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[4]RECORD SERIES
[6]FROM
[7]TO
[9]DATE
[11]PAGES :
[13]SUBJECTS :
[14]DOCUMENT TYPE :
[15]: Unclassified
[17]CLASSIFICATION
[19]DATE OF LAST REVIEW
[21]Document 1a.
[23]AGENCY : .
[25]: Sorensen Papers
[26]AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
[27]ORIGINATOR : .
[28]: Schlesinger, Jr.
[29]: President Kennedy
[30]TITLE :
[33]RESTRICTIONS :
[34]CURRENT STATUS :
[36]OPENING CRITERIA :
[38]COMMENTS :
[40]| 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
[42]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[43]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[45]NARA
[47]Memo to President CIA Reorganization
[48]15
[50]CIA
[52]Memoranda
[56]Sorensen Papers: Classified Subject Files 1961-64 Box 47, CIA,
[58]NW 49061 DoclId:32622644 Page 1
[60]visible errors.
[62]NW 49061 Docla:32622644 Page 2”
[64]7 Ga balance, CIA's
[65]ebout} are its errors.
[67]‘judgment, is that th
[69]es that thie autonoray is dus to three main causes: |
[70]doctrine of clandestine operations; - (2) an tnadequeta conception of.
[72]SECRET Se sanr7r2cb
[73]VERSION ;
[74]NUA-ENTING OF
[77]ARERBIC.C. afor
[79]AQU
[81]June 30, “1961
[83]a MLMORANDUM FC. THE PRESIDENT
[85]| SUBJECT: CLA Reorganization
[87]I submit the following views ‘as one who worked in CSS during the
[88]' wer and served as a periodic CIA consultant in the years since.
[90]record has probably been very good. In the
[91]‘nature uf clandestine operations, the triumphs of an intelligence
[92]agency are unknown; all the public hears about (or should hear:
[93]But, again in the nature of the case, an
[94]“agency dedicated to clandestine activity can afford damned {sw ~
[95]. The important thing to recognise teday,-in my —
[96]the CLA, as at present named and constituted, ha
[97]about used up its quota. Bs margin for future error is practically
[98]non-existent. " Cne more CIA debacle wilh shake faith considerab!;.
[99]in US ‘policy, at home ae well as abroad, And, until CIA is visibly _
[100]‘reorganised, it will (as in the Algerian instance) be widely & blamed for
[101]_ Sexelopmente of whieh it. is ) polly & fonocent. _ -
[104]SECRET | \o
[106]2.
[108]-  esnception of the. reintionship between operations and intelligence..
[109].. The memorandum also suggests waye in which sems of these prob-
[110]lems can perhaps be slevinted:
[112]Me 7 . _ Lok CIA Autonomy
[113]. . CIA. ‘conducts three :: ain forme of eecret work: clandestine tntelll- a
[116]. activities, it carri:s a: these functions with relative gutenemy.
[117]The reasoag for the autonomy are historical.
[119]‘Whaea CIA began, the State Department, atill thinking tee mach in
[120]: ‘terms. of its traditienal missisas in foreign affairs, losked onthic
[121]">, new venture with suspleion and renounced the oppertanity to seize
[122]. fiym contrel of CLA. aperations. ie did net, for example, tryto
[123]establish any effective system of clesrance far CIA activities; and
[124]_ some ambassadors trankly preferred not to know what CiA wea up to
[125]_ lJ. da their countries. Aer 1953 the fact that the Secretary of State and
[126]the Director of Central Intelligence were brothers fsrther. confizmed .
[127]‘CIA's independence trom eupervision by State Department desks.
[129]THE DETERIORATION oo
[131]“In the masutime, CIA grew in olae sind power. Daring the Sensis ie ee
[132]_begha in some arese te cutstrip the State Department in the quality of
[133]ite personnel. - ‘Partly because CIA paid higher salaries and even |:
[134]‘mere perhaps because Allen Dulles gave his peeple courageces pro-. hal
[135]tection against McCarthyite attacks, CIA was able te attract and held
[136]- ag larga number of adie and independent-minded men. The mere it-.
[137]added brilliant activists to ie staff, the mere mementum ite opersticns
[139]. y the time that State had begun to be fally swere ef the prebiens .
[140]created by an active. snd sutoncmoss CIA, it had long since missed.
[141]‘the chance to establish its. own ultimate authority, . While Btate re: TES
[143]HW 49061 Docid:32622644 Page 3°...) ..-
[145]2. SECRET. it Ao
[146]oe ’
[148]Yor its part. CIA bed developed a whole esrics of functions peral-
[149]loling alyeady existing functions of the State Department, and of
[151]the Defense Ceparts:.2nt aa well. Today it has ite own political
[152]desks and military safle; it hag in effect its own foreign service;
[154]it has (or bes bad) !:6 own combat forces). it even bes its own sir
[155]force. Rs annual Vudget to about times that of the State Depart-—
[156]ment, The contemporary CIA poseesces reay of the charactoristice
[158]ef a state within & st2te. .
[160]- Ih Deetrine
[162]Theugh CLA's eutooway developed for histories] reasons, it has been
[163]able to endure because there is no doctrine governing our conduct of ;
[164]' > Clandestine cperationa, Tae prodlem of doctrine for CIA te the extent -
[165]1 "to which its various clandestine missions are compatinie with a {rec
[166]j 7 and open society. uo,
[168]It ig idle to argue that, becauee the Communists can do such-and-sech,
[170]__ we are freo to de it 1990. Communism is a ‘creed nurtured in con- 7
[171]Spiracy; and the whole point of Communist social and pelitical orga:.i-
[172]sation is to make couspizacy effective. If ‘fighting five with fire’ means
[173]contracting the {recaoms traditionally enjoyed by Americans in order
[175]_ to give more freedo:s to CIA, no one seriously wishes to do that. Yet
[177]I do. not feel that we have tried rigorously to think through the limits .
[178]which the meintenance of an open society places on secret activity.
[179]Untll thie te done, CIA's role will sot be clearly defined and under-
[180]stead, The proble:n which must be faced is: what sort of eecret
[181]activity is consistent with the preservation of a free secial order’
[183]~ We must begin, ! beliove, by accepting the tact thas the United States .
[184]. will continue te be a astion in which politicians will ask questiens and
[185]-. Make speeches, repostere will dig out stories, newspspers will ane -
[186]--° lish editorials, individuale, driven by promptings ¢ of censcience, wil
[187]“hee bears’ out things ‘harmful to the etate, and so on... Ye de not wied i
[188]”) change these things and could not do so without violating the essence
[189]'! ef our society,. Thege things make up the framework in which ClA-
[190]'| lamust operate. - In ahort, they constitute the preblem; aod, as 2
[191]: General Marshall used to @ say. “There's no point in * Highting the -
[192]problem, " oan es
[194]awe sane WanVa. PRI AA Dane 4
[196]SECREN
[199]. Thess fellows from ‘ala, I would think, the conclusion that secret
[200]_ gstivities are permissible go long a9 they do nat corrugt ihe
[201], principles and practices of our society, that they cease to be
[202]. ; permissible when their effect ia to corrupt these principles and’
[203]eer practices.
[205]Rach form of secre: activity presents ita own problem. Clandestine
[206]intelligence collecti«:: hae been a traditional function of the national
[208]etate. Hs rules and usages are fairly well established, In the
[210]main, esoionsge, if <ouducted with discretion, should present no.
[212]- great problem. Howsver, when conducted with an open checkbook
[214]and a broad mandat+ even espionage can begin to push agninet the
[216]limits of secret activity in an open society. I censider later, for
[217]example, the questica of the Controlled American Source (CAS) and .
[218]whether the overdoing of CAS is not beginning to harm other acs wos
[219]ox | the government. . a
[221]Covert political operations present a trickier problem. Occasions
[222]_ arise when it is necessary to subsidise newspepers, politicians anc
[223]organisations in other countries. But corruption of the pelitical life —
[224]of another nation ie not a responsibility to be lightly assumed. I
[225]wendaz whether CLA \ae set'dene toe much of thle for the Joy af it.
[226]Paramilitary ectivities create on even more difficult problem, if .
[227]ely because the problems of concealment are se mech more difficult.
[229]In general, I would suggeet that any secret operation whose success is
[231]' depencéent on the suppreesian of news, on lying te Congressmen and
[233]journallets and on the deception of the electorate sheuld be undertaker
[235]only when the crisis io so considerable that the gains really seer to
[237]_° outweigh the disadvantages, Thie suggeste that the sise of. the pro- - oo
[238]- posed operation may be cf crucial importance. - Small operations can
[240]| “be done with a minimum ef accompanying corruption. The greater, = =~
[241]" the visibility of the operation, the more ite success depends on 7
[243]si eae ts uclonioa, wa ac’ aaee wagons b to tact om enews
[245]ee "ease be made for ite necessity. —
[247]Ia short, “vies eutsoated with 2 proposed operation, we must not |
[248]“<gek whether the operation is technically feasible ta ite own terms;
[250]__fertone way falee to Hie own principio’ we
[252]ww AONE1 Nnata-29699K4d) Pane 5
[256]i
[257],
[261]4
[262]i=)
[263]and
[264]Ke
[267]o
[268]Yoma
[269]H 4
[271]Ee
[272]et
[273][='
[274]w
[275]x.
[277]So
[279]+ en,
[281]FRIST a ceke
[283]{PHOTOCOPIED SY THE KENNEDY LIBRARY QUE T
[286]Wer 4qanez4
[288]“ OF THE ORTGINAL
[290]SECRET \o
[291]. 5, Ww
[293]I, Cperations and oliey
[295]Clandestine activitie should be assessed not only in the context
[296]of their relationship wo. pan society but also in the context of thei:
[297]relaticaship to United States foreign policy. ;
[299]“CLA operations have wot been held atfeccvely subordinates to U.S
[300]fereign policy.
[302]1. Clandestine :ctelligesce collection is, by charter, free fror.
[303]State Degertznent comtrel, This fact expeses American foreign policy
[304]to a muitituds of ombarrassments when CIA is discovered recruitin,
[305]agents or developing sources in a friendly country. The recent
[306]Singasore case, when CLA, without netice to the Consul General,
[307]tried to subvert a member of the Special Branch of the Singapore
[308]Police provides ac instructive example. After complications of
[310]. ludicrons complexity, incisding an attempt to subject the recruit to
[312]a le-deiactor test, it turned out thet the recruit kad long since
[313]informed his superiors of tha CIA approach and wes leeding CLA
[315]inte a trap which, when sprung, produced considerable emberrass-
[316]ment to relations batween the US and the Singapore government.
[317]There have been troubles of a comparabic sort in Pakisten and in
[318]Japan (where a group of Chiness Nationals were smaggied into Sascho
[319]to work in a CIA-NSA operation). ‘
[321]CIA has said that, in such cases, neither the Embsesy nor the Dopaz<-
[322]ment in Washington is normally informed of this type of eperation.
[324]in short, no one knows how many petential probleme fer US foreign
[325]peliey -- and how much potential friction with friendly states -- are
[326]being crested at this moment by CIA clandestine intelligence operations.
[327]Surely there is an argument for permitting State to decide whether the
[328]advantage to be gained by the cperation (oe. g,, the information derivsti»
[329]‘from en agent within the Special Branch of the Singspore Felice) out-
[330]weighe tho riek (0, g., exasperating the iccal government and shekir;
[331]ite confidence both in our purposes and in cur ecnse}, Clandestine
[333]” intelligence operations should plainly de cleared beth with the Depart -
[335]suent of State aad (eave for oxceptionel inetances sad on agreement of
[336]the Secretary of State) with the local U.3, Ambessadcr,
[338]Nanla-2IKIIRAA Pace
[340]6. Ne
[342]“a
[344]2. Covert politival eperations technically require State
[346]Department clearancy. In practice, however, ClA has often been
[347]-able to seiso the initiscive in ways which reduce State's role almost
[348]to that of 3 rubber eth
[350]; Thia hos been partly : ue consequence of the superior drive and
[351]activism of CLA pers-unei, especially as compared with the difficec.cz
[352]of State Lepartrcert persornel. For example, when men come to C14
[353]with the assignment ut developing cevert political campaigne or
[354]organising coups or preparing for peramilitary warfare, these men
[355]naturally fall to work with ingeavity and seal; they probably feel that
[356]they are net earning their pay uniess, cay, they organise asf many
[357]coupe na possible, The coacopt of ‘contingency planning’ has
[358]legitimatisec the concrete preparation of gpereticns sti) presumahi;
[359]in a hypothetical stage: people did not at first notice that ‘contingecy
[360]iplansing, ' when carried to the stage of recruitment and training of
[361]personnel, creates a vested interest which often transforms contin-
[362]gencies into apparent necessities, Thus, if a group is assembled
[363]and revved up on a contingency basis, then the failure to carry the
[364]project through (it ls ergued) will invite the disappointment and
[365]alienation of the greup; eo the pressure increases te follow through |
[369]THE DETER
[371]To!
[373]‘Es on what bad stasted 24 # pure apeculation. Thies was a central factor,
[374]a= of course, in the Cuban decision -- the fact that disbandment of the
[375]a3 Cuban force in Guatemala just seamed to exeete toe many problems and
[376]3.S embarrasomente. Having entered inte reletions with persenalitico i=
[377]Su foreign lanés, CIA has sometimes eaomed te feel that we must thors-
[378]ae after do pretty much what they want -- or else they will blow security
[379]og oF even go over to the Communists. This spproach hes mede us ox |
[380]EEL. oceasien the priscnero ef our own agents. ¢
[382]-" 9We become prisoners of our agente ia anether eenge too. The Cuba;
[384]' episode leaves the strong impression that CLA le not able to control its:
[386]. own low-level operatives. ‘While the CIA people in Weshingten are Foc
[388]vias of exceptionally higk quality, the mea sttracted to Meld jobs are aorzc
[390]a ‘times tough and even vielous peuple mativated by drives of thair ov
[392]- |” gnd not necossasily in political or even moral eympathy with the purpuse
[393]: "ef the operation. . Sach actions ag locking up the Revelationszy Cousci
[395]: ..aueb enterprises as. Cperation 40 in Miami where C1A agents report et.
[397]” aaa: - ot Le . pelt. : .
[399].{PHOTOCOPIED gy
[401]W 49061 Docla:32622644° Page. 7
[403]Wir Aank4
[405]GINAL,
[407]’ OF THE ord
[411]it has meant too the ihe State Department, often spprised of an
[412]operation only in its ater stagee, is under great pressure to
[414]endorse the operatic. ac already mounted becauce af the alleged
[416]evil consequences a exercising aveto. | well remember Tom
[417]Mann's remark the way the decision was made to go abead on Cuba:
[419]"I would never have isvored initiating thie cperation; but, since it
[421]bas gone as far as it hae, I do not think we can risk calling it off.’
[422]Moreover, at atime vhen there ie increseing premium on activioer,
[423]State, whan it queet.cae CLA operations or initiatives, caste itself in
[425]2 prissy. sissy, negative role. Tha advocate of clandestine activitics
[426]_seeme ‘tough' and realistic; the opponent hae te invoke such iatangibleas
[427]‘ge the reputation of the United States, world public epinion, "What
[429]do we say in the Unised Nations?"”, etc., and sseme bepelessly
[431]idealietic, legalistic and ‘saft. '
[433]The result of CIA‘s .uitiative in covert political operations has been
[435]to create situations chich have ferced policy an the State Department.
[436]This was set the or:;,.nal idea behind CIA. Ae Allen Dulles wrote
[438]in hie 1947 memorandum to the Senate Armed Services Committ.;c,
[439]“Tne Central Intelligence Agency should have aothing to do with potic;.
[440]Yet, in the years since, CIA has, in effect, ‘made’ policy in many
[441]parts af the world. <A number of governments still in power know
[443]that they bave even t«on targets of CIA attempts at overthrow -- not
[445]8 State of mind calculated to stinwmlate friendly feelings towerd tha
[447]- United States. Indengeia, of course, is a prime example. |
[449]This experience suggests that the present system by which CIA notifies
[450]State ef a projected covert operation is inadequate te protect US
[451]faterests. There rust be seme means by which State can be informed
[452]of euch operations at an early enough stage te affect the cenceptian
[454]’ and preliminary planing of the operation. Otherwise CLA will con-
[456]tinue to confroat State with propesitions having potential impact on
[457]tore. EO POUCY but at too late © point to gubject that impact to reasco-
[459]' able Control.
[460]3. The Controlied Americsn Source (CAS) representa a particular
[461]aepect of CLA's encroachmect on policy-meking functions. CIA today
[463]hee cearly ac many poople under official cover overeess an State -- .
[464]3980-to 3700, About 1500 of thees are under State Department cover .
[466]Ranta-%9699644 Pace 8B
[468]IE TO THE DETERIORATION }
[470]OF ‘THE ORIGINALS: 22.
[472]PHOTOCOPIED GY THE KENNEDY LIBRARY OU
[474]Ww 49061
[476]we
[478]8,
[480]{the other 2200 are >: ssumably onder military or other nen-State
[482]official cover). Cr: sinally the use ef State Department cover for
[484](CLA personne] vac s.-pposed to be atrictly limited and temporary.
[486]The Lolies-Correa-. icksen report stated in 1948, “The CIA should
[488]not use State Deparirient cover as a simple answer te all ite problen:z,
[489]but should preeced tu develop its own outside cover and eventually in
[491]this way and throug: increased efficiency of ite overseas personnel,
[493]find a way to tempe: tis darmands upon the State Departmest.” Noxn-
[495]theless CIA has steacily increased ite requisitions for official cover.
[497]' There are several :«asona why CLA has abandoned its original intent...
[499]_ ef deveiaping syste:::3 of private cover. 2 ie easier to arrange Ccex=:
[500]thruign State; if is iess expensive; it is quicker; it facilitates tne
[501]szcurizy <f operatic... ss well as cf communiecstiong; it insures a
[503]_ pleasanter life for ihe CIA people. But the effect is to further the
[504]CIA anercachmert on the trediticnal functions of State.
[506]in some missions, | understand, CAS pevecnasl gutuumbers reguilsr
[507]State Department persennai. in the Amorican Embassy in Vienne,
[508]out of 20 peraons ilated in the October 1940 Foreign Service List ae
[509]being in the Political Section, 16. are CAS personnel; of the 31 officers
[510]listed as engaging in reporting activities, over half are CAS. Cfthe
[511]13 officers listed in che Political Section in our Embassy in Chile, |
[512]ll are CAS, Cn the day of President Kennedy's Inauguration 47 perce:
[513]of the political officers serving in United States Embacsiss were CA5.
[514]Sometimes the CIA mission chicf has been fa the country lenger, ba»
[515]more money at his disposal, wields more influence (and is abler) ths:
[516]the Ambassador. ites be bas direct access te the local Prime
[517]Mizister, Sometimnss (as during a critical period in Lace) he pursieo
[518]a different policy from that of the Ambassador. Also he is genoraliy
[520]‘well known locally ac the CLA representative, |
[522]In the Paris Embassy todzy, there are 128 CIA peepie. CIA in Faris
[523]'. ‘hee tong since begun te move inte arees of political reporting normally -
[524]occupied by State. The ClA men doing overt tnterosi political cepurti:.:
[525]outnumber thoes in the Cmhaesy's political ec section by 10-2.. Cir hes
[526]even sought to monopelise contact with certain French political perec:. wie
[527]. les, among them the President of the National Aegambiy. CLA cecil: >)
[528]the top Deor of the Faris imbassy, s fact weil known locally; and on.
[530]“~ wat fete
[531]a hi ie i Ci tne AAA atlantida
[533]Docld:32622644 Page 9
[535]3. 7: ‘
[537]the night of the Gen- cals’ revolt in Algeria, passers-by noted
[538]with amusement the: the top floor was eblese with lights. (Iam
[539]Aaformed tha: Ambassador Cavin was able to secure entrance that
[540]night to the C1A off:: es only with diffleulty. )
[542]CLA is apparently pug firraly committed to the CAS approach es a
[543]permanent solution :or its problems. 2&8 is preesing to have ClA
[544]pecale given the ranz of Counselor. Before State loses control of
[546]_tmore and more of ite presumed oversese personnel, and befere CAL:
[547]becomes permenentiy intagrated into the Foreign Service, it would
[549]. €eam important (2) to assure every ambassador the firm control
[550]over the local CAS station nominally promised in the NSC Directive
[551]‘of January 19, 1961, and (b) to review the current CAS situation wit:
[552]an eye to a steady redaction ef CAS personnel.
[554]THE DETERIORATION}
[558]: 4. Paramilitary warfare, I gather, ie regarded in some quarters -
[560]as @ purely techsical matter, easily detachable from policy and thor<-
[561]fore a proper function ef the Department of Defense. Yet there is
[562]almost o0 CLA function more peculiarly copondant an the political
[563]context than paramilitary warfare.
[565]There are several reasens for this. Fer ene thing, a paramilitary
[566]operaticn is in its nature a large and attributable operation and ther=i.,,
[567]as suggested above, clashes with the presuppositions of eur open
[568]society. (These considerations need not apply, however, ta the
[569]training of, say, the Jeuth Vietnamese in gusrrilia tactics er to the
[571]. Wappert of already existing guerrilla activities.) For anether, the
[572]moral and political orice of direct peremilitary failure is acute for
[573]us. Comrounists, when they stimalate peramilitery activizy, are
[574]doing what the world expects from them; when we de it, we appear
[576]- t betray cur own professed principles and therefore canuet afford to
[578]_ Compound delinquency by defeat, Moreover, as the recent Algeriac
[580]' episode showed, once we cenvince the world that we are committed to 2
[581]paramilitery endeavor, we will be blamed for ali serte of things. Acc,
[583]' . ge the recent tractora-far-prisaners episode shewed, when we do se:.1 _
[584]men to possible death, we cannct lightly write them ef and clese the
[585]beaka. The Communists, en the other hen@, have no serugles about
[587]Mewidating ¢ a losing show.
[589]HE KENNEDY LIBRARY DUE TO
[591]OF. THE ORIGINAL, ~.: :.
[595]PHOTOCOPIED BY T
[597]N
[599]ert a et a iE Ag ee Las aes ene nee ent
[601]WW 49NKf1) Danta:29672644 Paae 10
[603]SECRET 18, Vor
[605]Mersoves, guerrilla sarfare is fought, mech more then snilitary
[606]mea ordinarily rea): ue, in an ideologies! context. The guerrilla
[607]‘gusceeds when hio program enliste graserects suppost; end it is
[608]wery difficult indsec: to beat him whea the countryside ts with Brn.
[609]-Van Mock told Genoral Marghall in 1946 act to worry sbout the ©
[610]- guerrillas in Indonema; “we sre sending 50, 000 men out there
[611]: and will clean the eizuation up in the three months." Marchal,
[612]- who bad bad experis-ca fighting guerrillas in the Piilippines,
[613]_ replied, “It won't ts eo casy. You will find thet they will bleed
[615]you to death." Cyprus and Algeria illustrate the difficulty of over-
[616]\- + cerning guerrilla resistance through sheer weight of military force.
[618]Serious guerrilla movements have been defeated only three times oince
[619]the exd of the Gecoud Vorid tar: in Greece, because Tite's defection -
[620]'  glosed the sorthera vorder; in the Philippines; snd in Malaya. © ic
[621]| the lact two cases the guorrilla resistance ented because ofthe ==
[622]' ‘eombination of political ang mil / countermeasures. The at strugaic
[623]‘tn Malaya, 20 Field “arehal Templer under stocd (acd sald), was f:
[624]the minds and hearts oi the people; it therefore involved net o=i;
[625].. paranillitary operations but a vast educational program, organization :
[626]| of trade unions, political reform aad an offer of national independencs..
[627]-. Ef the guerrilisls power lies in his revolutionary program, the angwer | :
[628]" dies in part tn meeting the needs which ensbie the guerrilla to rotse -
[629]the countryside, ‘v/ithout 6 political goal," wrete Maso Tee-tung, ©.
[630]<. “gaerrilia warfare must fail, as it mast if ite polities! objectives. do. . a
[631]net coiacide with the aspiraticns of the peeple and Uf thelz eympathy, =
[632]cooperation end aseistance cannot be gained," He edded, “Dowo
[634]"| wart the support of the masees? if ws do, we mast go amang the | a
[635]b inasses; arouse them te activity: contora eurecives with thei weal’.
[637]ésancferred. to ‘Defense. oe
[639]Dovid :32622644:: PB:
[641]; Vee
[642]oe
[644]5. How to Esta:Aigsh Policy Control? Here I wander whether the
[645]British experience «ight sot be of value. The notable feature of tho
[646]British intelligence -vetem is the determination to keep clandestine
[648]activity under etric: “orcign Uffice contral. This contre! is achicved
[649]: in a number of wayr
[651]Re | Seeret intelligence Service (mt) itself operates under
[652]a a . the direction of \n0 Joint Intelligence Committee, which has a
[654]| Foreign Céfice .asirman (until recently Sir Patrick Dean, who
[655]“he is now the Britic: representative at the UN) and which includes -
[656]7 the Service Inte‘ligence directors aud representatives of the
[658]‘Colonial Cfifice and the Commonwealth Relations Office ae well
[659]as the Chief of «iS.
[661]THE DETERIORATION
[663]; "pp baats positical wartare directives are erigiasted, act es
[664]‘by 8B, but by tae. Information Research Department inthe. ,
[665]Foreign Céfice, uften in consultation with an interdepartmeatal
[666]Working Group ~a International Communist Fronts, and under
[668]the ultimate co.:cral of the Superintending Under-Secretary of
[670]the Permanent vader Secretary's Department in the Feseign
[671]- Cifice, .
[673]A,
[675]¢) SIS covert political action campaigns wast not omy con-
[676]‘form to Foreign. office directives but must be cleared with the
[677]Appropriate Ferelgn Office secgraphical desks.
[679]@ working groupe under IRD chairmanship govern opera- a7
[680]"tiene in special areas, euch as, for example, Sine-Seviet rela-
[681]Hong oz the World Youth Feetival. ,
[683]=) a Forvign Office Stail Lisisen Officer cite sax to the 815
[684]“Cates, Suit Foreign Office officials serve ware of doty tn SIS
[686]HW 49061. DocTa:32622644. Paaé-12--
[689]SECRET
[691]. \o
[692]12, os
[694]enforced by directiv»s, by State Department chairmanship of
[695]. working groupe, a: by the infiltratica of State Department
[696]pereounel i into the i elligence agency.
[698]° Cbvisusly this set-~9 would not gueceed, however, unlessthe = ss ;
[699]State Departroeat itself were prepared to overcome Ke inbred
[700]pabite of diffusion, -agativiam and delay ‘and te take a firm and
[701]purposeful stip « on ine ettuation.
[703]Vv. c rations anc istelligence
[705]. The relationship ber waen aperationa end intelligence vaises yarticn- coe
[706]‘1! Yaely pesplezing questions. ‘Intelligence’ includes twe eeparebic
[707] “." aetivities: clandéssine cellection; and research, analysis and
[709]. ’ evaluation. The firet denle with that small portien of raw inteili-
[711]:. gemee procured by secret means (Mz. Dulles estimated in 1947 that —
[713]"a sroper analysie of the intelligence obtainable by. ... overt, .
[714]i. nermal, and aboveboard meane would supply ve with over 89 percent,
[715]“i. { ahouid estimate, of the information required fer the guidance of our
[716]':"" gatiens) policy"); the second lovelves the collstion and interpretstic7:
[718]of all forma of intalligence, . however ehtained axl the predusticn of
[719]. catimates.
[721]THE-DETERIORATION | > - _ s,
[723]2.
[725]Q
[727]- uader the British ayztem, clandestine collection Ls entrusted te the
[728]Secret Intelligence Service. The research, enalysts and estimating:
[729]tanctien ie located in the Fereign Office Rescarch Department. :
[731]H
[733]a Under the American system, CLA hes reeponsibility for beth ce :
[734]:” ‘elandestine ecllection and research and snalysie. | The State Depart -
[735]- grent's Bureau of Intelligence and Research else hes recearch énd
[736] enalyels responsibilities; but, in practice, CIA hee established |
[738] PHOTOCOPTED. BY -T
[740]HW 49061 DacIa:32622644 ‘" Page:
[742]SECRET . a,
[743]13. 7 . . .
[745]The argument agains: incorporating the research and estimate
[746]function in State wa. nede by Dulles in 1947: “Fos the proper
[747]judging of the situat:on in any foreign country it is important that
[748]_ infermation szould bs processed by an agency whose doty it is to
[749]weigh facts, and to ‘raw conclusians from those facte, without:
[750]having either the facta or the conelusions warped by the inevitable
[751]and even proper prs dices of the men whoee duty it is to determine
[752]policy and who, havic-g once determined a policy, are too likely to
[753]be blind to any facts which might tend to prove the pelicy to be.
[755]ot fealty."
[757]Precisely the eame aegument | can be used with equal effect ageinst
[759]the incorporstion oi -he resoarch and estimate function in CIA -. _
[761]4. @., Sf ingedligencs ie too closely connected with operstiona, then =...
[762]‘thees committed to + sarticular operation will tend te select out the 9.
[764]a intelligence which validates the operation.
[766]Cbvieusly both arg: ons conclude in & case fer the establishment ef!
[768]a fairly iodependent -esearch and estimate growp. But, ifthe Rei |
[770] 'greup {e too independent, oue rune inte the opposite danger! that te, ©) ne
[772]| that neither policy sor. overetions will be * subjected to adequate WR
[773]: intelligence ehecks. i
[775]The trouble with the ‘Suban operation, for example, was net that
[776]intelligence and eperstions were combined, bud precisely that the | sooty
[777]Cuban-cperation evaded systematic intelligence judgment. The in-:
[779]_ talligence branch (DOD of CLA was never informed of the existence
[781]oe would provoke uprisings behind the lines and defections from the
[783]WW 49061 -: Docid:32622644." Page .14 °°
[785]- @f the Cuban operation. Tho Office ef National Estimates was never
[786]| seked te comment. an the Besumption, for example, that discontent -_
[787]had reached the petit in Cuba where s successful landing operation.
[790]OcUuncl ‘ . -
[792]\G
[794]14,
[796]‘that knowledge of the Cuban eperation, flaunted in Miami bare _
[798]by any number of lc:--level agents in the operations branch of CIA,
[800]was dented to even ine top officials of the intelligence branch, Tho
[801]_ Bureau of Intelligence and Kessareh of the Dopertment « of State
[802]xaew sven lses abou: the Cuban operation.
[804]3 ‘The’ problom, then, ia to have aa R&E group p sufficiently independent
[806]of beth policy and cverations to resist the pressure to maka the casc
[807]fox vested ideao anc intcrests -- yet sufficiently clese to be able to
[808]Subjact projected omerations or pelicies to the most intense sand =e
[809]searching scrutiny
[811]Ve nere could this gruup be located? If the CIA ware to become :
[812]eubordinate tu State. ag 24i-6 is to the Foreign Office, then the Fé...
[813]function might de v- sted in a coordinate subagency, somewhat inde- --
[814], pendent of both Stars and CLA, yet closely connected with both ind...
[815]to-day operations. The R&F eubagency would receive intelligence ._
[816]+ from CIA and from “tate, 20 well as from the services and, of cours, ©:
[817]. frem public sources. It would reproseat, in effect, & fusion of CLA/it! |
[818]and State/Intelligexce and Aeaearch. & might aleo teke over certal:
[819]ef the service functions now confided to CIA -~ photographic interpre- - ..
[820]tation, blographice. data, foreign brosdcast monitoring, overt collec- -
[821]tien, maps, etc. . There might be in additien 6 Joint Intalligence Board:
[822]with sith representatives from all the intalligence agencice oad wehe . *
[823]State Department or White House chairman,
[825]vw Coachusten.
[827]. ‘The azgument of thie memorandum implies a fairly drastic feerron
[828]‘1, aang of our presest intelligence set-up. 28 aleo implies the eapaci
[830]. @f the State Department to assume command ef the eitustion and toc
[831]eo in an effective and purposeful way. f the State Department ae 2
[832]recent staffed ia not capable of assuming effective command, ithie-ts
[833]not, : in-may judgment, an. argument against a. rational. apricot: ;
[839]15,
[841]“The astructuse- woie! would meet the criteria coggoeted | ta thie
[842]memorandar \ would 8 as follows: t
[844]y) The Sta: Department would be granted general = i eti«;
[845]-cigayance auth ity ever al) clandestine activity, This —
[846]Toight be effectuaced on the British model by the appointment ara
[847]of a Ceputy Unt secretary of State for intelligence, who
[848]would act fort! Secretary in theses mstters and who malght
[849]. S8TVE &3 chairr a of a Joint intelligence Board,
[851]2) The Jour. Intelligence Board would include rapre-
[852]sextatives frorr «il elowente in the intelligence communty
[853]and ales from t: whi te » House.
[855]THE: DETERIORATION
[857]3) The operating branches of the preaent CIA would be
[858]reconstituted under some blamoless title (the National Informa- _
[859]aan _tien Service), This new agency would be charged with rasponai-.
[860]a ‘bility for clandestine collection, for covert pelitical operations =«§-_—™ o
[861]“Ll... endfor paramilitary activities, It would eubmit projects to the |
[862]". Deputy Undersecretary of State for Intelligence for clearance. | ae
[863]- I general, the agency would bear somewhat the same relation- ;
[864]ship te State as the Disaxmament Administration and A rn
[865]/,Preeently do, an ' rer
[867]ST
[869]| oe ae second ‘senuiindependent ‘agency y would bee sot up. again _
[870]o - Bearing a blamalase. title (the F oreign Research Agency), coordi -
[871]‘nate with the eperstigne agency. “This agency would be charged -
[872]with responsibility for collation and interpretatien, would ©
[873]- ".. "include CLA/DDi, the Lureau of Intelligence and Research in .
[874]Ot as : State, and the’ warioue service functions now carried .on by CIA
[875]"| (phittographic interprctation, biographical files, foreign broadca2s:
[876]"| monitoring, scientific Antetbigence, maps, overt collection, eic.).