]699. | 7
[6677]- He said that during the five or six years he
[6678]handled them, he never was at their homes, never met thea
[6679]in a safehouse (only on the strect), and never met either
[6680]of them alone without the other's presence.
[6682]~ He did not know about VOLKOV's and YEFREMOV's en-
[6683]counters with and developrent of one Dutch and five other
[6684]Rnecicans, independently known to CIA. of the Americans,
[6685]three were CIA agents and a fourth was the well-known
[6686]fPeerican diplomat and author Charles . THAYER.
[6688]- He told about VOLKOV's anc YErFEMov's compromise
[6689]of Robert BA.REETY in 1959 (Page 126) but did net know that
[6690]they had met BARRETT again in 1°61, shortly before BAPRETT
[6691]was recruited on the basisof the 195% compromise.
[6693]- He did net know details of why or hew VCLKOV and
[6694]YEPREMOV first cane into contact with their most recent
[6695]target, W.E. JGHNECN, nor how they set up the compromise
[6696]which led to NOSENKO's entry as a “police official" under
[6697]the name Yuriy Ivanovich NiXOLAYEV (Pages 289-293).
[6699](iii) Homosexual Entrapee: t Cperations
[6701]buring 1959 NCSEXKO said he made recruitment approaches
[6702]to five U.S. and British citizens cn the pasigs of homosexual
[6703]entrapment operaticns involving the agents YEFREMOV and VOLKOV.
[6704]All five approaches were successful, and the four Westerners
[6705]who have row been idestified have, in turn, identified NOSENKO
[6706]in one way or another as the recruiting officer. With the ex-
[6707]ception of the FRIPPEL case and the homosexual compromise of
[6708]BARRETT and WILLORTCRD. (which did not result in approaches dur-
[6709]ing NOSENKO's tour in the American Tourist Section), these were
[6710]the only operations in which NOSESKO tock part in 1959 and
[6711]they represented, in fact, the caly recruitments by the section
[6712]during this year, 'OSENKO said. He claimed repearedly in 1962,
[6713]1964, and 1965 that at the erd of 1959 he received a cormenda-
[6714]tion from the KGB Chair;an for his recruitment of the Five homo-
[6715]gexuals and FRIPPLL (discusses separateiy below). In October
[6716]1966, he admitted that this claim was untrue.
[6718]In discussing the GMB case (Pages 123-124) NOSENKO had
[6719]forgotten details which, irom his confirmed participation, he
[6720]certainly once knew. He said that (as with the SREP case--
[6721]see below) another case officer (IVANOV) had the file materials
[6722]on the target before he did. NOSENKO stated tnat his agents
[6724]“VOLKOV. and YEFREMOY reported to NOSENKO in Mosccw on
[6726]homosexuality and then “IVANOV and I and possibly GUSKCV, the
[6727]Section Chief, reported this to DUBAS," Chief of the Tourist
[6728]Department. NOSENKO couid rot remember the arrangements for
[6729]taking the pictures, nor in what Moscow hotel the photography
[6730]took place. When nt to Leningrad, NOSENKO wa3_ sent
[6731]there to approach hin, flying alcne (as in the case).
[6732]All Leningrad arrangements were made by the local kGB. Asked
[6733]why he was assigned to the case, NOSENKO replied: “I was told
[6734]to go." Asked why IVANOV could not handle it, he answered:
[6735]"ve was not considered capable,” his English was “not bad but
[6736]he didn't have enough operational experience.” NOSENKO did
[6737]not remenber who wrote the request for permission to make the
[6739]|
[6743]nae ¥
[6745]700. . 7
[6747]approach feuaybe 1 did, or maybe I dictated it to IVANOV") or
[6748]whether waS Btaying in the hotel where the Leningrad com-
[6749]promice and Sipproach took place. He named the Leningrad case
[6750]officer, FERELETCV, beat said that he, *OSENX%O, made the re- ;
[6751]cruitment Gaeta mm BAid another man was present, [
[6753]NOSENKO'9 account in general matches <apee statements ; a f
[6754]on this approach (Pages 125-126). The Wiscrepincies, as well : ano
[6755]‘as the omissions in the former's statements and his uncertainty
[6756]of the facts, may be attributable to faulty memory on the part:
[6757]of NOSFNKO. Although NOSENKO wae at this time Deputy Section
[6758]Chief, when asked to explain his own selection as recruiting
[6759]officer, he said that he did net know why “they" chose him \
[6760]and, when pressed as to who selected him, said "CUBAS, I think." i
[6761]when asked why the case officer VETLITSKIY, who originally had
[6762]the materials cn could not do *he jek, he answered:
[6763]"Y don't knew." NOSENKU clains that he himself arranged the !
[6764]transfer of a KS3 “agent or operational contact" (he did not ;
[6765]remenber which) to Uzhgorod from Odessa for this case, and
[6766]said he did this only by phone calls, with nothing written, i
[6767]He gave a physical description kut had no cther knowledge of \
[6768]this agent, neitner name nor code name nor job nor background
[6769]nor XGB status ("I wasn't interested"). The agent, he said,
[6770]travelled alone$ NOSE’KG did not arrange to receive hin in
[6771]Uzhgorod because the local KGB tock care of everything. NOSENKO
[6772]met him only once, and then in the company of a case officer
[6773]of the Uzhgorod KGB, whose name or other data he has also for-
[6774]gotten. NOSENKO said he did not report to Moscow about progress i
[6775]and plans on the case from Uzhgorod or other stops in this '
[6776]operation, nor obtain permissdon to travel alcne with the agent - :
[6777]to Lvov and Minsk after the recruitment; the local KGB's in ;
[6778]Uzhgorod, Lvov, and Minsk did that, he said. NOSENKO could
[6779]not describe KGB arrangements and support in Lvov and Minsk,
[6780]where he said “the only thing I needed was a car from the air-
[6781]port to the city.® said they travelled by train.)
[6782]Likewise, NOSENKO was unable to describe the KGB proceduzes
[6783]for clearance, tracing, reporting and other management of this
[6784]operation.
[6786](iv) The Agent “PRIPPEL -
[6788]“FRIPPEL (Pages 129-135) is the only American citizen with
[6790]i whom NOSENKO ever had more than fleeting operational contact
[6792]: in his whole KGB career and is the only foreign agent he claims
[6794]! to have run for more than two meetings at any time in his car-.
[6796]! eer (with the exception of Seeks pages 201-212, and *"PROKHOR,.”
[6797]: Pages 173-181). Zhe American Express Company representative
[6799]: in Moscow, FRIPPEL. was not recruited so that he could report
[6801]i on American tourists visiting the Seviet Union, or on official
[6803]and unofficial Americans living there, but in hopes of learn-
[6805]| ing about approaches being made to members of Scviet delegations
[6806]a visiting the United States. With a weaith of reporting assets
[6808]| in Moscow, NOSENKO said, the KGB did net need him there. When
[6809]t
[6810]|
[6816]PRIPPEL was reassigned to New York City, however, there were
[6818]no plans to contact him through the local KGB Legal Residency.
[6819]FRIPPEL. is identified by. XGB cryptonym in the CHEREPANOV papers
[6820]as a suspected American Intelligence agent. That FRIPPEL was
[6824]. considered such by the KGS is confirmed by statenents of a self-
[6825]i - admitted KGB agent in contact with the American tourist ‘ROBERTS |
[6826]_ in 1962.
[6832]TOP SECRET a ‘
[6834]sees
[6835]7
[6838][OP SEGRE! or
[6840]701.
[6842]NOSENKO said PRIPPEL was his agent and said, repeatedly:
[6843]“IJ recruited himmyself.” In 1962 no other KGB officer was
[6844]mentioned by NOSENKO, who qucted from a number of his conver-
[6845]gations with FRIPPEL. In 1964 NOSENKO said he and CHELNOKOV
[6846]°hzd carried out the recruitment together," but NOSENKO was the
[6847]case officer. According to FPRIPPEL's account, CHELNCKOV was
[6848]the senior officer in the recruitment and in the later meetings.
[6850]NOSFNKO never met PRIPPEL alone while FRIPPEL was stationed —
[6852]in Moscow. The only times he ever did so were later, he said,
[6853]when PRIPPEL returned to the USSR, and these consisted of a brief
[6854]‘visit to FRIPPEL's hotel room during FPRIP?EL's visit to Moscow
[6855]in the summer of 1962 and a short meeting in Odessa where FPRIP-
[6856]PEL was on a cruise in February 1963. (Both of these meetings
[6857]took place after NOSENKO, in his 1962 contacts with CIA, had
[6858]exposed FRIPPEL as a KGB agent.) According to FPRIPPEL, in the
[6859]February 1963 meeting. NOSENKO phoned someone to ask whether 7
[6860]he cculd accept FRIPPEL's invitation to board the ship; the
[6861]answer was evidently no. NOSENKO denied this, insisting that
[6862]there was no one in Odessa superior to nim, and as a Deputy De-
[6863]partment Chief, he would not have to ask anyone anyway.
[6865]NOSENKO, CHELNOKOV, and their wives dined at PRIPPEL's
[6866]house in Moscow some time after PRIPPEL's recruitment. NOSENKO
[6867]ackncewledged this to have been a most unusual procedure ard
[6868]could name no parallel in KGB agent handling. Asked why it
[6869]hapsened, he said: “Because he invited me," and when asked
[6870]why CHELNCKOV and his wife went along, NOSENKO said: “Because
[6871]he was also involved in the recruitment.”
[6873]NOSENKO said he retained operational control of PRIPPEL,
[6874]then still Moscow representative of a tourist firm, when KOSENKO
[6875]shifted in June 1960 from the Tourist Department to the Areri-
[6876]can Department; Later NOSENXO also maintained repponsibility
[6877]for contact duking FRIPPEL's visits to the USSR ater FRIPPEL's
[6878]PCS departure from Moscow in January 1961 and after his own re-
[6879]turn to the Tourist Department. According to FRIPPEL, who saw
[6880]no sign of change in NOSENKO's reponsibilities during his rela-
[6881]tionship with him, he recalled meeting CHELNOKOV (who had
[6882]stayed in the Tourist Department) alone, without NOSENKO, prob-
[6883]ably in 1960.
[6885]FRIPPEL said he was queried by NOSENKO and CHELNOKOV only
[6886]once concerning U.S. Embassy personalities, specifically on
[6887]BOWDEN and WINTERS. NOSENKO, who claimed case officer re-
[6888]sponsibility for Embassy Security Officer ABIDIAN in 19€0-1961
[6889]as well as for PRIPPEL said the two did not know each other;
[6890]in fact, they met socially several times. NOSENKO could re-
[6891]call nothing which FRIPPEL ever reported to or did for the KGB,
[6892]dismissing the subject on several occasions with: "He never
[6893]gave anything of value." The oniy question NOSENKO posed
[6894]when he cate to FRIPPEL in August 1952, FRIPPEL said, was
[6895]whether the agent knew “what the newspaper editors he was es-
[6896]corting were going to ask KHRUSHCHEV in an interview. Accord-
[6897]ing to FRIPPEL, in the February 1963 meeting NOSENKO posed
[6898]no questions and merely made polite conversation until PRIDPEL
[6899]excused himself.
[6901]ce meee pe eee
[6903]pre Hates nant sen Rrmemeernn
[6905]TOP SECRET
[6907]veneer, sre Ane es:
[6909]BpHO000
[6910]ms
[6912]Tor ctienth » from
[6913]702. fe
[6915]During the early 1965 interrogations, NOSENZO volunteered:
[6916]“1f you had Leen clever you could have made me work insize the
[6917]USSR; you could have ccntacted me through FRIPPEL..." NCSENKO
[6918]was asked in October 1966 whether he had expectel or hoped CIA
[6919]would attezpt to establish contact with nim insice the USSR i
[6920]through FRIPPEL. He strongly Jeniec this. }
[6922]4. Remarks
[6924]1OSENKO claims to have particirated directly or indirectly i
[6925]in every recruitne:t operation with American tcurists in the
[6926]‘years 1955-1959. itis presence in KSU operaticns during this
[6927]period has conetimes Leen ccatirmed, but not aiways did these +
[6928]cases involve tourists of the three nationalities--Arerican, i
[6929]British, end Canadian--fo: which NOSENKO said his section was :
[6930]responsibies : . i
[6932]Years  Nane Nationality Status in USSR Confirmed
[6933]1955 MALIA Rrerican ‘"Pourist No
[6934]1956 BUPGI American Tourist Yes
[6935]1957 German Commercial/Tourist No
[6936]British Tourists (under in- Yes
[6938]‘vestigation)
[6940]Norwegian Quasi-official visitor No
[6941]19538. Anerican Tourist Yes
[6942]KPAFT Americar. Tourist No
[6943]1959 DPEW_ American vourist Yes
[6944]: Britisn Tourist No
[6945]British Tourist No
[6946]British Resident Yes
[6947]American Tourist Yes
[6949]American Temporary Resident No :
[6951]WILLERFORD American Temporary Resident No |
[6953]FRIPPEL (to 1963) American Resident, later tour- |
[6955]ist Yes
[6957]This tabulation of 15 cases shows a higher number of operations
[6958]involving American (six) and British {chree) tourists than any
[6959]other category, but it nevertheless intermingles citizens of
[6960]other nationalities and having different status in the USSR.
[6961]FRIPPEL and B8i$¥ere neither tourists nor (according to them
[6962]and NOSENKO) used against tourists; GEER Ey ¥
[6963]from continental Europe; BARPETT and WILLERFCFD worked in Moscow
[6964]for several months. The tabulaticn also shows that, according
[6965]to NOSENKO, his operational work was ccnsiceracly more intensive
[6966]in the time after he became Deputy Chief of the section than.
[6967]before, when as a senior case officer his administrative respon-
[6968]sibilities presumably would have been far less demanding.
[6970]ee ce are nam
[6972]Although NOSENKO's participation in five cases of the Aneri- .
[6973]can Tourist Secticn is confirmed, his acknowledged role in five i
[6974]othere of different varieties--with corroboration by other ‘
[6975]sources in two of them--raises doubts about whether he belonged ,
[6976]to that section as a senior officer. The Goubts ar2 strengthened |
[6978]TOP SECRET
[6980]er AERA oe Soe Gag aa rent oN NR UE em
[6981]et ee neem etiema on
[6983]120000
[6985]LEP LMS Ese 2 deta nner aetna
[6987]dui? eLude ,
[6989]703.
[6991]by the nature of his information about the four individual cases
[6992]reviewed at length above:
[6994]- In the BURGI case NOSENKO did not have knowledge
[6995]cf the extensive background information on the recruitment.
[6996]target which the KGE possessed at the time of the approach;
[6997]or of other significant details in what NOSENKO described
[6998]as an operation of greatest importance to the American Tour-
[6999]ist Section and to himself personally. In addition, NOSENKO
[7000]haa admitted lying about his having received an award for
[7001]his role in the recruitment of BURZI.
[7003]- Regarding the DREW case, NOSENKO said he was chosen
[7004]for the approach (made on the basis of homosexuality) be-
[7005]cause the regular case officer lacked operational experi-
[7007]ence. By April 1359, however, the KGB had arranged “hurdreds*
[7009]of homosexual compromises in the USSR, KOSENKO reported in
[7010]another context. His earlier personal experience with
[7011]Western targets had been limited to a secondary role in
[7012]the BURGI case and a principa: role in the HARRIS case,
[7013]the latter not an approach on homosexual grounds. It is
[7014]difficult to comprchend how NOSENKO would have qualified
[7015]for the task whereas the case officer IVANOV would not.
[7017]--There are gaps in NOSENKO's infcrr.ation about a
[7018]numper of significant aspects in the B gecase, includ-
[7019]ing staff planning and maneyement of the operation, opera-
[7020]tional support arrangements, and on personnel of the outlying
[7021]KGB units involved. NOSENKO was unable to explain. why he
[7022]was selected to make the approach togé
[7024]- CHELNOKOV was the senicr case officer for FRIPPEL.
[7025]NOSENKO never met this agent alone while he resided in
[7026]Moscow as the American Express Company representative,
[7028]. and NOSENKO reportedly acted on a supervisor's instruc-
[7029]tions at their later meeting in Odessa. Despite his occue
[7030]pation and his entree into the American community ir Moscow,
[7031]FRIPPEL reportedly was not exploited by the KGS against
[7032]tourists or U.S. Government employees but was targetted
[7033]to report on matters to which he had no access; hence
[7034]there seems to have been no logical reason for the FRIPPEL
[7035]case to have been transferred from the Arerican Tourist
[7036]Section to the U.S. Embassy Section and back again. Al- ‘
[7037]though available information verifies the ccntinuity of
[7038]NOSENKO as FRIPPEL'’s handler, it cannot be considered firm
[7039]evidence of NOSENKO having been an officer in either of
[7040]these sections and in fact might be interpreted as evidence
[7041]that he was not.
[7043]Similarly, while familiar with some but not all of the opera-_.
[7044]tional activities of the homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFREIMOV,
[7045]NOSENKO failed to support his claim to being their American
[7046]Tourist Section case officer; he has been unable to provide
[7047]rudimentary background information of these two individuals,
[7049]who allegedly were prominent in operations of the section.
[7050]NOSENKO's statement that he retired the files of VOLKOV and
[7052]+ on emer me ar cae
[7056]_ TOP-SECRET.
[7058]14-0000
[7060]1
[7061]i
[7062]x
[7063]t
[7064]r
[7065]S
[7067]3!
[7069]i
[7070]i
[7071]t
[7072]2
[7073]2
[7074]4
[7076]104.
[7078]‘YEFREMOV because they were too well known is incompatible with
[7079]hie other reporting to the effect that neither took part in an
[7080]operation between 1959 and early 1962.
[7082]In further reference to NOSENKO's claime to having been. |
[7083]the case officer in these various operations, he has been ugable
[7084]to recount in any detail FGB staff procedures involved. in these
[7085]Operations, such as name-tracing, coordinating with other com-
[7086]ponents, obtaining approvals for action, etc. Pinally, of his
[7087]alleged 54 months of service in the American Tourist Section,
[7088]NOSENKO's described activity against foreigners accounts for |
[7089]only about three months; if the bulk of his tine was spent with
[7090]recruiting or handling Soviet-citizen agents, he might be ex-
[7091]pected to remember something about some of them. He can barely
[7092]remember names (and only a few), haa given confused accounts of
[7093]their recruitment, rememberg nothing about any of their spe-
[7094]cific operations or activities for the KGB, and knew no per-
[7095]sonality background data on any of then. ;
[7097]Even if it were assumed that NOSENKO wag a case officer of
[7098]the American Tourist Section, his claim to the position of Deputy’,
[7099]Chief cannot be substantiated. He himself could rot explain
[7100]his appointment to the job. He did not know about the CIA: {Mere
[7101]"legal travel" operations compromised to the KGB in 1958 and
[7102]1953 when he was allegedly in @ supervisory capacity. NOSENKO
[7103]knew nothing about the documents on such operations which BLAKE
[7104]gave the KGB and which can be presumed to have been of the ut-
[7105]most interest to the American Touriat Section, among all KGB
[7106]Headquarters clementa. These documents offered material that
[7107]could have proven valuable to the preparation of. NOSENKO's own
[7108]paper on Western tourist operations; they were used in the genu-
[7109]ine KGB paper written by the Tourist Department and passed to
[7110]CIA by GOLITSYN. As with his status as a case officer in the
[7111]American Tourist Section, NOSENKO the Deputy Chief could not
[7112]Gescribe how data on tourists was received, general and spe-
[7113]cific plans laid, events discussed, decisions made, anc lpads
[7114]channeled.
[7116]The foregoing paragraphs suggest the conclusion that NOSENKO
[7117]as not a senior case officer or the Deputy Chief of the Ameri-
[7118]an Tourist Section. While the methods of the Tourist Depart-
[7120]Bent are not independently known in detail, it is conceivable
[7122]that what NOSENKO did on behalf of the KGS (not necessarily the
[7124]American Tourist Section) could have been accomplished by a
[7126]“~~ principal agent. These conclusions do not cast doubt about .
[7128]the facts presented by NOSENKO on the KGB investigations in the
[7129]: OSWALD case but merely rule out the possibility of NOSENKXO's
[7130]i having been involved with this case in any way prior to the
[7132]assassination of President Kennedy.
[7134]TAD SECRET
[7137]795.
[7138]6. U.S. Embassy Section (1969-1961)
[7141]From January 1960 until January 1962 NOSESKY claims
[7142]to have been Deputy Chief of the U.S. Erbassy Section of
[7143]the American Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate,
[7144]under KOVSHUK. This period (described in Pages 152-285)
[7145]is the most eignificent in NOSENKO's account of his KGB
[7146]career for a number of reasons: .
[7148]- The section is the specific unit working against
[7149]the U.S. Embassy, by NOSENKO'S cwn statemcats the KGB's
[7150]most important counterintelligence target in the USSR.
[7152]Its operations (characterized on Page 152) directly
[7154]zffect American security. The section has the twe-
[7156]fold purpose uf knowing of and contrelling ati access
[7158]of Embassy personnel to Scviet citizens anc vf collecting,
[7159]assimilating, evaluating, and using informac.cn from
[7161]all possible sources to recruit Avtericans stationed
[7163]in Moscow.
[7165]- NOSENKO's position as Deputy Chief cf thig sec-
[7166]tion provided him his access to “ost of the major counter-
[7167]intelligence information ate has resorted, inciuding
[7168]recruitnents of foreicn embassy officials and micro-
[7169]phone operations against the U.S. Exbassy. Most impor-
[7170]tant, it provided HOSENKO with his authority for
[7171]stating that there were Ro successful recruitments
[7172]of or agents among official Americans in “oscow for
[7173]this two-year period, or for a tine both cetore and
[7174]after. (This is the same point made by incirection in
[7175]the CHEREPANOV papers; yet this view is contradicted
[7176]by information from GOLITSYN. Although the latter aid
[7177]not serve in the U.S. Fxabassy Section, he «new members
[7178]of it and gave leads to KGS operational interest in
[7179]and possible recruitments of official Americans in the
[7180]Moscow Embassy during this period. Some of these appear
[7181]to be related to information items NOSENKO nas provided.)
[7183]- The epparent importance of NOSENXO's information
[7185]on this period contrasts sharply with that from other
[7187]¢ periods. His accounts of recruitments in the tourist
[7188]field covering the five years prior to this assignment
[7189]and the two years following have been checked thoroughly
[7190]and not one of them represents a fenetraticn of any
[7191]government; none nas access to classified information:
[7192]most were inactive, suspect, or already known to
[7193]Western counterintelligence organs.
[7195]<= nNosexvo's work against the U.S. Embassy is con-
[7197]sensitive firmed by and less directly by other Scviet
[7199]sourced reporting to CIA and the FBI. It is Genied by
[7200]GOLITSYN. (GOLITSYN has said that NOSENKO was not in
[7201]the section during these years.)
[7203]TOP SECRET
[7209]2 Pe Anant vt Me Mat ED A PERE BOE ET ote mae A # w m oos
[7211]14-0000
[7213]706.
[7214]b. Entry into the Section
[7216]NOSENKO has given a detailed account of how he came to
[7217]be transferred into the U.S. Embassy Section, but he has
[7218]never given a precise date, usually saying “January 1960"
[7219]or “at the beginning of 1960."
[7221]Ags described on Pages 153-154, the shift vas made at
[7222]GRIBANOY's insistence and against NOSLNKO's own personal
[7223]wishes. GHIBANOV told NOSENKO during a personal interview,
[7224]at which KOSENKO voiced his objections, that the transfer
[7225]was part of his (GRIBANOV's) plans and was primarily to put
[7226]new life into operations against American code clerks, the
[7227]primary target of the Second Chicf Directorate. GRIBANOV
[7228]did not tell him why he, instead of another, had been
[7229]selected for this job, although NOSENKO had the impression
[7230]it was because of his achievements in the Tourist Depart-
[7231]ment. (see Part VIII.P.5.). NOSENKO's transfer could not
[7232]kave been a result of his close personal relationship with
[7233]GRIBANOV ox because his father was a friend of GRIBANOV's:
[7234]NOSENKO has admitted that he exaggerated the closeness of
[7235]his relattonship with the Chief of the Second Chief Directo-
[7236]rate and most recently (February 1965) said that he had few
[7237]personal contacts with him outside of work; NOSENKO has also
[7238]said that his father never met GRIBANOV,
[7240]NOSENKO initially said that he relieved nobody on
[7241]coming into the section. He eventually recalled, however,
[7242]that BAKHVALOV was hie predecessor but left the scction
[7243]before he (NOSENKO) arrived, NOSENKO's confusion on this
[7244]point, his description of how he assumed custody of certain
[7245]files from BAXHVALOV although the latter had transferred to
[7246]another department, and the opportunities NOSENKO had to
[7247]name BAKHVALOV as his predecessor before he eventually did
[7248]so are described on Pages 154-156.
[7250]c. Functions as Deputy Chief
[7252]In NOSENKO's view the transfer to become Deputy Chief
[7253]of the section from the same position in another section
[7254]was definitely an important promotion: He now became
[7255]second-in-charge of the most important operational section
[7256]of the entire Sccond Chief Directorate. As KOVSHUK's
[7257]deputy, NOSZNKO had the right and obligation to be aware of
[7258]all activities in order to exercise his general supervisory
[7259]functions and so as to be prepared to become the Acting
[7260]Chief of the section when necessary.
[7262]-NOSENKO said that consequently nothing was hidden fron
[7263]him for the two years 1960 and 1961. He claimed to have
[7264]had complete knowledge of the U.S. Embassy Section's activi-
[7265]ties during the relatively recent years of 1960 ard 1961
[7267]calmed
[7268]nCP te Seem
[7276]: and to know of all significant operational successes achieved
[7278]! in the years before and after this period, He has alsa-said he
[7279]i has told CIA all he knows of these activities. It was on this
[7280]: basis that he was able to say in 1965: "Tell si. MeCone
[7282]; that there were no recruitments. I was there.”
[7283]|
[7285]When NOSEXKO reported for duty, he and KOVSHUK agreed
[7286]: on a division of supervisory duties within the section.
[7287]i KOVSHUK was, in addition to his over-all responsibility for
[7290]i
[7291]|
[7292]| , Tr noooteoo
[7293]i
[7294]t
[7296]14-0000
[7298]707.
[7300]the section's operations, to supervise in particular opera- i
[7301]tional activity against American diplomatic personnel assigned {
[7302]to the U.S. Fmbassy. NOSENKO had been specifically instructed
[7303]by GRIBANOV and American Departnment Chief KLYPLY to concentrate
[7304]his efforts on the supervision of operations against the
[7306]most important American recruitment target, the code clerks
[7308]at the Embassy, with the aim of revitalizing these acti-
[7310]vities and making recruitments. (NOSENKO said there had
[7312]been none since the early 1950's.) According to the agreed-
[7313]upon division of labor, NOSENKO also assumed cese officer
[7314]responsibility for Johns ABIDIAN. the Embassy Security offi.
[7315]cer (identified by NSOSENKO as a CIA officer. buc actually a
[7317]CIA cooptee). Additionally, he was responsible for maintaining '
[7318]the section's file on factors pertaining to the physical
[7319]security of the Embassy and for receiving and disseminating
[7320]materials frou the microphones concealed in various U.S.
[7322]Enbassy offices. These were functions held, NOSENKO said, t
[7323]by hig predecessor BAKHVALOV and were turned over by NOSENKO
[7325]at the end of 1961 to his successor GRYAZNOV: Apart from
[7327]these duties, which apparently were routinely assumed by :
[7328]the Deputy Chief, NOSENKO supervised, during the early part i
[7329]of 1960 (as NOSENKO first said in 1965), .the work of the
[7331]officers responsible for operations againat. the Amorican
[7333]Armed Forces Attaches in Muscow; in October 1966, NOSENKO
[7335]reported that he was personally responsible during this
[7337]period for the operatiorml activity against Naval and Marine
[7339]officers in the Naval Attache's office.
[7341]d. knowledgeability as Deputy and Acting Chief
[7343]As deputy to KOVSHUK, NOSENKO said. he was aware of
[7344]all the operations being conducted by the section during
[7345]this two-year period; by his own statenent, nothing was
[7346]kept from him. There were in these two years a total of
[7347]over three ponths when KOVSHUK was ill or on leave, and at
[7348]these times NOSENKO was acting chief of the section. In
[7349]the latter capacity, NOSENKO was responsible for supervising
[7350]the administrative work and operational activity of the en-
[7351]tiresection and, in particular, assumed KOVSiHUK's work in
[7352]directing operations against diplomatic personnel assigned to
[7353]the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Therefore, pertinent to his
[7354]claims are the facts presented in the following paragraphs.
[7356]NOSENKO could not remember any operational decisions
[7357]that he made as acting chief, or any specific or unusual
[7358]occurrences during these times. In answer to a question,
[7359]NOSENKO said that the only specific responsibility of KOVSRUK’s
[7360]which he handled in the Chief's absence was reporting to the i
[7361]Chief of the First Department about all correspondence going
[7362]out of the U.S. Embassy Section.
[7364]NOSENKO did not meet any of KOVSHUK's agents during his
[7365]absences. He could not remember any of KOVSHUK's agents,
[7366]except GLAZUNIOV (whom NOSENKO said in April 1964 was his own
[7367]agent and later said was "KOVSHUK's and FEDYANIN's") and
[7368]the American correspondent STEVENS (about whom NOSENKO had
[7369]reported in connection with his responsibilities in 1953-55).
[7370]NOSERKKO also said that in 1960 KCVSHUX recruited PREISFREUND, :
[7371]although earlier he had reported that he (NOSENKO) had dose |
[7375]this. (Regardless of who ‘the recruiter might have been,
[7376]KOVSHUK attended NOSENKO's meetings with PRELSFREUND. )
[7380]qop SECRET
[7382]14-0000
[7384]WINTERS. He knew no details of KOVSHUK'sS contacts with (WINTERS,
[7386]7C8,
[7388]NOSENKO knew that his immediate supervisor KOVSEUK had per-
[7389]gonal contect, under Ministry of Foreign affairs ccver, with sore
[7390]U.S. Embassy offisers and was aware that one of these had been
[7392]nor that his own friend KISLOV, as well as his friend anc few-
[7393]quent source of operational information LOPUCYHOV, were also in :
[7394]touch with WINTERS | He could not remember who elise KOVEHLK BH
[7395]knew, cr what KOVSHUK was doing with them, or why. NOSENKO i
[7396]knew neither that William MORRELL (declared to the Scviet Govern- :
[7397]mant as a CIA officer) belonged to CIA nor that KOVSHUK, who
[7399]was aware of this fact, was in personal contact with MORELL.
[7401]Unlike KOVSHU:,ANTEMEV, KOSOLATOV, BORODI::, BIRYUKOV,
[7402]KRIVOSHEY and many other Second Chief Directorate officers,
[7403]NOSCNKO never had any direct contact, even for cultivation
[7404]or zssessment, with any Americar officials, either stationed
[7405]in the Embassy or visiting the USSR. However, his English
[7406]had been proven gcod cnough to quatify him particularly for
[7407]tourist recruitments and his operational flair hed been tested,
[7408](It was this which caused him to be picked for tne. DPEW,
[7410]%F anc other approaches and the cnly 1easor why he,
[7411]an ingiish speaker, would have been specially selected to
[7412]work on the German’ who spoxe “sone Englisn.")
[7414]DERYABIN an2 other defectors from the KGB have stated
[7415]that the deputy chief of a section working against 2 foreign
[7416]exbassy in Mosccw would be responsible for arproving and
[7417]retaining monthly schedules for the planned use cf safehouses
[7418]by the section; that he would discuss agent meeting sciedutes
[7419]with indivieval case officers and approve and retain 3 list
[7420]of planned agent meetings for each case officer on an indi-
[7421]vidual basis; and that he would approve the acquisition of new
[7422]agents and new safehouses and their transfer from one opera-
[7423]tion to another. By contrast, NOSEUYO first did not list
[7424]these functions azong his responsibilities and later denied
[7425]that he had them. NOSE:NAO did rot understand the questica
[7426]when esxed whether he had any responsibility for supervising
[7427]the use of safehozuses in Moscow (Paze Jo2) and said that as
[7428]the agents and the safehouses belonged to the case cfficers,
[7429]they could use them when and how they liked without informing
[7430]anyone; only when they were meeting an active development
[7431]agent was it necessary to report to NOSENKO and this only
[7432]after the meeting. XOSENKO said that, while he was ceputy
[7433]Chief of the section, three or four subordinate officers had
[7434]safe apartments, but he did not remember the location of any
[7435]of them. Neither NOSENKO ner his subordinates GRYACNOV and
[7436]KOSOLAPOV had such apartments, instead using less secure
[7437]"meeting apartments” (which are used in the absence cf the -
[7438]full-time occupant). NOSEKKO was able to locate his own
[7439]*neeting apartment” (which he said ne brought with him when
[7440]he transferred from the Tourist Department and iater took .
[7441]back with him to the Tourist Department) by street and could
[7442]do the same for GRYAZNOV's. He was not sure of the iccation
[7443]of the apartment used by KOSOLAPOV.
[7445]ie eden ARAN emer ee ee nn eS nS Al eee Ae a eR ey ee eeu
[7447]TOP SECRET
[7449]14-0000
[7451]i
[7452]L
[7453]t
[7455]i
[7456]M4
[7457]5
[7459]i
[7461]ha AA”
[7463]A Baa Alas
[7465]a
[7467]a
[7468]z
[7470]Tau. : at | ameell
[7472]e. Knowledgeavility of U.S. Embassy Physical Security
[7474]According to NOSENKO, he maintained the file on physical
[7475]security at the U.S. Embassy, and it contained detailed
[7476]floor plans and photograpne of the installation. NOSENKO was
[7477]unable to give the location or the floor of the office of
[7478]any single individual or component of the Embassy, including :
[7479]those of the Ambassador, or his own targets (ABIDIAN, the !
[7480]military code room, and the State Department comaunicationg
[7481]room),  NOSKKAO said that all Vapor taint Kabvady of tives
[7482]were located {n the “gone of securtly.” which he han varloualy
[7483]reported as the "seventh, eighth, ninth, and tenth floors,"
[7484]or “seventh and up," or the “top four floors." NOSENKO did
[7485]not remember how many floors there are in the Embassy, nor
[7486]was he even sure how many floors were included in the restric-
[7487]ted area. (The restricted area in fact consists of the top
[7488]three floors, the eighth, ninth, and tenth.)
[7490]f. Knowledgeability about American Intelligence Personnel
[7492]NOSENKO said that not only the deputy chief but every
[7493]officer in the section cculd identify the known end suspected
[7494]Anerican Intelligence personnel in the Embassy. Nevertaeless,
[7495]he himself did not know about three CIA officers (MAHONEY,
[7496]‘MORELL., and GARBLER) whom the KGB had definitely identified
[7497]as such before their assignments to Moscow in 1960-1961. For
[7498]example, -MORELL , whose overt Cla affiliation was offictally
[7499]announced by the Embassy to the Soviet Minister of Foretgn
[7500]Affairs, was under direct and active cultivation by KOVSHUK
[7501]and the KGB First Chief D:rectorate officer K.N. SMIRSOV in
[7502]1960-1961; NOSENKO knew nothing about this (although esked
[7503]leading questions znd given hints) and did not identify
[7504]-MORELL as a CIA officer. Four of the seven officers whos
[7505]he said the KGB suspected to be CIA had never had any such
[7506]affiliation. He could not give any information at all.on
[7507]the person he said the KGB considered to be the CIA chief
[7508]in Moscow, KLOSSON, either on his Moscow activity and contects
[7509]or on the extent and results of KGB coverage, .or on his per-
[7510]sonal situation and background. He could not explain why
[7511]KLOSSON was considered to be the CIA chief, but said that {
[7512]“every officer thought he was."
[7514]g- Knowledgeability of KGB Code Clerk Operations
[7516]As his main task, the prime reason he was moved into
[7517]the U.S. Embassy Section, NOSENKO alleged, was to supervise
[7518]the operational work against American code clerks. In this
[7519]capacity he closely guided the work of case officers GRYAZNOV
[7520]and KOSOLAPOV.* NOSENKO shared an office with his two sub-
[7521]ordinates, and the three were within sight and hearing of
[7525]*According to GOLITSYN, wio knew both men well. GRYAZNOV was
[7526]"a very experienced” case officer with some success; he had
[7527]spent about the last five years of his 16 years in the KGB
[7529]in the Amcrican Department and was a specialist in code
[7531]clerk operations. GOLITSYN seid that KOSOLAPOV had about
[7533]ten years' KGB experience and, like GRYAZNOV, was specializing
[7534]against code clerks in 1960. .
[7536]1 ORE APE TE , en Te
[7540]TOP-SECRET
[7542]710.
[7544]one anothcr and used a single safe, which contained files
[7546]on the Agerican code clerks and the agents involved with them.
[7547]NOSENKO said that he carefully directed the work of GRYAZNOV
[7549]. and KOSOLAPOV during these two years, discussing their cases
[7550]with them, taking part in operational planning, and approving
[7551]or disapproving all operational measures. NOSENKO originally
[7552]asserted that he tad also read and studied all the files
[7554]kept on the American code clerks; under questioning on indivi-
[7555]dual cases, however, he retracted these statements ard said
[7556]that he may Lave skimmed some of the files, that he did not
[7557]study any of them, but that in any event he rcad all the
[7558]current incomirg materials on the code clerks from microphones,
[7559]agents, and the like and then routed them to the case officer’
[7560]concerned. .
[7562]CIA has two types of information against which the reo
[7563]ports from NOSENKO can be compared. The first consists of
[7564]the detailed cebriefings of code clerks returning from
[7565]Moscow, administered routinely by the Department of State
[7566]and the military services; it also includes the special de-
[7567]briefings and interrogations of the Departnent of State,
[7568]the FBI, and CIA as a follow-up to KGB opcrational activity
[7569]which has become known from various sources. On this basis,
[7570]CIA has accumulated a considerable amount of collateral
[7571]information on the activities of the U.S. Embassy Section
[7572]involving United States code clerks during the period NOSEN-
[7573]KO said he was its Deputy Chief. The second type of infor-
[7574]mation is the reporting on KGB operations by GULITSYN «ho,
[7575]from contacts with U.S, Embassy Section officers in Moscow
[7576]and Helsinki, was able to provide several leads to what he
[7577]said were recruited American code clerks. GOLITSYN's infor-
[7578]nation thereby directly contradicts NCSENKO's statement that
[7579]the KGB had no successes in its code clerk recruitment opera-
[7580]tions from the early 1950's to the end of 1963, and none of
[7581]the subjects of GOLITSYN's leads have been positively identi-
[7582]fied. Some of GOLITSYN's information has been generally
[7583]substantiated by other sources. ln one case, this confirma-
[7584]tion has come from NOSENKO himself, whose information on the
[7585]-STORSBERG operation, on the agent PREISFREUND's role in it,
[7586]and on GOLITSYN's knowledge of KGB use of PREISFREULND pre-
[7587]sents an explanation of one and possibly two of GOLITSYN's
[7588]leads.* Another of GOLITSYN's leads, that concerning an
[7589]operational trip by KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki in order’ to estab-
[7590]lish contact with a code clerk, is confirmed by documentary
[7591]evidence that KOSOLAPOV did in fact travel on the Helsinki-
[7592]Moscow train with an American code clerk at the time and
[7593]under the cover GOLITSYN reported. NOSENKO denied that such
[7594]a trip was made by KOSOLAPOV.
[7596]NOSENKO has beea questioned in detail about each of the
[7597]code clerks serving in Moscow during 1960 and 1961. His in-
[7598]formation concerning KGB activities involving five of these
[7599]Americans (STORSBERG, JENNER, MORONE, ZUJUS, and KEYSERS) and
[7601]*As discussed below, there are important differences in tre
[7602]accounts of GOLITSYN and NOSENKO, particularly regarding the
[7603]outcome of this operation.
[7605]ENA
[7606]Ses he
[7610]me eee
[7612]wee et ere eee
[7614]TOP-SECRET
[7616]14-0000
[7618]bis lack of information concerning a sixth (GARLAND) is
[7620]' discussed in detail in Pages 166 through 219. NOSLNKO’s
[7621]information on & number of other cases, less important in
[7622]his opinion, is deseribed in the tabulation of American
[7623]case leads given on Poges 364-410. Certain of these cases
[7624]are further examined below to determine whether NOSENKO'S
[7625]knowledge equates with details which the deputy and acting
[7626]chief of the U.S. Embassy Section could reasonably be
[7628]‘ expected to knov and retain.
[7630](1) The STORSBERG Case
[7632]The operation against STORSBERG (Pages 166-185) was,
[7633]NOSENKO said, the must important case he had as supervisor
[7634]of code clerk operations. The KGB, while able to break
[7636]certain State Department ciphers, had had no success with
[7637]d therefore NOSENKO
[7639]z military cryptographic systems, an
[7641]3 “dropped everything for a year" to involve himself with the
[7642]i development of James STORSBERG, tte military code clerk at
[7644]: the U.S. Embassy. The following facts are pertinent to an
[7646]: evaluation of XOSENKO'S story of tris case.
[7650]i NOSENKO originally raised the STORSBERG case indirectly
[7651]z at his first meeting with CIA on 9 June 1962. He told how
[7653]GOLITSYN, during a visit to the American Department in 1960,
[7654]at a time NOSENKO was on leave, had requested permission
[7656]to use a U.S. Embassy Section agent, @ Finn, in his own opera-
[7657]tions in Helsinki. During his discussions in the American
[7658]Department, GOLITSYN learned that this Finnish agent was
[7659]being used in operations against Embassy employees living ip
[7660]America House. NOSENKO said that the KGB realized that
[7661]GOLITSYX had passed this information on to the Americans
[7662]following his defection, for the regulations governing
[7664]visits to America House by third nationals had been tightened.
[7665]At this meeting NOSENKO did not name the Finnish agent or
[7666]specify his involvement in any particular operational acti-
[7667]vity nor did he date the visit by GOLIITSYN.
[7669]why
[7673]And he dS nin age dt Oye Ph!
[7675]Later in the 1962 meet ings NOSENKO gave @& detailed
[7676]summary of the Finnish agent's involvement in the unsuccess-~
[7677]ful recruitment attempt against an Americas military code
[7678]clerk. NOSENKO, without naming the Finn or the American,
[7679]said that he personally conducted the recruitment confron-
[7680]tation with GRIBANOV present. These early accounts vere full
[7681]of quotes of shat SOSENKO said to the American and vice
[7682]7 versa. descriptions of the American's reaction to the confron-
[7683]po tation, and statenents of NOSENKO'’s admiration for the Ameri-
[7684]can despite his refusal to work. Following his defection,
[7685]NOSEXKO recounted the case in even greater detail, in fact,
[7687]' in more detail than he gave for any other case. He identi-
[7689]: fied the Finn as PREISFREUND ard the American as STORSBERG
[7691]: and described acd referred to the case whenever possible
[7693]: (over 50 times). When asked for details of other code clerk
[7694]: cases, for example, he repeatedly diverted to discussion of
[7695]the STORSBERG case to illustrate how the KGB operated against
[7697]code clerks in general.
[7699]wedge ele yp by penny
[7701]e
[7705]_ After defecting NOSENKO denied that he personally con-
[7706]fronted STORSBERG. He said that his personal role #as limited
[7707]to directing STORSBERG into the hotel room where the approach
[7708]was made; after first saying that he had never clained any
[7709]other role, he admitted that he may have been “painting”
[7713]= mere pee ee se
[7717]a a
[7719]cree Paes
[7721]TOP-SECRET
[7724]14-0000
[7726]712. . an
[7728]himself (exaggerating) in his descripzions of 1962, This ;
[7729]adaission came only after the tape of NOSENKO's 1362 :
[7730]statezents had been played to hina and he had successively
[7731]said that (a) it was not his voice, (b) he was drunk in
[7733]1962, (c) the CIA case officer in Geneva had made him
[7734]nervous, and (d) CIA probably spliced various pieces of
[7736]tape together to make this false one. Still, NOSENKO
[7738]said, he directed the entire operation from beginning to end,
[7739]and it was his most important case. Inuterrogated further
[7740]concerning his role in the STORSBERG operation in October
[7741]1936, NOSENKO said that he had never read the KGB file on
[7742]STORSBERG, which was held by GRYAZNOV, :
[7744]GOLITSYN, as NOSENKO reported, didvisit the American —-
[7745]Department, did request permission to use PREISFREUND operae
[7746]tionally in Helsinki, and did report this to CIA in late
[7747]196] following his defection. GOLITSYN also reported that,
[7748]in denying his request, KOVSHUK told him that PREISFREUND
[7749]had recently been used in the successful recruitment of an--
[7750]American Embassy employce, possibly a military man and pose
[7751]sibly a code clerk or diplomat; therefore, KOVSHUK said,
[7752]PREYSFREUND: could rot be used for six months or so in other
[7753]operations, for otherwise the Anericans might become suspi-
[7754]civus. NOSENKO has not reported these details, but has said
[7755]only that GOLITSYN was instructed to. drop interest in PREIS~=
[7756]FREUND because PREISFREUND belonged to the American Department
[7757]of the Second Chief Directorate. — .
[7759]NOSENKO volunteered at his first meeting with CIA that
[7760]he was on leave outside of Noscow on the occasioa of @MLITSYN's
[7761]visit to the Americen Department. Since defecting he has
[7762]insisted with absolute certainty that this visit took place
[7764]nm the late spring or carly summer of 1961 and has described
[7765]his leave, where he went and with whom. GOLITSYN's passport
[7766]and CIA travel data show that GOLITSYN was on TDY in Moscow
[7767]in January 1961.* Told this, NOSENKO said that it is untrue,
[7768]that he recalled being told of GOLITSYN's visit after his
[7769]return from leave in July ‘1961, and that he was certain that
[7770]ke (NOSENKO) was in Moscow: in January 1961.
[7772]NOSENKO has indirectly confirmed that the operation of
[7773]which GOLITSYN learned during this visit to the American
[7774]Department was the operation against STORSBERG. He did so by
[7775]his assertion that PREISFREUND, his own agent, was used in
[7776]only one operation, that against STORSBERG, Thus, as to the
[7777]outcome of this operation, there is a conflict between NOSEN-
[7778]KO's information and that earlier provided by COLITSYN.
[7780]There is also a conflict between NOSENKO's statements that
[7781]the recruitment approach took place some tims after May 1961
[7782](XOSINKO's dates have varied from June to October 1961,.
[7783]STORSBERNG.said it was in October 1961) and GOLITSYN's state—
[7784]ment that this approach had already been made in January 1961
[7785]when he learned of it.
[7787]GOLITSYN provided a second lead which NOSENKO appears
[7788]to confirm and which may be related to the STORSBERG case.
[7789]GOLITSYN said that during a visit to the American Department
[7793]*#GOLITSYN has based his assertion that NOSENKO was not in
[7794]the U.S. Embassy Section in 1960 and 1961 partly on this visit.
[7796]SPC ive
[7800]siamese
[7802]ewe oo ere
[7804]TOP SECRET
[7806]14-0000
[7808]et ad
[7812]me
[7814]wind
[7816]a
[7817]5
[7823]oe...
[7825]713.
[7829]in the spring of 1960,* he learned from GRYAZNOV that he
[7830](GRYAZKOV) had developed an operation against an American
[7831]military code clerk to the point that the KGB was "99 t
[7832]per cent’ certain that a recruitment approach to this code
[7833]clerk would be successful, GOLITS*N said that CRYAZNOV
[7835]told him that this would be the first recruitment of a mili-
[7836]tary code clerk (ag contrasted to a State Department code
[7837]clerk) in the history of the American Department. There
[7838]were only two persons meeting this criterion who were in
[7839]Yoscow at the tine GOLITSYN placed this visit, STORSBERG
[7841]ard NURLEY; the superior of STORSBERG, HURLEY per forned
[7842]back-up cryptographic duties in STORSBERG'’s absence. If
[7843]NOSENKO'S report that there was no developacnt of or approach
[7844]to HURLEY can be accepted, this lead from GOLITSYN would
[7845]apply to STORSBERG rather than HURLEY. There is a conflict
[7846]between NOSENKO's information on the STORSBERG case and this
[7847]second GOLITSYN lead in that GOLITSYN described an operation
[7848]which was in its final stages in the spring of 1960, whereas
[7849]NOSENKO (as well as STORSBEPG) asserted that the STORSBFRG
[7850]opuration was just under way at this time and wes long and
[7851]drawn-out. : .
[7853](ii) The JENNER Case
[7855]Apart from the STORSBERG operation, NOSENKO has been
[7856]able to supply the greatest amount of detail concerning the
[7857]operation (also unsuccessful) against the State Departcent
[7858]pouch clerk Paul JENNER (Pages 186-196). This case developed
[7859]as a result of an idea originated by NOSENKO himself shortly
[7860]after ne arrived in the U.S. Embassy Section. Because or
[7861]the iraccessibility of American code clerks to the KGB in
[7862]Moscow, it was NOSENKO's plan to send a KGB officer to Hel-
[7863]sirki in order to strike up an acquaintance with rx code
[7864]‘clerk entering tho Soviet Union aboard the Yelsinki-Moscow
[7865]train. The first (ard last) time this was attempted, NO-
[7866]SFAKO related, was in March 1960, whea the KCB learned that
[7867]JENNER, listed as a "secretary-archivist” and thus assumed
[7868]by the KGB to be a code clerk, was scheduled to transit
[7869]Helsinki en route to his assignaent at the U.S. Embassy in
[7870]Moscow. Under NOSENKO's supervision KOSOLAPOV therefore
[7871]travelled to Helsinki and boarded the same train as JENNER.’
[7872]Additionally, GRYAZNOV took a KGB female agert to the town,
[7873]of Vyborg, on the Finno-Soviet border, and placed her on the
[7874]same train. Both KOSOLAPOY and the female agent met and
[7875]spoke with JENNER en route to Mascow, and the girl gave hin
[7876]her telephone number, asking hia to call her. After JENNER‘'s
[7877]arrival in Moscow, both KOSOLAPOV ard GRYAZNOV subnitted
[7878]written reports to NOSENXO describing the contacts on the
[7879]train. Although the KGB later found out that JENNER was only
[7880]a pouch clerk, not a cryptographer, he was considered of
[7881]interest and when JENNER failed to telephone the female
[7882]agent, the two were brought together in a "chance meeting"
[7883]at the Moscow airport. JENNER: would have no part of the
[7884]agent's invitations, however, and the operation therefore
[7885]went no further.
[7887]#¥hen NOSENKO was told of the.GOLITSYN visit in May or June
[7888]1960, he denied that it took place, saying that he neces-
[7889]sarily would know if it had.
[7891]TOP SECRET
[7893]cere te tegen ee eee
[7897]DEEL men eet ea AR tae ect me
[7901]714.
[7907]JENNER reported to the Security Officer at the U.S,
[7908]Embassy upon his arrival that he had been contacted hy two
[7909]Soviet students from Vyborg, & young mai and a woman, on
[7910]the Helsinki-Noscow train. He also reported having been
[7911]given a telephone nuzber by the girl and lator repprted
[7912]having been recontacted by her at the Moscow airport.
[7914]CIA has documentary eviderce, in the forn of official
[7915]Fircrish train manifests, that JENNER travelled from Helsinkt
[7916]to Hoscow by train on 31 March 1960. This document shows
[7917]that JENNER travelled alone and no Soviets werc aboard when
[7918]the train lett Helsinki. CIA also has an official travel
[7919]manifest showing that KOSOLAPOV, using the name KOLOSOV,
[7920]travelled from Helsinki to Moscow by rail on 2 April 1960,
[7921]two days later, and that no Americans travelled on this train
[7922]with him. KOSENKU identified KOLOSOV's photograph as that
[7923]of his subordinate KOSOLAPOV. (NOSEXKO earlier said that .
[7924]he did not know whether KOSOLAPOV used an alias for ‘this
[7925]trip, what that alias might have been, or whether KOSOLAPOV
[7926]had an alias passport; he agreed that he would have had to
[7927]authorize such a passport.) When he was told of CIA evidence
[7928]that KOSOLAPOV cid not travel on the same train as JENNER
[7929]and therefore could not have met and talked with him as
[7930]YWSENKO had reorted, NOSENKO refused to believe it; he in-
[7931]sisted that he had read the reports of both KOSOLAPOV and .
[7932]GRYAZKOV, and that the events were exactly as he described j
[7933]then. _ :
[7937](14ii) The GARLAND Case ae
[7939]GOLITSYN told CIA after his defection that while he was
[7940]stationed in Helsinki, probably in Novenber=-not March..-1960,
[7941]KOSOLAPOV travelled to Finland under alias and commercial
[7942]cover in order to make the acquaintance of an American code
[7943]clerk on the Helsinki-oscow train. KOSOLAPOV's arrival had
[7944]been announced by a cable from KGB Headquarters to the
[7945]Helsinki Legal Residercy. According to GOLITSYN, the Legal
[7946]Residency learned which train this American was to board and
[7947]succeeded in placing KOSOLAPOV in the sane compartment with
[7948]him. GOLITSYN saw KOSOLAPOV board the train with this Ameri-
[7949]can. Later, when another Americana Department officer visited
[7950]Helsirki, GOLITSYN asked him how KOSOLAFOV's operation with
[7951]the code clerk had gone; from the officer's refusal to ansver,
[7952]GOLITSYN assumed that it had been a success.
[7954]CIA travel records show that KOSOLAPOV made a second
[7955]trip to Helsinki in Novemoer 1960, again under the KOLOSOV
[7956]alias. Finnish railroad manifests show that KOSOLAPOV left
[7957]Helsinki by train on 16 November 1960 and that one -¢ his
[7958]travelling companions on this train was GARLAND, who was
[7959]en route to Moscow to assume his duties as chief of the
[7960]State Department code room at the American Embassy (Page
[7961]198). There were no other Americans on this train.
[7963]Told that KOSOLAPOV had made a trip to Helsinki in
[7964]November 1960 and had travelled to Moscow on the same train
[7965]as an American code clerk, one of his on targets, NOSENKO
[7966]said that this could not be. He agreed that, as in the case
[7967]of KOSOLAPOV's trip to meet JENNER, he would necessarily
[7968]have been involved in the planning of such a second trip
[7969]and would have had to approve arrangements and correspondence
[7970]in connection with it. Even if such a trip took place when
[7971]NOSEKKO was out of Moscow, he said, the details of it would
[7973]an aren
[7975]10P SECRET |
[7978]44-00000
[7982]715. Wie
[7984]have beon known to him upon his return, and he would not
[7985]have forgotten about the trip. (In fact, CEA travel records show |
[7986]that KOSOLAPOV arrived in Helsinki on 12 November 1960 and
[7987]that NOSENKO left Moscow for Ansterdam, en route to Cuba,
[7988]on 15 November.) NOSENKO has not changed his position that
[7989]there was no such trip.
[7991](iv) The MNOROE Caso
[7993]Like the STORSBERG operation, the MORONE case Was men-
[7994]tioned at NOSENKO's first meeting with CIA; he cited it as
[7995]an example of a technique which NOSENKO introduced for using
[7996]third nationals to obtain access to American code clerts who
[7997]were reluctant to establish contacts with Soviet citizens.
[7998]According to NOSENKO's most recent version, given in early
[7999]1965, the KGB learned that MORONE and a Marine Guard (BEGGS)
[8000]planned to travel to Warsaw on leave. KOSOLAPOV thereupon
[8001]drew up an operational plan, edited by NOSENKO and KOVSHUE
[8002]and approved by GRIBAXOV, proposing that a ferale agent of
[8003]the Polish UB be introduced to MCRONE on the “‘oscow to War-
[8004]saw train for the purpose of obtaining comprosising materials.
[8005]KOSOLAPOV arranged with Polish liaison officials in Noscow
[8006]to have such an agent sent to Moscow, met her when she
[8007]arrived, and briefed her on the operation, She was then
[8008]placed on MORONE's train together with a KGB technician
[8009]whose task it was to obtain tape recordings of the compro-
[8010]mise. Events went according to plan: MORONE. «ct the girl
[8011]and was intimate with her on the train, but when the tech-
[8012]niciar reported to NOSENKO the day after the train arrived
[8013]in Warsaw, he said that the tape recordiugs were of low
[8014]quality and unsuitable for their intended purpose. Ina
[8015]further attempt to acquire comproukxing material on MORONE,
[8016]KOSOLAPOV later brought the UB agent to Moscow, and on this
[8017]occasion photographs were obtained of their intimacies in
[8018]a woscow hotel room. Still, the xGB felt, there was not
[8020]: enough blackmail matcrial to ensure recruitment, and it was
[8022]: further planned to have the America House maid IVANOVA
[8024]attempt to lure MORONE to a room in Moscow where truly
[8025]cospreoising photographs of intimacies with a Soviet citi-
[8027]: zen could be obtained. Possibly because they noticed MORONE's
[8028]to interest in IVANOVA, NOSEMKO said, the Americans ordered
[8029]MORONE out of Moscow before further steps could be taken.
[8031]Although NOSENKO provided a considerable amount of
[8032]detail on MORONE's trip to Warsaw, there were numerous
[8033]variations in his different accounts. In 1962 he said
[8034]that he had handled the entire operation himself, including
[8035]telephoning Warsaw with the request for the girl; he also
[8036]said that the UB obtained compromising photographs in Warsaw
[8037]and that several months lates the female agent was brought
[8038]to Moscow expressly for the purpose of introducing MORONE to
[8039]a Soviet girlfriend. This, NOSEXKO said, was successful and
[8040]MORONE was soon having intercourse with a KGB agent. While
[8041]still in place in Geneva on 1 February 1964 NOSENKO gave &
[8042]different version: We," he said, arranged for the girl by
[8043]a dispatch pouched to the KGB advisor in Warsaw; moreover,
[8044]the Poles, who had obtained compromising photographs in War-
[8045]Saw, sent the KGB only pictures of the two kissing, keeping
[8046]the best oncs for themselves, and this is why she had to be
[8047]brought to Moscow. NOSENKO told the FBI later in February
[8048]1964 that compromising photographs had been obtained in War-
[8049]saw but no recruitment was attempted because KHRUSHCHEV had
[8051]1GP SECRET.
[8054]14-0000
[8056]716.
[8058]given instructions that no actions were to be taken which
[8060]might embarrass then existing good relations with the United |
[8062]States. When in February 1365 it was pointed out that MORONE j
[8063]arrived in Warsaw on 14 December 1960 and that NOSENKO left a
[8064]for Cuba on 15 Ncvember 1960, NOSENKO revised his story of f
[8065]receiving the ptreonal report of the technician to say that
[8066]he had perhaps reed the technician's report after returning ~~; ‘
[8067]from Cuba in vecember 1960. an i
[8069]CIA learned of the MORONE train. trip and subsequent :
[8070]involvement witn the UB agent in 1961 from a Volish scurce 4 |
[8071]who had provided much sensitive and reliable information D4
[8072]previously. The Polish source submitted a considerable 7 :
[8073]amount of detail incleding the date of the operation (which ;
[8074]NOSENKO did not recall) and the fact that the Polish agent’... : vorcrs tS
[8075]was handled in Moscow by a KGB officer named “Volodya.* {
[8076]It was on the basis of ‘this report that MORONE was withdrawn 2,
[8077]from Moscow in May 1961.
[8079]In accounts given since his defection, NOSENKO has con- a
[8080]gistently named KOSOLAPOV as MORONE's case officer. KCSOLA~ aC
[8081]POV drafted tne plan for the operation on the train, discussed
[8082]it with NOSEN4%O and KOVSHUK, met with a U3 official in Mcscow
[8083]to arrange for the agent, met the agent on her arrival, and
[8084]briefed her on her assignment. NCSENKO hes not been asked
[8085]and has not volunteered who specifically placed the agent
[8086]on the train. Records show, however, that MORONE left Moscow
[8087]on 13 November 1960, arriving in Warsaw on the ldth; from
[8088]12 to 16 November 1960, KOSOLATOV is confirmed to have been
[8089]in Helsinki, apparently in connection with an operation in-
[8090]volving the American code cler% GARLAND (see above). It is
[8091]also noted that travel records show that NOSENKO, the officer
[8092]supervising this (as well, presumably, as KOSOLAPOV'Ss trip
[8094]. to Helsinki), left Moscow on 15 November 1960 with a dele- :
[8095]_ gation going to Cuba.
[8097]NOSENKO has been questioned concerning the KGB agents b
[8098]in contact with MORONE and what was learned from them. He . 4
[8099]reported that an Egyptian agent visited America House, met -
[8100]MORONE there, but did not report anything of interest con-
[8101]cerning him. NCSEMKO also mentioned IVANGVA, a maid at
[8102]America House, who knew MORONE and whom the KGB wanted to use
[8103]to lure MOPONE into a compromising situation (see above).
[8104]NOSENKO said that he, himself, had met with IVANOVA several
[8105]times to discuss MCRONE, but that he could not recall any-
[8106]thing specific of interest or use that she reported concerning
[8110]TAN ones.
[8112]eS] -
[8114]OP sees
[8117]14-0000
[8121]Fw eer a
[8123]Wi7.
[8125]him. Another agent who may have reported on MORONE, NOSENKO
[8126]gaid, was an East Gcraan girl sent to America House to pose
[8127]as an Austrian; NCSENKO was not sure what she might have
[8128]reported or when this was, other than it occurred when he
[8129]was working against “ORONE and that It wes durirg ABIDIAN's
[8130]tour in doscow, for he had coze tu Anerica House to question
[8131]the girl.
[8133]Various reperts indicato that VORONE was. involved in
[8134]illegel currency speculation with the Egyptiar agent and
[8135]that on at least one occasion the Feyptian introduced MORONE
[8136]to a Soviet female, with whom MORONE was intimate. NOSE*KO
[8137]did not know that SORONE. «as also involved in illegal cure
[8138]rency dealings with G@mkggERahon NOSENKO has identified as
[8139]KOSCLAPCY's agent aid who, ne said, was involved with and
[8140]reporting on NOSEXKO's target ABIDIAN. NOSENKO did not know
[8141]that IVANOVA once incroduced SORONE to a Soviet female, with
[8142]whom NORONE was intinate; additionally MORONE was reported
[8143]by a nusber of his co-residents at America House to nave been
[8144]intimate with LVANOVA herself (which MORONE denied). Some wtet
[8145]of these samc Amcricans reported also that MORONE was inti- -
[8146]mate with UMANETS, another KGB agent identified by NOSENKO;
[8147]WORCNE hinself said he knew LYANETS "voll." Finally, the
[8148]incident involving the East German girl posing as an Austrian
[8149]involved the code clerk ZUJUS, not MORONE, and took place
[8150]after NOSENKO clains to have heen transferred frem the U.S,
[8151]Embassy Section; she was interviewed by ARILIAN's suce- ssor,
[8152]NONTGOXERY. .
[8154](v) The KEYSERS Case
[8156]The approach tu KEYSERS is the only tine during his
[8157]service in the U.S. Embassy Section that NOSENKO claims to
[8158]have had direct contact with an American stationed in ilose
[8159]cow. (NOSENKO said on one occasion that this was the only
[8160]face-to-face encounter he could recall; and, on another, -
[8161]that it was possible that STORSEFRG--the only other possibility--
[8162]may not have seen hia on the night he was approached in the
[8163]Moscow hotel.) KEYSERS therefore is the only independent
[8164]Americap source sho could confirm that NOSENKO was involved
[8165]in operations against Aacrican Embassy personnel in 1960 or
[8166]1961.  NOSENKO himself pointed cut, however, that this con-
[8167]tact was of very short duration, and that it was possible
[8168]that KEYSERS would not recognize him. This was the case:
[8169]KEYSERS failed to identiiy NOSENKO's photograph and described
[8170]the officer wno approachcd him as a man considerably older,
[8171]shorter, and probably of a much heavicr build than NOSENKO
[8172]was, Although NOSENKO was able to provide a description of
[8173]this incident, he did not know much about the overall KCB
[8174]case against KEYSERS and a number of discrepancies have been
[8175]noted. ; .
[8177]In 1962 NOSENKO first reported the approach to KEYSERS,
[8178]without naming him, but saying he was the successor to STORS-
[8179]BERG. Since dcefecting in 1964, NOSENKO has continued to
[8180]identify hin as STCRSBERG's replacement. In fact, KEYSERS
[8181]was sent to Moscow as an assistant to the Embassy medical
[8182]officer; he also worked in the office of the Air Attache as
[8183]a collateral duty and for a short while in 1961 was under
[8184]training in the military code room aS a "back-up" crypto=-
[8185]grapher for STORSLERG. STORSBERG'Ss replacement in Moscow
[8186]was ZUJUS. .
[8188]JOP SECRET,
[8190]14-0000
[8192]718.
[8194]On 24 and 28 January 1964, before the defection, NO-
[8195]SENKO incorrectly mamed ZUJUS, who he said was STORSBERG 's
[8196]replaccment, as the target of this operation. On 2 February
[8197]1964 KOSENKO called & special meeting with his CIA handlers.
[8198]to correct this mistake. He said that, in fact, KEYSERS
[8199]was STOHSBERG’s replacement, and the approach kad been nade
[8200]to him. (Thus NOSENKO had forgotten the name of the one
[8201]American Embassy official he ever approached. )
[8203]In Pebruary 1965 XNOSENKO said that the KGB believed
[8204]that KEYSERS did vot report the receipt of the defection
[8205]letter end that there was no indication that he had fron
[8206]microphones or telephone coverage of the U.S. Embassy. In
[8207]fact, KEYSERS reported the letter at once in the office of
[8208]the Military Attache, where a microphone as discovered in
[8209]1964. NOSENKO had ecarlicr said that this particular micro-
[8210]phone was being monitored around the clock by the KGB.
[8211](XEYSERS' homosexuality and drinking problems kad also
[8212]been discussed widely in Embassy offices. NOSENKO was
[8213]unawere of these discussions.) ” .
[8215]NOSENKO did not know correctly where or how the KGB.
[8216]dedivered to KEYSERS the letter which preceded the airport
[8217]approach which NOSEXKO claimed to have made.
[8219](vi). Other Code Clerk Cases
[8221]Frark DAY: NOSENKO identified DAY as a State Nepartment
[8222]code clerk and the target of either KOSCLAPOV or GRYAZNOY.
[8223]As with all other code clerks, NOSENKO was asked whether he
[8224]knew of eny interesting information about DAY, whether he
[8225]knew of any of DAY's friends in Moscow, or of his travels
[8226]inside and outside the Soviet Union, etc. NCSENKO answered
[8227]"no" to all these questions. He said that the KGB had no
[8228]derogatory information on DAY, was unaware of any vulner-
[8229]abilities he might have had, and that no operational mes-
[8230]sures were taken against him. Records show that DAY was in
[8231]Moscow fros way 1960 to October 1961. In July 1961 he tra-
[8232]velled to the Caucasus with his friend, the U.S. Agricul~
[8233]tural Attache BROWN, formerly an overt CIA employee. DAY
[8234]later reported that the two were under surveillance by five
[8235]persons at all times on this trip, that on ore occasion they
[8236]found four “repairmes” in their hotel room upon returning
[8237]unexpectedly ahead of schedule, and that another time during
[8238]this trip an “attractive and available Soviet female" was
[8239]plsced in their train compartment.
[8241]John TAYLOR: NOSENKO said TAYLOR was a State Department
[8242]code clerk ard the target of KOSOLAPOV. NOSENKO did not
[8243]know of TAYLOR‘s previous service abroad or of any back-
[8244]ground information the KGB might have had about hin, He
[8245]described an operation against TAYLOR which centered around
[8246]his intimacy with a Russian maid (a KGB agent) and his sym
[8247]pathy tovards the Soviet Union and its people. No compro-
[8248]mising photographs were obtained of TAYLOR and the maid,
[8249]however, and no approach was made to hin, possibly because
[8250]the KGB did not want to jeopardize the more important STORS-
[8252]BERG case by creating a "flap." According to TAYLOR, he was _
[8254]intimate wito his maid from about September 1960 until the
[8255]beginning of 1961. On one occasion they were intimate in a
[8256]“friend's apartment” in Moscow. NOSENKO did not know that
[8257]the maid told TAYLOR she wes pregnant or that TAYLOR offered
[8259]v
[8261]t
[8263]t
[8265]14-0000
[8267]719,
[8269]her. money for an abortion. TAYLOR left Moscow in February.
[8270]1961, whereas the epproach to STORSPERG wes reported by
[8271]NOSEXEO and STORSBERG to have occurred four to cight months
[8272]afterward.
[8274]Maurice ZWANG: NOSENKO identified ZWANG es a State
[8275]Departnent code cTerk who was “actively worked on” during
[8276]the 1960-196] period. An Fgyptian agent, whose naze NOSEN.
[8277]KO did not recall, introduced ZRANG to e ferslo KCB agent
[8278]in an attespt to obtain compromising phctcgraphs, but the
[8279]agent did not like ZWANG and refused to have intercou:se
[8280]with him. At the time NOSENKO left the U.S. Embessy Sec-
[8281]tion tn January 1962, there was no further activity sur-
[8282]rounding Z*¥ANG, The KGB had no agente in corctact with hia,
[8283]and there wes co vulnersbility data concerning hin. Shen
[8284]ZWANG wag interviewed by the State Departcent afier returving
[8285]from his Moscow assignment, a polygraph exsninstioa indicated
[8286]that Z¥WanG hed had intercourse with his Russian raid, else-
[8287]where identified by NOSENXO as a KGB agent; 2¥*4N5 edmitted
[8288]visitirg the maid's apartment several tines but dented
[8289]intimacies. In March or April 196), ean rgyptian intreduced
[8290]ZWANG to another Soviet female; ZdANG also acnitred visiting
[8291]her apartrent on several occasiors, but again denied having
[8292]had intercourse with her. ZWANG was reported by various
[8293]other Americens stationed tn Moscow to have been active in
[8294]currency speculation and blrckzarketecring with the Egyptian
[8295]and MES and agent of KOSOLAPOY according to XOSEXKO.
[8296]NOSENKD Sas unaware of this.
[8298]TOP SECRET
[8301]14-0000
[8303]720.
[8305]h, Respons bility for and Knowle.tce of ‘31IDi...
[8307]NOSENLO said taat, as Deputy Chief of the U.S, Embassy
[8308]Section, he was directly s¢sponsible, £8 case officer, for
[8309]all coveraye of the Embassy Security Officer Joba V. ABIDIAN.
[8310]Thin was NOSEXEO'’s only individual target responsibility,
[8311]end no KGB officer shared it with hin. NOSENKO said that
[8312]he opened the KAUR 7ile on ABITLAN before ABIDIAN'S arrival)
[8313]in Moscow in early 1950, and that he turned tris file over
[8314]officially to his successor, GRYAZNOV, when transferred from
[8315]the U.S. Entass; Soction at the end of 11. It was NOSERKO
[8316]sho urotre the kGd plan for operations agoinst ABIDIAN in
[8317]about October 1969. ARIPLAN, according to NOSENKJ, was con-
[8318]sidered by the KGB to be 2 CIA officer e:d, as LANG ELLE's
[8319]suceessor, +45 also considered to be the nost important
[8320]counterintelligence target in the Enbassy. ABIDIAN was thus
[8321]made a special target of surveillance fron the cay of his
[8322]arrivel in the USSR; this seant he was alweys under surveil-=
[8323]lance by suveral teams of the KGB Seventh (Surveillance)
[8324]Pireetorete. The intensive coverage of ALIDIAN included
[8325]fail censorship, telephone taps, and agent revrorting; it was
[8326]instituted, NOSENKO said, “in the hore that he might lead
[8327]the KGB to another PCPOV." ABIDIAN was detected, NOSENKO
[8328]continued, in turce letter-mailings--ali to agents already
[8329]under KGB control. We *as scen to enter a suspected dead
[8330]drop site on Pushhin Street, the significance of which dld
[8331]not becene known to the KGB until later, «nen it *as learned
[8332]that this site scs to be used by PENFOVSAIY. In the hostile
[8333]interrogations of carly 1965, NOSENEG agroed tuat ie was the
[8334]single person in the KGB responsible for knowing everything
[8335]possible about “bIDIAN. .
[8337]KOSENKO ssid he knew nothing abeut APIDIAN's personal
[8338]background, his educatio:, his studies i: France, his alli-
[8339]tary service, his date of entry into the State Nepartment,
[8340]his State Departnent rank, his previous foreign assignments
[8341]with the State Department, or his status as ex Foreign Ser-
[8342]vice Reserve, Staff, or Officer status (FER, FSS, FSO).
[8343]NOSEXKO said he tried to learn these things, but the tnforna-
[8344]tion was unavailable in the Second Chief Directurate cr in
[8345]KGB Central files. and although he requested information
[8346]from the First Chier Dircctorate, nothizg was received. The
[8347]only information the KGB had on ‘ABIDIA, insofar as NOSENKO
[8348]knew, was that contained in ABIDIAN's visa request and in
[8349]ae report from one of the Legal Residencies in the United
[8350]States; the report provided a basis for believing him to be
[8351]a CIA officer.
[8353]NOSENKO was unaware of the meaning of the initials
[8354]FSR, FSS, and FSO. When asked whether he had checked the
[8355]Depastment of State Biographic Register for information on
[8356]ABIDIAN'S background, hie replied thes this document was not
[8357]available to the U.S. Embassy Section; he subsequently.
[8358]recalled that there was an old copy of the Biographic Register
[8359]“from about 1956" tn KOVSHUK's office, but That it contained
[8360]no information on ABLDIAN.
[8362]NOSENKO reported that one of the reasors ABIDIAN was
[8363]considered a Cla officer was his behavior «thile serving as
[8364]a Department of State Security Officer witt KERUSHCHEV's
[8365]deiegation when tre latter visited the lnited States in
[8367]an ahi
[8371]ce ecteceeg ep
[8373]ee nn et mn
[8375]14-0000
[8377]1A GOR: =e mngmmrameresenacn en nm men
[8379]72k.
[8381]1959. NOUSENKO never mentioned that KOSOLAPCY. whe ne
[8382]said was his immediate subordinate and shared SOSENKO’s
[8383]office in KGB Headquarters. was a member of this same ;
[8384]delegation.
[8386]NOSENKO did not know where ASIDIAN'S office was located
[8387]in the U.S. Exbagsy. Ne erid ne did not knoe and was
[8388]unable to find out who ARIDIAN's secretary was. He reported
[8389]that some agent told the KG that ABIDIAN fad a sign on
[8390]the door of his office shich said "Security Officer."
[8391]There was no such sign. ;
[8395]SOSENKO did not know where ARIDIAN'S apartauent was
[8396]located. He did not knus its conteats anda said that the
[8397]KGB was nut interested in this. He did not znew whether
[8398]ABIDIAN changed apartzents in “Moscow, which tre did.
[8400]NOSENKO ides: tified GROWAKOVA, an Enbassy language
[8401]teacher, 2S a KG agent who was valuable because she was
[8402]intelligent and was able to provide personality sketches on
[8403]her students taved on classroon discussione. He never
[8404]associated ABIDIAN with GROVASUVA. “sien told that ABIDIAN
[8405]had taken language lessons from iver. NCSELNKO resalled that
[8406]ABIDIAN took “severrnl” lessons from GEOMAKUVA at the beginning
[8407]of his tour bur discontinued; she repurted tothing of sigrii-
[8408]ficance and vhere vis no regular repurting froa her on
[8409]ABIDIAN. ABIDIAN, however, reported that he took regular,
[8410]private Russian lessons from GROM(OVA throvghout his tour
[8411]in Moscoe and that they discussed ic class h:s past personal
[8412]life, travel, education, fiancee, and his trips abroad to
[8413]see his fiancee.
[8415]NOSENKO knew that ABIDIAN :sravetled out of the USSR
[8416]two or three times, but had no idea when these trips took
[8417]Place or what countrivs ABIDIAN visited. NOSENKO said that,
[8418]as ABISIAN's predecessor LANGELLE wos known toe nave travelled
[8419]outside the USSR for operational reasons in consection with
[8420]the FOPOV case. it would have teen of interest to learn
[8421]where ALIDIAN had gone, but the KGR hal no way of finding
[8422]this out. (Note in the previous paregraph that CKOMAKOVA
[8423]knew.) When XOSENKO’S interrovetor pointed aut the possibi-
[8424]lity of photographing ABIDIAN'S passpore upon nis return to
[8425]tne USSR, NOSENKO replied that the &GB dues not photograph
[8426]the passperts of foreign diplozrats entering the soviet Unto...
[8428]NOSESKO said that ABIDIAS made no trips outside Moscow j
[8429]within the USSK and explained tliat. as case officer. he :
[8430]would necersarily have Leen aware of any suca trip as he
[8431]would have had to Nandle all arrangements for surveillance
[8432]during it. When NOSENKO was told that ABJDIAN travelled to
[8433]Soviet Armenia ir October 1960, NOSENKO said fcr the first
[8434]time that he was on leave in that month. NOSENKO admitted | :
[8435]in October 1966 that he krew nothing of ABIDIAN's trip. i
[8437]NOSENKO said that he did not know who were ABIDIAN's
[8438]close American friends in Moscow or his friends and profes-
[8439]sional contacts among foreigners there.
[8441]MOSENKO said at the esd of the January-February 1965
[8442]interrogations concerning ABIDIAN that tw reason he knew
[8443]so little abovt ABIDIAN was because ne was “working badly"
[8444]as ABIDIAN's case officer. The reason for his poor work, he
[8448]14-0000
[8450]oe
[8452]i
[8457]2 en Am apa ee
[8459]72.
[8460]said, was that he hed te concentrate on Supesvising tio work
[8461]against code clerks ard therefore had vesy Little tine
[8462]left for ACID:AN (sce above concerning code clerks.
[8464]In 1962 SCSENKC correctly described all of toe three
[8465]clandestine letter mailings carried out by AMTDIAN in Mose
[8466]cow at CIA request (Pages 226-236). He a}so proviced ace
[8467]curate information cn CIA lettor-mailings in generi:.
[8468]pointing out that none et ell were mailed for a year and a
[8469]half after the arrest of LANGELLE in October 1959. (No
[8470]letters were mailed fros V2 February 1960 until 1 April
[8471]1961, when ABIDIAN mailed his first one.) NOSESKO explained
[8472]that the KGB conpletely centrolled this activity through the
[8473]use of metka, a thicf powder applied to the clothing of
[8474]foreigners ia the USSR; a trace is left on anything coming
[8475]into contact with treated areas, and this can be detected
[8476]by spectal machines through which all mail passes. .Despite
[8477]the fact that all of ABIDIAN's letters were mailed to KGB
[8478]double agents and would therefore have becn detected enyway,
[8479]it was metka, NOSENKO said, vhich in each case led to their
[8480]initial” identification. After his defection NOSENKO described
[8481]how the metka had becn applied to AMLUTAN’s clothing (anc
[8482]hence to the letters) by the agent PLOOROVICH, aho began
[8483]working as ALIDIAN's maid several months efter ABIUIAN ar--
[8484]rived in Moscow in March 1360. NOSENKO insisted under inter-
[8485]rogation that FEDOROVICH was the gnly agent who had access
[8486]to ABIDIAN's apartment, that he, NOSENKC. had personally
[8487]briefed her on the application of metka, and that he was
[8488]sure that ARBIDIAN'’s letters were defected by means of muetka.
[8489]From a CIA debriefing of ASIDIAN, however. it eppeats that
[8490]FEBOROVICH did not begin working as ABIDIAN'S maid until
[8491]some time in July 1961, whereas ARIDIAN mailed his first
[8492]letter in “oscow on 1 April 1961 and “is second Vetter on
[8493]2 July 1961. ABIDIAN's third letter was mailed on 1 Septcm-
[8494]ber 196], after FELOROVICH began to work tor him.
[8496]i. Reporting on ABIDIAN’s Visit to the Pushkin Street Dead
[8499]NOSENKO's account of the visit by ABIDIAN to the
[8500]PENKOVSKIY déad drop site on Pushkin Street in Mosocw is
[8501]described in cetarl on Pages 231-225. In summary, NGS ENKO
[8502]reported that at the end of 1560 or early 1961 KGB surveil-
[8503]lance followed ABIDIAN from the U.S, Embassy to Pushkin
[8504]Street, where ABIDIAN was noted to enter a residential building.
[8505]Upon exanination it was decided that this was a likely
[8506]dead drop site, and a stationary surveillance post was as-
[8507]signed to watch it. After three months, since nothing sus-
[8508]picious had beep noted, this post was renoved. jne true
[8509]significance of the location did not become known to the
[8510]KGB until after the arrest of PENKOVSKIY in 1962. NOSENZO
[8511]said he was still in the U.S. Embassy Section ard was ABIDIAN's
[8512]case officer when this event took place. He heard of it |
[8513]while sitting in KOVSHUK's office on the day it haprened.
[8514]visited the site the following day with V. KOZLGV (Chief of
[8515]the Anericen Department of the KGB Surveillance firectorate),
[8516]placed the original surveillance rcport in ABIDIAN'S Zile,
[8517]and discussed the results of the stationary post with KOZLOV
[8518]on an almost daily basis during the first monti ard periodi-
[8519]celly thereafter until the post was removed. It was ECZLOV
[8520]whe told NOSENKO that after threé suonths the stationary
[8529]14-0000
[8531]PS Mae ab net STE deo: te gana tte
[8533]aoe Rr es ore
[8537]5
[8538]z
[8539]i
[8542]i
[8545]Ee ee RE eens nes oo =o
[8547]222.
[8549]surverllance had been discontinacd. NOSTNYO did net tell
[8550]CIA about this iscident in 1362, he said, because ae krew
[8551]that the watch Lad bein Ciscontinsed and thet notning suse
[8552]picious had been notcd; therefore, he thought the ane ieent
[8553]would not nave been of futerest to american Intelligence.
[8555]NOSLNEO has stressed that ALIDIA™ $35 vader special
[8556]surveillance by at least tvo surveiliscce teams at Bil tines
[8557]ang that, oa the asy he virtied Pushkin Street. SLILIAN vas
[8558]under cuntinucus watch froma the gonert he left ibe tabagsy
[8559]NOSENSG has teen able to pive a detrilece descriotion of
[8560]ABILIAS’6 covezent to the dead deep site.
[8562]inspite the special eurveidlasee coverage of ADIDIAS,
[8563]NOSENKU Shia, he 88s unaware of avy unusual “tovements UF
[8564]ABIDIAN during tne days ammedirately preceding his visit
[8565]1o Fusakin Street. SOSENKU said tha: he knew definitely
[8566]that surveillance had rcported nothing unusual during this
[8567]period and that ne was Sure ASIDIAN had not cluded the sur-
[8568]veilia:ce at any time during it. According to CIA records,
[8569]three cays before ABLUTAN wont to Fushxin Street in response
[8570]to indications tnat tne dead drop had beer loaded. ABIDIAN
[8571]left tne U.S. Embassy in his private car for Spastu ifouse
[8572]at about nine o'clock in_the evening: at about two o'clock
[8573]the next :.orning he and GARELER [CIA Chief of Station) went
[8574]in SBILIAN's car to check the telephore pole fer the signal
[8575]PENKOVSKLY was to leave us part of his signal that the drop
[8576]had been loaded. Two days before ABIDIAS went to Fushein
[8577]Street ke drove nis car to the apartment of Air Force Captain
[8578]DAVISGN; he again checked the telephone pole from & wisdow
[8579]in the apartzent and then valked by it on Poot. SOSENKO
[8580]identified GARULER Las aU.s. navel officer but not as 8 CIA
[8581]enployee (see above),
[8583]Asked why. in his opinion, ABILIAN went to Fushkin
[8584]Street at the tite he did, XCSENKO replied that in about
[8585]peu an Anerican ivuurist or delegation mexber had gone tu
[8586]this address. It was the "opinion of the Secure Cuief
[8587]Directorate” that thas American had selected the site as a@
[8588]dead drop lucetion, end that ASIDIAN wert tnere serely
[8589]to check the suitability of the site for this purpose. In
[8590]fact, ABIDIAN scut to Pushkin Street in respanee to what
[8592]appeared to be & prearrenged telephone Signal froa PENKOVSa«l=
[8594]signalling that we had lnaded the dead crup there. It has
[8595]been confirmed that FZNKOVSEKIY did not give this signal
[8597]and, Lecause of the circumstances and type of signal given, |
[8598]the possibility of coincidence 2a5s been ruled cut. CIA has
[8599]therefore concluded that the signal came from the «KGB.
[8601]The Pusnkin Street dead drop site was proposed by
[8602]PENKOVSKIY himself in the August 1960 Letter through which
[8603]he initially contacted CIA, There 18 110 record that a
[8604]“tourist or delegation neuber" visited this eddress, The
[8605]only known visit3 by Anericans to the building on Fusbkin
[8606]Street--the only ones having any connection with i¢s use
[8607]as a desd drop. locatica--occurred on 12 November and 4
[8608]Decenber 1960 when the CIA officer MAHONEY checked the
[8609]ecdress from cutside, and on 21 January 1261 vhen MAHONEY
[8610]entered the building asd dhecked the specific Iscation of
[8611]the dead drop. AAHONEY is known to have been identified
[8612]to the KGB as a CYA officer before arziving in “oscow ard
[8613]was tke target of heavy surveiliance throughout ris tour.
[8614](NOSEXKO did not know about MAHONEY or nis CIA status.)
[8616]2 ages 9
[8618]Deegan we: me
[8622]meter y
[8624]cere erence EMT cere nena s ane ee, a en RTH I RU NR TE mT ne ee
[8626]724.
[8628]NOSENKO’s cate of “Late B60 or carly 186U" 18 incorrect,
[8629]almost exactly by a year. XCSENXKO said he tucned ABIDIAN's
[8630]file over to GKYAANOV about 28 Veceader 1296), ABIDOIAN
[8631]cheeked the Fushkin Street dead drop en 20 Cecember 1961.
[8632]NOSEXAKAO hes described his gerticipatio:. in ai approach 10
[8633]the American touriet W.E, JOHNSON as happening ' ‘right after
[8634]returnirg to the Tourist Departgent in 1962." Becevee
[8635]XOSENKO's participation in thig cese vas confirned by SOUNSON.
[8636]and because the approach to JOHSSCN took place on 53 January
[8637]1262 (:e reported it to the U.S. Favassy at once), it car
[8638]be said with certainty that NSOSENKO's ertire story of his
[8639]own participation in the surveillence of the Pushkin Street
[8640]dead drop sitc is false. NCSENKO: (a) could not have
[8641]visited the dead drop site with KCZLOV (who in any event
[8642]was not in Moscow at the tise); (b)} could rot have placed
[8643]the original surveillance report in ABIDIAN's file,
[8644]which GRYAZXOV held as of 28 December 1961; (c)} could not
[8645]have received alaust daily reports from KOZLOV for about a
[8646]month and periodic reports thereafter; and (d) could not
[8647]have neglected to tell CIA of ABIDIAN's visit to the drdp
[8648]in 1962 on grounds that the surveillance of Pushkin Street
[8649]had been discontinued after three months without anything
[8650]suspicivis boirg noted. (NOSENKO was in Geneva on 15 March
[8651]1962, only two and a half months after ABIDIAN checked the
[8652]deed drop.)
[8654]NOSENKO has refused ty admit that he lied avout his
[8655]part in this incident. The page containing true contradic-
[8656]tions listed in the preceding paragraph was the only poge of
[8657]a “protocol” waich NOSENKO refused to sign during the hostile
[8658]interrogations of early 1965. In October 1950, snen he was
[8659]again asked whether he went to the Pu:hkin Street dead
[8660]drop site with KOZLOV, NOSENKO said that he could noi remea-
[8661]ber whether he had gone there at all.
[8664].
[8665]{-
[8666]f .
[8670]we QT
[8672]14-0000
[8674]. 725.
[8676]j- Responsibility ot Supervising Military Attache %perations
[8677]On 29 January 1965 NOSEXEKO told his interrogator that
[8679]for the first five or six months of 1960, immediatoly after _
[8681]transferring to tke U.S. Embassy Section and as part of his
[8682]responsibilities as its Deputy Chief, he supervised Second
[8683]Chief Directorate activities against American service at-
[8684]taches tn ¥oscow. Ey this.he meant, NOSEXKO said, that. when
[8685]GAVRILEXKO (the case officer for Air Force Attaches),
[8686]KURILENKO (Army Attaches), or BELOCLAZOV (Naval Attaches and
[8687]Marines) had any questions or reports to submit, they would
[8688]coze to him rather than to KOVSHUK, the Chief of the section,
[8689]After about six months he wag relieved of this duty because
[8690]his other duties did not allow sufficient time for this
[8691]function and because it was considered more suitable that
[8692]ALESHIN, recently assigned to the American Department as
[8693]Deputy Chief, be given this responsibility.
[8695]NOSENKO had previously been questioned in detail on
[8696]his resmesibilities in the U.S. Embassy Section, and had never
[8697]before mentioned this one. SOSENKO told CI. in June 1964
[8698]that when he reported for duty tn the U.S, Embassy Section
[8699]ip January 1960, DRANOVY was the responsible case officer for
[8700]the Naval Attaches and Marines. Soon after his own arrival,
[8701]NOSENKO said, DRANOV was transferred from the section and
[8702]his reeponsibilities were taken over by BELOGLAZOV, who had
[8703]earlier been as=i:tting DRANOV against these targets.
[8705]NOSENKO said on 20 October 1966 that immediately upon,
[8706]or at the latest a few weeks after, arriving in the U.S.
[8707]Embassy Section, he went on leave for a month. Either
[8708]immediately before or right after this leave KOVSHUK told
[8709]him that he would be responsible for activities against
[8710]the Naval Attaches, DHANOV was retiring and gave NOSENKO
[8711]the files on Naval and Warine personnel. This was NOSENKO's
[8712]first mention either of the leave period in early 1960 or
[8713]of having had case officer responsibilities for personnel
[8714]of the Naval Attache's office in sfoscow. (At the same time
[8715]1960)" that he had lied about going on leave in November
[8716]1960.
[8718]NOSENKO was reminded on 25 October 1966 that he had
[8719]said in 1965 that in 1960 he was supervisor of operations
[8720]against all U.S. service attache personnel. NOSENKO re-
[8721]plied: "I took the files only on the Navy, but I was working
[8722]on [supervising] all of thea.”
[8724]NOSENKO has never volunteered details of specific
[8725]operational activity he handled as the case officer for U.S.
[8726]Naval Attaches or supervisor of operations against all. .
[8727]attaches in early 1960. He said that Marine Colonel DULACKI's
[8728]contact with (or attempt recruit) the Indonesian KGB agent
[8729]which he has described in detail (see Page 488)
[8730]after he was relieved of these functions.
[8732]TOP SECRET
[8734]f
[8738]sete one Mite
[8740]Vi &
[8744]at 726.
[8747]peer
[8749]k. DY to Bulgaria and the LUNT Case
[8751]In the spring of 1961, NOSENKO said, four months after
[8752]returning from Cuba, he was told unexpectedly that in. about —:—.-
[8753]a week's time he would leave for Bulgaria to consult with :
[8754]the American Departuent of the Bulgarian MVR concerning
[8755]operations against the American Legation in Sofia (Pages
[8756]279-283). NOSENKO flew to Sofia in early April 1961, where
[8757]he was met by A.S. KOZLGV, an advisor there and a former
[8758]employee of the Second Chief Directorate whom NOSENKO had
[8759]known at KGB Headquarters. NOSENKO remained in Bulgaria
[8760]until about the niddle cf May. While there he discussed
[8761]both genera) matters and particular cases with the Bul- j
[8762]garians, gave several lectures on operations against Ameri- }
[8763]Can installations and personnel as well as against tourists, -
[8764]and finally directed the successful honosexual operation
[8765]against the American Professor LUST. .
[8769]Aside from being told that he would be advising the
[8770]Bulgarian service cn operations against Americans at the . ;
[8771]Legation in Sofia, NOSENKO apparently received no preparae ae
[8772]tion for this trip. He said in answer to specific questions \
[8773]that nobody told him what he was sunposed to discuss with:
[8774]the Bulgarians, that he did not meet with the Bulgarian
[8775]liaison representatives in Moscow before leaving, and that
[8776]he knew nothing of the organization, personnel, area of
[8777]responsibility, or problems of the American Department of
[8778]the Bulgarian service before arriving in Sofia.
[8780]NOSENKO was selected for this mission despite the fact
[8781]that he was extremely busy with his duties in the U.S. Embassy
[8782]Sectien (see above discussion of his responsibilities for
[8784]code clerks, ABIDIAN, and the military attaches) and despite
[8786]the fact that KOZLOV was permanently assigned as an advisor
[8787]in Sofia. NOSENKO described KOZLOV in another context as a
[8788]“"yery experienced officer” and has said that KOZLOV was. Chief
[8789]of the American Departeent until 1953 and then from June 1955
[8790]until sometime in 1958 was Deputy Chief of the Tourist De-
[8791]partment, Second Chief Directorate. (KOZLOV, assisted by .
[8792]KOSENKO, had recruited BUPRGI in June 1956.) Asked why KOZLOV
[8793]could not have advised the Bulgarians, NOSENKO said that he
[8794]was too busy advising on higher levels and had been away
[8796]from active operations in Moscow too long. .
[8800]NOSENKO gave only a general description of his duties
[8801]as an advisor on operations against the American Legation.
[8802]On the other hand,:he accidentally became involved in a hono- .
[8803]sexual entrapment operation against an American tourist who
[8804]was visiting Bulgaria, and he has described this operation
[8805]in considerable detail. (NOSENKO's previous speciality was
[8806]tourist operations, particularly those involving homosexual
[8807]compromise.)
[8809]NOSENKO's story about his role in the LUNT case changed
[8810]greatly between 1962 and 1964, During the first meeting ~
[8811]series he’ described in detail how he set the operation up .
[8812]and what he said to LUST when he personally confronted the
[8813]American with the evidence. Since defecting in 1964, how-
[8814]ever, NOSENKO has said that he took no personal part in the
[8815]approach itself, that he remained in his office, and that he
[8816]merely advised how to set it up. (A comparison of his account
[8817]and that of LUNT indicates that he was not on the scene at
[8818]the time.)
[8820]cramming ardent
[8822]14-0000
[8824]dee cc ee ee a en a ee ane NE
[8828]wb
[8830]727.
[8832]“ KOSENKO said that the Bulgarian service tecsne a: are
[8833]of LUNT's honosexual tendencies only after he ¢aw LUNT's)
[8835]name or heatiit mentioned; he recognized the name as that..of
[8837]a professor. who had been assessed as a homosexual when
[8840]carlier visiting Moscow, and traces with the KGR Second Chicf
[8841]Directorate conritmed that this was the same man. In state-
[8842]ments rade to U.S. authorities after the approach, LUNT said
[8843]he had had horosexual relaticns at least five difrerent times
[8845]with a Bulgarian during an earlier trip to Sofia. LUNT
[8846]gave this Rulgarian travellers’ checks, which the latter
[8847]planned to sell cn the biacknarket, was on one occasion
[8848]stopped on the sireet with nin by a Sulyxarian civil pelice-
[8849]man, and corresponded with him in the interim between his
[8851]first visit and the one during which the arproach tock place.
[8852]LUNT had written the BuJgsrian hemosexual that he was retyrning
[8854]to Sofia tefore arriviny on the second occasion.
[8856]NGSENKO said that’ in October 1960 he was zssicned to
[8857]accompany a delegation of autonctive speciaiists cn a visit
[8858]to the United States but thit when this trin was ceccelled,
[8859]he went on FLY to Cuba (Jages 274-278). After he had com-
[8860]pleted arrangements for his passport and had submitted his
[8861]true name to the U.S. Embassy for a visa, the Soviets were
[8862]informed by U.S. authorities that the delegation could not
[8863]then be accepted in the United States. At about the same
[8864]time, a delegation of nickel industry experts was being
[8866]readied for departure to Cuba. At first, NOSEN"G explained,
[8868]it was not considered necessary for a security officer to
[8869]accompany this delegation to a friendly country, tut ar the
[8871]last roment, two days before the delewation was scheduled to
[8873]leave Moscow, the Central Committee of the Comsunist Party
[8874]demanded that such an officer go along. Because there was
[8875]no time to do otherwise, NOSENKO was chosen for this job
[8877]since he already had a valid passport and authorization. to
[8878]travel abroad. Visa arrangements were made for the transit
[8880]countrics and NOSENKO left with the delegation, returning to
[8882]Moscow in mid- or late December 1960.
[8884]NOSENKO's U.S. visa request submitted to the U.S. Em-
[8886]bassy in Moscow on 29 October 1960 was his first use of this
[8888]name in connection with travel aoroad. (He travelled to
[8890]England in 1987 and 1958 as NIKOLAYEV, NOSENKO said. because
[8892]he had used this name with Eritish citizens ®
[8894]in the Soviet Union; a5 ‘aa Suspected ot 0
[8895]ligence officer, NOSENKO was exposed under this identity.
[8896]He applied for U.S. entry: under true name, however, cGespite
[8897]the fact that he had also used the NIXOLAYEV naxe with
[8898]Americans; one of them was FRIPPEL who, according to the
[8900]CHEREPANOV papers and one other source, was suspected by the
[8902]KGB to be an American intelligence agent. NCSENKO further
[8903]explained that he could not use the name NIKOLAYEV because
[8904]the automotive delegation cover he planned to use in the
[8905]United States conflicted with the sports/cultural cover he
[8906]had used in Great Britain, and the KGB feared that this.
[8907]would be ncticed «hen the American and British services ex-
[8909]changed notes. The proposed automotive cover, however, con-
[8911]flicts in the same way with the Ministry of Foreizn Affairs
[8913]cover NOSENKO used, again under true nane, in Geneva in 1962.
[8915]TOP SECRET
[8917]ee a TT ee =
[8919]eing an intel-
[8922]14-0000
[8924]ee rn
[8926]TOP SECRET
[8928]728.
[8930]NOSEXKO said that the decision to send him to Cuba
[8931]was made two days before the delegation left Moscow because
[8932]a security officer was required ard he happened to have a8
[8933]passport and authorization to travel. ~The delegation left-—-
[8934]Moscuw on 15 November 1960, acd therefore ‘this cecision
[8935]was reached on 13 November or thereabouts. NOSEXKO, who
[8936]had been transferred to the U.S. Enbassy. Section in order
[8937]to supervise and revitalize operations against code clerks,
[8938]the Section's most important recruitment target, consequently
[8939]left Moscow on the day that HORONE also departed by train
[8940]for Warsaw and at a time that his subordizate KOSOLAPOY was
[8941]in Helsinki (12-16 Novenber 1960), apparently in connection
[8943]_ with an operation against John GARLAND.
[8945]NOSENKO has given widely divergent accounts of the
[8946]purpose of his assignment to Cuba. In 1962 he related in
[8947]detail how he had been sent to investigate how the Cuban—
[8948]intelligence service was operating against Americans sta=-
[8949]tioned in Havana, particularly intelligence officers. and
[8950]described what he did to fulfill this mission. Since 1964,
[8951]however, NOSEIKO has claimed merely to have been the security
[8952]officer with the delegation.
[8954]TOP SECRET
[8956]fie eee
[8958]14-0000
[8960]Ed
[8962]ae oe
[8965]729.
[8967]1. Personal Handiirg of Agents
[8969]When NOSENKO transterred from the Tourist Department
[8970]to the American Departneat, he took along a number of the
[8971]agents he had used in tourist operations witb tim: YEFREWOV
[8972]and VOLKOV, FRIPPEL, DMITRIYEV,. and RYTOVA.. Durirg this
[8973]period he also handled LEVINA, @ Librerian and language
[8974]teacher at the U.S, Enbassy who was turned over to him by
[8976]“YS. Embassy Section case officer WASSYA in 1960; and
[8978]PREISFRELND and degree who were used in code clerk opera-
[8979]tions. These agents and NOSENKO's handling of them are dis-
[8980]cussed below.
[8982](i) YEFREOV and VOLKOV |
[8984]NOSENKO continued to mect with these to homosexual
[8985]sgents during his two years as Deputy Chief of tte section.
[8986]He did not use ther in any way, however, according to his
[8987]geecount. The ocly contact of the tzo known to CIA was B
[8988]mocting in 1961 with BARRETT. In 1999, while in Moscow and
[8989]a Cl2 agent, BARRETT was compremised vy YEFRE!MOV and VOLKOY:
[8990]in 1961, srortly after an upparently chance neering with
[8991]then, BARRETT ves recruited by the KGZ on the basis of the
[8992]materials obtained in 1959, NOSENDO deserited the compro-
[8993]sise cf BARRETT in 1959 and knew that he had been recruited
[8994]in 1961. He did not know of BARRETT's contacts Fith YEFRE-
[8995]WOV and YOLKOV in 1961.
[8997](11) FRIPPEL
[8999]XOSENKO said he continued to handle FRIPFEL during the
[9000]19Gu-1961. period, despite the fact that he sever provided
[9001]anything of value, because he and CHELNOKOV (the Chief of
[9002]the Tourist Department who was always present at these
[9003]meetings) “kept hoping he would give something.” FRIPPEL
[9004]left the Sovict Union in January 1961, but NOSENKO continued
[9005]to be registered as his case officer.
[9007](iii) DMITRIYEV
[9009]DWITRIYEV, 8 specialist on Japan and Thailand who
[9010]spoke Japanese and English, had teen NOSENKO's agent during
[9011]the 1955-1960 period. DUITRIYEV was then eaployed by the
[9012]Japanese Exhibition in Moscow, and NOSENKO did not indicate
[9013]how he was used in tourist operatious. NOSENXO did not
[9014]describe any operational use of hin in 1960 or 1961.
[9016](iv) aAYTOVA
[9018]RYTOVA was NOSENKO's agent in the Tourist Depsrtnent
[9019]after 1956 or 1957, at which tize she was employed at the
[9020]Russian Permancnt Exhibit in Moscow. An English speaker,
[9021]she reported any interesting information concerning visitors
[9022]to the exhibition. NOSENKO has not referred to any KGB opere-
[9023]tions in Moscow in which she participated during his service
[9024]there.
[9026](v) LEVINA
[9027]LEVIXA worked as a language teacher and librarian at
[9029]the American Enbassy and NOSENKO handled her because she
[9030]had a number of code clerks in her language classes. He
[9032]TOP SECRET
[9034]Peete Bet
[9036]J4-29000
[9038]730.
[9040]eet vith PEVINA @ cusher of times, but she never reportcd
[9041]anything interesting ard ves never uned directly in opere-
[9043]tions involving tie Anericans. ‘She 28 fired froa the ;
[9044]Enbassy ut the end of 1960 or early 1951.
[9046](vi) Jochen PREISFREUND
[9048]As described in Pages 173-1481 and discussed above,
[9049]PREISFREUND was, NOSENKO said, recruited by KOVSHUK in 19860
[9050]ard was bandied b¥ NCSENKO in the operation against Janes
[9051]STORSBERG. Coth NOSENKO and PREISFREUND said thrt this vas
[9052]the only operation in which he took part. NOSENKO suggested '
[9053]to CIA that PREISFREUND would be able to attest to his . as
[9054]description of this case, and CIA interviewed PREISFREUND .
[9055]in Helsinki. and Stockhola during the sunmer of 1965. PREIS- =. -
[9056]FREUND's account generally agreed with SOSENKO's ond he was CC
[9057]able to supply a considerable amount of personeiity and
[9058]background information concerning his former case officer.
[9059]From PREISFREUND's menner during these interviers, the nature
[9060]of his responses and statements, and his actions after the
[9061]interviews were completed, there was ho reesonshle doubt
[9062]that ho remaincd under KGB control while meeting the CIA
[9063]representatives.
[9065](vii)
[9067](KGB cryptonyn "“SARDAR") was recruited by NOSEN=
[9068]KO in 196l. A Syrian Beye Wai in Moscow, @7ais4
[9069]was first targetted against waerice House in Geacral, but
[9070]was chen used only in the development operation against
[9071]ZUIUS, the successor to James STGHKSLERG as nilitery code
[9072]> clerk in Moscow, @2@Eamet and developed ZUJUS, but nothing
[9073]had come of the operetion at the tine NOSZNKO transferred
[9074]fron the American Department. No other use was made of this
[9075]agent and there was ho approach to ZUJUS. NOSENKO first
[9076]sugeested that CIA actempt a “false flag’ recruitcent of
[9077]sing his (NOSENKO'§) name for thés purpose; he pro -
[9078]vided CIA with QRamgearte ogee min Danascus 50 that
[9079]contact could be established, Jater NOSENKO said that
[9080]: like PREISFREUND, could verify NOSENKO'S position as his
[9081]; handler in the ZUJUS operation (Pages 209-212). CIA inter-
[9082]: viewed ZUJUS, who vaguely recalled having ret QE ick
[9083]i recall his name and denied that his relationship ¥
[9084]was as close as NOSENKO reported. sO
[9088]ste we
[9090]TOP SECRET
[9092]vw ater oe nn EE cere eee rete
[9095]14-0000
[9097]A eae RENN eee ee: en te ie rie
[9099]731. .
[9101]a. -Transfer to the Tourist Department
[9103]Some time in the fall of 1961, NOSENKO said, he heard
[9104]of GRIBANOV's decision to promote himto the position of
[9106]Deputy Chief of the eatire Amcrican-Department. NOSENKO, —-. -
[9108]however, knew that his chief and friend KOVSHU* wanted the
[9109]job. and that FEDOSEYEV (Chief of the Department) also favored
[9110]KOVSHUK for this position. Realizing that his own appoint-
[9111]ment would therefore place him in a difficult position and
[9112]wishing to avoid this, NOSENKO spoke to the Chief of the
[9113]Tourist Department, CHELNOKOV, about returnirg there. At
[9114]CHELNOKOV's suggestion, NOSENKO went to GRIBANOV with the
[9115]request to be returned to the Tourist Department as Chief |
[9116]of the American Tourist Section, with the understanding that
[9117]he woulaé be made Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department
[9119]upon the retirement of the incumbent. BALDIN, in July 1962.
[9120]To this GRIBANOV agreed. NOSENKO said that GRIBANOV did
[9122]- not discuss with himhis reasons for wanting to appoint hin
[9124]Deputy Chief of the American Department or for appointing
[9125]him Chief of the American Tourist Section, nor did he discuss
[9126]with NOSENFKO his personal requirements for these positions.
[9127]On one occasion, in early 1965, NOSENKO said that it was
[9128]because GRIBANOV "thought I was a tough guy, a good case
[9129]officer. In 1959 I saw him often and was involved ir a lot.
[9130]of questiors which were reported to him." According to
[9132]his most recent version, NOSENKO was officially transferred
[9133]from the American Départment at the end of December 1951
[9134]and reported for duty in the Tourist Department on about
[9136]3 January 1962. .
[9138]KOVSHUK, who was also a candidate for the job as Reputy
[9139]Chief of the American Department, had earlier held this po-
[9140]sition, according to NOSENKO and GOLITSYN. He had been per-
[9141]sonally involved in many of the nore significant American
[9142]Department operations during the previous decade. These in-
[9143]cluded the recruitments of RIODES and SMITH (the latter one
[9144]of NOSENKO's most inportant leads, according to KOSENKO) ;
[9145]the handling of ‘SHAPIRO; the attempts to recruit. STORSBERG, .
[9147]STONE, and MANNHEIM; the development of the CIA officer
[9148]WINT:
[9149]“the
[9151]ERS;] acd the interrogation of LANGELLE in connection with
[9153]“POPOV arrest.
[9155]By contrast, GRIBANOV's original candidate forethe job,
[9156]NOSENKO, was present when KOZLOY recruited BUPGI;and himself
[9157]recruited EARRIS)and five homosexual tourists who visited
[9158]the Soviet Union in 1959: Furthermore, NOSENKO's perfor-
[9159]mance as Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section. as he
[9160]admitted under interrogation, was “not good."
[9162]; NOSENKO has given many contradictory dates for his
[9163]transfer to the Tourist Department. In 1962 NOSENKO said
[9165]at various times that this took place in January 1962 and
[9167]in February 1962: in 1964 he timed the transfer as falling
[9168]some time between 15 and 20 January 1962; and in February
[9169]1965 he arrived at the date of 2 or 3 January 1962, after
[9170]it was pointed out that he appeared in the approach to W.E.
[9171]JOHNSON on 5 January: (On this basis, he said that the
[9172]official order was issued about 25 December 1961 and that
[9173]he turned over his files to his successor GRYAZNOV several
[9174]days later.) NOSENKO contradicted this latter estimate.
[9175]however, by saying that he was in the U.S. Embassy Section
[9176]for the entire period of the three-month surveillance of
[9178]102 SECRET -
[9182]cane tee aan
[9184]14-0000
[9186]peeriee
[9188]o
[9190]732.
[9192]the Pushkin Street dead drop, i-e., until late March 1962,
[9193]and by his insistence that he had returned to the Tourist
[9194]Department by the time GOLITSYN defected; ho placed this on |
[9195]15 January 1962 and refused to belleve the correct date of
[9196]15 December 1961. .
[9198]p. Remarks
[9200]For no single responsibility has NOSENKO gubstantiated
[9201]his alleged service as Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy
[9202]Section in the vears 1960-1961. His statements about the
[9203]appointment to and transfer from this position have been
[9204]inconsistent; his comparatively narrow experience and his
[9205]acknowledged falsehoods about a personal relationship with
[9206]the Chief of the KGE Second Chief Directorate, GRIBANOV,
[9207]dispel the likelihcod that these personnel assignoents were
[9208]made in the way he claims. Repeatedly he has becn contra-
[9209]dictory about his activities during this two-year period,
[9210]shifting his story to suit the occasion and ignoring how
[9211]each succeeding version made all of his claizs increasingly
[9212]incredible. The Limited extent of NOSENKO's information
[9213]betrays a lack of familiarity with details on the duties,
[9214]targets, and most of the cperations which he has ascribed
[9215]to hinself; in a certain few instances, however, such as
[9216]his description of ABIDIAN‘s route to the Pushkin Street dead
[9217]drop, he has recounted events just as they are known from
[9218]other sources to have occurred. Nevertheless, where col-
[9219]lateral information has covered the few subjects on which
[9220]he provided details, it has almost invarlably contradicted
[9221]him and showed hin to be ignorant of significant facts.
[9223]The reporting by NOSENKO thus was so superficial, so in-
[9224]conplsute, and so demonstrably erroneous as to suggest_without_
[9225]. reservation that he never eerved as an. officer. in the_U.S._.
[9227]Embassy Séction, much less a3_its Deputy.Chief.. All avail-
[9228]‘able evidence, excluding that from certain Soviets who were
[9229]CIA and Fal sources (see Parts VIII.H. and VII,1. below),
[9231]combines to formulate this conclusion.
[9233]a
[9237]99 SECRET.
[9239]er
[9241]cecmenmmeeree es eer ees seman om Le en ee
[9243]Rann
[9245]100000
[9247]F :
[9248]% 733.
[9249]& 7. Tourist Department (1962-1964)
[9250]Fe :
[9251]ba a. Introducticn t
[9252]: NOSLNKO ajreed during the interrogations at the beginning
[9253]of 1965 that he must have reported for duty as Chief of the -
[9254]; - American Tourist Section on about 3 January 1962.* In this t
[9255]‘ job he was responsible for pianning and supervising KGB acti-
[9256]& vities against all tourists of American, British, and Canadian
[9259]nationalities arriving in the USSR, and his duties also encom-
[9260]passed preparations for the coming tourist season (Pages 225-
[9261]287).
[9263]evens
[9265]In July 1962, in conformity with GRIDANUV's intentions,
[9266]NOSENKO was promoted to the position of Deputy Chief of the
[9267]entire Tourist Department; it had a table of organization of
[9268]close to 100 staff officers, was responsible for handling opeta~
[9269]tions against all tourists to the Soviet Union, and maintzined
[9270]the facilities used in these operations. A year later NOSENKO
[9271]received the title of First Deputy Chief of the Departnert, a
[9272]“paper” promoticn as there was no other deputy. During this
[9273]pericd in the Tourist Department, in addition to his supervi-
[9274]sory duties (concerning which he has not been questioned in
[9275]detail), NOSENKO took personal part in approaches to several
[9276]tourists, organized and directed the arrest of an American
[9277]tourist on homosexual charges, and met with a number of agents.
[9278]It was his senior supervisory position that involved him in two '
[9279]of the most widely publicized cases of this pericd, the arrest
[9280]of BARGHOORN. and the case of OSWALD.
[9284]CF
[9286]b. Absences from Moscow:
[9288]During his two years in the Tourist Department, NOSENKO
[9289]was available to perform his assigned duties only part of the
[9290]time. -After arriving in the American Tourist Section and after
[9291]‘the approach to JOHNSON on 5 January 1562, NOSENKO spent sev-
[9292]eral weeks “getting the feel" of things by talking to case offi-
[9293]cers, reviewing reports of the section's activities during the
[9294]previous tvo years, and discussing plans for the up-coming tour-
[9295]ist season. In mid-February he began preparations for his assign-
[9297]enn er
[9299]: ment to Geneva with the Disarmament Delegation. NOSENKO has wt ee
[9301]| said that this involved discussions with the Eleventh Depart- —_ .
[9303]i ment of the Second Chief Directorate, responsible for arranging “ST 7 ;
[9304]for security coverage of Soviet delegations going abroad, as i &
[9306]well as with the case officers responsible for the investigation a
[9307]of suspected American agent SIIAKHOV. NOSENKO said that he did~ i
[9309]this on a part-time basis in addition to his regular duties,
[9311]but has noted in another context that these preparations required
[9312]sufficient time to make it impossible for him to take a personal '
[9314]part in the recruitment of BIENSTOCK in February 1962. On
[9316]15 March 1962, NOSENKO arrived in Geneva, remaining there with
[9317]the delegation until 15 June, when he left Geneva by train to
[9318]return to Moscow to reassume his duties as Chief of Section.
[9320](He said that he had no deputy chief in this position, and it
[9322]is unclear who performed these functions in his absence.) Thus,
[9323]according to NGSENKO's account, of the six months he was Chief
[9325]*—This date was settled upon after he acknowledged that his
[9326]approach to the American tourist W.E. JOHNSON must have
[9327]occurred on 5 January, as CIA records show.
[9329]1 eR a 2 terror
[9331]2 ete a ee re
[9333]BU UST
[9335]aon |
[9337]14-0000
[9339]744.
[9341],
[9345]of the American Tourist Section, he was in Monstow only three |
[9346]months and for much of this time was involved in breaking in
[9347]on his new job or in preparing for his temporury assignment ;
[9348]Chrocds NOSEUKO said ne hed “no accomplishments” in this | F
[9349]period. a : H
[9351]j
[9352]|
[9354]In the fall of 1962, NOSENKO went on leave for a inonth in|
[9355]Sochi with his wife end mother. fOSENKO has estimated that 31x
[9356]months of 1963 were spent cn various temporary assignments in
[9357]the Soviet Union outside cf Moscow, plus a one-month's vacation
[9358]in 153. From 15 June 1962 to ns arrival in Geneva on 19 Janu-
[9359]ary 1964, a period of 18 months, GSENKO was aksent from KGS
[9360]Hezdquarters for eight months. Tres in the period 1962-63,
[9361]holding supervisory pysitions, NOSEIKO was absent or "reading
[9362]in" for about 13 months, cr akout SO percent of the time.
[9364]ce. Personal _Participal.ioz in Cperaczons
[9365]HOSENXO had dairect operational corzact with three Americans
[9366]during 1962 and i963. Two of these (the approach to JOHNSCN
[9367]and the interrogation o: haRshHOOHs) were unusual in that they
[9368]were provocations without any attempt to recruit the target;
[9369]NOSEVKO could nane no cther examples of. such operations, In
[9370]poth cases, the victim of the provccation has verified NOSENKO's
[9371]presence. The third cate, the recruitment approach to BRAUNS,
[9372]was unsuccessful. Additionally, NOSENKO supervised the homo-
[9373]sexual compromise of KCTEN, who was closely tied in with atom
[9374]is % sensitive source and related.
[9376](1) The W.E. JCHNSON Prevovaticon
[9378]JOHNSON (Pages 289-293), NOSENKO said, was in Moscow as
[9379]a tourist in early January 1962. ard was considered for recruit-
[9380]ment, but a cecision was made thet he was net worth the effort
[9381]as he had no access to Classified aateriats and lived too far \
[9383]; from the KGB Legal Residencies in #ashington and New York City. i
[9385](JCHNSON's home was in Texas.) Severai days after this deci-
[9387]: sion was made, postal intercepts showed tnat JCHNSON was writing
[9388]abusive letters concerning tne Soviet Union. They were "so
[9389]bitter" and critical that the KGi decided that something had
[9390]to be done to stop him. At about the sane time the KGB received i
[9391]an indication that JOHNZON was a roemosexual, and it was decided gee
[9392]to entrap him on this basis and force him to promise not to :
[9394]i write any more letters or criticize the USSR in articles when foe
[9396]; he returned to the United States. The compromise was effected
[9398]by use of NOSENK9O'Ss homosexual agents, and NCSENKO was able to ;
[9400]i
[9402]describe the confrortation scene, his second meeting with JOHN-—°
[9403]SON; and JOKNSON's frigntened telephone call to the u.S. Enkassy
[9404]reporting that NOSENKO had recontacted hin.
[9406]NOSENKO told CIA in June 1962 that he had taken part in
[9407]this operation “in January.” When he contacted CIA in Geneva
[9408]: in 1964 he had a scrap of paper on which was noted JOHNSON's _
[9409]i name and the date “5 January 1962." This was the actual date
[9410]: of the approach, but NOSENKO insisted that the date bore no
[9411]relationship to the name, and that the approach to JOHNSON took
[9413]cee a ae we meagiowe +
[9415]seme nearer as
[9417]freon
[9419]TOP SECRET
[9422]44-00000
[9424]Ae PARARS € ah nag tien ae
[9426]ea ge ea Se
[9432]SSIES
[9434]I.
[9436]735.
[9438]place in the summer of 1962, a fact he recalled distinctly be-
[9439]cauge he wore no overcoat. It was only when confronted with
[9440]official U.S. records that NOSENKO agreed in early 1965 that
[9441]the apprcach was in January and recalled that it was made
[9442]immediately after NOSENKO returned to the Tourist Department. *
[9444]NOSENKO said that when JOHNSON first arrived in Moscow
[9445]there was consideration of recruiting him, but that there was
[9446]a decision against this as he was of little intelligence value.
[9447]Phen JOHNSON mailed insulting letters which were picked up
[9448]through postal intecept. “About the same time there were indi~
[9449]cationg of homosexuality. Then the operation was mounted
[9451]‘against him. This implies a very tight time schedule. JOHNSON
[9453]arrived in Moscow on 3) December 196); NOSENKO said he reported
[9454]for duty as Section Chief on 3 January 1962; JOHNSON reported
[9455]his first contact with NOSENKO'’s homosexual agent VOLKOV the
[9456]evening of 4 January; and the approach by NOSENKO was on 5 Janu-
[9460]Although NOSENKO impl$ed in 1962 that his homosexual agents
[9461]VOLKOV and YEFREMOV: were the ones who originally determined
[9463]JouNson "S| homosexuality, he said in 1964 only that there were
[9464]“"gigns.”
[9466]NOSENKO did not know what these indications were or
[9467]where they came fron. JOHNSON reported that he firet met the
[9468]agent VOLKOV on the evening of 4 January when the latter sat
[9469]down at his restaurant table; on this same occasion VOLKOV in-
[9470]vited JOHNSON to his hotel room the next day. The fact that
[9471]VOLKOV joined JOHNSON uninvited anc set him up for the approach
[9472]without leaving the table suggests that there had, in fact,
[9473]been signs of his homosexuality beforenand and that operational
[9475]plans had been laid by this time.
[9477]NOSENKO has described the caution taken in other homosexual
[9478]entrapment cases and has named several which were called off
[9479]because of a risk of scandal. It is, therefore, unusual that
[9480]the KGB would take this risk merely to force JOHNSON, an
[9482]American and a Baptist minister, to stop writing insulting let-
[9484]ters and articles.
[9486]NOSENKO did not know why he became involved in this opera-
[9488]- tion the’day after he reported for duty in the senior position
[9490]of Section Chief. He said only that BOBKOV, a Deputy Chief of
[9491]the Skcond Chief Directorate, told him to do it. During his
[9492]talks with JOHNSON, NOSENKO introduced himself to JOHNSON as
[9493]*“Georgiy Ivanovich NIKOLAYEV,"” (rendered by JOHNSON as NIKOLOV)
[9495]the "Chief of Police."
[9496]({i}) ‘The BARGHOORN Provocation-Arrest
[9498]. The arrest of Professor BARGHOORN (Pages 304-309) took
[9499]place at the end of October 1963, at the time NOSENKO said he
[9500]was First Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department. NOSENKO has
[9502]Slow NOSENKO'’S self-stated and confirmed participation in a
[9503]Tourist Department operation on 5 January 1962 carries
[9504]lications for his account of ABIDIAN's visit to the
[9506]_ PENKOVSKIY dead drop is Giscussed above.
[9508]f
[9510]H
[9514]14.90000
[9516]Be eee teem feet meres
[9518]736. info from sensitive scarce
[9520]described in cetail the selection of BA2SHOGPN as & hestege for
[9521]IVANOV (the KGB officer arrested chortiy before in New York
[9522]City as a result of @ BS bor ha: Pei et } the planning
[9523]of the provocation, Oct & Seo be ing BAIGHDORN
[9524]which were not related to the provocation, BANGHOORN's arrest
[9525]in Moscow, and the early stag?s of his interrogetion, Except
[9526]for sone variaticn in datcs, MOSENKO'& accounta of BARGHOD2I's
[9527]movements and of;the sequence of events in the provocation~
[9528]arrest matched that of BARGIHOOPR!. This case is in two ways
[9529]gimilar to the approach to W.E. JOUNSON: It was an operation
[9530]in which there wag_no thought of recruitment, and BARGHCOM was
[9532]able to identify NOSENKO as a perticipant.
[9534]BARGHOORN reported that the day after his arrest he was
[9535]questioned by the same officer who had interrogated him the
[9536]evening before abcut the "compromising materials" which had
[9537]been planted on hin. With this officer on this one occasion
[9538]was his “chief,” whom PARGHOORN subsequently identified by photo-
[9539]graph as NOSENKO. HOSE:NKO has said that he was tolduby the
[9540]Chief of the Tourist Department that GRIBANOV wanted him (NOSENKO)
[9541]present in the interrogation room it the time when BARGHOOPN
[9542]admitted that he had the. conpromising information in his posses~
[9543]pion at the time cf arrest. NOSENKO did not knew why his pir-
[9544]ticular presence was needed or desired, tut he complied deszite
[9545]the fact that he did not want to reveal hig face to BARGHOOPN
[9546]as he kncw BARGHOORN would be released. NOSENKO said that he
[9547]stayed in the interrogation room only until the interrogating
[9548]officer secured this admission ana then he left. BARGHOORY
[9549]has reported that NOSENKO attended one of the interrogatica
[9551]sessions, that th:s session covered only biogrepnic and bacxground
[9553]matters, and that the cempromising documents ard his possession
[9554]of them had been discussed the previous evenirg, right after his
[9555]arrest.
[9557]In deseribing the planning of this provecaticn, NOSENKO
[9558]told CIA that the suggestion to provide SARGHOOEN came fren
[9559]GRIBANOV, who took the idea of arresting BARGHOORN to KGB Chair-
[9560]man SEMICHASTNYY, Dut did not divulge to him thet it would be.
[9561]based on provocation. Shis was on the day before the arrest.
[9562]SEMICHASTNYY agreed with the idea of the arrest ard secured
[9563]permission to carry it out from BREZHNEV, as KHRUSHCHEV was
[9564]out of Moscow at the time. Reliable scurces show, however,
[9565]that KHRUSKCHEV was in Mcscow on 30 October, the day when SEMI-~-
[9566]CHASTNYY allegedly called BREZHNEV, and was also there on 31
[9567]October, the day cf the arrest. BREZHNEV was not seen by
[9568]Westerners in Moscow from 29 October until 2 November 1963.
[9570]iii) The Approach to BRAUNS
[9572]NOSENKO said he personally approached the American tour-
[9573]ist BRAUNS (Pages 293-295) shortly after returning to Moscow
[9574]from Geneva in 1962. BRAUNS had lived in Leningrad until World
[9575]War II, had left with the fleeing Germans, and had eventually
[9576]settled in the United States, where he was 4 technician working
[9577]at an “interesting company making computers, adding machines,
[9578]or other instruments.” NOSENKO had originally instructed his
[9580]TOP SECRET
[9584]wet etiee tet en rT
[9586]dinepee see ene ape
[9588]one ee get ste
[9590]14-0000
[9592]subordinate KRUPNOV to handle the case, but KPRUPNOV was not able » :
[9593]to get anywhere with BRAUNS and in the middle of the approach : :
[9594]called NOSENKO fcr help. NOSEUKD went to the Mcscow Hotel where
[9595]KRUPNOV and BRAUNS were talking, and he eventually secured:
[9596]ERAUNS! agreement to cccuperate, against threat of imprison:cent
[9597]for treason on the basis of his wartime flight from the Soviet
[9598]Union. BRAUNS left Moscow the next day for Leningrad, and be-
[9599]: cause NOSENKO felt the recruitment was “shaky,” KRUPNOV was |
[9600]pent after him to consolidate the agreement. BPAUNS refused
[9601]- to gee KRUPNOV however, 80 again KOSENKO went to help him. It
[9602]was clear to NOSENKO, however, that BRAUNS was 8¢ frightened
[9603]that he would never work for the KGB; NOSCNKO thereupon decided
[9604]to terminate the case, and BRAUMS wad sent on his way. r-
[9606]NOSENKO could not recall his position at the time he approached ‘
[9607]BRAUNS, he did not know why SRAUNS had visited th. Soviet Unics, i
[9608]and he was unable to name any Soviet citizesrs with whom BrAUNS :
[9609]came into contact while in the USSR. BRAUNS, in fact,.had spent
[9610]almost a week in Moscow before the approacu was mace... During
[9611]thie time’he spent his days with an Inturist tour ard his even-
[9612]ings with an old girlfriend he had knows Cefore the war. She
[9613]had been writing to BRAUNS in the United States for about a year,
[9614]telling him of her unhappy marriage an@ itpendiry divorce.
[9616]ERAUNS had written her cf his intenzion to visit the USSR, and
[9617]che travelled specially from her hene in tenincrad to Moscow to
[9618]spend this time with hin.
[9620]According to the account given by BRAUNS, the man (NOSENKO,
[9621]acceréing to NOSENKO) who jeined him and his original interre=-
[9622]gator in Moscow was the person who first epproached him in Lenin-
[9623]grad. This suggests, i£ correct, that it was NOSENKO who was
[9624]sent there to consolidate the recruitment, not KRUPHOY. BRAUNS’
[9625]wag unable to-identify NOScNKO's photograpn but explained that
[9626]he was so frightened that he probably cculd not recognize any-
[9627]one involved. Other aspects of his story therefore may be ccn-
[9628]fused.
[9630](iv) The Arrest of KOTEN
[9632]NOSENXO said he supervised the horosexual provecation anc
[9633]arrest of American tour guide KOTEN in 1963 and the develop-
[9635]‘e ments in the case were reported to him (Pages 292-303); he was .
[9636]not in face-te-face contact with KOTEN. NOSENKO explained that
[9637]KOTEN, a member or the CPUSA, had freguently visited the USSR
[9638]since the war, hed numerous suspicicus centacts there, and was °
[9639]considered possibly to be a “plant” (presumably of the FBI) ir :
[9641]he Copmunist Party. Prior to his arrival in-1963, @RERG ae i
[9643]: egal Residency reported thay KOTEN was in contac. ,
[9645]with an c=portant eesent in 3 that he was carrying
[9647]the addcess of relatives of this agent with Limon bis trip,
[9649]and that he intended to visit them. On this basis, it was
[9651]eonsidered that he might have the mission ef invescigatina LE
[9653]the (<9 the USS2. GF Ay PEPE SER be Ee De
[9655]15 rap’ Oe eee oes Da ak aE
[9656]SPATE AS it was suspectea iron e2ra.er trips that KOTEN
[9657]was a homosexual, the KGB planned to conpromise his, arrest oe
[9658]him, break him, and provide time for the GEE agent to make his “ o¥
[9660]escape from the United States. KOTEN was arrested, but the G#B
[9662]Se Conn
[9664]4
[9665]f
[9666]d
[9667]i
[9668]|
[9670]q
[9671]A
[9672]z
[9673]P)
[9674]2
[9676]i
[9677]H
[9679]3
[9680]t
[9682]a ene annem er SOs
[9683].
[9685]TOP SECRET : :
[9689]14-0000
[9693]TRC ASE IG APA a A pw PE Rdg Pe eee
[9695]Bae Dene
[9697]Lg TROT ya
[9699]s
[9701]mre ae a a nS IN, et eee
[9703]co athlon
[9704]eater eee amen
[9706]“.~Chief of the pmerican Department, NO
[9708]738.
[9710]agent refused to leave the United $
[9711]protested the arrest of one of its
[9713]tates, and wien the CPUSA
[9714]ROMDErS, KOTEN was released.
[9716]FKOTEN was 4 long-tine Cormanist, and there are no apparent
[9717]reasons why the KGB should doubt his loyalty. Nis homogexuality
[9718]was well-known to hig acquaintances within the CPUSA, and at ©
[9719]the time of his trip to the Soviet Union he was acting as a tour
[9721]uide for the New York firm “Afton Tours,” which is owned by
[9722]SVEKCHANSKIY. (NOSENKO said that SVENCHANSKIY, also a Conmunist,
[9723]was his. own agent at the time of KOTEN's ‘arrest.)
[9725]NOSENKO was able to give a consi
[9726]ing data on the "important gee agent”
[9728]This egent had been identified
[9729]m Rr wrEy Fe
[9733]The fact that KOTEN had been arcested on chargas of homo-
[9734]sexuality was leaked by Inturist to press services two days
[9735]after the reported date of the arrest, resulting in wide pub-
[9736]licity in Western newspapers. (‘tha U.S. fmbassy was nc” noti-
[9737]fied officially until cwo days later.) There was no apparent
[9738]reascn fcr this extrenezy unusual step by the KG3, which can
[9740]2 assumed to manipulate Inturigt for operational support pur-
[9742]poses.
[9744]After the CPUSA had protested the action, KOTEN was re-
[9745]jeased {rom priscn. He was told that the incident was a mistake
[9746]which had been corrected, that he was free co go anywhcre he
[9747]wanted in the Soviet Union, and that he co..d return anytime.
[9748]see RHE the @fgpagert. has since repatriated to the Soviet
[9750]enon.
[9752]d. Agents Handled by HOSENKO
[9754]hen NOSENKO transferred from the U.S. Embassy Section to
[9755]the Tourist Department, he took with him the two homesexual
[9756]agents VOLKOV and YEFR=MOV, PREISFREUND, WGA and RYTOVA
[9757](Pages 287-289). The homosexuals he used the day after his
[9758]return,’ in the operaticn against W.E. JOHNSON. This was their
[9759]first operational use since the fall of 1959; they were never
[9760]used again before being terminated at the end of 1962 or early
[9761]1963, NOSENKO said, because they were "too well known." PREIS~
[9762]FREUND was considered compromised to Emerican Intelligence
[9763]follcwing the cefection of GOLITSYN, so he also was never used
[9764]again, although NOSEKKO met him socially when PREISFPEUND re-
[9765]turned to Moscow on business trips as recently as 1963. During
[9766]the first part of 1962, on instructions from KOVSHUK and the
[9768]SENKO continued tc meet
[9770]with Be, who was still involved in the development of ZUJUS,
[9771]the Anerican code clerk. NOSENXO last saw GSeaiwR before going
[9773]to Geneva in March 1962; WEISS left ‘he Soviet Lnion to return
[9775]to Syria while NOSENKO was avay. RYTOVA, NOSENKO said, had
[9776]been his agent since 1956 or 1957. Some time in 1962 she moved
[9777]from her position as an instructor of Greek at the Institute
[9779]TOP SECRET
[9781]|
[9784]44-00000
[9786]te ee ame ane ty
[9788]i,
[9789]e
[9790]5
[9795]WT
[9797]Be,
[9798]‘ky
[9800]Eis des
[9802]See
[9806]oN
[9808]739.
[9810]of International Relations to a position in the school of the
[9811]CPSU Central Committee and ceased agent work. Alth.evgh she
[9812]was inactive, NOSZNKO continued to be registered as wer case
[9813]officer until 1964, when he defected. ;
[9815](i) PRIPPEL
[9816]Having left his assignment in Moscow in early 1961, PRIPPEL
[9818]"(Pages 129-133° and’ Part Vi11.D.5.) returned several times to
[9820]the Soviet Union in 1962 and 1963. NOSENKO, who remained his
[9821]case officer although FRIPVEL now lived and worked in New York
[9822]City, met him each time. FRIPPEL said there were three such ~
[9823]occasions, in February 1962 when he met once with NOSENKO and
[9824]CHELNOKOV in Odessa, and two later times in Moscow and Odessa,
[9825]when NOSENKO came alone. NOSENKO denied that he met PRIPPEL
[9827]in Odessa in February 1962 with CHELNOKOV, but said that he met
[9828]twice with him alone after returning to Moscow from Geneva. ~
[9829]The first of these meetings was in the summer of 1962 when FRIP~
[9830]PEL was accompanying a group of American newspaper editors tour-
[9831]ing the Soviet Union, FRIPPEL gaid NOSENKO called briefly at
[9832]his hotel room to enquire what questions ‘the editors planned
[9834]to ask KHRUSHCHFY during 4 planned interview. When FRIPPEL-
[9836]’ gaid he did not know, NOSENKO departed and FRIPPEL later re-
[9838]ported that he did not see NOSENKO again on thia trip. (NOSENKO
[9839]gaid he called again after the interview to learn the “reactions”
[9840]of the editors.) The second meeting was in Odessa, when FRIPPEL,
[9842]_yisited the. Soviet Union as a guide on a tour ship. According
[9844]to FRIPPEL, it was on this occasion that NOSENKO apparently made
[9845]a phone call to ask permission to go aboard FRIPPEL's ship, and
[9846]it might have been at this meeting or the earlier one that
[9847]NOSENKO told him something of his personal background. (FRIPPEL
[9848]knew a considerable amount of information about NOSENKO's father
[9849]and family.) NOSENKO denied the possibility that he would have
[9850]to request permission to board the vessel and said that if he
[9851]had told FRIPPEL anything about himself, it was when! he was
[9852]drunk. Both FRIPPEL and NOSENKO agreed that FRIPPEL provided
[9853]no information of value during any of these meetings. .
[9855](ii) SVENCHANSKTY
[9857]NOSENKO has cited SVENCHANSKIY, KGB cryptonym “ANOD,"” as
[9858]an example of the Second Chief Directorate's use of foreign
[9859]travel agents to signal the KGB when an interesting tourist is
[9860]about to visit the Soviet Union (Pages 295-298). SVENCHANSKIY
[9861]was recruited for this purpose, NOSENKO said, in 1961 and used
[9862]to send open-code signals to the Tourist Department by marking
[9863]visa applications whenever he spotted anything significant.
[9864]Some of SVENCHANSKIY's :signals had been, considered, NOSENKO
[9865]said, “of definite operational interest.” In September 1963,
[9866]NOSENKO took the case over from the previous handling officer,
[9867]NOSKOV, and his name was listed in SVENCHANSKIY's file as the
[9868]responsible officer. | .
[9870]NOSENKO first said that he had read SVENCHANSKIY's file
[9871]and then changed this to say that he had only skimmed it. He
[9872]met twice with his new agent, once in September 1963 and once
[9873]later in the year. On both occasions, NOSKOV was present.
[9875]TOP SECRET
[9877]we ee
[9879]fiers ce st ates
[9881]Ww
[9883]art TA “
[9887]Ton
[9889]SDSS ANSE
[9891]Ks
[9893]14-0000
[9895]poeaen
[9897]740,
[9899]NOSENKO said that at the time SVENCHANSKLY #a3 recruited
[9900]in 1961 that, because SVENCHANSKIY was known *o have had con-
[9901]tacts with AMTORS in New York, there was some suspicion that
[9902]he mignt be an FBI agent. NOSENKO was unable to be more pre~
[9903]cise as to the basis for these suspicions and, when asked how
[9904]NOSKOV had resolvec them, was able to say only that NOSKOV
[9905]*felt" that SVENCHANSKIY was not an American agent.
[9907]NOSENKO knew little about SVENCHANSKIY's background from
[9908]the one-volume file kept on him in the Tourist Department: He
[9909]did know that SVENCHANSKIY was recruited in 1961 on the promise
[9910]of commercial favors, that he had 2t one tine been detected
[9911]in blackmarket transactions in the USSR, and that in addition
[9912]to his travel agency, SVENCHANSKIY ran a Russian-language book-
[9913]atcre in Chicago. FBI ana CIA records show that SVENCHANSKIY ~
[9914]has becn employed by a series of registered Soviet Government
[9915]organizations in the United States since the early 1930's,
[9916]that he was released from his position as a United Nations radio
[9917]officer broadcasting to the Soviet Union in 1952 when he failed
[9918]to answer questions of the Senate Internal Security Comittee
[9919]concerning alleged subversive activity. and that both his travel
[9920]agency and his book store are affiliated with registered Sov-
[9921]jet agencies, Inturist and Mezhkniga. Allegation3 on file of
[9922]SVENCHANSKLY's Communist sympathies and probable Soviet espion-
[9923]age activities aate back to the Second World War. In August
[9924]1950, Harry GOLD linked SVENCHANSKIY to the Soviet espionage
[9925]network in the Unites g during the war. The FBI has re-
[9929]: augmes vey meet «ee Tt Aes a ease one time been the
[9930]cenridential cecretary of GOLCS, the “director of Soviet espion-
[9931]age in the United States.” (NOSENKO knew that someone called
[9932]Sonya worked for SVENCHANSKIY in New York, but said that she
[9934]is not a KGB agent and was not the one who marked the visa
[9936]‘ applications.)
[9938]e. The OSWALD Investigation
[9940]As First Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department, NOSENKO —
[9941]said, he was directiy involved in the investigation of OSWALD 's
[9942]activities in Minsk which was ordered after the assassination
[9943]of President KENNEDY (eages 136-144 and Part VIII.D.5.). It
[9944]is from his role at this time and his reading of the Minsk KGB
[9945]file on OSWALD that NCSENKO derived his authority to state that
[9946]the KGB “washed its hands of OSWALD” after his attempted sui-
[9947]cide in the USSR, that there was no attempt to recruit either
[9949]- OSWALD or his wife, and that KGB interest in OSWALD while he
[9951]lived in Minsk was restricted to passive observation. .
[9953]f£. The CHEREPANOV Investigation
[9955]Part VIII.8.6.c. contains a discussion of the CHEREPANOV
[9956]ease, in which NOSENKO claims to have been involved in Novem
[9957]ber 1962 while Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department.
[9959]TOP SECRET
[9961]'
[9964]ca ae pene eR ee
[9965]one
[9967]74.
[9969]g- Remarks
[9971]Leaving aside NOSENKO’S unsubstantiated claims to super=
[9972]visory jobs in the Tourist Department in 1962-1953, when he
[9973]indicated he was absent from KGB Headquarters neazly half of
[9974]the time, bis persorsl rose ia operations and investigations
[9975]of the period appears artificg$4l in some instances and im-
[9977]lausible in others. KOSENKO’s knowlecge of the origins of
[9978]the JOHNSON ‘case is incomplete, the timing conflicts with other
[9979]activities attrabuted to himself, the expressed purpose of
[9980]tne compromise in unigue, and the outcomes seems to have little
[9981]consequence beyond enabling JOHNSON to confirm that NOSENKO
[9982]appeared in it. Althosgh BRAUIS may have been in a position
[9983]to corroborate NOSExKO's appearance in that operation, he has
[9984]rot done so and his staterents contradict NOSENKO on the part
[9985]the latter played. So too do the statements of BAPRGHOORN, who ‘ j
[9986]recognized NOSENKO ag a person who was seen briefly during the :
[9987]interrogation sessions; certain facts from other sources Con~
[9988]tradict NOSENKO on one important detail (KHRUSHCHEV’s presence
[9989]ir, Moscow) of the EARGHOORN arrest. explained as_a retaliation-
[9990]hostace acticn for events in a PS P apleten ;
[9993]ave confirmed
[9994]=P. NCSEUKO'S
[9996]a L
[9997]be
[10002]earlier information BgGAPag
[10003]information on the bacagieued 2 cperation is
[10004]fragmentary, lacking evea the most impertant facts krown froz
[10005]‘several, mainly overt, scurces} his attendance at meetings
[10006]with SVENCHANSAIY: was confined to the two times when the -
[10007]original handler wes also present. The position of NOSENKO in
[10008]the FRIPPEL and OSWALD cases ig discussed in Part VIIT.D.5.
[10009]In summary, NOSENKO'Ss operational work was not commensurate
[10010]with that of a Section Chief and Deputy Department Chief, nor
[10011]with that of a case officer, regardless of rank. Where the
[10012]participation of NOSENKO in Tourist Department activities has
[10013]been or might be confirmed by other sources, it is therefore a
[10014]. wnproven that he was in a supervisory position in tne KGB or C__
[10015]that he was even a case officer. 7
[10019]pete ie
[10021]jor SetRcl
[10023]wien
[10024].
[10025].
[10026]+e peetye p eenteren Mion - - .
[10029]14-0000
[10031]a <a
[10033]NN
[10035]SM EE MC ULE TN eed de Oe AEE hk MTD phere re
[10037]SMI BT
[10039]SE nn 2 a
[10041]t
[10043]ru eid TS hae PS ae ng at eapgte wAak &
[10045]SAVARD 601 QUI mvemeaere me ae et
[10047]742 A
[10049]B. Examination of Other Aspects of NOSENKO's Biography
[10051]1. GB Awards and Ranks
[10053]a. Awards
[10055]At various times since contacting CIA in 1962, NOS EXNKO
[10056]described a series of awarcs and decorations which he received
[10057]over the years for his performance of duties in the Second Chief
[10058]Directorate (Pages 319-321). He claimed to have received the
[10059]Order of Lenin, the Order of the Red Star, and the Order of the
[10060]Red Banner; he said he received a special commendation from
[10061]KGB Chairman SEROV for his role in the BURGI recruitment and
[10062]the same award in 1959 for his recruitment of all of the Ameri:
[10063]can or British tourists recruited that year by the KGB (three
[10064]British and three American homosexuals). NOSENKO told of a
[10065]number of other commendations which he received--almost one a
[10066]year--for his “general good work." In October 1966 NOSENKO
[10067]said that he never received any awards for his KGB operational
[10068]performance, only a medal for satisfactery completion of 10
[10069]years of KGB service and a Red Army anniversary medal.
[10071]b. Ranks
[10073]NOSENKO's descriptions of his various rank promotions fol-
[10074]low a similar but more complicated pattern (Pages 322-326).
[10075]He has given two separate sets of circumstances for hfs .first
[10076]promotion, frem junior lieutenant to lieutenant. According to
[10077]the first of these, the one NOSENKO adnered to during 1964 and
[10078]1965, he was promoted to che rank of lieutenant while serving
[10079]in the Far East with the naval GRU at the beginning cf 1952.
[10080]NOSENKO explained chat the required time in grade is sometimes
[10081]cut in half for cfiicers serving at this undesirable post, and
[10082]that this is why he was promoted after only six months of
[10083]active duty. In 1966 NCSENKO said for the first time that he
[10084]aid rot enter on active duty until March 1951 and that his
[10085]promotion to lieutenant was in mid-1952, while stationed in
[10086]Sovetsk, on the Baltic. In all his accounts, HNOSENKO has said
[10087]that he entered the KGB with the -ank of lieutenant as this
[10088]had been his rank in the naval GRU.*
[10090]During his first meetings with CIA in Geneva during 1962
[10091]NOSENKO claimed then to be a KGB major and said that he had
[10092]already completed the necessary time in grade for a lieutenant
[10093]colonelcy. NOSENKO gave an apparently accurate description
[10094]of the structure of his salary as 6 major (so much for rank,
[10095]go much for longevity, etc.) and pointed out that he was fill-
[10096]ing a position (Chief of Section) normally held by a lieutenant
[10097]colonel. On contacting CIA again in 1964, NOSENKO claimed the
[10098]rank of lieutenant colonel. He supported this claim with the
[10099]TDY authorization issved for the CEEREPANOV search,**™. which
[10101]¥-— Se Part VIII.D.2. for a discussion of the likelihood that
[10102]NOSENKO served in the naval GRU.
[10104]*#* See Part VIII.B.?.c. for an analysis of the CHEREPANOV
[10105]case.
[10113]Saat te
[10115]14-0000
[10117]i 743.
[10119]gave NOSENKO's rank as lieutenant colone’. and was signed by
[10120]GRIBANOV himself and testified to it by his signature on the
[10121]“official biographical stetement" prepared in Frankfurt.
[10123]The first major change in NOSENKO's story of his promo-
[10124]ticns came during the interrogations of January 1965 wnen he
[10125]volunteered out of context and for no clear reason that he hed
[10126]never held the rank of major but rather, because of a scrics
[10127]of administrative slip-ups and GRIBANOV's advitze and help, had
[10128]jumped directly from the rank of captain, which hy received
[10129]in 1956, to the rank of lieutenant colonel in late 1963.
[10130]NOSENKO was later to claim that he had never said in 1962 that
[10131]he was a major.*
[10133]t
[10138]In. an unsolicited statenent given to CIA in April 1966,
[10139]NOSENKO wrote that he was only a captain and that the TDY authori-
[10140]zation for the CHEREPANOV search had been filled out in error.
[10142]Cc. xemarks
[10144]NOSENKO's admissions regarding his awards and promotions
[10145]directly affect hig self-portraiture as a successful and rapidly .
[10146]rising KG3 officer. They also have a beari © the
[10147]alleged reasons for this rise & pen}
[10148]GRIBAXOV's favoritism, NOSENKO ; ,
[10149]BANOV's name to each cf the awards he earlier claimed to have
[10150]received. In most cases it was GRIBANOV who ceCided that
[10151]NOSENKO should get a particular award; in the rest, it was
[10152]GRIBANVY who physically presented the award to NCSENKO. The
[10153]same. is true of NCSENKO's account of his rank premoticns:
[10154]GRIBANOV, NOSENKO said, had promised him that he would be pro-
[10155]moted Girectly from senior lieutenant to major in 1959; when
[10156]the Personnel Department made a mistaxe and caly vromoted
[10157]NOSENKO to captain, GRIDANOV adviscad him to accept this rank
[10158]and promised that when he had conpleted sufficier.. time in grade
[10159]for promotion to major, GRIBANOV would see to xt that he was
[10160]promoted directly to lieutenant colonel. fhis is what happened,
[10161]NOSENKO said in i965, and after he received his rank of lieu-
[10162]tenant colonel, GRIBA!!OV called him in and congratulated him,
[10163]On the basis of NOSEXKO's admissio.s, there is aiditional rea-
[10164]son to quegtion his relatienship with GRIBANOV.**
[10166]a
[10168]NOSENKO carried with him to Geneva, against 1G regulation
[10169]and for no reason he could explain, an official SOB docunent
[10170]listing him as a lieutenant colonel and signed by GRIBANOV him-
[10171]self as well as by two provincial euthorities. This suggests
[10172]strongly that the lie concerning NOSENKO's rank was not NOSEKKO'S
[10173]alone. (If, in fact, as pointed out above, the CHEREPANOV
[10175]_ papers were fabricated by the kGB, then there was no genuine search
[10176]- for CHEREPANOV and NOSENKO's document is also fabricated and
[10177]not a mistake ag NOSENKO claims.)
[10179]* "This change of story coincided
[10180]in the information reported by §
[10181]defection
[10182]made ite
[10184]v in time with a change
[10185]Shortly after NOSENKO's
[10186]had said that remarxs by his KGB associates
[10187]othe SENKO was 3a lieute t colonel.
[10189]that
[10190]was only a Captain.
[10192]_## NOSENKO's. retractions and changes of story concerning his
[10193]personal and cperationa! relationship with GRIBANOV are -
[10194]discussed elsewhere (Pages 327-336).
[10196]TGP SECRET
[10198]ret te
[10199]be
[10201]14-0000
[10203]Rite Riin aha gras’ aang te
[10205]a
[10206]‘.
[10208]Ca fat aun aut ee a ine
[10210]vivuatl
[10212]744.
[10214]2. Affiliation with Communist Party Organs
[10216]a. Introduction
[10218]NOSENKO drifted into the Komsomo!, he said, in 1943 or
[10219]1944 without giving the step any thozght whatsoever. All of
[10220]his friends at the Baku school were joining, s0 NOSENKO did
[10221]too. He remained an indifferent member of this Communist
[10222]youth organization throughout his scnool and university years,
[10223]in the GRU, and during his first year as a KGB officer. On
[10224]arriving in the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Depart-
[10225]ment in 1953, NOSEKKO told CIA, he was appointed Secretary of
[10226]the small Komsomol Organization of the Second Chief Director-~
[10227]ate, a group of about 17 members.
[10229]b. Discussion
[10231]NOSENNO was questioned by DERYABIN on his duties as Kom-
[10232]somol Secretary (Pages 623) and, although able to give a super-
[10233]ficial account of these functions, was found to be unaware of
[10234]certain basic information which DERYABIN felt a person in this
[10235]position should have. Thus, for example, NOSiNXO proviced a
[10236]description of the system of levying dues on Kemscmol members
[10237]which was substantially incorrect and was unaware that a Kom~
[10238]somol Congress (the first in many years and therefcre a major
[10239]event) had been held curing his claimed tenure 2s Secretary.
[10241]NOSENKO said that he held the position of Komosmol Organi-
[10242]zation Secretary until the late spring or early summer of 1954,
[10243]when he got into trouble for having used official KGB alias
[10244]documentation to conceal the fact that he received treatment
[10245]for venereal disease contracted from a prostitute. Immediately
[10246]aiter this incident, said NOSENKO, he was removed from nis
[10247]position and a “strict reprimand" was placed in his Kom-
[10248]somyl file. Several months thereafter, on the eve of his 27th
[10249]birthday, NOSENKO was forced out of the Komsomol because he was
[10251]too old. For over a year, until January 1956 when NOSENKO was
[10253]admitted as a candidate member of the Communist Party of the
[10255]’ Soviet Union, he was the only cfficer in the KGB who was neither
[10256]_a Komsomol nor a Party member. BOSENKO's account of his expul-
[10258]sion from the Komsc=ol on reaching his 27th birthday is con-
[10259]tradicted by the official Statutes of the Komsomol in effect
[10261]at that time. These regulations stipulate a maximum age of
[10263]25 years and NCSENKO should therefore have been forced cut at
[10264]the end of October 1953, upon reaching his 26th birthday. This
[10265]was explained to NOSENKO, who insisted that he remained a member
[10266]until he became 27 years old and that no special exceptions
[10267]were made in his case.
[10269]ce. Remarks
[10271]The fact that NOSENKO is incorrect regarding the age limi-
[10272]tation makes it doubtful that his account of the venereal
[10273]disease incident and his removal from the Komsomol Secretary-
[10274]ship is true. The date which he gives tc this incident is
[10275]after that on which he should have been expelled from the Kom-
[10276]gomol. (Additionally, NOSENKO's descriptions of the veneral
[10277]disease incident, his use of false documents, and his subsequent
[10278]punishment by the KGB and the Komsomol have been inconsistent;
[10279]see Pages 80-81).
[10281].
[10283]TOP SECRET
[10285]|
[10291]BS ee
[10293]due
[10295]veVlILe,
[10297]745.
[10299]The evidence that NOSEXKO lied about this particular
[10300]aspect of his first tour in the U.S. Embassy Section further
[10301]suggests that his entire account for this period of his
[10302]career is fabricated (See Part VIII.D.3.).
[10304]een ane tome wee canes Lee eee ~
[10306]en
[10308]am...
[10310]1Ul SECKET be
[10312]746.
[10313]3. Schooling
[10315]There is relatively little reliable collateral information |
[10316]concerning NOSENKO's schooling up until 1950, Other than what
[10318]. he himself has reported, available information consists of overt!
[10320]‘press releases pertaining to the Minister -NCSENKO's career (and.
[10322]giving his location at various times) and comments by one KGB :
[10323]officer and one defector. NOSENKO's own account, together with |
[10325]With the exception of minor variations in dates, attribut-
[10326]able to memory, NOSENKO‘s. story of his early years until the
[10327]beginning of World War If, «shen he had just completed the sixth
[10328]grade in Moscow, has been generally consistent in its various
[10329]tellings. Moreover, his accounts of having studied in Lenin-
[10330]grad and Moscow agree with informetion concerning the positions
[10331]and movements of the elder NOSENKO during these years. In con- ¢
[10332]trast, the pericd immediately following, during which NOSEXKO :
[10333]allegedly received his early training in naval matters {s char- —
[10334]acterized with freyuent changes of story, contradictions, and
[10335]admitted falsehood.
[10337]t
[10338]references to these other sources, is summarized below. H
[10339]| I
[10341]b. Discussion
[10343]In 1964 and 1665 NOSENKO recalled that he enrolled in the
[10344]Moscow special naval school in the summer of 1941, immediately
[10345]after the Germans attacked the Soviet Union, and was evacucted
[10346]with the entire school from Moscow to Kuybyshev in September
[10347]to begin studies in the seventh Grade. (An article in the Sov-
[10348]jet Army newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star) on 14 Jenuary 1967
[10349]confirmed that seven special naval schools were established in
[10350]the Soviet Union in April 1940. Ore of these was in Moscow, :
[10351]However, to be eligible for admission, one had to have completed!
[10352]the seventh grade. The article did not indicate that the Moscow:
[10353]school was evacuated.) In April 1966, NOSENZO remembered that i
[10354]he did not go to Kuybyshev at this time but rather had been
[10355]evacuated to €helyabinsk with his mother and entered the seventh
[10356]grade of a regular scrool.
[10358]1964 ard 1965 that he returned from Kuybyshev in the sumer of
[10359]1942 ard secured admission to the Leningrad Naval Preparatory
[10360]School, along with which he was evacuated Ly train to Baku in
[10361]the fall of that year. In April 1966, after inserting the year
[10362]spent at Chelyabinsk with his mother, NOSENKO moved all events
[10363]up a year and wrote in his autobiography that he entered the
[10364]Kuybyshev school in the fall of 1942 rather than the fall of
[10365]1941. NCSENKO also wrote at this time that he transferred to
[10366]the Leningrad preparatory school and travelled to Baku in the {
[10367]fall of 1943, not 1942.* ‘
[10368]|
[10372]In keeping with his respective accounts, NOSENKO said in |
[10375]'
[10377]a
[10378]* Describing the reasons for his transfer to the Leningrad Naval
[10380]-Preparatory School, ‘OSENKO explained that the Moscow special .
[10381]naval school was evacuated further to Achinsk in Siberia and {
[10382]‘that this was farther from heme than he wished to go. The
[10383]Rea Ster article menticned above said that the special naval
[10384]schools were all closed in 1943, however. The special school
[10385]‘apparently therefore was not transferred further to Achinsk, +
[10386]-but was shut down.
[10388]+ ee tl oe
[10390]TO? SECRET _ 7
[10393]14-0000
[10395]tur ollie
[10397]747.
[10399]Rqain to accommedate the added year in Chelyabings«, OSZNKO
[10400]gaid in 1966 that he spent half a year (actually, according ty
[10401]the rest of the story, about three months) in Baku before run-
[10402]ning away from schocl back to Mescow in January 1944. in
[10404]_ earlier accounte te said he was at the preparatcry school there
[10406]from Cctober 1942 until January 1944. Earlier he had also
[10407]giver expansive and chargirg accounts of his escape fron school
[10408]to join the Soviet front against the Germans at Tuapse; now he
[10409]admitted thet this was a lie. By cutting the time he was in
[10410]Baku from 15 months to about three, NOSENKO also admitted im-
[10411]plicitly that his accounts of the basic training he received
[10412]in the preparatory school, of the sumer he spent working at
[10413]the school rather than returning to Moscow on vacatica, and of
[10414]his “certainty” that he celebrated his 15th birthday in Baku
[10415]were also false.
[10417]NOSENKO has been relatively consistent in recounting the
[10418]events of 1944. In 1964, 1965 and again in 1966 he told of
[10419]studying as an “external” student in Moscow to complete his
[10420]ninth year of schooling and of rejoining his classmates from
[10421]Baku when the naval preparatory school returnad to Leningrad
[10422]in the autumn of 1244. On several occasions during 1964 and
[10423]1965, NOSENXO described how he and his classmates spent Octcber
[10424]and November 1944 working in the woods near‘Leringrad before
[10425]beginning their tenth grade studies late in the year; he omitted
[10426]this account from nis April 1966 autobiography.
[10428]NOSENKO's account of the next years is similarly marked
[10429]with a number of inconsistencies and falsehoods. (In the
[10430]latter category he has claimed and later admitted as untrue that
[10431]he attended the Frunze Kaval Academy from 1943 to 1944, that
[10432]he was on active military duty until being demobilized in 1945,
[10433]ana that he was ehct in the hand by a jealous ycung naval offi-
[10434]cer in 1945.) According to the account given under interroga~
[10435]tion in April 1964, NOSENKO was shot in the hand at a party in
[10436]the end of April 1945, was hospitalized, resigned from the ;
[10437]preparatory school, and received a certificate of satisfactory
[10438]completion of the tenth grade, although he had been in school
[10439]only since November 1944. In 1965 and 1966 NOSENKO said, re-
[10440]spectively, that he was shot by a naval officer in February
[10441]or March 1945 and that he shot himself in “early” 1945; since
[10442]the 1964 interrogations he has claimed only that he received
[10443]a statement of the courses he had attended at the preparatory
[10444]gchool and that he completed the tenth grade at the Shipbuild-
[10445]ing Tekhnikun in Leningrad.
[10447]Phe earliest collateral information specifically cuncern-
[10448]ing NOSEKKO's educational backgrounc, gayi22rs to a} te fhe
[10449]cereral sericd described above. geet ’
[10450]USas Se Sie tis tag ince ee Fa A neh 5 ot; Cee ae EE ts Gk Geeks
[10451]the Soviet Navy defector ARTAMONO said he attended 4 naval
[10452]preparatory school with NOSFNKO during the period 1944 to 1946.
[10453]ARTAMONOV, after NOSENKO'S defection was publicized, said he
[10454]had known a son of the Minister NOSENKO in the nzval school in
[10455]Leningrad from 1944 to 1946. He was then shown a picture of
[10456]NOSENKO and confirmed this was the man. However, acccrding
[10458]to NOSENKO's statements, NOSENKO would have been about two
[10461]14-0000
[10463]classes behind ARTIMGLOV, anc wouid have heen at the scnool
[10465]for only about two months. It is conceivable that the presence
[10467]of the son of the Minister of Snipruilding woule be widely known
[10469]in the school and later remembered, but so would that son's i
[10470]self-inflicted wound ard disappearance, «hich ARTAMONOY has not
[10471]mertioned. it is unlikely, moreover, that ARTAMONOV could (20 !
[10472]years later) reliably recognize a photo of a person who had been
[10473]there such a short tine and not in ARTANONOV's class. (NOSERKO a
[10474]claims not to have knewn ARTAMOLIOV nor to recognize the name.) .
[10476]In all eccounts, including his 1962 statements, NOSENKO
[10477]has said that he entered the Institute of International Rela-
[10478]tions in Moscow in 1945. His descriptions of cuurses, events
[10479]and friends are as vague and unsubstantial as his accounts of
[10480]his earlier schooling. He has given various cates for his
[10481]Graduation and has explained that he did so to cover Up the
[10482]fact that he failed his finai examination in the subject of
[10483]“Marxism-Leninism,” of which he was asnamed. ‘tiOSENKO inost re-
[10484]cently ciaimed that he received his diploma in the end of the
[10486]Gummer of 1950.  @-SaTERatgt pera ny ene Ai pel eee
[10488]c. Remarks
[10490]NOSENKO's own admissions, as «cil as the small amount of
[10491]collateral informatior. available, make it clear that auch of his
[10492]account of his education has been false. ‘The reasons for tris
[10493]are not at all clear and perhaps, in fact, there is no logical
[10494]explanation. The CIA psychologist wno tested and questioned
[10495]NCSENKO about his youth sucgested that, under corditiors of
[10496]interrogation, he may lie for no other reason other than his
[10497]nee@ to save face. Tnis view is an accurate aescription of
[10498]HOSENKO's behavior wnen questioned in Cetarl on this and other
[10500]spects of his pre-XGE life; it is not so with regard to ques-
[10501]tioning on his intelligence career. Nor does the psychologist's
[10502]view appear to explain way NOSENKO forgot or *as unwilling to
[10503]tell CIA about an entire year of his life, particularly such a
[10504]significant one, after consistently and apparently accurately
[10505](judging from the Soviet press accounts cf the Minister's
[10506]activities) describing the years preceding it. It is rot
[10507]apparent why NOSEXKO originally voluntecced the story of his
[10508]travel to Baku in the fall of 1942, when this was untrue, or
[10509]why he said that the Mosco# Special Naval School was evacuated
[10510]to Achinsk in 1943, when he must be aware that the school was
[10511]closed, if he was there.*
[10515]* The possibility that NOSENKO is not the person he claims
[10516]to be (and with a completely false life history, or one
[10517]lived ky someone else) has been examined earelully, but
[10518]no clear conclusion can be drawn or the basis of available
[10519]evidence. :
[10521]TOP SECRET
[10525]14-0000
[10527]. ._ 749.
[10529]bene oe
[10531]F. Appraisals of NOSENKO, his Motivation, and Other Opera-
[10532]Exopal Circusstances
[10534]1. Introduction
[10536]Appraisals of NOSENKO the man and of his motivations
[10537]must be founded, 48 with any source, on factors which are
[10538]often immessureable, but fewer reservations need be attached
[10539]to an appraisal of the other circumstances affecting the
[10540]course of events in Geneva in 1962 and 1964, These opera~ -_
[10541]tional circumstances Can be analyzed .and evaluated ino much
[10542]the same manner as were NOSENKO ‘s production, sourcing, and
[10543]biography for they are tangible pieces of. evidence. In the
[10544]next portions of this paper are presented these appraisals,
[10545]which draw chiefly upon Pages 603-641 (for NOSENKO the man),
[10546]Pages 20-29 (for his motivations), and Pages 11-19 and 30-
[10547]43 (for the operational circuzstances).
[10549]2. NOSENKO
[10551]The CIA specialists who assessed NOSENKO fouhbd him to
[10552]be of above-average intelligence, cne of them saying that
[10553]“his effective intelligence is more cleverness than intel-
[10554]lectuality, more shrewdness than efficiency." He_is capeble
[10555]of good memory and, a8 illustrated »x bis repeating certain
[10556]facts_in Tle same sequence, Capable of what appears to be
[10557]good memorization o} details. On the other hand, there were
[10558]numerous internal contradictions in NOSENKO's recountings
[10559]of various events, he himself claimed an odd or poor memory,
[10560]and he was the oxceptional defector by having been totally
[10561]debriefed within a relatively short period.
[10563]Parts VII.D. and VILI.E. discuss NOSEXKO's truthfulness
[10564]with reference to his Soviet Intelligence and personal
[10565]backgrounds. Here nay be added other observations by the
[10566]CIA specialists: NOSENKO can exercise deception cleverly,
[10567]he improvised and was evasive under interrogation, and he
[10568]hes a “remarkable” disregard for he truth where it serves
[10569]his purposes. The results of the polygraph examination were
[10570]that KOSENKO “attempted deliberate deception."
[10572]The gaps and errors in, NOSENKO's testimony therefore
[10573]do not seen attributable to low intelligence or to consis-
[10574]tently poor semory, but to a conscious attempt to mislead
[10575]American Intelligence. Independently, then, this conclusion
[10576]raises the questions of whether NOSENKO was dispatched by
[10578]_ the KGB and !{f so, why he was chosen. Regarding the latter
[10580]point, it is noted that a CIA psychiatrist observed: "This
[10581]man is capable of playing a role and playing it effectively,"
[10582]and that a CIA psychologist stated: "From a distance NO-
[10583]'SENKO looks very good [to his KGB superiors] es a possible
[10585]penetration agent, but close up he leaves much to be desired."
[10587]It was "close up," in the CIA debriefings and interrogations,
[10588]that NOSENKO displayed ao inability to explain the gaps and
[10589]errors in his reporting. .
[10591]_ TOP SECRET
[10595]L
[10597]Sd
[10601]14-0000
[10603]— J Vi VEU
[10605]750.
[10607]3. Motivation
[10609]Part of one's uotivation for such a drastic ect as
[10610]treason or defection may not be wholly cooscious, and there
[10611]may be underlying causes which any source might not went
[10612]or be able to admit even to hinself. Thus, what SOSENKO
[10613]said about motivation need not be taken at face value, and
[10614]for this reason the whole question of his motivation must
[10615]remain a minor weight in the overali asscssment of bona fides.
[10617]NOSENKO has tried to present a meaningful explazation
[10618]and has changed or adjusted his story to this end. He
[10619]initially insisted that he had no ideological motives -but
[10620]simply wanted to “make a deal“ in order to get out of
[10621]trouble; yet thisclaim is open to question: The enount of
[10622]operational money which NOSEXKO needed to replace was hardly
[10623]enough to have driven him to treasoa, especially since :
[10624]there were friends in Geneva like GUK and KISLOV who might
[10625]have helped him make up his loss. Furtheraore, only two
[10626]days after CIA had rescued him with the funds, NOSESKO
[10627]“Spent _the CTA moncy in another drunken debauchery (with the
[10628]Same companion) and came back needing more. The discre-
[10629]pancy between the degree of the necd and the seriousness of
[10630]of the act was s0 evident that the CIA case officer commented .,
[10631]to NOSENKO at the outset that there must be some deeper
[10632]explanation for his act. Thereupon NOSENKO added sew
[10633]reasons: His distaste for certain aspects of the regize,
[10634]his resentment of KHRUSHCHEY, and his liking for Americans.
[10636]By his defection ic 1964 NOSENKO chenged the course of
[10637]his life, although he had said in 1962, forcefully and
[10638]unequivocally, that he would never do so unless in acute
[10639]danger. In 1964 he could give no coherent explanaticn for
[10640]the change of heart and in October 1966 he denied, for the
[10641]first time, that: hehad said in 1962 that he would not de-
[10642]fect. His only motivation was that, having risen to the
[10643]level of Deputy Department Chief, he would not get to travel
[10644]abroad any more. (This contradicts NCSENKO's 1962 state-
[10645]ments:. anticipating imminent promotion to’ Deputy Cepartment
[10646]Chief, he said that he would Leave the USSR at least once
[10647]a year in the future.) For no visible reason NOSENKO seems
[10648]to have abandoned a purportedly successful and promising
[10649]career, an undisturbed ramily life and children of shom
[10650]he was fond, cast shame on his father's menory sud his re-
[10651]maining relatives, and departed forever from his ofr country.
[10653]His own unease concerning his motivation evidently con-
[10654]tinued until, in 1965, he wrote one cohesive explasation.
[10655]No part of this statement was ever borne ovt by his conduct,
[10656]attitudes, remarks or reactions. He appeared, wherever his
[10657]reactions seemed spontanedus, to dislike the United States,
[10658]to have po interest in it politically, culturally, or
[10659]scenically, and to preserve 4 preference for the USSR. A
[10660]CIA graphologist commented oa KOSENKO's “strong emotional
[10661]ties to his traditionel background,” while ea CIA psycholo-
[10662]gist reported: "Emotionally he has not defected in spite
[10663]of his attempt to intellectually rationalize that he has."
[10664]The psychologist also said that it is “almost impossible to
[10665]determine his true loyalties and true beliefs.”
[10667]rop SECRET. .
[10669]14-0000
[10671]cee ede de cree Sree en mee mT
[10673]751.
[10675]4. Operational Circumstances
[10676]a. Presence in Geneva (1962)
[10680]When he came to Geneva in mid-March 1962,;NOSENKO
[10681]was a newly appointed Section Chief in the KGB Second Chie?
[10682]Directorate, havirg held this position for two months. . i
[10683]He binmself acknowledged to CIA that it appeared strergze
[10684]for the KGS to send a new Section Chief on an extended trip
[10685]abroad unconnected with hig on work. His reasons for being
[10686]in Geneva have varied and to some degree contradict one ,
[10687]gnother: The Disarnaancnt Conference was not expected to . aa
[10688]Jast more then "a few peeks," but NOSEN KO did not begin his .
[10689]work egainst SHAKIOV (one of the main rezsons for bis being
[10690]there) until six weeks after arrival; GRISANOV played &
[10691]rote in his TDY, but NoSE¢KO Tater denied this; tkere secre
[10692]in 1962 “new rules” requiring & staff officer to accompany
[10693]a Sovict delegation, but in 1965 NOSENKO said he did not
[10694]renenber such regulations. He was permitted to go to Geneva
[10695]in 1962 and 1964, as well es to Cuba in 1950 and Freland
[10696]in 1957 and 1958, under no supervision or restraint cespite
[10697]his claim to a record so bad that he was not clearcd by the
[10699]KGB for persancnt posting ta Ethiopia in 1960.
[10701]b. Presence in Geneva (1964)
[10703]\USENKO said on one occasion thet GRIBANOY was cne of
[10704]those who allowed him tu come to Geneva in January 1964,
[10705]as a personal favor;* he later not only denied this tut said
[10706]in 1965 that GRIBANOV knew acthink about the TY. He re-
[10707]ported the 12964 TOY might, tecause of his nev position,
[10708]be his last trip to the West, hence the "favor" of his
[10709]superiors to permit hin this last trip; in 1962 NOSENKO
[10710]said he had the assurance that as Leputy Lepartment Chief
[10711](which he knew he was about to kecore) nc would in the future
[10712]cone to the *est at least once a year. Also, NOSENKO could
[10713]not explain why a First Deputy Departacnt Chief, if allowed '
[10714]out of the USSR as 8 “treat,” would go atroad for a conference ;
[10715]which could be expected to last many weexs, probably months. :
[10716]This question is compounded by the fact that NOSENEO would — ‘
[10717]be needed in Moscow: He Said that a KGS conference to plan .
[10718]the handling of the tourist season was to be held at about
[10719]this time, end he stuck to this story even siter admitting
[10720]that the telegraa recalling him for this Moscow conference
[10721]was ap invention (see below).
[10723]c. Access to KGB Residency and Availability to CIA
[10725]NOSEXNKO in 1962 routinely visited the KGB Legal Resi-
[10726]dency in Geneva every weekday morning. although he claimed
[10727]that he had ne reason and that it is normally forbidden (as
[10728]other sources hve confirmned).** When atked how ead vhy he
[10730]ser3zitive source
[10734]Feat pagcited GRIBANUY's personal authorization of NOSENKO's
[10735]rip in the face of derugatory information as ore cause of
[10737]_ GRIBANOV's dismissal. .
[10739]*#¢NOSENKO said he did not visit the KGB Legal Residency fn
[10740]London nore thaa once during his visits there in a sinilar
[10741]capacity in 1957 and 1958, nor during his trip tc Cuba in
[10743]1960.
[10745]TOP SECRET .
[10747]14-0000
[10749]752.
[10751]did so ip Geneva, NOSENKO has given different ansvers at
[10752]different times. His stories of sizply “drooping 1b and
[10753]hangirg erourd” for lack of anything better to co are
[10754]unacceptable in terms of known or likely Soviet practice.
[10755]His explanation that it was due to TSYMBAL's auspices or
[10757]or intervention sere contradicted by: First, his ovr con-
[10758]fused accounts of his relationship with TSYMBAL; and second,
[10759]his own statements at other times that it was GUK who as
[10760]primarily responsible for NOSEXKO's visits to the Residency.
[10762]NOSENKO had a full day free for meetings on ill June
[10764]1962, although thereafter he limited meeting tines to shorte: it
[10766]and shorter seriods until his departure. This seened
[10768]natural at the time since he would presumably huve his own
[10769]responsibilities and would need to be seen by his Soviet
[10770]colleagues ia his proper surroundings. However, in 1964.
[10772]he seemed not to save any official responsibilities or any
[10773]calls on his time: He was willing to spend all his time in
[10774]mectings with CIA. Although this could be explained by the
[10775]fact that he planned to defect anyway, it nevertheless vould
[10776]have involved unnecessary risks to a genuine source about
[10778]to become a defector. He showed no concern at tne time,
[10780]but later (in 1966), he said that he had been in fact afraid;
[10781]it was for this reason that he invented the Moscow recall
[10782]telegram, in order to hasten ais defection and put an end
[10784]to his fears of getting caught. It is, of course, impossible
[10785]to make conclusive judgments on Soviet practice, but one
[10786]would expect, if NOSENKO were not engaged in security duties,
[10787]that he would be required to participate for cover reasons
[10789]in more of the Soviet delegation's official activity. He
[10790]said that any absence could be explained as “security duties,"
[10791]since everyone on the Soviet Delegation knew or suspected
[10792]that he was a KGB officer. This unconcern for the suspicions
[10793]of other Soviets conforms neither with obsérved Soviet
[10794]practice nor with reports from other sources that Soviet
[10795]intelligence and security officers under cover go to some
[10796]pains to hide their true affiliation.
[10798]NOSENKO explained the contrast between his freedom
[10799]and availability in 1964 and his limited free tine in 1962
[10800]by the fact that in 1964 he had no personal friends in
[10801]Geneva; in 1962 both GUK and KISLOV expected to see him io
[10802]his free time. (This story does not explain his ability io -
[10803]1964 to get away during conference working hours; peither .
[10805]| GUE nor KISLOV affected this in 1962.)
[10807]@. Timing of .1962 Contact
[10809]NOSENKO had been in Geneva for three months in 1962
[10810]when the incident which brought him to CIA occurred; it
[10811]was only two weeks before his departure. He cane to David
[10812]MARK only 10 days before leaving. This bad tke effect of
[10813]limiting CIA's time with him. NOSENKO's contact cane only
[10814]about 10 days after CIA had completed, in the same city, a
[10815]series of meetings with BELITSKIY, a Soviet interpreter who
[10816]hed been recruited and handled as an agent by CIA during
[10817]earlier visits to the West. NOSE‘KO, as one of the two
[10818]primary items he wanted to "sell" revealed that BreLITSKIY
[10819]had been under KGB control from the outset (Page 517).
[10821]Top SECRET ,
[10825]ce gem me ne
[10831]TTA a RPTL E 9) AIS Son wr
[10833]14-0000
[10835]e. Willinoness to Meet CIA
[10837]Although in 1962 NOSENKO claimed that he wanted to
[10838]sell only two specific items for the money he had lost, and
[10839]then disappear, there were indications from the outset that
[10840]he expected and planned to come back for further meetings
[10841]with CIA. At this first meeting he called attention to
[10842]certain information in his possession about POPOV, hinting
[10844]that he would teil it later; even as he protested hia unwilling-
[10846]ness to continue meeting with CIA, he was giving ample
[10847]details about himself which would inevitably have compro~
[10848]mised him to CIA and forced his future ccllaboration. Before
[10849]he finally agreed to retura for more meetings, he said:
[10850]"Mayke I'l] meet you again Monday* (two days after the first
[10851]meeting). NOSENKO refused, despite repeated inducenents,
[10853]to meet on the intervening Sunday. in fact, when he did
[10854]return on Monday, ne said that he had spent Sunday with
[10855]friends, drinking and “discussing recent USSR foreign policy
[10856]moves and speeches by KHRUSECHEV." .
[10858]f. Tre Recall Teleoran
[10860]NOSENKO's confession that he fabricated the story of
[10861]his having been urgent\~ recalled te Moscow by a telegran
[10862]hetina ek CSET he ees Leaves only two
[10865]possicle interpretations:
[10867]- There was a telegren, but NCSENKO'S ming has
[10868]slipped and he is no longer able to distinguish between
[10869]fact and fancy. This, however, is not borne out by
[10870]his general conduct nor his performance under interro~
[10871]gation in 19€6.
[10873]in fact, no telegram. (This is borne
[10874]Yi -o.) Thus, the invention was
[10875]ae i Ea not NOSENGO's but the
[10876]KG ; the KGY prietec N-SENKO to report to CIA that a
[10877]telegram was sent; anu NCSENKO made an errer in later
[10878]admitting that it was rot.
[10880]g- Remarks
[10881]the operational circumstances so far reviewed point
[10882]out the facts that: _
[10884]- NOSENKO was inconsistent if not contradictory in
[10885]stating his reasons for being in Geneva in 1962 and
[10886]1964;
[10888]- He had unusual access to the KG Legal Residency
[10890]and an availability for meeting CIA that seemed to
[10891]impinge upon his security;
[10893]- He was willing to return to meetings with CIA al-
[10894]though having at first said that there were but two
[10895]items of information for sale;
[10897]- He was “in place” as a CIA source for the last
[10898]six of his 100 or so cays in Geneva in 1962, thus
[10899]restricting the amount of time he could provide continu-
[10900]ing reporting on the local Legal Residency; and ,
[10902]- After 12 days in the same status in 1964, he
[10904]forced the defection by the KGB recall telegram, which
[10905]appears to have been a fabrication.
[10907]Top SECRET
[10909]canes deme en ei
[10912]14-0000
[10914]154. . t
[10916]Taken together, these facts suggest the possibilities
[10917]that the KGB sent NOSENKO to Geneva on both occasions for
[10918]the purpose of contacting CIA, that the KGB wanted the
[10919]opportunity to gauge CIA's reactions to the walk-in in 1962
[10920]and to the defection plans in 1954, and that the KGB guid d
[10921]NOSENKO after contact was established in both years.
[10923]A further examination of the operational circumstances
[10924]in Geneva lends credence to these possibilities. During the
[10925]1962 meetings. NOSENKO would frequently answer CIA questions
[10926]by saying: “I will have to think about that tonight," or
[10927]"] wiil have some time tonight to jot down and prepare a
[10928]good answer for you," or "I don‘t xant to give you an answer
[10929]to thet right off--I am afreid to mislead you." He would
[10930]return to a later meeting with the information, efter having
[10931]visited the Legal Residency. In 1964 there were other
[10932]exazples of what may have been backstage guidance by the
[10933]KGB: . .
[10935]-~He called for an urgent special meeting to cor-
[10936]rect sumething he had said in an earlier meeting.
[10937]Initially KOSENKO had nemed ZUJUS instead of XEYSERS
[10938]as the U.S. Embassy code clerk whom he had personally
[10939]approached. in 1961. This seened remarkably urgent snd
[10940]important to him at the time, and in retrospect this
[10941]case gains special importance: It was the only time
[10942]he clmimed to have had direct contact with 8 U.S.
[10943]Embessy staff employee during his alleged tour in the
[10944]American Department in 19G0-1961. If he could not
[10945]remember this one name, it might call his entire story
[10946]into question. It is hard to find another explanation;
[10947]had he simply made 8 careless mistake, with his cus-
[10948]tomery indifference to names and dates. XOSENKO would
[10949]be unlikely to mull over what he hed said at the meeting
[10950]nor to bother about correcting a minor misstatement.
[10951]Much less would he feel compelled to call an emergency
[10952]meeting to do so.
[10954]~He came to meetings with "chance" items picked
[10955]up at the Legal Residency, esch of which would require
[10956]quick action and the commitment of assets on the part
[10957]of CIA in Geneva. Also, NOSENKO originally said io
[10958]January 1964 that he wanted to defect right away, but
[10959]various steps taken or plenned by his CIA handlers
[10960]kept him in place for a time. Each step, however. was
[10961]quickly negated--usually at the next meeting--by some
[10962]information NOSENKO had picked up by chance.
[10964]-He asked, out of context end without apy explapa-
[10965]tion, whether GOLITSYN had told CIA that the President
[10966]of Finland was a Soviet agent, and later could not
[10967]coherently explain where be had heard this, why he had
[10968]not told CIA about it in 1962, and why he hed asked.
[10970]In addition. the Soviet reactions to the defection were
[10971]unprecedented and contrasted sharply with, for exsnple, the
[10972]Soviets' avoidance of publicity concerning GOLITSYN's defec~
[10973]tion in 1961. The post-defection actions by the Soviet
[10974]Government created publicity which had the superficial effect
[10975]of underlining NOSENKO'sS authenticity, establishing him as
[10976]@ public figure, confirming that he had eB family, and veri-
[10977]fying that his defection was of alarming consequence. These
[10979]TOP SECRET : +
[10983]i
[10984]t
[10986]i
[10987]t
[10988]t
[10989]|
[10993]14-0000
[10997]755.
[10999]reactions seem purposeful in light of the approach in Paris
[11001]in 1966 of a Soviet photographer to Paris Match; the photo-
[11002]grapher passed photographs of NOSENKO’s wife and children
[11003]as part of a proposed story to dramatize the abardoned
[11004]family of a “top Soviet intelligence officer" whose cefec@-
[11005]tion had caused the “biggest blow ever suffered by Soviet
[11006]Intelligence. ”® There ig no independent press in the USS2&,
[11007]no Soviet journalist’ Allowed to publish as he pleases, and
[11008]the Soviet Government in the past has shown no predisposi-~
[11009]tion to dramatize defections from its most secret agency.
[11010]The photographer can only be presumed to have been acting on
[11011]KGB instructions.
[11013]TOP SECRET
[11015]a see says
[11017]a -
[11019]14-0000
[11021]A uP SECREL, >
[11023]TE6,
[11025]G. Sources Supporting HOSENKO
[11027]1, Introduction
[11030]|
[11031]|
[11033]i The preceding portions of fart VITI. present an
[11035]! analysis of the NOsSENKO case without yiving etailed con-
[11036]cideration to information about him fron Soviets re-
[11037]porting tc CIA and the FBI. because their evidence generally
[11039]‘yuna counter to the results of the foregoing analysis, it
[11040]js revicwed here separately so that the concentrated exanmina-
[11041]tion of NOSESKO wculd not ba diverted by asides as to the
[11042]authenticity and rcliability of these Soviets. 435 indicated
[11043]below, tne CIA and FBI sources who havy pensar sucosrted
[11044]oy os x
[11046]NOSEHEO's intelligence background are OF "4 sensitive sources
[11047]See aeee and the cefeccors ee and GOLITSYN. :
[11049]One eacupt CUuLITSYN claimed tu know GOT RO Tere onaily or
[11050]to have worked with him, and WorOnko contradicted GOLITEY
[11051]by saying they haa never ret. Som: ot then, as well as
[11052]CHERE®ZNOV, Supported NOSENKO indirectly through overlapping
[11053]information on specific ¥GB Cperations, but th's asgect
[11055]of their reporting is reviewed in Part 1X.
[11057]2. Cyrroboraticn vf KOSENFO's Inteltigence Career
[11058]Ba. a
[11059]The statements of (psy the sources confirm that:
[11060]KOSENKO was 2 KGB officerwith access to sensitive information:
[11062]oats Vive cure?
[11064]~ Dre Be SWS AAA, ite! Qh Cet vr: :
[11066]EERE said NCSiNKO was a KGB Licutenant colenel (Later
[11068]changed to captain), a friend and protege cf the head
[11070]of the KG3 Secunda Chief Directorate, GRIBAISV, who
[11071]ry.
[11073]oe oe
[11075]a
[11077]approvec NCSFNEO'S (2964) Toy co Geneva. (fe. A aa
[11078]OTHE S I a ee i eee mags ,
[11081]"chief," with access to detarts en-KG2 .pera-
[11082]tions against the U.S. Ercassy, and was mosc revently
[11083]Daputy Chief of the Tourist Cepartment. fic also stated
[11084]that NCSENKO, with his information on U.S. Embassy micro-
[11085]phones and KG3 operations involving cocrespondents and
[11086]tourists, was “more valuuvle [to American intelligence]
[11087]than PENKOVSKIY,"  NOSEKSS "could do tremendous harn
[11088]to the kG2," Gham Eee eR and morecver, tie
[11089]: KGB “will not be able to operate normally tor cwo years*
[11090]: (i.e., until 1956). fe described the repercussions ia
[11091]\ the KGS caused by NCSENKO'S defection: new NGB regu-
[11092]lations to increase secucity, the lismissai of many
[11093]KGB officer 1a GRILANOY and the recall of many
[11097]s includcin
[11099]sa om Se
[11101]Py
[11103].
[11104]S
[11106]: 2
[11107]0
[11108]ct
[11109]a sy
[11110]Oo
[11111]AS
[11112]Lies
[11113]wo
[11115]x
[11116]3}
[11121]O39
[11122]len
[11126]ia)
[11127]od
[11128]3]
[11130].
[11132]wt BAUS OCR ae Te tty eee sensitive source
[11133]stated that .OSENKO had atteniied the GaU's Mili- . . t
[11135]CE ie Smatic Academy (NOSENKO has indicated he de-
[11136]clined the opportunity to enroll in this strategic
[11137]intelligence schcol in the early 1959's.) ‘Afterwares,
[11138]A ETAL 5. SSP NOSENKO served in the GRU and then! entered
[11140]UE. nn ae te
[11142]nee Pe
[11144]se memter ee
[11148]- According to G&S Sf NOSE!KO was in *Intelli-
[11149]gence." His defection Lrought about the recall of a
[11150]KGB secretary from Geneva, the rumored transfer of some
[11151]60 Soviet officials from assignments abroad, and the
[11152]dismissai of KGB personne} including NOSENKO's friend
[11154]& GUK, whe had recomnended the TDY to Geneva. In addi-
[11156]tion, & pee reported, immediately after the de-
[11158]fection Spresentative of the Exits Commission of
[11160]the cpsu central Committee went to Geneva to speak to
[11162]the Soviet Government employees there. @
[11164]said thet NOSENKO had been tried in cugentia in
[11165]for treason and sentenced to death (see Pages 46 and
[11167]342).
[11169]- GOLITSYN feiled to comment wen shown SOSENKO'S
[11170]@ there 15 ede cyciceeaenca SELES! having
[11172]name in L96S, alc
[11174]eT a vn > =
[11175]WEnEDOned woth kn) prior To At ern press anncunce” |
[11176]ment oz pat Cefection in 1964, though i.e had naned
[11178]peooie knoan to him in the Americal Bart .ichz ef the
[11179]KGB econd Chief Directorate. (Snertry arter Cefecting
[11180]GILITSIN saic tract ne Hac visited this Deparctzent in
[11181]3960 and at tne turr of the year 1360-1961.) After
[11182]NOSENKO defected, GCLITSYN was given a suimery of
[11183]NOSENKO'S Liography. ‘hereupen GOLITISYN reported that
[11184]NOSENKO was a KGB officer whon he first met in 1953 and
[11185]last saw in 1959. Fren 1953 to 1957 or 1958, GOLITSYN
[11186]stated, NCSENKG was in the U.S. Embessy Sceticn of the
[11187]American Department, responsible for coverage of U.S.
[11188]military personnel and later either for cthers in the Mss- H
[11189]cow Fmvassy or for correspondents. As of 1953, GOLITSYN
[11190]said, BOSEWUKO was a senior officer in the Tourist Department; |
[11191]as of 1960, he was definitely not in the American Depart-
[11192]: ment. GOLITSYN added that GUK, CHUBANOV, and KASHCHEYEV |
[11193]! were friends in the KGa whom he shared with NOSENKO (see
[11194]: Pages 343-344). ; :
[11196]Source
[11198]Soviet source, Sein BRB, indicated she had :
[11199]. been told by her XGB friend SVIKIN that NOSENKO was a {
[11200]: ®civilian”; he had nevertheless provided information on :
[11201]microphcnes in the U.S. f7:b353 1d had caused “considerable
[11204]Te 2 . pyr, iso nave Cor
[11205]roborated certai- mnon-Intellagence aspects of ts SENKO'S
[11206]background.
[11208]3. Remarks -
[11209]wOurcey,
[11211]Era wi aside, the Soviet sources have certified
[11212]that NOSEXXO was a senior KGB officer, amu all asserted or
[11213]implied that he had access to information valuable to Ameri-
[11214]can Intelligence--the mic= -ag in the U.S. Erbassy being
[11215]one item in common,&
[11220]hee etaneoord .
[11222]14-0000
[11224]Or. ae. .
[11226]7 ond
[11228]\ JOP SECRET ~
[11230]758.
[11232]PATIOS OER. Most of them have described the serious repercus-
[11233]sions cf NOSENKO's defection, The possihilities with regard to
[11234]the accuracy of these sources’ reporting are:
[11236]First, they arc correct. If s0, the foregoing
[11237]analysis is in error, they ore valid sources, and
[11238]CSENKO igs what he claims to be: a genuine defector
[11239]Whose previous positions in the KGb enabled hir to
[11240]divulge all important details on operations against
[11241]Westerners, mainly Amcricans. :
[11243]Second, they are misinformed. If so, the fore-
[11244]going analysis is correct, they may be valic sources,
[11245]and NOSESKO has always beea under KGB control. For
[11246]this to ke true, it would have been necessary for the
[11247]KSB to dispatch NOSERKO with only @ highly restricted
[11248]numker of FGB personnel (including CRILANOV) aware of
[11249]the actual circumstances of the oneration. The K338,
[11250]at the same time, would hove propagated within and out-
[11251]side of the Soviet Intelligence Services the fiction
[11252]that NOSENKO was an actua) bet aisloyal KGB officer
[11253]poorted this fabricatton in vearisus
[11255]r . 20f:
[11256]epout tne severicy of tre TOSS OL NULSLNEO, etc.).
[11258]Third, they have teen purposefully misleading:
[11259]Rnerican Intellicence for their own or KG3 purposes.
[11260]If so, the foregeing analysis is correct, and some or
[11261]all of them have participated in a KGS conspiracy to
[11262]support the bona fides of NOSENKO, a KGS-controlled
[11263]source.
[11265]These possibilities are discussed further in Part IX,
[11267]Sera and te AEE MEU Re the rsvor spreadin
[11269]14-0000
[11271]STU BPS! ae Renee a ace gunner anes ee et an ee
[11273]TOP SECRET
[11275]759,
[11277]“
[11279]H. “Alternative Explanations
[11280]le Introduction
[11282]-“Pparts VIII.B. through VIII.P. have discussed the
[11283]inaccuracies, self-admitted contradictions, inconsistencies,
[11284]and incompleteness of NOSENKO's reporting about himself ‘and
[11285]the KGB. Collectively, these important flaws in the story
[11286]of and by NOSENKO make it necessary to choose an explanation
[11287]for his actions and the nature of his information. There
[11288]are three alternatives:
[11290]Pirst, NOSENKO was a KGB officer but (a) has
[11291]a faulty or selective memory, has embellished or
[11292]boasted, or his reporting has been influenced by a
[11293]combination thereof; or (b) he is insane.
[11295]Second, NOSENKO lied about himself in order to
[11296]save face. .
[11298]Third, NOSENKO has misrepresented himself, either
[11299]on his own or at the instigation of the KGB.
[11301]Each of these mutually exclusive alternatives is discussed
[11302]below.
[11304]2. First Alternative
[11306]According to one postulate, NOSENKO was an officer in
[11307]the KGB but has a faulty memory, has a selective memory,
[11308]and/or has embellished or boasted:
[11310]a. Faulty Memory
[11312]NOSENKO himself has repeatedly appealed for understanding
[11313]that “different pecple have differcnt memories" and that
[11314]his own is, "funny," and this is supported by his forget ful-
[11315]ness and errors concerning events he is kn i cendently
[11316]to have lived through, such as the BURGI and cases.
[11317]But it cannot be said that he is, in general, “very bad with
[11318]names," because he nas almost total rec2il of names and
[11319]positions of hundreds of KGB officers in the Aserican and
[11320]Tourist Departments. He has a good memory for teces and
[11321]rarely failed to recognize photegraphs of people he claimed
[11322]to know. He remembered consistently details about certain
[11323]operations (the compromise and investiga~10n of PENKOVSKIY,
[11324]the surveillance of ABIDIAN to Pushkin Street, the JENNER® ;
[11325]case, the arrest of ‘BARGHOORN, and the search for CHEREPANOV,
[11326]to cite a few examples). NCUSENKO was precisely accurate in
[11327]his recollection of most of his dealings with CIA personnel
[11328]from June 1962 onward.
[11330]b. Selective Memory
[11332]Although having a selective memory is probably true of
[11333]nearly everyone, a CIA psychologist has described NOSENKO as eos
[11334]a@ psychopath who would register each passing event only in .
[11335]relation to its effect on himself at that moment. This
[11336]would inevitably make him indifferent to the characteristics
[11337]of other people, for example, anc to the sequence in which
[11338]events transpired; the aspects important to him might rot
[11339]appear so to a more objective observer. Such a person would
[11341]9 SECRET,
[11343]We
[11345]14-0000
[11347]760,
[11349]suppress unpleasant memories and would have no real appre-
[11350]ciation of or respect for an “objective truth." His re-
[11351]porting, like his perception and his memory, might therefore aaanenee
[11353]. peem distorted. He right recount events according to his
[11355]mood of the monent. Thus, fo~ example, if real attachments = et
[11356]to family or friends is irpossible for a psychopath, there os
[11357]be an explanation as to why NOSENKO cannot easily remember wot
[11359]his childrens! birthdays, why in 1962 (or 1965) he appears
[11361]to have lied--or been indifferent to the truth--about his
[11363]older daughter's schooling, and why he cannot recall whes
[11365]he first married. In theory this hypothesis can explain
[11367]any aberration, since it involves the unknowable. In its
[11369]most extreme form, by describing NOSENKO as one unable to
[11371]discriminate between fact and fancy, it would encompass and
[11373]explain away the facts that his story is obviously untrue
[11375]and contradictory in major ways, that his uccount of his
[11377]personal and professional lite and his rendition of the.
[11379]information he knows are so vague and unsubstantial; that
[11381]he cannot (and/or does not care to) remewver or recount
[11383]how he did the things he did. Most important, it woula
[11385]dismiss any conciusions based on NOSENKO's testimony siace
[11387]nothing NOSENKO said could be taken seriously. This hypo-
[11389]thesis, however, is unsupportable because of several
[11391]factors.
[11393]First, NOSENKO claims--and other sources confirm--that
[11394]he quickly rose to high supervisory responsibility in a
[11395]counterintelligence organization which is known to require
[11396]attention to detail. He would have risen in the KGB while’
[11397]overcoming the black marks in his file; scandal, indiscip-
[11398]line, negative background factors, and bed Party record.
[11399]NOSENKO admits that his performance was not good; he was
[11400]dnattentive and inactive and almost none of his operational
[11401]activity was carried out unaccompanied. That his rise re-
[11402]sulted from his father's influence or GRIBANOV's is unten=
[11403]able, for his father died in 1956 and GRIBANOV's patronage
[11404](itself open to the strongest doubt) would not and could not
[11405]be dispensed upon such a mental case. Mental aberration to
[11406]the degree which would explain his poor performance under
[11407]CIA interrogation would necessarily have hindered his pere~
[11408]formance of KGB duties, denied him special privileges, and
[11409]and hence cost him the career which NOSENKO has claimed for
[11410]himself.
[11412]A second factor negating this hypothesis of a psycho-
[11413]pathic personality is that such a person could be induced
[11414]to recall certain details with the help of discussion,
[11415]questioning, and reminders, whereas NOSENKO's vague and hazy
[11416]reports seem to represent the absolute limits of his memory
[11417]or knowledge. Years of questioning have not succeeded in
[11418]dredging up any new details or incidents. Even when reminded,
[11419]be could not recall, for example, one of KOSOLAPOV'’s TDYs to
[11420]Helsinki, the details of the seizure of electronic equipment
[11421]from the U.S. Arny Attaches at Stalingrad, the correct date
[11422]of GOLITSYN's defection, or the presence of KHRUSHCHEY in
[11423]Moscow at the time of the decision to arrest BARGHOORN,.
[11425]Another factor is the impossibility of applying this
[11426]hypothesis to the totality of NOSENKO's reporting. If the
[11427]hypothesis holds that some things are important to him and
[11428]others are not, and that he therefore remembers the former
[11429]and forgets the latter, it is refuted by the inability ‘to.
[11431]TOP SECRET
[11433]1400008.
[11435]a ee cal A
[11437]761.
[11439]find a category of information about himself which he con-
[11440]Gistently remenbered nor any that he consistent y forgot:
[11442]f what is important is his cwn direct experiences, for
[11443]example, it is odd that he recéfled the operations of others
[11444]better than his own; he remembered the names of hundreds of
[11445]KGB officers, but could not recall names of his own agents
[11446]and people involved in his own career; he could recount
[11447]details of the PEXKOVSKIY investigation, in which he did
[11448]not participate, but not of the discovery of American spies
[11449]among tourists, such as NcGOWAN, for which he was responsible,
[11450]he remembered details uf the 1955 MALIA case in which he
[11451]did not meet the target personally but forgot details of the
[11452]1961 KEYSERS case in which he did. If it is the importance
[11453]to him of recruitment operations against U.S, Embassy em-
[11454]ployees which permitted him to recall some details of the
[11455]STORSBERG and MULE operations, it is not important enough
[11456]to help him recall some of the other details which were
[11457]equally pertinent to nim personally; and it ts not selective
[11458]memory which made him forget almost every detail about CIA
[11459]personnel in Moscow and KCB actton against them. If it is
[11460]said that his parental faniiy is important to him ( hence
[11461]his memory of his father's funeral and the names of his
[11462]uncles and aunts), it is odd that he cannot recall details
[11463]about his childhood. If drinking with important people is
[11464]meaningful to him, it would explain why he remembers one
[11465]GRIBANOV evening with sharp clarity, but it does not explain
[11466]why he cannot remember the other two times, not even in what
[11467]season of the ycar or in what restauraht they took plece.
[11469]Finally, with reference to the “selective memory" hypo-
[11470]thesis, it is precisely in matters NOSENKO said he remembers
[11471]best and which he told most confidently that the majority of .
[11472]inexplicable contradictions arise. Nothing could shake him
[11473]from his claim to have been directly responsible for ABiDIAN
[11474]or on his story of the Pushkin Street dead drop, among
[11475]numerous exanples.
[11477]ce. Embellishment
[11479]The third possibility is that he has simply enbel lished
[11480]and boasted, while underlying his story is a core of truth
[11481]somewhere near what he has reported. NOSENKO has, after all,
[11482]admitted many “white lies" and boasts ("painting” himself, as
[11483]he called it). Also, in the interrogations there were
[11484]repeated signs that he was fabricating and improvising, often
[11485]in ways which led him into more contradictions and further
[11486]admissions of white lies. Perhaps then, according to this
[11487]hypothesis, he simply invented, on his ovo, various aspects
[11488]of his career. Perhaps he dated his entry into the KGB
[11490]earlier to make himself seem more experienced, and invented
[11491]“his service in the American Department to make himself more
[11493]interesting to American Intelligence. Perhaps he was only
[11494]a principal agent, not a staff officer, but learned enough
[11495]from his operations and from his handlers to think he could
[11497]‘pose as one. This hypothesis would certainly explain many
[11499]of the dubious aspects: the story of his career, his lack
[11500]of information on KGB staff procedures, his ignorance of
[11501]major KGB events and sources, the degree of his relationship
[11502]with GRIBANOV, etc. This theory, however, founders on &
[11503]number of points: “
[11505]Le ee este
[11508]14-0000
[11510]“wo sources reported the recall to Mose
[11512]oath untdy
[11514]- - 762.
[11515]The validity of the information he 138 provided.
[11517]geet such information te xould have to be a KOR
[11518]staff officer, sust bave worked in eth the Awmcrican
[11519]and Tourast Departments 4° te says he did, azd wust
[11520]nave been & fair)y senior of ficer with brosc respor-
[11521]sibilities (in view of the number of Tourist Department -,..
[11522]operetiors revesled by naze in his 1964 notes). 79
[11523]pane a few other exarples from among huncreds possidle:
[11525](a) NOSENKO not only kaew the identity of @ KGB
[11526]double agent agaiast CIA, BELISSKIY, but gave checsable
[11527]details from inside the cASC. including the nenes by
[11528]which the CIA case orficers identified themseives <0
[11530]the double agent;
[11532](b) NOSENKO was able to report, with almost com~
[11533]lete accuracy, that C14 ceased clandestine letter-
[11534]Soviet Union for over 4 year after
[11536]mailings. inside the
[11538]the arrest of Russell LANGELLE in late 1959;
[11539](c) He identified several Americans recruited oF
[11541]gppreached by the KGB in operat ions in which he said
[11543]be did rot directly participates including “ANDREY"
[11545](Dayle SYUITH), Sergeant Robert JOHNSON, and Henry
[11549](4) NOSENKO kres inside informatisn oD Amer icacs
[11551]at the gEabassy in YWoscouw, including operational activi-
[11553]tics of Jobnr Y TDL AN CWI STERS? mailing of a letter to
[11555]popoy, the horosexuality of two diplomatic officers.
[11559]tain details of the story of Alek-
[11561](e) “We knew cer
[11562]ja not have been available
[11565]outside the KGB staff.
[11567]Thus there would not be any great need nor nuch roo
[11568]for enbellisbrent-
[11569]He appeared before
[11571]-The om nfirnations of others.
[11573]RN and cthe® KGB targets 4
[11574]: syubsuurces confirmed XNUSESNKO"S unusual
[11576]ispoiTe.. that he was 2 Deputy Pepartmeat Chief ia
[11577]the XCB, that his defection was 2 severe blow to Soviet
[11578]Jnteliigence: that he was morc importast
[11579]and so on. A Soviet journalist told Par
[11580]NOG ENKO'S aefectioa was the createst [Tass 2
[11581]by Soviet Intelligence-¥
[11583]m5 en og nay &: a gee
[11584]ow of many nob staffers 85
[11585]e defection, and these officers did
[11587]to the Soviet union.
[11588]only miaor details such
[11590]a result of th
[11591]jndeed retura
[11593]Liishment must concern
[11595]Thus any enmbe
[11596]which he has already admitted.
[11598]as his rank,
[11599]d. Corbination of Above
[11600]Another possibility might be that NOSENSO'S poor per-
[11601]formance ¥as due to a combination of bad senory, psycho-
[11602]pathologically selective memory, and eabellishnent. while
[11603]this theory is yntrinsically nore logical acd might correct
[11604]and rovnd off some obvious weaknesses in any one of the
[11606]u
[11608]ma
[11609]rom)
[11610]17)
[11614]s a “cnicf " and sensiti
[11615]. nsitive soureelg
[11618]14-0000
[11620]+ ce wemeeeee oe lt HR, rtm ame et
[11622]tot
[11624]763.
[11626](ndividual theories, {t cannot explain the counterarguzents
[11627]discussed under corponcat parte above.
[11632]It might ve postulates that NOSENKO weat insano and that
[11633]this ves the cause not only of his seentingly unmotivated
[11634]contact with CIA 35 1962 but of shortcomings tin his story.
[11635]However, NOSZNXO thereafter iandled senior KGB functions
[11636]well enough to be promoted aru to be percitted abroad in
[11637]1964; he has Seca excnined periciically by a CIA psyciolo-
[11638]gist and a CIA psychiatrist; he has heen in contact over
[11639]considerable periois of time and under veryirg degrees of
[11640]stress with experienced CIA and FRI persenanel; he has saine
[11641]tained his equilibriun under difficult circunstances. Nore
[11642]of the fcregoing results in an irdication of fnzanity and
[11643]there are countless other argunents which would invalidate
[11645]this hypothesis.
[11647]3. Second Alternative
[11649]It has also heen postulated that NOSENKO is a psycho-~ ee
[11651]path, is what he says he is, but that rer psychological
[11652]reasons and while under interrogation, he dia not want to
[11653]tell whet he knew. By this line of reasoning, NOSENKO has
[11654]lied for no other reason than to save face; by dwelling on
[11655]the inconasisteacies in NOSENKO'sS statements, the interro-
[11656]-ator merely caused nore inconsistescies or else received
[11657]the false answers tnat NOSENKO did not know or did not re-
[11658]menber the fucts. Uncer interrogation, hewever, NOSENKO
[11659]recalled ard repeated what he had previousiy said in the
[11660]less inhibiting atmosphere ef the relaxed debricfings prior
[11661]to 4 April 1964. Tnis alternative explanation
[11662]thus does aot account for the factual contradictions in
[11663]NOSENKO's reporting before the interrogations, such as the
[11664]errors in dates, in sourcing on the "ANDREY" case, in de-
[11665]tails about the Pushkin Surect dead drop, etc. It also
[11666]fails to account for KOSESK?'s retractions about his rank as
[11667]lieutenant cvelonel, in tie {ace of the ¥GB TDY travel autho-
[11668]rization which shows hin to be a Lieutenant colonel, and
[11669]about the telecraa recallia. hia to SOS Headquarters ia
[11671]b ray
[11673]January 1961. €¢ WT fener ROE OE Ee Ue
[11675]SAREE The suczestion that NOSENKO lied to
[11676]cn ee a gm ere
[11677]save face Consequently cau be disnissed.
[11679]4. Third Altersative
[11681]The only other postulate is that NOSENKO is not what
[11682]he claims to be, in which casc his sisrepresentation was
[11683]done either on his own or as part of a KGB operation.
[11685]if he is misrepresenting himself on his own, there are
[11686](even in theory) only two possibilities: He ts rerely exag- \
[11687]gerating (discussed above, under the "First Alternative") or
[11688]he is a fabricator. He cannot be a fabricator, however, since
[11689]the Soviets have certified him in wany ways; includirg his:
[11690]diplonatic status at the Geneva Conference, Soviet oficial
[11691]protests and Sovict Embassy confrontation in Washington,
[11692]Soviet officials’ renarks in various ereas of the world, and
[11693]reports fron @iGnasoam other sources on his KGB status end
[11694]importance. sensitive saree and ; :
[11696]~ 2 SECRET
[11698]14-0000 . .
[11700]7164,
[11702]There remains the possibility that NOSENKO has misrep-
[11703]resented himself and is a witting part of a KGB operation. This
[11704]hypothesis could accormodate the argument that the KGB would —
[11705]not dispatch a KGS staff officer ag a Gouble agent against a
[11706]hostile service because, whether or not the arguzent is valid,
[11707]NOSENKO (as indicated in Part VIII.9. above) has not proven his
[11708]claim to having served as an officer of the KGB. If he has
[11709]been and is now under KGB control, it would eppear that he was
[11710]being built up for years to look like an officer and was shown
[11711]to Kesterners in certain recruitment operations.* This could
[11712]explain NOSENKO's revelations to.FPRIPPEL and others about his
[11713]family and background; the otherwise pointless W.E. JOHNSON
[11714]case, and NOSENKO's appezrance in the BARGHOORN interrogation.
[11716]; It could explain NOSENKO's uneven memory and performance under
[11717]. detailed questionirg: Much of what he should have known by
[11718]personal experience could have been merely memorized as part
[11720]of his KGB briefing. Nothing in NOSEN“O'S production (see
[11722]Part VII1.B. above) would preclude his being a KGS-dispatched.
[11723]agent. That he was a KGB-dispatcnes agent was the conclusion
[11724]independently arrived at by the CIA speciaiist who administered
[11725]a polygraph examination to NCSENKO in April 1964.
[11727]4. Pemarks
[11729]The first alternative above has been rejected while the
[11730]possibility that MOSESKO on his own misrepresented himself
[11731]is unacceptable. The remaining possibility is that NOSENKO
[11732]has been manipulated by the KGB in an operation directed
[11733]against American Intelligence.
[11739]© fis American Department service in 1960-1961 was not supported
[11740]by any such “shew” appearances--he did not insist on the
[11741]truth of his claim to participation 15 the KEYSERS case,
[11742]which, moreover KEYSERS ¢ a t confirm; PREISFPESUND is an
[11743]unreliable witness; ancg is not accessible to
[11744]interview.
[11746]greener acer
[11747]chan one
[11749]he 10P SECRET -
[11751]Si eeetian ae
[11753]1400000
[11757]sitive
[11759]sources vipat —-" NOSENKO and others to tie contrary
[11761]I. Sunsary of Conclusions
[11763]CIA has considered every major aspect of the NOSENKO
[11764]case for the purpose of reaching & definitive corelusion
[11765]about the bone fides of this ap aho says he is a KGB
[11766]officer-detector coslaborattng with Ancr.can Intelligence.
[11768]As this point-by-point analysis has denonstrated,
[11769]there is no reason to accept any of SOSENKO'S eclaina to
[11770]a carcer as 8n officer it Soviet Intelligence, to authority
[11771]concerning the range and degrec of KGB operational successcs
[11772]in the USSR {particularly with U.S. offictals and private
[11773]citizens), to accurate knowledge regarding rajor security
[11774]cases in that country, or to cooperation with Arerican Intel-
[11776]ligeree.
[11778]it would be surficient proof of his mala fides to
[11779]yerify that NOSENKO Jied about a singic HeEnent OF his
[11780]cereer in the KGB. lic cannot have becn truthful in saying
[11781]that he was the Doputy Chief of the u.s. FE bassy Section,
[11782]Azerican Departacnt, KGN Secons Chicf Directurate. dn 1960-
[11783]3961 and a Deputy Catef in the Pourist Departacrt af the
[11784]sane directorate fron 14962 until als defection. Sucerous
[11785]indications make it duubtiul that SOSFNKO, as he contended,
[11786]Delengea to the naval GNU in 1951-1952, to the U.S. Enbassy
[11787]Section in 1953-1955, and to the American [Tourist Section
[11788]in 1959-1959. He wes unable to support his alleged staff
[11789]officer status in the EGB, providing incomplete ard inaccu-
[11790]rate information on his sub-sources and on such topics 85
[11791]Headquarters staff procedurcs while making illogical statae
[11792]rents on modus operandat. Neither a supervisor nor, proe
[11793]pably, a case oTTicer, it remains dubious but possible that
[11794]he wes a KGB principal agent whose speciality ta the past
[11795]was conpronising Western hoanscaxuals. énatever the capacity
[11796]in which NOSENKO served, it was not in the KGD rans, holding
[11797]the KGB titles, oF with the KGB honors he has ascrited to
[11798]hirself, and this fact is enough to prove the falsity of
[11799]his claims to being a genuine defector.
[11801]There is no question, hosever, that NOSENKO has had
[11802]the benefit of inside information fron the KCb. He has
[11803]eatd so, other sources have said so. the Sovict Government's
[11804]yeactions to the defection ypplécd as puch, anc his reports
[11805]contain details which could have coze enly from the KGe.
[11806]He was introduced into several operations, the first as
[11807]early as 1953, in a position appear ing “senior” to known KGB
[11808]staff officcts. He has provided data on organization, per=-
[11809]sonrel, and methods ccaplerent ing ard suppienenting that fron
[11810]others affiliated with the KGB. purposefully nisleading
[11811]about hinself, NOSENKO has aleo Deon deceitiul in discussing
[11812]the compromises of CHEREPANOV, PENKOVSKIY, and perkaps POPOV,
[11813]although here yas reporting ofte: correlates with that from
[11814]several CUA RE. IEE eres A Analysis shovs
[11818]a KGB provocateur, PE KOVSKIY was detected at the latest in
[11819]early 1961 pot 1952, and POPOV was probably uncovered earlicr
[11820]than January 1959 because of & KCB agent rather than survetl-
[11821]lance. KOSENKO thus has not merely misrepresented hinself but
[11822]has practiced deception uncer KGB guidance. Appraisals of
[11823]KOSENKO's performance under interrogatioa, his alleged motiva-
[11824]tion, and the operational circuastances support this view.
[11830]14-0000
[11832]W TopSECRET 7
[11836]766, \
[11837]Furthermore, it 18 the only acceptable oxplanation, em0ag f. -
[11838]the alternatives, for what bas transpired since contact with ‘
[11840]CIA began in 1962.
[11842]CIA's conclusion about the bona fides of NOSENKO is
[11843]unequivocal: ie is a dispatched agent controlled by the KGB,
[11845]Part 1X contains a discuasion of the impitcations of
[11846]the forezoirg conclusion for the Soviet scurces who, G)g¥ eR
[11847]EUR TTS hs tae Qi, have corrcborated the bona
[11849]i
[11850]i
[11852]pete apne ae ee es
[11854]TOP SECRET
[11857]14-0000
[11859]Ce a | oe 1 ne
[11863]Bt eae on a Po Eee at = ve : ot _ : <
[11864]“ike GEES PR OER
[11865]Ae deueetuetion _ tensitive cowees
[11867]is). The conclusion that NOSENKO did not serve in the KCB
[11868]- positions he claimed contradicts information reported to CIA
[11870]"+ and the FBI by (two categories of Seviet Inte:
[11871](2), Jthe ¢ TSYN (2) a
[11873]SRST :
[11875]whom have claimed to be collaborating honestly with Acaerican
[11877]Intellisence, stated or impiied that NOSENXO held erator
[11879]positions itn the KG3 Second Chief Directorate."* %f the con-
[11881]clusion cf this study of 'iCSEiKO's beng Ziges 15 accurate, none =
[11882]-. sources can be correct, ind they nist therefcre be re
[11884]in assessing whether and how Gseusd . Sa seacitive
[11885]souress could have been innocently misinformed adout SENKU efter he /
[11886]defected, 1t is necessary to consider the ways in whict the KGB
[11887]might Mave create? end supported a legend for a counterfeit KCB
[11888]officer-cefector like NOZJENKO, ‘The FSB might have accorplished
[11889]this by the following mear.s:
[11891]- NOSENKO's legend would have required the KC to
[11892]brief Kim in depch on sune:ous cases and various tergets
[11893]which he would be free to discuss wath CiA. The KGS
[11894]would also have to familiar:ze nim with KSE staff organi-
[11895]cational structure and procedyies,*** e7d KSB officers
[11896]prominent in his story le.g., GUx, KOVENLK, TSMeaL, .
[11897]GRIEANOV) so that he could noc only recesnize their i
[11898]photographs but also leri reality to his remarks arout
[11899]them, NOSENKO would also have co visit KG3 installations
[11900]and other 2reus which appeared in his legerd.
[11902]a“?
[11904]® Sources whose reporting tended to support NOSENKO but who
[11905]have not been members of the Soviet Inrelligence Services
[11906]are elimanated from Cetailed ccnsidecation here because
[11907]their connections with NOSEXKC are lees direct then the
[11908]sources with service in the KGB and GRU. @& Rome has) Source!
[11909]never reen a Soviet Intelligence officer, enc hia support
[11910]for NOSENKO has been relatively i:mated. Nowever, he re-
[11911]ported cn repercussions in Geneva caused sy NCSENKO's ce- A
[11912]: fection and like NOSENKU, he said that the KGB suspected
[11913]: , the U.S. State Department officirai David MARK of belonging
[11914]i to CIA. He has also reported on certain personalities
[11915]prominent in NOSENKO's reporting, including Yu. I. GUK
[11916]ana V.V. VAKRUSHEV,
[11918]** Although all of them supported NOSENKO by confirming his
[11919]KGB status, there is nevertheless a distance differerce
[11920]between GOLITSYN's opinion about him ane the statements
[11921]by the other sources. GOLITSYN believed NISENKO to be a ;
[11922]KGB-cispatched agent, while the rest indicated that he was i
[11923]a genuine defector. |
[11925]pete eee
[11927]te*That these preparations were imperfect, cr at least that
[11928]NOSENKO imperfectly mastered his briefing, was shown in
[11929]his performance urder interrogation.
[11931]be seer renee
[11933]j a FoR SEGRET
[11936]14-0000
[11938]te 768,
[11942]co “ . Mwother phase of the praperations vould have been
[11943]1" WOSMSND's artval and doowmstrable participation in opers-
[11945]Spt Ata ee
[11947]2°“ e1oce, eeentngly aa & X58 officers Preaunably this sould
[11948]* "Se done so that Festerners (6.G., BARGIOS?N, FRIPPEL, afd
[11950]WE. SHASON) could sertify that they hee scan HOSENKO. in
[11951]some such role.* a
[11953]~ The KGB presumably would have restricted the number
[11955]of {ts officers aware of sae or all of the operational
[11956]plan; it would nonetheless ke faced with the problem of
[11957]how public krowlecce of NCOSENKO's defection might affect
[11958]others in the service, G3 officers abroad uninformed cf
[11959]the operational plan micht be indiscreet with foreigners,
[11960]in meeting Westerr. double agents, or before micropheres in
[11961]their hotes and office3, aking sich remarks es “I. never
[11962]heard of this man NOSEIKO” or specslating close to the
[11963]mark. Thus the KG3 might : co eo, r thea rosa
[11964]fides of INKC SSR <a ; eg
[11965]+ ESSEC Se eb SE “iE
[11966]rumors about his authuaricity (this on the part of the
[11967]limited few awere of the facts of tre case), Sy recalling
[11968]KGb officers trom the poate in the west (osteasibly be-
[11969]cause they were rKhown to NOSENKO), zy announcing the whole-
[11970]sale dismissal of those responsibie inciuding GRIBALOYV
[11971](although in fact they may have routinely retired cr may
[11972]have been removed from tn main streem of KGB Heacdcuarters
[11973]activities). and by making ¢ announcener.ts within
[11974]the KGB ,anzonurn the "loss" Fs cu the defection ae
[11975]‘ einictes RoE be oe ee Fucther-
[11976]more, S15 MAD EOviet Practice t2 maxe a bad ex-
[11977]ample of defectors, such annvuncements might be expected
[11979]to denagrate WCSENKO is a “pad character ‘with venereal
[11980]‘disease; an oda Party record, self-inflicted wound, etc.,
[11982]in his packsground. The KG2 mignt a1s0 have taken pains
[11984]to support hOSENKO further by having Western Intelligence
[11985]sources, notabay double agents recognized by the KGB to
[11987]be such, told cf the seriousness of the defection.
[11991]one misht judge whether
[11993]WP concerning NOSENKO
[11995]& H
[11997]It is within this
[11998]the reperts off Mak es
[11999]were unwitting repetitions of wise.y <o:55
[12001]or whether their reports constactted purposeful passage of KGB
[12002]disinformation. .
[12006]Their direct and indirect support of NUSENKO's bona fizes,
[12007]as well as the statements by GOLITSYN, are presented and evaluated
[12008]in the next sections kelow, tocether with presentations and
[12009]appraisals of their informaticn on topics OF porting inc
[12010]with NOSEXKO's. Certain reports by ;
[12012]on
[12014]Source
[12016]* It 2:8 noteworthy that guch participation was linited to Tourist
[12017]Depertrent operations. NOSENKO did not claim physical partici-
[12018]pation in any contacts with American mnbassy officials during
[12019]the periods 1953-55 cr 1960-61, except for MULE and STORSBERG
[12020](where his clained role was uncheckacrile since it involved only
[12021]holding a door) and KEYZERS (whachn KEYZERS did rot ‘confirm
[12022]ard on wnich NOSENKO did not insist, admitting that he doubted
[12023]KEYZERS. would remember or recognize hin.
[12025]ror secret
[12027]i
[12028])
[12031]oe
[12033]14-0000
[12035]- a at : ae we Baye ' a
[12036]; ’ 769. 7 ok
[12037]. -, ae J 7 os * . ses ,
[12038]‘ a mye vot a syct ne “! wt aon we wE .
[12039]to ecdinaenrn ; are elso conaidered be
[12040]2. overlap HCSES* g sme extent, although by saying he was a
[12042]F 74 Civilian, @MASoE Mame contradicted his claim to KG3 atale
[12043]‘pte Jk) officer status. A number of general correlsticns batween the |
[12044]17 1°" MOBENKO case ard the prep is Vane a Tae Santee Re Dee Pate Ee ee
[12046]tterces . operations are then reviewed. kha final section of rart IX is &
[12048]pumary of conclusions about the relationship between the NOSENKO 9 oy 3
[12050]‘case snd the reporting about him by GOLITSN, GIRS As Re “7
[12051]Sr aaa = -
[12055]i
[12057]f
[12061]ger
[12063]: Tor se
[12065]14-0000
[12069]TOP SEGzz
[12071]Be
[12073]be ‘ 4 hey
[12074]: . a rr 1
[12075]. a tT aA
[12076]bug
[12077]hoe TRE Wa
[12079]ty ’
[12080]yeatiun fae Teor cughrzcc the
[12082]Sane a8he, atten aAts unst stings with SCSENKO
[12083]iarge overlap Of NOSLNKO'S anZormation and con-
[12084]aa of the CLA care of f.etrs who hau net
[12085]Low:eth GOLITSVN to G2 Pain tas Comments On Sue
[12086]SOLATSYN todd ClA had receive:
[12087]let.er i certarnm informs:
[12088]ota Le GOLUB that
[12092]te
[12093],
[12095]Lib
[12097]t .
[12098]moon ‘ LOYiaue Lt
[12099]rot an frum WOS!,
[12100]’ . : Chic?
[12101]i an sii
[12102]: i
[12103]. v4
[12104]Lowe,
[12105]~ f
[12106]st
[12109]ra ah general, .
[12110]ew cowl Soy | tat re WOE
[12111]ee We.l seen; “(e wor at Lo se
[12112]Tt was not j ven to hit.
[12114]on 40 Februscy 1964 Nuor
[12116]hols uercation trea the Sovret Pis-
[12117]acnmaument Celeyation rm Genevt, Suitevrband wa. tal red, anclud-
[12118]ing bis RGB afti.l:alron. When GOLETA Boar t s he am.edci-
[12119]ately recalled the ace jue2d “hucter” froma Seivcerbang snd linsed
[12120]HOSENZG to 1t; ne wiereepor stated thut ue recsided MOSENKO as @
[12122]member of tue Second Chtef urrectoraha working
[12123]e*tizens.
[12125]equsnst Awerican
[12127]Qn gl PeLsuary Joes
[12129]‘was given some bickgs
[12130]reservations abour br
[12131]mentns GOLITSYN was provided f€ataa tren tuc 1962 and 1964
[12132]meetings with NOSENKG ins land, amd at nis rcequcest was
[12133]supplied with ull the avallutle Diugraphic data ob NOSENKA to
[12134]ossist nim in analyzing the wperatasn. On 2) dune L964, GOLITSYN
[12135]was interviewed an cetaatd on the subject of hesa vu. He confirmea
[12136]NOSENKO'S adentaty as the eva of the former Miraster or Ship-
[12137]buildany und said trat he was a KGb ctiicerc whe had worked in the
[12138]American Depactment and the ‘Tourrsh Dep tre at the KGB's Second
[12139]Chief Directorate. te wes shewn « plat ogre ef S05 0. thot
[12140]buried in a pheto sore wo oganety) and dia cfentabhed 2t as a
[12141]photeyruph of the mun he hanew., Ae thers
[12142]abou. UWOSESKO whach 1s summa zed below.
[12144]TOP SECHET
[12146]tne wad PAE,
[12148]Lore he gave the information
[12151]14-0000
[12153]'
[12155]|
[12156]-
[12158]The NUSENKU case hus not heen discussed with GOLITSYI since
[12160]the 23 dune 1964 jatervied; thus he nas not Leen questioned
[12162]further on the eireunstunces which led to the encounters with
[12164]HOSENKU descrihed by him, nor have the results of subsequent
[12166]detailed reinterrogutions of NUSENKO - discussed st length in
[12168]the foregoing sections of this paper - been made available to
[12170]him for review, analysis, or commente
[12172]2. Resume and Discussion of Infermation*
[12174]american Departmont = 1953
[12175]ed the KGB in arch 1953**
[12177]NUSLUKO has said that he enter
[12179]and was first assiqned to the U.S. Embassy Section of the Ancrican
[12181]Department of what Js now the Second Chief Directorate, KGB. He
[12183]atetad that his duties from hig entry until sometime in 1954, per-
[12185]haps about June, were to work on files of american correspondents
[12187]on permanent assignment to “osco# and to meet with the Soviet
[12189]he corres-
[12191]citizens who were jgents Or informants reporting on t
[12193]pondents to the KGB.
[12195]GOLITSM stated that he met NOSENKO in the #merican Depart-
[12197]ment of the Internal Counterintelligence Directorate***® a couple
[12199]of times in 1953 when he, GLITSYN, was there on other matters.
[12201]GOLITSYN had earlier identified his owm job between becember
[12203]1952 and April 1953 as Chief of the american Sector, Counter-
[12205]intelligence (Ninth) Department, Foreign Directorate, under the
[12207]Chief Intelligence Directorate (formed in December 1952 and re-
[12209]organized in April 1953). From April 1953 until his departure
[12211]oars ae
[12212]* The relationship between the reporting by GOLITSYN and NOSENKO
[12214]on specific operations is shown on Pages §94-595, with comments
[12216]thereon appesring on Pages 647-659, while in this section are
[12218]a discussion and an evaluation of what GCLITSYN said about
[12220]NOSENKU's assignments in the Second Chief Directorate (see
[12222]Pages 343-344).
[12224]#® «mong the various dates civen by NOSENKO for this entry. March 1983
[12226]has bean given more often than others and is more consistent with
[12228]the rest of NOSENKO's story. ;
[12229]KGB Second Chief prreceorece OP gps, éi
[12231]eeemin da now Aeaicnated the
[12233]b.
[12235]for Vienna in October 1953 GOLITIY% ‘was Deputy Chief of “the
[12237]Emigre Secter, Counterintellicence vepartment, Foreign Intzlligenc?
[12238]Department, Foreign Intelligence Directorate. COLITSYN has not
[12239]indicated the nature of his responsibilities in either of these
[12241]positions whicn would have necessit3ted his visiting the American
[12243]b
[12244]i:
[12248]Department of the Internal Counterintelligence Directorate, although
[12250]certain activities of cormon interest with the latter would appear
[12251]- logical. NOSENKO's description of his alleged duties with corres-
[12252]pondents, however, did not encompsss his having official contacts
[12253]with representatives of any component of the Counterintelligenc?
[12254]Department of the Foreign Directorate. According to NOSENKO'2
[12255]description of the location of his claimed office in the American
[12256]Department, and his description of the duties of the co-worzers
[12258]he said shared it with his. chance contecta there with such a
[12260]representative would have been’ precluded. Even by NOSEIKO's account,
[12262]then, an encounter between GOLITSYN and himself could not have
[12263]been in the course of interdepartmental lisison between their
[12264]respective units, nor could it have occurred in NOSETKO's office.
[12265]GOLITSYS*s lack of reporting on KCB operations against American
[12266]correspondents (other than his conversation with KOVSHUK in 1956
[12267]or 1957 about Henry SHAPIRO) is further evidence that his business
[12268]. in the American Department was unrelated to NCSENKO's claimed
[12269]activities at that time, and GOLITSYN's own statexent on the 1953
[12270]encounters implied that his meetings with NOSENKO were accidental.
[12271]Pleeting as their contacts would therefore have been, it could
[12272]have led GULITSYN to make the unfounded assumption that NOSENKO ©
[12273]was a member of the staff within the smerican Department.
[12274]feerican Cepartment/Tourist Department - 1955-1960
[12276]NOSEXKO stated that he transferred from the American Depart-
[12277]went to the Tourist Department in June 1955, and remained in the
[12278]Tourist Department until 1960, becoming a deputy chief of section
[12279]there in 1958.
[12281]GOLITSYN, however, insisted that NOSEXKO remained in the
[12283]- American Oepartment until at least 1957, or possibly as late as
[12285]wet
[12286]nae
[12287]2
[12290]14-0000
[12292]swore
[12294]TOP SECEET
[12296]HOStEAU's true position in the american Vepactnent in 13957 or
[12298]1958. GOLITSM did not tndscate how he accuuired his knowledge
[12300]on this nor why the KGB subsequently would have Dean unable to
[12301]determine thet ne had. If nis access to this information was in-
[12302]decd that remote (a3 GULITS(I's assignment ia 1957 and 1958 ould
[12303]indicate - see below), it is readily apparent that {it could Llike- us
[12304]wise be sonewhat garbled. COLITSYN was unable to explain the I
[12305]fact that NOSEKKO's physica} presence in exclusively Tourist
[12306]Department cases had been ,ositively established through photo |
[12308]identifications made by several of the individuals “involved, who
[12310]met NOSEIKO a9 eurly as 1956.
[12312]From 1955 to 1959 (the same years when NOSENKO claimed to
[12313]have becn in the Tcurist Departrant) GOLITSYY was enrolled in
[12314]the KCB Higher School. le was detached from the school, in the
[12315]period January-larcn 1959, in order to gether material for his
[12316]thesis. At that time GOLITS Al spent just under tvo months in
[12317]the Tourist Department,* but GOLITSYN’s work did not involve hia
[12318]in any day-to-day operational activities of this department. He
[12319]has reported having “occasionally” met NOSENKO in 1959; althcuch
[12320]he did not specify that it was at precisely this time, it seems
[12321]probable that it woulec have been. GOLITSYN said that he asked
[12322]NOSENKO in 1989 where he wes working and NOSENKO told him the
[12323]Tourist Department. Again it appears from this that his encounters
[12324]must have been brief, superficial, 3nd not work-related, hence
[12325]insufficient for GOLITSYN to arrive independently at a well-founded
[12326]conclusion as to NOSENKO's sctual status and function with the
[12328]Touriet Departrent.
[12330]ee .
[12331]*In describing his own and others‘ responsibilities in the Teurist
[12332]Department, NOSEYKO has made no reference to this unit having a
[12333]formal or regular relationship with the KGB School or to students
[12335]fran the school having been detached to the department.
[12337]hae
[12339]14-0000 v
[12341]WwW N) a : 7 a . Ae i
[12343]inforazttion es ef villable to VOLIs iss igs . ‘ as
[12344]Tno detulled interrogattons of SOSGEIKY cur vagernina his claims. : .
[12345]to KGB positions betwean 1953 and 1964, did not toke place until
[12346]many months after GOLITSY: made his statenant a, and they were: ya3ed | :
[12347]upon all collatersl information knownyiréLabing to each phase. None- ,
[12348]of the results of these interrogations wags made available to
[12349]GCOLITS’N, so he was not aware of the countless points on which
[12350]NOSEXKO contradicted known facts and revealed his ignorance of
[12351]activities which were carried out by the KGB during his alleged
[12352]tenure in thess-Seportments. -
[12353]3. Comments on GOLITSYN
[12354]Several factors influence the evaluation of GOLITSYN's states
[12355]ments on WOSENKOs
[12356], - First, aS stoted in Part VIII.I., it is concluded
[12357]that NOSENKO aid not serve in the KGB positions ha claimed.
[12358]GOLITSYI's testimony verified this conclusion insofar as
[12359]NOSENKO's claims about service in the U.S, Embassy Section
[12360]of the American Department in 1960-1961 are concerned. hore-
[12361]over, in 1962 GOLITSYN concluded that the KGB “letter-writer®
[12362](actually NOSExKO) was under KG control in submitting infor- ,
[12363]mation to American Intelligence. At issue, therefore, is the
[12364]evidence from GOLITSYN to the effect that NOSENKO was an
[12365]officer in the American Department (until 1957 or 1958, “shereas
[12366]NoSAIKG said he was reassigned from the department in 1955)
[12367]and in the Tourist Department subsequently.
[12369]- Second, GOLITSYN made no comment about or identification
[12370]of NOSENKO prior to the public announcement of the latter's
[12371]defection, despite many previous opportunities to do Prey (e.gee |
[12372]in discussions of GUK, CHURAHOV, and KASHCHEYEV) ard despite
[12373]GOLITSYN'’s proven excellence of memory for names and tasks of
[12374]KGB personnel. GULITSYN gave little detail on the eircun-
[12375]stances of his encounters with NOSHIKO, and. he has not been
[12377]questioned further sbout them. Neverthelze9s. a% indicated in
[12379]the foregoing remarks on the circumstances in which the two tee
[12380]. a:
[12382]men could have met, it seems apparent that any contact would» .
[12384]have been brief, tnfrequent, casual, extra-official, an lp see Rael
[12385]ewtinldie we et dar tn? racy (5) acrtnre siorvéd SAU va
[12387]: : : Ave, vewome se oo woe oe
[12389]the Following discussion considers CULITS EN, information.
[12390]about Nosiiku in conjunction with NOSAKO' 3s dental about havin: ; jo
[12391]b2en in contact with WULINSYI.* vossible axpl ametion: for . i
[12392]COLITSYN's having referred to their encounters bat having mis- a
[12393]identified NUSENKO's positions in the KCB are: First, GOLITS¥
[12394]could have erreds second, COLITSYN cculd have lied for personal _
[12395]reasons;y and third, COLITSM! could heve lied st the direction
[12396]of the KGB because he (like NOSEVKO) is under G3 control. To
[12397]examine each of these points scparetely:
[12399]~ GOLITSYH could have erred. Apart free toe dental
[12401]by HUSEXKO, who is an unreliable source, there 13 no evidence
[12403]to refute COLITSYJ's statement that he and NCS2iKO met in
[12405]the ¢merican Vepartment in 1953 and in the Tourist Department
[12407]in 1958 or 1959. (the conclusion# é2"W'art VIII.I. about
[12409]NOSFUKO's bona fides do not rule out the possibility that
[12411]‘— he was physically present on occasion on the pramises of tha
[12412]two departments in these yoars, although not in the cepacities
[12413]that he has claimed.) The nature of their encounters, however, i
[12414]could have been such thst GOLITSY.I erred in assuming - becs3use
[12416]HOSENKO was secn on or near the premises of the two departments,
[12418]and because NOSENKO told GOLITSYN in 1958 cr 1959 that he was
[12420]in the Tourist Department - that NOSEIKO was therefore an
[12421]officer of these specific elements of the 7.23 Second Chief
[12423]Directorate. Thus, if COLITSYN met NOSENKO as he said, he
[12425]mistakenly identified NOSENKO ag being a menber of the staffs
[12427]. of the ¢merican and Tourist Departments at these times.
[12428]- GOLITSYN ‘could have lied for personal reasons. He may
[12430]have believed that to say he met NOSENKO or to say he knew
[12432]* There is insufficient information available te reach a conclusion ‘
[12433]‘ about, or even speculate on, why NOSENKO was so certain GOLITSY:A's |
[12434]defection occurred in January 1962, as contrasted with the fact
[12436]¥ that it took place on 15 December 1961. '
[12437]t
[12439]oo 10? SECRET ’
[12442]Hus: Likuts. posi tiene in 1 the Kuy would ahd ‘uthenticity to
[12444]his garlier evalu. tion of the NUsENKO Anforastion of 1962,
[12446]to hts. contradictions of NUSLNKO'S st atements concerning
[12447]service in tho U.5. Embassy Section an] the operations of
[12448]thet section, and to his contention thot the KGB would try
[12449]to counteract his (GOLITSYN's) informition by spreading
[12450]purportedly authoritative but purposefully misleading reports
[12451]on the same subject matter. In surmary, COLITS“'s intention
[12452]in lying about NOS2ixO could simely have heen te add greater
[12453]credibility to his expresseé opinion that (kJc:h0 was a ROB
[12454]provocateur,
[12456]-~ CULITSYN could have lied ut the direction of the KGB,
[12457]an explanation that is examined here for the sake of completeness
[12458]and not Lecause Cla has any reason to relieve GOLITSYN is under
[12459]KG3 control. This explenation would mean that COLITSYN,
[12460]although offering partial confirmation for NOsSmKO's claims,
[12461]directly attucked the bona Fics of another KGB-dispatched
[12462]agent of allegedly comparable rank and knowledgeability. acting
[12463]under KG3 instructions, GOLITSYN would have sought to undermine
[12465]ROSENKO's acceptability, regardless of the fact that NOSCNKO
[12467]said he wes providing reliable and comprchensive information
[12469]about KGB overations against «merican officials and tourists.
[12471]in the USSR. At the sume time, NOSEN¢O wis not giving an
[12473]account of their relationship that waa consistent with COLITSYN'‘s,
[12475]‘ by implication NOSENKO was distorting or diluting the earlier
[12476]reports of GOLITSYN on KGB operations in the Soviet Union,
[12478]oo and ROSENKO was seeking to gain acceptance by CIA equal to that
[12480]. experienced by GOLITSN. According to this hypothesis, two
[12481]sources under KGB control - each striving for acceptance -
[12482]deliberately gave conflicting stories of their ralationship,
[12484]and each tried to undermine the bona fides of the other,
[12486]GOLITSYN explictly and NOSENKO by implication, This explanation
[12488]fs so illov‘cal, as well a3 so detrimental to the KGB, that
[12492]it must be rejected from serious consideration.
[12494]ror SECHET, 7
[12497]a
[12499]or
[12501]WPS
[12503]he
[12505]‘Shea choice thus secms to lin betwoer tha first tvo “explanations
[12507]for GLITS I's misiduntification of NUSLNKO, one un understand. thle
[12509]error of s3aumption éraun from thoir fea chancs encounters, ‘the
[12511]other a misguided uttempt thet had no sinister goals. In either
[12513]ecuse, GOLITSYN's testimony does not eontribute to 4 determination
[12515]of the status of NOSENKO within the KGB aa of the years prior
[12517]to 1960.
[12519]There are two explanations for NOSHIKO's denial about having
[12521]met CULITSYI. One explunation is that they were never in personal
[12523]contect, the KGB was uware of this fact, and - unprepared Cor
[12525]GULITSYN's statements to the contrary - the KGB briefed NOSAIKO
[12527]accordingly. If in this particular instance NOSEMKO told the
[12529]truth und (as discussed above) GOLITSYN did not, no additional
[12530]or different conclusion cain be drawn spout the bona fides of
[12531]SOSENKO and his clains of service in the KGB.
[12533]is that, as GOLITSYN said, these encounters did take plece in 1953
[12535]The second explenstion
[12537]and again in 1956 or 1959, but becuusa of their casual and fleeting
[12539]nature, NOSENKO (unlike GOLITSYN) has not remembered them.
[12541]eo * JOP SEGRE
[12547]2. Resume gf _intorirvatsop*
[12549]Aevordiny Co COLPUSYR, he personally meq TOSEREG two or
[12550]three Cones at boos, whale visetane the US. Embassy inceson of
[12551]the Averican tapartueit, « Component of the internal .ccucity
[12552]directorate, und «gain in 1958 and 1958. On the orher hand, -
[12553]NOSEUKO: «as unable to identafy COLITSTI's photograph and he denied
[12554]ever havirg seer has GOLITSY sail chat GUK, CHURANGV. ‘ond
[12555]RASHGIEVEV were triends of SOSENKO as well as of COLITIYN.  (NOS-
[12556]ENKO claimed ta ne on firendly terms with each of ely ve three
[12557]KGH offieerss tee wohnouwledaed, hewowes, that his sequaintance |
[12558]with GUK had bees merery cauzal uruil NOCENKO's three-month TDY ,
[12559]to Coneva an iden wlocu made them the pest of fracnds.) From j
[12560]$952 to f9=7 ap TOLR CULITSYN said, HOSENKO was @ cane officer
[12561]tm the Vos. Batestoy See tron, chen Creansterred 1 the: Vourtst
[12562]Departacnt . wheres bie aes es Sembee ae oMface-e ate 19% tOLETSYN
[12563]Stoted uneqaiveacally cbat BUSENKO was now uw Deputy Chick of, Ube i
[12564]U.S, Einnassy Section or uorherwise setving an chat section or in .
[12565]the Anccican Lepactment. as of the time he (GOLITSYM) wonsulted
[12566]with various otfiacers there in April-June 1960 and January 1961.°%*
[12567]GOLITSYi spoke there with officers svicry NOSENKO claims as close
[12568]colleagues ite dud ng KOVAHURK ard CRYAZIGV, and would doursless
[12569]have known 1f NOsrKO weee supervising or otherwise involved in
[12570]code clerk operations. Ir summary GULITSYN concobor ited some
[12571]of NOSE..K3 s slleswed o:si¢mzent an tiie KGW Second Chi-:{ Direcrorare
[12572]cut not all of tiem while SCOSEUKO contradicted GOLI'T bY by saying
[12573]that the «wo men iad ewer met
[12575]|
[12577]3. Comsunts on Geli rsvs
[12579]From Decenier 1952 untal Apral 1953 GOLITSYN was Chief of
[12580]the Amesican Des« Counterintellicer ce Depactment. Foreign
[12581]Directorate. FG (then 448) and foc most of the period from,
[12582]January to March 1959 ne was on TOY creaining assigunents to the
[12583]Second Chief Gsrestorare In the firse yoo at lease OLITSYN
[12584]presumaoly would have had regular cecalings with the U S. Embassy
[12585]Section, and periap: also in the secaund he would have been in !
[12586]contact with the fourist Lepartmenr, in which NOSENKO claimed
[12587]to have been then serving Despite this and de:pite his
[12588]proven excellence: of memory for ther ranes and tasks of KCB
[12589]personnel, GOLEPSYN never mentioned MeSENKO in debrictings
[12590]éuring the years 1962 ond 1963, nor commented on his name on
[12591]the two occasions when ait was shown to him. although he had
[12592]numerous opportunitics to mencion him in connection with the
[12594]- mames of CHERASICV, FACECHEYEV, ang GUK.
[12596]se ee
[12598]” The relationship between the reporting by GCOLETSYN and
[12599]NOSENFO on specific Operations 1s shown on Puqen 994-595,
[12600]with canments tiereun appearing on Pages 647-659 while an
[12601]the section which follows below are a discussi07 and an
[12602]evaluatyon of what GOLITSYN said anout NOSENKO’s assignments
[12603]in the Secord Chief Directorate,.s described on Pages 343-344,
[12607]*e¢AS stated in Part VILLI, howewrer. 1¢ is not eredible chat
[12608]NOSENKO served tn the U.S. Embassy Suction in 19591. 5% or
[12609]wn 1960-298.
[12611]fs TOP SECRET
[12613]i : . : . .
[12615]ee Oe
[12617]SE Be ne gine ree En CTO PIER eS
[12620]14-0000
[12622]x
[12626]FS
[12627]AIEN TS cid
[12629]we
[12632]o
[12634]TOP SeoRET
[12636]14-0000
[12638]cage Seunen
[12640]Vt).
[12642]There would appear to be: no reason why NOSEUKO, af he had
[12643]ever met CULITSYU, should noc have zaid ro to &ericen Intelir-
[12644]gence Representatives. * fu have: date 20 would have gqaven NOSFLIKO
[12645]concrete oipport for nas ecliins of Kis scuff service, which he
[12646]knew to be in questvon. Gr. the contrary, however, NOSENKO consis-
[12647]tently denred any contact end ninufacturcd a demonstrably false
[12648]story to explain his on eksence during GOLITS s admitted visit
[12649]to the section in which 1:0S2-70 claims to have served in January
[12650]1961. Sen Page 183, secon footnote.)
[12652]On the othe: hand, COLITLYN's claim must le eecasured against
[12653]the backcround ond circumstances of his statements. In the ab-
[12654]sence of any coments atout or identiticatien of KCSENKO by GCLIT-
[12655]SYN praor to the public announcement of his defection from the
[12656]KGN, and in view of the anourt of informo:ion mute avarlable to
[12657]him trom NOSURKU matuertais prior to ta ahing any clatements
[12658]about his alieged acquairtsance with ham, COLLITS’2 s “identifica-
[12659]tion" of MOSENKO as a KGE staff officer known to him personally
[12660]cennot be considered as spmitencous Or uncentaminated' information.
[12662]The weight of andeperndenc evicence against NCSENKG'S alleged
[12663]service in those positicne waich GOLITSIN corroLorated, combined
[12664]with the conflict ketveen GOLITSYN s and BOSEUKO's testimony about
[12665]their personal acyuaintencesrip, maxes it impossirle to accept
[12666]GOLITSYN's verification of MOSENKO'S Claimed KGB status during
[12667]any stage of the latter's career.
[12669]Sit Is not likely that he weuld forget it. Direct relationship
[12670]with or knowledge of a defector would be interesting and im-
[12672]portant to rencin
[12673]post-defection reminiscences would alinost certainly bring back
[12675]memories of such recent az direct contacts as GOLITSYN relates.
[12677]Toe SECRET.
[12679]ing KGH officers? even if temporarily forgotten,
[12683]sae met me
[12685]fee eee re ae
[12688]14-0000
[12690]2. NOSFENKO’& Background and Carecr
[12692]Date of Information
[12695]“Ly february 1964 (Re-
[12697]ported tos the Fei on
[12698]ln February 1964)
[12700]7
[12704]10 February £964 (Tee
[12705]Eorted to the FRI on
[12706]{2 Feprusry 1964)
[12708]i
[12710]16 February Lvb4 (Ren
[12711]ported to the FRI on
[12712]}2 February 964)
[12716]19 February (Re-
[12718]gorted to the ERT on
[12719]29 Fobruury 1964)
[12723]Lady
[12726]BP TRIN My
[12728].
[12730]ititdot-— cana Rtas dene SP ae
[12732]Piet. neo Poe TE MO
[12736]Information Peported bh
[12738]NOSENKO was affiliated with the KG" for approxi-
[12739]mateiy 16 vears, since about 1947, and wa3 an
[12740]employee of the Second Chief Directorate in
[12741]Moscow. THis tather, now dead, was a Deputy to
[12742]the Prime Minister of the Soviet Union and also
[12743]Minister of the Shipbuilding Industry. There
[12745]is a shipyard named after NOSENKO's father in
[12746]the Ukrainc.
[12748]The photograph
[12750]which appeared an U.S.
[12751]papers is not that of NOSENKO,** sb :
[12753]newse-
[12755]: “rs NE Wg
[12756]werked with NOSENKO fer several yours in FoB
[12758]Head yuarlers; he deseribed NOSENKO as ao person
[12759]who iixes to be fashionably dressed at atl
[12761]times ard is fond.of women, by natire es tricndly
[12762]individual an! generally well-liked by his fei-
[12763]low workers. NOSENKO worked in the Second
[12765]Chief birecturate.
[12767]quite certain Winacat eres
[12768]what NOSENKO ha:i the ranr
[12770]al
[12772]TOP SECR
[12775]14-00000
[12778]14-0000
[12780]es
[12781]a res hae a ws
[12783]Ries was asked apie hes. whether hea felt
[12784]ee S actually defected af whether-he felt
[12786]the aogection might.be a "trick" by the KGB.
[12787]og ceplied that from his own knowledge of g
[12789](Reported co tye FBI
[12791]on 20 Febru: 1904)
[12793]va matter, he was convinced that NOSENKO's
[12794]defection was not a “trick” by the KGA.
[12796]NOSENHO worked against personne) stationed at
[12797]‘the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, and with hig help
[12798]agents were developed among these Americans.
[12799]It is assymed by the KGB that. he is familiar
[12800]with the number and location af microphones in
[12805]3
[12806]the U.S. Embassy, tA
[12808]to the FBI
[12809]ary 1964)
[12811](Reported
[12812]Jeon 22 Febs
[12814]Prior to NOSENKO's defection he was Deputy Lo
[12815]the Chief of a department in the Second Chief
[12816]Porectorate. while working ia the Se cake
[12817](Surveillance) Directorate in Moscow °
[12818]on three separate occasions participated in
[12819]conferences betwaen "important poop a" of the
[12820]Second Chief Directorate and the. Seventn Direce-
[12821]torata, NOSENKO was present at all of these.”
[12822]Althcuyh NOSENKO was a Deputy Chief he hela gs
[12823]only tha rank of captain in the KGB, o.
[12824]attributed this (the disparity between joo a
[12825]rank) to tha influence which GRIBANOY exerted
[12826]on tha behalf of NOSENKO.
[12828](Paported pO CIA by
[12829]the Fi of 2 February
[12830]2925) |
[12835]14-0000
[12837]DATE Sk) +
[12839]LOST/MISSING MATERIAL
[12841]THE DOCUMENT OR PAGE(S) LISTED BELOW WAS/WERE MISSING
[12842]DURING THE DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW BY THE HISTORICAL
[12843]REVIEW GROUP, CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF INTELLIGENCE.
[12845]DOCUMENT NO. DATED:
[12847]OR
[12848]PAGE(S) 177
[12850]FROM:
[12851]CIA JOB NO. .
[12852]pox no. Reel ¥
[12853]2F
[12855]FOLDER NO.
[12857]14-0000
[12859]PTC ee a : . seared be emma ae oe ie teen eee
[12861]el
[12863]ported : FRI on
[12864]12 iebruary Ta)
[12866]$904 (Pe-
[12867]the ¥SI on
[12868])
[12872]| cee nine yes ee
[12873]oo oh rs : _ F
[12874]Because of his long tenure in the KGB, NOSENKO . . ga
[12875]would have a great deal of important informa= a
[12876]tion which he could impart to intelligenve
[12877]agencies of cther countries. Certainly, he
[12878]would be acquainted with many KGB employees
[12879]and could identify them. He also would be
[12880]intimately acquainted with a large number of
[12881]Soviet agents working inside the USSR against
[12882]American and British nationale.
[12884]The bulk of MUSENKO's knowledge concerning KGB
[12885]activities would revolve around the intelli-
[12886]gence operutions of the KGB in Moscow and also -
[12887]YGB persenalition working in Neadquarters.
[12888]NOSENK vas alse unduultedly familiar wath ajl
[12889]KO's personalities in Geneva’ and certainly knew
[12891]som? KGB personaiities an ether countries. —
[12894]ho ata SEY oSEuKO had been an 3
[12896]the Seaune Chef biu:wtherato for about 14 years te
[12897]and was woymetoted with almost alt of the cm- a
[12898]ploynes of this wirectorate. He was aware of Ss
[12899]the structure of the KCL ant nnows many person~ —
[12901]nel oof the First Chief
[12904]Srabce
[12906]Directorate.
[12907]are tee”
[12909]as Deputy to the “Ourist Department,
[12910]had in his possession a telephone ¢cirectory
[12911]which lasted the names of some 10,000 KGB em~ he
[12912]ployecs in Moscow. Only Chiefs and Peput Pisies, 5 Be aed
[12913]rtments_pad these phone books.** aU Git. te:
[12914]P@expressed the opinion that"NUSENKO ¥
[12917]14-0000
[12919]7796
[12921](Reporttd to the
[12922]FBI on ’ ho19c64)
[12924]is much more valuable to/the FBI and CIA than.
[12925]was Oleg PENKOVSKIY becayiso of tha fuct that he
[12926]knows so much about the methods of work of t.ho
[12927]First and Second Directorates of the KGB und
[12929]is familiar with so many lindivi the KGB
[12930]both in Moscow and abroad. @@ipZ.dm ZA AB My
[12931]that PENKOVSKIY was able;to furnish Anerican
[12932]and Britith Intelligence jwith a lot of informa-
[12933]tion concerning defense sacrets of the Sovist
[12934]Union, but NOSENKO ig much more knowledqeable
[12935]in intelligence and counterintelligence opera-
[12936]tions of the KC."
[12938]NOSENKO knows many of the chiefs and deputies sm
[12939]of the KGB directorales gnd departments at KGB —_
[12940]Headquarters in Moscow, !Jn EG3 Keacquarters bed
[12941]ther: are four sepsrate dining cooms for per- ES
[12942]sonnel who work there; one such dining room is tad
[12943]reserved for chiefs and deputies of departments. ald
[12944]Because of this fact, Nol EKO has a vast know- : BS
[12946]tha KGB.* ~—
[12948]e—NUPLNKO voluntecred for the first time during the January-March 1965 interrogations that he had eaten
[12949]occasionally in the “chiefs' dining room." He had not mentioned this dining room earlier.
[12952]14-0000
[12954](Repor EN, to the FBI on "There seems nariimous opinion among the
[12955]27 March JS : amy ehat NOSENKO... could do
[12956]‘the KGB a tr anount of harm." NOSENKO
[12957]in his position as a deputy chief in one of the
[12958]‘ : departments of the Second Chief Directorate
[12959]! . would have been entitled to have one personnel
[12960]directory of approximatiely 30 pages setting
[12961]forth the identities cf all of the supervisory
[12962]‘ officials in KGB Headquarters. NOSENKO would
[12963]also have had a 200-pade directory listing by
[12964]name and telephone number all the rank-anud-
[12965]file cemployces working The Ob ean
[12966]expre sod mY some a
[12971]l
[12973]Vk su two dired«tories available to
[12974]Ameracan Intelligence, |lthe KGB would be guverely
[12975]damaged for the present and for several years
[12977]to come,* :
[12979]TN? SECF
[12981]20 May 1 (Ro-
[12982]ported to
[12983]on 21 May
[12985]10? § vat
[12987]The KGB was lucky that [the Americans found only
[12988]40 microphones in the U.S. Embassy in £COW.
[12989]Actually, about 200 madeepnones piel concealed
[12990]by the Soviets in the Embassy. @
[12991]quite aure that NOSENKG was respractree for
[12992]furnishing anformation ‘to the Amecicung which
[12993]resulted in the microptiones being found. It
[12994]was his opinion that NASENKO knew only the gen-
[12995]eral location of the 4({ microphones which were
[12996]found and does not have any knowledge of the
[12997]remaining ones. i
[12999]Report
[13000]by the
[13001]1l June l
[13003]* "Sea above; NOSENKO did not mention these directories.
[13006]14-0000
[13008](nepoceed Ye inet The aeneral consensus among cu employees Ga”
[13009]on 22 June l is that in the future the KGB will
[13010]3 we tee@ling pharply the effects of NOSENKO'sS es
[13011]cape to American Intelligenze. NOSENKO is con-
[13012]sidered to be vastly more important than either
[13013]‘ GOLITSYN or DERYABIN. This opinion appearr to
[13014]be based on ceveral factors: First, NOSENFKO
[13015]worked against personnel stationed at the U.8.
[13016]Embagsy in Meacow and with|his help asygcnts were
[13017]developed among theve Americans. Second, it
[13018]as assumed by ECB Rots. | that because cf”
[13020]his closeness to the U.S. fmbassy in the post,
[13021]NOSENKG would also be famijiar with the number
[13022]wf microphones which had bien anstalled in
[13023]the imoussy by the KGB and|/the locations of
[13024]these microphones. ‘ihird,;as a Deputy Chief
[13025]of a department, NOSENKG hs normally nave
[13027]t
[13030]tu
[13032]co
[13035]ao.
[13036]fom]
[13037]a
[13039]nad access to a telephone jlirectory listing
[13041]all personnel in all direcyorates of the KGR in
[13042]Moscow. Another fuctor, which is a formidable
[13043]one 1 the m.nds of other KGB employees, ib
[13044]that MOSENKO travelled in a rather influential
[13045]circle of frienes 10 Moscow “hago oigh in
[13046]the Soviet Government. Game pe ‘e"
[13047]these comments cited as reusons for hOSEUKC
[13048]being an “important catch" for American Intel-
[13049]liyence, but Gamm ET TE Te pee no one in the
[13050]KGB really knows exactly hpw much information
[13051]NOSENYO had concerning the; KGB.
[13057]The amount of damage caused by NOSENO's de-
[13058]fection is “unpredictabla.|' NOSENKO knew few
[13059]employees of the First Chief’ Directorate worke
[13060]ing abroad, but knew many buch employees serving
[13061]in KGE Neadquarters by virtue of seeing them in
[13062]the dining room which is riserved for chiefs
[13063]and deputy chiefs of KGB dppartments.
[13065](Reported Oo CAA
[13066]by the Far 8
[13067]Fobruary 1, )
[13072]14-0000
[13074]TOP SECRET
[13076]4.
[13078]19 Bob tary 1564. (Re~
[13079]ported ro ™‘e Sat on
[13081]2) Fe} raaryt964)
[13084]14-0000
[13086]KG
[13088]Set
[13092]fee
[13094]or
[13095]eaaneton, whli not
[13096]to NOSENKO || In tae o nis
[13097]OlCOW, KUROCHEIN has Vers Ofte: wisited
[13099]ent where NOSENKD worked anc
[13100]SEUNG
[13105]is "more than Casually uryuai.eed*
[13107]iA MaLippapronrors
[13108]PORTER
[13110]14-0000
[13112](Reported »
[13113]2R Februa:y WN
[13117]“a
[13119]14-0000
[13121]t
[13122]Qo a
[13124]~ tag
[13125]Sat
[13126]ae as
[13128]Fea
[13129]2 bie
[13130]M7)
[13132]Nwo-
[13134]27 Ot:
[13135]a orn
[13139]-
[13143]'
[13146]14-0000
[13148](Paported to FS:
[13150]on 5 May L9é43
[13152]am "
[13153]Two meant woes have been establashod by the CPSU
[13159]for the yucposes: (a, to determing why KOU em-
[13160]ployees such as DEKYAUIN, GOLITSYN, and NOSENKO
[13161]defeeted whale serving abroad; and (b) to attempt
[13162]to eliminate “weak" KGB employees and improve the
[13163]efficiency of the KOR.
[13167]An investigating commission of the CPSU Central
[13168]Committe: checking into the circumstances surm
[13169]rounding NOSENKO's defection has thus far been
[13170]responsible for the expulsion from the KGB of 15
[13171]Secon? Chicft Lirectorate employees. These in-
[13172]clude GRIPANOV, who was also expelled from the
[13173]CPSU and was stripped of his rank of lieutenant
[13174]general. GRIBANOV has been given a very small
[13175]pension, like an ordinary Sovict citizen, This
[13176]drastic action was taken sinde the primary re-
[13177]sponsibility ror the cefectian was placed on .
[13178]GRIBANOV. Tt was realized that, in addition to ‘
[13179]being Chie € of the Secong ‘ef Directorate at .
[13181]Nee ne AEGIS ETL gy PERE RT WRI ONE eT Se 8
[13184]_ . . 7 3 ede
[13185]ne eee evnen s wae ae ter ie alan deheanieant oe A Ee cant eames A oo “mali eeth
[13188]14-0000
[13190]787.
[13191]the time of the defaction, GRIBANOV was a port]
[13192]sonal friend of NOSENKO and had more or less
[13193]treated NOSENKO as a protege and had taken many
[13194]steps to further NOSENKO's garecr within the KGB.*®
[13195]It was felt that GRIBANOV should h
[13196]of NOSENKO'S 1 defect. Te
[13197]mrierer yipee neva No Wie Ee ee Ne ;
[13198]Tnree of GRIBANOV's deputics were also expelled
[13199]from the KGB, one of whom was a Major General
[13200]BANNIK of the 11 other fone Chief Direc-
[13202]torate Unployees expelled, fome were found to
[13203]have been personal fraends pf NOSENKO and some
[13204]of them were found to have fon ney to NOSENKO
[13206]shat tagey were working.
[13207]‘ pu pate S.M. GOLUBEV,
[13208]a “Gb oifiver stataoncd in Hashangton, would be
[13209]leaving for Hascaw because rhe anvestigating com=
[13210]mission had determined that|Guk, a mutual frienc
[13211]of NOSENKO and GOLUBFV told] NOSENKYU that GOLUBEV
[13212]had been assigned to the Waphington Legal Resi-
[13213]7 dency. GOLUREV had himself) worked with NOSENKO
[13214]my ‘in KGB Headquarters sometimp in the past, but
[13215]subsequently NOSENKO and GOLULEV were given dif-
[13216]ferent assignments Within tic ¥GB and thereafter
[13217]did not associate wath one jdnother in tho course
[13218]of their daily activities. .
[13222]¥ See Pages 327-356 an which NCOSENEG's description of his relationship wath GRIBANOV.is discussed.
[13223]ate ig a cae rol IR
[13225]OT Aaa hy 3 ah. saphena etl .
[13227]bees A? ral mk va ce, <3 ia | .
[13229]#40 NOSENKO identified GOLUBEV by name an] photograph as a First Chief Directorate counterintelligence officer,
[13230]who had served in New York City under United Nations cover in 1960 and 1961. NOSENKO said that he first
[13231]met GOLUREV in 1959 and knew nothing of his earlier career. Because GOLUBEV had at one point been assigned
[13232]to Geneva with the Soviet Disarmament. Delegation, NOSENKO went to him in 1962 for a briefing on Forcign
[13233]Ministry personnel in the delegation before his own assignment to Geneva. NOSENKO said he last saw GOLUBEV
[13234]in KGS Headquarters in 1963. At that time GOLUBEV was asgigneé to the New York Direction of the Counter=-
[13235]intelligence Hugactment of the First Chief Directorate, and NOSENKO said that GOLUBEV had been in this
[13236]Department as tong as he had known. hin.
[13238]tad
[13239]Ges
[13240]cw
[13243]oOo.
[13245]=e oon : . 2 EE EN I AE RR A
[13248]14-0000
[13250]Lvoted
[13252](OP S
[13254]It is commen knowledge among KGB employees that
[13255]GRIBANOV was expelled from the KGB and CPSU and
[13257]is now on pension, partial rather than full, as
[13259]a result of the NOSENKO defection. When NOSENKO
[13260]was being considered for assignment to Geneva
[13262](in 1961), a summary statement of his activities
[13263]was prepared in the Second Chicf Directorate and
[13264]sent to GRIBANOV. This summary contained con-
[13265]siderable "compromising information” concerning
[13266]NOSENKO; if acted upon properly, at would have
[13267]removed him froin connideration for this trip.
[13268]GRIBANOV read the summary material, ran a line
[13269]throng! all of it, and udded the notation: “Sand
[13270]him to Geneva." The general feeling is that
[13271]GRLBANOV was willing to overlook a lot of NOSENKO'S
[13272]derreiencins because of GRIBANOV's lony-time
[13273]triendship with NOSENKO's father. * erat
[13275](Reported to by fie
[13276]FBI on 29 Jarnua 5)
[13278]he sat Pad
[13280]GRIBAXOV has been dismissed from the FGB, ex-
[13282]pelle@ from the CPSU, and is presently Living
[13284]on a emall pension. His dismissal occurred
[13285]immediately after NOSENKO's defceotion.** in '
[13286]addition, not less than 50 other people were dis-
[13287]missed, many of whom were close friends of GRISANOV.
[13288]Most of these were from the First and Second Chief
[13289]Directorates, with the majority from the Second
[13291](voported TCL by
[13292]the FRI on 9 Peli
[13296]Tees
[13298]Chief Directorate. The present Acting Chie? of Bd
[13299]the Second Chief Directorate is a Major General eS
[13300]BANNIK, whose appointmont has not yet been approved rer
[13301]by the Central Committee of the CPSU. One of oo
[13302]his deputies is a Major General (F.A.) SHCHERBAK. Ss
[13306]. ROSENR said that bis father and GRIBANOV were not acquainted.
[13308]** GRIBANOV was reportedly in operational contact wath a senior Western diplomat in Moscow as recently
[13309]as late autumn of lu64. At that time he turned his contact over to another KGB officer.
[13311]earn Te ee Ee teaddind
[13315]14-0000
[13317]Custis
[13319]TOP §
[13321]Early June oee (Re-
[13322]orted to CIM by the
[13324]p
[13325]FRY on 29 gunosyu5)
[13327]Major General BANNLKOV is currently temporary
[13328]Chief of the Second Chief birectorate, having
[13329]replaced GRIRANOV who was expelled from the KGB
[13330]fecause he supported NOSENKO in his carcer.®
[13331]-GRIBANDV ia working in a small city outside
[13332]Moscow 2% the chief of security at an import=
[13333]ant military plant und is new a “nothing.”
[13335]After the dofection of MOSENKO the KGB conducted
[13336]an idttensave investigation to determine which
[13337]employees new him and the natuce of their rela-
[13338]tuenship. During this TAPARRIN was questioned;
[13339]id he knew NOSESKO, but only cusually and
[13340]because of Latcdted contacts within the KGB.
[13341]irventicatacn Guternined, however, thet
[13342]wrababkLn aid GhIBALG wero égiends socially and
[13343]that TARAGKIN attenéad several parties at which
[13344]NOLEMES was presepe.  dyyis invited by NOSENKO
[13345]were ulkQ thare & deseribed one such
[13346]party. Thereatter, i AWHRIN was afforded a hear-
[13347]ipg and was aeeused on willfully concealing
[13348]wital anfurmation, As a rasult he was expelled
[13349]from the KGB and the CPSU and was deprived of
[13350]all. ponsaon rights.***
[13352]nutnovined his 1964 trip to Geneva, during which he defected, and
[13353]i ‘ Qid not know that he (NUSENFO) was making this trip. Never-
[13354]chat GRIBANOV maght be fired from the K03 as a result of his defection
[13355]wa ahead.” NOSENKO suid that BANNTKOV would not be punashed because
[13357]* bam as a candidate fur the 21964 Geneva assignment (sce Pages 333-334).
[13360]that to the best of ris
[13361]theless, NOSENKO said &
[13362]becuuge"he was rccsponsiyl:
[13363]he had done nothing other
[13365]NOSENKO reported that TARAGAIN was Chief of the British Department from 1958 to 1963, at which time he be-
[13366]come Deputy Chief or “Service No. 2," the reorg nize Counterintelligenes Department of the First Chief
[13367]Directorate.
[13369]NOSENKO said he saw GRIBANOV tures Ciimes souLally during his KGB career: on each oceasion TARABRIN was presont.
[13370]NOSENKO reported that he provided githa for ERUDANOV and WARAGRIN at parties io 1962 and 1963, but not in 1961.
[13371]He could not recall any cotarle of the iver party fe.y., who the girls were, where they went, what they did,
[13372]ete.). He was, however, abla te deseribe the 1903 party, which took place in October or, in con=
[13373]Siderable Cctail Gon Ra a eee a ag ROP ‘ ee ere PR te At MT es ax iy
[13378]14-0000
[13382]YY
[13384]23 Apri pone
[13394]ti
[13398]TOP SESPET
[13400]Acero
[13402]TOP s-.
[13405]AST A ERS wag: ue:
[13406]te Otte. Fay EOFS? ay Le
[13407]t Wont ¥ en iS SEEM ieee Tar 09 Os, wate i. ae ® me
[13409]EINE EUs SE ep reese cone ts ;
[13410]. eee 4 Bes a eres
[13412]cee te eee em
[13415]Accorcing aR get de, tee sea : vents lealing
[13420]Soyer
[13421]cartmens.
[13422]ENKO, Dut no
[13424]Lo meer cs
[13425]PS 2Ets as &
[13427]VLSCUSSL
[13429]he
[13430]o the
[13431]a
[13433]than notified,
[13435]“he afturncen
[13437]Gc.
[13438][oie]
[13440]TOP SE
[13444]Ror wid
[13447]14-0000
[13452]f
[13454]14-0000
[13460]Vise.
[13462]e
[13465]‘TOPS
[13467]oO
[13469]136.
[13474]rg Re BE REE GS
[13475]PEC ST at
[13477]; Sour pee
[13478]eye BR fad
[13482]wig
[13490]“a
[13492]st hee
[13494]i
[13495]ed
[13497]To?
[13499]14-00000
[13501]b. The Conpromise of PEX“OVSKIY
[13502](4) Introduction
[13504]SEAS? and NOSENKO agree on only one aspect ef the
[13505]PEXNKOVSKIY compromise (sce Part Vtll. B.6.b.): They both
[13506]attribute the i compromise te HGP surveillance. Al-~
[13507]though & 3 : w renort sgrees with NCSENKO that
[13508]the KGR ertcan participation in the operation
[13509]only after PENKOVSKiY was arrested, iipsubsequent reports
[13510]contradict this by ty ing the comprotise directly to survoil-
[13511]lance of U.S. Emba personnel visiting the Pushkin Street
[13512]dead drop sitc. sta Za story of the events stenming from
[13513]the corpromise of the gead drop site is at odds both with
[13514]the facts of the case and with all other reporting by
[13515]Soviet sources of CiA and the FBI.
[13517](iid) Discussion
[13519]after the KGB terainated the Ce ated that the
[13520]KGB had been aware of PENXOVSXIY's involvement with Aneri-
[13521]cans, and specifically with the CIA officer JACOB, for about
[13522]two and one half months prior to the arrests. This state-
[13523]ment is inaccurate concerning JACOB, wino was a last-ninute
[13524]substitute for the servicing of the Pushkin Street dead drop
[13525]on 2 Movember 1962 and who never hefore had personally par-
[13527]ticipated in the opcration. statements otherwise aS :
[13528]agree with NCSENKO's subseavent report aad the “official
[13530]report" regarding KG3 ignorance of the role of American
[13531]Intelligence in the PENKOVSKIY cose.
[13533]ae BUport on the case, however, is contra-
[13534]dictory tu his first repert and to the othex sources: He
[13536]“said in 1963 that surveillance of U.S. Embassy tar-
[13538]gets detected a visit to the Pushkin Sircet site by an
[13540]American, and that the resulting 24-hour surveillance of the
[13542]site caught PENKOVSKIY visiting the same location, whereupon
[13544]he was arrested and confessed. CIA, however, has no evie
[13546]gence besides the statements b¥ Bthat PENKOVSKIY ever a
[13547]went to the Pushkin Strect site after it was visited by CIA
[13548]personsel.
[13550]In Gye 1963 Gahae reported at greater length about
[13551]the role of Pusnkin Sireet in PENKOVSKIY's compromise. At
[13552]this time he explained that the American had visited Pushkis
[13553]Street not once but twice: surveillance had observed Lim on
[13554]both vccasions when he went inside the entrance, but followed
[13555]‘him inside only on the second visit. The surveillant who wn ne
[13556]entered the building reported that the Ascrican appeared to :
[13557]be tving his shoe; although this was not unusual in itself,
[13558]: Swcontinucd, the ract that it was the second visit to
[13559]the same address for no visible purpose caused suspicion,
[13560]and as a result the KGB installed a cJosed circuit TV camera
[13561]to provide 24-hour coverage of the site. PRNKOVSKIY was ob-
[13562]served checking it (see preceding paragraph): an jmerican
[13563]was observed loading a dead drop behind a lubby heating unit
[13564](radiator); the KGB tagged the dead drop material with a
[13565]radioactive substance; PENKOVSKIY was observed unloading the
[13566]dead drop and proceeding to his office where he secreted the
[13568]Tne SECRET
[13570]14-0000
[13572]ror Sethe
[13574]Te.
[13576]snpaterial an 2 concealment areca inp his de:
[13578]the £56 also
[13579]continued in ¢erveallisee of the deat dour site, observed
[13580]PENKOVSKITY lend the 2-2 crop, and oe an JAnericin
[13581](JacOR) vho came te unlord it. PENECYSELY vis thea confroated
[13582]with photosrapnie evidence of the Loadings and unloadiags and
[13584]could offer no defers Tnis report s5 the caly indicaticn
[13585]froa a Soviet source taat the EGG iad veilled the two
[13586]vindts ty the Pusbhis Street site made Ly U.S, Enbasay of -
[13588]g ficers: ohile SEB report stated whet one Asericain
[13589]visited the @ tTeice, in face teo difserenat Anericars
[13590]wvacited the site once cach, MAHONEY on 2] Jaccary i961 end
[13591]ABIDIAN on 30 becenber W6l.
[13593]re
[13594]2
[13596](iv) Remarks
[13598]The Pushtin Street dead drep was never used fcr communi-
[13599]cation to PENKOVSKIY. and in fact was loaded only once, vhen
[13600]the KGP Git suo and activated it on 2 Novenmbcr 1962, thereby
[13601]1 apprehending JACOB, Worcover, the first visit to Pushkin
[13602]Strect, in January ifs}, predated any rersonal contect bet-
[13603]ween PENEOVSALY and Ugstern Intelligence, either Americaa or
[13604]British. Thus, @sM@eee report on Ancricans visiting there
[13605]is only partially oecuraiec., and the use of taese “surveilled"
[13606]visits 2s an explanation for how the KGB detected PENKOVSKIY
[13607]i is unsupportable. in reporting inccrrectly cr this matter,
[13608]co ee ——" eee conls have orrec merely tecause his sub-seurces (one & -
[13610]unnamed, the othe: aprorcaicy cezpite the conflict in
[13611]reporting sieur his position) repested erroneous infera-
[13613]tion in his presecn:e.
[13615]MELEE cccorsscless is the c :.arce t2 reveal that the
[13616]¥GE was aware of 4: ienkin ead Gro as early -as
[13617]21 January LAG SLU. ge, there- ¢
[13618]fore has c= £ NOSEND- cy showing
[13619]KG2 awarere une to the zead drop
[13620]site il i re, end even before
[13622]PENKCVSETY ing porsonai centact
[13623]with Western intelliceice servic was the ABIOIAN visit,
[13624]KOSEUKO said, snich first arouse: nicrest in the site at
[13626]Pushrin Street.
[13628]TO? Seoizi
[13631]14-0000
[13635]ww tet
[13637]10?
[13639]14-0000
[13641]a
[13643]i
[13645]: a
[13647]i .
[13649]---  -i- ee ee _ Ce
[13651]i
[13654]i '
[13656]1
[13658]: 1
[13660]: i
[13662]i '
[13664]‘ i
[13665]i
[13667]ae,
[13669]14-0000
[13672]r . _ . 3 on oom
[13675]14-0000
[13677]Cie Scene
[13678]Tb SU eat nae”
[13681]14-0000 r a“ ‘ ¢
[13687]Serko
[13689]en eye Te! Paes, as nie
[13690]Sey Red week eee
[13693]= Og ATOZ
[13694]lees dS A heme
[13696]Some eran Dab,
[13698]14-0000
[13702]: 7 qpsecer
[13704].
[13705]on t
[13706]- . A ; :
[13707]i u
[13709]. 4 ?
[13710]* - 4
[13711]oe .
[13714].
[13715]'
[13716]. eee
[13717].
[13719]|
[13720]|
[13721]|
[13724]14-0000
[13728]eS
[13734]3
[13736]TOP SEGh
[13739]14-0000
[13741]TOP SECTLT
[13743]60%.
[13745]i. Introgueétior.
[13747]ay
[13749]While in general terms corroboratins "OSENKO's claims to °
[13750]service in both the GRU and the KGB, EEUES. bas supplied scme ;
[13751]details which are incompatible with the statenente by NOSENKC on
[13752]his intelligence career. Althouunh roy 38 prolific a reporter on
[13753]BOSENKO as €& Er Ty UN suet tugemtics had several topics in
[13754]common with NGSENKO: UPON, Ke VSKIY, CHEREPANCV, SHUBIN,
[13755]SLESINGER, and the contacts hetween the GRU officer BOLSKAKOV and
[13756]Attorney General Fobert KFEGNFDY in 1962, “Wien compared with
[13757]NOSENKO's information, the ceports Ly gs Don the case of FOPOV,
[13758]PENKOVSKIY, and CHEREPANOV #re interlock:ng:
[13760]~G Band NOSENKO agree that FOPOV was compromised
[13761]after his return to Moscow from East Berlin in November 1958
[13762]ard in consequence of KGP surveillance.
[13764]- CHEREPENCV and NOSENKO likewise agree about POPOV's
[13765]compromise.
[13767]7 concurred with NOSENKO by indicating that
[13768]CHEREPANOV was a genuine source of American Intelligence, and
[13769]this statement by € j
[13771]: Ape: gge™ learned some of his
[13772]details cn the compromise Of FENKGVSKIY, end WRIiEgEBAand
[13773]ROSENKO lave indicated thet this compromise resulted from
[13774]KGB surveillance of PEXKCV3KLY's British contacts in Moscow,
[13776]Presented below are @Xgige s remarks about NOSENKO, followed by
[13777]a review of the topics conmon to these two sources.
[13779]2. Statements. on NOSENKO
[13781]When disevssing HOSENKO for the first time, EMSRS said on
[13782]. SSE NS Spee Pcthet they were not cversonelly acquainted, but
[13783]that. “various persons” in Moscow (whom he did rét identify) had
[13784]spoken to him about NOSENKO, The statements by WESERgsse and NOSENKO
[13785]on the latter's background are compared in the following tabulation:
[13787]HOSENKO
[13788]As a young man, NOSENKO attended NOSENKO said his entire ser-
[13789]the GRU's Military-Diplomatic vice in the GRU, in the years
[13790]Acadeny (MDA) end then was in 1950-1953, consisted of duty
[13791]i the GRU Information Department -- in the Naval GRU, first in
[13792]wide _ in all, perhaps a year of service the Far East and then in the .——. -
[13793]: in the GRU,* Baltic.**
[13795]/* Qntil the late 1950's, the course at tne MDA, the strategic
[13796]“intelligence school of the GRU, lasted for four years; more
[13797]recently, the course has been of three years’ duration.
[13799]**During the 1950-1953 period and before, the Naval GRU was
[13800]separate from the rest of the GRU, :
[13803]4 . . TOP SEE
[13805]14-0000
[13808]that NCSENKO had provided.
[13810]Typ secest
[13812]810.
[13813]NOSEKO
[13815]A “very undisciplined person“ NOSENKO's statements abcut him-
[13816]while in the GRU and “not very self during the 1950-1953 period
[13817]good," NOSEIKO was to have been appear to acree with the evalu-
[13818]Giecharged from the GRU. ation, but he has said rothing
[13820]about facing discharce by the
[13822]. Navel Gu,
[13824]ROSENKO's father, “a very in- His transfer from the Saval GRU
[13825]flventiai person in the Miz istry to the KG3 jn 1953, NOSINKO
[13826]of Shipbuilding," was able to said, wrs at the initiative of
[13827]get NOSSNKO transferred to the KG" General KOBULY, e friend
[13828]KGB. of } ris father: the eléer ROSENKO
[13830]was Minister of Snipbuiiding.
[13831]NOSEXKO was “an important boss" Aecording to NOSEVKO, his most
[13832]in the KC8 (directorste or recent KG3 title crior to de-
[13833]depertment unkno:m) . fecting was Deputy Cnief
[13835]Teurist Department, KG3 Second
[13836]Chief Direcrorate.
[13838]ASS See stated that NOSENKO cave ‘very, very geod information"
[13839]to the enited States, having hed “great access" to KGB information
[13840]which included "all means of KGP coveraze of people in Moscow,
[13842]srophore systems in the emLassies, etc." ihe U.5. Enkassyv. 4
[13843]“ae-ontinued. hed found micrephones on the basis of information
[13845]3. Parallels with NOSENKO's Reporting
[13846]a. The CHEREPANOV Case
[13848](i) Summary
[13850]One of the two ways in which EBX nas corroborated NOSENKO
[13851]on the authenticity of CHEREPANOV asa ceruine source of American.
[13853]the KGB; CHEREPAN ‘OV cave some papers to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow,
[13854]which returned them to che Soviet Miniscry of Foreign Affairs
[13855](MFA); the MFA turned the papers over to the KGB, which traced
[13856]them by analysis to CHEREPANOV; meanwhile, CHEcREFANOV had tried
[13858]to flee the USSR, but he was captured near the Turkisn border and
[13859]executed. In every major-respect, therefore G@igho@Magrees with
[13860]NOSEIKO's version Of the case When asked whether the CHEREPANOV
[13861]incident might Pave heen “a trick" by the KGS to emcarrass the
[13862]U.S. Embassy, 255 replied that it was definitely not.
[13864]The second way in which Pad has certified that CHEREPANOV
[13865]was a Genuine source is indirect. Like NOS@mIKO and-cme-of the
[13866]CHEREPANOV documents. sgemep hac ~ ‘GidicStec that KGB surv~:llance
[13867]of a U.S. Embassy officer creugnt about the compromise of POFOV.
[13869](ii) Remarks
[13870]As stated in Part VIII.B.6., the GIEREPANOV incident was a
[13872]KGB provocation against the U.S. Embassy, but it is conceivable
[13873]that statements suggesting the contrary could have been made
[13878]14-0000
[13880]TOP SEE".
[13882]81k.
[13884]k @égreement with:
[13885]e cause of POPOV! 8 compromise,
[13886]rowever, appears to Le based on direct involvement, and
[13887]does rot eppeer to be attributeb: suD-sources having provided
[13888]him with erroneous informstion; this £s discussed further below.
[13890]b. The Conpromise of PEXKKOVSKLY
[13892]G Pmepy dates on the conpronise of PE'KOVS¥IY are at vari-
[13893]ance with NCSZNKO's end they disagree on wrecker the ¥GD knew
[13894]American Intelligence to te involved in this operation befcre
[13895]JACOB of CIA was apprenended at the Pushkin Street dead drop on
[13896]2 November 1962. Soth sorces stated, however, that eurveillance
[13897]led to the detection of PEXKCVSKIY, although acain they differ on
[13898]the person with whom PEXYOVSXiY was firet seen by the KGB: ees
[13899]said this individual was the Britian busirecsnan wm while NOS.
[13900]EXKO said it was the Exglisnwonan brs. CHISECLM.
[13902]According t QGERETED PELKOVSKIY had been working openly
[13903]with WYNNE, explcaning tnat he was trying to develop WANE, and
[13904]the KGB learned cf their meetings througn surveillence,* CiA
[13905]records show that WYNNE ret PENKOVENIY in Moscow dtring April-
[13906]“av 1961, May-June 1961, Aagust 1961, and June-July 1962, EC
[13908]repert that PENXOVSKIY cane under fuspicion in May 196
[13909]therefore {1s not consistent with his staterent about KGS surveil-
[13910]lance of the WYNNE-PENKCVSKIY meetincs, nor does this report co-
[13911]incice witl. the evidence from WYNNE himself that the KC3 was
[13912]sufficiently Suspi Ci Oe of their meetings to record a conversea-
[13913]ticr they had had aaah 1951 (one year earlier than in the
[13915]version). NOSE: 9 dated the FENKOVSKIY compromise at a
[13916]month or two after he was first Setn, Eut at the time not iden-
[13917]tified, in contact with Mrs. CHISHOLM in November cr December
[13918]1961.
[13920]Whereas NOSENKO said the KGB was unaware of the participa-
[13921]tion of American Intellicence in the FESKOVSKIY operation until
[13922]JACOB was detained, reported that while PENKOVSKLY was
[13923]at a reception in Moscca, te was ocserved making contact with an
[13924]American in a lavator;. did sot date this event, but
[13926]CIA reccrds show that it “as on 27 Avgust 1962, added
[13927]that the KGB “invented” the incidert at Fushxin Street on 2 Nov-
[13928]ember 1962, the month after PENKOVSKIY's arrest, in order to
[13929]catch the American unlcading the dead drop. **
[13932]* The sane statement was made by NOSEWKO ard in the official
[13933]KGB document on PENKCVSKIY's compromise,
[13935]t*This is obviously true. although the cate cf PSNKOVOKIY's
[13936]arrest may have Leen more than a month Lefore.
[13938]yor scat
[13941]v
[13942]5
[13944]a
[13945]os
[13947]os
[13949]b
[13952]14-0000
[13954]TR SECT
[13956]G12.
[13958]ce The Compromi3ze of POPOV
[13960](4) Introductacn
[13962]Of all the sources available to American Intelligence, SIFU
[13963]is the 1 best placed to report on the compzomi $e of FOPOV: Cos eee
[13965]em.
[13967]Paze eae i xm 2 Ltr. that provided by NOSENKO "and
[13968]CHERES POV, es well as that in the 16 September 1959 message fren.
[13969]POFOV to CIA (kolieved to have been dictated Ly the KGB). These
[13970]four sources have indicated that the ccmpromise resulted from KG3
[13971]surveillance of a U.S. Foabessy official following the recall of
[13972]' PCPOV in Nevembver 1958. GEESE however, ras not precisely dated
[13973]the incident (Gated by inrerence cy the cthers at 2} January 1959),
[13974]has asscciated it with an Averican Intelligence dead drop for POPOV
[13975](whereas the otters have said it was CIA's mailing of a letter to
[13976]POPOV), and has not rived tne CIA officer involved {(George WINTERS) 2]
[13977]The evidence fr : @Piike that from NOSENM“O, CGHEREPANCV, and
[13978]the PCFGV message, conflicts with that from CULITSYN whose state-
[13979]ments on the compromise of FOPCV ere supported by andlysis of events
[13980]in 2957 and 1358 on which FOPOV reported (se: Pages 663-665),
[13982](ii) Letails
[13984]have been che prelude to the POPOV compromise:
[13986]“a¥ had rade a “very serious mistake" by using an
[13988]i accommodation acdre3s Supplied by Acrerican Intelligence to receive
[13990]' mail from a girlfriend in Austria.** “In secre hion” chis came
[13992]. to the attention of the Austrian poiice, ¢ age ARE and
[13993]it was determined that she had been sending 7al O28 Soviet offi-
[13994]cer in Berlin, The Austrian police notified the Soviets, and
[13996]| eventually FCFIV was confronted ty the chief of his GRU component
[13997]in Berlin.*** GRU Headquarters was notified, POPOV was recalled
[13999]ie ier se
[14001]Of providing in-
[14002]Jo sub-source for this remark
[14003]ee’ * 2 Fos : f and since then %
[14005]resolved the discrepancy pdetween this version ana the other
[14006]one treated at length here.
[14008]Sie ote
[14010]** CiA did not supply POPOV with en acconmodation address, but.
[14011]he did secretly ccrrespond with KOCHANEK.
[14013]Cs so emits Ss
[14015]? went to the Austrian police on 25 Auqust 1958 with
[14016]Hl intormation that included the identification of POPOV as a Te
[14017]' Soviet Intelligence officer.  POPOV’s superior confronted him :
[14018]on 4 November 1958 about KOCHANEX ard received from him an
[14019]; admission to having had some correspondence with her corcern-
[14020]ing his search for gperasional leads: the superior told POPOV
[14021]that the Soviets believed "she was working for someone” ard
[14022]that “possibly she is the cause” of the Perlin unit's opera-
[14023]tional difficulties. PCPOV was recalled to Moscow on 17 Nov-
[14024]enber 1958 ostersibly for a weex's TDY to discugs the case
[14025]of an American whom he was developing under CIA aegis. He
[14026]did not return to Berlin.
[14030]TOP SECT
[14032]ened.
[14034]“ 9 ~~
[14035]TOP Senet.
[14037]813.
[14039]to Moscow to explain the ejtuation, and when he was unable to do
[14040]so, the facts vere turned over to the KG3 for full-scale investiga-
[14041]PLAY ae SEE REMC eer it not been for POPOV's
[14042]correspondence with an woman, "they would never have
[14043]caught hin," and that FOP ecause of a connection
[14044]with a girl;" also, eae 1959 POPOV
[14045]was recelled to Moscow ~ “ee y fee
[14046]While the foregoing KGB investigation was in progsess B
[14047]routinely placed under surveillance a U.S. Emoassy official in
[14048]Moscow, This person was observed renting a boat in Gorkiy Park,
[14049]going to the vicinity of a new bridge near the Moscow Stadium,
[14050]and there taking photographs of the bridge and surrounding arec.
[14051]Its suspicions aroused, the KGB covered this area and observed
[14052]POPOV unloading a dead drop. He was arrested, doubled, and |
[14053]"operated" against American Intelligence for a year ard one-half.*
[14054]Eventually, the KG3 put in motion a plan to attempt to compromise
[14055]the Amcrican official who was meeting POPOV. The KGS photographed
[14056]a meeting in a Moscow resraurant, then arrested the official and
[14057]showed him pictures of his necting with POPCY and of FOPOV UNn-
[14058]loading the dead Grop at the bridge. iter the Awerican refused
[14059]to work fer the KGB, he was released and declared persona non
[14063]ar Pee CLA quest ioneaE eon popov's
[14064]compronise. He fala at tu:s time that he hed hesrd POPOV was
[14065]apprehended through a desd droup- PCrOV “apoarently was under
[14066]suspicion there in Perlin., and when tacy (presumably the GRU)
[14067]recalled him to Moscow, they wondered who his future contacts
[14068]would be, and they were told rhe following: 'KGB workers place
[14069]American I:nbassy employees uadec surveillance.' They observed an
[14070]American at the staircese... and they found a dead: drep unijer the
[14071]staircase. ‘So they established coverage of the dead drop and ob-
[14072]served POPOV come and unload the drop. They made a report, and
[14073]after this POPOV was under surveillance... Then he was called in
[14074]and told thus-and-so. They showed him photographs. They told
[14075]him he was going to work for them to expose his contacts. He
[14078]_
[14080]* Since POPOV returned to Moscow in November 1958 and LANGELLE
[14081]was arrested the following October, he could not have been
[14082]doubled against CIA for more than eleven months.
[14084]** Starting on 4 January 1959, POPOV had a series of six brush
[14085]contacts in Moscow with the CIA officer Russell LANGELLE of
[14086]the U.S. Embassy, culminating in the detention and interview
[14087]of LANGELLE by the KGB on 16 October 1959.
[14089]**#*As previously stated, no Moscow dead drops were used by CIA
[14090]in the POPOV operation, but LANGELLE did survey the possi-
[14091]bilities for dead drops to ke used in other operations, One
[14092]Of these was bocated-in-benin-Hills,-an_area of Moscow_not___
[14093]far from the new bridge near Moscow Stadium, and it was
[14095]meituated beneath a staircese; a4 rte as EG FEES
[14096]‘ EXE ree OLANIGELLE visited the area vs tne aeac
[14098]ecn <4 28 May 1959, but the dead drop was loaded
[14099]py a CIA legal travel agent (on 7 June 1958) rather than by
[14100]LANGELLE. The CHEREPANOV @ocument, discussed on Pages 563-
[14101]564, stated, in the course of reviewing LANGELLE's operation-
[14102]al activities in Moscaw, that this dead drop was for use with
[14103]an agent named REPNIKOV; in fect, it was not intended for
[14105]the REPNIKOV case.
[14107]Top secre! | a
[14109]14-0000
[14111]JOP Scurct poe
[14113]SE, that he had learned these
[14114]details aivut’ ine c =rorise me POPC! fcom a converset
[14116]B22 FRE A: ena AS TPS vs Conductca some of the aie
[14118]Veetrgalion or POPUV secattse at Che time he vas art
[14120]a ide FS Paes Sig’ Tae sane: sul-s
[14121]information L2 supplied CIA in
[14123]Civ) hemarks
[14125]Porte? BIG rreporcea, ineecurately, that Arerican Inteliigence
[14126]gave cress an accomaedation address in Berlin, that a dead drop
[14127]Wes used in tne Moscow puase cf the operation, and that the KGB
[14128]doubled FOPCV for a year and one-half before terminating tne case.
[14129]Fach of these inoorrect items cane to WER SSE. :
[14130]since Wry di Fs SF re participaced in tne investigation of
[14131]PCFOV, pres: iniBLY re would have recoonized then to_be untrue. One
[14132]cyplanation for the inacctracies mignt be that ¢
[14133]prscisely what he had been told, but. @@RREeymS c sldberately mis-
[14134]informed nim, There is, however, no evident reason why ere aC ERG
[14136]wold have done this. Another explanation might be thal eEiggiat ,
[14137]migundecstoog his sub-source, or in relaying + the infor aticn to
[14139]the details. Tuis . s
[14141]attentive to d.tails on a pe sal acguaintunce who had gainzd
[14143]notoriety, details wnich he was tole at a time when he was in a
[14145]positfioa comparable to Po ino cantact with aes intelli-
[14146]i as 2
[14149]entirely satisfactory, amd the enswer may lic elsewhere.
[14152]: a8 been inconsistense about the deqree of suspicion
[14153]surrounding POFOV hen ne was recalled to ho November 1958:
[14154]in connection mach his correspendence with Cr one hand,
[14155]_ Eo Geena eg evacn nis ce thet the KGF surve ce of the U.S.
[14156]Enbassy officer was _Coincidenta? with the separate investigation
[14157]of POPOV's wip With this Acstrian woman. Ci: the other
[14158]han in Sac W?implied that as a result of the suspicion
[14159]of ZOPOV in Berlin, tnere was interest 1n POFOV's future contacts
[14160]in Moscow, an interest whicn would he covered by the KGB's sur-~
[14161]veillance of U.S. Entassy employees.
[14163]*However, .in another version @QRaee said that ag soon as the
[14164]Illegals reported their compromist in January 1956, POPOV
[14165]irmediately fel) under suspicion. The conflict between <BR
[14167]Statements hes not been resolved.
[14169]t
[14171]THP Sesh
[14175]2 nema sete genera
[14179]14-0000
[14183]9 er | '
[14184]“TOP Siuist eS
[14186]BL5.
[14188]dg. suurin, “PLESINGER, ard ROLSHAKCY i
[14190]In three instanc(Gagmp6s NOSDXO confirmed reports made by
[14191]BEX ke 7 the izui@tfication of SHUEIN as a GRU agent, the
[14192]Soviets‘ suspicions that SLZSINGER was in cortact with the FBI, and
[14193]che status of BCLSHAKOV as a GRU officer.* ,
[14195]SHUBIN was previously known to have Leen associated with two
[14196]GRU Illegals in the United States during the 1949's, put indepen-
[14197]dent of NOSRNKO and qikpRieker there 1s no verification of his having
[14198]more recéatly been an agent of the GAU. «ir gine Ss ewe ae
[14202]POLSHAKOV, the only claimed mutual acquaintance of LEE
[14203]and KOSENKO, hag not bren named as @ GRU off:cor by eny other :
[14204]source, Ter has ne Leen observed if *tinns with GRU agents, Both
[14206]: GP and NUSPNNO spoke of ROLSH ‘s heving met Attorrsy
[14207]General Robert KENNEDY in 1962, NOZSEIKO added that, in initiating
[14208]the contact, the Attorney General kuew HOLSHAEOV to be a “military
[14209]intelligence officer," hut this repory has rot been corrokorated.**
[14211]4. Comments on <exeeEe
[14213][2 F confirmation that SOSZ[IKO is = cenuine KGB officer-
[14214]1s comprised of hearsay evidence. and hence the conclusion
[14216]ENKO was dispatched by the 855 woula not necessarily bring
[14218]“Pr bora Lides into question: much would depend upon @& Wine
[14220]-fources, as yet unidentified.
[14222]ality tind on the compromise
[14223]+ AS ity ar MAS: eae end both
[14225]have authenticated & Eee Cie validity of a CHERE-
[14226]PANOV document whicn concerned the FurOV compromise and which was
[14227]prepared by toe KGB for trensmittal to American Intelligsnce. In
[14228]addition, and NCSFNKO ‘support one another about the PENKOV-
[14229]SKIY comprenise pabout the contact between SULSHAKOY caging
[14230]Pats peueas acd Robert KEWIEDY, and about SHiUBIN and vomit
[14231]aT ineormetion or BOLSHAKOV and SHUNIN is unique; on SLESINGER
[14232]it is ccrrororated by actions taken by the KCB, as reported by
[14233]SLESINGER; on POPOV, PFNKCVSKIY, and CHEREPANOV it is confirmed
[14234]by KGS controlled sources.
[14236]of POPOV, a Pman
[14238]With the exception of his details on PCEOV Gg RELEESDR report-
[14239]ing on NOSENKO and on common topics <an be explained, individually,
[14240]by misinformat ion Ga-ERgeeR eceived and innocently passed along.
[14241]These items taken togetnec, however, in the light : state-
[14242]ments on the compromise of POPOV (which conflict with GOLITSYN's
[14243]reporting and analytical evidence) are indications that
[14244]is contrelled by the KGB.
[14246]**#I1€ Robert KENNEDY indeed knew BOLSHAKOV to be a GRU officer,
[14247]the question remains as to how NOSENKO was aware of the fact,
[14249]since as the only source to have made this identifica-
[14250]tion before the time when KENNEDY and BOLSHAKOV met. :
[14252]TOP SEE .
[14254]14-0000 -
[14257]_
[14258]- a
[14260]see won are eee ;
[14261]7“
[14264]poe .
[14265]|
[14268]817
[14270]TOP S22
[14272]er.
[14274]source
[14276]sensitive
[14278]en
[14285]618
[14289]ane
[14291][ —~ ]
[14293]r
[14295]t
[14297]-
[14298]a
[14302]i
[14305]Tor Ste
[14307]cost
[14308]619
[14312]a en ne ee ae
[14314]coecnes semrameyeen en ag
[14316]ola pt ona 7"
[14317]Thaytinecdete lo
[14319]AUP Ocul:
[14321]820
[14323]TOP
[14327]Chk:
[14329]_ . a)
[14330]oe | Tor Sesxel
[14332]821.
[14334]F.
[14336]1. Introduction
[14338]¢ BF) BY courterintellicgence production has been ex-
[14339]tremely limited. For the most part sic has provided only super-
[14340]ficial reports, generally only ir response to questioning and
[14341]frequently citing her cwn lack of access to information of value.
[14342]Her profe3sed personal involvement in, and dramatic accounts of,
[14343]certain situations on which XOSENKO's reporting is demonstrably
[14344]false is’ therefore nctreworthy in the context of her total perferm-
[14345]ance. Gee ppereys reporcing on NCSENKO, despite vequeness
[14346]ané contradictions, fas the net effect of supporting his bona
[14347]fiees und affirming the importance of the information he nas re-
[14348]ported. Her accounts of the CHEREPANOV czse emphasized the depth
[14350]¢Yy of nis treason ard the retrituzio: xGL--thermes +
[14352]as
[14354]Gomirate the NOSENKO account oa i BELG Z :
[14355]Ker reports on the compromise ct PENKOVSKIY, while differing
[14356]markedly from NOSENKO’s in basis, scope, ana detail, confirmed
[14357]almost to the month NOSENKO's dating of the compromise. Her
[14358]confessed pirticipetion as an egent of the KGB Second Chief
[14359]Directorate, despite her repeated claims to know rotiing of im-
[14360]portance concerning its operations, has placed her in NOSEiKO's
[14361]milieu, and the KCB officers who figured in her reporting are
[14362](with two exceptions) personzlities who have previously been
[14363]identificd as KG3 officers only by NOSENKO.
[14365]2. NOSENKO's Packground and Career
[14367]Phas claimed no first-hand or authoritative
[14368]knowlcéGe of NCSZNKO, reporting at various times that she had
[14369]heard gossip, had heard about him from her KGB friend SVIRIN
[14370](who she believed only "knew about" NOSE:KO, i.e. did not know
[14371]him personally), or h2d heard about him from “someone froa the
[14372]Ministry of Foreign Affairs, not SVIRIN."| She has reported frag-
[14373]ments on NOSENKO's background: his father's positicn, his mother's
[14374]ethnic background, and NOSENKO's non-KG2 status. She initially
[14375]said that NOSEVKO's father was a general, iater said she was not
[14377]od sure of that, and still later amended her description to “general
[14379]: or minister," adding that he was Ukrainian - thus approaching
[14380]an accurate statement only efter several conversations about
[14381]him. Her consistent statement that NOSENKO‘s mother was Jewish
[14382]and involved in black market activities has not keen elsewhere
[14383]reported, and her statement that NOSENXO was a civilian, rather
[14384]thar. a KGB officer, contradicts his ow account and that of
[14385]other sources who have confirmed his KGS status. gaia
[14386]sourcing of her limited information on NOSENKO to her KG
[14387]SVIRIN nevertheless demonstrates at least potential access to
[14388]some information about NOSENKO. (SVIRIN was identified by
[14389]NOSENKO as an officer of the Third Section of the American
[14391]————— Department, Second Chief Directorate, since 1963, and oefcre
[14393]that of the Thizd Department of the Directorate of the KGB
[14395]Second Chief Directorate, where he participated in and received
[14397]an award for his part in the investigation of PENKOVSKLY.)
[14399]bo : Tor SECRET
[14401]14-0000
[14405]nate
[14406]ve rn nen a nee eae ene ae sone neitie teenage rita A
[14408]822.
[14409]3. NOSENKO's Knowlecze - Damage to the K33 one
[14411]OER ; ures to the
[14412]Americans concerning the “microphor. es in tne U.S, Embassy - her
[14413]only reference to inforzation he miont have provided - on each
[14414]occasion when she has discussed NOSENKO, She ence ettributed to
[14415]SVIRIN the renark in October i19€6 that MOSENKO had done consider-
[14416]able harm to the Sceviet Unicn by revealing this information, thus
[14417](and specifically only in thiscor.text) underscoring the importence
[14418]of NCSENKO's infcrmation, (NOSENKO himself has characterized this
[14419]information es the most important he has provided.) The context
[14420]in which she has discussed MO5FKO has been the gereral one of
[14421]Gefectors frcm tne Soviet Unicon: she has rereatedly emphasized
[14422]that the Soviets 2tterre to ccnvince all Seviet cttizens that
[14424]ind tne Land nf KGS
[14428]; ke: ‘ : erence to NCSENKO, she
[14430]ite wiving Saad that NCSEK9,. too, would one
[14431]Gay be extermin vated, thes ciearly implying shat NOSENKC was a
[14432]Genuine cefectcr.
[14434]4. Parallels with SCEE:KO's Keporting
[14435]a. The CHEREPANDY Czse
[14437]SALT EIES S account of CHEREPA‘OV's cisalfection, treason,
[14439]arrest, and execution co.tirts ir general oaths he and in emphasis
[14440]that of SCSEXNKO. PEERS
[14441]ease through her own ana 15
[14442]ERP ENON ang his wit e.
[14444]a to that
[14446]She introduced her account of the CHERLFANCV case, as in her
[14447]discussions of NOSENKO, Ly references to the deternination ard
[14448]effectiveness cf the KGB in apprehending and executing those wno
[14449]were “running away"; she cffered GiZFCPANCY as an example'of a
[14450]Soviet traitor sno had ceen caught and executed. Her account c=
[14451]the details, however, differs sharply froa thet of NOSENKO (and
[14452]others). Her identification of CHEPEPANOY as 4 classmate of her
[14453]husband at the GkU's Military Diplomatic Acedemy (MCA) fron 1956
[14455]> to 1959 is unique amorg the sources who h revorted on CHERE-
[14456]PANOV, For the period Guring which FA said CHEREPHIOV
[14457]attended the XOA, NOSENKO has made no specific statements con-
[14458]cerning CGiEREPANOV's career; he has said only that at some un-
[14459]specified date after CHEREPANOV’s return from Belgrade (elsewhere
[14460]reported as mid-1956) and before earhy 1960 CHEREPANOV had been
[14461]assigned to the U.S. Enras American Cepartment, KG3
[14462]Second Chief Directcrate. : zlsc stated, however,
[14463]that after his craduation rrom tne MUA in 1959, CHEREPANOV
[14464]"finally" obtained a job in the Ministry of Foreign Trade, s19-
[14465]gesting that he had no intervening assignment. Wnere NOSENKO
[14466]has failed to establish a clear motive for CHEREPANOV's having
[14467]collected KGS cocumerts during his assignment to che UL 54, F-tassy
[14468]Section for later trarnsnuitctal to the Anericars, ; ; has
[14469]described his increasing bitzersess from the dat
[14470]the MPA in 195&. . She was not sure that he had been. a KGB officer;
[14471]she neither mentioned ror dig her account allow for nis assign-
[14472]ment to the U.S, Emkassy Section in 1960-1961 (as st tated by
[14476]este ty Se
[14478]14-0000
[14480]Top SECRET ee:
[14482]823.
[14484]by NCSENKO); and she described the dvxcuments which he turned over.
[14485]to the scericans as raving come from the Ministry of Foreign Trade.
[14486]She stated, therefore, rather than dencrstrated, the point that
[14487]“these were such imporcant decum nts, impoctant enough that...he
[14488]was enot.
[14490]~ Dering her seccn@ account of the GCERErPANOV affair;
[14491]2 “Y sourced her information differently ard added first-hand
[14492]Get:ils waich she hac previously disclaimed having. ‘She said that
[14493]"In teo days this man was arceste?...in two ronths he was snot."
[14494]Tnis is alto at variance with NCSiNMl's account of a KGB investiga-
[14495]tion sf tp to 29 cr 23 days, folluwei ry the KSr officer's visit
[14496]to CHEREFANOY on 8 Decemter 1963, GiZZEPeNOV's fiight, and a seven-
[14497]eay search for iim before his arrest
[14499]dD. The Compromise cf PRIKOVSKTY
[14501]Clesely conforming in tyis roscece ta NOSSNKO'S account cf
[14502]PRIKCVSAIY's comproa:se, S ea laced the date of initial
[14503]suspicion of PENKOWSHKiY at about Cccocer cr November 1961. Her
[14504]statemenzs of the casis for this cuspicien, however, differ com-
[14505]pletely from the reeszens advanced by NOSENKO (and other sources).
[14506]Her account 4s vacue, in consonance with her claimed lack of any
[14507]first-hand contezperery knowleds2 cf the investigation leading to
[14508]his errest, and ig celored py her expressed personal dislike for ,
[14509]FENKCWSXLY the man and by the professicenal asf ef her hus-
[14510]pand which resulted from FENKOVSKAI Y's arrest.
[14511]her KG3 friend SVIRIN as the source of some of her information,
[14512]as the scurce cf the indirect warring to her husband to stay away
[14514]from PEXKOVSKIY, and as scmcone «ho knew adcut PEIKOVSKIY's trial
[14515]end had beer, somehow essociated with the investication - thus
[14516]confirming KCSEXKO on SVIRIN's perticipzation tn’the PENKOVSKIY
[14517]investigation. —
[14519]c. Reports or KGS Fersornel
[14521]d Pas neomed reiatively few KG3 officers who have
[14522]figured ror careers as a K&B ager: cr about whom she cculd re-
[14523]port any sucstance. Of Her KGB handlers:
[14525]- CIA has been unable to identify one, Gennadiy Fedor-
[14526]ovich, whose last same she did rot know, her handler while
[14527]she worked at the Embassy cf Nepal in 19€4. NOSESKO has not
[14528]referred to operations against this Embassy.
[14530]~- Two KGa handlers were assigned to in
[14531]Leningrad - V. i. DEMIDOV and Georgiy PGiELIN. Soth OE these
[14532]officers had previously been identified by WOSENKO as officers
[14533]of the Leningrad KG3 and have not been identified by any
[14534]other source. They were two of the total ef four Leningrad
[14535]KCB officers named Ly NOSENKO, ,
[14537]- Her KGB hendler while she was employed by a Canadian:
[14538]correspondent in Moscow was Visd=mir Ivanovich KCSTYRYA.
[14539]Only NOSENKO has identified KCSTYPRYA as the KGB officer who
[14540]had been in the United States under the name Vladinir .
[14541]Vixtorovich WLADIMI2¢V: NCSEXKO cernsidered this, as he said
[14543]‘ : : 3 among KGB per
[14547]work, however, Lut her connection with a foreign corres-
[14548]pondent, which was KOSTYRYA's respensibility after his re-
[14549]turn to Moscow.
[14551]relationship with him was not related to her. earlier SAvurast
[14553]"00000 9 9
[14554]) TOP SECRET
[14556]824.
[14558]Of the four other KCB officers cn whom ® ,
[14559]reported in any cepth, three were previously ident fed by NOSEMKO
[14560]and only Ly HOSEIXO:
[14562]- V.G. SVIS1N, her KGS frierd, is mubicuitous figure |
[14563]in much of her reporting on other subjects ard in her account
[14564]of her personal life, as weli as her primary candidate for a
[14565]Western recruitment approach, SVIRIN had previously been
[14566]identified by NOSE.KS es a KGB officer of the American De-
[14567]partment, Second Chief Cirectorete, previously involved in
[14568]the PENKOVSKIY investigation (both of which assignments
[14569]Fas contirned).
[14571]fees epee is ee tem e
[14573]~ Im connection with SVIRIN, recounted an
[14575]incicene in whech a KuB officer woos riped in ceroga- ;
[14576]tory terms Valencin MJZEYUIK, hid narrowly escaped dismissal :
[14577]asa result of a Grunken brawl with a militteman. MUZEYNIA i
[14578]had not only survived, however, bit continued to bear a :
[14579]higher KGB rank than his former friend, colleague, and sub- i
[14580]Crdinate, SVIRIN. SOS&iKO said MUZEYNIX was an officer of i
[14581]the Directorate cf the KGB Second Chief Directorate.
[14583]- Vadim bZRYUKOV was identified by eX aa as the
[14584]KSB officer under Novesti cover 7ss1cged cto are on tha
[14585]ace 1 66 of SPOOR IIE
[14587]id iia at 30-4) te Pana hs Knead
[14589]NOSENYKU had previously given information concerning BIA‘UKOV,
[14590]a KSB officer of the Tenth Department, KGB Second Chief
[14591]Dircctcrate, targetted against foreign correspondents,
[14593]information on NOSENEO and incomsistency in her statements that,
[14594]on one hard, he was a civilian but on the other, he was aware of
[14595]microphones in the U.S. Embassy. These facts indicate that if she
[14596]the KCB to report to American Intelligence on 805-
[14597]Pas inadequately prepared. Otherwise, however,
[14598]2 aed 38d personally supported the bona fides of NOSEWKC’
[14599]by offering Cirect confirmation of the bona fides of CHEREPANOV,
[14600]by corrororating NOSENKC's cetails om the PENKOVSKIY compromise,
[14601]and by verifying his identification of KGB Second Chief Director-
[14602]ate personalities.
[14604]5. Remarks
[14605]There is confusion in QeeapeeeSEes suv-sourcing for her
[14606]'
[14607]|
[14610]. Note: Aside from her sup € NOSENKCG and CHEREF ANOV, |
[14611]H there are many aspects of the : case which in- “
[14612]dependently led CIA and other W ervices to conclude
[14614]that she is a KGR-adispatched agent. Some of these aspects
[14615]are as _ follows:
[14617]- The circumstances of her claimed. ‘relationship with
[14618]the KGB contradict KGB practice as known from other sources.
[14620]og description of her husband's recall
[14621]from Stockhelm afc his punishnaent for havirg previously
[14623]worked as a GRU colleague of PENKOVSKIY in the GKNNR fit
[14625]neither the treatment of other GRU officers whom PENKOV-
[14627]SK1Y also identifie2 nor the logic of the situation: Her
[14629]husband was sent to Stockholm after PENKCVSKiY was un- :
[14630]covered and even after he was arrested. (That the brief |
[14634]TOP SECRET
[14636]14-0000 a _
[14638]TOR SecrET
[14642]‘ 825.
[14643]: assignment in Scockholm may have ter a KGU-orgenized pre-
[14644]lude to the defection of @aiayer: 1s alco suggested by
[14646]the fact that the one operational cuntact ner husband 15
[14647]knoen to have had there was a Western double agent, 6nd
[14648]4 PF was able to provide identifying data on this
[14650]agent.
[14652]- Nearly all of ee ueags s identifications of
[14653]- Soviet Intelligence persorelities were previously known.
[14655]- She has given confliczing accounts cf her motivation
[14656]for defectirg, of her relationship with her husband, and of
[14657]her associations with KG3 personnel.
[14659]- Against the background of the claimed difficulties
[14660]in which she and husband found themselves, it seoms un-
[14661]likely that would have teen permitted to leave
[14662]the USSR. ” .
[14664]- There are oddities in he: relationship with the
[14665]Canadian correspondent who employsd Fez in the USSR and who
[14666]was her allcyed KGB target, as Well 23 in her conduct in
[14667]the West and in her husband's situaticn and behavior since
[14668]the defection.
[14670]ET SECRET
[14672]Lame mn erence ae
[14674]|
[14676]veeeeet
[14678]14-0000
[14680]thet with one
[14681]nor ycentify ce
[14684]whe JOH i
[14685]the cir cuistance
[14687]. mo. a £
[14688]nise becoure QO.
[14690]promises,
[14692]tO CiesS)TkeGd An ims
[14694]TOP SECKE:
[14696]TOP SECT
[14700]“to Sevect
[14702]“no. ?
[14704]Con-
[14705]the
[14706]sanriiice
[14707]5 hain in
[14708]t of COMpPLO-
[14709]posed dift.-
[14710]Less, ang
[14711]POSENKG
[14712]sole Leucs to
[14714]fast their acesss
[14718]te a tal,
[14722]a eae
[14726]we
[14728]a IRI ae ee ‘
[14730]~ TOP SEorEi
[14734]sensitive sources
[14739]TOP Sc:
[14741]a.
[14747]JOP Stata!
[14749]628
[14751]sensitive SOUrCeS.ece
[14753]TOP SEGiE
[14755]Be es
[14757]Pa ae
[14759]core ad!
[14761]Ay PO te
[14763]9 TOP Skuit:
[14765]sensitive sources
[14767]TOP SECRET
[14769]by
[14771]14-0000
[14773]TOP Sev ,
[14775]SE errs By
[14776]AC. pices sates
[14778]mo Top SET
[14780]14-0000
[14782]" walcn Verious acurce@es Nave confirmed one
[14785]_
[14787]pUrted : SY
[14788]that the Survertlance eu,
[14790]KGp Sur ce barertore’e includes epecial paint invisible
[14791]to tne naked ore Ov" visible tnrovan ese ot & Special Gesice
[14792]It a3 used an cconsunceien with Bend eprecs ciosed cirecuas
[14793]televisien at Lricaes. wenncas 6tL A Sinilar tecrnige?
[14795]was Gescribed by . i
[14797]-k PPAdOV Capris have coes-
[14799]to numans i : saliente ©
[14801]23 and
[14803]21 LAE
[14804]Direc uOrete
[14805]tecnn que
[14807]trensem2
[14808]Soviet
[14809][exon
[14811]Pate
[14813]. “ui ies sO shaped
[14815]pid: of e@ men s suit. They
[14817]Pons Guvers of rénus. Thus
[14819]. Moseor ny tne Kt to listen to
[14820]ets. particulacly at tne
[14824]ty SOLS EWSELT. COLITSYN
[14826]yocre CHIPEPANOV papers.
[14828]“PATO papers Gave tne KGB
[14830]develorad a :
[14831]tnat they can bat arm one
[14832]also can ce comeeniew in
[14833]concealed. tisy ac used
[14835]Eorel Merropo. and ine s
[14837]NC SESEZO
[14841]feparred ine KB reennique
[14842]of swWwit.nirg Lereprane oan batetee a for tie & S. Rabassy
[14843]in Moscow to a KiB ingtatsataon  enere tney are intercepred
[14844]by a Soviet posing as an American
[14846]Weere tne butik of KOSEIKO s reporting of KGB ocecrations was
[14847]concerned witn tnosr of tne Secoid Cares Sireitora.e. tnis nes
[14851]SDL Mak Sounierintsisigence activi-
[14853]nob
[14855]given Gerails on
[14857]ties in eGdition to inelir starements on tree comprem1 se of CIA
[14858]asserts witnin che UFHk ta tupic of reporiing > .q CUERE-
[14860]r4i). The anturmation from gy
[14861]is summarized reiow
[14863]4 ADLe Lo provi Sel BULL CeTOn
[14864]Chief Dire-rorate activity. He reporied tne FGt's discovery of
[14865]an American empioyea at tne Sokotniki Fanibirion ir Moscow 1n
[14867]sterile
[14870]* The existence and teasipility of such a supstance has rot been
[14871]verified.
[14873]TOP see"
[14876]14-0000
[14880]ae cod
[14882]TOP SECKE!
[14884]232.
[14886]clandestine comract with an unidenritie.: Soviet female. (Tnis
[14887]contact 1S rot identifies With any ClA coerencaa at the Exhibition
[14888]in 1959.) he vpuke Of the Kons nowsbewo: of ar American Intelii-
[14891]eeh an the area of the
[14893]Exhibition, He said chat the KCS contrcelied ai: YS. agent con-
[14894]tacts 1n Moscon, including on wits an old aax in his 60's
[14895]ENKG reported cn an indiviaue! who isay re jaocti:e#) with this
[14896]agent).
[14898]mene
[14900]Vee
[14902]: SEBS clearca ro paw 2-lfilled functions
[14904]vers have vest toed as steciurd procedure 2n
[14905]yoaue the Soviet Urion.
[14907]Tocrace agent
[14909]As previously medrese at eb rhe defecerans of
[14910]the genuine sources GCLI Sys Ri ieee "N6, that ¢merican
[14911]Intelligence Eegen to re. 2..e volsuinols ard cursally currcccrative
[14915]of . XOR Sccons Thief
[14917]on thas, anferma*Lan
[14919]tion ta the overlap of
[14920]y sources, even
[14924]torace informatic , ae a ee Kt decision to em-
[14926]phasize cr sacrifice at. ‘°
[14928]informeticn fron others on tne achratt
[14929]and Surve:llance Directordies. whe ¢
[14930]therefore acpeers to ke sicnaficent in ae
[14932]Oo wd
[14935]TOP SECRET ==
[14937]ty
[14938]om
[14939]— pe
[14941]|
[14942]|
[14944]oi ee, nee
[14948]os Cone
[14950]=_~™N
[14952]TOP SECRET
[14954]833
[14958]TOP Sih Re
[14960]oi
[14962]ne ee ne i TS Rte AS ES CL COT OLE RS A TS
[14966]TOP 822327
[14972]TOP SECaET
[14974]14-0000 - ‘
[14976]B35,
[14977]H. Evaluation
[14979]The conclusion thar BOSENFO 12 on a KG# m:3ss.ion could carry
[14980]damaging implications tor tne American intelligence sources wno
[14981]have Supported nis bona tides. Unless trzir statements or, NOSENKO
[14982]can be convinecinzly explained es innocens repetition of misinfor-
[14983]Mation spread by tre Fs within tne Sovier servicss. tnese sources
[14984]mignt be conciuced to nave been deliberately misleading eitner as
[14985]promotors cl tnéfir own persona! interests or as parties to a KGB
[14986]co.spiracy.
[14988]Regarding GCOLITSYN. tne opinion of CIA -1s tnat ie purpose-
[14989]fully gave false support for NOSENKO in an attempt to make his
[14990]opinions more @utnhoritative. This a satisfactory explana-
[14991]tion for the remarks on NOLENKO by : } P
[14992]however, there seem to oe no perscnai j Tac Uneal
[14994]“Support of SOSENKO's bona fides mignr Lave served. The choice
[14995]thus seeus to lie bewweoen tnese tnrec officers beiss genuine
[14996]Sources of ¢merican incelaigence wut eneitcing ¢nannels of KG
[14997]misinicrmation az: On tne otner mand, cne or more of tnem being
[14998]in league with tre KCL,
[15000]@ The possibiisty chi: Gee ! ee
[15001]K3E control was tested rurttier am the concexe cf nne NOSENKO opera-
[15002]tacr Cy reviewing caraiicis in their reperting ard his. and c:neral
[15003]correlations that ¢< fron one case to anotner. At the same
[15004]: ~~ connections were sroen for compar-
[15005]found tnat would eliminate
[15006]from considecracion as possibly being
[15008]aS ome
[15010]are uncer
[15012]Sars at
[15014]rovocation asent=.
[15016]This €xzmiration against the conclusion tnat
[15017]pntrol, has brougne the bona f14 of
[15019]gy isto Serious question. if Nos O 1s
[15020]tne KGB, these ctner so-rces cern also to ce.
[15024]TOP SE! -