[1]DARAAN
[2]Iito4-10310-10020, (2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 | -~-—
[4]TRANSMITTAL SLIP |
[6]FORM HO OA 1 REPLACES FORM 36-8 GPO. 1957—-O-430445 (@)
[7]1FEB 55 WHICH MAY BE USED. :
[9]13-00000-
[11]' Attachn.ent
[14]OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
[16]In reply refer to
[17]Action Memorandum No. _!
[19]Date TA ril 1905
[23]Deputy Director for Plaas
[24]Deputy Director for Intelligence
[26]TO : Deputy Disector for Science k Technology
[27]Deputy Director fer support
[29]Agreement Between the United states Secret service
[30]aad the Central Intelligence Agency Concerning
[31]SUBJECT : Prealdential Protection ln the Ucited states
[33]REFERENCE: b-ercorandam from DOCI te LD/1L, LbO/F, and OD/ 4,
[34]; — dated $ June 1963, subject: The CIA Role in Support
[35]of Presidential Trips Abrosd
[37]kh Attached for the information of addressees is a copy of subject
[38]agreement developed by the Chief of the Secret service and re, in accordance
[39]with the recommendations of the Warren Comrnissies and the actions of the
[40]Preeident's Cemmittes on the Warren Report.
[42]2. The Deputy Director for Plans is responsible for insuring
[43]Agency con:pliance with this agreement and for n:aintaining the active Liaison
[44]with the Secret Service. The staff fanction in this regard ie being perfors-ed
[45]in. the Counter Intelligence Scaff af the DD/P. All Agency conponente in
[46]Haisen with the Secret Service are to keep the Counter Intelligence stati
[47]informed of their dealings with the Jocret Service, The Counter Intellizesce
[48]Stall will provide advice te other Agency components wha receive requests
[49]for support frem the Secret Service.
[51]3. This agreement does mot amend or alter currert Agency policy
[52]as expressed in ny a:emorandun: ef 8 June 1983 concerning support of
[54]| Fresicential trips abroad. An additional ayreer-ent with the jecret service,
[56]iuvolving CLA aod other Governz.ent agencies dealing with } residential treve}
[57]abroad, ie in procesa of developi:.ent.
[59](Signed) Marshall §. Carter
[60]warohall 5, Cartier
[61]SUSPENSE DATE: ticutenant General, USA
[63]Deputy Cirector
[64]Co
[66]ce: OGC a {-.
[67]ny {s (CLASSIFICATION)
[71]4
[72]a
[74]ZCUZ>PRPOZmMZ ZORnHo>d
[76]13-00000
[78]CONFIDENTIAL
[79]AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE AND
[81]PROTECTION IN THE UNITED STATES
[83]I, Purpose of Agreement
[85]i
[87]t .
[89]THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY CONCERNING PRESIDENTIAL
[90]' A. The purpose of this Agreerrent is to define the types of infor-
[91]i
[93]| mation, administrative assistance and support to be furnished by the
[94]Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to the United States Secret Service so
[96]|
[98]that the Service may best fulfill its responsibilities to protect the person
[100]of the President of the United States while he is in the United States. The
[102]separate Agreement with the Secret Service.
[105]I
[106]|
[107]CIA role in support of Presidential trips abroad is the subject of a
[108]B. The terms of this Agreement shall be applied to the protection
[109]of members of the President's immediate family, the President-elect,
[110]| the Vice President or other officer next in the order of succession to
[111]|
[112]|
[114]the office of President, the Vice Presiijent-elect and former Presidents.
[115]| .
[117]| OU. General Responsibilities
[119]i
[121]A. The Secret Service has the responsibility for protecting the
[122]person of the President, It undertaker to identify individuals who, b--.ause
[123]| of their individual propensities or cnazacteristics, are dangerous 9~ .ho
[124]may pose a threat to the person of the President. It arranges whatever
[125]action is required to counteract any th eat to the person of ‘ e President
[127]posed by such individuals.
[129]{! CON TIDE TIAL
[131]13-00000 _
[133]gn a cS ee te ww mw etm . Fn A nel en TR
[135]CONFIDENTIAL
[137]| B. The CIA has primary responsibility for the clandestine collection
[138]tH ;
[140]' of foreign intelligence information, and for the correlation, evaluation
[142]1 and dissemination within the Government of foreign positive and counter
[143]intelligence. It gathers end maintains biographic and other data on
[145]| organizations and individuals, official and non-official, for the purpose of
[146]performing its statutory junctions. It also originates, and receives from
[147]other sources, reports on organizations and individuals. However, the
[149]|
[150]i
[151]|
[152]i
[153]|
[154]; Agency has no police, sulpoena or law-enforcement powers or internal-
[155]| .
[156]| security functions.
[158]i
[160]Ill. Information to be Revorted by CIA
[162]A. The CIA will furnish to the Secret Service information that comes :
[163]into its possession of the type set forth in Appendix A to this Agreement
[164]! concerning individuals coming to its attention of the classes set forth in
[165]:; Appendix B to this Agree:nent. The information may be furnished in more
[168]than one report, and in emergency situations priority attention will be
[170]i given to its preparation and delivery.
[172]B. After reportir.g an individual to the Secret Service, the CLA
[174]| will thereafter--unless the Secret Service otherwise requests--report to
[175]{ the Secret Service additional information which it thereafter receives or
[177]obtains concerning such individual.
[179]C. The CIA will Jurnish to the Secret Service intelligence and
[181]intelligence information tnat becomes available concerning:
[183]CONFIDENTIAL
[185]CONFIDENTIAL
[187](1) Groups outside the United States which advocate
[188]assassination of government officials as a political weapon
[189]and which appear to constitute an existing threat to the
[190]President or any persons named in Article 1, Paragraph B.
[191]above;
[193](2) Sabotage and assassination training by hostile
[194]intelligence services or groups and the identity of persons
[195]so trained who appear to constitute an existing threat to
[196]the President or any person named in Article I, Para-
[197]graph B. above;
[199](3) Plots in the United States or abroad to assassinate
[201]a Chief of State or other high official.
[203]D. . This agreement shall be reviewed by representatives of the CIA
[205]‘and the Secret Service annually, or at such more. frequent occasions as
[207]either the CIA or the Secret Service may request, to make certain that
[208]the system of reporting is both practicable and productive. Revisions
[209]may be made on the authority of the Deputy Director of the CIA and the
[211]Chief of the Secret Service.
[213]IV. Provision of CIA Personnel to Protect the President
[215].
[217]A. On occasion the use of a large number of armed officers is
[218]required to carry out the protective functions of the Secret Service due to
[219]such factors as the size of the crowds, the number of persons to be pro-
[220]tected or the existence of a national emergency. At such times CIA may,
[222]at the request of the Secret Service, detail some of its security officers
[224]CONFIDENTIAL
[226]CO NIL OENTIAL
[228]to the Secret Service in order :o augment the Service's capacity to carry
[230]out its protective functior.s in the most secure manner.
[232]B. Such officers detailed by tne CLA will be designated officers of
[233]the Secret Service under the direction and operational control of the Chief
[234]of the United States Secret Service. No person shall be so detailed unless
[235]he has qualified in the use of firearms either in accordance with standards
[236]established by the Chief cf the United States Secret Service, or in accord-
[237]ance with standards established by the Director of Security of the CIA.
[238]Persons so detailed will be authorized to carry firearms and to perform
[239]such other protective functions and duties as are authorized by law, as
[241]provided by section 3056 of title 18, United States Code, as amended.
[243]V. Implementation of Agreement
[245]A. The Secret Sezvice and the CIA undertake to maintain an active
[247]liaison to insure the pror:pi péssage cf available information concerning
[248]individuals reported to the Secret Service by the CIA and evaluated by
[250]the Secret Service as darnzerous to the President or any person named in
[251]Article I, Paragraph B. Furthermore, in order to effect the best possible
[252]security of such persons, the Secret Service and the CIA will take such
[253]steps as are necessary tc insure that the terms of this Agreement are
[255]fully carried out.
[257]Ceatral Intelligence Agency
[258]a
[262]a
[263]Datea: 27 Mores, Qos _ By e Sse ee
[264]Marshall S. Carter
[265]Deputy Director
[267]Uriicd States Secr.t Service
[269]IGN SIDE NTIAL Chiet \
[271]13-00000 _
[273]CONFIDENTIAL
[275]APPENDIX A
[277]Information to Be Furnished on Individuals Reported by the Central
[279]Intelligence Agency to the Secret Service
[281]1. Identification Date. - to the extent available to CIA, name or names of |
[282]i individual (includiag prior legal names, aliases and pseudonyms}, i
[283]address, photogrz ph (or staternent as to availability of such), physical
[285], description, date and place of birth, employment and marital status;
[287]2. Reason or Reasons for Reporting - statement of the class or classes
[289]in Appendix B, wkich the individual reported fits;
[291]CLA file on an ind:vidual reported which cause him to fit any class
[293]. i
[294]3. A summary or excerpts, as appropriate, of such portions ofany |
[295]or classes in Appendix B.
[297]|
[299]t
[301]|
[303]CONFIDENTIAL
[305]Se ee mmm ee ere
[307]2: doclinnrrmen ernie Geteininmeinymmnminnnmpeieetn a 8 Ne ee ee ee ee ee
[309]CONFIDENTIAL
[311]APPENDIX B
[313]Types of Individuals to Be Reported by the Central Intelligence Agency:
[315]to the Secret Service
[317]Individuals who have made threats of bodily harm against, or have
[318]attempted to cause bodily harm to, officials or employees of Federal,
[319]state or local Governments or foreign government officials while
[320]they are residing in or planning an imminent visit to this country;
[321]provided that such threats or acts are made against the Government
[323]official or employee because of his official status;
[325]Individuals who th:‘eaten or attempt to redress a real or imaginary
[326]grievance against Sederal, state or local Governments or any
[328]employee or official thereof by other than legal means;
[329]United States citiz2ns who defect or indicate a desire to defect;
[331]Nationals of any country in the Sino-Soviet Bloc (including the USSR
[332]and Communist China) located in the United States, and who have
[333]escaped from the contr6l of any such country, or who, being outside
[334]such jurisdiction ind control, are unwilling to return thereto, and
[335]who have been of : peciei interest or value to the United States, and
[336]who cannot be eliriinated as a possible source of danger to the
[338]President or any }erson named in Article I, Paragraph B;
[340]Subversives, com nunists, racists and fascists in the United States
[342]who meet one or riore of the following criteria:
[344]CONSIDENTIAL
[346]|
[347]|
[348]|
[349]|
[350]|
[352]'
[353]'
[354]'
[359]CONFIDENTIAL
[361](a) Evidence of emotional instability or irrational or
[362]suicidal behavior, particularly in persons who have a record
[363]of transitory residence or employment;
[365](b) Expressions of strong or violent anti-United States
[366]sentiment;
[368]{c) Prior acts (including arrest or convictions) or conduct
[369]or statements indicating a propensity for violence and antip-
[371]athy toward good order and government,
[373]The term ''subversives' shall mean persons (including members of
[374]the Communist Party and Communist front organizations) who
[375]knowingly or willfully advocate, abet, advise or teach the duty,
[376]necessity or propriety of overthrowing or destroying the Govern-
[377]ment of the Unitec. States or the government of any state, district
[378]or possession the.-eoi or the government of any political subdivision
[379]therein by force cr violence or by the assassination of any officer
[381]of any such government.
[383]CONFIDENTIAL
[385]13-00000 ,
[387]NEXT MONTH
[389]1284567
[390]8 910 111213 14
[391]15 16 17 18 1920 21
[392]22,25 24 25 26 27 28
[394]November ed
[399]10:15 j 250
[401]10:45, So yi 300
[402]11:00 - a 3:15 —
[403]11:15 ») 330
[404]11:30 | y, 3:45
[406]12:00 4:15 ave a aeakh af
[407]12:15 430 ES —
[408]12:30 445
[410]MEMORANDA
[411]326 Friday, November 22, 1963 39
[413]13-00000
[415]<a - [| 1:00
[416]a00d as cast ~ 1:15
[417]915 “Neou CO: O80
[420]cottage ee 10:00 BAS Me
[422]t
[426]so SS Se aes
[430]» 11:00 315 .
[432]" 11:90 | 3:45 | oO
[433]1145. |
[434]- : 12:00 1 415 .
[435]12:15 430
[437]rs [2:30 rv 8 on CARR Wes sé yo 4:45
[438]12:45 ‘ wee Wa w/e Wwngeivcr | 5:00
[440]MEMORANDA
[442]SAS Ways e | teen} wer me 6. Wane
[445]327 Sat, Nov. 23, 1963 38 328 Sun, Nov. 24, 1963 37
[447]i. a
[449]13-00000
[451]LAST MONTH
[453]163 OCTOBER 10963
[455]1963 NOVEMBER 13963 ©
[456]8
[458]8 M T WT iF
[460]1 2
[461]3456789
[462]10 11 12 13 14 15 16
[463]17 18 19 20 21 22 23
[464]24 25 26 27 28 29 30
[466]Big tia ok eo Tag
[474]9:45 | 2:00 -
[476]10:00 Lanier Ys ger ‘we ™~* C tek 2:15
[478]10:15 a ned Qed ‘] 2306
[481]10-45 | 3:00. oS = x . wd var } a
[482]11:00 | Psap ss
[484]11:30 , 7 3:45 ;
[488]12:00 Pes Sat Moy AE 4:15
[490]12:15, | Paso. i
[495]Cir cLh A ssa Newopber 25,1989, Derr edagy
[498]13-00000
[500]y
[502]14 February 1964
[504]MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
[506]SUBJECT: Special Group (5412) Meeting at 1600 on 13 February
[508]1, Present were Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Mr. McCone,
[509]Mr. Vance, General Taylor, Mr. Alexis Johnson, Mr. Mann,
[510]General Carter, Mr. FitzGerald, and Peter Jessup. General
[511]Taylor and Mr. FitzGerald were present. only for the Cuban
[512]item,
[514]2. Prior to the arrival of Mr. Bundy, General Taylor
[515]mentioned to Mr. Alexis Johnson an upcoming trip of the Joint
[516]Chiefs of Staff to Norfolk, Fort Bragg, and Panama, After
[517]some jocular bantering, Mr. Johnson vetoed the Panama portion
[518]‘of the trip, with General Taylor hoping that this denial was
[519]purely for the physical protection of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
[521]3. Mr. McCone mentioned the possibility that he might
[522]go to Saigon next week to see what was going on out there. He
[523]stated that we were not getting sufficient timely information
[524]from the Ambassador and that while he and Mr. McNamara
[525]might be going out later as a follow-up to their December trip,
[526]he felt the need to go now. General Taylor pointed out that
[527]there have been a great many visitors to Saigon in recent months
[528]and perhaps we should give them a rest out there for a while.
[530]In any event, he thought perhaps the newly-created NSAM com-
[531]mittee headed by Sullivan would want to make sucha trip, General
[532]Taylor seemed reluctant to have Mr. McCone go at this time.
[534]Mr. Johnson said he would take a look at it and be in touch with
[535]Mr. McCone early next week,
[537]4, The first item on the agenda was a discussion of
[538]the Vance memo of 10 February on "Clandestine and Covert
[539]Activities Against Cuba.'' Mr. Vance stated that he was strongly .
[540]for this course of action, that the risks were minimal, and that
[542]13-00000
[546]the JCS and Secretary McNamara also strongly supported it.
[547]Mr. Johnson pointed out that he would be much happier if the
[548]paper had been sent to the Cuban Coordinating Committee in
[550]accordance with usual procedures, Mr. Vance stated that the
[552]committee knows all about it and are for it. Mr. McCone
[553]stated that he was disturbed over the trend of events in Cuba
[554]and that this particular paper really does not go far enough.
[555]He pointed out that our economic denial program was eroding
[556]away and that the courses of action proposed by Mr. Vance's
[557]memo gave Castro maximum grounds for righteous indignation
[558]without really accomplishing anything, Mr. Vance stated that
[559]prior activities in this regard had created great consternation
[560]in Cuba, and Bundy challenged this and asked for proof, Mr,
[561]McCone pointed out the many times that we have had to stand
[562]down actions of this type in order to avoid raising the noise
[563]level. General Taylor said that what we really must do is to
[564]reaffirm the belief of the senior policy makers to the President
[565]that a program of this type must be continued. Mr. Bundy
[566]pointed out that the Secretary of Defense had previously stated
[567]to the President, along with Secretary Rusk, that they were
[568]not enthusiastic for this type of activity but he noted now that
[569]Mr. McNamara had reversed his position. Bundy pointed out
[570]that we have been somewhat hesitant to go ahead full force on
[571]these actions because we did not want to prejudice our position
[572]before the OAS in connection with the Venezuelan arms cache.
[573]Mann stated that our entire program as regards Cuba was
[574]ineffective insofar as it could result in any overthrow of Castro,
[575]At about this point both Mr. Mann and Mr. McCone stated that
[576]we should do everything possible to create provocations and
[577]distressing actions against Castro. Bundy stated that the low
[578]risk actions appear unrewarding and that rewarding actions have
[579]too high a risk, Mann stated that we need to do a lot more
[580]homework before the next OAS meeting (presently unscheduled)
[581]and Bundy said in any event we must have a top-level Cabinet
[582]Meeting with the President to discuss this whole matter, The
[583]agenda item was left as follows:
[585]a. Mann is to get the Crimmins staff hard at work
[586]on the Vance paper and on other alternative courses
[587]of action to include pros and cons, noise levels,
[588]estimated results, etc.
[590]13-00000
[592]b. Mann is to send around a draft OAS resolution
[593]which was prepared during Martin's time.
[595]c. As to the specific paragraphs of the Vance
[596]memo, Bundy indicated his personal views (not an
[597]Administration commitment) that items 1 and 2a were
[598]OK; 2b for Cuban ships only; 3a should be intensified;
[599]3b and 3c were directly connected to a separate black-
[600]list enterprise; 4 was OK. As for actions against
[601]Cuban subversion in Latin America, on paragraph 1 we
[602]should see just what our opportunities are, and on para-
[603]graph 2 CIA should determine just what we think the
[604]local traffic will bear and just what our capabilities
[605]might be. .
[607]Finally, after a very short discussion on low-level reconnaissance
[608]requirements for Cuba, General Taylor and Mr. McCone decided
[609]to pay close attention to high-level results on Friday, Saturday,
[610]and Sunday, and to take a fresh reading on the matter on Monday.
[611]Action: DD/I to cover the low-level matter over the weekend,
[612]DD/P to ride herd on the activities generated by the Vance memo,
[614]5. The next item was a very cursory review of the
[615]covert action programs for” ‘Japan, France, Tibet, . ‘Taiwan;. and
[616]China. Mr. Vance asked how we could measure the effectiveness
[617]of such actions and Mr. McCone pointed out to him that this could
[618]not be: really adequately measured and gave all the reasons therefor,
[619]Mr. Vance stated that he was just getting broken into this type of
[620]activity and he would appreciate some briefings by the action
[621]officers, (It was subsequently arranged through Pete Jessup to
[622]have Colby and Bill O'Ryan make appointments with Secretary Vance
[623]specifically to discuss French operations and our Far Eastern
[624]operations,
[626]6. Mr. McCone then brought up the matter of the SAC U-2
[627]aircraft in Manila as covered in his memorandum of 13 February
[628]which was not given any distribution. Mr. McCone said that ever
[629]since 1954 it had been established policy that all reconnaissance —
[630]flights over denied and unfriendly territory or covert flights over
[632]13-00000
[634]. friendly territory were a responsibility of the Director of
[636]Central Intelligence with the customary approvals of the Special
[637]Group and that he wished this policy reaffirmed and proper
[638]direction be given so that the DCI would designate the organiza~
[639]tion and resources to be used, either SAC.or CIA, Mr. Vance
[640]stated that NRO was involved and that upon receiving the urgent
[641]requirement from CINCPAC for this single flight and upon
[642]learning that the Taiwan assets were stood down because of fuel
[643]control problems, the JCS, Mr. McNamara, and he had agreed
[644]that SAC should fly the flight. He stated that Mr. McAfee of the
[645]State Department had been informed on Sunday night and that
[646]the Base Commander in the Philippines also knew about it. He
[647]stated that there were only two targets concerned and that with
[648]luck they could be obtained with a single flight. Mr. McCone >
[649]pointed out that the question had not been raised with him by
[650]Steakley as to military aircraft or sanitized aircraft nor was he
[651]aware of the cover plan that might be utilized in the event of
[652]difficulties, Mr, Vance stated it would be the regular cover
[653]plan of a weather ship off course. Vance said this was a one-
[654]shot problem only and that as soon as it was completed, the
[655]planes and crews would be withdrawn. He said both he and
[657]‘McNamara were greatly surprised when they learned that SAC
[659]had sent three airplanes and seven crews to perform this single
[660]mission. He said they could understand the need for. two air-
[661]planes in case one aborted but certainly not this large contingent.
[662]He said this had no connection with the South Vietmam broad
[663]coverage mapping and that the Taiwan assets should be used for
[664]this.
[666]7. It was apparent that all were in agreement that the
[667]Director of Central Intelligence had the responsibility for |
[668]approving requirements for photo coverage and for determining
[669]the appropriate resources to be used for this coverage whenever
[670]it required overflights of denied or hostile territory or whenever
[671]it required covert flights over friendly territory, Mr, Bundy
[672]stated that the DCI should prepare the necessary directive to
[673]this effect and circulate it to the other members of the Special
[674]Group for their approval at the next meeting. Action: DD/S&T
[676]13-00000
[680]to prepare for me by no later than noon Monday the simplest,
[681]most concise, directive along the foregoing lines.
[683]Marshall S, Carter
[685]Lieutenant General, USA
[686]Deputy Director
[688]Distribution:
[689]Original - DDCI
[691]1 - Elder/Enright
[692]Paras 1-5 to Mr, Paul Eckel DDP/SGO
[694]Paras 6 & 7 - DD/S&T
[696]13-Q0009
[700]So , f . -
[701]QTRAL floloc ty ti.
[705]18 January 1964
[707]MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
[709]SUBJECT: Disarmament Meeting on 18 January 1964
[710]at the White House
[712]‘1. At 2:45 this date Mr. Alexis Johnson informed me that
[713]there would be a meeting with the President at 3:15 p.m., in
[714]the White House to discuss the most recent revision of his
[715]proposed statement to the Geneva Conference, and that I was
[716]expected to be there. Upon arriving at the meeting place I was
[717]handed a draft by Adrian Fisher, It subsequently developed
[718]that McNamara, Rusk, Taylor, and the President must have
[719]had this draft for at least long enough to have thoroughly reviewed
[720]and considered it. In.any event, I read it immediately and was
[721]struck by the fact that in those areas of the original draft as
[722]given to Mr. McCone by Dr. Scoville in which the DCI had taken
[723]exception, ameliorating language had been inserted in the new
[724]draft to considerably temper and meet objections of Mr. McCone.
[725]The draft was now much more a speech by the President as to
[726]what he hoped might develop as a result of mutual give and take
[727]rather than a statement of U. S. policy and definite intentions.
[729]2. The President entered the room shortly, accompanied
[730]by Bill Moyer and Jack Valenti. Others present were Rusk,
[731]McNamara, General Taylor, Dr. Seaborg, Adrian Fisher, and
[732]myself. Alexis Johnson was not present.
[734]3. The President opened by stating that he had read the
[735]revised draft and wanted to know if there were any objections to
[736]it. Dr. Seaborg pointed out that he had some hesitancy about
[737]opening totally his closed-down plants for international inspection
[738](paragraph 3, page 3) but that there were many ways of deter-
[739]mining whether or not the reactor was in fact shut down -- he
[740]simply did not want to give carte blanche to inspectors overrunning
[741]the entire plant. This position was adopted. Dr. Seaborg then
[744]13-0000
[748]'
[749]é .
[751]u.
[754]on
[756]1
[758]said that he wanted it understood that the closing down of the .
[759]plants was not necessarily a permanent commitment and that
[760]whenever it became necessary or desirable, in the absence
[761]of international agreement to the contrary, we should retain
[762]complete freedom of action to reopen a reactor any time we
[763]chose. This position was agreed,
[765]4, Mr. McNamara pointed out that he had been working
[766]steadily the last few days to get agreement in the Pentagon on
[767]a paper substantially in accord with this draft and that the only
[768]thing that now gave them a problem was subparagraph (c) on
[769]page 4 as to the establishment of nuclear-free zones. He said
[770]if this could be deleted, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
[771]Department of Defense would buy the paper. Their concern
[772]was that we would get so involved in these zones that we would
[773]lose freedom of action to shift nuclear weapons through the
[774]Canal Zone, for example, or by air through overflights.
[775]Secretary Rusk pointed out that they had discussed this a num-
[776]ber of times before, that it was nothing new, and that he would
[777]hope we could establish nuclear-free zones in Latin America
[778]and Africa for example. The President said that when the
[779]crunch came he depended on the Joint Chiefs of Staff and that
[780]he must have them on his side. Accordingly the paragraph on
[781]nuclear-free zones was eliminated.
[783]5. I then stated that the President should know that there
[784]was on record a letter from Mr. McCone pointing out some
[785]problem areas that could develop in a number of these points,
[786]particularly as to our getting bac gnto a position of letting up
[787]on the need for full and adequate verification. I further said
[788]that aside from the intelligence aspects of the problem, there
[789]were certain policy matters as regards reaction of West Germany,
[790]and particularly France, that should be considered. The President
[791]then asked for Mr. McCone's letter and glanced through it rather
[792]hurriedly. General Taylor asked to see the letter and he did the
[793]same. I-then gave a copy to Secretary Rusk, particularly pointing
[794]out those portions of DCI's letter concerning his membership on
[795]the Committee of Principals and his reservations at the policy
[798]13-00000
[800]al
[801]EYes toy
[804]level. Mr. Rusk indicated he had seen Mr. McCone's letter.
[805](Subsequently Mr. Adrian Fisher stated that they had worked
[806]all afternoon and. most of the night in revising the original
[808]draft to meet the objections raised by the DCI and he thought
[810]that they had moderated their language and weasel-worded the
[811]statement adequately to meet DCI's objections.) The President
[812]then asked me if I had any specific, further objections to the
[813]statement now that the nuclear-free zone problem had been
[814]eliminated and that the DCI's letter was on record. 1 stated
[815]that depending upon what was actually finally determined as an
[816]international agreement, we might be in serious trouble on
[818]‘verification but that this problem would come later. I felt that
[820]as a statement by the President there was adequate protection
[822]in future negotiations to ensure the best interests of the United
[823]States, (I subsequently checked with Adrian Fisher who assured
[824]me that there was no backoff in ACDA and State from the require-
[825]ment for adequate verification and that the additional words
[826]inserted in the latest draft were specifically to meet DCI's prior
[827]objections. In other words, DCI's letter of comment is a matter
[828]of record with the President and the other principals at the
[829]meeting, and the President commented that the Central Intel-
[830]ligence Agency was certainly a smooth-operating outfit. It was
[831]obvious that he had his tongue in his cheek in this regard to
[832]indicate that we not only covered our rear but our flanks as well.)
[833]The President then directed a number of actions as regards
[834]Congressional briefings, preparation of a talk for him to make
[836]to the American public in explanation of his Geneva Conference
[837]statement, In connection with this speech for American con-
[838]sumption, he directed that it be prepared so that any tenant
[839]farmer could understand it -- ten words per sentence, four sen-
[840]tences per paragraph, and four-letter words throughout.
[842]6. This ended discussion of the Geneva Conference statement,
[843]7. New subjects:
[845]a. There was then a discussion of a letter to Khrushchev
[846]but I was not aware of the contents nor were the contents
[848]mentioned. _-The discussion revolved around the date at which
[849]such a letter would be made public.
[851]nn s |
[852]we. tone
[853]ho
[855]13-00000
[857]ne Lee Bi
[859]webs
[861]EYes GY
[865]b, The President then expressed his great concern
[866]over the emergent situation in Panama. He said that he
[867]had proposed injecting himself directly into the problem
[868]yesterday with a public statement and approaches to the
[869]OAS specifically to lay down publicly exactly what the facts
[870]were as regards Panamian aggression, intrusions into the
[871]Zone, killing of American soldiers with rifle bullets by
[872]snipers while they were armed only with bird shot, etc.,
[873]etc. He said that he had been dissuaded from this course
[874]by the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State and
[875]others. -He said he was shocked to read in this morning's
[876]New York Times a story (presumably the Tad Szulc article)
[877]that pretty well covered exactly what his proposals were.
[878]He said he still felt if was a good idea and that he thought
[879]Harriman, Rusk, McNamara, Johnson, and others should
[880]assemble small groups of Latin American Ambassadors and
[881]tell them what he, the President, wanted to tell them. He
[882]thought it was an even better idea if he did it himself. I did
[883]not get the impression that a decision was made in this
[884]regard nor do I think any action will be takenas a result of
[885]this meeting. Unfortunately the discussion centered then
[886]on the security aspects of leaks to the public and the President
[887]expressed in no uncertain terms, with great persuasiveness
[888]and even more emphasis, his unhappiness at his complete
[889]inability to say anything to anyone without its immediately’
[890]being in the papers or getting around town. He made some
[891]very pointed comments reflecting on the integrity of the State
[892]Department and of the Department of Defense in this regard.
[893]He felt. the situation had become extremely serious in the past
[894]two months since he had become President and did not recall |
[895]any such problem when he was meeting periodically with
[896]President Kennedy. He said he was prepared to clean house
[897]wherever necessary to overcome this. Secretary Rusk pointed
[898]out that this had been going on for twenty years and was nothing
[899]new and McNamara agreed. The President thought it was
[900]worse than he had ever seen it before and that in his 22 years
[901]on the Armed Services Committee and around the Hill he had
[902]never been involved in anything like this nor had he ever been
[904]13-00000
[906]ra
[908]eaten | kent
[909]whee
[911]| rene
[913]FS CY
[917]bothered by reporters once he had made it clear that he
[918]was not the talking kind. No decisions were taken, no
[919]actions directed although both Rusk and McNamara indi-
[920]cated they would immediately take whatever steps were
[921]feasible to improve the situation.
[923]c. The President then reverted to Cuba and said that
[924]he questioned seriously whether these sabotage efforts were
[925]the proper thing for the U. S. to be doing. He thought they
[926]were both hypocritical and ineffectual and while he under-
[927]stood the need for some of them to maintain the morale of
[928]internal dissidents to the Castro regime and to maintain the
[929]morale of Cuban exiles, he thought probably these consider-
[930]ations were outweighed by the hypocrisy of our seeking peace
[931]and talking peace and conducting this sort of activity on the
[932]side. Rusk said that he had never been in favor of this pro-
[933]gram and had the same doubts the President did. McNamara
[934]said that he too had never been in favor of this program and
[935]questioned our participation. I stated that while this program
[937]_ was conducted by the CIA, every action taken had the full
[939]approval of the Special Group on which the Secretary of State
[940]and the Secretary of Defense were adequately represented
[941]and that the program was designed in part for the specific
[942]purpose of generating internal sabotage and dissidents with
[943]a view to creating as many problems as possible for Castro
[944]and with a view to getting an escalation of anti-Castro activi-
[945]ties in Cuba, that over the long run any type of effort such
[946]as this was an irritant to Castro and that such action had
[947]some effect, even though slight, on the Cuban economy. I
[948]said that over the long run you could not expect the Castro
[949]regime to fall from these actions alone but that every little
[950]bit helped, and that we had noticed over the past four months
[951]a considerable increase in sabotage actions generated from
[952]internal Cuban elements over which we exercised no coiitrol.
[953]I said that I could not take exception to the fact that this
[954]policy was a hypocritical one in the light of a peace offensive
[955]although I did not feel we were trying to make peace with
[956]Castro, I also pointed out that sabotage activities in North
[958]CET
[960]Ralech
[962]EVES CAly
[964]13-00000
[968]Sele
[970]Eis cad
[972]Vietnam likewise had hypocritical aspects. At this point
[973]Mr. McNamara demurred and said North Vietnam was an
[974]entirely different matter but he gave no reasons therefor
[975]and this point was not developed further. General Taylor
[976]noted that in connection with sabotage operations they kept
[977]Castro constantly on the alert and kept his forces heavily
[978]occupied running hither and yon. The President noted that
[979]this was probably true but so little gain in it and generally
[980]seemed disaffected with sabotage efforts. Rusk pointed out
[981]that there was some value in maintaining some pressure of |
[982]this type since to completely desist would eventually lead
[983]Castro to believe that he was immune from retaliation. The
[985].President then directed that he wanted a complete review
[987]of our Cuban policy and some new, imaginative thinking
[988]developed. I stated that this was presently heavily in train
[989]in all appropriate agencies of the Government, and Rusk and
[990]McNamara nodded their agreement. The President said he
[991]would want to meet as soon as people had drawn up their
[992]proposals. In connection with Cuba the President noted that
[993]he continued to desire the most drastic pressures on our .
[994]Allies to insist upon their cooperation and assistance and
[995]compliance in our economic denial program against Cuba.
[996]He said that Segni and Erhard had both assured him we could
[997]count on the full cooperation of Italy and West Germany to
[998]cease any further Cuban trade. He said he wanted similar
[999]discussions prepared for him whenever he met these leaders
[1000]and for our leaders to take the same line in any discussions
[1001]they might have.
[1003]There was minor discussion as regards the situation
[1005]in BES Vietnam with no one indicating any great enthusiasm
[1006]or any great surge of hopefulness as to the present situation,
[1007]The President stated he was most unhappy to be making a
[1008]speech indicating that things were improving and then to have
[1009]a USIA spokesman and an Embassy spokesman state in Saigon
[1010]that things were falling apart. He said somebody was getting
[1011]poor advice as well as poor information and he was inclined
[1012]to think it was he. He said that he was new in the job and _
[1013]that he had in the past several months based his actions on
[1017]EVES ——s
[1019]13-00000
[1021]the advice and guidance he had received from his principal
[1022]advisers whom he considered professionals and experts ~
[1023]in their fields. He said he was beginning to have serious
[1024]doubts that his own judgment had been wrong in a number
[1026]of cases although he was the first to admit that he had been
[1027]wrong in the past throughout his life at various times and
[1028]was certainly no more immune than anyone else from
[1029]making mistakes. I got the distinct impression that he was
[1030]mighty unhappy with some of the actions he has taken as a
[1031]result of recommendations from State. I also got the feeling
[1032]that from here on out he is much more liable to use his own
[1033]intuition and prescience as to what should be done and what
[1034]should not be done in the daily operations of his actions in
[1035]the foreign policy field.
[1037]e. Turning to more pleasant matters, the President
[1038]noted that the dinner he had given for the Congressional
[1039]Committee leadership had been a complete success and that
[1040]he was going to repeat it again on the 23rd and the 30th. He
[1041]had received nothing but highly favorable accolades from
[1042]the people who had attended and many of them indicated it
[1043]was the first time they had ever been in the White House and
[1044]certainly the first time they had had an adequate briefing by
[1045]the Administration leadership: The President said that he -
[1046]had received a phone call saying that he should continue this
[1047]and he was certainly going to do so. He had also been
[1048]promised that at least in large measure as a result of this
[1049]briefing he would have a tax bill reported out by Wednesday.
[1050]The President then said we could do a lot better. He told
[1052]“Rusk and McNamara that they should take a nap in the after-
[1054]noon prior to these two dinners so they would be much
[1055]fresher and more alert -- that they had done an A No. 1 job
[1056]but not quite up to the caliber that they had put on for the
[1057]labor leaders -- in his mind that performance could not have
[1058]been better, The President said he had planned for the
[1059]briefing to be twenty minutes and that instead it had lasted
[1060]an hour. He said that this was entirely too long and that
[1061]Mr. McCone alone had spoken for seventeen minutes. He
[1063]SENT]
[1065]Se,
[1067]EVES GY
[1070]13-00000 st .
[1071]-" OL EhCi
[1073]EVES G::LV
[1075]then said that for the next two dinners he was going to have
[1076]only two briefers and the briefing would be scheduled for
[1077]fifteen minutes and that twenty minutes was the absolute
[1078]maximum he:would sit still for. He said he wanted Mr.
[1079]Rusk and Mr. McNamara to work this out together, with
[1080]Mr. McNamara covering both the U. S. military and the
[1081]Soviet military as covered by Mr. McCone, and Rusk
[1082]covering the Soviet economy and the world roundup as
[1083]covered by Rusk and McCone at the last hearing. I sub-
[1084]sequently checked with Bill Moyer to determine whether.
[1085]‘this was a change from the President's instructions to Mr.
[1086]McCone or whether it might have been an oversight. Mr.
[1087]Moyer stated that the President had given much thought to
[1088]this and since Mr. McCone would be away, he had changed
[1089]the system to the one just enumerated. This makes abun-
[1090]dant sense to me under the circumstances and I considered
[1091]any further discussion either with Moyer or the President
[1092]inappropriate.
[1094]8. The meeting then broke up at 4:15 because the President
[1095]had to go out to dedicate a building.
[1097]9. The foregoing notes are ina single copy and will be shown
[1098]only to the Director upon his return.. Any actions indicated will
[1099]be directed by me at the Monday morning meeting. I will send a
[1100]very short, sanitized report of this meeting to Mr. McCone by
[1102]cable.
[1103]| iz -.
[1105]Marshall S, Carter
[1106]_ Lieutenant General; USA’
[1107]Acting Director
[1109]Sera]
[1110]EYES 2
[1112]1, The background as to the purpose of this visit is covered
[1113]in my Memorandum for the Record dated | January on my visit to
[1114]Independence to see Mr. Truman, ,
[1116]2. We departed Kansas City airport in the early afternoon
[1117]of 31 December, arriving at the Johnson City airport ghortly before
[1118]3:00. This airport was built by President Johnson in his own back
[1119]yard and was subsequently turned over to Johnson City as their
[1120]airport. We were taken to the Johnson residence and made com-
[1121]fortable in the combination office-sitting room just off the dining
[1122]room. Coffee was served and ina few moments the President and
[1123]Mrs. Johnson joined us. After appropriate welcoming to the ranch,
[1124]Mrs. Johnson retired to her household chores.
[1126]3. Mr. Murphy briefed the President on our discussions
[1127]with Mr. Truman and reported to the President Mr. Truman's
[1128]desire to help in any way he could during the coming year. Mr.
[1130]‘Murphy followed generally the comments indicated in my previous
[1132]memorandum as put forward by Mr. Truman. I thought he gave a
[1133]much too favorable report on Mr. Truman's condition and mental
[1135]agility. This was understandable to me since Murphy is one of the
[1137]junior old cronies of Mr. Truman. The President asked me for
[1139]" my reaction and I gave it substantially in accordance with the last
[1141]paragraph of my Truman memorandum. I told the President that
[1142]I certainly felt Mr. Truman was willing to do anything he could or
[1143]was asked to do to assist President Johnson; that my own reaction
[1144]was that Mr. Truman was in some respects senile and living 90%
[1146]on memories and his past. I stated that I thought there was certainly
[1148]nothing wrong with Mr. Truman's mind or alertness but that I felt
[1149]some caution should be exercised in just how Mr. Truman's assets
[1150]might be utilized. The President made no comment except to note
[1152]13-00000
[1154]-2-.
[1156]wryly that he himself occasionally had problems with his memory
[1157]but that he did not think he was yet living with it entirely. The
[1158]President then noted that we should have been briefing Mr. Truman
[1159]more often and that perhaps had we done so, it would have pre-
[1160]vented the type of article he had recently published about the CIA.
[1161]The President then stated that he wanted President Hoover,
[1162]President Eisenhower, and President Truman briefed monthly on
[1163]the international situation as well as on the domestic situation
[1165]and what his programs were. (Action: This requires follow-up
[1166]with the White House and possibly a discussion between Mr. McCone
[1167]and the President since Mr. McCone indicated informally that he
[1168]thought once a month was too often and that, in any event, while
[1170]CIA can handle the international situation, we should have some
[1171]other agency handle the domestic situation. )
[1173]4. The President then made a number of statements which
[1174]seemed to be in part his philosophy of operations and in others a
[1175]repetition of his conversation with Erhard. It was difficult to
[1176]separate when he was repeating what he had said to Erhard and
[1177]when he was stating a Johnson principle.
[1179]5. The President stated that he was much taken with Erhard
[1180]and that he thought him a smart, articulate German who was much
[1181]more appealing than Adenauer. Erhard apparently attempted to
[1182]feel the President out as to his reactions to various statements and
[1183]positions taken by deGaulle. The President got the impression that
[1184]Erhard was initially trying to play off deGaulle against the President.
[1185]Mr. Johnson told Erhard that as far as he, Mr. Johnson, was con-
[1186]cerned, he was going to do everything possible to promote a peaceful
[1187]world but without in any way relaxing either our guard or our military
[1188]strength; he was prepared to walk around the world if necessary to
[1189]promote peace when he was convinced that such walking would assist --
[1190]on the other hand, he had no intention of making trips just to cultivate
[1191]friends and promote the giving away of U. S. resources in an effort
[1192]to entice people to join our camp; if they wanted to come in willingly
[1194]. with their eyes open, he would welcome them but he felt it was time
[1196]for other nations to do some thinking on their own and to make their
[1198]13-00000
[1202]own judgments without the need for U. S, persuasion in the form ;
[1203]of concrete financial and military aid. Accordingly, the President
[1204]intended to stay home and do his own heavy thinking as to just
[1206]how he can best promote peace -- if this led to trips, then he
[1208]would take trips. If people wanted to come to see him to talk
[1210]about peace or other matters, he would be delighted to receive
[1211]them but there must be something worthwhile to talk about and
[1212]something that will lead in the proper direction. He said that
[1213]during his lifetime the United States had been forced to fight two
[1214]wars because of Germany and that he was not going to allow any
[1215]situation to develop which might lead in that direction again so long
[1216]as he was President, He said he would not be a party to any shilly-
[1217]shallying in that direction and that Germany must make up its own
[1218]mind and see which way they intend to go. If it were going to be
[1219]toward deGaulle, then say so. If it were going to be toward the
[1220]United States and its concept of a free world, then say so and prove
[1221]it by putting more effort into their actions in this regard -- more
[1222]effort in the way of more money and more support of United States
[1223]policies. He told Erhard that this was the way he felt and there
[1224]was no point in Erhard trying to play off deGaulle against President
[1225]Johnson nor to try to get Germany in the middle between those two
[1226]nations. The President said that Erhard apparently accepted this
[1227]frank talk and for the rest of the visit never once mentioned deGaulle.
[1229]6. The President then directed that Salinger acquire from
[1230]USIA and CIA a roundup of world reaction as to Erhard's visit. He
[1231]said that if we did not make any money on that deal, we might just
[1232]as well fold-up our tent insofar as influencing foreign visitors was
[1233]concerned because he, the President, had really put out and had
[1234]really talked turkey to Erhard -- which was the only way he, the
[1235]President, knew how to talk. He said that this administration was
[1236]being criticized for either having no foreign policy or a poor one
[1237]and that he therefore wanted as much publicity as possible on the
[1238]highly favorable aspects of the Erhard visit. (I subsequently had
[1239]a CIA report prepared and forwarded to Salinger onl January,
[1240]pointing out that it was an initial report and that a real reading on
[1241]Ambassadorial and Governmental reactions would be coming along
[1243]13-00000
[1247]later since it takes more time to acquire these from somewhat
[1248]sensitive sources.
[1250]7. The President then went on to say that people seem to
[1251]have the impression he was going to sit back and try to keep things
[1252]on an even keel so as not to disturb the upcoming election. He
[1253]said that this was a wrong impression for people to have and that
[1254]he intended to do everything he possibly could to ensure maintaining
[1255]and augmenting the great forward momentum that President Kennedy
[1256]had been developing toward world peace and proper domestic
[1257]policies. He said that this was a time for real action and that the
[1258]United States must get itself out of this trend of thought that it sits
[1259]back and reacts to others' actions rather than creates actions of
[1260]its own. He is tired of reacting -- he wants to act and let others
[1261]react to him and this is one of the things he intends to think about
[1262]during upcoming months. He therefore urges the most imaginative
[1264]thinking possible both in and out of Government to see how best his
[1266]ends can be attained. He pointed out that this. was not going to be
[1267]easy because this was an election year and lots of people would be
[1268]looking for ways to attack him and his policies. He said, however,
[1269]that he could not sit by and watch this opportunity for promoting
[1270]peace and understanding among nations to dissipate simply because
[1271]it was an election year in which he would be politically involved. —
[1273]8. The President then said that he had been totally dis-
[1274]satisfied with what the State Department had proposed he send to
[1275]Khrushchev and he had therefore sat down at the desk (pointing) and
[1276]had in his own handwriting composed the New Year's message to
[1277]Khrushchev. He intended to continue to promote every possibility
[1278]for a basis of understanding looking toward peace and again reiterated
[1279]that any agreement would never be at the expense of our own security.
[1281]9. He then asked me for a briefing of any current situations
[1282]that he should be brought up to date on. [ brought him up to date on
[1283]Cyprus, on Cuba, and on South Vietnam since he had indicated that
[1284]he had read recent Checklists.
[1286]13-00000
[1290]10, As to Cuba, he stated his dissatisfaction with our
[1291]present policies and actions connected therewith and said that
[1292]shortly after his return to Washington, and probably after the
[1293]State of the Union message, he wanted a comprehensive review
[1294]of the Cuban situation and our policies and he wanted the most
[1295]imaginative and forward thinking people put to work on seeing
[1296]what else could be done. He did not feel the sabotage efforts
[1297]would ever really result in any ultimate goals for U. S, interests
[1298]but was prepared to accept some of them if they promote internal
[1299]dissidents and assisted the morale of the people we were working
[1300]with in Cuba, He stated he was not at all satisfied with the
[1301]Governmental actions taken thus far to curtail free world trade
[1302]with Cuba, He said he had told Erhard that he could not tolerate
[1303]West German trade with Cuba and that Erhard had assured him
[1304]that while it was very small, he would put a complete stop to it
[1305]as soon as he returned to Germany. The President directed that
[1306]thorough preparation be made so that when Pearson visits the
[1307]United States, Mr. Johnson can take him on in the same manner
[1308]and similar preparations should be made for other free world
[1309]countries doing appreciable business with Castro.
[1311]ll. There was thena discussion with Staats and Murphy
[1312]about some sort of pork barrel program which was to be canceled
[1313]and which Hubert Humphrey and Elvis Stahr had taken violent
[1314]exception to. Apparently the President had received a vitriolic
[1315]letter from Elvis Stahr about this matter because he commented
[1316]that he now understood why Stahr had made such an inadequate
[1317]Secretary of the Army. The lines of action directed by the
[1318]President as to preparation of responses was not a matter for CIA,
[1320]12, There was then a discussion as to some sort of adjust-
[1321]ment in tax procedures which, by reducing a figure from 15 to 14,
[1322]would save some $800 million this year. Neither Mike Forrestal
[1323]nor I heard this loud and clear but I think it had to do with adjusting
[1324]withholding tax deductions. In any event, no decision was reached
[1325]by the President and the conversation was directly with Staats and
[1326]not for the rest of the group.
[1328]13-00000 -
[1332]13. The President then turned to Indonesia and stated that
[1333]he was faced with the necessity of making a decision as to whether
[1334]or not it was in the national interest to continue aid to Indonesia.
[1335]This decision had to be made by him in accordance with the foreign
[1336]aid bill just passed. He said he wanted in writing from Secretary
[1337]Rusk, Secretary McNamara, and Mr. McCone their recommendations
[1338]as to what his decision should be, He also wanted to get reactions
[1339]from Senator Russell and several other Congressional leaders. He
[1340]quoted a figure of $25 million which was involved. (Action: The .
[1342]: wheels are grinding in the Agency to come up with a pro and con and
[1343]consequences paper for the Director upon which he may make his
[1344]. recommendation to the President. The figures are somewhat con-
[1346]fused and the actual amount appears to be in the neighborhood of
[1347]$60 million. Mike Forrestal has these figures pretty well tied down
[1349]and points out that the Presidential decision does not require any
[1351]action on PL 480 funds. )
[1353]14, The President then stated that he was totally dissatisfied
[1354]with the proposed program for alleviating poverty which apparently
[1355]suggested that he ask Congressional authorization for a lump sum
[1356]of money which he would administer through some sort of newly-
[1357]created poverty administration, He said he wouldn't touch it with _
[1358]a ten-foot pole and that if he proposed anything like that on the Hill,
[1359]they would laugh him out of court and it would probably bring a
[1360]defeat in the Democratic party in the upcoming elections. He would
[1361]give absolutely no consideration to anything which could possibly
[1362]result in graft or pork barrel activities, Any program for the
[1363]relief of poverty must be designed to get right down to the grass
[1364]roots out where the poverty actually exists and must be handled by
[1365]existing Federal, State, and community organizations which are
[1366]geared in this direction. He mentioned specifically the possibility
[1367]of utilizing the Bureau of Public Roads and other similar Federal
[1368]and State organizations. He said that if roads are to be built, they
[1369]should be built into and out of poverty-stricken areas and to pro-
[1370]vide access to schools and hospitals and such human needs activities
[1371]and not, repeat not, for the improvement of major trunk lines and
[1372]highways. He thought perhaps the people who were receiving this
[1374]13-00000
[1378]type of aid could be utilized in the construction of these roads
[1379]where they would see the results of what they were doing and the
[1380]purpose of it. He stated that any attempt to organize a new
[1381]administrative entity to handle this matter would not even get
[1383]off the ground before the year was out and would merely result
[1385]in more Government people on the payroll and more bureaucracy,
[1386]He directed an immediate reappraisal of his program for the
[1387]relief of poverty and coming up with an entirely different concept
[1388]for his approval. Mr. Staats and Mr. Murphy indicated they would
[1389]follow through on this.
[1391]15. The foregoing covers all pertinent points to the best
[1392]of my recollection, I shall write a separate memorandum of the
[1393]tour President Johnson gave us of his ranch and with particular
[1394]attention to. the fact that he built and paid for every improvement
[1395]on the place out of his own pocket, including the runway, the run-
[1396]way lights, and the dam across the river.
[1398]a .
[1399]MSC
[1401]13-00000
[1403]PH Wowk Wo toe Tuk OK Woe ha toh maha “trpae jue For done ~
[1405]Np | te wee Peau do nonylg“ gah ih. br nto Ot pia af oxy
[1407]Ay ~ hea wet to phen opp cpr US -
[1408]Yo Oty whee way Hay 40 pub more inks Ur wm afe ad
[1410]\. Fy 2 Ward Wag becaneap Cram — Wha te, Wais gem
[1411]te bee perky to tae biyabaly ng lee (Cabo Th Crhth ua, OL -
[1413]Uren waite oadag fim FESR) and O51A oe vent. veeFiny te
[1414]FerBadth view = Pid oY Arka Yah wang oy teu dcad rights Weed
[1415]qe “p> ve GH Ted oo be teeta peti — bot ap a ater -
[1416]| iytly Reoabe poy -
[1418]13-00000
[1420]ax
[1422]Ll January 1904
[1424]Paragraphs for message to DCI Tm. Te et OAS Gat 5 g partany t
[1426]1, The President has not yor approve approved the 1965 budget
[1427]and it is being extremely closely held. Agency requirements
[1428]totaled $122 billion and BOB cuts reduced it to $103 billion.
[1429]Further cute are quite obviously in the mill, The 'o5 total
[1430]request will be less than '64 and expenditures will likewise be
[1431]leas than ‘64. There will be departmental reductions in Defense,
[1432]3tate, AEC, Agriculture, with increases in HEW and Labor, _
[1433]With relation to Gross National Product, the '65 budget will be
[1434]the smallest since 1951. This will be the first time in ten years
[1435]that there haa been a decrease in personnel, amounting to .
[1436]approximately 100. The smallest increase during this period
[1437]was 7200 in 1957.
[1439]2. Major legislative proposale will be those that are
[1440]left over from last session, such as Civil Rights Bill, tax cut,
[1441]etc. New programe will include a procedure for attack on poverty,
[1442]new program for aid to education below college level, new program
[1443]for medicare, preparation for next year's foreign aid biil, etc.
[1445]- Najor emphasis on human needs continues,
[1447]3. The President wishes to conduct an all-out review of
[1449]_ our Cuban policy after returning to W.shington. He particularly
[1451]wants 2 more imaginative approach with hard-nosed emphasis on
[1452]economic denials through pressures on third countries. This in
[1453]line with his statements at recent Cuban meeting at White House.
[1455]4, President personally wrote New Year's message to
[1456]Khrushchev, released today.
[1458]5. Fresident faced with decision on whether or not to
[1459]continue $25 million aid program to Indonésia. As you know, this
[1460]is primarily civic action, § nte @ study of pros and cons
[1461]with recommendations in writing fgom you, Secretary of State, and
[1462]others. Also wants reaction from tor Russell and others on
[1463]fiill. Will take up when he returns.
[1465]6, Salinger will send me tomorrow the memoranda he
[1466]wrote on conversations with the Rusalans as to Fresident's intentions.
[1468]13-00000
[1470]7. President established outstanding rapport with Erhard
[1472]-and things are looking up in that area.
[1474]8. President greatly concerned over continuing situation
[1475]in South Vietnam, ©
[1477]3}. President wants General Eisenhower, Mr. Truman,
[1478]and Mr, Hoover briefed monthly on international and domestic
[1479]affairs. Stated that had President Truman been getting these
[1480]regularly, he probably would not have authorized publication of
[1481]CIA article. In connection with Truman article, this matter not
[1482]argued at Independence,
[1484]10, President much interested in foreign reaction to @rhard
[1485]talks. We furnished roundup news media reaction to Salinger today.
[1487]13-00000
[1489]Pp TOP SECRET _ a
[1491]“UNCLASSIFIED when blank —- TOP SECRET when attached to Top Secret Document — Automatically downgraded
[1492]-to SECRET when filled in form is detached from controlled document.
[1494]CONTROL AND COVER SHEET FOR TOP SECRET DOCUMENT
[1496]boc. DATE
[1498]ATTENTION: This form will be placed on top of and ettached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intel=
[1499]ligence Agency or classified Top Secret within the CIA and will remain attached to the document until such time as it
[1500]ia downgraded, deatroyed, or transmitted outside of CI4A. Access to Top Secret matter is linited to Top Secret Control,
[1501]personnel and those individuale whose official duties relate to the matter. Top Secret Control Officera whe receive
[1502]and/or celease the attached Top Secret material will sign thia form and indicate period of custody in the left-hand
[1503]columns provided. Each individual who sees the Top Secret document will sign and indicate the date of handling in the
[1504]right-hand coluans
[1508]7 we
[1509]bias
[1511]Shee meme, Owe
[1513]sap ne
[1515]‘NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When thia form ia detached from Top Secret material it shall be completed in the appropriate
[1516]spaces below and transmitted to Central Top Secret Control for record. :
[1518]. DOWNGRADED DESTROYED OISPATCHED (OUTSIDE CIA)
[1520]a
[1522]ay (Signature) WITNESSED BY (Signature) 8Y (Signature)
[1523]7} ,
[1524]em
[1526]to apn ss 26 use PREVICUS EDITIONS. TOP SECRET ",
[1528](OP-2). 12-50
[1531]13-00000
[1535]months.
[1537]TGP SEGRET
[1539]2 June 1961
[1541]MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
[1543]SUBJECT: Interview with Dave Morales » GS-14, Chief of CI Section,
[1544]Miami Base, 25 May 1961
[1546]1. Morales, who was born in Arizona of Indian and Spanish
[1547]parents and is bilingual in Spanish and English, former football
[1548]player, arrived in Miami in October 1960 after spending two years
[1550].at the Havana Station. He appears to have done a unique CI job
[1552]in organizing ,Within the Frente, the future intelligence service
[1553]for the new government of Cuba that the invasion force expected
[1555]to install. He also organized two other groups. He did this with
[1556]the help of a Chile structor that was supplied by headquarters,
[1557]and withimaterials\training) that WH/4/CI Section, Mr. Simmons, |
[1558]sent down to hin.
[1560]2. The principal group were 39 selected, highly educated
[1561]Cubans, who were trained as case officers to form the future ;
[1562]intelligence service. They are known as the "AMOTS". After being
[1563]trained they were employed by Morales in doing a series of highly
[1564]important tasks for the good of the station. These were as
[1567]a. Penetration of the local anti-Castro organizations.
[1569]b. Penetration of the pro-Castro organization in Miami,
[1570]the so called 26th of July organization.
[1572]c. Preparation of biographical information on all
[1573]prominent persons in the Frente.
[1575]d. Carding some 200,000 Cubans in the period of three
[1577]e. A special section of thé AMOTS monitored all radio
[1578]transmissions coming from Cuba. This amounted to eight stations
[1579]that were covered on a 24 hour a day basis. ;
[1581]n
[1583]f. -Screeing of all persons recruited for the grade 8-'4°*
[1584](but this work first started in November 1960, and by that time 300
[1585]or 400 men had already gone to camp) This AMOT screening of the
[1586]military trainees really amounted to a field check since the
[1587]various cases were discussed with Cuban sources of information
[1588]present in Miami. :
[1591]poe F Noga ccd.
[1592]beg Me
[1593]-@ ts. . tar dads
[1595]13-00000
[1597]g. Mail censorship. All mail coming from the military
[1598]camp in Guatemala was censored by this group before being released
[1599]for transmittal to Cuba.
[1601]h. Four of this’ were sent back to Cuba with instructions
[1602]to report on CI targets; chiefly the secret service and the police.
[1604]a 3. The second group trained by Morales were 100 selected —
[1605]Cubans who were given training as future CI officials and civil
[1607]government officials. Of the 100 thus trained, 61 were sent to
[1609]the camp in Guatemala for training with the brigade. They
[1611]accompanied the brigade on the invasion, and of the 61 only two
[1613]were lost, nine were caught and the rest got out, due to the
[1615]circumstance that most of them were on the steamer Lake Charles
[1617]which owing to the developments at the beaches did not land its
[1619]troops. These men were given the job of penetrating inland as
[1621]fast as possible with the troops and identifgang and seizing records
[1623]and documents of the Castro government. Following that they were
[1625]to set up the temporary civilian government of Cuba. This group were
[1626]J known as the AMFATS. The members of this group were brought back
[1628]to Miami where they are now living privately. The third group were
[1630]the AMCHEERS, a group of approximately 100 older, nonpolitical
[1632]individuals, who received training from Morales as a reserve im
[1634]intelligence personnel. Eighty of these had been trained by April
[1636]1961 for eventual legal return.
[1638]\, Morales stressed. that POA's had been received on members of
[1639]all three groups and that the AMOTS received tradecraft training
[1640]far in excess of that received by the average Agency staff employee.
[1642]5. After the invasion the Frente leaders endeavoya to change
[1643]the AMOTS: into a political organization and remove the chief leaders
[1644]of the AMOT group. Such a development had been anticipated by the
[1645]base and prior to that action all files, the most valuable part of
[1646]the AM organization. had been microfilmed (see my interviews with
[1647]Simmonsfoa more details. on this protective maneuver). The chief
[1648]AMOTS who were thus removed by the Cuban leaders are still organized
[1649]under Morales as a shadow intelligence organization.
[1651]6. Personnel shortages. Morales accomplished all of the
[1652]foregoing with the aid of only two girls one a GS-9 analyst. He
[1653]tried in vain for more than three months to get a junior case officer
[1654]assigned, but in vain. ‘This request was forwarded through Simmons,
[1655]the CI Chief in WH/4., Morales tried to get one or both of two JOTs
[1656]who were in Miami on TDY, but the JOT office refused to release them
[1657]tha on the ground that it would interfere with their training.
[1658]Morales feels that these young officers would have learned more in
[1664]13-00000
[1666]three months under him than they would learn in three years of formal
[1667]training. As a result of being so short handed, Morales had to work
[1668]about 14 hours a day, seven days a week. Otherwise, however, he
[1669]received excellent support generally, both from Headquarters and the
[1670]other sections of Miami Base.
[1672]7. As for suggestions for better operation in the future,
[1673]Morales made two points. (a) the screening of military trainees
[1675]should start at a much earlier point than was done this time; {v)
[1676]more adequate number of personnel should be furnished.
[1678]4 ft; 5 hia
[1680]R. D. Shea
[1682]13-00000
[1684].
[1688]UNCLASSIFIED when blank — TOP SECRET -when. attached to Top Secret Document — Automatically downgraded
[1689]te €&CRET when filled in form is detached from controlled document. ; ;
[1691]CONTROL AND COVER SHEET FOR TOP SECRET DOCUMENT
[1693]DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION . REGISTRY
[1694]SOURCE oo : CIA CONTROL NO.
[1695]; MEMO FOR THE RECORD
[1696]R. D. SHEA OFF POET REEETIE
[1697]. OATE
[1698]. : LOGGED BY ~
[1700]ATTENTION: This forn will be placed on top of and attached to each Top Secret document received by the Centrai Intel-
[1701]ligence Agency or classified Top Secret within the CIA and will cemain attached to the document until such time as it
[1702]vis downgraded, destroyed. or transmitted outside of CIA. Acceas ‘to Top Secret matter is limited to Top Secret Control
[1703]personne! and those individuals whose official duties relate to the matter. Top Secret Control Officers who receive
[1704]and/or release the attached Top Secret material will sign this form and indicate period of custody in the left-hand
[1705]columns provided. Each individual who sees the Top Secret document will sign and indicate the date of handling in the
[1706]right-hand columns
[1708]1 June 1961
[1710]Mr .Shaffer
[1713]YP
[1715]Mr. Dildine
[1717]Mr .Ki
[1719]8
[1721]Mr. Shea
[1723]TAH] |
[1725]NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this form is detached from Top Secret material it shall be completed in the appropriate
[1726]spaces below and transmitted to Centrai Tep Secret Control for record. ‘
[1728]DESTROYED DISPATCHED (OUTSIDE CIA)
[1730]BY (Signature) ~ TO
[1732]BY (Signature) WITNESSED BY (Signature) BY (Signature)
[1733]a
[1735]toner se 20 USE PREVICGUS EDITIONS. TOP SECRET 14aot
[1737](OP-2) 12-59
[1739]DATE
[1741]13-00000
[1742]«he ,
[1744]5 June 1961
[1746]MEMORANDUM FOR: THE RECORD .
[1748]SUBJECT: Interview with Clark Simmons, Chief of WH/4's CI Section,
[1749]1 June 1961
[1751](This memorandum should be read after Morales interview)
[1753]1. Simmons is a dedicated CI type having spent the last 11 years
[1754]chiefly on CI matters largely under OTR auspices. He spent two years
[1755]in Egypt, 1954 to 1956, setting up and training the Egyptian CI Staff,
[1756]apparently starting from scratch. He has been with OTR since then and
[1757]came to WH/4 in mid-April 1960. He is about to be transferred to the
[1758]WH Division Staff andhis replacement will be Louis Napoli who will
[1759]head the new combined FI/CI Section of WH/4. He stressed that the
[1760]charter of the new combined section will give CI the right to interfere
[1761]in any operation. This will be spelled out explicitly, thus countering
[1762]the difficulties that Simmons had in dealing with the PM Section prior
[1763]to the invasion. Bob Andrews will stay on for CI matters.and Seehafer
[1764]will head the FI part both under Napoli.
[1766]2. AMOTS (future Cuban intelligence service trained by Morales
[1767]at Miami). This idea started when Anderson of WH Division Staff told
[1768]Simmons that he had a.Chilean CI officer who was available for training
[1769]Cubans. Drawing on his Egyptian experience, Simmons drew the AMOT plan
[1770]and prepared the training materials and sent them to Morales for
[1771]execution. It was Morales who subsequently conceived the idea of
[1772]training the AMFATS (future o vice) and the AMCHEERS, a reserve
[1773]intelligence corps consisting‘ upéiae’? men. These matters are discussed
[1774]in detail in my memorandum on Morales. Morales also organized a group
[1775]of former Cuban diplomats presently in Miami to have them available
[1776]when a new government is set up. Subsequent to the invasion the_AMOTS
[1777]have been substantially changed by Cardona. He has replaced the top
[1778]AMOTS by political appointees who have no skill in tradecraft. The top
[1779]men thus fired had anticipated auch a move, and, in addition to micro-
[1780]filming 120,000 cards, they removed all cryptonyms and all memoranda
[1781]of conversation between them and Morales with the result that the new
[1782]service doesn't know the identity of. the AMOTS who are presently
[1783]Cuba. The AMOTS initially numbered 96. The Miami Base now has 18 Ole
[1784]22 of them of whom ¢ four are inside Cuba with 14 subsources; A of. at
[1785]them producing FI and CI reports. By December 1960 the AMOTS had / (14 (l..
[1786]produced 1, 800 intelligence reports and 750 radio monitor reports. b
[1787]4
[1788]Car bow Tr
[1790]VARA
[1792]13-00000
[1794]3. In dealing with the Miami Base, Simmons stuck strictly to
[1795]the relationship between Headquarters and a foreign station. His
[1796]command channel was, of course, via Chief of WH/4 to the Chief of
[1797]Miami Base to Morales. ‘He and Morales understood each other .
[1798]perfectly and there was no ether obstacle of any sort in their i¢
[1799]collaboration. There was no second-guessing or double case offering
[1800]in CI matters.
[1802]4. Simmons and his section ran a number of CI ops directly
[1803]from Headquarters. He referred to the following:
[1805]a. A certain lady of easy virtue who had a vast acquaintance
[1806]among the top Castro people.
[1808]bd. A Greek sailor who for eight years has worked for the
[1809]Agency as a penetration in Communist maritime unions in various
[1810]countries.
[1812]c. A certa r yRPanish intelligence officer, Amshad,
[1814]. who has been living in/ ome of the chief of G-2. “Unfortunately,
[1816]an expectedgCastro ‘official appointment did not materialize and this
[1817]operation has not proved to be of much value.
[1819]ad. A former U.S. negro citizen now in the Cuban service.
[1821]e. Juan Orta, former chief of Castro's executive office,
[1822]now out of office.
[1824]5. Simmons gave me the attached copies of four basic documents.
[1825]Tab A - WH/4 counterintelligence plan, June 1960
[1827]Tab B - Counterintelligence plan for an FRD security service,
[1828]late August 1960 J} oe
[1829]et. :
[1830]Tab C - CI program for future project, 20 April 1961 - rere
[1833]Tab D - Counterintelligence assets, 29 April 1961
[1835]In addition, Morales gave me a copy a a dispatch summarizing Miami's
[1836]CI assets currently in Guba, (Tab E).
[1838]6. ‘Relations with PM Section: Simmons' relations with the PM
[1839]section seem to have been marked with a considerable amount of friction,
[1840]perhaps more than always results fram the resentment operators feel at
[1841]the inhibiting influence of the CI man. Thus whenever a PM agent was
[1842]lost,.a CI man would analyse the files and draw a damage sheet showing
[1843]what the agent knew, etc. Simmons showed me a large file containing
[1844]about 50 of such cases. This work was made more difficult because the PM
[1845]people kept only very skimpy records. A CI representative, Rothwell,
[1847]13-00000
[1851]abet . 47 Lt AH
[1852]also went over all incoming messages from agents to scrutinize for
[1853]the use of freedom signals.’ When the absence of such signdlswas
[1854]pointed out to PM they would sometimes claim that the agent had b
[1855]merely forgotten them. CI was able to stop all cable traffic to { “7
[1856]such agents when under suspicion. After a while Rothwell was ae
[1857]delegated to be the CI contact with the PM people, and due to his 7 Meas
[1858]quiet methods and competence he gained a fair share of their
[1859]confidence and the work proceeded more smoothly.
[1861]7. Sinmons and his section prepared a 225-page study~of
[1862]Castro's intelligence organization. This document was distributed
[1863]generally throughout the U.S. intelligence community, as were also
[1864]some extensive studies on Cuban blockwardens. They also issued CS/
[1865]CI information reports and Simmons gave a number of briefings to
[1866]higher-ups. They were able to identify 14 provocative activities
[1867]by the Cuban: services in the U.S., Dakar and Havana. They identified
[1868]a U. S. employee of the U.S. Embassy in Havana as a Castro penetration _
[1869]agent in 1960. * This document contains the identities of 4g2 Castro G-2
[1870]_7 staff officers.
[1871]8. From September 1960 to January 1961 Sinmons spent half of
[1872]his time working on the case of the three ST ESCALATE members, i.e.,
[1873]the audio and development team which was arrested in Cuba and is still
[1874]under arrest. If these men had checked in with the CI Branch before
[1876]depart e they would ‘haves Varta not.to go. Simmons regards this
[1877]matter” of the greatest potential danger to the Agency, e.g., if these
[1878]men should be sent to Moscow to be milked.
[1880]9. Simmons described the following difficulties he had had:
[1882]a. Hissection was not fully staffed until October 1960,
[1883]although he went to the greatest lengths to get additional people.
[1884]He first had a machine run made for a list of CI personnel having a
[1885]“\ knowledge of Spanish. He checked the records of the individuals
[1886]thus disclosed. He sent the names thuyselected to the WH/4
[1888]_~. personnel. officer who made a great effort, but in no case was he able
[1890]\ to get_a man taken off his present job. He feels that the DD/P
[1891]should in the ure tell all his senior officers of the importance
[1892]_ Of such g project so that the latter will cooperate when their
[1893]“i valuable/$e requested. After borrowing Melberg fram covert training
[1894]for two TDY trips, Simmons could not face going to Marchand with a
[1895]further request, and instead asked Jack Farman in the DCI's office G
[1896]help him get Melberg for another trip. The Director of Training
[1897]complained of this irregular procedure. If Mr. Bissell had so
[1898]informed his. senior officers, Simmons feels that they would have
[1899]received-better “Cooperation. The Fesult of lack of personnel was that
[1900]they all worked six or seven days a week. Simmons knows of no case
[1901]of a directed assignment to the project. As it was he personfally
[1902]had to spend 80 per cent of his time on administrative matters with
[1903]the result that he could only spend 20 per centof his time on operations. —
[1904]His final T/O was four case officers, four analysts, two clerk-typists
[1905]and one secretary.
[1909]13-00000
[1911]Pe
[1913]b. Working space was also a great problem. From May
[1914]through September 1960 they were working seven or eight in a single
[1915]room. .
[1917]c.. Dr. Willets, chief of the JOTP refused to releas® two
[1918]JOTs whom Morales wanted as assistants in Miami. One of these is
[1919]named Ben Ramirez and is very fluent in Spanish.
[1921]‘10. For the future Simmons recommends:
[1923]a. That an LCFLUITER operator be assigned to each base
[1924]permanently, not. withstanding the expense. The need for such a man
[1925](at times can’ ‘be very urgent.
[1927]b: There should be one cleared Staff D room containing
[1928]all relevant files so that the entire job can be done in one room.
[1929]This means all Staff D files involved, all operating cards, personality
[1930]and report cards, so that,for instance, a CI analyst can ggthere and
[1931]do a complete job in perfect security. The Staff D yield was a
[1932]"gold mine", a
[1934]ec. If CI section had been told the time and place of the
[1935]invasion they could have checked their records on the area and the ©
[1936]adjacent areas and have given the brigade recommendations for
[1937]document, seizing, etc. in the towns that would be passed through.
[1939]ll. Despite, ‘difficulties referred to above, Simmons feel that
[1940]‘the results of his section's work were very good, and that one
[1941]indication of this is that the upper echelons of the Agency sent him
[1942]many matters for handling that were not strictly of a CI nature; for
[1943]instance, inquiries from the DCI, from Congress, etc.
[1945]l2. In-cases where the CI Section discovered that an agent
[1946]communicating by radio was not using hissafety signals, CI would help
[1947]the PM or other section to handle that agent in subsequent communica-
[1948]tions so that he.would be kept alive. This sometimes required that _
[1949]requests by the agent for supplies be complied with, Jn one case LUGLOG.
[1950]Simmons was intent on preserving the man so that he could be used at
[1951]the end for purposes of deception. The agent requested an air drop
[1952]and it was decided to comply. Simmons said that Gen. Cabell disclosed
[1953]to the Cuban aircraft a crew that was to make the air drop that the
[1954]agent was a double agent. Accordingly the crew did not even go near
[1955]the drop, nor did PM Section advise Simmons until four days later that
[1956]this had occured. The result was that the man was immediately taken
[1957]off the air and Sinmons had indications that he was shot. If Simmons
[1958]had been advised earlier of the failure to make the drop, he could
[1959]have tried by a suitable message to explain the omission.
[1961]L Sfx cm
[1963]R. D. Nhe
[1965]12 pee ~¢
[1966]ar rr eree |
[1968]13-00000-
[1970].”
[1972]JMARC COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PLAN
[1974]MISSION
[1975]To develop and/or maintain and extend, through agents and other
[1977]covert means, intelligence coverage of the organization, versonnel, target
[1979]interests, modus operandi, operations and assets of the Cuban Intelligence
[1981]and Security Services and the Cuban Communist Party; to similarly develop
[1982]intelligence coverage of activities affecting the Caribbean area which are
[1983]conducted by the U.5.5.B., by the U.A.R., and by the Chinese Communists or
[1984]other pro-CASTRO officials and groups; to protect current and future CI, FI
[1985]and CA operations tyrough analysis of their operational plans and through
[1986]exanination of new operational proposals; and to coordinate designated C1
[1987]matters with the Cl Staff and with staff and geographic comronents of WH
[1988]Division. |
[1989]REFERENCE
[1991]JMARC OPERATIUN ALP LAN
[1992]CONCEPT OF OPERATION
[1994]it is essential that an aggressive counterintelligesce program be
[1995]devised and irplemented to ensure sound operational. security for JMAEC
[1996]operations. The wMaRC counterintelligence effort will, therefore, be
[1997]directed towards acquiring information concerning the organizations, personnel,
[1998]target interests, modus operandi, operations and assets of foreign intelligence
[1999]and security services active in the Caribbean area; towards analysing JMAIC
[2000]operational proposals and steos in light of what is learned about opposition
[2001]intelligence capabilities and activities; and towards containing inimical
[2003]activities directed agains: JMARC assets and operations.
[2005]SEGHET
[2007]13-00000
[2009]Co vrr re.
[2015]IV, ORGANIZATION
[2017]Tho
[2019]following versomel ani facilities are required for successful
[2021]attainment of JMAKC CI objectives.
[2023]be
[2025]V. PHASING
[2027]Personnel: One senior CI officer; four overations officers;
[2028]five analysts (three with a proficiency rating of *high* in
[2029]reading Spanish); three clerk typists; one ‘secretary. initially,
[2030]two case officers and one analyst should be sent to the JKARC
[2032]Forward Operations Base (FOB) to carry out assigned tasks discussed
[2034]below, Two analysts (with at least high proficiency rating in
[2036]reading Spanish) will be assigned to the task of screening certain
[2037]information reports. “Two analysts (one senior) and a clerk tyvist
[2038]will form a records unit for the CI Section at Headquarters; two
[2039]operations officers and a clerk typist will form an operations
[2040]unit for the CI section at Headquarters.
[2042]Facilities: The CI section at Headquarters will require working
[2044]space for ten personnel and for the following heavy office equip-
[2045]ments: eight deske and chairs; eight standard tyvewriters; one
[2047]card safes three four-draver safes, Standard office supolies should
[2048]be provided, The CI operatiors unit at the FOB will reyulre support
[2050]comnensurate to its size.
[2052]R. PRSYARATORKY PHASE
[2054]1. Principal Ob ectives- To acquire current CI information on opposition
[2056]services in Caribbean area through developing counterintelligence
[2058]overations and through recording Cx information.
[2060]SECRET
[2062]13-00000
[2063]. we ee
[2064]Mil.
[2066]ry
[2068]2. Operational Tasks:
[2069]a. The Branch/h/ACI officer wills
[2070](1) Keep “hief, Branch/l informed on CI reyuirements,
[2071]ov-ortunities and developments affecting his branch.
[2072](2) Kee FI Deputy, wi Division and Deputy Chief, Cl Staff,
[2073]and the latter's appointed staff representatives (Victor
[2074]Wallen, Robert Brow, Paul Burke, and Birch O'Neal), inforsed
[2075]on CI matters in which they have an agreed interest (see below).
[2076](3) Direct assistany: CI personnel in performance of those jobs
[2077]relating to the responsibilities cited below.
[2078](lL) Carry out such other tasks which may be assigned to him by
[2079]Chief, Branch/L. |
[2080]‘The senior CI officer end individual section officers designated
[2081]by hin will acconplish the followings
[2082](1) Familiarize theaselves with selected Branch and CI Steff
[2083]redord assets and with designated branch and division
[2084]personnel pertinent to their responsibilities in order to
[2085]effectively exploit these assets and to coordinate work on
[2086]Cl operations with the appropriate persons,
[2087](2) Familiarize themselves with current CI overations affecting
[2088]Cuba which are directed by Branch/l, by CI Staff, and/or by
[2089]_WH Division with the objective of assuming responsibility
[2090]for these. |
[2091](3) Plan, coordinate, initiate and conduct CI operations not
[2092]specifically assigned to Paul Burke or Birch O'Neal of CI
[2093]Staff. |
[2095]SEGRET
[2097]13-00000
[2099]b.
[2101](4)
[2103](5)
[2105](6)
[2107](7)
[2109](8)
[2113]Propare draft CI requirements for F1/D analyste (acconplished) .
[2114]in addition, prepare or locate and forward to other Branch/k
[2115]officers vertinent cI requiremente and operational guidance
[2116]parers pertinent to thees officers' assigned responsibilities.
[2117](To date, I have forwarded ry own study on Utilization of
[2118]Exile Groups in Clandestine Oper :tions" to Jerry Droller.)
[2119]Prepare an operational summary format for use by operations
[2120]officers reviewing cases (accomoli shed).
[2122]Prepare. a defector register format cara ( accomplished) and
[2124]organize and mintain a register of defectors,
[2126]Exploit certain research and overational supvort assets of the
[2127]Clandestine Services in order to help all Branch/h sections
[2128]‘in the achievement of their objectives, To this end, one
[2129]analyst will work on materials controlled by CI Staff,
[2130]Examine current operations and/or programs in the PI and
[2132]CA fields in order to enaure that CI opportunities are fully
[2133]exploited and to identify operational security threats and
[2135]to recommend sound courses of action which will prevent or
[2137]counter such threats.
[2139]‘I Staff components \citead in each instance) will have the following
[2140]responsibilities:
[2141](1)
[2143]Chief, S.D, Ci Staff: Action resncnsibility for penetration
[2144]and double agent operations against Cuban intelligence and
[2145]Security Services at hame and abroad (as agreed to by Chief,
[2146]4H Uivision and Deputy Chief, CI Staff). Coordination wili
[2147]be effected with WH/L/CI and all traffic will be released by
[2148]wA/l. .
[2151]areraan
[2153]seencl
[2155]13-00000
[2159](2) Deputy Chief, Ici, CI Staffs acti responsibility for
[2160]penetration of Cusan Conmunist Party via third countries,
[2161]using Cubans as agents (as agreed to by Chief, WH Division
[2162]and Deputy Chief, CI Staff). Coordination will be effected
[2163]with WH/L/CI and all traffic will be released by sH/h.
[2165](3) Victor Wallen, Operations Division, CI Staff: Responsibility
[2167]. for comoiling recerds and studies on Cuban Intelligence and
[2169]_ Security Services. To this end, Victor Wallen wills
[2171](a) Prepare and mad ntain a briefing notebook on Cuban
[2172]- Intelligence and Security Services (accomplished).
[2174](v) Prepare a guide for screening Wi/l/Revorts personality
[2175]cerds and other record assets in order to identify sus-
[2176]pect persons aiding or abetting Cuban clandestine acti-
[2177]vities (accomplished). —
[2179](c) Prepare lists of suspect persons and maintain these
[2180]‘ists on a current basis for exploitation by all Branch/l
[2181]sections and other Agency components with operational
[2182]interest. (Initial lists have been orepared in 1} books).
[2184](d) Prepare or assemble CI rejuirements, as requested, which
[2185]pertain to the maintenance of (Zi nctebooks om the Cuban
[2186]services, (initial requirenents have ben drawn up for
[2188]_ Ernie Sparks use.)
[2190](lk) Deouty Chief, CL/ICG: Pesvonsi bility for compiling records
[2191]and studies om Cuban Commnist rarty. To this end, question. -
[2193]naires have been orenared for Agency officers assigned the
[2194]task of interrozating persons knowledgeable of Cuban Communist
[2196]Party persocnel and activities,
[2199]13-00000
[2201]Nfi ome
[2202]a } Lit; &
[2203]- 6 -
[2205](5) ‘WA/PI will prepare studies of CASIO subversive activities
[2207]abroad.
[2209]8, DEVELOPMENTAL PHASE
[2210]. 1, Principal Objectives To advance our knowledge of opposition services
[2211]end to dewlop a security service for the Cuoan Government in exile,
[2212]2. Operational Taskss
[2213]a. Wi/UCIs During this second phase, wH/k/CL personnel wills
[2214]| (1) Screen everational correspondence and eable traffic for leads
[2215]to CI operations against the Cuban Intelligence and Security
[2216]Services and the Cuban Communi st Party and forward pertinent
[2217]leada and CI informatim to ap -ropriate CI Staff component
[2218]and/or authorised security officers of agencies of U.S.
[2219]intelligence coumuni ty. | |
[2220](2) In coordination with Political Acti Section of Wi/l, outline
[2221]an organisation for a security intelligence service for the
[2222]Cuvan Government-in-Exile and list its functions in detail.
[2223](3) Continue and/or complete all tasks cited in Phase I.
[2224](h) Staff the FOB with two operations officers and one analyst
[2225]to verform those functions necessary to the initiation and
[2226]conduct of secure CI o-erations and cl poytection activities,
[2227]b. Cl Staff: The sia, Ira, and OPS/WH, as indicated, will earry out
[2228]the following acti ities:
[2229](1) Revise the notebook on Cuban intelligence and Security S-rvicea
[2230]as required (OPS /#t) .
[2231](2) Prevare organizati nal studies and blacklists of Cuban Intelli-
[2232]gence and S curity Scrvicespersonrel, and black lists of
[2234]person g.; an or abetting Cuban clandestine activity, in
[2235]Ch cET
[2237]rye
[2239]13-00000
[2241]Te -
[2243]three categories of sensitivity for use by the Agency, by
[2245]| dealgnated members of the United States intelligence community,
[2246]and by authorized components ef the Cuban Government-in-Exile,.
[2247](ors/ai)
[2249](3) Revise lists of suspect persons as required. (OPS/#H)
[2251](lL) Prepare special studies om Cuban Intelligence and Security
[2252]Services and m the Cuban Comaunist Party and other groups and
[2253]organizations active in the Caribbean area, as required. (07S/wH)
[2255]c. WH/FI will continue studies of CASTRO subversive activities abroad,
[2257]VI. COORDINATION
[2258]Coordination on CI operations and on operational ‘support activities
[2259]which davolve WI/FI, CI Staff and Wi/k/CI will be effected by sentor CI
[2260]officer of 1/1, Communications on these matters will be by telephone
[2261]and/or persmnal mectings. CI aspects of Vi /l/FT and CA operations will be
[2262]discussed by appropriate section officers and the smior CI officer or ths
[2263]latter's designates, .
[2265]SECRET
[2267]13-00000
[2269]t “¢ A _ - v i of
[2270]soe PEL Rae o
[2271]ape bats aA
[2272]er Sane
[2273]COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PLAN FOR AN FRD SECURITY SERVICE
[2274]TAB B
[2276]I. HISSION
[2278]To select, assess, organize, train on-the-job and support FRD
[2279]personnel for a security service capable of protecting the FRD,
[2281]its personnel, installations, secrets and activities fran sabotage,
[2282]subversion and espionage.
[2284]TI. QaEERENCES
[2286]A. Project Operational Plan
[2288]B. Project Political Action Plan
[2290]C. Project Counterintelligence Plan
[2292]dD Project Counterintelligence Budget for Fiscal Year 1941
[2293]lll. OF OPERATI: .
[2295]It is essential that the Agency create an aggressive service for
[2296]FRD-Project activities. Since there is no certainty that the leaders
[2297]of the FRD will achieve and hold responsible positions in a new
[2298]Govermment of Cuba, and since there is an everpresent threat that
[2299]political or operational flaps may destroy the FRD as an effective
[2300]Project instrument, it is essential that the Agency's role in creating
[2301]an FRD security service be carried out under cover of the BENDER-CARR
[2302]group. It is also essential that the leaders as well as rank and file
[2303]menbers of the FRD pay more than lip service to the requirements of
[2305]an effective security apparatus, even though these requirements dictate
[2306]a a need for major changes in the modus operandi of individual members.
[2307]To this end the BENDER-CARR group must direct the FRD to accept, in
[2308]return for its support, controls and limitations vhich must be imposed
[2309]by the security service if operational security is to be achieved.
[2311]’ The Agenay's objectives in establishing and supporting a security
[2312]service for the FRD arei
[2314]A. To protect its operational interests in the FRD} and
[2316]Be To acquire counterintelligence information through participation
[2317]in FRD operational security activities.
[2319]The security service of the FRD will have as its objectives:
[2320]A. <Sereening all personnel holding significant FRD positions;
[2322]B. Screening new adherents to the FRD;
[2324]13-00000
[2326]a
[2328]C. Maintaining pertinent file information on FRD personnel}
[2330]D. Maintaining physical seourity of FRD installations;
[2332]E. Staffing FRD debriefing centers;
[2334]F. forcing personnel security regulations;
[2336]G. Indootrinating FRD nenbers on personal security;
[2338]H, Monitoring malcontents} and
[2340]I. Acquiring both positive and counterintelligence information.
[2342]To build a security service for the FRD capable of attaining Agency
[2343]and FRD objectives, it is necessary for the Agenay:
[2345]A. To supervise the selection, assessment and training of
[2346]eight candidates;
[2348]B. To identify and select secure office sites in Miami, New York,
[2349]Washington and Mexico City, and to procure a secure eafehouse
[2350]training site in Miami; .
[2352]C. To create an organization which can fulfil) essigned security
[2353]funotions.
[2355]D. To supervise the training of thirty-two additional candidates
[2356]to staff the organization;
[2358]E. To support the organization through the BENDER-CARR group by
[2359]' providing, sanitised record data, special training, financial
[2360]backing,: and, at need, operational facilities; and
[2362]F. To supervise through the BENDER-CARR group the organization's
[2363]day- activities.
[2365]To implenent the plan for an FRD security service, BENLEH-CARR repre-
[2366]sentatives in Mexico City, Miami, Washington and New York will be
[2367]briefed on the plan for an FRD security service. The Chief, FRD/Intel-
[2368]ligence and Security Subcommittee, will be directed by BENDER to salect
[2369]seven officers to be processed for jobs with the service. Processing
[2370]will include medical examination, polygraph, and psychological assesment
[2371]of the candidates. They will later be briefed on the objectives and
[2372]functions of the security service by a representative of the BENLER-CARR
[2373]group. They will be trained on-the-job by a Chilean ex-police officer
[2374]who will be recomended to the FRI by the BENLER-CARR group. The
[2375]training will cover subjects pertinent to the service's day~to~day
[2377]13-00000
[2381]3
[2383]security responsibilities as spelled out in the organizational plen.
[2384]The FRU security components 4n Mexico City, Washington and New York
[2385]will be initially assigned one officer each from the first group of
[2386]eight candidates. The remaining five candidates will. be assigned to
[2388]. Miami. Of those candidates subsequently trained for the security
[2390]service, two additional men will be assigned to Washington; six to
[2391]New York; six to Mexico City; and eighteen to Miami.
[2393]OFGANIZATION
[2395]The organisational structure of the FRD security service and of the
[2396]Agency's related support structure are outlined in Attachment "A";
[2397]the facilities and personnel required to staff and support these
[2398]structures are discussed below:
[2400]A. Facilities
[2402]l. Seourity office sites in Mexico City, Miami, Washington
[2403]and New York. (These will be selected by the Office of
[2404]Security; the Office of Security will identify these
[2405]sites to the BENDER-CARR group, which in turn will direct
[2406]their use by appropriate FRD components. )
[2408]2. A training site will be selected in Miami by the Office of
[2409]Security and identified to the BENDER-CARR group, which
[2410]in turn will recomend it to the Chief, FRD/Intelligence
[2411]and Security Subconmittes. ;
[2413]3. One four—drawer safe will be acquired by the Office of
[2414]Security for use in each office site in the above-named
[2415]cities. ; ,
[2417]4 Appropriate office supplies will be assenbled by the FAD
[2418]component in each site.
[2420]BS Foreien Personne)
[2422]1. <A Chilean police officer has been selected and recruited
[2423]as training officer for the security service. The bENDER-
[2424]CARR group will recommend him to the FRD for this job as an
[2425]‘individual who, in its experience, is best suited for the ©
[2426]job, and as one who is most acceptable to the BENVER-CARA
[2427]organization.
[2429]13-00006
[2431]ay
[2435]2. The BENDER-CARR group will direct Chief, FRD/Intelligence
[2437].. and Security Subcomittee, to immediately select seven
[2438]officers for processing and training prior to assignment
[2439]-in the FRD security service. later, thirty-two additional
[2440]officers will be selected for processing and training.
[2442]6, Staff Personnel,
[2444]1. HENDER-CARR representatives will deal directly with Chief,
[2445]FRD/Intelligence and Security Subcommittee, in all matters
[2446]pertaining to the security service.
[2448]2. Project CI officers will provide through BENDER-CARR
[2449]representatives all advice, guidance and support to the
[2450]‘security service and its chief,
[2452]Ve FHASING
[2453]A. Preparatory Phase (25 suust ~ 15 September):
[2454]1. Primary Obiective: .
[2456]To. implement the plan for the security service by selecting,
[2457]assessing and training an initial cadre of eight officers,
[2458]including chief of the proposed service.
[2460]2. Operational Taskat
[2462]a. Advise BENDER-CARR representatives in Mexico City, Miami,
[2463]Washingto. and New York, by dispatch where appropriate,
[2464]before 26 August, of the Agenay's plan ami objectives
[2465]regarding an FRD security service.
[2467]b, Advise Chief, FRD/Intelligence and Security Subccamittee,
[2468]through BENDER, to select seven officers to participate
[2469]with him in processing and training for assigrment to
[2471]the FRD security service.
[2473]c. Procure from each candidate a complete PHS, a certification
[2474]of health dated this year, and three letters of recommendation
[2475]from as many FRD sponsors.
[2477]d. Arrange for polygraph exanination of candidates through
[2478]the Project security office.
[2480]®. Procure through the Project security office an appropriate
[2481]training site in the Miami area vhich will accommodate a
[2482]minimm of eight trainees and an instructor.
[2484]13-00000
[2486]ow
[2488]f. Assign trainer to Miami after BENDER gets concurrence
[2489]of Chief, FRD/Intelligence and Security Subcommittee.
[2491]g-. Arrange for Project CI officer in Miani to brief trainer
[2492]on his assignment.
[2494]h. Quarter trainer in training site.
[2495]4. Advise FRD representative to purchase minimm office
[2496]_ supplies from list to be provided ty the Project CI
[2497]officer.
[2499]J. Provide trainer with a curriculus and a training schedule
[2500]which encompass on-the-job application of techniques and
[2501]skills.
[2503]-_—- k. Diacuss with Chief, FRD/Intelligenoe and Security Sub-
[2504]committee, the organization and fimotions of the proposed
[2505]security service,
[2507]1. Initiate training of eight candidates (including Chief
[2508]of the service) end processing of others.
[2510]Me Get signed secrecy agreezent and loyalty cath fron
[2511]each student.
[2513]n. Identify and assess (for recruitment) potential agent.
[2514]candidates as Agenay-controlled sources.
[2516]B. ‘Pevaloment Phasat (16 ~ 30 September)
[2517]1. Primary Objective:
[2519]To build the seourity service in a way which will enatle it
[2520]to perform its assigned functions.
[2522]2. Qperational Tasks:
[2523]a. Assign trainees to FRD components in the oities named above.
[2524]be Complete processing of remaining candidates.
[2526]c. Procure secure office sites in the cities named above
[2527]or check the sites previously selected.
[2529]dad. Initiate training of remaining candidates.
[2531]13-00000
[2533]e. Activate a records center in Miami and provide it
[2534]with sanitized record data.
[2536]f. Forward physical security plan and physical security
[2537]regulations to Chief, FRD/Intelligence and Security
[2538]Subcommittee, through BENDER,
[2540]g. Forward operational security regulations for security
[2542]service to Chief, through BENDER,
[2544]h. Forward administrative procedures (involving communica-
[2545]tions among FRD elements, document controls, etc.) to
[2546]Chief, through BENDER,
[2548]4. Give remaining trainees their security service assignments.
[2550]j. Recruit candidates selected in Preparatory Phase.
[2552]C. Action Phase (30 Septanber on):
[2554]Dd.
[2558]1. Eximary Objective:
[2559]To identify and contain rabid CASTROITES, Cuban Communists,
[2560]menbders of the Cuban Seourlty Services, and Orbit espionage
[2561]‘and sabotage personnel.
[2562]Qperational Tasks!
[2563]a. Move the seourity apparatus into Cuba with the FRD.
[2564]be Provide FRD security service with black lists and
[2565]record data pertinent to the above objective.
[2566]ce. Monitor FRD security activities through the BENDER-CARR
[2567]Broupe.
[2568]Consolidation Phase:
[2569]1. Primary Objective:
[2570]To direct the FRO security service in its efforts to maintain
[2571]public security and to contain foreign services activities.
[2572]Operational Tasks
[2574]20
[2576]a. Request existing security units in the country to stay
[2578]on the job and to protect arm supplies, record assets,
[2579]and security force facilities.
[2585]be Continue to funnel sanitized arrest lists effecting
[2586]CASTRO security personnel to the FRD.
[2588]ce. Monitor FRD security service activities in Cuba.
[2589]VI. COORDINATION
[2590]The above plan will be coordinated vith the Political Action,
[2591]FI, and Support Sections of the Project.
[2593]VII SUPPORT
[2594]See SUPPORT ANNEXES,
[2596]13-00000
[2598]2
[2600]. Taare bu f
[2601]a ron FUTUR. an
[2603](pant | TABC |
[2605]20 apetl 1961
[2607]PEMORANIXM FOR; Chief, u/s
[2608]SUBJECT == CL.: Program for JUTE Project
[2610]sys. {t ie anticipated that ether —
[2611]for double egent operations will oe identified.
[2612]States; their exploitation will be coordinated with
[2613]Federal Berean of Investigation. ol,
[2614]te 4, To support sad direct the AMOT Intelligence and Security
[2615]- -", - Servies in Miend in the fulfilloent of egrees: upoh objectives.
[2617]@. . Fo suppert end direct && AMT effiecers and egeats now in -
[2618].. + . Gade, im the collection ef intelligence pertinent to Project
[2619](-* \. gqeeds, end in the fulfillazemt ef such other covert action
[2620]- sesigureats which may be deered within their competence. —
[2622]f,. To int rodues ‘Into Cuda wiileterally-ecoatrolled counter-
[2623]intelligence agents. .
[2625]_ &- Fo intenaify the Phofect'a Communist Party penetration
[2626]eregran,
[2628]fk. “Te inerease counteriatelligence operations rum {ate Cubs H
[2629]fa conjunction with liaison services of friendly countries.
[2631]L.° To counter the espfoncys, subversive and aaictage operations :
[2632]' ddracted by the Castro services against other States within :
[2634]. the Wastarn Bevlsphare.. Tile to be done in conmfunction with
[2635]_' the services of these countries with which we malatain
[2636]TLatison, ; |
[2637]|
[2639]13-00000
[2644]a.
[2646]>.
[2648]AMOT Security Sarvice: The AMT complex fe cace =. of 97
[2649]| BOF stall a @lerical personnel, 3& AHFASTS (security~
[2651]eounterintalligence teams) lecated im the Miami ares, and
[2652]63 AMCHEERS (senior Ceban citizens drewm froa banking,
[2653]eeamereial and ranching cireles in Cuba), also located in
[2655]in dgunay-comt rolled Coomunist Party penetration agent
[2657]located in Hevane.
[2659]im Aginty cont roTied agent vith eecese to leftist and
[2660]Communist eireles in the Western Healapbere, now in ew
[2661]Bork City.
[2663]in aqeet. esndidate vith aecess to engineering circles fa
[2664]Raevena, vhe will be available for essigumeat in Cuda fa
[2665]June of this year. .
[2667]ths aertty of chen ere Army ef lerey had bedteste
[2669]- @wlllingneze to dafect in place end help the opposition forces
[2671]When the strike cams; ‘Although the rebellion was crushed before
[2672]is eould advance rey for ths 30 individuals to fwlfill
[2674]‘(Der-3), three captainge heve thdicated willingness to cooperate.
[2676]The Infantry commander agreed to try to take th: base and the
[2677]nearby cadet school. Assusing that be had thet ezpabllity, it
[2678]way be further assunad thet be could recruit agents and inforzants
[2679]at these bases.
[2681]* Other pessible assets of this type Smelude the chiefs of the Fourth
[2683]end Fifth IMRA Zones im Pinar del] Rie and the Chief of Police in
[2685]| Santa Clera, Las Villes Province.
[2687]Te eddit{on we have on bend a list of potential defeetors who heve
[2688]shows dieillusionment with CASTRO, and who hewe been approsched
[2689]but who Reve mot yet declared themselves, It is possible thet the
[2690]turn c2Z events pay hove helettened thetr diegiltusloncent; ney be
[2691]Worth trying tc reervit thec at this time.
[2693]13-00000
[2698]»b.
[2700]a.
[2702]AMOT-EUBALE mere teren sr The Agency must. recoguire the
[2703]possitliity of stra feclings because of the fallure of
[2704]the imvastom, It is believed that the Agency representative
[2705]im Miami will be able, because of his excellent personal
[2706]Felationship with the Chief of the AMOT service, to maintain
[2707]a satisfactory working relationship.
[2709]Tks neal Us aaTINESES LDN agente son As place in Cube in
[2710]e agents now in place in Cuba in
[2711]the event theit positions becomes wntensdle..
[2713]rational Clixete. The Agemcy sust antie!fpate the develop-
[2714]= of 08 TrereasLagly unfavorable operational clincte
[2715]inside Coda tm view of the {ucreased security acasures being
[2716]tuplenented by the Castro sarvices,
[2718]Conprond sed a Assets Inaide Cuba. The Agency wuet asoune
[2719]: par essets in Caba heve probably been
[2721]eoupropised by Castro eeeurity counter measures takun at the
[2722]tine of the iuvasics. Bach ef these aspete or net must be
[2723]. wsefulnege
[2726]13-00000
[2729]<lo TesiassteteD 1) [TERNAL 2) CONFIDENTIAL (secret
[2731]ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
[2733]SUBJECT: (Optional)
[2735]Chief, Task Force W
[2737]10 July 1962
[2739]: TO: (Officer designation, room number, ond | are
[2740]| building) COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
[2741]| seceeo | ronwannen | to whom. Oraw a line across column after each comment.)
[2742]FORWARDED
[2744]"Deputy oagyeeer
[2745](Plans)
[2747]Elder for DCI
[2749]Party
[2751]ceil
[2752]BY, HAND
[2754]eT
[2756]aecngrading and
[2759]‘tse GTO “stete* (J SecRET —[] CONFIDENTIAL) Usegwty = C)_ UNCLASSIFIED
[2761]13-00000
[2763]ae en - yy:
[2764]cod Vy
[2765]4
[2767]| GE ; £6 (L2-#TEL |
[2769]10 July 1962
[2771]MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
[2772]THROUGH: Deputy. Director. (Plans)
[2773]SUBJECT: Juana (Juanita) CASTRO Ruz
[2775]“1. ACTION: None, This memorandum is for your informa-
[2776]tion,
[2778]2. In connection with Task Force W efforts to split the
[2779]Cuban leadership, some time ago we targeted Juana Castro Ruz,
[2780]half-sister of Fidel and: Raul Castro Ruz. A number of reports
[2781]have been. received indicating that Juana Castro Ruz opposed
[2782]the strong communist nature of the Cuban regime and was
[2783]prepared, at least to some extent, to cooperate with anti-
[2784]regime elements, In May 1962 we reestablished contact with and
[2785]recruited Mrs. Virginia Leitao De Cunha, Cuban born wife of
[2786]the Brazilian ambassador to the USSR and a long time: personal
[2787]friend of Juana Castro Ruz.
[2789]3, .On 11 June 1962, on our instructions, Madame De Cunha
[2790]proceeded to Havana where she maintained frequent contact
[2791]with Juana Castro Ruz and other prominent Cuban leaders until
[2792]1 July 1962, She discussed. the current regime quite frankly
[2793]with Juana Castro Ruz and, according to Madame De Cunha, she
[2794]obtained Juana's agreement to provide intelligence on the .
[2795]Cuban political leadership and to work against the Cuban
[2796]communist regime, short of engaging in activity which might
[2797]result in direct personal harm to her brothers Raul and Fidel.
[2798]According to.Madame De Cunha, Juana has agreed to proceed to
[2799]Mexico or the United States in this connection and return to
[2800]Cuba after discussions with “the Americans”
[2802]4- We are making the necessary arrangements with
[2803]Madame De Cunha to have Juana Castro Ruz proceed to Mexico as
[2804]soon as possible in order that we may attempt a direct re-
[2805]cruitment, You will be kept advised of any future develop-
[2807]ments of importance in this case.
[2808]Li Minu/ia eal
[2810]WILLIAM K, HARVEY
[2811]C/TFW
[2814]13-00000
[2816]ICICKNAL
[2818]- * Ly UNCLASSIFIED =O gee“owyh, 72°03 (Bg CDAFIDENTIAL
[2820]~  T SUBJECT: {Optional).
[2822]NO.
[2824]Chief, Western Hemisphere Division
[2825]1317 Barton Hell 10 January 1962
[2827]TO: (Officer designation, room number, and ; :
[2828]building) OFFICER'S | COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
[2829]to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
[2831]203 Admin. Building y Ae OmF fo DOCT- W2fir
[2833]INITIALS
[2834]a ye
[2835]bee,
[2837]ets, G10 Emre’ (2 ‘conFioenriat * “ET BS
[2839]13-00000
[2841]a7 al - R-O17
[2842]Dofs-6a- 6173
[2846]ti
[2848]Executive Roecisiry
[2850]MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Support)
[2852]10 Jamery 1962
[2854]SUBJECT 7 s Project IMATE
[2855]REFERENCES 1: @. Beecmendation approved by the President,
[2857]h dageet 96h, oeerte Covert action
[2858]Progrem Agains
[2860]bd. CAGID Bemoranduz to DCI, Subjects Action
[2861]_ with respect to the Agency Reserve for
[2862]Contingency held by the Burean ef the
[2863]Budget, approved by DCI 19 October 1961
[2865]1. The references eited establiahed the current STs
[2866]activity and cbteined funde in the enount of $5.36 xtllions
[2868]Se eperate the project dering the peried 1 duly ~ 3h
[2870]2. As set forth in paragreph four ef reference "b* it
[2871]is intended that the financial and andit requiransmte of this
[2873]. prejest be regularized to the extent possible consistent with
[2874]operational reqrirencente.
[2876]3. In the Project authority, reference "a", on k august
[2877]1961, and in subsequent discussions, the President approved —
[2878]covert operations incleding the funding of various persons,
[2879]groups, or activities, Cuban and non-Cuban, which, in eur
[2880]opinion, may be able to advance the over-all objectives of
[2881]FATE, These individuals, groups, and activities are and
[2882]will be many and varied. In many instances we will be able
[2883]to exercise little or no control over the finde, materiel,
[2884]arms, or equipment given such entities nor receive any suitable
[2886]accounting from then.
[2888]13-00000
[2890].
[2893]fy ~ 1‘ AG
[2896]7
[2897]t
[2898]es
[2900]4. I have, therefore, authorized the Deputy Director (Plans)
[2901]to pass to such persons, groups and activities, such JMATO monies,
[2902]eateries ms and sic pai as in his opinion may be necessary
[2904]» groups and activities, fhe Deputy Director
[2905](pian i tuthevized Fired to delegate this authority to the Co@P/piP, the
[2906]Cilef, Western Healsphere Division, the Chief, wifi, and Chief,
[2907]SMMAVE, as he may desire.
[2909]5. Pands advanced in accordance with thie authority shall te |
[2910]accounted for in accordance with normal Agency requirements except,
[2911]that, with respect to activities not controlled or administered
[2912]by the Agency, euch as those described in paragraph 3 above, .
[2913]certifications by the person passing funde to the activity may be
[2915]as final accomting when approved by an official designated
[2917]ebore. Such certifications ahall etate the amount passed, date, and
[2918]general purpose of the payment, and that further accounting is not
[2919]practical.
[2921]6 During the Project development, writing of sub-projects
[2923]"88 get forth in paragraph four of reference *b" will be deferred.
[2925]In liew, thereof, the project will provide you with copies ef
[2927]reference *a* which will be supplemented by more formal docanen-
[2929]tation when specific projects evolve as determined by the Deputy
[2931]Director (Plans). With the exception of the activities cited
[2933]fn paragraphs three and four abeve, activities whieh in the opinion
[2934]ef the Deputy Director (Plans) lend themselves to regularization
[2935]seated, sn uusteetive plans or fisesl annexee ill be eo oon
[2938]7. This authority does net amend regulstery sutheritices
[2939]in respect te adxinistretive matters covering Agency personnel.
[2941]SIGNED
[2943]dCHR A. MC CONE
[2944]Tirector
[2946]concurs
[2948]omptroller
[2950]Z¢ 62 G
[2952]CC: Dict por?
[2953]Dip
[2954]DLS ares
[2955]' Comptroller bam ee
[2956]Cfaudit staff LA Ff
[2958]13-00000
[2961]PROCESSING
[2963]PRO. ACCOM.
[2964]POSED | ACTION
[2966]"NO -NCEYING REQUIRED
[2968]ONLY QUALIFIES
[2970]y WEATCLARTERS GESK
[2971]WAN 1 DGE INGERING
[2973]ACC ester
[2974]SQW EEL
[2976]Cperational/d-aTi/ac7 -
[2977]Action Required: For infornation and fi les
[2979]1. Following is a brief straary of J.AVe/AUG:SK current assets in the
[2980]Target Area (CiuBa)s
[2982]|
[2983]|
[2984]|
[2985]a. &{CT=33 Subject is a source of operational intelligence in Havana,
[2986]he are naintaining contact via Sie Subject had a k/T set, cached it
[2987]and no longer kas access to it. ALtY.-1 has been instructed to deliver
[2988]another one to him,
[2989]bd pate Subject is a source of operaticnal intelligence in Criente
[2990]. rove %. n@ are in contact with Subject via a cutout at the Guantanano
[2991]Nav: Base. ; ]
[2993]Ce AMLTH106, 107 and 106: These three Subjects are sisters. They provide
[2994]7Cie3y with ope-ational intelligence in fabana.
[2996]de. Rolando “ANGUATT Julias Subject is an AT sub source in Pinar del Rio,
[2997]Subject is carrently reorganising his arsets -n that Province.
[2999]e. Jove ‘envel FuOUNA'L2Z Quintanas Subject is an ANCT eub scurce in the Port
[3001]of ise, SSS
[3003]f. Violeta NACIAS ig an MCT live drop in Rabana and is still active.
[3004]Ge Norberto \“ARTINEZ ig an AXCT sub source and is active in Habena and
[3005]Pinar del Rio Provinces,
[3007]2. SWAV4/KUD:SE current snd futare plans are to continue to support and] E
[3008]direct the existing assets it has in Cuba as outlined in psragraph 1 above, Moreover.
[3009]plans are now in motion for the followings
[3013]a, Exfiltrate, either legally or black, MASGUART end MARTINEZ for further
[3015]" training and return to the target ares
[3016]DATE TYPED OATE OSPATCHED |
[3018]Distributions :
[3019]3~ aD
[3021]_ DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
[3023]UFGke 1539
[3024]HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
[3026]192523
[3028]_ ORIGINATING ~
[3030]ae The detection, Adenti fication and ‘neatrali getica of bootie intelligence’
[3032]FrOviae sec rity checks on ager.ts, potential agent 6 and acsots, and
[3034]-Ge Provide, with the security section of Base ISUTE, security checks en CDYCKS J
[3035]covert ralationettn with Gite and ban erratisations. In adiition t.e TUD% Sect:
[3036]will continse to develop = ay paratus to be used as on (Ment corps which wan 3e 64s
[3037]in the rollup of Vastro end Comm aiat acert CAF rt of the post-Castro f
[3039]pevarmrant, fats, AMO 28, © Facts and ar be the main source for tf