[1]157-10011-10018 | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
[3]Date:08/15/92
[4]Page:1
[5]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[7]L IDENTIFICATION FORM
[9]AGENCY INFORMATION
[11]AGENCY : SSCIA
[12]RECORD NUMBER : 157-10011-10018
[14]RECORDS SERIES :
[16]AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
[18]ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
[19]FROM :
[20]TO :
[22]TITLE
[23]SSCI TRANSCRIPT DATED JUNE 11, 1975, TESTIMONY OF RICHARD M. BISSELL
[25]DATE : 06/11/75
[26]PAGES :; 135
[28]SUBJECTS :
[29]PTRANSCRIPT, TESTIMONY OF RICHARD M. BISSELL
[31]DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[32]CLASSIFICATION : T
[33]RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
[34]CURRENT STATUS : P
[35]DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/29/93 wrap
[37]OPENING CRITERIA :
[39]COMMENTS
[40]SSCI Box 231, Folder 5,. Testimony of Richard Bissell
[42][R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED
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[50]g 1 to reactivate the operation, to renew the attempt, until
[51]g
[52]. 2 after I had left the Agency, which was in February 1962.
[53]E 3 Senator Mondale. Now, you say you discussed probably
[54]2 4 with Bundy and Rostow the capability in developing more
[55]5 capability of assassinations. And you may have discussed
[56]6 | it in the context -of various potential targets! without
[57]9 | deciding on them. Once you decided on a target, or you were
[58]8 going to recommend a target, what was the process of getting
[59]9 clearance?
[60]|
[61]10 Mr. Bissell. I can't answer you that, simply because
[62]11 no specific target was ever recommended. And to the best
[63]12 of my knowledge and belief, other than the case we have discussed
[65]13 at length of Castro, which in time preceded the SRRIFLE pro-
[67]WARD & PAUL
[69]14 ject. The issue of obtaining clearance never ‘arose. I
[71]can speculate on how that would have worked if you wish.
[73]15
[74]16 Senator Mondale. No.
[75]“a9 The Chairman. Let's go ahead then with the questions.
[76]18 Mr. Schwarz. Senator Baker asked, did Helms succeed you?
[77]. 19 Mr. Bissell. That is correct.
[78]: 20 Mr. Schwarz. ‘pid you turn over SRRIFLE to him and
[79]: 21 did you tell him about it? |
[80]; 22 Mr. Bissell. I believe I did. And I also believe
[81]7 23 that Mr. Harvey told him about it promptly after the turnover.
[82]QP: 24 Mr. Schwarz. Do you Know a man called (Gasein O'Sonnel 3
[83]: 25 Mr. Bissell. Yes, I do. i
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[139]Mr. Schwarz. Did you ask him in words or /substance to
[141]kill Mr. Lumumba?
[143]Mr. Bissell. I asked him to investigate the possibility
[145]and to make explanation for so doing.
[147]Mr. Schwarz. When did you do that?
[149]Mr. Bissell. I don't remember the date of that. I may
[151]have it on a chronology here, but I imagine that is a matter
[153]of record, or that he has testified to that date. I don't
[155]remember the date.
[156]Mr .Schwarz.
[158]making plans to go
[159]Mr. Bissell.
[160]Mr. Schwarz.
[161]Mr. Bissell.
[163]do it. But he also
[165]priate action, and
[167]plished better in other ways.
[169]Mr. Schwarz.
[171]Did you tell him this connection with
[173]see
[175]I think I probably did.
[177]the passer of the poison, Mr. Gottlieb?
[179]Did he tell you he wouldn't do it?
[181]Later he told me that he didn't want to
[183]said that he thought it was jan inappro-
[185]that the desired object could be accom-
[187]Who authorized you to tell
[189]Mr.
[193]to take steps: to move toward assassinating Mr. 'Lumumba?
[195], Mr. Bissell. Nobody.
[197]Mr. Schwarz.
[198]Mr. Bissell.
[200]Mr. Schwarz.
[202]Did you inform the White House of that?
[204]No.
[206]To
[208]inform the White House
[210]Mr. Bissell.
[212]To
[214]the best of your knowledge, did anybody
[216]of that?
[218]the best of my knowledge, no.
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[269]Mr. Schwarz. Why did you seek to assassi
[270]Lumumba?
[271]Mr. Bissell. I didn't seek to assassinat
[273]told a member of the clandestine service to mak
[275]develop the capability so to do if it were appr
[276]ordered.
[277]Senator Goldwater. Approved by who?
[279]‘Mr. Bissell. It would have then had to h
[281]at the highest level of government.
[283]The Chairman. Where did the idea come from?
[285]Mr. Bissell. I don't remember, Mr. Chairm
[286]possibly have been mine.
[287]The Chairman. It could possibly have been
[288]Mr. Schwarz. Did you tell Rostow that was
[289]Mr. Bissell. I told him that the instruc
[290]J was my initiative.
[291]Senator Baker. How many others did you pl
[293]as a contingency?
[295]to,.assassinate?
[297]Mr: Bissell. I don't believe there were any others which °
[299]went to the point of instructing that a man be |
[301]Senator Baker. How many were there that d
[302]far? How many murders did you contemplate?
[304]Mr. Biseéll. Well, Senator --
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[311]nate Mr.
[312]e him. I
[314]e plans and
[316]oeved and
[318]ave approval
[320]an. It could
[321]yours?
[322]. your initiativ
[324]tion as to
[326]an on, just
[328]_” How many other people did you instruct to draw up plans
[330]prepared.
[332]idn't go that
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[376]quoting a cable concerning the asset WIROGUE, who was sent
[378]to the Congo in the fall of 1960.
[379]The Chairman. Mr. Bissell, the memorandum to which
[381]counsel has referred reads as follows:
[383]"In recommending the agent or asset ROGUE
[385]Station, Leopoldville, the Chief of the Agency's African
[387]Division, probably Bronson Tweedy, wrote in late 1960:
[389]‘He is indeed aware of the precepts of right and wrong,
[390]but if he is given an assignment, which may be orally wrong
[391]in the eyes of the world,but necessary because his case offi-
[392]cer ordered him to carry it out, then it is right, and he
[393]will dutifully undertake appropriate action for its execution
[394]without pangs of conscience. In a word, he can rationalize
[395]all actions'”".
[397]Is that fairly representative of the philosophy that
[398]applied to such matters at the time?
[400]Mr. Bissell. Well, it certainly applied within the
[401]range of matters that would have come under SRRIFLE.
[403]Could I. say, Mr. Chairman, that I know of no way in
[405]which it is possible to operate a secret intelligence agency
[406]or a secret service unless it has at least a number of
[407]employees who are willing to and can be depended upon to
[409]carry out orders involving acts of this sort.
[411]The Chairman. That assumes, of course, ithat the
[413]United States ought to assassinate foreign leaders.
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[463]61
[465]meant to suggest that that was entirely comparable?
[467]Mr. Bissell. It was not meant to sugges
[469]t that it was
[471]entirely comparable, but the individual whom I have mentioned
[473]were all perceived in their time and place as menaces to
[475]their own countries and the U.S. interests.
[477]Senator Goldwater. Might I ask a question based on his
[479]experience?
[480]From my readings in trying to learn more
[481]gence, I gathered the impression that the actio
[483]you have been describing up to and including as
[485]are practiced by every intelligence organization that I have
[487]been studying, is that correct?
[488]Mr. Bissell. That is my impression likewi
[489]Senator Goldwater. Including/:Erganad?
[490]we. Bissell. I believe so. In fact, I
[491]it has been used [by Ming. I couldn't give you
[493]cases.
[495]Senator Goldwater. Certainly KGB.
[497]about intelli-
[498]ns such as
[500]sassination,
[502]se, Senator.
[504]think =—
[506]specific
[508]Mr. Bissell. Certainly the KGB -- althoug
[509]man pointed out the other day, I at least canno
[510]any case where the KGB has carried out the assa
[512]a chief of state.
[514]Senator Goldwater. Would you assume that
[516]of those other countries that this ruler would)
[518]of this in every case?
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[522]h as, the Chair
[524]t point to
[526]in the cases
[528]ssination of
[529]have knowledge
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[578]Mb. Bissell. In the case specifically of the Ook. |
[579]I would answer in the affirmative. I also believe, however,
[580]that the Chief of the Intelligence Service of any one of those
[581]countries would flatly deny that the chief of state had
[582]knowledge of such action.
[584]Senator Goldwater. Thank you.
[586]Senator Baker. Would you deny it?
[588]Mr. Bissell. In our case here?:
[590]Senator Baker. Yes, sir.
[591]Mr. Bissell. Yes, it would be appropriate. to do so.
[592]Senator Baker. Have you done so? .
[593]Mr. Bissell. I have not had occasion to,| because I am
[594]unaware of any high level assassination that occurred by
[595]the U.S. '
[596]Senator Baker. Doesn't that amount to a denial?
[597]Mr. Bissell, It is a denial that any has occurred,
[598]at least in the period that I am aware of.
[600]Mr. Schwarz. Was your answer to Senator Baker meant to
[601]. 1
[603]indicate that you would perjure yourself on this matter?
[604]|
[606]Mr. Bissell. It depends a little bit on the context.
[608]There are occasions when I would go a tong way |to protect the
[610]President of the United States from certain kinds of embarrass~
[613]i
[615]ment. |
[617]Senator Baker. . The question was, very simply, would
[619]i
[622]you try to protect the President in such a case as you des-
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[672]63
[674]eribed,(MI6 or otherwise?
[676]Mr.Bissell. I can conceive of so doing, |Senator.
[678]Senator Tower. May I pursue that just a moment further?
[679]You might say one thing in sworn testimony before a
[681]committee like this, but say another thing publicly, is that
[683]what you mean?
[685]Mr. Bissell. That is exactly what I mean.
[687]The Chairman. Have you lied to this committee?
[689]t
[692]Mr. Bissell. No, sir.
[693]The Chairman. Would you lie to this committee?
[694]Mr. Bissell. No, sir.
[695].Senator Tower. I think that distinction/has tocbe made.
[696]I think I would have lied about the U-2 myself!
[697]The Chairman. Shall we proceed with the questions?
[698]Mr. Schwarz. The remaining topic I have is Trujillo.
[700]It is respectfully indicated, and involves a lot of documents.
[702]And we have some procedural matters that we need to take up.
[704]I know we can't finish Trujillo before 12:30, and I would
[705]suggest that. we ask the witness and whatever Senators that
[706]can return to. come back this afternoon on Trujillo.
[708]The Chairman. We have a -Senate order that there will
[709]be no further committee meetings this afternoon.
[711]I doubt that we can obtain unanimous consent.
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[750]almost any kind of paramilitary operation, such’ as the
[752]Rcvatantaitan operation, the Bay of Pigs itself is, the earlier
[754]operation that has been discussed in the press (in ¥ugan,
[756]mater gs Rangia : helt A ey care aT yy pe Le Te
[757]Whihehpreswiitedihbn: the oust eigmoiig Se
[758]( SHShE there is an expectation that such operations will involv
[760]military or semimilitary action, and that some [people will los
[762]1
[763]1
[765]their lives in the process.
[766]Senator Baker. Yes, but I am speaking rather more
[767]precisely of a single person or a group of people who were
[768]targeted, or discussions were held about. targeting ..them, for
[769]what would be an assassination were it not for the legal.
[770]Significance of the. term.
[771]Mr. Bissell. I don't think I remember any cases in
[772]which that sort of matter was discussed or was |the subject
[773]of planning, other than the ones which have already been
[774]mentioned in testimony.
[775]Senator Mathias. Could I interject a question at this
[776]point.
[777]But of course that contemplates what we have seen in
[778]the. earlier testimony, that when you begin an operation -—
[779]and I think. this was the history of the Castro/operation --
[780]to in some way incompacitate him politically, that it often
[781]moves to the extreme of incapacitating him physically, isn't
[782]that true?
[784]Mr. Bissell. That is correct, sir.
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[819]AFTERNOON SESSION we
[821]TESTIMONY OF RICHARD M. BISSELL (CON'D)
[822]The Chairman. The hearing will come to order.
[823]Mr. Schwarz will commence the questioning.
[825]It will be understood that the oath still continues to
[827]apply.
[829]Mr. Schwarz. Before we turn to Trujillo, | two quick
[831]Mr. Bissell. I have no recollection of that.
[832]Mr. Schwarz. And if I took out any of the details and
[833]broke it apart you would have no recollection?
[835]Mr. Bissell. I am afraid not.
[837]M. Schwarz. And the second thing, to pin down on Mr.
[838]Helms 'y did’ you brief. him about the Mafia matter?
[840]Met “Bissell. I am reasonably clear that t did not brief |-
[841]him-in’ “the. early stages, that is to say, in 1960. And my
[842]impression is that he may very well not have been briefed on i
[843]until I was about to leave the Agency in early 1962.
[845]Mr. Schwarz. But at that point you did brief him?.:?
[847]|
[848]“Mr. Bissell. I don't remember whether I personally
[849]|
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[898]they might eventually be so used.
[900]Mr. Schwarz. Is that a supposition, or is it based upon
[901]any recollection? |
[903]Mr. Bissell. I would say it is a faint recollection.
[904]But I find it very difficult in this case to distinguish
[905]between an element of supposition and a dim recollection.
[907]Let me come to what I seem to remember about this matter,
[909]There was, as you have already indicated, several discussions
[911]in the Special Group, and one or more at least in other very
[912]small groups with representation from State, the White House
[913]and the Agency. And I am clear -- I do recollect that the
[914]plans at that time contemplated the arming of opviously a
[915]relatively small group inside the Dominican Republic, that is,
[916]the provision of arms perhaps for a dozen or so| people, but
[917]not for something like a Bay of Pigs invasion or a major
[918]geurilla activity.
[920]Now, in discussing that kind of an operation, I am
[921]perfectly certain that everyone that participated in the
[922]discussion was clear that weapons so supplied might very well
[923]be used against Trujillo or other senior supporters of his.
[925]Mr. Schwarz. For how many countries in your experience
[926]at the CIA has the US Government supplied arms to dissident
[927]gréaps within the country? |
[929]Mr. Bissell. Well, we have talked about two cases;
[931]|
[932]is another casé during the time I was’ in the Agency,
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[941]8 1 or before I was DDP. Off hand I can't remember, other cases,
[943]2 but there may have been some, Well, earlier before I was ever
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[946]t
[948]3 in the Agency, there was [the: cas And there was the
[949]4 reasonably well publicized case (Gf Guatama la. |
[951]5 Mr. Schwarz. And the Iron Curtain countries?
[953]6 Mr. Bissell. I think we have.
[955]9 | Mr. Schwarz. But what I am driving at, it is fairly
[956]8 common to supply arms to dissident:.elements in countries all
[958]9 over the world? :
[960]10 Mr. Bissell. Yes, that is correct.
[962]11 Mr. Schwarz. Does taht also imply that there is an *
[963]12 assassination contemplated or not?
[965]13 Mr. Bissell. I would say definitely not, in most cases
[968]i
[970](GGatamailay there was
[973]a
[974]a
[975]a
[978]3
[980]14 not. In a large scale operation like
[981]15 no intention of any assassination. I think you) would include
[982]16 it under that term.
[983]7 The same is trueliinpieecantof course -- the| possibility
[984]18 that a chief of state would be killed.
[985]. 19 ; The Chairman. But you would distinguish this matter fro
[986]: 20 just supplying of arms to dissidents? [In other words, there
[987]F 21 was an element of knowledge here that the arms were supplied
[988]i 29 for a purpose, and that that purpose might well be the assassi
[989]: 23 nation of Trujillo or other highly Placed people in this
[990]; 24 Government, correct?
[991]_ 25 Mr. Bissell. The way I would prefer to state it, Senatoz,
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[1000]2
[1003]1 ‘I think is basically consistent with what you said. I would
[1004]3 2 say that in the planning of this operation, and in the approva
[1005]sn
[1006]i 3 process, those involved would probably have given a higher
[1007]E 4 probability to such use being made of the weapons than they
[1008]5 would in some of the other operations that I have referred to.
[1009]6 Mr. Schwarz. However, just focusing on the Special
[1010]” | Group as of the 12th of January, you can't tell from the
[1011]8 minutes which state of mind existed, but you have a faint
[1012]9 recollection that the more targeted state of mind existed as of
[1014]10 the 12th of January?
[1016]11 Mr. Bissell. My impression is that as of that time, as”
[1017]12 I mentioned at the end of the testimony this morning, the
[1018]13 reason that the State Department, and probably the Agency's
[1019]14 representatives in the Special Group, favored this group was
[1020]15 a pragmatic reason. It was to maintain and strengthen political
[1021]16 ties with the dissidents:
[1022]1 Mr. Schwarz. The next matter of record that we should
[1023]18 focus on is a memorandum of January 25, 1961, apparently
[1025]. 19 reflecting a discussion of FexonlecetEMDEED . Was §EMDEED the
[1027]é 20 code for the overthrow of Trujillo? . |
[1029]F 21 Mr. Bissell. I suspect it was the code name for the -
[1031]i 20 project of support to the dissidents.
[1033]: 2% Mr. Schwarz. Do you remember the name(\'E
[1035]ss 24 I show you the memorandum of January 24, 1961 headed
[1037]: 25 "Discussion of Project EMDEED]." Does it appear to be a
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[1089]TOP SECRET | 107
[1091]and this record, which is a record we have obtained from
[1093]the Agency, may be unfair to you. But do you not agree
[1095]that on this record it appears that on the item of the pass-
[1097]ing of the weapons which were the weapons that were in fact
[1098]used, it appears that the AGency elected to keep the State
[1099]Department uninformed on that item? _
[1101]Mr. Bissell. No, sir, it does not quite appear that way.
[1102]It appears -- if I put these two together --
[1104]'
[1106]Mr. Schwarz. By these two you mean your: cable of March
[1108]24 and the cable of May 1 relating to certain matters is
[1109]foo a
[1111]not to be discussed with the State Department?
[1113]Mr. Bissell. Yes. The earlier cable of those refers to
[1115]machine guns. . ,
[1117]|
[1119]Mr. Schwarz. And to the pouching of revolvers? i
[1121]I
[1122]i
[1124]Mr. Bissell. And the pouching of revolvers. And
[1126]I believe that '~ what ‘eventually passed to the dissidents
[1127]were three rifles, not the revolvers. And, therefore, neither
[1129]of these cables in fact refers to the passage to the dissi-
[1131]y .
[1133]This cable states the conditional willingness at some
[1134]time in the future to pass machine guns. That permission
[1135]was never granted and they were never passed.
[1137]It refers to pouching revolvers. And I don't
[1139]know whether there was a record that those were ever passed,
[1141]or even intended to be passed, to the dissidents. And it would
[1143]TOP SECRET
[1145]DoclId: 32203786 Page 14