[1]A AAAAA . -
[2]\q04-10337-10001 | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
[3]‘ 0 (W Ctntal intelkyence Agency
[5]co ase BANE Yo
[6]ce a ; le"
[8]April iT1 2
[10]The Honorable John Conyers, Jr.
[11]Chairman ;
[13]Committee on Government Operations
[14]House of Representatives
[15]Washington, D.C. 20515
[17]Dear Mr. Chairman:
[19]The Director has asked me to respond to your letter of
[20]April 6, 1992 requesting certain information regarding CIA
[21]holdings of records related to the assassination of
[22]President Kennedy. We do have a significant number of records
[23]relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy,
[24]although many of these records were originated by the FBI or
[25]by investigating committees of the Congress. We believe that
[26]a significant portion of our records could be released if H.J.
[27]Resolution 454 were enacted into law.
[29]I should also point out that the Central Intelligence
[30]Agency is currently embarking on its own review of
[31]assassination records. I would expect that this review will
[33]result in the public release of a significant body of
[34]information.
[36]To help the committee understand the nature and number of
[37]CIA records pertaining to the assassination, I am enclosing
[38]the answers to the specific questions you raised in your
[39]letter.
[41]aan Sincerely,
[43]Stanley M. Moskowitz
[44]Director of Congressional Affairs
[46]Enclosure
[48]13-00000
[50].
[52]The Honorable John Conyers, Jr.
[54]SUBJECT:
[56]Agency Records on the JFK Assassination
[58]OCA/LEG/DMPearline:rw 23 April 1992 (OCA 1123-92)
[60]Original
[62]PRR EB BP Bp
[64](OCA 1123-92/1)
[65](OCA 1123-92/2)
[67]Addressee (w/enclos)
[69]per
[71]DbBCcI
[75]ER
[77]D/OCA (w/enclos)
[79]DMPearline Signer (w/enclos)
[81]OCA/LEG Subject File (w/enclos)
[83]OCA Record (w/enclos)
[85]D/Center for the Study of Intelligence (w/enclos)
[87]13-00000
[91]on
[93]OCA 1123-92
[95]1. Did the CIA retain possession of records requested by
[96]or developed on behalf of the House Select Committee on
[97]Assassinations? If so, how many pages of such records does
[98]the Agency have in its possession? What is the nature of
[99]these records?
[101]Yes, the CIA retained possession of records requested by
[102]or developed on behalf of the House Select Committee on
[103]Assassinations (HSCA). The Agency has approximately 300,000 ¢
[104]pages of such records which include microfilm of CIA's Oswald
[105]file (originally collected in response to the Warren
[106]Commission's inquiry, then added to) as well as records
[107]collected in response to specific requests from the HSCA.
[108]Although these records cover a wide variety of topics, they
[109]principally focus on CIA operations against Cuba and Castro,
[110]Lee Harvey Oswald's sojourn in the USSR, and Oswald's
[111]activities in Mexico City and New Orleans. The vast majority
[112]ef documents pertaining to Oswald were created in response to
[113]specific inquiries from the Warren Commission and HSCA. They
[114]also include a large number of nanie tracea requested by the
[115]HSCA staff, as well as materials relating to the Garrison
[116]investigation, Watergate, Cuban exile activities, and copies
[117]of FBI reports relating to Oswald. Because the HSCA was also
[118]investigating the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King,
[119]Jr., there is also some material on the Black Panthers and the
[120]civil rights movement.
[122]2. Does the CIA have records outside of those related to
[123]the HSCA that may be considered relevant to the assassination
[124]of President Kennedy? If so, please describe such records and
[125]the approximate number of pages.
[127]The CIA responded to requests from the Warren Commission
[129]“>and the HSCA (approximately 300,000 pages, see above). The
[130]» CIA has never, however, attempted to locate every document
[132]bearing on every conceivable angle or theory relating to the
[134]assassination of President John F. Kennedy. If the Agency
[136]were asked to explore newly advanced theories the search for
[137]\documents could be a rather large undertaking’ involving the
[138]‘review of thousands of additional documents. To conduct any
[139]further search, CIA would require specific guidelines
[140],describing the kinds of records sought.
[142]3. Did any of the records described in questions 1 and 2
[143]originate with the FBI? If so, approximately how many?
[144]go <a wt Bae
[145]We believe that between 40 percent and—-50-pereent of the
[146]records described in questions 1 and 2 originated with the
[147]FBI.
[149]13-00000
[151]NS
[153]4. Did any of these records originate with any other
[154]Federal, foreign, state, or local agency? If so, please
[155]describe which agencies and the approximate numbers.
[157]A small number of CIA‘s records pertaining to the
[158]assassination of JFK, probably less than 5%, originated with
[159]the State Department and the Immigration and Naturalization
[160]Service. Another small number of records, also less than 5%,
[161]are original HSCA records stating Committee requests to CIA.
[163]5. How many of these records have been reviewed for
[164]release under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)? How many
[165]of these records have been released pursuant to such requests?
[167]CIA has released 7,432 pages of records pertaining to the
[168]assassination of JFK, representing 1,969 documents, under the
[169]FOIA. There is no documentation of how many JFK assassination
[170]records CIA has reviewed under FOIA.
[172]6. In the estimation of the CIA, approximately how many
[173]records would be released under the standards contained in
[174]House Joint Resolution 454?
[176]It is very difficult to estimate the number of documents
[177]that would be released if the Joint Resolution passed because
[178]consideration for protection of classified information and
[179]other sensitive categories of information would be required on
[180]a document by document basis. We would review our holdings
[181]carefully to ensure that the maximum amount of information is
[182]released, consistent with the DCI's responsibility to protect
[183]intelligence sources and methods and with privacy interests of
[184]individuals involved.
[186]13-00000
[187]Z. 2 HR eb Fe AAT Ee UNCLASSIFIED
[189]CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
[190]DCI History Staff
[192]316 Ames Building
[193]Washington, D.C. 20505
[194]Phone (703) 351-2621
[196]FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION COVER SHEET
[198]TRANSMITTED pare: 4/2/42 PAGES TRANSMITTED__ ©
[199](cover sheet included)
[201]TRANSMITTED TO:
[203]NAME: Sonn Pieiyea
[204]ORGANIZATION: » OG |
[206]BLDG, ROOM |
[208]TELE/EXT: (726160. CFA» ($74 320%)
[210]SUBJECT: OCA Lernae(ufine) £ /NE MEMO Cu fo arr)
[211]| "fo OA AS DRAET MA werrt STATES
[212]TRANSMITTED FROM:
[214]NAME: Ken MeDanipen |
[215]BLDG, ROOM: 3 es
[217]MESSAGE:
[218]—- Fhe oe wW hanced Dorveel F yi
[220]Seca’ wee ater th rabesces ) batted ptrecney Letty tadbtd) CAs Abeprty Qed
[221]Ore ate 1 Heels ( adit eran Beat LOheogy
[223]Sfearcckrrg metpan Sturt, Po ns rete hee KWniledse
[224]Mewes “efe- (Ken |
[226]UNCLASSIFIED
[228]13-00000
[230]Central lntclligencs Agency
[232]wets
[233]Av wad FS.
[235]hy,
[236]Aw Voc,
[238]& t
[240]The Honorable John Conyers, dr.
[241]Chairman
[243]Committee on Government Operations
[244]United States House of Representatives
[245]‘Washington, D.C. 20515 .
[247]Dear Mr. Chairman:
[249]The Director has asked.me to respond to your letter of
[250]6 April requesting certain information regarding CIA holdings
[251]of records related to the assassination of President Kennedy.
[252]We do have a significant number of records relating to the
[253]assassination of President John F. Kennedy, although many of
[254]these records were originated by the FBI or by investigating
[255]committees of the Congress. We believe that a significant
[256]portion of our records could be released if H.J. Resolutin 454 ,
[257]were enacted into law. A
[259]I should also point out that the Central Intelligence
[260]Agency is ourrentiy embarking on its own review of
[261]assassination records. I would expect that this review will
[262]result in the public release of a significant body of
[263]information. .
[265]To help the committee understand the nature and number of
[266]CIA records pertaining to the assassination, J am enclosing
[268]the answers to the specific questions you raised in your
[269]letter.
[271]Sincerely,
[273]Stanley M. Moskowitz
[274]Director of Congressional Affairs
[276]Enclosure
[278]yo
[282]13-00000 win cs iad om
[284]1.. Did the CIA retain possession of records requested by
[285]er developed on behalf of the House Select Committee on
[286]Assassinations? If so, how many pages of such records does
[287]the Agency have in its possession? What is the nature of
[288]these records?
[290]Yes, the CIA retained possession of records requested by
[291]or developed on behalf of the House Select Committea on
[292]Aseassinations (HSCA). The Agency has approximately 300,000
[293]pages of such records which .
[294](originally collected in response to the Warren Commission's
[295]inquiry, then added to) as well ag recorda collected in
[296]response to specific requests fram the House Seleat Committe
[297]on Agsassinations. Although these records cover a wide
[298]variety of topics, they principally focus on CIA operations A
[299]against Cuba and Castro, Lee Harvey Oswald's sojourn in the
[300]USSR, and Oswald's activities in Mexico City and New Orleans.
[302]They algo include a larga number of names traces requeated by
[303]the HSCA staff, as. well ag materials relating to the Garrison
[304]investigation, Watergate, Cuban exlle activities, and copies
[305]of FBI reports relating toe Oswald. Because the HSCA was also
[306]investigating the assassination of br. Martin Luther King,
[307]Jz., there is also some material on the Black Panthers and the
[308]givil yighta movement. ;
[310]2. Does the CIA have records outside of those relatad to
[311]the House Assassinations Committee that may be considered
[312]relevant to the assassination of President Kennedy? If so,
[313]Please des¢ribe such records and the approximate number of
[314]pages.
[316]The CIA responded to requests from the Warren Commission
[317]and the House Select Committee on Asaassinations —
[318](approximately 300,000 pages, see above). The CIA haa never,
[319]however, attempted to locate evary document bearing on every
[320]conceivable angle or theory relating to the asaaasination of
[321]President John F, Kennedy. To conduct any further search, CIA
[322]would require specific guidelines of the kinds, of records
[323]sought.
[325]include
[326]mrevets lu
[327]rd
[329]3. Did any of the records described in questions 1 and 2
[330]originate with the Federal Bureau of Investigation? If sa,
[331]approximately how many?
[333]We believe that between 40% and 50% of the records
[334]described in questions i and 2 originated with the Federal
[335]Bureau of Investigation.
[337]13-00000
[339]nem os
[341]te bt
[343]4. Did any of these records originate with any other
[344]Federal, foreign, state, or local agency?. If so, please
[345]describe which agencies and‘ the approximate numbers.
[347]A amall number of CIA's JFK assassination records,
[348]probably lesa than 5%, originated with the State Department
[349]and the Immigration and Naturalization Services, Another smail
[350]number of records, also less than 5%, are original HSCA
[351]records stating Committee requests to CIA.
[353]- 5. How many of these recoraés have been reviewed for
[354]release under the Freedom of Information Act? How many of
[355]these records have been released pursuant. to such requests?
[357]CIA hag released 7,432 pages of JFK aasassination
[358]records, representing 1,969 documents, under the Freedom of
[359]Information Act. There is no documentation of how many JFK
[360]assassination records CXA hag reviewed under FOIA.
[362]6. In the estimation of the CIA, approximately how many
[363]records would he released under the standards contained in
[364]House Joint Resolution 454?
[366]It is very difficult to estimate the number of documents
[367]that would be released Lf the Joint Resolution paased. We
[368]would review our holdings carefully to ensure that the maximum
[369]amount of information is released, consistent with the DCI's
[370]responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods.
[372]13-00000
[373]AES LES. ye @etde Foss
[375]el. APR cc
[377]° | Ro APR so?
[379]2GuW GiEwh Omid Coding
[380]GAM BUN, GEORGIA WeLia ¥ AGEN 2a OFLAWARE E a«
[381]SARL EVN, Mh" TEO $*fvemg, aLABKA ER 92- 4316
[382]dtl GASGER, CHMMTESEE WLM 8 COnta, MANE
[383]9avd PRYOR a: was WARREN B RVOMAM, HAW WAMPE HIRE
[386]NEAMLAT cGur WISCONSIN JOHN GEYMOUA CAF ORNIA q e
[387]since eer Dnited States Senate
[388]LEQNANG WEIEG, STAs DIRECTOR ‘ a .
[389]FRAKKUN C. POLE, MINGAITY GAM DINECTOR AND Cries COUMERL . GOV pepe Oh was
[391]WASHINGTON, DG 20610-6250
[393]April 14, 1992
[395]The Honorable Robert M. Gates
[396]Director CIA HA
[397]Central Intelligence Agency Bee
[398]Washington, D.C. 20505 .
[400]Dear Diractor Gatease
[402]I am please to learn that you will be teatifying before
[403]the Committee on Governmental Affairs on Tuesday, May 12,
[405]1992. The hearing will begin at 9:00 a.m. and be held in Room
[406]342 of tha Dirksen Senate Building. The subject of tha hearing
[407]will be the “Assassination Materlals Disclosure Act of 1992."
[408]The legislation proposes to create an independent review board
[409]to govern and coordinate the release of government information
[410]relevant to the assassination of former President John F.
[411]Kennedy. As required by Commmittee rules, please have 100
[412]copies of your written testimony delivered to the Committee by
[413]close of business, Friday, May §, 1992. While your written
[414]testimony may be as long as you wish, please plan to limit
[415]your spoken testimony to five to seven minutes in length.
[417]Your testimony will be extremely helpful to the Committee
[418]and te the Congresg as it considers this important -
[419]legislation. While you may discuss whatever aspects of the
[420]legislation you desire, particularly how it relates to the
[421]records and resources of your agency, the Committee would
[422]appreciate learning your views on several specific subjects:
[424]What ave the reasons which the Central Intelligence
[425]Agency has records related to the agsassination of
[427]President Kennedy?
[429]What have the methods been to date for the identification
[430]and definition of Central Intelligence Agency records as
[431]material related to the assassination of Prasident
[433]Kennedy?
[435]What steps has the Central Intelligence Agency made to
[436]assess the scope of relevant documents outside of
[437]materials requested by earlier investigative or other
[438]official committees or. commissions, or through the
[440]Freedom of Information Act?
[442]What ig the volume of material which you might recommend
[443]be released to the public without concern for further
[445]postponement?
[447]13-00000
[453]The Honorable Robc.: M. “ates
[454]Page 2
[456]‘Would you be opposed to a provision. requesting agencies,
[457]whenever possible, to self-certify materials which may
[458]released without agency objection?
[460]What recommendations can you make with regard to the need
[461]' for interagency working groups to identify thixd-agency
[463]records in agency files, to avoid duplication, and to
[465]assist in the efficient disclosure of information to the
[467]public?
[469]What are the logistical, manpower, and resource concerns
[470]that you have with regard to the review and release of
[472]assassination material?
[474]Thank you for your assistance and consideration. I look
[475]forward to seeing you on May 12th. In the event that you have
[476]any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me. Your
[477]staff has already heen very helpful to the Committee in its
[478]preparation for the hearing. They may also contact Dr. Leonard
[479]Welss, Staff Director, or Steven Kats, Counsel, at
[482]_ Sincerel
[485]Chairman
[487]JHG/sk
[489]13-00000
[491]HEARING
[492]before the
[493]SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
[494]on
[496]S.J. Res. 282:
[498]THE ASSASSINATION MATERIALS DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1992
[499]Tuesday, May 12, 1992
[502]Room 342 Dirksen Senate Office Building
[504]WITNESS LIST
[505]ME ORMATION
[509]Panel _ 1:
[511]The Honorable David L. Boren
[512]United States Senator (D-OK)
[514]The Honorable Arlen Specter
[515]United States Senator (R~PA)
[517]The Honorable Louis Stokes
[518]United States Representative (D-OH)
[521]Panel 2:
[522]The Honorable Robert M. Gates
[524]Director
[525]Central Intelligence Agency
[527]The Honorable Williams Sessions
[528]Director
[529]Federal Bureau of Investigation
[533]Panel 3:
[534]James Lesar ‘
[535]President
[536]Assassination Archives and Research Center
[537]Washington, D. C.
[539]Professor Ernest May
[540]Kennedy School of Government
[541]Harvard University
[542]Cambridge, Massachusetts
[544]Professor Athan Theoharis
[545]Department of History
[546]Marquette University
[547]Milwaukee, Wisconsin
[551]13-00000
[553]HEARING
[554]before the
[555]SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
[556]on
[557]S.J. Res. 282:
[558]THE ASSASSINATION MATERIALS DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1992
[560]Tuesday, May 12, 1992
[562]Room 342 Dirksen Senate Office Building
[564]WITNESS LISt?Tt
[566]CRMATION
[570]Panel 1:
[571]‘The Honorable David L. Boren
[572]United States Senator (D-OK)
[574]The Honorable Arlen Specter
[575]United States Senator (R~PA)
[577]The Honorable Louis Stokes
[578]United States Representative (D-OH)
[581]Panel 2:
[582]The Honorable..Robert M.—Gates.-----
[584]Director
[585]Central Intelligence Agency
[587]“The Honorable Williams Sessions
[588]Director .
[589]Federal Bureau of Investigatio
[593]Panel 3:
[594]James Lesar — a
[595]President
[596]Assassination Archives and Research Center
[598]Washington, D. C.
[600]Professor Ernest May
[601]Kennedy School of Government
[602]Harvard University
[603]Cambridge, Massachusetts
[605]Professor Athan Theoharis
[606]Department of History
[607]Marquette University
[608]Milwaukee, Wisconsin
[612]13-00000
[616]+3 PPR
[618]way
[619]Be $6 tela
[621]A,
[623]a.
[625]DB.
[627]OUTLINE OF TESTIMONY ON JFK RESOLUTION
[629]Agreement with Principles of Legislation.
[631]1, Favor disclosure of ag much material on UFK as
[632]is consistent with protection of intelligence
[634]_ Sources and methods.
[636]2, Established own declassification program.
[637]Presumption will be in favor of disclosure.
[639]3. Pledge to cooperate with any reasonable
[640]mechanism to declassify documents.
[642]Describe Nature and Amount of Records,
[643]1, Reasons for having records.
[645]2. Volume of existing material and who it belongs
[646]to. .
[648]3. How we have identified material related to JFK
[649]assassination.
[651]Row Much Material Can be Released? -
[653]1. Give estimate of amount of material to be
[654]released under CIA program or resolution.
[656]2. Deserihe material that could not *be disclosed.
[658]ample of Intelligence Sources and
[659]Methods that w would require withholding,
[661]b. Example of material the release of. which
[662]would invade privacy.
[664]3. Deagerxibe resources--manpower and funds-- to
[665]achieve results. :
[667]Concerns with Resolutiona.
[669]1. Address only Intelligence Community Concerns.
[670]Will defer to DoJ on Constitutional objections.
[672]13-00000
[674],
[676]7 APR dé $e Les 4?
[677]MPR 22°92 OB: 47
[679]PS
[681]2. CIA or other agencies that originate documents
[682]should conduct initial review of material to
[683]determine whether*it can be réleased. Material
[684]withheld from public release could then be made
[685]available to Review Board.
[687]3. Agencies that originate information should be
[688]allowed to review it for release even if that
[689]information is contained in a document prepared by
[690]another agency or Congress. Suggest interagency
[691]working group to handle coordination issues likely
[692]to arise with disclosure of third agency
[693]documents.
[695]4, Will cooperate with any request by the Board
[696]for additional material that has a reasonable
[697]relationship to the assassination.
[699]5. Would hope that the Board will consult with
[701]DCI before using subpoena power to compel
[702]production of material that involves sensitive
[704]intelligenee sources and methods .
[706]8, Exemptions need to be clarified so as to
[707]engure that deliberative process information and
[708]identities of covert employees are protected,
[710]Conclusion: Pledge to cooperate with whatever
[712]mechanism is established to declassify material. Hope that
[713]this effort will help to dispel myths regarding JFK
[715]assassination.
[719]13-00000
[721]“> ° - " ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY
[723]OCA 2034-92
[724]. . 1 May 1992
[726]MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
[728]SUBJECT: House Government Operations Committee Hearing on
[729]H.J. Res. 454 (JFK Materials Resolution)
[731]1, On 28 April, the undersigned attended a public
[732]hearing on the proposed Assassination Materials Disclosure _
[733]Act conducted by the House Government Operations Legislation
[734]and National Security Subcommittee. Majority
[735]Committee/Subcommittee Chairman Conyers and Ranking Minority
[736]Member Horton were present for the entire hearing; majority
[737]Subcommittee members English, Neal, Peterson, and Thornton
[738]and minority members Shays and Schiff and full Committee
[739]member Martinez attended at least part of the hearing. The
[740]Committee's Press release, which criticizes the government
[741]and particularly CIA as releasing JFK-related documents “at
[742]a snail's pace", and witness statements are attached.
[744]2. The hearing was well attended by the public and
[745]attracted much media coverage. Eight witnesses testified in
[746]four groups: Congressmen Louis Stokes (assisted by
[747]Robert Blakey, former counsel to the House Select Committee
[748]on Assassinations) and former HPSCI Chairman Lee Hamilton
[749]testified first. The congressmen were followed by the movie
[750]"“JFK"'s director Oliver Stone, who was followed by
[751]Howard Willens, Counsel to the Warren Commission, and
[752]James Johnston, Counsel to the Church Committee. The
[753]session closed with a panel comprised of Ms. Leslie Harris,
[754]Chief Legislative Counsel for the Washington office of the
[755]ACLU; Dr. Herbert Parmet, Professor of History,
[756]Queensborough Community College and Graduate School of the
[757]City University of New York, and Dr. Harold Rellyea,
[758]American National Government Specialist at the Congressional
[759]Research Service.
[761]3. Chairman Conyers advised in his opening remarks
[762]that the Committee wanted to hear from the Executive branch
[763]and thus would hold another hearing session. He noted that
[764]“after much negotiation," the Director of Central
[765]Intelligence would be testifying in mid-May. He further
[766]noted that the Committee also hoped to hear from the
[767]Attorney General, but negotiations with the Justice
[768]Department were still ongoing. Conyers was criticized of
[769]the DoJ at the outset, noting that the Committee had
[771]ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY
[773]13-00000
[775]Day
[777]ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY
[779]Subject: House Government Operations Committee Hearing on
[780]H.J. Res. 454 (JFK Materials Resolution)
[782]received a long, single-spaced letter from Justice detailing
[783]numerous "legalistic" objections to the resolution, which he
[784]characterized as not reflecting a real willingness to work
[785]together to release the documents to the American people.
[787]4. The general tone of the session was strongly in
[788]favor of the resolution and disclosure of the vast majority
[789]of the material. Most witnesses conceded that there might
[790]be some materials that required postponement of disclosure,
[791]but the biasswas clearly toward disclosure. Even
[792]Oliver-Stone, in response to a comment from Congressman
[793]Shays that he (Shays) found it hard to imagine what national
[794]security or privacy issues would persist after 30 years,
[795]conceded that there might be some exceptions, but Stone
[796]thought 98 percent of the material could be released.
[797]Several witnesses, including Corigressman Stokes and Church
[798]Committee counsel, suggested that most national security
[799]information should be released under the resolution, but
[800]that privacy interests posed greater concerns.
[802]Congressman Hamilton warned that the Congress should be
[803]careful that nondisclosure "loopholes" do not "swallow up
[804]the bill," which is why he said that review by an
[805]independent board was so important.
[807]5. Stone's testimony had quite an impact on the
[808]hearing. Several congressman and witnesses credited his
[809]movie "JFK" as "the reason we are all here today."
[811]Chairman Conyers appeared particularly impressed with Stone,
[812]describing his testimony in exchanges with later witnesses
[813]as "persuasive" and "compelling." A few potentially tough
[814]questions were thrown at Stone--did he not over-lionize
[815]Garrison; how much research did he do fer the movie and did
[816]he seek to talk to or obtain information from the government
[817]as part of his research process? However, there was no
[818]aggressive follow-up to Stone's answers. Discerning
[819]observers may have picked up on the fact that Stone's
[820]"research" seemed tailored to and limited by pre-conceived
[821]conspiracy theories. (For example, when asked if he had
[822]talked to President Ford, a member of the Warren Commission
[823]and advocate of disclosure of the JFK documents, Stone
[824]answered no--that it was pretty obvious where Ford stood as
[825]a proponent of the lone gunman theory.)
[827]6. When asked about his personal views, Stone said he
[828]believed that there were two conspiracies. The murder
[829]conspiracy was small and covert--perhaps involving no more
[830]that five to ten people--and was led by the "intelligence
[831]agencies." Stone did not mention CIA by name at this point.
[833]2
[835]ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY
[837]13-00000
[839]ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY
[841]Subject: House Government Operations Committee Hearing on
[842]H.J. Res. 454 (JFK Materials Resolution)
[844]He mentioned Oswald's alleged ties to naval intelligence,
[845]and also said that a closer look should be taken at an
[846]operation "MONGOOSE" and a Colonel Landsdale. He also
[847]posited a bigger "cover-up" conspiracy after the fact,
[848]spearheaded by President Johnson (who Stone alleged told
[849]Earl Warren he would be responsible for World War III if the
[850]Commission tied the Cubans into a conspiracy). Stone
[851]theorized that a much broader "Establishment", while not
[852]directly involved in the assassination, was not sorry to see
[853]Kennedy go beeause he was an agent of profound change
[854]embarking upon several courses that disturbed that
[855]"Establishment", including pulling out of Vietnam. In
[856]response to a later question about various theories, Stone
[857]called the Mafia theory a "red-herring." Stone said "as you
[858]know, the CIA has always used the Mafia for plausible
[859]deniability" and that it was important to look behind the
[860]Mafia at "who pulls the strings."
[862]7. Other matters of Agency interest discussed include
[863]that both the Warren Commission attorney and particularly
[864]the Church Committee attorney castigated CIA for "lying” to
[865]the Warren Commission. The particular example offered had
[866]to do with "AMLASH." This individual came up in connection
[867]with traces the Agency apparently conducted for the Warren
[868]Commission. CIA purportedly had a relationship with AMLASH
[869]in connection with a’Castro assassination plot, but did not
[870]make this fact known to the Warren Commission. The
[871]witnesses characterized this as pertinent information CIA
[872]consciously withheld from the Warren Commission. Also, when
[873]the final panel engaged in a broader discussion of
[874]government disclosure and FOIA with the; subcommittee, the
[875]ACLU held up the CIA Openness Task Force report as an
[876]example of why FOIA was a "dismal failure* as the mechanism
[877]to "vindicate t public’s right to know." (On 18 March
[878]Conyers rigorously questioned Gary Foster on the task force
[879]report when his subcommittee held a hearing on "Government.
[880]Secrecy After the Cold War.")
[882]8. A major recurring theme was concern that, despite
[883]the need to make the documents publicly available, the
[884]Administration would not support the resolution and it could
[885]be vetoed. Congressman Hamilton stated that, if the
[886]resolution were vetoed, he hoped that at minimum the House
[887]would pass a resolution to release its own records. (Such
[888]an action would be problematic for the Administration,
[889]because much Executive branch information is contained in
[890]House records, and the House also probably considers
[891]documents obtained from Executive agencies as part of its
[893]3
[895]ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY
[897]13-00000
[899]' ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY
[901]Subject: House Government Operations Committee Hearing on
[902]H.J. Res. 454 (JFK Materials Resolution)
[904]records.) Most witnesses thought the Congress should try to
[905]avoid a constitutional confrontation with the
[906]Administration, however, and a few practical suggestions to
[907]help work around problems were made. For example, the ACLU
[908]suggested that the Review Board might be modeled after the
[909]Advisory Committee established in connection with the State
[910]Department's preparation of the Foreign Relations of the
[911]United States (FRUS) series, with which CIA's historical
[912]staff is familiar. This body was established by a provision
[913]included in last year's Foreign Relations Authorization Act.
[915]9. In conclusion, the hearing did not get into much
[916]detail on provisions of the resolution. Much time was spent
[917]on general propositions like the fact that the documents
[918]ought to be released and why, and matters tangential to core
[919]issues raised by H.R. 454,
[921]\Wictoria L. Pepper
[923]Assistant General Counsel
[924]Office of Congressional Affairs
[926]4
[928]ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY
[930]13-00000
[932]~STEQNS
[934]POLE 4 May 1992
[936]i
[937]TABULATION OF PAGES IN THE OS dy 'hee-ngenestnanton FILE:
[939]6 Mar 64 Note-slip on DECLASSIFIED version held in NARA
[941]30 Jan 76 CIA transmittal sheet, with NARA's query of 15
[942]Jan 75 on deleting #s.
[944]6 Mar 64 DD/P transm sheet, re NARA‘ s holding.
[946]Pages Date Description-
[950]6 Mar 64 Helms Memo to Rankin, describing file contents.
[951]6 Mar 64 Copy of above, with Helms note to Rankin.
[952]31 Oct 5 tate Cable from Moscow to SecState.
[954]Redacted copy of same.
[955]1 Nov 59 Press clipping
[956]2 & 4 Nov Notes on Oswald & Papich (FBI) query
[957]2 Nov 59 on Sv Despatch, £r Moscow to Dept
[958]9 Nov 59 « tate Cable, Moscow to SecState
[959]* Redacted copy of same
[960]9 Nov 59 state Cable, Tokyo to SecState
[961]Redacted copy of same
[962]16 Nov 59. Press clipping
[963]26 Nov 59” Press clipping
[964]25 May 60 Cover Memo fr Dir Hoover, FBI, to Helms
[965]12 May 60 Attachment to above
[966]12 May 60 FBI report, fr Dallas
[967]25 Oct 60““State (Cumming) to Helm, listing US defectors
[968]Redacted copy of same
[969]3 Nov ‘60 —~DD/P Bissell to State (Cumming)
[970]Redacted copy of same .
[971]18 Nov 60——~Cover Memo (internal) to DD/P, to accompany
[972]draft reply to Cumming
[973]undated - ~Handwritten descrip of letter cited above
[974]21 Nov 60 ~ ~Cover letter, Bissell to Cumming, on US
[976]defectors
[977]“ Declassified version of Oswald info from ff
[978]" List of US defectors attached to Bissell letter
[980]18 Nov 60. Memo fr Horton, acting C/CIS, to Bissell
[981]21 Nov 60 Second copy of Bissell letter and list, above
[983]9 Dec 60 2 copies of redacted request to set up Oswald
[984]201.
[986]11 Jul 61 Fon Sv Despatch, Moscow to Dept
[988]26 May 61 copies of Fon Sv Despatch, Moscow to Dept
[990]13 Apr 61—S~DeptState Instruction on Oswald citizenship.
[991]and passport (signed Rusk)
[993]26 Jan 6l-—pState MemCon re Oswald
[995]" Redacted copy of same ;
[997]13 Jul 61 Cover letter to Helms fr Hoover, plus several
[998]FBI reports, much of which is illegible
[1000]28 Sep 61 Short bio of Marina (redacted), for inclusion
[1001]in Oswald 201
[1003]13 Oct 61—>-Fon Sv Despatch, Moscow to Dept, covering
[1004]copies of four Oswald letters to Embassy Moscow
[1006]7 Dec 61 Form fr INS to DD/P, asking for any derog info
[1007]on Oswald
[1009]13-00000
[1011]sqattt®
[1013]HES
[1014]mare
[1016]WW aI Nd wo on
[1018]N
[1020]20
[1021]20
[1023]14
[1025]14
[1027]3 Mar 62
[1028]26 Apr 62
[1029]7 Sep 62
[1030]10 Sep 63
[1031]24 Sep 63
[1032]10 Sep 63
[1033]8 Nov 63
[1034]7 Nov 63
[1035]25 Oct 63
[1037]31 Jan 64
[1039]-
[1044]Note saying Navy message of this date is
[1045]missing from CD 692 sent from Archives
[1046]Collection of Navy Memo to Hoover/FBI plus
[1047]Navy, USMC, and press items
[1049]Hoover to Helms, plus report fr SAC/Dallas
[1050]Redacted pages from above
[1052]FBI field report on Oswald from Dallas
[1054]FBI field report on Oswald from New Orleans
[1055]FBI field report on Oswald.from Dallas
[1056](apparently different from above)
[1058]Hoover to Helms, with page from New Orleans
[1059]report
[1061]Hoover to Helms, with a lot of bio data on
[1062]Oswald, plus Fair-Play-for-Cuba stuff
[1064]FBI to INS, New Orleans, with much of material
[1065]above
[1067]Report, not really contemprary with this file,
[1068]entitled: “Information Developed by CIA on
[1069]the Activity of ...Oswald in Mexico City..,”
[1070]28 Sep--3 Oct 63
[1072]Redacted copy of same
[1074]13-00000
[1076]OCA 2050-92
[1077]6 May 1992
[1079]MEMORANDUM ror: WY pi rector of Central Intelligence
[1081]’ FROM: Stanley M. Moskowitz
[1083]Director of Congressional Affairs
[1085]SUBJECT: JFK Testimony
[1087]1. Attached is a copy of your opening statement for
[1088]the 12 May hearing before Senate Governmental Affairs
[1089]Committee on the JFK Joint Resolution. Because we are
[1090]commenting on legislation, Executive Branch guidelines
[1092]‘xequire us to submit the testimony in advance to OMB for
[1094]Administration clearance. We also intend to provide your
[1095]opening statement in advance to the DoJ and FBI. As you
[1096]know, Director Sessions will be joining you for a panel
[1098]presentation before the Committee.
[1100]2. Please let me know whether you have any objections
[1101]to release of your statement to OMB, DoJ, and the FBI. The
[1102]Committee has requested that an advance copy of your °
[1103]statement be provided to them by 8 May. °
[1105]Oe fe >
[1107]a ~Staiiley M. Moskowitz —
[1109]Attachment:
[1110]as stated
[1112]13-00000
[1114]Draft 5/6/92
[1116]ECIAL COLLECTIONS
[1117]an SE LEASE W FULL
[1119]ot Het
[1121]STATEMENT OF ROBERT M. GATES
[1122]DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
[1123]BEFORE THE
[1124]COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
[1126]UNITED STATES SENATE
[1128]12 MAY 1992
[1130]13-00000
[1132]x
[1134]Mr. Chairman, J am here today at your request to provide
[1135]my views on Senate Joint Resolution 282, "The Assassination
[1136]Materials Disclosure Act of 1992," and to describe the nature of
[1138]- documents held by the CIA that relate to the assassination of John
[1139]_’ F, Kennedy. I very much appreciate the opportunity to speak on
[1141]this important matter.
[1143]Let me begin by stating that I am in complete agreement
[1144]with the purpose underlying the joint resolution--that efforts
[1145]should be made to declassify and make available to the public as
[1146]quickly as possible government documents relating to the
[1147]assassination of John F. Kennedy. We hope that opening up and
[1148]giving journalists, historians and, most importantly, the public
[1149]access to governmental files will help to resolve questions that
[1150]still linger even 28 years after the assassination. Further, I believe
[1151]that maximum disclosure will discredit the theory that ze CIA Hast fn,
[1153]participated the murder of John F. Kennedy. ws & lang
[1156]Even before introduction of this joint resolution, I
[1157]recognized the need for greater public access to CIA documents
[1158]of historical importance. Two months ago, I announced the .
[1159]establishment of a new unit within CIA that will be responsible
[1160]for declassifying as many historical documents as possible
[1161]consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and
[1163]13-00000
[1165]‘ methods. This new unit, the Historical Review Group, in the
[1166]Agency's Center for the Study of Intelligence, will review for
[1167]declassification documents 30 years old or older, and national .
[1168]intelligence estimates on the former Soviet Union that are
[1169]10 years old or older. In addition to the systematic review of 30-
[1170]year- old documents, I have directed the History Staff in the
[1171]Center for the Study of Intelligence to assemble CIA records fu
[1172]focusing on particular events of historical importance, including Fe
[1175]the assassination of President Kennedy. The Historical Review ~~ Ak
[1176]Group will then examine the documents for the purpose of Se,
[1178]declassifying the records. JAs-we-speakj- this-Group-has/ already
[1180]~N begun its review of the documents related to the assassination of
[1181]és. 4, President Kennedy, and I am glad to report that the first group of Re fy
[1182]pre ‘these records, : all CIA documents on Lee Harvey 73
[1183]wi : Oswald prior to the assassination, has been declassified and
[1184]. ‘s transferred to the National Archives for release to the public.
[1185]p
[1186]LF the 9 oo, |
[1187]a, me - As we carry out our program to declassify Kennedy
[1188]as assassination documents, we will usé a presumption in favor of
[1189]a
[1190]/ Se, 7 releasing as many documents as possible. In fact, I recently
[1191]P ;
[1195]“$2. approved new CIA declassification guidelines for our Historical
[1196]Review Program whic a presumption in favor of
[1197]declassification. I believe we can be very forward leaning in
[1198]making these documents available to the public, and I have
[1199]instructed the Historical Review Group.to do so.
[1201]be
[1203]f apy
[1207]i
[1209]13-00000
[1211]To understand the magnitude of the effort involved in
[1212]reviewing these documents for declassification, it is important to
[1213]place them in some context. The CIA's collection of documents
[1214]related to the assassination of President Kennedy consist of
[1215]approximately 250, 009-300 000 pages of material. This includes
[1218]64 boxes 0 Minformation provide ed to the House Seiec amitittee
[1220]on Assassination) robveen 22 preg 17 boxes of ¢
[1221]material on Lee Harvey Oswald “
[1222]President ICemnmnn doi ok mani ton .
[1226]assassination as a result of specific inquiries received from the
[1227]Warren Commission or the House Select Co ites 0 Doak Hanhlond
[1228]Assassinations, Faere-were some documents that dig exist
[1230]the assassination, but they were only brought together in resporise
[1231]to investigations of the event. I have prepared a chart that
[1232]illustrates this very point.
[1234]As you can see, prior to President Kennedy's assassination
[1235]pols peld only a small file le gu hee Harvey Oswald that consisted “/-¢Z#
[1236]SAY ofa document (tia i na ab obit 8 toca Geek WO.
[1238]. a 7 :
[1239]“eK “Navy, the FBI, and newspaper olipings—¥ have brought along a
[1241]copy of Oswald's file as it existed before the assassination so that
[1242]you can see first hand how slender it was at the time. As I have
[1244]3
[1246]13-00000
[1248]\ cat noted, we have declassified the CIA documents j in this file,
[1249]éi to the National Archives.’ The records in this .
[1251]file dealt with Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union in 1959 and
[1253]his activities }rthe-U-S: after his return in 1961. By contrast, it :
[1255]was only after the assassination that CIA ‘Collectaball the rest of. ON
[1256]the’material on Aecode 33,000 pages in total: y fe “a
[1258]the 17 boxes of Oswald records, approximately 40% percent of
[1260]the documents originated with the FBI, and about 20% originated
[1262]from the State Department or elsewhere, My Stati i is still goi I te
[1263](Worn Comimissum
[1265]through the material compiled at the request of the House Select
[1267]ssinations, which includes 63 boxes of pap paper ot
[1268]cueckom records and one box that Centains 72 reels of microfilm,
[1269]ia pant oven y
[1272](However) vi we es ate that within the 63 boxes of pape records,
[1273]approximately i % ar from the Saleem /
[1275]vere 2b otek ee oS na run. _
[1276]et ough our holdings do include many documents from
[1277]other agencies, we nonetheless have a substantial collection of
[1278]CIA documents that will require a considerable effort to review.
[1279]A preliminary soview of these files has provided us some
[1280]indications of what they contain. Although the records cover a
[1281]wide variety of topics, they principally focus on CIA activities
[1282]concerning Cuba and Castro, Oswald's defection to the Soviet
[1284]Commuttéé du.
[1286]ot et
[1288]4
[1290]13-00000
[1292]Union, and Oswald's subsequent activities in Mexico City and
[1294]New Orleans. They also include a large number of name traces .
[1295]on ,
[1297]requested by the staff of the House Select Co ttee, as well as
[1298]material relating to the Garrison savestigation ube exile
[1300]activities? eesies-ef= Bt reports abeatOswa
[1302]a
[1303]The CIA cannot Simply aet-1q declassify-ox{ release Sener tee x
[1305]_ documents unilaterally because of the limits in the Privacy Act
[1306](which protects the names of American citizens against
[1307]unauthorized disclosure), the sequestration of many documents by
[1308]the House Select Committee on Assassinations, and the fact that
[1309]many of the documents belong to agencies other than the CIA.
[1310]However, we have already taken the necessary steps to lift the
[1311]sequestration, coordinate with other agencies and begin the
[1313]process of declassification. Y neecetary, A Will ack
[1315]the Nene for a fpecotutionw fi :
[1318]yh ; wl 7 privacy concerns or the exposure of intelligence sources and
[1319]7 ‘methods. Let me take a moment to give examples of this type of
[1320]material. During the investigation by the House Select
[1321]Committee on Assassinations, I understand that security and
[1322]Qe Merwrher
[1324]personnel files were requested omyApency Umnployees. These files
[1325]contain fitness reports (performance evaluations), medical
[1326]evaluations and credit checks on individual CIA officers.
[1329]13-00000
[1331]CDs Geeta to the question of who killed President
[1333]Kennedy;these and other personal documents ultimately ended up
[1334]in the sequestered collection of documents. I do not believe that
[1335]the benefit to the public of disclosure of this information
[1336]outweighs the clear privacy interest of the individuals in keeping
[1337]this information confidential. Similar privacy concerns exist with
[1339]documents containing derogatory information on particular
[1341]individuals where the information is based on gossip or rumor.
[1343]Our files also contain names of living individuals who provided
[1345]us intelligence information on a promise of confidentiality. We
[1346]. Theie viewed, | .
[1348]would not disclose)this-informationjin breach of such a promise.
[1350]Where we cannot disclose such information ip the public, the
[1354]- “Agency will (be-wilting t) make redactions (Substitute generic
[1356]: ton jor summarize (berinformation in order to ensure tha
[1358]the maximum amount of information is released while still
[1359]protecting the identity of an agent or the privacy of an individual)’
[1361]The effort required to declassify the documents related t
[1362]the assassination of President Kennedy will be daunting.
[1363]However, it is an important program, and I am personally
[1364]committed to making it work. Even in this time of diminishing
[1365]resources within the Intelligence Community, I have directed the
[1367]15%» allocation of 5 EMT time positions to expand the History Staff,
[1369]and to form the Historical Review Group that will undertake the
[1371]interest.
[1373]13-00000
[1375]- Lpbing Te Sb te patna senber: pid tp le pebereed’
[1376]DB Shae LY éZ, bo Ad iL tte ae . a, y ord
[1377]Minter fd
[1378]3 #8
[1379]Kennedy,I-de-have-certain technical reservations about the font
[1380]mechanism established by the joint resolution to achieve this an,
[1382]* result. I intend to address only Intelligence Community concerns;
[1383]I will defer to the Department of Justice on any additional OP on tine
[1384]problems posed by the joint resolution. Me
[1386]to the assassination
[1388]can be
[1390]released to the public} in an outside
[1391]body is inconsistent with my statutory responsibility to protect
[1392]intelligence sources and methods. [fr addition, Lent concerned
[1393]that placing responsibility for classification determinations in a
[1394]Review Board that has no [partieuldg expertisé in
[1396]BAO tA AT aate 3 39 ATS Bot
[1397]a
[1399]bask
[1400]Gir Susenye Jit cbasac ar iss Cl tetitls
[1402]assassination materiglis bound to result in delays in releasing the
[1403]material. It wiT also result in a duplication of effort since
[1404]originating agencies will have to review the decision of the -
[1405]‘Executive Director to releasé particular decumes
[1407]ocuments be done in
[1409]I share your beli f that the review o
[1411]an expeditious and efficiert :
[1412]the initial review of assassination materials be made by the
[1414]13-00000
[1416]origtsating agencies and completed within a reasonabie period of
[1417]time. ASN have indicated, the CIA has already beg‘in this process.
[1418]Documents : aat an agency determines cannot bé released to the
[1419]pubhigy ould The nh be reviewed by membersOf the Review Board,
[1420]who could operate with a lean staff. Any dispute between an
[1421]agency and the Review Board overthe release of a document
[1422]could then be resolved by the Président or his designee. This
[1424]he initial review of documents is
[1426]arrangement would ensure
[1428]decisions yfade.to withhold i a 4 tapelib
[1430]hn Atriumed townld. bat = t) te“ arhets’,
[1431]"Second, I am concerned that th joi # resolution contains no
[1433]provision requiring security clearances or secure document
[1435]handling by the Assassination Materials Review Board or its staff.
[1437]could not e classified informatisa available to the Boar
[1438]it took the necessary steps to safeguard that informatio
[1440]Third, I am concerned that the joint resolution does not
[1441]provide the Agency with the opportunity to object to the release
[1442]of CIA information contained in documents originated by
[1443]Congress or the Warren Commission. Under the joint resolution,
[1444]documents originated by these entities can be released directly by
[1445]the Executive Director of the Assassination Materials Review
[1447]13-00000
[1449]Board without any review by the President or other Executive
[1450]Branch agencies. (or e again, this provision conflicts with my .
[1451]statutory responsibility tOxgrotect sources and methods; that duty
[1452]should not be delegated to an vutside body. I believe that the
[1453]joint resolution should provide thatan agency that originated
[1454]information found in another's documentshould have the
[1456]release of this "third agency" information in a timely fashion
[1458]mation materia
[1460]th, the joint resolution defines "assassj
[1461]broadly to include any records that relate "in Any manner or
[1462]ination." I believe we“have already identified
[1463]iouS inquiries from
[1465]arren Commission and House
[1467]degree to the assas
[1468]these documents as a reds
[1469]investigative bodies, such aSNhe¥
[1470]Select Committee on Assassthations. These investigations were
[1471]thorough, and any additidnal request3Nor information should bear
[1472]some reasonable relationship to the JFK adse
[1473]panel of distingyShed historians could be formed to provide
[1475]eview Board as to what, if any, additional material
[1477]ssination. Perhaps a
[1479]advice to the
[1480]We reviewed.
[1482]Fifth, the joint resolution a 30-day period for
[1484]agencies or departments to appeal decisions by the Executive
[1485]Director to release informationlsFhig may not provide sufficient
[1486]time for meaningful review of what could prove to be large
[1488]13-00000
[1490]vohumsk of material at one time. {ire € initial review
[1491]documents is doné by the Executive Director;tie joint resolution _
[1493]should be amended to pr at an agency may request a
[1495]reasonable Sion of time to determine whether documents
[1497]aay be released,
[1499]te Hinally, section 6 of the joint resolution, which outlines the
[1500]=, Sounds for postponement ¢ of Puble re release of a document nt ifs
[1502]For examplorihere9in no provision for postponing release of
[1504]< documents that may contain Executive privilege or deliberative
[1505]process, attorney-client, or attorney work-product information.
[1506]a S. White such privileges could be waived in the public interest and
[1507]are not likely to arise with respect to factual information directly
[1509]SS related to the JF. K assassination, they would be unavailable under
[1511]= process work. It is my hopé that the declassifi¢ation of this
[1512]jebesend Beiedmne Ti ey Coaiteel. 4 Lett
[1515]13-00000
[1517]6 May 1992
[1519]weg ay
[1520]NOTE FOR: DCI Pe
[1522][o)
[1523]icy
[1524]FROM: \Neal Wolin, SA/DCI Y, “ <Z
[1525]z Y iS
[1526]XK .
[1527]Attached is the draft JFK testimony, as prepared by oca. “Sh
[1528]draft has been coordinated with OGC, the Center for the Study of,
[1529]Intelligence. (both Dave Gries and Ken McDonald), and the DO. The
[1530]handwritten edits are mine and Dave Gries'. A briefing book with
[1531]Q's and A's will be ready by COB Friday. As Stan's cover note
[1533]suggests, the testimony must be coordinated with others in the
[1534]Executive; OCA's preference is to send it out tomorrow.
[1537]ft]
[1538]Re: JFK Testimony te
[1540]Dave and I agree that the section of the draft testimony
[1541]commenting on the proposed legislation (pp. 7 et seq.) is too long
[1542]and runs the risk of overwhelming the positive message you relay
[1543]in the first part of the statement. It seems to me that while you
[1544]should lay down your objections to the legislation's scheme
[1545]clearly (and even forcefully), you should do so in language that
[1546]will leave the impression (which is consistent with the reality)
[1547]that (1) you are in agreement with their basic objectivas relating
[1548]to the material in question and (2) that you are doing, and will
[1549]continue to do, all that you can to accommodate the release of
[1550]material consistent with your statutory obligations.
[1552]In particular I think it unnecessary to reiterate your
[1553]"statutory responsibility to protect sources and methods" more
[1554]than a couple of times. Moreover, I think the paragraph on the
[1555]definition of “assassination material" (middle of p.9) unnecessary
[1556]and potentially counterproductive. One of the impetuses for the
[1557]JFK resolution, after all, is the notion (crazy or not) that
[1558]previous inquiries were insufficient in scope; this paragraph
[1559]feeds right into that criticism. Some of the other "technical"
[1560]criticisms (i.e., paragraphs on pp. 9-10) seem important to make
[1561](especially if the basic model of the legislation is adopted) but
[1562]might be better included in a post-hearing letter to the committee
[1563]or something. Again, otherwise I fear you run the risk of leaving
[1564]the perception of trying to nitpick the concept of JFK material
[1565]declassification to death.
[1569]Nak
[1570]|, Neal
[1572]13-00000
[1574]OCA 2149-92
[1575]19 May 1992
[1577]MEMORANDUM FOR: | Director, Center for the Study of
[1578]Intelligence
[1579]Chief, Administrative Law Division, OGC
[1581]FROM: David M. Pearline
[1582]; Deputy Director for Legislation, OCA
[1584]SUBJECT: Follow-up to DCI's 15 May JFK Testimony
[1586]1. We have reviewed a transcript of the Director's
[1587]15 May testimony on the JFK Assassination Materials
[1588]Resolution to identify those questions with respect to which
[1589]CIA committed to provide answers for the record. A copy of
[1590]the transcript with relevant portions marked is attached.
[1592]2. The following specific questions require follow-up
[1593]action:
[1595]a. How much material has been destroyed by CIA that we
[1596]may never know about? (p. 5)
[1598]b. Why was the Oswald file opened at the CIA 14 months
[1599]after his defection? (p. 5)
[1601]c. Was Oswald in fact a Soviet spy? (p. 5)
[1603]d. Was that picture in his [Oswald's] file that was
[1604]thought to be him, was that an error? Or was there
[1605]something involved in that you can shed some light on?
[1607](p. 5)
[1609]e. (W]hat consisted of new information [in the Oswald
[1610]file] that the public had not already had in its published
[1611]files somewhere? (p. 14)
[1613]f. (WJould the establishment of such a panel of
[1614]outside experts [by DCI, to review redactions in the absence
[1615]of legislation] . . .violate the Privacy Act? (p. 16)
[1617]3. I assume CSI, in coordination with appropriate
[1618]components, will take the lead on all questions except for
[1619]the last. I understand OGC will take the lead on the .
[1620]Privacy Act question. (Note: OGC advises that the issue of
[1621]why Oswald's file was not opened for 14 months after his
[1622]defection is addressed in the Findings and Recommendations
[1623]volume of the HSCA Report at pp. 200-202.) I appreciate
[1624]your assistance in preparing proposed responses for the
[1625]record.
[1627]David -M- Péarline —~
[1628]Attachment
[1630]13-00000
[1632]Draft: 14 May 1992
[1634]e
[1636]STATEMENT OF ROBERT M. GATES
[1637]DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
[1638]BEFORE THE
[1640]ra SUBCOMMITTEE ON LEGISLATION AND __.
[1641]_ NATIONAL SECURITY
[1643]COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
[1645]UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
[1647]15 MAY 1992
[1649]13-00000
[1651]Mr. Chairman, I am here today-at-your-request_to-provide
[1652]my views on House Joint Resolution 454, "The Assassination
[1653]Materials Disclosure Act of 1992," and to describe the nature of
[1654]documents held by the CIA that relate to the assassination of John
[1655]F, Kennedy. I very much appreciate the opportunity to speak on
[1656]this important matter, just as I did before your Senate
[1657]counterparts last Tuesday.
[1659]Let me begin by stating that I am in complete agreement
[1660]with the purpose underlying the joint resolution--that efforts
[1661]should be made to declassify.and make available to the public as
[1662]quickly as possible government documents relating to the
[1663]assassination of John F. Kennedy. We hope that opening up and
[1664]giving journalists, historians and, most importantly, the public
[1666]: access to governmental files will help to resolve questions that _
[1667]still linger over 28 years after the assassination. Further, I believe
[1669]that maximum disclosure will discredit the theory that CIA had .
[1670]anything to do with the murder of President Kennedy.
[1672]Even before introduction of this joint resolution, I
[1673]recognized the need for greater public access to CIA documents
[1674]of historical importance. Two months ago, I announced the
[1675]establishment of a new unit within CIA that will be responsible
[1676]for declassifying as many historical documents as possible
[1678]13-00000
[1680]consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and
[1682]methods. This new unit, the Historical Review Group, in the
[1683]Agency's Center for the Study of Intelligence, will review for
[1684]“declassification documents 30 years old or older, and national.
[1685]intelligence estimates on the former Soviet Union that are
[1687]10 years old or older. In addition to the systematic review of
[1688]30-year-old documents, I have directed the History Staff in the an 1 ioe me
[1689]Center for the Study of Intelligence to assemble CIA records A) 7K
[1690]focusing on particular events of historical importance, including
[1692]the assassination of President Kennedy. The Historical Review
[1693]Group will then examine the documents for the purpose of
[1694]declassifying the records.
[1696]a Because of high interest in the JFK papers, I am not waiting
[1697]for legislation or other agencies to start declassifying documents
[1698]belonging to CIA. The Historical Review Group, at my direction,
[1699]. already has begun its review of the documents related to the.
[1700]‘assassination of President Kennedy, and I am happy to report that
[1701]the first group of these records, including all CIA documents on eo
[1702]Lee Harvey Oswald prior to the assassination, has been | oe se
[1703]declassified with quite minimal deletions and transferred to the/ ~ peu
[1704]National Archives for release to the public. This is, I ,
[1705]acknowledge, a small fraction of what we have, but it is an earnest
[1706]of my commitment immediately to begin review for
[1707]- declassification of this material. And; indeed, as I speak, the
[1708]reviewers are going through a substantial n ber of, cole | he a ¢ e 14
[1710]and | anticipate that many of these will be leisons | gue ye,
[1713]2
[1715]13-00000
[1717]AS we Catry out our program to declassify Kennedy
[1718]assassination documents, our goal will be to release as many as
[1719]possible. In fact, I recently approved new CIA declassification
[1720]guidelines for our Historical Review Program which specifically
[1721]direct a presumption in favor of declassification. I believe we can
[1722]be very forward leaning in making these documents available to
[1723]the public, and I have instructed the Historical Review Group to
[1724]take this attitude to heart. In this spirit, the Agency is making
[1725]publicly available these new guidelines for historical review
[1726]and declassification. _
[1728]In connection with these historical review guidelines, I
[1729]have recently commissioned a task force to review Agency
[1730]procedures under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). I
[1731]have instructed this task force to ensure that our internal
[1732]FOIA procedures are consistent with the approach that I have
[1733]described for historical declassification. Although the task
[1734]force will have to explore the difference between current
[1735]documents that often are requested under FOIA and 30-year-
[1736]old documents that are placed into the historical review
[1738]‘program, my intention is to bring to the FOIA process a much
[1740]more positive attitude toward declassification and release of
[1742]Agency records.
[1744]To understand the magnitude of the effort involved in
[1745]reviewing the JFK papers for declassification, it is important to
[1747]q
[1749]13-00000
[1751]place them in some context. CIA's collection of documents
[1752]related to the assassination of President Kennedy consists of Che al
[1753]approximately 250,000-300,000 pages of material. This includes
[1754]64 boxes of copies and originals of information provided to the
[1755]Warren Commission and the House Select Committee on
[1756]Assassinations and 17 boxes of material on Lee Harvey Oswald
[1757]accumulated after President Kennedy's assassination.
[1758]Unfortunately, and for reasons that I do not know, what we are
[1759]dealing with is a mass of material that is not indexed, is .
[1760]uncatalogued; and is highly disorganized~all of which makes the
[1761]review process more difficult. The material contains everything
[1762]from the most sensitive intelligence sources to the most mundane
[1763]news clippings. . . .
[1767]These records include documents that CIA had in its files
[1768]before the assassination, a large number of records that CIA _
[1769]received later as routine disseminations from other agencies, as
[1770]well as the reports, correspondence, and other papers that CIA ©
[1771]prepared in the course of the assassination investigations. I
[1773]' should emphasize that these records were assembled into the
[1774]present collection as a result of specific inquiries received from.
[1775]the Warren Commission or the House Select Committee on
[1776]Assassinations. I have-prepared a chart that illustrates this point.
[1778]As you can see, prior to President Kennedy's assassination
[1779]CIA held only a small file on Lee Hatvey Oswald that consisted
[1780]of 34 documents (amounting to 124 pages), some of which
[1782]13-00000
[1784]originated with the FBI, State Department, the Navy, and
[1785]newspaper clippings. (Although I reported slightly smaller
[1786]numbers to the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs
[1787]earlier this week, a subsequent count by my staff revealed
[1789]these exact numbers.) Only 11 of these documents originated
[1791]within CIA. I brought along a copy of Oswald's file as it existed
[1792]before the assassination so that you can see first-hand how slender
[1793]it was at the time. As I have already noted, we have declassified
[1794]the CIA documents in this file with quite minimal deletions and
[1795]provided them to the National Archives. The records in this file
[1796]dealt with Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union in 1959 and his
[1797]activities after his return in 1962. By contrast, it was only after
[1798]the assassination that CIA accumulated the rest of the material on
[1802]Oswald--some 33,000 pages—~most of which CIA received from - =
[1804]other agencies after November 22, 1963.
[1806]There has been some comment on this pre-assassination
[1807]Oswald file and how little it contained. I want to reemphasize
[1808]that this is but the first installment--an example of our
[1809]intentions. All of the assassination-related documents we have
[1810]will be reviewed for declassification, and we will transfefthéy"
[1811]declassified documents to the Archives as they are completed,
[1812]rather than waiting until work on the entirety has been
[1813]concluded. |
[1815]The committee has asked about documents in our possession
[1817]generated by other agencies. In fact, much of the material held by
[1819]5
[1821]a
[1823]13-00000
[1825]CIA originated with other agencies or departments. For example,
[1826]in the 17 boxes of Oswald records, approximately 40% of the
[1827]documents originated with the FBI, and about 20% originated
[1828]with the State Department or elsewhere. Our staff is still going
[1829]through the material compiled at the request -of the Warren
[1830]Commission and the House Select Committee on Assassinations,
[1831]which includes 63 boxes of paper records and one box that
[1832]contains 73 reels of microfilm. The microfilms-in part overlap
[1833]material in other parts of the collection. We estimate that within
[1834]the 63 boxes ef paper records, approximately 27% originated with
[1835]a variety of other U.S. government agencies, private .
[1836]organizations, and foreign and American press.
[1838]Mr. Chairman, you have also asked about assassination —
[1839]materials that may be held by other Intelligence Community
[1840]agencies. The FBI will describe its holdings separately, which
[1841]I assume include both intelligence and law enforcement
[1842]records. The National Security Agency and the State
[1843]Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research report,
[1844]after a preliminary search, that they have identified a
[1845]relatively small amount of material responsive to previous
[1846]inquiries by the Warren Commission, the Church Committee,
[1847]and the House Select Committee on Assassinations. The _
[1848]Defense Intelligence Agency, which did not come into existence
[1849]until 1961, has identified no assassination material to date,
[1850]and it anticipates that any holdings ‘it might have would be
[1852]13-00000
[1854]minimal because its mission at the time of the Kennedy
[1855]assassination focused upon foreign order of battle.
[1857]Although our holdings at CIA do include many documents
[1858]from other agencies, we nonetheless have a substantial collection
[1859]of CIA documents that will require a considerable effort to
[1860]review, and, as I said earlier, at my direction, this review for
[1861]declassification-is now underway. A preliminary survey of these
[1862]files has provided us some indications of what they contain.
[1863]Although the-records cover a wide variety of topics, they
[1864]principally focus on CIA activities concerning Cuba and Castro,
[1865]Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union, and Oswald's subsequent
[1866]activities in Mexico City and New Orleans. They also include a
[1867]large number of name traces requested by the staff of the House
[1868]Select Committee on Assassinations, as well as material relating
[1869]to the Garrison investigation and Cuban exile activities.
[1871]CIA cannot release a number of documents unilaterally
[1872]because of the limits in the Privacy Act (which protects the names
[1873]of American citizens against unauthorized disclosure), the
[1875]' sequestration of many documents by the House Select Committee
[1877]on Assassinations, and the fact that many of the documents
[1878]belong to agencies other than CIA. However, we have already
[1879]taken steps to lift the sequestration, to coordinate with other
[1880]agencies, and to begin the process of declassification. If
[1881]necessary, in the absence of legislation, I will ask the House of
[1883]13-00000
[1885]performance evaluations), medical evaluations and credit checks
[1887]Representatives for a resolution permitting CIA to release the
[1888]results of the declassification effort on the sequestered documents.
[1890]While I expect a large amount of material can be
[1891]declassified under our program, I assume that there still will be
[1892]information that cannot be released to the public for a variety of
[1893]reasons, including privacy concerns or the exposure of
[1894]intelligence sources and methods. Let me take a moment to give
[1895]examples of this type of material. During the investigation by the
[1896]House Select:;Committee on Assassinations, I understand that
[1897]security and personnel files were requested on a number of
[1898]Agency employees. These files contain fitness reports (or
[1899]on individual CIA officers. Although irrelevant to the question of
[1900]who killed President Kennedy, these and other personal
[1901]documents ultimately ended up in the sequestered collection of
[1902]documents. I do not believe that the benefit to the public of
[1903]disclosure of this information outweighs the clear privacy interest
[1904]of the individuals in keeping this information confidential.
[1905]Similar privacy concerns exist with documents containing
[1906]derogatory information on particular individuals where the
[1907]information is based on gossip or rumor. Our files also contain
[1908]names of individuals who provided us intelligence information on
[1909]a promise of confidentiality. We would not disclose their names
[1910]in breach of such a promise. Where we cannot disclose such
[1911]information to the public; the Agency will make redactions and
[1912]summarize the information in order to ensure that the maximum
[1914]8
[1916]13-00000
[1918]amount of information is released while still protecting the
[1919]identity of an agent or the privacy of an individual.
[1921]If legislation is not passed by Congress and signed by the
[1922]President regarding the JFK papers, to enhance public confidence
[1923]and to provide reassurance that CIA has not held back any
[1924]information relevant to the assassination, I would appoint a panel
[1925]of distinguished Americans from outside of government, perhaps
[1926]including distinguished former jurists, to examine whatever
[1927]documents wé have redacted or kept classified. They would then
[1928]issue an unclassified public report on their findings.
[1930]The effort required to declassify the documents related to
[1931]the assassination of President Kennedy will be daunting.
[1932]However, it is an important program, and I am personally
[1933]committed to making it work. Even in this time of diminishing
[1935]_ Tesources within the Intelligence Community, I have directed the
[1937]allocation of 15 full-time positions to expand the History Staff
[1938]and to form the Historical Review Group that will review the JFK
[1940]_ documents and other documents of historical interest.
[1942]I believe these actions attest to the seriousness of our intent
[1943]to get these papers declassified and released, and to open what
[1944]remains classified to outside, non-governmental review. It is
[1945]against this background that, in response to the committee's.
[1946]request, I cite our few technical reservations about the mechanism
[1947]established by the joint resolution to achieve this same result. I
[1949]a
[1951]13-00000
[1953]intend to address only Intelligence-Community concerns; I will
[1954]defer to the Department of Justice on any additional problems
[1955]posed by the joint resolution.
[1957]First, vesting in an outside body the determination as to
[1958]whether CIA materials related to the assassination can be released
[1959]to the public is inconsistent with my own statutory responsibility
[1960]to protect intelligence sources and methods.
[1962]Second, I am concemed that the joint resolution contains no
[1963]provision requiring security clearances or secure document
[1964]handling by the Assassination Materials Review Board or its staff.
[1966]Third, I am concerned that the joint resolution does not
[1967]provide the Agency with the opportunity to object to the release
[1968]of CIA information contained in documents originated by
[1970]_ Congress or the Warren Commission. Under the joint resolution,
[1972]documents originated by these entities can be released directly by
[1973]the Executive Director of the Assassination Materials Review
[1974]Board without any review by the President or other Executive
[1975]Branch agencies. |
[1977]Fourth, the joint resolution provision for a 30-day period for
[1978]agencies or departments to appeal decisions by the Executive
[1979]Director to release information may not provide sufficient time for
[1980]meaningful review of what could prove to be a large volume of
[1982]material at one time. .
[1984]13-00000
[1986]Fifth and finally, section 6 of the joint resolution, which
[1987]outlines the grounds for postponement of public release of a
[1988]document, makes no provision for postponing release of
[1989]documents that may contain Executive privilege or deliberative
[1990]process, attorney-client, or attorney work-product information.
[1991]While such privileges could be waived in the public interest and,
[1992]in fact, are not dikely to arise with respect to factual information
[1993]directly related to the JFK assassination, they would be
[1994]unavailable under the joint resolution in the rare case that they
[1996]might be needed.
[1998]These are technical problems that I believe can be solved in
[1999]ways that will, in fact, expedite the release of documents bearing
[2000]on the assassination of President Kennedy.
[2002]But, again, whatever the future course of this legislation,
[2003]CIA is proceeding even now to review for declassification the
[2004]relevant documents under its control. Further, we will cooperate
[2005]fully with any mechanism established by the Congress and the -
[2006]President to declassify all of this material.
[2008]13-00000
[2010]Statement of Admiral William O. Studeman, USN :
[2012]_ Deputy.Director of Central-Intelligence .. . .-.-- -..-/.-. .
[2014]~ Before the Subcommittee on Economic and Commercial Law
[2016]Committee on the Judiciary. —
[2017]U.S. House of Representatives
[2019]2 Poo fee ge see gg
[2021]~ Mr. Chairman, I am here today at your request to provide ———
[2022]‘our views on House Joint Resolution 454; "The Assassination ~~~
[2024]Materials Disclosure Act of 1992," and to describe the nature of
[2025]documents held by the CIA that relate to the assassination of John
[2026]F, Kennedy. I very much appreciate the opportunity to speak on
[2027]this important matter.
[2029]Let me begin, as the Director did last week in testifying on
[2030]this subject, by emphasizing that I am in complete agreement with
[2032]the purpose underlying the joint resolution--that efforts should be
[2034]made to declassify and make available to the public as quickly as
[2035]possible government documents relating to the assassination of
[2036]John F. Kennedy. We hope that opening up and giving
[2037]journalists, historians and, most importantly, the public access to
[2038]governmental files will help to resolve questions that still linger
[2039]over 28 years after the assassination.. Further, we-believe that -
[2040]maximum disclosure will discredit the theory that CIA had
[2041]anything to do with the murder of President Kennedy.
[2045]13-00000
[2047]Even before introduction of this joint resolution, the
[2048]Director recognized thé need for greater public accessto CIA _
[2049]~~ documents of historical importance. Two months ago,he =
[2051]announced the establishment of a new unit within CIA that will be
[2052]responsible for declassifying as many historical documents as
[2053]possible consistent with the protection of intelligence.sources and... _. ...
[2054]methods. This new unit, the Historical Review Group, in the -
[2055]noon -— oA gency's Center for the Study of Intelligence, willteview for ~~" ~~
[2057]_. 1... declassification documents-30-years-old-or-older,-and-national ---—-~- voce
[2059]— intelligence estimates on the former Soviet Union that are
[2060]10 years old or older. In addition to the systematic review of
[2061]30-year-old documents, the Director has directed the History Staff
[2062]in the Center for the Study of Intelligence to assemble CIA
[2063]records focusing on particular events of historical importance,
[2064]including the assassination of President Kennedy. The Historical
[2065]Review Group will then examine the documents for the purpose
[2066]of declassifying the records.
[2068]~ Because of high interest in the JFK papers, we are not
[2069]waiting for legislation or other agencies to start declassifying
[2070]documents belonging to CIA. The Historical Review Group
[2071]already has begun its review of the documents related to the
[2072]assassination of President Kennedy, and the first group of these
[2073]records, including all CIA documents on Lee Harvey Oswald
[2074]prior to the assassination, has been declassified with quite ;
[2075]minimal deletions and transferred to'the National Archives for
[2076]release to the public. This is but a small fraction of what we have,
[2078]2
[2080]13-00000
[2082]but it is an indication of our commitment immediately to begin
[2084]review for declassification of this material. And;indeed, as I
[2086]"speak, the reviewers are going through a substantial number of
[2088]documents, and we anticipate that many of these will be released
[2089]shortly.
[2091]As we carry out our program to declassify. Kennedy
[2092]assassination documents, our goal will:be to release as many as
[2094]- possible. In fact, the Director recently-approved-new CIA co ee
[2096]declassification guidelines for our Historical Review Program
[2097]which specifically direct a presumption in favor of
[2098]declassification. The Director believes that we can be very
[2099]forward leaning in making these documents available to the
[2100]public, and he has instructed the Historical Review Group to take
[2101]this attitude to heart. In this spirit, the Agency is making publicly
[2102]available these new guidelines for historical review and
[2103]declassification. OS
[2105]In connection with these historical review guidelines, the
[2106]Director has recently commissioned a task force to review Agency
[2107]procedures under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The
[2108]mission of this task force is to ensure that our internal FOIA
[2109]procedures are consistent with the approach that I have described
[2110]for historical declassification. Although the task force will have
[2111]to explore the difference between current documents that often are
[2112]requested under FOIA and 30-year-old documents that are placed
[2113]into the historical review program, our intention is to bring to the
[2115]3
[2117]13-00000
[2119]FOIA process a much more positive attitude toward
[2120]— _declassification and release of Agency records.
[2122]To understand the magnitude of the effort involved in
[2123]- reviewing the JFK papers for declassification, it is important to
[2125]related to the assassination of President Kennedy consists of
[2126]“-* approximately 2,50,000-300;000 pages of material. This _includes* “~~
[2128]Warren Commission and the House Sélect Committee on
[2129]Assassinations and 17 boxes of material on Lee Harvey Oswald
[2130]accumulated after President Kennedy's assassination.
[2131]Unfortunately, what we are dealing with is a mass of material that
[2132]is not indexed, is uncatalogued, and is highly disorganized--all of
[2133]which makes the review process more difficult. The material .
[2134]contains everything from the most sensitive intelligence s« sources
[2135]to the most mundane news clippings. —
[2137]These records include documents that CIA had in its files
[2138]before the assassination, a large number of records that CIA
[2139]received later as routine disseminations from other agencies, as
[2140]well as the reports, correspondence, and other papers that CIA
[2142]_ prepared in the course of the assassination investigations. I
[2143]should emphasize that these records were assembled into the
[2144]present collection as a result of specific inquiries received from
[2145]the Warren Commission or the House-Select Committee on
[2147]Assassinations.
[2149]place them in some context. CIA's collection of documents. ae
[2151]13-00000
[2153]Prior to President Kennedy's assassination, CIA held only a
[2155]~ small file on Lee Harvey Oswald that consisted of 34 documents
[2157](amounting to 124 pages), some of which originated with the FBI,
[2158]State Department, the Navy, and newspaper.clippings. Only 11 of
[2159]these documents originated within CIA. As I have.already.noted, .. -
[2160]we have declassified-the CIA documents in this file with quite
[2161]minimal deletions and provided them to the National Archives.
[2163]The records in this file dealt-with Oswald's defection to the Soviet
[2164]Union in 1959 and his activities after his return in 1962. By
[2165]contrast, it was only after the assassination that CIA accumulated
[2167]the rest of the material on Oswald--some 33,000 pages--most of
[2168]which CIA received from other agencies after November 22,
[2172]There has been some comment on this pre-assassination
[2173]Oswald file and how little it contained. I want to reemphasize
[2174]that this pre-assassination material is but the first installment of all
[2175]the material that we will review--an example of our intentions.
[2177]All of the assassination-related documents we have will be
[2178]reviewed _for declassification, and we will transfer the declassified
[2179]documents to the Archives as they are completed, rather than
[2180]waiting until work on the entirety has been concluded.
[2182]We have been asked about documents in our possession
[2183]generated by other agencies. In fact, much of the material held by
[2184]CIA originated with other agencies or departments. For example,
[2186]5
[2188]13-00000
[2190]gihtis a SRP
[2192]in the 17 boxes of Oswald records, approximately 40% of the
[2193]documents originated with the FBI, and about 20% originated
[2195]~ with the State Department or elsewhere. Our staffis still going =»
[2197]through the material compiled at the request of the Warren
[2198]Commission and the House Select Committee on Assassinations,
[2199]-which includes.63 boxes-of paper _records-and-one.box that-
[2200]contains 73 reels of microfilm. The microfilms in part overlap
[2201]material in other parts of the collection: We estimate that within
[2203]_ —---. -the 63-boxes of paper records,- -appreximately~ 27% originated: with:
[2205]a variety of other U.S. government agencies, private
[2206]organizations, and foreign and American press.
[2208]We have also been asked about assassination materials that
[2209]may be held by other Intelligence Community agencies. The FBI
[2210]will describe its holdings separately, which I assume include both
[2211]intelligence and law enforcement records. The National Security
[2212]Agency and the State Department's. Bureau of Intelligence and
[2213]Research report, after a preliminary search, that they have
[2214]identified a relatively small amount of material responsive to
[2215]previous inquiries by the Warren Commission, the Church
[2216]Committee, and the House Select Committee on Assassinations.
[2217]The Defense Intelligence Agency, which did not come into
[2219]_._._ existence until 1961, has identified no assassination material to_.
[2221]date, and it anticipates that any holdings it might have would be
[2222]minimal because its mission at the time of the Kennedy
[2223]assassination focused upon foreign order of battle.
[2225]13-00000
[2227]Although our holdings at CIA do include many documents
[2229]from other agencies, we nonetheless have a substantial collection
[2231]of CIA documents that will require a considerable effort to
[2232]review, and, as I said earlier, this review for declassification is
[2233]now underway. A preliminary survey of these files has provided
[2234]us some indications of what they contain. Although the records
[2235]cover a wide variety of topics, they principally focus on CIA
[2236]activities concerning Cuba and Castro, Oswald's defection to the
[2237]Soviet Union, and Oswald's subsequent activities in Mexico City
[2238]and New Orleans. They also include a large number of name
[2239]traces requested by the staff of the House Select Committee on
[2240]Assassinations, as well as material relating to the Garrison
[2241]investigation and Cuban exile activities.
[2243]CIA cannot release a number of documents unilaterally
[2244]because of the limits in the Privacy Act (which protects the names
[2245]of American citizens against unauthorized disclosure), the
[2247]- sequestration of many documents by the House Select Committee
[2249]on Assassinations, and the fact that many of the documents
[2250]belong to agencies other than CIA. However, we have already
[2251]taken steps to lift the sequestration, to coordinate with other
[2252]agencies, and to begin the process of declassification. If
[2254]_ necessary, in the absence of legislation, we will ask the House of
[2256]Representatives for a resolution permitting CIA to release the
[2257]results of the declassification effort on the sequestered documents.
[2258]We hope to work with you, Mr. Chairman, to remove any
[2259]obstacles that might arise in releasing the sequestered documents.
[2261]7
[2263]13-00000
[2265]While we expect that a large amount of material can be
[2266]declassified under our program, I assume that there still will be
[2268]information that cannot be released to the public fora varietyof =
[2270]reasons, including privacy concerns or the exposure of
[2272]intelligence sources and methods. Let me take a moment to give
[2273]examples of this type of material.. During the investigation by the .
[2274]House Select-Committee on Assassinations, I understand that |
[2276]security and personnel files were requested on a number of
[2278]Agency employees... These files contain fitness reports (or
[2279]performance evaluations), medical evaluations and credit checks
[2280]on individual CIA officers. Although irrelevant to the question of
[2281]who killed President Kennedy, these and other personal
[2282]documents ultimately ended up in the sequestered collection of
[2283]documents. I do not believe that the benefit to the public of
[2284]disclosure of this information outweighs the clear privacy interest
[2285]of the individuals in keeping this information confidential.
[2286]Similar privacy concems exist with documents containing
[2287]derogatory information on particular individuals where the
[2288]information is based on gossip or rumor. Our files also contain
[2289]names of individuals who provided us intelligence information on
[2291]-a- promise of confidentiality. We would not disclose their names
[2293]in breach of such a promise. Where we cannot disclose such
[2294]information to the public, the Agency will make redactions and
[2295]summarize the information in order to ensure that the maximum
[2296]amount of information is released while still protecting the
[2297]identity of an agent or the privacy of an individual.
[2299]13-00000
[2301]If legislation is not passed by Congress and signed by the
[2302]President regarding the JFK papers, to enhance public confidence
[2303]and to provide reassurance that CIA has not held back any
[2304]information relevant to the assassination, the Director has stated
[2305]that he would appoint a panel of distinguished Americans from
[2306]outside of government, perhaps including distinguished former
[2307]jurists, to examine whatever documents we have redacted or kept
[2308]classified. They would then issue an unclassified public report on
[2309]their findings. - me
[2311]”-
[2313]The effort required to declassify the documents related to
[2314]the assassination of President Kennedy will be daunting.
[2315]However, it is an important program, and both the Director and I
[2316]are personally committed to: making it work. Even in this time of —
[2317]diminishing resources within the Intelligence Community, the
[2318]Director has allocated 15 full-time positions to expand the History
[2319]Staff and to form the Historical Review Group that will review the
[2320]JFK documents and other documents of historical interest.
[2322]I believe these actions attest to the seriousness of our intent
[2324]—to get these papers declassified and released, and to open what —
[2326]remains classified to outside, non-governmental review. It is
[2327]against this background that, in response to the committee's
[2328]request, I cite our few technical reservations about the mechanism
[2329]established by the joint resolution to achieve this same result. I
[2330]intend to address only Intelligence Community concerns; I will
[2332]13-00000
[2334]defer to the Department of Justice on any additional problems
[2336]- posed by the joint resolution. '
[2338]First, vesting in an outside body the determination as to
[2339]whether CIA materials related to the assassination can be released
[2340]to the public is inconsistent with the-Director's statutory
[2341]responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods.
[2343]Second, we-are concerned that the joint resolution contains
[2344]no provision requiring security clearances or secure document
[2345]handling by the Assassination Materials Review Board or its staff.
[2347]; Third, we are concerned that the joint resolution does not
[2349]_ provide the Agency with the opportunity to object to the release
[2351]of CIA information contained in documents originated by
[2352]Congress or the Warren Commission. Under the joint resolution,
[2353]documents originated by these entities can be released directly by
[2354]the Executive Director of the Assassination Materials Review
[2355]Board without any review by the President or other Executive
[2356]Branch agencies.
[2358]Fourth, the joint resolution provision for a 30-day period for
[2359]agencies or departments to appeal decisions by the Executive
[2360]Director to release information may not provide sufficient time for
[2361]meaningful review of what could prove to be a large volume of
[2363]material at one time.
[2365]10
[2367]13-00000
[2369]Fifth and finally, section 6 of the joint resolution, which
[2370]outlines the grounds for postponement of public release of a
[2371]document, makes no provision for postponing release of
[2372]documents that may contain Executive privilege or deliberative
[2373]process, attorney-client, or attorney work-product information.
[2374]While such privileges could be waived in the public interest and,
[2375]in fact, are not likely to arise with respect to factual information
[2376]directly related to the JFK assassination, they would be -
[2377]unavailable under the joint resolution in the rare case that they —
[2379]might be needed.
[2381]These are technical problems that we believe can be solved
[2382]in ways that will, in fact, expedite the release of documents
[2383]bearing on the assassination of President Kennedy.
[2385]But, again, whatever the future course of this legislation,
[2386]CIA is proceeding even now to review for declassification the
[2387]relevant documents under its control. Further, we will cooperate
[2388]fully with any mechanism established by the Congress and the
[2389]President to declassify all of this material.
[2391]11
[2393]13-00000
[2395]a :.
[2396]SECRE
[2398]Central intelligence Agency
[2400]Washingfon. D.C. 20505
[2402]OCA 2157-92
[2403]22 May 1992
[2405]The Honorable John Glenn
[2407]Chairman ,
[2409]Committee on,Governmental Affairs .__
[2410]United States Senate
[2412]Washington, D.C. 20510
[2414]Dear Mr. Chairman: ~
[2416]I am writing to correct for the record two statements I
[2417]made when I testified before the Committee last Tuesday on
[2418]the Assassination Materials Disclosure Act.
[2420]I testified that there were 33 documents, amounting to
[2421]approximately 110 pages, in the Oswald file that was
[2422]declassified and released to the public. A subsequent count
[2423]by my staff revealed that the file actually contains a total
[2424]of 34 documents, amounting to 124 pages. I gave the correct
[2425]numbers when I testified last Friday before the Subcommittee
[2426]on Legislation and National Security of the House Committee
[2427]on Government Operations.
[2429]In addition, I was asked at your hearing by
[2430]Senator Cohen whether the State Department or the CIA had
[2431]had any contact with any Soviet officials concerning KGB or
[2432]GRU files relevant to the Kennedy assassination. I
[2433]answered that there had been no contact between the CIA and
[2434]the Russian KGB on this matter, and I added that the State
[2435]Department might have requested those files, but I was not
[2436]certain. At the time, I believed that that was an accurate
[2437]answer. I have since discovered, however, that in January
[2438]1992 an Agency official did ask the new Russian internal
[2439]service (MBRF) for any information related to the Kennedy
[2440]assassination. The Russians advised us, after reviewing
[2441]their file holdings on Oswald, that they had nothing that
[2442]would add to our knowledge or to the 22 November 1991 ABC
[2443]television special on this issue, which they termed
[2444]"detailed and. objective."
[2446]cL BY (2196777)
[2447]DECL OADR
[2448]DRV FM LIA 3-87
[2450]13-00000
[2452]Sree
[2454]The Honorable John Glenn
[2456]To avoid disrupting our continuing efforts to gain
[2457]access to the Russian files on Oswald, the fact that the
[2458]Agency has had direct contacts with the Russian service on
[2459]this topic must remain classified. For the purpose of
[2460]correcting the public record, I suggest the following
[2461]unclassified statement:
[2463]In response to a request from the US embassy in
[2464]Moscow, the Russians have reviewed their file
[2465]holdings’on Oswald. They hav@é advised us that
[2467]- they had nothing that would add to our knowledge
[2468]or to the 22 November 1991 ABC television special
[2469]on this issue, which they termed "detailed and
[2471]objective.*
[2473].I enjoyed the opportunity to testify -before the
[2474]Committee, and I hope that these corrections prove helpful.
[2475]A similar letter is being sent: to-Ranking Minority
[2477]Member Roth.
[2478]Sincerely,
[2482]Robert M. Gafes .
[2483]Director of Central Intelligence
[2485]cc: Senator Cohen
[2486]Senator Boren
[2487]Senator Murkowski
[2489]13-00000
[2491]ve . SSSCREL_
[2493]Central Intelligence Agency
[2495]Washingjon.D.C.20505
[2496]OCA 2157-92/1
[2497]22 May 1992
[2499]The Honorable William V. Roth, Jr.
[2500]Ranking Minority Member
[2502]Committee on‘ Governmental Affairs
[2503]United States Senate
[2505]Washington, D.C. 20510
[2507]Dear Mr. Roth:
[2509]I am writing to correct for the record two statements I
[2510]made when I testified before the Committee last Tuesday on
[2511]the Assassination Materials Disclosure Act.
[2513]I testified that there were 33 documents, amounting to
[2514]approximately 110 pages, in the Oswald file that was
[2515]declassified and released to the public. A subsequent count
[2516]by my staff revealed that the file actually contains a total
[2517]of 34 documents, amounting to 124 pages. I gave the correct
[2518]numbers when I testified last Friday before the Subcommittee
[2519]on Legislation and National Security of the House Committee
[2520]on Government Operations.
[2522]In addition, I was asked at your hearing by
[2523]Senator Cohen whether the State Department or the CIA had
[2524]had any contact with any Soviet officials concerning KGB or
[2525]GRU files relevant to the Kennedy assassination. I
[2526]answered that there had been no contact between the CIA and
[2527]the Russian KGB on this matter, and I added that the State
[2528]Department might have requested those files, but I was not
[2529]certain. At the time, I believed that that was an accurate
[2530]answer. I have since discovered, however, that in January
[2531]1992 an Agency official did ask the new Russian internal
[2532]service (MBRF) for any information related to the Kennedy
[2533]assassination. The Russians advised us, after reviewing
[2534]their file holdings on Oswald, that they had nothing that
[2535]would add to our knowledge or to the 22 November 1991 ABC
[2536]television special on this issue, which they termed
[2537]"detailed and objective."
[2539]CL BY 2196777}
[2540]DECL OADR
[2541]DRV FM LIA 3-87
[2543]13-00000
[2545]_
[2547]The Honorable William v. Roth, Jr.
[2549]To avoid disrupting our continuing efforts to gain
[2550]access to the Russian files on Oswald, the fact that the
[2551]Agency has had direct contacts with the Russian service on
[2552]this topic must remain classified. For the purpose of
[2553]correcting the public record, I suggest the following
[2554]unclassified statement:
[2556]In response to a request from the US. embassy in
[2557]‘Moscow, the Russians have reviewed their file
[2558]holdings on Oswald. They have advised us that _
[2559]they had nothing that would add to our knowledge
[2560]or to the 22 November 1991 ABC television special
[2561]on this issue, which they termed "detailed and
[2563]objective."
[2565]I enjoyed the opportunity to testify before the
[2566]Committee, and I hope that these corrections prove helpful.
[2567]A similar letter is being sent to Chairman Glenn.
[2569]Sincerely,
[2571]Robert M. Gates
[2572]Director of Central Intelligence
[2574]cc: Senator Cohen
[2575]Senator Boren
[2576]Senator Murkowski
[2578]13-00000
[2581]The Honorable John Glenn
[2583]The Honorable William V. Roth, Jr.
[2585]SUBJECT: Corrections on DCI Testimony before the Committee
[2586]on Governmental Affairs
[2588]OCA/LEG/SMDunne:me/37916 (21 May 1992) OCA 2157-92
[2590]Distribution:
[2591]Original ~ Addressees
[2592]- DCI
[2593]- PpDCcrI
[2594]- ExDir
[2595]- DDO
[2596]- D/OCA
[2597]~ D/CSI
[2598]- C/DCI History Staff
[2599]- ER
[2600]- OCA Records
[2601]- Leg Subj File
[2602]~ SMD Signer File
[2603]- SMD Soft File
[2605]PRP BPP PPP PPE PE
[2607]13-00000,,
[2611]John Glenn
[2613]IMMEDIATE RELEASE: Contact: Jack Sparks (202) 224-5635
[2614]May 12, 1992 Leonard Weiss (202) 224-4751
[2616]News Release
[2618]Statement of Senator John Glenn
[2619]Chairman, Senate Governmental Affairs Committee
[2620]Hearing on
[2621]S. J. Res. 282, "The Assassination Materials Disclosure Act" -
[2622]May 12, 1992
[2624]The bill before us today, S.J. Res. 282, is the
[2625]"Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992." The
[2626]legislation was introduced by Senator David Boren and Senator
[2627]Arlen Specter. An identical bill was introduced in the House of
[2628]Representatives by our colleague, Representative Louis Stokes.
[2630]The legislation would require the government to release
[2631]records to the American public which are "relevant to the
[2632]assassination of President John F. Kennedy." The bill would
[2633]establish an independent review board within 90 days of
[2634]enactment, and this board would work as quickly as possible to
[2635]release the records to the public through the National Archives
[2636]and the Government Printing Office.
[2638]The bill creates a strong presumption on releasing
[2639]documents. The onus will be on those who would withhold
[2641]documents to prove to the Review Board and the American people _.
[2643]why those documents must be shielded from public scrutiny.
[2645]It is also important to stress that the legislation does
[2646]not authorize, any official investigation of the assassination.
[2647]Its only purpose is to create a process by which the American
[2648]public may be given the most complete access to review relevant
[2649]records, and make their own observations and assessments. The
[2650]Committee's work and the hearing today is likewise limited to
[2651]this purpose.
[2653]This bill is the result of a climate of suspicion and
[2654]distrust that has grown over the years regarding the official
[2655]explanation of the assassination of President Kennedy. It is a
[2656]climate nurtured by many books, articles, television programs,
[2657]and the recent movie "JFK." Disclosure of information is the
[2658]only reliable way to maintain the public trust, and dispel
[2659]distrust. Those of us who knew President Kennedy personally and
[2660]remember where we were when we learned of President Kennedy's
[2661]assassination must exercise our responsibility to the next
[2662]generation of Americans, whose historical knowledge of the
[2664]13-00000 |
[2668]assassination of President Kennedy will be significantly
[2669]improved by the release of these records.
[2671]Ironically, it was President John F. Kennedy who first
[2672]required scheduled declassification in the release of Executive
[2673]Branch national security information. Declassification schedules
[2674]remained in effect until President Reagan eliminated the
[2675]requirement in 1981, and President Bush persists in this same
[2676]practice. It is likely that more government documents related to
[2677]the Kennedy assassination could have been released over the past
[2678]12 years if declassification was still a priority. It is also
[2679]fair to say that the 1986 amendments to the Freedom of
[2680]Information Act, including broad law enforcement exemptions,
[2681]have narrowed the release of Kennedy assassination records by
[2682]the FBI. ;
[2684]The public interest in the history of the assassination
[2685]of President Kennedy has been insatiable. In one noted
[2686]bibliography, a total of 5,134 books, articles, reports, films,
[2687]or television programs were produced on the subject between the
[2688]years 1963 and 1979. The Library of Congress has over 250
[2689]holdings on the subject. The FBI continues to receive reports,
[2690]allegations, and requests for further investigation. Indeed, as
[2691]Director Sessions may testify today, the FBI has recently
[2692]located and interviewed two of the three "hobos" who were
[2693]identified as witnesses of the shooting, as well as seven Dallas
[2694]police officers who were not previously interviewed by
[2695]government investigators.
[2697]The speculation about the assassination of President
[2698]Kennedy maybe more cruel than the truth itsélf. It is arguable ©
[2699]whether the disclosure of new information will dampen the
[2700]speculation, but I hope that the breadth of information made
[2701]available will answer many questions and provide many history
[2702]lessons.
[2704]I view the Committee's mandate as determining whether the
[2705]process for review and release of the records is fair and
[2706]appropriate; and that exemptions, when needed, must be kept to a>
[2707]minimum. The Department of Justice has told the Committee that
[2708]it will recommend a presidential veto of the bill as written. I
[2709]hope we can find a way to construct a process for release of
[2710]assassination related records that will be efficient and
[2711]effective, will gain the confidence of the public, and will
[2712]address concerns of the Justice Department that are legitimate.
[2714]The authors of the bill are to be congratulated for
[2715]working quickly to propose an independent and accountable
[2716]mechanism to release records related to the assassination.
[2717]However, we must carefully consider the parameters of the bill.
[2719]I believe that the major issues include:
[2721]13-00000
[2727]rf
[2729]First, how will agencies and others who hold records
[2730]define the universe of “relevant” Kennedy assassination
[2731]materials? It is important to be able to go beyond the frame of
[2732]reference of previous inquiries of commissions and committees,
[2733]but the question must be asked: Where will the search for
[2734]documents end?
[2736]Second, the definition and search for "relevant
[2737]assassination material" also raises important questions of human
[2738]resources and costs to organize and make material available to
[2739]the Review Board. How much will this cost?
[2741]Third, what is the best mechanism to govern the review
[2742]and release of records in an independent, accountable, and
[2743]credible manner. The tension between management and public
[2744]confidence in the process cannot be overlooked. However, it may
[2745]be important to simplify the process. The bill proposes a
[2746]five-member Review Board, with an Executive Director and staff.
[2747]Are we creating a Rube Goldberg machine, or are these layers
[2748]necessary?
[2750]Fourth, we must ask why the bill, which acts in the name
[2751]of openness in government, also exempts the Review Board from
[2752]the Government in the Sunshine Act, the Freedom of Information
[2753]Act, the Administrative Procedures Act, and judicial review?
[2755]Fifth, is the issue of standards for postponement of
[2756]disclosure. I strongly believe that the government should
[2757]practice disclosure of information as the rule, unless there are
[2758]demonstrable reasons for protecting the information. It is
[2759]important to emphasize that while hundreds of thousands of pages
[2760]of material will be released, the bill contains national
[2761]security and privacy exemptions, and withholds personnel and
[2762]administrative records relating to past official inquiries.
[2764]I personally believe that the agencies and the Congress,
[2765]which hold Kennedy assassination records should not wait for the
[2766]passage of legislation, and the resolution of all issues in the
[2767]bill, before releasing documents. It is my intention to move
[2768]legislation through the Committee as quickly as possible, but
[2769]regardless it will take time for whatever authority is created
[2770]in statute to become assembled, establish procedures, and begin
[2771]its work. We will hear today how ready key agencies and
[2772]congressional officials are to release their records. If even
[2773]some of the material can go out the door without further
[2774]adjustments, then let's give the public access now. The review
[2775]board or whatever authority is created will certainly have the
[2776]opportunity to face the more difficult issues shortly
[2777]thereafter.
[2779]Today we are fortunate to have several experts and
[2780]authorities to discuss these issues. These include the authors
[2781]of the legislation, as well as the Director of the Central
[2782]Intelligence Agency and the Director of the Federal Bureau of
[2786]13-00000
[2788]. ‘v
[2790]Investigation. We are grateful to have our other witnesses as
[2791]well. Among them is attorney James Lesar, President of the
[2792]Assassination Archives and Research Center. Mr. Lesar's work
[2793]represents the track record on public access to Kennedy
[2794]assassination material under the Freedom of Information Act. He
[2795]will speak to the nature and limitations of current access
[2796]arrangements. We also have two prominent twentieth century
[2797]historians, Professor Ernest May of Harvard University and
[2798]Professor Athan Theoharis from Marquette University. Each
[2799]possess extensive experience regarding the federal records of
[2800]the intelligence and. federal law enforcement communities. We
[2801]welcome all of you to the Committee.
[2803]2 armen So. nn oe
[2807]13-00000
[2809]on
[2811]Te phe os cel coment PRATT
[2813]Uk ferent th” Ng
[2815]Me as
[2817]SUGGESTED AREAS TO TO BE ADDRESSED IN aes ‘LANGUAGE
[2818]{IF NOT ADDRESSED IN THE TEXT OF THE RESOLUTION)
[2820]1. Initial Review of assassination materials. It
[2821]should be made clear that section S of H.J.Res. 454, which
[2822]requires that records not provided to the Archivist for
[2823]public disclosure be made available to the Review Board
[2824]within 60 days of enactment, is not intended to preclude
[2825]agencies from conducting their own reviews and making as
[2826]much information available as possible before the Review
[2827]Board conducts its review of assassination materials.
[2828]Suggested clarifying report language: .
[2830]The Committee notes that some agencies, such as the -
[2831]Central Intelligence Agency, have already begun to
[2832]review and release assassination materials. Section
[2833]S(a) (2), which requires that all records of an official.
[2834]investigation for which an agency is custodian be made
[2835]available to the Review Board within 60 days of
[2836]enactment of the Joint Resolution, is not intended to
[2837]preclude agencies from continuing any reviews that they
[2838]have ongoing and transferring documents to the Archives
[2839]for public release wherever possible. In, fact the
[2840]Committee encourages such reviews to continue inasmuch
[2841]as they can provide for more expeditious release of
[2842]assasSination materials to the public.
[2845]documents. The legislation on its face does not necessarily
[2846]provide that the agency or department that originated the
[2847]information will have any input into a decision to disclose
[2848]the record, or will even be apprised of such a decision
[2849]after the fact. Suggested clarifying report language:
[2851]The Committee understands that existing regulations
[2852]within the Executive Branch require that classified
[2853]information originated in one agency may not be
[2854]disseminated outside another agency to which it has
[2855]been made available without the consent of the
[2856]originating agency- The Committee expects that
[2857]agencies that are custodians of records will follow
[2858]this practice before providing information to the
[2859]Archivist under section 5(a)(1) for public release
[2860]pursuant to section 4.
[2862]Section 5(a) (2) requires agencies that are custodians
[2863]of records of official investigations to make such
[2864]records available to the Review Board. The Board will
[2865]then make a determination of whether the material
[2866]qualifies for postponement under the criteria set forth
[2868]13-00000 .
[2874]DRAE
[2876]in Section 7 and shall inform the custodian of records
[2877]and the originating body of the record of its
[2878]determination. The Committee expects that the Review
[2879]Board also will consult with the agency or department
[2880]that originated the information in reaching its
[2881]determination as to whether public disclosure of the
[2882]material must be postponed to ensure that it is
[2883]apprised of relevant sensitivities presented by that
[2884]information. For example, the Review Board should
[2885]consult with the relevant Executive Branch agency that
[2886]provided information incorporated into a Congressional
[2887]document before making a decision to release that
[2888]document and shall inform the originating agency of a
[2889]decision to release that information.
[2891]3. toe
[2892]. ‘Intelligence agent" is something of a term
[2893]of art that, left undefined, might not be construed to
[2894]protect information that would reveal the identity of covert
[2895]employees of intelligence organizations. Suggested
[2896]clarifying report language:
[2898]The term ‘intelligence agent" as used in séction
[2900]7(a) (1) (A) is intended to permit postponement of
[2901]release of information that would reveal the identity
[2902]of a domestic or foreign intelligence or
[2903]counterintelligence asset, collaborator, foreign
[2904]liaison contact, or covert employee of a United States
[2905]intelligence organization, where the identity of any of
[2906]these currently requires protection.
[2908]4. s w +
[2909]. <n addition to adding language to section 10(1) (1)
[2910]to clarify that requests for additional records must be made
[2911]by the Review Board itself, report language should make
[2912]clear that the Committee does not intend the Board‘s
[2913]discretion in this regard to be unbounded. Suggested report
[2914]language: .
[2916]Section 10(1)(1) provides that the Review Board may
[2917]request “any record" from an Executive agency. The
[2918]Committee intends to give the Review Board wide
[2919]latitude to determine what additional records may be
[2920]held by agencies that are relevant to the assassination
[2921]of President Kennedy. Rather than the Committee
[2922]attempting to define what records should be requested,
[2923]the Committee believes that this judgment is best left
[2924]to the Board, which will develop expertise in
[2925]assassination-related issues and documents as its work
[2927]13-00000 |
[2929]oat
[2933].
[2935]proceeds. However, the Committee does not intend to
[2936]vest unfettered discretion in the Review Board to
[2937]request any and all records of agencies without regard
[2938]to their relationship to the assassination. The
[2939]Committee expects that the Board will request only
[2941]‘documents that may bear some reasonable relationship to
[2943]the assassination, and that the Board will be guided by
[2944]the principle that unreasonable risk of exposure of
[2945]sensitive intelligence or law enforcement sources or
[2946]methods is to be avoided.
[2948]13-00000
[2950]“oe F. 4 °
[2951]SECRET
[2952]HPSCI BRIEFING - JFK DECLASSIFICATION 10 April 1996
[2954]1. Nature of the records--Oswald 201, Sequestered
[2956]- Other records: Minutes of DCI morning meetings; working
[2957]files
[2959]- Third Agency documents: FBI, SSCI, Presidential libraries
[2960]2. Pages released (227,000)
[2962]- Percentage of pages redacted; 70 *%
[2963]3. Process of declassification
[2965]- Former senior officers in HRG review
[2967]- Coordination with OGC, DO (DO team detailed to HRG)
[2969]4. Standards for review in JFK Assassination Records Collection
[2970]Act, 1992
[2972]- Records related to the assassination or investigation
[2973]into the assassination
[2975]- Law provides grounds for postponement of disclosure of
[2976]records
[2978]-- “Clear and convincing evidence“ must be pre-
[2979]sented to the Board
[2981]E.g., Identity of agent currently requiring
[2982]protection
[2984]- Source or method currently utilized
[2986]- Foreign government relationship cur-
[2987]rently requiring protection ©
[2989]5. Board has authority to release records unless it agrees there
[2990]is “clear and convincing evidence” to support a postponement
[2992]- Board then has to justify on the record each redaction
[2993]with which it agrees
[2995]- Once a determination is made, Board must publish it in
[2996]Federal Register within 14 days
[2998]13-00000
[3002]- Options available: substitute language e.g., “Northern
[3003]European station”
[3005]- Also, summary of a record
[3006]- Board has access to every document in full
[3007]6. Issues raised by Board's decisions:
[3008]- Problem: Board has difficulty in linking disclosure of
[3010]information that is 30 years old with damage to current
[3011]intelligence operations
[3013]- Identification of stations e.g., Helsinki /
[3015]- Names of former Agency employees who retired under cover
[3017]- Board guidelines: Protect person if retired under
[3018]cover and now residing overseas, but not if in US
[3020]- (Liaison, joint operations in Mexico: /
[3022]- Briefing of the Board by Dave _Edgeri, Jeff Smith, Central
[3023]Cover, DO desk officers, others
[3025]- Problem of accumulative effect of releases--eroding cover,
[3026]ability to conduct operations
[3028]7. Provision for appeal to the White House if we disagree
[3029]with Board's determination
[3031]- President has sole authority to require postponement of
[3032]a record or information
[3034]--President required to advise tHe Board within 30 days
[3035]of the Board's determination
[3037]-- This is published in the Federal Register
[3038]8. Current appeal (now resolved)
[3040]- Issues: identification of Agency asset
[3041]liaison relationship
[3042]identification of station
[3044]- Potential appeal: ffokyo station /
[3046]9. Additional requests of Board to review other records e.g.,
[3047]history of Mexico City station, Intelligence Community Staff
[3048]records ‘
[3051]13-00000
[3053]GET Mn
[3055]CSI 1997-552
[3056]10 December 1997
[3058]NOTE FOR: Director, Center for the Study
[3059]of Intelligence
[3060]Deputy Director
[3061]Office of Congressional Affairs
[3063]FROM: John Pereira
[3064]Chief, Historical Review Group
[3066]SUBJECT: JFK/Possible Letter from
[3067]Congressman Burton to EXDIR
[3069]Jeremy Gunn, Executive Director of the JFK Board, told
[3070]HRG yesterday that Congressman Dan Burton may well write a
[3071]letter to the EXDIR expressing concern about whether CIA
[3072]will be able to meet the deadline for declassification of
[3073]assassination-related records. Burton chairs the Government
[3074]Reform and Oversight Committee which has cognizance over the
[3075]JFK Board.
[3077]Gunn said that he briefed members of Burton’s staff
[3078]last week and told them he was concerned that the Agency may
[3079]not have enough resources dedicated to JFK to finish the
[3080]review of documents by 1. September 1998. Gunn showed the
[3081]staffers the recent exchange of letters between the Board
[3082]and the EXDIR on the same issue. According to the staffers,
[3083]Burton has a strong personal interest in the release of the
[3084]assassination records. The staffers gave Gunn the
[3085]impression that Burton’s strong interest will prompt him to
[3086]write to the Agency.
[3088]During our discussion with Gunn, we reviewed with him
[3089]the Agency’s clear commitment to declassifying all
[3090]assassination records. We also explained that we have
[3091]shifted four additional contractors to the JFK project, and
[3092]will shift more if necessary, even at the cost of slowing
[3093]down or stopping other declassification efforts.
[3095]John Pereira
[3097]ADMINISTRATI
[3099]AL USE ONLY
[3101]/einaletedoIPK
[3103]13-00000
[3105]{002
[3107]202 724 0457 ARRB .
[3108]ee te 8T Jee 09:17 FAL 1022022261274 DEC 17°97 17:24 No.003 P.07
[3110]DAN BURTON. OUUIA . wen a. Susromes
[3111]GENIAMIM A. GRMAN, NEW YORK am, TOM LANTOS, CAFORSMA
[3112]1. DES: sboneaR AD . . ONE HUNDRED BETH CONGRESS Seneca Toe
[3113]=a Congress of the United States 2
[3114]sete ba. YORK x
[3115]amore House of Representatives Reeourevertiaton
[3117]id w ViRCINCA = - ; CHAKA FANTAH, PENNETLVANOA
[3118]tinh €.cou0Eh, tan COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT Sais comet
[3119]Soret gtapeva,aicen 2157 Raveurn House Orrice Buroina pase? & Ove, «ano
[3120]STEVE G LATOURETTE OntiO SOHNE. TERRY, MARAACHUSETTS
[3121]MARSHALL “MART GANFORD, GOUTH CAROLING . y 44 TURNER, TEZAR
[3122]ZOOL Sunny, aw vaaraene Wasuineton, DC 20516-8143 THOMAS 6. ALLEN, MANE
[3123]OAck PAPRAA, MEW SERREY .. (ARCADE, FORD, dn, TENNEEBES
[3125]December 16, 1997
[3126]; CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
[3128]The Honorable George J. Tenet. DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
[3130]Director of Central Intelligence RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION’
[3132]Central Intelligence Agency SE THIS DOCUMENT
[3134]Washington, D.C. 20505 ,
[3136]Dear Director Tenet:
[3138]{As Chairman of tho Commitice on Government Reform énd Oversight, Lhave a greet interest in
[3139]ensuring that the Assassination Records Review Board, which is under the jurisdiction of the Committee,
[3140]completes its work by its scheduled termination date of September 30, 1998. Earlier this ycar I introduced
[3141]‘HR, 1553, now Public Law 105-25, which extended tho euhorization of the Review Boned for one additional
[3142]ycar, until September 30, 1998. This one-year extension of authorization for the Reviow Board was included
[3143]in President Clinton "s fiscal year 1998 budget, and received bipartisan support in Congress.
[3145]‘consideration of H.R. 1553, 1 stated my firm intention for this to be the final extension of
[3146]authorization for the Raview Board. Accordingly, I believe that it is of utmost importance that all fedcral
[3147]agencies holding assassination records fully cooperate with the Review Board, in a timely manner, in order
[3148]that documents may bo procossed and transferred to the National Archivos, in compliance with the President
[3149]John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (Public Law 102-526).
[3151]oe The Reviow Board has advised ms that while it perceives that the Ceatral Intelligence Agency (CIA)
[3152]generally has been cooperative and helpful, the Board novertholess believes that the CIA is not transferring
[3153]records to tho Board at a pace consistent with the need to complete the work on time. The Board similarly
[3154]has advised that, unless it receives processed records in a more expeditious manner, it is prepared to usc its
[3155]legal powers to order a transfor of recards to the Board which would then vole to open the records without
[3156]benefit of a pre-review by the CIA. The Board has informed me that it docs not wish to take this sicp, but
[3157]date ny Prepared to do so if neoossary to comple its work by is September 30, 1998, termination
[3159]T urge you to take all appropriate steps to ensure that the CLA promptly fulfills its obligations under
[3160]hl by expen vowing and tafe te ean cr ote Rev Bou
[3162]Dan aay
[3163]Chairman
[3167]13-00000
[3169]CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
[3170]WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
[3172]EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
[3174]OCA 97-1969
[3175]8 January 1998
[3177]CIA SPECIAL ©
[3179]The Honorable Dan Burton
[3181]Chairman .
[3183]Committee on Government Reform
[3184]and Oversight
[3186]House of Representatives
[3188]Washington, D.C. 20515
[3190]: . J
[3191]Dear Mr. Chairman:
[3193]Thank you for your letter of December 16, 1997 in which
[3194]you expressed interest in the status of Central Intelligence
[3195]Agency’s (CIA) processing of records related to President
[3196]John F. Kennedy’s assassination.
[3198]You referred to the Assassination Records Review Board’s
[3199]concern that CIA may not be processing records at a pace |
[3200]sufficient to complete the work on time. I want to assure
[3201]you, as I did to the Review: Board’s Executive Director in
[3202]the enclosed November 21, 1997 letter, that the Agency is
[3203]committed to taking all necessary steps to meet the statutory
[3204]deadline of September 30, 1998 for reviewing all of the
[3205]Agency’s assassination-related materials. As the Review
[3206]Board has noted, we are cooperating fully with the Board
[3207]and its staff in this effort.
[3209]We share the Review Board’s goal of declassifying
[3210]and releasing the relevant records to the fullest extent
[3211]possible. As you are aware, it is important that there be
[3212]a proper review of all the records so that still sensitive
[3213]information that might warrant continued protection can be
[3214]identified to the Board. For the past several years a team
[3215]of experienced reviewers has been dedicated to the task
[3216]of declassifying the assassination records. Recently we
[3217]shifted several additional personnel to the team in order to
[3219]accelerate the processing of documents and assure the prompt
[3221]transfer to the Review Board and ultimately to the National
[3222]Archives.
[3224]13-00000
[3226]The Honorable Dan Burton
[3228]I understand the importance that the Congress and the
[3229]President have placed on disclosing to the American people
[3230]all available information about the assassination. To this
[3231]end, we have released more than 200,000 pages of material
[3233]' and are working diligently to complete our review of the
[3235]remaining records.
[3236]If you or your staff require any further information or
[3237]would like a briefing on our declassification program, please
[3239]have your staff contact: Mr. Jim Meehan, Office of Congressional
[3240]Affairs, at (703) 482-8796.
[3242]Sincerely,
[3244]David W. Carey
[3246]Enclosure
[3248]13-00000
[3251]-
[3253]The Honorable Dan Burton
[3255]DCI/OCA/Liaison Grp/JPMeehan:dms/37976 (29 Dec 97 INTERIM)
[3256]OCA 97-1969 (FN:wdata/action/liaison/burton.doc)
[3257]Revised from INTERIM LTR (never sent) to FINAL LTR (6 Jan 97)
[3259]Distribution:
[3260]Original - The Honorable Dan Burton, HGR&OC
[3261]- EXDIR/CIA (Follow-up to SCI-97-536)
[3262]- DCI
[3263]- DDCI .
[3264]- ER (ACTION ITEM: ER 97-5851)
[3265]- DCI/OGC
[3266]- DCI/CSI
[3267]- DDO
[3268]DO/IMS
[3269]- DA/OIM
[3270]- DA/OIM/IRG
[3271]- DA/MS
[3272]- D/OCA
[3273]- AO/OCA :
[3274]- OCA Records (ACTION ITEM: A/97-05697)
[3275]- JPMeehan Chrono
[3277]PREP RPRPRP RRP PHP PEPE
[3282]13-00000
[3284]Mr. Chairman, I am here today at your request to provide
[3285]my views on Senate Joint Resolution 282, "The Assassination
[3286]Materials Disclosure Act of 1992," and to describe the nature of
[3288]documents held by the CIA that relate to the assassination of John
[3290]F, Kennedy. I very much appreciate the opportunity to speak on
[3291]this important matter.
[3293]Let me begin by stating that I am in complete agreement
[3294]with the purpose underlying the joint resolution--that efforts
[3295]should be made to declassify and make available to the public as
[3296]quickly as possible government documents relating to the
[3297]assassination of John F. Kennedy. We hope that opening up and
[3298]giving journalists, historians and, most importantly, the public
[3300]_ access to governmental files will help to resolve questions that
[3302]still linger over 28 years after the assassination. Further, I believe
[3303]that maximum disclosure will discredit the theory that CIA had
[3304]anything to do with the murder of John F. Kennedy.
[3306]Even before introduction of this joint resolution, I
[3307]recognized the need for greater public access to CIA documents
[3308]of historical importance. Two months ago, I announced the
[3309]establishment of a new unit within CIA that will be responsible
[3310]for declassifying as many historical documents as possible
[3311]consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and
[3313]13-00000
[3315]methods, This new unit, the Historical Review Group, in the
[3317]Agency's Center for the Study of Intelligence, will review for
[3318]declassification documents 30 years old or older, and national
[3319]intelligence estimates on the former Soviet Union that are
[3321]10 years old or older. In addition to the systematic review of
[3323]30-year-old documents, I have directed the History Staff in the
[3325]Center for the Study of Intelligence to assemble CIA records
[3326]focusing on.particular events of historical importance, including
[3327]the assassination of President Kennedy. The Historical Review
[3328]Group will then examine the documents for the purpose of
[3329]declassifying the records. |
[3331]Because of high interest in the JFK papers, I am not waiting
[3332]for legislation or other agencies to start declassifying documents
[3333]belonging to CIA. The Historical Review Group, at my direction,
[3334]already has begun its review of the documents related to the
[3335]assassination of President Kennedy, and I am glad to report that
[3337]the first group of these records, including all CIA documents on
[3339]Lee Harvey Oswald prior to the assassination, has’been
[3340]declassified with quite minimal deletions and is being transferred
[3341]to the National Archives for release to the public. This is, I
[3342]acknowledge, a small fraction of what we have, but it is an eamest -
[3343]of my commitment to begin review for declassification
[3344]immediately of this material. And, indeed, as I speak, the
[3345]reviewers are going through a substantial number of documents,
[3346]and I anticipate that many of these will be released shortly.
[3348]13-00000
[3350]AS we Carry out our program to declassify Kennedy
[3351]assassination documents, our goal will be to release as many
[3352]documents as possible. In fact, I recently approved new CIA
[3353]declassification guidelines for our Historical Review Program
[3354]which specifically direct a presumption in favor of
[3355]declassification. I believe we can be very forward leaning in
[3356]making these documents available to the public, and I have
[3358]instructed the Historical Review Group to take this attitude to ne hie ad fe
[3359]heart. | fe dy
[3360]. fordelt Bet
[3362]To understand the magnitude of the effort involved in
[3363]reviewing these documents for declassification, it is important to
[3364]place them in some context. The CIA's collection of documents
[3365]related to the assassination of President Kennedy consists of
[3366]approximately 250,000-300,000 pages of material. This includes
[3367]64 boxes of copies and originals of information provided to the
[3368]Warren Commission and the House Select Committee on
[3369]Assassinations and 17 boxes of material on Lee Harvey Oswald
[3370]accumulated after President Kennedy's assassination.
[3371]Unfortunately, and for reasons I do not know, what we are dealing
[3372]with is a mass of material that is not indexed, is uncatalogued, and
[3373]is highly disorganized--all of which makes the review process
[3374]more difficult. The material contains everything from the most
[3375]sensitive intelligence sources to the most mundane news:
[3376]clippings. |
[3378]13-00000
[3380]These records include documents that CIA had in its files
[3381]before the assassination, a large number of records that CIA
[3382]received later as routine disseminations from other agencies, as
[3383]well as the reports, correspondence, and other papers that CIA
[3384]prepared in the course of the assassination investigations. I
[3385]should emphasize that these records were assembled into the
[3386]present collection as a result of specific inquiries received from
[3387]the Warren Commission or the House Select Committee on
[3388]Assassinations. I have prepared a chart that illustrates this point.
[3390]As you can see, prior to President Kennedy's assassination
[3391]CIA held only a small file on Lee Harvey Oswald that consisted
[3392]of 33 documents (approximately 110 pages), some of which
[3393]originated with the FBI, State Department, the Navy, and
[3394]newspaper clippings. Only 11 documents originated with the
[3395]CIA. Ihave brought along a copy of Oswald's file as it existed
[3396]before the assassination so that you can see first-hand how slender
[3397]it was at the time. As I have already noted, we have declassified
[3398]the CIA documents in this file with quite minimal ‘deletions, and
[3399]we are providing them to the National Archives. The records in
[3400]this file dealt with Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union in 1959
[3401]and his activities after his return in 1961. By contrast, it was only
[3402]after the assassination that CIA accumulated the rest of the
[3403]material on Oswald--some 33,000 pages--most of which CIA
[3404]received from other agencies after November 22, 1963.
[3406]ion
[3408]13-00000
[3410]You have asked about documents in our possession
[3411]generated by other agencies. :In fact, much of the material held by
[3412]CIA originated with other agencies or departments. For example,
[3413]in the 17 boxes of Oswald records, approximately 40% of the
[3414]documents originated with the FBI, and about 20% originated |
[3415]from the State Department or elsewhere. Our staffis still going
[3416]through the material compiled at the request of the Warren
[3417]Commission and the House Select Committee on Assassinations,
[3418]which ingles 63 boxes of paper records and one box that
[3419]contains 72’reels of microfilm. The microfilms in part overlap
[3420]material in other parts of the collection. We estimate that within
[3421]the 63 boxes of paper records, approximately 27% of the
[3422]documents originated with a variety of other U.S. government
[3423]agencies, private organizations, and foreign and American press.
[3425]Although our holdings do include many documents from
[3426]other agencies, we nonetheless have a substantial collection of
[3427]CIA documents that will require a considerable effort to review
[3428]and, as I said earlier, at my direction, this review for
[3429]declassification is now underway. A preliminary survey of these
[3430]files has provided us some indications of what they contain.
[3431]Although the records cover a wide variety of topics, they
[3432]principally focus on CIA activities concerning Cuba and Castro,
[3433]Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union, and Oswald's subsequent
[3434]activities in Mexico City and New Orleans. They also include a
[3435]large number of name traces requested by the staff of the House
[3437]13-00000
[3439]Select Committee on Assassinations, as well as material relating
[3440]to the Garrison investigation and Cuban exile activities.
[3442]The CIA cannot release a number of documents unilaterally
[3443]because of the limits in the Privacy Act (which protects the names
[3444]of American citizens against unauthorized disclosure), the
[3445]sequestration of many documents by the House Select Committee
[3446]on Assassinations, and the fact that many of the documents
[3447]belong to agencies other than the CIA. However, we have already
[3448]taken the necessary steps to lift the sequestration, coordinate with
[3449]other agencies and begin the process of declassification. If
[3450]necessary, I will ask the House for a resolution permitting CIA to
[3451]release the results of the declassification effort on the sequestered
[3452]documents,
[3454]While I expect a large amount of material can be
[3455]declassified under our program, I assume that there still will be .
[3456]information that cannot be released to the public for a variety of
[3457]reasons, including privacy concerms or the exposure of
[3458]intelligence sources and methods. Let me take a moment to give
[3459]examples of this type of material. During the investigation by the
[3460]House Select Committee on Assassinations, I understand that
[3461]security and personnel files were requested on a number of
[3462]Agency employees. These files contain fitness reports
[3463](performance evaluations), medical evaluations and credit checks
[3464]on individual CIA officers. Although irrelevant to the question of
[3465]who killed President Kennedy, these and other personal
[3467]6
[3469]13-00000
[3471]documents ultimately ended up in the sequestered collection of
[3472]documents. I do not believe that the benefit to the public of
[3473]disclosure of this information outweighs the clear privacy interest
[3474]of the individuals in keeping this information confidential.
[3475]Similar privacy concerns exist with documents containing
[3476]derogatory information on particular individuals where the
[3477]information is based on gossip or rumor. Our files also contain
[3478]names of individuals who provided us intelligence information on
[3480]_ a promise of confidentiality. We would not disclose their names
[3482]in breach of such a promise. Where we cannot disclose such
[3484]. information to the public, the Agency will make redactions and _
[3486]summarize the information in order to ensure that the maximum
[3487]amount of information is released while still protecting the
[3489]identity of an agent or the privacy of an individual,
[3491]If legislation is not passed by Congress and signed by the
[3492]President regarding the JFK papers, to enhance public confidence
[3493]and provide reassurance that CIA has not held back any
[3494]information relevant to the assassination, I will appoint a panel of
[3495]distinguished Americans from outside of government to examine
[3496]whatever documents we have redacted or kept classified. They
[3497]would then issue an unclassified public report on their findings.
[3499]The effort required to declassify the documents related to
[3500]the assassination of President Kennedy will be daunting.
[3501]However, it is an important program, and I am personally
[3502]committed to making it work. Even in this. time of diminishing
[3504]7
[3506]C2
[3508]poe
[3510]13-00000
[3512]resources within the Intelligence Community, I have directed the
[3513]allocation of 15 full-time positions to expand the History Staff
[3514]and to form the Historical Review Group that will review the JFK
[3515]documents and other documents of historical interest.
[3517]I believe these actions attest to the seriousness of our intent
[3519]to get these papers declassified and released, and to open what
[3521]remains classified to outside, non-governmental review. It is
[3522]against this background that, in response to this Committee's
[3523]request, I cite our,technical reservations about the mechanism
[3524]established by the joint resolution to achieve this same result. I
[3525]intend to address only Intelligence Community concerns; I will
[3526]defer to the Department of Justice on any additional problems
[3527]posed by the joint resolution.
[3529]First, vesting in an outside body the determination as to
[3530]whether CIA materials related to the assassination can be released
[3531]to the public is inconsistent with my statutory responsibility to
[3532]protect intelligence sources and methods.
[3534]Second, I am concerned that the joint resolution contains no |
[3535]provision requiring security clearances or secure document
[3536]handling by the Assassination Materials Review Board or its staff.
[3538]Third, I am concerned that the joint resolution does not
[3539]provide the Agency with the opportunity to object to the release
[3540]of CIA information contained in documents originated by
[3542]13-00000
[3544]Congress or the Warren Commission. Under the joint resolution,
[3545]documents originated by these entities can be released directly by
[3546]the Executive Director of the Assassination Materials Review
[3547]Board without any review by the President or other Executive
[3548]Branch agencies.
[3550]Fourth, the joint resolution provision for a 30-day period for
[3551]agencies or departments to appeal decisions by the Executive .
[3552]Director to release information may not provide sufficient time for
[3553]meaningful review of what could prove to be a large volume of
[3554]material at one time,
[3556]Fifth and finally, section 6 of the joint resolution, which
[3557]outlines the grounds for postponement of public release of a
[3558]document, makes no provision for postponing release of
[3559]documents that may contain Executive privilege or deliberative
[3560]process, attorney-client, or attorney work-product information.
[3561]While such privileges could be waived in the public interest and
[3562]are not likely to arise with respect to factual information directly
[3563]related to the JFK assassination, they would be unavailable under
[3564]the joint resolution in the rare case that they might be needed.
[3566]he
[3568]These are,technical problems that I believe can be solved in
[3569]ways that will, in fact, expedite the release of documents bearing
[3570]on the assassination of President Kennedy.
[3572]13-00000
[3574]But, again, whatever the future course of the legislation,
[3575]CIA is proceeding even now to review for declassification the
[3576]relevant documents under its control. Further, we will cooperate
[3577]with any mechanism established by the Congress and the
[3578]President to declassify all of this material.
[3580]. : Z . = we . .
[3581]cz EMEA Cepemn © fee ewclon A Ga. fake.
[3582]oo / 76 4 me. are ae f.
[3583]. 4 2 owen! oe aaah Zo tee ° aaa a a vs Via
[3585]10
[3587]13-00000
[3590]PART,
[3592]ASE
[3594]a
[3597]4
[3599]EF 8B YH PE PAW NOHYRE RHE peo ewueer ene onnenbnd)
[3601]TIONS
[3603]arose Dy 4 May 1992
[3605]TABULATION OF PAGES IN THE col ne-assassrentio FILE:
[3607]P~)
[3609]Pages Date D ription.
[3611]6 Mar 64 Note-slip on DECLASSIFIED version held in NARA
[3613]30 Jan 76 CIA transmittal sheet, with NARA's query of 15
[3614]Jan 75 on deleting #s.
[3616]6 Mar 64 DD/P transm sheet, re NARA's holding.
[3618]6 Mar 64 Helms Memo to Rankin, describing file contents.
[3619]6 Mar 64 Copy of above, with Helms note to Rankin.
[3620]31 Oct 5 tate Cable from Moscow to SecState.
[3621]" Redacted copy of same.
[3622]lL Nov 59 Press clipping
[3623]2 & 4 Nov Notes on Oswald & Papich (FBI) query
[3624]2 Nov 59 on Sv Despatch, £r Moscow to Dept
[3625]9 Nov 59 . tate Cable, Moscow to SecState
[3627]* Redacted copy of same
[3628]9 Nov 59 metas Cable, Tokyo to SecState
[3629]. Redacted copy of same
[3630]16 Nov 59 Press clipping
[3631]26 Nov 59* Press clipping
[3632]25 May 60 Cover Memo fr Dir Hoover, FBI, to Helms
[3633]12 May 60 Attachment to above :
[3634]12 May 60 FBI report, fr Dallas
[3635]25 Oct 60““Sstate (Cumming) to Helm, listing US defectors
[3636]' Redacted copy of same
[3637]3 Nov ‘60 ~~ DD/P Bissell to State (Cumming)
[3638]Redacted copy of same .
[3639]18 Nov 60-—~Cover Memo (internal) to DD/P, to accompany
[3640]; draft reply to Cumming
[3641]undated - ~Handwritten descrip of letter cited above
[3642]21 Nov 60 ~ —Cover letter, Bissell to Cumming, on US’
[3643]defectors
[3644]Declassified version of Oswald info from ff
[3645]List of US defectors attached to Bissell letter
[3646]18 Nov 60 Memo fr Horton, acting C/CIS, to Bissell
[3647]21 Nov 60 Second copy of Bissell letter and list, above
[3649]9 Dec 60 2 copies of redacted request to set up Oswald
[3650]201.
[3652]11 Jul 61 Fon Sv Despatch, Moscow to Dept ;
[3654]26 May 61 copies of Fon Sv Despatch, Moscow to Dept
[3656]13 Apr 61 eptState Instruction on Oswald citizenship.
[3658]and passport (signed Rusk)
[3660]26 Jan 61l~—>State MemCon re Oswald
[3662]" Redacted copy of same
[3664]13 Jul 61 Cover letter to Helms fr Hoover, plus several
[3665]FBI reports, much of which is illegible
[3667]28 Sep 61 Short bio of Marina (redacted), for inclusion
[3668]in Oswald 201
[3670]13 Oct 61—-Fon Sv Despatch, Moscow to Dept, covering
[3671]copies of four Oswald letters to Embassy Moscow
[3673]7 Dec 61 Form fr INS to DD/P, asking for any derog info
[3674]on Oswald
[3676]SECRET.
[3678]13-00000
[3680]“Ses
[3682]1 3 Mar 62 Note saying Navy message of this date is
[3683]missing from CD 692 sent from Archives
[3685]5 26 Apr 62 Collection of Navy Memo to Hoover/FBI plus
[3686]Navy, USMC, and press items
[3688]9 7 Sep 62 Hoover to Helms, plus report fr SAC/Dallas
[3690]2 ” Redacted pages from above
[3692]7 10 Sep 63 FBI field report on Oswald from Dallas
[3694]3 24 Sep 63 FBI field report on Oswald from New Orleans.
[3696]3 10 Sep 63 FBI field report on Oswald from Dallas
[3698](apparently different from above)
[3699]2 8 Nov 63 Hoover to Helms, with page from New Orleans
[3700]; report
[3701]20 7 Nov 63 Hoover to Helms, with a lot of bio data on
[3703]Oswald, plus Fair-Play-for—-Cuba stuff
[3704]20 25 Oct 63 FBI to INS, New Orleans, with much of material
[3706]above -
[3707]5 14 31 Jan 64 Report, not really contemprary with this file,
[3708]agart® entitled: “Information Developed by CIA on
[3709], the Activity of ...Oswald in Mexico City..,"
[3710]Aon 28 Sep--3 Oct 63
[3711]Le 14 " Redacted copy of same
[3713]13-00000
[3714]ag
[3716]_ Theoharis -~ Appendix A
[3718]CIA HAS NO OBNECTION
[3719]DECLASSIFICATION ANDIOR _ Va : olan
[3720]RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT “Mr. DeLodth —_
[3721]Mr. Mohr
[3722]oo Mr. Wick =
[3723]~ ; _Me. Casper —___
[3724]; . : Mr. Callahan
[3725]June 14, .1966 Mr. Conrad
[3726]. ija Mr. Felt
[3727]ii a
[3728](4 Mr. Rosen
[3729]Mr. Sullivan ——
[3730]MR, TOLSON: Mr. Tavel
[3731]a . Mr. Trotter
[3732]Air a Y Tele. Room f
[3733]: Justice Fortas returned my call of midday, Miss Holmes ——4_
[3734]6/13/66, late last night. I told him that I wanted to see him Miss Gandy
[3735]about a matter which he might consider bordered on a violation ES ots
[3736]of judicial ethics. He was told that I had been able to discuss ae
[3737]AN) tters in confidence with him on several other occasions, i.e.,
[3738]thy Jenkins case, boyfriend, and other items which
[3740]Mr‘ Hoover had me handle with him, and that I therefore felt that he
[3741]wouldn't mind if this matter was brought to his attention.
[3743]Ns 6 00 Se 3 fe
[3744]Fs The Black case was then brought up and he was told that
[3745]although he had disqualified himself, he might not desire to discuss this
[3746]matter, Justice Fortas replied that he would be glad to not only discuss .
[3747]this matter but any other matter with me on a confidential basis at any time.
[3748]He then asked me to have breakfast with him at 7:45 a.m. this morning.
[3750]Upon seeing the Justice in his home for breakfast, we
[3752]preliminarily engaged in small talk and eventually got down to the meat
[3754]of the problem, I gave him a complete rundgwn on the exchange of corres-
[3755]pondence that the Director had had with Katzenbach. He,was told specifically
[3756].of Katzenbach's evasive tactics in attempting to defend Bobby Kerthedy.
[3758]I then mentioned the Black case and told him that while the Director planned
[3759]to furnish the Attorney General specific, honest, hardhitting answers to the
[3760]Supreme Court's questions, we nevertheless knew that Katzenbach would
[3761]throw our answers out the window and present his own slanted version to
[3763]the Supreme Court. Justice Fortas agreed. :
[3765]Justice Fortas stated that the entire matter boiled down to a.
[3766]continuing fight for the Presidency. He stated that Kennedy was of course
[3767]out to capture that segment of voters which in the past had belonged to .
[3768]Vice President Humphrey. He mentioned that Kennedy, to a certain extent,
[3769]had succeeded in capturing this left-wing group. He added that of course if
[3770]facts, as possessed by the FBI, concerning Kennedy's approval of wiretapping
[3771]were made known to the general public that it would serve to completely.
[3772]destroy Kennedy. .
[3780](2) 4" CONTINUED..... OVER
[3782]13-00000
[3784]Memorandum to Mr. Tolson
[3786]Justice Fortas spoke of the Black case. He stated that after
[3787]Solicitor General Thurgood MarShall had ineptly and inadequately presented
[3789].the matter of electronic devices to the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court
[3791]|
[3793]had held a confidential meeting among themselves. Although Justice Fortas
[3794]and Justice White disqualified themselves, they still attended the meeting.
[3795]At the meeting it was decided among the Justices that rather than remand
[3796]the Black case to a lower court, the Supreme Court would set itself up as a
[3797]tribunal to gather further information concerning the usage of electronic
[3798]devices and afterwards make a decision. The Justices, with the exception
[3799]of Byron White, felt that if the case was immediately remanded to a lower
[3800]court Attorney General Katzenbach would, in order to win the case, pick his
[3801]own Judge and thereby attain victory. Justice Fortas stated that some of
[3802]the Justices in the Supreme Court were somewhat belligerent in their attitude
[3803]towards Kennedy and Katzenbach. He stated these men would not be "pushed
[3805]around" regardless of the politics involved.
[3807]Justice Fortas stated that the problem at hand was to determine
[3808]how the FBI's irrefutable evidence exposing Kennedy and the Department in
[3809]‘their clear-cut authorization for usage of microphones could be gotten to the
[3810]Supreme Court and to the people. I showed him at this point several memo-
[3811]jranda taken from the file, including the New York telephone memorandum
[3812]which Kennedy had signed. He stated that there was no doubt in his mind
[3814]-|but what the FBI acted in a complete, above-board and honest manner at the
[3816]_| Specific urging of Kennedy and the Department. He then stated that he fully
[3818]recognized that Katzenbach would only slant any reply the FBI. I gave him in
[3819]answer to the * questions posed by the Supreme Court.
[3821]After some deliberation, Justice Fortas stated that he thought
[3822]{the best thing to'do would be for him to slip in the back door and see the
[3823]President. He stated he would tell the President all of the above facts. As
[3824]an aside, Justice Fortas asked me if the President had been aware of the
[3825]exchange of correspondence pertaining to the Director and the Attorney
[3827]|General, I replied that the Director in all fairness and in order to protect
[3829]|
[3831]the FBI, had definitely advised Watson and the President. The Justice
[3832]replied that this was good, however, he felt that the President would want
[3833]to know his opinion as a result of seeing it from the Supreme Court.
[3835]He then stated that his plan of action would serve to protect
[3836]the President and the FBI and could spell "back seat" for Katzenbach and
[3837]Kennedy. He mentioned that he would recommend to the President that the
[3838]President should immediately call Katzenbach in his office and tell him that
[3840]CONTINUED..... OVER
[3842]13-00000
[3844]Memorandum to Mr. Tolson
[3846]he was very greatly concerned about this entire matter and that, in order
[3847]for honesty and justice to prevail, an arbitrator should be set up who would
[3848]listen to all of the evidence and then furnish a complete report to the
[3849]Supreme Court. Justice Fortas added that naturally the arbitrator would
[3851]be someone whom the President could trust to furnish the absolute true facts.
[3853]He stated the next problem would be to find this particular
[3854]man. He said he had in mind somebody like’Ken Royall, former Secretary
[3855]of the Army. He asked me what I thought of him. I told him I naturally
[3856]had heard Mr. Royal's name, however, Mr. Hoover would have far better
[3857]judgment on this matter than I would. He next stated that perhaps someone
[3858]like Ross Malone? ‘former President of the American Bar Association, would
[3859]be good in this regard. I told him that we had enjoyed very favorable
[3860]relations with Mr. Malone. Justice Fortas then mentioned that there was
[3861]an immediate past President of the American Bar Association, from the State
[3862]of Virginia. I told him he probably was thinking of Lewis Powell. He stated
[3863]this was correct. He asked me what I thought of Powell. I told him that
[3864]Mr. Powell had generally concurred with Mr. Hoover's beliefs concerning
[3865]crime, however, on occasions he had been somewhat naive and a little weak.
[3866]Justice Fortas stated that he thought Royal or Malone would be the best man.
[3868]Justice Fortas told me that he would take the above action
[3869]immediately. He stated he was going to Jacksonville, Florida, today; however,
[3870]he would try to talk to the President prior to his departure---if not, he would
[3871]discuss this matter with the President Thursday morning, 6/16/66. I told
[3872]him that time was growing short inasmuch as the Supreme Court wanted an
[3873]answer almost immediately. He stated this was true and that, as a matter
[3874]of fact, once the arbitrator was appointed all of his facts would have to be
[3875]gathered and furnished to the Supreme Court within two. weeks. He stated
[3877]dhe thought this could be done. . °
[3879]Justice Fortas told me that he wanted to mention another
[3881]j? subject. He stated that he had already taken steps to disqualify himself in
[3883]|| the Hoffa case. He mentioned that the Black, Baker and Hoffa cases would
[3884]be continuing cases which would go on for many years. He asked me if I
[3885]‘knew of any irregularities on the part of Bobby Kennedy in connection with
[3886]the Hoffa case. { replied in the affirmative, stating that Kennedy on one _
[3887]occasion had specifically asked an FBI representative to place a microphone
[3888]on an attorney by the name of Haggerty. I stated this action had been taken
[3889]despite the fact that the FBI had not wanted to do this. Justice Fortas replied
[3890]that he had felt that such might be the case and that under the circumstances
[3892]CONTINUED..... OVER
[3894]13-00000
[3896]Memorandum to Mr. Tolson
[3898]he would sit with the rest of the Supreme Court on the Hoffa case and would
[3899]make certain that Kennedy was exposed. He stated that he felt that the
[3900]Supreme Court would definitely confirm the decision of the lower court in the
[3901]Hoffa case. He mentioned that this opinion had been expressed to him by the
[3902]other Justices.
[3904]employee by the name of Courtney Evdns. I told him that I did know Evans.
[3905]He asked if I knew of Evans' association with Kennedy. I told him that we
[3906]were well aware of this relationship. I then briefed Justice Fortas completely
[3907]concerning Evans. I told him of the statements made by Edward Bennett
[3908]Williams with respect to the fact that Kennedy planned to use Evans as his
[3909]“ace in the hole."' I told Justice Fortas that Mr. Hoover had instructed me
[3910]| to call Evans in and to show him approximately eight memoranda which had
[3911]previously been prepared by Evans. Justice Fortas was advised that Evans
[3912]! ! had been told that he had not only prepared but approved such memoranda and
[3913]4 that we demanded to know if the facts as he had given them at the time of
[3914]| preparation were as true now as they were then. I told Justice Fortas that
[3915]| Evans had affirmed the truthfulness of these facts and had sadly indicated,
[3916]"Facts are facts and can't be changed." I also told Justice Fortas that we
[3917]had specifically asked Evans if Bobby Kennedy had been furnished information
[3918]|from microphone coverage in the Black case. The Justice was advised that
[3919]Evans had admitted that he had frequently briefed Kennedy in this regard.
[3920]The Justice was told that we next inquired of Evans whether or not Kennedy
[3921]knew that such information came from microphone coverage and that Evans
[3922]jhad replied that there was one specific occasion in which Kennedy specifically
[3923]: ‘could have inferred that the information could only have come from microphone
[3924]coverage,
[3926]| Justice Fortas next, inquired if I had known a former Bureau
[3928]Justice Fortas asked if the President knew of Evans’ background.
[3929]| I told him that apparently the President did not know this. It was further
[3930]mentioned that Evans was currently employed by Katzenbach, obviously at
[3931]the urging of Kennedy. Justice Fortas replied that this was-the worst news he
[3932]had received since Bobby Kennedy's urging that the Viet Cong be allowed to
[3933]sit down at the conference table. He stated that the President should definitely
[3934]‘be told of this fact. He then mentioned that several members of the Supreme
[3935]Court are well aware of the background of Evans as well as the background of
[3936]such characters as Sheridan, Bellino, and other henchmen of Kennedy's.
[3938]CONTINUED..... OVER
[3940]13-00000
[3942]Memorandum to Mr. Tolson
[3944]. At this point, I told Justice Fortas of the memoranda in which
[3945]the Director in 1963, at the specific request of the President, had furnished
[3946]the President concerning Bellino, et al., and that the President had the
[3947]following day dismissed these individuals from employment at the White
[3949]+ House. I mentioned that Kenny O'Donnel! had immediately advised Bobby
[3950]Kennedy, and Bobby Kennedy had had Ed Guthman issue a direct threat to
[3951]us in connection with this matter. Justice Fortas stated this was typical
[3952]of Kennedy.
[3954]Justice Fortas next made reference to the decision handed
[3955]dawn by the Supreme Court yesterday in connection with confessions. He
[3956]stated that he sincerely hoped that the Director and the personnel of the FBI
[3958]J would pay close attention to the conclusion of the statement by Chief Justice
[3959]Warren wherein the Chief Justice clearly implied that the FBI was a model
[3960]agency for all law enforcement to follow. Justice Fortas told me that he
[3961]wanted the Director to know that following Thurgood Marshall's inept and
[3962]stupid presentation to the Supreme Court regarding the general matter of
[3963]confessions, he, Justice Fortas, had been instrumental in instructing
[3964]Thurgood Marshall to specifically return to the Department and ascertain
[3965]exactly how the FBI handled the matters of questioning of subjects, arraign-
[3966]ment of subjects, confessions, etc. He stated that Marshall therefore, as a
[3967]result of such action, had found it necessary to submit such procedures to
[3968]the Supreme Court. He stated on this basis, Chief Justice Warren had no
[3969]alternative but to pat the FBI on the back.
[3971]‘Justice Fortas inquired as to the Director's opinion concerning
[3972]Ramsey Clark. I told him that the Director of course had enjoyed a very
[3973]favorable friendly relationship with Justice Tom Clark for many years and
[3974]that the Director had also enjoyed a fairly favorable relationship with Ramsey
[3975]Clark, however, not anywhere near as close as the friendship with his father.
[3976]I told ‘the Justice that the Director had received information pointing oui that
[3977]despite the fact Ramsey Clark was known as a "Johnson man," he nevertheless
[3978]could see no wrong in Bobby Kennedy. Justice Fortas stated that he felt
[3979]Ramsey was a good man but young, naive and one that constantly looked down
[3980]into the deep waters and could see no wrong in anyone. He stated that Ramsey
[3981]Clark was a "dreamer." Justice Fortas then inquired as to whether or not
[3982]there are any loyal Johnson supporters in the Department. I stated that the.
[3983]Director had mentioned on a number of occasions that perhaps the only one
[3984]who could be declared a loyal supporter of the President's was Ed Weisl, Jr.
[3985]The Justice expressed no surprise. He stated he thought this to be the case.
[3987]CONTINUED..... OVER
[3989]15. V ‘ .
[3991]13-00000
[3993]Memorandum to Mr. Tolson
[3995]At the conclusion of our discussion, the Justice reiterated
[3996]once again the action he planned to take with the establishment of an “arbitrator.
[3997]He stated that I should keep in touch with him on a confidential basis regarding
[3998]this matter.. He also stated that I should not hesitate in the future to get in .
[3999]touch with him concerning any problems in which the FBI's interest should be
[4000]protected. He reminded me that the President had great faith in the Director
[4001]and the FBI and that in many instances we undoubtedly found ourselves in a
[4002]position where we could not protect ourselves. He also stated that while the
[4003]President had issued specific statements concerning wiretapping and usage of
[4004]electronic devices, he nevertheless realized that the FBI had to have the
[4005]advantage of such devices in order to adequately handle its responsibilities
[4006]both in the security and criminal fields. He stated the President's only concern
[4007]had been his opinion that there were too many electronic devices in the political
[4008]field. He stated we of course were not guilty of such practices. He stated he
[4009]recognized this and he also recognized that the entire hysteria concerning the
[4010]usage of microphones and electronic devices had been brought about as a result
[4011]of Bobby Kennedy's brash practices. He stated he deeply resented the fact
[4012]that Bobby Kennedy had thrown his former partner, Sheldon Cohen (Director, ,
[4014]Internal Revenue) to the wolves in connection with these matters. ,
[4020]an
[4021]ACTION: (1) Pursuant to the Director's instructions Twill advise Marvi <
[4023]Watson today of the background and current employment of
[4024]Courtney Evans.
[4026](2) If the Director agrees, I will advise Justice Fortas that
[4027]the Director is of the opinion that Ross Malone would probably be the best.
[4029]_man to serve as an "arbitrator."
[4031]WM, . > ) RESPECTFULLY,
[4032]- _ ) | ( ° BURZ —< -
[4034]A. Jj - Fo <8 “yy D. DE LOACH
[4035]. / . | YF : ‘ Ne !
[4036]6 pod mo ee os
[4038]IY Ch foover )
[4040]13-00000
[4042]2
[4044]pec oF THIS ;
[4045]4-760 (Rev. 12-14-88) REI . X0Q0GKX
[4047]Lo y) . XOUAKK
[4049]7 ~ P.0.0.9.0.0.4
[4051]FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
[4052]FOIPA DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
[4056]28 Page(s) withheld entirely at this location in the file. One or more of the following
[4057]~~~ statements, where indicated, explain this deletion.
[4059](1 Deletions were made pursuant to the exemptions indicated below with no segregable material
[4060]available for release to you. .
[4062]Section 552 Section 552a
[4064]C7 (b)(1) O) (bX7)(A) 0) (4X5)
[4066]D (x2) DO (x78) DO Gx2)
[4068]D (x3) DO wx) D wa)
[4069]O wr) Dae)
[4070]O xe) D «3
[4071]DO wr) aya)
[4073]BKOOS O xe) D1 Kxs)
[4075]D (x5) =) Owe)
[4077]DO (xs) ery
[4079](1 Information pertained only to a third party with no reference to you or the subject of your
[4080]request.
[4082]0 Information pertained only to a third party. Your name is listed in the title only.
[4084]CyDocuments originated with another Government agency(ies). These documents were referred
[4085]to that agency(ies) for review and direct response to you. -
[4087]Pages contain information furnished by ‘another Government “agency(ies). You will be
[4088]advised by the FBI as to the releasability of this information following our consultation
[4089]with the other agency(ies).
[4091]Page(s) withheld for the following reason(s):
[4093](© For your information:
[4095]yy The following number is to be used for reference regarding these pages:
[4099]SCHGOOOCIOOCOCOOOOKICK
[4100]. X DELETED PAGE(S) X
[4102]XOOOKX . X NO DUPLICATION FEE X
[4103]XXXXXX X FOR THIS PAGE x
[4104]XXXXXXKXAXKXKKXHKKXKKKN
[4106]FBI/DOJ
[4108]13-00000
[4111]o
[4113]QO Wal \ 19990 4S)
[4115]SECURITY Inp-~May La siteee
[4116]ee eee 7 oO :
[4117]_ Theoharis -- Appendix C ; '
[4119]Hareh 16, 1953
[4121]L
[4123]P-RSOWAL AND CCYPIDENTIAL
[4125]NEMORARSIUM 7CR THE ATTORNEY ONN RAL
[4127]ECLASSTY1= SRSc)
[4129]one nT ie 53 OT,
[4131]In connection with a possible unauthorized
[4133]leak of official Government information, it is believed
[4134]destrable to Institute a technical surveillance of
[4136]Jenry Williamtjrunewald, a prominent figure in Washington,
[4138]I therefore recomeend that you grant authority
[4139]to place a technical surveillance on the residence of
[4141]Orunewald, Apartaent 6258, The weatchester, 000 -
[4142]carhedre 2 Avemo, N. w., #saahbington, 3. C., telephone:
[4143]#00
[4145]037008 or any other residence or office space
[4146]which he might occupy in the future.
[4148]Respectfully, | {
[4149]. a
[4150]John edgar Soover |
[4152]a
[4153]RECORDED +9) Gu ~ ge WF
[4155]f
[4158]Sd
[4161]P?
[4163]/ ia J The Attorney General on "February 13, 1953, requested that
[4164]*. iw we cover the activities of Grunewald and daned that aS wa
[4165]technical surveillance be instituted “on his residence.= ~
[4167]This memorandun is being | submitted in wee with the
[4168]— Attorney General's suggest on.t “ope (ee/a rh) |
[4170]. _ sECvaITY rie Ve
[4172]oa os
[4174]ee ‘gi.
[4177]13-00000
[4180]Office Memordndum ¢ UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
[4181]TO 8 Mr, Tolson V/A | parz: April 28, 1953
[4182]. oe - ” fo Tole
[4183]mu L. B. Nichols als, Eerorautton COSTA TED ° Pat
[4184]: HERELY I trr1zp en
[4185]DAT BY Gosia
[4187]TESTIMONY OF HENRY GRUNEWALD tor
[4188]KEAN COMMITTEE ole
[4189]Tole. Re
[4190]Sian
[4191]Mies Geo
[4193]I saw John E. Tobin, the General Counsel of the Kean
[4194]Committee, on Monday evening, April 27th. Tobin pointed out that
[4195]on the first day Grunewald testified in Executive session
[4197]8 was probably
[4199]e point which Tobin
[4200]stated caused him the most concern because there was such a reference in
[4202]the report of Special Agen’ dated at New York on July 20, 67.
[4203]1951, in the investigation on ; ;
[4205]Tobin ry tlined this was
[4207]pg ee .
[4208]4. Tobin stated.that Grunewald had the habit of passing
[4209]out ties at Christmas and that as late as 195) Grunewald had sent ties to:
[4210]the Director, Clyde Tolson and Guy Hotel. I told Tobin if he was inferring
[4211]that because Grunewald sent ties to these three individuals they might have
[4212]urnished him the information, that he ought to be pretty cautious because (/f,
[4213]knew pretty well what the feeling was. I told him in the first place :
[4214]the Director had not seen Grunewald to my certain knowledge for a long
[4215]period of time; the Director was not intimate with Grunewald; the Director
[4216]has not appreciated the manner in which Gwnewald has thrown the Director's
[4218]cc: Mr, Ladd RECORNEN - oY bo-G1bst J47 :
[4219]Mr. Rosen INNEYEN . 583 a a ‘¢ .
[4222]13-00000
[4224]“mame around arid I had my serious doubts whether the Director had ever
[4225]seen the ties and I was certain the Director never reviewed the file on
[4226]With reference to Mr. Tolson, I told Tobin that Mr. Tolson
[4227]was one of the most conscientious individuals in Washington and that
[4228]certainly Mr. Tolson would not engage in any such activity. Thirdly,
[4229]aie all he had to do was look at the record so far as Hottel was concerned;
[4230]at that a few years ago, Hottel was primarily responsible for leading to
[4232]. Grunewald's downfall when he was hiding out from the Senate District
[4233]Committee.
[4235]poo Tobin was making quite a point about how Grunewald
[4236]« *. could have gotten the information. I told Tobin categorically I had
[4237]reviewed the files on the five individuals he had mentioned and that I
[4238]was absolutely certain Grunewald did not get any information from. the
[4239]IBureau. I further told him that with reference to the information on
[4240]Grunewald was a fairly good i jgator and it would have been
[4242]. -
[4243]Ve
[4244]a
[4248]ATe
[4250]pu
[4251]record; that one of the first things an investigator would do in the investi-
[4253]t gation of ,4 lawyer would be to check on his admission to the Bar and
[4254]aa e Committee; that anybody could have. gotten this.
[4255]“h ether he had any information to the effect that
[4256]& ‘assisted Grunewald in the investigation. He stated
[4258]I told hit undoubtedly
[4260]i s in the Department for many
[4262]Nc | years ; in the Department. I asked whether
[4263]‘ pbe had any information indicating vas close to McInerney.
[4265]— a
[4267]13-00000
[4269], The matter boiled down to the fact he was primarily
[4270]I concerned about fi I told him the investigative reports on
[4271]ent to the Attorney General and Vanech on November 9, 1951;
[4272]Congressman King on August 9, 1951; photostatic copies were given to
[4273]G-2 on December 26, 1951, and that the Attorney General requested a
[4274]summary of our files on February 28th; that a summary memo was
[4276]furnish AG under date of February 29th
[4277]and He then inquired as to why G-2 would wa ormation.
[4278][x told him I could not answer this, but would endeavor to ascertain the
[4280]answer.
[4282]I asked him if he had any indication as to when Grunewald
[4283]made his investigation, He stated it was shortly after the time when the
[4284]committee first started checking on Grunewald, which would be in
[4285]November or ‘December, 1951,
[4287]I further told Tobin a reputable news source had inquired
[4289]regarding (J ana stating he had heard there were a
[4290]‘couple of Communists: on the staff and that the evidence was: supposed to
[4291]be on the Director's desk. I told him obviously that was not the case
[4292]and it would”appear that the newspaper source was merely calling us to
[4293]let us know what was being circulated around town, but obviously we
[4295]| furnish¢d.’ information; that there was some indication from the source
[4296]that had been helping Grunewald and SR =: be in contact
[4297]with icInerney. ; ;
[4302].I told him he was at liberty to.
[4304]do so.
[4306]I told him I would check for the reason why G-2 wanted
[4307]the information and let him know, which is being done. .
[4311]13-00000
[4313]- ff In my conversation with Tobin, he advised that there was
[4314]+ tnforagtion over in the Senate stmilar to that furnished by Grunewald.
[4315]= << a8ked hin- where in the Senate d tt cane out of Senator .
[4316]i: MoCarran's Office. Inasnuch a toid that a member 0
[4318]o. the Ki tttee had told the Senator about
[4320]"9 A think tt might be well the next tine I see
[4321]4, | to entially tnquire aa to whether she recalled what member of
[4322]é the Comatttee furnished then this tnformatton.
[4324]I, of course, see no potnt in talking to
[4325]any further about this matter,
[4327]a
[4332]13-00000
[4336]cc Hr. Ladd
[4338]—. fir. Rosen
[4339]oe : ir, “Malley.
[4340]a b ir. Pennington
[4341]; wo . oo . . |
[4342]we The attorney General t 20 2 LG n, May 13,,1953
[4343]se ae, 6s--
[4344]abate? & S* PSGRSOMAL AND COMP AL
[4345]" Director, FBI Con. vn TAS 7 r 7 ERREOUAL AED COMERS
[4346]oe? . _ JUNE . Fe .
[4348]RENRY WILLIAM GRUN:AALD
[4350]INFORMATION CONCHREING ssrrzep BY |
[4351]| mays py Sie )
[4352]at
[4354]The following information concerning Henry Willian */, H
[4355]Grunewald was obtained by a confidential source of known iad
[4356]reliability on May 11, 1953.
[4359]13-00000
[4363]1 The attorney General
[4365]to,
[4367].
[4369]; Complete details cenzterning the fnlernatioa developed
[4370]in connection with tne request or Reputy Atteraey General _Ragers
[4371]wlll, of course, be Puraished to hin gpon- ihe ‘complet Lon ut the
[4372]lavestigutlon of thess matters. ;
[4374]HOTS:
[4376]Tnis is a condensed version of infornmuticn received from
[4377]the Washington Field Office which has been set forth in as readable
[4378]form as possible for the information of the Attorney General.
[4380]It is to be noted an attempt nas deen made to furnish tne attorney
[4381]Gensral with only pertinent information which appears would be of
[4383]interest to aim. a
[4385]13-00000
[4387]__ Theoharis -- Apendix B _.
[4389]; (5) ‘Buresn file 67-322 alec reflecte that, in april 1929 929, the Dureau
[4390]eonducted an investigation entitled, “Willian H. Vander Poel, Henry H. Grunewald,
[4391]Application for Commission in officer's zeserve Corps.* It le note noted that
[4392]Vander Poel had served as an agent of the Boreat of Investigation during ie: werld
[4393]War I. At the tine of the investigation, both were sesking to ebtain a ocm-
[4394]mission in the United States army. The Bureau's Lavestigation reflested that |
[4395]Grunewald was not trastvorthy, pessessed a bad reputation and had been indisted
[4397]. for wiolation of the National prohibitien ict, although he wus act convicted
[4399]of this offense. This information wes furnished to the Military Inteliigmes .
[4400]Bervice ty semorunda te the Departaent dated xay 6, 1929» ant Bepteaber 29, 2979.
[4402]nee me ae ——— TT,
[4405]j
[4407]te
[4412]WD
[4416]V
[4418]T. yearly, Seeretary to the President, the Bureau conducted an investigation in:
[4419]June and July, 1%40, entitled, “Harry H. Stake Henry william Grunewald,
[4420]also know as Henry Gruenwald, Frederish Wilkela be oad Booed Oevatweldy,
[4421]Misconduct in offies, Espionage." Mr. Early's wes baped on allegations
[4422]ar. cer.
[4423]effect that G dus genator Gerald P.
[4424]Kye and tha bad told that
[4425]Grunewald, on tro ecca yi secretary a ¢ ‘in the oun of
[4426]$4000 for Senator Hye. It was alleged that Grimewald had intimated this money
[4427]cane from Secretary of War, Harry H. Woodring and that the money was paid in
[4428]eonnaction with war Departaent megotiatioms. ‘On dune 25, 1940, the Bure
[4429]received a mmorandua from the Military Intelligence Servise reflecting that
[4430]wr. Saith ¥. Brookhart mat inrorned that Serviees that he had learned through |
[4431]alleged employee of the ‘Prensh-English
[4432]Service is 1917-1918 that the sven of Baxi esplomage in Washingten, 8. C., was
[4433]Froderieh Kilbele Crusemld, also knom as Neary Willies
[4434].Spartaente, ashingten, B.C. It is aoted that Bepomelé te
[4436]residing in the Westchester apartments and during 1937 and 2 Pa he
[4437]Grunewald shared offices with Nebonsld and former senater arthur BR. Redinsoa,
[4438]din the Munsey Dulléing, Washingtoa, D. ¢. (1) ce .
[4439](1) 65-6165-3
[4441]89.2965 227
[4443]13-00000
[4445]Memorandum to Mr. Tolson
[4447]At the conclusion of our discussion, the Justice reiterated
[4449]’ once again the action he planned to take with the establishment of an "arbitrator."
[4450]He stated that I should keep in touch with him on a confidential basis regarding
[4451]this matter. He also stated that I should not hesitate in the future to
[4452]touch him concerning any problems in which the FBI's interes
[4454]‘protected,. He reminded me that the President had great faith
[4455]and the FBI and that in many instances we undoubtedly found
[4457]position wheré.we could not protect ourselves. He also statéd that while the
[4459]President had issued specific statements concerning étapping and usage of
[4461]electronic devices, he nevertheless realized that BI had to have the
[4463]advantage of such devices in order to adequately Handle its responsibilities
[4465]both in the security and criminal fields. He st4ted the President's only concern
[4467]had been his opinion that.there were too electronic devices in the political _
[4468]field. He stated we of course were Bin of such practices. He stated he
[4470]recognized this and he also recognized that the entire hysteria concerning the
[4471]usage of microphones and electronic, evices had been brought about as a result
[4472]of Bobby Kennedy's brash practices. He’ stated he deeply resented the fact
[4473]that Bobby Kennedy had thrown ‘former partner, Sheldon Cohen (Director, ,
[4475]Internal Revenue) to the wolves“in cognection with these matters. — va
[4476]. . Sf fi} u\ *
[4477]ACTION: (1) Purs to the Director's ‘instructions IT will adviee Marvin ¢°
[4478]. Watson today of the backgreund and current employment of
[4479]Courtne Evans.
[4481](2)- tt the Director agrees, I will vise Justice Fortas that
[4482]the Director is-6f the opinion that Ross Malone would probably be the best
[4483]man to serve’as an “arbitrator.”
[4487]ml -RESPECTFU Y,
[4491]I* CHoover)
[4493]13-00000
[4495]JOHN EDGAR HOOVER > ; - . teem
[4496]WARECTON Se i. Be om
[4497]ose . ge of an nd Bs Papen .
[4499]cen aot Po. vom
[4500]SPP get oo illite Bae
[4501] : iashtepton, Be. “ites Peirpnates
[4502]: tm, Oenen
[4503]_ Mig 2, 1942 | _— — Ore Comee
[4504]. Ott. Deerten
[4506]bi 0 Sw
[4507]Wols. Gren
[4508]MEMORANDUM FOR mH DIRECTOR “Ces Bove
[4509]ate, maase ;
[4510]With further reference te Henry -usaaie bruno ’ alates
[4511]dn whor we are present J am attaching a memorandic. fates Genty
[4513]For your eporovel € there ds attached hereto a letter
[4514]for the ittorner General'!s Sicneture, to the Secraterr of the
[4515]Tre:
[4518]13-00000
[4520]_ T..c 4uvestigation in this mtter, which was closed July £A20,.
[4521]gegtasy that the original allegations were apparently based on surmise and wus pdoton
[4522]aie (= end not on any definite knowledge of: the cosplaincnts, “FYyaither the conditions
[4524]<° -allered aor any irregulsrity on the part of Grunew:ld Or former Secretary of
[4526]*. Yar Woodring were discovered, ‘There was ao evidence developed that Grunenald |
[4527]:- was engaged in any activity for the German governaent. The result of the in-
[4528]~ Nestigation in semorandua fora were Suratshed to ur. Early oo July 9%, 2940. ay
[4530]“. (7) Bureau fils 65-6165 ‘also reflects that in kay, 2941, the Military
[4531]. Intelligence Service advised the Burean that information had been received by
[4532]one of its informants that Grunenald was the pay-off man for German agents in
[4533]the United states and ws also contact man for various American peace and sub-
[4534]worsive organisations. Subsequently, the Bureau ascertained that the informant
[4535]of the Military Intelligence Service uas and it was
[4536]2 AD felt that the Kilitary Intelligence @ was merely resurrecting old in-
[4537]as tb formition in view af the fact that the ‘Bureau had previously investigated the
[4538]at i een sane allegations mde However, on a May 23, pitts a technical sur=-
[4539]5 KAnNe” veillance of Gronevaldws a rised and from June 4, 1941 through August 1,
[4540]A 2942, such survatllianse ws maintained on his epartment on the tiestohester
[4541]Apartments. “jo definite; information was developed, indicating that Crunesald
[4542]had violated any specific Pedsral statute. (2)
[4544](8) Bureau rite 65-6165 reflects ‘that on Septeaber 15,°1942, the Omaha -
[4545]office of, the Bureau received a compleint fron the Military Intelligence service
[4546]thet Henry tilliam Grunewald bad, on the previous evening, civen $110.00 in
[4547]currency to tro privates attached th Service Commnd,
[4548]while
[4550]wr AC . were drinking at a ber in
[4551]b the Fontenelle Hotel in Omaha. The two Privates were then engaged in studying -
[4552](No dntelligence work, and. becouing suspicious of Crunewald's apparent generosity ~
[4553]‘*it.; his mo d the matter to the Omaha Office. They Indicated that
[4555]approximtely
[4556]her purse in order
[4558]000 in her purse, money was 0
[4559]to furnish currency to Grunewald to pase out to the grou.
[4562]Grune.ald wat interviewed by two Agente of the Onsha office on
[4564]September 15, 1942, regarding the antter and he identified himself as being —
[4565]connected with the Alien Property Custodian's offiee in washington, D. 6., by
[4567]oY . exhibiting travel authority §5¢, signed by Janes B. Uarkham, of the Alien
[4569]. MEE | i: Property Custodians Office in Tashington, De C. Grunewald claimed to receive
[4571]ig ee TERY per year es salary fron the alien Property Custodiants Office. He adzitted
[4573]5 passing out money promiscuously in the bar and stated that-he gid not ro the .
[4575]‘e-- matter reported to his superiors in Washington although be was willing to —
[4577]ce" furnish information about the ineident Sone dent ty: ae fle "stated
[4579](1) 65-6165<8 oe a
[4580]~(2) 65-5165-225 65-6165 Subd 1, serial 1 ‘to 9 22" toe
[4582]a
[4585]13-00000
[4586]Serial i ais Out. : - 6) |
[4588]Subject_HENRY WILLIAM GRUNEWALD
[4590]This serial, the original peporandum from the FBI to the
[4591]Attorney General dated_.3/1 *_, which was
[4592]returned to the Bureau signed by the Attorney General
[4594]authorizing FBI to conduct electronic surveil
[4596]; lance, has 2 .
[4597]. .been permanently removed for retention in the 7
[4598]er memorandum
[4599]or details and where maintained. ;
[4601]i
[4603]n
[4605]Removed By__ 343 Date 1/21/74
[4607]Complete File and Serial Number 65-6165-124
[4609]Wai slole SY epeapla
[4611]f2-27-39 SpSsa pr
[4613]13-00000
[4615](carat tome SE a ee i ee ay. ce
[4616]i” jeomncn Rogue of Kean Comal ttos’ o Ser Saasy Ws tomnemd
[4618]“AY Lee te awe re ete a
[4619]Bs ; + .jEnclosed 40 0 eopy of a lettar dated April 7, 3953,
[4620]“.. . * .J@hdef Counsel of the Zouse Subcommittee on Administration of the
[4621]-  , ‘“@levenne Laws, requesting peruission to faspect the Imaigration anf... -
[4622]. a eee eee etre ile arene wate cee mel files relating to Reaxy ¥-
[4623]wee dpoaeeel pureas of Suvectigutdone tn Ties Of Sten Property and the
[4624]» “[rederel Barvan of Investigation ;
[4626]«sage Yuntgretion unt Seturalisation Service Sites ant ‘the Alten
[4627]‘Property files have been obtained and will be made available, minus any
[4628]“FAI reports, in accordance with policy. es .
[4630]Advice would be spprectated ubsther the Bureat bas a pe recone]
[4631]11s on Grunewald, and, if 50, wbsthar the Burean would have ary objection
[4632]to making it available, minus any investigative reports, for éxamination
[4633]a -{tby a Subcomlittee representatives. If ths Bureau has such a file and no °
[4634]objection to its examination, please advise ubether the Bureau would pre-
[4636]. SST uae fo eee so et
[4638]; this ice.
[4641]13-00000
[4643]OFFICIAL USE ONLY
[4645]14 May 1992
[4646]Note For: David Pearline, OCA
[4648]Subject: Suggested Qs & As for Hearing on JFK Assassination
[4649]Documents
[4651](Dave Gries suggests additional Qs and As along the following
[4652]lines)
[4654]Q. Many of the Oswald documents transferred to the National
[4655]Archives earlier this week were said to have been in the
[4656]Archives previously . Is this correct ?
[4658]Ans. Yes, but most of the documents were originated by
[4659]other agencies, and we were not aware of what those agencies
[4660]had previously released.
[4662]Q. There appears to be little information of interest in the
[4663]Oswald file that was released. Is this true ?
[4665]Ans. Yes this is essentially accurate. But the objective
[4666]in transferring the file was to demonstrate our good faith
[4667]commitment to release as many documents related to the
[4668]assassination as possible, and as expeditiously as possible
[4670]John Pereira
[4671]x (76160;
[4673]OFFICIAL USE ONLY
[4675]13-00000
[4677]’ rtt-rw’ TEXT-ASSASSINATIONS-M a ce
[4679]11:22 05-15 a SO
[4681]BC-TEXT-ASSASS INATIONS-MULTITAKES
[4682]THE REUTER TRANSCRIPT REPORT
[4684]HOUSE. GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS LEGISLATION AND NATIONAL
[4685]SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING
[4686]- Topic: H.J. Res. 454, Assassination.Materials Disclosure Act
[4687]of 1992
[4688]Witness: CIA Director Robert Gates
[4689]Location: Rayburn Building, Room 2154
[4690], Time: 10 a.m. - —
[4691]May 15, 1992
[4692]KKKKK
[4693]The editor of the report is Steve Ginsburg. Tim Ahmann, Eric
[4694]Beech, Peter Ramjug and Paul Schomer also are available to help
[4695]you. If you have questions, please call 202-898-8345. For
[4696]service problems inside the District of Columbia, call 202-898-
[4698]8355; outside D.C., call 1-800- 537- 9755.
[4699]RKKKK
[4701]KKKKK
[4702]This transcript is provided by News Transcripts, Inc. If
[4704]questions of content arise, call 682-9050
[4705]KKKKK
[4707]ROBERT GATES (director, CIA): Thank you, Mr.
[4708]Chairman.
[4710]I'm here to provide my views on House Resolution -454,---
[4712]the assassination materials disclosure act of 1992. I very much
[4713]appreciate the opportunity to appear before the committee, just
[4714]as I did before your colleagues in the Senate last Tuesday.
[4716]I can summarize my statement, I think. It is largely
[4717]the same as the one I did earlier. Let me just say, as I have
[4718]said, that I'm in complete agreement with the effort to
[4719]underline the joint resolution, that is, the effort to
[4720]declassify and make available to the public as quickly as
[4721]possible government documents relating to the assassination of
[4722]President Kennedy.
[4724]Further, I believe that ‘maximum disclosure will
[4725]discredit the theory that CIA had anything to do with his
[4726]murder.
[4728]I have undertaken a number of efforts at CIA to
[4729]accelerate the declassification of historical materials,
[4730]creating a new organization to do that. It will be classified,
[4731]or review for declassification, all documents over 30 years old,
[4732]‘and Soviet estimates up to 10 years ago.
[4734]I've asked them to take as their first priority the
[4735]review for declassification a review of the documents relating
[4736]to, the assassination of President Kennedy. And we have
[4737]proceeded with that, without waiting for legislation.
[4739]And I've indicated earlier this week, we've
[4740]declassified the first set of these records, the pre-
[4741]assassination Oswald file. And these have now been transferred
[4742]to the National Archives for release.
[4744]13-00000
[4748]. ; It's a small fraction of what we have, but I want to
[4749]do it right away as an earnest of our intention to move on, to
[4750]declassify these documents and to get them before the public as
[4751]quickly as possible.
[4753]I've also made publicly available this week the
[4754]agency's new guidelines for historical review and
[4755]declassification. _
[4757]~in—connection-with these guidelines T have recently
[4758]commissioned a task force to review agency procedures under the ;
[4759]Freedom of Information Act. I've instructed this task force to
[4760]ensure that our internal FOIA procedures are consistent with the
[4761]approach that I've described for historical declassification._.
[4763]Although the task force will have to explore the
[4764]difference between current documents and those that are often
[4765]requested under FOIA, and 30-year-old documents placed under
[4766]historical review programs, my intention is to bring to the FOIA
[4767]process a much more positive attitude toward declassification
[4768]and the release of government or CIA records. ~~
[4770]The chart that: I've brought along with me describes
[4771]the nature of CIA's collection of documents, about 250,000 to
[4772]300,000 pages of material. And I.don't need I think to go into
[4773]any further detail on that.
[4775]As I indicated, only. about 11 of the pre-assassination
[4776]documents belong to CIA, and we have released those, and as I
[4777]did earlier in the week, brought along that file simply to show
[4778]how thin it was before that time.
[4780]It was only after the assassination that CIA
[4781]accumulated most of the documents that it had; 33,000 pages on
[4782]Oswald alone.
[4784]There has been some comment on the pre-assassination
[4785]Oswald file, and how little it contained. I want to reemphasize
[4786]that this pre-assassination material is but the first -----
[4787]installment-of ali the material we will review; merely an
[4788]earnest of our intentions.
[4790]. All of the assassination-related documents we have
[4791]will be reviewed for declassification, and we will transfer the
[4792]declassified documents to the archives as they are completed
[4793]without waiting for work on the entirety to be completed.
[4795]Mr. Chairman, you have asked about assassination
[4796]materials that may be held by other intelligence community
[4797]agencies. The FBI will describe its holdings separately, which
[4798]I assume include both intelligence and law enforcement records.
[4800]The National Security Agency and the State
[4801]Department's bureau of intelligence and research report after a
[4802]preliminary search that they have identified a relatively small
[4803]amount of material responsive to previous inquiries by the
[4804]Warren Commission, the Church committee, and the House Select
[4805]Committee on Assassinations.
[4807]The Defense Intelligence Agency, which did not come
[4808]into existence until 1961, has identified no assassination
[4809]material to date, and it anticipates that any holdings it might
[4810]have would be minimal, because its mission at the time of the
[4811]assassination focused on foreign military order of battle.
[4813]I've indicated in my statement for the record that CIA
[4814]cannot release a number of documents unilaterally, because of
[4815]limits in the privacy act, which protects the names of Americans
[4816]against unauthorized disclosure; the sequestration of many
[4817]documents by the House Select Committee on Assassinations; and
[4819]o
[4821]13-00000
[4823]the*fact that many of the documents belong to agencies other
[4824]than CIA.
[4826]However, we've already taken steps to lift the
[4827]sequestration, to coordinate with other agencies, and to begin
[4828]the process of declassification.
[4830]As I indicated earlier-in the week, if necessary, and
[4832]—— in the absence of legislation, I will ask the House or
[4834]results. of the declassification effort on the sequestered
[4835]documents. And I hope that we can work together, Mr. Chairman,
[4836]to remove any obstacles that might arise in releasing the
[4837]sequestered documents.
[4839]I also have indicated in my statement for the record
[4840]that I assume there will be some materials that cannot be
[4841]released, for a variety of reasons, including privacy concerns,
[4842]or the exposure of intelligence sources and methods.
[4844]And let me again-take a moment to give an example of
[4845]this type of material. -—-
[4847]During the investigation by ‘the House Select Committee
[4848]on Assassinations, I understand that a number of security and
[4849]personnel files of CIA employees were requested. These files
[4850]contained fitness reports, or performance evaluations, medical
[4851]evaluations, and credit checks on individual CIA officers.
[4853]Although irrelevant’ to the question of who killed
[4854]President Kennedy, these and other personal documents ultimately
[4855]ended. up—in the sequestered collection of documents. I do not
[4856]believe that the benefit to the public of the disclosure of this
[4857]information outweighs the clear. privacy interest of the
[4858]individuals in keeping it confidential. —
[4860]Similar privacy concerns exist with documents
[4861]containing derogatory information on particular individuals,
[4862]where the information is based on gossip or rumor. bee ee
[4864]Our files also contain the names of individuals who ,
[4865]provided us intelligence information on a promise of
[4866]confidentiality, and we would not release their names in breach
[4867]of such a promise. |
[4869]Where we cannot disclosure such information to the
[4870]public, the agency will make redactions and summarize the
[4871]information in order to ensure that the maximum amount of
[4872]information is released while still protecting the identity of
[4873]an agent, or the privacy of an individual.
[4875]As I told your Senate colleagues earlier in the week,
[4876]if legislation is “not passed by the Congress and signed by the
[4877]president regarding these papers, to enhance public confidence
[4878]and to. provide reassurance that CIA has not held back
[4879]information relative to the assassination, I would appoint a
[4880]panel of distinguished Americans from outside of government,
[4881]perhaps including former jurists, to examine whatever documents .
[4882]we have redacted or kept classified.
[4884]And they would then issue an unclassified report on
[4885]their findings.
[4887]I believe that these actions attest to the seriousness
[4888]of our intent to get these documents declassified and released,
[4889]and to open what remains classified to outside nongovernmental
[4890]review.
[4892]It is against this background that I cite our few
[4893]technical reservations about the mechanism established by the
[4894]joint resolution to achieve this result.
[4896]5
[4898]13-00000
[4900]vO : First, vesting in a body outside--in an outside body
[4901]the determination whether CIA materials related to the
[4902]assassination can be released to the public is inconsistent with
[4903]my own statutory responsibility to protect intelligence sources
[4904]and methods.
[4906]Second, I am concerned that the joint resolution
[4907]contains no provision requiring security clearances or secure ;
[4909]-——decument—handLing-by—the— assassination materials review board or
[4910]its staff.
[4912]Third, I'm concerned that the Joint resolution does
[4913]not provide the agency with the opportunity to object to the
[4914]release of CIA information contained. in_documents. originated. by.
[4915]the Congress or the Warren Comniission-
[4917]Under the joint resolution documents originated by
[4918]these entities can be released directly by the executive
[4919]director of the assassination materials review board, without
[4920]any review by the president or the.executive branch.
[4922]Fourth, the joint resolution provision for a 30-day
[4923]period for agencies and departments to appeal decisions of the
[4924]executive director to release information may not provide
[4925]sufficient time for meaningful review of what could prove to be
[4926]a large volume of material at one time.
[4928]Fifth and finally, Section 6 of the Joint Resolution,
[4929]which outlines the grounds for postponement of a public release
[4930]of the documents, makes no provision for postponing release of
[4931]documents that may contain executive privilege, or deliberative
[4932]process, attorney-client or attorney-work product information.
[4933]While such privileges could be waived in the public interest,
[4934]and in fact are not likely to arise with respect to factual
[4935]information directly relating to the assassination, they would
[4936]be unavailable in the joint resolution in the rare case they
[4937]might be needed. oo
[4939]These are technical problems, and I believe they can
[4940]be. solved in ways that can expedite the release of documents
[4941]bearing on the assassination of President Kennedy. But again,
[4942]whatever the future course of this legislation, CIA is
[4943]proceeding even now to review for declassification the relevant
[4944]documents under its control. And further, we will cooperate
[4945]fully with any mechanism established by the Congress and the
[4946]president to declassify this material.
[4948]That concludes my summary of my statement, Mr.
[4950]Chairman.
[4951]KKKKK ve
[4952]KKKKK
[4953]The Reuter Transcript Report
[4954]Assassinations/hearing
[4955]May 15, 1992
[4956]MORE
[4958]LLLEnglish
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[4967]THE REUTER TRANSCRIPT REPORT —
[4969]HOUSE GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS LEGISLATION AND NATIONAL
[4970]SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING
[4971]Topic: H.J. Res. 454, Assassination Materials Disclosure Act
[4972]of 1992
[4973]-Witness: CIA Director Robert Gates
[4974]May 15, 1992
[4975](First. Add). _
[4976]KKKKR
[4978]x X X Mr. Chairman.
[4980]REP. JOHN CONYERS JR. (D-MI): Thank you very much,
[4981]Mr. Gates. We appreciate your statement. And I only have a
[4982]couple of observations.
[4984]Putting them altogether, I'm interested in how much
[4985]material has been destroyed by CIA that we may never know about?
[4986]Why"the Lee Oswald file was opened at the CIA-i4-months after
[4987]his defection. Was Oswald in fact a Soviet spy? And was that ~
[4988]picture in his file that was thought to be him, was that an
[4989]‘error? Or was there something involved in that that you can
[4990]shed some light on?
[4992]ignorant, Mr. Chairman, I I don' t know the answers to any of those
[4994]GATES: Well, at the risk of appearing yet tess ff)
[4996]questions. But I will take them for the record and respond
[4997]quickly to the committee.
[4999]REP. ‘CONYERS: Well, thank you so much.
[5001]We're here against the background of history and the
[5002]fact that this is the murder of the century. A president of the
[5003]United States, sitting president. And I thought it was
[5004]exemplary of the CIA--I never thought I'd be saying this this
[5005]morning, either--to find out that you had permitted your
[5006]representatives to discuss the subject, matter with various think
[5007]tanks around the city, one of which was included was the
[5008]Institute for Policy Studies, whose cofounder is Marcus Raskin.
[5010]And I was told that there was a very candid exchange .-
[5011]about this subject matter which was the purpose of the meeting.
[5012]Some dozen or more of your representatives were meeting with
[5013]‘them
[5015]And I think that that is a very healthy sign of the
[5016]times. I never thought it would happen, so I never thought I'd
[5017]say what I am saying today.. But one of the parts of that
[5018]discussion was that Oliver Stone, the producer of the movie, has
[5019]been parading around the country saying that you will not meet
[5020]with him. |
[5022]And as a conciliatory member Of this Congress, could I
[5023]facilitate such an arrangement so that it would help relieve the
[5024]confusions and the disturbances of a lot of people, since he
[5026]5
[5028]13-00000
[5030]has, as a result of this movie, become apparently an expert on
[5031]this subject?
[5033]GATES: Mr. Chairman, I would characterize him as a
[5034]self-styled expert on this subject. I am no expert at all. I
[5035]think I have moved very far in the direction of releasing these
[5036]documents, as you indicated at the outset of the hearing. I
[5037]——-think that—the--ageney—has—in-many_ways seta standard in terms
[5038]of its willingness to release these documents, and our
[5039]determination to do so whether or not there is legislation.
[5040]Frankly, I find that the allegations contained in:
[5041]the--that I have been told about in the movie; I have not seen
[5042]it--are offensive to the agency, and to the American government,
[5043]and to a number of people who were in office at that time from
[5044]_the President of the United States on down, President Johnson on
[5045]down. -
[5046]It-is not entirely clear to me what particular purpose
[5047]would be served by a meeting between myself and Mr. Stone.
[5049]REP. CONYERS: “Can you tell me about the sympathy and
[5050]understanding that you may have for the American people's
[5051]confusion and differences of view about whether Lee Harvey
[5052]Oswald was alone the sole assassin of the president?
[5054]GATES: Well, my view, and it's a very personal view,
[5055]Mr. Chairman, is that--and I have never made a study of the
[5056]assassination; I have not read the many books that have been ~
[5057]written about it--but my personal view is that the enormity of
[5058]the event and the sense of tragedy that the American people
[5059]- felt, and still feel, over that event, is so great that the idea
[5060]of a single individual, a single irrational individual,
[5062]committing an act of such enormous historical consequence is. wee cere erm
[5064]enormously difficult to--for thém €6 accept at face value.
[5066]And in many respects, it is similar to the continuing
[5067]controversy over the assassination of President Lincoln, as more
[5068]than 100 years later we still read books about conspiracies. and
[5069]so on in that respect.
[5071]And by the same token, and with all due respect to his
[5072]memory, there doesn't seem to any similar kind of controversy
[5073]about the assassination of President McKinley.
[5075]And so I think it is the inability of a lot of people
[5076]to accept such an irrational act with such enormous consequences
[5077]that has contributed to this. And I think that the--one of the
[5078]concerns that grows out of this film is not that people accept
[5080]it at face value but rather than particularly young people who
[5082]may not read much history and may not read the reviews and may
[5084]not read what historians have to say that is critical about the
[5085]movie, but come out of it with the sense that there is some fire
[5087]in all that smoke; that he may not have it right, but there must
[5088]have been some sort of conspiracy.
[5090]And I've had, as I indicated to you the other day, I
[5091]had a conversation about this with a distinguished United States
[5092]Senator who had sent some of his smartest young staff out to see
[5093]the fiotey , and they came back and the reaction was not that they
[5094]accepted what the movie said, but their concern that their
[5095]government had in some way been involved. And frankly it was
[5096]that more than anything else that prompted me to decide that it
[5097]was imperative to get these documents out and try to dispel the
[5099]C
[5101]13-00000
[5103]suspicions that had been created.
[5104]REP. CONYERS: Thank you very much. “Mr. Schiff.
[5106]REP. STEVEN SCHIFF (R-NM):: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[5108]First, Director Gates; I want to thank you for
[5109]appearing personally here. I know that you have a heavy
[5110]schedule,-and I'm-sure-all-the-members-of the committeé do” *
[5111]appreciate that.
[5113]I have just a few questions, but I do have a couple of
[5114]observations on your statement. The first is, I do not know
[5115]personally whether Mr. Oliver Stone who testified before us at
[5116]the last hearing is a real expert on the assassination of
[5117]President Kennedy, or as you suggested a self-styled expert.
[5119]I do know this, though. I do know that it's because
[5120]of his movie that members of the Congress of the United States
[5121]are discussing this matter publicly with the director of the
[5122]CIA. .And I'm quite- positive that his movie has caused all of
[5123]that. to happen today, (pnd I personally give him the credit for
[5124]that.
[5126]Second of all, I note your observation that there is
[5127]not a lingering conspiracy theory involving the assassination of
[5128]President McKinley. To your knowledge, anywhere in the
[5129]government, your. agency or elsewhere, are there any documents or
[5130]information which for any reason are not being released with
[5131]respect to the assassination of President McKinley?
[5133]; GATES: Well, I can't speak to that from direct .
[5134]knowledge, Mr. Schiff. But I will say that since it predated
[5135]CIA's formation by 47 years, I imagine not.
[5137]REP. SCHIFF: Well, you see, I think that's_the .. ----
[5138]central point here, is that there is--I'm not sure we'll ever
[5139]resolve all the questions about the assassination of President
[5140]Kennedy. You are correct that we have not resolved alli the
[5141]questions about the assassination of President Lincoln. On.
[5142]national TV I saw a program recently suggesting that John Wilkes
[5143]Booth did not actually die as suggested, and gave, reasons for
[5145]a
[5146]: But the difference between the assassination of
[5147]President Kennedy and these prior terrible assassinations in our
[5148]country's history is, this is the one situation where the
[5149]government, for whatever reason, and-for whatever circumstances,
[5150]still holds information which it considers to be confidential.
[5152]And that's the root of this controversy now, and
[5153]that's the root of this hearing, I think. :
[5155]And I made a note of items that you as director of the
[5156]CIA would consider to be still--to still warrant confidentiality
[5157]today. ‘And I made notes of three. If there were more, I
[5158]apologize that I missed them. I'm not talking about the
[5159]procedures , which you made observations about, and which I think
[5160]you'll find the committee willing to discuss with the executive
[5161]branch.
[5163]But three classifications of records. The first is
[5164]personnel records involving, I gather, government agents,
[5165]perhaps CIA agents, fitness reports and credit reports, first of
[5166]all.
[5168]Second of all, the privacy issue because government.
[5172]13-00000
[5174]files often accrue totally unsubstantiated information which can
[5175]be fairly characterized as gossip, but which do get into the
[5176]files when a total investigation is done; and third, where we've
[5177]made a specific promise of confidentiality to a particular
[5179]informant.
[5180]Before I ask you about ‘those three, can I just ask,
[5182]are there any other areas of documents that you_as director of oo wu.
[5184]-- the CIA believe should not “be reléaséa in terms « of a generic
[5185]category like these?
[5187]GATES: No, I would only include in the protection of
[5188]sources also the protection of intelligence methods. But I
[5189]think you've captured it.
[5191]REP. SCHIFF: Let me just go back on each of these
[5192]briefly. —_ ;
[5193]On protection of personnel records, why would those _
[5194]have gotten--I understand what you're talking about. I think we
[5195]all do matters where there is internal monitoring of your own -
[5196]agents, which I understand is a necessity at times, why would :
[5197]those records have gotten into the assassination records on
[5198]President Kennedy? Why are they mixed in there, do you know?
[5200]GATES: I don't really know, Mr. Schiff. I think, as
[5201]I understand it, from the materials that were prepared for me, a
[5202]great deal of documents were swept up in the material that is
[5203]kept, and as my statement indicates, I don't think I read this
[5204]part of it: These files contain everything from the most:
[5205]mundane newspaper articles, which are obviously not classified,
[5206]or shouldn't be, to the most sensitive intelligence sources.
[5208]And so I think it's just a hodgepodge. As I also”
[5210]indicated, part of the problem that we have in going through ------------ 7
[5212]these documents - -is that they afe not indexed; they are not
[5213]catalogued; and they really have no organization to them.
[5215]So when I started asking some months ago what was in
[5216]the documents, what did we have, it actually took quite some
[5217]time even to perform a survey to get some kind of idea of. what
[5218]kinds of records were in there.
[5220]But I assume that these kinds of- ‘things were just
[5222]swept up with a lot of other material.
[5223]RKKKK
[5225]KKKKK
[5227]The Reuter Transcript Report “”
[5228]Assassinations/hearing (first add)
[5229]May 15, 1992
[5231]MORE
[5233]LLLEnglish
[5235]Dd
[5237]13-00000
[5239]rtt-rw TEXT-ASSASSINATIONS-2
[5243]BC-TEXT-ASSASSINATIONS- 2NDADD
[5244]THE REUTER TRANSCRIPT REPORT
[5246]HOUSE GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS LEGISLATION AND NATIONAL
[5247]SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING
[5248]Topic: H.J. Res. 454, Assassination Materials Disclosure Act
[5249]of 1992
[5250]Witness: CIA Director Robert Gates
[5251]May 15, 1992
[5253](Second Add)
[5254]RKKKK —_——
[5256]x x x other material. 7 ——
[5257]; REP. SCHIFF: Well, let me go on to one of the other
[5258]categories, and that is, where the government has given a
[5259]promise of confidentiality, the government ought to keep that.
[5260]Can't the information be released without revealing the
[5261]informant? Because I think it's the information that is desired
[5262]here, not necessarily the-identity of who provided it.
[5264]GATES: My own view, Mr. Schiff, is that that should
[5265]be the case in almost every instance.
[5267]REP. SCHIFF: Finally with respect to intelligence
[5268]methods, I understand that there's a national security point. ....-..-
[5269]there. But we are also talking about 30 years ago,
[5270]approximately.
[5272]Are our intelligence-gathering methods so unchanged in
[5273]30 years that you believe that revealing how agencies gather and
[5274]collect and evaluation information would present a national
[5275]security risk today if revealed? " .
[5277]GATES: Well, first of all, if an intelligence method
[5278]is no longer in use, then I think it no. longer--and there's
[5279]little prospect of it ever being used again, I see no reason to
[5280]protect it. e ;
[5281]I think here again, though, that the focus should be
[5282]on the information provided by these sources and methods, rather
[5283]than the identification of the sources and methods themselves.
[5285]The only reason I would seek to protect them is in
[5286]‘those instances in which those techniques are still being used,
[5287]or we think there is a good chance they will be used again.
[5289]With respect to sources, I think that we have a much
[5290]longer standing commitment to protect them. But again, I'm
[5291]prepared, either under the legislation, through the board that
[5292]would be established, or in the absence of legislation, through
[5293]an outside panel, to let people who are not in the intelligence
[5294]business review any of that material that we had held back to
[5295]see that we had justifiable reasons for doing so.
[5297]REP. SCHIFF: So your overall position, Director
[5299]9
[5301]13-00000
[5303]Gates, is that everything that can be released should be
[5305]released?
[5306]GATES: Absolutely, Mr. Schiff.
[5307]REP. SCHIFF: Thank you very much. I yield back, Mr.
[5308]Chairman. ee _ eee
[5309]REP. CONYERS: Thank you, Mr. Schiff. “
[5310]The chair recognizes Mr. Thornton.
[5311]REP. RAY THORNTON (D-AR): Thank you very much, Mr.
[5312]Chairman.
[5314]And thank you, Director Gates, for a very forthcoming
[5315]and positive testimony before this committee. _I think that it
[5316]is important to emphasize that we share an-interest in 7
[5317]disclosing all of the information related to the substance of
[5318]this without jeopardizing the capacity of your agency to conduct
[5319]its business. ___
[5321]And in fact, Section 6 of the proposed resolution says
[5322]that disclosure to the general public of assassination material
[5323]or particular information in assassination material may be
[5324]postponed if its release would--and there's a whole list--but
[5325]among that list is, if an intelligence source or method which is-
[5326]currently utilized or reasonably expected to be utilized by the oe
[5327]United States government is involved.
[5328]And Director Gates, I believe that you're telling us,
[5330]and I want to ask you directly, that if the standards that are
[5332]. contained in this resolution were adopted, and the CIA's records
[5333]as you have suggested they should be, were released, with those
[5334]safeguards, do you believe that any sensitive sources or methods
[5335]would be revealed or compromise by the information which is oe
[5338]GATES: I think that the provisions that provide for
[5339]the protection of sources and methods and that allow us
[5340]ultimately the president to have the final say. would provide
[5341]adequate safeguards.
[5343]REP. THORNTON: The protections in the bill for
[5344]intelligence-related information then are sufficient?
[5346]GATES: Yes, sir. I've’indicated in my testimony we
[5347]would. ask the Congress to consider I think two additional
[5348]categories of information. I mentioned executive privilege, or
[5349]deliberative process. Attorney-client kinds of information.
[5351]Again, we think that there would be very little
[5352]information that would be withheld under those circumstances,
[5353]but without mentioning it, that recourse would be denied.
[5355]The second is, I think it would be useful to pick up.
[5356]on the same protection that the Congress has granted in separate
[5357]legislation in terms of not revealing the names of covert
[5358]employees of U.S. intelligence agencies.
[5360]REP. THORNTON: I appreciate ‘those suggestions. But
[5361]in summary the release of the CIA records in accordance with the
[5362]general outline contained. in this resolution would not damage
[5363]any current CIA operations; is that correct?
[5365]| 0
[5367]13-00000
[5369]GATES: .No, sir, not in keeping with those safeguards.
[5371]REP. THORNTON: I know, Director Gates, that you've
[5372]recently released, as you told us, some materials regarding
[5373]Oswald. Can you make a commitment here to promptly release all
[5374]of the files about the CIA's operations against Fidel-Castro in
[5378]GATES: We certainly--the files concerning Operation
[5379]Mongoose, AMLash (phonetic), and so on, are included in the
[5380]documents that will be reviewed in the--
[5382]REP. THORNTON: That was my specific followup question
[5384]as to whether those files would be included in the material.
[5386]GATES: Yes, Sir.
[5388]REP. THORNTON: I want to thank you again for your
[5390]-testimony:>—Like you I “have not seen the movie, and that is not
[5391]the basis of my concern. The basis of my concern is to make
[5392]sure that all of the information that is in government
[5393]possession relating to this assassination be released. Because
[5394]in addition to the movie, I believe there are some inferences
[5395]drawn by the House committee on investigations, and by the
[5396]Garrison jury, that while no showing of a government conspiracy;
[5397]that there were allusions to the possibility of an external
[5398]‘conspiracy, and whatever may have existed needs to be dispelled
[5399]by having the light of full disclosure shown upon the events of
[5401]that time.
[5402]Would you agree with that, sir?
[5403]GATES: I agree.with that totally, Mr. Thornton. ~
[5404]REP. THORNTON: Thank you. I yield back the balance
[5405]of my time.
[5407]REP..CONYERS: Thank you very much,. Mr. Thornton.
[5408]The chair recognizes Ms. Mink.
[5410]REP. PATSY T. MINK (D-HI): Thank you very much, Mr.
[5411]Chairman. I too want to commend the forthright position that
[5412]you've taken as the head of the CIA in initiating steps to
[5413]release. important documents that will contribute to the better
[5414]understanding of the public at large as to what exactly
[5415]happened.
[5417]I also agree with my colleagues that while the
[5418]conclusions and inferences that were part of Oliver Stone's
[5419]movie are under question, and perhaps totally negated by your
[5420]agency, they are nevertheless, the basis for the renewed
[5421]attention and concern as to exactly what happened on that day. -
[5423]And therefore, it seems to me appropriate that the
[5424]chair of this committee asked you to direct your attention to
[5425]the content of that movie, because what we need now is an
[5426]informed basis upon which to look at it.
[5428]I happen to have seen it, unlike some of my
[5429]colleagues. And there are a number of very troublesome
[5430]questions that the movie raises, and I am in no position to
[5432]I
[5434]13-00000
[5436]evaluate it, aS most of the people in the country. And
[5437]therefore, the disclosure of these documents are extremely
[5438]important.
[5439]Looking at your testimony, Mr. Gates, I notice that
[5440]you indicate that some of the documents: which are relevant to
[5441]this inquiry cannot be released by the CIA because they are in
[5442]fact documents which belong to other agencies.
[5443]_--—_. ——-.- —-Would-yeu--comment- on-that-and clarify that particular” ~
[5444]statement in your testimony?
[5446]GATES: Yes, ma'am. In the course of the post
[5447]assassination investigations, a great deal of information was
[5448]shared among the agencies. For example, in the 17 boxes of
[5449]Oswald records that we have, approximately 40 percent of those
[5450]documents originated with the FBI, and were simply made
[5451]available for information to CIA.
[5453]About 20 percent originated with the State Department
[5454]or other agencies, immigration and naturalization and so on.
[5456]Under the third~agency rule, it is our_obligation to
[5457]leave it to those agencies to declassify their own documents. We
[5458]cannot do that, and by the same token, they exercise the same
[5459]practice with us.
[5461]REP. MINK: Now, would the legislation that we are
[5462]considering now make it possible for your agency, as the
[5463]custedian of records that you have been given by other agencies,
[5464]be included in your own disclosure? Can we make that possible?
[5466]GATES: I don't think the legislation would do that,
[5467]Mrs. Mink. I-think that it would simply require those other
[5468]agencies to undertake the same steps that we are in terms of
[5469]reviewing for declassification the documents that they .
[5471]we don' t hold. the record copies of those documents. We
[5472]simply have copies of them.
[5474]RP MINK Now, in the materials that you have volunteered for
[5475]disclosure, with reference to Oswald, how much of the materials
[5476]in your possession, therefore, had to be excluded because they
[5477]were documents that your agency had been provided by other
[5478]governmental agencies?
[5480]GATES: Let me answer, and then check with my
[5481]colleagues to make sure I got it right, in this very thin file,
[5482]of the 34 documents, I think only 11 were originated by CIA. My
[5483]impression is that the others had all--belong to other agencies
[5484]had all already been declassified. That's correct. :
[5486]REP. MINK: So that we have the total file with
[5487]reference to Oswald now in the public domain?
[5489]GATES: The total file that CIA had in its possession.
[5491]REP. MINK: But you just said that all the other
[5492]agencies have also already declassified, meaning that they are
[5493]part of the public domain, and cannot be obtained, if not
[5494]necessarily voluntarily released by those agencies, are now
[5495]available public documents?
[5499]13-00000
[5501]Sennen AEE Abe bl «ante idarinaanes sd ieui
[5503]GATES: T don't know whether that s the case or not.
[5504]only the documents that we had from them have been released as
[5505]part of the file we released. They may have other documents
[5506]pre-November 22nd, 1963 that we didn't have.
[5508]REP. MINK: In other words, in reference to Oswald
[5509]everything that you had in your possession, regardless of
[5510]whether it belonged to other agencies, ‘bécauSe you found them to
[5511]be declassified, have all been released?
[5513]GATES: That's my understanding, yes, ma'am.
[5515]REP. MINK: Now, there is a:Washington Post article of
[5516]May 14th which suggests that the materials that have been
[5517]disclosed with reference to Lee Harvey Oswald contain nothing
[5518]new. Is that your understanding also of the documents that you
[5519]released to the archives?
[5521]GATES: As I indicated earlier,.L am certainly no
[5522]student of this material. I do not know the answer to that
[5524]question.
[5525]KREKKK
[5527]KKKKK
[5529]The Reuter Transcript Report
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[5531]May 15, 1992
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[5544]THE REUTER TRANSCRIPT REPORT =~
[5546]HOUSE GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS LEGISLATION AND NATIONAL
[5547]SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING
[5548]Topic: H.J. Res. 454, Assassination Materials Disclosure Act
[5549]of 1992
[5550]Witness: CIA Director Robert Gates
[5551]May 15, 1992
[5553](Third Add)
[5554]KKKKK
[5556]x x x that question.
[5558]REP. MINK: Does anyone in the room here from your
[5559]agency have an answer to that question?
[5561]GATES: Some of the documents had not previously been
[5562]released, so would have represented new information.
[5564]-REP. MINK: Might we know today what exactly were new
[5565]items that had not been released previously?
[5567]GATES: This is David Grease (phonetic). He is the
[5568]director of our center for the study of intelligence.
[5570]DAVID GREASE: (director, center for the study of
[5571]intelligence): Mrs. Mink, some of these documents had been
[5572]previously released. About half of those that are--originated
[5573]at the CIA.
[5575]Among the documents of other agencies that were in our
[5576]files, it's my understanding, but this would have to be
[5577]verified, that almost all of them,. if not all of them, had. been
[5578]previously released.
[5580]REP. MINK: So what consisted of new information that
[5581]the public had not already had in its ‘published files somewhere?
[5583]GREASE: Yes, I understand. We would have to respond
[5584]to you separately from that. I cannot from memory tell you
[5585]precisely which documents were new.
[5587]I do know that the new ones are not of much
[5588]consequence. They do not contain any information that is
[5589]particularly enlightening. But we can tell you after the
[5590]hearing what those are.
[5592]REP. MINK: Can you explain a second, if the CIA had
[5593]been alerted by the State Department by a cable dated October
[5594]31st, 1959, with respect to Oswald's defection, why the CIA did
[5595]not open a file until 14 months alter?
[5597]GATES: I don't think we have the faintest idea, Mrs.
[5601]5.
[5603]$A,
[5605]13-00000
[5607]“Mink.
[5609]REP. MINK: There was no policy in effect in 1959 with
[5610]reference to persons who publicly announced defection to the
[5611]Soviet Union?
[5613]GATES: I just- don't know. _
[5615]REP. MINK: Has there been any inquiry made within the
[5616]agency to determine that 14-month lapse?
[5618]GATES: I don't believe so.
[5620]GREASE: We did attempt to contact people who might
[5621]have been involved at the time, and that largely failed, and in
[5622]addition, we gained no information. We don't know.
[5624]REP. MINK: Now, I don't know the basis of this
[5625]conclusion in the news article, but it indicates that the
[5626]materials that were turned over to the National Archives, did
[5627]not indicate that they were originals, unexpurgated originals,
[5628]as the article says, that the materials turned over had been
[5629]altered, revised, in some way by the CIA before they were
[5630]released to the archives. Is that a-true statement?
[5632]GREASE: It is not correct to say that they were
[5633]altered or revised. Our effort was to furnish the file that we
[5634]had. That file contained copies of original documents.
[5636]Therefore we thought it appropriate to furnish precisely what we
[5637]had.
[5639]What might be characterized as alterations by some by
[5640]us are redactions of the kind of material that Director Gates
[5641]has described to you, meaning some numbers, some names, but I
[5642]can assure you, nothing of any consequence.
[5644]These are Privacy. Act considerations and things of
[5645]that nature.
[5647]REP. MINK: Mr. Gates, one final question: In your
[5648]testimony you indicated that you did not support vesting in an
[5649]outside body the determination of whether CIA materials related
[5650]to the assassination can be released to the public, and to agree
[5651]to that would be inconsistent with your statutory
[5652]responsibility. —
[5654]I take it, then, that you oppose the provisions in
[5655]this bill which call for such vesting in an outside body?
[5657]GREASE: Frankly, my own view is that the provisions
[5658]that provide that the president can have the final say, normally
[5659]I would not shift to the president my burden for protecting
[5660]sources and methods. But it seems to me that, given the unique
[5661]circumstances of this case, it seems to me that that is one part
[5662]of the bill that we could find a way to work around.
[5664]REP. MINK: Then is it not somewhat inconsistent in
[5665]your testimony in saying that if this bill didn't pass and
[5666]didn't become law, you would appoint a panel of distinguished
[5667]Americans from outside the government to do the exact same
[5668]function for your agency?
[5670][5
[5672]13-00000
[5674]o
[5676]GATES: No, matam, what I would appoint that panel to
[5677]do is examine all the redactions that we had made, and to
[5678]examine all of the documents that we decided could not be
[5679]declassified, and then provide a report to the American people
[5680]on whether or not any of those redactions or those withheld
[5681]documents had a bearing on the assassination.
[5683]They would not make the decision to declassify.
[5685]REP. MINK: Now, would the establishment of such a ‘ Q) .
[5686]panel of outside experts in effect also under your definition
[5687]violate the Privacy Act?
[5689]GATES: I don't know the answer to that. I would have { 4.
[5690]to have--I would have to have our attorneys look at it.
[5692]REP. MINK: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[5694]REP. CONYERS: Thank you very much, Mrs. Mink. You've
[5695]touched on some very important areas. °
[5697]There are just two related considerations that I'd
[5698]like to bring to your attention, Director Gates. One is in the
[5699]Freedom of Information Act, where electronic data is a
[5700]discretionary matter with the agency, and we would like you to
[5701]review the problem with the release of CIA electronic data of
[5702]previously released requests. It's a technical point, but I
[5704]bring it to your attention for your future consideration.
[5706]And finally, with regard to the Castro records, and HEG-
[5707]AMLash and Gilverto Lopez (phonetic), it is my hope that you
[5708]will elevate those as high. up on your agenda for reconsideration Nor.
[5710]for release as soon as appropriate. There are a number of
[5711]members in the Congress that have asked me to bring this matter
[5712]to your attention as well. .-. ,Y
[5714]GATES: I think we can do that, Mr. Chairman. [
[5716]REP.-CONYERS: Thank you very much. And on behalf of
[5717]the committee, we deeply appreciate your appearance before us
[5719]today.
[5720]GATES: Thank you, sir.
[5721]END GATES TESTIMONY te
[5722]KEKKK
[5723]KKKKK
[5724]The Reuter Transcript Report
[5725]Assassinations/hearing (third and final add)
[5726]May 15, 1992
[5727]REUTER
[5728]LLLEnglish
[5730]13-00000
[5732]vl sus ys PRL £1:00 FAA 2UL 12% Veur Ann?
[5734]—_—_.- wave
[5736]Assassination Records Review Board
[5737]600 E Street NW + 2nd Floor « Washington, DC 20530
[5738](202) 724-0088 « Fax: (202) 724-0457
[5740]January 30, 1998 CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
[5741]DECLAS SIFICATION ANC/OR
[5742]RELEASE OF © we ORMATION
[5743]iN THIS COCUME
[5744]The Honorable Dan Burton
[5745]Chairman
[5746]' Committee on Government Reform and Oversight
[5747]2185 Rayburn House Office Building
[5748]House of Representatives
[5749]Washington, DC 20515
[5750]Dear Mr. Chairman:
[5751]* This letter is the Assassination Records Review Board's sixth monthly progress report,
[5752]- as required by the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight report on H.R.
[5753]Mas 1553 (now P.L. 105-25), that extended the authorization of the Review Board until
[5755]September 30, 1998.
[5757]At the January 22 closed meeting, the Board processed for public release approximately
[5758]3,600 FBI records, 1,000 CIA records, and 350 records from other agencies. The nearly
[5759]‘5,000 records processed by the Board is its highest total for a single meetirig.. In
[5760]_addition, the Review Board recently released approximately 600 pages of military
[5761]records regarding U.S. policy. toward Cuba from 1962-63.- Additional military records
[5762]related to U.S. policy toward Cuba in the early 1960's will be ready for public release in
[5763]the coming months.
[5765]The 710 records that the CIA made available for Review Board action at the January
[5766]meeting is the highest monthly number of records released to date. In addition, a total
[5767]of 289 HSCA documents with CIA equities were opened in full pursuant to discussions
[5768]with the CIA. Although the Review Board believes that the pace must continue to
[5769]increase, the momentum is unquestionably in the right direction. The CIA also has
[5770]advised us that it has added additional reviewers and indexers, which we believe
[5771]should help it process more records during the upcoming months. We now are
[5772]conducting weekly meetings with CIA for the purpose of evaluating the pace of the ©
[5773]review process. The CIA also has increased its progress in responding to our requests
[5774]for additional information and records. The requests that we had identified as priorities
[5775]have now been answered either in whole or in part and the CIA has shown an increased
[5777]@oanv Memaens: John &. Tunheim, Chair * Henry F. Graff + Kermit L. Hall + William L. Joyce « Anna K. Nelson
[5778]Executive Dirnecron: T. Jeremy Guna * Deéeuty Oinector: Thomas E. Samoluk
[5780]13-00000
[5782]\ Usp SU79O PRA 11.0% PAA cuc tae varus Anne wyvee
[5783]The Honorable Dan Burton:
[5784]January 30, 1998
[5785]Page 2
[5787]willingness to respond to follow-up requests more quickly. While there are a
[5788]significant number of requests outstanding, the increased responsiveness of the CIA
[5789]bodes well for-the completion of these requests in a timely manner.
[5791]"Since ou our December report, the Board's FBI team has reviewed an additional 20,000
[5792]pages of records from the FBI’s HSCA files. Included in these files are the names of
[5794]individuals who have a prominent role in the history surrounding the assassination of
[5795]President Kennedy. Although this page count is higher than last month, we have
[5796]advised the FBI that the volume must return to earlier levels to ensure that the review is
[5797]completed i ina timely manner.
[5799]AsI reported i in my January 16, 1998 letter to you, all of the agencies and offices to
[5801]' which you addressed letters in December have now contacted us and pledged to
[5803]complete their work in a timely: manner. In particular, recent meetings and
[5804]communications with the Internal Revenue Service have been fruitful and provide
[5805]reason to believe that the IRS will fulfill its obligations under the law.
[5807]I would also like to take this opportunity to provide you with an update on the Board’s
[5808]federal compliance program. The State Department has submitted a draft final
[5809]compliance statement and we expect that its obligations under the JFK Act will be
[5810]completed and appropriately documented.by early March. The Joints Chiefs of Staff
[5812]has submitted its final compliance statement, and the Board has agreed that its
[5814]compliance statement is complete. The Social Security Administration also has
[5815]submitted its final compliance statement and has now received notification that its
[5816]obligations under the law are fulfilled. We continue to work with the other federal
[5817]agencies that have obligations under the JFK Act and the compliance program is
[5818]proving to be an effective mechanism to document their progress.
[5820]Again, thank you for your continuing interest in the work of the Review Board and the
[5821]support that you have provided in working with various federal agencies. Please do
[5822]not hesitate to have a member of your staff contact me if you have any comments or
[5823]questions. I can be reached at 724-0088, ext 226.
[5826]13-00000 se LU 24:03 FAA ZUZ 124 0457 ARRB . @oo2
[5827](Ou
[5829]T. Jeremy Gunn
[5830]Executive Director and General Counsel
[5831]Assassination Records Review Board
[5833]- Prepared Statement for
[5834]Senate Govemmental Affairs Committee
[5835]Hearing on S. 712
[5837]March 25, 1998 mee
[5839]Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee -- | appreciate the opportunity to
[5840]testify on S. 712 from the perspective of a person who has labored in the
[5841]declassification trenches for the past three and one-half years. Although | serve as the
[5842]Executive Director of the Assassination Records Review Board, | wish to emphasize
[5843]that I am testifying here today not as a spokesman for the Review Board, but as an
[5844]individual who has been involved in day-to-day interactions with numerous Federal
[5845]agencies on issues related to declassification. The Review Board members, who were
[5846]appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, are Judge John R. Tunheim,
[5847]Professor Henry F. Graff, Dean Kermit L. Hall, Dr. William L. Joyce, and Professor
[5848]Anna Kasten Nelson. The Board members have provided the American people
[5849]unparalleled access to information that has been held secret for more than a third of a
[5850]century. The Review Board’s official positions on matters related to declassification will
[5851]be set forth in its Final Report to Congress and the President later this year.
[5853]| applaud the efforts of Senator Moynihan, Senator Helms, and this Committee .to..-._
[5854]reduce govemment sectecy. Orie of the tragic consequences of government secrecy
[5855]has been the widely held belief that the goverment has known much more about the
[5856]assassination than it has been willing to reveal to the public. Many of the assassination ©
[5857]records that we have seen could have been opened to the public years ago without any
[5858]harm to the national security. The efforts of this Committee could go a long way to help
[5859]alleviate the suspicion of govemment -- some of it being justifiable suspicion — that has
[5860]festered since the assassination of President Kennedy. -
[5862]Because my experience comes principally from the field of declassification, ! will
[5863]focus my remarks on that area rather than discuss the very important issue of initial
[5864]classification.
[5866]|. Background
[5868]Although the word “unique” is over-used, it can fairly be applied to the work and
[5869]accomplishments of the Review Board. The Board was created by Congress in an
[5870]effort to release the government's still-secret files related to the assassination of
[5871]President Kennedy. tn accordance with the declassification standards articulated in
[5872]Section 6 of the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of
[5873]1992, 44 U.S.C. § 2107, Pub.L. 102-526 (as amended) (“UFK Act’), the Review Board
[5875]13-00000
[5877]ree er
[5879]4
[5882]igj003
[5883]ake hE A ee FE UE annD @
[5885]BY
[5889]has opened up previously classified records from numerous agencies and departments,
[5890]including the CIA, NSA, FBI, the Departments of State, Defense, Treasury, and Justice,
[5891]as well as the Military Services, Secret Service, Senate and House Committees, and
[5892]the National Security Council.
[5894]Under the JFK Act, agencies are required either to open assassination records in
[5895]fuil, or'to present to the Review Board proposed redactions and evidence in support of
[5896]their proposed redactions. After receiving the agencies’ evidence, the Review Board
[5897]deliberates and makes “formal determinations” as to whether the records should be
[5898]opened. The Board’s determinations have been overwhelmingly in favor of opening
[5899]racords. If an agency disagrees with the formal determination of the Review Board, its
[5900]sole recourse is to appeal the Board's decisions to the President. Thus far, only one
[5901]agency, the FBI, has appealed Board decisions. (The appeals ultimately Involved
[5902]approximately 90 records and four different issues.) After extensive briefings had been
[5903]submitted to the President -- with each side arguing why the records should or should -
[5904]not be released -- the FBI ultimately withdrew its appeals and negotiated with the
[5905]Review Board for resolution of the issues. Without exception, every formal
[5906]determination ultimately made by the Review Board has prevailed and records have
[5907]been released in accordance with Board decisions. !t has now been almost two years
[5908]since an agency has appealed a decision to the President. Thus, the Board’s work has
[5909]been a success. Although | do not consider the JFK Act to be the precise model for
[5910]future government-wide declassification efforts, it nevertheless has provided valuable _
[5911]lessons that may.be of use to you as you consider S: 712. ~ ~
[5913]li. The “Four Noble Truths” of Declassification —
[5915]In my opinion, any legislation that would attempt to have a significant impact on
[5916]the culture of secrecy must do more than articulate worthy goals and establish
[5917]bureaucratic entities to reiterate those goals. Effective legislation must address the
[5918]significant institutional Impediments to declassification. Any conscientious effort to
[5919]change the secrecy system should take Into account what | will call the “Four Noble
[5920]Truths” of declassification:
[5922]first, an independent entity, not the classifying agency, should be the final
[5923]decision maker on declassification; .
[5925]second, the independent declassification entity should be informed, committed,
[5926]and skeptical;
[5928]third, in order for declassification to be successful, there must be internal
[5929]institutional incentives to declassify information; and
[5931]fourth, the key to successful declassification is nof the articulation of the
[5933]wee ate te bana LUE 124 U4DT ARRB
[5935]13-00000 “Boo
[5937]List of Exhibits
[5938]Statement of T. Jeremy Gunn
[5940]Exhibit A.
[5941]Cable to the Mexico City Station from CIA Headquarters, November 27, 1963.
[5943]This document was released in full after a Board vote in 1995. The second line of
[5944]typed text includes the crypts (or cryptonyms) “RYBAT™ and “GPFLOOR.” These crypts
[5945]appear in the “slug line” and they are routing and sensitivity Indicators. “GPFLOOR?’ Is
[5946]the crypt that refers to Lee Harvey Oswald. This same crypt appears in the first line of
[5947]the second paragraph of text. CIA originally advised that GPFLOOR could not be
[5948]released in the slug line although it could be released in the text of the cable.
[5950]Exhibit B.
[5951]Letter to the Legal Attaché in Paris from the Director of the FBI, October 12, 1960.
[5953]Subject: Lee Harvey Oswald - intemal Security.
[5955]This document was one of several records exempted by the FBI because it contained
[5956]foreign goverment information. The stamps on the page suggest that the document
[5957]was reviewed in 1977 and stamped exempt from declassification. This document was
[5958]re-reviewed in 1992 and severely redacted. The Review Board, with the assistance of
[5959]the Department of State, approached the Swiss Govemment and requested that it
[5960]consent to the release of the information. In December-1995,the document was ~~
[5961]released in full after a Board vote and with the concurrence of the Swiss Government.
[5963]Exhibit C.
[5964]Memorandum to the Secretary of Defense from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 31,
[5966]1964. Subject: A Contingency Plan for a Coup in Cuba.
[5968]The Review Board located several Top Secret documents related to military
[5970]~ contingency planning for a coup in Cuba. This exhibit contains one page from a 58-
[5971]page document formerly classified Top Secret--Sensitive. The document was excluded
[5972]from automatic declassification and was unavailable to the public in any form. It was
[5973]systematically reviewed in October 1989 and the classification was continued. This
[5974]document and many similar documents were opened in full at a declassification session
[5975]in July 1997 after review by representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the CIA, the
[5976]National Security Council, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
[5978]Exhibit D.
[5979](a) Vietnam danuany-August t 1963, Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol. 3.
[5981]pp. 265-270.
[5983](b) Memorandum for the Record of the Eighth Secretary of Defense Conference on
[5984]' Vietnam, May 6, 1963, Honolulu, Hawaii .
[5986]13-00000
[5988]re cd
[5990]cE) eg
[5992]aun aaeta PAdA 2UZ (24 0457 ARRB
[5994]In May 1963, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara met with military advisers in the
[5995]eighth of a series of conferences on Vietnam in Honolulu, Hawaii. Part (a) of this
[5996]exhibit Includes all of the material that had been publicly ralieased on the conference
[5997]prior to Review Board action (a 6-page summary published in Foreign Relations of the
[5998]United States) and part (b) includes the title pages of the fli 213-page Flecord [of the]
[5999]Eighth Secretary of Defense Conference from the Joint Chiefs of Staff Official File that
[6000]has now been opened in full. Prior to Review Board action, the memorandum had been
[6001]excluded from automatic regrading and deciassification and could presumably have
[6002]remained classified forever. A stamp on page 1 discloses fihal fhe document was
[6003]systematically reviewed by JCS In May 1989, and the classiication of Top Secret was
[6004]continued. The document was opened in full at an ARRIB deciassification session in
[6005]July 1997.
[6007]Exhibit E.
[6009]Monthly Operational Report 1-30 September from the Chief of Station, Mexico City to
[6010]Chief KURIOT, October 18, 1963.
[6012]The CIA typically is reluctant to release information regarding technical surveillance.
[6014]- This document Is a CIA monthly operational report for Mexico City for September 1963, _
[6015]a period that includes Lee Harvey Oswald's anrval in the Mexdcan capital. The attached
[6017]form discloses that this document was reviewed in 1993 arm d postponed In its entirety. |
[6018]It was opened in full in 1995 after.a Board vote - - ao
[6020]Exhibit F.
[6021]NSA SIGINT product report, November 26, 1963.
[6023]The Review Board has had some success in releasing NSA records. This document. .
[6024]discloses NSA's Intercepts of communications related to Cuban military alerts after the
[6025]assassination of President John F. Kennedy. & was criginaify ursavailable to the public
[6026]in any form and was exempt from automatic declassification. This document was
[6028]released with sanitizations i by Board vote.
[6030]Exhibit G.
[6031]Memorandum to McGeorge Bundy from Gordon Chase, Jurse 15, 1964. Subject:
[6033]Assassination of Castro.
[6035]This document from the files of the National Security Council wes originally classified
[6036]“Secret” and was exempted from declassification in 1876. The NSC agreed to release
[6037]it in full after discussions with the Review Board in 1998.
[6041]13-00000 anne (g004
[6043]wer wee awe ee ke ea ae UR
[6047]categories of information exempt from release (although the clear articulation of
[6048]such categories is important), but the allocation of the burden of proof to the
[6049]party that seeks to exempt information from release.
[6051]Because these four points are Inextricably interconnected, | will discuss them in
[6052]reference to our work and to a series of documents that are attached as exhibits to this
[6053]testimony.
[6055]During the past four years, | have spent hundreds of hours talking with officials .
[6056]from-more than a dozen agencies and reviewing memoranda that argue against the
[6057]release of certain types of classifled information. it has been my general impression
[6058]that the officials making such arguments are intelligent, conscientious, competent, and
[6059]hardworking. (I also have had the general impression that they have sought to be
[6060]cooperative with the Review Board and that they have made good-faith efforts to
[6062]- comply with the JFK Act.) One nevertheless cannot help but observe a deep-seated,
[6063]institutional reluctance to release information — particularly on the part of those
[6064]institutions that were created for the purposes of collecting secret information and
[6065]preserving secrets.
[6067]In order to facilitate declassification, S. 712 requires agencies to articulate their
[6068]reasons for initial classifications and for exemptions from declassification. For example,
[6069]Section 4(¢)(2)(A) would require the agency to “provide in writing a detailed justification
[6070]for [an initial classification] decision.” Similarly, with regard to the 30-year review, _
[6071]agencies would “certi[fy] to the President at the end of such 30-year period that
[6072]continued protection of the Information from unauthorized disclosure is essential to the
[6073]national security of the United States .. . .” (Sect. 4(d)(2)). The talented officials who
[6074]are hired by the agencies will be able to provide such explanations and such
[6075]justifications. The issue from my perspective is not whether agencies are ablo to .
[6076]articulate such justifications, but to what extent their justifications can withstand
[6077]scrutiny. Let me provide some examples where initial Justifications for withholding
[6078]information did not withstand scrutiny.
[6080]Ilustration 1. See Exhibit A. The first illustration is a CIA cable dated November
[6082]27, 1963, that has now been released in full, As you can see,.the second line of typed
[6083]text includes the crypts (or cryptonyms) “RYBAT” and “GPFLOOR.” These crypts
[6084]appear in what is called the “slug line” and they are routing and sensitivity Indicators.
[6085]“GPFLOOR’ Is the crypt that refers to Lee Harvey Oswald. This same crypt appears in
[6086]the first line of the second paragraph of text. The CIA originally advised that GPFLOOR
[6087]could not be released In the slug line afthough it could be released in the text of the
[6088]cable. | had several discussions with agency officials as they tried to explain why
[6089]GPFLOOR could be released in one place but not in the other. | could not understand
[6090]their explanations. At that time | was new to the work and I did not know whether | was
[6091]simply not bright enough or experienced enough to understand the explanation being
[6093]- offered. | again raised the question in a later meeting with several agency officials that
[6097]aca ve tae UOT ARKB
[6101]covered other topics. Finally, an official said: “I don't see why It can't be released. This
[6102]is an issue for COMMO [COMMO i is the Communications Office.) Someone ask
[6103]COMMO whether it cares.” COMMO was subsequently asked — and it had no objection
[6104]to the release. | now infer that protecting crypts in slug lines was an ingrained agency
[6105]habit rather than a considered judgment. The disclosure came only after incessant
[6106]questioning by a skeptical interlocutor.
[6108]Illustration 2. During the course of our review of records from the Secret Service,
[6109]the Board identified for the Secret Service a record It intended to open in full and the
[6110]agency objected. The Board then advised that a copy of the record had actually been
[6111]published in full in 1964 as an exhibit to the Warren Commission Report. The agency
[6112]continued to object, arguing that even a subsequent release of an open document
[6113]would again disclose matters that should be kept secret. The Board subsequently
[6114]voted to open the record.
[6116]iifustration 3. In several FBI documents that were ‘subject to appeal to the
[6117]President, the FBI argued that certain types of its electronic surveillance had not
[6118]previously been disclosed. In our opposing memoranda, we showed that Director J.
[6119]Edgar Hoover, in open testimony to Congress, had effectively disclosed the existence
[6120]of the electronic surveillance. Those records are now open.
[6122]litustration 4. See Exhibit B. The Review Board was presented with a heavily _
[6123]redacted but provocative. document-pertaining to an FBI “intemal Security” Inquiry into
[6124]Lee Harvey Oswald in October 1960. The FBI declined to release the Information,
[6125]arguing that it contained the equities of a foreign govemment and that the govemment
[6126]had refused to release the information. The Review Board, with the assistance of the
[6127]Department of State, thereupon approached the Swiss Goverment and requested that
[6128]it consent to the release of information about the assistance that the Swiss Federal ~
[6129]Police provided to the FBI to, track down Oswald. The Swiss government agreed and
[6130]the record is now open in full.
[6132]illustration 5. See Exhibit C. The Review Board located several Top Secret
[6133]documents related to military contingency planning for a coup in Cuba. Exhibit C
[6134]contains one page from a 58-page document from this group that had been “excluded
[6135]from automatic downgrading and deciassification." The Review Board staff arranged
[6136]for a group of declassiflers from several military and other nationa!l-security entities to
[6137]meet at the Review Board offices in a joint-declassification session. The 58 pages of
[6138]this document, and many other records from this group, have gone from being
[6139]completely closed to completely open.
[6141]Illustration 6. See Exhibit D. In May 1963, Secretary of Defense Robert
[6142]McNamara met with military advisers in the eighth of a series of conferences on
[6143]Vietnam. Exhibit D includes all of the materiaf that had been publicly released on the
[6144]conference prior to Review Board action (a 6-page summary published in Foreign
[6146]13-00000 woos
[6148]oe ee ee 2
[6152]Relations of the United States, 1961-63 Vol. 3) and the title page of a 213-page Record
[6153][of the] Eighth Secretary of Defense Conference from the Joint Chiefs of Staff Official
[6154]File that has now been opened in full. Prior to Review Board action, the memorandum
[6155]had been excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification and could
[6156]presumably have remained classified forever. A stamp on page 1 discloses that the
[6157]document was systematically reviewed by JCS in May 1989 and the classification of
[6158]Top Secret was continued, The document was opened in full at a declassification
[6159]session in July 1997. _
[6161]Illustration 7. See Exhibit E. Like the FBI, the CIA typically is reluctant to
[6162]release information regarding technical surveillance. Exhibit E is a monthly operational
[6163]report from Mexico City from September 1-30, 1963, a period that includes Oswald's
[6164]arrival in the Mexican capital. In 1993, the document was postponed in its entirety. The
[6165]Review Board voted to open the record In its entirety.
[6167]Hlustration 8. See Exhibit F. The Review Board has also had some success in
[6168]releasing NSA records. Exhibit F is dated November 26, 1963, and discloses NSA’s
[6169]intercepts of communications related to Cuban military alerts after the assassination. It
[6170]was originally unavailable to the public in any form and was exempt from
[6171]declassification. After Board action, the important Information has been released.
[6173]Iilustration 9. See Exhibit G. Exhibit G is a Natlonal Security Council document -..-------
[6175]that pertains to an alleged plot: to assassinate Castro. Although it was originally
[6176]classified “Secret” and was deemed to be exempt from declassification, the NSC
[6177]agreed to release it in full after discussions with the Board. ’
[6179]I trust that these examples show that agencies are initially inclined to protect
[6180]information that can and should be released. But the examples also show that, with a
[6181]little prodding by an independent entity, agencies can and will participate in a
[6182]cooperative spirit to declassify secrets. Under the current regime, outside of the JFK
[6183]Act, agencies have little intemal or extemal incentive to take an energetic approach to ~
[6184]declassifying records. Agencies do not send the message to agency personnel that a
[6185]fast track to career advancement lies with the release of more information than is
[6186]absolutely necessary. Agencies have the natural disinclination to release information
[6187]that has been painstakingly acquired. Ultimately, secrecy becomes a habit and
[6188]declassification is mired in lack of attention and inertia. There is, however, an important
[6189]and encouraging message that comes out of the Board's experience: once agencies
[6190]come to the understanding that they must declassify records and that there is a
[6191]presumption that records should be opened, the agencies will cooperate in good faith
[6192]with the requirements established by Congress.
[6194]13-00000 cee ah nee nets A ae REMAN TGR SEW De TESS GIPT T
[6195], ig
[6196]orcas 9d LU 14:58 FAX 202 724 0457 ARRB [2007
[6198]Ill. The Mechanics of Declassification
[6200]Declassification involves more than appropriate standards for the release of
[6201]information. It also calls for the estab&shment of effective mechanisms to move records _.
[6202]through the bureaucracy. Once again, the experience of the Review Board provides
[6203]valuable lessons that should be of use to this Committee in considering fegisiation. |
[6204]would like to draw attention to four important points involving the mechanics of
[6205]declassification.
[6207]First, the “referral process” is one of the most significant,- government-wide
[6208]bottlenecks to the declassification of records. Before an agency can release
[6209]information in Its records that was obtained from another agency, it must refer the
[6210]record to the agency from which & derived that information. Although this procedure is
[6211]a sensible arrangement that promotes the valuable goal of sharing information among
[6212]agencies, it becomes a costly and time-consuming obstacle to declassification. Very
[6213]frequently, records become trapped in the morass of the referral process.
[6215]The Review Board developed essentially three procedures to help expedite the
[6216]referral process: (a) establishing joint-deciassification sessions where several agencies
[6217]convened at the Review Board offices (or sometimes at another site) and declassified
[6218]records; (b) hand-carrying records from one agency to another and having them
[6219]declassified on-site; and (c) giving agencies notice that-unless.records-were reviewed
[6220]by a certain date, thé Board would simply vote to open the records without receiving the
[6221]benefit of their input. In my opinion, any legislation designed to improve the
[6222]deciassification process must take info account this referral bottleneck by giving to the
[6223]independent, supervising agency, the authority to set enforceable timetables.
[6225]The ability to bring agencies together, such as In the joint-declassification
[6226]sessions, has important beneficial effects that extend beyond expediting the referral
[6227]process. In our experience, agencies tended to lose some of their institutional
[6228]inhibitions as they sat at a table with each other and discussed records openly.
[6229]‘Surprisingly, agencies typically assumed that another agency would not release
[6230]information when the other agency was in fact willing to do so. Frequently, it is the
[6231]suspicion that one agency does not want to release information that inhibits other
[6232]agencies from releasing Information. Like the COMMO example from Illustration 1
[6233]above, the perception of unwillingness to open records is sometimes greater than the
[6234]need to keep records closed.
[6236]Second, the Review Board profitted from the power, authorized by Congress, to
[6237]“direct a Government office to make available to the Review Board . . . additional
[6238]information, records, or testimony from individuals, which the Review Board has reason
[6239]to believe is required to fulfill its functions and responsibilities . . . .” JFK Act, §
[6240]7()(1)(C)(ii).. This power enabled the Review Board to obtain information about the
[6241]basis for classifications, the existence of records relevant to completing its mandate,
[6243]13-00000
[6245]wee ee Ca Vee . ANKE
[6249]and the circumstances surrounding the creation of records. It is important that an
[6250]agency with supervisory responsibility over declassification have the authority to obtain
[6251]the information It needs to accomplish its work.
[6253]Third, as with the referral process, a frequent bottleneck in the deciassification.
[6254]process is the final transfer of records from the declassifying agency to the National
[6255]Archives. An independent entity responsible for supervising this process should have
[6256]the authority and responsibility of guaranteeing that once the declassification process is
[6257]complete, the final step of making records available to the public is taken.
[6259]’ Fourth, although the start-up process is very time-consuming, it is a necessary
[6260]prelude to more efficlent and productive work. The start-up time for the Review Board,
[6261]as | understand is also the case for Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel
[6262](ISCAP), required education not only of the Board and staff, but also of the agencies. It
[6263]is important that any future planning of an endeavor of this nature take Into account the
[6264]initial costs and, importantly, take advantages of the lessons leamed by the Review
[6265]Board. The initial cost can be recuperated in the long run.
[6269]When an independent agency, such as the Review Board, has the authority to
[6271]set the agenda (by establishing timetables), sponsor joint declassification sessions,
[6273]require the production of evidence, and ensure the prompt transfer of declassified
[6274]records from the agencies to the National Archives, declassification can be a success.
[6275]I strongly urge this Committee -to take advantage of the momentum created by the JFK
[6276]Act and by {SCAP, and create an authority that will be able to bring Independence,
[6277]consistency, and energy to the process of making the government more open and
[6279]accountable to the people who have paid for it.
[6281]WV. Recommendations for Making S. 712 More Effective
[6283]With regard to S. 712, | wish to summarize the following recommendations that
[6285]‘ have been offered either explicitly or implicitly in the testimony above:
[6287]First, the entity responsible for overseeing the declassification process (which, in
[6288]the current version of the S. 712, is the National Declassification Center), must be
[6289]genuinely independent of the agencies whose records it oversees. The Center should
[6290]be staffed by persons who are both sensitive to the genuine secrets of the agencies,
[6291]but who also are skeptical and demanding of proof.
[6293]Second, the independent entity should have the power to set reasonable
[6294]timetables by which an agency must complete the declassitication review (or referral
[6295]review). The independent entity should be empowered to release information on its
[6296]own authority if agencies do not comply with reasonable timetables. The independent
[6297]agency should additionally be empowered to obtain information from the agencies that
[6299]Moos
[6301]13-00000
[6303]Moog
[6307]is essential for completing its work.
[6309]Third, the legislation should incorporate a statutory provision that, at a certain
[6310]point in time, records will presumptively be opened unless the agencies are able to
[6311]articulate specific and persuasive reasons for continued redactions. Although it would
[6312]be sensible to provide agencies with the benefit of the doubt regarding declassification
[6313]for an initial period (@.g., between 10 and 25 years), once this period has passed the
[6314]presumption should shift decisively in favor of releasing the information.
[6316]Fourth, agencies should be required to do more than provide mere: “detalled
[6317]justifications” (see, 6.g., S. 712 § 4(c)(2)(A)) for classifying and refusing to declassify
[6318]records. The written explanations must be more than “justifications,” they must be able
[6319]to convince a skeptical reader who has sufficient information to evaluate the merits of
[6320]the writing.
[6322]Fifth, it would be highly advisable to provide the declassification entity (the
[6323]National Declassification Genter), with the authority to make binding requests to
[6325]_ agencies to search out records that may have been misplaced or misfiled.
[6327]Finally, there is one additional recommendation that | would make that
[6328]presumably goes beyond the scope of today’s hearing and so | will raise it only in
[6329]passing. | beliave it would be advisable for future Executive Orders to break down the
[6330]“sources and methods” exemption, Inasmuch as itis used too casually and it covers a
[6332]~ multitude of very distinct issues. To the extent that the Committee Is interested, | would
[6334]be willing to submit additional comments at a later point to develop this issue.
[6336]a . * x.
[6338]| would like once again to thank the Committee for taking seriously the right of
[6339]the American people to better understand how their govemment functions. ! would be
[6340]pleased to answer your questions.
[6342]13-00000
[6344]STATEMENT OF STEVEN GARFINKEL
[6345]DIRECTOR, INFORMATION SECURITY OVERSIGHT OFFICE*
[6346]NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
[6348]before the
[6350]COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
[6352]UNITED STATES SENATE
[6353]CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
[6354]March 25,1998 Oh HME SIFICATION ANDIOR
[6355]OELEASE OF CIA, INFORMATICE
[6357]NTHIS DOCUMENT
[6358]Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: ~
[6360]| am very pleased to. appear before you today to report on our progress in implementing
[6361]the recently established system for classifying, safeguarding, and declassifying
[6362]national security information. On April 17, 1995, the President issued Executive Order
[6363]12958, entitled “Classified National Security Information.” This Order took effect on
[6364]October 14, 1995, only two and one-half years ago. While still in its early stages of .
[6366]implementation, the Order clearly attempts to strike an appropriate balance.
[6368]*The Information Security Oversight Office, or SOO, is responsible for overseeing Government-wide
[6369]implementation of the security programs under Executive Order 12958, “Classified National Security
[6370]Information," and Executive Order 12829, "National Industrial Security Program.” [SOO is also
[6371]responsible for reporting annually to the President on the status of those programs. Created in 1978,
[6372]ISOO became a component of the National Archives and Records Administration in November 1995. In
[6373]addition to reporting to the Archivist of the United States, the Director of ISOO receives policy guidance
[6374]from the National Security Council.
[6376]Among its functions, ISOO: (1) develops implementing directives and instructions; (2) maintains liaison
[6377]with all agencies that create or handle classified information; (3) inspects agency programs and reviews
[6378]their classified records; (4) receives and responds to public complaints, appeals and suggestions;
[6380](5) collects and reports to the President and Congress relevant statistical data about the security
[6381]classification program, including data about its costs; (6) serves as a spokesperson for information about
[6382]the security classification program; (7) provides program and administrative support for the Interagency
[6383]Security Classification Appeals Panel and the Information Security Policy Advisory Council; and
[6385](8) recommends policy changes to the President through the National Security Council.
[6387]13-00000
[6389]On the one hand, it seeks to reduce the permitted level of secrecy within our
[6390]Government, and to make available to the American people hundreds of millions of
[6391]pages of historically valuable documents that no longer require protection in the
[6392]interest of national security. On the other hand, the Order enables us to safeguard the
[6394]_ information that we must in order to protect our nation and our citizens. .
[6395]Already, this new system has achieved some rather remarkable results:
[6397]e Inthe last two years, the agencies of the executive branch have declassified more
[6399]than 400 million pages of permanently valuable government records.
[6401]° Of the more than 650 million pages that the executive branch has declassified since
[6403]1980, more than 70% of that total took place in the past three years.
[6405]e Agencies that never previously contemplated large-scale declassification, like the
[6406]Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the National
[6408]Reconnaissance Office, now have in place productive declassification units.
[6410]e The Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel, a new six member panel!
[6411]representing the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Attorney General, the
[6412]Director of Central Intelligence, the Archivist of the United States and the Assistant
[6414]to the President for National Security Affairs, has declassified in their entirety more =: -
[6416]13-00000
[6418]than 70% of the documents that have come before it on appeal from agency
[6420]decisions to keep those same documents classified.
[6422]e Original classification decisions, the actions most akin to new secrets, have
[6424]decreased to historic lows.
[6426]e Anecdotally, those of us who are exposed to a wide variety of classified information
[6427]are noting more and more situations in which information that would have been
[6428]routinely classified in the past is now routinely unclassified, without any increased
[6430]threat to our national security.
[6431]t
[6433]Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, | can state with total confidence that the
[6434]United States Government stands far in the forefront among nations in the manner,
[6435]timing and extent to which it makes available to its citizens and the general public its
[6436]records of governance, including its formerly classified records. In conversation after
[6437]conversation that | have had over the years with foreign government officials, and with *
[6438]foreign students, researchers, and joumalists, one visitor after another has expressed
[6439]great admiration for the degree of openness offered by our freedom of information laws,
[6440]and our security classification system, with its limitations on classification and its
[6442]emphasis on declassifying information as soon as it is prudent to do so.
[6444]13-00000
[6446]These indicators of progress do not mean that we have all the answers about our
[6447]security classification system or that there aren't ttemendous hurdles to clear. For
[6448]example, the implementation of the new system has been uneven among the major —
[6449]classifying agencies, and a few are only now just getting started; the costs of
[6450]implementing the system at some agencies are higher than we anticipated; and
[6452]resource limitations are having a clear impact on agency compliance and oversight. To
[6454]_be sure, the standards and goals established within the new Executive Order are
[6456]unparalleled. We are not yet certain that every agency, or perhaps any agency, can
[6457]achieve them. However, only if the targets are difficult can reaching them be
[6459]noteworthy.
[6461]| recognize that the focus of today’s hearing is the legislation before the Committee. |
[6462]will try to answer any questions you may have conceming the similarities and |
[6463]differences between the security classification system that currently exists and the
[6464]system that S. 712, as currently drafted, would impose. The Administration has serious
[6465]objections to certain provisions of S. 712, particularly as they could impinge upon the
[6466]President's authority and flexibility to manage the classification and decliassification
[6467]programs. Legislating in this area can be perilous, given the great deference
[6469]traditionally given to the President in the areas of national defense and foreign affairs.
[6471]13-00000
[6473]However, the Administration is prepared to work with the Congress to address these
[6474]concerns and to establish an effective National Declassification Center. .- The
[6475]Administration will identify the revisions that would be required to enable the
[6477]Administration to support S. 712.
[6479]. s
[6480]Aa . 4
[6481]Board of Sponsors
[6482](Pe tial List) @ : [ e@
[6484]* Sidney Altman
[6485]Bruce Ames
[6486]* Philip W. Anderson
[6487]* Kenneth J. Arrow
[6488]* Julius Axelrod
[6489]* David Baltimore
[6490]* Baruj Benacerraf
[6491]* Hans A. Bethe
[6492]* J. Michael Bishop
[6493]* Konrad Bloch
[6495]* Norman E, Borlaug
[6496]* Owen Chamberlain
[6497]Abram Chayes
[6498]* Stanley Cohen
[6499]* Leon N. Cooper
[6500]*E J. Corey
[6501]Paul B. Comely
[6502]* Johann Deisenhofer
[6504]John T. Edsall
[6505]Paul R. Ehrlich
[6507]Carl Kaysen
[6508]Chairman
[6510]* Donald Glaser
[6512]* Sheldon L. Glashéw
[6513]Marvin L. Goldberger *
[6515]* Joseph L. Goldstein
[6517]* Roger C.L. Guillemin
[6519]* Herbert A. Hauptman
[6521]* Dudley R. Herschbach
[6522]Frank von Hippel
[6524]* Roald Hoffmann
[6526]. John P. Holdren
[6528]* David H. Hubel
[6530]* Jerome Karle
[6531]Nathan Keyfitz
[6533]* H. Gobind Khorana
[6535]* Arthur Kornberg
[6537]* Edwin G. Krebs
[6539]* Willis E. Lamb, Jr.
[6541]* Leon Lederman
[6543]* Wassily W. Leontief
[6545]* William N. Lipscomb
[6546]Jessica T. Mathews
[6547]Matthew S. Meselson
[6548]Neal E. Miller
[6550]* Franco Modigliani -
[6551]Philip Morrison
[6552]Stephen S. Morse
[6554]* Joseph E. Murray
[6556]* Daniel Nathans
[6558]* Marshall Nirenberg
[6560]* Douglas D. Osheroff
[6562]* Amo A. Penzias
[6564]* Martin L. Pert
[6565]Gerard Piel
[6566]Paul Portney
[6567]Mark Ptashne
[6568]George Rathjens
[6570]* Frederick Reines
[6572]* Burton Richter
[6574]* Richard J. Roberts
[6575]Vernon Ruttan
[6576]Jeffrey Sachs
[6580]* J. Robert Schrieffer
[6582]*Glenn T. Seaborg
[6584]* Phillip A. Sharp
[6586]* Herbert A. Simon
[6588]* Richard E. Smalicy
[6589]Neil Smelser
[6591]* Jack Steinberger
[6593]* Henry Taube
[6595]* James Tobin
[6597]* Charles H. Townes
[6598]Robert A. Weinberg
[6599]Victor F. Weisskopf
[6601]* Torsten N. Wiesel
[6602]CLS. Wu
[6603]Herben F. York
[6605]Eric Hall Ameit
[6606]Rosemary Chalk
[6607]Steve Fetter
[6609]* Nobel laureates
[6611]FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS
[6613]307 Massachusetts Avenue, N.E. E-Mail fas@fas.org
[6614]Washington, D.C. 20002 Web http://www. fas.org/
[6615]Phone (202) 546-3300 Facsimile (202) 675-1010
[6617]Robert M. Adams Ann Druyan Charles C. Price Jeremy J. Stone
[6618]Vice-Chairman Secretary Treasurer President
[6619]Cl ! a
[6620]A HAS NO OBJECTION TO
[6622]DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
[6624]RELEASE OF Cia
[6625]tt THIS OCU: Tien NFORMATION
[6627]Statement
[6628]of
[6629]Steven Aftergood
[6631]"Director, Project on Government Secrecy
[6633]Federation of American Scientists
[6635]before the
[6637]Committee on Governmental Affairs
[6639]United States Senate
[6641]Hearing on
[6643]S. 712, The Government Secrecy Act
[6645]March 25, 1998
[6647]National Council Meaibers
[6649]*Val L. Fitch Arthur H. Rosenfeld
[6650]Robert Socotow
[6652]Bums H. Weston
[6654]Morton H. Halperin
[6655]Linda Gottfredson Daniel Kammen
[6656]David Hafemeister Priscilla J. McMillan
[6658]ex officio: *Robert M. Solaw. Andrew Sessier
[6660]13-00000
[6662]Introduction
[6664]Mr. Chairman, | appreciate the opportunity to address your Committee ori the
[6665]subject of government secrecy.
[6667]| believe that this subject is as important as any on the Committee's agenda
[6668]because it goes directly to the heart of our political system. Government controls on
[6669]information define the limits of American democracy. Limits on information mean limits
[6670]on informed debate, limits on the ability of citizens to meaningfully communicate with
[6671]their representatives, and on their ability to hold elected offi cials accountable.
[6673]At the same time, it is self-evident that some degree of secrecy is necessary in
[6674]certain matters of national security, including the protection of advanced military —
[6675]technologies and the conduct of diplomatic and intelligence activities.
[6677]‘A sound government information policy is therefore one that strikes a
[6678]responsible and appropriate balance between the imperatives of open, accountable
[6679]government and the requirements of national security secrecy.
[6681]Such a balance is precisely what has been lacking throughout the modern era of
[6682]cold war secrecy, leaving us today with a grotesquely distended secrecy system that
[6683]improperly withholds unimaginable quantities of records from public access while often
[6684]failing to protect genuine secrets.
[6686]My hope is that Congress and this Committee will take steps towards a new
[6687]balance that corrects the failings of the past, and will enact a government information
[6688]policy that better serves the national interest.
[6690]In the following remarks, | will first present several assertions about secrecy - _
[6691]policy by way of background, and | will then draw some specific conclusions concerning
[6692]the Government Secrecy Act.
[6694]BACKGROUND
[6696]I would like to emphasize several points that | believe should form the foundation
[6697]for congressional deliberation on the future of the government secrecy system.
[6699]1. Most Americans believe that government secrecy is excessive.
[6701]One might well suppose that public concern about official secrecy is limited to
[6703]‘those who are most immediately affected by it, such as journalists and historians, as
[6705]well as a smail cadre of advocates and activists. But that is not the case.
[6707]Public surveys conducted for the Department of Defense in 1994 and 1996
[6708]consistently found that a majority (55%) of Americans believe that “the government
[6710]13-00000
[6712]protects too many documents by classifying them as SECRET and TOP SECRET.”
[6714]In other words, concern about excessive government secrecy is not simply’the
[6715]province of “special interest” groups; it is shared throughout the general public.
[6716]Reducing government secrecy truly is a matter of “public interest.”
[6718]Much of this public concern is latent and diffuse, but it crystallizes time and
[6719]again around specific issues— the JFK assassination, POW/MIAs in Southeast Asia,
[6720]UFQs, Nazi war crimes, human rights violations in Latin America, and so forth.
[6722]2. Excessive classification is a fact. But independent review can overcome it.
[6724]Even if the majority of Americans believe that government secrecy is excessive,
[6726]‘they could conceivably be mistaken. But they-are not mistaken. It is demonstrably true
[6728]that government agencies classify too much and fail-to declassify information that no
[6729]longer warrants protection.
[6731]This problem is illustrated with particular clarity by the fact that agency refusals
[6732]to declassify records are frequently overturned— within the executive branch itself— by
[6733]the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP), which receives appeals
[6734]from members of the public for documents that agencies have refused to declassify
[6736]Deputy Assistant Attorney General Roslyn A. Mazer, who was appointed by
[6737]President Clinton to chair the ISCAP, reported recently on the latest activities of her
[6738]Panel, which includes representatives of the Departments of Justice, State, Defense,
[6739]CIA, NSC and the National Archives:
[6741]We have taken final votes on appeals for declassification of more than 70
[6742]documents on a wide variety of subjects. Of these, we have voted to declassify
[6743]more than 70 percent of them in their entirety, while declassifying significant
[6744]segments of most of the remainder. This is significant in my view because, in
[6745]each instance, we are voting to overturn an agency's decision reached at its
[6746]highest level of appeal...
[6748]‘Not inconsistently, a majority of those surveyed also favor “a high level of
[6749]secrecy” for technology with military applications. “Public Attitudes Towards Security
[6750]and Counter-Espionage Matters in 1994 and 1996" by Tom W. Smith, National Opinion
[6751]Research Center, prepared for the Department of Defense Personnel Security
[6752]Research Center, November 1996. <http:/Avww.fas:org/sgp/othergov/perssur2.htmlI>.
[6754]?Remarks by Roslyn A. Mazer, Chair, Interagency Security Classification
[6755]Appeals Panel, before the DoD Historical Records Declassification Advisory Panel,
[6756]March 6, 1998, emphasis added. <http:/Awww.fas.org/sgp/advisory/iscap0398.htmi>.
[6758]2
[6760]13-00000
[6762]The fact that agency classification policies often cannot withstand scrutiny even
[6763]within the executive branch points to the root of the problem. The problem is not that
[6764]classifiers are dishonest or acting in bad faith; in general, they are doing.a thankless
[6765]job the best they can.
[6767]The problem rather is the natural and often unconscious tendency of all
[6768]bureaucracies to limit the flow of information to outsiders. As Sen. Moynihan observed,
[6769]“The problem is that organizations within a culture of secrecy will opt for classifying as
[6770]much as possible, and for as long as possible.”* If they go unchecked, agencies will
[6771]hoard information beyond all reason, which is how we got to where we are today.
[6773]Fortunately, Ms. Mazer’s remarks also revéal a solution to this unavoidable
[6774]problem, and that is independent review of agency classification decisions. The record
[6775]of the ISCAP demonstrates that unnecessary classification can be reduced or
[6776]eliminated when contested classification actions are reviewed by “outsiders” who share
[6777]the agency's commitment to national security, but who do not share its Weberian
[6778]tendencies toward bureaucratic secrecy.
[6780]Only such independent reviewers are capable of separating the national security
[6781]wheat from the bureaucratic chaff. | believe that this is a crucial principle which should
[6783]‘inform Congressional action in this area.
[6785]3. Congress is free to legislate on secrecy policy.
[6787]The Justice Department “strongly opposes a statutory framework for the
[6788]safeguarding of national security information,” arguing in effect not only that the
[6789]President has the authority to set and implement classification policies, but that he has
[6791]‘exclusive authority to do so.4
[6793]The Committee should recognize that this is a natural and predictable response ,
[6794]from the executive branch, which seeks to preserve its prerogatives and to maximize its
[6795]own freedom of action. But | believe the Justice Department overstates its case.
[6797]3Report of the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy
[6798](“Commission Report”), 1997, Chairman's Foreword, page xxxix. Available in
[6799]searchable “html” format at <http:/Avww.fas.org/sgp/library/moynihan/index.html>.
[6801]“"Subjecting the protection of national security information to statutorily-required
[6802]standards or procedures would raise constitutional concerns to the extent that it would
[6803]limit the President's ability to discharge a core constitutional responsibility as he sees
[6804]fit.” Memorandum from the Deputy Attorney General on the Government Secrecy Act of
[6805]1997, September 15, 1997.
[6807]13-00000
[6809]There is no question.that Congress has the right and, | would say, the obligation
[6810]to legislate in this area, particularly since the executive branch has failed to manage:
[6811]the secrecy system in a way that best serves the national interest. As Harold Relyea of
[6812]the Congressional’ Research Service has pointed out:
[6814]Pursuant to its constitutional authority “To make Rules for the Government and
[6816]Regulation of the land and naval forces” (Article |, Section 8, clause 14), as well
[6817]as the “necessary and proper’ clause (Article I, Section 8, clause 18), Congress:
[6818]has long established rules, regulations, and procedures of general effect for the
[6820]government and the armed services.... These clauses would appear to empower’ .-
[6822]Congress with authority to. legislate policy and procedure comparable to that
[6823]prescribed by presidential executive order to effect security classification.> —
[6825]The right of Congress to enact secrecy-related legislation has also been clearly
[6826]recognized by the Supreme Court. Prier to the 1974 amendments to the Freedom of.
[6827]Information Act, the Court held in EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973) that Congress had
[6828]not intended for the courts to examine the propriety of classification decisions or
[6829]procedures. But, as Kate Martin of the Center for National Security Studies has noted,
[6830]the Court also found that:
[6832]Congress could certainly have provided that the Executive Branch adopt new
[6833]procedures or it could have established its own procedures— subject only to __
[6834]whatever limitations the Executive privilege may be held toi impose upon such
[6835]congressional ordering.®
[6837]And of course Congress has enacted legislation dictating classification policy on
[6838]numerous occasions, including the statutory classification framework of the Atomic
[6839]Energy Act and the National Security Act, in which Congress (not the President)
[6840]assigned the Director of Central Intelligence. the responsibility for protecting
[6841]intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.
[6843]Furthermore, Congress has also successfully enacted statutes requiring ©
[6845]5Statement by Harold C. Relyea, Congressional Research Service, before the
[6846]House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence hearing on “A Statutory Basis for
[6847]Classifying Information,” March 16, 1994, page 48ff.
[6849]®410 U.S. at 83 (1973). See Testimony of Kate Martin, Director, Center for
[6850]National Security Studies, before the House Permanent Select Committee on
[6851]Intelligence hearing on “A Statutory Basis for Classifying Information,” March 16, 1994,
[6852]page 66ff, for further elaboration of related Court rulings, and her conclusion that “the
[6853]only possible constitutional limitation would be that the Congress could not order
[6854]disclosure of advice given to the President that would constitute a state secret.”
[6856]4
[6858]13-00000
[6860]disclosure of certain classified information, including the JFK Assassination Records,
[6861]Collection Act (P.L. 102-526) and legislation concerning the State Department's .
[6862]Foreign Relations of the United States series (P.L. 102-138). In addition, Congress has
[6863]granted itself the authority to declassify any information in its possession.’
[6865]Today, several more bills mandating declassification are pending before
[6866]Congress, including: S. 1220, "The. Human Rights Information Act"; S. 1232, a bill to
[6867]declassify the private journal of Dr. Glenn Seaborg®; and S. 1379, "The Nazi War
[6868]Crimes Disclosure Act.""° Each of these bills was introduced because the public had
[6869]no choice but to turn to Congress in order to correct the failings of executive branch
[6870]classification and declassification policies. If the Justice Department position were to
[6871]be taken at face value, all of these bills— as well as the Freedom of Information Act
[6873]: itself— would be unconstitutional, and executive branch officials would have completely
[6874]_ unchecked power to withhold whatever information they Chose.
[6876]__ Inshort, while the executive branch is entitled to advise Congress to stay out of
[6877]national security information policy, Congress must be guided by the larger national
[6878]interest and has every right to reject that advice, as it has in the past.
[6880]4. The secrecy system is not as bad as it could be.
[6882]A statutory secrecy system should be conceived as a means, not an end in itself.
[6883]In considering legislative changes to secrecy policy, Congress should aim to fix what
[6884]needs fixing, but also to preserve what warrants preserving.
[6886]In particular, the Committee should recognize the changes that were
[6887]inaugurated with President Clinton’s executive order 12958, and which have already .
[6888]produced some impressive results.
[6890]Most important, from my point of view, is the order’s automatic declassification
[6891]provision (section 3.4) which requires the declassification of most historically valuable
[6893]25 year old documents by April 2000. This provision has generated an unprecedented
[6894]surge in declassification, reported at nearly 200 million pages in FY 1996 alone."
[6896]7See Senate Resolution 400, section 8. |
[6904]14996 ISOO Report to the President <http:/Awww.fas.org/sgp/isoo/isoo96.htm|>.
[6905]5
[6907]13-00000
[6909]So Congress need not and should not consider classification policy in a vacuum.
[6910]It must start with the reality of classification policy as it is today and “first, do no harm.”
[6911]Legislative changes to the classification system should begin by affirming what is°
[6912]positive in current policy— and then building on it.
[6914]THE GOVERNMENT SECRECY ACT OF 1997
[6916]The Government Secrecy Act contains a number of important provisions which
[6917]are derived from the two-year investigation of the Commission on Protecting and
[6918]Reducing Government Secrecy. The Act's two most positive innovations— a “balancing
[6919]test” and a National Declassification Center— are also the ones that have elicited the
[6920]strongest opposition from the executive branch. | will comment briefly on each of
[6921]these, and suggest one other area for Committee consideration.
[6923]1. The balancing test and judicial review.
[6925]‘Section 4(c)(1) of the Act would require officials to weigh or “balance” the
[6926]potential benefit from disclosure against the need for protection in making classification
[6927]and declassification decisions, and further dictates that if there is significant doubt
[6928]about the need to ‘classify the information, it shall not be classified.
[6930]From the perspective of a non-governmental consumer of government
[6931]information, this is the Act’s single most important provision.
[6933]In the abstract, the idea of “balancing” is unexceptionable and is almost built into
[6934]the practice of classification. Executive order 12958 includes a discretionary balancing
[6935]test for declassification (sect. 3.2b) as well as a “significant doubt" standard (sect. 1.2b)
[6936]for classification. (Interestingly, the CIA promulgated a balancing test during the Carter
[6937]Administration which remains in effect today [32 C.F.R. 1902. 13(c)].)
[6939]This provision of the Act has drawn agency opposition not because of its
[6940]balancing requirement per se, but because it would allow judicial review of agency
[6941]balancing decisions under the Freedom of Information Act. The idea that courts would
[6942]presume to “second guess” agency classification decisions is profoundly unwelcome to
[6943]classifiers, who warn of disastrous consequences if their judgment is questioned.
[6945]This warning is self-serving and needs to be taken with large grains of salt.
[6946]Similar concerns contributed to President Ford’s decision to veto the 1974 amendments
[6947]to the Freedom of Information Act, which allowed judges to determine whether
[6948]information had been “properly” classified."? Fortunately, Congress overrode that veto
[6949]and it turned out that the opponents’ fears were not realized. ,
[6951]'2See President Ford’s veto message at 120 Congressional Record H36243-4.
[6952]6
[6954]13-00000
[6956]To the contrary, judicial review has been a potent factor in making the FOIA as
[6957]useful a tool of democracy as it is. Indeed, it has been persuasively argued that the °
[6958]courts are not sufficiently diligent in reviewing agency classification decisions."
[6960]The CIA has warned of “costly legal challenges that risk second-guessing of
[6962]‘DCI/CIA judgments.” This is a considerable exaggeration since in practice, no judge
[6964]would reject a sworn affidavit from the DCI that certain information must be withheld.
[6965]But at the same time, CIA classification judgments are in need of the checks and
[6966]balances that judicial review would provide, particularly when it comes to the invocation
[6967]of “sources and methods.” Thus, the Secrecy Commission last year found that:
[6969]the sources and methods rationale has become a vehicle for agencies to
[6970]automatically keep information secret without engaging in the type of harm
[6971]analysis required by executive orders as a prerequisite to keeping other kinds of
[6972]information secret. The statutory requirement that sources and methods be
[6973]protected thus appears at times to have been applied not in a thoughtful way but
[6974]almost by rote.
[6976]Federal court judges will never reject a “thoughtful” or even a merely plausible
[6977]argument about the need to protect intelligence sources and methods. But the
[6978]possibility of judicial review will serve to discourage indefensible “rote” classification.
[6980]Dire warnings of the consequences of judicial review of classification have not
[6981]been borne out by the last 24 years of judicial review under the FOIA, and there is no
[6982]reason to believe that courts would suddenly become reckless now when confronted
[6983]with a balancing test.
[6985]| would add that any suggestions of a “flood” of lawsuits resulting from this ©
[6986]provision are certain to be exaggerated. For the typical FOIA requester, there are huge .
[6987]“barriers to entry” to the judicial system. Legal representation is absurdly expensive,
[6988]and pro bono assistance is generally available only in cases of considerable national
[6989]importance or when victory is all but assured. In the last twenty years | must have filed
[6990]hundreds of FOIA requests, but have brought suit under the FOIA only once.
[6992]The absence of effective “checks and balances” on executive branch
[6993]classification actions has helped to produce today’s bloated and highly arbitrary
[6994]classification system. A balancing test that is subject to judicial review is the most
[6996]"National Security Information Disclosure Under the FOIA: The Need for
[6997]Effective Judicial Enforcement,” Boston College Law Review 25: 611-643 (1 984).
[6999]“Commission Report, Chapter mt page 70, emphasis added.
[7000]7
[7002]13-00000
[7004]appropriate solution.*®
[7005]2. A National Declassification Center ‘
[7007]The proposed National Declassification Center is a response to the fragmented
[7009]. quality of declassification policy, and to the inadequacy of executive branch oversight,
[7011]which the Secrecy Commission described as “the critical missing link.”*
[7013]As currently conceived, however, the Center risks becoming an extraneous
[7014]bureaucracy that agencies are free to utilize or not, as they wish, and that has little or
[7015]no independent authority. In order to fulfill its intended purpose, the Center should be
[7016]assigned specific tasks and authorities. For example:
[7018]. The Center could be assigned to perform independent review and approval of all
[7019]agency declassification guides, so as to ensure their consistency and
[7020]compliance with the provisions of the Act and the executive order.
[7022]» The Center cotild be assigned to perform or to coordinate the declassification of
[7023]all documents involving multiple agency "equities," in order to optimize the
[7024]efficiency of the declassification process.
[7026]Perhaps most important, the Center could undertake in an expanded form many
[7027]of the oversight responsibilities now assigned to the Information Security Oversight
[7028]Office (ISOO) and the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP).
[7030]ISOO, under Steven Garfinkel’s leadership, has a profound understanding of the
[7031]intricacies and shortcomings of secrecy policy and, in my opinion, has generally
[7032]demonstrated good judgment about what is appropriate and achievable and what is not.
[7033]But ISOO’s staffing and resource levels are laughably low when compared to its
[7034]nominal responsibilities. This disparity between resources and responsibilities sends a —
[7035]message throughout the executive branch that “we're not going to take secrecy
[7036]oversight seriously.”
[7038]SThe characteristic risks and benefits of information disclosure, and the
[7039]mechanics of actually balancing them in practice are elucidated by Arvin S. Quist in
[7040]Security Classification of Information, Vol. 2: Principles for Classification of Information,
[7041]Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., Oak Ridge, TN, Report No. K/CG-1077/V2, April
[7042]1993, Chaps. 5; 6. Of particular interest, Quist discusses how legal standards for
[7043]weighing eviderice that are already part of the judicial process— such as “beyond a —
[7044]reasonable doubt,” “clear and convincing evidence,” and “preponderance of the
[7045]evidence’-- could be used in balancing and in any subsequent review (pp. 61-69).
[7047]‘*Commission Report, Chapter 2, page 42.
[7048]8
[7050]13-00000
[7052]The ISCAP, meanwhile, is doing a fine job, but on a tiny scale. And it is already
[7053]operating at full capacity, although its tasks are expected to escalate © sharply j in coming
[7054]years. As ISCAP Chair Roslyn Mazer has noted,
[7056]When | consider what the next few years may hold for ISCAP, | fear that to a
[7057]considerable extent we may become victims of our own successes-- and the
[7058]caseloads that these successes may engender. Unfortunately, ISOO [which
[7059]also supports the ISCAP] is a very small organization that faces ever-increasing
[7060]demands on its resources from the dramatic changes in the classification and
[7061]declassification systems now underway.... the onus on the ISCAP’s staffing
[7062]structure may very well prove too much to bear.’”
[7064]Therefore, one straightforward “fix” that Congress might consider, at least in the
[7065]interim, would be to significantly increase the stature and resources available to these
[7066]two organizations so as to help fill in the “missing link" of executive branch oversight.
[7068]But whether Congress chooses to invigorate the existing oversight entities or to
[7069]establish a new National Declassification Center, the goal should be one that has been .
[7070]clearly formulated by the Secrecy Commission:
[7072]Oversight should be the responsibility of a strong and active organization,
[7073]independent of the agencies that classify, perhaps modeled after agency
[7074]inspector general offices. To be truly effective, such an organization should also
[7075]possess the means to compel agency compliance with established policies...
[7076]Equally critical is that such a body have adequate resources, whether through a
[7077]budget line item or the reallocation of resources from the principal classifying
[7078]agencies."®
[7080]3... What About the “Other” Classification System?
[7082]" If the Government Secrecy Act became law, we would not just have a statutory
[7083]secrecy system— we would have two statutory secrecy systems: one for national
[7084]security information and one for atomic energy information, prescribed by the Atomic
[7085]Energy Act of 1954. This may be too much of a good thing.
[7087]The existence of two parallel classification systems has proven to be a
[7088]significant obstacle to efficiency in secrecy policy, as numerous records must undergo
[7089]separate declassification reviews under each system.
[7091]Remarks by Roslyn Mazer, footnote 2 above.
[7092]*8Commission Report, Chapter 2, page 44.
[7093]9
[7095]13-00000
[7097]Even the high-level executive branch officials who are members of the
[7098]Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel have been flummoxed by the .
[7099]difficulties in coordinating the declassification of information controlled under the
[7100]Atomic Energy Act. This is particularly absurd because, according to Ms. Mazer,
[7102]information that is similar or identical to much of what we have seen designated
[7103]as FRD [i.e. classified under the Atomic Energy Act] has been in the public
[7104]domain for many years, often as a result of a prior Department of Energy
[7105]declassification review. Moreover, there appears to be no system in place to get
[7106]this information declassified, even though the Departments involved— Energy,
[7107]Defense, and State— acknowledge that it is innocuous. "®
[7109]The perpetuation of two distinct classification systems would represent a
[7110]significant compromise of the Government Secrecy Act’s' goal of “a more stable and
[7111]cost-effective set of policies and a more consistent application of rules and
[7112]procedures.”
[7114]Therefore, | would suggest that the Committee consider the feasibility of
[7115]consolidating both classification systems into one.
[7117]CONCLUSION
[7119]Although the Cold War has officially been over for several years now, we stil!
[7120]face the challenges of adapting the inherited structures of that era to the present day.
[7121]Fixing the classification system is foremost among those challenges.
[7123]It is only natural that any significant changes to the status quo will be resisted by
[7124]the bureaucratic systems that are now in place. But the Committee should have
[7125]confidence in the traditional American mechanism of “checks and. balances.”
[7127]By installing new checks and balances into a classification system that has long
[7128]been allowed to function unilaterally, Congress can induce prudent changes that will
[7129]advance the national interest in open and accountable government, while more
[7130]efficiently protecting genuine national security information.
[7132]"Remarks by Roslyn Mazer, footnote 2 above, emphasis added.
[7134]10
[7136]13-00000
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[7140]2 Page 1
[7141]3. ©
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[7148]Congressional Record entry 1 of 100.
[7150]“ELR. 1553, 1-YEAR EXTENSION OF AUTHORIZATION OF THE
[7151]ASSASSINATION RECORDS REVIEW BOARD
[7153](Page: E876] CIA HAS HO ORJECT
[7154]-  DECLASSIFICATION ANDIOR ®
[7155]RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
[7157]HON. DAN BURTON iN THIS DOCUMENT
[7161]in the House of Representatives
[7162]THURSDAY, MAY 8, 1997
[7164]® Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, today I am introducing H.R. 1553, which amends the President
[7165]John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992—Public Law 102-526-~-to provide 1
[7166]additional year for the Assassination Records Review Board to complete its work. This legislation
[7167]would extend the Review Board 's September 30, 1997, termination date.under. current law to.
[7168]September 30, 1998. H.R. 1553 authorizes $1.6 million in fiscal year 1998 for this purpose. I am pleased
[7169]that the Honorable Henry Waxman, the ranking minority member on the Committee on Government
[7170]Reform and Oversight, and the Honorable Louis Stokes, who sponsored the 1992 Act and who chaired
[7171]the House Select Committee on Assassinations that was established in 1976, are original cosponsors of
[7172]FLR. 1553.
[7174]© The purpose of the 1992 legislation was to publicly release records relating to the Kennedy
[7175]assassination at the earliest possible date. The Assassination Records Review Board was set up to
[7176]review and release the voluminous amounts of information in the Government's possession. The FBI,
[7177]‘the Secret Service, the CIA, the Warren Commission, the Rockefeller Commission, the Church
[7178]Committee in the Senate, and the House Select Committee on Assassinations have all held
[7179]assassination records , and records have also been in the possession of certain State and local
[7180]authorities as well as private citizens. When this legislation was considered, nearly 1 million pages of
[7181]records compiled by official investigations of the assassination had not been made available to the
[7182]public, some 30 years after the tragedy. Congress believed that simply making all relevant information
[7183]available to the public was the best way to respond to the continuing high level of interest in the
[7184]Kennedy assassination , and was preferable to undertaking a new congressional investigation. The 1992
[7185]law requires the Review Board to presume that documents relating to the assassination should be made
[7186]public unless there is clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. I believe that the release of this
[7187]information is important to ensure accountability in the Government and to clearly demonstrate to
[7188]Americans that the Government has nothing to hide. _
[7190]® As aresult of the Review Board ‘s efforts, ovcr 10,000 documents have been transferred to the national
[7191]archives and Records Administration for inclusion in the JFK collection. At the end of 1996, that
[7193]13-00000
[7196]AKKD
[7198]"yo zg: AA ZUZ (24 U4dl
[7199]_ G3708/97 FRA 12718 FAA ; Page 2
[7201]Oe
[7203]-
[7205]collection totaled approximately 3.1 million pages and was used extensively by researchers from all over
[7206]the United States. The Review Board was in the news last month when it voted to make public the
[7207]Abraham Zapruder film of the Kennedy assassination . ;
[7209]The President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 originally provided a
[7210]3-year timetable for the Assassination Records Review Board to complete its work. Unfortunately,
[7211]there were lengthy delays in the appointment of Board members, and as a consequence the Review
[7212]Board was scheduled to cease operations before it even began its work. As a result, in 1994 Congress
[7213]restarted the clock by extending the 1992 law's termination date for 1 year, until September 30, 1996.
[7214]The Review Board subsequently exercised its authority to continue operating for 1 additional year, until
[7215]September 30, 1997. Because the review process proved to be more complex and time-consuming than
[7216]anticipated, the President included in his fiscal year 1998 budget a request for a 1-year extension of the
[7217]Review Board 's authorization.
[7219]I support the Assassination Records Review Board 's request for a 1-year extension of its authorization
[7220]so that it can complete its mission in a professional and thorough manner. I have always believed very
[7221]strongly that Congress should not indefinitely continue funding for Federal entities that were clearly
[7222]intended to be temporary in nature. The Review Board has informed me that it is confident that it will
[7223]be able to finish its work and complete its final report if Congress will extend its life for 1 additional
[7224]year, until September 30, 1998.
[7226]‘THIS SEARCH THIS DOCUMENT THIS CR ISSUE GO TO
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[7239]. *
[7241]TESTIMONY OF ATHAN G. THEOHARIS
[7243]PROFESSOR OF HISTORY
[7244]MARQUETTE UNIVERSITY
[7245]MILWAUKEE, WISCONSIN
[7247]on
[7248]S.J. Res. 282
[7249]"The Assassination Materials Disclosure Act"
[7251]Before the
[7253]SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
[7255]MAY 12, 1992
[7257]13-00000
[7259]Startaid OF aAcHan G. TH*eCHAPIS
[7261]I am a professor of history at Marquette University, specializing
[7262]in U.s. intelligence and surveillance policy, and have published extensively
[7263]on matters relating to the history of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
[7264](FBI). As a consultant in 1975 to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
[7265]Activities (the so-called Church Committee), I researcned classified and
[7266]nonclassified records deposited at the Truman, Hiserhower, Kennedy, and
[7267]Johnson presidential libraries and since 1978 have filed numerous Freedom
[7268]of Information Act (FOIA) requests for FBI records.
[7270]I welcome this opportunity to testify on S.J. Res. 282, the Assassination
[7271]Materials Disclosure Act of 1992, and the question it raises: Should Congress
[7272]create a special Review Board and authorize it to release or postpone the
[7273]release of relevant Government records?
[7275]There are precedents for legislating procedures governing the release
[7276]of "Government records relevant to the assassination of President John F.
[7277]Kennedy," most notably the Freedom of Information Act of 1965, as amended
[7278]in 197+, mandating the release of and stipulating the exemptions for withholdings
[7279]agency records. The congressional response to the so-cailed Nixon-sampson
[7280]agreement of 1974 offers a further precedent. Rejecting former President
[7281]Richard Nixon's claimed right to retain exclusive control over the records
[7282]pertaining to his presidency, including the right to destroy the sc-called
[7283]Oval Office tapes, Congress rescinded this agreement, created the 3rownell
[7284]Commission, and enacted the Presidential Records Act of 1978. Presidential
[7285]records were public records, and not a president's personal property,
[7286]Congress affirmed when defining the criteria to govern the disposition
[7287]and release of all presidential records.
[7289]As in the case of the Nixon presidential records, there exists
[7290]widespread public suspicion «bout the Government's disposition of the
[7291]Kennedy assassination records stemming from the beliefs that federal
[7292]officials (1) have not made available all Government assassination
[7293]records (even to the Warren Commission, Church Committee, House Assassination
[7294]Committee) and (2) have heavily redacted the records released under FCIA
[7295]in order to cover up sinister conspiracies. S.J. Res. 282 effectively
[7296]addresses these concerns first by creating an impartial body, the proposed
[7297]Executive Director and Review Board, with the authority tp review and
[7298]if necessary subpoena all relevant records and then by establishing the
[7299]criterion of full disclosure except in cases where "clear and convincing
[7300]justification exists for postponing" the release of specified documents.
[7302]There is reason to believe that all relevant Government records
[7303]pertaining to the Kennedy assassination have not been released and cannot
[7304]be precisely identified by persons outside the executive branci:. It might
[7305]not be the case that all such records were filed under specific names
[7306]and programs (Oswald, Ruby, Ferrie, Fair Play for Cuba Committee, Warren
[7307]Commission), The federal intelligence agencies, for example, had in the.
[7309]13-00000 |
[7311]re
[7313].
[7315]ry
[7319]recent past instituted separate records procedures to safeguard their
[7321]most sensitive documents. CIA files, for one, are compartmentalized to
[7322]limit access on the "need to know" principle. As one result, when responding
[7323]in 1975 to the Church Committee inquiry into the Agency's drug testing
[7324]program, CIA officials ac¢vised that the relevant program file had been
[7325]destroyed in 1973. In 1978, however, CIA officials admitted to having
[7326]discovered among the Agency's financial records extant documents which
[7327]provided additional information about the scope of this program. During
[7329]the Iran-contra hearings of 1987, moreover, CIA officials, at times,
[7330]distinguished between official and informal records while NSC official
[7331]Oliver -North admitted to having employed a "do not log" procedure to ensure
[7332]that his communications to his superior, John Poindexter, were not indexed
[7333]in the NSC's central records system. Although the FBI maintains a central
[7334]records system, FBI officials dating from 1940 had authorized a series
[7336]of special records procedures to ensure that sensitive records were not
[7337]serialized or filed in the Bureau's central records system or that sensitive
[7338]information cculd be withheld if a FBI report was circulated outside the
[7339]Bureau. These included: the Do Not File procedure for memos requesting
[7341]and authorizing "black beg jobs;" blue/pink/informal memos for "administrative"
[7342]matters in which case, was "to be destroyed after action is taken and not
[7343]sent to files section;" JUNE Mail for reported information received from
[7344]“sources illegal in nature" or from "moat secretive" sources such as
[7345]"Governors, secretaries to high officials who may be discussing such
[7346]officials and their attitude;" and administrative pages/cover letters
[7348]for reporting "facts and information " which could "cause embarrassment
[7350]to the Bureau, if distribut -d." Do Not File and blue/pink/informal memos
[7351]were to be maintained in “office files" of senior FBI officials (and were
[7352]to be destroyed every six months), JUNE Mail was to be maintained "under
[7353]lock and key" in FBI field offices or in the Special File Room at FP™
[7354]headquarters, while administrative pages/cover letters were to be detached
[7355]whenever the report to which they were appended was "distributed to any
[7356]agency outside the Bureau."
[7358]S.J. Res. 282 addresses the inability of requestors to identify all
[7359]relevant Kennedy assas.ination records and how and where they might have
[7360]been filed. Executive agencies are mandated to make available to the Review
[7361]Board “all asscssination materials" even if “uncertain if a record is
[7362]assassination material" and the Executive Director is authorized to
[7363]“inquire as to the existence of further records" and then recommend that
[7364]the Review Board “subpoenas such records in the event of denial." Properly
[7365]placing the burden of ensuring the accessioning of all Kennedy assassination
[7366]materials on agency officials who are most knowledgable about their agency's
[7367]records practices, S.J. Res. 282 further enables the Executive Director
[7368]and staff to identify additional records learned through a close reading
[7370]_of cross references in the "available" documents.
[7372]Section 6, moreover, addresses the companion obstacle to full disclosure,
[7373]the discretion which the FOIA allows federal agency officials to withhold
[7374]categories of information when releasing FOIA-requeated documents. Particularly
[7378]13-00000 |
[7382]during the 1980s agency officials have withheld information clearly
[7384]relevant to an understanding of the relationship of the agencies to
[7385]individuals identified directly or‘indirectly with the Kennedy assassination.
[7386]Administrative and legislative changes encouraged such non-disclosure--notably
[7387]President Ronald Reagan's 1982 classification order, legislation of 1984
[7388]totally exempting CIA "operational" files from disclosure, and legislation
[7389]of 1986 authorizing the FBI to withhold and deny the existence of FBI
[7390]informant files. Section 6 dovetails FOIA's exemptive provisions but,
[7392]at the same time, introduces a stricter non-disclosure standard to require
[7393]release unless "the threat to the military defense, intelligence operations
[7394]or conduct of foreign relations of the United States posed by its disclosure
[7395]is of auch gravity that it outweighs any public intereat in ite disclosure."
[7397]My skepticism about agency practices in withholding documents, moreover,
[7398]ia based on my experiences as a frequent user of the FOIA. I recognize
[7399]that this is not the proper forum for reviewing how federal agencies have
[7400]processed FOIA requests but think the following examples shed light on
[7401]whether the FOIA, and its provisions accepting agency discretion, can be
[7402]expected to ensure full and reasonable disclosure.
[7404]In 1980, I filed an FOIA request for the Official and Confidential
[7405]File of former FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover and in 1983 received approximately
[7406]6,000 heavily redacted pages of this 17,700 page file. Exercising my right
[7407]to appeal these withholdings, z eventually (in 1985) received approxdunately
[7408]2,000 additional documents. Granted the right of a second appeal, at this
[7409]time I offered a detailed foldsr by folder challenge, arguing that much
[7410]of the withhelu information was already in the public domain and further
[7411]that since the former FBI director had maintained in his office derogatory
[7412]informati.a on presidents, members of Congress, and other prominent
[7413]personalities the question of what use had been made of this information
[7414]required its release. These arguments proved somewhat convincing and in
[7415]1989 the FEI released approximately 15,000 pages including information
[7416]formerly redacted in the earlier processed releases. :
[7418]The enclosed Fortas document (see Appendix A) was one of the documents
[7419]released to me in 1989, but withheld entirely both in 1983 and 1985.
[7420]When withholding this document (and five others pertaining to the same
[7421]matter), the FBI had originally claimed that its release, would reveal
[7422]FBI sources and methods and violate personal privacy rights. Yet, Fortas
[7423]had not been acting as a FBI Criminal Informant or Security Informant
[7424]when concerting with FBI Assistant Director Cartha Deioach in 1966 and
[7425]the withheld information records Fortas's willingness to service the
[7426]political and bureaucratic interests of President Lyndon Johnson and
[7427]FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover.
[7429]This example, because the FBI had evaluated the same document three
[7430]times, offers insights into the criteria employed to deny the release
[7431]of records. And while the agency ultimately decided to disclose, this
[7433]13-00000 |
[7435]he
[7437]decision indirectly supports S.J. Res. 282's “clear and convincing"
[7438]standard. For, my original 1980 request and receipt in 1983 of the
[7440]heavily redacted Hoover file had become known to U.S. News and World
[7442]Report which devoted its 1984 issue of December 1903 to summarizing
[7444]the contents of the released Hoover file. The resulting publicity heightened
[7445]public and media interest in the heavily redacted Hoover file. By 1989,
[7447]if not 1985, FBI officiala were no longer williug to risk FOIA litigation
[7448]challenging their claimed interpretation of the FOIA's exemptive provisions.
[7450]My second example bears indirectly on how the FBI would process a
[7451]FOIA request for still-unreleased wiretap records first diclosed by the
[7452]House Assassination Committee. The House report had disclosed that FBI
[7453]wiretap intercepts recorded critical comments of organized crime leaders,
[7454]notably Carlos Marcello, regarding the Kennedys. Did the Mafia put a
[7455]"contract" out on John Kennedy? Did FBI officials purposefully withhold
[7456]this information from the Justice Department and the Secret Service in
[7457]1963 and ther from the Warren Commission in 19647 The answers to these
[7458]questions would require the release of the wiretap transcripts as. well
[7459]as other FBI memos recording how tne FBI dealt with these transcripts.
[7460]My experience involving how the FSI has processed my requests for other
[7461]FBI wiretaps suggests that any FOIA-released Kennedy documents will be
[7462]s« redacted as to preclude answers to these questions. In describing one
[7463]of my FBI wiretap requests, let me also outline for the Committee the
[7464]considerably broader "records universe" sought by scholars and which
[7465]cistinguish our approach from those of journalists, congressional staff,
[7466]and lawyers.
[7468]This case of FBI wiretapping involved Henry Grunewsld, a Washington,
[7470]D.C.-based investigator with close ties to New York insurance-executive --.-.-
[7472]Henry Marsh, isolationist Republican congressmen, former New Dealer Thomas
[7473]Corcoran, and +ashington bureaucrats. FBI officials were keenly interested
[7474]in Grunewale'. activities, confirmed by the inclusion in Hoover's office
[7476]file of two folders containing the transcripts of two FBI wiretaps of
[7477]Grunewald in 1941 and 1945. As in the case of the Fortas document, these
[7479]two folders had originally been withheld in entirety on sources and methods
[7480]and personal privacy grounds. The released 1941 wiretap transcript-
[7481]particularly interested me as I had learned from documents contained in
[7482]former FBI Assistant Director D. Milton Ladd's still extant office file
[7484]that Grunewald, as other conservative critics of the Roosevelt Administration,
[7485]became the subject of FBI "espionage" investigative interest during the
[7487]early 1940s. The Ladd file, however, did not resolve whether this 1941
[7488]wiretap had been known or authorized by the Attorney General or the White
[7489]House. Accordingly, 1 filed a further FOIA request for the FBI's headquarters
[7490]files on Grunewald. The released, redacted records confirmed the Roosevelt
[7491]Administration's interest in Grunewald's activities in 1940 but (see Appendix
[7492]B): either because of redactions or the Justice and Treasury Departaents®
[7493]failure to have processed a3 yet documents which they originated the
[7495]13-00000
[7498]wiretap authorization question cannot be resolved.
[7500]The heavily redacted Grunewald filee further disclosed that Grunewald
[7501]became the subject in 1953 of a third FBI wiretap. In 1952, a House ;
[7502]Committee held public hearings on the subject of influence peddling that
[7503]centered on Grunewald's activities, among others. Thin inquiry proved
[7504]embarrassing to the Truman Administration and was exploited by the Republicans
[7505]during the 1952 presidential and congressional campaigns. In 1953, the
[7506]new Republican-controlled House revisited this issue. Particularly interested
[7507]in Grunewald, the so-called Kean Committee sought assistance from the
[7508]Justice Department. The heavily redacted records (see Appendix C), however,
[7509]preclude answers to the questions as to why concurrent with this congressional
[7510]inquiry Attorney General Herbert Brownell had requested and authorized
[7511]this wiretap and whether the Justice Department's assistance to the Committee
[7512]included information learned from this wiretap. (I have only appended a
[7513]summary of one FBI report to the Attorney General, based on this wiretap.
[7515]The released transcripts of this 1553 wiretap, in contrast to those released
[7517]to me involving the 1941 and 1945 taps, were héavily redacted--the FBI
[7518]withheld on personal privacy grounds the names and intercepted conversations
[7519]of Grunewald's telephone partners, rendering the released transcripts
[7520]virtually incomprehensible and of minimal research value.)
[7522]I have gone into detail om the Fortas anc Grunewald matters as I
[7523]think they offer insights into the processing of FOIA requests, an
[7524]issue central to these hearings. It has been my experience that the
[7525]“culture of the intelligence agencies encourages agency officials to
[7526]interpret the FOIA exemptive provisions broadly but also that more senior
[7527]agency officials will release even embarrassing information in those
[7528]instances when their decisions are potentially subject to critical scrutiny.
[7529]The Review Board procedure promotes this needed accountai. lity. At the
[7530]same time, the Bo:.rd's independence can undercut public suspicions that
[7531]claimed national security or privacy justifications are a mask to preclude
[7532]full disclosure. Surely now, thirty years after President Kennedy's
[7533]assassination and with the end of the Cold War, we should be able to
[7534]assure the public that relevant Kennedy assassination records are neither
[7535]secreted nor withheld for bureaucratic reasons.
[7537]While I douSt that the rlease of the Kennedy assassination records
[7538]will conclusively resolve the question "who killed Kennedy,'' I am convinced
[7539]that the procedures outlined in S.J. Res. 282 will undercut suspicions that
[7540]records documenting a government conspiracy are being purposefully withheld.
[7541]Release of the Kenncdy assassination records, moreover, will service other
[7542]significant research interests of the scholarly community. let me conclude
[7543]by briefly list some of these non-assassination-related questions: (1) the
[7544]liaison relationship between the FBI and the CIA before and after the
[7545]assassination; (2) the liaison relationship between the FBI and the Secret
[7547]13-00000 |
[7553]Service and the background to the FBI's revised delimitation agreement
[7555]of 1964 with the Secret Service; (3) the politics of presidential commissions
[7556](the purpose for creation, the level‘of agency cooperation, and the
[7557]responses of federal agencies, Congress, the White House, and the public
[7559]to the Warren Commission's findings); (4) the paradox of the FBI's apparent
[7560]disinterest in Oswald (Soviet defector and Fair Play for Cuba Committee
[7561]activist) in contrast to the intensity of FBI interest in more respectable
[7562]national leaders (Eleanor Rossevelt,. Adlai Stevenson, Joseph Alsop, Ernest
[7563]Hemingway, even John Kennedy); and (5) the FBI's and the CIA's relationships
[7564]with and uses of informants and sources recruited to provide foreign
[7565]intelligence, counterintelligence, criminal, and "subversive activities"
[7566]information.
[7568]Cis, HAS NO CBJECTION TO
[7569]DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
[7570]RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
[7572]TESTIMONY OF SENATOR DAVID L. BOREN
[7573]BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
[7574]ON THE ASSASSINATION MATERIALS DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1992
[7575]oe ee a
[7577]May 12, 1992
[7579]Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I very much appreciate the
[7580]opportunity to appear before this Committee to discuss with you
[7581]Senate Joint Resolution 282, the Assassination Materials
[7583]Disclosure Act of 1992.
[7585]The purpose of this legislation is to provide for a
[7587]‘comprehensive process ultimately leading to the release of all
[7589]materials held by the United States Government regarding the
[7591]assassination of President John F. Kennedy. Congressman Louis
[7593]‘Stokes, the distinguished former Chairman of the House Select
[7595]Committee on Assassinations, has introduced identical legislation
[7596]7 . a
[7598]in the House of Representatives. I am particularly pleased, Mr.
[7600]Chairman, to have you as an original cosponsor of this
[7602]legislation.
[7604]We have had at least four substantial federal government
[7605]investigations into the Kennedy assassination: the first
[7606]conducted by the Warren Commission appointed by President Johnson
[7607]in 1963; the second, by the President’s Commission on CIA
[7611]13-00000
[7612]te
[7614]Activities -- the Rockefeller commission _- in 1975; the third by
[7615]the Senate Select Committee:to Study Governmental Operations with
[7616]Respect to Intelligence -- the Church Committee -- in 1975 and
[7617]1976 as part of its investigation of CIA assassination plots
[7618]against foreign leaders; and finally, the extensive investigation
[7620]of -the House Assassinations Committee in 1978 and 1979.
[7622]Each of these investigations, particularly the Warren
[7623]Commission and House Assassinations Committee investigation,
[7624]produced long, detailed public reports concerning the Kennedy
[7625]assassination.. In addition, literally hundreds of books and
[7627]articles have been written on the subject.
[7628]Yet still, almost 30 years later, the questions remain.
[7630]The recent release of the controversial film "JFK". has raised
[7631]them anew, suggesting that answers may well lie in the
[7632]assassination records and other materials that remain sealed by
[7633]our Government. Even prior to the release of “JFK," in fact,
[7634]there were diligent efforts made by researchers as well as
[7636]concerned legislators to open these files for public review.
[7638]Mr. Chairman, I do not know what all of these files contain.
[7639]Specifically, I do not know whether they contain information that
[7640]would call into question or undermine the findings of the previous
[7642]investigations or not.
[7644]13-00000
[7647]But it seems to me the time has come to open these files to
[7648]the public and let them speak for themselves. Let historians and
[7649]journalists and the people read them, and draw the appropriate
[7651]conclusions.
[7653]“As a general principle, the Intelligence Community should
[7654]make available its records after the passage of a reasonable
[7655]amount of time when current sources and methods would no longer be
[7656]compromised. The American people have a right to assure
[7657]themselves to the greatest degree possible of the accuracy of the
[7658]historical record of our government. The timely release of all
[7659]documents of historic value and importance helps to assure that
[7660]even the most secret programs of our government will be operated
[7662]in accordance with basic American values. Current intelligence
[7664]‘operations will be even more carefully conducted when it is
[7666]recognized that they will be scrutinized by the public during the
[7670]lifetime of many of those who administered the programs.
[7672]This is not to say that all of the files should simply be
[7673]pulled from the vaults, turned upside down and dumped onto
[7674]Pennsylvania Avenue for general consumption. Careful review is
[7675]required to ensure responsible public policy and fundamental
[7676]fairness. Even after almost thirty years, there remain
[7677]governmental interests, as well as individual privacy interests,
[7678]that we must consider. But these concerns must not stand in the
[7679]way of disclosure unless they are shown in a given case to be
[7680]especially compelling.
[7684]13-00000
[7686]What this Resolution proposes is a comprehensive, government-
[7687]wide review of the Kennedy assassination records conducted under
[7689]the auspices of an impartial, independent board.
[7691]It may be useful to state precisely what these records are.
[7692]First, they encompass all of the records of the FBI, the CIA,
[7693]Secret Service, military intelligence, and other Executive branch
[7694]agencies which may pertain to the Kennedy assassination. They
[7695]also include the records of the Warren commission, the Rockefeller
[7696]commission, the Church committee, and the House Select Committee
[7697]on Assassinations. Many of these records are now stored under
[7698]seal at the National Archives, while many others remain in agency
[7700]files. The Rockefeller Commission files were claimed by President
[7702]Ford as part of his personal papers and then deeded by him to the
[7704]Ford Presidential Library in Ann Arbor, Michigan. There may be
[7706]other relevant records at the Kennedy and Johnson presidential
[7708]libraries. These presidential library records are administered by
[7710]the National Archives, and thus we envision that they would be
[7711]subject to this Joint Resolution. °
[7713]I can report to you briefly on the status of one group of
[7714]these records -- the Church committee files, which are now in the
[7715]custody of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. All of
[7716]the Church committee files are housed in some 500 boxes in a
[7717]single small room at the National Archives. There is a
[7718]rudimentary index, but it is not always sufficiently descriptive,
[7722]13-00000
[7724]and a file-by-file review is probably necessary. My staff has
[7725]examined some of these files, and we believe the process of
[7726]separating out J.F.K. assassination materials -- once that term is
[7727]more precisely defined (as I will discuss in a moment) -- will not
[7728]prove especially cumbersome or time-consuming. The Kennedy =. _.
[7729]assassination investigation was only a small component of the
[7731]Church committee’s work and the investigation conducted concerned
[7732]only the role of the intelligence community in investigating the
[7733]assassination; it did not seek to determine who killed President
[7734]Kennedy. In addition, many of the Church records are in fact
[7736]copies of records originated by other agencies. However, the
[7738]Church staff did interview numerous witnesses, both inside and
[7739]outside of government, and the transcripts and notes of those
[7740]interviews, among other materials originated by the Church
[7742]committee, are -an important part of the J.F.K. files. .----..--.----- —--~---
[7744]Although many government records on the J.F.K. assassination
[7745]have previously been released by the Archives and as a result of
[7746]Freedom of Information Act litigation, a great deal remains
[7747]shielded from public view. Approximately twenty boxes of the
[7748]internal files generated by. the Warren Commission are still
[7749]sealed. Experts estimate that a much greater volume of FBI and
[7750]CIA files remain sealed. Many pages of documents that have been
[7751]released have been so extensively redacted that their
[7752]informational value is minimal. The extensive files of the House
[7753]Assassinations Committee, some 848 boxes of materials on both the
[7754]Kennedy and King assassinations, currently are sealed until the
[7758]13-00000
[7760]year 2029.
[7762]To date, these records have been withheld from the public due
[7763]to a variety of concerns: the fear of damaging foreign relations
[7764]and military defense,.-the--concern for disclosing the identities of
[7765]confidential sources or informants, and the desire to protect the
[7766]privacy of individuals. While these concerns may yet retain some
[7767]validity in a very few isolated cases, it seems to me that with
[7768]the passage of time, there should remain very few objections to
[7769]full disclosure. I believe it is time to review these records,
[7770]not in terms of the old assumptions, but rather in light of the
[7771]need for openness and to encourage confidence in the Government.
[7772]We need to assure ourselves of the facts, that there is not
[7773]information lurking somewhere in the Government that would shed
[7774]new light-on what remains perhaps the most heinous and enigmatic
[7776]crime of this century.
[7778]The Joint Resolution would make it much harder to justify the
[7780]continued shielding of a document from public view. It would also
[7782]w
[7783]create a process by which many records could be promptly released.
[7785]Any arguments made for withholding any document or portions of it
[7787]must be weighed against the strong public interest in disclosure.
[7788]The resolution establishes this kind of balancing test -- with a
[7790]strong presumption in favor of disclosure.
[7792]In addition, to address the, problem of heavily redacted and
[7793]therefore meaningless documents, the Joint Resolution borrows a
[7797]13-00000
[7799]page from the Classified Information Procedures Act, the law that
[7800]covers the handling of secret information in criminal trials.
[7801]Under that law, federal judges have discretion to permit
[7802]introduction in evidence of summaries or substitutes in place of
[7803]classified information. The Joint Resolution provides for
[7805]creation of such summaries or substitutes where appropriate, so
[7807]“that the public can learn essential facts about the Kennedy
[7809]assassination from a document even where references to private
[7810]matters or crucial national security secrets would render the
[7812]document itself mostly unreleasable at present.
[7814]In all cases, the Joint Resolution requires that the
[7815]presumption be in favor of release. All records will be released
[7816]unless there is clear and convincing evidence that postponing
[7818]release is essential to a vital interest.
[7820]Now let me briefly discuss the process established by the
[7821]Joint Resolution for applying these disclosure standards.
[7823]The Joint Resolution creates a five-member panel called the
[7824]Assassination Material Review Board. The members of this Review .
[7825]Board would be distinguished private citizens outside of
[7827]government who have had no prior involvement with previous
[7829]inquiries into the Kennedy assassination. This Review Board,
[7831]aided by an executive director and staff, would play the central
[7832]role in the release of the assassination materials. The Board
[7833]would be required to complete its work within two years of its
[7837]13-00000
[7839]first meeting, although it is certainly expected that it could be
[7840]completed much more quickly. The point is to proceed
[7842]expeditiously, while still doing a careful job.
[7844]We faced a difficult choice in deciding who should appoint
[7845]the Review Board, and I am aware your Committee is looking at
[7846]other alternatives. I am certainly amenable to this, but let me
[7847]give you some idea of why we came out as we did. Given the
[7848]allegations of government cover-up and the potential for perceived
[7849]conflict of interest, allowing the President or Congress to
[7850]appoint the Board did not seem appropriate. We settled instead on
[7851]the special three-judge federal court division that appoints
[7853]independent counsels for criminal investigations.
[7855]The Justice-Department;--in-an-April 27,°1992, letter to°--—7-7 77 OTT
[7856]Chairman Glenn, worries that "it is not clear" that our approach
[7857]to appointing the Review Board is constitutional. In addition,
[7858]some may feel that a judicial panel is ill-suited to make
[7859]appointments for this task. The judges themselves, who have very
[7860]small staffs and.other concerns, might well prefer to avoid this
[7861]assignment. In short, we recognized that this approach would
[7862]raise possible constitutional objections, as well as practical
[7863]ones, but, on balance, we felt the appointment authority should
[7864]rest with an impartial source without no interest or stake in the
[7865]outcome. I believe a strong argument can be made that the
[7866]appointment process is constitutional under the principles
[7867]enunciated by the Supreme Court in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654
[7871]13-00000 |
[7873](1988), which upheld the power of the same court division to
[7874]appoint independent counsels ‘to investigate executive branch
[7876]misconduct.
[7878]If the Committee nevertheless concludes that this approach is
[7879]undesirable, I would offer two alternatives for consideration,
[7880]conceding that both are also susceptible to possible
[7881]constitutional objection. The first would be for the President
[7882]and the leadership of the House and Senate each to appoint a given
[7883]number of Board members. Each body has interests in, and
[7884]responsibility for, certain of the records at issue. I would not
[7885]make these appointments subject to Senate confirmation, since
[7886]they are not policy positions, and confirmation would only delay
[7887]the task at hand. A second alternative would be the approach
[7888]suggested by the ACLU: adopt some variant of the formula used
[7889]last year by Congress in establishing the Advisory Committee on
[7890]Historical Diplomatic Documentation in the State Department,
[7891]namely to have the President appoint based on specific criteria,
[7892]i.e. background in particular disciplines, with most of the
[7893]members coming from lists submitted by designated professional
[7895]associations. -
[7897]Once the Review Board, however it is appointed, is
[7898]constituted, it would appoint an executive director, and the first
[7899]step in the process would be to make available to the Executive
[7900]Director all Government assassination materials. Where the
[7901]Executive Director suspects that the agencies have failed to
[7905]13-00000
[7907]submit some of the relevant records, he or she has authority to
[7908]question the agencies and to use the subpoena power of the Review
[7910]Board to obtain any additional records.
[7912]The Executive Director, assisted by employees of the Review
[7913]Board and, if deemed necessary, detailed from elsewhere in the
[7914]Government, would undertake the initial screening of these
[7915]records. If the Executive Director concluded that a particular
[7916]record was appropriate for release, the record would automatically
[7917]be released, unless the record implicated personal privacy or the
[7918]Executive agency or congressional committee with responsibility
[7919]for that record filed an appeal with the Review Board. In this
[7920]Manner, many records could be promptly released without formal
[7922]Review Board deliberations.
[7924]If the Executive Director determined that a particular record
[7925]was not appropriate for release under present circumstances or
[7926]that the record implicated personal privacy concerns, he or she
[7927]would automatically be required to refer that decision to the
[7929]Review Board.
[7930]The Executive Director would also be permitted to refer
[7931]particularly difficult decisions, or decisions requiring further
[7933]investigation, to the Review Board.
[7935]In deciding on appeals and-referrals from the Executive
[7936]Director, the Review Board would have authority to conduct
[7942]hearings and subpoena records and witnesses.
[7944]The Review Board would have final say as to the release or
[7945]non-release of all materials, except that in the case of Executive
[7946]branch materials, the President would have the authority to
[7947]supersede the Board’s determination and postpone release. But
[7948]each time the President did so, he would be required to explain
[7949]his reasons, both in a notice to the public and to the Congress.
[7950]Decisions by the Review Board itself to postpone release of
[7951]records would also have to be explained to the public and
[7953]Congress.
[7955]Finally, under the Joint Resolution, no item would remain
[7956]permanently sealed. The Review Board, before finishing its work,
[7957]would designate as to every item still withheld a specified time
[7958]or a specified occurrence following which the item could be
[7959]released. The files would then be transferred to the Archives,
[7960]where the Archivist would have a continuing duty to reconsider
[7961]them for release under the standards set by the Joint Resolution.
[7963]a
[7964]Materials released by the Archivist or the Review Board would
[7966]be available in the Archives for public review and copying.
[7968]Our Joint Resolution makes clear that an Executive branch
[7969]agency or congressional committee retains its existing powers
[7970]under.the law to release a particular record even if the Joint
[7971]Resolution does not require it to do so, and that the members of
[7975]13-00000
[7977]the public can continue to use the Freedom of Information Act to
[7979]X.
[7981]request from the agencies documents related to the assassination.
[7983]Mr. Chairman, this Resolution may appear complicated, but the
[7984]matter of disclosure is itself complicated. It cannot be
[7985]accomplished arbitrarily or summarily. The process established by
[7986]the Resolution, in my view, is logical and takes account of all
[7987]the interests and equities in the disclosure of these documents.
[7988]In the end, I think it will result in all of the pertinent
[7989]information pertaining to the assassination of President Kennedy
[7990]being made public in a prompt and orderly way, and, in doing so,
[7992]will help restore confidence among the public in our Government.
[7994]Since the Joint Resolution was introduced, comments have been
[7995]received from the Justice Department as well as others suggesting
[7997]the need for change.
[7999]With regard to the reaction of the Justice Department, I must
[8000]say I found it very unfortunate that the Department chose to take
[8001]what I found to be an extreme, hard-line position in opposing many
[8002]of the key provisions of the Resolution. Rather than showing the
[8003]flexibility needed in this unique circumstance to deal |
[8004]cooperatively with the Congress on a matter that is a serious
[8005]concern for many Americans, the Justice Department chose to
[8007]reassert familiar claims of Executive privilege and all of the
[8009]other reasons asserted over the years to block the release of
[8011]government information.
[8015]13-00000
[8017]The whole point of this legislation was to create new
[8018]criteria and new procedures to maximize the release of information
[8019]hitherto withheld by the Government. The old laws and old.
[8020]procedures have been tried for the last 30 years, and have not
[8021]produced the type of disclosure needed to restore the confidence
[8023]of the American people.
[8025]It seems to me that just this once, where the public policy
[8026]interest in full disclosure of these records is so apparent, the
[8027]Justice Department could dispense with its usual "to-the-last-man"
[8028]defense of Executive branch prerogatives, and help us deal with
[8030]solving the problem.
[8032]I feel obliged to take special note of one point in the _
[8033]Justice Department letter, and that is their claim that the
[8034]Executive branch must have not only increased safeguards over its
[8035]own material -- but also have the ability to veto release of any
[8036]congressionally-created assassination record. This strikes. me as
[8039]preposterous, particularly coming from a department that is
[8040]ostensibly so concerned to preserve a separation of powers. If
[8042]Congress wants to release information it has developed, the
[8044]President should not be able to stand in the way.
[8046]Hopefully, the Committee will yet be able to obtain executive
[8047]branch cooperation and move forward with this process. The public
[8048]expects action on this matter, as the many letters, postcards, and
[8052]13-00000
[8054]telephone calls to congressional offices demonstrate.
[8056]x
[8057]ry
[8059]Having said this, there are, in fact, several points raised
[8060]by the Justice Department's letter, and by private citizens in
[8061]touch with me, which I believe merit further:consideration by the
[8063]Committee.
[8065]‘.. Perhaps the most important matter involves setting the.
[8066]boundaries of “assassination material." The Joint Resolution
[8067]defines “assassination material" as "a record that relates in any
[8068]manner or degree to the assassination of President John F.
[8070]Kennedy.... But given the wide range of theories that have
[8072]developed as to who killed President Kennedy and why, many types
[8074]of records arguably relate in some manner to the assassination.
[8075]What: records regarding, for example, Cuba, Vietnan,: and’ organized rs
[8077]crime should be covered? This matter requires careful
[8079]consideration.
[8081]The Justice Department urges a substantial narrowing of the
[8082]definition of “assassination material," apparently to only those
[8083]records that on their face directly concern the assassination. I
[8084]am concerned that this formulation may be too narrow. There is
[8085]widespread public suspicion that some sort of conspiracy led to
[8086]the murder of President Kennedy. If we go out of our way to avoid
[8087]records that might shed light on activities linked to such an |
[8088]alleged conspiracy, we make little progress toward assuring the
[8089]public that it has the full story. If we err on the side of
[8093]13-00000
[8095]inclusiveness, and as a result learn a bit more about the
[8096]operations of our government and our foreign policy in the early
[8097]1960's, I think we will benefit. My only concern would be that
[8098]the search becomes so broad that it delays action of the release
[8099]of documents clearly germane to the assassination. But where
[8100]records have already been segregated, such as the executive branch
[8101]materials obtained by the House Assassinations Committee, full
[8103]review is probably appropriate.
[8105]I do, however, suggest that the Committee, either in the
[8106]Joint Resolution itself or in report language, set more precise
[8107]parameters defining "assassination material," or else direct the
[8108]Review Board to do so promptly after it is established.
[8109]Otherwise, we may end with widely varying interpretations by the
[8110]various records agencies and committees as to what documents
[8112]should be forwarded to the Review Board executive director.
[8114]2. As the Justice Department’s letter to Chairman Glenn
[8115]noted, the Joint Resolution, as drafted, would give an agency or
[8116]committee control over release of a record it originated even if
[8117]that record contained information obtained from another agency or
[8118]committee. I agree that this provision should be changed to give
[8119]agencies authority over release of their own information. .
[8120]However, the change suggested in the Justice Department letter may
[8121]not by itself do the trick, because a record, for example a
[8122]lengthy congressional report, may contain both information
[8126]13-00000
[8130].
[8132]developed by the body that created the record and information
[8133]originated by a- ‘xecutive agency. Instead of letting either of
[8134]these two “oric zing bodies" have veto power over the release of
[8135]an entire document, we should work out language that give an
[8136]agency or committee control over release of that portion of a
[8138]document for which it was responsible even if other information in
[8140]the document was originated elsewhere.
[8142]3. On reflection, I think it would be best to amend the
[8143]Joint Resolution to make the records of the Review Board itself
[8144]subject to the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act, and
[8145]to make the Board’s proceedings subject to the Sunshine Act and
[8146]the Administrative Procedures Act. A law mandating increased
[8147]government openness should not itself establish an exception from
[8148]general standards for accountability. I still’ strongly believe,
[8149]however, that we should avoid subjecting the Board to extensive
[8150]court litigation over the release of the J.F.K. files themselves
[8151]either under the standards set by the Joint Resolution or under
[8153]the Freedom of Information Act.
[8155]4. Section 11(a) should probably be amended to make clear
[8156]that the Joint Resolution’s provisions take precedence not only
[8158]over other laws, but also over executive orders and regulations.
[8160]5. A sentence might be added to Section 8(f) to ensure that
[8161]the public is clearly informed when summaries or substitutes are
[8162]released instead of actual records or information: “Any such
[8166]13-00000.
[8168]summary or substitution shall be clearly labeled as such when
[8170]released to the public." :
[8172]6. The Joint Resolution should probably be amended to
[8173]recognize the records of the Rockefeller commission as a component
[8174]of this effort. The Archives would be the appropriate custodian
[8175]of Rockefeller commission materials for purposes of the Joint
[8177]Resolution.
[8179]I thank the Committee for this opportunity to express my
[8181]views on this measure.
[8185]Statement for the Senate Committee on Government Affairs,
[8186]May 12, 1992
[8187]CIA HAS NG CRJECTION TO .
[8188]. DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR s,
[8189]Ernest R. May = RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
[8190].  iNTHIS DOCUMENT ~~~
[8192]It is an honor to be invited to ‘testify on this bill. —
[8194]I am.a professor af history. at Harvard University, where I
[8195]teach both in the history department and in the John F. Ken-
[8196]nedy School of Government. : While I have done research on
[8198]the history of intelligence agencies and have served in
[8199]Washington from time to time as a consultant, I do not speak .
[8200]as an expert on the matter before the committee. My com
[8201]ments are merely those of a historian looking at legislation
[8202]designed to unearth historical source material.
[8204]The bill now under consideration seeks to clear doubts
[8205]about President Kermedy’s murder. The Warren Comission had
[8206]the same aim. Its make-up was supposed to reassure the pub--
[8207]lic. It failed. The Commission reported in 1964. Almost
[8209]_within months, books challenging its ‘findings hit best—
[8210]seller lists. |
[8211]7 Over time, other theories multiplied. Now, it takes
[8212]whole books just to list books about the murder. Some of
[8213]these books picture the CIA or FBI as plotters. This is not
[8214]new. A number appeared in the 1970s. Recently, this par-
[8215]ticular set-of theories has found new life. Two books of
[8216]this genre reached best-seller lists in the spring of 1992,
[8218]and Oliver Stone’s filn, "EK," became a box office hit.
[8220]13-00000
[8222]we owe Om Pear ans ee at BOON AO deat PED se ° waver”.
[8224]The bill now under consideration would open records so
[8225]that the public can be reassured that these theories are
[8226]fantasies. The stated aim is to "contritwte to the trust of
[8227]the people in their government." | ;
[8229]’ ™o achieve this, the bill proposes to create a five—
[8230]person Review Board. As reassurance against a cover-up in
[8231]behalf of the President or Congress, the District of Colum-
[8233]-bia Circuit of the U.S. Court of Appeals would appoint the
[8234]Board. (The Supreme Court presumably is thought too
[8235]partisan; besides, it night bring to mind Chief Justice War-
[8236]ren.) ; |
[8238]The bill says that members of the Board are to be "dis-—
[8239]tinguished and impartial." Otherwise, it demands only that
[8240]they not be currently in government ‘employ and that they
[8242]‘never have been involved in any investigation of the Kennedy
[8243]murder. ; .
[8245]The Board and its Executive Director would have wide
[8246]povers. They would look at all materials relating to the
[8247]murder. re they suspect any agency of withholding material,
[8248]they would have a right to conduct a hunt. The bill gives .
[8249]the Board power to subpoena records and persons, to take
[8250]testimony under oath, to grant immunity to witmesses, and to
[8252]punish defiance.
[8254]13-00000
[8255]vurvosbZ = 111s OQV1F 4b 1b7Z bkA SCn GUY . i 006
[8257]The Board’s decisions are to be final unless the Presi~ —
[8258]dent himself intervenes to insist that some piece of in~
[8259]formation not be -released. The bill giving the Board its .
[8260]powers is to "take precedence over any other law, judicial
[8261]decision ..., or common law doctrine" that wight be in con- —
[8262]flict. |
[8264]My comments on this bill are mostly cautionary. I
[8265]question whether any legislation can achieve all that this
[8266]pill seeks to achieve. I question giving to a court-
[8267]appointed Review Board such broad responsibllities and
[8268]powers. I believe that a Review Board differently ‘selected,
[8269]with a more limited mandate, could do a better job.
[8271]“The first cautionary point concerns the aim of clearing
[8272]doubts about the Kennedy murder. Even if every bit of
[8273]relevant documentation becomes public, it will not yield a
[8274]story that all Americans will accept. Why should it?
[8275]Though we now know just about everything about the Pearl
[8277]_ Harbor attack, nev conspiracy theories continue to be woven.
[8278]One of the latest has Winston Churchill as the villain!
[8280]Despite more than a century of research, new theories
[8281]still appear about conspirators helping John Wilkes Booth
[8282]kill Lincoln. The chances are that the same will always be
[8284]true for Oswald and Kennedy. © After another decade or so,
[8286]13-00000
[8290]2aead Ws ORY Adie Ete OV ws
[8292]however, Kennedy’s murder will probably become, like Lin-
[8293]coln’s, more an interest of buffs than of the public at
[8295]diaxge-.
[8297]es VU:
[8299]The chances of clearing away all doubts are lessened by
[8301]the fact that every bit of relevant documentation will not
[8302]be released. his bill itself speaks of protecting secret
[8303]agents and intelligence sources and methods. It speaks also
[8304]of privacy rights. CIA and FBI reports and National
[8305]Security Agency intercepts contain much material that, by
[8306]these criteria,- would have to remain secret.
[8308]In fact, still more material may be kept from the pub-
[8309]lic. This bill refers only to protecting the privacy of
[8310]living persons. If the Review Board yields to human feel-
[8311]ings, it may extend protection to families and friends.
[8312]Suppose, for example, that it sees raw FBI files recording
[8313]old accusations against some Cuban-Anerican. Even if the
[8315]person is dead, anyone ever connected with: that person could
[8317]suffer should the accusations become public. If the Review
[8319]Board suspects that the accusations were malicious and
[8320]false, will it not choose to leave the files secret?
[8322]Also, it has to be assumed that some files will torn
[8323]oat to have been lost or destroyed. The proposed Review
[8324]Board would thus have to confess ‘not only that it chose to
[8326]13-00000
[8328]leave some material under wraps but that other material was
[8330]. simply missing.. Would spinners of conspiracy. theories take
[8332]the Board’s word? Would they not instead accuse it of col-
[8333]Luding in concealment of "smoking guns"?
[8335]The Review Board would meanwhile. be under pressure not
[8336]to let privacy rights or other considerations inhibit
[8337]release of documents. Investigative reporters, writers, and
[8338]docudrama producers would hamer at it. So would scholars,
[8339]including many interested in subjects other than the Kennedy
[8340]marder. So would others with axes to grind.
[8342]Some ‘material sought might have only a remote rela-
[8343]tionship to the mrder. The clamor would be no less fero-
[8344]cious. How much of the central files. of the FBI and CIA
[8345]would have. to be opened, for example,.to persuade disciples
[8347]of Mark North or Mark Lane or Oliver Stone that neither FBI
[8349]nor CIA officers participated in a morder plot?
[8351]The Review Board. would surely be urged to pursue data
[8352]on the possible involvement of right-wing extremists. Oob-
[8354]vious items would include not: only FBI files but aiso tax
[8356]' yeturns. Imagine the scope of possible documentation if, in
[8358]feixrness, the Review Board also sought data on financial ©
[8360]transactions by individuals associated with Vice President
[8362]Lyndon Johnson!
[8364]13-00000
[8366]ver VOS BE
[8368]lisis Soli 465 1872 EEN SCa GOY
[8370]I’ forecast, in other words, that'new evidence will not
[8371]dispel conspiracy theories. At most, it will curb some of
[8372]‘the more adventurous theorizing.
[8374]I also forecast that, if release of the evidence is
[8375]managed as this-bill proposes, one of two results will. fol-
[8376]low.
[8378]If the Review Board yields to outside pressures, it
[8379]will conduct a fishing expedition. Much embarrassing and
[8381]possibly harmful information will be made public. Alterne-
[8383]tively, the Review Board ‘will resist pressure. It will -
[8384]define its mandate narrowly. It will be prudent in what it’
[8385]reveals. It will then ‘be accused of a "whitewash." The
[8386]latter result could make matters worse rather than better.
[8387]Suspicion could be fed, not eallayed. - .
[8389]There may, however, be better means of doing what needs
[8391]doing. ‘The current bill would have the Rqview Board and its
[8393]Executive Director examine ali materials to ‘be released.
[8395]They would be charged with ferreting out ‘undisclosed nateri-
[8399]al, and they would have effective responsibility for decid-
[8401]ing what would and would not be released.
[8402]An: alternative would be @ bill simply enjoining holders
[8403]of records to identify and locate materials that, in the
[8405]language of the current bill, "relates in any manner or de-
[8407]13-00000
[8409]grea" to the murder-of President Kennedy. The injunction
[8410]| would apply to all congressional committees and all exvecu-—
[8412]’ tive agencies, including the CIA, the FBI, the Secret Ser-
[8413]vice, and the National Archives. The bill could direct __
[8414]these record-holders to make the materials public. It could
[8415]specify that the only materials to be held back would be
[8416]those itemized in the current bill -_ agents, intelligence
[8417]sources and methods, etc.
[8419]Where legislative writ does not run or is disputable, a
[8420]statute could urge voluntary action. “ghe current bill asks
[8421]such cooperation from state and local agencies and foreign
[8422]governments. A statute that sought to svoid constitutional
[8423]disputes conld ask the same of the President regarding
[8424]records of the ‘White House. and Executive office.
[8426]This alternative hill could require or request public
[8427]reports describing materials withheld from release —- their
[8428], characteristics and quantities, the genexal reasons for non-
[8430]disclosure, and plans for eventual release. .
[8432]| A Review Board could -be created with a limited — and
[8433]more workable -— mandate.
[8435]Its first duty could be to review record-holders’
[8436]guidelines. These might well differ from agency to agency.
[8437]Procedures for searching National Security Agency files of
[8439]13-00000
[8441]communications intercepts might not be the same as those for
[8443]searching the much less voluminous files of CIA stations and
[8445]headquarters divisions. The Board could try, however, to
[8447]ensure comparative uniformity in the diligence of searches.
[8448]The Board could try also to ensure comparative
[8450]‘uniformity in definitions of what is to be withheld. It
[8452]might urge, for exemple, that the intelligence sources and
[8454]methods criterion apply only to sources and methods in cur-
[8455]rent use, not just to amy ever used.
[8457]. The Board’s second duty could be to scan materials that
[8459]_ record-holders proposed actually to withhold. The Board
[8461]might question record-holders’ decisions. If so, it could
[8463]ask that the agency or committee think again. rf dif-
[8464]ferences continued, the Board could appeal to the President
[8465]or, for “Congressional documents, to the President of the
[8466]Senate « or the Speaker of the House.
[8468]In a final public report, the Board could describe any
[8469]still umresolved differences. While the description would
[8470]be in generalities, the issues vould become publicly known.
[8471]The broad purpose of the Board’s report would be to validate:
[8472]the record-holders’ non-disclosure decisions.
[8474]Such a Review Board could be selected by comparatively
[8475]traditional methods. Nominations could be asked of the
[8477]13-00000
[8481]‘American Bar Association, the American Historical Associa-
[8482]tion, the american Political Science Association, or kindred
[8483]bedies.. Appointments could be made by the President, with
[8485]_ advice and consent of the Senate.
[8487]Uniess the quantity of material withheld. proved to be
[8488]mich larger than I would expect, the Review Board could be
[8489]kept small. It conid probably manage with minimal staff..
[8491]I believe that this alternative statute would ac-
[8492]complish all that can be accomplished. It would Leave the
[8494]_ onus for release or non-release of records on those already
[8496]familiar with these records. Committees of Congress would
[8497]make rules for their files. The President, the heads of de-
[8498]partments; the Directors of Central intelligence and the
[8500]M012
[8502]FBI, and the archivist of the United states would make rules
[8504]for theirs.
[8506]This alternative statute would limit the powers and
[8508]_ responsibilities to be thrust on an untried and potentially
[8510]vulnerable Review Board. It would create a Board with the
[8512]assignment only of checking the coherence and consistency of
[8514]. oriteriza:' for aisclesure and non-disclosure.
[8516]Since the invitation to testify included questions
[8518]reaching beyond the current bill, I take the opportunity to |
[8520]respond to that concerning general declassification
[8522]13-00000
[8524]wee ee Wiz.
[8526]10
[8528]policies. I believe the procedure just outlined could be’
[8529]applied much more widely. A statute could declere that all
[8530]government records more than thirty years oid would become
[8531]public unless the originating agency showed specific cause
[8532]for continued non-disclosure. A Board or Commission ap~ .
[8533]pointed by the President with the advice and consent of the
[8534]Senate could have euthority to review all such naterials and
[8535]to question or appeal the non-disclosure. This approximates
[8536]practice in the United Kingdom.
[8537]. In conclusion, X repeat a verning ageinst expecting any
[8538]| legislation to create consensus and thereby "contribute to .
[8539]the trust o£ the people in their government." Inventors of
[8540]conspiracy. theories will alwaya be more ingenious than as-
[8541]semblers of evidence. The imediate result of releasing
[8542]records will be, moreover, to provide grist for the .
[8543]theorists’ milis. Even if everything were released tomor~
[8544]row, it would take at least a decade for researchers to sort
[8545]the newly released materials. In the meantime, conspiracy
[8546]builders would be picking out those bits and pices of evi-
[8547]Gence that suited them. In the long run, release of docu-
[8548]ments will get us closer to truth; but, as Keynes observed,
[8549]thet. long rom. probably stretches beyond any of our
[8551]lifetimes.
[8553]13-00000
[8555]4 '
[8556]4 6
[8557]a! o
[8559]TESTIMONY OF-JAMES H. LESAR
[8560]PRESIDENT
[8562]ASSASSINATION ARCHIVES AND RESEARCH CENTER
[8564]ON
[8565]S.J. RES. 282
[8567]"THE ASSASSINATION MATERIALS DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1992"
[8568]BEFORE
[8569]THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
[8571]OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE
[8573]. May 12, 1992
[8577]¢)
[8579]000
[8581]dy
[8583]Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee:
[8585]I am honored to have this opportunity to testify before you
[8587]on the legislation to require the government to release its records
[8589]pertaining to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. I
[8590]appear on behalf of the Assassination Archives and Research Center
[8591]("the AARC"), of which I am President. The AARC is a private, non-
[8592]profit organization which collects, preserves and disseminates
[8593]information and materials on political assassinations. The AARC
[8594]is funded by membership dues and donations from the public. I am
[8595]an attorney specializing in Freedom of Information Act litigation,
[8596]and have litigated well over 100 such lawsuits. Over the past
[8597]twenty years I have represented nearly all of the major authors and
[8598]researchers who have litigated their Freedom of Information Act
[8599]requests for records pertaining to the assassination of President
[8600]Kennedy. To date, I have handled over fifty such lawsuits.
[8602]I have carefully studied the proposed legislation. I have
[8603]also read the letter which you received from the Department of
[8604]Justice. I have heard that the Administration pay seek to achieve
[8605]its goals, particularly that of using more restrictive standards
[8606]for release of Executive Branch records, by issuing an executive
[8607]order rather than awaiting action by Congress. In my mind the only
[8608]thing worse than seeing the Justice Department's wishes granted in
[8609]legislation would be to see them set forth in a stand-alone
[8610]executive order which goes unchallenged by Congress. . Legislation
[8612]is needed to bring each branch of government which holds records
[8614]13-00000
[8616]Pe)
[8618]3
[8620]on to the same playing field, and to create a process which is
[8621]accountable, independent and credible. Incorporating the Justice
[8622]Department's restrictive standards in an executive order would
[8623]duplicate the devastating damage to the ideal ‘of full disclosure
[8624]which occurred when the Reagan Administration successfully
[8625]sabotaged the 1974 amendments to Exemption 1. by drastically
[8626]altering the standards for classifying information in the interests
[8627]of national security.
[8629]The difficulty which researchers have had gaining access to
[8630]Kennedy assassination materials amply demonstrates the need to
[8631]alter the standards employed by the FOIA and the current executive
[8632]order on national security classification. If you support release
[8633]of the Kennedy assassination records, you cannot favor the Justice
[8634]Department's recipe of simply mixing one part political will to
[8635]three parts of existing standards and stir. You must substantially
[8636]liberalize the existing standards and make it stick.
[8638]A few illustrations from my practice will- show the
[8639]inadequacies of the FOIA and the enormous frustration which accrues
[8640]to those who attempt to use it to obtain infermation about the
[8641]Kennedy assassination. These examples reveal a pattern of delay,
[8642]costly litigation, and untrue representations by the government.
[8643]Cases brought in the 1980's also show that massive withholding of
[8644]information, with little significant information being released.
[8646]Case 1: In 1969 Harold Weisberg, a leading Warren Commission
[8647]critic, made a simple request to the FBI. He wanted to see the
[8649]results of the spectrographic. tests which had been conducted on
[8651]13-00000
[8653]4
[8654]bullet(s), bullet fragments and items of evidence allegedly struck
[8655]by bullets during the assassination of President Kennedy. Denied
[8656]access by the FBI and the Attorney General, in 1970 he brought
[8657]suit. A four-year legal battle ensued. First, the district court,
[8658]relying on the Justice Department's representation that it was not
[8659]in the national interest to release the results of these scientific
[8660]tests, denied his request. A court of Appeals panel reversed, but
[8661]the dissenting judge wrote a scathing opinion in which he referred
[8662]to FOIA requesters as "rummaging writers" and characterized
[8663]Weisberg as "some party off the street." Stating that the FOIA
[8664]"forfend(ed) against" Weisberg's proposed further inquiry into the
[8665]Kennedy assassination, he concluded his dissent with a Latin phrase
[8666]in capital letters, "REQUIESCAT IN PACE." "Rest in Peace." But
[8667]the case did not rest in peace. The Justice Department sought a
[8668]rehearing before the full court, which was granted. On rehearing
[8669]en banc, the full court ruled that the files of the FBI were exempt
[8670]from the FOIA's disclosure requirements. That case set a precedent
[8672]so bad that when Congress first amended the FOIA in 1974, it
[8674]‘specifically overturned the Weisberg case, requiring that the FBI
[8676]and other law enforcement agencies demonstrate that allegedly
[8677]exempt records fall within one or more of six enumerated harms.
[8678]In 1975, when the new amendments took effect, Weisberg again
[8679]brought suit on his request for the spectrographic analyses, this
[8680]time adding a request for neutron activation testing on the same
[8681]evidentiary items. This new phase of the battle lasted eight years
[8683]and involved three trips to the’ Court of Appeals. Ultimately,
[8685]13-00000
[8687]5
[8689]Weisberg obtained important records on these scientific tests,
[8690]including records that the FBI had first said did not exist, then
[8691]claimed were missing or destroyed. Other records were never
[8692]located or were meaningless. From the date of the first request,
[8693]the legal battles lasted fourteen years. .
[8695]"case 2: In 1980 another requester asked the CIA to release
[8696]all of the records it had made available to the House Select
[8697]Committee on Assassinations. The CIA refused and the requester
[8698]brought suit. In court the CIA stated that there were
[8699]approximately 300,000 pages of records responsive to the request.
[8701]I spent the first three years of this lawsuit litigating four
[8703]‘threshold issues raised by the Government. Had-my client lost any
[8705]one of these four threshold issues, the CIA would not have had to.
[8706]release a single page from its 300,000 page collection.
[8708]By 1984 the CIA had begun to release a trickle of documents.
[8709]Although the .cIA told the court that it had assigned seven people
[8710]to work on the request, it processed the documents at an incredibly
[8711]slow pace. When it became evident that it would take the CIA
[8712]several decades to process all of the documents, the requester had
[8713]no choice but to drastically limit the scope of his request. Thus,
[8714]he entered into a stipulation which restricted his request to some
[8715]of the subjects discussed ‘in the report of the House Select
[8716]Committee on Assassinations and its supporting volumes. Although
[8717]the CIA's job of reviewing documents was reduced by more than one-
[8718]half, it took several more years for it to complete processing of
[8720]the remaining documents. Moreover, the CIA continued to withhold
[8722]13-00000_
[8724]6
[8725]virtually everything. Only a few thousand pages were released, and
[8726]most of them consisted of newspaper clippings, records that
[8727]previously had been released, or documents that were heavily
[8728]redacted.
[8730]Case 3: In 1976, Dr. Paul Hoch requested two batches of CIA
[8731]documents which had remained to be processed after the CIA had made
[8732]its initial releases of Kennedy assassination documents. Many of
[8733]the records responsive to this request related to the 1966-1969
[8734]investigation and trial of Clay Shaw by New Orleans District
[8735]Attorney Jim Garrison, who charged that Shaw, David Ferrie and
[8736]others had plotted to kill the President. The CIA repeatedly. told
[8737]Hoch that his request was being processed and that if he would only
[8738]be patient the documents would be released in "a few months," "in
[8739]six to eight weeks," "in the near future." Indeed,. Hoch received
[8740]such assurances on no less than 11 different occasions over a six-
[8741]year period.. After having been strung-out for six years, Hoch
[8742]retained counsel and filed suit. After the suit was filed,
[8743]evidence was developed. which indicated that all the CIA had done >
[8744]over the previous six years was to number the gocuments. It had
[8745]numbered several documents one month, a few more another month, a
[8746]couple more the next month. Then, in one month, it engaged in a
[8747]veritable orgy of numeration, numbering, as I recall, nearly a
[8748]hundred documents that month. . .
[8750]A few months.after Hoch filed his complaint in district court,:
[8751]the CIA produced 808 pages. It also continued to withhold a
[8753]considerable volume of materials, mostly on grounds of national
[8755]13-00000
[8757]7
[8758]security or because disclosure allegedly would identify
[8759]intelligence sources and methods. The district court upheld all
[8760]of the CIA's exemption claims save one. This one was an 11l-page
[8761]memorandum which the CIA swore must be withheld in its entirety
[8762]under Exemption 5's deliberative process privilege. The judge
[8763]ordered this anonymous, undated memorandum disclosed. Then things
[8764]got really interesting. The CIA moved the judge to reconsider his
[8765]order on this memorandum, asserting that it had claimed, albeit
[8766]obscurely, that this document was also withheld in its entirety
[8767]under Exemptions 1 and 3 in order to protect national security and
[8768]intelligence sources and methods. But before the court could act
[8769]on the motion for reconsideration, the CIA rushed to court with a
[8770]new revelation: the eleven-page memo, which dealt with the
[8772]CIA/Mafia plots to kill Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro, matters
[8774]‘exposed by the Church Committee in 1975, had been released nearly
[8776]in full almost a decade earlier, by the CIA itself.
[8777]Case 4: In 1969, Harold Weisberg made a request for FBI
[8778]records on the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. J.
[8780]Edgar Hoover himself ordered that no response be made to this
[8782]‘request. In 1975, when the amended FOIA became effective, Weisberg
[8784]submitted a new request for King assassination records. He
[8785]specifically included a request for crime scene photographs. After
[8786]he filed suit, the FBI claimed that it did not have any crime scene
[8787]photographs. This statement was false. Ultimately, the FBI
[8788]released more than 150 crime scene photographs to Weisberg.
[8790]During the same case, Weisberg picked up indications that an
[8792]13-00000
[8794]8
[8796]FBI supervisor named Long had kept a tickler on the King
[8797]assassination. A tickler is a file containing extra copies of
[8798]documents kept at hand so it can be immediately retrieved. The
[8799]FBI first denied that such a tickler file had been kept. Then it
[8800]Claimed that it could not locate it. After a long period of
[8801]resistance, the Justice Department finally located the Long tickler
[8802]exactly where Weisberg had suggested they look for it. When
[8803]finally located, most of the file had been gutted.
[8805]Weisberg's suit for the King assassination documents lasted
[8806]15 years. He obtained approximately 60,000 pages. If the same
[8807]suit were filed today, I believe that he would get about one-fourth
[8808]of what he obtained in the late 1970's and early 1980's.
[8810]These stories that I have related are unusual only because the
[8811]requesters actually went to court to fight the CIA and FBI. Most
[8812]requesters cannot afford the time or the money of litigating their
[8813]FOIA requests. against these agencies. You might be tempted to
[8814]conclude from the absence of litigation that the FOIA is working
[8815]just fine. The opposite is true. The FOIA has been severely
[8816]damaged by the 1984 amendments eliminating access to CIA
[8817]operational files and by the 1986 amendments to Exemption 7, which
[8818]applies to law enforcement records, as well as by a string of
[8819]decisions in the Supreme court and the United States Court of
[8820]Appeals for the District of Columbia which have greatly expanded
[8821]the amount of material which can be withheld from the public.
[8823]Let me add that while it is important to have obtained the
[8825]public pledges from CIA Director Gates and FBI Director Sessions
[8827]13-00000
[8829]9
[8830]which you heard today, if you support release of the records, you
[8832]must also ensure that you have the support of other agencies,
[8834]. including the Department of Defense, the Treasury Department, the
[8836]State Department, and such divisions as the Secret Service and the
[8837]National Security Agency.
[8839]I wish to caution that while I think that this legislation
[8840]will result in greatly enriching our fund of knowledge about the
[8841]Kennedy assassination and the official investigations of it, at
[8842]least if modified along the lines I suggest in the attachment to
[8843]this statement, I do not believe that there is likely to be any
[8844]"smoking gun," which will “solve the case." Rather, . this
[8845]legislation must be defended on the ground that the American people
[8846]have a right to the fullest possible disclosure so they can make
[8847]of it what they will. It will take much time to read, analyze, and _
[8848]understand the information released. Whether it will lead to the
[8849]resolution of any controversies which beset this subject remains
[8850]to be seen, but it is a course which cannot be avoided. The
[8851]American people want to know the details of their history, however
[8852]painful and puzzling it may be, and that is their right.
[8854]The proposed legislation has both strengths and weaknesses.
[8855]I am attaching to this statement a detailed discussion of the joint
[8856]resolution which includes a number of recommendations for changes.
[8857]To briefly summarize, the major provisions of the bill include: a
[8858]definition of "assassination materials," the composition of the
[8859]Review Board, and the standards for the postponement of the release
[8861]of information. |The standards for postponement are critical
[8863]13-00000
[8865]10
[8867]because they determine the. amount of material which may be
[8868]withheld. |
[8870]Before discussing the limitations on the term “assassination
[8871]material" as related to the assassination of President John F.
[8872]Kennedy, I note that this section excludes records on the
[8873]assassinations of Senator Robert F. Kennedy and Dr. Martin Luther
[8874]King, Jr. The House Select Committee on Assassinations ("HSCA")
[8875]conducted an extensive investigation on Dr. King's assassination
[8876]and concluded that his murder probably involved a conspiracy.
[8877]Public belief that Dr. King was killed as a result of a conspiracy
[8878]and that this crime remains unsolved is widespread. The alleged
[8879]assassin, James Earl Ray, denies that he shot Dr. King. Unless the
[8880]importance of historical issues is to be determined by whether a
[8881]movie has been made about them, there is no justification for
[8882]excluding the King assassination records from this legislation.
[8884]The assassination of Senator Robert F. Kennedy is equally the
[8885]subject of profound controversy. Recently, a group of
[8886]distinguished citizens have submitted a lengthy petition to the Los
[8887]Angeles County Grand Jury to investigate evidence that the Los
[8888]Angeles Police Department engaged in “willful and corrupt
[8889]misconduct" in its investigation of Senator Kennedy's
[8890]assassination. In support of these charges, the group submitted
[8892]more than 800 pages of exhibits, mainly derived from the Los
[8894]Angeles Police Department's own files, which document its charges:
[8896]that L.A.P.D. destroyed crucial items of evidence, ignored material
[8898]evidentiary leads, cannot account’ for important missing evidence,
[8900]13-00000
[8902]11
[8903]engaged in a cover-up of its failures, and failed to conduct a
[8904]thorough investigation of the crime. The records of federal
[8905]agencies and congressional committees relevant to Senator Kennedy's
[8906]assassination should also be included in this legislation.
[8908]The term Nassassination material" is broadly defined, but it
[8909]falls short of ensuring that scholars will have all of the
[8910]documents which they need in order to properly study the subject.
[8911]It should include policy documents which provide the context of
[8912]decisions in the Kennedy Administration which may shed light on
[8913]the assassination. It should include, as it presently does, all
[8914]documents obtained or created by any previous official
[8915]investigation. It should include materials on those persons who
[8916]have figured in previous official investigations: state, Federal
[8917]or local. Because no one can predict in advance where new avenues
[8918]of study may lead, or what they may produce, the definition should
[8919]be flexible enough to provide scholars with those materials
[8920]reasonable calculated to shed light on the assassination or its
[8921]investigations. Finally, it should also include information
[8922]records on agency operations and functions which may be relevant
[8923]to the study of the assassination.
[8925]The current provision defining assassination materials
[8926]contains an exemption for “personnel matters oor other
[8927]administrative affairs of a congressional committee, the Warren
[8928]Commission, or any entity within the Executive Branch of
[8929]Government." I strongly oppose this exclusion. The Warren
[8931]Commission records on this subject have been publicly available
[8933]13-00000
[8935]12
[8937]through the National Archives for many years and should not now be
[8938]made secret. The work of prior commissions and committees isa
[8939]perfectly legitimate subject, but it has been the subject of some
[8940]secrecy which has impeded the public's right to know. In
[8941]particular, the staff of the House Assassinations Committee, with
[8942]the exception of its General Counsel and Staff Director, G. Robert
[8943]Blakey, pledged an oath of secrecy about their work. Blakey has
[8944]published a commercial book about the committee's work, and is
[8945]quite public and outspoken about it. Because of the secrecy oath,
[8946]others who are quite knowledgeable about the Committee's work have
[8947]been silenced. The public has been denied their views and their
[8948]information. In this regard, I would urge the insertion of an
[8949]additional provision in this legislation which would rescind any
[8950]secrecy oaths taken by the staffs of any previous congressional or
[8951]executive branch commission or committee.
[8953]This provision would also be used to prohibit release of
[8954]information regarding a very troubling incident in which the House
[8955]Select Committee discovered that its most sensitive files on the
[8956]Kennedy assassination had been rifled by a CIA liaison officer
[8957]assigned to assist the committee. According to published accounts
[8958]in the Washington Post, this officer, Regis fT. Blahut,
[8959]surreptitiously entered the safe reserved for physical evidence of
[8960]President Kennedy's assassination, including autopsy photos, X-
[8961]rays, and other articles, including the so-called "magic bullet"
[8962]that wounded both Kennedy and Texas Governor John Connally.
[8964]According to the Post, Blahut was given several polygraph
[8966]13-00000
[8968]13
[8969]examinations. He was asked whether he did it, and according to one
[8970]source, he flunked that. He was asked whether anyone had ordered
[8971]him to do it, and he is said to have flunked that question too.
[8972]Materials regarding incidents of this kind should be fully
[8973]available to the public.
[8975]A second problem with this legislation is that is proposes to
[8976]exclude from the Review Board anyone who has had "previous
[8977]involvement with the investigation or inquiry relating to the
[8978]assassination of President John F. Kennedy." I believe this is too
[8979]broad and should be limited to involvement in prior "official"
[8980]investigations. Having a panel of Kennedy assassination agnostics
[8981]might have some idealistic allure, but the public is unlikely to
[8982]be persuaded that the government intends to disclose all pertinent
[8983]materials if the panel does not include experienced and
[8984]knowledgeable Kennedy researchers.
[8986]A third and critically important area that needs refinement
[8987]is the standards for postponement of disclosure. Particularly
[8988]significant is the need to narrow the definition of the term
[8989]“intelligence source" and the term “intelligence method."
[8990]Virtually all information an intelligence agency document can be
[8991]withheld under these terms. "Intelligence source" must be defined
[8992]to make clear that it does not include dead sources who have been
[8993]the subject of widespread publicity that is tantamount to official
[8994]acknowledgement, .and sources who are willing to have their:
[8995]identities disclosed, and sources who cannot reasonably be expected
[8997]to suffer death or serious bodily harm if their identities are
[8999]13-00000
[9001]14
[9002]disclosed. Similar restrictions must be put on the term
[9003]"confidential source." With respect to intelligence methods, it
[9005]must be made clear that this term does not include outmoded
[9006]methods, methods which are known to the public or methods’ which may
[9007]be commonly deduced. Nor should it include methods that are known
[9008]to other hostile intelligence services.
[9010]New legislation is needed. Half measures will not do. If
[9011]this legislation does succeed in substantially clearing the air,
[9012]it does not convince the public that nothing of critical importance
[9013]to our understanding has been withheld but for the very best. of
[9014]reasons, then public cynicism about government will continue to
[9015]increase.
[9017]I ask that additional comments be placed in the record.
[9019]13-00000
[9021]ANALYSIS AND COMMENTS
[9023]on S. J. Res. 282
[9025]Sec. 3. Definitions
[9027](2) “Assassination material" is broadly defined but still may
[9028]fall far short of the documents which scholars need in order to
[9029]properly study the Kennedy assassination. In essence, the present
[9030]definition limits "assassination materials" to those records which
[9031]have figured in previous inquiries by Congressional committees or
[9032]Executive Branch agencies or commissions. Since these entities may
[9033]not have asked for all of the relevant records, and may in fact not
[9034]have asked for records on some relevant subject areas, the
[9036]definition of "assassination material" needs further refinement.
[9038]. It should be modified to indicate that "assassination material"
[9040]includes any material which any member of the Assassination
[9041]Materials Review Board ("AMRB") or any individual seeking release
[9042]under the Freedom of Information Act ("the FOTA"), can plausibly
[9043]contend may shed light on the assassination or any of its
[9044]investigations.
[9046]The definition also contains two explicit exclusions. The
[9047]first of these excludes material to the extent that it pertains "to
[9048]personnel matters oor other administrative affairs of a
[9049]congressional committee, the Warren Commission, or any entity
[9051]within the Executive Branch of “the Government. . . . " This
[9053]13-00000
[9055]2
[9056]language could be used to prohibit release of materials pertaining
[9057]to Regis Blahut, the CIA employee suspected of tampering with
[9058]autopsy materials pertaining to the Kennedy assassination.
[9060]The second exclusion relates to the autopsy materials donated
[9061]by the Kennedy family to the National Archives. This assumes that
[9062]the autopsy materials were those of the Kennedy family to give to
[9063]the Archives. This legitimizes a bad precedent. The autopsy
[9064]materials ought to be subject to public, not private, control. The
[9065]remedy for abuse of autopsy materials should be a newly created
[9066]right of legal action by family members rather than denial or
[9067]public access.
[9069]Sec. 5. Assassination Materials Review Board
[9071](b) Court of Appeals division shall appoint "5 distinguished
[9073]and impartial private citizens, none of whom are presently
[9075]employees of any branch of the Government and none of whom shall
[9077]have had any previous involvement with any investigation or inquiry
[9078]relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, to
[9079]serve as members of the Review Board."
[9081]Query: Is this language designed tq exclude private
[9082]citizens who have written or spoken critically of the official
[9083]investigations of President Kennedy's assassinations? Or only
[9084]those persons who participated in official investigations or
[9085]inquiries? If it excludes the former, then it will be difficult
[9086]to find individuals who are sufficiently knowledgeable about.
[9087]Kennedy assassination matters to make the judgments called for by
[9089]the Joint Resolution (i.e., defining what materials are related to
[9091]13-00000
[9093]3
[9094]the assassination and whether the public interest in disclosure
[9095]outweigh other concerns). Additionally, without such persons on
[9096]the Review Board, it may be difficult to persuade the public that
[9097]all pertinent materials will be disclosed, thus undercutting the
[9098]objective of restoring trust in government. A committee of
[9099]distinguished citizens who know nothing about the subject is not
[9101]likely to inspire trust.
[9103]Sec. 6. Grounds for Postponement of Disclosure
[9105]Subsection 1 states that disclosure may be postponed if its
[9106]release would (A) reveal "an intelligence asset."
[9108]This must be qualified. It should only apply to living,
[9109]covert intelligence agents. Furthermore, if material in the public
[9110]domain identifies or suggests the identity of an intelligence
[9111]agent, the presumption should be that such material shall be
[9112]disclosed unless the agency which employed the agent can show by
[9113]clear and convincing evidence that serious damage to the agent can
[9114]reasonably be expected to result from disclosure.
[9116]Subsection 1 states that disclosure may he postponed if its
[9117]release would (B) reveal "an intelligence source or method which
[9118]is currently utilized, or reasonably expected to be utilized, by
[9119]the United States Government. . . ."
[9121]‘This provision also must be modified. The first problem is
[9122]that there is no limiting definition of “intelligence source of:
[9123]method." Under this proviso, it would be possible to withhold such
[9125]"intelligence sources" as newspapers, libraries, law enforcement
[9127]13-0000
[9129]0.
[9131]4
[9132]agencies, etc., as well as. the personnel affiliated with them.
[9133]Research in a public library is an “intelligence method, " and it,
[9134]too, is no doubt currently utilized. A fortiori would this
[9135]definition include the surveillance techniques employed at the
[9136]Cuban and Soviet embassies in Mexico City.
[9138]The "intelligence source" definition should be limited to
[9139]living sources in circumstances where disclosure could reasonably
[9140]be expected to result in actual serious personal damage to the
[9141]source. Where disclosure of the identity of the source will not
[9142]cause serious actual damage to the current national defense or
[9143]foreign policy interests of the United States or where the identity
[9144]of the source has become publicly known or is likely to have become
[9145]Known to any hostile or formerly hostile foreign power or an agency
[9146]thereof, it should be released.
[9148]"Intelligence methods" must also be modified so that it
[9149]applies only to methods that are unknown to the public. or to
[9150]foreign intelligence agencies.
[9152]Subsection 1 states that disclosure maybe postponed if its
[9153]release would (C) reveal “any other matter currently relating to
[9154]the military defense, intelligence operations or conduct of foreign
[9155]relations of the United States; and the threat to the military
[9156]defense or conduct of foreign relations of the Unites States posed
[9157]by its disclosure is of such gravity that it outweigh any public
[9158]interest in its disclosure.
[9160]The chief problem with this provision is that there is no
[9162]standard for what constitutes a’ “public interest" of sufficient
[9164]13-00000
[9166]5
[9167]moment to outweigh any of the putative threats. Is the general
[9168]interest in the fullest possible disclosure a public interest which
[9169]may be considered, or must a showing of public interest in the
[9170]substantive content of the material at issue be shown?
[9172]Subsection 2 provides that invasion of the privacy of a living
[9173]person is a grounds for postponement of disclosure "if that
[9174]invasion of privacy is so substantial that it outweigh any public
[9175]interest in its disclosure."
[9177]This exemption contains a phrase stating that it applies
[9178]"whether the person is identified in the material or not." This
[9179]phrase should be stricken. With this phrase included this
[9180]provision is significantly less liberal than current FOIA exemption
[9182]6, which covers only those invasions which result from the actual
[9184]production of the materials themselves. Additionally, some content... -
[9186]needs to be given to the invasion of privacy concept. One
[9187]limitation would be that it must cause an actual as opposed to a
[9188]theoretical invasion of privacy. A second that it relates only to
[9189]intimate personal matters the disclosure of which would be likely
[9190]to have profound adverse impact on an individual.
[9192]Subsection 3 states that disclosure may be postponed if its
[9193]release would constitute "a substantial and unjustified violation
[9194]of an understanding of confidentiality between a Government agent
[9195]and a witness or a foreign government. .. ."
[9197]This provision needs to be amended to include only those
[9198]promises of confidentiality--either to a witness or a foreign
[9200]government--made in writing. _ Among the reasons for this are the
[9202]13-00000
[9204]6
[9205]fact that (1) if the promise of confidentiality is not required to
[9206]have been made in writing, then there is seldom any effective means
[9207]to counter the agency's claim of confidentiality and the agency
[9208]wins by default; and (2) the agency's claim of confidentiality
[9209]frequently reflects not the desire of the witness but its own
[9210]desire for secrecy.
[9212]This provision needs to be amended to make it clear that it
[9213]does not authorize withholding of the identify of, or information
[9214]provided by, a deceased witness. Secondly, there should also be
[9215]some time limitation on any understanding of confidentiality made
[9216]with a foreign government. And perhaps there should be a
[9217]requirement that the foreign government officially object to each
[9218]such disclosure in writing. .
[9220]Additionally, it should be made clear, either in the text or
[9221]in the legislative history, that it is not a “substantial and
[9222]unjustified violation of a promise of confidentiality to disclose
[9223]information supplied by a witness if the identity of the witness
[9224]can be concealed. .
[9226]Section 8. Determinations by the Review Board
[9228]Subsection (g) provides that any decision of the AMRB that a
[9229]record is not assassination material or that disclosure should be
[9230]postponed "shall not be subject to judicial review."
[9232]Why not? Likely to pose less of a burden and expense than
[9233]litigation under the FOIA.
[9235]Subsection (h) (2) provides that the President may certify that
[9237]material "qualifies for postponement of disclosure pursuant to
[9239]13-00000. .
[9243]7
[9244]section 6, in which case release of the material shall be
[9245]postponed, and this decision shall not be subject to judicial
[9246]review."
[9248]There is no limitation on the duration of postponement by the
[9249]President. Suggest that the maximum period of time be that portion
[9250]of the President's term which remains.
[9252]Section 11. Rules of Construction
[9254]Subsection (b) provides that nothing in the Joint Resolution
[9255]shall be construed to eliminate any right to file requests with any
[9256]Executive agency other than the Review Board or seek judicial
[9257]review of the decisions of such agencies under the FOIA.
[9259]One problem here is that transferring all agency records to
[9260]the Review Board may mean that they are no longer “agency records"
[9261]within the meaning of the FOIA." |
[9263]A second problem is that this provision eliminates the AMBR
[9264]from FOIA coverage. This sets a bad precedent and sets up
[9265]circumstances of highest irony in which an agency whose overriding
[9266]mission is openness will itself operate in secrecy.
[9268]A provision should be added here stating that in any FOIA
[9269]action involving assassination materials the court is to apply the
[9270]standards for postponement set forth in the Assassination Materials
[9271]Disclosure Act in lieu of the exemptions provided in the FOTIA.
[9273]Additional Notes
[9275]It may be a good idea to expressly mention the Rockefeller
[9277]Commission as subject to the Act.
[9281]13-00000
[9287]CIA HAS NO OBIECTION 79
[9288]. DECLASS IFICATIO’
[9289]fudge John R. Tunheim ° N AND/OR
[9290]Judge J RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
[9291]f
[9293]Chairman
[9294]Assassination Records Review Boari!’ THIS DOCUMENT
[9296]Prepared Testimony In Support of
[9297]FLR. 1553,
[9298]To amend the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992
[9299]to extend the authorization of the Assassination Records Review Board
[9300]until September 30, 1998.
[9302]Before the
[9303]N ational Security, International Affairs and Criminal Justice Subcommittee,
[9304]; House Government Reform and Oversight Committee
[9306]June 4, 1997
[9308]I. Introduction
[9310]Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, I would like to thank you for the
[9311]opportunity to testify on behalf of the Assassination Records Review Board in support
[9312]of H.R. 1553, which would extend the authorization of the Review Board for one final
[9313]year. The Board acknowledges that all of the issues surrounding the assassination of
[9314]President Kennedy will likely never be fully resolved, however, this additional time
[9315]‘will allow us to complete our work, including the review and public release of critical
[9316]FBI and CIA ¢ecords, submit a comprehensive and complete final report to the
[9317]Congress and the President, and make available to the American public.as much
[9318]information as possible on the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.
[9320]I would also like to take this opportunity to thank Chairman Burton for introducing
[9321]HLR. 1553, and Congressmen Waxman and Stokes for cosponsoring this bill. These
[9322]Members have exhibited an admirable bipartisan spirit and an understanding that we
[9323]as a government, and as a nation, must bring closure to a sad chapter of our history,
[9324]and that we must seize this opportunity to do it now. In addition, we would like to
[9325]express our appreciation to Chairman Hastert for chairing this hearing today. It
[9326]provides an opportunity to explain what the Review Board has accomplished to date
[9327]and discuss how we could finish our work in Fiscal Year 1998, if given the opportunity.
[9329]Please allow me to introduce the other members of the Review Board with whom I have
[9330]had the professional honor and personal pleasure to work: Dr. Henry F. Graff,
[9332]_ Professor Emeritus of History, Columbia University; Dr. Kermit L. Hall, Dean, College
[9334]of Humanities, and Professor of History and Law, The Ohio State University; Dr.
[9335]William L. Joyce, Associate University Librarian for Rare Books and Special Collections,
[9336]Princeton University; and Dr. Anna K. Nelson, Distinguished Adjunct Historian in
[9338]13-00000
[9340]_ Residence, The American University. We have been honored to engage in this
[9342]important effort to make the history of the Kennedy assassination available to the
[9343]American public and I am pleased to be here today to testify before this Subcommittee
[9344]and answer any of your questions.
[9346]I would also like to describe briefly the professional staff that we are fortunate to have
[9347]hired. The Executive Director is Dr. David G.: Marwell, a professional historian who
[9348]gained vast experience dealing with large numbers of important historical documents .
[9349]with the Office of Special Investigations at the Department of Justice and later as the
[9350]Director of the Berlin Document Center. He leads a staff of 28 full-time employees, who
[9351]have varied backgrounds as historians, lawyers, analysts, investigators, and
[9352]administrators. The members of the staff have approached their unique task with
[9353]seriousness of purpose, creativity, professionalism, and competence, and have assisted
[9354]us in shedding new light on the assassination through the release of thousands of
[9355]Federal Government records, and the acquisition of records in private hands and local
[9356]governments that were not previously-available to the American public-: ‘I believe’ that. -:
[9357]we assembled exactly the typé: ‘Of professional and diversified staff that Congress °°
[9358]envisioned would be necessary to accomplish this difficult assignment.
[9360]I. Accomplishments to Date
[9362]As I know you are aware, the Review Board was created by The President John F.
[9363]Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (JFK Act) as an independent
[9364]Federal agency to oversee the identification and release of records related to the
[9365]assassination of President Kennedy. I know that certain members of this subcommittee
[9366]played a role in crafting and passing the JFK Act—a unique piece of legislation
[9367]designed to remove doubt and speculation about the content of government records
[9368]related to the assassination of President Kennedy. As a result of these lingering
[9369]suspicions, Congress determined that an independent board was the most effective and
[9370]efficient vehicle to make all assassination records available to the public.
[9372]The Review Board has accomplished much since we began releasing previously secret
[9373]records in June of 1995. The Board has acted to transfer more than 14,000 documents to
[9374]the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection (JFK Collection) at the
[9375]National Archives and Records Administration. We would not have been successful in
[9376]our efforts without the significant assistance of the National Archives. The JFK
[9377]Collection currently totals approximately 3.7 million pages and is used extensively by
[9378]researchers from all over the United States.
[9380]By the end of Fiscal Year 1997, the Review boat will have reviewed and processed .
[9381]nearly all.of the assassination records that have been identified by the more than 30
[9382]different government offices believed to be in possession of relevant records, with the
[9384]important exception of the FBI and the CIA. I will elaborate on the status of records
[9385]held by these two agencies later. The overwhelming majority of previously redacted -
[9386]information will have been made public by the Review Board.
[9388]Before discussing what we will accomplish with one final year, I would like to highlight
[9389]for the Members of the Subcommittee some of the important records that the Board has
[9390]made public. They include:
[9392]* Thousands of CIA documents on Lee Harvey Oswald and the assassination of
[9393]President Kennedy that made.up the CIA’s Oswald File and detail the agency’s
[9394]investigative activities following the assassination; _
[9396]* Thousands of once-secret records from the investigation by the House Select
[9397]Committee on Assassinations, chaired-by- Gongressman: Stokes, including the:
[9398]controversial Staff Report on Oswald‘s trip'té Mexico City; «°~":
[9400]# Thousands of records from the FBI's core and related assassination files that
[9401]document the FBI's interest in Oswald from 1959-63, after he had defected to the
[9402]Soviet Union, three years before the assassination; and.
[9404]* The extensive FBI files on its investigation of the assassination.
[9406]The important work in which the Review Board has been engaged can be best and most
[9407]graphically demonstrated by showing you the “before” and “after” versions of one of
[9408]the pre-assassiniation FBI documents to which I just referred and that the Board has
[9409]released to the public. Prior to the Review Board’s review, this FBI document (JFK
[9410]Collection Record Number: 124-10023-10236, Attachment Number 1) was available to
[9411]the public as you see it on the left. As you can see, it is heavily redacted. The only
[9412]information that was not secret was the date of the memorandum, “October 12, 1960,”
[9413]that it was to the “Director, FBI,” from “Legat, Paris” (the FBI representative in Paris),
[9414]that the subject was “Lee Harvey Oswald, Internal Security,” and that it had to do with
[9416]a “Paris letter 9/27/60.” The rest of the text was blacked out. Obviously, this version
[9417]of the document left room for a great deal of speculation among historians and
[9418]researchers regarding what was underneath the black ink on this document with the
[9419]provocative subject title.
[9421]The Review Board aggressively pursued the release of the redacted information in this
[9422]document and several others that relate to the FBI's interest in Oswald before the
[9423]assassination. After protracted negotiations with the FBI, an initial FBI appeal to the
[9424]White House in an effort to keep the document secret, and a direct appeal to the Swiss
[9427]13-00000
[9429]government, we were able to release the information. The unredacted memorandum
[9430]shows that the Swiss Federal Police had been enlisted by the FBI to try to locate Oswald
[9431]and to determine whether or not he had enrolled at a school in Switzerland. Now the.
[9432]public is able to see the document in full and judge its importance. In its redacted state,
[9433]the document could have meant anything that a researcher’s imaginationand -.
[9434]speculation could invent. In its released form, it must be analyzed for what it says.
[9436]One of the most important, most difficult, and most time-consuming responsibilities of
[9437]the Review Board is to identify and locate additional records-that are relevant to the
[9438]assassination. This is a task that to some degree must logically come later in the
[9439]process, after the Review Board has gained a full understanding of the records that have
[9440]already been identified. Although the Review Board has made a significant number of
[9441]requests for additional records and information, some of which I would like to outline,
[9443]much remains to be done before tt canbe be confident that it has completed. this. eek ste tke
[9445]responsibility. feconamer ibis
[9447]I would like to highlight some of our efforts to identify and locate additional.
[9448]assassination records. Some examples:
[9450]* Medical Records Inquiry. The Review Board has several ongoing efforts to
[9451]identify and locate assassination records involving medical issues. As with any
[9452]homicide, the medical records are among the most important pieces of evidence.
[9453]As part of its attempt to ensure that the medical records are as complete as_ .
[9454]possible, the Review Board staff has deposed the principal pathologists involved
[9456]' in President Kennedy's autopsy, as well as other individuals who had
[9457]knowledge of the autopsy and related photographic records.
[9459]Review Board has continued its efforts to locate additional FBI assassination
[9460]records by making several requests for records and information. The FBI has
[9461]assisted in this effort by giving the Review Board members access to requested
[9462]files. The JFK Task Force at the FBI has, on the whole, been extremely -
[9463]cooperative and helpful to the Board and has provided the requested
[9464]information.
[9466]Review Board has initiated a number of requests to the CIA for additional
[9467]information and records.: The Review Board expects that these requests will be’
[9468]promptly and fully satisfied during the upcoming year.
[9470]13-00000
[9472]Information. Time consuming and careful r review ‘of Secret Service activities by
[9473]the Review Board produced a series of requests for additional recordsand = *
[9474]information that, in turn, led to the identification of additional relevant
[9475]assassination records. For example, in response to the Review Board's first eight
[9476]requests for additional information, the Secret Service has submitted more than
[9477]1,500 pages of material.
[9479]Department of Defense (including it its many components and the oe
[9480]services) (collectively “DOD”), identified few assassination records on its own
[9481]initiative. DOD has nevertheless been cooperative with the efforts of the Review
[9482]Board to locate assassination records. When such records have been located,
[9483]DOD has been willing to release the records with few redactions.
[9485]Additional work would be required in‘ourlast year to.ensure that all.*: 242 t= er
[9486]assassination records in the military‘archives have been made a part of the TION
[9487]Collection. Fortunately, the diligent efforts of the ARRB staff have set the stage
[9488]for accomplishing this task.
[9490]V. Release of Private and Local Records
[9492]In addition to the release of records in the Federal Government's vast files,and
[9493]consistent with the Board’s mandate to make the historical record of the assassination as
[9494]complete as possible, we have been aggressive in identifying and acquiring significant
[9495]assassination-related records in the possession of private citizens and Ic
[9496]governments, including:
[9498]* The original personal papers of Warren Commission Chief Counsel J. Lee Rankin
[9499]that give further insight into the operations of the Commission;
[9501]* Copies of the official records of New Orleans District Attorney Jim Garrison’s
[9502]investigation of the assassination;
[9504]* The original papers of New Orleans attorney Edward Wegmann, from his work
[9505]as a member of the legal team that successfully defended Clay Shaw in 1969
[9506]against a charge of conspiracy to kill President Kennedy.
[9508]* Copies of records from the Metropolitan Crime Commission of New Orleans,
[9509]including records on District Attorney Garrison's investigation and prosecution .
[9510]of Clay Shaw and records regarding New Orleans organized crime figures;
[9512]13-00000
[9514]ean et cater nnn penton eee
[9516]* Long-lost films taken in Dallas on November 22, 1963, that the public had never
[9517]seen and that shed new light on the events of that day; and
[9518]. : , a
[9519]* Private collections of records from individuals including Warren Commission
[9520]attorney Wesley Liebler, author David Lifton, FBI Special Agent Hosty, Attorney
[9521]Frank Ragano, as well as others.
[9523]Iam also pleased to announce today that the Review Board has just acquired the
[9524]original personal papers of Clay Shaw, the late New Orleans businessman who is the
[9525]only person ever tried in connection with the assassination of President Kennedy. Shaw
[9526]was acquitted by a jury in 1969 after being charged as part of District Attorney
[9527]Garrison’s investigation. The Shaw papers will surely add another dimension to this
[9528]particular chapter of the assassination story.
[9530]All of these records will enrich the historical record of the assassination for future
[9532]generations of Americans.. te these Toco are Ppoesoed and described by se HAL a ive
[9534]National Archives, they will’be available for résearch. - .
[9535]VL The Need For Additional Ti
[9537]Despite our best efforts and significant accomplishments, some of which I have
[9538]outlined, the Review Board will not be able to complete its work within the original
[9539]three-year timetable set by Congress for the following reasons:
[9541]* First, the authors of the original legislation believed that our task would take
[9542]three years. That estimate was based on the best available information at the -
[9543]time, but the legislation established an unprecedented process. There was no
[9544]way of knowing the problems of scale and complexity that the Board would
[9545]encounter, nor was there any way to factor in the comprehensive approach we
[9546]have taken in fulfilling our ‘mandate.
[9548]* Second, the Board was not appointed until 18 months after the legislation was
[9549]signed into law. As a result, without the guidance of the Board, Federal agencies
[9550]initially defined for themselves the universe of records that should be processed
[9551]under The Act and to speculate about the kind of evidence that would be needed
[9552]to sustain the redaction of assassination-related information. Once the Board
[9553]was in place, agencies needed to redo a considerable amount of work. In fact,
[9554]many agencies have yet to complete their review and the Board is still seeking
[9555]their compliance.
[9557]Third, our enabling legislation imposed several restrictions on the manner in
[9558]which the Board could operate. Unlike other temporary agencies, the Board
[9560]13-00000
[9564]could not hire or detail experienced federal employees, but rather had to hire
[9565]new employees who had to undergo background investigations and be cleared at
[9566]the Top Secret level. Locating and renovating space that was suitable forthe ”
[9567]storage of classified materials was required. As a result, the Board could not
[9568]begin an effective review of records until the third quarter of our first year.
[9570]We are pleased and proud that the Review Board and staff have been able to overcome -
[9571]these obstacles, and that we have developed an efficient and effective process for the
[9572]review of records. All involved in this process want to see that the job is done, and do
[9573]not want to cease now with a reasonable conclusion in sight. We want to finish the job
[9574]we began, and with one additional year we can.
[9576]VIL The Job Ahead
[9577]The additional. year of operations will permit the Review Board to finish its task by
[9579]completing several major areas of our:work: Please be-assured that these are:
[9580]identifiable projects that ara‘critical to erisuring that the JFK Collection isas complete as.
[9582]~ possible, that relevant Federal agencies have been held accountable, and that all that we
[9583]have done is documented in our final report. The Board would focus in our final year
[9584]on the following:
[9588]CIA Sequestered Collection. The Review Board has completed its review of the
[9589]Oswald “201 file,” the file created and maintained by the CIA on Oswald and the
[9590]assassination. .The Review Board is now faced with the task of reviewing the
[9591]agency’s “Sequestered Collection,” the large collection of files that was
[9592]assembled by the CIA in response to requests made by the House Select
[9593]Committee on Assassinations, chaired by Congressman Stokes, in the late 1970's.
[9594]These records find their relevance to the assassination defined in part by the
[9595]course of the HSCA investigation. The Sequestered Collection originally
[9596]consisted of 63 boxes of CIA- and HSCA-originated records as well as 72 reels of ©
[9597]microfilm. Unfortunately, these records are in a confused order, poorly
[9598]described, and are replete with duplicates. Some of these records are clearly of
[9599]great significance, some are of only marginal interest, and the relevance of others
[9600]cannot be identified.
[9602]FBI] Sequestered Collection. The FBI divides its assassination records into two
[9603]general categories. The first is the “Core and Related Files,” consisting of nearly
[9604]600,000 pages of files collected in the course of the massive FBI investigation into
[9605]the assassination. The Review Board will complete its review of this significant
[9606]collection by the end of FY 1997. The second, which the FBI refers toasits
[9607]“HSCA records,” is a large collection of records that were identified as being of
[9608]interest to the HSCA and which remain to be reviewed by the Board. Like the
[9611]13-00000
[9613]CIA’s Sequestered Collection, this voluminous body of records (approximately
[9614]280,000 pages) ranges widely in relevance to the assassination.
[9616]‘Additional time will allow the | Board to o finish its. work with several ag agencies,
[9617]including the Secret Service, the National Security Agency, and Congressional
[9618]Committees, including the Senate Intelligence Committee. -
[9620]Search for Additional Records. With one more year of operations, the Board's
[9621]search for additional records held by Federal agencies, private individuals, and
[9622]local governments would be concluded with greater confidence. Some of these
[9623]records have been identified, but not yet acquired by the Board.
[9625]* Federal Agency Compliance. In November 1996, the Review Board initiated a
[9626]compliance program to ensure that Federal agencies have fully cooperated with
[9627]the Board in discharging its responsibility of assuring Congress andthe |! -
[9628]American public that the goals of the JEK Acthave been‘accomplished to the ° +
[9629]greatest possible extent. The requests to document compliance with the JFK Act
[9630]were sent to 27 U.S. government agencies and departments to confirm that the
[9631]U.S. government has identified, located, and released all records relating to the
[9632]assassination of President Kennedy. The agencies’ statements of compliance will
[9633]be included in the Review Board’s final report to the Congress. The one-year
[9634]extension will ensure that the compliance program is completed and fully
[9635]documented in the final report.
[9637]It is important for the Review Board to complete these major projects. The Board
[9638]believes that the completion of the task outlined above, the inclusion of these important
[9639]records in the JFK Collection, and the documentation of Federal agency compliance as
[9640]part of the final report will mark an appropriate point at which to conclude the Board’s
[9641]work. We are confident that all that remains for the Board can be accomplished in an
[9643]_ additional year.
[9645]It is clear to the members of the Review Board that there is much work to be done. The -
[9646]review of the remaining CIA and FBI records is a cumbersome and complicated task.
[9647]However, the Board and staff have the benefit of our experience to date that sets the
[9648]stage for an efficient and effective review of the remaining records. I would like to
[9649]briefly describe our early experiences reviewing records and how the past two years set
[9650]a firm foundation for the future and would work to our advantage in our last year.
[9652]13-00000
[9654]- Our review of records in the early months was slowed by the complexities of the issues
[9656]‘raised in the records. The unprecedented new standards of the JFK Act, which go far
[9658]beyond those established under the Freedom of Information Act, requiredatime- *
[9659]consuming early phase.
[9661]At first, the review process proceeded slowly and the agencies were afforded ample
[9662]opportunity to present their evidence. Over time, the Review Board began to
[9663]standardize its interpretation of the relevant section of the JFK Act and the issues raised
[9664]in the various documents. Now that the Review Board and the agencies are familiar
[9665]with the rigorous demands of the JFK Act, the process has accelerated. Ina
[9666]progressively increasing number of cases, records that initially contained proposed
[9667]postponements can be released through a “consent” process. In this consent process,
[9668]the ARRB staff notifies an agency that its proposed postponements are not likely to be
[9669]approved by the Review Board and the agency thereupon voluntarily consents to the
[9670]release of the information.
[9672]in our review of the FBI's “Core and Related Files” divdthe CIA’s“Oswald 201 File,” °° Te
[9674]the records that have been the focus of our attention to date, we subjected every
[9675]requested redaction to a rigorous test: did the evidence of the harm that would result
[9676]from the release of the information outweigh the public interest in the information?
[9678]In considering our review of the CIA and FBI “Sequestered Collections,” the Board
[9679]recognized that it needed to develop a different approach, one that would take into
[9680]account the varied degree of relevance of individual records to the assassination. Only -
[9681]in this way could the Board ensure that it would appropriately expend its resources in
[9682]its last year. As a first step, the Board carefully analyzed each collection in order to
[9683]determine what priority should be assigned to the category of records. In addition, the
[9684]Board developed a set of guidelines for the review of these records which recognized
[9685]that some categories of records did not require the intensivé word-by-word review that
[9686]had been the rule for the core collections that have been the subject of the Board’s
[9687]attention to date. The development of these guidelines began with the August 6, 1996
[9688]Board public hearing and culminated in their adoption at the October 16, 1996 Board
[9689]meeting. The ARRB staff will distinguish between records whose relevance to the
[9690]assassination is clear and those not believed to be relevant (or “NBR”). Applying these
[9691]new standards will permit the ARRB staff to identify and review the most significant
[9692]remaining records in order of priority.
[9694]These detailed guidelines will reduce the loss of valuable Review Board and ARRB staff
[9695]time expended to review, on a word-by-word basis, those documents thathavea __
[9696]remote relationship, at best, to the Kennedy assassination. Those documents that are
[9698]identified as relevant to the assassination will continue to be reviewed word-by-word.
[9700]These standards of relevance are designed to ensure that the greatest number of true
[9702]13-00000
[9706]assassination records is properly identified, reviewed, and made public in the JFK
[9707]Collection at the National Archives.
[9710]The fruits of our labor from the first three y years would be realized in our last year, one
[9711]in which we would be reviewing some of the most difficult records, and potentially
[9712]most important records, but with the benefit of our invaluable experience. Iam happy .
[9713]to report that we have received assurances from the FBI and CIA that they will work
[9714]with us in a final year to make sure that the necessary resources are applied so that our
[9715]task can be completed.
[9717]IX. Conclusion
[9719]In making our recommendation for a one-year extension, we, the members of the
[9720]Review Board, are fully cognizant of the difficulties inherent in extending a temporary
[9721]commission. We are aware of the concern that temporary bodies may havea self- :
[9722]preserving and self-perpetuating instinct, and want to-assure’you in the clearest arid ** e
[9723]most unambiguous manner that our recominiéridation’is motivated strictly by our désite’ 2°" 2°" 9
[9724]to complete the job. My colleagues and'I were appointed as private citizens and have
[9726]many competing claims on our time and energy. It is our collective conviction that the
[9728]additional time is necessary and our sincerest commitment that we will complete our
[9730]task by the end of Fiscal Year 1998, if given the means.
[9732]I would like to note that, as you may be aware, the Administration is supportive of the
[9733]one-year extension for the Review Board and has submitted an FY 1998 budget
[9734]amendment to allow us to complete our work, close out our operation, and submit our
[9735]final report.
[9737]‘Since the Review Board began this effort three years ago, we have witnessed the
[9738]widespread and passionate interest that the American public has in the assassination of
[9739]President Kennedy. We have received thousands of letters, telephone calls, faxes and
[9740]e-mail messages from individuals who care deeply about our history. They come from
[9741]all walks of life, from all over the country, and are of all ages. Their interest is of
[9742]varying degrees and they do not all agree on what happened in Dallas on November 22,
[9743]1963. However, they do agree that the public has the right to see the files on ithe -
[9744]assassination.
[9746]I believe that what the Review Board is all about can be summed up ina letter we
[9747]received from a man from California just last week. The author is not a professional
[9748]historian, not a student working on a paper for a history class, but simply a private
[9749]citizen interested in learning about this tragic historical event. He wrote the following:
[9751]“In my humble opinion, it appears that the ARRB is having a healing effect
[9753]10
[9755]13-00000
[9757]upon the American public, who may be coming to realize that there may be
[9758]closure in sight (in our lifetimes) with regard to the JEK assassination.”
[9759]These words capture why the Review Board was created by the Congress and why w we
[9760]hope that the Review Board will have the additional year to complete our task.
[9762]The Assassination Records Review Board was conceived as a means of eliminating
[9763]uncertainty and speculation about the contents of government files relating to the
[9764]assassination of President Kennedy. We, the members of the Board, believe that a
[9765]premature termination of the Review Board would surely generate intensified doubts
[9766]within the general public about the commitment of Congress to release all information
[9767]that relates to the assassination of President Kennedy, as well as renewed speculation
[9768]about the conduct of our government and its institutions and personnel. If appropriate
[9769]closure is not reached now, the identical issues will likely have to be addressed again in
[9770]the future—at even greater cost. The additional year that we: recommend. will allow for
[9771]a confident conclusion of this important task:#!:": of thos mrysoriert RS
[9773]’ Mr. Chairman, and Members of the Subcommittee, on behalf of the members of the
[9774]Assassination Records Review Board, I thank you for allowing us this opportunity to
[9775]discuss our work and our future. We urge you to favorably report H.R. 1553. I would
[9776]be happy to answer any questions that the members of the Subcommittee may have for
[9777]me. The Board and staff stand ready to provide the Subcommittee with any additional
[9778]information that may be required. Thank you.
[9780]11
[9782]13-00000
[9784]i
[9787]Copyright 1997 Federal Information Systems Corporation
[9788]Federal News Service
[9789]JUNE 4, 1997, WEDNESDAY ;
[9790]CIA HAS NG CBJECTION TO ,
[9791]SECTION: IN THE NEWS DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR %,.
[9792]RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION’
[9793]LENGTH: 12335 words iN THIS DOCUMENT
[9795]HEADLINE: HEARING OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY
[9797]INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE
[9798]SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE GOVERNMENT REFORM AND
[9799]OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE |
[9801]SUBJECT: ASSASSINATIONS RECORDS REVIEW BOARD REAUTHORIZATION
[9802]CHAIRED BY REPRESENTATIVE DENNIS HASTERT (R-IL)
[9803]2154 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
[9805]WASHINGTON, DC
[9807]BODY:
[9809]REP. HASTERT: The Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs and
[9811]- Criminal Justice will come to order. This hearing will focus on a very
[9813]important piece of legislation, HR 1553, the John F. Kennedy Assassination
[9814]Records Review Board Reauthorization Act. This bill was introduced by Chairman
[9815]Dan Burton on May 8, 1997 and included in original cosponsors ranking minority
[9816]member Henry Waxman and Congressman Louis Stokes, our first witness for today,
[9817]also who chaired the House Select Committee on Assassinations.
[9819]In 1992, 30 years after the assassination, nearly one million pages of records
[9820]compiled by official investigations still had been not-made public. Congress
[9821]decided to set up a process for reviewing and releasing to the public the
[9823]records surrounding the Kennedy assassination. The result was that on October
[9824]26, 1992, President Bush signed into law Public Law 102-526, the President John
[9826]F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992.
[9828]The original act provided a three-year timetable for the review board to
[9830]complete its work. Unfortunately, extensive delays in the appointment of board
[9831]members delayed the review board's work from the very beginning. In 1994, the
[9832]Congress extended the 1992 law's termination date for one year, until September
[9833]30th, 1996. The review board subsequently exercised its authority into the
[9835]statute to continue operating for one additional year.
[9837]The review process has proved to be more complex and time- consuming than
[9839]13-00000
[9841]anticipated. And although we believe that Congress should not indefinitely
[9842]continue funding federal entities that were intended to be temporary, Chairman
[9843]Burton and this subcommittee support the request for a one-year extension of the
[9844]board's reauthorization. I believe that by releasing these documents to the
[9846]public we serve an important public right to know and advance the cause of total
[9847]accountability to the people of this country.
[9849]At this time I would like to recognize the gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr.
[9851]Barrett.
[9853]REP. THOMAS M. BARRETT (D-WD): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm honored to
[9854]welcome
[9856]my esteemed colleague, Representative Louis Stokes, to testify before this
[9857]subcommittee. We are fortunate to be able to draw on your experience in this
[9858]area.
[9860]Over 30 years ago this country was shocked by the assassination of President
[9861]Kennedy in a way that it had not been shocked since the bombing of Pearl Harbor
[9862]or the bombing or Hiroshima. Yet today we are still prying papers out of the
[9863]government about that assassination.
[9865]13-00000
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[9868]1
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[9875]Federal News Service, JUNE 4, 1997
[9877]The legislation that created the Assassination Review Board broke new ground by
[9878]establishing the principle that there should be a presumption of public access
[9880]to government information. That legislation was necessary because
[9882]administration after administration had failed to release documents. That
[9884]should not be. The Assassination Review Board has released millions of pages
[9886]that could have otherwise remained locked in government file drawers. We are
[9887]here today to extend the authorization of this board because the process of
[9889]making government information public has been more complex and time-consuming
[9890]than anticipated. I am not criticizing the work of the board or the dedication
[9892]of its members. I am, however, critical of the fact that we are still fighting
[9894]with our government to allow public access to government documents.
[9896]Congress has passed laws and resolutions reiterating the principles of public
[9898]access that were laid down when this country was founded. Administration after
[9899]administration has worked to thwart that access. I applaud President Clinton
[9901]for his efforts to declassify xdocuments, but we need to do much more.
[9903]I hope that every employee at the Office of Management and Budget, and every
[9904]agency in the government will pay attention to what this board has accomplished.
[9905]It is the refusal to allow public access that breeds suspicion of the
[9907]government. It is the thwarting of public access that causes the public to
[9909]mistrust government officials. If we are to turn the tide of mistrust and
[9911]suspicion, it will be done by opening the doors of access. Today is one step in
[9913]that process, but there is much more work to be done.
[9915]Thank you.
[9917]REP. HASTERT: Are there any other members wishing to make an opening statement?
[9918]If not, our first witness this morning is fellow Congressman Lou Stokes, who
[9919]served as the chairman of the House Select Committee on Assassinations from 1976
[9920]to 1979, and is a cosponsor of this important bill.
[9922]And, Mr. Stokes, we want to say welcome, and thank you for your fine work in
[9923]this area. And please proceed with your opening statement.
[9925]REP. LOUIS STOKES (D-OH): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Barrett, Mr.
[9926]Turner, Mr. LaTourette.
[9928]Mr. Chairman, I'd like to submit my written testimony for the record, and if I
[9930]may, I'd like to just summarize my testimony. ,
[9932]REP. HASTERT: Without objection.
[9934]REP. STOKES: Thank you.
[9936]It seems, Mr. Chairman, it was not as long as it is, but actually it's been 20
[9938]years; it was in 1977 when I was appointed as chairman of the House Select
[9939]Committee on Assassinations. We were authorized at that time and directed to
[9940]complete an investigation surrounding the assassination and the death of
[9941]President John F. Kennedy. We completed, as you've already stated, our _
[9943]13-00000
[9945]1
[9947]‘t
[9949]investigation in 1979. And on March 28th of that year, we filed our final
[9951]report. In addition to it, 12 volumes of evidentiary material, printed by the
[9952]Government Printing Office, was made available to the American public. In
[9953]addition to this, we conducted 18 days of public hearings and an additional two
[9954]days of public policy hearings.
[9956]Prior to the committee running out of both time and money, we had released
[9957]everything that we had the time and resources to release. All of our other
[9959]. records were placed in the National Archives, under a House of Representatives
[9961]rule which existed at that time, Rule 36, requiring such unpublished records
[9962]routinely to be sealed for 30 to 50 years. The records of our committee
[9963]relative to this investigation consisted of 935 boxes, which we turned over to
[9965]. the National Archives. Then, over the years, a considerable public debate about
[9967]these records has ensued, including accusations that these records, if released,
[9968]would contain evidence of a government cover-up, or complicity of government
[9970]agencies in the assassination of President Kennedy.
[9972]13-00000
[9975]'
[9977]r,
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[9980]Federal News Service, JUNE 4, 1997
[9982]A great deal of this was fueled in 1992 by a movie entitled "JFK." That movie
[9983]contained many distortions of the facts and circumstances surrounding the death
[9984]of our president. As a result of that movie, my office was deluged with
[9986]thousands of letters and telegrams by Americans calling for the release of these
[9987]sealed files.
[9989]As a member of Congress, and a former chairman of that committee, I deemed it
[9990]important not to have the good work of our committee impugned by such baseless
[9991]accusations. Our committee had attempted to conduct its investigation into the
[9992]assassination of the president, and to present the results of that investigation
[9994]to the Congress and to the American people in a thorough and dignified manner in
[9995]keeping with the memory of this great president.
[9997]Consequently, in 1992, I introduced, and the House and Senate passed, PL
[9998]102-526, a bill entitled The President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records
[9999]Collection Act of 1992. That law created the Assassination Records Review
[10001]Board, which mandated and authorized that board to identify, secure, and make
[10002]available all records related to the assassination of President Kennedy. It was
[10004]our intention, Mr. Chairman, that everything that could be released from every
[10005]agency, every court record, anywhere they existed — that those records be
[10006]released to the American people.
[10008]Under the law, the board had until October 1, 1996, to fulfill its mandate, plus
[10010]an additional year, at the board's discretion.
[10012]We were very fortunate to have a very distinguished panel appointed. This panel
[10013]was appointed by President Clinton 18 months after the law was enacted here by
[10014]the Congress — a considerable delay in the appointment of this panel. But we
[10015]were very fortunate to have persons suchi as Chairman Tunheim, Dr. Henry Graff,
[10016]Dr. Kermit Hall, Dr. William Joyce, Dr. Anna Nelson, and an outstanding
[10017]executive director, David Marwell. :
[10019]Under this panel, they have now released more than 10,000 Previously secret
[10020]government documents.
[10022]They have released a report, which I would urge all the members of the committee
[10023]to read, if they have an opportunity, because I think you will see the extensive
[10024]amount of work in which they have been involved.
[10026]They now need one additional final year in order to complete their work. Their
[10027]work during this period of time will be primarily to secure the release of
[10028]documents from the CIA and the FBI. Those are the two main agencies left from
[10029]which they still have a considerable number of documents to be released.
[10031]Mr. Chairman, in closing I think that it's important that we complete this work
[10033]in an orderly manner with full and complete disclosure to the American people,
[10034]that they will feel that they know everything that their government knows about
[10036]13-00000
[10038]r ‘
[10040]the assassination of their president. And I would urge the support and passage
[10041]of this legislation sponsored by Chairman Burton, of which I am one of the
[10043]‘original co-sponsors.
[10045]I'd be pleased to answer any questions.
[10047]REP. HASTERT: Thank you, Chairman — or, Mr. Stokes. And I really appreciate
[10048]the work that you've done here. I have just two brief questions. Actually,
[10050]three. Do you believe that the Ford Review Board is up and running smoothly
[10051]now?
[10053]REP. STOKES: Absolutely. In spite of the delay of 18 months they have done just
[10054]a yeoman's amount of work. It's just been almost incomparable to realize how
[10055]much they have done. And to their credit, they feel that if given just this one
[10056]additional year that they will complete the work.
[10058]REP. HASTERT: And do you believe that this process is consistent with the goals
[10059]of your original legislation in 1992?
[10061]REP. STOKES: Yes, I do, Mr. Chairman.
[10063]13-00000
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[10068]Federal News Service, JUNE 4, 1997
[10070]REP. HASTERT: And then you are confident, as you said before, that the review
[10071]board can finish its task by September 30th, 1998.
[10073]REP. STOKES: I am just very confident that - in projecting the fact that they
[10075]can do this work with one year. And when they say themselves as they will say
[10076]to you when they appear, this'll be one final year.
[10078]REP. HASTERT: Thank you very much, and thank you for your testimony.
[10080]REP. STOKES: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[10082]REP. HASTERT: The gentleman from Wisconsin.
[10084]REP. BARRETT: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[10086]I don't have a lot of questions, either. I just want to compliment 5 you,
[10087]Congressman Stokes, for the fine job that you have done.
[10089]REP. STOKES: Thank you.
[10091]REP. BARRETT: And just one question. Do you think in the unfortunate and
[10092]hopefully unlikely scenario that there are future assassinations in the future
[10094]that this was a good way to approach this problem, the panel that you served? ©
[10095]Do you think that you have accomplished what you intended to accomplish?
[10096]REP. STOKES: Mr. Barrett, at the time that we undertook this panel and Congress
[10097]passed the act to create this panel, 85 percent of the American people believed
[10098]that someone other than Lee Harvey Oswald had participated in the assassination
[10099]of President Kennedy. A national poll had told us that. There were boundless
[10100]rumors and myths. People were writing numerous books and things of that sort.
[10101]And as a consequence of it, I think that putting this panel together and
[10102]permitting this type of investigation I think was very helpful. I think it
[10104]allayed many of the rumors and myths that grew up and abounded around the
[10105]assassination of our president.
[10107]However, I don't think that it put to bed everything. We uncovered many things.
[10108]For instance, we pointed up many of the things that the Warren Commission had
[10109]not done properly. And we were able to destroy many of the myths, such as the
[10110]umbrella man theory and things of that sort. But we couldn't put everything to
[10111]bed. We had begun that investigation 15 years after the assassination of the
[10112]president. I think had we been given this type of investigation immediately
[10114]after it had occurred, it would have been a different result. But many of the
[10115]witnesses had died. Evidence had disappeared. As you can see now, there were
[10116]materials which we were not able to get even within that two-year period before
[10117]we went out of existence. ;
[10119]And so as a consequence of it, I think we did an outstanding job. No one has
[10121]ever been able to refute any of the work that we did. No one has been able thus
[10122]far to say anything was ever covered up from the American people. And so to
[10123]that degree, I think that it performed a good service for the American people.
[10125]13-00000
[10127]REP. HASTERT: Okay, thank you very much.
[10129]The gentleman from Ohio.
[10131]REP. STEVEN LATOURETTE (R-OH): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I
[10132]want to
[10134]thank you for having this hearing today and for also expediting the markup on
[10136]1553, and give praise to the co- sponsors, our chairman, Mr. Burton, Mr. Waxman,
[10137]and also to Congressman Stokes.
[10139]The editorial comment I would make is I'm always amazed each succeeding day that
[10140]I serve in Congress at the rich history that a number of our colleagues have,
[10142]and to now have our fine colleague from Ohio, Congressman Stokes from Cleveland,
[10143]here and talk about his previous work on the House Select Committee on
[10144]Assassinations. Although many members in the House remember his service, I would
[10145]venture to say there are a number of people back home that don't know all of the
[10146]things.that you've done during your many years of service to this Congress and
[10148]this country.
[10150]Just as an example, the other day I found out — and I don't know if you're a
[10152]13-00000
[10154]an .
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[10157]PAGE 20
[10158]Federal News Service, JUNE 4, 1997
[10160]lawyer or not, Mr. Chairman, but I found out that Congressman Stokes — well,
[10161]you're lucky you're not a lawyer, but I am, and I'm proud to be a lawyer.
[10163]I found out that Congressman Stokes was responsible for a ruling called Terry
[10164]versus Ohio, and you might have heard of a "Terry Frisk and Search," and I
[10165]didn't know that till the other day, that Congressman Stokes had a hand in that,
[10166]and so, again, we find Congressman Stokes showing up again, sharing his
[10167]expertise with the country.
[10169]Lou, the one question I would have, deals with, in both your written testimony,
[10170]and then also your observations to Congressman Baird's question. You talked
[10171]about the "JFK" movie, and all of the rumors and innuendoes and the public
[10172]polls. And you still run into people — as I'm sure — I still run into people
[10174]that aren't convinced that Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone on that November day in
[10175]Dallas.
[10177]And part of it has to do, I think, with, after your commission met, and now the
[10178]legislation in '92, and a little delay in getting everybody in place in the
[10180]review board. Do you think it was necessary, after you've reviewed the
[10181]documents in this case, that we waited, as a government, 34 years to make these
[10182]documents available? Was there something impinging upon the national security
[10183]that you found or discovered that made it necessary for the government to wait
[10184]34 full years before releasing this information, and hopefully dispelling some
[10186]of those rumors? ,
[10187]REP. STOKES: Thank you very much, Mr. LaTourette, firstly for your nice remarks.
[10188]But it's a good question, because not many people realize that this was not --
[10189]when we sealed these records for the period 30 to 50 years, this was not done
[10190]because of anything relative to this particular investigation. That was a House
[10191]rule in existence at that time, that applied to any committee that, when it
[10192]completed its work and filed its final report, if they had documents which had
[10193]not been released publicly, under that House rule, they had to be sealed for 30
[10194]to 50 years. The same applied to the other part of that investigation which we
[10195]conducted, which was to investigate the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King
[10196]Jr., which was a companion part of our investigation. So that applied to that
[10197]one also.
[10199]But as a result of it, in compliance with the House rule, it just sort of sat
[10201]there until things were stirred up by that "JFK" movie and it sort of brought
[10202]things to the head.
[10204]REP. LATOURETTE: Okay. The principles behind your '92 legislation, the
[10205]Assassination Records Collection Act - obviously, now we collect records
[10206]differently than we did before. A lot of them are electronically stored. Do
[10208]you think that we can use that act as a vehicle, should another tragedy - God
[10209]forbid we should ever have such another tragedy in this country, but should
[10211]13-00000
[10213]another tragedy such as this occur, could we use the lessons learned in the
[10214]model of this review board to prevent the significant time lag between the date
[10215]of event and the eventual release of documents for public review?
[10216]REP. STOKES: I would hope, Mr. LaTourette, that we have learned some lessons.
[10217]Firstly, here in the Congress we'd no longer have such a rule in effect, and
[10218]that will help us, I think, tremendously.
[10219]But also, I think, by the agencies now working with a review panel of this s sort
[10220]and realizing that many of the type of documents which they will cite to you in
[10221]their testimony -- for instance, there's a very interesting document that they
[10222]will talk about, where the whole page, with the exception of just the date and
[10223]the name of a country -- everything was redacted. And under their work, that
[10224]whole page has been released, and everyone can read that.
[10225]What you do by that is that you're to allay all the suspicion as to what really
[10227]. has been redacted and people can really see. And then you can't have the kind
[10228]of rumors and myths that grow up around it.
[10230]13-00000
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[10233]Federal News Service, JUNE 4, 1997
[10235]And I think and hope that in the event of such an occurrence in the future —
[10237]which all of us hope would never occur -- that our agencies will realize that
[10239]this has been a good example of how we could allay some of the fears and
[10241]suspicions that the American people have around the manner in which we conduct
[10242]this type of thing.
[10244]REP. LATOURETTE: Thank you very much, Congressman Stokes, for your expertise —
[10245]REP. STOKES: Thank you.
[10247]REP. LATOURETTE: — and thank you, Mr. Chairman, for yielding.
[10249]REP. HASTERT: Thank you.
[10251]And at this time I recognize the gentleman from Texas.
[10253]REP. JIM TURNER (D-TX): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[10255]And all I would add is to also compliment you, Mr. Stokes, for your many years
[10256]of work on this effort. I too stand somewhat in awe at the number of years of
[10257]service and your contributions to this body.
[10259]REP. STOKES: Thank you.
[10261]REP. TURNER: And I know the Congress and the American people are grateful for
[10262]the years of service you’ ve provided not only on this issue, but on many other
[10263]issues to which you've contributed.
[10265]And I also want to thank those who've served on this panel, because I'm sure it
[10267]is a time-consuming endeavor to carry out this task.
[10269]Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[10271]REP. HASTERT: Thank you, Mr. Turner.
[10273]Thank you, Mr. Stokes.
[10275]REP. STOKES: Thank you.
[10277]REP. HASTERT: The second panel, come forward, please.
[10279]Our distinguished second panel includes four witnesses: Mr. John Tunheim, the
[10280]chair of the Assassination Records Review Board; Mr. Steven Tilley, the chief of
[10281]the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection at the National Archives.
[10282]We also have Mr. Max Holland, the author and contributing editor of the Wilson
[10283]Quarterly; and Mr. Bruce Hitchcock, an historian and teacher at Noblesville High
[10284]School in Indiana, our distinguished chairman's home state.
[10286]And I also would say that, at this time, Mr. Burton would have wanted to be here
[10287]to make a few comments. He is not here yet. We may entertain that at any time.
[10288]So, if you gentlemen would please stand, and -- (witnesses are sworn in). Thank
[10289]you. Let the record show that the witnesses answered in the affirmative.
[10291]And we start with you, Mr. Tunheim.
[10293]JOHN TUNHEIM (Chair, Assassination Records Review Board): Thank you, Mr.
[10294]Chairman. I, too, would like to submit my written testimony for the record and
[10296]13-00000
[10298]t
[10299]t
[10301]just give a brief summary to members of the subcommittee today.
[10303]I'd like to thank the subcommittee for this opportunity to testify today in
[10305]favor of House bill 1553. And I'd also like to note our thanks to Congressman
[10306]Stokes for his leadership on this issue and his guidance in the important effort
[10308]to release the records relating to the tragic assassination of President
[10309]Kennedy.
[10311]The review board is confident that the additional time requested and provided by
[10312]Congressman Burton's bill will allow us to complete our work and submit a truly |
[10313]complete final report to the Congress, to the president and to the American
[10314]public. I'd like to thank Chairman Burton for introducing the bill and
[10315]Congressman Waxman and Stokes for co-sponsoring the bill that is before the |
[10316]subcommittee today. And I also appreciate, Mr. Chairman, your role in chairing
[10317]this hearing today and assisting in this effort.
[10318]One of the other members of the review board is present with us today -- I'd
[10320]like to introduce her -- Dr. Anna Nelson, who is the distinguished adjunct
[10322]13-00000
[10324]4
[10325]4
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[10328]Federal News Service, JUNE 4, 1997
[10330]historian in residence at the American University and is seated in the row
[10331]directly behind me. Dr. David Marwell, the executive director of the review
[10332]board, is also here, as are a number of staff members who are very professional
[10333]and very dedicated and have done their work for us very well.
[10335]The review board, Mr. Chairman, began releasing records in July of 1995,
[10336]pursuant to the act passed by Congress. And thus far, the board has acted
[10337]specifically to transfer more than 14,000 documents to the JFK collection at the
[10338]National Archives. That collection, as Mr. Tilley will tell the subcommittee
[10339]shortly, now contains more than 3.7 million pages’ worth of material.
[10341]I'd like to show one brief and rather dramatic example of the work that the
[10342]review board is doing. Congressman Stokes mentioned this issue in his
[10343]testimony. This involves one particular record. This is the "before" version,
[10345]the record that was available to the public up until several years ago. You
[10346]probably cannot see it from here, but it is a document that was sent from the
[10347]FBI's representative in Paris to Director Hoover on October 12, 1960. That is
[10348]indicated at the top of the memorandum. The subject, as indicated, is Lee
[10349]Harvey Oswald: Internal Security. And then it says Re: Paris Letter 9-27- 60.
[10350]And the remainder of the entire document is blacked out. And not surprisingly,
[10351]a document like this dated three years prior to the assassination of President
[10352]Kennedy, a document sent to J. Edgar Hoover attracted a great deal of interest
[10353]among researchers who saw it because everything was blacked out underneath. The —
[10354]speculation that individuals had about this was great.
[10356]Well, the board aggressively pursued the release of this information, initially
[10357]ordering its release. The FBI appealed that decision to the president.
[10358]Subsequently we worked out with them, including an aggressive effort to contact
[10359]Swiss authorities who were the subject of this particular document. I met
[10360]personally with the Swiss ambassador to the United States to ask for his
[10361]assistance in obtaining Swiss approval to release it.
[10363]And here is the record that is now released to the American public at the
[10364]National Archives. All of the material is released. And what it indicates was
[10366]the FBI was interested in whether Oswald was indeed attending a college in
[10367]Switzerland during that period of time. And the document tells about the
[10368]investigation that Swiss authorities did to determine whether Oswald was,
[10369]indeed, enrolled. He was someone who the FBI was following because of his
[10370]interest in defecting to the Soviet Union. That's a good example of the type of
[10371]work that the review board is doing: pursuing individual releases of information
[10372]that has long been redacted from the public.
[10374]The board has worked closely with federal agencies. The vast majority of the
[10375]records are at the CIA and the FBI. We have completed the review of the core
[10376]collections in both of those agencies and significant numbers of materials have
[10378]13-00000
[10380]been released.
[10382]The board has also been aggressive in identifying and acquiring significant
[10383]assassination-related records that have been in the hands of private citizens
[10385]and local governments. Just a couple of examples: _
[10387]The papers of J. Lee Rankin, who was the chief counsel to the Warren Commission,
[10388]have now been released through the efforts of the review board. Virtually all
[10390]of the records of the prosecution in New Orleans of Clay Shaw was also released.
[10391]And I'm announcing for the first time today that the review board has just
[10392]acquired the original personal papers of Clay Shaw. He was the individual
[10393]prosecuted in New Orleans in 1969, the only individual prosecuted for the
[10394]assassination of President Kennedy. That will add another dimension to this
[10395]story. This is an example of his diary, which the board has just obtained, and
[10396]will be released as soon as we can process the materials. It's very
[10398]interesting. It's his diary from the day that he was arrested, on March Ist,
[10400]1967 and his feelings about Oswald on that particular day.
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[10405]Federal News Service, JUNE 4, 1997
[10407]Despite the best estimate, Mr. Chairman, that this job could be done in three
[10408]years, we cannot finish our work by the end of this fiscal year. We're
[10410]confident that in the additional year we will be able to get through the
[10412]records, which will largely involve the sequestered collections at the CIA and
[10414]at the FBI — records sequestered by the House Select Committee on
[10415]Assassinations. I'd be happy to answer any questions, Mr. Chairman, that you
[10416]and the members have.
[10417]REP. HASTERT: Thank you. We'll hold all the questions until the end of the
[10418]testimony.
[10420]MR. TUNHEIM: Very well.
[10422]REP. HASTERT: Mr. Tilley?
[10424]STEVEN TILLEY (Chief, Access and Freedom of Information Staff, National Archives
[10425]and Records Administration): Mr. Chairman, I am Steven Tilley, and I'm the chief
[10426]of the Access and Freedom of Information Staff at the National Archives and
[10427]Records Administration. And I wish to thank you for the opportunity to testify
[10428]today on behalf -- for the National Archives in support of HR 1553.
[10430]I'm appearing today in my capacity of NARA's chief of the President John F.
[10431]Kennedy Assassination Records Collection. In that role, lam charged with
[10432]implementing NARA's responsibilities under the act, and I serve as NARA's
[10433]liaison to the Assassination Records Review Board. And it's my understanding
[10434]that my written statement will be made part of the record, therefore, I'll be
[10436]brief in my remarks.
[10438]Mr. Chairman, this month marks the 20th anniversary of the closing of the office
[10439]of the Watergate Special Prosecution Force. I oversaw the closing of that
[10441]office and supervised the transfer of those records to the National Archives.
[10442]Most of my career at the National Archives since then has been involved with
[10443]working with sensitive records. And in 1993, I became the chief of the JFK
[10444]Collection, and I've served in that capacity ever since.
[10446]When the review board members were confirmed by the Senate in April of 1994, my
[10448]staff and I began to work with the board, and later with the board staff, to
[10450]provide information on the records in the JFK Collection, the development and
[10451]use of NARA's data base, our contacts and discussions with other agencies ~
[10452]involved in searches for assassination records, and the existence of
[10454]assassination records in the custody of private repositories or individuals.
[10456]The review board and NARA have maintained an excellent working relationship
[10457]through the.three years of the board's existence, and I'd like to think that
[10459]this close relationship has in some way contributed to the success of the review
[10460]board.
[10462]NARA enthusiastically supports passage of HR 1553 to extend the review board's
[10463]authorization.
[10465]13-00000
[10467]The board needs the time designated in this bill to complete its important work
[10468]in making available as complete a historical record as possible concerning the
[10469]assassination of President Kennedy.
[10471]I would like to briefly offer for your consideration some statistics and facts
[10473]to demonstrate the success of the board. The JFK Assassination Records
[10474]Collection has grown to more than 1,600 cubic feet of records, or approximately
[10475]3.75 million pages from more than 30 different government offices. These
[10476]numbers are a testament to the work of the board in obtaining the cooperation of
[10477]the entire federal government as well as private donors in this important task.
[10478]For the information of the committee, Mr. Chairman, I've attached to my
[10479]testimony a copy of the register of the collection, which lists the major groups
[10480]of federal records and private papers along with a supplemental listing of FBI
[10481]records.
[10483]Not only has the collection increased dramatically in size; the significance
[10485]13-00000
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[10488]Federal News Service, JUNE 4, 1997
[10490]of the records in the collection cannot be underestimated. In addition to the
[10491]records of numerous executive branch agencies and offices, the records of
[10492]relevant congressional committees, related court cases, and records donated by
[10493]private entities are also available in the collection.
[10495]This rich documentation is searchable electronically, giving researchers the
[10496]ability to seek out documents concerning a topic, person or event, or even
[10497]individual documents, not only at NARA's College Park facility but from their
[10498]own personal computer through the Internet.
[10500]Finally, Mr. Chairman, public demand for these records is the ultimate evidence
[10501]of the value of this collection. Reference requests have risen in number every
[10502]year since the collection opened with new records in August of 1993. This year
[10503]we have already received over 600 written inquiries, an increase of over 30
[10504]percent from this period of time last year. The number of inquiries on our
[10505]computer Web site is also steadily increasing. Since March 1996, when the
[10506]assassination records database was made available through the Internet, it has
[10507]been accessed over 100,000 times by the public.
[10509]Due to the exceptional work of the Assassination Records Review Board, great
[10510]progress has been made on making available as complete a record as possible in
[10511]the history of the assassination of John Kennedy. Without the focus, integrity
[10512]and expertise of the review board, the collection would not have the size,
[10513]quality or public demand witnessed today.
[10515]However, there is still much to do. NARA supports passage of HR 1553 so this ©
[10516]important work can be completed.
[10518]_ That concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman. I'll be glad to answer any
[10520]questions.
[10522]REP. HASTERT: Thank the gentleman.
[10523]Mr. Holland?
[10525]MAX HOLLAND (Author, contributing editor of Wilson Quarterly): Thank you, Mr
[10526]Chairman. I'd like to make a brief statement summarizing my testimony.
[10528]Nearly 75 years after President Lincoln's assassination, a chemist-turned-author
[10529]named Otto Eisenschiml provoked a national furor with his 1937 book, "Why Was
[10530]Lincoln Murdered?” Eisenschim claimed one of the most important events in
[10531]American history was still a mystery. And Eisenschiml claimed to have uncovered
[10532]the truth: President Lincoln was the victim of a conspiracy organized by his
[10533]secretary of war, Edwin Stanton, who was allegedly opposed to the president's
[10534]program for a charitable post-war reconstruction of the South.
[10536]When pressed, Otto Eisenschiml openly admitted that he had no evidence to
[10537]support his case. At the same time, it was precisely the documentary record
[10539]that enabled critics to prove that Eisenschiml's book was just another in a long
[10541]line of lunatic theories about the first assassination of an American president.
[10543]13-00000
[10545]'
[10547]Here lies, I submit, the long-term importance of the work being carried out by
[10549]the AARB. The meaning of the raw data being unearthed by the review board will
[10550]probably not be appreciated any time soon by the generations sentient when
[10551]President Kennedy was murdered in Dallas, but if these generations cannot come
[10552]to terms with history as it happened in their lifetimes, then at the very least,
[10554]they have an obligation to hand over, insofar as possible, a complete and
[10555]thorough documentary record. Citizens will need that record to rebut the Otto
[10556]Eisenschimls of the next century, not that there is any dearth of them now.
[10558]I strongly support without qualification extension of the review board for
[10559]another year and full funding of its operations. Bringing its work to an abrupt
[10560]end would not only diminish the investment of time and resources already made;
[10561]in all likelihood, it would throw the whole initiative into chaos. Not least of
[10563]all, gutting the effort now would surely create ineradicable suspicion about the
[10564]federal government's intentions in the first place. I'd like to spend the
[10566]balance of my time describing the three areas where I thank the review board
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[10571]Federal News Service, JUNE 4, 1997
[10573]had made its greatest contributions. The first has to do with the Warren
[10574]Commission. The review board's labors have resulted in many new documents that
[10575]I believe will eventually remove the stigma that has been attached to the
[10576]commission, which is probably the most unfairly reviled and/or ridiculed entity ©
[10577]ever created by the federal government.
[10578]These records paint a sobering portrait of our federal government during a very
[10579]traumatic time. It's not the idealized versions depicted in civics text books
[10580]nor the demonized version featured on talk radio. It's the real federal
[10581]government: imperfect, plodding, riven by ambition, distrust, rivalries,
[10582]compartmentalized by secrecy, working at cross-purposes or in ignorance,
[10583]simultaneously guided by the most banal bureaucratic instincts and the most
[10584]elevated national concerns. Somehow, through all of that, it does struggle and
[10585]manage to do the right thing.
[10586]Besides the Warren Commission, I think the work of the review board has made a
[10587]very substantial contribution towards understanding the operations of the
[10588]intelligence community. The assassination necessarily caused what could only be
[10589]termed a mobilization of the U.S. intelligence community's far-flung resources.
[10590]The government had to determine that weekend who was responsible and whether the
[10591]assassin or assassins had any co-conspirators either foreign or domestic. ©
[10592]Consequently the records being released now constitute a gold mine of
[10593]information about domestic and foreign intelligence operations at the midpoint
[10594]of the cold war. These records not only shed new light on what the government
[10595]knew 34 years ago; the release is an object lesson in why they were kept secret
[10596]for all those years. They do not contradict the federal government's official
[10597]conclusion at stated in the Warren report. Rather, the documents were kept
[10599]secret because they disclosed or tended to disclose ongoing intelligence sources
[10600]and methods.
[10601]With the release of these documents, the intelligence community's record in the
[10602]wake of the assassination can finally be assessed with some fairness and
[10603]thoroughness. The fact is that the information provided by the FBI, CIA and
[10604]other agencies was instrumental to preventing the United States government from
[10605]overreacting when the circumstantial public evidence was highly suggestive of a
[10606]link between Lee Harvey Oswald and a foreign power.
[10607]The last area in which the review board has made a -- perhaps its greatest
[10608]contribution has to do with whole issue of secrecy and disclosure. The balance
[10609]between secrecy and disclosure has always been in favor of secrecy, especially
[10610]since World War II, controlled by laws highly deferential to the equities of the
[10611]interested government agencies. The five citizens who serve on the review board
[10612]decided that if their mandate was to have any meaning it was imperative to
[10613]pierce this veil. They had to get at categories that had been classified here
[10615]13-00000
[10617]ry
[10621]before, including information derived from intelligence sources and methods.
[10622]While some historians have been critical of the resources devoted to this
[10623]particular effort, I like to believe that a breakthrough had to be achieved
[10624]somewhere, and in fact, the records pertaining to President Kennedy's
[10625]assassination make an excellent demonstration project of what can now be
[10626]released. The lines drawn by the review board should prove helpful as the
[10627]government undertakes to declassify the vast body of records generated during
[10628]the Cold War. ;
[10630]Finally, I'd like to say the entire history of the federal government's efforts
[10632]in the wake of the assassination, including the experience of the review board,
[10633]serves as a cautionary tale. Perhaps it will enable the government to strike a
[10634]better balance between secrecy and disclosure in the future, for there exists no
[10635]better example of the heavy wages of doubt, suspicion and public cynicism:
[10636]exacted by secrecy than the Kennedy assassination experience.
[10638]Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[10640]13-00000
[10642]PAGE 26
[10643]Federal News Service, JUNE 4, 1997
[10645]REP. HASTERT: I thank the gentleman.
[10647]And now, Mr. Hitchcock, I'd like to welcome you especially. A gentleman from
[10648]Ohio asked me a little while ago if I was an attorney. Indeed, I was not an
[10649]attorney, I happened to be a history teacher for 16 years before I ever got into
[10650]politics. So it's certainly a noble trade, and happy that you're here. I know
[10652]the chairman wanted to introduce you personally, but he couldn't make it this
[10653]afternoon.
[10655]You have contributed students, I understand, a clerk for this commission, and
[10656]have been involved in it at a very high degree. So we welcome you and listen to
[10657]your testimony.
[10659]BRUCE HITCHCOCK (Teacher, Noblesville High School, Indiana): Thank you, Mr
[10660]Chairman. And I, too, would ask that my written statement be entered into the
[10661]record and I will briefly summarize.
[10663]REP. HASTERT: Without objection, all written statements will be entered into the
[10664]record.
[10666]MR. HITCHCOCK: Thank you.
[10668]My name is Bruce Hitchcock and I am a teacher at Noblesville High School located
[10669]in Noblesville, Indiana, which is a community approximately 20 miles north of
[10670]Indianapolis. I am currently completing my 28th year in secondary education.
[10671]My teaching assignment has primarily been in the areas of United States history,
[10672]American government, and international relations.
[10674]And I want to express my appreciation to the committee for affording me the
[10675]honor and privilege of being here today and permitting me to make some brief
[10676]remarks concerning an issue about which I have very strong convictions not only
[10677]as a citizen, but as an educator.
[10679]In the spring of 1994, I assigned my Honors United States history class a
[10681]project studying the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. This project
[10682]culminated in the students placing the Warren Commission Report on trial. Half
[10683]of the class represented the prosecution and half the class defended the Warren
[10684]Commission Report. The class became quite interested in, and many would say
[10685]obsessed with this subject. The project resulted in a trial which became quite
[10686]intense and divisive, so much so that the class had to have a party at the end
[10688]of the semester to rekindle friendships. They became so fascinated with the
[10689]subject of the assassination that they requested an opportunity to travel to
[10690]Washington, DC during the summer following their graduation to do additional
[10691]research.
[10693]From that modest class assignment developed an internship opportunity with the
[10694]JFK Assassination Records Review Board. To date, four student groups from
[10696]13-00000
[10698]PAGE 27
[10699]Federal News Service, JUNE 4, 1997
[10701]believe the government did conceal, continues to conceal, and will continue to
[10702]conceal the truth. If the review board is permitted time to complete its work,
[10704]it will assist in defusing the last two charges. We cannot prevent the
[10706]speculation that someone did conceal the truth. But the argument that a
[10707]cover-up continues, and will continue, can at least be defused, or discouraged.
[10708]What has been lost cannot be replaced. However, what still exists can be made
[10709]public. We should have access, and our students should have access to the
[10710]information and documents still in existence. This is an opportunity for the
[10711]United States government to provide a credible response to public interest. The
[10712]review board established by the Congress, is actually a group of citizens
[10714]telling the government what to do, and what to release. An opportunity exists,
[10715]in this era of skepticism, to restore some credibility and trust in the
[10717]government.
[10719]In his recent book, “The Approaching Fury," author Stephen B. Oates quotes John
[10720]Furling as saying, "Events by themselves are unimportant. It is the perception
[10721]of events that is crucial."
[10723]Perhaps in 1997, the most important aspect concerning the assassination of
[10724]President Kennedy, is the perception, shared by many, of a conspiracy involving
[10725]individuals and agencies of the United States government. Do we not owe our
[10726]young people the opportunity to form the most accurate perception possible? Do
[10727]we not owe them the chance to see as much of the truth intact as can be
[10728]assembled?
[10730]It seems to me that we owe this generation, and all succeeding generations, the
[10731]opportunity to question, to study, and to form opinions on the basis of
[10732]information they can view independently, without solely relying on the opinions
[10733]of others. Oftentimes, while I'm in the classroom, I observe students who have
[10734]opinions, but little to substantiate them. Congress has a chance before it in
[10736]some small way — or maybe in some large way -- to at least provide them with
[10737]more information, so that they may have their turn in determining what the JFK
[10738]assassination means.
[10740]We have been affected by this event. For 34 years we have been affected. The 56
[10741]students from Noblesville High School have, as have countless others, been
[10742]affected by the events of November 22nd, 1963.
[10744]The study of this event has the public interest. It is an event to which the
[10746]public and students can relate. It touches people.
[10748]As an aside, last week an article was published in the Indianapolis Star. I have
[10750]a copy with me today. Regarding our school's ongoing JFK assassination project.
[10751]Within a day of its publication I received phone calls from a gentleman offering
[10752]500 pages of documents for our use. And from a former teacher calling me with
[10754]_ information regarding some scholarship opportunities. I also received a call
[10756]13-00000
[10758]from ABC News Nightline. And yesterday before leaving Noblesville High School
[10759]received a call from Atlanta, Georgia offering information.
[10761]The subject of the call from Nightline was seeking information as to what
[10762]Noblesville High School students were doing with regard to the study of the
[10763]assassination. Together I think these calls reflect continued local and national
[10764]interest in continuing the probe into what happened in Dallas. Congress has the
[10765]opportunity to lay the facts before the American public and permit a more
[10766]reasoned, rational and fact-based account and discussion of the assassination.
[10768]I would hope that the committee would take into consideration the fact that the
[10769]review board had a one-year delay before truly becoming operational, that it is
[10770]making a one-time request for an extension, that the review board has been on
[10771]task and on budget, that the review board has conducted its business in a
[10772]professional and non-partisan manner, and in 1992, when the act was passed by
[10773]this Congress and signed by President Bush, the enormity of the task was not
[10775]13-00000
[10777]Noblesville High School have interned with the review board, with the fifth
[10778]scheduled for the week of June 16th of this year. When this group completes its
[10779]work, a total of 56 of our students will have participated in this unique and
[10780]truly educational opportunity.
[10782]I might add that except for the first group, succeeding student groups have
[10783]studied, researched and prepared for their internship on their own time, outside
[10784]normal class meetings. The most recent group to participate did so over spring
[10785]break. The fact that students wanted to spend their vacation working with
[10786]government records reflects the interest that the JFK assassination has for
[10787]students.
[10789]In my 28 years of teaching, I have never had a topic create as much interest as
[10790]the assassination of President Kennedy. It is a mystery, and it provides an
[10791]excellent research opportunity, as well as a chance for students to be actively
[10792]involved in learning.
[10794]Since November 22nd, 1963, there have been many who have believed, and still
[10796]13-00000
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[10799]Federal News Service, JUNE 4, 1997 -
[10801]and could not be fully appreciated.
[10803]An opportunity exists to complete a task which I believe is overwhelmingly
[10804]supported by the American public, and it is important that this mission and
[10805]mandate authorized by Congress be completed. I would like to end with just a
[10806]couple of quotes, one from former Senator Bob Dole, who said in a different
[10807]context, this is not about only who we are. It is about have we made a
[10809]difference. This is a chance to make a difference. And as former President
[10810]Reagan often said, if not us, who, and if not now, when?
[10812]After 34 years it is time to let the public know the facts that remain. To do
[10814]less would be a tragedy and a travesty. As an educator I believe that our most
[10815]important task is to provide our young people the most complete story of who we
[10816]are and why we are who we are. We have an opportunity to work towards the
[10817]accomplishment of that goal. It is an opportunity, I believe, we cannot afford
[10819]to miss. .
[10821]In his last speech in Fort Worth on November 22nd, 1963, President Kennedy said,
[10822]we would like to live as we once lived, but history will not permit it. History
[10824]can only be served by permitting the public to see the evidence.
[10826]Mr. Chairman, as a further aside, if I might just have a few seconds. Reflective
[10828]of our students’ interest in this event, I have my honors government classes
[10829]perform a project for the model Congress. One of the students this year — they
[10830]could write a bill on whatever subject they wished, and one student who worked
[10831]with the review board last year introduced House concurrent resolution 1 in
[10832]support of the review board, and concludes, after all the whereas's, the
[10834]Congress of the United States firmly supports the assassination records review
[10835]board in all endeavors leading to the collection, review and release of the
[10836]documents regarding the assassination of President Kennedy and supports the
[10837]extension of the life of the ARRB for an additional fiscal year.
[10839]Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[10841]REP. HASTERT: We thank the gentleman and thank the panel. Now, I recognize the
[10842]gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Barrett.
[10844]REP. BARRETT: Mr. Hitchcock, can you give us the name of that student so we can
[10845]make him or her an honorary co-sponsor? Might as well get the name in the
[10846]record.
[10848]MR. HITCHCOCK: Abigail Meyer, M-e-y-e-r.
[10850]REP. BARRETT: Judge Tunheim, you mentioned that you were releasing some
[10851]materials from Clay Shaw's diary and perhaps other things. Is there any
[10852]information in here that you find particularly interesting?
[10854]MR. TUNHEIM: Mr. Barrett, I've not had a chance to go through it. We've just
[10855]gotten these materials in the last week through some aggressive efforts on our
[10857]13-00000
[10859]staff. The page that I cited to you is interesting in that he made the notation
[10861]in there and it's a portion of it in his own handwriting that it was perhaps
[10862]unfortunate that he had never met Oswald because then he might have possibly
[10863]been a tiny footnote in history, an ironic statement given the role that he
[10865]played in the trial.
[10867]We've not had a chance to analyze it thoroughly yet. It does contain his
[10868]reactions to events as they were going on around him during the course of the
[10869]prosecution and certainly supports his view that he was not involved whatsoever
[10870]in the assassination, which ultimately was the view of the jury that acquitted
[10871]him.
[10873]REP. BARRETT: For my benefit, as a person who has not been immersed in this
[10874]issue at all. You just mentioned it took some aggressive work from your staff to
[10875]get this released. Can you tell me what that entailed, where it was, why it was
[10876]so difficult to get this information?
[10878]MR. TUNHEIM: Certainly. Part of this, this is an investigation into where
[10880]13-00000
[10882]. PAGE 29
[10883]Federal News Service, JUNE 4, 1997
[10885]records are. The bulk of our work has been with federal agencies that hold
[10886]assassination records. But we've also, at the direction of Congress in the bill
[10888]that was passed, entertained a search for records wherever they might be.
[10889]Records that are in private hands are not records that we can subpoena and take
[10890]from people, so we have to find where they are.
[10892]Staff members go out, talk to people, encourage them to donate those records to
[10893]the American public, to the National Archives. That was done in this case. We
[10894]received a tip that an individual had records that were left over from Mr. Shaw,
[10895]and staff went and talked to the person, spent time with the person, encouraged
[10896]them to share those records with the American public, and that's how it was
[10897]developed.
[10899]REP. BARRETT: How do you determine which assassination records you can disclose
[10900]now and which just have to wait?
[10902]MR. TUNHEIM: Well, there's a standard that's set up by the act. There's first of
[10904]all a presumption that all records should be public. That presumption has
[10905]governed what the board has done throughout the process. But then there's a
[10906]standard where the board has to weigh the public interest in a particular record
[10907]or information with the potential harm that might be caused by release of the
[10908]material.
[10910]The standards that we look at are, are there national security interests such as
[10911]disclosure of an intelligence agent whose name hasn't been disclosed and whether
[10912]that person perhaps may be in some danger if that name was released publicly.
[10913]Does it disclose a method of protecting the president that is not generally
[10915]known today, so therefore it might be a threat to the president. Are there
[10917]personal privacy considerations that are involved.
[10919]I will tell you that when all is said and done, a very, very tiny percentage of |
[10920]information gets redacted under the standards that we are applying, and the
[10921]process of going through the records has led the board to arrive at a number of
[10922]policy decisions which the agencies by and large are now following in their own
[10923]review of records, and therefore decisions that we had to make two years ago now
[10924]we don't have to make because the agency is following the advice of the board
[10925]made on earlier records.
[10927]REP. BARRETT: As long as there are some records that are not being released, do
[10928]you think that we will inevitably face criticism from some people in the
[10930]American public that there is still some sort of cover-up? I make reference to
[10932]Mr. Holland's comments about a book being written 75 years after President
[10933]Lincoln's assassination.
[10935]Will the time ever come, do you think, when all records will be released?
[10937]13-00000
[10939]MR. TUNHEIM: I think it will, Mr. Barrett. The board is releasing every record.
[10940]The question is whether certain information on these records gets redacted or
[10941]not. For every redaction we are attaching a specific release date. Some of the
[10942]dates are five years in the future. The law that was passed which established
[10943]the review board provided that all records that are redacted, all information
[10944]redacted will be released in 2017 unless whoever is president at that time makes
[10945]a specifics determination that the record cannot be released because of some
[10946]continuing national security concern. ,
[10948]So we expect that virtually all of the information by 2017 will be released but
[10950]a very high percentage, in the 99.999 range is being released right now.
[10952]REP. BARRETT: Mr. Tilley, in your written statement you indicate that the
[10953]collections currently consist of 3.75 million pages. What's your estimate of how
[10954]many more records need to be reviewed?
[10956]MR. TILLEY: Well, it's hard to say because there is still a good deal of
[10958]material that's being reviewed by agencies at this time. But we have located
[10960]13-00000
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[10963]Federal News Service, JUNE 4, 1997
[10965]some records at the National Archives that are still under review, such as the
[10966]Secretary of Army's records dealing with Operation Mongoose, the campaign to
[10968]‘destabilize the Cuban government in the period after the Bay of Pigs.
[10970]Other records have been located at other agencies. I received a call from the
[10971]Customs Bureau today and they will be turning over their assassination records
[10972]to me hopefully this afternoon. After this hearing is over I'll be picking up’
[10974]the records they've located.
[10976]So it's tough to say how much is still out there but I think there's still going
[10978]to be another considerable amount of material, probably will be added to the
[10979]collection before this process is finished.
[10981]REP. BARRETT: Millions of pages?
[10983]MR. TILLEY: Oh, no. I would say probably, if we had another half a million
[10984]pages, that might be the extent of it. But what's interesting and fascinating
[10986]about this process is that we continue to turn up records where we did not know
[10987]there were records before. As agencies are aware of this effort, they have come
[10988]to the board. And the board is responsible for a lot of this by their aggressive
[10989]work with federal agencies. But I don't see us ever doubling the collection
[10991]again, but I think we will add a significant amount of material in the weeks and
[10992]years ahead.
[10994]REP. BARRETT: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[10996]REP. HASTERT: Mr. Tunheim, I have just a very short question. You mentioned the
[10997]movie that came out, JFK, and Mr. Oliver Stone's work in there. Did Mr. Stone
[10999]~ ever have any questions of your work at all, or did he do research?
[11001]MR. TUNHEIM: Mr. Stone has been very supportive of the work of the review board.
[11002]He testified before the Congress when this bill was passed initially,
[11004]encouraging broad release of the records. He sent a representative to one of our
[11005]public hearings who testified and spoke very favorably about the work of the
[11006]board. So he's been strongly supportive and we've appreciated that support.
[11008]REP. HASTERT: Why have you waited to this point in the process to begin
[11009]reviewing the CIA and FBI records?
[11011]MR. TUNHEIM: Well, we've been reviewing CIA records and FBI records from the
[11012]very beginning, Mr. Chairman. The volume of records in those agencies is really
[11013]significant. We have completed the entire review of the core collections of
[11015]those agencies and those are numbers, between the two agencies, it's more than a
[11016]million pages of records.
[11018]What we are doing right now are delving into what's called the sequestered
[11019]collection in both of these agencies. Within the CIA these are records that the
[11020]House Select Committee on Assassinations asked to be sequestered, taken away
[11021]from their files and kept in a secure place for future review. The House Select
[11022]Committee did not have time to review these records carefully. Some of them are
[11024]13-00000
[11026]highly relevant to the assassination, others are not. Within the CIA there are
[11027]about 62 boxes of material and 72 reels of microfilm.
[11029]In the FBI in the same kind of sequestered collection is about 280,000 pages of
[11030]records. Those records are the focus of the review board's work over the next
[11031]year, if we get the extension.
[11033]REP. HASTERT: Let me ask the same question I asked the previous panel. Do you
[11035]think that you can finish your work by the end of the fiscal year 1998?
[11037]MR. TILLEY: Mr. Chairman, I'm confident that the board can complete its work. |
[11038]Members of the review board are confident. We will make every effort to ensure
[11039]that it gets done. In fact, we intend to provide to your staff a timeline which
[11041]sets out our anticipation of how we will review these records over the next
[11043]year.
[11045]We have set up a review process that we're working on right now that's moving
[11046]quickly and we are confident that the work can be done. We were set up to bea
[11047]temporary board and no one on the board wishes this effort to take a long
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[11051]PAGE 31
[11052]Federal News Service, JUNE 4, 1997
[11054]time. We need to get the information to the American public.
[11056]REP. HASTERT: Thank you very much. Mr. Hitchcock, I want to ask you, bringing
[11057]students into the real realm of research and learning in that respect, how
[11058]important is it that records like this be made available to the public so that
[11060]folks like yourself can have the availability for students?
[11062]MR. HITCHCOCK: I think, Mr. Chairman, it is extremely important for not only
[11063]teachers of history and historians but also for future students and future
[11064]generations. One of the things so special about our relationship with the review
[11065]board has not only been an opportunity for students to travel to Washington, and
[11066]they pay their own way and they do their own research on their on time. But it
[11067]has helped change opinions in many cases by students about not only the
[11068]assassination but about government, politics, agencies and people who work for
[11069]the government.
[11071]I cannot overstate the importance this has had for the 43 thus far, and soon to
[11073]be 56, students from Noblesville High School who have had this research
[11074]opportunity, that have been able actually to see, handle original documents, to
[11075]work with documents, to see firsthand the evidence that exists. To have that
[11076]opportunity is something that no teacher, no classroom, no film, no laser disk,
[11078]nothing in the classroom can simulate such interest and focus as this trip to
[11080]Washington DC, the review of documents, the working with people that we've had »
[11081]the opportunity to be with at the review board on a firsthand basis.
[11083]It is just something that cannot be duplicated, or as I said, simulated in any
[11084]classroom anywhere in the country. It's just been a fantastic opportunity and
[11085]will provide students in the future with a place to go to find those records, to
[11086]look at the records, to look at the documents, and be at least assured that as
[11087]much as is available and is in existence can now be made available to them as
[11088]ordinary citizens of this country, whether they be students at a university,
[11089]students at a high school, or in their just curiosity and interest as American
[11090]citizens. ;
[11092]I don't think it can be overstated the impact that this will have in helping
[11094]bridge that gap of skepticism, if this is the correct way to say it, that
[11096]exists. I just cannot imagine what the many conspiracy theorists out there would
[11097]think if the review board has to finish its stay without completing its work.
[11099]REP. HASTERT: Thank you. The gentleman from Ohio.
[11101]REP. LATOURETTE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[11103]And Mr. Chairman, I would begin by indicating that my earlier query about your
[11104]legal training was not meant to be an affront, and I should have recognized that
[11105]your learned demeanor was that of a --
[11107]REP. HASTERT: Not at all.
[11109]13-00000
[11111]REP. LATOURETTE: Mr. Howe, I don't have a question but I'm glad you told the
[11112]story of Otto Eisenschiml because somewhere in the back of my mind I remember a
[11113]book or movie called the Lincoln conspiracy and I was certain that Secretary
[11114]Stanton had something to do with the demise of our sixteenth president, so I'm
[11115]glad you brought that up. .
[11117]Mr. Tunheim, I do want to ask you a follow-up question to what we were talking
[11118]to Congressmen Stokes about and I was fascinated by the document that you held
[11119]up. When I was in the prosecution business and we had a public records law in
[11120]Ohio which was new on the books, we found that law enforcement agencies always
[11121]wanted to take a big black magic marker and redact everything. It was my view
[11122]that that led to more conjecture, rumor, suspicion than not, and I think this
[11123]document that you brought forward, knowing that it came from the Swiss federal
[11124]police, that would give, I think, some cause to believe that Mr. Oswald had some
[11125]Swiss bank account and was squirreling away money from foreign nationals as part
[11126]of a conspiracy.
[11128]13-00000
[11130]PAGE 32
[11131]Federal News Service, JUNE 4, 1997
[11133]When you un-redact it, if that's really a word, you find out like so many other
[11134]people he apparently registered for the Albert Schweitzer College for the fall
[11135]semester of 1960 and didn’t show up. Nothing sinister or unusual in that at all.
[11136]The question I have is, when you were testifying you indicated that the FBI
[11137]originally appealed the decision to not—or to withdraw the redaction of this
[11138]particular document. You also indicated that the vast majority of documents that
[11139]you have left to review during this renewal period are located at the CIA and
[11140]the FBI in the sequestered section, I assume.
[11142]Are you any unusual difficulties with either of those agencies in terms of
[11143]cooperation as you attempt to get to a public release of what should be
[11144]appropriately publicly released?
[11146]MR. TUNHEIM: Well, Mr. LaTourette, the answer — the question i is, no, we're not
[11147]receiving any degree of difficulty with those agencies right now. They are
[11148]committed to this process. They are supportive of the effort to keep the process
[11149]going for one additional year.
[11151]The CIA has not appealed decisions that the review board has made. We've got a
[11152]good working relationship with the people within that agency who are doing their
[11153]work. The FBI appealed a significant number of our decisions, but now all of
[11154]those appeals have been withdrawn. And we've got a working relationship with
[11155]the FBI that I think has been constructive and professional and is working quite
[11156]well.
[11158]The FBI initially opposed release of the document that I held up and appealed
[11160]the decision because they had contacted, in a general way, the Swiss federal
[11161]police and asked whether this record could be released, and the answer was no.
[11162]Our follow-up through the ambassador is showing what really this document was
[11163]all about, led to some wiser approach to the particular issue. And sometimes it
[11164]takes additional work like that to accomplish the release of important
[11166]materials.
[11168]REP. LATOURETTE: And the last question I would have is Congressman Stokes
[11169]expressed the view that perhaps the fine work of this review board -- should
[11170]another review board setting be required in the future to review another ;
[11171]situation similar to this, that you may be breaking down some of the barriers in
[11172]terms of suspicions that the intelligence community may have about do we need
[11173]to, you know, stick to the script and have a page that has all black magic
[11175]marker on it? Do you find that the lessons learned in this review board will be
[11176]instructive to us as we move forward and think of ways of dealing with the
[11177]release of documents in the future?
[11179]MR. TUNHEIM: I think that's a very good question. And we have found through
[11180]this effort, being the first group, an independent group outside of an agency,
[11182]to have this degree of control over the declassification process. The process
[11184]13-00000
[11186]at first was rough and difficult and fraught with suspicion. That has changed.
[11187]There's been a sea change as these agencies have realized that release of this
[11188]information is not going to harm our national security, that perhaps it's time
[11189]simply to trust the American people with access to important information about
[11190]their government. And I think everyone has learned important lessons from this —
[11191]process. It's a process that, while time- consuming, has worked very well for
[11192]this set of records.
[11194]REP. LATOURETTE: And in that regard and in that vein, have you at the review
[11195]board put together sort of an instruction or an operating manual to be left
[11196]behind for future such endeavors?
[11198]MR. TUNHEIM: Well, we certainly will. We have — virtually all of our work has
[11199]been computerized so that we have an extensive record of exactly how we've
[11200]approached all these issues. We do intend, in our final report, to make
[11201]recommendations on how this effort can be extended in the future to other areas
[11202]if the Congress so wishes.
[11204]13-00000
[11206]PAGE 33
[11207]Federal News Service, JUNE 4, 1997 .
[11209]REP. LATOURETTE: Thank you for answering my questions. Thank you for your fine
[11210]work. And thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[11211]REP. : Thank you. I had a couple of questions. I read your testimony as I was
[11212]listening to the other two. I'm sorry I was late. I wanted to ask Mr. Holland;
[11214]were there credible historians who at this point were still questioning the
[11215]assassination in the Warren Commission and the information that came out before
[11216]this commission existed, before these documents came out?
[11218]MR. HOLLAND: Basically, most historians have stayed away from it because they
[11219]regard it as a tar baby. So there are actually surprisingly few. By
[11221]historians, you mean professors at universities. Surprisingly few have written
[11222]about it, because they just see it as a morass, and how are you going to
[11224]possibly figure out what happened? So my answer would be -- and, you know,
[11225]credible is in the eye of the beholder.
[11227]But there's actually remarkably few, and that's one of my arguments is that you
[11228]have to — it is time to insert it back into history. It did happen during the
[11230]Cold War, and that exerted a tremendous influence over what the government did.
[11231]Right after the assassination, it was a precipitating element of the formation
[11233]of the Warren Commission that the Cold War was ongoing, and they worried about
[11234]~ to be frank, they worried about congressional committees holding hearings and
[11235]disclosure of sources and methods, such as the fact that Oswald had gone to
[11236]Mexico City and been observed by photographic surveillance, and how was that
[11237]going to be handled by a congressional committee? So I do believe it has to be
[11238]inserted into-historical context. That's probably been the element that's been
[11239]missing all this time.
[11241]REP. : So you believe one of the elements of this commission is it'll bring out
[11243]of pulp -- pop culture -- pulp culture was a bad choice of words -- pop culture
[11245]and in more mainstream because more documents are there, less questions. It can
[11246]now be analyzed. And also, you seem to hint that we'll gain as much, not
[11247]necessarily that there's a lot of new information on the assassination, but that
[11249]we're going to learn a lot about how our government worked and a lot of the
[11250]interrelationships, and that may be, in fact, more use to the historians than
[11252]any questions they had remaining about the assassination.
[11254]MR. HOLLAND: I think -- my own particular view is that besides, you know, being
[11255]an investigation of three crimes — the murder of President Kennedy, the assault
[11257]on Governor Connally and the murder of Officer Tippett (sp), and then the murder
[11258]of Oswald, so four crimes -- the Warren Commission is a fantastic lens to view
[11260]the operation of the government circa 1963-64, because they had an overriding
[11261]mandate.
[11263]But yet they were going up against agencies such as the FBI and CIA with
[11265]13-00000
[11267]entrenched interests, and especially Hoover's FBI was sort of a wonder to
[11269]behold. You dealt with it very gingerly. So it's a great - and the FBI had
[11271]not been second-guessed since Hoover became director. This was the first time.
[11272]And you can't underestimate what that meant in terms of the difficulties it
[11274]posed for the commission. Now, I maintain they still came to the right
[11276]conclusion, but the fact is that they had a lot of trouble with the FBI.
[11278]REP. : One of the questions here is it took so many years to get to this point.
[11280]In looking at what future commissions might do, how much of that, do you think,
[11281]can be overcome? In other words, how much of this was the Hoover FBI, say, and
[11282]how much of this is institutional that in the first 10 years you'd have so many
[11284]‘agents active in the field, ongoing operations, in the first 20 years there's
[11286]still some — can we accelerate the process?
[11288]What have we learned from this as to -- obviously this is one that particularly
[11289]anybody in the '60s era was a defining event, so it's an extraordinary
[11290]assassination. But what have we learned for investigations in the future? Do
[11292]13-00000
[11294]PAGE 34
[11295]Federal News Service, JUNE 4, 1997
[11297]you believe the CIA and FBI will release information sooner? And if so,
[11298]presumably they'll still be redacted, which still could lead to Oliver Stone
[11299]movies and Lincoln conspiracy books and all sorts of things.
[11301]MR. HOLLAND: Mr. Chairman, I think that the fact that these records are 30 years
[11302]old has helped in obtaining their release. It's not information about the
[11303]assassination per se that agencies have objected to releasing. It's more who
[11304]said what to who, who's an intelligence agent and who's an informant for the
[11305]FBI, those kinds of issues. And there will still be institutional reluctance to
[11306]release any of that information.
[11308]I hope that through this process we can demonstrate to the public and to these
[11309]agencies that this information can be released to the public, that the public
[11311]can be trusted with information like this. There will still be a need for
[11313]secrecy to a certain extent, but certainly not with the broad brush/black pen
[11315]approach of the past.
[11317]REP. : We first learned -- I was elected in '94, and our first experience in
[11319]this committee was with Waco, where we had similar questions and still had some
[11320]information that wasn't able to be released. We're certainly having that
[11322]ongoing debate with the administration right now, because it gets far beyond the
[11323]initial investigation. In the course of Travelgate we discovered the data bank.
[11324]And, of course, with the data bank you discover the code, and then you find out
[11325]that the code leads to this. Pretty soon you're off into other investigations.
[11327]That's going to be an ongoing problem. Do you believe, in the end, that this
[11329]_ will have silenced most critics?
[11331]MR. HOLLAND: In my view, Mr. Chairman, it will silence some. It will perhaps
[11332]provoke others.
[11334]We're many years after an event that was investigated in a different era. There
[11335]were many mistakes made at the time that cannot be corrected at this stage in
[11336]time. But I think when the review board is done with its work, one thing we
[11337]should be able to prove to the American people is that the federal government is
[11338]no longer keeping secrets from them relative to the Kennedy assassination. I
[11339]think that will be a very significant development.
[11341]Whether all the questions will be resolved or not, that's a question for
[11342]historians in the future who will review these materials and will make their
[11343]determinations. This is like a gigantic puzzle with a lot of pieces missing.
[11345]We are putting some of those pieces in, small pieces and large pieces. But
[11346]there's a lot of pieces of the puzzle that will never be found. |
[11348]REP. : I want to ask one last question, and that's options of dealing with
[11349]acquiring the Zapruder film. Is that going to be a cost additional to what
[11350]you're requesting? Do you have options on how to pay for that? What's the
[11352]13-00000
[11354]status of that?
[11356]MR. HOLLAND: Well, the Zapruder film, as the chairman is aware, the review board
[11357]designated that as an assassination record about a month or so ago. We felt
[11359]that that decision was determined by the Congress in the passage of the JFK
[11360]Records Collection Act when it said that all records in the possession of the
[11361]National Archives are assassination records and should be included in this
[11362]collection. ,
[11364]Recognizing the potential cost of a film like this, we did set forth a 16-month
[11365]period before the taking would take place, so that the Congress could address
[11367]this issue and make appropriate determinations that the Congress wished to make
[11368]those determinations. The board did feel that that decision had been made for it
[11369]by the Congress in the earlier act and that it is the most significant piece of
[11370]evidence of one of the most significant crimes in our nation's history. So,
[11371]therefore, the original has an intrinsic value, and it should belong forever to
[11373]the American public.
[11375]13-00000
[11377]PAGE 35
[11378]Federal News Service, JUNE 4, 1997
[11380]We are hopeful that the Zapruder family will agree eventually to donate that
[11381]film to the American public. We have no assurances of that at this point. But
[11382]we did set the time frame far out in the future so that the Congress can review
[11383]this issue and make its own determinations if it so wishes. REP. : Do you have
[11384]any additional questions? With that, I thank you all for —
[11385]REP. LATOURETTE: Mr. Chairman, if I could beg your indulgence and just ask one
[11386]more question, if I may.
[11387]Mr. Tunheim, if I might, my previous question about difficulty with the CIA and
[11388]FBI. Sometimes I don't make things broad enough. And I guess my query would be,
[11389]it's been brought to my attention that perhaps there's been some difficulty in
[11390]obtaining records from the other body. Is there any agency within the federal
[11391]government that you're having difficulty in terms of cooperation that would
[11392]impede your ability to complete your work in a timely fashion, as envisioned by
[11393]this legislation?
[11394]MR. TUNHEIM: Mr. LaTourette, I have not seen any evidence currently that anyone
[11395]is deliberately stonewalling us, so that when we go away, they will put the
[11396]records back into the files. We had some significant problems early in the
[11397]process, just really because agencies didn't understand what this was all about
[11398]and didn't understand what the law really provided for. So it took some time.
[11399]It's taken some time, for example, with the Secret Service to get them to the
[11400]point of realizing their obligations under the act. They do now, and they've
[11401]been very cooperative and easy to work with. But this has been a learning
[11402]process for all of the agencies, and I feel at the current time there are no
[11403]impediments among any of the agency partners that we're.dealing with to
[11404]completing the review of the records on a timely basis. -
[11405]REP. LATOURETTE: Thank you. I thank the chair for your indulgence.
[11406]REP. : I thank you all for your testimony and appreciate your coming today. For
[11407]procedural purposes, I'll now close this hearing -- the hearing is adjourned --
[11408]and open a subcommittee markup on HR 1553, markup of the John F. Kennedy Record
[11409]Review Board Reauthorization Act. The hearing is now open.
[11410]If there are no opening statements, the subcommittee will now proceed to the
[11411]consideration of the bill as amended. Without objection, the first reading of
[11413]- the bill is dispensed with and the bill will be considered for amendment at any
[11414]point. Do any members wish to be recognized to offer an amendment? Hearing
[11415]none, the question is on favorable reporting of the bill, HR 1553, the John F.
[11416]Kennedy Assassination Records Review Board Reauthorization Act. All those in
[11417]favor say “Aye."
[11418]MEMBERS: Aye.
[11419]REP. : Opposed, "No." In the opinion of the chair, the ayes have it. It goes
[11420]fast. The question now comes, will the subcommittee report the bill to the full
[11422]13-00000
[11424]"4
[11426]4
[11428]mae,
[11430]4
[11432]committee? All those in favor, say "Aye." MEMBERS: Aye.
[11433]REP. : Opposed, "No." In the opinion of the chair, the ayes have it. The bill
[11434]moves forward to the full committee. There is no other business before the
[11436]subcommittee. We now stand adjourned. Thank you all for your hard work.
[11438]~END~