[1]157-10014-10018 | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
[3]Date
[4]Page
[6]08/04/95
[8]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[9]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[11]AGENCY INFORMATION
[13]AGENCY : SSCIA
[14]RECORD NUMBER ; 157-10014-10018
[15]RECORDS SERIES : HEARINGS
[16]AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 05-H~-02
[18]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[20]ORIGINATOR : SSCSGO
[21]FROM : BUNDY, MCGEORGE
[22]TO :
[23]TITLE :
[24]DATE : 07/11/75
[25]PAGES : 168
[26]SUBJECTS 3:
[28]BUNDY, MCGEORGE
[29]ROSTOW, WALT
[30]CASTRO, FIDEL
[33]OPERATION MONGOOSE
[35]DOCUMENT TYPE : TRANSCRIPT
[36]CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
[37]RESTRICTIONS : 1B
[38]CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
[39]DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 05/12/98
[40]OPENING CRITERIA :
[41]COMMENTS : Box 2
[43][R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED
[45]HY 50955 Docld:324235406 Page 1
[49]Hearing held before
[51]Senate Select committee to study Governmental
[52]operations with Respect to Intelligence activities
[53]atom ‘
[55]bee
[57]AG
[58]33S
[62]priday, July ll, 1975
[65]© Washington, D.C
[68]ape and Waste turned over
[70](Stenotype T
[71]ittee for destruction)
[73]to the Comm
[75]WARD & PAUL
[78]410 FIRST STREET, S. F-
[79]WASHINGTON, p. C. 20008
[82](202) 544-6000
[85]WARD & PAUL
[87]5.E., Yeasbengton, D.c. 20003
[89]410 First Street.
[91]TESTIMONY OF
[93]McGeorge Bundy
[95]Bundy No. 1
[96]Bundy No. 2A
[97]Bundy No. 2B
[99]Bundy No. 2c
[101]Bundy No. 2D
[102]Bundy No. 2
[104]Bundy .No-
[106]Bundy No.
[108]Bundy No.
[109]Bundy No.
[110]Bundy No-
[112]Bundy No.
[114]Bundy No-.
[115]; Bundy No.
[117]iBundy No.
[119]Bundy No.
[121]|
[122]| Bundy No.
[124]| Bundy No.
[126]i Bundy No.
[128]Bundy No.
[130]iBundy No.
[132]Bundy No. 7
[135]WARD & PAUL
[137]S.E- Washington, o.c. 20003"
[139]410 Fivst Street.
[141]Friday, July 11, 1975
[143]united States Senate,
[145]Select Committee to’ Study Governmental
[146]operations with Respect to
[147]Intelligence activities,
[149]Washington, D- c.
[151]the Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 8:40 a.M-r
[153]in Room $-407, rhe Capitol, Senator prank Church (Chairman)
[155]presiding.
[157]present: Senators Church (presiding). Hart of Michigan,
[158]Mondale, Morgan, Hart of Colorado, Tower, Baker, Mathias and
[159]schweiker-
[161]Also present: Frederick A. Oo. Schwarz, gr., Chief
[162]Counsel: Curtis R. smothers, Minority Counsel: Charles
[163]Lombard, patrick Shea, David Aaron, Robert Kelley Frederick
[165]Baron and Michael Madigan, professional staff Members.
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[176]410 First Street, 5.€., Washington, D.C. 20003
[178]HOE OD 2094 =
[180]phe Chairman, The hearing will please come to order.
[182]Mr. Bundy, would you please «stand and take the oath.
[184]Do you swear that the testimony you will ‘give in this
[185]hearing will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but
[186]the truth, so help you God?
[188]Mr. Bundy. I do.
[190]The Chairman. Mr. Schwarz.
[192]TESTIMONY OF MeGEORGE BUNDY
[194]Mr. Schwarz. Would you state your full name and address
[195]for the record, please?
[197]Mr. Bundy. My name is McGeorge Bundy. I live in New
[198]York. My home address is 1040 Fifth Avenue.
[200]Mr. Schwarz. And you are currently the Chairman or the
[201]President of the Ford Foundation?
[203]Mr. Bundy. The President of the Ford Foundation.
[205]Mr. Schwarz. In the Kennedy Administration what position
[207]did you hold?
[209]Mr. Bundy. I was Special Assistant for National Secur-
[211]ity Affairs.
[213]Mr. Schwarz. And you held that all the way through the
[215]| Kennedy Administration and for how many years in the Johnson
[217]Administration?
[218]Mr. Bundy. I held that office from the beginning of the
[219]Kennedy Administration to the end of February 1966.
[221]Mr. Sehwarz. Prior to commencing work with the Kennedy
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[228]i
[229]H
[232]H
[233]t
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[236]i
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[239]i
[240]it
[242]Administration, had you haa anything to do with the Central
[244]Intelligence Agency? —
[246]Mr. Bundy- IT had a prother who worked for many years in
[248]the Central Intelligence Ag
[250]ency. I occasionally talked with
[252]members of the Agency during the forties and the fifties, both
[254]about substantive questions
[255]conditions in the soviet Un
[256]efforts that they were chen
[257]graduates of colleges:
[259]Mr. schwarz. ,YoU ment
[260]thing of a aifferent kind i
[261]recently, would you recount
[262]in connection with the prob
[263]1950's.
[265]Mr. punéy- Well, mY
[266]Senator Joseph McCarthy:
[267]it, in general that he had
[268]Alger Hiss and was therefor
[269]as sensitive as the central
[271]Allan Dulles ~~ and ™
[272]quite characteristic of him
[273]on this matter: and stood b
[275]n fact in no sense a secur
[277]and the defense was
[279]continued in the Central In
[281]of what one thought about the
[282]ion, and occasionally also about
[283]making to recruit talented
[284]joned your brother. TO put some~
[285]n the record than we have gotten
[286]the position taken by Allan pulles
[288]Lem that your brother had in the
[290]brother care undex attack from
[291]and the ground was, as I recall
[292]peen a friend and supporter of
[293]e not to be trusted in a place
[294]Intelligence Agency
[295]Yy impression is that this was
[297]w= took an extremely firm stand
[298]y his estimate that my prother was
[299]ity risk, rather, to the con-
[301]successful, and my prother
[303]telligence Agency until the Kennedy
[306]Phone (Ares 202)
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[310]410 First Street, S.E., Wasnengton, D.C. 20003
[312]eT :
[314]Administration came at’ which time he moved over to the
[316]Defense Department.
[318]Mr. Schwarz. We have indicated to you that we are going
[320]to discuss the countries of Cuba, the Dominican Republic and
[322]Vietnam, although not much on Vietnam. And the majority and
[323]minority staff have shown you some documents of that period,
[324]some 15 years ago. Before I get to those three countries,
[326]I would like to ask you some questions about a subject
[327]called Executive Action. Have you ever heard of the subject
[328]called Executive Action?
[330]Mr. Bundy. Yes, I have.
[332]Mr. Schwarz. When did you first hear of it?
[334]Mr. Bundy. Well, as I have told your staff, that
[335]difficulty for me, because I cannot pinpoint the time at
[336]which I heard of it. My impression was that it was some
[337]in the early months of 1961.
[339]Mr. Schwarz. And do you have a recollection as to the
[340]context in which you heard about it, the person from whom you
[341]heard about it, and will you provide to the Committee your
[342]full recol’cction of the subject of Executive Action in the
[343]early 1961?
[345]Mr. Bundy. Would it help if I try to describe ina
[346]general way what I now understand of this matter, the
[347]part which is recollection and the part which is clarified
[349]by discussions with the staff and what I now think about it?
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[360]Mr. Schwarz. would you distinguish, though, the part
[361]that is recollection and the part that is based upon other
[362]matters?
[364]Mr. Bundy. That is exactly what I would like to do.
[366]The part that is recollection is very vague. And I
[367]would say that I have no recollection of more than one conver-
[368]sation on this subject. And the impression that sticks in
[369]my mind is that I was told about it in a general way. “and
[370]it was described to me as an effort to study through the
[371]possibilities by which one might act against an individual
[372]in a context other than that of espionage and counter~espionage,
[373]a context more political.
[375]Mr. Schwarz. When you say “act against an individual",
[376]act in what fashion?
[378]Mr. Bundy. Act in a variety of fashions, as I recollect
[379]it, but up to and including killing the individual.
[381]The two things that I think are clear in my recollection
[383]about that -- three -- one, that it was a concept presented
[385]or described to me -- I was in effect being briefed on it.
[387]two, that it was entirely an untargetted -- that it
[388]was in no sense a plan to do anything to anyone.
[390]And third, and I think quite important, that it was
[391]not anoperation which had any specific target.
[393]Mr. Schwarz. You said you were in effect briefed on
[395]By whom?
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[402]S.£., Washington, o.c. 20003
[404]S10 First Street,
[406]Mr. Bundy. - that is what I don't know. I cannot
[407]recollect who it was. And I think it inapproprate to guess
[408]when I have no recollection.
[410]Mr. Schwarz. What time? I don't mean what time of day,
[411]but what time?
[413]Mr. Bundy. As I Saye sometime I think in the early
[414]months of 1961. And searching memory is an uncertain busi-
[415]ness, but it sticks in my mind that { heard about it in’ the
[416]rooms of the Fxecutive Office Building. And that
[417]would place it in time, because I moved from .the Executive
[418]office Building to the West Basement of the White House sometim
[419]after the Bay of Pigs, perhaps in May-
[421]Mr. Schwarz. So based on that fact you place it in
[422]time sometime prior to the Bay of Pigs and sometime after-~
[424]Mr. Bundy. After my arcival in Washington.
[426]Mr. Schwarz. And when did you arrive in Washington?
[428]Mr. Bundy. About the 1Oth of January. I would place
[429]qt more closely, because I think it was after I was in the
[430]ottice of the Special Assistant, which, of course, was occupied
[431]until the 20th of January by others.
[433]Mr. Schwarz. So you place it after the 20th of January,
[435]but before the Bay of Pigs, which was April 14 or 17?
[437]Mr. Bundy. That is right.
[439]Mr. Schwarz. pid it come up in a context where you
[443]urged that such a capacity be created?
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[460]Mr. Schwarz. What context did it come up in?
[462]Mr. Bundy. Tt came up ina context in which it was being ~
[463]deseribed to me by someone else. Anc that is really about
[464]as far as I can take it with precision.
[466]Mr. Schwarz. WAs it described to you by someone else
[467]as a capacity in being?
[469]Mr. Bundy. as a capacity ~~ and this is not something
[470]I want to be too certain about, Mr. Schwarz, but my recolilec-
[471]tion would be that it was a capacity coming into being.
[473]Mr. Schwarz. Now, receiving that information, did you
[474]take any steps to discourage OF dissuade the person, whoever
[475]it was, who was describing to you the capacity coming
[478]Mr. Bundy. what T recollect is that I was satisfied with
[480]the description ft received on two points.
[482]First, that this was not an operational activity, and
[483]would not become guch without two conditions: first, that
[484]there be 4 desire or 4 -yequest Or 4 guidance that there
[485]should be planning against some specific individual; and
[486]second, that there should be a decision to move against an
[487]individual.
[489]Being satisfied that these two things were not happen
[490]ing 7-7 and I am now giving you a reconstruction rather than
[492]a precise recollection ~~ t am confident that what I did was
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[511]to place this notion Jin the category of
[513]things with no current urgency to them, and in that sense
[515]not a question that cried for attention in the sense that
[517]so many others did. If I may make a straightforward compari-
[518]son, we were, I think, even pefore the inauguration, but
[519]certainly very quickly thereafter, very heavily engaged in
[521]a real question of choice, which was the question of choices
[522]around what would: you do with the Cuban brigade which led
[523]eventually to the Bay of Pigs. And that occupied a very
[525]Large amount of time and attention, as did the crisis in Berlin
[526]and the crisis in Laos.
[528]In the same period there were briefings on contingency
[530]r the uses of nuclear weapons, other weapons, and a
[531]and here were reports that came
[532]naturally to the Special assistant's office, which was also
[533]being reorganized.
[535]So, I think that what I dia was simply to put this one
[536]aside. t cannot claim to have thought about it seriously,
[537]because it was in the flow of pusiness that would come to the
[538]Special Assistant's office.
[540]Mr. Schwarz. I want to see :£ we can be more precise
[542]o~ .
[543]on dates to check on what other evidence we have. We have
[544]other evidence that discussions of this matter were going
[546]on in the Central Intelligence Agency on the 25th and 26th
[548]of January 1961.
[551]oped
[553]WARD & PAUL
[555]410 First Street, $.E., Washington, 0.C, 20003
[557]: ron . . y
[559]Now, are you able to testify with respect to the likeli-
[561]hood of the conversation you have recounted taking place
[562]prior to the 25th or the 26th of January 1961.
[564]Mr. Bundy. I would rate it very, very unlikely.
[565]This is a matter I have thought about since you did mention
[566]those dates to me. And I would say that the chance that
[567]within the first four days after being sworn in I would have
[568]been drawn to consider this question is, from my side, as
[569]near zero as I can put it. I had been teaching international
[570]relations over a period of ten years. - TI was deeply interested
[571]in many of the immediate problems, most notably the problem of
[572]the crisis in Berlin and the concomitant question of relations
[573]with the Soviet Union. And I was preoccupied with all of
[574]the things that happened when you moved to Washington from
[575]helping the Secretary to buy a house, and working out a
[576]staff, and I was under instruction from the President to
[577]reorganize the White House National Security staff. This
[578]subject was far out of my mind, and I would not have brought
[579]it up. I doubt that anyone wouldhave brought it to
[580]me in those early days.
[582]The Chairman. May I interrupt for a moment.
[584]As I understand your testimony, Mr. Bundy, you were
[585]priefed on the concept of Executive capability sometime early
[587]in 1961, and you can't remember now who it was who briefed you.
[589]Do you recall whether or not you instructed anyone at
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[598]410 First Street, $.0., Wasningtan, D.C. 20003
[600]the CIA to develop such a capability?
[602]Mr. Bundy. r am sure I gave no instruction. But it is
[603]only fair to add that I do not recall that ‘I offered any
[604]impediment after I was briefed. .
[606]The Chairman. But your best recollection is that some-
[607]body toldyou that such a capability was being developed?
[609]Mr. Bundy. I don't want to be too firm on that, but that
[610]would be my best recollection.
[612]The Chairman. We received testimony from Mr. Bissell.
[614]Are you acquainted with Mr. Bissell?
[616]Mr. Bundy. Yes, sir. I have known him a long time, and
[618]he has been a great friend of mine.
[620]fhe Chairman. Mr. Schwarz,-since you are very familiar
[622]i
[623]H
[624]t
[625]4
[626]4
[627]i
[628]4
[630]with the record, are you going to take Mr. Bundy through the
[631]record of Mr. Bissell's testimony?
[633]Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Bissell testified --
[635]The Chairman. And we have the transcript. If it would
[637]we helpful for Mr. Bundy to look directly at the transcript.
[639]I think he should have it.
[641]Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Bissell’s testimony was, first, that
[642]in the first instance he said he did not recall any specific
[643]conversation. Then, however, he said, after having reviewed
[644]certain notes by Mr. Harvey, he concluded that if Mr. Harvey's
[645]note indicated, as they did, that he, Bissell, told Harvey
[647]in 1961 that he had been twice urged by the White House to set
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[660]. aent a ce aren?
[662]up an Executive Action capability, then he had no reason to
[663]doubt that testimony. And then he went on through a series
[664]of comments to end up saying that he would have been given
[665]that urging by either Rostow or Bundy, more likely Rostow.
[667]First, let's focus on Rostow. Waa Rostow inveived in
[668]the briefing? :
[670]Mr. Bundy. No ~~ now, that I can't tell you out of my
[671]recollection, but only out of my knowledge of the way the
[672]office was organized. The first things we did, Walt Rostow
[673]and I, was to work out an informal but nevertheless reasonably
[674]clear-cut division of labor. And the whole business of
[675]what I thought of as special group business, namely, matters
[676]that related to covert action, and would, if they came for
[677]division, come through the special group, fell on my side
[679]of that division. y don't recall that. Mr. Rostow was ever
[681]. . |
[682]involved in any matter of this sort. \
[684]the Chairman. It is fair to say that this was Mr. Rostow's
[686]testimony. -
[688]Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Bissel is,. aS you SaYr a friend of
[689]yours of long standing, and still is a friend of yours?
[691]Mr. Bundy. Yes, he is.
[693]Mr. Schwarz. Wehave his testimony which, while it did
[694]have gradations within it, ended up saying that
[695]he believed either you or Mr. Rostow urged him to set up the
[697]Executive Action capability. And you have testified that the
[700]WARD & PAUL
[702]410 First Street, S.€.. Wastington, D.C. 20003
[704]fact is that you were given a briefing, and you didn't urge it,
[705]but on the other hand you didn't say it should stop.
[707]How can you explain, if you can, the testimony of your
[708]friend Mr. Bissell, and the contrast between that and
[709]your testimony?
[711]Mr. Bundy. Well, as I understand Mr. Bissell's testi~
[712]mony ~~ and I should add, so that there will. be no misunder-
[713]standing, that I have not only the advantage of discussions with
[715]you, but I have talked with him about it -- as [I understand
[717]that téstimony. from that conversation, he was trying to ex~
[719]plain a situation in which he had no reason to question an Agency
[721]history to the effect that he first gave instructions on this
[723]matter in February 1961. And in that context -- and he had
[724]no reason to question the report that he had received
[726]White House encouragement -~ it is in that context that his
[727]speculations about Mr. Rostow and about me seem to fall.
[729]I would be surprised, if his memory were refreshed
[730]with respect to the dates of January which you have: des-
[731]cribed to me, if he were to believe that any initiative in
[732]this enterprise would come in the first instance from the
[733]Kennedy Administration.
[735]The Chairman. Mr. Bundy, our transcript of the
[736]Bissell testimony makes it-clear that Mr. Bissell himself
[737]does not dispute the documented record. He said in effect,
[739]if Harvey says that I told him that I had been twice instructed
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[752]by the White House to develop an Executive capability, I
[753]have no basis on which to dispute that record.
[755]Then when we asked him, very well, who in the White
[756]House told you, and when were you told, he replied, it
[757]must have been early in 1960, and I don't recall who told me,
[758]put it must have been either Rostow or Bundy.
[760]He then recounts that he had numerous conversations
[761]with both of you during the period, and concludes that the
[762]instruction must have come either from you or from Mr. Rostov.
[764]Now, Mr. Rostow tells us he never gave such an instruc”
[765]tion, and in fact has no memory of every having discussed
[766]such an instruction.
[768]Mr. Bundy. He would have in fact have had no authority
[769]to give such an instruction.
[771]the Chairman. That ig right.
[773]And he pointed that out.
[775]Mr. Bundy. And in fact I wouldn't have the authority
[776]to give any guch instruction, and I would have been only
[777]the channel to give such instruction.
[779]Senator Baker. Who would have had che authopity?
[781]mr. Bundy. If che authority were required out ide the
[783]AGency it would have to have been the President hingelf.
[785]The Chairman, What t would Like to ask you 77
[787]Mr. Bundy. Could I continue with Senator Baker's
[789]question for-one second.
[792]a
[794]ann
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[808]My own impression as to this matter -- and I have already
[809]testified to the fact that I am relying on a recollection of
[810]a meeting of which there is no record -- is that had I been
[811]briefed on this essentially hypothetical internal, undirected
[812]character, it did not appear to me to be a matter that required
[813]further authority outside the CIA. That may or may not have
[814]been right, but that is the quick judgment I appear to have
[815]reached. Because I certainly did not raise the question with
[816]others.
[818]Senator Baker. Do you recall that, Mr. Bundy, or is that
[819]your surmise? .
[821]Mr. Bundy. That is my reconstruction more than my ~~
[822]I know I did not raise it, I did not press the question, and
[823]I did not feel, therefore, that it was a question that needed
[824]further analysis, and it did not, so far as I know, get
[825]further consideration inthe white House. My own recollection
[827]is that I didn'thear the words again in any serious con-
[829]|
[831]text that I can recall] until this year.
[833]The Chairman. ° And you cannot recall who it was who
[834]briefed you? : .
[836]Mr. Bundy. I really cannot.
[838]Mr. Schwarz. Can you narrow the field?
[840]Mr. Bundy. I can narrow the field. It would have to have
[842]been a senior officer at the Agency, or someone with previous
[844]understanding in the White House. I have no reason to suppose
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[861]that it was the latter, but I cannot exclude that.
[863]The Chairman. Might it have been Bissell himself?
[865]Mr. bundy. It surely might have been.
[867]The Chairman. Based upon your best recollection of that
[868]priefing, you have already testified that you interpose no
[869]objection?
[871]Mr. Bundy. I am pretty sure I satisfied myself as £o
[872]the character of the enterprise. But I did not interpose an
[873]objection.
[875]The Chairman. Do you recall, then, having reported the
[876]priefing to the president? ’ .
[878]Mr. Bundy. No, t don't.
[880]The Chairman. Did it strike you ~~ before I ask that
[882]question, based upon your best recollection of the briefing,
[884]were you told that this was a new capability that was being
[886]developed, or were you told simply that the Agency possessed
[887]such a capability? .
[888]Mr. Bundy. I would put it that the Agency was working on
[889]such a capability, put without any great sense of precision.
[890]The Chairman. were you given the impression at
[891]that briefing that the Agency was seeking your authority or
[892]the authority of the White House?
[893]Mr. Bundy.t think they were testing my reaction, as
[894]I now Look back on it. But I do not recall that they were
[896]f . .
[897]seeking authority. If it had come to me as a matter of White
[899]Loe ea ET
[902]waRD & PAUL
[904]House authority: tT know from the context 77 MY own concept
[905]of my job what I would have done.
[907]qhe Chairman. . What would you have done? —
[909]Mr. Bundy. 1 would have had to take the matter to the
[911]pecause tT had no independent authority:
[913]the Chairman. Anda you have testified that you did not
[914]take the matter to the president?
[916]Mr. Bundy- ag far as tT can recall, Mr- Chairman.
[918]phe Chairman. Well, this is a subject dealing, 25 it
[919]does, with the development of a capability to will that would
[920]have peen of the character that if you had been asked for”
[921]authority you would have discussed with the president?
[923]Mr. Bundy. That is right.
[925]phe Chairman. : ana furthermore: is it not a subject of
[926]a character that you would be very Likely to recall?
[928]Mr. Bundy- tf I nad been asked for authority 1 would
[930]recall it- 1é 1 were the initiating oF deciding agent, I
[932]would recall that y kad had that role.
[933]you speak of the seriousness of it. It deals with 4@
[935]capability to kill. one of the sobering facts about coming
[936]qnto the government from outside into a sensitive position
[938]jike that one is the number of things on which you are priefed
[940]v which aeal with the capability to will. contingency plans
[942]for protecting West Berlin, contingency plans for the use of
[944]nuclear weapons ~~ shelf plans: a shade more remote, perhaps,
[947]WARD & PAUL
[949]410 Fiest Street, $.€.. Wasmengron, O.C. 20003
[951]for the use of different kinds of gases ~~ an operational plan
[953]for the invasion of Cuba -~ these were uncertainties as to
[955]whether there would have to he military landings in Laos. In
[957]the context of 1961 -- and I am not in any sense trying to un~
[959]derstate the seriousness of the context of 1975-- this was a
[961]hypothetical kind of a thing with two strong locks between
[963]it and any decision. And I'simply didn't pay it the attention
[966]then that we are paying to it now. We are right to pay
[968]that attention now.
[970]The Chairman. I understand that very well. And this
[971]Committee is endeavoring in every way it can to place this
[972]whole issue within the context of the time. Nevertheless, we
[973]are faced with a very real dilemma. We know that at the very
[974]time you were being briefed the Agency was not only interested
[975]in developing a capability, but was in fact engaged ina
[976]series of attempts to assassinate Castro, and had been in-
[977]volved in other murder plots and murder attempts against the
[978]leaders of certain foreign governments.
[980]The question we are endeavoring to answer is whether
[981]the Agency had ‘been authorized by the policy makers of the
[982]government to engage in this activity, or whether it was
[984]operating fast and loose on a wild gambit of its own in an
[986]area of extreme sensitivity that could have the most serious
[988]repercussions upon the government oF the U.S. and its
[990]reputation in the world.
[992]TOP SECRET
[995]18
[997]We are told by Mr. Bissell, who apparently was not only
[999]a very good friend of yours, but also a very good friend of Mr.
[1001]Mr. Bundy. That ig right.
[1002]The Chairman. -- a man whose credibility as a witness
[1003]would seem to have to be respected ~~ that he van at least
[1004]ged in developing such a capability on direct instructions
[1005]from the White House.
[1006]But when we pressed him for specifics, his testimony
[1008]' .
[1009]jo || becomes very vague. Ne can't remember just who it was who
[1010]i /
[1012]1
[1014]i told him, he can't dispute the record, which says that in effect
[1016]Mr. Harvey when he engaged Mr. Harvey to develop
[1018]the capability. and everyone else of high authority in
[1020]WARD & PAUL
[1022]the Administration that we have questioned so far testifies
[1023]that it was not the policy of the Administration to engage in
[1024]i assassination, and no such attempts were ever authorized,
[1025]and indeed, with the exception of one occasion in the Special
[1026]Group, the subject never even surfaced for discussion.
[1027]And when it did, if it did, it was quickly shot down.
[1028]Nevertheless; the cra was in fact embarked upon such
[1030]y . . : .
[1031]‘attempts during the period under review.
[1033]|
[1035]4
[1036]i
[1038]§.£., Wasnington, a.c. 20003
[1040]i Now, we are led to conclude either that we are not
[1041]being told the truth concerning the policy of the Administraticn,
[1042]which is very hard for me to accept, given the reputation oF
[1044]. ~
[1045]the witnesses that have come before us, for integrity and
[1047]410 First Street.
[1049]Psi wees. ow ti cia ER POR
[1051]truthfulness, or: that the CIA was running wild, and acting on
[1053]its own initiative, engaging in murder plots, murder attempts,
[1055]prone [Ares 202) 544-6000
[1057]and not informing, let alone securing the authority from,
[1059]those in government who held the responsibility, which in a way
[1060]is even more erightening-
[1062]Now, you tell us that you remember being briefed. You
[1063]don't remember advising the President. It didn't seem too
[1064]important at the time.Did you ever follow -up on whether such
[1065]a capability had in fact been perfected by the agency?
[1067]Mr. Bundy. Tf don't recall pursuing the matter aty all,
[1069]Mr. Chairman, any more than 1 would have pursued any other
[1071]shelf capability on which no question was heing pushed fo me,
[1073]either from below or above.
[1075]WARD & PAUL
[1077]If I may-g9o back and comment on one aspect of your,
[1078]I think, important and impressive description of
[1080]the difficulty the Committee faces, I am sure that if in the
[1082]| early months of 1963 3 had known what I now know, in part from
[1084]‘the newspapers and in part from discussions with your staff,
[1085]about what was really in train, T would have had a very
[1086]different approach.
[1088]Senator Mondale. Mr. Chairman.
[1090]S.E., Yeasnin ation, 0.c. 20003
[1092]The Chairman. Senator Mondale.
[1094]i : Senator Mondale. Yesterday Secretary Rusk testified be-
[1096]470 Eeurst Street,
[1098]i fore us. And some of the minutes or notes made following one
[1099]|
[1100]|
[1102]lof themeetings of the Special Group Augmented at least suggest
[1104]TOP SECRET
[1106]Ee
[1108]that the question of assassination occurred. And, Mr. Rusk
[1110]said, did you think anyone would bring that up at a town
[1112]Prone (Area 202)
[1114]meeting? And by that I gather he meant that these meetings
[1116]had large attendance from all different groups and prinicples
[1117]and staff assistants and go on, and as 4 result, if there .
[1118]were matters of exceeding delicacy, that was not the forum
[1119]at which such matters would be discussed.
[1120]“would you comment on that?
[1121]Mr. Bundy. Yes. My impression would be that the
[1123]Secretary was probably referring to the much discussed meeting
[1125]of August 10, 1962.
[1127]Senator Mondale. Right.
[1129]WARD & PAUL
[1131]Mr. Bundy. That was a large meeting, 16 or 18 people.
[1132]And the comment seems to be pertinent to that meeting. The
[1134]Special Group as such, the one which I would have had in
[1138]mind, for example, in early 1961, was set up under 4 national
[1139]security regulation of some sort whose number was 54/12.
[1141]Senator Mondale.” That was the Special Group.
[1143]290003
[1145]l . ; oo _
[1146]Mr. Bundy. That was the Special Group. and the Special
[1148]in and of itself was quite a gmal) group.
[1150]senator Mondale. ‘But people would volunteer to attend -—
[1152]Mr. Bundy. No.
[1153]Senator Mondale. They would not?
[1155]Mr. Bundy. No- The meeting of August 10 is a very
[1157]410 Fest Strect, 5.£., Wastingion, O.€.
[1159]special meeting in a variety of respects. That included ~~
[1161]TOP SECRET
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[1170]The Chairman, You were present at that meeting?
[1171]Mr. Bundy. I was present. My memory is entirely
[1172]a refreshed memory on this, I had no recollection of the
[1174]meeting until recent months, But I have found a seratch
[1176]pad that I apparently doodled on on that date, and it
[1178]shows who was there, and not much else.
[1179]“Mr. Schwarz. There were some beautiful: drawings.
[1180]Mr. Bundy. There were.
[1181]They were not very beautiful drawings.
[1182]The Special Group Augmented met in August -- and this
[1184]does coincide with my general recollection of the matter --
[1186]in response to concerns wihch were first, I think, and most
[1188]energetically pressed by Mr. McCone with respect to, what the
[1189]hell are the Russians doing in Cuba. And that was the center
[1190]of that meeting, and the center of later meetings, and the cen-
[1192]ter of a national security action memorandum of considerable
[1194]' complexity which wag put out toward the end of August, most
[1195]& of which dealt with this question, how do we know what they
[1196]‘are going to do, what do we do if they do it, and so forth,
[1197]iwith respect to missiles in Cuba.
[1199]Te was therefore in a sense much more than an. ordinary
[1201]! MONGOOSE meeting, let alone a Special Group meeting. And
[1203]{while I quite agree with the Secretary that that meeting as
[1204]planning session for anything as horrendous as assassina-
[1206]|
[1208]| tion is implausible in the extreme. Quite serious covert
[1210]| TOP SECRET.
[1213]Committee pursues its
[1215]or bad, well or badly
[1217]group.
[1221]actions were discussed in the s
[1223]ho chat that group is the vunodal
[1225]Senator Mondale.
[1227]pecial Group. and as your
[1228]studies of covert action it will find
[1230]point for policy decisions, good
[1231]nandled. And that was quite 4 small
[1233]The reason Tf ask that is that it seems
[1235]7 to me that the Chairman's question pursues the two alternatives,
[1237]8 either what we now know to have occurred was ordered at the
[1239]i] highest level,
[1241]Group Augmented,
[1243]15 | were with us.
[1245]16 Now, their test
[1247]or at a very high level,
[1248]or they operated on their own,
[1250]they were out of control and irresponsible,
[1252]i sure: that we have been examining s
[1254]such as the Special
[1255]in which case
[1257]or there was some
[1259]extra communications system that went around the formal struc”
[1261]of authority that these operators testified to when they
[1263]imony. was not very specific. they said,
[1265]17 || we thought we had authority, and we think we heard from
[1267]12 somebody, and so on.
[1269]what are the ch
[1270]there was such extra
[1272]Senator paker-
[1274]pee) \
[1276]o4 || now, t don't peliever
[1278]25 difficult to reconstruct history of assassination plots,
[1280]to Senator Mondale that I am
[1282]ut
[1283]» of the Inspector General's report,
[1285]anges; based upon your experience; that
[1286]official communications and order passine
[1287]Before Mr. Bundy answers, I might say
[1288]struck by the first paragraph
[1289]which we don't have here
[1290]it says, it is
[1292]but as IT remember it,
[1294]TOP SECRET
[1296]because
[1298]and would account for the sen:
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[1302]15
[1304]16
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[1310]of the high sensitivity.’ fe) the aubject ma
[1312]teer, no written .
[1314]records were kept, and it was: not “aiscussed at open ‘meetings.
[1315]phat is generally what was said. And it seems to me that is
[1316]implying, then, that as a matter of policy there was no
[1317]cormalization of this sort of communication.
[1319]I am sorry to interrupt.
[1321]Senator Mondale. Yes. .
[1323]And in that August 10 meeting two or three principals
[1324]testified that it did come up. and in fact it is not reflected
[1325]in the notes.
[1327]Mr. Bundy. perhaps the best way for me to begin at least
[1329]with an answer to your question is to describe my
[1331]i own sense -~ my own understanding of the way in which covert
[1333]operations of all types were brought forward. and this was
[1335]| perhaps the most important and the most constantly reiterated
[1337]fact of the process that I was exposed to when I began to
[1338]consider this whole range of. subjects on coming to Washington.
[1339]And whether it was with Mr. Gordon Gray, my predecessor, or
[1340]with Allen pulles, or with incoming and outgoing friends in
[1342]the Department of State, OF with Mr. Bissell, or with anyone
[1344]' else concerned with these matters, what I learned then and
[1346]what I applied throughout my time there to the best of my
[1347]ability was that all covert operations, whether intelligence
[1348]operations, clandestine: political activity, and clandestine
[1350]propaganda activity, and clandestine subversion, OF sabotage,
[1352]. TOP SECRET
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[1368]17
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[1375]which dia occur in'the case of Cuba, all of -them took their
[1376]authority from and came for their authority to the 54/12
[1377]group.
[1379]And when there was a question in such ‘a meeting as to
[1380]whether the matter required further judgment, it was the
[1381]responsibility of the Chairman of that group to make sure that
[1382]that was checked out.
[1384]The papers will usually say, higher authority, et cetera,
[1385]et cetera, and the President's name will often not appear --
[1386]any more than the precise character of the operation is likely
[1387]to appear in the minutes for the reasons that Senator Baker
[1388]has spoken of.
[1390]But I never knew of any operation of this kind of any
[1391]sort, with one exception, which is quite different, which did
[1392]not have that channel. The exception is the Bay of Pigs,
[1393]which was so big, so complicated, and overf lowed in so many
[1395]directions, and in which the President himself was involved in
[1396]so many ways, as he fully recognized and explained at the time,
[1397]that it did not go through this Committee process, it went
[1398]through a quite Presidential process, and everybody involved
[1399]knew that. -
[1401]But with that one exception, I would have told you up
[1402]until the beginning of this current public discussion, that
[1404]was the way it went, and that nothing went outside it, and
[1406]that the Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agencies, with
[1408]TOP SECRET :
[1412]yo ghee | pee
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[1422]WARD & PAUL
[1424]410 Fist Street, S.E., Wasningien. O.C. 20003
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[1433]16
[1434]1?
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[1439]ya
[1441]Now, I clearly am wrong. But that is what I would have
[1443]told you. oe a pie
[1444]Senator Mondale. Well, are. you wrong? .
[1445]In other words, what you testified to --
[1446]Mr. Bundy. Excuse me, T misstate myself. I beg your
[1450]pardon for interrupting. . |
[1451]|
[1453]i
[1455]XY am wrong in that things happened that didn't go through
[1457]i
[1458]|
[1460]i
[1462]that group.
[1464]Senator Mondale. Yes.
[1466]In other words, that is the big question, either they wer:
[1467]acting on authority, which apparently flowed around channels ~~
[1469]fhe Chairman. covertly --
[1471]Senator Mondale. Covertly ~~ or they were acting on thei:
[1473]own, and our attempts to find direct authority in these official
[1474]meetings led us nowhere. ‘ i
[1475]And your testimony is that you find it very unlikely
[1476]that there was this covert way of communicating authority.
[1477]Mr. Bundy. My testimony was that I wouldn't
[1478]have believed it existed. I have to consider the same al-
[1479]ternative that. the Chairman has so clearly pointed out. I
[1480]don't find it agreeable to conclude that the Agency was a
[1481]rogue elephant at a time when I strongly believe it was not.
[1483]. Senator Mondale. We asked General Taylor that question,
[1485]TOP SECRET
[1488]and he said he found it incredible to believe that they
[1490]2 would have gone around the Special Group Augmented with such.
[1492]Prone {Area 202) 544-6008:
[1493]i
[1495]° Mr. Bundy. General Taylor, of course <= and this ig an
[1497]4 important point -- was a-pointed to this responsibility after
[1498]5 || the Bay of Pigs, after a review of the failures that led to
[1500]6 the Bay of Pigs, and after a conclusion had been reached that .
[1502]i
[1505]7 it would strengthen the White House to have a man with a parti-
[1506]8 cular responsibility for the oversight of intelligence opera-
[1507]9 tions. He was called military representative to the President,
[1510]10} but in the announcement of his appointment -- I happened to
[1512]11 |) lock it up the other day -- President Kennedy made it clear that
[1514]i le | he would be his representative for intelligence matters.
[1516]i
[1517]15 | And he did in fact take over the chairmanship during the time
[1518]14 | that he was military representative of all of the Special i
[1519]15 | Groups, 54/12, the Special Group Counterinsurgency, and the
[1521]16 | Special Group Augmented, MONGOOSE. And when he said --
[1523]17 | if he has testified that his expectation would have been : !
[1525]1g || that nothing was going to go around him, he is saying exactly
[1527]19 i what I thought through the same period. :
[1528]|
[1530]26 | Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, in that respect -~ :
[1532]2] 4 The Chairman. Before I forget the question, let :
[1534]ep | me ask, since you were at the August 10 meeting, and since
[1536]2: ll we have received testimony buttressed by certain documentary
[1538]; evidence that the subject of assassination of Castro dia
[1540]fl
[1541]25 — up at that meeting, do you have any recollection of zg
[1543]TOP SECRET :
[1545]or
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[1563]12
[1565]a
[1567]14
[1569]15
[1571]16
[1573]17
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[1577]25
[1579]24
[1581]25
[1583]subject coming up or being discussed?
[1585]Mr. Bundy. I don't recollect the meeting. And I
[1586]don't recollect the subject ever coming up in a meeting of
[1587]that size, or indeed in any -- I don't have any recollection
[1588]of it coming up, although I do have a general recollection of
[1589]there being times at which this possibility was heard of. I
[1590]wouldn't want to testify that. I never heard anyone say,
[1591]there is somebody thinking about this, because that would be
[1592]different from my vague récollection.
[1594]But I have no recollection of that meeting, and there-
[1595]fore none of any specific statement made by anyone in it.
[1597]The Chairman. Senator Baker?
[1599]Senator Baker. In that connection, before I go to the
[1600]question I had in mind, is it fair to say, Mr. Bundy, that
[1601]all, or virtually all, of your testimony this morning, about
[1602]MONGOOSE, about the August 10 meeting, and about the general
[1603]situation, is from reconstructed memory rather than first
[1604]impression memory?
[1606]Mr. Bundy. I-didn't want to go that far, Senator Baker.
[1607]My knowledge, my sense of what 54/12 and Special Group
[1608]Augmented were, and where they stood in the line of authority,
[1609]is very clear, and is not reconstructed. I spent five
[1610]years -~ except for the time when General Taylor was there,
[1612]I was the chairman of these things.
[1614]Senator Baker. Let's take a piece at a time, then.
[1616]; TOP SECRET
[1618]t
[1619]t
[1620]i
[1621]t
[1623]7
[1625]PRT
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[1632]Phone (Area 202) 544-6000
[1634]WARD & PAUL
[1636]On the question of the Executive Action capability, I
[1637]believe referred to as the 2RRIFLE project --
[1639]Mr. Bundy. Imust say that if I had known that was its
[1640]name I would have looked harder, Senator Baker. .
[1642]Senator Baker. It is a fairly picturesque name -- as
[1643]to Executive Action Capability, or 2RRIFLE, do you have a
[1644]separate recollection?
[1646]Mr. Bundy. t have a recollection of what I think of
[1647]is one, I don't want to say there wasn’t more, but of
[1648]one discussion of the matter. And I know I was informed of
[1649]it: in some fashion at the time.
[1651]Senator Baker. Do you remember by whom?
[1653]Mr. Bundy. That is my difficulty, as I said earlier,
[1655]I don't know.
[1657]Senator Baker. The reason I ask is, from the other
[1658]documentation I have, which consists primarily of the
[1659]Inspector General of the CIA's report, and maybe other
[1660]material that I can't think of at the moment, it is clear
[1661]and unmistakeable that they think of RZRIFLE or Executive Ac-
[1663]tion Capability as a White House initiative, or a White House
[1665]request of considerable insistence from the White House that
[1667]t
[1668]U
[1670]they get on with the job.
[1671]Mr. Bundy. That is totally inconsistent with my un-
[1672]reconstructed recollection.
[1674]Senator Baker. Let me track that carefully.
[1676]TOP SECRET
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[1688]Do you recall.
[1690]Mr. Bundy. T(an only speak for myself here, and for
[1692]2
[1694]5 || my colleague Rostow, and my knowledge of his assignments.
[1696]4 yt recall that his assignments would have made it wildly out
[1698]5 of place, and totally out of character, for him to gnitiate 4
[1699]6 matter of this kind. And ft recall. that 1 did not. and I
[1701]7 recall that quite independently of any reconstruction of
[1703]sg || recent months.
[1705]9 senator Baker. t would like to Limit this, then,
[1707]10 || just to youvassignment-
[1709]12 Was it your general assignment to take care of so-
[1711]12 | called covert operations? .
[1713]13 Mr. Bundy. 2t was my assignment ~- may I take a minute
[1715]14 on this?
[1717]15 Senator Baker. yes, Sir.
[1718]16 | Mr. Bundy. There were two ways in which I could become i
[1719]| 4
[1720]17 involved in covert 77 three ways- t. might have thought up ‘
[1721],
[1723]t will have to say that f have no recollec-
[1725]18 || an idea myself.
[1726]i
[1727]i
[1729]19 \ tion that I ‘ever did. It was not 4 subject in which I had
[1731]an independent personal motivating interest. So,there were :
[1733]20 |
[1734]i
[1735]2) | two ways in which Tf could get involved in it. One was by
[1737]vole proposal upward from the Agency OF the Defense Intelligence
[1739]\.
[1740]|
[1741]Servicess which would come to the Special Group.
[1743]And the other was when the president had an interest”
[1745]interest ~~ from time to time in these
[1747]TOP SECRET
[1749]a5 and I did have an
[1751]tm
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[1761]|
[1762]|
[1764]ere
[1767]matters. He hada grea nterest:at teferent points in’
[1769]1961, 1962, in doing more about Cuba. And part of the more he
[1770]wanted to do was covert. “and he would aay so to me. And
[1771]I would say s0 to somebody else.
[1773]Senator Baker. Can you give us examples of that?
[1775]Mr. Bundy. No, I can’t. TI scan only gay that the kind
[1776]of things he was talking about was, why do all these raids not
[1777]get us anywhere? They say they can do something about the oil
[1778]refineries, why don't they? These are purely hypothetical,
[1780]Senator Baker, but they would be ina category, subversion
[1782]| and sabotage.
[1784]Senator Baker. WAS it Harvey that was spoken of as our
[1785]007?
[1786]Mr. Schwarz. once yesterday.
[1787]SEnator Baker. Do you remember when Mr. Harvey was
[1788]brought to see the President at the Oval office?
[1790]Mr. Bundy. I have been told about that, but I
[1791]am afraid that is non~refreshed recollection. I don't know
[1792]anything about it.
[1794]Senator Baker. Would that have been the character of
[1795]the things that the President was interested in, 007? ; :
[1797]Mr. Bundy. I am not going to try to repair the record
[1798]at this late stage and say that the president never read
[1799]Ian Fleming.
[1801]Senator Baker. Or ever seen Ian Fleming?
[1803]TOP SECRET
[1806]Prong (Ares 202) $44-6000,
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[1841]‘Mr. Bundy. I don't think
[1843]ever acted Ian
[1845]the’ President
[1846]Fleming. :
[1848]Senator Baker. I think that is right. But I think it...
[1849]is important for us, Mr. Bundy, to try to establish, as the
[1850]Chairman said, the range of available information or evi-
[1851]dence that sheds »some light on the three alternative possi-
[1852]bilities, and the type of things that the President interested
[1853]himself in is terribly important in that respect.
[1855]t believe that you said you had no information or no
[1856]recollection of what particular situation, or what other
[1857]deals that were made he was interested in.
[1859]Mr. Bundy. I will put it more concretely than that.
[1861]The President said, can't we do something more about Cuba?
[1862]Why don't you get ahold of these people who are dealing with
[1863]this and see if they can't do better, and pass the word
[1865]that I am interested, that kind of thing.
[1867]Senator Baker. Do I understand that to mean that he never
[1869]spoke of a particular practice?
[1871]Mr. Bundy. I can't tell you that, because I know, the
[1872]record indeed reminds me, that particular actions that are
[1873]related to Cuba that came up through the group of ten
[1874]went to him, and some were approved and some were not.’
[1876]So, he clearly looked at them.
[1878]I would have to have the documents there in order to
[1880]be precise, and I don't have them with me.
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[1907]Senator Baker. Which documents?
[1909]Mr. Bundy. Documents which the Committee staff
[1911]has provided.
[1913]Mr. Schwarz. We have them.
[1915]Senator Baker. Tell me what they:are.
[1917]Mr. Schwarz. November 30, 1961, Tab -- is that Tab H
[1919]or Tab 4 about the November 30, 1961, which authorizes
[1921]MONGOOSE?
[1923]Mr. Kelley. Tab 4.
[1924]Mr. Schwarz. May 5, '62, Lansdale Tab 21.
[1926]Senator Baker. Let's stop there, if I may.
[1928]Do you have a copy of this memorandum, Mr. Bundy?
[1930]Mr. Kelley. He will have it in a moment.
[1932]Mr. Bundy. One place these documents did not go is
[1934]into the memorabilia of former members.
[1936]Mr.
[1938]Mr. Kelley. All right, that is the chronology.
[1940]Mr. Bundy. November 30, 1961?
[1942]Senator Baker. Yes, sir. It is on page 3, the third
[1943]item.
[1945]Mr. Kelley. We are talking about Tab 4.
[1946]Senator Baker. Mine says, see Lansdale Tab 4.
[1948]Mr. Kelley. Yes. November 30, 1961.
[1950]Senator Baker. I would really prefer if someone gave
[1952]Bundy a copy of the same material I am working on.
[1954]Mr. Bundy. I have it.
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[1981]Senator Baker. président ennedy 5 decision to begin
[1983]MONGOOSE. I8 it clear, Mr. Bundy, that president Kennedy made
[1984]the decision to initiate the MONGOOSE program?
[1986]Mr. Bundy. No question.
[1988]Senator Baker. I notice in the staff interpretation
[1989]under the column “Issues and Questions" that they alleged
[1990]that you recall probably writing this memorandum.
[1992]Mr. Bundy. That is really a logical inference. The
[1993]President would not himself have written a long memorandum of
[1994]instructions of this kind. It is possible that General
[1995]Taylor wrote it. But I think it is more likely that I did.
[1996]But in any event, whichever of us did so was doing it as a
[1997]staff officer for the Prsident's convenience in recording
[1998]his decision.
[2000]Senator Baker. So at least to this extent there is
[2001]no question about the chain of command, or the chance to
[2002]control it, the President authorized it?
[2004]Mr. Bundy. Just to underline that point, as It recall
[2005]the paper which was shown to me, it is one from Mrs. Lincoln
[2006]to General Taylor saying, the President wants you to have
[2007]this as a description of the decisions.
[2009]Senator Baker. Would you repeat that?
[2011]Mr. Bundy. I think the covering memorandum on that —
[2012]document is from Nrs. Lincoln to General Taylor, and it says,
[2014]the President wants you to have this asa record of his
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[2050]decisions.
[2052]Senator Baker. Thank you, gir.
[2054]Do you have an independent recollection of the meeting
[2055]or the encounter with President Kennedy in connection with
[2056]MONGOOSE?
[2058]Mr. Bundy... Not a specific meeting, ‘but of the process
[2059]which led to this decision, yes. .
[2061]Senator Baker. pescribe for me, if you will, what
[2062]MONGOOSE was intended to be?
[2064]Mr. Bundy. Well, MONGOOSE in a general way was the
[2065]whole set of things to be concerned with mostly, but not only,
[2066]covert activities against the Communist regime in Cuba.
[2068]Senator Baker. The chronology also quotes the memo as
[2069]saying, one, Wwe will use our available assets to go ahead
[2070]with the discussed project in order to help Cuba overthrow
[2071]the Communist regime.
[2073]Can you elaborate on that?
[2075]Mr. Bundy. Not without documentary assistance beyond
[2076]what T have just said. It was to be a fairly wide ranging
[2077]program. TI believe that what that really sort of implies
[2078]to me is that all departments are to cooperate, that the
[2079]Committee is to review possibilities, proposals, to seek
[2080]them out, and that the thing is to he coordinated by the
[2082]Committee, whose chairman will be -- this summary doesn't
[2084]say so, but my recollection is that the chairman was to be
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[2122]. Lansdale
[2124]The Chairman:
[2126]Item 4-of cis menozendun reads: "The NSC 54/12 Group
[2128]will be kept. closely informed of activities, and will be
[2130]available for advice. and ‘ecotimendation".
[2132]n
[2134]Does this suggest to you that the regular channel was
[2135]supposed to operate with respect to MONGOOSE, that i# to say,
[2136]a central role was to be played by the Special Group in
[2138]connection with its activities?
[2140]Mr. Bundy. It is a puzzling sentence to me as.I read
[2142]it now. And I can't give you a precise answer on that. I
[2144]this point, please.,;
[2146]think the general answer has to be that the 54/12 Group continu.
[2148]through this period. General Taylor was the chairman of
[2149]both. The overlapping of membership was extensive. And
[2150]1 think you would get a more precise answer as to the exact
[2152]relation from General Taylor than IT am in a position to give
[2154]you.
[2156]The Chairman. I have a very clear memory of General
[2157]Taylor's testimony. and his testimony was that the Special
[2158]Group Augmented was the group that had charge of operation
[2159]MONGOOSE. It was further his testimony that all plans, all
[2160]operations, were to be brought to the Special Group Aug~
[2162]mented for its approval. And the approval of that Group
[2164]was necessary before any such plans were actually implemented.
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[2208]Chairman. I thought you were asking whether there was a
[2209]further requirement that it go from the Special Group
[2210]Augmented to the special. Group.. And I have no precise view
[2211]on that.
[2213]The Chairman. I see.
[2215]Now, when you refer to the NSC 54/12 Group -~
[2217]Mr. Bundy. That is what 1 think of as the Special Group.
[2219]The Chairman. That is what you think of as the Special
[2220]Group.
[2222]I asked the question because the language is a little
[2223]fuzzy. .
[2225]Mr. Bundy. It is.
[2227]The Chairman. This language might suggest that there is
[2228]an. independent line of authority, and that the Special Group
[2229]Augmented or the Special Group was simply to be kept informed,
[2230]and itsiadvice and recommendations would be taken under advise-
[2231]ment.
[2233]Mr. Bundy. I think myself, Mr. Chairman, that
[2234]we don't have a very serious problem here, because 1 would
[2235]agree with General Taylor's recollection that the Special
[2236]Group Augmented was the Cuba group.
[2238]Now, the Special Group is simply the same people. less
[2239]two or three. ~ And the only real operational value of this
[2241]paragraph is that perhaps the staff officer who serviced the
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[2291]54/12 would be availa le An, a “decision ‘to the state officer
[2292]servicing the spe¢ial Group Augmented. But the decision-making
[2293]persons are usimply a smaller number ‘of the very people
[2294]that both General Taylor and I recollect. as having the main
[2295]responsibility.
[2297]fhe Chairman. So according to your best remembrance,
[2298]you would agree with the testimony we have received from
[2299]General Taylor?
[2301]Mr. Bundy. Yes, I would.
[2303]The Chairman. Mr. Smothers?
[2305]Mr. Smothers. Mr. Bundy, perhaps we could get some help
[2306]in how the recollections come together here. I might pursue
[2307]for just a moment some of the background regarding other
[2309]sources of information you may have had regarding the subject
[2311]matter of his testimony. ;
[2312]You indicated earlier that you had talked with Mr.
[2313]Bissell about his testimony.
[2314]Did you talk with persons other than Mr. Bissell?
[2315]Mr. Bundy. Oh, yes.
[2316]Mr. Smothers. Did you talk with Mr. McNamara?
[2317]Mr. Bundy. YeS-e indeed.
[2318]Mr. Smothers. Regarding these events?
[2319]Mr. Bundy. Yes.
[2321]Mr. Smothers. Have you spoken with Mr. Gilpatric?
[2323]“Mr. Bundy. No, I don't think T have.
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[2365]Smothers:
[2367]Mr. Bundy. Yes.’ -
[2369]Mr. Smothers. Mr. MeCone?
[2371]Mr. Bundy. Yes.
[2373]Mr. Smothers. Are there others?
[2375]Mx. Bundy. I am'sure there are. Mr. Rostow. Mz.
[2376]Goodwin. There may well be others, Mr. Schlesinger and Mr.
[2377]Dungam -- who has very little to do with it, but I talked
[2378]to them because of my own absence of recollection about the
[2380]Dominican Republic. -
[2382]Mr. Smothers. Let me just raise a few questions regard-
[2383]ing those discussions, and perhaps it will be somewhat helpful
[2384]to us in trying to piece this together.
[2386]Has any documentary evidence passed between you and
[2387]the persons previously mentioned regarding the subject
[2388]matter of these hearings?
[2390]Mr. Bundy. Not that I know of.
[2392]Mr. Smothers. Did Mr. McCone provide you any documentary |
[2393]evidence?
[2395]Mr. Bundy. No.
[2397]Mr. Smother. Did you receive any documentary evidence
[2398]from any source other than the staff? ;
[2399]Mr. Bundy. No -~ I beg your pardon. When I testified
[2401]before the Rockefeller Commission I asked through that
[2403]Commission whether I could -look at NCS files particularly in
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[2440]reported it to me that the testimony that had been given by
[2442]order to clarify my recollection “ of ‘the 6th of August 1962.
[2444]And I was allowed to took at at the NSAM files. ‘and my memory was
[2445]refreshed by NSAM-1, which I believe the committee has.
[2446]Mr. Smothers. Have you’ made a similar request to
[2447]persons now within the Agency cor .on the White House staff?
[2448]Mr. Bundy. No. on
[2450]Mr. Smothers: Could we go back into your conversation
[2452]with Mr. Bissell? Could you describe for the Committee, please
[2454]your reaction when Mr. Bissell indicated to you that he had
[2455]in testimony before this Committee told the Committee that
[2456]either you or Mr. Rostow had asked him to establish an Execu-~
[2458]tive Action Capability?
[2460]Mr. Bundy. He didn't report it that way to me. He
[2462]others placed this event in February 1961. Testimony by
[2463]others indicated that he had said to them that he had been
[2465]encouraged to do this by the White House, and that in casting
[2467]around as to who might have encouraged, he had given the
[2469]names of Rostow and Bundy. I think this is roughly what
[2471]he said to me.
[2472]The Chairman. That was the character of his testimony?
[2473]Mr. Bundy. I told him that I thought he must
[2475]be wrong about Rostow, because that wasn't the way it worked,
[2477]and that my own recollection was not that we had encouraged
[2479]him, but that I had at some stage been informed about it.
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[2495]We then went on
[2497]we agreed that whatever else-it was, it was not an operation
[2499]plan, and it was not targeted against anyone.
[2501]Mr. Smothers.
[2503]What was his reaction to your comment
[2504]that he had been informed as opposed to initiating?
[2505]Mr. Bundy. I don't recall that we had a very extended
[2507]discussion on it. I don't recall his reaction, and I don't
[2509]recall exactly how I put the point.
[2510]\ .
[2511]The Chairman. Let me just ask at that point, the way you
[2513]have characterized Bissell's testimony correspnds with my
[2515]memory of it. It is hard for me, however, to understand
[2517]how Mr. Bissell -- why Mr. Bissell would have directed Mr.
[2519]Harvey to develop such a capability, and apparently represented |
[2521]if the documents are to be believed, to Mr. Harvey that he had
[2523]been twice instructed to do this by the White House, if he
[2525]had not in fact received such authority.
[2527]Do you think that Mr. Bissell would have undertaken
[2529]and
[2531]on his own initiative to develop such a capability
[2533]represented to his subordinate that he was doing soon :
[2535]simply
[2536]instructions from the White House?
[2537]Mr. Bundy. I think there is a prior question, Mr.
[2539]Chairman, which is the credibility of the witness from whom he
[2541]is taking this recollection. : \.
[2543]The Chairman. That is fair.
[2545]Though Mr. Bissell himself did not seem disposed --
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[2566]have already explained, to speculate as to why he did or did
[2568]not give him this instru
[2570]The Chairman. ‘Did ite. Bissell at any time during the
[2571]period under question, or at any later time, ever inform
[2572]you of CIA activities or involvement in assassination attempts
[2573]against any foreign leader? . 7 .
[2575]Mr. Bundy. No.
[2577]The Chairman. Doesn't it strike you as strange, since
[2578]Mr. Bissell was aware of such attempts, that he would not
[2579]have told him?
[2581]Mr. Bundy. Well, TI don't want, for reasons that I
[2583]not. I was operating, working on the assumption that I
[2584]would know that kind of-athing if it existed.
[2586]The Chairman.Senator Mathias?
[2588]Senator Mathias. Mr. Chairman, I don't want to leave
[2590]the record, or Mr. Bundy's mind, or in the alternative, my
[2592]mind, ina state of confusion as to what exactly Mr. Bissell's
[2593]recollection was.
[2595]Now, he was depending somewhat on Mr. Harvey's recollec~
[2596]tion and notes in the first instance. But as I recall, he
[2597]was very clear as 4 matter of independent recollection that
[2598]he had been horsed along a couple of times by the White House
[2599]on proceeding with the development of the Executive Action
[2603]Capability. And that was a matter of independent recollection,
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[2639]refreshing his recollection
[2640]Mr. Bundy. That, he didn't say to me, and I have no way
[2641]of commenting on it.
[2643]The Chairman. I think we must carefully review the
[2644]record on that score.
[2646]Senator Baker. It may be necessary to ask him to come
[2647]back for that purpose. .
[2649]May I ask a question there? -
[2651]Mr. Bundy, do you have any recollection of any specific
[2652]covert plans that would involve poisons, hypdermic syringes,
[2653]or other potentially lethal devices in conjunction with acti-
[2654]vities against Cuba? .
[2656]Mr. Bundy. I have no recollection of any specific plan.
[2657]I do have a very vague, essentially refreshed recollection
[2658]that I heard the word poison at some point in connection with
[2659]a possibility of action in Cuba. But that is as far as I
[2660]have been able to take it in my own memory.
[2662]Senator Baker. Can you remember who may have men-
[2663]tioned it to you and what the purposes of the poison may have
[2664]been?
[2666]Mr. Bundy. Nothing at all about it in detail.
[2668]Senator Baker. A poison pen?
[2670]Mr. Bundy. No, some kind of poison about which -- one
[2671]thing that does stick in my mind is that it seems totally
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[2707]impractical because “darge group of
[2709]people ina headquarters mess; or gomething of that sort.
[2711]Senator Baker. Do you ‘remember whether the plan was
[2712]declared non-feasible or infeasible by the Department of
[2713]Defense? | : ; . .
[2715]Mr. Bundy. No, I have no such recollection.
[2717]Senator baker. Do you remember anything about a hypodermic
[2718]syringe to carry poisons in a ballpoint pen?
[2720]Mr. Bundy. That is the sort of ‘thing that I was asked
[2721]the other day, and I said I remember it, and then it seems to
[2722]me about ten seconds later was that what I was remembering was
[2723]murder mysteries and nothing related to Cuba. I have no
[2724]recollection of connecting anything like that to Cuba.
[2726]Senator Baker. I have another question, but I will
[2727]wait, if you have something else.
[2729]The Chairman. Go ahead, sir.
[2730]Senator Baker. Do you feel that you have a good insight
[2731]into the relationship between the President and his brother
[2732]Robert Kennedy in this respect, that is, having to do with
[2733]Cuba operations, and Robert Kennedy and Richard Helms?
[2735]Mr. Bundy. I have a pretty good picture of the relation-
[2736]ship between President Kennedy and Robert Kennedy on Cuba,
[2737]and on many other things. It is a recollection which grows
[2739]stronger as the administration goes on, because I got to
[2741]know them better, and, of course, they got to know me better,
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[2770]and the relatio gor, my relation with
[2772]both of them. ‘tr had known the President for many, many
[2773]years, and the Attorney General much. more priefly.
[2775]I do not -have any clear picture of the relationship
[2776]between the Attorney General and Mr. Helma. - My ccurbstone
[2777]judgment would have been that it was not close. |
[2779]Senator Baker. Based on your insight, did the Presi-
[2780]dent delegate to Robert “Kennedy substantial aspects of Cuba
[2781]policy during the period we are speaking of?
[2782]Mr. Bundy. f wouldn't put it that way, Senator
[2783]Baker. He certainly counted on the Attorney General to be
[2785]a kind of gingerman on a4 great many subjects, of which Cuba
[2787]and counterinsurgency were the two that came more closely with-
[2789]in my area of interest.
[2790]Senator Baker. Counterinsurgency meaning what?
[2792]Mr. Bundy. Counterinsurgency meaning all those efforts
[2794]like the Green Berets and organizing to be able to assist
[2795]countries threatened by Communist subversion internally.
[2796]Senator Baker. Are you speaking of counterinsurgency
[2798]as it led to Cuba, or as a general capability?
[2800]There was a separate committee, the Special
[2802]Mr. Bundy.
[2804]Committee on CI, counterinsurgency- and the Attorney General
[2806]And I used to see him playing
[2808]was an active member of that.
[2809]this very important role of poking and prodding, and why can't
[2811]you do more, and why can't you do better, and why aren't we
[2813]TOP SECRET.
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[2852]| Senator Baker. Who was on that committee?
[2854]Mr. bundy. I'am sorry, I can't decide from recollection.
[2855]General Taylor was again the Chairman, but the membership was
[2856]different.
[2858]Senator Baker. Do you have minutes or records of that
[2859]group? .
[2861]Mr. Schwarz. No.
[2863]Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, I would like to request
[2865]tify as much as we can what that group is, and make a fomral —
[2866]request for documentation.
[2868]Mr. Aaron. We have reviewed some of that «material at
[2869]the John F. Kennedy Library. It is essentially in fact the
[2870]group that reviewed paramilitary operations and potential
[2871]insurgency situations.in a number of countries. There was an
[2872]insurgency list. It did not seem to relate to the subject
[2873]we are speaking of here. So we did not request the documents.
[2874]But we could have gotten them.
[2876]Senator Baker. Will you do that, please?
[2878]Is that agreeable, Mr. Chairman?
[2880]The Chairman. What is your request?
[2882]Senator Baker. I would Like documentation or any records
[2884]| relating to the counterinsurgency group during the period in
[2886]question.
[2888]TOP SECRET
[2890]i
[2892]that with Mr. Bundy's assistance after this hearing that we ident
[2895]“phe Chairma e suggest: that we designate a mem~
[2896]“FR. . .
[2898]2 | ber of the committee staff_to undertake that review, and
[2900]3
[2902]Phone (Area 202) 544-6000
[2904]report back to the committee.
[2906]Would that be satisfactory?
[2908]Senator Baker. That is fine. I just want. to know if
[2909]there is any worthwhile documentation. —
[2911]The Chairman. ves. Because it may be entirely ancillary
[2912]to this issue.
[2914]Senator Baker. Let me ask Mr. Bundy this, Would that
[2915]group have been important toward American policy during this
[2916]period?
[2918]Mr. Bundy. The CI Group?
[2920]Senator Baker. Yes.
[2922]WARD & PAUL
[2924]Mr. Bundy. I would think only most marginally,
[2925]Senator Baker, simply because the existence of other groups,
[2926]the Special Group Augmented or the MONGOOSE Group, was .so
[2928]clearly dominant and was the Central Committee for that sub-
[2930]ject.
[2932]Senator Baker. The gingerbread man concept?
[2934]Mr. Bundy. The gingerman concept.
[2936]Senator Baker. The gingerman concept. There isa
[2937]difference.
[2939]Do I directly infer from that description that the
[2941]President would authorize Robert Kennedy to urge and expedite
[2943]410 First Street. $.E., Washington, D.C. 20003
[2945]action to move from assignment to assignment and to push peopic
[2947]TOP SECRET
[2950]along ‘to produce a result?
[2952]Mr. Bundy. In a general way that is right. But the
[2954]form it took in the areas in which I was concerned was in one
[2956]Prone (Arma 202) 54
[2958]sense quite informal, .I know of no instance »where the Attorney
[2960]General tried to replace the normal channel. -- let's stay away |
[2962]for the moment from! the covert question and the Cuban ques-
[2963]tion, which I know you will want to talk about more precisely --
[2964]but if he felt, as he often did, that American policy in
[2966]Africa, for example, was insufficiently sensitive to the aspir-
[2968]ations of black people in Africa, he wouldn't fire off a kick, h
[2970]would come in and say, why can't you people do something about
[2972]the State Department on news and stuff.
[2974]Senator Baker. There is some evidence -- we had direct
[2976]WARD & PAUL
[2978]testimony that Mr. Helms, who was DDP at the time in ques-
[2979]tion, rather than DCI, clearly thought that the authority of
[2980]the Agency was to overthrow the Castro regime by any means, in-
[2981]cluding assassination.
[2983]And when pressed on the source of that authority he de-
[2984]signed to say that anyone specifically told him that, but
[2985]that he talked to Robert Kennedy frequently about it. Would
[2986]this be in the gingerman concept you are speaking of?
[2988]Mr. Bundy. Now we are right at the specific point I
[2989]| would like to make. But everything I knew about Bobby Kennedy
[2991]when he was goading and spurring people on is that he never
[2993]410 First Street, $.E., Washington, B.C. 20003
[2995]took away from the existing channel of authority its authority
[2997]TOP SECRET
[3000]‘on
[3002]on
[3004]— 10
[3006]co 11
[3008]1
[3009]a
[3012]WARD & FAUL
[3014]Ch 14
[3015]15
[3016]16
[3017]1?
[3019]18
[3021]re)
[3022]to
[3024]20
[3026]AlO Fiest Street, S E., Washington, D.C. 20003
[3028]Senator Baker.
[3030]‘Would
[3032]with whatyou describe?
[3034]what I -deacribe be consistent
[3036]Mr. Bundy. Not if it is interpreted as meaning that he
[3038]was providing a separate channel of authority.
[3040]Senator Baker. What I’ meant ‘was just what it was, and
[3042]in this respect.
[3044]Mr. Bundy. I
[3046]said, I know nothing about that.
[3048]Senator Baker.
[3050]Mr. Schwarz.
[3052]Senator Baker.
[3054]met regularly with the DDP rather than
[3056]Mr. Bundy.
[3060]I have no
[3062]that is, lNelms described for us meeting with Kennedy apparently
[3063]to stimulate the Agency's activities to. produce the overthrow
[3065]of the Castro regime, and that he met regularly with Kennedy
[3067]don't know how often they met or what was
[3069]tant than his relationship to Mr. Helms.
[3071]I am correct, am I,
[3073]time was DDP and not DCI?
[3075]That-.is right.-
[3076]Do you have any
[3077]the DCI?
[3079]idea that he did.
[3081]I would have said, just in
[3082]passing, that the Attorney General's relationship to the Direc-
[3084]tor of Central Intelligence was much closer and more impor-
[3086]that Helms atthe
[3088]idea why he would have
[3090]I know that he
[3092]met often and intimately and easily with the Director of
[3094]Central Intelligence, who was a close personal friend of his.
[3096]Senator Baker. You are speaking of Mr. McCone?
[3098]Mr. Bundy.
[3100]Mr.
[3102]McCone.
[3104]TOP SECRET -
[3106]4
[3107]i
[3108]i
[3111]C
[3112]cS
[3115]q
[3116]c
[3117]e
[3118]a
[3119]a
[3121]Phone (Arna 202) 544-6000
[3123]WARD & PAUL
[3125]410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003
[3127]j gince the point is impor-
[3128]tant, that when the Committee staff complete its review of the
[3129]evidence it ought ‘to be reminded to look closely at that Helms
[3130]testimony and identify exactly what words Helms might have
[3131]used to describe his relationship with Robert Kennedy.
[3133]Senator Baker. And the: time involved and what position
[3134]Helms occupied at the time.
[3136]The Chairman. I have another question.
[3138]Mr. Bundy, we also have it from Mr. Bissell that at one
[3139]time he called in an officer, a subordinate, O’Donnell,
[3140]that at one time Mr. Bissell called in a subordinate whose
[3141]name was Mr. O'Donnell, and asked Mr. O'Donnell if he would
[3142]be willing to undertake the assassination of Mr. Lumumba.
[3144]Mr. O'Connell testifies that he said he would not be
[3145]willing to undertake the assassination of Mr. Lumumba, because
[3146]he had moral compunctions against killing.
[3148]Mr. O'Donnell further testifies that he was then or
[3149]thereafter dispatched to the Congo, where he was informed that
[3150]some poison had been made available -- had come to the CIA
[3151]headquarters in the Congo.
[3153]Mr. Bundy. I am sorry, I missed that last.
[3155]The Chairman. He was informed that some poison had
[3156]arrived at the CIA headquarters in the Congo.
[3158]When we asked Mr. Bissell on what authority he had asked
[3160]O'Connell as to his willingness to undertake the assassination
[3162]TOP SECRET
[3165]Prone (Ares 202)
[3167]WARD & PAUL
[3169]410 First Street, $.E., Wasningtan, D.C. 20003
[3171]of Lumumba, he could hot provide us with that authority,
[3172]except to say that he may have done it, ‘on his own initiative.
[3173]‘Do you have any reaction to that?
[3175]Mr. Bundy. Where is it in. time?
[3177]Senator Church. It was in the fall of 1960. It was
[3179]not during the Kennedy Administeation, it preceded the Kennedy
[3180]Administration. But I asked you the question, because it
[3181]strikes me as being a very disturbing piece of testimony, that
[3182]any: man so positioned, in the CIA could not identify higher
[3183]authority for such an action, and would under oath say that it
[3184]might have been on his own initiative.
[3186]Mr. Bundy. I can't add to your comment on that, Mr.
[3187]Chairman.
[3189]The Chairman. very well.
[3191]Senator Morgan. Let me ask him a question or two, Mr.
[3193]The Chairman. Senator Morgan?
[3195]Senator Morgan. Mr. Bundy, you recall very vividly
[3196]talking with the president on many occasions about Cuba,
[3197]is that right?
[3199]Mr. Bundy. I recall vividly that I talked to him on many
[3200]occasions, I am not very good on remembering specific dis-
[3201]cussions.
[3203]Senator Morgan. You told us a few minutes ago that he was |
[3205]constantly prodding, and why don't you do this, and why doesn't
[3207]TOP SECRET
[3210]WARD & PAUL
[3212]410 First Street. $.E., Washington, O.C. 20003
[3214]Mr. Bundy. If I may ‘correct that, I said he prodded me
[3216]from time to time, not all the time.
[3218]Senator Morgan. Quite frequentiy?.
[3220]Mr. Bundy. If wouldn't put it that often. It might have
[3221]been three or four times.
[3223]Senator Morgan. Mr. Bundy, you were head of the Security
[3224]Council, you were his assistant?
[3226]Mr. Bundy. I am trying to give an accurate picture of
[3227]the number of times, Senator.
[3229]Senator Morgan. You are trying to give such an accurate
[3230]picture that you are not giving much of a picture at all.
[3232]Are you telling this committee that throughout the time
[3234]you assumed your duties, throughout the Cuban crisis, and all
[3236]the MONGOOSE operations, that you might have talked to him two
[3237]or three times about it?
[3239]Mr. Bundy. No.
[3241]Could I separate and try and clarify my answer?
[3243]Senator Morgan. Yes.
[3245]Mr. Bundy. I talked to the President, I suppose, many,
[3246]many times in the context of the events that led up to and
[3247]followed the Bay of Pigs. I talked to him dozens of times,
[3248]maybe even hundreds of times, in the context of the events that
[3249]led up to and followed the Cuban missile crisis. Those are the |
[3251]two great moments of Presidential concern over Cuba during the
[3253]TOP SECRET
[3256]JQA
[3258]Prone (Area 202) 544-6000
[3260]WARD & PAUL
[3262]15
[3264]416 First Street, SE. Washington, 0.C. 20003
[3266]14
[3268]16
[3270]1?
[3272]18
[3274]19
[3276]20
[3278]give you 4 numbe
[3279]the distinction I am trying to make.
[3281]Senator MOrgan. You were something between himself and
[3283]the National Security Council, were you not?
[3284]Mr. Bundy. That isntt exactly the way it works.
[3285]Senator Morgan. Just tell me what aid you do.
[3287]Mr. Bundy. I am trying to.
[3289]Senator Morgan. I have been listening all morning, Mr.
[3291]Bundy, and I just don't get it.
[3293]Let me go to one other question. Was it true a while
[3295]ago when you said that Robert Kennedy was constantiy prodding
[3297]people? why can't we do more?
[3298]Mr. Bundy. Yes, that is certainly true.
[3300]Senator Morgan. 1 have no other questions.
[3302]Senator Mondale. Could: I).ask one, Mr. Chairman?
[3304]The Chairman. Senator Mondale. ,
[3306]senator Mondale. I don't like to ask this question,
[3308]put 1 think it is important.
[3309]Have you talked to others involved during this period
[3311]when you may have been testifying before us and before the
[3313]Rockefeller Commission, SaYr in the last five months about
[3315]| this testimony?
[3317]i _Mr. Bundy. I answered that question. Yes, I have.
[3319]Senator Mondale. Would you repeat it briefly for us?
[3321]TOP SECRET
[3324]Mr. Smothers
[3325]Senator Mondale.
[3327]Senator Mondale. Go ahead.
[3329]Phone (Ares 202) 544-6608
[3331]Mr. Smothers. I believe. you indicated previously, Mr.
[3332]Bundy, that you talked to. -. issell, Mr. McNamara, Mr. McCone,
[3333]Mr. Rostow, Mr. Goodwin,’ “Mr “Sehletnger, and others that may
[3334]not be on that list. - And” you. ‘indicated that you had spoken to
[3335]Mr. Bissell after his testimony regarding executive action.
[3337]Mr. Bundy. That is right.
[3339]Mr. smothers. Had you spoken with him also before that
[3341]testimony?
[3343]Mr. Bundy. No.
[3345]Mr. Smothers. Did he call you or did you call him?
[3347]WARD & PAUL
[3349]Mr. Bundy. I don't honestly recall. I think I said the
[3351]other day that he had called me, but I think actually what
[3355]et
[3356]4
[3358]happened that he called me, and my. first words were, I needed
[3360]aces
[3362]to call you.
[3364]Mr. Smothers. Can we go to your conversations with Mr.
[3365]McNamara. When did you first talk with him about these matters
[3366]being testified to?
[3368]Mr. Bundy. I think pretty much as soon as it hit the papers.
[3370]Mr. Smothers. Can you give the Committee the sense of
[3371]your conversations with Mr. McNamara?
[3373]Mr. Bundy. There have been a number of them. Mr.
[3375]410 Fiest Street, $.€., Washington, D.C. 20003
[3377]McNamara and I not only have been close friends, but are very
[3379]TOP SECRET
[3382]quently; both about ubstance of matters of international
[3384]development, and about the’ business of the Ford Foundation.
[3386]Prone (Area 202)
[3388]So, I have talked to him a. number of times both on the
[3389]telephone and face to. face. he ¢ essence of the conversation
[3390]is the exploration ‘of questions: raised or doubts raised babout
[3392]the conviction we both’ share, which is that no one in the Kennedy
[3394]Administration, in the White House, or in the Capitol, ever
[3395]gave any authorization, approval, or instruction of any kind
[3397]for any effort to assassinate anyone by the CIA.
[3399]410 First Street, S.E., Wasnington, O.C. 20003
[3401]TOP SECRET
[3404]Phone (Aras 202)
[3406]WARD & FAUL
[3408]410 First Street, $.£., Washington. D.c. 20003
[3410]with you specifically, the fact that he had received from
[3412]Mr. McCone a memorandum from Mr. MeCone.in 1967?
[3414]Mr. Bundy. Yes, he told me that.
[3416]Mr. Smothers. Did you discuss the substance of that
[3417]memorandum? : : ct,
[3419]‘Mr. Bundy. Tf discussed ituinitially with Mr. Mecone.
[3421]Mr. smothers - pid you discuss it with Mr. McNamara?
[3423]Mr. Bundy. He mentioned it to me. I don't recall much
[3424]about it.
[3426]Mr. Smothers. pid you discuss the meeting of August 10
[3427]in Secretary Rusk's office?
[3429]Mr.-Bundy. That was the first discussed because the
[3430]newspapers said that there had been 4 meeting of three, four
[3431]or five of us, and the question was whether there had been
[3432]such a meeting limited to three, four,or five. And we were abie
[3433]to satisfy ourselves ‘that that was wrong.
[3435]Mr. Smothers. That was wrong. What do you recall to
[3437]have been Mr. McNamara's reaction of the August 10 meeting?
[3438]Mr. Bundy. He didn't seem to have any that I can recall,
[3440]at least I don't recall that he told me of any reaction of
[3442]it.
[3444]Mr. Smothers. Do you recall the substance of his
[3448]comment regarding the 1967 McCone report?
[3450]Mr. Bundy. No. Tf don't think he commented on it.
[3452]TOP SECRET
[3455]wee “ on
[3457]Mr. Smothers
[3459]a.
[3460]a With ‘regard to your conversation with
[3461]; ; 3 Mr. McCone, when did this occur; approximately?
[3462]| 4 Mr. Bundy. That occurred earlier-on.
[3463]5 Mr. Smothers. Before the Rockefeller Commission inquiry? |
[3464]6 Mr. Bundy. I don't know exactl when it was. Bat it
[3465]7 was within the context of the Rockefeller Commission
[3466]8 inguiry. and not this inquiry.
[3468]10 conversation?
[3470]9 Mr. Smothers. Are you talking about more than one
[3472]or the
[3474]I don't
[3476]; loa 11 Mr. Bundy. No, I think I talked to him on the phone
[3477]: “
[3478]4 ie : 12 and then I had a meeting with him.
[3479]; > : 13 Mr. Smothers. In either the phone conversation
[3480]. 14 meeting did you discuss Mr. McCone 's 1967 report?
[3481]_& 15 Mr. Bundy. He told me that he had heard of it.
[3482]ial 16 think he had then seen it. ,
[3483]of!
[3485]Mr. Smothers.
[3487]17
[3489]TOP. SECRET
[3491]You don't think he had then seen
[3493]it?
[3495]obviously
[3497]18. Mr. Bundy. . He had then seen it as of 1975. He
[3498]. 3 19 saw it in 1967.
[3500]8 20 Mr. Smothers. Can you give us a feeling for the approx-
[3501]i 21 imate time when this conversation occurred?
[3502]: 22 Mr. Bundy. I could ‘probably work it out from my own
[3503]: 23 | calendar, but I don't have it in my head. .
[3505]@ : 24 Mr. Smothers. But at this time he had not seen the
[3507]report? ,
[3510]since itis a report that -as".I under tand it, it isa
[3512]report that he made in 1967, and he had seen it then.
[3514]Mr. Smothers. Did he indicate to you that he was |
[3515]making-an effort to get that report?: a
[3517]Mr. Bundy. 1 think he told me that he had been in touch
[3519]with the Agency and would be seeing the report, but I don't
[3521]really recall.
[3523]Mr. Smothers. To go into your conversation with Mr.
[3524]Rostow, would you indicate to the Committee, please, the
[3525]substance of that conversation?
[3527]Mr. Bundy. Yes. I called him after my conversation
[3529]with Mr. Bissell, because it seemed to me that he ought to
[3531]WARD & PAUL
[3533]be informed, and the two of them ought to talke with each
[3534]other about that testimony.
[3536]Mr. Smothers. At the time you called him it was your
[3537]impression that Mr. Bissell had not talked with Mr. Rostow?
[3539]Mr. Bundy. But was planning to.
[3541]Mr. Smothers. And this was after Mr. Bissell's testi-
[3544]Mr. Bundy. That if right.
[3546]Mr. Smothers. Did you and Mr. Rostow discuss the fact
[3547]that both you and Mr. Rostow had been named as potential
[3549]sources for the Exective Action authorization?
[3551]410 First Street. $.£., véasnington, D.C. 20003
[3553]Mr. Bundy. My emphasis in talking about Mr. Rostow was
[3555]TOP SECRET
[3558]es
[3560]that in my recollection that: must be wrong, and he would be
[3562]Prone (Area 202) $44-6000722
[3564]interested in getting it’ straightened out.
[3566]Mr. smothers. Can we yo to your conversation with Mr.
[3567]Goodwin. pid you.call him or aia he cali you?
[3569]Mr. Bundy. “recalled him.
[3571]Mr. Smothers.- And the nature of that conversation?
[3573]Mr. Bundy. That conversation was about the Dominican
[3574]Republic, because of my complete failure of recollection as
[3575]to who or what the White House line of action, responsibility
[3576]and concern was with respect to the Dominican Republic in
[3578]1961. And I called him, and I called Dungan, and I called
[3580]WARD & PAUL
[3582]Schlesinger, because they were the the who had been very
[3583]much involved in things like the Alliance for Progress, and
[3584]new appointments to embassies in Latin America, and Latin
[3585]American Policy generally, except for the Bay of Pigs. And
[3586]I wanted to see if they had recollections about events in.
[3588]that spring that were more extensive than mine. I didn't lear
[3590]very much, but that was the purpose of the call.
[3592]Mr. Smothers. And it it your testimony that your first
[3593]exposure to the documentary evidence beyond these recollections
[3594]was when either the Rockefeller Commission staff or this
[3595]staff showed you documents pertaining to this inquiry.
[3597]Mr. Bundy. I want to be precise about the Rockefeller
[3599]410 First Street, S.E., Wasnington, O.C. 20603
[3601]Commission staff. They did not show me the documents, the
[3603]TOP SECRET
[3606]documents?
[3607]Mr. Bundy. Yes.
[3609]Mr. Smothers. Under what circumstance did the White House
[3611]Staff provide these documents to you? Was it at your request
[3612]or their request? |
[3614]Mr. Bundy. My request.
[3616]Mr. Smothers. When dia it occur?
[3618]Mr. Bundy. At-the time of the Rockefeller hearings.
[3620]Mr. Smothers. At the time of the Rockefeller hearings?
[3622]Mr. Bundy. Yes.
[3624]Mr. Smothers. And prior to your testimony?
[3626]Mr. Bundy. Yes.
[3628]Mr. Smothers. Who provided these documents to you?
[3630]Mr. Bundy. I never have testified on -- this is not a
[3632]Go |
[3633]2
[3634]rm i
[3635]“0
[3640]c.
[3641]&.
[3642]4
[3643]Bw
[3645]serious matter, because there is no secret about it. But I
[3646]have always taken the position that White House decisions
[3647]are for the White House to discuss, and I perfer to hold to
[3648]that position now.
[3650]Mr. Smothers. Are you saying that you do not feel at
[3651]liberty
[3653]Mr. Bundy. No, I am not saying, I am saying that I would |
[3655]410 First Street, S.E., Washington, G.C. 20003
[3657]request the committee to address that, question with the White
[3659]House.
[3661]TOP SECRET
[3664]WARD & PAUL
[3666]410 First Street, $.E., Washington, D.C. 20003
[3668]Mr. Smothers. ° The ‘question’ ts who in the White House
[3670]provided Mr. Bundy with documents relevant to this investigatidn
[3671]And I believe his position is that he would prefer not to
[3672]disclose that matter, or that that is a matter for the
[3673]Committee's determination.
[3675]Mr. Bundy. Let me explain, Mr. Chairman, because you
[3676]were out of the room, . that I have atwaya taken the position:
[3677]that decisions of the White House are for the White House
[3678]to discuss. I always asked permission to see documentation
[3679]and permission was given. I looked at the document, but 1
[3680]would rather not discuss it, because I think it is for the
[3681]White House to discuss it.
[3683]The Chairman. What is the document?
[3685]Mr. Bundy. I just described it, it is National Security
[3686]Action Memorandum No. 1, weshowed us the National Security
[3687]Action file, which I believe your staff has.
[3689]Mr. Schwarz. We have it here.
[3691]Mr. Smothers. My question was, who had the request been
[3693]and showed him the document?
[3695]Mr. Bundy. My point is that I have tried historically
[3696]not to discuss this kind of question when it is something
[3697]that concerns the White House, but to leave it to the White
[3698]House to discuss it,.and I would prefer to hold to that
[3700]position.
[3702]TOP SECRET
[3705]Phone (Ares 202) 544-6008
[3707]WARD @ PAUL
[3709]410 First Street, S.E., Waspington, O.. 20003
[3711]_ (Off the ‘record )
[3713]Mr. Smothers. This quite frankly, Mr. Bundy, this
[3715]related to an ancillary matter that is of concern to the
[3716]committee.
[3718]You mentioned conversations with Mr. Schlesinger. Again,
[3719]were those initiated by you? '
[3721]Mr. Bundy. .The most recent one, he called me. And il
[3722]think there were earlier ones, but I don't know. Tf can't be
[3723]precise. I must say t don't know that I understand the line
[3724]of questioning. ‘phese are very important matters, and
[3725]people closely involved in them should be trying to get 4
[3726]clear sense of what each other remembers after this many
[3727]years, it seems to me this would be entirely natural.
[3729]Mr. Smothers. I don't question the fact that it is
[3730]natural, Mr. Bundy. I think one of the difficult things
[3731]for this Committee to do is to separate out, if you will,
[3732]the independent recollections from the documentary evidence
[3733]we have shown you, and from conversations with ethers -~
[3735]Mr. Bundy. You are quite right. And I have tried
[3736]quite carefully to teil. you my recollection.
[3738]Mr. Smothers. We are merely trying now to establish.
[3739]those relationships so that when we get the- point in the
[3740]record there is some question regarding the nature of the
[3741]recollection that might be of some assistance to us. That
[3743]is not an attack on your veracity, it is not an attempt to
[3745]TOP SECRET
[3748]WAAD & PAUL
[3750]410 Furst Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C, 20003
[3752]Do you recall, Mr. Bundy, -from these conversations that
[3754]we have just mentioned, any matters which have been raised
[3755]by the participants: that may ‘be inconsistent with the
[3756]documentary record as you, have: seen. yer We know, of course,
[3757]that Mr. McNamara' 8 recollection appears to be inconsistent
[3758]with the documentary evidence regarding the August 10
[3759]meeting. .
[3761]Mr. Bundy. Well, so was mine. And I have no such
[3762]recollection.
[3764]re Smothers. I am speaking. now of the recollection of
[3766]others, if you will.
[3768]Mr. Bundy. I can't really recite on that, because I
[3769]haven't made the kind of comparison document by document
[3770]and conversation by conversation that would allow me to make
[3771]a clearcut and comprehensive answer. But I don't have any
[3772]recollection of sharp divergency of that sort.
[3774]The Chairman. Mr. Schwarz.
[3776]Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Bundy, I want to pick up on one
[3777]thing that you testified to that was left hanging and then
[3778]come back through your involvement with Cuba and starting
[3780]from the beginning. You testified that to your knowledge
[3782]no authorization for an assassination was given. I want to
[3784]TOP SECRET
[3787]told at any time by: "anybody that assassination: effoftts were
[3789]actually under way with respect to Mr Castro?
[3791]Phone (Area 202)
[3793]MY. Bundy « ‘Absolutely not.
[3794]Mr. Schwarz. Were you. ever tola by anybody that the
[3796]Central Intelligence Agency had hired the Mafia to assassinate
[3798]Castro?
[3799]“Mr. Bundy. No.
[3801]Mr. Schwarz. Were you ever told by anybody that auzing
[3802]the MONGOOSE program Mr. Harvey was engaged in assassination
[3803]efforts upon Fidel Castro?
[3805]Mr. Bundy. No.
[3807]Mr. Schwarz. Were you ever told by anybody that in
[3809]d
[3810]co)
[3813]C]
[3814]i}
[3817]2
[3819]fall of 1963 the Central Intelligence Agency was passing
[3820]assasSination devices to a Cuban military officer?
[3822]Mr. Bundy. No.
[3824]Mr. Schwarz. Were you ever told by anybody that in:
[3825]fall of 1963 the Central Intelligence Agency was engaged
[3826]an assassination effort with respect to Fidel Castro?
[3828]Mr. Bundy. No. _
[3830]Mr. Schwarz. Now, after the Bay of Pigs, was there a
[3831]reevaluation or reconsideration of what the policy toward Cuba |
[3833]should be? And would you turn in that connection to Tab B, -
[3835]of the bundy Book 1 of 2 -~
[3837]410 First Streat, S.E., Washington, B.C. 20003
[3839]Senator Tower. May I raise a purely technical point. [I
[3841]TOP SECRET
[3844]2
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[3856]re,
[3858]Mafia was’ hired to'as! sasei ate, Castro, rT: think that was
[3859]inaccurate, because I. aon! t think, we have anything that
[3860]indicates that we contacted’ the syndicate as such, and I think
[3861]if we use, "individuals “Likely, adsociated with the Mafia,”
[3863]or something like that. -- ae ‘is a ‘Little technical.
[3865]Mr. Schwarz. Let me restate the question to make sure
[3866]that there is not a problem with the scope of my question.
[3867]And Senator Tower is correct.:
[3869]Were you ever told that the Agency had contacted a man
[3870]called John Roselli?
[3872]Mr. Bundy. No.
[3874]Mr. Schwarz. A man called Sam Giancana?
[3876]Mr. Bundy. No. *
[3878]Mr. Schwarz. A man called Santos Traficante?
[3880]Mr. Bundy. No.
[3882]Mr. Schwarz. Any person who was a criminal or allegedly
[3883]a criminal for the purpose of assassinating Mr. Castro?
[3885]Mr. Bundy. No.
[3887]Mr. Schwarz. Do you have any recollection whatsoever
[3889]related to the subject we have been exploring in that group
[3891]of questions?
[3893]Mr. Bundy. No =~ you are familiar with the fact that -~
[3894]refreshed my recollection of activities associated with the
[3896]Mafia in a law enforcement context in Florida in 1964.
[3898]TOP SECRET
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[3915]Mr. Schwarz.
[3917]down right now. What happened in
[3918]Mavia and Cuba, co the best oF your recollection? | and then
[3919]we will just mark some documents. .
[3921]Mr. Bundy. Let me be clear that my recollection here is
[3922]entirely refreshed. Perhaps you would rather come back to
[3923]it?
[3925]Mr. Schwarz. Let's put it in the record here, since we
[3926]have raised the subject.
[3928]Let's mark as Bundy Exhibit 1 the: Helms memo to DCA
[3929]on the Cuban exile plan dated June 10, 1964.
[3931](Document referred to is marked as
[3933]Bundy Exhibit No. 1 for jdentificati
[3935]TOP SECRET
[3940]RR ee te TTA Oe gees HEAT
[3941]Ang? s pes " ae sae : Rea teeiay Zen
[3943]red to is marked a8
[3945]Bundy exhibit No. 2A for saentification|)
[3947]2
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[3957]S.£., Wasningtor .c. 20003
[3958]nw n w wn nw re
[3959]ag ies nm Ww oO oO
[3961]B10 First Srreet,
[3963]w
[3967]‘minutes of the
[3968]. reo Reuss cece eBE Dy eS ,
[3969]303 Committee of 18 June ° ;
[3973](Document referred to is marked as
[3975]Phone {Area 202)
[3977]- pundy Exhibit No. 2B for
[3979]_ fdentification.).
[3981]bona]
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[4004]410 First Street,
[4006]TOP SECRET
[4009]titer
[4012]EB seth ad
[4014]nypeks
[4016]Pn ee
[4017]chwarz
[4021](bocimant referred ‘to ig marked as
[4022]‘pundy Exhibit No. 2¢ for
[4025]as
[4027]Cc
[4028]4
[4029]tt 3
[4030]a
[4031]8
[4034]Cc 3
[4037]a
[4038]i
[4040]$.€., Washington, 0.c. 20003
[4042]nate
[4043]1O First Street,
[4050]for the Honorable Meceorg un al Nesistant to
[4052]the President, I. Investigation re Plans by Cuban
[4054]Exiles to assassinate Cuban Government Leaders," dated.
[4056]August 19, 1964.
[4057]* (Document referred to is marked as
[4059]Bundy exhibit No. 2p for
[4061]daentification.)
[4063]]
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[4086]410 First Street,
[4088]opportunity prior to the testimony, how again ig you seek
[4090]to do go, to refresh your recollection, will you recount for
[4092]the Committee what happened in the summer of 1964 in connect-
[4094]don with this matter?
[4096]Mr. Bundy. Well, it is a relatively small matter in the
[4097]eontext of what you are discussing, but what happened in the
[4098]gummer, of 1964 was that it came to our attention that there
[4099]were relations between Cuban refugees in Cuba and people
[4100]apparently associated with the Mafia. And this did not seem
[4101]to be a good idea. And this was ina period in which
[4102]sentiment had been steadily growing ‘€or gome time against
[4103]activities by cuban refugees that were wholly outside the
[4104]control and not really in the interest of the U.Ses and that
[4105]they should be associated with a criminal group.
[4107]and so when the matter came to the Special Group, the
[4108]decision was made to refer it to the Department of Justice
[4109]as a matter of internal American law enforcement. That was
[4110]done.
[4112]And the Department said that it was going after the
[4113]matter, which it then did, and reported back.
[4115]The reports don't give any conclusive picture of what
[4116]really was going on, put they do show that the Bureau went
[4118]to a number of people asking around about these matters, and
[4120]as far as 1 know, it then faded away.
[4122]TOP SECRET
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[4137]410 First Street,
[4139]Mr. schwarz. In thé contex of discussion did
[4140]anybody from the central Inteliigence Agency or anybody
[4141]else inform you that in earlier years there had been
[4142]a relationship with «7 to use Senator Tower's caution ~~
[4143]with persons alledgedly involved with the criminal syndicate
[4144]in order to accomplish the assassination of Fidel Castor?
[4146]Mr. Bundy. No.
[4148]Mr. Schwarz. Now, going back to the post-Bay of Pigs
[4149]period, would you put pefore the witness and mark as Exhibit
[4150]2 the National security minutes of a meeting held May 5, 1961.
[4151]It is at Tab B of the Senator's Book 1 of 2. This reflects,
[4152]am I correct, Mr- Bundy r a discussion of cuba. held with the
[4153]president and high officials of the government who are all
[4154]listed on the front page?
[4156]Mr. Bundy. Correct.
[4158]Mr. Schwarz. And Cuba was discussed, and it was
[4159]agreed, following the discussion that U.S. policy toward Cuba
[4160]should aim at the downfall of. Castro, and that since the
[4161]measures agreed below are not likely to achieve this end,
[4162]the matter should he reviewed at intervals with a view to
[4163]further action?
[4165]Mr. Bundy. Right. ;
[4167]Mr. Schwarz. Now, can you describe the measures agreed
[4168]to at that point?
[4170]Mr. Bundy. My only way of doing that with any accuracy
[4172]TOP SECRET
[4175]prone (Area 202)
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[4189]410 First Street, 5.
[4191]Mr. Schwarz.
[4193]Mr. Schwarz. The document speaks for itself, then. And
[4194]you can add nothing to it?
[4196]Mr. Bundy. No. .
[4198]Mr. Schwarz. But can you say cnat the measures 41d or
[4199]did not include assassination? .
[4201]Mr. Bundy- there is nothing in my recollection and
[4202]nothing in the document that seems to me to imply assassin-~
[4203]ation.
[4205]Mr. Schwar2- Now, following this instruction, was
[4206]cuban policy reviewed again in the fall of 1961?
[4208]Mr. Bundy. Yes.
[4210]Mr. SchwarZ- and ultimately out of the fall review
[4211]in 1961 came the so-called MONGOOSE program; is that correct?
[4213]Mr. Bundy- That is right.
[4215]Mr. Schwar2- Now, prior to discussing upon the MONGOOSE
[4216]program, aid you consider 4 lot of other options?
[4218]Mr. Bundy- I think we were ~~ and this is 4 nara
[4219]question, put I think what we were doing was working toward
[4220]an organization that would be able to take charge of the
[4221]complicated, varied inter-departmental kinds of things involved
[4222]in Cuba- We have been concentrating this morning on covert
[4223]actions: put there were also propaganda problems r economic i
[4225]problems, and Cuban refugee problems in Miami, and a number
[4227]TOP SECRET
[4230]Phone (Area 202) 544-6000;47-
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[4244]“Anytime you get that kind of problem you have an organization
[4246]of others : ia” a : th: “one juriadiction.
[4247]‘. : re, oO . \
[4249]problem. And the solution of 1961, which took sometime to
[4250]work out, as the passage of time suggests, was the creation
[4251]of a Special Committee under the Chairmanship of General
[4252]Taylor and with General Lansdale as its operating officer.
[4254]Mr. Schwarz. Now, in the course of the review that did
[4255]take place prior to the establishment of that Special committee
[4256]which then got called the MONGOOSE program, was one of the
[4257]matters which was considered the assassination of Mr. Castro?
[4259]Mr. Bundy. As I have already said, I can not tell you
[4260]that this question never came up. But rl recall no sustained
[4261]discussion of that matter in that period.
[4263]Mr. Schwarz. Whether you recall a sustained discussion
[4264]or not -"
[4266]Mr. Bundy. I don't recall a @iscussion that I can pin-
[4268]point anywhere, put over the period of 1961 to 1963 the
[4270]subject was mentioned from time to time by different individ
[4271]uals, never to me that I can recall by the President. But
[4272]it did come up’
[4273]Mr. Schwarz. And it may have come up in this period in
[4274]the fall of 1961 as something to consider, is that correct?
[4275]Mr. Bundy. As something to talk about rather than to
[4276]consider, would be my answer.
[4278]Mr. Schwarz. Would you put before the witness as Bundy
[4280]TOP SECRET
[4283]gated October 5+ 1961: mab ¢ of the Sena!
[4284]And as Bundy qonait 9a he minutes of the special Group
[4285]meeting dated october 6 1961, which is at Lansdale Tab 2-
[4286](pocument referred to is marked a8
[4287]Bundy exhibit No. 2 for taentification-}
[4288](pecument referred to is marked a3
[4289]pundy Exhibit No. 3 for taentificatt in.)
[4291](Document referred to jg marked a5
[4293]Bundy exhibit No- 3A for faentification:
[4295]2
[4296]2
[4300]o
[4305]E., Wasning?on. p.c. 20003
[4307]#10 First Street. Ss.
[4310]And finally, as Bundy Exhibit 3B a memorandum which we
[4312]have retyped from an indistinctcoriginal dated October 5,
[4314]1961 For the Record, ‘gigned by Mr. Parrott.
[4315]a / a
[4316]And the indistinct original is attached,
[4317](Document réferred to is marked as
[4319]Bundy Exhibit Nu. 3B for identificati
[4321]2
[4322]3
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[4331]410 First Street, 5-E.. Washington, D.C, 20003
[4333]TOP SECRET
[4336]Phone (Area 20:
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[4350]you the question » = nN ‘No 100° you sent to the Secretary
[4351]of State the following note: "In conformation of oral
[4352]instructions conveyed to Assistant Secretary of State
[4353]Woodward, a plan is desired ‘to the indicated contingency in
[4354]Cuba". Do you have an independent recollection of what that
[4355]indicated contingency was?
[4357]Mr. Bundy. Before seeing this document?
[4359]Mr. Schwarz. “Before ‘seeing the documents.
[4361]Mr. Bundy. No.
[4363]Mr. Schwarz. Having looked at not only Exhibit 3, but
[4364]Exhibit 3A and 3B, do you agree that the contingency referred
[4365]to in 3A and the contingency referred to in 3B are related
[4366]to NSAM No. 100?
[4368]Mr. Bundy. Yes, I do.
[4370]Mr. Schwarz. Now, the contingency referred to in 3B,
[4371]which is the earlier of the two following documents, is
[4372]‘gaid by Mr. Parrott to-be a plan against the contingency that
[4373]Castro would in some way or other be removed from the Cuban
[4374]scent. And I am going to come to some of the other parts
[4375]of that document with respect to the President's interest or
[4376]not.
[4378]And the contingency in 3A, which is the minutes of the
[4380]Special Group, as characterized as follows: "Mr. Parrott also
[4382]told the Group that two other exercises are in progress in
[4384]TOP SECRET
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[4401]connection with ‘the possible eneval of Castro from the
[4402]Cuban scene, and an updating of the overall plan for
[4403]covert operations". 7 :
[4405]Now, after having reviewed those documents, and in the
[4406]light: of your testimony that it is possible that the
[4407]consideration of the possibility of assassination which you
[4408]say did occur at some point; occurred in the fall of 1961,
[4409]do you agree that at that time the contingency under consider-
[4410]ation here was the possibility of the assassination of Castro?
[4412]mr. Bundy- Nos y would put it another way. The contin-
[4413]gency here is, what would we do if Castro were no longer
[4414]there. So that the question of how Castro ceased to be
[4415]there is left out of this set of papers. Clearly one of
[4416]the possibilities would be assassination, but only one of
[4417]them. What we are talking about here, as I read the docu-
[4418]ments, is a plan against the contingency that T am not reading
[4419]from the Parrott memorandum, against the contingency that
[4420]Castro would in some way OF other be removed from the Cuban
[4421]scene. NSAM 100, whose language is indirect, nonetheless
[4422]indicates: to me at least, rereading it, that the President
[4423]wanted to know what was likely to happen if Castro were no
[4425]longer there. He was, in other words, trying to get a picture
[4427]of whether that would really change things, and if so, in
[4429]what way-
[4431]TOP SECRET
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[4448]416 First Street, $.E., Wasmington, O.C. 20001
[4450]_file identified as the significant memorandum, NSAM 181.
[4452]detail that Mr. Smothers suggested
[4453]to me. Is NSAM 100 what the White House showed you, or is
[4454]it another document? .
[4455]Mr. Bundy. No, 181. But let.me be precise. I asked
[4456]to see the docunenta relating to -- from the National Security
[4458]files relating to August 1962. And they gave me the NSAM
[4460]Mr. Schwarz. Now, the contingency to be examined,
[4461]therefore, was what would: happen -- would it help the U.S.,
[4462]that is the question, if Castro were to disappear?
[4464]Mr. Bundy. What would it be like if Castro were to
[4465]disappear? The question is open ended.
[4467]Mr. Schwarz. What was the conclusion?
[4469]Mr. Bundy. I don't remember. My unaided sense of the
[4470]matter. is that intelligent political analysis would have
[4471]suggested in 1961 or at any time later that the removal of a
[4472]single individual in a revolution: complex and general as this
[4473]would have quite unpredictable and not necessarily helpful
[4474]effects.
[4476]Mr. Schwarz. You said that while you were clear the”
[4477]assassination was not in fact authorized, you believe that
[4478]at some point it was examined, is that a fair characterization,
[4480]Mr. Bundy. That isn't the word I used. Talk about. i
[4482]Mr. Schwarz. Talk about. And this exercise constitutes
[4484]an analysis of what Cuba/the U.S. would be like if Castro were
[4486]TOP SECRET
[4489]Prone (Area 202) 544-6008,
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[4503]removed.
[4505]Mr. Bundy. It constitutes a request for such an analysis.
[4507]© Mr. Schwarz. Was the analysis made?
[4509]Mr. Bundy . I don't have any recollection.
[4511]Mr. Schwarz. If one were exploring the possibility of
[4512]assassination, I take it this kind of analysis is the:.sort
[4514]of analysis one would wish to make if one was not simply
[4515]ruling assassination out as a matter of principle in the first
[4516]instance.
[4518]Mr. Bundy. Let me put it another way. If people were
[4519]suggesting this to you, and you were curious about whether
[4520]it was worth exploring, one way of getting more light on it
[4521]without going any further with that notion itself would be
[4522]to ask political people, not intelligence people, what they
[4523]thought would happen if Castro were not there any longer.
[4525]You will notice that this National Security Action
[4526]Memorandum is not addressed to the Central Intelligence
[4527]Agency, less still to the covert part of the Agency, but |
[4528]rather to the Secretary of State. And specifically clearly
[4529]the action of certain is Assistant Secretary Woodward.
[4531]. Mr. Schwarz. Now, document 3B indicates ~- and you
[4532]an opportunity to review this one before, I think --
[4533]Bundy. Which one are we now talking about?
[4535]Schwarz. 3B, Mr. Parrott's memo,
[4537]Bundy. Yes. I have a clearer copy now than I had
[4539]TOP SECRET
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[4552]Mr. Schwarz. cates that there was a presidential
[4553]interest in the matter: _ And then General maylor told Mr-
[4554]parrott that he prefered that the State pepartment, or Mx.
[4555]Woodward in the state pepartment, not be tola about the
[4556]presidential ynterest in the matter First, was there a
[4557]presidential gnterest in the matter? You have no reason to
[4558]doubt that there Was, I take le.
[4560]Mr. Bundy- rT am sorry, I was reading a note, and fT
[4561]didn't hear the last part of the question.
[4563]Mr. sohwarZ+ 1 asked really two questions, the first
[4564]of which is a direct question, was there a presidential
[4565]jnterest in the matter?
[4567]Mr. phere was 4 presidential ~~ there was no
[4568]dourt in mind that when I write in 4 National security
[4569]Action Memorandum a plan as desired, that the desire is not
[4570]mine- .
[4572]Mr. schwarZ- And the desire is in fact the presidents?
[4574]Mr- pundy - Yes.
[4576]Mr. SchwarZ- Now, have you any other recollection of
[4577]calling your attention to the fall of 1969?
[4579]Mr. Bundy: could I go pack and commen
[4580]question:
[4582]You correctly i out that there was concern to
[4584]keep the president’ name out of this process of request,
[4586]TOP SECRET
[4591]although you’ correctly. point out ‘that the President
[4593]one who wanted to know... My impression here is that whatever
[4595]Phone (Area 202) 544-6008.
[4597]concern we have, General Taylor or I, in the frame of this
[4598]language, it was precisely to insulate the President from
[4599]any false inference that what he was asking about was
[4600]assassination. It is easy to confuse the question. What
[4601]are things going to be like after Castro, with the other
[4602]* question, and we were trying to focus attention on the
[4603]information he obviously wanted, which is, what would happen
[4604]if we did do this sort of thing, and not get one into the
[4605]frame of mind of thinking that he was considering doing it.
[4607]That is the distinction, I think.
[4609]Py
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[4619]Mr. Schwarz. Do you have any further recollection of
[4620]discussion of this matter in this fall of 1961? And by this
[4621]matter I mean either the broader inquiry into what it would
[4622]be like if Castro disappeared, or a scenario arising of the
[4624]specific subject of assassination.
[4626]Mr. Bundy. No, I don't.
[4628]Mr. Schwarz. Had you ever heard before I asked you
[4629]about the last night about a conversation, an alledged conver-
[4630]sation, between the President and the. Journalist Theodore
[4632]Schwartz, and or Mr. Goodwin in this timeframe?
[4634]Mr. Bundy? I saw that in the newspapers.
[4636]Mr. Schwarz. Or in Esquire magazine?
[4638]410 First Street, S.£., Wasnington, O.C. 20003
[4640]Mr. Bundy. Wherever I saw it, I saw it in print.
[4642]TOP SECRET
[4645]Mr. Schwarz. “But you have: no. independent recollection
[4647]of that or of the fact that Mr.. Schultz met with the President?
[4649]_ Prone (Area 202) 544-6908
[4651]Mr. Bundy. No. But I will say this -- and it is-a random
[4653]observation -- if I were planning an action of great:sensitivity
[4654]I: wouldn't discuss it with any :journalist, I don't think.
[4656]Mr. Schwarz. the record from Mr. Schwartz is that the
[4657]president said he was opposed ‘to assassination, but that he
[4658]brought it up in a conversation with Mr. Schwartz, saying
[4659]that he was being encouraged to order assassination.
[4661]Now, you have said that you do recall that the subject
[4662]was talked about, your words, at some point, and that it
[4663]might have been in the fall of 1961.
[4665]Mr. Bundy. I wouldn't want to say that it was only in
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[4677]any given period.
[4678]Mr. Schwarz. But that one of the points in which it
[4679]might have been discussed was the fall of 1961.
[4681]Mr. Bundy. Certainly.
[4683]Mr. Schwarz. We are going to come to another period
[4684]which relates to you.
[4686]Mr. Bundy. May I interrupt one second.
[4688]could we go off the record for a moment?
[4690]The Chairman. Yes.
[4692](Discussion off the record.)
[4694]The Chairman. Let's put that on the record.
[4696]410 First Street. $.E., Washington, D.C. 20003
[4698]Would you restate what I have just stated?
[4700]TOP SECRET
[4703]Mr. Bundy...
[4704]have a message through ‘the courtesy of. the “committee from the
[4705]White House that there is no objection to answering the
[4706]question as to how the White House came to show me the NSC file
[4707]When I learned of some of the’ interests of the pockefeller
[4708]Commission, it seemed to me that it would be useful if I
[4709]could refresh my recollection. I telephoned pr. Kissinger,
[4710]who-it seemed to. me would be the right person both in his
[4711]capacity as Special Assistant and. the capacity as Secretary
[4712]of State, and he called me back to say that General Scocroft
[4713]would show me the documents I needed, and he did not.
[4715]Mr. Smothers. Just one question.
[4717]This file contained what, now, other than the NSAM?
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[4729]Mr. Bundy. The only file that I had time to go through
[4730]that I can recollect was the NSAM file, which is a relatively
[4731]short one.
[4733]Mr. Smothers. For which time period?
[4735]Mr. Bundy. For the period surrounding August 1962.
[4736]Mr. Smothers. It was given to us as an existing file,
[4737]or matters that had heen pulled, or organized --
[4738]i
[4739]Mr. Bundy. No, they gave’ me the whole file, they were
[4740]all documents that f have been involved with, it wag nothing
[4742]new to me. But the ones I was looking for were the ones
[4744]relating to this subject.
[4746]410 First Street, 5.£., Washington, D.C. 20003
[4748]Mr. Smothers. Were these only your documents?
[4750]TOP. SECRET
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[4767]an documents
[4768]gigned by you? _
[4770]Mr. Bundy. They voulan't be, all signed by me, not
[4771]every NSMA was signed by me. But they. would ‘All be documents
[4772]for which I had responsibility.
[4774]Mr. Smothers. And the timeframe was --
[4776]Mr. Bundy. Sufficiently before and after to give me a
[4778]picture of the political context of August 1962 in relation
[4780]to Cuba.
[4782]Mr. Smothers. And do you recall when you saw this file?
[4783]Mr. Bundy. Well, as I say, it was in’ the context of my
[4784]appearance before the Rockeferrer Commission. And that would
[4786]pe early this year. I don't have the dates, and I don’t
[4788]want to make a mistake on it.
[4790]Mr. Smothers. I am not trying to pin the @ate down.
[4791]would be helpful if you remember. But we can ask.
[4793]Mr. Schwarz.
[4795]Mr. Schwarz. I want to make sure that we have what we
[4797]have done so for accurately summarized, and that you agree
[4799]Can I use discussion of an assassination, will you
[4801]accept that?
[4803]Mr. Bundy. It implies more seriousness and more
[4805]sustained argument than I recollect.
[4808]Phone {Area 202) 544-6000:
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[4822]Mr.
[4824]Schwarz. So your records are, with respect to
[4826]persons asking about---~
[4828]Mr.
[4830]Mr.
[4832]Bundy. OF talking about.
[4833]; r
[4835]Schwarz. 77" OF talking about assassination, that
[4837]dia occur, that it probably occurred on more than one occasion?
[4839]Mr.
[4841]Mr.
[4843]Bundy. Yes.
[4845]Schwarz. And that one of the occasions may have
[4847]been in the fall of 1961?
[4849]Mr.
[4851]Bundy. What I recoliect about the fall of 1961 is
[4853]this question, what would happen if he is not there?
[4855]Mr.
[4857]Schwarz. Which would be a relevant question to ask
[4859]if one was talking about assassination.
[4861]Mr.
[4863]of talks
[4865]Bundy. Yes. But I have no independent recollection
[4867]about assassination, Mr. Schwarz, and I musn't lead
[4869]you by saying that I aid.
[4871]Mr.
[4873]Schwarz. In any event, passing from talking about or
[4875]discussions oF. contingencies, to authorizations for action,
[4877]and specifically focusing on this concrete period, was
[4879]assassination authorized in the fall of 1961?
[4881]Mr.
[4883]Mr.
[4885]Bundy. absolutely not.
[4887]Schwarz. In fact what was authorized in the fall of
[4889]Bundy. Well, we have a long document
[4891]Schwarz. And that is the MONGOOSE program?
[4893]TOP SECRET
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[4910]Mr. pundy. “an nat the MONGOOSE ‘programs.
[4912]Mr. Schwarz. in connection with the MONGOOSE. program,
[4913]you had some. dialogue about, the Attorney General which was
[4914]quite extensive. Let me ask you one additional question on
[4915]that subject. What was the relationship personally and pro-
[4916]fessionally between the Attorney General and General Maxwell
[4917]Taylor?
[4919]Mr. Bundy. It was very close. f think that they first
[4921]et ina hardworking sense when they were ~~ 1 think they
[4922]were both members of the committee to look into what happened
[4923]after the Bay of Pigs, or if the Attorney General was not
[4924]a member he was certainly elosely interested.
[4925]Mr. Schwarz. He was a member.
[4927]Mr. Bundy. And I am sure the Attorney General was
[4929]one of the people strongly favoring the appointment of General !
[4931]taylor as the president’s military advisor. They were both
[4933]active and ardent tennis piayers, they liked each other, and
[4935](
[4936]they visited back and forth. One ef the Kennedy children
[4938]jis named for General taylor, T think. There was 4 relation of:
[4940]real trust and confidence between them. and the measure of
[4941]its strength is that { think it easily survived later very
[4942]shart differences over Vietnam.
[4944]Mr. Schwarz. Now recognizing that, what I am asking for
[4945]you is a matter of opinion and not a fact, given your under
[4947]standing. of that relationship. will you give us your opinion
[4949]TOP SECRET
[4952]prone (Ares 202) $44-6000
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[4964]the likelihood that Rober ‘dn the face.
[4966]gaylor's chairmanship tthe 'speckal Group Augmented = was
[4967]Maxwell Taylor understood to be the chairman of the special
[4968]Group Augmented?
[4970]Mr. Bundy. -It certainly is my understanding.
[4972]Mr. Schwarz. Would Robert Kennedy in your opinion,
[4973]in the fact of Maxwell Taylor's chairmanship of the special
[4974]Group Augmented, nave developed 4 pach-channél relationship
[4975]with someone else for the purpose of assassinating Fidel
[4976]Castro?
[4978]Mr. Bundy. No.
[4980]Mr. Schwarz. Now, in connection with MONGOOSE, you were
[4981]a member of the special Group Augmented, were you?
[4983]Mr. Bundy. if was- y wasnit its most faithful attender,
[4984]put I was a member «
[4986]Mr. Schwarad. To the extent that you aid:attend, would
[4987]you describe the nature of the meetings, what ind of items
[4988]were brought before your what was the process for decision
[4989]making?
[4991]Mr. Bundy. Tt is very aifficult to do that without
[4992]documentary reconstruction. But in the broadest sense, T
[4993]think I can do it. The kinds of things would be Cuban exiles,
[4994]training them, how united are they, whose the leader, and
[4995]what kind of operations against the island are we able to
[4997]mount, specific proposals, just because I have seen it in
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[5014]_frequent problem. I don't recall that we worried so much
[5016]the last two or three days ~~ I saw. ‘sabotage. program which
[5017]involved, I think, oil facilities, transportation facilities,
[5019]and a couple of other categories ~~ exfiltration was a
[5021]about getting the agents in, but theré seems always to be
[5022]a great problem about getting them out. . Ana that sort of
[5023]thing that I mentioned, propaganda, there was the one island
[5024]enterprise -- was Florida doing much good, and how much
[5025]does it cost and things of that sort.
[5027]Mr. Schwarz. At any MONGOOSE meeting did Mr. Harvey
[5028]state that he had taken steps to assassinate Fidel Castro?
[5030]Mr. Bundy. I never heard anything from Mr. Harvey in
[5032]context in any meeting at any time on that subject.
[5034]Mr. Schwarz. And it-was clear that the President was
[5036]person basically in control, perhaps not of the details,
[5038]of the general program; is that right?
[5040]Mr. Bundy. The President had worked it. The day to
[5042]day operations where in the hands of different departments
[5043]for different categories of programs. The coordinator was
[5044]General Lansdale, and the Chairman of the Committee was General
[5045]Taylor.
[5046]Mr. Schwarz. Would you ‘turn to Lansdale Tab 38, please?
[5047]Where is the August 8 document that transmits the new
[5049]guidelines for MONGOOSE?
[5051]ur. Kelley. that ig Lansdale Tab 20.
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[5068]‘activities under the MONGOOSE? |
[5070]guidelines.
[5071]Mr.. Kelley. 38.
[5072]Mr. Schwarz. 38A.
[5074]Was there a change in or about August between what was:
[5076]characterized as Phase I of Operation MONGOOSE and a step-up
[5078]Mr. Bundy. It appeared to be 50 fom the documents I have
[5079]been reviewing. I couldn't give you an independent recollectic
[5080]on that point.
[5082]Mr. Schwarz. You have got no reason to doubt that there
[5083]was some step-up commencing in August?
[5085]Mr. Bundy. I think that sounds reasonable. I just
[5086]don't have any expertise other than as a reader many years
[5087]later.
[5089]Mr. Schwarz. Now, with respect to the August 10 meeting,
[5091]NM
[5092]you have previously testified - - I am not sure you have -~
[5094]do you recall the ‘subject of assassinations being brought up?
[5096]Mr. Bundy. In the August 10 meeting? No.
[5098]Mr. Schwarz. Specifically, do you recall Mr. McNamara
[5099]ever bringing the subject of assassinations up?
[5101]Mr. Bundy. No. \
[5102]Mr. Schwarz. We have shown you notes of Mr. Harvey on
[5104]August 14, and General Lansdale's memorandum of August 13
[5106]that refers to the liquidation of leaders and certain things
[5108]TOP SECRET
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[5123]we
[5125]whited out. Do you. rem seeing those?
[5127]Mr. Bundy. Yes.
[5129]Mr. Schwarz. Do they refresh your recollection?
[5131]Mr. Bundy. No. They give me no -= they do not persuade
[5132]me. simply don't from that suddenly have any flash, so and
[5133]so gaid that, not at all. :
[5135]Mr. Schwarz. But you don't have any reason to question
[5136]them, you just don't have a recollection, is that fair?
[5138]Mr. Bundy. I simply tell you that I was in a large
[5139]meeting in which a great many subjects were discussed, and
[5140]I have no recollection of that.
[5142]Mr. Schwarz. I will pass around Mr. Bundy's notes from
[5143]the meeting. If someone thinks they should be marked we can
[5144]do that. |
[5146]Mr. Bundy. If the Committee is feeling charitable I hope |
[5147]they may not go into them.
[5149]Mr. Schwarz. ;I don't think they will, but I thought we
[5150]would pass them around in case they were.
[5152]The Chairman. Let the Senators see them.
[5154]Mr. Schwarz. We will make one observation, though. Both |
[5155]Mr. Rusk's calendar and Mr. Bundy's notes do not indicate
[5156]Mr. Lansdale's being present at the meeting, although the
[5157]minutes of the meeting do. And I take it you have no
[5159]independent. recollection of whether or not: he was not there.
[5161]Mr. Bundy. I have no objection to entering anything in
[5163]TOP SECRET
[5166]anything that m
[5168]544-6000
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[5172]oy 2
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[5175]relevant. it simply illustrates what the hand will do
[5177]while the mind is elsewhere...
[5179]Prone (Area 202)
[5181]The Chairman. can you identify what you meant by the
[5183]words, "Worms who were opposing"... ”
[5185]Mr. Bundy. "worms" was a Cuban word, gusanos, and it
[5186]was their own word for themselves, Cubans in opposition to
[5187]Castor.
[5189](Discussion off the record.)
[5191]Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Bundy, would you mark with a B your
[5193]notes of the August 10 meeting.
[5195]And Mr. Reporter, will you mark that as Bundy Exhibit 4.
[5197]d
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[5231]“'gokng ack to thé. doodle sheet, the
[5232]item in your handwritten underlined -- do you have this?
[5234]Mr. Bundy. The Lansdale concept?
[5236]The Chairman. Is that concept?
[5238]Mr. Bundy. Concept. 1 don't wonder you ask.
[5240]The Chairman. Do you recall what you meant by that?
[5242]Mr. Bundy. My guess -~ and this is a reconstruction
[5243]really -- is that that has to do with the Lansdale plan which
[5244]we were referring to a minute ago, his long memorandum of
[5245]August 8, outlining all the things that might now be done
[5246]under the MONGOOSE.
[5248]Mr. Smothers. Would that have been planned plus?
[5250]Mr. Bundy. We argue about plans -- this is-again
[5251]reconstruction -- and I think I saw it in some discussion --
[5252]we argued about plans A and B and C, and settled on so-called
[5253]B Plus, which I hope you have: for the record, because that
[5254]would show what the decision was.
[5256]Mr. Schwarz. We do have it.
[5258]The Chairman. This was the 10th day of August 1962. And
[5259]that was about the time that some concern was given to be
[5260]expressed as to the possibility that the Russians were moving
[5261]into Cuba -- moving missiles into Cuba. You have on the
[5262]memorandum, I think, "USSR will put missiles". Do you recall
[5264]what you meant by that?
[5266]Mr. Bundy. I think.what that is, a hand following
[5268]TOP SECRET
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[5283]ne:
[5284]he Chairman.
[5285]Where are we, Mr. Schwarz.
[5287]please mark
[5288]{t-at Lansdale Tab 41.
[5289](Document referred to was marked
[5290].as Lansdale Exhibit No. 5 for
[5292]identification.)
[5294]TOP SECRET
[5297]Prone (Area 2062)
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[5303]Mr. Schwarz.” Do you’ have
[5307]Mr. Bundy. Yes, I have.
[5309]Mr. Schwarz. This reflects a number of options or
[5310]study that the president called for in the light of the
[5311]evidence of new block ‘activities in cuba. Was that evidence
[5312]connected with the missiles? .
[5314]“Mr. Bundy. Weil, there was quite a buildup reported
[5315]in the press and in the intelligence initially of Soviet
[5316]military personnel, of Soviet surface-to-air missiles. And
[5317]the crucial question was, what for and what is coming. And
[5318]the Director of Central Intelligence ~~ who was proved in
[5319]the end to be right -.~ was almost alone in his belief that
[5320]this was going to lead to a nuclear capability in Cuba that
[5321]could hit the U.S. And he raised these questions in the
[5322]month of August in a number of different ways. And the
[5323]National Security meeting from which this memorandum emerged
[5325]reviewed those problems, and as the memorandum itself shows,
[5327]the heavy emphasis of the President's concern and of the
[5328]Group's concern on the Likelihood that developed and what
[5329]should be done about it, or in preparation for it, in August.
[5330]Mr. Schwarz. The memorandum has quite a range of matters
[5331]to be considered. And they range from, if I can use the
[5332]characterization, on the soft side, Item 1, which was consider-
[5334]ation of the U.S.: pulling its'missiles near the Soviet Union out
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[5345]of Turkey, two, on th hard side,
[5347]possibilities in connection with Cuba. “Now, is that a
[5349]typical exercise that that White Hous
[5350]yourself would go through to Look at
[5351]ranging from the soft to the very tou
[5352]Mr. Bundy. Yes-
[5353]Let me say in passing that there
[5354]the problem ef getting the Jupiter mi
[5355]Mr. Schwarz. Conciliatory, woul
[5357]Mr. Bundy. It problem of actual
[5359]are military possibilities of invasio
[5361]n or some other military
[5362]@, the President and
[5363]a number of options. --
[5367]was nothing soft about
[5368]ssiles out of cuba.
[5369]d that be the word?
[5371]ly getting them out
[5373]which we came to in the following year was one which
[5375]demanded great diplomatic energy and
[5377]a
[5379]the State and Defense pepartments- B
[5381]wide range of issues charactically wo
[5383]finesse on the part of
[5384]ut you are right. A
[5386]uld be discussed. And
[5388]the President had a habit ef trying to look at problems from
[5390]many angles.
[5392]Mr. Schwarz. Were you fully in
[5393]in connection with what became the mi
[5395]Mr. Bundy. Yes-
[5397]Mr. Schwarz. Was there any disc
[5398]Fidel Castro uring that period?
[5400]Mr. Bundy. None.
[5402]touch with the president
[5404]ssile crisis.
[5406]ussion of assassinating
[5408]Mr. Schwarz. vias there agreement reached that as part
[5410]of the solution to the missile crisis that related to U.S.
[5412]TOP SECRET
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[5421]action vis-a-vis. Cuba
[5423]pledge. There was an undertaking on our side that if the
[5425]offensive capabilities --.and there was an argument on what
[5426]those were -~ were removed; we on our side would undertake -~-
[5428]1 don't want to present this language as if itis deeply
[5430]mathmatically precise -- but there was an undertaking on our
[5431]side that there would not be an assassination of Cuba.
[5433].The Chairman. Was that ever published?
[5435]Mr. Bundy. Yes. If my language is inconsistent with
[5436]what was published, then what was published should take
[5437]precedence, because I am’ only trying to report that.
[5439]Mr. Schwarz. Did this agreement exclude the sabotage
[5440]of Cuban facilities?
[5442]Mr. Bundy. Not in my view or in anyones’ view in the
[5443]U.S. Government. Just to give you an example of things it
[5444]did not exclude, it did not exclude continued surveillance,
[5445]which is not perfectly normal in relations between friéndly
[5446]states, that you overfly and check out what they are doing.
[5447]But surveillance was an explicit and public part of the
[5448]necessary concern for U.S. satisfaction with the resolution
[5449]of the Cuban missile crisis.
[5451]Mr. Schwarz. Recognizing again that this is calling for
[5452]an opinion, during the course of the missile crisis did
[5453]; anything happen with respect to the attitudes and actions of
[5455]either the President or the Attorney General that in your
[5457]_ TOP SECRET
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[5462]eo. like
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[5479]“ME os
[5481]enter into my judgment
[5483]Attorney General would: ever have ‘dons that, and I
[5485]to say, Mr. Chairman, that the most important point I want to
[5487]maka, just from where I stand personalty is that i find the
[5489]notion that they separately, privately encouraged, ordered,
[5491]arranged efforts at assassination totally inconsistent with
[5493]what I knew of both of them. And as an example, I would cite
[5495]Gensral in the Missile Crisis, because it was he who, most
[5497]emphatically, argued against a so-called surgical air strike
[5499]of the more careful approach which was aventually adopted by
[5500]the. President in the form of a quarrantine or a blockade.
[5502]The Chairman. Well, Mr. Bundy, let me put what may be
[5503]the same question a little differant way.
[5505]You came to know both the President and the Attorney
[5507]General rather intimately in the period of your long associa-
[5508]tion with them, did you not? ;
[5509]Mr. Bundy. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
[5510]The Chairman. Based upon that acquaintanceship, do you
[5511]believe, under any of the circumstances that occurred during
[5512]that whole period, either one of them would have authorized
[5514]the assassination of Fidel Castro? ~
[5516]Mr. Bundy. I most emphatically do not.
[5518]TOP SECRET
[5520]or any other action that would bring death upon many, in favor
[5522]and only one among very Many ~~ the role played by the Attorney
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[5529]Lat me make a “more general point that: domes: ate tee
[5533]another way.
[5535]If you have heard testimony that there was pressure to do
[5537]something about Cuba, there was. There was an effort, both from
[5539]the President in his style and from the Attorney General in his
[5541]style to keep the government active in looking for ways to
[5543]weaken the Cuban regime. There was. But if.you, as T under~
[5545]stand it, and not éven thosa who pressed the matter most closely
[5547]as having essentially been inspired by the White House can tell
[5549]you that anyone aver said to them, go and kill anyone.
[5551]Lat me say one other thing about thase two men, and that ia
[5553]that there was somathing that they really wanted dona, they did:
[5555]not leave people in doubt, so that on the one hand, I' would
[5557]say about their character, their purposes and thair nature and
[5558]the way they confronted international affairs that I find it
[5559]incredible that they would have ordered or authorized explicitl
[5560]or implicitly an assassination of Castro. I also feel that if
[5561]contrary to averything that I know about their character, thev
[5562]had had such a decision and such a purpose, people would not
[5563]have been in any doubt about it.
[5565]The Chairman. Then have you any way to explain to the
[5566]Committee, OF any explanation to giva to the Committee, as *%o
[5567]why Mr. Helms would testify that he was under, or that he had
[5568]no doubts, that the Agency was fully authorized to proceed to
[5570]not only dayelop schemes, but to engag? in active attempts to
[5572]TOP SECRET
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[5581]1
[5582]i
[5585]Phone (Area 202) $44-6000
[5587]WARD & PAUL
[5589]410 First Street, 5.E., Washington, B.C. 20003
[5591]assassinate castro?
[5593]Mr. Bundy. I have no explanation of that.
[5595]Senator Mondale. ‘part of our attempt to solve this riddle
[5596]of what would appear to be a record at the highast level, which
[5597]is at least not directly an order of an assassination plot or
[5598]attempt, and square it with the fact ‘that attempts were made,
[5599]to seek to understand the personalities and motivations and
[5600]methods of operation of people further down the chain of
[5601]command.
[5603]We have heard quite a few evaluations 168. Mr. Harvey as
[5604]a free-wheeling, James Bond kind of operator, and it has been
[5605]suggested through some disquiet and apprehension at higher
[5606]Yevels about the nature of his conduct. And I would -- I don't
[5607]know. I am beginning to have doubts about Mr. Helms whom I
[5609]have always admired. There is, for example, a memorandum that
[5611]is in the record’ to Mr. Rusk in response to a memo which the
[5613]|
[5614]1
[5615]Secretary wrote Mr. Helms following an article appearing in
[5617]some Cuban newspaper charging that the Mafia had been hired and
[5618]i
[5620]used by the CIA to assassinate Castro, in which Helms specifi-
[5621]cally and categorically denies flat out that any such relation-
[5622]ship existed when in fact it did and when in fact Mr. Halms was |
[5623]part of it.
[5625]Now, how do we sort this out? Is Mr. Helms someone who
[5627]might have, on his own, gone beyond the authority conferred
[5629]upon him by persons higher up?
[5631]TOP SECRET
[5634]WARD & PAUL
[5636]410 First Street, S.£., Washington, D.C. 20003
[5638]testimony that Mr. Helma and Mr. Harvey met and agreed ~not to
[5640]By i ;
[5641]“Lf -you, had asked me that question a
[5643]year ago, Senator, I would have said in my experience iwith him
[5644]he was not such an officer, but I- have no way of dealing with
[5645]the kind of thing you have just dascribed.
[5647]Senator Mondale. It shatters me bacause I have always
[5648]respected him. Because we know that these assassination attempts
[5650]occurred. We know that Mr. Helms was a part of it. We have
[5652]tell Mr. McCone what they were doing. And then wae have 4
[5653]document here ~~ well, that was Cubella -- and then we have a
[5654]mamo from Helms to Rusk which, in Minnesota: language looks
[5655]like a lie. Now, I just don't know. Maybs there are other
[5656]explanations. ~
[5658]The Chairman. The memo to Rusk had to do with Cubella
[5659]Yvather than the Mafia. .
[5661]Sanator Mondale. Is that it? It was not the Mafia?
[5663]Mr. Schwarz. It was Cubella, except if you just substitutd
[5665]Cubella for the word Mafia.
[5667]The Chairmah. What you said otherwise is correct.
[5669]Sanator Mondale. But ha was involved personally with
[5670]Cubella, wasn't he? And he knew that, and this memo said no.
[5672]Is there a plausible explanation?
[5674]Mr. Madigan. elms has one.
[5676]Senator Baker. Helms' position is that he did not lie,
[5678]he did not have anything to do with the Cubella incident,
[5680]TOP SECRET
[5685]Prone (Ares 2021 §
[5687]WARD & PAUL
[5689]5.E., Washington, D.C. 20003
[5691]410 First Street,
[5693]es
[5694]i
[5698]s that right?
[5699]Mr. Madigan. r think Realms claimed thet Cubella ts in
[5700]the strict context of the memos, operating on his own.
[5702]The Chairman. well, I “pelieve rather than speculate, we
[5703]had better look back carefully, and that cought, to ba another
[5704]subject for Mr. Helms when he returns:
[5706]Senator Mondale. Well, then I wilt ‘stand correctad.
[5708]senator Hart of Michigan. Would you yield?
[5710]T want to make the same record note that I suspend the
[5711]comment f made about that document yesterday. I thought it was
[5712]a flat-out lie.
[5714]Senator Mondale. I did too. 1 withdraw that, and 1 think
[5715]it would be good if the staff would write ug a little memo.
[5717]Senator Baker. Fritz might like to know that yesterday I
[5718]asked Counsel if they, a3 4 combined staff operation, would
[5719]prepare for us, and I believe they agreed to do this, prepare
[5720]for us two briefs, one citing the tastimony and the exhibit
[5721]evidence, that would. support an infefence that the authority
[5722]was Presidential: and another prie€, eiting the record and the
[5723]exhibit evidence citing the inference that it was not. There
[5724]is an abundance of both, to be frank with you. So that we
[5725]ean lay them down side by side and make our own separate
[5726]judgment.
[5728]bo I understand the staff is going to do it?
[5730]Tha Chairman. That is right.
[5732]TOP SECRET
[5735]WARD & PAUL
[5737]410 First Street, S.E., Wasnington, D.C. 20003
[5739]w
[5740]sO
[5742]be givan 4: break, Mre Bundy:
[5743]Mr. Bundy. Do you ‘vant ne to: cone. back, Mr. Chairman?
[5744]The Chairman. - Yess pleaser: if you want to take a break
[5745]for about five or ten minutes |
[5746]anteroom, that will give us a chance to take care of this
[5747]business.
[5748](Pause)
[5750](Whereupon at 11: 17 a.m. the witness left the hearing
[5752]room. )
[5754]TOP SECRET
[5757]Phone (Araa 202)
[5759]WARD & PAUL
[5761]ALO First Street, 5-E., Washington, O.C. 20003
[5763]adeveloping problem for
[5765]reasons unexplained with, ha Justice Department. I have
[5766]already mentioned one aspect of that problem, in connection with
[5767]the failure of the Department to supply most of the material
[5768]that we have requested, though that request wag put to the
[5769]pepartment two months ago, and it has-been -decided already by
[5770]the Committea that Mr. Levy and Mr. Kalley should be brought
[5771]before the Committee in the hopes that these delays can be
[5772]overcome.
[5774]The first question before the Committee is when that can
[5775]be done. It is suggested that the Attornay Ganeral has Tuesday |
[5776]morning available. If it is all right with the Committee, I
[5777]would like to schedule his appearance, together with that of
[5778]Mr. Kelley, for Tuesday morning.
[5780]Senator Baker. vr. Chairman, I don't mean to intrude my
[5782]parsonal conveniance into this consideration unduly, but if
[5784]the Attorney General could do it at Tuesday noon, Say, it would
[5786]halp me. I have a commitment in Tennessee Monday night. Tf
[5788]I catch the Tuesday morning plane I can’t get hera until 11:5
[5790]If that's not possible, I will cancel Monday-
[5792]Tha Chairman. This is procedural in charactar, s0
[5793]not altogether important that every member be present. I think |
[5794]that from the standpoint of this Committee schedule, Tuesday
[5795]morning, the Attorney General and Nr. Kelley would bs good,
[5797]would it not?
[5799]TOP SECRET
[5802]WARD & FAUL
[5804]410 First Street, S.E.. Wasnington, D.C. 20003
[5806]Mr. Miller. Yes,
[5808]Senator Baker. Well; why don't you leave it Tuesday
[5809]morning. ‘
[5811]The Chairman.. We are only informed that he \:has Tuesday
[5812]morning available. se . .
[5814]Mr. Gitenstein..— I ‘epdke to poug Marvin, one of his
[5815]Executive Assistants, and he said Tuesday was a possibility,
[5816]Wednesday is a problem because he has a Cabinet meeting and
[5817]he wasn't sure about Tuesday and he was going to get back to
[5818]us in tha next hour or two.
[5820]Tha Chairman. Well, let's seas if we can't sat it up
[5822]Tuesday.
[5824]Senator Baker. If, you can sat it up Tuesday afternoon and
[5826]nobody objects, that would ba batter for me.
[5828]‘The Chairman. Well, if wa can, we'll set it up Tuesday
[5829]afternoon. .
[5831]Senator Mathias. What is that for?
[5833]The Chairman. That is for Levy and Kelley to appear for
[5834]the purpose of telling us why they can't, or why it has taken
[5835]two months and we. still are waiting for the documents, most
[5836]of the documents we requested.
[5838]Senator Mathias. Well, I won't be here, but that's no
[5840]reason.
[5842]Senator Baker. Ara you going to be here Tuesday
[5844]morning?
[5846]TOP SECRET
[5849]Phone (Aras 202) 544-6000
[5851]WARD & PAUL
[5853]410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C..20003
[5855]i
[5857]Senator Mathias. Don't worry aboutiit. —
[5859]The Chairman. All right.
[5861]fhe second thing I would lika to bring up in this connec
[5862]tion:.is that I was informed yesterday by the staff that the
[5863]FBI has undoubtedly received instructions that none of its
[5864]agents are to be interrogated or interviewad by the staff of”
[5865]this Committee. I would like someone who knows the details and
[5866]can ba very specific to tell the Committea the exact status of
[5867]that situation, how we have!.been informed and if we can rely on
[5868]that information as being authoritative..
[5870]Mr, ElLif£. Yesterday morning at 9:00 o'clock or shortly
[5871]thereafter, I received a phone call from the. FSI's liaison with
[5872]this Committee with respect to a series of interviews that had
[5874]been arranged with the Bureau some relating to tha Huston Plan,
[5876]some relating to Martin Luther King matters. I was informed that
[5877]|
[5878]I had te address this request to the Justice Department in order
[5880]to secure approval for these staff interviews.
[5882]I than called our liaison in the Justice Department,
[5883]Special Counsel William O'Conner, and he told me I might as
[5884]well submit these requests in writing, because the Justice
[5885]Department would take at least ten days to give us an answer
[5886]on these requests and he didn't know what the answer was going
[5887]to be.
[5889]I then explored with him what some, of the reasons might he
[5891]for this delay and what the problems seemed to be, and the’
[5893]TOP SECRET
[5896]WARD & PAUL
[5898]@1O First Street, 5.€., Wasnington, o.c. 20063
[5900]‘the Committee had notified the Department in its letter of
[5902]approve or not {involved two issues. First was that since we
[5904]explanation ‘chat he gave me
[5906]june 27th that certain cases that we were investigating were .
[5907]abuse cases meant that any interviews that would be conducted
[5909]in connection with those matters would be considered by the
[5911]Department to be demand interviews, and therefore this “b prought
[5912]into play the provisions of the Federal Ragulations which
[5913]require the Attorney General's ‘approval. ,
[5915]1
[5917]Then the question as to whether the Attorney General would
[5918]had indicated the likelihood of an abuse in a particular area
[5919]that the Department itself would have to considsr whathar it
[5920]should institute 4 eriminal investigation of that matter, and
[5921]then, if so, whether our interview would interfere with that
[5923]ongoing criminal investigation.
[5925]And second, that the Department considered that any inter-
[5927]views undertaken by the Committee in such cases might inadver-
[5929]tently immunize the subject of the interview, and he referred
[5931]generally to some cases ard we have attempted to do legal
[5933]research on those cases and find this to bea a very shaky position
[5935]but they have good lawyers over chere and if they want to come
[5937]up with a sophisticated argument, We axpect that they could be
[5939]able to do that. :
[5940]The Chairman. Lawyers can make an argument over anything.
[5942]Mr. WLELEE « phat's so. And so the final conclusion is
[5945]Phone (Area 202} $44-6000°
[5947]WARD & PAUL
[5949]410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003
[5951]_investitation. So this is where wea stand on this issue.
[5953]that he did anticipate that ‘subpoenas:would:-be trequired.:}.
[5955]in every inatance and this position is very difficult for us to
[5956]accept because interviews, the low-key interview in the non-
[5957]pressure situation is an opportunity to elicit information that
[5958]is not matched by the formal subpoena situation, and to be
[5960]able to proceed initially by interview and then confirm, under
[5962]oath, via subpoena, is just absolutely essential for an effectiv
[5964]We later receivad a letter pertaining to an earlier
[5965]request for interviews relating to PBI COINTELPRO disruptive
[5967]activities where we had asked for certain interviews, and this
[5969]letter did not go into specifics, but merely stated that there
[5970]were problems that would have to be resolved, that the charac-
[5972]terization of an area of the Committea inquiry as abuse might
[5974]significantly alter arrangements of access to witnesses who
[5976]are present employess of the Dapartment.
[5978]The Chairman. In other words, the thrust of all of this
[5980]is that the more serious the nature of the inquiry, the more
[5981]difficult it will be to obtain the information, that if we are
[5983]concerned about a possible illegality or abuse, then the
[5985]Department will make it as difficult as possible for us to
[5987]secure tha information.
[5989]Mr. glliff.. I might add that it seems *- he in the naturd
[5991]of the documents also, the more serious the allegation,’ the more
[5993]resistance there is to providing us --
[5995]TOP SECRET
[5997]|
[5998]|
[5999]|
[6002]i
[6004]AeThepoye.
[6006]have not given us the documents on the controversial matters.
[6008]Prone (Ares 202) $44-6008°
[6010]They've given us plenty of documentation on less controversial
[6011]matters.
[6013]The Chairman. I think it is fronic, that the resistance we
[6014]from the Justice Department is so much more substantial than
[6015]ragistance we have gotten from the CIA.
[6017]Senator Baker. That's not necessarily so. I agree with
[6019]you the resistance is unfortunate and‘ inappropriate, but I
[6020]can think of a request for documentation from the CIA that is
[6021]now more than a month old and they haven't had the good grace
[6022]to tell us no. They have told as nothing.
[6024]The Chairman. But on the whole wa've gotten a greater
[6026]WARD &@ PAUL .
[6028]measure of cooperation from the CIA.
[6029]Senator Schweiker. I wonder, dows either counsel know,
[6030]Mr. Chairman, whether thé Attorney General or the FBI Director
[6032]initially confirmed whether they made any commitments to
[6034]Congress about supplying documents or materials to the
[6036]Committee?
[6038]Mr. Miller. Sanator Mathias can tell you, and Senator
[6040]Hart.
[6042]Senator Schweiker. Might there be a statement in their
[6043]testimony in confirmation, in agreeing to furnish Congress with!
[6045]materials of this nature?
[6047]410 First Street, $.E., Washington, B.C. 20003
[6049]Senator Mathias. Yes, those statements ware made, but let
[6051]TOP SECRET
[6054]i:
[6055]i
[6056]f
[6057]H
[6061]WARD & FAUL
[6063]410 First Street, S.E., Wasnington, D.C. 20003
[6065]discouraging: talk with the ‘ttorney General a couple of weeks
[6066]ago. I want down to: talk te ‘him about privacy legislation and
[6067]the Department of Justied at ‘the momant is taking about as hard
[6068]a line as any kind- ‘that I ‘know of in the last fifteen years.
[6069]Its whole kind of attitude
[6071]Senator Tower.. I just wonder if wa shouldn't take this
[6072]with them.
[6074]The Chairman. I think we should, but I think we should
[6075]also, in advance of that, in view of the kinds of signals we
[6076]are now getting from the Justice Department, indicate that we
[6077]believa that these objections that they are raising, or question
[6078]that they are raising, are a serious impediment procedurally
[6079]to our Committee and that we have every intention of interviewing
[6080]such agents as may be necessary, and that if necessary, wa will
[6081]subpoena them. ,
[6083]Mr. ELIIf££. Our feeling. is it is preferable not to
[6084]proceed by subpoena, but we do have a subpoena for one FBI
[6085]agent which we brought with us today which we would like to
[6086]proceed with.
[6088]1
[6090]The Chairman. Can you give us the facts of that case?
[6091].Mr. Epstein. This is an agent who is presently in’ Atlanta
[6093]H
[6094]Gaorgia, and the information wa've received from other witnesses
[6095]. 7
[6097]was that-in 1964, I: believe, he visited a newspaper editor in-
[6099]Atlanta, closed the door, put his hat on the desk, and said he
[6101]TOP SECRET
[6104]Prone {Area 202) 544-6000
[6106]WARD & PAUL
[6108]410 First Street, $.E., Washington, O.C. 20003
[6110]noted .from reading The Constitution that wa ware picturin
[6112]Dr. King as a moral leader and. something of a hero and then this
[6114]agent went on to talk in great detail about Dr. King's personal
[6115]life which he claimed he had learned from a confidential source,
[6116]and our intarast in interviewing. this agent obviously relates
[6117]to the circumstances surrounding that visit to a newspapernan,
[6118]who directed him to ado that, what the purpose of that visit
[6119]was, Whether there was any ‘documentation --
[6121]Sanator Baker. Who was the newspaper man?
[6123]Mr. Epstein. His name was Eugene Patterson and he was
[6124]with the Atlanta constitution at that time. He's now with a
[6125]newspaper in Plordida.
[6127]The Chairman. Do you believe the subpoena now to be
[6128]necessary because of what you have been’ told by the Justice
[6129]Department?
[6131]My. ELLiff. We have other agents which we would like to
[6133]proceed with at the interview level, so wa would like to proceed
[6135]at both levels to get their reaction te both types of requests. |
[6136]What is their reaction to a subpoena going to be, what is
[6137]their reaction to a renewed request to interview going to be?
[6139]So we crystallize each issue.
[6141]Senator Tower. I still think it might be good for us to
[6143]hold that up until we talk about it, gince they ara coming in
[6145]Tuesday morning or Tuesday sometime, it's not going to push
[6147]‘things too far.
[6149]TOP SECRET
[6152]Phone {Area 202) $84-6)
[6154]PAUL
[6156]WARD &
[6158]470 First Street, S.£., Washington, D.C, 20003
[6160]of it, but unless we get an extension to 1980 for this Committe
[6162]Senator Hart of Michigan. Would it be useful, at least,
[6164]if it is the feeling of the Committee to authorize you people,
[6165]or Bill, today, to say that the Committee barely suppressed its
[6166]outrage and that it won't do, and we will see you Tuesday?
[6167]Don't wait till Tuesday.
[6169]The Chairman. I think something should sabe said, actually.
[6171]Senator Hart of Michigan. Well, it prejudges' the hell out
[6173]The Chairman. I think you're right. Something neads to bd
[6174]said publicly that the Committee is determined that ws feel
[6175]that not only nas time ~~ we've already said, wa've already
[6176]made public the letter we have sent. I think a follow-up needs |
[6177]to be that we are concerned that impediments. that are now being |
[6178]suggested which would interfere with the Committee’s right to |
[6179]interrogate witnesses, we do not intend to allow the Committee's
[6180]work to. be obstructed and if necessary we will be prepared to
[6182]subpoena witnesses though we would hope that that would not
[6184]have to be the case.
[6186]Senator Baker. And we are going to try to work it out
[6187]from Tueday- ;
[6189]The Chairman. We're going to try to work it out from
[6190]‘Tuesday. .
[6192]Senator Baker. TI have a business matter.
[6194]The Chairman. So does Senator Mondale.
[6196]Senator Mondale. Just one point.
[6198]TOP SECRET
[6201]2
[6203]There is this troublesome dictum.in U.S. vs, Nixon about
[6205]might be nondiscoverable, all of which seems to bear on
[6207]Prone {Area 202) 544-6000
[6209]of foreign policy matters,
[6210]Am I correct -- I think we're going to hear a lot about
[6211]that -- but am I correct in reading that decision that it
[6213]really ‘-: almost s:atanda) wholly that they havea the duty to
[6215]produce all of the documentation and that case holds for that
[6217]proposition, so that in our CIA matters, while they might raisé
[6219]some of this dictum, the FBI has no such defense, unless wa're
[6221]really trodding on those same grounds.
[6222]Mr. Epstéin. Of course, there is another issue in the
[6224]Bureau materials, because we're on the issue of investigative
[6226]‘files, which has naver been really litigated, and that
[6228]' is thea propriety of Executive Privilege when it comes to that.
[6230]f
[6232]I might add that the importance of the issue of going
[6234]to subpoana on these really raises that, because if we go to
[6236]Cc.
[6237]a
[6239]m 3
[6242]{F
[6245]a
[6247]Cc
[6249]Cc
[6251]ac
[6255]subpoena on documents, then that is going to be worthless unlesg
[6257]we know in advance that we are going to win in court in a short
[6259]period of time, including whether we have jurisdiction to be
[6260]‘there.
[6261]Senator Mondale. In other words, you are saying they are
[6263]‘| going to raise the Executive Privilege defense, but that was
[6265]i the Nixon defense.
[6266]i ,
[6267]|
[6269]Mr. Epstein. 1 think that thev would’ love for us to be
[6271]410 Fiest Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003
[6273]| . .
[6274]| the position of having to issue a subpoana for documents,
[6276]TOP SECRET
[6281]410 First Street, $.€., Wasnington. D.C. 20003
[6283]WARD & PAUL
[6285]17 a eae
[6286]becausa them it would be a year. -
[6288]. 7 ve ft .
[6289]Mr. Schwarz, The Problem i's ‘the iErvin ‘Comittee ‘was found
[6291]not :to hava ‘jurisdiction ‘to-isgue thd:subpoena,
[6292]The Chairman. Well, we know wa'ra going to do the next
[6294]step on that.
[6296]Now, may I raise one other point --
[6298]Senator Baker. That's not quite: true: The Ervin. Committed
[6299]wasn't found to have no jurisdiction or. standing to Seek the
[6300]documents or to issue subpoenas, but they failed to carry the
[6301]burden of proving that it was required under the mandate of ,
[6302]their inquiry.
[6304]Now, I have another matter,. Frank.
[6306]The Chairman. Wa have two or three matters. Can r
[6307]recognize Senator Mondale first, because he had asked it.
[6309]Senator Mondale. A few days ago, when the White House
[6313]people were here, they showed us a document which we have in
[6315]our files which disclosed that President Nixon in 1970 had
[6319]ordered the delivery of three machine guns to some people in
[6321]Chile and had done so with instructions that that order should
[6323]go directly to some subordinate of fictals in CIA and should he
[6324]done without advising the official channels. And it is thought |
[6325]that they were directed against a General Schneider, who was
[6327]a top official in the Chilean government Opposed to a coup.
[6329]He was a Constitutionalist.
[6331]1 '
[6333]Schneider was killed, and there was a machine gun in the
[6335]. TOP SECRET
[6338]Phone (Aras 202) 54
[6340]WARD & PAUL
[6342]410 Fivst Street, $.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003
[6344]Now what I would like is,’while we finish this icycle on
[6346]assassinations, that we include among our studies of alleged
[6348]assassinations this matter.and. we request the dooumentation, of
[6350]all appropriate dociments,.-under, the: -category.of assassination.
[6352]Mr. Schwarz. Senator, when that document came to our
[6354]attention, we questioned a person who expands upon the allega-
[6355]tions contained in the documents. I wrote a letter to the
[6357]White House and ths CIA. We wanted forthwith to receive i
[6359]copies of all such documents relating to the passage of weapons.
[6361]We have had no response from the CIA.
[6365]Mr. Hills, we met with in the White llouse a week ago
[6367]Tuesday or Wadnesday, and I said wa must hava the documants and
[6368]‘ha said you cannot have them until you have the briefing on
[6369]Chile, because we refuse to accept this as an assassination
[6370]plan.
[6372]The Chairman. May I make this suggestion, Senator
[6373]Mondale?
[6375]First of all, I believe that it is absolutely imperative
[6376]that the Committee complete its investiqation on tha issue of
[6377]the assassination of foreign government leaders before the
[6378]Yacess and issue its report. That puts us under great pressure,|
[6379]but if we don't do it, I am going to ask tha Committee to stay
[6381]on the job. I would like very much to go to China, that is my
[6383]first opportunity in forty years to go to China, and I have
[6385]TOP SECRET
[6388]WARD & PAUL
[6390]410 First Street, $.€.. Washington, B.C. 20003
[6392]oe, yes : Bocas cenit Be Ee
[6393]such a trip laid on, but I am going to set it aside and ask
[6395]the Committee to continue its work right ‘into the recess until
[6396]this is done. Otherwise, wa are in a hopeless situation.
[6398]Senator Schwaiker. I think, Mr. Chairman, if we don't
[6399]finish it by then, we never will.
[6401]The Chairman. We never willi
[6403]I think we should look into this assassination, it is an
[6404]assassination. I think it's part of our vesponsibility to
[6405]look into it. But it is not an assassination, whatavear the
[6407]CIA input may have been, it is not an assassination of a head
[6408]of state, and so therefore I don't want it to, further delay
[6409]the completion of this phase of our inquiry.
[6411]Now with that in mind, I am in full accord with what
[6412]Senator Mondale says.
[6414]Senator Schweiker. Could we put it to another phase and
[6415]not in this phase?
[6417]The Chairman. Yes, we are going to have a phase on Chile,
[6418]anyway. It would fit into tha Chilean case.
[6420]' : .
[6422]Senator Mondale. I+ is significant because if we accept
[6423]their interpretation that it is not assassination, then we
[6424]avoid an understanding that we had that these documents, all
[6425]supposed to be available, then we get into ‘a discovery problem. |
[6427]In othar words, I-know what we're getting at, and I would
[6429]guess that we should proceed as rapidly as possible, but we
[6431]shouldn't hold up the cycla of -~
[6433]TOP SECRET
[6436]“ae
[6438]thera is another question
[6440]is why I’ don't want to see it
[6442]along the same lines; and that
[6444]Phone (Aras 202)
[6446]cloud this issue, and that is the Glomar Explorer, stopped by
[6447]the NLRB proceeding was shown to have stopped in Chile just
[6449]| about a week or so before Allende was killed, just by coincidence
[6450]for mechanical repairs. I would like to find out that ons,
[6451]too.
[6453]But this is a whole new thing. This puts us into the
[6454]Chile thing. Because I'm just as interasted as you are. I
[6455]don't .see that it hurts anything to put it in. a Phase II
[6456]proposition with Chile.
[6458]The Chairman. And Fritz, we can say that the Committee
[6460]WARD & PAUL
[6462]regards it in the category of assassination, but we can differ-
[6464]entiate it from the initial report, which does deal with
[6465]foreign leaders. .
[6466]Senator Hart of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, before you go to
[6467]a new subject -- and I am’ uneasy raising this -~ but your
[6468]reply reminds me, you say that we are going to conclude assassina-
[6469]| tions and issue our report before we go on recess. I think thati
[6470]disposes too readily of the problem that is going to confront
[6471]us in a vary few weeks, and that is having heard all of this,
[6473]now what do we do? I don't think we have decided yet how we
[6475]are going to present, once we open the doors, we've got to know
[6477]how we are going to handle it. I don't think we ought to lock
[6479]¢ 410 First Street, $.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003
[6481]‘ourselves in at the moment to a written report, as we leave town
[6483]TOP SECRET
[6486]Cc:
[6487]-
[6488]e
[6489]Cc.
[6490]Land
[6491]an <1
[6492]N
[6494]Phone (Area 202)
[6496]WARD & PAUL
[6498]410 First Street, $.E., Washington, D.C. 20003
[6500]the first of August.
[6502]Senator Baker. I agree with you 100 percent.
[6504]The Chairman. This Committee has got to get its business
[6505]done and I know the purpose of the delay downtown is to make it
[6506]as difficult as possible for: us to cope with our work. We will
[6507]be angulfed completely if we cannot deal with this phase of
[6508]our work in the time that we have given it and put it over unt
[6509]the ‘fall... What I'm. suggesting -isi:not -just:‘aimply:'the -report ‘of
[6510]the Committee. We are going to complete our witnesses, “7.4: .
[6512]we have time to issue such a report.
[6514]I am also suggesting the recommendations the Committee will
[6516]make with respect to this issue. Wa have to put this behind
[6517]us. It is just folly not to do it, because we must get on with
[6518]the other phases of the report and thera is no reason we cannot
[6519]do it. If we can't do it by the end of this. month, then we're
[6520]not going to be any more advantaged or any better advantaged
[6521]to then go out on our recass and come pack and take it up anew
[6522]in the fall. It isa very clear-cut issue.
[6524]Senator Nart.of Michigan. But what is not clear-cut to
[6525]me is how we report to our peers.
[6527]The Chairman. We will take that up.
[6529]Senator Schweiker. We discussed that at one meeting. We
[6530]had a little informal meeting. Maybe you missed that, Phil.
[6532]The Chairman. Thare is nothing that could be gained by
[6534]putting it off or defering it or postponing it. [It is very
[6536]TOP SECRET
[6538]|
[6541]WARD & PAUL
[6543]410 First Street, S.E.. Washington, O.€. 20003
[6545]| that we should complete the testimony and make our report and-
[6547]: : 4 ed .
[6548]clear that wa ara working at a’highly intensified pace in
[6550]ordar to gat the necessary avidance, and then there is no reasan
[6551]why we can't address ourselves to this question. .
[6553]Senator Hart of Michigan. The only reason that I raise
[6554]that is that I am as anxious to conclude this chapter, but this
[6555]Committee,.as a Committee, then must decide the ultimate
[6556]question: do you have open hearings? De you go to a closed
[6557]Senate?
[6559]The Chairman. That will be a top item of consideration for
[6560]the Committae. I have only deferred this discussion thinking
[6561]that we had best get all of the evidence first. That is all.
[6563]Then we will take it up at an appropriate time and discuss it.
[6565]1
[6566]Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, do I understand the situation
[6567]i
[6569]to ba then it is your hope that wa will finish our Executive !
[6570]Session testimony before the August recess, but not a report
[6571]to the Senate?
[6573]The Chairman. No, that is not my position. My position is
[6575]recommendation on this issue.
[6576]Senator Baker. But without prejudice to a future determina
[6577]tion of whether we have public hearings?
[6578]The Chairman. Oh, yes, that's always open to us. Rut I
[6579]let me make it -- let's not have any misunderstanding there.
[6582]It is always apen to this Committee to decide whether
[6584]public hearings on this or any other issue should be arranged
[6586]TOP SECRET
[6589]Prone (Area 202) 544-6000
[6591]WARD @ PAUL
[6593]410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003
[6595]the fall. Obviously, we cannot‘have them until fall.
[6597]. My personal position is against public hearings on the
[6598]issue of assassination. But what I am proposing is that the
[6599]Committee make its report, and I think that is a question the
[6601]Committee will have to take up and decide, and I think the
[6603]appropriate way to disclose thase facts, and I personally beliew
[6604]they must be disclosed, is through a@ Yeport ofthe Committee
[6605]that is made public, and I think that report should be made
[6606]before the recess.
[6608]Senator Baker. I don't think we can do that.
[6610]Senator Tower. Mr. Chairman, physically we have got three |
[6611]Weeks. Whether we can hear all of these witnesses and sit down!
[6612]and prepare the report and have the Committee agree on the
[6613]report, report it to the Senate and have the Senate act on it
[6615]in three weeks is questionable in my mind. I, like you, Want
[6617]to do it, but I wonder if we can do a workmanlike job and do
[6619]it in that time.
[6621]The Chairman. Well, let me say this,’ that the very request
[6622]that Senator Baker has made, and I hope we don't get into a tee |
[6623]prolonged ijiscussion on this issue because we Cannot dacida
[6624]it right now, but the very report that Sanator Baker has asked
[6625]for is now in the process of preparation. That report gives,
[6626]by neceSsity, as much of tha meat, the briefs that Senator
[6628]Baker has asked for, as much of the Yeport, laying out the
[6630]factual, the evidence that the Committee has seen. And I think!
[6632]TOP SECRET
[6635]Prone (Area 202} 548-6000
[6637]WARD & PAUL
[6639]410 Fast Street, $.£., Wasrengton, B.C. 20003
[6641]this can be done. I. know that we have to work very hard to do
[6643]it, but I know that our position will be much worse in every
[6645]‘way if we fail to do it.
[6647]Now without trying to decide that now, let us proceed.
[6649]Senator Schweiker. May I make one comment on that, Mr.
[6650]Chairman?
[6652]I have had vacillating feelings on public hearings, and I
[6653]think what I have come down on is this. I think we should go
[6654]ahead and issue a preliminary report without public hearings.
[6656]I think we should put the matter of public hearings in abeyance
[6657]until we get .into' the Chile thing and soma of the other areas
[6658]of so- ~called assassinations that may not be Presidential
[6660]assassinations per sé and leave the Committee option that we
[6662]may well want to elect to go into what happened in Chile
[6664]publicly and bring up that assassination if that is what we
[6665]determined.
[6667]I have trouble determining at this point in time whether
[6668]we should have public hearings, and I think we ought to keep
[6669]that option open aS we go ‘along.
[6671]The Chairman. I have no argument with the Senator on thet
[6673]Senator Schweiker. I know. As I Say, it reconciles with
[6674]your views and it protects the rights of those who say they
[6676]want public hearings.
[6678]The Chairman. I have no argument with that.
[6680]TOP SECRET
[6683]WARD & PAUL
[6685]S.E., Washington, 0.€. 20003
[6687]410 First S$
[6689]ra
[6691]Senator Baker has another matter.
[6693]Senator Baker. It won't take but a brief moment.
[6695]I think I owa the Committee =: a report. on the statement
[6696]that I made to the Press a few moments ago. I did not intend
[6697]to make a statement, but that it becomes impossible to avoid
[6698]when you step outside in these circumstances.
[6700]The Chairman. It is a good thing for you that Senator
[6702]Morgan is not presant.
[6704]Sanator Baker. As some of you may know, the news last
[6705]night and again this morning carried a story to the effect that:
[6706]a Colonel, a retired Colonel in the Air Force by the name of.
[6707]Fletcher Prowdy, has alleged by Alexander Butterfield was an
[6708]associate or an employee or a plant of something of the sort of
[6709]the CIA when he was at the white House.
[6711]I was asked if I had any comment on that. I was asked if
[6712]r was surprised by that, and my reply was I had-heard that
[6713]story before. I had never commented on it because I had no
[6715]proof of it. And it's raally so. As you know, in this ‘town
[6717]if you don't have confirmation of it you get into deep
[6719]ry
[6721]trouble.
[6723]Second, that I think it is worthy of looking into, and I
[6724]said I thought the Prowdy statement added a new dimension to
[6725]the rumors and I thought that. it did warrant further investicga-
[6727]tion, that I would recommend that to this Committee at the
[6729]1
[6730]appropriate time. ; ' |
[6731]|
[6733]TOP SECRET
[6736]Phone (Area 202) 544-6000
[6738]WARD & PAUL
[6740]410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003
[6742]“that: and I have also said that I
[6744]. Loe ¢ Ba: :
[6745]would ask the Committee for an investigation of this charge,
[6747]and Bill Miller tells me we have already received from the
[6748]Agency a preliminary report that is not satisfactory. We are
[6749]pursuing it and getting further information.
[6751]Senator Schwelker?
[6753]Senator Schweiker. I have a brief matter I «would: Hike to
[6755]seek the Committee's advice on.
[6757]''. ‘Could-we go ‘offthe-recdrd a minute?
[6759]The Chairman. Yes.
[6761](Discussion off the record, )
[6763]Senator Hart of Colorado. I'm sorry, Mr. Chairman, 1 have
[6764]an item of business also.
[6766]When I was in Europe last week and pursuant to the
[6767]direction of the Chairman and staff If tried to contact our
[6768]friend QUWIN to try to wrap up that lihk of the chain with, I
[6769]must say, the complete cooperation of the CIA and Mr. Colby,
[6770]who in fact sent a person over there to help uncover this
[6771]individual. We know who he is and where he is.
[6773]The CIA American contact talked to him, largely for the
[6774]reason that he feels extrema loyalty still to the Agency and to
[6775]one or two particular people that hea worked with and through.
[6776]He opted not to meet with me or anybody else. The feeling is,
[6778]both on my part and Mr. Colby's, that if wa got his contact in
[6780]that chain to get in touch with him directly that he would talk
[6782]TOP SECRET
[6785]WARO & PAUL
[6787]410 First Street, $.E€., Washington, O.C. 20003
[6789]important enough for:us' €6"pursue and dtcuwould-probably involve
[6791]a couple of people going back over.
[6792]Senator Baker. What is your recommendation?
[6793]Senator Hart of Colorado. .My own feeling, based almost
[6795]purely on the principle that no, stone ‘should ba left unturned
[6797]“4g that we should do it.
[6799]There ara some unanswered questions. He was here in the
[6800]states in '63, he was not confined to one operation and we
[6801]don't know what he was doing.
[6803]Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, I would racommend that we
[6804]commission Senator Hart to do that for us. Y
[6806]Sanator Nart of Colorado. It would take the cooperation
[6807]of one of the witnesses we've had here before to do it. |
[6809]The Chairman. What is your racommendation, Senator
[6810]Hart, I'm sorry?
[6812]Senator Hart of Colorado. That we should do it, that
[6813]should get: the cooperation of Mr. O'Donnell.
[6815]The Chairman. That wa should do what?
[6817]Senator Baker. Interview QUWIN in Europe.
[6819]Senator Mathias. Which means somebody has to do it and
[6821]O'Donnell with him.
[6823]Senator Baker. Take Mathias and Hart.
[6825]The Chairman. It is a very sensitive matter, if his
[6827]cover -- well, one thing this Committee must worry about --
[6829]TOP SECRET
[6832]Phone (Ares 202) 544-6000 Bio
[6834]Senator” woul you hope to get out of
[6836]it, Gary?
[6838]‘Senator Hart of Colorado. What his orders were, what his
[6840]what he was doing in the. Congo, what he was doing over and
[6842]6 || above his Congo operations, why he was in Florida in 1963.
[6844]7 . The Chairman. Well, Gary, when you told me this, you
[6846]8 || told me that this man had said to the CIA go between who was
[6848]9 | trying to arrange this interview that first ef all he preferred
[6849]10 not to be questioned, and sacondly, if he were questioned, he
[6850]li} would lie.
[6852]12 Senator Hart of Colorado. That was on the basis of the
[6855]1z || appointment we were trying to arrange then, and that was purely
[6857]WARD & PAUL
[6859]14 | because of his loyalties to the Agancy. The case was not
[6861]15 | presented well to him. What I am saying is if we took back his
[6862]16 | contact for whom he feels loyalty and the fellow should talk,
[6863]a7 | t think the feeling of the person who had made the original
[6865]16 | contact is that he would talk.
[6867]It was not presented to him in the way that the Agency
[6869]20 || wanted him to do it.
[6871]21! The Chairman. How valuable do you think this information
[6872]a2 is to the Committee? Thi tell you my concern. My concern is
[6874]| the one thing I have feared more than anything else, .in this
[6876]oe4 | investigation is that we take some action that allows them to
[6878]410 First Street, S.£., Wasnington, D.C, 20003
[6880]25 || say that we have blown the cover of some valuable agent abroad,
[6882]TOP SECRET
[6884]scope of authority was, what he was doing over and above -- well,
[6887]Phone (Ares 202) 544-6000
[6889]WARD & PAUL
[6891]430 First Street, S.£., Washington, D.C. 20003
[6893]“the whole intelli-
[6894]gence apparatus would ‘Weed yeukened and the man in the
[6895]field would be jeopardized by investigation of this kind.
[6897]‘We take that chance with this kind of -- and what do we
[6899]learn from it? Is it worth that chance?
[6901]Senator Hart of Colorado. Well, that. question could be i
[6903]asked of any witness that wa have in here. Number two, the CIA,|
[6904]Mr. Colby and the Chief of Station ingiAmsterdan, have no doubts
[6905]that this can be carried out without any veouriey breach what-
[6906]soevar. Now that's the CIA. He has not worked for: them in
[6907]ten years.
[6909]The Chairman. And the CIA would be the first to jump
[6911]upon the breach and say, we told you so.
[6913]Senator Hart of Colorado. Well, I leave it to the
[6915]Committee, I can't tell you what we're going to find out, it
[6916]may be zero.
[6918]Senator Mathias. ‘The Station Chief does not raise that as!
[6919]one of the dangers.
[6921]Senator Baker. Yas, thay did.
[6923]Senator Hart of Colorado. Nor does Colby.
[6925]Mr. Wides. Mr. Chairman, excuse me. The paper that
[6926]suggests the possibility that Mr. Win might have been in the
[6927]United States in 1963 is a paper involving the activity records
[6928]ef William Marvey who will be here this afternoon and that may
[6930]be that you can get more testimony under oath from him that will
[6932]TOP SECRET
[6935]Phone (Area 202) 544-6000
[6937]WARD & PAUL
[6939]410 Fiest Street, S.E., Wasnington, D.C. 20003
[6941]shed some light as to whether -he was just using QJWIN as a cover
[6943]which is what he told me, the designation for billing, or
[6944]whether he's willing to give out some more testimony.
[6946]The Chairman. Well, let us get that additional informa-
[6947]tion -- ; , ~ | i
[6949]Senator Baker. One further point, Mr. Chairman, that might
[6951]i
[6952]1
[6954]be of interest if my memory is correct, and I beliave it is
[6956]correct, is that the major commercial cover for the Agency in
[6958]ardam\was run by ((thediulyinecompany!
[6959]5 0 “2
[6960]Senator Hart of Colorado. ‘Frank, he's not worked for the
[6962]Agency in ten years. He's not an active agent.
[6964]The Chairman. Suppose that he were to tell us something
[6965]that is of importance, than how do we cross-examine him? Then
[6966]we have to bring him here for cross-examination, then we have
[6967]blown his cover.
[6969]Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, may I say ona other thing?
[6970]I meant to say it, and I frankly forgot, just so my colleagues
[6974]know what I'm about and not that I'm doing it behind their
[6976]back.
[6978]I got a call last night from one of the editors of Harper’
[6979]magazine in Europe relaying to me that Bernard Barker wanted to!
[6980]talk to me, and he thinks about the Butterfield situation, and
[6981]I intended to call him, but I wanted you to know that.
[6983]The Chairman. That's fine.
[6985]Let's defer decision right now, on that decision, Senator -
[6987]TOP SECRET
[6990]Let's get our w
[6992]morning.
[6994]4
[6995]3
[6997]e
[6999]fe)
[7001]4
[7002]z
[7004]410 First Street, S.E., Wasnington, O.c. 20003
[7006]TOP SECRET
[7009]Prone (Ares 202) 544-6000
[7011]2
[7016]is]
[7017]is
[7019]z
[7021]416 Fisst Street, $.E., Washington, D.C. 20063
[7023]rok f
[7025](Whereupon, at 12:00 noon the witness re-entered the
[7026]hearing room.)
[7027]The Chairman. All right.
[7029]You understand that the oath still applies to this part
[7031]of the testimony?
[7033]Mr. Schwarz.will renew the questioning.
[7035]‘Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Bundy, I want to call your attention now
[7036]to 1963, the Missile Crisis is over. Was there another reassess-
[7037]meant of Cuban policy in the winter and spring of '63?
[7039]Mr. Bundy. Yes, there was.
[7043]Mr. Schwarz. Again, did that reassessment of Cuban policy
[7046]involve a lot of reassessment of a lot of options? |
[7047]Mr. Bundy. That is my refreshed recollection.
[7049]Mr. Schwarz, All right.
[7050]We've shown you a lot-of documents, mostly by you in that
[7052]period, but some to you as well, and was one of the options the
[7054]consideration of the possibility that Mr. Castro might defect
[7056]or might ba communicated to in a way that would bring him around
[7057]more closely to the United States?
[7058]Mr. Bundy. The question of opening communications with
[7059]Fidel Castro arises in 1963, I think at more than one time,
[7060]and without having my attention drawn to specific documents, I
[7061]wouldn't be able to spell that out very much.
[7062]Mr. Schwarz. But you agree that it is in there, and it
[7064]is in there?
[7066]TOP SECRET
[7069]2
[7073]Q
[7074]c
[7076]5
[7078]410 First Street, $-E., Washington, D.C. 20003
[7080]Mr. Schwarze Now did you also consider, in the spring
[7081]1963, as you had in the fall of 1961, what would happen if
[7082]Castro died or were killed?
[7084]Mr. Bundy. What we did, we certainly posed the question,
[7085]the precise form is not clear to me, but what :I'now Know from thie
[7086]documents you have shown me, is we posed to the Director of the |
[7087]office of National getimates, a Dr. Sherman Kent -~
[7089]Mr. Schwarz. And what did Dr. Sherman Kent say in response
[7090]to that inquiry?
[7092]Mr. Bundy. Well, I would have to look at his response.
[7094]Mr. Schwarz. All right.
[7096]I would like to then mark a string of documents so you
[7097]can have that in front of you.
[7099]All right, would you mark as item 6, Bundy item 6, the
[7100]Bundy memorandum to the President dated January 4, 1963, which ,
[7102]appears at Bundy Tab K.
[7104](The document referred to
[7106]was marked Bundy Exhibit
[7108]No. 6 for identification.)
[7110]SECRET
[7113]‘ll then talk about
[7115]Phone (Area 202)
[7117]As Bundy Exhibit 6-A,, the niemorandum for the record,
[7118]Meeting on Cuba, 3 April: 63,-.between the President, the Attorney
[7119]General, yourself and ‘fiva ors ix other people.
[7121]Mr. Bundy. Right.
[7123](The document referred to
[7124]was marked as Bundy Exhibit
[7126]'
[7128]No. 6<-A for identification. ),
[7130]3
[7131]3
[7133]iN
[7134]4@
[7135]a
[7140]410 First Street, S.E., Wasnington, O.C. 20003
[7142]TOP SECRET
[7145]-)
[7147](The document referred to
[7148]was marked Bundy Exhibit
[7150]TOP SECRET
[7154]earreeneenss
[7158]eras
[7160]ms FT
[7163]Hh
[7165]n
[7167]769
[7169]WARD & PAUL
[7171]410 First Street, S.€., Wasnington, D.C. 20003
[7173]Ze dum also
[7175]dated April 11, 1963 from Mr. jordén Chase to yourself, headed
[7176]Cuban--Policy.
[7178](The-documant referred
[7180]_to was marked Bundy
[7181]Exhibit 6-c for
[7183]identification.)
[7186]Phone (Area 202) 544-60
[7188]to was marked Bundy
[7189]-) Exhibit 6-D for
[7191]identification.) \
[7193]an @
[7194]WARD & PAUL
[7198]2
[7199]8 19
[7200]J
[7201]6
[7202]€ 20 .
[7203]2 | -
[7204]e (
[7206]ia
[7207]4 22 ;
[7208]3 23 _
[7209]2 24 4
[7210]ad
[7212]26
[7214]TOP SECRET
[7216]WARD & PAUL
[7219]9
[7221]6
[7223]a
[7224]fa)
[7225]G
[7226]6
[7228]c
[7229]re
[7230]a
[7231]4
[7232]B
[7233]w
[7236]G30 Fisst Steeet,
[7238]Sunmary Record of NSC
[7242]Standing croup Meeting, April 23, 1963.
[7243]. _ (the document refarred
[7244]to was marked Bundy
[7245]Exhibit 6-E for
[7247]identification. )
[7250]Phone (Area 202) 544-6
[7252]to was marked Bundy
[7254]Exhibit 6-F for
[7256]identification.)
[7258]WARD & PAUL
[7260]$.E., Washington. p.c. 20003
[7262]410 First Street,
[7265]Sneanctaen
[7266]gore en 4
[7268]“April 30th, the document
[7270]being dated April 29th and signed by you.
[7271](The document referred
[7272]to was marked Bundy
[7274]Exhibit 6-G for
[7276]identification.)
[7278]WARD & PAUL
[7280]416 Fiest Street, S.E., Washington. D.C. 20003
[7282]TOP SECRET
[7285]Phone (Ares 202)
[7287]WARD & PAUL
[7289]a
[7291]3
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[7312]ed.
[7314]identification.)
[7317]Rey
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[7322]WARD & PAUL
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[7344]o
[7347]1963, draft memorandum
[7349]Possible U.S. Actions in: the Event of Castro's Death.
[7351](The document referred
[7353]“to, was marked as Bundy
[7354]Exhibit 6-1 for
[7356]identification.)
[7358]TOP SECRET
[7361]Mr. Schwarz. Now, ‘wou had a chance to read them
[7363]again, Mr. Bundy?
[7364]Mr. Bundy. Yes.
[7366]Mr. Schwarz. In summary, Mr. Bundy, is it a fair charac~
[7368]terization of these papers that you were, iandithd Standing.
[7370]Group was, examining the question of what the situation would
[7371]be if Castro were to die?
[7372]Mr. Bundy. That is one of the things we Ware examining,
[7374]certainly.
[7376]Mr. Schwarz. That was .a-gamut: of matters "I: tried to
[7378]pose at the beginning of this line of questioning?
[7380]Mr. Bundy. Yes.
[7382]Mr. Schwarz. That was one of the things you were consider
[7384]WARD & PAUL
[7386]ing?
[7387]Mr. Bundy. Right.
[7389]Mr. Schwarz. This was a period of time, as the fall of
[7391]1961 may also have been, when people asked about or talked
[7392]about assassinations as 4 means of causing Mr. Castro's death.
[7394]Mr. Bundy. I am not aware of much conversaticn on that
[7396]subject in the spring of '63, so I would have to take your
[7398]word on that.
[7400]Mr. Schwarz. I am asking you, I have no word on that.
[7402]Mr. Bundy. No, I don't think there was much discussion in
[7404]WY the spring of *63 on that subject.
[7406]410 First Street, S.E., Wasnington, B.C, 20003
[7408]Mr. Schwarz. Well, let's see if we can agreé on some
[7410]TOP SECRET
[7413]Phone (Area 202)
[7415]WARD & PAUL
[7417]5.€., Washington, D.C. 20003
[7419]410 First Street,
[7421]things first.
[7423]Can we further agrae that the ultimate conclusion was that
[7424]Castro's death would not be desirable for the united States?
[7426]Mr. Bundy. The recommendation, or the assessment, which
[7427]comes back from the Offica of National Estimates, makes it
[7428]clear that the odds would be that, upon Castro's death, his
[7429]prother Raul or some other figure in the regime would, with
[7430]Soviet backing and help take over control.
[7432]Then it goes on to say that there might be divisions and
[7433]splits, but that it was unlikely that anti-Comminist forces
[7434]would be able to take over without extensive U.S. help and
[7435]probably U.5. military intervention.
[7437]Mr. Schwarz. All right.
[7439]Now, I would Like to avoid having to go through every
[7440]single document.
[7442]Mr. Bundy. 50 would I.
[7444]Mr. Schwarz. And see Lif I could get you to agree with
[7445]this statement. You do agree that you were looking at 4
[7447]situation that would exist as if Castro were killed?
[7449]Mr. Bundy. That is one of the things we were looking at.
[7451]Mr. Schwarz. And in connection with that, was his being
[7453]‘killed by assassination one of the ways which you understood
[7455]he might be killed?
[7456]Mr. Bundy... f don't have any recollection of that point,
[7458]of it being on our minds.
[7461]phone (Area 202) 544-6000,
[7463]WARD & PAUL
[7465]S10 First Street, $.E., Wasnington, O.c. 20003
[7467]Mr. Schwarz. ALL right.
[7469]Then why wera you looking at the question 6fshis being
[7470]killed? Was there something known?
[7472]Mr. Bundy. I really don't have any independent of it.
[7473]My sense of events in 1963 is that the internal pressure from
[7474]within the Administration to "do something about Cuba" was
[7475]very much lower. There was, however, external pressure. There
[7476]wag political pressure in the United States, critics of the
[7477]Administration were making speeches about how not enough was
[7478]being done and we must get rid of the Castro regime, and as f
[7479]think I may have said earlier, and IT would like to say now,
[7480]I think that one reason for getting | an 1 estimate of this kind
[7482]emer ore mnie tet ME OE wee re
[7484]was to get it on ‘record, from, the point of view of those who
[7486]did not think we should be fussing | with ‘questions of “gasassina-
[7488]tion or anything like ite 3 s not a sound policy,
[7489]AAR wee _ " ”
[7491]cnet tae A ee Bene) nog na
[7493]leaving aside its moral meaning and wider political meaning
[7494]from the point of view of the narrow objectivas we had in Guba.
[7495]Mr. Schwarz. Who waa: taking the position. that’ assas8ina~
[7497]tion could be --
[7499]Mr. Bundy. I have no racollection on that.
[7501]Mr. Schwarz. But someone was?
[7503]Mr. Bundy. I have no recollection on that.
[7505]Mr. Schwarz. You have no recollection of any position
[7506]being taken pro OF con?
[7508]Mr. Bundy. 1 have no recollection of any specific
[7511]s
[7513]conversation or position that. triggered this particular
[7515]inquiry.
[7517]The Chairman. Well, isn't it perfactly plausible that
[7519]prone (Area 202)
[7521]this inquiry sought to examine what the situation would be in
[7522]the event of Castro's death by whatever maans it might occur?
[7523]Does: it necessarily follow that because the Administration
[7524]was making such a4 plausible inquiry against such a contingency
[7525]that might arise at any time that therefore it was within the
[7527]mind of the Administration to kill Castro? I don't see the
[7529]connection. ;
[7532]Mr. Bundy. Well, “you make my point, Mr. Chairman. That'9
[7534]just my point.
[7535]t
[7539]Mr. Schwarz. Now in- connection with that, would you look
[7541]WARD & PAUL
[7543]at your own Agenda for::-the ‘April: 19th meeting, 6-G?
[7544]Under item 1 -~ you distinguish between item 1 and item
[7546]2. Item 1 is the possible use of contingencies for the
[7548]achievement of wider political objactives; and item 2 is programs |
[7550]that might be initiated by the united States government.
[7552]I call your attention to the fact that the reference to
[7553]the possible death of Castro is one of the items under item
[7554]1 and not under item 26
[7556]Mr. Bundy. That is correct.
[7558]Mr. Schwarz. And do you regard that 4s relevant to the
[7560]exchange you had with the Chairman just now?
[7562]810 Fiest Street, S.E., Wasnington, 0.C. 20003
[7564]Mr. Bundy. It seems to me it bears out the Chairman's
[7566]TOP SECRET
[7569]Phone (Area 202)
[7571]WARD & PAUL
[7573]410 First Street, S.E., Wasnington, 0.C. 20003
[7575]point, that you’ have a number of possible things that might
[7577]happen, that you would then have something to do something
[7578]abouts or to act in the light of. ‘The other are the things
[7579]that you might do without waiting for soma contingency to
[7580]arise. .
[7582]Mr. Schwarz. Now the only remaining question I have on
[7583]this group of documents is, how was it that the subject of the
[7584]death of Castro -- do you investigate the possibilities of the
[7585]death of foreign leaders as a regular matter?
[7587]Mr. Bundy. Well, the question »)‘*After: Stalin,. What?" was
[7588]the staple of discussions in the 1940's, averywhere, academies
[7589]and I would assume inside the United States government; the
[7590]question after DeGaulle was a question about Western European
[7591]policy for a graat many years. And one could pick. - smaller
[7592]figures, more and less controversial, and have the same kind of |
[7593]question coming up, in a situation in which a particular
[7594]individual - .- is as dominant a figure in a set of events which |
[7595]it had the two, quite contrasting but heavy consequences of the |
[7596]Bay of Pigs and the Missile Crisis, it doesn't seem to me to
[7597]be an irrational question to ask, without any relation as to
[7598]whether the United States itself would have any active advisory
[7599]role or .any role whatever in having that event come to pass.
[7601]Mr. Schwarz. All right.
[7603]Would you mark as Exhibit 7 the September 20 document --
[7605]which is the page -- which states the assassination of Castro
[7607]TOP SECRET
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[7612]WARD & PAUL
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[7621]to was marked Bundy
[7623]Exhibit No. 7 for
[7625]identification.)
[7628]Mr. schwarz. - Me. Kelley, ou take over thea ques~
[7629]eioning of Mr. Bundy ¢ with the permission of the chairman, on
[7631]that particular series of documents + which is at the heading:
[7633]september 2nth '63 on the chronology:
[7634]Mr. Kelley> Yes.
[7635]bet ma show Mr. Bundy the documents - .
[7636]Mr. Sohwar2- Well, firsts will you tall us where the
[7637]documents are: pecause I couldn't find them under the heading |
[7638]you gava US-
[7639]Mr. Kelley: Yes.
[7640]In bundy pook 2, there is at Tab A the memorandum dated |
[7641]July 25th, 1963 from Mr. Georg? penney to Mr- crimnins ,
[7643]entitled "Cuba, possible Courses of Action.
[7645]WARD & PAUL
[7647]i]
[7649]|
[7651]at Tab B of Bundy pook 2 is 4 memorandum dated September
[7652]'
[7654]20th, 1963, from Gordon Chase to Mr. Bundy, ana this memorandum |
[7655]. i ’
[7657]summarizes the Denney memorandum of July 25th-
[7659]Mr. Bundy, did you review these documents with members of
[7660]the staff earlier this week?
[7662]Mr. Bundy- Yes, I did.
[7664]mr. Kelley: po you have any independent recollection of
[7665]these documents?
[7667]Mr. Bundy. Well, 28 t read 4 document of this kind, which
[7669]comes to me from a member of my own staff, I am very often
[7671]24 | yeminded and I am in this case, that this is a document which
[7673]as | 1 aid review and that it reflects his arguments as t then hearé
[7676]Kelley. Who was Mr. Gordon Chase?
[7678]Phone (Area 202) 544-6000
[7680]Mr. Bundy. Well, he was an assistant of mine at the time
[7681]with special responsibilities for Cuban affairs, and perhaps
[7682]more widely in Latin America. He was at that time a foreign
[7683]service officer secunded to the White House.
[7685]\Mr. Kelley. Did he have any responsibility for covert
[7688]Mr. Bundy. No.)
[7690]Mr. Kelley. Did he provide staff assistance ‘to you with
[7691]respect to the Special Group or the Special Group (Augmented)?
[7693]Mr. Bundy. Well, he may have done in gome excaptional
[7695]case when I needed his opinion on a matter, but in ordinary
[7697]WARD & FAUL
[7699]cases he would not have been party to Special Group work.
[7701]Mr. Kelley. What kind of things did he do with the
[7702]special responsibility for Cuba? What did that‘ involve?
[7704]Mr. Bundy. He would be keaping in touch with the Cuban
[7705]Task Force, which by this time was in the Department of State,
[7707]the MONGOOSE operation having been @isbanded. He would have
[7709]D.C. 290003
[7711]been responsible for keeping me alert to matters that were
[7712]proceeding in that Task Force that might have an implication for
[7713]the White House.
[7715]Mr. Kelley. Who was the head of the Cuban Task Force?
[7717]Mr. Bundy. well I don't want to get this wrong, but I
[7719]think by this time it was Mr. Crimmins.
[7721]TOP SECRET |
[7723]410 Fisst Street, 5.£.. Wasmington,
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[7728]D.C. 20003
[7730]410 First Street. 5.E., Washington.
[7732]Mr. “eximmins was “the State Department and
[7734]he was @ foreign service officer?
[7736]Mr. Bundy- That is right.
[7738]Mr. Kelley- The Cuban mask Force, what Was that?
[7740]Mr. Bundy. Well, it was the successor to the MONGOOSE
[7741]group, put much 1ess oriented toward secrat operations than
[7742]MONGOOSE, and the review of secret operations then came back
[7743]under the complete control of the Special Group, by now, 1
[7744]think, called the 303 committee, which was 4 Lineal successor
[7746]of 5412.
[7748]Mr. Kelley- I call your attention now to Mr.
[7750]memorandum, which is at gab A in Book 2, and it is
[7752]tt not that the memorandum is to Mr. crimmins?
[7754]Mr. Bundy - Right.
[7756]Senator Tower- Do you have any independent recollection
[7758]of this memorandum?
[7760]Mr. Bundy® - tT have no knowledge that I ever saw it, and I
[7762]did not find it familiar when t looked at it the other day.
[7763]Mr. Kelley. It is true, is it not, that Mr- Chase's memo
[7764]to you summarizes this much longer memorandum by Mr. Denney?
[7765]Mr. Bundy. Is that what it is?
[7766]Mr. Schwarz. Does it do that, Mr. Kelley, because Chase
[7767]memorandum starts by saying, here ig a summary of Paul Sakwa's
[7769]Mr. Kelley. 1 think that is an error in Mr. Chase's memo; !
[7771]1 because it is clear that what is being summarized here is Mr.
[7774]Phone (Area 202) 544-6000,
[7776]WARD & PAUL
[7778]mington, O.C, 20003
[7780]es
[7782]416 First Street, $.E
[7784]mamorandum.
[7786]Bundy. Let me rsuggest that:you. focus ‘on: Mr«: Chase's
[7788]memorandums with respect to my: recollection ‘and responsibility,
[7790]that ig: icledrly ‘the: operative’ document.
[7792]Mr. Kelley. With respect to Mr. Chase's memorandum, in
[7793]his summary of the rationale of proposals, he: states, as second ,,
[7794]"the present importance of Castro as a nationalist symbol makes
[7795]him the obvious operational target; assassination is excluded
[7796]to avoid Castro's martyrdom."
[7798]Bo you have any recollection of why he would exclude
[7799]assassination? Does that imply to you, or do you recollect,
[7800]whether Castro's assassination was being considered sand: here
[7802]is a staff paper excluding it, because. someone asked them to
[7804]| consider it?
[7806]Mr. Bundy. No, I think it's a simple statament of what
[7807]I would ragard as a rationale assessment of the situation by
[7808]whoever the original author was, and certainly by the staff
[7809]man with respsct to a subject that emarges directly from the
[7810]notion that he is an operational target, whatever that means
[7811]and goss on to say, but we don't mean assassination, because
[7812]it would maka him a martyr, what other reasons © against: that
[7813]there may be. It doesn't seam to me that you can read the
[7814]statement that assassination is excluded as an inference that
[7815]somebody else is including it.
[7817]Mr. Kelley. That's all.
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[7836]‘Atwood, or Mr. Atwood, as he may have then been called, and
[7838]the document says
[7839]it is excluded. ,
[7840]Mr. Kelley. ghat's right.
[7841]Mr. Schwarz. Nowvat that period of time in the fall of
[7843]1963, were you aware that through the offices of Ambassador
[7845]through the offices of a French journalist called Jean Daniel,
[7846]another effort was being made to establish contact with Mr.
[7847]Castro?
[7849]Mr. Bundy. I remember the Atwood effort, as I racolilect
[7850]that he came to see me about it. I don't recollect specifically
[7851]Jean Daniel, although it strikes a chord ag you mention it.
[7853]‘Mme. Schwarz. What the purpose, very briefly, of Mr.
[7854]atwood's effort?
[7856]Mr. Bundy. Wel}, as I understood it, he had been approached
[7857]by someone he knew from Cuba and had been givan to under stand
[7859]that there was interest in, Castro had an interest in, opening
[7861]communication, and he was exploring with us whether he could be
[7862]encouraged to undertaka such an explanation.
[7864]Mr. Schwarz. And .did you encourage him?
[7866]Mr. Bundy. The exact form of our massage to him, or our
[7867]if you want to call it, the instruction to him, the President's |
[7868]decision, I can no longer recollect, but my impression is that
[7870]we were interested, and that we did want him to explore it without
[7872]|
[7873]|
[7875]engaging the President any more than he could help.
[7877]TOP SECRET
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[7894]Mc. Schwarz. But was the President in fact informed and
[7895]in fact approved the actions taken?
[7897]Mr. Bundy. That is my understanding.
[7899]Mr. Schwarz. Is it your understanding or your recollection
[7901]Mr. Bundy. It is my recollection, but it is a recollection
[7902]that is refreshed by what I have learned and hearing more about
[7903]it in the last few days.
[7905]Mr. Schwarz. Now, were you told, in the fall of 1963,
[7906]that assassination devices had been requested by a Cuban for
[7907]the purpose of assassinating Mr. Castro, and that assassination |
[7908]devices ware offered to the Cuban in the fall of 1963?
[7910]Mr. Bundy. No. .
[7912]Mr. Schwarz. Now again, here, calling for a matter of
[7913]opinion, as a matter of opinion, do you believe that at the
[7914]same time, at a possible rapprochement with Mr. Castro was heind
[7915]pursued, the President would have authorized or permitted the
[7917]passage of assassination davices intended for their use on
[7919]Mr. Castro?
[7920]Mr. Bundy. Absolutely not.
[7921]Mr. Schwarz. TI have nothing further on Castro.
[7922]Chairman. Is there more?
[7923]Mr. Schwarz. Well, on Trujillo and Diem, with respect to
[7924]Diem --
[7925]Mr. Smothars. Well, if you're going on to something else,
[7927]there are a couple of things.
[7929]TOP SECRET
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[7944]ae BOTS ss
[7947]re Se Ree BRE MER BSE SESE D MRIS
[7948]“Going back to ‘earli dum: which
[7950]is in the pundy matarials, bot it has’ been ited about
[7951]previously ina Committee hearinge a memorandum which will be
[7952]identified as 4 Memorandum for the Record, dated 16+:October
[7953]1962, a memorandum signed by Mr. Richard Helms.
[7954](the document referred
[7955]to was marked Bundy
[7956]Exhibit No. 8 for
[7958]identification. }
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[7976]t
[7977]i
[7980]Mr. Smothers. Mr: Bundy, I am going to read through this
[7984]memorandum and ask you a couple of questions. about that. It's
[7985]a memorandum from Helms for the record on MONGOOSE.
[7987]Reading. from this memorandum, Mr. Bundy, reading from
[7988]Paragraph 2: “The Attorney General" -- well, let me read the
[7989]entire paragraph. ,
[7991]“The Attorney General opened the meeting” -- we're talking
[7992]about a MONGOOSE meeting '-- by expressing the general dissatis-
[7993]faction of the President,” --"'dissatisfaction of the President’
[7994]in quotes ~-- “with operation MONGOOSE."
[7996]Mr. Bundy. What date are we at? The date?
[7998]Mr. Smothers. The date of the memorandum is 16 October
[7999]1962.
[8001]"He pointed out that the Operation had been underway for a
[8002]year, that the results were discouraging, that there had been
[8003]no acts of sabotage, and that even the one which had been
[8004]attempted had failed twice. Ha indicated that there had been
[8005]noticeable improvement during the year in the collection of
[8006]intelligence, but that other actions had failed to:influence.
[8007]significantly the course of avents.in Cuba. He spoke of the
[8008]weekly meetings of top officials on this problem, and again
[8009]noted the small accomplishments, despite the fact that Secre-
[8010]taries Rusk and McNamara, General Taylor, McGeorge Bundy and he
[8012]personally had all been charged ‘by the President with “finding
[8015]i
[8017]a solution. He traced the history of General Lansdale's personal
[8019]TOP SECRET
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[8040]appointment by the president a year agow |
[8042]"The Attorney General then stated that in view of this
[8043]lack of progress, ha was going to give Operation MONGOOSE more
[8044]personal attention. In order to do this, he would hold a meeting
[8045]every morning at 0930 with the MONGOOSE operational representa-
[8046]tives from the various agencies (Lansdale, Harvey, Hurwich,
[8047]Ryan and General Johnson) ."
[8049]Now, the best of our information, Mr. Bundy, is that these
[8050]meetings were in fact held on a daily basis as indicated, and
[8051]that they did involve Lansdale and these members of the working |
[8053]i
[8054]group noted.
[8056]Were you aware of such meatings?
[8058]Mr. Bundy. I have no independent racollection of them, put
[8060]that does not sound implausible to me at all.
[8062]Mr. Smothers. It doesn't sound implausible to me that the |
[8063]Attorney General Lansdale and members of the working group to
[8064]develop MONGOOSE activities with him?
[8066]Mr. Bundy. To report to him how they were getting on, and |
[8067]to see if he couldn't, by listening to those reports and keeping
[8068]a lively -- keeping his lively concern in their consciousness
[8069]move the thing more rapidly.
[8071]Mr. Smothers. This is your interpretation of «giving More ,
[8072]personal attention to it?
[8074]Mr. Bundy. Exactly.
[8076]Mr. Smothers. You say you had. no knowledge of these in
[8078]TOP SECRET
[8081]Mr. Bundy. I didn't say that. I said I had no independent
[8083]Prone (Area 202) 544-6 7
[8085]recollaction of them.
[8087]Mr. Smothers. They did not coma to your attention at that
[8090]Mr. Bundy. I didn’t say say that. f don't know that they
[8092]I don't know that they didn't,
[8094]Mr. Smothers. But your recollection at this point is that
[8095]they did not come to your attention?
[8097]Mr. Bundy. That is not my recollection: I don't recall
[8098]that one way or the other. .
[8100]Mr. Smothers. Okay.
[8102]Let me ask you then about your knowledge of the Lansdale
[8104]z
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[8107]e
[8108]“
[8109]a
[8110]z
[8112]z
[8114]situation.
[8115]Do you know General Lansdale?
[8117]Mr. Bundy. Yes.
[8119]Mr. Smothers. Do you know his reputation for truth and
[8121]honesty?
[8123]Mr. Bundy. I don't think I have any -- his reputation for-
[8124]truth and honesty, if you ask me the question as one asks it
[8125]about, you know, all kinds of people, I have no reason to
[8126]question it. I have doubts about some of the things I have
[8127]Seen attributed to him in racant weeks.
[8129]Mr. Smothers. Wall, let me put it this way. Would you
[8131]410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003
[8133]beliave General Lansdale under oath?
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[8150]“Te woula depend on cwhat he said.
[8151]Mr. smothers. “It would dapena upon what he said.
[8152]Is your experience that Ceneral Lansdale is trustworthy
[8153]only on a selective basis?
[8154]Mr. Bundy. You are asking me questions about matters
[8155]assentially in which his testimony, as I hava seen it reported, |
[8156]Mr. Smothers. Wo, I am not asking you about his testimony
[8158]iam asking you if you would believe him under oath, based on
[8160]your knowladga.
[8162]Mr. Bundy. It would depend upon what he said, and if it °
[8163]was a matter on which I had my own knowladge.
[8165]Mr. Smothers. Without regard to matters that General
[8166]Lansdale has testified to befora this Committee, based on your
[8167]knowledge of him, your working relationship with him, your
[8168]knowledge of what othar People know of General Lansdale, his
[8169]Yeputation in the community, if you will, would you believe him
[8170]under oath?
[8172]Mr. Bundy. I would currently have to say that I could
[8174]give you a definite affirmative answer to that question.
[8176]Mr. Smothers, That's fine.
[8178]Now, let's go back to the period of General Lansdale's
[8179]appointment.
[8181]General Lansdale was appointed as the coordinator of the
[8182]Special Group, the Chief of Operations.
[8184]After General Taylor's efforts had been under effort for
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[8197]some time, six months, seven months, General Taylor comes in,
[8199]I balieve, in July after he completes his Bay of Pigs examina-
[8200]tion, General Lansdale is appointed by tha Prasident at the end
[8201]of November.
[8203]Do you have any present recollection of the circumstances
[8204]surrounding that appointment?
[8206]Mr. Bundy. None that goes beyond what I discussed earlier.
[8208]Mr. Smothers. To tha bast of your knowledge or recollectia
[8209]aid the appointment of this Chief of Staff or Chief of Operation
[8210]reflect any lack of confidence in General Taylor on the part of
[8211]either the Attorney General or the President?
[8213]Mr. Bundy. No, the opposite. Ganeral Taylor had heavy
[8214]responsibilities in his general responsibility as military
[8215]representative of the President. He was made Chairman of the
[8216]Committee to keep oversight on this. It was inappropriate
[8217]entirely in terms of his rank and his other duties that he
[8219]should be the day to day action officer.
[8221]Mr. Smothers. Are you familiar with the degree of General |
[8223]Taylor's involvement with the development of the Special
[8225]Group. (Augmented) agendas? Was this done by General Taylor?
[8226]Was it really General Lansdale's responsibility?
[8228]Mr. Bundy. I don't have any knowledge of the details of
[8229]the operations of the staff. It was clear to me, and I think
[8230]to everyone else, that the man in charge of that operation, of
[8232]that Committee, was General Taylor.
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[8251]Mr. Smothers. oxay.”
[8253]Just one final series of questions.
[8255]If we might, Mr. Bundy, go back to our conversations
[8256]Yegarding your request to sea documents prior to your testimony
[8257]before the Rockefeller Commission, when you talked to Mr:
[8258]Kissinger, precisely what did you request of him?
[8260]Mr. Bundy. I said to him -- and again I cannot be precise
[8261]and I thought that there were going to be questions with respect!
[8263]|
[8264]“to which it would be much easier for me to give helpful .and more
[8266]accurate answers if I could have access to appropriate document
[8267]since I have taken no documents of that character, no official
[8268]documents of that character, from the White House. And he said
[8270]he entirely agreed and he made tha appropriate arrangements.
[8272]Mr. Smothurs. Did you ask for a timeframe for these
[8273]documents?
[8275]Mr. Bundy. I don't recall that I did, but when I came to
[8276]look more closely at what I needed to see, as I told you
[8277]earlier, it related specifically to the period around August
[8278]1962.
[8280]Mr. Smothers. Did the White House make the selection of
[8281]documents for you?
[8283]Mr. Bundy. No. The White House handed me a file of
[8284]documents which covered the pariod.
[8286]Mr. Smothers. They handed you a file of documents covering
[8288]roughly the August 1962 period?
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[8309]Mr: Bundy. That's right.
[8311]Mr. Smothers. Had you made a request for documents
[8312]covering this August '62 timeframe?
[8314]Mr. Bundy. I must have told him the rough period with
[8315]which I am concerned. Again, I don't understand the drift of
[8316]your question.
[8318]Mr. Smothers. Well, tha drift of my question is, if indeed
[8319]you selected the August 1962 documents, why did you select |
[8321]that?
[8323]Mr. Bundy. Because Counsel to the Reckefeller Commission
[8324]had directed my attention to thea period.
[8326]Mr. Smothers. To August 1962?
[8328]Mr. Bundy. Yes.
[8330]Mr. Smothers. In the file that centered roughly on this
[8331]point in this timeframe, included NSA memo 181, was the file
[8332]put together by the White House pursuant to this guidance?
[8334]Mr. Bundy. The file that came into my hands, whether
[8335]they put it together or whether it was a file drawn off the
[8336]shelf, I can't tell you. You'll have to ask them.
[8338]Mr. Smothers. Did it appear to you to be an off-the-shelf
[8339]File?
[8341]Mr. Bundy. I don't know what it was.
[8343]The Chairman. What is tha object of this series of
[8344]questions, Curtis?
[8346]Mr. Smothers. Wall, I am trying to determine, Mr. Chairman,
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[8370]what Mr. Kissinger was requested to do and what actually
[8371]happened.
[8373]The Chairman. Don't we have that now in the racord?
[8374]It just seems to me like wa're going over the same series of
[8375]questions.
[8377]Mr. Smothers. Well, since we don't know what was in the
[8378]file --
[8380]Mr. Bundy. Well, I thought I said-the file was a file of
[8382]National Security Action memoranda, a file which you already
[8384]have here.
[8386]Mr. Smothers. Relating to August, 1962?
[8388]Mr. Bundy. Uh-huh.
[8390]Mr. Smothers. That's all I have, Mr. Chairman.
[8392]Mr. Schwarz. On the Trujillo matter ~~
[8394]Mr. Bundy. Sure.
[8396]Mr. Schwarz. You know Mr. Trujillo was killed. Did you
[8397]know or do you know that thea persons who killed him had
[8398]obtained some weapons from the United States?
[8400]Mr. Bundy. I did not know, and do not now know, of my
[8401]own knowledge that that was the case.
[8403]I did know, or at least I believe I must have been on
[8404]notice because of documents again that you have shown me, that
[8405]weapons by a decision of the Special Group in early January
[8406]had been or were being passed to Dominican dissidents.
[8408]| ;
[8409]Mr. Schwarz. Were you involved in the sending of a telegram
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[8414]to the Domincan Republic, either two or three days prior to tha
[8416]actual assassination of Mr. Trujillo?
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[8420]Mr. Bundy. I have no recollection of it, and when I saw
[8421]those telegrams in discussions with your staff, they stirred no
[8422]recollection on my part.
[8424]Mr. Schwarz. Is it fair to state that Mr. Richard Goodwin |
[8425]is the best witness on those subjects from the White House for
[8426]that period of time?
[8428]Mr. Bundy. It appears that way to ma, although that
[8430]appears more from the fact that important documents seem to
[8431]have been addressed to him than because of my own recollection
[8433]that he was interested in the matters and because of my phone
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[8445]conversation with him, he showed a considerable familiarity
[8446]with events in the Domincan Republic, political events during
[8447]that spring.
[8449]Me. Schwarz. Well, you got a memo from Mr. Bissell in
[8451]Pebruary, 17th February ‘61. It is Tab R of the Trujillo
[8452]Book 1 of 2, in which you were informed that the dissidents
[8453]had been told by the United States that it was prepared to
[8454]provide them with a limited supply of arms and equipment.
[8456]When you got such information, did it trigger in your mina -
[8458]Washington, O.C. 20003
[8460]anything to the effect of, let's be concerned about how they're.
[8462]going to use those weapons, or did you just accept the informa-
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[8466]tion and do nothing about it?
[8468]Mr. Bundy. It is clear that the information was sent to
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[8485]me and it was clear, in. that. ‘sense, that I had become responsi-
[8487]bie for knowing what was ‘in the document, but I have to say that
[8488]as I reread it I have no recollection that I aver, in fact, did
[8490]read it at the time. Whether that was because of tha flow, the
[8491]very heavy flow of other documents or because I passed it to
[8492]someone. else or because T just simply didn't get to it, I cannot
[8493]tell you, but I have no recollection‘ that I saw it. '
[8495]Mr. Schwarz. You did maka a request for a briefing paper?
[8497]Mr. Bundy. It must have been done,and it was either done
[8498]in my name or TI did it.
[8500]Mr. Schwarz. So you're not capable -- you don't remember
[8501]it. Are you capable of.making a comment on my question, which
[8502]was having received information that arms had been supplied --
[8504]Mr. Bundy. Having that information on Ty desk, anyway.
[8506]Mr. Schwarz. Okay.
[8508]In the light of hindsight, should persons in your position
[8510]when they receive such information inquire into the purpose for
[8512]which the arms are to be used?
[8514]Mr. Bundy. Yes, I would -- and my own guess on this, and
[8515]it's not much better than that, is that the decision which had
[8516]been taken only a week befora the new Administration came in,
[8517]in the Special Group, was partly reviewed in some fashion, with
[8518]the Special Group as reconstituted after the change in
[8519]Administration. So I would have to say that I suppose I knew
[8521]that weapons were being introduced into the Dominican Republic
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[8532]and I would have to add that I did not, or I have no recollectioh
[8533]and I think I would recollect it, if I had engaged in a careful
[8534]inquiry to find out just what, who, when where and so on did
[8535]not do that, and I think -- you ask in hindsight, L.think it
[8537]would clearly ba important to have that kind of understanding,
[8539]} .
[8540]bacause as I understand the evidence that has now been developed
[8542]there was a level of communication and connection with the
[8544]plotters in the Dominican Republic which exceeded what political
[8545]authority appears to have expected or believed was going on.
[8547]Mr. Schwarz. Would you agree with one further point,
[8548]that it is very difficult for the United States to control
[8549]events once it has made a decision to cooperate with dissident
[8550]elements, and in particular once it's made a dacision to
[8551]cooperate with dissident elements by providing them with arms?
[8553]Mr. Bundy. I think that -- one thing, I don't want to
[8554]generalize here, but I think -- I would agree with the generali-
[8555]zation, let me put it that way, if I could add that in the case |
[8556]of the Dominican Republic, I think one has also to recognize
[8557]retrospectively that there was no way to hava any communication
[8558]with dissidents that would not involve recognition that, if you
[8559]propose to be an effective dissident in that country under that
[8560]ruler, you would probably be contemplating fairly violent
[8561]action.
[8563]Mr. Schwarz. I have nothing further on Trujillo.
[8565]One question of Vietnam.
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[8582]closely with the President and
[8584]‘his instruction tof: some of
[8586]“Now Diem was killed. It does not appear to
[8588]e United states wanted him killeds.
[8589]Is that fair? i. .
[8591]Mr. Bundy. That is correct.
[8593]Mr. Schwarz... But the United States did want him deposed
[8594]iff a :coup could be. successful? Is that correct?
[8596]Mr. Bundy. The-United:States really had two views. Right
[8597]up tothe end, the United States hoped, hoped against hope, as
[8598]it became more and more difficult to communicate with Diem,
[8599]that he would see the, or come to share the kinds of argument,
[8600]that were mada to him, primarily by Ambassador Lodge, and that
[8601]a change in his government anda \iower, much lower, role for
[8602]his brother~ and sister-in-law would assist him in recapturing |
[8603]public confidence. That was always the preferred solution.
[8605]As prospects for that became more and more dim, the United
[8606]States did come to take the view. that there might be no alter-
[8607]native to a coup, and it certainly had the view that if there
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