[1]104-10192-10110
[3]2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
[5]eon
[10]is
[12]waren for fond
[14]‘ TQ. .
[15]: = Chicf£, WH, Division— _ fh 1 xp inoH ing FrQuretD _.
[16]Jeno. - ee Jom quaint Desk
[17]- . _ _ ’ Team nave IHoCING
[18]ct) re Ta a . Sanaa El
[20]" Chict of Station, JNWAVE fre worn {yr _
[22]——————
[24]___ © __ Plans for ODCA Mid-ApriT" Congress __*
[25]ACTON REQUIRED REFECUNCES * ” : . -
[27]"REF: . SNWAVE 0180:°
[29][son TAR MIS PAWN / AMMOP *
[31]re way be oe Soo 2, The purpose of this dispatch.is to.report the comments
[32]. , : of ANMOP-2 on 30 November regarding the forthcoming Organizacion
[33]; _ oo BDemocrata Cristiana de America (ODCA). Congress. — AMMOP-1 said
[34]- . coo. + that the precise date of ‘the. Congress. 1s yet to. be set though
[35]ate4s still Schedvled for mid-April. .He now feels that he will:
[36]have a copy ‘of. the formal agenda by: the end of December which
[37]is a full month earlier than reported in the reference. While
[38]- AMMOP-1 is. not-a member of the committee preparing the agenda,
[39]“he said ‘that he.is being kept generally informed of: developments
[40], and that once the agenda is. prepared he shoyld be in a position
[41]to influence avrevision of the agenda in the event that: there
[42]~ are no items concerning Cuba or that the items listed are not
[43]‘satisfactory. -He said that the principal person with whom he
[44]is in-contact on this matter ts Rafael CALDERA and that it
[45]will be through CALDERA that he would hope. to make his influence
[46]felt.. -AMNOP-1. also said that he has been assured by CALDERA
[47]that the Cuban case. will be prominent in the agenda.”
[49]2. We will continue to keep Headquarters informed -of
[50]developments on this end. .
[52]Roger E. MARCHBANE
[54]Distribution:
[56]ZO - WH/COG
[58]cay heat
[61](ROSS REFERENCE TO OSPAICH SYMBOL AND NUMBER : ale
[63]B- 201-767219 _ UFGA-29068 1 December 1967
[66]a cusercanes HOS FILE NUMBER
[67]7 ; SECRET © 19-300-10
[71]20 Qe ¢ |
[72]Ow: 9 Plead
[73]Ra. 20
[76]) | cn
[78]Far
[80]Re. MOC (28 Opase
[81]~ GG? Tatnw |
[83]re AOC
[86]14.90000
[88]: Chief, wil Division : _ : . ; : | Noceerns :
[89]Psvpvecr, ° 7 7
[91]_ ff ACTION REQUIRED - ACFCRERCES
[93]“ACTION REQUIRED: None, FYI.
[95]“othe subject matter merits ¢ se aid careful “study by ali Station
[97]and
[99]Chilean Presidential election led many to hope that ‘Christian
[100]Democracy might develop significantly throughout Latin Anerica — +f
[102]' observers to swallow hard, but there was no denying that these -
[103]- concepts had‘ an emotional appeal, This political charisma,
[106]Drrrot Sey eoe De meme
[107]WH/L rin draft)
[108]i i tin dra —
[109]i NT RENEE © 1249) :
[110]OFFICE SYMBOL Serecers SHOMATURL L 5 ‘| ch /
[111]Sm Po Panel
[112]: sans me FT 4 _
[113]es NESPATCH
[115]| _ oo Ltcine ge c a é
[116]“ft A Qh aSetancs ; nd ; PEOCESS iG achOn
[118]SECRET
[120]ps FCT eh RD
[122]hiefs, All Wi Stctions. and Bases a Xanga quero
[123]are . : _ . Etldeat nes is
[124]. . eee | jSsce Queciad CES
[126]JOAN AGE FRM UO
[128]Christian Democrac in Latin America
[130]an Phe following analysis ‘has been prepared in WH Division and
[131]dis transaitted to,all Wii Division Stations and Bases as a review
[132]of the current status of. Ciristian Dendcracy in Latin America ‘and.
[133]an updating o£ Neadquarters' vies on the movement. We believe —
[135]operations. and reports officers whose comments afte solicited.
[137]FYI, this material, in a-shorter and sanitized: form was published
[138]_ din the 3 Match issue of the Current Intelligence Weekly Revicw, —
[139]{will thu3'be widely dicseminated throughout the intelligence :
[141]cosunity., MWowevér, the WOGEAR study could not include much of
[142]the "Conclusions ‘section. since it was interpretative and had
[144]operational overtones, “Thus we've decided to send the full text
[145]herein in book dispatch form, 7 ut
[147]1. .- The decisive wietory of Eduardo Frei in the September 1964
[149]coxpeting with Communism on ideological grounds and offering an-
[150]alternative, democratic route to social and economic progress.
[151]Christian Démocracy"3 advocacy of "Third Force" concepts plus.
[153]’ feequent manifestations of enti-Yankee syndrome caused some
[155]coupled with’ a conmmicuent to, basic social reform and opposition to
[156]Communism, and presented within an ideolozical framework. stressing
[157]the dignity of the hunan person,
[159]attractiveness to the Latin American, particularly the~student and
[160]‘middle class“clements, This dispatch will review the current status
[161]of the CD parties and tho role of organizations -=- ODCA, CLASC,
[162]Party youth and student wings and European CD groups e- which
[164]OISFATCH SVMSCL AND AUMBER™
[166]BOOK DISPATCH 5951
[168]We mUMBER
[170]Joséph DiStefand gb (8 March 1967
[172]WHC.
[173]" COORDINATING
[175]comprised a package of considerable
[178]14-0000
[180]CARRION 7 7 TMOOL ANID SUMDee
[182]Cc UATIONOFS Ob. : ; by
[183]ee OP fo SECRET | OOS DISPATCH 5961
[185]represent key factors in the developzacnt of the Christian Democratic
[186]moverent in Latin dzeriéa. Our major purpose is to. determine, some
[187]two years offer the ‘ei Victory, whether thé gcnerally enthusiastic
[188]‘asgessaent of Christian Democratic prospects engendered by this
[189]highly significant-election was justified. ae
[191]aN
[192]\ .
[193]a Sh CURRENT BALANCE SUEET. OF CERISTIAN DEMOCRACY
[195]2. Parties of Current Sinntficance. . Christian Democratic
[197]- parties .cze genetally agreed to be of current political significance
[199]#. Salvador and Peru,
[203]ate 53a USE PREVIOUS LO&STO, $e CR ET
[205]in ‘Only four Latin American countries -- Chile, Venezuela, El
[207]> ca, the. Chilean.Pppc is the only party with the respon-
[209]' gibility of governing; the solid victory of Frei in the 1964 .
[210]-. presidential election .was followed by an even more impressive:
[211]-., «showing in the’March 1965 congressional election. lowever, the
[213]“party's xéfort program is being implecepted with less than
[214]deliberate speed, no progress has been made in weakening
[216]Marxist leadership domination of the urban labor force, and
[217]“indications are that Frei's moderation will be increasingly
[218]challenged by the left wing of the PDC.
[220]b. The COPEI Party of Venezuela has strong hopes of
[221]Guolicating the victory. of the Chilean Party in 1968 and
[222]appears to have narrowed the gap between itself (22 percent
[224]_of the cicctorate in 1963) and the governing Accion Democratica .
[225]-Party (32 percent). COPEL Secretary General Rafael Caldera, —
[226]“one of the few Latin American CD leaders of international
[227]stature, is expected to be the Party's standard bearer in his
[228]fourth try for the prestdency. — .
[230]ce. In El Salvador, the PDC gamered 29 percent of the
[231]votes in the March 1966 legislative election and one of its
[232]leaders, Jose Napoleon Duarte, retained the mayoralty of San
[233]Salvador. In less than six years the PDC has become the
[234]leading opposition party. it has little chance of capturing
[235]the. presidency in 1967, but should be a strong contender by
[236]. 1972, with Notre Dame-educated Mayor Duarte the. likely
[237]candidate. : . a ’
[239]d. The Peruvian PDC formed a coalition with. the Popular
[240]Action (AP) Party in 1963; it currently holds two cabinet
[241]positions. Soe would argue that. the Peruvian CD (with only
[242]4 percent of the votes in 1963) has no real future in compe- .
[243]tition with the dominant AP and.the long-established APRA,
[244]both reformist parties, and thus should not be included in a
[245]Listing of significant CD parties. Some weight is added to
[246]this argucent by the very recent split off of a dissident
[247]fsetion of the PDC into a separate party. However, the
[248]inclusion of the Peruvian party here is based primarily on the
[249]fact that it is the only CD group participating in a coalition
[250]covernzent and thus contributes an element of stability to the
[252]=)
[254]political sceae in Peru.
[256]oo - TUASSIFICA THON
[258]ee |
[261]14.90000
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[267]. Cees PAT Wh atl BTM DOL ANG Oa eee ——
[268]CONTINUATION OF : ,
[269]DISPATCH |. SECRET | soos DISPATCH ‘596
[271]; 3. ‘Parties of E Moderate Potential, "Applying even the most
[272]generous ‘Geiteris t to the judgcueat of. potential, there are not
[274]more than four CD parties -~ in the Dominican Republic, Panama,
[276]~ Brazil.and Guatemgla -- that might develop « as > moderately. important
[277]forces” over the next: ‘five years. : -
[279]ol Be “The Doainican ‘PRSC stands as.a prime exaaple of
[280]- cD irresponsibility’ from the tine Caonabo Javier. took over
[281]wpeee “Patty: leadership in che wake of the Dominican Revolution in
[283]SO “SAprik: 4965, -It has‘ collaborated with the entire spectrum of
[285]OS “Msrxist-Lining partics “and moderation of ita ‘extrema ”
[287]‘ gilitancy in the near future appears unlikely. The PRSC has
[288]-devéloged.a small but talented cadre of leadership, primarily
[289]-frea‘the university Yanks ,- and is buttressed by the strongest
[290]“CLASC affiliate (casc) in the Henisphere. ; :
[292]: “by “The Panemantan PDC ‘was registered some five years
[293]age and. polled dvily“3.1 percent of the votes in 1964. Although —
[294]it centinues a miniscule party, it has madé significant
[295]~Oxgentzatioual strides and its philosophy of. social justice
[296]gives it roots Lacking by most Panamanian parties, which are
[297]“Larcely personalistic or tied to. financial interests. “If the
[298]|_Panen ma CD.succeeds in expanding its middle-class base and
[299]“attracts militants ‘froa.the predominantly negro and mestizo
[300]- . population, it could bécone a force of some importance,
[302]-.¢, While the Brazilian PDC polled a mere 4 percent of
[303]‘thé vote in 1964, the Party has significant strength in three
[304]f-sey states of the Center-South (Parana, Sao Paulo, and
[305]Gusnabsra). Like all other pre-Castelle Branco political
[306]parties, the PDC was unable to campaign under its own banner
[307]in the. presidential and parlimentary elections of late 1966.
[309]' Expandéd political activity will probably be permitted after
[310]the seating ‘of President Costa e Silva in March 1967, but it
[311]is expected. that the number of legally recognized political
[313]‘parties will be limited, It appears likely. that the PDC will
[315]‘have to merge with another party 1f£ 4t is to compete in the
[316]legislative life of the country. If the. PDC joins with a
[317]‘party that has strength outside. the present PDC strongholds,
[318]and the PDC message and mystique seta the. tone for such a new
[319]political entity, the net result could be expanded importance
[321]for Caristian Democracy in Brazil, .
[323].° The Guaten alan PDC was..only recently recognized as
[325]ily constituted party. This nascent group has good
[327]in the youth and ‘student movement and growth
[329]atial in the ‘fmportant camgpesino sector. Current direction
[331]he party leaves much to be desired; PDC leader Rene. de
[333]- Leoa eppears honest and intelligmt . but he has little organs.
[334]izational flair or charisma, His. leadership is being challenged
[335]by a group of militant "Young Turks” on the left. With more
[337]vigorous leadership and the development of middle echelon
[339]cacres the party could develop significantly.
[341]gd -
[344]rho
[346]4, Partics of Insignificance. The remaining nine Christian
[347]-Dexceratie parties -- in Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica,
[348]Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay and Uruguay -- show scant ;
[349]ptenise of developing into forces of national importance over the
[350]next five years, Leadership of even modest stature exists only
[351]zoatina (Salvador Allende, Horacio Sualdo) and Bolivia
[353]in Arg
[355]CLASSIFICATION
[357]FORM
[359]sat
[361]53a USE PAEWCUS FOLTION,
[364]1400000 |
[366]TMP ATOM SY MUCL AML ATMA
[368]|BOOK DISPATCH 5961 -
[370]CURSSEICAT IS
[372]SECRET
[374]CONTINUATION OF
[375]DISPATCH _
[377](Rens “i Natale). These parties appear doomed to the role of
[378]bridesmaids to tad handful of parties that réally count.
[380]II +. PARTY YOUTH WENGS -
[382]5. CD Stroncthin ‘Universities. Ahead: ofP Party’ Strénsth. As
[383]with all political groups din. Latin Anerica, the vast majority of
[384]cD party militants are dram froa the. ranks of student appendages
[385]active in. the local ‘universities, In most countries of the htmi-
[386]sohore, CD. voting’ streAgth on the caspus is much more’ significant
[387]than the: ‘political - strenzth of the. parent party. A few examples.
[388].. + dllustrate this: point: Panama, the Party: polled 3.1 peréent
[389]“.o£ the vote-in. 1964. (and"probably would poll not more. than 5
[390]percent: todzy), while: Lts University youth got -12.8 percent in the.
[391]January’ 1966 election, -. The Dondinican PRSC received 5.4 percent of
[392]thé Vote. in 1962 (and its present strength could well be lower
[393]: because of internal divisions and ‘leadership conflicts), but its
[394]ssyouth wing on the ¢azpus garnered 40.2 percent of the vote. in
[395]May 19663 I VeneZucla, “COPEL polled 22 percent of the vote in
[396]“16633 its student wing on the campus of the Central University, .
[397]howaver, polled. 40.2 ‘percent of the vote in 1966, These comparitive
[398]figures suggest seae conclusions which are presented ia Paras. 19
[400]acd 20 below.
[402]of 6. Radiealization of Youth Wines. _Sevéxal cp leaders, most
[403]moteably Frei and Caldera, | have expressed considerable concern over
[404]the growing radicalization of party youth wings. That youth groups
[405]of every political stripa assume positions to the left of their
[406]partics is nothing new, but the situation in several CD groups has.
[407]gotten badly out of hand. In several countries only an opaque line
[408]‘divides the positions assumed. by CD youth groups (or important wings)
[409]froa the stance assuned by Maraist youth elements. “In Venezuela, |
[410]_the wing of the COPEL youth headed by Marta Sosa is so "far-out"™
[411]it has earned the sebriquct "the Astronauts." Chilean President
[413]Frei report tedly told a German Christian Democrat that his youth
[415]wing i s in danger of becoming Marxist. In Panama, the dominant
[416]wing of the CD youth has assumed positions at least as radical as
[417]the Communists. And in the Dominican Republic the Social Christian
[418]group in vthe: National University is allied with the Communist
[420]' students.
[422]7. Youth Tending to Push Parties Further Left. The great
[423]concern of responsible party leaders is that youth input to the
[424]parties will swell the ranks of the radical wings and push the
[426]‘- parties further left. Soce observers-believe that the CD youth
[427]’ problea has been exaggerated and. that the "hot heads" will mcLlow
[428]- once they participate directly in party life and cope with hard
[429]political reality. While this is*partially true, we would take
[430]issua with this relaxed view. Tha raw. material to be molded is
[431]far different. than {£t was ten years ago; since that time the demand
[432]for revolutionary {even -convylsive) change has mushroomed -- ard
[433]the youth the cry: has. assumed din proportions. The natural
[434]swing process. well no. longer produce the same magic.
[436]8. Reed 4 for treining. Some balieve that the only way of
[437]rresting the the CD youth erift to the left in the foresecable future
[438]cs in massive end intensive youth and political cadre training.
[439]Zsyts in this direction to date (at IFEDEC, several national
[440]li
[442]sical training institutes, ORMEU and various student training
[444]Ly). nea
[446]" ft] et fo
[448]QO by bee
[450]CLASSIFICATION
[452]Yer PREVIGUS EHNA,
[454]14-0000
[456]arta,
[458]y SEAS ERTS ” OSES STSRS aa OA
[459]SECRET - | BOSS BISTATCH $962
[461]CONTINUATION OF
[464]_ courses) have been discouraging. In most instances the teachers
[465]share icontical biases with the students with che sesule that
[466]misconccptionas are reinforced and no new horicoas sci opened up.
[467]Frei énd Caldera-have askéd the German Institute far International
[469]-., Solidarity to ineressa its support in the student trsinits fleld,
[470]“but the Germans, walle. recojnizing tha serioua need, have thus far
[471]“ dgelined-to increase their comsituent, To atcocplish anything
[472]. Significant, the Cermsns belive a rassive protran must ba Isunched
[473]‘Gwhich would tax their current resources), aad they wonder whether
[474]‘the:CD youth situation hss been permitted to drift too Long to.
[476]salvage. _
[478]ITI <.TNE IMPACT OF CLASC ON THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT
[480]. Study points out-that “Organised labor could contribute substantially
[481]_ to. the “development of well-organized CD political parties in the.
[482]‘hemisphere, ‘but it also offers tho best chance for-CD extrenists
[483]to cause ham'to the movezent." Few would argue thst how the CD
[484]movement fares and the imaso it projects depend in not insignificant
[485]mecsure on. the posture assused and progress achieved by CLASC.”
[487]_ .More often than not, the judgement of a mass movement is based on
[488]the worst elenent cexprising it -- and in this Yegard CLASC is
[489]challenged only by the party ‘youth and student wings. As an -
[490]organized lcbor force CLASC has been a dismal failure (with the .
[491]exception of its campesinos -am)} its only impact and sole raison
[493]- dioetra up to this time has becn.as a political action instrument
[494]witha primary appeal to the working classes, It is unlikely that
[495]CLASC, under Maspero leadership, will mellow aa do parties when
[496]they achieve the responsibility of government.
[498]9, CLASC Poses Serious Dancer for. CD Movement. A KUMOX
[500]10. CLASG Ras Maintained Posture of Independence. Despite its
[501]“Christian'’ label, CLASC has consistently maintained that it is not
[502]subservient to the Chriscisn Democratic movement or any menber ;
[503]party. ‘The statement cannot be disputed, for while CLASC is guilty
[504]of most of the seme aberrations as the least responsible of the'CD
[505]parties, it invarlebly comits its follies independently, (often,
[507]- in fact, setting en example that is emulated by the parties). But
[508]while CLASC can defend its claim of independence, it fis also true
[509]that CLASC docs net discourage the belief that it is the chosen .
[510]labor instrument. of the Christian Democratic movement, slthough |
[511]this label has never been formally bestowed. .
[513]11.: Closer Ties Retween CLASC and CD Movement Aspear Likely,
[514]It acpears likely ‘that 2 core organic participation of CLASC in CD
[515]affairs is in the offing.. A Sesinar was held in Montevideo from
[516]11 - 23 April (spensored by the Christian Democratic Formation |
[517]Institute «= IFEDEC) for officials of CLASC who are also officers
[518]of Christisn Dexocratic parties. The Seminar, called for the
[519]specific purpose of erransing closer coordination between the CD
[520]political movenent and the Christian labor movement, resulted in
[521]the signing of the "Carta de Montevideo” on 20 April. Thea Act
[522]calls for formal representation of ODCA in both tha Christian
[523]lebor orgenizatioa.and CD party labor departments. To this end,
[524]a Coorcizating Comittee was formed ~- the Comite Relscionsdor ¥'
[526]Coordinsdor De Orennizactones Laborales ¥ Funcionates te Les
[528]CLASSIFICATION
[530]SRORER
[532]Feline | os
[534]USE P@ENIOUS EDITION,
[537]14-0000
[539]‘Cosritses and ODCA recognition of CLASC as its chosen heaispheric
[541]_ OFA ‘Leadership .hed not ‘been obtained in advance.”
[543]CLASS identiffestioa with the Co political movecnt will likely.
[544]‘-gub off negatively on the CD youth wings. which invariably are further |
[545]. sleft’ than their parent parties .and identify much more closely with ,
[547]It is perhaps signif
[549]a movencnt. : This. initiativa:appeara to have made greatest. progress:
[550]“in-Central America, - - oT . . .
[552]America-(ODCA). Tha current officers of ODCA are:
[554]-eloser attention than we have given it to date if it had substantial
[556]_ homogencity and the cement o
[558]’ qualify wit
[560]“from tke Lat
[562]SECRET Lita BASINS
[564]" CONTINUATION OF
[565]DISPATCH
[567]poe
[569]to request ODCA ssproval of the-creation of this Coordinating
[571]labor instruct, The eventual approval of the ODCA leadership
[572]appears. likely; indedd, dt da doubtful chat the. Act would have
[573]exerjed froa the Montevideo Seminar i£ informal agreement of the
[575]eative CLASG ‘Influence on Perty Youth Wings, Closer
[577]inase and myatiquée CLASC has sovm and propagated,
[578]icant that. CLASC.has intensified its.cfforta - -
[580]since January. to establish youth appendages to“the Christian labox:
[582]a os
[583]ee _ IV < (THE ROLE OF OMCA)
[584]13. OSA Contributes Little Positive Direction, The Latin
[585]American CD paxtics fowned. their.resional organization in
[586]Montevideo in 1949 «= the Organizacion Democrata Cristiana de
[588]‘ President - . 3 Rafael Caldera, Venezuela
[589]Vico, President ‘+ Hector CORNEJO Chavez, Peru -
[590]Vice Presidcat t Rene DE LEON Schlotter, Guatemala
[591]Sceratary General: Tomas REYES Vieuna, Chile
[593]ODCA has consistently assumed an anti-Yankeé posture on a broad
[594]range of key issues (most forcefully on the American intervention
[595]in the Dominican Republic). out :on balance has been less strident
[596]in. its criticism than several of its member partics (notably the
[597]Chilean, Bolivien and Dominican CD's), probably because of -
[598]Caldera's rostraifiing hand. The Organization would merit much
[600]influence on or authority over member parties, or could apply
[601]sanctions egainst national groups. But ODCA amounts to little
[602]fore than a fraternity. Its member parties have little ideological
[603]£ their union appears to be based more
[604]oncty mysticism (which most parties are careful to
[605]h adjeétives like peaceful, democratic and Christian) _
[606]and .m nevative factors (hostility to the U,3., capitalism and the
[607]oligarchics), than on a foundation of Cd doctrine or basic agree~
[609]ment on just what they want.
[611]on revolutl
[613]14. Efforts to Fira Up the OCA Role. We have asked contacts
[614]in European CD circles to prod ODCA to sct criteria for mexbership
[615]and behavior and that the Europeans weigh petitions for support
[616]in American parties and organizations against these
[617]criteria. DCYVOUR officers have argued that while the Europeans
[618]eancot realistically require nascent and ill-trained CD groups in
[619]Latin Accrica to hold to tho sage rigid standards, of political
[620]morality that have evolved in Europe, neither should tha Europeans
[622]CUASSIFICATION
[623]USE PAEV:OUS COrTO™, | .
[624]Ere kee. mad
[627]i
[629]14-0000
[631]Tina Ge ote ferrin
[633]continuation of ¢ [ ee
[634]DISPATCH. | oe SE Cc R ET _ rr BOOK GFSPATCHL 5961
[635]nae a ee
[637]continus toa tolerate end thus ‘abet the, Lerespox iity of the
[638]Latin CD carties because theré ara no standerds Gt wil, ODCA
[639]leader Caldera cppears to tecognize the need for < least soma
[640]basic idcolozical comen ground: among ODCA-menver pirties. But
[641]ro sigacl | success hag been achieved in this direction to date
[642]and we arc eset at all sanguine that.even modest prasress will be
[643]made ia this esdrd-in tha foreseeable future,’ Reporting on the
[644]S@onstess of the “World Christian De =ocratle Unioa (CCU) held in
[645]Lina in April 1966" indicates clearly thes the Latin Acerican :
[646]parcics | “whll- not ssubade without combat to any effort (whether
[647]fnitiaicd by the’ ‘European financial. backers of the Cd movemant
[648]6c by OSCA) that aims at inposing standards and controls that.
[649]will impinge on their conplete freedon of action. .
[651]15. Fornaticn of Central American Regional Grouming. The
[652]Central Amcricaa CD parties act in £1 Salvador in July 1966 to
[653]establish a smaller regional grouping, The Union Resocrata Cristiana
[654]‘de: Controsmcrica (UDCCA). .This-action docs not appear to reflect
[655]anyrele lesent: of pique with ODCA * “(the ‘relations of COPEI and Rafael
[656]4 24 with the Central Ancrican parties appear close and cordial)
[657]bat: rather a desira to establish a émalicr and more cohesive unit
[658]‘that can better address itself to the problemas cama to the ;
[659]ereg and, to a lesser extént, to. the individual CD parties. UDCCA
[660]is ccnorised of five.partics (in Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua,
[661]Costa Rica and Penola), with the possibility that a sixth party
[662]will be formed in Honduras.
[664]"V = EUROPEAN CD ROLE AND INFLUENCE
[666]16. The: Furovean Christian Democratic Union (CECtU). The
[667]European CD D parties we: were first to establish a ‘a xegional organization,
[668]‘the Nouvelle Equipe Internationales (HEI) in 1947, The NEI never
[669]played a major role in world Christian Democratic affairs. From
[670]the outset the Latina Aner icen parties maintained their closest
[671]ties with individual leaders of the CD movement in earePes. particu-
[672]lerly those involved in financial operations with me sister parties
[673]and CLASC in Latin Auerica, The NEI became progressively less
[674]significant end in reeent years was virtually moribund. But in.
[675]mid+1955 the organization vas revamped and re- -christened as the
[676]European Christian Democratic Union (ECDU). Its nesly elected ~
[677]President, Mariano Rumor, Secretary General of the Italian PDC,
[678]appears intent on making the ECLU a strong organizstion which will
[679]at least catch the Socialist international in stature. _—
[681]17. European: “Pinanctel Sunport to. the: © Parties. The two CD
[682]orge nizations which have coatributed most heavily to the support
[683]of the Latin American CD partics and. related organizstions are the
[684]Institute for International Solidarity (11S) and the International
[685]Soliderity Foundatioa (Fis). Between thea they, will. contribute |
[686]an estimated $500, 000 to $1,C00,000 to the CD par ties and CLASC in
[687]Calendar Year 1967, It was recently reported that the COPEL party.
[688]of Venezucla vill receive $450,000 for the 1963 election from FIS
[689]at the rate of: 3160, 000 per year coumencing in 1965.
[691]The IIS, The Institute for International Solidarity,
[692]cil recently by Dr. Peter Molt (the xew Director is
[693]ierzenrath) ,- is an arm-of the Konrad Acenaucr Foundation
[695]Geraan Christian Democratic Union (CDu). Like its
[698]eaced wu
[700]£ the
[702]Gut
[704]CVeaSS ATION
[706]Pee Sta USE PARNIOWS FONTION: Ss Ec R E T . a
[708]14.90000
[710](--. dedders are: Dr. Johannes Schauff (President of the FIS,-a
[712] eontributed only $15,000 froa the CISC International Solidarity
[713]_Yund). FES appears to ba the exclusive European CD channel for
[715]_ of Eurosesn organizational support to the Christian Democratic
[717]controversial area:
[719]“¥e would anpear that the Christi
[726]nN c z set ;
[728]Governaeat, IIS maintain’ several. permsheut represeatatives
[730]- ih Latin \corica aid: supports several. cD activities. dircctly.
[731]* ‘pot .it-also costributes more than fifty percent of the FIS
[733]' budaete cree : 2 oe ;
[735]ob. Tho -Fitwe-Gne.Igtemational Solidarity Fund was ,
[736]spally. Srestcd oa 30 March 1964 to avoid duplication of
[737]ginoncisl. suppors efforts en the part of the Europaan CD
[738]parties, aad ochir Cd-oriented groups in Latin America. The
[739]"nama sv g lates changed’ to the International Solidarity. :
[740]‘Foundation (FIS) to avoid confusion with the solidarity fund
[741]- of CLSC -other organizations. Tho FIS operates a3-an ara
[742]of- the ECDU, with headquarters in Rose, Its most important
[744]Gerzan' nctieasl ,and.close personal friend of Konrad Adenauer),
[745]Naviano Resor, Adolf Herkenrath and August Vaniotendael
[746]_ (Seeretary General of the International Federation of
[747]Caristian Tradé Unions -- CISC).
[749]18, -pLléference in Finction of IIS and FIS. From tho ‘start
[751]of its activities, the Germana and [talions havo contributed
[752]alrost the entire FIS bidger (in 1964, for examplé, Vanistendael
[754]‘exrgenizations] support to the Latin American CD parties, While
[755]the Ifg fs the rich porter in the LIS-FIS. tandem. and could easily
[756]fone che Latin Amerigen parties directly, the FIS channel is
[757]prefecced by the Gesaans and has two major advantages: First,
[758]since TiS is a resional solidarity instrument with representation
[759](out rot contributions) froa all the European parties, the .
[760]responsibility for support to certain controversial Latin parties
[761]4g watered down and distributed among the European CD's collectively.
[762]Thus a Latin Acveri¢an govermzent’ or party in competition with the
[763]local CD's cannot casily make a formal demarche to the IIS or the
[764]nt. Second, it is casier to obfuscate tha magnitude
[768]German govern
[772]movezcne ia Latin Aceriea Lf it is channeled through a qulti-party
[773]orgenization. The Germans have limited 11S funding to, less
[775]as -- support to youth and student formation,
[776]political training institutes and CLASC training institutes.
[778](See Attachzent A for a detailed flow chart.) -
[779]CONCLUSIONS
[781]49, cots Challente Communist Desination of the Unfversity.
[782]Jt wes noted in Para. S above that almost without exception CD.
[783]atrenzth in the university greatly exseeds the voting strength of
[784]the parent party. The same is true of the Communists, and it ts
[785]a fact that Cescuntst/Christian Democratic strength on the campus
[786]is overwnelsincly deainant throughout the hemisphere. Few would
[787]take fesue with the conclusion that the vast najority of university
[788]youth are attracted to movements projecting an inspirational —
[789]message (the word “inspirational” more accurstely characterizes
[790]the CD movezcat than dses "Ldzological") or an aura of revolutionary
[791]mystique. During the past few years Communist voting losses in
[792]the university have been picked up mainly by the Christian Democrats
[793]we the vote has shifted From one movemcat with a messaze to another.
[794]an Democrata are the only political
[795]Coamunists’ hoaisphorie domination
[797]oe en iia
[798]: rx! CONTINUES t 8
[800]gecus capable of challenging the
[802]of she cannus.
[805]14.90000
[807]SANE RATIOS BATTS
[809]ROOK CLS2ANCH 5561
[813]“CONTINUATION OF vo
[814]DISPATCH i SSCRET.
[816]. 20. (CD Strenyth in University Mo Tadieatos agen Party >
[817]Strencth of. 2¢ tial, Frou the foregoing, however, it docs”
[818]~ - not Follew that tue growth of CD strength in the university —
[819]"- presates a corkesponding incressa in CD‘party streagtn. While
[820]-yoting patterns in the university provide valuable insights on
[821]populatioa (particularly youts
[823]4
[825]th) attitudes ond aspirations, these
[826]pattems are inet ¢ reliable bacaueter of either organized party °
[827]atrength- or future potential, inno country of Latin America
[828]{3 thd ‘voting strength of. the @'s or the Comaunists’ acarly -as
[829]‘strong ahong. the pooulation at Large aa 16 d3 on the caapus.. .
[830]Ona -reesen is: that’ the ‘untversity population of. Latia America is .
[831]‘Less than-2 perccat of the total population. The CD. cazpus leader
[832]alzost invariably graduates ‘froa-student;politics to more direct ©
[833]party’ involvescat when He’ leaves the university *- ever 1£ the
[834]party. las no discernable future. It would appear, however, that
[835]tho. néa-university youth (lacking the pscudo-intcllectual pre-
[836]tensions. and the. sclf-bestowed elite label of the university-
[837]traincd) are cuch less inclined to vote and. militate for Christian
[838]Democracy simply.beccuso it hss emotional or inspirational appeal.
[840]‘21. CD Fetlure to Transfom Affinity of Lower Classes Into
[841]Votes. The inadequately ccucgscd and tic lower social classes in
[842]‘Latin Aceriéa ave incvitably motivated by the pragmatism of the
[844]possible; to vote for a party that has limited potential to achieve
[845]national power, simply because it espouses views that hit responsive
[846]chords, is a luxury ho belicves.ha cannot afford. Batter, he
[847]thinks, to vote for the least objectionable of tha: traditional
[848]parties. Christian Democracy remains basically a niddle-class
[849]mover .iic. With few exceptions (Chile, the Dominican Republic and
[850]to a lesser extent Venezuela) it has scant worker or campesino
[851]appeal.” By end large, Christisn Democracy has failed to reach
[852]those on the lower rungs of the social ladder. =
[854]22. Individual Party Fortes Appear Unaffected by CD.
[855].Promress Elseiiere. Many expected, or at least hoped, that the
[856]Frei victory in Chile would give impetus to the development of
[857]the CD movexent throughout the henisphere. This has not happened,
[858]‘There is no evidence that individual CD parties were either ussisted
[859]or hindered in. their developzent by the Chilean success story. And
[860]yet the vicz persists that the Chiltan victory was a boon to the
[861]movenent's potential and progress, During the past year COPEL .
[862]leader Rafucl Caldera has. broadcast a variation on this theme that
[863]several Eurcpean CD leaders have taken up. They argue that COPEL
[864]must emerge victorious in the 1953 election if the CD movement is
[865]‘to maintain its momentum, for sa ideologically based movement
[866]cannot avoid peaking off, and gradually down, Lf it has only one
[867]sigaificant victery to cite over a period of several years. We
[868]would reject the view -- based ca election results in Argentina,
[869]Coloxbia, LL Salvador, the Dominican Republic and Uruguay -- that
[870]individeal party fortunes will be affected in any significant
[871]measure by the successes or failures of sister parties elsewhere.
[872]What copeavs to emerge from these elections 1s rather solid ,
[873]evidence that the national parties will sink or swim on their |
[875]wm devices, based largely on leadership abilities, the development
[876]tle cehelot cadres, organizational talents, appeal to the
[877]y Gisinherited," and the pragmatism of local issues and
[878]International evénts (with rare exception) count
[879]influence of ODCA and the successful CD parties”
[881]" of mic
[882]Meocd
[883]consicervations.
[884]for liczle, and the
[885]even less.
[887]FX Tescusnmet
[889]fou .
[890]teca = 6530 USC PREVIOUS EOITION, |
[895]te,
[896]CONTINUATION OF
[897]OISPATCH  -
[901]SECRET
[903]SIS Se ene Nees
[905]i Box DISPATCH 5961
[907]23. Growth Potential Exists, But Mach Less Thon Criginally
[908]Antictoated., The Cp movencnt has made. only modest progress the
[909]past two years, . Indications are that the developzent of the
[910]movercnt will be much slower and less extensive than many’ anti«
[911]cipated in the first flush of ‘enthusiasm following che Frei | ;
[912]victory, for it has many problems. to resolve. Chief among these.
[914]“perhaps, 13 CD fatlure to reach the-lower social classes and to
[915]cevelop ‘a significant’ worker base. The chances of CLASC. contrt-
[916]buting positively to correct this failure apoear recote, Another
[918]“poe major problem-is' the. absence ofan ideological comzonnground,
[920]“! - despite :the. lip ‘service paid to the Papal Encyclicals and the .
[921]_ Catholic. soctal philosophers, and the failure to enunciate oinimua
[923]sbéhaviordl. standards that these philosophical root's would impose,
[925]“This deficiency is tke root ‘cause ‘of. two manifestations: First,
[927]' & propensity’ to consort with-Cocaunfst and assorted Marxist groups
[929]. (¢.g., in Coloabta ‘Bolivia, ‘tha Dociiriican. Republic and Panama).
[931]Second, the progr ssive radicalization.of party youth witigs which
[933]threatens to push the parent parties further left. the fact,
[935]xenains, neverthéless, that Christian Demoéracy is the most unified
[936] Ron-Cemunist movement in Latin: America, It cannot be labeled
[938]| democratic or anti-Communist because of the behavioral aberrations
[940]. O£ several national parties, — : :
[942]24, Need for Eclectic Operational Approach to CD's. The.
[943]renks of those wao viewed Christian Democratic prospects with
[944]&reat cathusiasm. two years ago s- including the European financlal
[945]backers. of tha movencnt «= have ‘dwindled considerably, But those
[946]who have been erLtics ‘of Christian Democracy from the outset (many
[947]of vhom might be described as the “visceral denigrators") have
[948]displayed no:more perception in evaluating CD Prospects. The
[949]head-in-the-gand generalization that Christian Democracy has no |
[951]“future does not stand the challeége of investigation, Neither does
[952]the aesertion that ‘Christian Democracy is the hemispheric wave of
[953]the future. The only valid generalization that might be made on
[954]CD prospects is that all generalizations are false. We would :
[955]subait that the only valid approach ‘to the CD phenomenon is to assess
[956]the movemcat and make operational judgements on & comtry-by=
[957]country basis. There are some countries where the collapse of
[958]the party would be no loss. The. key question is: Can the party
[959]develop as a positive elenent in national political stability?
[960]‘If so, it is incumbent on the Station to develop assets within .
[961]‘the party and to examine the need for operational involvement,
[962]_ Station posture toward the cp movement must be based on the raw
[963]realities of the local situation, case by case,
[965]RUTHERFORD J, LYNER
[970]sea) S3a USE PeaNius COMMON,
[972]ARR,
[973]So
[975]14-00000
[976]Tia
[978]“7 et. eontinuation oz... of a rere |
[979]. DISPATCH» - “SECRET... © [ECON DISPATCH. 5961
[981]. Bas Distetbution:
[983]sony each)
[985]ia
[988]Janeiro  . - Lo.
[989]iloxisente a Ct Che [ca oo.
[990]Wa SAREE. a,
[991]Alegre; Wi/Reg istry re
[993]> wee moe . . - . i 7 . .
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[1008]sorota St RS
[1011]Jose | et re, ee
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[1013]o . : aris
[1015]Scn‘Szlvedoer
[1016]Gontiuals City —
[1017]Port au Peiace ¢ ; 7
[1018]Tesucty zelpa : , De ne
[1020]map
[1022]G
[1024]Quin eid
[1026]2 9
[1030]faa,
[1031]ran
[1033]seieo city ee ace
[1034]Lontoerey ; - - _ panees
[1038]Paraonaribo
[1039]Port of Spain
[1040]Hontevideo
[1041]Caracas —
[1042]sentiaze ‘de los Caballeros
[1044]Nenagua_
[1046]i 3 ; . oe : - r
[1047]— a we Premous ramen | ; 8B a a e t anime — | aa |
[1049]14-00000
[1050]> . |
[1051]E
[1052]| ,
[1053]> EUROPEAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC SOLIDARITY ORGANIZATIONS 4 7
[1055]3
[1056]3
[1057]) GERMAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC UNION (cou) WORLD CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC UNION (weoU)
[1058]> . .
[1059]: ° KONRAD ADENAUER FOUNDATION : So ' a
[1060]so I a
[1061].
[1062].
[1063]’ : Political European — Christian Democratic Christian Democratic Internationat Union
[1064], Picthole Leadership Student Christan Organization Union of .
[1065]: acemy ‘Academy Institute Democratic _ of of Young Christian
[1066]Union Latin America Centra! Europe Democrats
[1067](ECOU) (OOCA) (UCDEC) que)
[1068]Institute iq
[1069]for
[1070]internationat Solidarity Internatronal, Sclidarity .
[1071](IS) Foundation
[1072]OIRECTOR (FIS)
[1073]Adolf Herkenrath PRESIDENT
[1074]Johannes Schauft
[1075]SOME DUDGETARY SUPPORT
[1076]: 5
[1077]Support To: Organizational Support To: J
[1079]Political Training Institutes Polhtical Parties
[1081]Training Institutes of CLASC
[1082](Latin American Confederation of Christian Trade Unionists)
[1084]Youth and Student Training
[1086]agnor 367
[1089]2 Sateen erm t
[1091]oO - © secret
[1093]No Forign Disem
[1095]DIRECTORATE OF
[1096]INTELLIGENCE
[1100]Special Report
[1102]Christian Democracy in
[1104]eariee an eaisineneres ern
[1106]Secret
[1107]N@ 1100
[1109]-3 March 1967
[1111]No. 0279/67 ;
[1114]14-0000
[1116]Pa
[1118]d
[1119]4
[1121]ee a er ee
[1123]Se rat RH Ene 1 i eet se aaah gry tinut rane nen mp he ore nn yan ga
[1125](PA SOL Oe asa bem em eae AME eae
[1127]SECRET
[1129]Xo Foreign Sissen
[1131]CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY: IN LATIN AMERICA
[1133]“The. decisive. victory of Eduardo Frei in’ the sep-
[1134]‘tember :1964 Chilean presidential election led many to
[1135]hope that Christian Democracy would develop signifi-.
[1136]cantly throughout Latin America, competing with Com-
[1137]munism on ideological grounds and ‘offering an alterna=
[1139]tive, democratic reute to social and economic progress.
[1141]‘No such tren i has yet: developed. The Christian
[1142]Democratic movement's appeal is.to students and middle
[1143]_ Class, a relatively small percentage of the pepulation
[1144]in most Latin American countries, -Its concepts of
[1146]. ‘basic social refora and the dignity of the human person
[1147]. May. appeal ‘to the workers, but thay still cast their
[1149]vote on a pragmatic basis for the least objectionable
[1150]of the established parties that have an immediate chance
[1152]-of governing.
[1154]The movement's progress ‘is likely ‘to be hampered
[1155]by its lack of strong leaders and effective labor or-
[1156]ganizations to compete against the entrenched posi-
[1157]tions of other political movements.
[1159]. Current Balance Sheet.
[1161]The Christian Democratic
[1162]movement is generally agreed to
[1163]bé of current political signifi-
[1164]cance in only four Latin. American
[1166]countries~-Chile, Peru, Venemvela,
[1168]and’ El Salvador.
[1170]. In. only one of - these--Chile--
[1171]is the Christian Democratic Party
[1172](PDC) the governing party. rei's
[1173]solid victory in the 1963 presi~
[1174]dential election was followed by
[1175]an “even more impressive showing
[1176]in the March 1965 congressional
[1177]election. However, the party's’
[1178]reform program has run into d@if-
[1179]ficulty in the upper house of
[1180]Congress, which is still con-
[1182]‘trolled by the opposition; no
[1183]. progress has been made in weaken-
[1185]ing Marxist domination of the’
[1186]urban labor force; and-Frei's
[1188]“moderation has been increasingly
[1190]challenged by the left. wing of
[1191]his own party, which may capture
[1192]control in the next two or three
[1193]years.
[1195]The only other Christian
[1196]Democratic party with a claim to
[1197]a role in government is the one |
[1198]in Peru. It was brought into a
[1199]pre-election coalition by the
[1200]dominant Popular Action Party
[1201]in 1963 and, although it gained
[1202]only four percent of the votes,
[1203]it holds two cabinet posts. Its
[1204]voting strengrh has been weakened
[1205]recently by the defection of a
[1206]dissident faction which formed a
[1207]separate Popular Christian Party,
[1209]SECRET
[1211]Page 1
[1213]SPECIAL REPORT
[1215]3 Mar 67
[1217]14-0000
[1221]Oo Country with acieve Chistian Democratic cPanty
[1222]O “Country nih weak “chain Democratic Pasty .
[1223]. 6 Country: without Christian. Democratic Party
[1226]Le + MOmOU RAS an . ‘
[1227]meal , ot _ ok
[1228]eu sacvacot*syicanaGua  * aoe a
[1231]coera dice
[1233]BRAZIL
[1235]EDUARDO FREI
[1236]‘ . - Prosidant of Chile,
[1238]. BOLIVIA
[1239]lotin America’ ‘3 Christian Democratic loader.
[1242]. f
[1243]PARAGUAY ' wn
[1244]a
[1245]H
[1246]i.
[1248]fe
[1249]. RAFAEL CALDERA
[1250]Yeneruolan presidential aspirant and
[1251]number-Iwo Latin American Christion Democrat
[1252]65880 3-67
[1253]Classified material on-reverse. side of page :
[1256]14-0000
[1258]|. Salvador,
[1260]Venezuela's Christian Demo-
[1262]Crats (COPEI) have strong hopes
[1264]of duplicating the victory of the
[1266]Chilean party in 1968 and appear
[1267]to. have narrowed -the gap between
[1268]their 22 percent of the elector-
[1270]. ate in’ 1963 and the governing
[1272]Democratic Action's 32 percent.
[1273]COPEI Secretary Géneral Rafael
[1274]Caldera, one of the few Latin
[1275]American CD leaders. of interna-
[1276]tional stature, is expected ‘to
[1277]be the party's standard: bearer
[1278]in his fourth try for the presi-
[1279]dency. tle has recently come out
[1280]in favor of a politically expe-
[1281]dient move to the right, thus
[1282]filling the vacuum of the center-
[1284]“xight of the Venezuelan political
[1285]spectrum and opening new sources
[1287]of support.
[1289]In El Salvador, the Ppc
[1290]garnered 31.2 percent of the
[1291]votes in the March 1966 legisla-
[1293]“ tive election’ and one of its.
[1295]leaders, Jose Napoleon Duarte,
[1296]retained the mayoralty of San
[1298]In less than six years
[1299]the PDC has become the leading
[1300]Opposition party. It has little
[1301]chance of capturing the presi-
[1302]dency in-1967, but should bea
[1304]‘strong contender by 1972, with \
[1305]-Notre Dame ~ educated Mayor
[1306]‘Duarte the likely candidate,
[1308]Applying even the most gen-
[1310]-@rous criteria to the judgment
[1312]of potential, there are not more
[1313]than four other Cbd Parties--in
[1314]the Dominican Republic, Panama,
[1315]Brazil, and Guatemala--that might
[1316]develop as moderately important
[1317]forces ‘over the. next five years,
[1319]The Dominican Revolutionary
[1320]Social Christian Party (PRSC),
[1322]SECRET
[1323]SPECIAL REPORT
[1325]Page. 3
[1327]SECRET.
[1328]No Fer
[1330]% Ofesen.
[1332]led by Coanabo Javier, has aban-~
[1333]doried, atleast for the time being,
[1334]the irresponsible policies it °'- .
[1335]adopted after the April 1965 re- wo
[1336]volt and has moved toward the po- . - ;
[1337]litical center. The party -has
[1339]made its Opposition to the Bala-
[1340]guer..government clear, but has
[1342]also indicated that.it intends to
[1344]eperate within bounds acceptable
[1346]to the President. The PRSC hopes
[1348]that this moderate: line will in-
[1349]crease its following and enable.
[1351]| it to improve on the poor showing
[1353]it made in. the 1966 elections.
[1354]The party has developed a small
[1355]but talented cadre, primarily
[1356]from the university ranks,
[1358]The Panamanian PDC was reg-
[1359]istered some five years ago and
[1360]polled only 3.1 percent of the
[1361]votes in 1964, Although it con-
[1362]tinues a minuscule Party, it has
[1363]made significant organizational
[1364]strides and its philosophy of
[1365]‘social justice gives it roots.
[1366]lacked by most Panamanian parties,
[1367]which are largely personalistic
[1368]or tied to financial interests, | . i
[1369]The PDC is currently negotiating
[1370]with the mass-based Panamenista
[1371]Party of Arnulfo Arias--Panama's
[1372]largest--in hopes of forming a
[1373]coalition for the May 1968 elec-~ .
[1374]tions. The CDs have offered to :
[1375]provide the Panamenistas with °
[1376]much-needed administrative skills
[1377]in return for a share of the as-
[1378]sembly seats in the next election,
[1379]A long-range goal would be to
[1380]acquire support within arias’
[1381]Party and inherit his mass fol-
[1382]lowing when he passes from the - :
[1383]scene, . . : : :
[1385]The Brazilian ppc polled
[1386]only four percent of the vote in ; :
[1388]3 Mar 67
[1390]14-90000
[1392]_ ideology.
[1394]SECRET
[1396]No Forutgn Diseem
[1398]1962, but the party had signifi-
[1399]cant strength in three important
[1400]south-céntral states. (Parana,
[1402]Sad Paulo, and Guanabara). Like
[1404]‘all other Brazilian. parties, it
[1406]was abolished during a political —
[1407]reorganization under the Castello
[1408]Branco administration. Most of:
[1410]its meibers then affiliated with.
[1412]_ the progovernment_ARENA party |
[1414]and ‘campaigned under its banner
[1416]in the November 1966 congressional
[1417]elections. It is unlikely that
[1418]there will be any significant ex-
[1419]pansion in the number of politi-
[1420]cal parties--the new Brazilian
[1421]constitution sets down stringent.
[1423]|. Standards that virtually eliminate
[1424]“the possibility. of a repetition
[1425]of the forner proliferation of
[1427]parties. The former PDC has made
[1428]no attempt to reconstitute itself,
[1430]-but its former members ‘will prob-
[1431]‘ably join with. Liké-minded con-
[1433]gressmen to pursue policies con-
[1434]sistent with Christian Democratic
[1436]The Guatemalan PDC was only
[1438]“recently recognized as a legally
[1440]constituted party. This group,
[1441]which is being financed by Cath-~
[1442]oOlic sources in Germany and Bel-
[1443]gium, has some strength in the
[1444]youth and student movement and
[1445]Some growth potential among the
[1446]campesinos who make up more than
[1447]half the population. Current
[1449]direction of the Party leaves much’
[1451]to bedesired; its leader, Rene de
[1452]Leon, appears -honest, but he has
[1453]little organizational flair or °
[1454]popular appeal. With more vigo-
[1455]reus leadership and the develop-
[1456]ment of.a middle~echelon cadre, |
[1457]the party might develop signifi-
[1458]cantly--particularly if the in-
[1459]cumbent Revolutionary Party (PR)
[1460]administration fails to resolve
[1461]basic problems confronting it.
[1463]The rémaininy. nine Chris-
[1464]tian Democratic partios--in Ar-
[1465]gentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa
[1466]Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua,
[1467]Paraguay, and Uruguay-~show scant
[1468]promise of developing into forces.’
[1470]‘of national importance over. the
[1472]next five years. . Geadership of
[1473]even modest stature exists only
[1474]in Argentina (Salvador Alende,
[1475]Horacio, Sueldo) and Bolivia
[1476](Remo di Natale). :
[1478]Party Youth Wings me
[1480]As with all political groups
[1482]dn Latin America, the vast major-
[1484]ity of CD party militants. come
[1485]from-student organizations in the
[1486]local universities, In most
[1487]countries of the hemisphere, Cp.
[1488]voting strength on the campus is
[1489]much greater than the political
[1490]strength of the parent Party.
[1492]A few examples illustrate this
[1493]point: In Panama, the party
[1494]polled 3.1 percent of the national
[1495]vote in 1964 (and probably would
[1496]poll not more than 5 percent to-
[1497]day), but its university youth
[1498]got 12.8 percent in the January
[1499]1966 campus election and 24.4
[1500]percent in January 1967, The
[1501]Dominican PPSC received 5.4 per- -
[1502]cent of the vote in 1962‘(and its
[1503]present strength could well be
[1504]lower because of internal divi-
[1505]sions and leadership conflicts),-
[1506]but its youth wing on the campus
[1507]garnered 40.2 percent of the
[1509]vote in May 1966. In Venezuela,
[1510]COPEI polled 22 percent of the
[1512]j-vote in 1963; its student wing on
[1514]the campus of Central University,
[1515]however, polled 40.2 percent of
[1517]the. vote in 1966.
[1519]. ’ SECRET
[1520]so Page -4 SPECIAL REPORT 3 Mar 67
[1522]14.90000
[1525]/ Several CD leaders, most
[1526]notably Frei in ‘Chile, and: Caldera -
[1528]Jin Venezuela, Nave “€xpressed con-.
[1530]‘siderable concern over: the grow-
[1531]Ang -radicalization of party youth
[1532]wings. In Several countries the
[1533]positions assumed by CD youth.
[1534]groups (or important wings) are
[1535]almost indistinguishable from
[1536]those of pro-Communist youth ele-
[1538]‘Ments. In Venezuela, the wing
[1540]of the COPEI youth. headed by
[1542]_ Marta Sosa is ‘so “far out" it
[1544]has earned the sobriquet “the
[1546]Astronauts." Chilean: President ,
[1548]Frei reportedly told a-German |
[1549]Christian Democrat that his youth
[1550]wing is moving dangerously far
[1551]to the left. “In Panama, the
[1553]‘dominant wing of the CD youth hag
[1555]assumed positions at least as
[1556]radical as the Communists. And
[1557]in the Dominican Republic the
[1558]Social Christian group in the Na-
[1560]-tional University, while differ-
[1561]entiating itself from the Commu-
[1563]‘nist students on certain issues,
[1564]has frequently taken a parallel
[1565]line, us
[1567]. The great concern of respon-
[1568]Sible party leaders ig that these
[1569]students, as they Progress from
[1570]campus to parent party, will swell
[1571]the ranks of the radical wings
[1573]and push the parties further left.
[1574]Other observers, however, expect
[1575]the “hotheads” to mellow once
[1576]‘they participate directly in
[1577]Party life and cope with hard
[1578]political, reality. Both views
[1579]‘can be defended. Some mellowing
[1580]is inevitable, but in the past
[1581]ten years the demand for revolu-
[1582]tionary (even convulsive) change
[1583]has mushroomed--and among the
[1584]youth the cry has assumed much
[1585]greater proportions.
[1587]SECRET
[1589]Vo Fordign Diasem
[1594]"Both German and American
[1595]observers have ‘commented that
[1596]massive and intensive political.
[1598]' training of youth and political -
[1600]cadres might arrest “this drift
[1601]to the left. Frei and‘Caldera
[1603]“have specifically asked the West
[1605]German CD party's Institute for. .
[1606]International Solidarity to in- _
[1607]Crease its support in the student
[1609].training field. However,-the
[1611]Germans, who have long been pro- |
[1612]ponents of oraanizational programs
[1613]in Latin America, appear inclined
[1614]to the position in the youth and
[1615]student field that party leaders
[1616]have permitted the situation to
[1617]deteriorate too long for even a_
[1619]massive training program to pro-
[1621]duce a moderating trend,
[1622]The Labor Arm
[1624]A major influence in the
[1625]development of the Christian
[1626]Democratic movement will: be the -
[1627]actions and attitudes of its
[1628]labor organization, the Latin
[1629]American Confederation of Chris-
[1630]tian Trade Unionists (CLASC).
[1632]So far, as an organized force, it
[1633]has been.a dismal failure except
[1634]among the campesinos. Its only
[1635]impact and sole purpose up to
[1636]this time has been as a political
[1637]action instrument with primary
[1638]appeal to the working classes.
[1640]In this role, it has earned a
[1641]reputation for independent action
[1642]and irresponsibility that has re-
[1643]flected negatively-on the whole
[1644]movement despite CLASC's vigorous
[1645]claims that it is not subservient
[1646]to the Christian Democratic po-
[1647]litical ledders., ~~ .
[1649]In spite of the apparent .
[1650]differences between CLASC and
[1652]SECRET
[1654]Page 5
[1656]SPECIAL REPORT
[1658]3 Mar 67
[1660]14-00000
[1662]a SECRET 9
[1664]Ho. Foreign Diasan’
[1666]At, a closer and’
[1667]«relationship appears.
[1668]to be in the offing. Last April,
[1670]~ efficials of: CLASC who are also
[1671]‘officers of the Christian” Demo-..
[1673]cratic parties met in: Montevideo
[1675]to arrange closer coordination
[1677]between the-two groups... To ac-
[1678]complish this goal, they proposed-
[1680]that .both the CD party labor de- <
[1682]partments ard CLASC be. granted’
[1684]“formal representation in the
[1686]Christian Democratic Organiza-
[1687]tion of America (ODCA), the re-
[1689]gional grouping formed. in’ 1949, .
[1691]The plan has not yet been.
[1693]‘.implemented, but, eventual ODCA
[1695]approval appears: likely.. Closer
[1697]““. CLASC identification with ‘the CD
[1698]. political movement may have an
[1700]adverse effect on CD youth
[1701]wings, which--being further left
[1702]than their parent parties--have
[1704]“identified more closely with
[1706]CLASC's revolutionary image,
[1707]Since the first. of the year, °
[1708]CLASC has intensified. its ef-
[1709]forts to create: its own youth
[1710]groups and appears to have made
[1711]some progress, especially in
[1712]Central America. ot
[1714]The Role’ of ODCA"
[1716]In its 17 years of existence,
[1718]ODCA has not. evolved beyond a
[1719]sort.of fraternity held together
[1721]| more by-negative factors such as
[1723]hostility to the’US, to capital-
[1725]-ism, and to the oligarchies, than
[1727]by any basic agreement among it’s
[1728]‘members on doctrine or principles.
[1730]Moreover, the individual parties
[1732]have made very clear that they
[1733]will fight .any. effort--whether
[1734]initiated by ODCA or by the Eu-
[1735]ropean financial backers of the
[1736]CD movement--to impose standards
[1738]and ‘cantrols that will impinge
[1739]on their freedom of action,
[1741]_In gencral, ODCA takes a 7
[1742]Slightly less hostile line on .-’
[1743]US policies than that of its
[1744]membér’ parties, This probably
[1745]results fromthe influence of
[1746]its’ president, Rafael Caldera of
[1747]Venezuela, +The organization’ s
[1748]two vice presidents are Hector
[1749]Cornejo Chavez of Peru and ‘Rene
[1750]De Leon of Guatemala, Tomas Reyes
[1751]Victina of-Chile is its secretary
[1752]general,
[1754]Only in Central America has
[1755]there been any move toward a
[1756]more cohesive unit geared to area
[1757]problems, A smaller regional
[1759]_ group, the Christian Democratic
[1761]Union of Central America, was or-
[1763]- ganized last July. .It now has
[1765]five member parties, in Guatemaia,
[1766]El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica,
[1767]and Panama, and a sixth may be
[1769]-formed in Honduras,
[1771]European Role and Influence |
[1773]Although Latin American
[1774]Christian Democracy like the Eu-
[1775]ropean variety, has its roots in
[1777]_ the profoundly humanistic and
[1779]democratic ideag of the French
[1780]philosopher Jacques Maritain, it
[1781]does not contain the European
[1783]. fascist concept of the corporate
[1785]state. The European reaction to
[1786]the growth of Communism in the
[1787]1930s had little effect on the
[1788]Latin American CDs; consequently
[1789]the Americans were moving to the
[1790]political left as. the Europeans
[1791]were moving to the right.
[1793]Not, until 1947 did the newly
[1795]_ important and affluent: European
[1797]- 7 SECRET:
[1799]. Page 6 SPECIAL REPORT. 3 Mar 67
[1801]14-0000
[1803]Phare
[1805]2
[1807]EUROPEAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC SOLIDARITY ORGANIZATIONS = -_
[1809]GERMAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC UNION icoU}
[1811]KONRAD AQENAUER FOUNDATION
[1813].WORLD CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC. UNION (webu)
[1815]International Union
[1817]European —_. Christian Democratic §=— Christian Democratic
[1819]choir Political «= * Student. 2
[1820]inno Leadership é tudent . Christian Organization . - Union | : - of -
[1821]Academy Academy institute Democratic . of - a of. . Young Christian
[1822], Union _ Latin Amenca Central, Europe Democrats
[1823]. . > ~ {ECDU) _ __. _i00a) tUCDEC} . (USOC) |
[1824]institute . . . ae Tes
[1825]. te ;
[1826]Internationat Solidarity International, Solidarity
[1827]HS} Foundation
[1828]DIRECTOR - (FIS)
[1829]Adolf Herkenrath PRESIDENT
[1830]Johannes Schauff
[1831]SOME BUCGETARY SUPPORT
[1832]Support To: Organizational Support Te
[1833]Political Training Institutes Political Parties
[1834]Training Institutes of CLASC .
[1835]__ iLatin American Confederation of Christian Trade Unionists) : oe
[1836]— Youth and Student Training
[1839]-Classitred material on reverse sive of page
[1846]14-0000
[1848] SEGRET
[1850]No Foreign Dissem
[1851]. 1
[1853]CDs ‘attempt, to coordinate inter-.
[1854]national’ CD activity through an
[1855]organization they: called-the New
[1856]International Team (NEI). This.
[1857]arganization never, achieved any
[1859]_ significance because, European :
[1861]influence in- Latin America had
[1863]-already been undermined by a basic
[1864]' difference in political philosophy
[1865]-. and because the Latin Anerican :
[1866]Y parties had been maintaining in-
[1868]_ dividual relations-with the var-
[1870]jous European groups. These ties
[1872]were strictly: on vague, ideological.
[1874]grounds and for financial ‘reasons.
[1876]The two heaviest European
[1877]contributors to. the Latin Ameri-
[1878]can parties are the Institute for
[1879]international Solidarity. (IIS) and
[1881]- the International Solidarity
[1883]Foundation (FIS). Between them
[1885]‘they will contribute an estimated
[1887]$800,000 to. $1,000,000 to the
[1888]American CD parties and CLASC in
[1889]calendar year 1967. In addition,
[1890]it was recently reported that
[1892]the COPEI party of Venezuela will
[1893]receive $480,000 for the 1968
[1894]election from FIS.
[1896]The. 11S, under the direction
[1897]of Adolf Herkenrath, is an arm
[1898]of the West German Christian
[1899]Democratic Union with the bulk
[1900]of its budget coming directly
[1901]from the German government. It
[1902]maintains several ‘permanent rep-
[1903]resentatives in Latin America
[1904]and supports youth and student
[1905]grouvs, political training insti-
[1907]‘tutes, and CLASC organizations.
[1909]The FIS, under the leader-
[1910]ship of Dr. Johannes Schauff,
[1911]Operates as an arm of the European
[1912]Christian Democratic Union (ECDU),
[1913]successor to the NEI. Since.its
[1917]creation'in 1964, Germans and
[1918]Italians ‘have contributed almost
[1919]its entire budget. FIS appears
[1920]to be the exclusive European
[1921]channel fer organizational support
[1922]to the Latin American parties.
[1924]It ‘has’ assumed this responsibility
[1926]because it, is,composed of repre-
[1928]sentatives,of all the European
[1929]parties. Thus the responsibility
[1930]for support to certain contro
[1931]vergsial Latin parties is watered
[1932]down and distributed among the
[1934]| European COs collectively. Fur- *
[1936]thermore, a Latin American gov-
[1937]ernment: or party in’ competition
[1938]with the local CDs “cannot formally
[1939]protest its funding activities
[1941]to the German government.
[1943]Outlook
[1945]The modest progress made by
[1946]the Christian Democratic mqvement
[1947]in the past two-and a half years
[1948]suggests that its development
[1949]will be much slower and less ex~
[1950]tensive than many anticipated in
[1951]the first flush of enthusiasm
[1952]following the Frei victory.
[1954]One major problem is its
[1955]failure to reach the lower so-
[1956]cial élasses.and to develop a
[1957]significant worker base. Its
[1958]strength in the universities
[1959]and its ability to compete with
[1960]Communist groups on the campus
[1961]create unfounded optimism, The
[1962]"inspirational" approach tiat ,
[1963]attracts the college student
[1964]has no comearable appeal among
[1965]the inadequately educated lower
[1966]classes. . 7
[1968]Neither does a victory for
[1969]one party seem likely to have
[1971]SECRET
[1973]Page 8
[1975]SPECIAL REPORT
[1977]3 Mar 67
[1979]14-0000
[1981]ee he SECRET" 05 ee -
[1982]Yo : : No. Foreign Dissem ; .
[1983]. ' any ‘major effect oa--the fortunes - abilities, organizational talents,
[1984]: of another, What’ appears to : and approach to-local issues, In-
[1985]- : - . emerge .from CD gains ‘or. losses ~~. | ternational events count for lit-
[1986]: ‘in recent elections” isirather . -tle, and the influence of UDCA
[1987]' "solid. evidence that the national ‘| and the successful cD parties .for
[1988]parties: “will. sink er swim ‘on -the even less, (SECRET NO FOREIGN
[1989]basis’ of their own leadership - | BISSEM). © ;
[1991]I
[1992]my . _ SECRET ©
[1993]Le - ‘Page 9 SPECIAL REPORT 3 Mar 67 .
[1997]7 Fas yoy. Miori
[1998]uP : Mee
[2000]Bec wT
[2003]valu.
[2005]25 wove. Ids ke
[2006]Use IGHACTO VALLAG-
[2008]at
[2009]31 Oct. 1906 Misi, Fla.
[2010]Res MDC OOS Loss IAL
[2012]30 SEPT. LOGE NeW Jersey
[2013]JGNAGIO VALLADARES RODIIGUEE
[2015]COMBLOENTLAL
[2017]29 dug. 1966 Aisri, Fla.
[2018]RE: Mpe SESST
[2020]UOnE Dom T TAL
[2022]14-00000,
[2024]REPOST. COVER SHEET” oa we SO] Lo reecesete Acrion
[2026]Te SLE. c. R ne hee wo eceeene
[2027]‘teow : . ° . Rrecar No, 4 2 secer oo . ‘
[2028]- ; xx oO nGe iuOCaIng Lo
[2029]H TE OF UG B97 8 _— hae ae
[2030]8A at. 1966 BTED SCPA@ATELY :
[2031]John. fe. TARDELL/ VA. wee eee ety eee ienenee we peed Ae
[2032]aFecovind ere souect caver i oe
[2033]. . g TENS CHSscurmar ion
[2035]CATeA AGENCY
[2037]1 ‘ .
[2039]2 - Santo Domingo - HDC
[2041]2 - Saatiago de les Caballe _ Customs
[2043]2- Caracas. vo Border Patrol |
[2044]2- Guatemala city HES : USCG
[2046]Seren dwenTay rata
[2048]TYPIC . /
[2049]. —_ . iT
[2050]SOURCE: AMOT-245 in AMOT reports. as follows: Para. 2: DD-1874 from
[2051]Palacio BARBEITE, 10 June 1966, and DD-1988, 6 July, from BARBEITE |
[2052]and Angel HERNANDEZ ; paras.. 3 to 7 and source comment 2, DD-1888;
[2053]para 3S and source comment 5, DD-1883, 23 June, which included a copy
[2054]of the document; para. 9: DD- 1892, 15 July, from HERNANDEZ, DD-1895,
[2055]21 July, from a conversation between HERNANDEZ and Jorge MAS, and -
[2056]DD- 1902? 3 August; para. 10, DD-1892, para. 11, DD-1874 from Ignacio
[2057]VALLADARES; source comment 1: DD-1874 and DD-1890, -8 July, from
[2059]Laureano BATISTA.
[2060]AMCRUMP-1's true name appears in this report. Information available
[2062]in his 201 indicates that he was "suspended" on 25. February 1966,
[2063]and there is ne record ef contact since that time. .
[2065], . \ wf bey WSR
[2067]| Rn’ nae a ates Tf
[2068]| . ; Name’ "BATISTA Falla, Laureano
[2069]t
[2071])%
[2073]Sex: M*
[2074]PPOB: 1 | May 1935, Havana, Cuba.
[2075]@ Cit : Cuban
[2077]Committee of MDC- at congress 25- 25- =27 Feb. 86, “trip to. Bee
[2078]‘on behalf of MDC, June 66. ? :
[2080]Group 3: Excluded from
[2081]. Automatic’ Downgrading
[2082]and Deciassification
[2084]¢ -3¢0-lo.
[2086]trap
[2090]TE WWE? Mh - - f copy
[2094]14-0000
[2096]SECRET. .
[2097]Page’ two, of Cover Sheet cS oe | UFG-8873
[2098]Name: adi Arnaldo .
[2099]- Sex : ul.
[2100]a! Dros: 2.
[2102]Cit : . Cuban
[2103]Oce -or Status: Emigre in. DR.
[2106]_ Name: Xfeewanvez Rojo, Angel.
[2108]. Nickname 2. Baby, El Baby. — a :
[2109]' Sex cr. ‘ oe oe
[2111]“Connection with Mpc base.
[2113]“:. DPOB: 4 Sept 33 Havana Cuba wae ma “ee
[2114]Cit : Cuban
[2115]Oce or Status: Emigre in Miamis Second: _in command _of military.
[2116]Ndept o : : .
[2117]Name: SA eparberte breyre, Placido A.
[2118]Sex: M.
[2119]DPOB: 19°Nov 38, Batabano, Havana Prov. Cuba.
[2121]Cit : Cuban _
[2122]\ Occ or Status: _Emigre in ‘Miami. _ _Chf_of military. ‘dept of ef MDC.
[2123]poe
[2125]‘Name: A feavactos: San Juan, Armando
[2126]Sex : M
[2128]Cit : - Cuban : - :
[2129]Occ or Status: .Emigre. President of MDC in Puerto Rico,
[2131]14.90000
[2133]FIELD INFORMATION REPORT. 2. ee |
[2134]. GPADING OF SCURCE A Completely relate : Lease cohapie Chey fetarte D Mer usualy seratie UY ONat cease (Appia : . &
[2135]fowaley, tage vou of man competence ‘: Folatsty sacre! be futged [Apes to! eevee rwhaenly ;
[2137]1 Contemed by onan -atecartent ond rolable sources 2, Probarly tue} Posutiy sine. 4 Dourtt 5, Prunably
[2139]me _ CONFIDENTIAL
[2140]CONTROLLED DISSEH
[2142]APPS AISAL OF CONTING.
[2143]tua” 8 Corect ba weed.
[2145]COUNTRY Cuba/Dominican Republic _ REPORT NO.
[2146]. : laa, Leet. wa Lor Beatles ‘ . a oT
[2147]Suptct Gg Activities. of the MLGy Possibilitpare or rcost § August 1986
[2148]- - @f Reactivating a EaSe in the” © 7 re
[2149]Dominican RepubYic, Condition-of NO PAGES
[2150]_ Boats, Possible Alliances with:
[2151]Other Emigre Organizations . REFERENCES
[2153]DAILOF 29 May to late July 1966 a
[2154]INFO: . ff
[2155]oes United States, Miami | UFG-8973
[2157]DATE ACQ ep
[2159]SEADINGS AQT DIFINT i SEPRASAL OF CONTENT 1S EPStaD ve
[2161]fHis 1S VNEWALGATEO wiomear ce sy 424!
[2162]SOURCE, : , vo .
[2163]A member of a group of Cuban ¢migrés trained in the techniques.
[2164]of information collection. This group has provided useful
[2165]‘reports since 1961. _
[2167](. Summary; Laureans Satt leader of the Movimiento Democrata Cristiano
[2169]Christian pb. ° Bitlety igin, 7, \-werhined to Miami from the
[2170]‘lan Democratic Movemcat), 7 +t avan _
[2172]Republie on ~vimlenty La:
[2173]ore he alles ment. red t, O Oempors t apt me
[2174]from the’ Chieg of jlegeuly Gbtalned pled ; Mtamt in late June 19bbe Fests? (Mie,
[2176]Be Air Forng, of the Dominte AP an the Comin ienn
[2177]the Dor an Vel=Castry wNdertaving.
[2180]Ltary aepartment of the mie ™ M2 the APPOVS1
[2181]hee iy Y en ily issued a .
[2182]z af!
[2185]DRE) y and
[2186]Cored.
[2189]. “Presentact on i
[2191]in :
[2192]tionary Lirsetorate (
[2193]Uanees Rave yet been
[2195]"WLM aopewen i ‘
[2197](DRE) and the Cuban Representatzun ox =e,
[2198]alliances have been made. —_
[2200]2. Lauyeano Batista Falla, organization secretary of the National
[2201]Executive Comaittee of the MDC, left Miami on 6 June 1966 for . |
[2202]|
[2204]_ Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic, and returned. to, Miami
[2205]“on 26 Junot: On 29 June he met with other. leaders-of the MDC
[2207]vto inform them of the resulter of his trip#/’
[2209]cence - = EE WORE eee ae re ee : . : . we. - - -:
[2210]2 Batista said that during tkaxemm discussions held with Genéral Juan Ry Polen
[2211]| erez, Chief of the Air Forces of tha Dominic an Réfudic, he had requested Kxixktuxzenz-
[2213]foraounxw i Rochen Mia tha t Folch ate with the MDC ‘oy allowing the MDE 2. maintal
[2215]Base Luna leented at Estero: nnn re town of Pepillo ¥tug Salcedo (% natn
[2217]W 71-45) Y recordin nent. Batic seh a nduatexkinc,taibemee, 5 .. Geeo ts 19-43,
[2219]| mindicated nis wiissangness to cobpasav. weep ee
[2220]offered the following assistance, subject to the’ approval of |
[2221]President Balaguer, whom Folch said he will consult:
[2223]' CONTROLLED DISSEM
[2224]‘NO FOREIGN DISSEM
[2226]| "CONFIDENTIAL ot
[2227]|
[2228]i
[2230]e-/ DIA ARMY NAVY | AIR NSA_
[2231]SO #  USIA ( ) _T&NS (2) USA OO
[2232]WHC/SI | 1 E/IB/R::
[2234]FI 1
[2235]1 WHC/WAVE 1 E/MADR Day j
[2236]RE 3 WHC/CA ; re ; OS
[2237]cics Jj aoe ven’ .
[2238]1 CI/OPS/WH_ 2 WH/PACY(CINCSO) 1
[2240]|
[2242]i
[2244]i
[2246]ij RR
[2247]-
[2249]i
[2251]i
[2253]1
[2255]|
[2257]LS IE 2, CI 4, FI 3, CA'1, DO/H 1, Liaison _* a Ar are
[2259]14-0000
[2263]| known. -' Hernande =
[2265]7 OARS “the “meeting zy Batista neported that dis
[2267]CONFIDENTIAL ;
[2268]CONTROLLED -DISSEH
[2269]NO FOREIGN DISSEH .
[2271]<2 1: ;
[2273]. UPS -8873
[2275]ae The use of five falets fac ing Santiago de ‘los Caballeros.
[2276]city for a military base. Sie),
[2278]-b. Authorization for MDC. personnel to move ineo- and out
[2279]ef the Dominican Republic in a Clandestine manner.
[2281]¢. Transportation of HDC war materiel from Miami aboard
[2282]- Dominiean Air Force planes. .
[2283]occasions gga
[2284]; Base Luna ‘and on seve rnd cons uy &%
[2285]go de los banter
[2286]reniuing {a Santlai re ee be the MDC
[2287]ARARTNER ELS RARE
[2289]. mud wen, Sohat he wad, violted
[2290]L. Btn GaULs ta cake tha x
[2291]fee Cuban wkpxiiomaaxd
[2292]talked “with Arnalso BACM? gs00, per month xkiex ann EXSY
[2294]who is. the recipient ee of Rage Luna, Basan, EF
[2296]Zepublic for the maintenant h Folehy was
[2298]te.the Dominkeas, sepy od als meu tint alth Folch, ‘
[2300]‘ d ranges Batiste : . eres
[2302]. men ARLES oH, with the La Salle Cole Or nim the
[2304]eee Santiag> Ze los Caballeros had made arranipc ee ns ap fase Tana.
[2306]Sf a house to be cccupled by the MUC mentur’ STN NN Jive neu gage arranges ssid
[2307]wants TOT he Housa which {s occupied by the MDC nemerp who
[2309]are in charge of Base’ ‘Luna?
[2311]S$. Batista. expressed enthusiasm regarding Folch's proposals, and
[2312]stressed the necessity of acting immediately, including. sending
[2313]‘MDC personnel to the Dominican Republic. He directed Angel -
[2314]Hernandez Rojo, second in command of the military department,
[2315]to prepare a plan to operate from the Dominican Republic, and
[2316]Placido Barbeite Freyre, chief of the military department, to
[2317]prepare an estimate of the cost of the plans in-ordaé’ that the
[2318]necessary money ean-be obtained.
[2320]eet hf cones
[2322]azty id @ ton af operational
[2323]Al thou th ‘Barbeite asreed with batista f regarding ‘the need tor prepara
[2324]plans’ “and an astizste. of the coe 1, wif ER RSRESREN SY LHHCOGK he basically PERK ABASARETS ne
[2325]Hatixtx opposed Satista! a advocation of initisting immediate action. He Polt tha na
[2326]the implementa tlo: f the plang until Balaguer's reaction Is a
[2327]of Barbeite. Ns SRNL LLRANRANANAN RESELL
[2328]ended without a solution to the ur cement.
[2332]a at ghsckehp SRNL ARCH “The meeti z
[2333]vawemwes 2 sere Raenige Cwmuite - .
[2334]sension wathinx < exists peewee whth in the
[2335]Palnelos amaidux San :
[2337]ticularly he tween Arn
[2339]MDC in Puerto Files,
[2341]2 military
[2343]i 3 d. Perez! action with the ar ent that
[2345]plane und nett Sanuetmaneu military matters do not really fall RNLARXT RSH
[2347]within the scope of respons tbilitties of the a- ssident. cee ee ene
[2348]president. - a
[2350]Lawove fA tarbelte
[2352]a. The military department of the MDC set forth its views in a
[2353]‘document dated 29 May. This document included the following
[2354]- - pointe: ,
[2356]a. Discontent is becoming evident because of the lack of: 4
[2357]activity which, in turn, results from the lack of funds.
[2358]The sum mentioned is $10,090,5 — y |
[2359]Cig fae
[2360]b. No change in United States policy pefardiniactlex=
[2361]-apainst. (Cuba: fronm=tha-#-¢. is anticipated. A base of
[2362]operetions outside of the United States is considered
[2363]to be so vitally important that the military department
[2364]would be willing to operate an illegal base if the
[2365]resources were, made available.
[2366]|
[2368]Oo the condition of the boats is such that the MDC has no .
[2369]/- sea transportation. The beats are described as follows:
[2371]of CONFIDENTIAL
[2372]CONTROLLED DISSEM
[2373]NO FOREIGN PTSSEM
[2375]B
[2378]14-0000
[2380]: CONFIDENTIAL .
[2381]CONTROLLED DISSEM 1.) 5,
[2382]“NO FORCIGN DISSEM — ~
[2383]-jJ- |
[2385]urG-e873
[2387](1) The - CADELLO I ie. ‘docked acroes from Brito! s Boat Yard
[2388]at Stock Island, Flarida.6 The boat is in nead of.
[2389]repairs on the deck and superstructure, and the instal-
[2390]lation: of electronic navigational equipment would be.
[2392]aan required to put it in Operational condition. Current
[2394]...'. ° Gocking and routine maintenance costs are not being. .
[2395]' paid. Efforts’ toymake commercial usé of this boat have
[2396]a _ Not. been successful. This boat is considered ideal for
[2398]activities which might be undertaken if there were a
[2400]base from which to operate, but under the present cir-
[2402]cumstances the expense which this boat represents ig
[2404]not justifiable. -It is recommended that consideration
[2406]be given to selling the CADELLO I if an operational
[2408]base is not: established within four. months.
[2410]2) “The KYA- oRA? which was donated to the MDC by a nieubér
[2411]of the military department, is in drydock at Nuta‘ 8.)
[2412]Boat Yard. in Miami. There are leaks in the hull.
[2414]-(3) | The LANCHA AzuLeis in need of repairs, as well as trailer.
[2415]Repairs on this boat are being given priority, and will
[2416]‘proceed as money becomes availiable.
[2418]d. Informal discussions have been held with representatives- of :
[2419]“the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (DRE, Students? . a
[2420]Revolutionary’ Directorate), and there is an "agreement in
[2421]“principle” to coordinate future actions. There is no political
[2422]commitment. . :
[2424]9. In July JorgeMas Canosa, chief of press and propaganda of Representa-
[2425]cfion Cuban; en el Exilio (RECE, Cuban Representation in Exile),
[2426]‘proposed that the MDC enter into a pact with RECE, and indicated
[2427]that some members.of MDC wiit' be offered full-time employment
[2428]preparing military plans for the RECE. As of late July. no formal
[2429]agreement had been reached. : y military
[2431]saumeLl’? is incapable of formating 9Y) aeetude
[2433]that Ramon Font Se MUC and gECE “par Ww
[2435]. > ho feels atween tne HornandeZ
[2436]10, Hernandes, © tion of 4 pact betw tiitary operations.
[2438]org the Pormat1o Jans for m > ent of the
[2439]sbratepy, favors ration of P e the military 1 okich he currently
[2441]ipating in the aeanie reorganization of
[2444]pans {0 ee a leas Important post thon than that
[2446]Font. from par rtic
[2448]‘aid that he :
[2449]ane Cin rder to replace Barbe ite in |
[2450]MUC in a-eey wepartment ‘orxtne re “4h order” ~
[2451]pane - ~maweacte from his present. position to an unimportant
[2453]aid position in the department.
[2455]eeIn early June Ignacio Valladares Rodriguez?” lexpressed a desire
[2456]to participate in action against Cuba with the MDC. Barbeite™
[2457]agreed to inform Valladares when an operation isfto be carried
[2458]out. Before Valladares left Miami on 6 June for Dover, New
[2459]Jersey, he said that within a month he would send a 57mm récoil-
[2461]~less rifle, a 50-caliber machine, -gun, and an unstated number of
[2462]M-1 and Garand rifles. His address in Dover is Dover Cliff
[2464]Apartments, apartment 21.
[2466]CONFIDENTIAL
[2467]CONTROLLED PISSEM
[2468]NO FORETGN DTSSEM.
[2470]eee away aguas. Rie
[2472]x: hen . 7
[2473]ea gop Ve, pce cc darPatpe_
[2475]14-0000
[2479]8,
[2481]Field Comments.
[2483]6.
[2485]oe es tne
[2487]UFG-8473
[2489]Scurce Comment, At the tise of his departure, Batista told.
[2490]the executive ‘committee that he was Going directly to Caracas,
[2491]Nenezuela. It was not until after his return that it was
[2492]Yearned that he had not gone to Caracas or to Guatemala as
[2494]he had planned. He later explained that while he was in
[2495]Puerto. Rico he telephoned his relative in Guatemala and was
[2496]informed that the latter had "failed in his efforts." or
[2498]Field Comment. Presumably ke was referring to.an interview
[2499]with. President- Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro which Batista
[2500]hac earlier’ said had been arranged by his cousin... (Cf. :
[2501]UECHRAIa ae So
[2503]~ wh re we aes
[2505]Headquarters Comment: In early August 1964, Folch was reported o
[2506]ad : Be T T ic; XXBX ? ;
[2507]-Rave been in charge of Dominican 3x . Soot area See
[2508]i C y ; in the Monte Cris
[2509]Hee aE6G Pe peSpn 8te/0e MAS, Another source reported
[2510]‘ MeV LIP ULELL“090.-
[2512]: aSproximate ly 30 Cuban exiles were taking
[2514]that i sptember 1964 > e Lak lt
[2515]training at Sitchinp near Punta Presidente(N 19-47, W 71-46) Ace
[2516]: eT
[2518]BEART Py se Wa ve bee wise ac HEIMU lee. a
[2520]The location of the house was not given.
[2522]Source Comment. The document, as originally drafted, was
[2523]modified because Barbeite felt that the’ tone was too strong.
[2524]. Also, the amount of money requested was reduced to $10,000.
[2526]Field Comment. An earlier report from the same source
[2527]reported that the document was being prepared, and that ; . S
[2528]$75,000 would be requested. (Cf. . UFS-8327)9 Goer Bufoy radii)
[2530]we + _
[2532]The CADELLO I (FL 7579 F), an 83-foot boat, is a former
[2533]U.S. Coast Guard patrol boat.: The boat yard referred to
[2534]is the Syncrolift Boat Yard on Stock Island which is owned
[2535]by Mike Brito. Stock Island is on U.S. Highway 1, between
[2536]Key West and Boca Chica. . -
[2538]The KYA-ORA, or KIA-ORA, has Florida registration FL 8665 E..
[2540]The LANCHA AZUL has been described as a high-speed launch.
[2541](Cf. UFG=-83223,. Besides the CADELLO I, the. MDC has been
[2543]reported to own the VICKY I, a blve V-23; the FUNCHIN CHIA
[2544](FL 9256 SC), a 33-foot boat; and BERNARDO IT. -
[2546]Font is chief of military operations_of.Comandos L, which
[2547]Je
[2549]has an alliance with RECE. (C£.\ UFG B423K oe ' Bvafapaen€b
[2551]Valladares arrived in Miami on 27 May with weapons which
[2552]he gave to the MDC. He offered to Supply ‘weapons to the
[2553]MDC and the Association of Veterans of the Bay of Pigs
[2554](Brigade 2506). - . og
[2556]CONFIDENTIAL an
[2557]CONTROLLED DISSEM Co
[2558]“NO FOREIGN DISSEM
[2561]by | a
[2563]JEL
[2565]ba re be level
[2566]| na eau :
[2568]7 fan be Blaha
[2569]» JAC Cex
[2571]14.90000
[2573]Chief, VD
[2575]ef BO. files whi
[2577]BECRET
[2579]chief of Station, JMVAVE a. ae
[2582]Station Files on Cuban Countorrovolutionary and Krile Organizations
[2584]REVEABNCE: UFGT=16343,.32 Hay ‘1966
[2586]1. Wo are returning Voluso VII of the MDC file which you sont
[2587]with tho reference ior Headquorters to review as # sanple of a group
[2588]ch ere §£ro longer useful to the Station. Headquarters
[2590]appreciates your interost in this aspect of yecords improvenont,
[2592]considering the neod
[2593]until IDENTITY, & KUBARKK employee who is retiring scoop but is nou
[2594]engaged in writing historical studies, con visit the Station to
[2596]survey those files with others.
[2598]; 2, IDENTITY plans to visit SMBAVE for several days about the
[2599]end of July to size up and review certais records for writing & -
[2600]history of tho Station. Therefore; wa would like the 80 packgrourd
[2601]files to be left intact for bis visit. Afterwards & decision will
[2602]po made on thoir rotiresent. or other dispesition. .. ’
[2604]ng the files is critical wo will authorise
[2606]fer your holding thes
[2607]h cited above.
[2609]3. If space for stort
[2610]forwarding thea to Headquarters, but will pre
[2611]temporarily to assist with the historical researc
[2613]Claude F. GOTTFRIED |
[2616]‘Ll. Identity, u/s/c
[2617]2. MDC File, bh/o
[2619]Distribution: .
[2620]§-COS/JNHAVE, w/att. 1& 2
[2622]UPGS-8308
[2623]i,j BB eRET
[2625]Le
[2627]1-WH/RNO, w/att.} _WH/RNO ROBL C. WILSON/pap
[2629]1-WH/C/ESEC, w/fatt.1
[2630]1-8/C/CA/PP, w/att.1
[2631]1-Historical Staff .
[2632]c/mH/c/CA/PP | STEPHEN G. CHACONAS
[2634]C/WH/C/CA
[2635]c/wH/c/M0
[2637]for retrieval, but would like to defer a decision’
[2639]IDENTITY
[2641]Stivcl
[2643]SEPANATE COVER ATTACHAENT
[2645]TO UyGS-6308
[2646]Paul Loob
[2650]Lo. \
[2653]14-0000
[2655]“f
[2657]a. Loot, : . _ 7 oe
[2658]“ a . AO pr —
[2659]. os Ono: : oo AO PIS a Ta wiles Csi o
[2660]5 7Q FILE NO. eo MESSAGE - rorat comics tor. te
[2661]To WILE WO. . .
[2662]REPROMK TimW FROCK IBITED
[2664]‘ut ao acy. vo seance () - -
[2665] pestaor Osis. _
[2667]ADrANce COPY -
[2669]oO tsewee o serves EO vous
[2671]Teme ger ews See mee ee
[2673]SECRET 2109072
[2674]“Lima INFO DIR CITE VAVE 0321 7 Ul u
[2675]TYPIC a™MOP ' none Ay deg ,
[2677]“sREF Aw WAVE wek39790)"
[2678]B. DIR 75895 .
[2679]ANMOP-1, IDEN, DEPARTING MIAME @22¢ HRS 21 APRIL ON
[2681](es Cia leek 25- -2¢ APRL,
[2683]PERUVIAN AIRLINE FLIGHT 55 TO ATTEND REF CONFERENCE.
[2684]SECRET ,
[2686]- FN @321 0831 75595 avMOP-1- MIAMI @233 HRS 21 PEPUVIAN 65
[2691]14.90000
[2693]4
[2694]Inctae Ores, Des.
[2695]cuasstey yo Fae nO.
[2696]H-mUeTO FILE BO.
[2697]one ncO eer.
[2698]ocsteov: (si.
[2700]te arancn
[2702]SECR ET 2109172
[2703]LIMA INFO DIR-CITE WAVE 2322
[2704]_  TYPIC AMMOP .
[2705]4, REF WAVE 9321 | (wo 002s) ~
[2706]apens ERNESTO RODRIGUEZ DIAZ, MDC SECRETARY
[2708]ad
[2710]FOR INTERNATIONAL RE ELATIONS.
[2712]s E: CRET oe
[2713]CFN 9322 9321 ERNESTO RODRIGUEZ DIAZ MDC
[2714]2 SEORET
[2717]14.90000
[2722]waters a HR - oO. woo _ se .
[2723]cuaseee to Ht NO. : ‘quasi ted nest
[2725]a 1. We NO. ono
[2726]red act. ro eas O
[2727]soy One. —_ = ~
[2729]: - se P apvance coey oa Hi
[2730]ow ¢ @aw corr | O  GanmOond |
[2732]we £- : PS Taos.
[2734]Wa Dd Of o
[2738]seb UK BA IDiso1e:
[2740]SDOM INFO DIS CITE vaVe e198 a pee pe
[2742]; a boats 7 S80
[2744]DYVOUR ARTOP o
[2745]be ANCEIE=1 CIDEN) CONTACTED BY DULCE DE LA MAZA
[2746]RODRIGUEZ, NIECE CF PRSC LEADER ANTONIO ROSARIO, “HO
[2748]TRAVELEL THROUSK JMWAVE AREA. DE LA NAZA HAND CARRIED
[2750]LEITER TO AXCEIS=2 ‘DATED 4 APSIL FROM FRANCISCO CORDOVA,
[2751]PS’SC CECY OF INTL” AFFAIRS, WRICH REGUESTED AMCRIB~1- ARRANGE
[2752]FOS JPURCHASE ail ‘SHIPMENT OF TWO OR THREE USED CARS TO FE
[2753]USED FOR PREC PRESIDE: TIAL ELECT I0i: ACTIVITIES In DONREP. .
[2754]LETTER WAS ACCUMPANIED WITH £14EF 70R PUR CHASE - “AND
[2756]SHLPHENT cc=ts GF iCARS. ;
[2757]a ANCS IF = TELEPHOWED RCEANIO EVENING LE APRIL TO > . ,
[2759]CCNFIFE LETTee ar D AGREED TO PROVIDE AID IN PROCUF LG cans.
[2761]Roe SARIO [NFCRISE Agr TEI TRAT HE EXPECTED RECEIVE RONT-
[2763]NAT 108 AS PSES [ENTIAL CANE IDATE OF PRSC AT PARTY ASSEXELY .
[2765]oi 17 APRIL Aus STATED rE “OULD SELECT CESAR ESTRELLA AS HIS.
[2766]RUS SK ING MATE. FosAaR 10 ALSO, INDICATED HE EXPECTED SOME -
[2768]“ELECTORAL euPFOr T FRc UNSPECIFIED NUMPER OF APJ HEEBERS.
[2770]sec ET 5 et
[2772]dog EN REY Taper PP cer or crnecrsbtnie oo a
[2774]e
[2775]y
[2779]a
[2782]~~ yt
[2783]t
[2784]lle pace 2
[2787]i ‘CF 19a ANCRIB-1 DULCE DE LA PAZA RODRIGUEZ PRSC ANTONIO ROSARIO
[2789]rome Oe gee cee en,
[2791]CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
[2793]JHWAVE AMCRIP=1 4 FRANCISCO CORDOVA FREC “1 FRSC DOMREP sane
[2794]“lott =a PRSC 17 CESAR ESTRELLA Ara . |
[2796]PT
[2800]i
[2802]NWN
[2803].
[2804]'
[2805]|
[2807]| | ’
[2810]14-0000
[2813]4 ee
[2815]ye
[2816]che 4
[2818]4, ‘,
[2819]te 2
[2820]7 r
[2822]Bovance COPY
[2824]| pyvouR ator fa mo a
[2825]| REF: WAVE 0194 G79 Y )
[2826]me}
[2828]NTE,
[2829]OF
[2830]SBC
[2832]apa RS COVE ARTOIS OED ONE
[2834]: IDEN JESUS wniguLo cLEt
[2837]SECRET
[2839]CRIST LANG CUBA Ss ic ;
[2841]BT
[2843]BHEN
[2845]. _U reeves. :
[2847]CFNs 3195 194 sesus ANGULO CLEMENTE HOVIMLENT
[2849]— “geen dcuer 10N: PROM IBITED
[2851]Tire = pie
[2853]SECRETARY oF rovinieNto we
[2855]eat
[2859]0 -DENOCRATA
[2862]he X aN { a
[2863]ore Pre Ose Nuassieteo message 17
[2864]ceasotey To FIle Ad. —-
[2866]RA FO Ce we,
[2867]eree oo) oer. 10 posure Oo
[2868]vestooy Clare,
[2870]Torat copiers (aa
[2876]C) RID Copy
[2877]as =
[2878]Mic.
[2880]Jaovance copy
[2882]Qo toeves Cacorres Dace
[2884]M+
[2885]“"“S"E CRE 1416542
[2886]DIR INFO LIA QUIT CITE WAVE 0167
[2888]TYPIC AMMoP -
[2889]REFs WAVE o132 ( add Rut ye
[2890]AMCRIB-1 RECEIVED AIR TICKET THRU IDEN EFFORTS AND
[2892]WILL DEPART 9245 HOURS 14 APRIL FoR LIMA. HE NSTRUCTED
[2894]MONITOR ALL EVENTS For DESRIEFING ON RETURN,
[2896]SECR ET KE MaAET RI Pde ewe Fo ~ .
[2899]CFNt 9167 9132 AVCRIB-1 9245 14 LIMA
[2900]BT
[2902]SECRET
[2904]NNNN
[2907]1400000
[2909]REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED.
[2911]! i “ew rE i- 1a1orad. Dott ont S ; a ee . ee :
[2913]Sf). b . pir iro Lima uit CITE WAVE 68 oe ou, oo
[2914]TYPIC AMMOP = oe . Viva te. Yb626
[2916]REFs WAVE 0167 (w ee # a SO
[2918]. IDEN: “JULIO MONCAGATTA- SO a 7
[2920]SECRET. :
[2921]CFNr 9168 9167 JULIO MONCAGATTA SECRET
[2923]BT
[2925]SARS ACER EES RN BREN, SORE QR EIMEEY SO BETTE EN om oy DES URNRERAEN E T
[2927]NNNN-
[2929]WET cw tet mame net,
[2932]1400000 ,
[2934]"TSE ORE T 1416542 7
[2936]- ; DIR INFO LIMA QUIT CITE WAVE ais?
[2937]° : TYPIC “AMMOP .
[2938]| > REFS WAVE sao f 9 gud We . .
[2939]: ‘AMGRIB- 1 RECEIVED. AIR TICKET THRU IDEN EFFORTS AND
[2941]WILL DEPART 245. ‘HOURS 14 APRIL FOR Lima. neglisteucteo
[2942]po” _ MONITOR ALL EVENTS FOR DESRIEF ING’ ON RETURN.
[2944]' SECRET ..« KE PRETRI Bra Fite Pow
[2945]iy Bo : PETS WERE — yguap Cait end DEM *
[2947]CFNe 167 @132 ANCRIB-1 245 14 LIMA
[2948]"BT
[2950]EV Ob yy ane
[2952]Paral
[2954]PER IAY tase a at ten
[2956]SECRET
[2958]Pos
[2960]NNN
[2963]14-0000
[2966]2
[2968]POS gt stamtastone
[2970]i Ove On 7a
[2971]4
[2973]cuaserre™ 10 rie woe
[2974]A av ‘ta: eit 0.
[2976]ead ao wer. to-eaance (J |
[2977]. oesiaoy Oine. :
[2979]‘BORE i 1410242 —
[2981]DIR INFO LIMA QUIT CITE AVE 2168 eens
[2982]Lei eeentrera.)
[2984]TYPIC. AmMoP
[2985]REF: WAVE 0167 (0 SLi. AS
[2987]IDENs JULIO “‘MONCAGATTA
[2989]SECR ET
[2990]CFN: 0168 @167 JULIO MONCAGATTA > “SECRET
[2991]BT
[2993]NNNN
[2996]14-0000
[2998]| Chief of Station, Santiago
[3000]DISPATCH |
[3002]_ Chiefy, WH
[3004]a
[3009]Chief. of Station guwave ¢
[3012]Ht © AMMOP Circular Letter to Identity A Leaders and Org anizations
[3013]. ASTRON REQUIRED - REFERENCES
[3015]AR: FYI
[3016]REF: WAVE 9784
[3018]: ‘1. -As indicated.in reference, the ANMO> organization on
[3019]1S March 1966 sent a circular letter based on Fidel Castro's
[3020]13 March speech to Identity A individuals and organizations.
[3021]The. letter, which was signed and composed by AMMOP/1 and which)
[3022]was accompanied by transcripts of the speech, condemned Castro's
[3023]attack on Chilean President Eduardo Frei; requested ‘support for
[3024]. Frei's position; and asked the recipients to join the struggle
[3025]maintained by the Cuban people to overthrow Fidel Castro and
[3026]prepare for the freedom of Cuba from Communism.
[3028]2. The youth wing of the ANMOP firoup, headed by ANCRIB/1,
[3029]mailed a letter to its Identity A youth contacts. based on the
[3030]13 and 20 March speeches by Fidel Castro along the lines cited
[3031]above. Included in this letter were the strong anti-Castro
[3032], statements made by Identity B. Copies of both letters dre for-
[3033]warded. under separate. cover, a .
[3035], 3. According to AMMOP/1, his letter was retlayed by FUSEE
[3036]and was the basis for an article ina pares newspaper by
[3038]Identity C. vo .
[3039]Do Nevin ile RE ak
[3041]lip G. =LMAR
[3043]Attachments: a
[3044]A. Identities - u/se. tie
[3045]B. Cys of Ltrs - u/se.
[3047]Distribution:
[3048]“3 - WH/C w/atts :
[3050]Santia 4 ve itts —_ Da F
[3051]32 CRA att a ts — 76.6 a
[3053]*Please furnish HOS Fi
[3055]Boa _ ; - 3 hea Bae 18
[3056]“Chase serene 7. — | pesmaten $1680 Bow - Ton ART RE
[3057]UFGA-28893 31 March 66
[3058]GASSFGATON SP SE RE MOE a
[3059]SECRET « | .
[3061]meee mae
[3063]SETAE 2a Pot I tee ue PR  RUROY ee ce  ee ReE ee e cae
[3065]o
[3066]Sy oe
[3067]a . . ‘
[3068]. “ SECRET ‘
[3069]To witle
[3070]'U/se att JA to | |
[3071]UFGA-24893
[3072]IDENTITIES; A, Christian Democratic Party
[3073]B. Alfredo Lorca
[3074]C. Jorge Roman
[3075]GALLE
[3076]Ercleees tro automate
[3079]SECRET yn
[3080]£3 Guey
[3081]S “lo. a 4
[3086]. Cad
[3087]SEAS JOS 0 Vala Gia ioe”
[3088]1 2 | "ada
[3089]Marzo 15 de 19660. QDR NDS
[3090]Phe awe NAN
[3091]WO Lae TRMIISIUE STARA A BA a ok
[3095]cepia literal del discurso pronuncia-
[3097]el
[3099]Después de leer una
[3100]t en la escalinata de la Universidad de La Habana,
[3102]do por Castro,
[3103]pasaco 13 de marzo, me considero obligado con el Gobierno, el Par-
[3104]taco Demécrata Cristiano y el pueblo chileno, que fueron innoble-
[3105]mente atacados por Castro durante el transcurso de su alocuci6n, a
[3106]expresar mi opini6n con relacian a dicha ofensa.
[3108]Digo obligadc, porque el hecho de ser demécratacristiano
[3109]cubano, integrante de esa gran comunidad de seres humanos que un
[3111]ifa se dieron a la tarea de realizar una revoluci6én en libertad y
[3112]gue lamentablemente vieron tronchadas sus aspiraciones al compro-
[3113]bar que las mismas eran ahogaéas por la sangre vertida en los pa-
[3114]redones de fusilamientos por hérces como Porfirio Ramirez, Presi-
[3115]Gente de la FEU de la provincia de Las Villas en Cuba y el Dr. Hum
[3116]bexrto Sori Marfn, Comandante éel Sjéreito Rebelde y autor de la
[3117]Ley de Reforma Agraria: debe servirme de experiencia para
[3118]ar lo que pienso decir a través de estas lineas. Digo obli-
[3119]porque en igual forma que nosotros hemos pedido en milti-
[3121]Po]
[3123]ples oportunidades, colaboracidn y solidaridad con nuestra lucha,
[3124]solicitud que lamentablemente no ha sido respondida por algunos,
[3126]prensiss con el "proceso revolucionario" que se est4 llevando a
[3128]cabo on Cuba, no queremos que an esta oportunidad en qua son los
[3129]NDS
[3131]eros Chilenos los que necesitan Ge nuestra solidaridad, va~
[3133]yamos a encontrar a alguien que por desconocimiento, no se decida
[3134]X respaldar péblicanente al Gobierno, Partido y pueblo-de Chile
[3135]cfvica y valiente adoptada frente a las ofensas ex-
[3141]das por “Castro durante su discurso,
[3143]cribimos las siguientes: "A decir verdad, siempre he cceido que
[3144]Frei es un representante de la burguesfa chilena, que su gobier-
[3145]no es un gobierno de la burguesfa. Jam&s he creido que Frei vaya
[3147]a Racer ninguna revoluci6én".... posteriormente, al referirse a
[3149]los Sucesos provocados por los comunistas en la mina de cobre del”
[3151]Marie Fr
[3153]ari rei ha cemostrado con este hecho, no ser un individuo de
[3154]mano ‘irme, sind un individuo (‘cobarde, que abusa del poder,......
[3157]14-0000
[3159]o's . + ‘ . vo , 27 a = . - web
[3160]a
[3162]we ‘ : to ae ce “ . ; :
[3163]# te Freilha démostrado ser un mentiroso. Frei ha demostrado ser tun pe~ |
[3164]os litiq:ero vulgar que para justificar su saAguinario gesto, trata {
[3165].*. de culpar a°la Tri-Continental. Frei se desenmasgeata. Frei demues- - iz
[3167]eb... fa, Fa al ‘pueblo.de Chile y al mundo qué tipo de revolucign es la
[3169]aa of . ue va a hacer,.qué tipo de gobierno es ‘el que.va a llevar adelan-
[3170]7 “7° t@. Es decir, no una revolucién sin Sangre, sin6.una pol{tica de’.
[3172]"| |" Sangre sin-revoluci6n; sangre sin revoluci6n, esa es la polftica
[3174]: Ce Frei,.sangré.sin revolucién, ese es el gobierno de Frei, sangre
[3176]‘sin revolucién, esa es la polftica de la Alianza -para el -Progreso*.
[3179]j ; _ Después de estas expresiones, no podemos menos que salirle = j
[3180]edd cee, al ‘paso a Castro y a la camarilla qué desgobierna hoy a Cuba, e ©
[3181]: instar y pedir mayor colaboracién ‘con los patriotas que hoy ofren-
[3182]; “Gan sus vidas por liberar a Cuba, a fin de evitar no solo la con-
[3183]: tinuada masacre de cubanos que se lleva a cabo en la Isla, -sino
[3184]; ; tambien. ponerle’ fin a todos estos incidentes bochorhosos para la
[3185]ie : historia, en los que aparece un cubano, ofendiéndo publicamente
[3186]ante el. mundo_a.un Presidente, a un Partido y’a un pueblo que a
[3187]contrario sensus de lo que 61 esta haciendo en Cuba, sf est4 rea-
[3188]lizando una revoluci6én en libertad, s{ ha defendido en todo momen
[3189]to el sano nacionalismo, s{ se ha puesto de frente cuantas veces
[3190]las circunstancias lo han requerido a los’ oligarcas y explotado-
[3193]Para’ terminar, s6lo me queda reiterarle, que en nombre de
[3194]la solidaridad que une a todos los dem6cratacristianos, exprese
[3195]pablicamente, su deséo de colaborar con la lucha que mantiene el
[3197]‘pueblo cubano por derrocar al castrocomunismo y poder realizar en
[3198]Cuba, una verdadera revolucién en libertad, asf como su xespaldo
[3199]ala actitud asumida por el Gobierno, el Partido Demécrata Cris-
[3201]tiano y el pueblo chileno-en los actuales momentos,
[3203]SMe ee tes ene me Rhee ae eg Baad Say
[3205]oe : ' Pendiente de su_atencién y respuesta y dejando constancia
[3206]‘@e mi mayor consideracién, quedo suyo “
[3208]be
[3210]i - Corddalmente,
[3212]: . X
[3213]or . . So : . : Sil
[3214]ro. : ot . ODS) oj
[3215]i a)
[3216]| Ernesto ‘Rodriguez
[3218]; 7 ; . Sec. de Relaciones/T ternacionales del
[3219]a " : MDC Cuba
[3222]14.99000
[3224]thwnte a
[3226]TRESS ore ado oO nee une ea HY
[3228]. AS
[3230]i
[3233]PUVERTUS: 222 seauraca lst 14M be cus. no - - 7 | .
[3234]1732 We. Tun Sty ,
[3235]wad, FUL U. ‘. A - . + Miami, “Marzo 17 de 1966
[3238]'
[3239]L
[3240]Pye
[3243]Estimaco cozipafiero: . .
[3244]La JDC de Cuba, fiel al pensamiento de nuestro Apostol
[3245]Jos6 Mastf{ que.dice:“ver en silencio un -crimen es cometerlo”, no
[3246]ha queziéo marginarse del dato que Castro quicre hacerle a la
[3247]_ Revolucign en Libertad, que estd realizando el Presidente Eduar-
[3248]‘Go Frei, su Gobierno y el Partido Demécrata Cristiano de Chile. |
[3249]Consciente de que es posible que no te hayan llegado
[3250]muchas galas informaciones relacionadas con los innobles ata-
[3251]ques pfblicos de Castro a Frei y su Gobierno, ‘calificdndo al Pre
[3252]sidencte de “representante de la burguesf{a chilena", "reaccionario’
[3253]“mimado del imperialismo yanqui y guardian de sus intereses en
[3254]Chile".....etc. Hemos. querido comunicarte, no s6lo los ataques de
[3255]Castro a Frei, sino una de las muchas respuestas que se le’ han.
[3256]Gado & castro. Nos referimos a la que en dias pasadds hiciera el
[3257]“Diputsce Dem6crata-Cristiano Chileno, Alfredo Lorea y que a con~
[3258]tinuaciSa sranseribimos “Realmente, Fidel Castro es un caso dig-
[3259]mo de andlisis. Hace pocos dias atr&s, segGén expresaron @iputa-
[3260]é€os que estuvieron en Cuba, Castro dijo que Frei era un gran Pre-
[3261]sidente. agregd que si el hubiera estado en Chile, habrf{a hecho
[3262]lo mismo cue Frei, :
[3263]Pero ahora, porque se le ha tocade la epidermis ‘dela
[3264]Tri-Ceontinental, Frei se transforma en un Castro Cualquiera,.
[3265]Yo-estuve en Cuba -afiacdi6é Lorca- en 1959 cuando Castro
[3266]subi6é si poder,-En esa ocasi6n le pregunté al ver a tantos hom--
[3267]armados, si pensaba reorganizar al ejército. Y 61 me contes-
[3268]t6, con ese modo tan tropical: “chico, armas para qué cuando se.
[3269]tiene al pueblo", |
[3270]7 Sin embargo, -afladi6. Lorea- en los siete afos gue Fidel
[3271]ene al pueblo detras de 61, anda mds armhado que un militar en
[3273]ty
[3274]4
[3275]0
[3277]a]
[3279]i
[3280]plena guerra. En Chile, todos los Presidentes que yo recuerdo, los
[3281]Co , V2;
[3282]Ccta dal manana, . . rs Semocrata- Cristiana
[3284]14-0000
[3286]Wy tee xe
[3288]Moet cage
[3291]i
[3292]i
[3293]i
[3295]integrs, puro y extremadamente justo",
[3297]. .. *2 . : :
[3298]; . oo “et . °
[3299]radi cates, el Sr. Thsiter,. el St. Alessandri, ci ‘propio Sr. Froi,
[3300]hea rvecsrrido todo el pais sin gendarme, ni pistoleros a sueldo
[3301]como dius que ugilica Castro. —_
[3305]- No se puede dacir que Frei sea un cobarde, un “ment iroso -
[3306]Youn 6Gspota como Fidel Castro afirma - anadié Lorca- . En cambio
[3307]1 ests resguarcacs por metralletas y no pucde dormir, ni se le”
[3308]conoée zomicilio rijo porque los hijos de logs muertos en ol pare-
[3310]-@6n le Suscan. Adends ~puntualiz6 Lorca- vale la pena, destacar que
[3312]nadie sc ha-ido de Chile. En cambio, es ptiblico y notcrio que mas
[3313]ee 206 G20 personas han huido del paraiso fidelista. Y ma atrevo. ,
[3314]a pen2:r que si Fidel Castro diera libertad a quienes quieren irs
[3316].8e de Coda, se quedarfa-solo con sus barbas y su hermano: Radl,
[3318]Camilo Cienfuegés ya no ést4. Dicen que se cayé de un avién.
[3319]‘Pinalmente, Lorea recordé el caso del que fuera Presiden-
[3321]te ‘ee 06 tribunales populares de Cuba, Sorf Marf{n."Es un. hombre *
[3322]decf{a Castro de 61. “Estoy
[3324]porgue
[3326]sSegure cze nOnea condenarfa‘a quien no mereciera la pena de muer-
[3330]te". Si. obstante una mafana amaneci6 de mal genio.y el Sr. Sort
[3331]Marin convirti$ en un agente de la Central de Inteligencia de
[3332]los Es722dos Unidos. Resultado: hizo fusilar a ese hombre puro,
[3334]{Integrs y justo."
[3336]Estas palabras, expuestas por el Diputado D.c. Alfredo
[3337]Lorca, sefalando algunas de las muchas contradicciones de Castro,
[3338]ratizigea una vez mis lo que la JDC de Cuba a través de sus di- —
[3339]2, le ha venido diciendo a toda la juventud demécrutacris~
[3340]ae América y que hoy, con m4s fuerza y moral’ que niinca nos
[3341]pedirte en nombre de la solidaridad que nos une, que ex-=
[3342]blicamente tu respaldo a la Revolucién en Libertad que
[3343]lizando el Pueblo, Gobierno y Partido Demécrata Cristia
[3344]ale as{ como tu golaboracién a la lucha que mantiene el
[3346]riger.t
[3348]permite
[3349]pongas
[3352]Consciente de que nuestra. solicitud sera escuchada por
[3353]tf, y Seguros de que nos dar4s a conocer la atencion que has de
[3354]_Prestazle, quedo a tu entera disposicién
[3356]oa om an!
[3358]AD Cpe pee Oe
[3361]ot _ Jesas Angulo
[3362]; _ Presidente de la JDC de Cuba
[3364]a
[3366]14-00000
[3368]f
[3370]iwoeae Cy ees Dono : . RB }
[3371]_ CLASSIFIED Me JSAGE : TOTS. COP LES 3
[3373]CLASSIFY TO FIRE Ne.
[3374]ReREP TO PERE NOL
[3375]gare ain) ocr. to ozasce (J
[3376]cestooy (J sic.
[3378]Aovance Copy
[3380]— Oscars Diroree Chive
[3381]ial varia, eae, walenoe, cnlo4, Fueihwr, ciloa, ahez
[3383]Te . ~ 7
[3384]. 7 J, 2” Co
[3385]= ice =“ ae
[3386]SECRET 0422502 ( Aeiey Ame a, C hala
[3388]DIR INFO LIMA QUITO CITE: WAVE 9231 CINGHURST ACTING) CL
[3390]TYPIC ANMOP
[3392]REF A DIR 75895 #
[3394]B WAVE sosa(¥ 517° 7G
[3395]ANCRIB-1 ADVISED BY IDEN A THAT REF A LIMA CONFERENCE
[3397]Wa .82790
[3399]te
[3400]SCHEDULED FOR 23-26 APRIL, PRECEDED BY YOUTH SEMINAR 15-22 APRIL.
[3402]2. AMCRIB-1 HOPES OBTAIN TICKET THRU EFFORTS OF IDEN Bo
[3403]IF NOT SUCCESSFUL, STATION PLANS FINANCE AMCRIB-1 TRIP TO ;
[3404]ATTEND ROTH MEETINGS UNLESS ADVISED CONTRARY. é
[3405]3, AMMOP INVITED IDEN C, 201-749991, FORMER WAVE ASSET
[3406]WORKING IN QUITO, ATTEND REF CONFERENCE AS MEMBER AMMOP DELE-
[3407]GATION. IF IDEN C ATTENDS, WILL PAY OWN WAY,
[3408]4. PLS NOTE AMCRIB-1@ OF REF B SHOULD BE AMCRIB~1.
[3410]SECRET *asenen SHEesTIAN DEMOCRATIC OCNGKESS Scnzoied Usain
[3413]CFN @031 15895 523.4 AMCRIB~1 A A 23=26 APRIL 15-22 APRIL AMCRI3-1
[3415]B NOT SUCCESSFUL AMCRIB-1 AMMOP C 281-749991 AMMOP C AMNCRIB-19
[3417]B AMCRIB-1 near
[3418]SECitE
[3420]BT
[3422]14-0000
[3424]-weREP TO FILE WO,
[3426]~ |
[3428]woerr Oves Ono wey
[3429]{ CLASSIFIED MESSAGE”
[3431]CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
[3432][26 SECRET TREES
[3434]PERSON UNIT ROTIFITO
[3436]ere avo) eer. 10 sosuce O
[3437]oestioy Oaie.
[3439]AOVANCE COPY .
[3440]vs! RD COPY CD issees Charerres O)ruseo
[3442]SECRET 242232 . . RO
[3444]DIP INFO LIMA QUIT CITE WAVE 0032 ecg NN tats. 99798
[3446]TYPIC 4MMOP \
[3448]REF WAVE 923 I(ta/ ¥ 7720)
[3449]IDEN A. UTUOC
[3450]IDEN B. JULIO MONEAGATTA, JUDCA SECY. GEN.
[3451]ENC, JOSE M. ILLAN
[3453]SECRET
[3455]CFN 9832 O231 A UIJDOC B JULIO MONEAGATTA JUDCA SECY GEN ¢
[3457]JOSE M ILLAN
[3459]8T
[3461]14-00000 ' 1 . Po . Nm re we -
[3462]i i . ° a
[3463]ane
[3464]4
[3465]4 -
[3466]‘ 7 ; . — . -
[3467]. —— = =.
[3468]% REPORT COVER SHEET “SECRET OP vy erceessing scr ion
[3470]. qrese Noe aa a “Teaver sneer
[3471]: WACKED FOR INCERIEG -
[3472]: “leat oF Sacroet -— NO ISTEXING ACQUIRED
[3473]. 1 | 15_ February 1966 . ors Cata mePORTED SUP ARATELY
[3475]- a i . . . des DISSEMINATION .
[3476]‘alt ' “[souace “caver remem wanes Cee rt a
[3477]T TLON
[3478]ik -AVOT- 245 . ect OISSEMINATLO
[3479]\. Io FIELO DISTRIBUTION |.
[3480]he ~ERTRAS AGENCY
[3481]fp. -
[3482]il | 2.- Caracas | — .
[3483]| | 2-Lima . ae + ue
[3484]be 2 - Santiago Ms Tt .USCG
[3485]i 1. 2) - Bogota . : -
[3486]i, ; SUPPLEWENTAL DATA Sout foo
[3487]i ae .
[3488]Hi Jt .
[3489]iL, TYPIC Le
[3490]{ x .
[3491]7 | SOURCE: anor- 245. in DD-1768, 11 February 1966. Field Comment 2
[3492]yoyo. |p was received from AMCRIB-10, "orally, on 14 February.
[3493]| |. RID: No Index
[3494]Vd : .
[3495]1 y: .
[3496]i :
[3497]He i .
[3498]Pt . .
[3499]1 af —
[3500]J Group 1: Excluded from
[3501]' ' Automatic Downgrading:
[3502]and Declassification ’
[3503]ye i .
[3504]| |
[3506]- J 4
[3507]ohr,
[3508]fe |
[3509]M4 |
[3510]|
[3511]Wy SSS AWG7 Eee ;
[3512]They ' : ERTTHONS
[3513]i ‘ r
[3514]yad '
[3516]4
[3518]i
[3519]i i
[3520]toa i
[3521]|
[3524]1400000
[3526]’ COUNTRY
[3527]yore
[3529]SUBJECT
[3531]' DATE: ACO.
[3533]4
[3535]be
[3536]i
[3537]Hl
[3539]“GRADING OF SOURCE: A: Comencey,revigtis 8: Umut reliable.
[3541]. to soi
[3543]‘wources).
[3545]1. 84 to 27 February 1966 "ROPAGES 0D.
[3547], REFERENCES
[3548]care OF Barly February 1966 ,
[3549]PLACE & .. United States, Miani _ UFG-7960
[3553]Field Comments;
[3555]1.
[3557]4 2.
[3559]res of doubitul honesty or <aeily. regardless 41 mar ceinpetence).
[3561]SALOF CONTENT: 1: Condemed ty other indapennart ara reviapie sources. Piytably true” 2:-Poisibly true. & Dowtttud Probably: ”
[3562]aa & Cannot be judged, ” 5 - a :
[3564]Cuba
[3566]Christian Desocratic Hovemont
[3567]to Hold Congress in Hiani,
[3569](7_to 14 Febru
[3571]“THIS WS UNEVALUATED INPORMaTION SOURCE GRADIN
[3573]_A member of a group of Cuban emigres-trained in the techniques
[3574]of information collection.
[3575]reports since 1961.
[3577]"- whe Moviniento Democrata Cristiano (UDC, ‘Christian Democratic:
[3578]a Movement) in Miami will hold a congress from 24 to 37
[3579]“a 1966.
[3580]| ~-enile, Colombia, and Germany will attend the congress,
[3582]2. “The HDC is preparing to hold elections for positions en the
[3583]executive comnittes. : . .
[3585]_-invitations had been extended to delegations From these
[3587]. from Peru, which only acknowledged receipt of the invitation,
[3589]a
[3592]Gi Feiete peer'e, © G& Not ususty rovoble, E: NM petiage—. (Apotied
[3593]fF; Rehazoy cannot be judged Apphed to uatestes o Favtheientty
[3597]REPORT NO, 0 PR eA
[3599]DATE CF REPORT 15. February 1966
[3601]1965:
[3603]OR ARE DEFINITIVE, APPAAIBAL OF CONTENT 18 TENTATIVE.
[3605]The group has provided useful
[3607]February —
[3608]Delegations of Christian Democrats fron Venezugla, Peru,
[3610]‘The Bighth ‘National Congress of the MDC was held in Miami
[3611]from 19 to 21 February 1965. Delegations from Puerto Rico .
[3612]‘and Mexico attended. ' (Cf, CSDB-312,/007 90-65) :
[3613]Another: source, who is a member of the MDC,’ reported that . 7
[3615]countries, but that no replies have been received, except
[3617]CONFIDENTIAL
[3618]CONTROLLED DISSEH‘
[3619]HO DISSEM ABROAD