[1]4-00000
[3]104-10214-10034
[5]| 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
[7]e
[8]or”.
[10]WSLE OF CONTENS
[12]BO oo ee we
[13]tic
[14]fail re oars
[15]alg
[16]Greration Lanwet 2. 6 6 6 8 ee ee ee ee ee te ee
[17]State asks Farland if he could eagineer e ecup
[18]Farland replies that he could . 6. 6 6 6 0 eee ee ee ee
[20]Farlenod says the dissidents need guas
[21]The U.S. Ls prepared tc assist in overthrowicg Trujillo ..
[22]Rusotica asks wist iper rifles be ted ran dissicen ts
[24]Acting DCL approves air crop o7
[26]Spectal Group epproves snall am oa
[28]COS asks that one w boa be sont in each DOU rrr
[29]Tearbvorn learns o7 plen <s assassinate ty inte ptirg auto
[30]wWinpy Berry asks for sutmachine gums for pilot oe we we
[31]Dearborn asks for three 3S-caliber piswsis fo esidents
[32]The plot to kill Trujillo et his mistress’ spercmeat ee ee
[34]COS protes‘ss restriction om pouchirg weapons ~
[35]liqs guidance a on policy and objectives . . - - ee
[36]Station asks permission to pass three carbines to dissicents
[37]Has aporoves rast ing careings see eet eee eee
[38]ihe carbines are pessed ta the dissidents
[40]Request foe pouch waiver ref pouching summachine gums ...-
[41]Sutmachine guns pouched
[42]Pleas Prom dissidents that submachine guns be passed to then
[44]-Hgs informs the station not repeat not to yess submachine gums
[45]_ Post-Bay of
[47]isa stamddrm cable . 2 ee ele ee ee es
[48]Station ackncviedges reveipt of submachine gims
[50]Draft cable (not sent) arvroving relesse cf submachine guns
[51]State Departcent disapproves passing submachise guns
[53]The whereabouts of the three carbines . . - - see - -
[54]Special Group confirms ro i submachine guns to diss igerz
[55]ace dissidents’ 25sassins i are firm... - ee ee
[57]Dearbees and
[58]Critic No. lon the asses
[60]Discovery of U.5. involvement with assassination group
[61]Recepitulation oP ams passed or consicered
[63]Tre rotivations of the assassias
[66]7
[68]ant
[70]a
[71]3
[73]its
[76]KEREE @owne |
[78]NMI
[79]ho
[81]- 35
[82]2
[83]=)
[85]. 36
[86]36
[88]- 37
[90]. veh
[92]Le
[94]i
[95]i
[100]'
[101]a
[102]1
[104]yom gee gabe, ABs
[107]14-09000
[109]so Rafael Trujillo, the Deniniecen dictetor, was essacsinated at
[110]4 about ten p.m. cn the night of 30 May 1961. It was Trujiliots
[111]custem to visit one of his xletresses at his ranch at San Cristeval
[113]abcul cace a week. Cn most of his travels he rode in a Carysler
[115]w
[116]ru
[117]OO
[119]4
[120]an
[122]0Y
[123]{5
[124]y
[126]q
[127]e)
[128]2:
[130]re
[131]ic]
[132]i)
[133]6
[134]i
[135]i
[136]2
[137]a
[139]y stereotyped pattern of action:
[141]after his nightly walx, he dississed his companions; changed into a
[143]ss
[145]Ehaki uniform; aad set out gor San Cristotel in an unescorted 1957
[147]Chevrolet, always driven by the sare chauffeur.
[148]On the night of the Slaying, the Chevrolet was intercepted on
[150]a four-lane highway on the outskirts of Ciudad Trujillo by elfgat
[152]x : armed assassins in three cars. Trujillo vas killed by gunfire, and
[153]Fy his body was removed from the scene by the assassins. Trojillo’s
[155]chauffeur was seriously wounded, was left behind by the assassins,
[157]4 and survived. All of the assassins escaped from the scene. (One was
[159]. never caught and vas eventually granted amnesty. Two were killed
[161]. ° -
[163]. while resisting arrest. Tee others ...were arrested, confessed,.
[165]and were later executed tefore coming to trial. About eight or nine
[167]ate
[169]others, who vere in on or mew o° the plot but did not per~icimate
[171]sete nat
[173]in the actual assassination, were killed
[175]resisting arrest, or by suicide to avoid arrest and torture.
[177]“a
[178]1
[180]“
[184]1 :
[185]erie pe enn we
[189]he
[195]e
[196]1
[198]4.00000
[200](Pam,
[204]There were reports in Ciudsd Prujillo ay che time teat the
[206]U.S. Consulate ad been tn scme way involved with the plotters.
[208]i
[209]4
[210]i
[211]i
[213]Eventually, after the survivi
[217]plotters were granted amnesty
[218]many of the details care cut. Norman Call, a reporter with the
[220]San Juan Star, wrote an article thar appeared in The New Republic
[222]issue of 13 April 1963. Excerpts folloy:
[224]The assassination of the Daninican Republic's Rafael L.
[225]os Trujillo was carried out with essistance from the US Central
[226]' . Intelligence Agency. Arms Por the May 30, 1961 slaying of the
[227]. 69-year-old dictator on a Vonely stretch of highwaymear his
[228]: capital were smuggled by tne CIA into the country at toe
[229]request of the assassins.
[231]a, ; The CIA began shipping arzs to the Dominican Revublic in ‘
[232]Ci. ad late 1950, followicg a series of talks tetween US Consul Henry
[233]Dearborn, Chief Political Officer John Parfiela of the US
[234]Consulate, and Luis Aciama Tio. Also involved in the plot was .
[235]Antonio Imbert, who had been Governor of Porto Pleta province.
[237]4&3 Trujillo's political and Mrancial problems deepened,
[238]talks continued between Dearbon, Parfield and leaders of the
[239]anti-Trujillo conspirecy. Toward the end of 1960, contact vas
[240]established between Amiama and a CLA agent who .
[241]named Plato Cox.
[245]o
[247]The key link betieen the assassins and the CIA in the aras
[248]shipments was’a long-time American civilian resident of Ciudad :
[249]Trujillo, Lorenzo Berry, otherwise known as "dinpy,” who operated :
[250]@ supermarket ina fashionable neighborhood where Trujillo alsa
[251]lived. "Wimpy" was put under brief arrest after the eilling but
[252]was later allowed to leave the country. -
[254]The weapons vere inported in small parts, to ba assembled
[255]dater by the plotters, anong the routine grocery shitments ?or
[257]the supermarket arriving regularly in the capital's port. The
[259]-2- |
[260]Be EPNCT_IVIA man . , |
[261]“yj _ GrGnei-eies SLY |
[263]se
[264]ee rene Diormcirn per
[266]ie.
[269]fun. parts encered the Republic in spectally-carked food. cans,
[270]watch vere later turned over to the conspirators. ;
[272]: Plans for the intended assassination vere worked out during
[273]the same-period-in.whicn the abortive assault.on Cuba was. being...
[274]prepared. Esvever, when the ClA-crganized April 17,1961, 0° 2
[275]invasion at tre Ray of-Pigs failed and world attention was’
[276]focused on Washington's ‘complicity in that cperation, a post-
[277]ponement of the attempt on Trujillo's life was ordered because
[278]of the embarrassment enoiner such failure might cause the
[279]United States. But the order, to hold up cane too late. ‘The
[280]needed weapcas were already in the hanas of the conspirators; = -
[281]who reiused eppeals Wy Téarcdorn and Barrield to delay the
[282]_ assassination. They insisted on moving at the first opportimity.
[283]Tails came on May 30,-when frujillo end his chauffeur drove out
[284]into the country in an. usescorted.1957 Chevrolet for a
[285]-yendezvous at a San Crisioval estate, la Furcdacion, with '
[286]Trujillo's 2)-year-oid mistress, Mona Sanchez.
[288]It can be reported on excellent authority that close
[289]associates of the slain dictator knew of the US role within
[290]a few days following the killing.
[292]. Dearborn, Barfieid-and Berry bad meanvhile been rushed ,
[293]out of the Dominican Republic by-US officials. . .. + -
[294]Since the ouster of the Trujillos, Berry ("wimpy") has
[295]yeturned to operate his handsomely appointed supermarket,
[296]where he greets customers with calm and courtesy, as if
[299]Peon? AEs SOA:
[301]We interviewed Richard Bissell (then DD/P), J. C. King (then |
[303]‘Chief, WH Division), and J. D. Esterline (then Chief of Operations,
[305]WH Division). King recalls the Agency's role as being limited to
[307]monitoring internal plotting against the Trujillo regine "put. not
[309]pushing or instigating." Esterline, like King, recalls that the
[311]gency was not directly involved in coup plotting. He described the,-
[313]AIS CI TIMARU eae RRA AG PENN Ne bite ATE
[319]furnishizg of weapons os 2 symbol--sczething that-~.<
[320]tangible evidence of U.S. support. Bissell rerem’
[322]role. 85. 5. being somewhat more. posi. tive than te
[324]and Esterline. Be viewed the Agency's rele: as
[326]to an indigenous group wnose intended actions were in the U.S.
[330]terest. Ee descrived the affair es "a falziy normel operation
[332]involving meetings, discussions, and a rorzal approvals." de do rot
[333]have firm information as to whether or not any of the weapons
[334]supplied by CIA werefactusLly used in the assassination of Trujillo.
[335]Both Esterline and King. relieve they vere not. Bissell, powever,
[336]has 1 a vague impression trat one of them was.
[338]The Agency officers nost immediately involved with the plotters
[340]are: now. widely: scattered. Lear Reed,-vho was chief of ‘station:
[341]until October 1960,. ts now retired. Robert Oven, vho was chief
[343]of station at the time of the assassination, is. dn Farts... Charles -
[344]Cookson, the station's operations officer, is in Brazil. Tsabel
[345]cintren, the station's aduinistrative assistant vho vas used as a’ "
[347]: communications Link and in the passing of the arns, resigned in 196%
[349]and is believed to be living in Puerto Rico. Red Holsan, the head-
[351]quarters branch chief, is in Guatemala City. We eiected not to call
[353]. back any of these people for interviews. While they might be able -
[355]14-00000 7
[357]to furnish sinor detat}s that ere pissin rem the written records,
[359]we think it. valizely teat i y would: be Fe bie: "to. ada. ‘Significantly . ears
[361]to the quite . complete record ‘that appears dn tne EMDZED operational
[362]“files. :
[364]Agency activities a2 at. replacing the Trujillo regize were
[365]assigned the cryptonja EMDZ=D. One segment of |} D was known as
[367]EMSLEW, the cryptonya tor the Operation to rerove “Trujillo by
[369]* violent action. We have reviewed the voluninous 2MDEZD files. Most
[370]of this account is draw fron then. Many of the more significant
[371]documents were not put iato the EWEED files ‘but were kept ina
[372]private file ‘by J.C. King. He zade that file availnble to us.
[374]_ We also have studied anotzer- Particularly useful document. The
[376]Dominican Military Intellizence Service (sm) officer put in charge
[377]investigation of the
[379]of the/Trujillo assassination was @ navy lieutenant named ‘Ortiz: -
[381]“The Dominican Republic assigzed hin to its embassy in Ottava in
[382]‘November 1961 vhen the Trujillo family's attempt to regain Power
[384]7 failed, - The New York field office, of the Fal held extensive
[385]interviews with hin from 6 April through 10 May 1962. The result
[387]: WBS, a massively-detatled, 162-page report on the plot and on ‘the
[388]assassination as reconstructed by the SIM, from its interrogations
[390]: of. the persons it apprehenced.
[393]1400800, 7
[395]Torts
[397]rac Es. tI
[399]peep ELIA HT NIB I ARTI WE ON REE TES
[401]1
[403]'
[405]1 hee en are pene ete AEE ARS A SH
[407]“ascertain from the files the rature ond the extentof U.S. support
[409]the story is itz failure to identify the individuals with whom the
[411]a the course of
[413]U.S. policy with respect to the overtnroy of Trujillo. We also can
[415]of the plotter rs, including the passing to trem of weapons out cf the
[416]U.S. Consulate in Ciudad Trujille. Wat we cacy not discover from the
[418]files, despite quite massive docmentation, is how the coup group
[420]was organized. The best single account ve find, and it is not wholly
[422]accurate, is in a book by Robert Crassweller.* The wain flaw in
[424]U.S. Goverment vas actually working. Excerpts follow: Dae os
[426]The plot was organized on the basis of two groups of
[427]conspirators linked together by a liaison that later proved
[428]too fragile to bear the stresses laid upon it. Each group
[429]had its purpose and its separate Personnel.
[431]The function of the Action Group was to assassinate
[432]Trujillo and immediately present proof of its succes, in
[433]the form of Trujillo's corpse, to the second group, the
[434]Political Group. The latter would then launch a coup, ;
[435]taking over the machinery of the government and the Armed:
[436]Forces.
[438]ee The Action Group consisted of eight men. It t appears to
[440]"have been Organized originally ty General Antonio Inbert -
[441]Barreras and Salvador Estrelle. .... . They were joined
[443]’ by Lieut. Amado Garcia Guerrero, a nexiher o? the military
[444]corps attached to Trujillo in tre National Palace; Antonio
[445]de la Maza, the brother of Octavio de la Maza, who had teen
[446]killed by the goverment beceuse of his invol venent in the
[448]* + Robert D. Crassweller, Trufiiio: The Lite and Tises ota
[449]-Caribbean Dictator (New Yora: MacMilian Co., 1965)
[451]Calintez case z 3 O° Pastoriza; and Petro :
[452]Livio Cedeno. The eigath xenver, Ma asl Caceres Tuati, was in _ ot, . 4
[453]Moca 02, tie utgat © oP the 20th and sew none o? the action.
[455]: The Political Group had a-less G@istinct membership. :t
[456]incluéed Luis Amiaza Tis, Modesto Diaz, Ceneral Juan Teczes
[457]Diaz, and several others. At the very top it had the cupport
[459]£ Geseral Roman Fernandes, Ceeretary of State for the Arned
[460]Forces, ana his brother Bibin. ....: -
[462]* The over-all authorit ty appears to: have centered principally - : : : . whe
[463]in General Diaz, probably the only ome woo had sufficleat . : vos
[464]prestige to command authority. .....
[466]‘,. “The Action Group would remain in daily readiness. When
[467]information in the Palace indicated that Trujillo was going
[468]to Grive ty Estancia Fundacion .. . Garcia Guerrero in the
[470]Palace would inform the others by persozal message. + + + + « Sos al .
[472]The expected message from Garcia Guerrero in the Palace
[473]came to the patient plotters at seven o ‘cloc« on the evening
[474]of May 30. They were not fully prepared and coordinated at
[475]this momeat, but the ezotional and impetuous de la Maza
[476]threatened.to act by himself if the others lagged... in.any.
[477]event, the plan went into execution. . ... . Each of then
[478]had his revolver or pistol, and de la Maza also had his om
[479]saved-off shotgun and to M-1l semiautcratic rifles. .....
[481]fe
[483]_ |The conspiracy tegan to come apart within an hour. Never
[484]very professionally contrived, the plot vas hastened prematurely
[485]to its culsination by the impatience of de la Maza, and it was
[486]now afflicted with bad luck and ineptitude. Imediately after
[487]_ the assassination, the men of the Action Group were unable to
[489]reach General Roman. eee ee ae oe ae OE
[491]‘The Political Group of the conspiracy’ never took up its.
[492]| planned role. The Acticn Group scattered, leaving a trail as.
[493]wide as a boulevard. Trujilio's body was "weft in the trunk of
[495]eoeyhs
[498]a . > dela Maza's car, parsed in the garege of Ceneral Temas Diaz, |
[499]ot . _.  ° where the police found it in a few hours. The conspirators;
[500]Pe ' were all hunted dow very quickly, except for Anlana end
[502]Us se Imbert, who maraged to conceal themselves for moaths until
[503]_ the canzg2r had passed. : :
[505]14-0000
[507]~ geese
[509]sheimen
[511]Tne Far report of? tS iaterviews of Ortiz, the sr4 teeta,
[512].. @ives.an excellent account of way the plot fell apart after the -
[513]assassination took place. One ‘of the ascassins, Pedro Livio Cedeno, ,
[514]was :cerlously wounded (probably. by | fire from his own cagpanions).
[515].All of the assassins assembled at Generel Diaz' house after the
[517]killing. One of then called a friead, Dr. Potert Reid Cabral, to
[519]treat Livio. Dr. Reid found him so badly injured that surgery would
[521]be required. Reid ard two of the assassins took Livio to a hospital.
[523],
[525]While in deliriim be mumbled the nares "de la Maza” end “Juan .
[527]Tomas." The police immediately pickea up two brothers of Antonio
[529]de la Maza. Feither vas personally involved in the plot, but both
[530]knew the details and the names of most of the assassins. General ;
[531]. Diaz, Antonio de la Maz, and Lieut. Garcia Guerrero vere killed .
[533]resisting arrest. Amiama and Imbert went into hiding and survived.
[535]The rest were caught and interrogated follovingtorture. All
[536]confessed.
[538]e The confessions led ta y senti fication a of 5 persons who were in
[540]” or on the. fringes of the Political Group: General Roman and his
[541]brother, Aniana Tie, General- Garcia’ Urbaez, General Guarionex
[542]Estrella, Tomas Baez Diaz, Modesto Diaz, and Miguel Angel Baez Diaz.
[544]Lorenzo Berry (sispy) was identizied as a ccmunications Link betveen
[546]sai shank oi Sr asa
[548]’ the plotters and the U.S. Consulate . However, + the SIM did not
[550]m peke
[553]14-0000
[555]. discover the identities o2 tke political olotters with whom the
[557]a : Consulate
[559]vere available for interss
[561]were fairly widely imow wo persons not actually members so? it, there
[563]: : appears to have deen exselians compartmentation between the Political
[565]4
[566]4 . and the Action Groups--pertans too much compartsentation. .The
[567]ae assassination itsel? «a> well pleuned. General Diaz vas in over-
[569]all charge of the Operation, but de la Maza was the ore who did all
[572]7
[573]i}
[575]i
[576]t
[577]'
[578]I
[580]of the work. Fe took three cars to a local garage and had the
[582]engines rebuill so that the cars could reach sveeds of 120 mph.
[584]i
[585]{ He had possession of the weepcas from the U.S. Consulate, plus |
[586]: Several of his ow. Fe and the other Farticipants took the cars
[587]7 . to the site selected for the xiling ard conducted dry runs each
[588]é = night. Everything wes ready and the assassins vere lying in wait
[590]for Trujillo on tae nignt of 23 May. At the last minute ke decided
[592]y : : not to go.to San Cristcsel vecause he wasn't feeling too vell. The
[593]3 ; . assassins continued their Gry runs each evening. After the assassina-
[595]tion was carried out, essentially as it had been planned, the coup
[599]i
[601]i
[602]i
[604]that was to folloy failed--is Party because of bad luck, in part because
[606]of poor plarnicg, and in part because of too much compartzentation.
[608]E
[610]at
[612]Fan RP
[614]Pak imag centres en UMA TH AREER)
[616]3
[617]3.
[618]H
[620]H
[622]Lertiitet ven
[624]Apis
[626]aia i alae
[628]7 death, Was 08, told that the assassination was to be attespted on:
[630]_ trunk, where it ves later found by the police.
[632]“lam and then drove to the howe of General Rouen to alert hia.
[634]“He and Roman then returned to the scene of the assassination,
[636]Ceneral Rozaa, =ho Was. to take over the goverment after Trujillo's
[638]May.30th. Afser the slayitz, General Diaz tried to to telepzore
[639]General Roman but. could not reach hin. Diaz then teok the car
[641]with Trujillo: S body still in its mms and drove to Ranan's house.
[642]He saw'so many soldiers in she vicinity that he gave up and returned
[644]hone, leaving the car in the (driveway with the body still is tre
[646]What had happened was this: Former general and former head :
[647]of the SIM, Arturo Espaillat, happened to chance upon the scene So :
[648]while the assassination was taking Place. He was out for a drive ;
[649]with his wife dnd was Passed by a car that he recognized as Trujillo's. i
[650]Ee stopped at a drive-in restaurant end almost imediately beard os
[651]shooting ahead; vhich ‘he suspected involved Trujillo. Ee drove to org.
[653]the scene, saw what was happening, turned around, end sped back ; ot }
[654]into town. He stopped ata military installation and gave tie
[656]arriving simultaneously wick the police. The police found Trujillo's
[657]chauffeur, vho was wounded but still alive. Roman end Espailiat
[659]then vent to the hospitel to try to question the chauffeur. zaus,
[661]General Diaz could not reach General Roman to Ainfom Roman teat
[663]1400000 |;
[665]Trujillo‘ bad teen kilied and that it was tfre for Raman to rake nis.
[667]move to take ove: the _Soveranent. Remaz ines ony teat there hed been
[669]ce ERS 8 poe, Rig,
[671]a shooting involving qeujiire and “that Tratllo was nis sing. - —_ did
[673]“not Imow whether Generel Diaz! ‘group was involved in it or not. He
[675]was reluctant to move until ke was sure ¢h at Trujillo was dead. By ’
[677]the tice Roman concluded that Trujillo s must de Gead, it was too late
[679]Pee em eee ee
[681]for nia to act; Hector Trujillo and Joazay Abbes had already taken
[683]charge. ° Roman did pake’a couple of feeble + tries at engineering a
[685]take over, but it is apparent that he had n no real advance plan nor
[687]any appreciable chances of succeeding.
[689]The assassination itself and the plotting preceding {t took
[693]vivity in. opposition
[694]to the Trujillo regime, with beta the OAS and the U.S. taking clear-
[696]place against a’ background: of international ac
[698]cut stands. ‘These are scme of the highlights: ;
[699], a. A briefing paper prepared in wi Division for the Joint
[700]Chiefs of Staff in August 1960 states that a revolt was Planned
[702]. - for December 1S 993 in the Dominican Republic but was delayed ©
[704]pending receipt of arms from Verezuela. The plot was discovered |
[706]and was rolled up in January. Yenezuela brought charges in the
[710]QAS that the Dosinican Republic was "in Plagrant
[712]violation or
[714]; human rights, freedom, and denocracy” following the mass arrests
[716]in the Dominican Republic in January 1950. A coemittee of the
[719]14-D0009°
[723]ATES
[725]“OAS acstened to investigate the charges reported:on 8 June 1550...
[727]that the Dominices goverrment was guilzy as. charged.
[729]b. A near-miss assassination atvexpt against President
[733]i Betancourt on 24 June 1960. killed tyoi in nis entourage end
[735]injured hin and several others. The VYerezuelan governzent
[739]. S&nnouaced after capture of most of the assassins that the
[740]~ .: Dominican goverrment was responsible for the attempt on Betan-
[741]court's life and took its case to the OAS. On 20 Augilst, the
[743]OAS voted sanctions against the Dominican Republic. Under
[745]. Becretary of State Dillon, testifying before the House Agriculture
[747]Comittee’on 24 August in support of a request by President
[749]<2 Gat
[751]Eisenhower for a cut in the Dominican Republic's sugar quota,
[753]is reported as having said that it was hoped that econoaic
[755]oo : sanctions would result in the downfall of Trujillo's dictator-
[757]SUAS ANT EP SI
[759]ship and its replacement by @ moderate and free regime. The
[761]Unitea States severed diplomatic relations with the Dominican |
[763]Republi ic on 26 August 1960, elthough consular relations vere
[764]Pioute 4, aw, Continued, Ce! 3 “
[766]NLS eS:
[771]AS a. further. prelude to a. chronclog ical view of operat on":
[772]‘ pieedies MSTEM, ve think it vould ve useful to ident zy the veopte
[773]involved, especially since officers of the Department of State
[775]played a very prosineant role.
[776]af a
[778]Washington - Devartrent cf State
[780]Roy R. Ribottcen . Assistant Secretery of State for
[781]Inter-American Affairs . ts
[783]" Frace Devine a Special Assistant to Rubottcea
[785]* Jonn C. Hill . Special Assistant to Rubottom
[787]Chief, Wd Division
[789]Chief, Branch III, WH Divisioa
[791]. Ambassador until 28 June 1960. It is
[792]pertizent to note that King and Ester-
[793]line ettribute U.S. ard CIA invoivemeat
[795]- 33
[798]14-Do09 | - -
[800]Henry Dearborn
[802]"John D. Barfield
[804]Lear Reed
[806]' Robert Oven
[808]Ca Na ET BAA ORS 8 CT,
[810]- Charles Cookson .
[812]Isabel Cintron
[813]Key Dopinican Plotters
[814]noonenaeeneenieememneeneae ad
[815]Dr. Jordi Brossa
[817]Juan Vicinit _
[819]Luts Eaquero
[821]_ Who considered hinself quite a clandestine: jee
[823]“ plovters..
[825]with the plotters.
[827]" Ciutad Trujillo - CTA
[829], Atuinistrative Assistant ;
[831]- Code Tames: Mr. X,-ABC, and YAGUATE
[833]Code nare: SOCRATES
[835]with the plotters in the Dontatcaa ”
[836]Republic to Antascador Farland. Trey
[837]descrite him as # former FBI eaployze
[839]operator. Esterline, who later rerved
[840]uader him in Panara, called him “a wild
[841]man who buzzed the Agency to support a
[842]move to assassinate Trujillo.” He had
[843]direct dealinzs with a number of the key
[845]Counsellor of Embassy until 25 August
[846]1960 and Consul Cereral therearter. Ve
[847]_Used the code name DELTA in correspondence < . ;;
[849]‘Second Secretary until 26 August 1960 . -
[850]and a consular officer thercafter, Cote ea
[851]CIA cryptonym: EMDAZS-2 .
[853]Chief of Station until October 1950
[855]Chief of Station frem 20 Januery until
[856]& Jime 1961. Code name used with the
[857]Plotters: GALGO :
[859]Operations Officer:
[861]Code names: S¥ORD and EL catco
[864]14-00000 *-
[866]ieee taunts mabremi dy ost
[868]Dr. Severo Cabral :
[869]Jose Francisco Tapia
[870]Aullo Brea
[872]Andres Freitas
[874]Luis Amiama Tig
[876]Jose Rene Roman
[878]Juan Tomas Diaz
[880]' Donald Reid Cabral
[882]Lorenzo D. Berry
[884]. unhappy exverience. The consulate :
[885]_ Preferred to have “novaing.to.do with him,
[886]. but the Deninican plotters brought hin tf
[888]"Code name: CRISTOBAL’
[890]. tions link between the plotters and
[892]‘An Avaricdn ta the Declaican Republic
[893]with wacm the station had had aa earlier
[895]as 8 cutout to the consulate. Ee took
[896]delivery from Lorenzo Berry of three
[897]carbines passed to Zerry frog the U.S.
[898]Consulate. for use by the plotters. Ee -
[899]held them for a few @ays and then gave
[900]-them back-uhea Berry insisted they be
[901]returned. Berry then passed them to
[902]cne of the assassins.
[904]Code ‘names: . ESCTOR acd PLUTARCO
[906]Code name: ANDY , ar
[908]Code name: CIBAO
[910]“dimpy” - Berry is a U.S. citizen vho
[912]owed Wimpy's Supermarket in Ciudad
[913]Trujillo. He was the main ccmmuntca- .
[915]the U.S. Consulate. The weapons...
[916]furnished the plotters were actually
[917]passed to Berry. . :
[919]Wimpy's wife - a Dominican citfzen of
[920]Syrian extraction. She Sppears to have
[921]been even more active in the plot than
[923]_ber husband. It was she who had the
[925]contacts with the Denintcaas involved.
[927]4.00000
[929]Doni
[930]Consulate vere
[931]notes. Mrs. Ber
[932]fros or passed t
[933]Consul General?
[942]S Secretary or the
[943]CIA Station‘’s administrative assistant.
[945]Two dociuzents provide a useful point of depdture, from an
[947]Ve i
[950]hisvorical point of view. One is a semi-official letter from : _
[951]i
[953]Ambassador Farland in the Dominican Republi: to Assistant :
[955]Secretary of State Rubotton. The other document is an internal
[956]CIA staff paper revealing the relatively passive role that had
[958]been played by CLA prior to 1960.
[962]C | 16 November 1959
[963]a2 Sovenber 1959
[965]Pa _ Ambassador Farland wrote an "Official-Informal” memorandum
[967]“ "to Rubottom reporting that "the underground is more active today
[969]: than ever in the history of the Trujillo regime.” He described the
[970]Bo Principal opposition group as being about 2,000 strong. He said:
[971]‘ .
[973]oa : . ", . » within this Group there is growing militant anti-
[974]R. : American feeling based on the premise that the United States
[976]. should actively aid the Dominican revoluticnary (sic) for the :
[977]overthrow of the Trejillo regine. Discussions I have heard on :
[978]tuis subject shov aa appalling lack o? uncerstanding of the
[979]position of the United States and its adopied doctrine o? non-
[980]intervention. .... . This group is in possession of
[981]clandestine broadcasting equipment which will &0 into operation :
[983]CEE eT
[985]4 whea the strike is mage. CAS has deen informed and Joins with : }
[986]| me in suggesting that you pass this information to J. C. King." - 4 :
[989]# ‘ \ 16 - i .
[990]af NS . :
[992]- my :
[994]i way ; :
[996]i ;
[997]i
[999]* i
[1004]4-90000
[1006]— 7 araore
[1009]creeps ate
[1011]co Cate?, Wy Division, @iscusses
[1013]Cr - : izon coverage Of the Domirtean on
[1014]in the event of Trujillo's removal from power. The objectives 4
[1016]. . ; sh aut : i
[1017]see Stated in the Paper were to ensure orderly transition in the event
[1019]Loe
[1021]amend
[1023]Trujillo abdicatee or was Gepesed and to prevent a takeover by
[1025]Castro-type forces. The folloving excernt reveals the level of
[1026]JE 33 =
[1028]CIA activity in the Dominican Republic prior to that time:
[1030]t
[1031]i
[1033]“The CUS Cludad Trujillo conducts ne covert orerations; | i
[1035]hovever, his official contacts with Generalissimo Trujillo ana '
[1037]oo wits the Chie? of the Dominican Security Services has enabled
[1038]a hia on occesicn to assess the attivuces and reactions of the
[1039]Fé a Trujillo government to internal opposition activities and to
[1040]~ . eriticisns: of ang activities directed against the Dominican
[1042]Other Anerican governments unfriendly
[1044]@overncent by exiles and
[1045]to the [eminican regine,"
[1047]10 March 1960
[1048]ah Rarca 1960
[1050]j This is the date of the first draft that @ppears in Agency files
[1052]of a plan to persuade Trujillo to retire. ‘The originator of the draft
[1054]1
[1055]2, ‘4S not shown, but it was to be forvarded to President Elsenhover
[1056]i . , from General Edwin Clark, a friend of the President from their years
[1057]; of militery service. The plan was for Clar to appreaca Trujillo,
[1058]i With whom he hed been on good terms in the Fast, and attempt to
[1059]: persuade Trujillo to retire. It was to be pointed out that there was
[1060]F
[1062]rte: Pe eee one we mee a
[1064]<g
[1065]om i a NT
[1068]14.99000
[1072]Roti
[1074]eat
[1076]poe
[1078]oN
[1080]SE COC RON, R yA Gace A RE att
[1082]_ met with Trujillo on 2T March.
[1084](a wetsrery
[1088]eee ed
[1089]wet Cited
[1091]no C22 who could succeed hin, and that to crotect his Tasily ani
[1093]to preserve his inage as El S
[1095]he should step down and
[1097]allow asylun to ve arranzea for him. Eis fently would have the
[1098]é J
[1100]i
[1102]i
[1105]weelth already outsiée the Deminican Republic, and the fortune
[1107]inside would be placed in trust, to te edsinistered (ipterrationally-
[1108]known personages for the venefit o? tne Dorinican people.
[1110]This proposition received hign-level attention in Washington,
[1111]including that of President Zisenhower, Secretary of State Herter,
[1113]and Allen Dulles. In approving Clark's apprcach to Trujillo,
[1115]the President specified that Clark should travel as a representative
[1116]of the State Departzent, rather than as a personal emissary of the
[1118]“President. General Clark traveled to the Dominican Republic and
[1120]By the time of the meeting it
[1121]appears that it had been decided that the plan vould be presented
[1122]as merely that of private citizen Clark, and that wes what was done.
[1123]The station thought it likely that Trugillo recognized the official
[1125]U.S. Govermment hand in the proposal. O? course, nothing came o? the
[1127]_ meeting. .
[1129]22 March 1960
[1130]ce Maren 1900
[1132]Ambassador Farlard, in a TOP SECRET memorandum to Rubottan,
[1134]forwarded a plan of a Dominican grous plotting Trujillo's overthroy
[1138]QlPATT_ Tira pias .
[1139]Veh ET! 7.3 ely :
[1141]5 at
[1142]eke Te, + MN Am dln rr RE a TR Reet
[1145]aeRO mre
[1147]cameras +
[1150]. tenner aimee ne te
[1152]ceteeme ot alapenn ore tims one
[1153]Viees -ore
[1155]14-0000
[1157]Aer om
[1159]Hf
[1160]3
[1163]i)
[1165]2
[1166]ms
[1167]o
[1168]4
[1169]mo
[1170]oO
[1171]3
[1172]co
[1173]i
[1174]a
[1175]i
[1176]oO
[1177]Hy
[1178]“Ss
[1179]5
[1180]2,
[1181]ne
[1183]of being backed by muscle, ‘The cpereticn was to
[1184]v
[1186]arrival of a "special U.S. confidential envoy"/vould tell Trujillo
[1188]ion
[1190]oO 4
[1191]6 oeNEe
[1192]we cree apie acne
[1194]to leave the country. "He tells it plainly and decisively; ne will
[1195]give hin 12 or 18 hours to do it." It woula te nade clear thar
[1197]if Trujillo refused, a porder inciéent would be contrived,
[1199]would be Sollowed by "collective intervention." Assuming
[1201]Trujillo's acceptance of the ultimatua, the plan then outlined stens
[1203]for transition vo an operating representative government. The ary
[1204]1. aN would be reduced in size. A caretaker government would prepare for
[1205]a we free elections. Ambassador Farland forwarded the plan with these
[1207]comments of nis om to Rubotton: . i
[1209]z - « « this segment of the dissidents is psychologically
[1210]+ : conditioned to a point where it will take any step excent the \
[1211]ultinate, and for the execution of the latter they exuect |
[1212]United States assistance. ..... {
[1213]. : "Dick, I think the tine bas ccme ?or certain agencies of
[1214]. our Government, without ttribution, to establish and inplement
[1215]. . a@ definite cofstructive program to influence the course of events
[1216]no : in the Deminican Republic. My conversations with the Secretary a
[1217]: and Allen Dulles empnasized the problems and the possibilities
[1218]of this type of approach. .. 2... 7
[1220]30 March & 7 April 1960
[1222]4 The Special Group considered actions that wight be taken in the ‘
[1224]n
[1225]re vebinahame tenes wamanthsmtoee +
[1227]Py
[1228]Was Sao
[1231]u
[1233]soak TM eS nemmenne ne
[1234]2
[1237]Cn 20 March, Yrearing
[1239]L
[1241]event oF a flare-u
[1243]b
[1247]teat Cuca mignt be involv 4, there was talk of evacuating U.S.
[1248]civillans fren Guantanamo. There was also discussion of the
[1249]possinility c? sesling off the land entrance to the Dominican Republic
[1250]from Eaiti and of the proolem of providing asylum Zor Trujillo. On
[1251]7 April, there was further talk o7 sealing off the country if Trujilte
[1252]fell, and an appraisal was made of the chances oF hi his leaving
[1253]willingly:
[1255]" ,. . it is evident that Trugillo will not consider
[1257]meving any arrangerents for derly succession to himself, but
[1258]that ke will either hang ca to the bitter end or flee the
[1260]country on snort notice, a la Batista.”
[1262]9 April 1950
[1263]State sent a cable to Farland through CIA channels, fron which
[1265]the following is an extract:
[1267]"Could you, if so instructed, ake appropriate arrangements
[1268]thin rext few weexs with eppropriate civil and military
[1270]dissicent elezerts to take over the GODR? You would be authorized
[1272]to indicate to-them that as soon as they had seized power they
[1273]should immediately request United States recoguition, and ask for
[1274]United States military assistance under Article Tiree of the Rio
[1275]Treaty in tre event of actual or threatened Castro- sponsored
[1276]invasficas or of threatened insurrection incited by pro-Castro
[1278]or pro-Coomunist elements within or outside Dopinican Republic...
[1280]"Woat, if any, aid vould be essential to dissident elements
[1281]prior to takeover... + -
[1283]Ponte RA ase Clee ce
[1287]ORE PO SRST UA EPR, a Ew SOUR EET RNS ESSE TREEREE IED MEET ARS TEI VOT TST
[1289]fageyeecnr ts
[1291]sg BoE De TAWA SENSE CRETE epee Ev ener tac re erate 2 TE OT EE ERSTE TICE COST ERENT RSE CSTR,
[1293]seep ata
[1297]1 mee view eget eee
[1301]MET OT EL pent = vos
[1303]centages
[1307]Phe tee
[1309]abe,
[1311]a
[1312]sehasde as
[1314]eT
[1316]|
[1317]i
[1318]i
[1319]pot
[1320], OE
[1321]bE
[1322]ry
[1325]Tarland catlea his reply through CIA Chanrals, in pert as follows:
[1329]= 2 4 3 $
[1330]"Under instructisn, it would be Fossisie for me to make :
[1331]Srrangerents with apprrriate civilian diss cents waose leaders
[1332]are known to me dacluéing names their seliectees for Top '
[1333]6overomental Positions, and with one oiiicvan dissicent, a
[1334]GeL4erei, wro is expecting an exchange oY passwords for purpose
[1335]secret discussions.
[1337]"Regurdless of . . in
[1338]indicaticas reflect Dominican ai
[1340]acsittedly
[1341]poorly armed, loasely o
[1343]i
[1345]ens liaison with |
[1347]. ot ey military Gissidents, wil) fing it aifficoult to effect taxa. :
[1348](. . Over Of GODR vithout existence one or ro
[1350]—, following Cevelorments (ahi
[1353]or combination of
[1354]Yoich we summari K :
[1357]rd
[1358]8
[1360]is)
[1364](1) Clandestine ar=s shiments, wit Sabotage materiel, -
[1368](2) an invasf{ion to secve as a Sigzal to the populace.
[1370](3) Teptesentaion of th
[1372]e dissidents' "Operation Lancet.”
[1373](4) Advance psychoicgical conditioning by radio.
[1375](5) "Incapacitaticn or @ssassination of Trujills.?
[1377](6) 4 carerur Step-by-step plan for th
[1379]sce period precedin
[1380]the coup and Por the pertod Tolioving it.
[1382] Pinictm out key coorerstion't Trax Dominican
[1383]. 1
[1385]. poilitary dissidents, He added: :
[1386]: _ i
[1387]"One of the greatest ccatributions U.S. could make to i
[1388]fats would be to 1 [hem know we are Brerpared to assist i
[1389]i
[1391], we ~ el -
[1392]I i ;
[1396]Siicentet taint eeamattonane
[1399]taken or recommended
[1400]Dominican Republic. The Perer refers to tke nsed %%
[1401]assets, principally to custruct infiltreticn
[1403]Fidelistas. Among things recommended vere: Plocenert, of a junior
[1405]officer in the enbassy; ascigment of a full-tire ofPicer to the
[1407]headquarters desk for the covert ectica progren; authorization to use
[1409]Jose Figueres in third country operations; develoment of <
[1410]contingency Pi plan in the event Trujillo fell and hostile forces
[1411]attempted to seize power, end establisiment of a "U.S. Commi ttee
[1413]for Democracy in the Dosinican Republic.”
[1415]A menorandum written of a debriefing of Ambassador Farland reads,
[1416]in part, as follaws:
[1418]“The dissidents need gms and axmmition fron the United
[1419]States. In particular they need a susil mumber of high-powered
[1420]rifles with telescopic lenses. ‘The Ambassador said that he saw
[1421]no problem in the purchase and Celivery clandestinely of the
[1422]ams to the dissidents. But he saia, co? course, this raises
[1423]the question of whether the U.S. Goverment wants to engage in
[1424]this activity.
[1426]Fool. King said that this of course is a policy deci
[1428]sion. He
[1429]Baid that CIA could deliver the ams if this is the group we want
[1430]to supsort.
[1434].
[1437]ma cenit em we
[1444]x
[1445]2
[1447]w
[1448](Cument: Farland was in Washingtoa for consultatiocs.
[1450]Althouga he is listed as having served as Aubassador untli 23
[1452]June 1950, it appears that he aia not
[1454]os
[1456]ctually return to duty
[1458]in Ciuds@ Trujillo. His Successor, Yinton Chapin, was nominated
[1460]13 June, but he never took the post.)
[1461]3 June 1960
[1463]Farland met with Nelson H. Ssith, the Dominican desk officer
[1464]in WH Division. They compared lists of dissidents to see if the
[1466]names CIA had were those with whoo Farland had been dealing. Farland
[1468]"¢ — said, "Those are the boys all right.” Saith's memorandum of the
[1469]. ~~ meeting includes this carment:
[1470]r ; “Farland then told me that the underground cpposition are
[1471]z planning to assassinate Trujillo. Fe said that it is planced to
[1472]< use a powerful bembd which could be planted along the route of
[1473]é Trujillo's nightly walk and cculd be detonated by @ rezote-
[1474]2 control firing device. He intimated that this plan is pretty
[1475]. well elong and could be execttea at any time.”
[1476]Undated Working Paver (filed between papers dated 25 May end 13 June)
[1478]¥ The author is not identified nor is there any indication that
[1479]y the proposal was approved. Its objective was stated thus: "fo
[1480]‘ precipitate the downfall of the Trujillo regime by 1 Auzust or as
[1481]" Soon as pessisle thereafter.” It provosed chat the U.S. becese a
[1482]x prime motive force against the Trujillo resize. "In the event ‘Trujillo
[1483]i! .
[1484]y oN -
[1485]ye fb - 23-
[1486]I
[1487]aS een
[1488]i
[1489]r . .
[1490]a
[1491]wo spi ammnn en mee ee le 1 tee > 7
[1493]i
[1494]i
[1496]rare
[1500]sea Namen one a
[1502]A oe eertinge or nese
[1504]e
[1508]rye
[1517]'
[1519]oo
[1520]NRA et Go ne
[1522]refused to abiicate, consideration saculd be viv
[1524]over™ actions desigred to effect his removal Prom the scene.” A
[1526]eeadline of 1 July wes proposed for ccmpleting arrangements.
[1530]17 Juse 1950
[1532]Henry Dearborn, who was in charge in the Ambassador's absence, ‘
[1533]ueried State through CIA channels, asxing for con irmation on
[1534]certain points for a meeting he was having wlth a @issident deader,
[1535]Dr. Jordi Brosse. He stated his understanding of the U.S. position
[1536]45 follows:
[1538]ri a. Tae U.S. is not prepared to take overt action against
[1539]a nr the Trujillo government while it is in fll costrol.
[1541]0. The U.S. is prepared to assist the opposition Clandestinely
[1542]to develop effective forces to accomplish Trujillo's overtaroy.
[1544]ce. Assistance must continue to be channeled covertly }
[1545]until such time as the dissidents establish a provisional
[1546]goverment which controls a substentical section of the
[1547]Dosinican Republic.
[1549]20 Jue 1960
[1551]Dearborn, again through CIA channels, asked Rubottom and Farland
[1553]if he could make the same statements concerning U.S. policy ina
[1555]meeting with Juan Vicini, another dissident leader. Farland replied
[1557]in the affircative.
[1559]. . tre t
[1560]fh. so
[1565]4
[1566]“E
[1568]Dearborn cabled the results of his flrest meeting with Juan
[1570]Vicini. He said that Vicini felt that the time to concentrate on,
[1572]Smee Ber
[1574]ter plansing purposes, was the period extending through the
[1575]“ineapacitatiod’ of Trujillo; too much planning for what would
[1576]a J 3 I AS,
[1578]follow risked exposure. Dearborn said that he egreed. °
[1580]Also on 28 June (although the first written record we find is
[1581]& summary memorandum prepared on 18 October), Rubottom told J.C.
[1583]King that the Goverment of the United States was orenared to
[1585]; —_ participate in the overthrow of the Trujillo regime to the following
[1586]A al extent: "to provide a srall number of sniper rifles or other devices ‘
[1587]for the removal.of key Trujillo people from the scene. ....." j
[1588]a Rubottom added that the U.S. Government was not prepared, at this |
[1589]time, to send arms, equipsent, or paramilitary experts to assist the !
[1590]mee undergound to accomplish a revolt.
[1591]© , 29 June 1960 .
[1593]Dearborn cabled the results of his meeting with Dr. Brossa. Ee
[1594]said that Brossa had recommended a temporary standdow on "action
[1596]toward incapacitation of Trujillo" while determining Venezuela's
[1598]ui reaction to the Trujillo assassinatioa plot against Betancourt. #/¢
[1601].
[1602]cer OK rem tene meeeepe em
[1604]er ee no . poe pao wee
[1606]rite
[1611]14-0000
[1613]TAK LS
[1615]Or a oe ae
[1618]beard
[1620]YQ
[1623]J
[1624]“i
[1625]3
[1626]9
[1628]fat)
[1629]me
[1631]b
[1633]t the dissideats had a capability for pleking
[1634]in :
[1635]up arms at sea and for caching/nearby caves. he also described an
[1636]J
[1638]airdrop slte.
[1640]1 July 1950
[1642]A memorandum addressed to the Acting DCT recommended approval i
[1644]for the delivering of weapons to the Dominican dissidents.
[1646]"It is proposed to procure and deliver to underground
[1647]opposition forces in the Dominican Repuslic 12 sterile U.S.
[1648]rifles, Modal 1903 (Springfield), with telescopic sights, together
[1649]wits five hundred rounds of emiunition Por same. . 2...
[1650]it is plunned to deliver these veapons by air through DPD
[1651]facilities >rovided arrangements can te worked out with the
[1653]. opposition for their reception. If they cannot te delivered by
[1654]iC we air, plans are currently being studied in the CA staff for
[1655]delivery by sea.
[1657]"Approval for delivery of these ears bas been given by
[1658]Assistant Secretary of State Roy Rubottana, who requests that
[1659]x the aras be placed in the bands of the opposition at the
[1660]. earliest possible moment.
[1662]The memorandum was sigred by Rudy Gomez for Chief, WH Division; was
[1663]z ‘ concurred in by Richard Helms as Acting DD/P; and was approved by
[1665]C. P. Cabell on 2 July 1960 as Acting DCI. : :
[1667]Dearborn was informed by cable of plans to alirdrcp twelve
[1671]30.03 Springfields, with emmunition, and with sishts "fixed and
[1673]8
[1674]* sighted.” The cable asked for the coordinates of a suitable drop ;
[1675]2 3
[1676]ss i
[1677]site and for a four-man reception tean with flashlights. The cable :
[1679]ns y
[1681].
[1682]“4
[1683]- A - -
[1684]5;
[1685]g . : *
[1687]+} . - . .
[1688]g 2 RESP nie ern ae EE a at eg ee RADE TET Tr tere ea neo Trees ceieemeramatn ae Gyaeascenmmaermammmaces ae i
[1689]oe “t . .
[1691]1 “ie
[1692]i
[1693]u
[1694]z a
[1695]Z ad
[1696]2% . H
[1697]- ‘
[1699]14-0000
[1701]8 July 1960
[1703]Headquarters cabled Learcorn, in part:
[1706]hat p and capabilities are to oe
[1708]sly with action ta incacacitate Trujillo
[1710]in way of wa
[1712]O? particular importance is info re extent
[1714]esployed
[1715]and what is
[1716]of plan ofa
[1717]of military
[1718]aprarent lacs of knowledge of opposition organization, most
[1719]logical that he 1s actively collaborating wlth a group that
[1721]: must have some plan and capabi lity for action vbhich will assure
[1723]ttable interim government after removal c? Trujillo. .....
[1724]oe In your cpiniton are [iictaif 222/Brossa/ benders of sane group
[1725]z¢ or if not could the two grouvs te merged? . 1...
[1729]st 8 September 1960
[1731]verial support for implementation
[1733]a
[1734]pa sarticipation in preparations. In spite or /Vicint/
[1736]i The Special Group discussed a letter drafted by the Department
[1737]3
[1738]: of State for delivery to Trujillo (copy in CIA files dated 6 September)
[1740]ra proposing that he step dow. The DCT (Mr. Dulles) doubted the wisdom
[1741]a . : of putting such a proposal in writing. He preferred a personal
[1743]; appreach. The Group concluded that a rersonal approach would be
[1744]oan best and disc
[1746]issed William Pewley as 2 candidate for the Fey
[1748]ndida the job.
[1750]er
[1752]a 18 October 1940
[1754]hey
[1756]Chief, WH Division, prerared a mesorandim summarizing approvals
[1758]oo
[1759]yk ~ 2T -
[1760]y _
[1762]4} yy .
[1763]: rely
[1764]a
[1765]z
[1775]. 2
[1778]a angneetoveneme et nee
[1782]14-0000
[1785]2 oN
[1786]i v
[1787]obtatnel for actisa in Support of the Dominican internal oppositioa.
[1788]The text states that the summary was "provided in response to your
[1789]vertal request on 13 October 1969..." his is the memorandum
[1790]to which reference is, made earlier unéer the entry for 28 June 1960.
[1791]29 December 1960
[1792]The minutes of the Special Group meeting cor this date read,
[1793]in part:
[1794]. "Biscel gaye the broad cutlices of a two-pronged plan
[1795], for proceeding with certain limited covert activities i-Lrected
[1796]against the Trujillo regime. Ee emphasized that although
[1797]mn, suprort would be given to the Figueres group there is no
[1798]{ - : intention of establishing a pararilitary force as such... ..
[1799]~ nae He also exnphasized that the proposed actions would not of then-
[1800]selves bring about the desired resuit in the near future,
[1801]lecking some decisive stroke against Trujillo himself.
[1802]".... . It was noted thet Mr. Pawley feels thet
[1803]overt Intervention in the Dominican Fepublic should be
[1804]mounted sinultareously with the Cuban Operations. . ....
[1805]it was egreed that the plan is worth beginning at this tine
[1806]no watter what the eventual decisicn on overt intervention
[1807]may te."
[1808]: : (Comment: We find nothing in the files identifiable with
[1810]such a "plan." We found no other reference to any specific
[1812]plan of about this date.)
[1813]12 January 1961
[1815]The following is an excerpt ?rom the minutes of a meeting of the
[1819]- 2 -
[1821]hairs Lite Gal : -
[1823]i
[1825]f
[1826]t
[1828]i
[1829]i
[1831]i
[1832]an
[1834]7
[1835]|
[1836]|
[1839]14-D0000
[1841]Special Group cn this dete:
[1843]"Mr. Merchant explained the sealt zat
[1847]State that limited supplies of small ams and
[1849]a. ot shoulc te made aveilavle for dissidents inside
[1850]Repuolic. Mr. Parrott said that we believe th
[1852]securely by CIA, and that the plan would call
[1854]portatica inte the group beicg provided by +
[1856]themseives. The Croup approved the project.
[1857]= Paes -
[1859]19 January 1951
[1862]. Cable fron headguarters:
[1864]‘ : "For Dearborn: FYI and use as you consider adviseable,
[1866]. authority bes deen given t qs lor celivery to internal irons
[1867]aan of limited supply of szall arss and other material on condition
[1868]‘ a that introduction of material into LomRep te effected by Dons.
[1869]C 2 2 + + + Above coordinated with State."
[1871]MoD ets a sap
[1873]"It was confirmed (from Mr. Parrott by phone) that the -
[1874]’ Special Group row has approved that a ‘limited supply' of
[1876]: small arms and related equipment may be provided covertly to.
[1877]the Dominican resistance elements with whom we have been
[1879]e : : dealing. Tois was additional to the Special Group's apvroval
[1881]: On 29 Decenbder 1950 of. our Gperational Proposal."
[1883]t
[1887]a (Ccmzent: As noted in the entry for 2g December, we “now
[1888]a -
[1890]a sas ; .
[1892]te one of the specifics o? this Cpera tional Proposal.)
[1894]SE re rie ht ERS Sr We ee tee tee ames
[1898]Memorandum for the record of a discussion of Project EMDEZD by (
[1900]goes
[1901]members of the CA Staff and of WH Division: H
[1905]|
[1911]| geen Nees Hip eens
[1913]teens: ences Be seen
[1915]14-0000
[1917]31 January 1941
[1919]“O?ficial-Informal” letter from Dearbora to Devine in State
[1921]Thee
[1923]seer
[1925]Department:
[1927]"With regard to the delivery of exotic equipment, ny
[1928]friends were of course delignied that such a decision had been
[1929]mace. hope that it will not be necesssry ts play caen too
[1930]long the cuestion of actual delivery since they are eager
[1931]and expectant and too great tardiness on our yart would only
[1933]‘lead then to question our sincerity.”
[1935]6 February 1961
[1937]Cable fron headquarters:
[1939]Bom "1. Realize details not now available tut Eqs would
[1940], appreciate fdissidents'/ reaction to offer of ermed assistance
[1941]to includes /dissideats'/ current plan...
[1943]"2. Also request [Robert Owen's/ initial assessment
[1945]fSissidents' capability carry out plan of action once linitea
[1946]? . armed assistance provided."
[1948]10 February 1951
[1950]The station cabled its reply:
[1951]"Ho solid “reaction except doy as o2 9 Feb.
[1953]. . -"Initial asseesseat is /Srossa and Vicint/ could not
[1955]: . carry out plan. But with access /Dr. Severo Cabral/ he now
[1956]2 : appreaching point when will better be able evaluate group"
[1957]4 potential for action. We sone weeks away froo being able
[1958]make solid preliminary assessment. 7
[1960]"Suggest KUBARK consider sending in each pouch one szall
[1962]- 30 -
[1964]wags ea mee
[1967]14-0000
[1969]tata Se Lain
[1971])
[1973]come inter,
[1975]: 4& February 1941
[1976]4 . ee
[1979]ps
[1981]. 6 . aske
[1982]@utherity on the
[1983]Successor governnen
[1985](Coment: We dia
[1987]cree t nes ragernye set qeepecteenen =
[1989]in CIA files.)
[1991]L 15 rebruary ayo.
[1994]a Ned Holmen, the headquarters branch chfer, net with Juan
[1999]Vicinf end Donald Reid Cabral in New Yor: City. Excerpts fron his
[2001]menorandun record of the meeting follow:
[2003]w
[2005]e+ + + . Vicini played dowa scoewnhat the necessity for
[2006]_ delivery of arms, elthough he did Say that itis cesireable
[2007]a and should be a
[2009]part of the Planning. ze saia that members of
[2010]the opposition could, if they wanted co, Obtain small guanitities
[2011]ces . , a 2
[2013]an : of arms fron Army contacts... but that any arms so odtained
[2015]sy Would have to te used very Quickly before their loss is .
[2016]he ' @iscovered. For this reason, he said 14 would te desireable to
[2017]. : have ars celivered by uS that could be
[2019]stored for use at any
[2020]moment desired,
[2022]"Vicint said that the object of ebtaining this Kind ‘or help
[2023]eayway is the elimiration o¢ Trujilic and instead or using arms
[2024]or grenades he began to speak of more exoti-> materiels and methods
[2025]. a power?ul bombo that could be planted along the route of
[2026]Trujillo's evening walk and could be getonn: @ froa a nearby
[2028]3. _ a bots
[2033]14-0000
[2035]MT Sata ae tote,
[2037]o.. for)... the possibility of pofsoning
[2038]icctator's food or of putting poisson capsules in bottles
[2039]vain medicines that the dictater is knowa to take
[2041]a
[2043]tr 0
[2044]H
[2048]cc retda cet se.
[2050]actical plan that they Pet forvard
[2052]WAS one that they said had alreacy been planned at one tite
[2053]5 before, They said that ween the cictator leaves his office for
[2055]his hoze there are three automosiles in his procession with the -
[2056]dictator himself in the first automonile end the tcdyguaris in
[2057]the following two. The idea that has been discussed internally
[2058]is for several trucks to block wn progress of these cars ata
[2059]given intersection at which tine young mes who telang to che
[2060]action groups woulda leap out of the trucks wi
[2062].@renades to finish of? the dictator."
[2064]H
[2065]5
[2066]i
[2068]h varch 1961
[2069]aren Lol
[2071]Bator
[2073]Headquarters pouched to tre station a copy
[2075]of Holman's mesorendim
[2077]or his meeting, with Vicini and Reid. On lk March, the chief of station
[2079]era
[2081]cabled his assesment of the plan to intercept Trujillo's entourage
[2083]Dha
[2085]and kill him with guns and grenades:
[2087]Poel ee
[2091]"Vicini idea . . . alzost certain fail if applied. ‘That
[2092]type attack is precisely what bodyguards appear vest qualified
[2093]cope with. Their defense Fattern and displacement vehicles
[2094]Plus police practice detour traffic biocks away from entourage
[2095]make Vicini idea fatally childish in Owen's view.”
[2099]SEN TITS
[2101]a eae
[2102]Fics
[2104]SAHA OG
[2106]. i
[2107](Comment: The assassination was actually carried out :
[2111]through a variation of this Scheme. The assassins detected and ‘
[2113]took advantage ofa Stereotyred pattem in Trujillo's moverents
[2115]in which he rode at night, unescorted, on little traveled nigzways.)- i
[2117]Ste MS aS
[2119]|
[2120]a
[2122]ee ape,
[2123]wee ae
[2125]Swanetemie aeestewe mere
[2126]rob apeinie gare come meron +4
[2128]jose
[2130]5 a
[2131]- Sere eeneneenar te
[2132]. an
[2134]14-0000
[2137]if
[2139]° I
[2140]Tne station cabled headquarters on & Maren: |
[2141]: ". . . if opportunity sussort pro-US group uot to be Lost, i
[2142]. believe .. . imperative meke sure arms with amso ready for |
[2143]mediate entry DomRep .. . if necessary at air drop sites... " |
[2144]: 5 March 1941 | :
[2145]a 5 . as { i
[2146]As 9 follow-up to that cable, the station cabled a communication j i
[2147]t
[2148]from Dr. Severo Cabral: "We have in our hands chance to speedup | i
[2149]. events. Everything is being planned perfectly. Results say be | H
[2151]£ assured as much és human fallibility persits. ..... 7" |
[2152]|
[2153]z H :
[2154]i
[2155]_ 7 March 1961 { i
[2156]er ot ! i
[2157]zs ae | |
[2158]: Headquarters cabled the fiel3, in pert: co
[2159]. j
[2160]iM "Existing authorizatica precludes introduction ams into |
[2161]7 ~ Hy
[2162]d Don Rep by U.S. personnel. Order prepere contingency plans _
[2163]rf for possible alternate delivery metnod, request station }
[2164]sd determine additional drop zones and confirm those mentioned H
[2166]2 « « - - » Request type and quantity arms desired. ....." H \
[2167]i
[2168]f 8 March 1951
[2169]i |
[2170]8 : * , . . .
[2171]* . Cable from the station: . !
[2172]rn . | H
[2173]S ~ ~ .
[2174]2 "Brossa told Dearborn on 7 March that Dr. Severc Cabral and ' :
[2175]oa z wat + i. z . i
[2176]i. group plan try kill Trujilio ty /intercepting his zar/ et point | ;
[2178]# near faimpy's Supermarket/ - fate not sev and obviously depends | ‘
[2179]5 on Trujille traval . . . Severo Cabral 2ot aware Brossa has told
[2180]é us but interesting that Charge’ Papal Nuncieatura also aware plot i :
[2181]% exists but possibly not of rersonnel involved.” i
[2182]’ i
[2183]Ad |
[2184]3 :
[2185]3
[2186]j ae
[2187]: al ans . i
[2188]et : = -33- . - : a cb.
[2189]Boo Ne . i
[2190]2
[2192]5 i
[2193]i . . i . |
[2194]é io. |
[2195]a i .
[2196]a
[2197]ABE ECRAMne mae ae meta sgtitnnlr tN NS it eat cee a
[2200]3
[2201]r
[2202]i
[2205]1400000
[2207]Has seeing commitzent gor
[2210]. . request urgently:
[2211]i details in order mate plans timely assistance.
[2212]iaty of plans, timing 2:
[2214]s .
[2216]additicna
[2217]Uncertat
[2219]and
[2220]ch
[2222]u
[2224]requested, ....,.%"
[2226]13 March 1961
[2228]a
[2230]Rr :
[2232]pt Satter: ee wean Ait Fe aE,
[2234]Eeadquarters cabled the station;
[2236]"Following elicited frou EMOTE-8 (Andres Freitas):
[2237]Preiteas speaks for Aniosn To group wailch includes rilitary
[2238]mbembers . . . in six brigade Eqs and which teve capadllity, ©
[2239]et appropriate tire, of taking cover milttery garriscas vita
[2240]arms already at hand, and appointing milite y/civiltan jvata
[2241]in controh provisional govt. . Reqyst following station
[2242]action with respect Aniama Tio eroup: A. Identity military
[2243]membership; B. Assess capabilities as clained; C. Indicste
[2244]if assets can be ccordinated with overall e?*5 &. Eqs pisces
[2245]Special exphasis on identifying milivary mensership Aziaca Tio
[2246]group. This important for vetting as well as enable essess .
[2247]realistically chances success7ul takeover.”
[2249]ee ee) Ree
[2251]. a. 15 March 1961
[2253]Cable froz the station:
[2256]“Lorenzo (dimpy) Berry asked /a consulate employee] gor \s
[2258]small supply fregnentation grenedes ‘for ose in next week or so.'
[2259]By note, ihe chie? of station checked sack wita Wimpy and
[2260]learned the dissident group must do ELL] Troji lof this
[2261]month or drop it as number of be With loose mouths
[2262]are apperently aware renewal plan... 1. witlpy asxed for five
[2263]45 nm (sic) rapid fire weapons or sivilar,
[2265]Dietihi
[2267]2,500 rounds ammo for
[2269]Ree eta ee S
[2271]7 sO ee eee, ce me ene a rma wie fo ne MORE ACE an 2 tear
[2272]Cit
[2276]we te ttaytin eyatee
[2278]en ae gat Bette et
[2280]Pn enter ee a ees
[2283]4
[2284]1
[2287]14-0000
[2293]Pas
[2295]4
[2296]f * ole Nt
[2297]i
[2299]=», : Lk
[2300]- » OO Tragsentation grenades, . . . ten Siom tan
[2303]Headquarters cabled its reply:
[2305]4qs exploring possioiliti
[2306]advise ASAP. Meanvhile, request
[2308]Rerry making request on own ini
[2309]Dr. Severo Cabral? .... 2." .
[2312]i
[2314]L7 March 1952
[2316]t
[2322]a . : “For issue to several fof the dissident group/ Consul j
[2324]mo Nae ‘Generel Dearborn requests three 23 calicer Smith ana Wesson H
[2325]Special pi'stois or similar and three small boxes cartrclases. j
[2326]If sending emmo complicates problez, advise end we will try i
[2327]get from Marines.
[2329]"Chief of Station reiterates suggestion. /to send in each
[2330]pouch one small size high fire power weapoo/ as Dearborn
[2331]increasingly concerned lest momentim which group has now for
[2333]assassination] decline result lack tangible or too slow action
[2334]on arms by toe U.S. Goverrment. Also security these people
[2335]increasingly of direct interest US Government which each day
[2336]_ wore involved in [the operation/. Loss of one of key peosle .
[2337]: thru capture could lead revelation details ODYCKE/SMLE=D ‘
[2338]v. : activity. Thus preferable we give them some chance defend
[2339]thenselves egainst SI4." : :
[2343]: 18 March 1951 -
[2344]o : Chief of Statioa Robert Oven ret for the first time with Dr. i
[2346]Severo Cabral. He cabled the results:
[2350].
[2351].
[2352]tee Laver soeneme
[2354]ETL eg veteu er Re IT ee ea re oe
[2356]See
[2358]rd
[2360]ape
[2362]WM wet
[2363]Y
[2365]Rorrmrsiso
[2367]au
[2369]14-0000
[2373]tios/ pian new this: Group knows
[2374]Vea ;
[2376]"Eis group Ss
[2377]identity Peuiillo'’s ais
[2378]2
[2380]ss in capi T2L.
[2382]Week OF once in two weeks. ¢.Uoes ner ape . 200; .
[2383]. lightly guarded. roux apore rently has scmeone in buil
[2384]&. _ C&2 alert thes to visit. Lhessed as aray officers, small group
[2386]will g> to entrance, distract gan with pretext, dispatch hin
[2388]. or thes in silence, enter apartment and try do [essassinatios/,
[2389]possibly including mt stress, in silence.
[2391]"To do they need five M-3 or coun mparable mechine guns and
[2392]1509 rounds e=zo for persoral defense in event Pirefignt
[2393]use gulet weapons Por. “basic job. .... . Severo Cabral
[2394]pusitica was U.S. Government get items here socnest via pouch,
[2395]or similar means. Evident he actually worried that delivery by i
[2396]otker means would coupranise entire project. Obvicus he caa ‘ !
[2399]5]
[2405]. count on only one group both receive arms ard do /assassination/.
[2407]. "Dr. Severo Cabrel expects and willing risk chaos for period :
[2409]= of uncetermined lengih ater fescassination/ mainiy because for f
[2411]. cated security reasons his group canact ppreack military end hope + t
[2413]: ( é get decisive egreement support before /essassination/. |
[2415]TS ee : |
[2417]a 20 March 1951 , .
[2419]a .
[2421]ne, * Readquarters cabled the station: : , . \
[2423]: |
[2425]"Regret ns authorication exists to suspend pouch regulations 7 bos
[2427]; Sgainst shimment of arms... Will deliver to the group's 1, |
[2429]ag. representatives cutside the Dominican Republic if this feasible. :
[2431]BS Coordirated with State Department.”
[2433]fe a - 4
[2435]ui . - °
[2437]yu 22 Marca igS1
[2439]Tne station replied, in part: :
[2441]". . . we realize pemission does not now exist but
[2443]Chief of Station imows that he at last two posts received pistols
[2444]via pouch for worthy purposes, so it can te done. JuSaing =
[2445]- oe _Yef, WH not prepared take this step. If this unalteradly so then
[2447]Lt
[2449]Wika att he I me ee ee et RR ROR Ooo ee Panwa ve nen
[2451]irr ceed ER RT EN AH iA ate
[2454]By
[2457]14-0000
[2459]please continue
[2462]for arms, whaters
[2464]but the excerpt dees not fully reveal the contentious toze of the
[2465]os
[2467]cable. On 25 Marco, Headquarters, in a cable released by the DD/P
[2469]i
[2470]'
[2471]The above excerpt is the most significant point in the ‘cable,
[2473](Bissell) undertook to set Owen straight. The cable gives a fairly
[2474]complete statement of U.S. policy and o3jectives and of Gwen's
[2476]we responsibilities. It i3 sumsarized here. We Support a program to
[2477]replace the Trujillo regize; we wish to avoid precipitate action if
[2478]pianning is not well organized, as appears to be the case; machine
[2479]guns and armunition will te supplied to demonstrate good will to the
[2481]dissidents; the requested revolvers are being pouched. Eeadquarters
[2483]4 +
[2484]ms
[2485]t
[2490]is planning with State egainst the eventuality of sudden action by
[2492]the dissidents that might result in the forming cf a new goverment
[2493]"If above clarifies .agqs position, Oven should proceed accordingly.
[2494]In event major points resain unclear, State Depariment preparing
[2496]k . orders permit return for consultations.” ;
[2498]: ‘ Comment: We do not know whether Om replied to this cadle
[2499]: P.
[2501]afar.
[2503]or not. We do not find a reply in the files. Owen did gO to
[2505]headquarters for consultations about 5 April, but we cannot
[2506]ag .
[2508]A - 3T-
[2510]* It is apparent from the EMOEED operational files that no ams were
[2511]ever air-drovoped or delivered by sea.
[2513]stiagLoat Ahoy MT iagy a
[2516]a ne RE Se nn OO
[2518]SOL SME TT ee nt ae treet Fee pe ee ee ere mn ee
[2520]eee ce ~ te eee
[2522]we
[2524]a
[2525]“ mover ann.
[2528]14-06000._
[2530]establish that the trip wes a direct result of ‘this cable. Taere
[2532]etm! ON A EARN a ON BERT ZORENRNS
[2534]is some evidence that suggests that the trip may. have been in
[2536]connection with a } request from the dissidents for submachine ... «
[2538]‘guns.)
[2540]ritegl ey areas
[2542]26 verch 1961
[2544]:Cadle from the station:
[2546]STAG To riiLing tees
[2548]ms “ "For Dr. Severo Cabral request permission pass three semi-
[2549]automatic M-l carbines 30 caliver and supply ammo which avaliable
[2550]consulate from departed naval personmel. Would need from Has
[2551]nine 30 cartridge magazines for vespons. hKequest_ prompted by
[2552]- Severo Cabrai nute <5 March wnich says he cannol hoid group
[2553]togetuer beyond April 15 without arms delivery. .....
[2554](Ccmment:. It way be helpful to interrupt the chronology
[2555]at this point. As we will later explain, these carbines were
[2556]actually passed to the dissidents. They were in the hends of
[2557]Antonio de la Maza, vho worked out the details of the assassination
[2558]- ‘ ‘and was the lead figure in carrying it out. They almost certainly |
[2560]were taken to the scere of the slaying by the assassins. We have
[2562]AEROS NW cae Se se MLM SEAL ee EVN eT Dt CB Se
[2564]no evidence that any of them vere actually fired during the shootizg.- ~ :
[2566]The little evidence ve have suggests that they were not actually
[2568]used. These -three carbines are :the: weapons referred to by various
[2570]sources as having teen passed to the plotters by CIA. We find no , : : '
[2572]° ’ evidence of aay other weapons having been passed.) po tt es Se cp Screams
[2574]_ oR tenn Wyte etceMLon ne MeN RD Ne: tech ATE MI OE aOR RTS
[2576]14-0000 -
[2578]27 Maren 1951.
[2580]Feadquarters cabled the station:
[2582]“" MPYT, ref nardware /the three pistols the station’ asked be”
[2583]_pouched/ makes fairly sizeable packege 17 lumped single shiment.. ‘
[2584]Request soonest COS estizate of risk involved sending one paczage; : L goOL
[2585]or whether split shipment ore ferable.” ; : ‘
[2586].- (Comment: We find no indication in the files that these
[2587]‘ revolvers were ever actually pouched. We suspect they were not,
[2589]because the request for them was overtaken by subsequent events.) mo,
[2591]29 March 1961
[2593]Ecadquarters cabled the station: : : me ;
[2595]" | 4 . Hqs inclined to favor passing Severo Cabral ref
[2596]carbines and ammo. Are carbines carried on local installatioa’’-
[2597]inventory, thus requiring paper work which may olow CIA's ;
[2598]ultimate use?.. How does station propose to pass weapons in secure
[2599]manner order avoid other ODACID installation exsployees becoming:
[2600]witting they being cade available to Dominicars? Require a
[2601]Consul Cereral Dearborn's concurrence... Advise... 2. + « :
[2602]Pouchirg . . . nine magazines... ” so : :
[2604]31 March 1961
[2605]=. Se tas : .
[2606]‘The station replied: -- - = - ~ ano - nee
[2608]_ "No inventory problen.~ No parer work to skow CIA in act : w a
[2609]in. anyway. - Pian file of? serial;nimters. Will handle packaging § _ Poe
[2610]after hours. Only consulate person who kmows disposition is ; oS
[2611]Dearborn. Delivery to Wimpy Perry by the statica's female ma A
[2612]adninistrative assistant or otner CIA officer depending on what .
[2613]steps seems best here. Pearborm concurred in request end in this oT
[2614]& . message. We cannot enpnasice enough that we must make gesture of
[2617]14-p0g0g-
[2619]AOU CONE KAA O IT
[2623]: .
[2624]i
[2626]7
[2627]i.
[2629]_ Headquarters cable to the station:
[2631]9 April 1961,
[2633]' Headquarters asked for the station's plan for securely passing the
[2635]good will to Severo Cabral now. ‘These itens ere not what he
[2636]asked for but they are an investment in operational continulty.
[2637]Tae security ils in his havirg these iteas is no greater thaa
[2638]his having similar items delivery which done by: more complicated
[2639]and less.cecure cache or drop." . eet ame thet ay paw oe
[2643]" [Passing the three. carbines] approved. Advise Hqs when
[2644]passing.of this equipment completed.
[2646]‘ (Comment: This cable was released by the 0D/P (Bissell).)
[2648]Cable from the station:
[2650].. “ffhe pouch forwarding magazines for the three carbines/
[2651]contained 15-bullet magazines rather than 30-bullet magazines
[2652]as requested. Pls expedite pouching 9 latter type M-1 carbine
[2653]magazines.”
[2655]Se:
[2657]Cable from the station:
[2659]“/The station's female adminis rative assistant] passed
[2660]{the three carbines/ to /iimpy Berry/ April 7. No complications.”
[2662]_ (Comment:.-The files.do not contain an account of how the
[2663]carbines were actually passed. As ve will later’sée, headquarters
[2665]subsequently poucked submachine guns for fFassing to the dissidents...
[2667]subaachine guns to the dissidents. The station replied: . "Propose © os :
[2669]use essentially same technique es that for /the three carbines/.
[2671]14-00000 ,
[2673][ie station's female aéninistrative assistant] driving own car
[2674]will go wo lozel susermarket fitsoy Berry's] for -usual Saturday
[2675]Se ea eae morning ‘Purchases. Then to consulate to get sail. Will get assist:
[2676]trom Chief of Station in loading package or packages into car
[2677]trunk with groceries: . {Statioa operations officers will then
[2679]accompany to administrative: assistant's apartment, help taze _
[2681]groceries in. If no danger signal given by operations officer,
[2683]- fiiapy. Berry/ will arrive in personal car, pic« up items fram - cee 7" plc
[2685]operations officer at partially concealed entrance to acnini-
[2687]x
[2688]3
[2689]5
[2690]R
[2691]q
[2692]Pa
[2693]g
[2694]S
[2697]e
[2698]-
[2700]strative assistant's apartment and promptly ‘leave. Cover tor
[2702]his visit will be comercial delivery.")
[2704]April 1951
[2706]mo, . Chief, WH Division, sutmitted to Chief, RI, a memorandum requesting ©
[2708]waiver of pouch restriction on pouching weapons. "The above request
[2710]_ is submitted for the following reason: Station Ciudad Trujillo kas
[2712]‘requested. that Headquarters provide four M3 machine guns and 240
[2714]_ rounds of ammunition on a priority basis for issuance toa small action
[2716]Group to be used for self protection.” ; ; . ; vol ere
[2717](Comment; The entry for:18-March 1951 refers to a request . a oO
[2719]for submachine guns, but there was. no follow-up on it from tae station.
[2721]Tais pouch waiver request was submitted while the chief of station sas _ ‘
[2723]‘MIRNA ALTON ITE AE Te NFER LTP NNT BS PPE PALES IY STR I Ba EES ee EEE Se
[2728]73 gyey . gs
[2730]th ashi
[2732]at heatgquarters for consultations, I: is provedle that he made tre
[2734]plea in person. .
[2736]As will be seen later, tre sutzachine guns (the -so-
[2737]culled "grease guns” of World War TI) were poucked tut approval ‘was
[2739]hever given the station to Fass them to the plotters. )
[2741]ft.
[2743]Waprth 1st; 2 |, ; 7
[2745]Headquarters cabled the station:
[2747]"Equipment for Severo Cabral /Submachine guns? which subject
[2748]of Chief of Station conversations Eqs being pouched . . . 1h
[2749]April. Prior to Passing equimment, advise Has wnat scheme of
[2750]Gelivery proposed.” .
[2752]. (Comment: The delivery scheme is explained in comment on : S 5 :
[2753]the 9 April entry.) me
[2754]4 ; ; Ane i
[2755]13 April 1961 bye ty
[2756]a An extract. froma note sent to Consul General Dearborn fron: oe : ane
[2757]é ; Juan Vicint ; . Loe : i ane
[2758]4 "The three Leica cameras, model M-1 ftbe three carbines/,
[2759]. i _.With their accessories, should be in the proper hands in a day.
[2761]or tv... .. . With the’small exomt of equimment which. they
[2762]“ are receiving they can only take action at a few specific places
[2764]and therefore the probebilities are considerably reduced and mo
[2765]the tine factor, considerably extended accordingly. With the ~*~ .
[2766]rest_of tke equinment (four Leicas, node] 4-3) [tne sutmachire °
[2767]gens] the possible places of action are miltiplied and the lost
[2768]tice greatly reduced.”
[2770]“UA Apri, 1951 - ‘
[2772]Extract fron
[2774]& note from SOCRATES /Tuis Baquero/ to DELTA
[2777]14-0000
[2779]le 235 and acvessories are fr the hands :
[2780]5 of the ones Ww u Lect ‘hey need more cameras
[2781]: in order to “ “ we hope that the geno
[2783]‘ -17 April 1991
[2785]Note from YAGUATS /Guag Vicini/ and SocraTss /Tuis Eaquero/ to
[2790]"The last word, up to the minute in the matter o? cameras:
[2791]CRISTOBAL /General Juan Tooes Diaz/ says that with the 3 Leica
[2792]cameras alread: delivered it is impossible to us the BiSlugraunic . :
[2793]Job. He needs to heave the rest of the equirment (the & 4.3 .
[2795]Leices) before ne undertakes the job. The ones already delivered
[2797]he sees then as good ccnplenentary equimment (defensive) but he
[2799]needs the others for the aggressive part of the job. It is ny
[2801]belie? that the ores alread; delivered have served a psychological
[2803]purpose also: the ten involved have always been in doubt the .
[2804]gocd faith of your people in Wash. ‘Their feeling was that in
[2805]Several months ail they nave odtained were promises. Now they
[2806]see that you actually mean cusiness. So, now, all they are doing
[2808]- dis waiting for the heavy cazeras.”
[2810]YT April 1961
[2812]oT Headevarters cabled the station:
[2814]repeat not
[2815]yo 4 ee . 05% important [che suzechine guns7 not/be
[2816]Passed to Severo Cabrel without additional Hqs approval. Please
[2817]. . advise when equipment received and proposed scheze and timing of
[2818]B delivery." :
[2820]cw
[2822]we
[2824]PARE 3 00
[2826]2
[2828]z
[2829]‘i
[2830]i
[2831]it
[2834]. spb ee tenes, atte mee Orin fasten iE teeesibet ate A us.
[2836]dae y eteihte Rem e  e ee e ven ~
[2838]_ ee
[2841]1400008 2
[2843]20 April 1961
[2845]Hesaguarters: cabled the stat
[2847]« Bubsiachine cus] should be held | ia scation custody till’
[2848]further notice and not repeaz not be pascéd to [ainsy Berry/.
[2849]Tais Eqs decision based on judgneat that fillicg vacuum created
[2850]by. fassass imation] ncw bigger quest “fon whan ever:view unsettled + ;
[2851]condi tions : in Carlobdeea area.
[2853]"Request station provide foll: info soonest: (ea) Eave
[2854][the three carbires/ been delivered to Severo Cabral? (b) -
[2855]Details onan alteraate pian to deliver /summachine mus
[2856]" Mhich. would involve ground eachinz.” :
[2858]| (Commer.ti It might be noted that this cable was. sent
[2860]Just three days after the faflure uf the Liidirg at the Bay of
[2862]Pigs.)
[2864]20. April 1961
[2866]Note to DELTA /Deartorn/ from YAQIATE and SOCRATES:
[2868]. "The officers that were to co the photographic job are not
[2869]only disappointed but really angry at the refusal of the delivery
[2870]of the other Leicas. They bave decided to give up the plan and .-
[2871]disperse, because they cammot take any more risks for nothing.”
[2873]20 April 1961 ©
[2874]Cable from the station:
[2875]» "(Submachine guns here 19 April with no-entry problems
[2876]‘whatsoever. Excellent basic vrer poping means.station's plan can :.
[2877]be sinplified even mere. ‘ire ecministretive assistant, the”
[2879]Operations officer, aad the chief of station can share (celivery
[2880]@irect to drop. Request Has advise when ve may begin.”
[2883](Cc iment: The rrecise natum of-this cellent baste
[2885]wrapping” is not further clarified in tha. f Homan Gall
[2886], . 2
[2888]writing in The Nev Repyolic, said trat the weapoas “were chipped
[2890]to Winpy Terry ia feed'cans. ‘Tals soudds to us.as if the cubs
[2891]ons ere packed in fnsd containers Po pouching. If co, .
[2893]we wonder how Gall leerned of this. We can state with fair
[2894]confidence that. these sutzachine @AnS were never passed out of
[2895]the consulate. As late “e as the very day of the assassinati ica, Bop
[2896]Oven sent a cable protesting tse policy that fornade his Passing
[2897]‘chen. Tais sounds as if there mist have been a leak fron the
[2898]consulate--fron one of the very faw who mew of the submachine
[2899]guns. We cannot confirm that the submachine guns wre actually
[2900]packaged in food containers for pouching. ISD has no record of
[2902], . ; o
[2903]having done so. Jake Ssterline bas a faint recollection. of food.
[2904]containers, but not in connection with pouching. )
[2906]al April 1961
[2908]Cable from headquarters to the statioa:
[2910]. . "/Submachine guns/ snould be hel? in station custody til SY ree
[2911]further notice and not Tepeat not te Passed to > Attmvy Berry].
[2913]‘ regarding aisposition of ‘the: three mvitnen,
[2915]. . ftizpy Berry] bas given fthe three carbines/ ~
[2916]-to intermediary who holding until Severo Cabral picks up...
[2919]14-0008
[2921](Coment: Tats “iatemediary" aprears to have been Taccas
[2922]Stocke>. The sigaificance of this end tne securizy problen it
[2923]““ posed will -becane apnarent from ore of the later entries for ~.”
[2925]31 May.)
[2926]25 Avril 1961
[2928]Cable from the station:
[2930]"Foll from Dearborn: ‘I belleve political consequence o? not
[2931]aalt wing forrmoankinua a7 - cartes. T sl. =a Un chinetann ent tus
[2932]lelfvering fowneackine gucs/ so soripus I plan go Washington within
[2934]next few days for discussion with Department and CAS Hqsi” .
[2936]26 April 1961
[2938]Cable from, the station;
[2940]"/Wimpy Berry] told Chief of Station . . . Antonio de la ; :
[2941]_ Maza plans try assassinaticn between 29 April and 2 May. ~
[2942]- Severo Cabral possibly not yet aware plen. No ssifd info ose
[2943]members aszassization effert but General. Juan. Tomas Diaz. proiab’
[2944]will aid. Will use the three carbines plus whatever else can .
[2945]get. De la Maza asks Berry add the sutcachine guns if possible
[2946]o
[2948]_8 ee we . “t
[2950]; 4 30 April 1961 _
[2951]FS Cable from the station: i
[2952]zg ar - "Following from Dearborn: April 28 Lorenzo Berry as enissary
[2953]g ', Juan Vicini and Severo Cabral called on ze with foll info: . .. .
[2954]B main mission Berry was plead with me release sutmechine guas they ‘
[2955]Fe believe in Dom Rep and under ny control. Actios group has 3 , 4
[2956]s carbines, 4 to 6 12-gidge shotguns with 120 rounds and same small :
[2958]arms... ... . Action entails roadside anbush near San Cristocal
[2962]BAY et eas
[2964]SEES PR itatter ua rane erent re ron ena om
[2966]me A Om Ea
[2969]ane few u@iitional weapons portant. ... . . TI replied
[2970]I had ro sulmachine guns ur “yc coatrol a aa that any U.S.
[2971]controlled itens wrich mignt t2 in Dom Rep could only be released
[2973]-on specific euthorization from Washington. I pointed out that -
[2975]; Since. the. three-‘carcines were sade available Cuban incident had |.
[2976]occurred and hoped group could understand this is period of study
[2977]and assesment. | ‘
[2979]overthroy o ? the Trujillo “regine.."
[2981]2 iay 1961 .
[2983]Draft cable prepared at headquarters:
[2985]".... . Since it appears that ENOTH group haa committed
[2987]_ itself to action with or without additional support, coupled with
[2988]fact that the carbines already made available to them for personal
[2989]defense; station authorized pass”suamacaine guns’ to: Berry for
[2990]their additional protection on their proposed endeavor. . .'
[2992]~ (Comment: This cable was never sent. It was authenticated
[2993]: by Ray Eervert for J. C. King, and Richard Bissell coordinated, :
[2994]t. Itwas forvaried to the [2cl for release. General Cabell
[2995]" attached’ a handwritten buck-slio: "Return to: D
[2997]“ macted upon.) ©
[2999]La
[3001]Pia a! aaa
[3004]a
[3006]al
[3009]g
[3010]k May 1952
[3012]RPE HEE lareee i
[3014]The Director, ata ceeting of the Special: Group, reported ao
[3016]new aati-Trujillo plot, saying that we never mew (if one of these ,
[3018]PES A
[3020]would work or note
[3022]May 195) |
[3024]Headquarters cabled the staticn:
[3026]"Regret delay out release fot the submachine guns/ avaits
[3027]Bagh level State Deparcnent decision.”
[3029]Beéay 1961 coon
[3033]"Btate Department has disapproved passing /submachine. guns/.
[3035]16 May 1961
[3037]Cable ‘fron the station: : . : - ‘
[3038]: "For Achilles and Coerr from Dearborn: Thomas Stocker called
[3039]. on ne night May 15. Stated he euissary fran action ‘group. which.
[3041]ot plans execute action against Trujillo night May 16. Stocker's o
[3042]mission was urgently request me:to furnish group with few machine woot,
[3043]guns which it understood US agents have in Don Rep... i. ; °
[3045](Comment: There is an usigned and almost incempretiensible
[3047]- memorandim in the EMDEED files. It is dated 17 May 1961 and conceras Subs
[3049]a meeting with Mrs. Flerida Berry. The trensaittal dispatch makes.
[3051]Bil i
[3053]it clear that the author was Isabel Cintren, “thetstation's™-
[3055]séninistrative assistant. Thais is-our £ nterpretatioa of w
[3057]Mis s Giatmoa vas trying. to says Sone tine. during the second
[3059]wimpy Berry asked Taczas Stocker to to return, the three
[3060]carbines Eerry had given Stocker for the plotters. Stocker at
[3061]first refused but fically, agreed. /Presiumably Berry then passed _.
[3062]then to Antonio de la Maza.f/ On 15 May, Stocker again saw Berry
[3063]at the supermarket, said he had the carbines back in his possession,
[3064]and his group: planned to carry out the assassination the folleving
[3065]night, The group that: was to do the Job. was Bot the group. that
[3066]‘Bersy had been working ws th on tehalf of the consulate. ' SOCRATES
[3067]_ (luis Baq:iero) arrived at the supermarket vhdle Stocker was still
[3068]with Wimpy. After Stocker left, Mrs. Berry asked Baquero if-be.
[3069]had given the Carbines back to Stocker. Baquero said he was
[3070]certain. not,..although he and.the.man who. had the. carbines and.vas. :
[3071]to do the job aia not know each other's identities. “While Mrs. .
[3073]“Berry + was talking with Baquero, the jan to whom Berry 1 had last
[3075]given’ the weapons Ggreomably Antoato de la van arrived at the
[3076]‘supermarket. Mrs. Berry asked him if he nad returned the carbizes
[3077]to Stocker. He replied that’ ke had not that that, if she wanted’
[3079]eonfirmation, she could look in the trunk of his car where he.
[3081]always carried then.)
[3083]18 Mey 1952
[3085]_.Zhere vas discussion at a Special Group meeting.of planning vith |
[3087]respect to the Dominican Repuolic. . Chester Bcvles sata he thought
[3088]that an internal State planning ‘paper outlining an ambitious
[3089]yaraatlitary plan (and.2lleging :Specisi ‘Croup approval) exceeded
[3090]the Special Group's action. Mr. Farrott's notes supported that
[3092]inpression. The following is an excerpt fran the minutes:
[3094]"General Cabell noted that the internal dissidents were
[3095]pressizg fow the release to them of certain small arms now in
[3096]U.S. nands.in the Dominican Republic. Ee inquired whether’ the
[3098]feeling of the Creup remained that thece arms. chould ust be
[3099]passed. The members showed no inclizat: 201 to take a contrary
[3100]Position at this tine.” * :
[3102]Vay 1961
[3104]The agenda of the Special Group meeting for this date proposed .
[3105]discussion of "further guidance to Dearborn re contacts vith
[3106]dissidents.” The minutes of the meeting, hovever, make no mention
[3108]of, the mubject
[3110]eT May 964
[3112]The station. cabled:
[3114]“Department from Dearborn: 'May 26 I had long talk with -
[3115]" Andreas Freitas. ...:. . Freites made'no request for arms which *
[3116]indicates group kas accepted fact it must do with what it has.
[3118]# The ‘small ams to:.which-General Cabell referred vere the sudmachine’.
[3119]guns, which were Poucked. to the station but ‘were never. Passed to the
[3120]‘dissidents. . ‘
[3122]“Ens. SLL
[3125]14-0000
[3127]His caly statereat on
[3129]th is Fubjecs was that group bas armas but
[3130]sozewhat concerned whette 7
[3132]r enough.
[3134]‘tHe stated-acticn group planning overthrov-Trujillo for =
[3135]past 3 weeks an representing enti-comunist pro-denoc ratic
[3136]elerents cf which ke member remains on brink final perforvance
[3137]“and detercined as ever. Said he could give me no cate because
[3138]stion depends whea Trujillo, follows awaited pattern which
[3139]not known .in advance. . Group has arrangement for being informed
[3140]sufficient ay in advance to get into assigaed positioas once -
[3141]signal given. He asked if United States prepared assist pro-
[3142]United States Dominicans quickly if they succeed overthrow
[3144]“Trujilio.
[3146]"I replied . . » speed with waoich assistance could be : : pO
[3147]given would be increased considerably ir we could have prior —— . oo “
[3148]info on such subjects as timing, plans for ection, personalities - oo .
[3149]aJ..  .-imvolved. anc identity of proposed junta. .-. . . . Hé replied cbc eets
[3150]participants were not prepured give tinir nanes until afterward my
[3151]end could not give tice for reasons stated earlier. . ..- -
[3153]"Re timing Freitas stressed event could happen any day and
[3154]could in fact have happened 3 times in last .2.weeks’ except that
[3155]necessary juxtaposition of forces did not materialize.” .
[3157]. 29 May 1961
[3159]__..- Headquarters, cabled the station:
[3161]‘ oss: "For Dearborn from State ..... . We must not run risk
[3162]Of U.S. association with political assassination, since U.S.. ..
[3163]- as matter of general-policy cannot condone assassination.’ Tht
[3164]-“last-principal is overriding and” must” ‘prevail An d6éubtful
[3165]situation. . . .. . You must request and receive further . pee
[3166]specific instructica for any. specific covert activity. At the : Lae - i .
[3168]present time we are unable to transfer arus to dissidents. .....” a >
[3170]Deardorn and the chief of statica sent
[3172]: ci (Coments | Both
[3174]1400000, +
[3176]in Ciudad rujillo.on 33 May but were not received in Vashingtoa
[3178]until the early morning hours of 31 May--about eight hours .
[3180]“afver the assassination took place: Excerpts follow.)
[3181]31 Mav 1051
[3183]Cable. from the station:
[3185]"State frou Teartorn.... . If attempt is made by U.S.
[3187]friends assassinate Trujillo there will be accusations against
[3189]us and best we can do.is see there is no proof. Greatest danger
[3191]point is Thomas Stocker. He was given small number arms by
[3192]dissident agent to hold several days and has told several persons
[3194]dissidents obtained these items fren consulate. Stocker toid me |.
[3195]- Same and I have inforzed him this cannot. be true or I vould know
[3196]‘and when he requested ce supply arms through him for dissidents
[3198]I told him this impossible. .....
[3200]Cable from chief of station:
[3202]"Aseuse /the 29 May policy cable from State to Dearborn/ is’
[3203]final word on present policy on which CIA work here sust be based.
[3204]This for practical purposes -retreat from -previous policy...
[3206]However 4qs aware extent to vhich U.S. Goverment ‘already:
[3207]associat?i with aseassination. If we are to at least try ‘cover
[3208]up track:.' CIA personnel directly involved in assassination
[3209]preparation must be witkcrawn now. . ... . If assassination
[3210]- tried and not successful, immediate evacuation of the chief of -
[3211]> station, the operations officer, and the administrative
[3212]assistant mancatory. . - . -
[3214].
[3216]CB
[3217]- AY.
[3220]Seti 1 MYpocetcemreenonttesacanmngareccime asim
[3223]14400000,
[3225]31 May) 1951
[3227]Received in Head quarters Signal Center at 0341 hours,
[3229]. Washington ‘tine: °
[3231]FLASH SECRET CRITIC CIA CIUDAD TRUJILLO “RMAER 1. APER 2.
[3232]SOURCE DISSIDENT IN DIRSCT TOUCH: WLIH DISSIDENT ACTION Group (c). =.”
[3233]SOURCE A 2330 HOURS LOCAL TIM2 30 MAY RECEIVED PREARRANGED SIGNAL
[3234]WHICH MEANT TRUJILLO MITIED BY ASSASSINATION GAMZ MICET, AMERICAN.
[3236]| CONSULATE PERSONIEL ENCOUNTERED RCADBLOCKS ON CTUDAD TRUJILLO RIO
[3237]LEADIA SUPER HIGHWAY AT ABOUT 0030 SOURS LOCAL TIME 31 MAY. Boe
[3238]“INDIVIDUALS FORMENG BLOCKS APPEARED HASTILY ORGANIZED MILITIA ONLY
[3240]FEA OF WHOM ARMED Wid FIREARMS OTHERS WITH AACHETES. NO ; =
[3242]CONFIRMATION TRUJILLO ASSASSINATION AS OF 0100 MAY 31. FILED 06002.
[3244]_ 6200 Washington tine/
[3246]ANAL: QUIS:
[3248](Comment :. The e station's follow-up operational cable
[3249]identified the source of Crit‘c Fo. 1 as Lorenzo (wispy) Berry,
[3251]“who @ gave the information in person hed Consul General Pearbora
[3253]“and catet of Station Oven at ‘the consulates “At about 0100 hours,
[3254]: Dontatcan tise, J Andres ; Freitas _velepnozed Dearborn "to ask
[3256]oo cryvtically whether.'ve nad-the news." Freitas said he would add
[3258]“details vhen he had. them.) Co —_ 7 a
[3260]Memorandum. for. the record sigzed. by J. D. Esterline; ‘in part
[3262]_, "Fhe evening of 2 June, it was decizad to immediately *:
[3264]"move out of the Dominican Republic the Station Chief Cven, and
[3265]Case O-ficer Cookson. It was also decited that Administrative
[3266]Assistant Isabel Cintran should rot retusa to Trujillo. Accoré-,
[3267]ingly, an operaticcal immediate cable was seat to the Station
[3268]the afternoca of 2 Juce issuing aporopriate instructions.”
[3272]9 Jane 1961
[3274]Memorandum for the record signed by J. C. King, subject:
[3275]."High-Level Meeting on Dominican Crisis"--in part: ‘
[3277]-"The reeting vas held at 1800 hours on 5 June 1961 in Room
[3278]7514 of the Departzent of State. Among those ‘present were Vice
[3279]Presicent Ljndsa Jchnson, Secretary McNamara, General Llemnitzer,
[3280]Under Secretary Bowles, Deputy Under Secretary “Alexis Johnson,
[3281]Mr. Ed Hurrov, Chlef, USIA, Mr. Arthur Scalesinger, Mr. Richard
[3282]Goodvin, Mr. Ted Achilles, Mr. Wis Coerr,. Mr. Morales Carrion :
[3283]‘and Mr. Janeson. ; :
[3285]"Wice President. Lyndon Johnson referred: to another message ~ |
[3286]fran Consul.General Dearborn which was in an alarmist tone as to
[3287]the possibility of implicating the United States‘in the delivery of
[3288]arms to the dissidents. ‘The Vice President then asked what. :
[3290]. Was the timing and authority on the delivery of arms.” —
[3292](Coment: Tne message to wich Vice President_Joanson-
[3294]referred is not in the EMDEED ‘operational files. We didnot ;
[3296]find a copy in.a search of Cable Secretariat archives. Jake
[3297]Esterlize, who appears to have ridden herd on post-assassination
[3299]planning, does not recail having heard of Vice Presidént Johnson's
[3302]query.
[3304]Tee record. suggests that he znew of it bat -dcestnot now
[3306]. remenver.. There is an unsigasd memoranda in
[3307]Dominican ate
[3308]The Fenorandum summarizes State Departzent- Consulate involvenent
[3309]in having weapons furnished to the dissidents. Tae routing acd
[3310]record sheet attached to the ~eporandim snows it vas originated
[3311]by Jotin Poulter, \fH3/DR2H, acd was forwarded to C/0Ps fax
[3313](Esterline). - Esterline initialed the routing and record. sheet
[3315]oe
[3317]and returasd the pemorandia to Poulter. This ELazests to us.
[3319]that J.C. King, upon returning fren the nesting at State, asted:
[3321]Esterline to have a summary pulled toget toner.
[3323]J.C. King remenbers the. meeting.at which the Vice. President
[3324]asked about the delivery of arms. He does not nov recall the
[3325]"specific query. Re-reading his menorandim record of the meeting
[3326]leads him to believe that the Vice President's question was
[3328]atrectea to one of the State representati ves. Ee feels that,
[3330]ae, it had been directed to ‘CIA, he would have made rention of
[3332]..-that fact in-his recor2 o? the meétizg.
[3334]A renorandwm for the record prepared by J.'C. Firzg of a Walte
[3336]' House meeting on the Dominican crisis Ga’ 7 June 1961 makes no rention
[3338]“? | ~ of U.S. involvement in passing veapons to the assassins. The meeting” 6
[3340]was chaired by the President, and Vice President Johnson was present.
[3343]14-0000
[3345]The preceding, quite detalles, and ealcost wholly a dou “umentary
[3347]account of U.S. Goverment involvement with persons plotting
[3349]the < overtirod sof ‘Trajille ‘carries through the actual assassination:
[3351]chat vas to ‘follow
[3353]garly in the report we explained. way the cou
[3354]the assassination never. took place. Another essential pers, of ‘the - .
[3355]story is the roll-up of the essassination exoyp and the discovery .
[3357]of U.S. “4dnvolvement with them. ‘The ccnsulate cabled through CIA
[3359]channels on 9 December 1961 that ine 7 Deceate
[3361]. _ TDoeninican newspaper La Nacion carried.a story
[3363]TO " . based ca Huascar Tejeda Pinentel's statement ae
[3365]. to Judge of “Instruction that Wiepy (lorenzo A. Berry)
[3366]eo provided the caliber 30 M-1 Carasd autcmatic carbines used
[3368]to kill Trujillo.”
[3370]Wimpy's involvement with the plotters, including passing weapons
[3371]from the U.S. consulate to them, beceze Imown to the Dominican
[3372]_Miittery Intelligence. Service (SIM) as early as 3 June from-its.
[3374]_ Anteirroga tions of ‘the captured ‘assassins. The following summary
[3376]“is arava fran the Fst's report of its interviews of Ortiz, the. ‘SIM
[3378]; officer who ‘peadea. the investigation ‘of the the assassination.
[3380]Immediately after the slaying, all of the assassins assembled
[3382]at the house: of General Juan Tomas Diaz. Dr. Robert Reid Cabral
[3383]_ was called to treat the most seriously wounded assassin. Dr. Reid
[3385]was the cousin of Dorald Reia Cabral, cne of the key political plotters,
[3387]- Dut appears not to have been in on the plot himself. Since Dr. Reid
[3389]14x00000-
[3391]. a,
[3392]in being called a3 a Physician learned the igenticies of the ascassins,
[3394]General Diez 5212 be could not allow Dr. Refd to go free. General
[3396]Diaz ‘fc forced, Dr. Pai
[3398]mish refuge ‘in Reid's house for four
[3400]‘of the assassins (Cereral Diaz, Antonto de la Maza, Salvador , ane
[3402]Estrella, and Roberto Pastoriza). tA ne Other assassins vent their
[3404]Separate ways.
[3406]Within hours after entering Dr. Reid's house, General Diaz
[3408]. and nis three companions began to panic, tv might be noted here
[3410]‘that the assassins vere so sure that the coup would follow and they TE
[3412]would all be national heroes that they haa made absolutely Jrnow
[3414]plans for hiding or escape.) De la Maza called for Mrs. Reid. end - ms
[3416]ordered Dr. Reid aut of the room. De la Maza thereupon raped Mrs:
[3418]Reid in the presence of his ce=panicns. Pastoriza and 2strella \ vere
[3420]“highly incensed over the rape. Pastoriza left the house soon after
[3422]& near-fight and @ drayn-weapons confrontation. Estrella left after
[3423]@ few hours. Diaz and de le Maza left later and were killed in a.
[3425]gunfight while resisting arrest. Both Pastoriza. and Estrella vere
[3427]capturea, tortured, and confessed. Tae folloving are excerpts from
[3429]_the FBI's report of its interviews with Ortiz,
[3431]the SIM investigator.
[3433]+ + » after Pastoriza left General
[3434]a telegran eddressed to President
[3435]which said, ‘We who kaye Killed
[3436]in order to flee the Couatry.
[3438]uan Tomas Diaz composed
[3439]Roaulo Betancourt of Venezuela,
[3440]Tujillo ursen tly need your help
[3441]Signed General Jvan Tomas Diaz.'
[3444]14-0000
[3446]4
[3447]aa 4
[3449]Us "an
[3450]Trufflloa, and to ee
[3451]Zrem immediately to the A= =
[3452]vo code the teles i
[3453]ww fetancourt. .
[3454]t
[3455]"Reid refused to take the telegram on t! asis that he
[3456]had alveady inpliceted himsel? grestely in rough :
[3457]no fault of cin and stated that he tho was trying '
[3458]~O have hin cy asking biz to iahe i i to :
[3459]Mdimpy.! Wi thet de Maza tecate so ingensed that he i
[3460]punched Peid and rushed him around and even went so Par as to H
[3461]hold his revo ins ad of Reid's young son. Reid
[3462]then said that +b a sili the chlime: Reid family ‘
[3463]if they wished but that he would not deliver the telegram to
[3464]‘dirpy.' ,
[3465]t
[3466]"Estrella was asked to furcish what he imew concerning :
[3467]‘Wimpy's' alleged connection with the conspiracy. ¥Fstrella i
[3468]ao related that 'Wimpy' is the one who facilitated the oataining H
[3469]; of the shotgun and the automatic rifle for de la Maca and :
[3470]C at General Diaz. Ee was asked i? "dizpy' kney the purpese for
[3472]which thes® weapons vere secured and Estrella replied that ‘Wimpy!
[3473]Was aware of the purpose. Estrella further related that "Winpy’
[3475]: . works for the FSI, the State Deparssent, or same other agency :
[3476]of the U.S. Covermment. :
[3478]-"EstreLla was esxed to explain how he knew 'Wicpy' was
[3479]connected with the Americans end he replied that he nad heard
[3480]- from the other conspiretors that 'Wirpy' was the intermediary
[3481]a between tre American Consulate and the conspirators. Estrella
[3482]y Stated that 'dimpy'’ was a friend cf General Diaz, Antonio de la ,
[3483]: ; Maza and Luis Amisca Tio, and ihat 'Wimpy' bad been the inter- :
[3484]mediary through the American Consulate when these three discussed
[3485]their proposed coup with American authorities.
[3487]i "oo. . the source mentioned
[3489]. cf the conspirators whe mentioned
[3490]* were involved, they were all asked to
[3492]tL
[3493]§ officials, but nore of the conspirators were
[3495]teese officials by nace and :
[3497]functicuaries of the United States Department o
[3498]: only nane of any Aterican official which wes di
[3500]Tn rece meen mm Fee Se cone a mens Rtneenys memmerenee mee em enen
[3503]4
[3504]|
[3505]2 : ivy . . . i
[3506]- i i
[3507]ge mw S .
[3508]Ses : ms : t
[3509]4
[3510], 3 le
[3511]ied -
[3513]mesa eng ot
[3517]a
[3519]“ lone as tee he
[3520]ee Mee a . , .
[3522]in
[3524]Sead co
[3528]« the source comme
[3529]themselves did not believe 2%
[3531]. 6 Was
[3533]Simply a method by which Amiana H 2 3 cman to give his H
[3534]approval to the plot... . 0... : cpinion ‘ i
[3535]et that time that if ths ed in
[3537]this plot, the plot would have teen much bette
[3538]the coup would have succeeded.)
[3540]y
[3542]organized and
[3544]; “4. . by the latter part 2 June 1661, the investisation :
[3545]aN, had pretty well established the identities of all the individuals c
[3546]: f ; involved in the plot, many of wees had teen arrested end ;
[3547]{ | trae" interrogated. The only ones rot ac nied for were Luis Amiama Pot
[3548]~ Tio and Antonio Invert Harreras. As previously related, General
[3550]cuan Tomas Diaz, tonio ce la Maza, and Lieutenant Arado
[3552]3 Garcia Guerrero were killed vhen resisting arrest. (At this
[3553]vO point the source related that if Geaeral Diaz, Lieut. Garcia,
[3554]: de 1a Maza, Amiama, and Invert had been capturea, and made to
[3555]ee talk, it is certain that many rany more prisozers would nave
[3556]: : been taken.)
[3560]"As far as the source is aware, the only individuals who
[3562]‘ were arrested as a result of the assassination of Trujillo, who
[3563]Py a were brougnt before the courts were Tavares and Cenereal Roman.
[3564]red : As far as the source is aware, no other individual arrested in
[3566]eccanection with this plot wes bro
[3567]court. '‘'Winpy,' the Fes
[3568]before a court to be Reported; how
[3569]Was rot to be molested in any war <
[3570]aware, no action was takea against ‘Wimpy.?*
[3572]efore any Dominican
[3573]S$ to have been drought
[3575]crdered that he
[3577]ens eeta-tateste’ 3 cen de Oetemeemeteintcac"teemenathodahanencenmcnaammenieeneeen neta en wren tt
[3579]“TNO Ne int UF LSet Hn ofa “yay rane ema Fm
[3581]tease Se Bm Tee ee ye ate oe Bhat hee
[3585]14-00000
[3587]ooh
[3591]and reir children were allowed ty
[3593]tic. Taey went to Florica and subsequently oF
[3595] oeerenapteen
[3597]Berry «as given $2,000
[3599]granted the plotters in
[3601]urned to Santo Poningo and resumed :
[3605]Operating their evupersarzet They, esvecially Mrs. Berry, continued
[3607]to involve themselves in political intrigues. They were staunch, . : '
[3609]Supporters cf the conservative Antonio Inbert/vessin > Yessin faction
[3611]and were involved in the actions teat led to tke overthrows of the
[3613]govermuents headed by Juan Bosch and later by Donald Reid Cabrel.
[3615]( — To recap:
[3616]a. Assistant Secretary of State Rubottom told J. C. King
[3617]7 : on 28 Jume 1960 that the U.S. Goverment was prepared to partict-
[3619]pate in the overthrow of the Trujillo regime to the extent of
[3621]providing a small oumter of sniper rifles for the removal of
[3622]key Trujillo people from the scene. Ceneral Cabell, as Acting
[3623]DCL, on 1 July 1960 approved delivering 12 Sprinsfield riPles to
[3624]the Dosinican dissidents by air drop or by sea. ‘The rifles
[3625]were never delivered.
[3627]b. On 10 February 1961 the chie? of station cabled a
[3628]Suggestion that one small-size, nigh-fire-pover weapon be
[3630]. forwarded in each pouch. ‘This suggestion was not acted upon.
[3632]ce eeige women me eee
[3634]- 59 -
[3636],
[3637].
[3638]sentence Rettig pee
[3640]- , sgt
[3641]4 : .
[3642]Ban
[3644]14-0000
[3646]ce
[3648]c. On 17 March 1951, the chile? of station cabled a request
[3650]of Consul Generel ‘Tearbon Tor the pouching of ‘three 38 caliber,
[3652]Smith and descon ‘Special ‘pistols for delivery to key renbers
[3654]of the dissident. group. Headquartexs was preparing to pouch
[3656]the pistols but a aprarently did not do so. ‘There is no: indication
[3657]in the EMDEED operaticral files that the pistols were actually
[3658]pouched. The request for pis sols appears to have been overtaken
[3659]by a subsqve at request Tor submachine guas. '
[3661]d. On 26 March 1961 the sta tation cabled a- request for
[3663]“pemissioa to pass three sent -autonatic MeL carbines Plus ©
[3665]‘ammunition to Dr. Severo Cabral. The carbines and ammunition
[3666]were in the consulate, having been left by departed naval personnel. -
[3667]‘The station requested that headquarters Pouch magazines. Head~-
[3669]_ quarters approved passing the carbines and ammunition -and- ‘pouched’"
[3670]the magazines. The cable authorizing passing the carbines: was
[3671]released by the w/? (Bissell). The station said it / would file
[3673]oft. the: ‘carbines! serial numbers. The station cabled ‘that. the
[3675]“carbines” were’ passed to "Wimpy" Berry by the station‘ s female
[3676]administrative assistans on 7 April 1961. , Berry, at the request
[3677]of the dissident. “Sy Gave the caroines to S. Thomas Stocker for
[3679]ot temporary safekeeping. Berry later recovered the carbines from
[3681]Stocker and gave them to Antonio de Ja Maza, who reportedly kept
[3683]14-90008)
[3685]1
[3686]Bad
[3688]them in the trunk of his automobile. It is probable that at least
[3690]one of the carbines wes taken to the Scene of the assassination
[3692]- by dela Maza, but we have no evidence that ftwas actually usea
[3693]‘in the shooting. Ortiz; the sT4 investigator, ‘tola the FBI ‘that
[3694]the assassins who were apprehended and interrogated spoke only
[3695]of the firing of a sawed-off shotgun, revolvers, and pistols.
[3696]'e.. While at headquarters for consultations in early April
[3697]1061, Chie? of Station Robert Gwen evidently provelled upon
[3698]headquarters, to pouch four M-3 submachine guns and ammunition
[3699]to the station. The submachine gms vere pruched and arrived
[3700]“at the station on 19 April 1961. Headquarters cabled the station”
[3701]on 17 April that the submachine guns were not to be passed to
[3703]the dissidents without additional headquarters approval. . Despite
[3705]General, Washington continued to refuse authorization to pass
[3707]them. We think it is safe to conclude that the. submachine gums
[3709]‘were never passed to the dissidents.
[3711]A final, and rather sorry, footnote: We do not Imow the oS
[3713]motivations of men-such as: Jordi Bressa, Juan Vicini, Severo Cabral,,.
[3715]Aniama Tio, and Antonio Imbert. The SIM interrogations of the plotters
[3717]1
[3719]i
[3721]|
[3723]i
[3724]" Yepeated pleas from the Chief of Station and from. the Consul _ 7
[3725]it captured revealed that they were not greatly notivated by a desire
[3727]14-00000 -
[3729]1
[3731]to live ina free acd democratic republic. Most o? them vere seeking
[3733]vengeance or personal gain. Cenerai Ponaa, who was to have taken over.
[3735]and form aa interin ‘government, aduitied that ke bad had no intention ©
[3737]of permitting Pree elections. He had planzed to establish himself
[3738]as the new Dominican. "c+rogmman” replacing: Trujillo. ‘General Juan
[3739]Tomas Diaz was bitter over having teea prolicly disgraced by Trujillo
[3741]and then cashiered from the aray. Antonio de la Maza also had 2
[3743]‘personal grudge. His bre ser, Octavio, rad been Killed by tke
[3745]Trujillos to conceal his aad their participation in the slaying
[3746]of Gerald Murphy.in the Galindez case. Most of the others also
[3748]had personal reasons for wishing Trujillo dead.