[1]14-0000
[3]104- 10210- 10009 ja
[5]2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
[7]TO TRE
[9]TATE SEAL REVERSED AY CV HEALS OULAPLERS hy
[11]SELNGE COPLUPLEE OM ASSASSEBRATTONS SPARE HEMBERS
[13]ut :
[14]PBER/VGLUID : LEROLUSTEDI S Yen
[18]: are j
[19]nrc, vw 1) to!
[20].
[21]J . :
[23][ares eae 7
[24]i . . : I
[25][SNST/LOCAT Or: ee ee _ 7
[26]it : .
[28]| .
[30]as semmnanenarene sur enntns pentose Logorpen ons nar app tess mutate oe ane neem nent Nn I
[32]IP any: APO GEAR IAE Ft) SeCUIT YC Le
[34]seen Rantittemnennenere sree
[36]i a |
[37]CATE BT GHATURE OFF
[38]ry, ’
[40]URNED te IENING OFFICT AR
[42]tails care
[44]NTS MAY BE COPTED OP RLMOVED ERO THIS PILe.
[47]14-0000
[49]rs
[51]CONCLUSIONS AND COMMENTS
[52]IN THE CASE OF : ‘
[54]YURIY IVANOVICH NOSENKO
[56]Dalen ame So ae Liter See hae”
[58]. ed
[60]7 |
[64]j
[65]i
[66]* Bhs ee -, 4
[67]ane Phetne net Peter sll: wel j
[68]: i,
[69]: . i
[70], , . at !
[71]a : f
[73]w
[75]14-0000
[77]Per
[79]4
[81]ney tha te bee
[83]a 7 ; 1 Ociaber 1965
[85]L : o. . ,
[87]MEMORANDUM FOR: Directoy of Security
[89]1)
[91]FROM Desuty Chicl, Security Rescarch Stall
[93]oe
[95]DOSENKO, VYusly ivanevich
[97]Soe : SUBJECT
[99]4
[100]5
[102]1, Jn accordance with the request of thp Deputy Circctor
[103]‘.. of Central Intelligence, attached is a cummary| with cenclusioas ‘ .
[104]'. ' eeaceraing the bona fides of Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO. Sub- : ty
[105]@$ ° . conclusions are coniained ia tic sumraary concersiag several ;
[106]wmasjor areas which were csiven primary consideration in iaz maticr .
[107]“5 “gf the bona fides of NOSDNKO. coe ;
[108]. 2. Included in this cumraary arc coinments concerning
[109]conclusions in thu previcus sumraary and an annex contafrina ce-
[110]marks on three separate suujecto relisted to the NOSINKS cage.
[112]renee yee te
[114]meee ear
[116]3. In bricf, the conclusica of this suramary
[118]po fe the person he claims to be, thit ke heid bic claimed positions in
[119]: : the KGS during 1953 ~- January 1954, tact NCOENKO was act dis-
[121]. patched by the HOS, and tast bis previcus Nes and exagyerations
[122]wa ; . aro notactually of material cinniiicance at this time. :
[124]ocademsietemniuentadsee amide ba ceeera tea
[126]Bruce L.. Solis
[128]Attachment: . :
[129]“Summary
[131]go0LCG2
[133]TIT me or reassert Aiea ah ak awh
[137]SES
[139]14-0000
[141]TABLE OF CONTENTS
[143]1 intreduction
[144]1a Summary of Developmerxis in NOSENKO Case Since
[145]30.October 1967 :
[147]os _ iL Analytical Comments Concerning the Bona Fides of Yuriy
[148]o - - Ivanovich NOSENXO .
[150]aA. NOSENKO Identical to the Person Whom He Claims
[151]to be? 7
[153]_B. Is the Claimed 433 Carcer of NOSENKO Plausible?
[155]Gc, Has NOSENKO Given an Acceptable Explanation of
[156]His Motivation ta Contacting CIA in 1962 and For
[157]His Defectioxn in 1964?
[159]D. Is the Information Furnished by NOSENKO to CLA
[161]ot : : Concerning KGB Operations, Personalities, and
[162]. Organization Reasorabty Commensurate With Ki
[163]: - . « ° Giaimed KGB Career?
[165]: —=&z. Can. the Information Furnished by ? XOSEXKO be
[166]Consicered in Toto as Having Resulted in Materia?
[167].. Damage to the KGB anc/or Has the information
[168]- ° Furnisned by NOSZNKO Been of Signiticazt Benefit
[169]- to Western Intelligence? -
[170]F, Is There Evidence of KGB Deception or "Give-Away"
[171]in Information Furnisked by NOSENKO Which Wout
[172]: _ | Warrant a Coxnclusica that NOSENKO was Dispa sckeg
[173]- ' 5 by the KGB? . ,
[175]GOLACCS
[177]i
[178]4
[179]4
[183]Lo tetteaeg
[186]'
[187]2
[189]“ft
[191]14-0000
[193]G. is Taere Evicesace of & Polii.cal or Any Gtler Type
[194]Odjective Wrich Cowd Jusiily a Quspaicn of NOSENKO
[195]by the NGB With Pesmission to Speak Freely to CiA
[197]. Concerning iis Knowiedge of the KGB and W shout
[198]toy Lo. NOSENKO Being Given a Specific Mission or Missions?
[200]. CLA Were Known to the AGE Prior
[201]to His Deicction or That NOSENKO Was Xver Bricied
[202]Tyee by the AGB Relative to: Behavior or KGS Oxjective
[203]During Txese Contacts or After His Defecticn?
[205]12)
[207]Ho IV. Comments Concerning Previous Conclusions in Regaré to NCSENKO
[209]: A. NOSENKO Did Not Serve in the Naval. RU in Azy y of the
[210]Capacities or at the Places and Times He Claimed
[212]& _B. NOSENKO Did Not Enter the KGB in the Manner or at the
[213]Time He Claimec
[215]mo vey a 4
[217]c.: NOSENKO Did Not Serve in the American Embassy Section
[218]Throughout the 1953 - 1955 Period as He saimed
[220]D, During the Period 1955 - 1960, He Was Noithe: a Senior
[221]Case Ociicer in, nor Deputy Chief of, the Seventh
[222]Department American-British Commonweaih Section
[223]E, NOSENKO Was Neither Deputy Chiez of the American Embassy
[224]© ‘Section nor a Sénior Ofiicer or Suser rvisor in the Section
[225]‘ -  " During the Period-i961'- 1962{sic) a
[227]F. NOSENKO's Claims, That in 1962 He was Chiei of the
[229]“4 . Armerican-Britisn Commonwealta Section and Was
[231]. loot 0 Thereafter a Deputy Chici of the Seventh Department,
[232]Are Not Credible
[234]G. NOSENKO Has no Valid Claim to Certainty That the KGB
[235]Recruited No American Embassy Personnel Between
[236]1953 and His Defection in 1964
[238]i 0004004
[240]at rage et
[242]Ag
[245]14-0000
[249]SENAO
[251]fe)
[252]PA
[253].
[254]a
[255]3
[258]nex A = Si
[262]Text
[264]in
[266]ed
[268]Se Vee # of
[270]_
[273]te]
[275]c aaAov Papers
[277]ahe Cacrep,
[279]Annex C «
[282]14-0000
[284]Okt
[286]SE
[288]ODSCTION
[290]Creed
[293]id
[295]. -
[296]we . -
[297].
[299]“TEE
[301]YTS TR
[305]8
[307]i
[311]$f
[313]af
[315]q
[319]x
[322]14-0000
[324]teed,
[326]- _INTRODUCTION
[328]The following summary and analysis is not intended to be ; _
[330]all inclusive, that is to contain a specific comment on all organi-
[332]zational, operational, personality and case type information furnished
[334], Uby Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO: To attempt to do so would be repetitious
[336]and confusing to the reader and would not be of material benefit in the Se
[337]‘formation of logical conclusions concerning the rather limited areas of
[339]primary concern.
[341]. 4
[342]: so. This summary will not contain a detailed psychological an . 4 a |
[344]” assessment of NOSENKO nor will it contain'a xecitation of the numerous
[346]theories which have been-promulgated in the past concerning varying
[348]‘aspects of the NOSENKO case. This summary will be primarily
[350].directed toward the question of whether NOSENKO was or was not : mo - - |
[352]“ dispatched by the KGB, whether his claimed KGB career is relatively
[354]plausible and whether he has since late October 1967 been cooperative in Cw,
[355]a ‘reassessment of the entire case for or against NOSENKO. NOSENKO
[356]has admitted certain lies and exaggerations in the past but claims that
[358]. these were of a personal nature, intended to enhance his own importance . Coe : va
[361]14-0000
[364]Pia COR airy
[366]Vad.
[370]but not to mislead this Agency in any material matters of an operational
[372]or policy nature.
[374]In order to avoid any misunderstanding of the phrase "bona
[378]fides" as considered in this summary, NOSENKO will be judged primarily ; oof
[379]on whetocr he voluntarily defected to this Agency without KGB knowledge,
[380]and whetaer his 1962 and early 1964 contacts with representatives of this .
[381]Agency were known to the. KGB. . Motivation and certain other pertinent
[382]aspects will be considered, but his admitted previous errors, lies and Ot : .
[383]exaggerations will not per se warrant a conclusion that NOSENKO is nota
[385]There is not an accurate standard or scale of measurement ; : 7
[386]against which information concerning NOSENKO can be balanced or - .
[387]correlated to determine if he is or is nota dispatched KGB officer. For
[388]purposes of this analysis and summary, an arbitrary list of areas
[389]considered pertinent has been compiled, | Readers may differ in regard to
[390]whether this arbitrary standard is a completely accurate standard, but it :
[391]ia felt that the information from NOSENKO and information from other : ‘
[392]sources derived through independent investigation will permit the reader ; , . .
[393]to assess the information in toto against any standard he considers
[395]appropriate. . “
[397]The previous summary on NOSENKO entitled, "The. Exami-
[399]nation of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector, "has been considered in
[401]’ he a :
[402]e . . :
[403]goa ht EA SRCICES ash 1 inte moore mcerimten me
[405]howe
[407]SRISSIUA RECN a SSaEN SESE : RASS
[408]aS ane
[411]tabi caiseA RRA Lanai
[413]14-0000
[415]oC 4
[417]the preparation of thie summary. [2 will be cormmented on in part
[418]end thie summary will include conclusions correlated with the seven
[419]primzry conclusions est forth on page 3$8 of the above summary. -
[420]Remarks concerning certeiz crrore, inconsistencies, omiastons and
[421]unsupported conclusions in ine previens summary ia regord to specific
[422]cases or sub-areas will be included in this summary. However, this
[423]eummary will not include a point-by-potat comparison of all areas of OS z i
[424]agreement or disagreement with information contained in the provious
[425]summary. .
[427]: A positive decteion in regard to NOSENK® based on all
[429]avallable information should be made in the Immediate future. Thore
[431]a ir are wo known sources currently available'to provide new positive 0° :
[432]. information concerning NOSENKO and his bona fides. it te recognized
[433]i thet there fo always a possibility tn the future a new source or sources
[434]will be able to furnish additisnal information in regard to NOSENKO.
[435]> However, this possibility {oe exceedingly tenuous and it is felt there
[436]is cuffictent information available on which to base a conclusion in - Meets
[438]- : the KOSENKO matter.
[440]Se ae gs oe Fectres ih be ~G00LCCS. ;
[442]_ MARSA AT RIT tL, SOREN YE CH
[446]re eel Meares AN gee Lupus tre tame nnnn se eH
[448]14-0000
[450]vote a : . ,
[451]~ ok.
[454]wt - 3
[455]ra £35
[456]¢ . Seah.
[459]Go GR |
[460]aoc € a . ob
[461]hw) 3 !
[462]wo . fe a, j
[464]: Ss . ;
[465]a : , }
[466]° j : .
[467]. ‘ te . ;
[469], eh +
[470]‘ 4
[472]14-0000
[474]emnnry
[475]one aoe Y
[477]SUMMARY OF DEVELOPMENTS IN NOSENKO CASE
[479]SINCE 30 OCTOBER 1967 oe 7 7
[481]Since 30 October 1967, interviews with Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO a So
[482]have been conducted by one individual not previously known personally to
[483]NOSENKO but who has been aware of the NOSENXO case since June 1962.
[485]Interviews have been detailed and very extensive in scope, have oo
[486]been recorded and transcribed, and have covered the entire life and caree: ° .
[487]of NOSENKO without regard to whether @ particular aspect had been,
[488]covered during previous interview or interviews,
[490]NOSENKO, although naturally apprehensive during the firet few
[491]interviews, has been cooperative, has developed a relaxed attitude, and
[492]the interviewer has noted no gignificant reluctance to discuss any aspect
[493]of his life, career, or activities. On occasion NOSENKO has indicated a 7 ‘ : ¢
[495]. reluctance to make positive statements in certain areas previously
[496]considered at a minimum extremely controversial. This reluctance
[498]was understandable and when it became apparent to NOSENKO that the
[500]'
[502]SECRET ©
[504]bale? 3
[505]Exsis?23 tea sr't=ati
[506]taznday sat
[507]¢odeenticsha
[509]G00L011
[511]ms
[513]= . . t. vr
[515]NSAI SA
[516]SO
[518]ARHHEEMY
[520]14-0000
[522]S:
[524]interviewer would not Cispute or disparage his statements without adequate
[525]reason, this reluctance on the part of NOSENKO, in the opinion of the
[526]interviewer, totaly disappeared,
[528]During the interviewing period, particularly in the first 5ix months,
[529]SNOSENKO materially assisted the interviewer by preparing approximately
[530]sixty memoranda on such diverse subjects as his life, motivation for de-
[531]fection, individual cases, notes which he furnished to CLA in 1964, KGB
[532]organization, and KGB officer and agent personalities, As an example
[533]of the scope of this work by NOSENKO, four of the memoranda included
[536]remarks concerning approximately [875|KGB ofiicers, {roo\xcB agents,
[537]3 35 GRU officers, and[ago other Soviet nationals. These lists were alpha-
[538]beticaliy arranged and the above indicated cooperation of NOSENKO has
[539]materially assisted in the organization and evaluation of intormation
[540]furnished by him curing current interviews.
[542]Copies of transcripts of interviews with NOSENKO and related
[543]memoranda have been disseminated to the FBl and the Cl Staff. Special
[544]Agent Elbert Turner and Special Agent James Wooten of the Washington
[545]Field Office/FBI in particular have given great assistance in research
[546]and compilation of new or additional information and the FBI has inter-
[548]viewed or reinterviewed a number of United States citizens concerning
[550]whom NOSENKO has furnished pertinent information,
[552]2 c001012
[554]Cote SECRET
[556]mentee teats Be eet ew te eee
[561]14-0000
[563]ut
[566]aaa . In addition, throe professionals frorn the $B Division bave
[568]reviewed the current information and asasteted in the retrieval of
[570]previous information from NOSENKO and collation of current
[571]information with previous informatk-a. The latter ‘s a trernendous
[573]task because of the volume of material; the aumber of individual
[575]cases irvolved; and the extensive information in regard ta KGB .
[576]persenplities, procedures, organizational structure and activities. |
[577]The 8B Diviston elso provided tha services of an expert
[578]translator to translate the tapes of the 1965 interrogation of NOSENKD 7 H ; _ “
[579]_ by Petr DERYABIN and one of the previously mentioned three pro- .
[580]feneionala completed a new translation of the 1962 interviews with , tt
[582]NOSENKO. In addition, transcriptions of certain other particularly
[584]pertinent previous interviews of NOsENKO have been completed by
[585]the Office of Security.
[586]Approzimately 7000 pages of traascripta and related material
[587]have been compiled and disseminated since late October 1967. Com-~ .
[588]iments concerning the value of the information contained in the sbove
[589]: material ase contained tn another section of tats summary. As of the
[590]- a present thine, a complete analysis is not possible since a considerable
[591]. portion of the material hes not been fully processed. In tha preparation
[593]"of this summary all areas of major significance have been examined.
[595]‘ “ Because of the voluminous’ information, all analytical and: ‘collation work
[597]aede,
[599]has nat been completed; but it ie not considered that,. based on all -
[602]14-0000
[604]6% avatlable information, the remaining work will materially affect
[605]tha conclusions drawn in this summary. '
[607]The polygraph interview of NOSENKO was initiated on. _
[608]2 Auguet and concluded on 6 August 1968. Approximately sixty a
[609]questions of a pertinent nature wore tndhided in the polygraph tater-
[610]view. No probleme were encountered dosing the polygraph interview
[611]and no eéditional tenting ‘of NOSENKO te anticipated. Attached ts a
[612]copy of the self-explanatory report on the exalts of the polygrapy _
[613]tntorview. —_ co Co ‘
[617]- {Interviews with NOSENKO have continued since the polygraph ot
[619]ponte oe
[621]. interview on a temporarily reduced scale in order to permit.a review
[623]of previous information and Preparation of. thie, summary. There te,
[625]Bo doubt that fature interviews with NOSENKO will reveal information ;
[626]of intelligence value, but information developed thus far will parmit ;
[628]& doctelon in the case of Yurly Ivanovich NOSENK®.
[630]7
[632]“Attachment:
[634]2 iat St
[638]i
[639]OS REE so diigo He Tear
[641]14-0000
[643]ect RSS
[645]@ intention to defect? Xo.
[647]comes REE Ss
[651]. a . . . .
[652]2G : Cniet, Security Research Steff 12 Avuguss 1968
[653]FRO 3: Interrogation Research Division
[655]biveveson
[657]Yurty ivanovich NOSIIKO IRD # 67492
[659]g
[663]SoRNEIT YE NG DACA
[667]Subject is a 40 year old former KGa Stafter wo defected so the
[668]U.S. in 96h : in Geneva.
[670]BACKGROUND ' aed)
[672]iy. Bruce L. Solie of the Security Research Staff has béen de- ©
[673]‘oriefing and interrogating Subject since Octoser 1967. in order to
[674]resolve the issue whetier> Suoject was a dispatched agent of the KG.
[675]die hae conducted @ vast amount ox research and checking with sources
[676]* in en effort to estaolisa the veracity of Subdject's statements.
[678]PURPOSE
[679]@ "She ‘primary purpose of the poiygraph test was to deternine:
[680]l. ‘Whether Suoject was a Gispatched Agent of the KGB;
[682]2. whether Suoject had intentionally given Mr. Solte
[683]any faise inforaation.
[685]PROCEDURE
[687]Subject was given a polygraph examination on 2 August 1968 at
[688]a safesite in the vicinity of Washinston, D.C. The examination was
[689]conducted in the inglishs language. Suoject's comprehension and the
[690]aollity to express nimself in Engiisn was completely adequate for
[691]‘ purposes of polygraph testing. Suoject was completely cooperative
[692]in all respects. Suoject displayed no evasiveness and appeared to
[693]be completely frank whenever he was questioned or gave inforzation
[694]on @ topic.
[695]x
[697]The following relevant questions were asked auring the first test:
[698]Is your true name Yurly Ivanovich NOSENKO? Yes. ;
[699]Were you bora in the year 19277 Yes.
[701]Besides the Acericans, did you tell anyone élee ebout your
[703]- Shon? +
[704]EtssGd G22 what
[705]Cieesrediee sod
[707]BaMercttacton _ Lee
[709]abr een i ate sors na attadimnctre2~
[711]LEAN Une e we
[713]vat
[715]a
[718]14-0000
[720]wh . 6
[724]oad you ever teil anyone in the Kos about your contact with '
[725]fwerscan, Intelligence? ii0..
[727]seve you given instructions by tre KGB to get in contact wita
[729]t
[730]i]
[731]‘zerican Intelligence? iio.
[732]Were you told vy she KG3 to defect in order to carry out an :
[733]Inteiiigeace mission? io. : '
[734]The following relevant questions vere asxed during the second test: : ' y
[735]'
[736]Did the KGB actusliy serd oa comcunication for your recall to bo: \
[737]the USSR on the Gay of your defection? iio. . '
[738]Were you acquainted with CHSREPANOV? Yes. : . r
[739]i .
[740]Did you actually travel to Gorxiy in tiovemver 1963 to hunt for :
[741]CiTEREPANOV? «Yes. . :
[742]6 Ave you deliberately withholding from us any information about . : |
[743]+, ‘the KGB recruitcent of Acericans? No. : . : -
[744]Does tne XGB Lave MECKA and NEPrUuc 607 Yes.
[745]Were you the responsible Case Officer for Jona Abidian in 1960-617 ; .
[746]Yes. 1
[748]vo you Know tne true name of ANDASY or SASHA? Hoe . :
[749]Dia you ever nave tucercuiasis? Yes.
[750]Gne following relevant questions were asxed on test three: .
[751]aa a’ serve in Navy inteligence from 1951 to 19532 Yes. — :
[752]Was] Sidi |in the USSR during the period 1957 to 19597 Yes. .
[753]s . :
[754]To the best of your knowledge, were you in the Seventh ;
[755]Department at this time? Yes. . : , a
[756]Dia you telephone the GRU about[SHUDIN]at this time? Yes. Jd. |
[757]: : Go the best of your knowledge, was POPOV couprouised because i
[758]. . Of the letter Mr. sinters wailed? Yes. } .
[759]. . - 1
[760]oe ot . _. (001016 i . ;
[761]a : , ; ' v1 Sy
[762]ae meee ee les | 4
[765]; af
[766]a a
[769]SES, t
[771]caseieyens : : : os ~amegereens : : RRR TERT HUAN eT
[772]JUNC ont SS ASS aS
[773]HAE CERES S SERRE SSS 8 aed “ees
[776]14-0000
[778]-
[780]Sane
[781]raD st Gh
[782]Puce --3 .
[784]To tne vest of your iocvlccce, was TINOVaGY e:moesed to the
[785]333 decauce Of the 5155 Gurveliiance oa tie Driticn Scoassy? == +
[786]Yes. .
[788]wag them any nisleading tnforuation ia tue notes you-brougnt
[789]out from the Soviet Union? io.
[791]oat a8 you intentionally exaggerate ycur personal association witha
[792]sOVT Oe .
[794]Ave you niding any adverse information avout your background? No.
[796]SudSect's poiygrapn test refiected no significant responses indicative
[797]of deception regarding the relevant questions assed. iio further polygraza
[798]tests vere aduinistercd on a ets date occause the examiner did not want to
[799]run tne risk of fatigue se “@ in and thus possibiy ceusing adrenalin
[801]' exhaustion.
[803]Polygrapn testing was resuzeé. on 6 August 1963. Tne Toliowing
[804]relevant questions were asied ca test four: ~
[805]4
[806]: Did you join the KGB in arch 29537 Yes.
[807]Were you a KGB officer from 1953 to i964? Yes. . ,
[809].
[811]Were you a Deputy Chie? cZ the Seventh Deparment? Yea.
[812]Were you only a Captain at tris tine? “Yes.
[814]Were you an officer in the U.S. Emoassy Section frém March . ..
[815]1953 to May 19557 ‘Yes. .
[817]In 1958 and 1959 were you the Deputy Chie? of the ‘merican-
[818]Britisn-Canadian Sectica in the Seventh Department? Yes.
[820]Froa January 1960 to Decexber 196i | were you the Deputy to the
[821]Coie? of the First Section of the First Deparwent? Yes.
[823]From January to July 1962 were you the Chiez of the First + Section
[824]. of the Seventh Departcenv? Yes.
[826]Were you an officer in tze First Section, First Department, SCD,
[827]&t the tine of the Stalingrad operation against [Senson, Mule] and
[829][Stroud Yes. | . . ar) bo -
[830]er Ob Oo
[831]q . 7 | . 6001017
[833]. ' SECHFT .
[838]14-0000
[840]oe
[844].
[850]Page 4&
[852]The following reievant questions were asied on tesy Tive:
[854]Since 1953 do you “now of any other G2 recruitcczts in the
[855]American Eubassy besides ict and fiiouanbp Ne.
[856]ob
[858]Did the KGB xnow avout tie cotes you vrougit «7.5 ho.
[859]Nave you told us the complete truth about your “U3 career? Yes.
[861]Did you intentionally exagcerate your nersonal involvement in
[862]eases in 1962 ani i964 ia onier to misicad us? io.
[864]Did you intentionally give us any faise opcratiorar
[865]information? io.
[867]Did GRIBANOV offer you the position of Deputy Chie? of the
[868]First Departuent? Yes.
[870]Was an order actually prepared promoting you to Deputy to the
[871]Chief of the First Departuent? Yes.
[873]in early 1960 Gié GRIBANOV <ell you that your prizary responsibility
[874]was to Work against Auerican Code Cicrxs? Yes.
[876]Other than you xentioned, are you niding any other reasons for
[877]your defection? iio.
[879]Are you deliverately witnnoiding any inforuation on any foreigmera °
[880]reeruited oy the 43? No.
[882]Tne following relevant questions were asked oa test 6ix:
[884]Did you enter the KGB througa the influence of General BOGDAN
[885]KOSULOV?: «Yes.
[887]Did you succeed BAKEVALOV as Deputy Chief of the First Section?
[888]Yes. .
[890]Did GRYAZNOV succeed you as Deputy Crief of the First Section?
[891]Yes. -
[893]“Were the CHEREPANOV papers passed to the Anericans with KCB
[895]Knowledge? No. | LO
[897]Lo *, a  go04018
[899]ot en teeter ee woe eee - t
[901]14-0000
[906]C.
[907]Cc
[911]To: mnowledge wav there any ulsiending inforsation in the
[912]China: nov papers? io.
[914]: “fe 7 - . nt
[915]Did you ever personaiiy ueet GOLITSCYN? ito.
[917]_ . yo
[918]Was there @ cable sex. to Geneva for you to assist ARSE . . “
[919]in the BOLITSKIY case? Yes.
[921]Did you personally maxe an approach to |KavSEA3 at the Moscow '
[922]Airport? Yes.
[924]Tne foilowing relevant questions were asxed on test seven:
[926]Did you actualiy review the GB file on 0S4/LD? Yes.
[928]Did LEE HARVEY OSWALD receive any KGB training or aseiguuents? a a
[929]' No. . .
[931]+ . + te
[932]Were there any microphones instailed in the North Wing of the ‘
[933]U.S. Emoassy in Moscow? No.
[937]Was the review of microphone reports one of your duties in
[938]. 1960-617 Yes. :
[940]_ Are you withholding any information mow to you concerning
[941]KG3 microphones or electronic activity against tne U.S. i }
[944]Before your officiai transfer to the Seventh Departrent did :
[945]; you read the survelliance report on the visit of ABADIAN wy. ‘
[946]. to PUSHAT street? Yes. ,
[947]. c J
[949]Did you personally conauct a certain investigation of SHAXOV : i!
[950]in 1962 in Geneva? Yes. ‘
[952]Was the ranx of Lieutenant Colonel on your travel document . . . \
[953]to GORKTY only a uistake by KASHPEROV? § Yes. . : ‘
[955]_The following relevant questions were asxed on test eight:
[957]‘While in the U.S. Exoassy Section did you obtain a typewriter
[958], + for BORODIN for the preparation of a letter-to Edward Zilis
[959]SMITH? Yes. .
[961]a 001019.
[963]7 erepet. Le |
[964]pete ene: Te Ct reds venom ne erene am oe . wa te hy
[966]Rane
[967]SENTRA SoS
[968]ARHEE AREER,
[970]14-0000
[972]i a
[973]. ’ . Weevos a ‘ . . .
[974]re] . te tow
[975]oe & .
[976]ad #6792 , soe '
[977]Page Oo _ 7
[978]‘ os se passe a panne . ot
[979]Dad you read the official FOmOvs OC KGGGAOOY on hia contact
[980]: with vena on & traia ire. Ueisini to moscow? «= Yea.
[981]. . Are you intentioniliy vishal tay intonation conceming
[982]:, KGB xnowsedge of CIA personnel La “OGCOW? NO. , i. .
[983]: is there any possivility iLas uie KGB woured dispatch an officer
[984]a tO Gexect to tie Acericans? Xo. . .
[985]. - . '
[987]; Subject's polygrapn test of 6 Aagust lixewise re2ieoted xo '
[988]i indications of céecepiion. -
[990]eed ort
[991]. CONCLUSION : ' ‘ . o'
[992]. ——s : we
[993]oe ' Dased solely on the overali oniysis of Suvject's polygraph . ,
[994]‘ testa, it 1a the opinion of the Wierolgaed that the Suoject naa
[995]: been sUdstantially trucnAd in Oneweralg tha relevant gucetions _
[996]acked. . . tone TORS: ee ee oe me en eo es
[997]9 .
[998]a \ . ' .
[1000]. a om
[1001]. . ' .
[1003]aoope . . .
[1005]s.
[1006]nO oo.
[1007]: , : .
[1008]: . .
[1009]. . . .
[1011]pe So GOOLC2R
[1012]vee ott . ° toe . a Va fo te .
[1013]es oot,
[1014]_ SFERET. te
[1015]. wilt OU .
[1017]ERR
[1020]Pasha ATA.
[1025]Fe ome tsar.
[1029].
[1031]See Sr ee
[1033]14-0000
[1035]SECRE!
[1039]ANALYTICAL COMME?
[1043]OTE NE ag Crem
[1045]DE at ITU To hag 5 RMA oe caer atee meencter tone | nemeen gememtene at os meme ynemgena mma
[1047]sper et me a
[1049]TR oe tere ee rma tee ne
[1051]14-0000
[1053]a
[1058]BS ee
[1060]ANALYTICAL COMMENTS CONCERNING THE BONA FIDES OF
[1062]YURIY IVANOVICH NOSENKO oo, | oth, 2
[1064]_ - . As indicated in the introduction to this summary, information in :
[1065]i , regard to Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO will be considered against an arbi- Ii
[1066]; trary but realistic list of areas considered pertinent to the question of ‘
[1067]° whether NOSENKO voluntarily defected to this Agency without KGB :
[1068]‘ knowledge,” and whether his. 1962 and early 1964 contacts with represent- -
[1070]‘ atives of this Agency were known to the KGB. !
[1072]on 0 oe ; : .
[1073]bo. oe It was noted that motivation and certain other pertinent aspects o>
[1075]ed but that his admitted ‘previous lies and exag- . .
[1077]‘also be consic:
[1078]om : gerations. would not per se warrant a conclusion that NOSENKO is not a : a
[1080]"bona. fide defector,"
[1082]The following is a list of the areas considered pertinent and which
[1083]are being given specific consideration, Attached is a separate section 4 _
[1084],containing remarks in regard to the designated areas of A - H. os
[1086]' A. Is NOSENKO identical to the person whom he claims
[1088]ae to be? : . \
[1090]B, . Is the claimed KGB career of NOSENKO plausible?
[1094]tongs 128
[1095]secacaltiotia
[1097]See
[1101]RR ICON BO en WEA Mid Wats tan net v= mmm TTT meen earsand sieaiener mani dines ek tone
[1103]NO, oo
[1106]14-0000
[1108]C. Has NOGSENKO given an acceptable expianation of
[1109]his motivation in contacting CIA in 1962 and for his Ve ;
[1110]gefection in 1964? - : : . | ‘ : . :
[1112]D.. Is the information furnished by NOSENKO to CIA
[1114]Lo Oo concerning KGB operations, personalities, and organi-
[1116]zation reasonably commensurate with his claimed KGB .
[1118]career?
[1120]Ls
[1122]Can the information furnished by NOSENKO he con- + : :
[1124]sidered in toto as having resulted in materia] damage
[1126]a
[1127]x
[1129]to the KGB and/or has the information furnished by , 7
[1131]NOSENKO been of significant benefit to Western Intelli-
[1137]Is there evidence of KGB deception or "give away" in
[1139]information furnished by. NOSENKO which would warrant
[1140]a conclusion that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB?
[1142]G. Is there evidence of a political or any other type objective
[1146]# . which could justify a dispatch of NOSENKO by the KGB ' of :
[1148]SNE
[1150]with permission to speak freely to CIA concerning his
[1152]as knowledge of the KGB and without NOSENKO being given ©
[1154]a specific mission or missions?
[1156]6004023
[1158]poveseittbineanse smart: Witte. tote pony
[1161]14-0000
[1163]SECKE:.
[1165]a
[1166]a,
[1168]OSENKO
[1170]N
[1172]Is there any evidence that the contacts of
[1174]H.
[1176]1962 or in 1964 with CIA were known to the KGB
[1178]in
[1180]KO was ever briefed
[1182]EN
[1184]N
[1186]is
[1190]_ prior
[1192]defection or that:
[1194]KGB objectives
[1196]by the KGB relative
[1200]rs
[1204]ior or
[1206]during these contacts or after his defection?
[1211]SECRET
[1215]is NOS
[1217]che
[1219]a
[1221]a US ne re Sate Mee te ee teeny
[1223]LTE NRE one fe a RN ak tery ON ARENT
[1225]14-0000
[1229]°° Gungratiog arg
[1230]Geclassification
[1234]A. | Is NOSENKO identical to the person whom he claims to be?
[1236]During interviews NOSENKO has furnished detailed information in regard
[1237]to his family, his activities as a youth, the schools he attended, assoc- A
[1238]jates of his father and mother, and his own associates, The period : , . 4
[1239]under consideration in this section is the period preceding his. entry
[1241]‘ . ar t
[1243]into the First Department, Second Chief Directorate, MVD, -in mid- _— tfc vs
[1245]March 1953.
[1247]Information furnished by NOSENKO concerning his father and
[1249]> mother and his early, life, together with other information such asa
[1251]_comparison of photographs of NOSENKO and a photograph of his father
[1253]and confirmed travel of his mother to Western Europe in 1956 with
[1254]Madame KOSYGINA, conclusively establish that he.is Yuriy Ivanovich
[1255]‘-NOSENKO, the son of Ivan Isidorovich NOSENKO, the Minister of Ship-
[1256]building in the USSR prior to his death in 1956. This is also satisiactorily . . ; a =
[1258]supported by pexsonal-type information furnished by NOSENKO concern- 4
[1259]y ‘ a . . . . . : ‘ .
[1261]ing other associates of his father and mother. . . yf
[1262]e Since, as indicated above, there is considered to be no doubt
[1264]that Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO is the son of the former Minister of . 7
[1266]Shipbuilding, a detailed study of his life prior to 1945 (age 18) is of:
[1268]Ghoue 1
[1270]Saagracizs and
[1271]fechossitestey
[1273]a
[1275]shade Tt
[1277]AEE he
[1279]14-0000
[1283]hittie or no value in assessing U.c bona fides or non-pbona fides of
[1284]NOSENKO. An expose of his youtniul indiscretions, of which he has
[1285]admitted a number, is of no import in a discussion of whether NCSENKO
[1286]Was or was not dispatched by the AGB. Obtaining any collaterai first-
[1287]hand information in regard to NOSENKO beiore 1945 would be of
[1288]negligible value, but there actually is supporting information from
[1289]Nikolay ARTAMONOYV, a defector from the Soviet Navy, concerning
[1290]the claimed attendance by NOSENKO at a military-naval preparatory
[1291]school in Leningrad,
[1292]NOSENKO, during current interviews, has stated that he grad-
[1293]. ‘
[1294]ry uated from the Institute of International Relations in 1950 and had ,
[1295]attended the Institute ‘since: 1945. He has explained that he should pve 0
[1296]graduated in 1949'since it was a four-year course, but failed the final
[1297]examination in Marxiem and therefore was required to attend the Institute
[1298]for a longer period of time and again take his final examinations.
[1299]Based on information furnished by NOSENKO concerning co-
[1300]students and the Institute, there is no reason to doubt that he actually i
[1301]attended and graduated from the Institute of International Relations in
[1303]1950. The previous controversy in this matter was complicated by
[1305]NOSENKO who, in 1964 after his defection, stated in a biography that
[1309]“ he had graduated from the Institute in 1949. Actually this statement
[1311]\ a G001027
[1313]me
[1315]STENT Ta ; f RY aa 4 i RR RR SIRT
[1316]Sa RUS UC ERAC UENO i EN aS at ERNE R 33 a ‘ iS ts ca SG
[1318]14-0000
[1320]a Be
[1322]Rie BRI:
[1324]aN
[1326]by NOSENKO in 1964 resulted in conflicting information since NOSENKO
[1328]on 9 June 1962 during his first contact with CIA had stated that he
[1330]"completed the Institute of International Relations in 1950." NOSENKO
[1332]has given the explanation that he changed the date of his graduation to
[1334]1949 because he did not wish to admit that he had failed to graduate in.
[1336]1949, NOSENKO explained that this change in his date of graduation
[1338]caused him to pre-date his actual entry into Navy Intelligence to 1950
[1339]instead of 1951 and his actual entry into the KGB from 1953 to 1952.
[1341]The above action by NOSENKO is included in what NOSENKO has
[1343]' characterized as his “stupid blunders."' The latter is a rather apt:
[1345]characterization of his now admitted lies and exaggerations but is not
[1347]” evidence that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB. It is evidence of -
[1349]a certain personality trait of NOSENKO who has in the past by his own
[1350]admission tended to enhance his importance and astuteness by graphically
[1351]portraying his personal participation in KGB activities concerning which
[1352]he had knowledge but did not personally participate, .
[1353]The claimed service of NOSENKO in Navy Intelligence during
[1354]March 1951 to early 1953 in the Far East and the Baltic areas has been
[1356]seriously questioned in the past. Specific comments on this period of
[1358]re a a at GP AEA Be SIL LIN OT halaman TE IN
[1361]14-0000
[1363]ponerse
[1365]eres PRON UI 2 Seria
[1367]SEL...
[1369]_ time are contained in a separate section of this summary, but it is
[1371]considered that the recent interviews of NOSENKO satisfactorily sub-
[1372]stantiate his claimed service in Navy Intelligence during March 1951
[1373]to early 1953.
[1375]Attached is a typed copy ofa handwritten memorandum completed
[1376]by NOSENKO on 31 October 1967. This is a biographical statement con-
[1377]cerning his life and KGB carcer. No effort has been made to correct
[1378]grammatical errors or Spelling since to do so would be in conflict with
[1379]the manner in which current interviews were conducted; namely, to give
[1380]NOSENKO an opportunity to recdéunt his life.and activities to permit a re-
[1381]examination of the entire case. The comprehension and fluency of
[1382]NOSENKO in the English language was adequate for interview purposes
[1383]in October 1967 and both have materially improved since that time.
[1385]_ Interviews of and memoranda prepared by. NOSENKO since
[1387]* 31 October 1967 have not indicated any material discrepancies with the
[1388]statements of NOSEN KO in the attached memorandum, One change that
[1389]has-been made by NOSENKO is that he now dates his transfer from the.
[1390]‘First Department, Second Chief Directorate (SCD), KGB, to the Seventh
[1391]Department, SCD, as occurring in the latter part of May 1955 rather
[1393]. than June - July 1955 as indicated in the attached statement. NOSENKO
[1395], also now dates the period in which an unsatisfactory "characterization"
[1397]. oa rn +
[1398]ak TE en Nt TNA Ma Se eh bate et be SAE
[1400]k
[1401]4
[1404]14-0000
[1406]: {personnel evaluation) was prepared on NOSENKXO in March - April
[1408]. 1955 rather than May - June 1955. Since the unsatisfactory personnel
[1409]report was directly related to his transfer to the Seventh Department,
[1410]neither of the above changes are considered to be of a significant nature,
[1412]An- effort has been made during current interviews to differentiate between
[1414]errors due to faulty memory and discrepancies indicative of deception by
[1416]. NOSENKO.
[1418]Attachment:
[1419]31 Oct 67 Memo
[1421]-) oe ‘
[1423]cL ~~ 0001030
[1427]pee Manes re ee en re ea . coy
[1431]Sey
[1432]SAN
[1434]Bs
[1435]SESS tant
[1438]14-0000
[1440]RUE Wado ANE 814 LAPIN IIT ON NE die 183
[1442]: "Sudsmech" from summer 1934,
[1444]tee
[1446]at :
[1447]o arr joe ‘, . : ‘ ae
[1449]' i * Operational Memo # N-2
[1450]. SUBJECT: NOSENKO, Yuri Ivanovich :
[1452]The foliowing is a typed copy of a handwritten memorandum
[1453]furnished by Subject on 31 October 1967, following a request on
[1454]., 30 October 1967; .
[1455]“1 ‘NOSENKO, George; was born 30 October 1927 in the city
[1456]Glee. , ‘ ne
[1457]. Nicolaev, Ukraine, ,
[1459]ade.
[1461]n
[1463]My family: the father - NOSENKO, ivan, b. 1902, was working
[1465]-at the” ehipbuilding plant and studied at the shipbuilding institute, which .
[1467]he finished in 1928; the mother - NOSENKO, Tamara (nee MARKOVSKI),
[1469]b, 1908, a Housewife; the brother - NOSENKO, Vladimir, b, 1944, a
[1471]-student,
[1473]In September 1934 I began to study in the school (0 claas) out
[1475]_ Studied a short period of time because in October with the mother went
[1477]“in Leningrad where the father was working at the shipbuilding plant, .
[1479]In Nicoiaev I was living at the Street
[1481]. Nicolseki 7, All relatives of my family were living also in Nicolaev.
[1482]7 a in Leningrad I was living with parents in three places till 1938:
[1484]“at the Street Stachek (1934 - summer 1935}, St.. Canal of Griboedov,
[1486]154 (1935-1938), St. M.. Gorky (short period in 1938). From 1935 till
[1488]GUULU31
[1490]y Geue? 1 : :
[1493]° Gm reer a .
[1497]14-0000
[1499]er ere ene nes
[1501]7 . OLE . . _ Jo
[1503]shoe
[1505]. oe . ; ’
[1507]1938 I studied at the schools, which were close to my places of living. :
[1509]‘In 1938 the father began to work in Moscow and soon 1 with the mother
[1511]went to live in Moscow in the end of this year. 0 ; 7
[1513]wa : In Moscow we were living at the St, Serafimovich, 2, Here : ‘ qo a
[1515]I waa ‘continuing to study at the school 585 (St. Be Polianka), In 1941
[1517]‘I finished 6th class and went with parents to rest to the south (Sochi)
[1519]Sot, : +
[1520]71" “put goon began the war and we returned in Moscow, . {
[1522]re In October 1941 I with my mother went in the evacuation in . : . i
[1524]Cheliabinsk (Ural), where I] finished 7th class in spring 1942. In i Lt,
[1525]on an . ' ., mi
[1527]- Cheliabinsk I lived in the poselok ChTZ, beizg there I tried to run to
[1529]7 2 the front with my playfellow BUSKO, but.we were caught and returned : . er
[1531]home. . In 1942 (summer) I went with the mother.in city Gorxi and in
[1533]. July-August we returned in Moscow,
[1535]” _ In August I enter ed in the Moscowite military-navy special
[1536]- ., school, which was evacuated in Kuibyshev, where 1 iinished 8th class ane
[1537]7 _. + dn summer 1943 and after that I arrived on a leave in Moscow, This .
[1538]: . . *«
[1540]S11 1 . achool must be evacuated from Kuibyshev in Achinsk (Siberia) and I : ;
[1542]. did not want to go there, With the help of father J was accepted in the
[1544]Se Baku's military-navy preparatory.school and in August went in Baku, 7 Soe “oy
[1546]3
[1548]where I wae studying at the second course (9th-class). In this school - i
[1550]a : ‘I twice tried to be sent as a volunteer to.the front but failed, Soon : a , “ :
[1554]-G0UL032 “>.
[1556]DIT EON, tain “aPRANE NY
[1560]N
[1561]eRe
[1563]SENG, iunnniasab
[1566]14-0000
[1568]1
[1570]REPRE DRT SMT heme ae ne a Mk a
[1572]‘ Leningrad,
[1574]“after that I run witha friend (RADCIIENKO) home in Moscow (January
[1575]. ae
[1577]1944), In Moscow I studied at the courses (Russian word), finished
[1578]9th class and wae accepted again in the military-navy preparatory
[1580]school, which was located in Leningrad. In August of 1944 I went in
[1584]booq tb es .
[1585]! All cadets of this school were sent to forest (about 200 km.
[1588]ty, ~
[1590]from Leningrad) to prepare wood for winter, where we have been two
[1592]‘months. In November I wounded by chance the left hand. and was put
[1594]in the navy hospital, When I was in the hospital I decided-act to return
[1595]in the school. but to finish 10th class in Leningrad about what I have
[1596]‘written a letter to'my father asking his help and agreement with such
[1597]my decision, With the help of the father's friende I quited with the school
[1598]and entered in the shipbuilding college on the second course in January
[1599]1945 and studied there till the end of May, The WWII finished and I
[1600]decided to return to Moscow. The director of the shipbuilding college
[1601]had given me a document that I studied in this college at the second
[1602]course and finished this course {though I was not passing exams), In
[1603]“Leningrad Iwas living in the-hostel of this college (St. Tolmachev).
[1604]. In May 1945 I arrived in Moscow and was living with parents
[1606](St. Granovexi, 3).
[1608]Aso csentceseupsiea SECRET |S
[1610]re Te ne TE oN
[1615]14-0000
[1617]We pe tee an tot
[1619]Na EIEN CS PERRI IR ROS NINN nine U8 pak aia mattis
[1621]He pee Er manent fae ee ee
[1623]OL’
[1625]i _ , In summer 1945 there was created the institute of the inter~
[1627]national relations in Moscow and in July 1 entered in this institute.
[1629]z : , In july my father went in Germany with the group of engineers
[1631]and he took me (I received a temporary rank of a senior lieutenant,
[1633]documents and a uniform),
[1635]: In-1945~1950 I studied at the institute. In 1946 1 acquainted -
[1637]ed '
[1639]with a girl.- Shishkov FLAVIA, student of the medicine insiiiure. I
[1641]was.in close recjutions with this girl, because of the pregnancy i married
[1642]her and she made an abort. My parents were against the marriage and
[1644]we did not live together and we soon divorced, In the end of 1946 I was
[1646]_aequai nted with Telegin AUGUSTINE and was going to marry her, re+ ;
[1648]ceived a flat in 1947 (St.. Mira - former Ist Uecyehckad, 162/174). In
[1649]a November hhex father, General TELEGIN, was arrested, but I married <
[1650]: a her, The marriage was not succesaful. I foundout about her close
[1651]relations with the brother, and the child -girl was born with patnological
[1652]changes. Iwas not the father of this child. After that I broke with her
[1654]and we were living separately (end of 1948 - beginning 1949).
[1658]In spring 1950 before state exams in the institute was working
[1660]to the ‘commission, which was deal ing with future works. of the students of
[1662]+ .
[1664]my 5th course. I expressed a wish to work in any military organization
[1668]6001034 |
[1670]wee te Nowe,
[1673]14-0000
[1675]. : to? Nite ste he : Qo : ; \
[1676]7 ee 7 : .
[1677]: . ; ; . . wv . :
[1678]: _- @nd soon I was invited to visit personnel department of MGB (Ministry
[1679]i
[1680]» .of State Security). ‘But MGB did not accept me. After that with the
[1681]help of the father I began to deal with the personnel department of the — !
[1683]intelligence of the ministry of military navy concerning my. future work.
[1685]1
[1687]rr : Passing state exams I failed Marxism-Leninism and with a
[1689]I group of fails Iwas passing state exams once more, Jn October 1950
[1691].
[1693]tT finished the institute and received a diploma,
[1695]1 was accepted in the navy intelligence in the 13 of March 1951 ;
[1697]‘ ..and in March 17 went by a train to Soviet Harbour (intelligence of 7th
[1699]lay Fleet, as an interpreter.of the inforrnation department). Before going
[1701]Far East I began my divorce with the former wife.
[1703]+ ‘to the
[1705]At the end of April 1952 I went on a leave in Moscow, Immediately
[1707]after returning in Moscow:I had a blood cough out, J: the middle of May |
[1709]1 went to a tuberculous sanatorium not far from Moscow, In July I
[1711]finished my treatment and returned in Moscow. Because of the health
[1713]. "Tcould not return back to the Far East and te personnel department of . ‘ |
[1715]* the navy intelligence sent me to Baltic Sea (as a senior interpreter of
[1716]: ithe navy intelligence point of the intelligence of 4th Fleet - in Sovietsk,
[1717]Kaliningrad's dietrict),
[1719]When. I studied at the institute.I as all the atudents received a
[1721]rank of junior lieutenant. of administrative service after finishing the
[1723]cn qe Contam 5 oe meme me beware secre ent
[1725]Day entiecttvetrar ever . oar ee 4 i sreseeteery
[1726]| i at :
[1727]CRU AUS
[1729]ApS ASML ERGO ESE
[1731]+ red
[1733]wtebeee
[1735]anne
[1737]Bore Het eains
[1740]14-0000
[1744]ta DTS
[1746]ttc ep SARIS GAB IS es RAEN HE AEE ta 8
[1748]wae thinking about change of the Job. KOBULOV was Speaking with me
[1750]ond this theme and propose we work and his help in MGB, but nothing
[1752]It \
[1754]Ree ote
[1756]second course in 1947, In 1951 the ministry of navy nad given me also
[1758]the rank of junior lieutenant when I was accepted in the navy intelligence,
[1760]In September-October 1952 I received a rank of lieutenani,
[1762]In Sovietax the work was not interested and for me it was nothing
[1763]to do. Besidea this the climite was not good for my health and I décided
[1765]to change the job. With this purpose before new year at the end of 1952
[1766]re tal . .,
[1767]I took a leave and went to Moscow. January 1 Iwas with my parents
[1771]_at the evening party 2 at the cottage of General MGB KOBULOV, whom 1
[1773]a At
[1774]did not know before, but I knew his son-in-law Vahrushev Vasili-a
[1776]former student and my friend. I told him about my job and that now I
[1778]more definite was ‘said about my work, This month I reported to the
[1780]“head of the personnel department of the navy intelligence KALOSHIN
[1782]about my decision and that I will be working in MGB.
[1784]In the end of January I went again in the tuberculous sanatorium, .
[1786]_where I was in.1952. ‘In the days of funeral of STALIN I has come to
[1788]" Moscow and visited the ministry where my father was working. There
[1790]ol have seen General KOBULOV who has come to the father and he said : a
[1792]te
[1794]: that the would settle my “question concerning my jor After several days -
[1796]Vee
[1798]wea’ aloud "mat
[1799]ere ane le mn enh ae >in Stennis +
[1803]wee
[1805]i
[1806]|
[1811]14-00000
[1813]4
[1814]H
[1815]' : : 3
[1816]. 7 . an oe .
[1818]come to KOBULOV. There I have spent about two hours in the re-"
[1821],. ception room of KOBULOV, but he was too busy and his assistant
[1823]SAVITSKI sent me to the Deputy of the Chief of the Second Directory . . — i
[1825]~ . SHUBNIAKOV, who told me that there was signed an order and I was
[1827]‘accepted in the 1 department of 2 cniei. jirectory as a case officer. : ; s
[1829]_ ; (who was acting as the chief of 1 Department because the chief of the
[1831]fa department KOSLOV, Anatoli, was appointed to the special department
[1833]of extraordinarily affairs {investigation} | ). SHUBNIAKOV and
[1835]mye GORBATENKO said to me that I would be working in the 1] section of
[1837]' the department, Then I.with GORBATENKO.went tothe 1 department, -.,
[1839]- Was acquainted with the chief of section KOSLOV, Veniamin. KOSLOV
[1841]- .teld me that I will be working against the American correspondents,
[1845].~ showed me room, my desk and acquainted with the officers, who were
[1846]: - working in this room: KUTIREV, RACOVSKI, GROMOV and TORMOSOV,.
[1848]The last officer must give files on. the correspondents and agents, I _ ; _
[1850]', Was said to come next day and began to work,
[1852]° --.. When Iwas resting in the tuberculous sanatorium I acquainted
[1856]‘with KOJ EVNIKOV, Ludmila, a student of the Moscowite University,
[1858]2 AER eesti
[1862]"+ and in June 1953 we married. Before it I was living with my parents eo
[1864]at Ste Gorky, 9, but after marriage was living with the wife at —_ oy _ ce i
[1866]| son COLES :
[1868]I
[1870]Diiseltelomed Tac ernment: OL ALE Foe ee Tn eee enact le
[1872]SHUBNIAKOV invited the deputy of the chief of 1 department GORBATENKO , i . |
[1875]14-0000
[1877]3
[1879]WED Be eo tthe
[1881]wer weet h WET Ft,
[1884]St. Serafimovich, 2 (the flat of her parents), In 1955 I received a flat
[1885]at St. Narodnya, 13, where was living with my family. ; ; ‘ ¥
[1887]In 1954 I contracted a disease (gonorrhea) and on the advice
[1889]of the friend IVANOV went to medic point at St. Negliunya. Doctors | { . ‘
[1890]‘ -* agked to show a document, I had with me only MVD certificate and an :
[1892]operative passport and showed them the passport. Doctors had- given
[1894]me a.treatment, after that twice they made tests and asked to come once 7
[1895]ar “more, ‘but I did not come, They wanted to see once more and sent a
[1896]letter to the place of work, which was written‘in the passport, The .f
[1898]Plant with MVD found out about it. The deputy of the chief, SHUBNIAKOV,
[1900]a a oot
[1903]t
[1904]'
[1907]. was apeaking with r me, I shad written my explanation, and punished by the - | -
[1908]|
[1909]i
[1910]|
[1911]i
[1913]7 chief of the 2 directory, FEDOTOV - 15-days of arrest. The komsomol's |
[1915]organization also puniehed me, I received a strict reprimand and wae , |
[1919]{reed of the head of komsomol's organization of the 2 chief director,
[1921]Iwas a member of komsomol's orgarizationfrom, October 1943.
[1923]"In the end of 1954 before leaving komsomol (because of age) the komsomol
[1924]organization of KGB took off thie strict reprimand, ‘
[1925]In 1955 on all officers of the 2 chief directory were written
[1927]; characterizations (May-June). In my characterization was written that
[1929]I. did not appropriate to the 1 department 2 chief directory. In June- . : 7 ots ce
[1931]July iv was ‘appointed to the 7. department 2 chief directory as a case
[1933]001038
[1936]14-0000
[1940]. + ging -
[1942]wat
[1944]officer of 2 section,
[1946]Le Ve seen, Nw’
[1948]This section was new created (the work against
[1950]tourists), The chief of 7 department - PERFILIZV, the chief of the
[1952]2 section - GUSKOV.
[1954]4
[1956]In 1956 Iwas accepted as a candidate in the Communist Party,
[1958]senior case officer,
[1960]In 1457 Lwas accepted in the Party as a member.
[1962]| |} In Augiet 1956 my father died.
[1964]‘soon received a rank oi a senior lieutenant and got a promotion -a
[1966]In 1957 or 1958 I was promoted a deputy chief of 2 section. In
[1968]7th department Iwas working. til 1960 and in January 1960 was sent to :
[1970]work : asa deputy ‘chief of the 1 section in ‘the 1 department 2 ‘chiet
[1972]directory (chief. of the 1 department, KLIPIN, Viad,, chief of the
[1974]i section - KOVSHUX).
[1976]‘My family was consist of the wife and two daughters: Oksana,
[1978]born in 1954, and Tamara, born in 1958, Oksana wae ill (bronchial
[1980]asthma) from 1957 and almost every year till 1963 2-3 months was in
[1982]hospitals. In 1960 Iwas thinking about change (temporary) place of
[1984]Mving and there was a possibility to goto work in 2 departments. KGB
[1986]‘in Lvov and Odessa. But there was another question if I go from Moscow’
[1988]2 department, PIATROVSKI, Propos ed to. me to BO. to work i in » Ethiopia
[1990]: I would lose the flat in Moscow. At this time the. chief of the section: of:
[1993]14-0000
[1995]a
[1996]Sto op
[1998]&N
[1999]eRe dl one
[2001]i (counter -intelligence worx among Soviet specialists in Ethiopia), The — !
[2002]; : . i, ;
[2003], chief of 2 chief directory agreed and the question was almost decided Lot To
[2004]t : n
[2005]ai . !
[2006]‘4 ‘but in the last moment the personnel department of KGB did not agree, - 1
[2007]i .
[2009]The reasone were the case of 1954 (illness and use of the passport for 3
[2011]cover) and a checking in the place of my iiving (some of agents report : :
[2013]that drink and on this base have quarrels with the wife)...
[2015]I was working in the 1 department till 1962. In January 1962 -
[2017]» .J.was appointed again in-the 7 department as the chief of the 1 section
[2019](work. against tourists from the USA and Canada).
[2021]In December 1959 I got a rank of a captain. . a con,
[2023]When I began to wors in the 7 department I knew that soon I “ i ,
[2025]must be promoted a deputy chief of the department, when would free
[2027]a place - the deputy chief of.department BALDIN waa preparing to go
[2029]| "to work in astern Germany, : , : ; ; - ;
[2031]In July 1962 I was appointed the deputy. chief of 7 department ; ! ,
[2032]poo : : 7 ; : a “ay
[2033]7 ' (the chief of the department was CHELNOKOV) and here 1 was working . i
[2035]till January 18, 1964.
[2036]7 During my work in MVD-KGB I did not study in any school, -
[2038]only in 1953+1954 was visiting courses of foreign languages of MVD-
[2040].
[2042]Weer epee at 8 at Semmes ewe tie eae:
[2044]. KGBrat'St. Kiselni,
[2046]SE : : OSE
[2048]14-0000
[2050]i
[2051].
[2054]' >
[2056]]
[2057]-; - Five times J was sent abroad;
[2060]Nou “eh vty
[2063]eport delegation; in 1958 was again in Engiand with a sport delegation;
[2065]in 1957 I wae in England with a
[2067]‘in 196) Iwas ‘sent in Bulgaria with the aim to help to } department 2
[2069]. ‘ directory MVD; in 1962 I wae in Switzerland = the conference of dis-
[2071]armament.
[2073]Working in MVD-KGB every year Ihad leaves for rest, In
[2075]; | 1953.with the wife I was resting in the tuberculous sanatorium.
[2077]I was with the family at the cottage.
[2079]the cottage.
[2081]rested in Sochi,
[2083]Kislovodsk.
[2085]Nicolaev,
[2087]In 1958 I was resting at the cottage.
[2089]In 1957 iw wae in Leningrad two weeks with the wife and then rested at .
[2091]In 1989 I with the wife”
[2093]in 1960 I was in Cuba with a delegation of specialists of nickel industry; .
[2095]In 1954
[2096]In 1955 I was resting at the cottage.
[2098]In March 1956 I was résting with the wife in Karlovi Vary, Czechoslovakia,
[2100]In January-February 1960 1 rested with the wife in
[2102]In. 1961 + August - I rested with the wife and daughters in
[2104]In October 1962 1 rested with the wife in Sochi.
[2106]‘ ' L rested with the wife and daughters in Anapa.
[2107]i
[2109]UCT Mew meenete: meat ie ener ete
[2111]In July 1963
[2113]i
[2114]3
[2116]r
[2120]cine tee seme eeege
[2123]re eee terenmntiwien en eet meee ate nae etal
[2125]14-0000
[2129]CAR
[2131]n
[2132]OF)
[2134]IMED K
[2136]Set eeed
[2138]Spee anseieR aetna ee
[2140]" i
[2141]= “ . .
[2142]’ Ch) an
[2143]. . Me aa
[2144]' _ El -
[2145]of ERE. |.
[2146]a 3 ao
[2147]ry
[2148].
[2152]14-0000
[2154]bbe ged 8.
[2156]. :
[2157]os. Situ. Proms . +f . ;
[2159]wlan 3 Hes 4%
[2161]B.._Is the claimed KGB career of NOSENKO plausible? Inthe |
[2162]past the theory has been advanced that NOSENKO was never an officer -
[2164]in the KGB. information of a detailed nature from NOSENKO concern- : a
[2166]: ing the KGB, particularly the Second Chief Directorate, has ‘been so
[2167]extensive as to invalidate any contention that he was not a KGB officer. :
[2168]It is considered that NOSENKO was a KGB officer in the claimed. : :
[2170]Departments during the claimed periods of time and served in the claimed ,
[2172](J)
[2176]positions in’ each Department. It is interesting to'note that NOSENKO has we a oe
[2177]not materially varied in his statements in regard to the above since his’
[2178]original contact in June 1962 (with the exception of his change to 1952 aa
[2179]‘date of his entry into the KGB and then later reverting to the date given:
[2181]in 1962), There have been some variations in dates of'a minor nature, : tte
[2185]i as indicated elsewhere in this summary, but these are of month or day ; ‘
[2187]mye chee i : . 4
[2188]i 3S
[2190]of transfer irom one Department to another and not considered critical’
[2192]or evidence of deception. NOSENKO has admitted previously giving false .
[2194]formation in regard to rank and medals, but his basic story concerning ~ — 7 ue
[2195]: { . . .
[2197]SECRET
[2199]Chive. 1
[2200]Eechte4 tea wraty
[2203]este tt ty ‘
[2205] go0to43
[2207]RIPON TRAE SRE HEA EIN RY OH a he mn an
[2212]14-0000
[2214]7 4
[2215]his KGB career today is not significantly different from the fragmentaryi . . : ,
[2216]version he gave in June 1962. ‘ :
[2217]Basically the following is now considered to have been the KGB i 4 ;
[2218]. career of NOSENKO: - oo . a _ , a E (
[2219]" ' Mid-March 1953 - late May 1955, First Section, . | |
[2220]“ " “ Pirst Department, SCD , =. :
[2221]-. "| Late May 1955 - December 1959.(1958 = December > - pas . -
[2222]. . ve : ve
[2223]1959 - Deputy Chief of Section) Seventh : ‘3
[2224]Department, scD o 7
[2225]“~ January 1960 - December 1961, Deputy Chief of ’ iH
[2226]oo ~ wort . Section, First Section, Firet:Department, ns ee -., 4
[2227]. ScD |
[2228]: January 1962 - July 1962, Chief of First Section, ot | . 7 :
[2229]oe . Seventh Department, SCD = ; 2 |
[2230]. : July 1962 ~ January 1964, Deputy Chief of Seventh : : 7 :
[2231]7 . Department, SCD a : | _ - Sot
[2232](NOTE; The term. Deputy Chief is being used throughout this a 7 7
[2233]: summary, but the better terminology probably is "Deputy to Chief," =
[2234]: The position of "Deputy Chief" in United States Government parlance, :
[2236]Saree oe Ae
[2238]. 6 . ae 4
[2239]= sat ch yale eSAAE TTD ne ru RECA Nm ee
[2240]fA
[2242]14-0000
[2244]te at Pe RAE NL et Paeae teer =H
[2246]Aw ae Ve emma
[2248]in Soviet organizations and more spécilicaily in the KGB. As an example,
[2250]a Chief of Department in the KGB or the Chief of a Residentura adroad |
[2252]First Deputy. This particular deputy acts in the absence of the Chief
[2253]of Department and in genera] has supervisory functions over all the
[2254]Department sections. The exception to the latter is when the Chief of - ae . ‘
[2256]Department retains direct supervision over what hé may consider the ‘
[2258]over designated sections or organizational components. )
[2260]During current interviews and in prepared memoranda, .NOSENKO ‘ ‘
[2262]contained in separate sections of this summary.
[2263]It ie realized that GOLITSYN, although confirming that NOSE> sKO
[2265]was a KGB officer in both the First Department and Seventh Department,
[2267]circa 1958 and that NOSENKO was not Deputy Chief of the First Section,
[2269]First Department, in 1960, It is impossible to correlate this information
[2271]+ TR te a BNI ORAS Ad de Re RR ar
[2273]may. have 2, 3 or even 4 deputies, one of wnom is given the title of \
[2275]. most important section, Other deputies. have supervisory functions only. y
[2277]has furnished detailed information which it is considered substantiates ae
[2279]-his. claimed positions in the KGB, . Detailed remarks on these topics are
[2281]scp, has stated that NOSENKO- remained in the First Department until
[2283]' with the above indicated opinion that NOSENKO left the First Department
[2284]“in late May 1955 and was Deputy Chief of the First Section, First Depart-
[2286]- ment, in 1960, nor is an adequate explanation of these variances available
[2288]SECRET
[2290]t
[2291]1
[2293]gouLc45
[2295]Sedan Bre
[2298]14-0000
[2300]whee te Mean et
[2302]RAEN ATTEN RD Hct Tete Sed ffene +
[2306]Te
[2308]2 me oe 3 ene :
[2309]antowan aetna hac ete e Loe ae are
[2311]snunel
[2313]at this time. Onthe other hand, it is not reasonable that NOSENKO
[2314]would lay claim to the title of Deputy Chief of the First Section, First
[2315]Department, if this were not true when he clearly knew of the visits of
[2316]GOLITSYN to the First Section in 1900 - 1961 and of his conferences
[2317]with officers closely associated with NOSENKO at that time.
[2319]NOSENKO has also mentioned a number of officers of the SCD
[2320]or former cificers of the SCD who transferred to the FCD with whom
[2322]he was personally acquainted and who were also known to GOLITSYN.
[2324], A number of these officers were officers from whom GOLITSYN has
[2326]stated he obtained certain information or through whom he became aware _ : Fl
[2328]of cértain activities including Vladislav M, KOVSHUK, Gennadiy I.
[2330]GRYAZNOV, Viadimir Ivanovich PETROV, Yuriy I GU, Vladimir
[2332]A. CHURANOV, Yevgeniy GROMAKOVSKIY and Vadim V. KOSOLAPOV, :
[2334]The statement of NOSENKO that although he had heard of
[2335]GOLITSYN he had never personally met GOLITSYN, stands in conflict.
[2336]with the statements of GOLITSYN that he, GOLITSYN, had met and
[2337]talked with NOSE NKO in the SCD in the late 1950's, The description
[2338]of GOLITSY®N of this meeting is that of a casual encounter in the halls
[2340]rather than a specific office visit. In light of this, the absence of any
[2342]reason why NOSENKO from his point of view should remember such
[2344]‘an encounter and the absence of any reason for NOSENKO to lie on this |
[2346]a a Fe bey
[2348]SECRET
[2350]RRR,
[2351]Set SEES
[2353]9001046."
[2355]ARES
[2356]RN OMNSERSRGS
[2359]14-0000
[2361]issue, it is eminently reasonable to conclude that the encounter took
[2362]place but that NOSENKO simply has no recollection of it, There is :
[2363]no reason to attach signlicance to this lapse of memory.
[2365]The previous opinion that NOSENKO did not hoid the claimed
[2366]position of Deputy Chier, First Section, First Department, during 1960 - . .
[2367]; 1961 has had the most mer:t in the controversy over his statements | |
[2368], relative to-his KGB career, This particular aspect will be covered in. 7
[2370]detail in another section, but of note at this time is the controversy
[2371]. over what duties the position of Deputy Chief of Section in the SCD, KGB,
[2373]to, entails or does not entail. It is a fruitless exercise to attempt to judge ,
[2375]whether NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the First Section in 1960 - 1961 °”
[2377]on the basis of whether his knowledge of the total activities of the Firat —
[2378]Section was commensurate with the knowledge of a Deputy Branch Chief
[2379]in CIA in regard to the activities of the entire Branch,
[2381]Whether NOSENKO was a Deputy Chief of Section in the SCD,
[2382]KGB, must be judged on the basis of what were the duties of a Deputy
[2383]Chief of Section in the SCD and in particular what were his duties in
[2384]: the particular assignment, The organizational structure oi the KGB
[2386]| may or may not have some similarities to the organizational structure
[2388]|
[2389]| ‘
[2391]of CIA, but any similarities are surely not such as to permit a judgment ; -
[2393]5
[2395]SECRET
[2397]| eee gtenatnt Seemmemenee, enter kT Fone negeee
[2400]14-0000
[2402]ceeeenyy
[2404]ST hype”
[2405]~ Vocus’, Hl
[2407]as to wnether NOSENKO held a certain claimed position on the basis
[2408]of a comparison of his activities and responsibilities. with that inherent
[2409]in a.somewhat similar position in CIA. ; :
[2410]One of the most important differences between United States
[2411]e agencies or organizations, inciuding CIA, andthe bureaucratic structure
[2413]of agencies or organizations in the USSR, including the KGB, is the !
[2415]‘salary structure. Pay of a KGB officer is-based on military rank and
[2417]tae san Ts ete
[2419]i “on actual position held with an additional percentage increase for longevity
[2421]'
[2422]'
[2424]and language qualification. ‘Actual position held is important from a
[2427]t
[2428]ai
[2430]‘monetary viewpoint in addition to the prestige, As an example, the
[2432]om,
[2434]; ‘! " . : difference in monthly salary between a captain and a major is twenty
[2436]rubles and the difference in salary between a Senior Case Officer and
[2438]a Deputy Chief of Section is also twenty rubles, An increase in military
[2440]rank alone has limited pay advantages, as for example a Lieutenant ‘
[2441]. ?
[2443]Colonel who is only a Senior Case Officer receives less pay tnan a major
[2445]who holds the position of Chief of Section,
[2447]i / | ' During current interviews, an eifort has been made to obtain
[2449]from NOSENKO statements concerning his responsibilities in the various
[2451]Claimed positions, The judgment on whether he held or did not hold
[2453]‘the various claimed positions, in view of the absence of any factual
[2455]~~ SECRET
[2457]s * o
[2458]TIN 058 RRO Dore ches oe amie Uy Newer tine So opie “ : 4
[2460]LNT Sats
[2461]PSS
[2464]14-0000
[2466]th ot os
[2468]‘supporting or refuting information, has necessarily been based toa
[2470].considerabie degree on the logic of the statements made by NOSENKO.
[2472]ving the
[2474],
[2475]A
[2479]is no
[2481]Admittedly this
[2483]actory way of reso
[2485]t the most sat
[2487]' questions, but itis the oniy met
[2489]time.
[2491]15
[2493]e at thi
[2495]1
[2496]be
[2498]b
[2500]hod possi
[2502]fem semen
[2506]Fa te ettinn toe
[2508]LAREN eA OT Dy ot EERIE FEAL ALTGELD
[2510]14-0000
[2512]Me dar et ee
[2514]SECRET
[2516]“
[2518]CIVIN
[2520]NO
[2522]SE.
[2524]HAS NO.
[2526]c.
[2528]c
[2530]on
[2532]D FGR HIS D
[2534]ON I
[2536]3
[2538]7
[2540]tee . . . io Bs
[2542]. ee a
[2544]- 7 . : +
[2545]; it 5s 7
[2546]: | 4
[2547]. oad
[2549]7 ens eid POA er ON PERRIS OAL PEN
[2552]14-0000
[2554]‘ in the matter of the bona fides of NOSENXO, this category is probably
[2556]SECREL
[2558]C. Has NOSENKO given an acceptable explanation of his
[2559]motivation in contacting CLA in 1962 and for his defection in 1964? Of
[2561]the eight listed categories which are being given specific consideration
[2563]tau. 7
[2565]the most difficult in which to present a logical position with factual .
[2566]support, There are too many intangible aspects involved and although
[2567]motivation is an important factor, full resolution of the motivation .
[2568]problem is not a paramount factor in deciding whether NOSENKO is or
[2570]is not a‘dispatched agent, NOSENKO could have contacted this Agency in
[2572]of : i aa ee “ . wo oye - . et .
[2573]1962 and-defected-in 1964 without KGB knowledge and yet even at this late
[2574]date have failed to disclose some important events ofa personal nature
[2576]which actually were important ingredients in his ultimate decision.
[2578]Defectors are humans and have at least the normal reluctance to admit
[2579]7
[2581]_unfavorable information which-they consider of a personal nature.
[2583]. On 31 October 1967 NOSENKO, following.a request, furnished a.
[2585]handwritten memorandum on the topic of his motivation, a typed copy of
[2587]’. which is-attached. The memorandum, although not grammatically correct,
[2589]is quite ‘understandable and is worthy of‘review, The tenor of the memo-
[2591]randum ‘is one of increasing disillusionment with the Soviet regime.
[2594]14-0000
[2596]NOSENKO and others of his generation have lived in a Soviet society : ; ‘
[2597]throughout their entire lives. The environment is an important factor : ’
[2598]of influence in the life of an individual and true disillusionment is at
[2600]best usually a graduai process in which many factors, some recognized - .
[2601]coy
[2603]and some not’ recognized by the individual, have played a role in varying —
[2605]degrees,
[2607]re . NOSENXO, until 1955 and possibiy until the death of nis father , ‘ a
[2608]: ini August 1956, could be compared to the.profligate son of wealthy
[2609]‘parents in the United States who finally graduates from colle ge and obtains
[2611]' ~ .-employment.perhaps in the firm of his.father without actually earning any of
[2613]. the; luxuries he has enjoyed, “The father of NOSENKO was not only wealthy
[2615]by Soviet standards but also held a high government position. The
[2617]influence of his father and the name. of his father undoubtedly was an
[2619]. important if not the most-important factor in NOSENKO éven being
[2620]‘y permitted to enter the Naval RU and,the KGB even though NOSENKO is
[2621]“ particularly reluctant to admit, perhaps even to himself, .that this was:
[2623]the primary reason.
[2625].The above should not be construed as any reflection on the
[2627]wee actual intelligence of NOSENKO, but rather as an explanation of how
[2629]““NOSENKO could have even entered the Naval RU and KGB. His
[2631]~900Les2
[2633]enema ememanpetermenemesars Rt Rese Sten teeceeen ete o
[2635]a eet evento Celt aaa fe Beant
[2637]14-0000
[2639]SECRET. —- er
[2640]performance in both prior to 1956 by his own admission was such that
[2641]he probably would have been summarily terminated if he had not been
[2642]the son of the capable,. respected Minister of Shipbuilding. —— . . 7
[2644]“ a-certain amount of speculation is permitted, the |
[2646]disillusionment of NOSENKO, who lost, many personal advantages
[2648]following the death of his father inciuding a personal automobile, may ~
[2650]i have actually started soon after the death of his father. _Taat? NOSENKO. : a
[2652]ge ee eee - . : rn)
[2654]is undisciplined is supported by his admissions relative to his life in _ , . :
[2655]+ ‘the USSR ‘and his behavior both in 1962 in Geneva and for a period of time — ;
[2657]-- after his defection in 1964. _NOSENKO was addicted:to women, ‘liquor, ‘and | . : ‘ .
[2659]; . «the material things which can be purchased with money or obtained through
[2661].-influence. . 4
[2662]A question has been previously raised regarding his motivation - ; aan
[2663]in contacting CIA in 1962, particularly his statement that he needed money. , : ,
[2665]and would sell "two pieces of information. '' NOSENKO has stated that he ~ ue !
[2667]wanted to make a contact with the Americans, thathe vas not emotionally |
[2671]ready to defect, but that he subconsciously believed that if he made a . Oo : :
[2672]. contact he would be making an ultimate commitment from which he could oo, :
[2674]'no.longer retreat.
[2676]RAIS LONER D AAA ARIMA AL ane RS RAE EDN ma Tk
[2678]ee a Nas cere Nreeneneane ner 2cee Gaerne tt
[2681]14-0000
[2683]oe SECRET 7 _ 7 Jot
[2685]NOSENKO has stated that he gave considerabie thought to the
[2687]best way to contact the Americans 60 that he would be believed and not
[2689]rejected and came to the conclusion that he would offer to sell some. . a ] ; :
[2690]“information. NOSENKO stated that he thought if he approached the —— a
[2691]Americans stating he was a "KGB counter intelligence officer who wanted - . .
[2692]to give information, "he would not have been believed and would have
[2694]‘ been peremptorily rejected. NOSENKO stated he had difficulty deciding : . : ; “
[2696], = how much money to ask for and now to make the approach, but finally
[2698]decided to do it tnrough( iil AGRI whom the KGB considered was with
[2699]American Intelligence. .
[2701]» | The above statements by NOSENKO are not in conflict with the ge ts
[2703]record, . NOSENKO did offer to sell “two pieces-of information, " almost
[2704]immediately gave more information, made no significant demands for ; t
[2705]money, and in fact his price for "two pieces of information" was
[2706]ridiculously low by American standards. NOSENKO has during current
[2707]: interviews stated, as he first. stated in 1962, that he had spent excessive
[2708]i 7 amounts of money’ in one or two riotous evenings. However, NOSENKO
[2710]has during current interviews stated that he could have covered his ‘
[2712]expenditures 1 by other means without z receiving any money from the : poo os .
[2713]ka a aa Sy | Pe
[2715]Americans,
[2717]EEDA Ee, PER ne ncaa ney, Heratlitede sede dete
[2719]_SoReT
[2721]aj tnabiaremeetone TS ee trae neat ene etc ane oF LP MER EET SHEA MAST
[2723]14-0000
[2725]eee eerie . ..
[2728]ASR
[2729]TOE SER SSN CNSR
[2731]- SECRET
[2733]NOSENKO has ptated that the night before bio departure from
[2735]Geneva to the USSR he gave serious thought to defection but wae not
[2737]_ emotionally adapted to defect at'that time. Following his raturn to tha
[2739]Soviet Union, NOSENKO, during a@ period of time, made his flaal
[2740]decision to defect-at the first opportunity, renlining that it meant
[2741]leaving bis wife, children, snd othor members of hig far.ily in the
[2742]USSR.
[2744]Some aspects of the motivation of NOSENKO are obscure and
[2746]will probably so remsin. It would be preferable Lf an exact datailed
[2748]- ghronology of all the factore involved could be prepared or if even
[2750]cortsin obvious factors could be accurately delineated. These are both
[2752]impossible at this time and Probably at. any: time {a the fatare, What
[2754]is. important at thie | time ie a decision ee to whether the motivation of
[2756]NOSENKO was Lesed on personal reasons with no implications of KGB
[2758]dispatch. It lo considered that the explanation of NOSENK® concerning
[2760]his motivation ia acceptable and thet hie statement that no one except
[2762]_ the Americans was aware of his contacts with the Americana tn 1962
[2764]ox hts intent to defect in 1964 te supported by other information of a
[2766]collateral nature. (See Section I, H.)
[2769]Typed cpy} Memo from NOSENKO -
[2774]14-0000
[2776]Operational Memo # N-4
[2778]'
[2779]’ 4
[2781]: _ The following is a typed copy of a handwritten memorandum
[2782]a . + furnished by Subject on 1 November 1967, following a request on
[2783]: 31 Octover 1967: . ;
[2785]I. ‘What were the motif and the reasons which have led me to
[2786]the decision to breake with the Soviet Russia? The only definite is an
[2787]understanding of the situation in the Soviet Russia, the knowledge of
[2789]the methods.of the communist regime, the knowledge.of the real foreign
[2791]and interior policies of the Soviet government and the faith in the right+ -
[2793]nese of the free world,
[2795]It waa not a decision which was accepted or could be accepted :
[2796]4 , in a month or a year. This decision was slowly growing inme, 1 |
[2797]a think that the beginning was in the studentship.
[2798]Living with my parents.and being in the circles of the parent's.
[2799]; and my acquaintances I knew more then there was written in newspapers
[2800]and periodics and that was propagandized by radio and TV, Working in
[2802]i . the Far East and later being in trips in different regione and cities of
[2804]ih 7 Russia I found out much better the life and conditions of the life of the
[2806]~ people of the Soviet Russia.
[2808]24 . . me - coetsded trea astenalic
[2809]i - . - “{ & preeting and
[2810]21 gy eesti Tae sat Sent enn tee stan meee = Maetenettiontton
[2813]au 1 . “ . . i, : aa WERE END
[2814]Ne - . wes pote . .
[2816]SUBJECT: NOSENKO, Yuri Ivanovich i
[2820]seeded eater
[2824]a
[2827]14-0000
[2829]-” When I worked 11 years in MVD-KGB i understood and found |
[2831]out very many things, detaile and the real deal of the existing regime,
[2833]about methods of the work of MGB-MVD-KGB and about their doings, | , st 7 7 :
[2834]about hundreds of thousands of the people of Russia who were (and .
[2835]still are) considered "politically" dangerous and around whom was
[2836]{and still is) going an active work of all organs KGB.
[2838]At the same time when I was several times abroad I have , . _ :
[2840]seen personally the so-called "decay" at the Weet. “Lhave seen in *
[2842]reality how is living people.
[2846]Several times when I was abroad I was thinking about staying’
[2848]', at the West and not returning in Rugsia, but only one thing was keeping
[2850]"ome «= my family.
[2852]In 1962 in Switzerland I made the acquaintance with the
[2854]‘ . '. Americans, From my part "the sell of the information" was a real-
[2855]show, Iwas thinking that they would not beiieve me otherwise, In
[2856]that period of the time there was going a big struggle in me to stay.
[2858]; | _ abroad ‘or to return home till the last days of living in Geneva and even : : - 7
[2859]when I was returning home in Vienna.
[2861]4
[2863]|
[2864]|
[2865]| mc In 1962-1963 I decided definitely that I did not want and could
[2866]| not live more in the Soviet Russia, In this period of time I have done.
[2867]|
[2869]all my best to go as soon as possible abroad, . . a . cle wee
[2871]ate ee 2 re
[2873]SECRET.
[2875]a - -
[2877]yee 8 AEN Be ee Past a tert rhe
[2879]aR
[2880]SEY
[2882]14-0000
[2886]on
[2888]it was very difficult
[2890]his decision,
[2892]It waa not easy to make t
[2894]I do not regret,
[2898]ite of everyth
[2900]an 8
[2902]And now
[2906]a
[2909]14-0000
[2911]t
[2912]t
[2914]I8 THE INFORMATION FURNISHED
[2916]D
[2918]CONCERNING KGB OP
[2920]‘3
[2922]\ND ORGANIZATION 2
[2926]LY COMMEN
[2928]SCNAB
[2930]SA
[2932]_WITH_HIS CLAIMED KGB CAREER?
[2934]Sika ety
[2936]ines
[2938]why
[2940]SENET EN!
[2943]14-0000
[2945]H
[2947])
[2948]ive)
[2949]m
[2950]Cc?
[2951]Pa
[2952]’ Coal
[2954]. ; an ' -D. Is the information furnished by NOSENKO to CIA concerning
[2955]. “KGB operations, personalities, and organization reasonably commen-
[2957]surate with-his claimed KGB career? The conclusion is that the infor-
[2958]mation furnished by NOSENKO concerning KGB operations, personalities,
[2960]Boe _ * . and organization is more than reasonably commensurate with nis claimed
[2962]-ss 2 * Career in the KGB from mid-March 1953 to his: defection in early February
[2964]yh. 1964,
[2966].~. Ly reaching the above conclusion, consideration has been given
[2968]oe to his. claimed. departmental assignments and claimed positions in each
[2970]: department, Certain allowance has been made ‘for faulty memory with
[2972]consideration being given to whether there is any indication of deception
[2974]or whether the failure to recall a particular item of interest can logicaliy
[2975], a : 5
[2977]be attributed to the vagaries of the human mind, There is, of course, no
[2979]-'. ‘ae€curate atdndard of measurement which would permit a positive deter-
[2981]iv. + mination as to whether inability to recall certain details or events is
[2983]a actually due to the fact that the human mind cannot recall all past events
[2987]oF. could be attributed to willful deception.
[2989]Cas? 4
[2991]Gem astomitic
[2992]BaaGag 194.
[2993]ecassitvestiaa
[2995]14-0000
[2997]fw WO bem ay
[2998],
[3002]An effort has been made to determine if there are any particular
[3004]patterns or areas where NOSENKO has indicated he did not recall
[3005]: _ specific matters or certain details, and’no pattern or specific areas
[3006]oo have been noted. NOSENKO, in fact, ‘has an unusually good memory
[3007]: , as evidenced by the extensive information furnished by NOSENKO purely : ; ”
[3008]from recollection, In addition, there has been no material reluctance |
[3009]on the part of NOSENKO to discuss his entire life, KGB officers he has
[3011]known, KGB organization and procedures, or other topics of interest. : . :
[3013]NOSENKO has furnished considerable detail concerning KGB : , :
[3015]ce er
[3017]the
[3019]poo officers whom he has known at various periods in his entire KGB career,
[3021]; He. has been very consistent in information furnished and has frequently
[3022]poof added certain details which he recalled ata later date, mo ce
[3023]’ Certain remarks will be made in another section in regard to
[3024]the volume and scope of information furnished by NOSENKO. This in-
[3025]formation is not selective, but isan excellent indicator that NOSENKO
[3026]was assigned to the First Department-and Seventh Department, SCD, \
[3027]during the claimed periods of time and held the claimed positions. Con-
[3028]sideration has been given to his various claimed KGB assignments in
[3030]evaluating the information furnished in an effort to assess whether-his
[3032]i ' indicated knowledge was commensurate with his claimed position during
[3034]re : .
[3036]a0). GOULCEL
[3038]J casei dlascuits pettiminnermes were) Ho an ema abeet atan inner des cence me
[3041]14-0000
[3045]a particular period of time or suggested the possibility that he did not
[3046]occupy the. position which he claimed to have held.
[3048]It is considered that information furnished by NOSENKXO supports |
[3050]‘his claimed positions in the SCD. It has not been possible to substantially
[3052]confirm through collateral sources that NOSENKO served in his claimed
[3054]positions. ' Neither has it been possible to obtain from other sources an
[3056]applicable.description of the duties or responsibilities of an individual
[3058], holding any of the positions NOSENKO claimed to have held after 1958. It
[3060]is felt there: can be no question that NOSENKO served in the capacities of
[3062]junior case officer, case officer, and senior case officer during 1953 - 1957.
[3064]As regards the duties and responsibilities of a Deputy Chief of Section,
[3066]Chief of Section, ‘and Deputy Chief of Department, and whether NOSENKO.
[3067]held ‘these various claimed positions, a considerable amount of personal
[3068]judgment has been necessary. This personal judgment has been made in
[3070]as judicial a manner as possible, with full knowledge that any opinion in
[3072]' regard tothe above is largely dependent upon information from NOSENKO.
[3074]_| || .NOSENKO has compiled detailed diagramé of the actial officés
[3076]he claims to have occupied and surrounding offices curing the four pri-
[3078]" mary periods of time: 1953 - 1955, 1955 - 1959, 1960 - 1961, and 1962 -
[3080]He has prepared specific memoranda concerning his co-officers
[3082]- 0001CE2
[3085]14-0000
[3087]tbe alae
[3089]EB eee
[3091]and other personnel, and changes of personnel, as well as diagrams
[3093]of the offices of the Chief and Deputy Chiefs of the SCD during 1956 - : : : i
[3094]1964, This material is internally consistent. Furthermore NOSENKO
[3096]Pee ee
[3098]could not possibly have known that this detailed information could not
[3100]we immediately be checked for accuracy,- at least in. part, with a source : . ;
[3101]or another officer who has defected since mid-1964. If these diagrams .~ _ -
[3102]. and memoranda were not relatively correct, NOSENKO, who is quite
[3103]astute in matters of counterinteNigence, would hardly have voluntarily
[3104]prepared the material in such detail. This type of information is
[3105]peculiarly adaptable for analysie by a knowledgeable source or by another
[3106]: defector ‘and could, if not relatively correct, permit a ‘rather positive cone ; ao a - 4
[3107]clusion that NOSENKO was lying or fabricating ‘information.
[3108]NOSENKO has furnished quite specific information on KGB
[3109]operations during the 1953 - 1955, 1955 - 1959, 1960 - 1961,, and 1962 -
[3110]1963 periods of time. As might be expected, his specific knowledge is
[3111]jess.éor the 1953 - 1955 period; but his own personal situation and attitude: ve
[3112]until 1955 - 1956, which are mentioned elsewhere, should be given
[3113]consideration. In any event, he has furnished adequate information so
[3114]‘that his claimed assignment during 1953 - 1955 is considered suificiently
[3116]substantiated even though his actual job periormance. undoubtedly SO ES
[3118]oa deserved a low rating. ; os ; mo, OO
[3119]rn §CO0LEES
[3123]SECRET
[3125]anne wee ns ann nent en Ce pais meena 2 oo Se ee teeter ser ee poe ee
[3128]14-0000
[3130]The knowledge of NOSENKO- concerning cases, KGB operations, oo :  &£
[3131]and other officers can consistently be related to his claimed department a . oo
[3133]- and position assignment during the 1953 to January 1964 period. The Ct a mo, :
[3135]scope of his knowledge ‘of his own department when considered in toto a a,
[3137]is broader after 1957 than before, which is compatible with his claim of
[3139]‘increased responsibilities. His knowledge of the work of other departments = ° .
[3141]of.the SCD {from the late 1950's on is also more-extensive, which is also a.
[3143]: further indication that NOSENKO actually held the claimed positions
[3145]during this pericd of time.
[3147]i
[3148]a
[3150]eRe ce SE
[3153]14-0000
[3157]ty
[3159]TION
[3161]LATE
[3163]CAN THE INFORN
[3165]IN MATERIAL DAD
[3167]SAS
[3169]AND/ORE
[3171]THE XGB
[3173]AGE ZO
[3175]ra
[3176]a
[3178]v
[3180]ORMATION FURNISHED 3
[3183]z
[3185]-
[3186]a
[3188]HE IN
[3190]SIGNIFICAN
[3192]BE
[3197]14-0000
[3199]» cea teoriteenetanemrnen mame 1B moe ars mere ete Shen yen TMS St emt OT
[3201]. x
[3202]3
[3203]mo - oad
[3204]r
[3205]was eee : . x
[3206]- . ~ . . te a t
[3208]: 4
[3209]. yok
[3210]saat We . .
[3211]- . . : i
[3214]W¥ NOSENND Ut eo, 5
[3216]- - +
[3218]Western invellivence? The conclusion iz ‘ .
[3219]Guestions is allirrmative, even ougn tt te Toulined Tout. : a,
[3220]. * , . *
[3221]= - —_ : =a a ote Po ke a fo ane ee ee . . \ ve 7
[3222]ww tee XGB and ullimate Gonciit to Weston Intelligence eve boc sacly .
[3223]of an intangible navure anc wweESUTGMEN ;
[3225]VOUT SS
[3227]mercer t acd > Boe Tm me eyrtows Se peceente Tote : uy , vob
[3228]tg current and previous interviews. Aw accusats total : : :
[3230]s is not possibie at this time aud would at vest
[3232]ute, Tae actual sizaidicance of wick would ce
[3234]Pracucally every interview wits NCSENMS, even ac ore - : . ”
[3236]information of courievinielligence interest aud itis expecied cic this . '
[3237]Te ee cee en ee a re a ne
[3238]production cen continue for a considevcole peviod cf time. This should. : _
[3239]rm ee — . , Sone
[3240]OD °
[3242]mov be construed as an indication taat NOSENKO is intentonally w
[3244]molding information, Sut rather that stiinulicvion of bis memozy
[3246]normal questions axe discussions has been and can continue to be : : : -
[3248]productive,
[3250]i
[3252]a,
[3254]Cn
[3257]8
[3258]i
[3260]14-0000
[3262]. .
[3265]NOSENAO Las farniened ins ote Concerning
[3267]AGB ollice pues Gf Gveretive coniacts
[3269]Fallve Coinaets Gre useu wo reler to Soviet nationals) '
[3271]Olicers betweea the SCO and SCD. in ucdition, numerous ollicers
[3273]: . ste sh +
[3274]~The . ‘ - : : . : > : ‘ t
[3275]of the SCD and other internal KG3 organizations travel abroad with
[3277]delegations, tourist grouys, anc as visitors to various major exhisitions
[3278]such as Wor.d's Fairs. itis imposoisie at this time to estimate the
[3280]numbers of AGS officers iéentizied by NOSENXO who have deen outsiée
[3282]the Soviet Bloc since his defection or who will be out sometime in th
[3286]There has ceern very ittie atiempted exploitation of informeiion
[3288]cannot be estimated nor can the potential Camage to the KGB be esti-
[3290]Disclosure of
[3292]j
[3296]be a necessary part of any dispatch of a AGB agent or officer to the
[3298]West either ior purposes of contact with Western Intelligence for a
[3300]o001C67
[3302]| caee
[3304]14.90000
[3306]a
[3308]ne et wets oe
[3310]Lirnitea pesion of time ur fos tue L..cl., of the incivicual in a delectus
[3311]hae Tt aye we Sgt eet itn. Nd ates "Sa eee «, ue ee -
[3312]status, however, iGestuli.wue ue. AGG O.r.cers or ugents to West
[3314]intelligence is nectaskrly &@ wutier of concesan io the AGG as.
[3316]vs.
[3318]posure of the icentities of approximcier,[2, vod
[3322]‘nuncred|SGE agents could noi ve considered of negligible importance.
[3324]Obtaining specific information in regacd to KGB oflicers o:
[3325]KGB assets.is important to Uniied S:ates inelligence anc a consicer-
[3326]abie arnount of manpower and money is spent on this activity. Even
[3328]ging that it is much more Giliicuit for CLA to obtain this type
[3330]oi information about the AGB, which oncrates in a closed soc
[3332]itis for the KGB to ootain the icentity of CLA
[3334]Goubiiul any reacer of this summary would co
[3336]- wy
[3338]cation of} 2; GoO|CLA empioyees anc
[3340]everal Tuncred|agent assets to
[3342]sale
[3343]Gaal.
[3345]the KGB would be any iess than a very serious compromise of value
[3346]information,
[3348]Prior to the deiection of NOSENXO, little was known of the
[3350]organization of the SCD or other
[3352]sternal AGS organizations, The
[3354]iniormation provided by NOSENKO concerning both has been deviled
[3356]and extensive, That this information is of vaiue to the United Siates
[3358]Intelligence community is hardly subject to dispute, although analysis
[3360]3 ; c001C68
[3362]SECRET
[3364]me me ee ke ee see
[3366]Seeks
[3368]ARES
[3369]SESS
[3370]TAD
[3372]MAINTE
[3373]SS Sa
[3375]PONY
[3376]HEETT TO at RRS
[3377]RAVAN SER NER BREE HRM
[3381].
[3383]ay
[3384]SASH
[3391]be
[3392]eR ee 5 Seen Teng
[3395]14-0000
[3397]to ihe value of this
[3399]can Giiier as to the weignt which should
[3401]type of information, — ; . : cor
[3403]NOSENXO has furnished iniozmation concerz.ing SCD, «G3,
[3405]yvecruitments of United States citizens and
[3407]sy,
[3409]oreign nationais covering
[3411]the period of 1953 through 1963. This should not de interpreted as a
[3413]formation in regard to all
[3415]statement that NOSENKO has furnished ¢
[3416]rn coe SCD recruitments, even of Americans, Gurizig this period. His infor-
[3417]“mation based on personal knowledge is in peneral limited to the First
[3419]Department and Seventh Department. He hag furnished information ; _
[3421]" -concerning cases of several other Gepartments in the SCD and some
[3423]¢ . a
[3425]FCD-cases, but this information was in generai acquired indirectly
[3427]from social or business conversations with other KGB oificers.
[3429]NOSENKO has furnished information in regard to a number of . | : -
[3433]cases which weré previousiy known to United States intelligence, Wail
[3435]the value of such information cannot be considered high, the additional
[3436]- detaiis which NOSENKO has provided in a number of cases cannot be , . .
[3438]' |. dismissed as being of no value to Western Inteliigence, even if the
[3440]‘|. information cannot be regarded as damaging to the KGB, Furthermore,
[3442]‘inasmuch as there is no reason to question his sourcing of infjormatioa a _
[3444]already known, there is no basis for suspicion of NOSENKO for his so, ale”
[3446]‘ ant
[3448]having. provided such information. .
[3450],
[3452]_ oo0need
[3454]heeeaeihatiiednienereentbaiiieie ct RIE Lo Page PH Ta eT ie Be a
[3456]iS
[3457]y
[3458]SOREN UR
[3463]14-0000
[3465].
[3467]. NCOSE240 has furnished informa:ion in regard to a number of
[3468], o
[3470]recruitments by the KGB oi nor-Bicc nationals who weve. known by a)
[3475]Wester tellivence to be pro-Coramunisi or even connected with
[3477]Communist Organizations. The identification as a recruited 4KG3
[3478]agent of an individual previous.y ‘known to be pro-Commiunist is of
[3479]considerable value to Western intelligence and may be considered to
[3480]a . have resulted in some damage io the FOB. Admittedly, she potential
[3481]to the KGB of an agent who is known as pro-Communist is less than
[3482]- that of a “politically clean" individuzi, However, 'pro-Communist"
[3484]or even "Communist" are not synonymous with "recruited KGB agent."
[3486]‘ "" * NOSENKO has furnished additional information on cases in
[3488]which there was some previous but limitee information. In a number
[3490]of these instances the additional information from NOSENKO has per- wa
[3491]mitted identification of the individuals oi interest and the closing of an o-
[3494]"Unimown Subject" case, In such instances the information from
[3496]' So NOSENKO must be considered valuable to Western Intelligence since
[3498]the incomplete information known previously would in many cases not
[3500]have permitted ultimate identification of the individual of interest.
[3502]: . This category of cases must be considered as having: resulted in damage
[3503]. _ - . . . t
[3504]to the KGB and in benefit to Western Intelligence, ; , - oe ‘ i
[3506]asa
[3510]eS E DoT
[3511]seston anes maps SECRET .
[3514]Fee A eee
[3517]14-0000
[3519]i * -. fat sof s : : : + ra
[3520]jn. NOSENKO has furnished iutosr.ition in regard to &@ umber of
[3522]. individuals, both American anc non-bloc foreign, who were recruited
[3528]NOSENKO, particularly in the touriet cziégory, would sreuicly never
[3530]have actually materialized as procuctive KG
[3531]. v
[3533]AT
[3535]for various reasons including la
[3537]_', graphical inaccessibility to th
[3540]2
[3541]€)
[3542]tu
[3544]i)
[3547]et
[3549]re
[3551]3
[3553]g either ot the time
[3555]of SCD recruitment or later in a position to furnish. injormation o-
[3556]mo . *
[3558]Av,
[3560]“| interest to the KGB. inthis regard, NCSENKO has steic
[3562].,wntil 1962 there was a definite. tencency in the Seventh Desa
[3564]make a "recruitment" as a siatistic for the end-of-year report even
[3566]though it was apparent th
[3568]it was-highly unlikely there wouid De a potential in the futere.
[3570]“NOSENKO has furnished information on or leads to a mumoser of
[3572]cases, primarily third nationais but some American, in which be hes
[3574]ossible after acditional research anc investigation, Until an icenti-
[3576]: ideation is made, the value of any particular lead to. Western invelli-
[3577]fr ‘ we : .
[3579]es tay
[3581]gence cannot be estimated, but that there may be a potential value
[3583]gouEc74
[3585]Abe ane tant alee
[3588]14-0000
[3590]cannot be ignoreé, As an exarple oft
[3592]furnished a lead, stihl uncer invesiigziion, t
[3594]probably not an American, who in 1962 was ina positica to remove
[3596]the "NATO Emergency Codes," ccliver the codes to ine AGS ior
[3598]is
[3600]@, anc then
[3602]- agent is as yetunideniificd, his current access to i
[3603]eR oS re
[3605]' the security of the United States cannot be sauged,
[3609]'... Inali, the information irom: NOSENXO in the category of cases
[3610]where ‘Western Intelligence dic not previously have signizicant. intor-
[3612]" ,mation must be considered on balance as having resulted ix material
[3614]_-. 1 damage to the: KGB and of signi
[3616]cant Seneiit to Western intelligence.
[3618]Quantity alone of Cl or Fi information ivom a KGS defector is
[3620]not a siancard on which to juage vona ices, The question is whether
[3622]sormaiion is reasonably comyr
[3624]tlie amount-of his 4
[3626].; Claimed positions.in the KGB. This question es regards NOSENKS
[3627]top has-been examined, with aifirmeative ndings, in another section of
[3628]v ie o -
[3629]. 7 oe
[3631].. ‘ this paper,
[3633]1 wo me
[3635]A few examples from the above cited categories oi injoxrmation
[3637]“ifaarnished by NOSENKC are listed below. These cases arc siven as
[3639]illustrations and are not necessarily listed in order of importance,
[3641]]
[3644]14-0000
[3646]Tle Chou uw RGovert Lee JGHIION ane uu velo 6 ce Ge :
[3647]Jamies Alen MINT ADS NGAUGE eve Seen COvesue an the 0 juee ;
[3648]SU ary. Th ca OU Cute erece ECE VA VGSEG AE on
[3649]of @ leaG iroc, NOSENIO wh BOS 1G Sesto OF DOLINS ON,
[3650]. A
[3651]Another American caod is That ol Puech HOWARD, ven] 06, bg
[3652]employee who spent consicezazie time inthe Us in 1962 ~ 2953,
[3654]NOS) tay heed Tecsu.ied 2 .
[3655].. . : Na
[3656]the First Section, ;
[3657]thar[ HOWARD furnish nis! “* 9 tne XCB.
[3658]interviewed in 1964, OWwARD cic NOt ECAIT Ne had Veen cecsu.icd,
[3660]but suspicion o:[ MUBCICY RD]was Oreas ENOUGH So inet Lie Conccet With :
[3661]SiA\was not renewed. bb a “Rs oo
[3662]lo €etermine how much
[3663](Son as Dh wile in the :
[3664]Siaies Fimbassy. There is guu
[3665]recruited, it was he wno was * :
[3666]ma CLA Was atierazting to
[3667]‘ H
[3668]establish contact using
[3669]NOSENKO in 1964 ormation in regaré toa "ZHARI" :
[3670](apparentiy a KGB code name, |
[3672]‘ _ Ofparr. , oo
[3675]iO/SR | |
[3678]14-0000
[3682]a. my fare
[3684]ae Cb
[3686]mame). He tdentified "ZHARI" (phonetic) ae an American code clerk
[3687]who defected to the USSR tn 1961. An internal assumptlon was made
[3688]Baced om the original lead tofermation from NOSENKO that "ZHARI"
[3689]was Victor Norris HAMILTON, aka Fev-t hiltrt HINDALY, a former
[3690]NSA employee who defected to the USSR In 1962, and the information
[3691]from NOSENKO waa nover disseminated or investigated,
[3692]Prior to the surfectng of John Discoe SMITH by the Sovicts
[3693]fn the fail of 1967, Ect ames information concersing KGB knowledge
[3694]of American code clorks was being investigated; and John Discoe
[3695]SMITH was a loading suspect, After the curfacing of SMITH by the ; e
[3696]Soviets, it became eppzrept that SMITH, rather than HAMILTON, was
[3697]identical to "ZHARI,” Investigation disclosed that no definite informa-
[3698]tlen could be established {n regard to the actual whereabouts of SMITH
[3699]after circa mid-1960. It cannot be positively etated that appropriate
[3700]tavestigzetion tn 1964 of tha "ZHARI" lead would have led to the identi
[3701]fleation of Joha Discos SMITH as "ZHARI," However, such (dontifi-
[3702]cation would bave been of considerable interest to the Departinsnt of
[3703]Stete amd CLA, and could wery well bave permitted certain action which i
[3704]would bave at least lessened the propaginda effect. of the surprise
[3706]aanourcement by the Soviets in the fall of 1967.
[3708]i
[3710]NOSENKO, in June 1962, furnished trformation from which
[3711]William VASSALL could be quickly identified. GCLITSYN, tn late
[3712]1960 + carly 1961, bed furnished information concerning a Soviet pens-
[3714]tration of the British Government on the basle of, which the British
[3715]Wuu Kote
[3717]9
[3718]SPOKE
[3720]Stead. EUR alte
[3723]14-0000
[3725]i
[3727]Servicos had compiled a llet at twenty suspects, including VASSALL,
[3729]. Even though it may be presumed that Investigation of the twenty suspecta
[3731]would ultimately have resulted in a determination that VASSALL wag
[3732]the agent on whom GOLITSYN had furnished certain information, the
[3733]information from NOSCNKO tn June 1962 resulted in the carlier termi-
[3734]nation by the British Services of s still valuable productive KGB agent.
[3736]Although not the case cf a KGB agent, the matter of tha micro-
[3737]phones tin the United States Embassy should also bo mentioned.
[3738]GOLITSYN, following his defection in Cecernber 1961, furnished
[3739]certain information in regard to microphones inthe United States
[3740]Embassy (Chancery). Since in fact the microphones we.s connected
[3741]to coutral cables, location of ona microphone would logically have led
[3742]to the exposure of the entire set of inicrophones. However, appro-
[3743]priate action wae not taxon on this information and the KGB would have
[3744]been aware Sh2t no action was taken prior to Juns 1962 when NCSENKS
[3745]firet contacted CIA.
[3747]Lf NOSENKO® ts 2 diepatebed KGB agent, it is not clear why the
[3749]e
[3751]KGB would attract spscific attention to a system of microphones which
[3752]cust have etill had some value ae of June 1962. A preeumption may
[3753]be made that, if NOSENKO was a dispatched agent, the KGB had, as of
[3754]1962, an advanced system of monitoring davices which rendered the
[3755]above microphone system obsolete. However, no concrete evidence
[3756]of such an advanced system is available and it should be noted that it
[3758]SEGiNE
[3760]we tmeereeren ageing es ne ng Samer ReNEr: Seearereeave teat a tonsa EEO 0
[3762]|
[3763]i
[3764]i
[3765][
[3766]i
[3774]WAS Lot uniu. circa April iGo, tact aay elect ve aClicd Wao acs io
[3776]A iew genera, . (eGnte ince
[3778]nisheeé by NOSZNKO wae be nopie”
[3780]arés leads furnience Sy NOSL. oo
[3782]oi these leaés have Geen meniioned Lac Devious Sur
[3786]interviews with NOSENKO have resuhecs in apor
[3788]mew Amervican icads which ave being exarsince by ' ‘
[3789]Ww, I Se e
[3791]view : , :
[3792]number of casts previously m ; :
[3793]a ; Hl
[3794]ucGitional Ceveropment Of tucoe cases '
[3795]: |
[3796]NOSENKO was provided lcids te ove . :
[3797]i :
[3798]agenis, Geogrepvhicaily theese ieics ace wice in scoge, inciucing ‘ :
[3799]. t
[3800]: Pre . ~ oe : soe . ~ we - 1 +
[3801]niticnais of such courtries as indonesia, Ausivid, Ureguay, the Unied : ;
[3802]. . . . 1
[3805]Mungcom, France, West
[3807]Swecen, Australic, o2;
[3808]Mexico, ita
[3810]included in the more itsyortant of these ager. “tor other leads
[3812]s
[3814]are leads to high ieveis of government and intelligence to code clerks, . :
[3816]to access agents for Armerxicin targets, to actual or possible illegal
[3818]a - a 0001076
[3820]11
[3821]! i
[3822]it 1
[3823]i SCAT TS ‘
[3825]. elbini ;
[3826]' {
[3828]eye Ft = wt cede ‘ H
[3829]: |
[3832]a
[3835]14-0000
[3837]PaeeG LSS Loew Cor seebusnenio, regres
[3839]Bae ae eT tee ea Le TOU ee
[3840]> .
[3842]erates G2 .Gose
[3844]Ae SUPATAE LY Of Lae DOS Le cee Eee Ser
[3846]woe : ew oe eget tee
[3848]esas ee Vet Y A Sasst BUT Cign Te Xe
[3852]ra]
[3854]v
[3855]ss
[3856]be
[3858]G
[3859]ty
[3860]we
[3861]ra
[3863]a
[3864]Q
[3865]w
[3867]Ly
[3868]o
[3869]in
[3871]HY
[3873]G
[3874]v
[3875]e
[3876]ts
[3877]ta
[3879]in Moscow, inchiding actual AGS cluscesine cocess inte certain Western
[3881]bee ye
[3883]wmoasSies pout not the
[3885]NOSZNAO has a1s0 fucnlencc leads 1a Costain FOS
[3887]cant value to Western Inteligesce one Game:
[3889]Talis evan
[3891]Asa final note, the implicc conclusion in the previous summary
[3892]3s accepted that the failure of NOSZNKD to provide usable positive -
[3894], | . | 000/07THa-
[3896]4
[3901]14-0000
[3903]any
[3905]A
[3906]ss
[3907]“Ad
[3908]co
[3910]inteliigenco information is wot a significant factor in a daterminatizn
[3912]- of bis bona fides. The qualification should, however, be added that
[3914]it ts not felt that NOSICNKO has, as of this tima, been fully debrisfed
[3916]fa many areas of positive intelligence interest.
[3918]13 600141077
[3920]SECRET
[3923]14-0000
[3926]F, IS THERE 2VIDENCI OF NIL DECEPTION OX "OLIVE ANALY?
[3927]IN INFORMATION FURNIEE DD BY NOSINEMO WHICH
[3928]WOULD WARRANT A CONCLUSION THAT NOSENZO
[3929]WAS DISPATC
[3930]. . . :
[3931]: . r . . .
[3933]a
[3934]-
[3935]20
[3936]a
[3939]ses A mire te * wh mate mem
[3942]14-0000
[3946]F. Is there evidence of KGB deception or "give away" in
[3947]inforrnation furnished by NOSENKO which would warrant a conclusion
[3948]that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB? The conclusion in this
[3949]summary is that NOSENKO was not dispatched by the KGh,. in
[3951]reaching this conclusion, a full examination of the above «,..: siion has
[3953]been both a necessary and integral part,
[3955]It is inherent that the volume of information furnished by
[3956]NOSENKO is only one of the factors which should be given consideration
[3957]in arriving ata conclusion that NOSENKO was or was not dispatched by
[3958]the KGB. If NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB, the KGB would have
[3959]surely deen willing to sacrifice certain information of value to the KGB
[3960]in order te support the bona fides of NOSENKO. However, if NOSENKO
[3961]was dispatched, it must have been to accomplish or further a KGB
[3962]purpose or mission, the nature of which has been and continues to be
[3963]unknown,
[3965]An examination of the circumstances under which NOSENKG first
[3966]contacted CLA in Geneva in 1962 and his behavior during thése contacts is
[3967]particularly pertinent since during this period of time NOSENKO would
[3968]have surely been under direct KGB control if there are any implications
[3970]of KGB dispatch in the NOSENKO case.
[3972]SECRET GOOL079
[3978]14-0000
[3980]emeees.
[3982]cee grantee taee Bester noe
[3984]NOSENKO has stated that his original approach to ''sell two
[3986]pieces of information" was his own idea as to what was most lixely to
[3988]“pe successful. NOSENKO has stated that he wanted to make a contact
[3990]with the Americans, was not psychologically adapted to defect at the
[3991]time, and felt that if he merely stated that he was a "KGB counter-
[3992]intelligence ofiicer who wanted to give information," he very possibly
[3993]would be rejected, It should be noted that NOSENKO even during his
[3994]first contact did not limit his remarks to the "two pieces of information"
[3995]and began to talk quite freely on other matters.
[3997]If NOSENKO was dispatched, it is felt that he, during his 1962
[3998]contacts, would have been very carefully briefed and that his remarks
[3999]or statements would have not been of a nature which could cause any
[4000]suspicion in regard to the bona fides of NOSENKO. Instead, a current
[4001]review of his statements and remarks during his five contacts in 1962
[4002]indicate that his many errors, exaggerations, and actual lies were quite*
[4003]likely typical of a braggadocio element in the personality of NOSENKO
[4004]and may also have been evidence supporting the statement by NOSENKO
[4005]that he usually had a few drinks of liquor before each contact in
[4007]Geneva,
[4009]0001080
[4011]SECRET
[4013]i
[4014]A
[4017]4
[4020]14-0000
[4022]a
[4024]CTA ie
[4026]eee alan j
[4028]NOSENO, during his five contacts in Geneva, made many
[4029]statements which in retrospect were impossiole, and the investigation
[4030]of which could only have raised certain questions con 2rning NOSENKO.
[4031]The following is a list of the more obvious areas in which NOSENKO
[4032]made gross cxaggerations or mace incorrect or impossible statements.
[4034](a) NOSENKO claimed he personally was with
[4036]Oleg M. GRIBANOV, Chief of the SCD, during the
[4038]recruitment pitch to[Tames sfUasnzad (This was
[4040]a lie and an interview with BronBzndwita display -
[4042]of photograph would have disclosed that NOSENKO
[4044]did not participate. )
[4046](b) NOSENKO was involved in the recruitment
[4047], approach to Russell LANGELLE. (This was a lie and
[4049]LANGELLE was available for interview. )} ps
[4051](c) NOSENKO said he recruited |LUNT (Horace
[4053]LUNT)lin Bulgaria. (Actuaily NOSENKO never met
[4055]Eon)
[4058]c001Cs1
[4060]. my . ee ee en err es FO aeyee
[4062](BR
[4064]14-0000
[4066](d) NOSENKO claimed personal contact with] Edmund O6
[4067]STEVENS |who, according to NOSENKO, had been recruited
[4068]by the KGB. (NOSZNKO actually had never personatiy met
[4069](Stevens) and only had seen[STEVENS|once ata distance. }
[4070](e) NOSENKO dated the recruitment of "“ANDREY"
[4071]in Moscow as 1949-1950. At ithe same time he furnished
[4072]information that "ANDREY" (who is considered identical to
[4073]\ Dayle Wallis SMITH) was in Moscow during a part of the time
[4074]that Roy RHODES, also a recruited agent, was assigned to
[4075]Moscow, 1951-1953. “ANDREY" (SMITH) was actually in
[4076]Moscow 1952-1954.
[4077]f) NOSENKO said he, GRIBANOV, and another officer
[4078]met Edward Ellis SMITH. (NOSENKO has since stated he did
[4079]not meet SMITH and that his only role was obtaining a ioreiga
[4080]typewriter and paper for a KGB agent involved in the SMITH
[4081]operation. )
[4082](g) NOSENXO in a number of instances spoke in the
[4083]first person, saying We did this," or "We did that," in
[4085]reference to a particular KGB activity in which he now admits
[4089]G061082
[4093]Sk
[4095]ad
[4097]14-0000
[4099]oe BMS TE
[4102]he was not involved but had some knowledge. (Lf
[4104]NOSENXO was under KGB control in 1962, both he
[4106]and the xGB should have known that these indicated
[4108]exaggerations would eventually lead to a question
[4110]concerning the bona fides of NOSENKO. )}
[4112]In 1562-1963 a number of similarities were noted between
[4113]information furnished by NOSENKO and information which had been
[4114]furnished by GOLITSYN prior to June 1962. These similarities were
[4115]quite striking and gave riseto certain suspicions of NOSENKO because
[4116]he provided information which the KGB would presumably have considered
[4117]already compromised as a result of the defection of GOLITSYN. Certain
[4118]of the similarities at the time could only be explained in terms of
[4119]NOSENKO being a dispatched agent, The following are some examples of
[4120]the similarities noted.
[4122](a) Both furnished information in regard to
[4123][Johan PREISFREUND} O6
[4124](b) Both iurnished information in regard toa
[4125][Fnilitary code clerk case (James STORSBERG}, 0%, OG
[4126](c) Both furnished information in regard toa
[4127]trip of Vladislav KOVSHUK, under an as sumed name, c
[4129]to the United States. (GOLITSYN was sure it was
[4131]connected with a reactivation of an agent formerly in
[4133]a ; (G009LBS
[4135], ee
[4137]mesa ree ee cen ne senemeatttatnn oo «
[4140]14-0000
[4142]_ . ery
[4144]Moscow, or a recruitment of an American formerly
[4145]with the United States Embassy in Moscow; and NOSENKO
[4146]related it directly to the "ANDREY" case, giving the
[4147]assumed name which KOVSHUX used. )
[4148](4) Both furnished information in regard to
[4149]microphones in the United States Embassy in Moscow.
[4150](e) Both furnished information in regard to
[4151]Eenle STEVENS|andfisaac pont Snarnd
[4152]The above list is not complete nor does it indicate the acmal :
[4153]differences in the amount of information furnished on any particalar
[4154]topic by GOLITSYN and NOSENKO. To cite the above in detail in this
[4155]summary ia believed unnecessary since the only point of real interest
[4156]is whether the fact that NOSENKO was aware of certain events, cases, 7
[4157]ov situations of which GOLITSYN was also aware raises a legitimate
[4158]question concerning the bona fides of NOSENKO.
[4159]The above area of concern has been thoroughly examined and
[4160]it is considered that the fact that NOSENKO furnished some information
[4161]on certain cases or situations previously mentioned in lesser or
[4163]greater detail by GOLITSYN cannot logically be construed as evidence Zz
[4165]g001084
[4168]me
[4169]o>
[4170]pas)
[4172]|
[4175]5 2
[4176]AR Me ecm mee Pee ae IR Sb 8 TN PSO rahe RA ot
[4178]° 7 ZIG a
[4180]14-0000
[4183]i
[4184]i
[4186]a
[4188]i
[4189]~‘ wr j 4
[4190], reed he t~ a
[4191]Wai iis ; oa 4
[4193]‘that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB. NOSENKO has during
[4194]current interviews satisiactorily sourced his information in alm: st oe, 3
[4195]every instance. Ina few instances he has said ne did not recall -
[4196]how he learned of a particular piece of information but these -
[4197]apparent lapses of memory were not large in number and are
[4198]considered to be in no way suspicious. j
[4200]The general area in which there was a similarity between
[4201]information furnished by GOLITSYN in late 1961 - early.1962 and
[4202]information furnished by NOSENKO in June 1962 and which would have
[4203]been the most significant insofar as the security of the United States
[4204]Government was or is concerned related to certain activities centering
[4205]around or in the First Department, SCD.
[4206]. It is the conclusion of this summary that NOSENKO was an
[4208]officer of the First Section, First Department, SCD, during 1953-1955
[4209], and was Deputy Chief of the same section in 1960 - 1961, Therefore,
[4210]the fact that NOSENKO furnished information concerning certain cases
[4211]or situations in the First Department and the fact that GOLITSYN
[4212]furnished information concerning the same case or situation ia not
[4214]unusual or necessarily suspicious. NOSENKO has stated that GOLITSYN
[4218]eteeinneanemm cmeeNC RE oe eee NS re a
[4220]‘Sicebi a i ati ede EWR EIS BSS SDLP 8 Sac i Sedge sete oe He neeneeee
[4223]14-0000
[4225]a,
[4229]KNEW 2260 Was in coniact wah Giuner alcers OF Une F
[4231]GOLITSS
[4233]furnisneé by GOLITSYN and NOSENMNO on
[4235]ctorly correlate Cevinh, information from GOLITSYN
[4239]ne, ars cao anes Paes
[4240]702 - 163 OF the previous
[4242]with information from NOSENXO.
[4244]summary refer to iniormation from GOLITSYN whics is charccterizcc
[4246]as “Ivformation about AGB Operations Against Zmbassy Code Clerks in
[4248]meres
[4250]al Ape :
[4253]on remarks by Geanadiy ivanovica GCRAYAZNOV a
[4255]KOSOLAPOV of the First Section, First Departin
[4257]Scction, First Department, SCD, durin
[4261]responsibility was wor agains coce clerks at the United Siates Emcessy
[4263]m Moscow, and that both KOSOLAPOY and GRYAZNOV were enz
[4265]pee
[4267]the’ same work anc under his supervision. Tne statement by GOLITSYN
[4269]To en i re ae gate et DceROe OE RETR Re eta ee
[4272]14-0000
[4274]that NOSENKO was not Deputy Chief of the First Section in 1960 has
[4275]been noted and commented on in another section of this summary,
[4277]GOLITSYWN has furnished certain information which he re-
[4278]ceived from officers of the First Section, rirst Department, SCD. t
[4279]In each instance where this information, which was fragmentary, couid
[4280]not be immediately correlated with information from NOSENKO, it was
[4281]previously considered to be evidential of deception or lying on the part
[4282]of NOSENKO, This position, however, failed to allow for the possibility
[4283]that the discrepancies between the two sources were, at least in certain
[4284]instances, more apparent than real.
[4286]In certain instances it has now beer possible to correlate frag-
[4287]mentary information from GOLiITSYN with information from NOSENKO,
[4288]making it evident that in these instances the differences could not be
[4289]construed as in any way reflecting against NOSENKO. The four examples
[4290]cited below represent two probable correlations, (a) and (b); one possible
[4291]correlation, (c); and one instance where,no correlation is possible at this
[4292]time, (d):
[4294](a) GOLITSYN furnished information which he
[4295]received in April-May 1960 from Gennadiy GRYAZNOV
[4296]: that an attempt had been made by the KGB to recruit an
[4297]. . co
[4298]9 91067
[4300]SECRET.
[4302]14-0000
[4304]|
[4306]i
[4308]2
[4311]- was not a female secretary in the American Embassy, but
[4313]aTAAcT
[4314]via heaves,
[4315]American female employee of the American Embassy
[4316]in Moscow through a male Soviet friend, but that tae
[4317]attempt had failed. GOLITSYN also furnished inicrmation
[4318]that the woman had left Moscow by the time he learned of
[4319]the information but that the Soviets hoped she would return
[4320]to Moscow so that further work could be undertaxen to
[4321]efiect her recruitment, He did not recall the name of the
[4322]secretary, but did recall) that it was|a long and "German OS
[4323]sounding"|name,
[4325]NOSENKO has furnished information in regard to a
[4326]recruitment attempt against (Collette SCHWARZENBACH,| Hk
[4327]who it is considered is identical to the "American secretary"
[4328]referred to by COLITSYN. However| §CHWARZENBACH
[4330]ok 0
[4332]had been.employed as a secretary to the wife of Ambassador j
[4333]BOHLEN during 1955 - 1956 and from 1958 - 1959 was employed
[4335]as a correspondent by the United Press in Moscow The
[4336]recruitment attempt against{SCHWARZENBACH| according to, OG
[4337]NOSENKO, occurred in 1959 and was an operation of the First
[4339]Section, First Department, SCD.
[4341]c001088
[4343]oe
[4344]o
[4346]e>
[4347]Bia
[4348]o>
[4349]Ee)
[4350]Lay
[4351]ont
[4354]14-0000
[4361]he
[4363]H
[4364]|
[4365](b) Page 163 of tie previous summary contains infor ; |
[4366]mation that GOLITSYN also learned from GRYAZ>.OV in
[4368]the spring of 1960 that GRYAZNCV had deveioped an operation |
[4369]against an American Embassy rnilitary code cler« in which the
[4371]KGb was "99 per cent sure" that the target would be recruited,
[4373]This is believec to undcubiedly be a reference to the case of
[4375]|
[4377]Game SroasazRElwine was actually the subject of a recruit-
[4378]ment approach in 1961.
[4379]There is considered to be a good possibility that
[4380]GOLITSYN actually learned of the above information from
[4381]GRYAZNOV in early January 1961 when he was again in Moscow
[4382]rather than during the spring of 1960 when GOLITSYN was
[4383]‘preparing for his assignment to Helsinki, Finland. This
[4384]theory is supported by information on page 163 of the previous -
[4385]summary that GOLITSYN has stated he learned in January
[4386]1961 from Viadisiav M. KOVSHUK (Chief of the First Section)
[4387]that| Johan patSernondiped recently been used in the |
[4388]successful recruitment of an American employee ot the
[4389]Embassy. [Johan PREISPAEUND|wae used in ine{StonsS ERG]
[4390]operation, according to NOSENKO, and NOSENKO was also
[4391]3 6004029
[4394]SECRET
[4396]een eee ca . see a.
[4401]14-0000
[4403]7
[4406]gop aTe
[4408]ULV lee
[4409]aware that GOLITSYN had a conversation with KOVSHUK about
[4410]BarsrnzunSpince GOLITSYN wanted to vse[PREiSr bund]
[4411]in Helsinki, NOSENKO has stated he was not present during
[4412]the above conversation, It is very possibie that KOVSHUK
[4413]exaggerated a little in his conversation with GOLITSYN in the
[4414]matter of why GOLITSYN could not use(PRESFREUND jas an
[4415]agent.
[4417]NOSZ£NKO has furnished extensive information in regard
[4418]to the) James STORSSERG |case and with due consideration to
[4419]the accuracy and recoilection of GOLITSYN, there does not
[4420]appear to be an adequate basis for questioning the bona fides of
[4421]NOSENKO on the basis of the differences between the report-
[4422]ing by-GOLITSYN of information he received from GRYAZNOV
[4423]concerning what is considered to have been thei James G
[4424]STORSBERG)case and Setaited information furnished by
[4425]NOSENKXO concerning th James STORSBERG|case. The
[4426]exact date of the recruitment attempt against|STORSBERG|
[4427]has not been positively established, but it is considered to
[4428]have occurred before early May 1961 and probably in the
[4429]March-April 1961 period, The statement by[ ames | 06
[4431]g001C90
[4432]12
[4434]SECRET
[4436]comet on et a ees \
[4439]14-0000
[4441]- see
[4443]~ OLE,
[4445][Stoaspend|iat it occurred in October 1961 is com-
[4446]pieiely unacceptable and is even contradicted by other
[4447]statements by ST hang himseil,
[4449](c) Page 163 of the previous summary contains
[4450]information fromm GOLITSYN which he had received from
[4451]GRYAZNOV in April or May 1960 tnat an American
[4452]employee of the Embassy in Moscow was either recruited
[4453]or prepared for recruitment on the basis of a homosexual
[4454]compromise beginning in 1959 and concluding in 1960.
[4456]The previous summary also states that according to
[4457]GOLITSYN, the KGB had photographed the American in
[4458]various homosexual acts, but SHELEPIN, who had just
[4459]become Chairman of the KGB, was at the time atressing
[4460]ideological rather than biackmail recruitments. SHELEPIN
[4461]Gid not exclude future use of the photographs which the KGB
[4462]would hold in reserve.
[4464]NOSENKO has furnished information concerning the
[4465]homosexual compromise of[Robert ARRETT,L who was a
[4466]guide at thé United States Exhibition in Moscow in 1959, and
[4468]with whom "SHMELEV" and "GRIGORIY", two homosexual
[4470]| . G001C94
[4471]13
[4473]SECRET
[4476]14-0000
[4478]_ although the photographs were of a good quality, the KGB
[4480]the recruitment operation, [BARRETT following his return
[4484]agents of NOSENKO, became acquainted, Work against
[4485]the United States Exhibition was the responsibility of
[4486]the Nintn Department, SCD, but various Departments
[4487]were particip. iing under the direction of the Ninth
[4488]Department, \
[4490]One of the above homosexual agents succeeded in
[4491]invotving{ BADR rin homosexual activities which were
[4493]photographed by the KGB but, according to NOSENKO,
[4495]was unable to use the photographs in 1959 because ofa
[4497]general ban by the Central Committee on the recruitment
[4499]of the United States Exhibition guides due to the planned
[4501]visit of President EISENHOWER to the Sovict Union.
[4502]NOSENKO also stated that the compromising materiai
[4504]and information oof BARAETH was later given to the First
[4506]Department and that BARRETT was recruited by the Second
[4508]Section, First Department when he returned with another
[4510]Exhibition in 1961, and that he, NOSENKO, was not involved in
[4512]06
[4514]m 0001092
[4518]Woe
[4520]> enna A PADS ASCE CTSA SE PP TT IE PFO RE RET IO eR! Berne AnEFTTTMEARMED eon Setar -rusersvenrs A revs ne TEES nse onmen mare mien ere RIOORORY AAI tena renner So nee anette
[4522]14-0000
[4528]OCADTT
[4530]VLU,
[4532]to the United Staies in January 1962, confessed to the
[4533]FBI that he had been recruited in 1961 on the basis of
[4534]compromising photographs which had been taken
[4535]during his 1959 trip to Moscow.
[4537]Although it cannot be established at this
[4538]time, it is possibie that the information furnished
[4539]by GOLITSYN which he had received from GRYAZNOV
[4540]actually refers to tne[Robors 8 RRETT fase, It should
[4541]be noted that [Robert BARRET7 |could not actually be
[4542]characterized as an “American employee of the Embassy
[4543]in Moscow,"
[4545](a) Page 162 of the previous summary contains infor-
[4546]mation from GOLITSYN that in the spring of 1960 when he
[4547]visited the First Section, First Department, SCD, he learned
[4548]from GRYAZNOV that GRYAZNOV had as an agent an Embassy
[4549]code clerk who was scheduled to be transferred to Helsinki,
[4550]GRYAZNOV indicated to GOLITSYN that the code clerk had
[4552]already furnished the KGB with some information, that he was
[4554]15 - G001053
[4556]SECRET
[4558]SORE ao ate
[4563]14-0000
[4565]considered by the KGB to be a "real" agent and that if.
[4566]the transier of the code clerk materialized, GOLITSYN
[4567]might have the code clerk as an agent in Helsinki. _* -
[4568]NOSENKO has furnished no information which ca-. be
[4569]correlated in any way with the above information from
[4571]GOLITSYN, but neither has the information from GOLITSYN
[4573]resulted in an identification despite the considerable investigation
[4574]which has been conducted in the matter, Although this is
[4575]considered to be a, valid lead, it need not necessarily refer
[4579]code clerk who was in the United States Embassy in
[4583]Moscow during 1960 - 1961. It is also possiole that the previons
[4584]remark by GOLITSYN concerning the above "code clerk" who
[4585]might be transferred to Helsinki as well as his cited remarks
[4586]in a-c could be clarified or at least additional information
[4587]obtained if a specific reinterview on these matters was possible. a
[4589]i ; . ' The trip of Vadim Vv. KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki, Finland in
[4591]fad
[4593]November 1960 should be mentioned in any comparison of information :
[4595]from NOSENKO with information from GOLITSYN. This conflict is
[4597]goo1Csd
[4600]14-0000
[4602]# considered by the KGB to be a "real'' agent and that if
[4603]the transfer of the code clerk materialized, GOLITSYN
[4604]might have the code clerk as an agent in Helsinki.
[4605]NOSENKO has furnished no information which can be
[4606]correlated in any way.with the above information from
[4607]GOLITSYN, but neither has the information from GOLITSYN
[4608]resulted in an identification despite the considerable investigation
[4609]which has been conducted in the matter. Although this is
[4610]@ considered to be a valid lead, it need not necessarily refer
[4611]to a code clerk who was in the United States Embassy in
[4612]es Moscow during 1960 - 1941, It is also possible that the previous
[4613]remark by GOLITSYN concerning the above "code clerk" who
[4614]might be transferred to Helsinki as well as his cited remarks
[4615]in a-c could be clarified or at least additional information
[4616]obtained if a specific reinterview on these matters was possible.
[4617]The trip of Vadim V. KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki, Finland in
[4618]November 1960 should be mentioned in any comparison of information
[4620]from NOSENKO with information from GOLITSYN. This conflict is
[4622]es) 6 goose’s |
[4624]14-0000
[4626]fe
[4628]SECRET a :
[4630]also mentioned in another section pertaining to the 1960-1961 career
[4631]of NOSENKO. GOLITSYN stated that KOSOLAPOV came to Helsinki
[4632]a) accompany an American Embassy code clerk on the train to
[4633]a . Moscow and that KOSOLAPOV planned to strike up an acquaintance
[4634]with the code.clerk which could be continued’in Moscow.
[4635]. The American Embassy code clerk referred to above was
[4636]Ob
[4638]undoubtedly|J John GARLAND]|and the train manifest liste[John GARLAND]
[4639]and Viktor KOLOSOV (Vadim V. KOSOLAPOV) as passengers on the
[4641]- same train from Heisinki to Moscow. NOSEXNKO is aware of the io
[4645]7 identity of|John ee claims no 5 imowledge ‘of the above trip
[4646]of KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki, although being well aware of a previous trip. |
[4647]NOSENKO, as Deputy Chief of the First Section. specifically
[4648]. charged with work against code clerks, should have been aware of the
[4649]November 1960 trip of KOSOLAPOY to and from Helsinki. His lack of
[4650]; . . - Inowledge may or may not be explainable in terms of his other activities
[4651]such as his trip to Cuba in November ~December 1960 but it cannot be
[4653]interpreted as evidence NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB since, if
[4655]“he haa been, the KGB should have briefed NOSENKO on the trip of
[4657]OSOLAPOV to Helsinki in November 1960, as this was an event the — ot ; ag
[4659]a ee
[4661]cGB knew GOLITSYN was aware of.
[4662]oe 600105 5
[4666]Ep Ae A HGP EB ee ABE Ste at See aan a se tphee sera ee a oe Sh Bee Sate ate eee
[4668]14-0000
[4670]In connection with this theory, it should be noted that NOSENKO during
[4672]‘potential damage which could result from the defection of GOLITSYN, |
[4674]A theory which has previously been given consideration and -
[4675]warranted full consideration was that if NOSENKO was dispatched,
[4676]his mission was to confuse leads furnisied to American intelligence
[4678]and/or to denigrate the. value of information furnished by GOLITSYN.
[4680]current interviews 5 has not made any remarks which could in any way a
[4682]be. construed : as derogatory to GOLITSYN. In addition, NOSENKO does
[4683]not claim to lave any detailed knowledge of the FCD and frequently,
[4685]when some topic peculiar to the FCD has been. broached with NOSENKO,
[4687]his immediate reply hhas been to the effect that "1 didn't work in the FCD, "
[4689]ou ‘should a ask GoLiTsyN ‘about that."
[4691]In-connection with any consideration of whether the contact of
[4692]NOSENKO with CIA in Geneva in June 1962 could have been initiated by
[4693]the KGB as a result of the defection of GOLITSYN,: the timing of certain
[4694]events should be noted.. GOLITSYN defected on 15 December 1961,
[4695]NOSENKO Geparted from Moscow in March 1962 for Geneva, ‘Switzerland,
[4696]where he remained until 15 J une 1962.
[4698]‘It is felt that it would have been ‘practically impossible if not
[4700]impos Jséible for KGB officials to complete an assessment of the. actual ¢ or
[4703]Se a Se Sas
[4706]14-0000
[4708]i
[4711]S: EOVEL
[4715]select NOSENKO as the individual who would be Gispatched to counter-
[4717]act tne possible damage, and appropriately brief NOSENKO prior to
[4719]his departure for Geneva in March 1962. Therefore, if NOSENKO
[4720]was dispatched by the KGB, it would appear that pians for this would
[4721]have predated the defection of GOLITSYN and that any GOLITSYN
[4722]aspect could only be a related aspect and not the basis for the original
[4723]plan to dispatch NOSENKO. In addition, if NOSENKO was dispatched, so : 4
[4724]it would hardly seem necessary for the KGB to send NOSENKO to
[4725]Geneva two and one-half months before his first contact with CIA.
[4727]The theory has also been considered that NOSENKO could have
[4728]been dispatched to confuse and divert American inteiligence and thus
[4730]‘to protect an important KGB penetration or penetrations of the United
[4732]States Government, particularly CIA. This is a theory which should /
[4734]and has been given full consideration, but it is not possible to factually a ,
[4735]substantiate or refute this theory in the absence of specific information.
[4736]- that high-level KGB penetrations do or do not exist.
[4737]Actually, as regards NOSENKO, the primary area which should
[4738]be given consideration in the above matter is if all the information from
[4740]NOSENKO is accepted, what effect would or could it have on the efforts
[4742]eareesy
[4744]SECRET at
[4746]SN te nee ae eee tae Wg ee street oe SI ee nee ee a ae Sn ety
[4748],
[4749]sates ates alesse os pth!
[4751]; SRTR ERNE AREAS UNRAGRIEAT ATTN SAT
[4752]aA RRA EHO RC CoE
[4754]SECRET | | _
[4756]of American counter-inte.jigence td determine the identity of and
[4757]take ‘appropriate action against KGB penetrations of the United
[4758]States Government, The only answer to this question seems to be . “
[4759]that there would be little consolation or assurance to American intelli- .
[4760]gence even if every statement by NOSENKO was accepted at face value.
[4762]The only specific area in which NOSENKO could be even con-
[4763]sidered to claim full knowledge is the United States Embassy in Moscow.
[4764]In this area hie statements could be construed as assurance that there
[4765]were no recruitments of American personne] in the United States Embassy
[4767]oN in Moscow from 1953-December 1963 with.:he exception of "ANDREY" : |
[4769]. «(Dayle Wallis SMITH) and|Herbert HOWARD} The basis for this —
[4771]expressed. opinion of NOSENKO is considered elsewhere in this summary
[4772]and analysts may differ as to whether a recruitment could have occurred
[4773]of which NOSENKO did not have knowledge, assuming that his statements
[4774]are made in good faith. It should be noted, however, that at this time
[4775]there is no specific information which is in direct conflict with the
[4777]expressed opinion of NOSENXD. . , : _ :
[4779]NOSENKO, as previously mentioned, has never claimed any
[4781]particular knowledge of FCD activities. In addition, he does not claim
[4783]- e ‘
[4785]to be aware of all recruitments of Americans by the SCD. Asan .
[4787]eS _ 7 gooseee
[4791]6 we tebiclicae ree Mey
[4793]gO eon
[4796]A aol yt ge at
[4798]14-0000
[4800]-_ Ceo
[4801]mt SECRES
[4805]example, -he has made it clear that his knowlecge of SCD activities
[4806]against members of delegations, foreign businessmen, foreign students,
[4807]and individuals in the USSR on the iavitation of a Soviet organization or
[4808]a component of the Soviet Government is extremely limited and at best
[4809]mainly of a collateral nature.
[4811]NOSENKO does not even claim any detailed knowledge of
[4812]activities of the Second Section (Active Line) of the First Department, SCD,
[4813]nor does he claim to know all of the cases of which the Chief of the Seventh
[4814]Department was aware. The latter is-specifically supported by certain
[4815]notes brought out by NOSENKO which are short references to a number
[4816]of Seventh Department cases which are identified only by the KGB code
[4817]name, These notes, according to NOSENKO, were made when he had an
[4818]opportunity to review a notebook held by the Chief of the Seventh Department
[4820]and constitute the only knowledge NOSENKO had of these particular cases,
[4824]SECRET
[4826]mith web jad ako Says deb agin nhaitir germane oe weet ee nae
[4828]~ ee seem ok meet,
[4830]4
[4832]San heathen alt wo oe
[4835]14-0000
[4837]SECRET | os
[4839]G, JIS THERE ZVID.CNCE GF A POLITICAL GR.ANY
[4841]: : OF NOSEXKO BY THE KGR WITH
[4843]a8)
[4844]t]
[4845]a]
[4847]if
[4848]n
[4849]ue)
[4850]4
[4851]ce)
[4852]vA
[4854]1@)
[4856]rf)
[4857]y
[4858]BG
[4860]FREELY TO ClA CONCERNING HIS KNOWLEDGE OF THE KGB
[4862]AND WITHOUT NOSENKO BEING GIVEN A SPECIFI _
[4864]H MiSSION OR MISSIONS ?
[4866]CBOar 3
[4869]Gcwagreding and
[4870]Gectacsificetion
[4874]oD
[4882]-_--- tee tg ee - .. 4
[4883]'. ee TT a ca . * 7 7
[4884]as
[4885]4
[4890]14-0000
[4892]“7
[4894]tr pean fe ee mn Tf een
[4895]OO SUSAN Phu ee Gee SOS
[4898]LCLLLoONe
[4900]we Nr oa a
[4902]as NOSENAS,
[4904]g
[4905]Ne
[4906]by
[4907]te
[4908]i
[4910]w
[4911]re
[4913]64
[4914]al
[4917]4
[4918]a
[4920]mS
[4921]e
[4922]eA
[4924]political er other type sdjective wkics
[4926]ampoxtance by the KGS 10 warrant tac Clopatch Ul a ACE ofiicer with
[4928]the knowledge of NOSENAC to s
[4930]QR
[4931]St.
[4933]o
[4934]3
[4935]Pp
[4936]we
[4938]ae]
[4939]6
[4940]fe)
[4941]9,
[4942]Bay
[4943]ian
[4944]a
[4945]Ss
[4946]ry
[4947]ge
[4950]“
[4951]is)
[4952]u
[4955]a
[4956]ay
[4957]we
[4958]u
[4959]v,
[4960]i)
[4961]ay
[4962]th
[4964]limitations on tae KGS + crce infovrnation he m
[4966]chat
[4968]that Such act would, in the estimate oc the leadership, re loin ae net
[4972]positical gain for the USSA, For such a possibility to be seriously
[4974]entertained by the Soviets, however, it would Rave to involve an issue of
[4975]major importance to the Sovies leacership and presumabiy would have to
[4979]at
[4982]14-0000
[4986]V—~
[4988]: .
[4989]a :
[4990]a .
[4991]‘The ory on ba Lay Way by NOSE NAG wick
[4992]vey Goweld ia tie 6852 :
[4993]end his association with the Sovict Unica. ae Aee aot ut : mo Cas
[4994]1
[4995]obtaining at the time that there wis se ew
[4997]v assassination, premise tcat . 5
[4998]. . o- 2 vt
[4999]. invoivement, and (c) a Lypothesis tha
[5000]concerned lest erroneous conclusions de Erawa which could icad to
[5001]irreversable actions, it is conceivable thet the Sovict leadersiip mignt ve
[5002]’. have been prepared to take extreme stevs to convince ;
[5004]autnorities of their non-involvemcnt in the assassing bod
[5006]i to the United States Governmen: of tne aliegeciy coz oo
[5007]file on OSWALD was, in ; , SS
[5011]iight of the fact that among the intczmation NOSENKO provicec was
[5014]i
[5015]4 tiinside" KGB information on OSWALD: information waick purporzceciy
[5016]|
[5017]i
[5020]SE
[5022]at rn aerate on Oe bn
[5026]APOE eA et ARR ee ern cate een ee entered ote
[5028]eevee ENT
[5031]NRE SHRC OST ROERERRT ETON TERE Tiny
[5033]ES
[5035]5
[5036]SR nedaietdeseanes
[5039]14-0000
[5041]1 MRS ew tata at a ee ~ ~ wentaet
[5042]Tais information clearly inclecio® Vt these was no ACD vreler
[5044]we,
[5050]Poo,
[5054]STE e) a ene eae ene
[5056]vevealeé the subsiance of the concont of the AGB Tiles on OSWALD.
[5058]wita OSWALD, that the KOS hal us opovational insevest in OSWALD,
[5060]- a. mee ane f fe ne air. t
[5061]and that as a matier of fect OS WAL
[5063]sented the WAT yice c
[5064]CSSnWS We Te Worse
[5066]U
[5068]continuing series of proolems.
[5070]an Upon examination, however, NOSENXS Coes not meet the
[5073]‘requirements premisec above ior serious Soviet consideretion of @ iree
[5075]XGB defection. Tae following rezsons rencer this unacceptasle;
[5078]a. The chronoiogy, in itseli, presents virtually impossibie
[5080]problems, for such a theses, viz, NOSENKO's" proach to CIA
[5081]Mette fe ‘
[5083]in June 1962, 17 montis prior to thc assassinatio:
[5084]. er RR
[5086]enti Aennecy.
[5088]. b, While tac information from NOSZNXO oa OSWALD is
[5090]dee ray ned sawn ee Te ee fa eee as mes neers
[5091]anterestiing ana porunesc, i023 Nol, am nature, Scope, ana Content,
[5093]utaorities to reasonaesly Se
[5095]A
[5096]Be
[5097]re
[5098]o
[5099]go.
[5100]o
[5101]B
[5103]a
[5104]3)
[5105]3
[5106]5
[5107]Q
[5108]i
[5109]03
[5112]RR
[5113]a
[5114]3,
[5116]n
[5119]cr
[5121]we
[5122])
[5124]‘ expected to concluce that it resresencted unequivocal pros: of Soviet
[5126]r,
[5128]. non-involvement,
[5130]c. itis implausible not to assume that the Soviets would
[5132]assume that United States authorivies, in any examination of the
[5133]be .
[5135]| possibility of a Soviet (KGB) hand in the asszssination, would presume
[5137]OS RSE Sah Gira
[5139]RTT
[5140]PARSER fs
[5142]ce ee
[5144]wok
[5148]re Pees
[5151]14-0000
[5153]on
[5155]: Gwivs mintve?s Gi thls mevare. :
[5156]. Leven serious
[5157]GS COU Lave Logica ly SGea fitted ints the '
[5158]above very limited category. ; 7 , co oe 3
[5159]It ‘is accordingiy concluded tit ;
[5160]; motivated free dispatch can in the case of NCSENKO be satisfactorily : .,
[5161]eliminated, oo wo . ; . 7 Lb eel ts
[5162]. The possibility Las also Deen
[5165]bave theorized that by dispatching an
[5166]with nurnerous leads to non-valuable ox non-current KGS agents cz
[5168]" cases, the facilities of the Unitec Staves intelligence community woud
[5170]tad poet me mast
[5171]206 Of tarmc. 14.415 COUuLc -
[5173]be practically neutralized for an extonced pe
[5175]a
[5177]+ -.
[5179]omy be based on an assumption that che United States Intelligence Le
[5181]a
[5182]w
[5185]G
[5186]a)
[5187]w&
[5188]o
[5189]x]
[5190]33
[5191]a
[5192]e
[5193]9
[5194]Ee
[5196]ky
[5197]oO
[5199]ce
[5200]w
[5202]comrnunity. would involve a major porvion oz 2
[5204]in the investigation and resolution of cases waich had ttle or no current
[5206]or potential value to the KGB. The above nossidility cannot be
[5208]re. . *
[5210]i "arbitrarily eliminated.without.full consideration. It is not beleved chat
[5211]H
[5214]i
[5217]Nted et oat T6r Peer awe ane
[5219]Men re en ee eR webct
[5221]Far aja slid phe i ae |
[5223]free
[5225]Ee
[5227]Pel ed tne
[5229]SEG TRSTETITITS
[5232]stehernt nant RSIS HE
[5233]SBERSAS SAA RARE No
[5235]RANTS
[5236]SERS
[5238]14-0000
[5240]” - . Z
[5243]NOSENXO in the absence of on. ;
[5244]ov wiissions to fulfill comes Within the wsove cates . ‘
[5245]overall assessme the
[5247]exploitation of his. ini ation would be quite Gama
[5248]Considevation of the euove possisilicy mus
[5249]evaluation of the Ceterrent eiicct on tic prospecss of future recrulmments . “
[5250]by tre KCB caused oy Lega) action taken azainst incivicuals exposed by 2
[5251]information from the cisnatched agent or officer. The deterrent cficct ;
[5252]on others of the conviction aud sentescing of persons woo have commitied bo,
[5253]a crime or crimes has long been a vart of the legal theory of why persons : o
[5254]who commit a crime sould be iaprisoned or punished. |° '” -
[5255]The detelrent effect on others of the trials anc convictions of
[5256]— a.
[5257]William VASSALL, Robert Lee JOHNSON and James Allen MINTKIN~
[5258]a ER NO ie a =, —
[5259]BAUGH -snould not be uncesestimaied, . The KGS aiso could not have
[5260]CR ae er ne a :
[5261]Known that injormation turnisked by NOSENKO would not result in the .
[5262]. at
[5263]trial and conviction of otser KGB agents or recruitments concerning nn
[5265]whorn NOSENKO had some knowledge. ‘ - :
[5266]. . . . e ‘ 1 .
[5267]. ° , . .
[5268]: of. ; .
[5269]t . :
[5270]bose, : . :
[5271]im .
[5272]{ 7) 5
[5273]' .
[5274]i we ne fac :
[5277]CT emerneeee a aay mre nti oe OPT Oe Sa eS
[5279]4
[5280]Perey
[5283]14-0000
[5285]SECRET
[5287]rote
[5288]Nee
[5290]aN
[5292]NY EVI.
[5294]2
[5296]IS THERE
[5298]H,
[5300]NKO
[5302]T NCSE
[5304]TT
[5306]‘THA
[5308]KGBR
[5310]IS DEFECTION G2
[5311]‘THE t
[5313]3
[5315]GB PRIOR TO
[5316]‘WAS EVER BRIEFED BY
[5318]HAVIOR
[5320]ATIVS TOFS B
[5322]E CONTAC
[5324]TS OR
[5326]ING THES
[5328]R
[5330]CTIVES D
[5333]a
[5335]“OR KGB OBJ
[5337]As
[5341]IS DEE
[5343]h.
[5345]AFTER
[5347]ec od
[5349]ten ne ete ae ee te
[5351]4
[5352]j
[5353]4
[5354]i
[5357]4
[5358]i
[5359]i
[5361]i
[5365]14-0000
[5367]mATN Se
[5369]oO :
[5370]fad cal te 8 . : . ‘e
[5371]OLbi mee, . 2 4
[5373]H. Is there any evidence that the contacts of NOSENKO in 1962
[5374]or in 1964 with CIA were known to the XGB prior to his defection or
[5376]that NOSENKO was ever briefed by the KGB relative to his behavior
[5378]or KGB objectives during these contacts or aiter his defection? The
[5380]conclusion is that there is no evidence that the contacts of NOSENKO
[5382]in 1962 or in 1964 with CIA were shown to the KGB prior to his
[5383]defection and that NOSENKO was never briefed in any manner by the KGB.
[5384]The basis for the above conclusion is substantially contained in .
[5385]_ Previous sections. It is being. treatec here as a separate area of interest wD -
[5386]‘since it is a sufficiently important area as to warrant individual consideration. .
[5387]It is recognized that since positive factual confirmation such as
[5389]the KGB file on NOSENKXO is not available, any conclusion concerning
[5391]whether NOSENKO was or was not dispatched by the KGB can only de : :
[5392]. based on the full review of availabie information from NOSENKO,
[5393]collateral sources, independent investigation and the opinion of the
[5395]individual analyst concerning the significance or non-significance of
[5397]L ‘each item of available information.
[5399]. The conclusion that the contacts of NOSENKO with CIA in 1962
[5401]and 1964 prior to his defection were not known to the KGB is
[5405]‘Sa Sag NESE RED OE Cte Were dad ane mate Deemer ot abet gE neat mem
[5407]STANSTED
[5409]SERS Eats ethy
[5411]see matyayg
[5413]14-0000
[5415])
[5416]og)
[5418]©.
[5420]necessarily based in part on a judgment as to whether any of his
[5421]activities or information logically warrant a substantial suspicion
[5422]that they were or could be in any part the result of KGB direction
[5423]or control. One of the particular areas considered was his apparent
[5424]behavior during his contacts with CIA in June 1962 and the conclusion
[5425]was that it was incomprehensible that he could have been under KGB
[5426]control at that time,
[5428]Consideration has been given to the possibility that his 1962
[5429]; _ contacts with CLA were not known to the KGB," but became known to
[5431]i the KGB later and NOSENKO was doubled by the KGB, it was con-
[5433]+ or information which would warrant
[5435]cluded ‘that there was no basis fo
[5436]! serious consideration of the above possibility aside from the separate
[5437]conclusion that the KGB would be very unlikely to reward a traiter in
[5438]. KGB eyes by sending him again to Geneva where he would be quite free
[5439]to defect. ; 7 _ : ; -
[5441]~ Worthy of comment in this section is the fact that NOSENKO,
[5442]‘dur ing his 1962 contacts, expressed considerable concern over his
[5444]: “personal security, requesting that knowledge concerning his identity be
[5446]_ ve “kept to an absolute minimum, that no communications be sent to the
[5448]SECRET
[5450]ht teen eet a AERA SLA AAA ATA momar ne ome eee tem cee
[5453]14-0000
[5457]Bee CO oT
[5459]a wouid ne
[5461]moms
[5463]COnimct Withia the Soviet Union. NOSINN
[5465]BM.OTMEUGA SF
[5467]tat, oe _
[5469]wits CLA become .nows in the Usha Sites
[5471]‘ers to NOSENKO in any cos.ccs ol et
[5473]BIASES CONC. Wil NCSINAG
[5475]S TECOZL464 Coes toe Goove &
[5477]about his personal security is not substantial evicence thas NCSENKO
[5479]was noturndcer AGS co
[5481]savidence that NOCSENNO wes |
[5483]2ulj however,
[5485]. no: in any Way encouraging c4 tine contact of NOSENKO wicin the
[5486]Boo LT oO : . “
[5487]" ‘USSR, Which very likely would
[5488]was uncer 435 control,
[5489]uo: The matevial waies NCSENAG iuznisked to CIA in 1964 tas been
[5490]carefully veviewed to ce ¢ XGBE
[5492]participated in any way in the assursbling of this ravher unique collection :
[5493]i. of material. None of the material zpoears to have deen of an eocountable
[5494], type and, on the contrary, it appears that NOSONAG sould have furnished
[5495]all of the material to CIA an , veout the KGB ,
[5496]“ever ata later date becoming awaze that the materiai was actually missing.
[5497]: ; ‘The latter statement even includes the travel document whic authorized
[5500]‘the trip of NOSENKO to Gorkiy in December 1963.
[5502]TTY nee AO ad tk ne Re aE Magee |
[5505]14-0000
[5507]. Soom
[5509]ae ti dn Des SaNA
[5511]acceralag to NOSENACG, was vo
[5513]Keeney CANAD PANOV, «cco
[5515]NOSENKO, this particu,
[5517]3. 358 Lo tar ft in pees
[5518]OMY HeCessary O turn 2am Woe
[5520]expenses. NOSENAG ssaiced mac. 2s nad not
[5522]C.BeteG We PRT Seas
[5524]TAOUNE G2 TLOneY tO Which Le Was Untied on
[5526]6
[5528]seally Drougat the document dloag buccuss it gi
[5530]os Lieutesax: Coloacl,
[5532]NOSENKO. has completely retvactedc Lis cleiu so naving hac th
[5534]-
[5535]; 6
[5537]vank of Lieutenant Colunel, stating chat even as a Diputy Cali ol Deposte
[5539]ment he was only a Capiain although be was cntided te anc expecid to
[5541]receive the rank of Major
[5543]wae, ane
[5545]285 So
[5547]tae error of KASHPZEAOGV, the officer on cuty in the SCD.om Sunday, aad
[5548]that practically all Deputy Chieés of Department in the SCD nec at lecst
[5549]the rank of Lieutenant Colonel.
[5551]The above explanation by NCSENAG may soil we Considered by
[5552]readers with at least a cegzee oi skepticism. However, i: NOSENKO
[5554]was dispatched by the KGB, it would
[5558]eem taat he could save seen sro-
[5559]vided with something a little more substaniiai to Cocument Lis cizim of
[5561]the rank of Lieutenant Colone:, in addition, it woulé seera that the KGB
[5563]GO01110
[5565]sevem rece cenemeamamemencerse be A wer sene cone
[5569].:
[5570]meen A Rare RN a a WN Acoma oma wed Oe pete
[5572]Sn cee aenentenen meena: N on
[5574]1
[5576]TTR TT
[5580]14-0000
[5582]G
[5584]COC
[5586]Gl OMe type 0.
[5589]"h
[5590]-
[5592]ow
[5594]Le
[5596]ry
[5598]a
[5602]ONS
[5604]proaiee
[5606]imea 7
[5608]pope sare
[5611]ip)
[5613]ary Chis
[5615]a?
[5617]“3
[5619]Se Gi One
[5621]us.
[5625]oo
[5626]ow
[5630]OL
[5638]2 Tae
[5640]ara
[5642]eet ELS TD tet ate
[5644]Nee Ne ae eam re et
[5649]14-0000
[5651]bes
[5653]uO IV. COMMENTS COMCERNING PREVIOUS CONCLUSIONS : bo
[5655]- : . on
[5657]. INREGARD TONOSENKO - Do, .
[5659]” . ‘ : tA,
[5661]y : “C32 1 Soot ,
[5662]Cc BP &netaces 2m ar‘esatie] © Lots i
[5663]u OTT C@rrass ads f ’ , a
[5664]er Cee 2, Do beat tes wos 3 : . . . +
[5665]+ 1 + + . 7 a . a . “4.
[5666]: - + . a : ne . t
[5667]7 8 woke . , — od - mo. . “4
[5668]alee Oo ete tenet a AtntthnnanecAie a Mee Cane 98" ereaeedi aa Gerba Aga cieertcatettienta inc cnttlemmannaiaa in ete ne :
[5670]Baa
[5672]SEMEN aw
[5674]14-0000
[5676]m
[5677]a)
[5683]COMMENTS CONCERNING PREVIOUS CONCLUSIONS
[5685]IN REGARD TO NOSENKO
[5687]Attached is a verbatim copy of pages 357 - 360 of the "Examina- :
[5688]tion of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector"! which contains seven (A - G)
[5689]. , . - 7.
[5691]_, ‘primary conclusions concerning the claimed Naval RU (Navy Intelligence)
[5693]- and KGB career of NOSENKO, These conclusions or findings are
[5695]independently. treated in separate attachments.
[5697]. With the exception of "G, " the conclusions in this “‘sixrnmary are
[5699]in diréct conflict with the above conclusions and are basically tha
[5701]_:.. NOSENXO served.in.the Naval RU from March 195] to early 1953, was.
[5702]a KGB officer from March 1953 until his défection in February 1964,
[5703]_and held his claimed positions in the *XGB during the March 1953 =~
[5705]February 1964 period,
[5707]* For purposes of clarity, the term KGB is used to refer to the
[5709]: , |... Committee for State Security and predecessor-organizations, ;
[5710]i ‘unless otherwise indicated, -_
[5712]pos. ‘Attachment: te :
[5713], aCpy Pgs 357-360 of "Examination .
[5714]} 9f the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector"
[5715]t ‘ aan : oe TTR
[5716]z votes : ' _ Penctates tea avcostic|
[5717]. “5 (OLE : essciay 334
[5718]ee SEORET Sees
[5720]SRN TRTTI sentisinarerstrencacens SATAN AinecineareeraT?
[5721]$ sa . an Ure FRINTON CTU TIS TTS
[5722]AS ACRES aN RO x RSRESERS at SS
[5724]eee Sah
[5725]Uschi SA
[5727]14-0000
[5729]Seunes,
[5731]PREVIOUS CONCLUSIONS RE NOSENKO
[5732]AS CONTAINED ON PAGES 357 - 360 OF
[5733]"THE EXAMINATION OF THE BONA FIDES OF A KGB DEFECTOR"
[5735]- ,
[5737]The foliowing is a quote of the previous conclusions in the case of Yuriy
[5739]Ivanovich NOSENKO. (The specific conclusions have been given the designation
[5740]of A - Gifor purposes of easier correlation with other sections of this summary.)
[5741]"SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
[5742]| CONCERNING NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES"
[5744]"NOSENKO claims that he served for a decade in the KGB in
[5745]successively: senior positions of auhoriy from which he derived
[5746]extensive knowledge of the scope, character, and results of KGB
[5747]operations against Americans in the Soviet Union in the period
[5748]1953-1963. To substantiate his claim, he provides an impressive.
[5749]array of information about KGB personnel, organization and opera-
[5750]tions which, to the extent that it has been confirmed, is presumptive
[5751]evidence of his bona fides. Various Soviet officials, including
[5752]intelligence officers, have generally corroborated NOSENKO's
[5753]claims. According to some of these sources, NOSENKO was a
[5755].. senior KGB officer who occupied a series of sensitive. positions, who
[5759]Fo ee eRe Seer met on sme ee
[5763]RFE
[5764]Lea
[5767]14-0000
[5769]a | Nya ents
[5771]enjoyed considerable authoriiy and trust despite personal short- : . a
[5773]comings, and whose aefection, 'the greatest loss ever suffered
[5775]‘e
[5776],
[5778]by Soviet Intelligence',. paralyzed the work of _ KGB
[5779]- Legal Residency, and justified the formulation of plans to assase~.
[5780]sinate him,"
[5781]“The examination has compared each element of NOSENKO's
[5782]biography relevant to his claimed KGB service with known |
[5783]facte and reasonable surmise. The examination reflects the
[5784]test to which his accounts were put: whether his accounts are
[5786]- internally coherent and consistent with known fact, and whether
[5788]-,. He actually gained the information he has from occupying the.
[5789]KGB positions he claims to have. held. In short, is he what he .
[5790]says he ie, according to his own-accounts?"
[5792]“This examination had led to the iollowing findings, arrived
[5793]at independently; : _
[5794]A. NOSENKO cié not serve in the Naval RU
[5795]in any of the capacities or at the places and times he
[5796]_ Claimed,
[5797]cone B. NOSENKO did not enter the KGB in the
[5799]manner or at the time he. claimed.
[5801]"©. NOSENKO did not serve in the American. a” :
[5802]mo nnn sere EN GUOLLAS -
[5803]y, Section throughout the 1953-1955 periodas
[5805]: er : acnart | , we
[5806]OUR NAT GTI AAAS A NEO peered ned Rey ab are ant emaerS S re emit nd Stle e
[5809]14-0000
[5811]‘a senior case oificer in, nor Deputy Chiei of, the Seventh : _ . * _
[5813]of the American-3ritish Commonwealth Section and was as
[5815]‘not-credible,
[5817]Crees ea
[5819]D. During the period 1955-1900, ne was neither
[5821]Department American-Britisn Commonwealth Section. '
[5822]? ,
[5824]+ . : . . q
[5826]E. NOSENXO was neither Deputy Chief of the — .
[5828]American Embassy Section nor a senior oificer or
[5829]supervisor in the Section during the period 1961-1962. (sic) ; ee nos
[5830]F, NOSENKXO's claims, that in 1962:he was Chief , _
[5832]thereafter a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, are a . ps , . :
[5834]- : : ‘y
[5836]“..° G"NOSENKO has no valid claiin to certainty _
[5838]that the KGB recruited no American Embassy personnel
[5840]between 1953 and his defection in 1964. _ oy
[5842]These findings differ somewhat with respect to degree of probability
[5844]‘or certitude, but they reflect the preponderance of available evidence
[5846]in each instance." ; ,
[5848]'
[5850]of NO
[5852]as a whele unacceptabie. While truth and fact.in this case frequently — - : ae
[5854]of his. life and KGB service are s0 extensive as to make his claims
[5856]“The above judgments, if correct, rebut presumptive evidence
[5858]SENKO's bona fides, The contradictions in NOSENKO's accounts *
[5860]ee rs
[5862]4
[5864]—_ “004416: re ve
[5866]eeeumeemnn taaratee
[5868]pre itaiatats Oye eS ANS Nein I ne SL meee Lang artic tan Pageants
[5871]14-0000
[5873]od,
[5875]Waevatue
[5877]Ta tatie vies
[5879]“Cannot de established with certainty, it is evident that truth and
[5881]fact are not what NOSEN&O relates. By almost any test, virtually co
[5883]any of NOSENKO's above claims are impugned by iact or probability, _ :
[5885]or contradicted or retracted in his own statements. NOSENKO is
[5887]not what he claims to be, and thus he is not a bona fide defector,"
[5888]"Given the conclusion that NOSENKO is not a bona fide
[5890]deiector, itis necessary to attempt to determine his true motives
[5892]for contacting American intelligence and for providing the information
[5894]- hehas given. Here, it must be recognized that the evidence, largely : sO —
[5896]consisting of NOSENKO's own assertions, does not permit unequivocal
[5898]conclusions. Nevextriess, the question cannot be ignored, The
[5899]character of the information NOSENKO has conveyed, the fact that
[5900]some of his false claims have been corroborated by Soviet officials,
[5901]and the necessity to make decisions about NOSENKO's future all
[5902]require that at least a provisional judgment be made."'
[5904]i "Of the reasonable explanations advanced ior NOSENKO's
[5905]misrepresentations, the chief ones are that he is a swindler posing
[5906]as a former KGB officer for reasons of personal advantage; that he
[5908]suffers from a deranged personality or unbalanced mind; that he has
[5910]. greatly exaggerated his actual rank, status and access in the KGB, for : “ cog
[5914]simply personal reasons; or,. finally, that he is a dispatched KGB a ; _ !
[5915]hhh meee pagene tts 5 by
[5917]a
[5918]aah nels
[5920]ee “SECRET.
[5922]77 Scene aan Me TN ne 8 we ane a ae
[5926]14-0000
[5928]C7
[5929]fe
[5931]re
[5933]"The iirst two possibilities are easily dismissed. That
[5934]. NOSENKO is aot sitnply a swindler who falsciy claims for personal
[5935]‘advantage to have been a KG3B ofiicer is evident, we believe, from
[5937]the confirmed details of KGB organization, personnel and operations
[5939]which he has provided and which couid only derive from within the
[5941]“KGB itself,"
[5943]: "Second, as noted in the text, extensive psychiatric and
[5945]: “psychological examination by Gualified specialists rule out the‘
[5948]| ' ‘possibility.that NOSENXO's actions and testimony are the product
[5950]of a deranged personality or unbalanced mind." -
[5954]"It ig somewhat more plausible that NOSENKO is a KGB
[5955]‘officer who served in at least some of the components for some
[5957]or all of the time periods that he claims, but who greatly exag-
[5959]. gerated his positions, Tank and access to iniormation, and
[5961]_ invented some matters outright, to achieve greater status with
[5963]. American Intelligence. This explanation, however, fails to
[5964]accommodate the fact that several XGB ofiicers have asserted
[5965]that NOSENKO did in fact nold senior positions in the KGB. Also,
[5967]_ NOSENKO's assertions with respect to his rank, GRIBANOV's
[5971]tot
[5974]14-0000
[5976]y
[5978]Sea
[5980]"Because none of the above explanations is consistent with
[5981]the data developed in interrogations and investigations, we are
[5982]left with the hypothesis that NOSENKO was dispatched by the
[5983]KGB. While this explanation does not reconcile all the anomalies,
[5985]none of them renders it untenable, "
[5987]"In the absence of further revelations by NOSENKO, or . . :
[5989]other persuasive evidence to the contrary, CIA finds that the
[5991]evidence establishes a presumption that NOSENKO was dispatched
[5993]by the KGB, and. believes that prudence requires that he be
[5995]regarded as still responsive to KGB control, and that his infor-
[5997]mation should be assessed accordingly." . :
[5999]es eager ee:
[6001]Pip nme TUE Ted. CAPM geet oe enimncn A a Od Moe ta eects wera Le
[6004]14-0000
[6006]SECRET
[6008]Oper
[6013]RV
[6015]bee
[6017]NKO DID NOT S
[6019]NOSE
[6021]A.
[6023]IN ANY OF THE CAPAC.
[6025]N
[6029]=S ORAT THE PL
[6031]tree
[6032]wad
[6034]z
[6037]s
[6039]TIMES
[6041]CLAIMED ©
[6043]2
[6044]* .
[6045]: A
[6047]: i
[6048]i
[6049]i.
[6050]H
[6052]. 4
[6054]i
[6055]f | ;
[6056]: i
[6057]i:
[6058]. {
[6060]. }
[6061]. . i
[6062]. ;
[6063]- .
[6064], q
[6065]4 #3
[6066]. - 4 A
[6067]| CZ
[6068]| | 2
[6070]14-0000
[6074]A, NOSENKO did not serve in the N i RU in any of the capacities
[6076]or at the places and times he claimed. (Previous conclusion)
[6078]The above is conclusion "A" in the previous summary in regard
[6079]to NOSENKO, The current conclusion is that the claimed servicé of : a
[6080]NOSENKO in Navy Inteliigence (Naval RU) during March 1951 to early
[6082]. 1953 in the Far East and the Baltic areas is adequately substantiated ao . Ot
[6084]and should be accepted.
[6086]The interrogations of NOSENKO prior to 1967 were complicated ._-
[6088]by. NOSENKO changing the date of his graduation irom the institute of
[6089]‘International Relations from 1950 to 1949. because he did not wish to
[6090]admit that he had failed to graduate in 1949. with the majority of hie class.
[6091]However, ‘previous eforts of NOSENKO to revert to his original 1962
[6092]statement that he graduated in 1950 were not accepted and an unwarranted . , .
[6093]significance was given to the 1949 - early 1953 period of time.
[6095]It is considered that NOSENXO has adequately explained his
[6097]“stupid blunders" as they relate to the above and to certain other personal |
[6099]matters and that his claimed service in Navy Intelligence from March
[6101]Gai?
[6102]Extisted toe aatecatie!
[6105]Geclsesificatisy
[6107]14-0000
[6109]. 0,
[6110]. NOSENKO regarding approximately] 875 KGB officers,| 100;/KGB agents,
[6112]" (35 GRU officers and| 400 other Soviet nationale,
[6114]“DeLee cme as
[6116]1951 to early 1953 both in the Far East and the Baltic area is fully
[6117]acceptabie, Jt is not considered necessary to comment concerning all
[6118]of the remarxe in the previous summary regarding the claimed Naval
[6119]RU éeivice of NOSENKO as reflected on pages 49-59 and remarks will,
[6120]for purposes of brevity, be limited in scope,
[6122]The statement is made in the previous summary that "The sole
[6124]° Headquarters RU officer NOSENKO identified was the Personnel Chief,
[6126]Colonel KALOSHIN, He identified no ranxing officers in either the Baltic
[6127]or Far East Intelligence Staffs, Some 30 GRU officers he did identify,
[6128]by his own admission, NOSENKO knew not {rom his Naval RU service,
[6129]but through social acquaintance, later, in Moscow, or througn his visits
[6130]to.Geneva."
[6132]Attached is a copy of a handwritten memorandum voluntarily
[6133]prepared by NOSENKO in late i967 containing the names of a number
[6134]of GRU personnel of whom he had some knowledge. The attached was
[6135]not prepared as the result of any inquiry concerning his claimed Naval
[6136]RU service, but was only a small part of the material prepared by
[6138]NOSENKO at this time. The entire material included remarks by
[6140]0
[6142]- gpoit22
[6145]14-0000
[6148]Rose
[6150]It is interesting to note that the attached list contains the names
[6151]‘of approximately 20 GRU officers whom NOSENO relates to the early . y
[6152]1950's period. In addition, NOSENO has, during current interviews
[6153]and in other memoranda, furnished the names of additional Navy Intelii-
[6154]gence personel whom he knew in the 1951 - early 1953 period.
[6156]Page 52 of the above summary and other related pages question
[6157]whether NOSENXO ever served in the Baltic area with Naval Intelligence . ; To
[6158]and even question his geographical knowledge of the area. Attached is a
[6159]copy of a handwritten memorandum with certain diagrams prepared by
[6160]NOSENKO on 21 February. 1968 concerning his assignment with Navy
[6162]a eta Antelligence in the Far East and the Baltic area, The memorandum was
[6163].. completed by NOSENKO without any reference material and a review of
[6164]his diagrams indicates they are quite accurate.
[6166]NOSZNKO had previously stated that his service in the Baltic
[6168]area was at Sovetsk Primorskiy and during current interviews recalled
[6172]that the former name of the place, an aimost deserted fisnermen's
[6173]village, was Fishausen, The previous designation given by NOSENXO
[6174]for this place as having the mail address of Sovetsk Primorskiy had
[6176]; : | caused the conclusion that his alleged place of assignment was non-
[6178]existent. A further checkin the matter would have disclosed that the . ; od
[6180]‘ . ,
[6183]place was not nonexistent, that it is currently known as Primorsk and Oo - - ot
[6186]14-0000
[6188]~ . VuWetinn
[6190]The previous summary 4:50 stated that despite nis claimed
[6192]active cornmissioned service in the Navy, NOSENKO knew nothing of
[6194]. . oh
[6196]Soviet Navy tradition, doctrines, or organization of procedures. It
[6197]should be noted that there is a considerable difference between being . ; ¢
[6198]a member of the Naval RU and being.an actual member of the Soviet - : :
[6200]Navy. The situation could be compared to a career civilian employee
[6202]of the Office of Naval Intelligence and a line officer in the United States
[6204]i
[6206]Navy. , , .
[6208]i : . . . ; . Gm :
[6209]Attachments: . . ¢
[6210]| List. of GRU Personnel as Prepared by NOSENKO 4
[6212]‘Diagrams and comments as Prepared by NOSENKO
[6214]001124 eG
[6216]SECRET
[6218]ee ra ane ee rr Seat
[6219]haa tteeten ce BNR th oy a eed ete,
[6221]a ne
[6226]14,0000
[6228]—_ oe a Keener deen - LOC dbs; w 67 4I43 a Mepity pile p nag .
[6229]ph Ph ag
[6231]Late Me heey Hee ache, fpr | mallliginee , lader ks f wth & dept sfolef
[6232]if £ Mul ( Sezel dren w aad Jrash Fhe Len], J heard he tad we bay atfacte br A hip,
[6233]a PoE ’
[6234]ob, Bespeblar = a meiper, ‘coc bak of Ta “mer i tate Bazence wccip hflet |
[6235]“ Suit, ferbool region ts L451- 1362,
[6236]2: Pephectiny date rshiry =cut dey vty of cheek » f te ey ne a
[6237]Stesl (o m agents) oh sin SATII . :
[6238]4 bubald tee «fives ef he heey hdtgece pecal of iatebijou.
[6239]BUATEA jn Sovieteh Makeniyyrnd's desteial ’x AS, |
[6241]S 6 Chikirs -& Ie, a cokt nel ,tertled te Ke ptive of. L frtecgn 3
[6242]“ag, 42 fe ninizty fidifesee, _ |
[6243]ns Mauriksheg na Buel, ti Cael tpt Fe
[6244]fore m4 a fans f Lee ft iad yp off Aopetee.: a
[6245]® Aetuchents Newclenhe Bhan ; ‘ Weer ba aecy tnlelly (ence patep yA 2 stele jones Lf + Wit
[6246]ie Soviets , Lliuer cen pred § 4 tid reed
[6248]I Bolt Bobrstalor fir: on eiticr ffili[elome§), teed tee Whe LEA, |
[6250]; took. Leader corer of fleets - ayrney Meers * - it
[6252]. .  &.  bubperio, Lor NC - ba th. S araeled te GRU, os a
[6254]ne te Saliyere = ae. - 44 fpecer fh fue, es ged WE od Serber)._ 7 3
[6255]ts ld. hebeshen’ - accrued, by AD -146§ hile ff porsewncl de iG pertieat”
[6256]th. base. bi bles fuee » — eOuL125
[6258]Pee Denison be - om Witte a raililary whacke Pisiotestay tu Bean,
[6261], Laatrpabe - a Ligh Sort od ¢ ‘wilt B Zé ff inlecoal oad exlatin 5 :
[6262]Ta Talen ¢ ter he ey ertellgenee, walsed Bank ’ ler beelalbncees , ,
[6264]x
[6267]14-0000
[6269]td kepablin - an hie lifos Tele buy of lof Lie Mititon ot oo :
[6271]Aiple madi wonders. he keg bre beng: i zprbken 1 Le rem Rinteked Lh aeantn:
[6273]ty Ab, weeks in GRU, wavled in Hab) Tp wrd 6a Fox une, tes afew Mag kite ef |
[6274]4s: hassle Fimesheake bya {i fiiecrhedl the shila « f frreega tredt); Fipellein be Ve a
[6275]he - « tok ¢, rd “ed cshdeat ie ta the. Usd clin teorkes ea a Cdl,
[6277]Pee Glob i a A a
[6278]- ; _&.« Kha bowen _ th tse Se “ depuly ‘sol f “9. aa alckin ead
[6279]44 of vA wary nlelle gence “f P Five: tC. - a ~”
[6283]tf. Magtor S.J. -a deputy ¢ ! tchig (em Womtip nea i vuole - |
[6284]gta fF Feel ta 7S40-S A.
[6285]_ &. konther capil flesh ney iiteld zeus f PPL & en 7s2,.
[6286]_&. Leslershery - - ba LHF tn of fecer AL dipcrtecal ff foreign Aiess; fie: :
[6287]Meehes v “f defense, oe
[6289]7 0 Mtolehater — Aa ‘fives f gel 404) ve ences
[6290]. Ae Orelber, fetesads’ ~ ta USI-54 he ctlincntst tice re fice £ he heey 6 la— :
[6292]- tly Cipence if fi Flue _ | . *
[6293]. .. . Pegedin bores ~ a chip. fi be scowl linia 4 f meg ‘eb bipence fitie. |
[6294]te 80 -/952. , __) App rye Cricguenrge,.
[6296] «B. ke egenliee - A lttansntdee a dary sil Liyeuse pot of he bedi cute. ’
[6297]th Rect A. Soviet, febeainyratt Ab ful és HQ ‘
[6299]ue, A Seales, ~ 4 oe lis tye. Hoes & hil ta the eal diplematic as -
[6300]ayy ate : g math, ve yen eb a ah So gene i, Biased
[6302]enti 169 90 Sesame Made eneaemee
[6303]t
[6305]ian
[6312]14.00000
[6314]QL.” Mel ncker neler Se: ayy —a def uf tir heoes cite eCligeuce s y Ot Hit a sp,
[6315]i | ape ‘Matuaatadyg ~ a tected y a ehasfe fmey biofeligace. ral Black sxe, We Sb
[6317]Bp. Seegeyere — as cag eancer ~ fat celined 4 Sendor ffecer of f Aa wey, A!
[6319]wleblsjenee af vA Thetis a ONV- Sb [carlicr hh. sovrbed te te Farteey)
[6320], ff, . Sucslovick a ta LIL 0. Sob at Ce esini tad ex. f sag edo datcke elif.
[6321]ney sbsliigene. ft File,
[6323]itn from aching wos re0ckligf . a “ “ °
[6324]Wt Feshbe, - a wed wale rel be £850- « pity haf, ff h my! ‘th
[6325]Lei pease af. th miserly fe inclebery fut. “y. |
[6327]ace Teselewshey Greve - wordy ih Seu , Svec be e poe thel feqEn,
[6329]Bs tetenker, AC fat al officer ft Abs maeg jul dpe ds ff lect te L568. .
[6333]oe Srishelunor eu fii ef pee “igo a Y WA, betpae * edhe 7
[6335]if. inorder Aickee é. A tee. aluecral a fosnect hifi Any iuelijee “9
[6337]apg baecety La ~eedy Tag shins sles ict acral rnp shoves gers
[6338]A EEETON rbivsescgencl cl, .
[6340]: a Yeas wu = ah fleece ff potieruce fhe ney allipes f FT bet~
[6342]#8, Mswws einige. ay I ge poe
[6344]a nn
[6345]te .
[6347]“erapey
[6348]SEGRE
[6350]’ " . > a a
[6351]pares pa senna ene meme wo tees
[6353]Sgt beiedee
[6356]14-0000
[6358]. rgd
[6359]; Ke ue fe Nias i“ AZM “Leaf wept wel. an CRER bow sity ‘bp —
[6360]jee wheat 4 ae euler lod. ff he he Y fi lell, Ceyenec fre Gel
[6362]ih Soveet frbur, Province eohiy Let liel™, _ ackins S nec. we
[6364]by uw Drieet anol votied 4 his pla ce ff *Y, yy itia Chee C en EL,
[6365]Crud 6 ff ey A f ati fen Ategeeu~ le bbe Lake Bs. &, ‘thes here
[6366]ehaccgeel nx Corti ZL Kewsoinelsh. -en oi neee, Men crested the -
[6368]Pues teat fins ladies Ferret! ace Te Sevied he (is
[6369]EL °
[6374]_ wee ee . j
[6375]by lincge ‘| if
[6379]5
[6380]fag festeraga ‘3 \ bakes, .
[6381]4y — ; te vlad & te
[6383]~ Ny
[6384]sells, nents Zhillerbs €—_——— od ¥
[6386]ak ta a i
[6388]herfesse
[6392]7 ee an ee EE
[6394]$e; qe |
[6398]NON
[6400]© dle iatblizence if J Hct ve | oveted i by Letevss ye, dex
[6401]deine , abeo [ott tial Miceiory f 0 Hot, jubrc tine “sl chili 2h bites,
[6402]: de head Guartirs of of Ff Fecct wat beast Teed “a BEE Coseeretl Lililerbet,
[6403]Ale corcta neater -t4 lil 7 7 Klcl jcxd admiral ba ag her draws, .
[6405]oa heck if staf. - - tree wdicctal hegatin ee , . GOULL28 »
[6407]de chip ff Mery falelejeuee A 7. Fle a “goad 4 espe fd L/ eet .
[6411]wea! a tars f act eet ome ere eas
[6413]WOKE lane iigptins
[6416]q ae
[6417]ast atig FO Be
[6420]14-0000
[6422]finer Rode working ty Uber th ee lace ar. hey « f frees vf te ale
[6424]oo
[6426](tyes aly ey, ye tuent) Ce ivtien A le “ Zz CleytirS weeea Safe ere v lire
[6427]herbal, later f “ac “y Kouit bere ey. tate pea, Gee rkewe€
[6429]Leake - Te cotmi star),
[6430]J “ef workeg th Le. dif vten hein of hip Tee ut: Yfiecas. bad elon . “0
[6432]Puce
[6434]ley 7 “ee
[6436]a Le gp
[6438]ACW heclewast - crlrnel. Loyyes Luetewest lrow how Abvert,
[6439]Eeshes, “ee Vteing Orckher Redes tei Vegeclin, bes, a Coe anol PL we
[6441]: (fies. Here $6020 lee SearpenTs Ak pre waley,
[6443]_ ebhcen , it Stones hel & Mite. Fillouser.
[6445]Ms fet emit a
[6447]A, th, ee pub, MIS J fiw bia tho tecu CHirperg fi et
[6448]lege eee lshronl fr 4 Case, ; ‘ eUsefe ob ebicetory of
[6450]A jt - a AR we peesenil dyn heal” of Ui vin ey "titel.
[6451]jouee (a haf - colonel kalo ghein) weg ial iy a pecslete "don a |
[6452]ny Tin foronae. becacte fF hess, Mud baat epwiull tr tle heey
[6453]tale lec: “deee pret sp Aas Culeldsyin ec t 4 Fel tn Seve ek [bo
[6454]ele vA dfer & petisesucke t biklrips he ~ ~ fortcer fitéau), tekese vA
[6455]enced ty duzett, ty ft Cebicugrastss aivteiet frace Fecssin),
[6457]Sit Care Lette se Cy vellige oe force fori witla Ape ¢ fo -
[6459]- Levatd Svitel. ~ a etees eile! LUG fu 4, _ bare dex
[6460]-- ze < Atte, Melee sete. seit stad’ (72.
[6461]| ee Mle they debacle sou Chl
[6463]Be):
[6464]on da 60029 - ao.
[6466]ca
[6468]ct le abet aetna w. ne
[6470]~~ oe wee ee nee
[6472]he Px aed a se sed bad wha f. 188
[6474]AE yt eet lege we
[6478]Cos
[6480]14-0000
[6482]She beret niatestee - ha haf « of 74 Hee SC wet aticliucl + febrile NG.
[6483]ihe fe cliff ny ee oy teen pri ters een la tn 7, YD auk hi hye janlecr,
[6484]teu becne ffs: Fisegrecder, b hula “be rete "ale earl ethers ack seedyeals
[6485]tnd priced _ a
[6486]bifirs iy hes wuijel (2 diy) Ma ancy sale ll; ence petal aes Fe hafl a
[6487]. ted free. LA pereaeg | “ Srriesl, y, tn ferunuy Ue ceouk ft Thee
[6488]~~ tect wat deruceted well « gel 4 werk, here? Chess. leg aaothes,
[6489]th - a puparelicn 1 if a9 C-e8 fez seein peste bee Oat SL. sf new oo a
[6490](EF pessens ceal poet], — an hiv ltl; peenley Teobinelg . ;
[6491]A hee cod of Metec er I te La Gese tiaseneng st nile by Mes,
[6493]Ler Lreri fe petigl a Lrensforensie. + Oi) eter es ye eree, .
[6495]: he nel h March, t4§9 j Reza t : G ceeel Pel elif tity ee
[6496]G sheet my. E
[6498]Lee ee _ See ee |
[6500]an - ;
[6501]ee ce _ venetian ee a
[6502]m a ‘
[6503]: i
[6504]. Le ae : co eee ete wee ite ee J
[6505]i
[6507]i
[6508]i
[6510]: 7 fo ececvee ees nenne me menmtemn me Be one Oe come, - - . a0 ee ee ee 8 cee! A
[6511]; : “ me _— co 7 Tt es ne mma nme en mame s , . :
[6512]be. : . i Cog who. . H
[6513]Prt ny re tegrmrgnn aennnntns eetene cnn cere a green cy aae er atone panne mena marinas manana —emat atest # endian «amen?
[6514]ee GULL
[6515]FT i ne ee ey
[6516]F] . ° .
[6517]ge : . . La ‘ toe ao
[6518]be eS Sas Se ea ei {-
[6519]rE eR
[6520]* “7 Some re mmm mec mere ee ae . ae nn samme r bt: ” é
[6522]ry . . wg Ope teen et fev aneme ae wu Reralspras sb sh
[6523]ellen, talpben nt aatlta aR etna od tomar red eel we chemi 2 Dea Sage ag 2
[6524]Ng Et. Sema . .
[6528]14-0000
[6530]SECRET
[6534]TER
[6536]“aN
[6538]NOSENKXO DID NOT
[6540]3B.
[6542]Rue
[6544]i
[6545]. a
[6547]|
[6548]|
[6550].
[6552]i
[6554]i
[6555]t
[6556]4
[6559]Ser rucrenattaie in meaner ee te came Hae tes Wetee.
[6561]14-0000
[6563]“6
[6565]B. NOSENKO dic not enter the KGB in the manner or at the time i
[6567]claimed. (Previous conclusion) : |
[6569]The above is conclusion "B" in the previous summary in regard _
[6570]te NOSENKO. The conclusion in this summary is that NOSENKO entered
[6572]the then Second Chief Directorate, MVD, in mid-March 1953 and that his
[6576]entry was not only facilitated by but due to the influence of General
[6577]Bogdan Zakharovich KC3ULOV.
[6579]Previous statements by NOSENKO and changes relative to date of
[6580]entry into the KGB have been mentioned in another section of the summary
[6581]and will not be repeated here, His statements during current interviews
[6583]: that he entered on duty in mid-March 1953 as a case officer in the Firet
[6584]Section, First Department, Second Chief Directorate, MVD, are con-
[6586]sidered adequately substantiated and should be accepted.
[6588]j
[6590]The conclusion of the previous summary (pages 61-74) that
[6592]NOSENKO did not enter the KGB in the manner or at the time claimed
[6596]“was primarily based on conflicting statements by NOSENKO as to when -
[6597]he entered the KGB (MVD). In 1962 NOSENKO said March 1953 and in
[6599]1965 NOSENKO again said March 1953, soon after the death of STALIN. : : a .
[6601]_ SECRET = onata2
[6603]Cae 4
[6604]Exclaced em automate!
[6606]. donngrasiag 200
[6608]Seclassiticatica
[6610]G
[6612]i
[6613]i
[6617]+ Ree ee es in Abe sacha neo 7 eoeeane - — : .
[6618], eID Cs,” cine siren h ore : . ; RS
[6620]Ast nets ee
[6622]3
[6624]SY
[6625]Re
[6629]14-0000
[6633]~ . . : ‘le
[6634]Sane inn ad
[6635]in 1964, NOSENKO had given two dates in 1952 as nis time of entry into
[6636]the KGB in an effort not to'admit that he had failed to graduate from the
[6637]Institute of International Relations in 1949.
[6638]The previous summary gave considerable weight to the statements
[6639]of NOSENKO indicating that he. did not enter the KGB (MVD} under what
[6640]are considered normal KGB procedures. ‘Proper allowances were not
[6641]given tor position of the father of NOSENKO, the Minister of Shipbuilding,
[6642]‘sand the influence of General KOBULOV: An analyst can either accept or
[6643]reject the statement of NOSENKO that he entered the KGB (MVD) through
[6644]_ -the influence of.General KOBULOV:;. but,. if the statement is accepted, ‘then
[6645]sthe failure. of NOSENKO to be required to follow normal, KGB, procedures
[6646].should.also.be.accepted. - A Communist society or.a Soviet intelligence
[6647]organization is not and could not be immune to influence by a high official.
[6649]General KOBULOV as of mid-March 1953 was, First Deputy to BERI
[6651]YA,
[6653]the Minister of the then MVD. ;
[6655]The previous summary raises several points concerning the
[6657]‘ ,
[6659]“eligibility of NOSENKO for the KGB (MVD).' It points out on page 67
[6660]that other than his undistinguished period of service with the Naval RU,
[6662]whe was no more eligible for a KGB. appointment in 1953 than he was at
[6664]the time of his previous rejection in 1950, This statement is not contro-
[6667]co
[6668]SIR
[6671]14-0000
[6673]“was not sponsored by any person of influence as was tne case in 1953
[6674]with General KOBULOV who in mid-March 1953 was the First Deputy
[6675]to BERIYA.
[6677]The previous summary also states that according to KGB .
[6678]defectors familiar with the standards in force at the time, no candidate
[6680]was accepted who had ever had tuberculosis, This is a flat statement
[6682]which it is doubtiul any defector or series of defectors could fully ©
[6686]substantiate; namely, that it never happened. Until and unless it is
[6687]medically Proven that NOSENKO did not have tuberculosis, itis accepted
[6688]i that he did have tuberculosis in 1952 and was at a sanitarium --. xest-
[6690]the KGB.
[6692]a
[6694]after mid-March 1953. The influence of KOBULOV could undoubtedly
[6696]place in n Kubinka, | Tei is also accepted that he was an officer. i
[6698]have permitted NOSENKO to enter the KGB even though he previously
[6699]‘ had tuberculosis, but the flat statement that no candidate was accepted who
[6700]had ever had tuberculosis is not and cannot be sufficiently substantiated.
[6701]The previous summary contained a number of additional remarks
[6702]: and conclusions intended to show that NOSENKO was not eligible for and
[6703]therefore could not have entered the KGB (MVD). Comments concerning
[6704], these will be brief since there is considered to be no adequate basis at
[6705]“this ‘time on which to contend that NOSENKO did not enter the KGB oo
[6707]a (MVD) as an officer: in. mid-March 1953. .A comment was made that” - a
[6709]SECRET
[6711]seminamepmasammanineneataamaee ware te cee Aart Semin Le RRA cae Bae as elt Neeraemtet |
[6713]Leena tent +
[6716]14-0000
[6718]- WY ae eee
[6720]NOSENKO Gid not take a physical examination in connection’with his
[6721]processing ior KGB entry, and that such a medical examination was
[6722]a routine and mandatory part of the processing of a KGB candidate.
[6723]This statement makes no allowance for the influence of General
[6724]KOBULOV; but, in addition, does not consider the fact that the Naval
[6725]RU dossier on NOSENKO was available to the KGB (MVD).
[6727]7 The previgus summary also failed to note that the MVD would
[6728]have had independent information in regard to NOSENKO ‘since the MVD ss
[6729]would have conducted any necessary inquiry in connection with the entry
[6731]_ of NOSENKO into. the Naval RU. As of 1953, the MVD undoubtédly also
[6733]had a-dossier on the father of NOSENKO since this was still the STALIN
[6735]pont . Se ie
[6738]The summary also states’ that NOSENKO did not complete the
[6740]necessary lengthy Anketa before entry into the KGB (MVD) and did not
[6742]’ speak to any personnel officers or visit the personnel office, It would
[6744]en.
[6748]seem that the influence of General } KOBULOV could have permitted the
[6749]elimination of most if not all of the necessity of complying with normal -
[6750]procedures, but NOSENKO has during interviews stated that he com-
[6752]pleted the Anketa while sitting at his desk aiter entry into the KGB (MVD).
[6754]Page 70 of the previous summary states that NOSENKO did not
[6756]-LO0L135
[6758]naeectesncenrtmnen rants en seawnn eet om aes oe
[6760]SECRET
[6762]Tne aU AS yi a Hm Tamed aoa eT 6 Lom tg 8 VATE anew ae ied eons yen
[6764][sae os
[6766]Se
[6768]‘ know.the designation of his own Directorate either at the time he allegedly . 7 US
[6771]14-0000
[6773]entered on duty or during his first year of KGB service. While . a :
[6775]NOSENKO has claimed that the designation of his Directorate at the
[6777]time he entered the KGB (MVD) in mid-March 1953 was the Second
[6778]Chief Directorate and that it subsequently was redesignated the
[6780]First Chief Directorate, DERYABIN 2bas stated this reversal of
[6782]designations occurred in March 1953.
[6783]STALIN died in early March 1953 and that same month the’ ; - JA
[6785]MVD and the MGB were merged under the name MVD with BERIYA
[6787]as Minister. BERIYA held this position until his arrest in early June ae : 4 2
[6789]1955. BERIYA was succeeded. by KRUGLOV, who held office for less
[6791]. than.a year, Yuriy RASTVOROV, was recently queried concerning the ne, an - cor a zs
[6792]date of the reversal of the designation of the FCD,and SCD and places
[6793]it as the end of April or early May 1953. GOLITS-YN has indicated that
[6795]te . : .
[6796]the change occurred "soon after the advent of BERIYA as head of the
[6798],
[6800]MVD in April 1953," In the light of our inability to fix the effective date
[6802]of the reversal of the designations of the SGD and the FCD, it is oo -?
[6803]unreasonable to impugn NOSENKO on his statement as to the designation
[6805]of his Directorate at the time of his entry into the KGB (MVD).
[6806]There is a disagreement between NOSENKO and others as to-who
[6807]was responsible for the reversal of designations of ‘the FCD and the. SCD.
[6808]oe NOSENKO is ofthe opinion that-it occurred under. KRUGLOV, which is z j _
[6810]SECRET
[6812]matte Saegette Reis SRR “tan to
[6814]tty,
[6816]- . oe
[6817]. eo
[6818]ime rraman tame sence Neen nme § cartons tee
[6821]14-0000
[6823].GOLITSYN, all of whom maintain that BERIYA was responsible for
[6825]in conflict with the staternents of DERYABIN, RASTVOROV and hg,
[6827]the changes. As for the issue of who was responsibie for the reversal
[6828]of designations, it would appear that NOSENKO is in error. However,
[6830]the fact that he was a new junior officer and that this was a period of
[6833]upheaval in the KGB (MVD) effectively eliminates any significance in
[6835]this issue. a
[6837]NOSENXO is criticized in the previous summary for not knowing
[6838]the location of the Chief Directorate of the Militia or the history of the
[6839]KI (Committee of Information). NOSENKO has stated that he had no
[6840]contacts with either office during 1953-1955 and there is no adequate reason
[6841]to disbelieve this.statement. He is not aware of when the XI ceased to
[6842]exist (1951 given ia the summary, but other information indicates the KI
[6843]continied to exist in a nominal capacity until the mid-1950's), but care
[6844]should be used in stating what NOSENKO should know if he held a certain
[6845]position. Readers of this summary may wish to reflect on their, own
[6846]memory concerning the location and their knowledge of Agency facilities at
[6847]any given period of time or when Agency components or related organizations
[6849]were organized or ceased to exist, .
[6851]6
[6853]SECRET
[6855]x
[6859]ae ere es
[6861]eon Rear oe te
[6863]ote y
[6865]wee tee
[6868]14-0000
[6870]a
[6872]The point has also been made that any career of NOSENKO
[6874]in the KGB should have ended or he should have at least encountered
[6875]difficulty when his benefactor General KOBULOV, together with the
[6876]brother of General XOBULOV, was arrested with the BERIYA group in
[6877]a early June 1953. NOSENKO has during current interviews stated that he
[6878]encountered no difficulties but is aware that the KOBULOV connection . - :
[6879]- was discussed.by an officer from the Personnel Directory with an ., 7 : a : Sty
[6881]official of the First Department. ‘Under other circumstances NOSENKO
[6883]would very possibly have encountered difficulty; but, it shouldbe noted , ps
[6885]that the father of NOSENKO retained his position, that. NOSENKO only, © is.
[6887]met General KOBULOV through his father, and that NOSENKO has. stated lt. .
[6888]that although his father knew General KOBULOV, his father could in no
[6890]way be considered a member of the BERIYA group.
[6892]a Rb
[6894]‘ ie o - cr) re ‘ ~ pene eee
[6895]1 ge gh TOT NIA SCARF a AT OS nee Licance Come I ar LIN Meee asada get a coe BERET TE RE IS | :
[6897]RYO ARE ROR Hee Ree ert on
[6899]MES
[6901]14-0000
[6903]SECRET
[6908]Veet
[6910]CAN
[6912]rs
[6916]MER
[6918]“A
[6920]a ee
[6922]cere
[6924]THE 1953 -.1955 PER‘OD
[6926]He)
[6928]CTION THRO
[6930]‘SE
[6932]AS HE CLAIMED
[6934].
[6938]See net en erntnets oa att eo
[6940]RE
[6941]Oe
[6943]of
[6945]a
[6949]es
[6951]se
[6953]SMB
[6955]io)
[6957]t
[6959]bey
[6961]Nee
[6963]we fe
[6965]14-0000
[6967]C.
[6970]g} 8
[6971]s| 3
[6972]Oo] So
[6973]9 8
[6974]a °
[6975]ti)
[6976].)
[6977]al 3
[6978]§ 8
[6979]ont
[6980]e| 3
[6981]fs] Py
[6982]S
[6984]VU
[6985]ag .
[6986]|
[6987](3) v
[6989]<| 38
[6990]v rt
[6991]a i>)
[6992]bed 4)
[6993]ce} oo
[6994]ot n
[6995]my) 3s
[6996]4
[6998]a Me
[6999]Poy g
[7000]i) p.
[7001]& Ww
[7002]3] 8
[7003]3) on
[7004]g '
[7005]Pal
[7006]“A wn
[7008]a
[7009]3)
[7010]“| 8
[7012]3
[7013]fo)
[7014]1
[7015]3
[7018]4
[7020]The
[7022]"C" in the previ
[7027]7
[7029]10us Summary.
[7031]. The above is conc.
[7035]£ the Fi
[7037]is that NOSENKO was an off
[7039]ion in thi
[7041]conclus
[7043]icer o
[7045]nis summary 18
[7047]Section (American Embassy Section), First Department, from mid-March
[7049]1953 to late May 1955 when he was transferred to the Seventh Department,
[7051]SCD.
[7053]n detail with NOSENKO
[7055]that NOSENKO was an
[7057]ye
[7059]This period of time has been covered
[7061]ion is
[7063]The conclus
[7065]“¥
[7069]‘during current interviews.
[7071]but was not a very
[7073]ion
[7075]icer in the First Secti
[7082]effective officer and that
[7084]both his work and behavior were decidedly influenced by the fact that he
[7086]NOSENKO is reluctant to
[7088]was the. son of the Minister of Shipbuilding.
[7090]curing
[7092]admit that he was other than slightly lackadaisical in his work
[7094]that h
[7096]1 be-
[7098]it
[7100]dof time, but is not hesitant to adm
[7102]is perio
[7104]th
[7106]is persona
[7108]havior was such as to cause him to be removed as Secretary to the
[7110]Komsomo] unit in 1954 and to cause an unsatisfactory "characterization"
[7112]6061140
[7114]SECRET
[7116]a
[7118]os
[7119]25
[7120]ry
[7121]i
[7122]3
[7125]Liars tee)
[7127]bet oe tee eh Erde eered Mel gy BS
[7129]TT TT a ae
[7131]ten ae
[7135]ore
[7138]14-0000
[7140]os
[7142]to be prepared in early 1955 which necessitated a decision as to whether
[7143]he would be fired from the KGB or transierred to some other component.
[7144]The influence of his family is quite apparent in the above since
[7145]. his father was advised of his difficulties in 1954 by an official of the
[7146]KGB and his mother interceded on his behalf in 1955 with the Chief of
[7147]SCD. The result in 1955 was that NOSENXKO was transferred to the
[7148]Seventh Department and not fired from the KGB. .
[7149]The question has been raised as to how NOSENKO could remain
[7153]in the KGB when after 1954 he was not a member of the Komsomol and
[7155]thts ry . ve
[7157]-. , Was not eligible to become a candidate for the Communist Party. This
[7159]is.a valid question but a plausible explanation is again the fact that he was ue 2
[7161]the son of the then Minister of Shipbuilding.
[7162]NOSENKO has stated curing previous and current interviews that
[7164]following his entry into the KGB and until circa mid-1954 he was respon-
[7166]sible for work against American correspondents in Moscow. He has not
[7167]claimed that he had any successes and has stated that the work with news-
[7168]paper correspondents already recruited was being handled by other officers.
[7169]NOSENKO has explained that during this time he was a "new officer,"
[7170]indicating he could hardly have been expected to act as an experienced .
[7172]officer.. His knowledge of correspondents in Moscow during this period .
[7174]poy of time,: together. with his knowledge of other. KGB.officers and his _
[7176]co “GOOLL44:
[7178]SECRET
[7180]Liane SER See itn te chile al ot enh mete wel re ae meme nt wae x
[7182]eRHRTTTRTTRAT
[7184]HORNE aH
[7186]14-0000
[7188]: information concerning his own agents is delieved of sufficient weight
[7189]to accept the statement of NOSENKO that work against American cor-
[7190]respondents was his assignment irom mid-March 1953 to mid-1954.
[7191]From circa mid-1954 until his transfer to the Seventh Depart-
[7192]ment in late May 1955, NOSENKO claims and has claimed he was an
[7193]officer of the First Section with the responsibility of work against the
[7194]Military*Attaches (Army) at the United States Embassy in Moscow. It.
[7196]is considered, based on his knowledge of the various Military Attache
[7198]personnel and other collateral information furnished by NOSENKXO, that
[7200]NOSENKO was an officer. of the First Section during the mid-1954 - late
[7201]May 1955. period of time, that his primary work was against members
[7202]of the Office oi the Military Attache, but that the quality of hia work
[7203]undoubtedly left much to be desired.
[7205]In circa mid-1954, NOSENKO was removed as Secretary of the
[7206]Komsomol unit and by early 1955 his performance was such that at least
[7207]certain officials in the First Department desired his removal from the
[7209]. 2
[7210]First Department, if not the KGB. Under these circumstances,
[7212]NOSENKO could be criticized as having been a very poor if net
[7213]undesirable KGB officer, but his knowledge of the First Section during
[7215]this period of time and his knowledge of the members of the Office of
[7217]a
[7219]3 gg oat. 42
[7221]gp eT
[7225]“r Ste Ub ee
[7227]ak Se AARNE
[7229]14-0000
[7231]EUDORA ONS NES AOE TEASE OBL! I CLR ES METER FTTH CLA ONE NN TELEF CDE EI TEI I IE DAI TRIED SEM AEH TRE IRE I EN NM in EL
[7235]c>
[7237]oe
[7240]=I
[7242]the Military Attache supports the claira of NOSENZXO that he was an
[7243]officer oi the Firs? Section with the indicated assignment as related
[7244]by aim.
[7246]NOSENXO has stated that the work against the Military ’
[7247]Attaches was not primarily directed toward development of recruitment
[7248]possibilities, but was directed toward control of the Military Attaches
[7249]on trips in order to prevent observation of sensitive areas, sensitive
[7250]sites or sensitive activities in the USSR. This attitude by the KGB
[7251]would appear to be compietely plausible and NOSENKO noted as
[7252]exceptional in this regard the recruitment attempt against Captain Waiter
[7253]MULE. NOSENKO explained this exception as retaliation for approaches
[7254]to Soviets in the United States in that period,
[7256]NOSENKO has been criticized because he did not know all the
[7257]details concerning the Military Attaches which it was considered he
[7258]should have known if he had the specific responsibility for work against
[7259]the Military Attaches during the indicated period of time, it is submitted
[7261]that this may be evidence o: his failure to satisiactorily fulfill his
[7263]2 4 | 0001143
[7265]SECRET :
[7267]oes mete
[7269]14-0000
[7271]o
[7272]we
[7273]ba
[7277]7
[7278].
[7280]ack} ~- , toys te Cr eect
[7281]IOAS, bab Weekes ty @liowaesce In: the uscest
[7283]uel Jture un the KGB
[7285]Ps +
[7287]Bites wie - 1954. oy
[7289]NOS 2a Bae peevvadly .cleaied and otlll indicates a dcisnice
[7291]tack of avis during approxiac. ly
[7295]March - May 1935. NO, Was when an un-
[7297]satisiaciory "characiezization" was being prepared’ on NOSENKO, a
[7298]ducision was being mace on his case, anc a period of.time in wick he
[7300]2
[7302]Pages 84 - 387 of ine previous summary suzzest thas NOSE NLS
[7304]hed wor Zurnisned swiicient decails ahout nis alleged agent actwork foe
[7306]It is considered that CS
[7308]ormation concerning '". 7 LODINA
[7310]2 Weuld appeer that there was ao wt nc by
[7312]Venn ete fee eet
[7313]NOLENAG 2 withscic
[7315]foi. The. LO Was HeVET ble ED.
[7317]me. Vid Gels.
[7319]Cen A>
[7320]wa feat
[7321]SECRF
[7323]soatsencanvee
[7326]es pea tate tanennacesty =
[7328]cota Hite
[7331]21 NRBMMG FA cutee aeetyneuenemenenmaine ens ue eee seu «
[7333]roy
[7335]Re ts
[7336]x
[7337]a
[7339]pres
[7342]‘The effectiveness or non-eifectivenéss, of. NOSENKO during his
[7344]'
[7346]assignment to the First Section, First Department, ‘from mid-March
[7348]1953 to late May 1955 can have little pertinency in the. question of the |
[7349]bona fides of NOSENKO if it is accepted that he actually was an Officer
[7350]in the First Section during this period of time, It ie felt that information
[7351]furnished by NOSENKO in current interviews and in previous interviews
[7352]is of sufficient scope and detail that his claimed service as an officer
[7354]in the First Section during this period of time is completely acceptable.
[7356]6001145
[7358]6
[7360]SECRET
[7362]Ae se cette nd Sees a te ree
[7366]14-0000
[7369]14-0000
[7371]Rs A ALORS OE A gamer Inne ae ae a ee Oe me I eect oe
[7373]7 g eAtRa
[7375]ARERR
[7377]D. DURING THE PERIOD 1955 - 1960, HE WAS NEITEES
[7379]SENIOR CASE OFF iCER’ IN, NOR DEPUT TY CHIEF OF,
[7381]THE SEVENTH DEPARTMENT AMERICAN-BRITISH
[7383]COMMONWEALTH SECTION
[7385]e Looe ‘ v
[7386]ve ” Spe 4 we ; why
[7387]1 y Ke
[7388]4 . +
[7389]1 .
[7390]t oy s “ toa .
[7391]. too. *,
[7392]. °
[7396]te . érwasratss and
[7397]“ee . Gectssel seetioa
[7399]Baer gee rao .
[7401]i
[7404]wee
[7407]14-00000
[7408]RNS agit meet ae vte eta
[7409]SE 3 conie ats 8
[7411]q
[7413]D. During the period of 1955 ~ 1960, NOSENKO was neither a
[7415]senior case officer in, nor Deputy Chief of, the Seventh Department, | x =
[7417]American-British Commonwealth Section, (Previous conclusion) .
[7419]if
[7422]The above is conclusion "D" in the previous summary. The
[7423]current conclusion is that NOSENKO was an officer in the Seventh ‘
[7424]Department, SCD, from late May 1955 to December 1959 and was
[7425]Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section, Seventh
[7427]Department from 1958 to December 1959.
[7429]During current interviews, NOSENKO has furnished extensive
[7431]- information concerning his own activities in the Seventh Department
[7433]during the 1955-1959 period. Interviews of persons who were the sudject . =
[7435]of KGB interest collaterally confirm that NOSENKO was personally in- .
[7436]volved in certain claimed activities during 1955 to December 1959.
[7437]These activities include among others the recruitment of fRichara BURGI| oO
[7438])
[7439]in June 1956, contact with|Sir Allen Lane hendlistnee BIRS in the
[7440]summer of 1957, the recruitment oi[Gieeife HARRIS in 1958, the re-
[7442]0
[7443]cruitment off George DREW|in the spring of 1959, the recruitment of
[7445]| - 6001148 ky
[7446]SECRET
[7448]eae A tees. a A es em es en seme me NR ete es Esa
[7452]Bh new sense
[7454]14-0000
[7456]ol | 06 7
[7458][wintiam Stanley WiLBY}in June 1959, the recruitment of David TAYLOR] . |
[7459]- in the summer of 1959, the recruitment of|Gerard MERTENS |in July - |
[7460]. . ; . 6 igs
[7461]August 1959, and the recruitment of [Arsene FRIPPEL}in i959, The
[7462]foregoing is not a complete list of a]l cases in whicn NOSENKO ciaims
[7463]pexsonal involvement, but is representative of cases in which his alleged
[7464]participation has been contirmed by interviews with the individual who
[7466]06, Oo, OC
[7468][Sir Allen LANE, Arthur BIRSE, William Stanley WILBY, and
[7470]was the KGB target.
[7472][ace TAYLOR were[Byieifctizens and the other above-named indi-
[7473]viduals were[Unitelcated]citizens, This would seem to substantiate
[7474]the claim of NOSENKO that during 1955 - December 1959 he was an
[7475]officer engaged in KGB operations against American-British Common-
[7476]weaith tourists in the USSR,
[7478]in addition, NOSENKO has furnished specific information about
[7479]an operation againei(Kiasti MALI an American tourist who was in
[7480]the Soviet Union from approximatcly September 1955 to December 1955,
[7482](MALIA has not been interviewed and eviil not be interviewed, so at this
[7484]time no particular 1955 case in which NOSENKO claims involvement
[7486]or personal knowledge has been substantiated by interview of the
[7488]individual involved.
[7490]goci149
[7494]aE a ane Bee . wot ee ae es
[7496]Rene ©
[7498]eR
[7501]14-0000
[7503]ULV
[7505]NOSENKO nas turnisned information on tre travel of certain
[7506]United States Government oiiiciais, inciuding Congressional represent-
[7507]atives to the USSR in 1955 - 1956; and the trip of Supreme Court Justice
[7508]William 0, DOUGLAS in 1955 which, when consiuered with the previously
[7511]mentioned specifics, adequateiy substantiate his . .imed service in the
[7512]Seventh Department and work against American-B ritish Commonwealth
[7513]tourists during the late May 1955 - December 1959 period,
[7515]NOSENKO has stressed that when he transferred to the Seventh
[7516]Department, the Tourist Section had just been established and an agent
[7517]network was not .vailaole for operations against American and British
[7518]tourists, This seems quite logical since the infiux of tourists into the
[7519]USSR was jut in.a formative stage.
[7521]NOSENKO has spoken in detail about an agent network he de-
[7522]veloped after 1955 which primarily consisted of Intourist personnel
[7523]and two homosexual agents, "SHMELEV" and "GRIGORIY" (AGB code
[7524]names), whose extensive use in KGB operations has been confirmed by
[7525]interviews with individuals who were the subject of homosexual com-
[7526]promise operations,
[7528]The previous summary contained remarks on pages 101 - 150 roo
[7529]in regard'to the claimed 1955 - 1959 Seventh Department service of
[7531]g0g4159
[7533]NOSENKO. To comment on all the aspects mentioned in those fifty
[7535]wet
[7538]14-0000
[7541]CTAAT
[7543]VLU wwe
[7545]pages would be repetitious and in many instances superfiuous. Ii is
[7546]considered that even ji the statemenis were accepted in toto, there
[7547]woud stili not be an adequate basis for 4 conclusion that NOSENKO
[7548]was not an officer in ihe claimed positions in the Seventh Department
[7549]during the period of late May 1955 - Decemoer 1959. Ner is it con-
[7550]ceded that, if all the sub-conclusions and the interpretations of various
[7551]areas of information were accepied without quaiification, there is any
[7552]evidence that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB, "However, there
[7553]are certain assumptions and interpretations which appeared in the
[7554]previous summary which are particularly worthy of comment ang which
[7555]are considered erroneous or require additional clarification.
[7557]On page 145 it is stated that the evidence suggests that NOSENKO
[7559]was an English-speaking specialist in sexual entrapment, not a counter-
[7561]mr
[7562]a
[7563]WW
[7564]a
[7565]a
[7567]intelligence officer responsible for the identification of forcign a
[7568]among tourists or for the development, recruitment, and exploitation
[7570]of agents for the KGB. The Second Chief Directorate, KGB, and the
[7571]MVD have used homosexual and heterosexual compromise in numerous
[7572]known (and presumably unknown) successful recruitments and recruit-
[7573]ment attempts, This activity has not been limited to the Seventh Depart-
[7574]ment, SCD; and the innuendo that NOSENKO was "only an English-
[7576]speaking specialist in sexual entrapment" and not a KGB gsi wien
[7578]‘ 4
[7580]7 ‘SECRET |
[7583]14-0000
[7585]Seventh Departrnent personnel, activities, procedures, and topics of
[7587]a similar nature is not considered to have any foundation in fact.
[7590]4
[7593]rt a - .
[7595]considered with the cetaiied information NOSENKO has proviced on |
[7597]Page 145 of the above surnmary lists eleven operations which
[7599]were Seventh Department cases prior to 1960 and which were included ‘
[7600]in the notes furnished to CLA in 1964 by NOSEXKO. The named operations
[7602]were those against Bernaré PECHTER, Patrick PRESSMAN, John RUFE, Ob ds bby OL, 06,06, db dp
[7603]Gerald SEVERN, Sofia SHATTAUER, (inu) KARLOV, Norman FISK, ,
[7604]Ralph MATLAW] Marvin KANTOR { Michael GINSBURG, and William Ob bb
[7606]TARASKA), The criticism made in regard to the above eleven casea
[7608]was that NOSENKO could not describe the individual operations other |
[7610]than to say that he had recorded the name of the target and such details
[7612]ment in 1962 following his return from the First Department.
[7613]The notes brought out by NOSENKO axe considered in another
[7614]section of this summary, but it should be noted here that a full review
[7616]as he could acquire when he reviewed. the activities of the Seventh Depart~ |
[7618]of all of the notes of NOSENKO currently availabie indicates that his - |
[7619]I
[7621]statements as to how and why he obtained the information in tne notes ~~
[7623]are completely plausible. A detailed explanation of the notes furnished
[7625]by NOSENKO would almost. necessitate a separate listing of the approxi-
[7627]mately 150 cases or names mentioned in tae notes,
[7629]GovLL52
[7630]- SECRET
[7633]14-0000
[7637]er
[7639]During current interviews, NOSZNKO furnished specific
[7640]information on certain of the above cleven cases, including| Wiliiam
[7641]TARASKXA, Bernara PECIiITER, Michaei GINSBURG and John RUF
[7643].
[7644]It shouid aiso be noted that certain of the cases suchas Marvin KANTOR.
[7645]and William TARASKA| were cases in which the tourist was visiting
[7646]e Soviet Union and that NOSENKO has given a satisiactory
[7648]relatives in tr
[7650]expianation oi how he iearnea oi the KANTOR case. NOSENKO has, in
[7652]' discussing his cuties as Deputy Chief of the American-British Common-
[7654]wealth Section, also explained that if a tourist indicated that he intended
[7656]to visit relatives in the USS-., the case automaticaily was assigned toa
[7658]group of officers in the Section who reported directiy to the Chief of
[7660]Section and were, not under the supervision of NOSENKO,
[7662]NOSENKO has stated that he noted the names of three of the
[7663]individuals when retiring the files of "GRIGORIY" and "SHMELEV,"'
[7664]two homosexual agents of NOSENKO previously mentioned. NOSENKO
[7665]has explained that "SHMELEV" and "GRIGORIY" had the assignment of
[7666]identifying American travelers with homosexual tendencies, that they
[7667]had contact with numerous Americans, and that they had homosexual
[7668]activity with individuals on whom they reported but on whom no overt
[7670]action was taken by the Seventh Department. In some cases the individual
[7672]gouLLos
[7674]SECRET
[7676]Papeete we
[7678]3 06,06 06,06 08
[7681]14-0000
[7683]ye
[7686]my
[7687]ae)
[7689]pant
[7691]a
[7693]was not considered a worthwhile target and in others the information
[7695]' was just maintained for possible use at a later date if the individual
[7697]revurned to the USSR.
[7699]NOSENKO has aiso explained how he learned of the[Patrick ;
[7700]Ob
[7702]PRESSMAN land (Gerald SEVERN cases; and, tne listing of the Sofia OG
[7703]SHATTAUER |case in connection with the 1955 - 1959 period is in com-
[7704]plete error since page 427 of the previous surmmary contains information
[7705]from NOSENKO on her recruitment in 1962, During ‘current interviews
[7706]the notes which NOSENKO brought out in 1964 have been discussed in
[7707]detail with NOSENKO. He has given a detailed explanation of the material
[7708]which he brought out and his explanation of all aspects is very convincing.
[7710]The previous summary (page 144) suggested that the involvement
[7711]of NOSENKO in certain cases being handled by other Sections in the
[7712]Seventh Department or by the KGB Directorate of Moscow was unusual,
[7713]An examination of the cited cases does not indicate that his participation
[7714]was unusual, but rather that his explanation of why he was involved is
[7715]logical and normal, No consideration was previously given to the English
[7716]language capability of NOSENKO or the fact that his own homosexual agents
[7717]were used in two of the four cited cases.
[7719]The summary alsv.noted that there was a question concerning
[7721]whethex| Gisella HARRIS was necessarily a Seventh Department case,
[7723]ob govit54
[7725]. SFORFT
[7728]14-0000
[7730]a b 5
[7731]This question seems quite superfiuocus since A: \98 in the USSR
[7732]on a tourist visa and "reai" tourists are the respoissoility of the Seventa
[7733]Department. Departmental responsibility within the SCD ior an indi-
[7734]vicual traveling in tue USSH is decided on the basis of how the individual °
[7735]is traveiing; i.e., whether on a tourist visa, as a member ‘of a dcicgation,
[7736]as the invitee of an organization in the USSR, as a iormer diplomat ,
[7737]stationed in Moscow, as a Ciplomat not previously stationed in Moscow,
[7738]as a member of the Cultural Exchange program, as a student attending
[7739]a university in the USSR, etc. There are also various other factors
[7740]which affect the determination of which Department or organizational
[7741]component of the SCD has the responsibility for a tourist case, These
[7742]factors include whether the individual is already suspected of foreign
[7743]intelligence connections and whether the individual is a businessman,
[7744]In addition, certain actual tourists in the USSR may never become the
[7745]responsibility oi the SCD if the individual is of specific interest to the
[7746]FCD.
[7748]6
[7750]: On pages 148 - 149, NOSENKO is criticized for not knowing at
[7751]least some of the substance of the information furnished by George
[7752]BLAKE in regard to the CIA-MI-6 program of utilizing tourist agents
[7754]in the USSR. This criticism completely ignored the fact that NOSENKO
[7756]made severai references in 1962 to the KGB having such information
[7758]6001155
[7760](ba
[7763]14-0000
[7765]although he dic then and still suspects that Willlam VASSALL was the
[7767]source, The references by NCSENKO to the KGB naving such inior-
[7768]. .
[7770]mation were not developed in 1962 or later interrogations, and it was
[7772].
[7773]not until current interviews inat it was estabiisned that NOSENZO had
[7774]. ———~. “a _ -
[7776]‘actually seen excerpts oi information passe’ by George BLAKE.
[7777]According to NOSENKO, the information which was obviously only
[7781]partial was furnished to the FCO by the SCD and could oniy have come
[7782]from an agent. ,
[7784]The previous summary (page 149) also notes that in 1961 CIA
[7785]acquired a lengthy Top Secret study on the subject of the use of tourists
[7786]by American Intelligence for espionage and operational support in the
[7787]Soviet Union (document was iurnished by GOLITSYN following nis de-
[7788]fection in December 1961). it was noted that the summary contained
[7789]references to certain 1958 - 1959 tourists whom the KGB counter-
[7790]intelligence identified as Amirican agents and noted that NOSENKO
[7791]claimed he was Deputy Chicf of the American-British Commonwealth
[7792]Section in this period of time and that he claimed the KGB icentified
[7793]no American Intelligence agents during this period of time, What later
[7795]is described as a claim by NOSENKO is neither an accurate reflection
[7797]of what NOSENKO said prior to 1967 or has said since 1967,.
[7799]90041156
[7801]-?
[7804]14-0000
[7806]“aes
[7808]we
[7810]Ne Ge
[7812]Leemines
[7814]NOSENKO Las never clairned to kiiow all activities against
[7815]American traveiers in the Soviet Union curing 1958 -.1959, Many
[7816]of these travelers would have been the responsibility of a section in
[7817]the Seventh Departinent, other than the American-~Britisn Commen-
[7818]wealth Section, or another Depariment in the SCD, NOSENKO was
[7819]quite aware that certain of the American tourists in 1958 - 1959 were
[7820]acting suspiciously from a KGB point of view,
[7822]NOSENKO has stated he was aware thata document which the
[7823]Seventh Department had prepared and furnished to the FCD in an efiort
[7824]to obtain further assistance from the FCD in the work against tourists
[7825]had been compromised by GOLITSYN. NOSENKO stated he was not in
[7826]the Seventh Department when the document was prepared and did not
[7827]review the document wnitil after tne defection of GOLITSYN and foliow-
[7828]ing advice from the FCD to the Seventh Department, SCD, that the
[7829]document had been compromised. The document furnished by GOLITSYN
[7830]has never béen reviewed with NOSZNXO to determine if it contained
[7831]additional information not in the document which he waa aware had
[7832]been prepared by the Seventh Department for the FCD.
[7834]NOSENKO has been impugned on his apparent unfamiliarity with
[7836]a number of cases cited as examples in the document furnished by
[7838]GOLITSYN. In current interviews, however, the descriptiqn is POSENKO
[7840]ee ne eee .
[7842]ed
[7845]14-0000
[7847]tae GlStlly eel Go Deno lillies Wwlin ene Od foe
[7849]wees ~ oe a er - mete TTR eee : eta t
[7850]Ver eGee Cett SOLE ds Ge abee-,, Se Oa UV ee we 2D Boe
[7851]. wD ate se Te
[7852]Ye SENG Do
[7854]sree CL en Ue 2 Te
[7856]. . “a Pe ee FO ewe Tee sons
[7857]af ven le ween DC Aw On Ve COS & Bee.
[7859]SECO ween WeSC OTe) LOGY, & are
[7860]net we Are ee - ene i . foe Dec ab + as
[7861]aVDE goes craven OED as Vaca, SCA Toveon
[7863]ern Mn ce cee bap emt foe cla
[7864]WES thG SestOno eaby Ga tc DPourlee 2c.
[7866]Sma coef ee pt rey atiree tn ti TIS fe te te ee te
[7867]oe 2G CO LUMNGSE Ga WO VEAGIS WS US CO, BC AUEIN SS chon ees
[7868]cue wae tery Mine anton etn
[7869]Men, DETSous Craven eT OT,
[7872]2 Gl Oe UT ESSAVEG SLOS.C™
[7874]5 wt : - eA nee an
[7876]Loy NOSINAG of tes
[7878][ena ssusin}c: ea velid United
[7880]et of tne Sevenva Dezartq-
[7882]true mame in the USSR and, therefore, a tar
[7884]ment, a5 NOSINKO claims. lvnough several avenues o/ possisly
[7886]ation Lave not yet been fully explored, thete is 2
[7888]Cas.
[7890]14-0000
[7892]- - . +
[7893]af ‘s
[7894]a a .
[7895]a ‘
[7896]‘a > FE
[7897]~ 4 e be vet
[7898]Ps a as
[7899]fo} ? ae a oH 3
[7900]n 2 WS wa a ¥ ‘
[7901]” oo ua Q iH a .
[7902]a 9 i 3 “4 a a °
[7903]id Be a "J ‘ . :
[7904]os 3 sso 2 3 . Ms : Lo
[7905]bow "gg SE Ag
[7906]“ “t % a 8) “f 8 . . . 4 ai?
[7908]* S$ 3 8 F B 8 oO — ea
[7909]3 8 8 2 2 «kt - es B
[7910]N a ii 9 o , L _— ae
[7911]a at 2 ny He gy 4 ° : Be
[7912]¥ 4 2 r ad - B ia
[7913]ado 9 ~ FR . ‘ 7
[7914]S a3 4) 9. Q Hh ; | :
[7915]4 “ Qo db 4 ‘ : i ‘
[7916]re) gS fe ; : ae
[7917]a gy “4 ‘f 33 . . ; . 7
[7918]ort ue a fey z HW ~ woe ee
[7919]> a 3 3 : , ao
[7920]9 2 g Q a : - 7
[7921]a 9 go ~ . 74 ;
[7922]9 y nt 4 3 5 , j ;
[7923]- o a am no. ms : ot § i i
[7924]2 goa d 4 7 a0
[7925]9 aoe od 8 Sy
[7927]Q 9 3 33 0) : = :
[7928]“4 > >» 4 wW oy Sy
[7929]A ' Ss . :
[7930]i 5 06d os) . - oS ae
[7931]3 a8 Gy 3
[7932]3 4 8 } 4 . - “3
[7933]. + *, ° . ;
[7934]fs 4 i 2 4 ‘ ‘ ; ; :
[7935]" . : 7
[7936]3) . a o 3
[7937]2 a 3 Le) 4 oN .
[7938]: s 3 te sho ‘‘ .
[7939]ory et fay ry Q 1 ‘
[7940]ue ret ay Se 8 ;
[7941]ue a 6 rr ry “
[7942]eS .
[7943]3 ‘ H
[7944]¥P) 7) Q 2 u 63 Z 7 .
[7946]3° 7 42 8. a ¢ YF OS ” . he ,
[7947]a a fx] ‘s g 8 - a * “ . . an
[7948]a iP 2) .
[7949]3 8 a 3 t be
[7950]t4 > t) " i 19 “g °
[7951]34 9 3 6 § 3s
[7952]a 4 42 @ Sf gg 4 &
[7954]a 4 3 & 6@ <¢ #8 a oO .
[7957]1 Sant Treen ees oe meen ene RR CG ity dat
[7959]14-0000
[7961]SECRET
[7963]NOSENKO WAS NEITHER
[7965]ECTION NOR
[7967]EMBASSY S
[7971]PERIOD 1961 ~ 1962 (sic).
[7973]wee Cann eo HD eceremnamnnete ne H
[7977]FP ea ee ie sin a eae a a
[7980]i
[7981]4
[7983]x
[7985]eth
[7989]RY
[7994]oS
[7996]a veneneg tees |
[7997]ONS RESINS
[7998]ln AE
[8001]14-0000
[8003]TR ARON Lemna ens etn tecelin te merit meee vey met
[8006]se gee gpmmnere 01 a sited O86 Sento
[8007]we
[8009]ERY
[8010]Skee
[8012]ay
[8014]RARE
[8016]AP Betats ar ObOH
[8018]©)
[8020]E. NOSEN
[8022]Embassy Section nor s
[8024]curing the veriod of 1961 +
[8026]It is the conclusion of this summucsy that NOSENXO Lele ite
[8028]position of Deputy Chiei, First Section (fJaserican Emoassy Section),
[8029]ScD, from January 1960 - December 1981.
[8031]Tare claim of NOSE NKO that he hele the above position in 2956
[8033]- 196] has been the m, tion of NOSENXO co
[8035]satisfactorily resolve anc accept. Acc
[8037]his claim to have held this particular
[8038]a decision as to whether the remainder of his claimed KGB career
[8039]is valic. Itis believed scasoneole to presume that if NCSENKO wes
[8040]Deputy Chief of the American-Britiso Commonwealth Section, Seventh
[8041]Department, prior to December 1959 in the absence of any indicasion
[8042]that he was demoted, he should ha: ve been as seast a Deputy Chiez of
[8043]Section curing 1960 - 1961,
[8045]Position in the SCD, KG3, and througaout the XGB is important
[8047]from a monetary point of view as well as a prestige point of view. If
[8049]Vee wet
[8051]gouri6h
[8056]14-0000
[8060]k
[8062]5 apparent that the knowledge of NOCSENXO concezing a
[8064]: |. * ‘aspects of activity in the First Section, First Department, curing i¢50 -
[8066]1961 is incompiete wea iucged by whe: are considered the normai
[8068]mat interviews,
[8070]ities os NCSENK
[8072]et
[8074]ies of & Deputy Cr
[8076]: Ts ~o¥esponsibils
[8078]an eiiort was made to Getermine what the responsibi
[8080]ba
[8086]actually were in 1960 - 196i and whether his statements in this area
[8087]were impossible or could be accepted as not negating his claim to have
[8088]-been Deputy Chief, First Section,
[8090]According to NOSINKO, in the early 1960's there were only Loot
[8092]{7 .: .: approximately fizteen Deputy Chieis ci Section in the entire SCD and
[8095]: ‘'. ' 9 'isMcertain departments none of the sections nad a Deputy Chie! of Section,
[8096]: . . f
[8098]be roe
[8100]in acaition, transier of a Deputy Cuiel oi Section was not always followed
[8102]. «by a replacement in kind, according to NOSENXO who stated that he was
[8104]not replaced by another Deputy Chief when ne transferred to the First
[8106]Section, First Department.
[8108]gooise2
[8111]14-0000
[8113]According to NOSANAO, wiese wes muta Job
[8117]is
[8121]eg ote. fs ol tlhe wereetiaestees Spee Praeed
[8122]2 LMG Ve wees OS ie pariiculay Dizuty Cries
[8124]el of Deriwimnest anc Chiel of Sovivoa
[8126]The previous summary Couw avez
[8128]VER. Com.ct
[8130]between early siarements oF NOSINAS thet he replaced no ene when he
[8132]entezved on cuty in th
[8134]a
[8136]claim that he replaced Mi:
[8138]Section. Along with tunis he had first ere
[8140]other ofticers in the Section wich previous responsi
[8142]matters which were assigned to him uvon his arrival there, then later
[8144]‘stated that BAKHVALOV had been responsibie for these matcers, The
[8146]previous summary noted that interrogation had never resolved these
[8148]contradictions.
[8150]cture of the nature of &
[8152]In the light of the present clearer
[8154]Deputy Chief of Section, the statements of NOSENKO on BAKHVALOV
[8155]i nena
[8157]and on the issue of who he, NOSENKO, Gid or did not replace are not
[8158]contradictory, There is no reason to cuestion that BAKHVALOV, with
[8162]whom NOSENKO, incidertaliy, did not overlap, was a Deputy Chiel of
[8164]"Section in the First Section before NCSENXO, ane that he was respon-
[8166]sible for certain areas which later fell to NOSENKO, On the other
[8168]7 a 2 GOGLLES
[8170]: ms
[8171]ATA . Tee an
[8176]e
[8179],
[8180];-
[8182]y
[8184]BRUNT T ECS
[8185]TESS
[8187]DRRSERSEES
[8189]14-0000
[8191]anes ee TNS le oplee ised) renscon foe Bie Sele:
[8192]Hane, GCCGluang io LCSZNAG, vac PVN sal Teason 267 Gao oer, 2@
[8194]to the iret Section was to concestvate on a new arca of tinphusis (code
[8196]Saat
[8198]clerks), There cowd of course have been no specie predecessor for
[8199]‘ < . oxvea rostered or atl in we ee ee TL ES mt Cee
[8201]@ Sudsiantively Dew areca. Therefore, in one sesee SADZAVALOV wos
[8203]the prececessor G2 NOSGNAO anc in another stase ne was noi. The
[8205]interpretation of ihe various sicitemenies of NOSENKS on
[8207]being in conilic wut OF comrusio. on
[8209]ecorcing to NO at tac time of Kis transfer to the Firs . . :
[8210]A z NOSE ENKO, t t: + t
[8211]-' Section, First Department, in early 1960, he nad not been told and for ,
[8213](a short period thereawier was not told -vhat his actusl duties woule Sew tS
[8215]KOVSHUK, Caiei of the. First Section, wanted to assign NCSENKAS to
[8217]supervise the work asainst Service Attaches at the Unized States oribassy. . ~
[8218]NOSENKO ‘felt that tre proposed assignment by KOVSHUA was intence ot
[8220]to keep NOSENKO cecupiec with nonproductive work since AGS policy
[8221]e
[8222]for work against the Service Attaches was primarily one of conirel on oe
[8223]: .
[8224]trips and not active wor towards possible recruitmen:,
[8226]After a short period of time, NOSENKO was iniormed by
[8228]GRIBANOV that he, XCSENKO, had been tranoferred to supervise whe a : - :
[8230]work against code clerks (also code machine mechanics) at the United
[8232]ot States Embassy. GRISANOV defined this work as being of the greatest re c we
[8233]gouLied rs
[8235]Pecpanitee Doonan patintile eo,
[8237]we
[8241]ARCANE
[8243]ne) SHB
[8245]14-0000
[8247]importance, anc Use recruiimesi Of code cleras 25 a priovity airn of
[8249]. wrt we way: we -
[8251]wae AGB, ALY PIN, who was Cale: os che First Department, later sce
[8252]peated the avove and & group coneisiing of NOSINKO, Gersacty i.
[8254]GAYAZNOV and Vadim V. ACSOLAPOV was forvaed win NOSENAG
[8256]ft tame A Ae
[8258]responsible for supexvision of the work, GAYAZNOV anc ACSOLALTOG
[8259]were not new KGB oiiicers, experienced ofiicers
[8261]nA oe wee - ~ Cos : rd al tas sge porte “hae NATENCS
[8262]aithough bots as Senior Case O Fe of lesser yank than NOSENKC,
[8264]er or to minutely
[8266]NOSENKO coes not claim that he hac to trainee
[8268]scrutinize every action or proposed action of GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV.
[8270]jexvision over their -
[8272]NOSENKO does claim he was responsibic.
[8274]work,
[8276]AccorGing to NOSENKO, GAIZANOV sinpnasized that work
[8277]against code clexsks was to be his primary work in the First Section
[8279]_ and that it would take precedence over any ovnex activity. Other than
[8280]. work against code clerks, NQSENKO has generally defined his reszon-
[8281]i an ‘ . —_ - :
[8282]Do sibilities as joliows: - .
[8284](a) Responsidility for fiie of {work agains?) Joan :
[8286]: : ABIDIAN, Security Oiiicer at United Szates Embassy.
[8288](b) Responsibility for preliminary review of re-
[8290]mee on,
[8292]. ports sxom OTU (XGB technical unit) o: take" izom
[8294]> . _.. microphones.in the United States Embes sy.
[8296]vars
[8298]anemia et tee ce vert eect
[8300]x
[8303]14-0000
[8305]i
[8307]k
[8308]i
[8309]i
[8310]I.
[8313]z
[8315]avst Section, wien AOVSUA was absent.
[8317]As can be scen from the above,
[8319]by NOSENKO, wouid not coincide with the normal responsibilities of a
[8321]‘ Deputy Chief of Branch or Section in CLA. An analyst can either accept
[8323]or reject the theory; that there is necessariiy an equation between the
[8325]responsibilities. of.a Deputy Cnief in CLA aad the AGB, but i: the analyst
[8327]accepis the theory, ne must offer some supportin
[8329]cad
[8330]o
[8332]+ Pages 151 - 261 of the previous summary contained comments
[8334]and conclusions and sub-conciusions in regard to the ciaimed service
[8336]oi NOSENKO as Deputy Criei of First Section, First Depart
[8338]1961, The previous primary conclusion was that he was neither Deputy
[8340]Chief of the First (American Embassy} Section nor a supervisor in that
[8341]. section, Tne conclusion of this summary is that he was Deputy Chief
[8343]and had supervisory responsibilities for work against code clerks, The
[8345]: matter of the responsibility of NOSENXO for work against code clerks
[8347]-- sibilities listed in (a) ~ (d) above.
[8349]. will be considered later, Comments will first be mace on the respon-
[8351]g004166
[8353]me Leu ¢ _ .
[8354]Shuneh.
[8356]: x
[8357]cack som Teaches 2A AEST Bo Pin aldnaesenane oi OAT
[8359]evidence on this point.
[8361]arts
[8365]14-0000
[8367]Pages 265 - 222 of the previous summary contain a cevalled
[8368]ws, tae 2 *% — Fase Pee Pee ee ee 2ST NS Te ae et WO o>
[8369]640.8 tor ihe previous Conclusion thas NOSSNKO was not the KGS cose
[8370]- mimcene
[8372]officer tor Gonn ABIGIAN, The cusrvest conc
[8374]restonsible case ofiicer sor ADIDIAN,
[8376]ABIDIAN compared favoradly with what is con
[8378]Daa
[8380]“Ya vesponsible CLA case ofcvicer is immaterial; w
[8382]twmhnether NOSENKO xeasonably fullilice the requirements. of the AGB . . . .
[8384]-» for work against the particuizr target, John ABIDIAN. itis felt thar ; od
[8386]the answer to ihis is that NOSENKO did. . , Joss
[8388]a the
[8390]he
[8392]Was
[8394]#.CCOLPGING to
[8396]direction of determining if ABIDLAN would iead the KGB to “anotier ;
[8398]POPOV," and no consideration was given to active agent work against
[8399]ABIDIAN for possible recruitment. This explanation by NOSENKO
[8400]appears reasonable and logical aad his knowledge of ABIDIAN and his
[8401]Gescription of his work against ABIDIAN should be considered omy
[8403]. y .
[8404]within that framework,
[8406]Admittediy NOSENKO was unaware of a considerable amount
[8408]: ' of details regarding the background of ABIDIAN, but on the other hand
[8410]if the statements of NOSENKO are accepted that the only aim of the
[8412]KGB was.to see if coverage of ABIDIAN woule lead to "ancther POPOV,"
[8415]| -"" |" S it follows that: such personalia information on ABIDIAN would have had oO rr,
[8419]cine 5 ayRRA ICs RE eS ee a ae NS ai tat be Me weer .
[8421]m
[8424]14-0000
[8428]PRS RE
[8430]BY Bh x ; By 3 ;
[8431]oS SE RARE EN RNAS BIRR an ee RRR RARE : ¥ Mesh, PADS
[8433]Iyyp-? - = Ie ath Com cee at woe ee ee
[8434]iva, GF ADLOLAN in the USSR Al ADLOLAN was consicered to
[8436]as
[8438]ct
[8439]+3)
[8440]oO
[8441]e
[8443]4
[8445]ONG 1 CUG LION A.
[8447]Security Officer position formerly Lele oy Russell A, LANGILLE,
[8448]- sat wm ey ok dee er a ene On lee el pe ei ber th OAT
[8449]who was mown by the AGS to be CliA, No iivesiigation by the 50>
[8451]was necessary to Getermine if AZIDIAN was "“Amexican intei
[8453]Specizic siatements relative to ADIDIAN anc a Soviet mais, a AGS
[8456]ray
[8457]it
[8458]we
[8459].
[8461]operational contact according to NOSENKO, which are erron
[8463]This invalidates one oi tne bases for the previous conclusion the: 7
[8465]NOSEN KO was not the responsicie case uriicer fox ABIDIAN,
[8469]NOSENKO haa previousiy siateé that th cizvca Cotoser 1960 he
[8471]ae mm anoecstt -4 Pe oo ee! awe te pte fa ow pee blag ee el
[8472]prepared an operational plan on ABIOLAN which incluced continuation
[8474]2
[8475]of the placing of Mecitxa on.the clotring anc effects of ASIDIAN by =:
[8477]maid who is mentioned above, Tatyana TIDOROVICH, The statement
[8479].
[8481]is madein the summary that this coulé not be true because FEDOROVICH
[8482]did not works part time for ABIDIAN until ac least July 1961. ABIDIAN
[8484]has recently been reinterviewed concernin
[8485]invalidate the previous conciusion shat PEDOROVICE could net cave
[8487]treated the clothing and effects of ABIDIAN with Mezka prior to July i961.
[8493]TT
[8495]SN
[8497]aS
[8500]ay, NS
[8501]ORES
[8503]Na tee
[8505]‘f
[8508]14-0000
[8510]until she leit NM
[8512]a
[8516]ASMNER, FEDOROVICE
[8517]e 7
[8519]entry for cleaning purposes.
[8523]_ ABIDIAN Gid not mail any ogerationa: letters wituin the Soviet
[8525]1961 and therefore in view of the wbove, there
[8527]bt
[8529]Union until after Marc
[8531]nes ore eetn tag ee be hae
[8532]is no reason to contradict the statement oF NCSZTNXO thai the three fraile f ?
[8534]operational ietters intercepted by the KGS and mailed by ABIDIAN au
[8537]showed evidence of Metxa. It is interesting to note that NCSENKO in
[8538]Sannnenamnenaintens
[8540]June 1962 warned CLA about the KGS use of Merka for sporting intesnal
[8542]letter mailings by J:
[8544]‘“ABIDIAN, accorcing to NOSENXO, was the subject of a 24-hour
[8546]surveillance with the Seventh Directorate assigning a specific surveillance
[8548]'. brigade to cover ABIDIAN, The actual surveillance of ABIDIAN was te
[8550]J responsibility of the Seventh Directorate wich submitted reports to the
[8552]GoGL1i69
[8554]TaN mena MOD pl
[8556]i
[8561]14-0000
[8563]ABIDIAN, thecAGS wouwig have attempred «
[8566]J
[8568]weamesses were Gisciosed, according t¢ NOSENXO, and the pattern . : .
[8570]oi coverage to see ii AZIDIAN woulé lead the KGS tc “another POPOV"
[8571]remained unchanged.
[8573]Pages 210 - 212 of tae previous summarxy notes th
[8576]y
[8577]g
[8578](1
[8579]y
[8580]i
[8581]rs)
[8583]- . . " . .
[8585]Was unaware of countries visited by ABIDIAN
[8587]USSR and that no effort was made by NOSENKO through the SCD to find
[8588]out such information. According to the previcus summary, NOSZNKO
[8589]stated that the FCD "would not accept" suca 2 request ior "operational
[8591]“.
[8592]action against an American diplomat coming izom Moscow." The
[8593]surveillance which would have been required cn the part of the FCD
[8595]to achieve any sort oi reasonable coverage of ABIDIAN abroad would
[8597]certainly have placec a severe burden on the FCD. Further, NOSENKO . yy
[8599]contends that the results which might reasonably. be expécted would be
[8601]~. °  of.little or no practical value to tie SCD, .
[8603]o> ggoit70
[8605]. 6@eph
[8606]“ot
[8610](Oe ea AN. AE MEN oe EONS yor OL pated
[8615]14-0000
[8617]m8 O2 NOSZNKO on this matter incicates
[8619]TAGTCS GAG G2G Mucs iG CoOmuSse tnt issue.
[8621]2Cast TANT Zing tie areas Gi
[8625]NOSZNKG was sot inthe First
[8626]. Section, First Department, jor any racterial period of time aiter
[8628]30 December 1961. Ik is also clear that he either read the surveillance
[8632]report on ihe. visit of ABIDIAN to the Pushkin Street ceacérop site or
[8634]Ags:
[8636]was fully briefed on the details oi the visit. NOSENXO insists that he
[8637]reac the surveillance report at the time or shortly avter the event.
[8638]There is no reason.to question his assertion that he read the report
[8639]since his accurate knowledge o: the route cf ABIDLAX azcé
[8640],
[8642]in connection with the visit support this claim. However, his consistent
[8643]inability on his own to approximate the date of the visit or relaeit to bs
[8644]his change of assignments raises a question regarding when he actually
[8645]read the report.
[8647]a coe, NOSENKO claims tnat the visit of. ABIDIAN to the Pushkin Street
[8649]‘deaddrop area ledto the KGB setting upa stationary surveillance post
[8653]ay
[8655]co gg
[8657]Keer te
[8659]Sree nye renrmn a nena ata
[8661]an . x‘
[8664]14-0000 -
[8668]informed on a caily dDasiv of The resus Of inis stake cul (a.ways
[8670]Seventh
[8672]Geneva in mid-March i962,
[8674]lt is conceivadie Vaart,
[8676]advised of developments or norcevelopmenis following the visit oz
[8678]ABIDIAN to tie Pusakin Street building sy Veniamin KOZLOV, a Chic: :
[8680]of Department in the Seventh Directorate who hac been known tu
[8682], NOSENXO since 1953, or Viadisiav KOVSHUK or Gennadciy GRYAZNOV, my
[8684]Chief and Deputy Chief respectively of the First Section, First Depazrt-~
[8687]iS)
[8688]ct
[8690]a
[8692]ct
[8693]on
[8694]o
[8695]3]
[8696]et
[8698]i
[8701],
[8702]i
[8703]o
[8708]ment, Even so, however, his failure to cal cu
[8710]nm June 1952 would seem to require explanation, especially in view of
[8712]“
[8714]the fact that he did warn us about the danger of operational letters mail- : :
[8715]ings by ABIDIAN --a warning waich would appear clearly to have been
[8716]derived from KGB coverage oi the activities os ABIDIAN in the spring-
[8717]summer of 1961.
[8719]It is to be noted that curing the June 1962 meetings NOSENKO ot
[8720]was not specifically asked for any additional information regarding
[8722]- any known or suspected intelligence activities of ABIDIAN. Beyond mL
[8724]ee QOH TZ
[8729]14-0000
[8731]nis is not implausible, -/uucther possibie explaniiion, however,
[8733]derived from the alreacy noted inasi
[8735]for the visit, is th
[8737], of the visit itself after his. meetings with us in Sune 1962, it should be
[8739]. noted in this context that with the puslic éxposure of the PENKOVSKIY
[8740]' case in the fai. of 1962, the Pushkin Strect deccdrop undoubtédiy became ’
[8742]2
[8744]the subject of widespread interest within the KGB.
[8746]That NOSENKO is.at a minimum still confused about the vi
[8749]et
[8751]oi ABIDIAN to the Push«in Street ceaddrop and its consequences is clear
[8752]. from the record, While itis entirely possible that NOSENKO has con-
[8753]sciously exazzerated his involvement with the visit and its aftermaia,
[8754]° : -)
[8755]it is also possioie that the evident Gistortions of his accounts oz the
[8756]afiair derive 7-om honest coniusion,
[8757]Current interviews and a check of the tapes of previous inter-
[8758]views leave zo doubt that NOSENKO was aware of the visits of ABIDIAN
[8760]to the upper Gorkiy Street area circa March i961. These visits by
[8762]7: .. ABIDIAN were for cover ‘purposes and preceded his start of operatiozal
[8764]re — GooL73 _
[8766]BRK eater ements coe ce ae
[8768]-. 5 ate ea Re tee Loe
[8769]fe vralnwte Pita oy abe ae :
[8770]Ae owe wale bo
[8773]Jeune eee ay
[8775]4
[8777]HGR
[8778]ay
[8781]14-0000
[8783]ad pe a tle
[8784]PE een
[8786]hai visiis 62 ADIDIAN toa comsnission
[8788]. axt shop, according to NOS=
[8790]place for picking up or piacin
[8791]was placed on the art snop for a perice oc time 2o-20wsr.g the visit of
[8792]ABIDIAN, Ojficiai recorcs coniiz: the visits of ABIDIAN at che time
[8793]and to the buildings Gescrizec by NOSENAG,
[8794]- Pages 21d - 220 of the previous summary contain no reference
[8795]to the specific statements of NOSENKO relative to KGB interest in the
[8796]- visits of ABIDIAN to the e upper Gorkiy Streetiarea, — it is also cicar
[8798]froma review of certain transcripts of previous interrogations tha
[8802]no differentiation was rnace concerning his statements relative to KGB
[8804]coverage of the activities of ABIDIAN in the upper Goraiy Sivect arca
[8806]7
[8808]circa March 1961 and his s ements concern: ning Bis -Knowleéze o: the
[8809]es '.. ‘Pushkin Street Geaddrop site aiter the visit of ABIDIAN to that site
[8811](30 December 1962).
[8813]i It is impossibie at this time to siate that a cetailed cebzieiing
[8814]| : _ of NOSENKO concerning ABIDIAN prior to hostile interrogation would
[8816]i>, have permitted the clarification of ali issues including the above, but
[8818]_ a 8 gg OKL74
[8820]14.
[8822]7 et res
[8825]14-0000
[8827]absence-to the Chief
[8829]wet eek eect tL feta ee
[8830]Vue baat te HOS Les ones
[8832]to impugn his claim to living been cuse clicer for ABIDLAN from eccl
[8833]1960 until iate 1961, Forihermove, te fact tus NOSENAG to noe E512 Lo
[8835]‘ proverly date the visit of ABIDIAN vo Pushin Siveei, is in ne wey indicative
[8837]oi KGB dispatch, If dispatched, NOSENKO presumably would have nad the
[8838]Gate right,
[8840]In regard to (b),. the responsi ‘ilty of NOSZNXO for preliminary re-
[8842]view of reports from GTU (Technical Unis of AGB; of "sake" from micro-
[8844]pnones in the United States Embassy, the previous conclusion was that his
[8845]claim that he personally reviewed tae KGS monitoring reports was not
[8846]Sustained,
[8848]It is not felt that tie previous conclusion mace suslicient allow-
[8850]ance for the explanation of NOSENKO of what the responsibility actually
[8852]entailed, Iniormation irom microphones in the Uniteé States Embassy,
[8854]according to NOSENKO, was handiec very specially, Telephone inter-
[8855]cepis were given to a designated oificer for distribution to the appropriate
[8857]case officer, but microphone reports, to prevent wide dissemination even
[8859]-  G004175:
[8861]within the First Section, were brought daily to the Deputy Chief or in hi
[8863]and then were distributed to. the individual responsible
[8868]14-0000
[8870]cuse Oificer, In this way, according 16 NOSENKO, no one Leiow the
[8872]sank os Deputy Cries was aware of the tuial microphone Make! irom .
[8873]the United States Embassy as received sy tie section,
[8874]As regares political type invosmation, end wccosding to NOSENKAG
[8876]this was consicered tie most important sy tne MGB and OTU, NOSENKO
[8878]PF U.awmMate CisSeminenon Gs tA oy
[8880]had xo responsi
[8882]mation to the Ci : NIU, or the Central Commi
[8884]fay
[8886]since this was the responsibilty of @ unit in the oifice of the ChieZ, SCD.
[8888]H : NOSENKO has aiso stated that +2 be certain of the
[8890]wording microphones was "Gying' anc
[8892]ing a sufficient
[8894]o
[8896]reception difficulties was also having cifiiculty obtain
[8898]number of qualizied monitor-transiators. As a result, according to
[8900]——— meee oe oe
[8902]NOSENKO, OTU was uot providing complete verbatim transcripts Irom
[8903]“most microphones, but actually was repovziing only those portions which
[8904]OTU considered pertinent. Despite the fact that full transcripts oi ail
[8905]. “a
[8906]conversations in areas covered by active micropzones would have beea
[8907]' of interest to responsibie officers of the First Section, OTU, according ”
[8908]“i to NOSENKO, did not provide full transcripts and whea askee to provide
[8910]raore gave the routine answer of, "we could do so if we had more
[8912]personnel," According to NOSENKO, the tapes were maintained at
[8914]2) "+ QTU-and could: not be furnished.to the First Section, An officer _of
[8916]goose
[8918]apy Beda NONE abner aan a ag ome t To oe ancnmety ee
[8920]wee
[8922]win apes =
[8925]14-0000
[8927]ts
[8929]First Section could lisiea we pisiculs iape but ne Lic to 40 te OTU
[8930]ioe Gas a Tout this wes cone very infrequently.
[8932]Te fet? ee? ete e ae nee cece te ete ye TET ee gee te
[8933]ae 28 OCs CVES that any Presumpiion wire tae Ao Pecoverse Gs
[8935]NOSEN KO as hieing active microphones is nov reasonasle or even
[8937]realistic. Itis also unreulistic t
[8939]fe)
[8940]ae]
[8941]a
[8942]Q
[8943]A
[8944]i
[8945]w
[8946]et,
[8947]ty
[8948]ry
[8949]tt.
[8950]t
[8951]3
[8952]“
[8953]ia)
[8954]Y
[8955]ia)
[8957]G
[8958]a
[8959]we
[8961]aN
[8963]ay
[8964]3
[8965]o
[8966]a
[8967]$s
[8968]1
[8970]ecucted within reasonable distance of an active microphone was not
[8972]to be Cousideved in
[8974]ve been aware oc th
[8976]a
[8978]one had a conversation in one of the rooms in which there was an active
[8979]microphone and NOSZNXO has claimed he reviewed the "take! Irom
[8980]microphones in tne United States Embassy.
[8982]It is apparent that there are a number of imponcéerasie factors
[8984]to be consideree such as whether the. conversation cox
[8986]by the microphone, whether the monitor could recover sufficient portions
[8988]of the conversation to understand the gist of what was being saic, and
[8990]even ifhe did, whether he would consider it of suificient importance or
[8992]interest to incluce in his report in verbatim or in summary form.
[8993]In regard to (c), the claim of NOSZENXO that he was responsible
[8995]for maintenance of the physical security file on the United States Embassy,
[8997]go01177
[8999]2 AE gD TER
[9004]14-0000
[9006]verted into a presumption that therefore NCSENKO knew everyting
[9008]‘example of this, NOSENXO has shown z lack of detailed knowlecge of
[9009]‘the work against diplomatic personnel in, che United States Embassy.
[9011]He has stated he is sure he would Have sown of anything “important”
[9013]"to have reviewed all the reports of the various officers of the First
[9015]of NOSENKXO that he was custodian of ve Dovbassy security file-was
[9016]Be Gasis ior this coAclusion was
[9017]current interviews with NOSENXO have further indicated inat his claim
[9018]on this point snouwid be accepted, ©
[9020]In regared to (é), the claim of NOSZNXO that he ected in piace
[9022]of KOVSHUXK, the Caief of First Section, wren KOVS?
[9024]itis consicered that this claim is accez
[9026]that KOVSHUX knew.
[9028]NOSENKO claims that he was nei responsible for the direct
[9030]supervision 6f approximately two-‘hircs oi the officers in the First
[9032]Section, ‘These osticers normally reported directly to KOVSHUX and
[9034]would only report to NOSENKO when 4OVSHUK was absent. Asan
[9036]euch as a recruitment or attempted recruirment, but he does not claim -
[9039]14-0000
[9041]adequaic, —
[9043]of most agents or Operative coniacis who were pari. of tae KGS nework
[9045]among the incigenous
[9047]recognize their photogra;
[9049]cerning their specizic activities is consiccred to be an unwarranted
[9051]eriticism. NOSENKO incicates that in generai the aanciing of agenis
[9053].in the First Section was tne responsibility of incivicua:.case oificers.
[9055]It is also apparent that the philosophy in the KGB was to maintain
[9057]we
[9059]a single handler-agent relationship as much 4s possible, and that respon-
[9061]sibility for an agent would noi be transferreé merely bécause the agent
[9063]had access to a target who was the responsibility of a case oiZicer other
[9065]than the handler of the agent, Tais apparent philosophy is of particular
[9067]interest in connection with NOSSNAD, who even though he was the case
[9068]oificer responsible for ABIDIAN and together with KOSOLAPOV ane
[9070]GRYAZNOV worked actively against code clerks, did not have an agent
[9072]-network which he specifically handled. Mere use of an agent ior report-
[9075]14-0000
[9079]owt eo ont es
[9080]S4UNGsOC-EgCU. s
[9082]NOSENKO,
[9084]curing 2960 - 1961.
[9086]sib ity for supervision of work agains: ih
[9088]a
[9090]1960, he was, according to NOSENAO, responsivie for supervision of
[9092]the work of Vadim AL KOSOLAPOV, Cennaciy 2. GAYAZNGV, V.ac:
[9093]DEM IN and Yevgeny GROMAKOVSAIY
[9094]yo. » GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV. worked ozly against code clerks
[9096]and therefore were supervised solely by NOSE[NKO, whereas DEMKIN
[9098]- and GROMAKOVSXiY, who handie
[9100]House, came uncer the supervision of NOSENXO oniy in those cases
[9102]where these agents were directed against code clerks,
[9104]It is quite ciear that the knowledge of NCSENKO concerning the -
[9105]: . , , , :
[9107]‘ code clerks, code machine mechanics and pouca clerks who, accozcing
[9108]i to NOSENKO, were incluéed in his targets in 1960 - 1961, was much
[9109]greater than his knowledge of any other category of American employees . \
[9111]at the United States Embassy during this period except for ABIDIAN.
[9113]are ga g0041180
[9117]eatiesd
[9120]14-0000
[9124]cases
[9126]AGB, in
[9128]KOSOLAPOV and GRYAZNOV.
[9130]The first case,| Ca..e5 S70RS2 226} is covered on te
[9132]7 fant
[9134]177 oc the previous summary. Little ecch
[9136]ai corament is consicered
[9137]necessary on this case since there Cocs nor appear tc be any acequate : :
[9138]reason to question the general story
[9140]eZiort agains{ SToRsB=aC) ob . a
[9142]It is recognized and mentioned elsewhere that NOSENKO in 1902 : . ; ;
[9144]exaggerated his personal involvement in the case, particularly in pleci
[9146]himself as present with GRIBANOV wi
[9147]i%
[9148]toSTORSBERG] NOSENKO has retracted this particular claim, but
[9149]_J .
[9151]there is no reason to count that he was engaged ior approximaicly a year
[9153]in the planning and activities which prececec the unsuccessiul approach
[9156]: An issue was previously made over the timing of the approach
[9157]— ob p& }
[9158]to(STORSBERG)|since BTCaSB=ERG fated this as October 1961, NCSENXO
[9160]has indicated about June 1961, and information from GOLITSYN, baseé
[9162]on.remarks by KOVSHUK to kim, had been interpreted as indicating the
[9164]Araceae cect Mis tent nnee mails et ne Sm Se Ante,
[9166]eee Mates, Ter
[9168]em lO Shue chtn ena ES!
[9171]14-0000
[9173]approach occurred at ine "end uo 1960."
[9175]NOSENAO, Guring current
[9176]&ccount of tnelS705 ven sie has
[9177]cate the approach ioe oabbg Dut tne
[9181]e
[9191]When recently. reistervicwes, TORSSE.
[9193]that the approach occurred in Octcser 198i, : _
[9195], his description of collatera. evenis rakes it clear that the approach had :
[9196]to have taxen place considerably earlier,
[9198]06
[9199][Fosers MORONE| anotner code clerk at the United Siates Ombassy,
[9201]wao , will be the- sudject of further discussion beiow, nas seen interviewed
[9203]on the basis of statements by BTORSSERC|:hat soRO83was presect in
[9205]American House the night of the approach. Analysis oz the stacements
[9207]of JRONGNE) teas y
[9209]icates that the even ts[STORSZERG descrises
[9210]: could not have taken place later than the period Feoruary to early May
[9211]1961,°
[9213]. The best estimate possible at this time is that the approach to,
[9215][stonse bn occursd in March - April 1961, which is quite compatible
[9216]with the approximate dating of the approach by NOSENKO, In the face
[9218]of this approximation oz the date of the approaca to}S Sroadheaty it is - oo
[9219]So G001182 . :
[9221]bene et baba ieee ot
[9224]14-0000
[9226]believed reasonable to assume WAGt The rer
[9228]end of 1569, referred vofSTCRS3 =A) and thus SOVSHUX either was
[9230]faneing t6 = fae a ae tee se oe 8 the Gt eer las wae Shen th a eee?
[9231]Perersing 10 & COMPTomMmse Pinse G2 tae Osere.on Tatner tnan tue Gorue.
[9234]_approach, or was prematurely clair:
[9236]summary contain information
[9238]Ob. ext
[9240]@mes Aas SERS}
[9242]4
[9244]ard to the attempted
[9246]As of this time, it is considered that there are x
[9250]His
[9252]i?)
[9257]B
[9258]ie]
[9259]be
[9260]te
[9261]w
[9262]o
[9263]o
[9265]B
[9269]m from NOSENXO waieh in any way
[9271]refiect age inst 3 NOSZNKO. (& a5 ic not zea pactogra
[9273]record iniormation ance informa
[9277]NOSEN “£0 as the Soviet who ma ée a fast appvoachk to him at the <eir-
[9279]242
[9281]+ port, but this does not provice a va tid reason to é “ eve the statement
[9283]of NOSENKO that it was he who tried to talk {Eawhag, ob
[9287]There are certain statements relative to sae \KEYSEAS cas¢ as
[9288]set forta in the pr evious summary wnich require specizic comment.
[9289](a) Tnhe-ssatemeni is mace that no KGS oiticer ob
[9290]‘directly connected with the “OL could segare[KEysz2s) :
[9293]as the replacement for/STORSB=AE in fact, [REY =R5| OG
[9295]_actually was being trained oy[STOASS=RGIas a substitute,
[9297]» nota replacement, evea though his primary assignment
[9298]6001183
[9299]23 . .
[9301]EGRET | _
[9303]cli ate
[9305]premarin ones Nee coher, vam mre ane
[9307]Pecan Foca
[9309]dermal en aied
[9311]FER deere es OF
[9313]14-0000
[9316]i
[9318]CUTTeEnt wteETVaEews Tesacu 26%
[9320]pas
[9322]irom the OTU veports o. co
[9324]had beer away irom coce work for 2 consicerable period
[9326],
[9328]-oftime., In any event, che impression oi NOSENKS we
[9330]" shai[STOASBEAGhwas having @
[9331]the particular work to RoYohsy] Tae coservations of
[9332]-NOSENKO are of interest since sors URE a coca had .
[9333]1, Ok been a coae ciera but, as noted, was being trained .
[9334]vy[SroasBBaG)so that he could act as a substitute. Under
[9335]the circumstances, it is consicered quite Logical that the
[9337]KGB would assume at the time that}KEy SRS fwas to be the
[9339]eventual replacement G-oakhaagy : .
[9341]_(b) The previous summary stated that, "prior to hi
[9343]= 06 | ;
[9345]departure from Moscow, [REYSEAS|acknowledged to his
[9347]supervisors fCoronel URBAN] his homosexual tendencies
[9349]| and he admitted involvement in three homosexual inciderts,
[9351]‘all at the American House" (gaze 179).
[9353]gociie4
[9355]wont: : Inna tet Beales natin" “eat foe cecede te ital aaveneen “rons tg Naan ace eee Sane whet ere meter een g
[9356]: rs oak La Anne warns :
[9359]14-0000
[9361], €ateé 216 Sune 196i, of Colonel Ob
[9364]VR BAN}re [« SAS Was Koi informec by
[9366]Rot to ager
[9367]while withia the Soviet Union."
[9368]- (c) On page 230 of the previous summary, the
[9370]statement is made that, "In the singie case in which he
[9372]JNOSENKG/ asserted that he velicd on information pro-
[9374]B : me _ |
[9376]> cured from microphones (KEYS=RS\ ialure io report
[9378]receipt of the defection invitation) he was in error,"
[9380]While the official record shows thax[KEYSERS) DG
[9381].Gidg indeed report receipt of the defection. letter to}Colozel OG.
[9382]URBAN}n the office of Geienel aa it should be noted
[9384]that this occurred less than one hour before
[9388]se ‘
[9390]the Embassy for the airpoxt. NOSENXO has stated that
[9392]b
[9394]be
[9396]3
[9397]the absence of information to the contrary izom micvopibone .
[9399]and telephone taps, the KGB had concluced snai{KEYSERS]
[9401]had not reported receipt of the defection letter and there-
[9403]Ob
[9405].fore had Gecided to approach|KEYSERS atthe airport. Ih
[9407]PS
[9409]* ; view of the short time betweex[ KEYSERS| report of receipt
[9411]Ob 60041185
[9413]corner
[9415]ad
[9417]« Wi o
[9418]veg! ABeEdGaat Whemetnens mime wes - ee
[9419]yea x gs
[9421]4
[9423]: iH cue a aN
[9426]14-0000
[9428]Gi we lelier anc Lis cesirwure Jeora bDloscow, it would
[9429]4 + ees meee tee He SO ee YO eet .
[9430]nave Deen rermarkiuble if Uhe NCD Lad Leawaced tris ine
[9433]account of NOS=?
[9435]36 Considered co
[9437]Pages 18] - 134 of tne previous summary contain inicrmea
[9439]a at ad dda,
[9441]srotbonne a
[9443]a vegure rol Mathew UTES} who succe
[9445]saving arrived in Moscow in September 1961. GRYAZNOV was the
[9446]0G
[9447]ea ponsibie case Oilicer tor ES Bccoruing to NCSENKO,
[9449]Tae previous su ary stat es {page 333) tha ZUIUS), curing a
[9450]routine debriefing, confirmed aun Embassy report that in che summer of
[9451]1962 he had been intimate with an Austrian woman, "LILLIAN, " wao
[9452]visited the American House with someone from the United Aras Resubiic.
[9453]“LILLIAN was interviewed by the American House manager and she
[9455]claimed to be from Vienna but traveling wi
[9457]to.
[9461]Further inquiry revealed that no Austrian passport nad been issucd
[9463]“"LILLIAN," and she was later asked for her sassport, "LILLIAN"
[9465]replied that she had forgotten it, then leit, and cid not return.
[9466]The previous summary stated that the above incident had been
[9468]described by NOSENKO but in connection with attempts to entrap Joseph
[9470]os [BioRx 1960, sotfEUtS|in 1962. “GOCLLE6
[9472]Net
[9474]i
[9476]|
[9478]| . .
[9479]7 - . 26 . . ;
[9480]j SO us A
[9482]oa TT
[9483]ne |
[9487]me
[9490]Se Co aera
[9492]wee Ea a OM BAT rag coals tee i tet aunts
[9494]eer MEBAI
[9497]14-0000
[9499]OA Acoli ele AReERAreteiie © cee
[9501]a . sow St ote a tee ee nt tml ares cline Sap.
[9502]Page 194 of tie previews sums; relates information irom
[9504]with NOSENKO, - “According to NOSENKO, GAYAZNOV avran ed for
[9506]these two women, agents of the Geriin KGS Residentura, to visit Moscow
[9508]"uncer false Cocumientaiion, One as a West German anc the ciher as an
[9510]Austrian, NOSONAO surther icentizzed the "West German" agent,
[9511]. o>
[9513]at
[9514]D.
[9515]we
[9516]z
[9517]et
[9518]o
[9520]p*
[9521]o
[9522]o
[9523]ir
[9525]-
[9526]a
[9527]P4
[9528]o
[9529]a
[9531]“EANNA, "as having the cover of a journalist, an
[9533]NHANNA! hac met] MORONE bt American House, Ina recent interview,
[9536]MORONS Fost med that in early 196] he had met a West German girl
[9537]‘at American Hodse who claimed to bea journalist. The statements of
[9539]a appear to substantiate tae report of NOSENKO,
[9541]Concerning the agent documented as an Austrian, NOSENKO re-
[9543]ported that sne was queried about her passport at American House and
[9544]as a result the KGB returned her to East Germany without further
[9545]atiempts to use hex at American House.. NOSENKO places this incident
[9546]in the same time period as the "HANNA" Case; i.e., 1960 ~ 1961, He
[9547]has never suggested any connection witl{ 2UIUS, nor is Reese onsen
[9549]0
[9551].to assume that he could be referring to the experience of ZUSUS| since
[9553]this took place in the summer of 1982, after-NOSENKO haé left the
[9557]American Embassy Section.
[9559]aed ETT HE marae ty ts OT
[9561]SANE
[9564]14-0000
[9567]Clic net KAOW enous oe aloe Gackyroune to Rave exercised
[9568]any supervi sion iF Granted that NOSZNAS a
[9569]c! 2 tact is thet NCSENKO 4
[9573]cf +
[9575]time any supervisory func
[9577]Zuo fh who .
[9579]cid not arrive in Moscow untill September 1951, remained in Moscow . ;
[9581]until January 1963. NOS=
[9583]f
[9584]Nad
[9585]oO
[9588]e
[9589]oe
[9590]i
[9591]4)
[9592]e
[9594]t.
[9597]o
[9598]o
[9599]b
[9600]©,
[9601]a
[9603]a
[9604]"iS
[9611]es
[9617]o
[9621]“
[9623].
[9625]mowing anything aoous samen ex 1] January 2962,
[9626]co
[9628]. : Pages 165 ~ 169 of &
[9630]ravious summary contain a Synopsis of
[9632]previous information from NOSESNKO in reaaré to[Paul JENNER} ‘
[9634]- Basically, NOSENKO had reporied that when tse AGB learn2a tar
[9635]Paul LENNER| who was thought to be @ code clerk, was coming ta
[9639]Moscow through Helsinki, a plan was made to send Vadim V. KCSOLAPOV
[9641]to- Helsinki to travel on the same train aq JENNER to Moscow. «A iemale i
[9643]agent of GRYAZNOV was to be piaced on this train at Vyborg ater th : |
[9645]- train “er the USSR. The female agent was to become acquainiec
[9647]ee with JENNER]as a part of a iuiure operation againsy J alban in Moscew, . . 7
[9648]and KOSOLAPOV was also to become acquainted with|J [FENNE =R} dG
[9650]F _ XNOSENKO has stated that the opexation was successiul, that both
[9652]-,| ‘KOSOLAPOV and the female agent made the acguainiance of JENNER} b6 °° 7
[9654]28 9001188
[9656]fee
[9657]1
[9658]gett os Same canteen etesnine eoaehis Rea eaeys
[9662]ce cee rhe am etee oe
[9664]SASS
[9665]TSOP TORY
[9668]14-0000
[9670]ren -
[9672]oeu CLAD OV on . oa
[9674]wal ie Wao
[9676]ee te
[9678]ogo young Russians, “a Soy é
[9680]=f r
[9681]Cone - - .
[9682]NG StFUCK “peo LOnVEeD Sution.
[9684]0) of
[9685]According te] SENNza} they bora said that Agni Se ef FENNER am
[9687]Moscow, |About three months eof RRS eportced Seing approacaued
[9689]anc a girl, probably university stucents,
[9691]again by the same girl, this time at che Moscow airport where he nec
[9693]: gone on courier business, There wis 2 short conversaiion anc she give
[9695]06. . . .
[9697]i JENNER]a phone numver, insisting that ne cali her, The women aise
[9699]advised|JENNER mot t% mention the conversation to anyone, NOSONAO
[9701]i , rn we
[9703]has stated that in an effort to follow up the initial train acquaintance,
[9705]06
[9707]the KGB hae arrangeé Zor the iemale egent to encounter |JENNER at
[9709]So
[9711]‘ the Moscow railroac station cr airport waen he wert alone to meet
[9713]06 ;
[9715]. . Insofar as is known, |FENNER} mas never been shown a paotozrapa
[9717]couriers,
[9718]i . of KOSOLAPOV. ithough KOSOLAPOV was approxima sely 34 years of
[9719]age in 1960, his photograph and remarks by NOSENXO indicate that in
[9720]appearance he was much younger and that he could have passed as a
[9722]university student.
[9724]6001189
[9726](nme. ite Enea a # er nC ern
[9728]14-0000
[9730]PGE LG Seime
[9732]Oo. a
[9734]NNER] wes we only Moscow-bound passe
[9736]KGLOSSOV ja name NOSINKO nassicentiiied as an aitas
[9738]_KOSOLAPOY)- was on the 2 April 1960 train to Moscow,
[9739]The above obvious Giscrezancy has not been and cannot oe clari-
[9741]- - . fied withavailable information, NOSOLAPOV (XOLCSSSOV) w
[9743]~on.the same train as(FENNER or he was neoz, Train ilests indicate
[9744]7 that KCSOLAPOV was not, Neveriaciess, ine "Boy anc girl, probably
[9746]Struck up a conver-
[9748]university students" who, accorcing
[9749]sation with him on the train would appear clearly to be part of the
[9750]operationa: eiiort described by NOSENAO, particularly in view of the
[9752]later approach of this same girl to[SENNER|s: the airport. Thereis
[9753]- |
[9755]mo reason to question that tris girl was the female ager of CRYAZNOV. |
[9757]In view of the conflict between the train manifest and siarements by
[9758]: ' “NOSENKO, however, it is not clear who the “boy student" was; whether
[9760]this somehow was KOSOLAPOYV. or whether it may have been some
[9762]-other person entirely. GO 041150
[9764]30 —
[9765]ernsty
[9766]oLvre i
[9768]cack pbs we TN Te tame
[9770]HE hearer ateMNited vee wes
[9772]Dee
[9774]14-0000
[9776]evidence that KOSOLAPOV could not have Gees
[9778]Ob ;
[9779]JENNER, Neither is
[9781]Tnexe is just nota satisfactory ans
[9785]petween the train manifests anc tne
[9787]06
[9789]KOSOLAPOV anc|JENNER| Were on
[9793]cic mot travel with|JENNE: , SiS COGS UG eStaslish as than -
[9794]that NCSENKO is wrong; it is evicerce tiaz he Coes not know somecining ”
[9796]he, 45 the supervisur of KOSOLAPOV, should nave known accoréing to
[9798]his own statements.
[9800]Pages 190 - 192 contain a summary of previous information in
[9801]regard to the ohn EARLANB)case, [GARLAND]was idertified by
[9802]NOSENKO as & code clerk whom the KGS was stucying, but on whom
[9803]no cerogatory information was developed. NOSENKO provided practicaliy
[9804]no details in regard rofSan bans other than to identity him as a cede
[9805]clerk,
[9806]GOLITSYN has reported on an incident which it is considered
[9807]relates to the trip ot GAnDRNS rom Helsinki to Moscow on 16 November :
[9808]1960. GOLITSYN reported that in NovembSer 1960 the Helsinki KGB
[9809]Residency received a cable from Moscow advising that an American
[9811]code clerk would be arriving in Helsinki en route to Moscow and that }
[9813]gouuigg
[9816]w
[9822]Banat cate
[9824]4
[9826]14-0000
[9828]tee
[9830]SCD hoped to Costinus in Mesceow, GOLITSYN talked to ACSULAPOV
[9832]a place in the compartment of the Amevsican on the irain irom Helsing’
[9834]to Moscow,
[9836]The previous summary also stated GOLITSYN heed céviscd ¢
[9838]3)
[9840]Section" (First Section, SCD) about the case on waich he had nelsed
[9843]os KOSOLAPOV. According to GOLITSYN, the ofcvicer resusce to ciscuss : so vf
[9844]the case and he, GOLITSYN, conclucéed from this reaction that it must
[9846]have resulted ina successiul recruitment.
[9848]It has been Getermined that GOLITSYN, in an interview with the
[9849]€BI on 20 March 1962, referred to the above "SCD oficer from the
[9850]Embassy Section" as (fnu) ZENKIN of the American Devartment.
[9851]GOLITSYN also statec that the ofiicer was in Helsixxi uncer the alias
[9852]of SERGEEV (SERGZYEV), but was unabie to-furnish a rst name and
[9853]patronymic for SERGEYEV. GOLITSYN referred to (inu) ZENXN zs
[9855]' being from the American Department, SCD.
[9857]It is considered that there is no Goubt that the (Inu) ZENKIN :
[9859]referred to by GOLITSYN is the individual of the same last name Ds -
[9863]poe et mieten cates ine Tra eae oy
[9864]weeds we fa
[9870]7 AL
[9873]14-0000
[9875]On A crmeremine ne ne nttnee rl wee eee eo
[9877]lee a
[9878]i
[9879]concerning whoin NOSENKO nas furnisnce information. NOSINKO
[9881]has identified ZENAIN (whose cirut mime nc Coes nor secall Sur
[9883]against American intelligence anc that ZENAIN was a member of tris
[9885]group, NOSONKO has acvised that ZENIIN traveled abrazd in connection
[9886]with activities of the Second Section, Sur that ne had nu speciiic knowleége
[9888]'. yegarding the activities of ZENKXIN oa these trips. NOSENKO has iur-
[9890]nished some izagmeatary information wnics he learn
[9892]ZENKIN ane when the full name of SERGEYEV (ZENKIN) to ether with
[9894]is photograpa is obtained, this fragmentary information from NCSENKO
[9896]As regards tne KOSOLAPOV{GARLAND fatter anc the opinion
[9898]expresseé ay GOLITSYN based on the resusal of ZENKIN to G
[9900]bt
[9902]Tay prove quite useiul,
[9904]case (GARLAND) that it must have resuited ina successiul recruitment,
[9906]there appears to be an inadequate basis for this presutmpiion. According
[9908]NOSENKO, and there is no reason to disbelieve NOSZNXO on this
[9910]point, ZENKIN was in the Second Section, not tae First Section, in
[9912]1960 - 1961, He was not Chief of the Section, but only a Senior Case
[9914]33 — g001:4193
[9916]a ee
[9919]14-0000
[9921]it Coes noi appear that ZONAIN would nucessarily have knowe
[9923]eu
[9925]any
[9927], ‘ folowing the lead trom G
[9928]. _ the physical description of KOSOLASOV on the Melsinki-to-Moscow
[9929]~ trip, and denied ever being approached by Soviet InteHizgence, Later
[9931]interviews by the FBl and a polygraps interview did not indicate that he
[9933]. rae,
[9935]had ever met KCSOLAPOV or that ne cad ever knowingiy been coniaciec
[9936]by any foreign intelligence agent.
[9938]It is accepted tnat KOSCLAPOV went.from Moscow to Helsinsi
[9940]in November 1960, thai he talked with GOLITSYN there, anc that he
[9942]was on the same train as}|GARLAND|izom Helsinki to Moscow. it is
[9944]also accepted that NOSENKO is unaware that HOSOLAPOV made a tri;
[9946]‘to Helsinki in November 1960,
[9948]ide the USSR or Bloc countries
[9950]Travel for an SCD officer out
[9951]requires high-level approval, according to NOSENKO. It does not
[9953]poctis4
[9956]RET
[9958]Se ere ee
[9960]VME AS bb 8 6 gay hee Me tiineeetticateinhe aatne re en casas ©
[9963]14-0000
[9966]_ :
[9967]1
[9968]; ; thus must inevitaaty ° nave been 2 involve
[9969]: os turtie * support 3. have x. WOW? DEOUS . 4
[9970]. the x
[9971]7 . Om taken by/NCSENKG Gz thi :
[9972]7 ; the statement Dy. the inseaviewer thes ROSSLAD
[9973]. net “but he says at be, NOSENKO, 5
[9974]: chtet it. He adds only that had anything sé; ' :
[9975]eect ofeatlans, : he would have Seen aware of it. . vt
[9976]eee iia NOSENXO, a6 supervisor. ¢ of the | group working against coce ,
[9977]re . wend clerks, should i have known ‘ of any, trip of KOSOLAPOV to Fintand :
[9978]. JOS TI OAT SOI BEE NAD Be
[9979]" .. _1960.0r 1961, NOSENKO himself was out of Moscow on a trip to Cuba 1
[9980]he tbe _from 18 November 1960 to circa 37 December 1960. _ The possisiiiy
[9981]cee xists that this could 7 have accounted ed ior his iack Gi maowzed ge of the so :
[9982]i. trip of KOSOLAPOV to Heisinkt and revurn to Moscow on 16 Noverber
[9983]lola. af. Pe wee ee tees oN .
[9984]ee meen However, NOSENKO } has not a trempted to use his Cuban trip 43
[9985]: - a possible | explanation ior not mow ang oz tae 2 Novembe x KOSOLAPCV
[9986]| Tet the Paces mereenne *
[9987]Looe
[9988]Lthe frp. 7 rn PIV erie fey , ‘
[9990]La tele SV ee
[9992]As with the |JENNE ERLKOSOLAPOV case, it is not poppe at
[9994]this time to resoive the discrepancies pextaining to melGAR LAND} . :
[9996], erent teen an wee
[9998]'  KOSOLAPOV trip. The fact that NOSENXO denies any knowledze,¢¢ i ‘
[9999]an HAUS We ss) ;
[10000]Ce (@fane i- :
[10001]Milas ‘ : H
[10002]’ + Aaemaaonenan ena ene eS Alencar wit etary. Lat OL et ty tegen =o oe 7 a F mae H
[10003]7 |
[10004]t
[10006]“
[10007]6
[10010]14-0000
[10012]lee ag ts etka, oi his not knowing something ne, by his own
[10014]Vode -- statements ;’ should - have known, .
[10016]eee ace eel oe Voewed in-the context of the total kncowledze of NOSENKO of ~
[10018]eee "operpeions against code clerks, owever, neither the problems in the
[10020]Tae ose: ~ ean nor those in daa cae singly ‘or combined,
[10022]= in any’ way: represent conclusive evidence that NOSENKO Was not suDer-.
[10024]or-of- KOSGLAPOV or that he was not responsible for the code clerk
[10026]CHa gone “operations: described -by NOSENKO, This statement, Aowever, was not.
[10028]Wha ne ayy,
[10030]+. '-4 igubstantiated in the previous summary. wale
[10032]ve. vet s+ + + Pages 193'- 199 of the previous summary contain an account of
[10034]¢..5-. °" KGB activity against code clerk[Joseph NA RONE rom various sources,
[10036]“+ inéluding NOSENKO.” -NOSENKO first mentioned the casein 1962.
[10038]meet Accoxting to NOSENKO, the responsible case officer for work
[10039]; v) . ;
[10040]web sate against|[MORONE|was: KOSOLAPOV. When it was leartied trailwoxox 3] OL
[10042]wo itso Tang an-‘Embassy colleague, a Marine guard by the’ name of Babes] were
[10043]ss. c .loplakbing a vacation trip to Warsaw, arzangements were made with the
[10044]i. LS 2 CLUB (die Polish Sécurity.Service) for a iemale Polish agent to come to
[10046]vse) Moscow and travel rom there to Warsaw on the same train as|M@MORONE
[10048], ~ana[BEGCS} The-intent was. for the agent, either on the train or sub-
[10052]" sequently in Warsaw,-to meet and comprossise] MORONS ettaly. She
[10053]. -? Vey
[10054]fro
[10056]. | CO . . 0041496
[10059]14-0000
[10061]succespsully accompiis.ed this, put Cue to ceriain problems in KG3-UB
[10062]liaison relations, it was not poosivic ior the KG3 to expioit this cirectiy. .
[10064]The previous summary stated that with respect te the female
[10065]UB agent, there was persuasive evidine
[10067]KOSOLAPOV playeé the roles in
[10069]NOSENKO, That summary cited th
[10071]ob
[10073]of KOSCOLAPOV to Finland at approximately the same time as tie] MORONS]
[10075].KOSOLAPOV being invoivec personally in this part of the MORONS] 06
[10076]/ Case.
[10077]NOSENKO has stated that KCSOLAPOV met the Polish femzle
[10078]wagent and'made the arrangements to place ner on the train to Warsaw.
[10079]Fiona ALES coracte Moscow on 12 November 1960, itis not
[10080]‘mown when KOSOLAPOV leit Moscow for Helsinki, but he was on the
[10081]16 November 1960 train manifest zs ceparting Helsinki for Moscow.
[10082]NOSENKO departed Moscow on 15 November 1960 fox Cuda. The
[10083]: activities described by NOSENKO are therecore possible within the
[10084]known time frame, .
[10086]It is clear that NOSENKO in 1962 exaggerated his personal role
[10088]an) _
[10089]in the MORONE|case, particularly wnen he stated that he, NOSENKO,
[10091].placed the female agent on the train. NOSENKO now clearly states that
[10093]6001197
[10094]37
[10096]Cu ne teettae 1 BE
[10098]+ hoe oem ne anaes RAE EAL ET et ne Oo Sete 2 Few dats
[10100]x
[10101],
[10103]ORIN SER SS
[10104]ARGININE TS
[10105]POSEEES ay ES AUPE
[10109]14-0000
[10111]NOSENKO previously stated that a HGB technician who was on the train
[10112]from Moscow to Warsaw reposted back to NOSENXO the cay after the
[10114]rrivec in Warsaw, Later NOSENAO said that instead of talking
[10120]to the technician personaly, he may have read the report of the technician
[10122]after he returned from Cuba,
[10124].The activities Cescrisec by NCSENXO with re 5 od
[10128]‘are accordingty possibie within the Known time frame. It is not con-
[10129]‘sidered that the retractions NOS ENKO has made from his original
[10130]Statements on this operation are of sufiicient signiiicance to materially
[10131]‘discredit him.
[10132]Page 198 of the previous summary contains the statement that
[10133]4 :
[10134]| Mononz when interviewed, denied having been intimate with Svetiana
[10135]IVANOVA, a KGB agent employed at tne American House, NOSZNKO
[10136]“had stated that IVANOVA waa instructed to report everything she saw
[10137]or heard concerning) MORONE (page 194). The summary, sowever,
[10138]ae ate
[10139]cited a number of reports that[MORONE\nad been intimate with IVANOVA
[10140]and with Ella UMANETS, also a KGB agent employea at the American
[10142]House, and commented that NOSENKO therefore wa apparently unaware
[10144]: “of the sexual involvement of Bs with "IVANOVA's friends,"
[10146]G001138
[10149]14-0000
[10153]Yas : i * ~~
[10154]2east SOMe invosvem
[10157]e
[10158]-
[10160]ent of LVANOVA we
[10162]nished information on a developing operation against Marine
[10163]f
[10164]of b
[10165][GARCIA (Anthony A. GARCH) based on tis inveivemen: of[Ga “s
[10167]with IVANOVA, He hes also staiedé that the poss bility was con
[10169]Ob
[10170]of using IVANOVA ageinsi]MORONE fo Gbiain compromising paotograpns,
[10172]This pian was seriously affectec when it wes
[10174]militiaman/XGB guard at the United States Embassy that IVANOVA,
[10175]Ob
[10177]her girl friezd, [MORCNE S}ene a@ Marine guzrd, possibly GARTAAL nad
[10179]been "in the city," then returned to the "slat! of one of the Marinss
[10181]where the girls spent the night, This apparently laced the reliability
[10183]of IVANOVA in question in the eyes of the First Section,
[10185]According to the previous summary, NOSENKO stated that Pictro
[10187]CECCHI, Italian coox at the American Embassy and agent of KOSOLAPOV,
[10189]reported on Americans at the Embassy, bus NOSENKO recalled sovning
[10191]Ob .
[10193]specific that CECCHI had reported abou MORON=| The surunary also
[10194]ie)
[10195]states that{MORONE\was said by other American Embassy employees
[10197]0)
[10198]to be a close friend of CECCHi and that MORON had admitted black
[10200]market money exchanges with CECCHI,
[10202]During current interviews, NOSENKO has statec that CECCH
[10204]Og
[10206]furnished "pieces" of information concerning| MORON but he, NOSENXO,
[10208]go01199
[10210]ANT)
[10216]14-0000
[10218]new of no black market invaavemes: ef MORONE with loprerersee
[10222]NAO has also incicuted thai ue NGG sometines suspected,
[10224]Za
[10225]Le)
[10226]77)
[10229]fully report cveryt.
[10231]was aware that’ COCCHI was involvec in the black market, However,
[10233]yneiher he reporied to é : : th whore is
[10234]Open tO Questius; Viz., the [Maurice ZVWANG case Sciow,
[10236]' The comment was mace in the srevious summary that NOSEN
[10238]g oi
[10240]was unaware thay| oLSNE met some Soviet females in the spring
[10242]196] at the apartment of Sarwat el SHAZLY, en Sgyptian-national KGS
[10243]agent of the Sixth Department who was aiso reporting on Americans,
[10244]and was intimate with one in this apartment,
[10246]A review of oificial records incicates that[MORONZ}eie report
[10247]having met some Soviet giris at the apartment of Sarwat, but there is
[10248]no indication that he admitted or thet anyone ¢lse has reported that i.e
[10249]was intimate with any of them. The conciusion of the previous summery
[10250]inthis regard was baged on a misizzerpretation, Accordingly, since
[10251]there is no reason to believe that any compromise incident took place
[10253]in the Savwat apartment, the story of NOSENKO ona this matter is con-
[10255]sidered completely acceptable,
[10257]49 Gg001260
[10261]14-0000
[10263]“
[10265]NOSENKO on these cases was cons
[10267].
[10270]read
[10272]A few comments
[10274]previous summary on pages 169 - 204. Comments were mice there
[10276]concerning[five code clerks, Mauvice ZWANG, Joan TAYLOR, Frank Os 06, 06, XG 06,06
[10277]. . . } /
[10281]DAY, Robert DWELLY and Jose
[10283]sper ‘iically stated, the suggeszion is apparent t
[10285]hai the reporting of
[10287]perspective: L
[10288](a) (Maurice ZWANG - ZWANG was identified by.
[10289]NOSENKO as a code clerk who was actively "worked on‘!
[10290]duririg 1960 - 1961. The previous summary suggested
[10291]that the “SL, edge of NOSENKO regarding XGB activity
[10292]ein BAT inadequate, First, reporting of
[10293]NOSENKO on|ZW Ba eo atained no reference to the
[10294]relationship ofl ZWANG]with th his maid, whom NOSENKO
[10295]in another case has identifiea as a AGB agent. Althouga
[10296][EWANG]éentec sexual relations with his maid, he did
[10297]admit to some intimacies with her in her apartment,
[10299]Oe
[10300]During polygraph examination ZWANG) reacted when he
[10305]14-0000
[10307]Loe
[10309]+ < fete Bi ig on, Oe Gg NOUSEN KO t9 ve
[10310]Telaions With his Maia. The c.lase OF NOSENAO to ze-
[10312]Dut also Can be DieuSibly eXploined by Jauky memory on
[10314]iis part or fail
[10316]oi this relationship to the AGE,
[10318]Secornc, NOSSNNO haan
[10320]was invoived ia the currency operations of Pietro CZCCEI,
[10322]. — > .
[10324]known from KGB agent CECCHI.) From
[10326]employees, making it plausible that CZCCril was eliner
[10328]unaware of the invoivem cit of1Z FANG or, as NOSENKO
[10330]himseli stated he suspectec, CECCHI did not report all
[10331]Getails of his currency opevations to bis AGB handijer,
[10333]{o) [John TAYLOR |- NogeNxo igentisied [FAYLoa] 06
[10334])
[10335]as {a State Department code clerdjand target of KOSCLAPOV.
[10337]06
[10339]he KGB was aware of the involvemez:z of ay LOR|with
[10341]04
[10343]his Soviet maid, but no attemp: was made to recruit(TAY LOR] .
[10345]before his departure in early 1961 since to do so might
[10347]g001202
[10351]14-0000
[10353]LE ates tne ene rete
[10355]endanger the plans Jor a recruliment approach ro[Jemes
[10357]‘STORSBERG Gh WhO had Qcen uncer development for almost ‘
[10361]a year and was consideced more valuable.
[10363]The implication of
[10365]the explanation given avy NOSENXO was suvject to question
[10366]ough[STORSBERG | 66
[10368]was not approacsed until aiter the departure oifFAY WOR} 06
[10370]failed to take into account the fact that aith
[10372]the ‘a against|STORS2=RG\was underway beiore
[10373]FAT LOAbecame involvec with his maid. Further, itis
[10374]apparent that the KGB did not abandon interest ial] TA FLORIO
[10375]since ne was approached ata later date outside the USSR
[10376]on the basis of his previous afiair with his maid
[10377]Ob
[10378]({c) [Exszs DAY \- NOSENKO identizied) Prank DAY|as
[10379]| y
[10380][2 State Departmient code O8 who was ine target o: ciiner
[10381]KOSOLAPOV or GRYAZNOV. According to NOSENKO,
[10382]nothing "interesting' "was } learned abou «Dark nd no oper-
[10384]ational measures were taken agains BA The previous :
[10386]ob
[10387]summary noted that in July 1961 [Day|teav veiled to the
[10389]Caucasus with his friend ancfiermes overt CIA employee, (5 6& Q4
[10391]Agricultural Atiache G, Stanley ; sown} It was also
[10393]stated that the two were uncer surveillance by five persons :
[10395]: . 9001203
[10398]14-0000
[10400]|
[10401]|
[10402]|
[10403]|
[10404]|
[10405]|
[10406]|
[10408]at all tumes on the
[10410]local coverage of any emp.oyee at the Uni
[10412]KGB organization, not the SCD. Ik woule appear that the
[10413]locai organization was trying to do a thorough job on[ Day | Ob
[10414](oe OG ee
[10416]and BROWN| ‘but it apparently was nonproductive. lt Goes
[10418]not seem justiziadie to expect that NOSENXO snould Lave
[10419]recalled a trip a procuced no resulis,
[10421](a)) Robert DWwEiLy|- NOSENKO hes related in con-
[10423]siderable cetaii the eiforts of NOSES TO: RYAZNGOV anc
[10424]06) 0
[10426]KGSOLAPOV to involve|Robert DWELLY, a coce cier|
[10427]Moscow from April 1959 - July 1960, in & nomosexus. com-
[10428]promise operation. According to NOSENKO, a homosexual
[10430]: agent os GRYAZNOV was of the opinion wit. F]wae a - :
[10432]‘homosexuai, : . .
[10434]can | Gau42c4
[10437]14-0000
[10439]NOSENKO concerning MOL ellos to €ctermize wren
[10441]Ob
[10443]and a DWSLLY [was golag "into the city” (viescow)
[10445]Ca)
[10446]oO
[10448]that a homosexual compromise situation could be
[10450]aryanged, There were no speciiic Cevelosmenis irom
[10452]teeters
[10454]their eiiorts, OL rGing to NOSENXOG.
[10456]oO
[10458]Bwie ZLLY has categorically denied bein
[10459]sexual; NOSENKO has not said ne was, but only that the
[10461]homosexual agent of GRYAZNOV assessed] DWLLLY|as
[10463]a homosexuzi. There Coes not appear io be any reason
[10465]to consicer the statements of NCSZNKO adouy| DWELLY| Ob
[10466]as refiecting adversely on NCSENKO.~.
[10467](e) [Joseph AS eee - NOSENKO has identified
[10469]\Joseph GAFFEY|as 2 ode cers} The previous summary
[10471]im that NOSZENXO had siated the KGB had tried to lure
[10472]pealtay into downtown Moscow, using | Svetlana IVANOVA,
[10473]an agent of DEM. GAIN in the Americ an House.
[10474]oe” way of comment, the previous suramary stated
[10475]snare seine in Moscow in Sepreniper 2961 and
[10477]taat| Fred KADERA had reported th. thai] GAP env nad told him
[10479]he had been intimate with a Russian girl-at the AmegeE2C 5
[10482]14-0000
[10486]House, It was fusines noice thar\Gars
[10488]irom Moscow in
[10490]ness and Guring interview nad wcuitied being intimate
[10492]ment and that she had cliuimed pregnancy.
[10493]As to whether ine a5uve inlormation raises a
[10494]question concerning NOSENXO, the following sacrers
[10495]should be camsidered:
[10496](1) NOSENKO has stated that curing the
[10497]Jatter part of December 1961 he was part tirce
[10498]in the First Department and part time in tie
[10499]Seventh Department, and that-he reported full
[10500]time to the Seventh Department after New
[10501]Years Day 1902.
[10503](2) In addition to the information previously
[10505]mentioned as furnished bylGAFFeY Curing inter-
[10508]. Ob:
[10509]view, Gar by|also Stated that he was first:
[10510]intimate with IVANOVA in kis room on 27 December
[10511]1961 and was also intimate with hes later on three
[10512]06
[10514]occasions at her apartment. According to|GAFFEY
[10516]_IVANOVA told nim of her pregnancy about 1 May
[10518]erpncy
[10519]Vode!
[10521]gooi2c6,
[10523]PE MNP TET NE
[10526]14-0000
[10528]1962, which is appsox
[10530]NOSENNO hee Steied i
[10532]Department.
[10534]puone coverage on the United States Embassy has pr
[10537]e
[10538]oO
[10541]te
[10542]we
[10543]o
[10544]o
[10545]G
[10546]te)
[10548]mentioned in tais summary.
[10552]contained a deiailec account o
[10553]of microphones, countermeasures taken by the Americans in 1964, and
[10555]Gamage estimates prepared by the Americans. The previous conclusica
[10557]rye
[10559]was that his information did not sustain his claim to have been Deputy
[10561]Chief, First Section, or Lis claim rhat he personally reviewed the KGB
[10563]5
[10565]riicrophone monitoring reports. Cormments have been mace in this
[10567]summary in regard to this previous conclusion,
[10569]A few remarks, itis beiieved, will assist in a fuller understar7i-~
[10571]of the microphone matter. In the material brougat out by NOSENKO.u..
[10573]1964, there was a single sheet oi paper containing on one side haz.
[10574]written notes which NOSENKO ideniiiied as a list of tne active micro- -
[10575]phones (those which were being monitored) in tie United States Embass
[10576]This list is given on page 227 of the previous summary and need not be
[10578]. repeated here. The acquisition of this list by NOSENKXO was character-
[10580]- ized in the previous suramary as singular and it was stated that NOSENXO
[10582]go01207
[10583]47
[10585]SeCHet
[10587]ea De cea ent AIR ne eee Bataan ak sea”
[10589]14-0000
[10591]eee ne
[10593]tha NOSINKO than hac been
[10595]Gone delore, His expianaiion, both of
[10597].
[10599]aces waicn lec to
[10601]g tne list as wellas oi his siilih
[10603]judgment: of the previous summary.
[10605]NOSENKO has statec that i... 139 - 5961 Viadimir I PETROV
[10607]Cahier of the Second Section, First Department, cesired some "soints"
[10609]for use against targets os his section, NOSENKO uses th
[10611]@3 the term “point”
[10613]not as meaning just a micropaone, but as referring to an OTU sub-unit
[10615]which includes microphones as well as the necessary monitors and
[10620]mw “
[10622]transiatoys to covery the microphone end translate the "take,"
[10623]targets of PETROV were primarily Americans anc, therefore, there
[10625]was a transcription-translation problem.
[10627]According to NOSENKO, most of the available "points
[10629]assigzed to the First Section to cover microphones in the. Uniiec States
[10630]Embassy. The Chief of the First Department, Viadimir A. XLYPIN
[10632]held a meeting attended by KLYPIN, Chief of the First Sectioa Viadislav
[10634]oz which
[10636]6001208
[10638]KOVSHUK, Vladimir 1. PETROV, anc NOSENKO, the purpose
[10640]48
[10642]- SEPDET
[10643]rome!
[10645]neem ne ste ee tare Se
[10648]SHEET Oe) MPT ANTI CMe anim denen eu ERE A ere rere one diieen sm ar -
[10650]et
[10652]sow
[10655]14-0000
[10657]Was to Giscuss the po50.0%
[10658]. Embassy "point
[10660]PETROV to use
[10662]pee Ba wey ee
[10663]gat to tae me
[10665]or Names of ceriain targets to which he wished to give tecanical cover- . ¢
[10667]rently took 4 piece o: paper
[10669]age. During?
[10670]which PETROV hac end wrote on it a list of active microphones in the
[10671]United States Embassy and resicences. When the meciing enced,
[10672]NOSENKO had this paper anc he took it back to his office,
[10673]Contained on the reverse side of che paper were the ioliowing
[10675]06,06 - if ob ; =.
[10676]names in Russian: [Luan, MoCH, With BURTIN| fan[Si; be BURTS 3} .
[10678]: Ar
[10679]The name A, A. MIXHAYLOV was listed next to the name of LUBin} 0b
[10680]and the name of ¥Y, E, CHERNETSEV was listed next to the name of
[10681]” Hb j
[10682]ed tha LUBIN, SMITH, Wil BURTIN] 06, 06,06
[10684]SMITH, NOSENKO has exypi
[10685]and [Sipe BU TiN|were among the targets of PET ROV; anc MIKHAY LGV
[10687]t
[10689]Bb
[10691]and CHERNETSEV were oizicers of the Secoxd Sectiozn,
[10693]non-Soviet
[10695]NOSENKO siated he imew nothing more about the Zou:
[10696]. ; .
[10697]names except that they were targets of PETROV, NOSENKO stated isat
[10699]he could not be positive of the cate of the meeting other than that i
[10700]occurred while KLY PIN was Chies of the First Deparimenx:, (Accoréing
[10702]to NOSENKO, KLYPIN was succeeded by Sergey M. FHEDOSEYEV as
[10704]“ — gouazc9 os
[10706]: ROP RIT Oo .
[10707]| . erbnél :
[10709]so . anal ee ee pe ek te Sten eo vate cated
[10712]14-0000
[10714]LUBING ang that Will GUATIN asc
[10716]ol U6
[10718]wink] Sipe being tne Wile of WV
[10720]7 pro oN Upper aa eee en net ae
[10721]CLO int Seon Th788 OTe AMETiCan
[10723]has still not Seen icertiziec.
[10724]In view of the above, it has Geen possibie to cecuce ce Gate
[10726]oi the meeting cailed by XLUYPIN as, cizca June 2962.
[10728]Bove
[10730]o
[10732]escrised
[10734]o.
[10736]According ta NOSENKO, the piece of pape
[10738]was placec by NOSZONXO wits olher notes he Kept between the pazes.
[10739]of a bound volume which NOSENXO cails a “working copy." This,
[10740]according to NCSENXO, wes an accouniable, registerec novebook
[10742]they were supposed to write a2] their
[10744]ued to all ofiicers
[10746]notes, cestroying any other notes,
[10748]According to NOSENKO, he, lixe many other oiticers, did not
[10750]completely foiicw regulations anc the tendency was to irecuently put
[10752]loose notes in the notebook so t: nae the notebook octen actec as a sile
[10754]rather than being used in the way required by regulations, NOSENKO
[10756]: kas stated that when ke leit the First Section he took various notes
[10758]' with him to the Seventh Departmect; these incluced notes he kad drafted
[10760]: concerning certain First Section activities for use in briefing FEDOSEYE
[10762]~ . C001210
[10764]we
[10766]aA AD cat inate ete ie oe
[10770]ePrints MiemB RG AEB oe ee Be nk a mre om 7 ST Nee SY Mg
[10774]14-0000
[10776]when PEDO SYEV succecded ALTPIN, anc noies ae had prenarec Jor
[10778]Departmen,
[10780]In consideration of the above explanation by NOSENKC, it should
[10782]be noted that
[10784]FEDOSEYEV
[10785]in the First Section; e.g., his notes (:. . . scture ta the Seventh
[10786]Directorate in regard to a "mass surve..lauce" on the American
[10787]Embas sy.
[10789]By including a section {pages 236 + 235} on tae know.edge of
[10790]NOSENKO of the KGB cryptologic attack on Unitec States Embassy
[10791]communications, he previous summary implies that there is some
[10792]reason to question his informatioz on this sub,
[10794]NOSENKO has asserted that the KGB hac never succeeded in
[10795]reading enciphered communications of the Service Attaches; however,
[10796]he said that the Eighth Directorate (the unit of the KCB responsible for
[10797]communications intercept and cryztologic anaiysis) was reaGing some
[10798]United States Embassy traific. While it is open to guestion to what
[10800]: extent knowledge of successes of the Eighth Directorate would be known
[10802]cOOL24it
[10806](
[10808]oe)
[10811]g
[10812]4
[10813]4
[10815]OTN pe te gin cantante Tate rhe nao eke ree mee nT an . Ot ee
[10818]14-0000
[10820]to anyone ia the
[10822]PAT © Rrverves
[10824]ie case Officer for any of the listed CIA oflicers, Accorcdin
[10826]see
[10828]to his claim, NCSENKO ss.ouid h jam N. MORSLU
[10831]i
[10832]G
[10833]CO
[10834]ts
[10837]G
[10838]t
[10839]i
[10840]t
[10842]zs
[10846]te
[10848]was CIA, but he has never identified MOXZLiLas CIA. Surely XOVSEU:z -
[10849]o . . *
[10851]anew MORELL was CIA but why NOSENKO is not aware MORELL was
[10852]CIA is not known, It has already been estadlisned, nowever, that
[10853]NOSENKO, as Deputy Chief, was not aware of ali of the activities ci
[10854]KOVSHUX,
[10856]As regards some oi the other listed incividuais, a-lew remarks
[10857]are appropriate,
[10859]@) NS OSENKO has never indicated any knowiecge
[10860]Paui GARBLER was CIA, and yet GARBLER was surely
[10861]known to the FCD as a CIA empsoy ee before gon, Z to
[10863]: Moscow, It is presumed that the FCD furnished the SCD
[10865]at least basic iniormation that Paul GARBLER was
[10867]—_ “American Intelligence." GARBLER, however, did not
[10871]52 : .
[10874]Hit h .
[10877]BE
[10878]. Mt ‘ _ ears ui Ra
[10879]wae se ate te ee ts ed Nisiteetee . * MESON SSN aS
[10881]14-0000
[10883]we ee
[10885]196., omly a raonta
[10887]ar
[10889]ve in Moscow until Nove
[10891]bpeiore NOSENXO iekt the Fire: Section for the Seventh
[10893](5) The previous summary siuted that according
[10895]October 1960 to September 1961, The “intensive AGB
[10897]OS
[10899]surveillance" is based on statéments of/MAHGNEY|\and
[10900]may possibly be more a reflection of his personal concern
[10901]over surveillance rather than what was actually happening.
[10904].(c) [Steve WASHENKO]was correctly iderntisied by
[10905]NOSENKO as CIA. William HORBALY was CIA ancé
[10906]ideniiiieé by NOSENKO as suspected of being a CA officer
[10907]or cooptee, :
[10909]i6) Lewis BOWDEN, who was not CIA, was, according
[10910]to NOSENKO, suspected oi being a CIA officer.
[10912]George Payne WINTERS, Jr., has stated that
[10914]KOVSHUK warned WINTERS that BOWDEN was the "FBI
[10916]officer" in the Embassy. The Cherepanov Papers indicate
[10918]g001215
[10920]; cungenee ven oe ne Neder
[10921]re gdb nee set wey
[10923]3
[10924]rf
[10927]14-0000
[10931]that the ICCB had rescone to consider the activitles of
[10933]BOWDEN with suspicion.
[10935]It io not balleved that the Hated fatlures of NOSENKO to identlly
[10936]CIA officers are of particular signifleance in establighing that he was
[10937]ev was not Deputy Chief of the First Section. Thero are too mary un-
[10938]kaown facters wich would need to be considered. Despite cur ascump-
[10939]tlons as to what the KGB knows, itis possible that (5) the KGB did not
[10940]know of the CIA affiliation of these people, (b} the taformatton known
[10941]te the KGB was not availabie at the Firat Section, First Department,
[10942]lewel, or (c) information available to the Chief of the First Section or
[10943]to a specific cass officer waa of no official concern to NOSENKO and .
[10944]was not made svailable to him. The last of theee possibilities to
[10945]suggested in spite of claims by NOSINKO that he had to have known
[10946]whatover was known in the Section regarding CIA identifications; a
[10947]propenoity on the part of NOSENKO to exeggerate the area of hia own
[10948]hnowledgeability hso been ceen elecwhere in this case.
[10950]Pages 252 - 258 of tha previous summary contala a report of
[10951]the 1960 trip of NOSENKO to Cuba and bis 1961 trip to Bulgaria. With
[10952]regard to the Cuba trip, there is collateral evidence of his traval 2s
[10953]deseribod by NOSENKO, and there is no substantive reason to doubt
[10955]his account of his activitiea on this trip. The statement was made la
[10957]s4 - goui2i4
[10961]14-0000
[10963]AS NR IUNED ies Chm enema =
[10965]x)
[10966]i
[10967]Ge
[10968]be
[10969]o
[10970]i
[10971]6
[10972]mn
[10973]B
[10974]rf
[10976]ct
[10977]oO
[10978]ie]
[10979]t
[10980]o
[10981]p
[10982]te
[10983]we
[10984]an
[10985]os
[10986]Cre
[10988]the previous summary that the vr
[10989]damaged his claim that he was supervising onerations against Embissy
[10991]code clerks at the time,
[10993]say that no supervisor in the SCD would be permit
[10995]abroad unrelated to his supervisory function, a judgment for wl
[10997]there is no supporting evidence.
[11001]As regards tie trip of NOSENKOG io Bulgaria in 1961, dor which
[11002]there is no collateral iniorraaiion, the previous summary concluced
[11004]that his account of the trip was untrue anc argued that such a trip to
[11005]Bulgaria, iz it did take place, at a time when he claimed the operation
[11006]aseine{StonSSEAG]was reaching a climax and his subordinates were
[11007]“apparentiy planning to exploit] KEYSERS} newly -ciscovered vulnerability, "
[11009]it would indicate that the presence of NOSENKO in Moscow was Cis-
[11011]pensable. There was, however, no evidence that NOSENKO Gicé not
[11013]travel to Bulgaria and only highly specwative reasoning as to why ais
[11015]account of the purpose of the trip was untrue, .
[11017]As to th STORSBERG fase, while it cannot at present be proved .)
[11018]that the recruitment pitch took place before NOSED NAO leit for Bulgaria,
[11019]it can be stated, on the basis of reporting cconfc Ob, that it had to
[11021]have taken place before the time NOSENKO returned from Bulgaria.
[11023]Since no serious question has ever been raised concerning nese nce
[11024]. Cublele
[11027]14-0000
[11029].
[11030].
[11031].
[11032]u
[11034]we
[11035]te
[11036]fe]
[11037]».
[11041]$Y
[11042]pee
[11043].
[11046]9
[11048]te
[11049]t.
[11050]p
[11052]us
[11053]icy
[11054]Ny
[11055]hal
[11057]of NOSINKO in Moscow at the dine
[11059]‘ that NOSENAO was Comparatively
[11061]phase of sa stonseag GJoperatson hac been compieted, .
[11063]et
[11066]G
[11067]e
[11068].
[11069]o
[11072]lad
[11074]ts
[11075]f
[11076]a
[11077]G2
[11078]p
[11081]i
[11082]y
[11083]o
[11084]o
[11087]Gv.
[11088]o
[11089]e
[11090]$3
[11091]ad
[11092]w
[11094]As to nef SERS]ease, th re is nO Apparent proviera since
[11095]seis clear that the apsroach ro Kava
[11096]returned izom Bulgaria, and furthermore that the KGB probably cid
[11097]not become aware inat Poe a homosexual, and theresore
[11098]potentially vulnerable, until just before the pitch was mace,
[11100]In short, there is no reason to believe that the accounts by
[11102]NOSENKO of his trips to Cuba and to Bulgaria are not essentially true,
[11106]or that if they are true they necessarily reciect on nis claim io having
[11108]been supervisor of coée clerk operations.
[11110]v
[11112]o001216 oF
[11114]cae ANAL RET OIL cer wiyua
[11117]SECREI
[11119]ma
[11121]R
[11124]14-0000
[11126]SECRET
[11129]FF, NCSENKO's CLAIMS, IAT 15 22 LE WAS CHISD>
[11130]OF THE Ad (ERICAN-BRITISH COMMONWEALTH SECTION AND ,
[11131]| WAS THEREAFTER A. DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE SEVENTH . ; , :
[11132]i | DEPARTMENT, ARE NOT CREDIBLE
[11134]QD
[11135]cab)
[11136]co *
[11137]pe
[11138]- 0
[11139]ia}
[11143]gan RE
[11146]14-0000
[11150]F, NOSENKO's claims, that in 1962 he was Chief of the
[11152]American-British Commonweaith Section and was thereafter a
[11154]Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, are not credible. (Previous
[11156]conclusion)
[11158]The conclusion of this summary is that NOSENKO was Chief
[11159]of the American-British Commonwealth Section (First Section) from
[11161]January 1962 to July 1962 and that he was.a Deputy Chief of the Seventh
[11163]- Department thereafter. |
[11165]_ NOSENKO has. stated that, although he was offered the position
[11166]of a Deputy Chief of the First Department, SCD, by Oleg M. CRIBANOV,
[11167]Chief, SCD, and although an order had been prepared and was in the
[11168]Personnel Directorate, he declined the proffered position.
[11169]According to NOSENKO, he knew that Sergey Mikhaylovich
[11170]FEDOSEYEV, the Chief of the First Department, did not want NOSENKO
[11171]as a Deputy Chief, but instead wanted to promote Vladislav KOVSHUK,
[11173]then Chief of the First Section, to the position. FEDOSEYEV was
[11177]i
[11178]on
[11179]ry
[11181]3
[11184]14-0000
[11190]willing to promote NOSENKO to the position of Chief, First Section,
[11191]However, GRIBANOV cid not wish to promote KOVSHUK and NOSENKO
[11192]considered that under the circumstances it would be better for him to
[11193]return to the Seventh Department rather than to become a Deputy to
[11194]FEDOSEYEV who wanted KOVSHUKas a Deputy,
[11196]Vladimir Dmitriyevich CHELNOKOV had offered NOSENKO the
[11197]position of Chief.of the First Section, Seventh Department, pending the
[11198]reassignment of BALDIN to Germany at which time NOSZNKO would
[11199]become a Deputy Chief, Seventh Department, replacing BALDIN. The
[11200]above explanation of NOSENKO. seems plausible and credible and indi-
[11201]cates that GRIBANOV, the Chief of the SCD, for reasons best known to —
[11202]GRIBANOV, was assisting NOSENKO in his career in the KGB.
[11204]This ‘section actually covers two periods in the claimed career
[11205]of NOSENKO; namely, January - July 1962 as Chief of the First Section,
[11206]and July 1962 + January 1964 as a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Depart-
[11207]ment. Since NOSENKO wae in Geneva, Switzerland, from March to
[11208]June 1962, he actually cannot be seriously faulted for not having de-~
[11209]tailed knowledge of the activities of the First Section during January -
[11210]July 1962. The previous summary (pages 268 ~ 291) contains remarks
[11212]in regard to the January - July 1962 period, including the period of
[11214]March ~ June 1962 when he was in Geneva. Four specific tourist cases
[11216]go01219
[11221]14-0000
[11223]t me
[11224]—,
[11226]BRAUNS| Apparent conilicts between information from NOSENKO and
[11227]information derived from subsequent interviews with these individuals
[11228]were cited as evidence impugning NOSENKO, It is not believed that the
[11229]previous comments concerning these cases constitute any substantial
[11231]evidence that NOSENKO Gide not hold the claimed position of Chief of the , ’
[11233]cara
[11235]Oo lsee thee
[11237]are discussed in the previous summary; the cases of Wallace Everett OG 06, 0b, Oe
[11239]JOUNSON, William Carroll JONES, Natalie BIENSTOCK, and Horst
[11241]First Section, Seventh Department, during January ~ July 1962. That
[11242]there were KGB operations against[FOHNSON, JONES, ‘BIENSTOCK and 06, 06, 06 , 06
[11244]BRAUNS hhae been confirmed through interviews by the FBI of all four
[11246]individuals. .
[11248]A few additional remarks in regard to the above four cases are
[11249]warranted, not because it is considered that there are any substantial
[11250]discrepancies between what NOSENKO has said and what each individual
[11251]stated when interviewed, but because they may provide additional clari-
[11252]fication,
[11254]In the| Wallace Everett JOHNSONcase, it was previously noted-
[11255]that{JOHNSON brrived in Moscow on 31 December 1961 and that the KGB
[11256]operation against him occurred on 5 January 1962, The summary sug-
[11257]gested that the short lapse of time indicated that the homosexual tend~
[11258]encies offFOHRSON were known to the KGB prior to his arrival, contrary
[11259]to the statements of NOSENKO, NOSENKO during curg ant gintsgviews
[11261]3
[11263]SECRE]
[11266]14-0000
[11268]ne tet nn meee ae
[11270]'
[11274]06
[11276]has stated that the KGB learne of the homosexual tendencies oi JONSON]
[11277]“by chance" soon after his arrival. "SHMELEV" and "GRIGORIY," two
[11278]homosexual agents of NOSENXZO, were at the time operating out of a room
[11279]at the Metropol Hotei wnere FORGO) stayed, They mei(JCHiNSON|there
[11280]and reported his apparent homosexual tendencies,
[11282]d&
[11283]In regard to tne[ William Carroll JONES|case, NOSENKO curing
[11285]current interviews has furnished additional information on the AGB operation
[11287]agsine | JONES} including the woman indmila BUGAYEVA who was recruited:
[11288]O4 :
[11289]as an agent to work against{JONES|and was used in another case. The other
[11290]details furnished by NOSENKO concerning th TONES case are compatibie
[11291]with his claim to having been Chief of the First Section, Seventh Departments
[11292]In regard to the| Natalie aleSstock case, NOSENKO aid not claim
[11293]to have been the responsible case officer but was abie to provide enough
[11294]specific information concerning the case to bring about a confession when
[11295]she was interviewed by the FBI, That he did not know all the cetails con-
[11296]cerning mnBrexstbcR pase couid be explained by his claim to have been
[11297]Chief of Section and not the cay oiiicer directly involved with the case,
[11298]In regard to iniioret BRAGS case, in the previous summary
[11299]the criticism was levied that NOSENKO did not know wnyBRALASisitd
[11301]the USSR and was not able to identify any Soviet citizens whom |BRAUNS |
[11303]met in the USSR. It was also stated that NOSENKO had explained that
[11307]4 9001224
[11309]SECRET |
[11312]14-0000
[11314]23.
[11315]a
[11321]ee ae Sa et
[11323]the Seventh Department was not concerned wita ioreigners visiting
[11324]relatives in the USSR nor with Soviet expatriates. NOSENKO, accord-
[11325]ing to the previous summary, was aware sons BAAS vae a former
[11326]Soviet citizen and the summary siated that his plan to visit relatives
[11327]was information available to the KGB through his visa application,
[11329]In regard to the statement that the Seventh Department was not
[11330]concerned with foreigners visiting relatives in the USSR nor with Soviet
[11331]expatriates, this is not in agreement with current information from
[11332]NOSENKO, * Cases of "true" tourists, which were normally the respon-
[11333]sibility of the Seventh Department, could become the responsibility of
[11334]another department or KGB component where Soviet relatives were
[11335]involved. However, if the case was not taken over or assigned by higher
[11336]authority to another department or component, it was and remained the . ‘
[11337]xesponsibility of the Seventh Department, The fact wna fBRACRE wae a .
[11338]former Soviet citizen could very well have rnadef BAER 0 interest to
[11340]the Second Section, First Department, or a direction in the Service of
[11344]. the SCD, However, in the absence of an actual reassignment by higher
[11346]authority, the case. would remain the responsibility of the Seventh Depart-
[11347]ment sine BRAUNS|was visiting the Soviet Union on a tourist visa. The
[11348]previous summary also indicated thad BRA NS listed on a) isa appli-
[11350]cation that he planned to visit relatives in Leningrad. [ BRAUNS}had a a
[11352]* By 1962 there had been a large reorganization in the SCD and in the
[11354]. 9
[11355]Seventh Department. The situation was not the same GOD 8¢,
[11357]Monee Std Sedat oeRaa alle
[11359]. | |
[11360]SECRET. oaaeers
[11363]14-0000
[11365]Cai entensertmteiene + ceiver mare ese
[11367]06
[11369]relative or relatives in Leningrad. Although BRAUYS] when interviewed by
[11370]the FBI, mentioned a number of items of which the KGB was aware concern-
[11371]ing his background and occupation from his visa application, there is no
[11372]specific reference in these interviews indicating his statement of purpose
[11374]in visiting the USSR.
[11376]Pages 282 - 286 of the previous summary revicws remarks by
[11377]NOSENKO on the Boris BELITSKIY case and states that nis claimed role
[11378]in the case was not plausible. There are several siccific points made in
[11379]the summary which imply that NOSENKO was lying about his imowledge of
[11380]the case, Taere is adequate reason to believe that NOSENKO exaggerated
[11381]his own 1962 role in that NOSENKO now states he was to give assistance
[11382]to Vladimir Lvovich ARTEMOV in the handling of BELITSKIY in Geneva
[11383]in 1962 and not to supervise ARTEMOV,
[11385]The more important aspect and the primary one is the difference in
[11386]what NOSZNKO specifically reported about the BELITSKIY case and infor-
[11387]mation from the actual CIA record of the case, There are major difier-
[11388]ences and without going into all the details of the case which is very involved,
[11389]an effort has been made toward determining whether these apparent differ-
[11390]ences necessarily indicate that NOSENKO was or is lying or whether there
[11391]is a possibility he is relating the actual KGB version of the case. .
[11393]' NOSENKO has stated that BELITSKIY wae a KGB agent whom
[11395]American Intelligence recruited in London in 1960 or 1961 and that the
[11397]. | 9001223
[11398]6
[11400]SEGRE
[11402]Sa BASEN aaah ee Latha we ate dade ere oct oeme mene N
[11405]14-0000
[11407]KGB purpose in running the operation was to lure American Intelligence
[11408]into meeting BELITSKIY inside the USSR. The previous summary stated
[11409]that NOSZENKO did not know when the BELITSXIZ operation started
[11410](Brussels, Belgium, 1958), did not know the nature of the British
[11411]involvement, did n:t know the operational details anda contact arrange-~
[11412]ments BELITSKIY had with CIA, and did not know BELITSKIY's pattern
[11413]of activity in Moscow or Geneva,
[11415]NOSENKO during current interviews has indicatéd an awareness
[11416]that the KGB (Second Section, First Department) had been trying to use
[11417]BELITSKIY against the British. However, he still has dated the recruit-
[11418]ment of BELITSKIY as 1960-1961 in London and still states that the
[11419]primary purpose of the KGB was to involve American Intelligence in
[11420]contacts with BELITSKIY witnin the USSR, The latter was considered
[11421]completely inconsistent with the fact that BELITSKIY was recruited in
[11422]Brussels, Belgium, in 1958; that three letters had been mailed to
[11423]BELITSHIY in the USSR in 1959 and early 1960; and that BELITSKIY
[11424]had an accommodation address for contact outside the USSR.
[11426]There are at this time sufficient unresolved questions in the
[11427]BELITSKIY case to preclude any conclusion that the apparent dis=
[11428]crepancies between the statements by NOSENO on the BELITSKIY
[11430]case and the actual record are a reflection against NOSENKO,
[11432]/,
[11435]|
[11436]7
[11438]poti224
[11439]a
[11441]- SECRET
[11443]4
[11444]4
[11453]14-0000
[11455]the other hand, there is some reason to believe NOSENKO has
[11456]furnished the actual KGB version of the BELITSKIY case and that the
[11457]KGB, at least as of 1962, did not xnow the true story of the relation-
[11458]ship of BELITSKIY with CIA, There is a distinct pos sibility the
[11459]44GB believed the BELITSKIY recruitment occurred in 1961 in London oo
[11460]and BELITSKIY did not then nor has he since admitted to the KGB
[11461]‘his association with CIA actually started in 1958 in Brussels, Belgium,
[11462]As a possible reason why BELITSKIY would have told the KGB in
[11463]1961 a partial story of his contact with American Intelligence, some:
[11464]at present unknown event may have occurred in 1961 which caused
[11465]BELITSKIY to believe his security was endangered and as a result |
[11466]he told the KGB of certain events in London in 1961, relating these
[11467]events as being the original approach to BELITSKIY by CIA.
[11468]| The following are certain of the points which suggest the KGB
[11469]actually considered that BELITSKIY was recruited by CIA in London
[11470]in 196] and that BELITSKIY may have never told the KGB of the
[11471]developments in his case prioz to 196]:
[11472]. (a) BELITSKLY was in London in April 1960 at which
[11473]time he was in contact with a British citizen who was also ~ | oo
[11474]reporting to MI-5,. This individual reported information
[11476]received from BELITSKIY which may have been a lead to
[11478]9001225
[11480]vom a aM te aa eae OR
[11482]SECRET.
[11484]a.
[11487]14-0000
[11491]George BLAKE, (It seems highly unlikely the KGB would
[11493]ever have directed BELITSKIY to furnish information which
[11495]may have been a lead to George BLAKE, or at least could
[11497]have caused the employees of the unit in which BLAKE was
[11499]employed from June 1959 to August 1960 to come under .
[11501]suspicion as having passed information to Soviet Intelligence. )
[11502](b) NOSENKO has stated that BELITSKIY, aiiter he went
[11504]to Geneva in 1962, managed to reinitiate contact with CIA
[11506]rather quickly because he met a girl he had previously known
[11508]whom he was sure was an American Intelligence agent and
[11510]that she must have reported his presence in Geneva to American
[11512]Intelligence. (If the BELITSKIY case had been controlled by the
[11514]KGB from its inception in 1958, the KGB would have known of
[11516]the internal mailings to BELITSKIY and the fact that BELITSKIY
[11518]had a cover address outside the Soviet Union through which to '
[11520]initiate contact, However, if BELITSKIY did not tell the KGB
[11522]anything about his contacts with CIA prior to 1961 and then
[11524]gave only a partial story of what happened in London in 1961,
[11526]BELITSKIY would not have told the KGB of the internal mail- '
[11528]ings to BELITSKIY in the USSR or the fact that he long had
[11530]. a cover address outside the USSR. BELITSKIY therefore : te . |
[11531]- ; 6001226
[11534]14-0000
[11538]Nae cremate art
[11540]it
[11541]u
[11543]Meee wt
[11545]aes mae es Pe yO oe ed ane wee oe
[11546]Would not nave told the SCU how he actualy mode contact
[11548]with Arnaerican Liteliigesce in Ceneva .2 1902, but very well
[11549]Coule ave told ine KGS ne bid scen @ porticular woman
[11551]wom he Lad previously xcown, Lhe was sure one Worked
[11553]Acagrican Intelligence bese
[11554]Geseva. }
[11555]. (c) BELITSALY i. 2962 TO meet
[11557]within the USSR an indivicual rovreseniing Cla,’ However,
[11558]his agreement was. only under cortazia stipulatec co..citions,
[11559]the most interesting of wick was thot the incivicual mus
[11560]be unwitting oi the true nature of ibe relationskip of
[11561]BELITSALY with CIA. In addition, any message to
[11562]B=ELITSAHIY or any indivicual wke mez BELITSKIY must
[11566]make no reference to any previous meeting of SELITONIY
[11568].
[11570]with CiA.
[11572]The above conditions ave quite explainable if
[11573]BELITSAiY had not been under KGB control betwees 1958
[11574]and 1961 and in 1961 gave the KGS oziy 2 partial story of
[11576]the 1961 events in Loncon.
[11578]GOUL227
[11580]nonmenpepnemeee nS Meee eer cern een net LE er nrnmnnrineiere inant manent mene enn eae eee
[11582]eer PS nS ASSN: GE oP eV YP AOL A fs Sa Ht nA a
[11584]14-0000
[11586]As previously indicated, the conclusion is there are a sufficient
[11587]number of unresoived questions in the BELITSKIY case so that discrep-
[11588]ancies between information i.om NOSENKO and the actual record in the
[11589]BELITSKIY case cannot at present be considered as a reilection against |
[11590]NOSENKO, and there is a distinct possibility the KGB actually did not .
[11591]know the true facts of the BELITSXIY case.
[11593]The previous summary noted on page 106 that Nataliya SHULGINA
[11594]was an Intourist interpreter recruited by NOSENKO in 1955. It also
[11596]noted that NOSENKO had stated Boris BELITSKIY "reported to the KGB
[11598]..that CIA had warned BELITSKIY against SHULGINA," The previous
[11600]summary stated BELITSKIY reported to CIA that SHULGINA was a KGB
[11601]agent and "CIA did not warn BELITSKIY,"
[11603]There appears to be no doubt at this time that the statement by
[11604]NOSENKO that BELITSKIY reported the "CIA had warned BELITSKIY
[11605]against SHULGINA," is a reasonably accurate description of what actualy
[11606]happened in May 1962 during Agency contacts with BELITSKIY in Geneva.
[11607]The record reflects that BELITSKIY stated SHULGINA had confidentially
[11608]told him of her status as a KGB agent, stating she had been doubled by
[11609]the KGB after having been forcibly recruited by American Intelligence
[11611]whi previously in Paris, France.
[11613]6001228
[11615]11
[11617]SECRET
[11620]14-0000
[11622](3
[11624]ene e Reediod
[11626]it was determined there was no collateral information which
[11627]would indicate that the staternent by SHHULGINA had any factual basis
[11628]and BELITSKIY was warned SHULGINA may have been acting on behaif
[11629]of the KGB in stating to BELITSKIY she had been “iorcibly recruited by
[11630]American Intelligence" ata previous date, It was also suggested to
[11631]BELITSKIY that he should go to the KGB as a loyal Soviet citizen and
[11632]report the apparent indiscretion of SHULGL™A, .
[11633]Pages 282 ~ 286 of the previous summary, in connection with
[11634]the BELITSKIY case, made reference to Vladimir Lvovich ARTEMOV.
[11635]It was stated that ARTEMOV had been involved with a series of America::
[11636]tourist agents in the Soviet Union and although NOSENKO was allegedly
[11637]familiar with ARTEMOV, he was unaware of the involvement of ARTEMOV
[11638]with American tourist agents in 1958 - 1959, The summary noted this
[11639]was during a period when NOSENKO claimed to have been Deputy Chiet
[11640]of the American-British Commonwealth Section of the Seventh Depart~
[11641]ment, Although not specifically stated, the above suggested ARTEMOV
[11642]was actually in the Seventh Department in 1958 ~ 1959 and that NOSENKO
[11643]was not even aware ARTEMOV was in the Seventh Department. NOSENKO
[11644]has consistently stated that ARTEMOV was assigned to the First Section,
[11645]First Department, from the time he entered into the KGB in approxi- |
[11646]mately 1957, .
[11647]12 Q001223
[11648]SECRET |
[11650]. -
[11651]ne ec oe
[11653]PS te a eae N
[11655]beeee maine nencners wecmmenncen weer Mtr ene ne nee -
[11660]14-0000
[11662]A closer examination of the cases described in the previous
[11663]summary as "CiA American tourist agents," reveals there is no con-
[11664]flict in the involvement of ARTEMOYV in these cases and tne statement
[11665]by NOSENKO that ARTEMOV was w.th the First Section, First Depart- '
[11666]ment, As an example, one of the cases is the case of| Edward McGOWAN| O06
[11667]NOSENKO has furnished information concerning this case, stating it was
[11668]originally a Seventh Department case and that after the mailing of a letter ‘
[11669]by the individual in Minsk, the case was immediately taken over by the
[11670]First Department, There is adequate reason to believe ARTEMOV only
[11671]became involved after the case was transierred to the First Department,
[11673]Another of the cases involved the contact of ARTEMOV witha CIA
[11675]o¥,24, 1441
[11677]officer who was under Department of State cover in Helsinki, Finland,
[11678]and visited the USSR ona teurist visa. Such an individuai would under
[11679]no circumstances be considered a true tourist or the responsibility of
[11680]the Seventh Department, particularily since apparently the individual was |
[11681]even traveling under a diplomatic passport, it is,assumec the individual
[11682]\ .
[11683]was of interest to the First Chief Directorate and if the Fiist Chief
[11684]Directorate required or desired support from the SCD, it would normally »
[11685]request the First Department for such assistance and it is extremely un-
[11687]likely that the FCD would request the Seventh Department for assistance
[11689]é in a case involving an American diplomat,
[11691]: beg 0001230 ii kt
[11693]13
[11695]oo SECRET
[11697]re “ ees wee a Sea ae
[11700]14-0000
[11702]ame . . Wom ter tm
[11704]Pages 332 ~- 333 of the previous summary contain the basis
[11706]for the previous conciusion that the claim of NOSENKO that he wasa ..
[11707]Deputy Chief of the Seventa Department from July 1962 to January
[11708]1963 was not credible. It is considered that a detailed rebuttal is
[11709]not necessary since this conclusion was apparently based on inadequate
[11710]information. During current interviews, NOSENiXO has furnished
[11711]details concerning his duties and other aspects of his claimed position -
[11712]which substantiate his claim to having been a Deputy Chief of the
[11713]Seventh Department from July 1962 to January 1964,
[11715]An example in support of the statement that the previous conclu-
[11716]sion was based on inadequate iniormation is the matter of the written
[11717]notes which NOSENKO brought out and furnished to CIA in early 1964.-
[11718]The description of these notes on page 319 of the previous summary is
[11719]inadequate, inaccurate, and misleading. Prior to current interviews,
[11720]an effort had not been made to obtain from NOSENKO a detailed explan=
[11721]ation of his notes or of how he obtained the information in the notes.
[11723]° 7 During current interviews, NOSENKO has given detailed informa-
[11724]tion concerning all aspects of his notes. This information supports his
[11725]claimed position of Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department and includes
[11727]collateral support to his claim of being Deputy Chief of the First Section,
[11729]. First.Department, in 1960-1961. 6001231
[11731]oe SECRET
[11736]14-0000 .
[11738]Wiese
[11740]Primarily the notes of NOSENKO can be categorized as
[11742]follows: .
[11744]- (a} Short case summaries by the Chiefs of the
[11746]First Section, Second Section and Sixth Section, Seventa
[11748]i Department, NOSENKO has stated that he was in 1962 -
[11749]1963 responsibie for supervision over these Sections and
[11750]that Filip Denisovich BOBKOV,. Deputy Chief, SCD, who >
[11751]supervised the Seventh Department, requested a list of all
[11752]recruited agents of the Seventh Department. According to
[11753]NOSENKO, the order from BOBKOV was to only retain the
[11754]files (cases) of agents in tourist firms and that the files of
[11755]other recruited agents should be sent to the FCD or Archives.
[11756]NOSENKXO has stated that ne in turn levied on the Chiefs of
[11757]the three Sections the requirement of BOBKOV, but also ex~
[11758]panded the request to include all 1960 - 1962 cases, not
[11759]excluding previous cases or cases which had already been
[11760]given to the FCD. The notes of NOSENKO included hand-
[11761]written reports from the Chiei or Acting Chief of each Section
[11762]on recruited agents, with information varying from agent to
[11763]agent and even including some human errors.
[11765]Many of the above cases had previously ‘been trans-
[11767]ferred to the FCD, but the remarks of NOSENKO about thei 4232
[11768]15 ‘
[11770]ecency
[11773]oN ane . Loot be ede ene Be gee ages . oo
[11775]We Ne oes
[11778]14-0000
[11780]Fat AD SUI AIG ete a ee
[11782]inclusion ‘support his statement that he had expanded
[11783]the original request from BOBKOV so that he would have
[11784]some "pieces of information to give CIA,"
[11786](b) Notes by NOSENKO on other cases which he learned
[11787]of. during the 1962 ~ 1963 period. Certain of the notes were
[11788]made from a review of a notebook kept by the Chief, Seventh
[11789]Department, to which NOSENKO had access on at least two
[11790]occasions. Most of his notes were not detailed but were
[11791]sufficient to refresh the memory of NOSENKO at a later
[11792]date and yet were somewhat innocuous to maintain before
[11794]his defection.
[11796](c) Notes for lectures to officers of the Seventh Directorate
[11797]prepared while with the First Department, 1960 - 1961, and
[11798]the Seventh ‘Department, 1962 - 1363.
[11800]{d) Drait report for the briefing of the new Chief, First
[11801]Department, in the latter part of 1961, .
[11803](e) One of three copies of an unregistered report pre-
[11804]pared by the Chief, Seventh Department, and two Deputy Chiefs,
[11805]including NOSENKO. This was a briefing paper for use by the’
[11806]Chief (CHELNOKOV) in an appearance before the Collegium
[11808]of the KGB which was reviewing the activities of the Seventh
[11810]0001233
[11812]16 .
[11814]SECRET
[11816]ee eee tee Pe
[11818]cn ne
[11821]SHOES
[11822]BN een Shs
[11825]14-0000
[11827]SECRE!
[11828]ye a? ‘
[11829]in a
[11833]Department. According to NOSENKO, the prepared
[11835]report was never typed as a forrnal cocument,
[11837]The view has been set forth that NOSENKO took undue risk in
[11838]carrying written notes with him out of the Soviet Union, An examination
[11839]of this material suggests -nat NOSENKO was using extrerne care in
[11840]collecting material and was not attempting to obtain documents, the
[11841]possession of which might be incriminating er which if he had brought
[11842]out would have been immediately missed. Instead, he collected a con-
[11843]siderable amount of valuable information which he could bring out with
[11844]little or no fear that a search of his effects in the KGB after his depart-
[11845]ure for Geneva would disclose that certain material was missing. None
[11846]of the material was registered and all could have previously been des-
[11847]troyed by NOSENKO.
[11849]The previous summary stated that NOSENKO brought three. KGB
[11850]documents to Geneva. These were typed papers but none was registered ; cd
[11851]or actually accountable, The reference to three documents was to:
[11853]* (a) The drait report for the briefing of the Collegium
[11854]which has been mentioned previously. tee
[11855]i . (b) A.typed two-page report on several cases. Actually
[11856]a Chief of Section had typed his notes on cases instead of
[11858]on, submitting in handwriting as the others did. .
[11861]SECRET Fs
[11863]aarti yt meee mate tem A ee me
[11866]te tegen oe
[11868]FACS Poca ineg gc haan aloes Be
[11871]14-0000
[11873]kept by the Ca-2:f which he reviewed and that ne kept one,
[11875]leet eg,
[11877](c) A second copy of a summary on a XGB agent.
[11879]NOSENKO stated that there were two copies in the file
[11881]Of interest is the fact that the copy was not a registered
[11882]document and did not contain the usual information as to .
[11884]number of copies typed.
[11886]heclaisd sat ale
[11888]Ladrecceicl
[11890]6001235
[11893]14-0000
[11895]SECRET
[11897]4
[11899]me
[11902]nee.
[11904]HAS NO V
[11906]NCSENKO
[11908]G.
[11912]Qa
[11913]“
[11914]re
[11916]nor
[11918]CRUITE
[11920]3 RE
[11922]we
[11923]J
[11925]rus
[11926]ES Tied
[11928]CTION IN
[11932]EIS D
[11934]ANS
[11936]3
[11938]a
[11940]6001236
[11947]7
[11950]Care
[11952]SS,
[11953]read
[11956]PSRARENE RNS
[11961]Rae
[11963]Naas
[11965]at
[11967]rate,
[11968]N
[11969]i
[11972]14-0000
[11974]a
[11976]Teli A het SE Lt
[11978]vouncl
[11980]G,_NOSENKO i's no valid claim te certainty that the KGB
[11982]recruited no American Embassy versonnel between 1953 and his
[11985]éefecticn in 1964. (Previous conclusion}
[11987]The conclusion in this summary is that NOSENKO is of the
[11988]opinion that there were no KGB recruitments of United States Embassy
[11989]personnel in Moscow between 1953 and December 1963 with the exception
[11990]of "ANDREY" {Dayle Wailis SMITH) and ierbert HOWARD} who actually
[11991]was afin employee but did work part of the time in the Embassy.
[11993]The question here is whether or not the expressed opinion of
[11994]NOSENKO is sufficiently based on actual knowledge so that this opinion
[11995]can be accepted as absolute evidence that there were no other KGB
[11996]recruitments of Embassy personnel during this period of time. -The
[11997]only logical conclusion is that the opinion of NOSENKO cannot be
[11998]accepted as absolute fact and, therefore, there is a possibility that’:
[12000]a recruitment could have occurred and NOSENKO not be aware in any
[12001]way of the recruitment, This should in no way be interpreted as a
[12002]suggestion that NOSENKO could be lying, but rather that an unbiased
[12003]observer without personal knowledge could and should be hesitant to
[12004]accept the expressed opinion of NOSENKO jn this particular area,
[12006]- -The actual basis for the stated opinion of NOSEMEGT ST? be .
[12008]examined and can be cited as follows.
[12011]toelasssficatics
[12013]i
[12014]Rea
[12016]Sabet tae Ty
[12019]14-0000
[12021]‘ (a) During Marca 1953-late May 1955 NOSENKO
[12022]was a case oificer in the rirst Section, First Department,
[12023]SCD, NOSENKO does not claim that he would kave known
[12024]the detaiis concerning any recruitments (other than
[12025]"ANDREY") in this period, dut states if there had been
[12026]he would have heard "something."
[12028](b) During late May 1955 to December 1959 NOSENKO
[12029]was in tne Seventh Department, not the First Department,
[12030]but continued to have contact with certain officers in the
[12031]First Section, First Department. NOSENKO is of the
[12032]opinion that if there had been a recruitment in the United
[12033]States Embassy during this period he would have heard
[12034]"something" even though he would probably have learned |
[12035]few details,
[12037]{c) During the January 1960-December 1961 period
[12038]NOSENKO was Deputy Chiei of the First Section, First
[12040]Department, and he has made the categorical statement
[12041]that there were no recruitments by the KGB of United
[12042]pO . '* States Embassy personnel during this period of time.
[12044]He has also stated that if there had been any recruitments
[12046]- during the 1953-1959 period he is sure he would, during
[12048]C
[12050]1960-1961, have heard or learned some details of thg)(}{ 238
[12052]case or cases. There is merit to this contention by
[12054]BP Cee pee Yates +
[12057]14-0000
[12059]os
[12061]NOSENKO since the Chief of Section was Vladislav
[12062]KOVSHUK who had been an officer of the First Depart-
[12063]ment since 1953, actually working in the First Section
[12065]except for the periods of time that he was in the United
[12067]States to reactivate "ANDREY" in 1957-1958 and a Tos
[12068]period of time that he was Deputy Chief of the First
[12069]Department. |
[12070]{d) During 1962-1963 NOSENKO was again in the
[12071]Seventh Department. However, he continued to maintain
[12072]contact with certain officers of the First Section, First
[12073]Department: in particular, Gennadiy I GRYAZNOV,
[12074]who succeeded NOSENKO as Deputy Chief of the First
[12076]Section, then became Chief of Section, and in the latter
[12080]part of 1963 became a Deputy Chief of the First Department,
[12081]According to NOSENKO his relationship with
[12083]GRYAZNOV was sufficiently close during 1962-1963 that
[12084]he is sure GRYAZNOV would have furnished NOSENKO
[12085]some information in regard to any successful recruitments
[12087]. of United States Embassy personnel. NOSENKO pointed
[12089]06
[12091]out that he learned of the existence of the [Herbert HOWARD]
[12093]case from GRYAZNOV in 1962, although it was not until
[12095]— : 1963 that NOSENKO heard the name. NOSENKO actually
[12096]| 9001239
[12098]SECRET
[12100]eae Se ee Bl nO me Fee Se et
[12103]14-0000
[12105]ie SECRET
[12107]learned of the name when the First Section, First
[12108]Department, needed the services of the Seventh
[12109]_ Department (Third Section) in obtaining a room ina
[12111]06 ‘.
[12112]certain hotel for the Soviet girl friend of[H WARD] !
[12115]‘In general the above constitutes the basis for the stated opinion
[12118]of NOSENKO that "ANDREY" and[Herbert HOWARD }were the only
[12120]successful KGB recruitmenta during 1953 - December 1963. It should
[12121]be noted that there are no other identified KGB recruitments during
[12122]this period of time which would specifically refute the opinion of
[12123]NOSENKO. However, in view of the cited actual basis for the opinion
[12125]of NOSENKO, acceptance of the opinion of NOSENKO as being an . }
[12127]honest opinion should not be converted into a statement that it is
[12128]absolute proof that another recruitment could not have occurred.
[12129]NOSENKO may be completely correct in his opinion, but since
[12131]NOSENKO was only in the First Department 1953 - 1955 and 1960 - 1961
[12133]hiz opinton that he wovld have heard something" about a recruitment
[12135]in 1955 - 1959 or 1962 - 1963 @annot be accepted as infallible.
[12137]6001240
[12138]4
[12140]SECRET
[12142]|
[12143]|
[12144]|
[12145]|
[12151]14-0000
[12153]Lo. oe . ~ } . . woe aA
[12154]. . =z t -- fee
[12155]te SEES : 2 o . &
[12156]we . +7) ne a
[12157]os gies : os
[12158]oe) : “HES : -
[12159]td . - a: ‘ ' . a
[12160]Se) ‘ : i et
[12161]. . “OE oe
[12162]. 4 .
[12163]. . i a. . . . i - , :
[12164]. . . . . . F -
[12165]. ~ . _ Tose . . to
[12167]eaten
[12171]14-0000
[12173]~~ toe a
[12175]Ne mee eee '
[12177]ANNEX
[12178]j
[12179]The previous summary contained an Annex "A' and an Arnucx
[12180]"B" covering pages 316 - 435. Limited comments concersing Annex
[12181]'
[12182]"A," Statements of Soviet Officials About NOSENKO, and Annex "3B,"
[12183]Summaries of Cases Not Examined in Text, are attached, In addition,
[12184]1 - . cm - : . -
[12185]: there is an Annex "C" to this summary whica is entitled, "The
[12186]Cherepanov Papers," ;
[12190]: Annex A
[12191]Annex B
[12192]Annex C ‘
[12194]4 . . . *
[12195].
[12196]+ .
[12197]i oO. 7 . 001242 |
[12199]! -
[12200]i
[12201]ca
[12202]rman Seis veclie  dae tata J woe ese were _—— . “ .
[12203]7 . . :
[12204]i .
[12205]2 ' : .
[12206]Pet ‘ . aah
[12208]THC NICasy ssh * eee: any cas
[12209]Pada rsandy b menditadet ed am so
[12213]TO mates sagen Se wee
[12215]“SECRET
[12217]ANNEX B - SUMMARIES OF CASES NOT
[12219]EXAMINED IN TENT
[12221]“$ _ GO0L243
[12222]CRET Ered na
[12225]14-0000
[12227]SUMMARIES OF CASES NOT EX. DIN EXT
[12229]Pages 399 - 435 oi the previous summary contain sume
[12232]0
[12234]mericans who, accorci
[12236]@ 00 MLO ING LLOn 2S ON
[12238]NOSENKO, were oi KGB intevest, were approacked by the KGB, or
[12240]a
[12242]were actually recruited by the AGB, It was stated that these cases
[12244]did not clearly relate to the syeciic KGS positions held at particular
[12245]times by NOSENKO and thus could not de usetully employed in exnminin
[12246]his claimed KGB service. The sourcizn
[12248]in detail curing the curxent interviews wita NOSENKO, and it is now
[12250]rs
[12252]. possible to establish a certain relationsnip detween these cases and
[12253]certain claimed positions of NOSENKO in the KGB, : 7 :
[12254]8)
[12256]It is the conclusion of this summary that any group o2/<9 leases,
[12259]as well as all other cases concerning waica NCSENXO has furnisnzed
[12260]information, must be fully considered, noz necessarily for the importance
[12261]or unimportance of the information, but to determine how NOSENAG
[12262]claimed to have learned of che case and whether his statements con~
[12263]cerning each idertified case are supported by collateral information,
[12265], ‘These factors are important in assessing the overall validity of infor~
[12267]_ . ™ation from NOSENKO as well as being supporting evitdhdet4is
[12269]. : -¢laimed positions in the KGB. _
[12271]QeeneT
[12273]meee enue gm te ee a ag
[12276]14-0000
[12278]K
[12280]NOSENAO in approximately fad jof whe Rs _
[12282]fact that NOSENHO has
[12284]5 TAS
[12286]G
[12290]cases, Of even move significance
[12292]logically sourced his infovrsation in ctl exces: perharzal Zourlecases,
[12295]The indicated inability of NOSENKO to corspleicly source aii[ed fos
[12297]a ettote wl clea nis bay
[12298]Pereacsaray Since 215 4even
[12300]the cases is not consicered
[12302]knowledge of all the cases is quite compatible with his claimed positions
[12303]in the KGB. In addition, criticism of NOSEZNXO sor not seing able to
[12304]source all of his information would be unveasonable since it makes
[12306]no allowance for normal lapses of memory ox failure to recali some-
[12307]thing which was iasignidicant at the time it occurred,
[12309]Without citing in detail any of the/49|cases, the ways in whics : -
[12311]NOSENKO iearned of a number of the cases ere cons
[12313]since there is a direct relationship to his claim
[12315]scaliy the pos
[12317]during 1960 - January 1964, speciz ion of Deputy ChieZ,
[12318]First Section, First Department, 1960 - 1961; Chief, First Section,
[12319]Seventh Department, January - July 1962; anc as Deputy Chief, Seventh
[12321]Department, July 1902 - January 1964, Certain examples of the adeve
[12323]‘are as follows:
[12325]a 6001245
[12327]rd 2) -
[12328]o>
[12329]eS)
[12332]. .
[12333]ene ete pan gente ne TO a en ee
[12335]ge meeaaet
[12336]MISES
[12339]14-0000
[12341](a) NOSENKO ieaened of a wumuer of the Seventh
[12343]o
[12345]i
[12346]-
[12347]Ss)
[12349]Q
[12350]1
[12351]pe
[12352]al
[12353]ce.
[12355]w
[12356]v
[12358]Depariment cases whieh nad occurr
[12360]Ww
[12361]Ne)
[12362]a
[12363]2
[12364]v
[12365]6
[12366]v
[12368]i
[12369]is}
[12370]g
[12371]Fy
[12372]by
[12376]a
[12377]cs]
[12379]G
[12384]w
[12385]“s
[12387]well as several 1955 -1
[12389]the Chici or Acting
[12391]Section a 1 Section in 1903, These notes were gre-
[12393]pared at the request oi NOSENKO who as a Deper
[12396]a
[12398]th
[12399]Q
[12400]ms
[12401]en ae
[12403]Seventh Department, was responsivie for supervision of
[12404]oo these three sections; and the request was aciually an ex- '
[12406]pansion of tne original rccuest irom BOBKOV, Deputy Chief
[12408]of the SCD, for information on recruitments of the Severth
[12412]Department, NOSENKO brought with him in 1904 the noies
[12414]OE “ERE Er TRL AICO enw aioe deer
[12416]preparea by the Chiez or Acting Caiei of the First Section,
[12417]Second Section and Sixiu Section anc his knowledge of many .
[12418]of the cases which had occurred prior to 1962, particularly
[12419]1960 ~ 1961, was limited to information contained in the
[12420]notes. Irom these noices, NOSENKO had prepared his re-
[12421]port to BOBKXOV eliminating those which were nét applicable
[12423]to the request.
[12425](b) NOSENKO learned of several 1962 - 1963 cases of
[12427]the First Section, First Department, frors Gennadiy lL.
[12429]Sr mE Rey ORE
[12431]GRYAZNOV who succeeced NOSENKO as Deputy Chiei, . -
[12433]po _ 6001246
[12435]wee oe vlpter amet Lee :
[12436]. Seer thers Seek are pA eta 1 oh
[12439]14-0000
[12441]eon
[12442]First Section, First Depavivaent, This inforraation was
[12444]urnisned tg NOSENAO oriinarily decause a
[12446]Laly
[12449]with GRYAZNOV anc noi a5 tae result of mutual operailons.
[12451]was furnished additional cetails as a result of @ vequest
[12453]. from the Sevetis Depuriment te the First Section, >
[12455]08
[12457]Cestain of the[49 pases sisted were cases of the Seventh Devari- ‘
[12458]ment prior to 1960 or in 1962 - 1963 waen NOSENKO was in the Sevente
[12460]Department, Certain of the cases were cases ia Wai)
[12462]be
[12464]re)
[12466]oo
[12467]a
[12468]u.
[12469]e
[12472]Qo
[12474]ra)
[12475]N
[12480]First Department, was involved prior to 1960 or i960 - 196i. The
[12481]knowledge of NOSENKO concerning these tvo groups of cases Goes not
[12482]materially support his claimec positions in the First Department and
[12483]Seventh Department, but does support his claimed assignment to te
[12484]Seventh Department prior to 1950 and in 1962 - 1963, anc nis claimed
[12485]assigament to the First Depariment in 1960 - 1961. 0X
[12487]It is difficuit to specisically comment conceryaing these Es|cases
[12488]since they do not ial) into one ox two specific categories. Instead, they
[12489]constitute a rather motley group of cases remaining aster completion of
[12490]the detailed sections of the previous summary, Included are First
[12492]Department and Seventh Department cases covering a period of approxi-
[12494](
[12496]mately five and one-half years. It should be noted, hoyetrry Zhat the
[12498]. 4
[12499]. orenry
[12501]oN ne ng tet or Hoe ee eee ree oonennd Marta tans wet ne - cette com A et :
[12508]14-0000
[12510]primes eee
[12512]pas Soin ONS
[12513]SUCRE MEESINSCUSSIRRTINNS
[12515]SODA ANA SRST
[12517]5.
[12518]_CEpeey
[12520]OF
[12522]0001248
[12524]1
[12525]. )
[12526]t
[12527][
[12528]4
[12530]. :
[12531], i
[12532]ead .
[12535]14-0000
[12538]ANNEX C - THE CHIRTPANOV PAPERS
[12540]” 1
[12541]a 2
[12542]e
[12543]4
[12545]: .
[12548]| 7
[12549]! . ‘ on: .
[12550]| SECRET founrsaas aaa *
[12551]~ neeanh (hay :
[12552]Nn Sa sete tats GRIER TET TTT re reine Seine rite teen emt te tenn etree : i” we aaa ‘ .
[12555]14-0000
[12557]an
[12559]Pages 309 - 316 of the previous si
[12561]oi tne Cherepanov Papers, ane how Alexsandr Nikoiayevich CHERSPANCV
[12563]passed a package of documents io an American tourist in Moscow i
[12565]November 1963. The conclusion, however, was that the assertions of
[12567]NOSENKO with respect to the CHEREPANOV case were not material to
[12569]the claim of NOSENKO that he was Deputy Chiei, Seventh Department,
[12573]in late 1963. .
[12575]The definite relationship of the Cherepanov Papers to the bona
[12577]fides of NOSENKO cannot be ignored anc must de given specific consic-
[12581]eration, li CHEREPANOV was under KGB controi wien he passed the
[12582]papers to the American tourist, or if the papers contain "deception
[12583]information," the bona fides of NOSENKO are subject to very serious ‘
[12585]question,
[12587]NOSENKO had personal knowledge of CHEREPANOV who was, ; ,
[12589], according to NOSENKO, aa ocficer in the First Section, First Depaxtment,
[12591]C
[12595]001250
[12598]en, noe Soot me eegn em tare ee oy fen oe
[12602]an
[12605]14-0000
[12607]Mee ae ae,
[12609]-been Deputy Chief, First Section, wiizou
[12611]re
[12613]Garing i940 - mid-.961 when he was fozced in
[12615]Mal
[12617]G3. During the above period
[12621]acd a direct supervisory respoasibility over CHEREPANOV excess
[12623]b
[12625]et ro
[12627]na ike absence of tue Ciics o
[12629]we
[12631]NCOSENAKO
[12633]ilso claims vo have participated in the bunt Sor CHERIOPANGY in
[12634]December 1963.
[12636]Considevation has previously 5 been given to the cueory “het tee
[12637]Cherepanov Papers were passccé to Amevicans Sy the KGB tarou
[12638]CHERZEPANOV to support che bona Zides of NOSENKO, This theory
[12639]seems to have iittle credibility since the papers conte
[12640]which would even support tae claim of NCSZNKO that be was in the
[12641]First Section, First Depaviment, 1956 - 1961. The pape x6 also contain
[12642]no inzormation waich would indicate there was even a Deputy Cnici of
[12643]the First Section during 1958 ,- 1950.
[12645]Statements by NCSZNKO are empiatic that CHEREPANOV was
[12647]not under KGB control, that se passed the papers wuich it iavexr Cevelopec
[12649]he had taken from tie Fivst Section prior to his retirernent because he
[12650]was Cisgruniled with his treatrnent by the KGB, and that the action by
[12652]CHEREPANOV caused consternation in the KGB.
[12654]There is no coliateral evidence which contradicts any of
[12656].the.statements by NOSENKO about CHEREPANOV. Further, there is
[12658]GO01251
[12660]a - SEORE T
[12662]TN pe we eT ee eT te
[12665]14-0000
[12667]notaing in either the orm or suyvsiince of the papers which provides
[12669]a basis for suspicion as to their authe
[12671]and sudsiance of ihe papers ave in hee
[12673]G
[12675]& CHINAS PANSY case nus seen
[12677]were originally shown to NOSZNAC in 1964 anex Lis cefection, have
[12678]also been covered in cevail
[12679]NOSENKO does not claim to have speciiicaily seen any particular item
[12680]prior to 1964, his statements in regard to the various candwritings, ‘ =
[12681]types of notes, and Grait memoranca leave no Coubt that NOSENKO
[12683]was very famiiar wita personne! in the First Section, First Depaxt-
[12685]ment, ané with First Department procedures.
[12687]papers and a detailed analysis will be prepared eta later Gate, it
[12688]should be noted that a considerabie amount of pexvsornal judgmeni nas .
[12690]o
[12691]been necessary ia maxing an assessraent of tae Caexesanov Papers
[12692]since there are no exemplars with wiich to compare any of the material,
[12693]However, based on iniormation ceveloped thus far, and there is no
[12694]reason to believe additional work will alter the conclusion, there is
[12696]te not an adequate basis for an opsnion that CHEREDPANOV was under KGB
[12698]control, that the Cherepanov Papers contain "deceptive infer ean” : a
[12699]. “& .
[12701].
[12702]Parent a een PARNER Me Sete Cray tee bbe ee ee ee
[12704]pe cepa OH MVE cee
[12707]14-0000
[12709]or taat the papers were oiser thin the colicction of material uy a
[12711]runtled employee which he very carefully selected or accumulacd,
[12713]the removal of which would ony Lave constituted @ minimal visk to
[12715]The entire Cherepanov Piz
[12717]i
[12719]there is any information whics could ve considered "Cecepiive intor-
[12721]mation" either by direct siatemerxt ox implication. ‘Two possibie arezes
[12723]have been noted and civen ull consideration, These areas ures
[12724]o
[12726](a) There is no specitic information that there
[12727]were any recruitments by the KGB of American per-
[12728]sonnel in the United States Zmbassy durin,
[12730]nor is there any iniormation suggesting
[12732]the <GB had an
[12733]. American source or American agent in the Embassy )
[12734]during that period of time.
[12736]jb) Petr 5. POPOV, a GRU ofxficer who sad deen
[12738]an extremely valuable Cia source from 1953 on, was,
[12739]according to tne papers, exposed to the KGB in January
[12740]1959 as a result of a letter mailing by Ceoxge Payne
[12741]WINTERS, Jr. WINTSRS was a CIA ermployee under
[12743]Be
[12745]‘[Depastment of State cover bssigned to the Embassy in
[12746]Moscow, The letter, which was to POPOV, was obtained :
[12747]Nw by the KGB aiter mailing by WINTERS and was a direct
[12748]result of KGB surveillance of WINTERS. _ ‘ -
[12750]a | ~  G001253 SG
[12755]14-0000
[12757]G
[12759]only a rather a
[12761]st Section curing
[12763]t
[12764]3
[12768]w
[12769]“
[12771]w
[12772]‘v
[12773]a)
[12774]Du
[12776]Pay
[12777]a
[12778]i]
[12779]Q
[12781]pe
[12782]a
[12783]ray
[12786]A
[12788]o
[12789]a
[12790].
[12792]sm the Emuassy Curin
[12794]¥ COneicevaiion, Ibis not conclusive
[12795]prooi tuat a recruiiment was not mace or that an Amevican source
[12796]Gic not exist, The papers éo not contain a pOsiiive statement on
[12797]either matter.
[12799]In regard to (5), the quite speciic information in the papers
[12800]that Petr S. POPOV was uncoverca by tac KGB 25 4 result oz AGB
[12801]surveiliaace on Georze Payne WINTERS, Jr., who ‘mailed a letter to
[12802]POPOV in January 1959, this information should be considered as
[12803]possibiy information of a deceptive nature unless an adequate explanation
[12804]can be made for its presence in the papers, POPOV was recalled to
[12806]ox TOY.
[12808]Hy
[12810]Moscow irom East Germany ia November 1958 ostensibly
[12811]The circumstances under which Le was recaiied and coliaterai infor ~
[12812]mation have given adequate grounds for a belief that by November
[12813]1958 POPOV was suspected by tae KGB of cooperating with Western
[12814]Intelligence or that the KGB may even have been sure POPOV had
[12815]been cooperating with Ua ited States Intelligence,
[12817]It may be presumed that any lead to the KGB. in regard to
[12819]POPOV or the fact that United States Intelligence, more 8 0135 4
[12821]5
[12822]SECRET.
[12824]fee ite tat ene te ee ee
[12826]oo
[12829]14-0000
[12831]eater tearm cones mene
[12833]: FY
[12834]Grve ee CTEM oaeetaneniaal
[12836]CIA, had a source in ise GRU would have come irom ana
[12838]source of the FCD, KGB, noi ine SCD, It can aiso be presumed tha
[12840]e
[12842]a& source or agent of the PCD ina position to fuvnisa a lead to a
[12843]penetzaiion of the GRU by Western intelligence would be carulully
[12844]protected even within the KGB. The possibility of course oxists wnat
[12845]a leac fxom George BLAXE, an SCDa
[12846]of POPOV to the KGB, but itis noc established that it did nor is there
[12847]any reasor. to believe the TCD cou:d not or Gid not have another a
[12848]or agents who furnished informatioa to the KGB pertinent to cevelop-
[12849]ment of the case against POPOV.
[12850]‘The primary question, however, as regards the Cherepanov
[12852]Papers is whether, even ii itis presumed the KG3 obtained information
[12854]irom an FCD source or agent waica le suspicion of POPOV or
[12856]nioxvmation
[12860]identification of POPOV, ‘nis would be incompatible with
[12861]in the papers and could only lead to the comciusion that the pasexs contain
[12862]"deceptive information,"
[12864]The conclusion in regard to the above is that the faci the papers
[12866]attribute the exposure of POPOV to the KGB to surveillance on WINTERS
[12868]when he mailed the letter to POPOV in January 1959 is not incompatible
[12870]with the distinct possibility taat the KGB had previously obtained infor-~
[12872]mation from an FCD agent or agents which actually led to suspicion in
[12874]regard to POPOV or actual identitication of POPOV.
[12876]. 6
[12877]ECR
[12879]GO0L255
[12881]T
[12885]3 WS
[12886]SS Be RS
[12888]SAE Ra Pe RENE TORN ERR,
[12890]Tesi. eset hte mee a ers war ~ woe
[12893]14-0000
[12895]Pecaiapate, nn'f S
[12897]pant Mowe aaring bean ere = ee
[12899]{ informuiion was received from an important TCD agen:
[12900]suck as George BLAKE or inrouzgas another vaiuaole FCD agent waich
[12901]led to KGB suspicion of POLOV ysiox to his return to Moscow in
[12902]November 1958, it is highly unlinely suca information would reccive
[12904]wice distribution within the KGB, elither in the
[12906]ty
[12908]CD or th2 SCD,
[12910]is also possible the limited group within the AGB wao would be awe
[12912]that the KGB had received inforsmction leading to suspicion of POPOV
[12914]irom a valuable agent would be very interested in attvibutin
[12915]exposure of POPOV to the fortuitous mailing of the letter to POPOY
[12916]by WINTERS, The possivility szouid be considered that prior to the
[12917]retrieval by the KGB of the letter io POPOV tseve was only a dee
[12919]suspicion of POPOV but that the ietter compietely so.idizied the case
[12920]against POPOV.
[12922]Consideration has been given to the possibility chat CHERIS PANOV
[12923]was under KGS control when le pavsed the papers to the American
[12926]tourist and that it was done by the KGB with the ho ope os involving Si
[12928]in a KGB-control’ed operation within the USSR. In that event, the
[12929]papers passed by CHEREPANOV would most likeiy be genuine since
[12931]this would have been the initial step in waat tas KG hoped would become
[12932]a successful operation.
[12934]The above theory has beex rejected since there are a number
[12936]of factors which militate against it. These factors inclice the fact that _
[12938]eunteuoapecrnnaenenyt ry
[12939]Ri PASS Sh
[12940]xf RUAN
[12942]OE EN
[12947]14.90000
[12950]on ” .
[12951]; oS toe “>
[12952]the Pavers wes &t least thre
[12953]telat wees laeles ce O72 * OW me no cue v
[12954]~ Welle WOU BGA Cs sealae te YO Cus .
[12955]aay. a eariagn MRR Wo oo tees wt ‘
[12956]Was 10 indication CHER SPLNCY suture Comact.
[12957]‘ 1
[12958]. \
[12959]'
[12963], rer ad , _
[12964]‘ .
[12966]t
[12967]i
[12969]4 - ‘
[12970]1 . .
[12971]H : . :
[12975]H .
[12977]i
[12978]H
[12980]. : a
[12981]\ x
[12982]Te atlas Bg ag ERNE _ 7 . .
[12983]. -
[12985],
[12988]wo . 1 7 . . . '
[12991]14-0000
[12993]~ a
[12995]]
[12996]ABIDIAN, John - IV, E, 5, 715,19, 20, 52 |
[12997]“ANDREY" (Dayle Wallis SMITH) - IV,G,)-4 :
[12998]ARTAMONOV, Nikolay - I,A,2 4
[12999]ARTEMOY, Viadirsir Lvovich - 1V, F, 6, 12, ‘e .
[13000]BAKHVALOV, Mikhail - IV,E,3,4 7
[13001]BALDIN, Boris Andreyevich - IV, F,2 |
[13002][banners Robert]- 11, F, 14,15
[13003]“ob [BEGcs, Frank|~ IV, E, 36,37
[13004]BEL:TSKIY, Boris - IV, F,6-12 7
[13005]BERIYA, Lavrentiy Ivanovich ~ 1V,B,2,3,5¢7
[13006]Ve (BieNstocx, Natalie]- Iv, F,3,4 |
[13007]OG Birsz, Arthur}; 1V,D,1,2
[13008]BLAKE, George - IV,D,9; IV, F, 9: V,C, 6,7
[13009]BOBKOV, ‘Filip Denisovich ~ IV, F,15,16; V,B,3
[13010]BOHLEN, Ambassador - II, F,10
[13011]. ~ e
[13012]; BOWDEN, Lewis - IV, E, 53,54 ; oe rn
[13013]Ob [BRauns, Horst]- 1V, F,3~6
[13014]OG Brown, G. stantey}- Iv, 8, 43 _ 7 001258
[13018]‘ oy 1 ' :
[13019]~ ’ . + 6 ' soe Be . .
[13021]. roo - Ae : ! toe -
[13023]nee ie cane meanest kee et meen me eee tes Nena eet onan peed ce atk mp tee toe ee cece
[13024]we bg ye MOI : - - > os }
[13027]14-0000
[13029]BUGAYEVA, Ludmila - IV, F, 4
[13030]ab [Berat, Richard “IV,D,1
[13031]Do [Bue TIN, Sipe |} IV, E, 49, 50 .
[13032]0G [surtmn, wal} LV, E, 49, 50 a .
[13033]CECCHI, Pietro - IV, E, 39, 40, 42
[13034]CHELNOKOV, Vladimir Dmitriyevich - IV, F, 2,16
[13035]CHEREPANOV, Aleksandr N. - Il, H, 4; V,C,1-4, 6-8
[13036]CHERNETSEV, Y. ©. - IV,E,49
[13037]CHURANOV, Vladimir A. - ill, B, 4
[13038]Ob [pax, Frank| 1V, F, 41, 42
[13039]“) DEMKIN, Vladimir - IV, E,20,45
[13040]DERYABIN, Petr Sergeyevich - IV,B,5, 6
[13041]DOUGLAS, William O. - IV,D,3
[13042]06 {prew, George|- IV, D,1
[13043]Ob Pwexty, Robert} IV, E, 41,44, 45 7
[13044]-FARMAKOVSKAYA, Olga A. - V,A,1
[13045]FEDOROVICH, Tatyana - IV,E, 8,9
[13046]FEDOSEYEV, Sergey M. - IV,E, 49-5; IV, F,1
[13048]Ob [Fisk, Norman|- IV,D,5
[13050]OG [FRIPPEL, Arsene |- IV, D,2
[13051]’ 04 [GAFFEY, Joseph | IV, E, 41, 45, 46
[13052]o
[13053]r !
[13055]2
[13057]ea aE Comte ne ren a man ‘
[13061]0001259
[13064]14-0000
[13066]a
[13067]GARBLER, Paul - IV,E, 52
[13069]eo oe
[13071]ot [GARCIA, Anthony za) ~1V,E, 39:
[13073]Ob, (GARLAND, J: John ¥ IL, F, 173 2V, E, 31, 33-36
[13074]Ol [exsspure, » Michael]! Iv, D, 5,6
[13076]GOLITSYN, Anatoliy Mikhayiovich - UI,B,
[13078]IV,B,
[13080]VA,
[13082]3,4; IM, E,9-11;
[13083]5
[13085]1
[13087]GRIBANOV, Oleg M. - UI, F,3,4; IV,6; 1V,6; IV,E,4,5,21; IV,F,1,2
[13089]"GRIGORIY" - IU, F,13; 1V,5,3,6; IV,F,4
[13091]GROMAKOVSKIY, Yevgeniy - DI,B,4; IV,E,20
[13093]4 Ill, F, 5-13, 15-19;
[13094]6; IV,0,9,10; IV,E, 21,23, 31-34;
[13096]GRYAZNOV, Gennadiy I. - 10,B,4; Wi, F,8-13,15; IV,E,5,12, 19-21, 26-28,
[13097]. ; 30,43-45; IV.G,3; V,B,3,4
[13099]- GUK, Yuriy I. - 10,B,4
[13101]HAMILTON, Victor Norris - I,E,9.
[13102](aka: HiNDAL, Fouzi Mitri)
[13104]"HANNA" - IV,'E, 27
[13105]OC LHarnis, Gisella|- IV,D,1,7,3
[13106]HORBALY, Wi iam - IV, E,53
[13107]Ok [HOWARD, Herbert} 11, £,8; 10, F,20; 1V,6,1,3,4,
[13108]IVANOVA, Svetlana - IV, E, 38,39, 45, 46
[13109]Gb (FENNER, Paul . IV, E, 28-31, 35-36
[13110]JOHNSON, Robert Lee - IH,E,8; 11,G,5
[13111]dL [ZOHNSON, Wallace Everett) -1V,F,3,4
[13112] & (Bones, William Carroll}- IV, F, 3,4
[13113]<3 , 5
[13114]SECRET
[13116]bm a ee RT
[13118]GV0L1260
[13122].
[13123]if
[13124]7
[13125]a
[13126]i
[13128]FS:
[13129]ag
[13130]re
[13131]49
[13132]ra
[13134]e
[13135]bt
[13137]UP ELAN WreTe} eringctoee hy Sena ce
[13139]APC ee
[13141]14-0000
[13143]I, eTADIT
[13145]i : Cinerenrs
[13146]KADERA, Fred f IV,E, 45
[13148]KANTOR, Marvin - IV, D,5,6
[13150]O6[Karvov, fnul- IV,D,5
[13152]KASHPEROV, Mikhail - UI,H,4 . |
[13153]KEMMER, Myra -I1V,E,9
[13155]Ob[KExsERs. James|- IV, E, 22-26, 55, 56
[13156]KLY PIN, Vladimir Azekseyevich - 1V,E,5,48-51
[13157]KOBULOV, Bogdan Zakharovich (General) - 1V,B,1-4,7
[13159]KOLOSSOV, Viktor - IV, E, 30, 34
[13160](Alias used by KOSOLAPOV)
[13162]KOSOLAPOV, Vadim V. - 10,5,4; I,F,8,16,17; IV,E,5,19-21,28-32,
[13163]. : 34-39, 42-44
[13165]KOSYGINA, Madame - IJI,A,1
[13167]KOVSHUK, Vladislav M. - I,B,4; I,F,5,11,12; 1V,§,3,4,6, 12, 18,21,
[13168]23,49,52,53; IV,F,1,2; 1V,G,3; V,C,2
[13170]KOZLOV, Veniamin - IV,E, 12
[13171]KRUGLOV, Sergey Nixiforovich - IV,B,5
[13172]pee ee
[13173]Ol/| BANE, anew IV,D, 132
[13175]LANGELLE, Russell - II, F,3; IV,E,8
[13179]"LILLIAN" - IV, E, 26
[13181]Ob [Lusin, George) IV, E, 49, 50 |
[13183]- Ob (Eunt, Horace\ m1, F,3
[13185]Ob (MAHONEY, Eugene|- IV, E,53
[13187]flan. Martin k IV,D,2
[13189]6001261
[13191]Ep SP hE ae ona ae vee See ee as
[13193]wean swine > . . oe wea Tae ee
[13194]cig, atten © woe oa
[13197]ots Dene
[13199]14-0000
[13201](2
[13203]Nest aa f
[13204]VouUNNe
[13206]06
[13208][ea _David|- =, U1, c,4¢
[13209]ua aw, Ralph|- IV, D,5
[13210](MERTENS, Gerard -IV,D,2
[13211]. MIXHAYLOV, A, A, - IV,E,49
[13212]MINTKENBAUGH, James Allen - Ill, E, 8; U1,G,5
[13213]MORELL, William N. - IV,E, 52
[13214]. forone? Joseph}- IV, E, 22, 27, 36,37, 39, 40, 55
[13215]MULE, Walter (Capt.) - IV, C, 4
[13216]AM AC iC GOWAN, Edward -~IV,F,13
[13217]"ob fesciren, aeraahd} IV, D, 5, 6
[13218]PENKOVSKIY, Olcg Vasilyevich - IV,E,13
[13219]: PETROV, Vladimir Ivanovich - HI, B,4; IV, E, 48,49
[13221]POPOV, Petr S. - IVES? 10; V, C/4-7
[13223]"RAKETA" - Iv,Cc, 5
[13224]“(RASTVOROY, Yuriy (+ iv,B,5,6
[13225]" RHODES, Roy - In, F,4
[13226]O06 ure, Jona] IV, D, 5,6
[13228]OL, [SCHWARZENBACH, Collette]- 111, F,10
[13230]‘ashe eae akg agar
[13232]LRN RE TUNE Ne N O EPSRC RE IEE:
[13234]ES.
[13236]0001262
[13238]|
[13242]14-0000
[13244]em rayne tet ON RAGE LANL NAAR PANE AEE LONI AE
[13245]cpm ante NE RED ERAN AEE EAA LD LENCE PEEL REN oe et OLS Sem no ct
[13247]my .
[13248]es
[13250]T
[13252]} oo . mp.
[13254]pe
[13258]SERGEYEV (SERGEEV), FNU - IV,£, 32,33
[13260](Very poasibly Igor Alekseyevich ZENKIN, but is now considered also _
[13261]identical to Igor Alekseyevich SERGEYEV, Igor Alekseyevich SUKHOV
[13262]and very possibly Igor A. SNURNOV. } : .
[13264]66 |SHAPIRO, Isaac Henry|- uLF,6
[13266]ob [SHarTAuER,. Sofia]- 1V,D, 5,7
[13267]SHAZLY, Sarwat el - IV,E, 40
[13268]SHELEPIN, Aleksandr Nikolayevich - I, F, 13
[13269]“SHMELEV" + iil, F, 13; IV,D, 3,63 IV,F, 4
[13271]Ob [SHUBIN, Joba\- IV,D,
[13273]7 SHULGINA, Nataliya - IV,F,l, 12
[13275]SMITH, Dayle Wallis - Lu, F, 4,26; 1V,G,1
[13276]SMITH, Edward Ellis - Ut, ¥,4
[13278]06 (Smite, “Fohn Discos] - UI, E, 9; IV, E, 45, 50
[13279]STALIN - IV,B,5
[13281]OG [STEVENS, Edmund Lm, F,4,6
[13283]06 [SToRSBERG, James - Ui, F,3,5,11-13; IV, E, 21-24, 26, 43,55, 56
[13285]Ob [TARASKA, William} IV,D, 5,6
[13287]Qb[FAYLoR, David Hiv, D,2
[13289]OL [TAYzoR. John }-1V, E, 42, 43
[13291]UMANETS, Ella -IV,E, 38 6001262
[13294]6
[13296]SECRED
[13298]mR
[13302]14-0000
[13304]- x
[13307]STROM 0 = TENET CANARY 8 ROI ES A | SO RRRENEEMI Atm MU mI tee, MIE! EE Ae vie NEE a ge ee Nw we
[13309]“~ QT Ie
[13310]Viner
[13312]URBAN, {Colonel} IV,E,24,25
[13314]VASSALL, William - IU, E, 9; UI, G, 5; IV,D,9
[13316]06 [(arASHENEO, Ste: Steve} IV, E, 53
[13318]OS ¢ William Stanley\- iV, D,2Z
[13319]WINTERS, George Payne, Jr. - IV, £, 53; V,C,4+7
[13320]. ZENKIN, FNU - IV,E, 32-34
[13321]a : (Very possibly Igor Alexseyevica ZENKIN, but is now considered also
[13323]aad : and very ‘possibly Igor A. SMIRNOV. }
[13324]Of [ ZUJUS, Matthew IV, EB, 26-28
[13325]or) ZWANG, Maurice} IV, E, 40-42
[13327]| SECRET
[13329]identical to Igor Alekseyevich SERGEYEV, Igor Alexseyevich SUKHOV
[13331]GUOL 24.
[13333]trhta Vp tractor e: rane ART Themen LE WORE eeeb: H, -aner oe fags